{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_14970/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_14970","id":"gutenberg_14970","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/14970","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Classics of Literature","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Classical Antiquity","Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800","Philosophy -- Early works to 1800"],"text":"Produced by Ted Garvin, Keith Edkins and the PG Online Distributed\nProofreading Team\n\n\n\n\n\nTHE\n\nACADEMICA OF CICERO.\n\n_THE TEXT REVISED AND EXPLAINED_\n\nBY\n\nJAMES S. REID,\n\nM.L. CAMB. M.A. (LOND.)\nASSISTANT TUTOR AND LATE FELLOW, CHRIST'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE;\nASSISTANT EXAMINER IN CLASSICS TO THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON.\n\nLONDON:\nMACMILLAN AND CO.\n1874\n\n[_All Rights reserved_.]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nTO\nTHOSE OF HIS PUPILS\nWHO HAVE READ WITH HIM\n_THE ACADEMICA_,\nTHIS EDITION\nIS AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED\nBY\nTHE EDITOR.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nPREFACE.\n\nSince the work of Davies appeared in 1725, no English scholar has edited\nthe _Academica_. In Germany the last edition with explanatory notes is that\nof Goerenz, published in 1810. To the poverty and untrustworthiness of\nGoerenz's learning Madvig's pages bear strong evidence; while the work of\nDavies, though in every way far superior to that of Goerenz, is very\ndeficient when judged by the criticism of the present time.\n\nThis edition has grown out of a course of Intercollegiate lectures given by\nme at Christ's College several years ago. I trust that the work in its\npresent shape will be of use to undergraduate students of the Universities,\nand also to pupils and teachers alike in all schools where the\nphilosophical works of Cicero are studied, but especially in those where an\nattempt is made to impart such instruction in the Ancient Philosophy as\nwill prepare the way for the completer knowledge now required in the final\nClassical Examinations for Honours both at Oxford and Cambridge. My notes\nhave been written throughout with a practical reference to the needs of\njunior students. During the last three or four years I have read the\n_Academica_ with a large number of intelligent pupils, and there is\nscarcely a note of mine which has not been suggested by some difficulty or\nwant of theirs. My plan has been, first, to embody in an Introduction such\ninformation concerning Cicero's philosophical views and the literary\nhistory of the _Academica_ as could not be readily got from existing books;\nnext, to provide a good text; then to aid the student in obtaining a higher\nknowledge of Ciceronian Latinity, and lastly, to put it in his power to\nlearn thoroughly the philosophy with which Cicero deals.\n\nMy text may be said to be founded on that of Halm which appeared in the\nedition of Cicero's philosophical works published in 1861 under the\neditorship of Baiter and Halm as a continuation of Orelli's second edition\nof Cicero's works, which was interrupted by the death of that editor. I\nhave never however allowed one of Halm's readings to pass without carefully\nweighing the evidence he presents; and I have also studied all original\ncriticisms upon the text to which I could obtain access. The result is a\ntext which lies considerably nearer the MSS. than that of Halm. My\nobligations other than those to Halm are sufficiently acknowledged in my\nnotes; the chief are to Madvig's little book entitled _Emendationes ad\nCiceronis libros Philosophicos_, published in 1825 at Copenhagen, but\nnever, I believe, reprinted, and to Baiter's text in the edition of\nCicero's works by himself and Kayser. In a very few passages I have\nintroduced emendations of my own, and that only where the conjecttires of\nother Editors seemed to me to depart too widely from the MSS. If any\napology be needed for discussing, even sparingly, in the notes, questions\nof textual criticism, I may say that I have done so from a conviction that\nthe very excellence of the texts now in use is depriving a Classical\ntraining of a great deal of its old educational value. The judgment was\nbetter cultivated when the student had to fight his way through bad texts\nto the author's meaning and to a mastery of the Latin tongue. The\nacceptance of results without a knowledge of the processes by which they\nare obtained is worthless for the purposes of education, which is thus made\nto rest on memory alone. I have therefore done my best to place before the\nreader the arguments for and against different readings in the most\nimportant places where the text is doubtful.\n\nMy experience as a teacher and examiner has proved to me that the students\nfor whom this edition is intended have a far smaller acquaintance than they\nought to have with the peculiarities and niceties of language which the\nbest Latin writers display. I have striven to guide them to the best\nteaching of Madvig, on whose foundation every succeeding editor of Cicero\nmust build. His edition of the _De Finibus_ contains more valuable material\nfor illustrating, not merely the language, but also the subject-matter of\nthe _Academica_, than all the professed editions of the latter work in\nexistence. Yet, even after Madvig's labours, a great deal remains to be\ndone in pointing out what is, and what is not, Ciceronian Latin. I have\ntherefore added very many references from my own reading, and from other\nsources. Wherever a quotation would not have been given but for its\nappearance in some other work, I have pointed out the authority from whom\nit was taken. I need hardly say that I do not expect or intend readers to\nlook out all the references given. It was necessary to provide material by\nmeans of which the student might illustrate for himself a Latin usage, if\nit were new to him, and might solve any linguistic difficulty that\noccurred. Want of space has compelled me often to substitute a mere\nreference for an actual quotation.\n\nAs there is no important doctrine of Ancient Philosophy which is not\ntouched upon somewhere in the _Academica_, it is evidently impossible for\nan editor to give information which would be complete for a reader who is\nstudying that subject for the first time. I have therefore tried to enable\nreaders to find easily for themselves the information they require, and\nhave only dwelt in my own language upon such philosophical difficulties as\nwere in some special way bound up with the _Academica_. The two books\nchiefly referred to in my notes are the English translation of Zeller's\n_Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics_ (whenever Zeller is quoted without any\nfurther description this book is meant), and the _Historia Philosophiae_ of\nRitter and Preller. The _pages_, not the _sections_, of the fourth edition\nof this work are quoted. These books, with Madvig's _De Finibus_, all\nteachers ought to place in the hands of pupils who are studying a\nphilosophical work of Cicero. Students at the Universities ought to have\nconstantly at hand Diogenes Laertius, Stobaeus, and Sextus Empiricus, all\nof which have been published in cheap and convenient forms.\n\nAlthough this edition is primarily intended for junior students, it is\nhoped that it may not be without interest for maturer scholars, as bringing\ntogether much scattered information illustrative of the _Academica_, which\nwas before difficult of access. The present work will, I hope, prepare the\nway for an exhaustive edition either from my own or some more competent\nhand. It must be regarded as an experiment, for no English scholar of\nrecent times has treated any portion of Cicero's philosophical works with\nquite the purpose which I have kept in view and have explained above.\nShould this attempt meet with favour, I propose to edit after the same plan\nsome others of the less known and less edited portions of Cicero's\nwritings.\n\nIn dealing with a subject so unusually difficult and so rarely edited I\ncannot hope to have escaped errors, but after submitting my views to\nrepeated revision during four years, it seems better to publish them than\nto withhold from students help they so greatly need. Moreover, it is a\ngreat gain, even at the cost of some errors, to throw off that intellectual\ndisease of over-fastidiousness which is so prevalent in this University,\nand causes more than anything else the unproductiveness of English\nscholarship as compared with that of Germany,\n\nI have only to add that I shall be thankful for notices of errors and\nomissions from any who are interested in the subject.\n\nJAMES S. REID.\n\nCHRIST'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE, _December, 1873._\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nLIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS WORK.\n\nCic. = Cicero; Ac., Acad. = Academica; Ac., Acad. Post. = Academica\nPosteriora; D.F. = De Finibus; T.D. = Tusculan Disputations; N.D. = De\nNatura Deorum; De Div. = De Divinatione; Parad. = Paradoxa; Luc. =\nLucullus; Hortens. = Hortensius; De Off. = De Officiis; Tim. = Timaeus;\nCat. Mai. = Cato Maior; Lael. = Laelius; De Leg. = De Legibus; De Rep. = De\nRepublica; Somn. Scip. = Somnium Scipionis; De Or. = De Oratore; Orat. =\nOrator; De Inv. = De Inventione; Brut. = Brutus; Ad Att. = Ad Atticum; Ad\nFam. = Ad Familiares; Ad Qu. Frat. = Ad Quintum Fratrem; In Verr., Verr. =\nIn Verrem; Div. in. Qu. Caec. = Divinatio in Quintum Caecilium; In Cat. =\nIn Catilinam.\n\nPlat. = Plato: Rep. = Republic; Tim. = Timaeus; Apol. = Apologia Socratis;\nGorg. = Gorgias; Theaet. = Theaetetus.\n\nArist. = Aristotle; Nic. Eth. = Nicomachean Ethics; Mag. Mor. = Magna\nMoralia; De Gen. An. = De Generatione Animalium; De Gen. et Corr. = De\nGeneratione et Corruptione; Anal. Post. = Analytica Posteriora; Met. =\nMetaphysica; Phys. = Physica.\n\nPlut. = Plutarch; De Plac. Phil. = De Placitis Philosophorum; Sto. Rep. =\nDe Stoicis Repugnantiis.\n\nSext. = Sextus; Sext. Emp. = Sextus Empiricus; Adv. Math. or A.M. =\nAdversus Mathematicos; Pyrrh. Hypotyp. or Pyrrh. Hyp. or P.H. = Pyrrhone\u00f4n\nHypotypose\u00f4n Syntagmata.\n\nDiog. or Diog. Laert. = Diogenes Laertius.\n\nStob. = Stobaeus; Phys. = Physica; Eth. = Ethica.\n\nGalen; De Decr. Hipp. et Plat. = De Decretis Hippocratis et Platonis.\n\nEuseb. = Eusebius; Pr. Ev. = Praeparatio Evangelii.\n\nAug. or August. = Augustine; Contra Ac. or C. Ac. = Contra Academicos; De\nCiv. Dei = De Civitate Dei.\n\nQuintil. = Quintilian; Inst. Or. = Institutiones Oratoriae.\n\nSeneca; Ep. = Epistles; Consol. ad Helv. = Consolatio ad Helvidium.\n\nEpic. = Epicurus; Democr. = Democritus.\n\nMadv. = Madvig; M.D.F. = Madvig's edition of the De Finibus; Opusc. =\nOpuscula; Em. = Emendationes ad Ciceronis libros Philosophicos; Em. Liv. =\nEmendationes Livianae; Gram. = Grammar.\n\nBentl. = Bentley; Bait. = Baiter; Dav. = Davies; Ern. = Ernesti; Forc. =\nForcellini; Goer. = Goerenz; Herm. = Hermann; Lamb. = Lambinus; Man. or\nManut. = Manutius; Turn. = Turnebus; Wes. or Wesenb. = Wesenberg.\n\nCorss. = Corssen; Ausspr. = Aussprache, Vokalismus und Betonung.\n\nCurt. = Curtius; Grundz. = Grundz\u00fcge der Griechischen Etymologie.\n\nCorp. Inscr. = Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum.\n\nDict. Biogr. = Dictionary of Classical Biography.\n\nCf. = compare; conj. = 'conjecture' or 'conjectures'; conjug. =\nconjugation; constr. = construction; ed. = edition; edd. = editors; em. =\nemendation; ex. = example; exx. = examples; exc. = except; esp. =\nespecially; fragm. = fragment or fragments; Gr. and Gk. = Greek; Introd. =\nIntroduction; Lat. = Latin; n. = note; nn. = notes; om. = omit, omits, or\nomission; prep. = preposition; qu. = quotes or quoted by; subj. =\nsubjunctive.\n\nR. and P. = Ritter and Preller's Historia Philosophiae ex fontium locis\ncontexta.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nTHE ACADEMICA OF CICERO.\n\nINTRODUCTION.\n\nI. _Cicero as a Student of Philosophy and Man of\nLetters:_ 90--45 B.C.\n\nIt would seem that Cicero's love for literature was inherited from his\nfather, who, being of infirm health, lived constantly at Arpinum, and spent\nthe greater part of his time in study.[1] From him was probably derived\nthat strong love for the old Latin dramatic and epic poetry which his son\nthroughout his writings displays. He too, we may conjecture, led the young\nCicero to feel the importance of a study of philosophy to serve as a\ncorrective for the somewhat narrow rhetorical discipline of the time.[2]\n\nCicero's first systematic lessons in philosophy were given him by the\nEpicurean Phaedrus, then at Rome because of the unsettled state of Athens,\nwhose lectures he attended at a very early age, even before he had assumed\nthe toga virilis. The pupil seems to have been converted at once to the\ntenets of the master.[3] Phaedrus remained to the end of his life a friend\nof Cicero, who speaks warmly in praise of his teacher's amiable disposition\nand refined style. He is the only Epicurean, with, perhaps, the exception\nof Lucretius, whom the orator ever allows to possess any literary power.[4]\nCicero soon abandoned Epicureanism, but his schoolfellow, T. Pomponius\nAtticus, received more lasting impressions from the teaching of Phaedrus.\nIt was probably at this period of their lives that Atticus and his friend\nbecame acquainted with Patro, who succeeded Zeno of Sidon as head of the\nEpicurean school.[5]\n\nAt this time (i.e. before 88 B.C.) Cicero also heard the lectures of\nDiodotus the Stoic, with whom he studied chiefly, though not exclusively,\nthe art of dialectic.[6] This art, which Cicero deems so important to the\norator that he calls it \"abbreviated eloquence,\" was then the monopoly of\nthe Stoic school. For some time Cicero spent all his days with Diodotus in\nthe severest study, but he seems never to have been much attracted by the\ngeneral Stoic teaching. Still, the friendship between the two lasted till\nthe death of Diodotus, who, according to a fashion set by the Roman Stoic\ncircle of the time of Scipio and Laelius, became an inmate of Cicero's\nhouse, where he died in B.C. 59, leaving his pupil heir to a not\ninconsiderable property.[7] He seems to have been one of the most\naccomplished men of his time, and Cicero's feelings towards him were those\nof gratitude, esteem, and admiration.[8]\n\nIn the year 88 B.C. the celebrated Philo of Larissa, then head of the\nAcademic school, came to Rome, one of a number of eminent Greeks who fled\nfrom Athens on the approach of its siege during the Mithridatic war. Philo,\nlike Diodotus, was a man of versatile genius: unlike the Stoic philosopher,\nhe was a perfect master both of the theory and the practice of oratory.\nCicero had scarcely heard him before all inclination for Epicureanism was\nswept from his mind, and he surrendered himself wholly, as he tells us, to\nthe brilliant Academic.[9] Smitten with a marvellous enthusiasm he\nabandoned all other studies for philosophy. His zeal was quickened by the\nconviction that the old judicial system of Rome was overthrown for ever,\nand that the great career once open to an orator was now barred.[10]\n\nWe thus see that before Cicero was twenty years of age, he had been brought\ninto intimate connection with at least three of the most eminent\nphilosophers of the age, who represented the three most vigorous and\nimportant Greek schools. It is fair to conclude that he must have become\nthoroughly acquainted with their spirit, and with the main tenets of each.\nHis own statements, after every deduction necessitated by his egotism has\nbeen made, leave no doubt about his diligence as a student. In his later\nworks he often dwells on his youthful devotion to philosophy.[11] It would\nbe unwise to lay too much stress on the intimate connection which subsisted\nbetween the rhetorical and the ethical teaching of the Greeks; but there\ncan be little doubt that from the great rhetorician Molo, then Rhodian\nambassador at Rome, Cicero gained valuable information concerning the\nethical part of Greek philosophy.\n\nDuring the years 88--81 B.C., Cicero employed himself incessantly with the\nstudy of philosophy, law, rhetoric, and belles lettres. Many ambitious\nworks in the last two departments mentioned were written by him at this\nperiod. On Sulla's return to the city after his conquest of the Marian\nparty in Italy, judicial affairs once more took their regular course, and\nCicero appeared as a pleader in the courts, the one philosophic orator of\nRome, as he not unjustly boasts[12]. For two years he was busily engaged,\nand then suddenly left Rome for a tour in Eastern Hellas. It is usually\nsupposed that he came into collision with Sulla through the freedman\nChrysogonus, who was implicated in the case of Roscius. The silence of\nCicero is enough to condemn this theory, which rests on no better evidence\nthan that of Plutarch. Cicero himself, even when mentioning his speech in\ndefence of Roscius, never assigns any other cause for his departure than\nhis health, which was being undermined by his passionate style of\noratory[13].\n\nThe whole two years 79--77 B.C. were spent in the society of Greek\nphilosophers and rhetoricians. The first six months passed at Athens, and\nwere almost entirely devoted to philosophy, since, with the exception of\nDemetrius Syrus, there were no eminent rhetorical teachers at that time\nresident in the city[14]. By the advice of Philo himself[15], Cicero\nattended the lectures of that clear thinker and writer, as Diogenes calls\nhim[16], Zeno of Sidon, now the head of the Epicurean school. In Cicero's\nlater works there are several references to his teaching. He was biting and\nsarcastic in speech, and spiteful in spirit, hence in striking contrast to\nPatro and Phaedrus[17]. It is curious to find that Zeno is numbered by\nCicero among those pupils and admirers of Carneades whom he had known[18].\nPhaedrus was now at Athens, and along with Atticus who loved him beyond all\nother philosophers[19], Cicero spent much time in listening to his\ninstruction, which was eagerly discussed by the two pupils[20]. Patro was\nprobably in Athens at the same time, but this is nowhere explicitly stated.\nCicero must at this time have attained an almost complete familiarity with\nthe Epicurean doctrines.\n\nThere seem to have been no eminent representatives of the Stoic school then\nat Athens. Nor is any mention made of a Peripatetic teacher whose lectures\nCicero might have attended, though M. Pupius Piso, a professed Peripatetic,\nwas one of his companions in this sojourn at Athens[21]. Only three notable\nPeripatetics were at this time living. Of these Staseas of Naples, who\nlived some time in Piso's house, was not then at Athens[22]; it is\nprobable, however, from a mention of him in the De Oratore, that Cicero\nknew himm through Piso. Diodorus, the pupil of Critolaus, is frequently\nnamed by Cicero, but never as an acquaintance. Cratippus was at this time\nunknown to him.\n\nThe philosopher from whose lessons Cicero certainly learned most at this\nperiod was Antiochus of Ascalon, now the representative of a Stoicised\nAcademic school. Of this teacher, however, I shall have to treat later,\nwhen I shall attempt to estimate the influence he exercised over our\nauthor. It is sufficient here to say that on the main point which was in\ncontroversy between Philo and Antiochus, Cicero still continued to think\nwith his earlier teacher. His later works, however, make it evident that he\nset a high value on the abilities and the learning of Antiochus, especially\nin dialectic, which was taught after Stoic principles. Cicero speaks of him\nas eminent among the philosophers of the time, both for talent and\nacquirement [23]; as a man of acute intellect[24]; as possessed of a\npointed style[25]; in fine, as the most cultivated and keenest of the\nphilosophers of the age[26]. A considerable friendship sprang up between\nAntiochus and Cicero[27], which was strengthened by the fact that many\nfriends of the latter, such as Piso, Varro, Lucullus and Brutus, more or\nless adhered to the views of Antiochus. It is improbable that Cicero at\nthis time became acquainted with Aristus the brother of Antiochus, since in\nthe Academica[28] he is mentioned in such a way as to show that he was\nunknown to Cicero in B.C. 62.\n\nThe main purpose of Cicero while at Athens had been to learn philosophy; in\nAsia and at Rhodes he devoted himself chiefly to rhetoric, under the\nguidance of the most noted Greek teachers, chief of whom, was his old\nfriend Molo, the coryphaeus of the Rhodian school[29]. Cicero, however,\nformed while at Rhodes one friendship which largely influenced his views of\nphilosophy, that with Posidonius the pupil of Panaetius, the most famous\nStoic of the age. To him Cicero makes reference in his works oftener than\nto any other instructor. He speaks of him as the greatest of the\nStoics[30]; as a most notable philosopher, to visit whom Pompey, in the\nmidst of his eastern campaigns, put himself to much trouble[31]; as a\nminute inquirer[32]. He is scarcely ever mentioned without some expression\nof affection, and Cicero tells us that he read his works more than those of\nany other author[33]. Posidonius was at a later time resident at Rome, and\nstayed in Cicero's house. Hecato the Rhodian, another pupil of Panaetius,\nmay have been at Rhodes at this time. Mnesarchus and Dardanus, also hearers\nof Panaetius, belonged to an earlier time, and although Cicero was well\nacquainted with the works of the former, he does not seem to have known\neither personally.\n\nFrom the year 77 to the year 68 B.C., when the series of letters begins,\nCicero was doubtless too busily engaged with legal and political affairs to\nspend much time in systematic study. That his oratory owed much to\nphilosophy from the first he repeatedly insists; and we know from his\nletters that it was his later practice to refresh his style by much study\nof the Greek writers, and especially the philosophers. During the period\nthen, about which we have little or no information, we may believe that he\nkept up his old knowledge by converse with his many Roman friends who had a\nbent towards philosophy, as well as with the Greeks who from time to time\ncame to Rome and frequented the houses of the Optimates; to this he added\nsuch reading as his leisure would allow. The letters contained in the first\nbook of those addressed to Atticus, which range over the years 68--62 B.C.,\nafford many proofs of the abiding strength of his passion for literary\nemployment. In the earlier part of this time we find him entreating Atticus\nto let him have a library which was then for sale; expressing at the same\ntime in the strongest language his loathing for public affairs, and his\nlove for books, to which he looks as the support of his old age[34]. In the\nmidst of his busiest political occupations, when he was working his hardest\nfor the consulship, his heart was given to the adornment of his Tusculan\nvilla in a way suited to his literary and philosophic tastes. This may be\ntaken as a specimen of his spirit throughout his life. He was before all\nthings a man of letters; compared with literature, politics and oratory\nheld quite a secondary place in his affections. Public business employed\nhis intellect, but never his heart.\n\nThe year 62 released him from the consulship and enabled him to indulge his\nliterary tastes. To this year belong the publication of his speeches, which\nwere crowded, he says, with the maxims of philosophy[35]; the history of\nhis consulship, in Latin and Greek, the Greek version which he sent to\nPosidonius being modelled on Isocrates and Aristotle; and the poem on his\nconsulship, of which some fragments remain. A year or two later we find him\nreading with enthusiasm the works of Dicaearchus, and keeping up his\nacquaintance with living Greek philosophers[36]. His long lack of leisure\nseems to have caused an almost unquenchable thirst for reading at this\ntime. His friend Paetus had inherited a valuable library, which he\npresented to Cicero. It was in Greece at the time, and Cicero thus writes\nto Atticus: \"If you love me and feel sure of my love for you, use all the\nendeavours of your friends, clients, acquaintances, freedmen, and even\nslaves to prevent a single leaf from being lost.... Every day I find\ngreater satisfaction in study, so far as my forensic labours permit[37].\"\nAt this period of his life Cicero spent much time in study at his estates\nnear Tusculum, Antium, Formiae, and elsewhere. I dwell with greater\nemphasis on these facts, because of the idea now spread abroad that Cicero\nwas a mere dabbler in literature, and that his works were extempore\nparaphrases of Greek books half understood. In truth, his appetite for\nevery kind of literature was insatiable, and his attainments in each\ndepartment considerable. He was certainly the most learned Roman of his\nage, with the single exception of Varro. One of his letters to Atticus[38]\nwill give a fair picture of his life at this time. He especially studied\nthe political writings of the Greeks, such as Theophrastus and\nDicaearchus[39]. He also wrote historical memoirs after the fashion, of\nTheopompus[40].\n\nThe years from 59--57 B.C. were years in which Cicero's private cares\noverwhelmed all thought of other occupation. Soon after his return from\nexile, in the year 56, he describes himself as \"devouring literature\" with\na marvellous man named Dionysius[41], and laughingly pronouncing that\nnothing is sweeter than universal knowledge. He spent great part of the\nyear 55 at Cumae or Naples \"feeding upon\" the library of Faustus Sulla, the\nson of the Dictator[42]. Literature formed then, he tells us, his solace\nand support, and he would rather sit in a garden seat which Atticus had,\nbeneath a bust of Aristotle, than in the ivory chair of office. Towards the\nend of the year, he was busily engaged on the _De Oratore_, a work which\nclearly proves his continued familiarity with Greek philosophy[43]. In the\nfollowing year (54) he writes that politics must cease for him, and that he\ntherefore returns unreservedly to the life most in accordance with nature,\nthat of the student[44]. During this year he was again for the most part at\nthose of his country villas where his best collections of books were. At\nthis time was written the _De Republica_, a work to which I may appeal for\nevidence that his old philosophical studies had by no means been allowed to\ndrop[45]. Aristotle is especially mentioned as one of the authors read at\nthis time[46]. In the year 52 B.C. came the _De Legibus_, written amid many\ndistracting occupations; a work professedly modelled on Plato and the older\nphilosophers of the Socratic schools.\n\nIn the year 51 Cicero, then on his way to Cilicia, revisited Athens, much\nto his own pleasure and that of the Athenians. He stayed in the house of\nAristus, the brother of Antiochus and teacher of Brutus. His acquaintance\nwith this philosopher was lasting, if we may judge from the affectionate\nmention in the _Brutus_[47]. Cicero also speaks in kindly terms of Xeno, an\nEpicurean friend of Atticus, who was then with Patro at Athens. It was at\nthis time that Cicero interfered to prevent Memmius, the pupil of the great\nRoman Epicurean Lucretius, from destroying the house in which Epicurus had\nlived[48]. Cicero seems to have been somewhat disappointed with the state\nof philosophy at Athens, Aristus being the only man of merit then resident\nthere[49]. On the journey from Athens to his province, he made the\nacquaintance of Cratippus, who afterwards taught at Athens as head of the\nPeripatetic school[50]. At this time he was resident at Mitylene, where\nCicero seems to have passed some time in his society[51]. He was by far the\ngreatest, Cicero said, of all the Peripatetics he had himself heard, and\nindeed equal in merit to the most eminent of that school[52].\n\nThe care of that disordered province Cilicia enough to employ Cicero's\nthoughts till the end of 50. Yet he yearned for Athens and philosophy. He\nwished to leave some memorial of himself at the beautiful city, and\nanxiously asked Atticus whether it would look foolish to build a [Greek:\npropylon] at the Academia, as Appius, his predecessor, had done at\nEleusis[53]. It seems the Athenians of the time were in the habit of\nadapting their ancient statues to suit the noble Romans of the day, and of\nplacing on them fulsome inscriptions. Of this practice Cicero speaks with\nloathing. In one letter of this date he carefully discusses the errors\nAtticus had pointed out in the books _De Republica_[54]. His wishes with\nregard to Athens still kept their hold upon his mind, and on his way home\nfrom Cilicia he spoke of conferring on the city some signal favour[55].\nCicero was anxious to show Rhodes, with its school of eloquence, to the two\nboys Marcus and Quintus, who accompanied him, and they probably touched\nthere for a few days[56]. From thence they went to Athens, where Cicero\nagain stayed with Aristus[57], and renewed his friendship with other\nphilosophers, among them Xeno the friend of Atticus[58].\n\nOn Cicero's return to Italy public affairs were in a very critical\ncondition, and left little room for thoughts about literature. The letters\nwhich belong to this time are very pathetic. Cicero several times contrasts\nthe statesmen of the time with the Scipio he had himself drawn in the _De\nRepublica_[59]; when he thinks of Caesar, Plato's description of the tyrant\nis present to his mind[60]; when, he deliberates about the course he is\nhimself to take, he naturally recals the example of Socrates, who refused\nto leave Athens amid the misrule of the thirty tyrants[61]. It is curious\nto find Cicero, in the very midst of civil war, poring over the book of\nDemetrius the Magnesian concerning concord[62]; or employing his days in\narguing with himself a string of abstract philosophical propositions about\ntyranny[63]. Nothing could more clearly show that he was really a man of\nbooks; by nothing but accident a politician. In these evil days, however,\nnothing was long to his taste; books, letters, study, all in their turn\nbecame unpleasant[64].\n\nAs soon as Cicero had become fully reconciled to Caesar in the year 46 he\nreturned with desperate energy to his old literary pursuits. In a letter\nwritten to Varro in that year[65], he says \"I assure you I had no sooner\nreturned to Rome than I renewed my intimacy with my old friends, my books.\"\nThese gave him real comfort, and his studies seemed to bear richer fruit\nthan in his days of prosperity[66]. The tenor of all his letters at this\ntime is the same: see especially the remaining letters to Varro and also to\nSulpicius[67]. The _Partitiones Oratoriae_, the _Paradoxa_, the _Orator_,\nand the _Laudatio Catonis_, to which Caesar replied by his _Anticato_, were\nall finished within the year. Before the end of the year the _Hortensius_\nand the _De Finibus_ had probably both been planned and commenced. Early in\nthe following year the _Academica_, the history of which I shall trace\nelsewhere, was written.\n\nI have now finished the first portion of my task; I have shown Cicero as\nthe man of letters and the student of philosophy during that portion of his\nlife which preceded the writing of the _Academica_. Even the evidence I\nhave produced, which does not include such indirect indications of\nphilosophical study as might be obtained from the actual philosophical\nworks of Cicero, is sufficient to justify his boast that at no time had he\nbeen divorced from philosophy[68]. He was entitled to repel the charge made\nby some people on the publication of his first book of the later\nperiod--the _Hortensius_--that he was a mere tiro in philosophy, by the\nassertion that on the contrary nothing had more occupied his thoughts\nthroughout the whole of a wonderfully energetic life[69]. Did the scope of\nthis edition allow it, I should have little difficulty in showing from a\nminute survey of his works, and a comparison of them with ancient\nauthorities, that his knowledge of Greek philosophy was nearly as accurate\nas it was extensive. So far as the _Academica_ is concerned, I have had in\nmy notes an opportunity of defending Cicero's substantial accuracy; of the\nsuccess of the defence I must leave the reader to judge. During the\nprogress of this work I shall have to expose the groundlessness of many\nfeelings and judgments now current which have contributed to produce a low\nestimate of Cicero's philosophical attainments, but there is one piece of\nunfairness which I shall have no better opportunity of mentioning than the\npresent. It is this. Cicero, the philosopher, is made to suffer for the\nshortcomings of Cicero the politician. Scholars who have learned to despise\nhis political weakness, vanity, and irresolution, make haste to depreciate\nhis achievements in philosophy, without troubling themselves to inquire too\nclosely into their intrinsic value. I am sorry to be obliged to instance\nthe illustrious Mommsen, who speaks of the _De Legibus_ as \"an oasis in the\ndesert of this dreary and voluminous writer.\" From political partizanship,\nand prejudices based on facts irrelevant to the matter in hand, I beg all\nstudents to free themselves in reading the _Academica_.\n\nII. _The Philosophical Opinions of Cicero_.\n\nIn order to define with clearness the position of Cicero as a student of\nphilosophy, it would be indispensable to enter into a detailed historical\nexamination of the later Greek schools--the Stoic, Peripatetic, Epicurean\nand new Academic. These it would be necessary to know, not merely as they\ncame from the hands of their founders, but as they existed in Cicero's age;\nStoicism not as Zeno understood it, but as Posidonius and the other pupils\nof Panaetius propounded it; not merely the Epicureanism of Epicurus, but\nthat of Zeno, Phaedrus, Patro, and Xeno; the doctrines taught in the Lyceum\nby Cratippus; the new Academicism of Philo as well as that of Arcesilas and\nCarneades; the medley of Academicism, Peripateticism, and Stoicism put\nforward by Antiochus in the name of the Old Academy. A systematic attempt\nto distinguish between the earlier and later forms of doctrine held by\nthese schools is still a great desideratum. Cicero's statements concerning\nany particular school are generally tested by comparing them with the\nassertions made by ancient authorities about the earlier representatives of\nthe school. Should any discrepancy appear, it is at once concluded that\nCicero is in gross error, whereas, in all probability, he is uttering\nopinions which would have been recognised as genuine by those who were at\nthe head of the school in his day. The criticism of Madvig even is not free\nfrom this error, as will be seen from my notes on several passages of the\n_Academica_[70]. As my space forbids me to attempt the thorough inquiry I\nhave indicated as desirable, I can but describe in rough outline the\nrelation in which Cicero stands to the chief schools.\n\nThe two main tasks of the later Greek philosophy were, as Cicero often\ninsists, the establishment of a criterion such as would suffice to\ndistinguish the true from the false, and the determination of an ethical\nstandard[71]. We have in the _Academica_ Cicero's view of the first\nproblem: that the attainment of any infallible criterion was impossible. To\ngo more into detail here would be to anticipate the text of the _Lucullus_\nas well as my notes. Without further refinements, I may say that Cicero in\nthis respect was in substantial agreement with the New Academic school, and\nin opposition to all other schools. As he himself says, the doctrine that\nabsolute knowledge is impossible was the one Academic tenet against which\nall the other schools were combined[72]. In that which was most\ndistinctively New Academic, Cicero followed the New Academy.\n\nIt is easy to see what there was in such a tenet to attract Cicero. Nothing\nwas more repulsive to his mind than dogmatism. As an orator, he was\naccustomed to hear arguments put forward with equal persuasiveness on both\nsides of a case. It seemed to him arrogant to make any proposition with a\nconviction of its absolute, indestructible and irrefragable truth. One\nrequisite of a philosophy with him was that it should avoid this\narrogance[73]. Philosophers of the highest respectability had held the most\nopposite opinions on the same subjects. To withhold absolute assent from\nall doctrines, while giving a qualified assent to those which seemed most\nprobable, was the only prudent course[74]. Cicero's temperament also, apart\nfrom his experience as an orator, inclined him to charity and toleration,\nand repelled him from the fury of dogmatism. He repeatedly insists that the\ndiversities of opinion which the most famous intellects display, ought to\nlead men to teach one another with all gentleness and meekness[75]. In\npositiveness of assertion there seemed to be something reckless and\ndisgraceful, unworthy of a self-controlled character[76]. Here we have a\ntouch of feeling thoroughly Roman. Cicero further urges arguments similar\nto some put forward by a long series of English thinkers from Milton to\nMill, to show that the free conflict of opinion is necessary to the\nprogress of philosophy, which was by that very freedom brought rapidly to\nmaturity in Greece[77]. Wherever authority has loudly raised its voice,\nsays Cicero, there philosophy has pined. Pythagoras[78] is quoted as a\nwarning example, and the baneful effects of authority are often\ndepicted[79]. The true philosophic spirit requires us to find out what can\nbe said for every view. It is a positive duty to discuss all aspects of\nevery question, after the example of the Old Academy and Aristotle[80].\nThose who demand a dogmatic statement of belief are mere busybodies[81].\nThe Academics glory in their freedom of judgment. They are not compelled to\ndefend an opinion whether they will or no, merely because one of their\npredecessors has laid it down[82]. So far does Cicero carry this freedom,\nthat in the fifth book of the _Tusculan Disputations_, he maintains a view\nentirely at variance with the whole of the fourth book of the _De Finibus_,\nand when the discrepancy is pointed out, refuses to be bound by his former\nstatements, on the score that he is an Academic and a freeman[83]. \"Modo\nhoc, modo illud probabilius videtur[84].\" The Academic sips the best of\nevery school[85]. He roams in the wide field of philosophy, while the Stoic\ndares not stir a foot's breadth away from Chrysippus[86]. The Academic is\nonly anxious that people should combat his opinions; for he makes it his\nsole aim, with Socrates, to rid himself and others of the mists of\nerror[87]. This spirit is even found in Lucullus the Antiochean[88]. While\nprofessing, however, this philosophic bohemianism, Cicero indignantly\nrepels the charge that the Academy, though claiming to seek for the truth,\nhas no truth to follow[89]. The probable is for it the true.\n\nAnother consideration which attracted Cicero to these tenets was their\nevident adaptability to the purposes of oratory, and the fact that\neloquence was, as he puts it, the child of the Academy[90]. Orators,\npoliticians, and stylists had ever found their best nourishment in the\nteaching of the Academic and Peripatetic masters[91]. The Stoics and\nEpicureans cared nothing for power of expression. Again, the Academic\ntenets were those with which the common sense of the world could have most\nsympathy[92]. The Academy also was the school which had the most\nrespectable pedigree. Compared with its system, all other philosophies were\nplebeian[93]. The philosopher who best preserved the Socratic tradition was\nmost estimable, _ceteris paribus_, and that man was Carneades[94].\n\nIn looking at the second great problem, that of the ethical standard, we\nmust never forget that it was considered by nearly all the later\nphilosophers as of overwhelming importance compared with the first.\nPhilosophy was emphatically defined as the art of conduct (_ars vivendi_).\nAll speculative and non-ethical doctrines were merely estimable as\nsupplying a basis on which this practical art could be reared. This is\nequally true of the Pyrrhonian scepticism and of the dogmatism of Zeno and\nEpicurus. Their logical and physical doctrines were mere outworks or\nramparts within which the ordinary life of the school was carried on. These\nwere useful chiefly in case of attack by the enemy; in time of peace ethics\nheld the supremacy. In this fact we shall find a key to unlock many\ndifficulties in Cicero's philosophical writings. I may instance one passage\nin the beginning of the _Academica Posteriora_[95], which has given much\ntrouble to editors. Cicero is there charged by Varro with having deserted\nthe Old Academy for the New, and admits the charge. How is this to be\nreconciled with his own oft-repeated statements that he never recanted the\ndoctrines Philo had taught him? Simply thus. Arcesilas, Carneades, and\nPhilo had been too busy with their polemic against Zeno and his followers,\nmaintained on logical grounds, to deal much with ethics. On the other hand,\nin the works which Cicero had written and published before the _Academica_,\nwherever he had touched philosophy, it had been on its ethical side. The\nworks themselves, moreover, were direct imitations of early Academic and\nPeripatetic writers, who, in the rough popular view which regarded ethics\nmainly or solely, really composed a single school, denoted by the phrase\n\"Vetus Academia.\" General readers, therefore, who considered ethical\nresemblance as of far greater moment than dialectical difference, would\nnaturally look upon Cicero as a supporter of their \"Vetus Academia,\" so\nlong as he kept clear of dialectic; when he brought dialectic to the front,\nand pronounced boldly for Carneades, they would naturally regard him as a\ndeserter from the Old Academy to the New. This view is confirmed by the\nfact that for many years before Cicero wrote, the Academic dialectic had\nfound no eminent expositor. So much was this the case, that when Cicero\nwrote the _Academica_ he was charged with constituting himself the champion\nof an exploded and discredited school[96].\n\nCicero's ethics, then, stand quite apart from his dialectic. In the sphere\nof morals he felt the danger of the principle of doubt. Even in the _De\nLegibus_ when the dialogue turns on a moral question, he begs the New\nAcademy, which has introduced confusion into these subjects, to be\nsilent[97]. Again, Antiochus, who in the dialectical dialogue is rejected,\nis in the _De Legibus_ spoken of with considerable favour[98]. All ethical\nsystems which seemed to afford stability to moral principles had an\nattraction for Cicero. He was fascinated by the Stoics almost beyond the\npower of resistance. In respect of their ethical and religious ideas he\ncalls them \"great and famous philosophers[99],\" and he frequently speaks\nwith something like shame of the treatment they had received at the hands\nof Arcesilas and Carneades. Once he gives expression to a fear lest they\nshould be the only true philosophers after all[100]. There was a kind of\nmagnificence about the Stoic utterances on morality, more suited to a\nsuperhuman than a human world, which allured Cicero more than the\nbarrenness of the Stoic dialectic repelled him[101]. On moral questions,\ntherefore, we often find him going farther in the direction of Stoicism\nthan even his teacher Antiochus. One great question which divided the\nphilosophers of the time was, whether happiness was capable of degrees. The\nStoics maintained that it was not, and in a remarkable passage Cicero\nagrees with them, explicitly rejecting the position of Antiochus, that a\nlife enriched by virtue, but unattended by other advantages, might be\nhappy, but could not be the happiest possible[102]. He begs the Academic\nand Peripatetic schools to cease from giving an uncertain sound (balbutire)\nand to allow that the happiness of the wise man would remain unimpaired\neven if he were thrust into the bull of Phalaris[103]. In another place he\nadmits the purely Stoic doctrine that virtue is one and indivisible[104].\nThese opinions, however, he will not allow to be distinctively Stoic, but\nappeals to Socrates as his authority for them[105]. Zeno, who is merely an\nignoble craftsman of words, stole them from the Old Academy. This is\nCicero's general feeling with regard to Zeno, and there can be no doubt\nthat he caught it from Antiochus who, in stealing the doctrines of Zeno,\never stoutly maintained that Zeno had stolen them before. Cicero, however,\nregarded chiefly the ethics of Zeno with this feeling, while Antiochus so\nregarded chiefly the dialectic. It is just in this that the difference\nbetween Antiochus and Cicero lies. To the former Zeno's dialectic was true\nand Socratic, while the latter treated it as un-Socratic, looking upon\nSocrates as the apostle of doubt[106]. On the whole Cicero was more in\naccord with Stoic ethics than Antiochus. Not in all points, however: for\nwhile Antiochus accepted without reserve the Stoic paradoxes, Cicero\nhesitatingly followed them, although he conceded that they were\nSocratic[107]. Again, Antiochus subscribed to the Stoic theory that all\nemotion was sinful; Cicero, who was very human in his joys and sorrows,\nrefused it with horror[108]. It must be admitted that on some points Cicero\nwas inconsistent. In the _De Finibus_ he argued that the difference between\nthe Peripatetic and Stoic ethics was merely one of terms; in the _Tusculan\nDisputations_ he held it to be real. The most Stoic in tone of all his\nworks are the _Tusculan Disputations_ and the _De Officiis_.\n\nWith regard to physics, I may remark at the outset that a comparatively\nsmall importance was in Cicero's time attached to this branch of\nphilosophy. Its chief importance lay in the fact that ancient theology was,\nas all natural theology must be, an appendage of physical science. The\nreligious element in Cicero's nature inclined him very strongly to\nsympathize with the Stoic views about the grand universal operation of\ndivine power. Piety, sanctity, and moral good, were impossible in any form,\nhe thought, if the divine government of the universe were denied[109]. It\nwent to Cicero's heart that Carneades should have found it necessary to\noppose the beautiful Stoic theology, and he defends the great sceptic by\nthe plea that his one aim was to arouse men to the investigation of the\ntruth[110]. At the same time, while really following the Stoics in physics,\nCicero often believed himself to be following Aristotle. This partly arose\nfrom the actual adoption by the late Peripatetics of many Stoic doctrines,\nwhich they gave out as Aristotelian. The discrepancy between the spurious\nand the genuine Aristotelian views passed undetected, owing to the strange\noblivion into which the most important works of Aristotle had fallen[111].\nStill, Cicero contrives to correct many of the extravagances of the Stoic\nphysics by a study of Aristotle and Plato. For a thorough understanding of\nhis notions about physics, the _Timaeus_ of Plato, which he knew well and\ntranslated, is especially important. It must not be forgotten, also, that\nthe Stoic physics were in the main Aristotelian, and that Cicero was well\naware of the fact.\n\nVery few words are necessary in order to characterize Cicero's estimate of\nthe Peripatetic and Epicurean schools. The former was not very powerfully\nrepresented during his lifetime. The philosophical descendants of the\nauthor of the _Organon_ were notorious for their ignorance of logic[112],\nand in ethics had approximated considerably to the Stoic teaching. While\nnot much influenced by the school, Cicero generally treats it tenderly for\nthe sake of its great past, deeming it a worthy branch of the true Socratic\nfamily. With the Epicureans the case was different. In physics they stood\nabsolutely alone, their system was grossly unintellectual, and they\ndiscarded mathematics. Their ethical doctrines excited in Cicero nothing\nbut loathing, dialectic they did not use, and they crowned all their errors\nby a sin which the orator could never pardon, for they were completely\nindifferent to every adornment and beauty of language.\n\nIII. _The aim of Cicero in writing his philosophical works_.\n\nIt is usual to charge Cicero with a want of originality as a philosopher,\nand on that score to depreciate his works. The charge is true, but still\nabsurd, for it rests on a misconception, not merely of Cicero's purpose in\nwriting, but of the whole spirit of the later Greek speculation. The\nconclusion drawn from the charge is also quite unwarranted. If the later\nphilosophy of the Greeks is of any value, Cicero's works are of equal\nvalue, for it is only from them that we get any full or clear view of it.\nAny one who attempts to reconcile the contradictions of Stobaeus, Diogenes\nLaertius, Sextus Empiricus, Plutarch and other authorities, will perhaps\nfeel little inclination to cry out against the confusion of Ciceros ideas.\nSuch outcry, now so common, is due largely to the want, which I have\nalready noticed, of any clear exposition of the variations in doctrine\nwhich the late Greek schools exhibited during the last two centuries before\nthe Christian era. But to return to the charge of want of originality. This\nis a virtue which Cicero never claims. There is scarcely one of his works\n(if we except the third book of the _De Officiis_), which he does not\nfreely confess to be taken wholly from Greek sources. Indeed at the time\nwhen he wrote, originality would have been looked upon as a fault rather\nthan an excellence. For two centuries, if we omit Carneades, no one had\npropounded anything substantially novel in philosophy: there had been\nsimply one eclectic combination after another of pre-existing tenets. It\nwould be hasty to conclude that the writers of these two centuries are\ntherefore undeserving of our study, for the spirit, if not the substance of\nthe doctrines had undergone a momentous change, which ultimately exercised\nno unimportant influence on society and on the Christian religion itself.\n\nWhen Cicero began to write, the Latin language may be said to have been\ndestitute of a philosophical literature. Philosophy was a sealed study to\nthose who did not know Greek. It was his aim, by putting the best Greek\nspeculation into the most elegant Latin form, to extend the education of\nhis countrymen, and to enrich their literature. He wished at the same time\nto strike a blow at the ascendency of Epicureanism throughout Italy. The\ndoctrines of Epicurus had alone appeared in Latin in a shape suited to\ncatch the popular taste. There seems to have been a very large Epicurean\nliterature in Latin, of which all but a few scanty traces is now lost. C.\nAmafinius, mentioned in the _Academica_[113], was the first to write, and\nhis books seem to have had an enormous circulation[114]. He had a large\nnumber of imitators, who obtained such a favourable reception, that, in\nCicero's strong language, they took possession of the whole of Italy[115].\nRabirius and Catius the Insubrian, possibly the epicure and friend of\nHorace, were two of the most noted of these writers. Cicero assigns various\nreasons for their extreme popularity: the easy nature of the Epicurean\nphysics, the fact that there was no other philosophy for Latin readers, and\nthe voluptuous blandishments of pleasure. This last cause, as indeed he in\none passage seems to allow, must have been of little real importance. It is\nexceedingly remarkable that the whole of the Roman Epicurean literature\ndealt in an overwhelmingly greater degree with the physics than with the\nethics of Epicurus. The explanation is to be found in the fact that the\nItalian races had as yet a strong practical basis for morality in the legal\nand social constitution of the family, and did not much feel the need of\nany speculative system; while the general decay among the educated classes\nof a belief in the supernatural, accompanied as it was by an increase of\nsuperstition among the masses, prepared the way for the acceptance of a\npurely mechanical explanation of the universe. But of this subject,\ninteresting and important as it is in itself, and neglected though it has\nbeen, I can treat no farther.\n\nThese Roman Epicureans are continually reproached by Cicero for their\nuncouth style of writing[116]. He indeed confesses that he had not read\nthem, but his estimate of them was probably correct. A curious question\narises, which I cannot here discuss, as to the reasons Cicero had for\nomitting all mention of Lucretius when speaking of these Roman Epicureans.\nThe most probable elucidation is, that he found it impossible to include\nthe great poet in his sweeping condemnation, and being unwilling to allow\nthat anything good could come from the school of Epicurus, preferred to\nkeep silence, which nothing compelled him to break, since Lucretius was an\nobscure man and only slowly won his way to favour with the public.\n\nIn addition to his desire to undermine Epicureanism in Italy, Cicero had a\npatriotic wish to remove from the literature of his country the reproach\nthat it was completely destitute where Greek was richest. He often tries by\nthe most far-fetched arguments to show that philosophy had left its mark on\nthe early Italian peoples[117]. To those who objected that philosophy was\nbest left to the Greek language, he replies with indignation, accusing them\nof being untrue to their country[118]. It would be a glorious thing, he\nthinks, if Romans were no longer absolutely compelled to resort to\nGreeks[119]. He will not even concede that the Greek is a richer tongue\nthan the Latin[120]. As for the alleged incapacity of the Roman intellect\nto deal with philosophical enquiries, he will not hear of it. It is only,\nhe says, because the energy of the nation has been diverted into other\nchannels that so little progress has been made. The history of Roman\noratory is referred to in support of this opinion[121]. If only an impulse\nwere given at Rome to the pursuit of philosophy, already on the wane in\nGreece, Cicero thought it would flourish and take the place of oratory,\nwhich he believed to be expiring amid the din of civil war[122].\n\nThere can be no doubt that Cicero was penetrated by the belief that he\ncould thus do his country a real service. In his enforced political\ninaction, and amid the disorganisation of the law-courts, it was the one\nservice he could render[123]. He is within his right when he claims praise\nfor not abandoning himself to idleness or worse, as did so many of the most\nprominent men of the time[124]. For Cicero idleness was misery, and in\nthose evil times he was spurred on to exertion by the deepest sorrow[125].\nPhilosophy took the place of forensic oratory, public harangues, and\npolitics[126]. It is strange to find Cicero making such elaborate apologies\nas he does for devoting himself to philosophy, and a careless reader might\nset them down to egotism. But it must never be forgotten that at Rome such\nstudies were merely the amusement of the wealthy; the total devotion of a\nlife to them seemed well enough for Greeks, but for Romans unmanly,\nunpractical and unstatesmanlike[127]. There were plenty of Romans who were\nready to condemn such pursuits altogether, and to regard any fresh\nimportation from Greece much in the spirit with which things French were\nreceived by English patriots immediately after the great war. Others, like\nthe Neoptolemus of Ennius, thought a little learning in philosophy was\ngood, but a great deal was a dangerous thing[128]. Some few preferred that\nCicero should write on other subjects[129]. To these he replies by urging\nthe pressing necessity there was for works on philosophy in Latin.\n\nStill, amid much depreciation, sufficient interest and sympathy were roused\nby his first philosophical works to encourage Cicero to proceed. The elder\ngeneration, for whose approbation he most cared, praised the books, and\nmany were incited both to read and to write philosophy[130]. Cicero now\nextended his design, which seems to have been at first indefinite, so as to\nbring within its scope every topic which Greek philosophers were accustomed\nto treat[131]. Individual questions in philosophy could not be thoroughly\nunderstood till the whole subject had been mastered[132]. This design then,\nwhich is not explicitly stated in the two earliest works which we possess,\nthe _Academica_ and the _De Finibus_, required the composition of a sort of\nphilosophical encyclopaedia. Cicero never claimed to be more than an\ninterpreter of Greek philosophy to the Romans. He never pretended to\npresent new views of philosophy, or even original criticisms on its\nhistory. The only thing he proclaims to be his own is his style. Looked at\nin this, the true light, his work cannot be judged a failure. Those who\ncontrive to pronounce this judgment must either insist upon trying the work\nby a standard to which it does not appeal, or fail to understand the Greek\nphilosophy it copies, or perhaps make Cicero suffer for the supposed\nworthlessness of the philosophy of his age.\n\nIn accordance with Greek precedent, Cicero claims to have his oratorical\nand political writings, all or nearly all published before the\n_Hortensius_, included in his philosophical encyclopaedia[133]. The only\ntwo works strictly philosophical, even in the ancient view, which preceded\nthe _Academica_, were the _De Consolatione_, founded on Crantor's book,\n[Greek: peri penthous], and the _Hortensius_, which was introductory to\nphilosophy, or, as it was then called, protreptic.\n\nFor a list of the philosophical works of Cicero, and the dates of their\ncomposition, the student must be referred to the _Dict. of Biography_, Art.\nCicero.\n\nIV. _History of the Academica_.\n\nOn the death of Tullia, which happened at Tusculum in February, 45 B.C.,\nCicero took refuge in the solitude of his villa at Astura, which was\npleasantly situated on the Latin coast between Antium and Circeii[134].\nHere he sought to soften his deep grief by incessant toil. First the book\n_De Consolatione_ was written. He found the mechanic exercise of\ncomposition the best solace for his pain, and wrote for whole days\ntogether[135]. At other times he would plunge at early morning into the\ndense woods near his villa, and remain there absorbed in study till\nnightfall[136]. Often exertion failed to bring relief; yet he repelled the\nentreaties of Atticus that he would return to the forum and the senate. A\ngrief, which books and solitude could scarcely enable him to endure, would\ncrush him, he felt, in the busy city[137].\n\nIt was amid such surroundings that the _Academica_ was written. The first\ntrace of an intention to write the treatise is found in a letter of Cicero\nto Atticus, which seems to belong to the first few weeks of his\nbereavement[138]. It was his wont to depend on Atticus very much for\nhistorical and biographical details, and in the letter in question he asks\nfor just the kind of information which would be needed in writing the\n_Academica_. The words with which he introduces his request imply that he\nhad determined on some new work to which our _Academica_ would\ncorrespond[139]. He asks what reason brought to Rome the embassy which\nCarneades accompanied; who was at that time the leader of the Epicurean\nschool; who were then the most noted [Greek: politikoi] at Athens. The\nmeaning of the last question is made clear by a passage in the _De\nOratore_[140], where Cicero speaks of the combined Academic and Peripatetic\nschools under that name. It may be with reference to the progress of the\n_Academica_ that in a later letter he expresses himself satisfied with the\nadvance he has made in his literary undertakings[141]. During the whole of\nthe remainder of his sojourn at Astura he continued to be actively\nemployed; but although he speaks of various other literary projects, we\nfind no express mention in his letters to Atticus of the _Academica_[142].\nHe declares that however much his detractors at Rome may reproach him with\ninaction, they could not read the numerous difficult works on which he has\nbeen engaged within the same space of time that he has taken to write\nthem[143].\n\nIn the beginning of June Cicero spent a few days at his villa near\nAntium[144], where he wrote a treatise addressed to Caesar, which he\nafterwards suppressed[145]. From the same place he wrote to Atticus of his\nintention to proceed to Tusculum or Rome by way of Lanuvium about the\nmiddle of June[146]. He had in the time immediately following Tullia's\ndeath entertained an aversion for Tusculum, where she died. This he felt\nnow compelled to conquer, otherwise he must either abandon Tusculum\naltogether, or, if he returned at all, a delay of even ten years would make\nthe effort no less painful[147]. Before setting out for Antium Cicero wrote\nto Atticus that he had finished while at Astura _duo magna_ [Greek:\nsyntagmata], words which have given rise to much controversy[148]. Many\nscholars, including Madvig, have understood that the first edition of the\n_Academica_, along with the _De Finibus_, is intended. Against this view\nthe reasons adduced by Krische are convincing[149]. It is clear from the\nletters to Atticus that the _De Finibus_ was being worked out book by book\nlong after the first edition of the _Academica_ had been placed in the\nhands of Atticus. The _De Finibus_ was indeed begun at Astura[150], but it\nwas still in an unfinished state when Cicero began to revise the\n_Academica_[151]. The final arrangement of the characters in the _De\nFinibus_ is announced later still[152]; and even at a later date Cicero\ncomplains that Balbus had managed to obtain surreptitiously a copy of the\nfifth book before it was properly corrected, the irrepressible Caerellia\nhaving copied the whole five books while in that state[153]. A passage in\nthe _De Divinatione_[154] affords almost direct evidence that the\n_Academica_ was published before the _De Finibus_. On all these grounds I\nhold that these two works cannot be those which Cicero describes as having\nbeen finished simultaneously at Astura.\n\nAnother view of the [Greek: syntagmata] in question is that they are simply\nthe two books, entitled _Catulus_ and _Lucullus_, of the _Priora\nAcademica_. In my opinion the word [Greek: syntagma], the use of which to\ndenote a portion of a work Madvig suspects[155], thus obtains its natural\nmeaning. Cicero uses the word [Greek: syntaxis] of the whole work[156],\nwhile [Greek: syntagma][157], and [Greek: syngramma][158], designate\ndefinite portions or divisions of a work. I should be quite content, then,\nto refer the words of Cicero to the _Catulus_ and _Lucullus_. Krische,\nhowever, without giving reasons, decides that this view is unsatisfactory,\nand prefers to hold that the _Hortensius_ (or _de Philosophia_) and the\n_Priora Academica_ are the compositions in question. If this conjecture is\ncorrect, we have in the disputed passage the only reference to the\n_Hortensius_ which is to be found in the letters of Cicero. We are quite\ncertain that the book was written at Astura, and published before the\n_Academica_. This would be clear from the mention in the _Academica\nPosteriora_ alone[159], but the words of Cicero in the _De Finibus_[160]\nplace it beyond all doubt, showing as they do that the _Hortensius_ had\nbeen published a sufficiently long time before the _De Finibus_, to have\nbecome known to a tolerably large circle of readers. Further, in the\n_Tusculan Disputations_ and the _De Divinatione_[161] the _Hortensius_ and\nthe _Academica_ are mentioned together in such a way as to show that the\nformer was finished and given to the world before the latter. Nothing\ntherefore stands in the way of Krische's conjecture, except the doubt I\nhave expressed as to the use of the word [Greek: syntagma], which equally\naffects the old view maintained by Madvig.\n\nWhatever be the truth on this point, it cannot be disputed that the\n_Hortensius_ and the _Academica_ must have been more closely connected, in\nstyle and tone, than any two works of Cicero, excepting perhaps the\n_Academica_ and the _De Finibus_. The interlocutors in the _Hortensius_\nwere exactly the same as in the _Academica Priora_, for the introduction of\nBalbus into some editions of the fragments of the _Hortensius_ is an\nerror[162]. The discussion in the _Academica Priora_ is carried on at\nHortensius' villa near Bauli; in the _Hortensius_ at the villa of Lucullus\nnear Cumae. It is rather surprising that under these circumstances there\nshould be but one direct reference to the _Hortensius_ in the\n_Lucullus_[163].\n\nWhile at his Tusculan villa, soon after the middle of June, B.C. 45, Cicero\nsent Atticus the _Torquatus_, as he calls the first book of the _De\nFinibus_[164]. He had already sent the first edition of the _Academica_ to\nRome[165]. We have a mention that new prooemia had been added to the\n_Catulus_ and _Lucullus_, in which the public characters from whom the\nbooks took their names were extolled. In all probability the extant\nprooemium of the _Lucullus_ is the one which was then affixed. Atticus, who\nvisited Cicero at Tusculum, had doubtless pointed out the incongruity\nbetween the known attainments of Catulus and Lucullus, and the parts they\nwere made to take in difficult philosophical discussions. It is not\nuncharacteristic of Cicero that his first plan for healing the incongruity\nshould be a deliberate attempt to impose upon his readers a set of\nstatements concerning the ability and culture of these two noble Romans\nwhich he knew, and in his own letters to Atticus admitted, to be false. I\nmay note, as of some interest in connection with the _Academica_, the fact\nthat among the unpleasant visits received by Cicero at Tusculum was one\nfrom Varro[166].\n\nOn the 23rd July, Cicero left Home for Arpinum, in order, as he says, to\narrange some business matters, and to avoid the embarrassing attentions of\nBrutus[167]. Before leaving Astura, however, it had been his intention to\ngo on to Arpinum[168]. He seems to have been still unsatisfied with his\nchoice of interlocutors for the _Academica_, for the first thing he did on\nhis arrival was to transfer the parts of Catulus and Lucullus to Cato and\nBrutus[169]. This plan was speedily cast aside on the receipt of a letter\nfrom Atticus, strongly urging that the whole work should be dedicated to\nVarro, or if not the _Academica_, the _De Finibus_[170]. Cicero had never\nbeen very intimate with Varro: their acquaintance seems to have been\nchiefly maintained through Atticus, who was at all times anxious to draw\nthem more closely together. Nine years before he had pressed Cicero to find\nroom in his works for some mention of Varro[171]. The nature of the works\non which our author was then engaged had made it difficult to comply with\nthe request[172]. Varro had promised on his side, full two years before the\n_Academica_ was written, to dedicate to Cicero his great work _De Lingua\nLatino_. In answer to the later entreaty of Atticus, Cicero declared\nhimself very much dissatisfied with Varro's failure to fulfil his promise.\nFrom this it is evident that Cicero knew nothing of the scope or magnitude\nof that work. His complaint that Varro had been writing for two years\nwithout making any progress[173], shows that there could have been little\nof anything like friendship between the two. Apart from these causes for\ngrumbling, Cicero thought the suggestion of Atticus a \"godsend[174].\" Since\nthe _De Finibus_ was already \"betrothed\" to Brutus, he promised to transfer\nto Varro the _Academica_, allowing that Catulus and Lucullus, though of\nnoble birth, had no claim to learning[175]. So little of it did they\npossess that they could never even have dreamed of the doctrines they had\nbeen made in the first edition of the _Academica_ to maintain[176]. For\nthem another place was to be found, and the remark was made that the\n_Academica_ would just suit Varro, who was a follower of Antiochus, and the\nfittest person to expound the opinions of that philosopher[177]. It\nhappened that continual rain fell during the first few days of Cicero's\nstay at Arpinum, so he employed his whole time in editing once more his\n_Academica_, which he now divided into four books instead of two, making\nthe interlocutors himself, Varro and Atticus[178]. The position occupied by\nAtticus in the dialogue was quite an inferior one, but he was so pleased\nwith it that Cicero determined to confer upon him often in the future such\nminor parts[179]. A suggestion of Atticus that Cotta should also be\nintroduced was found impracticable[180].\n\nAlthough the work of re-editing was vigorously pushed on, Cicero had\nconstant doubts about the expediency of dedicating the work to Varro. He\nfrequently throws the whole responsibility for the decision upon Atticus,\nbut for whose importunities he would probably again have changed his plans.\nNearly every letter written to Atticus during the progress of the work\ncontains entreaties that he would consider the matter over and over again\nbefore he finally decided[181]. As no reasons had been given for these\nsolicitations, Atticus naturally grew impatient, and Cicero was obliged to\nassure him that there were reasons, which he could not disclose in a\nletter[182]. The true reasons, however, did appear in some later letters.\nIn one Cicero said: \"I am in favour of Varro, and the more so because he\nwishes it, but you know he is\n\n  [Greek: deinos an\u00ear, tacha ken kai anaition aitio\u00f4ito.]\n\nSo there often flits before me a vision of his face, as he grumbles, it may\nbe, that my part in the treatise is more liberally sustained than his; a\ncharge which you will perceive to be untrue[183].\" Cicero, then, feared\nVarro's temper, and perhaps his knowledge and real critical fastidiousness.\nBefore these explanations Atticus had concluded that Cicero was afraid of\nthe effect the work might produce on the public. This notion Cicero assured\nhim to be wrong; the only cause for his vacillation was his doubt as to how\nVarro would receive the dedication[184]. Atticus would seem to have\nrepeatedly communicated with Varro, and to have assured Cicero that there\nwas no cause for fear; but the latter refused to take a general assurance,\nand anxiously asked for a detailed account of the reasons from which it\nproceeded[185]. In order to stimulate his friend, Atticus affirmed that\nVarro was jealous of some to whom Cicero had shown more favour[186]. We\nfind Cicero eagerly asking for more information, on this point: was it\nBrutus of whom Varro was jealous? It seems strange that Cicero should not\nhave entered into correspondence with Varro himself. Etiquette seems to\nhave required that the recipient of a dedication should be assumed ignorant\nof the intentions of the donor till they were on the point of being\nactually carried out. Thus although Cicero saw Brutus frequently while at\nTusculum, he apparently did not speak to him about the _De Finibus_, but\nemployed Atticus to ascertain his feeling about the dedication[187].\n\nCicero's own judgment about the completed second edition of the _Academica_\nis often given in the letters. He tells us that it extended, on the whole,\nto greater length than the first, though much had been omitted; he adds,\n\"Unless human self love deceives me, the books have been so finished that\nthe Greeks themselves have nothing in the same department of literature to\napproach them.... This edition will be more brilliant, more terse, and\naltogether better than the last[188].\" Again: \"The Antiochean portion has\nall the point of Antiochus combined with any polish my style may\npossess[189].\" Also: \"I have finished the book with I know not what\nsuccess, but with a care which nothing could surpass[190].\" The binding and\nadornment of the presentation copy for Varro received great attention, and\nthe letter accompanying it was carefully elaborated[191]. Yet after\neverything had been done and the book had been sent to Atticus at Rome,\nCicero was still uneasy as to the reception it would meet with from Varro.\nHe wrote thus to Atticus: \"I tell you again and again that the presentation\nwill be at your own risk. So if you begin to hesitate, let us desert to\nBrutus, who is also a follower of Antiochus. 0 Academy, on the wing as thou\nwert ever wont, flitting now hither, now thither!\" Atticus on his part\n\"shuddered\" at the idea of taking the responsibility[192]. After the work\nhad passed into his hands, Cicero begged him to take all precautions to\nprevent it from getting into circulation until they could meet one another\nin Rome[193]. This warning was necessary, because Balbus and Caerellia had\njust managed to get access to the _De Finibus_[194]. In a letter, dated\napparently a day or two later, Cicero declared his intention to meet\nAtticus at Rome and send the work to Varro, should it be judged advisable\nto do so, after a consultation[195]. The meeting ultimately did not take\nplace, but Cicero left the four books in Atticus' power, promising to\napprove any course that might be taken[196]. Atticus wrote to say that as\nsoon as Varro came to Rome the books would be sent to him. \"By this time,\nthen,\" says Cicero, when he gets the letter, \"you have taken the fatal\nstep; oh dear! if you only knew at what peril to yourself! Perhaps my\nletter stopped you, although you had not read it when you wrote. I long to\nhear how the matter stands[197].\" Again, a little later: \"You have been\nbold enough, then, to give Varro the books? I await his judgment upon them,\nbut when will he read them?\" Varro probably received the books in the first\nfortnight of August, 45 B.C., when Cicero was hard at work on the _Tusculan\nDisputations_[198]. A copy of the first edition had already got into\nVarro's hands, as we learn from a letter, in which Cicero begs Atticus to\nask Varro to make some alterations in his copy of the _Academica_, at a\ntime when the fate of the second edition was still undecided[199]. From\nthis fact we may conclude that Cicero had given up all hope of suppressing\nthe first edition. If he consoles Atticus for the uselessness of his copies\nof the first edition, it does not contradict my supposition, for Cicero of\ncourse assumes that Atticus, whatever may be the feeling of other people,\nwishes to have the \"Splendidiora, breviora, meliora.\" Still, on every\noccasion which offered, the author sought to point out as his authorised\nedition the one in four books. He did so in a passage written immediately\nafter the _Academica Posteriora_ was completed[200], and often\nsubsequently, when he most markedly mentioned the number of the books as\nfour[201]. That he wished the work to bear the title _Academica_ is\nclear[202]. The expressions _Academica quaestio_, [Greek: Akad\u00eamik\u00ea\nsyntaxis], and _Academia_, are merely descriptive[203]; so also is the\nfrequent appellation _Academici libri_[204]. The title _Academicae\nQuaestiones_, found in many editions, is merely an imitation of the\n_Tusculanae Quaestiones_, which was supported by the false notion, found as\nearly as Pliny[205], that Cicero had a villa called Academia, at which the\nbook was written. He had indeed a Gymnasium at his Tusculan villa, which he\ncalled his Academia, but we are certain from the letters to Atticus that\nthe work was written entirely at Astura, Antium, and Arpinum.\n\nQuintilian seems to have known the first edition very well[206], but the\nsecond edition is the one which is most frequently quoted. The four books\nare expressly referred to by Nonius, Diomedes, and Lactantius, under the\ntitle _Academica_. Augustine speaks of them only as _Academici libri_, and\nhis references show that he knew the second edition only. Lactantius also\nuses this name occasionally, though he generally speaks of the _Academica_.\nPlutarch shows only a knowledge of the first edition[207].\n\nI have thought it advisable to set forth in plain terms the history of the\ngenesis of the book, as gathered from Cicero's letters to Atticus. That it\nwas not unnecessary to do so may be seen from the astounding theories which\nold scholars of great repute put forward concerning the two editions. A\nfair summary of them may be seen in the preface of Goerenz. I now proceed\nto examine into the constitution and arrangement of the two editions.\n\na. _The lost dialogue \"Catulus.\"_\n\nThe whole of the characters in this dialogue and the _Lucullus_ are among\nthose genuine Optimates and adherents of the senatorial party whom Cicero\nso loves to honour. The Catulus from whom the lost dialogue was named was\nson of the illustrious colleague of Marius. With the political career of\nfather and son we shall have little to do. I merely inquire what was their\nposition with respect to the philosophy of the time, and the nature of\ntheir connection with Cicero.