{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_15696/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_15696","id":"gutenberg_15696","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/15696","summary":null,"tags":["Atheism","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Politics","Category: Religion/Spirituality"],"text":"Produced by Freethought Archives, www.freethought.vze.com\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nSUPERSTITION UNVEILED.\n\nBY\n\nCHARLES SOUTHWELL,\nAUTHOR OF \"SUPERNATURALISM EXPLODED;\" \"IMPOSSIBILITY OF ATHEISM\nDEMONSTRATED,\" ETC.\n\n\nAbridged by the Author from his\n\"APOLOGY FOR ATHEISM.\"\n\n\n\n     \"Not one of you reflects that you ought to\n     know your Gods before you worship them.\"\n\n\n\nLONDON:\nEDWARD TRUELOVE, 240, STRAND,\nTHREE DOORS FROM TEMPLE BAR,\nAND ALL BOOKSELLERS\n\n1854.\n\n\n\n\n\nSUPERSTITION UNVEILED.\n\n\nReligion has an important bearing on all the relations and conditions of\nlife. The connexion between religious faith and political practice is,\nin truth, far closer than is generally thought. Public opinion has not\nyet ripened into a knowledge that religious error is the intangible but\nreal substratum of all political injustice. Though the 'Schoolmaster'\nhas done much, there still remain among us, many honest and energetic\nassertors of 'the rights of man,' who have to learn that a people in the\nfetters of superstition cannot, secure political freedom. These\nreformers admit the vast influence of Mohammedanism on the politics of\nConstantinople, and yet persist in acting as if Christianity had little\nor nothing to do with the politics of England.\n\nAt a recent meeting of the Anti-State Church Association it was remarked\nthat _throw what we would into the political cauldron, out it came in an\necclesiastical shape_. If the newspaper report may be relied on, there\nwas much laughing among the hearers of those words, the deep meaning of\nwhich, it may safely be affirmed, only a select few of them could\nfathom.\n\nHostility to state churches by no means implies a knowledge of the close\nand important connection between ecclesiastical and political questions.\nMen may appreciate the justice of voluntaryism in religion, and yet have\nrather cloudy conceptions with respect to the influence of opinions and\nthings ecclesiastical on the condition of nations. They may clearly see\nthat he who needs the priest, should disdain to saddle others with the\ncost of him, while blind to the fact that no people having faith in the\nsupernatural ever failed to mix up such faith with political affairs.\nEven leading members of the 'Fourth Estate' are constantly declaring\ntheir disinclination for religious criticism, and express particular\nanxiety to keep their journals free of everything 'strictly\ntheological.' Their notion is, that newspaper writers should endeavour\nto keep clear of so 'awful' a topic. And yet seldom does a day pass in\nwhich this self-imposed editorial rule is not violated--a fact\nsignificant, as any fact can be of _connection_ between religion and\npolitics.\n\nIt is quite possible the editors of newspapers have weighty reasons for\ntheir repugnance to agitate the much vexed question of religion; but it\nseems they cannot help doing so. In a leading article of this days'\n_Post_, [Endnote 4:1] we are told--_The stain and reproach of Romanism\nin Ireland is, that it is a political system, and a wicked political\nsystem, for it regards only the exercise of power_, and neglects utterly\nthe duty of improvement. In journals supported by Romanists, and of\ncourse devoted to the interests of their church, the very same charge is\nmade against English Protestantism. To denounce each other's 'holy\napostolic religion' may be incompatible with the taste of 'gentlemen of\nthe press,' but certainly they do it with a brisk and hearty vehemence\nthat inclines one to think it a 'labour of love.' What men do _con\namore_ they usually do well, and no one can deny the wonderful talent\nfor denunciation exhibited by journalists when writing down each other's\n'true Christianity.' The unsparing invective quoted above from the\n_Post_ is a good specimen. If just, Irish Romanism _ought_ to be\ndestroyed, and newspaper writers cannot be better employed than in\nhelping on the work of its destruction, or the destruction of any other\nreligion to which the same 'stain and reproach' may be fairly attached.\n\nI have no spite or ill-will towards Roman Catholics though opposed to\ntheir religion, and a willing subscriber to the opinion of Romanism in\nIreland expressed by the _Post_. The past and present condition of that\ncountry is a deep disgrace to its priests, the bulk of whom, Protestant\nas well as Romanist, can justly be charged with 'regarding only the\nexercise of power, while neglecting utterly the duty of improvement.'\n\nThe intriguing and essentially political character of Romanism it would\nbe idle to deny. No one at all acquainted with its cunningly contrived\n'system' will hesitate to characterise it as 'wickedly political,'\nproductive of nothing but mischief--a system through whose accursed\ninstrumentality millions are cheated of their sanity as well as\nsubstance, and trained dog-like to lick the hand that smites them. So\nperfect is their degradation that literally they 'take no thought for\nto-morrow,' it being their practice to wait 'till starvation stares them\nin the face,' [4:2] and _then_ make an effort against it.\n\nThe _Globe_ of Thursday, October 30th, 1845, contains an article on the\ndamage sustained by the potatoe crop here and in Ireland, full of matter\ncalculated to enlighten our first-rate reformers who seem profoundly\nignorant that superstition is the bane of intellect, and most formidable\nof all the obstacles which stand between the people and their rights.\nOne paragraph is so peculiarly significant of the miserable condition to\nwhich Romanism _and_ Protestantism have reduced a peasantry said to be\n'the finest in the world,' that I here subjoin it.\n\n_The best means to arrest the progress of the pestilence in the people's\nfood have occupied the attention of scientific men. The commission\nappointed by government, consisting of three of the must celebrated\npractical chemists, has published a preliminary report, in which several\nsuggestions, rather than ascertained results, are communicated, by which\nthe sound portions of the root may, it is hoped, be preserved from the\nepidemic, and possibly, the tainted be rendered innoxious, and even\npartially nutritious. Followed implicitly, their directions might\nmitigate the calamity. But the care, the diligence, the persevering\nindustry which the various forms of process require, in order to\neffecting the purpose which might result if they were promptly adopted\nand properly carried out, are the very qualities in which the Irish\npeasantry are most deficient. In the present crisis, the people are more\ndisposed to regard the extensive destruction of their crops in the light\nof an extraordinary visitation of Heaven, with which it is vain for\nhuman efforts to contend, than to employ counteracting, or remedial\napplications. \"Sure the Almighty sent the potatoe-plague and we must\nbear it as wall us we can,\" is the remark of many; while, in other\nplaces, the copious sprinklings of holy water on the potatoe gardens,\nand on the produce, as it lies upon the surface, are more depended on\nfor disinfecting the potatoes than those suggestions of science which\nrequire the application of patient industry._\n\nDaniel O'Connell boasted about Irish morale and Irish intellect--the\nhandsome women, and stalwart men of his 'beloved country,' but no\nsensible persons paid the least attention to him. It is, at all events,\ntoo late in the day for we 'Saxons' to be either cajoled or amused by\nsuch nonsense. An overwhelming majority of the Irish people have been\nproved indolent beyond all parallel, and not much more provident than\nthose unhappy savages who sell their beds in the morning, not being able\nto foresee they shall again require them at night. A want of forethought\nso remarkable and indolence so abominable, are results of superstitious\neducation. Does any one suppose the religion of the Irish has little, if\nanything, to do with their political condition? Or can it be believed\nthey will be fit for, much less achieve, political emancipation, while\npriests and priests alone, are their instructors? We may rely upon it\nthat intellectual freedom is the natural and necessary precursor of\npolitical freedom. _Education_, said Lord Brougham, _makes men easy to\nlead but difficult to drive; easy to govern but impossible to enslave_.\nThe Irish peasantry clamoured for 'Repeal,' never considering that did\nthey get it, no essential change would be made in their social, moral,\nor, to say all in one word, _political_ condition. They would still be\nthe tool of unprincipled political mountebanks--themselves the tool of\npriests.\n\nGreat was the outcry raised against the 'godless colleges' that Sir\nRobert Peel had the courageous good sense to _inflict_ on Ireland.\nProtestant, as well as Romanist priests, were terribly alarmed lest\nthese colleges should spoil the craft by which they live. Sagacious\nenough to perceive that whatever influence they possess must vanish with\nthe ignorance on which it rests, they moved heaven and earth to disgust\nthe Irish people with an educational measure of which superstition\nformed no part. Their fury, like 'empty space,' is boundless. They\ncannot endure the thought that our minister should so far play the game\nof 'infidelity' as to take from them the delightful task of teaching\nIreland's young idea 'how to shoot.' Sir Robert Inglis _christened_ this\nodious measure, a 'gigantic scheme of godless education,' and a large\nmajority of Irish Roman Catholic Prelates have solemnly pronounced it\n'dangerous to faith and morals.' Neither ministerial allurements, nor\nministerial threats can subdue the cantankerous spirit of these bigots.\nThey are all but frantic and certainly not without reason, for the Irish\nColleges' Bill is the fine point of that wedge which, driven home, will\nshiver to pieces their 'wicked political system.' Whatever improves\nIrish intellect will play the mischief with its 'faith,' though not at\nall likely to deteriorate its 'morals.' Let the people of Ireland be\nwell employed as a preliminary to being well educated, and speedily they\nmay _deserve_ to be singled out as 'the most moral people on the face of\nthe earth.'\n\nAn educated nation will never tamely submit to be priest-ridden, and\nwell do Ireland's enslavers know it. The most stupid of her priests,\nequally with the shrewdest of her 'patriots,' are quite alive to the\nexpediency of teaching as fact the fraudulent fables of the 'dark ages.'\nTo keep the people ignorant, or what is worse, to teach them only what\nis false, is the great end of _their_ training; and if a British\nministry propose anything better than the merest mockery of education,\nthey call it 'dangerous to faith and morals.'\n\nSuperstition is the curse of Ireland. To the rival churches of that\ncountry may be traced ALL the oppressions suffered by its people who\nnever can be materially improved till purged of their faith in priests.\nWhen that salutary work shall be accomplished, Ireland will indeed be 'a\nnation' in the secure enjoyment of political liberty. The priest-ridden\nmay talk of freedom, but can never secure it.\n\nWhat then can be thought of the first-rate reformers, before alluded to,\nwho are going to emancipate every body without the least offence to any\nbody's superstition? It should be borne in memory that other people are\nsuperstitious as well as the Irish, and that the churches of all\ncountries are as much parts of 'a wicked political system' as are the\nchurches of Ireland.\n\nThe judges of _our_ country frequently remind us that its laws have a\nreligious sanction; nay, they assure us Christianity is part and parcel\nof those laws. Do we not know that orthodox Christianity means\nChristianity as by law established? And can any one fail to perceive\nthat such a religion must needs be political? The cunning few, who\nesteem nothing apart from their own aggrandisement, are quite aware that\nthe civil and criminal law of England is intimately associated with\nChristianity--they publicly proclaim their separation impossible, except\nat the cost of destruction to both. They are sagacious enough to\nperceive that a people totally untrammelled by the fears, the\nprejudices, and the wickedness of superstition would never consent to\nremain in bondage.\n\nHence the pains taken by priests to perpetuate the dominion of that\nignorance which proverbially is 'the mother of devotion.' What care they\nfor universal emancipation? Free themselves, their grand object is to\nrivet the chains of others. So that those they defraud of their hard\nearned substance be kept down, they are not over scrupulous with respect\nto means. Among the most potent of their helps in the 'good work' are\nchurches, various in name and character but in principle the very same.\nAll are pronounced true by priests who profit by them, and false by\npriests who do not. Every thing connected with them bears the stamp of\ndespotism. Whether we look at churches foreign or domestic, Popish or\nProtestant, 'that mark of the beast' appears in characters as legible\nas, it is fabled, the handwriting on the wall did to a tyrant of old. In\nconnection with each is a hierarchy of intellect stultifiers, who\nexplain doctrines without understanding them, or intending they should\nbe understood by others; and true to their 'sacred trust,' throw every\navailable impediment in the way of improvement. Knowledge is their\naccuser. To diffuse the 'truth' that 'will set men free' is no part of\ntheir 'wicked political system.' On the contrary, they labour to excite\na general disgust of truth, and in defence of bad governments preach\nfine sermons from some one of the many congenial texts to be gathered in\ntheir 'Holy Scripture.' Non-established priesthoods are but little more\ndisposed to emancipate 'mind' and oil the wheels of political\nprogression than those kept in state pay. The air of conventicles is not\nof the freest or most bracing description. The Methodist preacher, who\nhas the foolish effrontery to tell his congregation 'the flush lusteth\nalways contrary to the spirit, and, _therefore_, every person born into\nthe world deserveth God's wrath and damnation,' may be a liberal\npolitician, one well fitted to pilot his flock into the haven of true\nrepublicanism; but I am extremely suspicious of such, and would not on\nany account place my liberty in their keeping.\n\nI possess little faith in political fanaticism, especially when in\nalliance with the frightful doctrines enunciated from conventicle\npulpits, and have no hesitation in saying that Anti-State Church\nAssociations do not touch the root of political evils. Their usefulness\nis great, because they give currency to a sound principle, but that\nprinciple though important, is not all-important--though powerful, is\nnot all-powerful. If universally adopted, it is questionable that any\nuseful change of a lasting character would be worked in the economy of\npolitics.\n\nWise men put no trust in doctrine which involves or assumes supernatural\nexistence. Believing that supernaturalism reduced to 'system' cannot be\nother than 'wickedly political,' they see no hope for 'slave classes,'\napart from a general diffusion of anti-superstitious ideas. They cannot\nreconcile the wisdom of theologians with undoubted facts, and though\nwilling to admit that some 'modes of faith' are less absurd than others,\nare convinced they are all essentially alike, because all fundamentally\nerroneous.