{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_15255/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_15255","id":"gutenberg_15255","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/15255","summary":null,"tags":["Asia -- Religion","Buddhism","Category: History - Other","Category: History - Religious","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Hinduism"],"text":"Produced by Jonathan Ingram, Shawn Wheeler and the PG Online\nDistributed Proofreading Team.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nHINDUISM AND BUDDHISM\nAN HISTORICAL SKETCH\n\n\nBY SIR CHARLES ELIOT\n\n\n\n\nIn three volumes VOLUME I\n\nROUTLEDGE & KEGAN PAUL LTD Broadway House, 68-74 Carter Lane, London,\nE.C.4.\n\n_First published_ 1921 _Reprinted_ 1954 _Reprinted_ 1957 _Reprinted_\n1962\n\n\nPRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY\n\nLUND HUMPHRIES LONDON {~BULLET~} BRADFORD\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nThe present work was begun in 1907 and was practically complete when the\nwar broke out, but many circumstances such as the difficulty of\nreturning home, unavoidable delays in printing and correcting proofs,\nand political duties have deferred its publication until now. In the\ninterval many important books dealing with Hinduism and Buddhism have\nappeared, but having been resident in the Far East (with one brief\nexception) since 1912 I have found it exceedingly difficult to keep in\ntouch with recent literature. Much of it has reached me only in the last\nfew months and I have often been compelled to notice new facts and views\nin footnotes only, though I should have wished to modify the text.\n\nBesides living for some time in the Far East, I have paid many visits to\nIndia, some of which were of considerable length, and have travelled in\nall the countries of which I treat except Tibet. I have however seen\nsomething of Lamaism near Darjeeling, in northern China and in Mongolia.\nBut though I have in several places described the beliefs and practices\nprevalent at the present day, my object is to trace the history and\ndevelopment of religion in India and elsewhere with occasional remarks\non its latest phases. I have not attempted to give a general account of\ncontemporary religious thought in India or China and still less to\nforecast the possible result of present tendencies.\n\nIn the following pages I have occasion to transcribe words belonging to\nmany oriental languages in Latin characters. Unfortunately a uniform\nsystem of transcription, applicable to all tongues, seems not to be\npractical at present. It was attempted in the _Sacred Books of the\nEast_, but that system has fallen into disuse and is liable to be\nmisunderstood. It therefore seems best to use for each language the\nmethod of transcription adopted by standard works in English dealing\nwith each, for French and German transcriptions, whatever their merits\nmay be as representations of the original sounds, are often misleading\nto English readers, especially in Chinese. For Chinese I have adopted\nWade's system as used in Giles's _Dictionary_, for Tibetan the system of\nSarat Chandra Das, for Pali that of the Pali Text Society and for\nSanskrit that of Monier-Williams's _Sanskrit Dictionary,_ except that I\nwrite s instead of s. Indian languages however offer many difficulties:\nit is often hard to decide whether Sanskrit or vernacular forms are more\nsuitable and in dealing with Buddhist subjects whether Sanskrit or Pali\nwords should be used. I have found it convenient to vary the form of\nproper names according as my remarks are based on Sanskrit or on Pali\nliterature, but this obliges me to write the same word differently in\ndifferent places, e.g. sometimes Aj\u00e2tasatru and sometimes Aj\u00e2tasattu,\njust as in a book dealing with Greek and Latin mythology one might\nemploy both Herakles and Hercules. Also many Indian names such as\nRamayana, Krishna, nirvana have become Europeanized or at least are\nfamiliar to all Europeans interested in Indian literature. It seems\npedantic to write them with their full and accurate complement of\naccents and dots and my general practice is to give such words in their\naccurate spelling (R\u00e2m\u00e2yana, etc.) when they are first mentioned and\nalso in the notes but usually to print them in their simpler and\nunaccented forms. I fear however that my practice in this matter is not\nentirely consistent since different parts of the book were written at\ndifferent times.\n\nMy best thanks are due to Mr R.F. Johnston (author of _Chinese\nBuddhism_), to Professor W.J. Hinton of the University of Hong Kong and\nto Mr H.I. Harding of H.M. Legation at Peking for reading the proofs and\ncorrecting many errors: to Sir E. Denison Ross and Professor L. Finot\nfor valuable information: and especially to Professor and Mrs Rhys\nDavids for much advice, though they are in no way responsible for the\nviews which I have expressed and perhaps do not agree with them. It is\nsuperfluous for me to pay a tribute to these eminent scholars whose\nworks are well known to all who are interested in Indian religion, but\nno one who has studied the early history of Buddhism or the Pali\nlanguage can refrain from acknowledging a debt of gratitude to those who\nhave made such researches possible by founding and maintaining during\nnearly forty years the Pali Text Society and rendering many of the texts\nstill more accessible to Europe by their explanations and translations.\n\nC. ELIOT.\n\nTOKYO,\n\n_May_, 1921.\n\n\n\n\nLIST OF ABBREVIATIONS\n\nThe following are the principal abbreviations used:\n\n\nEp. Ind. Epigraphia India.\n\nE.R.E. Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics (edited by Hastings).\n\nI.A. Indian Antiquary.\n\nJ.A. Journal Asiatique.\n\nJ.A.O.S. Journal of the American Oriental Society.\n\nJ.R.A.S. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.\n\nP.T.S. Pali Text Society.\n\nS.B.E. Sacred Books of the East (Clarendon Press).\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\nBOOK I\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\n1. INFLUENCE OF INDIAN THOUGHT IN EASTERN ASIA xi\n\n2. ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF HINDUISM xiv\n\n3. THE BUDDHA xix\n\n4. ASOKA xxii\n\n5. EXTENSION OF BUDDHISM AND HINDUISM BEYOND INDIA xxiv\n\n6. NEW FORMS OF BUDDHISM xxix\n\n7. REVIVAL OF HINDUISM xxxiii\n\n8. LATER FORMS OF HINDUISM xl\n\n9. EUROPEAN INFLUENCE AND MODERN HINDUISM xlvi\n\n10. CHANGE AND PERMANENCE IN BUDDHISM xlviii\n\n11. REBIRTH AND THE NATURE OF THE SOUL l\n\n12. \" \" \" \" lviii\n\n13. \" \" \" \" lxii\n\n14. EASTERN PESSIMISM AND RENUNCIATION lxv\n\n15. EASTERN POLYTHEISM lxviii\n\n16. THE EXTRAVAGANCE OF HINDUISM lxx\n\n17. THE HINDU AND BUDDHIST SCRIPTURES lxxii\n\n18. MORALITY AND WILL lxxvi\n\n19. THE ORIGIN OF EVIL lxxix\n\n20. CHURCH AND STATE lxxxi\n\n21. PUBLIC WORSHIP AND CEREMONIAL lxxxiv\n\n22. THE WORSHIP OF THE REPRODUCTIVE FORCES lxxxvi\n\n23. HINDUISM IN PRACTICE lxxxviii\n\n24. BUDDHISM IN PRACTICE xcii\n\n25. INTEREST OF INDIAN THOUGHT FOR EUROPE xcv\n\n\n\n\nBOOK II\n\nEARLY INDIAN RELIGION: A GENERAL VIEW\n\n\nI. RELIGIONS OF INDIA AND EASTERN ASIA 5\n\nII. HISTORICAL 15\n\nIII. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF INDIAN RELIGION 33\n\nIV. VEDIC DEITIES AND SACRIFICES 50\n\nV. ASCETICISM AND KNOWLEDGE 71\n\nVI. RELIGIOUS LIFE IN PRE-BUDDHIST INDIA 87\n\nVII. THE JAINS 105\n\n\n\n\nBOOK III\n\nPALI BUDDHISM\n\n\nVIII. LIFE OF THE BUDDHA 129\n\nIX. THE BUDDHA COMPARED WITH OTHER RELIGIOUS TEACHERS 177\n\nX. THE TEACHING OF THE BUDDHA 185\n\nXI. MONKS AND LAYMEN 237\n\nXII. ASOKA 254\n\nXIII. THE CANON 275\n\nXIV. MEDITATION 302\n\nXV. MYTHOLOGY IN HINDUISM AND BUDDHISM\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n1. _Influence of Indian Thought in Eastern Asia_\n\n\nProbably the first thought which will occur to the reader who is\nacquainted with the matters treated in this work will be that the\nsubject is too large. A history of Hinduism or Buddhism or even of both\nwithin the frontiers of India may be a profitable though arduous task,\nbut to attempt a historical sketch of the two faiths in their whole\nduration and extension over Eastern Asia is to choose a scene unsuited\nto any canvas which can be prepared at the present day. Not only is the\nbreadth of the landscape enormous but in some places it is crowded with\ndetails which cannot be omitted while in others the principal features\nare hidden by a mist which obscures the unity and connection of the\nwhole composition. No one can feel these difficulties more than I do\nmyself or approach his work with more diffidence, yet I venture to think\nthat wide surveys may sometimes be useful and are needed in the present\nstate of oriental studies. For the reality of Indian influence in\nAsia--from Japan to the frontiers of Persia, from Manchuria to Java, from\nBurma to Mongolia--is undoubted and the influence is one. You cannot\nseparate Hinduism from Buddhism, for without it Hinduism could not have\nassumed its medieval shape and some forms of Buddhism, such as Lamaism,\ncountenance Brahmanic deities and ceremonies, while in Java and Camboja\nthe two religions were avowedly combined and declared to be the same.\nNeither is it convenient to separate the fortunes of Buddhism and\nHinduism outside India from their history within it, for although the\nimportance of Buddhism depends largely on its foreign conquests, the\nforms which it assumed in its new territories can be understood only by\nreference to the religious condition of India at the periods when\nsuccessive missions were despatched.\n\nThis book then is an attempt to give a sketch of Indian thought or\nIndian religion--for the two terms are nearly equivalent in extent--and of\nits history and influence in Asia. I will not say in the world, for that\nsounds too ambitious and really adds little to the more restricted\nphrase. For ideas, like empires and races, have their natural frontiers.\nThus Europe may be said to be non-Mohammedan. Although the essential\nprinciples of Mohammedanism seem in harmony with European monotheism,\nyet it has been deliberately rejected by the continent and often\nrepelled by force. Similarly in the regions west of India[1], Indian\nreligion is sporadic and exotic. I do not think that it had much\ninfluence on ancient Egypt, Babylon and Palestine or that it should be\ncounted among the forces which shaped the character and teaching of\nChrist, though Christian monasticism and mysticism perhaps owed\nsomething to it. The debt of Manichaeism and various Gnostic sects is\nmore certain and more considerable, but these communities have not\nendured and were regarded as heretical while they lasted. Among the\nNeoplatonists of Alexandria and the Sufis of Arabia and Persia many seem\nto have listened to the voice of Hindu mysticism but rather as\nindividuals than as leaders of popular movements.\n\nBut in Eastern Asia the influence of India has been notable in extent,\nstrength and duration. Scant justice is done to her position in the\nworld by those histories which recount the exploits of her invaders and\nleave the impression that her own people were a feeble, dreamy folk,\nsundered from the rest of mankind by their sea and mountain frontiers.\nSuch a picture takes no account of the intellectual conquests of the\nHindus. Even their political conquests were not contemptible and were\nremarkable for the distance if not for the extent of the territory\noccupied. For there were Hindu kingdoms in Java and Camboja and\nsettlements in Sumatra[2] and even in Borneo, an island about as far\nfrom India as is Persia from Rome. But such military or commercial\ninvasions are insignificant compared with the spread of Indian thought.\nThe south-eastern region of Asia--both mainland and archipelago--owed its\ncivilization almost entirely to India. In Ceylon, Burma, Siam, Camboja,\nChampa and Java, religion, art, the alphabet, literature, as well as\nwhatever science and political organization existed, were the direct\ngift of Hindus, whether Brahmans or Buddhists, and much the same may be\nsaid of Tibet, whence the wilder Mongols took as much Indian\ncivilization as they could stomach. In Java and other Malay countries\nthis Indian culture has been superseded by Islam, yet even in Java the\nalphabet and to a large extent the customs of the people are still\nIndian.\n\nIn the countries mentioned Indian influence has been dominant until the\npresent day, or at least until the advent of Islam. In another large\narea comprising China, Japan, Korea, and Annam it appears as a layer\nsuperimposed on Chinese culture, yet not a mere veneer. In these regions\nChinese ethics, literature and art form the major part of intellectual\nlife and have an outward and visible sign in the Chinese written\ncharacters which have not been ousted by an Indian alphabet[3]. But in\nall, especially in Japan, the influence of Buddhism has been profound\nand penetrating. None of these lands can be justly described as Buddhist\nin the same sense as Burma or Siam but Buddhism gave them a creed\nacceptable in different forms to superstitious, emotional and\nmetaphysical minds: it provided subjects and models for art, especially\nfor painting, and entered into popular life, thought and language.\n\nBut what are Hinduism and Buddhism? What do they teach about gods and\nmen and the destinies of the soul? What ideals do they hold up and is\ntheir teaching of value or at least of interest for Europe? I will not\nat once answer these questions by general statements, because such names\nas Hinduism and Buddhism have different meanings in different countries\nand ages, but will rather begin by briefly reviewing the development of\nthe two religions. I hope that the reader will forgive me if in doing so\nI repeat much that is to be found in the body of this work.\n\nOne general observation about India may be made at the outset. Here more\nthan in any other country the national mind finds its favourite\noccupation and full expression in religion. This quality is geographical\nrather than racial, for it is possessed by Dravidians as much as by\nAryans. From the Raja to the peasant most Hindus have an interest in\ntheology and often a passion for it. Few works of art or literature are\npurely secular: the intellectual and aesthetic efforts of India, long,\ncontinuous and distinguished as they are, are monotonous inasmuch as\nthey are almost all the expression of some religious phase. But the\nreligion itself is extraordinarily full and varied. The love of\ndiscussion and speculation creates considerable variety in practice and\nalmost unlimited variety in creed and theory. There are few dogmas known\nto the theologies of the world which are not held by some of India's\nmultitudinous sects[4] and it is perhaps impossible to make a single\ngeneral statement about Hinduism, to which some sects would not prove an\nexception. Any such statements in this book must be understood as\nreferring merely to the great majority of Hindus.\n\nAs a form of life and thought Hinduism is definite and unmistakeable. In\nwhatever shape it presents itself it can be recognized at once. But it\nis so vast and multitudinous that only an encyclopedia could describe it\nand no formula can summarize it. Essayists flounder among conflicting\npropositions such as that sectarianism is the essence of Hinduism or\nthat no educated Hindu belongs to a sect. Either can easily be proved,\nfor it may be said of Hinduism, as it has been said of zoology, that you\ncan prove anything if you merely collect facts which support your theory\nand not those which conflict with it. Hence many distinguished writers\nerr by overestimating the phase which specially interests them. For one\nthe religious life of India is fundamentally monotheistic and Vishnuite:\nfor another philosophic Sivaism is its crown and quintessence: a third\nmaintains with equal truth that all forms of Hinduism are tantric. All\nthese views are tenable because though Hindu life may be cut up into\ncastes and sects, Hindu creeds are not mutually exclusive and repellent.\nThey attract and colour one another.\n\n\n2. _Origin and Growth of Hinduism_\n\nThe earliest product of Indian literature, the Rig Veda, contains the\nsongs of the Aryan invaders who were beginning to make a home in India.\nThough no longer nomads, they had little local sentiment. No cities had\narisen comparable with Babylon or Thebes and we hear little of ancient\nkingdoms or dynasties. Many of the gods who occupied so much of their\nthoughts were personifications of natural forces such as the sun, wind\nand fire, worshipped without temples or images and hence more indefinite\nin form, habitation and attributes than the deities of Assyria or Egypt.\nThe idea of a struggle between good and evil was not prominent. In\nPersia, where the original pantheon was almost the same as that of the\nVeda, this idea produced monotheism: the minor deities became angels and\nthe chief deity a Lord of hosts who wages a successful struggle against\nan independent but still inferior spirit of evil. But in India the\nSpirits of Good and Evil are not thus personified. The world is regarded\nless as a battlefield of principles than as a theatre for the display of\nnatural forces. No one god assumes lordship over the others but all are\nseen to be interchangeable--mere names and aspects of something which is\ngreater than any god.\n\nIndian religion is commonly regarded as the offspring of an Aryan\nreligion, brought into India by invaders from the north and modified by\ncontact with Dravidian civilization. The materials at our disposal\nhardly permit us to take any other point of view, for the literature of\nthe Vedic Aryans is relatively ancient and full and we have no\ninformation about the old Dravidians comparable with it. But were our\nknowledge less one-sided, we might see that it would be more correct to\ndescribe Indian religion as Dravidian religion stimulated and modified\nby the ideas of Aryan invaders. For the greatest deities of Hinduism,\nSiva, Krishna, R\u00e2ma, Durg\u00e2 and some of its most essential doctrines such\nas metempsychosis and divine incarnations, are either totally unknown to\nthe Veda or obscurely adumbrated in it. The chief characteristics of\nmature Indian religion are characteristics of an area, not of a race,\nand they are not the characteristics of religion in Persia, Greece or\nother Aryan lands[5].\n\nSome writers explain Indian religion as the worship of nature spirits,\nothers as the veneration of the dead. But it is a mistake to see in the\nreligion of any large area only one origin or impulse. The principles\nwhich in a learned form are championed to-day by various professors\nrepresent thoughts which were creative in early times. In ancient India\nthere were some whose minds turned to their ancestors and dead friends\nwhile others saw divinity in the wonders of storm, spring and harvest.\nKrishna is in the main a product of hero worship, but Siva has no such\nhistorical basis. He personifies the powers of birth and death, of\nchange, decay and rebirth--in fact all that we include in the prosaic\nword nature. Assuredly both these lines of thought--the worship of nature\nand of the dead--and perhaps many others existed in ancient India.\n\nBy the time of the Upanishads, that is about 600 B.C., we trace three\nclear currents in Indian religion which have persisted until the present\nday. The first is ritual. This became extraordinarily complicated but\nretained its primitive and magical character. The object of an ancient\nIndian sacrifice was partly to please the gods but still more to coerce\nthem by certain acts and formulae[6]. Secondly all Hindus lay stress on\nasceticism and self-mortification, as a means of purifying the soul and\nobtaining supernatural powers. They have a conviction that every man who\nis in earnest about religion and even every student of philosophy must\nfollow a discipline at least to the extent of observing chastity and\neating only to support life. Severer austerities give clearer insight\ninto divine mysteries and control over the forces of nature. Europeans\nare apt to condemn eastern asceticism as a waste of life but it has had\nan important moral effect. The weakness of Hinduism, though not of\nBuddhism, is that ethics have so small a place in its fundamental\nconceptions. Its deities are not identified with the moral law and the\nsaint is above that law. But this dangerous doctrine is corrected by the\ndogma, which is also a popular conviction, that a saint must be a\npassionless ascetic. In India no religious teacher can expect a hearing\nunless he begins by renouncing the world.\n\nThirdly, the deepest conviction of Hindus in all ages is that salvation\nand happiness are attainable by knowledge. The corresponding phrases in\nSanskrit are perhaps less purely intellectual than our word and contain\nsome idea of effort and emotion. He who knows God attains to God, nay he\nis God. Rites and self-denial are but necessary preliminaries to such\nknowledge: he who possesses it stands above them. It is inconceivable to\nthe Hindus that he should care for the things of the world but he cares\nequally little for creeds and ceremonies. Hence, side by side with\nirksome codes, complicated ritual and elaborate theology, we find the\nconviction that all these things are but vanity and weariness, fetters\nto be shaken off by the free in spirit. Nor do those who hold such views\ncorrespond to the anti-clerical and radical parties of Europe. The\nascetic sitting in the temple court often holds that the rites performed\naround him are spiritually useless and the gods of the shrine mere\nfanciful presentments of that which cannot be depicted or described.\n\nRather later, but still before the Christian era, another idea makes\nitself prominent in Indian religion, namely faith or devotion to a\nparticular deity. This idea, which needs no explanation, is pushed on\nthe one hand to every extreme of theory and practice: on the other it\nrarely abolishes altogether the belief in ritualism, asceticism and\nknowledge.\n\nAny attempt to describe Hinduism as one whole leads to startling\ncontrasts. The same religion enjoins self-mortification and orgies:\ncommands human sacrifices and yet counts it a sin to eat meat or crush\nan insect: has more priests, rites and images than ancient Egypt or\nmedieval Rome and yet out does Quakers in rejecting all externals. These\nsingular features are connected with the ascendancy of the Brahman\ncaste. The Brahmans are an interesting social phenomenon without exact\nparallel elsewhere. They are not, like the Catholic or Moslem clergy, a\npriesthood pledged to support certain doctrines but an intellectual,\nhereditary aristocracy who claim to direct the thought of India whatever\nforms it may take. All who admit this claim and accord a nominal\nrecognition to the authority of the Veda are within the spacious fold or\nmenagerie. Neither the devil-worshipping aboriginee nor the atheistic\nphilosopher is excommunicated, though neither may be relished by average\northodoxy.\n\nThough Hinduism has no one creed, yet there are at least two doctrines\nheld by nearly all who call themselves Hindus. One may be described as\npolytheistic pantheism. Most Hindus are apparently polytheists, that is\nto say they venerate the images of several deities or spirits, yet most\nare monotheists in the sense that they address their worship to one god.\nBut this monotheism has almost always a pantheistic tinge. The Hindu\ndoes not say the gods of the heathen are but idols, but it is the Lord\nwho made the heavens: he says, My Lord (R\u00e2ma, Krishna or whoever it may\nbe) is all the other gods. Some schools would prefer to say that no\nhuman language applied to the Godhead can be correct and that all ideas\nof a personal ruler of the world are at best but relative truths. This\nultimate ineffable Godhead is called Brahman[7].\n\nThe second doctrine is commonly known as metempsychosis, the\ntransmigration of souls or reincarnation, the last name being the most\ncorrect. In detail the doctrine assumes various forms since different\nviews are held about the relation of soul to body. But the essence of\nall is the same, namely that a life does not begin at birth or end at\ndeath but is a link in an infinite series of lives, each of which is\nconditioned and determined by the acts done in previous existences\n(karma). Animal, human and divine (or at least angelic) existences may\nall be links in the chain. A man's deeds, if good, may exalt him to the\nheavens, if evil may degrade him to life as a beast. Since all lives,\neven in heaven, must come to an end, happiness is not to be sought in\nheaven or on earth. The common aspiration of the religious Indian is for\ndeliverance, that is release from the round of births and repose in some\nchangeless state called by such names as union with Brahman, nirvana and\nmany others.\n\n\n3. _The Buddha_\n\nAs observed above, the Brahmans claim to direct the religious life and\nthought of India and apart from Mohammedanism may be said to have\nachieved their ambition, though at the price of tolerating much that the\nmajority would wish to suppress. But in earlier ages their influence was\nless extensive and there were other currents of religious activity, some\nhostile and some simply independent. The most formidable of these found\nexpression in Jainism and Buddhism both of which arose in Bihar in the\nsixth century[8] B.C. This century was a time of intellectual ferment in\nmany countries. In China it produced Lao-tz[u] and Confucius: in Greece,\nParmenides, Empedocles, and the sophists were only a little later. In\nall these regions we have the same phenomenon of restless, wandering\nteachers, ready to give advice on politics, religion or philosophy, to\nany one who would hear them.\n\nAt that time the influence of the Brahmans had hardly permeated Bihar,\nthough predominant to the west of it, and speculation there followed\nlines different from those laid down in the Upanishads, but of some\nantiquity, for we know that there were Buddhas before Gotama and that\nMah\u00e2v\u00eera, the founder of Jainism, reformed the doctrine of an older\nteacher called Parsva.\n\nIn Gotama's youth Bihar was full of wandering philosophers who appear to\nhave been atheistic and disposed to uphold the boldest paradoxes,\nintellectual and moral. There must however have been constructive\nelements in their doctrine, for they believed in reincarnation and the\nperiodic appearance of superhuman teachers and in the advantage of\nfollowing an ascetic discipline. They probably belonged chiefly to the\nwarrior caste as did Gotama, the Buddha known to history. The Pitakas\nrepresent him as differing in details from contemporary teachers but as\nrediscovering the truth taught by his predecessors. They imply that the\nworld is so constituted that there is only one way to emancipation and\nthat from time to time superior minds see this and announce it to\nothers. Still Buddhism does not in practice use such formulae as living\nin harmony with the laws of nature.\n\nIndian literature is notoriously concerned with ideas rather than facts\nbut the vigorous personality of the Buddha has impressed on it a\nportrait more distinct than that left by any other teacher or king. His\nwork had a double effect. Firstly it influenced all departments of Hindu\nreligion and thought, even those nominally opposed to it. Secondly it\nspread not only Buddhism in the strict sense but Indian art and\nliterature beyond the confines of India. The expansion of Hindu culture\nowes much to the doctrine that the Good Law should be preached to all\nnations.\n\nThe teaching of Gotama was essentially practical. This statement may\nseem paradoxical to the reader who has some acquaintance with the\nBuddhist scriptures and he will exclaim that of all religious books they\nare the least practical and least popular: they set up an anti-social\nideal and are mainly occupied with psychological theories. But the\nBuddha addressed a public such as we now find it hard even to imagine.\nIn those days the intellectual classes of India felt the ordinary\nactivities of life to be unsatisfying: they thought it natural to\nrenounce the world and mortify the flesh: divergent systems of ritual,\ntheology and self-denial promised happiness but all agreed in thinking\nit normal as well as laudable that a man should devote his life to\nmeditation and study. Compared with this frame of mind the teaching of\nthe Buddha is not unsocial, unpractical and mysterious but human,\nbusiness-like and clear. We are inclined to see in the monastic life\nwhich he recommended little but a useless sacrifice but it is evident\nthat in the opinion of his contemporaries his disciples had an easy\ntime, and that he had no intention of prescribing any cramped or\nunnatural existence. He accepted the current conviction that those who\ndevote themselves to the things of the mind and spirit should be\nreleased from worldly ties and abstain from luxury but he meant his\nmonks to live a life of sustained intellectual activity for themselves\nand of benevolence for others. His teaching is formulated in severe and\ntechnical phraseology, yet the substance of it is so simple that many\nhave criticized it as too obvious and jejune to be the basis of a\nreligion. But when he first enunciated his theses some two thousand five\nhundred years ago, they were not obvious but revolutionary and little\nless than paradoxical.\n\nThe principal of these propositions are as follows. The existence of\neverything depends on a cause: hence if the cause of evil or suffering\ncan be detected and removed, evil itself will be removed. That cause is\nlust and craving for pleasure[9]. Hence all sacrificial and sacramental\nreligions are irrelevant, for the cure which they propose has nothing to\ndo with the disease. The cause of evil or suffering is removed by\npurifying the heart and by following the moral law which sets high value\non sympathy and social duties, but an equally high value on the\ncultivation of individual character. But training and cultivation imply\nthe possibility of change. Hence it is a fatal mistake in the religious\nlife to hold a view common in India which regards the essence of man as\nsomething unchangeable and happy in itself, if it can only be isolated\nfrom physical trammels. On the contrary the happy mind is something to\nbe built up by good thoughts, good words and good deeds. In its origin\nthe Buddha's celebrated doctrine that there is no permanent self in\npersons or things is not a speculative proposition, nor a sentimental\nlament over the transitoriness of the world, but a basis for religion\nand morals. You will never be happy unless you realize that you can make\nand remake your own soul.\n\nThese simple principles and the absence of all dogmas as to God or\nBrahman distinguish the teaching of Gotama from most Indian systems, but\nhe accepted the usual Indian beliefs about Karma and rebirth and with\nthem the usual conclusion that release from the series of rebirths is\nthe _summum bonum_. This deliverance he called saintship (_arahattam_)\nor nirvana of which I shall say something below. In early Buddhism it is\nprimarily a state of happiness to be attained in this life and the\nBuddha persistently refused to explain what is the nature of a saint\nafter death. The question is unprofitable and perhaps he would have\nsaid, had he spoken our language, unmeaning. Later generations did not\nhesitate to discuss the problem but the Buddha's own teaching is simply\nthat a man can attain before death to a blessed state in which he has\nnothing to fear from either death or rebirth.\n\nThe Buddha attacked both the ritual and the philosophy of the Brahmans.\nAfter his time the sacrificial system, though it did not die, never\nregained its old prestige and he profoundly affected the history of\nIndian metaphysics. It may be justly said that most of his philosophic\nas distinguished from his practical teaching was common property before\nhis time, but he transmuted common ideas and gave them a currency and\nsignificance which they did not possess before. But he was less\ndestructive as a religious and social reformer than many have supposed.\nHe did not deny the existence nor forbid the worship of the popular\ngods, but such worship is not Buddhism and the gods are merely angels\nwho may be willing to help good Buddhists but are in no wise guides to\nreligion, since they need instruction themselves. And though he denied\nthat the Brahmans were superior by birth to others, he did not preach\nagainst caste, partly because it then existed only in a rudimentary\nform. But he taught that the road to salvation was one and open to all\nwho were able to walk in it[10], whether Hindus or foreigners. All may\nnot have the necessary qualifications of intellect and character to\nbecome monks but all can be good laymen, for whom the religious life\nmeans the observance of morality combined with such simple exercises as\nreading the scriptures. It is clear that this lay Buddhism had much to\ndo with the spread of the faith. The elemental simplicity of its\nprinciples--namely that religion is open to all and identical with\nmorality--made a clean sweep of Brahmanic theology and sacrifices and put\nin its place something like Confucianism. But the innate Indian love for\nphilosophizing and ritual caused generation after generation to add more\nand more supplements to the Master's teaching and it is only outside\nIndia that it has been preserved in any purity.\n\n\n4. _Asoka_\n\nGotama spent his life in preaching and by his personal exertions spread\nhis doctrines over Bihar and Oudh but for two centuries after his death\nwe know little of the history of Buddhism. In the reign of Asoka\n(273-232 B.C.) its fortunes suddenly changed, for this great Emperor\nwhose dominions comprised nearly all India made it the state religion\nand also engraved on rocks and pillars a long series of edicts recording\nhis opinions and aspirations. Buddhism is often criticized as a gloomy\nand unpractical creed, suited at best to stoical and scholarly recluses.\nBut these are certainly not its characteristics when it first appears in\npolitical history, just as they are not its characteristics in Burma or\nJapan to-day. Both by precept and example Asoka was an ardent exponent\nof the strenuous life. In his first edict he lays down the principle\n\"Let small and great exert themselves\" and in subsequent inscriptions he\ncontinually harps upon the necessity of energy and exertion. The Law or\nReligion (Dhamma) which his edicts enjoin is merely human and civic\nvirtue, except that it makes respect for animal life an integral part of\nmorality. In one passage he summarizes it as \"Little impiety, many good\ndeeds, compassion, liberality, truthfulness and purity.\" He makes no\nreference to a supreme deity, but insists on the reality and importance\nof the future life. Though he does not use the word _Karma_ this is\nclearly the conception which dominates his philosophy: those who do good\nare happy in this world and the next but those who fail in their duty\nwin neither heaven nor the royal favour. The king's creed is remarkable\nin India for its great simplicity. He deprecates superstitious\nceremonies and says nothing of Nirvana but dwells on morality as\nnecessary to happiness in this life and others. This is not the whole of\nGotama's teaching but two centuries after his death a powerful and\nenlightened Buddhist gives it as the gist of Buddhism for laymen.\n\nAsoka wished to make Buddhism the creed not only of India but of the\nworld as known to him and he boasts that he extended his \"conquests of\nreligion\" to the Hellenistic kingdoms of the west. If the missions which\nhe despatched thither reached their destination, there is little\nevidence that they bore any fruit, but the conversion of Ceylon and some\ndistricts in the Himalayas seems directly due to his initiative.\n\n\n5. _Extension of Buddhism and Hinduism beyond India_\n\nThis is perhaps a convenient place to review the extension of Buddhism\nand Hinduism outside India. To do so at this point implies of course an\nanticipation of chronology, but to delay the survey might blind the\nreader to the fact that from the time of Asoka onward India was engaged\nnot only in creating but also in exporting new varieties of religious\nthought.\n\nThe countries which have received Indian culture fall into two classes:\nfirst those to which it came as a result of religious missions or of\npeaceful international intercourse, and second those where it was\nestablished after conquest or at least colonization. In the first class\nthe religion introduced was Buddhism. If, as in Tibet, it seems to us\nmixed with Hinduism, yet it was a mixture which at the date of its\nintroduction passed in India for Buddhism. But in the second and smaller\nclass including Java, Camboja and Champa the immigrants brought with\nthem both Hinduism and Buddhism. The two systems were often declared to\nbe the same but the result was Hinduism mixed with some Buddhism, not\n_vice vers\u00e2_.\n\nThe countries of the first class comprise Ceylon, Burma and Siam,\nCentral Asia, Nepal, China with Annam, Korea and Japan, Tibet with\nMongolia. The Buddhism of the first three countries[11] is a real unity\nor in European language a church, for though they have no common\nhierarchy they use the same sacred language, Pali, and have the same\ncanon. Burma and Siam have repeatedly recognized Ceylon as a sort of\nmetropolitan see and on the other hand when religion in Ceylon fell on\nevil days the clergy were recruited from Burma and Siam. In the other\ncountries Buddhism presents greater differences and divisions. It had no\none sacred language and in different regions used either Sanskrit texts\nor translations into Chinese, Tibetan, Mongolian and the languages of\nCentral Asia.\n\n1. Ceylon. There is no reason to doubt that Buddhism was introduced\nunder the auspices of Asoka. Though the invasions and settlements of\nTamils have brought Hinduism into Ceylon, yet none of the later and\nmixed forms of Buddhism, in spite of some attempts to gain a footing,\never flourished there on a large scale. Sinhalese Buddhism had probably\na closer connection with southern India than the legend suggests and\nConjevaram was long a Buddhist centre which kept up intercourse with\nboth Ceylon and Burma.\n\n2. Burma. The early history of Burmese Buddhism is obscure and its\norigin probably complex, since at many different periods it may have\nreceived teachers from both India and China. The present dominant type\n(identical with the Buddhism of Ceylon) existed before the sixth\ncentury[12] and tradition ascribes its introduction both to the labours\nof Buddhaghosa and to the missionaries of Asoka. There was probably a\nconnection between Pegu and Conjevaram. In the eleventh century Burmese\nBuddhism had become extremely corrupt except in Pegu but King Anawrata\nconquered Pegu and spread a purer form throughout his dominions.\n\n3. Siam. The Thai race, who starting from somewhere in the Chinese\nprovince of Y\u00fcnnan began to settle in what is now called Siam about the\nbeginning of the twelfth century, probably brought with them some form\nof Buddhism. About 1300 the possessions of R\u00e2ma Komh\u00ebng, King of Siam,\nincluded Pegu and Pali Buddhism prevailed among his subjects. Somewhat\nlater, in 1361, a high ecclesiastic was summoned from Ceylon to arrange\nthe affairs of the church but not, it would seem, to introduce any new\ndoctrine. Pegu was the centre from which Pali Buddhism spread to upper\nBurma in the eleventh century and it probably performed the same service\nfor Siam later. The modern Buddhism of Camboja is simply Siamese\nBuddhism which filtered into the country from about 1250 onwards. The\nolder Buddhism of Camboja, for which see below, was quite different.\n\nAt the courts of Siam and Camboja, as formerly in Burma, there are\nBrahmans who perform state ceremonies and act as astrologers. Though\nthey have little to do with the religion of the people, their presence\nexplains the predominance of Indian rather than Chinese influence in\nthese countries.\n\n4. Tradition says that Indian colonists settled in Khotan during the\nreign of Asoka, but no precise date can at present be fixed for the\nintroduction of Buddhism into the Tarim basin and other regions commonly\ncalled Central Asia. But it must have been flourishing there about the\ntime of the Christian era, since it spread thence to China not later\nthan the middle of the first century. There were two schools\nrepresenting two distinct currents from India. First the Sarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2din\nschool, prevalent in Badakshan, Kashgar and Kucha, secondly the Mah\u00e2y\u00e2na\nin Khotan and Yarkand. The spread of the former was no doubt connected\nwith the growth of the Kushan Empire but may be anterior to the\nconversion of Kanishka, for though he gave a great impetus to the\npropagation of the faith, it is probable that, like most royal converts,\nhe favoured an already popular religion. The Mah\u00e2y\u00e2na subsequently won\nmuch territory from the other school.\n\n5. As in other countries, so in China Buddhism entered by more than one\nroad. It came first by land from Central Asia. The official date for its\nintroduction by this route is 62 A.D. but it was probably known within\nthe Chinese frontier before that time, though not recognized by the\nstate. Secondly when Buddhism was established, there arose a desire for\naccurate knowledge of the true Indian doctrine. Chinese pilgrims went to\nIndia and Indian teachers came to China. After the fourth century many\nof these religious journeys were made by sea and it was thus that\nBodhidharma landed at Canton in 520[13]. A third stream of Buddhism,\nnamely Lamaism, came into China from Tibet under the Mongol dynasty\n(1280). Khubilai considered this the best religion for his Mongols and\nnumerous Lamaist temples and convents were established and still exist\nin northern China. Lamaism has not perhaps been a great religious or\nintellectual force there, but its political importance was considerable,\nfor the Ming and Manchu dynasties who wished to assert their rule over\nthe Tibetans and Mongols by peaceful methods, consistently strove to win\nthe goodwill of the Lamaist clergy.\n\nThe Buddhism of Korea, Japan and Annam is directly derived from the\nearlier forms of Chinese Buddhism but was not affected by the later\ninflux of Lamaism. Buddhism passed from China into Korea in the fourth\ncentury and thence to Japan in the sixth. In the latter country it was\nstimulated by frequent contact with China and the repeated introduction\nof new Chinese sects but was not appreciably influenced by direct\nintercourse with Hindus or other foreign Buddhists. In the twelfth and\nthirteenth centuries Japanese Buddhism showed great vitality,\ntransforming old sects and creating new ones.\n\nIn the south, Chinese Buddhism spread into Annam rather late: according\nto native tradition in the tenth century. This region was a battlefield\nof two cultures. Chinese influence descending southwards from Canton\nproved predominant and, after the triumph of Annam over Champa, extended\nto the borders of Camboja. But so long as the kingdom of Champa existed,\nIndian culture and Hinduism maintained themselves at least as far north\nas Hu\u00e9.\n\n6. The Buddhism of Tibet is a late and startling transformation of\nGotama's teaching, but the transformation is due rather to the change\nand degeneration of that teaching in Bengal than to the admixture of\nTibetan ideas. Such admixture however was not absent and a series of\nreformers endeavoured to bring the church back to what they considered\nthe true standard. The first introduction is said to have occurred in\n630 but probably the arrival of Padma Sambhava from India in 747 marks\nthe real foundation of the Lamaist church. It was reformed by the Hindu\nAt\u00eesa in 1038 and again by the Tibetan Tsong-kha-pa about 1400.\n\nThe Grand Lama is the head of the church as reorganized by Tsong-kha-pa.\nIn Tibet the priesthood attained to temporal power comparable with the\nPapacy. The disintegration of the government divided the whole land into\nsmall principalities and among these the great monasteries were as\nimportant as any temporal lord. The abbots of the Sakya monastery were\nthe practical rulers of Tibet for seventy years (1270-1340). Another\nperiod of disintegration followed but after 1630 the Grand Lamas of\nLhasa were able to claim and maintain a similar position.\n\nMongolian Buddhism is a branch of Lamaism distinguished by no special\ndoctrines. The Mongols were partially converted in the time of Khubilai\nand a second time and more thoroughly in 1570 by the third Grand Lama.\n\n7. Nepal exhibits another phase of degeneration. In Tibet Indian\nBuddhism passed into the hands of a vigorous national priesthood and was\nnot exposed to the assimilative influence of Hinduism. In Nepal it had\nnot the same defence. It probably existed there since the time of Asoka\nand underwent the same phases of decay and corruption as in Bengal. But\nwhereas the last great monasteries in Bengal were shattered by the\nMohammedan invasion of 1193, the secluded valley of Nepal was protected\nagainst such violence and Buddhism continued to exist there in name. It\nhas preserved a good deal of Sanskrit Buddhist literature but has become\nlittle more than a sect of Hinduism.\n\nNepal ought perhaps to be classed in our second division, that is those\ncountries where Indian culture was introduced not by missionaries but by\nthe settlement of Indian conquerors or immigrants. To this class belong\nthe Hindu civilizations of Indo-China and the Archipelago. In all of\nthese Hinduism and Mahayanist Buddhism are found mixed together,\nHinduism being the stronger element. The earliest Sanskrit inscription\nin these regions is that of Vochan in Champa which is apparently\nBuddhist. It is not later than the third century and refers to an\nearlier king, so that an Indian dynasty probably existed there about\n150-200 A.D. Though the presence of Indian culture is beyond dispute, it\nis not clear whether the Chams were civilized in Champa by Hindu\ninvaders or whether they were hinduized Malays who invaded Champa from\nelsewhere.\n\n8. In Camboja a Hindu dynasty was founded by invaders and the Brahmans\nwho accompanied them established a counterpart to it in a powerful\nhierarchy, Sanskrit becoming the language of religion. It is clear that\nthese invaders came ultimately from India but they may have halted in\nJava or the Malay Peninsula for an unknown period. The Brahmanic\nhierarchy began to fail about the fourteenth century and was supplanted\nby Siamese Buddhism. Before that time the state religion of both Champa\nand Camboja was the worship of Siva, especially in the form called\nMukhalinga. Mahayanist Buddhism, tending to identify Buddha with Siva,\nalso existed but enjoyed less of the royal patronage.\n\n9. Religious conditions were similar in Java but politically there was\nthis difference, that there was no one continuous and paramount kingdom.\nA considerable number of Hindus must have settled in the island to\nproduce such an effect on its language and architecture but the rulers\nof the states known to us were hinduized Javanese rather than true\nHindus and the language of literature and of most inscriptions was Old\nJavanese, not Sanskrit, though most of the works written in it were\ntranslations or adaptations of Sanskrit originals. As in Camboja,\nSivaism and Buddhism both flourished without mutual hostility and there\nwas less difference in the status of the two creeds.\n\nIn all these countries religion seems to have been connected with\npolitics more closely than in India. The chief shrine was a national\ncathedral, the living king was semi-divine and dead kings were\nrepresented by statues bearing the attributes of their favourite gods.\n\n\n6. _New Forms of Buddhism_\n\nIn the three or four centuries following Asoka a surprising change came\nover Indian Buddhism, but though the facts are clear it is hard to\nconnect them with dates and persons. But the change was clearly\nposterior to Asoka for though his edicts show a spirit of wide charity\nit is not crystallized in the form of certain doctrines which\nsubsequently became prominent.\n\nThe first of these holds up as the moral ideal not personal perfection\nor individual salvation but the happiness of all living creatures. The\ngood man who strives for this should boldly aspire to become a Buddha in\nsome future birth and such aspirants are called Bodhisattvas. Secondly\nBuddhas and some Bodhisattvas come to be considered as supernatural\nbeings and practically deities. The human life of Gotama, though not\ndenied, is regarded as the manifestation of a cosmic force which also\nreveals itself in countless other Buddhas who are not merely his\npredecessors or destined successors but the rulers of paradises in other\nworlds. Faith in a Buddha, especially in Amit\u00e2bha, can secure rebirth in\nhis paradise. The great Bodhisattvas, such as Avalokita and Ma\u00f1jusr\u00ee,\nare splendid angels of mercy and knowledge who are theoretically\ndistinguished from Buddhas because they have indefinitely postponed\ntheir entry into nirvana in order to alleviate the sufferings of the\nworld. These new tenets are accompanied by a remarkable development of\nart and of idealist metaphysics.\n\nThis new form of Buddhism is called Mah\u00e2y\u00e2na, or the Great Vehicle, as\nopposed to the Small Vehicle or H\u00eenay\u00e2na, a somewhat contemptuous name\ngiven to the older school. The idea underlying these phrases is that\nsects are merely coaches, all travelling on the same road to salvation\nthough some may be quicker than others. The Mahayana did not suppress\nthe Hinayana but it gradually absorbed the traffic.\n\nThe causes of this transformation were two-fold, internal or Indian and\nexternal. Buddhism was a living, that is changing, stream of thought and\nthe Hindus as a nation have an exceptional taste and capacity for\nmetaphysics. This taste was not destroyed by Gotama's dicta as to the\nlimits of profitable knowledge nor did new deities arouse hostility\nbecause they were not mentioned in the ancient scriptures. The\ndevelopment of Brahmanism and Buddhism was parallel: if an attractive\nnovelty appeared in one, something like it was soon provided by the\nother. Thus the Bhagavad-g\u00eet\u00e2 contains the ideas of the Mahayana in\nsubstance, though in a different setting: it praises disinterested\nactivity and insists on faith. It is clear that at this period all\nIndian thought and not merely Buddhism was vivified and transmuted by\ntwo great currents of feeling demanding, the one a more emotional\nmorality the other more personal and more sympathetic deities.\n\nI shall show in more detail below that most Mahayanist doctrines, though\napparently new, have their roots in old Indian ideas. But the presence\nof foreign influences is not to be disputed and there is no difficulty\nin accounting for them. Gandhara was a Persian province from 530 to 330\nB.C. and in the succeeding centuries the north-western parts of India\nexperienced the invasions and settlements of numerous aliens, such as\nGreeks from the Hellenistic kingdoms which arose after Alexander's\nexpedition, Parthians, Sakas and Kushans. Such immigrants, even if they\nhad no culture of their own, at least transported culture, just as the\nTurks introduced Islam into Europe. Thus whatever ideas were prevalent\nin Persia, in the Hellenistic kingdoms, or in Central Asia may also have\nbeen prevalent in north-western India, where was situated the university\ntown of Taxila frequently mentioned in the J\u00e2takas as a seat of Buddhist\nlearning. The foreigners who entered India adopted Indian religions[14]\nand probably Buddhism more often than Hinduism, for it was at that time\npredominant and disposed to evangelize without raising difficulties as\nto caste.\n\nForeign influences stimulated mythology and imagery. In the reliefs of\nAsoka's time, the image of the Buddha never appears, and, as in the\nearliest Christian art, the intention of the sculptors is to illustrate\nan edifying narrative rather than to provide an object of worship. But\nin the Gandharan sculptures, which are a branch of Gr\u00e6co-Roman art, he\nis habitually represented by a figure modelled on the conventional type\nof Apollo. The gods of India were not derived from Greece but they were\nstereotyped under the influence of western art to this extent that\nfamiliarity with such figures as Apollo and Pallas encouraged the Hindus\nto represent their gods and heroes in human or quasi-human shapes. The\ninfluence of Greece on Indian religion was not profound: it did not\naffect the architecture or ritual of temples and still less thought or\ndoctrine. But when Indian religion and especially Buddhism passed into\nthe hands of men accustomed to Greek statuary, the inclination to\nvenerate definite personalities having definite shapes was\nstrengthened[15].\n\nPersian influence was stronger than Greek. To it are probably due the\nmany radiant deities who shed their beneficent glory over the Mahayanist\npantheon, as well as the doctrine that Bodhisattvas are emanations of\nBuddhas. The discoveries of Stein, Pelliot and others have shown that\nthis influence extended across Central Asia to China and one of the most\nimportant turns in the fortunes of Buddhism was its association with a\nCentral Asian tribe analogous to the Turks and called Kushans or\nY\u00fceh-chih, whose territories lay without as well as within the frontiers\nof modern India and who borrowed much of their culture from Persia and\nsome from the Greeks. Their great king Kanishka is a figure in Buddhist\nannals second only to Asoka. Unfortunately his date is still a matter of\ndiscussion. The majority of scholars place his accession about 78 A.D.\nbut some put it rather later[16]. The evidence of numismatics and of art\nindicates that he came towards the end of his dynasty rather than at the\nbeginning and the tradition which makes Asvaghosha his contemporary is\ncompatible with the later date.\n\nSome writers describe Kanishka as the special patron of Mahayanism. But\nthe description is of doubtful accuracy. The style of religious art\nknown as Gandharan flourished in his reign and he convened a council\nwhich fixed the canon of the Sarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2dins. This school was reckoned as\nHinayanist and though Asvaghosha enjoys general fame in the Far East as\na Mahayanist doctor, yet his undoubted writings are not Mahayanist in\nthe strict sense of the word[17]. But a more ornate and mythological\nform of religion was becoming prevalent and perhaps Kanishka's Council\narranged some compromise between the old and the new.\n\nAfter Asvaghosha comes N\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna who may have flourished any time\nbetween 125 and 200 A.D. A legend which makes him live for 300 years is\nnot without significance, for he represents a movement and a school as\nmuch as a personality and if he taught in the second century A.D. he\ncannot have been the _founder_ of Mahayanism. Yet he seems to be the\nfirst great name definitely connected with it and the ascription to him\nof numerous later treatises, though unwarrantable, shows that his\nauthority was sufficient to stamp a work or a doctrine as orthodox\nMahayanism. His biographies connect him with the system of idealist or\nnihilistic metaphysics expounded in the literature (for it is more than\na single work) called Praj\u00f1\u00e2p\u00e2ramit\u00e2, with magical practices (by which\nthe power of summoning Bodhisattvas or deities is specially meant) and\nwith the worship of Amit\u00e2bha. His teacher Saraha, a foreigner, is said\nto have been the first who taught this worship in India. In this there\nmay be a kernel of truth but otherwise the extant accounts of N\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna\nare too legendary to permit of historical deductions. He was perhaps the\nfirst eminent exponent of Mahayanist metaphysics, but the train of\nthought was not new: it was the result of applying to the external world\nthe same destructive logic which Gotama applied to the soul and the\nresult had considerable analogies to Sankara's version of the Vedanta.\nWhether in the second century A.D. the leaders of Buddhism already\nidentified themselves with the sorcery which demoralized late Indian\nMahayanism may be doubted, but tradition certainly ascribes to N\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna\nthis corrupting mixture of metaphysics and magic.\n\nThe third century offers a strange blank in Indian history. Little can\nbe said except that the power of the Kushans decayed and that northern\nIndia was probably invaded by Persians and Central Asian tribes. The\nsame trouble did not affect southern India and it may be that religion\nand speculation flourished there and spread northwards, as certainly\nhappened in later times. Many of the greatest Hindu teachers were\nDravidians and at the present day it is in the Dravidian regions that\nthe temples are most splendid, the Brahmans strictest and most\nrespected. It may be that this Dravidian influence affected even\nBuddhism in the third century A.D., for Aryadeva the successor of\nN\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna was a southerner and the legends told of him recall certain\nDravidian myths. Bodhidharma too came from the South and imported into\nChina a form of Buddhism which has left no record in India.\n\n\n7. _Revival of Hinduism_\n\nIn 320 a native Indian dynasty, the Guptas, came to the throne and\ninaugurated a revival of Hinduism, to which religion we must now turn.\nTo speak of the revival of Hinduism does not mean that in the previous\nperiod it had been dead or torpid. Indeed we know that there was a Hindu\nreaction against the Buddhism of Asoka about 150 B.C. But, on the whole,\nfrom the time of Asoka onwards Buddhism had been the principal religion\nof India, and before the Gupta era there are hardly any records of\ndonations made to Brahmans. Yet during these centuries they were not\ndespised or oppressed. They produced much literature[18]: their schools\nof philosophy and ritual did not decay and they gradually made good\ntheir claim to be the priests of India's gods, whoever those gods might\nbe. The difference between the old religion and the new lies in this.\nThe Br\u00e2hmanas and Upanishads describe practices and doctrines of\nconsiderable variety but still all the property of a privileged class in\na special region. They do not represent popular religion nor the\nreligion of India as a whole. But in the Gupta period Hinduism began to\ndo this. It is not a system like Islam or even Buddhism but a parliament\nof religions, of which every Indian creed can become a member on\ncondition of observing some simple rules of the house, such as respect\nfor Brahmans and theoretical acceptance of the Veda. Nothing is\nabolished: the ancient rites and texts preserve their mysterious power\nand kings perform the horse-sacrifice. But side by side with this,\ndeities unknown to the Veda rise to the first rank and it is frankly\nadmitted that new revelations more suited to the age have been given to\nmankind.\n\nArt too enters on a new phase. In the early Indian sculptures deities\nare mostly portrayed in human form, but in about the first century of\nour era there is seen a tendency to depict them with many heads and\nlimbs and this tendency grows stronger until in mediaeval times it is\npredominant. It has its origin in symbolism. The deity is thought of as\ncarrying many insignia, as performing more actions than two hands can\nindicate; the worshipper is taught to think of him as appearing in this\nshape and the artist does not hesitate to represent it in paint and\nstone.\n\nAs we have seen, the change which came over Buddhism was partly due to\nforeign influences and no doubt they affected most Indian creeds. But\nthe prodigious amplification of Hinduism was mainly due to the\nabsorption of beliefs prevalent in Indian districts other than the homes\nof the ancient Brahmans. Thus south Indian religion is characterized\nwhen we first know it by its emotional tone and it resulted in the\nmediaeval Sivaism of the Tamil country. In another region, probably in\nthe west, grew up the monotheism of the Bh\u00e2gavatas, which was the parent\nof Vishnuism.\n\nHinduism may be said to fall into four principal divisions which are\nreally different religions: the Sm\u00e2rtas or traditionalists, the\nSivaites, the Vishnuites and the S\u00e2ktas. The first, who are still\nnumerous, represent the pre-buddhist Brahmans. They follow, so far as\nmodern circumstances permit, the ancient ritual and are apparent\npolytheists while accepting pantheism as the higher truth. Vishnuites\nand Sivaites however are monotheists in the sense that their minor\ndeities are not essentially different from the saints of Roman and\nEastern Christianity but their monotheism has a pantheistic tinge.\nNeither sect denies the existence of the rival god, but each makes its\nown deity God, not only in the theistic but in the pantheistic sense and\nregards the other deity as merely an influential angel. From time to\ntime the impropriety of thus specially deifying one aspect of the\nuniversal spirit made itself felt and then Vishnu and Siva were adored\nin a composite dual form or, with the addition of Brahm\u00e2, as a trinity.\nBut this triad had not great importance and it is a mistake to compare\nit with the Christian trinity. Strong as was the tendency to combine and\namalgamate deities, it was mastered in these religions by the desire to\nhave one definite God, personal inasmuch as he can receive and return\nlove, although the Indian feeling that God must be all and in all\ncontinually causes the conceptions called Vishnu and Siva to transcend\nthe limits of personality. This feeling is specially clear in the growth\nof R\u00e2ma and Krishna worship. Both of these deities were originally\nancient heroes, and stories of love and battle cling to them in their\nlater phases. Yet for their respective devotees each becomes God in\nevery sense, God as lover of the soul, God as ruler of the universe and\nthe God of pantheism who is all that exists and can exist.\n\nFor some time before and after the beginning of our era, north-western\nIndia witnessed a great fusion of ideas and Indian, Persian and Greek\nreligion must have been in contact at the university town of Taxila and\nmany other places. Kashmir too, if somewhat too secluded to be a\nmeeting-place of nations, was a considerable intellectual centre. We\nhave not yet sufficient documents to enable us to trace the history and\nespecially the chronology of thought in these regions but we can say\nthat certain forms of Vishnuism, Sivaism and Buddhism were all evolved\nthere and often show features in common. Thus in all we find the idea\nthat the divine nature is manifested in four forms or five, if we count\nthe Absolute Godhead as one of them[19].\n\nI shall consider at length below this worship of Vishnu and Siva and\nhere will merely point out that it differs from the polytheism of the\nSm\u00e2rtas. In their higher phases all Hindu religions agree in teaching\nsome form of pantheism, some laying more and some less stress on the\npersonal aspect which the deity can assume. But whereas the pantheism of\nthe Sm\u00e2rtas grew out of the feeling that the many gods of tradition must\nall be one, the pantheism of the Vishnuites was not evolved out of\npre-buddhist Brahmanism and is due to the conviction that the one God\nmust be everything. It is Indian but it grew up in some region outside\nBrahmanic influence and was accepted by the Brahmans as a permissible\ncreed, but many legends in the Epics and Puranas indicate that there was\nhostility between the old-fashioned Brahmans and the worshippers of\nR\u00e2ma, Krishna and Siva before the alliance was made.\n\nS\u00e2ktism[20] also was not evolved from ancient Brahmanism but is\ndifferent in tone from Vishnuism and Sivaism. Whereas they start from a\nmovement of thought and spiritual feeling, S\u00e2ktism has for its basis\ncertain ancient popular worships. With these it has combined much\nphilosophy and has attempted to bring its teaching into conformity with\nBrahmanism, but yet remains somewhat apart. It worships a goddess of\nmany names and forms, who is adored with sexual rites and the sacrifice\nof animals, or, when the law permits, of men. It asserts even more\nplainly than Vishnuism that the teaching of the Vedas is too difficult\nfor these latter days and even useless, and it offers to its followers\nnew scriptures called Tantras and new ceremonies as all-sufficient. It\nis true that many Hindus object to this sect, which may be compared with\nthe Mormons in America or the Skoptsy in Russia, and it is numerous only\nin certain parts of India (especially Bengal and Assam) but since a\nsection of Brahmans patronize it, it must be reckoned as a phase of\nHinduism and even at the present day it is an important phase.\n\nThere are many cults prevalent in India, though not recognized as sects,\nin which the worship of some aboriginal deity is accepted in all its\ncrudeness without much admixture of philosophy, the only change being\nthat the deity is described as a form, incarnation or servant of some\nwell-known god and that Brahmans are connected with this worship. This\nhabit of absorbing aboriginal superstitions materially lowers the\naverage level of creed and ritual. An educated Brahman would laugh at\nthe idea that village superstitions can be taken seriously as religion\nbut he does not condemn them and, as superstitions, he does not\ndisbelieve in them. It is chiefly owing to this habit that Hinduism has\nspread all over India and its treatment of men and gods is curiously\nparallel. Princes like the Manipuris of Assam came under Hindu influence\nand were finally recognized as Kshattiyas with an imaginary pedigree,\nand on the same principle their deities are recognized as forms of Siva\nor Durga. And Siva and Durga themselves were built up in past ages out\nof aboriginal beliefs, though the cement holding their figures together\nis Indian thought and philosophy, which are able to see in grotesque\nrustic godlings an expression of cosmic forces.\n\nThough this is the principal method by which Hinduism has been\npropagated, direct missionary effort has not been wanting. For instance\na large part of Assam was converted by the preaching of Vishnuite\nteachers in the sixteenth century and the process still continues[21].\nBut on the whole the missionary spirit characterizes Buddhism rather\nthan Hinduism. Buddhist missionaries preached their faith, without any\npolitical motive, wherever they could penetrate. But in such countries\nas Camboja, Hinduism was primarily the religion of the foreign settlers\nand when the political power of the Brahmans began to wane, the people\nembraced Buddhism. Outside India it was perhaps only in Java and the\nneighbouring islands that Hinduism (with an admixture of Buddhism)\nbecame the religion of the natives.\n\nMany features of Hinduism, its steady though slow conquest of India, its\nextraordinary vitality and tenacity in resisting the attacks of\nMohammedanism, and its small power of expansion beyond the seas are\nexplained by the fact that it is a mode of life as much as a faith. To\nbe a Hindu it is not sufficient to hold the doctrine of the Upanishads\nor any other scriptures: it is necessary to be a member of a Hindu caste\nand observe its regulations. It is not quite correct to say that one\nmust be born a Hindu, since Hinduism has grown by gradually hinduizing\nthe wilder tribes of India and the process still continues. But a\nconvert cannot enter the fold by any simple ceremony like baptism. The\ncommunity to which he belongs must adopt Hindu usages and then it will\nbe recognized as a caste, at first of very low standing but in a few\ngenerations it may rise in the general esteem. A Hindu is bound to his\nreligion by almost the same ties that bind him to his family. Hence the\nstrength of Hinduism in India. But such ties are hard to knit and\nHinduism has no chance of spreading abroad unless there is a large\ncolony of Hindus surrounded by an appreciative and imitative\npopulation[22].\n\nIn the contest between Hinduism and Buddhism the former owed the victory\nwhich it obtained in India, though not in other lands, to this\nassimilative social influence. The struggle continued from the fourth to\nthe ninth century, after which Buddhism was clearly defeated and\nsurvived only in special localities. Its final disappearance was due to\nthe destruction of its remaining monasteries by Moslem invaders but this\nblow was fatal only because Buddhism was concentrated in its monkhood.\nInnumerable Hindu temples were destroyed, yet Hinduism was at no time in\ndanger of extinction.\n\nThe Hindu reaction against Buddhism became apparent under the Gupta\ndynasty but Mahayanism in its use of Sanskrit and its worship of\nBodhisattvas shows the beginnings of the same movement. The danger for\nBuddhism was not persecution but tolerance and obliteration of\ndifferences. The Guptas were not bigots. It was probably in their time\nthat the oldest Puranas, the laws of Manu and the Mahabharata received\ntheir final form. These are on the whole text-books of Sm\u00e2rta Hinduism\nand two Gupta monarchs celebrated the horse sacrifice. But the\nMahabharata contains several episodes which justify the exclusive\nworship of either Vishnu or Siva, and the architecture of the Guptas\nsuggests that they were Vishnuites. They also bestowed favours on\nBuddhism which was not yet decadent, for Vasubandhu and Asanga, who\nprobably lived in the fourth century, were constructive thinkers. It is\ntrue that their additions were of the dangerous kind which render an\nedifice top-heavy but their works show vitality and had a wide\ninfluence[23]. The very name of Asanga's philosophy--Yog\u00e2c\u00e2rya--indicates\nits affinity to Brahmanic thought, as do his doctrines of Alayavij\u00f1\u00e2na\nand Bodhi, which permit him to express in Buddhist language the idea\nthat the soul may be illumined by the deity. In some cases Hinduism, in\nothers Buddhism, may have played the receptive part but the general\nresult--namely the diminution of differences between the two--was always\nthe same.\n\nThe Hun invasions were unfavourable to religious and intellectual\nactivity in the north and, just as in the time of Moslim inroads, their\nravages had more serious consequences for Buddhism than for Hinduism.\nThe great Emperor Harsha ({~DAGGER~}647), of whom we know something from B\u00e2na and\nHs\u00fcan Chuang, became at the end of his life a zealous but eclectic\nBuddhist. Yet it is plain from Hsiian Chuang's account that at this time\nBuddhism was decadent in most districts both of the north and south.\n\nThis decadence was hastened by an unfortunate alliance with those forms\nof magic and erotic mysticism which are called S\u00e2ktism[24]. It is\ndifficult to estimate the extent of the corruption, for the singularity\nof the evil, a combination of the austere and ethical teaching of Gotama\nwith the most fantastic form of Hinduism, arrests attention and perhaps\nEuropean scholars have written more about it than it deserves. It did\nnot touch the Hinayanist churches nor appreciably infect the Buddhism of\nthe Far East, nor even (it would seem) Indian Buddhism outside Bengal\nand Orissa. Unfortunately Magadha, which was both the home and last\nasylum of the faith, was also very near the regions where S\u00e2ktism most\nflourished. It is, as I have often noticed in these pages, a peculiarity\nof all Indian sects that in matters of belief they are not exclusive nor\nhostile to novelties. When a new idea wins converts it is the instinct\nof the older sects to declare that it is compatible with their teaching\nor that they have something similar and just as good. It was in this\nfashion that the Buddhists of Magadha accepted S\u00e2ktist and tantric\nideas. If Hinduism could summon gods and goddesses by magical methods,\nthey could summon Bodhisattvas, male and female, in the same way, and\nthese spirits were as good as the gods. In justice it must be said that\ndespite distortions and monstrous accretions the real teaching of Gotama\ndid not entirely disappear even in Magadha and Tibet.\n\n\n8. _Later Forms of Hinduism_\n\nIn the eighth and ninth centuries this degenerate Buddhism was exposed\nto the attacks of the great Hindu champions Kum\u00e2rila and Sankara, though\nit probably endured little persecution in our sense of the word. Both of\nthem were Sm\u00e2rtas or traditionalists and laboured in the cause not of\nVishnuism or Sivaism but of the ancient Brahmanic religion, amplified by\nmany changes which the ages had brought but holding up as the religious\nideal a manhood occupied with ritual observances, followed by an old age\ndevoted to philosophy. Sankara was the greater of the two and would have\na higher place among the famous names of the world had not his respect\nfor tradition prevented him from asserting the originality which he\nundoubtedly possessed. Yet many remarkable features of his life work,\nboth practical and intellectual, are due to imitation of the Buddhists\nand illustrate the dictum that Buddhism did not disappear from India[25]\nuntil Hinduism had absorbed from it all the good that it had to offer.\nSankara took Buddhist institutions as his model in rearranging the\nascetic orders of Hinduism, and his philosophy, a rigorously consistent\npantheism which ascribed all apparent multiplicity and difference to\nillusion, is indebted to Mahayanist speculation. It is remarkable that\nhis opponents stigmatized him as a Buddhist in disguise and his system,\nthough it is one of the most influential lines of thought among educated\nHindus, is anathematized by some theistic sects[26].\n\nSankara was a native of southern India. It is not easy to combine in one\npicture the progress of thought in the north and south, and for the\nearlier centuries our information as to the Dravidian countries is\nmeagre. Yet they cannot be omitted, for their influence on the whole of\nIndia was great. Greeks, Kushans, Huns, and Mohammedans penetrated into\nthe north but, until after the fall of Vijayanagar in 1565, no invader\nprofessing a foreign religion entered the country of the Tamils. Left in\npeace they elaborated their own version of current theological problems\nand the result spread over India. Buddhism and Jainism also flourished\nin the south. The former was introduced under Asoka but apparently\nceased to be the dominant religion (if it ever was so) in the early\ncenturies of our era. Still even in the eleventh century monasteries\nwere built in Mysore. Jainism had a distinguished but chequered career\nin the south. It was powerful in the seventh century but subsequently\nendured considerable persecution. It still exists and possesses\nremarkable monuments at Sravana Belgola and elsewhere.\n\nBut the characteristic form of Dravidian religion is an emotional\ntheism, running in the parallel channels of Vishnuism and Sivaism and\naccompanied by humbler but vigorous popular superstitions, which reveal\nthe origin of its special temperament. For the frenzied ecstasies of\ndevil dancers (to use a current though inaccurate phrase) are a\nprimitive expression of the same sentiment which sees in the whole world\nthe exulting energy and rhythmic force of Siva. And though the most\nrigid Brahmanism still flourishes in the Madras Presidency there is\naudible in the Dravidian hymns a distinct note of anti-sacerdotalism and\nof belief that every man by his own efforts can come into immediate\ncontact with the Great Being whom he worships.\n\nThe Vishnuism and Sivaism of the south go back to the early centuries of\nour era, but the chronology is difficult. In both there is a line of\npoet-saints followed by philosophers and teachers and in both a\nconsiderable collection of Tamil hymns esteemed as equivalent to the\nVeda. Perhaps Sivaism was dominant first and Vishnuism somewhat later\nbut at no epoch did either extinguish the other. It was the object of\nSankara to bring these valuable but dangerous forces, as well as much\nBuddhist doctrine and practice, into harmony with Brahmanism.\n\nIslam first entered India in 712 but it was some time before it passed\nbeyond the frontier provinces and for many centuries it was too hostile\nand aggressive to invite imitation, but the spectacle of a strong\ncommunity pledged to the worship of a single personal God produced an\neffect. In the period extending from the eighth to the twelfth\ncenturies, in which Buddhism practically disappeared and Islam came to\nthe front as a formidable though not irresistible antagonist, the\ndominant form of Hinduism was that which finds expression in the older\nPuranas, in the temples of Orissa and Khajarao and the Kail\u00e2sa at\nEllora. It is the worship of one god, either Siva or Vishnu, but a\nmonotheism adorned with a luxuriant mythology and delighting in the\nmanifold shapes which the one deity assumes. It freely used the\nterminology of the S\u00e2nkhya but the first place in philosophy belonged to\nthe severe pantheism of Sankara which, in contrast to this riotous\nexuberance of legend and sculpture, sees the highest truth in one Being\nto whom no epithets can be applied.\n\nIn the next epoch, say the twelfth to the seventeenth centuries, Indian\nthought clearly hankers after theism in the western sense and yet never\ncompletely acquiesces in it. Mythology, if still rampant according to\nour taste, at least becomes subsidiary and more detachable from the\nsupreme deity, and this deity, if less anthropomorphic than Allah or\nJehovah, is still a being who loves and helps souls, and these souls are\nexplained in varying formulae as being identical with him and yet\ndistinct.\n\nIt can hardly be by chance that as the Hindus became more familiar with\nIslam their sects grew more definite in doctrine and organization\nespecially among the Vishnuites who showed a greater disposition to form\nsects than the Sivaites, partly because the incarnations of Vishnu offer\nan obvious ground for diversity. About 1100 A.D.[27] the first great\nVaishnava sect was founded by R\u00e2m\u00e2nuja. He was a native of the Madras\ncountry and claimed to be the spiritual descendant of the early Tamil\nsaints. In doctrine he expressly accepted the views of the ancient\nBh\u00e2gavatas, which had been condemned by Sankara, and he affirmed the\nexistence of one personal deity commonly spoken of as N\u00e2r\u00e2yana or\nV\u00e2sudeva.\n\nFrom the time of Sankara onwards nearly all Hindu theologians of the\nfirst rank expounded their views by writing a commentary on the Brahma\nS\u00fbtras, an authoritative but singularly enigmatic digest of the\nUpanishads. Sankara's doctrine may be summarized as absolute monism\nwhich holds that nothing really exists but Brahman and that Brahman is\nidentical with the soul. All apparent plurality is due to illusion. He\ndraws a distinction between the lower and higher Brahman which perhaps\nmay be rendered by God and the Godhead. In the same sense in which\nindividual souls and matter exist, a personal God also exists, but the\nhigher truth is that individuality, personality and matter are all\nillusion. But the teaching of R\u00e2m\u00e2nuja rejects the doctrines that the\nworld is an illusion and that there is a distinction between the lower\nand higher Brahman and it affirms that the soul, though of the same\nsubstance as God and emitted from him rather than created, can obtain\nbliss not in absorption but in existence near him.\n\nIt is round these problems that Hindu theology turns. The innumerable\nsolutions lack neither boldness nor variety but they all try to satisfy\nboth the philosopher and the saint and none achieve both tasks. The\nsystem of Sankara is a masterpiece of intellect, despite his\ndisparagement of reasoning in theology, and could inspire a fine piety,\nas when on his deathbed he asked forgiveness for having frequented\ntemples, since by so doing he had seemed to deny that God is everywhere.\nBut piety of this kind is unfavourable to public worship and even to\nthose religious experiences in which the soul seems to have direct\ncontact with God in return for its tribute of faith and love. In fact\nthe Advaita philosophy countenances emotional theism only as an\nimperfect creed and not as the highest truth. But the existence of all\nsects and priesthoods depends on their power to satisfy the religious\ninstinct with ceremonial or some better method of putting the soul in\ncommunication with the divine. On the other hand pantheism in India is\nnot a philosophical speculation, it is a habit of mind: it is not enough\nfor the Hindu that his God is lord of all things: he must _be_ all\nthings and the soul in its endeavour to reach God must obtain\ndeliverance from the fetters not only of matter but of individuality.\nHence Hindu theology is in a perpetual oscillation illustrated by the\ndiscrepant statements found side by side in the Bhagavad-g\u00eet\u00e2 and other\nworks. Indian temperament and Indian logic want a pantheistic God and a\nsoul which can transcend personality, but religious thought and practice\nimply personality both in the soul and in God. All varieties of\nVishnuism show an effort to reconcile these double aspirations and\ntheories. The theistic view is popular, for without it what would become\nof temples, worshippers and priests? But I think that the pantheistic\nview is the real basis of Indian religious thought.\n\nThe qualified monism of R\u00e2m\u00e2nuja (as his system is sometimes called) led\nto more uncompromising treatment of the question and to the affirmation\nof dualism, not the dualism of God and the Devil but the distinctness of\nthe soul and of matter from God. This is the doctrine of Madhva, another\nsouthern teacher who lived about a century after R\u00e2m\u00e2nuja and was\nperhaps directly influenced by Islam. But though the logical outcome of\nhis teaching may appear to be simple theism analogous to Islam or\nJudaism, it does not in practice lead to this result but rather to the\nworship of Krishna. Madhva's sect is still important but even more\nimportant is another branch of the spiritual family of R\u00e2m\u00e2nuja,\nstarting from R\u00e2m\u00e2nand who probably flourished in the fourteenth\ncentury[28].\n\nR\u00e2m\u00e2nuja, while in some ways accepting innovations, insisted on the\nstrict observance of caste. R\u00e2m\u00e2nand abandoned this, separated from his\nsect and removed to Benares. His teaching marks a turning-point in the\nhistory of modern Hinduism. Firstly he held that caste need not prevent\na man from rightly worshipping God and he admitted even Moslims as\nmembers of his community. To this liberality are directly traceable the\nnumerous sects combining Hindu with Mohammedan doctrines, among which\nthe Kabir Panthis and the Sikhs are the most conspicuous. But it is a\nsingular testimony to the tenacity of Hindu ideas that though many\nteachers holding most diverse opinions have declared there is no caste\nbefore God, yet caste has generally reasserted itself among their\nfollowers as a social if not as a religious institution. The second\nimportant point in R\u00e2m\u00e2nand's teaching was the use of the vernacular for\nreligious literature. Dravidian scriptures had already been recognized\nin the south but it is from this time that there begins to flow in the\nnorth that great stream of sacred poetry in Hindi and Bengali which\nwaters the roots of modern popular Hinduism. Among many eminent names\nwhich have contributed to it, the greatest is Tulsi Das who retold the\nRamayana in Hindi and thus wrote a poem which is little less than a\nBible for millions in the Ganges valley.\n\nThe sects which derive from the teaching of R\u00e2m\u00e2nand mostly worship the\nSupreme Being under the name of R\u00e2ma. Even more numerous, especially in\nthe north, are those who use the name of Krishna, the other great\nincarnation of Vishnu. This worship was organized and extended by the\npreaching of Vallabha and Caitanya (c. 1500) in the valley of the Ganges\nand Bengal, but was not new. I shall discuss in some detail below the\nmany elements combined in the complex figure of Krishna but in one way\nor another he was connected with the earliest forms of Vishnuite\nmonotheism and is the chief figure in the Bhagavad-g\u00eet\u00e2, its earliest\ntext-book. Legend connects him partly with Muttra and partly with\nwestern India but, though by no means ignored in southern India, he does\nnot receive there such definite and exclusive adoration as in the north.\nThe Krishnaite sects are emotional, and their favourite doctrine that\nthe relation between God and the soul is typified by passionate love has\nled to dubious moral results.\n\nThis Krishnaite propaganda, which coincided with the Reformation in\nEurope, was the last great religious movement in India. Since that time\nthere has been considerable activity of a minor kind. Protests have been\nraised against abuses and existing communities have undergone changes,\nsuch as may be seen in the growth of the Sikhs, but there has been no\ngeneral or original movement. The absence of such can be easily\nexplained by the persecutions of Aurungzeb and by the invasions and\ninternal struggles of the eighteenth century. At the end of that century\nHinduism was at its lowest but its productive power was not destroyed.\nThe decennial census never fails to record the rise of new sects and the\nsudden growth of others which had been obscure and minute.\n\nAny historical treatment of Hinduism inevitably makes Vishnuism seem\nmore prominent than other sects, for it offers more events to record.\nBut though Sivaism has undergone fewer changes and produced fewer great\nnames, it must not be thought of as lifeless or decadent. The lingam is\nworshipped all over India and many of the most celebrated shrines, such\nas Benares and Bhubaneshwar, are dedicated to the Lord of life and\ndeath. The Sivaism of the Tamil country is one of the most energetic and\nprogressive forms of modern Hinduism, but in doctrine it hardly varies\nfrom the ancient standard of the Tiruvacagam.\n\n\n9. _European Influence and Modern Hinduism_\n\nThe small effect of European religion on Hinduism is remarkable. Islam,\nthough aggressively hostile, yet fused with it in some sects, for\ninstance the Sikhs, but such fusions of Indian religion and Christianity\nas have been noted[29] are microscopic curiosities. European free\nthought and Deism have not fared better, for the Brahmo Samaj which was\nfounded under their inspiration has only 5504 adherents[30]. In social\nlife there has been some change: caste restrictions, though not\nabolished, are evaded by ingenious subterfuges and there is a growing\nfeeling against child-marriage. Yet were the laws against sati and human\nsacrifice repealed, there are many districts in which such practices\nwould not be forbidden by popular sentiment.\n\nIt is easy to explain the insensibility of Hinduism to European contact:\neven Islam had little effect on its stubborn vitality, though Islam\nbrought with it settlers and resident rulers, ready to make converts by\nforce. But the British have shown perfect toleration and are merely\nsojourners in the land who spend their youth and age elsewhere. European\nexclusiveness and Indian ideas about caste alike made it natural to\nregard them as an isolated class charged with the business of Government\nbut divorced from the intellectual and religious life of other classes.\nPrevious experience of Moslims and other invaders disposed the Brahmans\nto accept foreigners as rulers without admitting that their creeds and\ncustoms were in the least worthy of imitation. European methods of\norganization and advertisement have not however been disdained.\n\nThe last half century has witnessed a remarkable revival of Hinduism. In\nthe previous decades the most conspicuous force in India, although\nnumerically weak, was the already mentioned Brahmo Samaj, founded by Ram\nMohun Roy in 1828. But it was colourless and wanting in constructive\npower. Educated opinion, at least in Bengal, seemed to be tending\ntowards agnosticism and social revolution. This tendency was checked by\na conservative and nationalist movement, which in all its varied phases\ngave support to Indian religion and was intolerant of European ideas. It\nhad a political side but there was nothing disloyal in its main idea,\nnamely, that in the intellectual and religious sphere, where Indian life\nis most intense, Indian ideas must not decay. No one who has known India\nduring the last thirty years can have failed to notice how many new\ntemples have been built and how many old ones repaired. Almost all the\nprincipal sects have founded associations to protect and extend their\ninterests by such means as financial and administrative organization,\nthe publication of periodicals and other literature, annual conferences,\nlectures and the foundation of religious houses or quasi-monastic\norders. Several societies have been founded not restricted to any\nparticular sect but with the avowed object of defending and promoting\nstrict Hinduism. Among such the most important are, first the Bharat\nDharma Mahamandala, under the distinguished presidency of the Maharaja\nof Darbhanga: secondly the movement started by Ramakrishna and Swami\nVivekananda and adorned by the beautiful life and writings of Sister\nNivedita (Miss Noble) and thirdly the Theosophical Society under the\nleadership of Mrs Besant. It is remarkable that Europeans, both men and\nwomen, have played a considerable part in this revival. All these\norganizations are influential: the two latter have done great service in\ndefending and encouraging Hinduism, but I am less sure of their success\nin mingling Eastern and Western ideas or in popularizing Hinduism among\nEuropeans.\n\nSomewhat different, but described by the Census of 1911 as \"the greatest\nreligious movement in India of the past half century\" is the Arya Samaj,\nfounded in 1875 by Swami Dayanand. Whereas the movements mentioned above\nsupport San\u00e2tana Dharma or Orthodox Hinduism in all its shapes, the Arya\nSamaj aims at reform. Its original programme was a revival of the\nancient Vedic religion but it has since been perceptibly modified and\ntends towards conciliating contemporary orthodoxy, for it now prohibits\nthe slaughter of cattle, accords a partial recognition to caste, affirms\nits belief in karma and apparently approves a form of the Yoga\nphilosophy. Though it is not yet accepted as a form of orthodox\nHinduism, it seems probable that concessions on both sides will produce\nthis result before long. It numbers at present only about a quarter of a\nmillion but is said to be rapidly increasing, especially in the United\nProvinces and Panjab, and to be remarkable for the completeness and\nefficiency of its organization. It maintains missionary colleges,\norphanages and schools. Affiliated to it is a society for the\npurification (shuddhi) of Mohammedans, Christians and outcasts, that is\nfor turning them into Hindus and giving them some kind of caste. It\nwould appear that those who undergo this purification do not always\nbecome members of the Samaj but are merged in the ordinary Hindu\ncommunity where they are accepted without opposition if also without\nenthusiasm.\n\n\n10. _Change and Permanence in Buddhism_\n\nThus we have a record of Indian thought for about 3000 years. It has\ndirectly affected such distant points as Balkh, Java and Japan and it is\nstill living and active. But life and action mean change and such wide\nextension in time and space implies variety. We talk of converting\nforeign countries but the religion which is transplanted also undergoes\nconversion or else it cannot enter new brains and hearts. Buddhism in\nCeylon and Japan, Christianity in Scotland and Russia are not the same,\nalthough professing to reverence the same teachers. It is easy to argue\nthe other way, but it can only be done by setting aside as non-essential\ndifferences of great practical importance. Europeans are ready enough to\nadmit that Buddhism is changeable and easily corrupted but it is not\nsingular in that respect[31]. I doubt if Lhasa and Tantrism are further\nfrom the teaching of Gotama than the Papacy, the Inquisition, and the\nreligion of the German Emperor, from the teaching of Christ.\n\nA religion is the expression of the thought of a particular age and\ncannot really be permanent in other ages which have other thoughts. The\napparent permanence of Christianity is due first to the suppression of\nmuch original teaching, such as Christ's turning the cheek to the smiter\nand Paul's belief in the coming end of the world, and secondly to the\nadoption of new social ideals which have no place in the New Testament,\nsuch as the abolition of slavery and the improved status of women.\n\nBuddhism arising out of Brahmanism suggests a comparison with\nChristianity arising out of Judaism, but the comparison breaks down in\nmost points of detail. But there is one real resemblance, namely that\nBuddhism and Christianity have both won their greatest triumphs outside\nthe land of their birth. The flowers of the mind, if they can be\ntransplanted at all, often flourish with special vigour on alien soil.\nWitness the triumphs of Islam in the hands of the Turks and Mughals, the\nprogress of Nestorianism in Central Asia, and the spread of Manichaeism\nin both the East and West outside the limits of Persia. Even so Lamaism\nin Tibet and Amidism in Japan, though scholars may regard them as\nsingular perversions, have more vitality than any branch of Buddhism\nwhich has existed in India since the seventh century. But even here the\nparallel with Christian sects is imperfect. It would be more complete if\nPalestine had been the centre from which different phases of\nChristianity radiated during some twelve centuries, for this is the\nrelation between Indian and foreign Buddhism. Lamaism is not the\nteaching of the Buddha travestied by Tibetans but a late form of Indian\nBuddhism exported to Tibet and modified there in some external features\n(such as ecclesiastical organization and art) but not differing greatly\nin doctrine from Bengali Buddhism of the eleventh century. And even\nAmidism appears to have originated not in the Far East but in Gandhara\nand the adjacent lands. Thus the many varieties of Buddhism now existing\nare due partly to local colour but even more to the workings of the\nrestless Hindu mind which during many centuries after the Christian era\ncontinued to invent for it novelties in metaphysics and mythology.\n\nThe preservation of a very ancient form of Buddhism in Ceylon[32] is\ntruly remarkable, for if in many countries Buddhism has shown itself\nfluid and protean, it here manifests a stability which can hardly be\nparalleled except in Judaism. The Sinhalese, unlike the Hindus, had no\nnative propensity to speculation. They were content to classify,\nsummarize and expound the teaching of the Pitakas without restating it\nin the light of their own imagination. Whereas the most stable form of\nChristianity is the Church of Rome, which began by making considerable\nadditions to the doctrine of the New Testament, the most stable form of\nBuddhism is neither a transformation of the old nor a protest against\ninnovation but simply the continuation of a very ancient sect in strange\nlands[33]. This ancient Buddhism, like Islam which is also simple and\nstable, is somewhat open to the charge of engaging in disputes about\ntrivial details[34], but alike in Ceylon, Burma and Siam, it has not\nonly shown remarkable persistence but has become a truly national\nreligion, the glory and comfort of those who profess it.\n\n\n11. _Rebirth and the Nature of the Soul_\n\nThe most characteristic doctrine of Indian religion--rarely absent in\nIndia and imported by Buddhism into all the countries which it\ninfluenced--is that called metempsychosis, the transmigration of the soul\nor reincarnation. The last of these terms best expresses Indian,\nespecially Buddhist, ideas but still the usual Sanskrit equivalent,\n_Sams\u00e2ra_, means migration. The body breaks up at death but something\npasses on and migrates to another equally transitory tenement. Neither\nBrahmans nor Buddhists seem to contemplate the possibility that the\nhuman soul may be a temporary manifestation of the Eternal Spirit which\ncomes to an end at death--a leaf on a tree or a momentary ripple on the\nwater. It is always regarded as passing through many births, a wave\ntraversing the ocean.\n\nHindu speculation has never passed through the materialistic phase, and\nthe doctrine that the soul is annihilated at death is extremely rare in\nIndia. Even rarer perhaps is the doctrine that it usually enters on a\npermanent existence, happy or otherwise. The idea underlying the\ntransmigration theory is that every state which we call existence must\ncome to an end. If the soul can be isolated from all the accidents and\naccessories attaching to it, then there may be a state of permanence and\npeace but not a state comparable with human existence, however enlarged\nand glorified. But why does not this conviction of impermanence lead to\nthe simpler conclusion that the end of physical life is the end of all\nlife? Because the Hindus have an equally strong conviction of\ncontinuity: everything passes away and changes but it is not true to say\nof anything that it arises from nothing or passes into nothing. If human\norganisms (or any other organisms) are mere machines, if there is\nnothing more to be said about a corpse than about a smashed watch, then\n(the Hindu thinks) the universe is not continuous. Its continuity means\nfor him that there is something which eternally manifests itself in\nperishable forms but does not perish with them any more than water when\na pitcher is broken or fire that passes from the wood it has consumed to\nfresh fuel.\n\nThese metaphors suggest that the doctrine of transmigration or\nreincarnation does not promise what we call personal immortality. I\nconfess that I cannot understand how there can be personality in the\nordinary human sense without a body. When we think of a friend, we think\nof a body and a character, thoughts and feelings, all of them connected\nwith that body and many of them conditioned by it. But the immortal soul\nis commonly esteemed to be something equally present in a new born babe,\na youth and an old man. If so, it cannot be a personality in the\nordinary sense, for no one could recognize the spirit of a departed\nfriend, if it is something which was present in him the day he was born\nand different from all the characteristics which he acquired during\nlife. The belief that we shall recognize our friends in another world\nassumes that these characteristics are immortal, but it is hard to\nunderstand how they can be so, especially as it is also assumed that\nthere is nothing immortal in a dog, which possesses affection and\nintelligence, but that there is something immortal in a new born infant\nwhich cannot be said to possess either.\n\nIn one way metempsychosis raises insuperable difficulties to the\nsurvival of personality, for if you become someone else, especially an\nanimal, you are no longer yourself according to any ordinary use of\nlanguage. But one of the principal forms taken by the doctrine in India\nmakes a modified survival intelligible. For it is held that a new born\nchild brings with it as a result of actions done in previous lives\ncertain predispositions and these after being developed and modified in\nthe course of that child's life are transmitted to its next existence.\n\nAs to the method of transmission there are various theories, for in\nIndia the belief in reincarnation is not so much a dogma as an instinct\ninnate in all and only occasionally justified by philosophers, not\nbecause it was disputed but because they felt bound to show that their\nown systems were compatible with it. One explanation is that given by\nthe Ved\u00e2nta philosophy, according to which the soul is accompanied in\nits migrations by the _S\u00fbkshmasar\u00eera_ or subtle body, a counterpart of\nthe mortal body but transparent and invisible, though material. The\ntruth of this theory, as of all theories respecting ghosts and spirits,\nseems to me a matter for experimental verification, but the Ved\u00e2nta\nrecognizes that in our experience a personal individual existence is\nalways connected with a physical substratum.\n\nThe Buddhist theory of rebirth is somewhat different, for Buddhism even\nin its later divagations rarely ceased to profess belief in Gotama's\ndoctrine that there is no such thing as a soul--by which is meant no such\nthing as a permanent unchanging self or _\u00e2tman_. Buddhists are concerned\nto show that transmigration is not inconsistent with this denial of the\n_\u00e2tman_. The ordinary, and indeed inevitable translation of this word by\nsoul leads to misunderstanding for we naturally interpret it as meaning\nthat there is nothing which survives the death of the body and _a\nfortiori_ nothing to transmigrate. But in reality the denial of the\n_\u00e2tman_ applies to the living rather than to the dead. It means that in\na living man there is no permanent, unchangeable entity but only a\nseries of mental states, and since human beings, although they have no\n_\u00e2tman_, certainly exist in this present life, the absence of the\n_\u00e2tman_ is not in itself an obstacle to belief in a similar life after\ndeath or before birth. Infancy, youth, age and the state immediately\nafter death may form a series of which the last two are as intimately\nconnected as any other two. The Buddhist teaching is that when men die\nin whom the desire for another life exists--as it exists in all except\nsaints--then desire, which is really the creator of the world, fashions\nanother being, conditioned by the character and merits of the being\nwhich has just come to an end. Life is like fire: its very nature is to\nburn its fuel. When one body dies, it is as if one piece of fuel were\nburnt: the vital process passes on and recommences in another and so\nlong as there is desire of life, the provision of fuel fails not.\nBuddhist doctors have busied themselves with the question whether two\nsuccessive lives are the same man or different men, and have illustrated\nthe relationship by various analogies of things which seem to be the\nsame and yet not the same, such as a child and an adult, milk and curds,\nor fire which spreads from a lamp and burns down a village, but, like\nthe Brahmans, they do not discuss why the hypothesis of transmigration\nis necessary. They had the same feeling for the continuity of nature,\nand more than others they insisted on the principle that everything has\na cause. They held that the sexual act creates the conditions in which a\nnew life appears but is not an adequate cause for the new life itself.\nAnd unless we accept a materialist explanation of human nature, this\nargument is sound: unless we admit that mind is merely a function of\nmatter, the birth of a mind is not explicable as a mere process of cell\ndevelopment: something pre-existent must act upon the cells.\n\nEuropeans in discussing such questions as the nature of the soul and\nimmortality are prone to concentrate their attention on death and\nneglect the phenomena of birth, which surely are equally important. For\nif a soul survives the death of this complex of cells which is called\nthe body, its origin and development must, according to all analogy, be\ndifferent from those of the perishable body. Orthodox theology deals\nwith the problem by saying that God creates a new soul every time a\nchild is born[35] but free discussion usually ignores it and taking an\nadult as he is, asks what are the chances that any part of him survives\ndeath. Yet the questions, what is destroyed at death and how and why,\nare closely connected with the questions what comes into existence at\nbirth and how and why. This second series of questions is hard enough,\nbut it has this advantage over the first that whereas death abruptly\ncloses the road and we cannot follow the soul one inch on its journey\nbeyond, the portals of birth are a less absolute frontier. We know that\nevery child has passed through stages in which it could hardly be called\na child. The earliest phase consists of two cells, which unite and then\nproceed to subdivide and grow. The mystery of the process by which they\nassume a human form is not explained by scientific or theological\nphrases. The complete individual is assuredly not contained in the first\ngerm. The microscope cannot find it there and to say that it is there\npotentially, merely means that we know the germ will develop in a\ncertain way. To say that a force is manifesting itself in the germ and\nassuming the shape which it chooses to take or must take is also merely\na phrase and metaphor, but it seems to me to fit the facts[36].\n\nThe doctrines of pre-existence and transmigration (but not, I think, of\nkarma which is purely Indian) are common among savages in Africa and\nAmerica, nor is their wide distribution strange. Savages commonly think\nthat the soul wanders during sleep and that a dead man's soul goes\nsomewhere: what more natural than to suppose that the soul of a new born\ninfant comes from somewhere? But among civilized peoples such ideas are\nin most cases due to Indian influence. In India they seem indigenous to\nthe soil and not imported by the Aryan invaders, for they are not\nclearly enunciated in the Rig Veda, nor formulated before the time of\nthe Upanishads[37]. They were introduced by Buddhism to the Far East and\ntheir presence in Manichaeism, Neoplatonism, Sufiism and ultimately in\nthe Jewish Kabbala seems a rivulet from the same source. Recent research\ndiscredits the theory that metempsychosis was an important feature in\nthe earlier religion of Egypt or among the Druids[38]. But it played a\nprominent part in the philosophy of Pythagoras and in the Orphic\nmysteries, which had some connection with Thrace and possibly also with\nCrete. A few great European intellects[39]--notably Plato and\nVirgil--have given it undying expression, but Europeans as a whole have\nrejected it with that curiously crude contempt which they have shown\nuntil recently for Oriental art and literature.\n\nConsidering how fixed is the belief in immortality among Europeans, or\nat least the desire for it, the rarity of a belief in pre-existence or\ntransmigration is remarkable. But most people's expectation of a future\nlife is based on craving rather than on reasoned anticipation. I cannot\nmyself understand how anything that comes into being can be immortal.\nSuch immortality is unsupported by a single analogy nor can any instance\nbe quoted of a thing which is known to have had an origin and yet is\neven apparently indestructible[40]. And is it possible to suppose that\nthe universe is capable of indefinite increase by the continual addition\nof new and eternal souls? But these difficulties do not exist for\ntheories which regard the soul as something existing before as well as\nafter the body, truly immortal _a parte ante_ as well as _a parte post_\nand manifesting itself in temporary homes of human or lower shape. Such\ntheories become very various and fall into many obscurities when they\ntry to define the nature of the soul and its relation to the body, but\nthey avoid what seems to me the contradiction of the created but\nimmortal soul.\n\nThe doctrine of metempsychosis is also interesting as affecting the\nrelations of men and animals. The popular European conception of \"the\nbeasts which perish\" weakens the arguments for human immortality. For if\nthe mind of a dog or chimpanzee contains no element which is immortal,\nthe part of the human mind on which the claim to immortality can be\nbased must be parlously small, since _ex hypothesi_ sensation, volition,\ndesire and the simpler forms of intelligence are not immortal. But in\nIndia where men have more charity and more philosophy this distinction\nis not drawn. The animating principle of men, animals and plants is\nregarded as one or at least similar, and even matter which we consider\ninanimate, such as water, is often considered to possess a soul. But\nthough there is ample warrant in both Brahmanic and Buddhist literature\nfor the idea that the soul may sink from a human to an animal form or\n_vice vers\u00e2_ rise, and though one sometimes meets this belief in modern\nlife[41], yet it is not the most prominent aspect of metempsychosis in\nIndia and the beautiful precept of ahims\u00e2 or not injuring living things\nis not, as Europeans imagine, founded on the fear of eating one's\ngrandparents but rather on the humane and enlightened feeling that all\nlife is one and that men who devour beasts are not much above the level\nof the beasts who devour one another. The feeling has grown stronger\nwith time. In the Vedas animal sacrifices are prescribed and they are\neven now used in the worship of some deities. In the Epics the eating of\nmeat is mentioned. But the doctrine that it is wrong to take animal life\nwas definitely adopted by Buddhism and gained strength with its\ndiffusion.\n\nOne obvious objection to all theories of rebirth is that we do not\nremember our previous existences and that, if they are connected by no\nthread of memory, they are for all practical purposes the existences of\ndifferent people. But this want of memory affects not only past\nexistences but the early phases of this existence. Does any one deny his\nexistence as an infant or embryo because he cannot remember it[42]? And\nif a wrong could be done to an infant the effects of which would not be\nfelt for twenty years, could it be said to be no concern of the infant\nbecause the person who will suffer in twenty years time will have no\nrecollection that he was that infant? And common opinion in Eastern\nAsia, not without occasional confirmation from Europe, denies the\nproposition that we cannot remember our former lives and asserts that\nthose who take any pains to sharpen their spiritual faculties can\nremember them. The evidence for such recollection seems to me better\nthan the evidence for most spiritualistic phenomena[43].\n\nAnother objection comes from the facts of heredity. On the whole we\nresemble our parents and ancestors in mind as well as in body. A child\noften seems to be an obvious product of its parents and not a being come\nfrom outside and from another life. This objection of course applies\nequally to the creation theory. If the soul is created by an act of God,\nthere seems to be no reason why it should be like the parents, or, if he\ncauses it to be like them, he is made responsible for sending children\ninto the world with vicious natures. On the other hand if parents\nliterally make a child, mind as well as body, there seems to be no\nreason why children should ever be unlike their parents, or brothers and\nsisters unlike one another, as they undoubtedly sometimes are. An Indian\nwould say that a soul[44] seeking rebirth carries with it certain\npotentialities of good and evil and can obtain embodiment only in a\nfamily offering the necessary conditions. Hence to some extent it is\nnatural that the child should be like its parents. But the soul seeking\nrebirth is not completely fixed in form and stiff: it is hampered and\nlimited by the results of its previous life, but in many respects it may\nbe flexible and free, ready to vary in response to its new environment.\n\nBut there is a psychological and temperamental objection to the doctrine\nof rebirth, which goes to the root of the matter. Love of life and the\ndesire to find a field of activity are so strong in most Europeans that\nit might be supposed that a theory offering an endless vista of new\nactivities and new chances would be acceptable. But as a rule Europeans\nwho discuss the question say that they do not relish this prospect. They\nmay be willing to struggle until death, but they wish for\nrepose--conscious repose of course--afterwards. The idea that one just\ndead has not entered into his rest, but is beginning another life with\nsimilar struggles and fleeting successes, similar sorrows and\ndisappointments, is not satisfying and is almost shocking[45]. We do not\nlike it, and not to like any particular view about the destinies of the\nsoul is generally, but most illogically, considered a reason for\nrejecting it[46].\n\n\n12.\n\nIt must not however be supposed that Hindus like the prospect of\ntransmigration. On the contrary from the time of the Upanishads and the\nBuddha to the present day their religious ideal corresponding to\nsalvation is emancipation and deliverance, deliverance from rebirth and\nfrom the bondage of desire which brings about rebirth. Now all Indian\ntheories as to the nature of transmigration are in some way connected\nwith the idea of _Karma_, that is the power of deeds done in past\nexistences to condition or even to create future existences. Every deed\ndone, whether good or bad, affects the character of the doer for a long\nwhile, so that to use a metaphor, the soul awaiting rebirth has a\nspecial shape, which is of its own making, and it can find re-embodiment\nonly in a form into which that shape can squeeze.\n\nThese views of rebirth and karma have a moral value, for they teach that\nwhat a man gets depends on what he is or makes himself to be, and they\navoid the difficulty of supposing that a benevolent creator can have\ngiven his creatures only one life with such strange and unmerited\ndisproportion in their lots. Ordinary folk in the East hope that a life\nof virtue will secure them another life as happy beings on earth or\nperhaps in some heaven which, though not eternal, will still be long.\nBut for many the higher ideal is renunciation of the world and a life of\ncontemplative asceticism which will accumulate no karma so that after\ndeath the soul will pass not to another birth but to some higher and\nmore mysterious state which is beyond birth and death. It is the\nprevalence of views like this which has given both Hinduism and Buddhism\nthe reputation of being pessimistic and unpractical.\n\nIt is generally assumed that these are bad epithets, but are they not\napplicable to Christian teaching? Modern and medieval Christianity--as\nwitness many popular hymns--regards this world as vain and transitory, a\nvale of tears and tribulation, a troubled sea through whose waves we\nmust pass before we reach our rest. And choirs sing, though without much\nconviction, that it is weary waiting here. This language seems justified\nby the Gospels and Epistles. It is true that some utterances of Christ\nsuggest that happiness is to be found in a simple and natural life of\nfriendliness and love, but on the whole both he and St Paul teach that\nthe world is evil or at least spoiled and distorted: to become a happy\nworld it must be somehow remade and transfigured by the second coming of\nChrist. The desires and ambitions which are the motive power of modern\nEurope are, if not wrong, at least vain and do not even seek for true\npeace and happiness. Like Indian teachers, the early Christians tried to\ncreate a right temper rather than to change social institutions. They\nbade masters and slaves treat one another with kindness and respect, but\nthey did not attempt to abolish slavery.\n\nIndian thought does not really go much further in pessimism than\nChristianity, but its pessimism is intellectual rather than emotional.\nHe who understands the nature of the soul and its successive lives\ncannot regard any single life as of great importance in itself, though\nits consequences for the future may be momentous, and though he will not\nsay that life is not worth living. Reiterated declarations that all\nexistence is suffering do, it is true, seem to destroy all prospect of\nhappiness and all motive for effort, but the more accurate statement is,\nin the words of the Buddha himself, that all clinging to physical\nexistence involves suffering. The earliest Buddhist texts teach that\nwhen this clinging and craving cease, a feeling of freedom and happiness\ntakes their place and later Buddhism treated itself to visions of\nparadise as freely as Christianity. Many forms of Hinduism teach that\nthe soul released from the body can enjoy eternal bliss in the presence\nof God and even those severer philosophers who do not admit that the\nreleased soul is a personality in any human sense have no doubt of its\nhappiness.\n\nThe opposition is not so much between Indian thought and the New\nTestament, for both of them teach that bliss is attainable but not by\nsatisfying desire. The fundamental contrast is rather between both India\nand the New Testament on the one hand and on the other the rooted\nconviction of European races[47], however much Christian orthodoxy may\ndisguise their expression of it, that this world is all-important. This\nconviction finds expression not only in the avowed pursuit of pleasure\nand ambition but in such sayings as that the best religion is the one\nwhich does most good and such ideals as self-realization or the full\ndevelopment of one's nature and powers. Europeans as a rule have an\ninnate dislike and mistrust of the doctrine that the world is vain or\nunreal. They can accord some sympathy to a dying man who sees in due\nperspective the unimportance of his past life or to a poet who under the\nstarry heavens can make felt the smallness of man and his earth. But\nsuch thoughts are considered permissible only as retrospects, not as\nprinciples of life: you may say that your labour has amounted to\nnothing, but not that labour is vain. Though monasteries and monks still\nexist, the great majority of Europeans instinctively disbelieve in\nasceticism, the contemplative life and contempt of the world: they have\nno love for a philosopher who rejects the idea of progress and is not\nsatisfied with an ideal consisting in movement towards an unknown goal.\nThey demand a religion which theoretically justifies the strenuous life.\nAll this is a matter of temperament and the temperament is so common\nthat it needs no explanation. What needs explanation is rather the other\ntemperament which rejects this world as unsatisfactory and sets up\nanother ideal, another sphere, another standard of values. This ideal\nand standard are not entirely peculiar to India but certainly they are\nunderstood and honoured there more than elsewhere. They are professed,\nas I have already observed, by Christianity, but even the New Testament\nis not free from the idea that saints are having a bad time now but will\nhereafter enjoy a triumph, parlously like the exuberance of the wicked\nin this world. The Far East too has its unworldly side which, though\nharmonizing with Buddhism, is native. In many ways the Chinese are as\nmaterialistic as Europeans, but throughout the long history of their art\nand literature, there has always been a school, clear-voiced if small,\nwhich has sung and pursued the joys of the hermit, the dweller among\ntrees and mountains who finds nature and his own thoughts an\nall-sufficient source of continual happiness. But the Indian ideal,\nthough it often includes the pleasures of communion with nature, differs\nfrom most forms of the Chinese and Christian ideal inasmuch as it\nassumes the reality of certain religious experiences and treats them as\nthe substance and occupation of the highest life. We are disposed to\ndescribe these experiences as trances or visions, names which generally\nmean something morbid or hypnotic. But in India their validity is\nunquestioned and they are not considered morbid. The sensual scheming\nlife of the world is sick and ailing; the rapture of contemplation is\nthe true and healthy life of the soul. More than that it is the type and\nforetaste of a higher existence compared with which this world is\nworthless or rather nothing at all. This view has been held in India for\nnearly three thousand years: it has been confirmed by the experience of\nmen whose writings testify to their intellectual power and has commanded\nthe respect of the masses. It must command our respect too, even if it\nis contrary to our temperament, for it is the persistent ideal of a\ngreat nation and cannot be explained away as hallucination or\ncharlatanism. It is allied to the experiences of European mystics of\nwhom St Teresa is a striking example, though less saintly persons, such\nas Walt Whitman and J.A. Symonds, might also be cited. Of such mysticism\nWilliam James said \"the existence of mystical states absolutely\noverthrows the pretension of non-mystical states to be the sole and\nultimate dictators of what we may believe[48].\"\n\nThese mystical states are commonly described as meditation but they\ninclude not merely peaceful contemplation but ecstatic rapture. They are\nsometimes explained as union with Brahman[49], the absorption of the\nsoul in God, or its feeling that it is one with him. But this is\ncertainly not the only explanation of ecstasy given in India, for it is\nrecognized as real and beneficent by Buddhists and Jains. The same\nrapture, the same sense of omniscience and of ability to comprehend the\nscheme of things, the same peace and freedom are experienced by both\ntheistic and non-theistic sects, just as they have also been experienced\nby Christian mystics. The experiences are real but they do not depend on\nthe presence of any special deity, though they may be coloured by the\ntheological views of individual thinkers[50]. The earliest Buddhist\ntexts make right rapture (samm\u00e2 sam\u00e2dhi) the end and crown of the\neight-fold path but offer no explanation of it. They suggest that it is\nsomething wrought by the mind for itself and without the co-operation or\ninfusion of any external influence.\n\n\n13.\n\nIndian ideas about the destiny of the soul are connected with equally\nimportant views about its nature. I will not presume to say what is the\ndefinition of the soul in European philosophy but in the language of\npopular religion it undoubtedly means that which remains when a body is\narbitrarily abstracted from a human personality, without enquiring how\nmuch of that personality is thinkable without a material substratum.\nThis popular soul includes mind, perception and desire and often no\nattempt is made to distinguish it from them. But in India it is so\ndistinguished. The soul (\u00e2tman or purusha) _uses_ the mind and senses:\nthey are its instruments rather than parts of it. Sight, for instance,\nserves as the spectacles of the soul, and the other senses and even the\nmind (manas) which is an intellectual _organ_ are also instruments. If\nwe talk of a soul passing from death to another birth, this according to\nmost Hindus is a soul accompanied by its baggage of mind and senses, a\nsubtle body indeed, but still gaseous not spiritual. But what is the\nsoul by itself? When an English poet sings of death that it is \"Only the\nsleep eternal in an eternal night\" or a Greek poet calls it [Greek:\natermona n\u00eagreton hupnon] we feel that they are denying immortality. But\nIndian divines maintain that deep sleep is one of the states in which\nthe soul approaches nearest to God: that it is a state of bliss, and is\nunconscious not because consciousness is suspended but because no\nobjects are presented to it. Even higher than dreamless sleep is another\ncondition known simply as the fourth state[51], the others being waking,\ndream-sleep and dreamless sleep. In this fourth state thought is one\nwith the object of thought and, knowledge being perfect, there exists no\ncontrast between knowledge and ignorance. All this sounds strange to\nmodern Europe. We are apt to say that dreamless sleep is simply\nunconsciousness[52] and that the so-called fourth state is imaginary or\nunmeaning. But to follow even popular speculation in India it is\nnecessary to grasp this truth, or assumption, that when discursive\nthought ceases, when the mind and the senses are no longer active, the\nresult is not unconsciousness equivalent to non-existence but the\nhighest and purest state of the soul, in which, rising above thought and\nfeeling, it enjoys the untrammelled bliss of its own nature[53].\n\nIf these views sound mysterious and fanciful, I would ask those\nEuropeans who believe in the immortality of the soul what, in their\nopinion, survives death. The brain, the nerves and the sense organs\nobviously decay: the soul, you may say, is not a product of them, but\nwhen they are destroyed or even injured, perceptive and intellectual\nprocesses are inhibited and apparently rendered impossible. Must not\nthat which lives for ever be, as the Hindus think, independent of\nthought and of sense-impressions?\n\nI have observed in my reading that European philosophers are more ready\nto talk about soul and spirit than to define them[54] and the same is\ntrue of Indian philosophers. The word most commonly rendered by soul is\n_\u00e2tman_[55] but no one definition can be given for it, for some hold\nthat the soul is identical with the Universal Spirit, others that it is\nmerely of the same nature, still others that there are innumerable souls\nuncreate and eternal, while the Buddhists deny the existence of a soul\n_in toto_. But most Hindus who believe in the existence of an \u00e2tman or\nsoul agree in thinking that it is the real self and essence of all human\nbeings (or for that matter of other beings): that it is eternal _a parte\nante_ and _a parte post_: that it is not subject to variation but passes\nunchanged from one birth to another: that youth and age, joy and sorrow,\nand all the accidents of human life are affections, not so much of the\nsoul as of the envelopes and limitations which surround it during its\npilgrimage: that the soul, if it can be released and disengaged from\nthese envelopes, is in itself knowledge and bliss, knowledge meaning the\nimmediate and intuitive knowledge of God. A proper comprehension of this\npoint of view will make us chary of labelling Indian thought as\npessimistic on the ground that it promises the soul something which we\nare inclined to call unconsciousness.\n\nIn studying oriental religions sympathy and a desire to agree if\npossible are the first requisites. For instance, he who says of a\ncertain ideal \"this means annihilation and I do not like it\" is on the\nwrong way. The right way is to ascertain what many of our most\nintelligent brothers mean by the cessation of mental activity and why it\nis for them an ideal.\n\n\n14. _Eastern Pessimism and Renunciation_\n\nBut the charge of pessimism against Eastern religions is so important\nthat we must consider other aspects of it, for though the charge is\nwrong, it is wrong only because those who bring it do not use quite the\nright word. And indeed it would be hard to find the right word in a\nEuropean language. The temperament and theory described as pessimism are\nEuropean. They imply an attitude of revolt, a right to judge and\ngrumble. Why did the Deity make something out of nothing? What was his\nobject? But this is not the attitude of Eastern thought: it generally\nholds that we cannot imagine nothing: that the world process is without\nbeginning or end and that man must learn how to make the best of it.\n\nThe Far East purged Buddhism of much of its pessimism. There we see that\nthe First Truth about suffering is little more than an admission of the\nexistence of evil, which all religions and common sense admit. Evil\nceases in the saint: nirvana in this life is perfect happiness. And\nthough striving for the material improvement of the world is not held up\nconspicuously as an ideal in the Buddhist scriptures (or for that matter\nin the New Testament), yet it is never hinted that good effort is vain.\nA king should be a good king.\n\nRenunciation is a great word in the religions of both Europe and Asia,\nbut in Europe it is almost active. Except to advanced mystics, it means\nabandoning a natural attitude and deliberately assuming another which it\nis difficult to maintain. Something similar is found in India in the\nlegends of those ascetics who triumphed over the flesh until they become\nvery gods in power[56]. But it is also a common view in the East that he\nwho renounces ambition and passion is not struggling against the world\nand the devil but simply leading a natural life. His passions indeed\nobey his will and do not wander here and there according to their fancy,\nbut his temperament is one of acquiescence not resistance. He takes his\nplace among the men, beasts and plants around him and ceasing to\nstruggle finds that his own soul contains happiness in itself.\n\nMost Europeans consider man as the centre and lord of the world or, if\nthey are very religious, as its vice-regent under God. He may kill or\notherwise maltreat animals for his pleasure or convenience: his task is\nto subdue the forces of nature: nature is subservient to him and to his\ndestinies: without man nature is meaningless. Much the same view was\nheld by the ancient Greeks and in a less acute form by the Jews and\nRomans. Swinburne's line\n\n  Glory to man in the highest, for man is the master of things\n\nis overbold for professing Christians but it expresses both the modern\nscientific sentiment and the ancient Hellenic sentiment.\n\nBut such a line of poetry would I think be impossible in India or in any\ncountry to the East of it. There man is thought of as a part of nature\nnot its centre or master[57]. Above him are formidable hosts of deities\nand spirits, and even European engineers cannot subdue the genii of the\nflood and typhoon: below but still not separated from him are the\nvarious tribes of birds and beasts. A good man does not kill them for\npleasure nor eat flesh, and even those whose aspirations to virtue are\nmodest treat animals as humble brethren rather than as lower creatures\nover whom they have dominion by divine command.\n\nThis attitude is illustrated by Chinese and Japanese art. In\narchitecture, this art makes it a principle that palaces and temples\nshould not dominate a landscape but fit into it and adapt their lines to\nits features. For the painter, flowers and animals form a sufficient\npicture by themselves and are not felt to be inadequate because man is\nabsent. Portraits are frequent but a common form of European\ncomposition, namely a group of figures subordinated to a principal one,\nthough not unknown, is comparatively rare.\n\nHow scanty are the records of great men in India! Great buildings\nattract attention but who knows the names of the architects who planned\nthem or the kings who paid for them? We are not quite sure of the date\nof K\u00e2lid\u00e2sa, the Indian Shakespeare, and though the doctrines of\nSankara, Kabir, and N\u00e2nak still nourish, it is with difficulty that the\nantiquary collects from the meagre legends clinging to their names a few\nfacts for their biographies. And Kings and Emperors, a class who in\nEurope can count on being remembered if not esteemed after death, fare\neven worse. The laborious research of Europeans has shown that Asoka and\nHarsha were great monarchs. Their own countrymen merely say \"once upon a\ntime there was a king\" and recount some trivial story.\n\nIn fact, Hindus have a very weak historical sense. In this they are not\nwholly wrong, for Europeans undoubtedly exaggerate the historical\ntreatment of thought and art[58]. In science, most students want to know\nwhat is certain in theory and useful in practice, not what were the\ndiscarded hypotheses and imperfect instruments of the past. In\nliterature, when the actors and audience are really interested, the date\nof Shakespeare and even the authorship of the play cease to be\nimportant[59]. In the same way Hindus want to know whether doctrines and\nspeculations are true, whether a man can make use of them in his own\nreligious experiences and aspirations. They care little for the date,\nauthorship, unity and textual accuracy of the Bhagavad-g\u00eet\u00e2. They simply\nask, is it true, what can I get from it? The European critic, who\nexpects nothing of the sort from the work, racks his brains to know who\nwrote it and when, who touched it up and why?\n\nThe Hindus are also indifferent to the past because they do not\nrecognize that the history of the world, the whole cosmic process, has\nany meaning or value. In most departments of Indian thought, great or\nsmall, the conception of [Greek: telos] or purpose is absent, and if the\nEuropean reader thinks this a grave lacuna, let him ask himself whether\nsatisfied love has any [Greek: telos]. For Hindus the world is endless\nrepetition not a progress towards an end. Creation has rarely the sense\nwhich it bears for Europeans. An infinite number of times the universe\nhas collapsed in flaming or watery ruin, aeons of quiescence follow the\ncollapse and then the Deity (he has done it an infinite number of times)\nemits again from himself worlds and souls of the same old kind. But\nthough, as I have said before, all varieties of theological opinion may\nbe found in India, he is usually represented as moved by some\nreproductive impulse rather than as executing a plan. Sankara says\nboldly that no motive can be attributed to God, because he being perfect\ncan desire no addition to his perfection, so that his creative activity\nis mere exuberance, like the sport of young princes, who take exercise\nthough they are not obliged to do so.\n\nSuch views are distasteful to Europeans. Our vanity impels us to invent\nexplanations of the Universe which make our own existence important and\nsignificant. Nor does European science altogether support the Indian\ndoctrine of periodicity. It has theories as to the probable origin of\nthe solar system and other similar systems, but it points to the\nconclusion that the Universe as a whole is not appreciably affected by\nthe growth or decay of its parts, whereas Indian imagination thinks of\nuniversal cataclysms and recurring periods of quiescence in which\nnothing whatever remains except the undifferentiated divine spirit.\n\nWestern ethics generally aim at teaching a man how to act: Eastern\nethics at forming a character. A good character will no doubt act\nrightly when circumstances require action, but he need not seek\noccasions for action, he may even avoid them, and in India the\npassionless sage is still in popular esteem superior to warriors,\nstatesmen and scientists.