\n\nCatulus the younger need not detain us long. It is clear from the\n_Lucullus_[208] that he did little more than put forward opinions he had\nreceived from his father. Cicero would, doubtless, have preferred to\nintroduce the elder man as speaking for himself, but in that case, as in\nthe _De Oratore_, the author would have been compelled to exclude himself\nfrom the conversation[209]. The son, therefore, is merely the mouthpiece of\nthe father, just as Lucullus, in the dialogue which bears his name, does\nnothing but render literally a speech of Antiochus, which he professes to\nhave heard[210]. For the arrangement in the case of both a reason is to be\nfound in their [Greek: atripsia] with respect to philosophy[211]. This\n[Greek: atripsia] did not amount to [Greek: apaideusia], or else Cicero\ncould not have made Catulus the younger the advocate of philosophy in the\n_Hortensius_[212]. Though Cicero sometimes classes the father and son\ntogether as men of literary culture and perfect masters of Latin style, it\nis very evident on a comparison of all the passages where the two are\nmentioned, that no very high value was placed on the learning of the\nson[213]. But however slight were the claims of Catulus the younger to be\nconsidered a philosopher, he was closely linked to Cicero by other ties.\nDuring all the most brilliant period of Cicero's life, Catulus was one of\nthe foremost Optimates of Rome, and his character, life, and influence are\noften depicted in even extravagant language by the orator[214]. He is one\nof the pillars of the state[215], Cicero cries, and deserves to be classed\nwith the ancient worthies of Rome[216]. When he opposes the Manilian law,\nand asks the people on whom they would rely if Pompey, with such gigantic\npower concentrated in his hands, were to die, the people answer with one\nvoice \"On you[217].\" He alone was bold enough to rebuke the follies, on the\none hand, of the mob, on the other, of the senate[218]. In him no storm of\ndanger, no favouring breeze of fortune, could ever inspire either fear or\nhope, or cause to swerve from his own course[219]. His influence, though he\nbe dead, will ever live among his countrymen[220]. He was not only glorious\nin his life, but fortunate in his death[221].\n\nApart from Cicero's general agreement with Catulus in politics, there were\nspecial causes for his enthusiasm. Catulus was one of the _viri consulares_\nwho had given their unreserved approval to the measures taken for the\nsuppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy, and was the first to confer on\nCicero the greatest glory of his life, the title \"Father of his\ncountry[222].\" So closely did Cicero suppose himself to be allied to\nCatulus, that a friend tried to console him for the death of Tullia, by\nbidding him remember \"Catulus and the olden times[223].\" The statement of\nCatulus, often referred to by Cicero, that Rome had never been so\nunfortunate as to have two bad consuls in the same year, except when Cinna\nheld the office, may have been intended to point a contrast between the\nzeal of Cicero and the lukewarmness of his colleague Antonius[224].\nArchias, who wrote in honour of Cicero's consulship, lived in the house of\nthe two Catuli[225].\n\nWe have seen that when Cicero found it too late to withdraw the first\nedition of the _Academica_ from circulation, he affixed a prooemium to each\nbook, Catulus being lauded in the first, Lucullus in the second. From the\npassages above quoted, and from our knowledge of Cicero's habit in such\nmatters, we can have no difficulty in conjecturing at least a portion of\nthe contents of the lost prooemium to the _Catulus_. The achievements of\nthe elder Catulus were probably extolled, as well as those of his son. The\nphilosophical knowledge of the elder man was made to cast its lustre on the\nyounger. Cicero's glorious consulship was once more lauded, and great\nstress was laid upon the patronage it received from so famous a man as the\nyounger Catulus, whose praises were sung in the fervid language which\nCicero lavishes on the same theme elsewhere. Some allusion most likely was\nmade to the connection of Archias with the Catuli, and to the poem he had\nwritten in Cicero's honour. Then the occasion of the dialogue, its supposed\ndate, and the place where it was held, were indicated. The place was the\nCuman villa of Catulus[226]. The feigned date must fall between the year 60\nB.C. in which Catulus died, and 63, the year of Cicero's consulship, which\nis alluded to in the _Lucullus_[227]. It is well known that in the\narrangement of his dialogues Cicero took every precaution against\nanachronisms.\n\nThe prooemium ended, the dialogue commenced. Allusion was undoubtedly made\nto the _Hortensius_, in which the same speakers had been engaged; and after\nmore compliments had been bandied about, most of which would fall to\nCicero's share, a proposal was made to discuss the great difference between\nthe dogmatic and sceptic schools. Catulus offered to give his father's\nviews, at the same time commending his father's knowledge of philosophy.\nBefore we proceed to construct in outline the speech of Catulus from\nindications offered by the _Lucullus_, it is necessary to speak of the\ncharacter and philosophical opinions of Catulus the elder.\n\nIn the many passages where Cicero speaks of him, he seldom omits to mention\nhis _sapientia_, which implies a certain knowledge of philosophy. He was,\nsays Cicero, the kindest, the most upright, the wisest, the holiest of\nmen[228]. He was a man of universal merit, of surpassing worth, a second\nLaelius[229]. It is easy to gather from the _De Oratore_, in which he\nappears as an interlocutor, a more detailed view of his accomplishments.\nThroughout the second and third books he is treated as the lettered man,\npar excellence, of the company[230]. Appeal is made to him when any\nquestion is started which touches on Greek literature and philosophy. We\nare especially told that even with Greeks his acquaintance with Greek, and\nhis style of speaking it, won admiration[231]. He defends the Greeks from\nthe attacks of Crassus[232]. He contemptuously contrasts the Latin\nhistorians with the Greek[233]. He depreciates the later Greek rhetorical\nteaching, while he bestows high commendation on the early sophists[234].\nThe systematic rhetoric of Aristotle and Theophrastus is most to his\nmind[235]. An account is given by him of the history of Greek speculation\nin Italy[236]. The undefiled purity of his Latin style made him seem to\nmany the only speaker of the language[237]. He had written a history of his\nown deeds, in the style of Xenophon, which Cicero had imitated[238], and\nwas well known as a wit and writer of epigrams[239].\n\nAlthough so much is said of his general culture, it is only from the\n_Academica_ that we learn definitely his philosophical opinions. In the _De\nOratore_, when he speaks of the visit of Carneades to Rome[240], he does\nnot declare himself a follower of that philosopher, nor does Crassus, in\nhis long speech about Greek philosophy, connect Catulus with any particular\nteacher. The only Greek especially mentioned as a friend of his, is the\npoet Antipater of Sidon[241]. Still it might have been concluded that he\nwas an adherent either of the Academic or Peripatetic Schools. Cicero\nrepeatedly asserts that from no other schools can the orator spring, and\nthe whole tone of the _De Oratore_ shows that Catulus could have had no\nleaning towards the Stoics or Epicureans[242]. The probability is that he\nhad never placed himself under the instruction of Greek teachers for any\nlength of time, but had rather gained his information from books and\nespecially from the writings of Clitomachus. If he had ever been in actual\ncommunication with any of the prominent Academics, Cicero would not have\nfailed to tell us, as he does in the case of Antonius[243], and\nCrassus[244]. It is scarcely possible that any direct intercourse between\nPhilo and Catulus can have taken place, although one passage in the\n_Lucullus_ seems to imply it[245]. Still Philo had a brilliant reputation\nduring the later years of Catulus, and no one at all conversant with Greek\nliterature or society could fail to be well acquainted with his\nopinions[246]. No follower of Carneades and Clitomachus, such as Catulus\nundoubtedly was[247], could view with indifference the latest development\nof Academic doctrine. The famous books of Philo were probably not known to\nCatulus[248].\n\nI now proceed to draw out from the references in the _Lucullus_ the chief\nfeatures of the speech of Catulus the younger. It was probably introduced\nby a mention of Philo's books[249]. Some considerable portion of the speech\nmust have been directed against the innovations made by Philo upon the\ngenuine Carneadean doctrine. These the elder Catulus had repudiated with\ngreat warmth, even charging Philo with wilful misrepresentation of the\nolder Academics[250]. The most important part of the speech, however, must\nhave consisted of a defence of Carneades and Arcesilas against the dogmatic\nschools[251]. Catulus evidently concerned himself more with the system of\nthe later than with that of the earlier sceptic. It is also exceedingly\nprobable that he touched only very lightly on the negative Academic\narguments, while he developed fully that positive teaching about the\n[Greek: pithanon] which was so distinctive of Carneades. All the counter\narguments of Lucullus which concern the destructive side of Academic\nteaching appear to be distinctly aimed at Cicero, who must have represented\nit in the discourse of the day before[252]. On the other hand, those parts\nof Lucullus' speech which deal with the constructive part of\nAcademicism[253] seem to be intended for Catulus, to whom the maintenance\nof the genuine Carneadean distinction between [Greek: ad\u00eala] and [Greek:\nakatal\u00eapta] would be a peculiarly congenial task. Thus the commendation\nbestowed by Lucullus on the way in which the _probabile_ had been handled\nappertains to Catulus. The exposition of the sceptical criticism would\nnaturally be reserved for the most brilliant and incisive orator of the\nparty--Cicero himself. These conjectures have the advantage of establishing\nan intimate connection between the prooemium, the speech of Catulus, and\nthe succeeding one of Hortensius. In the prooemium the innovations of Philo\nwere mentioned; Catulus then showed that the only object aimed at by them,\na satisfactory basis for [Greek: epist\u00eam\u00ea], was already attained by the\nCarneadean theory of the [Greek: pithanon]; whereupon Hortensius showed,\nafter the principles of Antiochus, that such a basis was provided by the\nolder philosophy, which both Carneades and Philo had wrongly abandoned.\nThus Philo becomes the central point or pivot of the discussion. With this\narrangement none of the indications in the _Lucullus_ clash. Even the\ndemand made by Hortensius upon Catulus[254] need only imply such a bare\nstatement on the part of the latter of the negative Arcesilaean doctrines\nas would clear the ground for the Carneadean [Greek: pithanon]. One\nimportant opinion maintained by Catulus after Carneades, that the wise man\nwould opine[255] ([Greek: ton sophon doxasein]), seems another indication\nof the generally constructive character of his exposition. Everything\npoints to the conclusion that this part of the dialogue was mainly drawn by\nCicero from the writings of Clitomachus.\n\nCatulus was followed by Hortensius, who in some way spoke in favour of\nAntiochean opinions, but to what extent is uncertain[256]. I think it\nextremely probable that he gave a r\u00e9sum\u00e9 of the history of philosophy,\ncorresponding to the speech of Varro in the beginning of the _Academica\nPosteriora_. One main reason in favour of this view is the difficulty of\nunderstanding to whom, if not to Hortensius, the substance of the speech\ncould have been assigned in the first edition. In the _Academica\nPosteriora_ it was necessary to make Varro speak first and not second as\nHortensius did; this accounts for the disappearance in the second edition\nof the polemical argument of Hortensius[257], which would be appropriate\nonly in the mouth of one who was answering a speech already made. On the\nview I have taken, there would be little difficulty in the fact that\nHortensius now advocates a dogmatic philosophy, though in the lost dialogue\nwhich bore his name he had argued against philosophy altogether[258], and\ndenied that philosophy and wisdom were at all the same thing[259]. Such a\nhistorical r\u00e9sum\u00e9 as I have supposed Hortensius to give would be within the\nreach of any cultivated man of the time, and would only be put forward to\nshow that the New Academic revolt against the supposed old\nAcademico-Peripatetic school was unjustifiable. There is actual warrant for\nstating that his exposition of Antiochus was merely superficial[260]. We\nare thus relieved from the necessity of forcing the meaning of the word\n_commoveris_[261], from which Krische infers that the dialogue, entitled\n_Hortensius_, had ended in a conversion to philosophy of the orator from\nwhom it was named. To any such conversion we have nowhere else any\nallusion.\n\nThe relation in which Hortensius stood to Cicero, also his character and\nattainments, are too well known to need mention here. He seems to have been\nas nearly innocent of any acquaintance with philosophy as it was possible\nfor an educated man to be. Cicero's materials for the speech of Hortensius\nwere, doubtless, drawn from the published works and oral teaching of\nAntiochus.\n\nThe speech of Hortensius was answered by Cicero himself. If my view of the\npreceding speech is correct, it follows that Cicero in his reply pursued\nthe same course which he takes in his answer to Varro, part of which is\npreserved in the _Academica Posteriora_[262]. He justified the New Academy\nby showing that it was in essential harmony with the Old, and also with\nthose ancient philosophers who preceded Plato. Lucullus, therefore,\nreproves him as a rebel in philosophy, who appeals to great and ancient\nnames like a seditious tribune[263]. Unfair use had been made, according to\nLucullus, of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Parmenides, Xenophanes,\nPlato, and Socrates[264]. But Cicero did not merely give a historical\nsummary. He must have dealt with the theory of [Greek: katal\u00eaptik\u00ea\nphantasia] and [Greek: ennoiai] (which though really Stoic had been adopted\nby Antiochus), since he found it necessary to \"manufacture\" (_fabricari_)\nLatin terms to represent the Greek[265]. He probably also commented on the\nheadlong rashness with which the dogmatists gave their assent to the truth\nof phenomena. To this a retort is made by Lucullus[266]. That Cicero's\ncriticism of the dogmatic schools was incomplete may be seen by the fact\nthat he had not had occasion to Latinize the terms [Greek: katal\u00eapsis]\n(i.e. in the abstract, as opposed to the individual [Greek: katal\u00eaptik\u00ea\nphantasia]), [Greek: enargeia, horm\u00ea, apodeixis, dogma, oikeion, ad\u00eala,\nepoch\u00ea], nearly all important terms in the Stoic, and to some extent in the\nAntiochean system, all of which Lucullus is obliged to translate for\nhimself[267]. The more the matter is examined the more clearly does it\nappear that the main purpose of Cicero in this speech was to justify from\nthe history of philosophy the position of the New Academy, and not to\nadvance sceptical arguments against experience, which were reserved for his\nanswer to Lucullus. In his later speech, he expressly tells us that such\nsceptical paradoxes as were advanced by him in the first day's discourse\nwere really out of place, and were merely introduced in order to disarm\nLucullus, who was to speak next[268]. Yet these arguments must have\noccupied some considerable space in Cicero's speech, although foreign to\nits main intention[269]. He probably gave a summary classification of the\nsensations, with the reasons for refusing to assent to the truth of each\nclass[270]. The whole constitution and tenor of the elaborate speech of\nCicero in the _Lucullus_ proves that no general or minute demonstration of\nthe impossibility of [Greek: epist\u00eam\u00ea] in the dogmatic sense had been\nattempted in his statement of the day before. Cicero's argument in the\n_Catulus_ was allowed by Lucullus to have considerably damaged the cause of\nAntiochus[271]. The three speeches of Catulus, Hortensius, and Cicero had\ngone over nearly the whole ground marked out for the discussion[272], but\nonly cursorily, so that there was plenty of room for a more minute\nexamination in the _Lucullus_.\n\nOne question remains: how far did Cicero defend Philo against the attack of\nCatulus? Krische believes that the argument of Catulus was answered point\nby point. In this opinion I cannot concur. Cicero never appears elsewhere\nas the defender of Philo's reactionary doctrines[273]. The expressions of\nLucullus seem to imply that this part of his teaching had been dismissed by\nall the disputants[274]. It follows that when Cicero, in his letter of\ndedication to Varro, describes his own part as that of Philo (_partes mihi\nsumpsi Philonis_[275]), he merely attaches Philo's name to those general\nNew Academic doctrines which had been so brilliantly supported by the pupil\nof Clitomachus in his earlier days. The two chief sources for Cicero's\nspeech in the _Catulus_ were, doubtless, Philo himself and Clitomachus.\n\nIn that intermediate form of the _Academica_, where Cato and Brutus\nappeared in the place of Hortensius and Lucullus, there can be no doubt\nthat Brutus occupied a more prominent position than Cato. Consequently Cato\nmust have taken the comparatively inferior part of Hortensius, while Brutus\ntook that of Lucullus. It may perhaps seem strange that a Stoic of the\nStoics like Cato should be chosen to represent Antiochus, however much that\nphilosopher may have borrowed from Zeno. The r\u00f4le given to Hortensius,\nhowever, was in my view such as any cultivated man might sustain who had\nnot definitely committed himself to sceptical principles. So eminent an\nAntiochean as Brutus cannot have been reduced to the comparatively\nsecondary position assigned to Hortensius in the _Academica Priora_. He\nwould naturally occupy the place given to Varro in the second edition[276].\nIf this be true, Brutus would not speak at length in the first half of the\nwork. Cato is not closely enough connected with the _Academica_ to render\nit necessary to treat of him farther.\n\nb. _The \"Lucullus.\"_\n\nThe day after the discussion narrated in the _Catulus_, during which\nLucullus had been merely a looker-on, the whole party left the Cuman villa\nof Catulus early in the morning, and came to that of Hortensius at\nBauli[277]. In the evening, if the wind favoured, Lucullus was to leave for\nhis villa at Neapolis, Cicero for his at Pompeii[278]. Bauli was a little\nplace on the gulf of Baiae, close to Cimmerium, round which so many legends\nlingered[279]. The scenery in view was magnificent[280]. As the party were\nseated in the xystus with its polished floor and lines of statues, the\nwaves rippled at their feet, and the sea away to the horizon glistened and\nquivered under the bright sun, and changed colour under the freshening\nbreeze. Within sight lay the Cuman shore and Puteoli, thirty stadia\ndistant[281].\n\nCicero strove to give vividness to the dialogue and to keep it perfectly\nfree from anachronisms. Diodotus is spoken of as still living, although\nwhen the words were written he had been dead for many years[282]. The\nsurprise of Hortensius, who is but a learner in philosophy, at the wisdom\nof Lucullus, is very dramatic[283]. The many political and private troubles\nwhich were pressing upon Cicero when he wrote the work are kept carefully\nout of sight. Still we can catch here and there traces of thoughts and\nplans which were actively employing the author's mind at Astura. His\nintention to visit Tusculum has left its mark on the last section of the\nbook, while in the last but one the _De Finibus_, the _De Natura Deorum_\nand other works are shadowed forth[284]. In another passage the design of\nthe _Tusculan Disputations_, which was carried out immediately after the\npublication of the _Academica_ and _De Finibus_, is clearly to be\nseen[285].\n\nHortensius and Catulus now sink to a secondary position in the\nconversation, which is resumed by Lucullus. His speech is especially\nacknowledged by Cicero to be drawn from the works of Antiochus[286]. Nearly\nall that is known of the learning of Lucullus is told in Cicero's dialogue,\nand the passages already quoted from the letters. He seems at least to have\ndallied with culture, although his chief energy, as a private citizen, was\ndirected to the care of his fish-ponds[287]. In his train when he went to\nSicily was the poet Archias, and during the whole of his residence in the\nEast he sought to attach learned men to his person. At Alexandria he was\nfound in the company of Antiochus, Aristus, Heraclitus Tyrius, Tetrilius\nRogus and the Selii, all men of philosophic tastes[288]. He is several\ntimes mentioned by Pliny in the _Natural History_ as the patron of Greek\nartists. Yet, as we have already seen, Cicero acknowledged in his letters\nto Atticus that Lucullus was no philosopher. He has to be propped up, like\nCatulus, by the authority of another person. All his arguments are\nexplicitly stated to be derived from a discussion in which he had heard\nAntiochus engage. The speech of Lucullus was, as I have said, mainly a\nreply to that of Cicero in the _Catulus_. Any closer examination of its\ncontents must be postponed till I come to annotate its actual text. The\nsame may be said of Cicero's answer.\n\nIn the intermediate form of the _Academica_, the speech of Lucullus was no\ndoubt transferred to Brutus, but as he has only such a slight connection\nwith the work, I do not think it necessary to do much more than call\nattention to the fact. I may, however, notice the close relationship in\nwhich Brutus stood to the other persons with whom we have had to deal. He\nwas nephew of Cato, whose half-sister Servilia was wife of Lucullus[289].\nCato was tutor to Lucullus' son, with Cicero for a sort of adviser: while\nHortensius had married a divorced wife of Cato. All of them were of the\nSenatorial party, and Cato and Brutus lived to be present, with Cicero,\nduring the war between Pompey and Caesar. Brutus and Cicero were both\nfriends of Antiochus and Aristus, whose pupil Brutus was[290].\n\nc. _The Second Edition._\n\nWhen Cicero dedicated the _Academica_ to Varro, very slight alterations\nwere necessary in the scenery and other accessories of the piece. Cicero\nhad a villa close to the Cuman villa of Catulus and almost within sight of\nHortensius' villa at Bauli[291]. Varro's villa, at which the scene was now\nlaid, was close to the Lucrine lake[292]. With regard to the feigned date\nof the discourse, we may observe that at the very outset of the work it is\nshown to be not far distant from the actual time of composition[293]. Many\nallusions are made to recent events, such as the utter overthrow of the\nPompeian party, the death of Tullia[294], and the publication of the\n_Hortensius_[295]. Between the date of Tullia's death and the writing of\nthe _Academica_, it can be shown that Varro, Cicero and Atticus could not\nhave met together at Cumae. Cicero therefore for once admits into his works\nan impossibility in fact. This impossibility would at once occur to Varro,\nand Cicero anticipates his wonder in the letter of dedication[296].\n\nFor the main facts of Varro's life the student must be referred to the\nordinary sources of information. A short account of the points of contact\nbetween his life and that of Cicero, with a few words about his\nphilosophical opinions, are alone needed here. The first mention we have of\nVarro in any of Cicero's writings is in itself sufficient to show his\ncharacter and the impossibility of anything like friendship between the\ntwo. Varro had done the orator some service in the trying time which came\nbefore the exile. In writing to Atticus Cicero had eulogised Varro; and in\nthe letter to which I refer he begs Atticus to send Varro the eulogy to\nread, adding \"_Mirabiliter moratus est, sicut nosti,_ [Greek: elikta kai\nouden][297].\" All the references to Varro in the letters to Atticus are in\nthe same strain. Cicero had to be pressed to write Varro a letter of thanks\nfor supposed exertions in his behalf, during his exile[298]. Several\npassages show that Cicero refused to believe in Varro's zeal, as reported\nby Atticus[299]. On Cicero's return from exile, he and Varro remained in\nthe same semi-friendly state. About the year 54 B.C., as we have already\nseen, Atticus in vain urged his friend to dedicate some work to the great\npolymath. After the fall of the Pompeian cause, Cicero and Varro do seem to\nhave been drawn a little closer together. Eight letters, written mostly in\nthe year before the _Academica_ was published, testify to this\napproximation[300]. Still they are all cold, forced and artificial; very\ndifferent from the letters Cicero addressed to his real intimates, such for\ninstance as Sulpicius, Caelius, Paetus, Plancus, and Trebatius. They all\nshow a fear of giving offence to the harsh temper of Varro, and a humility\nin presence of his vast learning which is by no means natural to Cicero.\nThe negotiations between Atticus and Cicero with respect to the dedication\nof the second edition, as detailed already, show sufficiently that this\nslight increase in cordiality did not lead to friendship[301].\n\nThe philosophical views of Varro can be gathered with tolerable accuracy\nfrom Augustine, who quotes considerably from, the work of Varro _De\nPhilosophia_[302]. Beyond doubt he was a follower of Antiochus and the\nso-called Old Academy. How he selected this school from, among the 288\nphilosophies which he considered possible, by an elaborate and pedantic\nprocess of exhaustion, may be read by the curious in Augustine. My notes on\nthe _Academica Posteriora_ will show that there is no reason for accusing\nCicero of having mistaken Varro's philosophical views. This supposition\nowes its currency to M\u00fcller, who, from Stoic phrases in the _De Lingua\nLatina_, concluded that Varro had passed over to the Stoics before that\nwork was written. All that was Stoic in Varro came from Antiochus[303].\n\nThe exact specification of the changes in the arrangement of the\nsubject-matter, necessitated by the dedication to Varro, will be more\nconveniently deferred till we come to the fragments of the second edition\npreserved by Nonius and others. Roughly speaking, the following were the\ncontents of the four books. Book I.: the historico-philosophical exposition\nof Antiochus' views, formerly given by Hortensius, now by Varro; then the\nhistorical justification of the Philonian position, which Cicero had given\nin the first edition as an answer to Hortensius[304]. Book II.: an\nexposition by Cicero of Carneades' positive teaching, practically the same\nas that given by Catulus in ed. I.; to this was appended, probably, that\nforetaste of the negative arguments against dogmatism, which in ed. 1. had\nformed part of the answer made by Cicero to Hortensius. Book III.: a speech\nof Varro in reply to Cicero, closely corresponding to that of Lucullus in\ned. 1. Book IV.: Cicero's answer, substantially the same as in ed. 1.\nAtticus must have been almost a [Greek: k\u00f4phon pros\u00f4pon].\n\nI may here notice a fact which might puzzle the student. In some old\neditions the _Lucullus_ is marked throughout as _Academicorum liber IV_.\nThis is an entire mistake, which arose from a wrong view of Nonius'\nquotations, which are always from the _second_ edition, and can tell us\nnothing about the constitution of the _first_. One other thing is worth\nremark. Halm (as many before him had done) places the _Academica Priora_\nbefore the _Posteriora_. This seems to me an unnatural arrangement; the\nsubject-matter of the _Varro_ is certainly prior, logically, to that of the\n_Lucullus_.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nM. TULLII CICERONIS\n\nACADEMICORUM POSTERIORUM\n\nLIBER PRIMUS.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nI. 1. In Cumano nuper cum mecum Atticus noster esset, nuntiatum est nobis a\nM. Varrone, venisse eum Roma pridie vesperi et, nisi de via fessus esset,\ncontinuo ad nos venturum fuisse. Quod cum audissemus, nullam moram\ninterponendam putavimus quin videremus hominem nobiscum et studiis isdem et\nvetustate amicitiae coniunctum. Itaque confestim ad eum ire perreximus,\npaulumque cum _ab_ eius villa abessemus, ipsum ad nos venientem vidimus:\natque ilium complexi, ut mos amicorum est, satis eum longo intervallo ad\nsuam villam reduximus. 2. Hic pauca primo, atque ea percontantibus nobis,\necquid forte Roma novi, Atticus: Omitte ista, quae nec percontari nec\naudire sine molestia possumus, quaeso, inquit, et quaere potius ecquid ipse\nnovi. Silent enim diutius Musae Varronis quam solebant, nec tamen istum\ncessare, sed celare quae scribat existimo. Minime vero, inquit ille:\nintemperantis enim arbitror esse scribere quod occultari velit: sed habeo\nopus magnum in manibus, idque iam pridem: ad hunc enim ipsum--me autem\ndicebat--quaedam institui, quae et sunt magna sane et limantur a me\npolitius. 3. Et ego: Ista quidem, inquam, Varro, iam diu exspectans, non\naudeo tamen flagitare: audivi enim e Libone nostro, cuius nosti\nstudium--nihil enim eius modi celare possumus--non te ea intermittere, sed\naccuratius tractare nec de manibus umquam deponere. Illud autem mihi ante\nhoc tempus numquam in mentem venit a te requirere: sed nunc, postea quam\nsum ingressus res eas, quas tecum simul didici, mandare monumentis\nphilosophiamque veterem illam a Socrate ortam Latinis litteris illustrare,\nquaero quid sit cur, cum multa scribas, genus hoc praetermittas, praesertim\ncum et ipse in eo excellas et id studium totaque ea res longe ceteris et\nstudiis et artibus antecedat.\n\nII. 4. Tum ille: Rem a me saepe deliberatam et multum agitatam requiris.\nItaque non haesitans respondebo, sed ea dicam, quae mihi sunt in promptu,\nquod ista ipsa de re multum, ut dixi, et diu cogitavi. Nam cum philosophiam\nviderem diligentissime Graecis litteris explicatam, existimavi, si qui de\nnostris eius studio tenerentur, si essent Graecis doctrinis eruditi, Graeca\npotius quam nostra lecturos: sin a Graecorum artibus et disciplinis\nabhorrerent, ne haec quidem curaturos, quae sine eruditione Graeca\nintellegi non possunt: itaque ea nolui scribere, quae nec indocti\nintellegere possent nec docti legere curarent. 5. Vides autem--eadem enim\nipse didicisti--non posse nos Amafinii aut Rabirii similis esse, qui nulla\narte adhibita de rebus ante oculos positis volgari sermone disputant, nihil\ndefiniunt, nihil partiuntur, nihil apta interrogatione concludunt, nullam\ndenique artem esse nec dicendi nec disserendi putant. Nos autem praeceptis\ndialecticorum et oratorum etiam, quoniam utramque vim virtutem esse nostri\nputant, sic parentes, ut legibus, verbis quoque novis cogimur uti, quae\ndocti, ut dixi, a Graecis petere malent, indocti ne a nobis quidem\naccipient, ut frustra omnis suscipiatur _labor_. 6. Iam vero physica, si\nEpicurum, id est, si Democritum probarem, possem scribere ita plane, ut\nAmafinius. Quid est enim magnum, cum causas rerum efficientium sustuleris,\nde corpusculorum--ita enim appellat atomos--concursione fortuita loqui?\nNostra tu physica nosti, quae cum contineantur ex effectione et ex materia\nea, quam fingit et format effectio, adhibenda etiam geometria est, quam\nquibusnam quisquam enuntiare verbis aut quem ad intellegendum poterit\nadducere? _Quid_, haec ipsa de vita et moribus, et de expetendis\nfugiendisque rebus? Illi enim simpliciter pecudis et hominis idem bonum\nesse censent: apud nostros autem non ignoras quae sit et quanta subtilitas.\n7. Sive enim Zenonem sequare, magnum est efficere ut quis intelligat quid\nsit illud verum et simplex bonum, quod non possit ab honestate seiungi:\nquod bonum quale sit negat omnino Epicurus sine voluptatibus sensum\nmoventibus ne suspicari _quidem_. Si vero Academiam veterem persequamur,\nquam nos, ut scis, probamus, quam erit illa acute explicanda nobis! quam\nargute, quam obscure etiam contra Stoicos disserendum! Totum igitur illud\nphilosophiae studium mihi quidem ipse sumo et ad vitae constantiam quantum\npossum et ad delectationem animi, nec ullum arbitror, ut apud Platonem est,\nmaius aut melius a dis datum munus homini. 8. Sed meos amicos, in quibus\nest studium, in Graeciam mitto, id est, ad Graecos ire iubeo, ut ea a\nfontibus potius hauriant quam rivulos consectentur. Quae autem nemo adhuc\ndocuerat nec erat unde studiosi scire possent, ea, quantum potui--nihil\nenim magno opere meorum miror--feci ut essent nota nostris. A Graecis enim\npeti non poterant ac post L. Aelii nostri occasum ne a Latinis quidem. Et\ntamen in illis veteribus nostris, quae Menippum imitati, non interpretati,\nquadam hilaritate conspersimus, multa admixta ex intima philosophia, multa\ndicta dialectice +quae quo facilius minus docti intelligerent, iucunditate\nquadam ad legendum invitati, in laudationibus, in his ipsis antiquitatum\nprooemiis +philosophe scribere voluimus, si modo consecuti sumus.\n\nIII. 9. Tum, ego. Sunt, inquam, ista, Varro. Nam nos in nostra urbe\nperegrinantis errantisque tamquam hospites tui libri quasi domum\ndeduxerunt, ut possemus aliquando qui et ubi essemus agnoscere. Tu aetatem\npatriae, tu descriptiones temporum, tu sacrorum iura, tu sacerdotum, tu\ndomesticam, tu bellicam disciplinam, tu sedem regionum locorum, tu omnium\ndivinarum humanarumque rerum nomina, genera, officia, causas aperuisti,\nplurimumque poetis nostris omninoque Latinis et litteris luminis et verbis\nattulisti, atque ipse varium et elegans omni fere numero poema fecisti\nphilosophiamque multis locis incohasti, ad impellendum satis, ad edocendum\nparum. 10. Causam autem probabilem tu quidem adfers; aut enim Graeca legere\nmalent qui erunt eruditi aut ne haec quidem qui illa nesciunt. Sed da mihi\nnunc: satisne probas? Immo vero et haec qui illa non poterunt et qui Graeca\npoterunt non contemnent sua. Quid enim causae est cur poetas Latinos\nGraecis litteris eruditi legant, philosophos non legant? an quia delectat\nEnnius, Pacuvius, Attius, multi alii, qui non verba, sed vim Graecorum\nexpresserunt poetarum? Quanto magis philosophi delectabunt, si, ut illi\nAeschylum, Sophoclem, Euripidem, sic hi Platonem imitentur, Aristotelem,\nTheophrastum? Oratores quidem laudari video, si qui e nostris Hyperidem\nsint aut Demosthenem imitati. 11. Ego autem--dicam enim, ut res est--dum me\nambitio, dum honores, dum causae, dum rei publicae non solum cura, sed\nquaedam etiam procuratio multis officiis implicatum et constrictum tenebat,\nhaec inclusa habebam et, ne obsolescerent, renovabam, cum licebat, legendo.\nNunc vero et fortunae gravissimo percussus volnere et administratione rei\npublicae liberatus, doloris medicinam a philosophia peto et otii\noblectationem hanc honestissimam iudico. Aut enim huic aetati hoc maxime\naptum est aut iis rebus, si quas dignas laude gessimus, hoc in primis\nconsentaneum aut etiam ad nostros civis erudiendos nihil utilius aut, si\nhaec ita non sunt, nihil aliud video quod agere possimus. 12. Brutus quidem\nnoster, excellens omni genere laudis, sic philosophiam Latinis litteris\npersequitur, nihil ut iisdem de rebus Graecia desideret, et eandem quidem\nsententiam sequitur quam tu. Nam Aristum Athenis audivit aliquam diu, cuius\ntu fratrem Antiochum. Quam ob rem da, quaeso, te huic etiam generi\nlitterarum.\n\nIV. 13. Tum, ille. Istuc quidem considerabo, nec vero sine te. Sed de te\nipso quid est, inquit, quod audio? Quanam, inquam, de re? Relictam a te\nveterem illam, inquit, tractari autem novam. Quid? ergo, inquam, Antiocho\nid magis licuerit, nostro familiari, remigrare in domum veterem e nova quam\nnobis in novam e vetere? certe enim recentissima quaeque sunt correcta et\nemendata maxime. Quamquam Antiochi magister Philo, magnus vir, ut tu\nexistimas ipse, negat in libris, quod coram etiam ex ipso audiebamus, duas\nAcademias esse erroremque eorum, qui ita putarunt, coarguit. Est, inquit,\nut dicis: sed ignorare te non arbitror, quae contra _ea_ Philonis Antiochus\nscripserit. 14. Immo vero et ista et totam veterem Academiam, a qua absum\niam diu, renovari a te, nisi molestum est, velim, et simul, adsidamus,\ninquam, si videtur. Sane istud quidem, inquit: sum enim admodum infirmus.\nSed videamus idemne Attico placeat fieri a me, quod te velle video. Mihi\nvero, ille: quid est enim quod malim quam ex Antiocho iam pridem audita\nrecordari? et simul videre satisne ea commode dici possit Latine? Quae cum\nessent dicta, in conspectu consedimus [omnes].\n\n15. Tum Varro ita exorsus est: Socrates mihi videtur, id quod constat inter\nomnis, primus a rebus occultis et ab ipsa natura involutis, in quibus omnes\nante eum philosophi occupati fuerunt, avocavisse philosophiam et ad vitam\ncommunem adduxisse, ut de virtutibus et vitiis omninoque de bonis rebus et\nmalis quaereret, caelestia autem vel procul esse a nostra cognitione\ncenseret vel, si maxime cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene vivendum\n_valere_. 16. Hic in omnibus fere sermonibus, qui ab iis qui illum\naudierunt perscripti varie _et_ copiose sunt, ita disputat ut nihil\nadfirmet ipse, refellat alios: nihil se scire dicat nisi id ipsum, eoque\npraestare ceteris, quod illi quae nesciant scire se putent, ipse se nihil\nscire, id unum sciat, ob eamque rem se arbitrari ab Apolline omnium\nsapientissimum esse dictum, quod haec esset una omnis sapientia non\narbitrari sese scire quod nesciat. Quae cum diceret constanter et in ea\nsententia permaneret, omnis eius oratio tamen in virtute laudanda et in\nhominibus ad virtutis studium cohortandis consumebatur, ut e Socraticorum\nlibris, maximeque Platonis, intellegi potest. 17. Platonis autem\nauctoritate, qui varius et multiplex et copiosus fuit, una et consentiens\nduobus vocabulis philosophiae forma instituta est, Academicorum et\nPeripateticorum: qui rebus congruentes nominibus differebant. Nam cum\nSpeusippum, sororis filium, Plato philosophiae quasi heredem reliquisset,\nduos autem praestantissimo studio atque doctrina, Xenocratem Chalcedonium\net Aristotelem Stagiritem, qui erant cum Aristotele, Peripatetici dicti\nsunt, quia disputabant inambulantes in Lycio, illi autem, qui Platonis\ninstituto in Academia, quod est alterum gymnasium, coetus erant et sermones\nhabere soliti, e loci vocabulo nomen habuerunt. Sed utrique Platonis\nubertate completi certam quandam disciplinae formulam composuerunt et eam\nquidem plenam ac refertam, illam autem Socraticam dubitationem de omnibus\nrebus et nulla adfirmatione adhibita consuetudinem disserendi reliquerunt.\nIta facta est, quod minime Socrates probabat, ars quaedam philosophiae et\nrerum ordo et descriptio disciplinae. 18. Quae quidem erat primo duobus, ut\ndixi, nominibus una: nihil enim inter Peripateticos et illam veterem\nAcademiam differebat. Abundantia quadam ingeni praestabat, ut mihi quidem\nvidetur, Aristoteles, sed idem fons erat utrisque et eadem rerum\nexpetendarum fugiendarumque partitio.\n\nV. Sed quid ago? inquit, aut sumne sanus, qui haec vos doceo? nam etsi non\nsus Minervam, ut aiunt, tamen inepte quisquis Minervam docet. Tum Atticus:\nTu vero, inquit, perge, Varro: valde enim amo nostra atque nostros, meque\nista delectant, cum Latine dicuntur, et isto modo. Quid me, inquam, putas,\nqui philosophiam iam professus sim populo nostro exhibiturum? Pergamus\nigitur, inquit, quoniam placet. 19. Fuit ergo iam accepta a Platone\nphilosophandi ratio triplex: una de vita et moribus, altera de natura et\nrebus occultis, tertia de disserendo et quid verum sit, quid falsum, quid\nrectum in oratione pravumve, quid consentiens, quid repugnans iudicando. Ac\nprimum partem illam bene vivendi a natura petebant eique parendum esse\ndicebant, neque ulla alia in re nisi in natura quaerendum esse illud summum\nbonum quo omnia referrentur, constituebantque extremum esse rerum\nexpetendarum et finem bonorum adeptum esse omnia e natura et animo et\ncorpore et vita. Corporis autem alia ponebant esse in toto, alia in\npartibus: valetudinem, viris pulchritudinem in toto, in partibus autem\nsensus integros et praestantiam aliquam partium singularum, ut in pedibus\nceleritatem, vim in manibus, claritatem in voce, in lingua etiam explanatam\nvocum impressionem: 20. animi autem, quae essent ad comprehendendam\ningeniis virtutem idonea, eaque ab iis in naturam et mores dividebantur.\nNaturae celeritatem ad discendum et memoriam dabant: quorum utrumque mentis\nesset proprium et ingeni. Morum autem putabant studia esse et quasi\nconsuetudinem: quam partim exercitationis adsiduitate, partim ratione\nformabant, in quibus erat philosophia ipsa. In qua quod incohatum est neque\nabsolutum, progressio quaedam ad virtutem appellatur: quod autem absolutum,\nid est virtus, quasi perfectio naturae omniumque rerum, quas in animis\nponunt, una res optima. Ergo haec animorum. 21. Vitae autem--id enim erat\ntertium--adiuncta esse dicebant, quae ad virtutis usum valerent. Nam virtus\nanimi bonis et corporis cernitur, et _in_ quibusdam quae non tam naturae\nquam beatae vitae adiuncta sunt. Hominem esse censebant quasi partem\nquandam civitatis et universi generis humani, eumque esse coniunctum cum\nhominibus humana quadam societate. Ac de summo quidem atque naturali bono\nsic agunt: cetera autem pertinere ad id putant aut adaugendum aut tuendum,\nut divitias, ut opes, ut gloriam, ut gratiam. Ita tripartita ab iis\ninducitur ratio bonorum.\n\nVI. 22. Atque haec illa sunt tria genera, quae putant plerique\nPeripateticos dicere. Id quidem non falso: est enim haec partitio illorum:\nillud imprudenter, si alios esse Academicos, qui tum appellarentur, alios\nPeripateticos arbitrantur. Communis haec ratio et utrisque hic bonorum\nfinis videbatur, adipisci quae essent prima natura quaeque ipsa per sese\nexpetenda, aut omnia aut maxima. Ea sunt autem maxima, quae in ipso animo\natque in ipsa virtute versantur. Itaque omnis illa antiqua philosophia\nsensit in una virtute esse positam beatam vitam, nec tamen beatissimam,\nnisi adiungerentur et corporis et cetera, quae supra dicta sunt, ad\nvirtutis usum idonea. 23. Ex hac descriptione agendi quoque aliquid in vita\net officii ipsius initium reperiebatur: quod erat in conservatione earum\nrerum, quas natura praescriberet. Hinc gignebatur fuga desidiae\nvoluptatumque contemptio: ex quo laborum dolorumque susceptio multorum\nmagnorumque recti honestique causa et earum rerum, quae erant congruentes\ncum descriptione naturae, unde et amicitia exsistebat et iustitia atque\naequitas: eaeque voluptatibus et multis vitae commodis anteponebantur. Haec\nquidem fuit apud eos morum institutio et eius partis, quam primam posui,\nforma atque descriptio.\n\n24. De natura autem--id enim sequebatur--ita dicebant, ut eam dividerent in\nres duas, ut altera esset efficiens, altera autem quasi huic se praebens,\nea quae efficeretur aliquid. In eo, quod efficeret, vim esse censebant, in\neo autem, quod efficeretur, materiam quandam: in utroque tamen utrumque:\nneque enim materiam ipsam cohaerere potuisse, si nulla vi contineretur,\nneque vim sine aliqua materia. Nihil est enim quod non alicubi esse\ncogatur. Sed quod ex utroque, id iam corpus et quasi qualitatem quandam\nnominabant: dabitis enim profecto, ut in rebus inusitatis, quod Graeci ipsi\nfaciunt, a quibus haec iam diu tractantur, utamur verbis interdum\ninauditis.\n\nVII. 25. Nos vero, inquit Atticus: quin etiam Graecis licebit utare, cum\nvoles, si te Latina forte deficient. Bene sane facis: sed enitar ut Latine\nloquar, nisi in huiusce modi verbis, ut philosophiam aut rhetoricam aut\nphysicam aut dialecticam appellem, quibus, ut aliis multis, consuetudo iam\nutitur pro Latinis. Qualitates igitur appellavi, quas [Greek: poiot\u00eatas]\nGraeci vocant, quod ipsum apud Graecos non est vulgi verbum, sed\nphilosophorum, atque id in multis. Dialecticorum vero verba nulla sunt\npublica: suis utuntur. Et id quidem commune omnium fere est artium. Aut\nenim nova sunt rerum novarum facienda nomina aut ex aliis transferenda.\nQuod si Graeci faciunt, qui in his rebus tot iam saecula versantur, quanto\nid magis nobis concedendum est, qui haec nunc primum tractare conamur? 26.\nTu vero, inquam, Varro, bene etiam meriturus mihi videris de tuis civibus,\nsi eos non modo copia rerum auxeris, uti fecisti, sed etiam verborum.\nAudebimus ergo, inquit, novis verbis uti te auctore, si necesse erit. Earum\nigitur qualitatum sunt aliae principes, aliae ex his ortae. Principes sunt\nunius modi et simplices: ex his autem ortae variae sunt et quasi\nmultiformes. Itaque a\u00ebr--utimur enim pro Latino--et ignis et aqua et terra\nprima sunt: ex his autem ortae animantium formae earumque rerum, quae\ngignuntur e terra. Ergo illa initia et, ut e Graeco vertam, elementa\ndicuntur: e quibus a\u00ebr et ignis movendi vim habent et efficiendi, reliquae\npartes accipiendi et quasi patiendi, aquam dico et terram. Quintum genus, e\nquo essent astra mentesque, singulare eorumque quattuor, quae supra dixi,\ndissimile Aristoteles quoddam esse rebatur. 27. Sed subiectam putant\nomnibus sine ulla specie atque carentem omni illa qualitate--faciamus enim\ntractando usitatius hoc verbum et tritius--materiam quandam, ex qua omnia\nexpressa atque efficta sint: quae tota omnia accipere possit omnibusque\nmodis mutari atque ex omni parte, eoque etiam interire non in nihilum, sed\nin suas partis, quae infinite secari ac dividi possint, cum sit nihil\nomnino in rerum natura minimum quod dividi nequeat: quae autem moveantur,\nomnia intervallis moveri, quae intervalla item infinite dividi possint. 28.\nEt cum ita moveatur illa vis, quam qualitatem esse diximus, et cum sic\nultro citroque versetur, materiam ipsam totam penitus commutari putant et\nilla effici, quae appellant qualia, e quibus in omni natura cohaerente et\ncontinuata cum omnibus suis partibus effectum esse mundum, extra quem nulla\npars materiae sit nullumque corpus, partis autem esse mundi omnia, quae\ninsint in eo, quae natura sentiente teneantur, in qua ratio perfecta insit,\nquae sit eadem sempiterna: nihil enim valentius esse a quo intereat: 29.\nquam vim animum esse dicunt mundi eandemque esse mentem sapientiamque\nperfectam, quem deum appellant, omniumque rerum, quae sunt ei subiectae,\nquasi prudentiam quandam, procurantem caelestia maxime, deinde in terris\nea, quae pertinent ad homines: quam interdum eandem necessitatem appellant,\nquia nihil aliter possit atque ab ea constitutum sit, inter quasi fatalem\net immutabilem continuationem ordinis sempiterni: non numquam eandem\nfortunam, quod efficiat multa improvisa ac necopinata nobis propter\nobscuritatem ignorationemque causarum.\n\nVIII. 30. Tertia deinde philosophiae pars, quae erat in ratione et in\ndisserendo, sic tractabatur ab utrisque. Quamquam oriretur a sensibus,\ntamen non esse iudicium veritatis in sensibus. Mentem volebant rerum esse\niudicem: solam censebant idoneam cui crederetur, quia sola cerneret id,\nquod semper esset simplex et unius modi et tale quale esset. Hanc illi\n[Greek: idean] appellabant, iam a Platone ita nominatam, nos recte speciem\npossumus dicere. 31. Sensus autem omnis hebetes et tardos esse\narbitrabantur, nec percipere ullo modo res eas, quae subiectae sensibus\nviderentur, quae essent aut ita parvae, ut sub sensum cadere non possent,\naut ita mobiles et concitatae, ut nihil umquam unum esset constans, ne idem\nquidem, quia continenter laberentur et fluerent omnia. Itaque hanc omnem\npartem rerum opinabilem appellabant. 32. Scientiam autem nusquam esse\ncensebant nisi in animi notionibus atque rationibus: qua de causa\ndefinitiones rerum probabant, et has ad omnia, de quibus disceptabatur,\nadhibebant. Verborum etiam explicatio probabatur, id est, qua de causa\nquaeque essent ita nominata, quam [Greek: etymologian] appellabant: post\nargumentis et quasi rerum notis ducibus utebantur ad probandum et ad\nconcludendum id, quod explanari volebant: itaque tradebatur omnis\ndialecticae disciplina, id est, orationis ratione conclusae. Huic quasi ex\naltera parte oratoria vis dicendi adhibebatur, explicatrix orationis\nperpetuae ad persuadendum accommodatae. 33. Haec erat illis disciplina a\nPlatone tradita: cuius quas acceperim mutationes, si voltis, exponam. Nos\nvero volumus, inquam, ut pro Attico etiam respondeam.\n\nIX. Et recte, inquit, respondes: praeclare enim explicatur Peripateticorum\net Academiae veteris auctoritas. Aristoteles primus species, quas paulo\nante dixi, labefactavit: quas mirifice Plato erat amplexatus, ut in iis\nquiddam divinum esse diceret. Theophrastus autem, vir et oratione suavis et\nita moratus, ut prae se probitatem quandam et ingenuitatem ferat,\nvehementius etiam fregit quodam modo auctoritatem veteris disciplinae:\nspoliavit enim virtutem suo decore imbecillamque reddidit, quod negavit in\nea sola positum esse beate vivere. 34. Nam Strato, eius auditor, quamquam\nfuit acri ingenio, tamen ab ea disciplina omnino semovendus est: qui cum\nmaxime necessariam partem philosophiae, quae posita est in virtute et\nmoribus, reliquisset totumque se ad investigationem naturae contulisset, in\nea ipsa plurimum dissedit a suis. Speusippus autem et Xenocrates, qui primi\nPlatonis rationem auctoritatemque susceperant, et post eos Polemo et Crates\nunaque Crantor, in Academia congregati, diligenter ea, quae a superioribus\nacceperant, tuebantur. Iam Polemonem audiverant adsidue Zeno et Arcesilas.\n35. Sed Zeno cum Arcesilam anteiret aetate valdeque subtiliter dissereret\net peracute moveretur, corrigere conatus est disciplinam. Eam quoque, si\nvidetur, correctionem explicabo, sicut solebat Antiochus. Mihi vero,\ninquam, videtur, quod vides idem significare Pomponium.\n\nX. Zeno igitur nullo modo is erat, qui, ut Theophrastus, nervos virtutis\ninciderit, sed contra, qui omnia quae ad beatam vitam pertinerent in una\nvirtute poneret nec quicquam aliud numeraret in bonis, idque appellaret\nhonestum, quod esset simplex quoddam et solum et unum bonum. 36. Cetera\nautem etsi nec bona nec mala essent, tamen alia secundum naturam dicebat,\nalia naturae esse contraria. His ipsis alia interiecta et media numerabat.\nQuae autem secundum naturam essent, ea sumenda et quadam aestimatione\ndignanda docebat, contraque contraria: neutra autem in mediis relinquebat,\nin quibus ponebat nihil omnino esse momenti. 37. Sed quae essent sumenda,\nex iis alia pluris esse aestimanda, alia minoris. Quae pluris, ea\npraeposita appellabat, reiecta autem quae minoris. Atque ut haec non tam\nrebus quam vocabulis commutaverat, sic inter recte factum atque peccatum,\nofficium et contra officium media locabat quaedam: recte facta sola in\nbonis actionibus ponens, prave, id est peccata, in malis: officia autem\nservata praetermissaque media putabat, ut dixi. 38. Cumque superiores non\nomnem virtutem in ratione esse dicerent, sed quasdam virtutes natura aut\nmore perfectas, hic omnis in ratione ponebat, cumque illi ea genera\nvirtutum, quae supra dixi, seiungi posse arbitrarentur, hic nec id ullo\nmodo fieri posse disserebat nec virtutis usum modo, ut superiores, sed\nipsum habitum per se esse praeclarum, nec tamen virtutem cuiquam adesse\nquin ea semper uteretur. Cumque perturbationem animi illi ex homine non\ntollerent, naturaque et condolescere et concupiscere et extimescere et\nefferri laetitia dicerent, sed eas contraherent in angustumque deducerent,\nhic omnibus his quasi morbis voluit carere sapientem. 39. Cumque eas\nperturbationes antiqui naturalis esse dicerent et rationis expertis aliaque\nin parte animi cupiditatem, alia rationem collocarent, ne his quidem\nadsentiebatur. Nam et perturbationes voluntarias esse putabat opinionisque\niudicio suscipi et omnium perturbationum arbitrabatur matrem esse\nimmoderatam quamdam intemperantiam. Haec fere de moribus.\n\nXI. De naturis autem sic sentiebat, primum, ut quattuor initiis rerum illis\nquintam hanc naturam, ex qua superiores sensus et mentem effici rebantur,\nnon adhiberet. Statuebat enim ignem esse ipsam naturam, quae quidque\ngigneret, et mentem atque sensus. Discrepabat etiam ab isdem quod nullo\nmodo arbitrabatur quicquam effici posse ab ea, quae expers esset corporis,\ncuius generis Xenocrates et superiores etiam animum esse dixerant, nec vero\naut quod efficeret aliquid aut quod efficeretur posse esse non corpus. 40.\nPlurima autem in illa tertia philosophiae parte mutavit. In qua primum de\nsensibus ipsis quaedam dixit nova, quos iunctos esse censuit e quadam quasi\nimpulsione oblata extrinsecus, quam ille [Greek: phantasian], nos visum\nappellemus licet, et teneamus hoc verbum quidem: erit enim utendum in\nreliquo sermone saepius. Sed ad haec, quae visa sunt et quasi accepta\nsensibus, adsensionem adiungit animorum, quam esse volt in nobis positam et\nvoluntariam. 41. Visis non omnibus adiungebat fidem, sed iis solum, quae\npropriam quandam haberent declarationem earum rerum, quae viderentur: id\nautem visum, cum ipsum per se cerneretur, comprehendibile--feretis hoc? Nos\nvero, inquit. Quonam enim modo [Greek: katal\u00eapton] diceres?--Sed, cum\nacceptum iam et approbatum esset, comprehensionem appellabat, similem iis\nrebus, quae manu prehenderentur: ex quo etiam nomen hoc duxerat, cum eo\nverbo antea nemo tali in re usus esset, plurimisque idem novis verbis--nova\nenim dicebat--usus est. Quod autem erat sensu comprehensum, id ipsum sensum\nappellabat, et si ita erat comprehensum, ut convelli ratione non posset,\nscientiam: sin aliter, inscientiam nominabat: ex qua exsisteret etiam\nopinio, quae esset imbecilla et cum falso incognitoque communis. 42. Sed\ninter scientiam et inscientiam comprehensionem illam, quam dixi,\ncollocabat, eamque neque in rectis neque in pravis numerabat, sed soli\ncredendum esse dicebat. E quo sensibus etiam fidem tribuebat, quod, ut\nsupra dixi, comprehensio facta sensibus et vera esse illi et fidelis\nvidebatur, non quod omnia, quae essent in re, comprehenderet, sed quia\nnihil quod cadere in eam posset relinqueret quodque natura quasi normam\nscientiae et principium sui dedisset, unde postea notiones rerum in animis\nimprimerentur, e quibus non principia solum, sed latiores quaedam ad\nrationem inveniendam viae reperiuntur. Errorem autem et temeritatem et\nignorantiam et opinationem et suspicionem et uno nomine omnia, quae essent\naliena firmae et constantis adsensionis, a virtute sapientiaque removebat.\nAtque in his fere commutatio constitit omnis dissensioque Zenonis a\nsuperioribus.\n\nXII. 43. Quae cum dixisset: Breviter sane minimeque obscure exposita est,\ninquam, a te, Varro, et veteris Academiae ratio et Stoicorum: verum esse\n[autem] arbitror, ut Antiocho, nostro familiari, placebat, correctionem\nveteris Academiae potius quam aliquam novam disciplinam putandam. Tunc\nVarro: Tuae sunt nunc partes, inquit, qui ab antiquorum ratione desciscis\net ea, quae ab Arcesila novata sunt, probas, docere quod et qua de causa\ndiscidium factum sit, ut videamus satisne ista sit iusta defectio. 44. Tum\nego: Cum Zenone, inquam, ut accepimus, Arcesilas sibi omne certamen\ninstituit, non pertinacia aut studio vincendi, ut mihi quidem videtur, sed\nearum rerum obscuritate, quae ad confessionem ignorationis adduxerant\nSocratem et iam ante Socratem Democritum, Anaxagoram, Empedoclem, omnis\npaene veteres: qui nihil cognosci, nihil percipi, nihil sciri posse\ndixerunt: angustos sensus, imbecillos animos, brevia curricula vitae et, ut\nDemocritus, in profundo veritatem esse demersam, opinionibus et institutis\nomnia teneri, nihil veritati relinqui, deinceps omnia tenebris circumfusa\nesse dixerunt. 45. Itaque Arcesilas negabat esse quicquam quod sciri\nposset, ne illud quidem ipsum, quod Socrates sibi reliquisset: sic omnia\nlatere censebat in occulto: neque esse quicquam quod cerni aut intellegi\nposset: quibus de causis nihil oportere neque profiteri neque adfirmare\nquemquam neque adsensione approbare, cohibereque semper et ab omni lapsu\ncontinere temeritatem, quae tum esset insignis, cum aut falsa aut incognita\nres approbaretur, neque hoc quicquam esse turpius quam cognitioni et\nperceptioni adsensionem approbationemque praecurrere. Huic rationi quod\nerat consentaneum faciebat, ut contra omnium sententias dicens in eam\nplerosque deduceret, ut cum in eadem re paria contrariis in partibus\nmomenta rationum invenirentur, facilius ab utraque parte adsensio\nsustineretur. 46. Hanc Academiam novam appellant, quae mihi vetus videtur,\nsi quidem Platonem ex illa vetere numeramus, cuius in libris nihil\nadfirmatur et in utramque partem multa disseruntur, de omnibus quaeritur,\nnihil certi dicitur: sed tamen illa, quam exposui_sti_, vetus, haec nova\nnominetur: quae usque ad Carneadem perducta, qui quartus ab Arcesila fuit,\nin eadem Arcesilae ratione permansit. Carneades autem nullius philosophiae\npartis ignarus et, ut cognovi ex iis, qui illum audierant, maximeque ex\nEpicureo Zenone, qui cum ab eo plurimum dissentiret, unum tamen praeter\nceteros mirabatur, incredibili quadam fuit facultate....\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nACADEMICORUM POSTERIORUM FRAGMENTA.\n\nEX LIBRO I.\n\n1. Nonius p. 65 Merc. _Digladiari dictum est dissentire et dissidere,\ndictum a gladiis. Cicero Academicorum lib. I._: quid autem stomachatur\nMenesarchus? quid Antipater digladiatur cum Carneade tot voluminibus?\n\n2. Nonius s.v. _concinnare_ p. 43. _Idem in Academicis lib. I._: qui cum\nsimilitudine verbi concinere maxime sibi videretur.\n\nEX LIBRO II.\n\n3. Nonius p. 65. _Aequor ab aequo et plano Cicero Academicorum lib. II.\nvocabulum accepisse confirmat_: quid tam planum videtur quam mare? e quo\netiam aequor illud poetae vocant.\n\n4. Nonius p. 69. _Adamare Cicero Academicorum lib. II._: qui enim serius\nhonores adamaverunt vix admittuntur ad eos nec satis commendati multitudini\npossunt esse.\n\n5. Nonius p. 104. _Exponere pro exempla boni ostentare. Cicero Academicis\nlib. II._: frangere avaritiam, scelera ponere, vitam suam exponere ad\nimitandum iuventuti.\n\n6. Nonius p. 121. _Hebes positum pro obscuro aut obtuso. Cicero\nAcademicorum lib. II.:_ quid? lunae quae liniamenta sint potesne dicere?\ncuius et nascentis et senescentis alias hebetiora, alias acutiora videntur\ncornua.\n\n7. Nonius p. 162. _Purpurascit. Cicero Academicorum lib. II.:_ quid? mare\nnonne caeruleum? at eius unda, cum est pulsa remis, purpurascit: et quidem\naquae tinctum quodam modo et infectum....\n\n8. Nonius p. 162. _Perpendiculi et normae. Cic. Academicorum lib. II.:_\natqui si id crederemus, non egeremus perpendiculis, non normis, non\nregulis.\n\n9. Nonius p. 394. _Siccum dicitur aridum et sine humore ... Siccum dicitur\net sobrium, non madidum ... Cic. Academicorum lib. II.:_ alius (_color_)\nadultis, alius adulescentibus, alius aegris, _alius sanis_, alius siccis,\nalius vinulentis ...\n\n10. Nonius p. 474. _Urinantur. Cic. in Academicis lib. II.:_ si quando enim\nnos demersimus, ut qui urinantur, aut nihil superum aut obscure admodum\ncernimus.\n\n11. Nonius p. 545. _Alabaster. Cic. Academicorum lib. II.:_ quibus etiam\nalabaster plenus unguenti puter esse videtur.\n\nEX LIBRO III.\n\nCicero ad Att. XVI. 6. \u00a74. _De gloria librum ad te misi: at in eo_\nprooemium _id est, quod in Academico tertio._\n\n12. Nonius p. 65. _Digladiari ... idem tertio:_ digladiari autem semper,\ndepugnare cum facinorosis et audacibus, quis non cum miserrimum, tum etiam\nstultissimum dixerit?\n\n13. Nonius p. 65. _Exultare dictum est exilire. Cic. Academicorum lib.\nIII._: et ut nos nunc sedemus ad Lucrinum pisciculosque exultantes videmus\n...\n\n14. Nonius p. 123. _Ingeneraretur ut innasceretur. Cic. Academicorum lib.\nIII._: in tanta animantium varietate, homini ut soli cupiditas\ningeneraretur cognitionis et scientiae.\n\n15. Nonius p. 419. _Vindicare, trahere, liberare ... Cicero Academicorum\nlib. III._: aliqua potestas sit, vindicet se in libertatem.\n\n16. Lactantius Inst. div. VI. 24. _Cicero ... cuius haec in Academico\ntertio verba sunt:_ quod si liceret, ut iis qui in itinere deerravissent,\nsic vitam deviam secutis corrigere errorem paenitendo, facilior esset\nemendatio temeritatis.\n\n17. Diomedes p. 373, ed. Putsch.: p. 377, ed. Keil. _Varro ad Ciceronem\ntertio_ fixum _et Cicero Academicorum tertio_ (= _Lucullus_ \u00a727): +malcho\nin opera adfixa.\n\n18. Nonius p. 139. _Mordicibus et mordicus pro morsu, pro morsibus ... Cic.\nAcademicorum lib. III._: perspicuitatem, quam mordicus tenere debemus,\nabesse dicemus. = _Lucullus_ \u00a751.\n\n19. Nonius p. 117. _Gallinas. Cic. Academicorum lib. III._: qui gallinas\nalere permultas quaestus causa solerent: ii cum ovum inspexerant, quae\ngallina peperisset dicere solebant. = _Lucullus_ \u00a757.\n\nEX LIBRO IIII.\n\n20. Nonius p. 69, _Adstipulari positum est adsentiri. Cic. in Academicis\nlib. IIII._: falsum esse.... Antiochus. = _Lucullus_ \u00a767.\n\n21. Nonius p. 65. _Maeniana ab inventore eorum Maenio dicta sunt; unde et\ncolumna Maenia. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII._: item ille cum aestuaret,\nveterum ut Maenianorum, sic Academicorum viam secutus est. = _Lucullus_\n\u00a770.\n\n22. Nonius p. 99. _Dolitum, quod dolatum usu dicitur, quod est percaesum\nvel abrasum vel effossum ... Cicero dolatum Academicorum lib. IIII._: non\nenim est e saxo sculptus aut e robore dolatus. = _Lucullus_ \u00a7100.\n\n23. Nonius p. 164. _Ravum fulvum. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII._: quia\nnobismet ipsis tum caeruleum, tum ravum videtur, quodque nunc a sole\nconlucet.... = _Lucullus_ \u00a7105.\n\n24. Nonius p. 107. _Exanclare est perpeti vel superare. Cic. Academicorum\nlib. IIII._: credoque Clitomacho ita scribenti ut Herculi quendam laborem\nexanclatum. = _Lucullus_ \u00a7108.\n\n25. Nonius p. 163. _Pingue positum pro impedito et inepto. Cic.\nAcademicorum lib. IIII._: quod ipsi ... contrarium. = _Lucullus_ \u00a7109.\n\n26. Nonius p. 122. _Infinitatem. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII._: at hoc\nAnaximandro infinitatem. = _Lucullus_ \u00a7118.\n\n27. Nonius p. 65. _Natrices dicuntur angues natantes Cic. Academicorum lib.\nIIII._: sic enim voltis ... fecerit. = _Lucullus_ \u00a7120.\n\n28. Nonius p. 189. _Uncinatum ab unco. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII._: nec\nut ille qui asperis et hamatis uncinatisque corpusculis concreta haec esse\ndicat. = _Lucullus_ \u00a7121.\n\n29. Martianus Capella V. \u00a7517, p. 444, ed. Kopp. _Cicero ... in\nAcademicis_: latent ista omnia, Varro, magnis obscurata et circumfusa\ntenebris. = _Lucullus_ \u00a7122.\n\n30. Nonius p. 102. _E regione positum est ex adverso. Cic. Academicorum\nlib. IIII._: nec ego non ita ... vos etiam dicitis e regione nobis in\ncontraria parte terrae qui adversis vestigiis stent contra nostra vestigia.\n= _Lucullus_ \u00a7123.\n\n31. Nonius p. 80. _Balbuttire est cum quadam linguae haesitatione et\nconfusione trepidare, Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII._: plane, ut supra\ndictus, Stoicus perpauca balbuttiens. = _Lucullus_ \u00a7135.\n\nEx LIBRIS INCERTIS.\n\n32. Lactantius Inst. div. III. 14. _Haec tua verba sunt_ (_sc. Cicero!_):\nmihi autem non modo ad sapientiam caeci videmur, sed ad ea ipsa quae aliqua\nex parte cerni videantur, hebetes et obtusi.\n\n33. August. contra Academicos II. \u00a726.: _id probabile vel veri simile\nAcademici vacant, quod nos ad agendum sine adsensione potent invitare_. ...\nTalia, _inquit Academicus_, mihi videntur omnia quae probabilia vel veri\nsimilia putavi nominanda: quae tu si alio nomine vis vocare, nihil repugno.\nSatis enim mihi est te iam bene accepisse quid dicam, id est, quibus rebus\nhaec nomina imponam; non enim vocabulorum opificem, sed rerum inquisitorem\ndecet esse sapientem. [_Proximis post hunc locum verbis perspicue asseverat\nAugustinus haec ipsius esse Ciceronis verba_.]\n\n34. Augustin. c. Acad. III. \u00a715. _Est in libris Ciceronis quae in huius\ncausae (i.e. Academicorum) patrocinium scripsit, locus quidam.... _\nAcademico sapienti ab omnibus ceterarum sectarum, qui sibi sapientes\nvidentur, secundas partes dari; cum primas sibi quemque vindicare necesse\nsit; ex quo posse probabiliter confici eum recte primum esse iudicio suo,\nqui omnium ceterorum judicio sit secundus.\n\n35. Augustin. c. Acad. III. \u00a743. _Ait enim Cicero_ illis (_i.e.\nAcademicis_) morem fuisse occultandi sententiam suam nec eam cuiquam, nisi\nqui secum ad senectutem usque vixissent, aperire consuesse.\n\n36. Augustin. De Civit. Dei VI. 2. _Denique et ipse Tullius huic (i.e. M.T.\nVarroni) tale testimonium perhibet, ut in libris Academicis eam quae ibi\nversatur disputationem se habuisse cum M. Varrone_, homine, _inquit_,\nomnium facile acutissimo et sine ulla dubitatione doctissimo.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nACADEMICORUM PRIORUM\n\nLIBER II.\n\nI. 1. Magnum ingenium Luci Luculli magnumque optimarum artium studium, tum\nomnis liberalis et digna homine nobili ab eo percepta doctrina, quibus\ntemporibus florere in foro maxime potuit, caruit omnino rebus urbanis. Ut\nenim admodum adolescens cum fratre pari pietate et industria praedito\npaternas inimicitias magna cum gloria est persecutus, in Asiam quaestor\nprofectus, ibi permultos annos admirabili quadam laude provinciae praefuit;\ndeinde absens factus aedilis, continuo praetor--licebat enim celerius legis\npraemio--, post in Africam, inde ad consulatum, quem ita gessit ut\ndiligentiam admirarentur omnes, ingenium cognoscerent. Post ad\nMithridaticum bellum missus a senatu non modo opinionem vicit omnium, quae\nde virtute eius erat, sed etiam gloriam superiorum. 2. Idque eo fuit\nmirabilius, quod ab eo laus imperatoria non admodum exspectabatur, qui\nadolescentiam in forensi opera, quaesturae diuturnum tempus Murena bellum\nin Ponto gerente in Asia pace consumpserat. Sed incredibilis quaedam ingeni\nmagnitudo non desideravit indocilem usus disciplinam. Itaque cum totum iter\net navigationem consumpsisset partim in percontando a peritis, partim in\nrebus gestis legendis, in Asiam factus imperator venit, cum esset Roma\nprofectus rei militaris rudis. Habuit enim divinam quandam memoriam rerum,\nverborum maiorem Hortensius, sed quo plus in negotiis gerendis res quam\nverba prosunt, hoc erat memoria illa praestantior, quam fuisse in\nThemistocle, quem facile Graeciae principem ponimus, singularem ferunt: qui\nquidem etiam pollicenti cuidam se artem ei memoriae, quae tum primum\nproferebatur, traditurum respondisse dicitur oblivisci se malle discere,\ncredo, quod haerebant in memoria quaecumque audierat et viderat. Tali\ningenio praeditus Lucullus adiunxerat etiam illam, quam Themistocles\nspreverat, disciplinam. Itaque ut litteris consignamus quae monumentis\nmandare volumus, sic ille in animo res insculptas habebat. 3. Tantus ergo\nimperator in omni genere belli fuit, proeliis, oppugnationibus, navalibus\npugnis totiusque belli instrumento et apparatu, ut ille rex post Alexandrum\nmaximus hunc a se maiorem ducem cognitum quam quemquam eorum, quos\nlegisset, fateretur. In eodem tanta prudentia fuit in constituendis\ntemperandisque civitatibus, tanta aequitas, ut hodie stet Asia Luculli\ninstitutis servandis et quasi vestigiis persequendis. Sed etsi magna cum\nutilitate rei publicae, tamen diutius quam vellem tanta vis virtutis atque\ningeni peregrinata afuit ab oculis et fori et curiae. Quin etiam, cum\nvictor a Mithridatico bello revertisset, inimicorum calumnia triennio\ntardius quam debuerat triumphavit. Nos enim consules introduximus paene in\nurbem currum clarissimi viri: cuius mihi consilium et auctoritas quid tum\nin maximis rebus profuisset dicerem, nisi de me ipso dicendum esset: quod\nhoc tempore non est necesse. Itaque privabo illum potius debito testimonio\nquam id cum mea laude communicem.\n\nII. 4. Sed quae populari gloria decorari in Lucullo debuerunt, ea fere sunt\net Graecis litteris celebrata et Latinis. Nos autem illa externa cum\nmultis, haec interiora cum paucis ex ipso saepe cognovimus. Maiore enim\nstudio Lucullus cum omni litterarum generi tum philosophiae deditus fuit\nquam qui illum ignorabant arbitrabantur, nec vero ineunte aetate solum, sed\net pro quaestore aliquot annos et in ipso bello, in quo ita magna rei\nmilitaris esse occupatio solet, ut non multum imperatori sub ipsis pellibus\notii relinquatur. Cum autem e philosophis ingenio scientiaque putaretur\nAntiochus, Philonis auditor, excellere, eum secum et quaestor habuit et\npost aliquot annos imperator, cumque esset ea memoria, quam ante dixi, ea\nsaepe audiendo facile cognovit, quae vel semel audita meminisse potuisset.\nDelectabatur autem mirifice lectione librorum, de quibus audiebat.\n\n5. Ac vereor interdum ne talium personarum cum amplificare velim, minuam\netiam gloriam. Sunt enim multi qui omnino Graecas non ament litteras,\nplures qui philosophiam, reliqui, etiam si haec non improbent, tamen earum\nrerum disputationem principibus civitatis non ita decoram putant. Ego\nautem, cum Graecas litteras M. Catonem in senectute didicisse acceperim, P.\nautem Africani historiae loquantur in legatione illa nobili, quam ante\ncensuram obiit, Panaetium unum omnino comitem fuisse, nec litterarum\nGraecarum nec philosophiae iam ullum auctorem requiro. 6. Restat ut iis\nrespondeam, qui sermonibus eius modi nolint personas tam gravis illigari.\nQuasi vero clarorum virorum aut tacitos congressus esse oporteat aut\nludicros sermones aut rerum colloquia leviorum! Etenim, si quodam in libro\nvere est a nobis philosophia laudata, profecto eius tractatio optimo atque\namplissimo quoque dignissima est, nec quicquam aliud videndum est nobis,\nquos populus Romanus hoc in gradu collocavit, nisi ne quid privatis studiis\nde opera publica detrahamus. Quod si, cum fungi munere debebamus, non modo\noperam nostram numquam a populari coetu removimus, sed ne litteram quidem\nullam fecimus nisi forensem, quis reprehendet nostrum otium, qui in eo non\nmodo nosmet ipsos hebescere et languere nolumus, sed etiam ut plurimis\nprosimus enitimur? Gloriam vero non modo non minui, sed etiam augeri\narbitramur eorum, quorum ad popularis illustrisque laudes has etiam minus\nnotas minusque pervolgatas adiungimus. 7. Sunt etiam qui negent in iis, qui\nin nostris libris disputent, fuisse earum rerum, de quibus disputatur,\nscientiam: qui mihi videntur non solum vivis, sed etiam mortuis invidere.\n\nIII. Restat unum genus reprehensorum, quibus Academiae ratio non probatur.\nQuod gravius ferremus, si quisquam ullam disciplinam philosophiae probaret\npraeter eam, quam ipse sequeretur. Nos autem, quoniam contra omnis dicere\nquae videntur solemus, non possumus quin alii a nobis dissentiant recusare:\nquamquam nostra quidem causa facilis est, qui verum invenire sine ulla\ncontentione volumus, idque summa cura studioque conquirimus. Etsi enim\nomnis cognitio multis est obstructa difficultatibus eaque est et in ipsis\nrebus obscuritas et in iudiciis nostris infirmitas, ut non sine causa\nantiquissimi et doctissimi invenire se posse quod cuperent diffisi sint,\ntamen nec illi defecerunt neque nos studium exquirendi defetigati\nrelinquemus, neque nostrae disputationes quicquam aliud agunt nisi ut in\nutramque partem dicendo eliciant et tamquam exprimant aliquid, quod aut\nverum sit aut ad id quam proxime accedat. 8. Neque inter nos et eos, qui se\nscire arbitrantur, quicquam interest, nisi quod illi non dubitant quin ea\nvera sint, quae defendunt: nos probabilia multa habemus, quae sequi facile,\nadfirmare vix possumus. Hoc autem liberiores et solutiores sumus, quod\nintegra nobis est iudicandi potestas, nec ut omnia, quae praescripta et\nquasi imperata sint, defendamus necessitate ulla cogimur. Nam ceteri primum\nante tenentur adstricti quam quid esset optimum iudicare potuerunt: deinde\ninfirmissimo tempore aetatis aut obsecuti amico cuidam aut una alicuius,\nquem primum audierunt, oratione capti de rebus incognitis iudicant et, ad\nquamcumque sunt disciplinam quasi tempestate delati, ad eam tamquam ad\nsaxum adhaerescunt. 9. Nam, quod dicunt omnino se credere ei, quem iudicent\nfuisse sapientem, probarem, si id ipsum rudes et indocti iudicare\npotuissent--statuere enim qui sit sapiens vel maxime videtur esse\nsapientis--, sed ut potuerint, potuerunt omnibus rebus auditis, cognitis\netiam reliquorum sententiis, iudicaverunt autem re semel audita atque ad\nunius se auctoritatem contulerunt. Sed nescio quo modo plerique errare\nmalunt eamque sententiam, quam adamaverunt, pugnacissime defendere quam\nsine pertinacia quid constantissime dicatur exquirere. Quibus de rebus et\nalias saepe multa quaesita et disputata sunt et quondam in Hortensii villa,\nquae est ad Baulos, cum eo Catulus et Lucullus nosque ipsi postridie\nvenissemus, quam apud Catulum fuissemus. Quo quidem etiam maturius venimus,\nquod erat constitutum, si ventus esset, Lucullo in Neapolitanum, mihi in\nPompeianum navigare. Cum igitur pauca in xysto locuti essemus, tum eodem in\nspatio consedimus.\n\nIV. 10. Hic Catulus: Etsi heri, inquit, id, quod quaerebatur, paene\nexplicatum est, ut tota fere quaestio tractata videatur, tamen exspecto ea,\nquae te pollicitus es, Luculle, ab Antiocho audita dicturum. Equidem,\ninquit Hortensius, feci plus quam vellem: totam enim rem Lucullo integram\nservatam oportuit. Et tamen fortasse servata est: a me enim ea, quae in\npromptu erant, dicta sunt, a Lucullo autem reconditiora desidero. Tum ille:\nNon sane, inquit, Hortensi, conturbat me exspectatio tua, etsi nihil est\niis, qui placere volunt, tam adversarium, sed quia non laboro quam valde\nea, quae dico, probaturus sim, eo minus conturbor. Dicam enim nec mea nec\nea, in quibus, si non fuerint, _non_ vinci me malim quam vincere. Sed\nmehercule, ut quidem nunc se causa habet, etsi hesterno sermone labefactata\nest, mihi tamen videtur esse verissima. Agam igitur, sicut Antiochus\nagebat: nota enim mihi res est. Nam et vacuo animo illum audiebam et magno\nstudio, eadem de re etiam saepius, ut etiam maiorem exspectationem mei\nfaciam quam modo fecit Hortensius. Cum ita esset exorsus, ad audiendum\nanimos ereximus. 11. At ille: Cum Alexandriae pro quaestore, inquit, essem,\nfuit Antiochus mecum et erat iam antea Alexandriae familiaris Antiochi\nHeraclitus Tyrius, qui et Clitomachum multos annos et Philonem audierat,\nhomo sane in ista philosophia, quae nunc prope dimissa revocatur, probatus\net nobilis: cum quo Antiochum saepe disputantem audiebam, sed utrumque\nleniter. Et quidem isti libri duo Philonis, de quibus heri dictum a Catulo\nest, tum erant adlati Alexandriam tumque primum in Antiochi manus venerant:\net homo natura lenissimus--nihil enim poterat fieri illo mitius--stomachari\ntamen coepit. Mirabar: nec enim umquam ante videram. At ille, Heracliti\nmemoriam implorans, quaerere ex eo viderenturne illa Philonis aut ea num\nvel e Philone vel ex ullo Academico audivisset aliquando? Negabat. Philonis\ntamen scriptum agnoscebat: nec id quidem dubitari poterat: nam aderant mei\nfamiliares, docti homines, P. et C. Selii et Tetrilius Rogus, qui se illa\naudivisse Romae de Philone et ab eo ipso illos duos libros dicerent\ndescripsisse. 12. Tum et illa dixit Antiochus, quae heri Catulus\ncommemoravit a patre suo dicta Philoni, et alia plura, nec se tenuit quin\ncontra suum doctorem librum etiam ederet, qui Sosus inscribitur. Tum igitur\net cum Heraclitum studiose audirem contra Antiochum disserentem et item\nAntiochum contra Academicos, dedi Antiocho operam diligentius, ut causam ex\neo totam cognoscerem. Itaque compluris dies adhibito Heraclito doctisque\ncompluribus et in iis Antiochi fratre, Aristo, et praeterea Aristone et\nDione, quibus ille secundum fratrem plurimum tribuebat, multum temporis in\nista una disputatione consumpsimus. Sed ea pars, quae contra Philonem erat,\npraetermittenda est: minus enim acer est adversarius is, qui ista, quae\nsunt heri defensa, negat Academicos omnino dicere. Etsi enim mentitur,\ntamen est adversarius lenior. Ad Arcesilam Carneademque veniamus.\n\nV. 13. Quae cum dixisset, sic rursus exorsus est: Primum mihi videmini--me\nautem nomine appellabat, cum veteres physicos nominatis, facere idem, quod\nseditiosi cives solent, cum aliquos ex antiquis claros viros proferunt,\nquos dicant fuisse popularis, ut eorum ipsi similes esse videantur.\nRepetunt ii a P. Valerio, qui exactis regibus primo anno consul fuit,\ncommemorant reliquos, qui leges popularis de provocationibus tulerint, cum\nconsules essent; tum ad hos notiores, C. Flaminium, qui legem agrariam\naliquot annis ante secundum Punicum bellum tribunus plebis tulerit invito\nsenatu et postea bis consul factus sit, L. Cassium, Q. Pompeium: illi\nquidem etiam P. Africanum referre in eundem numerum solent. Duos vero\nsapientissimos et clarissimos fratres, P. Crassum et P. Scaevolam, aiunt\nTi. Graccho auctores legum fuisse, alterum quidem, ut videmus, palam,\nalterum, ut suspicantur, obscurius. Addunt etiam C. Marium. Et de hoc\nquidem nihil mentiuntur. Horum nominibus tot virorum atque tantorum\nexpositis eorum se institutum sequi dicunt. 14. Similiter vos, cum\nperturbare, ut illi rem publicam, sic vos philosophiam bene iam constitutam\nvelitis, Empedoclem, Anaxagoram, Democritum, Parmenidem, Xenophanem,\nPlatonem etiam et Socratem profertis. Sed neque Saturninus, ut nostrum\ninimicum potissimum nominem, simile quicquam habuit veterum illorum nec\nArcesilae calumnia conferenda est cum Democriti verecundia. Et tamen isti\nphysici raro admodum, cum haerent aliquo loco, exclamant quasi mente\nincitati, Empedocles quidem, ut interdum mihi furere videatur, abstrusa\nesse omnia, nihil nos sentire, nihil cernere, nihil omnino quale sit posse\nreperire: maiorem autem partem mihi quidem omnes isti videntur nimis etiam\nquaedam adfirmare plusque profiteri se scire quam sciant. 