\n\nSpeculative thinkers of so radical a temper are not numerous. If\nesteemed, as happens to certain commodities, in proportion to their\nscarcity they would enjoy a large share of public respect. Indeed, they\nare so few and far between, or at least so seldom make their presence\nvisible, that William Gillespie is convinced they are an anomalous\nspecies of animal produced by our common parent 'in a moment of\nmadness.' Other grave Christian writers, though horrified at\nUniversal--nicknamed Athe-ism--though persuaded its professors, 'of all\nearth's madmen, most deserve a chain;' and, though constantly abusing\nthem, are still unable to believe in the reality of such persons. These,\namong all the opponents of Sense and Wisdom may fairly claim to be\nconsidered most mysterious; for, while lavishing on deniers of their\nidols every kind of sharp invective and opprobrious epithet, they cannot\nassure themselves the 'monsters' did, or do, actually exist. With\ncharacteristic humour David Hume observed, 'There are not a greater\nnumber of philosophical reasonings displayed upon any subject than those\nwhich prove the existence of Deity, and refute the fallacies of\nAtheists, and yet the most religious philosophers still dispute whether\nany man can be so blinded as to be a speculative Atheist;' 'how\n(continues he) shall we reconcile these contradictions? The\nKnight-errants who wandered about to clear the world of dragons and of\ngiants, never entertained the least doubt with regard to the existence\nof these monsters.' [8:1]\n\nThe same Hume who thus pleasantly rebuked 'most religious philosophers,'\nwas himself a true Universalist. That he lacked faith in the\nsupernatural must be apparent to every student of his writings, which\nabound with reflections far from flattering to the self-love of\nsuperstitionists, and little calculated to advance their cause. Hume\nastonished religious fanatics by declaring that _while we argue from the\ncourse of nature and infer a particular intelligent cause, which first\nbestowed, and still preserves order in the universe, we embrace a\nprinciple which is both uncertain and useless. It is uncertain, because\nthe subject lies entirely beyond the reach of human experience. It is\nuseless, because our knowledge of this cause being derived entirely from\nthe course of nature, we can never, according to the rules of just\nreasoning, return back from the cause with any new inference, or making\nadditions to the common and experienced course of nature, establish any\nprinciples of conduct and behaviour_. [9:1]\n\nNor did Hume affect to consider popular Christianity less repugnant to\nreason than any other theory or system of supernaturalism. Though\nconfessedly fast in friendship, generous in disposition, and blameless\nin all the relations of life, few sincere Divines can forgive his\nhostility to their faith. And, without doubt, it was hostility eminently\ncalculated to exhaust their stock of patience, because eminently\ncalculated to damage their superstition, which has nothing to fear from\nthe assaults of ignorant and immoral opponents; but when assailed by men\nof unblemished reputation, who know well how to wield the weapons of\nwit, sarcasm, and solid argumentation, its priests are not without\nreason alarmed lest their house should be set _out_ of order.\n\nIt would be difficult to name a philosopher at once so subtle, so\nprofound, so bold, and so _good_ as Hume. Notwithstanding his heterodox\nreputation, many learned and excellent Christians openly enjoyed his\nfriendship. A contemporary critic recently presented the public with 'a\ncurious instance of contrast and of parallel,' between Robertson and\nHume. 'Flourishing (says he) in the same walk of literature, living in\nthe same society at the same time; similar in their habits and generous\ndispositions; equally pure in their morals, and blameless in all the\nrelations of private life: the one was a devout believer, the other a\nmost absolute Atheist, and both from deep conviction, founded upon\ninquiries, carefully and anxiously conducted. The close and warm\nfriendship which subsisted between these two men, may, after what we\nhave said, be a matter of surprise to some; but Robertson's Christianity\nwas enlarged and tolerant, and David Hume's principles were liberal and\nphilosophical in a remarkable degree.' [9:2]\n\nThis testimony needs no comment. It clearly tells its own tale, and\nought to have the effect of throwing discredit upon the vulgar notion\nthat disgust of superstition is incompatible with talents and virtues of\nthe highest order; for, in the person of David Hume, the world saw\nabsolute Universalism co-existent with genius, learning, and moral\nexcellence, rarely, if ever, surpassed.\n\nThe unpopularity of that grand conception it would be vain to deny. A\nvast majority of mankind associate with the idea of disbelief in their\nGods, everything stupid, monstrous, absurd and atrocious. Absolute\nUniversalism is thought by them the inseparable ally of most shocking\nwickedness, involving 'blasphemy against the Holy Ghost,' which we are\nassured shall not be forgiven unto men 'neither in this world nor in\nthat which is to come.' Educated to consider it 'an inhuman, bloody,\nferocious system, equally hostile to every restraint and to every\nvirtuous affection,' the majority of all countries detest and shun its\napostles. Their horror of them may be likened to that it is presumed the\nhorse feels towards the camel, upon whom (so travellers tell us) he\ncannot look without _shuddering_.\n\nTo keep alive and make the most of this superstitious feeling has ever\nbeen the object of Christian priests, who rarely hesitate to make\ncharges of Atheism, not only against opponents, but each other; not only\nagainst disbelievers but believers. The Jesuit Lafiteau, in a Preface to\nhis 'Histoire des Sauvages Americanes,' [10:1] endeavours to prove that\nonly Atheists will dare assert that God created the Americans. Not a\nmetaphysical writer of eminence has escaped the 'imputation' of Atheism.\nThe great Clarke and his antagonist the greater Leibnitz were called\nAtheists. Even Newton was put in the same category. No sooner did\nsharp-sighted Divines catch a glimpse of an 'Essay on the Human\nUnderstanding' than they loudly proclaimed the Atheism of its author.\nJulian Hibbert, in his learned account 'Of Persons Falsely Entitled\nAtheists,' says, 'the existence of some sort of a Deity has usually been\nconsidered undeniable, so the imputation of Atheism and the title of\nAtheist have usually been considered as insulting.' This author, after\ngiving no fewer than thirty and two names of 'individuals among the\nPagans who (with more or less injustice) have been accused of Atheism,'\nsays, 'the list shews, I think, that almost all the most celebrated\nGrecian metaphysicians have been, either in their own or in following\nages, considered, with more or less reason, to be Atheistically\ninclined. For though the word Atheist was probably not often used till\nabout a hundred years before Christ, yet the imputation of _impiety_ was\nno doubt as easily and commonly bestowed, before that period, as it has\nbeen since.' [11:1]\n\nVoltaire relates, in the eighteenth chapter of his 'Philosophie de\nL'Histoire,' [11:2] that a Frenchman named Maigrot, Bishop of Conon, who\nknew not a word of Chinese, was deputed by the then Pope to go and pass\njudgment on the opinions of certain Chinese philosophers; _he treated\nConfucius as Atheist, because that sage had said, 'the sky has given me\nvirtue, and man can do me no hurt.'_\n\nOn grounds no more solid than this, charges of Atheism are often erected\nby 'surpliced sophists.' Rather ridiculous have been the mistakes\ncommitted by some of them in their hurry to affix on objects of their\nhate the brand of Impiety. Those persons, no doubt, supposed themselves\nprivileged to write or talk any amount of nonsense and contradiction.\nMen who fancy themselves commissioned by Deity to interpret his\n'mysteries,' or announce his 'will,' are apt to make blunders without\nbeing sensible of it; as did those worthy Jesuits who declared, in\nopposition to Bayle, that a society of Atheists was impossible, and at\nthe same time assured the world that the government of China was a\nsociety of Atheists. So difficult it is for men inflamed by prejudices,\ninterests, and animosities, to keep clear of sophisms, which can impose\non none but themselves.\n\nMany Universalists conceal their sentiments on account of the odium\nwhich would certainly be their reward did they avow them. But the\nunpopularity of those sentiments cannot, by persons of sense and\ncandour, be allowed, in itself, a sufficient reason for their rejection.\nThe fact of an opinion being unpopular is no proof it is false. The\nargument from general consent is at best a suspicious one for the truth\nof any opinion or the validity of any practice. History proves that the\ngenerality of men are the slaves of prejudice, the sport of custom, and\nfoes most bigoted to such opinions concerning religion as have not been\ndrawn in from their sucking-bottles, or 'hatched within the narrow\nfences of their own conceit.'\n\nEvery day experience demonstrates the fallibility of majorities. It\npalpably exhibits, too, the danger as well as folly of presuming the\nunpopularity of certain speculative opinions an evidence of their\nuntruth. A public intellect, untainted by gross superstition, can\nnowhere be appealed to. Even in this favoured country, 'the envy of\nsurrounding nations and admiration of the world,' the multitude are\nanything but patterns of moral purity and intellectual excellence. They\nwho assure us _vox populi_ 'is the voice of God,' are fairly open to the\ncharge of ascribing to Him what orthodox pietists inform us exclusively\nbelongs to the Father of Evil. If by 'voice of God' is meant something\ndifferent from noisy ebullitions of anger, intemperance, and fanaticism,\nthey who would have us regulate our opinions in conformity therewith are\nrespectfully requested to reconcile mob philosophy with the sober\ndictates of experience, and mob law with the law of reason.\n\nA writer in the _Edinburgh Review_ [12:1] assures us _the majority of\nevery nation consists of rude uneducated masses, ignorant, intolerant,\nsuspicious, unjust, and uncandid, without the sagacity which discovers\nwhat is right, or the intelligence which comprehends it when pointed\nout, or the morality which requires it to be done._ And yet religious\nphilosophers are fond of quoting the all but universal horror of\nUniversalism as a formidable argument against that much misunderstood\ncreed!\n\nThe least reflection will suffice to satisfy any reasonable man that the\nspeculative notions of rude, uneducated masses, so faithfully described\nby the Scotch Reviewer, are, for the most part, grossly absurd and\nconsequently the reverse of true. If the masses of all nations are\nignorant, intolerant, suspicious, unjust, and uncandid, without the\nsagacity which discovers what is right, or the intelligence which\ncomprehends it when pointed out, or the morality which requires it to be\ndone, who with the least shadow of claim to be accounted _reasonable_\nwill assert that a speculative heresy is the worse for being unpopular,\nor that an opinion is false, and _must_ be demoralising in its\ninfluence, because the majority of mankind declare it so.\n\nI would not have it inferred from the foregoing remarks that horror of\nUniversalism, and detestation of its apostles, is _confined_ to the low,\nthe vulgar, the base, or the illiterate. Any such inference would be\nwrong, for it is certainly true that learned, benevolent, and very able\nChristian writers, have signalised themselves in the work of obstructing\nthe progress of Universalism by denouncing its principles, and imputing\nall manner of wickedness to its defenders. It must, indeed, be admitted\nthat their conduct in this particular amply justifies pious Matthew\nHenry's confession that 'of all the Christian graces, zeal is most apt\nto turn sour.'\n\nOne John Ryland, A.M., of Northampton, published a 'Preceptor, or\nGeneral Repository of useful information, very necessary for the various\nages and departments of life,' in which 'pride and lust, a corrupt pride\nof heart, and a furious filthy lust of body,' are announced as the\nAtheist's 'springs of action,' 'desire to act the beast without control,\nand live like a devil without a check of conscience,' his only 'reasons\nfor opposing the existence of God,' in which he is told 'a world of\ncreatures are up in arms against him to kill him as they would a\nvenomous mad dog,' in which, among other hard names, he is called\n'absurd fool,' 'beast,' 'dirty monster,' 'brute,' 'gloomy dark animal,'\n'enemy of mankind,' 'wolf to civil society,' 'butcher and murderer of\nthe human race,' in which, moreover, he is _cursed_ in the following\nhearty terms;--'Let the glorious mass of fire burn him, let the moon\nlight him to the gallows, let the stars in their courses fight against\nthe Atheist, let the force of the comets dash him to pieces, let the\nroar of thunders strike him deaf, let red lightnings blast his guilty\nsoul, let the sea lift up her mighty waves to bury him, let the lion\ntear him to pieces, let dogs devour him, let the air poison him, let the\nnext crumb of bread choke him, nay, let the dull ass spurn him to\ndeath.'\n\nThis is a notable specimen of zeal turned sour.\n\nBishop Hall was a Divine of solid learning and unquestionable piety,\nwhose memory is reverenced by a large and most respectable part of the\nChristian world. He ranked amongst the best of his class, and, generally\nspeaking, was so little disposed to persecute his opponents because of\ntheir heterodox opinions, that he wrote and published a \"Treatise on\nModeration,\" in the course of which he eloquently condemns the practice\nof regulating, or, rather, attempting to regulate opinion by act of\nparliament; yet, incredible as it may appear, in that very Treatise he\napplauds Calvin on account of his conduct towards Servetus. Our\nauthority for this statement is not 'Infidel' but Christian--the\nauthority of Evans, who, after noticing the Treatise in question, says,\n'he (Bishop Hall) has discussed the subject with that ability which is\npeculiar to all his writings. But this great and good man, towards the\nclose of the same Treatise, forgetting the principles which he had been\ninculcating, devotes one solitary page to the cause of intolerance: this\npage he concludes with these remarkable expressions: \"Master Calvin did\nwell approve himself to God's Church in bringing Servetus to the stake\nin Geneva.\"\n\nRemarkable, indeed! and what is the moral that they point? To me they\nare indicative of the startling truth, that neither eloquence nor\nlearning, nor faith in God and his Scripture, nor all three combined,\nare incompatible with the cruelest spirit of persecution. The Treatise\non Moderation will stand an everlasting memorial against its author,\nwhose fine intellect, spoiled by superstitious education, urged him to\napprove a deed, the bare remembrance of which ought to excite in every\nbreast, feelings of horror and indignation. That such a man should\ndeclare the aim of Universalists is 'to dethrone God and destroy man,'\nis not surprising. From genuine bigots they have no right to expect\nmercy. He who applauded the bringing of Servetus to the stake must have\ndeemed their utter extermination a religious duty.\n\nThat our street and field preaching Christians, with very few\nexceptions, heartily sympathise with the fire and faggot sentiments of\nBishop Hall, is well known, but happily, their absurd ravings are\nattended to by none save eminently pious people, whose brains are\n_unclogged_ by any conceivable quantity of useful knowledge. In point of\nintellect they are utterly contemptible. Their ignorance, however, is\nfully matched by their impudence, which never forsake, them. They claim\nto be considered God's right-hand men, and of course duly qualified\npreachers of his 'word,' though unable to speak five minutes without\ntaking the same number of liberties with the Queen's English. Swift was\nprovoked by the prototypes of these pestiferous people, to declare that,\n'formerly the apostles received the gift of speaking several languages,\na knowledge so remote from our dealers in the art of enthusiasm, that\nthey neither understand propriety of speech nor phrases of their own,\nmuch less the gift of tongues.'\n\nThe millions of Christian people who have been trained up in the way\nthey should _not_ go, by this active class of fanatics, are naturally\neither opposed to reason or impervious to it. They are convinced not\nonly that the wisdom of the world is foolishness with God, but that\nwisdom with God is foolishness with the world; nor will any one affirm\ntheir 'moderation' in respect to unbelievers one tittle more moderate\nthan Bishop Hall's; or that they are one tittle less disposed than 'that\ngood and great man,' to think those who bring heretics to the stake at\nGeneva or elsewhere, 'do well approve themselves to God's Church.'\nEducated, that is to say _duped_ as they are, they cannot but think\ndisbelief highly criminal, and when practicable, or convenient, deal\nwith it as such.