\n\n\n15. _Eastern Polytheism_\n\nDifferent as India and China are, they agree in this that in order not\nto misapprehend their religious condition we must make our minds\nfamiliar with a new set of relations. The relations of religion to\nphilosophy, to ethics, and to the state, as well as the relations of\ndifferent religions to one another, are not the same as in Europe. China\nand India are pagan, a word which I deprecate if it is understood to\nimply inferiority but which if used in a descriptive and respectful\nsense is very useful. Christianity and Islam are organized religions.\nThey say (or rather their several sects say) that they each not only\npossess the truth but that all other creeds and rites are wrong. But\npaganism is not organized: it rarely presents anything like a church\nunited under one head: still more rarely does it condemn or interfere\nwith other religions unless attacked first. Buddhism stands between the\ntwo classes. Like Christianity and Islam it professes to teach the only\ntrue law, but unlike them it is exceedingly tolerant and many Buddhists\nalso worship Hindu or Chinese gods.\n\nPopular religion in India and China is certainly polytheistic, yet if\none uses this word in contrast to the monotheism of Islam and of\nProtestantism the antithesis is unjust, for the polytheist does not\nbelieve in many creators and rulers of the world, in many Allahs or\nJehovahs, but he considers that there are many spiritual beings, with\ndifferent spheres and powers, to the most appropriate of whom he\naddresses his petitions. Polytheism and image-worship lie under an\nunmerited stigma in Europe. We generally assume that to believe in one\nGod is obviously better, intellectually and ethically, than to believe\nin many. Yet Trinitarian religions escape being polytheistic only by\njuggling with words, and if Hindus and Chinese are polytheists so are\nthe Roman and Oriental Churches, for there is no real distinction\nbetween praying to the Madonna, Saints and Angels, and propitiating\nminor deities. William James[60] has pointed out that polytheism is not\ntheoretically absurd and is practically the religion of many Europeans.\nIn some ways it is more intelligible and reasonable than monotheism. For\nif there is only one personal God, I do not understand how anything that\ncan be called a person can be so expanded as to be capable of hearing\nand answering the prayers of the whole world. Anything susceptible of\nsuch extension must be more than a person. Is it not at least equally\nreasonable to assume that there are many spirits, or many shapes taken\nby the superpersonal world spirit, with which the soul can get into\ntouch?\n\nThe worship of images cannot be recommended without qualification, for\nit seems to require artists capable of making a worthy representation of\nthe divine. And it must be confessed that many figures in Indian\ntemples, such as the statues of K\u00e2l\u00ee, seem repulsive or grotesque,\nthough a Hindu might say that none of them are so strange in idea or so\nhorrible in appearance as the crucifix. But the claim of the iconoclast\nfrom the times of the Old Testament onwards that he worships a spirit\nwhereas others worship wood and stone is true only of the lowest phases\nof religion, if even there. Hindu theologians distinguish different\nkinds of _avat\u00e2ras_ or ways in which God descends into the world: among\nthem are incarnations like Krishna, the presence of God in the human\nheart and his presence in a symbol or image (_arc\u00e2_). It may be\ndifficult to decide how far the symbol and the spirit are kept separate\neither in the East or in Europe, but no one can attend a great\ncar-festival in southern India or the feast of Durg\u00e2 in Bengal without\nfeeling and in some measure sharing the ecstasy and enthusiasm of the\ncrowd. It is an enthusiasm such as may be evoked in critical times by a\nking or a flag, and as the flag may do duty for the king and all that he\nstands for, so may the image do duty for the deity.\n\n\n16. _The Extravagance of Hinduism_\n\nWhat I have just said applies to India rather than to China and so do\nthe observations which follow. India is the most religious country in\nthe world. The percentage of people who literally make religion their\nchief business, who sacrifice to it money and life itself (for religious\nsuicide is not extinct), is far greater than elsewhere. Russia[61]\nprobably comes next but the other nations fall behind by a long\ninterval. Matter of fact respectable people--Chinese as well as\nEuropeans--call this attitude extravagance and it sometimes deserves the\nname, for since there is no one creed or criterion in India, all sorts\nof aboriginal or decadent superstitions command the respect due to the\nname of religion.\n\nThis extravagance is both intellectual and moral. No story is too\nextraordinary to be told of Hindu gods. They are the magicians of the\nuniverse who sport with the forces of nature as easily as a conjuror in\na bazaar does tricks with a handful of balls. But though the average\nHindu would be shocked to hear the Puranas described as idle tales, yet\nhe does not make his creed depend on their accuracy, as many in Europe\nmake Christianity depend on miracles. The value of truth in religion is\nrated higher in India than in Europe but it is not historical truth. The\nHindu approaches his sacred literature somewhat in the spirit in which\nwe approach Milton and Dante. The beauty and value of such poems is\nclear. The question whether they are accurate reports of facts seems\nirrelevant. Hindus believe in progressive revelation. Many Tantras and\nVishnuite works profess to be better suited to the present age than the\nVedas, and innumerable treatises in the vernacular are commonly accepted\nas scripture.\n\nScriptures in India[62] are thought of as words not writings. It is the\nsacred sound not a sacred book which is venerated. They are learnt by\noral transmission and it is rare to see a book used in religious\nservices. Diagrams accompanied by letters and a few words are credited\nwith magical powers, but still tantric spells are things to be recited\nrather than written. This view of scripture makes the hearer uncritical.\nThe ordinary layman hears parts of a sacred book recited and probably\nadmires what he understands, but he has no means of judging of a book as\na whole, especially of its coherency and consistency.\n\nThe moral extravagance of Hinduism is more serious. It is kept in check\nby the general conviction that asceticism, or at least temperance,\ncharity and self-effacement are the indispensable outward signs of\nreligion, but still among the great religions of the world there is none\nwhich countenances so many hysterical, immoral and cruel rites. A\nliterary example will illustrate the position. It is taken from the\ndrama M\u00e2dhava and M\u00e2lat\u00ee written about 730 A.D., but the incidents of\nthe plot might happen in any native state to-day, if European\nsupervision were removed. In it M\u00e2dhava, a young Brahman, surprises a\npriest of the goddess Ch\u00e2mund\u00e2 who is about to immolate M\u00e2lat\u00ee. He kills\nthe priest and apparently the other characters consider his conduct\nnatural and not sacrilegious. But it is not suggested that either the\npolice or any ecclesiastical authority ought to prevent human\nsacrifices, and the reason why M\u00e2dhava was able to save his beloved from\ndeath was that he had gone to the uncanny spot where such rites were\nperformed to make an offering of human flesh to demons.\n\nIn Buddhism religion and the moral law are identified, but not in\nHinduism. Brahmanical literature contains beautiful moral sayings,\nespecially about unselfishness and self-restraint, but the greatest\npopular gods such as Vishnu and Siva are not identified with the moral\nlaw. They are super-moral and the God of philosophy, who _is_ all\nthings, is also above good and evil. The aim of the philosophic saint is\nnot so much to choose the good and eschew evil as to draw nearer to God\nby rising above both.\n\nIndian literature as a whole has a strong ethical and didactic flavour,\nyet the great philosophic and religious systems concern themselves\nlittle with ethics. They discuss the nature of the external world and\nother metaphysical questions which seem to us hardly religious: they\nclearly feel a peculiar interest in defining the relation of the soul to\nGod, but they rarely ask why should I be good or what is the sanction of\nmorality. They are concerned less with sin than with ignorance: virtue\nis indispensable, but without knowledge it is useless.\n\n\n17. _The Hindu and Buddhist Scriptures_\n\nThe history and criticism of Hindu and Buddhist scriptures naturally\noccupy some space in this work, but two general remarks may be made\nhere. First, the oldest scriptures are almost without exception\ncompilations, that is collections of utterances handed down by tradition\nand arranged by later generations in some form which gives them apparent\nunity. Thus the Rig Veda is obviously an anthology of hymns and some\nthree thousand years later the Granth or sacred book of the Sikhs was\ncompiled on the same principle. It consists of poems by Nanak, Kabir and\nmany other writers but is treated with extraordinary respect as a\ncontinuous and consistent revelation. The Brahmanas and Upanishads are\nnot such obvious compilations yet on careful inspection the older[63]\nones will be found to be nothing else. Thus the Brihad Aranyaka\nUpanishad, though possessing considerable coherency, is not only a\ncollection of such philosophic views as commended themselves to the\ndoctors of the Taittiriya school, but is formed by the union of three\nsuch collections. Each of the first two collections ends with a list of\nthe teachers who handed it down and the third is openly called a\nsupplement. One long passage, the dialogue between Y\u00e2jnavalkya and his\nwife, is incorporated in both the first and the second collection. Thus\nour text represents the period when the Taittir\u00eeyas brought their\nphilosophic thoughts together in a complete form, but that period was\npreceded by another in which slightly different schools each had their\nown collection and for some time before this the various maxims and\ndialogues must have been current separately. Since the conversation\nbetween Yajnavalkya and Maitreyi occurs in almost the same form in two\ncollections, it probably once existed as an independent piece.\n\nIn Buddhist literature the composite and tertiary character of the Sutta\nPitaka is equally plain. The various Nikayas are confessedly collections\nof discourses. The two older ones seem dominated by the desire to bring\nbefore the reader the image of the Buddha preaching: the Samyutta and\nAnguttara emphasize the doctrine rather than the teacher and arrange\nmuch the same matter under new headings. But it is clear that in\nwhatever form the various sermons, dialogues and dissertations appear,\nthat form is not primary but presupposes compilers dealing with an oral\ntradition already stereotyped in language. For long passages such as the\ntract on morality and the description of progress in the religious life\noccur in several discourses and the amount of matter common to different\nSuttas and Nikayas is surprising. Thus nearly the whole of the long\nSutta describing the Buddha's last days and death[64], which at first\nsight seems to be a connected narrative somewhat different from other\nSuttas, is found scattered in other parts of the Canon.\n\nThus our oldest texts whether Brahmanic or Buddhist are editions and\ncodifications, perhaps amplifications, of a considerably older oral\nteaching. They cannot be treated as personal documents similar to the\nKoran or the Epistles of Paul.\n\nThe works of middle antiquity such as the Epics, Puranas, and Mahayanist\nsutras were also not produced by one author. Many of them exist in more\nthan one recension and they usually consist of a nucleus enveloped and\nsometimes itself affected by additions which may exceed the original\nmatter in bulk. The Mah\u00e2bh\u00e2rata and Praj\u00f1\u00e2p\u00e2ramit\u00e2 are not books in the\nEuropean sense: we cannot give a date or a table of contents for the\nfirst edition[65]: they each represent a body of literature whose\ncomposition extended over a long period. As time goes on, history\nnaturally grows clearer and literary personalities become more distinct,\nyet the later Puranas are not attributed to human authors and were\nsusceptible of interpolation even in recent times. Thus the story of\nGenesis has been incorporated in the Bhavishya Purana, apparently after\nProtestant missionaries had begun to preach in India.\n\nThe other point to which I would draw attention is the importance of\nrelatively modern works, which supersede the older scriptures,\nespecially in Hinduism. This phenomenon is common in many countries, for\nonly a few books such as the Bhagavad-g\u00eet\u00e2, the Gospels and the sayings\nof Confucius have a portion of the eternal and universal sufficient to\noutlast the wear and tear of a thousand years. Vedic literature is far\nfrom being discredited in India, though some Tantras say openly that it\nis useless. It still has a place in ritual and is appealed to by\nreforming sects. But to see Hinduism in proper perspective we must\nremember that from the time of the Buddha till now, the composition of\nreligious literature in India has been almost uninterrupted and that\nalmost every century has produced works accepted by some sect as\ninfallible scripture. For most Vishnuites the Bhagavad-g\u00eet\u00e2 is the\nbeginning of sacred literature and the N\u00e2r\u00e2yan\u00eeya[66] is also held in\nhigh esteem: the philosophy of each sect is usually determined by a\ncommentary on the Brahma Sutras: the Bhagavata Purana (perhaps in a\nvernacular paraphrase) and the Ramayana of Tulsi Das are probably the\nfavourite reading of the laity and for devotional purposes may be\nsupplemented by a collection of hymns such as the Namghosha, copies of\nwhich actually receive homage in Assam. The average man--even the average\npriest--regards all these as sacred works without troubling himself with\ndistinctions as to _sruti_ and _smriti_, and the Vedas and Upanishads\nare hardly within his horizon.\n\nIn respect of sacred literature Buddhism is more conservative than\nHinduism, or to put it another way, has been less productive in the last\nfifteen hundred years. The Hinayanists are like those Protestant sects\nwhich still profess not to go beyond the Bible. The monks read the\nAbhidhamma and the laity the Suttas, though perhaps both are disposed to\nuse extracts and compendiums rather than the full ancient texts. Among\nthe Mahayanists the ancient Vinaya and Nikayas exist only as literary\ncuriosities. The former is superseded by modern manuals, the latter by\nMahayanist Sutras such as the Lotus and the Happy Land, which are\nhowever of respectable antiquity. As in India, each sect selects rather\narbitrarily a few books for its own use, without condemning others but\nalso without according to them the formal recognition received by the\nOld and New Testaments among Christians.\n\nNo Asiatic country possesses so large a portion of the critical spirit\nas China. The educated Chinese, however much they may venerate their\nclassics, think of them as we think of the masterpieces of Greek\nliterature, aS texts which may contain wrong readings, interpolations\nand lacunae, which owe whatever authority they possess to the labours of\nthe scholars who collected, arranged and corrected them. This attitude\nis to some extent the result of the attempt made by the First Emperor\nabout 200 B.C. to destroy the classical literature and to its subsequent\nlaborious restoration. At a time when the Indians regarded the Veda as a\nverbal revelation, certain and divine in every syllable, the Chinese\nwere painfully recovering and re-piecing their ancient chronicles and\npoems from imperfect manuscripts and fallible memories. The process\nobliged them to enquire at every step whether the texts which they\nexamined were genuine and complete: to admit that they might be\ndefective or paraphrases of a difficult original. Hence the Chinese have\nsound principles of criticism unknown to the Hindus and in discussing\nthe date of an ancient work or the probability of an alleged historical\nevent they generally use arguments which a European scholar can accept.\n\nChinese literature has a strong ethical and political flavour which\ntempered the extravagance of imported Indian ideas. Most Chinese systems\nassert more or less plainly that right conduct is conduct in harmony\nwith the laws of the State and the Universe.\n\n\n18. _Morality and Will_\n\nIt is dangerous to make sweeping statements about the huge mass of\nIndian literature, but I think that most Buddhist and Brahmanic systems\nassume that morality is merely a means of obtaining happiness[67] and is\nnot obedience to a categorical imperative or to the will of God.\nMorality is by inference raised to the status of a cosmic law, because\nevil deeds will infallibly bring evil consequences to the doer in this\nlife or in another. But it is not commonly spoken of as such a law. The\nusual point of view is that man desires happiness and for this morality\nis a necessary though insufficient preparation. But there may be higher\nstates which cannot be expressed in terms of happiness.\n\nThe will receives more attention in European philosophy than in Indian,\nwhether Buddhist or Brahmanic, which both regard it not as a separate\nkind of activity but as a form of thought. As such it is not neglected\nin Buddhist psychology: will, desire and struggle are recognized as good\nprovided their object is good, a point overlooked by those who accuse\nBuddhism of preaching inaction[68].\n\nSchopenhauer's doctrine that will is the essential fact in the universe\nand in life may appear to have analogies to Indian thought: it would be\neasy for instance to quote passages from the Pitakas showing that\n_tanh\u00e2_, thirst, craving or desire, is the force which makes and remakes\nthe world. But such statements must be taken as generalizations\nrespecting the world as it is rather than as implying theories of its\norigin, for though _tanh\u00e2_ is a link in the chain of causation, it is\nnot regarded as an ultimate principle more than any other link but is\nmade to depend on feeling. The M\u00e2y\u00e2 of the Vedanta is not so much the\naffirmation of the will to live as the illusion that we have a real\nexistence apart from Brahman, and the same may be said of Ahamk\u00e2ra in\nthe S\u00e2nkhya philosophy. It is the principle of egoism and individuality,\nbut its essence is not so much self-assertion as the _mistaken_ idea\nthat this is _mine_, that _I_ am happy or unhappy.\n\nThere is a question much debated in European philosophy but little\nargued in India, namely the freedom of the will. The active European\nfeeling the obligation and the difficulties of morality is perplexed by\nthe doubt whether he really has the power to act as he wishes. This\nproblem has not much troubled the Hindus and rightly, as I think. For if\nthe human will is not free, what does freedom mean? What example of\nfreedom can be quoted with which to contrast the supposed non-freedom of\nthe will? If in fact it is from the will that our notion of freedom is\nderived, is it not unreasonable to say that the will is not free?\nAbsolute freedom in the sense of something regulated by no laws is\nunthinkable. When a thing is conditioned by external causes it is\ndependent. When it is conditioned by internal causes which are part of\nits own nature, it is free. No other freedom is known. An Indian would\nsay that a man's nature is limited by Karma. Some minds are incapable of\nthe higher forms of virtue and wisdom, just as some bodies are incapable\nof athletic feats. But within the limits of his own nature a human being\nis free. Indian theology is not much hampered by the mad doctrine that\nGod has predestined some souls to damnation, nor by the idea of Fate,\nexcept in so far as Karma is Fate. It is Fate in the sense that Karma\ninherited from a previous birth is a store of rewards and punishments\nwhich must be enjoyed or endured, but it differs from Fate because we\nare all the time making our own karma and determining the character of\nour next birth.\n\nThe older Upanishads hint at a doctrine analogous to that of Kant,\nnamely that man is bound and conditioned in so far as he is a part of\nthe world of phenomena but free in so far as the self within him is\nidentical with the divine self which is the creator of all bonds and\nconditions. Thus the Kaush\u00eetaki Upanishad says, \"He it is who causes the\nman whom he will lead upwards from these worlds to do good works and He\nit is who causes the man whom he will lead downwards to do evil works.\nHe is the guardian of the world, He is the ruler of the world, He is the\nLord of the world and He is myself.\" Here the last words destroy the\napparent determinism of the first part of the sentence. And similarly\nthe Ch\u00e2ndogya Upanishad says, \"They who depart hence without having\nknown the Self and those true desires, for them there is no freedom in\nall worlds. But they who depart hence after knowing the Self and those\ntrue desires, for them there is freedom in all worlds[70].\"\n\nEarly Buddhist literature asserts uncompromisingly that every state of\nconsciousness has a cause and in one of his earliest discourses the\nBuddha argues that the Skandhas, including mental states, cannot be the\nSelf because we have not free will to make them exactly what we\nchoose[71]. But throughout his ethical teaching it is I think assumed\nthat, subject to the law of karma, conscious action is equivalent to\nspontaneous action. Good mental states can be made to grow and bad\nmental states to decrease until the stage is reached when the saint\nknows that he is free. It may perhaps be thought that the early\nBuddhists did not realize the consequences of applying their doctrine of\ncausation to psychology and hence never faced the possibility of\ndeterminism. But determinism, fatalism, and the uselessness of effort\nformed part of the paradoxical teaching of Makkhali Gosala reported in\nthe Pitakas and therefore well known. If neither the Jains nor the\nBuddhists allowed themselves to be embarrassed by such denials of free\nwill, the inference is that in some matters at least the Hindus had\nstrong common sense and declined to accept any view which takes away\nfrom man the responsibility and lordship of his own soul.\n\n\n19. _The Origin of Evil_\n\nThe reader will have gathered from what precedes that Hinduism has\nlittle room for the Devil[72]. Buddhism being essentially an ethical\nsystem recognizes the importance of the Tempter or M\u00e2ra, but still M\u00e2ra\nis not an evil spirit who has spoilt a good world. In Hinduism, whether\npantheistic or polytheistic, there is even less disposition to personify\nevil in one figure, and most Indian religious systems are disposed to\nthink of the imperfections of the world as suffering rather than as sin.\n\nYet the existence of evil is the chief reason for the existence of\nreligion, at least of such religions as promise salvation, and the\nexplanation of evil is the chief problem of all religions and\nphilosophies, and the problem which they all alike are conspicuously\nunsuccessful in solving. I can assign no reason for rejecting as\nuntenable the idea that the ultimate reality may be a duality--a good and\nan evil spirit--or even a plurality[73], but still it is unthinkable for\nme and I believe for most minds. If there are two ultimate beings,\neither they must be complementary and necessary one to the other, in\nwhich case it seems to me more correct to describe them as two aspects\nof one being, or if they are quite separate, my mind postulates (but I\ndo not know why) a third being who is the cause of them both.\n\nThe problem of evil is not quite the same for Indian and European\npantheists. The European pantheist holds that since God is all things or\nin all things, evil is only something viewed out of due perspective:\nthat the world would be seen to be perfect, if it could be seen as a\nwhole, or that evil will be eliminated in the course of development. But\nhe cannot explain why the partial view of the world which human beings\nare obliged to take shows the existence of obvious evil. The Hindus\nthink that it is possible and better for the soul to leave the vain show\nof the world and find peace in union with God. They are therefore not\nconcerned to prove that the world is good, although they cannot explain\nwhy God allows it to exist. The Upanishads contain some myths and\nparables about the introduction of evil but they do not say that a\nnaturally good world was spoilt[74]. They rather imply that increasing\ncomplexity involves the increase of evil as well as of good. This is\nalso the ground thought of the Agga\u00f1\u00f1a Sutta, the Buddhist Genesis (Dig.\nNik. XXVII.).\n\nI think that the substance of much Indian pantheism--late Buddhist as\nwell as Brahmanic--is that the world, the soul and God (the three terms\nbeing practically the same) have two modes of existence: one of repose\nand bliss, the other of struggle and trouble. Of these the first mode is\nthe better and it is only by mistake[75] that the eternal spirit adopts\nthe latter. But both the mistake and the correction of it are being\neternally repeated. Such a formulation of the Advaita philosophy would\nno doubt be regarded in India as wholly unorthodox. Yet orthodoxy admits\nthat the existence of the world is due to the coexistence of M\u00e2y\u00e2\n(illusion) with Brahman (spirit) and also states that the task of the\nsoul is to pass beyond M\u00e2y\u00e2 to Brahman. If this is so, there is either a\nreal duality (Brahman and M\u00e2y\u00e2) or else M\u00e2y\u00e2 is an aspect of Brahman,\nbut an aspect which the soul should transcend and avoid, and for whose\nexistence no reason whatever is given. The more theistic forms of Indian\nreligion, whether Sivaite or Vishnuite, tend to regard individual souls\nand matter as eternal. By the help of God souls can obtain release from\nmatter. But here again there is no explanation why the soul is\ncontaminated by matter or ignorance.\n\nIt is clearly illogical to condemn the Infinite as bad or a mistake.\nBuddhism is perhaps sometimes open to this charge because on account of\nits exceedingly cautious language about nirvana it fails to set it up as\na reality contrasted with the world of suffering. But many varieties of\nIndian religion do emphatically point to the infinite reality behind and\nbeyond M\u00e2y\u00e2. It is only M\u00e2y\u00e2 which is unsatisfactory because it is\npartial.\n\nAnother attempt to make the Universe intelligible regards it as an\neternal rhythm playing and pulsing outwards from spirit to matter\n(pravritti) and then backwards and inwards from matter to spirit\n(nirvritti). This idea seems implied by Sankara's view that creation is\nsimilar to the sportive impulses of exuberant youth and the\nBhagavad-g\u00eet\u00e2 is familiar with _pravritti_ and _nirvritti_, but the\ndouble character of the rhythm is emphasized most clearly in S\u00e2kta\ntreatises. Ordinary Hinduism concentrates its attention on the process\nof liberation and return to Brahman, but the Tantras recognize and\nconsecrate both movements, the outward throbbing stream of energy and\nenjoyment (bhukti) and the calm returning flow of liberation and peace.\nBoth are happiness, but the wise understand that the active outward\nmovement is right and happy only up to a certain point and under certain\nrestrictions.\n\nThat great poet Tulsi Das hints at an explanation of the creation or of\nGod's expansion of himself which will perhaps commend itself to\nEuropeans more than most Indian ideas, namely that the bliss enjoyed by\nGod and the souls whom he loves is greater than the bliss of solitary\ndivinity[76].\n\n\n20. _Church and State_\n\nI will now turn to another point, namely the relations of Church and\nState. These are simplest in Buddhism, which teaches that the truth is\none, that all men ought to follow it and that all good kings should\nhonour and encourage it. This is also the Christian position but\nBuddhism has almost always been tolerant and has hardly ever\ncountenanced the doctrine that error should be suppressed by force[77].\nBuddhism does not claim to cover the whole field of religion as\nunderstood in Europe: if people like to propitiate spirits in the hope\nof obtaining wealth and crops, it permits them to do so. In Japan and\nTibet Buddhism has played a more secular role than in other countries,\nanalogous to the struggles of the mediaeval European church for temporal\nauthority. In Japan the great monasteries very nearly became the chief\nmilitary as well as the chief political power and this danger was\naverted only by the destruction of Hieizan and other large\nestablishments in the sixteenth century. What was prevented in Japan did\nactually happen in Tibet, for the monasteries became stronger than any\nof the competing secular factions and the principal sect set up an\necclesiastical government singularly like the Papacy. In southern\ncountries, such as Burma and Ceylon, Buddhism made no attempt to\ninterfere in politics. This aloofness is particularly remarkable in Siam\nand Camboja, where state festivals are usually conducted by Brahmans not\nby Buddhist ecclesiastics. In Siam, as formerly in Burma, the king being\na Buddhist is in some ways the head of the Church. He may reform lax\ndiscipline or incorrect observances, but apparently not of his own\nauthority but merely as an executive power enforcing the opinion of the\nhigher clergy.\n\nBuddhism and Hinduism both have the idea that the monk or priest is a\nperson who in virtue of ordination or birth lives on a higher level than\nothers. He may teach and do good but irrespective of that it is the duty\nof the laity to support the priesthood. This doctrine is preached by\nHinduism in a stronger form than by Buddhism. The intellectual\nsuperiority of the Brahmans as a caste was sufficiently real to ensure\nits acceptance and in politics they had the good sense to rule by\nserving, to be ministers and not kings. In theory and to a considerable\nextent in practice, the Brahmans and their gods are not an _imperium in\nimperio_ but an _imperium super imperium_. The position was possible\nonly because, unlike the Papacy and unlike the Lamas of Tibet, they had\nno Pope and no hierarchy. They produced no \u00e0'Beckets or Hildebrands and\nno Inquisition. They did not quarrel with science but monopolized it.\n\nIn India kings are expected to maintain the priesthood and the temples\nyet Hinduism rarely assumes the form of a state religion[78] nor does it\nadmit, as state religions generally have to admit, that the secular arm\nhas a co-ordinate jurisdiction in ecclesiastical matters. Yet it affects\nevery department of social life and a Hindu who breaks with it loses his\nsocial status. Hindu deities are rarely tribal gods like Athene of\nAthens or the gods of Mr Kipling and the German Emperor. There are\nthousands of shrines specially favoured by a divine presence but the\nworshippers think of that presence not as the protector of a race or\ncity but as a special manifestation of a universal though often\ninvisible power. The conquests of Mohammedans and Christians are not\ninterpreted as meaning that the gods of Hinduism have succumbed to alien\ndeities.\n\nThe views prevalent in China and Japan as to the relations of Church and\nState are almost the antipodes of those described. In those countries it\nis the hardly dissembled theory of the official world that religion is a\ndepartment of government and that there should be regulations for gods\nand worship, just as there are for ministers and etiquette. If we say\nthat religion is identified with the government in Tibet and forms an\n_imperium super imperium_ in India, we may compare its position in the\nFar East to native states under British rule. There is no interference\nwith creeds provided they respect ethical and social conventions:\ninteresting doctrines and rites are appreciated: the Government accepts\nand rewards the loyal co-operation of the Buddhist and Taoist\npriesthoods but maintains the right to restrict their activity should it\ntake a wrong political turn or should an excessive increase in the\nnumber of monks seem a public danger. The Chinese Imperial Government\nsuccessfully claimed the strangest powers of ecclesiastical discipline,\nsince it promoted and degraded not only priests but deities. In both\nChina and Japan there has often been a strong current of feeling in the\nofficial classes against Buddhism but on the other hand it often had the\nsupport of both emperors and people, and princes not infrequently joined\nthe clergy, especially when it was desirable for them to live in\nretirement. Confucianism and Shintoism, which are ethical and ceremonial\nrather than doctrinal, have been in the past to some extent a law to the\ngovernments of China and Japan, or more accurately an aspect of those\ngovernments. But for many centuries Far Eastern statesmen have rarely\nregarded Buddhism and Taoism as more than interesting and legitimate\nactivities, to be encouraged and regulated like educational and\nscientific institutions.\n\n\n21. _Public Worship and Ceremonial_\n\nIn no point does Hinduism differ from western religions more than in its\npublic worship and, in spite of much that is striking and interesting,\nthe comparison is not to the advantage of India. It is true that temple\nworship is not so important for the Hindus as Church services are for\nthe Christian. They set more store on home ceremonies and on\ncontemplation. Still the temples of India are so numerous, so\nconspicuous and so crowded that the religion which maintains them must\nto some extent be judged by them.\n\nAt any rate they avoid the faults of public worship in the west. The\npractice of arranging the congregation in seats for which they pay seems\nto me more irreligious than the slovenliness of the heathen and makes\nthe whole performance resemble a very dull concert.\n\nProtestant services are in the main modelled on the ritual of the\nsynagogue. They are meetings of the laity at which the scriptures are\nread, prayers offered, sermons preached and benedictions pronounced. The\nclergy play a principal but not exclusive part. The rites of the Roman\nand Eastern Churches have borrowed much from pagan ceremonial but still\nthey have not wholly departed from the traditions of the synagogue.\nThese have also served as a model for Mohammedan ritual which differs\nfrom the Jewish in little but its almost military regularity.\n\nBut with all this the ordinary ritual of Hindu temples[79] has nothing\nin common. It derives from another origin and follows other lines. The\ntemple is regarded as the court of a prince and the daily ceremonies are\nthe attendance of his courtiers on him. He must be awakened, fed, amused\nand finally put to bed. This conception of ritual prevailed in Egypt but\nin India there is no trace of it in Vedic literature and perhaps it did\nnot come into fashion until Gupta times. Although the laity may be\npresent and salute the god, such worship cannot be called\ncongregational. Yet in other ways a Hindu temple may provide as much\npopular worship as a Nonconformist chapel. In the corridors will\ngenerally be found readers surrounded by an attentive crowd to whom they\nrecite and expound the Mahabharata or some other sacred text. At\nfestivals and times of pilgrimage the precincts are thronged by a crowd\nof worshippers the like of which is hardly to be seen in Europe,\nworshippers not only devout but fired with an enthusiasm which bursts\ninto a mighty chorus of welcome when the image of the god is brought\nforth from the inner shrine.\n\nThe earlier forms of Buddhist ceremonial are of the synagogue type\n(though in no way derived from Jewish sources) for, though there is no\nprayer, they consist chiefly of confession, preaching and reading the\nscriptures. But this puritanic severity could not be popular and the\nveneration of images and relics was soon added to the ritual. The former\nwas adopted by Buddhism earlier than by the Brahmans. The latter, though\na conspicuous feature of Buddhism in all lands, is almost unknown to\nHinduism. In their later developments Buddhist and Christian ceremonies\nshow an extraordinary resemblance due in my opinion chiefly to\nconvergence, though I do not entirely exclude mutual influence. Both\nBuddhism and Roman Catholicism accepted pagan ritual with some\nreservations and refinements. The worship has for its object an image or\na shrine containing a relic which is placed in a conspicuous position at\nthe end of the hall of worship[80]. Animal sacrifices are rejected but\nofferings of flowers, lights and incense are permitted, as well as the\nsinging of hymns. It is not altogether strange if Buddhist and Catholic\nrituals starting from the same elements ended by producing similar\nscenic effects.\n\nYet though the scenic effect may be similar, there is often a difference\nin the nature of the rite. Direct invocations are not wanting in Tibetan\nand Far Eastern Buddhism but many services consist not of prayers but of\nthe recitation of scripture by which merit is acquired. This merit is\nthen formally transferred by the officiants to some special object, such\nas the peace of the dead or the prosperity of a living suppliant.\n\nThe later phases of both Hinduism and Buddhism are permeated by what is\ncalled Tantrism[81], that is to say the endeavour to attain spiritual\nends by ritual acts such as gestures and the repetition of formulae.\nThese expedients are dangerous and may become puerile, but those who\nridicule them often forget that they may be termed sacramental with as\nmuch propriety as magical and are in fact based on the same theory as\nthe sacraments of the Catholic Church. When a child is made eligible for\nsalvation by sprinkling with water, by the sign of the cross and by the\nmantra \"In the Name of the Father,\" etc., or when the divine spirit is\nlocalized in bread and wine and worshipped, these rites are closely\nanalogous to tantric ceremonial.\n\nThe Buddhist temples of the Far East are in original intention copies of\nIndian edifices and in the larger establishments there is a daily\nroutine of services performed by resident monks. But the management of\nreligious foundations in these countries has been much influenced by old\npagan usages as to temples and worship which show an interesting\nresemblance to the customs of classical antiquity but have little in\ncommon with Buddhist or Christian ideas. A Chinese municipal temple is a\npublic building dedicated to a spirit or departed worthy. If sacrifices\nare offered in it, they are not likely to take place more than three or\nfour times a year. Private persons may go there to obtain luck by\nburning a little incense or still more frequently to divine the future:\npublic meetings and theatrical performances may be held there, but\nanything like a congregational service is rare. Just so in ancient Rome\na temple might be used for a meeting of the Senate or for funeral games.\n\n\n22. _The Worship of the Reproductive Forces_\n\nOne aspect of Indian religions is so singular that it demands notice,\nalthough it is difficult to discuss. I mean the worship of the\ngenerative forces. The cult of a god, or more often of a goddess, who\npersonifies the reproductive and also the destructive powers of nature\n(for it is not only in India that the two activities are seen to be\nakin) existed in many countries. It was prominent in Babylonia and Asia\nMinor, less prominent but still distinctly present in Egypt and in many\ncases was accompanied by hysterical and immoral rites, by mutilations of\nthe body and offerings of blood. But in most countries such deities and\nrites are a matter of ancient history: they decayed as civilization\ngrew: in China and Japan, as formerly in Greece and Rome, they are not\nan important constituent of religion. It is only in India and to some\nextent in Tibet, which has been influenced by India, that they have\nremained unabashed until modern times.\n\nIf it is right to regard with veneration the great forces of nature,\nfire, sun and water, a similar feeling towards the reproductive force\ncannot be unphilosophic or immoral. Nor does the idea that the supreme\ndeity is a mother rather than a father, though startling, contain\nanything unseemly. Yet it is an undoubted fact that all the great\nreligions except Hinduism, though they may admit a Goddess of\nMercy--Kuan-yin or the Madonna--agree in rejecting essentially sexual\ndeities. Modern Europe is probably prudish to excess, but the general\npractice of mankind testifies that words and acts too nearly connected\nwith sexual things cannot be safely permitted in the temple. This remark\nwould indeed be superfluous were it not that many millions of our Hindu\nfellow-citizens are of a contrary opinion.\n\nSuch practices prevail chiefly among the S\u00e2ktas in Bengal and Assam but\nsimilar licence is permitted (though the theoretical justification and\ntheological setting are different) in some Vishnuite sects. Both are\nreprobated by the majority of respectable Hindus, but both find educated\nand able apologists. And though it may be admitted that worship of the\nlinga may exist without bad effects, moral or intellectual, yet I think\nthat these effects make themselves felt so soon as a sect becomes\ndistinctly erotic. Anyone who visits two such different localities as\nKamakhya in Assam and Gokul near Muttra must be struck with the total\nabsence in the shrines of anything that can be called beautiful, solemn\nor even terrible. The general impression is of something diseased,\nunclean and undignified. The figure of the Great Goddess of life and\ndeath might have fired[82] the invention of artists but as a matter of\nfact her worship has paralyzed their hands and brains.\n\nNor can I give much praise to the Tantras as literature[83]. It is true\nthat, as some authors point out, they contain fine sayings about God and\nthe soul. But in India such things form part of the common literary\nstock and do not entitle the author to the praise which he would win\nelsewhere, unless his language or thoughts show originality. Such\noriginality I have not found in those Tantras which are accessible. The\nmagical and erotic parts may have the melancholy distinction of being\nunlike other works but the philosophical and theological sections could\nhave been produced by any Hindu who had studied these branches of Indian\nliterature.\n\n\n23. _Hinduism in Practice_\n\nAfter reviewing the characteristics of a religion it is natural to ask\nwhat is its effect on those who profess it. Buddhism, Christianity and\nIslam offer materials for answering such a question, since they are not\nracial religions. In historical times they have been accepted by peoples\nwho did not profess them previously and we can estimate the consequences\nof such changes. But Hinduism has racial or geographical limits. It\nproselytizes, but hardly outside the Indian area: it is difficult to\ndistinguish it from Indian custom, as the gospel is distinguished from\nthe practice of Europe: it is superfluous to enquire what would be its\neffect on other countries, since it shows no desire to impose itself on\nthem and they none to accept it. It is, like Shinto in Japan, not a\nreligion which has moulded the national character but the national\ncharacter finding expression in religion. Shinto and Hinduism are also\nalike in perpetuating ancient beliefs and practices which seem\nanachronisms but otherwise they are very different, for many races and\nlanguages have contributed their thoughts and hopes to the ocean of\nHinduism and they all had an interest in speculation and mysticism\nunknown to the Japanese.\n\nThe fact that Hinduism is something larger and more comprehensive than\nwhat we call a religion is one reason why it contains much of dubious\nmoral value. It is analogous not to Christianity but to European\ncivilization which produces side by side philanthropy and the horrors of\nwar, or to science which has given us the blessings of surgery and the\ncurse of explosives. There is a deep-rooted idea in India that a man's\ndaily life must be accompanied by religious observances and regulated by\na religious code, by no means of universal application but still\nsuitable to his particular class. An immoral occupation need not be\nirreligious: it simply requires gods of a special character. Hence we\nfind Thugs killing and robbing their victims in the name of Kali. But\nthough the Hindu is not at ease unless his customs are sanctioned by his\nreligion, yet religion in the wider sense is not bound by custom, for\nthe founders of many sects have declared that before God there is no\ncaste. A Hindu may devote himself to religion and abandon the world with\nall its conventions, but if like most men he prefers to live in the\nworld, it is his duty to follow the customs and usages sanctioned for\nhis class and occupation. Thus as Sister Nivedita has shown in her\nbeautiful writings, cooking, washing and all the humble round of\ndomestic life become one long ritual of purification and prayer in which\nthe entertainment of a guest stands out as a great sacrifice. But though\nreligion may thus give beauty and holiness to common things, yet\ninasmuch as it sanctifies what it finds rather than prescribes what\nshould be, it must bear the blame for foolish and even injurious\ncustoms. Child marriages have nothing to do with the creed of Hinduism,\nyet many Hindus, especially Hindu women, would feel it irreligious, as\nwell as a social disgrace, to let a daughter become adult without being\nmarried.\n\nA comparison of Indian Mohammedans and Hindus suggests that the former\nare more warlike and robust, the latter more intellectual and ingenious.\nThe fact that some Mohammedans belong to hardy tribes of invaders must\nbe taken into account but Islam deserves the credit of having introduced\na simple and fairly healthy rule of life which does not allow every\ncaste to make its own observances into a divine law. Yet it would seem\nthat the medical and sanitary rules of Hinduism deserve less abuse than\nthey generally receive. Col. King, Sanitary Commissioner of the Madras\nPresidency, is quoted as saying in a lecture[84]: \"The Institutes of\nVishnu and the Laws of Manu fit in excellently with the bacteriology,\nparasitology and applied hygiene of the West. The hygiene of food and\nwater, private and public conservancy, disease suppression and\nprevention, are all carefully dealt with.\"\n\nHinduism certainly has proved marvellously stimulating to the intellect\nor--shall we put it the other way?--is the product of profound, acute,\nand restless minds. It cannot be justly accused of being enervating or\nmelancholy, for many Hindu states were vigorous and warlike[85] and the\naccounts of early travellers indicate that in pre-mohammedan days the\npeople were humane, civilized and contented. It created an original and\nspiritual art, for Indian art, more than any other, is the direct\nproduct of religion and not merely inspired by it. In ages when original\ntalent is rare this close relation has disadvantages for it tends to\nmake all art symbolic and conventional. An artist must not represent a\ndeity in the way that he thinks most effective: the proportions,\nattitude and ornaments are all prescribed, not because they suit a\npicture or statue but because they mean something.\n\nIndian literature is also directly related to religion. Its extent is\nwell-nigh immeasurable. I will not alarm the reader with statistics of\nthe theological and metaphysical treatises which it contains. A little\nof such goes a long way even when they are first-rate, but India may at\nleast boast of having more theological works which, if considered as\nintellectual productions, must be placed in the first class than Europe.\nNor are religious writings of a more human type absent--the language of\nheart to heart and of the heart to God. The Ramayana of Tulsi Das and\nthe Tiruvw\u00e7agam are extolled by Gro\u00e2se, Grierson and Pope (all of them\nChristians, I believe) as not only masterpieces of literature but as\nnoble expressions of pure devotion, and the poems of Kabir and Tukaram,\nif less considerable as literary efforts, show the same spiritual\nquality. Indian poetry, even when nominally secular, is perhaps too much\nunder religious influence to suit our taste and the long didactic and\nphilosophic harangues which interrupt the action of the Mahabharata seem\nto us inartistic, yet to those who take the pains to familiarize\nthemselves with what at first is strange, the Mahabharata is, I think, a\ngreater poem than the _Iliad_. It should not be regarded as an epic\ndistended and interrupted by interpolated sermons but as the scripture\nof the warrior caste, which sees in the soldier's life a form of\nreligion.\n\nI have touched in several places on the defects of Hinduism. They are\ndue partly to its sanction of customs which have no necessary connection\nwith it and partly to its extravagance, which in the service of the gods\nsees no barriers of morality or humanity. But suttee, human sacrifices\nand orgies strike the imagination and assume an importance which they\nhave not and never had for Hinduism as a whole. If Hinduism were really\nbad, so many great thoughts, so many good lives could not have grown up\nin its atmosphere. More than any other religion it is a quest of truth\nand not a creed, which must necessarily become antiquated: it admits the\npossibility of new scriptures, new incarnations, new institutions. It\nhas no quarrel with knowledge or speculation: perhaps it excludes\nmaterialists, because they have no common ground with religion, but it\ntolerates even the S\u00e2nkhya philosophy which has nothing to say about God\nor worship. It is truly dynamic and in the past whenever it has seemed\nin danger of withering it has never failed to bud with new life and put\nforth new flowers.\n\nMore than other religions, Hinduism appeals to the soul's immediate\nknowledge and experience of God. It has sacred books innumerable but\nthey agree in little but this, that the soul can come into contact and\nintimacy with its God, whatever name be given him and even if he be\nsuperpersonal. The possibility and truth of this experience is hardly\nquestioned in India and the task of religion is to bring it about, not\nto promote the welfare of tribes and states but to effect the\nenlightenment and salvation of souls.\n\nThe love of the Hindus for every form of argument and philosophizing is\nwell known but it is happily counterbalanced by another tendency.\nInstinct and religion both bring them into close sympathy with nature.\nIndia is in the main an agricultural country[86] and nearly\nthree-quarters of the population are villagers whose life is bound up\nwith the welfare of plants and animals and lies at the mercy of rivers\nthat overflow or skies that withhold the rain. To such people\nnature-myths and sacred animals appeal with a force that Europeans\nrarely understand. The parrots that perch on the pinnacles of the temple\nand the oxen that rest in the shade of its courts are not intruders but\nhumble brothers of mankind, who may also be the messengers of the gods.\n\n\n24. _Buddhism in Practice_\n\nAs I said above, it is easier to estimate the effects of Buddhism than\nof Hinduism, for its history is the chronicle of a great missionary\nenterprise and there are abundant materials for studying the results of\nits diffusion.\n\nEven its adversaries must admit that it has many excellent qualities. It\npreaches morality and charity and was the first religion to proclaim to\nthe world--not to a caste or country--that these are the foundation of\nthat Law which if kept brings happiness. It civilized many nations, for\ninstance the Tibetans and Mongols. It has practised toleration and true\nunworldliness, if not without any exception[87], at least far more\ngenerally than any other great religion. It has directly encouraged art\nand literature and, so far as I know, has never opposed the progress of\nknowledge. But two charges may be brought against it which deserve\nconsideration. First that its pessimistic doctrines and monastic\ninstitutions are, if judged by ordinary standards, bad for the welfare\nof a nation: second that more than any other religion it is liable to\nbecome corrupt.\n\nIn all Buddhist lands, though good laymen are promised the blessings of\nreligion, the monastic and contemplative life is held up as the ideal.\nIn Christendom, this ideal is rejected by Protestants and for the Roman\nand Oriental Churches it is only one among others. Hence every one's\njudgment of Buddhism must in a large measure depend on what he thinks of\nthis ideal. Monks are not of this world and therefore the world hateth\nthem. If they keep to themselves, they are called lazy and useless. If\nthey take part in secular matters, they meet with even severer\ncriticism. Yet can any one doubt that what is most needed in the present\nage is more people who have leisure and ability to think?\n\nWhatever evil is said of Buddhist monks is also said of Mt Athos and\nsimilar Christian establishments. I am far from saying that this\ndepreciation of the cloistered life is just in either case but any\nimpartial critic of monastic institutions must admit that their virtues\navoid publicity and their faults attract attention. In all countries a\nlarge percentage of monks are indolent: it is the temptation which\nbesets all but the elect. Yet the Buddhist ideal of the man who has\nrenounced the world leaves no place for slackness, nor I think does the\nChristian. Buddhist monks are men of higher aspirations than others:\nthey try to make themselves supermen by cultivating not the forceful and\ndomineering part of their nature but the gentle, charitable and\nintelligent part. The laity treat them with the greatest respect\nprovided that they set an example of a life better than most men can\nlive. A monastic system of this kind is found in Burma. I do not mean\nthat it is not found in other Buddhist lands, but I cite an instance\nwhich I have seen myself and which has impressed most observers\nfavourably.\n\nThe Burmese monks are not far from the ideal of Gotama, yet perhaps by\nadhering somewhat strictly to the letter of his law they have lost\nsomething of the freedom which he contemplated. In his time there were\nno books: the mind found exercise and knowledge in conversation. A\nmonastery was not a permanent residence, except during the rainy season,\nbut merely a halting-place for the brethren who were habitually\nwanderers, continually hearing and seeing something new. Hermits and\nsolitary dwellers in the forests were not unknown but assuredly the\nmajority of the brethren had no intention of secluding themselves from\nthe intellectual life of the age. What would Gotama have done had he\nlived some hundreds or thousands of years later? I see no reason to\ndoubt that he would have encouraged the study of literature and science.\nHe would probably have praised all art which expresses noble and\nspiritual ideas, while misdoubting representations of sensuous beauty.\n\nThe second criticism--that Buddhists are prone to corrupt their faith--is\njust, for their courteous acquiescence in other creeds enfeebles and\ndenaturalizes their own. In Annam, Korea and some parts of China though\nthere are temples and priests more or less deserving the name of\nBuddhist, there is no idea that Buddhism is a distinct religion or mode\nof life. Such statements as that the real religion of the Burmese is not\nBuddhism but animism are, I think, incorrect, but even the Burmese are\ndangerously tolerant.\n\nThis weakness is not due to any positive defect, since Buddhism provides\nfor those who lead the higher life a strenuous curriculum and for the\nlaity a system of morality based on rational grounds and differing\nlittle from the standard accepted in both Europe and China, except that\nit emphasizes the duties of mankind to animals. The weakness comes from\nthe absence of any command against superstitious rites and beliefs. When\nthe cardinal principles of Buddhism are held strongly these accessories\ndo not matter, but the time comes when the creeper which was once an\nornament grows into the walls of the shrine and splits the masonry. The\nfaults of western religions are mainly faults of self-assertion--such as\nthe Inquisition and opposition to science. The faults of Indian\nreligions are mainly tolerance of what does not belong to them and\nsometimes of what is not only foreign to them but bad in itself.\n\nBuddhism has been both praised and blamed as a religion which\nacknowledges neither God nor the soul[88] and its acceptance in its\nlater phases of the supernatural has been regarded as proving the human\nmind's natural need of theism. But it is rather an illustration of that\ncraving for personal though superhuman help which makes Roman Catholics\nsupplement theism with the worship of saints.\n\nOn the whole it is correct to say that Buddhism (except perhaps in very\nexceptional sects) has always taken and still takes a point of view\nwhich has little in common with European theism. The world is not\nthought of as the handiwork of a divine personality nor the moral law as\nhis will. The fact that religion can exist without these ideas is of\ncapital importance[89]. But any statements implying that Buddhism\ndivorces morality from the doctrine of immortality may be misunderstood\nfor it teaches that just as an old man may suffer for the follies of his\nyouth, so faults committed in one life may be punished in another.\nRewards and punishments in another world were part of the creed of Asoka\nand tradition represents the missionaries who converted Ceylon as using\nthis simple argument[90]. It would not however be true to say that\nBuddhism makes the value of morality contingent on another world. The\nlife of an Arhat which includes the strictest morality is commended on\nits own account as the best and happiest existence.\n\nEuropean assertions about Buddhism often imply that it sets up as an\nideal and goal either annihilation or some condition of dreamy bliss.\nModern Buddhists who mostly neglect Nirvana as something beyond their\npowers, just as the ordinary Christian does not say that he hopes to\nbecome a saint, lose much of the Master's teaching but do it less\ninjustice than such misrepresentations. The Buddha did not describe\nNirvana as something to be won after death, but as a state of happiness\nattainable in this life by strenuous endeavour--a state of perfect peace\nbut compatible with energy, as his own example showed.\n\n\n25. _Interest of Indian Thought for Europe_\n\nWe are now in a better position to answer the question asked at the\nbeginning of this introduction, Is Indian thought of value or at least\nof interest for Europe?\n\nLet me confess that I cannot share the confidence in the superiority of\nEuropeans and their ways which is prevalent in the west. Whatever view\nwe take of the rights and wrongs of the recent war, it is clearly absurd\nfor Europe as a whole to pose in the presence of such doings as a\nqualified instructor in humanity and civilization. Many of those who are\nproudest of our fancied superiority escape when the chance offers from\nwestern civilization and seek distraction in exploration, and many who\nhave spent their lives among what they consider inferior races are\nuneasy when they retire and settle at home. In fact European\ncivilization is not satisfying and Asia can still offer something more\nattractive to many who are far from Asiatic in spirit. Yet though most\nwho have paid even a passing visit to the East feel its charm, the\nhistory, art and literature of Asia are still treated with ignorant\nindifference in cultured circles--an ignorance and indifference which are\nextraordinary in Englishmen who have so close a connection with India\nand devote a disproportionate part of their education to ancient Greece\nand Rome. I have heard a professor of history in an English university\nsay that he thought the history of India began with the advent of the\nBritish and that he did not know that China had any history at all. And\nMatthew Arnold in speaking of Indian thought[91] hardly escaped meriting\nhis own favourite epithets of condemnation, Philistine and _saugrenu_.\n\nEuropeans sometimes mention it as an amazing and almost ridiculous\ncircumstance that an educated Chinese can belong to three religions,\nConfucianism, Taoism and Buddhism. But I find this attitude of mind\neminently sensible. Confucianism is an admirable religion for State\nceremonies and College chapels. By attending its occasional rites one\nshows a decent respect for Heaven and Providence and commits oneself to\nnothing. And though a rigid Confucianist may have the contempt of a\nscholar and statesman for popular ideas, yet the most devout Buddhist\nand Taoist can conform to Confucianism without scruple, whereas many who\nhave attended an English coronation service must have wondered at the\nlanguage which they seemed to approve of by their presence. And in China\nif you wish to water the aridity of Confucianism, you can find in\nBuddhism or Taoism whatever you want in the way of emotion or philosophy\nand you will not be accused of changing your religion because you take\nthis refreshment. This temper is not good for creating new and profound\nreligious thought, but it is good for sampling and appreciating the\n\"varieties of religious experience\" which offer their results as guides\nfor this and other lives.\n\nFor religion is systematized religious experience and this experience\ndepends on temperament. There can therefore be no one religion in the\nEuropean sense and it is one of the Hindus' many merits that they\nrecognize this. Some people ask of religion forgiveness for their sins,\nothers communion with the divine: most want health and wealth, many\ncrave for an explanation of life and death. Indian religion accommodates\nitself to these various needs. Nothing is more surprising than the\nvariety of its phases except the underlying unity.\n\nThis power of varying in sympathetic response to the needs of many minds\nand growing in harmony with the outlook of successive ages, is a\ncontrast to the pretended _quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab\nomnibus_[92] of Western Churches, for in view of their differences and\nmutual hostility it can only be called a pretence. Indians recognize\nthat only the greatest and simplest religious questions can be asked now\nin the same words that came to the lips more than two thousand years ago\nand even if the questions are the same, the answers of the thoughtful\nare still as widely divergent as the pronouncements of the Buddha and\nthe Brahmans. But nearly all the propositions contained in a European\ncreed involve matters of history or science which are obviously affected\nby research and discovery as much as are astronomy or medicine, and not\nonly are the propositions out of date but they mostly refer to problems\nwhich have lost their interest. But Indian religion eschews creeds and\nwill not die with the spread of knowledge. It will merely change and\nenter a new phase of life in which much that is now believed and\npractised will be regarded as the gods and rites of the Veda are\nregarded now.\n\nI do not think that there is much profit in comparing religions, which\ngenerally means exalting one at the expense of the others, but rather\nthat it is interesting and useful to learn what others, especially those\nleast like ourselves, think of these matters. And in religious questions\nAsia has a distinct right to be heard.\n\nFor if Europeans have any superiority over Asiatics, it lies in\npractical science, finance and administration, not in thought or art. If\none were collecting views about philosophy and religion in Europe, one\nwould not begin by consulting financiers and engineers, and the\npoliceman who stands in the middle of the street and directs the traffic\nto this side and that is not intellectually superior to those who obey\nhim as if he were something superhuman. Europeans in Asia are like such\na policeman: their gifts are authority and power to organize: in other\nrespects their superiority is imaginary.\n\nI do not think that Christianity will ever make much progress in Asia,\nfor what is commonly known by that name is not the teaching of Christ\nbut a rearrangement of it made in Europe and like most European\ninstitutions practical rather than thoughtful. And as for the teaching\nof Christ himself, the Indian finds it excellent but not ample or\nsatisfying. There is little in it which cannot be found in some of the\nmany scriptures of Hinduism and it is silent on many points about which\nthey speak, if not with convincing authority, at least with suggestive\nprofundity. Neither do I think that Europe is likely to adopt Buddhist\nor Brahmanic methods of thought on any large scale. Theosophical and\nBuddhist societies have my sympathy but it is sympathy with lonely\nworkers in an unpopular cause and I am not sure that they always\nunderstand what they try to teach. There is truth at the bottom of the\ndogma that all Buddhas must be born and teach in India: Asiatic doctrine\nmay commend itself to European minds but it fits awkwardly into European\nlife.\n\nBut this is no reason for refusing to accord to Indian religion at least\nthe same attention that we give to Plato and Aristotle. Every idea which\nis held strongly by any large body of men is worthy of respectful\nexamination, although I do not think that because an opinion is\nwidespread it is therefore true. Thus the idea that in the remote past\nthere was some kind of paradise or golden age and that the span of human\nlife was once much longer than now is found among most nations. Yet\nresearch and analogy suggest that it is without foundation. The fact\nthat about half the population of the world has come under the influence\nof Hindu ideas gives Indian thought historical importance rather than\nauthority. The claim of India to the attention of the world is that she,\nmore than any other nation since history began, has devoted herself to\ncontemplating the ultimate mysteries of existence and, in my eyes, the\nfact that Indian thought diverges widely from our own popular thought is\na positive merit. In intellectual and philosophical pursuits we want new\nideas and Indian ideas are not familiar or hackneyed in the west, though\nI think that more European philosophers and mystics have arrived at\nsimilar conclusions than is generally supposed.\n\nIndian religions have more spirituality and a greater sense of the\nInfinite than our western creeds and more liberality. They are not\nmerely tolerant but often hold that the different classes of mankind\nhave their own rules of life and suitable beliefs and that he who\nfollows such partial truths does no wrong to the greater and\nall-inclusive truths on which his circumstances do not permit him to fix\nhis attention. And though some Indian religions may sanction bad\ncustoms, sacrifice of animals and immoral rites, yet on the whole they\ngive the duty of kindness to animals a prominence unknown in Europe and\nare more penetrated with the idea that civilization means a gentle and\nenlightened temper--an idea sadly forgotten in these days of war. Their\nspeculative interest can hardly be denied. For instance, the idea of a\nreligion without a personal God may seem distasteful or absurd but the\nstudent of human thought must take account of it and future generations\nmay not find it a useless notion. It is certain that in Asia we find\nBuddhist Churches which preach morality and employ ritual and yet are\nnot theistic, and also various systems of pantheism which, though they\nmay use the word God, obviously use it in a sense which has nothing in\ncommon with Christian and Mohammedan ideas.\n\nIndia's greatest contribution to religion is not intellectual, as the\nmass of commentaries and arguments produced by Hindus might lead us to\nimagine, but the persistent and almost unchallenged belief in the\nreality and bliss of certain spiritual states which involve intuition.\nAll Indians agree that they are real, even to the extent of offering an\nalternative superior to any ordinary life of pleasure and success, but\ntheir value for us is lessened by the variety of interpretations which\nthey receive and which make it hard to give a more detailed definition\nthan that above. For some they are the intuition of a particular god,\nfor others of divinity in general. For Buddhists they mean a new life of\nknowledge, freedom and bliss without reference to a deity. But apart\nfrom such high matters I believe that the mental training preliminary to\nthese states--what is called meditation and concentration--is well worth\nthe attention of Europeans. I am not recommending trances or catalepsy:\nin these as in other matters the Hindus are probably prone to exaggerate\nand the Buddha himself in his early quest for truth discarded trances as\nan unsatisfactory method. But the reader can convince himself by\nexperiment that the elementary discipline which consists in suppressing\n\"discursive thought\" and concentrating the mind on a particular\nobject--say a red flower--so that for some time nothing else is present to\nthe mind and the image of the flower is seen and realized in all its\ndetails, is most efficacious for producing mental calm and alertness. By\nsuch simple exercises the mind learns how to rest and refresh itself.\nIts quickness of apprehension and its retentive power are considerably\nincreased, for words and facts imprinted on it when by the suppression\nof its ordinary activities it has thus been made a _tabula rasa_ remain\nfixed and clear.\n\nSuch great expressions of emotional theism as the R\u00e2m\u00e2yana of Tulsi Das\nare likely to find sympathetic readers in Europe, but the most original\nfeature of Indian thought is that, as already mentioned, it produces\nsystems which can hardly be refused the name of religion and yet are\nhardly theistic. The Buddha preached a creed without reference to a\nsupreme deity and the great Emperor Asoka, the friend of man and beast,\npopularized this creed throughout India. Even at the present day the\nprosperous and intelligent community of Jains follow a similar doctrine\nand the Advaita philosophy diverges widely from European theism. It is\ntrue that Buddhism invented gods for itself and became more and more\nlike Hinduism and that the later Vedantist and Sivaite schools have a\nstrong bent to monotheism. Yet all Indian theism seems to me to have a\npantheistic tinge[93] and India is certainly the classic land of\nPantheism. The difficulties of Pantheism are practical: it does not lend\nitself easily to popular cries and causes and it finds it hard to\ndistinguish and condemn evil[94]. But it appeals to the scientific\ntemper and is not repulsive to many religious and emotional natures.\nIndeed it may be said that in monotheistic creeds the most thoughtful\nand devout minds often tend towards Pantheism, as witness the Sufis\namong Moslims, the Kabbalists among the Jews and many eminent mystics in\nthe Christian Church. In India, the only country where the speculative\ninterest is stronger than the practical, it is a common form of belief\nand it is of great importance for the history and criticism of religion\nto see how an idea which in Europe is hardly more than philosophic\ntheory works on a large scale.\n\nLater Buddhism--the so-called Mahayana--may be justly treated as one of\nthe many varieties of Indian religion, not more differentiated from\nothers than is for instance the creed of the Sikhs. The speculative side\nof early Buddhism (which was however mainly a practical movement) may be\nbetter described as an Indian critique of current Indian views. The\npsychology of the Pitakas has certainly enough life to provoke\ndiscussion still, for it receives both appreciative treatment and\nuncompromising condemnation at the hands of European scholars. To set it\naside as not worth the labour spent on elucidating it, seems to me an\nerror of judgment. As a criticism of the doctrine developed in the\nUpanishads, it is acute and interesting, even if we hold the Upanishads\nto be in the right, and no serious attempt to analyze the human mind can\nbe without value, for though the facts are before every human being such\nattempts are rare. It is singular that so many religions should\nprescribe and prophecy for the soul without being able to describe its\nnature. Hesitation and diffidence in defining the Deity seem proper and\nnatural but it is truly surprising that people are not agreed as to the\nessential facts about their own consciousness, their selves, souls,\nminds and spirits: whether these are the same or different: whether they\nare entities or aggregations. The Buddha's answers to these questions\ncannot be dismissed as ancient or outlandish, for they are practically\nthe conclusions arrived at by a distinguished modern psychologist,\nWilliam James, who says in his _Psychology_[95], \"The states of\nconsciousness are all that psychology requires to do her work with.\nMetaphysics or theology may prove the soul to exist, but for psychology\nthe hypothesis of such a substantial principle of unity is superfluous\"\nand again \"In this book the provisional solution which we have reached\nmust be the final one: The thoughts themselves are the thinkers.\"\n\nEqually in sympathy with Buddhist ideas is the philosophy of M. Bergson,\nwhich holds that movement, change, becoming is everything and that there\nis nothing else: no things that move and change and become[96]. Huxley\ntoo, speaking of idealism, said \"what Berkeley does not seem to have so\nclearly perceived is that the non-existence of a substance of mind is\nequally arguable.... It is a remarkable indication of the subtlety of\nIndian speculation that Gautama should have seen deeper than the\ngreatest of modern idealists[97].\"\n\nEven Mr Bradley says \"the soul is a particular group of psychical events\nin so far as those events are taken merely as happening in time[98].\"\nThere is a smack of the Pitakas about this, although Mr Bradley's\nphilosophy as a whole shows little sympathy for Buddhism but a wondrous\nresemblance both in thought and language to the Ved\u00e2nta. This is the\nmore remarkable because there is no trace in his works of Sanskrit\nlearning or even of Indian influence at second hand. A peculiarly\noriginal and independent mind seems to have worked its way to many of\nthe doctrines of the Advaita, without entirely adopting its general\nconclusions, for I doubt if Sankara would have said \"the positive\nrelation of every appearance as an adjective to reality and the presence\nof reality among its appearances in different degrees and with different\nvalues--this double truth we have found to be the centre of philosophy.\"\nBut still this is the gist of many Vedantic utterances both early[99]\nand late. Gaudap\u00e2da states that the world of appearance is due to\n_svabh\u00e2va_ or the essential nature of Brahman and I imagine that the\nthought here is the same as when Mr Bradley says that the Absolute is\npositively present in all appearances.\n\nAmong many coincidences both in thought and expression, I note the\nfollowing. Mr Bradley[100] says \"The Perfect ... means the identity of\nidea and existence, accompanied by pleasure\" which is almost the verbal\nequivalent of _saccid\u00e2nanda_. \"The universe is one reality which appears\nin finite centres.\" \"How there can be such a thing as appearance we do\nnot understand.\" In the same way Vedantists and Mahayanists can offer no\nexplanation of Maya or whatever is the power which makes the universe of\nphenomena. Again he holds that neither our bodies nor our souls (as we\ncommonly understand the word) are truly real[101] and he denies the\nreality of progress \"For nothing perfect, nothing genuinely real can\nmove.\" And his discussion of the difficulty of reconciling the ideas of\nGod and the Absolute and specially the phrase \"short of the Absolute,\nGod cannot rest and having reached that goal he is lost and religion\nwith him\" is an epitome of the oscillations of philosophic Hinduism\nwhich feels the difficulty far more keenly than European religion,\nbecause ideas analogous to the Absolute are a more vital part of\nreligion (as distinguished from metaphysics) in India than in\nEurope[102].\n\nNor can Indian ideas as to Maya and the unreality of matter be dismissed\nas curious dreams of mystical brains, for the most recent phases of\nPhysics--a science which changes its fundamental ideas as often as\nphilosophy--tend to regard matter as electrical charges in motion. This\ntheory is a phrase rather than an explanation, but it has a real\naffinity to Indian phrases which say that Brahman or Sakti (which are\nforces) produce the illusion of the world.\n\nI am not venturing here on any general comparison of European and Indian\nthought. My object is merely to point out that the latter contains many\nideas to which British philosophers find themselves led and from which,\nwhen they have discovered them in their own way, they do not shrink. It\ncan hardly then be without interest to see how these ideas have been\nelaborated, often more boldly and thoroughly, in Asia.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK II\n\n\n\n\nEARLY INDIAN RELIGION\n\nA GENERAL VIEW\n\n\n\n\nBOOK II\n\n\nIn this book I shall briefly sketch the condition of religion in India\nprior to the rise of Buddhism and in so doing shall be naturally led to\nindicate several of the fundamental ideas of Hinduism. For few old ideas\nhave entirely perished: new deities, new sects and new rites have arisen\nbut the main theories of the older Upanishads still command respect and\nmodern reformers try to justify their teaching from the ancient texts.\n\nBut I do not propose to discuss in detail the religion of the Vedic\nhymns for, so far as it can be distinguished from later phases, it looks\nbackward rather than forward. It is important to students of comparative\nmythology, of the origins of religion, of the Aryan race. But it\nrepresents rather what the Aryans brought into India than what was\ninvented in India, and it is this latter which assumes a prominent place\nin the intellectual history of the world as Hinduism and Buddhism. The\nancient nature gods of the wind and the dawn have little place in the\nmental horizon of either the Buddha or Bhagavad-g\u00eet\u00e2 and even when the\nold names remain, the beings who bear them generally have new\nattributes. Still, Vedic texts are used in modern worship and in many\nrespects there is a real continuity of thought.\n\nIn the first chapter I enquire whether there is any element common to\nthe religions of India and to the countries of Eastern Asia and find\nthat the worship of nature spirits and the veneration of ancestors\nprevail throughout the whole of this vast region and have not been\nsuppressed by Buddhism or Brahmanism. Then coming to the purely Indian\nsphere, I have thought it might not be amiss to give an epitome of such\nparts of Indian history as are of importance for religion. Next I\nendeavour to explain how the social institutions of India and the unique\nposition acquired by the Brahman aristocracy have determined the\ncharacter of Hindu religion--protean and yet unmistakeably Indian in all\nits phases--and I also investigate the influence of the belief in\nrebirth, which from the time of the Upanishads onwards dominates Indian\nthought. In the fourth and fifth chapters I trace the survival of some\nancient ideas and show how many attributes of the Vedic gods can be\nfound in modern deities who are at first sight widely different and how\ntheories of salvation by sacrifice or asceticism or knowledge have been\nsimilarly persistent. In the sixth chapter I attempt to give a picture\nof religious life, both Brahmanic and non-Brahmanic, as it existed in\nIndia about the time when the Buddha was born. Of the non-Brahmanic\nsects which then flourished most have disappeared, but one, namely the\nJains, has survived and left a considerable record in literature and\nart. I have therefore devoted a chapter to it here.\n\nMy object in this book is to discuss the characteristics of Indian\nreligion which are not only fundamental but ancient. Hence this is not\nthe place to dwell on Bhakti or relatively modern theistic sects,\nhowever great their importance in later Hinduism may be.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nRELIGIONS OP INDIA AND EASTERN ASIA\n\n\nThe countries with which this work deals are roughly speaking India with\nCeylon; Indo-China with parts of the Malay Archipelago; Japan and China\nwith the neighbouring regions such as Tibet and Mongolia. All of them\nhave been more or less influenced by Hinduism and Buddhism and in hardly\nany of them is Mohammedanism the predominant creed[103], though it may\nhave numerous adherents. The rest of Asia is mainly Mohammedan or\nChristian and though a few Buddhists may be found even in Europe (as the\nKalmuks) still neither Hinduism nor Buddhism has met with general\nacceptance west of India.\n\nIn one sense, the common element in the religion of all these countries\nis the presence of Indian ideas, due in most cases to Buddhism which is\nthe export form of Hinduism, although Brahmanic Hinduism reached Camboja\nand the Archipelago. But this is not the element on which I wish now to\ninsist. I would rather enquire whether apart from the diffusion of ideas\nwhich has taken place in historical times, there is any common\nsubstratum in the religious temperament of this area, any fund of\nprimitive, or at least prehistoric ideas, shared by its inhabitants.\nSuch common ideas will be deep-seated and not obvious, for it needs but\nlittle first-hand acquaintance with Asia to learn that all\ngeneralizations about the spirit of the East require careful testing and\nthat such words as Asiatic or oriental do not connote one type of mind.\nFor instance in China and Japan the control of the state over religion\nis exceptionally strong: in India it is exceptionally weak. The\nreligious temperaments of these nations differ from one another as much\nas the Mohammedan and European temperaments and the fact that many races\nhave adopted Buddhism and refashioned it to their liking does not\nindicate that their mental texture is identical. The cause of this\nsuperficial uniformity is rather that Buddhism in its prime had no\nserious rivals in either activity or profundity, but presented itself to\nthe inhabitants of Eastern Asia as pre-eminently the religion of\ncivilized men, and was often backed by the support of princes. Yet one\ncannot help thinking that its success in Eastern Asia and its failure in\nthe West are not due merely to politics and geography but must\ncorrespond with some racial idiosyncrasies. Though it is hard to see\nwhat mental features are common to the dreamy Hindus and the practical\nChinese, it may be true that throughout Eastern Asia for one reason or\nanother such as political despotism, want of military spirit, or on the\nother hand a tendency to regard the family, the clan or the state as the\nunit, the sense of individuality is weaker than in Western Asia or\nEurope, so that pantheism and quietism with their doctrines of the\nvanity of the world and the bliss of absorption arouse less opposition\nfrom robust lovers of life. This is the most that can be stated and it\ndoes not explain why there are many Buddhists in Japan but none in\nPersia.\n\nBut apart from Buddhism and all creeds which have received a name,\ncertain ideas are universal in this vast region. One of them is the\nbelief in nature spirits, beings who dwell in rocks, trees, streams and\nother natural objects and possess in their own sphere considerable\npowers of doing good or ill. The Nagas, Yakshas and Bhutas of India, the\nNats of Burma, the Peys of Siam, the Kami of Japan and the Shen of China\nare a few items in a list which might be indefinitely extended. In many\ncountries this ghostly population is as numerous as the birds of the\nforest: they haunt every retired spot and perch unseen under the eaves\nof every house. Theology has not usually troubled itself to define their\nstatus and it may even be uncertain whether respect is shown to the\nspirits inhabiting streams and mountain peaks or to the peaks and\nstreams themselves[104].\n\nThey may be kindly (though generally requiring punctilious attention),\nor mischievous, or determined enemies of mankind. But infinite as are\ntheir variations, the ordinary Asiatic no more doubts their existence\nthan he doubts the existence of animals. The position which they enjoy,\nlike their character, is various, for in Asia deities like men have\ncareers which depend on luck. Many of them remain mere elves or goblins,\nsome become considerable local deities. But often they occupy a position\nintermediate between real gods and fairies. Thus in southern India,\nBurma and Ceylon may be seen humble shrines, which are not exactly\ntemples but the abodes of beings whom prudent people respect. They have\nlittle concern with the destinies of the soul or the observance of the\nmoral law but much to do with the vagaries of rivers and weather and\nwith the prosperity of the village. Though these spirits may attain a\nhigh position within a certain district (as for instance Maha Saman, the\ndeity of Adam's Peak in Ceylon) they are not of the same stuff as the\ngreat gods of Asia. These latter are syntheses of many ideas, and\ncenturies of human thought have laboured on their gigantic figures. It\nis true that the mental attitude which deifies the village stream is\nfundamentally the same as that which worships the sun, but in the latter\ncase the magnitude of the phenomenon deified sets it even for the most\nrustic mind in another plane. Also the nature gods of the Veda are not\nquite the same as the nature spirits which the Indian peasants worship\nto-day and worshipped, as the Pitakas tell us, in the time of the\nBuddha. For the Vedic deities are such forces as fire and light, wind\nand water. This is nature worship but the worship of nature generalized,\nnot of some bold rock or mysterious rustling tree. It may be that a\nmigratory life, such as the ancient Aryans at one time led, inclined\ntheir minds to these wider views, since neither the family nor the tribe\nhad an abiding interest in any one place. Thus the ancestors of the\nTurks in the days before Islam worshipped the spirits of the sky, earth\nand water, whereas the more civilized but sedentary Chinese had genii\nfor every hamlet, pool and hillock.\n\nIt is difficult to say whether monotheism is a development of this\nnature worship or has another origin. In Japanese religion the\nmonotheistic tendency is markedly absent. The sun-goddess is the\nprincipal deity but remains simply _prima inter pares_. But in the\nancient religion of China, T'ien or Heaven, also called Shang-ti, the\nsupreme ruler, though somewhat shadowy and impersonal, does become an\nomnipotent Providence without even approximate rivals. Other superhuman\nbeings are in comparison with him merely angels. Unfortunately the early\nhistory of Chinese religion is obscure and the documents scanty. In\nIndia however the evolution of pantheism or theism (though usually with\na pantheistic tinge) out of the worship of nature forces seems clear.\nThese gods or forces are seen to melt into one another and to be aspects\nof one another, until the mind naturally passes on to the idea that they\nare all manifestations of one force finding expression in human\nconsciousness as well as in physical phenomena. The animist and\npantheist represent different stages but not different methods of\nthought. For the former, every natural object which impresses him is\nalive; the latter concurs in this view, only he thinks the universe is\ninstinct with one and the same life displaying itself in infinite\nvariety.\n\nOne difficulty incidental to the treatment of Asiatic religions in\nEuropean languages is the necessity, or at any rate the ineradicable\nhabit, of using well-known words like God and soul as the equivalents of\nAsiatic terms which have not precisely the same content and which often\nimply a different point of view. For practical life it is wise and\ncharitable to minimize religious differences and emphasize points of\nagreement. But this willingness to believe that others think as we do\nbecomes a veritable vice if we are attempting an impartial exposition of\ntheir ideas. If the English word God means the deity of ordinary\nChristianity, who is much the same as Allah or Jehovah--that is to say\nthe creator of the world and enforcer of the moral law--then it would be\nbetter never to use this word in writing of the religions of India and\nEastern Asia, for the concept is almost entirely foreign to them. The\nnature spirits of which we have been speaking are clearly not God: when\nan Indian peasant brings offerings to the tomb of a deceased brigand or\nthe Emperor of China promotes some departed worthy to be a deity of a\ncertain class, we call the ceremony deification, but there is not the\nsmallest intention of identifying the person deified with the Supreme\nBeing, and odd as it may seem, the worship of such \"gods\" is compatible\nwith monotheism or atheism. In China, Shang-ti is less definite than\nGod[105] and it does not appear that he is thought of as the creator of\nthe world and of human souls. Even the greater Hindu deities are not\nreally God, for those who follow the higher life can neglect and almost\ndespise them, without, however, denying their existence. On the other\nhand Brahman, the pantheos of India, though equal to the Christian God\nin majesty, is really a different conception, for he is not a creator in\nthe ordinary sense: he is impersonal and though not evil, yet he\ntranscends both good and evil. He might seem merely a force more suited\nto be the subject matter of science than of religion, were not\nmeditation on him the occupation, and union with him the goal, of many\ndevout lives. And even when Indian deities are most personal, as in the\nVishnuite sects, it will be generally found that their relations to the\nworld and the soul are not those of the Christian God. It is because the\nconception of superhuman existence is so different in Europe and Asia\nthat Asiatic religions often seem contradictory or corrupt: Buddhism and\nJainism, which we describe as atheistic, and the colourless respectable\nreligion of educated Chinese, become in their outward manifestations\nunblushingly polytheistic.\n\nSimilar difficulties and ambiguities attend the use of the word soul,\nfor Buddhism, which is supposed to hold that there is no soul, preaches\nretribution in future existences for acts done in this, and seeks to\nterrify the evil doer with the pains of hell; whereas the philosophy of\nthe Brahmans, which inculcates a belief in the soul, seems to teach in\nsome of its phases that the disembodied and immortal soul has no\nconsciousness in the ordinary human sense. Here language is dealing with\nthe same problems as those which we describe by such phrases as the\nsoul, immortality and continuous existence, but it is striving to\nexpress ideas for which we have little sympathy and no adequate\nterminology. They will be considered later.\n\nBut one attitude towards that which survives death is almost universal\nin Eastern Asia and also easily intelligible. It finds expression in the\nceremonies known as ancestor worship. This practice has attracted\nspecial attention in China, where it is the commonest and most\nconspicuous form of religious observance, but it is equally prevalent\namong the Hindus, though less prominent because it is only one among the\nmany rites which engage the attention of that most devout nation. It is\none of the main constituents in the religions of Indo-China and Japan,\nthough the best authorities think that it was not the predominant\nelement in the oldest form of Shinto. It is less prominent among the\nTibeto-Burmese tribes but not absent, for in Tibet there are both good\nand evil ghosts who demand recognition by appropriate rites. It is\nsometimes hard to distinguish it from the worship of natural forces. For\ninstance in China and southern India most villages have a local deity\nwho is often nameless. The origin of such deities may be found either in\na departed worthy or in some striking phenomenon or in the association\nof the two.\n\nThe cult of ghosts may be due to either fear or affection, and both\nmotives are found in Eastern Asia. But though abundant examples of the\npropitiation of angry spirits can be cited, respect and consideration\nfor the dead are the feelings which usually inspire these ceremonies at\nthe present day and form the chief basis of family religion. There is no\nneed to explain this sentiment. It is much stronger in Asia than in\nEurope but some of its manifestations may be paralleled by masses and\nprayers for the dead, others by the care bestowed on graves and by\nnotices _in memoriam_. As a rule both in China and India only the last\nthree generations are honoured in these ceremonies. The reason is\nobvious: the more ancient ancestors have ceased to be living memories.\nBut it might be hard to find a theoretical justification for neglecting\nthem and it is remarkable that in all parts of Asia the cult of the dead\nfits very awkwardly into the official creeds. It is not really\nconsistent with any doctrine of metempsychosis or with Buddhist teaching\nas to the impermanence of the Ego. In China may be found the further\ninconsistency that the spirit of a departed relative may receive the\ntribute of offerings and salutations called ancestor worship, while at\nthe same time Buddhist services are being performed for his deliverance\nfrom hell. But of the wide distribution, antiquity and strength of the\ncult there can be no doubt. It is anterior not only to Brahmanism but to\nthe doctrines of transmigration and karma, and the main occupation of\nBuddhist priests in China and Japan is the performance of ceremonies\nsupposed to benefit the dead. Even within Buddhism these practices\ncannot be dismissed as a late or foreign corruption. In the\nKhuddaka-p\u00e2tha which, if not belonging to the most ancient part of the\nBuddhist canon, is at least pre-Christian and purely Indian, the dead\nare represented as waiting for offerings and as blessing those who give\nthem. It is also curious that a recent work called _Raymond_ by Sir O.\nLodge (1916) gives a view of the state after death which is\nsubstantially that of the Chinese. For its teaching is that the dead\nretain their personality, concern themselves with the things of this\nworld, know what is going to happen here and can to some extent render\nassistance to the living[106]. Also (and this point is specially\nremarkable) burning and mutilation of the body seem to inconvenience the\ndead.\n\nEarly Chinese works prescribe that during the performance of ancestral\nrites, the ghosts are to be represented by people known as the\npersonators of the dead who receive the offerings and are supposed to be\ntemporarily possessed by spirits and to be their mouthpieces. Possession\nby ghosts or other spirits is, in popular esteem, of frequent occurrence\nin India, China, Japan and Indo-China. It is one of the many factors\nwhich have contributed to the ideas of incarnation and deification, that\nis, that gods can become men and men gods. In Europe the spheres of the\nhuman and divine are strictly separated: to pass from one to the other\nis exceptional: a single incarnation is regarded as an epoch-making\nevent of universal importance. But in Asia the frontiers are not thus\nrigidly delimitated, nor are God and man thus opposed. The ordinary dead\nbecome powers in the spirit world and can bless or injure here: the\ngreat dead become deities: in another order of ideas, the dead\nimmediately become reincarnate and reappear on earth: the gods take the\nshape of men, sometimes for the space of a human life, sometimes for a\nshorter apparition. Many teachers in India have been revered as partial\nincarnations of Vishnu and most of the higher clergy in Tibet claim to\nbe Buddhas or Bodhisattvas manifest in the flesh. There is no proof that\nthe doctrine of metempsychosis existed in Eastern Asia independently of\nIndian influence but the ready acceptance accorded to it was largely due\nto the prevalent feeling that the worlds of men and spirits are divided\nby no great gulf. It is quite natural to step into the spirit world and\nback again into this.\n\nIt will not have escaped the reader's attention that many of the\nfeatures which I have noticed as common to the religions of Eastern\nAsia--such as the worship of nature spirits and ancestors--are not\npeculiar to those countries but are almost, if not quite, universal in\ncertain stages of religious development. They can, for instance, be\ntraced in Europe. But whereas they exist here as survivals discernible\nonly to the eye of research and even at the beginning of the Christian\nera had ceased to be the obvious characteristics of European paganism,\nin Asia they are still obvious. Age and logic have not impaired their\nvigour, and official theology, far from persecuting them, has\naccommodated its shape to theirs. This brings us to another point where\nthe linguistic difficulty again makes itself felt, namely, that the word\nreligion has not quite the same meaning in Eastern Asia as in Mohammedan\nand Christian lands. I know of no definition which would cover\nChristianity, Buddhism, Confucianism and the superstitions of African\nsavages, for the four have little community of subject matter or aim. If\nany definition can be found it must I think be based on some superficial\ncharacteristic such as ceremonial. Nor is there any objection to\nrefusing the title of religion to Buddhism and Confucianism, except that\nan inconvenient lacuna would remain in our vocabulary, for they are not\nadequately described as philosophies. A crucial instance of the\ndifference in the ideas prevalent in Europe and Eastern Asia is the fact\nthat in China many people belong to two or three religions and it would\nseem that when Buddhism existed in India the common practice was\nsimilar. Paganism and spiritual religion can co-exist in the same mind\nprovided their spheres are kept distinct. But Christianity and Islam\nboth retain the idea of a jealous God who demands not only exclusive\ndevotion but also exclusive belief: to believe in other Gods is not only\nerroneous; it is disobedience and disloyalty. But such ideas have little\ncurrency in Eastern Asia, especially among Buddhists. The Buddha is not\na creator or a king but rather a physician. He demands no allegiance and\nfor those who disobey him the only punishment is continuance of the\ndisease. And though Indian deities may claim personal and exclusive\ndevotion, yet in defining and limiting belief their priests are less\nexacting than Papal or Moslim doctors. Despite sectarian formulas, the\nHindu cherishes broader ideas such as that all deities are forms and\npassing shapes of one essence; that all have their proper places and\nthat gods, creeds and ceremonies are necessary helps in the lower stages\nof the religious life but immaterial to the adept.\n\nIt does not follow from this that Hindus are lukewarm or insincere in\ntheir convictions. On the contrary, faith is more intense and more\nwidely spread among them than in Europe. Nor can it be said that their\nreligion is something detachable from ordinary life: the burden of daily\nobservances prescribed and duly borne seems to us intolerable. But\nBuddhism and many forms of Hinduism present themselves as methods of\nsalvation with a simplicity and singleness of aim which may be\nparalleled in the Gospels but only rarely in the national churches of\nEurope. The pious Buddhist is one who moulds his life and thoughts\naccording to a certain law: he is not much concerned with worshipping\nthe gods of the state or city, but has nothing against such worship: his\naims and procedure have nothing to do with spirits who give wealth and\nchildren or avert misfortune. But since such matters are of great\ninterest to mankind, he is naturally brought into contact with them and\nhe has no more objection to a religious service for procuring rain than\nto a scientific experiment for the same purpose. Similarly Confucians\nfollow a system of ethics which is sufficient for a gentleman and\naccords a decorous recognition to a Supreme Being and ancestral spirits.\nMuch concession to superstition would be reprehensible according to this\ncode but if a Confucian honours some deity either for his private\nobjects or because it is part of his duties as a magistrate, he is not\noffending Confucius. He is simply engaging in an act which has nothing\nto do with Confucianism. The same distinction often applies in Indian\nreligion but is less clear there, because both the higher doctrine as\nwell as ordinary ceremonial and mythology are described under one name\nas Hinduism. But if a native of southern India occasionally sacrifices a\nbuffalo to placate some village spirit, it does not follow that all his\nreligious notions are of this barbarous type.\n\nAsiatic ideas as to the relations between religions are illustrated by\nan anecdote related to me in Assam. Christianity has made many converts\namong the Khasis, a non-Hindu tribe of that region, and a successful\nrevival meeting extending over a week was once held in a district of\nprofessing Christians. When the week was over and the missionaries gone,\nthe Khasis performed a ceremony in honour of their tribal deities. Their\npastors regarded this as a woeful lapse from grace but no disbelief in\nChristianity or change of faith was implied. The Khasis had embraced\nChristianity in the same spirit that animated the ancient disciples of\nthe Buddha: it was the higher law which spoke of a new life and of the\nworld to come. But it was not understood that it offered to take over\nthe business of the local deities, to look after crops and pigs and\nchildren, to keep smallpox, tigers and serpents in order. Nobody doubted\nthe existence of spirits who regulate these matters, while admitting\nthat ethics and the road to heaven were not in their department, and\ntherefore it was thought wise to supplement the Christian ceremonies by\nothers held in their honour and thus let them see that they were not\nforgotten and run no risk of incurring their enmity.\n\nMy object in this chapter is to point out at the very beginning that in\nAsia the existence of a duly labelled religion, such as Buddhism or\nConfucianism, does not imply the suppression of older nameless beliefs,\nespecially about nature spirits and ghosts. In China and many other\ncountries we must not be surprised to find Buddhists honouring spirits\nwho have nothing to do with Buddhism. In India we must not suppose that\nthe doctrines of R\u00e2m\u00e2nuja or any other great teacher are responsible for\nthe crudities of village worship, nor yet rashly assume that the\nvillager is ignorant of them.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nHISTORICAL\n\n\nIt may be useful to insert here a brief sketch of Indian history, but\nits aim is merely to outline the surroundings in which Hindu religion\nand philosophy grew up. It, therefore, passes lightly over much which is\nimportant from other points of view and is intended for reference rather\nthan for continuous reading.\n\nAn indifference to history, including biography, politics and geography,\nis the great defect of Indian literature. Not only are there few\nhistorical treatises[107] but even historical allusions are rare and\nthis curious vagueness is not peculiar to any age or district. It is as\nnoticeable among the Dravidians of the south as among the speakers of\nAryan languages in the north. It prevails from Vedic times until the\nMohammedan conquest, which produced chronicles though it did not induce\nBrahmans to write them in Sanskrit. The lacuna is being slowly filled up\nby the labours of European scholars who have collected numerous data\nfrom an examination of inscriptions, monuments and coins, from the\ncritical study of Hindu literature, and from research in foreign,\nespecially Chinese, accounts of ancient India.\n\nAt first sight the history of India seems merely a record of invasions,\nthe annals of a land that was always receptive and fated to be\nconquered. The coast is poor in ports and the nearest foreign shore\ndistant. The land frontiers offer more temptation to invaders than to\nemigrants. The Vedic Aryans, Persians, Greeks and hordes innumerable\nfrom Central Asia poured in century after century through the passes of\nthe north-western mountains and after the arrival of Vasco da Gama other\nhordes came from Europe by sea. But the armies and fleets of India can\ntell no similar story of foreign victories. This picture however\nneglects the fact that large parts of Indo-China and the Malay\nArchipelago (including Camboja, Champa, Java and even Borneo) received\nnot only civilization but colonists and rulers from India. In the north\ntoo Nepal, Kashmir, Khotan and many other districts might at one time or\nanother be legitimately described as conquered or tributary countries.\nIt may indeed be justly objected that Indian literature knows nothing of\nCamboja and other lands where Indian buildings have been discovered[108]\nand that the people of India were unconscious of having conquered them.\nBut Indian literature is equally unconscious of the conquests made by\nAlexander, Kanishka and many others. Poets and philosophers were little\ninterested in the expeditions of princes, whether native or foreign. But\nif by India is meant the country bounded by the sea and northern\nmountains it undoubtedly sent armies and colonists to regions far beyond\nthese limits, both in the south-east and the north, and if the expansion\nof a country is to be measured not merely by territorial acquisition but\nby the diffusion of its institutions, religion, art and literature, then\n\"the conquests of the Dhamma,\" to use Asoka's phrase, include China,\nJapan, Tibet and Mongolia.\n\nThe fact that the Hindus paid no attention to these conquests and this\nspread of their civilization argues a curious lack of interest in\nnational questions and an inability to see or utilize political\nopportunities which must be the result of temperament rather than of\ndistracting invasions. For the long interval between the defeat of the\nHuns in 526 A.D. and the raids of Mahmud of Ghazni about 1000 A.D. which\nwas almost entirely free from foreign inroads, seems precisely the\nperiod when the want of political ideas and constructive capacity was\nmost marked. Nor were the incursions always destructive and sterile. The\ninvaders, though they had generally more valour than culture of their\nown, often brought with them foreign art and ideas, Hellenic, Persian or\nMohammedan. Naturally the northern districts felt their violence most as\nwell as the new influences which they brought, whereas the south became\nthe focus of Hindu politics and culture which radiated thence northwards\nagain. Yet, on the whole, seeing how vast is the area occupied by the\nHindus, how great the differences not only of race but of language, it\nis remarkable how large a measure of uniformity exists among them (of\ncourse I exclude Mohammedans) in things religious and intellectual.\nHinduism ranges from the lowest superstition to the highest philosophy\nbut the stages are not distributed geographically. Pilgrims go from\nBadrinath to Ramesvaram: the Vaishnavism of Trichinopoly, Muttra and\nBengal does not differ in essentials, the worship of the linga can be\nseen almost anywhere. And though India has often been receptive, this\nreceptivity has been deliberate and discriminating. Great as was the\nadvance of Islam, the resistance offered to it was even more remarkable\nand at the present day it cannot be said that in the things which most\ninterest them Indian minds are specially hospitable to British ideas.\n\nThe relative absence of political unity seems due to want of interest in\npolitics. It is often said that the history of India in pre-Mohammedan\ntimes is an unintelligible or, at least, unreadable, record of the\ncomplicated quarrels and varying frontiers of small states. Yet this is\nas true of the history of the Italian as of the Indian peninsula. The\nreal reason why Indian history seems tedious and intricate is that large\ninterests are involved only in the greatest struggles, such as the\nefforts to repulse the Huns or Mohammedans.\n\nThe ordinary wars, though conducted on no small scale, did not involve\nsuch causes or principles as the strife of Roundheads with Cavaliers.\nWith rare exceptions, states and empires were regarded as the property\nof their monarchs. Religion claimed to advise kings, like other wealthy\npersons, as to their duties and opportunities, and ministers became the\npractical rulers of kingdoms just as a steward may get the management of\nan estate into his hands. But it rarely occurred to Hindus that other\npersons in the estate had any right to a share in the government, or\nthat a Raja could be dispossessed by anybody but another Raja. Of that,\nindeed, there was no lack. Not only had every sovereign to defend\nhimself against the enemies in his own house but external politics\nseemed based on the maxim that it is the duty of a powerful ruler to\nincrease his territory by direct and unprovoked attacks on his\nneighbours. There is hardly a king of eminence who did not expand his\npower in this way, and the usual history of a royal house is successful\naggression followed by collapse when weaker hands were unable to hold\nthe inherited handful. Even moderately long intervals of peace are rare.\nYet all the while we seem to be dealing not with the expansion or\ndecadence of a nation, but with great nobles who add to their estates or\ngo bankrupt.\n\nThese features of Indian politics are illustrated by the Arthas\u00e2stra, a\nmanual of state-craft attributed to C\u00e2nakya, the minister of Candragupta\nand sometimes called the Indian Macchiavelli. Its authenticity has been\ndisputed but it is now generally accepted by scholars as an ancient work\ncomposed if not in the fourth century, at least some time before the\nChristian era. It does not, like Manu and other Brahmanic law-books,\ngive regulations for an ideal kingdom but frankly describes the practice\nof kings. The form of state contemplated is a small kingdom surrounded\nby others like it and war is assumed to be their almost normal relation,\nbut due to the taste or policy of kings, not to national aspirations or\neconomic causes. Towards the Brahmans a king has certain moral\nobligations, towards his subjects and fellow monarchs none. It is\nassumed that his object is to obtain money from his subjects, conquer\nhis neighbours, and protect himself by espionage and severe punishments\nagainst the attacks to which he is continually exposed, especially at\nthe hands of his sons. But the author does not allow his prince a life\nof pleasure: he is to work hard and the first things he has to attend to\nare religious matters.\n\nThe difficulty of writing historical epitomes which are either accurate\nor readable is well known and to outline the events which have occurred\nin the vast area called India during the last 2500 years is a specially\narduous task, for it is almost impossible to frame a narrative which\nfollows the fortunes of the best known Hindu kingdoms and also does\njustice to the influence of southern India and Islam. It may be useful\nto tabulate the principal periods, but the table is not continuous and\neven when there is no gap in chronology, it often happens that only one\npolitical area is illuminated amid the general darkness and that this\narea is not the same for many centuries.\n\n1. From about 500 to 200 B.C. Magadha (the modern Bihar) was the\nprincipal state and the dominions of its great king Asoka were almost\nthe same as British India to-day.\n\n2. In the immediately succeeding period many invaders entered from the\nnorth-west. Some were Greeks and some Iranians but the most important\nwere the Kushans who ruled over an Empire embracing both north-western\nIndia and regions beyond it in Afghanistan and Central Asia. This Empire\ncame to an end in the third century A.D. but the causes of its collapse\nare obscure.\n\n3. The native Hindu dynasty of the Guptas began to rule in 320 A.D. Its\ndominions included nearly all northern India but it was destroyed by the\ninvasions of the Huns in the fifth and sixth centuries.\n\n4. The Hindu Emperor Harsha (606-647 A.D.) practically reconstituted the\nGupta Empire but his dominions split up after his death. At the same\ntime another Empire which extended from Gujarat to Madras was founded by\nPulakesin, a prince from the south, a region which though by no means\nuncivilized had hitherto played a small part in the general history of\nIndia.\n\n5. From 650 to 1000 A.D. India was divided among numerous independent\nkingdoms. There was no central power but Bengal and the Deccan were more\nprominent than previously.\n\n6. After 1000 A.D. the conquests of Mohammedan invaders became important\nand the Hindu states of northern and central India collapsed or grew\nweak. But the Hindus held out in Rajputana, Orissa, and above all in\nVijayanagar.\n\n7. In 1526 came the invasion of the Mughals, who founded an Empire which\nat its zenith (1556-1707) included all India except the extreme south.\nIn its decadence the Marathas and Sikhs became powerful and Europeans\nbegan to intervene.\n\nIt is generally agreed that at a period which, though not fixed, was\nanterior to 1000 B.C.[109] a body of invaders known as Aryans and nearly\nakin to the ancient Iranians entered India through the north-western\nmountains. They found there other tribes not deficient in civilization\nbut unable to offer any effective resistance. These tribes who retired\nsouthwards are commonly known as Dravidians[110] and possibly represent\nan earlier invasion of central-Asiatic tribes allied to the remote\nancestors of the Turks and Mongols[111]. At the time when the earlier\nhymns of the Rig Veda were composed, the Aryans apparently lived in the\nPanjab and did not know the sea, the Vindhya mountains or the Narbudda\nriver. They included several tribes, among whom five are specially\nmentioned, and we hear that a great battle was fought on the Ravi, in\nwhich a confederation of ten kings who wished to force a passage to the\neast was repulsed by Sudas, chief of the Tritsus. Still the\nsouth-eastern movement, across the modern United Provinces to the\nborders of Bengal, continued and, so far as our records go, it was in\nthis direction rather than due south or south-west, that the Aryans\nchiefly advanced[112]. When the Br\u00e2hmanas and earlier Upanishads were\ncomposed (c. 800-600 B.C.) the principal political units were the\nkingdoms of the Panc\u00e2las and Kurus in the region of Delhi. The city of\nAyodhy\u00e2 (Oudh) is also credited with a very ancient but legendary\nhistory.\n\nThe real history of India begins with the life of the Buddha who lived\nin the sixth century B.C.[113] At that time the small states of northern\nIndia, which were apparently oligarchies or monarchies restricted by the\npowers of a tribal council, were in process of being absorbed by larger\nstates which were absolute monarchies and this remained the normal form\nof government in both Hindu and Moslim times. Thus Kosala (or Oudh)\nabsorbed the kingdom of Benares but was itself conquered by Magadha or\nBihar, the chief city of which was Pataliputra or Patna, destined to\nbecome the capital of India. We also know that at this period and for\nabout two centuries later the Persian Empire had two satrapies within\nthe limits of modern India, one called \"India,\" including the country\neast of the Indus and possibly part of the Panjab, and the other called\nG\u00e2ndh\u00e2ra (Peshawar) containing Takshasil\u00e2[114], a celebrated university.\nThe situation of this seat of learning is important, for it was\nfrequented by students from other districts and they must have felt\nthere in early times Persian and afterwards Hellenistic influence. There\nare clear signs of Persian influence in India in the reign of Asoka. Of\nMagadha there is little to be said for the next century and a half, but\nit appears to have remained the chief state of northern India.\n\nIn 327 B.C. Alexander the Great after over-throwing the Persian Empire\ninvaded India, where he remained only nineteen months. He probably\nintended to annex Sind and the Panjab permanently to his Empire but he\ndied in 323 and in the next year Candragupta, an exiled scion of the\nroyal house of Magadha, put an end to Macedonian authority in India and\nthen seized the throne of his ancestors. He founded the Maurya dynasty\nunder which Magadha expanded into an Empire comprising all India except\nthe extreme south. Seleucus Nicator, who had inherited the Asiatic\npossessions of Alexander and wished to assert his authority, came into\ncollision with Candragupta but was completely worsted and about 303 B.C.\nconcluded a treaty by which he ceded the districts of Kabul, Herat and\nKandahar. Shortly afterwards he sent as his ambassador to the court of\nPataliputra a Greek named Megasthenes who resided there for a\nconsiderable time and wrote an account of the country still extant in a\nfragmentary form. The grandson of Candragupta was Asoka, the first ruler\nof all India (c. 273-231 B.C.). His Empire extended from Afghanistan\nalmost to Madras and was governed with benevolent but somewhat\ngrandmotherly despotism. He was an ardent Buddhist and it is mainly\nowing to his efforts, which are described in more detail below, that\nBuddhism became during some centuries the dominant faith in India.\nAsoka's Empire broke up soon after his death in circumstances which are\nnot clear, for we now enter upon one of those chaotic periods which\nrecur from time to time in Indian history and we have little certain\ninformation until the fourth century A.D. Andhra, a region including\nlarge parts of the districts now called the Northern Circars, Hyderabad\nand Central Provinces, was the first to revolt from the Mauryas and a\ndynasty of Andhra kings[115], who claimed to belong to the S\u00e2tav\u00e2hana\nfamily, ruled until 236 A.D. over varying but often extensive\nterritories. What remained of the Maurya throne was usurped in 184 B.C.\nby the Sungas who in their turn were overthrown by the Kanvas. These\nlatter could not withstand the Andhras and collapsed before them about\n27 B.C.\n\nAlexander's invasion produced little direct effect, and no allusion to\nit has been found in Indian literature. But indirectly it had a great\ninfluence on the political, artistic and religious development of the\nHindus by preparing the way for a series of later invasions from the\nnorth which brought with them a mixed culture containing Hellenic,\nPersian and other elements. During some centuries India, as a political\nregion, was not delimitated on the north-western side as it is at\npresent and numerous principalities rose and fell which included Indian\nterritory as well as parts of Afghanistan.\n\nThese states were of at least three classes, Hellenistic, Persian or\nParthian, and Scythian, if that word can be properly used to include the\nSakas and Kushans.\n\nBactria was a Persian satrapy before Alexander's invasion but when he\npassed through it on his way to India he founded twelve cities and\nsettled a considerable number of his soldiers in them. It formed part of\nthe Empire of Seleucus but declared itself independent in 250 B.C. about\nthe same time that the Parthians revolted and founded the Empire of the\nArsacidae. The Bactrian kings bore Greek names and in 209 Antiochus III\nmade peace with one of them called Euthydemus, in common cause against\nthe nomads who threatened Western Asia. Demetrius, the son of this\nEuthydemus, appears to have conquered Kabul, the Panjab and Sind (c. 190\nB.C.) but his reign was troubled by the rebellion of a certain\nEukratides and it is probable that many small and contending\nfrontier-states, of which we have a confused record, were ruled by the\nrelatives of one or other of these two princes. The most important of\nthem was Menander, apparently king of the Kabul valley. About 155 he\nmade an incursion to the east, occupied Muttra and threatened\nPataliputra itself but was repulsed. He is celebrated in Buddhist\nliterature as the hero of the Questions of Milinda but his coins, though\nshowing some Buddhist emblems, indicate that he was also a worshipper of\nPallas. Shortly after this Hellenic influence in Bactria was overwhelmed\nby the invasion of the Y\u00fceh-chih, though the Greek principalities in the\nPanjab may have lasted considerably longer.\n\nIn the reign of Mithridates (c. 171-138 B.C.) the Parthian Empire was\nlimitrophe with India and possibly his authority extended beyond the\nIndus. A little later the Parthian dependencies included two satrapies,\nAracosia and the western Panjab with capitals at Kandahar and Taxila\nrespectively. In the latter ruled kings or viceroys one of whom called\nGondophores (c. 20 A.D.) is celebrated on account of his legendary\nconnection with the Apostle Thomas.\n\nMore important for the history of India were the conquests of the Sakas\nand Y\u00fceh-chih, nomad tribes of Central Asia similar to the modern\nTurkomans[116]. The former are first heard of in the basin of the river\nIli, and being dislodged by the advance of the Y\u00fceh-chih moved\nsouthwards reaching northwestern India about 150 B.C. Here they founded\nmany small principalities, the rulers of which appear to have admitted\nthe suzerainty of the Parthians for some time and to have borne the\ntitle of satraps. It is clear that western India was parcelled out among\nforeign princes called Sakas, Yavanas, or Pallavas whose frontiers and\nmutual relations were constantly changing. The most important of these\nprincipalities was known as the Great Satrapy which included Surashtra\n(Kathiawar) with adjacent parts of the mainland and lasted until about\n395 A.D.\n\nThe Y\u00fceh-chih started westwards from the frontiers of China about 100\nB.C. and, driving the Sakas before them, settled in Bactria. Here\nKadphises, the chief of one of their tribes, called the Kushans,\nsucceeded in imposing his authority on the others who coalesced into one\nnation henceforth known by the tribal name. The chronology of the Kushan\nEmpire is one of the vexed questions of Indian history and the dates\ngiven below are stated positively only because there is no space for\nadequate discussion and are given with some scepticism, that is desire\nfor more knowledge founded on facts. Kadphises I (c. 15-45 A.D.) after\nconsolidating his Empire led his armies southwards, conquering Kabul and\nperhaps Kashmir. His successor Kadphises II (c. 45-78 A.D.) annexed the\nwhole of north-western India, including northern Sind, the Panjab and\nperhaps Benares. There was a considerable trade between India and the\nRoman Empire at this period and an embassy was sent to Trajan,\napparently by Kanishka (c. 78-123), the successor of Kadphises. This\nmonarch played a part in the later history of Buddhism comparable with\nthat of Asoka in earlier ages[117]. He waged war with the Parthians and\nChinese, and his Empire which had its capital at Peshawar included\nAfghanistan, Bactria, Kashgar, Yarkand, Khotan[118] and Kashmir. These\ndominions, which perhaps extended as far as Gaya in the east, were\nretained by his successors Huvishka (123-?140 A.D.) and Vasudeva\n(?140-178 A.D.), but after this period the Andhra and Kushan dynasties\nboth collapsed as Indian powers, although Kushan kings continued to rule\nin Kabul. The reasons of their fall are unknown but may be connected\nwith the rise of the Sassanids in Persia. For more than a century the\npolitical history of India is a blank and little can be said except that\nthe kingdom of Surashtra continued to exist under a Saka dynasty.\n\nLight returns with the rise of the Gupta dynasty, which roughly marks\nthe beginning of modern Hinduism and of a reaction against Buddhism.\nThough nothing is known of the fortunes of Pataliputra, the ancient\nimperial city of the Mauryas, during the first three centuries of our\nera, it continued to exist. In 320 a local Raja known as Candragupta I\nincreased his dominions and celebrated his coronation by the institution\nof the Gupta era. His son Samudra Gupta continued his conquests and in\nthe course of an extraordinary campaign, concluded about 340 A.D.,\nappears to have received the submission of almost the whole peninsula.\nHe made no attempt to retain all this territory but his effective\nauthority was exercised in a wide district extending from the Hugli to\nthe rivers Jumna and Chambal in the west and from the Himalayas to the\nNarbudda. His son Candragupta II or Vikram\u00e2ditya added to these\npossessions Malwa, Gujarat and Kathiawar and for more than half a\ncentury the Guptas ruled undisturbed over nearly all northern India\nexcept Rajputana and Sind. Their capital was at first Pataliputra, but\nafterwards Kausambi and Ayodhya became royal residences.\n\nThe fall of the Guptas was brought about by another invasion of\nbarbarians known as H\u00fbnas, Ephthalites[119] or White Huns and apparently\na branch of the Huns who invaded Europe. This branch remained behind in\nAsia and occupied northern Persia. They invaded India first in 455, and\nwere repulsed, but returned about 490 in greater force and overthrew the\nGuptas. Their kings Toram\u00e2na and Mihiragula were masters of northern\nIndia till 540 and had their local capital at Sialkot in the Panjab,\nthough their headquarters were rather in Bamyin and Balkh. The cruelties\nof Mihiragula provoked a coalition of Hindu princes. The Huns were\ndriven to the north and about 565 A.D. their destruction was completed\nby the allied forces of the Persians and Turks. Though they founded no\npermanent states their invasion was important, for many of them together\nwith kindred tribes such as the Gurjaras (Gujars) remained behind when\ntheir political power broke up and, like the Sakas and Kushans before\nthem, contributed to form the population of north-western India,\nespecially the Rajput clans.\n\nThe defeat of the Huns was followed by another period of obscurity, but\nat the beginning of the seventh century Harsha (606-647 A.D.), a prince\nof Thanesar, founded after thirty-five years of warfare a state which\nthough it did not outlast his own life emulated for a time the\ndimensions and prosperity of the Gupta Empire. We gather from the\naccount of the Chinese pilgrim Hs\u00fcan Chuang, who visited his court at\nKanauj, that the kings of Bengal, Assam and Ujjain were his vassals but\nthat the Panjab, Sind and Kashmir were independent. Kalinga, to the\nsouth of Bengal, was depopulated but Harsha was not able to subdue\nPulakesin II, the C\u00e2lukya king of the Deccan.\n\nLet us now turn for a moment to the history of the south. It is even\nmore obscure both in events and chronology than that of the north, but\nwe must not think of the Dravidian countries as uninhabited or\nbarbarous. Even the classical writers of Europe had some knowledge of\nthem. King Pandion (P\u00e2ndya) sent a mission to Augustus in 20 B.C.[120]\nPliny[121] speaks of Modura (Madura) and Ptolemy also mentions this town\nwith about forty others. It is said[122] that there was a temple\ndedicated to Augustus at Muziris, identified with Cranganore. From an\nearly period the extreme south of the peninsula was divided into three\nstates known as the P\u00e2ndya, Cera and Cola kingdoms[123]. The first\ncorresponded to the districts of Madura and Tinnevelly. Cera or Kerala\nlay on the west coast in the modern Travancore. The Cola country\nincluded Tanjore, Trichinopoly, Madras, with the greater part of Mysore.\nFrom the sixth to the eighth century A.D. a fourth power was important,\nnamely the Pallavas, who apparently came from the north of the Madras\nPresidency. They had their capital at Conjeevaram and were generally at\nwar with the three kingdoms. Their king, Narasimha-Varman (625-645 A.D.)\nruled over part of the Deccan and most of the Cola country but after\nabout 750 they declined, whereas the Colas grew stronger and Rajaraja\n(985-1018) whose dominions included the Madras Presidency and Mysore\nmade them the paramount power in southern India, which position they\nretained until the thirteenth century.\n\nAs already mentioned, the Deccan was ruled by the Andhras from 220 B.C.\nto 236 A.D., but for the next three centuries nothing is known of its\nhistory until the rise of the C\u00e2lukya dynasty at Vatapi (Badami) in\nBijapur. Pulakesin II of this dynasty (608-642), a contemporary of\nHarsha, was for some time successful in creating a rival Empire which\nextended from Gujarat to Madras, and his power was so considerable that\nhe exchanged embassies with Khusru II, King of Persia, as is depicted in\nthe frescoes of Ajanta. But in 642 he was defeated and slain by the\nPallavas.\n\nWith the death of Pulakesin and Harsha begins what has been called the\nRajput period, extending from about 650 to 1000 A.D. and characterized\nby the existence of numerous kingdoms ruled by dynasties nominally\nHindu, but often descended from northern invaders or non-Hindu\naboriginal tribes. Among them may be mentioned the following:\n\n1. Kanauj or Panc\u00e2la. This kingdom passed through troublous times after\nthe death of Harsha but from about 840 to 910 A.D. under Bhoja (or\nMihira) and his son, it became the principal power in northern India,\nextending from Bihar to Sind. In the twelfth century it again became\nimportant under the Gaharwar dynasty.\n\n2. Kanauj was often at war with the Palas of Bengal, a line of Buddhist\nkings which began about 730 A.D. Dharmapala (c. 800 A.D.) was\nsufficiently powerful to depose the king of Kanauj. Subsequently the\neastern portion of the Pala kingdom separated itself under a rival\ndynasty known as the Senas.\n\n3. The districts to the south of the Jumna known as Jej\u00e2kabhukti\n(Bundelkhand) and Cedi (nearly equivalent to our Central Provinces) were\ngoverned by two dynasties known as Candels and Kalacuris. The former are\nthought to have been originally Gonds. They were great builders and\nconstructed among other monuments the temples of Khajarao. K\u00eertivarman\nChandel (1049-1100) greatly extended their territories. He was a patron\nof learning and the allegorical drama Prabodhacandrodaya was produced at\nhis court.\n\n4. The Paramara (Pawar) dynasty of Malwa were likewise celebrated as\npatrons of literature and kings Munja (974-995) and Bhoja (1018-1060)\nwere authors as well as successful warriors.\n\n5. Though the C\u00e2lukyas of Vatapi were temporarily crushed by the\nPallavas their power was re-established in 655 and continued for a\ncentury. The Eastern C\u00e2lukyas, another branch of the same family,\nestablished themselves in Vengi between the Kistna and Godaveri. Here\nthey ruled from 609 to 1070 first as viceroys of the Western C\u00e2lukyas\nand then as an independent power till they were absorbed by the Colas.\nYet another branch settled in Gujarat.\n\n6. The C\u00e2lukyas of Vatapi were overthrown by the R\u00e2shtrak\u00fbtas who were\nmasters of the Deccan from about 750 to 972, and reigned first at Nasik\nand then at Manyakheta (Malkhed). Krishna I of this dynasty excavated\nthe Kailasa temple at Ellora (c. 760) but many of his successors were\nJains. During the ninth century the R\u00e2shtrak\u00fbtas seem to have ruled over\nmost of western India from Malwa to the Tungabhadra.\n\n7. The R\u00e2shtrak\u00fbtas collapsed before a revival of the C\u00e2lukya dynasty\nwhich reappears from 993 to 1190 as the C\u00e2lukyas of Kalyani (in the\nNizam's dominions). The end of this dynasty was partly due to the\nusurpation of a Jain named Bijjala in whose reign the sect of the\nLing\u00e2yats arose.\n\nWe must now turn to an event of great historical importance although its\ndetails are not relevant to the subject of this book, namely the\nMohammedan conquest. Three periods in it may be recognized. First, the\nconquest of Sind in 712 A.D. by the Arabs, who held it till the eleventh\ncentury but without disturbing or influencing India beyond their\nimmediate neighbourhood. Secondly, the period of invasions and dynasties\nwhich are commonly called Turki (c. 1000-1526 A.D.). The progress of\nIslam in Central Asia coincided with the advance to the west and south\nof vigorous tribes known as Turks or Mongols, and by giving them a\nreligious and legal discipline admirably suited to their stage of\ncivilization, it greatly increased their political efficiency. The\nMoslim invaders of India started from principalities founded by these\ntribes near the north-western frontier with a military population of\nmixed blood and a veneer of Perso-Arabic civilization, and apart from\nthe greater invasions, there were incursions and settlements of Turkis,\nAfghans and Mongols. The whole period was troublous and distracted. The\nthird period was more significant and relatively stable. Baber, a\nTurkish prince of Fergana, captured Delhi in 1526 and founded the power\nof the Mughals, which during the seventeenth century deserved the name\nof the Indian Empire.