{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_1584/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_1584","id":"gutenberg_1584","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1584","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Classics of Literature","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Classical literature","Courage -- Early works to 1800","Socrates, 470 BC-399 BC"],"text":"Produced by Sue Asscher\n\n\n\n\n\nLACHES\n\nOR COURAGE\n\nBy Plato\n\nTranslated by Benjamin Jowett\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION.\n\nLysimachus, the son of Aristides the Just, and Melesias, the son of\nthe elder Thucydides, two aged men who live together, are desirous of\neducating their sons in the best manner. Their own education, as often\nhappens with the sons of great men, has been neglected; and they are\nresolved that their children shall have more care taken of them, than\nthey received themselves at the hands of their fathers.\n\nAt their request, Nicias and Laches have accompanied them to see a man\nnamed Stesilaus fighting in heavy armour. The two fathers ask the two\ngenerals what they think of this exhibition, and whether they would\nadvise that their sons should acquire the accomplishment. Nicias and\nLaches are quite willing to give their opinion; but they suggest that\nSocrates should be invited to take part in the consultation. He is a\nstranger to Lysimachus, but is afterwards recognised as the son of his\nold friend Sophroniscus, with whom he never had a difference to the\nhour of his death. Socrates is also known to Nicias, to whom he had\nintroduced the excellent Damon, musician and sophist, as a tutor for his\nson, and to Laches, who had witnessed his heroic behaviour at the battle\nof Delium (compare Symp.).\n\nSocrates, as he is younger than either Nicias or Laches, prefers to\nwait until they have delivered their opinions, which they give in a\ncharacteristic manner. Nicias, the tactician, is very much in favour of\nthe new art, which he describes as the gymnastics of war--useful when\nthe ranks are formed, and still more useful when they are broken;\ncreating a general interest in military studies, and greatly adding to\nthe appearance of the soldier in the field. Laches, the blunt warrior,\nis of opinion that such an art is not knowledge, and cannot be of any\nvalue, because the Lacedaemonians, those great masters of arms, neglect\nit. His own experience in actual service has taught him that these\npretenders are useless and ridiculous. This man Stesilaus has been seen\nby him on board ship making a very sorry exhibition of himself. The\npossession of the art will make the coward rash, and subject the\ncourageous, if he chance to make a slip, to invidious remarks. And now\nlet Socrates be taken into counsel. As they differ he must decide.\n\nSocrates would rather not decide the question by a plurality of votes:\nin such a serious matter as the education of a friend's children, he\nwould consult the one skilled person who has had masters, and has works\nto show as evidences of his skill. This is not himself; for he has never\nbeen able to pay the sophists for instructing him, and has never had\nthe wit to do or discover anything. But Nicias and Laches are older\nand richer than he is: they have had teachers, and perhaps have made\ndiscoveries; and he would have trusted them entirely, if they had not\nbeen diametrically opposed.\n\nLysimachus here proposes to resign the argument into the hands of the\nyounger part of the company, as he is old, and has a bad memory. He\nearnestly requests Socrates to remain;--in this showing, as Nicias says,\nhow little he knows the man, who will certainly not go away until he\nhas cross-examined the company about their past lives. Nicias has often\nsubmitted to this process; and Laches is quite willing to learn from\nSocrates, because his actions, in the true Dorian mode, correspond to\nhis words.\n\nSocrates proceeds: We might ask who are our teachers? But a better and\nmore thorough way of examining the question will be to ask, 'What is\nVirtue?'--or rather, to restrict the enquiry to that part of virtue\nwhich is concerned with the use of weapons--'What is Courage?' Laches\nthinks that he knows this: (1) 'He is courageous who remains at his\npost.' But some nations fight flying, after the manner of Aeneas in\nHomer; or as the heavy-armed Spartans also did at the battle of Plataea.\n(2) Socrates wants a more general definition, not only of military\ncourage, but of courage of all sorts, tried both amid pleasures and\npains. Laches replies that this universal courage is endurance.\nBut courage is a good thing, and mere endurance may be hurtful and\ninjurious. Therefore (3) the element of intelligence must be added. But\nthen again unintelligent endurance may often be more courageous than\nthe intelligent, the bad than the good. How is this contradiction to be\nsolved? Socrates and Laches are not set 'to the Dorian mode' of words\nand actions; for their words are all confusion, although their actions\nare courageous. Still they must 'endure' in an argument about endurance.\nLaches is very willing, and is quite sure that he knows what courage is,\nif he could only tell.\n\nNicias is now appealed to; and in reply he offers a definition which\nhe has heard from Socrates himself, to the effect that (1) 'Courage is\nintelligence.' Laches derides this; and Socrates enquires, 'What sort\nof intelligence?' to which Nicias replies, 'Intelligence of things\nterrible.' 'But every man knows the things to be dreaded in his own\nart.' 'No they do not. They may predict results, but cannot tell whether\nthey are really terrible; only the courageous man can tell that.' Laches\ndraws the inference that the courageous man is either a soothsayer or a\ngod.