\n\nIt is, nevertheless, true, that Universalists have been helped to some\nof their best arguments by adversaries. Bishop Watson, to wit, has\nsuggested objections to belief in the Christian's Deity, which they who\nhold no such belief consider unanswerable. In his famous 'Apology' he\ndesired to know what Paine thought 'of an uncaused cause of everything,\nand a Being who has no relation to time, not being older to day than he\nwas yesterday, nor younger to day than he will be to-morrow--who has no\nrelation to space, not being a part here and a part there, or a whole\nanywhere? of an omniscient Being who cannot know the future actions of\nman, or if his omniscience enables him to know them, of the contingency\nof human actions? of the distinction between vice and virtue, crime and\ninnocence, sin and duty? of the infinite goodness of a Being who existed\nthrough eternity without any emanation of his goodness manifested in the\ncreation of sensitive beings? or, if it be contended that there was an\neternal creation, of an effect coeval with its cause, of matter not\nposterior to its maker? of the existence of evil, moral and natural, in\nthe work of an Infinite Being, powerful, wise, and good? finally, of the\ngift of freedom of will, when the abuse of freedom becomes the cause of\ngeneral misery?' [15:1]\n\nThese questions imply much. That they flowed from the pen of a Bishop,\nis one of many extraordinary facts which have grown out of theological\ncontroversy. They are questions strongly suggestive of another. Is it\npossible to have experience of, or even to imagine, a Being with\nattributes so strange, anomalous, and contradictory? It is plain that\nBishop Watson was convinced 'no man by searching can find out God.' The\ncase is, that he, in the hope of converting Deists, ventured to\ninsinuate arguments highly favourable to Atheism, whose professors\nconsider an admission of utter ignorance of God, tantamount to a denial\nof His existence. Many Christians, with more candour, perhaps, than\nprudence, have avowed the same opinion. Minutius Felix, for example,\nsaid to the Heathen, 'Not one of you reflects that you ought to know\nyour Gods before you worship them.' [15:2] As if he felt the absurdity\nof pretending to love and honour an unknown 'Perhaps.' That he did\nhimself what he ridiculed in them proves nothing but his own\ninconsistency.\n\nThe Christian, equally with the Heathen, is open to the reproach of\nworshipping HE KNOWS NOT WHAT. Yes, to idol-hating 'enlightened\nChristians,' may be fairly applied the severe sarcasm Minutius Felix so\ntriumphantly levelled against idol-loving 'benighted Heathens.' Will any\none say the Christian absolutely knows more about Jehovah than the\nHeathen did about Jupiter? I believe that few, if any, who have\nattentively considered Bishop Watson's queries, will say the 'dim\nUnknown,' they so darkly shadow forth, is conceivable by any effort\neither of sense or imagination.\n\nUnder cover, then, of what reason can Christians escape the imputation\nof pretending to adore what they have no conception of? The very 'book\nof books,' to which they so boldly appeal, is conclusive _against_ them.\nIn its pages they stand convicted of idolatry. Without doubt a God is\nrevealed by Revelation; but not _their_ God, not a supernatural Being,\ninfinite in power, in wisdom, and in goodness. The Bible Deity is\nsuperhuman in nothing; all that His adorers have ascribed to Him being\nmere amplification of human powers, human ideas, and human passions. The\nBible Deity 'has mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he\nhardeneth;' is 'jealous,' especially of other Gods; changeful,\nvindictive, partial, cruel, unjust, 'angry with the wicked every day;'\nand altogether a Being far from respectable, or worthy to be considered\ninfinite in wisdom, power, and goodness. Is it credible that a Being\nsupernaturally wise and good, proclaimed the murderous adulterer David,\na man after his own heart, and commanded the wholesale butchery of\nCanaanites? Or that a God of boundless power, 'whose tender mercies are\nover all his works,' decreed the extermination of entire nations for\nbeing what he made them? Jehovah did all three. Confessedly a God of\nArmies and Lord of Hosts; confessedly, too, a hardener of men's, hearts\nthat he might destroy them, he authorised acts at which human nature\nshudders, and of which it is ashamed: yet to _reverence_ Him we are\ncommanded by the self-styled 'stewards of his mysteries,' on peril of\nour 'immortal souls.' Verily, these pious anathematisers task our\ncredulity a little too much. In their zeal for the God of Israel, they\nare apt to forget that only Himself can compass impossibilities, and\naltogether lose sight of the fact that where, who, or what Jehovah is,\nno man knoweth. Revelation (so-called) reveals nothing about 'the\ncreator of heaven and earth,' on which a cultivated intellect can repose\nwith satisfaction. Men naturally desire positive information concerning\nthe superhuman Deity, belief in whom is the _sine qua non_ of all\nsuperstition. But the Bible furnishes no such information concerning\nJehovah. On the contrary, He is there pronounced 'past finding out,'\nincomprehensible, and the like. 'Canst thou by searching find out God?\nCanst thou find out the Almighty to perfection?' are questions put by an\n'inspired writer,' who felt the cloudy and unsatisfactory nature of all\nhuman conceit concerning Deity.\n\nNow, a Revelation from God might reasonably be expected to make the mode\nand nature of His existence manifest. But the Christian Bible falls\ninfinitely short in this particular. It teaches there is a God; but\nthrows no light on the dark question _What is God?_ Numerous and various\nas are Scripture texts, none can be cited in explanation of a Deity no\nolder to-day than he was yesterday, nor younger to-day than he will be\nto-morrow; of a Deity who has no relation to space, not being a part\nhere and a part there, or a whole any where: in short, of that Deity\nwritten about by Bishop Watson, who, like every other sincere Christian,\nmade the mistake of resting his religious faith on 'words without\nknowledge.'\n\nIt is to this description of faith Universalists object. They think it\nthe root of superstition, that greatest of all the plagues by which poor\nhumanity is afflicted. Are they to blame for thus thinking? The\nChristian has no mercy on the superstition of the Heathen, and should\nscorn to complain when the bitter chalice is returned to his own lips.\nUniversalists believe the God of Bishop Watson a supernatural chimera,\nand to its worshippers have a perfect right to say, _Not one of you\nreflects that you ought to know your Gods before you worship them_.\nThese remarkable words, originally addressed to the Heathen, lose none\nof their force when directed against the Christian.\n\nNo one can conceive a supernatural Being, and what none can conceive\nnone ought to worship, or even assert the existence of. Who worships a\nsomething of which he knows nothing is an idolater. To talk of, or bow\ndown to it, is nonsensical; to pretend affection for it, is worse than\nnonsensical. Such conduct, however pious, involves the rankest\nhypocrisy; the meanest and most odious species of idolatry; for\nlabouring to destroy which the Universalist is called 'murderer of the\nhuman soul,' 'blasphemer,' and other foolish names, too numerous to\nmention.\n\nIt would be well for all parties, if those who raise against us the cry\nof 'blasphemy,' were made to perceive that 'godless' unbelievers cannot\nbe blasphemers; for, as contended by Lord Brougham in his Life of\nVoltaire, blasphemy implies belief; and, therefore, Universalists cannot\nlogically or justly be said to blaspheme him. The blasphemer, properly\nso called, is he who imagines Deity, an ascribes to the idol of his own\nbrain all manner of folly, contradiction, inconsistency, and wickedness.\n\nSuperstition is universally abhorred, but no one believes _himself_\nsuperstitious. There never was a religionist who believed his own\nreligion mere superstition. All shrink indignantly from the charge of\nbeing superstitious; while all raise temples to, and bow down, before\n'thingless names.' The 'masses' of every nation erect chimera into\nsubstantial reality, and woe to these who follow not the insane example.\nThe consequences--the fatal consequences--are everywhere apparent. In\nour own country we see social disunion on the grandest possible scale.\nSociety is split up into an almost infinite variety of sects whose\nmembers imagine themselves patented to think truth and never to be wrong\nin the enunciation of it.\n\n_Sanders' News Letter and Daily Advertiser_ of Feb. 18, 1845, among\nother curiosities, contains an 'Address of the Dublin Protestant\nOperative Association, and Reformation Society,' one sentence of which\nis--_We have raised our voices against the spirit of compromise, which\nis the opprobrium of the age; we have unfurled the banner of Protestant\ntruth, and placed ourselves beneath it; we have insisted upon Protestant\nascendancy as just and equitable, because Protestant principles are true\nand undeniable_.\n\nPuseyite Protestants tell a tale the very reverse of that so modestly\ntold by their nominal brethren of the Dublin Operative Association.\nThey, as may be seen in Palmer's Letter to Golightly, _utterly reject\nand anathematise the principle of Protestantism, as a heresy with all\nits forms, sects, or denominations_. Nor is that all our 'Romeward\nDivines' do, for in addition to rejecting utterly and cursing bitterly,\nas well the name as the principle of Protestantism, they eulogise the\nChurch of Rome, because forsooth _she yields_, says Newman in his letter\nto Jelf, _free scope to feelings of awe, mystery, tenderness, reverence,\nand devotedness_; while we have it on the authority of Tract 90, that\nthe Church of England is _in bondage; working in chains, and _(tell it\nnot in Dublin)_ teaching with the stammering lips of ambiguous\nformularies_. Fierce and burning is the hatred of Dublin Operative\nAssociation Christians to Popery, but exactly that style of hatred to\nProtestantism is avowed by Puseyites. Both sets of Christians are quite\nsure they are right: but (alas! for infallibility) a third set of\nChristians insist that they are both wrong. There are Papists, or Roman\nCatholics, who consider Protestant principles the very reverse of true\nand undeniable, and treat with derisive scorn the 'fictitious\nCatholicism' of Puseyite Divines.\n\nCount de Montalambert, in his recently published 'Letter to the Rev. Mr.\nNeale on the Architectural, Artistical, and Archaeological Movements of\nthe Puseyites,' enters his 'protest' against the most unwarranted and\nunjustifiable assumption of the name of Catholic by people and things\nbelonging to the actual Church of England. _'It is easy,'_ he observes,\n_'to take up a name, but it is not so easy to get it recognised by the\nworld and by competent authority. Any man for example, may come out to\nMadeira and call himself a Montmorency, or a Howard, and even enjoy the\nhonour and consideration belonging to such a name till the real\nMontmorencys or Howards hear something about it, and denounce him, and\nthen such a man would be justly scouted from society, and fall down much\nlower than the lowness from which he attempted to rise. The attempt to\nsteal away from us and appropriate to the use of a fraction of the\nChurch of England that glorious title of Catholic is proved to be an\nusurpation by every monument of the past and present--by the coronation\noath of your sovereigns--by all the laws which have established your\nChurch--even by the recent answer of your University of Oxford to the\nlay address against Dr. Pusey, &c., where the Church of England is\njustly styled the Reformed Protestant Church. The question then is, have\nyou, the Church of England, got the picture for your frame? have you got\nthe truth, the one truth; the same truth as the men of the middle ages.\nThe Camden Society says yes; but the whole Christian world, both\nProtestant and Catholic, says no; and the Catholic world adds that there\nis no truth but in unity, and this unity you most certainly have not.\nOne more; every Catholic will repeat to you the words of Manzoni, as\nquoted by M. Faber: 'The greatest deviations are none if the main point\nbe recognised; the smallest are damnable heresies, if it be denied. That\nmain point is the infallibility of the Church, or rather of the Pope.'_\n\nNo one desires to be eternally punished; and, therefore, if any one\nembrace a false faith, it is because he makes the mistake of supposing\nit the true one. The three sets of Christians, just adverted to, may all\nbe equally sincere, but cannot all have the true faith. Protestant\nprinciples, as taught by the Dublin Operative Association, may be true.\nAnglo-Catholic principles, as taught by the Oxford Tractmen, may be\ntrue. Roman Catholic principles, as taught by the Count de Montalembert,\nmay be true; but they cannot ALL be true. It is impossible to reconcile\nthat orthodox Papists' 'main point,' _i.e._ the infallibility of the\n(Romish) Church, or rather of the Pope, with the 'main point' of\northodox Protestants, who denounce 'the great harlot of Babylon,' that\n'scarlet lady who sitteth upon the seven hills,' in the most unmeasured\nand virulent terms. Anti-Christ is the name they 'blasphemously' apply\nto the actual 'old chimera of a Pope.' Puseyite Divines treat his\nHoliness with more tenderness, but even _they_ boggle at his\ninfallibility, and seem to occupy a position between the rival churches\nof Rome and England analogous to that of Captain Macheath when singing\nbetween two favourite doxies--\n\n          How happy could I be with either,\n           Were t'other dear charmer away;\n          But while you thus teaze me together,\n           The devil a word will I say.\n\nInfallibility of Popes is the doctrine insisted upon by Count De\nMontalembert as essential--as doctrine the smallest deviation from which\nis damnable heresy. Believe and admit Antichrist is _not_ Antichrist,\nbut God's accredited viceregent upon earth, infinite is the mercy in\nstore for you; but woe to those who either cannot or will not believe\nand admit anything of the kind. On them every sincere Roman Catholic is\nsure that God will empty the vials of his wrath.\n\nPriests ascribe to Deity the low, grovelling, vindictive, feelings which\nagitate and disgrace themselves. If Roman Catholic principles are true\nand undeniable, none but Roman Catholics will be saved from the wrath to\ncome. If Anglo-Catholic principles are true and undeniable, none but\nAnglo-Catholics will be saved from the wrath to come. If orthodox\nProtestant principles are true and undeniable, none but orthodox\nProtestants will be saved from the wrath to come.\n\nThus superstitionists\n\n                            Grunt and groan,\n          Cursing all systems but their own.\n\nAgreeing in little else save disagreement, the 'main point' of this\nclass of believers is a matter of little consequence to that class of\nbelievers, and no matter at all to a third class of believers. Look at\nthe thousand-and-one sects into which the Christian world is divided.\n'Some reject Scripture; others admit no other writings but Scripture.\nSome say the Devils shall be saved, others that they shall be damned;\nothers that there are no Devils at all. Some hold that it is lawful to\ndissemble in religion, others the contrary. Some say that Antichrist is\ncome, some say not; others that he is a particular man, others that he\nis not a man, but the Devil; and others that by Antichrist is meant a\nsuccession of men. Some will have him to be Nero, some Caligula, some\nMohammed, some the Pope, some Luther, some the Turk, some of the Tribe\nof Dan; and so each man according to his fancy will make an Antichrist.