\n\nThe first serious Moslim incursions were those of Mahmud of Ghazni, who\nbetween 997 and 1030 made many raids in which he sacked Kanauj, Muttra,\nSomnath and many other places but without acquiring them as permanent\npossessions. Only the Panjab became a Moslim province. In 1150 the\nrulers of Ghor, a vassal principality near Herat, revolted against\nGhazni and occupied its territory, whence the chieftain commonly called\nMuhammad of Ghor descended on India and subdued Hindustan as well as the\nPanjab (1175-1206). One of his slaves named Kutb-ud-Din Ibak became his\ngeneral and viceroy and, when Muhammad died, founded at Delhi the\ndynasty known as Slave Sultans. They were succeeded by the Khilji\nSultans (1290-1318) the most celebrated of whom was the capable but\nferocious Ala-ud-Din and these again by the Tughlak dynasty. Muhammad\nAdil, the second of this line, attempted to move the capital from Delhi\nto Daulatabad in the Deccan. In 1398 northern India was convulsed by the\ninvasion of Timur who only remained a few months but sacked Delhi with\nterrible carnage. Many years of confusion followed, and a dynasty known\nas the Saiyids ruled in greatly diminished territories. But in 1451\narose the Lodi or Afghan dynasty which held the Panjab, Hindustan and\nBundelkhand until the advent of the Mughals. These five royal houses do\nnot represent successive invasions from the west. Their founders, though\nof diverse origin, were all leaders engaged in the troubled politics of\nnorthern India, and they all reigned at Delhi, round which a tradition\nof Empire thus grew up. But the succession was disputed in almost every\ncase; out of thirty-four kings twelve came to a violent end and not one\ndeserved to be called Emperor of India. They were confronted by a double\narray of rivals, firstly Hindu states which were at no period all\nreduced to subjection, and, secondly, independent Mohammedan states, for\nthe governors in the more distant provinces threw off their allegiance\nand proclaimed themselves sovereigns. Thus Bengal from the time of its\nfirst conquest by Muhammad Bakhtyar had only a nominal connection with\nDelhi and declared itself independent in 1338. When Timur upset the\nTughlak dynasty, the states of Jaunpur, Gujarat, Malwa and Khandesh\nbecame separate kingdoms and remained so until the time of Akbar. In the\nsouth one of Muhammad Adil's generals founded the Bahmani dynasty which\nfor about a century (1374-1482) ruled the Deccan from sea to sea. It\nthen split up into five sultanates with capitals at Bidar, Bijapur,\nGolkonda, Ahmadnagar and Elichpur.\n\nIn the twelfth century, the Hindu states were not quite the same as\nthose noticed for the previous period. Kanauj and Gujarat were the most\nimportant. The Palas and Senas ruled in Bengal, the Tomaras at Delhi,\nthe Chohans in Ajmer and subsequently in Delhi too. The Mohammedans\nconquered all these states at the end of the twelfth century. Their\nadvance was naturally less rapid towards the south. In the Deccan the\nold Hindu dynasties had been replaced by the Hoysalas (c. 1117-1310\nA.D.) and the Yadavas (1180-1309 A.D.) with capitals at Halebid and\nDaulatabad respectively. Both were destroyed by Malik Kafur, the slave\ngeneral of Sultan Ala-ud-Din, but the spirit of the Deccan was not\nbroken and within a few years the brothers Bukka and Harihara founded\nthe state of Vijayanagar, \"the never-to-be-forgotten Empire\" as a native\nscholar has aptly termed it, which for more than two centuries was the\ncentre of Hindu political power. The imposing ruins of its capital may\nstill be seen at Hampi on the Tungabhadra and its possessions comprised\neverything to the south of this, and, at times, also territory to the\nnorth, for throughout its existence it was engaged in warfare with the\nBahmani dynasty or the five sultanates. Among its rulers the most\nnotable was Krishnadeva (1509-1529) but the arrogance and weakness of\nhis successors provoked the five Moslim Sultans to form a coalition.\nThey collected an immense army, defeated the troops of Vijayanagar at\nthe battle of Talikota and sacked the city (1565).\n\nIn two other districts the Hindus were able to retain political\nindependence until the time of Akbar, namely Orissa and Rajputana. In\nthe former the best known name is Anantavarman Colaganga (1076-1147) who\nbuilt the temple of Jagannath at Puri, established the Eastern Ganga\ndynasty and ruled from the Godaveri to the Ganges. The Mohammedans never\noccupied Rajputana, and though they captured the principal fortresses,\nthey did not retain them. The State of Mewar can even boast that it\nnever made any but a nominal and honourable submission to the Sultans of\nDelhi. Akbar incorporated the Rajputs in his Empire and by his\nconsiderate treatment secured their support.\n\nThe history of the Mughals may be divided into three periods. In the\nfirst Baber acquired (1526 A.D.) the dominions of the Lodi dynasty as\nwell as Jaunpur, but his death was followed by a troubled interval and\nit was not till the second period (1556-1707) comprising the reigns of\nAkbar, Jehangir, Shah Jehan and Aurungzeb that the Empire was securely\nestablished. Akbar made himself master of practically all India north of\nthe Godaveri and his liberal policy did much to conciliate his Hindu\nsubjects. He abolished the poll tax levied from non-Moslims and the tax\non pilgrimages. The reform of revenue administration was entrusted to an\northodox Hindu, Todar Mall. Among the Emperor's personal friends were\nBrahmans and Rajputs, and the principal Hindu states (except Mewar) sent\ndaughters to his harem. In religion he was eclectic and loved to hear\ntheological argument. Towards the end of his life he adopted many Hindu\nusages and founded a new religion which held as one of its principal\ntenets that Akbar was God's Viceregent. His successors, Jehangir and\nShah Jehan, were also tolerant of Hinduism, but Aurungzeb was a\nfanatical Moslim and though he extended his rule over all India except\nthe extreme south, he alienated the affection of his Hindu subjects by\nreimposing the poll tax and destroying many temples. The Rajputs, Sikhs\nand Marathas all rebelled and after his death the Empire entered into\nthe third period in which it rapidly disintegrated. Hindu states, like\nthe Maratha confederacy and Rajputana, asserted themselves. Mohammedan\ngovernors declared their independence in Oudh, Bengal, the Nizam's\ndominions and elsewhere: Persians and Afghans raided the Panjab: French\nand English contended for the possession of southern India.\n\nIt would be outside the purpose of this book even to outline the\nestablishment of British authority, but I may mention that direct\nEuropean influence began to be felt in the sixteenth century, for Vasco\nda Gama arrived in Calicut in 1498 and Goa was a Portuguese possession\nfrom 1510 onwards. Nor can we linger over the fortunes of the Marathas\nwho took the place of Vijayanagar as the Hindu opposition to\nMohammedanism. They are, however, important for us in so far as they\nshow that even in matters political the long Moslim domination had not\nbroken the spirit of the Hindus. About 1660 a chieftain named Sivaji,\nwho was not merely a successful soldier but something of a fanatic with\na belief in his divine mission, founded a kingdom in the western Ghats\nand, like the Sikh leaders, almost created a nation, for it does not\nappear that before his time the word Maratha (Mah\u00e2r\u00e2shtra) had any\nspecial ethnic significance. After half a century the power of his\nsuccessors passed into the hands of their Brahman ministers, known as\nPeshwas, who became the heads of a confederacy of Maratha chiefs,\nincluding the Rajas of Gwalior, Berar and Orissa, Indore and Baroda.\nAbout 1760 the Marathas were practically masters of India and though the\nMughal Emperor nominally ruled at Delhi, he was under their tutelage.\nThey had a chance of reviving the glories of Asoka and the Guptas, but,\neven apart from the intervention of Europeans, they were distracted by\njealousy and quarrels.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nGENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF INDIAN RELIGION\n\n1\n\n\nIn the first chapter we enquired whether there are any religious ideas\ncommon to Eastern Asia as a whole and found that they amount to little\nmore than a background of nature worship and ancestor worship almost\nuniversally present behind the official creeds. Also the conception of a\nreligious system and its relation to beliefs which do not fall within it\nare not quite the same in these countries as in Europe, so that the\ninhabitants sometimes follow more than one religion.\n\nLet us now examine the characteristics common to Indian creeds. They are\nnumerous and striking. A prolonged study of the multitudinous sects in\nwhich Indian religion manifests itself makes the enquirer feel the truth\nof its own thesis that plurality is an illusion and only the one\nsubstratum real. Still there are divergent lines of thought, the most\nimportant of which are Hinduism and Buddhism. Though decadent Buddhism\ndiffered little from the sects which surrounded it, early Buddhism did\noffer a decided contrast to the Brahmanic schools in its theories as to\nhuman nature as well as in ignoring tradition and sacerdotalism. We may\nargue that Buddhism is merely Vaishnavism or Saivism in travelling\ndress, but its rejection of Brahmanic authority is of capital\nimportance. It is one of the reasons for its success outside India and\nits disappearance in India meant that it could not maintain this\nattitude. Yet many features of Buddhism are due to the fact that\nHinduism, and not Islam or Christianity, was the national expression of\nreligion in India and also many features of Hinduism may be explained by\nthe existence of this once vigorous antagonist.\n\nHinduism[124] has striking peculiarities which distinguish it from\nChristianity, Islam and even from Buddhism. It recognizes no one master\nand all unifying principles known to other creeds seem here to be\nabsent. Yet its unity and vitality are clear and depend chiefly on its\nassociation with the Brahman caste. We cannot here consider the complex\ndetails of the modern caste system but this seems the place to examine\nthe position of the Brahmans, for, from the dawn of Sanskrit literature\nuntil now, they have claimed to be the guides of India in all matters\nintellectual and religious and this persistent claim, though often\ndisputed, has had a great measure of success.\n\nThe institution of caste is social rather than religious and has grown\ngradually: we know for instance that in the time of the Buddha it had\nnot attained to anything like its present complexity and rigidity. Its\norigin is explicable if we imagine that the Indo-Aryans were an invading\npeople with an unusual interest in religion. The Kshatriyas and Vaisyas\nmark the distinction between the warriors or nobles and the plebs which\nis found in other Aryan communities, and the natives whom the Aryans\nconquered formed a separate class, recognized as inferior to all the\nconquerors. This might have happened in any country. The special feature\nof India is the numerical, social and intellectual strength of the\npriestly caste. It is true that in reading Sanskrit literature we must\nremember that most of it is the work of Brahmans and discount their\nproclivity to glorify the priesthood, but still it is clear that in\nIndia the sacerdotal families acquired a position without parallel\nelsewhere and influenced its whole social and political history. In most\ncountries powerful priesthoods are closely connected with the Government\nunder which they flourish and support the secular authority. As a result\nof this alliance, kings and the upper classes generally profess and\nprotect orthodoxy, and revolutionary movements in religion generally\ncome from below. But in ancient India though the priests were glad\nenough to side with the kings, the nobles during many centuries were not\nready to give up thinking for themselves. The Hindu's capacity for\nveneration and the small inclination of the Brahmans to exercise direct\ngovernment prevented revolts against sacerdotal tyranny from assuming\nthe proportions we should expect, but whereas in many countries history\nrecords the attempts of priests to become kings, the position is here\nreversed. The national proclivity towards all that is religious,\nmetaphysical, intellectual and speculative made all agree in regarding\nthe man of knowledge who has the secret of intercourse with the other\nworld as the highest type. The priests tended to become a hereditary\nguild possessed of a secret professional knowledge. The warrior caste\ndisputed this monopoly and sought with less learning but not inferior\nvigour to obtain the same powers. They had some success during a\nconsiderable period, for Buddhism, Jainism and other sects all had their\norigin in the military aristocracy and had it remained purely Hindu, it\nwould perhaps have continued the contest. But it was partly destroyed by\nTuranian invaders and partly amalgamated with them, so that in 500 A.D.\nwhereas the Brahmans were in race and temperament very much what they\nwere in 500 B.C. the Kshatriyas were different. It is interesting to see\nhow this continuity of race brought triumph to the Brahmans in the\ntheological sphere. At one time the Buddhists and even the Jains seemed\nto be competitors for the first place, but there are now hardly any\nIndian Buddhists in India[125] and less than a million and a half of\nJains, whereas Hinduism has more than 217 million adherents. The power\nof persistence and resistance displayed by the priestly caste is largely\ndue to the fact that they were householders not collected in temples or\nmonasteries but distributed over the country in villages, intensely\noccupied with the things of the mind and soul, but living a simple\nfamily life. The long succession of invasions which swept over northern\nIndia destroyed temples, broke up monasteries and annihilated dynasties,\nbut their destructive force had less effect on these communities of\ntheologians whose influence depended not on institutions or organization\nbut on their hereditary aptitudes. Though the modern Brahmans are not\npure in race, still the continuity of blood and tradition is greater\namong them than in the royal families of India. Many of these belong to\ndistricts which were formerly without the pale of Hinduism: many more\nare the descendants of the northern hordes who century after century\ninvaded India: few can bring forward any good evidence of Kshatriya\ndescent. Hence in India kings have never attained a national and\nrepresentative position like the Emperors of China and Japan or even the\nSultans of Turkey. They were never considered as the high priests of the\nland or a quasi-divine epitome of the national qualities: the people\ntended to regard them as powerful and almost superhuman beings, but\nsomewhat divorced from the moral standard and ideals of their subjects.\nIn early times there was indeed the idea of a universal Emperor, the\nCakravartin, analogous to the Messiah but, by a characteristic turn of\nthought, he was thought of less as a deliverer than as a type of\nsuperman, recurring at intervals. But monarchs who even approximated to\nthis type were rare, and some of the greatest of them were in early ages\nBuddhists and in later Mohammedans, so that they had not the support of\nthe priesthood and as time went on it became less and less possible to\nimagine all India rendering sympathetic homage to one sovereign.\n\nIn the midst of a perturbed flux of dynasties, usually short lived,\noften alien, only occasionally commanding the affection and respect of\nthe population, the Brahmans have maintained for at least two\nmillenniums and a half their predominant position as an intellectual\naristocracy. They are an aristocracy, for they boldly profess to be by\nbirth better than other men. Although it is probable that many clans\nhave entered the privileged order without genealogical warrant, yet in\nall cases birth is claimed[126]. And though the Brahmans have\naristocratic faults, such as unreasonable pride of birth, still\nthroughout their long history they have produced in every age men of\nintelligence, learning and true piety, in numbers sufficient to make\ntheir claims to superiority seem reasonable. In all ages they have been\nsensual, ambitious and avaricious, but in all ages penetrated by the\nconviction that desire is a plague and gratification unsatisfying. It is\nthe intelligent sensualist and politician who are bound to learn that\npassion and office are vanity.\n\nA Brahman is not necessarily a priest. Although they have continually\nand on the whole successfully claimed a monopoly of sacred science, yet\nat the present day many follow secular callings and probably this was so\nin early periods. And though many rites can be performed by Brahmans\nonly, yet by a distinction which it is difficult for Europeans to grasp,\nthe priests of temples are not necessarily and, in many places, not\nusually Brahmans. The reason perhaps is that the easy and superstitious\nworship offered in temples is considered trivial and almost degrading in\ncomparison with the elaborate ceremonial and subtle speculation which\nought to occupy a Brahman's life.\n\nIn Europe we are accustomed to associate the ideas of sacerdotalism,\nhierarchy and dogma, mainly because they are united in the greatest\nreligious organization familiar to us, the Roman Catholic Church. But\nthe combination is not necessary. Hinduism is intensely sacerdotal but\nneither hierarchical nor dogmatic: Mohammedanism is dogmatic but neither\nsacerdotal nor hierarchical: Buddhism is dogmatic and also somewhat\nhierarchical, since it has to deal with bodies of men collected in\nmonasteries where discipline is necessary, but except in its most\ncorrupt forms it is not sacerdotal. The absence of the hierarchical idea\nin Hinduism is striking. Not only is there no Pope, but there is hardly\nany office comparable with a Bishopric[127]. The relationships\nrecognized in the priesthood are those springing from birth and the\nequally sacred ties uniting teacher and pupil. Hence there is little to\nremind us of the organization of Christian Churches. We have simply\nteachers expounding their sacred books to their scholars, with such\ncombination of tradition and originality as their idiosyncrasies may\nsuggest, somewhat after the theory of congregational churches. But that\nresemblance is almost destroyed by the fact that both teachers and\npupils belong to clans, connected by descent and accepted by the people\nas a superior order of mankind. Even in the most modern sects the\ndescendants of the founder often receive special reverence.\n\nThough the Brahmans have no ecclesiastical discipline, they do not\ntolerate the interference of kings. Buddhist sovereigns have summoned\ncouncils, but not so Hindu monarchs. They have built temples, paid\npriests to perform sacrifices and often been jealous of them but for the\nlast two thousand years they have not attempted to control them within\ntheir own sphere or to create a State Church. And the Brahmans on their\nside have kept within their own province. It is true that they have\nsucceeded in imposing--or in identifying themselves with--a most exacting\ncode of social, legal and religious prescriptions, but they have rarely\naimed at temporal power or attempted to be more than viziers. They have\nof course supported pious kings and received support--especially\ndonations--from them, and they have enjoyed political influence as\ndomestic chaplains to royal families, but they have not consented to any\nsuch relations between religion and the state as exist (or existed) in\nEngland, Russia, Mohammedan countries or China. At the ancient\ncoronation ceremony the priest who presented the new ruler to his\nsubjects said, \"This is your King, O people: The King of us Brahmans is\nSoma[128].\"\n\n\n2\n\nThese facts go far to explain some peculiar features of Hinduism.\nCompared with Islam or Christianity its doctrines are extraordinarily\nfluid, multiform and even inconsistent: its practice, though rarely lax,\nis also very various in different castes and districts. The strangeness\nof the phenomenon is diminished if one considers that the uniformity and\nrigidity of western creeds are due to their political more than to their\nreligious character. Like the wind, the spirit bloweth where it listeth:\nit is governed by no laws but those which its own reverence imposes: it\nlives in changing speculation. But in Europe it has been in double\nbondage to the logic of Greece and the law of Rome. India deals in\nimages and metaphor: Greece in dialectic. The original thought of\nChristianity had something of this Indian quality, though more sober and\nless fantastic, with more limitation and less imagination. On this\nsubstratum the Greeks reared their edifices of dialectic and when the\nquarrels of theologians began to disturb politics, the state treated the\nwhole question from a legal point of view. It was assumed that there\nmust be a right doctrine which the state should protect or even enforce,\nand a wrong doctrine which it should discourage or even forbid. Hence\ncouncils, creeds and persecutions. The whole position is logical and\nlegal. The truth has been defined: those who do not accept it harm not\nonly themselves but others: therefore they should be restrained and\npunished.\n\nBut in religious matters Hindus have not proceeded in this way as a\nrule. They have adopted the attitude not of a judge who decides, but of\nthe humane observer who sees that neither side is completely right or\ncompletely wrong and avoids expressing his opinion in a legal form.\nHindu teachers have never hesitated to proclaim their views as the whole\nand perfect truth. In that indeed they do not yield to Christian\ntheologians but their pronouncements are professorial rather than\njudicial and so diverse and yet all so influential that the state,\nthough bound to protect sound doctrine, dare not champion one more than\nthe other. Religious persecution is rare. It is not absent but the\nstudent has to search for instances, whereas in Christian Europe they\nare among the most conspicuous facts of history.\n\nRestless, subtle and argumentative as Hindu thought is, it is less prone\nthan European theology to the vice of distorting transcendental ideas by\ntoo stringent definition. It adumbrates the indescribable by metaphors\nand figures. It is not afraid of inconsistencies which may illustrate\ndifferent aspects of the infinite, but it rarely tries to cramp the\ndivine within the limits of a logical phrase. Attempts to explain how\nthe divine and human nature were combined in Christ convulsed the\nByzantine Empire and have fettered succeeding generations with their\nstiff formulae. It would be rash to say that the ocean of Hindu\ntheological literature contains no speculations about the incarnations\nof Vishnu similar to the views of the Nestorians, Monophysites and\nCatholics, but if such exist they have never attracted much interest or\nbeen embodied in well-known phrases[129]. The process by which a god can\nbe born as a man, while continuing to exist as a god, is not described\nin quasi-legal language. Similarly the Soma offered in sacrifices is a\ngod as well as a drink. But though the ritual of this sacrifice has\nproduced an infinity of discussion and exegesis, no doctrine like\ntransubstantiation or consubstantiation has assumed any prominence.\n\nThe Hindu has an extraordinary power of combining dogma and free\nthought, uniformity and variety. For instance it is held that the Vedas\nare a self-existent, eternal revelation made manifest to ancient sages\nand that their correct recitation ensures superhuman results. Yet each\nVeda exists in several recensions handed down by oral tradition in\nseparate schools, and though the exact text and pronunciation are\nmatters of the utmost importance, diversities of opinion respecting them\nare tolerated and honoured. Further, though the early scriptures were\npreserved with scrupulous care the canon was never closed. It is\nimpossible to say how many Upanishads there are, nor does a Hindu think\nthe less of an Upanishad because it is not found in a certain list. And\nin mediaeval and modern times these ancient sacred books have been\nreplaced for all except Brahmans by more recent Sanskrit works, or by a\nvernacular literature which, though having no particular imprimatur,\nclaims the same authority as the Vedas[130].\n\nThe only essential tenets of Hinduism are recognition of the Brahman\ncaste and divine authority of the Vedas. Those who publicly deny these\ndoctrines as the Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs have done, put themselves\noutside the pale, but the recognition required to ensure orthodoxy or at\nleast to avoid excommunication must not be compared with that implied by\nsuch phrases as recognizing the authority of the Bible, or the supremacy\nof the Pope. The utmost latitude of interpretation is allowed and the\nsupposed followers of the Veda comprise sects whose beliefs seem to have\nno relation to one another or to the Veda, philosophic atheists and\ndemonolaters whose religious ideas hardly rise above those of African\nsavages.\n\nOne explanation may be, that every nation insists on liberty at the\nexpense of logic in the matters which interest it most. We do this in\npolitics. It might be difficult to make an untravelled oriental\nunderstand how parliamentary institutions can continue for a day, how\nsocialists and republicans can take part in the government of a\nmonarchical country, and why the majority do not muzzle the opposition.\nYet Englishmen prefer to let this curious illogical muddle continue\nrather than tolerate some symmetrical and authoritative system which\nwould check free speech and individuality. It is the same in Indian\nreligion. In all ages the Hindu has been passionately devoted to\nspeculation. He will bear heavy burdens in the way of priestly exaction,\nsocial restrictions, and elaborate ceremonies, but he will not allow\nsecular or even ecclesiastical authority to cramp and school his\nreligious fancy, nor will he be deterred from sampling an attractive\nform of speculation merely because it is pronounced unorthodox by the\npriesthood, and the priesthood, being themselves Hindus, are discreet in\nthe use of anathemas. They insist not so much on particular doctrines\nand rites as on the principle that whatever the doctrine, whatever the\nrite, they must be the teachers and officiants. In critical and\nrevolutionary times the Brahmans have often assured their pre-eminence\nby the judicious recognition of heresies. In all ages there has been a\nconservative clique which restricted religion to ceremonial observances.\nAgain and again some intellectual or emotional outburst has swept away\nsuch narrow limits and proclaimed doctrines which seemed subversive of\nthe orthodoxy of the day. But they have simply become the orthodoxy of\nthe morrow, under the protection of the same Brahman caste. The\nassailants are turned into champions, and in time the bold reformers\nstiffen into antiquated saints.\n\nHinduism has not been made but has grown. It is a jungle not a building.\nIt is a living example of a great national paganism such as might have\nexisted in Europe if Christianity had not become the state religion of\nthe Roman Empire, if there had remained an incongruous jumble of old\nlocal superstitions, Greek philosophy and oriental cults such as the\nworship of Mithra or Serapis. Yet the parallel is not exact, for in Rome\nmany of the discordant religious elements remained exotic, whereas in\nIndia they all, whatever their origin, became Indian and smack of the\nsoil. There was wanting in European paganism the bond of union supplied\nby the Brahmans who by sometimes originating, sometimes tolerating and\nadapting, have managed to set their seal upon all Indian beliefs.\n\n\n3\n\nThus the dominance of the Brahmans and their readiness to countenance\nevery cult and doctrine which can attract worshippers explains the\ndiversity of Indian religion, but are there no general characteristics\nwhich mark all its multiple forms? There are, and they apply to Buddhism\nas well as Hinduism, but in attempting to formulate them it is well to\nsay that Indian religion is as wilful and unexpected in its variations\nas human nature itself and that all generalizations about it are subject\nto exceptions. If we say that it preaches asceticism and the subjection\nof the flesh, we may be confronted with the Vallabh\u00e2c\u00e2ryas who inculcate\nself-indulgence; if we say that it teaches reincarnation and successive\nlives, we may be told that the Ling\u00e2yats[131] do not hold that doctrine.\nAnd though we might logically maintain that these sects are unorthodox,\nyet it does not appear that Hindus excommunicate them. Still, it is just\nto say that the doctrines mentioned are characteristic of Hinduism and\nare repudiated only by eccentric sects.\n\nPerhaps the idea which has had the widest and most penetrating influence\non Indian thought is that conception of the Universe which is known as\nSams\u00e2ra, the world of change and transmigration. The idea of rebirth and\nthe wandering of souls from one body to another exists in a fragmentary\nform among savage tribes in many countries, but in India it makes its\nappearance as a product of ripening metaphysics rather than as a\nsurvival. It plays no part in the Vedic hymns: it first acquires\nimportance in the older Upanishads but more as a mystery to be\ncommunicated to the elect than as a popular belief and to some extent as\nthe special doctrine of the military class rather than of the Brahmans.\nAt the time of the Buddha, however, it had passed beyond this stage and\nwas as integral a part of popular theology as is the immortality of the\nsoul in Europe.\n\nSuch expressions as the transmigration of souls or metempsychosis\nimperfectly represent Indian ideas. They are incorrect as descriptions\nof Buddhist dogmas, which start by denying the existence of a soul, and\nthey are not entirely suitable to those Vedantic schools which regard\ntransmigration as part of the illusory phenomenal world. The thought\nunderlying the doctrine is rather that as a child grows into youth and\nage, so the soul passes from life to life in continuity if not in\nidentity. Whatever the origin of the idea may have been, its root in\npost-Vedic times is a sense of the transitoriness but continuity of\neverything. Nothing is eternal or even permanent: not even the gods, for\nthey must die, not even death, for it must turn into new life.\n\nThis view of life is ingrained in Indian nature. It is not merely a\nscientific or philosophical speculation, but it summarizes the outlook\nof ordinary humanity. In Europe the average religious man thanks or at\nleast remembers his Creator. But in India the Creator has less place in\npopular thought. There is a disinclination to make him responsible for\nthe sufferings of the world, and speculation, though continually\noccupied with the origins of things, rarely adopts the idea familiar to\nChristians and Mohammedans alike, that something was produced out of\nnothing by the divine fiat. Hindu cosmogonies are various and discordant\nin details, but usually start with the evolution or emanation of living\nbeings from the Divinity and often a reproductive act forms part of the\nprocess, such as the hatching of an egg or the division of a Divinity\ninto male and female halves. In many accounts the Deity brings into\nbeing personages who continue the work of world-making and such entities\nas mind, time and desire are produced before the material world. But\neverything in these creation stories is figurative. The faithful are not\nperplexed by the discrepancies in the inspired narratives, and one can\nhardly imagine an Indian sect agitated by the question whether God made\nthe world in six literal days.\n\nAll religious doctrines, especially theories about the soul, are matters\nof temperament. A race with more power of will and more delight in life\nmight have held that the soul is the one agent that can stand firm and\nunshaken midst the flux of circumstance. The intelligent but passive\nHindu sees clearly that whatever illusions the soul may have, it really\npasses on like everything else and continueth not in one stay. He is\ndisposed to think of it not as created with the birth of the body, but\nas a drop drawn from some ocean to which it is destined to return. As a\nrule he considers it to be immortal but he does not emphasize or value\npersonality in our sense. In previous births he has already been a great\nmany persons and he will be a great many more. Whatever may be the\nthread between these existences it is not individuality. And what he\ncraves is not eternal personal activity, but unbroken rest in which\npersonality, even if supposed to continue, can have little meaning.\n\nThe character of the successive appearances or tenements of the soul is\ndetermined by the law of Karma, which even more than metempsychosis is\nthe basis of Indian ideas about the universe. Karma is best known as a\nterm of the Buddhists, who are largely responsible both for the\ndefinition and wide diffusion of the doctrine. But the idea is Brahmanic\nas well as Buddhist and occurs in well-known passages of the Upanishads,\nwhere it is laid down that as a man acts so shall he be in the next\nlife[132]. The word (which means simply _deed_) is the accepted\nabbreviation for the doctrine that all deeds bring upon the doer an\naccurately proportionate consequence either in this existence, or, more\noften, in a future birth. At the end of a man's life his character or\npersonality is practically the sum of his acts, and when extraneous\ncircumstances such as worldly position disappear, the soul is left with\nnothing but these acts and the character they have formed as, in Indian\nlanguage, the fruit of life and it is these acts and this character\nwhich determine its next tenement. That tenement is simply the home\nwhich it is able to occupy in virtue of the configuration and qualities\nwhich it has induced in itself. It cannot complain.\n\nOne aspect of the theory of Sams\u00e2ra which is important for the whole\nhistory of Indian thought is its tendency towards pessimism. This\ntendency is specially definite and dogmatic in Buddhism, but it is a\nmarked characteristic of the Indian temperament and appears in almost\nevery form of devotion and speculation. What salvation or the desire to\nbe saved is to the ordinary Protestant, Mukti or Moksha, deliverance, is\nto the ordinary Hindu. In Buddhism this desire is given a dogmatic basis\nfor it is declared that all existence in all possible worlds necessarily\ninvolves dukkha or suffering[133] and this view seems to have met with\npopular as well as philosophic assent. But the desire for release and\ndeliverance is based less on a contemplation of the woes of life than on\na profound sense of its impermanence and instability[134]. Life is not\nthe preface to eternity, as religious Europeans think: the Hindu justly\nrejects the notion that the conduct of the soul during a few score years\ncan fix its everlasting destiny. Every action is important for it helps\nto determine the character of the next life, but this next life, even if\nit should be passed in some temporary heaven, will not be essentially\ndifferent from the present. Before and behind there stretches a vista of\nlives, past, present and to come, impermanent and unsatisfying, so that\nfuture existences are spoken of not as immortality but as repeated\ndeath.\n\n\n4\n\nThis sense of weary reiteration is increased by two other doctrines,\nwhich are prevalent in Hinduism, though not universal or uncontested.\nThe first of them identifies the human soul with the supreme and only\nBeing. The doctrine of Sams\u00e2ra holds that different forms of existence\nmay be phases of the same soul and thus prepares the way for the\ndoctrine that all forms of existence are the same and all souls parts\nof, or even identical with the \u00c2tman or Self, the divine soul which not\nonly pervades the world but _is_ the world. Connected with this doctrine\nis another, namely, that the whole world of phenomena is M\u00e2y\u00e2 or\nillusion. Nothing really exists except the supreme \u00c2tman: all perception\nof plurality and difference is illusion and error: the reality is unity,\nidentity and rest. The development of these ideas leads to some of the\nprincipal systems of philosophy and will claim our attention later. At\npresent I merely give their outlines as indicative of Hindu thought and\ntemperament. The Indian thinks of this world as a circular and unending\njourney, an ocean without shore, a shadow play without even a plot. He\nfeels more strongly than the European that change is in itself an evil\nand he finds small satisfaction in action for its own sake. All his\nhigher aspirations bid him extricate himself from this labyrinth of\nrepeated births, this phantasmagoria of fleeting, unsubstantial visions\nand he has generally the conviction that this can be done by knowledge,\nfor since the whole Sams\u00e2ra is illusion, it collapses and ceases so soon\nas the soul knows its own real nature and its independence of phenomena.\nThis conviction that the soul in itself is capable of happiness and in\norder to enjoy needs only the courage to know itself and be itself goes\nfar to correct the apathy which is the great danger of Indian thought.\nIt is also just to point out that from the Upanishads down to the\nwritings of Rabindranath Tagore in the present day Indian literature\nfrom time to time enunciates the idea that the whole universe is the\nmanifestation of some exuberant force giving expression to itself in\njoyous movement. Thus the Taittir\u00eeya Upanishad (III. 6) says: \"Bliss is\nBrahman, for from bliss all these beings are born, by bliss when born\nthey live, into bliss they enter at their death.\"\n\nIt is remarkable that Indian thought, restless and speculative as it is,\nhardly ever concerns itself with the design, object or end of the world.\nThe notion of [Greek: Telos] plays little part in its cosmogony or\nethics[135]. The Universe is often regarded as a sport, a passing whim\nof the divine Being, almost a mistake. Those legends which describe it\nas the outcome of a creative act, generally represent the creator as\nmoved by some impulse to multiply himself rather than as executing some\ndeliberate if mysterious plan. Legends about the end of the world and\nthe establishment of a better order are rare. Hindu chronology revels in\nperiods, whose enormous length though expressed in figures leaves no\nreal impression on the mind, days and nights of Brahma, Kalpas,\nManvantaras and Yugas, in which gods and worlds are absorbed into the\nsupreme essence and born again. But there is no finality about these\ncatastrophes: the destruction of the whole universe is as certain as the\ndeath of a mouse and to the philosopher not more important[136].\nEverything is periodic: Buddhas, Jinas and incarnations of all sorts are\nall members of a series. They all deserve great respect and are of great\nimportance in their own day, but they are none of them final, still less\nare they able to create a new heaven and earth or to rise above the\nperpetual flux of Sams\u00e2ra. The Buddhists look forward to the advent of\nMaitreya, the future Buddha, and the Hindus to the reappearance of\nVishnu as Kalk\u00ee, who, sword in hand and mounted on a white horse, will\npurge India of barbarians, but these future apparitions excite only a\nfeeble interest in the popular conscience and cannot be compared in\nintensity with such ideas as the Jewish Messiah.\n\nIt may seem that Indian religion is dreamy, hopeless, and unpractical,\nbut another point of view will show that all Indian systems are\nintensely practical and hopeful. They promise happiness and point out\nthe way. A mode of life is always prescribed, not merely by works on law\nand ceremony but by theological and metaphysical treatises. These are\nnot analogous to the writings of Kant or Schopenhauer and to study them\nas if they were, is like trying to learn riding or cricket by reading\nhandbooks. The aphorisms of the S\u00e2nkhya and Vedn\u00e2ta are meant to be read\nunder the direction of a teacher who will see that the pupil's mind is\nduly prepared not only by explanation but by abstinence and other\nphysical training. Hindu religions are unpractical only in so far that\nthey decline to subordinate themselves to human life. It is assumed that\nthe religious man who is striving towards a goal beyond this world is\nready to sacrifice the world without regret and in India the assumption\nis justified surprisingly often.\n\nAs mentioned already the word god has more than one meaning. In India we\nhave at least two different classes of divinities, distinguished in the\nnative languages. First there is Brahman the one self-existent,\nomnipresent, superpersonal spirit from whom all things emanate and to\nwhom all things return. The elaboration of this conception is the most\noriginal feature of Indian theology, which tends to regard Brahman as\nnot merely immanent in all things, but as being all things, so that the\nsoul liberated from illusion can see that it is one with him and that\nnothing else exists. Very different is the meaning of Deva: this\nsignifies a god (which is not the same as God, though our language\ninsufficiently distinguishes the two) roughly comparable with the gods\nof classical mythology[137]. How little sense of divinity it carries\nwith it is seen by the fact that it became the common form of address to\nkings and simply equivalent to Your Majesty. In later times, though Siva\nis styled Mah\u00e2deva, it was felt that the great sectarian gods, who are\nfor their respective worshippers the personal manifestations in which\nBrahman makes himself intelligible, required some name distinguishing\nthem from the hosts of minor deities. They are commonly spoken of by\nsome title signifying the Lord: thus Siva is \u00cesvara, Vishnu and his\nincarnations are more often styled Bhagavad.\n\nFrom the Vedic hymns onwards the gods of India have been polymorphic\nfigures not restricted by the limitations of human personality. If a Jew\nor a Moslim hears new views about God, he is disposed to condemn them as\nwrong. The Hindu's inclination is to appropriate them and ascribe to his\nown deity the novel attributes, whether they are consistent with the\nexisting figure or not. All Indian gods are really everything. As the\nthought of the worshipper wanders among them they turn into one another.\nEven so sturdy a personality as Indra is declared to be the same as Agni\nand as Varuna, and probably every deity in the Vedic pantheon is at some\ntime identified with another deity. But though in one way the gods seem\nvague and impersonal, in another the distinction between gods and men is\nslight. The Br\u00e2hmanas tell us that the gods were originally mortal and\nobtained immortality by offering sacrifices: the man who sacrifices like\nthem makes for himself an immortal body in the abode of the gods and\npractically becomes a Deva and the bliss of great sages is declared\nequal to the bliss of the gods[138]. The human and divine worlds are not\nreally distinct, and as in China and Japan, distinguished men are\ndeified. The deification of Buddha takes place before our eyes as we\nfollow the course of history: the origin of Krishna's godhead is more\nobscure but it is probable that he was a deified local hero. After the\nperiod of the Br\u00e2hmanas the theory that deities manifest themselves to\nthe world in avat\u00e2ras or descents, that is in our idiom incarnations,\nbecomes part of popular theology.\n\nThere are other general characteristics of Indian religion which will be\nbest made clear by more detailed treatment in succeeding chapters. Such\nare, firstly, a special theory of sacrifice or ritual which, though\ntotally rejected by Buddhism, has survived to modern times. Secondly, a\nbelief in the efficacy of self-mortification as a means of obtaining\nsuper-human powers or final salvation. Thirdly, an even more deeply\nrooted conviction that salvation can be obtained by knowledge. Fourthly,\nthere is the doctrine that faith or devotion to a particular deity is\nthe best way to salvation, but this teaching, though it seems natural to\nour minds, does not make its appearance in India until relatively late.\nIt is not so peculiarly Indian as the other ideas mentioned, but even at\nthe outset it is well to insist on its prevalence during the last two\nthousand years because a very false impression may be produced by\nignoring it.\n\nThere also runs through Indian religion a persistent though\ninconspicuous current of non-theistic thought. It does not deny the\nexistence of spirits but it treats them as being, like men, subject to\nnatural laws, though able, like men, to influence events. The ultimate\ntruth for it is not pantheism but fixed natural laws of which no\nexplanation is offered. The religion of the Jains and the S\u00e2nkhya\nphilosophy belong to this current. So did the teaching of several\nancient sects, such as the \u00c2j\u00eev\u00eckas, and strictly speaking Buddhism\nitself. For the Buddha is not an Avat\u00e2ra or a messenger but a superman\nwhose exceptional intelligence sees that the Wheel of Causation and the\nFour Truths are part of the very nature of things. It is strange too\nthat asceticism, sacrifices and modern tantric rites which seem to us\nconcerned with the relations between man and God are in India penetrated\nby a non-theistic theory, namely that there are certain laws which can\nbe studied and applied, much like electricity, and that then spirits can\nbe coerced to grant what the ascetic or sacrificer desires. At the same\ntime such views are more often implied than formulated. The Dharma is\nspoken of as the teaching of the Buddha rather than as Cosmic Order like\nthe Tao of the Chinese and though tantric theory assumes the existence\nof certain forces which can be used scientifically, the general\nimpression produced by tantric works is that they expound an intricate\nmythology and ritual.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nVEDIC DEITIES AND SACRIFICES\n\n1\n\n\nOur knowledge of early Indian religion is derived almost entirely from\nliterature. After the rise of Buddhism this is supplemented to some\nextent by buildings, statues and inscriptions, but unlike Egypt and\nBabylonia, pre-Buddhist India has yielded no temples, images or other\nreligious antiquities, nor is it probable that such will be discovered.\nCertainly the material for study is not scanty. The theological\nliterature of India is enormous: the difficulty is to grasp it and\nselect what is important. The enquirer is confronted with a series of\nencyclop\u00e6dic works of great bulk and considerable antiquity, treating of\nevery aspect of religion which interested the Brahmans. But he\ncontinually feels the want of independent testimony to check their\nstatements. They set forth the views of their authors but whether those\nviews met with general acceptance outside the Brahmanic caste and\ninfluenced Indian life as a whole or whether classes, such as the\nmilitary caste, or regions, such as western India and Dravidian India,\nhad different views, it is often hard to say. Even more serious is the\ndifficulty of chronology which affects secular as well as religious\nliterature. The feats of Hindus in the matter of computing time show in\nthe most extravagant form the peculiarities of their mental temperament,\nfor while in their cosmogonies \u00e6ons whose length the mind can hardly\ngrasp are tabulated with the names of their superhuman rulers there are\nfew[139] dates in the pre-Mohammedan history which can be determined\nfrom purely Indian sources. The fragments of obscure Greek writers and\nthe notes of a travelling Chinaman furnish more trustworthy data about\nimportant epochs in the history of the Hindus than the whole of their\ngigantic literature, in which there has been found no mention of\nAlexander's invasion and only scattered allusions to the conquests of\nthe Sakas, Kushans and H\u00fbnas. We can hardly imagine doubt as to the\ncentury in which Shakespeare or Virgil lived, yet when I first studied\nSanskrit the greatest of Indian dramatists, Kalidasa, was supposed to\nhave lived about 50 B.C. His date is not yet fixed with unanimity but it\nis now generally placed in the fifth or sixth century A.D.\n\nThis chronological chaos naturally affects the value of literature as a\nrecord of the development of thought. We are in danger of moving in a\nvicious circle: of assigning ideas to an epoch because they occur in a\ncertain book, while at the same time we fix the date of the book in\nvirtue of the ideas which it contains. Still we may feel some security\nas to the sequence, if not the exact dates, of the great divisions in\nIndian religious literature such as the period of the Vedic hymns, the\nperiod of the Br\u00e2hmanas, the rise of Buddhism, the composition of the\ntwo great epics, and the Puranas. If we follow the opinion of most\nauthorities and accept the picture of Indian life and thought contained\nin the Pali Tripitaka as in the main historical, it seems to follow that\nboth the ritual system of the Br\u00e2hmanas and the philosophic speculations\nof the Upanishads were in existence by 500 B.C.[140] and sufficiently\ndeveloped to impress the public mind with a sense of their futility.\nSome interval of mental growth seems to separate the Upanishads from the\nBr\u00e2hmanas and a more decided interval separates the Br\u00e2hmanas from the\nearlier hymns of the Rig Veda, if not from the compilation of the whole\ncollection[141]. We may hence say that the older Upanishads and\nBrahmanas must have been composed between 800 and 500 B.C. and the hymns\nof the Rig Veda hardly later than 1000 B.C. Many authorities think the\nearlier hymns must date from 2000 rather than 1000 B.C. but the\nresemblance of the Rig Veda to the Zoroastrian Gathas (which are\ngenerally regarded as considerably later than 1000 B.C.) is plain, and\nit will be strange if the two collections prove to be separated by an\ninterval of many centuries. But the stage of social and religious\nculture indicated in the Vedic hymns may have begun long before they\nwere composed, and rites and deities common to Indians and Iranians\nexisted before the reforms of Zoroaster[142].\n\nIt may seem that everything is uncertain in this literature without\ndates or authors and that the growth of religion in India cannot be\nscientifically studied. The difficulties are indeed considerable but\nthey are materially reduced by the veneration in which the ancient\nscriptures were held, and by the retentiveness of memory and devotion to\ngrammar, if not to history, which have characterized the Brahmans for at\nleast twenty-five centuries. The authenticity of certain Vedic texts is\nguaranteed not only by the quotations found in later works, but by\ntreatises on phonetics, grammar and versification as well as by indices\nwhich give the number of words in every book, chapter and verse. We may\nbe sure that we possess not perhaps the exact words of the Vedic poets,\nbut what were believed about 600 B.C. to be their exact words, and there\nis no reason to doubt that this is a substantially correct version of\nthe hymns as recited several centuries earlier[143].\n\nIn drawing any deductions from the hymns of the Rig Veda it must be\nremembered that it is the manual of the Hotri priests[144]. This does\nnot affect the age or character of the single pieces: they may have been\ncomposed at very different dates and they are not arranged in the order\nin which the priest recites them. But the liturgical character of the\ncompilation does somewhat qualify its title to give a complete picture\nof religion. One could not throw doubt on a ceremony of the Church,\nstill less on a popular custom, because it was not mentioned in the\nmissal, and we cannot assume that ideas or usages not mentioned in the\nRig Veda did not exist at the time when it was composed.\n\nWe have no other Sanskrit writings contemporary with the older parts of\nthe Rig Veda, but the roots of epic poetry stretch far back and ballads\nmay be as old as hymns, though they neither sought nor obtained the\nofficial sanction of the priesthood. Side by side with Vedic tradition,\nunrecorded Epic tradition built up the figures of Siva, R\u00e2ma and Krishna\nwhich astonish us by their sudden appearance in later literature only\nbecause their earlier phases have not been preserved.\n\nThe Vedic hymns were probably collected and arranged between 1000 and\n500 B.C. At that period rites and ceremonies multiplied and absorbed\nman's mind to a degree unparalleled in the history of the world and\nliterature occupied itself with the description or discussion of this\ndreary ceremonial. Buddhism was a protest against the necessity of\nsacrifices and, though Buddhism decayed in India, the sacrificial system\nnever recovered from the attack and assumed comparatively modest\nproportions. But in an earlier period, after the composition of the\nVedic hymns and before the predominance of speculation, skill in\nceremonial was regarded as the highest and indeed only science and the\nancient prayers and poems of the race were arranged in three collections\nto suit the ritual. These were the Rig Veda, containing metrical\nprayers: the Yajur Veda (in an old and new recension known as the Black\nand the White) containing formul\u00e6 mainly in prose to be muttered during\nthe course of the sacrifice: and the S\u00e2ma Veda, a book of chants,\nconsisting almost entirely of verses taken from the Rig Veda and\narranged for singing. The Rig Veda is clearly older than the others: its\nelements are anterior to the Brahmanic liturgy and are arranged in less\ncomplete subservience to it than in the Yajur and S\u00e2ma Vedas.\n\nThe restriction of the words Veda and Vedic to the collection of hymns,\nthough convenient, is not in accordance with Indian usage, which applies\nthe name to a much larger body of religious literature. What we call the\nRig Veda is strictly speaking the mantras of the Rig Veda or the\nRig-Veda-Samhit\u00e2: besides this, there are the Br\u00e2hmanas or ceremonial\ntreatises, the \u00c2ranyakas and Upanishads containing philosophy and\nspeculation, the S\u00fbtras or aphoristic rules, all comprised in the Veda\nor Sruti (hearing), that is the revelation heard directly by saints as\nopposed to Smriti (remembering) or tradition starting from human\nteachers. Modern Hindus when not influenced by the language of European\nscholars apply the word Veda especially to the Upanishads.\n\nFor some time only three[145] Vedas were accepted. But the Epics and the\nPuranas know of the fourfold Veda and place the Atharva Veda on a level\nwith the other three. It was the manual of two ancient priestly\nfamilies, the Atharvans and Angirasas, whose speciality was charms and\nprophylactics rather than the performance of the regular sacrifices. The\nhymns and magic songs which it contains were probably collected\nsubsequently to the composition of the Br\u00e2hmanas, but the separate poems\nare older and, so far as can be judged from their language, are\nintermediate between the Rig Veda and the Br\u00e2hmanas. But the substance\nof many of the spells must be older still, since the incantations\nprescribed show a remarkable similarity to old German, Russian and\nLettish charms. The Atharva also contains speculative poems and, if it\nhas not the freshness of the Rig Veda, is most valuable for the history\nof Indian thought and civilization.\n\nI will not here enquire what was the original home of the Aryans or\nwhether the resemblances shown by Aryan languages justify us in\nbelieving that the ancestors of the Hindus, Greeks, Kelts, Slavs, etc.,\nbelonged to a single race and physical type. The grounds for such a\nbelief seem to me doubtful. But a comparison of language, religion and\ncustoms makes it probable that the ancestors of the Iranians and Hindus\ndwelt together in some region lying to the north of India and then, in\ndescending southwards, parted company and wandered, one band westwards\nto Persia and the other to the Panjab and south-east[146]. These latter\nproduced the poets of the Rig Veda. Their home is indicated by their\nacquaintance with the Himalayas, the Kabul river, the Indus and rivers\nof the Panjab, and the Jamna. The Ganges, though known, apparently lay\nbeyond their sphere, but the geography of the Atharva extends as far as\nBenares and implies a practical knowledge of the sea, which is spoken of\nsomewhat vaguely in the Rig Veda. It is probable that the oldest hymns\nwere composed among the rivers of the Panjab, but the majority somewhat\nfurther to the east, in the district of Kurukshetra or Thanesar. At some\nperiod subsequent to the Aryan immigration there was a great struggle\nbetween two branches of the same stock, related in a legendary form as\nthe contest between the Kauravas and P\u00e2ndavas. Some have thought that we\nhave here an indication of a second invasion composed of Aryans who\nremained in the mountainous districts north of the Hindu Kush when the\nfirst detachment moved south and who developed there somewhat different\ncustoms. It is also possible that the Atharva Veda may represent the\nreligious ideas of these second invaders. In several passages the\nMah\u00e2bh\u00e2rata speaks of the Atharva as the highest Veda and represents the\nP\u00e2ndavas as practising polyandry, a custom which still prevails among\nmany Himalayan tribes.\n\nThe Rig Veda depicts a life not far advanced in material arts but,\nconsidering the date, humane and civilized. There were no towns but\nmerely villages and fortified enclosures to be used as refuges in case\nof necessity. The general tone of the hymns is kindly and healthy; many\nof them indeed have more robust piety than interest. There are few\nindications of barbarous customs. The general impression is of a free\nand joyous life in which the principal actors are chiefs and priests,\nthough neither have become tyrannical.\n\nThe composition of this anthology probably extended over several\ncenturies and comprised a period of lively mental growth. It is\ntherefore natural that it should represent stages of religious\ndevelopment which are not contemporaneous. But though thought is active\nand exuberant in these poems they are not altogether an intellectual\noutburst excited by the successful advance into India. The calm of\nsettlement as well as the fire of conquest have left their mark on them\nand during the period of composition religion grew more boldly\nspeculative but also more sedentary, formal and meticulous. The earliest\nhymns bear traces of quasi-nomadic life, but the writers are no longer\nnomads. They follow agriculture as well as pasturage, but they are still\ncontending with the aborigines: still expanding and moving on. They\nmention no states or capitals: they revere rivers and mountains but have\nno shrines to serve as religious centres, as repositories and factories\nof tradition. Legends and precepts have of course come down from earlier\ngenerations, but are not very definite or cogent: the stories of ancient\nsages and warriors are vague and wanting in individual colour.\n\n\n2\n\nThe absence of sculpture and painting explains much in the character of\nthe Vedic deities. The hymn-writers were devout and imaginative, not\ncontent to revere some undescribed being in the sky, but full of\nmythology, metaphor and poetry and continually singling out new powers\nfor worship. Among many races the conceptions thus evolved acquire\nsolidity and permanence by the aid of art. An image stereotypes a deity,\nworshippers from other districts can see it and it remains from\ngeneration to generation as a conservative and unifying force. Even a\nstone may have something of the same effect, for it connects the deity\nwith the events, rites and ideas of a locality. But the earliest stratum\nof Vedic religion is worship of the powers of nature--such as the Sun,\nthe Sky, the Dawn, the Fire--which are personified but not localized or\ndepicted. Their attributes do not depend at all on art, not much on\nlocal or tribal custom but chiefly on imagination and poetry, and as\nthis poetry was not united in one collection until a later period, a\nbard was under no obligation to conform to the standards of his fellows\nand probably many bards sang without knowing of one another's existence.\n\nSuch a figure as Agni or Fire--if one can call him a figure--illustrates\nthe fluid and intangible character of Vedic divinities. He is one of the\ngreatest in the Pantheon, and in some ways his godhead is strongly\nmarked. He blesses, protects, preserves, and inspires: he is a divine\npriest and messenger between gods and men: he \"knows all generations.\"\nYet we cannot give any definite account of him such as could be drawn up\nfor a Greek deity. He is not a god of fire, like Vulcan, but the Fire\nitself regarded as divine. The descriptions of his appearance are not\nreally anthropomorphic but metaphorical imagery depicting shining,\nstreaming flames. The hymns tell us that he has a tawny beard and hair:\na flaming head or three heads: three tongues or seven: four eyes or a\nthousand. One poem says that he faces in all directions: another that he\nis footless and headless. He is called the son of Heaven and Earth, of\nTvashtri and the Waters, of the Dawn, of Indra-Vishnu. One singer says\nthat the gods generated him to be a light for the Aryans, another that\nhe is the father of the gods. This multiple origin becomes more definite\nin the theory of Agni's three births: he is born on earth from the\nfriction of fire sticks, in the clouds as lightning, and in the highest\nheavens as the Sun or celestial light. In virtue of this triple birth he\nassumes a triune character: his heads, tongues, bodies and dwellings are\nthree, and this threefold nature has perhaps something to do with the\ntriads of deities which become frequent later and finally develop into\nthe Trim\u00fbrti or Brahm\u00e2, Vishnu, and Siva. But there is nothing fixed or\ndogmatic in this idea of Agni's three births. In other texts he is said\nto have two, one in Heaven and one on Earth, and yet another turn of\nfancy ascribes to him births innumerable because he is kindled on many\nhearths. Some of the epithets applied to him become quasi-independent.\nFor instance, Agni Vaisv\u00e2nara--All men's fire--and Agni Tanunapat, which\nseems to mean son of himself, or fire spontaneously generated, are in a\nlater period treated almost as separate deities. M\u00e2tarisvan is sometimes\na name of Agni and sometimes a separate deity who brings Agni to\nmankind.\n\nIn the same way the Rig Veda has not one but many solar deities. Mitra,\nS\u00fbrya, Savitri, and perhaps Pusan, Bhaga, Vivasvat and Vishnu, are all\nloose personifications of certain functions or epithets of the sun.\nDeities are often thought of in classes. Thus we have the Maruts, Rudras\nand Vasus. We hear of Praj\u00e2pati in the singular, but also of the\nPraj\u00e2patis or creative forces.\n\nNot only does Agni tend to be regarded as more than one: he is\nidentified with other gods. We are told he is Varuna and Mitra, Savitri\nand Indra. \"Thou art Varuna when born,\" says one hymn, \"thou becomest\nMitra when kindled. In thee, O son of strength, are all the gods[147].\"\nSuch identifications are common in the Vedas. Philosophically, they are\nan early manifestation of the mental bias which leads to pantheism,\nmetempsychosis, and the feeling that all things and persons are\ntransitory and partial aspects of the one reality. But evidently the\nmutability of the Vedic gods is also due to their nature: they are\nbundles of epithets and functions without much personal or local centre.\nAnd these epithets and functions are to a large extent, the same. All\nthe gods are bright and swift and helpful: all love sacrifices and\nbestow wealth, sons and cows. A figure like Agni enables us to\nunderstand the many-sided, inconsistent presentment of Siva and Vishnu\nin later times. A richer mythology surrounds them but in the fluidity of\ntheir outline, their mutability and their readiness to absorb or become\nall other deities they follow the old lines. Even a deity like Ganesa\nwho seems at first sight modern and definite illustrates these ancient\ncharacteristics. He has one or five heads and from four to sixteen arms:\nthere are half a dozen strange stories of his birth and wonderful\nallegories describing his adventures. Yet he is also identified with all\nthe Gods and declared to be the creator, preserver and destroyer of the\nUniverse, nay the Supreme Spirit itself[148].\n\nIn Soma, the sacred plant whose juice was offered in the most solemn\nsacrifices, we again find the combination of natural phenomena and\ndivinity with hardly any personification. Soma is not a sacred tree\ninhabited by some spirit of the woods but the Lord of immortality who\ncan place his worshippers in the land of eternal life and light. Some of\nthe finest and most spiritual of the Vedic hymns are addressed to him\nand yet it is hard to say whether they are addressed to a person or a\nbeverage. The personification is not much more than when French writers\ncall absinthe \"La f\u00e9e aux yeux verts.\" Later, Soma was identified with\nthe moon, perhaps because the juice was bright and shining. On the other\nhand Soma worship is connected with a very ancient but persistent form\nof animism, for the Vedic poets celebrate as immortal the stones under\nwhich the plant is pressed and beg them to bestow wealth and children.\nJust so at the present day agricultural and other implements receive the\nsalutations and prayers of those who use them. They are not gods in any\nordinary sense but they are potent forces.\n\nBut some Vedic deities are drawn more distinctly, particularly Indra,\nwho having more character has also lasted longer than most of his\nfellows, partly because he was taken over by Buddhism and enrolled in\nthe retinue of the Buddha. He appears to have been originally a god of\nthunder, a phenomenon which lends itself to anthropomorphic treatment.\nAs an atmospheric deity, he conquers various powers of evil,\nparticularly Vritra, the demon of drought. The Vedas know of evil\nspirits against whom the gods wage successful war but they have no\nsingle personification of evil in general, like our devil, and few\nmalevolent deities. Of these latter Rudra, the prototype of Siva, is the\nmost important but he is not wholly malevolent for he is the god of\nhealing and can take away sickness as well as cause it. Indian thought\nis not inclined to dualism, which is perhaps the outcome of a practical\nmind desiring a certain course and seeing everywhere the difficulties\nwhich the Evil One puts in the way of it, but rather to that pantheism\nwhich tends to subsume both good and evil under a higher unity.\n\nIndra was the tutelary deity of the invading Aryans. His principles\nwould delight a European settler in Africa. He protects the Aryan colour\nand subjects the black skin: he gave land to the Aryans and made the\nD\u00e2syus (aborigines) subject to them: he dispersed fifty thousand of the\nblack race and rent their citadels[149]. Some of the events with which\nhe is connected, such as the battles of King Sudas, may have a\nhistorical basis. He is represented as a gigantic being of enormous size\nand vigour and of gross passions. He feasts on the flesh of bulls and\nbuffaloes roasted by hundreds, his potations are counted in terms of\nlakes, and not only nerve him for the fray but also intoxicate him[150].\nUnder the name of Sakka, Indra figures largely in the Buddhist s\u00fbtras,\nand seems to have been the chief popular deity in the Buddha's lifetime.\nHe was adopted into the new creed as a sort of archangel and heavenly\ndefender of the faith. In the epics he is still a mighty deity and the\nlord of paradise. Happiness in his heaven is the reward of the pious\nwarrior after death. The Mah\u00e2bh\u00e2rata and the Puranas, influenced perhaps\nby Buddhism, speak of a series of Indras, each lasting for a cycle, but\nsuperseded when a new heaven and earth appear. In modern Hinduism his\nname is familiar though he does not receive much worship. Yet in spite\nof his long pre-eminence there is no disposition to regard him as the\nsupreme and only god. Though the Rig Veda calls him the creator and\ndestroyer of all things[151], he is not God in our sense any more than\nother deities are. He is the personification of strength and success,\nbut he is not sufficiently spiritual or mystical to hold and satisfy the\nenquiring mind.\n\n\n3\n\nOne of the most interesting and impressive of Vedic deities is Varuna,\noften invoked with a more shadowy double called Mitra. No myths or\nexploits are related of him but he is the omnipotent and omniscient\nupholder of moral and physical law. He established earth and sky: he set\nthe sun in heaven and ordained the movements of the moon and stars: the\nwind is his breath and by his law the heavens and earth are kept apart.\nHe perceives all that exists in heaven and earth or beyond, nor could a\nman escape him though he fled beyond the sky. The winkings of men's eyes\nare all numbered by him[152]: he knows all that man does or thinks. Sin\nis the infringement of his ordinances and he binds sinners in fetters.\nHence they pray to him for release from sin and he is gracious to the\npenitent. Whereas the other deities are mainly asked to bestow material\nboons, the hymns addressed to Varuna contain petitions for forgiveness.\nHe dwells in heaven in a golden mansion. His throne is great and lofty\nwith a thousand columns and his abode has a thousand doors. From it he\nlooks down on the doings of men and the all-seeing sun comes to his\ncourts to report.\n\nThere is much in these descriptions which is unlike the attributes\nascribed to any other member of the Vedic pantheon and recalls Ahura\nMazda of the Avesta or Semitic deities. No proof of foreign influence is\nforthcoming, but the opinion of some scholars that the figure of Varuna\nsomehow reflects Semitic ideas is plausible. It has been suggested that\nhe was originally a lunar deity, which explains his association with\nMitra (the Persian Mithra) who was a sun god, and that the group of\ndeities called \u00c2dityas and including Mitra and Varuna were the sun, moon\nand the five planets known to the ancients. This resembles the\nBabylonian worship of the heavenly bodies and, though there is no record\nwhatever of how such ideas reached the Aryans, it is not difficult to\nimagine that they may have come from Babylonia either to India[153] or\nto the country where Indians and Iranians dwelt together. There is a\nSemitic flavour too in the Indian legend of the Churning of the\nOcean[154]. The Gods and Asuras effect this by using a huge serpent as a\nrope to whirl round a mountain and from the turmoil there arise various\nmarvellous personages and substances including the moon. This resembles\nin tone if not in detail the Babylonian creation myths, telling of a\nprim\u00e6val abyss of waters and a great serpent which is slain by the Gods\nwho use its body as the material for making the heavens and the\nearth[155].\n\nYet Varuna is not the centre of a monotheistic religion any more than\nIndra, and in later times he becomes a water god of no marked\nimportance. The Aryans and Semites, while both dissatisfied with\npolytheism and seeking the one among the many, moved along different\npaths and did not reach exactly the same goal. Semitic deities were\nrepresentations of the forces of nature in human form but their\ncharacter was stereotyped by images, at any rate in Assyria and\nBabylonia, and by the ritual of particular places with which they were\nidentified. Semitic polytheism is mainly due to the number of tribes and\nlocalities possessing separate deities, not to the number of deities\nworshipped by each place and tribe. As villages and small towns were\nsubordinate to great towns, so the deities of minor localities were\nsubordinate to those of the greater. Hence the Semitic god was often\nthought of as a king who might be surrounded by a court and then became\nthe head of a pantheon of inferior deities, but also might be thought of\nas tolerating no rivals. This latter conception when combined with moral\nearnestness gives us Jehovah, who resembles Varuna, except that Varuna\nis neither jealous nor national. Indian polytheism also originated in\nthe personification of various phenomena, the sun, thunder, fire,\nrivers, and so forth, but these deities unlike the Semitic gods had\nlittle to do with special tribes or localities and the philosophic\nIndian easily traced a connection between them. It is not difficult to\nsee that sun, fire and lightning have something in common. The gods are\nfrequently thought of as joined in couples, triads or larger companies\nand early worship probably showed the beginnings of a feature which is\nprominent in the later ritual, namely, that a sacrifice is not an\nisolated oblation offered to one particular god but a series of\noblations presented to a series of deities. There was thus little\ndisposition to exalt one god and annihilate the others, but every\ndisposition to identify the gods with one another and all of them with\nsomething else. Just as rivers, mountains and plains are dimly seen to\nbe parts of a whole which later ages call nature, so are the gods seen\nto be parts of some divine whole which is greater than any of them. Even\nin the Rig Veda we find such sentiments as \"The priests speak of the One\nBeing in many ways: they call it Agni, Yama, M\u00e2tarisvan[156].\" Hence it\nis not surprising that when in the later Vedic period a tendency towards\nmonotheism (but monotheism of a pantheistic type) appears, the supreme\nposition is given to none of the old deities but to a new figure,\nPraj\u00e2pati. This word, meaning Lord of living creatures, occurs in the\nRig Veda as an epithet of the sun and is also occasionally used as the\nname of the Being by whom all gods and worlds were generated and by\nwhose power they continue to exist. In the Br\u00e2hmanas and later ritual\nliterature he is definitely recognized as the supreme deity, the\nCreator, the first sacrificer and the sacrifice itself. It is perhaps\nowing to his close connection with ceremonial that enquiring and\nspeculative minds felt Praj\u00e2pati not to be a final or satisfactory\nexplanation of the universe. He is identified with Brahm\u00e2, the active\npersonal creator, and this later name gradually ousts the other but he\ndoes not, any more than Indra or Varuna, become the \u00c2tman or supreme\nuniversal Being of the Upanishads.\n\nThe principal Vedic deities are male and the few goddesses that are\nmentioned such as Ushas. the Dawn, seem to owe their sex to purely\ndramatic reasons. Greece and Rome as well as India felt it appropriate\nto represent the daybreak as a radiant nymph. But though in later times\nsuch goddesses as Durg\u00e2 assumed in some sects a paramount position, and\nthough the Veda is familiar with the idea of the world being born, there\nare few traces in it of a goddess corresponding to the Great Mother,\nCybele or Astarte.\n\nIn an earlier period of Vedic studies many deities were identified with\nfigures in the classical or Teutonic mythology chiefly on philological\ngrounds but most of these identifications have now been abandoned. But a\nfew names and figures seem to be found among both the Asiatic and\nEuropean Aryans and to point to a common stock of ideas. Dyaus, the Sky\nGod, is admittedly the same as Zeus and Jupiter. The Asvins agree in\ncharacter, though not in name, with the Dioscuri and other parallels are\nquoted from Lettish mythology. Bhaga, the bountiful giver, a somewhat\nobscure deity, is the same word as the Slavonic Bog, used in the general\nsense of God, and we find _deva_ in Sanskrit, _deus_ in Latin, and\n_devas_ in Lithuanian. Ushas, the Dawn, is phonetically related to\n[Greek: '\u00cah\u00f4s] and Aurora who, however, are only half deities. Indra, if\nhe cannot be scientifically identified with Thor, is a similar personage\nwho must have grown out of the same stock of ideas. By a curious\ntransference the Prophet Elias has in south-eastern Europe inherited the\nattributes of the thunder god and is even now in the imagination of the\npeasantry a jovial and riotous being who, like Indra, drives a noisy\nchariot across the sky.\n\nThe connection with ancient Persian mythology is closer. The Avestan\nreligion was a reformation due to the genius of Zoroaster and therefore\ncomparable with Buddhism rather than Hinduism, but the less systematic\npolytheism which preceded it contained much which reminds us of the\nVedic hymns. It can hardly be doubted that the ancestors of the Indians\nand Iranians once practised almost identical forms of religion and had\neven a common ritual. The chief features of the fire cult and of the\nSoma or Haoma sacrifice appear in both. The sacrifice is called Yaj\u00f1a in\nthe Veda, Yasna in the Avesta: the Hotri priest is Zaotar, Atharvan is\nAthravan, Mitra is Mithra. V\u00e2yu and \u00c2pah (the divine waters) meet us in\nthe Avesta in almost the same forms and Indra's epithet of Vritrahan\n(the slayer of Vritra) appears as Verethragna. Ahura Mazda seems to be a\ndevelopment of the deity who appears as Varuna in India though he has\nnot the same name, and the main difference between Indian and Iranian\nreligion lies in this, that the latter was systematized by a theistic\nreformer who exalted one deity above the others, whereas in India, where\nthere was more religious vitality, polytheistic and pantheistic fancies\nflourished uncurbed and the greatest reformer, the Buddha, was not a\ntheist.\n\nOne peculiarity of Indians in all ages is that they put more into\nreligion than other races. It received most of the energy and talent\nwhich, elsewhere, went into art, politics and philosophy. Hence it\nbecame both intense and manifold, for deities and creeds were wanted for\nevery stage of intelligence and variety of taste, and also very\ntolerant, for sects in India, though multitudinous, are not so sharply\ndivided or mutually hostile as in Europe. Connected with the general\ninterest which religion inspired is its strongly marked speculative\ncharacter. The Rig Veda asks whether in the beginning there was being or\nnot being, and the later Vedas and Br\u00e2hmanas are filled with discussions\nas to the meaning of ceremonies, which show that the most dreary\nformalism could not extinguish the innate propensity to seek for a\nreason. In the Upanishads we have the same spirit dealing with more\npromising material. And throughout the long history of Hinduism religion\nand philosophy are seldom separated: we rarely find detached\nmetaphysicians: philosophers found new sects or support old ones:\nreligion absorbs philosophy and translates it into theology or myths.\n\n\n4\n\nTo the age of the Vedas succeeds that of the Br\u00e2hmanas or sacrificial\ntreatises. The two periods are distinct and have each a well-marked\ntone, but they pass into one another, for the Yajur and S\u00e2ma Vedas\npre-suppose the ritual of the Br\u00e2hmanas. These treatises introduce us to\none feature of Indian religion mentioned above, namely the extraordinary\nelaboration of its ritual. To read them one would suppose that the one\noccupation of all India was the offering of sacrifices. The accounts are\nno doubt exaggerated and must often be treated as specimens of\nsacerdotal imagination, like the Biblical descriptions of the rites\nperformed in the Tabernacle during the wanderings of the Israelites. But\nmaking all allowance for priestly enthusiasm, it still remains true that\nthe intellect of India, so far as it is preserved in literature, was\noccupied during two centuries or so with the sacrificial art and that\nphilosophy had difficulty in disentangling itself from ceremonies. One\nhas only to compare Greek and Sanskrit literature to see how vast are\nthe proportions assumed by ritual in India. Our information about the\npolitical institutions, the wars and chronology of ancient Greece is\nfull, but of the details of Greek worship we hear little and probably\nthere was not much to tell. But in India, where there are no histories\nand no dates, we know every prayer and gesture of the officiants\nthroughout complicated sacrifices and possess a whole library describing\ntheir correct performance.\n\nIn most respects these sacrifices which absorbed so much intellect and\nenergy belong to ancient history. They must not be confounded with the\nceremonies performed in modern temples, which have a different origin\nand character. A great blow was struck at the sacrificial system by\nBuddhism. Not only did it withdraw the support of many kings and nobles\n(and the greater ceremonies being very costly depended largely on the\npatronage of the wealthy), but it popularized the idea that animal\nsacrifices are shocking and that attempts to win salvation by offerings\nare crude and unphilosophic. But though, after Buddhism had leavened\nIndia for a few centuries, we no longer find the religious world given\nover to sacrificing as it had been about 600 B.C., these rites did not\ndie out. Even now they are occasionally performed in South India and the\nDeccan. There are still many Brahmans in these regions who, if they have\nnot the means or learning to perform the greater Vedic ceremonies, at\nany rate sympathize with the mental attitude which they imply, and this\nattitude has many curious features.\n\nThe rite of sacrifice, which in the simple form of an offering supposed\nto be agreeable to the deity is the principal ceremony in the early\nstages of most religions, persists in their later stages but gives rise\nto clouds of theory and mystical interpretations. Thus in Christianity,\nthe Jewish sacrifices are regarded as prototypes of the death of Christ\nand that death itself as a sacrifice to the Almighty, an offering of\nhimself to himself, which in some way acts as an expiation for the sins\nof the world. And by a further development the sacrifice of the mass,\nthat is, the offering of portions of bread and wine which are held to be\nmiraculously transformed into the body and blood of Christ by the\nmanipulations of a qualified priest, is believed to repeat every day the\ntragedy of Calvary. The prevalence of this view in Europe should make us\nchary of stigmatizing Hindu ideas about sacrifice as mental aberrations.\nThey represent the fancies of acute intellects dealing with ancient\nceremonies which they cannot abandon but which they transform into\nsomething more congenial to their own transitional mode of thought.\n\nThough the Br\u00e2hmanas and Upanishads mix up ritual with physical and\nmetaphysical theories in the most extraordinary fashion, their main\nmotive deserves sympathy and respect. Their weakness lies in their\ninability to detach themselves (as the Buddha succeeded in doing) from a\nritual which though elaborate was neither edifying nor artistic: they\nseem unable to see the great problems of existence except through the\nmists of altar smoke. Their merit is their evident conviction that this\nformalism is inadequate. Their wish is not to distort and cramp nature\nby bringing it within the limits of the ritual, but to enlarge and\nexpand the ritual until it becomes cosmic. If they regard the whole\nuniverse as one long act of prayer and sacrifice, the idea is grandiose\nrather than pedantic, though the details may not always be to our\ntaste[157]. And the Upanishads pass from ritual and theology to real\nspeculation in a way unknown to Christian thought. To imagine a\nparallel, we must picture Spinoza beginning with an exposition of the\nTrinity and transubstantiation and proceeding to develop his own system\nwithout becoming unorthodox.\n\nThe conception of the sacrifice set forth in the Br\u00e2hmanas is that it is\na scientific method of acquiring immortality as well as temporal\nblessings. Though originally a mere offering in the _do ut des_\nprinciple, it has assumed a higher and more mysterious position[158]. We\nare told that the gods obtained immortality and heaven by sacrifice,\nthat they created the universe by sacrifice, that Praj\u00e2pati, the\ncreator, _is_ the sacrifice. Although some writers are disposed to\ndistinguish magic sharply from religion, the two are not separated in\nthe Vedas. Sacrifice is not merely a means of pleasing the gods: it is a\nsystem of authorized magic or sacred science controlling all worlds, if\nproperly understood. It is a mysterious cosmic force like electricity\nwhich can be utilized by a properly trained priest but is dangerous in\nunskilful hands, for the rites, if wrongly performed, bring disaster or\neven death on bunglers. Though the Vedic sacrifices fell more and more\nout of general use, this notion of the power of rites and formulae did\nnot fade with them but has deeply infected modern Hinduism and even\nBuddhism, in both of which the lore of spells and gestures assumes\nmonstrous proportions. The Vedic and modern tantric rituals are\ndifferent but they are based on the same supposition that the universe\n(including the gods which are part of it) is regulated by some\npermeating principle, and that this principle can be apprehended by\nsacred science and controlled by the use of proper methods[159]. So far\nas these systems express the idea that the human mind can grasp the\nuniverse by knowledge, they offer an example of the bold sweep of the\nHindu intellect, but the methods prescribed are often fatuous.\n\nThe belief in the potency of words and formulae, though amplified and\nembellished by the Hindus, is not an Indian invention but a common\naspect of early thought which was less emphasized in other countries. It\nis found in Persia and among the tribes of Central and Northern Asia and\nof Northern Europe, and attained a high development in Finland where\n_runot_ or magical songs are credited with very practical efficacy. Thus\nthe Kalevala relates how W\u00e4in\u00e4m\u00f6inen was building a boat by means of\nsongs when the process came to a sudden stop because he had forgotten\nthree words. This is exactly the sort of thing that might happen in the\nlegends of a Vedic sacrifice if the priest had forgotten the texts he\nought to recite.\n\nThe external features of Vedic rites are remarkable and unlike what we\nknow of those performed by other nations of antiquity. The sacrifice is\nnot as a rule a gift presented to a single god to win his favour.\nOblations are made to most members of the pantheon in the course of a\nprolonged ceremony, but the time, manner and recipients of these\noblations are fixed rather by the mysteries of sacrificial science, than\nby the sacrificer's need to propitiate a particular deity. Also the\nsacrifice is not offered in a temple and it would appear that in\npre-Buddhist times there were no religious edifices. It is not even\nassociated with sacred spots, such as groves or fountains haunted by a\ndeity. The scene of operations requires long and careful preparation,\nbut it is merely an enclosure with certain sheds, fireplaces and mounds.\nIt has no architectural pretensions and is not a centre round which\nshrines can grow for it requires reconsecration for each ceremony, and\nin many cases must not be used twice. There is little that is national,\ntribal or communal about these rites. Some of them, such as the\nAsvamedha or horse sacrifice and the R\u00e2jasaya, or consecration of a\nking, may be attended by games and sports, but that is because they are\nconnected with secular events. In their essence sacrifices are not\npopular festivals or holidays but private services, performed for the\nbenefit of the sacrificer, that is, the person who pays the fees of the\npriests. Usually they have a definite object and, though ceremonies for\nthe attainment of material blessings are not wanting, this object is\nmost frequently supramundane, such as the fabrication of a body in the\nheavenly world. It is in keeping with these characteristics that there\nshould be no pomp or spectacular effect: the rites resemble some\ncomplicated culinary operation or scientific experiment, and the\nsacrificial enclosure has the appearance of a laboratory rather than a\nplace of worship.\n\nVedic ritual includes the sacrifice of animals, and there are\nindications of the former prevalence of human sacrifice. At the time\nwhen the Br\u00e2hmanas were composed the human victims were released alive,\nbut afterwards the practice of real sacrifice was revived, probably\nowing to the continual incorporation into the Hindu community of\nsemi-barbarous tribes and their savage deities. Human victims were\noffered to Mah\u00e2dev\u00ee the spouse of Siva until the last century, and would\ndoubtless be offered now, were legal restrictions removed. But though\nthe sporadic survival of an old custom in its most primitive and\nbarbarous form is characteristic of Hinduism, the whole tendency of\nthought and practice since the rise of Buddhism has been adverse to\nreligious bloodshed, even of animals. The doctrine of substitution and\natonement, of offering the victim on behalf of the sacrificer, though\nnot absent, plays a smaller part than in the religions of Western Asia.\n\nEvidently it was not congenial: the Hindu has always been inclined to\nthink that the individual earns his future in another world by his own\nthoughts and acts. Even the value of the victim is less important than\nthe correct performance of the ceremony. The teaching of the Br\u00e2hmanas\nis not so much that a good heart is better than lavish alms as that the\nritually correct sacrifice of a cake is better than a hecatomb not\noffered according to rule.\n\nThe offerings required by the Vedic ritual are very varied. The simplest\nare cakes and libations of melted butter poured on the fire from two\nwooden spoons held one over the other while Vedic verses are recited.\nBesides these there was the animal sacrifice, and still more important\nthe Soma[160] sacrifice. This ceremony is very ancient and goes back to\nthe time when the Hindus and Iranians were not divided. In India the\nsacrifice lasted at least five days and, even in its simpler forms, was\nfar more complicated than any ceremony known to the Greeks, Romans or\nJews. Only professional priests could perform it and as a rule a priest\ndid not attempt to master more than one branch and to be for instance\neither a reciter (Hotri) or singer (Udg\u00e2tri). But the five-day\nsacrifices are little more than the rudiments of the sacrificial art and\nlead on to the Ah\u00eenas or sacrifices comprising from two to twelve days\nof Soma pressing which last not more than a month. The Ahinas again can\nbe combined into sacrificial sessions lasting a year or more[161], and\nit would seem that rites of this length were really performed, though\nwhen we read of such sessions extending over a hundred years, we may\nhope that they are creations of a fancy like that of the hymn-writer who\ncelebrated the state\n\nWhere congregations ne'er break up And Sabbaths never end.\n\nThe ritual literature of India is enormous and much of it has been\nedited and translated by European scholars with a care that merited a\nbetter object. It is a mine of information respecting curious beliefs\nand practices of considerable historical interest, but it does not\nrepresent the main current of religious ideas in post-Buddhist times.\nThe Brahmans indeed never ceased to give the sacrificial system their\ntheoretical and, when possible, their practical approval, for it\nembodies a principle most dear to them, namely, that the other castes\ncan obtain success and heaven only under the guidance of Brahmans and by\nrites which only Brahmans can perform. But for this very reason it\nincurred the hostility not only of philosophers and morally earnest men,\nbut of the military caste and it never really recovered from the blow\ndealt it by Buddhism, the religion of that caste. But with every\nBrahmanic revival it came to the front and the performance of the\nAsvamedha or horse sacrifice[162] was long the culminating glory of an\northodox king.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nASCETICISM AND KNOWLEDGE\n\n1\n\n\nAs sacrifice and ceremonial are the material accompaniments of prayer,\nso are asceticism and discipline those of thought. This is less\nconspicuous in other countries, but in India it is habitually assumed\nthat the study of what we call metaphysics or theology needs some kind\nof physical discipline and it will be well to elucidate this point\nbefore describing the beginnings of speculation.\n\nTapas, that is asceticism or self-mortification, holds in the religious\nthought and practice of India as large a place as sacrifice. We hear of\nit as early, for it is mentioned in the Rig Veda[163], and it lasts\nlonger, for it is a part of contemporary Hinduism just as much as prayer\nor worship. It appears even in creeds which disavow it theoretically,\n_e.g._ in Buddhism, and evidently has its root in a deep-seated and\npersistent instinct.\n\nTapas is often translated penance but the idea of mortification as an\nexpiation for sins committed, though not unknown in India, is certainly\nnot that which underlies the austerities of most ascetics. The word\nmeans literally heat, hence pain or toil, and some think that its origin\nshould be sought in practices which produced fever, or tended to\nconcentrate heat in the body. One object of Tapas is to obtain abnormal\npowers by the suppression of desires or the endurance of voluntary\ntortures. There is an element of truth in this aspiration. Temperance,\nchastity and mental concentration are great aids for increasing the\nforce of thought and will. The Hindu believes that intensity and\nperseverance in this road of abstinence and rapture will yield\ncorrespondingly increased results. The many singular phenomena connected\nwith Indian asceticism have been imperfectly investigated but a\npsychological examination would probably find that subjective results\n(such as visions and the feeling of flying through the air) are really\nproduced by the discipline recommended and there may be elements of much\ngreater value in the various systems of meditation. But this is only the\nbeginning of Tapas. To the idea that the soul when freed from earthly\ndesires is best able to comprehend the divine is superadded another\nidea, namely that self-mortification is a process of productive labour\nakin to intellectual toil. Just as the whole world is supposed to be\npermeated by a mysterious principle which can be known and subdued by\nthe science of the sacrificing priests, so the ascetic is able to\ncontrol gods and nature by the force of his austerities. The creative\ndeities are said to have produced the world by Tapas, just as they are\nsaid to have produced it by sacrifice and Hindu mythology abounds in\nstories of ascetics who became so mighty that the very gods were\nalarmed. For instance R\u00e2vana, the Demon ruler of Lanka who carried off\nS\u00eet\u00e2, had acquired his power by austerities which enabled him to extort\na boon from Brahm\u00e2. Thus there need be nothing moral in the object of\nasceticism or in the use of the power obtained. The epics and dramas\nfrequently portray ascetics as choleric and unamiable characters and\nmodern Yogis maintain the tradition.\n\nThough asceticism resembles the sacrifice in being a means by which man\ncan obtain his wishes whether religious or profane, it differs in being\ncomparatively easy. Irksome as it may be, it demands merely strength of\nwill and not a scientific training in ritual and Vedic texts. Hence in\nthis sphere the supremacy of the Brahman could be challenged by other\ncastes and an instructive legend relates how R\u00e2ma slew a S\u00fbdra whom he\nsurprised in the act of performing austerities. The lowest castes can by\nthis process acquire a position which makes them equal to the\nhighest[164].\n\nOf the non-Brahmanic sects, the Jains set the highest value on Tapas,\nbut chiefly as a purification of the soul and a means of obtaining an\nunearthly state of pure knowledge[165]. In theory the Buddha rejected\nit; he taught a middle way, rejecting alike self-indulgence and\nself-mortification. But even Pali Buddhism admits such practices as the\nDh\u00fbt\u00e2ngas and the more extravagant sects, for instance in Tibet, allow\nmonks to entomb themselves in dark cells. According to our standards\neven the ordinary religious life of both Hindus and Buddhists is\nseverely ascetic. It is assumed as a _sine qua non_ that strict chastity\nmust be observed, nourishment be taken only to support life and not for\npleasure, that all gratification coming from the senses must be avoided\nand the mind kept under rigid discipline. This discipline receives\nsystematic treatment in the Yoga school of philosophy but it is really\ncommon to all varieties of Hinduism and Buddhism; all agree that the\nbody must be subdued by physical training before the mind can apprehend\nthe higher truths. The only question is how far asceticism is directly\ninstrumental in giving higher knowledge. If some texts speak slightingly\nof it, we must remember that the life of a hermit dwelling in the woods\nwithout possessions or desires might not be regarded by a Hindu as\n_tapas_ though we should certainly regard it as asceticism. It is also\nagreed that supernatural powers can be acquired by special forms of\nasceticism. These powers are sometimes treated as mere magic and\nspiritually worthless but their reality is not questioned.\n\n\n2\n\nWe have now said something of two aspects of Indian religion--ritual and\nasceticism--and must pass on to the third, namely, knowledge or\nphilosophy. Its importance was recognized by the severest ritualists.\nThey admitted it as a supplement and crown to the life of ceremonial\nobservances and in the public estimation it came to be reputed an\nalternative or superior road to salvation. Respect and desire for\nknowledge are even more intimately a part of Hindu mentality than a\nproclivity to asceticism or ritual. The sacrifice itself must be\nunderstood as well as offered. He who _knows_ the meaning of this or\nthat observance obtains his desires[166].\n\nNor did the Brahmans resent criticism and discussion. India has always\nloved theological argument: it is the national passion. The early\nUpanishads relate without disapproval how kings such as Aj\u00e2tasatru of\nK\u00e2si, Prav\u00e2hana Jaivali and Asvapati Kaikeya imparted to learned\nBrahmans philosophical and theological knowledge previously unknown to\nthem[167] and even women like G\u00e2rg\u00ee and Maitrey\u00ee took part in\ntheological discussions. Obviously knowledge in the sense of\nphilosophical speculation commended itself to religiously disposed\npersons in the non-sacerdotal castes for the same reason as asceticism.\nWhatever difficulties it might offer, it was more accessible than the\nlearning which could be acquired only under a Brahman teacher, although\nthe Brahmans in the interests of the sacerdotal caste maintained that\nphilosophy like ritual was a secret to be imparted, not a result to be\nwon by independent thought.\n\nAgain and again the Upanishads insist that the more profound doctrines\nmust not be communicated to any but a son or an accredited pupil and\nalso that no one can think them out for himself[168], yet the older ones\nadmit in such stories as those mentioned that the impulse towards\nspeculation came in early periods, as it did in the time of the Buddha,\nlargely from outside the priestly clans and was adopted rather than\ninitiated by them. But in justice to the Brahmans we must admit that\nthey have rarely--or at any rate much less frequently than other\nsacerdotal corporations--shown hostility to new ideas and then chiefly\nwhen such ideas (like those of Buddhism) implied that the rites by which\nthey gained their living were worthless. Otherwise they showed great\npliancy and receptivity, for they combined Vedic rites and mythology\nwith such systems as the S\u00e2nkhya and Advaita philosophies, both of which\nreally render superfluous everything which is usually called religion\nsince, though their language is decorous, they teach that he who _knows_\nthe truth about the universe is thereby saved.\n\nThe best opinion of India has always felt that the way of knowledge or\nJ\u00f1\u00e2na was the true way. The favourite thesis of the Brahmans was that a\nman should devote his youth to study, his maturity to the duties and\nceremonies of a householder, and his age to more sublime speculations.\nBut at all periods the idea that it was possible to know God and the\nuniverse was allied to the idea that all ceremonies as well as all\nworldly effort and indeed all active morality are superfluous[169]. All\nalike are unessential and trivial, and merit the attention only of those\nwho know nothing higher. Human feelings and interests qualified and\ncontradicted this negative and unearthly view of religion, but still\npopular sentiment as well as philosophic thought during the whole period\nof which we know something of them in India tended to regard the highest\nlife as consisting in rapt contemplation or insight accompanied by the\nsuppression of desire and by disengagement from mundane ties and\ninterests. But knowledge in Indian theology implies more intensity than\nwe attach to the word and even some admixture of volition. The knowledge\nof Brahman is not an understanding of pantheistic doctrines such as may\nbe obtained by reading _The Sacred Books of the East_ in an easy chair\nbut a realization (in all senses) of personal identity with the\nuniversal spirit, in the light of which all material attachments and\nfetters fall away.\n\nThe earlier philosophical speculations of the Brahmans are chiefly found\nin the treatises called Upanishads. The teaching contained in these\nworks is habitually presented as something secret[170] or esoteric and\ndoes not, like Buddhism or Jainism, profess to be a gospel for all. Also\nthe teaching is not systematized and has never been unified by a\npersonality like the Buddha. It grew up in the various _parishads_, or\ncommunities of learned Brahmans, and perhaps flourished most in north\nwestern India[171]. There is of course a common substratum of ideas but\nthey appear in different versions: we have the teaching of Y\u00e2j\u00f1avalkya,\nof Udd\u00e2laka \u00c2runi and other masters and each teaching has some\nindividuality. They are merely reported as words of the wise without an\nattempt to harmonize them. There are many apparent inconsistencies due\nto the use of divergent metaphors to indicate different aspects of the\nindescribable, and some real inconsistencies due to the existence of\ndifferent schools. Hence, attempts whether Indian or European to give a\nharmonious summary of this ancient doctrine are likely to be erroneous.\n\nThere are a great number of Upanishads, composed at various dates and\nnot all equally revered. They represent different orders of ideas and\nsome of the later are distinctly sectarian. Collections of 45, 52 and 60\nare mentioned, and the Muktik\u00e2 Upanishad gives a list of 108. This is\nthe number currently accepted in India at the present day. But\nSchrader[172] describes many Upanishads existing in MS. in addition to\nthis list and points out that though they may be modern there is no\nground for calling them spurious. According to Indian ideas there is no\n_a priori_ objection to the appearance now or in the future of new\nUpanishads[173]. All revelation is eternal and self-existent but it can\nmanifest itself at its own good time.\n\nMany of the more modern Upanishads appear to be the compositions of\nsingle authors and may be called tracts or poems in the ordinary\nEuropean sense. But the older ones, unless they are very short, are\nclearly not the attempts of an individual to express his creed but\ncollections of such philosophical sayings and narratives as a particular\nschool thought fit to include in its version of the scriptures. There\nwas so to speak a body of philosophic folk-lore portions of which each\nschool selected and elaborated as it thought best. Thus an apologue\nproving that the breath is the essential vital constituent of a human\nbeing is found in five ancient Upanishads[174]. The Ch\u00e2ndogya and\nBrihad-\u00c2ranyaka both contain an almost identical narrative of how the\npriest \u00c2runi was puzzled and instructed by a king and a similar story is\nfound at the beginning of the Kaus\u00eehtaki[175]. The two Upanishads last\nmentioned also contain two dialogues in which king Aj\u00e2tasatru explains\nthe fate of the soul after death and which differ in little except that\none is rather fuller than the other[176]. So too several well-known\nstanzas and also quotations from the Veda used with special applications\nare found in more than one Upanishad[177].\n\nThe older Upanishads[178] are connected with the other parts of the\nVedic canon and sometimes form an appendix to a Br\u00e2hmana so that the\ntopics discussed change gradually from ritual to philosophy[179]. It\nwould be excessive to say that this arrangement gives the genesis of\nspeculation in ancient India, for some hymns of the Rig Veda are purely\nphilosophic, but it illustrates a lengthy phase of Brahmanic thought in\nwhich speculation could not disengage itself from ritual and was also\nhampered by physical ideas. The Upanishads often receive such epithets\nas transcendental and idealistic but in many passages--perhaps in the\nmajority--they labour with imperfect success to separate the spiritual\nand material. The self or spirit is sometimes identified in man with the\nbreath, in nature with air, ether or space. At other times it is\ndescribed as dwelling in the heart and about the size of the thumb but\ncapable of becoming smaller, travelling through the veins and showing\nitself in the pupil: capable also of becoming infinitely large and one\nwith the world soul. But when thought finds its wings and soars above\nthese material fancies, the teaching of the Upanishads shares with\nBuddhism the glory of being the finest product of the Indian intellect.\n\nIn India the religious life has always been regarded as a journey and a\nsearch after truth. Even the most orthodox and priestly programme admits\nthis. There comes a time when observances are felt to be vain and the\nsoul demands knowledge of the essence of things. And though later\ndogmatism asserts that this knowledge is given by revelation, yet a note\nof genuine enquiry and speculation is struck in the Vedas and is never\nentirely silenced throughout the long procession of Indian writers. In\nwell-known words the Vedas ask[180] \"Who is the God to whom we shall\noffer our sacrifice? ... Who is he who is the Creator and sustainer of\nthe Universe ... whose shadow is immortality, whose shadow is death?\"\nor, in even more daring phrases[181], \"The Gods were subsequent to the\ncreation of this universe. Who then knows whence it sprang? He who in\nthe highest heaven is the overseer of this universe, he knows or even he\ndoes not know.\" These profound enquiries, which have probably no\nparallel in the contemporary literature of other nations, are as time\ngoes on supplemented though perhaps not enlarged by many others, nor\ndoes confidence fail that there is an answer--the Truth, which when known\nis the goal of life. A European is inclined to ask what use can be made\nof the truth, but for the Hindus divine knowledge is an end and a state,\nnot a means. It is not thought of as something which may be used to\nimprove the world or for any other purpose whatever. For use and purpose\nimply that the thing utilized is subservient and inferior to an end,\nwhereas divine knowledge is the culmination and meaning of the universe,\nor, from another point of view, the annihilation of both the external\nworld and individuality. Hence the Hindu does not expect of his saints\nphilanthropy or activity of any sort.\n\nAs already indicated, the characteristic (though not the only) answer of\nIndia to these questionings is that nothing really exists except God or,\nbetter, except Brahman. The soul is identical with Brahman. The external\nworld which we perceive is not real in the same sense: it is in some way\nor other an evolution of Brahman or even mere illusion. This doctrine is\nnot universal: it is for instance severely criticized and rejected by\nthe older forms of Buddhism but its hold on the Indian temperament is\nseen by its reappearance in later Buddhism where by an astounding\ntransformation the Buddha is identified with the universal spirit.\nThough the form in which I have quoted the doctrine above is an epitome\nof the Ved\u00e2nta, it is hardly correct historically to give it as an\nepitome of the older Upanishads. Their teaching is less complete and\nuncompromising, more veiled, tentative and allusive, and sometimes\ncumbered by material notions. But it is obviously the precursor of the\nVed\u00e2nta and the devout Ved\u00e2ntist can justify his system from it.\n\n\n3\n\nInstead of attempting to summarize the Upanishads it may be well to\nquote one or two celebrated passages. One is from the\nBrihad-\u00c2ranyaka[182] and relates how Y\u00e2j\u00f1avalkya, when about to retire\nto the forest as an ascetic, wished to divide his property between his\ntwo wives, K\u00e2ty\u00e2yan\u00ee \"who possessed only such knowledge as women\npossess\" and Maitrey\u00ee \"who was conversant with Brahman.\" The latter\nasked her husband whether she would be immortal if she owned the whole\nworld. \"No,\" he replied, \"like the life of the rich would be thy life\nbut there is no hope of immortality.\" Maitrey\u00ee said that she had no need\nof what would not make her immortal. Y\u00e2j\u00f1avalkya proceeded to explain to\nher his doctrine of the \u00c2tman, the self or essence, the spirit present\nin man as well as in the universe. \"Not for the husband's sake is the\nhusband dear but for the sake of the \u00c2tman. Not for the wife's sake is\nthe wife dear but for the sake of the \u00c2tman. Not for their own sake are\nsons, wealth, Brahmans, warriors, worlds, gods, Vedas and all things\ndear, but for the sake of the \u00c2tman. The \u00c2tman is to be seen, to be\nheard, to be perceived, to be marked: by him who has seen and known the\n\u00c2tman all the universe is known.... He who looks for Brahmans, warriors,\nworlds, gods or Vedas anywhere but in the \u00c2tman, loses them all....\"\n\n\"As all waters have their meeting place in the sea, all touch in the\nskin, all tastes in the tongue, all odours in the nose, all colours in\nthe eye, all sounds in the ear, all percepts in the mind, all knowledge\nin the heart, all actions in the hands....As a lump of salt has no\ninside nor outside and is nothing but taste, so has this \u00c2tman neither\ninside nor outside and is nothing but knowledge. Having risen from out\nthese elements it (the human soul) vanishes with them. When it has\ndeparted (after death) there is no more consciousness.\" Here Maitrey\u00ee\nprofesses herself bewildered but Y\u00e2j\u00f1avalkya continues \"I say nothing\nbewildering. Verily, beloved, that \u00c2tman is imperishable and\nindestructible. When there is as it were duality, then one sees the\nother, one tastes the other, one salutes the other, one hears the other,\none touches the other, one knows the other. But when the \u00c2tman only is\nall this, how should we see, taste, hear, touch or know another? How can\nwe know him by whose power we know all this? That \u00c2tman is to be\ndescribed by no, no (neti, neti). He is incomprehensible for he cannot\nbe comprehended, indestructible for he cannot be destroyed, unattached\nfor he does not attach himself: he knows no bonds, no suffering, no\ndecay. How, O beloved, can one know the knower?\" And having so spoken,\nY\u00e2j\u00f1avalkya went away into the forest. In another verse of the same work\nit is declared that \"This great unborn \u00c2tman (or Self) undecaying,\nundying, immortal, fearless, is indeed Brahman.\"\n\nIt is interesting that this doctrine, evidently regarded as the\nquintessence of Y\u00e2j\u00f1avalkya's knowledge, should be imparted to a woman.\nIt is not easy to translate. \u00c2tman, of course, means self and is so\nrendered by Max M\u00fcller in this passage, but it seems to me that this\nrendering jars on the English ear for it inevitably suggests the\nindividual self and selfishness, whereas \u00c2tman means the universal\nspirit which is Self, because it is the highest (or only) Reality and\nBeing, not definable in terms of anything else. Nothing, says\nY\u00e2j\u00f1avalkya, has any value, meaning, or indeed reality except in\nrelation to this Self[183]. The whole world including the Vedas and\nreligion is an emanation from him. The passage at which Maitrey\u00ee\nexpresses her bewilderment is obscure, but the reply is more definite.\nThe Self is indestructible but still it is incorrect to speak of the\nsoul having knowledge and perception after death, for knowledge and\nperception imply duality, a subject and an object. But when the human\nsoul and the universal \u00c2tman are one, there is no duality and no human\nexpression can be correctly used about the \u00c2tman. Whatever you say of\nit, the answer must be _neti, neti_, it is not like that[184]; that is\nto say, the ordinary language used about the individual soul is not\napplicable to the \u00c2tman or to the human soul when regarded as identical\nwith it.\n\nThis identity is stated more precisely in another passage[185] where\nfirst occurs the celebrated formula Tat tvam asi, That art Thou, or Thou\nart It[186], _i.e._ the human soul is the \u00c2tman and hence there is no\nreal distinction between souls. Like Y\u00e2j\u00f1iavalkya's teaching, the\nstatement of this doctrine takes the form of an intimate conversation,\nthis time between a Brahman, Udd\u00e2laka \u00c2runi, and his son Svetaketu who\nis twenty-four years of age and having just finished his studentship is\nvery well satisfied with himself. His father remarks on his conceit and\nsays \"Have you ever asked your teachers for that instruction by which\nthe unheard becomes heard, the unperceived perceived and the unknown\nknown?\" Svetaketu enquires what this instruction is and his father\nreplies, \"As by one lump of clay all that is made of clay is known, and\nthe change[187] is a mere matter of words, nothing but a name, the truth\nbeing that all is clay, and as by one piece of copper or by one pair of\nnail-scissors all that is made of copper or iron can be known, so is\nthat instruction.\" That is to say, it would seem, the reality is One:\nall diversity and multiplicity is secondary and superficial, merely a\nmatter of words. \"In the beginning,\" continues the father, \"there was\nonly that which is, one without a second. Others say in the beginning\nthere was that only which is not (non-existence), one without a second,\nand from that which is not, that which is was born. But how could that\nwhich is be born of that which is not[188]? No, only that which is was\nin the beginning, one only without a second. It thought, may I be many:\nmay I have offspring. It sent forth fire.\" Here follows a cosmogony and\nan explanation of the constitution of animate beings, and then the\nfather continues--\"All creatures have their root in the Real, dwell in\nthe Real and rest in the Real. That subtle being by which this universe\nsubsists, it is the Real, it is the \u00c2tman, and thou, Svetaketu, art It.\"\nMany illustrations of the relations of the \u00c2tman and the universe\nfollow. For instance, if the life (sap) leaves a tree, it withers and\ndies. So \"this body withers and dies when the life has left it: the life\ndies not.\" In the fruit of the Banyan (fig-tree) are minute seeds\ninnumerable. But the imperceptible subtle essence in each seed is the\nwhole Banyan. Each example adduced concludes with the same formula, Thou\nart that subtle essence, and as in the Brihad-\u00c2ranyaka salt is used as a\nmetaphor. \"'Place this salt in water and then come to me in the\nmorning.' The son did so and in the morning the father said 'Bring me\nthe salt.' The son looked for it but found it not, for of course it was\nmelted. The father said, 'Taste from the surface of the water. How is\nit?' The son replied, 'It is salt.' 'Taste from the middle. How is it?'\n'It is salt.' 'Taste from the bottom, how is it?' 'It is salt.' ... The\nfather said, 'Here also in this body you do not perceive the Real, but\nthere it is. That subtle being by which this universe subsists, it is\nthe Real, it is the \u00c2tman and thou, Svetaketu, art It.'\"\n\nThe writers of these passages have not quite reached Sankara's point of\nview, that the \u00c2tman is all and the whole universe mere illusion or\nM\u00e2y\u00e2. Their thought still tends to regard the universe as something\ndrawn forth from the \u00c2tman and then pervaded by it. But still the main\nfeatures of the later Advaita, or philosophy of no duality, are there.\nAll the universe has grown forth from the \u00c2tman: there is no real\ndifference in things, just as all gold is gold whatever it is made into.\nThe soul is identical with this \u00c2tman and after death may be one with it\nin a union excluding all duality even of perceiver and perceived.\n\nA similar union occurs in sleep. This idea is important for it is\nclosely connected with another belief which has had far-reaching\nconsequences on thought and practice in India, the belief namely that\nthe soul can attain without death and as the result of mental discipline\nto union[189] with Brahman. This idea is common in Hinduism and though\nBuddhism rejects the notion of union with the supreme spirit yet it\nattaches importance to meditation and makes Sam\u00e2dhi or rapture the crown\nof the perfect life. In this, as in other matters, the teaching of the\nUpanishads is manifold and unsystematic compared with later doctrines.\nThe older passages ascribe to the soul three states corresponding to the\nbodily conditions of waking, dream-sleep, and deep dreamless sleep, and\nthe Brihad-\u00c2ranyaka affirms of the last (IV. 3. 32): \"This is the Brahma\nworld. This is his highest world, this is his highest bliss. All other\ncreatures live on a small portion of that bliss.\" But even in some\nUpanishads of the second stratum (M\u00e2ndukya, Maitr\u00e2yana) we find added a\nfourth state, Caturtha or more commonly Tur\u00eeya, in which the bliss\nattainable in deep sleep is accompanied by consciousness[190]. This\ntheory and various practices founded on it develop rapidly.\n\n\n4\n\nThe explanation of dreamless sleep as supreme bliss and Y\u00e2j\u00f1avalkya's\nstatement that the soul after death cannot be said to know or feel, may\nsuggest that union with Brahman is another name for annihilation. But\nthat is not the doctrine of the Upanishads though a European perhaps\nmight say that the consciousness contemplated is so different from\nordinary human consciousness that it should not bear the same name. In\nanother passage[191] Y\u00e2j\u00f1avalkya himself explains \"when he does not\nknow, yet he is knowing though he does not know. For knowing is\ninseparable from the knower, because it cannot perish. But there is no\nsecond, nothing else different from him that he could know.\" A common\nformula for Brahman in the later philosophy is Saccid\u00e2nanda, Being,\nThought and Joy[192]. This is a just summary of the earlier teaching. We\nhave already seen how the \u00c2tman is recognized as the only Reality. Its\nintellectual character is equally clearly affirmed. Thus the\nBrihad-\u00c2ranyaka (III. 7. 23) says: \"There is no seer beside him, no\nhearer beside him, no perceiver beside him, no knower beside him. This\nis thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal. Everything distinct from\nhim is subject to pain.\" This idea that pain and fear exist only as far\nas a man makes a distinction between his own self and the real Self is\neloquently developed in the division of the Taittir\u00eeya Upanishad called\nthe Chapter of Bliss. \"He who knows Brahman\" it declares, \"which exists,\nwhich is conscious, which is without end, as hidden in the depth of the\nheart, and in farthest space, he enjoys all blessings, in communion with\nthe omniscient Brahman.... He who knows the bliss (\u00e2nandam) of that\nBrahman from which all speech and mind turn away unable to reach it, he\nnever fears[193].\"\n\nBliss is obtainable by union with Brahman, and the road to such union is\nknowledge of Brahman. That knowledge is often represented as acquired by\ntapas or asceticism, but this, though repeatedly enjoined as necessary,\nseems to be regarded (in the nobler expositions at least) as an\nindispensable schooling rather than as efficacious by its own virtue.\nSometimes the topic is treated in an almost Buddhist spirit of\nreasonableness and depreciation of self-mortification for its own sake.\nThus Y\u00e2j\u00f1avalkya says to G\u00e2rg\u00ee[194]: \"Whoever without knowing the\nimperishable one offers oblations in this world, sacrifices, and\npractises asceticism even for a thousand years, his work will perish.\"\nAnd in a remarkable scene described in the Ch\u00e2ndogya Upanishad, the\nthree sacred fires decide to instruct a student who is exhausted by\nausterities, and tell him that Brahman is life, bliss and space[195].\n\nAnalogous to the conception of Brahman as bliss, is the description of\nhim as light or \"light of lights.\" A beautiful passage[196] says: \"To\nthe wise who perceive him (Brahman) within their own self, belongs\neternal peace, not to others. They feel that highest, unspeakable bliss\nsaying, this is that. How then can I understand it? Has it its own light\nor does it reflect light? No sun shines there, nor moon nor stars, nor\nthese lightnings, much less this fire. When he shines everything shines\nafter him: by his light all the world is lighted.\"\n\nIn most of the texts which we have examined the words Brahman and \u00c2tman\nare so impersonal that they cannot be replaced by God. In other passages\nthe conception of the deity is more personal. The universe is often said\nto have been emitted or breathed forth by Brahman. By emphasizing the\norigin and result of this process separately, we reach the idea of the\nMaker and Master of the Universe, commonly expressed by the word \u00cesvara,\nLord. But even when using this expression, Hindu thought tends in its\nsubtler moments to regard both the creator and the creature as\nillusions. In the same sense as the world exists there also exists its\ncreator who is an aspect of Brahman, but the deeper truth is that\nneither is real: there is but One who neither makes nor is made[197]. In\na land of such multiform theology it would be hazardous to say that\nMonotheism has always arisen out of Pantheism, but in the speculative\nschools where the Upanishads were composed, this was often its genesis.\nThe older idea is that a subtle essence pervades all nature and the\ndeities who rule nature: this is spiritualized into the doctrine of\nBrahman attributed to Y\u00e2j\u00f1avalkya and it is only by a secondary process\nthat this Brahman is personified and sometimes identified with a\nparticular god such as Siva. The doctrine of the personal \u00cesvara is\nelaborated in the Svet\u00e2svatara Upanishad of uncertain date[198]. It\ncelebrates him in hymns of almost Mohammedan monotheism. \"Let us know\nthat great Lord of Lords, the highest God of Gods, the Master of\nMasters, the highest above, as God, as Lord of the world, who is to be\nglorified[199].\" But this monotheistic fervour does not last long\nwithout relapsing into the familiar pantheistic strain. \"Thou art\nwoman,\" says the same Upanishad[200], \"and Thou art man: Thou art youth\nand maiden: Thou as an old man totterest along on thy staff: Thou art\nborn with thy face turned everywhere. Thou art the dark-blue bee: Thou\nthe green parrot with the red eyes. Thou art the thunder cloud, the\nseasons and the seas. Thou art without beginning because Thou art\ninfinite, Thou, from whom all worlds are born.\"\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nRELIGIOUS LIFE IN PRE-BUDDHIST INDIA\n\n\nIn reading the Br\u00e2hmanas and older Upanishads we often wish we knew more\nof the writers and their lives. Rarely can so many representative men\nhave bequeathed so much literature and yet left so dim a sketch of their\ntimes. Thought was their real life: of that they have given a full\nrecord, imperfect only in chronology, for though their speculations are\noften set forth in a narrative form, we hear surprisingly little about\ncontemporary events.\n\nThe territory familiar to these works is the western part of the modern\nUnited Provinces with the neighbouring districts of the Panjab, the\nlands of the Kurus, Panc\u00e2las, and Matsyas, all in the region of Agra and\nDelhi, and further east K\u00e2si (Benares) with Videha or Tirhut. G\u00e2ndh\u00e2ra\nwas known[201] but Magadha and Bengal are not mentioned. Even in the\nBuddha's lifetime they were still imperfectly brahmanized.\n\nWhat we know of the period 800 to 600 B.C. is mostly due to the\nBrahmans, and many Indianists have accepted their view, that they were\nthen socially the highest class and the repository of religion and\nculture. But it is clear from Buddhist writings (which, however, are\nsomewhat later) that this pre-eminence was not unchallenged[202], and\nmany admissions in the Br\u00e2hmanas and Upanishads indicate that some\ncenturies before the Buddha the Kshatriyas held socially the first rank\nand shared intellectual honours with the Brahmans. Janaka, king of\nVideha[203], and Y\u00e2j\u00f1avalkya, the Brahman, meet on terms of mutual\nrespect and other Kshatriyas, such as Aj\u00e2tasatru of K\u00e2si and Prav\u00e2hana\nJaivali are represented as instructing Brahmans, and the latter in doing\nso says \"this knowledge did not go to any Brahman before but belonged to\nthe Kshatriyas alone[204].\" But as a profession theology, both practical\nand speculative, was left to the Brahmans.\n\nThe proper relation between the nobles and Brahmans finds expression in\nthe office of Purohita[205] or domestic chaplain, which is as old as the\nVedas and has lasted to the present day. In early times he was not\nmerely a spiritual guide but also a councillor expected to advise the\nking as to his enterprises and secure their success by appropriate\nrites. By king we should understand a tribal chief, entrusted with\nconsiderable powers in the not infrequent times of war, but in peace\nobliged to consult the clan, or at least the aristocratic part of it, on\nall matters of importance. A Purohita might attain a very high position,\nlike Devabhaga, priest of both the Kurus and Srinjayas[206]. The\nBrahmans did not attempt to become kings, but the sacred books insist\nthat though a Brahman can do without a king, yet a king cannot do\nwithout a Brahman. The two castes are compared to the deities Mitra and\nVaruna, typifying intelligence and will. When they are united deeds can\nbe done[207]. But \"the Gods do not eat the food of a king who is without\na Purohita.\" Other castes can offer sacrifices only by the mediation of\nBrahmans, and it does not appear that kings disputed this, though they\nclaimed the right to think for themselves and may have denied the\nutility of sacrifice[208]. Apart from kings the duties and claims of the\nBrahman extend to the people at large. He has four virtues, \"birth,\ndeportment, fame and the perfecting of the people,\" and in return the\npeople owe him respect, liberality, security against oppression and\nagainst capital punishment.\n\nTowns in this period must have been few and those few essentially forts,\nnot collections of palaces and temples. We hear of K\u00e2si (Benares) but\nthe name may signify a district. People are said to go to the Kurus or\nPanc\u00e2las, not to Mithil\u00e2 or any other city. It was in village life--which\nis still the life of the greater part of India--that Brahmanism grew up.\nProbably then as now Brahman families occupied separate villages, or at\nleast quarters, and were allowed to hold the land rent free as a reward\nfor rendering religious services to the king. They followed various\nprofessions but the life which was most respected, and also most\nlucrative, was that devoted to the study and practice of sacred science,\nthat is the learning and recitation of sacred texts, performance of\nceremonies, and theological discussion. The later law books divide a\nBrahman's life into four stages or \u00e2sramas in which he was successively\na student, a householder, a hermit and an ascetic[209]. The third and\nfourth stages are not very clearly distinguished. A hermit is supposed\nto renounce family life and live in the forest, but still to perform\nsacrifices, whereas the Sanny\u00e2si or perfect ascetic, in many ways the\nideal of India, subsists on alms, freed alike from duties and passions\nand absorbed in meditation. In the older Upanishads three stages are\nindicated as part of contemporary practice[210]. For a period of from\nnine to thirty-six years, a Brahman dwelt with a teacher. While his\nstate of pupilage lasted he lived on alms and was bound by the severest\nvows of obedience and chastity. The instruction given consisted in\nimparting sacred texts which could be acquired only by hearing them\nrecited, for writing, though it may have been known in India as early as\nthe seventh century B.C., was not used for literature. The Satapatha\nBr\u00e2hmana recommends the study not only of the four Vedas but of the\nprecepts (perhaps grammar, etymology, etc.), the sciences (perhaps\nphilosophy), dialogues (no doubt such as those found in the Upanishads),\ntraditions and ancient legends, stanzas and tales of heroes[211],\nshowing that, besides the scriptures, more popular compositions which\ndoubtless contained the germs of the later Epics and Puranas were held\nin esteem.\n\nOn terminating his apprenticeship the young Brahman became a householder\nand married, moderate polygamy being usual. To some extent he followed\nthe occupations of an ordinary man of business and father of a family,\nbut the most important point in establishing a home of his own was the\nkindling of his own sacred fire[212], and the householder's life was\nregarded as a series of rites, such as the daily offering of milk, the\nnew and full moon ceremonies, seasonal sacrifices every four months and\nthe Soma sacrifice once a year, besides oblations to ancestors and other\ndomestic observances. The third stage of life should begin when a\nhouseholder sees that his hair is turning grey and a grandson has been\nborn. He should then abandon his home and live in the forest. The\ntradition that it is justifiable and even commendable for men and women\nto abandon their families and take to the religious life has at all\ntimes been strong in India and public opinion has never considered that\nthe deserted party had a grievance. No doubt comfortable householders\nwere in no hurry to take to the woods and many must always have shirked\nthe duty. But on the other hand, the very pious, of whom India has\nalways produced a superabundance, were not willing to bear the cares of\ndomestic life and renounced the world before the prescribed time. On the\nwhole Brahmanic (as opposed to Buddhist) literature is occupied in\ninsisting not so much that the devout should abandon the world as that\nthey must perform the ritual observances prescribed for householders\nbefore doing so.\n\nThe Brahman's existence as drawn in the law-books is a description of\nwhat the writers thought ought to be done rather than of the general\npractice. Still it cannot be dismissed as imaginary, for the\nNambutiri[213] Brahmans of Travancore have not yet abandoned a mode of\nlife which is in essentials that prescribed by Manu and probably that\nled by Brahmans in the seventh century B.C. or earlier[214].\n\nThey are for the most part landowners dwelling in large houses built to\naccommodate a patriarchal family and erected in spacious compounds. In\nyouth they spend about eight years in learning the Veda, and in mature\nlife religious ceremonies, including such observances as bathing and the\npreparation of meals, occupy about six hours of the day. As a\nprofession, the performance of religious rites for others is most\nesteemed. In food, drink and pleasures, the Nambutiris are almost\nascetics: their rectitude, punctiliousness and dignity still command\nexaggerated respect. But they seem unproductive and petrified, even in\nsuch matters as literature and scholarship, and their inability to adapt\nthemselves to changing conditions threatens them with impoverishment and\ndeterioration.\n\nYet the ideal Brahmanic life, which by no means excludes intellectual\nactivity, is laid out in severe and noble lines and though on its good\nside somewhat beyond the reach of human endeavour and on its bad side\noverloaded with pedantry and superstition, it combines in a rare degree\nself-abnegation and independence. It differs from the ideal set up by\nBuddhism and by many forms of Hinduism which preach the renunciation of\nfamily ties, for it clearly lays down that it is a man's duty to\ncontinue his family and help his fellow men just as much as to engage in\nreligious exercises. Thus, the Satapatha Br\u00e2hmana[215] teaches that man\nis born owing four debts, one to the gods, one to the Rishis or the\nsages to whom the Vedic hymns were revealed, one to his ancestors and\none to men. To discharge these obligations he must offer sacrifices,\nstudy the Veda, beget a son and practise hospitality.\n\nThe tranquil isolation of village life in ancient India has left its\nmark on literature. Though the names of teachers are handed down and\ntheir opinions cited with pious care, yet for many centuries after the\nVedic age we find no books attributed to human authors. There was an\nindifference to literary fame among these early philosophers and a\ncurious selflessness. Doctors disputed as elsewhere, yet they were at no\npains to couple their names with theories or sects. Like the Jewish\nRabbis they were content to go down to posterity as the authors of a few\nsayings, and these are mostly contributions to a common stock with no\npretension to be systems of philosophy. The Upanishads leave an\nimpression of a society which, if reposeful, was also mentally alert and\ntolerant to an unusual degree. Much was absent that occupied the\nintelligence of other countries. Painting, sculpture and architecture\ncan have attained but modest proportions and the purview of religion\nincluded neither temples nor images. India was untroubled by foreign\ninvasions and all classes seem to have been content to let the\nKshatriyas look after such internal politics as there were. Trade too\nwas on a small scale. Doubtless the Indian was then, as now, a good man\nof business and the western coast may have been affected by its\nrelations with the Persian Gulf, but Brahmanic civilization was a thing\nof the Midland and drew no inspiration from abroad. The best minds were\noccupied with the leisurely elaboration and discussion of speculative\nideas and self-effacement was both practised and preached.