15. Quod si illi\ntum in novis rebus quasi modo nascentes haesitaverunt, nihilne tot\nsaeculis, summis ingeniis, maximis studiis explicatum putamus? nonne, cum\niam philosophorum disciplinae gravissimae constitissent, tum exortus est ut\nin optima re publica Ti. Gracchus qui otium perturbaret, sic Arcesilas qui\nconstitutam philosophiam everteret et in eorum auctoritate delitisceret,\nqui negavissent quicquam sciri aut percipi posse? quorum e numero tollendus\nest et Plato et Socrates: alter, quia reliquit perfectissimam disciplinam,\nPeripateticos et Academicos, nominibus differentis, re congruentis, a\nquibus Stoici ipsi verbis magis quam sententiis dissenserunt. Socrates\nautem de se ipse detrahens in disputatione plus tribuebat iis, quos volebat\nrefellere. Ita, cum aliud agnosceret atque sentiret, libenter uti solitus\nest ea dissimulatione, quam Graeci [Greek: eir\u00f4neian] vocant: quam ait\netiam in Africano fuisse Fannius, idque propterea vitiosum in illo non\nputandum, quod idem fuerit in Socrate.\n\nVI. 16. Sed fuerint illa veteribus, si voltis, incognita. Nihilne est\nigitur actum, quod investigata sunt, postea quam Arcesilas Zenoni, ut\nputatur, obtrectans nihil novi reperienti, sed emendanti superiores\nimmutatione verborum, dum huius definitiones labefactare volt, conatus est\nclarissimis rebus tenebras obducere? Cuius primo non admodum probata ratio,\nquamquam floruit cum acumine ingeni tum admirabili quodam lepore dicendi,\nproxime a Lacyde solo retenta est: post autem confecta a Carneade, qui est\nquartus ab Arcesila: audivit enim Hegesinum, qui Euandrum audierat, Lacydi\ndiscipulum, cum Arcesilae Lacydes fuisset. Sed ipse Carneades diu tenuit:\nnam nonaginta vixit annos, et qui illum audierant, admodum floruerunt: e\nquibus industriae plurimum in Clitomacho fuit--declarat multitudo\nlibrorum--ingeni non minus in [Aeschine], in Charmada eloquentiae, in\nMelanthio Rhodio suavitatis. Bene autem nosse Carneadem Stratoniceus\nMetrodorus putabatur. 17. Iam Clitomacho Philo vester operam multos annos\ndedit. Philone autem vivo patrocinium Academiae non defuit. Sed, quod nos\nfacere nunc ingredimur, ut contra Academicos disseramus, id quidam e\nphilosophis et ii quidem non mediocres faciendum omnino non putabant: nec\nvero esse ullam rationem disputare cum iis, qui nihil probarent,\nAntipatrumque Stoicum, qui multus in eo fuisset, reprehendebant, nec\ndefiniri aiebant necesse esse quid esset cognitio aut perceptio aut, si\nverbum e verbo volumus, comprehensio, quam [Greek: katal\u00eapsin] illi vocant,\neosque, qui persuadere vellent, esse aliquid quod comprehendi et percipi\nposset, inscienter facere dicebant, propterea quod nihil esset clarius\n[Greek: enargeiai], ut Graeci: perspicuitatem aut evidentiam nos, si\nplacet, nominemus fabricemurque, si opus erit, verba, ne hic sibi--me\nappellabat iocans--hoc licere putet soli: sed tamen orationem nullam\nputabant illustriorem ipsa evidentia reperiri posse nec ea, quae tam clara\nessent, definienda censebant. Alii autem negabant se pro hac evidentia\nquicquam priores fuisse dicturos, sed ad ea, quae contra dicerentur, dici\noportere putabant, ne qui fallerentur. 18. Plerique tamen et definitiones\nipsarum etiam evidentium rerum non improbant et rem idoneam, de qua\nquaeratur, et homines dignos, quibuscum disseratur, putant. Philo autem,\ndum nova quaedam commovet, quod ea sustinere vix poterat, quae contra\nAcademicorum pertinaciam dicebantur, et aperte mentitur, ut est reprehensus\na patre Catulo, et, ut docuit Antiochus, in id ipsum se induit, quod\ntimebat. Cum enim ita negaret, quicquam esse, quod comprehendi posset--id\nenim volumus esse [Greek: akatal\u00eapton]--, si illud esset, sicut Zeno\ndefiniret, tale visum--iam enim hoc pro [Greek: phantasiai] verbum satis\nhesterno sermone trivimus--visum igitur impressum effictumque ex eo, unde\nesset, quale esse non posset, ex eo, unde non esset, id nos a Zenone\ndefinitum rectissime dicimus: qui enim potest quicquam comprehendi, ut\nplane confidas perceptum id cognitumque esse, quod est tale, quale vel\nfalsum esse possit? hoc cum infirmat tollitque Philo, iudicium tollit\nincogniti et cogniti: ex quo efficitur nihil posse comprehendi. Ita\nimprudens eo, quo minime volt, revolvitur. Qua re omnis oratio contra\nAcademiam suscipitur a nobis, ut retineamus eam definitionem, quam Philo\nvoluit evertere. Quam nisi obtinemus, percipi nihil posse concedimus.\n\nVII. 19. Ordiamur igitur a sensibus: quorum ita clara iudicia et certa\nsunt, ut, si optio naturae nostrae detur, et ab ea deus aliqui requirat\ncontentane sit suis integris incorruptisque sensibus an postulet melius\naliquid, non videam quid quaerat amplius. Nec vero hoc loco exspectandum\nest, dum de remo inflexo aut de collo columbae respondeam: non enim is sum,\nqui quidquid videtur tale dicam esse quale videatur. Epicurus hoc viderit\net alia multa. Meo autem iudicio ita est maxima in sensibus veritas, si et\nsani sunt ac valentes et omnia removentur, quae obstant et impediunt.\nItaque et lumen mutari saepe volumus et situs earum rerum, quas intuemur,\net intervalla aut contrahimus aut diducimus, multaque facimus usque eo, dum\nadspectus ipse fidem faciat sui iudicii. Quod idem fit in vocibus, in\nodore, in sapore, ut nemo sit nostrum qui in sensibus sui cuiusque generis\niudicium requirat acrius. 20. Adhibita vero exercitatione et arte, ut oculi\npictura teneantur, aures cantibus, quis est quin cernat quanta vis sit in\nsensibus? Quam multa vident pictores in umbris et in eminentia, quae nos\nnon videmus! quam multa, quae nos fugiunt in cantu, exaudiunt in eo genere\nexercitati! qui primo inflatu tibicinis Antiopam esse aiunt aut\nAndromacham, quum id nos ne suspicemur quidem. Nihil necesse est de gustatu\net odoratu loqui, in quibus intellegentia, etsi vitiosa, est quaedam tamen.\nQuid de tactu, et eo quidem, quem philosophi interiorem vocant, aut doloris\naut voluptatis? in quo Cyrenaici solo putant veri esse iudicium, quia\nsentiatur:--potestne igitur quisquam dicere inter eum, qui doleat, et inter\neum, qui in voluptate sit, nihil interesse? aut, ita qui sentiet non\napertissime insaniat? 21. Atqui qualia sunt haec, quae sensibus percipi\ndicimus, talia secuntur ea, quae non sensibus ipsis percipi dicuntur, sed\nquodam modo sensibus, ut haec: 'illud est album, hoc dulce, canorum illud,\nhoc bene olens, hoc asperum.' Animo iam haec tenemus comprehensa, non\nsensibus. 'Ille' deinceps 'equus est, ille canis.' Cetera series deinde\nsequitur, maiora nectens, ut haec, quae quasi expletam rerum\ncomprehensionem amplectuntur: 'si homo est, animal est mortale, rationis\nparticeps.' Quo e genere nobis notitiae rerum imprimuntur, sine quibus nec\nintellegi quicquam nec quaeri disputarive potest. 22. Quod si essent falsae\nnotitiae--[Greek: ennoias] enim notitias appellare tu videbare--, si igitur\nessent hae falsae aut eius modi visis impressae, qualia visa a falsis\ndiscerni non possent, quo tandem his modo uteremur? quo modo autem quid\ncuique rei consentaneum esset, quid repugnaret videremus? Memoriae quidem\ncerte, quae non modo philosophiam, sed omnis vitae usus omnisque artis una\nmaxime continet, nihil omnino loci relinquitur. Quae potest enim esse\nmemoria falsorum? aut quid quisquam meminit, quod non animo comprehendit et\ntenet? Ars vero quae potest esse nisi quae non ex una aut duabus, sed ex\nmultis animi perceptionibus constat? Quam si subtraxeris, qui distingues\nartificem ab inscio? Non enim fortuito hunc artificem dicemus esse, illum\nnegabimus, sed cum alterum percepta et comprehensa tenere videmus, alterum\nnon item. Cumque artium aliud eius modi genus sit, ut tantum modo animo rem\ncernat, aliud, ut moliatur aliquid et faciat, quo modo aut geometres\ncernere ea potest, quae aut nulla sunt aut internosci a falsis non possunt,\naut is, qui fidibus utitur, explere numeros et conficere versus? Quod idem\nin similibus quoque artibus continget, quarum omne opus est in faciendo\natque agendo. Quid enim est quod arte effici possit, nisi is, qui artem\ntractabit, multa perceperit?\n\nVIII. 23. Maxime vero virtutum cognitio confirmat percipi et comprehendi\nmulta posse. In quibus solis inesse etiam scientiam dicimus, quam nos non\ncomprehensionem modo rerum, sed eam stabilem quoque et immutabilem esse\ncensemus, itemque sapientiam, artem vivendi, quae ipsa ex sese habeat\nconstantiam. Ea autem constantia si nihil habeat percepti et cogniti,\nquaero unde nata sit aut quo modo? Quaero etiam, ille vir bonus, qui\nstatuit omnem cruciatum perferre, intolerabili dolore lacerari potius quam\naut officium prodat aut fidem, cur has igitur sibi tam gravis leges\nimposuerit, cum quam ob rem ita oporteret nihil haberet comprehensi,\npercepti, cogniti, constituti? Nullo igitur modo fieri potest ut quisquam\ntanti aestimet aequitatem et fidem, ut eius conservandae causa nullum\nsupplicium recuset, nisi iis rebus adsensus sit, quae falsae esse non\npossint. 24. Ipsa vero sapientia, si se ignorabit sapientia sit necne, quo\nmodo primum obtinebit nomen sapientiae? deinde quo modo suscipere aliquam\nrem aut agere fidenter audebit, cum certi nihil erit quod sequatur? cum\nvero dubitabit quid sit extremum et ultimum bonorum, ignorans quo omnia\nreferantur, qui poterit esse sapientia? Atque etiam illud perspicuum est,\nconstitui necesse esse initium, quod sapientia, cum quid agere incipiat,\nsequatur, idque initium esse naturae accommodatum. Nam aliter\nappetitio--eam enim volumus esse [Greek: horm\u00ean]--, qua ad agendum\nimpellimur, et id appetimus, quod est visum, moveri non potest. 25. Illud\nautem, quod movet, prius oportet videri eique credi: quod fieri non potest,\nsi id, quod visum erit, discerni non poterit a falso. Quo modo autem moveri\nanimus ad appetendum potest, si id, quod videtur, non percipitur\naccommodatumne naturae sit an alienum? Itemque, si quid offici sui sit non\noccurrit animo, nihil umquam omnino aget, ad nullam rem umquam impelletur,\nnumquam movebitur. Quod si aliquid aliquando acturus est, necesse est id ei\nverum, quod occurrit, videri. 26. Quid quod, si ista vera sunt, ratio omnis\ntollitur, quasi quaedam lux lumenque vitae, tamenne in ista pravitate\nperstabitis? Nam quaerendi initium ratio attulit, quae perfecit virtutem,\ncum esset ipsa ratio confirmata quaerendo. Quaestio autem est appetitio\ncognitionis quaestionisque finis inventio. At nemo invenit falsa, nec ea,\nquae incerta permanent, inventa esse possunt, sed, cum ea, quae quasi\ninvoluta fuerunt, aperta sunt, tum inventa dicuntur. Sic et initium\nquaerendi et exitus percipiendi et comprehendendi tenet_ur_. Itaque\nargumenti conclusio, quae est Graece [Greek: apodeixis], ita definitur:\n'ratio, quae ex rebus perceptis ad id, quod non percipiebatur, adducit.'\n\nIX. 27. Quod si omnia visa eius modi essent, qualia isti dicunt, ut ea vel\nfalsa esse possent, neque ea posset ulla notio discernere, quo modo\nquemquam aut conclusisse aliquid aut invenisse diceremus aut quae esset\nconclusi argumenti fides? Ipsa autem philosophia, quae rationibus progredi\ndebet, quem habebit exitum? Sapientiae vero quid futurum est? quae neque de\nse ipsa dubitare debet neque de suis decretis, quae philosophi vocant\n[Greek: dogmata], quorum nullum sine scelere prodi poterit. Cum enim\ndecretum proditur, lex veri rectique proditur, quo e vitio et amicitiarum\nproditiones et rerum publicarum nasci solent. Non potest igitur dubitari\nquin decretum nullum falsum possit esse sapientique satis non sit non esse\nfalsum, sed etiam stabile, fixum, ratum esse debeat, quod movere nulla\nratio queat. Talia autem neque esse neque videri possunt eorum ratione, qui\nilla visa, e quibus omnia decreta sunt nata, negant quicquam a falsis\ninteresse. 28. Ex hoc illud est natum, quod postulabat Hortensius, ut id\nipsum saltem perceptum a sapiente diceretis, nihil posse percipi. Sed\nAntipatro hoc idem postulanti, cum diceret ei, qui adfirmaret nihil posse\npercipi, consentaneum esse unum tamen illud dicere percipi posse, ut alia\nnon possent, Carneades acutius resistebat. Nam tantum abesse dicebat, ut id\nconsentaneum esset, ut maxime etiam repugnaret. Qui enim negaret quicquam\nesse quod perciperetur, eum nihil excipere: ita necesse esse, ne id ipsum\nquidem, quod exceptum non esset, comprehendi et percipi ullo modo posse.\n29. Antiochus ad istum locum pressius videbatur accedere. Quoniam enim id\nhaberent Academici decretum,--sentitis enim iam hoc me [Greek: dogma]\ndicere--, nihil posse percipi, non debere eos in suo decreto, sicut in\nceteris rebus, fluctuare, praesertim cum in eo summa consisteret: hanc enim\nesse regulam totius philosophiae, constitutionem veri falsi, cogniti\nincogniti: quam rationem quoniam susciperent docereque vellent quae vis_a_\naccipi oporteret et quae repudiari, certe hoc ipsum, ex quo omne veri\nfalsique iudicium esset, percipere eos debuisse: etenim duo esse haec\nmaxima in philosophia, iudicium veri et finem bonorum, nec sapientem posse\nesse, qui aut cognoscendi esse initium ignoret aut extremum expetendi, ut\naut unde proficiscatur aut quo perveniendum sit nesciat: haec autem habere\ndubia neque iis ita confidere, ut moveri non possint, abhorrere a sapientia\nplurimum. Hoc igitur modo potius erat ab his postulandum, ut hoc unum\nsaltem, percipi nihil posse, perceptum esse dicerent. Sed de inconstantia\ntotius illorum sententiae, si ulla sententia cuiusquam esse potest nihil\napprobantis, sit, ut opinor, dictum satis.\n\nX. 30. Sequitur disputatio copiosa illa quidem, sed paulo abstrusior--habet\nenim aliquantum a physicis--, ut verear ne maiorem largiar ei, qui contra\ndicturus est, libertatem et licentiam. Nam quid eum facturum putem de\nabditis rebus et obscuris, qui lucem eripere conetur? Sed disputari poterat\nsubtiliter, quanto quasi artificio natura fabricata esset primum animal\nomne, deinde hominem maxime, quae vis esset in sensibus, quem ad modum\nprimum visa nos pellerent, deinde appetitio ab his pulsa sequeretur, tum ut\nsensus ad res percipiendas intenderemus. Mens enim ipsa, quae sensuum fons\nest atque etiam ipsa sensus est, naturalem vim habet, quam intendit ad ea,\nquibus movetur. Itaque alia visa sic adripit, ut iis statim utatur, alia\nquasi recondit, e quibus memoria oritur. Cetera autem similitudinibus\nconstruit, ex quibus efficiuntur notitiae rerum, quas Graeci tum [Greek:\nennoias], tum [Greek: prol\u00eapseis] vocant. Eo cum accessit ratio\nargumentique conclusio rerumque innumerabilium multitudo, tum et perceptio\neorum omnium apparet et eadem ratio perfecta his gradibus ad sapientiam\npervenit. 31. Ad rerum igitur scientiam vitaeque constantiam aptissima cum\nsit mens hominis, amplectitur maxime cognitionem, et istam [Greek:\nkatal\u00eapsin], quam, ut dixi, verbum e verbo exprimentes comprehensionem\ndicemus, cum ipsam per se amat--nihil est enim ei veritatis luce\ndulcius--tum etiam propter usum. Quocirca et sensibus utitur et artis\nefficit, quasi sensus alteros, et usque eo philosophiam ipsam corroborat,\nut virtutem efficiat, ex qua re una vita omnis apta sit. Ergo ii, qui\nnegant quicquam posse comprehendi, haec ipsa eripiunt vel instrumenta vel\nornamenta vitae vel potius etiam totam vitam evertunt funditus ipsumque\nanimal orbant animo, ut difficile sit de temeritate eorum, perinde ut causa\npostulat, dicere.\n\n32. Nec vero satis constituere possum quod sit eorum consilium aut quid\nvelint. Interdum enim cum adhibemus ad eos orationem eius modi: 'Si ea,\nquae disputentur, vera sint, tum omnia fore incerta,' respondent: 'Quid\nergo istud ad nos? num nostra culpa est? naturam accusa, quae in profundo\nveritatem, ut ait Democritus, penitus abstruserit.' Alii autem elegantius,\nqui etiam queruntur, quod eos insimulemus omnia incerta dicere, quantumque\nintersit inter incertum et id, quod percipi non possit, docere conantur\neaque distinguere. Cum his igitur agamus, qui haec distinguunt: illos, qui\nomnia sic incerta dicunt, ut stellarum numerus par an impar sit, quasi\ndesperatos aliquos relinquamus. Volunt enim--et hoc quidem vel maxime vos\nanimadvertebam moveri--probabile aliquid esse et quasi veri simile, eaque\nse uti regula et in agenda vita et in quaerendo ac disserendo.\n\nXI. 33. Quae ista regula est veri et falsi, si notionem veri et falsi,\npropterea quod ea non possunt internosci, nullam habemus? Nam si habemus,\ninteresse oportet ut inter rectum et pravum, sic inter verum et falsum. Si\nnihil interest, nulla regula est nec potest is, cui est visio veri falsique\ncommunis, ullum habere iudicium aut ullam omnino veritatis notam. Nam cum\ndicunt hoc se unum tollere, ut quicquam possit ita videri, ut non eodem\nmodo falsum etiam possit videri, cetera autem concedere, faciunt\npueriliter. Quo enim omnia iudicantur sublato reliqua se negant tollere: ut\nsi quis quem oculis privaverit, dicat ea, quae cerni possent, se ei non\nademisse. Ut enim illa oculis modo agnoscuntur, sic reliqua visis, sed\npropria veri, non communi veri et falsi nota. Quam ob rem, sive tu\nprobabilem visionem sive probabilem et quae non impediatur, ut Carneades\nvolebat, sive aliud quid proferes quod sequare, ad visum illud, de quo\nagimus, tibi erit revertendum. 34. In eo autem, si erit communitas cum\nfalso, nullum erit iudicium, quia proprium in communi signo notari non\npotest. Sin autem commune nihil erit, habeo quod volo: id enim quaero, quod\nita mihi videatur verum, ut non possit item falsum videri. Simili in errore\nversantur, cum convicio veritatis coacti perspicua a perceptis volunt\ndistinguere et conantur ostendere esse aliquid perspicui, verum illud\nquidem impressum in animo atque mente, neque tamen id percipi atque\ncomprehendi posse. Quo enim modo perspicue dixeris album esse aliquid, cum\npossit accidere ut id, quod nigrum sit, album esse videatur? aut quo modo\nista aut perspicua dicemus aut impressa subtiliter, cum sit incertum vere\ninaniterne moveatur? Ita neque color neque corpus nec veritas nec\nargumentum nec sensus neque perspicuum ullum relinquitur. 35. Ex hoc illud\niis usu venire solet, ut, quidquid dixerint, a quibusdam interrogentur:\n'Ergo istuc quidem percipis?' Sed qui ita interrogant, ab iis irridentur.\nNon enim urguent, ut coarguant neminem ulla de re posse contendere neque\nadseverare sine aliqua eius rei, quam sibi quisque placere dicit, certa et\npropria nota. Quod est igitur istuc vestrum probabile? Nam si, quod cuique\noccurrit et primo quasi adspectu probabile videtur, id confirmatur, quid eo\nlevius? 36. Sin ex circumspectione aliqua et accurata consideratione, quod\nvisum sit, id se dicent sequi, tamen exitum non habebunt: primum quia iis\nvisis, inter quae nihil interest, aequaliter omnibus abrogatur fides:\ndeinde, cum dicant posse accidere sapienti ut, cum omnia fecerit\ndiligentissimeque circumspexerit, exsistat aliquid quod et veri simile\nvideatur et absit longissime a vero, ne si magnam partem quidem, ut solent\ndicere, ad verum ipsum aut quam proxime accedant, confidere sibi poterunt.\nUt enim confidant, notum iis esse debebit insigne veri, quo obscurato et\noppresso quod tandem verum sibi videbuntur attingere? Quid autem tam\nabsurde dici potest quam cum ita locuntur: 'Est hoc quidem illius rei\nsignum aut argumentum et ea re id sequor, sed fieri potest ut id, quod\nsignificatur, aut falsum sit aut nihil sit omnino.' Sed de perceptione\nhactenus. Si quis enim ea, quae dicta sunt, labefactare volet, facile etiam\nabsentibus nobis veritas se ipsa defendet.\n\nXII. 37. His satis cognitis, quae iam explicata sunt, nunc de adsensione\natque approbatione, quam Graeci [Greek: synkatathesin] vocant, pauca\ndicemus, non quo non latus locus sit, sed paulo ante iacta sunt fundamenta.\nNam cum vim, quae esset in sensibus, explicabamus, simul illud aperiebatur,\ncomprehendi multa et percipi sensibus, quod fieri sine adsensione non\npotest. Deinde cum inter inanimum et animal hoc maxime intersit, quod\nanimal agit aliquid--nihil enim agens ne cogitari quidem potest quale\nsit--, aut ei sensus adimendus est aut ea, quae est in nostra potestate\nsita, reddenda adsensio. 38. At vero animus quodam modo eripitur iis, quos\nneque sentire neque adsentiri volunt. Ut enim necesse est lancem in libra\nponderibus impositis deprimi, sic animum perspicuis cedere. Nam quo modo\nnon potest animal ullum non appetere id, quod accommodatum ad naturam\nappareat--Graeci id [Greek: oikeion] appellant--, sic non potest obiectam\nrem perspicuam non approbare. Quamquam, si illa, de quibus disputatum est,\nvera sunt, nihil attinet de adsensione omnino loqui. Qui enim quid\npercipit, adsentitur statim. Sed haec etiam secuntur, nec memoriam sine\nadsensione posse constare nec notitias rerum nec artis, idque, quod maximum\nest, ut sit aliquid in nostra potestate, in eo, qui rei nulli adsentietur,\nnon erit. 39. Ubi igitur virtus, si nihil situm est in ipsis nobis? Maxime\nautem absurdum vitia in ipsorum esse potestate neque peccare quemquam nisi\nadsensione: hoc idem in virtute non esse, cuius omnis constantia et\nfirmitas ex iis rebus constat, quibus adsensa est et quas approbavit,\nomninoque ante videri aliquid quam agamus necesse est, eique, quod visum\nsit, adsentiatur. Qua re qui aut visum aut adsensum tollit, is omnem\nactionem tollit e vita.\n\nXIII. 40. Nunc ea videamus, quae contra ab his disputari solent. Sed prius\npotestis totius eorum rationis quasi fundamenta cognoscere. Componunt\nigitur primum artem quandam de iis, quae visa dicimus, eorumque et vim et\ngenera definiunt, in his, quale sit id, quod percipi et comprehendi possit,\ntotidem verbis quot Stoici. Deinde illa exponunt duo, quae quasi contineant\nomnem hanc quaestionem: quae ita videantur, ut etiam alia eodem modo videri\npossint nec in iis quicquam intersit, non posse eorum alia percipi, alia\nnon percipi: nihil interesse autem, non modo si omni ex parte eiusdem modi\nsint, sed etiam si discerni non possint. Quibus positis unius argumenti\nconclusione tota ab his causa comprehenditur. Composita ea conclusio sic\nest: 'Eorum, quae videntur, alia vera sunt, alia falsa, et quod falsum est,\nid percipi non potest: quod autem verum visum est, id omne tale est, ut\neiusdem modi etiam falsum possit videri.' Et, 'quae visa sint eius modi, ut\nin iis nihil intersit, non posse accidere ut eorum alia percipi possint,\nalia non possint. 41. Nullum igitur est visum quod percipi possit.' Quae\nautem sumunt, ut concludant id, quod volunt, ex his duo sibi putant\nconcedi: neque enim quisquam repugnat. Ea sunt haec: 'Quae visa falsa sint,\nea percipi non posse,' et alterum: 'Inter quae visa nihil intersit, ex iis\nnon posse alia talia esse, ut percipi possint, alia ut non possint:'\nreliqua vero multa et varia oratione defendunt, quae sunt item duo, unum:\n'quae videantur, eorum alia vera esse, alia falsa,' alterum: 'omne visum,\nquod sit a vero, tale esse, quale etiam a falso possit esse.' 42. Haec duo\nproposita non praetervolant, sed ita dilatant, ut non mediocrem curam\nadhibeant et diligentiam. Dividunt enim in partis et eas quidem magnas:\nprimum in sensus, deinde in ea, quae ducuntur a sensibus et ab omni\nconsuetudine, quam obscurari volunt. Tum perveniunt ad eam partem, ut ne\nratione quidem et coniectura ulla res percipi possit. Haec autem universa\nconcidunt etiam minutius. Ut enim de sensibus hesterno sermone vidistis,\nitem faciunt de reliquis, in singulisque rebus, quas in minima dispertiunt,\nvolunt efficere iis omnibus, quae visa sint, veris adiuncta esse falsa,\nquae a veris nihil differant: ea cum talia sint, non posse comprehendi.\n\nXIV. 43. Hanc ego subtilitatem philosophia quidem dignissimam iudico, sed\nab eorum causa, qui ita disserunt, remotissimam. Definitiones enim et\npartitiones et horum luminibus utens oratio, tum similitudines\ndissimilitudinesque et earum tenuis et acuta distinctio fidentium est\nhominum illa vera et firma et certa esse quae tutentur, non eorum qui\nclament nihilo magis vera illa esse quam falsa. Quid enim agant, si, cum\naliquid definierint, roget eos quispiam, num illa definitio possit in aliam\nrem transferri quamlubet? Si posse dixerint, quid dicere habeant cur illa\nvera definitio sit? si_n_ negaverint, fatendum sit, quoniam vel illa vera\ndefinitio transferri non possit in falsum, quod ea definitione explicetur,\nid percipi posse: quod minime illi volunt. Eadem dici poterunt in omnibus\npartibus. 44. Si enim dicent ea, de quibus disserent, se dilucide\nperspicere nec ulla communione visorum impediri, comprehendere ea se\nfatebuntur. Sin autem negabunt vera visa a falsis posse distingui, qui\npoterunt longius progredi? Occurretur enim, sicut occursum est. Nam\nconcludi argumentum non potest nisi iis, quae ad concludendum sumpta erunt,\nita probatis, ut falsa eiusdem modi nulla possint esse. Ergo si rebus\ncomprehensis et perceptis nisa et progressa ratio hoc efficiet, nihil posse\ncomprehendi, quid potest reperiri quod ipsum sibi repugnet magis? cumque\nipsa natura accuratae orationis hoc profiteatur, se aliquid patefacturam\nquod non appareat et, quo id facilius adsequatur, adhibituram et sensus et\nea, quae perspicua sint, qualis est istorum oratio, qui omnia non tam esse\nquam videri volunt? Maxime autem convincuntur, cum haec duo pro\ncongruentibus sumunt tam vehementer repugnantia: primum esse quaedam falsa\nvisa: quod cum volunt, declarant quaedam esse vera: deinde ibidem, inter\nfalsa visa et vera nihil interesse. At primum sumpseras, tamquam\ninteresset: ita priori posterius, posteriori superius non iungitur.\n\n45. Sed progrediamur longius et ita agamus, ut nihil nobis adsentati esse\nvideamur, quaeque ab iis dicuntur, sic persequamur, ut nihil in praeteritis\nrelinquamus. Primum igitur perspicuitas illa, quam diximus, satis magnam\nhabet vim, ut ipsa per sese ea, quae sint, nobis ita ut sint indicet. Sed\ntamen, ut maneamus in perspicuis firmius et constantius, maiore quadam opus\nest vel arte vel diligentia, ne ab iis, quae clara sint ipsa per sese,\nquasi praestigiis quibusdam et captionibus depellamur. Nam qui voluit\nsubvenire erroribus Epicurus iis, qui videntur conturbare veri cognitionem,\ndixitque sapientis esse opinionem a perspicuitate seiungere, nihil\nprofecit: ipsius enim opinionis errorem nullo modo sustulit.\n\nXV. 46. Quam ob rem cum duae causae perspicuis et evidentibus rebus\nadversentur, auxilia totidem sunt contra comparanda. Adversatur enim\nprimum, quod parum defigunt animos et intendunt in ea, quae perspicua sunt,\nut quanta luce ea circumfusa sint possint agnoscere; alterum est, quod\nfallacibus et captiosis interrogationibus circumscripti atque decepti\nquidam, cum eas dissolvere non possunt, desciscunt a veritate. Oportet\nigitur et ea, quae pro perspicuitate responderi possunt, in promptu habere,\nde quibus iam diximus, et esse armatos, ut occurrere possimus\ninterrogationibus eorum captionesque discutere: quod deinceps facere\nconstitui. 47. Exponam igitur generatim argumenta eorum, quoniam ipsi etiam\nilli solent non confuse loqui. Primum conantur ostendere multa posse videri\nesse, quae omnino nulla sint, cum animi inaniter moveantur eodem modo rebus\niis, quae nullae sint, ut iis, quae sint. Nam cum dicatis, inquiunt, visa\nquaedam mitti a deo, velut ea, quae in somnis videantur quaeque oraculis,\nauspiciis, extis declarentur--haec enim aiunt probari Stoicis, quos contra\ndisputant--, quaerunt quonam modo, falsa visa quae sint, ea deus efficere\npossit probabilia: quae autem plane proxime ad verum accedant, efficere non\npossit? aut, si ea quoque possit, cur illa non possit, quae\nperdifficiliter, internoscantur tamen? et, si haec, cur non inter quae\nnihil sit omnino? 48. Deinde, cum mens moveatur ipsa per sese, ut et ea\ndeclarant, quae cogitatione depingimus, et ea, quae vel dormientibus vel\nfuriosis videntur non numquam, veri simile est sic etiam mentem moveri, ut\nnon modo non internoscat vera visa illa sint anne falsa, sed ut in iis\nnihil intersit omnino: ut si qui tremerent et exalbescerent vel ipsi per se\nmotu mentis aliquo vel obiecta terribili re extrinsecus, nihil ut esset,\nqui distingueretur tremor ille et pallor, neque ut quicquam interesset\ninter intestinum et oblatum. Postremo si nulla visa sunt probabilia, quae\nfalsa sint, alia ratio est. Sin autem sunt, cur non etiam quae non facile\ninternoscantur? cur non ut plane nihil intersit? praesertim cum ipsi\ndicatis sapientem in furore sustinere se ab omni adsensu, quia nulla in\nvisis distinctio appareat.\n\nXVI. 49. Ad has omnis visiones inanis Antiochus quidem et permulta dicebat\net erat de hac una re unius diei disputatio. Mihi autem non idem faciendum\nputo, sed ipsa capita dicenda. Et primum quidem hoc reprehendendum, quod\ncaptiosissimo genere interrogationis utuntur, quod genus minime in\nphilosophia probari solet, cum aliquid minutatim et gradatim additur aut\ndemitur. Soritas hoc vocant, quia acervum efficiunt uno addito grano.\nVitiosum sane et captiosum genus! Sic enim adscenditis: Si tale visum\nobiectum est a deo dormienti, ut probabile sit, cur non etiam ut valde veri\nsimile? cur deinde non ut difficiliter a vero internoscatur? deinde ut ne\ninternoscatur quidem? postremo ut nihil inter hoc et illud intersit? Huc si\nperveneris, me tibi primum quidque concedente, meum vitium fuerit: sin ipse\ntua sponte processeris, tuum. 50. Quis enim tibi dederit aut omnia deum\nposse aut ita facturum esse, si possit? quo modo autem sumis, ut, si quid\ncui simile esse possit, sequatur ut etiam difficiliter internosci possit?\ndeinde ut ne internosci quidem? postremo ut eadem sint? ut, si lupi canibus\nsimiles _sunt_, eosdem dices ad extremum. Et quidem honestis similia sunt\nquaedam non honesta et bonis non bona et artificiosis minime artificiosa:\nquid dubitamus igitur adfirmare nihil inter haec interesse? Ne repugnantia\nquidem videmus? Nihil est enim quod de suo genere in aliud genus transferri\npossit. At si efficeretur, ut inter visa differentium generum nihil\ninteresset, reperirentur quae et in suo genere essent et in alieno. 51.\nQuod fieri qui potest? Omnium deinde inanium visorum una depulsio est, sive\nilla cogitatione informantur, quod fieri solere concedimus, sive in quiete\nsive per vinum sive per insaniam. Nam ab omnibus eiusdem modi visis\nperspicuitatem, quam mordicus tenere debemus, abesse dicemus. Quis enim,\ncum sibi fingit aliquid et cogitatione depingit, non simul ac se ipse\ncommovit atque ad se revocavit, sentit quid intersit inter perspicua et\ninania? Eadem ratio est somniorum. Num censes Ennium, cum in hortis cum\nSer. Galba vicino suo ambulavisset, dixisse: 'Visus sum mihi cum Galba\nambulare?' At, cum somniavit, ita narravit:\n\n  'visus Homerus adesse poeta.'\n\nIdemque in Epicharmo:\n\n  'Nam videbar somniare med ego esse mortuum.'\n\nItaque, simul ut experrecti sumus, visa illa contemnimus neque ita habemus,\nut ea, quae in foro gessimus.\n\nXVII. 52. At enim dum videntur, eadem est in somnis species eorum_que_,\nquae vigilantes videmus! Primum interest: sed id omittamus. Illud enim\ndicimus, non eandem esse vim neque integritatem dormientium et vigilantium\nnec mente nec sensu. Ne vinolenti quidem quae faciunt, eadem approbatione\nfaciunt qua sobrii: dubitant, haesitant, revocant se interdum iisque, quae\nvidentur, imbecillius adsentiuntur, cumque edormiverunt, illa visa quam\nlevia fuerint intellegunt. Quod idem contingit insanis, ut et incipientes\nfurere sentiant et dicant aliquid, quod non sit, id videri sibi, et, cum\nrelaxentur, sentiant atque illa dicant Alcmaeonis:\n\n  'Sed mihi ne utiquam cor consentit cum oculorum\n  adspectu' ...\n\n53. At enim ipse sapiens sustinet se in furore, ne approbet falsa pro\nveris. Et alias quidem saepe, si aut in sensibus ipsius est aliqua forte\ngravitas aut tarditas aut obscuriora sunt quae videntur aut a perspiciendo\ntemporis brevitate excluditur. Quamquam totum hoc, sapientem aliquando\nsustinere adsensionem, contra vos est. Si enim inter visa nihil interesset,\naut semper sustineret aut numquam. Sed ex hoc genere toto perspici potest\nlevitas orationis eorum, qui omnia cupiunt confundere. Quaerimus\ngravitatis, constantiae, firmitatis, sapientiae iudicium: utimur exemplis\nsomniantium, furiosorum, ebriosorum. Illud attendimus in hoc omni genere\nquam inconstanter loquamur? Non enim proferremus vino aut somno oppressos\naut mente captos tam absurde, ut tum diceremus interesse inter vigilantium\nvisa et sobriorum et sanorum et eorum, qui essent aliter adfecti, tum nihil\ninteresse. 54. Ne hoc quidem cernunt, omnia se reddere incerta, quod\nnolunt, ea dico incerta, quae [Greek: ad\u00eala] Graeci. Si enim res se ita\nhabeant, ut nihil intersit, utrum ita cui videatur, ut insano, an sano, cui\npossit exploratum esse de sua sanitate? quod velle efficere non mediocris\ninsaniae est. Similitudines vero aut geminorum aut signorum anulis\nimpressorum pueriliter consectantur. Quis enim nostrum similitudines negat\nesse, cum eae plurimis in rebus appareant? Sed, si satis est ad tollendam\ncognitionem similia esse multa multorum, cur eo non estis contenti,\npraesertim concedentibus nobis? et cur id potius contenditis, quod rerum\nnatura non patitur, ut non suo quidque genere sit tale, quale est, nec sit\nin duobus aut pluribus nulla re differens ulla communitas? ut [sibi] sint\net ova ovorum et apes apium simillimae: quid pugnas igitur? aut quid tibi\nvis in geminis? Conceditur enim similis esse, quo contentus esse potueras:\ntu autem vis eosdem plane esse, non similis: quod fieri nullo modo potest.\n55. Dein confugis ad physicos eos, qui maxime in Academia irridentur, a\nquibus ne tu quidem iam te abstinebis, et ais Democritum dicere\ninnumerabilis esse mundos et quidem sic quosdam inter sese non solum\nsimilis, sed undique perfecte et absolute ita pares, ut inter eos nihil\nprorsus intersit [et eos quidem innumerabiles], itemque homines. Deinde\npostulas, ut, si mundus ita sit par alteri mundo, ut inter eos ne minimum\nquidem intersit, concedatur tibi ut in hoc quoque nostro mundo aliquid\nalicui sic sit par, ut nihil differat, nihil intersit. Cur enim, inquies,\nex illis individuis, unde omnia Democritus gigni adfirmat, in reliquis\nmundis et in iis quidem innumerabilibus innumerabiles Q. Lutatii Catuli non\nmodo possint esse, sed etiam sint, in hoc tanto mundo Catulus alter non\npossit effici?\n\nXVIII. 56. Primum quidem me ad Democritum vocas, cui non adsentior\npotiusque refello propter id, quod dilucide docetur a politioribus physicis\nsingularum rerum singulas proprietates esse. Fac enim antiquos illos\nServilios, qui gemini fuerunt, tam similis quam dicuntur, num censes etiam\neosdem fuisse? Non cognoscebantur foris, at domi: non ab alienis, at a\nsuis. An non videmus hoc usu venire, ut, quos numquam putassemus a nobis\ninternosci posse, eos consuetudine adhibita tam facile internosceremus, uti\nne minimum quidem similes viderentur? 57. Hic, pugnes licet, non repugnabo:\nquin etiam concedam illum ipsum sapientem, de quo omnis hic sermo est, cum\nei res similes occurrant, quas non habeat dinotatas, retenturum adsensum\nnec umquam ulli viso adsensurum, nisi quod tale fuerit, quale falsum esse\nnon possit. Sed et ad ceteras res habet quandam artem, qua vera a falsis\npossit distinguere, et ad similitudines istas usus adhibendus est. Ut mater\ngeminos internoscit consuetudine oculorum, sic tu internosces, si\nadsueveris. Videsne ut in proverbio sit ovorum inter se similitudo? Tamen\nhoc accepimus, Deli fuisse compluris salvis rebus illis, qui gallinas alere\npermultas quaestus causa solerent: ii cum ovum inspexerant, quae id gallina\npeperisset dicere solebant. 58. Neque id est contra nos: nam nobis satis\nest ova illa non internoscere: nihil enim magis adsentiri par est, hoc\nillud esse, quasi inter illa omnino nihil interesset: habeo enim regulam,\nut talia visa vera iudicem, qualia falsa esse non possint: ab hac mihi non\nlicet transversum, ut aiunt, digitum discedere, ne confundam omnia. Veri\nenim et falsi non modo cognitio, sed etiam natura tolletur, si nihil erit\nquod intersit: ut etiam illud absurdum sit, quod interdum soletis dicere,\ncum visa in animos imprimantur, non vos id dicere, inter ipsas impressiones\nnihil interesse, sed inter species et quasdam formas eorum. Quasi vero non\nspecie visa iudicentur! quae fidem nullam habebunt sublata veri et falsi\nnota. 59. Illud vero perabsurdum, quod dicitis, probabilia vos sequi, si re\nnulla impediamini. Primum qui potestis non impediri, cum a veris falsa non\ndistent? deinde quod iudicium est veri, cum sit commune falsi? Ex his illa\nnecessario nata est [Greek: epoch\u00ea], id est adsensionis retentio, in qua\nmelius sibi constitit Arcesilas, si vera sunt quae de Carneade non nulli\nexistimant. Si enim percipi nihil potest, quod utrique visum est, tollendus\nadsensus est. Quid enim est tam futile quam quicquam approbare non\ncognitum? Carneadem autem etiam heri audiebamus solitum esse _eo_ delabi\ninterdum, ut diceret opinaturum, id est peccaturum esse sapientem. Mihi\nporro non tam certum est esse aliquid, quod comprehendi possit, de quo iam\nnimium etiam diu disputo, quam sapientem nihil opinari, id est, numquam\nadsentiri rei vel falsae vel incognitae. 60. Restat illud, quod dicunt,\nveri inveniendi causa contra omnia dici oportere et pro omnibus. Volo\nigitur videre quid invenerint. Non solemus, inquit, ostendere. Quae sunt\ntandem ista mysteria? aut cur celatis, quasi turpe aliquid, sententiam\nvestram? Ut, qui audient, inquit, ratione potius quam auctoritate ducantur.\nQuid, si utroque? num peius est? Unum tamen illud non celant, nihil esse\nquod percipi possit. An in eo auctoritas nihil obest? Mihi quidem videtur\nvel plurimum. Quis enim ista tam aperte perspicueque et perversa et falsa\nsecutus esset, nisi tanta in Arcesila, multo etiam maior in Carneade et\ncopia rerum et dicendi vis fuisset?\n\nXIX. 61. Haec Antiochus fere et Alexandreae tum et multis annis post, multo\netiam adseverantius, in Syria cum esset mecum, paulo ante quam est mortuus.\nSed iam confirmata causa te, hominem amicissimum--me autem appellabat--et\naliquot annis minorem natu, non dubitabo monere: Tune, cum tantis laudibus\nphilosophiam extuleris Hortensiumque nostrum dissentientem commoveris, eam\nphilosophiam sequere quae confundit vera cum falsis, spoliat nos iudicio,\nprivat approbatione, omnibus orbat sensibus? Et Cimmeriis quidem, quibus\nadspectum solis sive deus aliquis sive natura ademerat sive eius loci, quem\nincolebant, situs, ignes tamen aderant, quorum illis uti lumine licebat,\nisti autem, quos tu probas, tantis offusis tenebris ne scintillam quidem\nullam nobis ad dispiciendum reliquerunt: quos si sequamur, iis vinculis\nsimus adstricti, ut nos commovere nequeamus. 62. Sublata enim adsensione\nomnem et motum animorum et actionem rerum sustulerunt: quod non modo recte\nfieri, sed omnino fieri non potest. Provide etiam ne uni tibi istam\nsententiam minime liceat defendere. An tu, cum res occultissimas aperueris\nin lucemque protuleris iuratusque dixeris ea te comperisse, quod mihi\nquoque licebat, qui ex te illa cognoveram, negabis esse rem ullam quae\ncognosci, comprehendi, percipi possit? Vide, quaeso, etiam atque etiam ne\nillarum quoque rerum pulcherrimarum a te ipso minuatur auctoritas. Quae cum\ndixisset ille, finem fecit. 63. Hortensius autem vehementer admirans, quod\nquidem perpetuo Lucullo loquente fecerat, ut etiam manus saepe tolleret,\nnec mirum: nam numquam arbitror contra Academiam dictum esse subtilius, me\nquoque, iocansne an ita sentiens--non enim satis intellegebam--, coepit\nhortari, ut sententia desisterem. Tum mihi Catulus: Si te, inquit, Luculli\noratio flexit, quae est habita memoriter, accurate, copiose, taceo neque te\nquo minus, si tibi ita videatur, sententiam mutes deterrendum puto. Illud\nvero non censuerim, ut eius auctoritate moveare. Tantum enim non te modo\nmonuit, inquit adridens, ut caveres ne quis improbus tribunus plebis,\nquorum vides quanta copia semper futura sit, adriperet te et in contione\nquaereret qui tibi constares, cum idem negares quicquam certi posse\nreperiri, idem te comperisse dixisses. Hoc, quaeso, cave ne te terreat. De\ncausa autem ipsa malim quidem te ab hoc dissentire. Sin cesseris, non magno\nopere mirabor. Memini enim Antiochum ipsum, cum annos multos alia\nsensisset, simul ac visum sit, sententia destitisse. Haec cum dixisset\nCatulus, me omnes intueri.\n\nXX. 64. Tum ego non minus commotus quam soleo in causis maioribus, huius\nmodi quadam oratione sum exorsus: Me, Catule, oratio Luculli de ipsa re ita\nmovit, ut docti hominis et copiosi et parati et nihil praetereuntis eorum,\nquae pro illa causa dici possent, non tamen ut ei respondere posse\ndiffiderem. Auctoritas autem tanta plane me movebat, nisi tu opposuisses\nnon minorem tuam. Adgrediar igitur, si pauca ante quasi de fama mea dixero.\n65. Ego enim si aut ostentatione aliqua adductus aut studio certandi ad\nhanc potissimum philosophiam me applicavi, non modo stultitiam meam, sed\netiam mores et naturam condemnandam puto. Nam, si in minimis rebus\npertinacia reprehenditur, calumnia etiam coercetur, ego de omni statu\nconsilioque totius vitae aut certare cum aliis pugnaciter aut frustrari cum\nalios tum etiam me ipsum velim? Itaque, nisi ineptum putarem in tali\ndisputatione id facere, quod, cum de re publica disceptatur, fieri interdum\nsolet, iurarem per Iovem deosque penates me et ardere studio veri\nreperiendi et ea sentire, quae dicerem. 66. Qui enim possum non cupere\nverum invenire, cum gaudeam, si simile veri quid invenerim? Sed, ut hoc\npulcherrimum esse iudico, vera videre, sic pro veris probare falsa\nturpissimum est. Nec tamen ego is sum, qui nihil umquam falsi approbem, qui\nnumquam adsentiar, qui nihil opiner, sed quaerimus de sapiente. Ego vero\nipse et magnus quidem sum opinator--non enim sum sapiens--et meas\ncogitationes sic dirigo, non ad illam parvulam Cynosuram,\n\n  'Qua fidunt duce nocturna Phoenices in alto,'\n\nut ait Aratus, eoque directius gubernant, quod eam tenent,\n\n  'Quae cursu interiore, brevi convertitur orbe,'\n\nsed Helicen et clarissimos Septemtriones, id est, rationes has latiore\nspecie, non ad tenue elimatas. Eo fit ut errem et vager latius. Sed non de\nme, ut dixi, sed de sapiente quaeritur. Visa enim ista cum acriter mentem\nsensumve pepulerunt, accipio iisque interdum etiam adsentior, nec percipio\ntamen; nihil enim arbitror posse percipi. Non sum sapiens; itaque visis\ncedo nec possum resistere. Sapientis autem hanc censet Arcesilas vim esse\nmaximam, Zenoni adsentiens, cavere ne capiatur, ne fallatur videre. Nihil\nest enim ab ea cogitatione, quam habemus de gravitate sapientis, errore,\nlevitate, temeritate diiunctius. Quid igitur loquar de firmitate sapientis?\nquem quidem nihil opinari tu quoque, Luculle, concedis. Quod quoniam a te\nprobatur--ut praepostere tecum agam, mox referam me ad ordinem--haec primum\nconclusio quam habeat vim considera.\n\nXXI. 67. Si ulli rei sapiens adsentietur umquam, aliquando etiam\nopinabitur: numquam autem opinabitur: nulli igitur rei adsentietur. Hanc\nconclusionem Arcesilas probabat: confirmabat enim et primum et secundum.\nCarneades non numquam secundum illud dabat: adsentiri aliquando. Ita\nsequebatur etiam opinari, quod tu non vis et recte, ut mihi videris. Sed\nillud primum, sapientem, si adsensurus esset, etiam opinaturum, falsum esse\net Stoici dicunt et eorum adstipulator Antiochus: posse enim eum falsa a\nveris et quae non possint percipi ab iis, quae possint, distinguere. 68.\nNobis autem primum, etiam si quid percipi possit, tamen ipsa consuetudo\nadsentiendi periculosa esse videtur et lubrica. Quam ob rem cum tam\nvitiosum esse constet adsentiri quicquam aut falsum aut incognitum,\nsustinenda est potius omnis adsensio, ne praecipitet, si temere\nprocesserit. Ita enim finitima sunt falsa veris, eaque, quae percipi non\npossunt, _iis quae possunt_--si modo ea sunt quaedam: iam enim videbimus--,\nut tam in praecipitem locum non debeat se sapiens committere. Sin autem\nomnino nihil esse quod percipi possit a me sumpsero et, quod tu mihi das,\naccepero, sapientem nihil opinari, effectum illud erit, sapientem adsensus\nomnes cohibiturum, ut videndum tibi sit, idne malis an aliquid opinaturum\nesse sapientem. Neutrum, inquies, illorum. Nitamur igitur, nihil posse\npercipi: etenim de eo omnis est controversia.\n\nXXII. 69. Sed prius pauca cum Antiocho, qui haec ipsa, quae a me\ndefenduntur, et didicit apud Philonem tam diu, ut constaret diutius\ndidicisse neminem, et scripsit de his rebus acutissime, et idem haec non\nacrius accusavit in senectute quam antea defensitaverat. Quamvis igitur\nfuerit acutus, ut fuit, tamen inconstantia levatur auctoritas. Quis enim\niste dies illuxerit quaero, qui illi ostenderit eam, quam multos annos esse\nnegitavisset, veri et falsi notam. Excogitavit aliquid? Eadem dicit quae\nStoici. Poenituit illa sensisse? Cur non se transtulit ad alios et maxime\nad Stoicos? eorum enim erat propria ista dissensio. Quid? eum Mnesarchi\npoenitebat? quid? Dardani? qui erant Athenis tum principes Stoicorum.\nNumquam a Philone discessit, nisi postea quam ipse coepit qui se audirent\nhabere. 70. Unde autem subito vetus Academia revocata est? Nominis\ndignitatem videtur, cum a re ipsa descisceret, retinere voluisse, quod\nerant qui illum gloriae causa facere dicerent, sperare etiam fore ut ii,\nqui se sequerentur, Antiochii vocarentur. Mihi autem magis videtur non\npotuisse sustinere concursum omnium philosophorum. Etenim de ceteris sunt\ninter illos non nulla communia: haec Academicorum est una sententia, quam\nreliquorum philosophorum nemo probet. Itaque cessit, et ut ii, qui sub\nNovis solem non ferunt, item ille, cum aestuaret, veterum, ut Maenianorum,\nsic Academicorum umbram secutus est. 71. Quoque solebat uti argumento tum,\ncum ei placebat nihil posse percipi, cum quaereret, Dionysius ille\nHeracleotes utrum comprehendisset certa illa nota, qua adsentiri dicitis\noportere, illudne, quod multos annos tenuisset Zenonique magistro\ncredidisset, honestum quod esset, id bonum solum esse, an quod postea\ndefensitavisset, honesti inane nomen esse, voluptatem esse summum bonum:\nqui ex illius commutata sententia docere vellet nihil ita signari in animis\nnostris a vero posse, quod non eodem modo possit a falso, is curavit _ut_\nquod argumentum ex Dionysio ipse sumpsisset, ex eo ceteri sumerent. Sed cum\nhoc alio loco plura, nunc ad ea, quae a te, Luculle, dicta sunt.\n\nXXIII. 72. Et primum quod initio dixisti videamus quale sit: similiter a\nnobis de antiquis philosophis commemorari atque seditiosi solerent claros\nviros, sed tamen popularis aliquos nominare. Illi cum res _non_ bonas\ntractent, similes bonorum videri volunt. Nos autem dicimus ea nobis videri,\nquae vosmet ipsi nobilissimis philosophis placuisse conceditis. Anaxagoras\nnivem nigram dixit esse. Ferres me, si ego idem dicerem? Tu, ne si\ndubitarem quidem. At quis est? num hic sophistes?--sic enim appellabantur\nii, qui ostentationis aut quaestus causa philosophabantur--: maxima fuit et\ngravitatis et ingeni gloria. 73. Quid loquar de Democrito? Quem cum eo\nconferre possumus non modo ingeni magnitudine, sed etiam animi? qui ita sit\nausus ordiri: 'Haec loquor de universis.' Nihil excipit de quo non\nprofiteatur. Quid enim esse potest extra universa? quis hunc philosophum\nnon anteponit Cleanthi, Chrysippo, reliquis inferioris aetatis? qui mihi\ncum illo collati quintae classis videntur. Atque is non hoc dicit, quod\nnos, qui veri esse aliquid non negamus, percipi posse negamus; ille verum\nplane negat esse: sensus quidem non obscuros dicit, sed tenebricosos: sic\nenim appellat [eos]. Is, qui hunc maxime est admiratus, Chius Metrodorus\ninitio libri, qui est de natura: 'Nego,' inquit, 'scire nos sciamusne\naliquid an nihil sciamus, ne id ipsum quidem, nescire aut scire, scire nos,\nnec omnino sitne aliquid an nihil sit.' 74. Furere tibi Empedocles videtur:\nat mihi dignissimum rebus iis, de quibus loquitur, sonum fundere. Num ergo\nis excaecat nos aut orbat sensibus, si parum magnam vim censet in iis esse\nad ea, quae sub eos subiecta sunt, iudicanda? Parmenides, Xenophanes, minus\nbonis quamquam versibus, sed tamen illi versibus increpant eorum\nadrogantiam quasi irati, qui, cum sciri nihil possit, audeant se scire\ndicere. Et ab iis aiebas removendum Socratem et Platonem. Cur? an de ullis\ncertius possum dicere? Vixisse cum iis equidem videor: ita multi sermones\nperscripti sunt, e quibus dubitari non possit quin Socrati nihil sit visum\nsciri posse. Excepit unum tantum, 'scire se nihil se scire,' nihil amplius.\nQuid dicam de Platone? qui certe tam multis libris haec persecutus non\nesset, nisi probavisset. Ironiam enim alterius, perpetuam praesertim, nulla\nfuit ratio persequi.\n\nXXIV. 75. Videorne tibi, non ut Saturninus, nominare modo illustris\nhomines, sed imitari numquam nisi clarum, nisi nobilem? Atqui habebam\nmolestos vobis, sed minutos, Stilponem, Diodorum, Alexinum, quorum sunt\ncontorta et aculeata quaedam [Greek: sophismata]; sic enim appellantur\nfallaces conclusiunculae. Sed quid eos colligam, cum habeam Chrysippum, qui\nfulcire putatur porticum Stoicorum? Quam multa ille contra sensus, quam\nmulta contra omnia, quae in consuetudine probantur! At dissolvit idem. Mihi\nquidem non videtur: sed dissolverit sane. Certe tam multa non collegisset,\nquae nos fallerent probabilitate magna, nisi videret iis resisti non facile\nposse. 76. Quid Cyrenaici _tibi_ videntur, minime contempti philosophi? Qui\nnegant esse quicquam quod percipi possit extrinsecus: ea se sola percipere,\nquae tactu intimo sentiant, ut dolorem, ut voluptatem: neque se quo quid\ncolore aut quo sono sit scire, sed tantum sentire adfici se quodam modo.\n\nSatis multa de auctoribus. Quamquam ex me quaesieras nonne putarem post\nillos veteres tot saeculis inveniri verum potuisse tot ingeniis tantisque\nstudiis quaerentibus. Quid inventum sit paulo post videro, te ipso quidem\niudice. Arcesilam vero non obtrectandi causa cum Zenone pugnavisse, sed\nverum invenire voluisse sic intellegitur. 77. Nemo, inquam, superiorum non\nmodo expresserat, sed ne dixerat quidem posse hominem nihil opinari, nec\nsolum posse, sed ita necesse esse sapienti. Visa est Arcesilae cum vera\nsententia tum honesta et digna sapiente. Quaesivit de Zenone fortasse quid\nfuturum esset, si nec percipere quicquam posset sapiens nec opinari\nsapientis esset. Ille, credo, nihil opinaturum, quoniam esset, quod percipi\nposset. Quid ergo id esset? Visum, credo. Quale igitur visum? tum illum ita\ndefinisse, ex eo, quod esset, sicut esset, impressum et signatum et\neffictum. Post requisitum etiamne, si eiusdem modi esset visum verum, quale\nvel falsum. Hic Zenonem vidisse acute nullum esse visum quod percipi\nposset, si id tale esset ab eo, quod est, ut eiusdem modi ab eo, quod non\nest, posset esse. Recte consensit Arcesilas; ad definitionem additum: neque\nenim falsum percipi posse neque verum, si esset tale, quale vel falsum.\nIncubuit autem in eas disputationes, ut doceret nullum tale esse visum a\nvero, ut non eiusdem modi etiam a falso possit esse. 78. Haec est una\ncontentio, quae adhuc permanserit. Nam illud, nulli rei adsensurum esse\nsapientem, nihil ad hanc controversiam pertinebat. Licebat enim nihil\npercipere et tamen opinari, quod a Carneade dicitur probatum: equidem\nClitomacho plus quam Philoni aut Metrodoro credens, hoc magis ab eo\ndisputatum quam probatum puto. Sed id omittamus. Illud certe opinatione et\nperceptione sublata sequitur, omnium adsensionum retentio, ut, si ostendero\nnihil posse percipi, tu concedas numquam adsensurum esse.\n\nXXV. 79. Quid ergo est quod percipi possit, si ne sensus quidem vera\nnuntiant? quos tu, Luculle, communi loco defendis: quod ne [id] facere\nposses, idcirco heri non necessario loco contra sensus tam multa dixeram.\nTu autem te negas infracto remo neque columbae collo commoveri. Primum cur?\nNam et in remo sentio non esse id, quod videatur, et in columba pluris\nvideri colores nec esse plus uno. Deinde nihilne praeterea diximus?--Manent\nilla omnia, iacet ista causa: veracis suos esse sensus dicit.--Igitur\nsemper auctorem habes eum, qui magno suo periculo causam agat! Eo enim rem\ndemittit Epicurus, si unus sensus semel in vita mentitus sit, nulli umquam\nesse credendum. 80. Hoc est verum esse, confidere suis testibus et\nimportune insistere! Itaque Timagoras Epicureus negat sibi umquam, cum\noculum torsisset, duas ex lucerna flammulas esse visas: opinionis enim esse\nmendacium, non oculorum. Quasi quaeratur quid sit, non quid videatur. Sed\nhic quidem maiorum similis: tu vero, qui visa sensibus alia vera dicas\nesse, alia falsa, qui ea distinguis? Desine, quaeso, communibus locis: domi\nnobis ista nascuntur. Si, inquis, deus te interroget: Sanis modo et\nintegris sensibus, num amplius quid desideras? quid respondeas?--Utinam\nquidem roget? Audiret quam nobiscum male ageret. Ut enim vera videamus,\nquam longe videmus? Ego Catuli Cumanum ex hoc loco video, Pompeianum non\ncerno, neque quicquam interiectum est quod obstet, sed intendi acies\nlongius non potest. O praeclarum prospectum! Puteolos videmus: at\nfamiliarem nostrum C. Avianium, fortasse in porticu Neptuni ambulantem, non\nvidemus. 81. At ille nescio qui, qui in scholis nominari solet, mille et\noctingenta stadia quod abesset videbat: quaedam volucres longius.\nResponderem igitur audacter isti vestro deo me plane his oculis non esse\ncontentum. Dicet me acrius videre quam illos pisces fortasse qui neque\nvidentur a nobis et nunc quidem sub oculis sunt neque ipsi nos suspicere\npossunt. Ergo ut illis aqua, sic nobis a\u00ebr crassus offunditur. At amplius\nnon desideramus. Quid? talpam num desiderare lumen putas? Neque tam\nquererer cum deo, quod parum longe quam quod falsum viderem. Videsne navem\nillam? Stare nobis videtur: at iis, qui in nave sunt, moveri haec villa.\nQuaere rationem cur ita videatur: quam ut maxime inveneris, quod haud scio\nan non possis, non tu verum testem habere, sed eum non sine causa falsum\ntestimonium dicere ostenderis.\n\nXXVI. 82. Quid ego de nave? Vidi enim a te remum contemni. Maiora fortasse\nquaeris. Quid potest esse sole maius? quem mathematici amplius duodeviginti\npartibus confirmant maiorem esse quam terram. Quantulus nobis videtur! Mihi\nquidem quasi pedalis. Epicurus autem posse putat etiam minorem esse eum\nquam videatur, sed non multo: ne maiorem quidem multo putat esse vel tantum\nesse, quantus videatur, ut oculi aut nihil mentiantur aut non multum. Ubi\nigitur illud est semel? Sed ab hoc credulo, qui numquam sensus mentiri\nputat, discedamus: qui ne nunc quidem, cum ille sol, qui tanta incitatione\nfertur, ut celeritas eius quanta sit ne cogitari quidem possit, tamen nobis\nstare videatur. 83. Sed, ut minuam controversiam, videte, quaeso, quam in\nparvo lis sit. Quattuor sunt capita, quae concludant nihil esse quod nosci,\npercipi, comprehendi possit, de quo haec tota quaestio est. E quibus primum\nest esse aliquod visum falsum, secundum non posse id percipi, tertium,\ninter quae visa nihil intersit, fieri non posse ut eorum alia percipi\npossint, alia non possint, quartum nullum esse visum verum a sensu\nprofectum, cui non appositum sit visum aliud, quod ab eo nihil intersit\nquodque percipi non possit. Horum quattuor capitum secundum et tertium\nomnes concedunt. Primum Epicurus non dat; vos, quibuscum res est, id quoque\nconceditis. Omnis pugna de quarto est. 84. Qui igitur P. Servilium Geminum\nvidebat, si Quintum se videre putabat, incidebat in eius modi visum, quod\npercipi non posset, quia nulla nota verum distinguebatur a falso: qua\ndistinctione sublata quam haberet in C. Cotta, qui bis cum Gemino consul\nfuit, agnoscendo eius modi notam, quae falsa esse non posset? Negas tantam\nsimilitudinem in rerum natura esse. Pugnas omnino, sed cum adversario\nfacili. Ne sit sane: videri certe potest. Fallet igitur sensum, et si una\nfefellerit similitudo, dubia omnia reddiderit. Sublato enim iudicio illo,\nquo oportet agnosci, etiam si ipse erit, quem videris, qui tibi videbitur,\ntamen non ea nota iudicabis, qua dicis oportere, ut non possit esse eiusdem\nmodi falsa. 85. Quando igitur potest tibi P. Geminus Quintus videri, quid\nhabes explorati cur non possit tibi Cotta videri qui non sit, quoniam\naliquid videtur esse, quod non est? Omnia dicis sui generis esse, nihil\nesse idem, quod sit aliud. Stoicum est quidem nec admodum credibile 'nullum\nesse pilum omnibus rebus talem, qualis sit pilus alius, nullum granum.'\nHaec refelli possunt, sed pugnare nolo. Ad id enim, quod agitur, nihil\ninterest omnibusne partibus visa res nihil differat an internosci non\npossit, etiam si differat. Sed, si hominum similitudo tanta esse non\npotest, ne signorum quidem? Dic mihi, Lysippus eodem aere, eadem\ntemperatione, eodem caelo atque ceteris omnibus, centum Alexandros eiusdem\nmodi facere non posset? Qua igitur notione discerneres? 86. Quid? si in\neius_dem_ modi cera centum sigilla hoc anulo impressero, ecquae poterit in\nagnoscendo esse distinctio? an tibi erit quaerendus anularius aliqui,\nquoniam gallinarium invenisti Deliacum illum, qui ova cognosceret?\n\nXXVII. Sed adhibes artem advocatam etiam sensibus. Pictor videt quae nos\nnon videmus et, simul inflavit tibicen, a perito carmen agnoscitur. Quid?\nhoc nonne videtur contra te valere, si sine magnis artificiis, ad quae\npauci accedunt, nostri quidem generis admodum, nec videre nec audire\npossimus? Iam illa praeclara, quanto artificio esset sensus nostros\nmentemque et totam constructionem hominis fabricata natura! 87. Cur non\nextimescam opinandi temeritatem? Etiamne hoc adfirmare potes, Luculle, esse\naliquam vim, cum prudentia et consilio scilicet, quae finxerit vel, ut tuo\nverbo utar, quae fabricata sit hominem? Qualis ista fabrica est? ubi\nadhibita? quando? cur? quo modo? Tractantur ista ingeniose: disputantur\netiam eleganter. Denique videantur sane, ne adfirmentur modo. Sed de\nphysicis mox et quidem ob eam causam, ne tu, qui idem me facturum paulo\nante dixeris, videare mentitus. Sed ut ad ea, quae clariora sunt, veniam,\nres iam universas profundam, de quibus volumina impleta sunt non a nostris\nsolum, sed etiam a Chrysippo:--de quo queri solent Stoici, dum studiose\nomnia conquisierit contra sensus et perspicuitatem contraque omnem\nconsuetudinem contraque rationem, ipsum sibi respondentem inferiorem\nfuisse, itaque ab eo armatum esse Carneadem.--88. Ea sunt eius modi, quae a\nte diligentissime tractata sunt. Dormientium et vinolentorum et furiosorum\nvisa imbecilliora esse dicebas quam vigilantium, siccorum, sanorum. Quo\nmodo? quia, cum experrectus esset Ennius, non diceret 'se vidisse Homerum,\nsed visum esse,' Alcmaeo autem:\n\n  'Sed mihi ne utiquam cor consentit ...'\n\nSimilia de vinolentis. Quasi quisquam neget et qui experrectus sit, eum\nsomnia re_ri_ et cuius furor consederit, putare non fuisse ea vera, quae\nessent sibi visa in furore. Sed non id agitur: tum, cum videbantur, quo\nmodo viderentur, id quaeritur. Nisi vero Ennium non putamus ita totum illud\naudivisse,\n\n  'O pietas animi ...',\n\nsi modo id somniavit, ut si vigilans audiret. Experrectus enim potuit illa\nvisa putare, ut erant, somnia: dormienti vero aeque ac vigilanti\nprobabantur. Quid? Iliona somno illo:\n\n  'Mater, te appello ...'\n\nnonne ita credit filium locutum, ut experrecta etiam crederet? Unde enim\nilla:\n\n'Age adsta: mane, audi: iterandum eadem istaec mihi!' num videtur minorem\nhabere visis quam vigilantes fidem?\n\nXXVIII. 89. Quid loquar de insanis? qualis tandem fuit adfinis tuus,\nCatule, Tuditanus? quisquam sanissimus tam certa putat quae videt quam is\nputabat quae videbantur? Quid ille, qui:\n\n  'Video, video te. Vive, Ulixes, dum licet,'\n\nnonne etiam bis exclamavit se videre, cum omnino non videret? Quid? apud\nEuripidem Hercules, cum, ut Eurysthei filios, ita suos configebat sagittis,\ncum uxorem interemebat, cum conabatur etiam patrem, non perinde movebatur\nfalsis, ut veris moveretur? Quid? ipse Alcmaeo tuus, qui negat 'cor sibi\ncum oculis consentire,' nonne ibidem incitato furore:\n\n  'unde haec flamma oritur?'\n\net illa deinceps:\n\n  'Incedunt, incedunt: adsunt, _adsunt_, me expetunt:'\n\nQuid? cum virginis fidem implorat:\n\n  'Fer mi auxilium, pestem abige a me, flammiferam\n      hanc vim, quae me excruciat!\n  Caerulea incinctae angui incedunt, circumstant\n      cum ardentibus taedis.'\n\nNum dubitas quin sibi haec videre videatur? Itemque cetera:\n\n  'Intendit crinitus Apollo\n  arcum auratum, luna innixus:\n  Diana facem iacit a laeva.'\n\n90. Qui magis haec crederet, si essent, quam credebat, quia videbantur?\nApparet enim iam 'cor cum oculis consentire.' Omnia autem haec proferuntur,\nut illud efficiatur, quo certius nihil potest esse, inter visa vera et\nfalsa ad animi adsensum nihil interesse. Vos autem nihil agitis, cum illa\nfalsa vel furiosorum vel somniantium recordatione ipsorum refellitis. Non\nenim id quaeritur, qualis recordatio fieri soleat eorum, qui experrecti\nsint, aut eorum, qui furere destiterint, sed qualis visio fuerit aut\nfurentium aut somniantium tum cum movebantur. Sed abeo a sensibus.\n\n91. Quid est quod ratione percipi possit? Dialecticam inventam esse\ndicitis, veri et falsi quasi disceptatricem et iudicem. Cuius veri et\nfalsi? et in qua re? In geometriane quid sit verum aut falsum dialecticus\niudicabit an in litteris an in musicis? At ea non novit. In philosophia\nigitur. Sol quantus sit quid ad illum? Quod sit summum bonum quid habet ut\nqueat iudicare? Quid igitur iudicabit? quae coniunctio, quae diiunctio vera\nsit, quid ambigue dictum sit, quid sequatur quamque rem, quid repugnet? Si\nhaec et horum similia iudicat, de se ipsa iudicat. Plus autem pollicebatur.\nNam haec quidem iudicare ad ceteras res, quae sunt in philosophia multae\natque magnae, non est satis. 92. Sed quoniam tantum in ea arte ponitis,\nvidete ne contra vos tota nata sit: quae primo progressu festive tradit\nelementa loquendi et ambiguorum intellegentiam concludendique rationem, tum\npaucis additis venit ad soritas, lubricum sane et periculosum locum, quod\ntu modo dicebas esse vitiosum interrogandi genus.\n\nXXIX. Quid ergo? istius vitii num nostra culpa est? Rerum natura nullam\nnobis dedit cognitionem finium, ut ulla in re statuere possimus quatenus.\nNec hoc in acervo tritici solum, unde nomen est, sed nulla omnino in re\nminutatim interrogati, dives pauper, clarus obscurus sit, multa pauca,\nmagna parva, longa brevia, lata angusta, quanto aut addito aut dempto\ncertum respondeamus [non] habemus.--93. At vitiosi sunt soritae.--Frangite\nigitur eos, si potestis, ne molesti sint. Erunt enim, nisi cavetis. Cautum\nest, inquit. Placet enim Chrysippo, cum gradatim interrogetur, verbi causa,\ntria pauca sint anne multa, aliquanto prius quam ad multa perveniat\nquiescere, id est, quod ab his dicitur, [Greek: h\u00easychazein]. Per me vel\nstertas licet, inquit Carneades, non modo quiescas. Sed quid proficit?\nSequitur enim, qui te ex somno excitet et eodem modo interroget. Quo in\nnumero conticuisti, si ad eum numerum unum addidero, multane erunt?\nProgrediere rursus, quoad videbitur. Quid plura? hoc enim fateris, neque\nultimum te paucorum neque primum multorum respondere posse. Cuius generis\nerror ita manat, ut non videam quo non possit accedere. 94. Nihil me\nlaedit, inquit: ego enim, ut agitator callidus, prius quam ad finem veniam,\nequos sustinebo, eoque magis, si locus is, quo ferentur equi, praeceps\nerit. Sic me, inquit, ante sustineo nec diutius captiose interroganti\nrespondeo. Si habes quod liqueat neque respondes, superbus es: si non\nhabes, ne tu quidem percipis. Si, quia obscura, concedo. Sed negas te usque\nad obscura progredi. Illustribus igitur rebus insistis. Si id tantum modo,\nut taceas, nihil adsequeris. Quid enim ad illum, qui te captare volt, utrum\ntacentem irretiat te an loquentem? Sin autem usque ad novem, verbi gratia,\nsine dubitatione respondes pauca esse, in decimo insistis: etiam a certis\net illustrioribus cohibes adsensum. Hoc idem me in obscuris facere non\nsinis. Nihil igitur te contra soritas ars ista adiuvat, quae nec augentis\nnec minuentis quid aut primum sit aut postremum docet. 95. Quid? quod eadem\nilla ars, quasi Penelope telam retexens, tollit ad extremum superiora.\nUtrum ea vestra an nostra culpa est? Nempe fundamentum dialecticae est,\nquidquid enuntietur--id autem appellant [Greek: axi\u00f4ma], quod est quasi\neffatum--, aut verum esse aut falsum. Quid igitur? haec vera an falsa sunt?\nSi te mentiri dicis idque verum dicis, mentiris _an_ verum dicis? Haec\nscilicet inexplicabilia esse dicitis. Quod est odiosius quam illa, quae nos\nnon comprehensa et non percepta dicimus.\n\nXXX. Sed hoc omitto. Illud quaero, si ista explicari non possunt, nec eorum\nullum iudicium invenitur, ut respondere possitis verane an falsa sint, ubi\nest illa definitio: 'effatum esse id, quod aut verum aut falsum sit'? Rebus\nsumptis adiungam ex his sequendas esse alias, alias improbandas, quae sint\nin genere contrario. 96. Quo modo igitur hoc conclusum esse iudicas? 'Si\ndicis _nunc lucere et verum dicis, lucet; dicis autem_ nunc lucere et verum\ndicis: lucet igitur.' Probatis certe genus et rectissime conclusum dicitis.\nItaque in docendo eum primum concludendi modum traditis. Aut quidquid\nigitur eodem modo concluditur probabitis aut ars ista nulla est. Vide ergo\nhanc conclusionem probaturusne sis: 'Si dicis te mentiri verumque dicis,\nmentiris; dicis autem te mentiri verumque dicis, mentiris igitur.' Qui\npotes hanc non probare, cum probaveris eiusdem generis superiorem? Haec\nChrysippea sunt, ne ab ipso quidem dissoluta. Quid enim faceret huic\nconclusioni? 'Si lucet, lucet; lucet autem: lucet igitur.' Cederet\nscilicet. Ipsa enim ratio conexi, cum concesseris superius, cogit inferius\nconcedere. Quid ergo haec ab illa conclusione differt? 'Si mentiris,\nmentiris: mentiris autem: mentiris igitur.' Hoc negas te posse nec\napprobare nec improbare. 97. Qui igitur magis illud? Si ars, si ratio, si\nvia, si vis denique conclusionis valet, eadem est in utroque. Sed hoc\nextremum eorum est: postulant ut excipiantur haec inexplicabilia. Tribunum\naliquem censeo adeant: a me istam exceptionem numquam impetrabunt. Etenim\ncum ab Epicuro, qui totam dialecticam et contemnit et irridet, non\nimpetrent ut verum esse concedat quod ita effabimur, 'aut vivet cras\nHermarchus aut non vivet' cum dialectici sic statuant, omne, quod ita\ndiiunctum sit, quasi 'aut etiam aut non,' non modo verum esse, sed etiam\nnecessarium: vide quam sit catus is, quem isti tardum putant. Si enim,\ninquit, alterutrum concessero necessarium esse, necesse erit cras\nHermarchum aut vivere aut non vivere; nulla autem est in natura rerum talis\nnecessitas. Cum hoc igitur dialectici pugnent, id est, Antiochus et Stoici:\ntotam enim evertit dialecticam. Nam si e contrariis diiunctio--contraria\nautem ea dico, cum alterum aiat, alterum neget, si talis diiunctio falsa\npotest esse, nulla vera est. 98. Mecum vero quid habent litium, qui ipsorum\ndisciplinam sequor? Cum aliquid huius modi inciderat, sic ludere Carneades\nsolebat: 'Si recte conclusi, teneo: sin vitiose, minam Diogenes reddet.' Ab\neo enim Stoico dialecticam didicerat: haec autem merces erat dialecticorum.\nSequor igitur eas vias, quas didici ab Antiocho, nec reperio quo modo\niudicem 'si lucet, lucet,' verum esse ob eam causam, quod ita didici, omne,\nquod ipsum ex se conexum sit, verum esse, non iudicem 'si mentiris,\nmentiris,' eodem modo [esse] conexum. Aut igitur hoc et illud aut, nisi\nhoc, ne illud quidem iudicabo.\n\nXXXI. Sed, ut omnes istos aculeos et totum tortuosum genus disputandi\nrelinquamus ostendamusque qui simus, iam explicata tota Carneadis sententia\nAntiochea ista corruent universa. Nec vero quicquam ita dicam, ut quisquam\nid fingi suspicetur: a Clitomacho sumam, qui usque ad senectutem cum\nCarneade fuit, homo et acutus, ut Poenus, et valde studiosus ac diligens.\nEt quattuor eius libri sunt de sustinendis adsensionibus. Haec autem, quae\niam dicam, sunt sumpta de primo. 99. Duo placet esse Carneadi genera\nvisorum, in uno hanc divisionem: 'alia visa esse quae percipi possint, alia\nquae non possint,' in altero autem: 'alia visa esse probabilia; alia non\nprobabilia.' Itaque, quae contra sensus contraque perspicuitatem dicantur,\nea pertinere ad superiorem divisionem: contra posteriorem nihil dici\noportere: qua re ita placere: tale visum nullum esse, ut perceptio\nconsequeretur, ut autem probatio, multa. Etenim contra naturam esset, si\nprobabile nihil esset. Et sequitur omnis vitae ea, quam tu, Luculle,\ncommemorabas, eversio. Itaque et sensibus probanda multa sunt, teneatur\nmodo illud, non inesse in iis quicquam tale, quale non etiam falsum nihil\nab eo differens esse possit. Sic, quidquid acciderit specie probabile, si\nnihil se offeret quod sit probabilitati illi contrarium, utetur eo sapiens\nac sic omnis ratio vitae gubernabitur. Etenim is quoque, qui a vobis\nsapiens inducitur, multa sequitur probabilia, non comprehensa neque\npercepta neque adsensa, sed similia veri: quae nisi probet, omnis vita\ntollatur. 100. Quid enim? conscendens navem sapiens num comprehensum animo\nhabet atque perceptum se ex sententia navigaturum? Qui potest? Sed si iam\nex hoc loco proficiscatur Puteolos stadia triginta, probo navigio, bono\ngubernatore, hac tranquillitate, probabile videatur se illuc venturum esse\nsalvum. Huius modi igitur visis consilia capiet et agendi et non agendi,\nfaciliorque erit, ut albam esse nivem probet, quam erat Anaxagoras, qui id\nnon modo ita esse negabat, sed sibi, quia sciret aquam nigram esse, unde\nilla concreta esset, albam ipsam esse, ne videri quidem. 101. Et quaecumque\nres eum sic attinget, ut sit visum illud probabile neque ulla re impeditum,\nmovebitur. Non enim est e saxo sculptus aut e robore dolatus, habet corpus,\nhabet animum, movetur mente, movetur sensibus, ut ei multa vera videantur,\nneque tamen habere insignem illam et propriam percipiendi notam: eoque\nsapientem non adsentiri, quia possit eiusdem modi exsistere falsum aliquod,\ncuius modi hoc verum. Neque nos contra sensus aliter dicimus ac Stoici, qui\nmulta falsa esse dicunt, longeque aliter se habere ac sensibus videantur.\n\nXXXII. Hoc autem si ita sit, ut unum modo sensibus falsum videatur, praesto\nest qui neget rem ullam percipi posse sensibus. Ita nobis tacentibus ex uno\nEpicuri capite, altero vestro perceptio et comprehensio tollitur. Quod est\ncaput Epicuri? 'Si ullum sensus visum falsum est, nihil percipi potest.'\nQuod vestrum? 'Sunt falsa sensus visa.' Quid sequitur? ut taceam, conclusio\nipsa loquitur: 'nihil posse percipi.' Non concedo, inquit, Epicuro. Certa\nigitur cum illo, qui a te totus diversus est: noli mecum, qui hoc quidem\ncerte, falsi esse aliquid in sensibus, tibi adsentior. 102. Quamquam nihil\nmihi tam mirum videtur quam ista dici, ab Antiocho quidem maxime, cui erant\nea, quae paulo ante dixi, notissima. Licet enim haec quivis arbitratu suo\nreprehendat, quod negemus rem ullam percipi posse, certe levior reprehensio\nest: quod tamen dicimus esse quaedam probabilia, non videtur hoc satis esse\nvobis. Ne sit: illa certe debemus effugere, quae a te vel maxime agitata\nsunt: 'nihil igitur cernis? nihil audis? nihil tibi est perspicuum?'\nExplicavi paulo ante Clitomacho auctore quo modo ista Carneades diceret.\nAccipe quem ad modum eadem dicantur a Clitomacho in eo libro, quem ad C.\nLucilium scripsit po\u00ebtam, cum scripsisset isdem de rebus ad L. Censorinum,\neum, qui consul cum M. Manilio fuit. Scripsit igitur his fere verbis--sunt\nenim mihi nota, propterea quod earum ipsarum rerum, de quibus agimus, prima\ninstitutio et quasi disciplina illo libro continetur--, sed scriptum est\nita: 103. 'Academicis placere esse rerum eius modi dissimilitudines, ut\naliae probabiles videantur, aliae contra: id autem non esse satis cur alia\nposse percipi dicas, alia non posse, propterea quod multa falsa probabilia\nsint, nihil autem falsi perceptum et cognitum possit esse.' Itaque ait\nvehementer errare eos, qui dicant ab Academia sensus eripi, a quibus\nnumquam dictum sit aut colorem aut saporem aut sonum nullum esse, illud sit\ndisputatum, non inesse in his propriam, quae nusquam alibi esset, veri et\ncerti notam. 104. Quae cum exposuisset, adiungit dupliciter dici adsensus\nsustinere sapientem: uno modo, cum hoc intelligatur, omnino eum rei nulli\nadsentiri: altero, cum se a respondendo, ut aut approbet quid aut improbet,\nsustineat, ut neque neget aliquid neque aiat. Id cum ita sit, alterum\nplacere, ut numquam adsentiatur, alterum tenere, ut sequens probabilitatem,\nubicumque haec aut occurrat aut deficiat, aut 'etiam' aut 'non' respondere\npossit. +Nec, ut placeat, eum, qui de omnibus rebus contineat se ab\nadsentiendo, moveri tamen et agere aliquid, reliquit eius modi visa, quibus\nad actionem excitemur: item ea, quae interrogati in utramque partem\nrespondere possimus, sequentes tantum modo, quod ita visum sit, dum sine\nadsensu: neque tamen omnia eius modi visa approbari, sed ea, quae nulla re\nimpedirentur. 105. Haec si vobis non probamus, sint falsa sane, invidiosa\ncerte non sunt. Non enim lucem eripimus, sed ea, quae vos percipi\ncomprehendique, eadem nos, si modo probabilia sint, videri dicimus.\n\nXXXIII. Sic igitur inducto et constituto probabili, et eo quidem expedito,\nsoluto, libero, nulla re implicato, vides profecto, Luculle, iacere iam\nillud tuum perspicuitatis patrocinium. Isdem enim hic sapiens, de quo\nloquor, oculis quibus iste vester caelum, terram, mare intuebitur, isdem\nsensibus reliqua, quae sub quemque sensum cadunt, sentiet. Mare illud, quod\nnunc Favonio nascente purpureum videtur, idem huic nostro videbitur, nec\ntamen adsentietur, quia nobismet ipsis modo caeruleum videbatur, mane\nravum, quodque nunc, qua a sole collucet, albescit et vibrat dissimileque\nest proximo et continenti, ut, etiam si possis rationem reddere cur id\neveniat, tamen non possis id verum esse, quod videbatur oculis, defendere.\n106. Unde memoria, si nihil percipimus? Sic enim quaerebas. Quid? meminisse\nvisa nisi comprehensa non possumus? Quid? Polyaenus, qui magnus\nmathematicus fuisse dicitur, is postea quam Epicuro adsentiens totam\ngeometriam falsam esse credidit, num illa etiam, quae sciebat, oblitus est?\nAtqui, falsum quod est, id percipi non potest, ut vobismet ipsis placet. Si\nigitur memoria perceptarum comprehensarumque rerum est, omnia, quae quisque\nmeminit, habet ea comprehensa atque percepta. Falsi autem comprehendi nihil\npotest, et omnia meminit Siron Epicuri dogmata. Vera igitur illa sunt nunc\nomnia. Hoc per me licet: sed tibi aut concedendum est ita esse, quod minime\nvis, aut memoriam mihi remittas oportet et fateare esse ei locum, etiam si\ncomprehensio perceptioque nulla sit. 107. Quid fiet artibus? Quibus? Iisne,\nquae ipsae fatentur coniectura se plus uti quam scientia, an iis, quae\ntantum id, quod videtur, secuntur nec habent istam artem vestram, qua vera\net falsa diiudicent?\n\nSed illa sunt lumina duo, quae maxime causam istam continent. Primum enim\nnegatis fieri posse ut quisquam nulli rei adsentiatur. At id quidem\nperspicuum est. Cum Panaetius, princeps prope meo quidem iudicio Stoicorum,\nea de re dubitare se dicat, quam omnes praeter eum Stoici certissimam\nputant, vera esse haruspicum [_responsa_], auspicia, oracula, somnia,\nvaticinationes, seque ab adsensu sustineat: quod is potest facere vel de\niis rebus, quas illi, a quibus ipse didicit, certas habuerint, cur id\nsapiens de reliquis rebus facere non possit? An est aliquid, quod positum\nvel improbare vel approbare possit, dubitare non possit? an tu in soritis\npoteris hoc, cum voles: ille in reliquis rebus non poterit eodem modo\ninsistere, praesertim cum possit sine adsensione ipsam veri similitudinem\nnon impeditam sequi? 108. Alterum est, quod negatis actionem ullius rei\nposse in eo esse, qui nullam rem adsensu suo comprobet. Primum enim videri\noportet in quo sit etiam adsensus. Dicunt enim Stoici sensus ipsos adsensus\nesse, quos quoniam appetitio consequatur, actionem sequi: tolli autem\nomnia, si visa tollantur.\n\nXXXIV. Hac de re in utramque partem et dicta sunt et scripta multa, sed\nbrevi res potest tota confici. Ego enim etsi maximam actionem puto\nrepugnare visis, obsistere opinionibus, adsensus lubricos sustinere,\ncredoque Clitomacho ita scribenti, Herculi quendam laborem exanclatum a\nCarneade, quod, ut feram et immanem beluam, sic ex animis nostris\nadsensionem, id est, opinationem et temeritatem extraxisset, tamen, ut ea\npars defensionis relinquatur, quid impediet actionem eius, qui probabilia\nsequitur, nulla re impediente? 109. Hoc, inquit, ipsum impediet, quod\nstatuet, ne id quidem, quod probet, posse percipi. Iam istuc te quoque\nimpediet in navigando, in conserendo, in uxore ducenda, in liberis\nprocreandis plurimisque in rebus, in quibus nihil sequere praeter\nprobabile.\n\nEt tamen illud usitatum et saepe repudiatum refers, non ut Antipater, sed,\nut ais, 'pressius.' Nam Antipatrum reprehensum, quod diceret consentaneum\nesse ei, qui adfirmaret nihil posse comprehendi, id ipsum saltem dicere\nposse comprehendi, quod ipsi Antiocho pingue videbatur et sibi ipsum\ncontrarium. Non enim potest convenienter dici nihil comprehendi posse, si\nquicquam comprehendi posse dicatur. Illo modo potius putat urguendum fuisse\nCarneadem: cum sapientis nullum decretum esse possit nisi comprehensum,\nperceptum, cognitum, ut hoc ipsum decretum, quod sapientis esset, nihil\nposse percipi, fateretur esse perceptum. Proinde quasi nullum sapiens aliud\ndecretum habeat et sine decretis vitam agere possit! 110. Sed ut illa habet\nprobabilia non percepta, sic hoc ipsum, nihil posse percipi. Nam si in hoc\nhaberet cognitionis notam, eadem uteretur in ceteris. Quam quoniam non\nhabet, utitur probabilibus. Itaque non metuit ne confundere omnia videatur\net incerta reddere. Non enim, quem ad modum, si quaesitum ex eo sit,\nstellarum numerus par an impar sit, item, si de officio multisque aliis de\nrebus, in quibus versatus exercitatusque sit, nescire se dicat. In incertis\nenim nihil probabile est, in quibus autem est, in iis non deerit sapienti\nnec quid faciat nec quid respondeat. 