\nSome only will observe the Lord's day, some only the Sabbath; some both,\nand some neither. Some will have all things in common, some not. Some\nwill have Christ's body only in Heaven, some everywhere; some in the\nbread, others with the bread, others about the bread, others under the\nbread, and others that Christ's body is the bread, or the bread his\nbody. And others that his body is transformed into his divinity. Some\nwill have the Eucharist administered in both kinds, some in one, some\nnot at all. Some will have Christ descend to hell in respect of his\nsoul, some only in his power, some in his divinity, some in his body,\nsome not at all. Some by hell understand the place of the damned, some\n_limbus patrum_, others the wrath of God, others the grave. Some will\nmake Christ two persons, some give him but one nature and one will; some\naffirming him to be only God, some only man, some made up of both, some\naltogether deny him. Some will have his body come from Heaven, some from\nthe Virgin, some from the elements. Some will have our souls mortal,\nsome immortal; some bring them into the body by Infusion, some by\ntraduction. Some will have souls created before the world, some after;\nsome will have them created altogether, others severally; some will have\nthem corporeal, some incorporeal; some of the substance of God, some of\nthe substance of the body. So infinitely are men's conceits distracted\nwith a variety of opinions, whereas _there is but one Truth_, which\nevery man aims at, but few attain it; every man thinks he hath it, and\nyet few enjoy it.' [20:1]\n\nChiefs of these sects are, for the most part, ridiculously intolerant;\nso many small Popes, who fancy that whomsoever they bind on earth shall\nbe bound in Heaven; and whomsoever they loose on earth shall be loosed\nin Heaven. They remorselessly cobble the true faith, without which, to\ntheir 'sole exclusive Heaven,' none can be admitted.\n\n          As if religion were intended,\n          For nothing else but to be mended.\n\nAnd never seem so happy as when promising eternal misery to those who\nreject their chimeras.\n\nBut wisdom, we read, is justified by her children; and to the wise of\nevery nation the Universalist confidently appeals. He rejects popular\nreligion, because such religion is based on principles of imaginative\nignorance. Bailly defines it as 'the worship of the unknown, piety,\ngodliness, humility, before the _unknown_.' Lavater as 'Faith in the\nsupernatural, invisible, _unknown_'. Vauvenargus as 'the duties of men\ntowards the _unknown_.' Dr. Johnson as 'Virtue founded upon reverence of\nthe _unknown_, and expectation of future rewards and punishments.'\nRivarol as 'the science of serving the _unknown_.' La Bruyere as 'the\nrespectful fear of the _unknown_.' Du Marsais, as 'the worship of the\n_unknown_, and the practice of all the virtues.' Walker as 'Virtue\nfounded upon reverence of the _unknown_, and expectation of rewards or\npunishments; a system of divine faith and worship as opposed to other\nsystems.' De Bonald as 'social intercourse between man and the\n_unknown_.' Rees as 'the worship or homage that is due to the _unknown_\nas creator, preserver, and, with Christians, as redeemer of the world,'\nLord Brougham as 'the subject of the science called Theology:' a science\nhe defines as 'the knowledge and attributes of the _unknown_' which\ndefinitions agree in making the essential principle of religion a\nprinciple of ignorance. That they are sufficiently correct definitions\nwill not be disputed, and upon them the Universalist is satisfied to\nrest his case. To him the worship or adoration of what is confessedly\nunknown is mere superstition; and to him professors of theology are\n'artists in words,' who pretend to teach what nobody has any conception\nof. Now, such persons may be well-intentioned; but their wisdom is by no\nmeans apparent. They must be wonderfully deficient of the invaluable\nsense so falsely called 'common.' Idolizers of 'thingless names,' they\nset at naught the admirable dictum of Locke that it is 'unphilosophic to\nsuppose names in books signify real entities in nature, unless we can\nframe clear and distinct ideas of those entities.'\n\nTheists of every class would do well to calmly and fully consider this\nrule of philosophising, for it involves nothing less than the\ndestruction of belief in the supernatural. The Jupiter of Mythologic\nHistory, the Allah of Alkoran, and the Jehovah of 'Holy Scripture,' if\nentities at all, are assuredly entities that baffle human conception. To\n'frame clear and distinct ideas of them' is impossible. In respect to\nthe attribute of _unknown ability_ all Gods are alike.\n\nBooks have been written to exhibit the difficulties of (what priests\nchoose to call) Infidelity, and without doubt unbelief has its\ndifficulties. But, according to a universally recognised rule of\nphilosophising, of two difficulties we are in all cases to choose the\nleast. From a rule so palpably just no one can reasonably depart, and\nthe Universalist, while freely admitting a great difficulty on his own\nside, is satisfied there can be demonstrated an infinitely greater\ndifficulty on the side of his opponents. The Universalist labours to\nconvince mankind they are not warranted by the general course of Nature\nin assigning to it a Cause; inasmuch as it is more in accordance with\nexperience to suppose Nature the uncaused cause, than to imagine, as\nerrorists do, that there is an uncaused cause of Nature.\n\nTheologians ask, who created Nature? without adducing satisfactory\nevidence that Nature _was_ created, and without reflecting that if it is\ndifficult to believe Nature self-existent, it is much more difficult to\nbelieve some self-existent Super-nature, capable of producing it. In\ntheir anxiety to get rid of a natural difficulty, they invent a\nsupernatural one, and accuse Universalists of 'wilful blindness,' and\n'obstinate deafness,' for not choosing so unphilosophic a mode of\nexplaining universal mystery.\n\nThe rule of philosophising just adverted to--that rule which forbids us,\nin any case, to chose the greater of two difficulties--is of immense\nimportance, and should be carefully considered by every one anxious to\narrive at correct conclusions with respect to theology. For if believers\nin God do depart from that rule--if their belief necessarily involve its\nviolation--to persist in such belief is to persist in what is clearly\nopposed to pure reason. Now, it has been demonstrated, so far as words\ncan demonstrate any truth whatever, that the difficulty of him who\nbelieves Nature never had an author, is infinitely less than the\ndifficulty of him who believes it had a cause itself uncaused.\n\nIn the 'Elements of Materialism,' an unequal, but still admirable work\nby Dr. Knowlton, a well-known American writer, this question of\ncomparative difficulty is well handled.\n\n'The sentiment,' says the Doctor, 'that a being exists which never\ncommenced existence, or what is the same thing, that a being exists\nwhich has existed from all eternity, appears to us to favour Atheism,\nfor if one Being exist which never commenced existence--why not\nanother--why not the universe? It weighs nothing, says the Atheist, in\nthe eye of reason, to say the universe appears to man as though it were\norganised by an Almighty Designer, for the maker of a thing must be\nsuperior to the thing made; and if there be a maker of the universe\nthere can be no doubt, but that if such maker were minutely examined by\nman, man would discover such indications of wisdom and design that it\nwould be more difficult for him to admit that such maker was not caused\nor constructed by a pre-existing Designer, than to admit that the\nuniverse was not caused or constructed by a Designer. But no one will\ncontend for an infinite series of Makers; and if, continues the Atheist,\nwhat would, if viewed, be indications of design, are no proofs of a\ndesigner in the one case, they are not in the other; and as such\nindications are the only evidence we have of the existence of a Designer\nof the universe, we, as rational beings, contend there is no God. We do\nnot suppose the existence of any being, of which there is no evidence,\nwhen such supposition, it admitted, so far from diminishing would only\nincrease a difficulty, which, at best, is sufficiently great. Surely, if\na superior being may have existed from all eternity, an inferior may\nhave existed from all eternity; if a great God sufficiently mighty to\nmake a world may have existed from all eternity, of course without\nbeginning and without cause, such world may have existed from all\neternity, without beginning, and without cause.' [23:1]\n\nThese are 'strong reasons' for Universalism. They prove that Theists set\nat nought the rule of philosophising which forbids us to choose the\ngreater of two difficulties. Their system compels them to do so; for\nhaving no other groundwork than the strange hypotheses that time was\nwhen there was no time--something existed when there was nothing, which\nsomething created everything; its advocates would be tongue-tied and\nlost if reduced to the hard necessity of appealing to facts, or rigidly\nregarding rules of philosophising which have only their reasonableness\nto recommend them. They profess ability to account for Nature, and are\nof course exceeding eager to justify a profession so presumptuous. This\neagerness betrays them into courses, of which no one bent on rejecting\nwhatever is either opposed to, or unsanctioned by, experience, can\npossibly approve. It is plain that of the God they tell us to believe\n'created the worlds,' no man has any experience. This granted, it\nfollows that worship of such fancied Being is mere superstition. Until\nit be shown by reference to the general course of things, that things\nhad an author, Himself uncreated or unauthorized, religious philosophers\nhave no right to expect Universalists to abandon their Universalism. The\nduty of priests is to reconcile religion with reason, _if they can_, and\nadmit their inability to do so, _if they cannot_.\n\nRomanists will have nothing to do with reason whenever it appears at\nissue with their faith. All sects, as sects, play fast and loose with\nreason. Many members of all sects are forward enough to boast about\nbeing able to give a reason for the faith that is in them; but an\noverwhelming majority love to exalt faith above reason. Philosophy they\ncall 'vain,' and some have been found so filled with contempt for it, as\nto openly maintain that what is theologically true, is philosophically\nfalse; or, in other terms, that the truths of religion and the truths of\nphilosophy have nothing in common. According to them, religious truths\nare independent of, and superior to, all other truths. Our faith, say\nthey, if not agreeable to _mere_ reason is infinitely superior to it.\nPriests are 'at one' on the point. Dissenting and Protestant, as well as\nRomanising priests, find it convenient to abuse reason and extol faith.\nAs priests, they can scarcely be expected to do otherwise; for reason is\na stern and upright judge whose decrees have hitherto been unfavourable\nto superstition. Its professors, who appeal to that judge, play a part\nmost inconsistent and dangerous, as is evident in the case of Origen\nBachelor, who more zealous and candid than prudent, declared the real\nand only question between Atheism and Theism a question of fact;\nreducing it to these terms--'Is there reason, all things considered, for\nbelieving that there is a God, an intelligent cause of things, infinite\nand perfect in all his attributes and moral qualities?' [24:1]\n\nNow, the reader has seen that the hypothesis of 'an intelligent cause of\nthings' involves difficulties, greater, infinitely greater than the one\ndifficulty involved in the hypothesis that things always existed. He has\nseen the folly of explaining natural, by the invention of supernatural\nmystery, because it manifestly violates a rule of philosophising, the\njustness of which it would be ridiculous to dispute. Having clearly\nperceived thus much, he will perhaps think it rather 'too bad' as well\nas absurd, to call Universalists 'madmen' for lacking faith in the\nmonstrous dogma that Nature was caused by 'something amounting to\nnothing' itself uncaused.\n\nThere is something. That truth admits not of being evidenced. It is,\nnevertheless, accepted. It is accepted by men of all religious opinions,\nequally with men of no religious opinions. If any truth be self-evident\nand eternal, here is that truth. To call it in question would be worse\nthan idle. We may doubt the reality of an external world, we may be\nsceptical as to the reality of our own bodies, but we cannot doubt that\nthere is something. The proposition falls not within the domain of\nscepticism. It must be true. To suppose it false is literally\nimpossible. Its falsehood would involve contradiction, and all\ncontradiction involves Impossibility. But, if proof of this were needed,\nwe have it in the fact that no man, sage or simple, ever pretended to\ndeny there is something. Whatever men could doubt or deny they have\ndoubted or denied, but in no country of the world, in no age, has the\ndogma--there is something--been denied or even treated as doubtful. Here\nthen Universalists, Theists, and Polytheists agree. They agree of\nnecessity. There is no escape from the conclusion that something is,\nexcept we adopt the unintelligible dogma--there is nothing--which no\nhuman being can, as nothing amounts to nothing, and of what amounts to\nnothing no one can have an idea. To define the word something by any\nother word would be labour in vain. There is no other word in any\nlanguage whoso meaning is better understood, and they who do not\nunderstand what it means, if such persons there be, are not likely to\nunderstand the meaning of any word or words whatever. Ideas of nothing\nnone have. That there is something, we repeat, must be true, all dogmas\nor propositions being necessarily true whose denial involves an\nimpossibility. What the nature of that something may be is a secondary\nquestion, and however determined cannot affect the primary dogma--things\nare things whatever may be their individual or their aggregate nature.\nNor is it of the least consequence what name or names we may see fit to\ngive things, so that each word has its fixed and true meaning. Whether,\nfor example, we use for the sign of that something which is, the word\nUniverse, or God, or Substance, or Spirit, or Matter, or the letter X,\nis of no importance, if we understand the word or letter used to be\nmerely the sign of that something. Words are seldom useful except when\nthey are the sign of true ideas; evidently therefore, their legitimate\nfunction is to convey such ideas; and words which convey no ideas at\nall, or what is worse, only those which are false, should at once be\nexpunged from the vocabularies of nations. Something is. The\nUniversalist calls it matter. Other persons may choose to call it other\nnames: let them. He chooses to call it this one--and no other.\n\nThere ever has been something. Here, again, is a point of unity. All are\nequally assured there ever has been something. Something is, something\nmust always have been, cry the religious, and the cry is echoed by the\nirreligious. This last dogma, like the first, admits not of being\nevidenced. As nothing is inconceivable, we cannot even imagine a time\nwhen there was nothing. Universalists say, something ever was, which\nsomething is matter. Theists say, something has been from all eternity,\nwhich something is not matter but God. They boldly affirm that matter\nbegan to be. They affirm its creation from nothing, by a something,\nwhich was before the universe. Indeed, the notion of universal creation\ninvolves first, that of universal annihilation, and secondly, that of\nsomething prior to everything. What creates everything must be before\neverything, in the same way that he who manufactures a watch must exist\nbefore the watch. As already remarked, Universalists agree with Theists,\nthat something ever has been, but the point of difference lies here. The\nUniversalist says, matter is the eternal something, and asks proof of\nits beginning to be. The Theist insists that matter is not the eternal\nsomething, but that God is; and when pushed for an account of what he\nmeans by God, he coolly answers, a Being, having nothing in common with\nanything, who nevertheless, by his Almighty will, created everything. It\nmay without injustice be affirmed, that the sincerest and strongest\nbelievers in this mysterious Deity are often tormented by doubts, and,\nif candid, must own they believe in the existence of many things with a\nfeeling much closer allied to certainty than they do in the reality of\ntheir 'Great First Cause, least understood.' No man's faith in the\ninconceivable is ever half so strong as his belief in the visible and\ntangible.\n\nBut few among professional mystifiers will admit this, obviously true as\nit is. Some have done so. Baxter, of pious memory, to wit, who said, _I\nam not so foolish as to pretend my certainty be greater than it is,\nbecause it is dishonour to be less certain; nor will I by shame be kept\nfrom confessing those infirmities which those have as much as I, who\nhypocritically reproach with them._ MY CERTAINTY THAT I AM A MAN IS\nBEFORE MY CERTAINTY THAT THERE IS A GOD.