\n\nAgain, (2) in Nicias' way of speaking, the term 'courageous' must be\ndenied to animals or children, because they do not know the danger.\nAgainst this inversion of the ordinary use of language Laches reclaims,\nbut is in some degree mollified by a compliment to his own courage.\nStill, he does not like to see an Athenian statesman and general\ndescending to sophistries of this sort. Socrates resumes the argument.\nCourage has been defined to be intelligence or knowledge of the\nterrible; and courage is not all virtue, but only one of the virtues.\nThe terrible is in the future, and therefore the knowledge of the\nterrible is a knowledge of the future. But there can be no knowledge of\nfuture good or evil separated from a knowledge of the good and evil\nof the past or present; that is to say, of all good and evil. Courage,\ntherefore, is the knowledge of good and evil generally. But he who has\nthe knowledge of good and evil generally, must not only have courage,\nbut also temperance, justice, and every other virtue. Thus, a single\nvirtue would be the same as all virtues (compare Protagoras). And after\nall the two generals, and Socrates, the hero of Delium, are still in\nignorance of the nature of courage. They must go to school again, boys,\nold men and all.\n\nSome points of resemblance, and some points of difference, appear in\nthe Laches when compared with the Charmides and Lysis. There is less\nof poetical and simple beauty, and more of dramatic interest and power.\nThey are richer in the externals of the scene; the Laches has more play\nand development of character. In the Lysis and Charmides the youths are\nthe central figures, and frequent allusions are made to the place of\nmeeting, which is a palaestra. Here the place of meeting, which is also\na palaestra, is quite forgotten, and the boys play a subordinate part.\nThe seance is of old and elder men, of whom Socrates is the youngest.\n\nFirst is the aged Lysimachus, who may be compared with Cephalus in the\nRepublic, and, like him, withdraws from the argument. Melesias, who is\nonly his shadow, also subsides into silence. Both of them, by their\nown confession, have been ill-educated, as is further shown by the\ncircumstance that Lysimachus, the friend of Sophroniscus, has never\nheard of the fame of Socrates, his son; they belong to different\ncircles. In the Meno their want of education in all but the arts of\nriding and wrestling is adduced as a proof that virtue cannot be taught.\nThe recognition of Socrates by Lysimachus is extremely graceful; and his\nmilitary exploits naturally connect him with the two generals, of\nwhom one has witnessed them. The characters of Nicias and Laches are\nindicated by their opinions on the exhibition of the man fighting in\nheavy armour. The more enlightened Nicias is quite ready to accept the\nnew art, which Laches treats with ridicule, seeming to think that this,\nor any other military question, may be settled by asking, 'What do the\nLacedaemonians say?' The one is the thoughtful general, willing to avail\nhimself of any discovery in the art of war (Aristoph. Aves); the other\nis the practical man, who relies on his own experience, and is the\nenemy of innovation; he can act but cannot speak, and is apt to lose his\ntemper. It is to be noted that one of them is supposed to be a hearer of\nSocrates; the other is only acquainted with his actions. Laches is the\nadmirer of the Dorian mode; and into his mouth the remark is put that\nthere are some persons who, having never been taught, are better than\nthose who have. Like a novice in the art of disputation, he is delighted\nwith the hits of Socrates; and is disposed to be angry with the\nrefinements of Nicias.\n\nIn the discussion of the main thesis of the Dialogue--'What is Courage?'\nthe antagonism of the two characters is still more clearly brought out;\nand in this, as in the preliminary question, the truth is parted between\nthem. Gradually, and not without difficulty, Laches is made to pass on\nfrom the more popular to the more philosophical; it has never occurred\nto him that there was any other courage than that of the soldier; and\nonly by an effort of the mind can he frame a general notion at all. No\nsooner has this general notion been formed than it evanesces before the\ndialectic of Socrates; and Nicias appears from the other side with the\nSocratic doctrine, that courage is knowledge. This is explained to mean\nknowledge of things terrible in the future. But Socrates denies that the\nknowledge of the future is separable from that of the past and present;\nin other words, true knowledge is not that of the soothsayer but of the\nphilosopher. And all knowledge will thus be equivalent to all virtue--a\nposition which elsewhere Socrates is not unwilling to admit, but which\nwill not assist us in distinguishing the nature of courage. In this part\nof the Dialogue the contrast between the mode of cross-examination which\nis practised by Laches and by Socrates, and also the manner in which\nthe definition of Laches is made to approximate to that of Nicias, are\nworthy of attention.\n\nThus, with some intimation of the connexion and unity of virtue and\nknowledge, we arrive at no distinct result. The two aspects of courage\nare never harmonized. The knowledge which in the Protagoras is explained\nas the faculty of estimating pleasures and pains is here lost in an\nunmeaning and transcendental conception. Yet several true intimations of\nthe nature of courage are allowed to appear: (1) That courage is\nmoral as well as physical: (2) That true courage is inseparable from\nknowledge, and yet (3) is based on a natural instinct. Laches exhibits\none aspect of courage; Nicias the other. The perfect image and harmony\nof both is only realized in Socrates himself.