111. Ne illam quidem praetermisisti,\nLuculle, reprehensionem Antiochi--nec mirum: in primis enim est nobilis--,\nqua solebat dicere Antiochus Philonem maxime perturbatum. Cum enim\nsumeretur, unum, esse quaedam falsa visa, alterum nihil ea differre a\nveris, non adtendere, superius illud ea re a se esse concessum, quod\nvideretur esse quaedam in vivis differentia, eam tolli altero, quo neget\nvisa a falsis vera differre; nihil tam repugnare. Id ita esset, si nos\nverum omnino tolleremus. Non facimus. Nam tam vera quam falsa cernimus. Sed\nprobandi species est: percipiendi signum nullum habemus.\n\nXXXV. 112. Ac mihi videor nimis etiam nunc agere ieiune. Cum sit enim\ncampus in quo exsultare possit oratio, cur eam tantas in angustias et in\nStoicorum dumeta compellimus? si enim mihi cum Peripatetico res esset, qui\nid percipi posse diceret, 'quod impressum esset e vero,' neque adhiberet\nillam magnam accessionem, 'quo modo imprimi non posset a falso,' cum\nsimplici homine simpliciter agerem nec magno opere contenderem atque etiam,\nsi, cum ego nihil dicerem posse comprehendi, diceret ille sapientem\ninterdum opinari, non repugnarem, praesertim ne Carneade quidem huic loco\nvalde repugnante: nunc quid facere possum? 113. Quaero enim quid sit quod\ncomprehendi possit. Respondet mihi non Aristoteles aut Theophrastus, ne\nXenocrates quidem aut Polemo, sed qui his minor est: 'tale verum quale\nfalsum esse non possit.' Nihil eius modo invenio. Itaque incognito nimirum\nadsentiar, id est, opinabor. Hoc mihi et Peripatetici et vetus Academia\nconcedit: vos negatis, Antiochus in primis, qui me valde movet, vel quod\namavi hominem, sicut ille me, vel quod ita iudico, politissimum et\nacutissimum omnium nostrae memoriae philosophorum. A quo primum quaero quo\ntandem modo sit eius Academiae, cuius esse se profiteatur? Ut omittam alia,\nhaec duo, de quibus agitur, quis umquam dixit aut veteris Academiae aut\nPeripateticorum, vel id solum percipi posse, quod esset verum tale, quale\nfalsum esse non posset, vel sapientem nihil opinari? Certe nemo. Horum\nneutrum ante Zenonem magno opere defensum est. Ego tamen utrumque verum\nputo, nec dico temporis causa, sed ita plane probo.\n\nXXXVI. 114. Illud ferre non possum. Tu cum me incognito adsentiri vetes\nidque turpissimum esse dicas et plenissimum temeritatis, tantum tibi\nadroges, ut exponas disciplinam sapientiae, naturam rerum omnium evolvas,\nmores fingas, finis bonorum malorumque constituas, officia describas, quam\nvitam ingrediar definias, idemque etiam disputandi et intellegendi iudicium\ndicas te et artificium traditurum, perficies ut ego ista innumerabilia\ncomplectens nusquam labar, nihil opiner? Quae tandem ea est disciplina, ad\nquam me deducas, si ab hac abstraxeris? Vereor ne subadroganter facias, si\ndixeris tuam. Atqui ita dicas necesse est. 115. Neque vero tu solus, sed ad\nsuam quisque rapiet. Age, restitero Peripateticis, qui sibi cum oratoribus\ncognationem esse, qui claros viros a se instructos dicant rem publicam\nsaepe rexisse, sustinuero Epicureos, tot meos familiaris, tam bonos, tam\ninter se amantis viros, Diodoto quid faciam Stoico, quem a puero audivi?\nqui mecum vivit tot annos? qui habitat apud me? quem et admiror et diligo?\nqui ista Antiochea contemnit? Nostra, inquies, sola vera sunt. Certe sola,\nsi vera: plura enim vera discrepantia esse non possunt. Utrum igitur nos\nimpudentes, qui labi nolumus, an illi adrogantes, qui sibi persuaserint\nscire se solos omnia? Non me quidem, inquit, sed sapientem dico scire.\nOptime: nempe ista scire, quae sunt in tua disciplina. Hoc primum quale\nest, a non sapiente explicari sapientiam? Sed discedamus a nobismet ipsis,\nde sapiente loquamur, de quo, ut saepe iam dixi, omnis haec quaestio est.\n\n116. In tres igitur partis et a plerisque et a vobismet ipsis distributa\nsapientia est. Primum ergo, si placet, quae de natura rerum sint quaesita,\nvideamus: at illud ante. Estne quisquam tanto inflatus errore, ut sibi se\nilla scire persuaserit? Non quaero rationes eas, quae ex coniectura\npendent, quae disputationibus huc et illuc trahuntur, nullam adhibent\npersuadendi necessitatem. Geometrae provideant, qui se profitentur non\npersuadere, sed cogere, et qui omnia vobis, quae describunt, probant. Non\nquaero ex his illa initia mathematicorum, quibus non concessis digitum\nprogredi non possunt. Punctum esse quod magnitudinem nullam habeat:\nextremitatem et quasi libramentum in quo nulla omnino crassitudo sit:\nliniamentum sine ulla latitudine [carentem]. Haec cum vera esse concessero,\nsi adigam ius iurandum sapientem, nec prius quam Archimedes eo inspectante\nrationes omnis descripserit eas, quibus efficitur multis partibus solem\nmaiorem esse quam terram, iuraturum putas? Si fecerit, solem ipsum, quem\ndeum censet esse, contempserit. 117. Quod si geometricis rationibus non est\ncrediturus, quae vim adferunt in docendo, vos ipsi ut dicitis, ne ille\nlonge aberit ut argumentis credat philosophorum, aut, si est crediturus,\nquorum potissimum? Omnia enim physicorum licet explicare; sed longum est:\nquaero tamen quem sequatur. Finge aliquem nunc fieri sapientem, nondum\nesse, quam potissimum sententiam eliget _et_ disciplinam? Etsi quamcumque\neliget, insipiens eliget. Sed sit ingenio divino, quem unum e physicis\npotissimum probabit? Nec plus uno poterit. Non persequor quaestiones\ninfinitas: tantum de principiis rerum, e quibus omnia constant, videamus\nquem probet: est enim inter magnos homines summa dissensio.\n\nXXXVII. 118. Princeps Thales, unus e septem, cui sex reliquos concessisse\nprimas ferunt, ex aqua dixit constare omnia. At hoc Anaximandro, populari\net sodali suo, non persuasit: is enim infinitatem naturae dixit esse, e qua\nomnia gignerentur. Post eius auditor Anaximenes infinitum a\u00ebra, sed ea,\nquae ex eo orirentur, definita: gigni autem terram, aquam, ignem, tum ex\nhis omnia. Anaxagoras materiam infinitam, sed ex ea particulas, similis\ninter se, minutas, eas primum confusas, postea in ordinem adductas a mente\ndivina. Xenophanes, paulo etiam antiquior, unum esse omnia neque id esse\nmutabile et id esse deum neque natum umquam et sempiternum, conglobata\nfigura: Parmenides ignem, qui moveat terram, quae ab eo formetur:\nLeucippus, plenum et inane: Democritus huic in hoc similis, uberior in\nceteris: Empedocles haec pervolgata et nota quattuor: Heraclitus ignem:\nMelissus hoc, quod esset infinitum et immutabile, et fuisse semper et fore.\nPlato ex materia in se omnia recipiente mundum factum esse censet a deo\nsempiternum. Pythagorei ex numeris et mathematicorum initiis proficisci\nvolunt omnia. Ex his eliget vester sapiens unum aliquem, credo, quem\nsequatur: ceteri tot viri et tanti repudiati ab eo condemnatique discedent.\n119. Quamcumque vero sententiam probaverit, eam sic animo comprehensam\nhabebit, ut ea, quae sensibus, nec magis approbabit nunc lucere, quam,\nquoniam Stoicus est, hunc mundum esse sapientem, habere mentem, quae et se\net ipsum fabricata sit et omnia moderetur, moveat, regat. Erit ei persuasum\netiam solem, lunam, stellas omnis, terram, mare deos esse, quod quaedam\nanimalis intellegentia per omnia ea permanet et transeat, fore tamen\naliquando ut omnis hic mundus ardore deflagret.\n\nXXXVIII. Sint ista vera--vides enim iam me fateri aliquid esse veri--,\ncomprehendi ea tamen et percipi nego. Cum enim tuus iste Stoicus sapiens\nsyllabatim tibi ista dixerit, veniet flumen orationis aureum fundens\nAristoteles, qui illum desipere dicat: neque enim ortum esse umquam mundum,\nquod nulla fuerit novo consilio inito tam praeclari operis inceptio, et ita\nesse eum undique aptum, ut nulla vis tantos queat motus mutationemque\nmoliri, nulla senectus diuturnitate temporum exsistere, ut hic ornatus\numquam dilapsus occidat. Tibi hoc repudiare, illud autem superius sicut\ncaput et famam tuam defendere necesse erit, cum mihi ne ut dubitem quidem\nrelinquatur. 120. Ut omittam levitatem temere adsentientium, quanti\nlibertas ipsa aestimanda est non mihi necesse esse quod tibi est? Cur deus,\nomnia nostra causa cum faceret--sic enim voltis--, tantam vim natricum\nviperarumque fecerit? cur mortifera tam multa _ac_ perniciosa terra marique\ndisperserit? Negatis haec tam polite tamque subtiliter effici potuisse sine\ndivina aliqua sollertia. Cuius quidem vos maiestatem deducitis usque ad\napium formicarumque perfectionem, ut etiam inter deos Myrmecides aliquis\nminutorum opusculorum fabricator fuisse videatur. 121. Negas sine deo posse\nquicquam. Ecce tibi e transverso Lampsacenus Strato, qui det isti deo\nimmunitatem magni quidem muneris: sed cum sacerdotes deorum vacationem\nhabeant, quanto est aequius habere ipsos deos! Negat opera deorum se uti ad\nfabricandum mundum. Quaecumque sint, docet omnia effecta esse natura, nec,\nut ille, qui asperis et levibus et hamatis uncinatisque corporibus concreta\nhaec esse dicat interiecto inani. Somnia censet haec esse Democriti non\ndocentis, sed optantis. Ipse autem singulas mundi partis persequens,\nquidquid aut sit aut fiat, naturalibus fieri aut factum esse docet\nponderibus et motibus. Ne ille et deum opere magno liberat et me timore.\nQuis enim potest, cum existimet curari se a deo, non et dies et noctes\ndivinum numen horrere et, si quid adversi acciderit--quod cui non\naccidit?--extimescere ne id iure evenerit? Nec Stratoni tamen adsentior,\nnec vero tibi. Modo hoc, modo illud probabilius videtur.\n\nXXXIX. 122. Latent ista omnia, Luculle, crassis occultata et circumfusa\ntenebris, ut nulla acies humani ingeni tanta sit, quae penetrare in caelum,\nterram intrare possit: corpora nostra non novimus: qui sint situs partium,\nquam vim quaeque pars habeat ignoramus. Itaque medici ipsi, quorum\nintererat ea nosse, aperuerunt, ut viderentur. Nec eo tamen aiunt empirici\nnotiora esse illa, quia possit fieri ut patefacta et detecta mutentur. Sed\necquid nos eodem modo rerum naturas persecare, aperire, dividere possumus,\nut videamus terra penitusne defixa sit et quasi radicibus suis haereat an\nmedia pendeat? 123. Habitari ait Xenophanes in luna eamque esse terram\nmultarum urbium et montium. Portenta videntur, sed tamen neque ille, qui\ndixit, iurare posset, ita se rem habere, neque ego non ita. Vos etiam\ndicitis esse e regione nobis, e contraria parte terrae, qui adversis\nvestigiis stent contra nostra vestigia, quos [Greek: antipodas] vocatis:\ncur mihi magis suscensetis, qui ista non aspernor, quam iis, qui, cum\naudiunt, desipere vos arbitrantur? Hicetas Syracusius, ut ait Theophrastus,\ncaelum, solem, lunam, stellas, supera denique omnia stare censet neque\npraeter terram rem ullam in mundo moveri: quae cum circum axem se summa\nceleritate convertat et torqueat, eadem effici omnia, quae, si stante terra\ncaelum moveretur. Atque hoc etiam Platonem in Timaeo dicere quidam\narbitrantur, sed paulo obscurius. Quid tu, Epicure? loquere. Putas solem\nesse tantulum? Egone? ne bis quidem tantum! Et vos ab illo irridemini et\nipsi illum vicissim eluditis. Liber igitur a tali irrisione Socrates, liber\nAristo Chius, qui nihil istorum sciri putat posse. 124. Sed redeo ad animum\net corpus. Satisne tandem ea nota sunt nobis, quae nervorum natura sit,\nquae venarum? tenemusne quid sit animus, ubi sit? denique sitne an, ut\nDicaearcho visum est, ne sit quidem ullus? Si est, tresne partis habeat, ut\nPlatoni placuit, rationis, irae, cupiditatis, an simplex unusque sit? si\nsimplex, utrum sit ignis an anima an sanguis an, ut Xenocrates, numerus\nnullo corpore--quod intellegi quale sit vix potest--et, quidquid est,\nmortale sit an aeternum? nam utramque in partem multa dicuntur. Horum\naliquid vestro sapienti certum videtur, nostro ne quid maxime quidem\nprobabile sit occurrit: ita sunt in plerisque contrariarum rationum paria\nmomenta.\n\nXL. 125. Sin agis verecundius et me accusas, non quod tuis rationibus non\nadsentiar, sed quod nullis, vincam animum cuique adsentiar deligam ... quem\npotissimum? quem? Democritum: semper enim, ut scitis, studiosus nobilitatis\nfui. Urguebor iam omnium vestrum convicio. Tune aut inane quicquam putes\nesse, cum ita completa et conferta sint omnia, ut et quod movebitur\ncorporum cedat et qua quidque cesserit aliud ilico subsequatur? aut atomos\nullas, e quibus quidquid efficiatur, illarum sit dissimillimum? aut sine\naliqua mente rem ullam effici posse praeclaram? et cum in uno mundo ornatus\nhic tam sit mirabilis, innumerabilis supra infra, dextra sinistra, ante\npost, alios dissimilis, alios eiusdem modi mundos esse? et, ut nos nunc\nsimus ad Baulos Puteolosque videamus, sic innumerabilis paribus in locis\nisdem esse nominibus, honoribus, rebus gestis, ingeniis, formis, aetatibus,\nisdem de rebus disputantis? et, si nunc aut si etiam dormientes aliquid\nanimo videre videamur, imagines extrinsecus in animos nostros per corpus\nirrumpere? Tu vero ista ne asciveris neve fueris commenticiis rebus\nadsensus. Nihil sentire est melius quam tam prava sentire. 126. Non ergo id\nagitur, ut aliquid adsensu meo comprobem; quae tu, vide ne impudenter etiam\npostules, non solum adroganter, praesertim cum ista tua mihi ne probabilia\nquidem videantur. Nec enim divinationem, quam probatis, ullam esse\narbitror, fatumque illud, quo omnia contineri dicitis, contemno. Ne\nexaedificatum quidem hunc mundum divino consilio existimo, atque haud scio\nan ita sit.\n\nXLI. Sed cur rapior in invidiam? licetne per vos nescire quod nescio? an\nStoicis ipsis inter se disceptare, cum his non licebit? Zenoni et reliquis\nfere Stoicis aether videtur summus deus, mente praeditus, qua omnia\nregantur. Cleanthes, qui quasi maiorum est gentium Stoicus, Zenonis\nauditor, solem dominari et rerum potiri putat. Ita cogimur dissensione\nsapientium dominum nostrum ignorare, quippe qui nesciamus soli an aetheri\nserviamus. Solis autem magnitudinem--ipse enim hic radiatus me intueri\nvidetur ac monet ut crebro faciam mentionem sui--vos ergo huius\nmagnitudinem quasi decempeda permensi refertis: huic me quasi malis\narchitectis mensurae vestrae nego credere. Ergo dubium est uter nostrum\nsit, leniter ut dicam, verecundior? 127. Neque tamen istas quaestiones\nphysicorum exterminandas puto. Est enim animorum ingeniorumque naturale\nquoddam quasi pabulum consideratio contemplatioque naturae. Erigimur,\nelatiores fieri videmur, humana despicimus, cogitantesque supera atque\ncaelestia haec nostra ut exigua et minima contemnimus. Indagatio ipsa rerum\ncum maximarum tum etiam occultissimarum habet oblectationem. Si vero\naliquid occurrit, quod veri simile videatur, humanissima completur animus\nvoluptate. 128. Quaeret igitur haec et vester sapiens et hic noster, sed\nvester, ut adsentiatur, credat, adfirmet, noster, ut vereatur temere\nopinari praeclareque agi secum putet, si in eius modi rebus veri simile\nquod sit invenerit. Veniamus nunc ad bonorum malorumque notionem: at paulum\nante dicendum est. Non mihi videntur considerare, cum physica ista valde\nadfirmant, earum etiam rerum auctoritatem, si quae illustriores videantur,\namittere. Non enim magis adsentiuntur neque approbant lucere nunc, quam,\ncum cornix cecinerit, tum aliquid eam aut iubere aut vetare, nec magis\nadfirmabunt signum illud, si erunt mensi, sex pedum esse quam solem, quem\nmetiri non possunt, plus quam duodeviginti partibus maiorem esse quam\nterram. Ex quo illa conclusio nascitur: si sol quantus sit percipi non\npotest, qui ceteras res eodem modo quo magnitudinem solis approbat, is eas\nres non percipit. Magnitudo autem solis percipi non potest. Qui igitur id\napprobat, quasi percipiat, nullam rem percipit. Responderint posse percipi\nquantus sol sit. Non repugnabo, dum modo eodem pacto cetera percipi\ncomprehendique dicant. Nec enim possunt dicere aliud alio magis minusve\ncomprehendi, quoniam omnium rerum una est definitio comprehendendi.\n\nXLII. 129. Sed quod coeperam: Quid habemus in rebus bonis et malis\nexplorati? nempe fines constituendi sunt ad quos et bonorum et malorum\nsumma referatur: qua de re est igitur inter summos viros maior dissensio?\nOmitto illa, quae relicta iam videntur, ut Herillum, qui in cognitione et\nscientia summum bonum ponit: qui cum Zenonis auditor esset, vides quantum\nab eo dissenserit et quam non multum a Platone. Megaricorum fuit nobilis\ndisciplina, cuius, ut scriptum video, princeps Xenophanes, quem modo\nnominavi, deinde eum secuti Parmenides et Zeno, itaque ab his Eleatici\nphilosophi nominabantur. Post Euclides, Socratis discipulus, Megareus, a\nquo iidem illi Megarici dicti, qui id bonum solum esse dicebant, quod esset\nunum et simile et idem semper. Hic quoque multa a Platone. A Menedemo\nautem, quod is Eretria fuit, Eretriaci appellati, quorum omne bonum in\nmente positum et mentis acie, qua verum cerneretur, Herilli similia, sed,\nopinor, explicata uberius et ornatius. 130. Hos si contemnimus et iam\nabiectos putamus, illos certe minus despicere debemus, Aristonem, qui cum\nZenonis fuisset auditor, re probavit ea quae ille verbis, nihil esse bonum\nnisi virtutem, nec malum nisi quod virtuti esset contrarium: in mediis ea\nmomenta, quae Zeno voluit, nulla esse censuit. Huic summum bonum est in his\nrebus neutram in partem moveri, quae [Greek: adiaphoria] ab ipso dicitur.\nPyrrho autem ea ne sentire quidem sapientem, quae [Greek: apatheia]\nnominatur. Has igitur tot sententias ut omittamus, haec nunc videamus, quae\ndiu multumque defensa sunt. 131. Alii voluptatem finem esse voluerunt:\nquorum princeps Aristippus, qui Socratem audierat, unde Cyrenaici. Post\nEpicurus, cuius est disciplina nunc notior, neque tamen cum Cyrenaicis de\nipsa voluptate consentiens. Voluptatem autem et honestatem finem esse\nCallipho censuit: vacare omni molestia Hieronymus: hoc idem cum honestate\nDiodorus: ambo hi Peripatetici. Honeste autem vivere fruentem rebus iis,\nquas primas homini natura conciliet, et vetus Academia censuit, ut indicant\nscripta Polemonis, quem Antiochus probat maxime, et Aristoteles eiusque\namici nunc proxime videntur accedere. Introducebat etiam Carneades, non quo\nprobaret, sed ut opponeret Stoicis, summum bonum esse frui rebus iis, quas\nprimas natura conciliavisset. Honeste autem vivere, quod ducatur a\nconciliatione naturae, Zeno statuit finem esse bonorum, qui inventor et\nprinceps Stoicorum fuit.\n\nXLIII. 132. Iam illud perspicuum est, omnibus iis finibus bonorum, quos\nexposui, malorum finis esse contrarios. Ad vos nunc refero quem sequar:\nmodo ne quis illud tam ineruditum absurdumque respondeat: 'Quemlibet, modo\naliquem.' Nihil potest dici inconsideratius. Cupio sequi Stoicos.\nLicetne--omitto per Aristotelem, meo iudicio in philosophia prope\nsingularem--per ipsum Antiochum? qui appellabatur Academicus, erat quidem,\nsi perpauca mutavisset, germanissimus Stoicus. Erit igitur res iam in\ndiscrimine. Nam aut Stoicus constituatur sapiens aut veteris Academiae.\nUtrumque non potest. Est enim inter eos non de terminis, sed de tota\npossessione contentio. Nam omnis ratio vitae definitione summi boni\ncontinetur, de qua qui dissident, de omni vitae ratione dissident. Non\npotest igitur uterque sapiens esse, quoniam tanto opere dissentiunt, sed\nalter. Si Polemoneus, peccat Stoicus, rei falsae adsentiens--nam vos quidem\nnihil esse dicitis a sapiente tam alienum--: sin vera sunt Zenonis, eadem\nin veteres Academicos _et_ Peripateticos dicenda. Hic igitur neutri\nadsentietur? Sin, inquam, uter est prudentior? 133. Quid? cum ipse\nAntiochus dissentit quibusdam in rebus ab his, quos amat, Stoicis, nonne\nindicat non posse illa probanda esse sapienti? Placet Stoicis omnia peccata\nesse paria. At hoc Antiocho vehementissime displicet. Liceat tandem mihi\nconsiderare utram sententiam sequar. Praecide, inquit: statue aliquando\nquidlibet. Quid, quod quae dicuntur et acuta mihi videntur in utramque\npartem et paria? nonne caveam ne scelus faciam? Scelus enim dicebas esse,\nLuculle, dogma prodere. Contineo igitur me, ne incognito assentiar: quod\nmihi tecum est dogma commune. 134. Ecce multo maior etiam dissensio. Zeno\nin una virtute positam beatam vitam putat. Quid Antiochus? Etiam, inquit,\nbeatam, sed non beatissimam. Deus ille, qui nihil censuit deesse virtuti,\nhomuncio hic, qui multa putat praeter virtutem homini partim cara esse,\npartim etiam necessaria. Sed ille vereor ne virtuti plus tribuat quam\nnatura patiatur, praesertim Theophrasto multa diserte copioseque dicente.\nEt hic metuo ne vix sibi constet, qui cum dicat esse quaedam et corporis et\nfortunae mala, tamen eum, qui in his omnibus sit, beatum fore censeat, si\nsapiens sit. Distrahor: tum hoc mihi probabilius, tum illud videtur, et\ntamen, nisi alterutrum sit, virtutem iacere plane puto. Verum in his\ndiscrepant.\n\nXLIV. 135. Quid? illa, in quibus consentiunt, num pro veris probare\npossumus? Sapientis animum numquam nec cupiditate moveri nec laetitia\nefferri. Age, haec probabilia sane sint: num etiam illa, numquam timere,\nnumquam dolere? Sapiensne non timeat, si patria deleatur? non doleat, si\ndeleta sit? Durum, sed Zenoni necessarium, cui praeter honestum nihil est\nin bonis, tibi vero, Antioche, minime, cui praeter honestatem multa bona,\npraeter turpitudinem multa mala videntur, quae et venientia metuat sapiens\nnecesse est et venisse doleat. Sed quaero quando ista fuerint _ab_ Academia\nvetere decreta, ut animum sapientis commoveri et conturbari negarent?\nMediocritates illi probabant et in omni permotione naturalem volebant esse\nquendam modum. Legimus omnes Crantoris veteris Academici de luctu. Est enim\nnon magnus, verum aureolus et, ut Tuberoni Panaetius praecipit, ad verbum\nediscendus libellus. Atque illi quidem etiam utiliter a natura dicebant\npermotiones istas animis nostris datas: metum cavendi causa, misericordiam\naegritudinemque clementiae, ipsam iracundiam fortitudinis quasi cotem esse\ndicebant, recte secusne alias viderimus. 136. Atrocitas quidem ista tua quo\nmodo in veterem Academiam irruperit nescio: illa vero ferre non possum, non\nquo mihi displiceant: sunt enim Socratica pleraque mirabilia Stoicorum,\nquae [Greek: paradoxa] nominantur, sed ubi Xenocrates, ubi Aristoteles ista\ntetigit? hos enim quasi eosdem esse voltis. Illi umquam dicerent sapientis\nsolos reges, solos divites, solos formosos? omnia, quae ubique essent,\nsapientis esse? neminem consulem, praetorem, imperatorem, nescio an ne\nquinquevirum quidem quemquam nisi sapientem? postremo, solum civem, solum\nliberum? insipientis omnis peregrinos, exsules, servos, furiosos? denique\nscripta Lycurgi, Solonis, duodecim tabulas nostras non esse leges? ne urbis\nquidem aut civitatis, nisi quae essent sapientium? 137. Haec tibi, Luculle,\nsi es adsensus Antiocho, familiari tuo, tam sunt defendenda quam moenia:\nmihi autem bono modo, tantum quantum videbitur.\n\nXLV. Legi apud Clitomachum, cum Carneades et Stoicus Diogenes ad senatum in\nCapitolio starent, A. Albinum, qui tum P. Scipione et M. Marcello coss.\npraetor esset, eum, qui cum avo tuo, Luculle, consul fuit, doctum sane\nhominem, ut indicat ipsius historia scripta Graece, iocantem dixisse\nCarneadi: 'Ego tibi, Carneade, praetor esse non videor, quia sapiens non\nsum: nec haec urbs nec in ea civitas.' Tum ille: 'Huic Stoico non videris.'\nAristoteles aut Xenocrates, quos Antiochus sequi volebat, non dubitavisset\nquin et praetor ille esset et Roma urbs et eam civitas incoleret. Sed ille\nnoster est plane, ut supra dixi, Stoicus, perpauca balbutiens. 138. Vos\nautem mihi veremini ne labar ad opinionem et aliquid asciscam et comprobem\nincognitum, quod minime voltis. Quid consilii datis? Testatur saepe\nChrysippus tres solas esse sententias, quae defendi possint, de finibus\nbonorum: circumcidit et amputat multitudinem: aut enim honestatem esse\nfinem aut voluptatem aut utrumque: nam qui summum bonum dicant id esse, si\nvacemus omni molestia, eos invidiosum nomen voluptatis fugere, sed in\nvicinitate versari, quod facere eos etiam, qui illud idem cum honestate\nconiungerent, nec multo secus eos, qui ad honestatem prima naturae commoda\nadiungerent: ita tres relinquit sententias, quas putat probabiliter posse\ndefendi. 139. Sit sane ita--quamquam a Polemonis et Peripateticorum et\nAntiochi finibus non facile divellor, nec quicquam habeo adhuc\nprobabilius--, verum tamen video quam suaviter voluptas sensibus nostris\nblandiatur. Labor eo, ut adsentiar Epicuro aut Aristippo. Revocat virtus\nvel potius reprehendit manu: pecudum illos motus esse dicit, hominem iungit\ndeo. Possum esse medius, ut, quoniam Aristippus, quasi animum nullum\nhabeamus, corpus solum tuetur, Zeno, quasi corporis simus expertes, animum\nsolum complectitur, ut Calliphontem sequar, cuius quidem sententiam\nCarneades ita studiose defensitabat, ut eam probare etiam videretur.\nQuamquam Clitomachus adfirmabat numquam se intellegere potuisse quid\nCarneadi probaretur. Sed, si istum finem velim sequi, nonne ipsa veritas et\ngravis et recta ratio mihi obversetur? Tu, cum honestas in voluptate\ncontemnenda consistat, honestatem cum voluptate tamquam hominem cum belua\ncopulabis?\n\nXLVI. 140. Unum igitur par quod depugnet reliquum est, voluptas cum\nhonestate. De quo Chrysippo fuit, quantum ego sentio, non magna contentio.\nAlteram si sequare, multa ruunt et maxime communitas cum hominum genere,\ncaritas, amicitia, iustitia, reliquae virtutes: quarum esse nulla potest,\nnisi erit gratuita. Nam quae voluptate quasi mercede aliqua ad officium\nimpellitur, ea non est virtus, sed fallax imitatio simulatioque virtutis.\nAudi contra illos, qui nomen honestatis a se ne intellegi quidem dicant,\nnisi forte, quod gloriosum sit in volgus, id honestum velimus dicere:\nfontem omnium bonorum in corpore esse, hanc normam, hanc regulam, hanc\npraescriptionem esse naturae, a qua qui aberravisset, eum numquam quid in\nvita sequeretur habiturum. 141. Nihil igitur me putatis, haec et alia\ninnumerabilia cum audiam, moveri? Tam moveor quam tu, Luculle, neque me\nminus hominem quam te putaveris. Tantum interest, quod tu, cum es commotus,\nadquiescis, adsentiris, approbas, verum illud certum, comprehensum,\nperceptum, ratum, firmum, fixum esse vis, deque eo nulla ratione neque\npelli neque moveri potes: ego nihil eius modi esse arbitror, cui si\nadsensus sim, non adsentiar saepe falso, quoniam vera a falsis nullo\ndiscrimine separantur, praesertim cum iudicia ista dialecticae nulla sint.\n\n142. Venio enim iam ad tertiam partem philosophiae. Aliud iudicium\nProtagorae est, qui putet id cuique verum esse, quod cuique videatur: aliud\nCyrenaicorum, qui praeter permotiones intimas nihil putant esse iudicii:\naliud Epicuri, qui omne iudicium in sensibus et in rerum notitiis et in\nvoluptate constituit. Plato autem omne iudicium veritatis veritatemque\nipsam abductam ab opinionibus et a sensibus cogitationis ipsius et mentis\nesse voluit. 143. Num quid horum probat noster Antiochus? Ille vero ne\nmaiorum quidem suorum. Ubi enim aut Xenocratem sequitur, cuius libri sunt\nde ratione loquendi multi et multum probati, aut ipsum Aristotelem, quo\nprofecto nihil est acutius, nihil politius? A Chrysippo pedem nusquam.\n\nXLVII. Quid ergo Academici appellamur? an abutimur gloria nominis? aut cur\ncogimur eos sequi, qui inter se dissident? In hoc ipso, quod in elementis\ndialectici docent, quo modo iudicare oporteat verum falsumne sit, si quid\nita conexum est, ut hoc, 'si dies est, lucet,' quanta contentio est! Aliter\nDiodoro, aliter Philoni, Chrysippo aliter placet. Quid? cum Cleanthe\ndoctore suo quam multis rebus Chrysippus dissidet! quid? duo vel principes\ndialecticorum, Antipater et Archidemus, opiniosissimi homines, nonne multis\nin rebus dissentiunt? 144. Quid me igitur, Luculle, in invidiam et tamquam\nin contionem vocas? et quidem, ut seditiosi tribuni solent, occludi\ntabernas iubes? quo enim spectat illud, cum artificia tolli quereris a\nnobis, nisi ut opifices concitentur? qui si undique omnes convenerint,\nfacile contra vos incitabuntur. Expromam primum illa invidiosa, quod eos\nomnis, qui in contione stabunt, exsules, servos, insanos esse dicatis:\ndeinde ad illa veniam, quae iam non ad multitudinem, sed ad vosmet ipsos,\nqui adestis, pertinent. Negat enim vos Zeno, negat Antiochus scire\nquicquam. Quo modo? inquies: nos enim defendimus etiam insipientem multa\ncomprehendere. 145. At scire negatis quemquam rem ullam nisi sapientem. Et\nhoc quidem Zeno gestu conficiebat. Nam, cum extensis digitis adversam manum\nostenderat, 'visum,' inquiebat, 'huius modi est.' Deinde, cum paulum\ndigitos contraxerat, 'adsensus huius modi.' Tum cum plane compresserat\npugnumque fecerat, comprehensionem illam esse dicebat: qua ex similitudine\netiam nomen ei rei, quod ante non fuerat, [Greek: katal\u00eapsin] imposuit. Cum\nautem laevam manum adverterat et illum pugnum arte vehementerque\ncompresserat, scientiam talem esse dicebat, cuius compotem nisi sapientem\nesse neminem. Sed qui sapientes sint aut fuerint ne ipsi quidem solent\ndicere. Ita tu nunc, Catule, lucere nescis nec tu, Hortensi, in tua villa\nnos esse. 146. Num minus haec invidiose dicuntur? nec tamen nimis\neleganter: illa subtilius. Sed quo modo tu, si nihil comprehendi posset,\nartificia concidere dicebas neque mihi dabas id, quod probabile esset,\nsatis magnam vim habere ad artis, sic ego nunc tibi refero artem sine\nscientia esse non posse. An pateretur hoc Zeuxis aut Phidias aut\nPolyclitus, nihil se scire, cum in iis esset tanta sollertia? Quod si eos\ndocuisset aliquis quam vim habere diceretur scientia, desinerent irasci: ne\nnobis quidem suscenserent, cum didicissent id tollere nos, quod nusquam\nesset, quod autem satis esset ipsis relinquere. Quam rationem maiorum etiam\ncomprobat diligentia, qui primum iurare 'ex sui animi sententia' quemque\nvoluerunt, deinde ita teneri 'si sciens falleret,' quod inscientia multa\nversaretur in vita, tum, qui testimonium diceret, ut 'arbitrari' se diceret\netiam quod ipse vidisset, quaeque iurati iudices cognovissent, ea non ut\nesse facta, sed ut 'videri' pronuntiarentur.\n\nXLVIII. 147. Verum, quoniam non solum nauta significat, sed etiam Favonius\nipse insusurrat navigandi nobis, Luculle, tempus esse et quoniam satis\nmulta dixi, est mihi perorandum. Posthac tamen, cum haec quaeremus, potius\nde dissensionibus tantis summorum virorum disseramus, de obscuritate\nnaturae deque errore tot philosophorum, qui de bonis contrariisque rebus\ntanto opere discrepant, ut, cum plus uno verum esse non possit, iacere\nnecesse sit tot tam nobilis disciplinas, quam de oculorum sensuumque\nreliquorum mendaciis et de sorite aut pseudomeno, quas plagas ipsi contra\nse Stoici texuerunt. 148. Tum Lucullus: Non moleste, inquit, fero nos haec\ncontulisse. Saepius enim congredientes nos, et maxime in Tusculanis\nnostris, si quae videbuntur, requiremus. Optime, inquam, sed quid Catulus\nsentit? quid Hortensius? Tum Catulus: Egone? inquit, ad patris revolvor\nsententiam, quam quidem ille Carneadeam esse dicebat, ut percipi nihil\nputem posse, adsensurum autem non percepto, id est, opinaturum sapientem\nexistimem, sed ita, ut intellegat se opinari sciatque nihil esse quod\ncomprehendi et percipi possit: qua re [Greek: epoch\u00ean] illam omnium rerum\nnon probans, illi alteri sententiae, nihil esse quod percipi possit,\nvehementer adsentior. Habeo, inquam, sententiam tuam nec eam admodum\naspernor. Sed tibi quid tandem videtur, Hortensi? Tum ille ridens:\nTollendum. Teneo te, inquam: nam ista Academiae est propria sententia. Ita\nsermone confecto Catulus remansit: nos ad naviculas nostras descendimus.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nNOTES.\n\nBOOK I.\n\n    \u00a7\u00a71--14. Summary. Cic., Varro and Atticus meet at Cumae (1). Cic.,\n    after adroitly reminding Varro that the promised dedication of the _De\n    Lingua Latina_ is too long delayed, turns the conversation towards\n    philosophy, by asking Varro why he leaves this subject untouched (2,\n    3). Varro thinks philosophy written in Latin can serve no useful\n    purpose, and points to the failures of the Roman Epicureans (4--6). He\n    greatly believes in philosophy, but prefers to send his friends to\n    Greece for it, while he devotes himself to subjects which the Greeks\n    have not treated (7, 8). Cic. lauds this devotion, but demurs to the\n    theory that philosophy written in Latin is useless. Latins may surely\n    imitate Greek philosophers as well as Greek poets and orators. He gives\n    reasons why he should himself make the attempt, and instancing the\n    success of Brutus, again begs Varro to write on philosophy (9--12).\n    Varro putting the request on one side charges Cic. with deserting the\n    Old Academy for the New. Cic. defends himself, and appeals to Philo for\n    the statement that the New Academy is in harmony with the Old. Varro\n    refers to Antiochus as an authority on the other side. This leads to a\n    proposal on the part of Cic. to discuss thoroughly the difference\n    between Antiochus and Philo. Varro agrees, and promises an exposition\n    of the principles of Antiochus (13, 14).\n\n\u00a71. _Noster_: our common friend. Varro was much more the friend of Atticus\nthan of Cic., see Introd. p. 37. _Nuntiatum_: the spelling _nunciatum_ is a\nmistake, cf. Corssen, _Ausspr._ I. p. 51. _A M. Varrone_: _from M. Varro's\nhouse_ news came. _Audissemus_: Cic. uses the contracted forms of such\nsubjunctives, as well as the full forms, but not intermediate forms like\n_audiissemus_. _Confestim_: note how artfully Cic. uses the dramatic form\nof the dialogue in order to magnify his attachment for Varro. _Ab eius\nvilla_: the prep is absent from the MSS., but Wesenberg (_Em. M.T. Cic.\nEpistolarum_, p. 62) shows that it must be inserted. Cic. writes _abesse\nRoma_ (_Ad Fam._ V. 15, 4), _patria_ (_T.D._ V. 106) etc., but not _abesse\nofficio_ (_De Off._ I. 43, where Wes. alters it) or the like. _Satis eum\nlongo intervallo_: so all the MSS.; but Halm, after Davies, reads _se\nvisentum_ for _satis eum_, quoting _Ad Att._ I. 4, Madv. _tum_ for _eum_\n(Baiter and Halm's ed. of 1861, p. 854). The text is sound; the repetition\nof pronouns (_illum_, _eum_) is quite Ciceronian. The emphatic _ille_ is\noften repeated by the unemphatic _is_, cf. _T.D._ III. 71, and _M.D.F._ V.\n22. I may note that the separation of _satis_ from _longo_ by the word\n_eum_ is quite in Cicero's style (see my note on 25 _quanta id magis_).\nSome editors stumble (Goerenz miserably) by taking _intervallo_ of distance\nin space, instead of duration in time, while others wrongly press _satis_,\nwhich only means \"tolerably,\" to mean \"sufficiently.\" The words _satis\nlongo intervallo_ simply = \"after a tolerably long halt.\" For the clause\n_ut mos_, etc., cf. _De Or._ II. 13.\n\n\u00a72. _Hic pauca primo_: for the omission of _locuti_, cf. the very similar\npassages in _D.F._ I. 14, III. 8, also my note on 14. _Atque ea_: Halm\nbrackets _ea_, quite needlessly, for its insertion is like Cic. _Ecquid\nforte Roma novi_: _Roma_ is the ablative, and some verb like _attulisset_\nis omitted. (So Turnebus.) To take it as nom., understanding _faciat_, is\nclearly wrong. _Percontari_: the spelling _percunctari_ rests on false\nderivation (Corss. I. 36). _Ecquid ipse novi_: cf. _De Or._ II. 13. The\nMSS. have _et si quid_, bad Latin altered by Manutius. _Istum_: some edd.\n_ipsum_, but Cic. often makes a speaker use _iste_ of a person who is\npresent. Goer. qu. _Brut._ 125, _De Or._ II. 228. _Velit_: Walker reads\n_velis_ with St Jerome. For _quod velit_ = _quod quis velit_, cf. _De Or._\nI. 30. _In manibus_: so often, cf. _Cat. Mai._ 38. _Idque_: MSS. have in\nthe place of this _quod_ with variants _que_, _quae_, _qui_, _quo_. Dav.\ngave _quia_, which was the vulgate reading down to Halm, who reads _idque_,\nafter Christ. _Ad hunc enim ipsum_: MSS. have _eum_ for _enim_ (exc. Halm's\nG). Such a combination of pronouns is vainly defended by Goer.; for\nexpressions like _me illum ipsum_ (_Ad Att._ II. 1, 11) are not in point.\nOf course if _quia_ be read above, _eum_ must be ejected altogether.\n_Quaedam institui_: the _De Lingua Latina_; see _Ad. Att_ XIII. 12.\n\n\u00a73. _E Libone_: the father-in-law of Sext. Pompeius; see C\u00e6sar _B. Civ._\nIII. 5, 16, 24. _Nihil enim eius modi_ again all MSS. except Halm's G. have\n_eum_ for _enim_. Christ conj. _enim eum_; so Baiter. _Illud ...\nrequirere_: i.e. the question which follows; cf. _requiris_ in 4. _Tecum\nsimul_: Halm's G om. _tecum_; but cf. _De Or._ III. 330. _Mandare\nmonumentis--letteris illustrare_: common phrases in Cic., e.g. _D.F._ I. 1,\n_T.D._ I. 1, _De Div._ II. 4. _Monumentis_: this, and not _monimentis_\n(Halm) or _monementis_, is probably the right spelling; cf. Corss. II. 314.\n_Ortam a_: Cic. _always_ writes the prep. after _ortus_; cf. _M.D.F._ V.\n69. _Genus_: regularly used by Cic. as _opus_ by Quintilian to mean\n\"department of literature.\" _Ea res_: one of Halm's MSS. followed by Baiter\nhas _ars_; on the other hand Bentley (if the _amicus_ so often quoted in\nDavies' notes be really he) reads _artibus_ for _rebus_ below. The slight\nvariation, however, from _res_ to _artibus_ is such as Cic. loves.\n_Ceteris_: the spelling _caeteris_ (Klotz) is absolutely wrong, cf. Corss.\nI. 325. _Antecedat_: some MSS. give _antecellat_. a frequent variant, cf.\n_De Off._ I. 105\n\n\u00a74. _Deliberatam--agitatam_: Cic. as usual exaggerates the knowledge\npossessed by the _personae_ of the dialogue; cf. Introd. p. 38, _De Or._\nII. 1. _In promptu_: so II. 10. _Quod ista ipsa ... cogitavi_: Goer., who\nhalf a page back had made merry over the gloss hunters, here himself\nscented a miserable gloss; Schutz, Goerenz's echo expels the words. Yet\nthey are thoroughly like Cic. (cf. _De Div._ II. 1, _Cat. Mai._ 38), and\nmoreover nothing is more Ciceronian than the repetition of words and\nclauses in slightly altered forms. The reason here is partly the intense\ndesire to flatter Varro. _Si qui ... si essent_: the first _si_ has really\nno conditional force, _si qui_ like [Greek: eitines] merely means \"all\nwho,\" for a strong instance see _Ad Fam._ I. 9, 13, ed Nobbe, _si accusandi\nsunt, si qui pertimuerunt_. _Ea nolui scribere_, etc.: very similar\nexpressions occur in the prologue to _D.F._ I., which should be compared\nwith this prologue throughout.\n\n\u00a75. _Vides ... didicisti_: MSS. have _vides autem eadem ipse didicisti\nenim_. My reading is that of Dav. followed by Baiter. Halm, after Christ,\nhas _vides autem ipse--didicisti enim eadem--non posse_, etc. _Similis_:\nHalm, in deference to MSS., makes Cic. write _i_ and _e_ indiscriminately\nin the acc. plur. of i stems. I shall write _i_ everywhere, we shall thus,\nI believe, be far nearer Cicero's real writing. Though I do not presume to\nsay that his usage did not vary, he must in the vast majority of instances\nhave written _i_, see Corss. I. 738--744. _Amafinii aut Rabirii_: cf.\nIntrod. p. 26. _Definiunt ... partiuntur_: n. on 32. _Interrogatione_:\nFaber saw this to be right, but a number of later scholars alter it, e.g.\nBentl. _argumentatione_, Ernesti _ratione_. But the word as it stands has\nexactly the meaning these alterations are intended to secure.\n_Interrogatio_ is merely the _conclusio_ or syllogism put as a series of\nquestions. Cf. _Paradoxa_ 2, with _T.D._ II. 42 which will show that\n_interrogatiuncula_ and _conclusiuncula_ are almost convertible terms. See\nalso _M.D.F._ I. 39. _Nec dicendi nec disserendi_: Cic.'s constant mode of\ndenoting the Greek [Greek: rh\u00eatorik\u00ea] and [Greek: dialektik\u00ea]; note on 32.\n_Et oratorum etiam_: Man., Lamb. om. _etiam_, needlessly. In _Ad Fam._ IX.\n25, 3, the two words even occur without any other word to separate them.\nFor _oratorum_ Pearce conj. _rhetorum_. _Rhetor_, however is not thus used\nin Cic.'s phil. works. _Utramque vim virtutem_: strange that Baiter (esp.\nafter Halm's note) should take Manutius' far-fetched conj. _unam_ for\n_virtutem_. Any power or faculty (vis, [Greek: dynamis]) may be called in\nGk. [Greek: aret\u00ea], in Lat _virtus_. Two passages, _D.F._ III. 72, _De Or._\nIII. 65, will remove all suspicion from the text. _Verbis quoque novis_:\nMSS. have _quanquam_ which however is impossible in such a place in Cic.\n(cf. _M.D.F._ V. 68). _Ne a nobis quidem_: so all the MSS., but Orelli\n(after Ernesti) thinking the phrase \"_arrogantius dictum_\" places _quidem_\nafter _accipient_. The text is quite right, _ne quidem_, as Halm remarks,\nimplies no more than the Germ. _auch nicht_, cf. also Gk. [Greek: oude].\n_Suscipiatur labor_: MSS. om. the noun, but it is added by a later hand in\nG.\n\n\u00a76. _Epicurum, id est si Democritum_: for the charge see _D.F._ I. 17, IV.\n13, _N.D._ I. 73. _Id est_ often introduces in Cic. a clause which\nintensifies and does not merely explain the first clause, exx. in _M.D.F._\nI. 33. _Cum causas rerum efficientium sustuleris_: cf. _D.F._ I. 18, the\nsame charge is brought by Aristotle against the Atomists, _Met._ A, 2. Many\neditors from Lamb. to Halm and Baiter read _efficientis_, which would then\ngovern _rerum_ (cf. _D.F._ V. 81, _De Fato_, 33, also Gk. [Greek:\npoi\u00eatikos]). But the genitive is merely one of definition, the _causae_ are\nthe _res efficientes_, for which cf. 24 and _Topica_, 58, _proximus locus\nest rerum efficientium, quae causae appellantur_. So Faber, though less\nfully. _Appellat_: i.e. Amafinius, who first so translated [Greek: atomos].\n_Quae cum contineantur_: this reading has far the best MSS. authority, it\nmust be kept, and _adhibenda etiam_ begins the _apodosis_. Madvig\n(_Emendationes ad Ciceronis Libros Philosophicos_, Hauniae, 1825, p. 108)\ntacitly reads _continentur_ without _cum_, so Orelli and Klotz. Goer.\nabsurdly tries to prop up the subj. without _cum_. _Quam quibusnam_:\nDurand's em. for _quoniam quibusnam_ of the MSS., given by Halm and also\nBaiter. Madv. (_Em._ p. 108) made a forced defence of _quoniam_, as marking\na rapid transition from one subject to another (here from physics to\nethics) like the Gk. [Greek: epei], only one parallel instance, however,\nwas adduced (_T.D._ III. 14) and the usage probably is not Latin.\n_Adducere?_: The note of interrogation is Halm's; thus the whole sentence,\nso far, explains the difficulty of setting forth the true system of\nphysics. If _quoniam_ is read and no break made at _adducere_, all after\n_quoniam_ will refer to ethics, in that case there will be a strange change\nof subject in passing from _quisquam_ to _haec ipsa_, both which\nexpressions will be nominatives to _poterit_, further, there will be the\nalmost impossible ellipse of _ars_, _scientia_, or something of the kind\nafter _haec ipsa_. On every ground the reading of Madv. is insupportable.\n_Quid, haec ipsa_: I have added _quid_ to fill up the lacuna left by Halm,\nwho supposes much more to have fallen out. [The technical philosophical\nterms contained in this section will be elucidated later. For the Epicurean\nignorance of geometry see note on II. 123] _Illi enim simpliciter_:\n\"frankly,\" cf. _Ad Fam._ VIII. 6, 1 _Pecudis et hominis_: note on II. 139.\n\n\u00a77. _Sive sequare ... magnum est_: for the constr. cf. II. 140. _Magnum\nest_: cf. _quid est magnum_, 6. _Verum et simplex bonum_: cf. 35. _Quod\nbonum ... ne suspicari quidem_ an opinion often denounced by Cic., see esp\n_T.D._ III. 41, where Cic.'s Latin agrees very closely with the Greek\npreserved by Diog. Laert. X. 6 (qu. Zeller, 451), and less accurately by\nAthenaeus, VII. 279 (qu. R. and P. 353). _Ne suspicari quidem_: for this\nMSS. give _nec suspicari_, but Madv. (_D.F._, Excursus III.) has\nconclusively shown that _nec_ for _ne ... quidem_ is post Augustan Latin.\nChrist supposes some thing like _sentire_ to have fallen out before _nec\nsuspicari_; that this is wrong is clear from the fact that in _D.F._ II.\n20, 30, _T.D._ III. 46, _N.D._ I. 111, where the same opinion of Epicurus\nis dealt with, we have either _ne suspicari quidem_ or _ne intellegere\nquidem_ (cf. also _In Pisonem_ 69). Further, _ne ... quidem_ is esp\nfrequent with _suspicari_ (_D.F._ II. 20), and verbs of the kind\n(_cogitari_ II. 82), and especially, as Durand remarked, at the end of\nsentences eg _Verr._ II. 1, 155. Notice _negat ... ne suspicari quidem_\nwithout _se_, which however Baiter inserts, in spite of the numerous\npassages produced from Cic. by Madv. (_Em._ 111), in which not only _se_,\nbut _me_, _nos_, and other accusatives of pronouns are omitted before the\ninfinitive, after verbs like _negat_. Cf. also the omission of _sibi_ in\n_Paradoxa_ 40. _Si vero_: this, following _sive enim_ above, is a departure\nfrom Cic.'s rule which is to write _sive--sive_ or _si--sin_, but not\n_si--sive_ or _sive--si_. This and two or three other similar passages in\nCic. are explained as anacolutha by Madv. in a most important and\nexhaustive excursus to his _D.F._ (p. 785, ed. 2), and are connected with\nother instances of broken sequence. There is no need therefore to read\n_sive_ here, as did Turn. Lamb. Dav. and others. _Quam nos ... probamus_:\ncf. Introd. p. 62. _Erit explicanda_: for the separation of these words by\nother words interposed, which is characteristic of Cic., see 11, 17. I am\nsurprised that Halm and Baiter both follow Ernesti in his hypercritical\nobjection to the phrase _explicare Academiam_, and read _erunt_ against the\nMSS., making _illa_ plural. If _erunt_ is read, _erit_ must be supplied\nfrom it to go with _disserendum_, which is harsh. _Quam argute, quam\nobscure_: at first sight an oxymoron, but _argute_ need not only imply\n_clearness_, it means merely \"acutely\". _Quantum possum_: some MSS. have\n_quantam_, which is scarcely Latin, since in Cic. an accusative only\nfollows _nequeo_, _volo_, _malo_, _possum_, and such verbs when an\ninfinitive can be readily supplied to govern it. For _velle_ see a good\ninstance in _D.F._ III. 68, where consult Madv. _Constantiam_: the notions\nof firmness, consistency, and clearness of mind are bound up in this word,\ncf. II. 53. _Apud Platonem_: _Timaeus_, 47 B, often quoted or imitated by\nCic., cf. _De Leg._ I. 58, _Laelius_ 20, 47, _T.D._ I. 64.\n\n\u00a78. _Id est ... jubeo_: these words have been naturally supposed a gloss.\nBut Cicero is nothing if not tautological; he is fond of placing slight\nvariations in phrase side by side. See some remarkable instances of\nslightly varied phrases connected by _id est_ in _D.F._ I. 72, II. 6, 90. I\ntherefore hold Halm and Baiter to be wrong in bracketing the words. _Ea a_:\nLamb., objecting to the sound (which is indeed not like Cic.), would read\n_e_ for _a_, which Halm would also prefer. _De_, _ab_, and _ex_ follow\n_haurire_ indifferently in Cic. _Rivulos consectentur_: so Wordsworth, \"to\nhunt the waterfalls\". The metaphor involved in _fontibus--rivulos_ is often\napplied by Cic. to philosophy, see esp. a sarcastic passage about Epicurus\nin _N.D._ I. 120. _Nihil enim magno opere_: _magno opere_ should be written\nin two words, not as _magnopere_, cf. the phrases _maximo opere_, _nimio\nopere_, the same holds good of _tanto opere_, _quanto opere_. _L. Aelii_:\nMSS. _Laelii_. The person meant is L. Aelius Stilo or Praeconinus, the\nmaster of Varro, and the earliest systematic grammarian of Rome. See\nQuintil. _Inst. Or._ X. 1, 99, Gellius X. 21, Sueton. _Gramm._ 3.\n_Occasum_: an unusual metaphor. _Menippum_: a Cynic satirist, see _Dict.\nBiogr._ Considerable fragments of Varro's Menippean Satires remain, and\nhave often been edited--most recently by Riese (published by Teubner).\n_Imitati non interpretati_: Cic. _D.F._ I. 7, gives his opinion as to the\nright use to be made of Greek models. _+Quae quo_: these words are\nevidently wrong. Halm after Faber ejects _quae_, and is followed by Baiter.\nVarro is thus made to say that he stated many things dialectically, _in\norder that_ the populace might be enticed to read. To my mind the fault\nlies in the word _quo_, for which I should prefer to read _cum_ (=_quom_,\nwhich would be written _quo_ in the MSS.) The general sense would then be\n\"Having introduced philosophy into that kind of literature which the\nunlearned read, I proceeded to introduce it into that which the learned\nread.\" _Laudationibus_: [Greek: logois epitaphiois], cf. _Ad Att._ XIII. 48\nwhere Varro's are mentioned. _+Philosophe scribere_: the MSS. all give\n_philosophie_. Klotz has _philosophiam_, which is demonstrably wrong,\n_physica_, _musica_ etc. _scribere_ may be said, but not _physicam_,\n_musicam_ etc. _scribere_. The one passage formerly quoted to justify the\nphrase _philosophiam scribere_ is now altered in the best texts (_T.D._ V.\n121, where see Tischer). Goer. reads _philosophiae scribere_; his\nexplanation is, as Orelli gently says, \"vix Latina.\" I can scarcely think\nHalm's _philosophe_ to be right, the word occurs nowhere else, and Cic.\nalmost condemns it by his use of the Greek [Greek: philosoph\u00f4s] (_Ad Att._\nXIII. 20). In older Greek the adverb does not appear, nor is [Greek:\nphilosophos] used as an adjective much, yet Cic. uses _philosophus_\nadjectivally in _T.D._ V. 121, _Cat. Mai._ 22, _N.D._ III. 23, just as he\nuses _tyrannus_ (_De Rep._ III. 45), and _anapaestus_ (_T.D._ III. 57)\nMight we not read _philosophis_, in the dative, which only requires the\nalteration of a single letter from the MSS. reading? The meaning would then\nbe \"to write _for_ philosophers,\" which would agree with my emendation\n_cum_ for _quo_ above. _Philosophice_ would be a tempting alteration, but\nthat the word [Greek: philosophikos] is not Greek, nor do _philosophicus_,\n_philosophice_ occur till very late Latin times. _Si modo id consecuti\nsumus_: cf. _Brut._ 316.\n\n\u00a79. _Sunt ista_: = [Greek: esti tauta], so often, e.g. _Lael._ 6. Some edd.\nhave _sint_, which is unlikely to be right. _Nos in nostra_: Augustine (_De\nCiv. Dei_ VI. 2) quotes this with the reading _reduxerunt_ for\n_deduxerunt_, which is taken by Baiter and by Halm; who quotes with\napproval Durand's remark, \"_deducimus honoris causa sed errantes reducimus\nhumanitatis_.\" The words, however, are almost convertible; see _Cat. Mai._\n63. In _Lael._ 12, _Brut._ 86, we have _reducere_, where Durand's rule\nrequires _deducere_, on the other hand cf. _Ad Herennium_ IV. 64, _hospites\ndomum deducere. Aetatem patriae_ etc., August. (_De Civ. Dei_ VI. 3)\ndescribes Varro's \"_Libri Antiquitatum_\" (referred to in 8), in which most\nof the subjects here mentioned were treated of. _Descriptiones temporum_:\nlists of dates, so [Greek: chronoi] is technically used for dates, Thuc. V.\n20, etc. _Tu sacerdotum_: after this Lamb. inserts _munera_ to keep the\nbalance of the clauses. Cic. however is quite as fond of variety as of\nformal accuracy. _Domesticam--bellicam_: opposed like _domi bellique_, cf.\n_Brut._ 49, _De Off._ I. 74. Augustine's reading _publicam_ shows him to\nhave been quoting from memory. _Sedem_: so the best MSS. of Aug., some edd.\nhere give _sedium_. The argument for _sedem_ is the awkwardness of making\nthe three genitives, _sedium_, _regionum_, _locorum_, dependent on the\naccusatives, _nomina_, _genera_, _officia_, _causas_. Cic. is fond of using\n_sedes_, _locus_, _regio_ together, see _Pro Murena_, 85, _Pro Cluentio_,\n171, quoted by Goer. _Omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum_: from the\nfrequent references of Aug. it appears that the \"_Libri Antiquitatum_\" were\ndivided into two parts, one treating of _res humanae_, the other of _res\ndivinae_ (_De Civ. Dei_, IV. 1, 27, VI. 3). _Et litteris luminis_: for\n_luminis_, cf. _T.D._ I. 5. _Et verbis_: Manut. reads _rebus_ from 26.\nVarro's researches into the Latin tongue are meant. _Multis locis\nincohasti_: Varro's book \"_De Philosophia_\" had apparently not yet been\nwritten.\n\n\u00a710. _Causa_: = [Greek: prophasis]. _Probabilem_: = specious. _Nesciunt_:\nHalm with his one MS. G, which is the work of a clever emendator, gives\n_nescient_ to suit _malent_ above, and is followed by Baiter. It is not\nnecessary to force on Cic. this formally accurate sequence of tenses, which\nHalm himself allows to be broken in two similar passages, II. 20, 105. _Sed\nda mihi nunc, satisne probas?_: So all MSS. except G, which has the evident\nconj. _sed ea (eam) mihi non sane probas_. This last Baiter gives, while\nHalm after Durand reads _sed eam mihi non satis probas_, which is too far\nfrom the MSS. to please me. The text as it stands is not intolerable,\nthough _da mihi_ for _dic mihi_ is certainly poetic. _Da te mihi_ (Manut.,\nGoer., Orelli) is far too strong for the passage, and cannot be supported\nby 12, _Brut._ 306, _Ad Fam._ II. 8, or such like passages. _Attius_: the\nold spelling _Accius_ is wrong. _Si qui ... imitati_: note the collocation,\nand cf. 17. Halm needlessly writes _sint_ for MSS. _sunt_. For this section\nthroughout cf. the prologues to _D.F._ I., _T.D._ I. and II.\n\n\u00a711. _Procuratio_: for the proper meaning of _procurator_ and _procuratio_\nsee Jordan on _Pro Caecina_ 55. _Implacatum et constrictum_: the\nconjunction introduces the intenser word, as usual; cf. 17 _plenam ac\nrefertam_, II. 127 _exigua et minima_, so [Greek: kai] in Greek. _Inclusa\nhabebam_: cf. _T.D._ I. 1. _Obsolescerent_, used of _individual_ memory, is\nnoteworthy. _Percussus volnere_: many edd. give the frequent variant\n_perculsus_. The _volnus_, which Goer. finds so mysterious, is the death of\nTullia, cf. _N.D._ I. 9, _De Consolatione_, fragment 7, ed. Nobbe, and\nIntrod. p. 32. _Aut ... aut ... aut ... aut_: This casting about for an\nexcuse shows how low philosophy stood in public estimation at Rome. See\nIntrod. p. 29. The same elaborate apologies often recur, cf. esp the\nexordium of _N.D._ I.\n\n\u00a712. _Brutus_: the same praise often recurs in _D.F._ and the _Brutus\nGraecia desideret_ so all Halm's MSS., except G, which has _Graeca_. Halm\n(and after him Baiter) adopts the conj. of Aldus the younger, _Graeca\ndesideres_. A reviewer of Halm, in Schneidewin's _Philologus_ XXIV. 483,\napproves the reading on the curious ground that Brutus was not anxious to\nsatisfy Greek requirements, but rather to render it unnecessary for Romans\nto have recourse to Greece for philosophy. I keep the MSS. reading, for\nGreece with Cicero is the supreme arbiter of performance in philosophy, if\nshe is satisfied the philosophic world is tranquil. Cf. _Ad Att._ I. 20, 6,\n_D.F._ I. 8, _Ad Qu. Fr._ II. 16, 5. I just note the em. of Turnebus, _a\nGraecia desideres_, and that of Dav. _Graecia desideretur_. _Eandem\nsententiam_: cf. Introd. p. 56. _Aristum_: cf. II. 11, and _M.D.F._ V. 8.\n\n\u00a713. _Sine te_: = [Greek: sou dicha]. _Relictam_: Cic. very rarely omits\n_esse_, see note on II. 77, for Cicero's supposed conversion see Introd. p.\n20. _Veterem illam_: MSS. have _iam_ for _illam_. The position of _iam_\nwould be strange, in the passage which used to be compared, _Pro Cluentio_\n16, Classen and Baiter now om. the word. Further, _vetus_ and _nova_ can\nscarcely be so barely used to denote the Old and the New Academy. The\nreading _illam_ is from Madv. (_Em._ 115), and is supported by _illam\nveterem_ (18), _illa antiqua_ (22), _istius veteris_ (_D.F._ V. 8), and\nsimilar uses. Bentl. (followed by Halm and Bait.) thinks _iam_ comprises\nthe last two syllables of _Academiam_, which he reads. _Correcta et\nemendata_: a fine sentiment to come from a conservative like Cic. The words\noften occur together and illustrate Cic.'s love for small diversities of\nexpression, cf. _De Leg._ III. 30, _D.F._ IV. 21, also Tac. _Hist._ I. 37.\n_Negat_: MSS. have _negaret_, but Cic. never writes the subj. after\n_quamquam_ in _oratio recta_, as Tac. does, unless there is some\nconditional or potential force in the sentence; see _M.D.F._ III. 70.\nNothing is commoner in the MSS. than the substitution of the imp. subj. for\nthe pres. ind. of verbs of the first conjug. and _vice versa_. _In libris_:\nsee II. 11. _Duas Academias_: for the various modes of dividing the Academy\nrefer to R. and P. 404. _Contra ea Philonis_: MSS. have _contra Philonis_\nmerely, exc. Halm's V., which gives _Philonem_, as does the ed. Rom.\n(1471). I have added _ea_. Orelli quotes _Ad Att._ XII. 23, 2, _ex\nApollodori_. Possibly the MSS. may be right, and _libros_ may be supplied\nfrom _libris_ above, so in _Ad Att._ XIII. 32, 2, _Dicaearchi_ [Greek: peri\npsych\u00eas] _utrosque_, the word _libros_ has to be supplied from the\npreceding letter, cf. a similar ellipse of _bona_ in 19, 22. Madvig's\n_Philonia_ is improbable from its non-appearance elsewhere, while the\ncompanion adjective _Antiochius_ is frequent. Halm inserts _sententiam_, a\nheroic remedy. To make _contra_ an adv. and construe _Philonis Antiochus_\ntogether, supplying _auditor_, as is done by some unknown commentators who\nprobably only exist in Goerenz's note, is wild, and cannot be justified by\n_D.F._ V. 13.\n\n\u00a714. _A qua absum iam diu_: MSS. have strangely _aqua absumtam diu_,\nchanged by Manut. _Renovari_: the vulg. _revocari_ is a curious instance of\noversight. It crept into the text of Goer. by mistake, for in his note he\ngave _renovari_. Orelli--who speaks of Goerenz's \"_praestantissima\nrecensio_,\" and founds his own text upon it two years after Madvig's\ncrushing exposure in his _Em._ often quoted by me--not only reads\n_revocari_, but quotes _renovari_ as an em. of the ed. Victoriana of 1536.\nFrom Orelli, Klotz, whose text has no independent value, took it.\n_Renovare_ in Cic. often means \"to refresh the memory,\" e.g. 11, _Brut._\n315. _Nisi molestum est_: like _nisi alienum putas_, a variation on the\ncommon _si placet, si videtur_. _Adsidamus_: some MSS. have _adsideamus_,\nwhich would be wrong here. _Sane istud_: Halm _istuc_ from G. _Inquit_: for\nthe late position of this word, which is often caused by its affinity for\n_quoniam_, _quidem_, etc., cf. _M.D.F._ III. 20 _Quae cum essent dicta, in\nconspectu consedimus (omnes)_: most edd. since Gulielmus print this without\n_essent_ as a hexameter, and suppose it a quotation. But firstly, a verse\nso commonplace, if familiar, would occur elsewhere in Cic. as others do, if\nnot familiar, would not be given without the name of its author. Secondly,\nmost MSS. have _sint_ or _essent_ before _dicta_. It is more probable\ntherefore that _omnes_ was added from an involuntary desire to make up the\nhexameter rhythm. Phrases like _quae cum essent dicta consedimus_ often\noccur in similar places in Cic.'s dialogues cf. _De Div._ II. 150, and\nAugustine, the imitator of Cic., _Contra Academicos_, I. 25, also\n_consedimus_ at the end of a clause in _Brut._ 24, and _considitur_ in _De\nOr._ III. 18. _Mihi vero_: the omission of _inquit_, which is strange to\nGoer., is well illustrated in _M.D.F._ I. 9. There is an odd ellipse of\n_laudasti_ in _D.F._ V. 81.\n\n    \u00a7\u00a715--42. Antiochus' view of the history of Philosophy. First part of\n    Varro's Exposition, 15--18. Summary. Socrates rejected physics and made\n    ethics supreme in philosophy (15). He had no fixed tenets, his one\n    doctrine being that wisdom consists in a consciousness of ignorance.\n    Moral exhortation was his task (16). Plato added to and enriched the\n    teaching of his master, from him sprang two schools which abandoned the\n    negative position of Socrates and adopted definite tenets, yet remained\n    in essential agreement with one another--the Peripatetic and the\n    Academic (17, 18).\n\n\u00a715. _A rebus ... involutis_: physical phenomena are often spoken of in\nthese words by Cic., cf. 19, _Timaeus_ c. 1, _D.F._ I. 64, IV. 18, V. 10,\n_N.D._ I. 49. Ursinus rejected _ab_ here, but the insertion or omission of\n_ab_ after the passive verb depends on the degree to which _natura_ is\npersonified, if 28 be compared with _Tim._ c. 1, this will be clear.\n_Involutis_ = veiled; cf. _involucrum_. Cic. shows his feeling of the\nmetaphor by adding _quasi_ in II. 26, and often. _Avocavisse philosophiam_:\nthis, the Xenophontic view of Socrates, was the popular one in Cicero's\ntime, cf. II. 123, _T.D._ V. 10, _D.F._ V. 87, 88, also Varro in Aug. _De\nCiv. Dei_, VIII. 3. Objections to it, however occurred to Cic., and were\ncuriously answered in _De Rep._ I. 16 (cf. also Varro in Aug. _De Civ.\nDei_, VIII. 4). The same view is supposed to be found in Aristotle, see the\npassages quoted by R. and P. 141. To form an opinion on this difficult\nquestion the student should read Schleiermacher's _Essay on the Worth of\nSocrates as a Philosopher_ (trans. by Thirlwall), and Zeller's _Socrates\nand the Socratic Schools_, Eng. Trans., pp. 112--116 [I dissent from his\nview of Aristotle's evidence], also Schwegler's _Handbook_, so far as it\nrelates to Socrates and Plato. _Nihil tamen ad bene vivendum valere_:\n_valere_ is absent from MSS., and is inserted by Halm, its use in 21 makes\nit more probable than _conferre_, which is in ed. Rom. (1471). Gronovius\nvainly tries to justify the MSS. reading by such passages as _D.F._ I. 39,\n_T.D._ I. 70. The strangest ellipse with _nihil ad_ elsewhere in Cic. is in\n_De Leg._ I. 6.\n\n\u00a716. _Hic ... illum_: for this repetition of pronouns see _M.D.F._ IV. 43.\n_Varie et copiose_: MSS. omit _et_, but it may be doubted whether Cic.\nwould let two _adverbs_ stand together without _et_, though three may (cf.\nII. 63), and though with pairs of _nouns_ and _adjectives, et_ often is\nleft out, as in the passages quoted here by Manut. _Ad Att._ IV. 3, 3, _Ad\nFam._ XIII. 24, XIII. 28, cf. also the learned note of Wesenberg, reprinted\nin Baiter and Halm's edition, of Cic.'s philosophical works (1861), on\n_T.D._ III. 6. _Varie et copiose_ is also in _De Or._ II. 240. Cf. the\nomission of _que_ in 23, also II. 63. _Perscripti_: Cic. like Aristotle\noften speaks of Plato's dialogues as though they were authentic reports of\nSocratic conversations, cf. II. 74. _Nihil adfirmet_: so _T.D._ I. 99.\n\"_Eoque praestare ceteris_\" this is evidently from Plato _Apol._ p. 21, as\nto the proper understanding of which see note on II. 74. _Ab Apolline_,\nPlato _Apol._ 21 A, _Omnium_: Dav. conj. _hominum_ needlessly. _Dictum_:\nLamb., followed by Schutz, reads _iudicatum_, it is remarkable that in four\npassages where Cic. speaks of this very oracle (_Cato Mai._ 78, _Lael._ 7,\n9, 13) he uses the verb _iudicare_. _Una omnis_: Lamb. _hominis_, Baiter\nalso. _Omnis eius oratio tamen_: _notwithstanding_ his negative dialectic\nhe gave positive teaching in morals. _Tamen_: for MSS. _tam_ or _tum_ is\ndue to Gruter, Halm has _tantum_. _Tam_, _tum_ and _tamen_ are often\nconfused in MSS., e.g. _In Veri_ (_Act_ II.) I. 3, 65, II. 55, 112, V. 78,\nwhere see Zumpt. Goer. abuses edd. for not knowing that _tum ... et_, _tum\n... que_, _et ... tum_, correspond in Cic. like _tum ... cum_, _tum ...\ntum_. His proofs of this new Latin may be sampled by _Ac._ II. 1, 43. _Ad\nvirtutis studium cohortandis_: this broad assertion is distinctly untrue;\nsee Zeller's _Socrates_ 88, with footnote.\n\n\u00a717. _Varius et multiplex, et copiosus_: these characteristics are named to\naccount for the branching off from Plato of the later schools. For\n_multiplex_ \"many sided,\" cf. _T.D._ V. 11. _Una et consentiens_: this is\nan opinion of Antiochus often adopted by Cic. in his own person, as in\n_D.F._ IV. 5 _De Leg._ I. 38, _De Or._ III. 67. Five ancient philosophers\nare generally included in this supposed harmonious Academico-Peripatetic\nschool, viz. Aristotle, Theophrastus, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo (cf.\n_D.F._ IV. 2), sometimes Crantor is added. The harmony was supposed to have\nbeen first broken by Polemo's pupils; so Varro says (from Antiochus) in\nAug. _De Civ. Dei_ XIX. 1, cf. also 34. Antiochus doubtless rested his\ntheory almost entirely on the ethical resemblances of the two schools. In\n_D.F._ V. 21, which is taken direct from Antiochus, this appears, as also\nin Varro (in Aug. as above) who often spoke as though ethics were the whole\nof philosophy (cf. also _De Off._ III. 20). Antiochus probably made light\nof such dialectical controversies between the two schools as that about\n[Greek: ideai], which had long ceased. Krische _Uber Cicero's Akademika_ p.\n51, has some good remarks. _Nominibus_: the same as _vocabulis_ above. Cic.\ndoes not observe Varro's distinction (_De L. L._ IX. 1) which confines\n_nomen_ to proper nouns, _vocabulum_ to common nouns, though he would not\nuse _vocabulum_ as Tac. does, for the name of a person (_Annals_ XII. 66,\netc.). _Quasi heredem ... duos autem_: the conj. of Ciaconus \"_ex asse\nheredem, secundos autem_\" is as acute as it is absurd. _Duos_: it is\ndifficult to decide whether this or _duo_ is right in Cic., he can scarcely\nhave been so inconsistent as the MSS. and edd. make him (cf. Baiter and\nHalm's ed., _Ac._ II. 11, 13 with _De Div._ I. 6). The older inscr. in the\n_Corpus_ vol. I. have _duo_, but only in _duoviros_, two near the time of\nCic. (_C.I._ vol. I. nos. 571 and 1007) give _duos_, which Cic. probably\nwrote. _Duo_ is in old Latin poets and Virgil. _Chalcedonium_: not\n_Calchedonium_ as Klotz, cf. Gk. [Greek: Chalk\u00eadonion]. _Praestantissimos_:\nHalm wrongly, cf. _Brut._ 125. _Stagiritem_: not _Stagiritam_ as Lamb., for\nCic., exc. in a few nouns like _Persa_, _pirata_, etc., which came down\nfrom antiquity, did not make Greek nouns in [Greek: -\u00eas] into Latin nouns\nin _-a_. See _M.D.F._ II. 94. _Coetus ... soliti_: cf. 10. _Platonis\nubertate_: cf. Quintilian's \"_illa Livii lactea ubertas_.\" _Plenum ac\nrefertam_: n. on 11. _Dubitationem_: Halm with one MS., G, gives\n_dubitantem_, Baiter _dubitanter_, Why alter? _Ars quaedam philosophiae_:\nbefore these words all Halm's MSS., exc G, insert _disserendi_, probably\nfrom the line above, Lipsius keeps it and ejects _philosophiae_, while\nLamb., Day read _philosophia_ in the nom. Varro, however, would never say\nthat philosophy became entirely dialectical in the hands of the old\nAcademics and Peripatetics. _Ars_ = [Greek: techn\u00ea], a set of definite\nrules, so Varro in Aug. (as above) speaks of the _certa dogmata_ of this\nold school as opposed to the incertitude of the New Academy. _Descriptio_:\nso Halm here, but often _discriptio_. The _Corp. Inscr._, vol. I. nos. 198\nand 200, has thrice _discriptos_ or _discriptum_, the other spelling never.\n\n\u00a718. _Ut mihi quidem videtur_: MSS. transpose _quidem_ and _videtur_, as in\n44. _Quidem_, however nearly always comes closely after the pronoun, see\n_M.D.F._ IV. 43, cf. also I. 71, III. 28, _Opusc._ I. 406. _Expetendarum\nfugiendarumque_: [Greek: hairet\u00f4n kai pheukt\u00f4n], about which more in n. on\n36. The Platonic and Aristotelian ethics have indeed an external\nresemblance, but the ultimate bases of the two are quite different. In\nrejecting the Idea of the Good, Aristotle did away with what Plato would\nhave considered most valuable in his system. The ideal theory, however, was\npractically defunct in the time of Antiochus, so that the similarity\nbetween the two schools seemed much greater than it was. _Non sus\nMinervam_: a Greek proverb, cf. Theocr. _Id._ V. 23, _De Or._ II. 233, _Ad\nFam._ IX. 18, 3. Binder, in his German translation of the _Academica_, also\nquotes Plutarch _Pr\u00e6c. Polit._ 7. _Inepte ... docet_: elliptic for _inepte\ndocet, quisquis docet_. _Nostra atque nostros_: few of the editors have\nunderstood this. Atticus affects everything Athenian, and speaks as though\nhe were one of them; in Cic.'s letters to him the words \"_tui cives_,\"\nmeaning the Athenians, often occur. _Quid me putas_: i.e. _velle_.\n_Exhibiturum_: Halm inserts _me_ before this from his one MS. G, evidently\nemended here by its copyist. For the omission of _me_, cf. note on 7.\n\n    \u00a7\u00a719--23. Part II. of Varro's Exposition: Antiochus' _Ethics_. Summary.\n    The threefold division of philosophy into [Greek: \u00eathik\u00ea, physik\u00ea,\n    dialektik\u00ea]. Goodness means obedience to nature, happiness the\n    acquisition of natural advantages. These are of three kinds, mental,\n    bodily, and external. The bodily are described (19); then the mental,\n    which fall into two classes, congenital and acquired, virtue being the\n    chief of the acquired (20), then the external, which form with the\n    bodily advantages a kind of exercise-ground for virtue (21). The\n    ethical standard is then succinctly stated, in which virtue has chief\n    part, and is capable in itself of producing happiness, though not the\n    greatest happiness possible, which requires the possession of all three\n    classes of advantages (22). With this ethical standard, it is possible\n    to give an intelligent account of action and duty (23).\n\n\u00a719. _Ratio triplex_: Plato has not this division, either consciously or\nunconsciously, though it was generally attributed to him in Cicero's time,\nso by Varro himself (from Antiochus) in Aug. _De Civ. Dei_ VIII. 4, and by\nDiog. Laert. III. 56 (see R. and P., p. 195). The division itself cannot be\ntraced farther back than Xenocrates and the post-Aristotelian Peripatetics,\nto whom it is assigned by Sext. Emp. _Adv. Math._ VII. 16. It was probably\nfirst brought into strong prominence by the Stoics, whom it enabled more\nsharply and decisively to subordinate to Ethics all else in philosophy. Cf.\nesp. _M.D.F._ IV. 3. _Quid verum ... repugnans iudicando_: MSS. exc. G have\n_et_ before _quid falsum_, whence Klotz conj. _sit_ in order to obviate the\nawkwardness of _repugnet_ which MSS. have for _repugnans_. Krische wishes\nto read _consequens_ for _consentiens_, comparing _Orator_ 115, _T.D._ V.\n68, _De Div._ II. 150, to which add _T.D._ V. 21 On the other hand cf. II.\n22, 91. Notice the double translations of the Greek terms, _de vita et\nmoribus_ for [Greek: \u00eathik\u00ea], etc. This is very characteristic of Cic., as\nwe shall see later. _Ac primum_: many MSS. and edd. _primam_, cf. 23, 30.\n_A natura petebant_: how Antiochus could have found this in Plato and\nAristotle is difficult to see; that he did so, however, is indubitable; see\n_D.F._ V. 24--27, which should be closely compared with our passage, and\nVarro in Aug. XIX. 3. The root of Plato's system is the [Greek: idea] of\nthe Good, while so far is Aristotle from founding his system on the\nabstract [Greek: physis], that he scarcely appeals even incidentally to\n[Greek: physis] in his ethical works. The abstract conception of nature in\nrelation to ethics is first strongly apparent in Polemo, from whom it\npassed into Stoic hands and then into those of Antiochus. _Adeptum esse\nomnia_: put rather differently in _D.F._ V. 24, 26, cf. also _D.F._ II. 33,\n34, _Ac._ II. 131. _Et animo et corpore et vita_: this is the [Greek:\ntrias] or [Greek: trilogia t\u00f4n agath\u00f4n], which belongs in this form to late\nPeripateticism (cf. _M.D.F._ III. 43), the third division is a development\nfrom the [Greek: bios teleios] of Aristotle. The [Greek: trias] in this\ndistinct shape is foreign both to Plato and Arist, though Stobaeus,\n_Ethica_ II. 6, 4, tries hard to point it out in Plato; Varro seems to\nmerge the two last divisions into one in Aug. _De Civ. Dei_ XIX 3. This\nagrees better with _D.F._ V. 34--36, cf. also Aug. VIII. 8. On the\nAntiochean _finis_ see more in note on 22. _Corporis alia_: for ellipse of\n_bona_, see n. on 13. _Ponebant esse_: n. on 36. _In toto in partibus_: the\nsame distinction is in Stob. _Eth._ II. 6, 7; cf. also _D.F._ V. 35.\n_Pulchritudinem_: Cic. _Orator_ 160, puts the spelling _pulcher_ beyond a\ndoubt; it often appears in inscr. of the Republic. On the other hand only\n_pulcrai_, _pulcrum_, etc., occur in inscr., exc. _pulchre_, which is found\nonce (_Corp. Inscr._ I. no 1019). _Sepulchrum_, however, is frequent at an\nearly time. On the tendency to aspirate even native Latin words see Boscher\nin Curtius' _Studien_ II. 1, p. 145. In the case of _pulcher_ the false\nderivation from [Greek: polychroos] may have aided the corruption.\nSimilarly in modern times J.C. Scaliger derived it from [Greek: poly cheir]\n(Curtius' _Grundz_ ed. 3, p. 8) For _valetudinem viris pulchritudinem_, cf.\nthe [Greek: hygieia ischys kallos] of Stob. _Eth_. II. 6, 7, and _T.D._ V.\n22. _Sensus integros_ [Greek: euaisth\u00easia] in Stob., cf. also _D.F._ V. 36\n(_in sensibus est sua cuiusque virtus_). _Celeritatem_: so [Greek:\npod\u00f4keia] in Stob., _bene currere_ in Aug. XIX. 3. _Claritatem in voce_:\ncf. _De Off._ I. 133. _Impressionem_: al. _expressionem_. For the former\ncf. _De Or._ III. 185, which will show the meaning to be the distinct\nmarking of each sound; for the latter _De Or._ III. 41, which will disprove\nKlotz's remark \"_imprimit lingua voces, non exprimit_.\" See also _De Off._\nI. 133. One old ed. has _pressionem_, which, though not itself Ciceronian,\nrecalls _presse loqui_, and _N.D._ II. 149. Pliny, _Panegyric_, c. 64, has\n_expressit explanavitque verba_; he and Quintilian often so use\n_exprimere_.\n\n\u00a720. _Ingeniis_: rejected by many (so Halm), but cf. _T.D._ III. 2, and\n_animis_ below and in _N.D._ II. 58. _In naturam et mores_: for _in ea quae\nnatura et moribus fiunt_. A similar inaccuracy of expression is found in\nII. 42. The division is practically Aristotle's, who severs [Greek: aretai]\ninto [Greek: diano\u00eatikai] and [Greek: \u00eathikai] (_Nic. Eth._ I. c. 13,\n_Magna Mor._ I. c. 5). In _D.F._ V. 38 the [Greek: diano\u00eatikai] are called\n_non voluntariae_, the [Greek: \u00eathikai] _voluntariae_. _Celeritatem ad\ndiscendum et memoriam_: cf. the [Greek: eumatheia, mn\u00eam\u00ea] of Arist. (who\nadds [Greek: anchinoia sophia phron\u00easis]), and the _docilitas, memoria_ of\n_D.F._ V. 36. _Quasi consuetudinem_: the _quasi_ marks a translation from\nthe Greek, as frequently, here probably of [Greek: ethismos] (_Nic. Eth._\nII. c. 1). _Partim ratione formabant_: the relation which reason bears to\nvirtue is set forth in _Nic. Eth._ VI. c. 2. _In quibus_: i.e. _in\nmoribus_. All the late schools held that ethics formed the sole ultimate\naim of philosophy. _Erat_: note the change from _oratio obliqua_ to\n_recta_, and cf. the opposite change in II. 40. _Progressio_: this, like\nthe whole of the sentence in which it stands, is intensely Stoic. For the\nStoic [Greek: prokor\u00ea, prokoptein eis aret\u00ean], cf. _M.D.F._ IV. 64, 66, R.\nand P. 392, sq., Zeller, _Stoics_ 258, 276. The phrases are sometimes said\nto be Peripatetic, if so, they must belong only to the late Stoicised\nPeripateticism of which we find so much in Stobaeus. _Perfectio naturae_:\ncf. esp. _De Leg._ I. 25. More Stoic still is the definition of virtue as\nthe perfection of the _reason_, cf. II. 26, _D.F._ IV. 35, V. 38, and\nMadvig's note on _D.F._ II. 88. Faber quotes Galen _De Decr. Hipp. et\nPlat._ c. 5, [Greek: h\u00ea aret\u00ea teleiot\u00eas esti t\u00eas hekastou physeos]. _Una\nres optima_: the supremacy of virtue is also asserted by Varro in Aug. XIX.\n3, cf. also _D.F._ V. 36, 38.\n\n\u00a721. _Virtutis usum_: so the Stoics speak of their [Greek: adiaphora] as\nthe practising ground for virtue (_D.F._ III. 50), cf. _virtutis usum_ in\nAug. XIX. 1. _Nam virtus_: most MSS. have _iam_, which is out of place\nhere. _Animi bonis et corporis cernitur et in quibusdam_: MSS. omit _et_\nbetween _cernitur_ and _in_, exc. Halm's G which has _in_ before _animi_\nand also before _corporis_. These last insertions are not necessary, as may\nbe seen from _Topica_ 80, _causa certis personis locis temporibus\nactionibus negotiis cernitur aut_ in _omnibus aut_ in _plerisque_, also\n_T.D._ V. 22. In Stob. II. 6, 8, the [Greek: telos] of the Peripatetics is\nstated to be [Greek: to kat' aret\u00ean z\u00ean en tois peri s\u00f4ma kai tois ex\u00f4then\nagathois], here _quibusdam quae_ etc., denote the [Greek: ex\u00f4then] or\n[Greek: ektos agatha], the third class in 19. _Hominem ... societate_: all\nthis is strongly Stoic, though also attributed to the Peripatetics by Stob.\nII. 6, 7 ([Greek: koin\u00ea philanthr\u00f4pia]), etc., doubtless the\nhumanitarianism of the Stoics readily united with the [Greek: physei\nanthr\u00f4pos politikon z\u00f4on] theory of Aristotle. For Cic. cf. _D.F._ III. 66,\n_De Leg._ I. 23, for the Stoics, Zeller 293--296. The repetitions\n_hominem_, _humani_, _hominibus_, _humana_ are striking. For the last,\nBentley (i.e. Davies' anonymous friend) proposed _mundana_ from _T.D._ V.\n108, Varro, however, has _humana societas_ in Aug. XIX. 3. _Cetera autem_:\nwhat are these _cetera?_ They form portion of the [Greek: ektos agatha],\nand although not strictly contained within the _summum bonum_ are necessary\nto enrich it and preserve it. Of the things enumerated in Stob. II. 6, 8,\n13, [Greek: philia, philoi] would belong to the _quaedam_ of Cicero, while\n[Greek: ploutos arch\u00ea eutychia eugeneia dynasteia] would be included in\n_cetera_. The same distinction is drawn in Aug. VIII. 8. _Tuendum_: most\nMSS. _tenendum_, but _tuendum_ corresponds best with the division of\n[Greek: agatha] into [Greek: poi\u00eatika] and [Greek: phylaktika], Stob. II.\n6, 13. For the word _pertinere_ see _M.D.F._ III. 54.\n\n\u00a722. _Plerique_: Antiochus believes it also Academic. _Qui tum\nappellarentur_: MSS. _dum_, the subj. is strange, and was felt to be so by\nthe writer of Halm's G, which has _appellantur_. _Videbatur_: Goer. and\nOrelli stumble over this, not perceiving that it has the strong meaning of\nthe Gr. [Greek: edokei], \"it was their dogma,\" so often. _Adipisci_: cf.