\n\nSo candid was Richard Baxter, and so candid are _not_ the most part of\nour priests, who would fain have us think them altogether _un_sceptical.\nNevertheless, they write abundance of books to convince us 'God is,'\nthough they never penned a line in order to convince us, we actually\nare, and that to disbelieve we are is a 'deadly sin.'\n\nCould God be known, could his existence be made 'palpable to feeling as\nto sight,' as unquestionably is the existence of matter, there would be\nno need of 'Demonstrations of the existence of God', no need of\narguments _a priori_ or _a posteriori_ to establish that existence.\nSaint John was right; 'No man hath seen God at any time', to which 'open\nconfession' he might truly have added, 'none ever will,' for the unreal\nis alway unseeable. Yet have 'mystery men' with shameless and most\ninsolent pertinacity asserted the existence of God while denying the\nexistence of matter.\n\n_The incomprehensible is not to be defined._ It is difficult to give\n_intelligible_ account of an Immense Being confessedly mysterious and\nabout whom his worshippers admit they only know, they know nothing,\nexcept that\n\n                             'He is good,\n          And that themselves are blind.'\n\nSpinoza said, _of things which have nothing in common, one cannot be the\ncause of the other_; and to me it seems eminently unphilosophic to\nbelieve a Being having nothing in common with anything, capable of\ncreating or causing everything. 'Only matter can be touched or touch;'\nand as the Christian's God is not material, his adorers are fairly open\nto the charge of superstition. An unknown Deity, without body, parts or\npassions, is of all idols the least tangible; and they who pretend to\nknow and reverence him, are deceived or deceivers.\n\nIn this Christian country, where men are expected to believe and called\n'Infidel' if they _cannot_ believe in a 'crucified Saviour,' it seems\nstrange so much fuss should be made about his immateriality. All but\nUnitarian Christians hold as an essential article of faith, that in him\ndwelt the fulness of the Godhead bodily; in other words, that our\nRedeemer and our Creator, though two persons, are but one God. It is\ntrue that Divines of our 'Reformed Protestant Church,' call everything\nbut gentlemen those who lay claim to the equivocal privilege of feasting\nperiodically upon the body and blood of Omnipotence. The pains taken by\nProtestants to show from Scripture, Reason and Nature, that Priests\ncannot change lumps of dough into the body, and bumpers of wine into the\nblood, of their God, are well known and appreciated. But the Roman\nCatholics are neither to be argued nor laughed out of their 'awful\ndoctrine' of the real presence, to which they cling with desperate\nearnestness.\n\nLocke wrote rather disparagingly of 'many among us,' who will be found\nupon Inquiry, to fancy God in the shape of a man fitting in heaven, and\nhave other absurd and unfit conceptions of him.' As though it were\npossible to think of shapeless Being, or as though it were criminal in\nthe superstitious to believe 'God made man after his own image.'\n\nThat Christians as well as Turks 'really have had whole sects earnestly\ncontending that the Deity was corporeal and of human shape', is a fact,\nso firmly established as to defy contradiction. And though every sincere\nsubscriber to the Thirty Nine Articles must believe, or at least must\nbelieve he believes in Deity without body, parts, or passions, it is\nwell known that 'whole sects' of Christians do even now 'fancy God in\nthe shape of a man sitting in heaven, and entertain other absurd and\nunfit conceptions of him.'\n\nMr. Collibeer, who is considered by Christian writers 'a most ingenious\ngentleman', has told the world in his Treatise entitled 'The Knowledge\nof God,' that Deity must have some form, and intimates it may probably\nbe the spherical; an intimation which has grievously offended many\nlearned Theists who considered going so far an abuse of reason, and warn\nus that 'its extension beyond the assigned boundaries, has proved an\nample source of error.' But what the 'assigned boundaries' of reason\nare, they don't state, nor by whom 'assigned.' That if there is a God he\nmust have _some_ form is self-evident and why Mr. Collibeer should be\nostracized by his less daringly imaginative brethren, for preferring a\nspherical to a square or otherwise shaped Deity, is to my understanding\nwhat God's grace is to their's.\n\nBut admitting the unfitness, and absurdity, and 'blasphemy' of such\nconceptions, it is by no means clear that any other conceptions of the\n'inconceiveable' would be an improvement upon them. Undoubtedly, the\nmatter-God-system has its difficulties, but they are trifles in\ncomparison with those by which the spirit-God system is encompassed;\nfor, one obvious consequence of faith in bodiless Divinity is an utter\nconfusion of ideas in those who preach it, as regards possibilities and\nimpossibilities.\n\nThe universe is an uncaused existence, or it was caused by something\nbefore it. By universe we mean matter, the sum total of things, whence\nall proceeds, and whither all returns. No truth is more obviously true\nthan the truth that matter, or something not matter, exists of itself,\nand consequently is not an effect, but an uncaused cause of all effects.\n\nFrom such conviction, repugnant though it be to vulgar ideas, there is\nno rational way of escape; for however much we may desire, however much\nwe may struggle to believe there was a time when there was nothing, we\ncannot so believe. Human nature is constituted intuitively or\ninstinctively to feel the eternity of something. To rid oneself of that\nfeeling is impossible. Nature or something not Nature must ever have\nbeen, is a conclusion to which what poets call Fate--\n\n          Leads the willing and drags the unwilling.\n\nBut does this undeniable truth make against Universalism? Far from\nit--so far, indeed, as to make for it. The reason is no mystery. Of\nmatter we have ideas clear, precise, and indispensable, whereas of\nsomething not matter we cannot have any idea whatever, good, bad, or\nindifferent. The Universe is extraordinary, no doubt, but so much of it\nas acts upon us is perfectly conceivable, whereas, any thing within,\nwithout, or apart from the Universe, is perfectly inconceivably.\n\nThe notion of necessarily existing matter seems fatal to belief in God;\nthat is, if by the word God be understood something not matter, for 'tis\nprecisely because priests were unable to reconcile such belief with the\nidea of matter's self-existence or eternity, that they took to imagining\na 'First cause.'\n\nIn the 'forlorn hope' of vanquishing the difficulty of necessarily\nexisting _Matter_, they assent to a necessarily existing _Spirit_, and\nwhen the nature of spirit is demanded from these assertors of its\nexistence, they are constrained to avow that it is material or nothing.\n\nYes, they are constrained to make directly or indirectly one or other of\nthese admissions; for, as between truth and falsehood, there is no\nmiddle passage; so between something and nothing, there is no\nintermediate existence. Hence the serious dilemma of Spiritualists, who\ngravely tell us their God is a spirit, and that a spirit is not any\nthing, which not any thing or nothing (for the life of us we cannot\ndistinguish between them) 'framed the worlds' nay, _created_ as well as\nframed them.\n\nIf it be granted, for the mere purpose of explanation, that spirit is an\nentity, we can frame 'clear distinct ideas of'--a real though not\nmaterial existence, surely no man will pretend to say an uncreated\nSpirit, is less inexplicable than uncreated Matter. All could not have\nbeen caused or created unless nothing can be a Cause, the very notion of\nwhich involves the grossest of absurdities.\n\n_Whatever is produced, without any cause, is produced by nothing; or, in\nother words, has nothing for its cause. But nothing never can be a cause\nno more than it can be something or equal to two right angles. By the\nsame intuition that we perceive nothing not to be equal to two right\nangles, or not to be something, we perceive that it can never be a\ncause, and consequently must perceive that every object has a real cause\nof its existence. When we exclude all causes we really do exclude them,\nand neither suppose nothing nor the object itself to be the causes of\nthe existence, and consequently can draw no argument from the absurdity\nof these suppositions except to prove the absurdity of that exclusion.\nIf everything must have a cause, it follows that upon the exclusion of\nother causes, we must accept of the object itself or nothing as causes.\nBut it is the very point in question whether everything must have a\ncause or not, and therefore, according to all just reasoning ought not\nto be taken for granted_. [29:1]\n\nThis reasoning amounts to logical demonstration (if logical\ndemonstration there can be) of a most essential truth, which in all ages\nhas been obstinately set at nought by dabblers in the supernatural. It\ndemonstrates that something never was, never can be, caused by nothing,\nwhich can no more be a cause, properly so called, than it can be\nsomething, or equal to two right angles; and therefore that everything\ncould not have had a cause, which, the reader has seen, is the very\npoint assumed by Theists--the very point on which as a pivot they so\nmerrily and successfully turn their fine metaphysical theories and\nimmaterial systems.\n\nThe universe, quoth they, must have had a cause, and that cause must\nhave been First Cause, or cause number one, because nothing can exist of\nitself. Oh, most lame and impotent conclusion! How, in consistency, can\nthey declare nothing can exist without a cause in the teeth of their oft\nrepeated dogma that God is uncaused. If God never commenced to be, _He_\nis an uncaused existence, that is to say, exists without a cause. [29:2]\nThe difference on this point between Theists and Universalists is very\npalpable. The former say, Spirit can exist without a cause, the latter\nsay Matter can exist without a cause. Whole libraries of theologic dogma\nwould be dearly purchased by Hume's profound remark--_if everything must\nhave a cause, it follows that upon the exclusion of other causes we must\naccept of the object itself or of nothing as causes._\n\nSaint Augustine, more candid than modern theologians, said 'God is a\nbeing whom we speak of but whom we cannot describe and who is superior\nto all definitions.' Universalists, on the other hand, as candidly deny\nthere is any such being. To them it seems that the name God stands for\nnothing, is the archetype of nothing, explains nothing, and contributes\nto nothing but the perpetuation of human imbecility, ignorance and\nerror. To them it represents neither shadow nor substance, neither\nphenomenon nor thing, neither what is ideal nor what is real; yet is it\nthe name without senseless faith in which there could be no\nsuperstition.\n\nIf Nature is all, and all is Nature, nothing but itself could ever have\nexisted, and of course nothing but itself can be supposed ever to have\nbeen capable of causing. To cause is to act, and though body without\nnotion is conceivable, action without body is not. Neither can two\nInfinites be supposed to tenant one Universe. Only 'most religious\nphilosophers' can pretend to acknowledge the being of an infinite God\nco-existent with an infinite Universe.\n\nUniversalists are frequently asked--What moves matter? to which question\n_nothing_ is the true and sufficient answer. Matter moves matter. If\nasked how we know it does, our answer is, because we see it do so, which\nis more than mind imaginers can say of their 'prime mover.' They tell us\nmind moves matter; but none save the _third sighted_ among them ever saw\nmind, and if they never saw mind, they never could have seen matter\npushed about by it. They babble about mind, but nowhere does mind exist\nsave in their mind; that is to say, nowhere but nowhere. Ask these\nbroad-day dreamers where mind is _minus_ body? and very cutely they\nanswer, body is the mind, and mind is the body.\n\nThat this is neither joke nor slander, we will show by reference to No.\n25 of 'The Shepherd,' a clever and well known periodical, whose editor,\n[30:1] in reply to a correspondent of the 'chaotic' tribe, said 'As to\nthe question--where is magnetism without the magnet? We answer,\nmagnetism is the magnet, and the magnet is magnetism.' If so, body is\nthe mind and the mind is body; and our Shepherd, if asked, 'Where is\nmind without the body?' to be consistent, should answer, body is the\nmind and the mind is the body. Both these answers are true, or both are\nfalse; and it must be allowed--\n\n          Each lends to each a borrowed charm,\n          Like pearls upon an Ethiop's arm.\n\nAsk the 'Shepherd' where is mind without the body? and, if not at issue\nwith himself, he _must_ reply, mind is the man and man is the mind.\n\nIf this be so,--if the mind is the man and the man is the mind, which\nnone can deny who say magnetism is the magnet and the magnet\nmagnetism--how, in Reason's name, can they be different, or how can the\n'Shepherd' consistently pretend to distinguish between them; yet he does\nso. He writes about the spiritual part of man as though he really\nbelieved there is such a part. Not satisfied, it would seem, with body,\nlike Nonentitarians of vulgar mould, he tenants it with Soul or Spirit,\nor Mind, which Soul, or Spirit, or Mind, according to his own showing,\nis nothing but body in action; in other terms, organised matter\nperforming vital functions. Idle declamation against 'facts mongers'\nwell becomes such self-stultifying dealers in fiction. Abuse of\n'experimentarians' is quite in keeping with the philosophy of those who\nmaintain the reality of mind in face of their own strange statement,\nthat magnetism is the magnet and the magnet magnetism.\n\nBut we deny that magnetism is the magnet. These words magnetism and\nmagnet do not, it is true, stand for two things, but one thing: that one\nand only thing called matter. The magnet is an existence, _i.e._, that\nwhich moves. Magnetism is not an existence, but phenomenon, or, if you\nplease, phenomena. It is the effect of which magnetic body is the\nimmediate and obvious cause.\n\nTo evade the charge of Materialism, said Dr. Engledue, we\n(Phrenologists) content ourselves with stating that the immaterial makes\nuse of the material to show forth its powers. What is the result of\nthis? We have the man of theory and believer in supernaturalism\nquarrelling with the man of fact and supporter of Materialism. We have\ntwo parties; the one asserting that man possesses a _spirit_ superadded\nto, but not inherent in, the brain--added to it, yet having no necessary\nconnection with it--producing material changes, yet\nimmaterial--destitute of any of the known properties of matter--in fact\nan _immaterial something_ which in one word means _nothing_, producing\nall the cerebral functions of man, yet not localised-not susceptible of\nproof; the other party contending that the belief in spiritualism\nfetters and ties down physiological investigation--that man's intellect\nis prostrated by the domination of metaphysical speculation--that we\nhave no evidence of the existence of an _essence_, and that organised\nmutter is all that is requisite to produce the multitudinous\nmanifestations of human and brute cerebration.\n\nWe rank ourselves with the second party, and conceive that we must cease\nspeaking of 'the mind,' and discontinue enlisting in our investigations\na spiritual essence, the existence of which cannot be proved, but which\ntends to mystify and perplex a question sufficiently clear if we confine\nourselves to the consideration of organised matter--its forms--its\nchanges--and its aberrations from normal structure. [31:1]\n\nThe eccentric Count de Caylus, when on his death-bed, was visited by\nsome near relation and a pious Bishop, who hoped that under such trying\ncircumstance he would manifest some concern respecting those 'spiritual'\nblessings which, while in health, he had uniformly treated with\ncontempt. After a long pause he broke silence by saying, _'Ah, my\nfriends, I see you are anxious about my soul;'_ whereupon they pricked\nup their ears with delight; before, however, any reply could be made the\nCount added, _'but the fact is I have not got one, and really my good\nfriends you must allow me to know best.'