\n\nBut movement and circulation prevented this calm rustic world from\nbecoming stagnant. Though roads were few and dangerous, a habit of\ntravel was conspicuous among the religious and intellectual classes. The\nIndian is by nature a pilgrim rather than a stationary monk, and we\noften hear of Brahmans travelling in quest of knowledge alone or in\ncompanies, and stopping in rest houses[216]. In the Satapatha\nBr\u00e2hmana[217], Udd\u00e2laka \u00c2runi is represented as driving about and\noffering a piece of gold as a prize to those who could defeat him in\nargument. Great sacrifices were often made the occasion of these\ndiscussions. We must not think of them as mere religious ceremonies, as\na sort of high mass extending over several days. The fact that they\nlasted so long and involved operations like building sheds and altars\nmade them unlike our church services and gave opportunities for debate\nand criticism of what was done. Such competition and publicity were good\nfor the wits. The man who cut the best figure in argument was in\ngreatest demand as a sacrificer and obtained the highest fees. But these\nstories of prizes and fees emphasize a feature which has characterized\nthe Brahmans from Vedic times to the present day, namely, their\nshameless love of money. The severest critic cannot deny them a\ndisinterested taste for intellectual, religious and spiritual things,\nbut their own books often use language which shows them as professional\nmen merely anxious to make a fortune by the altar. \"The sacrifice is\ntwofold,\" says the Satapatha Br\u00e2hmana, \"oblations to the gods and gifts\nto the priests. With oblations men gratify the gods and with gifts the\nhuman gods. These two kinds of gods when gratified convey the worshipper\nto the heavenly world[218].\" Without a fee the sacrifice is as dead as\nthe victim. It is the fee which makes it living and successful[219].\n\nTradition has preserved the names of many of these acute, argumentative,\nfee-loving priests, but of few can we form any clear picture. The most\ndistinguished is Y\u00e2j\u00f1avalkya who, though seen through a mist of myths\nand trivial stories about the minutiae of ritual, appears as a\npersonality with certain traits that are probably historical. Many\nremarks attributed to him are abrupt and scornful and the legend\nindicates dimly that he was once thought a dangerous innovator. But, as\nhas happened so often since, this early heretic became the corner stone\nof later orthodoxy. He belonged to the school of the Yajur Veda and was\napparently the main author of the new or White recension in which the\nprayers and directions are more or less separate, whereas in the old or\nBlack recension they are mixed together. According to the legend he\nvomited forth the texts which he had learnt, calling his fellow pupils\n\"miserable and inefficient Brahmans,\" and then received a new revelation\nfrom the Sun[220]. The quarrel was probably violent for the Satapatha\nBr\u00e2hmana mentions that he was cursed by priests of the other party. Nor\ndoes this work, while recognizing him as the principal teacher, endorse\nall his sayings. Thus it forbids the eating of beef but adds the curious\nremark \"Nevertheless Y\u00e2j\u00f1avalkya said, I for one eat it, provided it is\ntender[221].\" Remarkable, too, is his answer to the question what would\nhappen if all the ordinary materials for sacrifices were absent, \"Then\nindeed nothing would be offered here, but there would be offered the\ntruth in faith[222].\" It is probable that the Black Yajur Veda\nrepresents the more western schools and that the native land of the\nWhite recension and of Y\u00e2j\u00f1avalkya lay further east, perhaps in Videha.\nBut his chief interest for us is not the reforms in text and ritual\nwhich he may have made, but his philosophic doctrines of which I have\nalready spoken. Our principal authority for them is the Brihad-\u00c2ranyaka\nUpanishad of which he is the protagonist, much as Socrates is of the\nPlatonic dialogues. Unfortunately the striking picture which it gives of\nY\u00e2j\u00f1avalkya cannot be accepted as historical. He is a prominent figure\nin the Satapatha Br\u00e2hmana which is older than the Upanishad and\nrepresents an earlier stage of speculation. The sketch of his doctrines\nwhich it contains is clearly a preliminary study elaborated and\namplified in the Upanishad. But if a personage is introduced in early\nworks as expounding a rudimentary form of certain doctrines and in later\nworks is credited with a matured philosophy, there can be little doubt\nthat he has become a great name whose authority is invoked by later\nthought, much as Solomon was made the author of the Proverbs and\nEcclesiastes and the Song which bears his name.\n\nY\u00e2j\u00f1avalkya appears in the Brihad-\u00c2ranyaka as the respected friend but\napparently not the chaplain of King Janaka. This monarch celebrated a\ngreat sacrifice and offered a thousand cows with a present of money to\nhim who should prove himself wisest. Y\u00e2j\u00f1avalkya rather arrogantly bade\nhis pupil drive off the beasts. But his claim was challenged: seven\nBrahmans and one woman, G\u00e2rg\u00ee V\u00e2caknav\u00ee, disputed with him at length but\nhad to admit his superiority. A point of special interest is raised by\nthe question what happens after death. Y\u00e2j\u00f1avalkya said to his\nquestioner, \"'Take my hand, my friend. We two alone shall know of this.\nLet this question of ours not be discussed in public.' Then these two\nwent out and argued, and what they said was Karma and what they praised\nwas Karma[223].\" The doctrine that a man's deeds cause his future\nexistence and determine its character was apparently not popular among\nthe priesthood who claimed that by their rites they could manufacture\nheavenly bodies for their clients.\n\n\n2\n\nThis imperfect and sketchy picture of religious life in India so far as\nit can be gathered from the older Brahmanic books has reference mainly\nto the kingdoms of the Kuru-Panc\u00e2las and Videha in 800-600 B.C. Another\npicture, somewhat fuller, is found in the ancient literature of the\nBuddhists and Jains, which depicts the kingdoms of Magadha (Bihar) and\nKosala (Oudh) in the time of the Buddha and Mah\u00e2v\u00eera, the founder of\nJainism, that is, about 500 B.C. or rather earlier. It is probable that\nthe picture is substantially true for this period or even for a period\nconsiderably earlier, for Mah\u00e2v\u00eera was supposed to have revived with\nmodifications the doctrines of Parsvan\u00e2tha and some of the Buddhas\nmentioned as preceding Gotama were probably historical personages. But\nthe Brahmanic and Buddhist accounts do not give two successive phases of\nthought in the same people, for the locality is not quite the same. Both\npictures include the territory of K\u00e2si and Videha, but the Brahmanic\nlandscape lies mainly to the west and the Buddhist mainly to the east of\nthis region. In the Buddhist sphere it is clear that in the youth of\nGotama Brahmanic doctrines and ritual were well known but not\npredominant. It is hardly demonstrable from literature, but still\nprobable, that the ideas and usages which found expression in Jainism\nand Buddhism existed in the western districts, though less powerful\nthere than in the east[224].\n\nA striking feature of the world in which Jainism and Buddhism arose was\nthe prevalence of confraternities or religious orders. They were the\nrecognized form of expression not only for piety but for the germs of\ntheology, metaphysics and science. The ordinary man of the world kept on\ngood terms with such gods as came his way, but those who craved for some\nhigher interest often separated themselves from the body of citizens and\nfollowed some special rule of life. In one sense the Brahmans were the\ngreatest of such communities, but they were a hereditary corporation and\nthough they were not averse to new ideas, their special stock in trade\nwas an acquaintance with traditional formul\u00e6 and rites. They were also,\nin the main, sedentary and householders. Somewhat opposed to them were\nother companies, described collectively as Paribb\u00e2jakas or Samanas[225].\nThese, though offering many differences among themselves, were clearly\ndistinguished from the Brahmans, and it is probable that they usually\nbelonged to the warrior caste. But they did not maintain that religious\nknowledge was the exclusive privilege of any caste: they were not\nhouseholders but wanderers and celibates. Often they were ascetics and\naddicted to extreme forms of self-mortification. They did not study the\nVedas or perform sacrifices, and their speculations were often\nrevolutionary, and as a rule not theistic. It is not easy to find any\nEnglish word which describes these people or the Buddhist Bhikkhus. Monk\nis perhaps the best, though inadequate. Pilgrim and friar give the idea\nof wandering, but otherwise suggest wrong associations. But in calling\nthem monks, we must remember that though celibates, and to some extent\nrecluses (for they mixed with the world only in a limited degree), they\nwere not confined in cloisters. The more stationary lived in woods,\neither in huts or the open air, but many spent the greater part of the\nyear in wandering.\n\nThe practice of adopting a wandering religious life was frequent among\nthe upper classes, and must have been a characteristic feature of\nsociety. No blame attached to the man who abruptly left his family,\nthough well-to-do people are represented as dissuading their children\nfrom the step. The interest in philosophical and theological questions\nwas perhaps even greater than among the Brahmans, and they were\nrecognized not as parerga to a life of business or amusement, but as\noccupations in themselves. Material civilization had not kept pace with\nthe growth of thought and speculation. Thus restless and inquisitive\nminds found little to satisfy them in villages or small towns, and the\nwanderer, instead of being a useless rolling stone, was likely not only\nto have a more interesting life but to meet with sympathy and respect.\nIdeas and discussion were plentiful but there were no books and hardly\nany centres of learning. Yet there was even more movement than among the\ntravelling priests of the Kurus and Panc\u00e2las, a coming and going, a\ntrafficking in ideas. Knowledge was to be picked up in the market-places\nand highways. Up and down the main roads circulated crowds of highly\nintelligent men. They lived upon alms, that is to say, they were fed by\nthe citizens who favoured their opinions or by those good souls who gave\nindiscriminately to all holy men--and in the larger places rest houses\nwere erected for their comfort. It was natural that the more commanding\nand original spirits should collect others round them and form bands,\nfor though there was public discussion, writing was not used for\nreligious purposes and he who would study any doctrine had to become the\npupil of a master. The doctrine too involved a discipline, or mode of\nlife best led in common. Hence these bands easily grew into communities\nwhich we may call orders or sects, if we recognize that their\nconstitution was more fluid and less formal than is implied by those\nwords. It is not easy to say how much organization such communities\npossessed before the time of the Buddha. His Sangha was the most\nsuccessful of them all and doubtless surpassed the others in this as in\nother respects. Yet it was modelled on existing institutions and the\nVinaya Pitaka[226] itself represents him as prescribing the observance\nof times and seasons, not so much because he thought it necessary as\nbecause the laity suggested that he would do well to follow the practice\nof the Titthiya schools. By this phrase we are to understand the\nadherents of Makkhali Gos\u00e2la, S\u00e2\u00f1jaya Belatthiputta and others. We know\nless about these sects than we could wish, but two lists of schools or\ntheories are preserved, one in the Brahmaj\u00e2la Sutta[227] where the\nBuddha himself criticises 62 erroneous views and another in Jain\nliterature[228], which enumerates no fewer than 363.\n\nBoth catalogues are somewhat artificial, and it is clear that many views\nare mentioned not because they represent the tenets of real schools but\nfrom a desire to condemn all possible errors. But the list of topics\ndiscussed is interesting. From the Brahmaj\u00e2la Sutta we learn that the\nproblems which agitated ancient Magadha were such as the following:--is\nthe world eternal or not: is it infinite or finite: is there a cause for\nthe origin of things or is it without cause: does the soul exist after\ndeath: if so, is its existence conscious or unconscious: is it eternal\nor does it cease to exist, not necessarily at the end of its present\nlife but after a certain number of lives: can it enjoy perfect bliss\nhere or elsewhere? Theories on these and other points are commonly\ncalled v\u00e2da or talk, and those who hold them v\u00e2dins. Thus there is the\nK\u00e2la-v\u00e2da[229] which makes Time the origin and principle of the\nuniverse, and the Svabh\u00e2va-vada which teaches that things come into\nbeing of their own accord. This seems crude when stated with archaic\nfrankness but becomes plausible if paraphrased in modern language as\n\"discontinuous variation and the spontaneous origin of definite\nspecies.\" There were also the Niyati-v\u00e2dins, or fatalists, who believed\nthat all that happens is the result of Niyati or fixed order, and the\nYadricch\u00e2-v\u00e2dins who, on the contrary, ascribed everything to chance and\napparently denied causation, because the same result follows from\ndifferent antecedents. It is noticeable that none of these views imply\ntheism or pantheism but the Buddha directed so persistent a polemic\nagainst the doctrine of the \u00c2tman that it must have been known in\nMagadha. The fundamental principles of the S\u00e2nkhya were also known,\nthough perhaps not by that name. It is probably correct to say not that\nthe Buddha borrowed from the S\u00e2nkhya but that both he and the S\u00e2nkhya\naccepted and elaborated in different ways certain current views.\n\nThe Pali Suttas[230] mention six agnostic or materialist teachers and\ngive a brief but perhaps not very just compendium of their doctrines.\nOne of them was the founder of the Jains who, as a sect that has lasted\nto the present day with a considerable record in art and literature,\nmerit a separate chapter. Of the remaining five, one, S\u00e2\u00f1jaya of the\nBelattha clan, was an agnostic, similar to the people described\nelsewhere[231] as eel-wrigglers, who in answer to such questions as, is\nthere a result of good and bad actions, decline to say either _(a)_\nthere is, _(b)_ there is not, _(c)_ there both is and is not, _(d)_\nthere neither is nor is not. This form of argument has been adopted by\nBuddhism for some important questions but S\u00e2\u00f1jaya and his disciples\nappear to have applied it indiscriminately and to have concluded that\npositive assertion is impossible.\n\nThe other four were in many respects what we should call fatalists and\nmaterialists[232], or in the language of their time Akriya-v\u00e2dins,\ndenying, that is, free will, responsibility and the merit or demerit of\ngood or bad actions. They nevertheless believed in metempsychosis and\npractised asceticism. Apparently they held that beings are born again\nand again according to a natural law, but not according to their deeds:\nand that though asceticism cannot accelerate the soul's journey, yet at\na certain stage it is a fore-ordained and indispensable preliminary to\nemancipation. The doctrines attributed to all four are crude and\nstartling. Perhaps they are exaggerated by the Buddhist narrator, but\nthey also reflect the irreverent exuberance of young thought. P\u00fbrana\nKassapa denies that there is any merit in virtue or harm in murder.\nAnother ascetic called Ajita of the garment of hair teaches that nothing\nexists but the four elements, and that \"fools and wise alike are\nannihilated on the dissolution of the body and after death they are\nnot.\" Then why, one asks, was he an ascetic? Similarly Pakudha Kacc\u00e2yana\nstates that \"when a sharp sword cleaves a head in twain\" the soul and\npain play a part similar to that played by the component elements of the\nsword and head. The most important of these teachers was Makkhali\nGos\u00e2la. His doctrine comprises a denial of causation and free will and\nan assertion that fools and wise alike will make an end of pain after\nwandering through eighty-four hundred thousand births. The followers of\nthis teacher were called \u00c2j\u00cevikas: they were a distinct body in the time\nof Asoka, and the name[233] occurs as late as the thirteenth century in\nSouth Indian inscriptions. Several accounts[234] of the founder are\nextant, but all were compiled by bitter opponents, for he was hated by\nJains and Buddhists alike. His doctrine was closely allied to Jainism,\nespecially the Digambara sect, but was probably more extravagant and\nanti-social. He appears to have objected to confraternities[235], to\nhave enjoined a solitary life, absolute nudity and extreme forms of\nself-mortification, such as eating filth. The Jains accused his\nfollowers of immorality and perhaps they were ancient prototypes of the\nlower class of religious mendicants who have brought discredit on\nHinduism.\n\n3\n\nNone of the phases of religious life described above can be called\npopular. The religion of the Brahmans was the thought and science of a\nclass. The various un-Brahmanic confraternities usually required their\nmembers to be wandering ascetics. They had little to say to village\nhouseholders who must have constituted the great majority of the\npopulation. Also there are signs that priests and nobles, however much\nthey quarrelled, combined to keep the lower castes in subjection[236].\nYet we can hardly doubt that then as now all classes were profoundly\nreligious, and that just as to-day village deities unknown to the Vedas,\nor even to the Puranas, receive the worship of millions, so then there\nwere gods and rites that did not lack popular attention though unnoticed\nin the scriptures of Brahmans and Buddhists.\n\nWe know little of this popular religion by direct description before or\neven during the Buddhist period, but we have fragmentary indications of\nits character. Firstly several incongruous observances have obtruded\nthemselves into the Brahmanic ritual. Thus in the course of the\nMah\u00e2vrata ceremony[237] the Hotri priest sits in a swing and maidens,\ncarrying pitchers of water on their heads and singing, dance round an\naltar while drums are beaten. Parallels to this may be found to-day. The\nimage of Krishna, or even a priest who represents Krishna, is swung to\nand fro in many temples, the use of drums in worship is distressingly\ncommon, and during the Pongol festivities in southern India young people\ndance round or leap over a fire. Other remarkable features in the\nMah\u00e2vrata are the shooting of arrows into a target of skin, the use of\nobscene language (such as is still used at the Holi festival) and even\nobscene acts[238]. We must not assume that popular religion in ancient\nIndia was specially indecent, but it probably included ceremonies\nanalogous to the Lupercalia and Thesmophoria, in which licence in words\nand deeds was supposed to promote fertility and prosperity.\n\nWe are also justified in supposing that offerings to ancestors and many\nceremonies mentioned in the Grihya-s\u00fbtras or handbooks of domestic\nritual were performed by far larger classes of the population than the\ngreater sacrifices, but we have no safe criteria for distinguishing\nbetween priestly injunctions and the real practice of ancient times.\n\nSecondly, in the spells and charms of the Atharva[239], which received\nthe Brahmanic imprimatur later than the other three Vedas, we find an\noutlook differing from that of the other Vedas and resembling the\npopular religion of China. Mankind are persecuted by a host of evil\nspirits and protect themselves by charms addressed directly to their\ntormentors or by invoking the aid of beneficent powers. All nature is\nanimated by good and evil spirits, to be dealt with like other natural\nadvantages or difficulties, but not thought of as moral or spiritual\nguides. It is true that the Atharva often rises above this phase, for it\nconsists not of simple folk-lore, but of folk-lore modified\nunder-sacerdotal influence. The protecting powers invoked are often the\ngods of the Rig Veda[240], but prayers and incantations are also\naddressed directly to diseases[241] and demons[242] or, on the other\nhand, to healing plants and amulets[243]. We can hardly be wrong in\nsupposing that in such invocations the Atharva reflects the popular\npractice of its time, but it prefers the invocation of counteracting\nforces, whether Vedic deities or magical plants, to the propitiation of\nmalignant spirits, such as the worship of the goddesses presiding over\nsmallpox and cholera which is still prevalent in India. In this there is\nprobably a contrast between the ideas of the Aryan and non-Aryan races.\nThe latter propitiate the demon or disease; the Aryans invoke a\nbeneficent and healing power. But though on the whole the Atharva is\ninclined to banish the black spectres of popular demonology with the\nhelp of luminous Aryan gods, still we find invoked in it and in its\nsubsidiary literature a multitude of spirits, good and bad, known by\nlittle except their names which, however, often suffice to indicate\ntheir functions. Such are \u00c2s\u00e2pati (Lord of the region), Kshetrapati\n(Lord of the field), both invoked in ceremonies for destroying locusts\nand other noxious insects, Sakambhara and Apv\u00e2, deities of diarrhoea,\nand Ar\u00e2ti, the goddess of avarice and grudge. In one hymn[244] the poet\ninvokes, together with many Vedic deities, all manner of nature spirits,\ndemons, animals, healing plants, seasons and ghosts. A similar\ncollection of queer and vague personalities is found in the popular\npantheon of China to-day[245].\n\nThirdly, various deities who are evidently considered to be well known,\nplay some part in the Pali Pitakas. Those most frequently mentioned are\nMah\u00e2brahm\u00e2 or Brahm\u00e2 Sahampati, and Sakka or Indra, but not quite the\nsame as the Vedic Indra and less in need of libations of Soma. In two\ncurious suttas[246] deputations of deities, clearly intended to include\nall the important gods worshipped at the time, are represented as\nvisiting the Buddha. In both lists a prominent position is given to the\nFour Great Kings, or Ruling Spirits of the Four Quarters, accompanied by\nretinues called Gandhabbas, Kumbhandas, N\u00e2gas, and Yakkhas respectively,\nand similar to the Nats of Burma. The Gandhabbas (or Gandharvas) are\nheavenly musicians and mostly benevolent, but are mentioned in the\nBr\u00e2hmanas as taking possession of women who then deliver oracles. The\nN\u00e2gas are serpents, sometimes represented as cobras with one or more\nheads and sometimes as half human: sometimes they live in palaces under\nthe water or in the depths of the earth and sometimes they are the\ntutelary deities of trees. Serpent worship has undoubtedly been\nprevalent in India in all ages: indications of it are found in the\nearliest Buddhist sculptures and it still survives[247]. The Yakkhas (or\nYakshas) though hardly demons (as their name is often rendered) are\nmostly ill disposed to the human race, sometimes man-eaters and often of\nunedifying conduct. The Mah\u00e2samaya-sutta also mentions mountain spirits\nfrom the Himalaya, Satagiri, and Mount Vepulla. Of the Devas or chiefs\nof the Yakkhas in this catalogue only a few are known to Brahmanic\nworks, such as Soma, Varuna, Venhu (Vishnu), the Yamas, Paj\u00e2pati, Inda\n(Indra), Sanan-kum\u00e2ra. All these deities are enumerated together with\nlittle regard to the positions they occupy in the sacerdotal pantheon.\nThe enquirer finds a similar difficulty when he tries in the twentieth\ncentury to identify rural deities, or even the tutelaries of many great\ntemples, with any personages recognized by the canonical literature.\n\nIn several discourses attributed to the Buddha[248] is incorporated a\ntract called the S\u00eela-vagga, giving a list of practices of which he\ndisapproved, such as divination and the use of spells and drugs. Among\nspecial observances censured, the following are of interest. (_a_) Burnt\nofferings, and offerings of blood drawn from the right knee. (_b_) The\nworship of the Sun, of Siri, the goddess of Luck, and of the Great One,\nmeaning perhaps the Earth. (_c_) Oracles obtained from a mirror, or from\na girl possessed by a spirit or from a god.\n\nWe also find allusions in Buddhist and Jain works as well as in the\ninscriptions of Asoka to popular festivals or fairs called Samajjas[249]\nwhich were held on the tops of hills and seem to have included music,\nrecitations, dancing and perhaps dramatic performances. These meetings\nwere probably like the modern _mela_, half religion and half\nentertainment, and it was in such surroundings that the legends and\nmythology which the great Epics show in full bloom first grew and\nbudded.\n\nThus we have evidence of the existence in pre-Buddhist India of rites\nand beliefs--the latter chiefly of the kind called animistic--disowned for\nthe most part by the Buddhists and only tolerated by the Brahmans. No\nelaborate explanation of this popular religion or of its relation to\nmore intellectual and sacerdotal cults is necessary, for the same thing\nexists at the present day and the best commentary on the S\u00eela-vagga is\nCrooke's _Popular Religion and Folk-lore of Northern India_.\n\nIn themselves such popular superstitions may seem despicable and\nrepulsive (as the Buddha found them), but when they are numerous and\nvigorous, as in India, they have a real importance for they provide a\nmatrix and nursery in which the beginnings of great religions may be\nreared. S\u00e2ktism and the worship of R\u00e2ma and Krishna, together with many\nless conspicuous cults, all entered Brahmanism in this way. Whenever a\npopular cult grew important or whenever Brahmanic influence spread to a\nnew district possessing such a cult, the popular cult was recognized and\nbrahmanized. This policy can be abundantly illustrated for the last four\nor five centuries (for instance in Assam), and it was in operation two\nand a half millenniums ago or earlier. It explains the low and magical\ncharacter of the residue of popular religion, every ceremony and deity\nof importance being put under Brahmanic patronage, and it also explains\nthe sudden appearance of new deities. We can safely assert that in the\ntime of the Buddha, and _a fortiori_ in the time of the older\nUpanishads[250] and Br\u00e2hmanas, Krishna and R\u00e2ma were not prominent as\ndeities in Hindustan, but it may well be that they had a considerable\nposition as heroes whose exploits were recited at popular festivals and\nthat Krishna was growing into a god in other regions which have left no\nliterature.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\nTHE JAINS[251]\n\n1\n\n\nBefore leaving pre-Buddhist India, it may be well to say something of\nthe Jains. Many of their doctrines, especially their disregard not only\nof priests but of gods, which seems to us so strange in any system which\ncan be called a religion, are closely analogous to Buddhism and from one\npoint of view Jainism is part of the Buddhist movement. But more\naccurately it may be called an early specialized form of the general\nmovement which culminated in Buddhism. Its founder, Mah\u00e2v\u00eera, was an\nearlier contemporary of the Buddha and not a pupil or imitator[252].\nEven had its independent appearance been later, we might still say that\nit represents an earlier stage of thought. Its kinship to the theories\nmentioned in the last chapter is clear. It does not indeed deny\nresponsibility and free will, but its advocacy of extreme asceticism and\ndeath by starvation has a touch of the same extravagance and its list of\nelements in which physical substances and ideas are mixed together is\ncuriously crude.\n\nJainism is atheistic, and this atheism is as a rule neither apologetic\nnor polemical but is accepted as a natural religious attitude. By\natheism, of course, a denial of the existence of Devas is not meant; the\nJains surpass, if possible, the exuberant fancy of the Brahmans and\nBuddhists in designing imaginary worlds and peopling them with angelic\nor diabolical inhabitants, but, as in Buddhism, these beings are like\nmankind subject to transmigration and decay and are not the masters,\nstill less the creators, of the universe. There were two principal world\ntheories in ancient India. One, which was systematized as the Ved\u00e2nta,\nteaches in its extreme form that the soul and the universal spirit are\nidentical and the external world an illusion. The other, systematized as\nthe S\u00e2nkhya, is dualistic and teaches that primordial matter and\nseparate individual souls are both of them uncreated and indestructible.\nBoth lines of thought look for salvation in the liberation of the soul\nto be attained by the suppression of the passions and the acquisition of\ntrue knowledge.\n\nJainism belongs to the second of these classes. It teaches that the\nworld is eternal, self-existent and composed of six constituent\nsubstances: souls, dharma, adharma, space, time, and particles of\nmatter[253]. Dharma and adharma are defined by modern Jains as subtle\nsubstances analogous to space which make it possible for things to move\nor rest, but Jacobi is probably right in supposing that in primitive\nspeculation the words had their natural meaning and denoted subtle\nfluids which cause merit and demerit. In any case the enumeration places\nin singular juxtaposition substances and activities, the material and\nthe immaterial. The process of salvation and liberation is not\ndistinguished from physical processes and we see how other sects may\nhave drawn the conclusion, which apparently the Jains did not draw, that\nhuman action is necessitated and that there is no such thing as free\nwill. For Jainism individual souls are free, separate existences, whose\nessence is pure intelligence. But they have a tendency towards action\nand passion and are misled by false beliefs. For this reason, in the\nexistence which we know they are chained to bodies and are found not\nonly in Devas and in human beings but in animals, plants and inanimate\nmatter. The habitation of the soul depends on the merit or demerit which\nit acquires and merit and demerit have respectively greater or less\ninfluence during immensely long periods called Utsarpin\u00ee and Avasarpin\u00ee,\nascending and descending, in which human stature and the duration of\nlife increase or decrease by a regular law. Merit secures birth among\nthe gods or good men. Sin sends the soul to baser births, even in\ninanimate substances. On this downward path, the intelligence is\ngradually dimmed till at last motion and consciousness are lost, which\nis not however regarded as equivalent to annihilation.\n\nAnother dogmatic exposition of the Jain creed is based on seven\nprinciples, called soul, non-soul, influx, imprisonment, exclusion,\ndissipation, release[254]. Karma, which in the ordinary language of\nIndian philosophy means deeds and their effect on the soul, is here\nregarded as a peculiarly subtle form of matter[255] which enters the\nsoul and by this influx (or \u00e2srava, a term well-known in Buddhism)\ndefiles and weighs it down. As food is transformed into flesh, so the\nKarma forms a subtle body which invests the soul and prevents it from\nbeing wholly isolated from matter at death. The upward path and\nliberation of the soul are effected by stopping the entrance of Karma,\nthat is by not performing actions which give occasion to the influx, and\nby expelling it. The most effective means to this end is\nself-mortification, which not only prevents the entrance of new Karma\nbut annihilates what has accumulated.\n\nLike most Indian sects, Jainism considers the world of transmigration as\na bondage or journey which the wise long to terminate. But joyless as is\nits immediate outlook, its ultimate ideas are not pessimistic. Even in\nthe body the soul can attain a beatific state of perfect knowledge[256]\nand above the highest heaven (where the greatest gods live in bliss for\nimmense periods though ultimately subject to transmigration) is the\nparadise of blessed souls, freed from transmigration. They have no\nvisible form but consist of life throughout, and enjoy happiness beyond\ncompare. With a materialism characteristic of Jain theology, the\ntreatise from which this account is taken[257] adds that the dimensions\nof a perfected soul are two-thirds of the height possessed in its last\nexistence.\n\nHow is this paradise to be reached? By right faith, right knowledge and\nright conduct, called the three jewels, a phrase familiar to Buddhism.\nThe right faith is complete confidence in Mah\u00e2v\u00eera and his teaching.\nRight knowledge is correct theology as outlined above. Knowledge is of\nfive degrees of which the highest is called Kevalam or omniscience. This\nsounds ambitious, but the special method of reasoning favoured by the\nJains is the modest Sy\u00e2dv\u00e2da[258] or doctrine of may-be, which holds\nthat you can (1) affirm the existence of a thing from one point of view,\n(2) deny it from another, and (3) affirm both existence and\nnon-existence with reference to it at different times. If (4) you should\nthink of affirming existence and non-existence at the same time and from\nthe same point of view, you must say that the thing cannot be spoken of.\nThe essence of the doctrine, so far as one can disentangle it from\nscholastic terminology, seems just, for it amounts to this, that as to\nmatters of experience it is impossible to formulate the whole and\ncomplete truth, and as to matters which transcend experience language is\ninadequate: also that Being is associated with production, continuation\nand destruction. This doctrine is called _anek\u00e2nta-v\u00e2da_, meaning that\nBeing is not one and absolute as the Upanishads assert: matter is\npermanent, but changes its shape, and its other accidents. Thus in many\npoints the Jains adopt the common sense and _prim\u00e2 facie_ point of view.\nBut the doctrines of metempsychosis and Karma are also admitted as\nobvious propositions, and though the fortunes and struggles of the\nembodied soul are described in materialistic terms, happiness is never\nplaced in material well-being but in liberation from the material\nuniverse.\n\nWe cannot be sure that the existing Jain scriptures present these\ndoctrines in their original form, but the full acceptance of\nmetempsychosis, the animistic belief that plants, particles of earth and\nwater have souls and the materialistic phraseology (from which the\nwidely different speculations of the Upanishads are by no means free)\nagree with what we know of Indian thought about 550 B.C. Jainism like\nBuddhism ignores the efficacy of ceremonies and the powers of priests,\nbut it bears even fewer signs than Buddhism of being in its origin a\nprotestant or hostile movement. The intellectual atmosphere seems other\nthan that of the Upanishads, but it is very nearly that of the S\u00e2nkhya\nphilosophy, which also recognizes an infinity of individual souls\nradically distinct from matter and capable of attaining bliss only by\nisolation from matter. Of the origin of that important school we know\nnothing, but it differs from Jainism chiefly in the greater elaboration\nof its psychological and evolutionary theories and in the elimination of\nsome materialistic ideas. Possibly the same region and climate of\nopinion gave birth to two doctrines, one simple and practical, inasmuch\nas it found its principal expression in a religious order, the other\nmore intellectual and scholastic and, at least in the form in which we\nread it, later[259].\n\nRight conduct is based on the five vows taken by every Jain ascetic, (1)\nnot to kill, (2) not to speak untruth, (3) to take nothing that is not\ngiven, (4) to observe chastity, (5) to renounce all pleasure in external\nobjects. These vows receive an extensive and strict interpretation by\nmeans of five explanatory clauses applicable to each and to be construed\nwith reference to deed, word, and thought, to acting, commanding and\nconsenting. Thus the vow not to kill forbids not only the destruction of\nthe smallest insect but also all speech or thought which could bring\nabout a quarrel, and the doing, causing or permitting of any action\nwhich could even inadvertently injure living beings, such as\ncarelessness in walking. Naturally such rules can be kept only by an\nascetic, and in addition to them asceticism is expressly enjoined. It is\neither internal or external. The former takes such forms as repentance,\nhumility, meditation and the suppression of all desires: the latter\ncomprises various forms of self-denial, culminating in death by\nstarvation. This form of religious suicide is prescribed for those who\nhave undergone twelve years' penance and are ripe for Nirvana[260] but\nit is wrong if adopted as a means of shortening austerities. Numerous\ninscriptions record such deaths and the head-teachers of the Digambaras\nare said still to leave the world in this way.\n\nImportant but not peculiar to Jainism is the doctrine of the periodical\nappearance of great teachers who from time to time restore the true\nfaith[261]. The same idea meets us in the fourteen Manus, the\nincarnations of Vishnu, and the series of Buddhas who preceded Gotama.\nThe Jain saints are sometimes designated as Buddha, Kevalin, Siddha,\nTath\u00e2gata and Arhat (all Buddhist titles) but their special appellation\nis Jina or conqueror which is, however, also used by Buddhists[262]. It\nwas clearly a common notion in India that great teachers appear at\nregular intervals and that one might reasonably be expected in the sixth\ncentury B.C. The Jains gave preference or prominence to the titles Jina\nor T\u00eerthankara: the Buddhists to Buddha or Tath\u00e2gata.\n\n\n2\n\nAccording to the Jain scriptures all Jinas are born in the warrior\ncaste, never among Brahmans. The first called Rishabha, who was born an\nalmost inexpressibly[263] long time ago and lived 8,400,000 years, was\nthe son of a king of Ayodhy\u00e2. But as ages elapsed, the lives of his\nsuccessors and the intervals which separated them became shorter.\nParsva, the twenty-third Jina, must have some historical basis[264]. We\nare told that he lived 250 years before Mah\u00e2v\u00eera, that his followers\nstill existed in the time of the latter: that he permitted the use of\nclothes and taught that four and not five vows were necessary[265]. Both\nJain and Buddhist scriptures support the idea that Mah\u00e2v\u00eera was a\nreviver and reformer rather than an originator. The former do not\nemphasize the novelty of his revelation and the latter treat Jainism as\na well-known form of error without indicating that it was either new or\nattributable to one individual.\n\nMah\u00e2v\u00eera, or the great hero, is the common designation of the\ntwenty-fourth Jina but his personal name was Vardham\u00e2na. He was a\ncontemporary of the Buddha but somewhat older and belonged to a\nKshatriya clan, variously called J\u00f1\u00e2ta, \u00d1\u00e2ta, or \u00d1\u00e2ya. His parents lived\nin a suburb of Vais\u00e2l\u00ee and were followers of Parsva. When he was in his\nthirty-first year they decided to die by voluntary starvation and after\ntheir death he renounced the world and started to wander naked in\nwestern Bengal, enduring some persecution as well as self-inflicted\npenances. After thirteen years of this life, he believed that he had\nattained enlightenment and appeared as the Jina, the head of a religious\norder called Nirganthas (or Niganthas). This word, which means\nunfettered or free from bonds, is the name by which the Jains are\ngenerally known in Buddhist literature and it occurs in their own\nscriptures, though it gradually fell out of use. Possibly it was the\ndesignation of an order claiming to have been founded by Parsva and\naccepted by Mah\u00e2v\u00eera.\n\nThe meagre accounts of his life relate that he continued to travel for\nnearly thirty years and had eleven principal disciples. He apparently\ninfluenced much the same region as the Buddha and came in contact with\nthe same personalities, such as kings Bimbis\u00e2ra and Aj\u00e2tasattu. He had\nrelations with Makkhali Gos\u00e2la and his disciples disputed with the\nBuddhists[266] but it does not appear that he himself ever met Gotama.\nHe died at the age of seventy-two at P\u00e2v\u00e2 near R\u00e2jagaha. Only one of his\nprincipal disciples, Sudharman, survived him and a schism broke out\nimmediately after his death. There had already been one in the fifteenth\nyear of his teaching brought about by his son-in-law.\n\n\n3\n\nWe have no information about the differences on which these schisms\nturned, but Jainism is still split into two sects which, though\nfollowing in most respects identical doctrines and customs, refuse to\nintermarry or eat together. Their sacred literature is not the same and\nthe evidence of inscriptions indicates that they were distinct at the\nbeginning of the Christian era and perhaps much earlier.\n\nThe Digambara sect, or those who are clothed in air, maintain that\nabsolute nudity is a necessary condition of saintship: the other\ndivision or Svet\u00e2mbaras, those who are dressed in white, admit that\nMah\u00e2v\u00eera went about naked, but hold that the use of clothes does not\nimpede the highest sanctity, and also that such sanctity can be attained\nby women, which the Digambaras deny. Nudity as a part of asceticism was\npractised by several sects in the time of Mah\u00e2v\u00eera[267] but it was also\nreprobated by others (including all Buddhists) who felt it to be\nbarbarous and unedifying. It is therefore probable that both Digambaras\nand Svet\u00e2mbaras existed in the infancy of Jainism, and the latter may\nrepresent the older sect reformed or exaggerated by Mah\u00e2v\u00eera. Thus we\nare told[268] that \"the law taught by Vardham\u00e2na forbids clothes but\nthat of the great sage Parsva allows an under and an upper garment.\" But\nit was not until considerably later that the schism was completed by the\nconstitution of two different canons[269]. At the present day most\nDigambaras wear the ordinary costume of their district and only the\nhigher ascetics attempt to observe the rule of nudity. When they go\nabout they wrap themselves in a large cloth, but lay it aside when\neating. The Digambaras are divided into four principal sects and the\nSvet\u00e2mbaras into no less than eighty-four, which are said to date from\nthe tenth century A.D.\n\nApart from these divisions, all Jain communities are differentiated into\nlaymen and members of the order or Yatis, literally strivers. It is\nrecognized that laymen cannot observe the five vows. Killing, lying, and\nstealing are forbidden to them only in their obvious and gross forms:\nchastity is replaced by conjugal fidelity and self-denial by the\nprohibition of covetousness. They can also acquire merit by observing\nseven other miscellaneous vows (whence we hear of the twelvefold law)\ncomprising rules as to residence, trade, etc. Agriculture is forbidden\nsince it involves tearing up the ground and the death of insects.\n\nMah\u00e2v\u00eera was succeeded by a long line of teachers sometimes called\nPatriarchs and it would seem that their names have been correctly\npreserved though the accounts of their doings are meagre. Various\nnotices in Buddhist literature confirm the idea that the Jains were\nactive in the districts corresponding to Oudh, Tirhut and Bihar in the\nperiod following Mah\u00e2v\u00eera's death, and we hear of them in Ceylon before\nour era. Further historical evidence is afforded by inscriptions[270].\nThe earliest in which the Jains are mentioned are the edicts of Asoka.\nHe directed the officials called \"superintendents of religion\" to\nconcern themselves with the Niganthas[271]: and when [272] he describes\nhow he has provided medicine, useful plants and wells for both men and\nanimals, we are reminded of the hospitals for animals which are still\nmaintained by the Jains. According to Jain tradition (which however has\nnot yet been verified by other evidence) Samprati, the grandson of\nAsoka, was a devout patron of the faith. More certain is the patronage\naccorded to it by King Kh\u00e2ravela of Orissa about 157 B.C. which is\nattested by inscriptions. Many dedicatory inscriptions prove that the\nJains were a flourishing community at Muttra in the reigns of Kanishka,\nHuvishka and Vasudeva and one inscription from the same locality seems\nas old as 150 B.C. We learn from these records that the sect comprised a\ngreat number of schools and subdivisions. We need not suppose that the\ndifferent teachers were necessarily hostile to one another but their\nexistence testifies to an activity and freedom of interpretation which\nhave left traces in the multitude of modern subsects.\n\nJainism also spread in the south of India and before our era it had a\nstrong hold in Tamil lands, but our knowledge of its early progress is\ndefective. According to Jain tradition there was a severe famine in\nnorthern India about 200 years after Mah\u00e2v\u00eera's death and the patriarch\nBhadrab\u00e2hu led a band of the faithful to the south[273]. In the seventh\ncentury A.D. we know from various records of the reign of Harsha and\nfrom the Chinese pilgrim Hs\u00fcan Chuang that it was nourishing in Vais\u00e2l\u00ee\nand Bengal and also as far south as Conjeevaram. It also made\nconsiderable progress in the southern Maratha country under the C\u00e2lukya\ndynasty of Vatapi, in the modern district of Bijapur (500-750) and under\nthe R\u00e2shtrak\u00fbta sovereigns of the Deccan. Amoghavarsha of this line\n(815-877) patronized the Digambaras and in his old age abdicated and\nbecame an ascetic. The names of notable Digambara leaders like Jinasena\nand Gunabhadra dating from this period are preserved and Jainism must in\nsome districts have become the dominant religion. Bijjala who usurped\nthe C\u00e2lukya throne (1156-1167) was a Jain and the Hoysala kings of\nMysore, though themselves Vaishnavas, protected the religion.\nInscriptions[274] appear to attest the presence of Jainism at Girnar in\nthe first century A.D. and subsequently Gujarat became a model Jain\nstate after the conversion of King Kumarapala about 1160.\n\nSuch success naturally incurred the enmity of the Brahmans and there is\nmore evidence of systematic persecution directed against the Jains than\nagainst the Buddhists. The Cola kings who ruled in the south-east of the\nMadras Presidency were jealous worshippers of Siva and the Jains\nsuffered severely at their hands in the eleventh century and also under\nthe P\u00e2ndya kings of the extreme south. King Sundara of the latter\ndynasty is said to have impaled 8000 of them and pictures on the walls\nof the great temple at Madura represent their tortures. A little later\n(1174) Ajayadeva, a Saiva king of Gujarat, is said to have raged against\nthem with equal fury. The rise of the Ling\u00e2yats in the Deccan must also\nhave had an unfavourable effect on their numbers. But in the fourteenth\ncentury greater tolerance prevailed, perhaps in consequence of the\ncommon danger from Islam. Inscriptions found at Sravana Belgola and\nother places[275] narrate an interesting event which occurred in 1368.\nThe Jains appealed to the king of Vijayanagar for protection from\npersecution and he effected a public reconciliation between them and the\nVaishnavas, holding the hands of both leaders in his own and declaring\nthat equal protection would be given to both sects. Another inscription\nrecords an amicable agreement regulating the worship of a lingam in a\nJain temple at Halebid. Many others, chiefly recording grants of land,\ntestify to the prosperity of Jainism in the Hindu kingdom of Vijayanagar\nand in the region of Mt Abu in the sixteenth and seventeenth\ncenturies[276]. The great Emperor Akbar himself came under the influence\nof Jainism and received instruction from three Jain teachers from 1578\nto 1597.\n\nPersecution and still more the steady pressure and absorptive power of\nHinduism have reduced the proportions of the sect, and the last census\nestimated it at one million and a third. It is probable, however, that\nmany Jains returned themselves as Hindus, and that their numbers are\nreally greater. More than two-fifths of them are found in Bombay,\nRajputana, and Central India. Elsewhere they are generally distributed\nbut only in small numbers. They observe caste, at least in some\ndistricts, and generally belong to the Baniyas. They include many\nwealthy merchants who expend large sums on the construction and\nmaintenance of temples, houses for wandering ascetics and homes for\ncattle. Their respect and care for animal life are remarkable. Wherever\nJains gain influence beasts are not slaughtered or sacrificed, and when\nold or injured are often kept in hospitals or asylums, as, for instance,\nat Ahmadabad[277]. Their ascetics take stringent precautions to avoid\nkilling the smallest creature: they strain their drinking water, sweep\nthe ground before them with a broom as they walk and wear a veil over\ntheir mouths. Even in the shops of the laity lamps are carefully\nscreened to prevent insects from burning themselves.\n\nThe principal divisions are the Digambara and Svet\u00e2mbara as above\ndescribed and an offshoot of the latter called Dhundia[278] who refuse\nto use images in worship and are remarkable even among Jains for their\naversion to taking life. In Central India the Digambaras are about half\nthe total number; in Baroda and Bombay the Svet\u00e2mbaras are stronger. In\nCentral India the Jains are said to be sharply distinguished from Hindus\nbut in other parts they intermarry with Vaishnavas and while respecting\ntheir own ascetics as religious teachers, employ the services of\nBrahmans in their ceremonies.\n\n\n4\n\nThe Jains have a copious and in part ancient literature. The oldest\nworks are found in the canon (or Siddh\u00e2nta) of the Svet\u00e2mbaras, which is\nnot accepted by the Digambaras. In this canon the highest rank is given\nto eleven works[279] called Angas or limbs of the law but it also\ncomprises many other esteemed treatises such as the Kalpas\u00fbtra ascribed\nto Bhadrab\u00e2hu. Fourteen older books called Puvvas (Sk. P\u00fbrvas) and now\nlost are said to have together formed a twelfth anga. The language of\nthe canon is a variety of Prakrit[280], fairly ancient though more\nmodern than Pali, and remarkable for its habit of omitting or softening\nconsonants coming between two vowels, _e.g._ s\u00fbyam for s\u00fbtram, loo for\nloko[281]. We cannot, however, conclude that it is the language in which\nthe books were composed, for it is probable that the early Jains,\nrejecting Brahmanical notions of a revealed text, handed down their\nreligious teaching in the vernacular and allowed its grammar and\nphonetics to follow the changes brought about by time. According to a\ntradition which probably contains elements of truth the first collection\nof sacred works was made about 200 years after Mah\u00e2v\u00eera's death by a\ncouncil which sat at Pataliputra. Just about the same time came the\nfamine already mentioned and many Jains migrated to the south. When they\nreturned they found that their co-religionists had abandoned the\nobligation of nakedness and they consequently refused to recognize their\nsacred books. The Svet\u00e2mbara canon was subsequently revised and written\ndown by a council held at Valabhi in Gujarat in the middle of the fifth\ncentury A.D. This is the edition which is still extant. The canon of the\nDigambaras, which is less well known, is said to be chiefly in Sanskrit\nand according to tradition was codified by Pushpadanta in the second\ncentury A.D. but appears to be really posterior to the Svet\u00e2mbara\nscriptures[282]. It is divided into four sections called Vedas and\ntreating respectively of history, cosmology, philosophy and rules of\nlife[283].\n\nThough the books of the Jain canon contain ancient matter, yet they\nseem, as compositions, considerably later than the older parts of the\nBuddhist Tripitaka. They do not claim to record recent events and\nteaching but are attempts at synthesis which assume that Jainism is well\nknown and respected. In style they offer some resemblance to the\nPitakas: there is the same inordinate love of repetition and in the more\nemotional passages great similarity of tone and metaphor[284].\n\nBesides the two canons, the Jains have a considerable literature\nconsisting both of commentaries and secular works. The most eminent of\ntheir authors is Hemacandra, born in 1088, who though a monk was an\nornament of the court and rendered an important service to his sect by\nconverting Kum\u00e2rap\u00e2la, King of Gujarat. He composed numerous and\nvaluable works on grammar, lexicography, poetics and ecclesiastical\nbiography. Such subjects were congenial to the later Jain writers and\nthey not only cultivated both Sanskrit and Prakrit but also had a\nvivifying effect on the vernaculars of southern India. Kanarese, Tamil,\nand Telugu in their literary form owe much to the labours of Jain monks,\nand the Jain works composed in these languages, such as the\nJ\u00eevakacint\u00e2mani in Tamil, if not of world-wide importance, at least\ngreatly influenced Dravidian civilization.\n\nThough the Jains thus occupy an honourable, and even distinguished place\nin the history of letters it must be confessed that it is hard to praise\ntheir older religious books. This literature is of considerable\nscientific interest for it contains many data about ancient India as yet\nunsifted but it is tedious in style and rarely elevated in sentiment. It\nhas an arid extravagance, which merely piles one above the other\ninterminable lists of names and computations of immensity in time and\nspace. Even more than in the Buddhist suttas there is a tendency to\nrepetition which offends our sense of proportion and though the main\nidea, to free the soul from the trammels of passion and matter, is not\ninferior to any of the religious themes of India, the treatment is not\nadequate to the subject and the counsels of perfection are smothered\nunder a mass of minute precepts about the most unsavoury details of life\nand culminate in the recommendation of death by voluntary starvation.\n\n\n5\n\nBut observation of Jainism as it exists to-day produces a quite\ndifferent impression. The Jains are well-to-do, industrious and\npractical: their schools and religious establishments are well ordered:\ntheir temples have a beauty, cleanliness, and cheerfulness unusual in\nIndia and due to the large use made of white marble and brilliant\ncolours. The tenderness for animal life may degenerate into superstition\n(though surely it is a fault on the right side) and some observances of\nthe ascetics (such as pulling out the hair instead of shaving the head)\nare severe, but as a community the Jains lead sane and serious lives,\nhardly practising and certainly not parading the extravagances of\nself-torture which they theoretically commend. Mah\u00e2v\u00eera is said to have\ntaught that place, time and occasion should be taken into consideration\nand his successors adapted their precepts to the age in which they\nlived. Such monks as I have met[285] maintained that extreme forms of\n_tapas_ were good for the nerves of ancient saints but not for the\nweaker natures of to-day. But in avoiding rigorous severity, they have\nnot fallen into sloth or luxury.\n\nThe beauty of Jainism finds its best expression in architecture. This\nreached its zenith both in style and quantity during the eleventh and\ntwelfth centuries which accords with what we know of the growth of the\nsect. After this period the Mohammedan invasions were unfavourable to\nall forms of Hindu architecture. But the taste for building remained and\nsomewhat later pious Jains again began to construct large edifices which\nare generally less degenerate than modern Hindu temples, though they\noften show traces of Mohammedan influence. Hathi Singh's temple at\nAhmadabad completed in 1848 is a fine example of this modern style.\n\nThere is a considerable difference between Jain and Buddhist\narchitecture both in intention and effect. Jain monks did not live\ntogether in large communities and there was no worship of relics. Hence\nthe vih\u00e2ra and the st\u00fbpa--the two principal types of Buddhist\nbuildings--are both absent. Yet there is some resemblance between Jain\ntemples (for instance those at Palit\u00e2na) and the larger Burmese\nsanctuaries, such as the Shwe Dagon Pagoda. It is partly due to the same\nconviction, namely that the most meritorious work which a layman can\nperform is to multiply shrines and images. In both localities the\ngeneral plan is similar. On the top of a hill or mound is a central\nbuilding round which are grouped a multitude of other shrines. The\nrepetition of chapels and images is very remarkable: in Burma they all\nrepresent Gotama, in Jain temples the figures of T\u00eerthankaras are\nnominally different personalities but so alike in presentment that the\nlaity rarely know them apart. In both styles of art white and jewelled\nimages are common as well as groups of four sitting figures set back to\nback and facing the four quarters[286]: in both we meet with veritable\ncities of temples, on the hill tops of Gujarat and in the plain of Pagan\non the banks of the Irawaddy. As some features of Burmese art are\nundoubtedly borrowed from India[287], the above characteristics may be\ndue to imitation of Jain methods. It might be argued that the\narchitectural style of late Indian Buddhism survives among the Jains but\nthere is no proof that the multiplication of temples and images was a\nfeature of this style. But in some points it is clear that the Jains\nhave followed the artistic conventions of the Buddhists. Thus\nP\u00e2rsvan\u00e2tha is sheltered by a cobra's hood, like Gotama, and though the\nBo-tree plays no part in the legend of the T\u00eerthankaras, they are\nrepresented as sitting under such trees and a living tree is venerated\nat Palit\u00e2na.\n\nAs single edifices illustrating the beauty of Jain art both in grace of\ndesign and patient elaboration of workmanship may be mentioned the\nTowers of Fame and Victory at Chitore, and the temples of Mt Abu. Some\ndifferences of style are visible in north and south India. In the former\nthe essential features are a shrine with a portico attached and\nsurmounted by a conical tower, the whole placed in a quadrangular court\nround which are a series of cells or chapels containing images seated on\nthrones. These are the T\u00eerthankaras, almost exactly alike and of white\nmarble, though some of the later saints are represented as black. The\nSvet\u00e2mbaras represent their T\u00eerthankaras as clothed but in the temples\nof the Digambaras the images are naked.\n\nIn the south are found religious monuments of two kinds known as Bastis\nand Bettus. The Bastis consist of pillared vestibules leading to a\nshrine over which rises a dome constructed in three or four stages. The\nBettus are not temples in the ordinary sense but courtyards surrounding\ngigantic images of a saint named Gommatesvara who is said to have been\nthe son of the first T\u00eerthankara[288]. The largest of these colossi is\nat Sravana Belgola. It is seventy feet in height and carved out of a\nmass of granite standing on the top of a hill and represents a sage so\nsunk in meditation that anthills and creepers have grown round his feet\nwithout breaking his trance. An inscription states that it was erected\nabout 983 A.D. by the minister of a king of the Ganga dynasty[289].\n\nBut even more remarkable than these gigantic statues are the collections\nof temples found on several eminences, such as Girnar and\nSatrunjaya[290], mountain masses which rise abruptly to a height of\nthree or four thousand feet out of level plains. On the summit of\nSatrunjaya are innumerable shrines, arranged in marble courts or along\nwell-paved streets. In each enclosure is a central temple surrounded by\nothers at the sides, and all are dominated by one which in the\nproportions of its spire and courtyard surpasses the rest. Only a few\nYatis are allowed to pass the night in the sacred precincts and it is a\nstrange experience to enter the gates at dawn and wander through the\ninterminable succession of white marble courts tenanted only by flocks\nof sacred pigeons. On every side sculptured chapels gorgeous in gold and\ncolour stand silent and open: within are saints sitting grave and\npassionless behind the lights that burn on their altars. The multitude\nof calm stone faces, the strange silence and emptiness, unaccompanied by\nany sign of neglect or decay, the bewildering repetition of shrines and\ndeities in this aerial castle, suggest nothing built with human purpose\nbut some petrified spirit world.\n\nSoon after dawn a string of devotees daily ascends the hill. Most are\nlaymen, but there is a considerable sprinkling of ascetics, especially\nnuns. After joining the order both sexes wear yellowish white robes and\ncarry long sticks. They spend much of their time in visiting holy places\nand usually do not stop at one rest house for more than two months. The\nworship performed in the temples consists of simple offerings of\nflowers, incense and lights made with little ceremony. Pilgrims go their\nrounds in small bands and kneeling together before the images sing the\npraises of the Jinas.\n\n\n6\n\nIt is remarkable that Jainism is still a living sect, whereas the\nBuddhists have disappeared from India. Its strength and persistence are\ncentred in its power of enlisting the interest of the laity and of\nforming them into a corporation. In theory the position of the Jain and\nBuddhist layman is the same. Both revere and support a religious order\nfor which they have not a vocation, and are bound by minor vows less\nstringent than those of the monks. But among the Buddhists the members\nof the order came to be regarded more and more as the true church[291]\nand the laity tended to become (what they actually have become in China\nand Japan) pious persons who revere that order as something extraneous\nto themselves and very often only as one among several religious\norganizations. Hence when in India monasteries decayed or were\ndestroyed, little active Buddhism was left outside them. But the\nwandering ascetics of the Jains never concentrated the strength of the\nreligion in themselves to the same extent; the severity of their rule\nlimited their numbers: the laity were wealthy and practically formed a\ncaste; persecution acted as a tonic. As a result we have a sect\nanalogous in some ways to the Jews, Parsis, and Quakers[292], among all\nof whom we find the same features, namely a wealthy laity, little or no\nsacerdotalism and endurance of persecution.\n\nAnother question of some interest is how far Jainism should be regarded\nas separate from Buddhism. Historically the position seems clear. Both\nare offshoots of a movement which was active in India in the sixth\ncentury B.C. in certain districts and especially among the aristocracy.\nOf these offshoots--the survivors among many which hardly outlived their\nbirth--Jainism was a trifle the earlier, but Buddhism was superior and\nmore satisfying to the intellect and moral sense alike. Out of the\ntheory and practice of religious life current in their time Gotama\nfashioned a beautiful vase, Mah\u00e2v\u00eera a homely but still durable pot. The\nresemblances between the two systems are not merely obvious but\nfundamental. Both had their origin outside the priestly class and owed\nmuch of their success to the protection of princes. Both preach a road\nto salvation open to man's unaided strength and needing neither\nsacrifice nor revealed lore. Both are universal, for though Buddhism set\nabout its world mission with more knowledge and grasp of the task, the\nJain s\u00fbtras are addressed \"to Aryans and non-Aryans\" and it is said that\nin modern times Mohammedans have been received into the Jain Church.\nNeither is theistic. Both believe in some form of reincarnation, in\nkarma and in the periodical appearance of beings possessed of superhuman\nknowledge and called indifferently Jinas or Buddhas. The historian may\ntherefore be disposed to regard the two religions as not differing much\nmore than the varieties of Protestant Dissenters to be found in Great\nBritain. But the theologian will perceive real differences. One of the\nmost important doctrines of Buddhism---perhaps in the Buddha's own\nesteem the central doctrine--is the non-existence of the soul as a\npermanent entity: in Jainism on the contrary not only the human body but\nthe whole world including inanimate matter is inhabited by individual\nsouls who can also exist apart from matter in individual blessedness.\nThe Jain theory of fivefold knowledge is unknown to the Buddhists, as is\ntheir theory of the Skandhas to the Jains. Secondly as to practice\nJainism teaches (with some concessions in modern times) that salvation\nis obtainable by self-mortification but this is the method which the\nBuddha condemned after prolonged trial. It is clear that in his own\nopinion and that of his contemporaries the rule and ideal of life which\nhe prescribed differed widely from those of the Jains, \u00c2j\u00eevikas and\nother wandering ascetics.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK III\n\nPALI BUDDHISM\n\n\n\n\nBOOK III\n\n\nIn the previous book I have treated chiefly the general characteristics\nof Indian religion. They persist in its later phases but great changes\nand additions are made. In the present book I propose to speak about the\nlife and teaching of the Buddha which even hostile critics must admit to\nbe a turning point in the history of Indian thought and institutions,\nand about the earliest forms of Buddhism. For twelve centuries or more\nafter the death of this great genius Indian religion flows in two\nparallel streams, Buddhist and Brahmanic, which subsequently unite,\nBuddhism colouring the whole river but ceasing within India itself to\nhave any important manifestations distinct from Brahmanism.\n\nIn a general survey it is hardly possible to follow the order of strict\nchronology until comparatively modern times. We cannot, for instance,\ngive a sketch of Indian thought in the first century B.C., simply\nbecause our data do not permit us to assign certain sects and books to\nthat period rather than to the hundred years which preceded or followed\nit. But we can follow with moderate accuracy the two streams of thought\nin their respective courses. I have wondered if I should not take\nHinduism first. Its development from ancient Brahmanism is continuous\nand Buddhism is merely an episode in it, though a lengthy one. But many\nas are the lacun\u00e6 in the history of Buddhism, it offers more data and\ndocuments than the history of Hinduism. We know more about the views of\nAsoka for instance than about those of Candragupta Maurya. I shall\ntherefore deal first with Buddhism and then with Hinduism, while\nregretting that a parallel and synoptic treatment is impracticable.\n\nThe eight chapters of this book deal mainly with Pali Buddhism[293]--a\nconvenient and non-controversial term--and not with the Mahayana, though\nthey note the tendencies which found expression in it. In the first\nchapter I treat of the Buddha's life: in the second I venture to compare\nhim with other great religious teachers: in the third I consider his\ndoctrine as expounded in the Pali Tripitaka and in the fourth the order\nof mendicants which he founded. The nature and value of the Pali Canon\nform the subject of the fifth chapter and the sixth is occupied with the\ngreat Emperor Asoka whose name is the clearest landmark in the early\nhistory of Buddhism, and indeed of India.\n\nThe seventh and eighth chapters discuss topics which belong to Hinduism\nas well as to Buddhism, namely, meditation and mythology. The latter is\nanterior to Buddhism and it is only in a special sense that it can be\ncalled an addition or accretion. Indian thought makes clearings in the\njungle of mythology, which become obliterated or diminished as the\njungle grows over them again. Buddhism was the most thorough of such\nclearings, yet it was invaded more rapidly and completely than any\nother. The Ved\u00e2nta and S\u00e2nkhya are really, if less obviously, similar\nclearings. They raise no objection to popular divinities but such\ndivinities do not come within the scope of religious philosophy as they\nunderstand it.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\nLIFE OF THE BUDDHA\n\n1\n\n\nWe have hitherto been occupied with obscure and shadowy personalities.\nThe authors of the Upanishads are nameless and even Mah\u00e2v\u00cera is unknown\noutside India. But we now come to the career of one who must be ranked\namong the greatest leaders of thought that the world has seen, the\nIndian prince generally known as Gotama or the Buddha. His historical\ncharacter has been called in question, but at the present day probably\nfew, if any, competent judges doubt that he was a real person whose date\ncan be fixed and whose life can be sketched at least in outline.\n\nWe have seen that apart from the personality of Gotama, ancient India\nwas familiar with the idea of a Buddha and had even classified the\nattributes he should possess. Two styles of biography are therefore\npossible: an account of what Gotama actually was and did and an account\nof what a Buddha is expected to be and do. This second style prevails in\nlater Buddhist works: they contain descriptions of the deeds and\nteaching of a Buddha, adapted to such facts in Gotama's life as seemed\nsuitable for such treatment or could not be ignored. Rhys Davids has\nwell compared them to _Paradise Regained_, but the supernatural element\nis, after the Indian fashion, more ornate.\n\nThe reader will perhaps ask what are the documents describing Gotama's\nsayings and doings and what warrant we have for trusting them. I will\ntreat of this question in more detail in a later chapter and here will\nmerely say that the Pali works called Vinaya or monastic rules and\nSuttas[294] or sermons recount the circumstances in which each rule was\nlaid down and each sermon preached. Some narrative passages, such as the\nSutta which relates the close of the Buddha's life and the portion of\nthe Vinaya which tells how he obtained enlightenment and made his first\nconverts, are of considerable length. Though these narratives are\ncompilations which accepted new matter during several centuries, I see\nno reason to doubt that the oldest stratum contains the recollections of\nthose who had seen and heard the master.\n\nIn basing the following account on the Pali Canon, I do not mean to\ndiscredit Sanskrit texts merely because they are written in that\nlanguage or to deny that many Pali texts contain miraculous and\nunhistorical narratives[295]. But the principal Sanskrit S\u00fbtras such as\nthe Lotus and the Diamond Cutter are purely doctrinal and those texts\nwhich profess to contain historical matter, such as the Vinayas\ntranslated from Sanskrit into Chinese, are as yet hardly accessible to\nEuropean scholars. So far as they are known, they add incidents to the\ncareer of the Buddha without altering its main lines, and when the\naccounts of such incidents are not in themselves improbable they merit\nconsideration. On the whole these Sanskrit texts are later and more\nembellished than their Pali counterparts, but it is necessary not to\nforget the existence of this vast store-house of traditions, which may\ncontain many surprises[296].\n\nThough the Pali texts do not give the story of the Buddha's life in a\nconnected form, they do give us details about many important events in\nit and they offer a picture of the world in which he moved. The idea of\nbiography was unknown to the older Indian literature. The Br\u00e2hmanas and\nUpanishads tell us of the beliefs and practices of their sages, the\ndoctrines they taught and the sacrifices they offered, but they rarely\ngive even an outline of their lives. And whenever the Hindus write about\na man of religion or a philosopher, their weak historical sense and\ntheir strong feeling for the importance of the teaching lead them to\nneglect the figure of the teacher and present a portrait which seems to\nus dim and impersonal. Indian saints are distinguished by what they\nsaid, not by what they did and it is a strong testimony to Gotama's\nindividuality and force of character, that in spite of the centuries\nwhich separate us from him and the misty unreal atmosphere which in\nlater times hangs round his name, his personality is more distinct and\nlifelike than that of many later teachers.\n\nMost of the stories of his youth and childhood have a mythical air and\nmake their first appearance in works composed long after his death, but\nthere is no reason to distrust the traditional accounts of his lineage.\nHe was the son of Suddhodana of the Kshatriya clan known as S\u00e2kya or\nS\u00e2kiya[297]. In later literature his father is usually described as a\nking but this statement needs qualification. The S\u00e2kyas were a small\naristocratic republic. At the time of the Buddha's birth they recognized\nthe suzerainty of the neighbouring kingdom of Kosala or Oudh and they\nwere subsequently annexed by it, but, so long as they were independent,\nall that we know of their government leads us to suppose that they were\nnot a monarchy like Kosala and Magadha. The political and administrative\nbusiness of the clan was transacted by an assembly which met in a\ncouncil hall[298] at Kapilavatthu. Its president was styled R\u00e2j\u00e2 but we\ndo not know how he was selected nor for how long he held office. The\nBuddha's father is sometimes spoken of as R\u00e2j\u00e2, sometimes as if he were\na simple citizen. Some scholars think the position was temporary and\nelective[299]. But in any case it seems clear that he was not a Mah\u00e2r\u00e2j\u00e2\nlike Aj\u00e2tasattu and other monarchs of the period. He was a prominent\nmember of a wealthy and aristocratic family rather than a despot. In\nsome passages[300] Brahmans are represented as discussing the Buddha's\nclaims to respect. It is said that he is of a noble and wealthy family\nbut not that he is the son of a king or heir to the throne, though the\nstatement, if true, would be so obvious and appropriate that its\nomission is sufficient to disprove it. The point is of psychological\nimportance, for the later literature in its desire to emphasize the\nsacrifice made by the Buddha exaggerates the splendour and luxury by\nwhich he was surrounded in youth and produces the impression that his\ntemperament was something like that reflected in the book of\nEcclesiastes, the weary calm, bred of satiety and disenchantment, of one\nwho has possessed everything and found everything to be but vanity. But\nthis is not the dominant note of the Buddha's discourses as we have\nthem. He condemns the pleasures and ambitions of the world as\nunsatisfying, but he stands before us as one who has resisted and\nvanquished temptation rather than as a disillusioned pleasure-seeker.\nThe tone of these sermons accords perfectly with the supposition,\nsupported by whatever historical data we possess, that he belonged to a\nfighting aristocracy, active in war and debate, wealthy according to the\nstandard of the times and yielding imperfect obedience to the authority\nof kings and priests. The Pitakas allude several times to the pride of\nthe S\u00e2kyas, and in spite of the gentleness and courtesy of the Buddha\nthis family trait is often apparent in his attitude, in the independence\nof his views, his calm disregard of Brahmanic pretensions and the\nauthority that marks his utterances.\n\nThe territory of the S\u00e2kyas lay about the frontier which now divides\nNepal from the United Provinces, between the upper Rapti and the Gandak\nrivers, a hundred miles or so to the north of Benares. The capital was\ncalled Kapilavatthu[301], and the mention of several other towns in the\noldest texts indicates that the country was populous. Its wealth was\nderived chiefly from rice-fields and cattle. The uncultivated parts were\ncovered with forest and often infested by robbers. The spot where the\nBuddha was born was known as the Lumbini Park and the site, or at least\nwhat was supposed to be the site in Asoka's time, is marked by a pillar\nerected by that monarch at a place now called Rummindei[302]. His mother\nwas named M\u00e2y\u00e2 and was also of the S\u00e2kya clan. Tradition states that she\ndied seven days after his birth and that he was brought up by her\nsister, Mah\u00e2praj\u00e2pat\u00ee, who was also a wife of Suddhodana. The names of\nother relatives are preserved, but otherwise the older documents tell us\nnothing of his childhood and the copious legends of the later church\nseem to be poetical embellishments. The Sutta-Nip\u00e2ta contains the story\nof an aged seer named Asita who came to see the child and, much like\nSimeon, prophesied his future greatness but wept that he himself must\ndie before hearing the new gospel.\n\nThe personal name of the Buddha was Siddh\u00e2rtha in Sanskrit or Siddhattha\nin Pali, meaning he who has achieved his object, but it is rarely used.\nPersons who are introduced in the Pitakas as addressing him directly\neither employ a title or call him Gotama (Sanskrit Gautama). This was\nthe name of his _gotra_ or gens and roughly corresponds to a surname,\nbeing less comprehensive than the clan name S\u00e2kya. The name Gotama is\napplied in the Pitakas to other S\u00e2kyas such as the Buddha's father and\nhis cousin \u00c2nanda. It is said to be still in use in India and has been\nborne by many distinguished Hindus. But since it seemed somewhat\nirreverent to speak of the Buddha merely by his surname, it became the\ncustom to describe him by titles. The most celebrated of these is the\nword Buddha[303] itself, the awakened or wise one. But in Pali works he\nis described just as frequently by the name of Bhagav\u00e2 or the Lord. The\ntitles of S\u00e2kya-Muni and S\u00e2kya-Simha have also passed into common use\nand the former is his usual designation in the Sanskrit s\u00fbtras. The word\nTath\u00e2gata, of somewhat obscure signification[304], is frequently found\nas an equivalent of Buddha and is put into the mouth of Gotama himself\nas a substitute for the first personal pronoun.\n\nWe can only guess what was the religious and moral atmosphere in which\nthe child grew up. There were certainly Brahmans in the S\u00e2kya territory:\neveryone had heard of their Vedic lore, their ceremonies and their\nclaims to superiority. But it is probable that their influence was less\ncomplete here than further west[305] and that even before this time they\nencountered a good deal of scepticism and independent religious\nsentiment. This may have been in part military impatience of priestly\npedantry, but if the S\u00e2kyas were not submissive sheep, their waywardness\nwas not due to want of interest in religion. A frequent phrase in the\nBuddha's discourses speaks of the \"highest goal of the holy life for the\nsake of which clansmen leave their homes and go forth into\nhomelessness.\" The religious mendicant seemed the proper incarnation of\nthis ideal to which Kshatriyas as well as Brahmans aspired, and we are\njustified in supposing that the future Buddha's thoughts would naturally\nturn towards the wandering life. The legend represents him as carefully\nsecluded from all disquieting sights and as learning the existence of\nold age, sickness and death only by chance encounters which left a\nprofound impression. The older texts do not emphasize this view of his\nmental development, though they do not preclude it. It is stated\nincidentally that his parents regretted his abandonment of worldly life\nand it is natural to suppose that they may have tried to turn his mind\nto secular interests and pleasures[306]. His son, R\u00e2hula, is mentioned\nseveral times in the Pitakas but his wife only once and then not by name\nbut as \"the princess who was the mother of R\u00e2hula[307].\" His separation\nfrom her becomes in the later legend the theme of an affecting tale but\nthe scanty allusions to his family found in the Pitakas are devoid of\nsentimental touches. A remarkable passage is preserved in the Anguttara\nNik\u00e2ya[308] describing his feelings as a young man and may be the origin\nof the story[309] about the four visions of old age, sickness, death and\nof peace in the religious life. After describing the wealth and comfort\nin which he lived[310], he says that he reflected how people feel\nrepulsion and disgust at the sight of old age, sickness and death. But\nis this right? \"I also\" he thought \"am subject to decay and am not free\nfrom the power of old age, sickness and death. Is it right that I should\nfeel horror, repulsion and disgust when I see another in such plight?\nAnd when I reflected thus, my disciples, all the joy of life which there\nis in life died within me.\"\n\nNo connected account of his renunciation of the world has been found in\nthe Pitakas but[311] people are represented as saying that in spite of\nhis parents' grief he \"went out from the household life into the\nhomeless state\" while still a young man. Accepted tradition, confirmed\nby the Mah\u00e2parinibb\u00e2na Sutta, says that he retired from worldly life\nwhen he was twenty-nine years old. The event is also commemorated in a\npoem of the Sutta-Nip\u00e2ta[312] which reads like a very ancient ballad.\n\nIt relates how Bimbis\u00e2ra, King of Magadha, looking out from his palace,\nsaw an unknown ascetic, and feeling he was no ordinary person went\nhimself to visit him. It would appear from this that Gotama on leaving\nhis family went down to the plains and visited R\u00e2jagaha, the capital of\nMagadha, now Rajg\u00eer to the south of Patna. The teachers of the Ganges\nvalley had probably a greater reputation for learning and sanctity than\nthe rough wits of the S\u00e2kya land and this may have attracted Gotama. At\nany rate he applied himself diligently to acquire what knowledge could\nbe learned from contemporary teachers of religion. We have an account\nput into his own mouth[313] of his experiences as the pupil of Al\u00e2ra\nK\u00e2l\u00e2ma and Uddaka R\u00e2maputta but it gives few details of his studies. It\nwould appear however that they both had a fixed system (dhamma) to\nimpart and that their students lived in religious discipline (vinaya) as\nmembers of an Order. They were therefore doing exactly what the Buddha\nhimself did later on a larger scale and with more conspicuous success.\nThe instruction, we gather, was oral. Gotama assimilated it thoroughly\nand rapidly but was dissatisfied because he found that it did not\nconduce to perfect knowledge and salvation[314]. He evidently accepted\nhis teachers' general ideas about belief and conduct--a dhamma, a vinaya,\nand the practice of meditation--but rejected the content of their\nteaching as inadequate. So he went away.\n\nThe European mystic knows the dangers of Quietism[315]. When Molinos and\nother quietists praise the Interior Silence in which the soul neither\nspeaks nor desires nor thinks, they suggest that the suspension of all\nmental activity is good in itself. But more robust seekers hold that\nthis \"orison of quiet\" is merely a state of preparation, not the end of\nthe quest, and valuable merely because the soul recuperates therein and\nis ready for further action. Some doctrine akin to that of the quietists\nseems to underlie the mysterious old phrases in which the Buddha's two\nteachers tried to explain their trances, and he left them for much the\nsame reasons as led the Church to condemn Quietism. He did not say that\nthe trances are bad; indeed he represented them as productive of\nhappiness[316] in a sense which Europeans can hardly follow. But he\nclearly refused to admit that they were the proper end of the religious\nlife. He felt there was something better and he set out to find it.\n\nThe interval between his abandonment of the world and his enlightenment\nis traditionally estimated at seven years and this accords with our\nother data. But we are not told how long he remained with his two\nteachers nor where they lived. He says however that after leaving them\nhe wandered up and down the land of Magadha, so that their residence was\nprobably in or near that district[317]. He settled at a place called\nUruvel\u00e2. \"There\" he says \"I thought to myself, truly this is a pleasant\nspot and a beautiful forest. Clear flows the river and pleasant are the\nbathing places: all around are meadows and villages.\" Here he determined\nto devote himself to the severest forms of asceticism. The place is in\nthe neighbourhood of Bodh-Gaya, near the river now called Phalgu or\nLila\u00f1ja but formerly Nera\u00f1jara. The fertile fields and gardens, the\nflights of steps and temples are modern additions but the trees and the\nriver still give the sense of repose and inspiration which Gotama felt,\nan influence alike calming to the senses and stimulating to the mind.\nBuddhism, though in theory setting no value on the pleasures of the eye,\nis not in practice disdainful of beauty, as witness the many allusions\nto the Buddha's personal appearance, the persistent love of art, and the\nequally persistent love of nature which is found in such early poems as\nthe Therag\u00e2th\u00e2 and still inspires those who select the sites of\nmonasteries throughout the Buddhist world from Burma to Japan. The\nexample of the Buddha, if we may believe the story, shows that he felt\nthe importance of scenery and climate in the struggle before him and his\nfollowers still hold that a holy life is led most easily in beautiful\nand peaceful landscapes.\n\n\n2\n\nHitherto we have found allusions to the events of the Buddha's life\nrather than consecutive statements and narratives but for the next\nperiod, comprising his struggle for enlightenment, its attainment and\nthe commencement of his career as a teacher, we have several accounts,\nboth discourses put into his own mouth and narratives in the third\nperson like the beginning of the Mah\u00e2vagga. It evidently was felt that\nthis was the most interesting and critical period of his life and for\nit, as for the period immediately preceding his death, the Pitakas\nprovide the elements of a biography. The accounts vary as to the amount\nof detail and supernatural events which they contain, but though the\nsimplest is perhaps the oldest, it does not follow that events\nconsistent with it but only found in other versions are untrue. One\ncannot argue that anyone recounting his spiritual experiences is bound\nto give a biographically complete picture. He may recount only what is\nrelevant to the purpose of his discourse.\n\nGotama's ascetic life at Uruvel\u00e2 is known as the wrestling or struggle\nfor truth. The story, as he tells it in the Pitakas, gives no dates, but\nis impressive in its intensity and insistent iteration[318]. Fire, he\nthought to himself, cannot be produced from damp wood by friction, but\nit can from dry wood. Even so must the body be purged of its humours to\nmake it a fit receptacle for illumination and knowledge. So he began a\nseries of terrible fasts and sat \"with set teeth and tongue pressed\nagainst the palate\" until in this spiritual wrestling the sweat poured\ndown from his arm pits. Then he applied himself to meditation\naccompanied by complete cessation of breathing, and, as he persevered\nand went from stage to stage of this painful exercise, he heard the\nblood rushing in his head and felt as if his skull was being split, as\nif his belly were being cut open with a butcher's knife, and finally as\nif he were thrown into a pit of burning coals. Elsewhere[319] he gives\nfurther details of the horrible penances which he inflicted on himself.\nHe gradually reduced his food to a grain of rice each day. He lived on\nseeds and grass, and for one period literally on dung. He wore haircloth\nor other irritating clothes: he plucked out his hair and beard: he stood\ncontinuously: he lay upon thorns. He let the dust and dirt accumulate\ntill his body looked like an old tree. He frequented a cemetery--that is\na place where corpses were thrown to decay or be eaten by birds and\nbeasts--and lay among the rotting bodies.\n\nBut no enlightenment, no glimpse into the riddle of the world came of\nall this, so, although he was nearly at death's door, he determined to\nabstain from food altogether. But spirits appeared and dissuaded him,\nsaying that if he attempted thus to kill himself they would nourish him\nby infusing a celestial elixir through his skin and he reflected that he\nmight as well take a little food[320]. So he took a palmful or two of\nbean soup. He was worn almost to a shadow, he says. \"When I touched my\nbelly, I felt my backbone through it and when I touched my back, I felt\nmy belly--so near had my back and my belly come together through this\nfasting. And when I rubbed my limbs to refresh them the hair fell\noff[321].\" Then he reflected that he had reached the limit of\nself-mortification and yet attained no enlightenment. There must be\nanother way to knowledge. And he remembered how once in his youth he had\nsat in the shade of a rose apple tree and entered into the stage of\ncontemplation known as the first rapture. That, he now thought, must be\nthe way to enlightenment: why be afraid of such bliss? But to attain it,\nhe must have more strength and to get strength he must eat. So he ate\nsome rice porridge. There were five monks living near him, hoping that\nwhen he found the Truth he would tell it to them. But when they saw that\nhe had begun to take food, their faith failed and they went away.\n\nThe Buddha then relates how, having taken food, he began to meditate and\npassed through four stages of contemplation, culminating in pure\nself-possession and equanimity, free alike from all feeling of pain or\nease. Such meditation was nothing miraculous but supposed to be within\nthe power of any trained ascetic. Then there arose before him a vision\nof his previous births, the hundreds of thousands of existences with all\ntheir details of name, family and caste through which he had passed.\nThis was succeeded by a second and wider vision in which he saw the\nwhole universe as a system of karma and reincarnation, composed of\nbeings noble or mean, happy or unhappy, continually \"passing away\naccording to their deeds,\" leaving one form of existence and taking\nshape in another. Finally, he understood the nature of error[322] and of\nsuffering, the cessation of suffering and the path that leads to the\ncessation of suffering. \"In me thus set free the knowledge of freedom\narose and I knew 'Rebirth has been destroyed, the higher life has been\nled; what had to be done has been done, I have no more to do with this\nworld[323].' This third knowledge came to me in the last watch of the\nnight: ignorance was destroyed, knowledge had arisen, darkness was\ndestroyed, light had arisen, as I sat there earnest, strenuous,\nresolute[324].\"\n\nOn attaining enlightenment he at first despaired of preaching the truth\nto others. He reflected that his doctrine was abstruse and that mankind\nare given over to their desires. How can such men understand the chain\nof cause and effect or teaching about Nirvana and the annihilation of\ndesire? So he determined to remain quiet and not to preach. Then the\ndeity Brahm\u00e2 Sahampati appeared before him and besought him to preach\nthe Truth, pleading that some men could understand. The Buddha surveyed\nthe world with his mind's eye and saw the different natures of mankind.\n\"As in a pool of lotuses, blue, red or white, some lotuses born in the\nwater, grown up in the water, do not rise above the water but thrive\nhidden under the water and other lotuses, blue, red or white, born in\nthe water, grown up in the water, reach to the surface: and other\nlotuses, blue, red or white, born in the water, grown up in the water,\nstand up out of the water and the water does not touch them.\" Thus did\nhe perceive the world to be and he said to Brahm\u00e2 \"The doors of\nimmortality are open. Let them that have ears to hear, show faith.\"\n\nThen he began to wonder to whom he should first preach his doctrine, and\nhe thought of his former teachers. But a spirit warned him that they had\nrecently died. Then he thought of the five monks who had tended him\nduring his austerities but left him when he ceased to fast. By his\nsuperhuman power of vision he perceived that they were living at Benares\nin the deer park, Isipatana. So, after remaining awhile at Uruvel\u00e2 he\nstarted to find them and on the way met a naked ascetic, in answer to\nwhose enquiries he proclaimed himself as the Buddha; \"I am the Holy One\nin this world, I am the highest teacher, I alone am the perfect supreme\nBuddha, I have gained calm and nirvana, I go to Benares to set moving\nthe wheels of righteousness[325]. I will beat the drum of immortality in\nthe darkness of this world.\" But the ascetic replied. \"It may be so,\nfriend,\" shook his head, took another road and went away, with the\nhonour of being the first sceptic.\n\nWhen the Buddha reached the deer park[326], a wood where ascetics were\nallowed to dwell and animals might not be killed, the five monks saw him\ncoming and determined not to salute him since he had given up his\nexertions, and turned to a luxurious life. But as he drew near they were\noverawed and in spite of their resolution advanced to meet him, and\nbrought water to wash his feet. While showing him this honour they\ncalled him Friend Gotama but he replied that it was not proper to\naddress the Tath\u00e2gata[327] thus. He had become a Buddha and was ready to\nteach them the Truth but the monks demurred saying that if he had been\nunable to win enlightenment while practising austerities, he was not\nlikely to have found it now that he was living a life of ease. But he\novercame their doubts and proceeded to instruct them, apparently during\nsome days, for we are told that they went out to beg alms.\n\nCan this account be regarded as in any sense historical, as being not\nperhaps the Buddha's own words but the reminiscences of some one who had\nheard him describe the crisis of his life? Like so much of the Pitakas\nthe narrative has an air of patchwork. Many striking passages, such as\nthe descriptions of the raptures through which he passed, occur in other\nconnections but the formul\u00e6 are ancient and their use here may be as\nearly and legitimate as elsewhere. In its main outlines the account is\nsimple, unpretentious and human. Gotama seeks to obtain enlightenment by\nself-mortification: finds that this is the wrong way: tries a more\nnatural method and succeeds: debates whether he shall become a teacher\nand at first hesitates. These are not features which the average Indian\nhagiographer, anxious to prove his hero omnipotent and omniscient, would\ninvent or emphasize. Towards the end of the narrative the language is\nmore majestic and the compiler introduces several stanzas, but though it\nis hardly likely that Gotama would have used these stanzas in telling\nhis own story, they may be ancient and in substance authentic. The\nsupernatural intervention recorded is not really great. It amounts to\nthis, that in mental crises the Buddha received warnings somewhat\nsimilar to those delivered by the d\u00e6mon of Socrates[328]. The appearance\nof Brahm\u00e2 Sahampati is related with more detail and largely in verse,\nwhich suggests that the compiler may have inserted some legend which he\nfound ready to hand, but on the whole I am inclined to believe that in\nthis narrative we have a tradition not separated from the Buddha by many\ngenerations and going back to those who had themselves heard him\ndescribe his wrestling to obtain the Truth and his victory.\n\nOther versions of the enlightenment give other incidents which are not\nrendered less credible by their omission from the narrative quoted, for\nit is clearly an epitome put together for a special didactic purpose.\nBut still the story as related at the beginning of the Mah\u00e2vagga of the\nVinaya has a stronger smack of mythology than the passages quoted from\nthe Sutta-Pitaka. In these last the Bodhi-tree[329] is mentioned only\nincidentally, which is natural, for it is a detail which would impress\nlater piety rather than the Buddha himself. But there is no reason to be\nsceptical as to the part it has played in Buddhist history. Even if we\nhad not been told that he sat under a tree, we might surmise that he did\nso, for to sit under a tree or in a cave was the only alternative for a\nhomeless ascetic. The Mah\u00e2vagga states that after attaining Buddhahood\nhe sat crosslegged at the foot of the tree for seven days\nuninterruptedly, enjoying the bliss of emancipation, and while there\nthought out the chain of causation which is only alluded to in the\nsuttas quoted above. He also sat under three other trees, seven days\nunder each. Heavy rain came on but Mucalinda, the king of the serpents,\n\"came out of his abode and seven times encircled the body of the Lord\nwith his windings and spread his great hood over the Lord's head.\" Here\nwe are in the domain of mythology: this is not a vignette from the old\nreligious life on the banks of the Nera\u00f1jara but a work of sacred art:\nthe Holy Supreme Buddha sitting immovable and imperturbable in the midst\nof a storm sheltered by the folds of some pious monster that the\nartist's fancy has created.\n\nThe narrative quoted from the Majjhima-Nik\u00e2ya does not mention that the\nBuddha during his struggle for enlightenment was assailed or tempted by\nM\u00e2ra, the personification of evil and of transitory pleasures but also\nof death. But that such an encounter--in some respects analogous to the\ntemptation of Christ by the Devil--formed part of the old tradition is\nindicated by several passages in the Pitakas[330] and not merely by the\nlater literature where it assumes a prominent and picturesque form. This\nstruggle is psychologically probable enough but the origin of the story,\nwhich is exhaustively discussed in Windisch's _Buddha und M\u00e2ra_, seems\nto lie not so much in any account which the Buddha may have given of his\nmental struggles as in amplifications of old legends and in\ndramatizations of metaphors which he may have used about conquering\ndeath.\n\nThe Bodhi-tree is still shown at Bodh-Gaya. It stands on a low terrace\nbehind the temple, the whole lying in a hollow, below the level of the\nsurrounding modern buildings, and still attracts many pilgrims from all\nBuddhist lands though perhaps not so many as the tree at Anuradhapura in\nCeylon, which is said to be sprung from one of its branches transplanted\nthither. Whatever title it may have to the reverence of the faithful\nrests on lineage rather than identity, for the growth which we see at\nBodh-Gaya now cannot claim to be the branches under which the Buddha sat\nor even the trunk which Asoka tended. At best it is a modern stem sprung\nfrom the seeds of the old tree, and this descent is rendered disputable\nby legends of its destruction and miraculous restoration. Even during\nthe time that Sir A. Cunningham knew the locality from 1862 to 1880 it\nwould seem that the old trunk decayed and was replaced by scions grown\nfrom seed.\n\nThe texts quoted above leave the Buddha occupied in teaching the five\nmonks in the Deer Park and the Mah\u00e2vagga gives us the text of the\nsermon[331] with which he opened his instruction. It is entitled Turning\nthe Wheel of Righteousness, and is also known as The Sermon at Benares.\nIt is a very early statement of the main doctrines of primitive Buddhism\nand I see no reason to doubt that it contains the ideas and phrases of\nthe Buddha. The gist of the sermon is extremely simple. He first says\nthat those who wish to lead a religious life should avoid the two\nextremes of self-indulgence and self-torture and follow a middle way.\nThen he enunciates what he calls the four truths[332] about evil or\nsuffering and the way to make an end of it. He opens very practically,\nand it may be noticed that abstruse as are many of his discourses they\ngenerally go straight to the heart of some contemporary interest. Here\nhe says that self-indulgence is low and self-mortification crazy: that\nboth are profitless and neither is the religious life. That consists in\nwalking in the middle path, or noble eightfold path defined in a\ncelebrated formula as right views, right aspirations, right speech,\nright conduct, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right\nrapture. He then enunciates the four truths. The first declares that all\nclinging to existence involves suffering. I shall have occasion to\nexamine later the pessimism which is often said to characterize Buddhism\nand Indian thought generally. Here let it suffice to say that the first\ntruth must be taken in conjunction with the others. The teaching of the\nBuddha is a teaching not so much of pessimism as of emancipation: but\nemancipation implies the existence of evil from which men must be freed:\na happy world would not need it. Buddhism recognizes the evil of the\nworld but it is not on that account a religion of despair: the essence\nof it is that it provides a remedy and an escape.\n\nThe second and third truths must be taken together and in connection\nwith the formula known as the chain of causation (paticcasamupp\u00e2da).\nEverything has a cause and produces an effect. If this is, that is: if\nthis is not, then that is not. This simple principle of uniform\ncausation is applied to the whole universe, gods and men, heaven, earth\nand hell. Indian thought has always loved wide applications of\nfundamental principles and here a law of the universe is propounded in a\nform both simple and abstract. Everything exists in virtue of a cause\nand does not exist if that cause is absent. Suffering has a cause and if\nthat cause can be detected and eliminated, suffering itself will be\neliminated. This cause of evil is Tanh\u00e2, the thirst or craving for\nexistence, pleasure and success. And the cure is to remove it. It may\nseem to the European that this is a proposal to cure the evils of life\nby removing life itself but when in the fourth truth we come to the\ncourse to be followed by the seeker after salvation--the eightfold\npath--we find it neither extravagant nor morbid. We may imagine that an\nIndian of that time asking different schools of thinkers for the way to\nsalvation would have been told by Brahmans (if indeed they had been\nwilling to impart knowledge to any but an accredited pupil) that he who\nperforms a certain ceremony goes to the abode of the gods: other\nteachers would have insisted on a course of fasting and self-torture:\nothers again like S\u00e2\u00f1jaya and Makkhali would have given argumentative\nand unpractical answers. The Buddha's answer is simple and practical:\nseven-eighths of it would be accepted in every civilized country as a\ndescription of the good life. It is not merely external, for it insists\non right thought and right aspiration: the motive and temper are as\nimportant as the act. It does not neglect will-power and activity, for\nright action, right livelihood and right effort are necessary--a point to\nbe remembered when Buddhism is called a dreamy unpractical religion. But\nno doubt the last stage of the path, right rapture or right meditation,\nis meant to be its crown and fulfilment. It takes the place of prayer\nand communion with the deity and the Buddha promises the beatific vision\nin this life to those who persevere. The negative features of the Path\nare also important. It contains no mention of ceremonial, austerities,\ngods, many or one, nor of the Buddha himself. He is the discoverer and\nteacher of the truth; beyond that his personality plays no part.\n\nBut we are here treating of his life rather than of his doctrine and\nmust now return to the events which are said to have followed the first\nsermon.\n\nThe first converts had, even before embracing the Buddha's teaching,\nbeen followers of a religious life but the next batch of recruits came\nfrom the wealthy mercantile families of Benares. The first was a youth\nnamed Yasa who joined the order, while his father, mother and former\nwife became lay believers. Then came first four and subsequently fifty\nfriends of Yasa and joined the order. \"At that time\" says the\nMah\u00e2vagga. \"there were sixty-one Arhats[333] in the world,\" so that at\nfirst arhatship seems to have followed immediately on ordination. Arhat,\nit may be mentioned, is the commonest word in early Buddhist literature\n(more common than any phrase about nirvana) for describing sanctity and\nspiritual perfection. The arhat is one who has broken the fetters of the\nsenses and passions, for whom there will be no new birth or death, and\nwho lives in this world like the Buddha, detached but happy and\nbeneficent.\n\nThe Buddha then addressed his followers and said--\"Monks, I am delivered\nfrom all fetters, human and divine, and so are you. Go now and wander\nfor the gain of many, for the welfare of many, out of compassion for the\nworld, for the good, for the gain and for the welfare of gods and men.\nLet not two of you go the same way. Preach the doctrine which is\nglorious in the beginning, glorious in the middle and glorious in the\nend, in the spirit and in the letter; proclaim a consummate, perfect and\npure life of holiness.\" The monks then went forth and returned bringing\ncandidates to be formally ordained by the Buddha. But seeing that these\njourneys caused fatigue and trouble, he authorized the ordained monks to\nconfer ordination without reference to himself. He then returned to\nUruvel\u00e2, where he had dwelt before attaining Buddhahood, and converted a\nthousand Jatilas, that is to say Brahmans living the life of hermits,\nwhich involved the abandonment of household life but not of sacrifices.\nThe admission of these hermits to the order is probably historical and\nexplains the presence among the Buddha's disciples of a tendency towards\nself-mortification of which he himself did not wholly approve. The\nMah\u00e2vagga[334] contains a series of short legends about these\noccurrences, one of them in two versions. The narratives are miraculous\nbut have an ancient tone and probably represent the type of popular\nstory current about the Buddha shortly after or even during his life.\nOne of them is a not uncommon subject in Buddhist art. It relates how\nthe chamber in which a Brahman called Kassapa kept his sacred fire was\nhaunted by a fire-breathing magical serpent. The Buddha however spent\nthe night in this chamber and after a contest in which both emitted\nflames succeeded in conquering the beast. After converting the Jatilas\nhe preached to them the celebrated Fire Sermon, said to have been\ndelivered on the eminence now called Brahma Yoen[335] near Gaya and\npossibly inspired by the spectacle of grass fires which at some seasons\nmay be seen creeping over every hill-side in an Indian night,\n\"Everything, Monks, is burning and how is it burning? The eye is\nburning: what the eye sees is burning: thoughts based on the eye are\nburning: the contact of the eye (with visible things) is burning and the\nsensation produced by that contact, whether pleasant, painful or\nindifferent is also burning. With what fire is it burning? It is burning\nwith the fire of lust, the fire of anger, with the fire of ignorance; it\nis burning with the sorrows of birth, decay, death, grief, lamentation,\nsuffering, dejection and despair.\"\n\nThe Buddha now went on with his converts to R\u00e2jagaha. He stopped in a\nbamboo grove outside the town and here the king, Bimbis\u00e2ra, waited on\nhim and with every sign of respect asked him to take food in his palace.\nIt was on this occasion that we first hear of him accepting an\ninvitation to dinner[336], which he did frequently during the rest of\nhis career. After the repast the king presented a pleasure garden just\noutside the town \"to the fraternity of monks with the Buddha at their\nhead.\" At that time another celebrated teacher named S\u00e2\u00f1jaya was\nstopping at R\u00e2jagaha with a train of two hundred and fifty disciples.\nTwo of them, S\u00e2riputta and Moggall\u00e2na, joined the Buddha's order and\ntook with them the whole body of their companions.\n\nThe Mah\u00e2vagga proceeds to relate that many of the young nobility joined\nthe order and that the people began to murmur saying \"The Monk Gotama\ncauses fathers to beget no sons and families to become extinct.\" And\nagain \"The Great Monk has come to Giribbaja of the Magadha people,\nleading with him all the followers of S\u00e2\u00f1jaya. Whom will he lead off\nnext?\" When this was told to the Buddha he replied that the excitement\nwould only last seven days and bade his followers answer with the\nfollowing verse \"It is by the true doctrine that the great heroes, the\nBuddhas, lead men. Who will murmur at the wise who lead men by the power\nof truth?\" It is possible, as Oldenburg suggests, that we have here two\npopular couplets which were really bandied between the friends and\nenemies of the Buddha.\n\n\n3\n\nIt now becomes difficult to give dates but the Mah\u00e2vagga[337] relates\nthat the Buddha stopped some time at R\u00e2jagaha and then revisited his\nnative town, Kapilavatthu. That he should have done so is natural enough\nbut there is little trace of sentiment in the narrative of the Vinaya.\nIts object is to state the occasion on which the Buddha laid down the\nrules of the order. Irrelevant incidents are ignored and those which are\nnoticed are regarded simply as the circumstances which led to the\nformulation of certain regulations. \"The Lord dwelt in the Sakka country\nnear Kapilavatthu in the Banyan Grove. And in the forenoon having put on\nhis robes and taken his alms bowl he went to the home of the Sakka\nSuddhodana[338] and sat down on a seat prepared for him. Then the\nprincess who was the mother of R\u00e2hula[339] said to him 'This is your\nfather, R\u00e2hula, go and ask him for your inheritance.' Then young R\u00e2hula\nwent to the place where the Lord was, and standing before him said 'Your\nshadow, Monk, is a place of bliss.' Then the Lord rose from his seat and\nwent away but R\u00e2hula followed him saying 'Give me my inheritance, Monk.'\nThen the Lord said to S\u00e2riputta (who had already become his chief\ndisciple) 'Well, S\u00e2riputta, confer the preliminary ordination on young\nR\u00e2hula.' S\u00e2riputta asked how he should do so and the Buddha explained\nthe forms.\n\n\"Then the Sakka Suddhodana went to the place where the Lord was and\nafter respectfully saluting him asked for a boon. 'Lord, when the\nBlessed One gave up the world, it was great pain to me and so it was\nwhen Nanda[340] did the same. Great too was my pain when R\u00e2hula did it.\nThe love for a son, Lord, cuts into the skin, the flesh, the bones, and\nreaches the marrow. Let not the preliminary ordination be conferred on a\nson without his parents' permission.' The Buddha assented. Three or four\nyears later Suddhodana died.\"\n\nFrom Kapilavatthu the Buddha is said to have gone to S\u00e2vatth\u00ee, the\ncapital of Kosala where Pasenadi was king, but now we lose the\nchronological thread and do not find it again until the last years of\nhis life. Few of the numerous incidents recorded in the Pitakas can be\ndated. The narrators resemble those Indian artists who when carving a\nstory in relief place all the principal figures in one panel without\nattempting to mark the sequence of the incidents which are represented\nsimultaneously. For the connection of events with the Buddha's teaching\nthe compilers of the Pitakas had an eye; for their connection with his\nlife none at all. And though this attitude is disquieting to the\nhistoric sense it is not unjustifiable. The object and the achievement\nof the Buddha was to preach a certain doctrine and to found an order.\nAll the rest--years and countries, pains and pleasures--was of no\nimportance. And it would appear that we have not lost much: we should\nhave a greater sense of security if we had an orderly account of his\nwanderings and his relations with the kings of his time, but after he\nhad once entered on his ministry the events which broke the peaceful\ntenour of his long life were few and we probably know most of them\nthough we cannot date them. For about forty-five years he moved about\nKosala, Magadha and Anga visiting the two capitals S\u00e2vatth\u00ee and R\u00e2jagaha\nand going as far west as the country of the Kurus. He took little part\nin politics or worldly life, though a hazy but not improbable story[341]\nrepresents him as pacifying the S\u00e2kyas and Koliyas, who were on the\npoint of fighting about the water of the Rohini which irrigated the\nlands of both clans. He uniformly enjoyed the respect and attention of\nkings and the wealthy classes. Doubtless he was not popular with the\nBrahmans or with those good people who disliked seeing fine young men\nmade into monks. But it does not appear that his teaching provoked any\nserious tumults or that he was troubled by anything but schism within\nthe order. We have, if not a history, at least a picture of a life which\nthough peaceful was active and benevolent but aloof, majestic and\nauthoritative.\n\nWe are told[342] that at first his disciples wandered about at all\nseasons but it was not long before he bade them observe the already\nestablished routine for itinerant monks of travelling on foot during the\ngreater part of the year but of resting for three months during the\nrainy season known as Vassa and beginning some time in June. When moving\nabout he appears to have walked from five to ten miles a day, regulating\nhis movements so as to reach inhabited places in time to collect food\nfor the midday meal. The afternoon he devoted to meditation and in the\nevening gave instruction. He usually halted in woods or gardens on the\noutskirts of villages and cities, and often on the bank of a river or\ntank, for shade and water would be the first requisites for a wandering\nmonk. On these journeys he was accompanied by a considerable following\nof disciples: five hundred or twelve hundred and fifty are often\nmentioned and though the numbers may be exaggerated there is no reason\nto doubt that the band was large. The suttas generally commence with a\npicture of the surroundings in which the discourse recorded was\ndelivered. The Buddha is walking along the high road from R\u00e2jagaha to\nN\u00e2landa with a great company of disciples. Or he is journeying through\nKosala and halting in a mango-grove on the banks of the Aciravat\u00ee river.\nOr he is stopping in a wood outside a Brahman village and the people go\nout to him. The principal Brahmans, taking their siesta on the upper\nterraces of their houses, see the crowd and ask their doorkeepers what\nit means. On hearing the cause they debate whether they or the Buddha\nshould pay the first call and ultimately visit him. Or he is halting on\nthe shore of the Gaggar\u00e2 Lake at Camp\u00e2 in Western Bengal, sitting under\nthe fragrant white flowers of a campaka tree. Or he visits the hills\noverlooking R\u00e2jagaha haunted by peacocks and by wandering monks. Often\nhe stops in buildings described as halls, which were sometimes merely\nrest houses for travellers. But it became more and more the custom for\nthe devout to erect such buildings for his special use and even in his\nlifetime they assumed the proportions of monasteries[343]. The people of\nVes\u00e2l\u00ee built one in a wood to the north of their city known as the\nGabled Hall. It was a storied house having on the ground floor a large\nroom surrounded by pillars and above it the private apartments of the\nBuddha. Such private rooms (especially those which he occupied at\nS\u00e2vatth\u00ee), were called Gandhak\u00fbt\u00ee or the perfumed chamber. At\nKapilavatthu[344] the S\u00e2kyas erected a new building known as Santhag\u00e2ra.\nThe Buddha was asked to inaugurate it and did so by a discourse lasting\nlate into the night which he delivered sitting with his back against a\npillar. At last he said his back was tired and lay down, leaving \u00c2nanda\nto continue the edification of the congregation who were apparently less\nexhausted than the preacher.\n\nBut perhaps the residence most frequently mentioned is that in the\ngarden called Jetavana at S\u00e2vatth\u00ee. An\u00e2thapindika, a rich merchant of\nthat town, was converted by the Buddha when staying at R\u00e2jagaha and\ninvited him to spend the next rainy season at S\u00e2vatth\u00ee[345]. On\nreturning to his native town to look for a suitable place, he decided\nthat the garden of the Prince Jeta best satisfied his requirements. He\nobtained it only after much negotiation for a sum sufficient to cover\nthe whole ground with coins. When all except a small space close to the\ngateway had been thus covered Jeta asked to be allowed to share in the\ngift and on receiving permission erected on the vacant spot a gateway\nwith a room over it. \"And An\u00e2thapindika the householder built dwelling\nrooms and retiring rooms and storerooms and halls with fireplaces, and\noutside storehouses and closets and cloisters and halls attached to the\nbath rooms and ponds and roofed open sheds[346].\"\n\nBuddhaghosa has given an account[347] of the way in which the Buddha was\nwont to spend his days when stopping in some such resting-place, and his\ndescription is confirmed by the numerous details given in the Pitakas.\nHe rose before dawn and would often retire and meditate until it was\ntime to set out on the round for alms but not unfrequently he is\nrepresented as thinking that it was too early to start and that he might\nfirst visit some monk of the neighbourhood. Then he went round the town\nor village with his disciples, carrying his almsbowl and accepting\neverything put into it. Sometimes he talked to his disciples while\nwalking[348]. Frequently, instead of begging for alms, he accepted an\ninvitation to dine with some pious person who asked the whole band of\ndisciples and made strenuous culinary efforts. Such invitations were\ngiven at the conclusion of a visit paid to the Buddha on the previous\nday and were accepted by him with silence which signified consent. On\nthe morning of the next day the host announced in person or through a\nmessenger that the meal was ready and the Buddha taking his mantle and\nbowl went to the house. The host waited on the guests with his own\nhands, putting the food which he had prepared into their bowls. After\nthe repast the Buddha delivered a discourse or catechized the company.\nHe did the same with his own disciples when he collected food himself\nand returned home to eat it. He took but one meal a day[349], between\neleven and twelve, and did not refuse meat when given to him, provided\nthat he did not know the animals had been slaughtered expressly for his\nfood. When he had given instruction after the meal he usually retired to\nhis chamber or to a quiet spot under trees for repose and meditation. On\none occasion[350] he took his son R\u00e2hula with him into a wood at this\nhour to impart some of the deepest truths to him, but as a rule he gave\nno further instruction until the late afternoon.\n\nThe Pitakas represent all believers as treating the Buddha with the\ngreatest respect but the salutations and titles which they employ hardly\nexceed those ordinarily used in speaking to eminent persons[351]. Kings\nwere at this time addressed as Deva, whereas the Buddha's usual title is\nBhagav\u00e2 or Bhante, Lord. A religious solemnity and deliberation prevails\nin the interviews which he grants but no extravagance of adoration is\nrecorded. Visitors salute him by bowing with joined hands, sit\nrespectfully on one side while he instructs them and in departing are\ncareful to leave him on their right hand. He accepts such gifts as food,\nclothes, gardens and houses but rejects all ceremonial honours. Thus\nPrince Bodhi[352] when receiving him carpeted his mansion with white\ncloths but the Buddha would not walk on them and remained standing at\nthe entrance till they were taken up.\n\nThe introduction to the Ariyapariyesana-Sutta gives a fairly complete\npicture of a day in his life at S\u00e2vatth\u00ee. It relates how in the morning\nhe took his bowl and mantle and went to the town to collect food. While\nhe was away, some monks told his personal attendant \u00c2nanda that they\nwished to hear a discourse from him, as it was long since they had had\nthe privilege. \u00c2nanda suggested that they had better go to the hermitage\nof the Brahman Rammaka near the town. The Buddha returned, ate his meal\nand then said \"Come, \u00c2nanda, let us go to the terrace of Mig\u00e2ra's\nmother[353] and stay there till evening.\" They went there and spent the\nday in meditation. Towards evening the Buddha rose and said \"Let us go\nto the old bath to refresh our limbs.\" After they had bathed, \u00c2nanda\nsuggested that they should go to Rammaka's hermitage: the Buddha\nassented by his silence and they went together. Within the hermitage\nwere many monks engaged in instructive conversation, so the Buddha\nwaited at the door till there was a pause in the talk. Then he coughed\nand knocked. The monks opened the door, and offered him a seat. After a\nshort conversation, he recounted to them how he had striven for and\nobtained Buddhahood.\n\nThese congregations were often prolonged late into the night. We hear\nfor instance how he sat on the terrace belonging to Mig\u00e2ra's mother[354]\nin the midst of an assembly of monks waiting for his words, still and\nsilent in the light of the full moon; how a monk would rise, adjusting\nhis robe so as to leave one shoulder bare, bow with his hands joined and\nraised to his forehead and ask permission to put a question and the Lord\nwould reply, Be seated, monk, ask what you will. But sometimes in these\nnightly congregations the silence was unbroken. When King Aj\u00e2tasattu\nwent to visit him[355] in the mango grove of J\u00eevaka he was seized with\nsudden fear at the unearthly stillness of the place and suspected an\nambush. \"Fear not, O King,\" said J\u00eevaka, \"I am playing you no tricks. Go\nstraight on. There in the pavilion hall the lamps are burning ... and\nthere is the Blessed One sitting against the middle pillar, facing the\neast with the brethren round him.\" And when the king beheld the assembly\nseated in perfect silence, calm as a clear lake, he exclaimed \"Would\nthat my son might have such calm as this assembly now has.\"\n\nThe major part of the Buddha's activity was concerned with the\ninstruction of his disciples and the organization of the Sangha or\norder. Though he was ready to hear and teach all, the portrait presented\nto us is not that of a popular preacher who collects and frequents\ncrowds but rather that of a master, occupied with the instruction of his\npupils, a large band indeed but well prepared and able to appreciate and\nlearn by heart teaching which, though freely offered to the whole world,\nwas somewhat hard to untrained ears. In one passage[356] an enquirer\nasks him why he shows more zeal in teaching some than others. The answer\nis, if a landowner had three fields, one excellent, one middling and one\nof poor soil, would he not first sow the good field, then the middling\nfield, and last of all the bad field, thinking to himself; it will just\nproduce fodder for the cattle? So the Buddha preaches first to his own\nmonks, then to lay-believers, and then, like the landowner who sows the\nbad field last, to Brahmans, ascetics and wandering monks of other\nsects, thinking if they only understand one word, it will do them good\nfor a long while. It was to such congregations of disciples or to\nenquirers belonging to other religious orders that he addressed his most\nimportant discourses, iterating in grave numbered periods the truths\nconcerning the reality of sorrow and the equal reality of salvation, as\nhe sat under a clump of bamboos or in the shade of a banyan, in sight\nperhaps of a tank where the lotuses red, white and blue, submerged or\nrising from the water, typified the various classes of mankind.\n\nHe did not start by laying down any constitution for his order. Its\nrules were formed entirely by case law. Each incident and difficulty was\nreferred to him as it arose and his decision was accepted as the law on\nthat point. During his last illness he showed a noble anxiety not to\nhamper his followers by the prestige of his name but to leave behind him\na body of free men, able to be a light and a help to themselves. But a\ncurious passage[357] represents an old monk as saying immediately after\nhis death \"Weep not, brethren; we are well rid of the Great Monk. We\nused to be annoyed by being told, 'This beseems you and this does not\nbeseem you. But now we shall be able to do what we like and not have to\ndo what we don't like.'\" Clearly the laxer disciples felt the Master's\nhand to be somewhat heavy and we might have guessed as much. For though\nGotama had a breadth of view rare in that or in any age, though he\nrefused to multiply observances or to dogmatize, every sutta indicates\nthat he was a man of exceptional authority and decision; what he has\nlaid down he has laid down; there is no compulsion or punishment, no vow\nof obedience or _sacrificium intellectus_; but it is equally clear that\nthere is no place in the order for those who in great or small think\ndifferently from the master.\n\nIn shepherding his flock he had the assistance of his senior disciples.\nOf these the most important were S\u00e2riputta and Moggall\u00e2na, both of them\nBrahmans who left their original teacher S\u00e2\u00f1jaya to join him at the\noutset of his ministry. S\u00e2riputta[358] enjoyed his confidence so fully\nthat he acted as his representative and gave authoritative expositions\nof doctrine. The Buddha even compared him to the eldest son of an\nEmperor who assists his father in the government. But both he and\nMoggall\u00e2na died before their master and thus did not labour\nindependently. Another important disciple Up\u00e2li survived him and\nprobably contributed materially to the codification of the Vinaya.\nAnuruddha and \u00c2nanda, both of them S\u00e2kyas, are also frequently\nmentioned, especially the latter who became his personal attendant[359]\nand figures in the account of his illness and death as the beloved\ndisciple to whom his last instructions were committed. These two\ntogether with four other young S\u00e2kya nobles and Up\u00e2li joined the order\ntwenty-five years before Gotama's death and perhaps formed an inner\ncircle of trusted relatives, though we have no reason to think there was\nany friction between them and Brahmans like S\u00e2riputta. Up\u00e2li is said to\nhave been barber of the S\u00e2kyas. It is not easy to say what his social\nstatus may have been, but it probably did not preclude intimacy.\n\nThe Buddha was frequently occupied with maintaining peace and order\namong his disciples. Though the profession of a monk excluded worldly\nadvancement, it was held in great esteem and was hence adopted by\nambitious and quarrelsome men who had no true vocation. The troubles\nwhich arose in the Sangha are often ascribed in the Vinaya to the\nChabbaggiyas, six brethren who became celebrated in tradition as spirits\nof mischief and who are evidently made the peg on which these old\nmonkish anecdotes are hung. As a rule the intervention of the Buddha was\nsufficient to restore peace, but one passage[360] indicates resistance\nto his authority. The brethren quarrelled so often that the people said\nit was a public scandal. The Buddha endeavoured to calm the disputants,\nbut one of them replied, \"Lord, let the Blessed One quietly enjoy the\nbliss which he has obtained in this life. The responsibility for these\nquarrels will rest with us alone.\" This seems a clear hint that the\nBlessed One had better mind his own business. Renewed injunctions and\nparables met with no better result. \"And the Blessed One thought\" says\nthe narrative \"'truly these fools are infatuated,' and he rose from his\nseat and went away.\"\n\nOther troubles are mentioned but by far the most serious was the schism\nof Devadatta, represented as occurring in the old age of Gotama when he\nwas about seventy-two. The story as told in the Cullavagga[361] is\nembellished with supernatural incidents and seems not to observe the\nnatural sequence of events but perhaps three features are historical:\nnamely that Devadatta wished to supersede the Buddha as head of the\norder, that he was the friend of Aj\u00e2tasattu, Crown Prince and afterwards\nKing of Magadha[362], and that he advocated a stricter rule of life than\nthe Buddha chose to enforce. This combination of piety and ambition is\nperhaps not unnatural. He was a cousin of the Buddha and entered the\norder at the same time as \u00c2nanda and other young S\u00e2kya nobles. Sprung\nfrom that quarrelsome breed he possessed in a distorted form some of\nGotama's own ability. He is represented as publicly urging the Master to\nretire and dwell at ease but met with an absolute refusal. S\u00e2riputta was\ndirected to \"proclaim\" him in R\u00e2jagaha, the proclamation being to the\neffect that his nature had changed and that all his words and deeds were\ndisowned by the order. Then Devadatta incited the Crown Prince to murder\nhis father, Bimbis\u00e2ra. The plot was prevented by the ministers but the\nking told Aj\u00e2tasattu that if he wanted the kingdom he could have it and\nabdicated. But his unnatural son put him to death all the same[363] by\nstarving him slowly in confinement. With the assistance of Aj\u00e2tasattu,\nDevadatta then tried to compass the death of the Buddha. First he hired\nassassins, but they were converted as soon as they approached the sacred\npresence. Then he rolled down a rock from the Vulture's peak with the\nintention of crushing the Buddha, but the mountain itself interfered to\nstop the sacrilege and only a splinter scratched the Lord's foot. Then\nhe arranged for a mad elephant to be let loose in the road at the time\nof collecting alms, but the Buddha calmed the furious beast. It is\nperhaps by some error of arrangement that after committing such\nunpardonable crimes Devadatta is represented as still a member of the\norder and endeavouring to provoke a schism by asking for stricter rules.\nThe attempt failed and according to later legends he died on the spot,\nbut the Vinaya merely says that hot blood gushed from his mouth.\n\nThat there are historical elements in this story is shown by the\nnarrative of Fa Hsien, the Chinese pilgrim who travelled in India about\n400 A.D. He tells us that the followers of Devadatta still existed in\nKosala and revered the three previous Buddhas but refused to recognize\nGotama. This is interesting, for it seems to show that it was possible\nto accept Gotama's doctrine, or the greater part of it, as something\nindependent of his personality and an inheritance from earlier teachers.\n\nThe Ud\u00e2na and J\u00e2taka relate another plot without specifying the year.\nSome heretics induced a nun called Sundar\u00ee to pretend she was the\nBuddha's concubine and hired assassins to murder her. They then accused\nthe Bhikkhus of killing her to conceal their master's sin, but the real\nassassins got drunk with the money they had received and revealed the\nconspiracy in their cups.\n\nBut these are isolated cases. As a whole the Buddha's long career was\nmarked by a peace and friendliness which are surprising if we consider\nwhat innovations his teaching contained. Though in contending that\npriestly ceremonies were useless he refrained from neither direct\ncondemnation nor satire, yet he is not represented as actively\nattacking[364] them and we may doubt if he forbade his lay disciples to\ntake part in rites and sacrifices as a modern missionary might do. We\nfind him sitting by the sacred fire of a Brahman[365] and discoursing,\nbut not denouncing the worship carried on in the place. When he\nconverted Siha[366], the general of the Licchavis, who had been a Jain,\nhe bade him continue to give food and gifts as before to the Jain monks\nwho frequented his house--an instance of toleration in a proselytizing\nteacher which is perhaps without parallel. Similarly in the\nS\u00eeg\u00e2lov\u00e2da-sutta it is laid down that a good man ministers to monks and\nto Brahmans. If it is true that Aj\u00e2tasattu countenanced Devadatta's\nattempts to murder him, he ignored such disagreeable details with a\nsublime indifference, for he continued to frequent R\u00e2jagaha, received\nthe king, and preached to him one of his finest sermons without alluding\nto the past. He stands before us in the suttas as a man of amazing power\nof will, inaccessible to fear, promises and, one may add, to argument\nbut yet in comparison with other religious leaders singularly gentle in\ntaking the offensive against error. Often he simply ignored it as\nirrelevant: \"Never mind\" he said on his deathbed to his last convert\n\"Never mind, whether other teachers are right or wrong. Listen to me, I\nwill teach you the truth.\" And when he is controversial his method is\noften to retain old words in honourable use with new meanings. The\nBrahmans are not denounced like the Pharisees in the New Testament but\nthe real Brahman is a man of uprightness and wisdom: the real sacrifice\nis to abstain from sin and follow the Truth.\n\nWomen played a considerable part in the entourage of Gotama. They were\nnot secluded in India at that time and he admitted that they were\ncapable of attaining saintship. The work of ministering to the order, of\nsupplying it with food and raiment, naturally fell largely to pious\nmatrons, and their attentive forethought delighted to provide for the\nmonks those comforts which might be accepted but not asked for.\nProminent among such donors was Vis\u00e2kh\u00e2, who married the son of a\nwealthy merchant at S\u00e2vatth\u00ee and converted her husband's family from\nJainism to the true doctrine. The Vinaya recounts how after entertaining\nthe Buddha and his disciples she asked eight boons which proved to be\nthe privileges of supplying various classes of monks with food, clothing\nand medicine and of providing the nuns with bathing dresses, for, said\nshe, it shocked her sense of propriety to see them bathing naked. But\nthe anecdotes respecting the Buddha and women, whether his wife or\nothers, are not touched with sentiment, not even so much as is found in\nthe conversation between Y\u00e2j\u00f1avalkya and Maitrey\u00ee in the Upanishad. To\nwomen as a class he gave their due and perhaps in his own opinion more\nthan their due, but if he felt any interest in them as individuals, the\nsacred texts have obliterated the record. In the last year of his life\nhe dined with the courtezan Ambap\u00e2l\u00ee and the incident has attracted\nattention on account of its supposed analogy to the narrative about\nChrist and \"the woman which was a sinner.