\n_adeptum esse_, 19. _Quae essent prima natura_: MSS. have _in natura_. For\nthe various modes of denoting the [Greek: pr\u00f4ta kata physin] in Latin see\nMadvig's _Fourth Excursus to the D.F._, which the student of Cic.'s\nphilosophy ought to know by heart. The phrase _prima natura_ (abl.) could\nnot stand alone, for [Greek: ta pr\u00f4ta t\u00ea physei] is one of Goerenz's\nnumerous forgeries. The ablative is always conditioned by some verb, see\nMadv. A comparison of this statement of the ethical _finis_ with that in 19\nand the passages quoted in my note there, will show that Cic. drew little\ndistinction between the Stoic [Greek: ta pr\u00f4ta kata physin] and the\nPeripatetic [Greek: trilogia]. That this is historically absurd Madvig\nshows in his _Excursus_, but he does not sufficiently recognise the fact\nthat Cicero has perfectly correctly reported Antiochus. At all events,\nVarro's report (Aug. _De Civ. Dei_ XIX. 3) coincides with Cic.'s in every\nparticular. Even the _inexplicabilis perversitas_ of which Madv. complains\n(p. 821) is traceable to Antiochus, who, as will be seen from Augustine\nXIX. 1, 3, included even _virtus_ among the _prima naturae_. A little\nreflection will show that in no other way could Antiochus have maintained\nthe practical identity of the Stoic and Peripatetic views of the _finis_. I\nregret that my space does not allow me to pursue this difficult subject\nfarther. For the Stoic [Greek: pr\u00f4ta kata physin] see Zeller, chap XI.\n_Ipsa per sese expetenda_: Gk. [Greek: haireta], which is applied to all\nthings contained within the _summum bonum_. As the Stoic _finis_ was\n[Greek: aret\u00ea] only, that alone to them was [Greek: haireton], their\n[Greek: pr\u00f4ta kata physin] were not [Greek: haireta], (cf. _D.F._ III. 21).\nAntiochus' _prima naturae_ were [Greek: haireta] to him, cf. Aug. XIX. 3,\n_prima illa naturae propter se ipsa existimat expetenda_ so Stob., II. 6,\n7, demonstrates each branch of the [Greek: trilogia] to be [Greek: kath'\nhauto haireton]. _Aut omnia aut maxima_: so frequently in Cic., e.g. _D.F._\nIV. 27, so Stob. II. 6, 8, [Greek: ta pleista kai kyri\u00f4tata]. _Ea sunt\nmaxima_: so Stob., Varro in Aug. _passim_. _Sensit_: much misunderstood by\nedd., here = _iudicavit_ not _animadvertit_ cf. _M.D.F._ II. 6.\n_Reperiebatur_: for change of constr. cf. _D.F._ IV. 26 _Nec tamen\nbeatissimam_: the question whether [Greek: aret\u00ea] was [Greek: autarkes pros\neudaimonian] was one of the most important to the late Greek philosophy. As\nto Antiochus, consult _M.D.F._ V. 67.\n\n\u00a723. _Agendi aliquid_: Gk. [Greek: praxe\u00f4s], the usual translation, cf. II.\n24, 37. _Officii ipsius initium_: [Greek: tou kath\u00eakontos arch\u00ean], Stob.\nII. 6, 7. This sentence is covertly aimed at the New Academics, whose\nscepticism, according to the dogmatists, cut away the ground from action\nand duty, see II. 24. _Recti honestique_: these words are redolent of the\nStoa. _Earum rerum_: Halm thinks something like _appetitio_ has fallen out,\n_susceptio_ however, above, is quite enough for both clauses; a similar use\nof it is found in _D.F._ III. 32. _Descriptione naturae_: Halm with one MS.\n(G) gives _praescriptione_, which is in II. 140, cf. also _praescriberet_\nabove. The phrase is Antiochean; cf. _prima constitutio naturae_ in _D.F._\nIV. 15. _Aequitas_: not in the Roman legal sense, but as a translation of\n[Greek: epieikeia]. _Eaeque_: so Halm for MSS. _haeque_, _haecque_. Of\ncourse _haecque_, like _hicque_, _sicque_, would be un-Ciceronian.\n_Voluptatibus_: a side blow at the Epicureans. _Forma_ see n. on 33.\n\n    \u00a7\u00a724--29. Part III of Varro's Exposition. Antiochus' _Physics_.\n    Summary. All that is consists of force and matter, which are never\n    actually found apart, though they are thought of as separate. When\n    force impresses form on the formless matter, it becomes a formed entity\n    ([Greek: poion ti] or _quale_)--(24). These formed entities are either\n    _primary_ or _secondary_. Air, fire, water, earth are primary, the two\n    first having an active, the two last a passive function. Aristotle\n    added a fifth (26). Underlying all formed entities is the formless\n    matter, matter and space are infinitely subdivisible (27). Force or\n    form acts on the formless matter and so produces the ordered universe,\n    outside which no matter exists. Reason permeates the universe and makes\n    it eternal. This Reason has various names--Soul of the Universe, Mind,\n    Wisdom, Providence, Fate, Fortune are only different titles for the\n    same thing (28, 29).\n\n\u00a724. _Natura_: this word, it is important to observe, has to serve as a\ntranslation both of [Greek: physis] and [Greek: ousia]. Here it is [Greek:\nousia] in the broadest sense, all that exists. _In res duas_: the\ndistinction between Force and Matter, the active and passive agencies in\nthe universe, is of course Aristotelian and Platonic. Antiochus however\nprobably apprehended the distinction as modified by the Stoics, for this\nread carefully Zeller, 135 sq., with the footnotes. The clearest view of\nAristotle's doctrine is to be got from Schwegler, _Handbook_, pp 99--105.\nR. and P. 273 sq. should be consulted for the important coincidence of\nForce with logical _genus_ ([Greek: eidos]), and of Matter ([Greek: hyl\u00ea])\nwith logical _differentia_ ([Greek: diaphora]). For the _duae res_, cf.\n_D.F._ I. 18. _Efficiens ... huic se praebens_: an attempt to translate\n[Greek: to poioun] and [Greek: to paschon] of the _Theaetetus_, [Greek: to\nothen] and [Greek: to dechomenon] of the _Timaeus_ (50 D). Cic. in _Tim._\nhas _efficere_ and _pati_, Lucretius I. 440 _facere_ and _fungi_. _Ea\nquae_: so Gruter, Halm for MSS. _eaque._ The meaning is this; passive\nmatter when worked upon by an active generative form results in an\n_aliquid_, a [Greek: tode ti] as Aristotle calls it. Passive matter [Greek:\nhyl\u00ea] is only potentially [Greek: tode ti], passing into actual [Greek:\ntode ti], when affected by the form. (Cf. [Greek: tode, touto], Plato\n_Tim._ 49 E, 50 A, also Arist. _Metaph_ H, 1, R. and P. 270--274). A\nfigurative description of the process is given in _Timaeus_, 50 D. _In eo\nquod efficeret ... materiam quandam_: Cic. is hampered by the _patrii\nsermonis egestas_, which compels him to render simple Greek terms by\nlaboured periphrases. _Id quod efficit_ is not distinct from, but\n_equivalent_ to _vis_, _id quod efficitur_ to _materia_. _Materiam\nquandam_: it is extraordinary how edd. (esp Goer.) could have so stumbled\nover _quandam_ and _quasi_ used in this fashion. Both words (which are\njoined below) simply mark the unfamiliarity of the Latin word in its\nphilosophical use, in the Greek [Greek: hyl\u00ea] the strangeness had had time\nto wear off. _In utroque_: for _in eo quod ex utroque_ (sc. _vi et\nmateria_) _fit_, the meaning is clearly given by the next clause, viz. that\nForce and Matter cannot actually exist apart, but only in the compound of\nthe two, the formed entity, which doctrine is quite Aristotelian. See the\nreff. given above. _Nihil enim est quod non alicubi esse cogatur_: the\nmeaning of this is clear, that nothing can _exist_ except in space\n_(alicubi)_, it is more difficult to see why it should be introduced here.\nUnless _est_ be taken of merely phenomenal existence (the only existence\nthe Stoics and Antiochus would allow), the sentence does not represent the\nbelief of Aristotle and Plato. The [Greek: ideai] for instance, though to\nPlato in the highest sense existent, do not exist in space. (Aristotle\nexplicitly says this, _Phys._ III. 4). Aristotle also recognised much as\nexistent which did not exist in space, as in _Phys._ IV. 5 (qu. R. and P.\n289). Cic. perhaps translates here from _Tim._ 52 B, [Greek: phamen\nanankaion einai pou to hon hapan en tini top\u00f4]. For ancient theories about\nspace the student must be referred to the histories of philosophy. A fair\nsummary is given by Stob. _Phys._ [Greek: peri kenou kai topou kai ch\u00f4ras],\nch. XVIII. 1. _Corpus et quasi qualitatem_: note that _corpus_ is _formed_,\nas contrasted with _materia_, _unformed_ matter. _Qualitas_ is here wrongly\nused for _quale_; it ought to be used of Force only, not of the product of\nForce and Matter, cf. 28. The Greeks themselves sometimes confuse [Greek:\npoiot\u00eas] and [Greek: poion], the confusion is aided by the ambiguity of the\nphrase [Greek: to poion] in Greek, which may either denote the [Greek: tode\nti] as [Greek: poion], or the Force which makes it [Greek: poion], hence\nArist. calls one of his categories [Greek: to poion] and [Greek: poiot\u00eas]\nindifferently For the Stoic view of [Greek: poiot\u00eas], see Zeller, 96--103,\nwith footnotes.\n\n\u00a725. _Bene facis_: _passim_ in comedy, whence Cic. takes it; cf. _D.F._\nIII. 16, a passage in other respects exceedingly like this. _Rhetoricam_:\nH\u00fclsemann conj. _ethicam_, which however is _not_ Latin. The words have no\nphilosophical significance here, but are simply specimens of words once\nforeign, now naturalised. _D.F._ III. 5 is very similar. Cic.'s words make\nit clear that these nouns ought to be treated as Latin first declension\nnouns; the MSS. often give, however, a Gk. accus. in _en_. _Non est vulgi\nverbum_: it first appears in _Theaet._ 182 A, where it is called [Greek:\nallokoton onoma]. _Nova ... facienda_: = _imponenda_ in _D.F._ III. 5.\n_Suis utuntur_: so _D.F._ III. 4. _Transferenda_: _transferre_ = [Greek:\nmetapherein], which is technically used as early as Isocrates. See Cic. on\nmetaphor, _De Or._ III. 153 sq., where _necessitas_ is assigned as one\ncause of it (159) just as here; cf. also _De Or._ III. 149. _Saecula_: the\nspelling _secula_ is wrong; Corss. I. 325, 377. The diphthong bars the old\nderivations from _secare_, and _sequi_. _Quanto id magis_: Cic. is\nexceedingly fond of separating _tam quam ita tantus quantus_, etc., from\nthe words with which they are syntactically connected, by just one small\nword, e.g. _Lael._ 53 _quam id recte_, _Acad._ II. 125 _tam sit mirabilis_,\nII. 68 _tam in praecipitem_; also _D.F._ III. 5 _quanto id nobis magis est\nconcedendum qui ea nunc primum audemus attingere_.\n\n\u00a726. _Non modo rerum sed verborum_: cf. 9. _Igitur_ picks up the broken\nthread of the exposition; so 35, and frequently. _Principes ... ex his\nortae_: the Greek terms are [Greek: hapla] and [Greek: syntheta], see\nArist. _De Coelo_, I. 2 (R. and P. 294). The distinction puzzled Plutarch\n(quoted in R. and P. 382). It was both Aristotelian and Stoic. The Stoics\n(Zeller, 187 sq.) followed partly Heraclitus, and cast aside many\nrefinements of Aristotle which will be found in R. and P. 297. _Quasi\nmultiformes_: evidently a trans. of [Greek: polyeideis], which is opposed\nto [Greek: haplous] in Plat. _Phaedr._ 238 A, and often. Plato uses also\n[Greek: monoeid\u00eas] for _unius modi_; cf. Cic. _Tim._ ch. VII., a transl. of\nPlat. _Tim._ 35 A. _Prima sunt_: _primae_ (sc. _qualitates_) is the\nneedless em. of Walker, followed by Halm. _Formae_ = _genera_, [Greek:\neid\u00ea]. The word is applied to the four elements themselves, _N.D._ I. 19;\ncf. also _quintum genus_ below, and _Topica_, 11--13. A good view of the\nhistory of the doctrine of the four elements may be gained from the section\nof Stob. _Phys._, entitled [Greek: peri arch\u00f4n kai stoichei\u00f4n kai tou\npantos]. It will be there seen that Cic. is wrong in making _initia_ and\n_elementa_ here and in 39 ([Greek: archai] and [Greek: stoicheia])\nconvertible terms. The Greeks would call the four elements [Greek:\nstoicheia] but _not_ [Greek: archai], which term would be reserved for the\nprimary Matter and Force. _A\u00ebr et ignis_: this is Stoic but _not_\nAristotelian. Aristot., starting with the four necessary properties of\nmatter, viz. heat, cold, dryness, moisture, marks the two former as active,\nthe two latter as passive. He then assigns _two_ of these properties, _one_\nactive and _one_ passive, to each of the four elements; each therefore is\nto him _both_ active and passive. The Stoics assign only _one_ property to\neach element; heat to fire, cold to air (cf. _N.D._ II. 26), moisture to\nwater, dryness to earth. The doctrine of the text follows at once. Cf.\nZeller, pp. 155, 187 sq., with footnotes, R. and P. 297 sq. _Accipiendi ...\npatiendi_: [Greek: dechesthai] often comes in Plat. _Tim._ _Quintum genus_:\nthe note on this, referred to in Introd. p. 16, is postponed to 39.\n_Dissimile ... quoddam_: so MSS.; one would expect _quiddam_, which Orelli\ngives. _Rebatur_: an old poetical word revived by Cic. _De Or._ III. 153;\ncf. Quintil. _Inst. Or._ VIII. 3, 26.\n\n\u00a727. _Subiectam ... materiam_: the [Greek: hypokeimen\u00ea hyl\u00ea] of Aristotle,\nfrom which our word subject-matter is descended. _Sine ulla specie_:\n_species_ here = _forma_ above, the [Greek: eidos] or [Greek: morph\u00ea] of\nArist. _Omnibus_ without _rebus_ is rare. The ambiguity is sometimes\navoided by the immediate succession of a neuter relative pronoun, as in 21\nin _quibusdam_, _quae_. _Expressa_: chiselled as by a sculptor (cf.\n_expressa effigies_ _De Off_. III. 69); _efficta_, moulded as by a potter\n(see II. 77); the word was given by Turnebus for MSS. _effecta_. So Matter\nis called an [Greek: ekmageion] in Plat. _Tim._ _Quae tota omnia_: these\nwords have given rise to needless doubts; Bentl., Dav., Halm suspect them.\n_Tota_ is feminine sing.; cf. _materiam totam ipsam_ in 28; \"which matter\nthroughout its whole extent can suffer all changes.\" For the word _omnia_\ncf. II. 118, and Plat. _Tim._ 50 B ([Greek: dechetai gar \u00eai ta panta]), 51\nA ([Greek: eidos pandeches]). The word [Greek: pandeches] is also quoted\nfrom Okellus in Stob. I. 20, 3. Binder is certainly wrong in taking _tota_\nand _omnia_ both as neut.--\"_alles und jedes_.\" Cic. knew the _Tim._ well\nand imitated it here. The student should read Grote's comments on the\npassages referred to. I cannot here point out the difference between\nPlato's [Greek: hyl\u00ea] and that of Aristotle. _Eoque interire_: so MSS.;\nHalm after Dav. _eaque_. Faber was right in supposing that Cic. has said\nloosely of the _materia_ what he ought to have said of the _qualia_. Of\ncourse the [Greek: prote hyl\u00ea], whether Platonic or Aristotelian, is\nimperishable (cf. _Tim._ 52 A. [Greek: phthoran ou prosdechomenon]). _Non\nin nihilum_: this is aimed at the Atomists, who maintained that infinite\nsubdivision logically led to the passing of things into nothing and their\nreparation out of nothing again. See Lucr. I. 215--264, and elsewhere.\n_Infinite secari_: through the authority of Aristotle, the doctrine of the\ninfinite subdivisibility of matter had become so thoroughly the orthodox\none that the Atom was scouted as a silly absurdity. Cf. _D.F._ I. 20 _ne\nillud quidem physici credere esse minimum_, Arist. _Physica_, I. 1 [Greek:\nouk estin elachiston megethos]. The history of ancient opinion on this\nsubject is important, but does not lie close enough to our author for\ncomment. The student should at least learn Plato's opinions from _Tim._ 35\nA sq. It is notable that Xenocrates, tripping over the old [Greek:\nantiphasis] of the One and the Many, denied [Greek: pan megethos diaireton\neinai kai meros echein] (R. and P. 245). Chrysippus followed Aristotle very\nclosely (R. and P. 377, 378). _Intervallis moveri_: this is the theory of\nmotion without void which Lucr. I. 370 sq. disproves, where see Munro. Cf.\nalso Sext. Emp. _Adv. Math._ VII. 214. Aristotle denied the existence of\nvoid either within or without the universe, Strato allowed its possibility\nwithin, while denying its existence without (Stob. I. 18, 1), the Stoics\ndid the exact opposite affirming its existence without, and denying it\nwithin the universe (Zeller 186, with footnotes). _Quae intervalla ...\npossint_: there is no ultimate space atom, just as there is no matter atom.\nAs regards space, the Stoics and Antiochus closely followed Aristotle,\nwhose ideas may be gathered from R. and P. 288, 9, and especially from M.\nSaint Hilaire's explanation of the _Physica_.\n\n\u00a728. _Ultro citroque_: this is the common reading, but I doubt its\ncorrectness. MSS. have _ultro introque_, whence _ed. Rom._ (1471) has\n_ultro in utroque_. I think that _in utroque_, simply, was the reading, and\nthat _ultro_ is a dittographia from _utro_. The meaning would be \"since\nforce plays this part in the compound,\" _utroque_ being as in 24 for _eo\nquod ex utroque fit_. If the vulg. is kept, translate \"since force has this\nmotion and is ever thus on the move.\" _Ultro citroque_ is an odd expression\nto apply to universal Force, Cic. would have qualified it with a _quasi_.\nIndeed if it is kept I suggest _quasi_ for _cum sic_. The use of _versetur_\nis also strange. _E quibus in omni natura_: most edd. since Dav. (Halm\nincluded) eject _in_. It is perfectly sound if _natura_ be taken as [Greek:\nousia] = existence substance. The meaning is \"out of which _qualia_,\nthemselves existing in (being co-extensive with) universal substance (cf.\n_totam commutari_ above), which is coherent and continuous, the world was\nformed.\" For the _in_ cf. _N.D._ II. 35, _in omni natura necesse est\nabsolvi aliquid_, also a similar use _ib._ II. 80, and _Ac._ II. 42. If _in\nutroque_ be read above, _in omni natura_ will form an exact contrast,\nsubstance as a whole being opposed to the individual _quale_. _Cohaerente\net continuata_: the Stoics made the universe much more of a unity than any\nother school, the expressions here and the striking parallels in _N.D._ II.\n19, 84, 119, _De Div._ II. 33, _De Leg._ fragm. 1. (at the end of Bait. and\nHalm's ed.) all come ultimately from Stoic sources, even if they be got at\nsecond hand through Antiochus. Cf. Zeller 137, Stob. I. 22, 3. The _partes\nmundi_ are spoken of in most of the passages just quoted, also in _N.D._\nII. 22, 28, 30, 32, 75, 86, 115, 116, all from Stoic sources. _Effectum\nesse mundum_: Halm adds _unum_ from his favourite MS. (G). _Natura\nsentiente_: a clumsy trans. of [Greek: aisth\u00eat\u00ea ousia] = substance which\ncan affect the senses. The same expression is in _N.D._ II. 75. It should\nnot be forgotten, however, that to the Stoics the universe was itself\nsentient, cf. _N.D._ II. 22, 47, 87. _Teneantur_: for _contineantur_; cf.\n_N.D._ II. 29 with II. 31 _In qua ratio perfecta insit_: this is thorough\ngoing Stoicism. Reason, God, Matter, Universe, are interchangeable terms\nwith the Stoics. See Zeller 145--150 By an inevitable inconsistency, while\nbelieving that Reason _is_ the Universe, they sometimes speak of it as\nbeing _in_ the Universe, as here (cf. Diog. Laert. VII. 138, _N.D._ II. 34)\nIn a curious passage (_N.D._ I. 33), Cic. charges Aristotle with the same\ninconsistency. For the Pantheistic idea cf. Pope \"lives through all life,\nextends through all extent\". _Sempiterna_: Aristotle held this: see II. 119\nand _N.D._ II. 118, Stob. I. 21, 6. The Stoics while believing that our\nworld would be destroyed by fire (Diog. Laert. VII. 141, R. and P. 378,\nStob. I. 20, 1) regarded the destruction as merely an absorption into the\nUniversal World God, who will recreate the world out of himself, since he\nis beyond the reach of harm (Diog. Laert. VII. 147, R. and P. 386, Zeller\n159) Some Stoics however denied the [Greek: ekpyr\u00f4sis]. _Nihil enim\nvalentius_: this is an argument often urged, as in _N.D._ II. 31 (_quid\npotest esse mundo valentius?_), Boethus quoted in Zeller 159. _A quo\nintereat_: _interire_ here replaces the passive of _perdere_ cf. [Greek:\nanast\u00eanai, ekpiptein hypo tinos].\n\n\u00a729. _Quam vim animum_: there is no need to read _animam_, as some edd. do.\nThe Stoics give their World God, according to his different attributes, the\nnames God, Soul, Reason, Providence, Fate, Fortune, Universal Substance,\nFire, Ether, All pervading Air-Current, etc. See Zeller, ch. VI. _passim_.\nNearly all these names occur in _N.D._ II. The whole of this section is\nundilutedly Stoic, one can only marvel how Antiochus contrived to fit it\nall in with the known opinions of old Academics and Peripatetics.\n_Sapientiam_: cf. _N.D._ II. 36 with III. 23, in which latter passage the\nStoic opinion is severely criticised. _Deum_: Cic. in _N.D._ I. 30 remarks\nthat Plato in his _Timaeus_ had already made the _mundus_ a God. _Quasi\nprudentium quandam_: the Greek [Greek: pronoia] is translated both by\n_prudentia_ and _providentia_ in the same passage, _N.D._ II. 58, also in\n_N.D._ II. 77--80. _Procurantem ... quae pertinent ad homines_: the World\nGod is perfectly beneficent, see _Ac._ II. 120, _N.D._ I. 23, II. 160\n(where there is a quaint jest on the subject), Zeller 167 sq.\n_Necessitatem_: [Greek: anank\u00ean], which is [Greek: eirmos aiti\u00f4n],\n_causarum series sempiterna_ (_De Fato_ 20, cf. _N.D._ I. 55, _De Div._ I.\n125, 127, Diog. VII. 149, and Zeller as before). This is merely the World\nGod apprehended as regulating the orderly sequence of cause upon cause.\nWhen the World God is called Fortune, all that is expressed is human\ninability to see this orderly sequence. [Greek: Tuch\u00ea] therefore is defined\nas [Greek: aitia ad\u00ealos anthr\u00f4pin\u00f4i logism\u00f4i] (Stob. I. 7, 9, where the\nsame definition is ascribed to Anaxagoras--see also _Topica_, 58--66). This\nidentification of Fate with Fortune (which sadly puzzles Faber and excites\nhis wrath) seems to have first been brought prominently forward by\nHeraclitus, if we may trust Stob. I. 5, 15. _Nihil aliter possit_: on\n_posse_ for _posse fieri_ see _M.D.F._ IV. 48, also _Ac._ II. 121. For the\nsense of Cleanthes' hymn to Zeus (i.e. the Stoic World-God), [Greek: oude\nti gignetai ergon epi chthoni sou dicha daimon]. _Inter quasi fatalem_: a\ntrans. of the Gk. [Greek: kat\u00eanankasmenon]. I see no reason for suspecting\n_inter_, as Halm does. _Ignorationemque causarum_: the same words in _De\nDiv._ II. 49; cf. also August. _Contra Academicos_ I. 1. In addition to\nstudying the reff. given above, the student might with advantage read\nAristotle's _Physica_ II. ch. 4--6, with M. Saint Hilaire's explanation,\nfor the views of Aristotle about [Greek: tych\u00ea] and [Greek: to automaton],\nalso ch. 8--9 for [Greek: anank\u00ea]. Plato's doctrine of [Greek: anank\u00ea],\nwhich is diametrically opposed to that of the Stoics, is to be found in\n_Timaeus_ p. 47, 48, Grote's _Plato_, III. 249--59.\n\n    \u00a7\u00a730--32. Part iv. of Varro's Exposition: Antiochus' _Ethics_. Summary.\n    Although the old Academics and Peripatetics based knowledge on the\n    senses, they did not make the senses the criterion of truth, but the\n    mind, because it alone saw the permanently real and true (30). The\n    senses they thought heavy and clogged and unable to gain knowledge of\n    such things as were either too small to come into the domain of sense,\n    or so changing and fleeting that no part of their being remained\n    constant or even the same, seeing that all parts were in a continuous\n    flux. Knowledge based _only_ on sense was therefore mere opinion (31).\n    Real knowledge only came through the reasonings of the mind, hence they\n    _defined_ everything about which they argued, and also used verbal\n    explanations, from which they drew proofs. In these two processes\n    consisted their dialectic, to which they added persuasive rhetoric\n    (32).\n\n\u00a730. _Quae erat_: the Platonic [Greek: \u00ean], = was, as we said. _In ratione\net disserendo_: an instance of Cicero's fondness for tautology, cf. _D.F._\nI. 22 _quaerendi ac disserendi_. _Quamquam oriretur_: the sentence is\ninexact, it is _knowledge_ which takes its rise in the senses, not the\ncriterion of truth, which is the mind itself; cf. however II. 30 and n.\n_Iudicium_: the constant translation of [Greek: krit\u00earion], a word foreign\nto the older philosophy. _Mentem volebant rerum esse iudicem_: Halm with\nhis pet MS. writes _esse rerum_, thus giving an almost perfect iambic,\nstrongly stopped off before and after, so that there is no possibility of\navoiding it in reading. I venture to say that no real parallel can be found\nto this in Cic., it stands in glaring contradiction to his own rules about\nadmitting metre in prose, _Orator_ 194 sq., _De Or._ III. 182 sq. _Solam\ncensebant ... tale quale esset_: probably from Plato's _Tim._ 35 A thus\ntranslated by Cic., _Tim._ c. 7 _ex ea materia quae individua est et unius\nmodi_ ([Greek: aei kata tauta echous\u00eas] cf. 28 A. [Greek: to kata tauta\nechon]) _et sui simile_, cf. also _T.D._ I. 58 _id solum esse quod semper\ntale sit quale sit, quam_ [Greek: idean] _appellat ille, nos speciem_, and\n_Ac._ II. 129. _Illi_ [Greek: idean], etc.: there is more than one\ndifficulty here. The words _iam a Platone ita nom_ seem to exclude Plato\nfrom the supposed old Academico-Peripatetic school. This may be an\noversight, but to say first that the school (_illi_, cf. _sic tractabatur\nab utrisque_) which included Aristotle held the doctrine of [Greek: ideai],\nand next, in 33, that Aristotle crushed the same doctrine, appears very\nabsurd. We may reflect, however, that the difference between Plato's\n[Greek: ideai] and Aristotle's [Greek: ta kathalou] would naturally seem\nmicroscopic to Antiochus. Both theories were practically as dead in his\ntime as those of Thales or Anaxagoras. The confusion must not be laid at\nCicero's door, for Antiochus in reconciling his own dialectics with Plato's\nmust have been driven to desperate shifts. Cicero's very knowledge of Plato\nhas, however, probably led him to intensify what inconsistency there was in\nAntiochus, who would have glided over Plato's opinions with a much more\ncautious step.\n\n\u00a731. _Sensus omnis hebetes_: this stands in contradiction to the whole\nAntiochean view as given in II. 12--64, cf. esp. 19 _sensibus quorum ita\nclara et certa iudicia sunt_, etc.: Antiochus would probably defend his\nagreement with Plato by asserting that though sense is naturally dull,\nreason may sift out the certain from the uncertain. _Res eas ... quae\nessent aut ita_: Halm by following his pet MS. without regard to the\nmeaning of Cic. has greatly increased the difficulty of the passage. He\nreads _res ullas ... quod aut ita essent_; thus making Antiochus assert\nthat _no_ true information can be got from sensation, whereas, as we shall\nsee in the _Lucullus_, he really divided sensations into true and false. I\nbelieve that we have a mixture here of Antiochus' real view with Cicero's\nreminiscences of the _Theaetetus_ and of Xenocrates; see below. _Nec\npercipere_: for this see _Lucullus_ passim. Christ's conj. _percipi, quod\nperceptio sit mentis non sensuum_, which Halm seems to approve, is a wanton\ncorruption of the text, cf. II. 101 _neget rem ullam percipi posse\nsensibus_, so 21, 119 (just like _ratione percipi_ 91), also I. 41 _sensu\ncomprehensum_. _Subiectae sensibus_: cf. II. 74 and Sext. Emp. _Adv. Math._\nVIII. 9, [Greek: ta hypopiptonta t\u00ea aisth\u00easei]. _Aut ita mobiles_, etc.:\nthis strongly reminds one of the _Theaetetus_, esp. 160 D sq. For\n_constans_ cf. [Greek: est\u00eakos], which so often occurs there and in the\n_Sophistes_. _Ne idem_: Manut. for MSS. _eidem_. In the _Theaetetus_,\nHeraclitus' theory of flux is carried to such an extent as to destroy the\nself-identity of things; even the word [Greek: eme] is stated to be an\nabsurdity, since it implies a permanent subject, whereas the subject is\nchanging from moment to moment; the expression therefore ought to be\n[Greek: tous eme]. _Continenter_: [Greek: ounech\u00f4s]; cf. Simplicius quoted\nin Grote's Plato, I. p. 37, about Heraclitus, [Greek: en metabol\u00ea gar\nsynechei ta onta]. _Laberentur et fluerent_: cf. the phrases [Greek: rho\u00ea,\npanta rhei, hoion rheumata kineisthai ta panta], etc., which are scattered\nthickly over the _Theaet._ and the ancient texts about Heraclitus; also a\nvery similar passage in _Orator_ 10. _Opinabilem_: [Greek: doxast\u00ean], so\n_opinabile_ = [Greek: doxaston] in Cic. _Tim_ ch. II. The term was largely\nused by Xenocrates (R. and P. 243--247), Arist. too distinguishes between\nthe [Greek: doxaston] and the [Greek: epist\u00eaton], e.g _Analyt. Post._ I. 33\n(qu. R. and P. 264).\n\n\u00a732. For this cf. _D.F._ IV. 8--10. _Notionibus_: so one MS. for\n_motionibus_ which the rest have. _Notio_ is Cicero's regular translation\nfor [Greek: ennoia], which is Stoic. This statement might have been made\nboth by Aristotle and Plato, though each would put a separate meaning on\nthe word _notio_. [Greek: Epist\u00eam\u00ea] in Plato is of the [Greek: ideai] only,\nwhile in Aristotle it is [Greek: ton katholou]; cf. _Anal. Post._ I. 33 (R.\nand P. 264), [Greek: leg\u00f4 noun arch\u00ean epist\u00eam\u00eas]. _Definitiones rerum_:\nthese must be carefully distinguished fiom _definitiones nominum_, see the\ndistinction drawn after Aristotle in R. and P. 265, note b. The _definitio\nrei_ really involves the whole of philosophy with Plato and Aristotle (one\nmight almost add, with moderns too). Its importance to Plato may be seen\nfrom the _Politicus_ and _Sophistes_, to Aristotle from the passages quoted\nin R. and P. pp. 265, 271, whose notes will make the subject as clear as it\ncan be made to any one who has not a knowledge of the whole of Aristotle's\nphilosophy. _Verborum explicatio_: this is quite a different thing from\nthose _definitiones nominum_ just referred to; it is _derivation_, which\ndoes not necessitate definition. [Greek: etymologian]: this is almost\nentirely Stoic. The word is foreign to the Classic Greek Prose, as are\n[Greek: etymos] and all its derivatives. ([Greek: Etym\u00f4s] means\n\"etymologically\" in the _De Mundo_, which however is not Aristotle's). The\nword [Greek: etymologia] is itself not frequent in the older Stoics, who\nuse rather [Greek: onomat\u00f4n orthot\u00eas] (Diog. Laert. VII. 83), the title of\ntheir books on the subject preserved by Diog. is generally \"[Greek: peri\nt\u00f4n etymologik\u00f4n]\" The systematic pursuit of etymology was not earlier than\nChrysippus, when it became distinctive of the Stoic school, though Zeno and\nCleanthes had given the first impulse (_N.D._ III. 63). Specimens of Stoic\netymology are given in _N.D._ II. and ridiculed in _N.D._ III. (cf. esp. 62\n_in enodandis nominibus quod miserandum sit laboratis_). _Post argumentis\net quasi rerum notis ducibus_: the use of etymology in rhetoric in order to\nprove something about the thing denoted by the word is well illustrated in\n_Topica_ 10, 35. In this rhetorical sense Cic. rejects the translation\n_veriloquium_ of [Greek: etymologia] and adopts _notatio_, the _rerum nota_\n(Greek [Greek: symbolon]) being the name so explained (_Top._ 35). Varro\ntranslated [Greek: etymologia] by _originatio_ (Quintil. I. 6, 28).\nAristotle had already laid down rules for this rhetorical use of etymology,\nand Plato also incidentally adopts it, so it may speciously be said to\nbelong to the old Academico-Peripatetic school. A closer examination of\nauthorities would have led Halm to retract his bad em. _notationibus_ for\n_notas ducibus_, the word _notatio_ is used for the whole science of\netymology, and not for particular derivations, while Cic. in numerous\npassages (e.g. _D.F._ V. 74) describes _verba_ or _nomina_ as _rerum\nnotae_. Berkley's _nodis_ for _notis_ has no support, (_enodatio nominum_\nin _N.D._ III. 62 is quite different). One more remark, and I conclude this\nwearisome note. The _quasi_ marks _rerum nota_ as an unfamiliar trans. of\n[Greek: symbolon]. Davies therefore ought not to have placed it before\n_ducibus_, which word, strong as the metaphor is, requires no\nqualification, see a good instance in _T.D._ I. 27. _Itaque tradebatur_: so\nHalm improves on Madvig's _ita_ for _in qua_ of the MSS., which cannot be\ndefended. Orelli's reference to 30 _pars_ for an antecedent to _qua_ (_in\nea parte in qua_) is violent, while Goerenz's resort to _partem rerum\nopinabilem_ is simply silly. Manut. conj. _in quo_, Cic. does often use the\nneut. pronoun, as in _Orator_ 3, but not quite thus. I have sometimes\nthought that Cic. wrote _haec, inquam_ (cf. _huic_ below). _Dialecticae_:\nas [Greek: logik\u00ea] had not been Latinised, Cic. is obliged to use this word\nto denote [Greek: logik\u00ea], of which [Greek: dialektik\u00ea] is really one\nsubdivision with the Stoics and Antiochus, [Greek: rh\u00eatorik\u00ea] which is\nmentioned in the next sentence being the other; see Zeller 69, 70.\n_Orationis ratione conclusae_: speech drawn up in a syllogistic form which\nbecomes _oratio perpetua_ under the influence of [Greek: rh\u00eatorik\u00ea]. _Quasi\nex altera parte_: a trans. of Aristotle's [Greek: antistrophos] in the\nbeginning of the _Rhetoric_. _Oratoria_: Halm brackets this word; cf.\nhowever a close parallel in _Brut._ 261 _oratorio ornamenta dicendi_. The\nconstruction is simply a variation of Cic.'s favourite double genitive\n(_T.D._ III. 39), _oratoria_ being put for _oratoris_. _Ad persuadendum_:\n[Greek: to pithanon] is with Arist. and all ancient authorities the one aim\nof [Greek: rh\u00eatorik\u00ea].\n\n    \u00a7\u00a733--42. Part v. of Varro's exposition: the departures from the old\n    Academico-Peripatetic school. Summary. Arist. crushed the [Greek:\n    ideai] of Plato, Theophrastus weakened the power of virtue (33). Strato\n    abandoned ethics for physics, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crates,\n    Crantor faithfully kept the old tradition, to which Zeno and Arcesilas,\n    pupils of Polemo, were both disloyal (34). Zeno maintained that nothing\n    but virtue could influence happiness, and would allow the name _good_\n    to nothing else (35). All other things he divided into three classes,\n    some were in accordance with nature, some at discord with nature, and\n    some were neutral. To the first class he assigned a positive value, and\n    called them _preferred_ to the second a negative value and called them\n    _rejected_, to the third no value whatever--mere verbal alterations on\n    the old scheme (36, 37). Though the terms _right action_ and _sin_\n    belong only to virtue and vice, he thought there was an appropriate\n    action (_officium_) and an inappropriate, which concerned things\n    _preferred_ and things _rejected_ (37). He made _all_ virtue reside in\n    the reason, and considered not the _practice_ but the mere _possession_\n    of virtue to be the important thing, although the possession could not\n    but lead to the practice (38). All emotion he regarded as unnatural and\n    immoral (38, 39). In physics he discarded the fifth element, and\n    believed fire to be the universal substance, while he would not allow\n    the existence of anything incorporeal (39). In dialectic he analysed\n    sensation into two parts, an impulse from without, and a succeeding\n    judgment of the mind, in passing which the will was entirely free (40).\n    Sensations (_visa_) he divided into the true and the untrue; if the\n    examination gone through by the mind proved irrefragably the truth of a\n    sensation he called it _Knowledge_, if otherwise, _Ignorance_ (41).\n    _Perception_, thus defined, he regarded as morally neither right nor\n    wrong but as the sole ultimate basis of truth. Rashness in giving\n    assent to phenomena, and all other defects in the application to them\n    of the reason he thought could not coexist with virtue and perfect\n    wisdom (42).\n\n\u00a733. _Haec erat illis forma_: so Madv. _Em._ 118 for MSS. _prima_,\ncomparing _formulam_ in 17, also _D.F._ IV. 19, V. 9, _T.D._ III. 38, to\nwhich add _Ac._ I. 23. See other em. in Halm. Goer. proposes to keep the\nMSS. reading and supply _pars_, as usual. His power of _supplying_ is\nunlimited. There is a curious similarity between the difficulties involved\nin the MSS. readings in 6, 15, 32 and here. _Immutationes_: so Dav. for\n_disputationes_, approved by Madv. _Em._ 119 who remarks that the phrase\n_disputationes philosophiae_ would not be Latin. The em. is rendered almost\ncertain by _mutavit_ in 40, _commutatio_ in 42, and _De Leg._ I. 38. Halm's\nodd em. _dissupationes_, so much admired by his reviewer in Schneidewin's\n_Philologus_, needs support, which it certainly does not receive from the\none passage Halm quotes, _De Or._ III. 207. _Et recte_: for the _et_ cf.\n_et merito_, which begins one of Propertius' elegies. _Auctoritas_:\n\"system\". _Inquit_: sc. Atticus of course. Goer., on account of the\nomission of _igitur_ after Aristoteles, supposes Varro's speech to begin\nhere. To the objection that Varro (who in 8 says _nihil enim meorum magno\nopere miror_) would not eulogise himself quite so unblushingly, Goer.\nfeebly replies that the eulogy is meant for Antiochus, whom Varro is\ncopying. _Aristoteles_: after this the copyist of Halm's G. alone, and\nevidently on his own conjecture, inserts _igitur_, which H. adopts. Varro's\nresumption of his exposition is certainly abrupt, but if chapter IX. ought\nto begin here, as Halm supposes, a reader would not be much incommoded.\n_Labefactavit_, that Antiochus still continued to include Aristotle in the\nsupposed old Academico-Peripatetic school can only be explained by the fact\nthat he considered ethical resemblances as of supreme importance, cf. the\nstrong statement of Varro in Aug. XIX. 1 _nulla est causa philosophandi\nnisi finis boni_. _Divinum_: see R. and P. 210 for a full examination of\nthe relation in which Plato's [Greek: ideai] stand to his notion of the\ndeity. _Suavis_: his constant epithet, see Gellius qu. R. and P. 327. His\nreal name was not Theophrastus, he was called so from his style (cf.\n_loquendi nitor ille divinus_, Quint. X. 1, 83). For _suavis_ of style cf.\n_Orat._ 161, _Brut._ 120. _Negavit_: for his various offences see _D.F._ V.\n12 sq., _T.D._ V. 25, 85. There is no reason to suppose that he departed\nvery widely from the Aristotelian ethics; we have here a Stoic view of him\ntransmitted through Antiochus. In II. 134 Cic. speaks very differently of\nhim. Between the particular tenet here mentioned and that of Antiochus in\n22 the difference is merely verbal. _Beate vivere_: the only translation of\n[Greek: eudaimonian]. Cic. _N.D._ I. 95 suggests _beatitas_ and _beatitudo_\nbut does not elsewhere employ them.\n\n\u00a734. _Strato_: see II. 121. The statement in the text is not quite true for\nDiog. V. 58, 59 preserves the titles of at least seven ethical works, while\nStob. II. 6, 4 quotes his definition of the [Greek: agathon]. _Diligenter\n... tuebantur_: far from true as it stands, Polemo was an inchoate Stoic,\ncf. Diog. Laert. IV. 18, _Ac._ II. 131, _D.F._ II. 34, and R. and P.\n_Congregati_: \"_all_ in the Academic fold,\" cf. _Lael._ 69, _in nostro, ut\nita dicam, grege_. Of Crates and Crantor little is known. _Polemonem ...\nZeno et Arcesilas_: scarcely true, for Polemo was merely one of Zeno's many\nteachers (Diog. VII. 2, 3), while he is not mentioned by Diog. at all among\nthe teachers of Arcesilas. The fact is that we have a mere theory, which\naccounts for the split of Stoicism from Academicism by the rivalry of two\nfellow pupils. Cf. Numenius in Euseb. _Praep. Ev._ XIV. 5, [Greek:\nsymphoit\u00f4ntes para Polem\u00f4ni ephilo tim\u00eath\u00easan]. Dates are against the\ntheory, see Zeller 500.\n\n\u00a735. _Anteiret aetate_: Arcesilas was born about 315, Zeno about 350,\nthough the dates are uncertain. _Dissereret_: was a deep reasoner. Bentl.\nmissing the meaning conj. _definiret_. _Peracute moveretur_: Bentl.\n_partiretur_; this with _definiret_ above well illustrates his licence in\nemendations. Halm ought not to have doubted the soundness of the text, the\nwords refer not to the emotional, but to the intellectual side of Zeno's\nnature. The very expression occurs _Ad Fam._ XV. 21, 4, see other close\nparallels in n. on II. 37. _Nervos ... inciderit_: same metaphor in\n_Philipp._ XII. 8, cf. also _T.D._ II. 27 _nervos virtutis elidere_, III.\n83 _stirpis aegritudinis elidere_. (In both these passages Madv. _Em. Liv._\n135 reads _elegere_ for _elidere_, I cannot believe that he is right).\nPlato uses [Greek: neura ektemnein] metaphorically. Notice _inciderit_ but\n_poneret_. There is no need to alter (as Manut., Lamb., Dav.) for the\nsequence is not uncommon in Cic., e.g. _D.F._ III. 33. _Omnia, quae_: MSS.\n_quaeque_, which edd. used to take for _quaecunque_. Cf. Goerenz's\nstatement \"_negari omnino nequit hac vi saepius pronomen illud reperiri_\"\nwith Madvig's utter refutation in the sixth Excursus to his _D.F._ _Solum\net unum bonum_: for the Stoic ethics the student must in general consult R.\nand P. and Zeller for himself. I can only treat such points as are involved\nin the special difficulties of the _Academica_.\n\n\u00a736. _Cetera_: Stoic [Greek: adiaphora], the presence or absence of which\ncannot affect happiness. The Stoics loudly protested against their being\ncalled either _bona_ or _mala_, and this question was one of the great\nbattle grounds of the later Greek philosophy. _Secundum naturam ...\ncontraria_: Gr. [Greek: kata physin, para physin]. _His ipsis ...\nnumerabat_: I see no reason for placing this sentence after the words _quae\nminoris_ below (with Christ) or for suspecting its genuineness (with Halm).\nThe word _media_ is the Gk. [Greek: mesa], which word however is not\nusually applied to _things_, but to _actions_. _Sumenda_: Gk. [Greek:\nl\u00eapta]. _Aestimatione_: [Greek: axia], positive value. _Contraque\ncontraria_: Cic. here as in _D.F._ III. 50 feels the need of a word to\nexpress [Greek: apaxia] (negative value). (Madv. in his note on that\npassage coins the word _inaestimatio._) _Ponebat esse_: cf. 19, _M.D.F._ V.\n73.\n\n\u00a737. To cope thoroughly with the extraordinary difficulties of this section\nthe student must read the whole of the chapters on Stoic ethics in Zeller\nand Ritter and Preller. There is no royal road to the knowledge, which it\nwould be absurd to attempt to convey in these notes. Assuming a general\nacquaintance with Stoic ethics, I set out the difficulties thus: Cic.\nappears at first sight to have made the [Greek: apopro\u00eagmena] a subdivision\nof the [Greek: l\u00eapta] (_sumenda_), the two being utterly different. I\nadmit, with Madv. (_D.F._ III. 50), that there is no reason for suspecting\nthe text to be corrupt, the heroic remedy of Dav., therefore, who reads\n_media_ in the place of _sumenda_, must be rejected. Nor can anything be\nsaid for Goerenz's plan, who distorts the Stoic philosophy in order to save\nCicero's consistency. On the other hand, I do not believe that Cic. could\nso utterly misunderstand one of the cardinal and best known doctrines of\nStoicism, as to think even for a moment that the [Greek: apopro\u00eagmena]\nformed a branch of the [Greek: l\u00eapta]. This view of Madvig's is strongly\nopposed to the fact that Cic. in 36 had explained with perfect correctness\nthe Stoic theory of the [Greek: adiaphora], nor is there anywhere in the\nnumerous passages where he touches on the theory any trace of the same\nerror. My explanation is that Cic. began with the intention to speak of the\n_sumenda_ only and then rapidly extended his thought so as to embrace the\nwhole class of [Greek: adiaphora], which he accordingly dealt with in the\nlatter part of the same sentence and in the succeeding sentence. (The\nremainder has its own difficulties, which I defer for the present.) Cic.\ntherefore is chargeable not with ignorance of Stoicism but with careless\nwriting. A striking parallel occurs in _D.F._ III. 52, _quae secundum locum\nobtinent_, [Greek: pro\u00eagmena] _id est producta nominentur, quae vel ita\nappellemus, vel promota et remota_. If this language be closely pressed,\nthe [Greek: apopro\u00eagmena] are made of a subdivision of the [Greek:\npro\u00eagmena], though no sensible reader would suppose Cic. to have had that\nintention. So if his words in _D.F._ V. 90 be pressed, the _sumenda_ are\nmade to include both _producta_ and _reducta_, in _D.F._ III. 16\n_appeterent_ includes _fugerent_, _ibid._ II. 86 the opposite of _beata\nvita_ is abruptly introduced. So _D.F._ II. 88 _frui dolore_ must be\nconstrued together, and _ibid._ II. 73 _pudor modestia pudicitia_ are said\n_coerceri_, the writer's thoughts having drifted on rapidly to the vices\nwhich are opposite to these virtues.\n\nI now pass on to a second class of difficulties. Supposing that by _ex iis_\nCic. means _mediis_, and not _sumendis_, about which he had intended to\ntalk when he began the sentence; I believe that _pluris aestimanda_ and\n_minoris aestimanda_ simply indicate the [Greek: axia] and [Greek: apaxia]\nof the Greek, _not_ different degrees of [Greek: axia] (positive value).\nThat _minor aestimatio_ should mean [Greek: apaxia] need not surprise us\nwhen we reflect (1) on the excessive difficulty there was in expressing\nthis [Greek: apaxia] or negative value in Latin, a difficulty I have\nalready observed on 36; (2) on the strong negative meaning which _minor_\nbears in Latin, e.g. _sin minus_ in Cic. means \"but if not.\" Even the\nGreeks fall victims to the task of expressing [Greek: apaxia]. Stobaeus, in\na passage closely resembling ours makes [Greek: elatt\u00f4n axia] equivalent to\n[Greek: poll\u00ea apaxia] (II. 6, 6), while Sext. Emp. after rightly defining\n[Greek: apopro\u00eagmena] as [Greek: ta hikan\u00ean apaxian echonta] (_Adv. Math._\nXI. 62--64) again speaks of them as [Greek: ta m\u00ea hikan\u00ean echonta axian]\n(_Pyrrhon. Hypot._ III. 191) words which usually have an opposite meaning.\nNow I contend that Cicero's words _minoris aestimanda_ bear quite as strong\na negative meaning as the phrase of Sextus, [Greek: ta m\u00ea hikan\u00ean axian\nechonta]. I therefore conclude that Cicero has striven, so far as the Latin\nlanguage allowed, to express the Stoic doctrine that, of the [Greek:\nadiaphora], some have [Greek: axia] while others have [Greek: apaxia]. He\nmay fairly claim to have applied to his words the rule \"_re intellecta in\nverborum usu faciles esse debemus_\" (_D.F._ III. 52). There is quite as\ngood ground for accusing Sextus and Stobaeus of misunderstanding the Stoics\nas there is for accusing Cicero. There are difficulties connected with the\nterms [Greek: hikan\u00ea axia] and [Greek: hikan\u00ea apaxia] which are not\nsatisfactorily treated in the ordinary sources of information; I regret\nthat my space forbids me to attempt the elucidation of them. The student\nwill find valuable aid in the notes of Madv. on the passages of the _D.F._\nquoted in this note. _Non tam rebus quam vocabulis_: Cic. frequently\nrepeats this assertion of Antiochus, who, having stolen the clothes of the\nStoics, proceeded to prove that they had never properly belonged to the\nStoics at all. _Inter recte factum atque peccatum_: Stob. speaks II. 6, 6\nof [Greek: ta metaxy aret\u00eas kai kakias]. (This does not contradict his\nwords a little earlier, II. 6, 5, [Greek: aret\u00eas de kai kakias ouden\nmetaxy], which have regard to divisions of men, not of actions. Diog.\nLaert., however, VII. 127, distinctly contradicts Cic. and Stob., see R.\nand P. 393.) _Recte factum_ = [Greek: katorth\u00f4ma], _peccatum_ = [Greek:\nhamart\u00eama], _officium_ = [Greek: kath\u00eakon] (cf. R. and P. 388--394, Zeller\n238--248, 268--272). _Servata praetermissaque_: MSS. have _et_ before\n_servata_, which all edd. since Lamb. eject. Where _et_ and _que_\ncorrespond in Cic., the _que_ is always an afterthought, added in oblivion\nof the _et_. With two nouns, adjectives, adverbs, or participles, this\noblivion is barely possible, but when the conjunctions go with separate\n_clauses_ it is possible. Cf. 43 and _M.D.F._ V. 64.\n\n\u00a738. _Sed quasdam virtutes_: see 20. This passage requires careful\nconstruing: after _quasdam virtutes_ not the whole phrase _in ratione esse\ndicerent_ must be repeated but _dicerent_ merely, since only the _virtutes\nnatura perfectae_, the [Greek: diano\u00eatikai aretai] of Arist., could be said\nto belong to the reason, while the _virtutes more perfectae_ are\nAristotle's [Greek: \u00eathikai aretai]. Trans. \"but spoke of certain\nexcellences as perfected by the reason, or (as the case might be) by\nhabit.\" _Ea genera virtutum_: both Plato and Arist. roughly divided the\nnature of man into two parts, the intellectual and the emotional, the\nformer being made to govern, the latter to obey (cf. _T.D._ II. 47, and\nArist. [Greek: to men h\u00f4s logon echon, to de epipeithes log\u00f4i]); Zeno\nhowever asserted the nature of man to be one and indivisible and to consist\nsolely of Reason, to which he gave the name [Greek: h\u00eagemonikon] (Zeller\n203 sq.). Virtue also became for him one and indivisible (Zeller 248,\n_D.F._ III. _passim_). When the [Greek: h\u00eagemonikon] was in a perfect\nstate, there was virtue, when it became disordered there was vice or\nemotion. The battle between virtue and vice therefore did not resemble a\nwar between two separate powers, as in Plato and Aristotle, but a civil war\ncarried on in one and the same country. _Virtutis usum_: cf. the\ndescription of Aristotle's _finis_ in _D.F._ II. 19. _Ipsum habitum_: the\nmere possession. So Plato, _Theaetet._ 197 B, uses the word [Greek: hexis],\na use which must be clearly distinguished from the later sense found in the\n_Ethics_ of Arist. In this sense virtue is _not_ a [Greek: hexis],\naccording to the Stoics, but a [Greek: diathesis] (Stob. II. 6, 5, Diog.\nVII. 89; yet Diog. sometimes speaks of virtue loosely as a [Greek: hexis],\nVII. 92, 93; cf. Zeller 249, with footnotes). _Nec virtutem cuiquam adesse\n... uteretur_: cf. Stob. II. 6, 6 [Greek: duo gen\u00ea t\u00f4n anthr\u00f4p\u00f4n einai to\nmen t\u00f4n spoudai\u00f4n, to de t\u00f4n phaul\u00f4n, kai to men t\u00f4n spoudai\u00f4n dia pantos\ntou biou chr\u00easthai tais aretais, to de t\u00f4n phaul\u00f4n tais kakiais].\n_Perturbationem_: I am surprised that Halm after the fine note of\nWesenberg, printed on p. 324 of the same volume in which Halm's text of the\n_Acad._ appears, should read the plural _perturbationes_, a conj. of\nWalker. _Perturbationem_ means emotion in the abstract; _perturbationes_\nbelow, particular emotions. There is exactly the same transition in _T.D._\nIII. 23, 24, IV. 59, 65, V. 43, while _perturbatio_ is used, in the same\nsense as here, in at least five other passages of the _T.D._, i.e. IV. 8,\n11, 24, 57, 82. _Quasi mortis_: a trans. of Stoic [Greek: pathesi], which\nCic. rejects in _D.F._ III. 35. _Voluit carere sapientem_: emotion being a\ndisturbance of equilibrium in the reason, and perfect reason being virtue\n(20), it follows that the Stoic sapiens must be emotionless (Zeller 228\nsq.). All emotions are reasonless; [Greek: h\u00eadon\u00ea] or _laetitia_ for\ninstance is [Greek: alogos eparsis]. (_T.D._ Books III. and IV. treat\nlargely of the Stoic view of emotions.) Wesenberg, _Em._ to the _T.D._ III.\np. 8, says Cic. always uses _efferri laetitia_ but _ferri libidine_.\n\n\u00a739. _Aliaque in parte_: so Plato, _Tim._ 69 C, _Rep._ 436, 441, Arist. _De\nAnima_ II. 3, etc.; cf. _T.D._ I. 20. _Voluntarias_: the whole aim of the\nStoic theory of the emotions was to bring them under the predominance of\nthe will. How the moral freedom of the will was reconciled with the general\nStoic fatalism we are not told. _Opinionisque iudicio suscipi_: all emotion\narose, said the Stoics, from a false judgment about some external object;\ncf. Diog. VII. 111. [Greek: ta path\u00ea kriseis einai]. Instances of each in\nZeller 233. For _iudicio_ cf. _D.F._ III. 35, _T.D._ III. 61, IV. 14, 15,\n18. _Intemperantiam_: the same in _T.D._ IV. 22, Gk. [Greek: akolasia], see\nZeller 232. _Quintam naturam_: the [Greek: pempt\u00ea ousia] or [Greek: pempton\ns\u00f4ma] of Aristotle, who proves its existence in _De Coelo_ I. 2, in a\ncurious and recondite fashion. Cic. is certainly wrong in stating that\nArist. derived _mind_ from this fifth element, though the finest and\nhighest of material substances. He always guards himself from assigning a\nmaterial origin to mind. Cic. repeats the error in _T.D._ I. 22, 41, 65,\n_D.F._ IV. 12. On this last passage Madv. has an important note, but he\nfails to recognise the essential fact, which is clear from Stob. I. 41, 33,\nthat the Peripatetics of the time were in the habit of deriving the mind\nfrom [Greek: aith\u00ear], which is the very name that Aristotle gives to the\nfifth element ([Greek: s\u00f4ma aitherion] in the _De Coelo_), and of giving\nthis out to be Aristotle's opinion. The error once made, no one could\ncorrect it, for there were a hundred influences at work to confirm it,\nwhile the works of Aristotle had fallen into a strange oblivion. I cannot\nhere give an exhaustive account of these influences, but will mention a\nfew. Stoicism had at the time succeeded in powerfully influencing every\nother sect, and it placed [Greek: nous en aitheri] (see Plutarch, qu. R.\nand P. 375). It had destroyed the belief in immaterial existence The notion\nthat [Greek: nous] or [Greek: psych\u00ea] came from [Greek: aith\u00ear] was also\nfostered by the language of Plato. He had spoken of the soul as [Greek:\naeikin\u00eatos] in passages which were well known to Cic. and had taken great\nhold on his mind One from the _Phaedrus_ 245 C is translated twice, in\n_Somnium Scipionis_ (_De Rep._ VI.), and _T.D._ I. 53 sq. Now the only\nthing with Aristotle which is [Greek: aeikin\u00eatos] in eternal perfect\ncircular motion (for to the ancients circular motion is alone perfect and\neternal), is the [Greek: aith\u00ear] or [Greek: pempton s\u00f4ma], that fiery\nexternal rim of the universe of which the stars are mere nodes, and with\nwhich they revolve. How natural then, in the absence of Aristotle's works,\nto conclude that the [Greek: aeikin\u00eatos psych\u00ea] of Plato came from the\n[Greek: aeikin\u00eatos aith\u00ear] of Aristotle! Arist. had guarded himself by\nsaying that the soul as an [Greek: arch\u00ea kin\u00ease\u00f4s] must be [Greek:\nakin\u00eatos], but Cic. had no means of knowing this (see Stob. I. 41, 36).\nAgain, Plato had often spoken of souls at death flying away to the outer\ncircle of the universe, as though to their natural home, just where Arist.\nplaced his [Greek: pempton s\u00f4ma] Any one who will compare _T.D._ I. 43 with\nthe _Somn. Scipionis_ will see what power this had over Cicero. Further,\nCic. would naturally link the mind in its origin with the stars which both\nPlato and Arist. looked on as divine (cf. _Somn. Scip._ 15) These\nconsiderations will be enough to show that neither Cic. nor Antiochus, whom\nMadv. considers responsible for the error, could have escaped it in any way\nnot superhuman except by the recovery of Aristotle's lost works, which did\nnot happen till too late. _Sensus_: we seem here to have a remnant of the\ndistinction drawn by Arist. between animal heat and other heat, the former\nbeing [Greek: analogon t\u00f4 t\u00f4n astr\u00f4n stoichei\u00f4] (_De Gen. An._ II. 3, qu.\nR. and P. 299). _Ignem_: the Stoics made no difference, except one of\ndegree, between [Greek: aith\u00ear] and [Greek: pyr], see Zeller 189, 190.\n_Ipsam naturam_: [Greek: pyr] is [Greek: kat' exoch\u00ean stoicheion] (Stob. I.\n10, 16), and is the first thing generated from the [Greek: apoios hyl\u00ea];\nfrom it comes air, from air water, from water earth (Diog. Laert. VII. 136,\n137) The fire is [Greek: logikon], from it comes the [Greek: h\u00eagemonikon]\nof man, which comprises within it all powers of sensation and thought.\nThese notions came from Heraclitus who was a great hero of the Stoics\n(Zeller ch. VIII. with notes) For his view of sensation and thought see\nSextus _Adv. Math._ VII. 127--129, qu. by R. and P. 21. The Stoics probably\nmisunderstood him; cf. R. and P. \"Heraclitus,\" and Grote's _Plato_ I. 34\nsq. _Expers corporis_: for Stoic materialism see Zeller, pp. 120 sq. The\nnecessity of a connection between the perceiving mind and the things\nperceived followed from old physical principles such as that of Democritus\n([Greek: ou gar ench\u00f4rein ta hetera kai diapheronta paschein hyp' all\u00eal\u00f4n],\nqu. from Arist. _De Gen. et Corr._ I. 7, by R. and P. 43), the same is\naffirmed loosely of all the old [Greek: physikoi], (Sextus _Adv. Math._\nVII. 116), and by Empedocles in his lines [Greek: gaiai men gaian\nop\u00f4pamen], etc. Plato in the _Timaeus_ fosters the same notion, though in a\ndifferent way. The Stoics simply followed out boldly that line of thought.\n_Xenocrates_: see II. 124, n. _Superiores_: merely the supposed old\nAcademico-Peripatetic school. _Posse esse non corpus_: there is no ultimate\ndifference between Force and Matter in the Stoic scheme, see Zeller, pp.\n134, 135.\n\n\u00a740. _Iunctos_: how can anything be a _compound_ of one thing? The notion\nthat _iunctos_ could mean _aptos_ (R. and P. 366) is untenable. I entirely\nagree with Madv. (first Excursus to his _D.F._) that we have here an\nanacoluthon. Cic. meant to say _iunctos e quadam impulsione et ex assensu\nanimorum_, but having to explain [Greek: phantasia] was obliged to break\noff and resume at _sed ad haec_. The explanation of a Greek term causes a\nvery similar anacoluthon in _De Off._ I. 153. Schuppe, _De Anacoluthis\nCiceronianis_ p. 9, agrees with Madv. For the expression cf. _D.F._ II. 44\n_e duplici genere voluptatis coniunctus_ Ernesti em. _cunctos_, Dav.\n_punctos_, _ingeniose ille quidem_ says Halm, _pessime_ I should say.\n[Greek: Phantasian]: a full and clear account of Stoic theories of\nsensation is given by Zeller, ch. V., R. and P. 365 sq. _Nos appellemus\nlicet_: the same turn of expression occurs _D.F._ III. 21, IV. 74. _Hoc\nverbum quidem hoc quidem_ probably ought to be read, see 18. _Adsensionem_\n= [Greek: synkatathesin]. _In nobis positam_: the usual expression for\nfreedom of the will, cf. II. 37, _De Fato_, 42, 43 (a very important\npassage). The actual sensation is involuntary ([Greek: akousion] Sext. Emp.\n_Adv. Math._ VIII. 397). _Tironum causa_ I note that the Stoics sometimes\nspeak of the assent of the mind as _involuntary,_ while the [Greek:\nkatal\u00eaptik\u00ea phantasia] _compels_ assent (see II. 38). This is, however,\nonly true of the healthy reason, the unhealthy may refuse assent.\n\n\u00a741. _Visis non omnibus_: while Epicurus defended the truth of all\nsensations, Zeno abandoned the weak positions to the sceptic and retired to\nthe inner citadel of the [Greek: katal\u00eaptik\u00ea phantasia]. _Declarationem_:\n[Greek: enargeian], a term alike Stoic, Epicurean, and Academic, see n. on\nII. 17. _Earum rerum_: only this class of sensations gives correct\ninformation of the _things_ lying behind. _Ipsum per se_: i.e. its whole\ntruth lies in its own [Greek: enargeia], which requires no corroboration\nfrom without. _Comprehendibile_: this form has better MSS. authority than\nthe vulg _comprehensibile_. Goerenz's note on these words is worth reading\nas a philological curiosity _Nos vero, inquit_: Halm with Manut. writes\n_inquam_. Why change? Atticus answers as in 14, 25, 33. [Greek:\nKatal\u00eapton]: strictly the _thing_ which emits the _visum_ is said to be\n[Greek: katal\u00eapton], but, as we shall see in the _Lucullus_, the sensation\nand the thing from which it proceeds are often confused. _Comprehensionem_:\nthis word properly denotes the process of perception in the abstract, not\nthe individual perception. The Greeks, however, themselves use [Greek:\nkatal\u00eapsis] for [Greek: katal\u00eaptik\u00ea phantasia] very often. _Quae manu\nprehenderentur_: see II. 145. _Nova enim dicebat_: an admission not often\nmade by Cic., who usually contends, with Antiochus, that Zeno merely\nrenamed old doctrines (cf. 43). _Sensum_: so Stob., I. 41, 25 applies the\nterm [Greek: aisth\u00easis] to the [Greek: phantasia]. _Scientiam_: the word\n[Greek: epist\u00eam\u00ea] is used in two ways by the Stoics, (1) to denote a number\nof coordinated or systematised perceptions ([Greek: katal\u00eapseis] or [Greek:\nkatal\u00eaptikai phantasiai]) sometimes also called [Greek: techn\u00ea] (cf. Sext.\n_Pyrrh. Hyp._ III. 188 [Greek: techn\u00ean de einai syst\u00eama ek katal\u00eapse\u00f4n\nsyngegymnasmen\u00f4n]); (2) to denote a single perception, which use is copied\nby Cic. and may be seen in several passages quoted by Zeller 80. _Ut\nconvelli ratione non posset_: here is a trace of later Stoicism. To Zeno\nall [Greek: katal\u00eaptikai phantasiai] were [Greek: asphaleis, ametapt\u00f4toi\nhypo logou]. Later Stoics, however, allowed that some of them were not\nimpervious to logical tests; see Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 253, qu. Zeller\n88. Thus every [Greek: katal\u00eaptik\u00ea phantasia], instead of carrying with it\nits own evidence, had to pass through the fire of sceptical criticism\nbefore it could be believed. This was, as Zeller remarks, equivalent to\ngiving up all that was valuable in the Stoic theory. _Inscientiam: ex qua\nexsisteret_: I know nothing like this in the Stoic texts; [Greek: amathia]\nis very seldom talked of there. _Opinio_: [Greek: doxa], see Zeller and cf.\n_Ac._ II. 52, _T.D._ II. 52, IV. 15, 26.\n\n\u00a742. _Inter scientiam_: so Sextus _Adv. Math._ VII. 151 speaks of [Greek:\nepist\u00eam\u00ean kai doxan kai t\u00ean en methopiai tout\u00f4n katal\u00eapsin]. _Soli_: Halm,\nI know not why, suspects this and Christ gives _solum ei_. _Non quod\nomnia_: the meaning is that the reason must generalize on separate\nsensations and combine them before we can know thoroughly any one _thing_.\nThis will appear if the whole sentence be read _uno haustu_; Zeller p. 78\nseems to take the same view, but I have not come across anything exactly\nlike this in the Greek. _Quasi_: this points out _normam_ as a trans. of\nsome Gk. word, [Greek: krit\u00earion] perhaps, or [Greek: gn\u00f4m\u00f4n] or [Greek:\nkan\u00f4n]. _Notiones rerum_: Stoic [Greek: ennoiai]; Zeller 81--84, R. and P.\n367, 368. _Quodque natura_: the omission of _eam_ is strange; Faber\nsupplies it. _Imprimerentur_: the terms [Greek: enapesphragismen\u00ea,\nenapomemagmen\u00ea, entetyp\u00f4men\u00ea] occur constantly, but generally in relation\nto [Greek: phantasiai], not to [Greek: ennoiai]. _Non principia solum_:\nthere seems to be a ref. to those [Greek: archai t\u00eas apodeixe\u00f4s] of Arist.\nwhich, induced from experience and incapable of proof, are the bases of all\nproof. (See Grote's _Essay on the Origin of Knowledge_, first printed in\nBain's _Mental and Moral Science_, now re-published in Grote's\n_Aristotle._) Zeno's [Greek: ennoiai] were all this and more.\n_Reperiuntur_: two things vex the edd. (1) the change from _oratio obliqua_\nto _recta_, which however has repeatedly taken place during Varro's\nexposition, and for which see _M.D.F._ I. 30, III. 49; (2) the phrase\n_reperire viam_, which seems to me sound enough. Dav., Halm give\n_aperirentur_. There is no MSS. variant. _Aliena_: cf. _alienatos_ _D.F._\nIII. 18. _A virtute sapientiaque removebat_: cf. _sapiens numquam fallitur\nin iudicando_ _D.F._ III. 59. The _firma adsensia_ is opposed to\n_imbecilla_ 41. For the _adsensio_ of the _sapiens_ see Zeller 87. More\ninformation on the subject-matter of this section will be found in my notes\non the first part of the _Lucullus_. _In his constitit_: cf. II. 134.\n\n    \u00a7\u00a743--END. Cicero's historical justification of the New Academy.\n    Summary. Arcesilas' philosophy was due to no mere passion for victory\n    in argument, but to the obscurity of phenomena, which had led the\n    ancients to despair of knowledge (44). He even abandoned the one tenet\n    held by Socrates to be certain; and maintained that since arguments of\n    equal strength could be urged in favour of the truth or falsehood of\n    phenomena, the proper course to take was to suspend judgment entirely\n    (45). His views were really in harmony with those of Plato, and were\n    carried on by Carneades (46).\n\n\u00a743. _Breviter_: MSS. _et breviter;_ see 37. _Tunc_: rare before a\nconsonant; see Munro on _Lucr._ I. 130. _Verum esse [autem] arbitror_: in\ndeference to Halm I bracket _autem_, but I still think the MSS. reading\ndefensible, if _verum_ be taken as the neut. adj. and not as meaning _but_.\nTranslate: \"Yet I think the truth to be ... that it is to be thought,\" etc.\nThe edd. seem to have thought that _esse_ was needed to go with _putandam_.\nThis is a total mistake; cf. _ait ... putandam_, without _esse_ II. 15,\n_aiebas removendum_ II. 74; a hundred other passages might be quoted from\nCic.\n\n\u00a744. _Non pertinacia aut studio vincendi_: for these words see n. on II.\n14. The sincerity of Arcesilas is defended also in II. 76. _Obscuritate_: a\nside-blow at _declaratio_ 41. _Confessionem ignorationis_: see 16. Socrates\nwas far from being a sceptic, as Cic. supposes; see note on II. 74. _Et iam\nante Socratem_: MSS. _veluti amantes Socratem;_ Democritus (460--357 B.C.)\nwas really very little older than Socrates (468--399) who died nearly sixty\nyears before him. _Omnis paene veteres_: the statement is audaciously\ninexact, and is criticised II. 14. None of these were sceptics; for\nDemocritus see my note on II. 73, for Empedocles on II. 74, for Anaxagoras\non II. 72. _Nihil cognosci, nihil penipi, nihil sciri_: the verbs are all\nequivalent; cf. _D.F._ III. 15 _equidem soleo etiam quod uno Graeci ...\nidem pluribus verbis exponere_. _Angustos sensus_: Cic. is thinking of the\nfamous lines of Empedocles [Greek: steinopoi men gar palamai k.t.l.] R. and\nP. 107. _Brevia curricula vitae_: cf. Empedocles' [Greek: pauron de z\u00f4\u00eas\nabiou meros]. Is there an allusion in _curricula_ to Lucretius' _lampada\nvitai tradunt_, etc.? _In profundo_: Dem. [Greek: en byth\u00f4], cf. II. 32.\nThe common trans. \"well\" is weak, \"abyss\" would suit better. _Institutis_:\n[Greek: nom\u00f4] of Democritus, see R. and P. 50. Goerenz's note here is an\nextraordinary display of ignorance. _Deinceps omnia_: [Greek: panta\nephex\u00eas] there is no need to read _denique_ for _deinceps_ as Bentl., Halm.\n_Circumfusa tenebris_: an allusion to the [Greek: skoti\u00ea gn\u00f4sis] of\nDemocr., see II. 73. _Dixerunt_: Halm brackets this because of _dixerunt_\nabove, parts of the verb _dicere_ are however often thus repeated by Cic.\n\n\u00a745. _Ne illud quidem_: cf. 16. _Latere censebat_ Goer. omitted _censebat_\nthough in most MSS. Orelli and Klotz followed as usual. For the sense II.\n122. _Cohibereque_: Gk. [Greek: epechein], which we shall have to explain\nin the _Lucullus_. _Temeritatem ... turpius_: for these expressions, see\nII. 66, note. _Praecurrere_: as was the case with the dogmatists. _Paria\nmomenta_: this is undiluted scepticism, and excludes even the possibility\nof the _probabile_ which Carneades put forward. For the doctrine cf. II.\n124, for the expression Euseb. _Praep. Evan._ XIV. c. 4 (from Numenius) of\nArcesilas, [Greek: einai gar panta akatal\u00eapta kai tous eis ekatera logous\nisokrateis all\u00ealois], Sextus _Adv. Math._ IX. 207 [Greek: isostheneis\nlogoi]; in the latter writer the word [Greek: isostheneia] very frequently\noccurs in the same sense, e g _Pyrrhon. Hyp._ I. 8 (add _N.D._ I. 10,\n_rationis momenta_)\n\n\u00a746. _Platonem_: to his works both dogmatists and sceptics appealed, Sextus\n_Pyrrhon. Hyp._ I. 221 [Greek: ton Plat\u00f4na oin hoi men dogmatikon ephasan\neinai, hoi de apo \u00eatikon, hoi de kata men ti apor\u00eatikon, kata de ti\ndogmatikon]. Stobaeus II. 6, 4 neatly slips out of the difficulty; [Greek:\nPlat\u00f4n polyph\u00f4nos \u00f4n, ouch h\u00f4s tines oiontai polydoxos]. _Exposuisti_:\nDurand's necessary em., approved by Krische, Halm, etc. for MSS. _exposui_.\n_Zenone_: see Introd. p. 5.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nNOTES ON THE FRAGMENTS.\n\nBOOK I.\n\n1. _Mnesarchus_: see II. 69, _De Or._ I. 45, and _Dict. Biogr._\n'Antipater'; cf. II. 143, _De Off._ III. 50. Evidently this fragment\nbelongs to that historical justification of the New Academy with which I\nsuppose Cicero to have concluded the first book.\n\n2. The word _concinere_ occurs _D.F._ IV. 60, _N.D._ I. 16, in both which\nplaces it is used of the Stoics, who are said _re concinere, verbis\ndiscrepare_ with the other schools. This opinion of Antiochus Cic. had\nalready mentioned 43, and probably repeated in this fragment. Krische\nremarks that Augustine, _Cont. Acad._ II. 14, 15, seems to have imitated\nthat part of Cicero's exposition to which this fragment belongs. If so Cic.\nmust have condemned the unwarrantable verbal innovations of Zeno in order\nto excuse the extreme scepticism of Arcesilas (Krische, p. 58).\n\nBOOK II.\n\n3. This fragm. clearly forms part of those anticipatory sceptical arguments\nwhich Cic. in the first edition had included in his answer to Hortensius,\nsee Introd. p. 55. The argument probably ran thus: What seems so level as\nthe sea? Yet it is easy to prove that it is really not level.\n\n4. On this I have nothing to remark.\n\n5. There is nothing distinctive about this which might enable us to\ndetermine its connection with the dialogue. Probably Zeno is the person who\n_serius adamavit honores_.\n\n6. The changing aspects of the same thing are pointed to here as\ninvalidating the evidence of the senses.\n\n7. This passage has the same aim as the last and closely resembles\n_Lucullus_ 105.\n\n8. The fact that the eye and hand need such guides shows how untrustworthy\nthe senses are. A similar argument occurs in _Luc._ 86. _Perpendiculum_ is\na plumb line, _norma_ a mason's square, the word being probably a\ncorruption of the Greek [Greek: gn\u00f4m\u00f4n] (Curt. _Grundz_ p. 169, ed. 3),\n_regula_, a rule.\n\n9. The different colours which the same persons show in different\nconditions, when young and when old, when sick and when healthy, when sober\nand when drunken, are brought forward to prove how little of permanence\nthere is even in the least fleeting of the objects of sense.\n\n10. _Urinari_ is to dive; for the derivation see Curt. _Grundz_ p. 326. A\ndiver would be in exactly the position of the fish noticed in _Luc._ 81,\nwhich are unable to see that which lies immediately above them and so\nillustrate the narrow limits of the power of vision.\n\n11. Evidently an attempt to prove the sense of smell untrustworthy.\nDifferent people pass different judgments on one and the same odour. The\nstudent will observe that the above extracts formed part of an argument\nintended to show the deceptive character of the senses. To these should\nprobably be added fragm. 32. Fr. 19 shows that the impossibility of\ndistinguishing eggs one from another, which had been brought forward in the\n_Catulus_, was allowed to stand in the second edition, other difficulties\nof the kind, such as those connected with the bent oar, the pigeon's neck,\nthe twins, the impressions of seals (_Luc._ 19, 54), would also appear in\nboth editions. The result of these assaults on the senses must have been\nsummed up in the phrase _cuncta dubitanda esse_ which Augustine quotes from\nthe _Academica Posteriora_ (see fragm. 36).\n\nBOOK III.\n\n12. This forms part of Varro's answer to Cicero, which corresponded in\nsubstance to Lucullus' speech in the _Academica Priora_ The drift of this\nextract was most likely this: just as there is a limit beyond which the\nbattle against criminals cannot be maintained, so after a certain point we\nmust cease to fight against perverse sceptics and let them take their own\nway. See another view in Krische, p. 62.\n\n13. Krische believes that this fragment formed part of an attempt to show\nthat the senses were trustworthy, in the course of which the clearness with\nwhich the fishes were seen leaping from the water was brought up as\nevidence. (In _Luc._ 81, on the other hand, Cic. drew an argument hostile\nto the senses from the consideration of the fish.) The explanation seems to\nme very improbable. The words bear such a striking resemblance to those in\n_Luc._ 125 (_ut nos nunc simus ad Baulos Puteolosque videmus, sic\ninnumerabilis paribus in locis esse isdem de rebus disputantis_) that I am\ninclined to think that the reference in Nonius ought to be to Book IV. and\nnot Book III., and that Cic., when he changed the scene from Bauli to the\nLucrine lake, also changed _Puteolosque_ into _pisciculosque exultantes_\nfor the sufficient reason that Puteoli was not visible from Varro's villa\non the Lucrine.\n\n14. The passion for knowledge in the human heart was doubtless used by\nVarro as an argument in favour of assuming absolute knowledge to be\nattainable. The same line is taken in _Luc._ 31, _D.F._ III. 17, and\nelsewhere.\n\n15. It is so much easier to find parallels to this in Cicero's speech than\nin that of Lucullus in the _Academica Priora_ that I think the reference in\nNonius must be wrong. The talk about freedom suits a sceptic better than a\ndogmatist (see _Luc._ 105, 120, and Cic.'s words in 8 of the same). If my\nconjecture is right this fragment belongs to Book IV. Krische gives a\ndifferent opinion, but very hesitatingly, p. 63.\n\n16. This may well have formed part of Varro's explanation of the [Greek:\nkatal\u00eapsis], _temeritas_ being as much deprecated by the Antiocheans and\nStoics as by the Academics cf. I. 42.\n\n17. I conjecture _malleo_ (a hammer) for the corrupt _malcho_, and think\nthat in the second ed. some comparison from building operations to\nillustrate the fixity of knowledge gained through the [Greek: katal\u00eapseis]\nwas added to a passage which would correspond in substance with 27 of the\n_Lucullus_. I note in Vitruvius, quoted by Forc. s.v. _malleolus_, a\nsimilar expression (_naves malleolis confixae_) and in Pliny _Nat. Hist._\nXXXIV. 14 _navis fixa malleo_. _Adfixa_ therefore in this passage must have\nagreed with some lost noun either in the neut. plur. or fem. sing.\n\n18. This and fragm. 19 evidently hang very closely together. As Krische\nnotes, the Stoic [Greek: enargeia] had evidently been translated earlier in\nthe book by _perspicuitas_ as in _Luc._ 17.\n\n19. See on _Luc._ 57.\n\nBOOK IV.\n\nFurther information on all these passages will be found in my notes on the\nparallel passages of the _Lucullus_.\n\n21. _Viam_ evidently a mistake for the _umbram_ of _Luc._ 70.\n\n23. The best MS. of Nonius points to _flavum_ for _ravum_ (_Luc._ 105).\nMost likely an alteration was made in the second edition, as Krische\nsupposes, p. 64.\n\n28. _Corpusculis_: _Luc._ 121 has _corporibus_. Krische's opinion that this\nlatter word was in the second edition changed into the former may be\nsupported from I. 6, which he does not notice. The conj. is confirmed by\nAug. _Contr. Ac._ III. 23.\n\n29. _Magnis obscurata_: in _Luc._ 122 it is _crassis occultata_, so that we\nhave another alteration, see Krische, p. 64.\n\n30. Only slight differences appear in the MSS. of the _Luc._ 123, viz.\n_contraria_, for _in c._, _ad vestigia_ for _contra v._\n\n31. _Luc._ 137 has _dixi_ for _dictus_. As Cic. does not often leave out\n_est_ with the passive verb, Nonius has probably quoted wrongly. It will be\nnoted that the fragments of Book III. correspond to the first half of the\n_Luc._, those of Book IV. to the second half. Cic. therefore divided the\n_Luc._ into two portions at or about 63.\n\nUNCERTAIN BOOKS.\n\n32. I have already said that this most likely belonged to the preliminary\nassault on the senses made by Cic. in the second book.\n\n33. In the Introd. p. 55 I have given my opinion that the substance of\nCatulus' speech which unfolded the doctrine of the _probabile_ was\nincorporated with Cicero's speech in the second book of this edition. To\nthat part this fragment must probably be referred.\n\n34. This important fragment clearly belongs to Book II., and is a jocular\napplication of the Carneadean _probabile_, as may be seen from the words\n_probabiliter posse confici_.\n\n35. Krische assigns this to the end of Varro's speech in the third Book.\nWith this opinion I find it quite impossible to agree. A passage in the\n_Lucullus_ (60) proves to demonstration that in the first edition this\nallusion to the esoteric teaching of the Academy could only have occurred\neither in the speech of Catulus or in that of Cicero. As no reason whatever\nappears to account for its transference to Varro I prefer to regard it as\nbelonging to Cic.'s exposition of the positive side of Academic doctrine in\nthe second book. Cic. repeatedly insists that the Academic school must not\nbe supposed to have no truths to maintain, see _Luc._ 119, also 66 and\n_N.D._ I. 12. Also Aug. _Contra. Ac._ II. 29.\n\n36. It is difficult to see where this passage could have been included if\nnot in that prooemium to the third book which is mentioned _Ad. Att._ XVI.\n6, 4. I may here add that Krische seems to me wrong in holding that the\nwhole four books formed one discussion, finished within the limits of a\nsingle day. Why interrupt the discussion by the insertion of a prologue of\nso general a nature as to be taken from a stock which Cic. kept on hand\nready made? (Cf. _Ad Att._ as above.)\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nBesides the actual fragments of the second edition, many indications of its\ncontents are preserved in the work of Augustine entitled _Contra\nAcademicos_, which, though written in support of dogmatic opinions,\nimitated throughout the second edition of the _Academica_ of Cic. No\nwritings of the Classical period had so great an influence on the culture\nand opinions of Augustine as the _Academica_ and the lost _Hortensius_. I\ngive, partly from Krische, the scattered indications of the contents of the\nformer which are to be gathered from the bishop's works. In Aug. _Contr.