_\n\nIf people in general had one tenth the good sense of this _impious_\nCount, the fooleries of Spiritualism would at once give place to the\nphilosophy of Materialism, and none would waste time in talking or\nwriting about non-entities. All would know that what theologians call\nsometimes spirit, sometimes soul, and sometimes mind, is an imaginary\nexistence. All would know that the terms _immaterial something_ do in\nvery truth mean _nothing_. Count de Caylus died as became a man\nconvinced that soul is not an entity, and that upon the dissolution of\nour 'earthly tabernacle', the particles composing it cease to perform\nvital functions, and return to the shoreless ocean of Eternal Being.\nPietists may be shocked by such _nonchalance_ in the face of their 'grim\nmonster;' but philosophers will admire an indifference to inevitable\nconsequences resulting from profoundest love of truth and contempt of\nsuperstition. Count de Caylus was a Materialist, and no Materialist can\nconsistently feel the least alarm at the approach of what\nsuperstitionists have every reason to consider the 'king of terrors.'\nBelievers in the reality of immaterial existence cannot be 'proper'\nMaterialists. Obviously, therefore, no believers in the reality of God\ncan be _bona fide_ Materialists; for 'God' is a name signifying\nsomething or nothing; in other terms matter or that which is not matter.\nIf the latter, to Materialists the name is meaningless--sound without\nsense. If the former, they at once pronounce it a name too many; because\nit expresses nothing that their word MATTER does not express better.\n\nDr. Young held in horror the Materialist's 'universe of dust.' But there\nis nothing either bad or contemptible in dust--man is dust--all will be\ndust. A _dusty_ universe, however, _shocked_ the poetic Doctor, whose\nwritings analogise with--\n\n          Rich windows that exclude the light,\n          And passages that lead to nothing.\n\nA universe of nothing was more to his taste than a universe of dust, and\nhe accordingly amused himself with the 'spiritual' work of imagining\none, and called its builder 'God.'\n\nThe somewhat ungentle 'Shepherd' cordially sympathises with Dr. Young in\nhis detestation of the Materialist's universe of dust, and is sorely\npuzzled to know how mere dust contrives to move without the assistance\nof 'an immaterial power between the particles;' as if he supposed\nanything could be between everything--or nothing be able to move\nsomething. Verily this gentleman is as clever a hand at 'darkening\ncounsel by words without knowledge' as the cleverest of those he rates\nso soundly.\n\nThe names of Newton and Clarke are held in great esteem by all who are\nfamiliar with the history of mechanical and metaphysical philosophy. As\na man of science, there is no individual, ancient, or modern, who would\nnot suffer by comparison with Sir Isaac Newton; while common consent has\nassigned to Dr. Samuel Clarke the first place among religious\nmetaphysicians. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to cite any\nother Theists of better approved reputation than these two, and\ntherefore we introduce them to the reader's notice in this place; for as\nthey ranked among the most philosophic of Theists, it might be expected\nthat their conceptions of Deity, would be clear, satisfactory, and\ndefinite.--Let us see, then, _in their own writings_, what those\nconceptions were.\n\nNewton conceived God to be one and the same for ever, and everywhere,\nnot only by his own virtue or energy, but also in virtue of his\nsubstance.--Again, 'All things are contained in him and move in him, but\nwithout reciprocal action' (_sed sine muta passione_) God feels nothing\nfrom the movements of bodies; nor do they experience any resistance from\nhis universal presence. [33:1]\n\nPause, reader, and demand of yourself whether such a conception of Deity\nis either clear, satisfactory, or definite,--God is _one_. Very\ngood--but one _what?_ From the information, 'He is the same for ever and\neverywhere,' we conclude that Newton thought him a Being. Here, however,\nmatter stops the way; for the idea of Being is in all of us inseparably\nassociated with the idea of substance. When told that God is an 'Immense\nBeing,' without parts, and consequently unsubstantial, we try to think\nof such a Being; but in vain. Reason puts itself in a _quandary_, the\nmoment it labours to realise an idea of absolute nothingness; yet\nmarvellous to relate, Newton did distinctly declare his Deity 'totally\ndestitute of body,' and urged that _fact_ as a _reason_ why He cannot be\neither seen, touched, or understood, and also as a _reason_ why he ought\nnot to be adored under any corporeal figure!\n\nThe proper function of 'Supernaturality or Wonder,' according to\nPhrenologists, is to create belief in the reality of supernatural\nbeings, and begets fondness for news, particularly if extravagant. Most\nlikely then, such readers of this book as have that organ 'large' will\nbe delighted with Newton's rhodomontade about a God who resists nothing,\nfeels nothing, and yet with condescension truly divine, not only\ncontains all things, but permits them to move in His motionless and\n'universal presence;' for 'news' more extravagant, never fell from the\nlips of an idiot, or adorned the pages of a prayer-book.\n\nBy the same great _savan_ we are taught that God governs all, not as the\nsoul of the world, but as the Lord and sovereign of all things: that it\nis in consequence of His sovereignty He is called the Lord God, the\nUniversal Emperor--that the word God is relative, and relates itself\nwith slaves--and that the Deity is the dominion or the sovereignty of\nGod, not over his own body, as those think who look upon God as the soul\nof the world, but over slaves--from all which _slavish_ reasoning, a\nplain man who had not been informed it was concocted by Europe's pet\nphilosopher, would infallibly conclude some unfortunate lunatic had\ngiven birth to it. That there is no creature now tenanting Bedlam who\nwould or could scribble purer nonsense about God than this of Newton's,\nwe are well convinced--for how could the most frenzied of brains imagine\nanything more repugnant to every principle of good sense than a\nself-existent, eternal, omnipotent, omnipresent Being, creator of all\nthe worlds, who acts the part of 'universal emperor,' and plays upon an\ninfinitely larger scale, the same sort of game as Nicholas of Russia, or\nMohammed of Egypt, plays upon a small scale. There cannot be slavery\nwhere there is no tyranny, and to say, as Newton did, that we stand in\nthe name relation to a universal God, as a slave does to his earthly\nmaster, is practically to accuse such God, at reason's bar of _tyranny_.\nIf the word God is relative, and relate itself with slaves, it\nincontestably follows that all human beings are slaves, and Deity is by\nsuch reasoners degraded into the character of universal slave-driver.\nReally, theologians and others who declaim so bitterly against\n'blasphemers,' and take such very stringent measures to punish\n'infidels', who speaks or write of their God, should seriously consider\nwhether the worst, that is, the least superstitious of infidel writers,\never penned a paragraph so disparaging to the character of that God they\neffect to adore, as the last quoted paragraph of Newton's.\n\nIf even it could be demonstrated that there is a super-human Being, it\ncannot be proper to clothe Him in the noblest human attributes--still\nless can it be justifiable in pigmies, such as we are, to invest Him\nwith odious attributes belonging only to despots ruling over slaves.\nBesides, how can we imagine a God, who is 'totally destitute of body and\nof corporeal figure,' to have any kind of substance? Earthly emperors we\nknow to be substantial and common-place sort of beings enough, but is it\nnot sheer abuse of reason to argue as though the character of God were\nat all analogous to theirs; or rather, is it not shocking abuse of our\nreasoning facilities to employ them at all about a Being whose\nexistence, if we really have an existence, is perfectly enigmatical, and\nallowed to be so by those very men who pretend to explain its character\nand attributes? We find no less a sage than Newton explicitly declaring\nas incontestible truth, that God exists necessarily--that the same\nnecessity obliges him to exist always and everywhere--that he is all\neyes, all ears, all brains, all arms, all feeling, all intelligence, all\naction--that he exists in a mode by no means corporeal, an yet this same\nsage, in the self-same paragraph, acknowledges God is _totally unknown\nto us_.\n\nNow, we should like to be informed by what _reasonable_ right Newton\ncould pen a long string of 'incontestible truths,' such as are here\nselected from his writings, with respect to a Being of whom, by his own\nconfession, he had not a particle of knowledge. Surely it is not the\npart of a wise man to write about that which is 'totally unknown' to\nhim, and yet that is precisely what Newton did, when he wrote concerning\nGod.\n\nSo much for the Theism of Europe's chief religious philosopher. Turn we\nnow to the Theism of Dr. Samuel Clarke.\n\nHe wrote a book about the being and attributes of God, in which he\nendeavoured to establish, first, that 'something has existed from all\neternity;' second, that 'there has existed from eternity some one\nunchangeable and independent Being;' third, that 'such unchangeable and\nindependent Being, which has existed from all eternity, without any\nexternal cause of its existence, must be necessarily existent;' fourth,\nthat 'what is the substance or essence of that Being, which is\nnecessarily existing, or self-existent, we have no idea--neither is it\npossible for us to comprehend it;' fifth, that 'the self-existent Being\nmust of necessity be eternal as well as infinite and omnipresent;'\nsixth, that 'He must be one, and as he is the self-existent and original\ncause of all things, must be intelligent;' seventh, that 'God is not a\nnecessary agent, but a Being endowed with liberty and choice;' eighth,\nthat 'God is infinite in power, infinite in wisdom, and, as He is\nsupreme cause of all things, must of necessity be a Being infinitely\njust, truthful, and good--thus comprising within himself all such moral\nperfections as becomes the supreme governor and judge of the world.'\n\nThese are the leading dogma contained in Clarke's book--and as they are\ndeemed invincible by a respectable, though not very numerous, section of\nTheists, we will briefly examine the more important important of them.\n\nThe dogma that _something has existed from all eternity_, as already\nshown, is perfectly intelligible, and may defy contradiction--but the\nreal difficulty is to satisfactorily determine _what that something is_.\nMatter exists, and as no one can even imagine its non-existence or\nannihilation, the Materialist infers _that_ must be the eternal\nsomething. Newton as well as Clark thought the everlasting Being\ndestitute of body, and consequently without parts, figure, motion,\ndivisibility, or any other such properties as we find in matter--_ergo_,\nthey did not believe matter to be the eternal something; but if not\nmatter, again we ask, what can it be? Of bodilessness or incorporiety no\none, even among those who say their God is incorporeal, pretend to have\nan idea. Abady insisted that _the question is not what incorporiety is,\nbut whether it be?_ Well, we have no objection to parties taking that\nposition, because there is nothing more easy than to dislodge those who\nthink fit to do so--for this reason: the advocates of nothing, or\nincorporiety, can no more establish by arguments drawn from unquestioned\nfacts, that incorporiety _is_ than they can clearly show _what_ it is.\nIt has always struck the author as remarkable that men should so\nobstinately refuse to admit the possibility of matter's necessary\nexistence, while they readily embrace, not only as possibly, but\ncertainly, true, the paradoxical proposition that a something, having\nnothing in common with anything, is necessarily existent. Matter is\neverywhere around and about us. We ourselves are matter--all our ideas\nare derived _from_ matter--and yet such is the singularly perverse\ncharacter of human intellect that, while resolutely denying the\npossibility of matter's eternity, an immense number of our race embrace\nthe incredible proposition that matter was created in time by a\nnecessarily existing Being, who is without body, parts, passions, or\npositive nature!\n\nThe second dogma informs us that this always-existing Being is\nunchangeable and independent. One unavoidable inference from which is\nthat Deity is itself immoveable, as well as unconnected with the\nuniverse--for a moveable Being must be a changeable Being, by the very\nfact of its motion; while an independent Being must be motiveless, as it\nis evident all motives result from our relationship to things eternal;\nbut an independent Being can have no relations, and consequently must\nact without motives. Now, as no intelligent _human_ action can be\nimagined without necessary precursors in the shape of motives, reasoning\nfrom analogy, it seems impossible that the unchangeable and independent\nBeing, Clarke was so sure must ever have existed, could have created the\nuniverse, seeing he could have had no _motive_ or _inducement_ to create\nit.\n\nThe third dogma may be rated a truism--it being evidently true that a\nthing or Being, which has existed from eternity without any eternal\ncause of its existence, must be self-existent: but of course that dogma\nleaves the disputed question, namely, whether matter, or something _not_\nmatter, is self-existent, just where it found it.\n\nThe fourth dogma is not questioned by Universalists, as they are quite\nconvinced that it is not possible for us to comprehend the substance or\nessence of an immaterial Being.\n\nThe other dogmas we need not enlarge upon, as they are little more than\nrepetition or expansion of the preceding one. Indeed, much of the\nforegoing would be superfluous, were it not that it serves to\nillustrate, so completely and clearly theistical absurdities. The only\ndogma worth overturning, of the eight here noticed, is the _first_, for\nif that fall, the rest must fall with it. If, for example, the reader is\nconvinced that it is more probable matter is mutable as regards _form_\nbut eternal as regards _essence_, than that it was willed into existence\nby a Being said to be eternal and immutable, he at once becomes a\nUniversalist--for if matter always was, no Being could have been before\nit, nor can any exist after it. It is because men in general are shocked\nat the idea of matter without beginning and without end, that they do\nreadily embrace the idea of a God, forgetting that if the idea of\neternal matter shock our sense of the _probable_, the idea of an eternal\nBeing who existed _before_ matter, _if well considered_, is sufficient\nto shock all sense of the _possible_.\n\nThe man who is contented with the universe, who stops at _that_ has at\nleast the satisfaction of dealing with something tangible--but he who\ndon't find the universe large enough for him to expatiate in, and whirls\nhis brains into a belief that there is a necessarily existing something\nbeyond the limits of a world _unlimited_, is in a mental condition no\nreasonable man need envy.\n\nOf the universe, or at least so much of it as our senses have been\noperated upon by, we have conceptions clear, vivid, and distinct; but\nwhen Dr. Clarke tell us of an intelligent Being, not _part_ but\n_creator_ of that universe, we can form no clear, vivid, distinct, or,\nin point of fact, _any_ conception of such Being. When he explains that\nit is infinite and omnipresent, like poor Paddy's famed ale, the\nexplanation 'thickens as it clears;' for being ourselves _finite_, and\nnecessarily present on one small spot of our very small planet, the\nwords _infinite_ and _omnipresent_ do not suggest to us either positive\nor practical ideas--of course, therefore, we have neither positive nor\npractical ideas of an infinite and omnipresent Being.