\" But the resemblance is small.\nThere is no sign that the Buddha, then eighty years of age, felt any\npersonal interest in Ambap\u00e2l\u00ee. Whatever her morals may have been, she\nwas a benefactress of the order and he simply gave her the same\nopportunity as others of receiving instruction. When the Licchavi\nprinces tried to induce him to dine with them instead of with her, he\nrefused to break his promise. The invitations of princes had no\nattraction for him, and he was a prince himself. A fragment of\nconversation introduced irrelevantly into his deathbed discourses[367]\nis significant--\"How, Lord, are we to conduct ourselves with regard to\nwomankind? Don't see them, \u00c2nanda. But if we see them, what are we to\ndo? Abstain from speech. But if they should speak to us what are we to\ndo? Keep wide awake.\"\n\nThis spirit is even more evident in the account of the admission of Nuns\nto the order. When the Buddha was visiting his native town his aunt and\nfoster mother, Mah\u00e2praj\u00e2pat\u00ee, thrice begged him to grant this privilege\nto women but was thrice refused and went away in tears. Then she\nfollowed him to Ves\u00e2l\u00ee and stood in the entrance of the K\u00fbtag\u00e2ra Hall\n\"with swollen feet and covered with dust, and sorrowful.\" \u00c2nanda, who\nhad a tender heart, interviewed her and, going in to the Buddha,\nsubmitted her request but received a triple refusal. But he was not to\nbe denied and urged that the Buddha admitted women to be capable of\nattaining saintship and that it was unjust to refuse the blessings of\nreligion to one who had suckled him. At last Gotama yielded--perhaps the\nonly instance in which he is represented as convinced by argument--but he\nadded \"If, \u00c2nanda, women had not received permission to enter the Order,\nthe pure religion would have lasted long, the good law would have stood\nfast a thousand years. But since they had received that permission, it\nwill now stand fast for only five hundred years[368].\"\n\nHe maintained and approved the same hard detached attitude in other\ndomestic relations. His son R\u00e2hula received special instruction but is\nnot represented as enjoying his confidence like \u00c2nanda. A remarkable\nnarrative relates how, when the monk Sang\u00e2maji was sitting beneath a\ntree absorbed in meditation, his former wife (whom he had left on\nabandoning the world) laid his child before him and said \"Here, monk, is\nyour little son, nourish me and nourish him.\" But Sang\u00e2maji took no\nnotice and the woman went away. The Buddha who observed what happened\nsaid \"He feels no pleasure when she comes, no sorrow when she goes: him\nI call a true Brahman released from passion[369].\" This narrative is\nrepulsive to European sentiment, particularly as the chronicler cannot\nspare the easy charity of a miracle to provide for the wife and child,\nbut in taking it as an index of the character of Gotama, we must bear in\nmind such sayings of Christ as \"If any man come to me and hate not his\nfather and mother and wife and children and brethren and sisters, yea\nand his own life also, he cannot be my disciple[370].\"\n\n\n4\n\nPolitical changes, in which however he took no part, occurred in the\nlast years of the Buddha's life. In Magadha Aj\u00e2tasattu had come to the\nthrone. If, as the Vinaya represents, he at first supported the schism\nof Devadatta, he subsequently became a patron of the Buddha. He was an\nambitious prince and fortified P\u00e2talig\u00e2ma (afterwards P\u00e2taliputra)\nagainst the Vajjian confederation, which he destroyed a few years after\nthe Buddha's death. This confederation was an alliance of small\noligarchies like the Licchavis and Videhans. It would appear that this\nform of constitution was on the wane in northern India and that the\nmonarchical states were annexing the decaying commonwealths. In Kosala,\nVid\u00fbdabha conquered Kapilavatthu a year or two before the Buddha's\ndeath, and is said to have perpetrated a great massacre of the S\u00e2kya\nclan[371]. Possibly in consequence of these events the Buddha avoided\nKosala and the former S\u00e2kya territory. At any rate the record of his\nlast days opens at R\u00e2jagaha, the capital of Magadha.\n\nThis record is contained in the Mah\u00e2parinibb\u00e2na Sutta, the longest of\nthe suttas and evidently a compilation. The style is provokingly uneven.\nIt often promises to give a simple and natural narrative but such\npassages are interrupted by more recent and less relevant matter. No\ngeneral estimate of its historical value can be given but each incident\nmust be apprized separately. Nearly all the events and discourses\nrecorded in it are found elsewhere in the canon in the same words[372]\nand it contains explanatory matter of a suspiciously apologetic nature.\nAlso the supernatural element is freely introduced. But together with\nall this it contains plain pathetic pictures of an old man's fatigue and\nsufferings which would not have been inserted by a later hand, had they\nnot been found ready in tradition. And though events and sermonettes are\nstrung together in a way which is not artistic, there is nothing\nimprobable in the idea that the Buddha when he felt his end approaching\nshould have admonished his disciples about all that he thought most\nimportant.\n\nThe story opens at R\u00e2jagaha about six months before the Buddha's death.\nThe King sends his minister to ask whether he will be successful in\nattacking the Vajjians. The Buddha replies that as long as they act in\nconcord, behave honourably, and respect the Faith, so long may they be\nexpected not to decline but prosper. The compiler may perhaps have felt\nthis narrative to be an appropriate parallel to the Buddha's advice to\nhis disciples to live in peace and order. He summoned and addressed the\nbrethren living in R\u00e2jagaha and visited various spots in the\nneighbourhood. In these last utterances one phrase occurs with special\nfrequency, \"Great is the fruit, great the advantage of meditation\naccompanied by upright conduct: great is the advantage of intelligence\naccompanied by meditation. The mind which has such intelligence is freed\nfrom intoxications, from the desires of the senses, from love of life,\nfrom delusion and from ignorance.\"\n\nHe then set forth accompanied by \u00c2nanda and several disciples. Judging\nfrom the route adopted his intention was to go ultimately to S\u00e2vatth\u00ee.\nThis was one of the towns where he resided from time to time, but we\ncannot tell what may have been his special motives for visiting it on\nthe present occasion, for if the King of Kosala had recently massacred\nthe S\u00e2kyas his presence there would have been strange. The road was not\ndirect but ran up northwards and then followed the base of the\nmountains, thus enabling travellers to cross rivers near their sources\nwhere they were still easy to ford. The stopping-places from R\u00e2jagaha\nonwards were N\u00e2landa, P\u00e2taliputra, Ves\u00e2l\u00ee, Bhandag\u00e2ma, P\u00e2v\u00e2, Kusin\u00e2r\u00e2,\nKapilavatthu, Setavya, S\u00e2vatth\u00ee. On his last journey the Buddha is\nrepresented as following this route but he died at the seventh\nstopping-place, Kusin\u00e2r\u00e2. When at P\u00e2talig\u00e2ma, he prophesied that it\nwould become a great emporium[373]. He was honourably entertained by the\nofficers of the King who decided that the gate and ferry by which he\nleft should be called Gotama's gate and Gotama's ferry. The gate\nreceived the name, but when he came to the Ganges he vanished\nmiraculously and appeared standing on the further bank. He then went on\nto Ves\u00e2l\u00ee, passing with indifference and immunity from the dominions of\nthe King of Magadha into those of his enemies, and halted in the grove\nof the courtezan Ambap\u00e2l\u00ee[374]. She came to salute him and he accepted\nher invitation to dine with her on the morrow, in spite of the protests\nof the Licchavi princes.\n\nThe rainy season was now commencing and the Buddha remained near Ves\u00e2l\u00ee\nin the village of Beluva, where he fell seriously ill. One day after his\nrecovery he was sitting in the shade with \u00c2nanda, who said that during\nthe illness his comfort had been the thought that the Buddha would not\npass away without leaving final instructions to the Order. The reply was\na remarkable address which is surely, at least, in parts the Buddha's\nown words.\n\n\"What does the order expect of me, \u00c2nanda? I have preached the truth\nwithout any distinction of esoteric or exoteric, for in respect of the\ntruth, there is no clenched hand in the teaching of the Tath\u00e2gata. If\nthere is anyone who thinks 'it is I who will lead the brotherhood' or\n'the order is dependent on me,' it is he who should give instructions.\nBut the Tath\u00e2gata does not think that he should lead the order or that\nthe order is dependent on him. Why then should he leave instructions? I\nam an old man now, and full of years, my pilgrimage is finished, I have\nreached my sum of days, I am turning eighty years; and just as a\nworn-out cart can only be made to move along with much additional care,\nso can the body of the Tathag\u00e2ta be kept going only with much additional\ncare. It is only when the Tathag\u00e2ta, ceasing to attend to any outward\nthing becomes plunged in meditation, it is only then that the body of\nthe Tathag\u00e2ta is at ease. Therefore, \u00c2nanda, be a lamp and a refuge to\nyourselves. Seek no other refuge. Let the Truth be your lamp and refuge;\nseek no refuge elsewhere.\n\n\"And they, \u00c2nanda, who now or when I am dead shall be a lamp and a\nrefuge to themselves, seeking no other refuge but taking the Truth as\ntheir lamp and refuge, these shall be my foremost disciples--these who\nare anxious to learn.\"\n\nThis discourse is succeeded by a less convincing episode, in which the\nBuddha tells \u00c2nanda that he can prolong his life to the end of a\nworld-period if he desires it. But though the hint was thrice repeated,\nthe heedless disciple did not ask the Master to remain in the world.\nWhen he had gone, M\u00e2ra, the Evil one, appeared and urged on the Buddha\nthat it was time for him to pass away. He replied that he would die in\nthree months but not before he had completely established the true\nreligion. Thus he deliberately rejected his allotted span of life and an\nearthquake occurred. He explained the cause of it to \u00c2nanda, who saw his\nmistake too late. \"Enough, \u00c2nanda, the time for making such a request is\npast[375].\"\n\nThe narrative becomes more human when it relates how one afternoon he\nlooked at the town and said, \"This will be the last time that the\nTath\u00e2gata will behold Ves\u00e2l\u00ee. Come, \u00c2nanda, let us go to Bhandag\u00e2ma.\"\nAfter three halts he arrived at P\u00e2v\u00e2 and stopped in the mango grove of\nCunda, a smith, who invited him to dinner and served sweet rice, cakes,\nand a dish which has been variously interpreted as dried boar's flesh or\na kind of truffle. The Buddha asked to be served with this dish and bade\nhim give the sweet rice and cakes to the brethren. After eating some of\nit he ordered the rest to be buried, saying that no one in heaven or\nearth except a Buddha could digest it, a strange remark to chronicle\nsince it was this meal which killed him[376]. But before he died he sent\nword to Cunda that he had no need to feel remorse and that the two most\nmeritorious offerings in the world are the first meal given to a Buddha\nafter he has obtained enlightenment and the last one given him before\nhis death. On leaving Cunda's house he was attacked by dysentery and\nviolent pains but bore them patiently and started for Kusin\u00e2r\u00e2 with his\ndisciples. In going thither he crossed the river Kakutth\u00e2[377], and some\nverses inserted into the text, which sound like a very old ballad,\nrelate how he bathed in it and then, weary and worn out, lay down on his\ncloak. A curious incident occurs here. A young Mallian, named Pukkuisa,\nafter some conversation with the Buddha, presents him with a robe of\ncloth of gold, but when it is put on it seems to lose its splendour, so\nexceedingly clear and bright is his skin. Gotama explains that there are\ntwo occasions when the skin of a Buddha glows like this--the night of his\nenlightenment and the night before his death. The transfiguration of\nChrist suggests itself as a parallel and is also associated with an\nallusion to his coming death. Most people have seen a face so light up\nunder the influence of emotion that this popular metaphor seemed to\nexpress physical truth and it is perhaps not excessive to suppose that\nin men of exceptional gifts this illumination may have been so bright as\nto leave traces in tradition.\n\nThen they went on[378] to a grove at Kusin\u00e2r\u00e2, and he lay down on a\ncouch spread between two S\u00e2la trees. These trees were in full bloom,\nthough it was not the season for their flowering; heavenly strains and\nodours filled the air and spirits unseen crowded round the bed. But\n\u00c2nanda, we are told, went into the Vih\u00e2ra, which was apparently also in\nthe grove, and stood leaning against the lintel weeping at the thought\nthat he was to lose so kind a master. The Buddha sent for him and said,\n\"Do not weep. Have I not told you before that it is the very nature of\nthings most near and dear to us that we must part from them, leave them,\nsever ourselves from them? All that is born, brought into being and put\ntogether carries within itself the necessity of dissolution. How then is\nit possible that such a being should not be dissolved? No such condition\nis possible. For a long time, \u00c2nanda, you have been very near me by\nwords of love, kind and good, that never varies and is beyond all\nmeasure. You have done well, \u00c2nanda. Be earnest in effort and you too\nshall soon be free from the great evils--from sensuality, from\nindividuality, from delusion and from ignorance.\"\n\nThe Indians have a strong feeling that persons of distinction should die\nin a suitable place[379], and now comes a passage in which \u00c2nanda begs\nthe Buddha not to die \"in this little wattle and daub town in the midst\nof the jungle\" but rather in some great city. The Buddha told him that\nKusin\u00e2r\u00e2 had once been the capital of King Mah\u00e2sudassana and a scene of\ngreat splendour in former ages. This narrative is repeated in an\namplified form in the Sutta and J\u00e2taka[380] called Mah\u00e2sudassana, in\nwhich the Buddha is said to have been that king in a previous birth.\n\nKusin\u00e2r\u00e2 was at that time one of the capitals of the Mallas, who were an\naristocratic republic like the S\u00e2kyas and Vajjians. At the Buddha's\ncommand \u00c2nanda went to the Council hall and summoned the people. \"Give\nno occasion to reproach yourself hereafter saying, The Tath\u00e2gata died in\nour own village and we neglected to visit him in his last hours.\" So the\nMallas came and \u00c2nanda presented them by families to the dying Buddha as\nhe lay between the flowering trees, saying \"Lord, a Malla of such and\nsuch a name with his children, his wives, his retinue and his friends\nhumbly bows down at the feet of the Blessed One.\"\n\nA monk called Subhadda, who was not a believer, also came and \u00c2nanda\ntried to turn him away but the Buddha overhearing said \"Do not keep out\nSubhadda. Whatever he may ask of me he will ask from a desire for\nknowledge and not to annoy me and he will quickly understand my\nreplies.\" He was the last disciple whom the Buddha converted, and he\nstraightway became an Arhat.\n\nNow comes the last watch of the night. \"It may be, \u00c2nanda,\" said the\nBuddha, \"that some of you may think, the word of the Master is ended. We\nhave no more a teacher. But you should not think thus. The truths and\nthe rules which I have declared and laid down for you all, let them be\nthe teacher for you after I am gone.\n\n\"When I am gone address not one another as hitherto, saying 'Friend.' An\nelder brother may address a younger brother by his name or family-name\nor as friend, but a younger brother should say to an elder, Sir, or\nLord.\n\n\"When I am gone let the order, if it should so wish, abolish all the\nlesser and minor precepts.\"\n\nThus in his last address the dying Buddha disclaims, as he had\ndisclaimed before in talking to \u00c2nanda, all idea of dictating to the\norder: his memory is not to become a paralyzing tradition. What he had\nto teach, he has taught freely, holding back nothing in \"a clenched\nfist.\" The truths are indeed essential and immutable. But they must\nbecome a living part of the believer, until he is no longer a follower\nbut a light unto himself. The rest does not matter: the order can change\nall the minor rules if expedient. But in everyday life discipline and\nforms must be observed: hitherto all have been equal compared with the\nteacher, but now the young must show more respect for the older. And in\nthe same spirit of solicitude for the order he continues:\n\n\"When I am gone, the highest penalty should be imposed on Channa.\" \"What\nis that, Lord?\" \"Let him say what he likes, but the brethren should not\nspeak to him or exhort him or admonish him[381].\"\n\nThe end approaches. \"It may be, that there is some doubt or misgiving in\nthe mind of some as to the Buddha, or the truth, or the path, or the\nway. Enquire freely. Do not have to reproach yourselves afterwards with\nthe thought, 'Our teacher was face to face with us and we could not\nbring ourselves to enquire when we were face to face with him.'\" All\nwere silent. A second and third time he put the same question and there\nwas silence still. \"It may be, that you put no questions out of awe for\nthe teacher. Let one friend communicate to another.\" There was still\nsilence, till \u00c2nanda said \"How wonderful, Lord, and how marvellous. In\nthis whole assembly there is no one who has any doubt or misgiving as to\nthe Buddha, the truth, the path and the way.\" \"Out of the fulness of\nfaith hast thou spoken \u00c2nanda, but the Tath\u00e2gata knows for certain that\nit is so. Even the most backward of all these five hundred brethren has\nbecome converted and is no longer liable to be born in a state of\nsuffering and is assured of final salvation.\"\n\n\"Behold, I exhort you saying, The elements of being are transitory[382].\nStrive earnestly. These were the last words of the Tath\u00e2gata.\" Then he\npassed through a series of trances (no less than twenty stages are\nenumerated) and expired.\n\nAn earthquake and thunder, as one might have predicted, occurred at the\nmoment of his death but comparatively little stress is laid on these\nprodigies. Anuruddha seems to have taken the lead among the brethren and\nbade \u00c2nanda announce the death to the Mallas. They heard it with cries\nof grief: \"Too soon has the Blessed One passed away. Too soon has the\nlight gone out of the world.\"\n\nNo less than six days were passed in preparation for the obsequies[383].\nOn the seventh they decided to carry the body to the south of the city\nand there burn it. But when they endeavoured to lift it, they found it\nimmoveable. Anuruddha explained that spirits who were watching the\nceremony wished it to be carried not outside the city but through it.\nWhen this was done the corpse moved easily and the heaven rained\nflowers. The meaning of this legend is that the Mallas considered a\ncorpse would have defiled the city and therefore proposed to carry it\noutside. By letting it pass through the city they showed that it was not\nthe ordinary relics of impure humanity.\n\nAgain, when they tried to light the funeral pile it would not catch\nfire. Anuruddha explained that this delay also was due to the\nintervention of spirits who wished that Mah\u00e2kassapa, the same whom the\nBuddha had converted at Uruvel\u00e2 and then on his way to pay his last\nrespects, should arrive before the cremation. When he came attended by\nfive hundred monks the pile caught fire of itself and the body was\nconsumed completely, leaving only the bones. Streams of rain\nextinguished the flames and the Mallas took the bones to their council\nhall. There they set round them a hedge of spears and a fence of bows\nand honoured them with dance and song and offerings of garlands and\nperfumes.\n\nWhatever may be thought of this story, the veneration of the Buddha's\nrelics, which is attested by the Piprava vase, is a proof that we have\nto do with a man rather than a legend. The relics may all be false, but\nthe fact that they were venerated some 250 years after his death shows\nthat the people of India thought of him not as an ancient semi-divine\nfigure like Rama or Krishna but as something human and concrete.\n\nSeven persons or communities sent requests for a portion of the relics,\nsaying that they would erect a stupa over them and hold a feast. They\nwere King Aj\u00e2tasattu of Magadha, the Licchavis of Ves\u00e2l\u00ee, the S\u00e2kyas of\nKapilavatthu, the Bulis of Allakappa, the Kotiyas of R\u00e2mag\u00e2ma, the\nMallas of P\u00e2v\u00e2[384] and the Brahman of Vethad\u00eepa. All except the last\nwere Kshatriyas and based their claim on the ground that they like the\nBuddha belonged to the warrior caste. The Mallas at first refused, but a\nBrahman called Dona bade them not quarrel over the remains of him who\ntaught forbearance. So he divided the relics into eight parts, one for\nKusin\u00e2r\u00e2 and one for each of the other seven claimants. At this juncture\nthe Moriyas of Pipphalivana sent in a claim for a share but had to be\ncontent with the embers of the pyre since all the bones had been\ndistributed. Then eight stupas were built for the relics in the towns\nmentioned and one over the embers and one by Dona the Brahman over the\niron vessel in which the body had been burnt.\n\n\n5\n\nThus ended the career of a man who was undoubtedly one of the greatest\nintellectual and moral forces that the world has yet seen, but it is\nhard to arrive at any certain opinion as to the details of his character\nand abilities, for in the later accounts he is deified and in the\nPitakas though veneration has not gone so far as this, he is\necclesiasticized and the human side is neglected. The narrative moves\nlike some stately ceremonial in which emotion and incident would be out\nof place until it reaches the strange deathbed, spread between the\nflowering trees, and \u00c2nanda introduces with the formality of a court\nchamberlain the Malla householders who have come to pay their last\nrespects and bow down at the feet of the dying teacher. The scenes\ndescribed are like stained glass windows; the Lord preaching in the\ncentre, sinners repenting and saints listening, all in harmonious\ncolours and studied postures. But the central figure remains somewhat\naloof; when once he had begun his ministry he laboured uninterruptedly\nand with continual success, but the foundation of the kingdom of\nRighteousness seems less like the triumphant issue of a struggle than\nthe passage through the world of some compassionate angel. This is in\ngreat part due to the fact that the Pitakas are works of edification.\nTrue, they set before us the teacher as well as his teaching but they\nspeak of his doings and historical surroundings only in order to provide\na proper frame for the law which he preached. A less devout and more\nobservant historian would have arranged the picture differently and even\nin the narratives that have come down to us there are touches of human\ninterest which seem authentic.\n\nWhen the Buddha was dying \u00c2nanda wept because he was about to lose so\nkind a master and the Buddha's own language to him is even more\naffectionate. He cared not only for the organization of the order but\nfor its individual members. He is frequently represented as feeling that\nsome disciple needed a particular form of instruction and giving it. Nor\ndid he fail to provide for the comfort of the sick and weary. For\ninstance a ballad[385] relates how Panthaka driven from his home took\nrefuge at the door of the monastery garden. \"Then came the Lord and\nstroked my head and taking me by the arm led me into the garden of the\nmonastery and out of kindness he gave me a towel for my feet.\" A\nstriking anecdote[386] relates how he once found a monk who suffered\nfrom a disagreeable disease lying on the ground in a filthy state. So\nwith \u00c2nanda's assistance he washed him and lifting him up with his own\nhands laid him on his bed. Then he summoned the brethren and told them\nthat if a sick brother had no special attendant the whole order should\nwait on him. \"You, monks, have no mothers or fathers to care for you. If\nyou do not wait one on the other, who is there who will wait on you?\nWhosoever would wait on me, he should wait on the sick.\" This last\nrecalls Christ's words, \"Inasmuch as ye have done it unto the least of\nthese brethren, ye have done it unto me.\" And, if his approval of monks\nbeing deaf to the claims of family affection seems unfeeling, it should\nalso be mentioned that in the book called _Songs of the Nuns_[387] women\nrelate how they were crazy at the loss of their children but found\ncomplete comfort and peace in his teaching. Sometimes we are told that\nwhen persons whom he wished to convert proved refractory he \"suffused\nthem with the feeling of his love\" until they yielded to his\ninfluence[388]. We can hardly doubt that this somewhat cumbrous phrase\npreserves a tradition of his personal charm and power.\n\nThe beauty of his appearance and the pleasant quality of his voice are\noften mentioned but in somewhat conventional terms which inspire no\nconfidence that they are based on personal reminiscence, nor have the\nmost ancient images which we possess any claim to represent his\nfeatures, for the earliest of them are based on Greek models and it was\nnot the custom to represent him by a figure until some centuries after\nhis death. I can imagine that the truest idea of his person is to be\nobtained not from the abundant effigies which show him as a somewhat\nsanctimonious ascetic, but from statues of him as a young man, such as\nthat found at Sarnath, which may possibly preserve not indeed the\nphysiognomy of Gotama but the general physique of a young Nepalese\nprince, with powerful limbs and features and a determined mouth. For\nthere is truth at the bottom of the saying that Gotama was born to be\neither a Buddha or a universal monarch: he would have made a good\ngeneral, if he had not become a monk.\n\nWe are perhaps on firmer ground when we find speakers in the\nPitakas[389] commenting on his calm and bright expression and his\nunruffled courtesy in discussion. Of his eloquence it is hard to judge.\nThe Suttas may preserve his teaching and some of his words but they are\nprobably rearrangements made for recitation. Still it is impossible to\nprove that he did not himself adopt this style, particularly when age\nand iteration had made the use of certain formul\u00e6 familiar to him. But\nthough these repetitions and subdivisions of arrangement are often\nwearisome, there are not wanting traces of another manner, which suggest\na terse and racy preacher going straight to the point and driving home\nhis meaning with homely instances.\n\nHumour often peeps through the Buddha's preaching. It pervades the\nJ\u00e2taka stories, and more than once he is said to have smiled when\nremembering some previous birth. Some suttas, such as the tales of the\nGreat King of Glory, and of King Mah\u00e2 Vijita's sacrifice[390], are\nsimply J\u00e2takas in another form--interesting stories full of edification\nfor those who can understand but not to be taken as a narrative of\nfacts. At other times he simply states the ultimate facts of a case and\nleaves them in their droll incongruity. Thus when King Aj\u00e2tasattu was\nmoved and illuminated by his teaching, he observed to his disciples that\nHis Majesty had all the makings of a saint in him, if only he had not\nkilled that excellent man his own father. Somewhat similar is his\njudgment[391] on two naked ascetics, who imitated in all things the ways\nof a dog and a cow respectively, in the hope of thus obtaining\nsalvation. When pressed to say what their next birth would be, he opined\nthat if their penance was successful they would be reborn as dogs and\ncows, if unsuccessful, in hell. Irony and modesty are combined in his\nrejection of extravagant praise. \"Such faith have I, Lord[392]\" said\nS\u00e2riputta, \"that methinks there never has been nor will be nor is now\nany other greater or wiser than the Blessed One.\" \"Of course, S\u00e2riputta\"\nis the reply, \"you have known all the Buddhas of the past.\" \"No, Lord.\"\n\"Well then, you know those of the future.\" \"No, Lord.\" \"Then at least\nyou know me and have penetrated my mind thoroughly.\" \"Not even that,\nLord.\" \"Then why, S\u00e2riputta, are your words so grand and bold.\"\n\nThere is much that is human in these passages yet we should be making a\nfancy portrait did we allow ourselves to emphasize them too much and\nneglect the general tone of the Pitakas. These scriptures are the\nproduct of a school; but that school grew up under the Buddha's personal\ninfluence and more than that is rooted in the very influences and\ntendencies which produced the Buddha himself. The passionless,\nintellectual aloofness; the elemental simplicity with which the facts of\nlife are stated and explained without any concession to sentiment, the\nrigour of the prescription for salvation, that all sensual desire and\nattachment must be cut off, are too marked and consistent for us to\nsuppose them due merely to monkish inability to understand the more\nhuman side of his character. The Buddha began his career as an Indian\nMuni, one supposed to be free from all emotions and intent only on\nseeking deliverance from every tie connecting him with the world. This\nwas expected of him and had he done no more it would have secured him\nuniversal respect. The fact that he did a great deal more, that he\ndevoted his life to active preaching, that he offered to all happiness\nand escape from sorrow, that he personally aided with advice and\nencouragement all who came to him, caused both his contemporaries and\nfuture generations to regard him as a saviour. His character and the\nsubstance of his teaching were admirably suited to the needs of the\nreligious world of India in his day. Judged by the needs of other\ntemperaments, which are entitled to neither more nor less consideration,\nthey seem too severe, too philosophic and the later varieties of\nBuddhism have endeavoured to make them congenial to less strenuous\nnatures.\n\nBefore leaving the personality of the Buddha, we must say a word about\nthe more legendary portions of his biography, for though of little\nimportance for history they have furnished the chief subjects of\nBuddhist art and influenced the minds of his followers as much as or\nmore than the authentic incidents of his career[393]. The later legend\nhas not distorted the old narrative. It is possible that all its\nincidents may be founded on stories known to the compilers of the\nPitakas, though this is not at present demonstrable, but they are\nembellished by an unstinted use of the supernatural and of the hyperbole\nusual in Indian poetry. The youthful Buddha moves through showers of\nflowers and an atmosphere crowded with attendant deities. He cannot even\ngo to school without an escort of ten thousand children and a hundred\nthousand maidens and astonishes the good man who proposes to teach him\nthe alphabet by suggesting sixty-four systems of writing.\n\nThe principal scenes in this legend are as follows. The Bodhisattva,\nthat is the Buddha to-be, resides in the Tusita Heaven and selects his\nbirth-place and parentage. He then enters the womb of his mother M\u00e2y\u00e2 in\nthe shape of a white elephant, which event she sees in a dream. Brahmans\nare summoned and interpret the vision to mean that her son will be a\nUniversal Monarch or a Buddha. When near her confinement M\u00e2y\u00e2 goes to\nvisit her parents but on the way brings forth her son in the Lumbini\ngrove. As she stands upright holding the bough of a tree, he issues from\nher side without pain to her and is received by deities, but on touching\nthe ground, takes seven steps and says, \"I am the foremost in the\nworld.\" On the same day are born several persons who play a part in his\nlife--his wife, his horse, \u00c2nanda, Bimbis\u00e2ra and others. Asita does\nhomage to him, as does also his father, and it is predicted that he will\nbecome a Buddha and renounce the world. His father in his desire to\nprevent this secludes him in the enjoyment of all luxury. At the\nploughing festival he falls into a trance under a tree and the shadow\nstands still to protect him and does not change. Again his father does\nhim homage. He is of herculean strength and surpasses all as an archer.\nHe marries his cousin Yasodhar\u00e2, when sixteen years old. Then come the\nfour visions, which are among the scenes most frequently depicted in\nmodern sacred art. As he is driving in the palace grounds the gods show\nhim an old man, a sick man, a corpse and a monk of happy countenance.\nHis charioteer explains what they are and he determines to abandon the\nworld. It was at this time that his son was born and on hearing the news\nhe said that a new fetter now bound him to worldly life but still\ndecided to execute his resolve. That night he could take no pleasure in\nthe music of the singing women who were wont to play to him and they\nfell asleep. As he looked at their sleeping forms he felt disgust and\nordered Channa, his charioteer, to saddle Kanthaka, a gigantic white\nhorse, eighteen cubits long from head to tail. Meanwhile he went to his\nwife's room and took a last but silent look as she lay sleeping with her\nchild.\n\nThen he started on horseback attended by Channa and a host of heavenly\nbeings who opened the city gates. Here he was assailed by M\u00e2ra the\nTempter who offered him universal empire but in vain. After jumping the\nriver Anom\u00e2 on his steed, he cut off his long hair with his sword and\nflinging it up into the air wished it might stay there if he was really\nto become a Buddha. It remained suspended; admiring gods placed it in a\nheavenly shrine and presented Gotama with the robes of a monk.\n\nNot much is added to the account of his wanderings and austerities as\ngiven in the Pitakas, but the attainment of Buddhahood naturally\nstimulates the devout imagination. At daybreak Gotama sits at the foot\nof a tree, lighting up the landscape with the golden rays which issue\nfrom his person. Suj\u00e2r\u00e2 a noble maiden and her servant P\u00fbrn\u00e2 offer him\nrice and milk in a golden vessel and he takes no more food for seven\nweeks. He throws the vessel into the river, wishing that if he is to\nbecome a Buddha it may ascend the stream against the current. It does so\nand then sinks to the abode of the N\u00e2gas. Towards evening he walks to\nthe Bodhi-tree and meets a grass-cutter who offers him grass to make a\nseat. This he accepts and taking his seat vows that rather than rise\nbefore attaining Buddhahood, he will let his blood dry up and his body\ndecay. Then comes the great assault of the Tempter. M\u00e2ra attacks him in\nvain both with an army of terrible demons and with bands of seductive\nnymphs. During the conflict M\u00e2ra asked him who is witness to his ever\nhaving performed good deeds or bestowed alms? He called on the earth to\nbear witness. Earthquakes and thunders responded to the appeal and the\ngoddess of the Earth herself rose and bore testimony. The rout of M\u00e2ra\nis supposed to have taken place in the late evening. The full moon[394]\ncame out and in the three watches of the night he attained\nenlightenment.\n\nThe Pali and early Sanskrit texts place the most striking legendary\nscenes in the first part of the Buddha's life just as scribes give\nfreest rein to their artistic imagination in tracing the first letter\nand word of a chapter. In the later version, the whole text is coloured\nand gilded with a splendour that exceeds the hues of ordinary life but\nno incidents of capital importance are added after the\nEnlightenment[395]. Historical names still occur and the Buddha is still\na wandering teacher with a band of disciples, but his miracles\ncontinually convulse the universe: he preaches to mankind from the sky\nand retires for three months to the Tusita Heaven in order to instruct\nhis mother, who had died before she could hear the truth from her son's\nlips, and often the whole scene passes into a vision where the ordinary\nlimits of space, time and number cease to have any meaning.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\nTHE BUDDHA COMPARED WITH OTHER RELIGIOUS TEACHERS\n\n\nThe personality of the Buddha invites comparison with the founders of\nthe other world-religions, Christ and Mohammed. We are tempted to ask\ntoo if there is any resemblance between him and Confucius, a\ncontemporary Asiatic whose influence has been equally lasting, but here\nthere is little common ground. For Confucius's interest was mainly in\nsocial and ethical problems, not in religion. He laid stress on those\nties of kinship and society, respecting which the Indian monk (like\nChrist) sometimes spoke harshly, although there is a strong likeness\nbetween the moral code of the Buddhist layman and Confucianism: he was\nfull of humility and respect for antiquity, whereas Gotama had a good\nshare of that self-confidence which is necessary for all who propound to\nthe world a new religion.[396]\n\nBut with Mohammed comparison, or rather contrast, is easier. Both were\nseekers after truth: both found what they believed to be the truth only\nwhen of mature years, Gotama when about thirty-six, Mohammed when forty\nor more: both lived to be elderly men and possessed great authority. But\nthere the analogy ends. Perhaps no single human being has had so great\nan effect on the world as Mohammed. His achievements are personal and,\nhad he never lived, it is not clear that the circumstances of the age\nwould have caused some one else to play approximately the same part. He\nmore than C\u00e6sar or Alexander was individually the author of a movement\nwhich transformed part of three continents. No one else has been able to\nfuse the two noble instincts of religion and empire in so perfect a\nmanner, perfect because the two do not conflict or jar, as do the\nteachings of Christ and the pretensions of his Church to temporal power.\nBut it is precisely this fusion of religion and politics which\ndisqualifies Islam as a universal religion and prevents it from\nsatisfying the intellectual and spiritual wants of that part of humanity\nwhich is most intellectual and most spiritual. Law and religion are\ninextricably mixed in it and a Moslim, more than the most superstitious\nof Buddhists or Christians, is bound by a vast number of ties and\nobservances which have nothing to do with religion. It is in avoiding\nthese trammels that the superior religious instinct of Gotama shows\nitself. He was aided in this by the temper of his times. Though he was\nof the warrior caste and naturally brought into association with\nprinces, he was not on that account tempted to play a part in politics,\nfor to the Hindus, then as now, renunciation of the world was\nindispensable for serious religion and there is no instance of a teacher\nobtaining a hearing among them without such renunciation as a\npreliminary. According to Indian popular ideas a genius might become\neither an Emperor or a Buddha but not like Mohammed a mixture of the\ntwo. But the danger which beset Gotama, and which he consistently and\nconsciously avoided, though Mohammed could not, was to give\nauthoritative decisions on unessential points as to both doctrine and\npractice. There was clearly a party which wished to make the rule of his\norder more severe and, had he consented, the religious world of his day\nwould have approved. But by so doing he would have made Buddhism an\nIndian sect like Jainism, incapable of flourishing in lands with other\ninstitutions. If Buddhism has had little influence outside Asia, that is\nbecause there are differences of temperament in the world, not because\nit sanctions anachronisms or prescribes observances of a purely local\nand temporary value. In all his teaching Gotama insists on what is\nessential only and will not lend his name and authority to what is\nmerely accessory. He will not for instance direct or even recommend his\ndisciples to be hermits. \"Whoever wishes may dwell in a wood and whoever\nwishes may dwell near a village.\" And in his last days he bade them be a\nlight unto themselves and gave them authority to change all the lesser\nprecepts. It is true that the order decided to make no use of this\npermission, but the spirit which dictated it has shaped the destinies of\nthe faith.\n\nAkin to this contrast is another--that between the tolerance of Gotama\nand the persecuting spirit of Islam. Mohammed and his followers never\ngot rid of the idea that any other form of religion is an insult to the\nAlmighty: that infidels should if possible be converted by compulsion,\nor, if that were impossible, allowed to exist only on sufferance and in\nan inferior position. Such ideas were unknown to Gotama. He laboured not\nfor his own or his Creator's glory but simply and solely to benefit\nmankind. Conversion by force had no meaning for him, for what he desired\nwas not a profession of allegiance but a change of disposition and amid\nmany transformations his Church has not lost this temper.\n\nWhen we come to compare Gotama and Christ we are struck by many\nresemblances of thought but also by great differences of circumstances\nand career. Both were truly spiritual teachers who rose above forms and\ncodes: both accepted the current ideals of their time and strove to\nbecome the one a Buddha, the other Messiah. But at the age when Christ\nwas executed Gotama was still in quest of truth and still on the wrong\ntrack. He lived nearly fifty years longer and had ample opportunity of\nputting his ideas into practice. So far as our meagre traditions allow\nus to trace the development of the two, the differences are even more\nfundamental. Peaceful as was the latter part of Gotama's life, the\nbeginning was a period of struggle and disillusion. He broke away from\nworldly life to study philosophy: he broke away from philosophy to wear\nout his body with the severest mortification; that again he found to be\nvanity and only then did he attain to enlightenment. And though he\noffers salvation to all without distinction, he repeatedly says that it\nis difficult: with hard wrestling has he won the truth and it is hard\nfor ordinary men to understand.\n\nTroubled as was the life of Christ, it contains no struggle of this\nsort. As a youth he grew up in a poor family where the disenchantment of\nsatiety was unknown: his genius first found expression in sermons\ndelivered in the synagogue--the ordinary routine of Jewish ritual: his\nappearance as a public teacher and his ultimate conviction that he was\nthe Messiah were a natural enlargement of his sphere, not a change of\nmethod: the temptation, though it offers analogies to Gotama's mental\nstruggle and particularly to the legends about M\u00e2ra, was not an internal\nrevolution in which old beliefs were seen to be false and new knowledge\narose from their ashes. So far as we know, his inner life was continuous\nand undisturbed, and its final expression is emotional rather than\nintellectual. He gives no explanations and leaves no feeling that they\nare necessary. He is free in his use of metaphor and chary of\ndefinition. The teaching of the Buddha on the other hand is essentially\nintellectual. The nature and tastes of his audience were a sufficient\njustification for his style, but it indicates a temper far removed from\nthe unquestioning and childlike faith of Christ. We can hardly conceive\nhim using such a phrase as Our Father, but we may be sure that if he had\ndone so he would have explained why and how and to what extent such\nwords can be properly used of the Deity.\n\nThe most sceptical critics of the miracles recorded in the Gospels can\nhardly doubt that Christ possessed some special power of calming and\nhealing nervous maladies and perhaps others. Sick people naturally\nturned to him: they were brought to him when he arrived in a town.\nThough the Buddha was occasionally kind to the sick, no such picture is\ndrawn of the company about him and persons afflicted with certain\ndiseases could not enter the order. When the merchant An\u00e2thapindika is\nseriously ill, he sends a messenger with instructions to inform the\nBuddha and S\u00e2riputta of his illness and to add in speaking to S\u00e2riputta\nthat he begs him to visit him out of compassion[397]. He does not\npresume to address the same request to the Buddha. Christ teaches that\nthe world is evil or, perhaps we should say, spoiled, but wishes to\nremove the evil and found the Kingdom of Heaven: the Buddha teaches that\nbirth, sickness and death are necessary conditions of existence and that\ndisease, which like everything else has its origin in Karma, can be\ndestroyed only when the cause is destroyed[398]. Nor do we find ascribed\nto him that love of children and tenderness towards the weak and erring\nwhich are beautiful features in the portrait of Christ[399]. He had no\nprejudices: he turned robust villains like Angulim\u00e2la, the brigand, into\nsaints and dined with prostitutes but one cannot associate him with\nsimple friendly intercourse. When he accepted invitations he did not so\nmuch join in the life of the family which he visited as convert the\nentertainment offered to him into an edifying religious service. Yet in\npropaganda and controversy he was gracious and humane beyond the measure\nof all other teachers. He did not call the priests of his time a\ngeneration of vipers, though he laughed at their ceremonies and their\npretensions to superior birth.\n\nThough the Buddha passed through intellectual crises such as the\nbiographies of Christ do not hint at, yet in other matters it is he\nrather than Christ who offers a picture and example of peace. Christ\nenjoyed with a little band of friends an intimacy which the Hindu gave\nto none, but from the very commencement of his mission he is at enmity\nwith what he calls the world. The world is evil and a great event is\ncoming of double import, for it will bring disaster on the wicked as\nwell as happiness for the good. \"Repent ye, for the Kingdom of Heaven is\nat hand.\" He is angry with the world because it will not hear him. He\ndeclares that it hates him and the gospel according to St John even\nmakes him say, \"I pray not for the world, but for them which thou hast\ngiven me[400].\" The little towns of Galilee are worse in his eyes than\nthe wicked cities of antiquity because they are not impressed by his\nmiracles and Jerusalem which has slighted all the prophets and finally\nhimself is to receive signal punishment. The shadow of impending death\nfell over the last period of his ministry and he felt that he was to be\noffered as a sacrifice. The Jews even seem to have thought at one time\nthat he was unreasonably alarmed[401].\n\nBut the Buddha was not angry with the world. He thought of it as\nunsatisfactory and transitory rather than wicked, as ignorant rather\nthan rebellious. He troubled little about people who would not listen.\nThe calm and confidence which so many narratives attribute to him rarely\nfailed to meet with the respect which they anticipated. In his life\nthere is no idea of sacrifice, no element of the tragic, no nervous\nirritability. When Devadatta meditated his assassination, he is\nrepresented as telling his disciples that they need not be uneasy\nbecause it was physically impossible to kill a Buddha. The saying is\nperhaps not historical but it illustrates Indian sentiment. In his\nprevious existences, when preparing for Buddhahood, he had frequently\ngiven his life for others, not because it was any particular good to\nthem but in order to perfect his character for his own great career and\nbring about the selflessness which is essential to a Buddha. When once\nhe had attained enlightenment any idea of sacrifice, such as the\nshepherd laying down his life for the sheep, had no meaning. It would be\nsimply the destruction of the more valuable for the less valuable. Even\nthe modern developments of Buddhism which represent the Buddha Amida as\na saviour do not contain the idea that he gives up his life for his\nfollowers.\n\nGotama instituted a religious order and lived long enough to see it grow\nout of infancy, but its organization was gradual and for a year or two\nit was simply a band of disciples not more bound by rules than the\nseventy whom Christ sent forth to preach. Would Christ, had he lived\nlonger, have created something analogous to the Buddhist _sangha_, a\ncommunity not conflicting with national and social institutions but\nindependent of them? The question is vain and to Europeans Christ's\nsketch of the Christian life will appear more satisfactory than the\nfinished portrait of the Bhikkhu. But though his maxims are the perfect\nexpression of courtesy and good feeling with an occasional spice of\nparadox, such as the command to love one's enemies, yet the experience\nof nearly twenty centuries has shown that this morality is not for the\ncitizens of the world. The churches which give themselves his name\npreach with rare exceptions that soldiering, financing and the business\nof government--things about which he cared as little as do the birds and\nthe lilies of the field--are the proper concern of Christian men and one\nwonders whether he would not, had his life been prolonged, have seen\nthat many of his precepts, such as turning the other cheek and not\nresisting evil, are incompatible with ordinary institutions and have\nfollowed the example of the great Indian by founding a society in which\nthey could be kept. The monastic orders of the Roman and Eastern\nChurches show that such a need was felt.\n\nThere are many resemblances between the Gospels and the teaching of the\nBuddha but the bases of the two doctrines are different and, if the\nresults are sometimes similar, this shows that the same destination can\nbe reached by more than one road. It is perhaps the privilege of genius\nto see the goal by intuition: the road and the vehicle are subsidiary\nand may be varied to suit the minds of different nations. Christ, being\na Jew, took for his basis a refined form of the old Jewish theism. He\npurged Jehovah of his jealousy and prejudices and made him a spirit of\npure benevolence who behaves to men as a loving father and bids them\nbehave to one another as loving brethren. Such ideas lie outside the\nsphere of Gotama's thought and he would probably have asked why on this\nhypothesis there is any evil in the world. That is a question which the\nGospels are chary of discussing but they seem to indicate that the\ndisobedience and sinfulness of mankind are the root of evil. A godly\nworld would be a happy world. But the Buddha would have said that though\nthe world would be very much happier if all its inhabitants were moral\nand religious, yet the evils inherent in individual existence would\nstill remain; it would still be impermanent and unsatisfactory.\n\nYet the Buddha and Christ are alike in points which are of considerable\nhuman interest, though they are not those emphasized by the Churches.\nNeither appears to have had much taste for theology or metaphysics.\nChrist ignored them: the Buddha said categorically that such\nspeculations are vain. Indeed it is probably a general law in religions\nthat the theological phase does not begin until the second generation,\nwhen the successors of the founder try to interpret and harmonize his\nwords. He himself sees clearly and says plainly what mankind ought to\ndo. Neither the Buddha, nor Christ, nor Mohammed cared for much beyond\nthis, and such of their sayings as have reference to the whence, the\nwhither and the why of the universe are obscure precisely because these\nquestions do not fall within the field of religious genius and receive\nno illumination from its light. Argumentative as the Buddhist suttas\nare, their aim is strictly practical, even when their language appears\nscholastic, and the burden of all their ratiocination is the same and\nvery simple. Men are unhappy because of their foolish desires: to become\nhappy they must make themselves a new heart and will and, perhaps the\nBuddha would have added, new eyes.\n\nNeither the Buddha nor Christ thought it worth while to write anything\nand both of them ignored ceremonial and sacerdotal codes in a way which\nmust have astounded their contemporaries. The law-books and sacrifices\nto which Brahmans and Pharisees devoted time and study are simply left\non one side. The former are replaced by injunctions to cultivate a good\nhabit of mind, such as is exemplified in the Eightfold Path and the\nBeatitudes, the latter by some observances of extreme simplicity, such\nas the P\u00e2timokkha and the Lord's Prayer. In both cases subsequent\ngenerations felt that the provision made by the Founders was inadequate\nand the Buddhist and Christian Churches have multiplied ceremonies\nwhich, though not altogether unedifying, would certainly have astonished\nGotama and Christ.\n\nFor Christ the greatest commandments were that a man should love God and\nhis neighbours. This summary is not in the manner of Gotama and though\nlove (mett\u00e2) has an important place in his teaching, it is rather an\ninseparable adjunct of a holy life than the force which creates and\nanimates it. In other words the Buddha teaches that a saint must love\nhis fellow men rather than that he who loves his fellow men is a saint.\nBut the passages extolling _mett\u00e2_ are numerous and striking, and\nEuropean writers have, I think, shown too great a disposition to\nmaintain that _mett\u00e2_ is something less than Christian love and little\nmore than benevolent equanimity. The love of the New Testament is not\neros but agape, a new word first used by Jewish and Christian writers\nand nearly the exact equivalent of _mett\u00e2_. For both words love is\nrather too strong a rendering and charity too weak. Nor is it just to\nsay that the Buddha as compared with Christ preaches inaction. The\nChristian nations of Europe are more inclined to action than the\nBuddhist nations of Asia, yet the Beatitudes do not indicate that the\nstrenuous life is the road to happiness. Those declared blessed are the\npoor, the mourners, the meek, the hungry, the pure and the persecuted.\nSuch men have just the virtues of the patient Bhikkhu and like Christ\nthe Buddha praised the merciful and the peacemakers. And similarly\nChrist's phrase about rendering unto C\u00e6sar the things that are Caesar's\nseems to dissociate his true followers (like the Bhikkhus) from\npolitical life. Money and taxes are the affair of those who put their\nheads on coins; God and the things which concern him have quite another\nsphere.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X\n\nTHE TEACHING OF THE BUDDHA\n\n1\n\n\nWhen the Buddha preached his first sermon[402] to the five monks at\nBenares the topics he selected were the following. First comes an\nintroduction about avoiding extremes of either self-indulgence or\nself-mortification. This was specially appropriate to his hearers who\nwere ascetics and disposed to over-rate the value of austerities. Next\nhe defines the middle way or eightfold path. Then he enunciates the four\ntruths of the nature of suffering, its origin, its cessation, and the\nmethod of bringing about that cessation. This method is no other than\nthe eightfold path. Then his hearers understood that whatever has a\nbeginning must have an end. This knowledge is described as the pure and\nspotless Eye of Truth. The Buddha then formally admitted them as the\nfirst members of the Sangha. He then explained to them that there is no\nsuch thing as self. We are not told that they received any further\ninstruction before they were sent forth to be teachers and missionaries:\nthey were, it would seem, sufficiently equipped. When the Buddha\ninstructs his sixth convert, Yasa, the introduction is slightly\ndifferent, doubtless because he was a layman. It treats of \"almsgiving,\nof moral duties, of heaven, of the evil, vanity and sinfulness of\ndesires, of the blessings which come from abandoning desires.\" Then when\nhis catechumen's mind was prepared, he preached to him \"the chief\ndoctrine of the Buddhas, namely suffering, its cause, its cessation and\nthe Path.\" And when Yasa understood this he obtained the Eye of Truth.\n\nIt is clear, therefore, that the Buddha regarded practice as the\nfoundation of his system. He wished to create a temper and a habit of\nlife. Mere acquiescence in dogma, such as a Christian creed, is not\nsufficient as a basis of religion and test of membership. It is only in\nthe second stage that he enunciates the four great theorems of his\nsystem (of which one, the Path, is a matter of practice rather than\ndoctrine) and only later still that he expounds conceptions which are\nlogically fundamental, such as his view of personality. \"Just as the\ngreat ocean has only one taste, the taste of salt, so has this doctrine\nand discipline only one taste, the taste of emancipation[403].\" This\npractical aim has affected the form given to much of the Buddha's\nteaching, for instance the theory of the Skandhas and the chain of\ncausation. When examined at leisure by a student of to-day, the dogmas\nseem formulated with imperfect logic and the results trite and obvious.\nBut such doctrines as that evil must have a cause which can be\ndiscovered and removed by natural methods: that a bad unhappy mind can\nbe turned into a good, happy mind by suppressing evil thoughts and\ncultivating good thoughts, are not commonplaces even now, if they\nreceive a practical application, and in 500 B.C. they were not\ncommonplaces in any sense.\n\nAnd yet no one can read Buddhist books or associate with Buddhist monks\nwithout feeling that the intellectual element is preponderant, not the\nemotional. The ultimate cause of suffering is ignorance. The Buddha has\nwon the truth by understanding the universe. Conversion is usually\ndescribed by some such phrase as acquiring the Eye of Truth, rather than\nby words expressing belief or devotion. The major part of the ideal\nlife, set forth in a recurring passage of the D\u00eegha Nik\u00e2ya, consists in\nthe creation of intellectual states, and though the Buddha disavowed all\nspeculative philosophy his discourses are full, if not of metaphysics,\nat least of psychology. And this knowledge is essential. It is not\nsufficient to affirm one's belief in it; it must be assimilated and\ntaken into the life of every true Buddhist. All cannot do this: most of\nthe unconverted are blinded by lust and passion, but some are\nincapacitated by want of mental power. They must practise virtue and in\na happier birth their minds will be enlarged.\n\nThe reader who has perused the previous chapters will have some idea of\nthe tone and subject matter of the Buddha's preaching. We will now\nexamine his doctrine as a system and will begin with the theory of\nexistence, premising that it disclaims all idea of doing more than\nanalyze our experience. With speculations or assertions as to the\norigin, significance and purpose of the Universe, the Buddha has nothing\nto do. Such questions do not affect his scheme of salvation. What\nviews--if any--he may have held or implied about them we shall gather as\nwe go on. But it is dangerous to formulate what he did not formulate\nhimself, and not always easy to understand what he did formulate. For\nhis words, though often plain and striking, are, like the utterances of\nother great teachers, apt to provoke discordant explanations. They meet\nour thoughts half way, but no interpretation exhausts their meaning.\nWhen we read into them the ideas of modern philosophy and combine them\ninto a system logical and plausible after the standard of this age, we\noften feel that the result is an anachronism: but if we treat them as\nancient simple discourses by one who wished to make men live an austere\nand moral life, we still find that there are uncomfortably profound\nsayings which will not harmonize with this theory.\n\nThe Buddha's aversion to speculation did not prevent him from insisting\non the importance of a correct knowledge of our mental constitution, the\nchain of causation and other abstruse matters; nor does it really take\nthe form of neglecting metaphysics: rather of defining them in a manner\nso authoritative as to imply a reserve of unimparted knowledge. Again\nand again questions about the fundamental mysteries of existence are put\nto him and he will not give an answer. It would not conduce to\nknowledge, peace, or freedom from passion, we are told, and, therefore,\nthe Lord has not declared it. _Therefore_: not, it would seem, because\nhe did not know, but because the discussion was not profitable. And the\nmodern investigator, who is not so submissive as the Buddha's disciples,\nasks why not? Can it be that the teacher knew of things transcendental\nnot to be formulated in words? Once[404] he compared the truths he had\ntaught his disciples to a bunch of leaves which he held in his hand and\nthe other truths which he knew but had not taught to the leaves of the\nwhole forest in which they were walking. And the story of the blind men\nand the elephant[405] seems to hint that Buddhas, those rare beings who\nare not blind, can see the constitution of the universe. May we then in\nchance phrases get a glimpse of ideas which he would not develop? It may\nbe so, but the quest is temerarious. \"What I have revealed[406] hold as\nrevealed, and what I have not revealed, hold as not revealed.\" The\ngracious but authoritative figure of the Master gives no further reply\nwhen we endeavour to restate his teaching in some completer form which\nadmits of comparison with the ancient and modern philosophies of Europe.\n\nThe best introduction to his theory of existence is perhaps the\ninstruction given to the five monks after his first sermon. The\nbody[407] is not the self, he says, for if it were, it would not be\nsubject to disease and we should be able to say, let my body be or not\nbe such and such. As the denial of the existence of the self or ego\n(Att\u00e2 in Pali, \u00c2tman in Sanskrit) is one of the fundamental and original\ntenets of Gotama, we must remember that this self whose existence is\ndenied is something not subject to decay, and possessing perfect free\nwill with power to exercise it. The Brahmanic \u00c2tman is such a self but\nit is found nowhere in the world of our experience[408]. For the body or\nform is not the self, neither is sensation or feeling (_vedan\u00e2_) for\nthey are not free and eternal. Neither is perception (_sa\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2_)[409] the\nself. Neither, the Buddha goes on to say, are the _Sankh\u00e2ras_ the self,\nand for the same reason.\n\nHere we find ourselves sailing on the high seas of dogmatic terminology\nand must investigate the meaning of this important and untranslateable\nword. It is equivalent to the Sanskrit _samsk\u00e2ra_, which is akin to the\nword Sanskrit itself, and means compounding, making anything artificial\nand elaborate. It may be literally translated as synthesis or\nconfection, and is often used in the general sense of phenomena since\nall phenomena are compound[410]. Occasionally[411] we hear of three\nSankh\u00e2ras, body or deed, word and thought. But in later literature the\nSankh\u00e2ras become a category with fifty-two divisions and these are\nmostly mental or at least subjective states. The list opens with contact\n(phasso) and then follow sensation, perception, thought, reflection,\nmemory and a series of dispositions or states such as attention, effort,\njoy, torpor, stupidity, fear, doubt, lightness of body or mind, pity,\nenvy, worry, pride. As European thought does not class all these items\nunder one heading or, in other words, has no idea equivalent to\nSankh\u00e2ra, it is not surprising that no adequate rendering has been\nfound, especially as Buddhism regards everything as mere becoming, not\nfixed existence, and hence does not distinguish sharply between a\nprocess and a result--between the act of preparing and a preparation.\nConformations, confections, syntheses, co-efficients, tendencies,\npotentialities have all been used as equivalents but I propose to use\nthe Pali word as a rule. In some passages the word phenomena is an\nadequate literary equivalent, if it is remembered that phenomena are not\nthought of apart from a perceiving subject: in others some word like\npredispositions or tendencies is a more luminous rendering, because the\nSankh\u00e2ras are the potentialities for good and evil action existing in\nthe mind as a result of Karma[412].\n\nThe Buddha has now enumerated four categories which are not the self.\nThe fifth and last is Vi\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2na, frequently rendered by consciousness. But\nthis word is unsuitable in so far as it suggests in English some unified\nand continuous mental state. Vi\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2na sometimes corresponds to thought\nand sometimes is hardly distinguished from perception, for it means\nawareness[413] of what is pleasant or painful, sweet or sour and so on.\nBut the Pitakas continually insist[414] that it is not a unity and that\nits varieties come into being only when they receive proper nourishment\nor, as we should say, an adequate stimulus. Thus visual consciousness\ndepends on the sight and on visible objects, auditory consciousness on\nthe hearing and on sounds. Vi\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2na is divided into eighty-nine classes\naccording as it is good, bad or indifferent, but none of these classes,\nnor all of them together, can be called the self.\n\nThese five groups--body, feeling, perception, the sankh\u00e2ras, thought--are\ngenerally known as the Skandhas[415] signifying in Sanskrit collections\nor aggregates. The classification adopted is not completely logical, for\nfeeling and perception are both included in the Sankh\u00e2ras and also\ncounted separately. But the object of the Buddha was not so much to\nanalyze the physical and mental constitution of a human being as to show\nthat this constitution contains no element which can be justly called\nself or soul. For this reason all possible states of mind are\ncatalogued, sometimes under more than one head. They are none of them\nthe self and no self, ego, or soul in the sense defined above is\ndiscernible, only aggregates of states and properties which come\ntogether and fall apart again. When we investigate ourselves we find\nnothing but psychical states: we do not find a psyche. The mind is even\nless permanent than the body[416], for the body may last a hundred years\nor so \"but that which is called mind, thought or consciousness, day and\nnight keeps perishing as one thing and springing up as another.\" So in\nthe Samyutta-Nik\u00e2ya, Mara the Tempter asks the nun Vajir\u00e2 by whom this\nbeing, that is the human body, is made. Her answer is \"Here is a mere\nheap of _sankh\u00e2ras_: there is no 'being.' As when various parts are\nunited, the word 'chariot[417]' is used (to describe the whole), so when\nthe _skandhas_ are present, the word 'being' is commonly used. But it is\nsuffering only that comes into existence and passes away.\" And\nBuddhaghosa[418]says:\n\n \"Misery only doth exist, none miserable;\n  No doer is there, naught but the deed is found;\n  Nirvana is, but not the man that seeks it;\n  The path exists but not the traveller on it.\"\n\n\nThus the Buddha and his disciples rejected such ideas as soul, being and\npersonality. But their language does not always conform to this ideal of\nnegative precision, for the vocabulary of Pali (and still more of\nEnglish) is inadequate for the task of discussing what form conduct and\nbelief should take unless such words are used. Also the Att\u00e2 (\u00c2tman),\nwhich the Buddha denies, means more than is implied by our words self\nand personality. The word commonly used to signify an individual is\npuggalo. Thus in one sutta[419] the Buddha preaches of the burden, the\nbearer of the burden, taking it up and laying it down. The burden is the\nfive skandhas and the bearer is the individual or puggalo. This, if\npressed, implies that there is a personality apart from the skandhas\nwhich has to bear them. But probably it should not be pressed and we\nshould regard the utterance as merely a popular sermon using language\nwhich is, strictly speaking, metaphorical.\n\n\n2\n\nThe doctrine of Anatt\u00e2--the doctrine that there is no such thing as a\nsoul or self--is justly emphasized as a most important part of the\nBuddha's teaching and Buddhist ethics might be summarized as the\nselfless life. Yet there is a danger that Europeans may exaggerate and\nmisunderstand the doctrine by taking it as equivalent to a denial of the\nsoul's immortality or of free will or to an affirmation that mind is a\nfunction of the body. The universality of the proposition really\ndiminishes its apparent violence and nihilism. To say that some beings\nhave a soul and others have not is a formidable proposition, but to say\nthat absolutely no existing person or thing contains anything which can\nbe called a self or soul is less revolutionary than it sounds. It\nclearly does not deny that men exist for decades and mountains for\nmillenniums: neither does it deny that before birth or after death there\nmay be other existences similar to human life. It merely states that in\nall the world, organic and inorganic, there is nothing which is simple,\nself-existent, self-determined, and permanent: everything is compound,\nrelative and transitory. The obvious fact that infancy, youth and age\nform a series is not denied: the series may be called a personality and\ndeath need not end it. The error to be avoided is the doctrine of the\nBrahmans that through this series there runs a changeless self, which\nassumes new phases like one who puts on new garments.\n\nThe co-ordination and apparent unity observable in our mental\nconstitution is due to _mano_ which is commonly translated mind but is\nreally for Buddhism, as for the Upanishads, a _sensus communis_. Whereas\nthe five senses have different spheres or fields which are independent\nand do not overlap, _mano_ has a share in all these spheres. It receives\nand cognizes all sense impressions.\n\nThe philosophy of early Buddhism deals with psychology rather than with\nmetaphysics. It holds it profitable to analyze and discuss man's mental\nconstitution, because such knowledge leads to the destruction of false\nideals and the pursuit of peace and insight. Enquiry into the origin and\nnature of the external world is not equally profitable: in fact it is a\nvain intellectual pastime. Still in treating of such matters as\nsensation, perception and consciousness, it is impossible to ignore the\nquestion of external objects or to avoid propounding, at least by\nimplication, some theory about them. In this connection we often come\nupon the important word Dhamma (Sanskrit, Dharma). It means a law, and\nmore especially the law of the Buddha, or, in a wider sense, justice,\nrighteousness or religion[420]. But outside the moral and religious\nsphere it is commonly used in the plural as equivalent to phenomena,\nconsidered as involving states of consciousness. The Dhamma-sangani[421]\ndivides phenomena into those which exist for the subject and those which\nexist for other individuals and ignores the possibility of things\nexisting apart from a knowing subject. This hints at idealism and other\nstatements seem more precise. Thus the Samyutta-Nik\u00e2ya declares:\n\"Verily, within this mortal body, some six feet high, but conscious and\nendowed with mind, is the world, and its origin, and its passing\naway[422].\" And similarly[423] the problem is posed, \"Where do the four\nelements pass away and leave no trace behind.\" Neither gods nor men can\nanswer it, and when it is referred to the Buddha, his decision is that\nthe question is wrongly put and therefore admits of no solution.\n\"Instead of asking where the four elements pass away without trace, you\nshould have asked:\n\n  Where do earth, water, fire and wind,\n  And long and short and fine and coarse,\n  Pure and impure no footing find?\n  Where is it that both name and form[424]\n  Die out and leave no trace behind?\"\n\n\nTo that the answer is: In the mind of the Saint.\n\nYet it is certain that such passages should not be interpreted as\nequivalent to the later Yog\u00e2c\u00e2ra doctrine that only thought really\nexists or to any form of the doctrine that the world is M\u00e2y\u00e2 or\nillusion. The Pitakas leave no doubt on this point, for they elaborate\nwith clearness and consistency the theory that sensation and\nconsciousness depend on contact, that is contact between sense organs\nand sense objects. \"Man is conceived as a compound of instruments,\nreceptive and reacting[425]\" and the Samyutta-Nik\u00e2ya puts into the\nBuddha's mouth the following dogmatic statement[426]. \"Consciousness\narises because of duality. What is that duality? Visual[427]\nconsciousness arises because of sight and because of visible objects.\nSight is transitory and mutable: it is its very nature to change.\nVisible objects are the same. So this duality is both in movement and\ntransitory.\"\n\nThe question of the reality of the external world did not present itself\nto the early Buddhists. Had it been posed we may surmise that the Buddha\nwould have replied, as in similar cases, that the question was not\nproperly put. He would not, we may imagine, have admitted that the human\nmind has the creative power which idealism postulates, for such power\nseems to imply the existence of something like a self or \u00e2tman. But\nstill though the Pitakas emphasize the empirical duality of sense-organs\nand sense-objects, they also supply a basis for the doctrines of\nN\u00e2g\u00e2rjuna and Asanga, which like much late Buddhist metaphysics insist\non using logic in regions where the master would not use it. When it is\nsaid that the genesis of the world and its passing away are within this\nmortal frame, the meaning probably is that the world as we experience it\nwith its pains and pleasures depends on the senses and that with the\nmodification or cessation of the senses it is changed or comes to an\nend. In other words (for this doctrine like most of the Buddha's\ndoctrines is at bottom ethical rather than metaphysical) the saint can\nmake or unmake his own world and triumph over pain. But the theory of\nsensation may be treated not ethically but metaphysically. Sensation\nimplies a duality and on the one side the Buddha's teaching argues that\nthere is no permanent sentient self but merely different kinds of\nconsciousness arising in response to different stimuli. It is admitted\ntoo that visible objects are changing and transitory like sight itself\nand thus there is no reason to regard the external world, which is one\nhalf of the duality, as more permanent, self-existent and continuous\nthan the other half. When we apply to it the destructive analysis which\nthe Buddha applied only to mental states, we easily arrive at the\nnihilism or idealism of the later Buddhists. Of this I will treat later.\nFor the present we have only to note that early Buddhism holds that\nsensation depends on contact, that is on a duality. It does not\ninvestigate the external part of this duality and it is clear that such\ninvestigation leads to the very speculations which the Buddha declared\nto be unprofitable, such as arguments about the eternity and infinity of\nthe universe.\n\nThe doctrine of Anatt\u00e2 is counterbalanced by the doctrine of causation.\nWithout this latter the Buddha might seem to teach that life is a chaos\nof shadows. But on the contrary he teaches the universality of law, in\nthis life and in all lives. For Hindus of most schools of thought,\nmetempsychosis means the doctrine that the immortal soul passes from one\nbodily tenement to another, and is reborn again and again: karma is the\nlaw which determines the occurrence and the character of these births.\nIn Buddhism, though the Pitakas speak continually of rebirth,\nmetempsychosis is an incorrect expression since there is no soul to\ntransmigrate and there is strictly speaking nothing but karma. This\nword, signifying literally action or act, is the name of the force which\nfinds expression in the fact that every event is the result of causes\nand also is itself a cause which produces effects; further in the fact\n(for Indians regard it as one) that when a life, whether of a god, man\nor lower creature, comes to an end, the sum of its actions (which is in\nmany connections equivalent to personal character) takes effect as a\nwhole and determines the character of another aggregation of skandhas--in\npopular language, another being--representing the net result of the life\nwhich has come to an end. Karma is also used in the more concrete sense\nof the merit or demerit acquired by various acts. Thus we hear of karma\nwhich manifests itself in this life, and of karma which only manifests\nitself in another. No explanation whatever is given of the origin of\nkarma, of its reason, method or aims and it would not be consistent with\nthe principles of the Buddha to give such an explanation. Indeed, though\nit is justifiable to speak of karma as a force which calls into being\nthe world as we know it, such a phrase goes beyond the habitual language\nof early Buddhism which merely states that everything has a cause and\nthat every one's nature and circumstances are the result of previous\nactions in this or other existences. Karma is not so much invoked as a\nmetaphysical explanation of the universe as accorded the consideration\nwhich it merits as an ultimate moral fact.\n\nIt has often been pointed out that the Buddha did not originate or even\nfirst popularize the ideas of reincarnation and karma: they are Indian,\nnot specifically Buddhist. In fact, of all Indian systems of thought,\nBuddhism is the one which has the greatest difficulty in expressing\nthese ideas in intelligible and consistent language, because it denies\nthe existence of the ego. Some writers have gone so far as to suggest\nthat the whole doctrine formed no part of the Buddha's original teaching\nand was an accretion, or at most a concession of the master to the\nbeliefs of his time. But I cannot think this view is correct. The idea\nis woven into the texture of the Buddha's discourses. When in words\nwhich have as strong a claim as any in the Pitakas to be regarded as old\nand genuine he describes the stages by which he acquired enlightenment\nand promises the same experiences to those who observe his\ndiscipline[428], he says that he first followed the thread of his own\nprevious existences through past \u00e6ons, plumbing the unfathomed depths of\ntime: next, the whole of existence was spread out before him, like a\nview-seen from above, and he saw beings passing away from one body and\ntaking shape in another, according to their deeds. Only when he\nunderstood both the perpetual transformation of the universe and also\nthe line and sequence in which that transformation occurs, only then did\nhe see the four truths as they really are.\n\nIt is unfortunate for us that the doctrine of reincarnation met with\nalmost universal assent in India[429]. If some one were to found a new\nChristian sect, he would probably not be asked to prove the immortality\nof the soul: it is assumed as part of the common religious belief.\nSimilarly, no one asked the Buddha to prove the doctrine of rebirth. If\nwe permit our fancy to picture an interview between him and someone\nholding the ordinary ideas of an educated European about the soul, we\nmay imagine that he would have some difficulty in understanding what is\nthe alternative to rebirth. His interlocutor might reply that there are\ntwo types of theory among Europeans. Some think that the soul comes into\nexistence with the body at birth but continues to exist everlasting and\nimmortal after the death of the body. Others, commonly called\nmaterialists, while agreeing that the soul comes into existence with the\nbirth of the body, hold that it ceases to exist with the death of the\nbody. To the first theory the Buddha would probably have replied that\nthere is one law without exception, namely that whatever has a beginning\nhas also an end. The whole universe offers no analogy or parallel to the\nsoul which has a beginning but no end, and not the smallest logical need\nis shown for believing a doctrine so contrary to the nature of things.\nAnd as for materialism he would probably say that it is a statement of\nthe processes of the world as perceived but no explanation of the mental\nor even of the physical world. The materialists forget that objects as\nknown cannot be isolated from the knowing subject. Sensation implies\ncontact and duality but it is no real explanation to say that mental\nphenomena are caused by physical phenomena. The Buddha reckoned among\nvain speculations not only such problems as the eternity and infinity of\nthe world but also the question, Is the principle of life (J\u00eeva)\nidentical with the body or not identical. That question, he said, is not\nproperly put, which is tantamount to condemning as inadequate all\ntheories which derive life and thought from purely material\nantecedents[430]. Other ideas of modern Europe, such as that the body is\nan instrument on which the soul works, or the expression of the soul,\nseem to imply, or at least to be compatible with, the pre-existence of\nthe soul.\n\nIt is probable too that the Buddha would have said, and a modern\nBuddhist would certainly say, that the fact of rebirth can easily be\nproved by testimony and experience, because those who will make the\neffort can recall their previous births. For his hearers the difficulty\nmust have been not to explain why they believed in rebirth but to\nharmonize the belief with the rest of the master's system, for what is\nreborn and how? We detect a tendency to say that it is Vi\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2na, or\nconsciousness, and the expression patisandhivi\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2nam or\nrebirth-consciousness occurs[431]. The question is treated in an\nimportant dialogue in the Majjhima-Nik\u00e2ya[432], where a monk called S\u00e2ti\nmaintains that, according to the Buddha's teaching, consciousness\ntransmigrates unchanged. The Buddha summoned S\u00e2ti and rebuked his error\nin language of unusual severity, for it was evidently capital and fatal\nif persisted in. The Buddha does not state what transmigrates, as the\nEuropean reader would wish him to do, and would no doubt have replied to\nthat question that it is improperly framed and does not admit of an\nanswer.\n\nHis argument is directed not so much against the idea that consciousness\nin one existence can have some connection with consciousness in the\nnext, as against the idea that this consciousness is a unity and\npermanent. He maintains that it is a complex process due to many causes,\neach producing its own effect. Yet the Pitakas seem to admit that the\nprocesses which constitute consciousness in one life, can also produce\ntheir effect in another life, for the character of future lives may be\ndetermined by the wishes which we form in this life. Existence is really\na succession of states of consciousness following one another\nirrespective of bodies. If _ABC_ and _abc_ are two successive lives,\n_ABC_ is not more of a reality or unity than _BCa_. No personality\npasses over at death from _ABC_ to _abc_ but then _ABC_ is itself not a\nunity: it is merely a continuous process of change[433].\n\nThe discourse seems to say that tanh\u00e2, the thirst for life, is the\nconnecting link between different births, but it does not use this\nexpression. In one part of his address the Buddha exhorts his disciples\nnot to enquire what they were or what they will be or what is the nature\nof their present existence, but rather to master and think out for\nthemselves the universal law of causation, that every state has a cause\nfor coming into being and a cause for passing away. No doubt his main\nobject is as usual practical, to incite to self-control rather than to\nspeculation. But may he not also have been under the influence of the\nidea that time is merely a form of human thought? For the ordinary mind\nwhich cannot conceive of events except as following one another in time,\nthe succession of births is as true as everything else. The higher kinds\nof knowledge, such as are repeatedly indicated in the Buddha's\ndiscourse, though they are not described because language is incapable\nof describing them, may not be bound in this way by the idea of time and\nmay see that the essential truth is not so much a series of births in\nwhich something persists and passes from existence to existence, as the\ntimeless fact that life depends upon tanh\u00e2, the desire for life. Death,\nthat is the breaking up of such constituents of human life as the body,\nstates of consciousness, etc., does not affect tanh\u00e2. If tanh\u00e2 has not\nbeen deliberately suppressed, it collects skandhas again. The result is\ncalled a new individual. But the essential truth is the persistence of\nthe tanh\u00e2 until it is destroyed.\n\nStill there is no doubt that the earliest Buddhist texts and the\ndiscourse ascribed to the Buddha himself speak, when using ordinary\nuntechnical language, of rebirth and of a man dying and being born[434]\nin such and such a state. Only we must not suppose that the man's self\nis continued or transferred in this operation. There is no entity that\ncan be called soul and strictly speaking no entity that can be called\nbody, only a variable aggregation of skandhas, constantly changing. At\ndeath this collocation disperses but a new one reassembles under the\ninfluence of tanh\u00e2, the desire of life, and by the law of karma which\nprescribes that every act must have its result. The illustration that\ncomes most naturally is that of water. Waves pass across the surface of\nthe sea and successive waves are not the same, nor is what we call the\nsame wave really the same at two different points in its progress, and\nyet one wave causes another wave and transmits its form and movement. So\nare beings travelling through the world (sams\u00e2ra) not the same at any\ntwo points in a single life and still less the same in two consecutive\nlives: yet it is the impetus and form of the previous lives, the desire\nthat urges them and the form that it takes, which determine the\ncharacter of the succeeding lives.\n\nBut Buddhist writers more commonly illustrate rebirth by fire than by\nwater and this simile is used with others in the Questions of Milinda.\nWe cannot assume that this book reflects the views of the Buddha or his\nimmediate followers, but it is the work of an Indian in touch with good\ntradition who lived a few centuries later and expressed his opinions\nwith lucidity. It denies the existence of transmigration and of the soul\nand then proceeds to illustrate by metaphors and analogies how two\nsuccessive lives can be the same and yet not the same. For instance,\nsuppose a man carelessly allows his lamp to set his thatch on fire with\nthe result that a whole village is burnt down. He is held responsible\nfor the loss but when brought before the judge argues that the flame of\nhis lamp was not the same as the flame that burnt down the village. Will\nsuch a plea be allowed? Certainly not. Or to take another metaphor.\nSuppose a man were to choose a young girl in marriage and after making a\ncontract with her parents were to go away, waiting for her to grow up.\nMeanwhile another man comes and marries her. If the two men appeal to\nthe King and the later suitor says to the earlier, The little child whom\nyou chose and paid for is one and the full grown girl whom I paid for\nand married is another, no one would listen to his argument, for clearly\nthe young woman has grown out of the girl and in ordinary language they\nare the same person. Or again suppose that one man left a jar of milk\nwith another and the milk turned to curds. Would it be reasonable for\nthe first man to accuse the second of theft because the milk has\ndisappeared?\n\nThe caterpillar and butterfly might supply another illustration. It is\nunfortunate that the higher intelligences offer no example of such\nmetamorphosis in which consciousness is apparently interrupted between\nthe two stages. Would an intelligent caterpillar take an interest in his\nfuture welfare as a butterfly and stigmatize as vices indulgences\npleasant to his caterpillar senses and harmful only to the coming\nbutterfly, between whom and the caterpillar there is perhaps no\ncontinuity of consciousness? We can imagine how strongly butterflies\nwould insist that the foundation of morality is that caterpillars should\nrealize that the butterflies' interests and their own are the same.\n\n\n3\n\nWhen the Buddha contemplated the sams\u00e2ra, the world of change and\ntransmigration in which there is nothing permanent, nothing satisfying,\nnothing that can be called a self, he formulated his chief conclusions,\ntheoretical and practical, in four propositions known as the four\nnoble[435] truths, concerning suffering, the cause of suffering, the\nextinction of suffering, and the path to the extinction of\nsuffering[436]. These truths are always represented as the essential and\nindispensable part of Buddhism. Without them, says the Buddha more than\nonce, there can be no emancipation, and agreeably to this we find them\nrepresented as having formed part of the teaching of previous\nBuddhas[437] and consequently as being rediscovered rather than invented\nby Gotama. He even compares himself to one who has found in the jungle\nthe site of an ancient city and caused it to be restored. It would\ntherefore not be surprising if they were found in pre-Buddhist writings,\nand it has been pointed out that they are practically identical with the\nfour divisions of the Hindu science of medicine: roga, disease;\nrogahetu, the cause of disease; arogya, absence of disease; bhaisajya,\nmedicine. A similar parallel between the language of medicine and moral\nscience can be found in the Yoga philosophy, and if the fourfold\ndivision of medicine can be shown to be anterior to Buddhism[438], it\nmay well have suggested the mould in which the four truths were cast.\nThe comparison of life and passion to disease is frequent in Buddhist\nwritings and the Buddha is sometimes hailed as the King of Physicians.\nIt is a just compendium of his doctrine--so far as an illustration can be\na compendium--to say that human life is like a diseased body which\nrequires to be cured by a proper regimen. But the Buddha's claim to\noriginality is not thereby affected, for it rests upon just this, that\nhe was able to regard life and religion in this spirit and to put aside\nthe systems of ritual, speculation and self-mortification which were\nbeing preached all round him.\n\nThe first truth is that existence involves suffering. It receives\nemotional expression in a discourse in the Samyutta-Nik\u00e2ya[439]. \"The\nworld of transmigration, my disciples, has its beginning in eternity. No\norigin can be perceived, from which beings start, and hampered by\nignorance, fettered by craving, stray and wander. Which think you are\nmore--the tears which you have shed as you strayed and wandered on this\nlong journey, grieving and weeping because you were bound to what you\nhated and separated from what you loved--which are more, these tears, or\nthe waters in the four oceans? A mother's death, a son's death, a\ndaughter's death, loss of kinsmen, loss of property, sickness, all these\nhave you endured through long ages--and while you felt these losses and\nstrayed and wandered on this long journey, grieving and weeping because\nyou were bound to what you hated and separated from what you loved, the\ntears that you shed are more than the water in the four oceans.\"\n\nIt is remarkable that such statements aroused no contradiction. The\nBuddha was not an isolated and discontented philosopher, like\nSchopenhauer in his hotel, but the leader of an exceptionally successful\nreligious movement in touch and sympathy with popular ideas. On many\npoints his assertions called forth discussion and contradiction but when\nhe said that all existence involves suffering no one disputed the\ndictum: no one talked of the pleasures of life or used those arguments\nwhich come so copiously to the healthy-minded modern essayist when he\ndevotes a page or two to disproving pessimism[440]. On this point the\nviews and temperament of the Buddha were clearly those of educated\nIndia. The existence of this conviction and temperament in a large body\nof intellectual men is as important as the belief in the value of life\nand the love of activity for its own sake which is common among\nEuropeans. Both tempers must be taken into account by every theory which\nis not merely personal but endeavours to ascertain what the human race\nthink and feel about existence.\n\nThe sombre and meditative cast of Indian thought is not due to physical\ndegeneration or a depressing climate. Many authors speak as if the\nHindus lived in a damp relaxing heat in which physical and moral stamina\nalike decay. I myself think that as to climate India is preferable to\nEurope, and without arguing about what must be largely a question of\npersonal taste, one may point to the long record of physical and\nintellectual labour performed even by Europeans in India. Neither can it\nbe maintained that in practice Buddhism destroys the joy and vigour of\nlife. The Burmese are among the most cheerful people in the world and\nthe Japanese among the most vigorous, and the latter are at least as\nmuch Buddhists as Europeans are Christians. It might be plausibly\nmaintained that Europeans' love of activity is mainly due to the\nintolerable climate and uncomfortable institutions of their continent,\nwhich involve a continual struggle with the weather and continual\ndiscussion forbidding any calm and comprehensive view of things. The\nIndian being less troubled by these evils is able to judge what is the\nvalue of life in itself, as an experience for the individual, not as\npart of a universal struggle, which is the common view of seriously\nminded Europeans, though as to this struggle they have but hazy ideas of\nthe antagonists, the cause and the result.\n\nThe Buddhist doctrine does not mean that life is something trifling and\nunimportant, to be lived anyhow. On the contrary, birth as a human being\nis an opportunity of inestimable value. He who is so born has at least a\nchance of hearing the truth and acquiring merit. \"Hard is it to be born\nas a man, hard to come to hear the true law\" and when the chance comes,\nthe good fortune of the being who has attained to human form and the\ncritical issues which depend on his using it rightly are dwelt on with\nan earnestness not surpassed in Christian homiletics. He who acts ill as\na man may fall back into the dreary cycles of inferior births, among\nbeasts and blind aimless beings who cannot understand the truth, even if\nthey hear it. From this point of view human life is happiness, only like\nevery form of existence it is not satisfying or permanent.\n\nDukkha is commonly rendered in English by pain or suffering, but an\nadequate literary equivalent which can be used consistently in\ntranslating is not forthcoming. The opposite state, sukha, is fairly\nrendered by well-being, satisfaction and happiness. Dukkha is the\ncontrary of this: uneasiness, discomfort, difficulty. Pain or suffering\nare too strong as renderings, but no better are to hand. When the Buddha\nenlarges on the evils of the world it will be found that the point most\nemphasized as vitiating life is its transitoriness.\n\n\"Is that which is impermanent sorrow or joy?\" he asks of his disciples.\n\"Sorrow, Lord,\" is the answer, and this oft-repeated proposition is\nalways accepted as self-evident. The evils most frequently mentioned are\nthe great incurable weaknesses of humanity, old age, sickness and death,\nand also the weariness of being tied to what we hate, the sadness of\nparting from what we love. Another obvious evil is that we cannot get\nwhat we want or achieve our ambitions. Thus the temper which prompts the\nBuddha's utterances is not that of Ecclesiastes--the melancholy of\nsatiety which, having enjoyed all, finds that all is vanity--but rather\nthe regretful verdict of one who while sympathizing with the nobler\npassions--love, ambition, the quest of knowledge--is forced to pronounce\nthem unsatisfactory. The human mind craves after something which is\npermanent, something of which it can say This is mine. It longs to be\nsomething or to produce something which is not transitory and which has\nan absolute value in and for itself. But neither in this world nor in\nany other world are such states and actions possible. Only in Nirvana do\nwe find a state which rises above the transitory because it rises above\ndesire. Not merely human life but all possible existences in all\nimaginable heavens must be unsatisfactory, for such existences are\nmerely human life under favourable conditions. Some great evils, such as\nsickness, may be absent but life in heaven must come to an end: it is\nnot eternal, it is not even permanent, it does not, any more than this\nlife, contain anything that god or man can call his own. And it may be\nobserved that when Christian writers attempt to describe the joys of a\nheaven which is eternally satisfying, they have mostly to fall back on\nnegative phrases such as \"Eye hath not seen nor ear heard.\"\n\nThe European view of life differs from the Asiatic chiefly in\nattributing a value to actions in themselves, and in not being disturbed\nby the fact that their results are impermanent. It is, in fact, the\ntheoretical side of the will to live, which can find expression in a\ntreatise on metaphysics as well as in an act of procreation. An\nEnglishman according to his capacity and mental culture is satisfied\nwith some such rule of existence as having a good time, or playing the\ngame, or doing his duty, or working for some cause. The majority of\nintelligent men are prepared to devote their lives to the service of the\nBritish Empire: the fact that it must pass away as certainly as the\nEmpire of Babylon and that they are labouring for what is impermanent\ndoes not disturb them and is hardly ever present to their minds. Those\nEuropeans who share with Asiatics some feeling of dissatisfaction with\nthe impermanent try to escape it by an unselfish morality and by holding\nthat life, which is unsatisfactory if regarded as a pursuit of\nhappiness, acquires a new and real value if lived for others. And from\nthis point of view the European moralist is apt to criticize the\nBuddhist truths of suffering and the release from suffering as selfish.\nBut Buddhism is as full as or fuller than Christianity of love,\nself-sacrifice and thought for others. It says that it is a fine thing\nto be a man and have the power of helping others: that the best life is\nthat which is entirely unselfish and a continual sacrifice. But looking\nat existence as a whole, and accepting the theory that the happiest and\nbest life is a life of self-sacrifice, it declines to consider as\nsatisfactory the world in which this principle holds good. Many of the\nbest Europeans would probably say that their ideal is not continual\npersonal enjoyment but activity which makes the world better. But this\nideal implies a background of evil just as much as does the Buddha's\nteaching. If evil vanished, the ideal would vanish too.\n\nThere is one important negative aspect of the truth of suffering and\nindeed of all the four truths. A view of human life which is common in\nChristian and Mohammedan countries represents man as put in the world by\nGod, and human life as a service to be rendered to God. Whether it is\npleasant, worth living or not are hardly questions for God's servants.\nThere is no trace of such a view in the Buddha's teaching. It is\nthroughout assumed that man in judging human life by human standards is\nnot presumptuous or blind to higher issues. Life involves unhappiness:\nthat is a fact, a cardinal truth. That this unhappiness may be ordered\nfor disciplinary or other mysterious motives by what is vaguely called\nOne above, that it would disappear or be explained if we could\ncontemplate our world as forming part of a larger universe, that \"there\nis some far off divine event,\" some unexpected solution in the fifth act\nof this complicated tragedy, which could justify the creator of this\n_dukkhakkhandha_, this mass of unhappiness--for all such ideas the\ndoctrine of the Blessed One has nothing but silence, the courteous and\ncharitable silence which will not speak contemptuously. The world of\ntransmigration has neither beginning nor end nor meaning: to those who\nwish to escape from it the Buddha can show the way: of obligation to\nstop in it there can be no question[441].\n\nBuddhism is often described as pessimistic, but is the epithet just?\nWhat does it mean? The dictionary defines pessimism as the doctrine\nwhich teaches that the world is as bad as it can be and that everything\nnaturally tends towards evil. That is emphatically not Buddhist\nteaching. The higher forms of religion have their basis and origin in\nthe existence of evil, but their justification and value depend on their\npower to remove it. A religion, therefore, can never be pessimistic,\njust as a doctor who should simply pronounce diseases to be incurable\nwould never be successful as a practitioner. The Buddha states with the\nutmost frankness that religion is dependent on the existence of evil.\n\"If three things did not exist, the Buddha would not appear in the world\nand his law and doctrine would not shine. What are the three? Birth, old\nage and death.\" This is true. If there were people leading perfectly\nhappy, untroubled lives, it is not likely that any thought of religion\nwould enter their minds, and their irreligious attitude would be\nreasonable, for the most that any deity is asked to give is perfect\nhappiness, and that these imaginary folk are supposed to have already.\nBut according to Buddhism no form of existence can be perfectly happy or\npermanent. Gods and angels may be happier than men but they are not free\nfrom the tyranny of desire and ultimately they must fall from their high\nestate and pass away.\n\n\n4\n\nThe second Truth declares the origin of suffering. \"It is,\" says the\nBuddha, \"the thirst which causes rebirth, which is accompanied by\npleasure and lust and takes delight now here, now there; namely, the\nthirst for pleasure, the thirst for another life, the thirst for\nsuccess.\" This Thirst (Tanh\u00e2) is the craving for life in the widest\nsense: the craving for pleasure which propagates life, the craving for\nexistence in the dying man which brings about another birth, the craving\nfor wealth, for power, for pre-eminence within the limits of the present\nlife. What is the nature of this craving and of its action? Before\nattempting to answer we must consider what is known as the chain of\ncausation[442], one of the oldest, most celebrated, and most obscure\nformul\u00e6 of Buddhism. It is stated that the Buddha knew it before\nattaining enlightenment[443], but it is second in importance only to the\nfour truths, and in the opening sections of the Mah\u00e2vagga, he is\nrepresented as meditating on it under the Bo-tree, both in its positive\nand negative form. It runs as follows: \"From ignorance come the\nsankh\u00e2ras, from the sankh\u00e2ras comes consciousness, from consciousness\ncome name-and-form, from name-and-form come the six provinces (of the\nsenses), from the six provinces comes contact, from contact comes\nsensation, from sensation comes craving, from craving comes clinging,\nfrom clinging comes existence, from existence comes birth, from birth\ncome old age and death, pain and lamentation, suffering, sorrow, and\ndespair. This is the origin of this whole mass of suffering. But by the\ndestruction of ignorance, effected by the complete absence of lust, the\nsankh\u00e2ras are destroyed, by the destruction of the sankh\u00e2ras,\nconsciousness is destroyed\" and so on through the whole chain backwards.\n\nThe chain is also known as the twelve Nid\u00e2nas or causes. It is clearly\nin its positive and negative forms an amplification of the second and\nthird truths respectively, or perhaps they are a luminous compendium of\nit.\n\nBesides the full form quoted above there are shorter versions. Sometimes\nthere are only nine links[444] or there are five links combined in an\nendless chain[445]. So we must not attach too much importance to the\nnumber or order of links. The chain is not a genealogy but a statement\nrespecting the interdependence of certain stages and aspects of human\nnature. And though the importance of cause (hetu) is often emphasized,\nthe causal relation is understood in a wider sense than is usual in our\nidiom. If there were no birth, there would be no death, but though birth\nand death are interdependent we should hardly say that birth is the\ncause of death.\n\nIn whatever way we take the Chain of Causation, it seems to bring a\nbeing into existence twice, and this is the view of Buddhaghosa who says\nthat the first two links (ignorance and the sankh\u00e2ras) belong to past\ntime and explain the present existence: the next eight (consciousness to\nexistence) analyse the present existence: and the last two (birth and\nold age) belong to future time, representing the results in another\nexistence of desire felt in this existence. And that is perhaps what the\nconstructor of the formula meant. It is clearest if taken backwards.\nSuppose, the Buddha once said to \u00c2nanda[446], there were no birth, would\nthere then be any old age or death? Clearly not. That is the meaning of\nsaying that old age and death depend on birth: if birth were\nannihilated, they too would be annihilated. Similarly birth depends on\nBhava which means becoming and does not imply anything self-existent and\nstationary: all the world is a continual process of coming into\nexistence and passing away. It is on the universality of this process\nthat birth (j\u00e2ti) depends. But on what does the endless becoming itself\ndepend? We seem here on the threshold of the deepest problems but the\nanswer, though of wide consequences, brings us back to the strictly\nhuman and didactic sphere. Existence depends on Up\u00e2d\u00e2na. This word means\nliterally grasping or clinging to and should be so translated here but\nit also means fuel and its use is coloured by this meaning, since\nBuddhist metaphor is fond of describing life as a flame. Existence\ncannot continue without the clinging to life, just as fire cannot\ncontinue without fuel[447].\n\nThe clinging in its turn depends on Tanh\u00e2, the thirst or craving for\nexistence. The distinction between tanh\u00e2 and up\u00e2d\u00e2na is not always\nobserved, and it is often said tanh\u00e2 is the cause of karma or of sorrow.\nBut, strictly speaking, up\u00e2d\u00e2na is the grasping at life or pleasure:\ntanh\u00e2 is the incessant, unsatisfied craving which causes it. It is\ncompared to the birana, a weed which infests rice fields and sends its\nroots deep into the ground. So long as the smallest piece of root is\nleft the weed springs up again and propagates itself with surprising\nrapidity, though the cultivator thought he had exterminated it. This\nmetaphor is also used to illustrate how tanh\u00e2 leads to a new birth.\nDeath is like cutting down the plant: the root remains and sends up\nanother growth.\n\nWe now seem to have reached an ultimate principle and basis, namely, the\ncraving for life which transcends the limits of one existence and finds\nexpression in birth after birth. Many passages in the Pitakas justify\nthe idea that the force which constructs the universe of our experience\nis an impersonal appetite, analogous to the Will of Schopenhauer. The\nshorter formula quoted above in which it is said that the sankh\u00e2ras come\nfrom tanh\u00e2 also admits of such an interpretation. But the longer chain\ndoes not, or at least it considers tanh\u00e2 not as a cosmic force but\nsimply as a state of the human mind. Suffering can be traced back to the\nfact that men have desire. To what is desire due? To sensation. With\nthis reply we leave the great mysteries at which the previous links\nseemed to hint and begin one of those enquiries into the origin and\nmeaning of human sensation which are dear to early Buddhism. Just as\nthere could be no birth if there were no existence, so there could be no\ndesire if there were no sensation. What then is the cause of sensation?\nContact (phasso). This word plays a considerable part in Buddhist\npsychology and is described as producing not only sensation but\nperception and volition (cetan\u00e2)[448]. Contact in its turn depends on\nthe senses (that is the five senses as we know them, and mind as a\nsixth) and these depend on name-and-form. This expression, which occurs\nin the Upanishads as well as in Buddhist writings, denotes mental and\ncorporeal life. In explaining it the commentators say that form means\nthe four elements and shape derived from them and that name means the\nthree skandhas of sensation, perception and the sankh\u00e2ras. This use of\nthe word n\u00e2ma probably goes back to ancient superstitions which regarded\na man's name as containing his true being but in Buddhist terminology it\nis merely a technical expression for mental states collectively.\nBuddhaghosa observes that name-and-form are like the playing of a lute\nwhich does not come from any store of sound and when it ceases does not\ngo to form a store of sound elsewhere.\n\nOn what do name-and-form depend? On consciousness. This point is so\nimportant that in teaching \u00c2nanda the Buddha adds further explanations.\n\"Suppose,\" he says, \"consciousness were not to descend into the womb,\nwould name-and-form consolidate in the womb? No, Lord. Therefore,\n\u00c2nanda, consciousness is the cause, the occasion, the origin of\nname-and-form.\" But consciousness according to the Buddha's\nteaching[449] is not a unity, a thinking soul, but mental activity\nproduced by various appropriate causes. Hence it cannot be regarded as\nindependent of name-and-form and as their generator. So the Buddha goes\non to say that though name-and-form depend on consciousness it is\nequally true that consciousness depends on name-and-form. The two\ntogether make human life: everything that is born, and dies or is reborn\nin another existence[450], is name-and-form plus consciousness.\n\nWhat we have learnt hitherto is that suffering depends on desire and\ndesire on the senses. For didactic purposes this is much, but as\nphilosophy the result is small: we have merely discovered that the world\ndepends on name-and-form plus consciousness, that is on human beings.\nThe first two links of the chain (the last in our examination) do not\nleave the previous point of view--the history of individual life and not\nan account of the world process--but they have at least that interest\nwhich attaches to the mysterious.\n\n\"Consciousness depends on the sankh\u00e2ras.\" Here the sankh\u00e2ras seem to\nmean the predispositions anterior to consciousness which accompany birth\nand hence are equivalent to one meaning of Karma, that is the good and\nbad qualities and tendencies which appear when rebirth takes place.\nPerhaps the best commentary on the statement that consciousness depends\non the sankh\u00e2ras is furnished by a Sutta called Rebirth according to the\nsankh\u00e2ras[451]. The Buddha there says that if a monk possessed of the\nnecessary good qualities cherishes a wish to be born after death as a\nnoble, or in one of the many heavens, \"then those predispositions\n(sankh\u00e2ra) and mental conditions (vih\u00e2ro) if repeated[452] conduce to\nrebirth\" in the place he desires. Similarly when Citta is dying, the\nspirits of the wood come round his death-bed and bid him wish to be an\nEmperor in his next life. Thus a personality with certain\npredispositions and aptitudes may be due to the thought and wishes of a\nprevious personality[453], and these predispositions, asserts the last\narticle of the formula, depend upon ignorance. We might be tempted to\nidentify this ignorance with some cosmic creative force such as the\nUnconscious of Hartmann or the M\u00e2y\u00e2 of Sankara. But though the idea that\nthe world of phenomena is a delusion bred of ignorance is common in\nIndia, it does not enter into the formula which we are considering. Two\nexplanations of the first link are given in the Pitakas, which are\npractically the same. One[454] states categorically that the ignorance\nwhich produces the sankh\u00e2ras is not to know the four Truths.\nElsewhere[455] the Buddha himself when asked what ignorance means\nreplies that it is not to know that everything must have an origin and a\ncessation. The formula means that it is ignorance of the true nature of\nthe world and the true interests of mankind that brings about the\nsuffering which we see and feel. We were born into the world because of\nour ignorance in our last birth and of the desire for re-existence which\nwas in us when we died.\n\nOf the supreme importance attached to this doctrine of causation there\ncan be no doubt. Perhaps the best instance is the story of S\u00e2riputta's\nconversion. In the early days of the Buddha's mission he asked for a\nbrief summary of the new teaching and in reply the essential points were\nformulated in the well-known verses which declare that all things have a\ncause and an end[456]. Such utterances sound like a scientific dictum\nabout the uniformity of nature or cosmic law. But though the Pitakas\nimply some such idea, they seem to shrink from stating it clearly. They\ndo not emphasize the orderly course of nature or exhort men to live in\nharmony with it. We are given to understand that the intelligence of\nthose supermen who are called Buddhas sees that the four Truths are a\nconsequence of the nature of the universe but subsequent instruction\nbids us attend to the truths themselves and not to their connection with\nthe universal scheme. One reason for this is that Indians were little\ninclined to think of impersonal laws and forces[457]. The law of karma\nand the periodic rhythm of growth and decay which the universe obeys are\nideas common to Hinduism and Buddhism and not incompatible with the\nmythology and ritual to which the Buddha objected. And though the\nPitakas insist on the universality of causation, they have no notion of\nthe uniformity of nature in our sense[458]. The Buddhist doctrine of\ncausation states that we cannot obtain emancipation and happiness unless\nwe understand and remove the cause of our distress, but it does not\ndiscuss cosmic forces like karma and M\u00e2y\u00e2. Such discussion the Buddha\nconsidered unprofitable[459] and perhaps he may have felt that\ninsistence on cosmic law came dangerously near to fatalism[460].\n\nThough the number of the links may be varied the Buddha attached\nimportance to the method of concatenation and the impersonal formulation\nof the whole and in one passage[461] he objects to the questions, what\nare old age and death and who is it that has old age and death. Though\nthe chain of causation treats of a human life, it never speaks of a\nperson being born or growing old and Buddhaghosa[462] observes that the\nWheel of existence is without known beginning, without a personal cause\nor passive recipient and empty with a twelvefold emptiness. It has no\nexternal cause such as Brahma or any deity \"and is also wanting in any\nego passively recipient of happiness and misery.\"\n\nThe twelve Nid\u00e2nas have passed into Buddhist art as the Wheel of Life.\nAn ancient example of this has been discovered in the frescoes of Ajanta\nand modern diagrams, which represent the explanations current in\nmedi\u00e6val India, are still to be found in Tibet and Japan[463]. In the\nnave of the wheel are three female figures signifying passion, hatred\nand folly and in the spaces between the spokes are scenes depicting the\nphases of human life: round the felly runs a series of pictures\nrepresenting the twelve links of the chain. The first two links are\nrepresented by a blind man or blind camel and by a potter making pots.\nThe third, or consciousness, is an ape. Some have thought that this\nfigure represents the evolution of mind, which begins to show itself in\nanimals and is perfected in man. It may however refer to a simile found\nin the Pitakas[464] where the restless, changeable mind is compared to a\nmonkey jumping about in a tree.\n\n\n5\n\nWe have now examined three of the four Truths, for the Chain of\nCausation in its positive form gives us the origin of suffering and in\nits negative form the facts as to the extinction of suffering: it\nteaches that as its links are broken suffering disappears. The fourth\ntruth, or the way which leads to the extinction of suffering, gives\npractical directions to this effect. The way is the Noble Eightfold Path\nconsisting of: right views, right aspirations, right speech, right\nconduct, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right\nrapture. This formula is comparable not with the Decalogue, to which\ncorrespond the precepts for monks and laymen, but rather with the\nBeatitudes. It contains no commands or prohibitions but in the simplest\nlanguage indicates the spirit that leads to emancipation. It breathes an\nair of noble freedom. It says nothing about laws and rites: it simply\nstates that the way to be happy is to have a good heart and mind, taking\nshape in good deeds and at last finding expression and fulfilment in the\nrapture of ecstasy. We may think the numerical subdivisions of the Path\npedantic and find fault with its want of definition, for it does not\ndefine the word right (samm\u00e2) which it uses so often, but in thus\nignoring ceremonialism and legalism and making simple goodness in spirit\nand deed the basis of religion. Gotama rises above all his\ncontemporaries and above all subsequent teachers except Christ. In\ndetaching the perfect life from all connection with a deity or outside\nforces and in teaching man that the worst and best that can happen to\nhim lie within his own power, he holds a unique position.\n\nIndian thought has little sympathy with the question whether morality is\nutilitarian or intuitionist, whether we do good to benefit ourselves or\nwhether certain acts and states are intrinsically good. The Buddha is a\nphysician who prescribes a cure for a disease--the disease of\nsuffering--and that cure is not a quack medicine which pretends to heal\nrapidly but a regime and treatment. If we ask whether the reason for\nfollowing the regime is that it is good for us or that it is\nscientifically correct; or why we want to be well or whether health is\nreally good: both the Buddha and the physician would reply that such\nquestions are tiresome and irrelevant. With an appearance of profundity,\nthey ask nothing worth answering. The eightfold path is the way and the\nonly way of salvation. Its form depends on the fact that the knowledge\nof the Buddha, which embraces the whole universe, sees that it is a\nconsequence of the nature of things. In that sense it may be described\nas an eternal law, but this is not the way in which the Pitakas usually\nspeak of it and it is not represented as a divine revelation dictated by\nother than human motives. \"Come, disciples,\" the Buddha was wont to say,\n\"lead a holy life for the complete extinction of suffering.\" Holiness is\nsimply the way out of misery into happiness. To ask why we should take\nthat way, would seem to an Indian an unnecessary question, as it might\nseem to a Christian if he were asked why he wants to save his soul, but\nif the question is pressed, the answer must be at every point, for the\nChristian as much as for the Buddhist, to gain happiness[465].\nIncidentally the happiness of others is fully cared for, since both\nreligions make unselfishness the basis of morality and hold that the\nconscious and selfish pursuit of happiness is not the way to gain it,\nbut if we choose to apply European methods of analysis to the Buddha's\npreaching, it is utilitarian. But the fact that he and his first\ndisciples did not think such analysis and discussion necessary goes far\nto show that the temper created in his Order was not religiously\nutilitarian. It never occurred to them to look at things that way.\n\nThe eightfold path is the road to happiness but it is the way, not the\ndestination, and the action of the Buddha and his disciples is something\nbeyond it. They had obtained the goal, for they were all Arhats, and\nthey might, if they had been inspired by that selfishness which some\nEuropean authors find prominent in Buddhism, have entered into their\nrest. Yet the Buddha bade them go among men and preach \"for the gain and\nwelfare of many\" and they continued their benevolent activity although\nit could add nothing to the reward which they had already won.\n\nThe Buddha often commented on the eightfold path, and we may follow one\nof the expositions attributed to him[466]. What, he asks, is meant by\nright views (_Samm\u00e2ditthi_)? Simply a knowledge of the four truths, and\nof such doctrines about personality and karma as are implied in them.\nBut the negative aspects of this _Samm\u00e2ditthi_ are more striking than\nthe positive. It does not imply any philosophical or metaphysical\nsystem: the Buddha has shaken off all philosophical theories[467].\nSecondly, it does not imply that any knowledge or belief is of efficacy\nin itself, as the lore of the Brahmans is supposed to be or those\nChristian creeds which save by faith. The Buddha has not a position such\nas the Church attributes to Christ, or later Buddhism to Amida. All that\nis required under the head of right belief is a knowledge of the general\nprinciples and programme of Buddhism.\n\nThe Buddha continues, What is right resolve? It is the resolve to\nrenounce pleasures, to bear no malice and do no harm. What is right\nspeech? To abstain from lying and slandering, harsh words and foolish\nchatter. What is right conduct? To abstain from taking life, from\nstealing, from immorality. What is right livelihood? To abandon wrong\noccupations and get one's living by a right occupation. This is\nelsewhere defined as one that does not bring hurt or danger to any\nliving thing, and five bad occupations are enumerated, namely, those of\na caravan-trader, slave-dealer, butcher, publican and poison seller.\nEuropean critics of Buddhism have often found fault with its ethics as\nbeing a morality of renunciation, and in the explanation epitomized\nabove each section of the path is interpreted in this way. But this\nnegative form is not a peculiarity of Buddhism. Only two of the\ncommandments in our Decalogue are positive precepts; the rest are\nprohibitions. The same is true of most early codes. The negative form is\nat once easier and more practical for it requires a mental effort to\nformulate any ideal of human life; it is comparatively easy to note the\nbad things people do, and say, don't. The pruning of the feelings, the\ncutting off of every tendril which can cling to the pleasures of sense,\nis an essential part of that mental cultivation in which the higher\nBuddhism consists. But the Pitakas say clearly that what is to be\neliminated is only bad mental states. Desire for pleasure and striving\nafter wealth are bad, but it does not follow that desire and striving\nare bad in themselves. Desire for what is good (Dhammachando as opposed\nto K\u00e2machando) is itself good, and the effort to obtain nirvana is often\ndescribed as a struggle or wrestling[468]. Similarly though absolute\nindifference to pains and pleasures is the ideal for a Bhikkhu, this by\nno means implies, as is often assumed, a general insensibility and\nindifference, the harmless oyster-like life of one who hurts nobody and\nremains in his own shell. European criticisms on the selfishness and\npessimism of Buddhism forget the cheerfulness and buoyancy which are the\nchief marks of its holy men. The Buddhist saint is essentially one who\nhas freed himself. His first impulse is to rejoice in his freedom and\nshare it with others, not to abuse the fetters he has cut away. Active\nbenevolence and love[469] are enjoined as a duty and praised in language\nof no little beauty and earnestness. In the Itivuttaka[470] the\nfollowing is put into the mouth of Buddha. \"All good works whatever[471]\nare not worth one sixteenth part of love which sets free the heart. Love\nwhich sets free the heart comprises them: it shines, gives light and\nradiance. Just as the light of all the stars is not worth one sixteenth\nof the light of the moon: as in the last month of the rains in the\nseason of autumn, when the sky is clear and cloudless the sun mounts up\non high and overcomes darkness in the firmament: as in the last hour of\nthe night when the dawn is breaking, the morning star shines and gives\nlight and radiance: even so does love which sets free the soul and\ncomprises all good works, shine and give light and radiance.\" So, too,\nthe Sutta-Nip\u00e2ta bids a man love not only his neighbour but all the\nworld. \"As a mother at the risk of her life watches over her own child,\nher only child, so let every one cultivate a boundless love towards all\nbeings[472].\" Nor are such precepts left vague and universal. If some of\nhis acts and words seem wanting in family affection, the Buddha enjoined\nfilial piety as emphatically as Moses or Confucius. There are two\nbeings, he says, namely Father and Mother, who can never be adequately\nrepaid[473]. If a man were to carry his parents about on his shoulders\nfor a hundred years or could give them all the kingdoms and treasures of\nthe earth, he still would not discharge his debt of gratitude[474]. But\nwhereas Confucius said that the good son does not deviate from the way\nof his father, the Buddha, who was by no means conservative in religious\nmatters, said that the only way in which a son could repay his parents\nwas by teaching them the True Law.\n\nThe Buddha defines the sixth section of the path more fully than those\nwhich precede. Right effort, he says, is when a monk makes an effort,\nand strives to prevent evil states of mind from arising: to suppress\nthem if they have arisen: to produce good states of mind, and develop\nand perfect them. Hitherto we have been considering morality,\nindispensable but elementary. This section is the beginning of the\nspecially Buddhist discipline of mental cultivation. The process is apt\nto seem too self-conscious: we wonder if a freer growth would not yield\nbetter fruits. But in a comparison with the similar programmes of other\nreligions Buddhism has little to fear. Its methods are not morbid or\nintrospective: it does not fetter the intellect with the bonds of\nauthority. The disciple has simply to discriminate between good and bad\nthoughts, to develop the one and suppress the other. It is noticeable\nthat under this heading of right effort, or right wrestling as it is\nsometimes called, both desire and striving for good ends are\nconsecrated. Sloth and torpor are as harmful to spiritual progress as\nevil desires and as often reprimanded. Also the aim is not merely\nnegative: it is partly creative. The disciple is not to suppress will\nand feeling, but he is to make all the good in him grow; he should\nfoster, increase and perfect it.\n\nWhat is right-mindfulness[475], the seventh section of the path? It is\n\"When a monk lives as regards the body, observant of the body,\nstrenuous, conscious, mindful and has rid himself of covetousness and\nmelancholy\": and similarly as regards the sensations, the mind and\nphenomena. The importance of this mindfulness is often insisted on. It\namounts to complete self-mastery by means of self-knowledge which allows\nnothing to be done heedlessly and mechanically and controls not merely\nrecognized acts of volition but also those sense-impressions in which we\nare apt to regard the mind as merely receptive. \"Self is the lord of\nself: who else should be the lord? With self well subdued, a man finds a\nlord such as few can find[476].\"\n\nAlthough the Buddha denies that there is any soul or self (att\u00e2) apart\nfrom the skandhas, yet here his ethical system seems to assume that a\nruling principle which may be called self does exist. Nor is the\ndiscrepancy fully explained by saying that the non-existence of self or\nsoul is the correct dogma and that expressions like self being the lord\nof self are concessions to the exigencies of exposition. The evolution\nof the self-controlled saint out of the confused mental states of the\nordinary man is a psychological difficulty. As we shall see, when the\neightfold path has been followed to the end new powers arise in the\nmind, new lights stream into it. Yet if there is no self or soul, where\ndo they arise, into what do they stream?\n\nThe doctrine of Gotama as expressed in his earliest utterance on the\nsubject to the five monks at Benares is that neither the body, nor any\nmental faculty to which a name can be given, is what was called in\nBrahmanic theology \u00e2tman, that is to say an entity which is absolutely\nfree, imperishable, changeless and not subject to pain. This of course\ndoes not exclude the possibility that there may be something which does\nnot come under any of the above categories and which may be such an\nentity as described. Indeed Brahmanic works which teach the existence of\nthe \u00e2tman often use language curiously like that of Buddhism. Thus the\nBhagavad-g\u00eet\u00e2[477] says that actions are performed by the Gunas and only\nhe who is deluded by egoism thinks \"I am the doer.\" And the Vishnu\nPurana objects to the use of personal pronouns. \"When one soul is\ndispersed in all bodies, it is idle to ask who are you, who am I[478]?\"\nThe accounts of the Buddhist higher life would be easier to understand\nif we could suppose that there is such a self: that the pilgrim who is\nwalking in the paths gradually emancipates, develops and builds it up:\nthat it becomes partly free in nirvana before death and wholly free\nafter death. Schrader[479] has pointed out texts in the Pitakas which\nseem to imply that there is something which is absolute and therefore\nnot touched by the doctrine of anatt\u00e2. In a remarkable passage[480] the\nBuddha says: Therefore my disciples get rid of what is not yours. To get\nrid of it will mean your health and happiness for a long time. Form,\nsensation, perception, etc., are not yours; get rid of them. If a man\nwere to take away, or burn, or use for his needs, all the grass, and\nboughs, and branches and leaves in this Jeta wood, would it ever occur\nto you to say, the man is taking _us_ away, burning _us_, or using _us_\nfor his needs? Certainly not, Lord. And why not? Because, Lord, it is\nnot our self or anything belonging to our self. Just in the same way,\nreplies the Buddha, get rid of the skandhas. The natural sense of this\nseems to be that the skandhas have no more to do with the real being of\nman than have the trees of the forest where he happens to be[481]. This\nsuggests that there is in man something real and permanent, to be\ncontrasted with the transitory skandhas and when the Buddha asks whether\nanything which is perishable and changeable can be called the self, he\nseems to imply that there is somewhere such a self. But this point\ncannot be pressed, for it is perfectly logical to define first of all\nwhat you mean by a ghost and then to prove that such a thing does not\nexist. If we take the passages at present collected as a whole, and\nadmit that they are somewhat inconsistent or imperfectly understood, the\nnet result is hardly that the name of self can be given to some part of\nhuman nature which remains when the skandhas are set on one side.\n\nBut though the Buddha denied that there is in man anything permanent\nwhich can be called the self, this does not imply a denial that human\nnature can by mental training be changed into something different,\nsomething infinitely superior to the nature of the ordinary man, perhaps\nsomething other than the skandhas[482]. One of his principal objections\nto the doctrine of the permanent self was that, if it were true,\nemancipation and sanctity would be impossible[483], because human nature\ncould not be changed. In India the doctrine of the \u00e2tman was really\ndangerous, because it led a religious man to suppose that to ensure\nhappiness and emancipation it is only necessary to isolate the \u00e2tman by\nself-mortification and by suppressing discursive thought as well as\npassion. But this, the Buddha teaches, is a capital error. That which\ncan make an end of suffering is not something lurking ready-made in\nhuman nature but something that must be built up: man must be reborn,\nnot flayed and stripped of everything except some core of unchanging\nsoul. As to the nature of this new being the Pitakas are reticent, but\nnot absolutely silent, as we shall see below. Our loose use of language\nmight possibly lead us to call the new being a soul, but it is decidedly\nnot an \u00e2tman, for it is something which has been brought into being by\ndeliberate effort. The collective name for these higher states of mind\nis _pa\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2_[484], wisdom or knowledge. This word is the Pali equivalent\nof the Sanskrit _praj\u00f1\u00e2_ and is interesting as connecting early and\nlater Buddhism, for _praj\u00f1\u00e2_ in the sense of transcendental or absolute\nknowledge plays a great part in Mahayanism and is even personified.