\nAc._ II. 14, 15, we have what appears to be a summary of the lost part of\nBook I. to the following effect. The New Academy must not be regarded as\nhaving revolted against the Old, all that it did was to discuss that new\ndoctrine of [Greek: katal\u00eapsis] advanced by Zeno. The doctrine of [Greek:\nakatal\u00eapsia] though present to the minds of the ancients had never taken\ndistinct shape, because it had met with no opposition. The Old Academy was\nrather enriched than attacked by the New. Antiochus, in adopting Stoicism\nunder the name of the Old Academy, made it appear that there was a strife\nbetween it and the New. With Antiochus the historical exposition of Cic.\nmust have ended. From this portion of the first book, Aug. derived his\nopinion (_Contra. Ac._ II. 1) that New Academicism was excusable from the\nnecessities of the age in which it appeared. Indications of Book II. in\nAug. are scarce, but to it I refer _Contra. Ac._ I. 7 _placuit Ciceroni\nnostro beatum esse qui verum investigat etiam si ad eius inventionem non\nvaleat pervenire_, also _ibid._ III. 10 _illis (Academicis) placuit esse\nposse hominem sapientem, et tamen in hominem scientiam cadere non posse_.\nThese I refer to Cicero's development of the _probabile_ in Book II.,\nalthough I ought to say that Krische, p. 65, maintains that the substance\nof Catulus' exposition in the _Ac. Priora_ transferred to Book IV. of the\n_Ac. Posteriora_. As this would leave very meagre material for Book II.,\nnothing indeed excepting the provisional proof of the deceptiveness of the\nsenses, I cannot accede to his arrangement; mine, I may remark, involves a\nmuch smaller departure from the first edition. Allusions in Aug. to the\nattack on the senses by Cic. in Book II. are difficult to fix, as they\napply equally well to the later attack in Book IV. As to Books III. and\nIV., I do not think it necessary here to prove from Aug. the points of\nagreement between them and the _Lucullus_, which will find a better place\nin my notes on the latter, but merely give the divergences which appear\nfrom other sources. These are the translation of [Greek: sophismata] by\n_cavillationes_ in _Luc._ 75 (Seneca _Ep._ III.), and the insertion in 118\nof _essentia_ as a translation of [Greek: ousia].\n\nBOOK II.\n\nENTITLED _LUCULLUS_.\n\n    \u00a7\u00a71--12. Summary. Lucullus, though an able and cultivated man, was\n    absent from Rome on public service too long during his earlier years to\n    attain to glory in the forum (1). He unexpectedly proved a great\n    general. This was due to his untiring study and his marvellous memory\n    (2). He had to wait long for the reward of his merits as a commander\n    and civil administrator, and was allowed no triumph till just before my\n    consulship. What I owed to him in those troublous times I cannot now\n    tell (3). He was not merely a general; he was also a philosopher,\n    having learned much from Antiochus and read much for himself (4). Those\n    enemies of Greek culture who think a Roman noble ought not to know\n    philosophy, must be referred to the examples of Cato and Africanus (5).\n    Others think that famous men should not be introduced into dialogues of\n    the kind. Are they then, when they meet, to be silent or to talk about\n    trifles? I, in applying myself to philosophy, have neglected no public\n    duty, nor do I think the fame of illustrious citizens diminished, but\n    enriched, by a reputation for philosophical knowledge (6). Those who\n    hold that the interlocutors in these dialogues had no such knowledge\n    show that they can make their envy reach beyond the grave. Some critics\n    do not approve the particular philosophy which I follow--the Academic.\n    This is natural, but they must know that Academicism puts no stop to\n    inquiry (7). My school is free from the fetters of dogma; other schools\n    are enslaved to authority (8). The dogmatists say they bow to the\n    authority of the wise man. How can they find out the wise man without\n    hearing all opinions? This subject was discussed by myself, Catulus,\n    Lucullus, and Hortensius, the day after the discussion reported in the\n    _Catulus_ (9). Catulus called on Lucullus to defend the doctrines of\n    Antiochus. This Lucullus believed himself able to do, although the\n    doctrines had suffered in the discussion of the day before (10). He\n    spoke thus: At Alexandria I heard discussions between Heraclitus Tyrius\n    the pupil of Clitomachus and Philo, and Antiochus. At that very time\n    the books mentioned by Catulus yesterday came into the hands of\n    Antiochus, who was so angry that he wrote a book against his old\n    teacher (11 and 12). I will now give the substance of the disputes\n    between Heraclitus and Antiochus, omitting the remarks made by the\n    latter against Philo (12).\n\n\u00a71. _Luculli_: see Introd. p. 58, and _Dict. Biog._ _Digna homini nobili_:\na good deal of learning would have been considered _unworthy_ of a man like\nLucullus, see Introd. p. 30. _Percepta_: \"gained,\" \"won;\" cf. _percipere\nfruges_, \"to reap,\" _Cat. Mai._ 24. _Caruit_: \"was cut off from;\" _carere_\ncomes from a root _skar_ meaning to divide, see Corss. I. 403. For the\nthree nouns with a singular verb see Madv. _Gram._ 213 A, who confines the\nusage to nouns denoting things and impersonal ideas. If the common reading\n_dissensit_ in _De Or._ III. 68 is right, the restriction does not hold.\n_Admodum_: \"to a degree.\" _Fratre_: this brother was adopted by a M.\nTerentius Varro, and was a man of distinction also; see _Dict. Biog._\n_Magna cum gloria_: a ref. to _Dict. Biog._ will show that the whole affair\nwas discreditable to the father; to our notions, the sons would have gained\ngreater glory by letting it drop. _Quaestor_: to Sulla, who employed him\nchiefly in the civil administration of Asia. _Continuo_: without any\ninterval. _Legis praemio_: this seems to mean \"by the favour of a special\nlaw,\" passed of course by Sulla, who had restored the old _lex annalis_ in\nall its rigour, and yet excepted his own officers from its operation.\n_Prooemio_, which has been proposed, would not be Latin, see _De Leg._ II.\n16. _Consulatum_: he seems to have been absent during the years 84--74, in\nthe East. _Superiorum_: scarcely that of Sulla.\n\n\u00a72. _Laus_: \"merit,\" as often, so _praemium_, Virg. _Aen._ XII. 437, means\na deed worthy of reward. _Non admodum exspectabatur_: Cic. forgets that\nLuc. had served with distinction in the Social War and the first\nMithridatic war. _In Asia pace_: three good MSS. have _Asiae_; Baiter\nejects _Asia_; Guilelmus read _in Asia in pace_ (which Davies conjectures,\nthough he prints _Asiae_). _Consumere_ followed by an ablative without _in_\nis excessively rare in Cic. Madv. _D.F._ V. 53 denies the use altogether.\nIn addition, however, to our passage, I note _hoc loco consumitur_ in\n_T.D._ IV. 23, where Baiter's two texts (1861 and 1863) give no variants.\n_Pace_ here perhaps ought to be taken adverbially, like _tranqullo_.\n_Indocilem_: this is simply passive, = \"untaught,\" as in Prop. I. 2, 12,\nOv. _Fast._ III. 119 (the last qu. by Dav.). Forc. s.v. is wrong in making\nit active. _Factus_: = _perfectus_; cf. Hor. _Sat._ I. 5, 33 _homo factus\nad unguem_, Cic. _De Or._ III. 184, _In Verr._ IV. 126. So _effectus_ in\nsilver Latin. _Rebus gestis_: military history, so often. _Divinam quandam\nmemoriam_: the same phrase in _De Or._ II. 360. _Rerum, verborum_: same\ndistinction in _De Or._ II. 359. _Oblivisci se malle_: the same story is\ntold _D.F._ II. 104, _De Or._ II. 299. The ancient art of memory was begun\nby Simonides (who is the person denoted here by _cuidam_) and completed by\nMetrodorus of Scepsis, for whom see _De Or._ II. 360. _Consignamus_: cf.\n_consignatae in animis notiones_ in _T.D._ I. 57. _litteris_ must be an\nablative of the instrument. _Mandare monum._: cf. I. 3. _Insculptas_: rare\nin the metaphorical use, cf. _N.D._ I. 45.\n\n\u00a73. _Genere_: \"department\" cf. I. 3. _Navalibus pugnis_: [Greek:\nnaumachiais]. _Instrumento et adparatu_: [Greek: kataskeu\u00ea kai paraskeu\u00ea].\n_Rex_: Mithridates. _Quos legisset_: = _de quibus l._; cf. the use of the\npassive verb so common in Ovid, e.g. _Trist._ IV. 4, 14. I take of course\n_rex_ to be nom. to _legisset_, the suggestion of a friend that Lucullus is\nnom. and that _quos legisset_ = _quorum commentarios legisset_ I think\nimprobable. _Hodie_: Drakenborch on Livy V. 27 wants to read _hodieque_,\nwhich however, is not Ciceronian. In passages like _De Or._ I. 103 and\n_Verr._ V. 64, the _que_ connects clauses and does not modify _hodie_. On\nthis subject see Madv. _Opuscula_ I. 390. _Etsi_: _M.D.F._ V. 68, shows\nthat in Cic. a parenthetic clause with _etsi_ always has a common verb with\nits principal clause; a rule not observed by the silver writers. The same\nholds of _quamquam_, see n. on I. 5. _Calumnia_: properly a fraudulent use\nof litigation, [Greek: sykophantia]. The chief enemy was the infamous\nMemmius who prosecuted him. _In urbem_: until his triumph Luc. would remain\noutside the city. _Profuisset_: this ought properly to be _profuerit_, but\nthe conditional _dicerem_ changes it. _Potius ... quam ... communicem_: n.\non 23.\n\n\u00a74. _Sunt ... celebrata_: cf. I. 11, 17 for the collocation of the words.\n_Externa ... interiora_: cf. _De Div._ II. 124 _sed haec quoque in promptu,\nnunc interiora videamus_. _Pro quaestore_: for this Faber wrote _quaestor_,\narguing that as Luc. was Sulla's _quaestor_ and Sulla sent him to Egypt, he\ncould not be _pro quaestor_. But surely after the first year he would be\n_pro quaestor_. Dav. reads _quaestor_ here and 11, saying \"_veterem\nlectionem iugulavit Faber_\". _Ea memoria ... quam_: Bentl., Halm, Baiter\ngive _qua_, Halm refers to Bentl. on Hor. _Sat._ I. 6, 15. A passage like\nours is _D.F._ I. 29, _ista sis aequitate, quam ostendis_, where one MS.\nhas _qua_. Read Madvig's lucid note there. _De quibus audiebat_: Madv.\n_Em._ 121 makes this equivalent to _de eis rebus de quibus_, the necessity\nof which explanation, though approved by Halm, I fail to see. The form of\nexpression is very common in Cic., and the relative always refers to an\nactually expressed antecedent, cf. e.g. _Cat. Mai._ 83. I take _quibus_ as\nsimply = _libris_.\n\n\u00a75. _Ac_: strong, as often, = [Greek: kai m\u00ean]. _Personarum_: public\ncharacters, [Greek: pros\u00f4p\u00f4n pole\u00f4s] (_Ad. Fam._ XV. 17, 2), so _personas_\n6. _Multi ... plures_: cf. Introd. p. 30. _Reliqui_: many MSS. insert _qui_\nby _dittographia_, as I think, though Halm, as well as Bait., retains it.\nOn the retention or omission of this _qui_ will depend the choice of\n_putant_ or _putent_ below. _Earum rerum disputationem_: for _disp._\nfollowed by genitive see n. on I. 33. _Non ita decoram_: for this feeling\nsee Introd. p. 30. For _non ita_ cf. the Lowland Scottish \"no just sae\".\n_Historiae loquantur_: _hist._ means in Cic. rather \"memoirs\" than\n\"history,\" which is better expressed by _res gestae_. Note that the verb\n_loqui_ not _dicere_ is used, and cf. n. on 101. _Legatione_: to the kings\nin Egypt and the East in alliance with Rome. The censorship was in 199 B.C.\nAbout the embassy see _Dict. Biogr._ art. 'Panactius'. _Auctorem_: one\nwould think this simple and sound enough, Bentl. however read _fautorem_,\nDav. _auditorem_.\n\n\u00a76. _Illigari_: \"entangled\" as though in something bad. For this use Forc.\nqu. Liv. XXXIII. 21, Tac. _Ann._ XIII. 40. _Aut ludicros sermones_: = _aut\nclar. vir. serm. ludic. esse oporteat_. _Rerum leviorum_: a similar\nargument in _D.F._ I. 12. _Quodam in libro_: the _Hortensius_. _Gradu_: so\nthe word \"degree\" was once used, e.g. \"a squire of low degree\" in the\nballad. _De opera publica detrahamus_: the dative often follows this verb,\nas in _D.F._ III. 7 _nihil operae reipublicae detrahens_, a passage often\nwrongly taken. _Operae_ is the dat. after the verb, not the gen. after\n_nihil_, _reip._ the gen. after _operae_, like _opera publica_ here, not\nthe dat. after _detrahens_. _Nisi forensem_: the early oratorical works may\nfairly be said to have this character; scarcely, however, the _De\nRepublica_ or the _De Leg._ both of which fall within the period spoken of.\n_Ut plurimis prosimus_: cf. Introd. p. 29. _Non modo non minui, sed_:\nnotice _non modo ... sed_ thrice over in two sentences.\n\n\u00a77. _Sunt ... qui negent_: and truly, see Introd. p. 38. In _Cat. Mai._ \u00a73\nCic. actually apologises for making Cato more learned than he really was.\n_Mortuis_: Catulus died in 60, Lucullus about 57, Hortensius 50. _Contra\nomnis dicere quae videntur_: MSS. mostly insert _qui_ between _dicere_ and\n_quae_, one of the best however has _dicere quae aliis_ as a correction,\nwhile another has the marginal reading _qui scire sibi videntur_. The\nomission of _qui_, which I conjectured, but now see occurs in a MS. (Pal.\n2) referred to by Halm, gives admirable sense. _Verum invenire_: cf. 60.\n_Contentione_: = [Greek: philoneikia] as usual. _In ... rebus obscuritas_:\ncf. I. 44 _rerum obscuritate_. _Infirmitas_: cf. I. 44 _imbecillos animos_.\n_Antiquissimi et doctissimi_: on the other hand _recentissima quaeque sunt\ncorrecta et emendata maxime_ I. 13. _Diffisi_: one of the best MSS. has\n_diffissi_, which reminds one of the spelling _divisssiones_, asserted to\nbe Ciceronian in Quint. _Inst. Or_. I. 7, 20. _In utramque partem_: [Greek:\nep' amphotera], cf. I. 45. _Exprimant_: \"embody,\" cf. n. on I. 19.\n\n\u00a78. _Probabilia_: [Greek: pithana], for which see 33. _Sequi_: \"act upon,\"\ncf. 99-101. _Liberiores et solutiores_: these two words frequently occur\ntogether in Cic. and illustrate his love for petty variations; see 105,\nalso _T.D._ V. 43, _De Div._ I. 4, _De Rep._ IV. 4, _N.D._ I. 56, _Orat._\n64. _Integra_: \"untrammelled,\" cf. the phrase \"_non mihi integrum est_\"--\"I\nhave committed my self.\" _Et quasi_: MSS. have _et quibus et quasi_.\n_Cogimur_: for this Academic freedom see Introd. p. 18. _Amico cuidam_:\nOrelli after Lamb. _cuipiam;_ for the difference see Madv. _Gram._ 493 _b_,\nc.\n\n\u00a79. _Ut potuerint, potuerunt_: thus Lamb. corrected the MSS. reading which\nwas simply _ut potuerunt_, \"granting that they had the ability, they gained\nit by hearing all things, now as a matter of fact they _did_ decide on a\nsingle hearing,\" etc. _Iudicaverunt autem_: so Lamb. for MSS. _aut_.\nMuretus, by what Dav. calls an \"_arguta hariolatio_,\" read _an_ for _aut_\nand put a note of interrogation at _contulerunt_. C.F. Hermann\n(Schneidewin's _Philologus_ VII. 466) introduces by conj. a sad confusion\ninto the text, but no other good critic since Madvig's remarks in _Em._ 125\nhas impugned Lambinus' reading. Goerenz indeed, followed by the faithful\nSchutz, kept the MSS. reading with the insertion of _aut_ between _sed_ and\n_ut_ at the beginning; of this Madv. says \"_non solum Latina non est, sed\nsanae menti repugnat_.\" For the proceeding which Cic. deprecates, cf.\n_N.D._ I. 10, _De Leg._ I. 36. _Quam adamaverunt_: \"which they have learned\nto love;\" the _ad_ has the same force as [Greek: pro] in [Greek:\npromanthanein], which means \"to learn _on and on_, to learn by degrees\"\n(cf. [Greek: proumathon stergein kakois]), not, as the lexica absurdly say,\n\"to learn beforehand, i.e. to learn thoroughly.\" _Constantissime_: \"most\nconsistently\". _Quae est ad Baulos_: cf. Introd. p. 57. _In spatio_: this\n_xystus_ was a colonnade with one side open to the sea, called [Greek:\nxystos] from its polished floor and pillars. _Consedimus_: n. on I. 14.\n\n\u00a710. _Servatam oportuit_: a construction very characteristic of Terence,\nfound, but rarely, in Cic. and Livy. _In promptu ... reconditiora_: cf. _in\npromptu ... interiora_ in _De Div._ II. 124, also _Ac._ I. 4. _Quae dico_:\nGoer. is exceedingly troubled by the pres. tense and wishes to read\n_dixero_. But the substitution of the pres. for the future is common enough\nin all languages cf. Iuv. IV. 130 with Mayor's copious note. _Si non\nfuerint_: so all Halm's best MSS. Two, however, of Davies' have _si vera_\netc. In support of the text, see I. 9 (_sunt ista_) and note.\n_Labefactata_: this is only found as an alteration in the best MSS. and in\n_Ed. Rom._ (1471); the others have _labefacta_. Orelli's statement (note to\nhis separate text of the _Academica_ 1827) that Cic. commonly uses the\nperfect _labefeci_ and the part, _labefactus_ is quite wrong. The former is\nindeed the vulg. reading in _Pro Sestio_ 101, the latter in _De Haruspicum\nResponsis_ 60, but the last of these two passages is doubtful. Cic. as a\nrule prefers long forms like _sustentatus_, which occurs with\n_labefactatus_ in _Cat. Mai._ 20. For the perfect _labefactavit_ cf. I. 33.\n_Agam igitur_: Cic. rather overdoes the attempt to force on his readers a\nbelief in the learning of Lucullus.\n\n\u00a711. _Pro quaestore_: cf. 4. _Essem_: MSS. _issem_, whence Goer. conj.\n_Alexandriam issem_. _Heraclitus Tyrius_: scarcely known except from this\npassage. _Clitomachum_: for this philosopher see Zeller 532. _Quae nunc\nprope dimissa revocatur_: sc. _a Cicerone_. Philo's only notable pupils had\ncombined to form the so called \"Old Academy,\" and when Cic. wrote the\n_Academica_ the New Academic dialectic had been without a representative\nfor many years. Cf. Introd. p. 21. _Libri duo_: cf. I. 13. _Heri_ for this\nindication of the contents of the lost _Catulus_, see Introd. p. 50.\n_Implorans_: \"appealing to,\" the true meaning being \"to appeal to with\ntears,\" see Corss. I. 361. _Philonis_: sc. _esse_. _Scriptum agnoscebat_:\ni.e. it was an actual work of Ph. _Tetrilius_: some MSS. are said to have\nTetrinius, and the name _Tertinius_ is found on Inscr. One good MS. has\n_Tretilius_, which may be a mistake for _Tertilius_, a name formed like\n_Pompilius_, _Quintilius_, _Sextilius_. Qy, should _Petrilius_, a\nderivative from the word for four, be read? _Petrilius_ and _Pompilius_\nwould then agree like _Petronius_ and _Pomponius_, _Petreius_ and\n_Pompeius_. For the formation of these names see Corss. I. 116. _Rogus_: an\nill omened and unknown name. _Rocus_, as Ursinus pointed out, occurs on\n_denarii_ of the _gens Creperia_. _De Philone ... ab eo ipso_: note the\nchange of prep. \"from Philo's lips,\" \"from his copy.\" _De_ and _ex_ are\ncommon in Cic. after _audire_, while _ab_ is rather rarer. See _M.D.F._ I.\n39, and for _describere ab aliquo_ cf. _a te_ in _Ad Att._ XIII. 22, 3.\n\n\u00a712. _Dicta Philoni_: for this see Introd. p. 50. It cannot mean what Goer.\nmakes it mean, \"_coram Philone_.\" I think it probable that _Philoni_ is a\nmarginal explanation foisted on the text. As to the statements of Catulus\nthe elder, they are made clear by 18. _Academicos_: i.e. _novos_, who are\nhere treated as the true Academics, though Antiochus himself claimed the\ntitle. _Aristo_: see Introd. p. 11. _Aristone_: Diog. VII. 164 mentions an\nAristo of Alexandria, a Peripatetic, who may be the same. Dio seems\nunknown. _Negat_: see n. on 18. _Lenior_: some MSS. _levior_, as is usual\nwith these two words. In 11 one of the earliest editions has _leviter_ for\n_leniter_.\n\n    \u00a7\u00a713--18. Summary. Cicero seems to me to have acted like a seditious\n    tribune, in appealing to famous old philosophers as supporters of\n    scepticism (13), Those very philosophers, with the exception of\n    Empedocles, seem to me, if anything, too dogmatic (14). Even if they\n    were often in doubt, do you suppose that no advance has been made\n    during so many centuries by the investigations of so many men of\n    ability? Arcesilas was a rebel against a good philosophy, just as Ti.\n    Gracchus was a rebel against a good government (15). Has nothing really\n    been learned since the time of Arcesilas? His opinions have had scanty,\n    though brilliant support (16). Now many dogmatists think that no\n    argument ought to be held with a sceptic, since argument can add\n    nothing to the innate clearness of true sensations (17). Most however\n    do allow of discussion with sceptics. Philo in his innovations was\n    induced to state falsehoods, and incurred all the evils he wished to\n    avoid, his rejection of Zeno's definition of the [Greek: katal\u00eaptik\u00ea\n    phantasia] really led him back to that utter scepticism from which he\n    was fleeing. We then must either maintain Zeno's definition or give in\n    to the sceptics (18).\n\n\u00a713. _Rursus exorsus est_: cf. _exorsus_ in 10. _Popularis_: [Greek:\nd\u00eamotikous]. _Ii a_: so Dav. for MSS. _iam_. _Tum ad hos_: so MSS., Dav.\n_aut hos_. The omission of the verb _venire_ is very common in Cic.'s\nletters. _C. Flaminium_: the general at lake Trasimene. _Aliquot annis_:\none good MS. has _annos_, cf. _T.D._ I. 4, where all the best MSS. have\n_annos_. The ablative is always used to express point of time, and indeed\nit may be doubted whether the best writers _ever_ use any accusative in\nthat sense, though they do occasionally use the ablative to express\nduration (cf. Prop. I. 6, 7 and Madv. _Gram._ 235, 2). _L. Cassium_: this\nis L. Cassius Longinus Ravilla, a man of good family, who carried a ballot\nbill (_De Leg._ III. 35), he was the author of the _cui bono_ principle and\nso severe a judge as to be called _scopulus reorum_. Pompeium: apparently\nthe man who made the disgraceful treaty with Numantia repudiated by home in\n139 B.C. _P. Africanum_: i.e. the younger, who supported the ballot bill of\nCassius, but seems to have done nothing else for the democrats. _Fratres_:\nLamb. _viros_, but cf. _Brut._ 98. _P. Scaevolam_: the pontifex, consul in\nthe year Tib. Gracchus was killed, when he refused to use violence against\nthe tribunes. The only connection these brothers had with the schemes of\nGracchus seems to be that they were consulted by him as lawyers, about the\nlegal effect the bills would have. _Ut videmus ... ut suspicantur_: Halm\nwith Gruter brackets these words on the ground that the statement about\nMarius implies that the demagogues lie about all but him. Those words need\nnot imply so much, and if they did, Cic. may be allowed the inconsistency.\n\n\u00a714. _Similiter_: it is noticeable that five MSS. of Halm have _simile_.\n_Xenophanem_: so Victorius for the MSS. _Xenoplatonem_. _Ed. Rom._ (1471)\nhas _Cenonem_, which would point to _Zenonem_, but Cic. does not often name\nZeno of Elea. _Saturninus_: of the question why he was an enemy of\nLucullus, Goer. says _frustra quaeritur_. Saturninus was the persistent\nenemy of Metellus Numidicus, who was the uncle of Lucullus by marriage.\n_Arcesilae calumnia_: this was a common charge, cf. _Academicorum calumnia_\nin _N.D._ II. 20 and _calumnia_ in 18 and 65 of this book. So August.\n_Contra Acad._ II. 1 speaks of _Academicorum vel calumnia vel pertinacia\nvel pericacia_. _Democriti verecundia_: Cic. always has a kind of\ntenderness for Democritus, as Madv. on _D.F._ I. 20 remarks, cf. _De Div._\nII. 30 where Democr. is made an exception to the general _arrogantia_ of\nthe _physici_. _Empedocles quidem ... videatur_: cf. 74. The exordium of\nhis poem is meant, though there is nothing in it so strong as the words of\nthe text, see R. and P. 108. _Quale sit_: the emphasis is on _sit_, the\nsceptic regards only phenomenal, not essential existence. _Quasi modo\nnascentes_: Ciacconus thought this spurious, cf. however _T.D._ II. 5 _ut\noratorum laus ... senescat ... , philosophia nascatur_.\n\n\u00a715. _haesitaverunt_: Goer. cf. _De Or._ I. 40. _Constitutam_: so in 14.\n_Delitisceret_: this is the right spelling, not _delitesceret_, which one\ngood MS. has here, see Corssen II. 285. _Negavissent_: \"had denied, as they\nsaid.\" _Tollendus est_: a statement which is criticised in 74. _Nominibus\ndifferentis ... dissenserunt_: genuine Antiochean opinions, see the\n_Academica Posteriora_ 17, 43. _De se ipse_: very frequent in Cic. (cf.\nMadv. _Gram._ 487 _b_). _Diceret_: this is omitted by the MSS., but one has\n_agnosceret_ on the margin; see n. on 88. _Fannius_: in his \"Annals.\" The\nsame statement is quoted in _De Or._ II. 270, _Brutus_ 299. Brutus had\nwritten an epitome of this work of Fannius (_Ad Att._ XII. 5, 3).\n\n\u00a716. _Veteribus_: Bentley's em. of MSS. _vetera_: C.F. Hermann (Schneid\n_Philol._ VII. 457), thinking the departure from the MSS. too great, keeps\n_vetera_ and changes _incognita_ into _incondita_, comparing _De Or._ I.\n197, III. 173. A glance, however, at the exx. in Forc. will show that the\nword always means merely \"disordered, confused\" in Cic. The difference here\nis not one between order and no order, but between knowledge and no\nknowledge, so that _incognita_ is far better. I am not at all certain that\nthe MSS. reading needs alteration. If kept the sense would be: \"but let us\nsuppose, for sake of argument, that the doctrines of the ancients were not\n_knowledge_, but mere _opinion_.\" The conj. of Kayser _veri nota_ for\n_vetera_ (cf. 76) and _investigatum_ below, is fanciful and improbable.\n_Quod investigata sunt_: \"in that an investigation was made.\" Herm. again\ndisturbs the text which since Madv. _Em._ 127 supported it (quoting _T.D._\nV. 15, Liv. XXXV. 16) had been settled. Holding that _illa_ in the former\nsentence cannot be the subj. of the verb, he rashly ejects _nihilne est\nigitur actum_ as a dittographia (!) from 15 _nihilne explicatum_, and reads\n_quot_ for _quod_ with Bentl. For the meaning cf. _T.D._ III. 69 and Arist.\non the progress of philosophy as there quoted. _Arcesilas Zenoni ...\nobtrectans_: see n. on I. 34. These charges were brought by each school\nagainst the other. In Plutarch _Adv. Colotem_ p. 1121 F, want of novelty is\ncharged against Arcesilas, and the charge is at once joyfully accepted by\nPlut. The scepticism of Arcesilas was often excused by the provocation Zeno\ngave, see Aug. _Contra Acad._ II. 14, 15 and notes on fragm. 2 and 35 of\nthe _Academica Posteriora_. _Immutatione verborum_: n. on I. 33. This\nphrase has also technical meanings; it translates the Greek [Greek: tropoi]\n(_Brut._ 69) and [Greek: all\u00eagoria] in _De Or._ II. 261, where an ex. is\ngiven. _Definitiones_: n. on 18. _Tenebras obducere_: such expressions\nabound in Cic. where the New Academy is mentioned, cf. 30 (_lucem\neripere_), _N.D._ I. 6 (_noctem obfundere_) Aug. _Contra Ac._ III. 14\n(_quasdam nebulas obfundere_), also the joke of Aug. II. 29 _tenebrae quae\npatronae Academicorum solent esse_. _Non admodum probata_: cf. the passage\nof Polybius qu. by Zeller 533. _Lacyde_: the most important passages in\nancient authorities concerning him are quoted by Zeller 506. It is\nimportant to note that Arcesilas left no writings so that Lacydes became\nthe source of information about his teacher's doctrines. _Tenuit_: cf. the\nuse of _obtinere_ in _De Or._ I. 45. _In Aeschine_: so Dav. for the\nconfused MSS. reading. For this philosopher see Zeller 533. As two MSS.\nhave _hac nonne_ Christ conj. _Hagnone_ which Halm, as well as Baiter\ntakes; Zeller 533 seems to adopt this and at once confuses the supposed\nphilosopher with one Agnon just mentioned in Quint. II. 17, 15. There is\nnot the slightest reason for this, Agnon and Hagnon being known, if known\nat all, from these two passages only.\n\n\u00a717. _Patrocinium_: for the word cf. _N.D._ I. 6. _Non defuit_: such\npatronage _was_ wanting in the time of Arcesilas (16). _Faciendum omnino\nnon putabant_: \"Epictetus (Arrian, _Diss._ I. 27, 15) quietly suppresses a\nsceptic by saying [Greek: ouk ag\u00f4 schol\u00ean pros tauta]\" (Zeller 85, n.). In\nanother passage (Arrian, I. 5) Epict. says it is no more use arguing with a\nsceptic than with a corpse. _Ullam rationem disputare_: the same constr.\noccurs in 74 and _Pro Caecina_ 15, _Verr. Act._ I. 24. _Antipatrum_: cf.\nfragm. 1 of Book I. _Verbum e verbo_: so 31, _D.F._ III. 15, _T.D._ III. 7,\nnot _verbum de verbo_, which Goer. asserts to be the usual form.\n_Comprehensio_: cf. I. 41. _Ut Graeci_: for the ellipse of the verb cf. I.\n44 _ut Democritus_. _Evidentiam_: other translations proposed by Cic. were\n_illustratio_ (Quint. VI. 2, 32) and _perspicientia_ (_De Off._ I. 15).\n_Fabricemur_: cf. 87, 119, 121. _Me appellabat_: Cic. was the great\nadvocate for the Latinisation of Greek terms (_D.F._ III. 15). _Sed tamen_:\nthis often resumes the interrupted narrative, see Madv. _Gram._ 480. _Ipsa\nevidentia_: note that the verb _evidere_ is not Latin.\n\n\u00a718. _Sustinere_: cf. 70. _Pertinaciam_: the exact meaning of this may be\nseen from _D.F._ II. 107, III. 1. It denotes the character which cannot\nrecognise a defeat in argument and refuses to see the force of an\nopponent's reasoning. For the application of the term to the Academics, cf.\nn. on 14, 66, also I. 44 and _D.F._ V. 94, _N.D._ I. 13, in the last of\nwhich passages the Academy is called _procax_. _Mentitur_: cf. 12. _Ita\nnegaret_: this _ita_ corresponds to _si_ below,--a common sequence of\nparticles in Cic., cf. 19. [Greek: Akatal\u00eapton]: the conj. of Turnebus\n[Greek: katal\u00eapton] is unnecessary, on account of the negative contained in\n_negaret_. _Visum_: cf. I. 40. _Trivimus_: cf. I. 27. _Visum igitur_: the\nGreek of this definition will be found in Zeller 86. The words _impressum\neffictumque_ are equivalent to [Greek: enapesphragismen\u00ea kai\nenapomemagmen\u00ea] in the Gk. It must not be forgotten that the Stoics held a\nsensation to be a real alteration ([Greek: heteroi\u00f4sis]) of the material\nsubstance of the soul through the action of some external thing, which\nimpresses its image on the soul as a seal does on wax, cf. Zeller 76 and 77\nwith footnotes. _Ex eo unde esset ... unde non esset_: this translation\ncorresponds closely to the definition given by Sextus in four out of the\nsix passages referred to by Zeller (in _Adv. Math._ VIII. 86 _Pyrrh.\nHypotyp._ III. 242, the definition is clipt), and in Diog. Laert. VII. 50\n(in 46 he gives a clipt form like that of Sextus in the two passages just\nreferred to). It is worth remarking (as Petrus Valentia did, p. 290 of\nOrelli's reprint of his _Academica_) that Cic. omits to represent the words\n[Greek: kat' auto to hyparchon]. Sextus _Adv. Math._ VII. 249 considers\nthem essential to the definition and instances Orestes who looking at\nElectra, mistook her for an Erinys. The [Greek: phantasia] therefore which\nhe had although [Greek: apo hyparchontos] (proceeding from an actually\nexistent thing) was not [Greek: kata to hyparchon], i.e. did not truly\nrepresent that existent thing. Aug. _Cont. Acad._ II. 11 quotes Cicero's\ndefinition and condenses it thus; _his signis verum posse comprehendi quae\nsigna non potest habere quod falsum est_. _Iudicium_: [Greek: krit\u00earion], a\ntest to distinguish between the unknown and the known. _Eo, quo minime\nvolt_: several things are clear, (1) that Philo headed a reaction towards\ndogmatism, (2) that he based the possibility of knowledge on a ground quite\ndifferent from the [Greek: katal\u00eaptik\u00ea phantasia], which he pronounced\nimpossible, (3) that he distorted the views of Carneades to suit his own.\nAs to (1) all ancient testimony is clear, cf. 11, Sextus _Pyrr. Hyp._ I.\n235, who tells us that while the Carneadeans believed all things to be\n[Greek: akatal\u00eapta], Philo held them to be [Greek: katal\u00eapta], and Numenius\nin Euseb. _Praep. Ev._ XIV. 8, p. 739, who treats him throughout his notice\nas a renegade. (2) is evident from the _Academica_ and from Sextus as\nquoted above. The foundation for knowledge which he substituted is more\ndifficult to comprehend. Sextus indeed tells us that he held things to be\n_in their own nature_ [Greek: katal\u00eapta (hoson de epi t\u00ea physei t\u00f4n\npragmat\u00f4n aut\u00f4n katal.)]. But Arcesilas and Carneades would not have\nattempted to disprove this; they never tried to show that things _in\nthemselves_ were incognisable, _but_ that human faculties do not avail to\ngive information about them. Unless therefore Philo deluded himself with\nwords, there was nothing new to him about such a doctrine. The Stoics by\ntheir [Greek: katal\u00eaptik\u00ea phantasia] professed to be able to get at _the\nthing in itself_, in its real being, if then Philo did away with the\n[Greek: katal. phant.] and substituted no other mode of curing the defects\nalleged by Arcesilas and Carneades to reside in sense, he was fairly open\nto the retort of Antiochus given in the text. Numenius treats his polemic\nagainst the [Greek: katal. phant.] as a mere feint intended to cover his\nretreat towards dogmatism. A glimpse of his position is afforded in 112 of\nthis book, where we may suppose Cic. to be expressing the views of Philo,\nand not those of Clitomachus as he usually does. It would seem from that\npassage that he defined the cognisable to be \"_quod impressum esset e\nvero_\" ([Greek: phantasia apo hyparchontos enapomemagmen\u00ea]), refusing to\nadd \"_quo modo imprimi non posset a falso_ ([Greek: hoia ouk an genoito apo\nm\u00ea hyparchontos]), cf. my n. on the passage. Thus defined, he most likely\ntried to show that the cognisable was equivalent to the [Greek: d\u00ealon] or\n[Greek: pithanon] of Carneades, hence he eagerly pressed the doubtful\nstatement of the latter that the wise man would \"opine,\" that is, would\npronounce definite judgments on phenomena. (See 78 of this book.) The\nscarcity of references to Philo in ancient authorities does not allow of a\nmore exact view of his doctrine. Modern inquiry has been able to add little\nor nothing to the elucidation given in 1596 by Petrus Valentia in his book\nentitled _Academica_ (pp. 313--316 of the reprint by Orelli). With regard\nto (3), it it not difficult to see wherein Philo's \"lie\" consisted. He\ndenied the popular view of Arcesilas and Carneades, that they were apostles\nof doubt, to be correct (12). I may add that from the mention of Philo's\nethical works at the outset of Stobaeus' _Ethica_, he would appear to have\nafterwards left dialectic and devoted himself to ethics. What is important\nfor us is, that Cic. never seems to have made himself the defender of the\nnew Philonian dialectic. By him the dialectic of Carneades is treated as\ngenuinely Academic. _Revolvitur_: cf. _De Div._ II. 13, also 148 of this\nbook. _Eam definitionem_: it is noteworthy that the whole war between the\nsceptics and the dogmatists was waged over the definition of the single\nsensation. Knowledge, it was thought, was a homogeneous compound of these\nsense atoms, if I may so call them, on all hands it was allowed that _all_\nknowledge ultimately rests on sense; therefore its possibility depends on\nthe truth of the individual perception of sense.\n\n    \u00a7\u00a719--29. Summary. If the senses are healthy and unimpaired, they give\n    perfectly true information about external things. Not that I maintain\n    the truth of _every_ sensation, Epicurus must see to that. Things which\n    impede the action of the senses must always be removed, in practice we\n    always do remove them where we can (19). What power the cultivated\n    senses of painters and musicians have! How keen is the sense of touch!\n    (20). After the perceptions of sense come the equally clear perceptions\n    of the mind, which are in a certain way perceptions of sense, since\n    they come through sense, these rise in complexity till we arrive at\n    definitions and ideas (21). If these ideas may possibly be false, logic\n    memory, and all kinds of arts are at once rendered impossible (22).\n    That true perception is possible, is seen from moral action. Who would\n    act, if the things on which he takes action might prove to be false?\n    (23) How can wisdom be wisdom if she has nothing certain to guide her?\n    There must he some ground on which action can proceed (24). Credence\n    must be given to the thing which impels us to action, otherwise action\n    is impossible (25). The doctrines of the New Academy would put an end\n    to all processes of reasoning. The fleeting and uncertain can never be\n    discovered. Rational proof requires that something, once veiled, should\n    be brought to light (26). Syllogisms are rendered useless, philosophy\n    too cannot exist unless her dogmas have a sure basis (27). Hence the\n    Academics have been urged to allow their _dogma_ that perception is\n    impossible, to be a certain perception of their minds. This, Carneades\n    said, would be inconsistent, since the very dogma excludes the\n    supposition that there can be _any_ true perception (28). Antiochus\n    declared that the Academics could not be held to be philosophers if\n    they had not even confidence in their one dogma (29).\n\n\u00a719. _Sensibus_: it is important to observe that the word _sensus_ like\n[Greek: aisth\u00easis] means two things, (1) one of the _five_ senses, (2) an\nindividual act of sensation. _Deus_: for the supposed god cf. _T.D._ II.\n67. _Non videam_: this strong statement is ridiculed in 80. _De remo\ninflexo et de collo columbae_: cf. 79, 82. The [Greek: k\u00f4p\u00ea enalos\nkeklasmen\u00ea] and [Greek: peristeras trach\u00ealos] are frequently mentioned,\nalong with numerous other instances of the deceptiveness of sense, by Sext.\nEmp., e.g. _Pyrrhon. Hypot._ I. 119-121, _Adv. Math._ VII. 244, 414.\nCicero, in his speech of the day before, had probably added other examples,\ncf. Aug. _Cont. Ac._ III. 27. _Epicurus hoc viderit_: see 79, 80. Epic.\nheld all sensation, _per se_, to be infallible. The chief authorities for\nthis are given in R. and P. 343, 344, Zeller 403, footnote. _Lumen mutari_:\ncf. _Brut._ 261. _Intervalla ... diducimus_: for this cf. Sext. _Pyrrh_. I.\n118 [Greek: pemptos esti logos] (i.e. the 5th sceptic [Greek: tropos] for\nshowing sense to be untrustworthy) [Greek: ho para tas theseis] (_situs_)\n[Greek: kai ta diast\u00eamata] (_intervalla_) [Greek: kai tous topous].\n_Multaque facimus usque eo_: Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 258 [Greek: panta\npoiei mechris an tran\u00ean kai pl\u00eaktik\u00ean spas\u00ea phantasian]. _Sui iudicii_: see\nfor the gen. _M.D.F._ II. 27; there is an extraordinary instance in Plaut.\n_Persa_ V. 2, 8, quoted by Goer. _Sui cuiusque_: for this use of _suus\nquisque_ as a single word see _M.D.F._ V. 46.\n\n\u00a720. _Ut oculi ... cantibus_: Halm after Dav. treats this as a gloss: on\nthe other hand I think it appropriate and almost necessary. _Quis est quin\ncernat_: read Madvig's strong remarks on Goerenz's note here (_D.F._ II.\n27). _Umbris ... eminentia_: Pliny (see Forc.) often uses _umbra_ and\n_lumen_, to denote background and foreground, so in Gk. [Greek: skia] and\n[Greek: skiasma] are opposed to [Greek: lampra]; cf. also [Greek:\nskiagraphein], _adumbrare_, and Aesch. _Agam_. 1328. Cic. often applies\nmetaphorically to oratory the two words here used, e.g. _De Or._ III. 101,\nand after him Quintilian, e.g. II. 17, 21. _Inflatu_: cf. 86 (where an\nanswer is given) and [Greek: anabol\u00ea]. _Antiopam_: of Pacuvius.\n_Andromacham_: of Ennius, often quoted by Cic., as _De Div._ I. 23.\n_Interiorem_: see R. and P. 165 and Zeller's _Socrates and the Socratic\nSchools_, 296. _Quia sentiatur_: [Greek: aisth\u00easis] being their only\n[Greek: krit\u00earion]. Madv. (without necessity, as a study of the passages\nreferred to in R. and P. and Zeller will show) conj. _cui adsentiatur_,\ncomparing 39, 58; cf. also 76. _Inter eum ... et inter_: for the repetition\nof _inter_ cf. _T.D._ IV. 32 and Madv. _Gram._ 470. _Nihil interesse_: if\nthe doctrine of the Academics were true, a man might really be in pain when\nhe fancied himself in pleasure, and _vice versa_; thus the distinction\nbetween pleasure and pain would be obscured. _Sentiet ... insaniat_: For\nthe sequence cf. _D.F._ I. 62 and Wesenberg's fine note on _T.D._ V. 102.\n\n\u00a721. _Illud est album_: these are [Greek: axi\u00f4mata], judgments of the mind,\nin which alone truth and falsehood reside; see Zeller 107 sq. There is a\npassage in Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 344, 345 which closely resembles ours;\nit is too long to quote entire: [Greek: aisth\u00easesi men oun monais labein\ntal\u00eathes] (which resides only in the [Greek: axi\u00f4ma]) [Greek: ou dynatai\nanthr\u00f4pos. ... physei gar eisin alogoi ... dei de eis phantasian achth\u00eanai\ntou toioutou pragmatos \"touto leukon esti kai touto glyky estin.\" t\u00f4i de\ntoiout\u00f4i pragmati ouketi t\u00eas aisth\u00ease\u00f4s ergon estin epiballein ... synese\u00f4s\nte dei kai mn\u00eam\u00eas]. _Ille deinceps_: _deinceps_ is really out of place; cf.\n24 _quomodo primum_ for _pr. quom._ _Ille equus est_: Cic. seems to\nconsider that the [Greek: axi\u00f4ma], which affirms the existence of an\nabstract quality, is prior to that which affirms the existence of a\nconcrete individual. I can quote no parallel to this from the Greek texts.\n_Expletam comprehensionem_: full knowledge. Here we rise to a definition.\nThis one often appears in Sextus: e.g. _Adv. Math._ VII. [Greek: anthr\u00f4pos\nesti z\u00f4on logikon thn\u00eaton, nou kai epist\u00eam\u00eas dektikon]. The Stoic [Greek:\nhoroi], and this among them, are amusingly ridiculed, _Pyrrh. Hyp._ II.\n208--211. _Notitiae_: this Cic. uses as a translation both of [Greek:\nprol\u00eapsis] and [Greek: ennoia], for which see Zeller 79, 89. In I. 40\n_notiones rerum_ is given. _Sine quibus_: [Greek: dia gar t\u00f4n ennoi\u00f4n ta\npragmata lambanetai] Diog. VII. 42.\n\n\u00a722. _Igitur_: for the anacoluthia cf. Madv. _Gram._ 480. _Consentaneum_:\nso Sextus constantly uses [Greek: akolouthon]. _Repugnaret_: cf. I. 19 and\nn. _Memoriae certe_: n. on 106. _Continet_: cf. _contineant_ in 40. _Quae\npotest esse_: Cic. nearly always writes _putat esse_, _potest esse_ and the\nlike, not _esse putat_ etc., which form is especially rare at the end of a\nclause. _Memoria falsorum_: this difficulty is discussed in Plato\n_Sophist._ 238--239. _Ex multis animi perceptionibus_: the same definition\nof an art occurs in _N.D._ II. 148, _D.F._ III. 18 (see Madv.), Quint, II.\n17, 41, Sext. _Pyrrh. Hyp._ III. 188 [Greek: techn\u00ean einai syst\u00eama ek\nkatal\u00eapseon syngegymnasmen\u00f4n] _ib._ III. 250. _Quam_: for the change from\nplural to singular (_perceptio in universum_) cf. n. on I. 38, Madv. _D.F._\nII. 61, _Em._ 139. _Qui distingues_: Sext. _Adv. Math._ VIII. 280 [Greek:\nou dioisei t\u00eas atechnias h\u00ea techn\u00ea]. Sextus often comments on similar\ncomplaints of the Stoics. _Aliud eiusmodi genus sit_: this distinction is\nas old as Plato and Arist., and is of constant occurrence in the late\nphilosophy. Cf. Sext. _Adv. Math._ XI. 197 who adds a third class of\n[Greek: technai] called [Greek: apotelesmatikai] to the usual [Greek:\nthe\u00f4r\u00eatikai] and [Greek: praktikai], also Quint. II. 18, 1 and 2, where\n[Greek: poi\u00eatik\u00ea] corresponds to the [Greek: apot.] of Sext. _Continget_:\n\"will be the natural consequence.\" The notion that the verb _contingit_\ndenotes necessarily _good_ fortune is quite unfounded; see Tischer on\n_T.D._ III. 4. _Tractabit_: [Greek: mellei metacheirizesthai].\n\n\u00a723. _Cognitio_: like Germ. _lehre_, the branch of learning which concerns\nthe virtues. Goer. is quite wrong in taking it to be a trans. of [Greek:\nkatal\u00eapsis] here. _In quibus_: the antecedent is not _virtutum_, as Petrus\nValentia (p. 292 ed. Orelli) supposes and gets into difficulty thereby, but\n_multa_. This is shown by _etiam_; not _merely_ the virtues but _also_ all\n[Greek: epist\u00eam\u00ea] depends on [Greek: katal\u00eapseis]; cf. I. 40, 41, with\nnotes, Zeller 88, R. and P. 367. _Stabilem_: [Greek: bebaion kai\nametapt\u00f4tou]. _Artem vivendi_: \"_tralaticium hoc apud omnes philosophos_\"\n_M.D.F._ I. 42. Sextus constantly talks about [Greek: h\u00ea oneiropoloumen\u00ea\nperi ton bion techn\u00ea] (_Pyrrh. Hyp._ III. 250) the existence of which he\ndisproves to his own satisfaction (_Adv. Math._ XI. 168 sq). _Ille vir\nbonus_: in all ancient systems, even the Epicurean, the happiness of the\n_sapiens_ must be proof against the rack; cf. esp. _D.F._ III. 29, 75,\n_T.D._ V. 73, Zeller 450, and the similar description of the [Greek:\nsophos] in Plato's _Gorgias_. _Potius quam aut_: Lamb. _ut_; but I think\nC.F. Hermann is right in asserting after Wopkens that Cic. _never_ inserts\n_ut_ after _potius quam_ with the subj. Tischer on _T.D._ II. 52 affirms\nthat _ut_ is frequently found, but gives no exx. For the meaning cf. _De\nOff._ I. 86, Aug. _Cont. Ac._ II. 12 who says the _sapiens_ of the Academy\nmust be _desertor officiorum omnium_. _Comprehensi ... constituti_: cf. the\nfamous _abiit, evasit, excessit, crupit_. _Iis rebus_: note the assumption\nthat the _sensation_ corresponds to the _thing_ which causes it. _Adsensus\nsit ... possint_: nearly all edd. before Halm read _possunt_, but the subj.\nexpresses the possibility as present to the mind of the supposed _vir\nbonus_. Cf. Madv. _Gram._ 368.\n\n\u00a724. _Primum_: out of place, see on 21. _Agere_: the dogmatist always held\nthat the sceptic must, if consistent, be [Greek: anenerg\u00eatos en bi\u00f4i]\n(Sext. _Pyrrh. Hyp._ I. 23). _Extremum_: similar attempts to translate\n[Greek: telos] are made in D.F. I. 11, 29, V. 17. _Cum quid agere_: cf. I.\n23 for the phrase _Naturae accommodatum_. a purely Stoic expression,\n[Greek: h\u00f4moi\u00f4menon t\u00ea physei]; cf. 38 and _D.F._ V. 17, also III. 16,\nZeller 227, footnote, R. and P. 390. _Impellimur_: [Greek: kinoumetha],\nSext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 391, as often.\n\n\u00a725. _Oportet videri_: \"ought to be seen.\" For this use cf. 39, 81 and 122\nof this book. _Videri_ at the end of this section has the weak sense, \"to\nseem.\" Lucretius often passes rapidly from the one use to the other; cf. I.\n262 with I. 270, and Munro's n., also _M.D.F._ II. 52, _Em. Liv._ p. 42.\n_Non poterit_: as the Academics allege. _Naturae ... alienum_: Cic. uses\nthis adjective with the dat, and also with the ablative preceded by _ab_; I\ndoubt whether the phrase _maiestate alienum_ (without the preposition) can\nbe right in _De Div._ II. 102, where the best texts still keep it. _Non\noccurrit ... aget_: occurrit is probably the perfect. Cf. n. on 127.\n\n\u00a726. _Quid quod si_: Goer., outrageously reads _quid quod si, si_.\n_Tollitur_: the verb _tollere_ occurs as frequently in this sense as\n[Greek: anairein] does in Sextus. _Lux lumenque_: Bentl. _dux_ The\nexpression _dux vitae_ is of course frequent (cf. _N.D._ I. 40, _T.D._ V. 5\nand Lucretius), but there is no need to alter. _Lux_ is properly natural\nlight, _lumen_ artificial, cf. _Ad Att._ XVI. 13, 1. _lumina dimiseramus,\nnec satis lucebat_, D.F. III. 45 _solis luce ... lumen lucernae_. There is\nthe same difference between [Greek: ph\u00f4s] and [Greek: phengos], the latter\nis used for the former ([Greek: phengos h\u00ealiou]) just as _lumen_ is for\n_lux_ (_si te secundo lumine his offendere_--_Ad Att._ VII. 26, 1) but not\noften _vice versa_. Trans. \"the luminary and the lamp of life,\" and cf.\nSext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 269 where the [Greek: phantasia] is called [Greek:\nphengos]. _Finis_: so in the beginning of the _Nicom. Eth._ Aristot.\nassumes that the actual existence of human exertion is a sufficient proof\nthat there is a [Greek: telos]. _Aperta_: a reminiscence of the frequently\nrecurring Greek terms [Greek: ekkalyptein, ekkalyptikos] etc., cf. Sextus\n_passim_, and _D.F._ I. 30. _Initium ... exitus_ = [Greek: arch\u00ea ...\ntelos]. _Tenetur_: MSS. _tenet_, the nom. to which Guietus thought to be\n_ratio_ above. [Greek: Apodeixis]: cf. the definition very often given by\nSext. e.g. _Pyrrh. Hyp._ II. 143 [Greek: logos di' homologoumen\u00f4n l\u00eammat\u00f4n]\n(premisses) [Greek: kata synag\u00f4g\u00ean epiphoran] (conclusion) [Greek:\nekkalypt\u00f4n ad\u00ealon], also Diog. VII. 45, [Greek: logon dia t\u00f4n mallon\nkatalambanomen\u00f4n to h\u00eatton katalambanomenon perainonta] (if the reading be\nright).\n\n\u00a727. _Notio_: another trans. of [Greek: ennoia]. _Conclusisse_: although\nthe Greeks used [Greek: symperasma] instead of [Greek: epiphora] sometimes\nfor the conclusion of the syllogism, they did not use the verb [Greek:\nsymperainein] which has been supposed to correspond to _concludere_. It is\nmore likely to be a trans. of [Greek: synagein], and _conclusum argumentum_\nof [Greek: synaktikos logos], which terms are of frequent occurrence.\n_Rationibus progredi_: to a similar question Sextus answers, [Greek: ouk\nestin anankaion tas ekeinon] (the dogmatists) [Greek: dogmatologias\nprobainein, plasmat\u00f4deis hyparchousas] (_Adv. Math._ VIII. 367).\n_Sapientiae ... futurum est_: for the dat. with _facio_ and _fio_ see Madv.\n_Gram._ 241, obs. 5, _Opusc._ I. 370, _D.F._ II. 79, and cf. 96 of this\nbook. _Lex veri rectique_: cf. 29; the _constitutio veri_ and the\ndetermination of what is _rectum_ in morals are the two main tasks of\nphilosophy. _Sapientique satis non sit_: so Manut. for the _sapientisque\nsit_ of the MSS. Halm after Dav. reads _sapientis, neque satis sit_, which\nI think is wrong, for if the ellipse be supplied the construction will run\n_neque dubitari potest quin satis sit_, which gives the exact opposite of\nthe sense required. _Ratum_: cf. 141.\n\n\u00a728. _Perceptum_: thoroughly known and grasped. Similar arguments are very\nfrequent in Sextus, e.g. _Adv. Math._ VIII. 281, where the dogmatist argues\nthat if proof be impossible, as the sceptic says, there must be a proof to\nshow it impossible; the sceptic doctrine must be _provable_. Cf. 109 of\nthis book. _Postulanti_: making it a necessity for the discussion; cf. _De\nLeg._ I. 21. _Consentaneum esse_: [Greek: akolouthon einai]. _Ut alia_:\n_although_ others. _Tantum abest ut--ut_: cf. Madv. _Gram._ 440 a.\n\n\u00a729. _Pressius_: cf. _De Fato_ 31, 33, _N.D._ II. 20, _T.D._ IV. 14,\n_Hortensius_ fragm. 46 ed. Nobbe. The word is mocked in 109. _Decretum_: of\ncourse the Academics would say they did not hold this [Greek: dogma] as\n_stabile fixum ratum_ but only as _probabile_. Sextus however _Pyrrh. Hyp._\nI. 226 (and elsewhere) accuses them of making it in reality what in words\nthey professed it not to be, a fixed dogma. _Sentitis enim_: cf. _sentis_\nin _D.F._ III. 26. _Fluctuare_: \"to be at sea,\" Halm _fluctuari_, but the\ndeponent verb is not elsewhere found in Cic. _Summa_: cf. _summa\nphilosophiae_ _D.F._ II. 86. _Veri falsi_: cf. n. on 92. _Quae visa_: so\nHalm for MSS. _quaevis_, which edd. had changed to _quae a quovis_.\n_Repudiari_: the selection depended on the _probabile_ of course, with the\nAcademics. _Veri falsique_: these words were used in different senses by\nthe dogmatist and the sceptic, the former meant by them \"the undestructibly\ntrue and false.\" This being so, the statements in the text are in no sense\narguments, they are mere assertions, as Sext. says, [Greek: psil\u00ea phasei\nison pheretai psil\u00ea phasis] (_A.M._ VII. 315), [Greek: phasei men phasis\nepischeth\u00easetai] (_ib._ 337). _Cognoscendi initium_: cf. 26, \"This I have,\"\nthe Academic would reply, \"in my _probabile_.\" _Extremum expetendi_: a\nrather unusual phrase for the ethical _finis_. _Ut moveri non possint_: so\n[Greek: kineisthai] is perpetually used in Sext. _Est ut opinor_: so Halm\nafter Ernesti for _sit_ of the MSS. I think it very likely that the MSS.\nreading is right, and that the whole expression is an imitation of the\nGreek [Greek: hikanos eio\u00easth\u00f4] and the like. The subj. is supported by\n_D.F._ III. 20, _De Off._ I. 8, _Ad Att._ XIII. 14, 3, where _ut opinor_ is\nthrown in as here, and by _Ac._ II. 17, _D.F._ III. 21, 24, _N.D._ I. 109,\nwhere _si placet_ is appended in a similar way.\n\n    \u00a7\u00a730--36. Summary. With respect to physical science, we might urge that\n    nature has constructed man with great art. His mind is naturally formed\n    for the attainment of knowledge (30). For this purpose the mind uses\n    the senses, and so gradually arrives at virtue, which is the perfection\n    of the reason. Those then who deny that any certainty can be attained\n    through the senses, throw the whole of life into confusion (31). Some\n    sceptics say \"we cannot help it.\" Others distinguish between the\n    absolute absence of certainty, and the denial of its absolute presence.\n    Let us deal with these rather than with the former (32). Now they on\n    the one hand profess to distinguish between true and false, and on the\n    other hold that no absolutely certain method for distinguishing between\n    true and false is possible (33). This is absurd, a thing cannot be\n    known at all unless by such marks as can appertain to no other thing.\n    How can a thing be said to be \"evidently white,\" if the possibility\n    remains that it may be really black? Again, how can a thing be\n    \"evident\" at all if it may be after all a mere phantom (34)? There is\n    no definite mark, say the sceptics, by which a thing may be known.\n    Their \"probability\" then is mere random guess work (35). Even if they\n    only profess to decide after careful pondering of the circumstances, we\n    reply that a decision which is still possibly false is useless (36).\n\n\u00a730. _Physicis_: neuter not masc.; cf. I. 6. _Libertatem et licentiam_:\n_et_ = \"and even.\" _Libertas_ = [Greek: parr\u00easia] as often in Tacitus.\n_Abditis rebus et obscuris_: cf. n. on I. 15, and the word [Greek:\nsyneskiasmenos] Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 26. _Lucem eripere_: like _tollere_\n(n. on 26), cf. 38, 103 and _N.D._ I. 6. For the sense see n. on 16, also\n61. _Artificio_: this word is used in Cic. as equivalent to _ars_ in all\nits senses, cf. 114 and _De Or._ II. 83. _Fabricata esset_: the expression\nis sneered at in 87. _Quem ad modum primum_: so Halm rightly for MSS.\n_prima_ or _primo_, which latter is not often followed by _deinde_ in\nCicero. _Primum_ is out of position, as in 24. _Appetitio pulsa_: = _mota_,\nset in motion. For [Greek: horm\u00ea] see 24. _Intenderemus_: as in the exx.\ngiven in 20. _Fons_: \"reservoir,\" rather than \"source\" here. It will be\nnoted that [Greek: synkatathesis] must take place before the [Greek: horm\u00ea]\nis roused. _Ipse sensus est_: an approach to this theory is made in Plat.\n_Theaet._ 185, 191. Cf. especially Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 350 [Greek: kai\nhoi men diapherein aut\u00ean t\u00f4n aisth\u00ease\u00f4n, h\u00f4s hoi pleious, hoi de aut\u00ean\neinai tas aisth\u00easeis ... h\u00eas stase\u00f4s \u00earxe Straton]. All powers of sensation\nwith the Stoics, who are perhaps imitated here, were included in the\n[Greek: h\u00eagemonikon], cf. n. on I. 38. _Alia quasi_: so Faber for _aliqua_.\n\"_In vera et aperta partitione nec Cicero nec alius quisquam aliquis--alius\ndixit, multo minus alius--aliquis_,\" _M.D.F._ III. 63. Goer. on the other\nhand says he can produce 50 exx. of the usage, he forbears however, to\nproduce them. _Recondit_: so the [Greek: ennoiai] are called [Greek:\napokeimenai no\u00easeis] (Plut. _De Sto. Repug._ p. 1057 a). In Sext. _Adv.\nMath._ VII. 373 [Greek: mn\u00eam\u00ea] is called [Greek: th\u00easaurismos phantasi\u00f4n].\n_Similitudinibus_: [Greek: kath' homoi\u00f4sin] Sext. _Pyrr. Hyp._ II. 75. Cic.\nuses this word as including all processes by which the mind gets to know\nthings not immediately perceived by sense. In _D.F._ III. 33 it receives\nits proper meaning, for which see Madv. there, and the passages he quotes,\n\"analogies\" will here best translate the word, which, is used in the same\nwide sense in _N.D._ II. 22 38. _Construit_: so MSS. Orelli gave\n_constituit_. _Notitiae_: cf. 22. Cic. fails to distinguish between the\n[Greek: physikai ennoiai] or [Greek: koinai] which are the [Greek:\nprol\u00eapseis], and those [Greek: ennoiai] which are the conscious product of\nthe reason, in the Stoic system. Cf. _M.D.F._ III. 21, V. 60, for this and\nother inaccuracies of Cic. in treating of the same subject, also Zeller 79.\n_Rerumque_: \"facts\". _Perfecta_: _sapientia_, _virtus_, _perfecta ratio_,\nare almost convertible terms in the expositions of Antiocheanism found in\nCic. Cf. I. 20.\n\n\u00a731. _Vitaeque constantiam_: which philosophy brings, see 23.\n_Cognitionem_: [Greek: epist\u00eam\u00ean]. _Cognitio_ is used to translate [Greek:\nkatal\u00eapsis] in _D.F._ II. 16, III. 17, cf. n. on I. 41. _Ut dixi ...\ndicemus_: For the repetition cf. 135, 146, and _M.D.F._ I. 41. The future\ntense is odd and unlike Cic. Lamb. wrote _dicimus_, I would rather read\n_dicamus_; cf. n. on 29. _Per se_: [Greek: kath' aut\u00ean], there is no need\nto read _propter_, as Lamb. _Ut virtutem efficiat_: note that virtue is\nthroughout this exposition treated as the result of the exercise of the\n_reason_. _Evertunt_: cf. _eversio_ in 99. _Animal ... animo_: Cic. allows\n_animus_ to all animals, not merely _anima_; see Madv. _D.F._ V. 38. The\nrule given by Forc. s.v. _animans_ is therefore wrong. _Temeritate_:\n[Greek: propeteia], which occurs _passim_ in Sext. The word, which is\nconstantly hurled at the dogmatists by the sceptics, is here put by way of\nretort. So in Sext. _Adv. Math._ VII. 260, the sceptic is called [Greek:\nembront\u00eatos] for rejecting the [Greek: katal\u00eaptik\u00ea phantasia].\n\n\u00a732. _Incerta_: [Greek: ad\u00eala]. _Democritus_: cf. I. 44. _Quae ...\nabstruserit_: \"_because_ she has hidden.\" _Alii autem_: note the ellipse of\nthe verb, and cf. I. 2. _Etiam queruntur_: \"actually complain;\" \"go so far\nas to complain.\" _Inter incertum_: cf. Numenius in Euseb. _Pr. Ev._ XIV. 7,\n12, [Greek: diaphoran einai ad\u00ealou kai akatal\u00eaptou, kai panta men einai\nakatal\u00eapta ou panta de ad\u00eala] (quoted as from Carneades), also 54 of this\nbook. _Docere_: \"to prove,\" cf. n. on 121. _Qui haec distinguunt_: the\nfollowers of Carneades rather than those of Arcesilas; cf. n. on I. 45.\n_Stellarum numerus_: this typical uncertainty is constantly referred to in\nSext. e.g. _P.H_. II. 90, 98, _A.M_. VII. 243, VIII. 147, 317; where it is\nreckoned among things [Greek: ai\u00f4nion echonta agn\u00f4sian]. So in the Psalms,\nGod only \"telleth the number of the stars;\" cf. 110. _Aliquos_:\ncontemptuous; [Greek: aponeno\u00eamenous tinas]. Cf. _Parad._ 33 _agrestis\naliquos_. _Moveri_: this probably refers to the speech of Catulus; see\nIntrod. p. 51. Aug. _Cont. Ac._ III. 15 refers to this passage, which must\nhave been preserved in the second edition.\n\n\u00a733. _Veri et falsi_: these words Lamb. considered spurious in the first\nclause, and Halm brackets; but surely their repetition is pointed and\nappropriate. \"You talk about a rule for distinguishing between the true and\nthe false while you do away with the notion of true and false altogether.\"\nThe discussion here really turns on the use of terms. If it is fair to use\nthe term \"true\" to denote the _probably true_, the Academics are not open\nto the criticism here attempted; cf. 111 _tam vera quam falsa cernimus_.\n_Ut inter rectum et pravum_: the sceptic would no more allow the absolute\ncertainty of this distinction than of the other. _Communis_: the [Greek:\naparallaktos] of Sextus; \"in whose vision true and false are confused.\" Cf.\n[Greek: koin\u00ea phantasia al\u00eathous kai pseudous] Sext. _A.M._ VII. 164 (R.\nand P. 410), also 175. _Notam_: the [Greek: s\u00eameion] of Sextus; cf. esp.\n_P.H_. II. 97 sq. _Eodem modo falsum_: Sext. _A.M._ VII. 164 (R. and P.\n410) [Greek: oudemia estin al\u00eath\u00eas phantasia hoia ouk an genoito pseud\u00eas].\n_Ut si quis_: Madv. in an important n. on _D.F._ IV. 30 explains this thus;\n_ista ratione si quis ... privaverit, possit dicere_. I do not think our\npassage at all analogous to those he quotes, and still prefer to construe\n_quem_ as a strong relative, making a pause between _quis_ and _quem_.\n_Visionem_: Simply another trans. of [Greek: phantasia]. _Ut Carneades_:\nsee Sext. _A.M._ VII. 166 [Greek: t\u00ean te pithan\u00ean phantasian kai t\u00ean\npithan\u00ean hama kai aperispaston kai diex\u00f4deumen\u00ean] (R. and P. 411). As the\ntrans. of the latter phrase in Zeller 524 \"probable undisputed and tested\"\nis imperfect, I will give Sextus' own explanation. The merely [Greek:\npithan\u00ea] is that sensation which at first sight, without any further\ninquiry, seems probably true (Sext. _A.M._ VII. 167--175). Now no sensation\nis perceived _alone_; the percipient subject has always other synchronous\nsensations which are able to turn him aside ([Greek: perispan, perielkein])\nfrom the one which is the immediate object of his attention. This last is\nonly called [Greek: aperispastos] when examination has shown all the\nconcomitant sensations to be in harmony with it. (Sext. as above 175--181.)\nThe word \"undisputed,\" therefore, is a misleading trans. of the term. The\n[Greek: diex\u00f4deumen\u00ea] (\"thoroughly explored\") requires more than a mere\napparent agreement of the concomitant sensations with the principal one.\nCircumstances quite external to the sensations themselves must be examined;\nthe time at which they occur, or during which they continue; the condition\nof the space within which they occur, and the apparent intervals between\nthe person and the objects; the state of the air; the disposition of the\nperson's mind, and the soundness or unsoundness of his eyes (Sext.\n181--189).\n\n\u00a734. _Communitas_: [Greek: aparallaxia] or [Greek: epimixia t\u00f4n\nphantasi\u00f4n]; Sext. _A.M._ VII. 403, _P.H._ I. 127. _Proprium_: so Sext.\noften uses [Greek: idioma], e.g. _A. M._ IX. 410. _Signo notari_: _signo_\nfor _nota_, merely from love of variety. The _in_ before _communi_, though\nbracketed by Halm after Manut., Lamb. is perfectly sound; it means \"within\nthe limits of,\" and is so used after _notare_ in _De Or._, III. 186.\n_Convicio_: so Madv. _Em._ 143 corrected the corrupt MSS. readings,\ncomparing _Orator_ 160, _Ad Fam._ XV. 18. A.W. Zumpt on _Pro Murena_ 13\nrightly defines the Ciceronian use of the word, \"_Non unum maledictum\nappellatur convicium sed multorum verborum quasi vociferatio_.\" He is wrong\nhowever in thinking that Cic. only uses the word _once_ in the plural (_Ad\nAtt._ II. 18, 1), for it occurs _N.D._ II. 20, and elsewhere. _Perspicua_:\n[Greek: enarg\u00ea], a term used with varying signification by all the later\nGreek schools. _Verum illud quidem_: \"which is indeed what _they_ call\n'true'.\" _Impressum_: n. on 18. _Percipi atque comprehendi_: Halm retains\nthe barbarous _ac_ of the MSS. before the guttural. It is quite impossible\nthat Cic. could have written it. The two verbs are both trans. of [Greek:\nkatalambanesthai]; Cic. proceeds as usual on the principle thus described\nin _D.F._ III. 14 _erit notius quale sit, pluribus notatum vocabulis idem\ndeclarantibus_. _Subtiliter_: Cic.'s constant trans. of [Greek: akrib\u00f4s] or\n[Greek: kat' akribeian] (_passim_ in Sext. e.g. _P.H._ II. 123).\n_Inaniterne moveatur_: MSS. agree in _ve_ for _ne_, on which see _M.D.F._\nIV. 76. _Inaniter_ = [Greek: ken\u00f4s] = [Greek: pseud\u00f4s]. Cf. n. on I. 35,\nalso II. 47, _D.F._ V. 3 (_inaniter moveri_), _T.D._ IV. 13, _De Div._ II.\n120, 126, 140 (_per se moveri_), Greek [Greek: kenopathein] (Sext. _P.H._\nII. 49), [Greek: kenopatheia] (= _inanis motus_, Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 184),\n[Greek: kenopath\u00eamata kai anaplasmata t\u00eas dianoias] (_ib._ VIII. 354),\n[Greek: diakenos helkysmos] (_ib._ VII. 241), [Greek: diakenos phantasia]\n(_ib._ VIII. 67), and the frequent phrase [Greek: kin\u00eama t\u00eas dianoias]. For\nthe meaning see n. on 47. _Relinquitur_: so in Sext. [Greek: apoleipein] is\nconstantly used as the opposite of [Greek: anairein] (_tollere_).\n\n\u00a735. _Neminem_ etc.: they are content to make strong statements without any\nmark of certainty. _Primo quasi adspectu_: the _merely_ [Greek: pithan\u00ea\nphantasia] is here meant; see 33.\n\n\u00a736. _Ex circumspectione_, etc.: the [Greek: diex\u00f4deumen\u00ea]; see n. on 33.\n_Primum quia ... deinde_: for the slight anacoluthia, cf. _M.D.F_ ed. II.\np. 796. _Iis visis_, etc.: i.e. if you have a number of _things_, emitting\na number of _appearances_, and you cannot be sure of uniting each\n_appearance_ to the _thing_ from which it proceeds, then you can have no\nfaith in any _appearance_ even if you have gone through the process\nrequired by Carneades' rules. _Ad verum ipsum_: cf. 40. _Quam proxime_: cf.\n47, and also 7. _Insigne_: [Greek: s\u00eameion], the same as _nota_ and\n_signum_ above. _Quo obscurato_: so Lamb. for MSS. _obscuro_ which Halm\nkeeps. Cf. _quam obscurari volunt_ in 42 and _quo sublato_ in 33.\n_Argumentum_: Cic. seems to be thinking of the word [Greek: tekm\u00earion],\nwhich, however, the Stoics hardly use. _Id quod significatur_: [Greek: to\ns\u00eamei\u00f4nton] in Sext.\n\n    \u00a7\u00a737--40. Summary The distinction of an animal is to act. You must\n    either therefore deprive it of sensation, or allow it to assent to\n    phenomena (37). Mind, memory, the arts and virtue itself, require a\n    firm assent to be given to some phenomena, he therefore who does away\n    with assent does away with all action in life (38, 39).\n\n\u00a737. _Explicabamus_: 19--21 and 30 (_quae vis esset in sensibus_).\n_Inanimum_: not _inanimatum_, cf. _M.D.F_. IV. 36. _Agit aliquid_: I. 23.\n_Quae est in nostra_: Walker's insertion of _non_ before _est_ is needless,\ncf. n. on I. 40. It is the impact of the sensation from without, not the\nassent given to it, that is involuntary (Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 397 [Greek: to\nmen gar phantasi\u00f4th\u00eanai aboul\u00eaton \u00ean]). For _in potestate_ cf. _De Fato_ 9,\n_N.D._ I. 69\n\n\u00a738. _Eripitur_: cf. 30. _Neque sentire_: Christ om. _neque_; but the\nsceptics throughout are supposed to rob people of their senses. _Cedere_:\ncf. [Greek: eikein, eixis] in Sext. _P.H._ I. 193, 230, Diog. VII. 51,\n[Greek: t\u00f4n de aisth\u00eatik\u00f4n meta eixe\u00f4s kai synkatathese\u00f4s ginontai [hai\nphantasia]]; also 66 of this book. [Greek: Oikeion]: cf. 34. _Adsentitur\nstatim_: this really contradicts a good deal that has gone before, esp. 20.\n_Memoriam_: cf. 22. _In nostra potestate_: this may throw light on fragm.\n15 of the _Ac. Post._, which see.\n\n\u00a739. _Virtus_: even the Stoics, who were fatalists as a rule, made moral\naction depend on the freedom of the will; see n. on I. 40. _Ante videri\naliquid_ for the doctrine cf. 25, for the passive use of _videri_, n. on\n25. _Adsentiatur_: the passive use is illustrated by Madv. _Em._ 131, the\nchange of construction from infin. to subj. after _necesse est_ on _D.F._\nV. 25. _Tollit e vita_: so _De Fato_ 29.\n\n    \u00a7\u00a740--42. Summary. The Academics have a regular method. They first give\n    a general definition of sensation, and then lay down the different\n    classes of sensations. Then they put forward their two strong\n    arguments, (1) _things_ which produce _sensations_ such as might have\n    been produced in the same form by other _things_, cannot be partly\n    capable of being perceived, partly not capable, (2) _sensations_ must\n    be assumed to be of the same form if our faculties do not enable us to\n    distinguish between them. Then they proceed. Sensations are partly\n    true, partly false, the false cannot of course be real _perceptions_,\n    while the true are always of a form which the false _may_ assume. Now\n    sensations which are indistinguishable from false cannot be partly\n    perceptions, partly not. There is therefore no sensation which is also\n    a perception (40). Two admissions, they say, are universally made, (1)\n    false sensations cannot be perceptions, (2) sensations which are\n    indistinguishable from false, cannot be partly perceptions, partly not.\n    The following two assertions they strive to prove, (1) sensations are\n    partly true, partly false, (2) every sensation which proceeds from a\n    reality, has a form which it might have if it proceeded from an\n    unreality (41). To prove these propositions, they divide perceptions\n    into those which are sensations, and those which are deduced from\n    sensations; after which they show that credit cannot be given to either\n    class (42). [The word \"perception\" is used to mean \"a certainly known\n    sensation.\"]\n\n\u00a740. _Quasi fundamenta_: a trans. probably of [Greek: themelios] or the\nlike; cf. [Greek: h\u00f4sper themelios] in Sext. _A.M._ V. 50. _Artem_: method,\nlike [Greek: techn\u00ea], cf. _M.D.F._ III. 4, Mayor on Iuv. VII. 177. _Vim_:\nthe general character which attaches to all [Greek: phantasiai]; _genera_\nthe different classes of [Greek: phantasiai]. _Totidem verbis_: of course\nwith a view to showing that nothing really corresponded to the definition.\nCarneades largely used the _reductio ad absurdum_ method. _Contineant ...\nquaestionem_: cf. 22 and _T.D._ IV. 65 _una res videtur causam continere_.\n_Quae ita_: it is essential throughout this passage to distinguish clearly\nthe _sensation_ (_visum_) from the _thing_ which causes it. Here the\n_things_ are meant; two _things_ are supposed to cause two _sensations_ so\nsimilar that the person who has one of the _sensations_ cannot tell from\nwhich of the two _things_ it comes. Under these circumstances the sceptics\nurge that it is absurd to divide _things_ into those which can be perceived\n(known with certainty) and those which cannot. _Nihil interesse autem_: the\nsceptic is not concerned to prove the absolute similarity of the two\nsensations which come from the two dissimilar things, it is enough if he\ncan show that human faculties are not perfect enough to discern whatever\ndifference may exist, cf. 85. _Alia vera sunt_: Numenius in Euseb. _Pr.\nEv._ XIV. 8, 4 says Carneades allowed that truth and falsehood (or reality\nand unreality) could be affirmed of _things_, though not of _sensations_.\nIf we could only pierce _through_ a sensation and arrive at its source, we\nshould be able to tell whether to believe the sensation or not. As we\ncannot do this, it is wrong to assume that _sensation_ and _thing_\ncorrespond. Cf. Sext. _P.H._ I. 22 [Greek: peri men tou phaisthai toion \u00ea\ntoion to hypokeimenon] (i.e. the thing from which the appearance proceeds)\n[Greek: oudeis is\u00f4s amphisb\u00eatei, peri de tou ei toiouton estin hopoion\nphainetai z\u00eateitai]. Neither Carneades nor Arcesilas ever denied, as some\nmodern sceptics have done, the actual existence of things which cause\nsensations, they simply maintained that, granting the existence of the\nthings, our sensations do not give us correct information about them.\n_Eiusdem modi_: cf. 33 _eodem modo_. _Non posse accidere_: this is a very\nremarkable, and, as Madv. (_D.F._ I. 30) thinks, impossible, change from\n_recta oratio to obliqua_. Halm with Manut. reads _potest_. Cf. 101.\n\n\u00a741. _Neque enim_: a remark of Lucullus' merely. _Quod sit a vero_: cf.\nMunio on Lucr. II. 51 _fulgor ab auro_. _Possit_: for the om. of _esse_ cf.\nn. on I. 29.\n\n\u00a742. _Proposita_: cf. [Greek: protaseis] _passim_ in Sext. _In sensus_: =\n_in ea, quae ad sensus pertinent_ cf. I. 20. _Omni consuetudine_: \"general\nexperience\" [Greek: empeiria], cf. _N.D._ I. 83. _Quam obscurari volunt_:\ncf. I. 33. _quod explanari volebant_; the em. of Dav. _obscurare_ is\nagainst Cic.'s usage, that of Christ _quam observari nolunt_ is wanton\nwithout being ingenious. _De reliquis_: i.e. _iis quae a sensibus\nducuntur_. _In singulisque rebus_: the word _rebus_ must mean _subjects_,\nnot _things_, to which the words _in minima dispertiunt_ would hardly\napply. _Adiuncta_: Sext. _A.M._ VII. 164 (R. and P. 410) [Greek: pas\u00eai t\u00ea\ndokous\u00eai al\u00eathei kathestanai eurisketai tis aparallaktos pseud\u00eas], also\nVII. 438, etc.\n\n    \u00a7\u00a743--45. Summary. The sceptics ought not to _define_, for (1) a\n    definition cannot be a definition of two things, (2) if the definition\n    is applicable only to one thing, that thing must be capable of being\n    thoroughly known and distinguished from others (43). For the purposes\n    of reasoning their _probabile_ is not enough. Reasoning can only\n    proceed upon _certain_ premisses. Again to say that there are false\n    sensations is to say that there are true ones; you acknowledge\n    therefore a difference, then you contradict yourselves and say there is\n    none (44). Let us discuss the matter farther. The innate clearness of\n    _visa_, aided by reason, can lead to knowledge (45).\n\n\u00a743. _Horum_: Lamb. _harum_; the text however is quite right, cf. Madv.\n_Gram._ 214 b. _Luminibus_: cf. 101. _Nihilo magis_: = [Greek: ouden\nmallon], which was constantly in the mouths of sceptics, see e.g. Sext.\n_P.H._ I. 14. _Num illa definitio ... transferri_: I need hardly point out\nthat the [Greek: horos] of the Academics was merely founded on probability,\njust as their \"truth\" was (cf. n. on 29). An Academic would say in reply to\nthe question, \"probably it cannot, but I will not affirm it.\" _Vel illa\nvera_: these words seem to me genuine, though nearly all editors attack\nthem. _Vel_ = \"even\" i.e. if _even_ the definition is firmly known, the\nthing, which is more important, must also be known. In _illa vera_ we have\na pointed mocking repetition like that of _veri et falsi_ in 33. _In\nfalsum_: note that _falsum_ = _aliam rem_ above. For the sense cf. Sext.\n_P.H._ II. 209 [Greek: mochth\u00earous horous einai tous periechontas ti t\u00f4n m\u00ea\nprosont\u00f4n tois horistois], and the schoolmen's maxim _definitio non debet\nlatior esse definito suo_. _Minime volunt_: cf. 18. _Partibus_: Orelli\nafter Goer. ejected this, but _omnibus_ hardly ever stands for _omn.\nrebus_, therefore C.F. Hermann reads _pariter rebus_ for _partibus_. A\nlittle closer attention to the subject matter would have shown emendation\nto be unnecessary, cf. 42 _dividunt in partis_, _T.D._ III. 24, where\n_genus_ = division, _pars_ = subdivision.\n\n\u00a744. _Impediri ... fatebuntur_: essentially the same argument as in 33 at\nthe end. _Occurretur_: not an imitation of [Greek: enantiousthai] as Goer.\nsays, but of [Greek: apantan], which occurs very frequently in Sext.\n_Sumpta_: the two premisses are in Gk. called together [Greek: l\u00eammata],\nseparately [Greek: l\u00eamma] and [Greek: prosl\u00eapsis] (_sumptio et adsumptio_\n_De Div_ II. 108). _Orationis_: as Faber points out, Cic. does sometimes\nuse this word like _ratio_ ([Greek: syllogismos]), cf. _De Leg._ I. 48\n_conclusa oratio_. Fab. refers to Gell. XV. 26. _Profiteatur_: so [Greek:\nhypischneisthai] is often used by Sext. e.g. _A.M._ VIII. 283.\n_Patefacturum_: n. on 26, [Greek: ekkalyptein, ekkalyptikos, d\u00eal\u00f4tikos]\n(the last in Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 277) often recur in Greek. _Primum esse ...\nnihil interesse_: there is no inconsistency. Carneades allowed that _visa_,\n_in themselves_, might be true or false, but affirmed that human faculties\nwere incapable of distinguishing those _visa_ which proceed from real\nthings and give a correct representation of the things, from those which\neither are mere phantoms or, having a real source, do not correctly\nrepresent it. Lucullus confuses _essential_ with _apparent_ difference.\n_Non iungitur_: a supposed case of [Greek: diart\u00easis], which is opposed to\n[Greek: synart\u00easis] and explained in Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 430.\n\n\u00a745. _Assentati_: here simply = _assensi_. _Praeteritis_: here used in the\nstrong participial sense, \"in the class of things passed over,\" cf. _in\nremissis_ _Orat._ 59. _Primum igitur ... sed tamen_: for the slight\nanacoluthia cf. Madv. _Gram._ 480. _Iis qui videntur_: Goer. _is qui\nvidetur_, which is severely criticised by Madv. _Em._ 150. For Epicurus'\nview of sensation see n. on 79, 80.\n\n    \u00a7\u00a746--48. Summary. The refusal of people to assent to the innate\n    clearness of some phenomena ([Greek: enargeia]) is due to two causes,\n    (1) they do not make a serious endeavour to see the light by which\n    these phenomena are surrounded, (2) their faith is shaken by sceptic\n    paradoxes (46). The sceptics argue thus: you allow that mere phantom\n    sensations are often seen in dreams, why then do you not allow what is\n    easier, that two sensations caused by two really existing things may be\n    mistaken the one for the other? (47). Further, they urge that a phantom\n    sensation produces very often the same effect as a real one. The\n    dogmatists say they admit that mere phantom sensations _do_ command\n    assent. Why should they not admit that they command assent when they so\n    closely resemble real ones as to be indistinguishable from them? (48)\n\n\u00a746. _Circumfusa sint_: Goer. retains the MSS. _sunt_ on the ground that\nthe clause _quanta sint_ is inserted [Greek: parenthetik\u00f4s]! Orelli\nactually follows him. For the phrase cf. 122 _circumfusa tenebris_.\n_Interrogationibus_: cf. I. 5 where I showed that the words _interrogatio_\nand _conclusio_ are convertible. I may add that in Sextus pure syllogisms\nare very frequently called [Greek: er\u00f4t\u00easeis], and that he often introduces\na new argument by [Greek: er\u00f4tatai kai touto], when there is nothing\ninterrogatory about the argument at all. _Dissolvere_: [Greek: apolyesthai]\nin Sext. _Occurrere_: cf. 44.\n\n\u00a747. _Confuse loqui_: the mark of a bad dialectician, affirmed of Epicurus\nin _D.F._ II. 27. _Nulla sunt_: on the use of _nullus_ for _non_ in Cic.