\n\nWe can as easily understand that the universe ever did exist, as we now\nunderstand that it does exist--but we cannot conceive its absence for\nthe millionth part of an instant--and really it puzzles one to conceive\nwhat those people can be dreaming of who talk as familiarly about the\nextinction of a universe as the chemist does of extinguishing the flame\nof his spirit-lamp. The unsatisfactory character of all speculations\nhaving for their object 'nonentities with formidable names,' should long\nere this have opened men's eyes to the folly of _multiplying causes\nwithout necessity_--another rule of philosophising, for which we are\nindebted to Newton, but to which no superstitious philosophiser pays due\nattention. Newton himself in his theistical character, wrote and talked\nas though most blissfully ignorant of that rule.\n\nThe passages given above from his 'Principia' palpably violate it. But\nTheists, however learned, pay little regard to any rules of\nphilosophising, which put in peril their fundamental crotchet.\n\nA distinguished modern Fabulist [38:1] has introduced to us a\nphilosophical mouse who praised beneficent Deity because of his great\nregard for mice: for one half of us, quoth he, received the gift of\nwings, so that if they who have none, should by cats happen to be\nexterminated, how easily could our 'Heavenly Father,' out of the bats\nre-establish our exterminated species.\n\nVoltaire had no objection to fable if it were symbolic of truth; and\nhere is fable, which, according to its author, is symbolic of the little\nregarded truth, that our pride rests mainly on our ignorance, for, as he\nsagely says, 'the good mouse knew not that there are also winged cats.'\nIf she had her speculations concerning the beneficence of Deity would\nhave been less orthodox, mayhap, but decidedly more rational. The wisdom\nof this pious mouse is very similar to that of the Theologian who knew\nnot how sufficiently to admire God's goodness in causing large rivers\nalmost always to flow in the neighbourhood of large towns.\n\nTo jump at conclusions on no other authority than their own ignorant\nassumption, and to Deify errors on no other authority than their own\nheated imagination, has in all ages been the practice of Theologians. Of\nthat practice they are proud, as was the mouse of our Fabulist. Clothed\nin no other panoply than their own conceits they deem themselves\ninvulnerable. While uttering the wildest incoherencies their\nself-complacency remains undisturbed. They remind one of that ambitious\ncrow who, thinking more highly of himself than was quite proper,\nstrutted so proudly about with the Peacock's feathers in which he had\nbedecked himself.--Like him, they plume themselves upon their own\negregious folly, and like him should get well _plucked_ for their pains.\n\nLet any one patiently examine their much talked of argument from design,\nand he will be satisfied that these are no idle charges. That argument\nhas for its ground-work beggarly assumption, and for its main pillar,\nreasoning no less beggarly. Nature must have had a cause, because it\nevidently is an effect. The cause of Nature must have been one God,\nbecause two Gods, or two million Gods, could not have agreed to cause\nit. That cause must be omnipotent, wise, and good, because all things\nare double one against another, and He has left nothing imperfect. Men\nmake watches, build ships or houses, out of pre-existing metals, wood,\nhemp, bricks, mortar, and other materials, therefore God made nature out\nof no material at all. Unassisted nature cannot produce the phenomena we\nbehold, therefore such phenomena clearly prove there is something\nunnatural. Not to believe in a God who designed Nature, is to close both\nears and eyes against evidence, therefore Universalists are wilfully\ndeaf and obstinately blind.\n\nThese are samples of the flimsy stuff, our teachers of what nobody\nknows, would palm upon us as demonstration of the Being and Attributes\nof God.\n\nBy artfully taking for granted what no Universalist can admit, and\nassuming cases altogether dissimilar to be perfectly analogous, our\nnatural theologians find no difficulty in proving that God is, was, and\never will be; that after contemplating His own perfections, a period\nsufficiently long for 'eternity to begin and end in,' He said, let there\nbe matter, and there was matter; that with Him all things are possible,\nand He, of course, might easily have kept, as well as made, man upright\nand happy, but could not consistently with his own wisdom, or with due\nregard to his own glorification. Wise in their generation, these 'blind\nleaders of the blind' ascribe to this Deity of their own invention\npowers impossible, acts inconceivable, and qualities incompatible; thus\nerecting doctrinal systems on no sounder basis than their own ignorance;\ndeifying their own monstrous errors, and filling the earth with misery,\nmadness, and crime.\n\nThe writer who declared theology _ignorance of natural causes reduced to\nsystem_, did not strike wide of the true mark. It is plain that the\nargument from design, so vastly favoured by theologians, amounts to\nneither more nor less than ignorance of natural causes reduced to\nsystem. An argument to be sound must be soundly premised. But here is an\nargument whose primary premise is a false premise--a mere begging of the\nvery question in dispute. Did Universalists _admit_ the universe was\ncontrived, designed, or adapted, they could not _deny_ there must have\nbeen at least one Being to contrive, design, or adapt; but they see no\nanalogy between a watch made with hands out of something, and a universe\nmade without hands out of nothing. Universalists are unable to perceive\nthe least resemblance between the circumstance of one intelligent body\nre-forming or changing the condition of some other body, intelligent or\nnon-intelligent, and the circumstance of a bodiless Being creating all\nbodies; of a partless Being acting upon all parts; and of a passionless\nBeing generating and regulating all passions. Universalists consider the\ngeneral course of nature, though strangely unheeded, does proclaim with\n'most miraculous organ,' that dogmatisers about any such 'figment of\nimagination' would, in a rational community, be viewed with the same\nfeelings of compassion, which, even in these irrational days, are\nexhibited towards confirmed lunatics.\n\nThe author, while passing an evening with some pleasant people in\nAshton-under-Lyne, heard one of them relate that before the schoolmaster\nhad made much progress in that _devil-dusted_ neighbourhood, a labouring\nman walking out one fine night, saw on the ground a watch, whose ticking\nwas distinctly audible; but never before having seen anything of the\nkind, he thought it a living creature, and full of fear ran back among\nhis neighbours, exclaiming that he had seen a most marvellous thing, for\nwhich he could conceive of no better name than CLICKMITOAD. After\nrecovering from their surprise and terror, this 'bold peasant' and his\nneighbours, all armed with pokers and other formidable weapons, crept up\nto the ill-starred ticker, and smashed it to pieces.\n\nThe moral of this anecdote is no mystery. Our clickmitoadist had never\nseen watches, knew nothing about watches, and hearing as well as seeing\none for the first time, naturally judged it must be an animal. Readers\nwho may feel inclined to laugh at his simplicity, should ask themselves\nwhether, if accustomed to see watches growing upon watch trees, they\nwould feel more astonished than they usually do when observing crystals\nin process of formation, or cocoa-nuts growing upon cocoa-nut trees; and\nif as inexperienced with respect to watches, or works of art, more or\nless analogous to watches, they would not under his circumstances have\nacted very much as he did.\n\nSupposing, however, that theologians were to succeed in establishing an\nanalogy between 'the contrivances of human art and the various\nexistences of the universe,' is it not evident that Spinoza's axiom--of\nthings which having nothing in common one cannot be the cause of the\nothers--is incompatible with belief in the Deity of our Thirty-Nine\nArticles, or, indeed, belief in _any_ unnatural Designer or Causer of\nMaterial Nature. Only existence can have anything in common with\nexistence.\n\nNow, an existence, properly so called, must have at least two\nattributes, and whatever exhibits two or more attributes is matter. The\ntwo attributes necessary to existence are solidity and extension. Take\nfrom matter these attributes and matter itself vanishes. That fact was\nspecially testified to by Priestley, who acknowledged the primary truths\nof Materialism though averse to the legitimate consequences flowing from\ntheir recognition.\n\nAccording to this argument, nothing exists which has not solidity and\nextension, and nothing is extended and solid but matter, which in one\nstate forms a crystal, in another a blade of grass, in a third a\nbutterfly, and in other states other forms. The _essence_ of grass, or\nthe _essence_ of crystal, in other words, those native energies of their\nseveral forms constituting and keeping them what they are, can no more\nbe explained than can the _essentiality_ of _human_ nature.\n\nBut the Universalist, because he finds it impossible to explain the\naction of matter, because unable to state why it exhibits such vast and\nvarious energies as it is seen to exhibit, is none the less assured it\n_naturally_ and therefore _necessarily_ acts thus energetically. No\nUniversalist pretends to understand how bread nourishes his frame, but\nof the _fact_ that bread does nourish it he is well assured. He\nunderstands not how or why two beings should, by conjunction, give\nvitality to a third being more or less analogous to themselves, but the\n_fact_ stares him in the face.\n\nOur 'sophists in surplices,' who can no otherwise bolster up their\nsupernatural system than by outraging all such rules of philosophising\nas forbid us to choose the greater of two difficulties, or to multiply\ncauses without necessity, are precisely the men to explain everything.\nBut unfortunately their explanations do, for the most part, stand more\nin need of explanation than the thing explained. Thus, they explain the\norigin of matter by reference to an occult, immense, and immensely\nmysterious phantasm without body, parts or passions, who sees though not\nto be seen, hears though not to be heard, feels though not to be felt,\nmoves though not to be moved, knows though not to be known, and, in\nshort, does everything, though not to be _done_ by anything. Well might\nGodwin say _the rage of accounting for what is obviously unaccountable,\nso common among philosophers of this stamp, has brought philosophy\nitself into discredit_.\n\nThere is an argument against the notion of a Supernatural Causer which\nthe author does not remember to have met with, but which he considers an\nargument of great force--it is this. Cause means change, and as there\nmanifestly could not be change before there was anything to change, to\nconceive the universe caused is impossible.\n\nThat the sense here attached to the word cause is not a novel one every\nreader knows who has seen an elaborate and ably written article by Mr.\nG.H. Lewes, on 'Spinoza's Life and Works,' where effect is defined as\ncause realised; the _natura naturans_ conceived as _natura naturata_;\nand cause or causation is define as simply change. When, says Mr. Lewes,\nthe change is completed, we name the result effect. It is only a matter\nof naming.\n\nThese definitions conceded accurate, the conclusion that neither cause\nnor effect _exist_, seems inevitable, for change of being is not being\nitself any more than attraction is the thing attracted. One might as\nphilosophically erect attraction into reality and fall down and worship\n_it_ as change which is in very truth a mere \"matter of naming.\" Not so\nthe things changing or changed; _they_ are real, the prolific parent of\nall appearance we behold, of all sensation we experience, of all ideas\nwe receive, in short, of all causes and of all effects, which causes and\neffects, as shown by Mr. Lewis, are merely notional, for \"we call the\nantecedent cause, and the sequent effect; but these are merely relative\nconceptions; the sequence itself is antecedent to some subsequent\nchange, and the former antecedent was once only a sequent to its cause,\nand so on.\"\n\nAncient Simonides, when asked by Dionysius to explain the nature of\nDeity, demanded a day to \"see about it,\" then an additional two days,\nand then four days more, thus wisely intimating to his silly pupil, that\nthe more men think about Gods, the less competent they are to give any\nrational account of them.\n\nCicero was sensible and candid enough to acknowledge that he found it\nmuch easier to say what God was not, than what he was. Like Simonides,\nhe was _mere_ Pagan, and like him, arguing from the known course of\nnature, was unable, with all his mastery of talk, to convey positive\nideas of Deity. But how should he convey to others what he did not,\ncould not, himself possess? To him no revolution had been vouchsafed,\nand though my Lord Brougham is quite sure, without the proof of natural\nTheology, revelation has no other basis than mere tradition; we have\neven better authority than his Lordship's for the staggering fact that\nnatural Theology, without the prop of revelation, is a 'rhapsody of\nwords,' mere jargon, analogous to the tale told by an idiot, so happily\ndescribed by our great poet as 'full of sound and fury, signifying\nnothing.' We have a Rev. Hugh M'Neil 'convinced that, from external\ncreation, no right conclusion can be drawn concerning the _moral_\ncharacter of God,' and that 'creation is too deeply and disastrously\nblotted in consequence of man's sin, to admit of any satisfactory result\nfrom an adequate contemplation of nature.' [42:1] We have a Gillespie\nsetting aside the Design Argument, on the ground that the reasonings by\nwhich it is supported are 'inapt' to show such attributes as infinity,\nomnipresence, free agency, omnipotency, eternality, or unity,' belong in\nany way to God. On this latter attribute he specially enlarges, and\nafter allowing the contrivances we observe in nature, may establish a\nunity of _counsel_, desires to be told how they can establish a unity of\n_substance_. [42:2] We have Dr. Chalmors and Bishop Watson, whose\ncapacities were not the meanest, contending that there is no natural\nproof of a God, and that we must trust solely to revelation. [42:3] We\nhave the Rev. Mr. Faber in his 'Difficulties of Infidelity' boldly\naffirming that no one ever did, or ever will 'prove without the aid of\nrevelation, that the universe was designed by a _single_ designer.'\nObviously, then, there is a division in the religious camp with respect\nto the sufficiency of natural Theology, unhelped by revelation. By three\nof the four Christian authors just quoted, the design argument is\ntreated with contempt. Faber says, 'evident design must needs imply a\ndesigner,' and that 'evident design shines out in every part of the\nuniverse.' But he also tells us 'we reason exclusively, if with the\nDeist we thence infer the existence of one and only one Supreme\nDesigner.' By Gillespie and M'Neil, the same truth is told in other\nwords. By Chalmers and Watson we are assured that, natural proof of a\nGod there is none, and our trust must be placed solely in revelation;\nwhile Brougham, another Immense Being worshipper, declares that\nrevelation derives its chief support from natural Theology, without\nwhich it has 'no other basis than vague tradition.'\n\nNow, Universalists agree with Lord Brougham as to the traditionary basis\nof Scripture; and as they also agree with Chalmers and Watson with\nrespect to there being no natural proof of a God, they stand acquitted\nto their own consciences of 'wilful deafness' and 'obstinate blindness,'\nin rejecting as inadequate the evidence that 'God is,' drawn either from\nNature, Revelation, or both.