\n\nThe Pitakas imply that Buddhas and Arhats can understand things which\nthe ordinary human mind cannot grasp and human words cannot utter. Later\nIndian Buddhists had no scruples in formulating what the master left\nunformulated. They did not venture to use the words \u00e2tman or att\u00e2, but\nthey said that the saint can rise above all difference and plurality,\ntranscend the distinction between subject and object and that nirvana is\nthe absolute (Bh\u00fbtatathat\u00e2). The Buddha would doubtless have objected to\nthis terminology as he objected to all attempts to express the ineffable\nbut perhaps the thought which struggles for expression in such language\nis not far removed from his own thought.\n\nOne of the common Buddhist similes for human life is fire and it is the\nbest simile for illuminating all Buddhist psychology. To insist on\nfinding a soul is like describing flames as substances. Fire is often\nspoken of as an element but it is really a process which cannot be\nisolated or interrupted. A flame is not the same as its fuel and it can\nbe distinguished from other flames. But though you can individualize it\nand propagate it indefinitely, you cannot isolate it from its fuel and\nkeep it by itself. Even so in the human being there is not any soul\nwhich can be isolated and go on living eternally but the analogy of the\nflame still holds good. Unseizable though a flame may be, and\nundefinable as substance, it is not unreasonable to trim a fire and make\na flame rise above its fuel, free from smoke, clear and pure. If it were\na conscious flame, such might be its own ideal.\n\nThe eighth and last section of the path is samm\u00e2-sam\u00e2dhi, right\nconcentration or rapture. Mental concentration is essential to sam\u00e2dhi,\nwhich is the opposite of those wandering desires often blamed as seeking\nfor pleasure here and there. But sam\u00e2dhi is more than mere concentration\nor even meditation and may be rendered by rapture or ecstasy, though\nlike so many technical Buddhist terms it does not correspond exactly to\nany European word. It takes in Buddhism the place occupied in other\nreligions by prayer--prayer, that is, in the sense of ecstatic communion\nwith the divine being. The sermon[485] which the Buddha preached to King\nAj\u00e2tasattu on the fruits of the life of a recluse gives an eloquent\naccount of the joys of sam\u00e2dhi. He describes how a monk[486] seats\nhimself in the shade of a tree or in some mountain glen and then\n\"keeping his body erect and his intelligence alert and intent\" purifies\nhis mind from all lust, ill-temper, sloth, fretfulness and perplexity.\nWhen these are gone, he is like a man freed from jail or debt, gladness\nrises in his heart and he passes successively through four stages of\nmeditation[487]. Then his whole mind and even his body is permeated with\na feeling of purity and peace. He concentrates his thoughts and is able\nto apply them to such great matters as he may select. He may revel in\nthe enjoyment of supernatural powers, for we cannot deny that the oldest\ndocuments which we possess credit the sage with miraculous gifts, though\nthey attach little importance to them, or he may follow the train of\nthought which led the Buddha himself to enlightenment. He thinks of his\nprevious births and remembers them as clearly as a man who has been a\nlong walk remembers at the end of the day the villages through which he\nhas passed. He thinks of the birth and deaths of other beings and sees\nthem as plainly as a man on the top of a house sees the people moving in\nthe streets below. He realizes the full significance of the four truths\nand he understands the origin and cessation of the three great evils,\nlove of pleasure, love of existence and ignorance. And when he thus sees\nand knows, his heart is set free. \"And in him thus set free there arises\nthe knowledge of his freedom and he knows that rebirth has been\ndestroyed, the higher life has been led, what had to be done has been\ndone. He has no more to do with this life. Just as if in a mountain\nfastness there were a pool of water, clear, translucent and serene and a\nman standing on the bank and with eyes to see should perceive the\nmussels and the shells, the gravel and pebbles and the shoals of fish as\nthey move about or lie within it.\"\n\nSimilar accounts occur in many other passages with variations in the\nnumber of stages described. We must not therefore insist on the details\nas essential. But in all cases the process is marked by mental activity.\nThe meditations of Indian recluses are often described as\nself-hypnotism, and I shall say something on this point elsewhere, but\nit is clear that in giving the above account the Buddha did not\ncontemplate any mental condition in which the mind ceases to be active\nor master of itself. When, at the beginning, the monk sits down to\nmeditate it is \"with intelligence alert and intent\": in the last stage\nhe has the sense of freedom, of duty done, and of knowledge immediate\nand unbounded, which sees the whole world spread below like a clear pool\nin which every fish and pebble is visible.\n\n\n6\n\nWith this stage he attains Nirv\u00e2na[488], the best known word and the\nmost difficult to explain in all the vocabulary of Buddhism.\n\nIt is perhaps used more by western students than by oriental believers\nand it belongs to the same department of religious language as the word\nsaint. For most Christians there is something presumptuous in trying to\nbe a saint or in defining the precise form of bliss enjoyed by saints in\nheaven and it is the same with nirvana. Yet no one denies that sanctity\nand nirvana are religious ideals. In a passage already quoted[489],\nGotama described how in attaining Buddhahood he sought and arrived at\nthe incomparable security of nirvana in which there is no birth, age,\nsickness, death, pain or defilement. This, confirmed by many other\nstatements, shows that nirvana is a state attainable in this existence\nand compatible with a life of intellectual and physical exertion such as\nhe himself led. The original meaning is the state of peace and happiness\nin which the fires of lust, hatred and stupidity are extinguished and\nthe participle _nibbuto_ apparently derived from the same root had\npassed into popular language in the sense of happy[490]. Two forms of\nnirvana are distinguished. The first is up\u00e2di-sesa-nibb\u00e2nam[491] or\nnirvana in which the skandhas remain, although passion is destroyed.\nThis state is also called arhatship, the condition of an arhat, meaning\noriginally a worthy or venerable man, and the person enjoying it is\nalive. The idea that the emancipated saint who has attained the goal\nstill lingers in the world, though no longer of the world, and teaches\nothers, is common to all Indian religions. With the death of an arhat\ncomes the state known as an-up\u00e2di-sesa-nibb\u00e2nam in which no skandhas\nremain. It is also called Parinibb\u00e2nam and this word and the participle\nparinibbuto are frequently used with special reference to the death of\nthe Buddha[492]. The difference between the two forms of nirvana is\nimportant though the second is only the continuation of the first.\nNirvana in this life admits of approximate definition: it is the goal of\nthe religious life, though only the elect can even enter the struggle.\nNirvana after death is not a goal in the same sense. The correct\ndoctrine is rather that death is indifferent to one who has obtained\nnirvana and the difficulty of defining his nature after death does not\nmean that he has been striving for something inexplicable and illusory.\n\nArhatship is the aim and sum of the Buddha's teaching: it is associated\nin many passages with love for others, with wisdom, and happiness and is\na condition of perfection attainable in this life. The passages in the\nPitakas which seem to be the oldest and the most historical suggest that\nthe success of the Buddha was due to the fact that he substituted for\nthe chilly ideal of the Indian Munis something more inspiring and more\nvisibly fruitful, something akin to what Christ called the Kingdom of\nHeaven. Thus we are told in the Vinaya that Bhaddiya was found sitting\nat the foot of a tree and exclaiming ecstatically, O happiness,\nhappiness. When asked the reason of these ejaculations, he replied that\nformerly when he was a raja he was anxious and full of fear but that\nnow, even when alone in the forest, he had become tranquil and calm,\n\"with mind as peaceful as an antelope's.\"\n\nNirvana is frequently described by such adjectives as deathless, endless\nand changeless. These epithets seem to apply to the quality, not to the\nduration of the arhat's existence (for they refer to the time before the\ndeath of the body) and to signify that in the state which he has\nattained death and change have no power over him. He may suffer in body\nbut he does not suffer in mind, for he does not identify himself with\nthe body or its feelings[493].\n\nNumerous passages could be quoted from the poetical books of the Pali\nCanon to the effect that nirvana is happiness and the same is stated in\nthe more dogmatic and logical portions. Thus we hear of the bliss of\nemancipation and of the happiness which is based on the religious\nlife[494] and the words \"Nirvana is the greatest happiness\" are put into\nGotama's own mouth[495]. The middle way preached by him is declared to\nbe free from all distress, and those who walk in it make an end of pain\neven in this life[496]. In one passage[497] Gotama is found meditating\nin a wood one winter night and is asked if he feels well and happy. The\nnight is cold, his seat is hard, his clothes are light and the wind\nbitter. He replies emphatically that he is happy. Those who live in\ncomfortable houses suffer from the evils of lust, hatred and stupidity\nbut he has made an end of those evils and therefore is happy. Thus\nnirvana is freedom and joy: it is not extinction in the sense we give\nthe word but light to them that sit in darkness, release to those in\nprison and torture. But though it is legitimately described in terms\nwhich imply positive happiness it transcends all human standards of good\nand evil, pleasure and pain. In describing the progress to it we\nall--whether Indians or Europeans--necessarily use such words as better,\nhigher, happier, but in truth it is not to be expressed in terms of such\nvalues. In an interesting sutta[498] a Jain argues that happiness is the\ngoal of life. But the Buddha states categorically first that perfect\nhappiness is only attainable by abandoning the conscious pursuit of\nhappiness and secondly that even absolute happiness when attained is not\nthe highest goal: there is a better state beyond, and that state is\ncertainly not annihilation or extinction of feeling, for it is described\nin terms of freedom and knowledge.\n\nThe Dhamma-sangani speaks of Nirvana as the Uncompounded Element[499]\nand as a state not productive of good or evil. Numerous assertions[500]\nare made about it incidentally but, though we hear that it is perfected\nand supramundane, most of the epithets are negative and amount to little\nmore than that it transcends, or is absolutely detached from, all human\nexperience. Uncompounded (asankhato) may refer to the passing away of\nall sankh\u00e2ras but what may be the meaning of dh\u00e2tu or element in this\ncontext, I do not presume to conjecture. But whatever else the word may\nmean, it clearly does not signify annihilation. Both here and in the\nQuestions of Milinda an impression is produced in the mind of the\nreader, and perhaps was not absent in the mind of the writer, that\nnirvana is a sphere or plane of existence resembling though excelling\nspace or ether. It is true that the language when carefully examined\nproves to be cautious and to exclude material interpretations but\nclearly the expositor when trying to make plain the inexplicable leaned\nto that side of error rather than towards annihilation[501].\n\nSomewhat similar is the language attributed to the Buddha in the\nUd\u00e2na[502]. \"There is a state (\u00e2yatanam) where there is neither earth\nnor water, fire nor air, nor infinity either of space or of\nconsciousness, nor nothingness, nor the absence of perception or\nnon-perception[503], neither this world nor another, neither sun nor\nmoon. That I call neither coming, going, nor standing, neither death nor\nbirth. It is without stability, without movement, without basis: it is\nthe end of sorrow, unborn, unoriginated, uncreated, uncompounded[504].\"\nThe statements about nirvana in the Questions of Milinda are definite\nand interesting. In this work[505], N\u00e2gasena tells King Milinda that\nthere are two things which are not the result of a cause, to wit space\nand Nirvana. Nirvana is unproduceable (which does not mean unattainable)\nwithout origin, not made of anything and uncompounded. He who orders his\nlife aright passes beyond the transitory, and gains the Real, the\nhighest fruit. And when he has gained that, he has realized\nNirvana[506].\n\nThe parts of the Pitakas which seem oldest leave the impression that\nthose who heard and understood the Buddha's teaching at once attained\nthis blissful state, just as the Church regards the disciples of Christ\nas saints. But already in the Pitakas[507] we find the idea that the\nstruggle to obtain nirvana extends over several births and that there\nare four routes leading to sanctification. These routes are described by\nthe names of those who use them and are commonly defined in terms of\nrelease from the ten fetters binding man to the world[508]. The first is\nthe Sot\u00e2panno, he who has entered into the stream and is on his way to\nsalvation. He has broken the first three fetters called belief in the\nexistence of self, doubt, and trust in ceremonies or good works. He will\nbe born again on earth or in some heaven but not more than seven times\nbefore he attains nirvana. He who enters on the next stage is called\nSakad\u00e2g\u00e2min or coming once, because he will be born once more in this\nworld[509] and in that birth attain nirvana. He has broken the fetters\nmentioned and also reduced to a minimum the next two, lust and hate. The\nAn\u00e2g\u00e2min, or he who does not return, has freed himself entirely from\nthese five fetters and will not be reborn on earth or any sensuous\nheaven but in a Brahm\u00e2 world once only. The fourth route is that of the\nArhat who has completed his release by breaking the bonds called love of\nlife, pride, self-righteousness and ignorance and has made an end of all\nevil and impurity. He attains nirvana here and is no more subject to\nrebirth. This simple and direct route is the one contemplated in the\nolder discourses but later doctrine and popular feeling came to regard\nit as more and more unusual, just as saints grow fewer as the centuries\nadvance further from the Apostolic age. In the dearth of visible Arhats\nit was consoling to think that nirvana could be won in other worlds.\n\nThe nirvana hitherto considered is that attained by a being living in\nthis or some other world. But all states of existence whatever come to\nan end. When one who has not attained nirvana dies, he is born again.\nBut what happens when an Arhat or a Buddha dies? This question did not\nfail to arouse interest during the Buddha's lifetime yet in the Pitakas\nthe discussion, though it could not be stifled, is relegated to the\nbackground and brought forward only to be put aside as unpractical. The\ngreatest teachers of religion--Christ as well as Buddha--have shown little\ndisposition to speak of what follows on death. For them the centre of\ngravity is on this side of the grave not on the other: the all important\nthing is to live a religious life, at the end of which death is met\nfearlessly as an incident of little moment. The Kingdom of Heaven, of\nwhich Christ speaks, begins on earth though it may end elsewhere. In the\nGospels we hear something of the second coming of Christ and the\nJudgment: hardly anything of the place and character of the soul's\neternal life. We only gather that a child of God who has done his best\nneed have no apprehension in this or another world. Though expressed in\nvery different phraseology, something like that is the gist of what the\nBuddha teaches about the dying Saint. But this reticent attitude did not\nsatisfy ancient India any more than it satisfies modern Europe and we\nhave the record of how he was questioned and what he said in reply.\nWithin certain limits that reply is quite definite. The question, does\nthe Tath\u00e2gata, that is the Buddha or perfected saint, exist after death,\nwhich is the phraseology usually employed by the Pitakas in formulating\nthe problem, belongs to the class of questions called not declared or\nundetermined[510], because they do not admit of either an affirmative or\na negative answer. Other problems belonging to this class are: Is the\nworld eternal or not: Is the world infinite or not: Is the soul[511] the\nsame as the body or different from it? It is categorically asserted that\nnone of these questions admit of a reply: thus it is not right to say\nthat _(a)_ the saint exists after death, _(b)_ or that he does not\nexist, _(c)_ or that he both does and does not exist, _(d)_ or that he\nneither exists nor does not exist. The Buddha's teaching about these\nproblems is stated with great clearness in a Sutta named after\nM\u00e2lunkyaputta[512], an enquirer who visits him and after enumerating\nthem says frankly that he is dissatisfied because the Buddha will not\nanswer them. \"If the Lord answers them, I will lead a religious life\nunder him, but if he does not answer them, I will give up religion and\nreturn to the world. But if the Lord does not know, then the\nstraightforward thing is to say, I do not know.\" This is plain speaking,\nalmost discourtesy. The Buddha's reply is equally plain, but unyielding.\n\"Have I said to you, come and be my disciple and I will teach you\nwhether the world is eternal or not, infinite or not: whether the soul\nis identical with the body, or separate, whether the saint exists after\ndeath or not?\" \"No, Lord.\" \"Now suppose a man were wounded by a poisoned\narrow and his friends called in a physician to dress his wound. What if\nthe man were to say, I shall not have my wound treated until I know what\nwas the caste, the family, the dwelling-place, the complexion and\nstature of the man who wounded me; nor shall I let the arrow be drawn\nout until I know what is the exact shape of the arrow and bow, and what\nwere the animals and plants which supplied the feathers, leather, shaft\nand string. The man would never learn all that, because he would die\nfirst.\" \"Therefore\" is the conclusion, \"hold what I have determined as\ndetermined and what I have not determined, as not determined.\"\n\nThis sutta may be taken in connection with passages asserting that the\nBuddha knows more than he tells his disciples. The result seems to be\nthat there are certain questions which the human mind and human language\nhad better leave alone because we are incapable of taking or expressing\na view sufficiently large to be correct, but that the Buddha has a more\nthan human knowledge which he does not impart because it is not\nprofitable and overstrains the faculties, just as it is no part of a\ncure that the patient should make an exhaustive study of his disease.\n\nWith reference to the special question of the existence of the saint\nafter death, the story of Yamaka[513] is important. He maintained that a\nmonk in whom evil is destroyed (kh\u00een\u00e2savo) is annihilated when he dies,\nand does not exist. This was considered a grave heresy and refuted by\nS\u00e2riputta who argues that even in this life the nature of a saint passes\nunderstanding because he is neither all the skandhas taken together nor\nyet one or more of them.\n\nYet it would seem that according to the psychology of the Pitakas an\nordinary human being is an aggregate of the skandhas and nothing more.\nWhen such a being dies and in popular language is born again, the\nskandhas reconstitute themselves but it is expressly stated that when\nthe saint dies this does not happen. The Chain of Causation says that\nconsciousness and the sankh\u00e2ras are interdependent. If there is no\nrebirth, it is because (as it would seem) there are in the dying saint\nno sankh\u00e2ras. His nature cannot be formulated in the same terms as the\nnature of an ordinary man. It may be noted that karma is not equivalent\nto the effect produced on the world by a man's words and deeds, for if\nthat were so, no one would have died leaving more karma behind him than\nthe Buddha himself, yet according to Hindu doctrine, whether Buddhist or\nBrahmanic, no karma attaches to the deeds of a saint. His acts may\naffect others but there is nothing in them which tends to create a new\nexistence.\n\nIn another dialogue[514] the Buddha replies to a wandering monk called\nVaccha who questioned him about the undetermined problems and in answer\nto every solution suggested says that he does not hold that view. Vaccha\nasks what objection he has to these theories that he has not adopted any\nof them?\n\n\"Vaccha, the theory that the saint exists (or does not exist and so on)\nafter death is a jungle, a desert, a puppet show, a writhing, an\nentanglement and brings with it sorrow, anger, wrangling and agony. It\ndoes not conduce to distaste for the world, to the absence of passion,\nto the cessation of evil, to peace, to knowledge, to perfect\nenlightenment, to nirvana. Perceiving this objection, I have not adopted\nany of these theories.\" \"Then has Gotama any theory of his own?\"\n\"Vaccha, the Tath\u00e2gata has nothing to do with theories, but this is what\nhe knows: the nature of form, how form arises, how form perishes: the\nnature of perception, how it arises and how it perishes (and so on with\nthe other skandhas). Therefore I say that the Tath\u00e2gata is emancipated\nbecause he has completely and entirely abandoned all imaginations,\nagitations and false notions about the Ego and anything pertaining to\nthe Ego.\" But, asks Vaccha, when one who has attained this emancipation\nof mind dies where is he reborn? \"Vaccha, the word 'reborn' does not fit\nthe case.\" \"Then, Gotama, he is not reborn.\" \"To say he is not reborn\ndoes not fit the case, nor is it any better to say he is both reborn and\nnot reborn or that he is neither reborn nor not reborn.\" \"Really,\nGotama, I am completely bewildered and my faith in you is gone.\"\n\n\"Never mind your bewilderment. This doctrine is profound and difficult.\nSuppose there was a fire in front of you. You would see it burning and\nknow that its burning depended on fuel. And if it went out (nibb\u00e2yeyya)\nyou would know that it had gone out. But if some one were to ask you, to\nwhich quarter has it gone, East, West, North or South, what would you\nsay?\"\n\n\"The expression does not fit the case, Gotama. For the fire depended on\nfuel and when the fuel is gone it is said to be extinguished, being\nwithout nourishment.\"\n\n\"In just the same way, all form by which one could predicate the\nexistence of the saint is abandoned and uprooted like a fan palm[515],\nso that it will never grow up in future. The saint who is released from\nwhat is styled form is deep, immeasurable, hard to fathom, like the\ngreat ocean. It does not fit the case to say either that he is reborn,\nnot reborn, both reborn and not reborn, or neither reborn nor not\nreborn.\" Exactly the same statement is then repeated four times the\nwords sensation, perception, sankh\u00e2ras and consciousness being\nsubstituted successively for the word form. Vaccha, we are told, was\nsatisfied.\n\nTo appreciate properly the Buddha's simile we must concentrate our\nattention on the fire. When we apply this metaphor to annihilation, we\nusually think of the fuel or receptacle and our mind dwells sadly on the\nheap of ashes or the extinguished lamp. But what has become of the fire?\nIt is hardly correct to say that it has been destroyed. If a particular\nfire may be said to be annihilated in the sense that it is impossible to\nreconstitute it by repeating the same process of burning, the reason is\nnot so much that we cannot get the same flames as that we cannot burn\nthe same fuel twice. But so long as there is continuous combustion in\nthe same fireplace or pile of fuel, we speak of the same fire although\nneither the flame nor the fuel remains the same. When combustion ceases,\nthe fire goes out in popular language. To what quarter does it go? That\nquestion clearly does not \"fit the case.\" But neither does it fit the\ncase to say that the fire is annihilated[516].\n\nNirvana is the cessation of a process not the annihilation of an\nexistence. If I take a walk, nothing is annihilated when the walk comes\nto an end: a particular form of action has ceased. Strictly speaking the\ncase of a fire is the same: when it goes out a process ceases. For the\nordinary man nirvana is annihilation in the sense that it is the absence\nof all the activities which he considers desirable. But for the arhat\n(who is the only person able to judge) nirvana after death, as compared\nwith nirvana in life, may be quiescence and suspension of activity, only\nthat such phrases seem to imply that activity is the right and normal\ncondition, quiescence being negative and unnatural, whereas for an arhat\nthese values are reversed.\n\nWe may use too the parallel metaphor of water. A wave cannot become an\nimmortal personality. It may have an indefinitely long existence as it\nmoves across the ocean, although both its shape and substance are\nconstantly changing, and when it breaks against an obstacle the\nresultant motion may form new waves. And if a wave ceases to struggle\nfor individual existence and differentiation from the surrounding sea,\nit cannot be said to exist any more as a wave. Yet neither the water\nwhich was its substance nor the motion which impelled it have been\nannihilated. It is not even quite correct to say that it has been merged\nin the sea. A drop of water added to a larger liquid mass is merged. The\nwave simply ceases to be active and differentiated.\n\nIn the Samyutta-Nik\u00e2ya[517] the Buddha's statement that the saint after\ndeath is deep and immeasurable like the ocean is expanded by significant\nillustration of the mathematician's inability to number the sand or\nexpress the sea in terms of liquid measure. It is in fact implied that\nif we cannot say _he is_, this is only because that word cannot properly\nbe applied to the infinite, innumerable and immeasurable.\n\nThe point which is clearest in the Buddha's treatment of this question\nis that whatever his disciples may have thought, he did not himself\nconsider it of importance for true religion. Speculation on such points\nmay be interesting to the intellect but is not edifying. It is a jungle\nwhere the traveller wanders without advancing, and a puppet-show, a vain\nworldly amusement which wears a false appearance of religion because it\nis diverting itself with quasi-religious problems. What is the state of\nthe saint after death, is not as people vainly suppose a question\nparallel to, am I going to heaven or hell, what shall I do to be saved?\nTo those questions the Buddha gives but one answer in terms of human\nlanguage and human thought, namely, attain to nirvana and arhatship on\nthis side of death, if possible in your present existence; if not now,\nthen in the future good existences which you can fashion for yourself.\nWhat lies beyond is impracticable as a goal, unprofitable as a subject\nof speculation. We shall probably not be transgressing the limits of\nGotama's thought if we add that those who are not arhats are bound to\napproach the question with misconception and it is a necessary part of\nan Arhat's training to get rid of the idea \"I am[518].\" The state of a\nSaint after death cannot be legitimately described in language which\nsuggests that it is a fuller and deeper mode of life[519]. Yet it is\nclear that nearly all who dispute about it wish to make out that it is a\nstate they could somehow regard with active satisfaction. In technical\nlanguage they are infected with ar\u00fbpar\u00e2go, or desire for life in a\nformless world, and this is the seventh of the ten fetters, all of which\nmust be broken before arhatship is attained. I imagine that those modern\nsects, such as the Zen in Japan, which hold that the deepest mysteries\nof the faith cannot be communicated in words but somehow grow clear in\nmeditation are not far from the master's teaching, though to the best of\nmy belief no passage has been produced from the Pitakas stating that an\narahat has special knowledge about the avy\u00e2kat\u00e2ni or undetermined\nquestions.\n\nAlmost all who treat of nirvana after death try to make the Buddha say,\nis or is not. That is what he refused to do. We still want a plain\nanswer to a plain question and insist that he really means either that\nthe saint is annihilated or enters on an infinite existence. But the\ntrue analogues to this question are the other insoluble questions, for\ninstance, is the world infinite or finite in space? This is in form a\nsimple physical problem, yet it is impossible for the mind to conceive\neither an infinite world or a world stopping abruptly with not even\nspace beyond. A common answer to this antinomy is that the mind is\nattempting to deal with a subject with which it is incompetent to deal,\nthat the question is wrongly formulated and that every answer to it thus\nformulated must be wrong. The way of truth lies in first finding the\ntrue question. The real difficulty of the Buddha's teaching, though it\ndoes not stimulate curiosity so much as the question of life after\ndeath, is the nature and being of the saint in this life before death,\nraised in the argument with Yamaka[520].\n\nAnother reason for not pressing the Buddha's language in either\ndirection is that, if he had wished to preach in the subtlest form\neither infinite life or annihilation, he would have found minds\naccustomed to the ideas and a vocabulary ready for his use. If he had\nwished to indicate any form of absorption into a universal soul, or the\nacquisition by the individual self of the knowledge that it is identical\nwith the universal self, he could easily have done so. But he studiously\navoided saying anything of the kind. He teaches that all existence\ninvolves suffering and he preaches escape from it. After that escape the\nwords being and not being no longer apply, and the reason why some\npeople adopt the false idea of annihilation is because they have\ncommenced by adopting the false alternative of either annihilation or an\neternal prolongation of this life. A man makes[521] himself miserable\nbecause he thinks he has lost something or that there is something which\nhe cannot get. But if he does not think he has lost something or is\ndeprived of something he might have, then he does not feel miserable.\nSimilarly, a man holds the erroneous opinion, \"This world is the self,\nor soul and I shall become it after death and be eternal, and\nunchanging.\" Then he hears the preaching of a Buddha and he thinks \"I\nshall be annihilated, I shall not exist any more,\" and he feels\nmiserable. But if a man does not hold this doctrine that the soul is\nidentical with the universe and will exist eternally--which is just\ncomplete full-blown folly[522]--and then hears the preaching of a Buddha\nit does not occur to him to think that he will be annihilated and he is\nnot miserable. Here the Buddha emphasizes the fact that his teaching is\nnot a variety of the Brahmanic doctrine about the \u00c2tman. Shortly\nafterwards in the same sutta he even more emphatically says that he does\nnot teach annihilation. He teaches that the saint is already in this\nlife inconceivable (_ananuvejjo_): \"And when I teach and explain this\nsome accuse me falsely and without the smallest ground[523] saying\n'Gotama is an unbeliever; he preaches the annihilation, the destruction,\nthe dying out of real being.' When they talk like this they accuse me of\nbeing what I am not, of saying what I do not say.\"\n\nThough the Buddha seems to condemn by anticipation the form of the\nVedanta known as the Advaita, this philosophy illustrates the difficulty\nof making any statement about the saint after his death. For it teaches\nthat the saint knows that there is but one reality, namely Brahman, and\nthat all individual existences are illusion: he is aware that he is\nBrahman and that he is not differentiated from the world around him. And\nwhen he dies, what happens? Metaphors about drops and rivers are not\nreally to the point. It would be more correct to say that nothing at all\nhas happened. His physical life, an illusion which did not exist for\nhimself, has ceased to exist for others.\n\nPerhaps he will be nearest to the Buddha's train of thought who attempts\nto consider, by reflection rather than by discussion in words, what is\nmeant by annihilation. By thinking of the mystery of existence and\nrealizing how difficult it is to explain how and why anything exists, we\nare apt to slip into thinking that it would be quite natural and\nintelligible if nothing existed or if existing things became nothing.\nYet as a matter of fact our minds have no experience of this nothing of\nwhich we talk and it is inconceivable. When we try to think of\nnothingness we really think of space from which we try to remove all\ncontent, yet could we create an absolute vacuum within a vessel, the\ninterior of the vessel would not be annihilated. The man who has\nattained nirvana cannot be adequately defined or grasped even in this\nlife: what binds him to being is cut[524] but it is inappropriate and\ninadequate to say that he has become nothing[525].\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI\n\nMONKS AND LAYMEN\n\n1\n\n\nThe great practical achievement of the Buddha was to found a religious\norder which has lasted to the present day. It is known as the Sangha and\nits members are called Bhikkhus[526]. It is chiefly to this institution\nthat the permanence of his religion is due.\n\nCorporations or confraternities formed for the purpose of leading a\nparticular form of life are among the most widespread manifestations, if\nnot of primitive worship, at any rate of that stage in which it passes\ninto something which can be called personal religion and at least three\ncauses contribute to their formation. First, early institutions were\nnarrower and more personal than those of to-day. In politics as well as\nreligion such relatively broad designations as Englishman or Frenchman,\nBuddhist or Christian, imply a slowly widening horizon gained by\ncenturies of cooperation and thought. In the time of the Buddha such\nnational and religious names did not exist. People belonged to a clan or\nserved some local prince. Similarly in religious matters they followed\nsome teacher or worshipped some god, and in either case if they were in\nearnest they tended to become members of a society. Societies such as\nthe Pythagorean and Orphic brotherhoods were also common in Greece from\nthe sixth century B.C. onwards but the result was small, for the genius\nof the Greeks turned towards politics and philosophy. But in India,\nwhere politics had strangely little attraction for the cultured classes,\nenergy and intelligence found an outlet in the religious life and\ncreated a multitude of religious societies. Even to-day Hinduism has no\none creed or code and those who take a serious interest in religion are\nnot merely Hindus but follow some sect which, without damning what it\ndoes not adopt, selects its own dogmas and observances. This is not\nsectarianism in the sense of schism. It is merely the desire to have for\noneself some personal, intimate religious life. Even in so\nuncompromising and levelling a creed as Islam the devout often follow\nspecial _tariqs_, that is, roads or methods of the devotional life, and\nthese _tariqs_, though differing more than the various orders of the\nRoman Catholic Church, are not regarded as sects distinct from ordinary\northodoxy. When Christ died, Christianity was not much more than such a\n_tariq_. It was an incipient religious order which had not yet broken\nwith Judaism.\n\nThis idea of the private, even secret religious body is closely allied\nto another, namely, that family life and worldly business are\nincompatible with the quest for higher things. In early ages only\npriests and consecrated persons are expected to fast and practise\nchastity but when once the impression prevails that such observances not\nonly achieve particular ends but produce wiser, happier, or more\npowerful lives, then they are likely to be followed by considerable\nnumbers of the more intelligent, emotional and credulous sections of the\npopulation. The early Christian Church was influenced by the idea that\nthe world is given over to Satan and that he who would save himself must\ndisown it. The gentler Hindus were actuated by two motives. First, more\nthan other races, they felt the worry and futility of worldly life.\nSecondly, they had a deep-rooted belief that miraculous powers could be\nacquired by self-mortification and the sensations experienced by those\nwho practised fasting and trances confirmed this belief.\n\nThe third cause for the foundation and increase of religious orders is a\nperception of the influence which they can exercise. The disciples of a\nmaster or the priests of a god, if numerous and organized, clearly\npossess a power analogous to that of an army. To use such institutions\nfor the service and protection of the true faith is an obvious expedient\nof the zealot: ecclesiastical statecraft and ambition soon make their\nappearance in most orders founded for the assistance of the Church\nmilitant. But of this spirit Buddhism has little to show; except in\nTibet and Japan it is almost absent. The ideal of the Buddha lay within\nhis order and was to be realized in the life of the members. They had no\nneed to strive after any extraneous goal.\n\nThe Sangha, as this order was called, arose naturally out of the social\nconditions of India in the time of Gotama. It was considered proper that\nan earnest-minded man should renounce the world and become a wanderer.\nIn doing this and in collecting round him a band of disciples who had a\ncommon mode of life Gotama created nothing new. He merely did with\nconspicuous success what every contemporary teacher was doing. The\nconfraternity which he founded differed from others chiefly in being\nbroader and more human, less prone to extravagances and better\norganized. As we read the accounts in the Pitakas, its growth seems so\nsimple and spontaneous that no explanation is necessary. Disciples\ngather round the master and as their numbers increase he makes a few\nsalutary regulations. It is almost with surprise that we find the result\nto be an organization which became one of the great forces of the world.\n\nThe Buddha said that he taught a middle path equally distant from luxury\nand from self-mortification, but Europeans are apt to be struck by his\ncondemnation of pleasure and to be repelled by a system which suppresses\nso many harmless activities. But contemporary opinion in India\ncriticized his discipline as easy-going and lax. We frequently hear in\nthe Vinaya that the people murmured and said his disciples behaved like\nthose who still enjoy the good things of the world. Some, we are told,\ntried to enter the order merely to secure a comfortable existence[527].\nIt is clear that he went to the extreme limits which public opinion\nallowed in dispensing with the rigours considered necessary to the\nreligious life, and we shall best understand his spirit if we fix our\nattention not so much on the regime, to our way of thinking austere,\nwhich he prescribed--the single meal a day and so on--as on his insistence\nthat what is necessary is emancipation of heart and mind and the\ncultivation of love and knowledge, all else being a matter of\nindifference. Thus he says to the ascetic Kassapa[528] that though a man\nperform all manner of penances, yet if he has not attained the bliss\nwhich comes of good conduct, a good heart and good mind, he is far from\nbeing a true monk. But when he has the heart of love that knows no anger\nnor ill-will, when he has destroyed lust and become emancipated even\nbefore death, then he deserves the name of monk. It is a common thing to\nsay, he goes on, that it is hard to lead the life of a monk. But\nasceticism is comparatively easy; what is really hard is the conversion\nand emancipation of the heart.\n\nIn India, where the proclivity to asceticism and self-torture is\nendemic, it was only natural that penance should in very truth seem\neasier and more satisfactory than this spiritual discipline. It won more\nrespect and doubtless seemed more tangible and definite, more like what\nthe world expected from a holy man. Accordingly we find that efforts\nwere made by Devadatta and others to induce the Buddha to increase the\nseverity of his discipline. But he refused[529]. The more ascetic form\nof life, which he declined to make obligatory, is described in the rules\nknown as Dhut\u00e2ngas, of which twelve or thirteen are enumerated. They are\npartly a stricter form of the ordinary rules about food and dress and\npartly refer to the life of a hermit who lives in the woods or in a\ncemetery.\n\nIn the Pitakas[530] Kassapa's disciples are described as _dhutav\u00e2d\u00e2_ and\nthe advantages arising from the observance of the Dhut\u00e2ngas are\nenumerated in the Questions of Milinda. It is probable that the Buddha\nhimself had little sympathy with them. He was at any rate anxious that\nthey should not degenerate into excesses. Thus he forbade[531] his\ndisciples to spend the season of the rains in a hollow tree, or in a\nplace where dead bodies are kept, or to use an alms bowl made out of a\nskull. Now Kassapa had been a Brahman ascetic and it is probable that in\ntolerating the Dhut\u00e2ngas the Buddha merely intended to allow him and his\nfollowers to continue the practices to which they were accustomed. They\nwere an influential body and he doubtless desired their adhesion, for he\nwas sensitive to public opinion[532] and anxious to conform to it when\nconformity involved no sacrifice of principle. We hear repeatedly that\nthe laity complained of some practice of his Bhikkhus and that when the\ncomplaint was brought to his ears he ordered the objectionable practice\nto cease. Once the king of Magadha asked the congregation to postpone\nthe period of retreat during the rains until the next full moon day.\nThey referred the matter to the Buddha: \"I prescribe that you obey\nkings,\" was his reply.\n\nOne obvious distinction between the Buddha's disciples and other\nconfraternities was that they were completely clad, whereas the\n\u00c2j\u00eevikas, Jains and others went about naked. The motive for this rule\nwas no doubt decency and a similar thought made Gotama insist on the use\nof a begging bowl, whereas some sectaries collected scraps of food in\ntheir hands. Such extravagances led to abuses resembling the degradation\nof some modern fakirs. Even the Jain scriptures admit that pious\nhouseholders were disgusted by the ascetics who asked for a lodging in\ntheir houses--naked, unwashed men, foul to smell and loathsome to\nbehold[533]. This was the sort of life which the Buddha called anariyam,\nignoble or barbaric. With such degradation of humanity he would have\nnothing to do. He forbade nakedness, as well as garments of hair and\nother uncomfortable costumes. The raiment which he prescribed consisted\nof three pieces of cloth of the colour called k\u00e2s\u00e2va. This was probably\ndull orange, selected as being unornamental. It would appear that in\nmedi\u00e6val India the colour in use was reddish: at present a rather bright\nand not unpleasing yellow is worn in Burma, Ceylon, Siam and Camboja.\nOriginally the robes were made of rags collected and sewed together but\nit soon became the practice for pious laymen to supply the Order with\nraiment.\n\n\n2\n\nIn the Mah\u00e2 and Culla-vaggas of the Vinaya Pitaka we possess a large\ncollection of regulations purporting to be issued by the Buddha for the\nguidance of the Order on such subjects as ceremonial, discipline,\nclothes, food, furniture and medicine. The arrangement is roughly\nchronological. Gotama starts as a new teacher, without either followers\nor a code. As disciples multiply the need for regulations and uniformity\nof life is felt. Each incident and difficulty that arises is reported to\nhim and he defines the correct practice. One may suspect that many\nusages represented as originating in the injunctions of the master\nreally grew up gradually. But the documents are ancient; they date from\nthe generations immediately following the Buddha's death, and their\naccount of his activity as an organizer is probably correct in\nsubstance. One of the first reasons which rendered regulations necessary\nwas the popularity of the order and the respect which it enjoyed. King\nBimbis\u00e2ra of Magadha is represented as proclaiming that \"It is not\npermitted to do anything to those who join the order of the\nSakyaputtiya[534].\" Hence robbers[535], debtors, slaves, soldiers\nanxious to escape service and others who wished for protection against\nthe law or merely to lead an idle life, desired to avail themselves of\nthese immunities. This resulted in the gradual elaboration of a code of\ndiscipline which did much to secure that only those actuated by proper\nmotives could enter the order and only those who conducted themselves\nproperly could stay within it.\n\nWe find traces of a distinction between those Bhikkhus who were hermits\nand lived solitary lives in the woods and those who moved about in\nbands, frequenting rest houses. In the time of the Buddha the wandering\nlife was a reality but later most monks became residents in monasteries.\nAlready in the Vinaya we seem to breathe the atmosphere of large\nconventual establishments where busy superintendents see to the lodging\nand discipline of crowds of monks, and to the distribution of the gifts\nmade by pious laymen. But the Buddha himself knew the value of forests\nand plant life for calming and quickening the mind. \"Here are trees,\" he\nwould say to his disciples at the end of a lecture, \"go and think it\nout[536].\"\n\nIn the poetical books of the Tripitaka, especially the collections known\nas the Songs of the Monks and Nuns, this feeling is still stronger: we\nare among anchorites who pass their time in solitary meditation in the\ndepths of forests or on mountain tops and have a sense of freedom and a\njoy in the life of wild things not found in cloisters. These old monkish\npoems are somewhat wearisome as continuous reading, but their monotonous\nenthusiasm about the conquest of desire is leavened by a sincere and\nobservant love of nature. They sing of the scenes in which meditation is\npleasant, the flowery banks of streams that flow through reeds and\ngrasses of many colours as well as the mysterious midnight forest when\nthe dew falls and wild beasts howl; they note the plumage of the blue\npeacock, the flight of the yellow crane and the gliding movements of the\nwater snake. It does not appear that these amiable hermits arrogated any\nsuperiority to themselves or that there was any opposition between them\nand the rest of the brethren. They preferred a form of the religious\nlife which the Buddha would not make compulsory, but it is older than\nBuddhism and not yet dead in India. The Sangha exercised no hierarchical\nauthority over them and they accepted such simple symbols of union as\nthe observance of Uposatha days.\n\nThe character of the Sangha has not materially changed since its\nconstitution took definite shape towards the end of the master's life.\nIt was and is simply a body of people who believe that the higher life\ncannot be lived in any existing form of society and therefore combine to\nform a confraternity where they are relieved of care for food and\nraiment, where they can really take no thought for the morrow and turn\nthe cheek to the smiter. They were not a corporation of priests and they\nhad no political aims. Any free man, unless his parents or the state had\na claim on him and unless he suffered from certain diseases, was\nadmitted; he took no vows of obedience and was at any time at liberty to\nreturn to the world.\n\nThough the Sangha as founded by the Buddha did not claim, still less\nexact, anything from the laity, yet it was their duty, their most\nobvious and easy method of acquiring merit, to honour and support monks,\nto provide them with food, clothes and lodging and with everything which\nthey might lawfully possess. Strictly speaking a monk does not beg for\nfood nor thank for what he receives. He gives the layman a chance of\ndoing a good deed and the donor, not the recipient, should be thankful.\n\nAt first the Buddha admitted converts to the order himself, but he\nsubsequently prescribed two simple ceremonies for admission to the\nnovitiate and to full privileges respectively. They are often described\nas ordinations but are rather applications from postulants which are\ngranted by a Chapter consisting of at least ten members. The first,\ncalled pabbajj\u00e2 or going forth--that is leaving the world--is effected\nwhen the would-be novice, duly shorn and robed in yellow, recites the\nthree refuges and the ten precepts[537]. Full membership is obtained by\nthe further ceremony called upasampad\u00e2. The postulant, who must be at\nleast twenty years old, is examined in order to ascertain that he is\n_sui juris_ and has no disqualifying disease or other impediment. Then\nhe is introduced to the Chapter by \"a learned and competent monk\" who\nasks those who are in favour of his admission to signify the same by\ntheir silence and those who are not, to speak. If this formula is\nrepeated three times without calling forth objection, the upasampad\u00e2 is\ncomplete. The newly admitted Bhikkhu must have an Upajjh\u00e2ya or preceptor\non whom he waits as a servant, seeing to his clothes, bath, bed, etc. In\nreturn the preceptor gives him spiritual instruction, supervises his\nconduct and tends him when sick.\n\nThe Chapter which had power to accept new monks and regulate discipline\nconsisted of the monks inhabiting a parish or district, whose extent was\nfixed by the Sangha itself. Its reality as a corporate body was secured\nby stringent regulations that under no excuse must the Bhikkhus resident\nin a parish omit to assemble on Uposatha days[538]. The Vinaya[539]\nrepresents the initiative for these simple observances as coming not\nfrom the Buddha but from King Bimbis\u00e2ra, who pointed out that the\nadherents of other schools met on fixed days and that it would be well\nif his disciples did the same. He assented and ordered that when they\nmet they should recite a formula called P\u00e2timokkha which is still in\nuse. It is a confessional service, in which a list of offences is read\nout and the brethren are asked three times after each item \"Are you pure\nin this matter?\" Silence indicates a good conscience. Only if a monk has\nanything to confess does he speak. It is then in the power of the\nassembly to prescribe some form of expiation. The offender may be\nrebuked, suspended or even expelled. But he must admit his guilt.\nOtherwise disciplinary measures are forbidden.\n\nWhat has been said above[540] about the daily life of the Buddha applies\nequally to the life of his disciples. Like him they rose early,\njourneyed or went to beg their only meal until about half-past eleven\nand spent the heat of the day in retirement and meditation. In the\nevening followed discussion and instruction. It was forbidden to accept\ngold and silver but the order might possess parks and monasteries and\nreceive offerings of food and clothes. The personal possessions allowed\nto a monk were only the three robes, a girdle, an alms bowl, a razor, a\nneedle and a water strainer[541]. Everything else which might be given\nto an individual had to be handed over to the confraternity and held in\ncommon and the Vinaya shows clearly how a band of wandering monks\nfollowing their teacher from place to place speedily grew into an\ninfluential corporation possessing parks and monasteries near the\nprincipal cities. The life in these establishments attained a high level\nof comfort according to the standard of the times and the number of\nrestrictive precepts suggests a tendency towards luxury. This was\nnatural, for the laity were taught that their duty was to give and the\nOrder had to decide how much it could properly receive from those pious\nsouls who were only too happy to acquire merit. In the larger Vih\u00e2ras,\nfor instance at S\u00e2vatth\u00ee, there were halls for exercise (that is walking\nup and down), halls with fires in them, warm baths and store rooms.\n\nThe year of the Bhikkhus was divided into two parts. During nine months\nthey might wander about, live in the woods or reside in a monastery.\nDuring the remaining three months, known as Vassa[542] or rainy season,\nresidence in a monastery was obligatory. This custom, as mentioned,\nexisted in India before the Buddha's time and the Pitakas represent him\nas adopting it, chiefly out of deference to public opinion. He did not\nprescribe any special observances for the period of Vassa, but this was\nthe time when people had most leisure, since it was hard to move about,\nand also when the monks were brought into continual contact with the\ninhabitants of a special locality. So it naturally became regarded as\nthe appropriate season for giving instruction to the laity. The end of\nthe rainy season was marked by a ceremony called Pav\u00e2ran\u00e2, at which the\nmonks asked one another to pardon any offences that might have been\ncommitted, and immediately after it came the Kathina ceremony or\ndistribution of robes. Kathina signifies the store of raw cotton cloth\npresented by the laity and held as common property until distributed to\nindividuals.\n\nIt would be tedious to give even an abstract of the regulations\ncontained in the Vinaya. They are almost exclusively concerned with\nmatters of daily life, dwellings, furniture, medicine and so forth, and\nif we compare them with the statutes of other religious orders, we are\nstruck by the fact that the Buddha makes no provision for work,\nobedience or worship. In the western branches of the Christian\nChurch--and to some extent, though less markedly, in the eastern--the\ntheory prevails that \"Satan finds some mischief still for idle hands to\ndo\" and manual labour is a recognized part of the monastic life. But in\nIndia conditions and ideals were different. The resident monk grew out\nof the wandering teacher or disputant, who was not likely to practise\nany trade; it was a maxim that religious persons lived on alms, and\noccupations which we consider harmless, such as agriculture, were held\nto be unsuitable because such acts as ploughing may destroy animal life.\nProbably the Buddha would not have admitted the value of manual labour\nas a distraction and defence against evil thoughts. No one was more\nearnestly bent on the conquest of such thoughts, but he wished to\nextirpate them, not merely to crowd them out. Energy and activity are\ninsisted on again and again, and there is no attempt to discourage\nmental activity. Reading formed no part of the culture of the time, but\na life of travel and new impressions, continual discussion and the war\nof wits, must have given the Bhikkhus a more stimulating training than\nwas to be had in the contemporary Brahmanic schools.\n\nThe Buddha's regulations contain no vow of obedience or recognition of\nrank other than simple seniority or the relation of teacher to pupil. As\ntime went on various hierarchical expedients were invented in different\ncountries, since the management of large bodies of men necessitates\nauthority in some form, but except in Lamaism this authority has rarely\ntaken the form familiar to us in the Roman and Oriental Churches, where\nthe Bishops and higher clergy assume the right to direct both the belief\nand conduct of others. In the Sangha, no monk could give orders to\nanother: he who disobeyed the precepts of the order ceased to be a\nmember of it either _ipso facto_, or if he refused to comply with the\nexpiation prescribed. Also there was no compulsion, no suppression of\ndiscussion, no delegated power to explain or supplement the truth. Hence\ndifferences of opinion in the Buddhist Church have largely taken the\nshape of schools of thought rather than of separate and polemical sects.\nDissension indeed has not been absent but of persecution, such as stains\nthe annals of the Christian Church, there is hardly any record. The fact\nthat the Sangha, though nearly five hundred years older than any\nChristian institution, is still vigorous shows that this noble freedom\nis not unsuccessful as a practical policy.\n\nThe absence of anything that can be called worship or cultus in Gotama's\nregulations is remarkable. He not merely sets aside the older religious\nrites, such as prayer and sacrifice; he does not prescribe anything\nwhatever which is in ordinary language a religious act. For the\nP\u00e2timokkha, Pav\u00e2ran\u00e2, etc., are not religious ceremonies, but chapters\nof the order held with an ethical object, and the procedure (the\nproposal of a resolution and the request for an expression of opinion)\nis that adopted in modern public meetings, except that assent is\nsignified by silence. It is true that the ceremonial of a religion is\nnot likely to develop during the life of the founder, for pious\nrecollection and recitation of his utterances in the form of scripture\nare as yet impossible. Still, if the Buddha had had any belief whatever\nin the edifying effect of ritual, he would not have failed to institute\nsome ceremony, appealing if not to supernatural beings at least to human\nemotions. Even the few observances which he did prescribe seem to be the\nresult of suggestion from others and the only inference to be drawn is\nthat he regarded every form of religious observance as entirely\nsuperfluous.\n\nAt first the Sangha consisted exclusively of men. It was not until about\nfive years after its establishment that the entreaties of the Buddha's\nfostermother, who had become a widow, and of \u00c2nanda prevailed on him to\nthrow it open to women as well[543] but it would seem that the\npermission was wrung from him against his judgment. His reluctance was\nnot due to a low estimate of female ability, for he recognized and made\nuse of the influence of women in social and domestic life and he\nadmitted that they were as capable as men of attaining the highest\nstages of spiritual and intellectual progress. This is also attested by\nthe Pitakas, for some of the most important and subtle arguments and\nexpositions are put into the mouths of nuns[544]. Indeed the objections\nraised by the Buddha, though emphatic, are as arguments singularly vague\nand the eight rules for nuns which he laid down and compared to an\nembankment built to prevent a flood seem dictated not by the danger of\nimmorality but by the fear that women might aspire to the management of\nthe order and to be the equals or superiors of monks.\n\nSo far as we can tell, his fears were not realized. The female branch of\nthe order showed little vigour after its first institution but it does\nnot appear that it was a cause of weakness or corruption. Women were\ninfluential in the infancy of Buddhism, but we hear little of the nuns\nwhen this first ardour was over. We may surmise that it was partly due\nto personal devotion to Gotama and also that there was a growing\ntendency to curtail the independence allowed to women by earlier Aryan\nusage. The daughters of Asoka play some part in the narratives of the\nconversion of Ceylon and Nepal but after the early days of the Church\nfemale names are not prominent: subsequently the succession became\ninterrupted and, as nuns can receive ordination only from other nuns and\nnot from monks, it could not be restored. The so-called nuns of the\npresent day are merely religious women corresponding to the sisters of\nProtestant Churches, but are not ordained members of an order. But the\nright of women to enjoy the same spiritual privileges as men is not\ndenied in theory and in practice Buddhism has done nothing to support or\ncommend the system of the harem or zenana. In some Buddhist countries\nsuch as Burma and Siam women enjoy almost the same independence as in\nEurope. In China and Japan their status is not so high, but one period\nwhen Buddhism was powerful in Japan (800-1100 A.D.) was marked by the\nnumber of female writers and among the Manchus and Tibetans women enjoy\nconsiderable freedom and authority.\n\nThose who follow the law of the Buddha but are not members of the Sangha\nare called Up\u00e2sakas[545], that is worshippers or adherents. The word may\nbe conveniently rendered by laymen although the distinction between\nclergy and laity, as understood in most parts of Europe, does not quite\ncorrespond to the distinction between Bhikkhus and Up\u00e2sakas. European\nclergy are often thought of as interpreters of the Deity, and whenever\nthey have had the power they have usually claimed the right to supervise\nand control the moral or even the political administration of their\ncountry. Something similar may be found in Lamaism, but it forms no part\nof Gotama's original institution nor of the Buddhist Church as seen\nto-day in Burma, Siam and Ceylon. The members of the Sangha are not\npriests or mediators. They have joined a confraternity in order to lead\na higher life for which ordinary society has no place. They will teach\nothers, not as those whose duty it is to make the laity conform to their\nstandard but as those who desire to make known the truth. And easy as is\nthe transition from this attitude to the other, it must be admitted that\nBuddhism has rarely laid itself open to the charge of interfering in\npolitics or of seeking temporal authority. Rather may it be accused of a\ntendency to indolence. In some cases elementary education is in the\nhands of the monks and their monasteries serve the purpose of village\nschools. Elsewhere they are harmless recluses whom the unsympathetic\ncritic may pity as useless but can hardly condemn as ambitious or\ninterfering. This is not however altogether true of Tibet and the Far\nEast.\n\nIt is sometimes said that the only real Buddhists are the members of the\nSangha and there is some truth in this, particularly in China, where one\ncannot count as a Buddhist every one who occasionally attends a Buddhist\nservice. But on the other hand Gotama accorded to the laity a definite\nand honourable position and in the Pitakas they notify their conversion\nby a special formula. They cannot indeed lead the perfect life but they\ncan ensure birth in happy states and a good layman may even attain\nnirvana on his death-bed. But though the pious householder \"takes his\nrefuge in the law and in the order of monks\" from whom he learns the\nlaw, yet these monks make no attempt to supervise or even to judge his\nlife. The only punishment which the Order inflicts, to turn down the\nbowl and refuse to accept alms from guilty hands, is reserved for those\nwho have tried to injure it and is not inflicted on notorious evil\nlivers. It is the business of a monk to spread true knowledge and good\nfeeling around him without enquiring into the thoughts and deeds of\nthose who do not spontaneously seek his counsel. Indeed it may be said\nthat in Burma it is the laity who supervise the monks rather than _vice\nversa_. Those Bhikkhus who fall short of the accepted standard,\nespecially in chastity, are compelled by popular opinion to leave the\nmonastery or village where they have misbehaved. This reminds us of the\ncriticisms of laymen reported in the Vinaya and the deference which the\nBuddha paid to them.\n\nThe ethical character of Buddhism and its superiority to other Indian\nsystems are shown in the precepts which it lays down for laymen.\nCeremony and doctrine have hardly any place in this code, but it enjoins\ngood conduct and morality: moderation in pleasures and consideration for\nothers. Only five commandments are essential for a good life but they\nare perhaps more comprehensive and harder to keep than the Decalogue,\nfor they prescribe abstinence from the five sins of taking life,\ndrinking intoxicants, lying, stealing and unchastity. It is meritorious\nto observe in addition three other precepts, namely, to use no garlands\nor perfumes: to sleep on a mat spread on the ground and not to eat after\nmidday. Pious laymen keep all these eight precepts, at least on Uposatha\ndays, and often make a vow to observe them for some special period. The\nnearer a layman can approximate to the life of a monk the better for his\nspiritual health, but still the aims and ideals, and consequently the\nmethods, of the lay and religious life are different. The Bhikkhu is not\nof this world, he has cut himself loose from its ties, pleasures and\npassions; he strives not for heaven but for arhatship. But the layman,\nthough he may profitably think of nirvana and final happiness, may also\nrightly aspire to be born in some temporary heaven. The law merely bids\nhim be a kind, temperate, prudent man of the world. It is only when he\nspeaks to the monks that the Buddha really speaks to his own and gives\nhis own thoughts: only for them are the high selfless aspirations, the\naustere counsels of perfection and the promises of bliss and something\nbeyond bliss. But the lay morality is excellent in its own sphere--the\ngood respectable life--and its teaching is most earnest and natural in\nthose departments where the hard unsentimental precepts of the higher\ncode jar on western minds. Whereas the monk severs all family ties and\nis fettered by no domestic affection, this is the field which the layman\ncan cultivate with most profit. It was against his judgment that the\nBuddha admitted women to his order and in bidding his monks beware of\nthem he said many hard things. But for women in the household life the\nPitakas show an appreciation and respect which is illustrated by the\nposition held by women in Buddhist countries from the devout and capable\nmatron Vis\u00e2kh\u00e2 down to the women of Burma in the present day. The Buddha\neven praised the ancients because they married for love and did not buy\ntheir wives[546].\n\nThe right life of a layman is described in several suttas[547] and in\nall of them, though almsgiving, religious conversation and hearing the\nlaw are commended, the main emphasis is on such social virtues as\npleasant speech, kindness, temperance, consideration for others and\naffection. The most complete of these discourses, the\nSig\u00e2lov\u00e2da-sutta[548], relates how the Buddha when starting one morning\nto beg alms in R\u00e2jagaha saw the householder Sig\u00e2la bowing down with\nclasped hands and saluting the four quarters, the nadir and the zenith.\nThe object of the ceremony was to avert any evil which might come from\nthese six points. The Buddha told him that this was not the right way to\nprotect oneself: a man should regard his parents as the east, his\nteachers as the south, his wife and children as the west, his friends as\nthe north, his servants as the nadir and monks and Brahmans as the\nzenith. By fulfilling his duty to these six classes a man protects\nhimself from all evil which may come from the six points. Then he\nexpounded in order the mutual duties of (1) parents and children, (2)\npupils and teachers, (3) husband and wife, (4) friends, (5) master and\nservant, (6) laity and clergy. The precepts which follow show how much\ncommon sense and good feeling Gotama could bring to bear on the affairs\nof every-day life when he gave them his attention and the whole\nclassification of reciprocal obligations recalls the five relationships\nof Chinese morality, three of which are identical with Gotama's\ndivisions, namely parents and children, husband and wife, and friends.\nBut national characteristics make themselves obvious in the differences.\nGotama says nothing about politics or loyalty; the Chinese list, which\nopens with the mutual duties of sovereigns and subjects, is silent\nrespecting the church and clergy.\n\nThe Sangha is an Indian institution and invites comparison with that\nremarkable feature of Indian social life, the Brahman caste. At first\nsight the two seem mutually opposed, for the one is a hereditary though\nintellectual aristocracy, claiming the possession of incommunicable\nknowledge and power, the other a corporation open to all who choose to\nrenounce the world and lead a good life. And this antithesis contains\nhistorical truth: the Sangha, like the similar orders of the Jains and\nother Kshatriya sects, was in its origin a protest against the\nexclusiveness and ritualism of the Brahmans. Yet compared with anything\nto be found in other countries the two bodies have something in common.\nFor instance it is a meritorious act to feed either Brahmans or\nBhikkhus. Europeans are inclined to call both of them priests, but this\nis inaccurate for a Bhikkhu rarely deserves the title [549] and nowadays\nBrahmans are not necessarily priests nor priests Brahmans. But in India\nthere is an old and widespread idea that he who devotes himself to a\nreligious and intellectual life (and the two spheres, though they do not\ncoincide, overlap more than in Europe) should be not only respected but\nsupported by the rest of the world. He is not a professional man in the\nsense that lawyers, doctors and clergymen are, but rather an aristocrat.\nThough from the earliest times the nobles of India have had a full share\nof pride and self-confidence, the average Hindu has always believed in\nanother kind of upper class, entered in some sects by birth, in others\nby merit, but in general a well-defined body, the conduct of whose\nmembers does not fail to command respect. The _do ut des_ principle is\ncertainly not wanting, but the holy man is honoured not so much because\nhe will make an immediate return by imparting some instruction or\nperforming some ceremony but because to honour him is a good act which,\nlike other good acts, will sooner or later find its reward. The Buddha\nis not represented as blaming the respect paid to Brahmans but as saying\nthat Brahmans must deserve it. Birth and plaited hair do not make a true\nBrahman any more than a shaven head makes a Bhikkhu, but he who has\nrenounced the world, who is pure in thought, word and deed, who follows\nthe eight-fold path, and perfects himself in knowledge, he is the true\nBrahman[550]. Men of such aspirations are commoner in India than\nelsewhere and more than elsewhere they form a class, which is defined by\neach sect for itself. But in all sects it is an essential part of piety\nto offer respect and gifts to this religious aristocracy.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII\n\nASOKA\n\n1\n\n\nThe first period in the history of Buddhism extends from the death of\nthe founder to the death of Asoka, that is to about 232 B.C. It had then\nnot only become a great Indian religion but had begun to send forth\nmissionaries to foreign countries. But this growth had not yet brought\nabout the internal changes which are inevitable when a creed expands far\nbeyond the boundaries within which it was a natural expression of local\nthought. An intellectual movement and growth is visible within the\nlimits of the Pali Canon and is confirmed by what we hear of the\nexistence of sects or schools, but it does not appear that in the time\nof Asoka the workings of speculation had led to any point of view\nmaterially different from that of Gotama.\n\nOur knowledge of general Indian history before the reign of Asoka is\nscanty and the data which can be regarded as facts for Buddhist\necclesiastical history are scantier still. We hear of two (or including\nthe Mah\u00e2sang\u00eeti three) meetings sometimes called Councils; scriptures,\nobviously containing various strata, were compiled, and eighteen sects\nor schools had time to arise and some of them to decay. Much doubt has\nbeen cast upon the councils[551] but to my mind this suspicion is\nunmerited, provided that too ecclesiastical a meaning is not given to\nthe word. We must not suppose that the meetings held at R\u00e2jagaha and\nVes\u00e2l\u00ee were similar to the Council of Nicaea or that they produced the\nworks edited by the Pali Text Society. Such terms as canon, dogma and\ncouncil, though indispensable, are misleading at this period. We want\nless formal equivalents for the same ideas. A number of men who were\nstrangers to those conceptions of a hierarchy and a Bible[552] which are\nso familiar to us met together to fix and record the opinions and\ninjunctions of the Master or to remove misapprehensions and abuses. It\nwould be better if we could avoid using even the word Buddhist at this\nperiod, for it implies a difference sharper than the divisions existing\nbetween the followers of Gotama and others. They were in the position of\nthe followers of Christ before they received at Antioch the name of\nChristians and the meeting at R\u00e2jagaha was analogous to the conferences\nrecorded in the first chapter of the Acts of the Apostles.\n\nThe record of this meeting and of the subsequent meeting at Ves\u00e2l\u00ee is\ncontained in Chapters XI. and XII. of the Cullavagga, which must\ntherefore be later than the second meeting and perhaps considerably\nlater. Other accounts are found in the D\u00eepavamsa, Mah\u00e2-Bodhi-Vamsa and\nBuddhaghosa's commentaries. The version given in the Cullavagga is\nabrupt and does not entirely agree with other narratives of what\nfollowed on the death of the Buddha[553]. It seems to be a combination\nof two documents, for it opens as a narrative by Kassapa, but it soon\nturns into a narrative about him. But the clumsiness in compilation and\nthe errors of detail are hardly sufficient to discredit an event which\nis probable in itself and left an impression on tradition. The Buddha\ncombined great personal authority with equally great liberality. While\nhe was alive he decided all questions of dogma and discipline himself,\nbut he left to the Order authority to abolish all the minor precepts. It\nseems inevitable that some sort of meeting should have been held to\nconsider the position created by this wide permission. Brief and\nconfused as the story in the Cullavagga is, there is nothing improbable\nin its outline--namely that a resolution was taken at Kusin\u00e2r\u00e2 where he\ndied to hold a synod during the next rains at R\u00e2jagaha, a more central\nplace where alms and lodgings were plentiful, and there come to an\nagreement as to what should be accepted as the true doctrine and\ndiscipline. Accordingly five hundred monks met near this town and\nenquired into the authenticity of the various rules and suttas. They\nthen went on to ask what the Buddha had meant by the lesser and minor\nprecepts which might be abolished. \u00c2nanda (who came in for a good deal\nof blame in the course of the proceedings) confessed that he had\nforgotten to ask the Master for an explanation and divergent opinions\nwere expressed as to the extent of the discretion allowed. Kassapa\nfinally proposed that the Sangha should adopt without alteration or\naddition the rules made by the Buddha. This was approved and the Dhamma\nand Vinaya as chanted by the assembled Bhikkhus were accepted. The\nAbhidhamma is not mentioned. The name usually given to these councils is\nSang\u00eeti, which means singing or chanting together. An elder is said to\nhave recited the text sentence by sentence and each phrase was intoned\nafter him by the assembly as a sign of acceptance. Up\u00e2li was the\nprincipal authority for the Vinaya and \u00c2nanda for the Dhamma but the\nlimits of the authority claimed by the meeting are illustrated by an\nanecdote[554] which relates that after the chanting of the law had been\ncompleted P\u00fbrana and his disciples arrived from the Southern Hills. The\nelders asked him to accept the version rehearsed by them. He replied,\n\"The Dhamma and Vinaya have been well sung by the Theras, nevertheless\nas they have been received and heard by me from the mouth of the Lord,\nso will I hold them.\" In other words the council has put together a very\ngood account of the Buddha's teaching but has no claim to impose it on\nthose who have personal reminiscences of their own.\n\nThis want of a central authority, though less complete than in\nBrahmanism, marks the early life of the Buddhist community. We read in\nlater works[555] of a succession of Elders who are sometimes called\nPatriarchs[556] but it would be erroneous to think of them as possessing\nepiscopal authority. They were at most the chief teachers of the order.\nFrom the death of the Buddha to Asoka only five names are mentioned. But\nfive names can fill the interval only if their bearers were unusually\nlong-lived. It is therefore probable that the list merely contains the\nnames of prominent Theras who exercised little authority in virtue of\nany office, though their personal qualities assured them respect. Up\u00e2li,\nwho comes first, is called chief of the Vinaya but, so far as there was\none head of the order, it seems to have been Kassapa. He is the Brahman\nascetic of Uruvel\u00e2 whose conversion is recorded in the first book of the\nMah\u00e2vagga and is said to have exchanged robes with the Buddha[557]. He\nobserved the Dhut\u00e2ngas and we may conjecture that his influence tended\nto promote asceticism. Dasaka and Sonaka are also designated as chiefs\nof the Vinaya and there was perhaps a distinction between those who\nstudied (to use modern phrases) ecclesiastical law and dogmatic\ntheology.\n\nThe accounts[558] of the second Council are as abrupt as those of the\nfirst and do not connect it with previous events. The circumstances said\nto have led to its meeting are, however, probable. According to the\nCullavagga, a hundred years after the death of the Buddha certain\nBhikkhus of Vajjian lineage resident at Ves\u00e2l\u00ee upheld ten theses\ninvolving relaxations of the older discipline. The most important of\nthese was that monks were permitted to receive gold and silver, but all\nof them, trivial as they may seem, had a dangerous bearing for they\nencouraged not only luxury but the formation of independent schools. For\ninstance they allowed pupils to cite the practice of their preceptors as\na justification for their conduct and authorized monks resident in one\nparish to hold Uposatha in separate companies and not as one united\nbody. The story of the condemnation of these new doctrines contains\nmiraculous incidents but seems to have a historical basis. It relates\nhow a monk called Yasa, when a guest of the monks of Ves\u00e2l\u00ee, quarrelled\nwith them because they accepted money from the laity and, departing\nthence, sought for support among the Theras or elders of the south and\nwest. The result was a conference at Ves\u00e2l\u00ee in which the principal\nfigures are Revata and Sabbak\u00e2mi, a pupil of \u00c2nanda, expressly said to\nhave been ordained one hundred and twenty years earlier[559]. The ten\ntheses were referred to a committee, which rejected them all, and this\nrejection was confirmed by the whole Sangha, who proceeded to rehearse\nthe Vinaya. We are not however told that they revised the Sutta or\nAbhidhamma.\n\nHere ends the account of the Cullavagga but the D\u00eepavamsa adds that the\nwicked Vajjian monks, to whom it ascribes wrong doctrines as well as\nerrors in discipline, collected a strong faction and held a schismatic\ncouncil called the Mah\u00e2sang\u00eeti. This meeting recited or compiled a new\nversion of the Dhamma and Vinaya[560]. It is not easy to establish any\nfacts about the origin and tenets of this Mah\u00e2sang\u00eetika or Mah\u00e2sanghika\nsect, though it seems to have been important. The Chinese pilgrims Fa\nHsien and Hs\u00fcan Chuang, writing on the basis of information obtained in\nthe fifth and seventh centuries of our era, represent it as arising in\nconnection with the first council, which was either that of R\u00e2jagaha or\nsome earlier meeting supposed to have been held during the Buddha's\nlifetime, and Hs\u00fcan Chuang[561] intimates that it was formed of laymen\nas well as monks and that it accepted additional matter including\ndh\u00e2ran\u00ees or spells rejected by the monkish council. Its name (admitted\nby its opponents) seems to imply that it represented at one time the\nopinions of the majority or at least a great number of the faithful. But\nit was not the sect which flourished in Ceylon and the writer of the\nD\u00eepavamsa is prejudiced against it. It may be a result of this animus\nthat he connects it with the discreditable Vajjian schism and the\nChinese tradition may be more correct. On the other hand the adherents\nof the school would naturally be disposed to assign it an early origin.\nFa Hsien says[562] that the Vinaya of the Mah\u00e2sanghikas was considered\n\"the most complete with the fullest explanations.\" A translation of this\ntext is contained in the Chinese Tripitaka[563].\n\nEarly Indian Buddhism is said to have been divided into eighteen sects\nor schools, which have long ceased to exist and must not be confounded\nwith any existing denominations. Fa Hsien observes that they agree in\nessentials and differ only in details and this seems to have been true\nnot only when he wrote (about 420 A.D.) but throughout their history. In\ndifferent epochs and countries Buddhism presents a series of surprising\nmetamorphoses, but the divergences between the sects existing in India\nat any given time are less profound in character and less violent in\nexpression than the divisions of Christianity. Similarly the so-called\nsects[564] in modern China, Burma and Siam are better described as\nschools, in some ways analogous to such parties as the High and Low\nChurch in England. On the other hand some of the eighteen schools\nexceeded the variations permitted in Christianity and Islam by having\ndifferent collections of the scriptures. But at the time of which we are\ntreating these collections had not been reduced to writing: they were of\nconsiderable extent compared with the Bible or Koran and they admitted\nlater explanatory matter. The record of the Buddha's words did not\nprofess to be a miraculous revelation but merely a recollection of what\nhad been said. It is therefore natural that each school should maintain\nthat the memory of its own scholars had transmitted the most accurate\nand complete account and that tradition should represent the successive\ncouncils as chiefly occupied in reciting and sifting these accounts.\n\nIt is generally agreed that the eighteen[565] schools were in existence\nduring or shortly before the reign of Asoka, and that six others[566]\narose about the same period, but subsequently to them. The best\nmaterials for a study of their opinions are afforded by the text and\ncommentary[567] of the Kath\u00e2-vatthu, a treatise attributed to Tissa\nMoggaliputta, who is said to have been President of the Third Council\nheld under Asoka. It is an examination and refutation of heretical views\nrather than a description of the bodies that held them but we can judge\nfrom it what was the religious atmosphere at the time and the commentary\ngives some information about various sects. Many centuries later I-ching\ntells us that during his visit to India (671-695 A.D.) the principal\nschools were four in number, with eighteen subdivisions. These four[568]\nare the Mah\u00e2sanghika, the Sthavira (equivalent to the old Therav\u00e2da),\nthe M\u00fblasarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2da and the Sammitiya, and from the time of Asoka\nonwards they throw the remaining divisions into the shade[569]. He adds\nthat it is not determined which of the four should be grouped with the\nM\u00e2h\u00e2yana and which with the H\u00eenay\u00e2na, that distinction being probably\nlater in origin. The differences between the eighteen schools in\nI-ching's time were not vital but concerned the composition of the canon\nand details of discipline. It was a creditable thing to be versed in the\nscriptures of them all[570]. It is curious that though the Kath\u00e2vatthu\npays more attention to the opinions of the six new sects than to those\nheld by most of the eighteen, yet this latter number continued to be\nquoted nearly a thousand years later, whereas the additional six seem\nforgotten. It may be that they were more unorthodox than the others and\nhence required fuller criticism. Five of their names are geographical\ndesignations, but we hear no more of them after the age of Asoka.\n\nThe religious horizon of the heretics confuted in the K\u00e2thavatthu does\nnot differ materially from that of the Pitakas. There are many questions\nabout arhatship, its nature, the method of obtaining it and the\npossibility of losing it. Also we find registered divergent views\nrespecting the nature of knowledge and sensation. Of these the most\nimportant is the doctrine attributed to the Sammitiyas, that a soul\nexists in the highest and truest sense. They are also credited with\nholding that an arhat can fall from arhatship, that a god can enter the\npaths or the Order, and that even an unconverted man can get rid of all\nlust and ill-will[571]. This collection of beliefs is possibly\nexplicable as a result of the view that the condition of the soul, which\nis continuous from birth to birth, is stronger for good or evil than its\nsurroundings. The germs of the Mah\u00e2y\u00e2na may be detected in the opinions\nof some sects on the nature of the Buddha and the career of a\nBodhisattva. Thus the Andhakas thought that the Buddha was superhuman in\nthe ordinary affairs of life and the Vetulyakas[572] held that he was\nnot really born in the world of men but sent a phantom to represent him,\nremaining himself in the Tusita heaven. The doctrines attributed to the\nUttar\u00e2pathakas and Andhakas respectively that an unconverted man, if\ngood, is capable of entering on the career of a Bodhisattva and that a\nBodhisattva can in the course of his career fall into error and be\nreborn in state of woe, show an interest in the development of a\nBodhisattva and a desire to bring it nearer to human life which are\nforeign to the Pitakas. An inclination to think of other states of\nexistence in a manner half mythological half metaphysical is indicated\nby other heresies, such as that there is an intermediate realm where\nbeings await rebirth, that the dead benefit by gifts given in the\nworld[573], that there are animals in heaven, that the Four Truths, the\nChain of Causation, and the Eightfold Path, are self-existent\n(asankhata).\n\nThe point of view of the Kath\u00e2-vatthu, and indeed of the whole Pali\nTripitaka, is that of the Vibhajjav\u00e2dins, which seems to mean those who\nproceed by analysis and do not make vague generalizations. This was the\nschool to which Tissa Moggaliputta belonged and was identical with the\nTherav\u00e2da (teaching of the elders) or a section of it. The prominence of\nthis sect in the history of Buddhism has caused its own view, namely\nthat it represents primitive Buddhism, to be widely accepted. And this\nview deserves respect for it rests on a solid historical basis, namely\nthat about two and a half centuries after the Buddha's death and in the\ncountry where he preached, the Vibhajjav\u00e2dins claimed to get back to his\nreal teaching by an examination of the existing traditions[574]. This is\na very early starting-point. But the Sarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2dins[575] were also an\nearly school which attained to widespread influence and had a similar\ndesire to preserve the simple and comparatively human presentment of the\nBuddha's teaching as opposed to later embellishments. Only three\nquestions in the Kath\u00e2-vatthu are directed against them but this\nprobably means not that they were unimportant but that they did not\ndiffer much from the Vibhajjav\u00e2dins. The special views attributed to\nthem are that everything really exists, that an arhat can fall from\narhatship, and that continuity of thought constitutes Sam\u00e2dhi or\nmeditation. These theses may perhaps be interpreted as indicative of an\naversion to metaphysics and the supernatural. A saint has not undergone\nany supernatural transformation but has merely reached a level from\nwhich he can fall: meditation is simply fixity of attention, not a\nmystic trance. In virtue of the first doctrine European writers often\nspeak of the Sarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2dins as realists but their peculiar view\nconcerned not so much the question of objective reality as the\ndifference between being and becoming. They said that the world _is_\nwhereas other schools maintained that it was a continual process of\nbecoming[576]. It is not necessary at present to follow further the\nhistory of this important school. It had a long career and flourished in\nKashmir and Central Asia.\n\nConfused as are the notices of these ancient sects, we see with some\nclearness that in opposition to the Therav\u00e2da there was another body\nalluded to in terms which, though hostile, still imply an admission of\nsize and learning, such as Mah\u00e2sanghika or Mah\u00e2sang\u00eetika, the people of\nthe great assembly, and \u00c2c\u00e2ryav\u00e2da or the doctrine of the Teachers. It\nappears to have originated in connection with some council and to embody\na popular protest against the severity of the doctrine there laid down.\nThis is natural, for it is pretty obvious that many found the\nargumentative psychology of the Therav\u00e2dins arid and wearisome. The\nD\u00eepavamsa accuses the Mah\u00e2sanghikas of garbling the canon but the\nChinese pilgrims testify that in later times their books were regarded\nas specially complete. One well-known work, the Mah\u00e2vastu, perhaps\ncomposed in the first century B.C., describes itself as belonging to the\nLokuttara branch of the Mah\u00e2sanghikas. The Mah\u00e2sanghikas probably\nrepresent the elements which developed into the Mah\u00e2y\u00e2na. It is not\npossible to formulate their views precisely but, whereas the Therav\u00e2da\nwas essentially teaching for the Bhikkhu, they represented those\nconcessions to popular taste from which Buddhism has never been quite\ndissociated even in its earliest period.\n\n\n2\n\nFor some two centuries after Gotama's death we have little information\nas to the geographical extension of his doctrine, but some of the\nSanskrit versions of the Vinaya[577] represent him as visiting Muttra,\nNorth-west India and Kashmir. So far as is known, the story of this\njourney is not supported by more ancient documents or other arguments:\nit contains a prediction about Kanishka, and may have been composed in\nor after his reign when the flourishing condition of Buddhism in\nG\u00e2ndh\u00e2ra made it seem appropriate to gild the past. But the narratives\nabout Muttra and Kashmir contain several predictions relating to the\nprogress of the faith 100 years after the Buddha's death and these can\nhardly be explained except as references to a tradition that those\nregions were converted at the epoch mentioned. There is no doubt of the\nconnection between Kashmir and the Sarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2dins nor anything\nimprobable in the supposition that the first missionary activity was in\nthe direction of Muttra and Kashmir.\n\nBut the great landmark in the earlier history of Buddhism is the reign\nof Asoka. He came to the throne about 270 B.C. and inherited the vast\ndominions of his father and grandfather. Almost all that we know of the\npolitical events of his reign is that his coronation did not take place\nuntil four years later, which may indicate a disputed succession, and\nthat he rounded off his possessions by the conquest of Kalinga, that is\nthe country between the Mahanadi and the Godavari, about 261 B.C. This\nwas the end of his military career. Nothing could be gained by further\nconquests, for his empire already exceeded the limits set to effective\ngovernment by the imperfect communications of the epoch, seeing that it\nextended from Afghanistan to the mouths of the Ganges and southwards\nalmost to Madras. No evidence substantiates the later stories which\nrepresent him as a monster of wickedness before his conversion, but\naccording to the D\u00eepavamsa he at first favoured heretics.\n\nThe general effect of Asoka's rule on the history of Buddhism and indeed\nof Asia is clear, but there is still some difference of opinion as to\nthe date of his conversion. The most important document for the\nchronology of his reign is the inscription known as the first Minor Rock\nEdict[578]. It is now generally admitted that it does not state the time\nwhich has elapsed since the death of the Buddha, as was once supposed,\nand that the King relates in it how for more than two and a half years\nafter his conversion to Buddhism he was a lay-believer and did not exert\nhimself strenuously, but subsequently joined the Sangha[579] and began\nto devote his energies to religion rather more than a year before the\npublication of the edict. This proclamation has been regarded by some as\nthe first, by others as the last of his edicts. On the latter\nsupposition we must imagine that he published a long series of ethical\nbut not definitely Buddhist ordinances and that late in life he became\nfirst a lay-believer and then a monk, probably abdicating at the same\ntime. But the King is exceedingly candid as to his changes of life and\nmind: he tells us how the horrors of the war with Kalinga affected him,\nhow he was an easygoing layman and then a zealous monk. Had there been a\nstage between the war and his acceptance of Buddhism as a layman, a\nperiod of many years in which he devoted himself to the moral progress\nof his people without being himself a Buddhist, he would surely have\nexplained it. Moreover in the Bh\u00e2br\u00fb edict, which is distinctly\necclesiastical and deals with the Buddhist scriptures, he employs his\nfavourite word Dhamma in the strict Buddhist sense, without indicating\nthat he is giving it an unusual or new meaning. I therefore think it\nprobable that he became a lay Buddhist soon after the conquest of\nKalinga, that is in the ninth or tenth year after his accession, and a\nmember of the Sangha two and a half years later. On this hypothesis all\nhis edicts are the utterances of a Buddhist.\n\nIt may be objected that no one could be a monk and at the same time\ngovern a great empire: it is more natural and more in accordance with\nIndian usage that towards the end of his life an aged king should\nabdicate and renounce the world. But Wu Ti, the Buddhist Emperor of\nChina, retired to a monastery twice in the course of his long reign and\nthe cloistered Emperors of Japan in the eleventh and twelfth centuries\ncontinued to direct the policy of their country, although they abdicated\nin name and set a child on the throne as titular ruler. The Buddhist\nChurch was not likely to criticize Asoka's method of keeping his\nmonastic vows and indeed it may be said that his activity was not so\nmuch that of a pious emperor as of an archbishop possessed of\nexceptional temporal power. He definitely renounced conquest and\nmilitary ambitions and appears to have paid no attention to ordinary\ncivil administration which he perhaps entrusted to Commissioners; he\ndevoted himself to philanthropic and moral projects \"for the welfare of\nman and beast,\" such as lecturing his subjects on their duties towards\nall living creatures, governing the Church, building hospitals and\nst\u00fbpas, supervising charities and despatching missions. In all his\nvaried activity there is nothing unsuitable to an ecclesiastical\nstatesman: in fact he is distinguished from most popes and prelates by\nhis real indifference to secular aspirations and by the unusual\nfacilities which he enjoyed for immediately putting his ideals into\npractice.\n\nAsoka has won immortality by the Edicts which he caused to be engraved\non stone[580]. They have survived to the present day and are the most\nimportant monuments which we possess for the early history of India and\nof Buddhism. They have a character of their own. A French writer has\nsaid \"On ne bavarde pas sur la pierre,\" and for most inscriptions the\nsaying holds good, but Asoka wrote on the rocks of India as if he were\ndictating to a stenographer. He was no stylist and he was somewhat vain\nalthough, considering his imperial position and the excellence of his\nmotives, this obvious side of his character is excusable. His\ninscriptions give us a unique series of sermons on stones and a record,\nif not of what the people of India thought, at least of what an\nexceptionally devout and powerful Hindu thought they ought to think.\n\nBetween thirty and forty of these inscriptions have been discovered,\nscattered over nearly the whole of India, and composed in vernacular\ndialects allied to Pali[581]. Many of them are dated by the year of the\nKing's reign and all announce themselves as the enactments of Piyadassi,\nthe name Asoka being rarely used[582]. They comprise, besides some\nfourteen single edicts[583], two series, namely:\n\n(1) Fourteen Rock Edicts, dating from the thirteenth and fourteenth\nyears of Asoka's reign[584] and found inscribed in seven places but the\nrecensions differ and some do not include all fourteen edicts.\n\n(2) Seven Pillar Edicts dating from the 27th and 28th years, and found\nin six recensions.\n\nThe fourteen Rock Edicts are mostly sermons. Their style often recalls\nthe Pitakas verbally, particularly in the application of secular words\nto religious matters. Thus we hear that righteousness is the best of\nlucky ceremonies and that whereas former kings went on tours of pleasure\nand hunting, Asoka prefers tours of piety and has set out on the road\nleading to true knowledge. In this series he does not mention the Buddha\nand in the twelfth edict he declares that he reverences all sects. But\nwhat he wished to preach and enforce was the _Dhamma_. It is difficult\nto find an English equivalent for this word[585] but there is no doubt\nof the meaning. It is the law, in the sense of the righteous life which\na Buddhist layman ought to live, and perhaps religion is the simplest\ntranslation, provided that word is understood to include conduct and its\nconsequences in another world but not theism. Asoka burns with zeal to\npropagate this Dhamma and his language recalls[586] the utterances of\nthe Dhammapada. He formulates the law under four heads[587]: \"Parents\nmust be obeyed: respect for living creatures must be enforced: truth\nmust be spoken ... the teacher must be reverenced by the pupil and\nproper courtesy must be shown to relations.\" In many ways the Sacred\nEdict of the Chinese Emperor K'ang Hsi resembles these proclamations for\nit consists of imperial maxims on public morality addressed by a\nConfucian Emperor to a population partly Buddhist and Taoist, just as\nAsoka addressed Brahmans, Jains and other sects as well as Buddhists.\nBut when we find in the thirteenth Rock Edict the incidental statement\nthat the King thinks nothing of much importance except what concerns the\nnext world, we feel the great difference between Indian and Chinese\nideas whether ancient or modern.\n\nThe Rock Edicts also deal with the sanctity of animal life. Asoka's\nstrong dislike of killing or hurting animals cannot be ascribed to\npolicy, for it must have brought him into collision with the Brahmans\nwho offered animals in sacrifice, but was the offspring of a naturally\ngentle and civilized mind. We may conjecture that the humanity of\nBuddhism was a feature which attracted him to it. In Rock Edict I. he\nforbids animal sacrifices and informs us that whereas formerly many\nthousand animals were killed daily for the royal kitchens now only three\nare killed, namely two peacocks and a deer, and the deer not always. But\nin future even these three creatures will not be slaughtered. In Rock\nEdict II. he describes how he has cared for the comfort of man and\nbeast. Wells have been dug; trees, roots and healing herbs have been\nplanted and remedies--possibly hospitals--have been provided, all for\nanimals as well as for men, and this not only in his own dominions but\nin neighbouring realms. In the fourteenth year of his reign he appointed\nofficers called Dhamma-mah\u00e2m\u00e2t\u00e2, Ministers or Censors of the Dhamma.\nTheir duty was to promote the observance of the Dhamma and they also\nacted as Charity Commissioners and superintendents of the households of\nthe King's relatives. We hear that \"they attend to charitable\ninstitutions, ascetics, householders and all the sects: I have also\narranged that they shall attend to the affairs of the Buddhist clergy,\nas well as the Brahmans, the Jains, the \u00c2j\u00eevikas and in fact all the\nvarious sects.\" Further he tells us that the local authorities[588] are\nto hold quinquennial assemblies at which the Dhamma is to be proclaimed\nand that religious processions with elephants, cars, and illuminations\nhave been arranged to please and instruct the people. Similar\nprocessions can still be seen at the Perahera festival in Kandy.\n\nThe last Rock Edict is of special interest for the light which it sheds\nboth on history and on the King's character. He expresses remorse for\nthe bloodshed which accompanied the conquest of Kalinga and declares\nthat he will henceforth devote his attention to conquest by the Dhamma,\nwhich he has effected \"both in his own dominions and in all the\nneighbouring realms as far as six hundred leagues (?), even to where the\nGreek King named Antiochus dwells and beyond that Antiochus to where\ndwell the four kings named Ptolemy, Antigonus, Magas and Alexander[589],\nand in the south the kings of the Colas and Pandyas[590] and of Ceylon\nand likewise here in the King's dominions, among the Yonas[591] and\nK\u00e2mbojas[592] in N\u00e2bhaka of the N\u00e2bhitis[593] among the Bhojas and\nPitinikas, among the \u00c2ndhras and Pulindas[594]. Asoka thus appears to\nstate that he has sent missionaries to (1) the outlying parts of India,\non the borders of his own dominions, (2) to Ceylon, (3) to the\nHellenistic Kingdoms of Asia, Africa and Europe.\n\nThis last statement is of the greatest importance, but no record has\nhitherto been found of the arrival of these missionaries in the west.\nThe language of the Edict about them is not precise and in fact their\ndespatch is only an inference from it. Of the success of the Indian\nmissions there is no doubt. Buddhism was introduced into southern India,\nwhere it flourished to some extent though it had to maintain a double\nstruggle against Jains as well as Brahmans. The statement of the D\u00eepa\nand Mah\u00e2-vamsas that missionaries were also sent to Pegu (Suvannabh\u00fbmi)\nis not supported by the inscriptions, though not in itself improbable,\nbut the missions to the north and to Ceylon were remarkably successful.\n\nThe Sinhalese Chronicles[595] give the names of the principal\nmissionaries despatched and their statements have received confirmation\nin the discoveries made at Sanchi and Sonari where urns have been found\ninscribed with the names of Majjhima, Kassapa, and Gotiputta the\nsuccessor of Dundhubhissara, who are called teachers of the Himalaya\nregion. The statement in the Mah\u00e2 and D\u00eepa-vamsas is that Majjhima was\nsent to preach in the Himalaya accompanied by four assistants Kassapa,\nM\u00e2lik\u00e2deva, Dundh\u00e2bhinossa and Sahassadeva.\n\nAbout the twenty-first year of his reign Asoka made a religious tour and\nunder the guidance of his preceptor Upagupta, visited the Lumbini Park\n(now Rummindei) in the Ter\u00e2i, where the Buddha was born, and other spots\nconnected with his life and preaching. A pillar has been discovered at\nRummindei bearing an inscription which records the visit and the\nprivileges granted to the village where \"the Lord was born.\" At Nigl\u00eeva\na few miles off he erected another inscribed pillar stating that he had\ndone reverence to the st\u00fbpa of the earlier Buddha Kon\u00e2gamana and for the\nsecond time repaired it.\n\nDuring this tour he visited Nepal and Lalitpur, the capital, founding\nthere five st\u00fbpas. His daughter C\u00e2rumat\u00ee is said to have accompanied him\nand to have remained in Nepal when he returned. She built a convent\nwhich still bears her name and lived there as a nun. It does not appear\nthat Asoka visited Kashmir, but he caused a new capital (Sr\u00eenagar) to be\nbuilt there, and introduced Buddhism.\n\nIn the 27th and 28th year of his reign he composed another series of\nEdicts and this time had them carved in pillars not on rocks. They are\neven more didactic than the Rock Edicts and contain an increasing number\nof references to the next world, as well as stricter regulations\nforbidding cruelty to animals, but the King remains tolerant and\nsays[596] that the chief thing is that each man should live up to his\nown creed. It is probable that at this time he had partially abdicated\nor at least abandoned some of the work of administration, for in Edict\nIV. he states that he has appointed Commissioners with discretion to\naward honours and penalties and that he feels secure like a man who has\nhanded over his child to a skilful nurse.\n\nIn the two series of Rock and Pillar Edicts there is little dogmatic\nBuddhism. It is true that the King's anxiety as to the hereafter of his\nsubjects and his solicitude for animals indicate thoughts busy with\nreligious ideas, but still his Dhamma is generally defined in terms\nwhich do not go beyond morality, kindness and sympathy. But in the\nBh\u00e2br\u00fb (less correctly Bh\u00e2br\u00e2) Edict he recommends for study a series of\nscriptural passage which can be identified more or less certainly with\nportions of the Pali Pitakas. In the Sarnath Edict he speaks not only as\na Buddhist but as head of the Church. He orders that monks or nuns who\nendeavour to create a schism shall put on lay costume and live outside\ntheir former monastery or convent. He thus assumes the right to expel\nschismatics from the Sangha. He goes on to say that a similar edict\n(i.e. an edict against schism) is to be inscribed for the benefit of the\nlaity who are to come and see it on Uposatha days. \"And on the Uposatha\ndays in all months every officer is to come for the Uposatha service to\nbe inspired with confidence in this Edict and to learn it.\" Thus the\nKing's officers are to be Buddhists at least to the extent of attending\nthe Uposatha ceremony, and the edict about schismatics is to be brought\nto the notice of the laity, which doubtless means that the laity are not\nto give alms to them.\n\nIt is probable that many more inscriptions remain to be discovered but\nnone of those known allude to the convening of a Council and our\ninformation as to this meeting comes from the two Sinhalese Chronicles\nand the works of Buddhaghosa. It is said to have been held two hundred\nand thirty-six years after the death of the Buddha[597] and to have been\nnecessitated by the fact that the favour shown to the Sangha induced\nheretics to become members of it without abandoning their errors. This\noccasioned disturbances and the King was advised to summon a sage called\nTissa Moggaliputta (or Upagupta) then living in retirement and to place\nthe affairs of the church in his hands. He did so. Tissa then composed\nthe Kath\u00e2-vatthu and presided over a council composed of one thousand\narhats which established the true doctrine and fixed the present Pali\nCanon.\n\nEven so severe a critic of Sinhalese tradition as Vincent Smith admits\nthat the evidence for the council is too strong to be set aside, but it\nmust be confessed that it would be reassuring to find some allusion to\nit in Asoka's inscriptions. He did not however always say what we should\nexpect. In reviewing his efforts in the cause of religion he mentions\nneither a council nor foreign missions, although we know from other\ninscriptions that such missions were despatched. The sessions of the\ncouncil may be equally true and are in no way improbable, for in later\ntimes kings of Burma, Ceylon and Siam held conventions to revise the\ntext of the Tripitaka. It appeared natural that a pious King should see\nthat the sacred law was observed, and begin by ascertaining what that\nlaw was.\n\nAccording to tradition Asoka died after reigning thirty-eight or forty\nyears but we have no authentic account of his death and the stories of\nhis last days seem to be pure legends. The most celebrated are the\npathetic tale of Kun\u00e2la which closely resembles a J\u00e2taka[598], and the\naccount of how Asoka vowed to present a hundred million gold pieces to\nthe Sangha and not being able to raise the whole sum made a gift of his\ndominions instead.\n\n\n3\n\nAsoka had a decisive effect on the history of Buddhism, especially in\nmaking it a world religion. This was not the accidental result of his\naction in establishing it in north-west India and Ceylon, for he was\nclearly dominated by the thought that the Dhamma must spread over the\nwhole world and, so far as we know, he was the first to have that\nthought in a practical form. But we could estimate his work better if we\nknew more about the religious condition of the country when he came to\nthe throne. As it is, the periods immediately before and after him are\nplunged in obscurity and to illuminate his reign we have little\ninformation except his own edicts which, though copious, do not aim at\ngiving a description of his subjects. Megasthenes who resided at\nPataliputra about 300 B.C. does not appear to have been aware of the\nexistence of Buddhism as a separate religion, but perhaps a foreign\nminister in China at the present day might not notice that the Chinese\nhave more than one religion. On the other hand in Asoka's time Buddhism,\nby whatever name it was called, was well known and there was evidently\nno necessity for the King to explain what he meant by Dhamma and Sangha.\nThe Buddha had belonged to a noble family and was esteemed by the\naristocracy of Magadha; the code of morality which he prescribed for the\nlaity was excellent and sensible. It is therefore not surprising if the\nKshatriyas and others recognized it as their ideal nor if Asoka found it\na sound basis of legislation. This legislation may be called Buddhist in\nthe sense that in his edicts the King enjoins and to some extent\nenforces _s\u00eelam_ or morality, which is the indispensable beginning for\nall spiritual progress, and that his enactments about animals go beyond\nwhat is usual in secular law. But he expressly refrains from requiring\nadherence to any particular sect. On the other hand there is no lack of\ndefinite patronage of Buddhism. He institutes edifying processions, he\ngoes on pilgrimages to sacred sites, he addresses the Sangha as to the\nmost important parts of the scriptures, and we may infer that he did his\nbest to spread the knowledge of those scriptures. Though he says nothing\nabout it in the Edicts which have been discovered, he erected numerous\nreligious buildings including the Sanchi tope and the original temple at\nBodh-Gaya. Their effect in turning men's attention to Buddhism must have\nbeen greatly enhanced by the fact that so far as we know no other sect\nhad stone temples at this time. To such influences, we must add the\nhuman element. The example and well-known wishes of a great king,\nsupported by a numerous and learned clergy, could not fail to attract\ncrowds to the faith, and the faith itself--for let us not forget Gotama\nwhile we give credit to his follower--was satisfying. Thus Asoka probably\nfound Buddhism in the form of a numerous order of monks, respected\nlocally and exercising a considerable power over the minds and conduct\nof laymen. He left it a great church spread from the north to the south\nof India and even beyond, with an army of officials to assist its\nprogress, with sacred buildings and monasteries, sermons and ceremonies.\nHow long his special institutions lasted we do not know, but no one\nacquainted with India can help feeling that his system of inspection was\nliable to grave abuse. Black-mailing and misuse of authority are ancient\nfaults of the Indian police and we may surmise that the generations\nwhich followed him were not long in getting rid of his censors and\ninspectors.\n\nChristian critics of Buddhism are apt to say that it has a paralyzing\neffect on the nations who adopt it, but Asoka's edicts teem with words\nlike energy and strenuousness. \"It is most necessary to make an effort\nin this world,\" so he recounts the efforts which he has himself made and\nwants everybody else to make an effort. \"Work I must for the public\nbenefit--and the root of the matter is in exertion and despatch of\nbusiness than which nothing is more efficacious for the general\nwelfare.\" These sound like the words of a British utilitarian rather\nthan of a dreamy oriental emperor. He is far from pessimistic: indeed,\nhe almost ignores the Truth of Suffering. In describing the conquest of\nKalinga he speaks almost in the Buddha's words of the sorrow of death\nand separation, but instead of saying that such things are inevitable he\nwishes his subjects to be told that he regrets what has happened and\ndesires to give them security, peace and joy.\n\nAsoka has been compared with Constantine but it has been justly observed\nthat the comparison is superficial, for Constantine (more like Kanishka\nthan Asoka) merely recognized and regulated a religion which had already\nwon its way in his empire. He has also been compared with St Paul and in\nso far as both men transformed a provincial sect into a religion for all\nmankind the parallel is just, but it ends there. St Paul was a\nconstructive theologian. For good or evil he greatly developed and\ncomplicated the teaching of Christ, but the Edicts of Asoka if compared\nwith the Pitakas seem to curtail and simplify their doctrines. No\ninscription has yet been found mentioning the four truths, the chain of\ncausation and other familiar formul\u00e6. Doubtless Asoka duly studied these\nquestions, but it was not theology nor metaphysics which drew him\ntowards religion. In the gallery of pious Emperors--a collection of\ndubious moral and intellectual value--he stands isolated as perhaps the\none man whose only passion was for a sane, kindly and humane life,\nneither too curious of great mysteries nor preoccupied with his own soul\nbut simply the friend of man and beast.\n\nFor the history of doctrine the inscription at Rummindei is particularly\nimportant. It merely states that the King did honour or reverence to the\nbirthplace of the Buddha, who receives no titles except Sakyamuni and\nBhagavan here or elsewhere in the inscriptions. It is a simple record of\nrespect paid to a great human teacher who is not in any way deified nor\ndoes Asoka's language show any trace of the doctrines afterwards known\nunder the name of Mahayana. He does not mention nirvana or even\ntransmigration, though doubtless what he says about paradise and rewards\nhereafter should be read in the light of Indian doctrines about karma\nand sams\u00e2ra.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII\n\nTHE CANON\n\n1\n\n\nThere are extant in several languages large collections of Buddhist\nscriptures described by some European writers as the Canon. The name is\nconvenient and not incorrect, but the various canons are not altogether\nsimilar and the standard for the inclusion or exclusion of particular\nworks is not always clear. We know something of four or five canons.\n\n(1) The Pali Canon, accepted by the Buddhists of Ceylon, Burma and Siam,\nand rendered accessible to European students by the Pali Text Society.\nIt professes to contain the works recognized as canonical by the Council\nof Asoka and it is reasonably homogeneous, that is to say, although some\ningenuity may be needed to harmonize the different strata of which it\nconsists, it does not include works composed by several schools.\n\n(2) The Sanskrit Canon or Canons.\n\n_(a)_ Nepalese scriptures. These do not correspond with any Pali texts\nand all belong to the Mahayana. There appears to be no standard for\nfixing the canonical character of Mahayanist works. Like the Upanishads\nthey are held to be revealed from time to time.\n\n_(b)_ Buddhist texts discovered in Central Asia. Hitherto these have\nbeen merely fragments, but the number of manuscripts found and not yet\npublished permits the hope that longer texts may be forthcoming. Those\nalready made known are partly Mahayanist and partly similar to the Pali\nCanon though not a literal translation of it. It is not clear to what\nextent the Buddhists of Central Asia regarded the Hina and Mahayanist\nscriptures as separate and distinct. Probably each school selected for\nitself a small collection of texts as authoritative[599].\n\n_(3)_ The Chinese Canon. This is a gigantic collection of Buddhist works\nmade and revised by order of various Emperors. The imperial imprimatur\nis the only standard of canonicity. The contents include translations of\nworks belonging to all schools made from the first to the thirteenth\ncentury A.D. The originals were apparently all in Sanskrit and were\nprobably the texts of which fragments have been found in Central Asia.\nThis canon also includes some original Chinese works.\n\n(4) There is a somewhat similar collection of translations into Tibetan.\nBut whereas the Chinese Canon contains translations dated from 67 A.D.\nonwards, the Tibetan translations were made mainly in the ninth and\neleventh centuries and represent the literature esteemed by the medi\u00e6val\nBuddhism of Bengal. Part at least of this Tibetan Canon has been\ntranslated into Mongol.\n\nRenderings of various books into Uigur, Sogdian, Kuchanese, \"Nordarisch\"\nand other languages of Central Asia have been discovered by recent\nexplorers. It is probable that they are all derived from the Sanskrit\nCanon and do not represent any independent tradition. The scriptures\nused in Japan and Korea are simply special editions of the Chinese\nCanon, not translations.\n\nIn the following pages I propose to consider the Pali Canon, postponing\nuntil later an account of the others. It will be necessary, however, to\ntouch on the relations of Pali and Sanskrit texts.\n\nThe scriptures published by the Pali Text Society represent the canon of\nthe ancient sect called Vibhajjav\u00e2dins and the particular recension of\nit used at the monastery in Anuradhapura called Mah\u00e2vih\u00e2ra. It is\ntherefore not incorrect to apply to this recension such epithets as\nsouthern or Sinhalese, provided we remember that in its origin it was\nneither one nor the other, for the major part of it was certainly\ncomposed in India[600]. It was probably introduced into Ceylon in the\nthird century B.C. and it is also accepted in Burma, Siam and\nCamboja[601]. Thus in a considerable area it is the sole and undisputed\nversion of the scriptures.\n\nThe canon is often known by the name of Tripitaka[602] or Three Baskets.\nWhen an excavation was made in ancient India it was the custom to pass\nup the earth in baskets along a line of workmen[603] and the\nmetaphorical use of the word seems to be taken from this practice and to\nsignify transmission by tradition.\n\nThe three Pitakas are known as Vinaya, Sutta, and Abhidhamma. Vinaya\nmeans discipline and the works included in this division treat chiefly\nof the rules to be observed by the members of the Sangha. The basis of\nthese rules is the P\u00e2timokkha, the ancient confessional formula\nenumerating the offences which a monk can commit. It was read\nperiodically to a congregation of the order and those guilty of any sin\nhad to confess it. The text of the P\u00e2timokkha is in the Vinaya combined\nwith a very ancient commentary called the Sutta-vibhanga. The Vinaya\nalso contains two treatises known collectively as the Khandakas but more\nfrequently cited by their separate names as Mah\u00e2vagga and Cullavagga.\nThe first deals with such topics as the rules for admission to the\norder, and observance of fast days, and in treating of each rule it\ndescribes the occasion on which the Buddha made it and to some extent\nfollows the order of chronology. For some parts of the master's life it\nis almost a biography. The Cullavagga is similar in construction but\nless connected in style[604]. The Vinaya contains several important and\ncurious narratives and is a mine of information about the social\nconditions of ancient India, but much of it has the same literary value\nas the book of Leviticus. Of greater general interest is the Sutta\nPitaka, in which the sermons and discourses of the Buddha are collected.\nSutta is equivalent to the Sanskrit word S\u00fbtra, literally a thread,\nwhich signifies among the Brahmans a brief rule or aphorism but in Pali\na relatively short poem or narrative dealing with a single object. This\nSutta Pitaka is divided into five collections called Nik\u00e2yas. The first\nfour are mainly in prose and contain discourses attributed to Gotama or\nhis disciples. The fifth is mostly in verse and more miscellaneous.\n\nThe four collections of discourses bear the names of D\u00eegha, Majjhima,\nSamyutta and Anguttara. The first, meaning long, consists of thirty-four\nnarratives. They are not all sermons and are of varying character,\nantiquity and interest, the reason why they are grouped together being\nsimply their length[605]. In some of them we may fancy that we catch an\necho of Gotama's own words, but in others the legendary character is\nvery marked. Thus the Mah\u00e2samaya and At\u00e2n\u00e2tiya suttas are epitomes of\npopular mythology tacked on to the history of the Buddha. But for all\nthat they are interesting and ancient.\n\nMany of the suttas, especially the first thirteen, are rearrangements of\nold materials put together by a considerable literary artist who lived\nmany generations after the Buddha. The account of the Buddha's last days\nis an example of such a compilation which attains the proportions of a\nGospel and shows some dramatic power though it is marred by the\njuxtaposition of passages composed in very different styles.\n\nThe Majjhima-Nik\u00e2ya is a collection of 152 discourses of moderate\n(majjhima) length. Taken as a whole it is perhaps the most profound and\nimpassioned of all the Nik\u00e2yas and also the oldest. The sermons which it\ncontains, if not verbatim reports of Gotama's eloquence, have caught the\nspirit of one who urged with insistent earnestness the importance of\ncertain difficult truths and the tremendous issues dependent on right\nconduct and right knowledge. The remaining collections, the Samyutta and\nAnguttara, classify the Buddha's utterances under various headings and\npresuppose older documents which they sometimes quote[606]. The Samyutta\nconsists of a great number of suttas, mostly short, combined in groups\ntreating of a single subject which may be either a person or a topic.\nThe Anguttara, which is a still longer collection, is arranged in\nnumerical groups, a method of classification dear to the Hindus who\ndelight in such computations as the four meditations, the eightfold\npath, the ten fetters. It takes such religious topics as can be counted\nin this way and arranges them under the numbers from one to eleven. Thus\nunder three, it treats of thought, word and deed and the applications of\nthis division to morality; of the three messengers of the gods, old-age,\nsickness and death; of the three great evils, lust, ill-will and\nstupidity and so on.\n\nThe fifth or Khuddaka-Nik\u00e2ya is perhaps the portion of the Pali\nscriptures which has found most favour with Europeans, for the treatises\ncomposing it are short and some of them of remarkable beauty. They are\nin great part composed of verses, sometimes disconnected couplets,\nsometimes short poems. The stanzas are only imperfectly intelligible\nwithout an explanation of the occasion to which they refer. This is\ngenerally forthcoming, but is sometimes a part of the accepted text and\nsometimes regarded as merely a commentary. To this division of the\nPitaka belong the Dhammapada, a justly celebrated anthology of\ndevotional verses, and the Sutta-Nip\u00e2ta, a very ancient collection of\nsuttas chiefly in metre. Other important works included in it are the\nThera and Ther\u00ee-g\u00e2th\u00e2 or poems written by monks and nuns respectively,\nand the J\u00e2taka or stories about the Buddha's previous births[607]. Some\nof the rather miscellaneous contents of this Nik\u00e2ya are late and do not\nbelong to the same epoch of thought as the discourses attributed to\nGotama. Such are the Buddha-vamsa, or lives of Gotama and his\ntwenty-four predecessors, the Cariy\u00e2-Pitaka, a selection of J\u00e2taka\nstories about Gotama's previous births and the Vim\u00e2na and Peta-vatthus,\naccounts of celestial mansions and of the distressful existence led by\nthose who are condemned to be ghosts[608].\n\nThough some works comprised in this Nik\u00e2ya (e.g. the Suttanip\u00e2ta) are\nvery ancient, the collection, as it stands, is late and probably known\nonly to the southern Church. The contents of it are not quite the same\nin Ceylon, Burma and Siam, and only a small portion of them has been\nidentified in the Chinese Tripitaka. Nevertheless the word\n_pa\u00f1canek\u00e2yika_, one who knows the five Nik\u00e2yas, is found in the\ninscriptions of Sanchi and five Nik\u00e2yas are mentioned in the last books\nof the Cullavagga. Thus a fifth Nik\u00e2ya of some kind must have been known\nfairly early.\n\nThe third Pitaka is known by the name of Abhidhamma. Dhamma is the usual\ndesignation for the doctrine of the Buddha and Buddhaghosa[609] explains\nthe prefix abhi as signifying excess and distinction, so that this\nPitaka is considered pre-eminent because it surpasses the others. This\npre-eminence consists solely in method and scope, not in novelty of\nmatter or charm of diction. The point of view of the Abhidhamma is\ncertainly later than that of the Sutta Pitaka and in some ways marks an\nadvance, for instead of professing to report the discourses of Gotama it\ntakes the various topics on which he touched, especially psychological\nethics, and treats them in a connected and systematic manner. The style\nshows some resemblance to Sanskrit s\u00fbtras for it is so technical both in\nvocabulary and arrangement that it can hardly be understood without a\ncommentary[610]. According to tradition the Buddha recited the\nAbhidhamma when he went to heaven to preach to the gods, and this seems\na polite way of hinting that it was more than any human congregation\ncould tolerate or understand. Still throughout the long history of\nBuddhism it has always been respected as the most profound portion of\nthe scriptures and has not failed to find students. This Pitaka includes\nthe Kath\u00e2-vatthu, attributed to Tissa Moggaliputta who is said to have\ncomposed it about 250 B.C. in Asoka's reign[611].\n\nThere is another division of the Buddhist scriptures into nine _angas_\nor members, namely: 1. Suttas. 2. Geyya: mixed prose and verse. 3.\nG\u00e2th\u00e2: verse. 4. Ud\u00e2na: ecstatic utterances. 5. Veyy\u00e2karana:\nexplanation. 6. Itivuttaka: sayings beginning with the phrase \"Thus said\nthe Buddha.\" 7. J\u00e2taka: stories of former births. 8. Abbhutadhamma:\nstories of wonders. 9. Vedalla: a word of doubtful meaning, but perhaps\nquestions and answers. This enumeration is not to be understood as a\nstatement of the sections into which the whole body of scripture was\ndivided but as a description of the various styles of composition\nrecognized as being religious, just as the Old Testament might be said\nto contain historical books, prophecies, canticles and so on.\nCompositions in these various styles must have been current before the\nwork of collection began, as is proved by the fact that all the _angas_\nare enumerated in the Majjhima-Nik\u00e2ya[612].\n\n\n2\n\nThis Tripitaka is written in Pali[613] which is regarded by Buddhist\ntradition as the language spoken by the Master. In the time of Asoka the\ndialect of Magadha must have been understood over the greater part of\nIndia, like Hindustani in modern times, but in some details of grammar\nand phonetics Pali differs from M\u00e2gadh\u00ee Prakrit and seems to have been\ninfluenced by Sanskrit and by western dialects. Being a literary rather\nthan a popular language it was probably a mixed form of speech and it\nhas been conjectured that it was elaborated in Avanti or in G\u00e2ndh\u00e2ra\nwhere was the great Buddhist University of Takshas\u00eel\u00e2. Subsequently it\ndied out as a literary language in India[614] but in Ceylon, Burma, Siam\nand Camboja it became the vehicle of a considerable religious and\nscholastic literature. The language of Asoka's inscriptions in the third\ncentury B.C. is a parallel dialect, but only half stereotyped. The\nlanguage of the Mah\u00e2vastu and some Mahayanist texts, often called the\nlanguage of the G\u00e2th\u00e2s, seems to be another vernacular brought more or\nless into conformity with Sanskrit. It is probable that in preaching the\nBuddha used not Pali in the strict sense but the spoken dialect of\nMagadha[615], and that this dialect did not differ from Pali more than\nScotch or Yorkshire from standard English, and if for other reasons we\nare satisfied that some of the suttas have preserved the phrases which\nhe employed, we may consider that apart from possible deviations in\npronunciation or inflexion they are his _ipsissima verba_. Even as we\nhave it, the text of the canon contains some anomalous forms which are\ngenerally considered to be Magadhisms[616].\n\nThe Cullavagga relates how two monks who were Brahmans represented to\nthe Buddha that \"monks of different lineage ... corrupt the word of the\nBuddha by repeating it in their own dialect. Let us put the word of the\nBuddhas into _chandas_[617].\" No doubt Sanskrit verse is meant,\n_chandas_ being a name applied to the language of the Vedic verses.\nGotama refused: \"You are not to put the word of the Buddhas into\n_chandas_. Whoever does so shall be guilty of an offence. I allow you to\nlearn the word of the Buddhas each in his own dialect.\" Subsequent\ngenerations forgot this prohibition, but it probably has a historical\nbasis and it indicates the Buddha's desire to make his teaching popular.\nIt is not likely that he contemplated the composition of a body of\nscriptures. He would have been afraid that it might resemble the hymns\nof the Brahmans which he valued so little and he wished all men to hear\nhis teaching in the language they understood best. But when after his\ndeath his disciples collected his sayings it was natural that they\nshould make at least one version of them in the dialect most widely\nspoken and that this version should be gradually elaborated in what was\nconsidered the best literary form of that dialect[618]. It is probable\nthat the text underwent several linguistic revisions before it reached\nits present state.\n\nPali is a sonorous and harmonious language which avoids combinations of\nconsonants and several difficult sounds found in Sanskrit. Its\nexcellence lies chiefly in its vocabulary and its weakness in its\nsyntax. Its inflexions are heavy and monotonous and the sentences lack\nconcentration and variety. Compound words do not assume such monstrous\nproportions as in later Sanskrit, but there is the same tendency to make\nthe process of composition do duty for syntax. These faults have been\nintensified by the fact that the language has been used chiefly for\ntheological discussion. The vocabulary on the other hand is copious and\nfor special purposes admirable. The translator has to struggle\ncontinually with the difficulty of finding equivalents for words which,\nthough apparently synonymous, really involve nice distinctions and much\nmisunderstanding has arisen from the impossibility of adequately\nrendering philosophical terms, which, though their European equivalents\nsound vague, have themselves a precise significance. On the other hand\nsome words (e.g. _dhamma_ and _attho_) show an inconveniently wide range\nof meaning. But the force of the language is best seen in its power of\ngathering up in a single word, generally a short compound, an idea which\nthough possessing a real unity requires in European languages a whole\nphrase for its expression. Thus the Buddha bids his disciples be\n_attad\u00eep\u00e2 atta-saran\u00e2, ana\u00f1\u00f1a-saran\u00e2: dhammad\u00eep\u00e2 dhammasaran\u00e2_[619]. \"Be\nye lamps unto yourselves. Be ye a refuge unto yourselves. Betake\nyourselves to no external refuge. Hold fast to the truth as a lamp. Hold\nfast to the truth as a refuge.\" This is Rhys Davids' translation and\nexcellent both as English and as giving the meaning. But the five Pali\nwords compel attention and inscribe themselves on the memory in virtue\nof a monumental simplicity which the five English sentences do not\npossess.\n\nBut the feature in the Pali scriptures which is most prominent and most\ntiresome to the unsympathetic reader is the repetition of words,\nsentences and whole paragraphs. This is partly the result of grammar or\nat least of style. The simplicity of Pali syntax and the small use made\nof dependent sentences, lead to the regular alignment of similar phrases\nside by side like boards in a floor. When anything is predicated of\nseveral subjects, for instance the five Skandhas, it is rare to find a\nsingle sentence containing a combined statement. As a rule what has to\nbe said is predicated first of the first Skandha and then repeated\n_totidem verbis_ of the others. But there is another cause for this\ntedious peculiarity, namely that for a long period the Pitakas were\nhanded down by oral tradition only. They were first reduced to writing\nin Ceylon about 20 B.C. in the reign of Vattag\u00e2mani, more than a century\nand a half after their first importation in an oral form. This\ncircumstance need not throw doubt on the authenticity of the text, for\nthe whole ancient literature of India, prose as well as verse, was\nhanded down by word of mouth and even in the present day most of it\ncould be recovered if all manuscripts and books were lost. The Buddhists\ndid not, like the Brahmans, make minute regulations for preserving and\nmemorizing their sacred texts, and in the early ages of the faith were\nimpressed with the idea that their teaching was not a charm to be learnt\nby heart but something to be understood and practised. They nevertheless\nendeavoured, and probably with success, to learn by heart the words of\nthe Buddha, converting them into the dialect most widely understood. It\nwas then a common thing (and the phenomenon may still be seen in India)\nfor a man of learning to commit to memory a whole Veda together with\nsubsidiary treatises on ritual, metre, grammar and genealogy. For such\nmemories it was not difficult to retain the principal points in a series\nof sermons. The Buddha had preached day by day for about forty-five\nyears. Though he sometimes spoke with reference to special events he no\ndoubt had a set of discourses which he regularly repeated. There was the\nless objection to such repetition because he was continually moving\nabout and addressing new audiences. There were trained Brahman students\namong his disciples, and at his death many persons, probably hundreds,\nmust have had by heart summaries of his principal sermons.