\ncf. Madv. _Gram._ 455 obs. 5. The usage is mostly colloquial and is very\ncommon in Plaut. and Terence, while in Cic. it occurs mostly in the\nLetters. _Inaniter_: cf. 34. There are two ways in which a sensation may be\nfalse, (1) it may come from one really existent thing, but be supposed by\nthe person who feels it to be caused by a totally different thing, (2) it\nmay be a mere [Greek: phantasma] or [Greek: anaplasma t\u00eas dianoias], a\nphantom behind which there is no reality at all. _Quae in somnis\nvideantur_: for the support given by Stoics to all forms of divination see\nZeller 166, _De Div._ I. 7, etc. _Quaerunt_: a slight anacoluthon from\n_dicatis_ above. _Quonam modo ... nihil sit omnino_: this difficult passage\ncan only be properly explained in connection with 50 and with the general\nplan of the Academics expounded in 41. After long consideration I elucidate\nit as follows. The whole is an attempt to prove the proposition announced\nin 41 and 42 viz. _omnibus veris visis adiuncta esse falsa_. The criticism\nin 50 shows that the argument is meant to be based on the assumption known\nto be Stoic, _omnia deum posse_. If the god can manufacture (_efficere_)\nsensations which are false, but probable (as the Stoics say he does in\ndreams), why can he not manufacture false sensations which are so probable\nas to closely resemble true ones, or to be only with difficulty\ndistinguishable from the true, or finally to be utterly indistinguishable\nfrom the true (this meaning of _inter quae nihil sit omnino_ is fixed by\n40, where see n.)? _Probabilia_, then, denotes false sensations such as\nhave only a slight degree of resemblance to the true, by the three\nsucceeding stages the resemblance is made complete. The word _probabilia_\nis a sort of tertiary predicate after _efficere_ (\"to manufacture so as to\nbe probable\"). It _must not be repeated_ after the second _efficere_, or\nthe whole sense will be inverted and this section placed out of harmony\nwith 50. _Plane proxime_: = _quam proxime_ of 36.\n\n\u00a748. _Ipsa per sese_: simply = _inaniter_ as in 34, 47, i.e. without the\napproach of any external object. _Cogitatione_: the only word in Latin, as\n[Greek: dianoia] is in Greek, to express our \"imagination.\" _Non numquam_:\nso Madv. for MSS. _non inquam_. Goer. after Manut. wrote _non inquiunt_\nwith an interrogation at _omnino_. _Veri simile est_: so Madv. _D.F._ III.\n58 for _sit_. The argument has the same purpose as that in the last\nsection, viz to show that phantom sensations may produce the same effect on\nthe mind as those which proceed from realities. _Ut si qui_: the _ut_ here\nis merely \"as,\" \"for instance,\" cf. n. on 33. _Nihil ut esset_: the _ut_\nhere is a repetition of the _ut_ used several times in the early part of\nthe sentence, all of them alike depend on _sic_. Lamb. expunged _ut_ before\n_esset_ and before _quicquam_. _Intestinum et oblatum_: cf. Sext. _A.M._\nVII. 241 [Greek: \u00eatoi t\u00f4n ektos \u00ea t\u00f4n en h\u00eamin path\u00f4n], and the two classes\nof _falsa visa_ mentioned in n. on 47. _Sin autem sunt_, etc.: if there\n_are_ false sensations which are probable (as the Stoics allow), why should\nthere not be false sensations so probable as to be with difficulty\ndistinguishable from the true? The rest exactly as in 47.\n\n    \u00a7\u00a749--53. Antiochus attacked these arguments as _soritae_, and\n    therefore faulty (49). The admission of a certain amount of similarity\n    between true and false sensations does not logically lead to the\n    impossibility of distinguishing between the true and the false (50). We\n    contend that these phantom sensations lack that self evidence which we\n    require before giving assent. When we have wakened from the dream, we\n    make light of the sensations we had while in it (51). But, say our\n    opponents, while they last our dreaming sensations are as vivid as our\n    waking ones. This we deny (52). \"But,\" say they, \"you allow that the\n    wise man in madness withholds his assent.\" This proves nothing, for he\n    will do so in many other circumstances in life. All this talk about\n    dreamers, madmen and drunkards is unworthy our attention (53).\n\n\u00a749. _Antiochus_: Sext. often quotes him in the discussion of this and\nsimilar subjects. _Ipsa capita_: [Greek: auta ta kephalaia].\n_Interrogationis_: the _sorites_ was always in the form of a series of\nquestions, cf. _De Div._ II. 11 (where Cic. says the Greek word was already\nnaturalised, so that his proposed trans. _acervalis_ is unnecessary),\n_Hortens._ fragm. 47, and n. on 92. _Hoc vocant_: i.e. _hoc genus_, cf.\n_D.F._ III. 70 _ex eo genere, quae prosunt_. _Vitiosum_: cf. _D.F._ IV. 50\n_ille sorites, quo nihil putatis_ (Stoici) _vitiosius_. Most edd. read\n_hos_, which indeed in 136 is a necessary em. for MSS. _hoc_. _Tale visum_:\ni.e. _falsum_. _Dormienti_: sc. [Greek: tini]. _Ut probabile sit_, etc.:\ncf. 47, 48 and notes. _Primum quidque_: not _quodque_ as Klotz; cf.\n_M.D.F._ II. 105, to whose exx. add _De Div._ II. 112, and an instance of\n_proximus quisque_ in _De Off._ II. 75. _Vitium_: cf. _vitiosum_ above.\n\n\u00a750. _Omnia deum posse_: this was a principle generally admitted among\nStoics at least, see _De Div._ II. 86. For the line of argument here cf.\n_De Div._ II. 106 _fac dare deos, quod absurdum est_. _Eadem_: this does\nnot mean that the two sensations are merged into one, but merely that when\none of them is present, it cannot be distinguished from the other; see n.\non 40. _Similes_: after this _sunt_ was added by Madv. _In suo genere\nessent_: substitute _esse viderentur_ for _essent_, and you get the real\nview of the Academic, who would allow that _things in their essence_ are\ndivisible into sharply-defined _genera_, but would deny that the\n_sensations_ which proceed from or are caused by the _things_, are so\ndivisible.\n\n\u00a751. _Una depulsio_: cf. 128 (_omnium rerum una est definitio\ncomprehendendi_), _De Div._ II. 136 (_omnium somniorum una ratio est_). _In\nquiete_: = _in somno_, a rather poetical usage. _Narravit_: Goer., Orelli,\nKlotz alter into _narrat_, most wantonly. _Visus Homerus_, etc.: this\nfamous dream of Ennius, recorded in his _Annals_, is referred to by Lucr.\nI. 124, Cic. _De Rep._ VI. 10 (_Somn. Scip._ c. 1), Hor. _Epist._ II. 1,\n50. _Simul ut_: rare in Cic., see Madv. _D.F._ II. 33, who, however, unduly\nrestricts the usage. In three out of the five passages where he allows it\nto stand, the _ut_ precedes a vowel; Cic. therefore used it to avoid\nwriting _ac_ before a vowel, so that in _D.F._ II. 33 _ut_ should probably\nbe written (with Manut. and others) for _et_ which Madv. ejects.\n\n\u00a752. _Eorumque_: MSS. om. _que_. Dav. wrote _ac_ before _eorum_, this\nhowever is as impossible in Cic. as the c before a guttural condemned in n.\non 34. For the argument see n. on 80 _quasi vero quaeratur quid sit non\nquid videatur_. _Primum interest_: for om. of _deinde_ cf. 45, 46.\n_Imbecillius_: cf. I. 41. _Edormiverunt_: \"have slept _off_ the effects,\"\ncf. [Greek: apobrizein] in Homer. _Relaxentur_: cf. [Greek: anienai t\u00eas\norg\u00eas] Aristoph. _Ran._ 700, _relaxare_ is used in the neut. sense in\n_D.F._ II. 94. _Alcmaeonis_: the Alcmaeon of Ennius is often quoted by\nCic., e.g. _D.F._ IV. 62.\n\n\u00a753. _Sustinet_: [Greek: epechei]; see on 94. _Aliquando sustinere_: the\npoint of the Academic remark lay in the fact that in the state of madness\nthe [Greek: epoch\u00ea] of the _sapiens_ becomes _habitual_; he gives up the\nattempt to distinguish between true and false _visa_. Lucullus answers\nthat, did no distinction exist, he would give up the attempt to draw it,\neven in the sane condition. _Confundere_: so 58, 110, Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 56\n([Greek: syncheousi ta pragmata]), _ib._ VIII. 157 ([Greek: syncheomen ton\nbion]), VIII. 372 ([Greek: hol\u00ean syncheei t\u00ean philosophon z\u00eat\u00easin]), Plut.\n_De Communi Notit. adv. Stoicos_ p. 1077 ([Greek: h\u00f4s panta pragmata\nsyncheousi]). _Utimur_: \"we have to put up with,\" so [Greek: chr\u00easthai] is\nused in Gk. _Ebriosorum_: \"habitual drunkards,\" more invidious than\n_vinolenti_ above. _Illud attendimus_: Goer., and Orelli write _num illud_,\nbut the emphatic _ille_ is often thus introduced by itself in questions, a\ngood ex. occurs in 136. _Proferremus_: this must apparently be added to the\nexx. qu. by Madv. on _D.F._ II. 35 of the subj. used to denote \"_non id\nquod fieret factumve esset, sed quod fieri debuerit_.\" As such passages are\noften misunderstood, I note that they can be most rationally explained as\nelliptic constructions in which a _condition_ is expressed without its\n_consequence_. We have an exact parallel in English, e.g. \"_tu dictis\nAlbane maneres_\" may fairly be translated, \"hadst thou but kept to thy\nword, Alban!\" Here the condition \"_if_ thou hadst kept, etc.\" stands\nwithout the consequence \"thou wouldst not have died,\" or something of the\nkind. Such a condition may be expressed without _si_, just as in Eng.\nwithout \"_if_,\" cf. Iuv. III. 78 and Mayor's n. The use of the Greek\noptative to express a wish (with [Greek: ei gar], etc., and even without\n[Greek: ei]) is susceptible of the same explanation. The Latin subj. has\nmany such points of similarity with the Gk. optative, having absorbed most\nof the functions of the lost Lat. optative. [Madv. on _D.F._ II. 35 seems\nto imply that he prefers the hypothesis of a suppressed protasis, but as in\nhis _Gram._ 351 _b_, obs. 4 he attempts no elucidation, I cannot be\ncertain.]\n\n    \u00a7\u00a754--63. Summary. The Academics fail to see that such doctrines do\n    away with all probability even. Their talk about twins and seals is\n    childish (54). They press into their service the old physical\n    philosophers, though ordinarily none are so much ridiculed by them\n    (55). Democritus may say that innumerable worlds exist in every\n    particular similar to ours, but I appeal to more cultivated physicists,\n    who maintain that each thing has its own peculiar marks (55, 56). The\n    Servilii were distinguished from one another by their friends, and\n    Delian breeders of fowls could tell from the appearance of an egg which\n    hen had laid it (56, 57). We however, do not much care whether we are\n    able to distinguish eggs from one another or not. Another thing that\n    they say is absurd, viz. that there may be distinction between\n    individual sensations, but not between classes of sensations (58).\n    Equally absurd are those \"probable and undisturbed\" sensations they\n    profess to follow. The doctrine that true and false sensations are\n    indistinguishable logically leads to the unqualified [Greek: epoch\u00ea] of\n    Arcesilas (59). What nonsense they talk about inquiring after the\n    truth, and about the bad influence of authority! (60). Can you, Cicero,\n    the panegyrist of philosophy, plunge us into more than Cimmerian\n    darkness? (61) By holding that knowledge is impossible you weaken the\n    force of your famous oath that you \"knew all about\" Catiline. Thus\n    ended Lucullus, amid the continued wonder of Hortensius (62, 63). Then\n    Catulus said that he should not be surprised if the speech of Lucullus\n    were to induce me to change my view (63).\n\n\u00a754. _Ne hoc quidem_: the common trans. \"not even\" for \"_ne quidem_\" is\noften inappropriate. Trans. here \"they do not see this _either_,\" cf. n. on\nI. 5. _Habeant_: the slight alteration _habeat_ introduced by Goer. and\nOrelli quite destroys the point of the sentence. _Quod nolunt_: cf. 44. _An\nsano_: Lamb. _an ut sano_, which Halm approves, and Baiter reads.\n_Similitudines_: cf. 84--86. The impossibility of distinguishing between\ntwins, eggs, the impressions of seals, etc. was a favourite theme with the\nsceptics, while the Stoics contended that no two things were absolutely\nalike. Aristo the Chian, who maintained the Stoic view, was practically\nrefuted by his fellow pupil Persaeus, who took two twins, and made one\ndeposit money with Aristo, while the other after a time asked for the money\nback and received it. On this subject cf. Sextus _A.M._ VII. 408--410.\n_Negat esse_: in phrases like this Cic. nearly always places _esse_ second,\nespecially at the end of a clause. _Cur eo non estis contenti_: Lucullus\nhere ignores the question at issue, which concerned the _amount_ of\nsimilarity. The dogmatists maintained that the similarity between two\nphenomena could never be great enough to render it impossible to guard\nagainst mistaking the one for the other, the sceptics argued that it could.\n_Quod rerum natura non patitur_: again Lucullus confounds _essential_ with\n_phenomenal_ difference, and so misses his mark; cf. n. on 50. _Nulla re\ndifferens_: cf. the _nihil differens_ of 99, the substitution of which here\nwould perhaps make the sentence clearer. The words are a trans. of the\ncommon Gk. term [Greek: aparallaktos] (Sext. _A.M._ VII. 252, etc.). _Ulla\ncommunitas_: I am astonished to find Bait. returning to the reading of\nLamb. _nulla_ after the fine note of Madv. (_Em._ 154), approved by Halm\nand other recent edd. The opinion maintained by the Stoics may be stated\nthus _suo quidque genere est tale, quale est, nec est in duobus aut\npluribus nulla re differens ulla communitas_ ([Greek: oude hyparchei\nepimig\u00ea aparallaktos]). This opinion is negatived by _non patitur ut_ and\nit will be evident at a glance that the only change required is to put the\ntwo verbs (_est_) into the subjunctive. The change of _ulla_ into _nulla_\nis in no way needed. _Ut_ [_sibi_] _sint_: _sibi_ is clearly wrong here.\nMadv., in a note communicated privately to Halm and printed by the latter\non p. 854 of Bait. and Halm's ed of the philosophical works, proposed to\nread _nulla re differens communitas visi? Sint et ova_ etc. omitting _ulla_\nand _ut_ and changing _visi_ into _sibi_ (cf. Faber's em. _novas_ for\n_bonas_ in 72). This ingenious but, as I think, improbable conj. Madv. has\njust repeated in the second vol. of his _Adversaria_. Lamb. reads _at tibi\nsint_, Dav. _at si vis, sint_, Christ _ut tibi sint_, Bait. _ut si sint_\nafter C.F.W. Muller, I should prefer _sui_ for _sibi_ (SVI for SIBI). B is\nvery frequently written for V in the MSS., and I would easily slip in.\n_Eosdem_: once more we have Lucullus' chronic and perhaps intentional\nmisconception of the sceptic position; see n. on 50. Before leaving this\nsection, I may point out that the [Greek: epimig\u00ea] or [Greek: epimixia t\u00f4n\nphantasi\u00f4n] supplies Sext. with one of the sceptic [Greek: tropoi], see\n_Pyrrh. Hyp._ I. 124.\n\n\u00a755. _Irridentur_: the contradictions of physical philosophers were the\nconstant sport of the sceptics, cf. Sext. _A.M._ IX. 1. _Absolute ita\nparis_: Halm as well as Bait. after Christ, brackets _ita_; if any change\nbe needed, it would be better to place it before _undique_. For this\nopinion of Democr. see R. and P. 45. _Et eo quidem innumerabilis_: this is\nthe quite untenable reading of the MSS., for which no satisfactory em. has\nyet been proposed, cf. 125. _Nihil differat, nihil intersit_: these two\nverbs often appear together in Cic., e.g._D.F._ III. 25.\n\n\u00a756. _Potiusque_: this adversative use of _que_ is common with _potius_,\ne.g._D.F._ I. 51. Cf. _T.D._ II. 55 _ingemescere nonnum quam viro concessum\nest, idque raro_, also _ac potius_, _Ad Att._ I. 10, etc. _Proprietates_:\nthe [Greek: idiot\u00eates] or [Greek: idi\u00f4mata] of Sextus, the doctrine of\ncourse involves the whole question at issue between dogmatism and\nscepticism. _Cognoscebantur_: Dav. _dignoscebantur_, Walker\n_internoscebantur_. The MSS. reading is right, cf. 86. _Consuetudine_: cf.\n42, \"experience\". _Minimum_: an adverb like _summum_.\n\n\u00a757. _Dinotatas_: so the MSS., probably correctly, though Forc. does not\nrecognise the word. Most edd. change it into _denotatas_. _Artem_: [Greek:\ntechn\u00ean], a set of rules. _In proverbio_: so _venire in proverbium_, _in\nproverbii usum venire_, _proverbii locum obtinere_, _proverbii loco dici_\nare all used. _Salvis rebus_: not an uncommon phrase, e.g. _Ad Fam._ IV. 1.\n_Gallinas_: cf. fragm. 19 of the _Acad. Post._ The similarity of eggs was\ndiscussed _ad nauseam_ by the sceptics and dogmatists. Hermagoras the Stoic\nactually wrote a book entitled, [Greek: \u00f4i skopia] (egg investigation)\n[Greek: \u00ea peri sophisteias pros Akad\u00eamaikous], mentioned by Suidas.\n\n\u00a758. _Contra nos_: the sense requires _nos_, but all Halm's MSS. except one\nread _vos_. _Non internoscere_: this is the reading of all the MSS., and is\ncorrect, though Orelli omits _non_. The sense is, \"we are quite content not\nto be able to distinguish between the eggs, we shall not on that account be\nled into a mistake for our rule will prevent us from making any positive\nassertion about the eggs.\" _Adsentiri_: for the passive use of this verb\ncf. 39. _Par est_: so Dav. for _per_, which most MSS. have. The older edd.\nand Orelli have _potest_, with one MS. _Quasi_: the em. of Madv. for the\n_quam si_ of the MSS. _Transversum digitum_: cf. 116. _Ne confundam omnia_:\ncf. 53, 110. _Natura tolletur_: this of course the sceptics would deny.\nThey refused to discuss the nature of _things in themselves_, and kept to\n_phenomena_. _Intersit_: i.e. _inter visa_. _In animos_: Orelli with one\nMS. reads _animis_; if the MSS. are correct the assertion of Krebs and\nAllgayer (_Antibarbarus_, ed. 4) \"_imprimere_ wird klas sisch verbunden _in\naliqua re_, nicht _in aliquam rem_,\" will require modification. _Species et\nquasdam formas_: [Greek: eid\u00ea kai gen\u00ea], _quasdam_ marks the fact that\n_formas_ is a trans. I have met with no other passage where any such\ndoctrine is assigned to a sceptic. As it stands in the text the doctrine is\nabsurd, for surely it must always be easier to distinguish between two\n_genera_ than between two individuals. If the _non_ before _vos_ were\nremoved a better sense would be given. It has often been inserted by\ncopyists when _sed_, _tamen_, or some such word, comes in the following\nclause, as in the famous passage of Cic _Ad Quintum Fratrem_, II. 11,\ndiscussed by Munro, Lucr. p. 313, ed. 3.\n\n\u00a759. _Illud vero perabsurdum_: note the omission of _est_, which often\ntakes place after the emphatic pronoun. _Impediamini_: cf. n. on 33. _A\nveris_: if _visis_ be supplied the statement corresponds tolerably with the\nAcademic belief, if _rebus_ be meant, it is wide of the mark. _Id est ...\nretentio_: supposed to be a gloss by Man., Lamb., see however nn. on I. 6,\n8. _Constitit_: from _consto_, not from _consisto_ cf. 63 _qui tibi\nconstares_. _Si vera sunt_: cf. 67, 78, 112, 148. The _nonnulli_ are Philo\nand Metrodorus, see 78. _Tollendus est adsensus_: i.e. even that qualified\nassent which the Academics gave to probable phenomena. _Adprobare_: this\nword is ambiguous, meaning either qualified or unqualified assent. Cf. n.\non 104. _Id est peccaturum_: \"which is equivalent to sinning,\" cf. I. 42.\n_Iam nimium etiam_: note _iam_ and _etiam_ in the same clause.\n\n\u00a760. _Pro omnibus_: note _omnibus_ for _omnibus rebus_. _Ista mysteria_:\nAug. _Contra Ac._ III. 37, 38 speaks of various doctrines, which were\n_servata et pro mysteriis custodita_ by the New Academics. The notion that\nthe Academic scepticism was merely external and polemically used, while\nthey had an esoteric dogmatic doctrine, must have originated in the\nreactionary period of Metrodorus (of Stratonice), Philo, and Antiochus, and\nmay perhaps from a passage of Augustine, _C. Ac._ III. 41 (whose authority\nmust have been Cicero), be attributed to the first of the three (cf. Zeller\n534, n.). The idea is ridiculed by Petrus Valentia (Orelli's reprint, p.\n279), and all succeeding inquirers. _Auctoritate_: cf. 8, 9. _Utroque_:\nthis neuter, referring to two fem. nouns, is noticeable, see exx. in Madv.\n_Gram._ 214 c.\n\n\u00a761. _Amicissimum_: \"_because_ you are my dear friend\". _Commoveris_: a\nmilitary term, cf. _De Div._ II. 26 and Forc., also Introd. p. 53.\n_Sequere_: either this is future, as in 109, or _sequeris_, the constant\nform in Cic. of the pres., must be read. _Approbatione omni_: the word\n_omni_ is emphatic, and includes both qualified and unqualified assent, cf.\n59. _Orbat sensibus_: cf. 74, and _D.F._ I. 64, where Madv. is wrong in\nreproving Torquatus for using the phrase _sensus tolli_, on the ground that\nthe Academics swept away not _sensus_ but _iudicium sensuum Cimmeriis_.\nGoer. qu. Plin. _N.H._ III. 5, Sil. Ital. XII. 131, Festus, s.v.\n_Cimmerii_, to show that the town or village of Cimmerium lay close to\nBauli, and probably induced this mention of the legendary people. _Deus\naliquis_: so the best edd. without comment, although they write _deus\naliqui_ in 19. It is difficult to distinguish between _aliquis_ and\n_aliqui_, _nescio quis_ and _nescio qui_, _si quis_ and _si qui_ (for the\nlatter see n. on 81). As _aliquis_ is substantival, _aliqui_ adjectival,\n_aliquis_ must not be written with impersonal nouns like _terror_ (_T.D._\nIV. 35, V. 62), _dolor_ (_T.D._ I. 82, _Ad Fam._ VII. 1, 1), _casus_ (_De\nOff._ III. 33). In the case of personal nouns the best edd. vary, e.g.\n_deus aliqui_ (_T.D._ I. 23, IV. 35), _deus aliquis_ (_Lael._ 87, _Ad Fam._\nXIV. 7, 1), _anularius aliqui_ (86 of this book), _magistratus aliquis_\n(_In Verr._ IV. 146). With a proper name belonging to a real person\n_aliquis_ ought to be written (_Myrmecides_ in 120, see my n.).\n_Dispiciendum_: not _despiciendum_, cf. _M.D.F._ II. 97, IV. 64, also _De\nDiv._ II. 81, _verum dispicere_. _Iis vinculis_, etc. this may throw light\non fragm. 15 of the _Acad. Post._, which see.\n\n\u00a762. _Motum animorum_: n. on 34. _Actio rerum_: here _actio_ is a pure\nverbal noun like [Greek: praxis], cf. _De Off._ I. 83, and expressions like\n_actio vitae_ (_N.D._ I. 2), _actio ullius rei_ (108 of this book), and the\nsimilar use of _actus_ in Quintilian (_Inst. Or._ X. 1, 31, with Mayor's\nn.) _Iuratusque_: Bait. possibly by a mere misprint reads _iratus_.\n_Comperisse_: this expression of Cic., used in the senate in reference to\nCatiline's conspiracy, had become a cant phrase at Rome, with which Cic.\nwas often taunted. See _Ad Fam._ V. 5, 2, _Ad Att._ I. 14, 5. _Licebat_:\nthis is the reading of the best MSS., not _liquebat_, which Goer., Kl., Or.\nhave. For the support accorded by Lucullus to Cic. during the conspiracy\nsee 3, and the passages quoted in Introd. p. 46 with respect to Catulus, in\nmost of which Lucullus is also mentioned.\n\n\u00a763. _Quod ... fecerat, ut_: different from the constr. treated by Madv.\n_Gram._ 481 b. _Quod_ refers simply to the fact of Lucullus' admiration,\nwhich the clause introduced by _ut_ defines, \"which admiration he had shown\n... to such an extent that, etc.\" _Iocansne an_: this use of _ne ... an_\nimplies, Madv. says (on _D.F._ V. 87), more doubt than the use of _ne_\nalone as in _vero falsone_. _Memoriter_: nearly all edd. before Madv. make\nthis mean _e memoria_ as opposed to _de scripto_; he says, \"_laudem habet\nbonae et copiosae memoriae_\" (on _D.F._ I. 34). See Krebs and Allgayer in\nthe _Antibarbarus_, ed. 4. _Censuerim_: more modest than _censeo_, see\nMadv. _Gram._ 380. _Tantum enim non te modo monuit_: edd. before Madv.,\nseeing no way of taking _modo_ exc. with _non_, ejected it. Madv. (_Em._\n160) retains it, making it mean _paulo ante_. On the other hand, Halm after\nChrist asserts that _tantum non_ = [Greek: monon ou] occurs nowhere else in\nCic. Bait. therefore ejects _non_, taking _tantum_ as _hoc tantum, nihil\npraeterea_. Livy certainly has the suspected use of _tantum non_.\n_Tribunus_: a retort comes in 97, 144. _Antiochum_: cf. I. 13.\n_Destitisse_: on the difference between _memini_ followed by the pres. and\nby the perf. inf. consult Madv. _Gram._ 408 _b_, obs. 2.\n\n    \u00a7\u00a764--71. Summary. Cic. much moved thus begins. The strength of\n    Lucullus argument has affected me much, yet I feel that it can be\n    answered. First, however, I must speak something that concerns my\n    character (64). I protest my entire sincerity in all that I say, and\n    would confirm it by an oath, were that proper (65). I am a passionate\n    inquirer after truth, and on that very account hold it disgraceful to\n    assent to what is false. I do not deny that I make slips, but we must\n    deal with the _sapiens_, whose characteristic it is never to err in\n    giving his assent (66). Hear Arcesilas' argument: if the _sapiens_ ever\n    gives his assent he will be obliged to _opine_, but he never will\n    _opine_ therefore he never will give his assent. The Stoics and\n    Antiochus deny the first of these statements, on the ground that it is\n    possible to distinguish between true and false (67). Even if it be so\n    the mere habit of assenting is full of peril. Still, our whole argument\n    must tend to show that _perception_ in the Stoic sense is impossible\n    (68). However, a few words first with Antiochus. When he was converted,\n    what proof had he of the doctrine he had so long denied? (69) Some\n    think he wished to found a school called by his own name. It is more\n    probable that he could no longer bear the opposition of all other\n    schools to the Academy (70). His conversion gave a splendid opening for\n    an _argumentum ad hominem_ (71).\n\n\u00a764. _Quadam oratione_: so Halm, also Bait. after the best MSS., not\n_quandam orationem_ as Lamb., Orelli. _De ipsa re_: cf. _de causa ipsa_\nabove. _Respondere posse_: for the om. of _me_ before the infin, which has\nwrongly caused many edd. either to read _respondere_ (as Dav., Bait.) or to\ninsert _me_ (as Lamb.), see n. on I. 7.\n\n\u00a765. _Studio certandi_: = [Greek: philoneikia]. _Pertinacia ... calumnia_:\nn. on 14. _Iurarem_: Cic. was thinking of his own famous oath at the end of\nhis consulship.\n\n\u00a766. _Turpissimum_: cf. I. 45, _N.D._ I. 1. _Opiner_: _opinio_ or [Greek:\ndoxa] is judgment based on insufficient grounds. _Sed quaerimus de\nsapiente_: cf. 115, _T.D._ IV. 55, 59 also _De Or._ III. 75 _non quid ego\nsed quid orator_. _Magnus ... opinator_: Aug. _Contra Acad._ III. 31 qu.\nthis passage wrongly as from the _Hortensius_. He imitates it, _ibid._ I.\n15 _magnus definitor_. _Qua fidunt_, etc.: these lines are part of Cic.'s\n_Aratea_, and are quoted in _N.D._ II. 105, 106. _Phoenices_: the same fact\nis mentioned by Ovid, _Fasti_ III. 107, _Tristia_ IV. 3, 1. _Sed Helicen_:\nthe best MSS. om. _ad_, which Orelli places before _Helicen_. _Elimatas_:\nthe MSS. are divided between this and _limatas_. _Elimare_, though a very\nrare word occurs _Ad Att._ XVI. 7, 3. _Visis cedo_: cf. n. on 38. _Vim\nmaximam_: so _summum munus_ is applied to the same course of action in\n_D.F._ III. 31. _Cogitatione_: \"idea\". _Temeritate_: cf. I. 42, _De Div._\nI. 7, and the charge of [Greek: propeteia] constantly brought against the\ndogmatists by Sext. _Praepostere_: in a disorderly fashion, taking the\nwrong thing first.\n\n\u00a767. _Aliquando ... opinabitur_: this of course is only true if you grant\nthe Academic doctrine, _nihil posse percipi_. _Secundum illud ... etiam\nopinari_: it seems at first sight as though _adsentiri_ and _opinari_ ought\nto change places in this passage, as Manut. proposes. The difficulty lies\nin the words _secundum illud_, which, it has been supposed, must refer back\nto the second premiss of Arcesilas' argument. But if the passage be\ntranslated thus, \"Carneades sometimes granted _as a second premiss_ the\nfollowing statement, that the wise man sometimes does opine\" the difficulty\nvanishes. The argument of Carneades would then run thus, (1) _Si ulli rei_,\netc. as above, (2) _adsentietur autem aliquando_, (3) _opinabitur igitur_.\n\n\u00a768. _Adsentiri quicquam_: only with neuter pronouns like this could\n_adsentiri_ be followed by an accusative case. _Sustinenda est_: [Greek:\nephekteon]. _Iis quae possunt_: these words MSS. om. _Tam in praecipiti_:\nfor the position of _in_ cf. n. on I. 25. The best MSS. have here _tamen\nin_. Madv. altered _tamen_ to _tam_ in n. on _D.F._ V. 26. The two words\nare often confused, as in _T.D._ IV. 7, cf. also n. on I. 16. _Sin autem_,\netc.: cf. the passage of Lactantius _De Falsa Sapientia_ III. 3, qu. by P.\nValentia (p. 278 of Orelli's reprint) _si neque sciri quicquam potest, ut\nSocrates docuit, neque opinari, oportet, ut Zeno, tota philosophia sublata\nest_. _Nitamur ... percipi_: \"let us struggle to prove the proposition,\netc.\" The construction is, I believe, unexampled so that I suspect _hoc_,\nor some such word, to have fallen out between _igitur_ and _nihil_.\n\n\u00a769. _Non acrius_: one of the early editions omits _non_ while Goer. reads\n_acutius_ and puts a note of interrogation at _defensitaverat_. M. _Em._\n161 points out the absurdity of making Cic. say that the old arguments of\nAntiochus in favour of Academicism were weaker than his new arguments\nagainst it. _Quis enim_: so Lamb. for MSS. _quisquam enim_. _Excogitavit_:\non interrogations not introduced by a particle of any kind see Madv.\n_Gram._ 450. _Eadem dicit_: on the subject in hand, of course. Taken\nwithout this limitation the proposition is not strictly true, see n. on\n132. _Sensisse_: = _iudicasse_, n. on I. 22. _Mnesarchi ... Dardani_: see\n_Dict. Biogr._\n\n\u00a770. _Revocata est_: Manut. here wished to read _renovata_, cf. n. on I.\n14. _Nominis dignitatem_, etc.: hence Aug. _Contra Acad._ III. 41 calls him\n_foeneus ille Platonicus Antiochus_ (that _tulchan_ Platonist). _Gloriae\ncausa_: cf. Aug. _ibid._ II. 15 _Antiochus gloriae cupidior quam\nveritatis_. _Facere dicerent_: so Camerarius for the MSS. _facerent_.\n_Sustinere_: cf. 115 _sustinuero Epicureos_. _Sub Novis_: Faber's brilliant\nem. for the MSS. _sub nubes_. The _Novae Tabernae_ were in the forum, and\nare often mentioned by Cic. and Livy. In _De Or._ II. 266 a story is told\nof Caesar, who, while speaking _sub Veteribus_, points to a \"_tabula_\"\nwhich hangs _sub Novis_. The excellence of Faber's em. may be felt by\ncomparing that of Manut. _sub nube_, and that of Lamb. _nisi sub nube_. I\nhave before remarked that _b_ is frequently written in MSS. for _v_.\n_Maenianorum_: projecting eaves, according to Festus s.v. They were\nprobably named from their inventor like _Vitelliana_, _Vatinia_ etc.\n\n\u00a771. _Quoque ... argumento_: the sentence is anacoluthic, the broken thread\nis picked up by _quod argumentum_ near the end. _Utrum_: the neuter\npronoun, not the so called conjunction, the two alternatives are marked by\n_ne_ and _an_. The same usage is found in _D.F._ II. 60, _T.D._ IV. 9, and\nmust be carefully distinguished from the use of _utrum ... ne ... an_,\nwhich occurs not unfrequently in Cic., e g _De Invent._ II. 115 _utrum\ncopiane sit agri an penuria consideratur_. On this point cf. M. _Em._ 163,\n_Gram._ 452, obs. 1, 2, Zumpt on Cic. _Verr._ IV. 73. _Honesti inane nomen\nesse_: a modern would be inclined to write _honestum_, in apposition to\n_nomen_, cf. _D.F._ V. 18 _voluptatis alii putant primum appetitum_.\n_Voluptatem_ etc.: for the conversion of Dionysius (called [Greek: ho\nmetathemenos]) from Stoicism to Epicureanism cf. _T.D._ II. 60, Diog.\nLaert. VII. 166--7. _A vero_: \"coming from a reality,\" cf. 41, n. _Is\ncuravit_: Goer. reads _his_, \"_solet V. D. in hoc pronomen saevire_,\" says\nMadv. The scribes often prefix _h_ to parts of the pronoun _is_, and Goer.\ngenerally patronises their vulgar error.\n\n    \u00a7\u00a772--78. Summary. You accuse me of appealing to ancient names like a\n    revolutionist, yet Anaxagoras, Democritus, and Metrodorus, philosophers\n    of the highest position, protest against the truth of sense knowledge,\n    and deny the possibility of knowledge altogether (72, 73). Empedocles,\n    Xenophanes, and Parmenides all declaim against sense knowledge. You\n    said that Socrates and Plato must not be classed with these. Why?\n    Socrates said he knew nothing but his own ignorance, while Plato\n    pursued the same theme in all his works (74). Now do you see that I do\n    not merely name, but take for my models famous men? Even Chrysippus\n    stated many difficulties concerning the senses and general experience.\n    You say he solved them, even if he did, which I do not believe, he\n    admitted that it was not easy to escape being ensnared by them (75).\n    The Cyrenaics too held that they knew nothing about things external to\n    themselves. The sincerity of Arcesilas may be seen thus (76). Zeno held\n    strongly that the wise man ought to keep clear from _opinion_.\n    Arcesilas agreed but this without _knowledge_ was impossible.\n    _Knowledge_ consists of _perceptions_. Arcesilas therefore demanded a\n    definition of _perception_. This definition Arcesilas combated. This is\n    the controversy which has lasted to our time. Do away with _opinion_\n    and _perception_, and the [Greek: epoch\u00ea] of Arcesilas follows at once\n    (77, 78).\n\n\u00a772. _De antiquis philosophis_: on account of the somewhat awkward constr.\nLamb. read _antiquos philosophos_. _Popularis_: cf. 13. _Res non bonas_:\nMSS. om. _non_, which Or. added with two very early editions. Faber\ningeniously supposed the true reading to be _novas_, which would be written\n_nobas_, and then pass into _bonas_. _Nivem nigram_: this deliverance of\nAnaxagoras is very often referred to by Sextus. In _P.H._ I. 33 he quotes\nit as an instance of the refutation of [Greek: phainomena] by means of\n[Greek: nooumena], \"[Greek: Anaxagoras t\u00f4i leuk\u00ean einai t\u00ean chiona,\nanetithei hoti chi\u00f4n estin hydor pep\u00eagos to de hydor esti melan kai h\u00ea\nchi\u00f4n ara melaina].\" There is an obscure joke on this in _Ad Qu. Fratrem_\nII. 13, 1 _risi nivem atram ... teque hilari animo esse et prompto ad\niocandum valde me iuvat_. _Sophistes_: here treated as the demagogue of\nphilosophy. _Ostentationis_: = [Greek: epideixeos].\n\n\u00a773. _Democrito_: Cic., as Madv. remarks on _D.F._ I. 20, always\nexaggerates the merits of Democr. in order to depreciate the Epicureans,\ncf. _T.D._ I. 22, _De Div._ I. 5, II. 139, _N.D._ I. 120, _De Or._ I. 42.\n_Quintae classis_: a metaphor from the Roman military order. _Qui veri esse\naliquid_, etc.: cf. _N.D._ I. 12 _non enim sumus ii quibus nihil verum esse\nvideatur, sed ii qui omnibus veris falsa quaedam adiuncta dicamus_. _Non\nobscuros sed tenebricosos_: \"not merely dim but darkened.\" There is a\nreference here to the [Greek: skoti\u00ea gn\u00f4sis] of Democr., by which he meant\nthat knowledge which stops at the superficial appearances of things as\nshown by sense. He was, however, by no means a sceptic, for he also held a\n[Greek: gn\u00easi\u00ea gn\u00f4sis], dealing with the realities of material existence,\nthe atoms and the void, which exist [Greek: ete\u00eai] and not merely [Greek:\nnom\u00f4i] as appearances do. See R. and P. 51.\n\n\u00a774. _Furere_: cf. 14. _Orbat sensibus_: cf. 61, and for the belief of\nEmpedocles about the possibility of [Greek: epist\u00eam\u00ea] see the remarks of\nSextus _A.M._ VII. 123--4 qu. R. and P. 107, who say \"_patet errare eos qui\nscepticis adnumerandum Empedoclem putabant_.\" _Sonum fundere_: similar\nexpressions occur in _T.D._ III. 42, V. 73, _D.F._ II. 48. _Parmenides,\nXenophanes_: these are the last men who ought to be charged with\nscepticism. They advanced indeed arguments against sense-knowledge, but\nheld that real knowledge was attainable by the reason. Cf. Grote, _Plato_\nI. 54, Zeller 501, R. and P. on Xenophanes and Parmenides. _Minus bonis_:\nDav. qu. Plut. _De Audit._ 45 A, [Greek: mempsaito d' an tis Parmenidou t\u00ean\nstichopoiian]. _Quamquam_: on the proper use of _quamquam_ in clauses where\nthe verb is not expressed see _M.D.F._ V. 68 and cf. I. 5. _Quasi irati_:\nfor the use of _quasi_ = almost cf. _In Verr. Act._ I. 22, _Orat._ 41.\n_Aiebas removendum_: for om. of _esse_ see n. on I. 43. _Perscripti sunt_:\ncf. n. on I. 16. _Scire se nihil se scire_: cf. I. 16, 44. The words\nreferred to are in Plat. _Apol._ 21 [Greek: eoika goun toutou smikr\u00f4i tini\naut\u00f4i tout\u00f4i soph\u00f4teros einai, hoti a m\u00ea oida oude oiomai eidenai], a very\ndifferent statement from the _nihil sciri posse_ by which Cic. interprets\nit (cf. R. and P. 148). That [Greek: epist\u00eam\u00ea] in the strict sense is\nimpossible, is a doctrine which Socrates would have left to the Sophists.\n_De Platone_: the doctrine above mentioned is an absurd one to foist upon\nPlato. The dialogues of search as they are called, while exposing sham\nknowledge, all assume that the real [Greek: epist\u00eam\u00ea] is attainable.\n_Ironiam_: the word was given in its Greek form in 15. _Nulla fuit ratio\npersequi_: n. on 17.\n\n\u00a775. _Videorne_: = _nonne videor_, as _videsne_ = _nonne vides_. _Imitari\nnumquam nisi_: a strange expression for which Manut. conj. _imitari? num\nquem_, etc., Halm _nullum unquam_ in place of _numquam_. Bait. prints the\nreading of Man., which I think harsher than that of the MSS. _Minutos_: for\nthe word cf. _Orat._ 94, also _De Div._ I. 62 _minuti philosophi_, _Brut._\n256 _minuti imperatores_. _Stilponem_, etc.: Megarians, see R. and P.\n177--182. [Greek: sophismata]: Cic. in the second edition probably\nintroduced here the translation _cavillationes_, to which Seneca _Ep._ 116\nrefers, cf. Krische, p. 65. _Fulcire porticum_: \"to be the pillar of the\nStoic porch\". Cf. the anonymous line [Greek: ei m\u00ea gar \u00ean Chrysippos, ouk\nan \u00ean Stoa]. _Quae in consuetudine probantur_: n. on 87. _Nisi videret_:\nfor the tense of the verb, see Madv. _Gram._ 347 _b_, obs. 2.\n\n\u00a776. _Quid ... philosophi_: my reading is that of Durand approved by Madv.\nand followed by Bait. It is strange that Halm does not mention this\nreading, which only requires the alteration of _Cyrenaei_ into _Cyrenaici_\n(now made by all edd. on the ground that _Cyrenaeus_ is a citizen of\nCyreno, _Cyrenaicus_ a follower of Aristippus) and the insertion of _tibi_.\nI see no difficulty in the _qui_ before _negant_, at which so many edd.\ntake offence. _Tactu intimo_: the word [Greek: haph\u00ea] I believe does not\noccur in ancient authorities as a term of the Cyrenaic school; their great\nword was [Greek: pathos]. From 143 (_permotiones intimas_) it might appear\nthat Cic. is translating either [Greek: pathos] or [Greek: kin\u00easis]. For a\nclear account of the school see Zeller's _Socrates_, for the illustration\nof the present passage pp 293--300 with the footnotes. Cf. also R. and P.\n162 sq. _Quo quid colore_: cf. Sext. _A.M._ VII. 191 (qu. Zeller _Socrates_\n297, R. and P. 165). _Adfici se_: = [Greek: paschein]. _Quaesieras_: note\nthe plup. where Eng. idiom requires the perfect or aorist. _Tot saeculis_:\ncf. the same words in 15. _Tot ingeniis tantisque studiis_: cf. _summis\ningeniis, maximis studiis_ in 15. _Obtrectandi_: this invidious word had\nbeen used by Lucullus in 16; cf. also I. 44.\n\n\u00a777. _Expresserat_: \"had put into distinct shape\". Cf. 7 and I. 19.\n_Exprimere_ and _dicere_ are always sharply distinguished by Cic., the\nlatter merely implying the mechanic exercise of utterance, the former the\nmoulding and shaping of the utterance by conscious effort; cf. esp. _Orat._\n3, 69, and _Ad Att._ VIII. 11, 1; also _De Or._ I. 32, _De Div._ I. 79, qu.\nby Krebs and Allgayer. The conj. of Dav. _exposuerat_ is therefore\nneedless. _Fortasse_: \"we may suppose\". _Nec percipere_, etc.: cf. 68, n.\n_Tum illum_: a change from _ille, credo_ (sc. _respondit_), the _credo_\nbeing now repeated to govern the infin. For the constr. after _ita\ndefinisse_ cf. _M.D.F._ II. 13 (who quotes exx.); also the construction\nwith _ita iudico_ in 113. _Ex eo, quod esset_: cf. 18, n. _Effictum_: so\nManut. for MSS. _effectum_, cf. 18. _Ab eo, quod non est_: the words _non\nest_ include the two meanings \"is non existent,\" and \"is different from\nwhat it seems to be\"--the two meanings of _falsum_ indeed, see n. on 47.\n_Eiusdem modi_: cf. 40, 84. MSS. have _eius modi_, altered by Dav. _Recte\n... additum_: the semicolon at _Arcesilas_ was added by Manutius, who is\nfollowed by all edd. This involves taking _additum_ = _additum est_, an\nellipse of excessive rarity in Cic., see Madv. _Opusc._ I. 448, _D.F._ I.\n43, _Gram._ 479 a. I think it quite possible that _recte consensit additum_\nshould be construed together, \"agreed that the addition had been rightly\nmade.\" For the omission of _esse_ in that case cf. Madv. _Gram._ 406, and\nsuch expressions as _dicere solebat perturbatum_ in 111, also _ita\nscribenti exanclatum_ in 108. _Recte_, which with the ordinary stopping\nexpresses Cic.'s needless approval of Arcesilas' conduct would thus gain in\npoint. Qy, should _concessit_ be read, as in 118 _concessisse_ is now read\nfor MSS. _consensisse_? _A vero_: cf. 41.\n\n\u00a778. _Quae adhuc permanserit_: note the subj., \"which is of such a nature\nas to have lasted\". _Nam illud ... pertinebat_: by _illud_ is meant the\nargument in defence of [Greek: epoch\u00ea] given in 67; by _nihil ...\npertinebat_ nothing more is intended than that there was no _immediate_ or\n_close_ connection. Cf. the use of _pertinere_ in _D.F._ III. 55.\n_Clitomacho_: cf. n. on 59.\n\n    \u00a7\u00a779--90. Summary You are wrong, Lucullus, in upholding your cause in\n    spite of my arguments yesterday against the senses. You are thus acting\n    like the Epicureans, who say that the inference only from the sensation\n    can be false, not the sensation itself (79, 80). I wish the god of whom\n    you spoke would ask me whether I wanted anything more than sound\n    senses. He would have a bad time with me. For even granting that our\n    vision is correct how marvellously circumscribed it is! But say you,\n    _we_ desire no more. No I answer, you are like the mole who desires not\n    the light because he is blind. Yet I would not so much reproach the god\n    because my vision is narrow, as because it deceives me (80, 81). If you\n    want something greater than the bent oar, what can be greater than the\n    sun? Still he seems to us a foot broad, and Epicurus thinks he may be a\n    little broader or narrower than he seems. With all his enormous speed,\n    too, he appears to us to stand still (82). The whole question lies in a\n    nutshell; of four propositions which prove my point only one is\n    disputed viz. that every true sensation has side by side with it a\n    false one indistinguishable from it (83). A man who has mistaken P. for\n    Q. Geminus could have no infallible mode of recognising Cotta. You say\n    that no such indistinguishable resemblances _exist_. Never mind, they\n    _seem_ to exist and that is enough. One mistaken sensation will throw\n    all the others into uncertainty (84). You say everything belongs to its\n    own _genus_ this I will not contest. I am not concerned to show that\n    two sensations _are_ absolutely similar, it is enough that human\n    faculties cannot distinguish between them. How about the impressions of\n    signet rings? (85) Can you find a ring merchant to rival your chicken\n    rearer of Delos? But, you say, art aids the senses. So we cannot see or\n    hear without art, which so few can have! What an idea this gives us of\n    the art with which nature has constructed the senses! (86) But about\n    physics I will speak afterwards. I am going now to advance against the\n    senses arguments drawn from Chrysippus himself (87). You said that the\n    sensations of dreamers, drunkards and madmen were feebler than those of\n    the waking, the sober and the sane. The cases of Ennius and his\n    Alcmaeon, of your own relative Tuditanus, of the Hercules of Euripides\n    disprove your point (88, 89). In their case at least 'mind and eyes\n    agreed. It is no good to talk about the saner moments of such people;\n    the question is, what was the nature of their sensations at the time\n    they were affected? (90)\n\n\u00a779. _Communi loco_: [Greek: top\u00f4], that of blinking facts which cannot be\ndisproved, see 19. _Quod ne_ [_id_]: I have bracketed _id_ with most edd.\nsince Manut. If, however, _quod_ be taken as the conjunction, and not as\nthe pronoun, _id_ is not altogether insupportable. _Heri_: cf. Introd. 55.\n_Infracto remo_: n. on 19. Tennyson seems to allude to this in his \"Higher\nPantheism\"--\"all we have power to see is a straight staff bent in a pool\".\n_Manent illa omnia, iacet_: this is my correction of the reading of most\nMSS. _maneant ... lacerat_. Madv. _Em._ 176 in combating the conj. of Goer.\n_si maneant ... laceratis istam causam_, approves _maneant ... iaceat_, a\nreading with some MSS. support, adopted by Orelli. I think the whole\nconfusion of the passage arises from the mania of the copyists for turning\nindicatives into subjunctives, of which in critical editions of Cic. exx.\noccur every few pages. If _iacet_ were by error turned into _iaceret_ the\nreading _lacerat_ would arise at once. The nom. to _dicit_ is, I may\nobserve, not Epicurus, as Orelli takes it, but Lucullus. Trans. \"all my\narguments remain untouched; your case is overthrown, yet his senses are\ntrue quotha!\" (For this use of _dicit_ cf. _inquit_ in 101, 109, 115).\nHermann approves the odd reading of the ed. Cratandriana of 1528 _latrat_.\nDav. conjectured comically _blaterat iste tamen et_, Halm _lacera est ista\ncausa_. _Habes_: as two good MSS. have _habes et eum_, Madv. _Em._ 176\nconj. _habet_. The change of person, however, (from _dicit_ to _habes_)\noccurs also in 101. _Epicurus_: n. on 19.\n\n\u00a780. _Hoc est verum esse_: Madv. _Em._ 177 took _verum_ as meaning fair,\ncandid, in this explanation I concur. Madv., however, in his critical\nepistle to Orelli p. 139 abandoned it and proposed _virum esse_, a very\nstrange em. Halm's conj. _certum esse_ is weak and improbable. _Importune_:\nthis is in one good MS. but the rest have _importata_, a good em. is\nneeded, as _importune_ does not suit the sense of the passage. _Negat ...\ntorsisset_: for the tenses cf. 104 _exposuisset, adiungit_. _Cum oculum\ntorsisset_: i.e. by placing the finger beneath the eye and pressing upwards\nor sideways. Cf. Aristot. _Eth. Eud._ VII. 13 (qu. by Dav.) [Greek:\nophthalmous diastrepsanta h\u00f4ste duo to hen phan\u00eanai]. Faber qu. Arist.\n_Problemata_ XVII. 31 [Greek: dia ti eis to plagion kinousi ton ophthalmon\nou (?) phainetai duo to hen]. Also _ib._ XXXI. 3 inquiring the reason why\ndrunkards see double he says [Greek: tauto touto gignetai kai ean tis\nkat\u00f4then pies\u00ea ton ophthalmon]. Sextus refers to the same thing _P.H._ I.\n47, _A.M._ VII. 192 ([Greek: ho parapiesas ton ophthalmon]) so Cic. _De\nDiv._ II. 120. Lucretius gives the same answer as Timagoras, _propter\nopinatus animi_ (IV. 465), as does Sext. _A.M._ VII. 210 on behalf of\nEpicurus. _Sed hic_: Bait. _sit hic_. _Maiorum_: cf. 143. _Quasi\nquaeratur_: Carneades refused to discuss about things in themselves but\nmerely dealt with the appearances they present, [Greek: to gar al\u00eathes kai\nto pseudes en tois pragmasi synech\u00f4rei] (Numen in Euseb. _Pr. Eu._ XIV. 8).\nCf. also Sext. _P.H._ I. 78, 87, 144, II. 75. _Domi nascuntur_: a proverb\nused like [Greek: glauk' es' Ath\u00eanas] and \"coals to Newcastle,\" see Lorenz\non Plaut. _Miles_ II. 2, 38, and cf. _Ad Att._ X. 14, 2, _Ad Fam._ IX. 3.\n_Deus_: cf. 19. _Audiret ... ageret_: MSS. have _audies ... agerent_. As\nthe insertion of _n_ in the imp. subj. is so common in MSS. I read _ageret_\nand alter _audies_ to suit it. Halm has _audiret ... ageretur_ with Dav.,\nBait. _audiet, egerit_. _Ex hoc loco video ... cerno_: MSS. have _loco\ncerno regionem video Pompeianum non cerno_ whence Lipsius conj. _ex hoc\nloco e regione video_. Halm ejects the words _regionem video_, I prefer to\neject _cerno regionem_. We are thus left with the slight change from\n_video_ to _cerno_, which is very often found in Cic., e.g. _Orat._ 18.\nCic. sometimes however joins the two verbs as in _De Or._ III. 161. _O\npraeclarum prospectum_: the view was a favourite one with Cic., see _Ad\nAtt._ I. 13, 5.\n\n\u00a781. _Nescio qui_: Goer. is quite wrong in saying that _nescio quis_\nimplies contempt, while _nescio qui_ does not, cf. _Div. in qu. Caec._ 47,\nwhere _nescio qui_ would contradict his rule. It is as difficult to define\nthe uses of the two expressions as to define those of _aliquis_ and\n_aliqui_, on which see 61 n. In _Paradoxa_ 12 the best MSS. have _si qui_\nand _si quis_ almost in the same line with identically the same meaning\nDav. quotes Solinus and Plin. _N.H._ VII. 21, to show that the man\nmentioned here was called Strabo--a misnomer surely. _Octingenta_: so the\nbest MSS., not _octoginta_, which however agrees better with Pliny. _Quod\nabesset_: \"_whatever_ might be 1800 stadia distant,\" _aberat_ would have\nimplied that Cic. had some _particular_ thing in mind, cf. Madv. _Gram._\n364, obs. 1. _Acrius_: [Greek: oxyteron], Lamb. without need read _acutius_\nas Goer. did in 69. _Illos pisces_: so some MSS., but the best have\n_ullos_, whence Klotz conj. _multos_, Orelli _multos illos_, omitting\n_pisces_. For the allusion to the fish, cf. _Acad. Post._ fragm. 13.\n_Videntur_: n. on 25. _Amplius_: cf. 19 _non video cur quaerat amplius_.\n_Desideramus_: Halm, failing to understand the passage, follows Christ in\nreading _desiderant_ (i.e. _pisces_). To paraphrase the sense is this \"But\nsay my opponents, the Stoics and Antiocheans, we desire no better senses\nthan we have.\" Well you are like the mole, which does not yearn for the\nlight because it does not know what light is. Of course all the ancients\nthought the mole blind. A glance will show the insipidity of the sense\ngiven by Halm's reading. _Quererer cum deo_: would enter into an\naltercation with the god. The phrase, like [Greek: loidoresthai tini] as\nopposed to [Greek: loidorein tina] implies mutual recrimination, cf. _Pro\nDeiotaro_ 9 _querellae cum Deiotaro_. The reading _tam quererer_ for the\n_tamen quaereretur_ of the MSS. is due to Manut. _Navem_: Sextus often uses\nthe same illustration, as in _P.H._ I. 107, _A.M._ VII. 414. _Non tu verum\ntestem_, etc.: cf. 105. For the om. of _te_ before _habere_, which has\nstrangely troubled edd. and induced them to alter the text, see n. on I. 6.\n\n\u00a782. _Quid ego_: Bait. has _sed quid_ after Ernesti. _Nave_: so the best\nMSS., not _navi_, cf. Madv. _Gram._ 42. _Duodeviginti_: so in 128. Goer.\nand Roeper qu. by Halm wished to read _duodetriginta_. The reff. of Goer.\nat least do not prove his point that the ancients commonly estimated the\nsun at 28 times the size of the earth. _Quasi pedalis_: cf. _D.F._ I. 20\n_pedalis fortasse_. For _quasi_ = _circiter_ cf. note on 74. Madv. on\n_D.F._ I. 20 quotes Diog. Laert. X. 91, who preserves the very words of\nEpicurus, in which however no mention of a foot occurs, also Lucr. V. 590,\nwho copies Epicurus, and Seneca _Quaest. Nat._ I. 3, 10 (_solem sapientes\nviri pedalem esse contenderunt_). Madv. points out from Plut. _De Plac.\nPhil._ II. 21, p. 890 E, that Heraclitus asserted the sun to be a foot\nwide, he does not however quote Stob. _Phys._ I. 24, 1 [Greek: h\u00ealion\nmegethos echein euros podos anthr\u00f4peiou], which is affirmed to be the\nopinion of Heraclitus and Hecataeus. _Ne maiorem quidem_: so the MSS., but\nGoer. and Orelli read _nec_ for _ne_, incurring the reprehension of Madv.\n_D.F._ p. 814, ed 2. _Nihil aut non multum_: so in _D.F._ V. 59, the\ncorrection of Orelli, therefore, _aut non multum mentiantur aut nihil_, is\nrash. _Semel_: see 79. _Qui ne nunc quidem_: sc. _mentiri sensus putat_.\nHalm prints _quin_, and is followed by Baiter, neither has observed that\n_quin ne ... quidem_ is bad Latin (see _M.D.F._ V. 56). Nor can _quin ne_\ngo together even without _quidem_, cf. Krebs and Allgayer, _Antibarbarus_\ned. 4 on _quin_.\n\n\u00a783. _In parvo lis sit_: Durand's em. for the _in parvulis sitis_ of the\nMSS., which Goer. alone defends. _Quattuor capita_: these were given in 40\nby Lucullus, cf. also 77. _Epicurus_: as above in 19, 79 etc.\n\n\u00a784. _Geminum_: cf. 56. _Nota_: cf. 58 and the speech of Lucullus _passim_.\n_Ne sit ... potest_: cf. 80 _quasi quaeratur quid sit, non quid videatur.\nSi ipse erit_ for _ipse_ apparently = _is ipse_ cf. _M.D.F._ II. 93.\n\n\u00a785. _Quod non est_: = _qu. n. e. id quod esse videtur_. _Sui generis_: cf.\n50, 54, 56. _Nullum esse pilum_, etc.: a strong expression of this belief\nis found in Seneca _Ep._. 113, 13, qu. R. and P. 380. Note the word\n_Stoicum_; Lucullus is of course not Stoic, but Antiochean. _Nihil\ninterest_: the same opinion is expressed in 40, where see my note. _Visa\nres_: Halm writes _res a re_, it is not necessary, however, either in Gk.\nor Lat. to express _both_ of two related things when a word is inserted\nlike _differat_ here, which shows that they _are_ related. Cf. the elliptic\nconstructions in Gk. with [Greek: homoion, metaxy, mesos], and such words.\n_Eodem caelo atque_: a difficult passage. MSS. have _aqua_, an error easy,\nas Halm notes, to a scribe who understood _caelum_ to be the heaven, and\nnot [Greek: glypheion], a graving tool. Faber and other old edd. defend the\nMSS. reading, adducing passages to show that sky and water were important\nin the making of statues. For _aqua_ Orelli conj. _acu_ = _schraffirnadel_,\nC.F. Hermann _caelatura_, which does not seem to be a Ciceronian word.\nHalm's _aeque_ introduces a construction with _ceteris omnibus_ which is\nnot only not Ciceronian, but not Latin at all. I read _atque_, taking\n_ceteris omnibus_ to be the abl. neut. \"all the other implements.\" Formerly\nI conj. _ascra_, or _atque in_, which last leading would make _omnibus_ =\n_om. statuis_. _Alexandros_: Lysippus alone was privileged to make statues\nof Alexander, as Apelles alone was allowed to paint the conqueror, cf. _Ad\nFam._ V. 12, 7.\n\n\u00a786. _Anulo_: cf. 54. _Aliqui_: n. on 61. _Gallinarium_: cf. 57. _Adhibes\nartem_: cf. 20 _adhibita arte_. _Pictor ... tibicen_: so in 20. _Simul\ninflavit_: note _simul_ for _simul atque_, cf. _T.D._ IV. 12. _Nostri\nquidem_: i.e. _Romani_. _Admodum_: i.e. _adm. pauci_ cf. _De Leg._ III. 32\n_pauci enim atque admodum pauci_. _Praeclara_: evidently a fem. adj.\nagreeing with _natura_. Dav. and Ern. made the adj. neuter, and\nunderstanding _sunt_ interpreted \"these arguments I am going to urge are\ngrand, viz. _quanto art_. etc.\"\n\n\u00a787. _Scilicet_: Germ. \"nat\u00fcrlich.\" _Fabricata sit_: cf. 30, 119, 121 and\nN.D. I. 19. _Ne modo_: for _modo ne_, a noticeable use. _Physicis_:\nprobably neut. _Contra sensus_: he wrote both for and against [Greek:\nsyn\u00eatheia]; cf. R. and P. 360 and 368. _Carneadem_: Plut. _Sto. Rep_. 1036\nB relates that Carneades in reading the arguments of Chrysippus against the\nsenses, quoted the address of Andromache to Hector: [Greek: daimonie\nphthisei se to son menos]. From Diog. IV. 62 we learn that he thus parodied\nthe line qu. in n. on 75, [Greek: ei m\u00ea gar \u00ean Chrysippos ouk an \u00ean eg\u00f4].\n\n\u00a788. _Diligentissime_: in 48--53. _Dicebas_: in 52 _imbecillius\nadsentiuntur_. _Siccorum_: cf. Cic. _Contra Rullum_ I. 1 _consilia\nsiccorum_. _Madere_ is common with the meaning \"to be drunk,\" as in Plaut.\n_Mostellaria_ I. 4, 6. _Non diceret_: Orelli was induced by Goer. to omit\nthe verb, with one MS., cf. 15 and I. 13. The omission of a verb in the\nsubjunctive is, Madv. says on _D.F._ I. 9, impossible; for other ellipses\nof the verb see _M.D.F._ V. 63. _Alcmaeo autem_: i.e. Ennius' own Alcmaeon;\ncf. 52. _Somnia reri_: the best MSS. have _somniare_. Goer. reads _somnia_,\nsupplying _non fuisse vera_. I have already remarked on his extraordinary\npower of _supplying_. Halm conj. _somnia reprobare_, forgetting that the\nverb _reprobare_ belongs to third century Latinity, also _sua visa putare_,\nwhich Bait. adopts. Thinking this too large a departure from the MSS., I\nread _reri_, which verb occurred in I. 26, 39. Possibly _putare_, a little\nfarther on, has got misplaced. _Non id agitur_: these difficulties supply\nSextus with one of his [Greek: tropoi], i.e. [Greek: ho peri tas\nperistaseis]; cf. _P.H._ I. 100, also for the treatment of dreams, _ib._ I.\n104. _Si modo_, etc.: \"if only he dreamed it,\" i.e. \"merely because he\ndreamed it.\" _Aeque ac vigilanti_: = _aeque ac si vigilaret_. Dav. missing\nthe sense, and pointing out that _when awake_ Ennius did not assent to his\nsensations at all, conj. _vigilantis_. Two participles used in very\ndifferent ways not unfrequently occur together, see Madv. _Em. Liv._ p.\n442. _Ita credit_: MSS. have _illa_, which Dav. altered. Halm would prefer\n_credidit_. _Itera dum_, etc.: from the _Iliona_ of Pacuvius; a favourite\nquotation with Cic.; see _Ad Att._ XIV. 14, and _T.D._ II. 44.\n\n\u00a789. _Quisquam_: for the use of this pronoun in interrogative sentences cf.\nVirg. _Aen._ I. 48 with the Notes of Wagner and Conington. _Tam\ncerta putat_: so Sextus _A.M._ VII. 61 points out that Protagoras must in\naccordance with his doctrine [Greek: pant\u00f4n metron anthr\u00f4pos] hold that the\n[Greek: mem\u00ean\u00f4s] is the [Greek: krit\u00earion t\u00f4n en maniai phainomen\u00f4n].\n_Video, video te_: evidently from a tragedy whose subject was [Greek: Aias\nmainomenos], see Ribbeck _Trag. Lat. rel._ p. 205. Cic. in _De Or._ III.\n162 thus continues the quotation, \"_oculis postremum lumen radiatum rape_.\"\nSo in Soph. _Aiax_ 100 the hero, after killing, as he thinks, the Atridae,\nkeeps Odysseus alive awhile in order to torture him. _Hercules_: cf. Eur.\n_Herc. Fur._ 921--1015. The mad visions of this hero, like those of\nOrestes, are often referred to for a similar purpose by Sext., e.g. _A.M._\nVII. 405 [Greek: ho goun Herakl\u00eas maneis kai lab\u00f4n phantasian apo t\u00f4n idi\u00f4n\npaid\u00f4n h\u00f4s Eurystheos, t\u00ean akolouthon praxin taut\u00eai t\u00ea phantasiai syn\u00eapsen.\nakolouthon de \u00ean to tous tou echthrou paidas anelein, hoper kai epoi\u00easen.]\nCf. also _A.M._ VII. 249. _Moveretur_: imperf. for plup. as in 90. _Alcmaeo\ntuus_: cf. 52. _Incitato furore_: Dav. reads _incitatus_. Halm qu. from\nWesenberg _Observ. Crit. ad Or. p. Sestio_ p. 51 this explanation, \"_cum\nfuror eius initio remissior paulatim incitatior et vehementior factus\nesset_,\" he also refers to Wopkens _Lect. Tull._ p. 55 ed. Hand. _Incedunt_\netc.: the MSS. have _incede_, which Lamb. corrected. The subject of the\nverb is evidently _Furiae_. _Adsunt_: is only given once by MSS., while\nRibbeck repeats it thrice, on Halm's suggestion I have written it twice.\n_Caerulea ... angui_: _anguis_ fem is not uncommon in the old poetry. MSS.\nhere have _igni_. _Crinitus_: [Greek: akersekom\u00eas], \"never shorn,\" as\nMilton translates it. _Luna innixus_: the separate mention in the next line\nof _Diana_, usually identified with the moon, has led edd. to emend this\nline. Some old edd. have _lunat_, while Lamb. reads _genu_ for _luna_, cf.\nOv. _Am._ I. 1, 25 (qu. by Goer.) _lunavitque genu sinuosum fortiter\narcum_. Wakefield on Lucr. III. 1013 puts a stop at _auratum_, and goes on\nwith _Luna innixans_. Taber strangely explains _luna_ as = _arcu ipso\nlunato_, Dav. says we ought not to expect the passage to make sense, as it\nis the utterance of a maniac. For my part, I do not see why the poet should\nnot regard _luna_ and _Diana_ as distinct.\n\n\u00a790. _Illa falsa_: sc. _visa_, which governs the two genitives. Goer.\nperversely insists on taking _somniantium recordatione ipsorum_ closely\ntogether. _Non enim id quaeritur_: cf. 80 n. Sext. very often uses very\nsimilar language, as in _P.H._ I. 22, qu. in n. on 40. _Tum cum\nmovebantur_: so Halm for MSS. _tum commovebantur_, the em. is supported by\n88.\n\n    \u00a7\u00a791--98. Summary: Dialectic cannot lead to stable knowledge, its\n    processes are not applicable to a large number of philosophical\n    questions (91). You value the art, but remember that it gave rise to\n    fallacies like the _sorites_, which you say is faulty (92). If it is\n    so, refute it. The plan of Chrysippus to refrain from answering, will\n    avail you nothing (93). If you refrain because you _cannot_ answer,\n    your knowledge fails you, if you _can_ answer and yet refrain, you are\n    unfair (94). The art you admire really undoes itself, as Penelope did\n    her web, witness the _Mentiens_, (95). You assent to arguments which\n    are identical in form with the _Mentiens_, and yet refuse to assent to\n    it Why so? (96) You demand that these sophisms should be made\n    exceptions to the rules of Dialectic. You must go to a tribune for that\n    exception. I just remind you that Epicurus would not allow the very\n    first postulate of your Dialectic (97). In my opinion, and I learned\n    Dialectic from Antiochus, the _Mentiens_ and the arguments identical\n    with it in form must stand or fall together (98).\n\n\u00a791. _Inventam esse_: cf. 26, 27. _In geometriane_: with this inquiry into\nthe special function of Dialectic cf. the inquiry about Rhetoric in Plato\n_Gorg._ 453 D, 454 C. _Sol quantus sit_: this of course is a problem for\n[Greek: physik\u00ea], not for [Greek: dialektik\u00ea]. _Quod sit summum bonum_: not\n[Greek: dialektik\u00ea] but [Greek: \u00eathik\u00ea] must decide this. _Quae\nconiunctio_: etc. so Sext. often opposes [Greek: symplok\u00ea] or [Greek:\nsyn\u00eammenon] to [Greek: diezeugmenon], cf. esp _P.H._ II. 201, and Zeller\n109 sq. with footnotes. An instance of a _coniunctio_ (hypothetical\njudgment) is \"_si lucet, lucet_\" below, of a _disiunctio_ (disjunctive\njudgment) \"_aut vivet cras Hermarchus aut non vivet_\". _Ambigue dictum_:\n[Greek: amphibolon], on which see _P.H._ II. 256, Diog VII. 62. _Quid\nsequatur_: [Greek: to akolouthon], cf. I. 19 n. _Quid repugnet_: cf. I. 19,\nn. _De se ipsa_: the _ipsa_, according to Cic.'s usage, is nom. and not\nabl. Petrus Valentia (p. 301, ed Orelli) justly remarks that an art is not\nto be condemned as useless merely because it is unable to solve every\nproblem presented to it. He quotes Plato's remarks (in _Rep._ II.) that the\nExpert is the man who knows exactly what his art can do and what it cannot.\nVery similar arguments to this of Cic. occur in Sext., cf. esp. _P.H._ II.\n175 and the words [Greek: eautou estai ekkalyptikon]. For the mode in which\nCarneades dealt with Dialectic cf. Zeller 510, 511. The true ground of\nattack is that Logic always _assumes_ the truth of phenomena, and cannot\n_prove_ it. This was clearly seen by Aristotle alone of the ancients; see\nGrote's essay on the Origin of Knowledge, now reprinted in Vol II. of his\n_Aristotle_.\n\n\u00a792. _Nata sit_: cf. 28, 59. _Loquendi_: the Stoic [Greek: logik\u00ea], it must\nbe remembered, included [Greek: rh\u00eatorik\u00ea]. _Concludendi_: [Greek: tou\nsymperainein] or [Greek: syllogizesthai]. _Locum_: [Greek: topon] in the\nphilosophical sense. _Vitiosum_: 49, n. _Num nostra culpa est_: cf. 32.\n_Finium_: absolute limits; the fallacy of the _sorites_ and other such\nsophisms lies entirely in the treatment of purely _relative_ terms as\nthough they were _absolute_. _Quatenus_: the same ellipse occurs in\n_Orator_ 73. _In acervo tritici_: this is the false _sorites_, which may be\nbriefly described thus: A asks B whether one grain makes a heap, B answers\n\"No.\" A goes on asking whether two, three, four, etc. grains make a heap. B\ncannot always reply \"No.\" When he begins to answer \"Yes,\" there will be a\ndifference of one grain between heap and no heap. One grain therefore\n_does_ make a heap. The true _sorites_ or chain inference is still treated\nin books on logic, cf. Thomson's _Laws of Thought_, pp 201--203, ed 8.\n_Minutatim_: cf. Heindorf's note on [Greek: kata smikron] in _Sophistes_\n217 D. _Interrogati_: cf. 104. In 94 we have _interroganti_, which some\nedd. read here. _Dives pauper_, etc.: it will be easily seen that the\nprocess of questioning above described can be applied to any relative term\nsuch as these are. For the omission of any connecting particle between the\nmembers of each pair, cf. 29, 125, _T.D._ I. 64, V. 73, 114, Zumpt _Gram._\n782. _Quanto addito aut dempto_: after this there is a strange ellipse of\nsome such words as _id efficiatur, quod interrogatur_. [_Non_] _habemus_: I\nbracket _non_ in deference to Halm, Madv. however (_Opusc._ I. 508) treats\nit as a superabundance of negation arising from a sort of anacoluthon,\ncomparing _In Vatin._ 3, _Ad Fam._ XII. 24. The scribes insert and omit\nnegatives very recklessly, so that the point may remain doubtful.\n\n\u00a793. _Frangite_: in later Gk. generally [Greek: apolyein]. _Erunt ...\ncavetis_: this form of the conditional sentence is illustrated in Madv.\n_D.F._ III. 70, _Em. Liv._ p. 422, _Gram._ 340, obs. 1. Goer. qu. Terence\n_Heaut._ V. 1, 59 _quot incommoda tibi in hac re capies nisi caves_, cf.\nalso 127, 140 of this book. The present is of course required by the\ninstantaneous nature of the action. _Chrysippo_: he spent so much time in\ntrying to solve the sophism that it is called peculiarly his by Persius VI.\n80. _inventus, Chrysippe, tui finitor acervi_. The titles of numerous\ndistinct works of his on the _Sorites_ and _Mentiens_ are given by Diog.\n_Tria pauca sint_: cf. the instances in Sext. _A.M._ VII. 418 [Greek: ta\npent\u00eakonta oliga estin, ta myria oliga estin], also Diog. VII. 82 [Greek:\nh\u00easychazein] the advice is quoted in Sext. _P.H._ II. 253 ([Greek: dein\nhistasthai kai epechein]), _A.M._ VII. 416 ([Greek: ho sophos st\u00easetai kai\nh\u00easychasei]). The same terms seem to have been used by the Cynics, see\nSext. _P.H._ II. 244, III. 66. _Stertas_: imitated by Aug. _Contra Ac._\nIII. 25 _ter terna novem esse ... vel genere humano stertente verum sit_,\nalso _ib._ III. 22. _Proficit_: Dav. _proficis_, but Madv. rightly\nunderstands [Greek: to h\u00easychazein] (_Em._ 184), cf. _N.D._ II. 58.\n_Ultimum ... respondere_: \"to put in as your answer\" cf. the use of\n_defendere_ with an accus. \"to put in as a plea\". Kayser suggests _paucorum\nquid sit_.\n\n\u00a794. _Ut agitator_: see the amusing letter to Atticus XIII. 21, in which\nCic. discusses different translations for the word [Greek: epechein], and\nquotes a line of Lucilius _sustineat currum ut bonu' saepe agitator\nequosque_, adding _semperque Carneades_ [Greek: probol\u00ean] _pugilis et\nretentionem aurigae similem facit_ [Greek: epoch\u00ea]. Aug. _Contra Ac._\ntrans. [Greek: epoch\u00ea] by _refrenatio_ cf. also _Lael._ 63. _Superbus es_:\nI have thus corrected the MSS. _responde superbe_; Halm writes _facis\nsuperbe_, Orelli _superbis_, which verb is hardly found in prose. The\nphrase _superbe resistere_ in Aug. _Contra Ac._ III. 14 may be a\nreminiscence. _Illustribus_: Bait. with some probability adds _in_,\ncomparing _in decimo_ below, and 107, cf. however Munro on Lucr. I. 420.\n_Irretiat_: parallel expressions occur in _T.D._ V. 76, _De Or._ I. 43, _De\nFato_ 7. _Facere non sinis_: Sext. _P.H._ II. 253 points the moral in the\nsame way. _Augentis nec minuentis_: so Halm for MSS. _augendi nec\nminuendi_, which Bait. retains. I cannot believe the phrase _primum\naugendi_ to be Latin.\n\n\u00a795. _Tollit ... superiora_: cf. _Hortensius_ fragm. 19 (Orelli) _sed ad\nextremum pollicetur prolaturum qui se ipse comest quod efficit\ndialecticorum ratio_. _Vestra an nostra_: Bait. after Christ needlessly\nwrites _nostra an vestra_. [Greek: axi\u00f4ma]: \"a judgment expressed in\nlanguage\"; cf. Zeller 107, who gives the Stoic refinements on this subject.\n_Effatum_: Halm gives the spelling _ecfatum_. It is probable that this\nspelling was antique in Cic.'s time and only used in connection with\nreligious and legal formulae as in _De Div._ I. 81, _De Leg._ II. 20, see\nCorss. _Ausspr._ I. 155 For the word cf. Sen. _Ep._ 117 _enuntiativum\nquiddam de corpore quod alii effatum vocant, alii enuntiatum, alii\nedictum_, in _T.D._ I. 14 _pronuntiatum_ is found, in _De Fato_ 26\n_pronuntiatio_, in Gellius XVI. 8 (from Varro) _prologium_. _Aut verum esse\naut falsum_: the constant Stoic definition of [Greek: axi\u00f4ma], see Diog.\nVII. 65 and other passages in Zeller 107. _Mentiris an verum dicis_: the\n_an_ was added by Schutz on a comparison of Gellius XVIII. 10 _cum mentior\net mentiri me dico, mentior an verum dico?_ The sophism is given in a more\nformally complete shape in _De Div._ II. 11 where the following words are\nadded, _dicis autem te mentiri verumque dicis, mentiris igitur_. The\nfallacy is thus hit by Petrus Valentia (p. 301, ed Orelli), _quis unquam\ndixit \"ego mentior\" quum hoc ipsum pronuntiatum falsum vellet declarare?_\n_Inexplicabilia_: [Greek: apora] in the Greek writers. _Odiosius_: this\nadj. has not the strong meaning of the Eng. \"hateful,\" but simply means\n\"tiresome,\" \"annoying.\" _Non comprehensa_: as in 99, the opposite of\n_comprehendibilia_ III. 1, 41. The past partic. in Cic. often has the same\nmeaning as an adj. in _-bilis_. Faber points out that in the _Timaeus_ Cic.\ntranslates [Greek: alytos] by _indissolutus_ and _indissolubilis_\nindifferently. _Imperceptus_, which one would expect, is found in Ovid.\n\n\u00a796. _Si dicis_: etc. the words in italics are needed, and were given by\nManut. with the exception of _nunc_ which was added by Dav. The idea of\nOrelli, that Cic. clipped these trite sophisms as he does verses from the\ncomic writers is untenable. _In docendo_: _docere_ is not to _expound_ but\nto _prove_, cf. n. on 121. _Primum ... modum_: the word _modus_ is\ntechnical in this sense cf. _Top._ 57. The [Greek: protos logos\nanapodeiktos] of the Stoic logic ran thus [Greek: ei h\u00eamera esti, ph\u00f4s\nestin ... alla m\u00ean h\u00eamera estin ph\u00f4s ara estin] (Sext. _P.H._ II. 157, and\nother passages qu. Zeller 114). This bears a semblance of inference and is\nnot so utterly tautological as Cic.'s translation, which merges [Greek:\nph\u00f4s] and [Greek: h\u00eamera] into one word, or that of Zeller (114, note).\nThese arguments are called [Greek: monol\u00eammatoi] (involving only one\npremise) in Sext. _P.H._ I. 152, 159, II. 167. _Si dicis te mentiri_, etc.:\nit is absurd to assume, as this sophism does, that when a man _truly_\nstates that he _has_ told a lie, he establishes against himself not merely\nthat he _has_ told a lie, but also that he _is_ telling a lie at the moment\nwhen he makes the _true_ statement. The root of the sophism lies in the\nconfusion of past and present time in the one infinitive _mentiri_.\n_Eiusdem generis_: the phrase _te mentiri_ had been substituted for _nunc\nlucere_. _Chrysippea_: n. on 93. _Conclusioni_: on _facere_ with the dat.\nsee n. on 27. _Cederet_: some edd. _crederet_, but the word is a trans. of\nGk. [Greek: eikein]; n. on 66. _Conexi_: = [Greek: syn\u00eammenon], cf. Zeller\n109. This was the proper term for the hypothetical judgment. _Superius_:\nthe [Greek: syn\u00eammenon] consists of two parts, the hypothetical part and\nthe affirmative--called in Greek [Greek: h\u00eagoumenon] and [Greek: l\u00eagon]; if\none is admitted the other follows of course.\n\n\u00a797. _Excipiantur_: the legal _formula_ of the Romans generally directed\nthe _iudex_ to condemn the defendant if certain facts were proved, unless\ncertain other facts were proved; the latter portion went by the name of\n_exceptio_. See _Dict. Ant_. _Tribunum ... adeant_: a retort upon Lucullus;\ncf. 13. The MSS. have _videant_ or _adeant_; Halm conj. _adhibeant_,\ncomparing 86 and _Pro Rabirio_ 20. _Contemnit_: the usual trans. \"to\ndespise\" for _contemnere_ is too strong; it means, like [Greek: olig\u00f4rein],\nmerely to neglect or pass by. _Effabimur_; cf. _effatum_ above.\n_Hermarchus_: not _Hermachus_, as most edd.; see _M.D.F._ II. 96.\n_Diiunctum_: [Greek: diezeugmenon], for which see Zeller 112.\n_Necessarium_: the reason why Epicurus refused to admit this is given in\n_De Fato_ 21 _Epicurus veretur ne si hoc concesserit, concedendum sit fato\nfieri quaecumque fiant_. The context of that passage should be carefully\nread, along with _N.D._ I. 69, 70. Aug. _Contra Ac._ III. 29 lays great\nstress on the necessary truth of disjunctive propositions. _Catus_: so\nLamb. for MSS. _cautus_. _Tardum_: _De Div._ II. 103 _Epicurum quem hebetem\net rudem dicere solent Stoici_; cf. also _ib._ II. 116, and the frequent\nuse of [Greek: bradys] in Sext., e.g. _A.M._ VII. 325. _Cum hoc igitur_:\nthe word _igitur_, as usual, picks up the broken thread of the sentence.\n_Id est_: n. on I. 8. _Evertit_: for the Epicurean view of Dialectic see R.\nand P. 343. Zeller 399 sq., _M.D.F._ I. 22. _E contrariis diiunctio_: =\n[Greek: diezeugmenon ex enanti\u00f4n].\n\n\u00a798. _Sequor_: as in 95, 96, where the _Dialectici_ refused to allow the\nconsequences of their own principles, according to Cic. _Ludere_: this\nreminds one of the famous controversy between Corax and Tisias, for which\nsee Cope in the old _Journal of Philology_. No. 7. _Iudicem ... non\niudicem_: this construction, which in Greek would be marked by [Greek: men]\nand [Greek: de], has been a great crux of edd.; Dav. here wished to insert\n_cum_ before _iudicem_, but is conclusively refuted by Madv. _Em._ 31. The\nsame construction occurs in 103. _Esse conexum_: with great probability\nChrist supposes the infinitive to be an addition of the copyists.\n\n    \u00a7\u00a798--105. Summary. In order to overthrow at once the case of\n    Antiochus, I proceed to explain, after Clitomachus, the whole of\n    Carneades' system (98). Carneades laid down two divisions of _visa_,\n    one into those capable of being perceived and those not so capable, the\n    other into probable and improbable. Arguments aimed at the senses\n    concern the first division only; the sapiens will follow probability,\n    as in many instances the Stoic sapiens confessedly does (99, 100). Our\n    sapiens is not made of stone; many things _seem_ to him true; yet he\n    always feels that there is a possibility of their being false. The\n    Stoics themselves admit that the senses are often deceived. Put this\n    admission together with the tenet of Epicurus, and perception becomes\n    impossible (101). It is strange that our _Probables_ do not seem\n    sufficient to you. Hear the account given by Clitomachus (102). He\n    condemns those who say that sensation is swept away by the Academy;\n    nothing is swept away but its _necessary_ certainty (103). There are\n    two modes of withholding assent; withholding it absolutely and\n    withholding it merely so far as to deny the _certainty_ of phenomena.\n    The latter mode leaves all that is required for ordinary life (104).\n\n\u00a798. _Tortuosum_: similar expressions are in _T.D._ II. 42, III. 22, _D.F._\nIV. 7. _Ut Poenus_: \"as might be expected from a Carthaginian;\" cf. _D.F._\nIV. 56, _tuus ille Poenulus, homo acutus_. A different meaning is given by\nthe _ut_ in passages like _De Div._ II. 30 _Democritus non inscite nugatur,\nut physicus, quo genere nihil arrogantius_; \"for a physical philosopher.\"\n\n\u00a799. _Genera_: here = classifications of, modes of dividing _visa_. This\nway of taking the passage will defend Cic. against the strong censure of\nMadv. (Pref. to _D.F._ p. lxiii.) who holds him convicted of ignorance, for\nrepresenting Carneades as dividing _visa_ into those which can be perceived\nand those which cannot. Is it possible that any one should read the\n_Academica_ up to this point, and still believe that Cic. is capable of\nsupposing, even for a moment, that Carneades in any way upheld [Greek:\nkatal\u00eapsis]? _Dicantur_: i.e. _ab Academicis_. _Si probabile_: the _si_ is\nnot in MSS. Halm and also Bait. follow Christ in reading _est, probabile\nnihil esse_. _Commemorabas_: in 53, 58. _Eversio_: cf. _D.F._ III. 50 (the\nsame words), Plat. _Gorg_. 481 C [Greek: h\u00eam\u00f4n ho bios anatetrammenos an\nei\u00ea], Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 157 [Greek: syncheomen ton bion]. _Et sensibus_:\nno second _et_ corresponds to this; _sic_ below replaces it. See Madv.\n_D.F._ p. 790, ed. 2. _Quicquam tale_ etc.: cf. 40, 41. _Nihil ab eo\ndifferens_: n. on 54. _Non comprehensa_: n. on 96.\n\n\u00a7100. _Si iam_: \"if, for example;\" so _iam_ is often used in Lucretius.\n_Probo ... bono_: it would have seemed more natural to transpose these\nepithets. _Facilior ... ut probet_: the usual construction is with _ad_ and\nthe gerund; cf. _De Div._ II. 107, _Brut_. 180. _Anaxagoras_: he made no\n[Greek: homoiomereiai] of snow, but only of water, which, when pure and\ndeep, is dark in colour. _Concreta_: so Manut. for MSS. _congregata_. In\n121 the MSS. give _concreta_ without variation, as in _N.D._ II. 101, _De\nDiv._ I. 130, _T.D._ I. 66, 71.\n\n\u00a7101. _Impeditum_: cf. 33, n. _Movebitur_: cf. _moveri_ in 24. _Non enim\nest_: Cic. in the vast majority of cases writes _est enim_, the two words\nfalling under one accent like _sed enim, et enim_ (cf. Corss. _Ausspr._ II.\n851); Beier on _De Off._ I. p. 157 (qu. by Halm) wishes therefore to read\n_est enim_, but the MSS. both of the _Lucullus_ and of Nonius agree in the\nother form, which Madv. allows to stand in _D.F._ I. 43, and many other\nplaces (see his note). Cf. fragm. 22 of the _Acad. Post_. _E robore_: so\nNonius, but the MSS. of Cic. give here _ebore_. _Dolatus_: an evident\nimitation of Hom. _Od._ T 163 [Greek: ou gar apo drios essi palaiphatou\noud' apo petr\u00eas]. _Neque tamen habere_: i.e. _se putat_. For the sudden\nchange from _oratio recta_ to _obliqua_ cf. 40 with n. _Percipiendi notam_:\n= [Greek: charakt\u00eara t\u00eas synktathese\u00f4s] in Sext. _P.H._ I. 191. For the use\nof the gerund cf. n. on 26, with Madv. _Gram._ 418, Munro on Lucr. I. 313;\nfor _propriam_ 34. _Exsistere_. cf. 36. _Qui neget_: see 79. _Caput_: a\nlegal term. _Conclusio loquitur_: cf. _historiae loquantur_ (5),\n_consuetudo loquitur_ (_D.F._ II. 48), _hominis institutio si loqueretur_\n(_ib._ IV. 41), _vites si loqui possint_ (_ib._ V. 39), _patria loquitur_\n(_In Cat._ I. 18, 27); the last use Cic. condemns himself in _Orat._ 85.