\n\nIt was long a Protestant custom to taunt Roman Catholics with being\ndivided among themselves as regards topics vitally important, and to\ndraw from the fact of such division an argument for making Scripture the\nonly 'rule of faith and manners.' Chillingworth said, _there are Popes\nagainst Popes, councils against councils, some fathers against others,\nthe same fathers against themselves--a consent of fathers of one age\nagainst a consent of fathers of another age, the church of one age\nagainst the church of another age. Traditive interpretations of\nScripture are pretended, but there are few or none to be found. No\ntradition but only of Scripture can derive itself from the fountain, but\nmay be plainly proved, either to have been brought in in such an age\nafter Christ, or that in such an age it was not in. In a word, there is\nno sufficient certainty but of Scripture only for any considering man to\nbuild on_. [43:1] And after reading this should 'any considering man'\nbe anxious to know something about the Scripture on which alone he is to\nbuild, he cannot do better than dip into Dr. Watt's book on the right\nuse of Reason, where we are told _every learned (Scripture) critic has\nhis own hypothesis, and if the common text be not favourable to his\nviews a various lection shall be made authentic. The text must be\nsupposed to be defective or redundant, and the sense of it shall be\nliteral or metaphorical according as it best supports his own scheme.\nWhole chapters or books shall be added or left out of the sacred canon,\nor be turned into parables by this influence. Luther knew not well how\nto reconcile the epistle of St. James to the doctrine of justification\nby faith alone, and so he could not allow it to be divine. The Papists\nbring all their Apocrypha into their Bible, and stamp divinity upon it,\nfor they can fancy purgatory is there, and they find prayers for the\ndead. But they leave out the second commandment because it forbids the\nworship of images. Others suppose the Mosaic history of the creation,\nand the full of man, to be oriental ornaments, or a mere allegory,\nbecause the literal sense of those three chapters of Genesis do not\nagree with their theories._\n\nThese remarks are certainly not calculated to make 'considering men' put\ntheir trust in Scripture. Coming from a Protestant Divine of such high\ntalent and learning, they may rather be expected to breed in\n'considering men' very unorthodox opinions as well of the authenticity\nas the genuineness of _both_ Testaments, and a strong suspicion that\nChillingworth was joking when he talked about their \"sufficient\ncertainty.\" The author has searched Scripture in vain for 'sufficient\ncertainty,' with respect to the long catalogue of religious beliefs\nwhich agitate and distract society. Laying claim to the character of a\n'considering man,' he requires that Scripture to be proved the word of a\nGod before appealed to, as His Revelation; a feat no man has yet\naccomplished. Priests, the cleverest, most industrious, and least\nscrupulous, have tried their hands at the pious work, but all have\nfailed. Notwithstanding the mighty labours of our Lardner's and\nTillemont's and Mosheim's, no case is made out for the divinity of\neither the Old or New Testament. 'Infidels' have shown the monstrous\nabsurdity of supposing that any one book has an atom more divinity about\nit than any other book. These 'brutes' have completely succeeded in\nproving that Christianity is a superstition no less absurd than\nMohammedanism, and to the full as mischievous.\n\nChristian practice is after all, the best answer to Christian theory.\nMen who think wisely, do not, it is true, always act wisely; but\ngenerally speaking, the moral, like the physical tree, is known by its\nfruit, and bitter, most bitter, is the fruit of that moral tree, the\nfollowers of Jesus planted. Notwithstanding their talk about the pure\nand benign influence of their religion, an opinion is fast gaining\nground, that Bishop Kidder was right, when he said, _were a wise man to\njudge of religion by the lives of its professors, perhaps, Christianity\nis the last he would choose_.\n\nHe who agrees with Milton that\n\n          To know what every day before us lies\n          Is the prime wisdom,\n\nwill in all likelihood not object to cast his eyes around and about him,\nwhere proofs of modern priestly selfishness are in wonderful abundance.\nBy way of example may be cited the cases of those right reverend Fathers\nin God the Bishops of London and Chester, prelates high in the church;\ndisposers of enormous wealth with influence almost incalculable; the\nformer more especially. And how stand they affected towards the poor? By\nreference to the _Times_ newspaper of September 27th, 1845, it will be\nseen that those very influential and wealthy Bishops are supporters _en\nchef_ of a Reformed Poor Law,' the virtual principle of which is 'to\nreduce the condition of those whose necessities oblige them to apply for\nrelief, below that of the labourer of the _lowest class_.' A Reformed\nPoor Law, having for its 'object,' yes reader, its object, the\nrestoration of the pauper to a position below that of the independent\nlabourer.' This is their 'standard' of reference, by rigid attention to\nwhich they hope to fully carry out their 'vital principle,' and thus\nbring to a satisfactory conclusion the great work of placing 'the pauper\nin a worse condition than the 'independent labourer.' It appears, from\nthe same journal, that in reply to complaints against their dietary, the\nCommissioners appointed to work the Reformed Poor Law, consider that\ntwenty-one ounces of food daily 'is more than the hard working labourer\nwith a family could accomplish for himself by his own exertions.' This,\nobserves a writer in the _Times_, being the Commissioners' reading of\ntheir own 'standard,' it may be considered superfluous to refer to any\nother authority; but, as the Royal Agricultural Society of England have\nclubbed their general information on this subject in a compilation from\na selection of essays submitted to them, we are bound to refer to such\nwitnesses who give the most precise information on the actual condition\nof the _independent labourer_, with minute instructions for his general\nguidance, and the economical expenditure of his income. 'He should,'\nthey say, 'toil early and late' to make himself 'perfect' in his\ncalling. 'He should _pinch and screw_ the family, even in the _commonest\nnecessaries_,' until he gets 'a week's wages to the fore.' He should\ndrink in his work 'water mixed with some powdered ginger,' which warms\nthe stomach, and is 'extremely cheap.' He should remember that 'from\nthree to four pounds of potatoes are equal in point of nourishment to a\npound of the best wheaten bread, besides having the great advantage of\n_filling_ the stomach. He is told that 'a lot of bones may always be got\nfrom the butchers for 2d., and they are never scraped so clean as not to\nhave some scraps of meat adhering to them.' He is instructed to boil\nthese two penny worth of bones, for the first day's family dinner, until\nthe liquor 'tastes something like broth.' For the _second_ day, the\nbones are to be again boiled in the same manner, but for a _longer_\ntime. Nor is this all, they say 'that the bones, if again boiled for a\n_still longer_ time, will _once more_ yield a nourishing broth, which\nmay be made into pea soup.'\n\nThis is the system and this is the schoolmastership expressly sanctioned\nby the Bishops of London and Chester. In piety nevertheless those\nprelates are not found wanting. They may starve the bodies but no one\ncan charge them with neglecting the souls of our 'independent\nlabourers.' Nothing can exceed their anxiety to feed and clothe the\nspiritually destitute. They raise their mitred fronts, even in palaces,\nto proclaim and lament over the spiritual destitution which so\nextensively prevails--but they seldom condescend to notice _physical_\ndestitution. When the cry of famine rings throughout the land they\ncoolly recommend rapid church extension, thus literally offering stones\nto those who ask them for bread. To got the substantial and give the\nspiritual is their practical Christianity. To spiritualise the poor into\ncontentment with the 'nourishing broth' from thrice boiled bones, and to\ndie of hunger rather than demand relief, are their darling objects.\n\nDid Universalists thus act, did they perpetrate, connive at, or tolerate\nsuch atrocities as were brought to light during the Andover inquiry,\nsuch cold blooded heartlessness would at once be laid to the account of\ntheir principles. Oh yes, Christians are forward to judge of every tree\nby its fruit, except the tree called Christianity.\n\nThe vices of the universalist they ascribe to his creed. The vices of\nthe Christian to anything but his creed. Let professors of Christianity\nbe convicted of gross criminality, and lo its apologists say such\nprofessors are not Christian. Let fanatical Christians commit excesses\nwhich admit not of open justification, and the apologist of Christianity\ncoolly assures us such conduct is _mere rust on the body of his\nreligion--moss which grows on the stock of his piety._\n\nFrom age to age the wisest among men have abhorred and denounced\nsuperstition. It is true that only a small section of them treated\nreligion as if _necessarily_ superstition, or went quite as far as John\nAdams, who said, _this would be the best of all possible worlds if there\nwere no religion in it_. But an attentive reading of ancient and modern\nphilosophical books has satisfied the author that through all recorded\ntime, religion has been _tolerated_ rather than _loved_ by great\nthinkers, who had _will_, but not _power_ to wage successful war upon\nit. Gibbon speaks of Pagan priests who, 'under sacerdotal robes,\nconcealed the heart of an Atheist.' Now, these priests were also the\nphilosophers of Rome, and it is not impossible that some modern\nphilosophical priests, like their Pagan prototypes, secretly despise the\nreligion they openly profess. Avarice, and lust of power, are potent\nunderminers of human virtue. The mighty genius of Bacon was not proof\nagainst then, and he who deserves to occupy a place among 'the wisest\nand greatest' has been 'damned to eternal fame' as the 'meanest of\nmankind.'\n\nNor are avarice and lust of power the only base passions under the\ninfluence of which men, great in intellect, have given the lie to their\nown convictions, by calling that religion which they knew to be rank\nsuperstition. Fear of punishment for writing truth is the grand cause\nwhy their books contain so little of it. If Bacon had openly treated\nChristianity as mere superstition, will any one say that his life would\nhave been worth twenty-four hours' purchase?\n\nThere is an old story about a certain lady who said to her physician,\n'Doctor, what is your religion?' My religion, madame, replied the\nDoctor, 'is the religion of all sensible men.' 'What kind of religion is\nthat?' said the lady. 'The religion, madame,' quoth the Doctor, 'that no\nsensible man will tell.'\n\nThis doctor may be given as a type of the class of shrewd people who\ndespise superstition, but will say nothing about it, lest by so doing\nthey give a shock to prejudice, and thus put in peril certain\nprofessional or other emoluments. Too sensible to be pious, and too\ncautious to be honest, they must be extremely well paid ere they will\nincur the risk attendant upon a confession of anti-superstitious faith.\n\nAnimated by a vile spirit of accommodation, their whole sum of practical\nwisdom can be told in four words--BE SILENT AND SAFE. They are amazed at\nthe 'folly' of these who make sacrifices at the shrine of sincerity; and\nwhile sagacious enough to perceive that superstition is a clumsy\npolitical contrivance, are not wanting in the prudence which dictates at\nleast a _seeming_ conformity to prevailing prejudices.\n\nNone have done more to perpetrate error than these time-serving 'men of\nthe world,' for instead of boldly attacking it, they preserve a prudent\nsilence which bigots do not fail to interpret as consent. Mosheim says,\n[47:1] 'The simplicity and ignorance of the generality in those times\n(fifth century) furnished the most favourable occasion for the exercise\nof fraud; and the impudence of impostors, in contriving false miracles,\nwas artfully proportioned to the credulity of the vulgar, while the\nsagacious and the wise, who perceived these cheats, were overawed into\nsilence by the dangers that threatened their lives and fortunes, if they\nshould expose the artifice. Thus,' continues this author, 'does it\ngenerally happen, when danger attends the discovery and the profession\nof truth, the prudent are _silent_, the multitude _believe_, and\nimpostors _triumph_.'\n\nBeausobre, too, in his learned account of Manicheism reads a severe\nlesson to those who, under the influence of such passions as _fear_ and\n_avarice_, will do nothing to check the march of superstition, or\nrelieve their less 'sensible,' but more honest, fellow-creatures from\nthe weight of its fetters. After alluding to an epistle written by that\n'demi-philosopher,' Synesius, when offered by the Patriarch the\nBishopric of Ptolemais, [48:1] Beausobre says, 'We see in the history\nthat I have related a kind of hypocrisy, which, perhaps, has been far\ntoo common in all times. It is that of ecclesiastics, who not only do\nnot say what they think, but the reverse of what they think.\nPhilosophers in their closet, when out of them they are content with\nfables, though they know well they are fables. They do more; they\ndeliver to the executioner the excellent men who have said it. How many\nAtheists and profane persons have brought holy men to the stake under\nthe pretext of heresy? Every day, hypocrites consecrate the host and\ncause it to be adored, although firmly convinced as I am that it is\nnothing more than a piece of bread.'\n\nWhatever may be urged in defence of such execrable duplicity, there can\nbe no question as to its anti-progressive tendency. The majority of men\nare fools, and if such 'sensible' politicians as our Doctor and the\ndouble doctrinising ecclesiastics, for whose portraits we are indebted\nto Mosheim and Beausobre, shall have the teaching of them, fools they\nare sure to remain. Men who dare not be 'mentally faithful' to\nthemselves may obstruct, but cannot advance, the interests of truth. In\nlegislation, in law, in all the relations of life, we want honesty _not_\npiety. There is plenty of piety, and to spare, but of honesty--sterling,\nbold, uncompromising honesty--even the best regulated societies can\nboast a very small stock. The men best qualified to raise the veil under\nwhich truth lies concealed from vulgar gaze, are precisely the men who\nfear to do it. Oh, shame upon ye self-styled philosophers, who in your\nclosets laugh at 'our holy religion,' and in your churches do it\nreverence. Were your bosoms warmed by one spark of generous wisdom,\n_silence_ on the question of religion would be broken, the multitude\ncease to _believe_, and imposters to _triumph_.\n\n\n\n\n\n          London: Printed by Edward Truelove, 240, Strand.\n\n\n\n\n\n[ENDNOTES]\n\n\n[4:1] 25th November, 1845.\n\n[4:2] Vide 'Times' Commissioner's Letter on the Condition of Ireland,\nNovember 28, 1845.\n\n[8:1] 'Essay on Providence and a Future State.'\n\n[9:1] Essay of the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy. [9:2] Critical\nremarks on Lord Brougham's 'Lives of Men of Letters and Science, who\nflourished in the time of George III.'--The _Times_, Wednesday, October\n1, 1845.\n\n[10:1] History of American Savages.\n\n[11:1] Appendix the Second to 'Plutarchus and Theophrastus on\nSuperstition.'\n\n[11:2] Philosophy of History.\n\n[12:1] See a Notice of Lord Brougham's Political Philosophy, in the\nnumber for April, 1845.\n\n[15:1] 'Apology for the Bible,' page 133.\n\n[15:2] Unusquisque vestrum non cogitat prius se debere Deos nosse quam\ncolere.\n\n[20:1] See a curious 'Essay on Nature,' Printed for Badcock and Co., 2,\nQueen's Head Passage, Paternoster Row. 1807.\n\n[23:1] Elements of Materialism, chapter 1.\n\n[24:1] Discussion on the Existence of God, between Origen Bachelor and\nRobert Dale Owen.\n\n[29:1] Hume's Treastise on Human Nature.\n\n[29:2] This sexing is a stock receipt for mystification.--_Colonel\nThompson._\n\n[30:1] The Rev. J.K. Smith.\n\n[31:1] 'An Address on Cerebral Physiology and Materialism,' delivered to\nthe Phrenological Association In London, June 20, 1842.\n\n[33:1] Principia Mathematica, p. 528, Lond. edit., 1720.\n\n[38:1] Lessing.\n\n[42:1] Lecture by the Rev. Hugh M'Neil, Minister of St. Jude's Church,\nLiverpool, delivered about seven years since, in presence of some 400 of\nthe Irish Protestant Clergy.\n\n[42:2] The necessary existence of Deity, by William Gillespie.\n\n[42:3] Page 106 of a Discussion on the Existence of God, between Origen\nBatchelor and R.D. Owen.\n\n[43:1] Quoted by Dr. Samuel Clarke, in his introduction to the Scripture\nDoctrine of the Trinity.\n\n[47:1] Ecclesiastical History, vol. ii, page 11.\n\n[48:1] Manicheisme, tome ii, p. 568.","title":"Superstition unveiled","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":21616}