\n\nBut a sermon is less easy to remember than a poem or matter arranged by\nsome method of _memoria technica_. An obvious aid to recollection is to\ndivide the discourse into numbered heads and attach to each certain\nstriking phrases. If the phrases can be made to recur, so much the\nbetter, for there is a guarantee of correctness when an expected formula\nappears at appropriate points.\n\nIt may be too that the wearisome and mechanical iteration of the Pali\nCanon is partly due to the desire of the Sinhalese to lose nothing of\nthe sacred word imparted to them by missionaries from a foreign country,\nfor repetition to this extent is not characteristic of Indian\ncompositions. It is less noticeable in Sanskrit Buddhist s\u00fbtras than in\nthe Pali but is very marked in Jain literature. A moderate use of it is\na feature of the Upanishads. In these we find recurring formul\u00e6 and also\nsuccessive phrases constructed on one plan and varying only in a few\nwords[620].\n\nBut still I suspect that repetition characterized not only the reports\nof the discourses but the discourses themselves. No doubt the versions\nwhich we have are the result of compressing a free discourse into\nnumbered paragraphs and repetitions: the living word of the Buddha was\nsurely more vivacious and plastic than these stiff tabulations. But the\npeculiarities of scholars can often be traced to the master and the\nBuddha had much the same need of mnemonics as his hearers. For he had\nexcogitated complicated doctrines and he imparted them without the aid\nof notes and though his natural wit enabled him to adapt his words to\nthe capacity of his hearers and to meet argument, still his wish was to\nformulate a consistent statement of his thoughts. In the earliest\ndiscourse ascribed to him, the sermon at Benares, we see these habits of\nnumbering and repetition already fully developed. The next discourse, on\nthe absence of a soul, consists in enumerating the five words, form,\nsensation, perception, sankh\u00e2ras, and consciousness three times, and\napplying to each of them consecutively three statements or arguments,\nthe whole concluding with a phrase which is used as a finale in many\nother places. Artificial as this arrangement sounds when analyzed, it is\na natural procedure for one who wished to impress on his hearers a\nseries of philosophic propositions without the aid of writing, and I can\nimagine that these rhythmical formul\u00e6 uttered in that grave and pleasant\nvoice which the Buddha is said to have possessed, seemed to the\nleisurely yet eager groups who sat round him under some wayside banyan\nor in the monastery park, to be not tedious iteration but a gradual\nrevelation of truth growing clearer with each repetition.\n\nWe gather from the Pitakas that writing was well known in the Buddha's\ntime[621]. But though it was used for inscriptions, accounts and even\nletters, it was not used for books, partly because the Brahmans were\nprejudiced against it, and partly because no suitable material for\ninditing long compositions had been discovered. There were religious\nobjections to parchment and leaves were not employed till later. The\nminute account of monastic life given in the Vinaya makes it certain\nthat the monks did not use writing for religious purposes. Equally\nconclusive, though also negative, is the fact that in the accounts of\nthe assemblies at R\u00e2jagaha and Ves\u00e2l\u00ee[622] when there is a dispute as to\nthe correct ruling on a point, there is no appeal to writing but merely\nto the memory of the oldest and most authoritative monks. In the Vinaya\nwe hear of people who know special books: of monks who are preachers of\nthe Dhamma and others who know the Sutta: of laymen who have learnt a\nparticular suttanta and are afraid it will fall into oblivion unless\nothers learn it from them. Apprehensions are expressed that suttas will\nbe lost if monks neglect to learn them by heart[623]. From inscriptions\nof the third century B.C.[624] are quoted words like Petak\u00ee, a reciter\nof the Pitakas or perhaps of one Pitaka: Sutt\u00e2ntika and Sutt\u00e2ntakin\u00ee, a\nman or woman who recites the suttantas: Pancanek\u00e2yika, one who recites\nthe five Nik\u00e2yas. All this shows that from the early days of Buddhism\nonwards a succession of persons made it their business to learn and\nrecite the doctrine and disciplinary rules and, considering the\nretentiveness of trained memories, we have no reason to doubt that the\ndoctrine and rules have been preserved without much loss[625].\n\nNot, however, without additions. The disadvantage of oral tradition is\nnot that it forgets but that it proceeds snowball fashion, adding with\nevery generation new edifying matter. The text of the Vedic hymns was\npreserved with such jealous care that every verse and syllable was\ncounted. But in works of lesser sanctity interpolations and additions\nwere made according to the reciters' taste. We cannot assign to the\nMah\u00e2bh\u00e2rata one date or author, and the title of Upanishad is no\nguarantee for the age or authenticity of the treatises that bear it.\nAlready in the Anguttara-Nik\u00e2ya[626], we hear of tables of contents and\nthe expression is important, for though we cannot give any more precise\nexplanation of it, it shows that care was taken to check the contents of\nthe works accepted as scripture. But still there is little doubt that\nduring the two or three centuries following the Buddha's death, there\nwent on a process not only of collection and recension but also of\ncomposition.\n\nAn account of the formation of the canon is given in the last two\nchapters of the Cullavagga[627]. After the death of the Buddha his\ndisciples met to decide what should be regarded as the correct doctrine\nand discipline. The only way to do that was to agree what had been the\nutterances of the master and this, in a country where the oral\ntransmission of teaching was so well understood, amounted to laying the\nfoundations of a canon. Kassapa cross-examined experts as to the\nBuddha's precepts. For the rules of discipline Up\u00e2li was the chief\nauthority and we read how he was asked where such and such a rule--for\ninstance, the commandment against stealing--was promulgated.\n\n\"At R\u00e2jagaha, sir.\"\n\n\"Concerning whom was it spoken?\"\n\n\"Dhaniya, the potter's son.\"\n\n\"In regard to what matter?\"\n\n\"The taking of that which had not been given.\"\n\nFor collecting the suttas they relied on the testimony of \u00c2nanda and\nasked him where the Brahmaj\u00e2la[628] was spoken. He replied \"between\nR\u00e2jagaha and N\u00e2landa at the royal rest-house at Ambalatthika.\"\n\"Concerning whom was it spoken?\" \"Suppiya, the wandering ascetic and\nBrahmadatta the young Brahman.\"\n\nThen follows a similar account of the S\u00e2ma\u00f1\u00f1aphala sutta and we are told\nthat \u00c2nanda was \"questioned through the five Nik\u00e2yas.\" That is no doubt\nan exaggeration as applied to the time immediately after the Buddha's\ndeath, but it is evidence that five Nik\u00e2yas were in existence when this\nchapter was written[629].\n\n\n3\n\nLines of growth are clearly discernible in the Vinaya and Sutta Pitakas.\nAs already mentioned, the Khuddaka-Nik\u00e2ya is, as a collection, later\nthan the others although separate books of it, such as the Sutta-nip\u00e2ta\n(especially the fourth and fifth books), are among the earliest\ndocuments which we possess. But other books such as the Peta-[630] and\nVim\u00e2na-vatthu show a distinct difference in tone and are probably\nseparated from the Buddha by several centuries. Of the other four\nNik\u00e2yas the Samyutta and Anguttara are the more modern and the Anguttara\nmentions Munda, King of Magadha who began to reign about forty years\nafter the Buddha's death. But even in the two older collections, the\nD\u00eegha and the Majjhima, we have not reached the lowest stratum. The\nfirst thirteen suttantas of the D\u00eegha all contain a very ancient\ntractate on morality, and the S\u00e2ma\u00f1\u00f1aphala and following sections of the\nD\u00eegha and also some suttas of the Majjhima contain either in whole or in\npart a treatise on progress in the holy life. These treatises were\nprobably current as separate portions for recitation before the suttas\nin which they are now set were composed.\n\nSimilarly, the Vinaya clearly presupposes an old code in the form of a\nlist of offences called the P\u00e2timokkha. The Mah\u00e2vagga contains a portion\nof an ancient word-for-word explanation of this code[631] and most of\nthe Sutta-vibhanga is an amplification and exposition of it. The\nP\u00e2timokkha was already in existence when these books were composed, for\nwe hear[632] that if in a company of Bhikkhus no one knows the\nP\u00e2timokkha, one of the younger brethren should be sent to some better\ninstructed monastery to learn it. And further we hear[633] that a\nlearned Bhikkhu was expected to know not merely the precepts of the\nP\u00e2timokkha but also the occasion when each was formulated. The place,\nthe circumstances and the people concerned had been in each case handed\ndown. There is here all the material for a narrative. The reciter of a\nsutta simply adopts the style of a village story-teller. \"Thus have I\nheard. Once upon a time the Lord was dwelling at R\u00e2jagaha,\" or wherever\nit was, and such and such people came to see him. And then, after a more\nor less dramatic introduction, comes the Lord's discourse and at the end\nan epilogue saying how the hearers were edified and, if previously\nunconverted, took refuge in the true doctrine.\n\nThe Cullavagga states that the Vinaya (but not the other Pitakas) was\nrecited and verified at the Council of Ves\u00e2l\u00ee. As I have mentioned\nelsewhere, Sinhalese and Chinese accounts speak of another Council, the\nMah\u00e2sangha or Mah\u00e2sang\u00eeti. Though its date is uncertain, there is a\nconsensus of tradition to the effect that it recognized a canon of its\nown, different from our Pali Canon and containing a larger amount of\npopular matter.\n\nSinhalese tradition states that the canon as we now have it was fixed at\nthe third Council held at Pataliputra in the reign of Asoka (about\n272-232 B.C.). The most precise statements about this Council are those\nof Buddhaghosa who says that an assembly of monks who knew the three\nPitakas by heart recited the Vinaya and the Dhamma.\n\nBut the most important and interesting evidence as to the existence of\nBuddhist scriptures in the third century B.C. is afforded by the Bh\u00e2br\u00fb\n(or Bh\u00e2br\u00e2) edict of Asoka. He recommends the clergy to study seven\npassages, of which nearly all can be identified in our present edition\nof the Pitakas[634]. This edict does not prove that Asoka had before him\nin the form which we know the D\u00eegha and other works cited. But the most\ncautious logic must admit that there was a collection of the Buddha's\nsayings to which he could appeal and that if most of his references to\nthis collection can be identified in our Pitakas, then the major part of\nthese Pitakas is probably identical in substance (not necessarily\nverbally) with the collection of sayings known to Asoka.\n\nNeither Asoka nor the author of the Kath\u00e2-vatthu cites books by name.\nThe latter for instance quotes the well-known lines \"anupubbena medhavi\"\nnot as coming from the Dhammapada but as \"spoken by the Lord.\" But the\nauthor of the Questions of Milinda, who knew the canonical books by the\nnames they bear now, also often adopts a similar method of citation.\nAlthough this author's probable date is not earlier than our era his\nevidence is important. He mentions all five Nik\u00e2yas by name, the titles\nof many suttas and also the Vibhanga, Dh\u00e2tu-kath\u00e2, Puggala-Pa\u00f1\u00f1atti,\nKath\u00e2-vatthu, Yamaka and Patth\u00e2na.\n\nEverything indicates and nothing discredits the conclusion that this\ncanon of the Vibhajjav\u00e2dins was substantially fixed in the time of\nAsoka, so far as the Vinaya and Sutta Pitakas are concerned. Some works\nof minor importance may have had an uncertain position and subsequent\nrevisions may have been made but the principal scriptures were already\nrecognized and contained passages which occur in our versions. On the\nother hand this recension of the scriptures was not the only one in\nexistence. If the patronage of Asoka gave it a special prestige in his\nlifetime, it may have lost it in India after his death and for many\ncenturies the Buddhist Canon, like the list of the Upanishads, must have\nbeen susceptible of alteration. The Sarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2dins compiled an\nAbhidhamma Pitaka of their own, apparently in the time of Kanishka, and\nthe Dharmagupta school also seems to have had its own version of this\nPitaka[635]. The date of the Pali Abhidhamma is very doubtful and I do\nnot reject the hypothesis that it was composed in Ceylon, for the\nSinhalese seem to have a special taste for such literature. But there is\nno proof of this Sinhalese origin.\n\nAccording to Sinhalese tradition all three Pitakas were introduced into\nCeylon by Mahinda in the reign of Asoka, but only as oral tradition and\nnot in a written form. They received this latter about 20 B.C., as the\nresult of a dispute between two monasteries[636]. The controversy is\nobscure but it appears that the ancient foundation called Mah\u00e2vih\u00e2ra\naccepted as canonical the fifth book of the Vinaya called Pariv\u00e2ra,\nwhereas it was rejected by the new monastery called Abhayagiri. The\nSinhalese chronicle (Mah\u00e2vamsa XXXIII. 100-104) says somewhat abruptly\n\"The wise monks had hitherto handed down the text of the three Pitakas\n(Pitakattayap\u00e2lim) as well as the commentary by word of mouth. But\nseeing that mankind was becoming lost, they assembled together and wrote\nthem in books in order that the faith might long endure.\" This brief\naccount seems to mean that a council was held not by the whole clergy of\nCeylon but by the monks of the Mah\u00e2vih\u00e2ra at which they committed to\nwriting their own version of the canon including the Pariv\u00e2ra. This book\nforms an appendix to the Vinaya Pitaka and in some verses printed at the\nconclusion is said to be the work of one D\u00eepa. It is generally accepted\nas a relatively late production, composed in Ceylon. If such a work was\nincluded in the canon of the Mah\u00e2vih\u00e2ra, we must admit the possibility\nthat other portions of it may be Sinhalese and not Indian.\n\nBut still the _onus probandi_ lies with those who maintain the Sinhalese\norigin of any part of the Pali Canon and two strong arguments support\nthe Indian origin of the major part. First, many suttas not only show an\nintimate knowledge of ancient Indian customs but discuss topics such as\ncaste, sacrifice, ancient heresies, and the value of the Veda which\nwould be of no interest to Sinhalese. Secondly, there is no Sinhalese\nlocal colour and no Sinhalese legends have been introduced. Contrast\nwith this the D\u00eepa-and Mah\u00e2-vamsa both of which open with accounts of\nmythical visits paid by the Buddha to Ceylon[637].\n\nIn Ceylon versions of the scriptures other than that of the Mah\u00e2vih\u00e2ra\nwere current until the twelfth century when uniformity was enforced by\nPar\u00e2krama B\u00e2hu. Some of these, for instance the Pitaka of the\nVetulyakas, were decidedly heretical according to the standard of local\northodoxy but others probably presented variations of reading and\narrangement rather than of doctrine. Anesaki[638] has compared with the\nreceived Pali text a portion of the Samyukt\u00e2gama translated by\nGunabhadra into Chinese. He thinks that the original was the text used\nby the Abhayagiri monastery and brought to China by Fa Hsien.\n\nThe Sinhalese ecclesiastical history, Nik\u00e2ya-Sangrahawa, relates[639]\nthat 235 years after the Buddha's death nine heretical fraternities were\nformed who proceeded to compose scriptures of their own such as the\nVarnapitaka and Angulim\u00e2la-Pitaka. Though this treatise is late (_c_.\n1400 A.D.) its statements merit attention as showing that even in\northodox Ceylon tradition regarded the authorized Pitaka as one of\nseveral versions. But many of the works mentioned sound like late\ntantric texts rather than compositions of the early heretics to whom\nthey are attributed.\n\nEcclesiastical opinion in Ceylon after centuries of discussion ended by\naccepting the edition of the Mah\u00e2vih\u00e2ra as the best, and we have no\ngrounds for rejecting or suspecting this opinion. According to tradition\nBuddhaghosa was well versed in Sanskrit but deliberately preferred the\nsouthern canon. The Mahayanist doctor Asanga cites texts found in the\nPali version, but not in the Sanskrit[640]. The monks of the Mah\u00e2vih\u00e2ra\nwere probably too indulgent in admitting late scholastic treatises, such\nas the Pariv\u00e2ra. On the other hand they often showed a critical instinct\nin rejecting legendary matter. Thus the Sanskrit Vinayas contain many\nmore miraculous narratives than the Pali Vinaya.\n\n\n4\n\nEuropean critics have rarely occasion to discuss the credibility of\nSanskrit literature, for most of it is so poetic or so speculative that\nno such question arises. But the Pitakas raise this question as directly\nas the Gospels, for they give the portrait of a man and the story of a\nlife, in which an overgrowth of the miraculous has not hidden or\ndestroyed the human substratum. How far can we accept them as a true\npicture of what Gotama was and taught?\n\nTheir credibility must be judged by the standard of Indian oral\ntradition. Its greatest fault comes from that deficiency in historic\nsense which we have repeatedly noticed. Hindu chroniclers ignore\nimportant events and what they record drifts by in a haze in which\nproportion, connection, and dates are lost. They frequently raise a\nstructure of fiction on a slight basis of fact or on no basis at all.\nBut the fiction is generally so obvious that the danger of historians in\nthe past has been not to be misled by it but to ignore the elements of\ntruth which it may contain. For the Hindus have a good verbal memory;\ntheir genealogies, lists of kings and places generally prove to be\ncorrect and they have a passion for catalogues of names. Also they take\na real interest in describing doctrine. If the Buddha has been\nmisrepresented, it is not for want of acumen or power of transmitting\nabstruse ideas. The danger rather is that he who takes an interest in\ntheology is prone to interpret a master's teaching in the light of his\nown pet views.\n\nThe Pitakas illustrate the strong and weak points of Hindu tradition.\nThe feebleness of the historical sense may be seen in the account of\nDevadatta's doings in the Cullavagga[641] where the compiler seems\nunable to give a clear account of what he must have regarded as\nmomentous incidents. Yet the same treatise is copious and lucid in\ndealing with monastic rules, and the sayings recorded have an air of\nauthenticity. In the suttas the strong side of Hindu memory is brought\ninto play. Of consecutive history there is no question. We have only an\nintroduction giving the names of some characters and localities followed\nby a discourse. We know from the Vinaya that the monks were expected to\nexercise themselves in remembering these things, and they are precisely\nthe things that they would get rightly by heart. I see no reason to\ndoubt that such discourses as the sermon preached at Benares[642] and\nthe recurring passages in the first book of the D\u00eegha-Nik\u00e2ya are a Pali\nversion of what was accepted as the words of the Buddha soon after his\ndeath. And the change of dialect is not of great importance. Asoka's\nBh\u00e2br\u00fb Edict contains the saying: _Thus the good law shall long endure_,\nwhich is believed to be a quotation and certainly corresponds pretty\nclosely with a passage in the Anguttara-Nik\u00e2ya[643]. The King's version\nis _Saddhamma cilathitike hasati_: the Pali is _Saddhammo c\u00eeratthitiko\nhoti_. Somewhat similar may have been the differences between the\nBuddha's speech and the text which we possess. The importance of the\nchange in language is diminished and the facility of transmission is\nincreased by the fact that in Pali, Sanskrit and kindred Indian\nlanguages ideas are concentrated in single words rather than spread over\nsentences. Thus the principal words of the sermon at Benares give its\npurport with perfect clearness, if they are taken as a mere list without\ngrammatical connection. Similarly I should imagine that the recurring\nparagraphs about progress in the holy life found in the early Suttas of\nthe D\u00eegha-Nik\u00e2ya are an echo of the Buddha's own words, for they bear an\nimpress not only of antiquity but of eloquence and elevation. This does\nnot mean that we have any sermon in the exact form in which Gotama\nuttered it. Such documents as the S\u00e2ma\u00f1\u00f1aphala-sutta and Ambattha-sutta\nprobably give a good idea of his method and style in consecutive\ndiscourse and argument. But it would not be safe to regard them as more\nthan the work of compilers who were acquainted with the surroundings in\nwhich he lived, the phrases he used, and the names and business of those\nwho conversed with him. With these they made a picture of a day in his\nlife, culminating in a sermon[644].\n\nLike the historical value of the Pitakas, their literary value can be\njustly estimated only if we remember that they are not books in our\nsense but treatises handed down by memory and that their form is\ndetermined primarily by the convenience of the memory. We must not\ncompare them with Plato and find them wanting, for often, especially in\nthe Abhidhamma, there is no intention of producing a work of art, but\nmerely of subdividing a subject and supplying explanations. Frequently\nthe exposition is thrown into the form of a catechism with questions and\nanswers arranged so as to correspond to numbered categories. Thus a\ntopic may be divided into twenty heads and six propositions may be\napplied to each with positive or negative results. The strong point of\nthese Abhidhamma works---and of Buddhist philosophy generally--lies in\ncareful division and acute analysis but the power of definition is weak.\nRarely is a definition more than a collection of synonyms and very often\nthe word to be defined is repeated in the definition. Thus in the\nDhamma-sangani the questions, what are good or bad states of mind?\nreceive answers cast in the form: when a good or bad thought has arisen\nwith certain accompaniments enumerated at length, then these are the\nstates that are good or bad. No definition of good is given.\n\nThis mnemonic literature attains its highest excellence in poetry. The\nart of composing short poems in which a thought, emotion or spiritual\nexperience is expressed with a few simple but pregnant words in the\ncompass of a single couplet or short hymn, was carried by the early\nBuddhists to a perfection which has never been excelled. The\nDhammapada[645] is the best known specimen of this literature. Being an\nanthology it is naturally more suited for quotation or recitation in\nsections than for continuous reading. But its twenty-five chapters are\nconsecrated each to some special topic which receives fairly consecutive\ntreatment, though each chapter is a mosaic of short poems consisting of\none or more verses supposed to have been uttered by the Buddha or by\narhats on various occasions. The whole work combines literary beauty,\ndepth of thought and human feeling in a rare degree. Not only is it\nirradiated with the calm light of peace, faith and happiness but it\nglows with sympathy, with the desire to do good and help those who are\nstruggling in the mire of passion and delusion. For this reason it has\nfound more favour with European readers than the detached and\nphilosophic texts which simply preach self-conquest and aloofness.\nInferior in beauty but probably older is the Sutta-nip\u00e2ta, a collection\nof short discourses or conversations with the Buddha mostly in verse.\nThe rugged and popular language of these stanzas which reject\nspeculation as much as luxury, takes us back to the life of the\nwanderers who followed the Buddha on his tours and we may imagine that\npoems like the Dhaniya sutta would be recited when they met together in\na rest-house or grove set apart for their use on the outskirts of a\nvillage.\n\nThe Buddhist suttas, are interesting as being a special result of\nGotama's activity; they are not analogous to the Brahmanic works called\ns\u00fbtras, and they have no close parallel in later Indian literature.\nThere is little personal background in the Upanishads, none at all in\nthe S\u00e2nkhya and Ved\u00e2nta s\u00fbtras. But the Sutta Pitaka is an attempt to\ndelineate a personality as well as to record a doctrine. Though the idea\nof writing biography has not yet been clearly conceived, yet almost\nevery discourse brings before us the figure of the Lord: though the\ndoctrine can be detached from the preacher, yet one feels that the\nhearers of the Pitaka hungered not merely for a knowledge of the four\ntruths but for the very words of the great voice: did he really say\nthis, and if so when, where and why? Most suttas begin by answering\nthese questions. They describe a scene and report a discourse and in so\ndoing they create a type of literature with an interest and\nindividuality of its own. It is no exaggeration to say that the Buddha\nis the most living figure in Hindu literature. He stands before us more\ndistinctly not only than Y\u00e2j\u00f1avalkya and Sankara, but than modern\nteachers like Nanak and R\u00e2m\u00e2nuja and the reason of this distinctness can\nI think be nothing but the personal impression which he made on his age.\nThe later Buddhists compose nothing in the style of the Nik\u00e2yas: they\nwrite about Gotama in new and fanciful ways, but no Acts of the Apostles\nsucceed the Gospels.\n\nThough the Buddhist suttas are _sui generis_ and mark a new epoch in\nIndian literature, yet in style they are a natural development of the\nUpanishads. The Upanishads are less dogmatic and show much less interest\nin the personality of their sages, but they contain dialogues closely\nanalogous to suttas. Thus about half of the Brihad-\u00c2ranyaka is a\nphilosophic treatise unconnected with any particular name, but in this\nare set five dialogues in which Y\u00e2j\u00f1avalkya appears and two others in\nwhich Aj\u00e2tasatru and Prav\u00e2hana Jaivali are the protagonists.\n\nThough many suttas are little more than an exposition of some doctrine\narranged in mnemonic form, others show eloquence and dramatic skill.\nThus the S\u00e2ma\u00f1\u00f1aphala-sutta opens with a vivid description of the visit\npaid one night by Aj\u00e2tasattu to the Buddha[646]. We see the royal\nprocession of elephants and share the alarm of the suspicious king at\nthe unearthly stillness of the monastery park, until he saw the Buddha\nsitting in a lighted pavilion surrounded by an assembly of twelve\nhundred and fifty brethren, calm and silent as a clear lake. The king's\nlong account of his fruitless quest for truth would be tiresome if it\nwere not of such great historic interest and the same may be said of the\nBuddha's enumeration of superstitious and reprehensible practices, but\nfrom this point onwards his discourse is a magnificent crescendo of\nthought and language, never halting and illustrated by metaphors of\ngreat effect and beauty. Equally forcible and surely resting on some\ntradition of the Buddha's own words is the solemn fervour which often\nmarks the suttas of the Majjhima such as the descriptions of his\nstruggle for truth, the admonitions to R\u00e2hula and the reproof\nadministered to S\u00e2ti.\n\n\n5\n\nAs mentioned above, our Pali Canon is the recension of the\nVibhajjav\u00e2dins. We know from the records of the Chinese pilgrims that\nother schools also had recensions of their own, and several of these\nrecensions--such as those of the Sarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2dins, Mah\u00e2sanghikas,\nMahis\u00e2sakas, Dhammaguttikas, and Sammit\u00eeyas--are still partly extant in\nChinese and Tibetan translations. These appear to have been made from\nthe Sanskrit and fragments of what was probably the original have been\npreserved in Central Asia. A recension of the text in Sanskrit probably\nimplies less than what we understand by a translation. It may mean that\ntexts handed down in some Indian dialect which was neither Sanskrit nor\nPali were rewritten with Sanskrit orthography and inflexions while\npreserving much of the original vocabulary. The Buddha allowed all men\nto learn his teaching in their own language, and different schools are\nsaid to have written the scriptures in different dialects, e.g. the\nMah\u00e2sanghikas in a kind of Prakrit not further specified and the\nMah\u00e2sammat\u00eeyas in Apabhramsa. When Sanskrit became the recognized\nvehicle for literary composition there would naturally be in India\n(though not in Ceylon) a tendency to rewrite books composed in other\ndialects[647]. The idea that when any important matter is committed to\nwriting it should be expressed in a literary dialect not too\nintelligible to the vulgar is prevalent from Morocco to China. The\nlanguage of Bengal illustrates what may have happened to the Buddhist\nscriptures. It is said that at the beginning of the nineteenth century\nninety per cent, of the vocabulary of Bengali was Sanskrit, and the\ngrammatical construction sanskritized as well. Though the literary\nlanguage now-a-days is less artificial, it still differs widely from the\nvernacular. Similarly the spoken word of the Buddha was forced into\nconformity with one literary standard or another and ecclesiastical Pali\nbecame as artificial as Sanskrit. The same incidents may be found worked\nup in both languages. Thus the Sanskrit version of the story of P\u00fbrn\u00e2 in\nthe Divy\u00e2va-d\u00e2na repeats what is found in Pali in the\nSamyutta-Nik\u00e2ya[648] and reappears in Sanskrit in the Vinaya of the\nM\u00fblasarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2din school.\n\nThe Chinese Tripitaka has been catalogued and we possess some\ninformation respecting the books which it contains, though none of them\nhave been edited in Europe. Thus we know something[649] of the\nSarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2din recension of the Abhidhamma. Like the Pali version it\nconsists of seven books of which one, the J\u00f1\u00e2na-prasth\u00e2na by\nK\u00e2ty\u00e2yan\u00eeputra, is regarded as the principal, the rest being\nsupplementary. All the books are attributed to human authors, and though\nsome of these bear the names of the Buddha's immediate disciples,\ntradition connects K\u00e2ty\u00e2yan\u00eeputra with Kanishka's council. This is not a\nvery certain date, but still the inference is that about the time of the\nChristian era the contents of the Abhidhamma-Pitaka were not rigidly\ndefined and a new recension was possible.\n\nThe Sanskrit manuscripts discovered in Central Asia include S\u00fbtras from\nthe Samyukta and Ekottara \u00c2gamas (equivalent to the Samyutta and\nAnguttara Nik\u00e2yas), a considerable part of the Dharmapada, fragments of\nthe Sutta-Nip\u00e2ta and the Pr\u00e2timoksha of the Sarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2din school. These\ncorrespond fairly well with the Pali text but represent another\nrecension and a somewhat different arrangement. We have therefore here\nfragments of a Sanskrit version which must have been imported to Central\nAsia from northern India and covers, so far as the fragments permit us\nto judge, the same ground as the Vinaya and Suttas of the Pali Canon.\nFar from displaying the diffuse and inflated style which characterizes\nthe Mah\u00e2y\u00e2na texts it is sometimes shorter and simpler than our Pali\nversion[650].\n\nWhen was this version composed and what is its relation to the Pali? A\ndefinite reply would be premature, for other Sanskrit texts may be\ndiscovered in Central Asia, but two circumstances connect this early\nBuddhist literature in Sanskrit with the epoch of Kanishka. Firstly the\nSanskrit Abhidharma of the Sarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2dins seems to date from his council\nand secondly a Buddhist drama by Asvaghosha[651] of about the same time\nrepresents the Buddha as speaking in Sanskrit whereas the inferior\ncharacters speak Prakrit. But these facts do not prove that Sanskrit was\nnot the language of the canon at an earlier date[652] and it is not safe\nto conclude that because Asoka did not employ it for writing edicts it\nwas not the sacred language of any section of Indian Buddhists. On the\nother hand some of the Sanskrit texts contain indications that they are\na translation from Pali or some vernacular[653]. In others are found\nhistorical allusions which suggest that they must have received\nadditions after our era[654].\n\nI have already raised the question of the relative value attaching to\nPali and Sanskrit texts as authorities for early history. Two instances\nwill perhaps illustrate this better than a general discussion. As\nalready mentioned, the Vinaya of the M\u00fblasarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2dins makes the Buddha\nvisit north-western India and Kashmir, whereas the Pali texts do not\nrepresent him as travelling further west than the country of the Kurus.\nThe Sanskrit account is not known to be confirmed by more ancient\nevidence, but there is nothing impossible in it, particularly as there\nare periods in the Buddha's long life filled by no incidents. The\nnarrative however contains a prediction about Kanishka and therefore\ncannot be earlier than his reign. Now there is no reason why the Pali\ntexts should be silent about this journey, if the Buddha really made it,\nbut one can easily imagine reasons for inventing it in the period of the\nKushan kings. North-western India was then full of monasteries and\nsacred sites and the same spirit which makes uncritical Buddhists in\nCeylon and Siam assert to-day that the master visited their country\nimpelled the monks of Peshawar and Kashmir to imagine a not improbable\nextension of his wanderings[655].\n\nOn the other hand this same Vinaya of the M\u00fblasarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2dins probably\ngives us a fragment of history when it tells us that the Buddha had\nthree wives, perhaps too when it relates how R\u00e2hula's paternity was\ncalled in question and how Devadatta wanted to marry Yasodhar\u00e2 after the\nBuddha had abandoned worldly life[656]. The Pali Vinaya and also some\nSanskrit Vinayas[657] mention only one wife or none at all. They do not\nattempt to describe Gotama's domestic life and if they make no allusion\nto it except to mention the mother of R\u00e2hula, this is not equivalent to\nan assertion that he had no other wife. But when one Vinaya composed in\nthe north of India essays to give a biography of the Buddha and states\nthat he had three wives, there is no reason for doubting that the\ncompiler was in touch with good local tradition.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV\n\nMEDITATION\n\n\nIndian religions lay stress on meditation. It is not merely commended as\na useful exercise but by common consent it takes rank with sacrifice and\nprayer, or above them, as one of the great activities of the religious\nlife, or even as its only true activity. It has the full approval of\nphilosophy as well as of theology. In early Buddhism it takes the place\nof prayer and worship and though in later times ceremonies multiply, it\nstill remains the main occupation of a monk. The Jains differ from the\nBuddhists chiefly in emphasizing the importance of self-mortification,\nwhich is put on a par with meditation. In Hinduism, as might be expected\nin a fluctuating compound of superstition and philosophy, the schools\ndiffer as to the relative efficacy of meditation and ceremonial, but\nthere is a strong tendency to give meditation the higher place. In all\nages a common characteristic appears in the most divergent Indian\ncreeds--the belief that by a course of mental and physical training the\nsoul can attain to a state of bliss which is the prelude to the final\ndeliverance attained after death.\n\n\n1\n\nWe may begin by examining Brahmanic ideas as to meditation. Many of them\nare connected with the word Yoga, which has become familiar to Europe.\nIt has two meanings. It is applied first to a definite form of Indian\nphilosophy which is a theistic modification of the S\u00e2nkhya and secondly\nto much older practices sanctioned by that philosophy but anterior to\nit.\n\nThe idea which inspires these theories and practices is that the\nimmaterial soul can by various exercises free itself from the fetters of\nmatter. The soul is distinguished from the mind which, though composed\nof the subtlest matter, is still material. This presupposes the duality\nof matter and spirit taught by Jainism and the S\u00e2nkhya philosophy, but\nit does not necessarily presuppose the special doctrines of either nor\ndo Ved\u00e2ntists object to the practice of the Yoga. The systematic\nprosecution of mental concentration and the idea that supernatural\npowers can be acquired thereby are very old--certainly older than\nBuddhism. Such methods had at first only a slight philosophic substratum\nand were independent of S\u00e2nkhya doctrines, though these, being a\nspeculative elaboration of the same fundamental principles, naturally\ncommended themselves to those who practised Yoga. The two teachers of\nthe Buddha, \u00c2l\u00e2ra and Uddaka, were Yogis, and held that beatitude or\nemancipation consisted in the attainment of certain trances. Gotama,\nwhile regarding their doctrine as insufficient, did not reject their\npractices.\n\nOur present Yoga S\u00fbtras are certainly much later than this date. They\nare ascribed to one Pata\u00f1jali identified by Hindu tradition with the\nauthor of the Mah\u00e2bh\u00e2shya who lived about 150 B.C. Jacobi[658] however\nis of opinion that they are the work of an entirely different person who\nlived after the rise of the philosophy ascribed to Asanga sometimes\ncalled Yog\u00e2c\u00e2ra. Jacobi's arguments seem to me suggestive rather than\nconclusive but, if they are confirmed, they lead to an interesting\ndeduction. There is some reason for thinking that Sankara's doctrine of\nillusion was derived from the Buddhist S\u00fbnyav\u00e2da. If Pata\u00f1jali's s\u00fbtras\nare posterior to Asanga, it also seems probable that the codification of\nthe Yoga by the Brahmans was connected with the rise of the Yog\u00e2c\u00e2ra\namong the Buddhists[659].\n\nThe S\u00fbtras describe themselves as an exposition of Yoga, which has here\nthe meaning not of union with God, but rather of effort. The opening\naphorisms state that \"Yoga is the suppression of the activities of the\nmind, for then the spectator abides in his own form: at other times\nthere is identity of form with the activities.\" This dark language means\nthat the soul in its true nature is merely the spectator of the mind's\nactivity, consciousness being due, as in the S\u00e2nkhya, to the union of\nthe soul with the mind[660] which is its organ. When the mind is active,\nthe soul appears to experience various emotions, and it is only when the\nmind ceases to feel emotions and becomes calm in meditation, that the\nsoul abides in its own true form. The object of the Yoga, as of the\nS\u00e2nkhya, is Kaivalya or isolation, in which the soul ceases to be united\nwith the mind and is dissociated from all qualities (gunas) so that the\nshadow of the thinking principle no longer falls upon it. This isolation\nis produced by performing certain exercises, physical as well as mental,\nand, as a prelude to final and complete emancipation, superhuman powers\nare acquired. These two ideas, the efficacy of physical discipline and\nthe acquisition of superhuman powers, have powerfully affected all\nschools of religious thought in India, including Buddhism. They are not\npeculiar to the Yoga, but still it is in the Yoga S\u00fbtras that they find\ntheir most authoritative and methodical exposition.\n\nThe practice of Yoga has its roots in the fact that fasting and other\nphysical mortifications induce a mental state in which the subject\nthinks that he has supernatural experiences[661]. Among many savage\ntribes, especially in America, such fasts are practised by those who\ndesire communication with spirits. In the Yoga philosophy these ideas\nappear in a refined form and offer many parallels to European mysticism.\nThe ultimate object is to dissociate the soul from its material\nenvelopes but in the means prescribed we can trace two orders of ideas.\nOne is to mortify the body and suppress not only appetite and passion\nbut also discursive thought: the other is to keep the body in perfect\nhealth and ease, so that the intelligence and ultimately the soul may be\nuntroubled by physical influences. These two ideas are less incongruous\nthan they seem. Many examples show that extreme forms of asceticism are\nnot unhealthy but rather conducive to long life and the Yoga in\nendeavouring to secure physical well-being does not aim at pleasure but\nat such a purification of the physical part of man that it shall be the\nobedient and unnoticed servant of the other parts. The branch of the\nsystem which deals with method and discipline is called Kriy\u00e2-yoga and\nin later works we also find the expression Hatha-yoga, which is\nspecially used to designate mechanical means (such as postures,\npurification, etc.) prescribed for the attainment of various mental\nstates. In contrast to it is R\u00e2ja-yoga, which signifies ecstasy and the\nmethod of obtaining it by mental processes. The immediate object of the\nKriy\u00e2-yoga is to destroy the five evils[662], namely ignorance, egoism,\ndesire, aversion and love of life: it consists of asceticism,\nrecitations and resignation to God, explained as meaning that the\ndevotee fasts, repeats mantras and surrenders to God the fruit of all\nhis works and, feeling no more concern for them, is at peace. Though the\nYoga S\u00fbtras are theistic, theism is accessory rather than essential to\ntheir teaching. They are not a theological treatise but the manual of an\nancient discipline which recognizes devotional feelings as one means to\nits end. The method would remain almost intact if the part relating to\nthe deity were omitted, as in the S\u00e2nkhya. God is not for the Yoga\nS\u00fbtras, as he is for many Indian and European mystics, the one reality,\nthe whence and whither of the soul and world.\n\nEight branches of practice[663] are enumerated, namely:--\n\n1. Yama or restraint, that is abstinence from killing, lying, stealing,\nincontinence, and from receiving gifts. It is almost equivalent to the\nfive great precepts of Buddhism.\n\n2. Niyama or observance, defined as purification, contentment,\nmortification, recitation and devotion to the Lord.\n\nPurification is treated at great length in the later treatises on\nHatha-yoga under the name of Shat-karma or sixfold work. It comprises\nnot only ordinary ablutions but cleansing of the internal organs by such\nmethods as taking in water by the nostrils and discharging it by the\nmouth. The object of these practices which, though they assume queer\nforms, rest on sound therapeutic principles, is to remove adventitious\nmatter from the system and to reduce the gross elements of the\nbody[664].\n\n3. \u00c2sanam or posture is defined as a continuous and pleasant attitude.\nIt is difficult to see how the latter adjective applies to many of the\npostures recommended, for considerable training is necessary to make\nthem even tolerable. But the object clearly is to prescribe an attitude\nwhich can be maintained continuously without creating the distracting\nfeeling of physical discomfort and in this matter European and oriental\nlimbs feel differently. All the postures contemplated are different ways\nof sitting cross-legged. Later works revel in enumerations of them and\nalso recognize others called Mudr\u00e2. This word is specially applied to a\ngesture of the hand but is sometimes used in a less restricted sense.\nThus there is a celebrated Mudra called Khechar\u00ee, in which the tongue is\nreversed and pressed into the throat while the sight is directed to a\npoint between the eyebrows. This is said to induce the cataleptic trance\nin which Yogis can be buried alive.\n\n4. Pr\u00e2nayama or regulation of the breath. When the Yogi has learnt to\nassume a permanent posture, he accustoms himself to regulate the acts of\ninspiration and expiration so as to prolong the period of quiescence\nbetween the two. He will thus remove the veils which cover the light\nwithin him. This practice probably depends on the idea which constantly\ncrops up in the Upanishads that the breath is the life and the soul.\nConsequently he who can control and hold his breath keeps his soul at\nhome, and is better able to concentrate his mind. Apart from such ideas,\nthe fixing of the attention on the rhythmical succession of inspirations\nand expirations conduces to that peaceful and detached frame of mind on\nwhich most Indian sects set great store. The practice was greatly\nesteemed by the Brahmans, and is also enjoined among the Taoists in\nChina and among Buddhists in all countries, but I have found no mention\nof its use among European mystics.\n\n5. Praty\u00e2h\u00e2ra, the retraction or withdrawing of the senses. They are\nnaturally directed outwards towards their objects. The Yogi endeavours\nto bring them into quiescence by diverting them from those objects and\ndirecting them inwards. From this, say the S\u00fbtras, comes complete\nsubjugation of the senses[665].\n\n6-8. The five kinds of discipline hitherto mentioned constitute the\nphysical preparation for meditation comprising in succession _(a)_ a\nmorality of renunciation, _(b)_ mortification and purification, _(c)_\nsuitable postures, _(d)_ regulation of the breathing, _(e)_ diversion of\nthe senses from their external objects. Now comes the intellectual part\nof the process, consisting of three stages called Dh\u00e2ran\u00e2, Dhy\u00e2na and\nSam\u00e2dhi. Dh\u00e2ran\u00e2 means fixing the mind on a particular object, either a\npart of the body such as the crown of the head or something external\nsuch as the sky. Dhy\u00e2na[666] is the continuous intellectual state\narising out of this concentration. It is defined as an even current of\nthought undisturbed by other thoughts. Sam\u00e2dhi is a further stage of\nDhy\u00e2na in which the mind becomes so identified with the thing thought of\nthat consciousness of its separate existence ceases. The thinking power\nis merged in the single thought and ultimately a state of trance is\ninduced. Several stages are distinguished in this Sam\u00e2dhi. It is divided\ninto conscious and unconscious[667] and of the conscious kind there are\nfour grades[668], analogous, though not entirely corresponding to the\nfour Jh\u00e2nas of Buddhism. When the feeling of joy passes away and is lost\nin a higher sense of equanimity, there comes the state known by the\nremarkable name of Dharma-megha[669] in which the isolation of the soul\nand its absolute distinctness from matter (which includes what we call\nmind) is realized, and Karma is no more. After the state of Dharma-megha\ncomes that of unconscious Sam\u00e2dhi, in which the Yogi falls into a trance\nand attains emancipation which is made permanent by death.\n\nThe methods of the Kriy\u00e2-yoga can be employed for the attainment not\nonly of salvation but of miraculous powers[670]. This subject is\ndiscussed in the third book of the Yoga S\u00fbtras where it is said that\nsuch powers are obstructions in the contemplative and spiritual life,\nthough they may lead to success in waking or worldly life. This is the\nsame point of view as we meet in Buddhism, viz. that though the\nmiraculous powers resulting from meditation are real, they are not\nessential to salvation and may become dangerous hindrances[671].\n\nThey are attained according to the Yoga S\u00fbtras by the exercise of\nsamyama which is the name given conjointly to the three states of\ndh\u00e2ran\u00e2, dhy\u00e2na and sam\u00e2dhi when they are applied simultaneously or in\nimmediate succession to one object of thought[672]. The reader will\nremember that this state of contemplation is to be preceded by\npraty\u00e2h\u00e2ra, or direction of the senses inwards, in which ordinary\nexternal stimuli are not felt. It is analogous to the hypnotic state in\nwhich suggestions made by the hypnotizer have for the subject the\ncharacter of reality although he is not conscious of his surroundings,\nand auto-suggestions--that is the expectations with which the Yogi begins\nhis meditation--apparently have the same effect. The trained Yogi is able\nto exercise samyama with regard to any idea--that is to say his mind\nbecomes identified with that idea to the exclusion of all others.\nSometimes this samyama implies simply a thorough comprehension of the\nobject of meditation. Thus by making samyama on the samsk\u00e2ras or\npredispositions existing in the mind, a knowledge of one's previous\nbirths is obtained; by making samyama on sound, the language of animals\nis understood. But in other cases a result is considered to be obtained\nbecause the Yogi in his trance thinks it is obtained. Thus if samyama is\nmade on the throat, hunger and thirst are subdued; if on the strength of\nan elephant, that strength is obtained: if on the sun, the knowledge of\nall worlds is acquired. Other miraculous attainments are such that they\nshould be visible to others, but are probably explicable as subjective\nfancies. Such are the powers of becoming heavy or light, infinitely\nlarge or infinitely small and of emitting flames. This last phenomenon\nis perhaps akin to the luminous visions, called photisms by\npsychologists, which not infrequently accompany conversion and other\nreligious experiences and take the form of flashes or rays proceeding\nfrom material objects[673]. The Yogi can even become many persons\ninstead of one by calling into existence other bodies by an effort of\nhis will and animating them all by his own mind[674].\n\nEuropeans are unfavourably impressed by the fact that the Yoga devotes\nmuch time to the cultivation of hypnotic states of doubtful value both\nfor morality and sanity. But the meditation which it teaches is also\nakin to aesthetic contemplation, when the mind forgets itself and is\nconscious only of the beauty of what is contemplated. Schopenhauer[675]\nhas well expressed the Indian idea in European language. \"When some\nsudden cause or inward disposition lifts us out of the endless stream of\nwilling, the attention is no longer directed to the motives of willing\nbut comprehends things free from their relation to the will and thus\nobserves them without subjectivity purely objectively, gives itself\nentirely up to them so far as they are ideas, but not in so far as they\nare motives. Then all at once the peace which we were always seeking,\nbut which always fled from us on the former path of the desires, comes\nto us of its own accord and it is well with us.\" And though the Yoga\nS\u00fbtras represent superhuman faculties as depending chiefly on the\nhypnotic condition of samyama, they also say that they are obtainable--at\nany rate such of them as consist in superhuman knowledge--by pratibh\u00e2 or\nillumination. By this term is meant a state of enlightenment which\nsuddenly floods the mind prepared by the Yoga discipline. It precedes\nemancipation as the morning star precedes the dawn. When this light has\nonce come, the Yogi possesses all knowledge without the process of\nsamyama. It may be compared to the Dibba-cakkhu or divine eye and the\nknowledge of the truths which according to the Pitakas[676] precede\narhatship. Similar instances of sudden intellectual enlightenment are\nrecorded in the experiences of mystics in other countries. We may\ncompare the haplosis or ekstasis of Plotinus and the visions of St\nTheresa or St Ignatius in which such mysteries as the Trinity became\nclear, as well as the raptures in which various Christian mystics[677]\nexperienced the feeling of levitation and thought that they were being\nliterally carried off their feet.\n\nThe practices and theories which are systematized in the Yoga S\u00fbtras are\nknown to the Upanishads, particularly those of the Atharva Veda. But\neven the earlier Upanishads allude to the special physical and mental\ndiscipline necessary to produce concentration of mind. The Maitr\u00e2yana\nUpanishad says that the sixfold Yoga consists of restraint of the\nbreath, restraint of the senses, meditation, fixed attention,\ninvestigation, absorption. The Svet\u00e2svatara Upanishad speaks of the\nproper places and postures for meditation, and the Ch\u00e2ndogya[678] of\nconcentrating all the senses on the self, a process which is much the\nsame as the praty\u00e2h\u00e2ra of the Yoga.\n\nA later and mysterious but most important method of Yoga is known to the\nTantras[679] as Shatcakrabheda or piercing of the six cakras. These are\ndynamic or nervous centres distributed through the human body from the\nbase of the spinal cord to the eyebrows. In the lowest of them resides\nthe Dev\u00ee Kundalin\u00ee, a force identical with Sakti, who is the motive\npower of the universe. In ordinary conditions this Kundalin\u00ee is pictured\nas lying asleep and coiled like a serpent. But appropriate exercises\ncause her to awake and ascend until she reaches the highest cakra when\nshe unites with Siva and ineffable bliss and emancipation are attained.\nThe process, which is said to be painful and even dangerous to health,\nis admittedly unintelligible without oral instruction from a Guru and,\nas I have not had this advantage, I will say no more on the topic except\nthis, that strange and fanciful as the descriptions of Shatcakrabheda\nmay seem, they can hardly be pure inventions but must have a real\ncounterpart in nervous phenomena which apparently have not been studied\nby European physiologists or psychologists[680].\n\n\n2\n\nWhen we turn to the treatment of meditation and ecstasy in the earlier\nBuddhist writings we are struck by its general resemblance to the\nprogramme laid down in the Yoga S\u00fbtras, and by many coincidences of\ndetail. The exercises, rules of conduct, and the powers to be\nincidentally obtained are all similar. The final goal of both systems\nalso seems similar to the outsider, although a Buddhist and a Yogi might\nhave much to say about the differences, for the Yoga wishes to isolate a\nsoul which is complete and happy in its own nature if it can be\ndisentangled from its trammels, whereas Buddhism teaches that there is\nno such soul awaiting release and that religious discipline should\ncreate and foster good mental states. Just as the atmosphere of the\nPitakas is not that of the Br\u00e2hmanas or S\u00fbtras, so are their ideas about\nJh\u00e2na and Sam\u00e2dhi somewhat different. Though hypnotic and even\ncataleptic phases are not wanting, the journey of the religious life, as\ndescribed in the Pitakas, is a progress of increasing peace, but also of\nincreasing intellectual power and activity. Gotama did not hold Jh\u00e2na or\nregulated meditation to be essential to nirvana or arhatship, for that\nstate was attainable by laymen and apparently through sudden\nillumination. But such cases were the exception. His own mental\nevolution which culminated in enlightenment comprised the four\nJh\u00e2nas[681]. Also in the eightfold path which is essential to arhatship\nand nirvana the last and highest stage is samm\u00e2sam\u00e2dhi, right rapture or\necstasy.\n\nJh\u00e2na is difficult for laymen, but it was the rule of the order to\ndevote at least the afternoon to it. We might compare this with the\nsolitary prayer of Christians, and there is real similarity in the\nprocess and the result. It brought peace and strength to the mind and we\nhear of the bright clear faces and the radiantly happy expression of\nthose who returned to their duties after such contemplation. But\nChristian prayer involves the idea of self-surrender and throwing open\nthe doors and windows of the soul to an influence which streams into it.\nBuddhist meditation is rather the upsoaring of the mind which rises from\necstasy to ecstasy until it attains not some sphere where it can live\n_in_ bliss but a state which is in itself satisfying and all-comprising.\n\nAll mental states to which such names as ecstasy, trance, and vision can\nbe applied involve a dangerous element which, if not actually\npathological, can easily become so. But the account of meditation put in\nthe Buddha's own mouth does not suggest either morbid dejection or\nhysterical excitement[682] and it is stated expressly that the exercise\nshould be begun after the midday meal so that any visions which may come\ncannot be laid to the charge of an empty stomach. Jh\u00e2na is not the same\nas Sam\u00e2dhi or concentration, though the Jh\u00e2nas may be an instance of\nSam\u00e2dhi. This latter is capable of marvellous extension and development,\nbut essentially it is a mental quality like Samm\u00e2sati or right\nmindfulness, whereas Jh\u00e2na is a mental exercise or progressive rapture\npassing through defined stages.\n\nAny system which analyzes and tabulates stages of contemplation and\necstasy may be suspected of being late and of having lost something of\nthe glow and impetus which its cold formul\u00e6 try to explain. But the\nimpulse to catalogue is old in Buddhism[683] and one important\ndistinction in the various mental states lumped together under the name\nof meditation deserves attention, namely that according to the oldest\ndocuments some of them are indispensable preliminaries to nirvana and\nsome are not. Buddhaghosa reviewing the whole matter in scholastic\nfashion in his Way of Purity divides the higher life into three\nsections, firstly conduct or morality as necessary foundation, secondly\n_adhicitta_, higher consciousness or concentration which leads to\n_samatho_ or peace and thirdly _adhipa\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2_ or the higher wisdom which\nleads to _vipassan\u00e2_ or insight. Of these _adhipa\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2_ and _vipassan\u00e2_\nare superior inasmuch as nirvana cannot be obtained without them but the\nmethods of _adhicitta_, though admirable and followed by the Buddha\nhimself, are not equally indispensable: they lead to peace and happiness\nbut not necessarily to nirvana. It is probably unwise (at any rate for\nEuropeans) to make too precise statements, for we do not really know the\nnature of the psychical states discussed. _Adhipa\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2_ assuredly includes\nthe eightfold path ending with _sam\u00e2dhi_ which is defined by the Buddha\nhimself in this connection in terms of the four _Jh\u00e2nas_[684]. On the\nother hand the doctrine that nirvana is attainable merely by practising\nthe _Jh\u00e2nas_ is expressly reprobated as a heresy[685]. The teaching of\nthe Pitakas seems to be that nirvana is attainable by living the higher\nlife in which meditation and insight both have a place. In normal saints\nboth sides are developed: raptures and trances are their delight and\nluxury. But in some cases nirvana may be attained by insight only: in\nothers meditation may lead to ecstasy and more than human powers of mind\nbut yet stop short of nirvana. The distinction is not without importance\nfor it means that knowledge and insight are indispensable for nirvana:\nit cannot be obtained by hypnotic trances or magical powers.\n\nThe Buddha is represented as saying that in his boyhood when sitting\nunder a tree he once fell into a state of contemplation which he calls\nthe first Jh\u00e2na. It is akin to a sensation which comes to Europeans most\nfrequently in childhood, but sometimes persists in mature life, when the\nmind, usually under the influence of pleasant summer scenery, seems to\nidentify itself with nature, and on returning to its normal state asks\nwith surprise, can it be that what seems a small distant personality is\nreally I? The usual form of Jh\u00e2na comprises four stages[686]. The first\nis a state of joy and ease born of detachment, which means physical calm\nas well as the absence of worldly desires and irrelevant thoughts. It is\ndistinguished from the subsequent stages by the existence of reasoning\nand investigation, and while it lasts the mind is compared to water\nagitated by waves. In the second Jh\u00e2na reasoning and investigation\ncease: the water becomes still and the mind set free rises slowly above\nthe thoughts which had encumbered it and grows calm and sure, dwelling\non high[687]. In this Jh\u00e2na the sense of joy and ease remains, but in\nthe third stage joy disappears, though ease remains. This ease (sukham)\nis the opposite of dukkham, the discomfort which characterizes all\nordinary states of existence. It is in part a physical feeling, for the\ntext says that he who meditates has this sense of ease in his body. But\nthis feeling passes away in the fourth Jh\u00e2na, in which there is only a\nsense of equanimity. This word, though perhaps the best rendering which\ncan be found for the Pali upekkh\u00e2, is inadequate for it suggests merely\nthe absence of inclination, whereas upekkh\u00e2 represents a state of mind\nwhich, though rising above hedonistic views, is yet positive and not\nmerely the negation of interest and desire.\n\nIn the passage quoted the Buddha speaks as if only an effort of will\nwere needed to enter into the first Jh\u00e2na, but tradition, supported by\nthe Pitakas[688], sanctions the use of expedients to facilitate the\nprocess. Some are topics on which attention should be concentrated,\nothers are external objects known as Kasina. This word (equivalent to\nthe Sanskrit kritsna) means entire or total, and hence something which\nengrosses the attention. Thus in the procedure known as the earth\nKasina[689] the Bhikkhu who wishes to enter into the Jh\u00e2na makes a small\ncircle of reddish clay, and then gazes at it fixedly. After a time he\ncan see it as plainly when his eyes are closed as when they are\nopen[690]. This is followed by entry into Jh\u00e2na and he should not\ncontinue looking at the circle. There are ten kinds of Kasina differing\nfrom that described merely in substituting for the earthen circle some\nother object, such as water, light, gold or silver. The whole procedure\nis clearly a means of inducing a hypnotic trance[691].\n\nThe practice of tranquillizing the mind by regulating the breathing is\nrecommended repeatedly in Suttas which seem ancient and authentic; for\ninstance, in the instruction given by the Buddha to his son R\u00e2hula[692].\nOn the other hand, his account of his fruitless self-mortification shows\nthat the exercise even in its extreme forms is not sufficient to secure\nenlightenment. It appears to be a method of collecting and concentrating\nthe mind, not necessarily hypnotic. All Indian precepts and directions\nfor mental training attach far more importance to concentration of\nthought and the power of applying the mind at will to one subject\nexclusively than is usual in Europe.\n\nBuddhaghosa at the beginning of his discussion of _adhicitta_ enumerates\nforty subjects of meditation namely, \"the ten Kasinas, ten impurities,\nten reflections, four sublime states (Brahm\u00e2-vih\u00e2ra), the four formless\nstates, one perception and one analysis[693].\" The Kasinas have been\nalready described. The ten impurities are a similar means of inducing\nmeditation. The monk fixes his attention on a corpse in some horrible\nstage of decay and thus concentrates his mind on the impermanence of all\nthings. The ten recollections are a less gloomy exercise but similar in\nprinciple, as the attention is fixed on some religious subject such as\nthe Buddha, his law, his order, etc.\n\nThe Brahm\u00e2-vih\u00e2ras[694] are states of emotional meditation which lead to\nrebirth in the heavens of Brahm\u00e2. They are attained by letting love or\nsome other good emotion dominate the mind, and by \"pervading the whole\nworld\" with it. This language about pervading the world with kindly\nemotion is common in Buddhist books though alien to European idiom. The\nmind must harbour no uncharitable thought and then its benevolence\nbecomes a psychic force which spreads in all directions, just as the\nsound of a trumpet can be heard in all four quarters.\n\nThese Brahm\u00e2-vih\u00e2ras are sometimes represented as coming after the four\nJh\u00e2nas[695], sometimes as replacing them[696]. But the object of the two\nexercises is not the same, for the Brahm\u00e2-vih\u00e2ras aim at rebirth in a\nbetter world. They are based on the theory common to Buddhism and\nHinduism that the predominant thoughts of a man's life, and especially\nhis thoughts when near death, determine the character of his next\nexistence.\n\nThe trances known as the four formless states are analogous to the\nBrahm\u00e2-vih\u00e2ras, their object being to ensure rebirth not in the heaven\nof Brahm\u00e2 but in one of the heavens known as Formless Worlds where the\ninhabitants have no material form[697]. They are sometimes combined with\nother states into a series of eight, known as the eight\ndeliverances[698]. The more advanced of these stages seem to be hypnotic\nand even cataleptic. In the first formless state the monk who is\nmeditating rises above all idea of form and multiplicity and reaches the\nsphere in which the infinity of space is the only idea present to his\nmind. He then passes to the sphere where the infinity of thought only is\npresent and thence to the sphere in which he thinks \"nothing at all\nexists[699],\" though it would seem that the consciousness of his own\nmental processes is undiminished. The teaching of Al\u00e2ra K\u00e2l\u00e2ma, the\nBuddha's first teacher, made the attainment of this state its goal. It\nis succeeded by the state in which neither any idea nor the absence of\nany idea is specially present to the mind[700]. This was the goal of\nUddaka R\u00e2maputta, his second teacher, and is illustrated by the simile\nof a bowl which has been smeared with oil inside. That is to say,\nconsciousness is reduced to a minimum. Beyond these four stages is yet\nanother[701], in which a complete cessation of perception and feeling is\nattained[702]. This state differs from death only in the fact that heat\nand physical life are not extinct and while it lasts there is no\nconsciousness. It is stated that it could continue during seven days but\nnot longer. Such hypnotic trances have always inspired respect in India\nbut the Buddha rejected as unsatisfying the teaching of his masters\nwhich made them the final goal.\n\nBut let us return to his account of Jh\u00e2na and its results. The first of\nthese is a correct knowledge of the body and of the connection of\nconsciousness with the body. Next comes the power to call up out of the\nbody a mental image which is apparently the earliest form of what has\nbecome known in later times as the astral body. In the account of the\nconversion of Angulim\u00e2la the brigand[703] it is related that the Buddha\ncaused to appear an image of himself which Angulim\u00e2la could not overtake\nalthough he ran with all his might and the Buddha was walking quietly.\n\nThe five states or faculties which follow in the enumeration are often\ncalled (though not in the earliest texts) abhi\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2, or transcendental\nknowledge. They are _iddhi_, or the wondrous gift: the heavenly ear\nwhich hears heavenly music[704]: the knowledge of others' thoughts: the\npower of remembering one's own previous births: the divine eye, which\nsees the previous births of others[705]. It would appear that the order\nof these states is not important and that they do not depend on one\nanother. Iddhi, like the power of evoking a mental image, seems to be\nconnected with hypnotic phenomena. It means literally power, but is used\nin the special sense of magical or supernatural gifts such as ability to\nwalk on water, fly in the air, or pass through a wall[706]. Some of\nthese sensations are familiar in dreams and are probably easily\nattainable as subjective results in trances. I am inclined to attribute\naccounts implying their objective reality to the practice of hypnotism\nand to suppose that a disciple in a hypnotic state would on the\nassurance of his teacher believe that he saw the teacher himself, or\nsome person pointed out by the teacher, actually performing such feats.\nOf iddhi we are told that a monk can practise it, just as a potter can\nmake anything he likes out of prepared clay, which is a way of saying\nthat he who has his mind perfectly controlled can treat himself to any\nmental pleasure he chooses. Although the Buddha and others are\nrepresented as performing such feats as floating in the air whenever it\nsuits them, yet the instruction given as to how the powers may be\nacquired starts by bidding the neophyte pass through the four stages of\nJh\u00e2na or meditation in which ordinary external perception ceases. Then\nhe will be able to have the experiences described. And it is probable\nthat the description gives a correct account of the sensations which\narise in the course of a trance, particularly if the trance has been\nentered upon with the object of experiencing them. In other words they\nare hypnotic states and often the result of suggestion, since he who\nmeditates knows what the result of his meditation should be. Sometimes,\nas mentioned, Jh\u00e2na is induced by methods familiar to mesmerists, such\nas gazing at a circle or some bright object but such expedients are not\nessential and with this European authorities agree. Thus Bernheim states\nthat even when a subject is hypnotized for the first time, no gestures\nor passes are necessary, provided he is calm. It suffices to bid him\nlook at the operator and go to sleep. He adds that those who are most\nsusceptible to the hypnotic influence are not nervous and hysterical\nsubjects but docile and receptive natures who can concentrate their\nattention[707]. Now it is hardly possible to imagine better hypnotic\nsubjects than the pupils of an Indian religious teacher. They are taught\nto regard him with deep respect and complete confidence: they are\ncontinually in a state of expectant receptivity, assimilating not only\nthe texts and doctrines which he imparts, but his way of life: their\ntraining leads them to believe in the reality of mental and physical\npowers exceeding those of ordinary mankind and indeed to think that if\nthey do not have such experiences it is through some fault of their own.\nThe teachers, though ignorant of hypnotism as such, would not hesitate\nto use any procedure which seemed to favour progress in meditation and\nthe acquisition of supernatural powers. Now a large number of Indian\nmarvels fall under two heads. In the first case Buddha, Krishna, or any\npersonage raised above the ordinary human level points out to his\ndisciples that wonders are occurring or will occur: he causes people to\nappear or disappear: he appears himself in an amazing form which he\nexplains. In the other case the possessor of marvellous powers has\nexperience which he subsequently relates: he goes up to heaven or flies\nto the uttermost parts of the earth and returns. Both of these cases are\ncovered by the phenomena of hypnotism. I do not mean to say that any\ngiven Indian legend can be explained by analyzing it as if it were a\nreport of a hypnotic operation, but merely that the general character of\nthese legends is largely due to the prevalence of hypnotic experiences\namong their composers and hearers[708]. Two obscure branches of\nhypnotism are probably of great importance in the religious history of\nthe human race, namely self-hypnotization without external suggestion\nand the hypnotization of crowds. India affords plentiful materials for\nthe study of both.\n\nThere is no reason to doubt that the Buddha believed in the existence of\nthese powers and countenanced the practices supposed to lead to them.\nThus Moggall\u00e2na, second only to S\u00e2riputta among his disciples, was\ncalled the master of iddhi[709], and it is mentioned as a creditable and\nenjoyable accomplishment[710]. But it is made equally plain that such\nmagical or hypnotic practices are not essential to the attainment of the\nBuddha's ideal. When lists of attainments are given, iddhi does not\nreceive the first place and it may be possessed by bad men: Devadatta\nfor instance was proficient in it. It is even denounced in the story of\nPindola Bh\u00e2radv\u00e2ja[711] and in the Kevaddha sutta[712]. In this curious\ndialogue the Buddha is asked to authorize the performance of miracles as\nan advertisement of the true faith. He refuses categorically, saying\nthere are three sorts of wonders namely iddhi, that is flying through\nthe air, etc. the wonder of manifestation which is thought-reading: and\nthe wonder of education. Of the first two he says \"I see danger in their\npractice and therefore I loathe, abhor and am ashamed of them.\" Then by\none of those characteristic turns of language by which he uses old words\nin new senses he adds that the true miracle is the education of the\nheart.\n\nNeither are the other transcendental powers necessary for emancipation.\nS\u00e2riputta had not the heavenly eye, yet he was the chief disciple and an\neminent arhat. This heavenly eye (dib-ba-cakkhu) is not the same as the\neye of truth (dhamma-cakkhu). It means perfect knowledge of the\noperation of Karma and hence a panoramic view of the universe, whereas\nthe eye of truth is a technical phrase for the opening of the eyes, the\nmental revolution which accompanies conversion. But though\ntranscendental knowledge is not indispensable for attaining nirvana, it\nis an attribute of the Buddha and in most of its forms amounts to an\nexceptional insight into human nature and the laws of the universe,\nwhich, though after the Indian manner exaggerated and pedantically\ndefined, does not differ essentially from what we call genius.\n\nThe power of recollecting one's previous births, often mentioned in the\nPitakas, has been described in detail by Buddhist writers and\nBuddhaghosa[713] distinguishes between the powers possessed by various\npersons. The lowest form of recollection merely passes from one mental\nstate to a previous mental state and so on backwards through successive\nlives, not however understanding each life as a whole. But even ordinary\ndisciples can not only recollect previous mental states but can also\ntravel backwards along the sequence of births and deaths and bring up\nbefore their minds the succession of existences. A Buddha's intelligence\ndispenses with the necessity of moving backwards from birth to birth but\ncan select any point of time and see at once the whole series of births\nextending from it in both directions, backwards and forwards.\nBuddhaghosa then goes on to prescribe the method to be followed by a\nmonk who tries for the first time to recollect previous births. After\ntaking his midday meal he should choose a quiet place and sitting down\npass through the four Jh\u00e2nas in succession. On rising from the fourth\ntrance he should consider the event which last took place, namely his\nsitting down; and then in retrograde order all that he did the day and\nnight before and so backwards month after month and year after year. A\nclever monk (so says Buddhaghosa) is able at the first trial to pass\nbeyond the moment of his conception in the present existence and to take\nas the object of his thought his individuality at the moment of his last\ndeath. But since the individuality of the previous existence ceased and\nanother one came into being, therefore that point of time is like thick\ndarkness. Buddhaghosa goes on to explain, if I apprehend his meaning\nrightly, that the proper recollection of previous births involves the\nelement of form and the mind sharpened by the practice of the four\ntrances does not merely reproduce feelings and impressions but knows the\nname and events of the previous existence, whereas ordinary persons are\napt to reproduce feelings and impressions without having any clear idea\nof the past existence as a whole. This, I believe, corresponds with the\nexperience of modern Buddhists. It is beyond doubt that those who\nattempt to carry their memory back in the way described are convinced\nthat they remember existences before the present life. As a rule it\ntakes from a fortnight to a month to obtain such a remembrance clearly,\nand every day the aspirant to a knowledge of previous births must carry\nhis memory further and further back, dwelling less and less on the\ndetails of recent events. When he reaches the time of his birth, he\nfeels as if there were a curtain of black darkness before him, but if\nthe attention is concentrated, this curtain is rent and the end of the\nprevious life is recovered behind it. The process is painful for it\ninvolves the recollection of death and the even greater pains of birth\nand many have not courage to go beyond this point. It is not uncommon in\nCeylon, Burma, Siam and probably in all parts of the Far East, to find\npeople who are persuaded they can remember previous births in this way,\nbut I have never met anyone who professed to recall more than two or\nthree. There is no room in these modest modern visions for the long\nvistas of previous lives seen by the earlier Buddhists.\n\nMeditation also plays a considerable part in the Buddhism of the Far\nEast under the name of Ch'an or Zen of which we shall have something to\nsay when we treat of China and Japan.\n\nAs already indicated the methods and results of meditation as practised\nby Brahmanic Hindus and by Buddhists show considerable resemblance to\nthe experiences of Christian mystics. The coincidences do not concern\nmere matters of detail, although theology has done its best to make the\ncontent and explanation of the experiences as divergent as possible. But\nthe essential similarity of form remains and there is clearly no\nquestion of borrowing or direct influence. It is certain that what is\nsometimes called the Mystic Way is not only true as a succession of\npsychic states but is, for those who can walk in it, the road to a\nhappiness which in reality and power to satisfy exceeds all pleasures of\nthe senses and intellect, so that when once known it makes all other\njoys and pains seem negligible. Yet despite the intense reality of this\nhappy state, despite the illumination which floods the soul and the wide\nvisions of a universal plan, there is no agreement as to the cause of\nthe experience nor, strange to say, as to its meaning as opposed to its\nform. For many both in the east and west the one essential and\nindubitable fact throughout the experience is God, yet Buddhists are\nequally decided in holding that the experience has nothing to do with\nany deity. This is not a mere question of interpretation. It means that\nviews as to theism and pantheism are indifferent for the attainment of\nthis happy state.\n\nThe mystics of India are sometimes contrasted with their fellows in\nEurope as being more passive and more self-centred: they are supposed to\ndesire self-annihilation and to have no thought for others. But I doubt\nif the contrast is just. If Indian mysticism sometimes appears at a\ndisadvantage, I think it is because it is popular and in danger of being\nstereotyped and sometimes vulgarized. Nowadays in Europe we have\nstudents of mysticism rather than mystics, and the mystics of the\nChristian Church were independent and distinguished spirits who, instead\nof following the signposts of the beaten track, found out a path for\nthemselves. But in India mysticism was and is as common as prayer and as\npopular as science. It was taught in manuals and parodied by charlatans.\nWhen mysticism is the staple crop of a religion and not a rare wild\nflower, the percentage of imperfect specimens is bound to be high. The\nBuddha, Sankara and a host of less well-known teachers were as strenuous\nand influential as Francis of Assisi or Ignatius Loyola. Neither in\nEurope nor in Asia has mysticism contributed much directly to political\nand social reform. That is not its sphere, but within the religious\nsphere, in preaching, teaching and organization, the mystic is intensely\npractical and the number of successes (as of failures) is greater in\nAsia than in Europe. Even in theory Indian mysticism does not repudiate\nenergy. No one enjoyed more than the Buddha himself what Ruysbroeck\ncalls \"the mysterious peace dwelling in activity,\" for before he began\nhis mission he had attained nirvana and such of his disciples as were\narhats were in the same case. Later Buddhism recognizes a special form\nof nirvana called apratishthita: those who attain it see that there is\nno real difference between mundane existence and nirvana and therefore\ndevote themselves to a life of beneficent activity.\n\nThe period of transition and trial known to European mystics as the Dark\nNight of the Soul, is not mentioned in Indian manuals as an episode of\nthe spiritual life, for such an interruption would hardly harmonize with\ntheir curriculum of regular progress towards enlightenment. But mystic\npoetry testifies that in Asia as in Europe this feeling of desertion and\nloneliness is a frequent experience in the struggles and adventures of\nthe soul. It is apparently not necessary, just as the incidental joys\nand triumphs of the soul--strains of heavenly music, aerial flights, and\nvisions of the universal scheme--are also not essential. The essential\nfeatures of the mystic way, as well as its usual incidents, are common\nto Asia and Europe, and in both continents are expressed in two forms.\nOne view contrasts the surface life and a deeper life: when the\nintellect ceases to plague and puzzle, something else arises from the\ndepth and makes its unity with some greater Force to be felt as a\nreality. This idea finds ample expression in the many Brahmanic systems\nwhich regarded the centre and core of the human being as an _\u00e2tman_ or\n_purusha_, happy when in the undisturbed peace of its own nature but\ndistracted by the senses and intellect. The other view of mystic\nexperiences regards them as a remaking of character, the evolution of a\nnew personality and in fact a new birth. This of course need not be a\ndenial of the other view: the emergence of the latent self may effect a\ntransformation of the whole being. But Buddhism, at any rate early\nBuddhism, formulates its theory in a polemical form. There is no\nready-made latent self, awaiting manifestation when its fetters and\nveils are removed: man's inner life is capable of superhuman extension\nbut the extension is the result of enlargement and training, not of\nself-revelation.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XV\n\nMYTHOLOGY IN HINDUISM AND BUDDHISM\n\n1\n\n\nThe later phases of Buddhism, described as Mah\u00e2y\u00e2na, show this feature\namong many others, that the supernatural and mythological side of\nreligion becomes prominent. Gods or angels play an increasingly\nimportant part, the Buddha himself becomes a being superior to all gods,\nand Buddhas, gods and saints perform at every turn feats for which\nmiracle seems too modest a name. The object of the present chapter is to\ntrace the early stages of these beliefs, for they are found in the Pali\nCanon, although it is not until later that they overgrow and hide the\ntemple in whose walls they are rooted.\n\nIt may be fairly said that Buddhism is not a miraculous religion in the\nsense that none of its essential doctrines depend on miracles. It would\nseem that such a religion as Mormonism must collapse if it were admitted\nthat the Book of Mormon is not a revelation delivered to Joseph Smith.\nBut the content of the Buddha's teaching is not miraculous and, though\nhe is alleged to have possessed insight exceeding ordinary human\nknowledge, yet this is not exactly a miracle and it is a question\nwhether an unusual intelligence disciplined by meditation might not\nattain to such knowledge. Still, though the essence of the doctrine may\nbe detachable from miracles and even be scientific, one cannot read very\nfar in the Vinaya or the Sutta Pitaka without coming upon unearthly\nbeings or supernatural occurrences.\n\nThe credibility of miracles is to my mind simply a question of evidence.\nAny extraordinary event, such as a person doing a thing totally foreign\nto his character, is improbable _a priori_. But the law does not allow\nthat the best of men is incapable of committing the worst of crimes, if\nthe evidence proves he did. Nor can the most extraordinary violation of\nnature's laws be pronounced impossible if supported by sufficient\nevidence, only the evidence must be strong in proportion to the\nstrangeness of the circumstances. But I cannot see that the uniformity\nof nature is any objection to the occurrence of miracles, for as a rule\na miracle is regarded not as an event without a cause, but as due to a\nnew cause, namely the intervention of a superhuman person. Many of the\nbest known miracles are such that one may imagine this person to effect\nthem by understanding and controlling some unknown natural force, just\nas we control electricity. Only evidence is required to show that he can\ndo so. But on the other hand the weakness of every religion which\ndepends on miracles is that their truth is contested and not\nunreasonably. If they are true, why are they not certain? Of all the\nphenomena described as miracles, ghosts, fortune telling, magic,\nclairvoyance, prophesying, and so on, none command unchallenged\nacceptance. In every age miracles, portents and apparitions have been\nrecorded, yet none of them with a certainty that carries universal\nconviction and in many ages contemporary scepticism was possible. Even\nin Vedic times there were people who did not believe in the existence of\nIndra[714].\n\nIt is clear that some miracles require more evidence than others and\nmany old stories are so fantastic that they may justly be put aside\nbecause those who reported them did not see, as we can, what\ndifficulties they involve and hence felt no need for caution in belief.\nAmong ancient Indians or Hebrews tales of seven headed snakes or of\nstopping the sun did not arouse the critical spirit, for the phenomena\ndid not seem much more extraordinary than centipedes or eclipses. Only\nthose who understand that such stories upset all we know of anatomy and\nastronomy can realize their improbability and the weight of evidence\nnecessary to make them credible. The most important distinction in\nmiracles (I use the word as a popular description of extraordinary\nevents which is readily understood though hard to define) is whether\nthey are in any way subjective, that is to say that they depend in the\nlast resort on an impression produced in certain, but not all, human\nminds or whether they are objective, that is to say that all witnesses\nwould have seen them like any other event. A man rising into the air\nwould be an objective miracle if it were admitted that this levitation\nwas as real as the flight of a bird, and very strong evidence would be\nnecessary to make us believe that such a movement had really been\nexecuted. But the case is different if we are dealing with the\nconviction of an enthusiast that he rose aloft or even with the\nconviction of his disciples, that they, being in an ecstasy, saw him do\nso. There is no reason to doubt the subjective reality of\nwell-authenticated visions and as motives and stimuli to action they may\nhave real objective importance. Miracles of healing are not dissimilar.\nA man's mind can affect his body, either directly through his conviction\nthat certain physical changes are about to take place or indirectly as\nconveying the influence of some powerful external mind which may be\neither calming or stimulating. That some persons have a special power of\nhealing nervous or mental diseases can hardly be doubted and I am not\ndisposed to reject any well-authenticated miraculous cure, believing\nthat sudden mental relief or acute joy can so affect the whole frame\nthat in the improved physical conditions thus caused even diseases not\nusually considered as nervous may pass away. But though there is no\nreason to discredit miracles of healing, it is clear that they are not\nonly exaggerated but also distorted by reporters who do not understand\ntheir nature. Those who chronicle the cures supposed to be effected at\nLourdes at the present day keep within the bounds of what is explicable,\nbut a Hindu who had seen a cripple recover some power of movement might\nbe equally ready to believe that when a man's leg had been cut off the\nstump could grow into a complete limb.\n\nThe miraculous events recorded in the Pitakas differ from those of later\nworks, whether Mahayanist literature or the Hindu Puranas and Epics,\nchiefly in their moderation. They may be classified under several heads.\nMany of them are mere embroidery or embellishment due to poetical\nexuberance, esteemed appropriate in those generous climates though\nrepugnant to our chilly tastes. In every country poetry is allowed to\noverstep the prosaic borders of fact without criticism. When an English\npoet says that--\n\n  The red rose cries She is near, she is near:\n  And the white rose weeps She is late:\n  The larkspur listens, I hear, I hear:\n  And the lily whispers, I wait--\n\nno one thinks of criticizing the lines as absurd because flowers cannot\ntalk or of trying to prove that they can. Poetry can take liberties with\nfacts provided it follows the lines of metaphors which the reader finds\nnatural. The same latitude cannot be allowed in unfamiliar directions.\nThus though a shower of flowers from heaven is not more extraordinary\nthan talking flowers and is quite natural in Indian poetry, it would\nprobably disconcert the English reader[715]. An Indian poet would not\nrepresent flowers as talking, but would give the same idea by saying\nthat the spirits inhabiting trees and plants recited stanzas. Similarly\nwhen a painter draws a picture of an angel with wings rising from the\nshoulder blades, even the very scientific do not think it needful to\npoint out that no such anatomical arrangement is known or probable, nor\ndo the very pious maintain that such creatures exist. The whole question\nis allowed to rest happily in some realm of acquiescence untroubled by\ndiscussions. And it is in this spirit that Indian books relate how when\nthe Buddha went abroad showers of flowers fell from the sky and the air\nresounded with heavenly music, or diversify their theological\ndiscussions with interludes of demons, nymphs and magic serpents. And\nalthough this riot of the imagination offends our ideas of good sense\nand proportion, the Buddhists do not often lose the distinction between\nwhat Matthew Arnold called Literature and Dogma. The Buddha's visits to\nvarious heavens are not presented as articles of faith: they are simply\na pleasant setting for his discourses.\n\nSome miracles of course have a more serious character and can be less\neasily separated from the essentials of the faith. Thus the Pitakas\nrepresent the Buddha as able to see all that happens in the world and to\ntransport himself anywhere at will. But even in such cases we may\nremember that when we say of a well-informed and active person that he\nis omniscient and ubiquitous, we are not misunderstood. The hyperbole of\nIndian legends finds its compensation in the small importance attached\nto them. No miraculous circumstance recorded of the Buddha has anything\nlike the significance attributed by Christians to the virgin birth or\nthe resurrection of Christ. His superhuman powers are in keeping with\nthe picture drawn of his character. They are mostly the result of an\nattempt to describe a mind and will of more than human strength, but the\nsuperman thus idealized rarely works miracles of healing. He saves\nmankind by teaching the way of salvation, not by alleviating a few\nchance cases of physical distress. In later works he is represented as\nperforming plentiful and extraordinary miracles, but these are just the\ninstances in which we can most clearly trace the addition of\nembellishments.\n\n\n2\n\nThe elaboration of marvellous episodes is regarded in India as a\nlegitimate form of literary art, no more blameable than dramatization,\nand in sacred writings it flourishes unchecked. In Hinduism, as in\nBuddhism, there is not wanting a feeling that the soul is weary of the\ncrowd of deities who demand sacrifices and promise happiness, and on the\nserener heights of philosophy gods have little place. Still most forms\nof Hinduism cannot like Buddhism be detached from the gods, and no\nextravagance is too improbable to be included in the legends about them.\nThe extravagance is the more startling because their exploits form part\nof quasi-historical narratives. R\u00e2ma and Krishna seem to be idealized\nand deified portraits of ancient heroes, who came to be regarded as\nincarnations of the Almighty. This is understood by Indians to mean not\nthat the Almighty submitted consistently to human limitations, but that\nhe, though incarnate, exercised whenever it pleased him and often most\ncapriciously his full divine force. With this idea before them and no\nhistorical scruples to restrain them, Indian writers tell how Krishna\nheld up a mountain on his finger, Indian readers accept the statement,\nand crowds of pilgrims visit the scene of the exploit.\n\nThe later Buddhist writings are perhaps not less extravagant than the\nPuranas, but the Pitakas are relatively sober, though not quite\nconsistent in their account of the Buddha's attitude to the miraculous.\nThus he encourages S\u00e2gata[716] to give a display of miracles, such as\nwalking in the air, in order to prepare the mind of a congregation to\nwhom he is going to preach, but in other narratives[717] which seem\nancient and authentic, he expresses his disapproval of such performances\n(just as Christ refused to give signs), and says that they do not\n\"conduce to the conversion of the unconverted or to the increase of the\nconverted.\" Those who know India will easily call up a picture of how\nthe Bhikkhus strove to impress the crowd by exhibitions not unlike a\nmodern juggler's tricks and how the master stopped them. His motives are\nclear: these performances had nothing to do with the essence of his\nteaching. If it be true that he ever countenanced them, he soon saw his\nerror. He did not want people to say that he was a conjurer who knew the\nG\u00e2ndh\u00e2ra charm or any other trick. And though we have no warrant for\ndoubting that he believed in the reality of the powers known as iddhi,\nit is equally certain that he did not consider them essential or even\nimportant for religion.\n\nSomewhat similar is the attitude of early Buddhism to the spirit\nworld--the hosts of deities and demons who people this and other spheres.\nTheir existence is assumed, but the truths of religion are not dependent\non them, and attempts to use their influence by sacrifices and oracles\nare deprecated as vulgar practices similar to juggling. Later Buddhism\nbecame infected with mythology and the critical change occurs when\ndeities, instead of being merely protectors of the church, take an\nactive part in the work of salvation. When the Hindu gods developed into\npersonalities who could appeal to religious and philosophic minds as\ncosmic forces, as revealers of the truth and guides to bliss, the\nexample was too attractive to be neglected and a pantheon of\nBodhisattvas arose. But it is clear that when the Buddha preached in\nKosala and Magadha, the local deities had not attained any such\nposition. The systems of philosophy then in vogue were mostly not\ntheistic, and, strange as the words may sound, religion had little to do\nwith the gods. If this be thought to rest on a mistranslation, it is\ncertainly true that the _dhamma_ had very little to do with _devas_. The\nexample of Rome under the Empire or of modern China makes the position\nclearer. In neither would a serious enquirer turn to the ancient\nnational gods for spiritual help.\n\nOften as the Devas figure in early Buddhist stories, the significance of\ntheir appearance nearly always lies in their relations with the Buddha\nor his disciples. Of mere mythology, such as the dealings of Brahm\u00e2 and\nIndra with other gods, there is little. In fact the gods, though freely\ninvoked as accessories, are not taken seriously[718], and there are some\nextremely curious passages in which Gotama seems to laugh at them, much\nas the sceptics of the eighteenth century laughed at Jehovah. Thus in\nthe Kevaddha sutta[719] he relates how a monk who was puzzled by a\nmetaphysical problem applied to various gods and finally accosted Brahm\u00e2\nhimself in the presence of all his retinue. After hearing the question,\nwhich was Where do the elements cease and leave no trace behind? Brahm\u00e2\nreplies, \"I am the Great Brahm\u00e2, the Supreme, the Mighty, the\nAll-seeing, the Ruler, the Lord of all, the Controller, the Creator, the\nChief of all, appointing to each his place, the Ancient of days, the\nFather of all that are and are to be.\" \"But,\" said the monk, \"I did not\nask you, friend, whether you were indeed all you now say, but I ask you\nwhere the four elements cease and leave no trace.\" Then the Great Brahm\u00e2\ntook him by the arm and led him aside and said, \"These gods think I know\nand understand everything. Therefore I gave no answer in their presence.\nBut I do not know the answer to your question and you had better go and\nask the Buddha.\" Even more curiously ironical is the account given of\nthe origin of Brahm\u00e2[720]. There comes a time when this world system\npasses away and then certain beings are reborn in the World of Radiance\nand remain there a long time. Sooner or later, the world system begins\nto evolve again and the palace of Brahm\u00e2 appears, but it is empty. Then\nsome being whose time is up falls from the World of Radiance and comes\nto life in the palace and remains there alone. At last he wishes for\ncompany, and it so happens that other beings whose time is up fall from\nthe World of Radiance and join him. And the first being thinks that he\nis Great Brahm\u00e2, the Creator, because when he felt lonely and wished for\ncompanions other beings appeared. And the other beings accept this view.\nAnd at last one of Brahm\u00e2's retinue falls from that state and is born in\nthe human world and, if he can remember his previous birth, he reflects\nthat he is transitory but that Brahm\u00e2 still remains and from this he\ndraws the erroneous conclusion that Brahm\u00e2 is eternal.\n\nHe who dared to represent Brahm\u00e2 (for which name we might substitute\nAllah or Jehovah) as a pompous deluded individual worried by the\ndifficulty of keeping up his position had more than the usual share of\nscepticism and irony. The compilers of such discourses regarded the gods\nas mere embellishments, as gargoyles and quaint figures in the cathedral\nporch, not as saints above the altar. The mythology and cosmology\nassociated with early Buddhism are really extraneous. The Buddha's\nteaching is simply the four truths and some kindred ethical and\npsychological matter. It grew up in an atmosphere of animism which\npeopled the trees and streams and mountains with spirits. It accepted\nand played with the idea, just as it might have accepted and played with\nthe idea of radio-activity. But such notions do not affect the essence\nof the Dharma and it might be preached in severe isolation. Yet in Asia\nit hardly ever has been so isolated. It is true that Indian mythology\nhas not always accompanied the spread of Buddhism. There is much of it\nin Tibet and Mongolia but less in China and Japan and still less in\nBurma. But probably in every part of Asia the Buddhist missionaries\nfound existing a worship of nature spirits and accepted it, sometimes\neven augmenting and modifying it. In every age the elect may have risen\nsuperior to all ideas of gods and heavens and hells, but for any just\nhistorical perspective, for any sympathetic understanding of the faith\nas it exists as a living force to-day, it is essential to remember this\nbackground and frame of fantastic but graceful mythology.\n\nMany later Mahayanist books are full of dh\u00e2ran\u00ees or spells. Dh\u00e2ran\u00ees are\nnot essentially different from mantras, especially tantric mantras\ncontaining magical syllables, but whereas mantras are more or less\nconnected with worship, dh\u00e2ran\u00ees are rather for personal use, spells to\nward off evil and bring good luck. The Chinese pilgrim Hs\u00fcan Chuang[721]\nstates that the sect of the Mah\u00e2sanghikas, which in his opinion arose in\nconnection with the first council, compiled a Pitaka of dh\u00e2ran\u00ees. The\ntradition cannot be dismissed as incredible for even the D\u00eegha-Nik\u00e2ya\nrelates how a host of spirits visited the Buddha in order to impart a\nformula which would keep his disciples safe from harm. Buddhist and\nBrahmanic mythology represent two methods of working up popular legends.\nThe Mah\u00e2bh\u00e2rata and Puranas introduce us to a moderately harmonious if\nmiscellaneous society of supernatural personages decently affiliated to\none another and to Brahmanic teaching. The same personages reappear in\nBuddhism but are analogous to Christian angels or to fairies rather than\nto minor deities. They are not so much the heroes of legends, as\nprotectors: they are interesting not for their past exploits but for\ntheir readiness to help believers or to testify to the true doctrine.\nStill there was a great body of Buddhist and Jain legend in ancient\nIndia which handled the same stories as Brahmanic legend--e.g. the tale\nof Krishna--but in a slightly different manner. The characteristic form\nof Buddhist legend is the J\u00e2taka, or birth story. Folk-lore and sagas,\nancient jokes and tragedies, the whole stock in trade of rhapsodists and\nminstrels are made an edifying and interesting branch of scripture by\nsimply identifying the principal characters with the Buddha, his friends\nand his enemies in their previous births[722]. But in Hinayanist\nBuddhism legend and mythology are ornamental, and edifying, nothing\nmore. Spirits may set a good example or send good luck: they have\nnothing to do with emancipation or nirvana. The same distinction of\nspheres is not wholly lost in Hinduism, for though the great philosophic\nworks treat of God under various names they mostly ignore minor deities,\nand though the language of the Bhagavad-g\u00eet\u00e2 is exuberant and\nmythological, yet only Krishna is God: all other spirits are part of\nhim.\n\nThe deities most frequently mentioned in Buddhist works are Indra,\ngenerally under the name of Sakka (Sakra) and Brahm\u00e2. The former is no\nlonger the demon-slaying soma-drinking deity of the Vedas, but the\nheavenly counterpart of a pious Buddhist king. He frequently appears in\nthe J\u00e2taka stories as the protector of true religion and virtue, and\nwhen a good man is in trouble, his throne grows hot and attracts his\nattention. His transformation is analogous to the process by which\nheathen deities, especially in the Eastern Church, have been accepted as\nChristian saints[723]. Brahm\u00e2 rules in a much higher heaven than Sakka.\nHis appearances on earth are rarer and more weighty, and sometimes he\nseems to be a personification of whatever intelligence and desire for\ngood there is in the world[724]. But in no case do the Pitakas concede\nto him the position of supreme ruler of the Universe. In one singular\nnarrative the Buddha tells his disciples how he once ascertained that\nBrahm\u00e2 Baka was under the delusion that his heaven was eternal and cured\nhim of it[725].\n\n\n3\n\nAll Indian religions have a passion for describing in bold imaginative\noutline the history and geography of the universe. Their ideas are\njuster than those of Europeans and Semites in so far as they imply a\nsense of the distribution of life throughout immensities of time and\nspace. The Hindu perceived more clearly than the Jew and Greek that his\nown age and country were merely parts of a much longer series and of a\nfar larger structure or growth. He wished to keep this whole continually\nbefore the mind, but in attempting to describe it he fell into that\nbesetting intellectual sin of India, the systematizing of the imaginary.\nAges, continents and worlds are described in detailed statements which\nbear no relation to facts. Thus, Brahmanic cosmogony usually deals with\na period of time called Kalpa. This is a day in the life of Brahm\u00e2, who\nlives one hundred years of such days, and it marks the duration of a\nworld which comes into being at its commencement and is annihilated at\nits end. It consists of 4320 times a million years and is divided into\nfourteen smaller periods called manvantaras each presided over by a\nsuperhuman being called Manu[726]. A manvantara contains about\nseventy-one mah\u00e2yugas and each mah\u00e2yuga is what men call the four ages\nof the world[727]. Geography and astronomy show similar precision. The\nEarth is the lowest of seven spheres or worlds, and beneath it are a\nseries of hells[728]. The three upper spheres last for a hundred Kalpas\nbut are still material, though less gross than those below. The whole\nsystem of worlds is encompassed above and below by the shell of the egg\nof Brahm\u00e2. Round this again are envelopes of water, fire, air, ether,\nmind and finally the infinite Pradh\u00e2na or cause of all existing things.\nThe earth consists of seven land-masses, divided and surrounded by seven\nseas. In the centre of the central land-mass rises Mount Meru, nearly a\nmillion miles high and bearing on its peaks the cities of Brahm\u00e2 and\nother gods.\n\nThe cosmography of the Buddhists is even more luxuriant, for it regards\nthe universe as consisting of innumerable spheres (cakkav\u00e2las), each of\nwhich might seem to a narrower imagination a universe in itself, since\nit has its own earth, heavenly bodies, paradises and hells. A sphere is\ndivided into three regions, the lowest of which is the region of desire.\nThis consists of eleven divisions which, beginning from the lowest, are\nthe hells, and the worlds of animals, Pretas (hungry ghosts), Asuras\n(Titans)[729] and men. This last, which we inhabit, consists of a vast\ncircular plain largely covered with water. In the centre of it is Mount\nMeru, and it is surrounded by a wall. Above it rise six devalokas, or\nheavens of the inferior gods. Above the realms of desire there follow\nsixteen worlds in which there is form but no desire. All are states of\nbliss one higher than the other and all are attained by the exercise of\nmeditation. Above these again come four formless worlds, in which there\nis neither desire nor form. They correspond to the four stages of Ar\u00fbpa\ntrances and in them the gross and evil elements of existence are reduced\nto a minimum, but still they are not permanent and cannot be regarded as\nfinal salvation. We naturally think of this series of worlds as so many\nstoreys rising one above the other and they are so depicted[730] but it\nwill be observed that the animal kingdom is placed between the hells and\nhumanity, obviously not as having its local habitation there but as\nbetter off than the one, though inferior to the other, and perhaps if we\npointed this out to the Hindu artist he would smile and say that his\nmany storeyed picture must not be taken so literally: all states of\nbeing are merely states of mind, hellish, brutish, human and divine.\n\nGrotesque as Hindu notions of the world may seem, they include two great\nideas of modern science. The universe is infinite or at least\nimmeasurable[731]. The vision of the astronomer who sees a solar system\nin every star of the milky way is not wider than the thought that\ndevised these Cakkav\u00e2las or spheres, each with a vista of heavens and a\nprocession of Buddhas, to look after its salvation. Yet compared with\nthe sum of being a sphere is an atom. Space is filled by aggregates of\nthem, considered by some as groups of three, by others as clusters of a\nthousand. And secondly these world systems, with the living beings and\nplants in them, are regarded as growing and developing by natural\nprocesses, and, equally in virtue of natural processes, as decaying and\ndisintegrating when the time comes. In the Agga\u00f1\u00f1a-Sutta[732] we have a\ncurious account of the evolution of man which, though not the same as\nDarwin's, shows the same idea of development or perhaps degeneration and\ndifferentiation. Human beings were originally immaterial, aerial and\nself-luminous, but as the world gradually assumed its present form they\ntook to eating first of all a fragrant kind of earth and then plants\nwith the result that their bodies became gross and differences of sex\nand colour were produced.\n\nNo sect of Hinduism personifies the powers of evil in one figure\ncorresponding to Satan, or the Ahriman of Persia. In proportion as a\nnation thinks pantheistically it is disinclined to regard the world as\nbeing mainly a contest between good and evil. It is true there are\ninnumerable demons and innumerable good spirits who withstand them. But\njust as there is no finality in the exploits of R\u00e2ma and Krishna, so\nR\u00e2vana and other monsters do not attain to the dignity of the Devil. In\na sense the destructive forces are evil, but when they destroy the world\nat the end of a Kalpa the result is not the triumph of evil. It is\nsimply winter after autumn, leading to spring and another summer.\n\nBuddhism having a stronger ethical bias than Hinduism was more conscious\nof the existence of a Tempter, or a power that makes men sin. This power\nis personified, but somewhat indistinctly, as M\u00e2ra, originally and\netymologically a god of death. He is commonly called M\u00e2ra the Evil\nOne[733], which corresponds to the Mrityuh p\u00e2pm\u00e2 of the Vedas, but as a\npersonality he seems to have developed entirely within the Buddhist\ncircle and to be unknown to general Indian mythology. In the thought of\nthe Pitakas the connection between death and desire is clear. The great\nevils and great characteristics of the world are that everything in it\ndecays and dies and that existence depends on desire. Therefore the\nruler of the world may be represented as the god of desire and death.\nBuddha and his saints struggle with evil and overcome it by overcoming\ndesire and this triumphant struggle is regarded as a duel with M\u00e2ra, who\nis driven off and defeated[734].\n\nEven in his most mythological aspects, M\u00e2ra is not a deity of Hell. He\npresides over desire and temptation, not over judgment and punishment.\nThis is the function of Yama, the god of the dead, and one of the\nBrahmanic deities who have migrated to the Far East. He has been adopted\nby Buddhism, though no explanation is given of his status. But he is\nintroduced as a vague but effective figure--and yet hardly more than a\nmetaphor--whenever it is desired to personify the inflexible powers that\nsummon the living to the other world and there make them undergo, with\nawful accuracy, the retribution due for their deeds. In a remarkable\npassage[735] called Death's Messengers, it is related that when a sinner\ndies he is led before King Yama who asks him if he never saw the three\nmessengers of the gods sent as warnings to mortals, namely an old man, a\nsick man and a corpse. The sinner under judgment admits that he saw but\ndid not reflect and Yama sentences him to punishment, until suffering\ncommensurate to his sins has been inflicted.\n\nBuddhism tells of many hells, of which Av\u00eeci is the most terrible. They\nare of course all temporary and therefore purgatories rather than places\nof eternal punishment, and the beings who inhabit them have the power of\nstruggling upwards and acquiring merit[736], but the task is difficult\nand one may be born repeatedly in hell. The phraseology of Buddhism\ncalls existences in heavens and hells new births. To us it seems more\nnatural to say that certain people are born again as men and that others\ngo to heaven or hell. But the three destinies are really parallel[737].\n\nThe desire to accommodate influential ideas, though they might be\nincompatible with the strict teaching of the Buddha, is well seen in the\nposition accorded to spirits of the dead. The Buddha was untiring in his\ndenunciation of every idea which implied that some kind of soul or\ndouble escapes from the body at death and continues to exist. But the\nbelief in the existence of departed ancestors and the presentation of\nofferings to them have always formed a part of Hindu domestic religion.\nTo gratify this persistent belief, Buddhism recognized the world of\nPetas, that is ghosts or spirits. Many varieties of these are described\nin later literature. Some are as thin as withered leaves and suffer from\ncontinual hunger, for their mouths are so small that they can take no\nsolid food. According to strict theology, the Petas are a category of\nbeings just above animals and certain forms of bad conduct entail birth\namong them. But in popular estimation, they are merely the spirits of\nthe dead who can receive nourishment and other benefits from the living.\nThe veneration of the dead and the offering of sacrifices to or for\nthem, which form a conspicuous feature in Far Eastern Buddhism, are\noften regarded as a perversion of the older faith, and so, indeed, they\nare. Yet in the Khuddaka-p\u00e2tha[738], which if not a very early work is\nstill part of the Sutta Pitaka, are found some curious and pathetic\nverses describing how the spirits of the departed wait by walls and\ncrossways and at the doors, hoping to receive offerings of food. When\nthey receive it their hearts are gladdened and they wish their relatives\nprosperity. As many streams fill the ocean, so does what is given here\nhelp the dead. Above all, gifts given to monks will redound to the good\nof the dead for a long time. This last point is totally opposed to the\nspirit of Gotama's doctrine, but it contains the germ of the elaborate\nsystem of funeral masses which has assumed vast proportions in the Far\nEast.\n\n\n4\n\nWhat then is the position of the Buddha himself in this universe of many\nworlds and multitudinous deities? European writers sometimes fail to\nunderstand how the popular thought of India combines the human and\nsuperhuman: they divorce the two aspects and unduly emphasize one or the\nother. If they are impressed by the historical character of Gotama, they\nconclude that all legends with a supernatural tinge must be late and\nadventitious. If, on the other hand, they feel that the extent and\nimportance of the legendary element entitles it to consideration, they\nminimize the historical kernel. But in India, reality and fancy, prosaic\nfact and extravagant imagination are found not as successive stages in\nthe development of religious ideas, but simultaneously and side by side.\nKeshub Chunder Sen was a Babu of liberal views who probably looked as\nprosaic a product of the nineteenth century as any radical politician.\nYet his followers were said to regard him as a God, and whether this is\na correct statement or not, it is certain that he was credited with\nsuperhuman power and received a homage which seemed even to Indians\nexcessive[739]. It is in the light of such incidents and such\ntemperaments that we should read the story of the Buddha. Could we be\ntransported to India in the days of his preaching, we should probably\nsee a figure very like the portrait given in the more sober parts of the\nPitakas, a teacher of great intelligence and personal charm, yet\ndistinctly human. But had we talked about him in the villages which lay\nalong his route, or even in the circle of his disciples, I think we\nshould have heard tales of how Devas visited him and how he was wont to\nvanish and betake himself to some heaven. The Hindu attributes such\nfeats to a religious leader, as naturally as Europeans would ascribe to\nhim a magnetic personality and a flashing eye.\n\nThe Pitakas emphasize the omniscience and sinlessness of the Buddha but\ncontain no trace of the idea that he is God in the Christian or\nMahommedan sense. They are consistently non-theistic and it is only\nlater that Buddhas and Bodhisattvas become transformed into beings about\nwhom theistic language can be used. But in those parts of the Pitakas\nwhich may be reasonably supposed to contain the ideas of the first\ncentury after the Buddha's death, he is constantly represented as\ninstructing Devas and receiving their homage[740]. In the Khuddaka-p\u00e2tha\nthe spirits are invited to come and do him reverence. He is described as\nthe Chief of the World with all its gods[741], and is made to deny that\nhe is a man. If a Buddha cannot be called a Deva rather than a man, it\nis only because he is higher than both. It is this train of thought\nwhich leads later Buddhists[742] to call him Dev\u00e2tideva, or the Deva who\nis above all other Devas, and thus make him ultimately a being\ncomparable with Siva or Vishnu.\n\nThe idea that great teachers of mankind appear in a regular series and\nat stated intervals is certainly older than Gotama, but it is hard to\nsay how far it was systematized before his time. The greatness of the\nposition which he won and the importance of the institutions which he\nfounded naturally caused his disciples to formulate the vague traditions\nabout his predecessors. They were called indifferently Buddha, Jina,\nArhat, etc., and it was only after the constitution of the Buddhist\nchurch that these titles received fixed meanings.\n\nClosely connected with the idea of the Buddha or Jina is that of the\nMah\u00e2purusha or great man. It was supposed that there are born from time\nto time supermen distinguished by physical marks who become either\nuniversal monarchs (cakra-vartin) or teachers of the truth. Such a\nprediction is said to have been made respecting the infant Gotama and\nall previous Buddhas. The marks are duly catalogued, as thirty-two\ngreater and eighty[743] smaller signs. Many of them are very curious.\nThe hair is glossy black: the tongue is so long that it can lick the\nears: the arms reach to the knees in an ordinary upright position: the\nskin has a golden tinge: there is a protuberance on the skull and a\nsmaller one, like a ball, between the eyebrows. The long arms may be\ncompared with the Persian title rendered in Latin by Longimanus[744] and\nit is conceivable that the protuberances on the head may have been\npersonal peculiarities of Gotama. For though the thirty-two marks are\nmentioned in the Pitakas as well-known signs establishing his claims to\neminence, no description of them has been found in any pre-Buddhist\nwork[745], and they may have been modified to suit his personal\nappearance. At any rate it is clear that the early generations of\nBuddhists considered that the Master conformed to the type of the\nMah\u00e2purusha and attached importance to the fact[746]. The Pitakas\nrepeatedly allude to the knowledge of these marks as forming a part of\nBrahmanic training and in the account of the previous Buddha Vipass\u00ee\nthey are duly enumerated. These ideas about a Great Man and his\ncharacteristics were probably current among the people at the time of\nthe Buddha's birth. They do not harmonize completely with later\ndefinitions of a Buddha's nature, but they show how Gotama's\ncontemporaries may have regarded his career.\n\nIn the older books of the Pitakas six Buddhas are mentioned as preceding\nGotama[747], namely Vipass\u00ee, Sikh\u00ee, Vessabh\u00fb, Kakusandha, Kon\u00e2gamana and\nKassapa. The last three at least may have some historical character. The\nChinese pilgrim Fa Hsien, who visited India from 405 to 411 A.D., saw\ntheir reputed birthplaces and says that there still existed followers of\nDevadatta (apparently in Kosala) who recognized these three Buddhas but\nnot Gotama. Asoka erected a monument in honour of Kon\u00e2gamana in Nepal\nwith a dedicatory inscription which has been preserved. In the\nMajjhima-Nik\u00e2ya[748] we find a story about Kakusandha and his disciples\nand Gotama once gave[749] an extended account of Vipass\u00ee, whose teaching\nand career are represented as almost identical with his own. Different\nexplanations have been given of this common element. There is clearly a\nwish to emphasize the continuity of the Dhamma and the similarity of its\nexponents in all ages. But are we to believe that the stories, true or\nromantic, originally told of Gotama were transferred to his mythical\nforerunners or that before his birth there was a Buddha legend to which\nthe account of his career was accommodated? Probably both processes went\non simultaneously. The notices of the Jain saints show that there must\nhave been such legends and traditions independent of Gotama. To them we\nmay refer things like the miracles attending birth. But the general\noutline of the Buddha's career, the departure from home, struggle for\nenlightenment and hesitation before preaching, seem to be a reminiscence\nof Gotama's actual life rather than an earlier legend.\n\nThere is an interesting discourse describing the wonders that attend the\nbirth of a Buddha[750], such as that he passes from the Tusita heaven to\nhis mother's womb; that she must die seven days after his birth: that\nshe stands when he is born: and so on. We may imagine that the death of\nthe mother is due to the historical fact that Gotama's mother did so\ndie, while the other circumstances are embellishments of the old Buddha\nand Mah\u00e2purusha legend. But the construction of this sutta is curious.\nThe monks in the Jetavana are talking of the wondrous powers possessed\nby Buddhas. Gotama enters and asks what is the subject of their\ndiscourse. They tell him and he bids \u00c2nanda describe more fully the\nwondrous attributes of a Buddha. \u00c2nanda gives a long list of marvels and\nat the end Gotama observes, \"Take note of this too as one of the\nwondrous attributes of a Buddha, that he has his feelings, perceptions\nand thoughts under complete control[751].\"\n\nNo passage has yet been adduced from the suttas mentioning more than\nseven Buddhas but later books, such as the Buddha-vamsa and the\nintroduction to the J\u00e2taka, describe twenty-five[752]. There are\ntwenty-four Jain T\u00eerthankaras and according to some accounts twenty-four\nincarnations of Vishnu. Probably all these lists are based on some\ncalculation as to the proper allowance of saints for an aeon. The\nbiographies of these Buddhas are brief and monotonous. For each sage\nthey record the number of his followers, the name of his city, parents,\nand chief disciples, the tree under which he attained enlightenment, his\nheight and his age, both in extravagant figures. They also record how\neach met Gotama in one of his previous births and prophesied his future\nglory. The object of these biographies is less to give information about\nprevious Buddhas than to trace the career of Gotama as a Bodhisattva.\nThis career began in the time of D\u00eepankara, the first of the twenty-five\nBuddhas, incalculable ages ago, when Gotama was a hermit called Sumedha.\nSeeing that the road over which D\u00eepankara had to pass was dirty, he\nthrew himself down in the mire in order that the Buddha might tread on\nhim and not soil his feet. At the same time he made a resolution to\nbecome a Buddha and received from D\u00eepankara the assurance that ages\nafterwards his wish would be fulfilled. This incident, called pranidh\u00e2na\nor the vow to become a Buddha, is frequently represented in the frescoes\nfound in Central Asia.\n\nThe history of this career is given in the introduction to the J\u00e2taka\nand in the late Pali work called the Cariy\u00e2-pitaka, but the suttas make\nlittle reference to the topic. They refer incidentally to Gotama's\nprevious births[753] but their interest clearly centres in his last\nexistence. They not infrequently use the word Bodhisattva to describe\nthe youthful Gotama or some other Buddha before the attainment of\nBuddhahood, but in later literature it commonly designates a being now\nexisting who will be a Buddha in the future. In the older phase of\nBuddhism attention is concentrated on a human figure which fills the\nstage, but before the canon closes we are conscious of a change which\npaves the way for the Mah\u00e2y\u00e2na. Our sympathetic respect is invited not\nonly for Gotama the Buddha, but for the struggling Bodhisattva who,\nbattling towards the goal with incredible endurance and self-sacrifice\nthrough lives innumerable, at last became Gotama.\n\nIt is only natural that the line of Buddhas should extend after as well\nas before Gotama. In the Pitakas there are allusions to such a posterior\nseries, as when for instance we hear[754] that all Buddhas past and to\ncome have had and will have attendants like \u00c2nanda, but Metteya the\nBuddha of the future has not yet become an important figure. He is just\nmentioned in the D\u00eegha Nik\u00e2ya and Buddha-Vamsa and the Milinda Pa\u00f1ha\nquotes an utterance of Gotama to the effect that \"He will be the leader\nof thousands as I am of hundreds,\" but the quotation has not been\nidentified.\n\nThe Buddhas enumerated are supreme Buddhas (Samm\u00e2-sam-buddha) but there\nis another order called Pacceka (Sanskrit Pratyeka) or private Buddhas.\nBoth classes attain by their own exertions to a knowledge of the four\ntruths but the Pacceka Buddhas are not, like the supreme Buddhas,\nteachers of mankind and omniscient[755]. Their knowledge is confined to\nwhat is necessary for their own salvation and perfection. They are\nmentioned in the Nik\u00e2yas as worthy of all respect[756] but are not\nprominent in either the earlier or later works, which is only natural,\nseeing that by their very definition they are self-centred and of little\nimportance for mankind. The idea of the private Buddha however is\ninteresting, inasmuch as it implies that even when the four truths are\nnot preached they still exist and can be discovered by anyone who makes\nthe necessary mental and moral effort. It is also noticeable that the\nsuperiority of a supreme Buddha lies in his power to teach and help\nothers. A passionless and self-centred sage falls short of the ideal.\n\n\n\n\n[Footnote 1: The frontier seems to be about Long. 65\u00b0 E.]\n\n[Footnote 2: See Coedes's views about Sr\u00eevijaya in _B.E.F.E.O._ 1918, 6.\nThe inscriptions of Rajendracola I (1012-1042 A.D.) show that Hindus in\nIndia were not wholly ignorant of Indian conquests abroad.]\n\n[Footnote 3: But the Japanese syllabaries were probably formed under\nIndian influence.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Probably the Christian doctrine of the atonement or\nsalvation by the death of a deity is an exception. I do not know of any\nIndian sect which holds a similar view. The obscure verse Rig Veda x.\n13. 4 seems to hint at the self-sacrifice of a deity but the hymn about\nthe sacrifice of Purusha (x. 90) has nothing to do with redemption or\natonement.]\n\n[Footnote 5: It is possible (though not, I think, certain) that the\nBuddha called his principal doctrines _ariya_ in the sense of Aryan not\nof noble. But even the Blessed One may not have been infallible in\nethnography. When we call a thing British we do not mean to refer it to\nthe ancient Britons more than to the Saxons or Normans. And was the\nBuddha an Aryan? See V. Smith, _Oxford History of India_, p. 47 for\ndoubts.]\n\n[Footnote 6: This is not altogether true of the modern temple ritual.]\n\n[Footnote 7: It is very unfortunate that English usage should make this\nword appear the same as Brahman, the name of a caste, and there is much\nto be said for using the old-fashioned word Brahmin to denote the caste,\nfor it is clear, though not correct. In Sanskrit there are several\nsimilar words which are liable to be confused in English. In the\nnominative case they are:\n\n  (1) Br\u00e2hmanah, a man of the highest caste.\n\n  (2) Br\u00e2hmanam, an ancient liturgical treatise.\n\n  (3) Brahma, the Godhead, stem Brahman, neuter.\n\n  (4) Brahm\u00e2, a masculine nominative also formed from the stem Brahman and\nused as the name of a personal deity.\n\nFor (3) the stem Brahman is commonly used, as being distinct from\nBrahm\u00e2, though liable to be confounded with the name of the caste.]\n\n[Footnote 8: For some years most scholars accepted the opinion that the\nBuddha died in 487 B.C. but the most recent researches into the history\nof the Saisun\u00e2ga dynasty suggest that the date should be put back to 554\nB.C. See Vincent Smith, _Oxford History of India_, p. 52.]\n\n[Footnote 9: This is sometimes rendered simply by desire but _desire_ in\nEnglish is a vague word and may include feelings which do not come\nwithin the Pali _tanh\u00e2_. The Buddha did not reprobate good desires. See\nMrs Rhys David's _Buddhism_, p. 222 and _E.R.E._ s.v. Desire.]\n\n[Footnote 10: It is practically correct to say that Buddhism was the\nfirst universal and missionary religion, but Mah\u00e2vira, the founder of\nthe Jains and probably somewhat slightly his senior, is credited with\nthe same wide view.]\n\n[Footnote 11: It may be conveniently and correctly called Pali Buddhism.\nThis is better than Southern Buddhism or H\u00eenay\u00e2na, for the Buddhism of\nJava which lies even farther to the south is not the same and there were\nformerly H\u00eenay\u00e2nists in Central Asia and China.]\n\n[Footnote 12: See Finot, _J.A._ 1912, n. 121-136.]\n\n[Footnote 13: There is no Indian record of Bodhidharma's doctrine and\nits origin is obscure, but it seems to have been a compound of Buddhism\nand Vedantism.]\n\n[Footnote 14: This is proved by coins and also by the Besnagar\ninscription.]\n\n[Footnote 15: I do not think that this view is disproved by the fact\nthat Pata\u00f1jali and the scholiasts on P\u00e2nini allude to images for they\nalso allude to Greeks. For the contrary view see Sten Konow in _I.A._\n1909, p. 145. The facts are (_a_) The ancient Brahmanic ritual used no\nimages. (_b_) They were used by Buddhism and popular Hinduism about the\nfourth century B.C. (_c_) Alexander conquered Bactria in 329 B.C. But\nallowance must be made for the usages of popular and especially of\nDravidian worship of which at this period we know nothing.]\n\n[Footnote 16: Few now advocate an earlier date such as 58 B.C.]\n\n[Footnote 17: His authorship of _The Awakening of Faith_ must be\nregarded as doubtful.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Much of the Ramayana and Mahabharata must have been\ncomposed during this period, both poems (especially the latter)\nconsisting of several strata.]\n\n[Footnote 19: _E.g._ the Vy\u00fbhas of the P\u00e2ncar\u00e2tras, the five Jinas of\nthe Mahayanists and the five Sad\u00e2siva tattvas. See Gopin\u00e2tha Rao,\n_Elements of Indian Iconography_, vol. III p. 363.]\n\n[Footnote 20: I draw a distinction between S\u00e2ktism and Tantrism. The\nessence of S\u00e2ktism is the worship of a goddess with certain rites.\nTantrism means rather the use of spells, gestures, diagrams and various\nmagical or sacramental rites, which accompanies S\u00e2ktism but may exist\nwithout it.]\n\n[Footnote 21: According to _Census of India_, 1911, _Assam_, p. 47,\nabout 80,000 animists were converted to Hinduism in Goalpara between\n1901 and 1911 by a Brahman called Sib Narayan Swami.]\n\n[Footnote 22: It is said that in Burma Hindu settlers become absorbed in\nthe surrounding Buddhists. _Census of India_, 1911, I. p. 120.]\n\n[Footnote 23: The life and writings of Vasubandhu illustrate the\ntransition from the Hina-to the Mahayana. In the earlier part of his\nlife he wrote the Abhidharmakosa which is still used by Mahayanists in\nJapan as a text-book, though it does not go beyond Hinayanism. Later he\nbecame a Mahayanist and wrote Mahayanist works.]\n\n[Footnote 24: As already mentioned, I think S\u00e2ktism is the more\nappropriate word but Tantrism is in common use by the best authorities.]\n\n[Footnote 25: In India proper there are hardly any Buddhists now. The\nKumbhipathias, an anti-Brahmanic sect in Orissa, are said to be based on\nBuddhist doctrines and a Buddhist mission in Mysore, called the Sakya\nBuddhist Society, has met with some success. See _Census of India_,\n1911, i. pp. 122 and 126.]\n\n[Footnote 26: See the quotation in Schomerus, _Der Saiva Siddh\u00e2nta_, p.\n20 where a Saiva Hindu says that he would rather see India embrace\nChristianity than the doctrine of Sankara.]\n\n[Footnote 27: Some think that the sect called Nim\u00e1vats was earlier.]\n\n[Footnote 28: The determination of his precise date offers some\ndifficulties. See for further discussion Book v.]\n\n[Footnote 29: The Kadianis and Chet Ramis in the N.W. Provinces are\nmentioned but even here the fusion seems to be chiefly between Islam and\nChristianity. See also the article R\u00e2dh\u00e2 So\u00e2rai in _E.R.E._]\n\n[Footnote 30: According to the Census of 1911.]\n\n[Footnote 31: There are curious survivals of paganism in out of the way\nforms of Christianity. Thus animal sacrifices are not extinct among\nArmenians and Nestorians. See _E.R.E._ article \"Prayer for the Dead\" at\nthe end.]\n\n[Footnote 32: The Buddhism of Siam and Burma is similar but in Siam it\nis a medi\u00e6val importation and the early religious history of Burma is\nstill obscure.]\n\n[Footnote 33: Although stability is characteristic of the Hinayana its\nlater literature shows a certain movement of thought phases of which are\nmarked by the Questions of Milinda, Buddhaghosa's works and the\nAbhidhammattha Sangaha.]\n\n[Footnote 34: _E.g._ the way a monastic robe should be worn and the\nS\u00eem\u00e2.]\n\n[Footnote 35: I believe this to be the orthodox explanation but it is\nopen to many objections.