\n_Inquit_: \"quotha,\" indefinitely, as in 109, 115; cf. also _dicit_ in 79.\n\n\u00a7102. _Reprehensio est ... satis esse vobis_: Bait. follows Madv. in\nplacing a comma after _est_, and a full stop at _probabilia_. _Tamen_ ought\nin that case to follow _dicimus_, and it is noteworthy that in his\ncommunication to Halm (printed on p. 854 of Bait., and Hahn's ed. of the\nphilosophical works, 1861) Madv. omits the word _tamen_ altogether, nor\ndoes Bait. in adopting the suggestion notice the omission. _Ista diceret_:\n\"stated the opinions you asked for.\" _Poetam_: this both Halm and Bait.\ntreat as a gloss.\n\n\u00a7103. For this section cf. Lucullus' speech, passim, and Sext. _P.H._ I.\n227 sq. _Academia ... quibus_: a number of exx. of this change from sing.\nto plural are given by Madv. on _D.F._ V. 16. _Nullum_: on the favourite\nCiceronian use of _nullus_ for _non_ see 47, 141, and Madv. _Gram._ 455,\nobs. 5. _Illud sit disputatum_: for the construction cf. 98; _autem_ is\nomitted with the same constr. in _D.F._ V. 79, 80. _Nusquam alibi_: cf. 50.\n\n\u00a7104. _Exposuisset adiungit_: Madv. on _D.F._ III. 67 notices a certain\nlooseness in the use of tenses, which Cic. displays in narrating the\nopinions of philosophers, but no ex. so strong as this is produced. _Ut aut\napprobet quid aut improbet_: this Halm rejects. I have noticed among recent\neditors of Cic. a strong tendency to reject explanatory clauses introduced\nby _ut_. Halm brackets a similar clause in 20, and is followed in both\ninstances by Bait. Kayser, who is perhaps the most extensive _bracketer_ of\nmodern times, rejects very many clauses of the kind in the Oratorical\nworks. In our passage, the difficulty vanishes when we reflect that\n_approbare_ and _improbare_ may mean either to render an _absolute_\napproval or disapproval, or to render an approval or disapproval merely\nbased on _probability_. For example, in 29 the words have the first\nmeaning, in 66 the second. The same is the case with _nego_ and _aio_. I\ntrace the whole difficulty of the passage to the absence of terms to\nexpress distinctly the difference between the two kinds of assent. The\ngeneral sense will be as follows. \"There are two kinds of [Greek: epoch\u00ea],\none which prevents a man from expressing any assent or disagreement (in\neither of the two senses above noticed), another which does not prevent him\nfrom giving an answer to questions, provided his answer be not taken to\nimply absolute approval or absolute disapproval; the result of which will\nbe that he will neither absolutely deny nor absolutely affirm anything, but\nwill merely give a qualified 'yes' or 'no,' dependent on probability.\" My\ndefence of the clause impugned is substantially the same as that of Hermann\nin the _Philologus_ (vol. VII.), which I had not read when this note was\nfirst written. _Alterum placere ... alterum tenere_: \"the one is his formal\ndogma, the other is his actual practice.\" For the force of this see my note\non _non probans_ in 148, which passage is very similar to this. _Neget ...\naiat_: cf. 97. _Nec ut placeat_: this, the MSS. reading, gives exactly the\nwrong sense, for Clitomachus _did_ allow such _visa_ to stand as were\nsufficient to serve as a basis for action. Hermann's _neu cui_ labours\nunder the same defect. Various emendations are _nam cum_ (Lamb., accepted\nby Zeller 522), _hic ut_ (Manut.), _et cum_ (Dav. followed by Bait.), _sed\ncum_ (Halm). The most probable of these seems to me that of Manut. I should\nprefer _sic ut_, taking _ut_ in the sense of \"although.\" _Respondere_: \"to\nput in as an answer,\" as in 93 and often. _Approbari_: sc. _putavit_. Such\nchanges of construction are common in Cic., and I cannot follow Halm in\naltering the reading to _approbavit_.\n\n\u00a7105. _Lucem eripimus_: cf. 30.\n\n    \u00a7\u00a7105--111. Summary. You must see, Lucullus, by this time, that your\n    defence of dogmatism is overthrown (105). You asked how memory was\n    possible on my principles. Why, did not Siron remember the dogmas of\n    Epicurus? If nothing can be remembered which is not absolutely true,\n    then these will be true (106). Probability is quite sufficient basis\n    for the arts. One strong point of yours is that nature compels us to\n    _assent_. But Panaetius doubted even some of the Stoic dogmas, and you\n    yourself refuse assent to the _sorites_, why then should not the\n    Academic doubt about other things? (107) Your other strong point is\n    that without assent action is impossible (108). But surely many actions\n    of the dogmatist proceed upon mere probability. Nor do you gain by the\n    use of the hackneyed argument of Antiochus (109). Where probability is,\n    there the Academic has all the knowledge he wants (110). The argument\n    of Antiochus that the Academics first admit that there are true and\n    false _visa_ and then contradict themselves by denying that there is\n    any difference between true and false, is absurd. We do not deny that\n    the difference _exists_; we do deny that human faculties are capable of\n    perceiving the difference (111).\n\n\u00a7105. _Inducto ... prob._: so Aug. _Cont Ac._ II. 12 _Soluto, libero_: cf.\nn. on 8. _Implicato_: = _impedito_ cf. 101. _Iacere_: cf. 79. _Isdem\noculis_: an answer to the question _nihil cernis?_ in 102. _Purpureum_: cf.\nfragm. 7 of the _Acad. Post_. _Modo caeruleum ... sole_: Nonius (cf. fragm.\n23) quotes _tum caeruleum tum lavum_ (the MSS. in our passage have\n_flavum_) _videtur, quodque nunc a sole_. C.F. Hermann would place _mane\nravum_ after _quodque_ and take _quod_ as a proper relative pronoun, not as\n= \"because.\" This transposition certainly gives increased clearness.\nHermann further wishes to remove _a_, quoting exx. of _collucere_ without\nthe prep., which are not at all parallel, i.e. _Verr._ I. 58, IV. 71.\n_Vibrat_: with the [Greek: an\u00earithmon gelasma] of Aeschylus.\n_Dissimileque_: Halm, followed by Bait., om. _que_. _Proximo et_: MSS. have\n_ei_, rightly altered by Lamb., cf. e.g. _De Fato_ 44. _Non possis ...\ndefendere_: a similar line is taken in 81.\n\n\u00a7106. _Memoria_: cf. 22. _Polyaenus_: named _D.F._ I. 20, Diog. X. 18, as\none of the chief friends of Epicurus. _Falsum quod est_: Greek and Latin do\nnot distinguish accurately between the _true_ and the _existent_, the\n_false_ and the _non existent_, hence the present difficulty; in Plato the\nconfusion is frequent, notably in the _Sophistes_ and _Theaetetus_. _Si\nigitur_: \"if then recollection is recollection only of things perceived and\nknown.\" The dogmatist theory of [Greek: mn\u00eam\u00ea] and [Greek: no\u00easis] is dealt\nwith in exactly the same way by Sext. _P.H._ II. 5, 10 and elsewhere, cf.\nalso Plat _Theaet._ 191 sq. _Siron_: thus Madv. on _D.F._ II. 119 writes\nthe name, not _Sciron_, as Halm. _Fateare_: the em. of Dav. for _facile_,\n_facere_, _facias_ of MSS. Christ defends _facere_, thinking that the\nconstr. is varied from the subj. to the inf. after _oportet_, as after\n_necesse est_ in 39. For _facere_ followed by an inf. cf. _M.D.F._ IV. 8.\n_Nulla_: for _non_, cf. 47, 103.\n\n\u00a7107. _Fiet artibus_: n. on 27 for the constr., for the matter see 22.\n_Lumina_: \"strong points.\" Bentl. boldly read _columina_, while Dav.\nproposed _vimina_ or _vincula_. That an em. is not needed may be seen from\n_D.F._ II. 70. _negat Epicurus (hoc enim vestrum lumen est)_ _N.D._ I. 79,\nand 43 of this book. _Responsa_: added by Ernesti. Faber supplies\n_haruspicia_, Orelli after Ern. _haruspicinam_, but, as Halm says, some\nnoun in the plur. is needed. _Quod is non potest_: this is the MSS.\nreading, but most edd. read _si is_, to cure a wrong punctuation, by which\na colon is placed at _perspicuum est_ above, and a full stop at\n_sustineat_. Halm restored the passage. _Habuerint_: the subj. seems due to\nthe attraction exercised by _sustineat_. Bait. after Kayser has\n_habuerunt_. _Positum_: \"when laid down\" or \"assumed.\"\n\n\u00a7108. _Alterum est quod_: this is substituted for _deinde_, which ought to\ncorrespond to _primum_ above. _Actio ullius rei_: n. on _actio rerum_ in\n62, cf. also 148. _Adsensu comprobet_: almost the same phrase often occurs\nin Livy, Sueton., etc. see Forc. _Sit etiam_: the _etiam_ is a little\nstrange and was thought spurious by Ernesti. It seems to have the force of\nEng. \"indeed\", \"in what indeed assent consists.\" _Sensus ipsos adsensus_:\nso in I. 41 _sensus_ is defined to be _id quod est sensu comprehensum_,\ni.e. [Greek: katal\u00eapsis], cf. also Stobaeus I. 41, 25 [Greek: aisth\u00eatik\u00ea\ngar phantasia synkatathesis esti]. _Appetitio_: for all this cf. 30. _Et\ndicta ... multa_: Manut. ejected these words as a gloss, after _multa_ the\nMSS. curiously add _vide superiora_. _Lubricos sustinere_: cf. 68 and 94.\n_Ita scribenti ... exanclatum_: for the om. of _esse_ cf. 77, 113 with\nnotes. _Herculi_: for this form of the gen. cf. Madv. on _D.F._ I. 14, who\ndoubts whether Cic. ever wrote _-is_ in the gen. of the Greek names in\n_-es_. When we consider how difficult it was for copyists _not_ to change\nthe rarer form into the commoner, also that even Priscian (see _M.D.F._ V.\n12) made gross blunders about them, the supposition of Madv. becomes almost\nirresistible. _Temeritatem_: [Greek: propeteian, eikaiot\u00eata].\n\n\u00a7109. _In navigando_: cf. 100. _In conserendo_: Guretus interprets \"[Greek:\nen t\u00f4 phytyesthai ton agron],\" and is followed by most commentators, though\nit seems at least possible that _manum_ is to be understood. For the\nsuppressed accus. _agrum_ cf. n. on _tollendum_ in 148. _Sequere_: the fut.\nnot the pres. ind., cf. 61. _Pressius_: cf. 28. _Reprehensum_: sc.\n_narrasti_. _Id ipsum_: = _nihil posse comprehendi_. _Saltem_: so in 29.\n_Pingue_: cf. _Pro Archia_ 10. _Sibi ipsum_: note that Cic. does not\ngenerally make _ipse_ agree in case with the reflexive, but writes _se\nipse_, etc. _Convenienter_: \"consistently\". _Esse possit_: Bait. _posset_\non the suggestion of Halm, but Cic. states the doctrine as a living one,\nnot throwing it back to Antiochus time and to this particular speech of\nAnt. _Ut hoc ipsum_: the _ut_ follows on _illo modo urguendum_ above.\n_Decretum quod_: Halm followed by Bait. gives _quo_, referring to _altero\nquo neget_ in 111, which however does not justify the reading. The best\nMSS. have _qui_. _Et sine decretis_: Lamb. gave _nec_ for _et_, but Dav.\ncorrectly explains, \"_multa decreta habent Academici, non tamen percepta\nsed tantum probabilia._\"\n\n\u00a7110. _Ut illa_: i.e. the _decreta_ implied in the last sentence. Some MSS.\nhave _ille_, while Dav. without necessity gives _alia_. _Sic hoc ipsum_:\nSext. then is wrong is saying (_P.H._ I. 226) that the Academics [Greek:\ndiabebaiountai ta pragmata einai akatal\u00eapta], i.e. state the doctrine\ndogmatically, while the sceptics do not. _Cognitionis notam_: like _nota\npercipiendi_, _veri et falsi_, etc. which we have already had. _Ne\nconfundere omnia_: a mocking repetition of Lucullus phrase, cf. 58.\n_Incerta reddere_: cf. 54. _Stellarum numerus_: another echo of Lucullus;\nsee 32. _Quem ad modum ... item_: see Madv. on _D.F._ III. 48, who quotes\nan exact parallel from _Topica_ 46, and _sicut ... item_ from _N.D._ I. 3,\nnoting at the same time that in such exx. neither _ita_ nor _idem_, which\nMSS. sometimes give for _item_, is correct.\n\n\u00a7111. _Dicere ... perturbatum_: for om. of _esse_ cf. 108, etc.\n_Antiochus_: this Bait. brackets. _Unum ... alterum_: cf. 44. _Esse quaedam\nin visis_: it was not the _esse_ but the _videri_, not the actual existence\nof a difference, but the possibility of that difference being infallibly\nperceived by human sense, that the Academic denied. _Cernimus_: i.e. the\n_probably_ true and false. _Probandi species_: a phenomenal appearance\nwhich belongs to, or properly leads to qualified approval.\n\n    \u00a7\u00a7112--115. Summary. If I had to deal with a Peripatetic, whose\n    definitions are not so exacting, my course would be easier; I should\n    not much oppose him even if he maintained that the wise man sometimes\n    _opines_ (112). The definitions of the real Old Academy are more\n    reasonable than those of Antiochus. How, holding the opinions he does,\n    can he profess to belong to the Old Academy? (113) I cannot tolerate\n    your assumption that it is possible to keep an elaborate dogmatic\n    system like yours free from mistakes (114). You wish me to join your\n    school. What am I to do then with my dear friend Diodotus, who thinks\n    so poorly of Antiochus? Let us consider however what system not I, but\n    the _sapiens_ is to adopt (115).\n\n\u00a7112. _Campis ... exsultare ... oratio_: expressions like this are common\nin Cic., e.g. _D.F._ I. 54, _De Off._ I. 61, _Orat._ 26; cf. also Aug.\n_Cont. Ac._ III. 5 _ne in quaestionis campis tua eqitaret oratio_. _Cum\nPeripatetico_: nothing that Cic. states here is at discord with what is\nknown of the tenets of the later Peripatetics; cf. esp. Sext. _A.M._ VII.\n216--226. All that Cic. says is that he could accept the Peripatetic\nformula, putting upon it his own meaning of course. Doubtless a Peripatetic\nwould have wondered how a sceptic _could_ accept his formulae; but the\nspectacle of men of the most irreconcilable opinions clinging on to the\nsame formulae is common enough to prevent us from being surprised at\nCicero's acceptance. I have already suggested (n. on 18) that we have here\na trace of Philo's teaching, as distinct from that of Carneades. I see\nabsolutely no reason for the very severe remarks of Madvig on _D.F._ V. 76,\na passage which very closely resembles ours. _Dumeta_: same use in _N.D._\nI. 68, Aug. _Cont. Ac._ II. 6; the _spinae_ of the Stoics are often\nmentioned, e.g. _D.F._ IV. 6. _E vero ... a falso_: note the change of\nprep. _Adhiberet_: the MSS. are confused here, and go Halm reads _adderet_,\nand Bait. follows, while Kayser proposes _adhaereret_, which is indeed\nnearer the MSS.; cf. however I. 39 _adhiberet_. _Accessionem_: for this cf.\n18 and 77. _Simpliciter_: the opposite of _subtiliter_; cf.\n_simpliciter--subtilitas_ in I. 6. _Ne Carneade quidem_: cf. 59, 67, 78,\n148.\n\n\u00a7113. _Sed qui his minor est_: given by Halm as the em. of Io. Clericus for\nMSS. _sed mihi minores_. Guietus gave _sed his minores_, Durand _sed\nminutior_, while Halm suggests _sed minutiores_. I conj. _nimio minares_,\nwhich would be much nearer the MSS.; cf. Lucr. I. 734 _inferiores partibus\negregie multis multoque minores_. _Tale verum_: _visum_ omitted as in\n_D.F._ V. 76. _Incognito_: cf. 133. _Amavi hominem_: cf. Introd. p. 6. _Ita\niudico, politissimum_; it is a mistake to suppose this sentence incomplete,\nlike Halm, who wishes to add _eum esse_, or like Bait., who with Kayser\nprints _esse_ after _politissimum_. Cf. 108 _ita scribenti, exanclatum_,\nand the examples given from Cic. by Madv. on _D.F._ II. 13. _Horum\nneutrum_: cf. 77 _nemo_. _Utrumque verum_: Cic. of course only accepts the\npropositions as Arcesilas did; see 77.\n\n\u00a7114. _Illud ferre_: cf. 136. _Constituas_: this verb is often used in\nconnection with the ethical _finis_; cf. 129 and I. 19. _Idemque etiam_:\nKrebs and Allgayer (_Antibarbarus_, ed. 4) deny that the expression _idem\netiam_ is Latin. One good MS. here has _atque etiam_, which Dav. reads; cf.\nhowever _Orat._ 117. _Artificium_: = _ars_, as in 30. _Nusquam labar_: cf.\n138 _ne labar_. _Subadroganter_: cf. 126.\n\n\u00a7115. _Qui sibi cum oratoribus ... rexisse_: so Cic. vary often speaks of\nthe Peripatetics, as in _D.F._ IV. 5, V. 7. _Sustinuero_: cf. 70. _Tam\nbonos_: Cic. often speaks of them and of Epicurus in this patronising way;\nsee e.g. _T.D._ II. 44, III. 50, _D.F._ I. 25, II. 81. For the Epicurean\nfriendships cf. esp. _D.F._ I. 65. _Diodoto_: cf. Introd. p. 2. _Nolumus_:\nHalm and Bait., give _nolimus_; so fine a line divides the subjunctive from\nthe indicative in clauses like these that the choice often depends on mere\nindividual taste. _De sapiente loquamur_: n. on 66.\n\n    \u00a7\u00a7116--128. Summary. Of the three parts of philosophy take Physics\n    first. Would your _sapiens_ swear to the truth of any geometrical\n    result whatever? (116) Let us see which one of actual physical systems\n    the _sapiens_ we are seeking will select (117). He must choose _one_\n    teacher from among the conflicting schools of Thales, Anaximander,\n    Anaximenos, Anaxagoras, Xenophanes, Leucippus, Democritus, Empedocles,\n    Heraclitus, Melissus, Plato and Pythagoras. The remaining teachers,\n    great men though they be, he must reject (118). Whatever system he\n    selects he must know absolutely; if the Stoic, he must believe as\n    strongly in the Stoic theology as he does in the sunlight. If he holds\n    this, Aristotle will pronounce him mad; you, however, Lucullus, must\n    defend the Stoics and spurn Aristotle from you, while you will not\n    allow me even to doubt (119). How much better to be free, as I am and\n    not compelled to find an answer to all the riddles of the universe!\n    (120) Nothing can exist, say you, apart from the deity. Strato,\n    however, says he does not need the deity to construct the universe. His\n    mode of construction again differs from that of Democritus. I see some\n    good in Strato, yet I will not assent absolutely either to his system\n    or to yours (121). All these matters lie far beyond our ken. We know\n    nothing of our bodies, which we can dissect, while we have not the\n    advantage of being able to dissect the constitution of things or of the\n    earth to see whether she is firmly fixed or hovers in mid air (122).\n    Xenophanes, Hicetas, Plato and Epicurus tell strange things of the\n    heavenly bodies. How much better to side with Socrates and Aristo, who\n    hold that nothing can be known about them! (123) Who knows the nature\n    of mind? Numberless opinions clash, as do those of Dicaearchus, Plato\n    and Xenocrates. Our _sapiens_ will be unable to decide (124). If you\n    say it is better to choose any system rather than none, I choose\n    Democritus. You at once upbraid me for believing such monstrous\n    falsehoods (125). The Stoics differ among themselves about physical\n    subjects, why will they not allow me to differ from them? (126) Not\n    that I deprecate the study of Physics, for moral good results from it\n    (127). Our _sapiens_ will be delighted if he attains to anything which\n    seems to resemble truth. Before I proceed to Ethics, I note your\n    weakness in placing all perceptions on the same level. You must be\n    prepared to asseverate no less strongly that the sun is eighteen times\n    as large as the earth, than that yon statue is six feet high. When you\n    admit that all things can be perceived no more and no less clearly than\n    the size of the sun, I am almost content (128).\n\n\u00a7116. _Tres partes_: cf. I. 19. _Et a vobismet_: \"and especially by you\".\nThe threefold division was peculiarly Stoic, though used by other schools,\ncf. Sext. _P.H._ II. 13 (on the same subject) [Greek: hoi St\u00f4ikoi kai alloi\ntines]. For other modes of dividing philosophy see Sext. _A.M._ VII. 2. _At\nillud ante_: this is my em. for the MSS. _velut illud ante_, which probably\narose from a marginal variant \"_vel ut_\" taking the place of _at_; cf. a\nsimilar break in 40 _sed prius_, also in 128 _at paulum ante_. Such breaks\noften occur in Cic., as in _Orator_ 87 _sed nunc aliud_, also _T.D._ IV. 47\n_repenam fortasse, sed illud ante._ For _velut_ Halm writes _vel_ (which\nBait. takes), Dav. _verum_. _Inflatus tumore_: cf. _De Off._ I. 91 _inflati\nopinionibus._ Bentl. read _errore_. _Cogere_: this word like [Greek:\nanankazein] and [Greek: biazesthai] often means simply to argue\nirresistibly. _Initia_: as in 118, bases of proof, themselves naturally\nincapable of proof, so [Greek: archai] in Gk. _Digitum_: cf. 58, 143.\n_Punctum esse_ etc.: [Greek: s\u00eameion estin ou meros outhen] (Sext. _P.H._\nIII. 39), [Greek: stigm\u00ea] = [Greek: to ameres] (_A.M._ IX. 283, 377).\n_Extremitatem_: = [Greek: epiphaneian]. _Libramentum_: so this word is used\nby Pliny (see Forc.) for the slope of a hill. _Nulla crassitudo_: in Sext.\nthe [Greek: epiphaneia] is usually described not negatively as here, but\npositively as [Greek: m\u00eakos meta platous] (_P.H._ III. 39), [Greek: peras]\n(_extremitas_) [Greek: somatos duo echon diastaseis, m\u00eakos kai platos]\n(_A.M._ III. 77). _Liniamentum ... carentem_: a difficult passage. Note (1)\nthat the line is defined in Greek as [Greek: m\u00eakos aplates]. (Sext. as\nabove), (2) that Cic. has by preference described the point and surface\nnegatively. This latter fact seems to me strong against the introduction of\n_longitudinem_ which Ursinus, Dav., Orelli, Baiter and others propose by\nconjecture. If anything is to be introduced, I would rather add _et\ncrassitudine_ before _carentem_, comparing I. 27 _sine ulla specie et\ncarentem omni illa qualitate_. I have merely bracketed _carentem_, though I\nfeel Halm's remark that a verb is wanted in this clause as in the other\ntwo, he suggests _quod sit sine_. Hermann takes _esse_ after _punctum_ as\nstrongly predicative (\"there _is_ a point,\" etc.), then adds _similiter_\nafter _liniamentum_ and ejects _sine ulla_. Observe the awkwardness of\nhaving the _line_ treated of after the _superficies_, which has induced\nsome edd. to transpose. For _liniamentum_ = _lineam_ cf. _De Or._ I. 187.\n_Si adigam_: the fine em. of Manut. for _si adiiciamus_ of MSS. The\nconstruction _adigere aliquem ius iurandum_ will be found in Caes. _Bell.\nCiv._ I. 76, II. 18, qu. by Dav., cf. also Virg. _Aen._ III. 56 _quid non\nmortalia pectora cogis auri sacra fames?_ _Sapientem nec prius_: this is\nthe \"_egregia lectio_\" of three of Halm's MSS. Before Halm _sapientemne_\nwas read, thus was destroyed the whole point of the sentence, which is\n_not_ that the _sapiens_ will swear to the size of the sun after he has\nseen Archimedes go through his calculations, _but_ that the _sapiens_,\nhowever true he admits the bases of proof to be which Archimedes uses, will\n_not_ swear to the truth of the elaborate conclusions which that geometer\nrears upon them. Cicero is arguing as in 128 against the absurdity of\nattaching one and the same degree of certainty to the simplest and the most\ncomplex truths, and tries to condemn the Stoic _sapiens_ out of his own\nmouth, cf. esp. _nec ille iurare posset_ in 123. _Multis partibus_: for\nthis expression see Munro on Lucr. I. 734, for the sense cf. 82, 123, 126,\n128. _Deum_: see 126.\n\n\u00a7117. _Vim_: = [Greek: anank\u00ean], cf. _cogere_ in 116. _Ne ille_: this\nasseverative _ne_ is thus always closely joined with pronouns in Cic.\n_Sententiam eliget et_: MSS. have (by _dittographia_ of _m_, _eli_) added\n_melius_ after _sententiam_, and have also dropped _et_. Dav. wished to\nread _elegerit_, comparing the beginning of 119. _Insipiens eliget_: cf.\n115 _quale est a non sapiente explicari sapientiam?_ and 9 _statuere qui\nsit sapiens vel maxime videtur esse sapientis_. _Infinitae quaestiones_:\n[Greek: theseis], general propositions, opposed to _finitae quaestiones_,\nlimited propositions, Gk. [Greek: hypotheseis]. Quintal III. 5, 5 gives as\nan ex. of the former _An uxor ducenda_, of the latter _An Catoni ducenda_.\nThese _quaestiones_ are very often alluded to by Cic. as in _D.F._ I. 12,\nIV. 6, _De Or._ I. 138, II. 65--67, _Topica_ 79, _Orat._ 46, cf. also\nQuint. X. 5, II. _E quibus omnia constant_: this sounds like Lucretius,\n_omnia_ = [Greek: to pan].\n\n\u00a7118. For these _physici_ the student must in general be referred to R. and\nP., Schwegler, and Grote's _Plato_ Vol. I. A more complete enumeration of\nschools will be found in Sext. _P.H._ III. 30 sq. Our passage is imitated\nby Aug _De Civ. Dei_ XVIII. 37. _Concessisse primas_: Cic. always considers\nThales to be _sapientissimus e septem_ (_De Leg._ II. 26). Hence Markland\non Cic. _Ad Brutum_ II. 15, 3 argued that that letter cannot be genuine,\nsince in it the supremacy among the seven is assigned to Solon.\n_Infinitatem naturae_: [Greek: to apeiron], _naturae_ here = [Greek:\nousias]. _Definita_: this is opposed to _infinita_ in _Topica_ 79, so\n_definire_ is used for _finire_ in _Orat._ 65, where Jahn qu. _Verr._ IV.\n115. _Similis inter se_: an attempt to translate [Greek: homoiomereias].\n_Eas primum_, etc.: cf. the exordium of Anaxagoras given from Diog. II. 6\nin R. and P. 29 [Greek: panta chr\u00eamata \u00ean homou eita nous elth\u00f4n auta\ndiekosm\u00ease]. _Xenophanes ... deum_: Eleaticism was in the hands of Xenoph.\nmainly theological. _Neque natum unquam_: cf. _neque ortum unquam_ in 119.\n_Parmenides ignem_: cf. Arist. _Met. A._ 5 qu. R. and P. 94. He only\nhypothetically allowed the existence of the phenomenal world, after which\nhe made two [Greek: archai, thermon kai psychron tout\u00f4n de to men kata men\nto hon thermon tattei, thateron de kata to m\u00ea on]. _Heraclitus_: n. on I.\n39. _Melissus_: see Simplicius qu. R. and P. 101, and esp. [Greek: to eon\naiei ara \u00ean te kai estai]. _Plato_: n. on I. 27. _Discedent_: a word often\nused of those vanquished in a fight, cf. Hor. _Sat._ I. 7, 17.\n\n\u00a7119. _Sic animo ... sensibus_: knowledge according to the Stoics was\nhomogeneous throughout, no one thing could be more or less known than\nanother. _Nunc lucere_: cf. 98, also 128 _non enim magis adsentiuntur_,\netc. _Mundum sapientem_: for this Stoic doctrine see _N.D._ I. 84, II. 32,\netc. _Fabricata sit_: see 87 n. _Solem_: 126. _Animalis intellegentia_:\nreason is the essence of the universe with the Stoics, cf. Zeller 138--9,\nalso 28, 29 of Book I. _Permanet_: the deity is to the Stoic [Greek: pneuma\nendi\u00eakon di holou tou kosmou] (Plut. _De Plac. Phil._ I. 7 qu. R. and P.\n375), _spiritus per omnia maxima ac minima aequali intentione diffusus._\n(Seneca, _Consol. ad Helvid._ 8, 3 qu. Zeller 147). _Deflagret_: the Stoics\nconsidered the [Greek: kosmos phthartos], cf. Diog. VII. 141, Zeller\n156--7. _Fateri_: cf. _tam vera quam falsa cernimus_ in 111. _Flumen\naureum_: Plut. _Vita Cic._ 24 alludes to this ([Greek: hoti chrysiou\npotamos ei\u00ea reontos]). This is the constant judgment of Cic. about\nAristotle's style. Grote, _Aristot._ Vol I. p. 43, quotes _Topica_ 3, _De\nOr._ I. 49, _Brut._ 121, _N.D._ II. 93, _De Inv._ II. 6, _D.F._ I. 14, _Ad\nAtt._ II. 1, and discusses the difficulty of applying this criticism to the\nworks of Aristotle which we possess. _Nulla vis_: cf. I. 28. _Exsistere_:\nWalker conj. _efficere_, \"_recte ut videtur_\" says Halm. Bait. adopts it.\n_Ornatus_: = [Greek: kosmos].\n\n\u00a7120. _Libertas ... non esse_: a remarkable construction. For the Academic\nliberty see Introd. p. 18. _Quod tibi est_: after these words Halm puts\nmerely a comma, and inserting _respondere_ makes _cur deus_, etc. part of\nthe same sentence. Bait. follows. _Nostra causa_: Cic. always writes _mea,\ntua, vestra, nostra causa_, not _mei, tui, nostri, vestri_, just as he\nwrites _sua sponte_, but not _sponte alicuius_. For the Stoic opinion that\nmen are the chief care of Providence, see _N.D._ I. 23, II. 37, _D.F._ III.\n67, _Ac._ I. 29 etc., also Zeller. The difficulties surrounding the opinion\nare treated of in Zeller 175, _N.D._ II. 91--127. They supply in Sext.\n_P.H._ I. 32, III. 9--12 an example of the refutation of [Greek: nooumena]\nby means of [Greek: nooumena]. _Tam multa ac_: MSS. om. _ac_, which I\ninsert. Lactantius qu. the passage without _perniciosa_. _Myrmecides_: an\nactual Athenian artist, famed for minute work in ivory, and especially for\na chariot which a fly covered with its wings, and a ship which the wings of\na bee concealed. See Plin. _Nat. Hist._ VII. 21, XXXVI. 5.\n\n\u00a7121. _Posse_: n. on I. 29. _Strato_: R. and P. 331. _Sed cum_: _sed_ often\nmarks a very slight contrast, there is no need to read _et_, as Halm.\n_Asperis ... corporibus_: cf. fragm. 28 of the _Ac. Post._, also _N.D._ I.\n66. _Somnia_: so _N.D._ I. 18 _miracula non disserentium philosophorum sed\nsomniantium_, _ib._ I. 42 _non philosophorum iudicia sed delirantium\nsomnia_, also _ib._ I. 66 _flagitia Democriti_. _Docentis_: giving _proof_.\n_Optantis_: Guietus humorously conj. _potantis,_ Durand _oscitantis_ (cf.\n_N.D._ I. 72), others _opinantis_. That the text is sound however may be\nseen from _T.D._ II. 30 _optare hoc quidem est non docere_, _De Fato_ 46,\n_N.D._ I. 19 _optata magis quam inventa_, _ib._ III. 12 _doceas oportet nec\nproferas_; cf. also _Orat._ 59 _vocis bonitas optanda est, non est enim in\nnobis_, i.e. a good voice is a thing to be prayed for, and not to be got by\nexertion. There is a similar Greek proverb, [Greek: euch\u00ea mallon \u00ea\nal\u00eatheia], in Sext. _P.H._ VIII. 353. _Magno opere_: Hermann wishes to read\n_onere_. The phrase _magnum onus_ is indeed common (cf. _De Or._ I. 116),\nbut _magnum opus_, in the sense of \"a great task,\" is equally so, cf.\n_T.D._ III. 79, 84, _Orat._ 75. _Modo hoc modo illud_: 134.\n\n\u00a7122. _Latent ista_: see n. on fragm. 29 of the _Ac. Post._; for _latent_\ncf. I. 45. Aug. _Cont. Ac._ II. 12, III. 1 imitates this passage.\n_Circumfusa_: cf. I. 44, and 46 of this book. _Medici_: cf. _T.D._ I. 46\n_Viderentur_: a genuine passive, cf. 25, 39, 81. _Empirici_: a school of\nphysicians so called. _Ut ... mutentur_: exactly the same answer was made\nrecently to Prof. Huxley's speculations on protoplasm; he was said to have\nassumed that the living protoplasm would have the same properties as the\ndead. _Media pendeat_: cf. _N.D._ II. 98, _De Or._ III. 178.\n\n\u00a7123. _Habitari ait_: for this edd. qu. Lactant. _Inst._ III. 23, 12.\n_Portenta_: \"monstrosities these,\" cf. _D.F._ IV. 70. _Iurare_: cf. 116.\n_Neque ego_, etc.: see fragm. 30 of _Ac. Post._ [Greek: Antipodas]: this\ndoctrine appears in Philolaus (see Plut. _Plac. Phil._ III. 11 qu. R. and\nP. 75), who give the name of [Greek: antichth\u00f4n] to the opposite side of\nthe world. Diog. VIII. 26 (with which passage cf. Stob. _Phys._ XV. 7)\nmentions the theory as Pythagorean, but in another passage (III. 24) says\nthat Plato first invented the name. The word [Greek: antipous] seems to\noccur first in Plat. _Tim._ 63 A. The existence of [Greek: antipodes]; was\nof course bound up with the doctrine that the universe or the world is a\nglobe (which is held by Plat. in the _Tim._ and by the Stoics, see Stob.\n_Phys._ XV. 6, Diog. VII. 140), hence the early Christian writers attack\nthe two ideas together as unscriptural. Cf. esp Aug. _De Civ. Dei_ XVI. 9.\n_Hicetas_: he was followed by Heraclides Ponticus and some Pythagoreans.\nSext. _A.M._ X. 174 speaks of the followers of Aristarchus the\nmathematician as holding the same doctrine. It seems also to be found in\nPhilolaus, see R. and P. 75. _Theophrastus_: who wrote much on the history\nof philosophy, see R. and P. 328. _Platonem_: the words of Plato (_Tim._ 40\nB) are [Greek: g\u00ean de trophon men h\u00eameteran, eillomen\u00ean de peri ton dia\npantos polon tetamenon]. _Quid tu, Epicure_: the connection is that Cic.,\nhaving given the crotchets of other philosophers about [Greek: physik\u00ea],\nproceeds to give the peculiar crotchet of Epic. _Putas solem ... tantum_: a\nhard passage. _Egone? ne bis_ is the em. of Lamb. for MSS. _egone vobis_,\nand is approved by Madv., who thus explains it (_Em._ 185) \"_cum\ninterrogatum esset num tantulum (quasi pedalem 82) solem esse putaret,\nEpic. non praecise definit (tantum enim esse censebat quantus videretur vel\npaulo aut maiorem aut minorem) sed latius circumscribit, ne bis quidem\ntantum esse, sed inter pedalem magnitudinem et bipedalem_\". (_D.F._ I. 20)\nThis explanation though not quite satisfactory is the best yet given.\nEpicurus' absurdity is by Cic. brought into strong relief by stating the\noutside limit to which Epic. was prepared to go in estimating the sun's\nsize, i.e. twice the apparent size. _Ne ... quidem_ may possibly appear\nstrange, cf. however _ne maiorem quidem_ in 82. _Aristo Chius_: for this\ndoctrine of his see R. and P. 358.\n\n\u00a7124. _Quid sit animus_: an enumeration of the different ancient theories\nis given in _T.D._ I. 18--22, and by Sext. _A.M._ VII. 113, who also speaks\nin _P.H._ II. 31 of the [Greek: poll\u00ea kai an\u00eanytos mach\u00ea] concerning the\nsoul. In _P.H._ II. 57 he says [Greek: Gorgias oude dianoian einai ph\u00easi].\n_Dicaearcho_: _T.D._ I. 21. _Tres partis_: in Plato's _Republic_. _Ignis_:\nZeno's opinion, _T.D._ I. 19. _Animam_: _ib._ I. 19. _Sanguis_: Empodocles,\nas in _T.D._ I. 19 where his famous line [Greek: haima gar anthr\u00f4pois\nperikardion esti no\u00eama] is translated, see R. and P. 124. _Ut Xenocrates_:\nsome edd. read _Xenocrati_, but cf. I. 44, _D.F._ II. 18, _T.D._ III. 76.\n_Numerus_: so Bentl. for _mens_ of MSS., cf. I. 39, _T.D._ I. 20, 41. An\nexplanation of this Pythagorean doctrine of Xenocrates is given in R. and\nP. 244. _Quod intellegi_ etc.: so in _T.D._ I. 41 _quod subtiliter magis\nquam dilucide dicitur_. _Momenta_ n. on I. 45.\n\n\u00a7125. _Verecundius_: cf. 114 _subadroganter_. _Vincam animum_: a common\nphrase in Cic., cf. _Philipp._ XII. 21. _Queru potissimum? quem?_: In\nrepeated questions of this kind Cic. usually puts the corresponding case of\n_quisnam_, not _quis_, in the second question, as in _Verr._ IV. 5. The\nmutation of Augustine _Contra Ac._ III. 33 makes it probable that _quemnam_\nwas the original reading here. Zumpt on _Verr._ qu. Quint. IX. 2, 61, Plin.\n_Epist._ I. 20, who both mention this trick of style, and laud it for its\nlikeness to impromptu. _Nobilitatis_: this is to be explained by referring\nto 73--75 (_imitari numquam nisi clarum, nisi nobilem_), where Cic.\nprotests against being compared to a demagogue, and claims to follow the\naristocracy of philosophy. The attempts of the commentators to show that\nDemocr. was literally an aristocrat have failed. _Convicio_: cf. 34.\n_Completa et conferta_: n. on I. 27. _Quod movebitur ... cedat_: this is\nthe theory of motion disproved by Lucr. I. 370 sq., cf. also _N.D._ II. 83.\nHalm writes _quo quid_ for _quod_ (with Christ), and inserts _corpus_\nbefore _cedat_, Baiter following him. The text is sound. Trans. \"whatever\nbody is pushed, gives way.\" _Tam sit mirabilis_: n. on I. 25.\n_Innumerabilis_: 55. _Supra infra_: n. on 92. _Ut nos nunc simus_, etc.: n.\non fragm. 13 of _Ac. Post._ _Disputantis_: 55. _Animo videre_: cf. 22.\n_Imagines_: [Greek: eid\u00f4la], which Catius translated (_Ad Fam._ XV. 16) by\n_spectra_, Zeller 432. _Tu vero_: etc. this is all part of the personal\n_convicium_ supposed to be directly addressed to Cic. by the Antiocheans,\nand beginning at _Tune aut inane_ above. _Commenticiis_: a favourite word\nof Cic., cf. _De Div._ II. 113.\n\n\u00a7126. _Quae tu_: elliptic for _ut comprobem quae tu comprobas_ cf. 125.\n_Impudenter_: 115. _Atque haud scio_: _atque_ here = [Greek: kaitoi], \"and\nyet,\" n. on 5 _ac vereor_. _Invidiam_: cf. 144. _Cum his_: i.e. _aliis cum\nhis_. _Summus deus_: \"the highest form of the deity\" who was of course one\nin the Stoic system. Ether is the finest fire, and [Greek: pyr technikon]\nis one of the definitions of the Stoic deity, cf. I. 29, Zeller 161 sq.\n_Solem_: as of course being the chief seat of fire. _Solis autem ... nego\ncredere_: Faber first gave _ac monet_ for MSS. _admonens_, which Halm\nretains, Manut. then restored to its place _permensi refertis_, which MSS.\nhave after _nego_. _Hic_, which MSS. have after _decempeda_, Madv. turns\ninto _hunc_, while _hoc_, which stands immediately after _nego_, he ejects\n(_Em._ 187). _Ergo_ after _vos_ is of course analeptic. Halm departs\nsomewhat from this arrangement. _Leniter_: Halm and Hermann _leviter_; the\nformer reads _inverecundior_ after Morgenstern, for what reason it is\ndifficult to see.\n\n\u00a7127. _Pabulum_: similar language in _D.F._ II. 46. _Consideratio\ncontemplatioque_: Cic. is fond of this combination, as _De Off._ I. 153;\ncf. Wesenberg on _T.D._ V. 9, who qu. similar combinations from _D.F._ V.\n11, 58. _Elatiores_: MSS. mostly have _latiores_. Halm with Lamb. reads\n_altiores_, in support of which reading Dav. qu. _D.F._ II. 51, Val.\nFlaccus _Argon._ II. 547, add Virg. _Aen._ VI. 49, Cic. _Orat._ 119.\n_Exigua et minima_: [Greek: smikra kai elachista]. Madv. on _D.F._ V. 78\nnotes that except here Cic. always writes _exigua et paene minima_ or\nsomething of the kind. _Occultissimarum_: n. on I. 15. _Occurit ...\ncompletur_: MSS. have _occuret_ mostly, if that is retained _complebitur_\nmust be read. Madv. _Opusc._ II. 282 takes _occurit_, explaining it as a\nperfect, and giving numerous exx. of this sequence of tenses, cf. also\nWesenb. on _T.D._ IV. 35.\n\n\u00a7128. _Agi secum_: cf. _nobiscum ageret_ in 80. _Simile veri_: cf. 66.\n_Notionem_: = _cognitionem_, [Greek: epist\u00eam\u00ean]. _At paulum_: MSS. _et_\nHalm _sed._; cf. _at illud ante_ in 116. _Si quae_: Halm and many edd. have\n_se, quae_. But the _se_ comes in very awkwardly, and is not needed before\nthe infinitive. Madv. indeed (_Em._ 114), after producing many exx. of the\nreflexive pronoun omitted, says that he doubts about this passage because\n_considero_ does not belong to the class of verbs with which this usage is\nfound, but he produces many instances with _puto_, which surely stands on\nthe same level. _Non magis_: so in 119 _nec magis approbabit nunc lucere_,\netc. The sunlight was the stock example of a most completely cognisable\nphenomenon; hence the Academics showed their hostility to absolute\nknowledge by refusing [Greek: ton h\u00ealion homologein einai katal\u00eapton]\n(Galen _De Opt. Gen. Dicendi_ 497 B qu. P. Valentia 304 ed. Or.). _Cornix_:\nfor the Stoic belief in divination see Zeller 349--358. _Signum illud_: the\n_xystus_ (9) was adorned with statues; edd. qu. Plin. _Nat. Hist._ XXXIV.\n8. _Duodeviginti_: 82, I just note that _octodecim_ is not used by Cic.\n_Sol quantus sit_: 91. _Omnium rerum ... comprehendendi_: not a case of a\nplural noun with a singular gerund like _spe rerum potiendi_, etc., but of\ntwo genitives depending in different ways on the same word (_definitio_).\nM. _Em._ 197 qu. Plat. _Leg._ 648 E [Greek: t\u00ean pant\u00f4n h\u00eattan phoboumenos\nanthr\u00f4pon toi p\u00f4matos], _Brut._ 163 _Scaevolae dicendi elegantia_, _De Or._\nIII. 156. Other exx. in _M.D.F._ I. 14. For the turn of expression cf.\n_T.D._ IV. 62 _omnium philosophorum una est ratio medendi_, _Lael._ 78\n_omnium horum vitiorum una cautio est_, also 51 of this book.\n\n    \u00a7\u00a7129--141. Summary. What contention is there among philosophers about\n    the ethical standard! I pass by many abandoned systems like that of\n    Herillus but consider the discrepancies between Xenophanes, Parmenides,\n    Zeno of Elea, Euclides, Menedemus, Aristo, Pyrrho, Aristippus,\n    Epicurus, Callipho, Hieronymus, Diodorus, Polemo, Antiochus, Carneades\n    (129-131). If I desire to follow the Stoics, Antiochus will not allow\n    me, while if I follow Polemo, the Stoics are irate (132). I must be\n    careful not to assent to the unknown, which is a dogma common to both\n    you, Lucullus, and myself (133). Zeno thinks virtue gives happiness.\n    \"Yes,\" says Antiochus, \"but not the greatest possible.\" How am I to\n    choose among such conflicting theories? (134) Nor can I accept those\n    points in which Antiochus and Zeno agree. For instance, they regard\n    emotion as harmful, which the ancients thought natural and useful\n    (135). How absurd are the Stoic Paradoxes! (136) Albinus joking said to\n    Carneades \"You do not think me a praetor because I am not a _sapiens_.\"\n    \"That,\" said Carneades, \"is Diogenes' view, not mine\" (137). Chrysippus\n    thinks only three ethical systems can with plausibility be defended\n    (138). I gravitate then towards one of them, that of pleasure. Virtue\n    calls me back, nor will she even allow me to join pleasure to herself\n    (139). When I hear the several pleadings of pleasure and virtue, I\n    cannot avoid being moved by both, and so I find it impossible to choose\n    (141, 142).\n\n\u00a7129. _Quod coeperam_: in 128 at _veniamus nunc ad boni maique notionem_.\n_Constituendi_: n. on 114. _Bonorum summa_: cf. _D.F._ V. 21 and Madv. _Est\nigitur_: so in _De Div._ II. 8, _igitur_ comes fourth word in the clause;\nthis is not uncommon in Cic., as in Lucretius. _Omitto_: MSS. _et omitto_,\nbut cf. Madv. _Em._ 201 _certe contra Ciceronis usum est 'et omitto' pro\nsimplici 'omitto,' in initio huius modi orationis ubi universae sententiae\nexempla subiciuntur per figuram omissionis_. _Relicta_: cf. 130 _abiectos_.\nCic. generally classes Herillus (or Erillus as Madv. on _D.F._ II. 35\nspells the name), Pyrrho and Aristo together as authors of exploded\nsystems, cf. _D.F._ II. 43, _De Off._ I. 6, _T.D._ V. 85. _Ut Herillum_.\nMSS. have either _Erillum_ or _et illum_, one would expect _ut Herilli_.\n_Cognitione et scientia_: double translation of [Greek: epist\u00eam\u00ea]. For the\n_finis_ of Herillus see Madv. on _D.F._ II. 43. _Megaricorum_:\n_Xenophanes_. Cic considers the Eleatic and Megarian schools to be so\nclosely related as to have, like the schools of Democritus and Epicurus, a\ncontinuous history. The Megarian system was indeed an ethical development\nof Eleatic doctrine. Zeller, _Socrates_ 211. _Unum et simile_: for this see\nZell. _Socr._ 222 sq, with footnotes, R. and P. 174 sq. _Simile_ ought\nperhaps to be _sui simile_ as in _Tim._ c. 7, already quoted on I. 30, see\nmy note there and cf. I. 35. _Menedemo_: see Zeller _Socr._ 238, R. and P.\n182. The _Erctrian_ school was closely connected with the Megarian. _Fuit_:\n= _natus est_, as often. _Herilli_: so Madv. for _ulli_ of MSS.\n\n\u00a7130. _Aristonem_: this is Aristo of Chios, not Aristo of Ceos, who was a\nPeripatetic; for the difference see R. and P. 332, and for the doctrines of\nAristo the Chian _ib._ 358, Zeller 58 sq. _In mediis_: cf. I. 36, 37.\n_Momenta_ = _aestimationes_, [Greek: axiai] in 36, where _momenti_ is used\nin a different way. _Pyrrho autem_: one would expect Pyrrhoni as Dav.\nconj., but in 124 there is just the same change from _Pyrrhoni_ to\n_Xenocrates_. [Greek: Apatheia]: Diog. IX. 108 affirms this as well as\n[Greek: praiot\u00eas] to be a name for the sceptic [Greek: telos], but the name\nscarcely occurs if at all in Sext. who generally uses [Greek: ataraxia],\nbut occasionally [Greek: metriopatheia]; cf. Zeller 496, R. and P. 338.\n[Greek: Apatheia] was also a Stoic term. _Diu multumque_: n. on I. 4.\n\n\u00a7131. _Nec tamen consentiens_: cf. R. and P. 352 where the differences\nbetween the two schools are clearly drawn out, also Zeller 447, 448.\n_Callipho_: as the genitive is _Calliphontis_, Cic. ought according to rule\nto write _Calliphon_ in the nom; for this see Madv. on _D.F._ II. 19, who\nalso gives the chief authorities concerning this philosopher. _Hieronymus_:\nmentioned _D.F._ II. 19, 35, 41, V. 14, in which last place Cic. says of\nhim _quem iam cur Peripateticum appellem nescio_. _Diodorus_: see Madv. on\n_D.F._ II. 19. _Honeste vivere_, etc.: in _D.F._ IV. 14 the _finis_ of\nPolemo is stated to be _secundum naturam vivere_, and three Stoic\ninterpretations of it are given, the last of which resembles the present\npassage--_omnibus aut maximis rebus iis quae secundum naturam sint fruentem\nvivere_. This interpretation Antiochus adopted, and from him it is\nattributed to the _vetus Academia_ in I. 22, where the words _aut omnia aut\nmaxima_, seem to correspond to words used by Polemo; cf. Clemens Alex. qu.\nby Madv. on _D.F._ IV. 15. See n. below on Carneades. _Antiochus probat_:\nthe germs of many Stoic and Antiochean doctrines were to be found in\nPolemo; see I. 34, n. _Eiusque amici_: Bentl. _aemuli_, but Halm refers to\n_D.F._ II. 44. The later Peripatetics were to a great degree Stoicised.\n_Nunc_: Halm _huc_ after Jo. Scala. _Carneades_: this _finis_ is given in\n_D.F._ II. 35 (_frui principiis naturalibus_), II. 42 (_Carneadeum illud\nquod is non tam ut probaret protulit, quam ut Stoicis quibuscum bellum\ngerebat opponeret_), V. 20 (_fruendi rebus iis, quas primas secundum\nnaturam esse diximus, Carneades non ille quidem auctor sed defensor\ndisserendi causa fuit_), _T.D._ V. 84 (_naturae primus aut omnibus aut\nmaximis frui, ut Carneades contra Stoicos disserebat_). The _finis_\ntherefore, thus stated, is not different from that of Polemo, but it is\nclear that Carneades intended it to be different, as he did not include\n_virtus_ in it (see _D.F._ II. 38, 42, V. 22) while Polemo did (I. 22). See\nmore on 139. _Zeno_: cf. _D.F._ IV. 15 _Inventor et princeps_: same\nexpression in _T.D._ I. 48, _De Or._ I. 91, _De Inv._ II. 6; _inv._ =\n[Greek: oikist\u00eas].\n\n\u00a7132. _Quemlibet_: cf. 125, 126. _Prope singularem_: cf. _T.D._ I. 22\n_Aristoteles longe omnibus--Platonem semper excipio--praestans_; also\n_D.F._ V. 7, _De Leg._ I. 15. _Per ipsum Antiochum_: a similar line of\nargument is taken in Sext. _P.H._ I. 88, II. 32, etc. _Terminis ...\npossessione_: there is a similar play on the legal words _finis terminus\npossessio_ in _De Leg._ I. 55, 56, a noteworthy passage. _Omnis ratio_\netc.: this is the constant language of the later Greek philosophy; cf. Aug.\n_De Civ. Dei_ XIX. 1 _neque enim existimat_ (Varro) _ullam philosophiae\nsectam esse dicendam, quae non eo distat a ceteris, quod diversos habeat\nfines bonorum et malorum_, etc. _Si Polemoneus_: i.e. _sapiens fuerit_.\n_Peccat_: a Stoic term turned on the Stoics, see I. 37. _Academicos et_:\nMSS. om. _et_ as in I. 16, and _que_ in 52 of this book. _Dicenda_: for the\nomission of the verb with the gerundive (which occurs chiefly in emphatic\nclauses) cf. I. 7, and Madv. on _D.F._ I. 43, who how ever unduly limits\nthe usage. _Hic igitur ... prudentior_: MSS. generally have _assentiens_,\nbut one good one (Halm's E) has _assentientes_. I venture to read\n_adsentietur_, thinking that the last two letters were first dropt, as in\n26 (_tenetur_) and that then _adsentiet_, under the attraction of the _s_\nfollowing, passed into _adsentiens_, as in 147 _intellegat se_ passed into\n_intelligentes_. _N_, I may remark, is frequently inserted in MSS. (as in\nI. 7 _appellant_, 16 _disputant_, 24 _efficerentur_), and all the changes\ninvolved in my conj. are of frequent occurrence. I also read _sin, inquam_\n(_sc. adsentietur_) for _si numquam_ of MSS. The question _uter est\nprudentior_ is intended to press home the dilemma in which Cicero has\nplaced the supposed _sapiens_. All the other emendations I have seen are\ntoo unsatisfactory to be enumerated.\n\n\u00a7133. _Non posse ... esse_: this seems to me sound; Bait. however reads\n_non esse illa probanda sap._ after Lamb., who also conj. _non posse illa\nprobata esse_. _Paria_: _D.F._ III. 48, _Paradoxa_ 20 sq., Zeller 250.\n_Praecide_: [Greek: syntomos] or [Greek: synel\u00f4n eipe], cf. _Cat. Mai._ 57,\n_Ad Att._ VIII. 4, X. 16. _Inquit_: n. on 79. _Quid quod quae_: so Guietus\nwith the approval of Madv. (_Em._ 203) reads for MSS. _quid quae_ or _quid\nquaeque_, Halm and Bait., follow Moser in writing _Quid? si quae_ removing\nthe stop at _paria_, and make _in utramque partem_ follow _dicantur_, on\nOrelli's suggestion. When several relative pronouns come together the MSS.\noften omit one. _Dicebas_: in 27. _Incognito_: 133.\n\n\u00a7134. _Etiam_: = \"yes,\" Madv. _Gram._ 454. _Non beatissimam_: I. 22, n.\n_Deus ille_: i.e. more than man (of Aristotle's [Greek: \u00ea theos \u00ea\nth\u00earion]), if he can do without other advantages. For the omission of _est_\nafter the emphatic _ille_ cf. 59, n. _Theophrasto_, etc.: n. on I. 33, 35.\n_Dicente_: before this Halm after Lamb., followed by Bait., inserts\n_contra_, the need for which I fail to see. _Et hic_: i.e. Antiochus. _Ne\nsibi constet_: Cic. argues in _T.D._ V. that there cannot be degrees in\nhappiness. _Tum hoc ... tum illud_: cf. 121. _Iacere_: 79. _In his\ndiscrepant_: I. 42 _in his constitit_.\n\n\u00a7135. _Moveri_: [Greek: kineisthai], 29. _Laetitia efferri_: I. 38.\n_Probabilia_: the removal of passion and delight is easier than that of\nfear and pain. _Sapiensne ... deleta sit_: see Madv. _D.F._ p. 806, ed. 2,\nwho is severe upon the reading of Orelli (still kept by Klotz), _non\ntimeat? nec si patria deleatur? non doleat? nec, si deleta sit?_ which\ninvolves the use of _nec_ for _ne ... quidem_. I have followed the reading\nof Madv. in his _Em._, not the one he gives (after Davies) in _D.F._ _ne\npatria deleatur_, which Halm takes, as does Baiter. Mine is rather nearer\nthe MSS. _Decreta_: some MSS. _durata_; Halm conj. _dictata_.\n_Mediocritates_: [Greek: mesopetes], as in Aristotle; cf. _T.D._ III. 11,\n22, 74. _Permotione_: [Greek: kinesei]. _Naturalem ... modum_: so _T.D._\nIII. 74. _Crantoris_: sc. _librum_, for the omission of which see n. on I.\n13; add Quint. IX. 4, 18, where Spalding wished to read _in Herodoti_,\nsupplying _libro_. _Aureolus ... libellus_: it is not often that two\ndiminutives come together in Cic., and the usage is rather colloquial; cf.\n_T.D._ III. 2, _N.D._ III. 43, also for _aureolus_ 119 _flumen aureum_.\n_Panaetius_: he had addressed to Tubero a work _de dolore_; see _D.F._ IV.\n23. _Cotem_: _T.D._ IV. 43, 48, Seneca _De Ira_ III. 3, where the saying is\nattributed to Aristotle (_iram calcar esse virtutis_). _Dicebant_: for the\nrepetition of this word cf. 146, I. 33.\n\n\u00a7136. _Sunt enim Socratica_: the Socratic origin of the Stoic paradoxes is\naffirmed in _Parad._ 4, _T.D._ III. 10. _Mirabilia_: Cic. generally\ntranslates [Greek: paradoxa] by _admirabilia_ as in _D.F._ IV. 74, or\n_admiranda_, under which title he seems to have published a work different\nfrom the _Paradoxa_, which we possess: see Bait., and Halm's ed. of the\nPhil. works (1861), p. 994. _Quasi_: = almost, [Greek: h\u00f4s epos eipein].\n_Voltis_: cf. the Antiochean opinion in I. 18, 22. _Solos reges_: for all\nthis see Zeller 253 sq. _Solos divites_: [Greek: hoti monos ho sophos\nplousios], _Parad._ VI. _Liberum_: _Parad._ V. [Greek: hoti monos ho sophos\neleutheros kai pas aphron doulos]. _Furiosus_: _Parad._ IV. [Greek: hoti\npas aphron mainetai].\n\n\u00a7137. _Tam sunt defendenda_: cf. 8, 120. _Bono modo_: a colloquial and\nPlautine expression; see Forc. _Ad senatum starent_: \"were in waiting on\nthe senate;\" cf. such phrases as _stare ad cyathum_, etc. _Carneade_: the\nvocative is _Carneades_ in _De Div._ I. 23. _Huic Stoico_: i.e. _Diogeni_;\ncf. _D.F._ II. 24. Halm brackets _Stoico_, and after him Bait. _Sequi\nvolebat_: \"professed to follow;\" cf. _D.F._ V. 13 _Strato physicum se\nvoluit_ \"gave himself out to be a physical philosopher:\" also Madv. on\n_D.F._ II. 102. _Ille noster_: Dav. _vester_, as in 143 _noster Antiochus_.\nBut in both places Cic. speaks as a friend of Antiochus; cf. 113.\n_Balbutiens_: \"giving an uncertain sound;\" cf. _De Div._ I. 5, _T.D._ V.\n75.\n\n\u00a7138. _Mihi veremini_: cf. Caes. _Bell. Gall_. V. 9 _veritus navibus_. Halm\nand Bait. follow Christ's conj. _verenti_, removing the stop at _voltis_.\n_Opinationem_: the [Greek: oi\u00easin] of Sext., e.g. _P.H._ III. 280. _Quod\nminime voltis_: cf. I. 18. _De finibus_: not \"concerning,\" but \"from among\"\nthe different _fines_; otherwise _fine_ would have been written. Cf. I. 4\n_si qui de nostris._ _Circumcidit et amputat_: these two verbs often come\ntogether, as in _D.F._ I. 44; cf. also _D.F._ III. 31. _Si vacemus omni\nmolestia_: which Epicurus held to be the highest pleasure. _Cum honestate_:\nCallipho in 131. _Prima naturae commoda_: Cic. here as in _D.F._ IV. 59, V.\n58 confuses the Stoic [Greek: pr\u00f4ta kata physin] with [Greek: ta tou\ns\u00f4matos agatha kai ta ektos] of the Peripatetics, for which see I. 19. More\non the subject in Madvig's fourth Excursus to the _D.F._ _Relinquit_:\nOrelli _relinqui_ against the MSS.\n\n\u00a7139. _Polemonis ... finibus_: all these were composite _fines_. _Adhuc_: I\nneed scarcely point out that this goes with _habeo_ and not with\n_probabilius_; _adhuc_ for _etiam_ with the comparative does not occur till\nthe silver writers. _Labor eo_: cf. Horace's _nunc in Aristippi furtim\npraecepta relabor_, also _D.F._ V. 6 _rapior illuc: revocat autem\nAntiochus_. _Reprehendit manu_: _M.D.F._ II. 3. _Pecudum_: I. 6, _Parad._\n14 _voluptatem esse summum bonum, quae mihi vox pecudum videtur esse non\nhominum_; similar expressions occur with a reference to Epicurus in _De\nOff._ I. 105, _Lael._ 20, 32. _T.D._ V. 73, _D.F._ II. 18; cf. also\nAristoph. _Plut._ 922 [Greek: probatiou bion legeis] and [Greek: bosk\u00eamat\u00f4n\nbios] in Aristotle. The meaning of _pecus_ is well shown in _T.D._ I. 69.\n_Iungit deo_: Zeller 176 sq. _Animum solum_: the same criticism is applied\nto Zeno's _finis_ in _D.F._ IV. 17, 25. _Ut ... sequar_: for the repeated\n_ut_ see _D.F._ V. 10, Madv. _Gram._ 480, obs. 2. Bait. brackets the second\n_ut_ with Lamb. _Carneades ... defensitabat_: this is quite a different\nview from that in 131; yet another of Carneades is given in _T.D._ V. 83.\n_Istum finem_: MSS. _ipsum_; the two words are often confused, as in I. 2.\n_Ipsa veritas_: MSS. _severitas_, a frequent error; cf. _In Verr. Act._ I.\n3, III. 162, _De Leg._ I. 4, also Madv. on _D.F._ IV. 55. _Obversetur_:\nHalm takes the conj. of Lamb., _adversetur_. The MSS. reading gives\nexcellent sense; cf. _T.D._ II. 52 _obversentur honestae species viro_.\nBait. follows Halm. _Tu ... copulabis_: this is the feigned expostulation\nof _veritas_ (cf. 34 _convicio veritatis_), for which style see 125.\n\n\u00a7140. _Voluptas cum honestate_: this whole expression is in apposition to\n_par_, so that _cum_ must not be taken closely with _depugnet_; cf. Hor.\n_Sat._ I. 7, 19 _Rupili et Persi par pugnat uti non compositum melius_ (sc.\n_par_) _cum Bitho Bacchius_. _Si sequare, ruunt_: for constr. cf. I. 7.\n_Communitas_: for Stoic philanthropy see Zeller 297. _Nulla potest nisi\nerit_: Madv. _D.F._ III. 70 \"_in hac coniunctione--hoc fieri non potest\nnisi--fere semper coniunctivus subicitur praesentis--futuri et perfecti\nindicativus ponitur_.\" _Gratuita_: \"disinterested.\" _Ne intellegi quidem_:\nn. on I. 7, cf. also _T.D._ V. 73, 119. _Gloriosum in vulgus_: cf. _D.F._\nII. 44 _populus cum illis facit_ (i.e. _Epicureis_). _Normam ... regulam_:\nn. on _Ac. Post._ fragm. 8. _Praescriptionem_: I. 23, n.\n\n\u00a7141. _Adquiescis_: MSS. are confused here, Halm reads _adsciscis_,\ncomparing 138. Add _D.F._ I. 23 (_sciscat et probet_), III. 17\n(_adsciscendas esse_), III. 70 (_adscisci et probari_) Bait. follows Halm.\n_Ratum ... fixum_: cf. 27 and n. on _Ac. Post._ fragm. 17. _Falso_: like\n_incognito_ in 133. _Nullo discrimine_: for this see the explanation of\n_nihil interesse_ in 40, n. _Iudicia_: [Greek: krit\u00earia] as usual.\n\n    \u00a7\u00a7142--146. Summary. To pass to Dialectic, note how Protagoras, the\n    Cyrenaics, Epicurus, and Plato disagree (142). Does Antiochus follow\n    any of these? Why, he never even follows the _vetus Academia_, and\n    never stirs a step from Chrysippus. Dialecticians themselves cannot\n    agree about the very elements of their art (143). Why then, Lucullus,\n    do you rouse the mob against me like a seditious tribune by telling\n    them I do away with the arts altogether? When you have got the crowd\n    together, I will point out to them that according to Zeno all of them\n    are slaves, exiles, and lunatics, and that you yourself, not being\n    _sapiens_, know nothing whatever (144). This last point Zeno used to\n    illustrate by action Yet his whole school cannot point to any actual\n    _sapiens_ (145). Now as there is no knowledge there can be no art. How\n    would Zeuxis and Polycletus like this conclusion? They would prefer\n    mine, to which our ancestors bear testimony.\n\n\u00a7142. _Venio iam_: Dialectic had been already dealt with in 91--98 here it\nis merely considered with a view to the choice of the supposed _sapiens_,\nas was Ethical Science in 129--141 and Physics in 116--128. With the\nenumeration of conflicting schools here given compare the one Sextus gives\nin _A.M._ VII. 48 sq. _Protagorae_: R. and P. 132 sq. _Qui putet_: so MSS.,\nHalm and Bait. _putat_ after Lamb. Trans. \"inasmuch as he thinks\".\n_Permotiones intimas_: cf. 20 _tactus interior_, also 76. _Epicuri_: nn. on\n19, 79, 80. _Iudicium_: [Greek: krit\u00earion] as usual. _Rerum notitiis_:\n[Greek: prol\u00eapsesi], Zeller 403 sq. _Constituit_: note the constr. with\n_in_, like _ponere in_. _Cogitationis_: cf. I. 30. Several MSS. have\n_cognitionis_, the two words are frequently confused. See Wesenberg _Fm._\nto _T.D._ III. p. 17, who says, _multo tamen saepius \"cogitatio\" pro\n\"cognitio\" substituitur quam contra_, also _M.D.F_ III. 21.\n\n\u00a7143. _Ne maiorum quidem suorum_: sc. _aliquid probat_. For _maiorum_ cf.\n80. Here Plato is almost excluded from the so-called _vetus Academia_, cf.\nI. 33. _Libri_: titles of some are preserved in Diog. Laert. IV. 11--14.\n_Nihil politius_: cf. 119, n. _Pedem nusquam_: for the ellipse cf. 58, 116,\n_Pro Deiot._ 42 and _pedem latum_ in Plaut. _Abutimur_: this verb in the\nrhetorical writers means to use words in metaphorical or unnatural senses,\nsee Quint. X. 1, 12. This is probably the meaning here; \"do we use the name\nAcademic in a non natural fashion?\" _Si dies est lucet_: a better trans of\n[Greek: ei ph\u00f4s estin, h\u00eamera estin] than was given in 96, where see n.\n_Aliter Philoni_: not Philo of Larissa, but a noted dialectician, pupil of\nDiodorus the Megarian, mentioned also in 75. The dispute between Diodorus\nand Philo is mentioned in Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 115--117 with the same purpose\nas here, see also Zeller 39. _Antipater_: the Stoic of Tarsus, who\nsucceeded Diogenes Babylonius in the headship of the school. _Archidemus_:\nseveral times mentioned with Antipater in Diog., as VII. 68, 84.\n_Opiniosissimi_: so the MSS. I cannot think that the word is wrong, though\nall edd. condemn it. Halm is certainly mistaken in saying that a laudatory\nepithet such as _ingeniosissimi_ is necessary. I believe that the word\n_opiniosissimi_ (an adj. not elsewhere used by Cic.) was manufactured on\nthe spur of the moment, in order to ridicule these two philosophers, who\nare playfully described as men full of _opinio_ or [Greek: doxa]--just the\nimputation which, as Stoics, they would most repel. Hermann's\n_spinosissimi_ is ingenious, and if an em. were needed, would not be so\nutterly improbable as Halm thinks.\n\n\u00a7144. _In contionem vocas_: a retort, having reference to 14, cf. also 63,\n72. For these _contiones_ see Lange, _Romische Alterthumer_ II. 663, ed 2.\nThey were called by and held under the presidency of magistrates, all of\nwhom had the right to summon them, the right of the tribune being under\nfewer restrictions than the right of the others. _Occludi tabernas_ in\norder of course that the artisans might all be at the meeting, for this see\nLiv. III. 27, IV. 31, IX. 7, and compare the cry \"to your tents, O Israel\"\nin the Bible. _Artificia_: n. on 30. _Tolli_: n. on 26. _Ut opifices\nconcitentur_: cf. _Pro Flacc._ 18 _opifices et tabernarios quid neqoti est\nconcitare?_ _Expromam_: Cic. was probably thinking of the use to which he\nhimself had put these Stoic paradoxes in _Pro Murena_ 61, a use of which he\nhalf confesses himself ashamed in _D.F._ IV. 74. _Exsules_ etc.: 136.\n\n\u00a7145. _Scire negatis_: cf. Sext. _A.M._ VII. 153, who says that even\n[Greek: katal\u00eapsis] when it arises in the mind of a [Greek: phaulos] is\nmere [Greek: doxa] and not [Greek: epist\u00eam\u00ea]; also _P.H._ II. 83, where it\nis said that the [Greek: phaulos] is capable of [Greek: to al\u00eathes] but not\nof [Greek: al\u00eatheia], which the [Greek: sophos] alone has. _Visum ...\nadsensus_: the Stoics as we saw (II. 38, etc.) analysed sensations into two\nparts; with the Academic and other schools each sensation was an ultimate\nunanalysable unit, a [Greek: psilon pathos]. For this symbolic action of\nZeno cf. _D.F._ II. 18, _Orat._ 113, Sextus _A.M._ II. 7, Quint. II. 20, 7,\nZeller 84. _Contraxerat_: so Halm who qu. Plin. _Nat. Hist._ XI. 26, 94\n_digitum contrahens aut remittens_; Orelli _construxerat_; MSS. mostly\n_contexerat_. _Quod ante non fuerat_: [Greek: katalambanein] however is\nfrequent in Plato in the sense \"to seize firmly with the mind.\"\n_Adverterat_: the best MSS. give merely _adverat_, but on the margin\n_admoverat_ which Halm takes, and after him Bait.; one good MS. has\n_adverterat_. _Ne ipsi quidem_: even Socrates, Antisthenes and Diogenes\nwere not [Greek: sophoi] according to the Stoics, but merely were [Greek:\nen prokop\u00eai]; see Diog. VII. 91, Zeller 257, and cf. Plut. _Sto. Rep._ 1056\n(qu. by P. Valentia p. 295, ed Orelli) [Greek: esti de outos] (i.e. [Greek:\nho sophos]) [Greek: oudamou g\u00eas oude gegone]. _Nec tu_: sc. _scis_; Goer.\nhas a strange note here.\n\n\u00a7146. _Illa_: cf. _illa invidiosa_ above (144). _Dicebas_: in 22. _Refero_:\n\"retort,\" as in Ovid. _Metam._ I. 758 _pudet haec opprobria nobis Et dici\npotuisse et non potuisse referri_; cf. also _par pari referre dicto_. _Ne\nnobis quidem_: \"_nor_ would they be angry;\" cf. n. on. I. 5. _Arbitrari_:\nthe original meaning of this was \"to be a bystander,\" or \"to be an\neye-witness,\" see Corssen I. 238. _Ea non ut_: MSS. have _ut ea non aut_.\nHalm reads _ut ea non_ merely, but I prefer the reading I have given\nbecause of Cicero's fondness for making the _ut_ follow closely on the\nnegative: for this see Madv. _Gram._ 465 _b_, obs.\n\n\u00a7147. _Obscuritate_: cf. I. 44, n. on I. 15. _Plus uno_: 115. _Iacere_: cf.\n79. _Plagas_: cf. n. on 112.\n\n\u00a7148. _Ad patris revolvor sententiam_: for this see Introd. 50, and for the\nexpression 18. _Opinaturum_: see 59, 67, 78, 112. _Intellegat se_: MSS.\n_intellegentes_, cf. n. on 132. _Qua re_: so Manut. for _per_ of MSS.\n[Greek: Epoch\u00ean] _illam omnium rerum_: an odd expression; cf. _actio rerum_\nin 62. _Non probans_: so Madv. _Em._ 204 for MSS. _comprobans_. Dav. conj.\n_improbans_ and is followed by Bait. I am not sure that the MSS. reading is\nwrong. The difficulty is essentially the same as that involved in 104,\nwhich should be closely compared. A contrast is drawn between a theoretical\ndogma and a practical belief. The dogma is that _assent_ (meaning absolute\nassent) is not to be given to phenomena. This dogma Catulus might well\ndescribe himself as formally approving (_comprobans_). The _practice_ is to\ngive assent (meaning modified assent). There is the same contrast in 104\nbetween _placere_ and _tenere_. I may note that the word _alteri_ (cf.\n_altero_ in 104) need not imply that the dogma and the practice are\nirreconcilable; a misconception on this point has considerably confirmed\nedd. in their introduction of the negative. _Nec eam admodum_: cf. _non\nrepugnarem_ in 112. _Tollendum_: many edd. have gone far astray in\ninterpreting this passage. The word is used with a double reference to\n_adsensus_ and _ancora_; in the first way we have had _tollere_ used a\nscore of times in this book; with regard to the second meaning, cf. Caes.\n_Bell. Gall._ IV. 23, _Bell. Civ._ I. 31, where _tollere_ is used of\nweighing anchor, and Varro _De Re Rust._ III. 17, 1, where it occurs in the\nsense \"to get on,\" \"to proceed,\" without any reference to the sea. (The\nexx. are from Forc.) This passage I believe and this alone is referred to\nin _Ad Att._ XIII. 21, 3. If my conjecture is correct, Cic. tried at first\nto manage a joke by using the word _inhibendum_, which had also a nautical\nsignification, but finding that he had mistaken the meaning of the word,\nsubstituted _tollendum_.\n\n[1] _De Leg._ II. \u00a73.\n\n[2] Cf. _De Or._ II. \u00a71 with II. \u00a75.\n\n[3] _Ad Fam._ XIII. 1, Phaedrus nobis,... cum pueri essemus, valde ut\nphilosophus probabatur.\n\n[4] _N.D._ I. \u00a793, Phaedro nihil elegantius, nihil humanius.\n\n[5] _Ad Fam._ XIII. 1.\n\n[6] _Brutus_, \u00a7309.\n\n[7] _Ad Att._ II. 20, \u00a76.\n\n[8] _Ad Fam._ XIII. 16. _T.D._ V. \u00a7113. _Acad._ II. \u00a7115.\n\n[9] _Brutus_, \u00a7306.\n\n[10] _Ibid._\n\n[11] _Rep._ I. \u00a77. _T.D._ V. \u00a75. _De Off._ II. \u00a7\u00a73,4. _De Fato_, \u00a72.\n\n[12] Cf. _Brutus_, \u00a7\u00a7312, 322.\n\n[13] Cf. _Brutus_, \u00a7\u00a7312, 314, 316.\n\n[14] _Brutus_, \u00a7315.\n\n[15] _N.D._ I. \u00a759.\n\n[16] VII. I. \u00a735.\n\n[17] Cf. _N.D._ I. \u00a793 with _Ad Fam._ XIII. 1, \u00a71.\n\n[18] _Ac._ I. \u00a746.\n\n[19] _D.F._ V. \u00a73.\n\n[20] _D.F._ I. \u00a716.\n\n[21] _D.F._ V. \u00a76, etc.\n\n[22] _D.F._ V. \u00a78.\n\n[23] _Ac._ II. \u00a74.\n\n[24] _Ib._ \u00a769.\n\n[25] _Ad Att._ XIII. 19, \u00a75.\n\n[26] _Ac._ II. \u00a7113.\n\n[27] _Ac._ II. \u00a7113. _De Leg._ I. \u00a754.\n\n[28] II. \u00a712.\n\n[29] _Brutus_, \u00a7316.\n\n[30] _Hortensius_, fragm. 18, ed. Nobbe.\n\n[31] _T.D._ II. \u00a761.\n\n[32] _De Div._ I. \u00a7130.\n\n[33] _D.F._ I. \u00a76.\n\n[34] _Ad Att._ I. 10 and 11.\n\n[35] _Ibid._ II. 1, \u00a73. _N.D._ I. \u00a76.\n\n[36] _Ad Att._ II. 2.\n\n[37] _Ibid._ I. 20. Cf. II. 1, \u00a712.\n\n[38] II. 6.\n\n[39] _Ad Att._ II. 7 and 16.\n\n[40] _Ibid._ II. 6, \u00a72.\n\n[41] Cf. _Ad Att._ IV. 11 with IV. 8 a.\n\n[42] _Ibid._ IV. 10.\n\n[43] _Ibid._ IV. 16, \u00a72.\n\n[44] _Ibid._ IV. 16 c, \u00a710, ed. Nobbe.\n\n[45] _Ad Qu. Fr._ II. 14.\n\n[46] _Ad Qu. Fr._ III. 5 and 6.\n\n[47] \u00a7332.\n\n[48] _Ad Fam._ XIII. 1. _Ad Att._ V. 11, \u00a76.\n\n[49] _Ad Att._ V. 10, \u00a75.\n\n[50] _De Off._ I. \u00a71.\n\n[51] _Tim._ c. 1.\n\n[52] Cf. _Tim._ c. 1 with _De Div._ I. \u00a75. _Brutus_, \u00a7250.\n\n[53] _Ad Att._ VI. 1, \u00a726.\n\n[54] _Ibid._ VI. 2, \u00a73.\n\n[55] _Ibid._ VI. 6, \u00a72.\n\n[56] _Ibid._ VI. 7, \u00a72. _Ad Fam._ II. 17, \u00a71.\n\n[57] _T.D._ V. \u00a722.\n\n[58] _Ad Att._ VII. 1, \u00a71.\n\n[59] _Ibid._ VII. 3, VIII. 11.\n\n[60] _Ad Att._ X. 8, \u00a76.\n\n[61] _Ibid._ VIII. 2, \u00a74.\n\n[62] [Greek: peri homonoias], _Ad Att._ IX. 9, \u00a72, etc.\n\n[63] _Ibid._ IX. 4, \u00a72; 9, \u00a71.\n\n[64] _Ibid._ IX. 10, \u00a72.\n\n[65] _Ad Fam._ IX. 1.\n\n[66] _Ibid._ IX. 3.\n\n[67] _Ibid._ IV. 3 and 4.\n\n[68] _De Rep._ I. \u00a77. _T.D._ V. \u00a75, etc.\n\n[69] Cf. _N.D._ I. \u00a76.\n\n[70] Esp. I. \u00a7\u00a726, 37.\n\n[71] Cf. _Ac._ II. \u00a729.\n\n[72] _Ac._ II. \u00a770.\n\n[73] _De Div._ II. \u00a71. _Ac._ I. \u00a745, etc.\n\n[74] _N.D._ I. \u00a71.\n\n[75] Cf. esp. _N.D._ I. \u00a75. _T.D._ II. \u00a75.\n\n[76] _De Div._ II. \u00a71. _N.D._ I. \u00a77, etc.\n\n[77] _T.D._ II. \u00a74.\n\n[78] _N.D._ I. \u00a710.\n\n[79] Cf. _Ac._ II. \u00a78. _N.D._ I. \u00a7\u00a710, 66.\n\n[80] _T.D._ II. \u00a79.\n\n[81] _N.D._ I. \u00a710.\n\n[82] _Ibid._ I. \u00a717. _Ac._ II. \u00a7\u00a7120, 137.\n\n[83] _T.D._ V. \u00a733.\n\n[84] _Ac._ II. \u00a7121.\n\n[85] _T.D._ V. \u00a782, _libas ex omnibus_.\n\n[86] _Ac._ II. \u00a7143.\n\n[87] _T.D._ V. \u00a711.\n\n[88] _Ac._ II. \u00a710.\n\n[89] _N.D._ I. \u00a712.\n\n[90] _Parad._ \u00a72. _De Fato_, \u00a73. _T.D._ I. \u00a77. _De Off._ I. \u00a73.\n\n[91] _D.F._ IV. \u00a75.\n\n[92] _Paradoxa_, \u00a72.\n\n[93] _T.D._ I. \u00a755. _De Div._ II. \u00a762.\n\n[94] _T.D._ V. \u00a711. _D.F._ II. \u00a7\u00a71 and 2, etc.\n\n[95] \u00a713.\n\n[96] Cf. esp. _N.D._ i. \u00a76. _Ac._ ii. \u00a7\u00a711 and 17.\n\n[97] _De Leg._ I. \u00a739.\n\n[98] _Ibid._ I. \u00a7\u00a755, 56.\n\n[99] _N.D._ I. \u00a74.\n\n[100] _T.D._ IV. \u00a753.\n\n[101] Cf. _De Off._ III. \u00a720.\n\n[102] _T.D._ V. \u00a7\u00a721-31, esp. \u00a723.\n\n[103] _Ibid._ V. \u00a775.\n\n[104] _De Off._ II. \u00a735.\n\n[105] _T.D._ V. \u00a734.\n\n[106] _Ac._ I. \u00a716.\n\n[107] _Paradoxa_, \u00a74. _Ac._ II. \u00a7\u00a7136, 137. _T.D._ III. \u00a710.\n\n[108] _Ac._ II. \u00a7135.\n\n[109] See esp. _N.D._ I. \u00a7\u00a73, 4.\n\n[110] _Ibid._, also _T.D._ V. \u00a783.\n\n[111] Grote's _Aristotle_, vol. I. ch. 11.\n\n[112] _T.D._ IV. \u00a79. _D.F._ III. \u00a741.\n\n[113] I. \u00a76.\n\n[114] _T.D._ IV. \u00a77.\n\n[115] _Ibid._ IV. \u00a77. Cf. _D.F._ II. \u00a744, _populus cum illis facit_.\n\n[116] _Ac._ I. \u00a76. _T.D._ IV. 6, 7; II. \u00a77; III. \u00a733. _D.F._ III. \u00a740.\n\n[117] _T.D._ IV. \u00a73.\n\n[118] _D.F._ I. \u00a7\u00a74-6. _Ac._ I. \u00a710. _D.F._ III. \u00a75.\n\n[119] _De Div._ I. \u00a7\u00a74, 5.\n\n[120] _D.F._ III. \u00a75. _N.D._ I. \u00a78. _T.D._ III. \u00a7\u00a710, 16.\n\n[121] _T.D._ I. \u00a75.\n\n[122] _T.D._ II. \u00a75.\n\n[123] _De Div._ II. \u00a71. _De Off._ II. \u00a74.\n\n[124] _De Div._ II. \u00a76. _De Off._ II. \u00a72.\n\n[125] See esp. _De Consolatione_, fragm. 7, ed. Nobbe. _T.D._ V. \u00a75. _Ac._\nI. \u00a711.\n\n[126] _N.D._ I. \u00a76.\n\n[127] _T.D._ II. \u00a7\u00a71, 4. _De Off._ II. \u00a73. _D.F._ I. \u00a71.\n\n[128] _T.D._ II. \u00a71. _D.F._ I. \u00a7\u00a71, 3.\n\n[129] _D.F._ I. \u00a7\u00a71, 11.\n\n[130] _De Div._ II. \u00a75. _De Off._ II. \u00a72. _T.D._ IV. \u00a71.\n\n[131] _De Div._ II. \u00a74.\n\n[132] _N.D._ I. \u00a79. _T.D._ II. \u00a71.\n\n[133] _De Div._ II. \u00a74.\n\n[134] _Ad Att._ XII. 19, \u00a71.\n\n[135] _Ibid._ XII. 14, \u00a73.\n\n[136] _Ibid._ XII. 15, 16.\n\n[137] _Ibid._ XII. 21, \u00a75.\n\n[138] _Ibid._ XII. 23, \u00a72.\n\n[139] _Ut scias me ita dolere ut non iaceam._\n\n[140] _De Or._ III. \u00a7109.\n\n[141] _Ad Att._ XII. 28, \u00a72.\n\n[142] Cf. esp. _Ad Att._ XII. 40, \u00a72 with 38, \u00a73.\n\n[143] _Ibid._ XII. 40, \u00a72.\n\n[144] _Ibid._ XII. 40, \u00a75.\n\n[145] _Ibid._ XIII. 26.\n\n[146] _Ibid._ XII. 41, \u00a71, also 42, 43; XIII. 26.\n\n[147] _Ibid._ XII. 46.\n\n[148] _Ad Att._ XII. 45, \u00a71.\n\n[149] _\u00dcber Cicero's Akademika_, p. 4.\n\n[150] Cf. _Ad Att._ XII. 12, \u00a72, where there is a distinct mention of the\nfirst two books.\n\n[151] _Ibid._ XIII. 12, \u00a73.\n\n[152] _Ibid._ XIII. 19, \u00a74.\n\n[153] _Ibid._ XIII. 21, \u00a7\u00a74, 5; 22, \u00a73.\n\n[154] II. \u00a72.\n\n[155] _De Fin._ Praef. p. lvii. ed. 2.\n\n[156] _Ad Att._ XIII. 12, \u00a73; 16, \u00a71.\n\n[157] _Ibid._ XVI. 3, \u00a71.\n\n[158] _Ibid._ XVI. 6, \u00a74.\n\n[159] _Ac._ II. \u00a761.\n\n[160] _D.F._ I. \u00a72.\n\n[161] _T.D._ II. \u00a74. _De Div._ II. \u00a71.\n\n[162] Cf. Krische, p. 5.\n\n[163] _Ac._ II. \u00a761.\n\n[164] _Ad Att._ XIII. 5, \u00a71.\n\n[165] _Ibid._ XIII. 32, \u00a73.\n\n[166] _Ad Att._ XIII. 33, \u00a74.\n\n[167] _Ibid_. XIII. II. \u00a71.\n\n[168] _Ibid_. XII. 42.\n\n[169] _Ibid_. XIII. 16, \u00a71.\n\n[170] _Ibid_. XIII. 12, \u00a73.\n\n[171] _Ibid_. IV. 16a, \u00a72.\n\n[172] _Ibid_. XIII. 12, \u00a73; also IV. 16a, \u00a72.\n\n[173] _Ad Att._ XIII. 12, \u00a73.\n\n[174] _Ibid_. XIII. 19, \u00a74.\n\n[175] _Ibid_. XIII. 12, \u00a73.\n\n[176] _Ibid_. XIII. 19, \u00a74.\n\n[177] _Ibid_. XIII. 12, \u00a73; 19, \u00a74; 16, \u00a71.\n\n[178] _Ibid_. XIII. 19, \u00a73.\n\n[179] _Ad Att._ XIII. 22, \u00a71.\n\n[180] _Ibid._ XIII. 19, \u00a75.\n\n[181] Cf. _Ibid._ XIII. 14, \u00a73; 16, \u00a72; 18; 19, \u00a75.\n\n[182] _Ibid._ XIII. 19, \u00a75.\n\n[183] _Ibid._ XIII. 25, \u00a73.\n\n[184] _Ad Att._ XIII. 24.\n\n[185] _Ibid._ XIII. 13, \u00a71; 18.\n\n[186] _Ibid._ XIII. 13, \u00a71; 18; 19, \u00a74.\n\n[187] _Ibid._ XIII. 12, \u00a73. I may here remark on the absurdity of the dates\nSch\u00fctz assigns to these letters. He makes Cicero execute the second edition\nof the _Academica_ in a single day. Cf. XIII. 12 with 13.\n\n[188] _Ad Att._ XIII. 13, \u00a71.\n\n[189] _Ibid._ XIII. 19, \u00a75.\n\n[190] _Ibid._ XIII. 19, \u00a73.\n\n[191] _Ibid._ XIII. 25, \u00a73.\n\n[192] _Ibid._ XIII. 25, \u00a73.\n\n[193] _Ibid._ XIII. 21, \u00a74.\n\n[194] _Ibid._ XIII. 21, \u00a75.\n\n[195] _Ad Att._ XIII. 22, \u00a73.\n\n[196] _Ibid._ XIII. 24.\n\n[197] _Ibid._ XIII. 35, 36, \u00a72.\n\n[198] _Ibid._ XIII. 38, \u00a71.\n\n[199] _Ibid._ XIII. 21, \u00a7\u00a73, 4.\n\n[200] _T.D._ II. \u00a74. Cf. Quintil. _Inst. Or._ III. 6, \u00a764.\n\n[201] _Ad Att._ XVI. 6, \u00a74. _N.D._ I. \u00a711. _De Div._ II. \u00a71.\n\n[202] _De Off._ II. \u00a78, _Tim\u00e6us_, c. 1. _Ad Att._ XIII. 13, \u00a71; 19, \u00a75.\n\n[203] _Ad Att._ XIII. 12; 16; 13; 19.\n\n[204] _Ibid._ XVI. 6, \u00a74. _T.D._ II. \u00a74. _N.D._ I. \u00a711. _De Div._ II. \u00a71.\n\n[205] _Nat. Hist._ XXXI. c. 2.\n\n[206] _Inst. Or._ III. 6, \u00a764.\n\n[207] Plut. _Lucullus_, c. 42.\n\n[208] \u00a7\u00a712, 18, 148.\n\n[209] Cf. _Att._ XIII. 19, \u00a74.\n\n[210] _Lucullus_, \u00a712.\n\n[211] _Ad Att._ XIII. 16, \u00a71.\n\n[212] Lactant. _Inst._ VI 2.\n\n[213] Cf. esp. _De Off._ I. \u00a7133 with _Brutus_, \u00a7\u00a7133, 134.\n\n[214] Esp. _Pro Lege Manilia_, \u00a751.\n\n[215] _Brutus_, \u00a7222.\n\n[216] _In Verrem_, II. 3, \u00a7210.\n\n[217] _Pro Lege Manilia_, \u00a759.\n\n[218] _Pro Sestio_, \u00a7122.\n\n[219] _Pro Sestio_, \u00a7101.\n\n[220] _Philipp._ II. \u00a712.\n\n[221] _Ad Att._ II. 24, \u00a74.\n\n[222] _Pis._ \u00a76. _Pro Sestio_, \u00a7121. _Pro Domo_, \u00a7113. _Post Reditum in\nSenatu_, \u00a79. _Philipp._ II. \u00a712.\n\n[223] _Ad Fam._ IX. 15, \u00a73.\n\n[224] Cf. _Post Reditum in Senatu_, \u00a79. _Pro Domo_, \u00a7113.\n\n[225] _Pro Archia_, \u00a7\u00a76, 28.\n\n[226] Cf. _Ac._ II. \u00a79 with \u00a780.\n\n[227] \u00a762.\n\n[228] _Pro Plancio_, \u00a712. _Pro Murena_, \u00a736. _Pro Rabirio_, \u00a726. _Pro\nCornelia_ II. fragm. 4, ed. Nobbe.\n\n[229] _T.D._ V. \u00a756. Cf. _De Or._ III. \u00a79. _N.D._ III. \u00a780.\n\n[230] Cf. esp. III. \u00a7173.\n\n[231] _Ibid._ II. \u00a728.\n\n[232] _Ibid._ II. \u00a7\u00a713, 20, 21.\n\n[233] _Ibid._ II. \u00a751.\n\n[234] Cf. _ibid._ II. \u00a774 with III. \u00a7127.\n\n[235] Cf. II. \u00a7152 with III. \u00a7187.\n\n[236] _Ibid._ II. \u00a7154.\n\n[237] _Brutus_, \u00a7\u00a7132, 133, 134, 259. _De Or._ III. \u00a729.\n\n[238] _Brutus_, \u00a7132.\n\n[239] _De Or._ II. \u00a7244. _N.D._ I. \u00a779. Cf. Gellius, XIX. 9.\n\n[240] _De Or._ II. \u00a7155.\n\n[241] _Ibid._ III. \u00a7194.\n\n[242] Cf. _De Or._ II. \u00a768 with III. \u00a7\u00a7182, 187.\n\n[243] _De Or._ I. \u00a782 sq.; II. \u00a7360.\n\n[244] _Ibid._ I. \u00a745; II. \u00a7365; III. \u00a7\u00a768, 75.\n\n[245] \u00a712, _commemoravit a patre suo dicta Philoni_.\n\n[246] Cf. _De Or._ III. \u00a7110.\n\n[247] _Ac._ II. \u00a7148.\n\n[248] Cf. _Ac._ II. \u00a711.\n\n[249] _Ibid._\n\n[250] _Ibid._ \u00a7\u00a712, 18, with my notes.\n\n[251] _Ac._ II. \u00a712: _ista quae heri defensa sunt_ compared with the words\n_ad Arcesilam Carneademque veniamus_.\n\n[252] See below.\n\n[253] _Ac._ II. \u00a7\u00a733--36 inclusive; \u00a754.\n\n[254] _Ac._ II. \u00a728.\n\n[255] Cf. _Ac._ II. \u00a7\u00a759, 67, 78, 112, 148, with my notes.\n\n[256] _Ibid._ II. \u00a710.\n\n[257] _Ibid._ II. \u00a728.\n\n[258] Cf. II. \u00a761 with the fragments of the _Hortensius_; also _T.D._ II.\n\u00a74; III. \u00a76; _D.F._ I. \u00a72.\n\n[259] Lactant. III. 16.\n\n[260] Cf. _Ac._ II. \u00a710.\n\n[261] _Ib._ II. \u00a761.\n\n[262] \u00a7\u00a744--46.\n\n[263] \u00a713.\n\n[264] Cf. II. \u00a714 with I. \u00a744, and II. \u00a7\u00a755, 56.\n\n[265] II. \u00a7\u00a717, 18, 22.\n\n[266] Cf. II. \u00a731 with I. \u00a745.\n\n[267] II. \u00a7\u00a717, 24, 26, 27, 29, 38, 54, 59.\n\n[268] II. \u00a779.\n\n[269] Cf. the words _tam multa_ in II. \u00a779.\n\n[270] See II. \u00a742, where there is a reference to the \"_hesternus sermo_.\"\n\n[271] II. \u00a710.\n\n[272] Cf. II. \u00a710: _id quod quaerebatur paene explicatum est, ut tota fere\nquaestio tractata videatur_.\n\n[273] What these were will appear from my notes on the _Lucullus_.\n\n[274] II. \u00a712.\n\n[275] _Ad Fam._ IX. 8.\n\n[276] Cf. _Ad Att._ XIII. 25, \u00a73: _Ad Brutum transeamus_.\n\n[277] This is not, as Krische supposes, the villa Cicero wished to buy\nafter Hortensius' death. That lay at Puteoli: see _Ad Att._ VII. 3, \u00a79.\n\n[278] II. \u00a79.\n\n[279] Cf. II. \u00a761.\n\n[280] II. \u00a780: _O praeclarum prospectum_!\n\n[281] Cf. II. \u00a79 with \u00a7128 (_signum illud_), also \u00a7\u00a780, 81, 100, 105, 125.\n\n[282] II. \u00a7115.\n\n[283] II. \u00a763.\n\n[284] II. \u00a7\u00a7147, 148.\n\n[285] II. \u00a7135.\n\n[286] Cf. II. \u00a7\u00a711, 12 with the words _quae erant contra_ [Greek:\nakatal\u00eapsian] _praeclare collecta ab Antiocho_: _Ad Att._ XIII. 19, \u00a73.\n\n[287] Varro, _De Re Rust._ III. 17.\n\n[288] II. \u00a711.\n\n[289] _Paradoxa_, \u00a71. _D.F._ III. \u00a78. _Brutus_, \u00a7119.\n\n[290] _Ac._ I. \u00a712. _D.F._ V. \u00a78.\n\n[291] Cf. II. \u00a780.\n\n[292] Cf. Aug. _Adv. Acad._ III. \u00a735. Nonius, sub v. _exultare_.\n\n[293] Cf. the word _nuper_ in \u00a71.\n\n[294] \u00a711.\n\n[295] \u00a7\u00a73, 18.\n\n[296] _Ad Fam._ IX. 8, \u00a71.\n\n[297] _Ad Att._ II. 25, \u00a71.\n\n[298] _Ibid_. III. 8, \u00a73.\n\n[299] _Ibid_. III. 15, \u00a73; 18, \u00a71.\n\n[300] _Ad Fam._ IX. 1--8. They are the only letters from Cicero to Varro\npreserved in our collections.\n\n[301] Above, pp. xxxvii--xlii.\n\n[302] _De Civ. Dei_, XIX. cc. 1--3.\n\n[303] See Madvig, _De Fin._ ed. 2, p. 824; also Krische, pp. 49, 50.\nBr\u00fcckner, _Leben des Cicero_, I. p. 655, follows M\u00fcller.\n\n[304] Cf. Krische, p. 58.","title":"Academica","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":98261}