\n\n(1) It is a mere phrase. If to create means to produce something out of\nnothing, then we have never seen such an act and to ascribe a sudden\nappearance to such an act is really no explanation. Perhaps an act of\nimagination or a dream may justly be called a creation, but the relation\nbetween a soul and its Creator is not usually regarded as similar to the\nrelation between a mind and its fancies.\n\n(2) The responsibility of God for the evil of the world seems to be\ngreatly increased, if he is directly responsible for every birth of a\nchild in unhappy conditions.\n\n(3) Animals are not supposed to have souls. Therefore the production of\nan animal's mind is not explained by this theory and it seems to be\nassumed that such a complex mind ag a dog's can be explained as a\nfunction of matter, whereas there is something in a child which cannot\nbe so explained.\n\n(4) If a new immortal soul is created every time a birth takes place,\nthe universe must be receiving incalculably large additions. For some\nphilosophies such an idea is impossible. (See Bradley, _Appearance and\nReality_, p. 502. \"The universe is incapable of increase. And to suppose\na constant supply of new souls, none of which ever perished, would\nclearly land us in the end in an insuperable difficulty.\") But even if\nwe do not admit that it is impossible, it at least destroys all analogy\nbetween the material and spiritual worlds. If all the bodies that ever\nlived continued to exist separately after death, the congestion would be\nunthinkable. Is a corresponding congestion in the spiritual world really\nthinkable?]\n\n[Footnote 36: This seems to be the view of the Ch\u00e2ndogya Up. VI. 12. As\nthe whole world is a manifestation ol Brahman, so is the great banyan\ntree a manifestation of the subtle essence which is also present in its\nminute seeds.]\n\n[Footnote 37: The Brihad Ar. Up. knows of sams\u00e2ra and karma but as\nmatters of deep philosophy and not for the vulgar: but in the Buddhist\nPitakas they are assumed as universally accepted. The doctrine must\ntherefore have been popularized after the composition of the Upanishad.\nBut some allowance must be made for the fact that the Upanishads and the\nearliest versions of the Buddhist Suttas were produced in different\nparts of India.]\n\n[Footnote 38: Yet many instances are quoted from Celtic and Teutonic\nfolklore to the effect that birds and butterflies are human souls, and\nCaesar's remarks about the Druids may not be wholly wrong.]\n\n[Footnote 39: Several other Europeans of eminence have let their minds\nplay with the ideas of metempsychosis, pre-existence and karma, as for\ninstance Giordano Bruno, Swedenborg, Goethe, Lessing, Lavater, Herder,\nSchopenhauer, Ibsen, von Helmont, Lichtenberg and in England such\ndifferent spirits as Hume and Wordsworth. It would appear that towards\nthe end of the eighteenth century these ideas were popular in some\nliterary circles on the continent. See Bertholet, _The Transmigration of\nSouls_, pp. 111 ff. Recently Professor McTaggart has argued in favour of\nthe doctrine with great lucidity and persuasiveness. Huxley too did not\nthink it absurd. See his _Romanes Lecture, Evolution and Ethics,\nCollected Essays_, vol. IX. p. 61. As Deussen observes, Kant's argument\nwhich bases immortality on the realization of the moral law, attainable\nonly by an infinite process of approximation, points to transmigration\nrather than immortality in the usual sense.]\n\n[Footnote 40: The chemical elements are hardly an exception. Apparently\nthey have no beginning and no end but there is reason to suspect that\nthey have both.]\n\n[Footnote 41: I know well-authenticated cases of Burmese and Indians\nthinking that the soul of a dead child had passed into an animal.]\n\n[Footnote 42: Or again, when I wake up in the morning I am conscious of\nmy identity because innumerable circumstances remind me of the previous\nday. But if I wake up suddenly in the night with a toothache which\nleaves room for no thought or feeling except the feeling of pain, is the\nfact that I experience the pain in any way lessened if for the moment I\ndo not know who or where I am?]\n\n[Footnote 43: I believe that a French savant, Colonel Rochas, has\ninvestigated in a scientific spirit cases in which hypnotized subjects\nprofess to remember their former births and found that these\nrecollections are as clear and coherent as any revelations about another\nworld which have been made by Mrs Piper or other mediums. But I have not\nbeen able to obtain any of Col. Rochas's writings.]\n\n[Footnote 44: I use the word _soul_ merely for simplicity, but Buddhists\nand others might demur to this phraseology.]\n\n[Footnote 45: But for a contrary view see _Reincarnation, the Hope of\nthe World_ by Irving S. Cooper. Even the Brihad Aran. Upan. (IV. 4. 3.\n4) speaks of new births as new and more beautiful shapes which the soul\nfashions for itself as a goldsmith works a piece of gold.]\n\n[Footnote 46: The increase of the human population of this planet does\nnot seem to me a serious argument against the doctrine of rebirth for\nanimals, and the denizens of other worlds may be supplying an increasing\nnumber of souls competent to live as human beings.]\n\n[Footnote 47: Perhaps Russians in this as in many other matters think\nsomewhat differently from other Europeans.]\n\n[Footnote 48: _Varieties of Religious Experience_, p. 427. The chapter\ncontains many striking instances of these experiences, collected mostly\nin the west.]\n\n[Footnote 49: Compare _St Teresa's Orison of Union_, W. James, _l.c._ p.\n408.]\n\n[Footnote 50: Indian devotees understand how either Siva or Krishna is\nall in all, and thus too St Teresa understood the mystery of the\nTrinity. See W. James, _l.c._ p. 411.]\n\n[Footnote 51: Tur\u00eeya or caturtha.]\n\n[Footnote 52: Indians were well aware even in early times that such a\nstate might be regarded as equivalent to annihilation. Br. Ar. Up. II.\n4. 13; Ch\u00e2nd. Up. VIII. ii. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 53: The idea is not wholly strange to European philosophy. See\nthe passage from the _Phaedo_ quoted by Sir Alfred Lyall. \"Thought is\nbest when the mind is gathered into herself and none of these things\ntrouble her--neither sounds nor sights nor pain nor any pleasure--when she\nhas as little as possible to do with the body and has no bodily sense or\nfeeling, but is aspiring after being.\"]\n\n[Footnote 54: Mr Bradley _(Appearance and Reality_, p. 498) says \"Spirit\nis a unity of the manifold in which the externality of the manifold has\nutterly ceased.\" This seems to me one of the cases in which Mr Bradley's\nthought shows an interesting affinity to Indian thought.]\n\n[Footnote 55: But also sometimes _purusha_.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Even when low class yogis display the tortures which they\ninflict on their bodies, their object I think is not to show what\npenances they undergo but simply that pleasure and pain are alike to\nthem.]\n\n[Footnote 57: The sense of human dignity was strongest among the early\nBuddhists. They (or some sects of them) held that an arhat is superior\nto a god (or as we should say to an angel) and that a god cannot enter\nthe path of salvation and become an arhat.]\n\n[Footnote 58: Cf. Bosanquet, _Gifford Lectures_, 1912, p. 78. \"History\nis a hybrid form of experience incapable of any considerable degree of\nbeing or trueness. The doubtful story of successive events cannot\namalgamate with the complete interpretation of the social mind, of art,\nor of religion. The great things which are necessary in themselves,\nbecome within the narrative contingent or ascribed by most doubtful\nassumptions of insight to this actor or that on the historical stage.\nThe study of Christianity is the study of a great world experience: the\nassignment to individuals of a share in its development is a problem for\nscholars whose conclusions, though of considerable human interest, can\nnever be of supreme importance.\"]\n\n[Footnote 59: The Chinese critic Hsieh Ho who lived in the sixth century\nof our era said: \"In Art the terms ancient and modern have no place.\"\nThis is exactly the Indian view of religion.]\n\n[Footnote 60: _The Varieties of Religious Experience_, pp. 525-527 and\n_A Pluralistic Universe_, p. 310.]\n\n[Footnote 61: And in Russia there are sects which prescribe castration\nand suicide.]\n\n[Footnote 62: This, of course, does not apply to Buddhism in China,\nJapan and Tibet.]\n\n[Footnote 63: This is not true of the more modern Upanishads which are\noften short treatises specially written to extol a particular deity or\ndoctrine.]\n\n[Footnote 64: Mah\u00e2parinibb\u00e2na sutta. See the table of parallel passages\nprefixed to Rhys Davids's translation, _Dialogues of the Buddha_, II.\n72.]\n\n[Footnote 65: Much the same is true of the various editions of the\nVinaya and the Mah\u00e2vastu. These texts were produced by a process first\nof collection and then of amplification.]\n\n[Footnote 66: The latter part of Mah\u00e2bh\u00e2rata XII.]\n\n[Footnote 67: Though European religions emphasize man's duty to God,\nthey do not exclude the pursuit of happiness: e.g. Westminster Shorter\nCatechism (1647). Question 1, \"What is the chief end of man? _A._ Man's\nchief end is to glorify God and to enjoy him for ever.\"]\n\n[Footnote 68: Mrs Rhys Davids has brought out the importance of the will\nfor Buddhist ethics in several works. See _J.R.A.S._ 1898, p. 47 and\n_Buddhism_, pp. 221 ff. See also Maj. Nik. 19 for a good example of\nBuddhist views as to the necessity and method of cultivating the will.]\n\n[Footnote 69: Kaush. Up. III. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 70: The words are k\u00e2mac\u00e2ra and ak\u00e2mac\u00e2ra. Chand. Up. 8. 1-6.]\n\n[Footnote 71: Mah\u00e2vag. I. 6. _E.g._ Aj\u00e2tasattu (Dig. Nik. 2, _ad fin._)\nwould have obtained the eye of truth, had he not been a parricide. The\nconsequent distortion of mind made higher states impossible.]\n\n[Footnote 72: But all general statements about Hinduism are liable to\nexceptions. The evil spirit Duhsaha described in the M\u00e2rkandeya Pur\u00e2na\n(chaps. L and LI) comes very near the Devil.]\n\n[Footnote 73: I can understand that the immediate reality is a duality\nor plurality and that the one spirit may appear in many shapes.]\n\n[Footnote 74: _E.g._ Chand. Up. V. 1. 2. Bri. Ar. Up. I. 3. In the\nP\u00e2\u00f1car\u00e2tra we do hear of a j\u00f1\u00e2nabhramsa or a fall from knowledge\nanalogous to the fall of man in Christian theology. Souls have naturally\nunlimited knowledge but this from some reason becomes limited and\nobscured, so that religion is necessary to show the soul the right way.\nHere the ground idea seems to be not that any devil has spoilt the world\nbut that ignorance is necessary for the world process, for otherwise\nmankind would be one with God and there would be no world. See Schrader,\n_Introd. to the P\u00e2ncar\u00e2tra_, pp. 78 and 83.]\n\n[Footnote 75: The Satapatha Br\u00e2hmana has a curious legend (XI. 1. 6. 8\nff.) in which the Creator admits that he made evil spirits by mistake\nand smites them. In the K\u00e2rik\u00e2 of Gaudap\u00e2da, 2. 19 it is actually said:\nMayaish\u00e2 tasya devasya yay\u00e2 sammohitah svayam.]\n\n[Footnote 76: He does not say this expressly and it requires careful\nstatement in India where it is held strongly that God being perfect\ncannot add to his bliss or perfection by creating anything. Compare\nDante, _Paradiso_, xxix. 13-18:\n\n  Non per aver a s\u00e8 di bene acquisto,\n  ch' esser non pu\u00f2, ma perch\u00e8 suo splendore\n  potesse risplendendo dir: subsisto.\n  In sua eternit\u00e0 di tempo fuore,\n  fuor d' ogni altro comprender, come i piacque,\n  s'aperse in nuovi amor l' eterno amore.]\n\n[Footnote 77: The history of Japan and Tibet offers some exceptions.]\n\n[Footnote 78: There are some exceptions, _e.g._ ancient Camboja, the\nSikhs and the Marathas.]\n\n[Footnote 79: But there are other kinds of worship, such as the old\nVedic sacrifices which are still occasionally performed, and the burnt\nofferings (homa) still made in some temples. There are also tantric\nceremonies and in Assam the public worship of the Vishnuites has\nprobably been influenced by the ritual of Lamas in neighbouring Buddhist\ncountries.]\n\n[Footnote 80: This position is of great importance as tending to produce\na similar arrangement of religious paraphernalia. The similarity\ndisappears when Buddhist ceremonies are performed round St\u00fbpas out of\ndoors.]\n\n[Footnote 81: As explained elsewhere, I draw a distinction between\nTantrism and S\u00e2ktism.]\n\n[Footnote 82: It does not seem to me to have given much inspiration to\nRossetti in his _Aatarte Syriaca_.]\n\n[Footnote 83: But in justice to the Tantras it should be mentioned that\nthe Mah\u00e2-nirv\u00e2na Tantra, x. 79, prohibits the burning of widows.]\n\n[Footnote 84: See _Asiatic Review_, July, 1916, p. 33.]\n\n[Footnote 85: _E.g._ Vijayanagar, the Marathas and the states of\nRajputana.]\n\n[Footnote 86: According to the census of 1911 no less than 72 per cent.\nof the population live by agriculture.]\n\n[Footnote 87: The chief exceptions are: (_a_) the Tibetan church has\nacquired and holds power by political methods. It is an exact parallel\nto the Papacy, but it has never burnt people. (_b_) In medi\u00e6val Japan\nthe great monasteries became fortified castles with lands and troops of\ntheir own. They fought one another and were a menace to the state. Later\nthe Tokugawa sovereigns had the assistance of the Buddhist clergy in\ndriving out Christianity but I do not think that their action can be\ncompared either in extent or cruelty with the Inquisition. (_c_) In\nChina Buddhism was in many reigns associated with a dissolute court and\npalace intrigues. This led to many scandals and great waste of money.]\n\n[Footnote 88: See for instance Huxley's striking definition of Buddhism\nin his _Romanes Lecture_, 1893. \"A system which knows no God in the\nwestern sense; which denies a soul to man: which counts the belief in\nimmortality a blunder and the hope of it a sin: which refuses any\nefficacy to prayer and sacrifice: which bids men look to nothing but\ntheir own efforts for salvation: which in its original purity knew\nnothing of vows of obedience and never sought the aid of the secular\narm: yet spread over a considerable moiety of the old world with\nmarvellous rapidity and is still with whatever base admixture of foreign\nsuperstitions the dominant creed of a large fraction of mankind.\" But\nsome of this is too strongly phrased. Early Buddhism counted the desire\nfor heaven as a hindrance to the highest spiritual life, but if a man\nhad not attained to that plane and was bound to be reborn somewhere, it\ndid not question that his natural desire to be reborn in heaven was\nright and proper.]\n\n[Footnote 89: It may of course be denied that Buddhism is a religion. In\nthis connection some remarks of Mr Bradley are interesting. \"The\ndoctrine that there cannot be a religion without a personal God is to my\nmind entirely false\" (_Essays on Truth and Reality_, p. 432). \"I cannot\naccept a personal God as the ultimate truth\" (ib. 449). \"There are few\ngreater responsibilities which a man can take on himself than to have\nproclaimed or even hinted that without immortality all religion is a\ncheat, all morality a self-deception\" (_Appearance and Reality_, p.\n510).]\n\n[Footnote 90: Mah\u00e2vamsa, xii. 29, xiv. 58 and 64. D\u00eepavamsa, xn. 84 and\n85, xiii. 7 and 8.]\n\n[Footnote 91: _Essays in Criticism_, Second Series, Amiel.]\n\n[Footnote 92: This definition of orthodoxy is due to St Vincent of\nLerins. _Quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus creditum est._]\n\n[Footnote 93: I know that this statement may encounter objections, but I\nbelieve that few Indians would be surprised at the proposition that God\nis all things. Some might deny it, but as a familiar error.]\n\n[Footnote 94: But orthodox Christianity really falls into the same\ndifficulty. For if God planned the redemption of the world and we are\nsaved by the death of Christ, then the Chief Priests, Judas, Pilate and\nthe soldiers who crucified Christ are at least the instruments of\nsalvation.]\n\n[Footnote 95: Wm James, _Psychology_, pp. 203 and 216.]\n\n[Footnote 96: I quote this epitome from Wildon Carr's Henri Bergson,\n_The Philosophy of Change_, because the phraseology is thoroughly\nBuddhist and appears to have the approval of M. Bergson himself.]\n\n[Footnote 97: _Romanes Lecture_, 1893.]\n\n[Footnote 98: _Appearance_, p. 298.]\n\n[Footnote 99: Thus the Svet\u00e2svatara Up. says that the whole world is\nfilled with the parts or limbs of God and metaphors like sparks from a\nfire or threads from a spider seem an attempt to express the same idea.\nBr. Ar. Up. 2. 1. 20; Mund. Up. 2. 1. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 100: _Appearance_, p. 244; _Essays on Truth_, p. 409;\n_Appearance_, p. 413. Though the above quotations are all from Mr\nBradley I might have added others from Mr Bosanquet's _Gifford Lectures_\nand from Mr McTaggart.]\n\n[Footnote 101: \"The plurality of souls in the Absolute is therefore\nappearance and their existence not genuine ... souls like their bodies,\nare as such nothing more than appearance--Neither (body and soul) is real\nin the end: each is merely phenomenal.\" _Appearance_, pp. 305-307.]\n\n[Footnote 102: Since I wrote this I have read Mr Wells' book _God the\nInvisible King_. Mr Wells knows that he is indebted to oriental thought\nand thinks that European religion in the future may be so too, but I do\nnot know if he realizes how nearly his God coincides with the Mahayanist\nconception of a Bodhisattva such as Avalokita or Ma\u00f1jusri. These great\nbeings have, as Bodhisattvas, a beginning: they are not the creators of\nthe world but masters and conquerors of it and helpers of mankind: they\nhave courage and eternal youth and Ma\u00f1jusri \"bears a sword, that clean\ndiscriminating weapon.\" Like most Asiatics, Mr Wells cannot allow his\nGod to be crucified and he draws a distinction between God and the\nVeiled Being, very like that made by Indians between \u00cesvara and\nBrahman.]\n\n[Footnote 103: The Malay countries are the only exception.]\n\n[Footnote 104: Thus Motoori (quoted in Aston's _Shinto_, p. 9) says\n\"Birds, beasts, plants and trees, seas and mountains and all other\nthings whatsoever which deserve to be dreaded and revered for the\nextraordinary and pre-eminent powers which they possess are called\n_Kami_.\"]\n\n[Footnote 105: This impersonality is perhaps a later characteristic. The\noriginal form of the Chinese character for T'ien Heaven represented a\nman. The old Finnish and Samoyede names for God--Ukko and Num--perhaps\nbelong to this stage of thought.]\n\n[Footnote 106: See the account of the Faunus message in this book.]\n\n[Footnote 107: The chief exception in Sanskrit is the R\u00e2jatarangin\u00ee, a\nchronicle of Kashmir composed in 1148 A.D. There are also a few\npanegyrics of contemporary monarchs, such as the Harshacarita of B\u00e2na,\nand some of the Puranas (especially the Matsya and V\u00e2yu) contain\nhistorical material. See Vincent Smith, _Early History of India_, chap.\nI, sect. II, and _Pargiter Dynasties of the Kali Age_. The Greek and\nRoman accounts of Ancient India have been collected by McCrindle in six\nvolumes 1877-1901.]\n\n[Footnote 108: The inscriptions of the Chola Kings however (c. 1000\nA.D.) seem to boast of conquests to the East of India. See Coed\u00e8s \"Le\nroyaume de \u00c7r\u00eevijaya\" in _B.E.F.E.O._ 1918]\n\n[Footnote 109: Very different opinions have been held as to whether this\ndate should be approximately 1500 B.C. or 3000 B.C. The strong\nresemblance of the hymns of the Rig Veda to those of the Avesta is in\nfavour of the less ancient date, but the date of the Gathas can hardly\nbe regarded as certain.]\n\n[Footnote 110: Linguistically there seems to be two distinct divisions,\nthe Dravidians and the Munda (Kolarian).]\n\n[Footnote 111: The affinity between the Dravidian and Ural-Altaic groups\nof languages has often been suggested but has met with scepticism. Any\nadequate treatment of this question demands a comparison of the earliest\nforms known in both groups and as to this I have no pretension to speak.\nBut circumstances have led me to acquire at different times some\npractical acquaintance with Turkish and Finnish as well as a slight\nliterary knowledge of Tamil and having these data I cannot help being\nstruck by the general similarity shown in the structure both of words\nand of sentences (particularly the use of gerunds and the constructions\nwhich replace relative sentences) and by some resemblances in\nvocabulary. On the other hand the pronouns and consequently the\nconjugation of verbs show remarkable differences. But the curious Brahui\nlanguage, which is classed as Dravidian, has negative forms in which\n_pa_ is inserted into the verb, as in Yakut Turkish, e.g. Yakut\n_bis-pa-ppin_, I do not cut; Brahui _khan-pa-ra_, I do not see. The\nplural of nouns in Brahui uses the suffixes _k_ and _t_ which are found\nin the Finnish group and in Hungarian.]\n\n[Footnote 112: See the legend in the Sat. Br\u00e2h. I. 4. 1. 14 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 113: This much seems sure but whereas European scholars were\ntill recently agreed that he died about 487 B.C. it is now suggested\nthat 543 may be nearer the true date. See Vincent Smith in _Oxford\nHistory of India_, 1920, p. 48.]\n\n[Footnote 114: Pali Takkasila. Greek Taxila. It was near the modern\nRawal Pindi and is frequently mentioned in the J\u00e2takas as an ancient and\nwell-known place.]\n\n[Footnote 115: Most of them are known by the title of S\u00e2takarni.]\n\n[Footnote 116: But perhaps not in language. Recent research makes it\nprobable that the Kushans or Y\u00fceh-chih used an Iranian idiom.]\n\n[Footnote 117: Fleet and Franke consider that Kanishka preceded the two\nKadphises and began to reign about 58 B.C.]\n\n[Footnote 118: He appears to have been defeated in these regions by the\nChinese general Pan-Chao about 90 A.D. but to have been more successful\nabout fifteen years later.]\n\n[Footnote 119: Or Hephthalites. The original name seems to have been\nsomething like Haptal.]\n\n[Footnote 120: Strabo XV. 4. 73.]\n\n[Footnote 121: _Hist. Nat_. VI. 23. (26).]\n\n[Footnote 122: For authorities see Vincent Smith, _Early History of\nIndia_, 1908, p. 401.]\n\n[Footnote 123: The inscriptions of Asoka mention four kingdoms, P\u00e2ndya,\nKeralaputra, Cola and Satiyaputra.]\n\n[Footnote 124: Hinduism is often used as a name for the mediaeval and\nmodern religion of India, and Brahmanism for the older pre-Buddhist\nreligion. But one word is needed as a general designation for Indian\nreligion and Hinduism seems the better of the two for this purpose.]\n\n[Footnote 125: Excluding Burma the last Census gives over 300,000. These\nare partly inhabitants of frontier districts, which are Indian only in\nthe political sense, and partly foreigners residing in India.]\n\n[Footnote 126: Only tradition preserves the memory of an older and freer\nsystem, when warriors like Visv\u00e2mitra were able by their religious\nausterities to become Brahmans. See Muir's _Sanskrit texts_, vol. I. pp.\n296-479 on the early contests between Warriors and Brahmans. We hear of\nKings like Janaka of Videha and Aj\u00e2tasatru of K\u00e2si who were admitted to\nbe more learned than Brahmans but also of Kings like Vena and Nahusha\nwho withstood the priesthood \"and perished through want of\nsubmissiveness.\" The legend of Parasur\u00e2ma, an incarnation of Vishnu as a\nBrahman who destroyed the Kshatriya race, must surely have some\nhistorical foundation, though no other evidence is forthcoming of the\nevents which it relates.]\n\n[Footnote 127: In southern India and in Assam the superiors of\nmonasteries sometimes exercise a quasi-episcopal authority.]\n\n[Footnote 128: Sat. Br\u00e2hm. v. 3. 3. 12 and v. 4. 2. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 129: The M\u00e2rkandeya Pur\u00e2na discusses the question how Krishna\ncould become a man.]\n\n[Footnote 130: See for instance _The Holy Lives of the Azhvars_ by\nAlkondavilli Govind\u00e2c\u00e2rya. Mysore, 1902, pp. 215-216. \"The Dravida Vedas\nhave thus as high a sanction and authority as the Girvana (i.e.\nSanskrit) Vedas.\"]\n\n[Footnote 131: I am inclined to believe that the Ling\u00e2yat doctrine\nreally is that Ling\u00e2yats dying in the true faith do not transmigrate any\nmore.]\n\n[Footnote 132: E.g. Brih.-\u00c2r. III. 2. 13 and IV. 4. 2-6.]\n\n[Footnote 133: This is the accepted translation of _dukkha_ but perhaps\nit is too strong, and _uneasiness_, though inconvenient for literary\nreasons, gives the meaning better.]\n\n[Footnote 134: The old Scandinavian literature with its gods who must\ndie is equally full of this sense of impermanence, but the Viking\ntemperament bade a man fight and face his fate.]\n\n[Footnote 135: But see Rabindrannath Tagore: Sadhana, especially the\nChapter on Realization.]\n\n[Footnote 136: Cf. Shelley's lines in Hellas:--\n\n \"Worlds on worlds are rolling ever\n  From creation to decay,\n  Like the bubbles on a river\n  Sparkling, bursting, borne away.\"]\n\n[Footnote 137: Nevertheless _deva_ is sometimes used in the Upanishads\nas a designation of the supreme spirit.]\n\n[Footnote 138: E.g. Brih.-\u00c2r. Up. IV. 3. 33 and the parallel passages in\nthe Taittir\u00eeya and other Upanishads.]\n\n[Footnote 139: The principal one is the date of Asoka, deducible from an\ninscription in which he names contemporary Seleucid monarchs.]\n\n[Footnote 140: _E.g._ a learned Brahman is often described in the Sutta\nPitaka as \"a repeater (of the sacred words) knowing the mystic verses by\nheart, one who had mastered the three Vedas, with the indices, the\nritual, the phonology, the exegesis and the legends as a fifth.\"]\n\n[Footnote 141: There had been time for misunderstandings to arise. Thus\nthe S^{.}atapatha Br\u00e2hmana sees in the well-known verse \"who is the God\nto whom we shall offer our sacrifices\" an address to a deity named Ka\n(Sanskrit for _who_) and it would seem that an old word, _uloka_, has\nbeen separated in several passages into two words, _u_ (a meaningless\nparticle) and _loka_.]\n\n[Footnote 142: Recent scholars are disposed to fix the appearance of\nZoroaster between the middle of the seventh century and the earlier half\nof the sixth century B.C. But this date offers many difficulties. It\nmakes it hard to explain the resemblances between the Gathas and the Rig\nVeda and how is it that respectable classical authorities of the fourth\ncentury B.C. quoted by Pliny attribute a high antiquity to Zoroaster?]\n\n[Footnote 143: This applies chiefly to the three Samhit\u00e2s or collections\nof hymns and prayers. On the other hand there was no feeling against the\ncomposition of new Upanishads or the interpolation and amplification of\nthe Epics.]\n\n[Footnote 144: The Hotri recites prayers while other priests perform the\nact of sacrifice. But there are several poems in the Rig Veda for which\neven Indian ingenuity has not been able to find a liturgical use.]\n\n[Footnote 145: Thus the Pali Pitakas speak of the Tevijj\u00e2 or threefold\nknowledge of the Brahmans.]\n\n[Footnote 146: Or it may be that the ancestors of the Persians were also\nin the Panjab and retired westwards.]\n\n[Footnote 147: R.V. v. 3. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 148: See the Ganes\u00e2tharvas\u00eersha Upan. and Gopinatha Rao.\n_Hindu Iconography_, vol. I. pp. 35-67.]\n\n[Footnote 149: See R.V. III. 34. 9. i. 130. 8; iv. 26. 2. vi. 18. 3; iv.\n16. 13.]\n\n[Footnote 150: In one singular hymn (R.V. x. 119) Indra describes his\nsensations after drinking freely, and in the Satapatha Brahmana (V. 5.\n4. 9 and XII. 7. 1. 11) he seems to be represented as suffering from his\nexcesses and having to be cured by a special ceremony.]\n\n[Footnote 151: In some passages of the Upanishads he is identified with\nthe \u00e2tman _(e.g._ Kaushitaki Up. III. 8), but then all persons, whether\ndivine or human, are really the \u00e2tman if they only knew it.]\n\n[Footnote 152: A.V. IV. 16. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 153: The Indian alphabets are admittedly Semitic in origin.]\n\n[Footnote 154: See Mah\u00e2bh\u00e2r. I. xvii-xviii and other accounts in the\nR\u00e2m\u00e2yana and Pur\u00e2nas.]\n\n[Footnote 155: It has also been conjectured that Sk. Asura=Ashur, the\nGod of Assyria, and that Sumeru or Sineru (Meru)=Sumer or Shinar, see\n_J.R.A.S._ 1916, pp. 364-5.]\n\n[Footnote 156: Rig V. I. 164. 46.]\n\n[Footnote 157: For instance chap. III. of the Ch\u00e2ndogya Upanishad, which\ncompares the solar system to a beehive in which the bees are Vedic\nhymns, is little less than stupendous, though singular and hard for\nEuropean thought to follow.]\n\n[Footnote 158: I presume that the strong opinion expressed in Caland and\nHenri's _Agnishloma_ p. 484 that the sacrifice is merely a _do ut des_\noperation refers only to the earliest Vedic period and not to the time\nof the Br\u00e2hmanas.]\n\n[Footnote 159: Thus both the Vedas and the Tantras devote considerable\nspace to rites which have for object the formation of a new body for the\nsacrificer. Compare for instance the Aitareya Br\u00e2hmana (I. 18-21: II.\n35-38: III. 2 and VI. 27-31) with Avalon's account of Ny\u00e2sa, in his\nintroduction to the Mah\u00e2nirv\u00e2na Tantra pages cvii-cxi.]\n\n[Footnote 160: There is considerable doubt as to what was the plant\noriginally known as Soma. That described in the Vedas and Br\u00e2hmanas is\nsaid to grow on the mountains and to have a yellow juice of a strong\nsmell, fiery taste and intoxicating properties. The plants used as Haom\n(Hum) by the modern Parsis of Yezd and Kerman are said to be members of\nthe family Asclepiadaceae (perhaps of the genus Sarcostemma) with fleshy\nstalks and milky juice, and the Soma tested by Dr Haug at Poona was\nprobably made from another species of the same or an allied genus. He\nfound it extremely nasty, though it had some intoxicating effect. (See\nhis _Aitareya Brdh-mana_ n. p. 489.)]\n\n[Footnote 161: An ordinary sacrifice was offered for a private person\nwho had to be initiated and the priests were merely officiants acting on\nhis behalf. In a Sattra the priests were regarded as the sacrificers and\nwere initiated. It had some analogy to Buddhist and Christian monastic\nfoundations for reading s\u00fbtras and saying masses.]\n\n[Footnote 162: The political importance of the Asvamedha lay in the fact\nthat the victim had to be let loose to roam freely for a year, so that\nonly a king whose territories were sufficiently extensive to allow of\nits being followed and guarded during its wanderings could hope to\nsacrifice it at the end.]\n\n[Footnote 163: R.V. x. 136 and x. 190.]\n\n[Footnote 164: Even the Upanishads (_e.g._ Ch\u00e2nd. III. 17, Mah\u00e2n\u00e2r. 64)\nadmit that a good life which includes _tapas_ is the equivalent of\nsacrifice. But this of course is teaching for the elect only. The\nBrih.-\u00c2ran. Up. (V. ii) contains the remarkable doctrine that sickness\nand pain, if regarded by the sufferer as _tapas_, bring the same\nreward.]\n\n[Footnote 165: So too in the Taittir\u00eeya Upanishad _tapas_ is described\nas the means of attaining the knowledge of Brahman (III. 1-5).]\n\n[Footnote 166: Any ritual without knowledge may be worse than useless.\nSee Ch\u00e2nd. Up. I. 10. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 167: See the various narratives in the Ch\u00e2ndogya, Br.-\u00c2ran.\nand Kaush\u00eetaki Upanishads. The seventh chapter of the Ch\u00e2ndogya relating\nhow N\u00e2rada, the learned sage, was instructed by Sanatkum\u00e2ra or Skanda,\nthe god of war, seems to hint that the active military class may know\nthe great truths of religion better than deeply read priests who may be\nhampered and blinded by their learning. For Skanda and N\u00e2rada in this\nconnection see Bhagavad-git\u00e2 x. 24, 26.]\n\n[Footnote 168: For the necessity of a teacher see K\u00e2th. Up. II. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 169: See especially the bold passage at the end of Taitt.\nUpan. II. \"He who knows the bliss of Brahman ... fears nothing. He does\nnot torment himself by asking what good have I left undone, what evil\nhave I done?\"]\n\n[Footnote 170: The word Upanishad probably means sitting down at the\nfeet of a teacher to receive secret instruction: hence a secret\nconversation or doctrine.]\n\n[Footnote 171: Some allusions in the older Upanishads point to this\ndistrict rather than the Ganges Valley as the centre of Brahmanic\nphilosophy. Thus the Brihad-\u00c2ranyaka speaks familiarly of G\u00e2ndh\u00e2ra.]\n\n[Footnote 172: Cat. Adyar Library. The Rig and S\u00e2ma Vedas have two\nUpanishads each, the Yajur Veda seven. All the others are described as\nbelonging to the Atharva Veda. They have no real connection with it, but\nit was possible to add to the literature of the Atharva whereas it was\nhardly possible to make similar additions to the older Vedas.]\n\n[Footnote 173: Debendranath Tagore composed a work which he called the\nBr\u00e2hm\u00ee Upanishad in 1848. See Autobiography, p. 170. The sectarian\nUpanishads are of doubtful date, but many were written between 400 and\n1200 A.D. and were due to the desire of new sects to connect their\nworship with the Veda. Several are Saktist (e.g. Kaula, Tripur\u00e2, Dev\u00ee)\nand many others show Saktist influence. They usually advocate the\nworship of a special deity such as Ganesa, S\u00fbrya, R\u00e2ma, Nri Simha.]\n\n[Footnote 174: Br.-\u00c2ran. VI. 1, Ait. \u00c2ran. II. 4, Kaush. III. 3, Prasna,\nII. 3, Ch\u00e2nd. V. 1. The apologue is curiously like in form to the\nclassical fable of the belly and members.]\n\n[Footnote 175: Br.-\u00c2ran. VI. 2, Ch\u00e2nd. V. 3]\n\n[Footnote 176: Br.-\u00c2ran. II. 1, Kaush. IV. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 177: The composite structure of these works is illustrated\nvery clearly by the Brihad-\u00c2ranyaka. It consists of three sections each\nconcluding with a list of teachers, namely (_a_) adhy\u00e2yas 1 and 2, (_b_)\nadh. 3 and 4, (_c_) adh. 5 and 6. The lists are not quite the same,\nwhich indicates some slight difference between the sub-schools which\ncomposed the three parts, and a lengthy passage occurs twice in an\nalmost identical form. The Upanishad is clearly composed of two separate\ncollections with the addition of a third which still bears the title of\n_Khila_ or supplement. The whole work exists in two recensions.]\n\n[Footnote 178: The Eleven translated in the _Sacred Books of the East_,\nvols. I and XV, include the oldest and most important.]\n\n[Footnote 179: Thus the Aitareya Br\u00e2hmana is followed by the Aitareya\n\u00c2ranyaka and that by the Aitareya-\u00c2ranyaka-Upanishad.]\n\n[Footnote 180: R.V. X. 121. The verses are also found in the Atharva\nVeda, the V\u00e2jasaneyi, Taittir\u00eeya, Maitr\u00e2yani, and K\u00e2thaka Samhit\u00e2s and\nelsewhere.]\n\n[Footnote 181: R.V. X. 129.]\n\n[Footnote 182: IV. 5. 5 and repeated almost verbally II. 4. 5 with some\nomissions. My quotation is somewhat abbreviated and repetitions are\nomitted.]\n\n[Footnote 183: The sentiment is perhaps the same as that underlying the\nwords attributed to Florence Nightingale: \"I must strive to see only God\nin my friends and God in my cats.\"]\n\n[Footnote 184: It will be observed that he had said previously that the\n\u00c2tman must be seen, heard, perceived and known. This is an inconsistent\nuse of language.]\n\n[Footnote 185: Ch\u00e2ndogya Upanishad VI.]\n\n[Footnote 186: In the language of the Upanishads the \u00c2tman is often\ncalled simply Tat or it.]\n\n[Footnote 187: _I.e._ the difference between clay and pots, etc. made of\nclay.]\n\n[Footnote 188: Yet the contrary proposition is maintained in this same\nUpanishad (III. 19. 1), in the Taittir\u00eeya Upanishad (II. 8) and\nelsewhere. The reason of these divergent statements is of course the\ndifficulty of distinguishing pure Being without attributes from not\nBeing.]\n\n[Footnote 189: The word union is a convenient but not wholly accurate\nterm which covers several theories. The Upanishads sometimes speak of\nthe union of the soul with Brahman or its absorption in Brahman (_e.g._\nMaitr. Up. VI. 22, _S\u00e2yujyatvam_ and _asabde nidhanam eti_) but the soul\nis more frequently stated to be Brahman or a part of Brahman and its\ntask is not to effect any act of union but simply to _know_ its own\nnature. This knowledge is in itself emancipation. The well-known simile\nwhich compares the soul to a river flowing into the sea is found in the\nUpanishads (Ch\u00e2nd. VI. 10. 1, Mund. III. 2, Prasna, VI. 5) but Sankara\n(on Brahma S. I. iv. 21-22) evidently feels uneasy about it. From his\npoint of view the soul is not so much a river as a bay which _is_ the\nsea, if the landscape can be seen properly.]\n\n[Footnote 190: The M\u00e2ndukya Up. calls the fourth state\n_ek\u00e2tmapratyayas\u00e2ra_, founded solely on the certainty of its own self\nand Gaudap\u00e2da says that in it there awakes the eternal which neither\ndreams nor sleeps. (K\u00e2r. I. 15. See also III. 34 and 36.)]\n\n[Footnote 191: Br.-\u00c2ranyaka, IV. 3. 33.]\n\n[Footnote 192: Cf. Bradley, _Appearance and Reality_, p. 244. \"The\nperfect ... means the identity of idea and existence, attended also by\npleasure.\"]\n\n[Footnote 193: Tait. Up. II. 1-9. See too ib. III. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 194: Br.-\u00c2ran. III. 8. 10. See too VI. 2.15, speaking of those\nwho in the forest worship the truth with faith.]\n\n[Footnote 195: Ch\u00e2ndog. Up. IV. 10. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 196: It occurs Katha. Up. II. v. 13, 15, also in the\nSvet\u00e2svatara and Mundaka Upanishads and there are similar words in the\nBhagavad-g\u00eet\u00e2. \"This is that\" means that the individual soul is the same\nas Brahman.]\n\n[Footnote 197: The Nrisimhottaratapan\u00eeya Up. I. says that \u00cesvara is\nswallowed up in the Tur\u00eeya.]\n\n[Footnote 198: But still ancient and perhaps anterior to the Christian\nera.]\n\n[Footnote 199: Svet. Up. VI. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 200: Svet. Up. IV. 3. Max M\u00fcller's translation. The commentary\nattributed to Sankara explains n\u00eelah patangah as bhramarah but Deussen\nseems to think it means a bird.]\n\n[Footnote 201: Ch\u00e2nd. Up. vi. 14. 1. Sat. Br\u00e2h. viii. 1. 4. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 202: The Brahmans are even called low-born as compared with\nKshatriyas and in the Ambattha Sutta (Dig. Nik. iii.) the Buddha\ndemonstrates to a Brahman who boasts of his caste that the usages of\nHindu society prove that \"the Kshatriyas are higher and the Brahmans\nlower,\" seeing that the child of a mixed union between the castes is\naccepted by the Brahmans as one of themselves but not by the Kshatriyas,\nbecause he is not of pure descent.]\n\n[Footnote 203: He had learnt the Veda and Upanishads. Brih.-\u00c2r. iv. 2.\n1.]\n\n[Footnote 204: Ch\u00e2nd. Up. v. 3. 7, Kaush. Up. iv., Brih.-\u00c2r. Up. ii. 1.\nThe Kshatriyas seem to have regarded the doctrine of the two paths which\ncan be taken by the soul after death (_devay\u00e2na_ and _pitriy\u00e2na_, the\nlatter involving return to earth and transmigration) as their special\nproperty.]\n\n[Footnote 205: Literally set in front, pr\u00e6fectus.]\n\n[Footnote 206: Sat. Br\u00e2h. ii. 4. 4. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 207: Sat. Br\u00e2h. iv. 1. 4. 1-6.]\n\n[Footnote 208: The legends of Vena, Parasur\u00e2ma and others indicate the\nprevalence of considerable hostility between Brahmans and Kshatriyas at\nsome period.]\n\n[Footnote 209: Brahmac\u00e2rin, Grihastha, Vanaprastha, Sanny\u00e2sin.]\n\n[Footnote 210: Thus in the Brih.-\u00c2ran. Yaj\u00f1avalkya retires to the\nforest. But even the theory of three stages was at this time only in the\nmaking, for the last section of the Ch\u00e2ndogya Up. expressly authorizes a\nreligious man to spend all his life as a householder after completing\nhis studentship and the account given of the stages in Ch\u00e2nd. ii. 21 is\nnot very clear.]\n\n[Footnote 211: Sat. Br\u00e2h. xi. 5. 6. 8. Cf. the lists in the Ch\u00e2ndogya\nUpanishad vii. secs. 1, 2 and 7.]\n\n[Footnote 212: In southern India at the present day it is the custom for\nBrahmans to live as Agnihotris and maintain the sacred fire for a few\ndays after their marriage.]\n\n[Footnote 213: See Thurston, _Castes and Tribes of Southern India_, vol.\nv. s.v.]\n\n[Footnote 214: The Emperor Jehangir writing about 1616 implies that the\nAsramas, which he describes, were observed by the Brahmans of that time.\nSee his _Memoirs_, edited by Beveridge, pp. 357-359.]\n\n[Footnote 215: Sat. Br\u00e2h. I. 7. 2. 1. Cf. Tait. Br\u00e2h. VI. 3. 10. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 216: Such as those built by J\u00e2nasruti Pautr\u00e2yana. See Ch\u00e2nd.\nUp. IV. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 217: Sat. Br\u00e2h. XI. 4. 1. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 218: Sat. Br\u00e2h. ii. 2. 2. 6 and iv. 3. 4. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 219: Sat. Br\u00e2h. iv. 3. 4. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 220: Vishnu Pur. iii. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 221: Sat. Br\u00e2h. iii. 8. 2. 24. Y\u00e2j\u00f1avalkya is the principal\nauthority cited in books i-v and x-xiv of this Br\u00e2hmana, but not in\nbooks vi-ix, which perhaps represent an earlier treatise incorporated in\nthe text.]\n\n[Footnote 222: Or \"in confidence.\" Sat. Br\u00e2h. xi. 3. 1. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 223: Brih.-\u00c2r. iii. 2. 13.]\n\n[Footnote 224: In the Pali Pitaka the Buddha is represented as preaching\nin the land of the Kurus.]\n\n[Footnote 225: These are the Pali forms. The Sanskrit equivalents are\nParivr\u00e2jaka and Sramana.]\n\n[Footnote 226: See for instance Mah\u00e2v. II. 1 and III. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 227: Dig. Nik. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 228: See O. Schrader, _Stand der indischen Philosophie zur\nZeit Mah\u00e2v\u00eeras und Buddhas_, 1902.\n\nSee also Ang. Nik. vol. III. p. 276 and Rhys Davids' _Dialogues of the\nBuddha_, I. pp. 220 ff. But these passages give one an impression of the\nmultitude of ascetic confraternities rather than a clear idea of their\ndifferent views.]\n\n[Footnote 229: It finds expression in two hymns of the Atharva Veda,\nXIX. 53 and 54. Cf. too Gaudap. K\u00e2r. 8. K\u00e2l\u00e2t pras\u00fbtim bhut\u00e2n\u00e2m manyante\nk\u00e2lacintak\u00e2h.]\n\n[Footnote 230: D\u00eegha Nik\u00e2ya II. The opinions of the six teachers are\nquoted as being answers to a question put to them by King Aj\u00e2tasattu,\nnamely, What is gained by renouncing the world? Judged as such, they are\nirrelevant but they probably represent current statements as to the\ndoctrine of each sect. The six teachers are also mentioned in several\nother passages of the D\u00eegha and Maj. Nik\u00e2yas and also in the\nSutta-Nip\u00e2ta. It is clear that at a very early period the list of their\nnames had become the usual formula for summarizing the teaching\nprevalent in the time of Gotama which was neither Brahmanic nor\nBuddhist.]\n\n[Footnote 231: Dig. Nik. I. 23-28.]\n\n[Footnote 232: A rather defiant materialism preaching, \"Let us eat and\ndrink for to-morrow we die,\" crops up in India in various ages though\nnever very prominent.]\n\n[Footnote 233: But possibly the ascetics described by it were only\nDigambara Jains.]\n\n[Footnote 234: See especially the article \u00c2j\u00eevikas by Hoernle, in\nHastings' _Dictionary of Religion_. Also Hoernle, _Uv\u00e2sagadasao_,\nappendix, pp. 1-29. Rockhill, _Life of the Buddha_, pp. 249 ff.\nSchrader, _Stand der indischen Philosophie zur Zeit Mah\u00e2v\u00edras und\nBuddhas_, p. 32. S\u00fbtrakrit\u00e2nga II. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 235: Makkhali lived some time with Mah\u00e2vira, but they\nquarrelled. But his followers, though they may not have been a united\nbody so much as other sects, had definite characteristics.]\n\n[Footnote 236: _E.g._ Sat. Br\u00e2h. v. 4. 4. 13. \"He thus encloses the\nVaisya and S\u00fbdra on both sides by the priesthood and nobility and makes\nthem submissive.\"]\n\n[Footnote 237: See S\u00e2nkh\u00e2yana \u00c2ranyaka. Trans. Keith, pp. viii-xi, 78\n85. Also Aitareya \u00c2ran. book v.]\n\n[Footnote 238: Cf. the ritual for the Horse sacrifice. ['Sat]. Br\u00e2h,\nxiii. 2. 8, and Hillebrandt, _Vedische Opfer_., p. 152.]\n\n[Footnote 239: Supplemented by the Kausika S\u00fbtra, which, whatever its\nage may be, has preserved a record of very ancient usages.]\n\n[Footnote 240: _E.g._ I. 10. This hymn, like many others, seems to\ncombine several moral and intellectual stages, the level at which the\ncombination was possible not being very high. On the one hand Varuna is\nthe Lord of Law and of Truth who punishes moral offences with dropsy. On\nthe other, the sorcerer \"releases\" the patient from Varuna by charms,\nwithout imposing any moral penance, and offers the god a thousand other\nmen, provided that this particular victim is released.]\n\n[Footnote 241: _E.g._ VII. 116, VI. 105, VI. 83.]\n\n[Footnote 242: _E.g._ V. 7, XI. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 243: _E.g._ V. 4, XIX. 39, IV. 37, II. 8, XIX. 34, VIII. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 244: A. V XI. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 245: See, for instance, Du Bose, _The Dragon, Image and\nDemon_, 1887, pp. 320-344.]\n\n[Footnote 246: At\u00e2n\u00e2tiya and Mah\u00e2samaya. Dig. Nik. XX. and XXXII.]\n\n[Footnote 247: See Crooke's _Popular Religion of Northern India_, vol.\nII. chap. ii.]\n\n[Footnote 248: In the Brahma-Jala and subsequent suttas of the D\u00eegha\nNik\u00e2ya.]\n\n[Footnote 249: See Rhys Davids' _Dialogues of the Buddha_, vol. I. p. 7,\nnote 4, and authorities there quoted.]\n\n[Footnote 250: Krishna is perhaps mentioned in the Ch\u00e2nd. Up. III. 17.\n6, but in any case not as a deity.]\n\n[Footnote 251: See, besides the translations mentioned below, B\u00fchler,\n_Ueber die indische Secte der Jainas_ 1887; Hoernle, _Metaphysics and\nEthics of the Jainas_ 1908; and Gu\u00e9rinot, _Essai de Bibliographie Jaina_\nand _R\u00e9pertoire d'\u00c9pigraphie Jaina_; Jagmanderlal Jaini, _Outlines of\nJainism_; Jacobi's article Jainism in _E.R.E._. Much information may\nalso be found in Mrs Stevenson's _Heart of Jainism_. Winternitz,\n_Geschichte d. Indischen Literatur_, vol. II. part II. (1920) treats of\nJain literature but I have not been able to see it.]\n\n[Footnote 252: In _J.R.A.S._ 1917, pp. 122-130 s.v. Venkatesvara argues\nthat Vardham\u00e2na died about 437 B.C. and that the Niganthas of the\nPitakas were followers of Parsva. His arguments deserve consideration\nbut he seems not to lay sufficient emphasis on the facts that _(a)_\naccording to the Buddhist scriptures the Buddha and Gos\u00e2la were\ncontemporaries, while according to the Jain scriptures Gos\u00e2la and\nVardham\u00e2na were contemporaries, _(b)_ in the Buddhist scriptures\nN\u00e2taputta is the representative of the Niganthas, while according to the\nJain scriptures Vardham\u00e2na was of the \u00d1ata clan.]\n\n[Footnote 253: The atoms are either simple or compound and from their\ncombinations are produced the four elements, earth, wind, fire and\nwater, and the whole material universe. For a clear statement of the\nmodern Jain doctrine about _dharma_ and _adharma_, see Jagmanderlal\nJaini, l.c. pp. 22 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 254: J\u00eeva, aj\u00eeva, \u00e2srava, bandha, samvara, nirjar\u00e2, moksha.\nThe principles are sometimes made nine by the addition of _punya_,\nmerit, and _p\u00e2pa_, sin.]\n\n[Footnote 255: Paudgalikam karma. It would seem that all these ideas\nabout Karma should be taken in a literal and material sense. Karma,\nwhich is a specially subtle form of matter able to enter, stain and\nweigh down the soul, is of eight kinds (1 and 2) j\u00f1\u00e2na- and\ndarsana-varan\u00eeya impede knowledge and faith, which the soul naturally\npossesses; (3) mohan\u00eeya causes delusion; (4) vedan\u00eeya brings pleasure\nand pain; (5) ayushka fixes the length of life; (6) n\u00e2ma furnishes\nindividual characteristics, and (7) gotra generic; (8) antar\u00e2ya hinders\nthe development of good qualities.]\n\n[Footnote 256: Kevalam also called J\u00f1\u00e2na, moksha, nirv\u00e2na. The nirv\u00e2na\nof the Jains is clearly not incompatible with the continuance of\nintelligence and knowledge.]\n\n[Footnote 257: Uttar\u00e2dhy\u00e2yana XXXVI. 64-68 in _S.B.E._ XLV. pp.\n212-213.]\n\n[Footnote 258: _S.B.E._ XLV. p. xxvii. Bhandarkar Report for 1883-4, pp.\n95 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 259: Somewhat similar seems to be the relation of Jainism to\nthe Vaiseshika philosophy. It accepted an early form of the atomic\ntheory and this theory was subsequently elaborated in the philosophy\nwhose founder Kan\u00e2da was according to the Jains a pupil of a Jain\nascetic.]\n\n[Footnote 260: _E.g._ see Acar\u00e2nga S. I. 7. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 261: They seem to have authority to formulate it in a form\nsuitable to the needs of the age. Thus we are told that Parsva enjoined\nfour vows but Mah\u00e2v\u00eera five.]\n\n[Footnote 262: When Gotama after attaining Buddhahood was on his way to\nBenares he met Upaka, a naked ascetic, to whom he declared that he was\nthe Supreme Buddha. Then, said Upaka, you profess to be the Jina, and\nGotama replied that he did, \"Tasm\u00e2 'ham Upak\u00e2 jinoti.\" (Mah\u00e2vag. I. 6.\n10.)]\n\n[Footnote 263: The exact period is 100 billion s\u00e2garas of years. A\ns\u00e2gara is 100,000,000,000 palyas. A palya is the period in which a well\na mile deep filled with fine hairs can be emptied if one hair is\nwithdrawn every hundred years.]\n\n[Footnote 264: See M. Bloomfield, _Life and Stories of P\u00e2r\u00e7van\u00e2tha_\n(1919).]\n\n[Footnote 265: See the discussions between followers of Parsva and\nMah\u00e2v\u00eera given in Uttar\u00e2dhy\u00e2yana XXIV. and S\u00fbtrakrit\u00e2nga II. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 266: There are many references to the Niganthas in the\nBuddhist scriptures and the Buddha, while by no means accepting their\nviews, treats them with tolerance. Thus he bade Siha, General of the\nLicchavis, who became his disciple after being an adherent of N\u00e2taputta\nto continue to give alms as before to Nigantha ascetics (Mah\u00e2vag. VI.\n32).]\n\n[Footnote 267: Especially among the \u00c2j\u00eevikas. Their leader Gos\u00e2la had a\npersonal quarrel with Mah\u00e2v\u00eera but his teaching was almost identical\nexcept that he was a fatalist.]\n\n[Footnote 268: Uttar\u00e2dhy\u00e2yana. XXIII. 29.]\n\n[Footnote 269: According to Svet\u00e2mbara tradition there was a great\nschism 609 years after Mah\u00e2v\u00eera's death. The canon was not fixed until\n904 (? 454 A.D.) of the same era. The Digambara traditions are different\nbut appear to be later.]\n\n[Footnote 270: See especially Gu\u00e9rinot, _R\u00e9pertoire d'\u00c9ipigraphie\nJaina_]\n\n[Footnote 271: So B\u00fchler, Pillar Edict no. VIII. Senart Inscrip. de\nPiyadasi II. 97 translates somewhat differently, but the reference to\nthe Jains is not disputed.]\n\n[Footnote 272: Rock Edict VI.]\n\n[Footnote 273: Rice _(Mysore and Coorg from the Inscriptions_, 1909, p.\n310) thinks that certain inscriptions at Sravana Belgola in Mysore\nestablish that this tradition is true and also that the expedition was\naccompanied by King Candragupta who had abdicated and become a Jain\nascetic. But this interpretation has been much criticised. It is\nprobably true that a migration occurred and increased the differences\nwhich ultimately led to the division into Svet\u00e2mbaras and Digambaras.]\n\n[Footnote 274: Gu\u00e9rinot, _\u00c9pig. Jaina_, no. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 275: Rice, _Mysore and Coorg from the Inscriptions_, 1909, pp.\n113-114, 207-208.]\n\n[Footnote 276: Similar tolerance is attested by inscriptions (_e.g._\nGu\u00e9rinot, nos. 522 and 5776) recording donations to both Jain and Saiva\ntemples.]\n\n[Footnote 277: They also make a regular practice of collecting and\nrearing young animals which the owners throw away or wish to kill.]\n\n[Footnote 278: Or Sth\u00e2nakav\u00e2si. See for them _Census of India_, 1911, 1.\np. 127 and _Baroda_, p. 93. The sect waa founded about A.D. 1653.]\n\n[Footnote 279: Their names are as follows in Jain Prakrit, the Sanskrit\nequivalent being given in bracketa:\n\n  1. *\u00c2y\u00e2r\u00e2ngasuttam (\u00c2c\u00e2r\u00e2nga).\n  2. *S\u00fbyagadangam (S\u00fbtrakrit\u00e2ngam).\n  3. Th\u00e2nangam (Sth\u00e2.).\n  4. Samav\u00e2yangam.\n  5. Viy\u00e2hapa\u00f1\u00f1atti (Vy\u00e2khy\u00e2prajn\u00e2pti). This work is commonly known\n     as the Bhagavat\u00ee.\n  6. \u00d1\u00e2y\u00e2dhammakah\u00e2o (J\u00f1\u00e2tadharmakath\u00e2).\n  7. *Uv\u00e2sagadasao (Up\u00e2sakadas\u00e2h).\n  8. *Antagadadasao (Antakritad.).\n  9. *Anuttarovav\u00e2idas\u00e2o (Anuttaraupap\u00e2tikad.).\n  10. Panh\u00e2v\u00e2garan\u00e2im (Prasnavyakaran\u00e2ni).\n  11. Viv\u00e2gasuyam (Vip\u00e2kasrutam).\n\nThe books marked with an asterisk have been translated by Jacobi\n(_S.B.E._ vols. XXII. and XIV.), Hoernle and Barnett. See too Weber,\n_Indischie Studien_, Bd. XVI. pp. 211-479 and Bd. XVIII. pp. 1-90.]\n\n[Footnote 280: It is called \u00c2rsha or Ardha-M\u00e2gadhi and is the literary\nform of the vernacular of Berar in the early centuries of the Christian\nera. See H. Jacobi, Ausgew\u00e4hlte Erz\u00e4hlungen in _Maharashtri_, and\nintroduction to edition of _Ayar\u00e2nga-sutta_.]\n\n[Footnote 281: The titles given in note 2 illustrate aome of its\npeculiarities.]\n\n[Footnote 282: When I visited Sravana Belgola in 1910, the head of the\nJains there, who professed to be a Digambara, though dressed in purple\nraiment, informed me that their sacred works were partly in Sanskrit and\npartly in Prakrit. He showed me a book called Trilokas\u00e2ra.]\n\n[Footnote 283: But see Jagmanderlal Jaini, l.c. appendix V.]\n\n[Footnote 284: Compare for instance Uttar\u00e2dyayana X., XXIII. and XXV.\nwith the Sutta-Nip\u00e2ta and Dhammapada.]\n\n[Footnote 285: I have only visited establishments in towns. Possibly\nYatis who follow a severer rule may be found in the country, especially\namong Digambaras.]\n\n[Footnote 286: In Gujarat they are called Cho-mukhji and it is said that\nwhen a T\u00eerthankara preached in the midst of his audience each side saw\nhim facing them. In Burma the four figures are generally said to be the\nlast four Buddhas.]\n\n[Footnote 287: This seems clear from the presence in Burma of the\ncurvilinear sikra and even of copies of Indian temples, _e.g._ of\nBodh-Gaya at Pagan. Burmese pilgrims to Gaya might easily have visited\nMt Parasnath on their way.]\n\n[Footnote 288: I have this information from the Jain Guru at Sravana\nBelgola. He said that Gomatesvara (who seems unknown to the Svet\u00e2mbaras)\nwaa a Kevalin but not a T\u00eerthankara.]\n\n[Footnote 289: Two others, rather smaller, are known, one at Kark\u00e2l\n(dated 1431) and one at Yannur. These images are honoured at occasional\nfestivals (one was held at Sravana Belgola in 1910) attended by a\nconsiderable concourse of Jains. The type of the statues is not\nBuddhist. They are nude and represent sages meditating in a standing\nposition whereas Buddhists prescribe a sitting posture for meditation.]\n\n[Footnote 290: The mountain of Satrunjaya rises above Palit\u00e2na, the\ncapital of a native state in Gujarat. Other collections of temples are\nfound on the hill of Parasnath in Bengal, at Son\u00e2gir near Dati\u00e2, and\nMuktagiri near G\u00e2w\u00eelgarh. There are also a good many on the hills above\nRajg\u00eer.]\n\n[Footnote 291: The strength of Buddhism in Burma and Siam is no doubt\nlargely due to the fact that custom obliges every one to spend part of\nhis life--if only a few days--as a member of the order.]\n\n[Footnote 292: One might perhaps add to this list the Skoptsy of Russia\nand the Armenian colonies in many European and Asiatic towns.]\n\n[Footnote 293: Throughout this book I have not hesitated to make use of\nthe many excellent translations of Pali works which have been published.\nStudents of Indian religion need hardly be reminded how much our\nknowledge of Pali writings and of early Buddhism owes to the labours of\nProfessor and Mrs Rhys Davids.]\n\n[Footnote 294: Sanskrit S\u00fbtra, Pali Sutta. But the use of the words is\nnot quite the same in Buddhist and Brahmanic literature. A Buddhist\nsutta or s\u00fbtra is a discourse, whether in Pali or in Sanskrit; a\nBrahmanic s\u00fbtra is an aphorism. But the 227 divisions of the P\u00e2timokkha\nare called Suttas, so that the word may have been originally used in\nPali to denote short statements of a single point. The longer Suttas are\noften called Suttanta.]\n\n[Footnote 295: _E.g._ Maj. Nik. 123 about the marvels attending the\nbirth of a Buddha.]\n\n[Footnote 296: See some further remarks on this subject at the end of\nchap. XIII. (on the Canon).]\n\n[Footnote 297: Also Sakya or Sakka. The Sanskrit form is S\u00e2kya.]\n\n[Footnote 298: See among other passages the Ambattha Sutta of the D\u00eegha\nNik\u00e2ya in which Ambattha relates how he saw the S\u00e2kyas, old and young,\nsitting on grand seats in this hall.]\n\n[Footnote 299: But in Cullavagga VII. 1 Bhaddiya, a cousin of the Buddha\nwho is described as being the R\u00e2j\u00e2 at that time, says when thinking of\nrenouncing the world \"Wait whilst I hand over the kingdom to my sons and\nmy brothers,\" which seems to imply that the kingdom was a family\npossession. Rajja perhaps means Consulship in the Roman sense rather\nthan kingdom.]\n\n[Footnote 300: E.g. the Sonadanda and K\u00fbtadanta Suttas of the D\u00eegha\nNik\u00e2ya.]\n\n[Footnote 301: Sanskrit Kapilavastu: red place or red earth.]\n\n[Footnote 302: Tradition is unanimous that he died in his eightieth year\nand hitherto it has been generally supposed that this was about 487\nB.C., so that he would have been born a little before 560. But Vincent\nSmith now thinks that he died about 543 B.C. See _J.R.A.S._ 1918, p.\n547. He was certainly contemporary with kings Bimbis\u00e2ra and Aj\u00e2tasattu,\ndying in the reign of the latter. His date therefore depends on the\nchronology of the Saisun\u00e2ga and Nanda dynasties, for which new data are\nnow available.]\n\n[Footnote 303: It was some time before the word came to mean definitely\nthe Buddha. In Ud\u00e2na 1.5, which is not a very early work, a number of\ndisciples including Devadatta are described as being all _Buddh\u00e2_.]\n\n[Footnote 304: The Chinese translators render this word by Ju-lai (he\nwho has come thus). As they were in touch with the best Indian\ntradition, this translation seems to prove that Tath\u00e2gata is equivalent\nto Tath\u00e2-\u00e2gata not to T\u00e2tha-gata and the meaning must be, he who has\ncome in the proper manner; a holy man who conforms to a type and is one\nin a series of Buddhas or Jinas.]\n\n[Footnote 305: See the article on the neighbouring country of Magadha in\nMacdonell and Keith's _Vedic Index_.]\n\n[Footnote 306: Cf. the Ratthap\u00e2la-sutta.]\n\n[Footnote 307: Mah\u00e2v. I. 54. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 308: Devad\u00fbtavagga. Ang. Nik. III. 35.]\n\n[Footnote 309: But the story is found in the Mah\u00e2pad\u00e2na-sutta. See also\nWinternitz, _J.R.A.S._ 1911, p. 1146.]\n\n[Footnote 310: He mentions that he had three palaces or houses, for the\nhot, cold and rainy seasons respectively, but this is not necessarily\nregal for the same words are used of Yasa, the son of a Treasurer\n(Mah\u00e2v. 1. 7. 1) and Anuruddha, a S\u00e2kyan noble (Cullav. VII. 1. 1).]\n\n[Footnote 311: In the Sonadanda-sutta and elsewhere.]\n\n[Footnote 312: The Pabbajj\u00e2-sutta.]\n\n[Footnote 313: Maj. Nik. Ariyapariyesana-sutta. It is found in\nsubstantially the same form in the Mah\u00e2saccaka-sutta and the\nBodhir\u00e2jakum\u00e2ra-sutta.]\n\n[Footnote 314: The teaching of Al\u00e2ra K\u00e2l\u00e2ma led to rebirth in the sphere\ncalled aki\u00f1ca\u00f1-\u00f1\u00e2yatanam or the sphere in which nothing at all is\nspecially present to the mind and that of Uddaka R\u00e2maputta to rebirth in\nthe sphere where neither any idea nor the absence of any idea is\nspecially present to the mind. These expressions occur elsewhere (_e.g._\nin the Mah\u00e2parinibb\u00e2na-sutta) as names of stages in meditation or of\nincorporeal worlds (ar\u00fbpabrahm\u00e2loka) where those states prevail. Some\nmysterious utterances of Uddaka are preserved in Sam. Nik. XXXV. 103.]\n\n[Footnote 315: Underhill, _Introd. to Mysticism_, p. 387.]\n\n[Footnote 316: Sam. Nik. XXXVI. 19.]\n\n[Footnote 317: The Lalita Vistara says Al\u00e2ra lived at Ves\u00e2l\u00ee and Uddaka\nin Magadha.]\n\n[Footnote 318: The following account is based on Maj. Nik. suttas 85 and\n26. Compare the beginning of the Mah\u00e2vagga of the Vinaya.]\n\n[Footnote 319: Maj. Nik. 12. See too Dig. Nik. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 320: If this discourse is regarded as giving in substance\nGotama's own version of his experiences, it need not be supposed to mean\nmuch more than that his good angel (in European language) bade him not\ntake his own life. But the argument represented as appealing to him was\nthat if spirits sustained him with supernatural nourishment, entire\nabstinence from food would be a useless pretence.]\n\n[Footnote 321: The remarkable figures known as \"fasting Buddhas\" in\nLahore Museum and elsewhere represent Gotama in this condition and show\nvery plainly the falling in of the belly.]\n\n[Footnote 322: \u00c2sava. The word appears to mean literally an intoxicating\nessence. See _e.g._ Vinaya, vol. IV. p. 110 (Rhys Davids and Oldenburg's\ned.). Cf. the use of the word in Sanskrit.]\n\n[Footnote 323: N\u00e2param itthatt\u00e2y\u00e2ti. Itthattam is a substantive formed\nfrom ittham thus. It was at this time too that he thought out the chain\nof causation.]\n\n[Footnote 324: Tradition states that it was on this occasion that he\nuttered the well-known stanzas now found in the Dhammapada 154-5 (cf.\nTherag\u00e2th\u00e2 183) in which he exults in having, after long search in\nrepeated births, found the maker of the house. \"Now, O maker of the\nhouse thou art seen: no more shalt thou make a house.\" The lines which\nfollow are hard to translate. The ridge-pole of the house has been\ndestroyed (visankhitam more literally de-com-posed) and so the mind\npasses beyond the sankh\u00e2ras (visankh\u00e2ragatam). The play of words in\nvisankhitam and visankh\u00e2ra can hardly be rendered in English.]\n\n[Footnote 325: As Rhys Davids observes, this expression means \"to found\nthe Kingdom of Righteousness\" but the metaphor is to make the wheels of\nthe chariot of righteousness move unopposed over all the Earth.]\n\n[Footnote 326: At the modern Sarnath.]\n\n[Footnote 327: It is from this point that he begins to use this title in\nspeaking of himself.]\n\n[Footnote 328: Similar heavenly messages were often received by\nChristian mystics and were probably true as subjective experiences. Thus\nSuso was visited one Whitsunday by a heavenly messenger who bade him\ncease his mortifications.]\n\n[Footnote 329: It is the Pipal tree or Ficus religiosa, as is mentioned\nin the D\u00eegha Nik\u00e2ya, XIV. 30, not the Banyan. Its leaves have long\npoints and tremble continually. Popular fancy says this is in memory of\nthe tremendous struggle which they witnessed.]\n\n[Footnote 330: Such are the Padh\u00e2na-sutta of the Sutta-Nip\u00e2ta which has\nan air of antiquity and the tales in the Mah\u00e2vagga of the\nSamyutta-Nik\u00e2ya. The Mah\u00e2vagga of the Vinaya (I. 11 and 13) mentions\nsuch an encounter but places it considerably later after the conversion\nof the five monks and of Yasa.]\n\n[Footnote 331: The text is also found in the Samyutta-Nik\u00e2ya.]\n\n[Footnote 332: Concisely stated as suffering, the cause of suffering,\nthe suppression of suffering and the method of effecting that\nsuppression.]\n\n[Footnote 333: Writers on Buddhism use this word in various forms,\narhat, arahat and arahant. Perhaps it is best to use the Sanskrit form\narhat just as karma and nirvana are commonly used instead of the Pali\nequivalents.]\n\n[Footnote 334: I.15-20.]\n\n[Footnote 335: Brahmayoni. I make this suggestion about grass fires\nbecause I have myself watched them from this point.]\n\n[Footnote 336: This meal, the only solid one in the day, was taken a\nlittle before midday.]\n\n[Footnote 337: I. 53-54.]\n\n[Footnote 338: His father.]\n\n[Footnote 339: _I.e._ the Buddha's former wife.]\n\n[Footnote 340: Half brother of the Buddha and Suddhodana'a son by\nMah\u00e2praj\u00e2pat\u00ee.]\n\n[Footnote 341: J\u00e2taka, 356.]\n\n[Footnote 342: Mah\u00e2vag. III. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 343: Thus we hear how Dasama of Atthakam (Maj. Nik. 52) built\none for fifteen hundred monks, and Ghotamukha another in Pataliputta,\nwhich bore his name.]\n\n[Footnote 344: Maj. Nik. 53.]\n\n[Footnote 345: Cullavag. VI. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 346: Probably sheds consisting of a roof set on posts, but\nwithout walls.]\n\n[Footnote 347: Translated by Rhys Davids, _American Lectures_, pp. 108\nff.]\n\n[Footnote 348: _E.g._ Maj. Nik. 62.]\n\n[Footnote 349: But in Maj. Nik. II. 5 he says he is not bound by rules\nas to eating.]\n\n[Footnote 350: Maj. Nik. 147.]\n\n[Footnote 351: In an exceedingly curious passage (Dig. Nik. IV.) the\nBrahman Sonadanda, while accepting the Buddha's teaching, asks to be\nexcused from showing the Buddha such extreme marks of respect as rising\nfrom his seat or dismounting from his chariot, on the ground that his\nreputation would suffer. He proposes and apparently is allowed to\nsubstitute less demonstrative salutations.]\n\n[Footnote 352: Cullavagga V. 21 and Maj. Nik. 85.]\n\n[Footnote 353: Vis\u00e2kh\u00e2, a lady of noted piety. It was probably a raised\ngarden planted with trees.]\n\n[Footnote 354: Maj. Nik. 110.]\n\n[Footnote 355: Dig. Nik. No. 2. Compare J\u00e2taka 150, which shows how much\nvariation was permitted in the words ascribed to the Buddha.]\n\n[Footnote 356: Sam. Nik. XLII. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 357: Mah\u00e2parinib-sutta, 6. 20. The monk Subhadda, in whose\nmouth these words are put, was apparently not the person of the same\nname who was the last convert made by the Buddha when dying.]\n\n[Footnote 358: His personal name was Upatissa.]\n\n[Footnote 359: This position was also held, previously no doubt, by\nSagata.]\n\n[Footnote 360: Mahav\u00e2g. X. 2. Compare the singular anecdote in VI. 22\nwhere the Buddha quite unjustifiably suspects a Doctor of making an\nindelicate joke. The story seems to admit that the Buddha might be wrong\nand also that he was sometimes treated with want of respect.]\n\n[Footnote 361: VII. 2 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 362: The introductions to J\u00e2takas 26 and 150 say that\nAj\u00e2tasattu built a great monastery for him at Gay\u00e2s\u00eesa.]\n\n[Footnote 363: The Buddha says so himself (Dig. Nik. II.) but does not\nmention the method.]\n\n[Footnote 364: The Dhamma-sangani defines courtesy as being of two\nkinds: hospitality and considerateness in matters of doctrine.]\n\n[Footnote 365: Maj. Nik. 75.]\n\n[Footnote 366: Mahav. vi. 31. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 367: Cullavag. x. 1. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 368: Mah\u00e2parinib. V. 23. Perhaps the Buddha was supposed to be\ngiving \u00c2nanda last warnings about his besetting weakness.]\n\n[Footnote 369: Ud\u00e2na 1. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 370: Compare too the language of Angela of Foligno (1248-1309)\n\"By God's will there died my mother who was a great hindrance unto me in\nfollowing the way of God: my husband died likewise and all my children.\nAnd because I had commenced to follow the aforesaid way and had prayed\nGod that he would rid me of them, I had great consolation of their\ndeaths, although I did also feel some grief.\" Beatae Angelae de Fulginio\nVisionum et Instructionum Liber. Cap. ix.]\n\n[Footnote 371: No account of this event has yet been found in the\nearliest texts but it is no doubt historical. The versions found in the\nJ\u00e2taka and Commentaries trace it back to a quarrel about a marriage, but\nthe story is not very clear or consistent and the real motive was\nprobably that indicated above.]\n\n[Footnote 372: See Rhys Davids, _Dialogues_, II. p. 70 and Przyluski's\narticles (in _J.A_. 1918 ff.) Le Parinirvana et les fun\u00e9railles du\nBouddha where the Pali texts are compared with the M\u00fblasarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2din\nVinaya and with other accounts.]\n\n[Footnote 373: This was probably written after P\u00e2taliputra had become a\ngreat city but we do not know when its rise commenced.]\n\n[Footnote 374: She was a noted character in Ves\u00e2l\u00ee. In Mah\u00e2vag. viii. 1,\npeople are represented as saying that it was through her the place was\nso flourishing and that it would be a good thing if there were some one\nlike her in R\u00e2jagaha.]\n\n[Footnote 375: The whole passage is interesting as displaying even in\nthe Pali Canon the germs of the idea that the Buddha is an eternal\nspirit only partially manifested in the limits of human life. In the\nMah\u00e2parinib.-sutta Gotama is only voluntarily subject to natural death.]\n\n[Footnote 376: The phrase occurs again in the Sutta-Nip\u00e2ta. Its meaning\nis not clear to me.]\n\n[Footnote 377: The text seems to represent him as crossing first a\nstreamlet and then the river.]\n\n[Footnote 378: It is not said how much time elapsed between the meal at\nCunda's and the arrival at Kusin\u00e2r\u00e2 but since it was his last meal, he\nprobably arrived the same afternoon.]\n\n[Footnote 379: Cf. Lyall's poem, on a Rajput Chief of the Old School,\nwho when nearing his end has to leave his pleasure garden in order that\nhe may die in the ancestral castle.]\n\n[Footnote 380: Dig. Nik. 17 and J\u00e2taka 95.]\n\n[Footnote 381: It is said that this discipline was efficacious and that\nChanna became an Arhat.]\n\n[Footnote 382: It is difficult to find a translation of these words\nwhich is both accurate and natural in the mouth of a dying man. The Pali\ntext _vayadhamm\u00e2 sankh\u00e2r\u00e2_ (transitory-by-nature are the Sankh\u00e2ras) is\nbrief and simple but any correct and adequate rendering sounds\nmetaphysical and is dramatically inappropriate. Perhaps the rendering\n\"All compound things must decompose\" expresses the Buddha's meaning\nbest. But the verbal antithesis between compound and decomposing is not\nin the original and though sankh\u00e2ra is etymologically the equivalent of\nconfection or synthesis it hardly means what we call a compound thing as\nopposed to a simple thing.]\n\n[Footnote 383: The Buddha before his death had explained that the corpse\nof a Buddha should be treated like the corpse of a universal monarch. It\nshould be wrapped in layers of new cloth and laid in an iron vessel of\noil. Then it should be burnt and a Dagoba should be erected at four\ncross roads.]\n\n[Footnote 384: The Mallas had two capitals, Kusin\u00e2r\u00e2 and P\u00e2v\u00e2,\ncorresponding to two subdivisions of the tribe.]\n\n[Footnote 385: Therag\u00e2th\u00e2 557 ff. Water to refresh tired and dusty feet\nis commonly offered to anyone who comes from a distance.]\n\n[Footnote 386: Mah\u00e2vag. VIII. 26.]\n\n[Footnote 387: _E.g._ Ther\u00eeg\u00e2th\u00e2 133 ff. It should also be remembered\nthat orientals, particularly Chinese and Japanese, find Christ's\nbehaviour to his mother as related in the gospels very strange.]\n\n[Footnote 388: _E.g._ Roja, the Malta, in Mah\u00e2vag. VI. 36 and the\naccount of the interview with the Five Monks in the Nid\u00e2nakath\u00e2 (Rhys\nDavids, _Budd. Birth Stories_, p. 112).]\n\n[Footnote 389: _E.g._ Maj. Nik. 36.]\n\n[Footnote 390: Dig. Nik. XVII. and V.]\n\n[Footnote 391: Maj. Nik. 57.]\n\n[Footnote 392: Mah\u00e2parib. Sutta, I. 61.]\n\n[Footnote 393: The earliest sources for these legends are the Mah\u00e2vastu,\nthe Sanskrit Vinayas (preserved in Chinese translations), the Lalita\nVistara, the Introduction to the J\u00e2taka and the Buddha-carita. For\nBurmese, Sinhalese, Tibetan and Chinese lives of the Buddha, see the\nworks of Bigandet, Hardy, Rockhill and Schiefner, Wieger and Beal. See\nalso Foucher, _Liste indienne des actes du Buddha_ and Hackin, _Sc\u00e8nes\nde la Vie du Buddha d'apr\u00e8s des peintures tib\u00e9taines_.]\n\n[Footnote 394: It was the full moon of the month Vais\u00e2kha.]\n\n[Footnote 395: The best known of the later biographies of the Buddha,\nsuch as the Lalita Vistara and the Buddha-carita of Asvaghosha stop\nshort after the Enlightenment.]\n\n[Footnote 396: There are some curious coincidences of detail between the\nBuddha and Confucius. Both disliked talking about prodigies (Analects.\nV11. 20) Confucius concealed nothing from his disciples (ib. 23), just\nas the Buddha had no \"closed fist,\" but he would not discuss the\ncondition of the dead (Anal. xi. 11), just as the Buddha held it\nunprofitable to discuss the fate of the saint after death. Neither had\nany great opinion of the spirits worshipped in their respective\ncountries.]\n\n[Footnote 397: Maj. Nik. 143.]\n\n[Footnote 398: The miraculous cure of Suppiy\u00e2 (Mah\u00e2vag. VI. 23) is no\nexception. She was ill not because of the effects of Karma but because,\naccording to the legend, she had cut off a piece of her flesh to cure a\nsick monk who required meat broth. The Buddha healed her.]\n\n[Footnote 399: The most human and kindly portrait of the Buddha is that\nfurnished by the Commentary on the Thera- and Ther\u00ee-g\u00e2th\u00e2. See\nThera-g\u00e2th\u00e2 xxx, xxxi and Mrs Rhys Davids' trans. of _Ther\u00ee-g\u00e2th\u00e2_, pp.\n71, 79.]\n\n[Footnote 400: John xvii. 9. But he prayed for his executioners.]\n\n[Footnote 401: John vii. 19-20.]\n\n[Footnote 402: See chap. VIII. of this book.]\n\n[Footnote 403: Cullavag, IX, I. IV.]\n\n[Footnote 404: Sam. Nik. LVI. 31.]\n\n[Footnote 405: Ud\u00e2na VI. 4. The story is that a king bade a number of\nblind men examine an elephant and describe its shape. Some touched the\nlegs, some the tusks, some the tail and so on and gave descriptions\naccordingly, but none had any idea of the general shape.]\n\n[Footnote 406: Or \"determined.\"]\n\n[Footnote 407: Or form: _r\u00fbpa_.]\n\n[Footnote 408: The word Jiva, sometimes translated _soul_, is not\nequivalent to _\u00e2tman_. It seems to be a general expression for all the\nimmaterial side of a human being. It is laid down (Dig. Nik. VI. and\nVII.) that it is fruitless to speculate whether the Jiva is distinct\nfrom the body or not.]\n\n[Footnote 409: Sa\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2 like many technical Buddhist terms is difficult to\nrender adequately, because it does not cover the same ground as any one\nEnglish word. Its essential meaning is recognition by a mark. When we\nperceive a blue thing we recognize it as blue and as like other blue\nthings that we have marked. See Mrs Rhys Davids, Dhamma-Sangani, p. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 410: The Samyutta-Nik\u00e2ya XXII. 79. 8 states that the Sankh\u00e2ras\nare so-called because they compose what is compound (sankhatam).]\n\n[Footnote 411: Maj. Nik. 44.]\n\n[Footnote 412: In this sense Sankh\u00e2ra has also some affinity to the\nSanskrit use of Samsk\u00e2ra to mean a sacramental rite. It is the essential\nnature of such a rite to produce a special effect. So too the Sankh\u00e2ras\npresent in one existence inevitably produce their effect in the next\nexistence. For Sankh\u00e2ra see also the long note by S.Z. Aung at the end\nof the _Compendium of Philosophy_ (P.T.S. 1910).]\n\n[Footnote 413: The use of this word for Vi\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2na is, I believe, due to\nMrs Rhys Davids.]\n\n[Footnote 414: See especially Maj. Nik. 38.]\n\n[Footnote 415: Pali, Khanda. But it has become the custom to use the\nSanskrit term. Cf. Karma, nirv\u00e2na.]\n\n[Footnote 416: See Sam. Nik. XII. 62. For parallels to this view in\nmodern times see William James, _Text Book of Psychology_, especially\npp. 203, 215, 216.]\n\n[Footnote 417: Cf. Milinda Panha II. 1. 1 and also the dialogue between\nthe king of Sauv\u00eera and the Brahman in Vishnu Pur. II. XIII.]\n\n[Footnote 418: Vis. Mag. chap. XVI. quoted by Warren, _Buddhism in\nTranslations_, p. 146. Also it is admitted that vi\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2na cannot be\ndisentangled and sharply distinguished from feeling and sensation. See\npassages quoted in Mrs Rhys Davids, _Buddhist Psychology,_ pp. 52-54.]\n\n[Footnote 419: Sam. Nik. XXII. 22. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 420: With reference to a teacher dhamma is the doctrine which\nhe preaches. With reference to a disciple, it may often be equivalent to\nduty. Cf. the Sanskrit expressions: sva-dharma, one's own duty;\npara-dharma, the duty of another person or caste.]\n\n[Footnote 421: Dhamma-s. 1044-5.]\n\n[Footnote 422: II. 3. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 423: Dig. Nik. XI. 85.]\n\n[Footnote 424: Name and form is the Buddhist equivalent for subject and\nobject or mind and body.]\n\n[Footnote 425: Mrs Rhys Davids, _Buddhist Psychology_, p. 39.]\n\n[Footnote 426: Sam. Nik. xxxv. 93.]\n\n[Footnote 427: The same formula is repeated for the other senses.]\n\n[Footnote 428: See Maj. Nik. 36 for his own experiences and Dig. Nik. 2.\n93-96.]\n\n[Footnote 429: In Dig. Nik. xxiii. P\u00e2y\u00e2si maintains the thesis, regarded\nas most unusual (sec. 5), that there is no world but this and no such\nthings as rebirth and karma. He is confuted not by the Buddha but by\nKassapa. His arguments are that dead friends whom he has asked to bring\nhim news of the next world have not done so and that experiments\nperformed on criminals do not support the idea that a soul leaves the\nbody at death. Kassapa's reply is chiefly based on analogies of doubtful\nvalue but also on the affirmation that those who have cultivated their\nspiritual faculties have intuitive knowledge of rebirth and other\nworlds. But P\u00e2y\u00e2si did not draw any distinction between rebirth and\nimmortality as understood in Europe. He was a simple materialist.]\n\n[Footnote 430: The more mythological parts of the Pitakas make it plain\nthat the early Buddhists were not materialists in the modern sense. It\nis also said that there are formless worlds in which there is thought,\nbut no form or matter.]\n\n[Footnote 431: See too the story of Godhika's death. Sam. Nik. I. iv. 3\nand Buddhaghosa on Dhammap. 57.]\n\n[Footnote 432: No. 38 called the Mah\u00e2tanh\u00e2sankhaya-suttam.]\n\n[Footnote 433: See too Dig. Nik. n. 63, \"If Vi\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2na did not descend into\nthe womb, would body and mind be constituted there?\" and Sam. Nik. xii.\n12. 3, \"Vi\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2na food is the condition for bringing about rebirth in the\nfuture.\"]\n\n[Footnote 434: Uppajjati is the usual word.]\n\n[Footnote 435: Ariyasacc\u00e2ni. Rhys Davids translates the phrase as Aryan\ntruths and the word Ariya in old Pali appears not to have lost its\nnational or tribal sense, _e.g._ Dig. Nik. n. 87 Ariyam \u00e2yatanam the\nAryan sphere (of influence). But was a religious teacher preaching a\ndoctrine of salvation open to all men likely to describe its most\nfundamental and universal truths by an adjective implying pride of\nrace?]\n\n[Footnote 436: In Maj. Nik. 44 the word dukkha is replaced by sakk\u00e2ya,\nindividuality, which is apparently regarded as equivalent in meaning. So\nfor instance the Noble Eightfold path is described as\nsakk\u00e2ya-nirodha-g\u00e2min\u00ee patipad\u00e2.]\n\n[Footnote 437: Therag\u00e2th\u00e2 487-493, and Puggala Pa\u00f1. iv. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 438: But it has not been proved so far as I know.]\n\n[Footnote 439: Sam. Nik. XV. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 440: Buddhist works sometimes insist on the impurity of human\nphysical life in a way which seems morbid and disagreeable. But this\nview is not exclusively Buddhist or Asiatic. It is found in Marcus\nAurelius and perhaps finds its strongest expression in the De Contemptu\nMundi of Pope Innocent III (in Pat. Lat. ccxvii. cols. 701-746).]\n\n[Footnote 441: As a general rule suicide is strictly forbidden (see the\nthird P\u00e2r\u00e2jika and Milinda, iv. 13 and 14) for in most cases it is not a\npassionless renunciation of the world but rather a passionate and\nirritable protest against difficulties which simply lays up bad karma in\nthe next life. Yet cases such as that of Godhika (see Buddhaghosa on the\nDhammapada, 57) seem to imply that it is unobjectionable if performed\nnot out of irritation but by one who having already obtained mental\nrelease is troubled by disease.]\n\n[Footnote 442: Pali Paticca-samupp\u00e2da. Sanskrit Prat\u00eetya-samutp\u00e2da.]\n\n[Footnote 443: Sam. Nik. xii. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 444: Dig. Nik. XV.]\n\n[Footnote 445: \"Contact comes from consciousness: sensation from\ncontact: craving from sensation: the sankh\u00e2ras from craving:\nconsciousness from the sankh\u00e2ras: contact from consciousness\" and so on\n_ad infinitum_. See Mil. Pan. 51.]\n\n[Footnote 446: Dig. Nik. XV.]\n\n[Footnote 447: Sam. Nik. XII. 53. Cf. too the previous sutta 51. In the\nAbhidhamma Pitaka and later scholastic works we find as a development of\nthe law of causation the theory of relations (paccaya) or system of\ncorrelation (patth\u00e2na-nayo). According to this theory phenomena are not\nthought of merely in the simple relation of cause and effect. One\nphenomenon can be the assistant agency (upak\u00e2raka) of another phenomenon\nin 24 modes. See Mrs Rhys Davids' article Relations in _E.R.E._]\n\n[Footnote 448: Mrs Rhys Davids, Dhamma-sangani, pref. p. lii. \"The\nsensory process is analysed in each case into (_a_) an apparatus capable\nof reaching to an impact not itself: (_b_) an impinging form (r\u00fbpam):\n(_c_) contact between (_a_) and (_b_): (_d_) resultant modification of\nthe mental continuum, viz. first, contact of a specific sort, then\nhedonistic result or intellectual result or presumably both.\"]\n\n[Footnote 449: See _e.g._ Maj. Nik. 38.]\n\n[Footnote 450: This does not mean that the same name-and-form plus\nconsciousness which dies in one existence reappears in another.]\n\n[Footnote 451: Maj. Nik. 120 Sankh\u00e2ruppatti sutta.]\n\n[Footnote 452: He should make it a continual mental exercise to think of\nthe rebirth which he desires.]\n\n[Footnote 453: So too in the S\u00e2nkhya philosophy the samsk\u00e2ras are said\nto pass from one human existence to another. They may also remain\ndormant for several existences and then become active.]\n\n[Footnote 454: Maj. Nik. 9 Samm\u00e2ditthi sutta.]\n\n[Footnote 455: Sam. Nik. xxii. 126.]\n\n[Footnote 456: Mah\u00e2vag. i. 23. 4 and 5:]\n\nYe dhamm\u00e2 hetuppabhav\u00e2 tesam hetum Tath\u00e2gato \u00c2ha tesa\u00f1ca yo nirodho\nevamv\u00e2di Mah\u00e2samano ti.\n\nThe passage is remarkable because it insists that this is the principal\nand essential doctrine of Gotama. Compare too the definition of the\nDhamma put in the Buddha's own mouth in Majjhima, 79: Dhammam te\ndesess\u00e2mi: imasmim sati, idam hoti: imass' upp\u00e2d\u00e2 idam upajjhati, etc.]\n\n[Footnote 457: The S\u00e2nkhya might be described as teaching a law of\nevolution, but that is not the way it is described in its own manuals.]\n\n[Footnote 458: Take among hundreds of instances the account of the\nBuddha's funeral.]\n\n[Footnote 459: The Anguttara Nik\u00e2ya, book iv. chap. 77, forbids\nspeculation on four subjects as likely to bring madness and trouble. Two\nof the four are kamma-vip\u00e2ko and loka-cint\u00e2. An attempt to make the\nchain of causation into a cosmic law would involve just this sort of\nspeculation.]\n\n[Footnote 460: The Pitakas insist that causation applies to mental as\nwell as physical phenomena.]\n\n[Footnote 461: Sam. Nik. xii. 35.]\n\n[Footnote 462: Vis. Mag. xvii. Warren, p. 175.]\n\n[Footnote 463: See Waddell, _J.R.A.S._ 1894, pp. 367-384: Rhys Davids,\n_Amer. Lectures,_ pp. 155-160.]\n\n[Footnote 464: Sam. Nik. XII. 61. See too Therag\u00e2th\u00e2, verses 125 and\n1111, and for other illustrative quotations Mrs Rhys Davids, _Buddhist\nPsychology_, pp. 34, 35.]\n\n[Footnote 465: But see Maj. Nik. 79, for the idea that there is\nsomething beyond happiness.]\n\n[Footnote 466: Dig. Nik. 22.]\n\n[Footnote 467: Sutta-Nip\u00e2ta, 787.]\n\n[Footnote 468: Padh\u00e2nam. But in later Buddhism we also find the idea\nthat nirvana is something which comes only when we do not struggle for\nit.]\n\n[Footnote 469: Mett\u00e2, corresponding exactly to the Greek [Greek: agapei]\nof the New Testament.]\n\n[Footnote 470: III. 7. The translation is abbreviated.]\n\n[Footnote 471: More literally, \"All the occasions which can be used for\ndoing good works.\"]\n\n[Footnote 472: Sutta-Nip\u00e2ta, 1-8, _S.B.E._ vol. X. p. 25 and see also\nAng. Nik. IV. 190 which says that love leads to rebirth in the higher\nheavens and Sam. Nik. XX. 4 to the effect that a little love is better\nthan great gifts. Also _Questions of Milinda_, 4. 4. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 473: Ang. Nik. 1. 2. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 474: Cf. too Mah\u00e2vag. VIII. 22 where a monk is not blamed for\ngiving the property of the order to his parents.]\n\n[Footnote 475: Sati is the Sanskrit Smriti.]\n\n[Footnote 476: Dhammap. 160.]\n\n[Footnote 477: Bhag-g\u00eet\u00e2, 3. 27.]\n\n[Footnote 478: Vishnu Pur. II. 13. The ancient Egyptians also, though\nfor quite different reasons, did not accept our ideas of personality.\nFor them man was not an individual unity but a compound consisting of\nthe body and of several immaterial parts called for want of a better\nword souls, the _ka_, the _ba_, the _sekhem_, etc., which after death\ncontinue to exist independently.]\n\n[Footnote 479: _Ueber den Stand der indischen Philosophie zur Zeit\nMah\u00e2v\u00eeras und Buddhas_, 1902. And On the problem of Nirvana in _Journal\nof Pali Text Society_, 1905. See too Sam. Nik. XXII. 15-17.]\n\n[Footnote 480: Maj. Nik. 22.]\n\n[Footnote 481: Compare also the sermon on the burden and the bearer and\nSam Nik. XXII. 15-17. It is admitted that Nirvana is not dukkha and not\naniccam and it seems to be implied it is not anattam.]\n\n[Footnote 482: See the argument with Yamaka in Sam. Nik. XXII. 85.]\n\n[Footnote 483: See Sam. Nik. III., XXII. 97.]\n\n[Footnote 484: Also pa\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2kkhandha or vijj\u00e2.]\n\n[Footnote 485: Dig. Nik. II.]\n\n[Footnote 486: These exercises are hardly possible for the laity.]\n\n[Footnote 487: See chap. XIV. for details.]\n\n[Footnote 488: Sanskrit Nirv\u00e2na: Pali Nibb\u00e2na.]\n\n[Footnote 489: Maj. Nik. 26.]\n\n[Footnote 490: _E.g_. the words addressed to Buddha, nibbut\u00e2 n\u00fbna s\u00e2\nnar\u00ee yass\u00e2yam \u00eediso pati. Happy is the woman who has such a husband. In\nthe Anguttara Nik\u00e2ya, III. 55 the Brahman J\u00e2nussoni asks Buddha what is\nmeant by Sanditthikam nibb\u00e2nam, that is nirv\u00e2na which is visible or\nbelongs to this world. The reply is that it is effected by the\ndestruction of lust, hatred and stupidity and it is described as\n_ak\u00e2likam, ehipassikam opanayikam, paccattam veditabbam\nvi\u00f1\u00f1\u00fbhi_--difficult words which occur elsewhere as epithets of Dhamma\nand apparently mean immediate, inviting (it says \"come and see\"),\nleading to salvation, to be known by all who can understand. For some\nviews as to the derivation of nibbana, nibbuto, etc. see _J.P.T.S._\n1919, pp. 53 ff. But the word nirv\u00e2na occurs frequently in the\nMah\u00e2bh\u00e2rata and was probably borrowed by the Buddhists from the\nBrahmans.]\n\n[Footnote 491: Or sa-up\u00e2di.]\n\n[Footnote 492: But parinirv\u00e2na is not always rigidly distinguished from\nnirv\u00e2na, _e.g._ Sutta Nip\u00e2ta, 358. And in Cullavag. VI. 4. 4 the Buddha\ndescribes himself as Br\u00e2hmano parinibbuto. Parinibbuto is even used of a\nhorse in Maj. Nik. 65 _ad fin_.]\n\n[Footnote 493: Sam. Nik. XXII. 1. 18.]\n\n[Footnote 494: Vimuttisukham and brahmacariyogadham sukham.]\n\n[Footnote 495: Maj. Nik. 139, cf. also Ang. Nik. II. 7 where various\nkinds of sukham or happiness are enumerated, and we hear of\nnekkhammasukham nirupadhis, upekkh\u00e2s, ar\u00fbparamanam sukham, etc.]\n\n[Footnote 496: _E.g._ Maj. Nik. 9 Ditthe dhamme dukkhass' antakaro\nhoti.]\n\n[Footnote 497: Ang. Nik. V. xxxii.]\n\n[Footnote 498: Maj. Nik. 79.]\n\n[Footnote 499: Asankhatadh\u00e2tu, cf. the expression asankh\u00e2raparinibb\u00e2y\u00ee.\nPugg. Pan. l. 44.]\n\n[Footnote 500: Tabulated in Mrs Rhys Davids' translation, pp. 367-9.]\n\n[Footnote 501: Such a phrase as _Nibb\u00e2nassa sacchikiriy\u00e2ya_ \"for the\nattainment or realization of Nirvana\" would be hardly possible if\nNirvana were annihilation.]\n\n[Footnote 502: Ud\u00e2na VII. near beginning.]\n\n[Footnote 503: These are the formless stages of meditation. In Nirvana\nthere is neither any ordinary form of existence nor even the forms of\nexistence with which we become acquainted in trances.]\n\n[Footnote 504: This negative form of expression is very congenial to\nHindus. Thus many centuries later Kabir sung \"With God is no rainy\nseason, no ocean, no sunshine, no shade: no creation and no destruction:\nno life nor death: no sorrow nor joy is felt .... There is no water,\nwind, nor fire. The True Guru is there contained.\"]\n\n[Footnote 505: IV. 7. 13 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 506: See also Book VII. of the Milinda containing a long list\nof similes illustrating the qualities necessary for the attainment of\narhatship. Thirty qualities of arhatship are mentioned in Book VI. of\nthe same work. See also Mah\u00e2parinib. Sut. III. 65-60 and Rhys Davids'\nnote.]\n\n[Footnote 507: _E.g._ Dig. Nik. xvi. ii. 7, Cullavag. ix. 1. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 508: _E.g._ Pugg. Pan. 1. 39. The ten fetters are (1)\nsakk\u00e2yaditthi, belief in the existence of the self, (2) vicikicch\u00e2,\ndoubt, (3) silabbataparam\u00e2so, trust in ceremonies of good works, (4)\nk\u00e2mar\u00e2go, lust, (5) patigho, anger, (6) r\u00fbpar\u00e2go, desire for rebirth in\nworlds of form, (7) ar\u00fbpar\u00e2go, desire for rebirth in formless worlds,\n(8) mano, pride, (9) uddhaccam, self-righteousness, (10) avijj\u00e2,\nignorance.]\n\n[Footnote 509: There is some diversity of doctrine about the\nSakad\u00e2g\u00e2min. Some hold that he has two births, because he _comes back_\nto the world of men after having been born once meanwhile in a heaven,\nothers that he has only one birth either on earth or in a devaloka.]\n\n[Footnote 510: Avy\u00e2katani. The Buddha, being omniscient, _saba\u00f1\u00f1u_, must\nhave known the answer but did not declare it, perhaps because language\nwas incapable of expressing it]\n\n[Footnote 511: Jiva not att\u00e2. ]\n\n[Footnote 512: Maj. Nik. 63.]\n\n[Footnote 513: Sam. Nik. xvii. 85.]\n\n[Footnote 514: Maj. Nik. 72.]\n\n[Footnote 515: Which is said not to grow up again.]\n\n[Footnote 516: It may be that the Buddha had in his mind the idea that a\nflame which goes out returns to the primitive invisible state of fire.\nThis view is advocated by Schrader (_Jour. Pali Text Soc_. 1905, p.\n167). The passages which he cites seem to me to show that there was\nsupposed to be such an invisible store from which fire is born but to be\nless conclusive as proving that fire which goes out is supposed to\nreturn to that store, though the quotation from the Maitreyi Up. points\nin this direction. For the metaphor of the flame see also Sutta-Nip\u00e2ta,\nverses 1074-6.]\n\n[Footnote 517: XLIV. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 518: Maj. Nik. 9, ad init. Asm\u00eeti ditthim \u00e2n\u00e2nusayam\nsam\u00fbhanitv\u00e2.]\n\n[Footnote 519: See especially Sutta-Nip\u00e2ta, 1076 Atthan gatassa na\npam\u00e2nam atthi, etc.]\n\n[Footnote 520: Sam. Nik. XXII. 85.]\n\n[Footnote 521: Maj. Nik. 22, Alagadd\u00fbpama-suttam.]\n\n[Footnote 522: Later in the same Sutta: Kevalo parip\u00fbro b\u00e2ladhammo.]\n\n[Footnote 523: Four emphatic synonyms in the original.]\n\n[Footnote 524: Dig. Nik. I. 73 uccinna-bhava-nettiko.]\n\n[Footnote 525: I recommend the reader to consider carefully the passage\nat the end of Book IV. of Schopenhauer's _Die Welt als Wille und\nVorstellung_ (Haldane and Kemp's translation, vol. I. pp. 529-530).\nThough he evidently misunderstood what he calls \"the Nirvana of the\nBuddhists\" yet his own thought throws much light on it.]\n\n[Footnote 526: Sk. _Bhikshu_, beggar or mendicant, because they live on\nalms. _Bhiksh\u00e2caryam_ occurs in Brihad-\u00c2r. Up. III. 5. I.]\n\n[Footnote 527: Mah\u00e2vag. I. 49, cf. ib. I. 39.]\n\n[Footnote 528: Dig. Nik. VIII.]\n\n[Footnote 529: Cullavag. I. 1. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 530: Sam. Nik. XIV. 15. 12, Ang. Nik. I. xiv.]\n\n[Footnote 531: Mah\u00e2vag. III. 12.]\n\n[Footnote 532: Or the opinion of single persons, e.g. Vis\u00e2kh\u00e2 in\nMah\u00e2vag. III. 13.]\n\n[Footnote 533: Ac\u00e2r\u00e2ngasut, II. 2. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 534: Mah\u00e2v. I. 42.]\n\n[Footnote 535: But converted robbers were occasionally admitted, e.g.\nAngulim\u00e2la.]\n\n[Footnote 536: Sam. Nik. IV. XXXV., Maj. Nik. 8 ad fin. On the value\nattached by mystics in all countries to trees and flowers, see\nUnderhill, _Mysticism_, p. 231.]\n\n[Footnote 537: They are abstinence from (1) destroying life, (2)\nstealing, (3) impurity, (4) lying, (5) intoxicants, (6) eating at\nforbidden times, (7) dancing, music and theatres, (8) garlands,\nperfumes, ornaments, (9) high or large beds, (10) accepting gold or\nsilver.]\n\n[Footnote 538: These are practically equivalent to Sundays, being the\nnew moon, full moon and the eighth days from the new and full moon. In\nTibet however the 14th, 15th, 29th and 30th of each month are observed.]\n\n[Footnote 539: Mah\u00e2vag. II. 1-2.]\n\n[Footnote 540: Chap. VIII. Sec. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 541: Required not so much to purify water as to prevent the\naccidental destruction of insects.]\n\n[Footnote 542: It might begin either the day after the full moon of\nAs\u00e2lha (June-July) or a month later. In either case the period was three\nmonths. Mah\u00e2vag. III. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 543: Cullavag. X. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 544: See the papers by Mrs Bode in _J.R.A.S._ 1893, pp. 517-66\nand 763-98, and Mrs Rhys Davids in _Ninth Congress of Orientalists_,\nvol. I. p. 344.]\n\n[Footnote 545: Feminine Up\u00e2sik\u00e2.]\n\n[Footnote 546: Sutta-Nip\u00e2ta, 289.]\n\n[Footnote 547: _E.g._ Mah\u00e2mangala and Dhammika-Sutta in Sut. Nip. II. 4\nand 14.]\n\n[Footnote 548: Dig. Nik. 31.]\n\n[Footnote 549: It may seem superfluous to insist on this, yet Warren in\nhis _Buddhism in Translations_ uniformly renders Bhikkhu by priest.]\n\n[Footnote 550: The same idea occurs in the Upanishads, _e.g._ Brih.-\u00c2r.\nUp. IV. 4. 23, \"he becomes a true Brahman.\"]\n\n[Footnote 551: Especially in R.O. Franke's article in the _J.P.T.S._\n1908. To demonstrate the \"literary dependence\" of chapters XI., XII. of\nthe Cullavagga does not seem to me equivalent to demonstrating that the\nnarratives contained in those chapters are \"air-bubbles.\"]\n\n[Footnote 552: The mantras of the Brahmans were hardly a sacred book\nanalogous to the Bible or Koran and, besides, the early Buddhists would\nnot have wished to imitate them.]\n\n[Footnote 553: _E.g._ Dig. Nik. XVI.]\n\n[Footnote 554: Cullav. XI. i. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 555: Especially in Chinese works.]\n\n[Footnote 556: Up\u00e2li, Dasaka, Sonaka, Siggava (with whom the name of\nCandravajji is sometimes coupled) and Tissa Moggaliputta. This is the\nlist given in the D\u00eepavamsa.]\n\n[Footnote 557: Sam. Nik. XVI. 11. The whole section is called Kassapa\nSamyutta.]\n\n[Footnote 558: They are to be found chiefly in Cullavagga, XII.,\nD\u00eepavamsa, IV. and V. and Mah\u00e2vamsa, IV.]\n\n[Footnote 559: The D\u00eepavamsa adds that all the principal monks present\nhad seen the Buddha. They must therefore all have been considerably over\na hundred years old so that the chronology is open to grave doubt. It\nwould be easier if we could suppose the meeting was held a hundred years\nafter the enlightenment.]\n\n[Footnote 560: They are said to have rejected the Pariv\u00e2ra, the\nPatisambhid\u00e2, the Niddesa and parts of the J\u00e2taka. These are all later\nparts of the Canon and if the word rejection were taken literally it\nwould imply that the Mah\u00e2sang\u00eeti was late too. But perhaps all that is\nmeant is that the books were not found in their Canon. Chinese sources\n(_e.g._ Fa Hsien, tr. Legge, p. 99) state that they had an Abhidhamma of\ntheir own.]\n\n[Footnote 561: _Buddhist Records of the Western World_, vol. II. pp.\n164-5; Watters, _Y\u00fcan Chwang_, pp. 159-161.]\n\n[Footnote 562: Cap. XXXVI. Legge, p. 98.]\n\n[Footnote 563: See I-tsing's _Records of the Buddhist Religion_, trans.\nby Takakusu, p. XX. and Nanjio's _Catalogue of the Buddhist Tripitaka_,\nnos. 1199, 1105 and 1159.]\n\n[Footnote 564: An exception ought perhaps to be made for the Japanese\nsects.]\n\n[Footnote 565: The names are not quite the same in the various lists and\nit seems useless to discuss them in detail. See D\u00eepavamsa, V. 39-48,\nMah\u00e2vamsa, V. ad in., Rhys Davids, _J.R.A.S._ 1891, p. 411, Rockhill,\n_Life of the Buddha_, chap, VI., Geiger, _Trans. of Mah\u00e2vamsa_, App. B.]\n\n[Footnote 566: The Hemavatikas, R\u00e2jagirikas, Siddhattas, Pubbaselikas,\nAparaselikas and Aparar\u00e2jagirikas.]\n\n[Footnote 567: Published in the _J.P.T.S._ 1889. Trans, by S.Z. Aung and\nMrs Rhys Davids, 1915. The text mentions doctrines only. The names of\nthe sects supposed to hold them are supplied by the commentary.]\n\n[Footnote 568: They must not be confused with the four philosophic\nschools Vaibh\u00e2shika, Sautr\u00e2ntika, Yog\u00e2c\u00e2ra and M\u00e2dhyamika. These came\ninto existence later.]\n\n[Footnote 569: But the Vetulyakas were important in Ceylon.]\n\n[Footnote 570: See Param\u00e2rtha's _Life of Vasabandhu_, Toung Pao, 1904,\np. 290.]\n\n[Footnote 571: See Rhys Davids in _J.R.A.S._ 1892, pp. 8-9. The name is\nvariously spelt. The P.T.S. print Sammitiya, but the Sanskrit text of\nthe Madhyamakavritti (in _Bibl. Buddh._) has S\u00e2mmit\u00eeya. Sanskrit\ndictionaries give Sammat\u00eeya. The Abhidharma section of the Chinese\nTripitaka (Nanjio, 1272) contains a s\u00e2stra belonging to this school.\nNanjio, 1139 is apparently their Vinaya.]\n\n[Footnote 572: Kern (_Versl. en Med. der K. Akad. van Wetenschappen\nLetterk._ 4. R.D. VIII. 1907, pp. 312-319, cf. _J.R.A.S._ 1907, p. 432)\nsuggested on the authority of Kashgarian MSS. that the expression\nVailpulya s\u00fbtra is a misreading for Vaitulya s\u00fbtra, a s\u00fbtra of the\nVetulyakas. \u00c2nanda was sometimes identified with the phantom who\nrepresented the Buddha.]\n\n[Footnote 573: It is remarkable that this view, though condemned by the\nKath\u00e2-vatthu, is countenanced by the Khuddaka-p\u00e2tha.]\n\n[Footnote 574: The Kath\u00e2-vatthu constantly cites the Nik\u00e2yas.]\n\n[Footnote 575: Pali Sabbatthiv\u00e2dins.]\n\n[Footnote 576: Cf. the doctrine of the S\u00e2nkhya. For more about the\nSarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2dins see below, Book IV. chap. XXII.]\n\n[Footnote 577: See especially Le Nord-Ouest de L'Inde dans le Vinaya des\nM\u00fblasarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2dins by Przyluski in _J.A._ 1914, II. pp. 492 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 578: See articles by Fleet in _J.R.A.S._ of 1903, 1904,\n1908-1911 and 1914: Hultzsch in _J.R.A.S._ 1910-11: Thomas in _J.A._\n1910: S. L\u00e9vi, _J.A._ 1911.]\n\n[Footnote 579: Asoka's statement is confirmed (if it needs confirmation)\nby the Chinese pilgrim I-ching who saw in India statues of him in\nmonastic costume.]\n\n[Footnote 580: For a bibliography of the literature about these\ninscriptions see Vincent Smith, _Early History of India_, 3rd ed. 1914,\npp. 172-4.]\n\n[Footnote 581: The dialect is not strictly speaking the same in all the\ninscriptions.]\n\n[Footnote 582: Piyadassi, Sanskrit Priyadarsin. The D\u00eepavamsa, VI. 1 and\n14, calls Asoka Piyadassi and Piyadassana. The name Asoka has hitherto\nonly been found in one edict discovered at Hyderabad, _J.R.A.S._ 1916,\np. 573.]\n\n[Footnote 583: The principal single edicts are (1) that known as Minor\nRock Edict I. found in four recensions, (2) The Bh\u00e2br\u00fb (or Bh\u00e2br\u00e2) Edict\nof great importance for the Buddhist scriptures, (3) Two Kalinga Edicts,\n(4) Edicts about schism, found at Sarnath and elsewhere, (4)\nCommemorative inscriptions in the Ter\u00e2i, (5) Dedications of caves.]\n\n[Footnote 584: Asoka came to the throne about 270 B.C. (268 or 272\naccording to various authorities) but was not crowned until four years\nlater. Events are generally dated by the year after his coronation\n(abhisheka), not after his accession.]\n\n[Footnote 585: I must confess that Law of Piety (Vincent Smith) does not\nseem to me very idiomatic.]\n\n[Footnote 586: See Senart, _Inscrip. de Piyadassi_, II. pp. 314 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 587: The Second Minor Rock Edict.]\n\n[Footnote 588: R\u00e2j\u00fbka and pradesika.]\n\n[Footnote 589: I.e. Syria, Egypt, Macedonia, Cyrene and Epirus.]\n\n[Footnote 590: Kingdoms in the south of India.]\n\n[Footnote 591: The inhabitants of the extreme north-west of India, not\nnecessarily Greeks by race.]\n\n[Footnote 592: Possibly Tibet.]\n\n[Footnote 593: Or N\u00e2bhapamtis. In any case unknown.]\n\n[Footnote 594: All these appear to have been tribes of Central India.]\n\n[Footnote 595: D\u00eepav. VIII.; Mah\u00e2v. XII.]\n\n[Footnote 596: Pillar Edict VI.]\n\n[Footnote 597: Perhaps meant to be equivalent to 251 B.C. Vincent Smith\nrejects this date and thinks that the Council met in the last ten years\nof Asoka's reign. But the Sinhalese account is reasonable. Asoka was\nvery pious but very tolerant. Ten years of this regime may well have led\nto the abuse complained of.]\n\n[Footnote 598: J\u00e2taka, no. 472.]\n\n[Footnote 599: See for instance the _Life of Hs\u00fcan Chuang_; Beal, p. 39;\nJulien, p. 50.]\n\n[Footnote 600: I consider it possible, though by no means proved, that\nthe Abhidhamma was put together in Ceylon.]\n\n[Footnote 601: For the Burmese Canon see chap. XXVI. Even if the Burmese\nhad Pali scriptures which did not come from Ceylon, they sought to\nharmonize them with the texts known there.]\n\n[Footnote 602: Pali Tipitaka.]\n\n[Footnote 603: So in Maj. Nik. xxi. a man who proposes to excavate comes\nKuddalapitakam \u00e2d\u00e2ya, \"With spade and basket.\"]\n\n[Footnote 604: The list of the Vinaya books is:\n\n  P\u00e2r\u00e2jikam } together constituting the Sutta-vibhanga.\n  Pacittiyam}\n\n  Mah\u00e2vagga } together constituting the Khandakas.\n  Cullavagga}\n\n  Pariv\u00e2ra-p\u00e2tha: a supplement and index. This book was rejected by some\n  schools.\n\nSomething is known of the Vinaya of the Sarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2dins existing in a\nChinese translation and in fragments of the Sanskrit original found in\nCentral Asia. It also consists of the P\u00e2timokkha embedded in a\ncommentary called Vibh\u00e2ga and of two treatises describing the foundation\nof the order and its statutes. They are called Kshudrakavastu and\nVinayavastu. In these works the narrative and anecdotal element is\nlarger than in the Pali Vinaya. See also my remarks on the Mah\u00e2vastu\nunder the Mahayanist Canon. For some details about the Dharmagupta\nVinaya, see _J.A._ 1916, ii. p. 20: for a longish extract from the\nM\u00fclasarv. Vinaya, _J.A._ 1914, ii. pp. 493-522.]\n\n[Footnote 605: I find it hard to accept Francke's view that the D\u00eegha\nshould be regarded as the Book of the Tath\u00e2gata, deliberately composed\nto expound the doctrine of Buddhahood. Many of the suttas do not deal\nwith the Tath\u00e2gata.]\n\n[Footnote 606: The Samyutta quotes by name a passage from the D\u00eegha as\n\"spoken by the Lord\": compare Sam. Nik. XXII. 4 with Dig. Nik. 21. Both\nthe Anguttara and Samyutta quote the last two cantos of the\nSutta-Nip\u00e2ta.]\n\n[Footnote 607: It appears that the canonical book of the J\u00e2taka consists\nonly of verses and does not include explanatory prose matter. Something\nsimilar to these collections of verses which are not fully intelligible\nwithout a commentary explaining the occasions on which they were uttered\nmay be seen in Ch\u00e2ndogya Up. VI. The father's answers are given but the\nson's questions which render them intelligible are not found in the text\nbut are supplied in the commentary.]\n\n[Footnote 608: The following ia a table of the Sutta Pitaka:\n\n  I. D\u00eegha-Nik\u00e2ya      }\n  II. Majjhima-Nik\u00e2ya  } Collections of discourses mostly attributed\n  III. Samyutta-Nik\u00e2ya } to the Buddha.\n  IV. Anguttara-Nik\u00e2ya }\n\n  V. Khuddaka-Nik\u00e2ya: a collection of comparatively short treatises,\n  mostly in poetry, namely:\n     1. Dhammapada.\n     2. Ud\u00e2na       } Utterances of the Buddha with explanations\n     3. Itivuttakam } af the attendant circumstances.\n     4. Khuddaka-p\u00e2tha: a short anthology.\n     5. Sutta-nip\u00e2ta: a collection of suttas mostly in verse.\n    *6. Thera-g\u00e2th\u00e2: poems by monks.\n    *7. Ther\u00ee-g\u00e2th\u00e2: poems by nuns.\n     8. Niddesa: an old commentary on the latter half of the Sutta-nip\u00e2ta,\n        ascribed to S\u00e2riputta.\n    *9. The J\u00e2taka verses.\n    10. Patisambhid\u00e2.\n   *11. Apad\u00e2na.\n   *12. Buddha-vamsa.\n   *13. Vim\u00e2na-vatthu.\n   *14. Peta-vatthu.\n   *15. Cariy\u00e2-pitaka.\n\nThe works marked * are not found in the Siamese edition of the Tripitaka\nbut the Burmese editions include four other texts, the Milinda-pa\u00f1ha,\nPetakopadesa, Suttassanigaha, and Nettipakarana.\n\nThe Khuddaka-Nik\u00e2ya seems to have been wanting in the Pitaka of the\nSarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2dins or whatever sect supplied the originals from which the\nChinese Canon was translated, for this Canon classes the Dhammapada as a\nmiscellaneous work outside the Sutta Pitaka. Fragments of the\nSutta-nip\u00e2ta have been found in Turkestan but it is not clear to what\nPitaka it was considered to belong. For mentions of the Khuddaka-Nik\u00e2ya\nin Chinese see _J.A._ 1916, pp. 32-3.]\n\n[Footnote 609: See _J.R.A.S._ 1891, p. 560. See too _Journal P.T.S._\n1919, p. 44. Lexicographical notes.]\n\n[Footnote 610: Mrs Rhys Davids' _Translations of the Dhamma-sangani_\ngive a good idea of these books.]\n\n[Footnote 611: The works comprised in this Pitaka are:\n\n  1. Dhamma-sangani.\n  2. Vibhanga.\n  3. Kath\u00e2-vatthu.\n  4. Puggala-pa\u00f1\u00f1atti.\n  5. Dh\u00e2tu-kath\u00e2.\n  6. Yamaka.\n  7. Patth\u00e2na.\n\nThe Abhidhamma of the Sarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2dins was entirely different. It seems\nprobable that the Abhidhamma books of all schools consisted almost\nentirely of explanatory matter and added very little to the doctrine\nlaid down in the suttas. It would appear that the only new topic\nintroduced in the Pali Abhidhamma is the theory of relations (paccaya).]\n\n[Footnote 612: Maj. Nik. XXII. and Angut. Nik. IV. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 613: Pali means primarily a line or row and then a text as\ndistinguished from the commentary. Thus P\u00e2limattam means the text\nwithout the commentary and Palibh\u00e2s\u00e2 is the language of the text or what\nwe call Pali. See _Pali and Sanskrit_, R.O. Franke, 1902. Windisch,\n\"Ueber den sprachlichen Character des Pali,\" in _Actes du XIV'me Congr\u00e8s\ndes Orientalistes_, 1905. Grierson, \"Home of Pali\" in _Bhandarkar\nCommemorative Essays_, 1917.]\n\n[Footnote 614: It is not easy to say how late or to what extent Pali was\nused in India. The Milinda-Pa\u00f1ha (or at least books II. and III.) was\nprobably composed in North Western India about the time of our era.\nDharmap\u00e2la wrote his commentaries (c. 500 A.D.) in the extreme south,\nprobably at Conjeevaram. Pali inscriptions of the second or third\ncentury A.D. have been discovered at Sarnath but contain mistakes which\nshow that the engraver did not understand the language (_Epig. Ind_.\n1908, p. 391). Bendall found Pali MSS. in Nepal, _J.R.A.S._ 1899, p.\n422.]\n\n[Footnote 615: Magadha of course was not his birth-place and the dialect\nof Kosala must have been his native language. But it is not hinted that\nhe had any difficulty in making himself understood in Magadha and\nelsewhere.]\n\n[Footnote 616: E.g. nominatives singular in _e_. For the possible\nexistence of scriptures anterior to the Pali version and in another\ndialect, see S. L\u00e9vi, _J.A._ 1912, II. p. 495.]\n\n[Footnote 617: Cullavag. V. 33, chandaso \u00e2ropema.]\n\n[Footnote 618: Although Pali became a sacred language in the South, yet\nin China, Tibet and Central Asia the scriptures were translated into the\nidioms of the various countries which accepted Buddhism.]\n\n[Footnote 619: Mah\u00e2parinibb\u00e2na-sutta, II. 26. Another expressive\ncompound is Dh\u00fbmak\u00e2-likam (Cullav. XI. 1. 9) literally smoke-timed. The\ndisciples were afraid that the discipline of the Buddha might last only\nas long as the smoke of his funeral pyre.]\n\n[Footnote 620: Winternitz has acutely remarked that the Pali Pitaka\nresembles the Upanishads in style. See also Keith, _Ait. Ar_. p. 55. For\nrepetitions in the Upanishads, see Ch\u00e2nd. v. 3. 4 ff., v. 12 ff. and\nmuch in VII. and VIII., Brihad. \u00c2r. III. ix. 9 ff., VI. iii. 2, etc.\nThis Upanishad relates the incident of Y\u00e2j\u00f1avalkya and Ma\u00eetrey\u00ee twice.\nSo far as style goes, I see no reason why the earliest parts of the\nVinaya and Sutta Pitaka should not have been composed immediately after\nthe Buddha's death.]\n\n[Footnote 621: E.g. Mah\u00e2v. 1. 49, Dig. Nik. I. 14, Sut. Vib. Bhikkhun\u00ee,\nLXIX., Sut. Vib. P\u00e2r\u00e2j. III. 4. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 622: Cullav. IV. 15. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 623: Ang. Nik. IV. 100. 5, ib. v. lxxiv. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 624: See B\u00fchler in _Epigraphia Indica_, vol. II. p. 93.]\n\n[Footnote 625: Even at the time of Fa Hsien's visit to India (c. 400\nA.D.) the Vinaya of the Sarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2din school was preserved orally and\nnot written. See Legge's trans, p. 99.]\n\n[Footnote 626: Ang. Nik. IV. 160. 5, Bhikkh\u00fb bahussut\u00e2 ... m\u00e2tik\u00e2dh\u00e2r\u00e2\nmonks who carry in memory the indices.]\n\n[Footnote 627: Cullavag. XI., XII. ]\n\n[Footnote 628: Dig. Nik. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 629: It is remarkable that this account contemplates five\nNik\u00e2yas (of which the fifth is believed to be late) but only two\nPitakas, the Abhidhamma not being mentioned.]\n\n[Footnote 630: It refers to a king Pingalaka, said to have reigned two\nhundred years after the Buddha's time.]\n\n[Footnote 631: Mah\u00e2v XI. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 632: Mah\u00e2v. II. 17.]\n\n[Footnote 633: Cullav. IX. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 634: The passages are:\n\n  1. The Vinaya-Samukasa. Perhaps the sermon at Benares with\n     introductory matter found at the beginning of the Mah\u00e2vagga.\n     See Edmunds, in _J.R.A.S._ 1913, p. 385.\n  2. The Alia-V\u00e2s\u00e2ni (Pali Ariya-V\u00e2s\u00e2ni) = the Samg\u00eeti-sutta of the\n     D\u00eegha Nik\u00e2ya.\n  3. The An\u00e2gata-bhay\u00e2ni = Anguttara-Nik\u00e2ya, V. 77-80, or part of it.\n  4. The Munig\u00e2tha=Sutta-Nip\u00e2ta, 206-220.\n  5. The Moneyasute=Moneyya-sutta in the Itivuttakam, 67: see\n     also Ang. Nik. III. 120.\n  6. The Upatisapasine. The question of Upatissa: not identified.\n  7. The L\u00e2ghulov\u00e2de mus\u00e2v\u00e2dam adhigicya. The addresses to R\u00e2hula\n     beginning with subject of lying=Maj. Nik. 61.]\n\n[Footnote 635: See _J.A._ 1916, II. pp. 20,38.]\n\n[Footnote 636: For the date see the chapter on Ceylon.]\n\n[Footnote 637: S. L\u00e9vi gives reasons for thinking that the prohibitions\nagainst singing sacred texts (ayataka g\u00eetassara, Cullavag. V. 3) go back\nto the period when the Vedic accent was a living reality. See _J.A._\n1915, I. pp. 401 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 638: _Mus\u00e9on_, 1905, p. 23. Anesaki thinks the text used by\nGunabhadra was in Pali but the Abhayagiri, which had Mahayanist\nproclivities, may have used Sanskrit texts.]\n\n[Footnote 639: Nik\u00e2ya-Sangrahawa, Fernando, _Govt. Record Office_,\nColombo, 1918.]\n\n[Footnote 640: See Mah\u00e2y\u00e2na-s\u00fbtr\u00e2latik\u00e2ra, xvi. 22 and 75, with L\u00e9vi's\nnotes.]\n\n[Footnote 641: Cullav. VII. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 642: In the first book of the Mah\u00e2vagga. ]\n\n[Footnote 643: Ang. Nik. V. 201 and VI. 40.]\n\n[Footnote 644: It may be objected that some Suttas are put into the\nmouths of the Buddha's disciples and that their words are very like\nthose of the Master. But as a rule they spoke on behalf of him and the\nobject was to make their language as much like his as possible.]\n\n[Footnote 645: The Pali anthology known by this name was only one of\nseveral called Dhammapada or Ud\u00e2na which are preserved in the Chinese\nand Tibetan Canons.]\n\n[Footnote 646: The work might also be analyzed as consisting of three\nold documents (the tract on morality, an account of ancient heresies,\nand a discourse on spiritual progress) put together with a little\nconnecting matter, and provided with a prologue and epilogue.]\n\n[Footnote 647: But in Ceylon there was a decided tendency to rewrite\nSinhalese treatises in Pali.]\n\n[Footnote 648: Cf. Divy\u00e2v. ed. Cowell, p. 37 and Sam. Nik. _P.T.S._\nedition, vol. IV. p. 60.]\n\n[Footnote 649: See Takakusu on the Abhidharma literature of the\nSarv\u00e2stiv\u00e2dins in the _Journ. of the Pali Text Society_, 1905, pp.\n67-147.]\n\n[Footnote 650: But not always. See S. L\u00e9vi, _J.A._ 1910, p. 436.]\n\n[Footnote 651: See L\u00fcders, _Bruchst\u00fccke Buddhistischer Dramen_, 1911 and\nib. _Das S\u00e2ri putra-prakarana_, 1911.]\n\n[Footnote 652: Inscriptions from Swat written in an alphabet supposed to\ndate from 50 B.C. to 50 A.D. contain Sanskrit verses from the Dharmapada\nand Mah\u00e2parinirv\u00e2nas\u00fbtra. See _Epig. Indica_, vol. IV. p. 133.]\n\n[Footnote 653: E.g. The Sanskrit version of the Sutta-Nip\u00e2ta. See\n_J.R.A.S._ 1916, pp. 719-732.]\n\n[Footnote 654: See the remarks on the Samyukt\u00e2gama in _J.A._ 1916, II.\np. 272.]\n\n[Footnote 655: In the same spirit, the Chinese version of the Ekottara\n(sec. 42) makes the dying Buddha order his bed to be made with the head\nto the north, because northern India will be the home of the Law. See\n_J.A._ Nov., Dec. 1918, p. 435.]\n\n[Footnote 656: See for the whole question, P\u00e9ri, Les Femmes de \u00c7\u00e2kya\nMuni, _B.E.F.E.O._ 1918, No. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 657: Those of the Dharmaguptas, Mah\u00e2s\u00e2nghikas and\nMah\u00ees\u00e2sakas.]\n\n[Footnote 658: See _J.A.O.S._ Dec. 1910, p. 24.]\n\n[Footnote 659: Jacobi considers the Yoga S\u00fbtras later than 450 A.D. but\nif we adopt P\u00e9ri's view that Vasubandhu, Asanga's brother, lived from\nabout 280-360, the fact that they imply a knowledge of the Vijn\u00e2nav\u00e2da\nneed not make them much later than 300 A.D. It is noticeable that both\nAsanga and the Yoga S\u00fbtras employ the word _dharma-megha_.]\n\n[Footnote 660: Called Citta in the Yoga philosophy.]\n\n[Footnote 661: See Tylor, _Primitive Culture_, vol. II. pp. 410 ff.\nSavages often supplement fasting by the use of drugs and the Yoga S\u00fbtras\n(IV. 1) mention that supernatural powers can be obtained by the use of\nherbs.]\n\n[Footnote 662: Klesa: Kilesa in Pali.]\n\n[Footnote 663: The practices systematized in the Yoga S\u00fbtras are\nmentioned even in the older Upanishads such as the Maitr\u00e2yana,\nSvet\u00e2svatara and Ch\u00e2ndogya.]\n\n[Footnote 664: An extreme development of the idea that physical\nprocesses can produce spiritual results is found in Rasesvara Darsana or\nthe Mercurial System described in the Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha chap. IX.\n_Marco Polo_ (Yule's Edition, vol. II. pp. 365, 369) had also heard of\nit.]\n\n[Footnote 665: It seems to me analogous to the _introversion_ of\nEuropean mystics. See Underhill, _Mysticism_, chaps, VI. and VII.]\n\n[Footnote 666: Jh\u00e2na in Pali.]\n\n[Footnote 667: Sampraj\u00f1\u00e2ta and Asampraj\u00f1\u00e2ta, called also sa- and\nnirbija, with and without seed.]\n\n[Footnote 668: Savitarka and Savic\u00e2ra, in which there is investigation\nconcerned with gross and subtle objects respectively: S\u00e2nanda, in which\nthere is a feeling of joy: Sasmit\u00e2, in which there is only\nself-consciousness. The corresponding stages in Buddhism are described\nas phases of Jh\u00e2na not of Sam\u00e2dhi.]\n\n[Footnote 669: It is not easy to translate. _Megha_ is cloud and\n_dharma_ may be rendered by righteousness but has many other meanings.\nFor the metaphor of the cloud compare the title of the English mystical\ntreatise _The Cloud of Unknowing_.]\n\n[Footnote 670: Siddhi, vibh\u00fbti, aisvarya. A belief in these powers is\nfound even in the Rig Veda where it is said (X. 136) that munis can fly\nthrough the air and associate with gods.]\n\n[Footnote 671: So too European mystics \"are all but unanimous in their\nrefusal to attribute importance to any kind of visionary experience\"\n(Underhill, _Mysticism_, p. 335). St John of the Cross, Madame Guyon and\nWalter Hilton are cited as severe critics of such experience.]\n\n[Footnote 672: Cf. Underbill's remarks about contemplation (_Mysticism_,\np. 394). \"Its results feed every aspect of the personality: minister to\nits instinct for the Good, the Beautiful and the True. Psychologically\nit is an induced state in which the field of consciousness is greatly\ncontracted: the whole of the self, its conative power, being sharply\nfocussed, concentrated upon one thing. We pour ourselvea out or, as it\nsometimes seems to us, _in_ towards this overpowering interest: seem to\nourselves to reach it and be merged with it. Whatever the thing may be,\nin this act we _know_ it, as we cannot know it by any ordinary devices\nof thought.\"]\n\n[Footnote 673: See instances quoted in W. James, _Varieties of Religious\nExperience_, pp. 251-3.]\n\n[Footnote 674: This curious idea is also countenanced, though not much\nemphasized, by the Brahma S\u00fbtras, IV. 4. 15. The object of producing\nsuch bodies is to work off Karma. The Yogi acquires no new Karma but he\nmay have to get rid of accumulated Karma inherited from previous births,\nwhich must bear fruit. By \"making himself many\" he can work it off in\none lifetime.]\n\n[Footnote 675: _World as Will and Idea_, Book III. p. 254 (Haldane and\nKemp's translation).]\n\n[Footnote 676: E.g. Dig. Nik. II. 95, etc.]\n\n[Footnote 677: St Theresa, St Catharine of Siena and Rudman Merawin. Cf.\n1 John ii. 20, 27. \"Ye know all things.\"]\n\n[Footnote 678: Ch\u00e2ndog. Up. VIII. 15.]\n\n[Footnote 679: As also to the Samhit\u00e2s of the Vaishnavas and the \u00c2gamic\nliterature of the Saivas. The six cakras are: (1) M\u00fbladh\u00e2ra at the base\nof the spinal cord, (2) Sv\u00e2dhishth\u00e2na below the navel, (3) Manip\u00fbra near\nthe navel, (4) An\u00e2hata in the heart, (5) Visuddha at the lower end of\nthe throat, (6) \u00c2j\u00f1\u00e2 between the eyebrows. See Avalon, _Tantric Texts_,\nII. Shatcakranir\u00fbpana. Ib. _Tantra of Great Liberation_, pp. lvii ff.,\ncxxxii ff. Ib. _Principles of Tantra_, pp. cvii ff. Gopinatha Ras,\n_Indian Iconography_, pp. 328 ff. See also \"Manual of a Mystic\" (_Pali\nText Soc._) for something apparently similar, though not very\nintelligible, in Hinayanist Buddhism.]\n\n[Footnote 680: For the later Yoga see further Book V. I have recently\nreceived A. Avalon, _The Serpent Power_, from which it appears that the\ndanger of the process lies in the fact that as Kundalin\u00ee ascends, the\nlower parts of the body which she leaves become cold. The preliminary\nnote on Yoga in Grieraon and Barnett's Lall\u00e2-V\u00e2ky\u00e2ni (_Asiat. Soc.'s\nMonographs_, vol. XVII. 1920) contains much valuable information, but\nboth works arrived too late for me to make use of them.]\n\n[Footnote 681: Maj. Nik. 36 and 85, but not in 26.]\n\n[Footnote 682: Dig. Nik. 2. For the methods of Buddhist meditation, the\nreader may consult the \"Manual of a Mystic,\" edited (1896) and\ntranslated (1916) by the _Pali Text Society_. But he will not find it\neasy reading.]\n\n[Footnote 683: See Ang. Nik. 1. 20 for a long list of the various kinds\nof meditation. A conspectus of the system of meditation is given in\nSeidenst\u00fccker, _Pali-Buddhismus_, pp. 344-356.]\n\n[Footnote 684: Dig. Nik. XXII. _ad. in._]\n\n[Footnote 685: Dig. Nik. I. 21-26.]\n\n[Footnote 686: See, for instance, Dig. Nik. II. 75. Sometimes five\nJh\u00e2nas are enumerated. This means that reasoning and investigation are\neliminated successively and not simultaneously, so that an additional\nstage is created.]\n\n[Footnote 687: See _Dhamma-Sangani_; Mrs Rhys Davids' translation, pp.\n45-6 and notes. Also _Journal of Pali Text Society_, 1885, p. 32, for\nmeaning of the difficult word Ekodibh\u00e2va.]\n\n[Footnote 688: _E.g._ Maj. Nik. 77; Ang. Nik. 1. XX. 63.]\n\n[Footnote 689: Hardy, _Eastern Monachism_, pp. 252 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 690: But also without shape, colour or outward appearance, so\nthis statement must not be taken too literally.]\n\n[Footnote 691: Such procedure has not received much countenance in\nChristian mysticism but the contemplation of a burnished pewter dish and\nof running water induced ecstasy in Jacob Boehme and Ignatius Loyola\nrespectively. See Underhill, _Mysticism_, p. 69.]\n\n[Footnote 692: Maj. Nik. 62 end.]\n\n[Footnote 693: The analysis means to analyze all things as consisting\nalike of the four elements. The one perception is the perception that\nall nourishment is impure.]\n\n[Footnote 694: See Dig. Nik. 13 and Rhys Davids' introduction to it. In\nspite of their name, they seem to be purely Buddhist and have not been\nfound in Brahmanic literature. The four states are characterized\nrespectively by love, sympathy with sorrow, sympathy with joy, and\nequanimity.]\n\n[Footnote 695: Dig. Nik. XIII. 76.]\n\n[Footnote 696: Dig. Nik. XVII. 2-4.]\n\n[Footnote 697: Christian mystics also, such as St Angela and St Theresa,\nhad \"formless visions.\" See Underhill, _Myst._ pp. 338 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 698: Attha vimokkh\u00e2. See Mah\u00e2parinib. sut. in Rhys Davids'\n_Dialogues of the Buddha,_ II. 119.]\n\n[Footnote 699: Aki\u00f1ca\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2yatanam.]\n\n[Footnote 700: Nevasa\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2n\u00e2sa\u00f1\u00f1\u00e2yatanam.]\n\n[Footnote 701: Sa\u00f1\u00f1aved\u00e2yita nirodhasam\u00e2patti. The Buddha when dying\n(Dig. XVI. V. 8, 9) passes through this state, but does not go from it\nto Parinibb\u00e2na. This perhaps means that it was regarded as a\npurification of the mind, but not on the direct road to the final goal.]\n\n[Footnote 702: See Maj. Nik. 43. But the point of the discussion seems\nto be not so much special commendation of this form of trance as an\nexplanation of its origin, namely that it, like other mental states, is\nbound to ensue when certain preliminary conditions both moral and\nintellectual have been realized. See also Sam. Nik. XXXVI. ii. 5. See\nfor examples of this cataleptic form of Sam\u00e2dhi Max M\u00fcller's _Life of\nRamakrishna_, pp. 49,59, etc. Christian mystics (_e.g._ St Catharine of\nSiena and St Theresa) were also subject to deathlike trances lasting for\nhours and St Theresa is said once to have been in this condition for\nsome days.]\n\n[Footnote 703: Maj. Nik. 86.]\n\n[Footnote 704: This is known to European mystics, particularly Suso. St\nFrancis of Assisi, St Catharine of Siena and Richard Rolle are also\ncited. See Underhill. _Mysticism_, p. 332.]\n\n[Footnote 705: Christian visions of Hell, Purgatory and Paradise are\nanother instance of the divine eye, which thinks it can see the whole\nscheme of things.]\n\n[Footnote 706: Tales about such powers, are still very common in the\nEast, for instance the Chinese story (in the _Liao Chai_) of the man who\nlearnt from a Taoist how to walk through a wall but failed ignominiously\nwhen he tried to give an exhibition to his family. Educated Chinese seem\nto think there is something in the story and say that he failed because\nhis motives were bad.]\n\n[Footnote 707: Bernheim, _La Suggestion_, chap. I. Quand j'ai \u00e9loign\u00e9 de\nson esprit la pr\u00e9occupation que fait na\u00eetre l'id\u00e9e de magn\u00e9tisme ... je\nlui dis \"Regardez-moi bien et ne songez qu'\u00e0 dormir. Vous allez sentir\nune lourdeur dans les paupi\u00e8res, une fatigue dans vos yeux: ils\nclignotent, ils vont se mouiller; la vue devient confuse: ils se\nferment.\" Quelques sujets ferment les yeux et dorment imm\u00e9diatement....\n_C'est le sommeil par la suggestion, c'est l'image du sommeil_ que je\nsugg\u00e8re, que j'insinue dans le cerveau. Les passes, la fixation des yeux\nou des doigts de l'op\u00e9rateur, propres seulement \u00e0 concentrer\nl'attention, ne sont pas absolument nec\u00e9ssaires.]\n\n[Footnote 708: Thus in the drama Ratn\u00e2val\u00ee a magician makes the\ncharacters see an imaginary conflagration of the palace and also a\nvision of heaven. His performance seems to be accepted as merely a\nremarkable piece of conjuring.]\n\n[Footnote 709: Ang. Nik. xvi. 1. In spite of his magic power he could\nnot prevent himself being murdered. The Milinda-Pa\u00f1ha explains this as\nthe result of Karma, which is stronger than magic and everything else.]\n\n[Footnote 710: _E.g._ Maj. Nik. 77. ]\n\n[Footnote 711: Cullavag. v. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 712: Dig. Nik. xi.]\n\n[Footnote 713: Visuddhi Magga, xii. in Warren, _Buddhism in\nTranslation_, pp. 315 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 714: R.V. II. 12. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 715: Yet Tennyson can say \"And at their feet the crocus brake\nlike fire,\" but in a mythological poem.]\n\n[Footnote 716: Mah\u00e2v. V. i.]\n\n[Footnote 717: E.g. Dig. Nik. XI. and Cullavag. V. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 718: Even in the Upanishads the gods are not given a very high\nposition. They are powerless against Brahman (e.g. Kena Up. 14-28) and\nare not naturally in possession of true knowledge, though they may\nacquire it (e.g. Ch\u00e2nd. Up. VIII. 7).]\n\n[Footnote 719: Dig. Nik. XI.]\n\n[Footnote 720: Dig. Nik. I. chap. 2, 1-6. The radiant gods are the\nAbhassara, cf. Dhammap 200.]\n\n[Footnote 721: Watters, II. p. 160.]\n\n[Footnote 722: The legends of both R\u00e2ma and Krishna occur in the _Book\nof J\u00e2takas_ in a somewhat altered form, nos. 641 and 454.]\n\n[Footnote 723: Thus Helios the Sun passes into St Elias.]\n\n[Footnote 724: He is often called Brahm\u00e2 Sahampati, a title of doubtful\nmeaning and not found in Brahmanic writings. The Pitakas often speak of\nBrahm\u00e2s and worlds of Brahm\u00e2 in the plural, as if there were a whole\nclass of Brahm\u00e2s. See especially the Suttas collected in book I, chap.\nvi. of the Samyutta-Nik\u00e2ya where we even hear of Pacceka Brahm\u00e2s,\napparently corresponding in some way to Pacceka Buddhas.]\n\n[Footnote 725: Maj. Nik. 49. The meaning of the title Baka is not clear\nand may be ironical. Another ironical name is manopadosik\u00e2 (debauched in\nmind) invented as the title of a class of gods in Dig. Nik. I. and XX.\nThe idea that sages can instruct the gods is anterior to Buddhism, See\ne.g. Brihad-\u00c2r. Up. II. 5. 17, and ib. IV. 3. 33, and the parallel\npassage in the Tait. Ch\u00e2nd. Kaush. Upanishads and Sat. Br\u00e2hmana for the\nidea that a Srotriya is equal to the highest deities.]\n\n[Footnote 726: Six Manvantaras of the present Kalpa have elapsed and we\nare in the seventh.]\n\n[Footnote 727: We are in the Kali or worst age of the present mah\u00e2yuga.\nThe Kali lasts 432,000 years and began 3102 B.C.\n\nIn their number and in many other points of cosmography the various\naccounts differ greatly. The account given above is taken from the\nVishnu Pur\u00e2na, book II. but the details in it are not entirely\nconsistent.]\n\n[Footnote 728: The detailed formulation of this cosmography was\nnaturally gradual but its chief features are known to the Nik\u00e2yas. Dig.\nNik. XIV. 17 and 30 seem to imply the theory of spheres. For Heavens,\nsee Maj. Nik. 49, Dig. Nik. XI. 68-79 and for Hells Sut. Nip. III. 10,\nMaj. Nik. 129. See too De la Vall\u00e9e Poussin's article, _Cosmology\nBuddhist_, in _E.R.E._]\n\n[Footnote 729: See for the Asuras Sam. Nik. I. xi. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 730: See a Tibetan representation in Waddell's _Buddhism of\nTibet_, p. 79.]\n\n[Footnote 731: The question of whether the universe is infinite in space\nor not is according to the Pitakas one of those problems which cannot be\nanswered.]\n\n[Footnote 732: Dig. Nik. XXVII.]\n\n[Footnote 733: M\u00e2ro p\u00e2pim\u00e2. See especially Windisch, _M\u00e2ra and Buddha_,\n1895, and Sam. Nik. I. iv.]\n\n[Footnote 734: We sometimes hear of M\u00e2ras in the plural. Like Brahm\u00e2 he\nis sometimes a personality, sometimes the type of a class of gods. We\nalso hear that he has obtained his present exalted though not virtuous\npost by his liberality in former births. Thus, like Sakka and other\nBuddhist Devas, M\u00e2ra is really an office held by successive occupants.\nHe is said to be worshipped by some Tibetan sects. It is possible that\nthe legends about M\u00e2ra and his daughters and about Krishna and the Gop\u00ees\nmay have a common origin for M\u00e2ra is called Kanha (the Prakrit\nequivalent of Krishna) in Sutta-Nip\u00e2ta, 439.]\n\n[Footnote 735: Ang. Nik. III. 35.]\n\n[Footnote 736: This seems to be the correct doctrine, though it is hard\nto understand how the popular idea of continual torture is compatible\nwith the performance of good deeds. The Kath\u00e2-vatthu, XIII. 2, states\nthat a man in purgatory can do good. See too Ang. Nik. 1. 19.]\n\n[Footnote 737: But even the language of the Pitakas is not always quite\ncorrect on this point, for it represents evil-doers as falling down\nstraight into hell.]\n\n[Footnote 738: Khud. Path. 7. In this poem, the word Peta (Sk. Preta)\nseems to be used as equivalent to departed spirits, not necessarily\nimplying that they are undergoing punishment. In the _Questions of\nMilinda_ (IV. 8. 29) the practice of making offerings on behalf of the\ndead is countenanced, and it is explained exactly what classes of dead\nprofit by them. On the other hand the Kath\u00e2-vatthu states that the dead\ndo not benefit by gifts given in this world, but two sects, the\nR\u00e2jagirika and Siddhattika, are said by the commentary to hold the\ncontrary view.]\n\n[Footnote 739: See Max M\u00fcller's _Ramakrishna_, p. 40, for another\ninstance.]\n\n[Footnote 740: In a passage of the Mah\u00e2parinib. Sut. (III. 22) which is\nprobably not very early the Buddha says that when he mixes with gods or\nmen he takes the shape of his auditors, so that they do not know him.]\n\n[Footnote 741: Sam. Nik. II. 3. 10. Sadevakassa lokassa aggo.]\n\n[Footnote 742: E.g. in the Lotus Sutra.]\n\n[Footnote 743: One hundred and eight marks on the sole of each foot are\nalso enumerated in later writings.]\n\n[Footnote 744: Artaxerxes Longimanus. Cf. the Russian princely name\nDolgorouki. The Chinese also attribute forty-nine physical signs of\nperfection to Confucius, including long arms. See Dor\u00e9, _Recherches sur\nles Superstitions en Chine_, vol. XIII. pp. 2-6.]\n\n[Footnote 745: Though Brahmans are represented as experts in these\nmarks, it seems likely that the idea of the Mah\u00e2purusha was popular\nchiefly among the Kshatriyas, for in one form, at any rate, it teaches\nthat a child of the warrior caste born with certain marks will become\neither a universal monarch or a great teacher of the truth. This notion\nmust have been most distasteful to the priestly caste.]\n\n[Footnote 746: See Dig. Nik. 3. The Lakkhana Suttanta (Dig. Nik. 30)\ncontains a discussion of the marks.]\n\n[Footnote 747: See Dik. Nig. 14, Mah\u00e2pad\u00e2nasutta: Therag. 490; Sam. Nik.\nXII. 4-10.]\n\n[Footnote 748: Maj. Nik. 50, M\u00e2ratajjaniyasuttam.]\n\n[Footnote 749: Dig. Nik. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 750: Maj. Nik. 123. See also Dig. Nik. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 751: More literally that he knows exactly how his feelings,\netc., arise, continue and pass away and is not swayed by wandering\nthoughts and desires.]\n\n[Footnote 752: Three extra Buddhas are sometimes mentioned but are\nusually ignored because they did not, like the others, come into contact\nwith Gotama in his previous births.]\n\n[Footnote 753: E.g. Ang. Nik. III. 15 and the Mah\u00e2-Sudassana Sutta (Dig.\nNik. X.) in which the Buddha says he has been buried at Kusin\u00e2ra no less\nthan six times.]\n\n[Footnote 754: Dig. Nik. XVI. v. 15.]\n\n[Footnote 755: The two kinds of Buddhas are defined in the\nPuggala-Pannatti, IX. 1. For details about Pratyeka-Buddhas see De La\nVall\u00e9e Poussin's article in _E.R.E._]\n\n[Footnote 756: Thus in Dig. Nik. XVI. 5. 12 they are declared worthy of\na D\u00e2gaba or funeral monument and Sam. Nik. III. 2. 10 declares the\nefficacy of alms given to them.]","title":"Hinduism and Buddhism, An Historical Sketch, Vol. 1","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":177434}