\n\nThe Dialogue offers one among many examples of the freedom with which\nPlato treats facts. For the scene must be supposed to have occurred\nbetween B.C. 424, the year of the battle of Delium, and B.C. 418, the\nyear of the battle of Mantinea, at which Laches fell. But if Socrates\nwas more than seventy years of age at his trial in 399 (see Apology), he\ncould not have been a young man at any time after the battle of Delium.\n\n\n\n\nLACHES, OR COURAGE.\n\n\n\n\nPERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE:\n\n     Lysimachus, son of Aristides.\n     Melesias, son of Thucydides.\n     Their sons.\n     Nicias, Laches, Socrates.\n\n\nLYSIMACHUS: You have seen the exhibition of the man fighting in armour,\nNicias and Laches, but we did not tell you at the time the reason why my\nfriend Melesias and I asked you to go with us and see him. I think that\nwe may as well confess what this was, for we certainly ought not to have\nany reserve with you. The reason was, that we were intending to ask your\nadvice. Some laugh at the very notion of advising others, and when they\nare asked will not say what they think. They guess at the wishes of the\nperson who asks them, and answer according to his, and not according to\ntheir own, opinion. But as we know that you are good judges, and will\nsay exactly what you think, we have taken you into our counsels. The\nmatter about which I am making all this preface is as follows: Melesias\nand I have two sons; that is his son, and he is named Thucydides,\nafter his grandfather; and this is mine, who is also called after his\ngrandfather, Aristides. Now, we are resolved to take the greatest care\nof the youths, and not to let them run about as they like, which is too\noften the way with the young, when they are no longer children, but to\nbegin at once and do the utmost that we can for them. And knowing you\nto have sons of your own, we thought that you were most likely to have\nattended to their training and improvement, and, if perchance you have\nnot attended to them, we may remind you that you ought to have done so,\nand would invite you to assist us in the fulfilment of a common duty. I\nwill tell you, Nicias and Laches, even at the risk of being tedious,\nhow we came to think of this. Melesias and I live together, and our sons\nlive with us; and now, as I was saying at first, we are going to confess\nto you. Both of us often talk to the lads about the many noble deeds\nwhich our own fathers did in war and peace--in the management of the\nallies, and in the administration of the city; but neither of us has any\ndeeds of his own which he can show. The truth is that we are ashamed of\nthis contrast being seen by them, and we blame our fathers for letting\nus be spoiled in the days of our youth, while they were occupied with\nthe concerns of others; and we urge all this upon the lads, pointing out\nto them that they will not grow up to honour if they are rebellious and\ntake no pains about themselves; but that if they take pains they may,\nperhaps, become worthy of the names which they bear. They, on their\npart, promise to comply with our wishes; and our care is to discover\nwhat studies or pursuits are likely to be most improving to them. Some\none commended to us the art of fighting in armour, which he thought an\nexcellent accomplishment for a young man to learn; and he praised the\nman whose exhibition you have seen, and told us to go and see him. And\nwe determined that we would go, and get you to accompany us; and we were\nintending at the same time, if you did not object, to take counsel with\nyou about the education of our sons. That is the matter which we wanted\nto talk over with you; and we hope that you will give us your opinion\nabout this art of fighting in armour, and about any other studies or\npursuits which may or may not be desirable for a young man to learn.\nPlease to say whether you agree to our proposal.\n\nNICIAS: As far as I am concerned, Lysimachus and Melesias, I applaud\nyour purpose, and will gladly assist you; and I believe that you,\nLaches, will be equally glad.\n\nLACHES: Certainly, Nicias; and I quite approve of the remark which\nLysimachus made about his own father and the father of Melesias, and\nwhich is applicable, not only to them, but to us, and to every one who\nis occupied with public affairs. As he says, such persons are too apt\nto be negligent and careless of their own children and their private\nconcerns. There is much truth in that remark of yours, Lysimachus. But\nwhy, instead of consulting us, do you not consult our friend Socrates\nabout the education of the youths? He is of the same deme with you,\nand is always passing his time in places where the youth have any noble\nstudy or pursuit, such as you are enquiring after.\n\nLYSIMACHUS: Why, Laches, has Socrates ever attended to matters of this\nsort?\n\nLACHES: Certainly, Lysimachus.\n\nNICIAS: That I have the means of knowing as well as Laches; for quite\nlately he supplied me with a teacher of music for my sons,--Damon, the\ndisciple of Agathocles, who is a most accomplished man in every way, as\nwell as a musician, and a companion of inestimable value for young men\nat their age.\n\nLYSIMACHUS: Those who have reached my time of life, Socrates and Nicias\nand Laches, fall out of acquaintance with the young, because they are\ngenerally detained at home by old age; but you, O son of Sophroniscus,\nshould let your fellow demesman have the benefit of any advice which you\nare able to give. Moreover I have a claim upon you as an old friend of\nyour father; for I and he were always companions and friends, and to the\nhour of his death there never was a difference between us; and now it\ncomes back to me, at the mention of your name, that I have heard these\nlads talking to one another at home, and often speaking of Socrates\nin terms of the highest praise; but I have never thought to ask them\nwhether the son of Sophroniscus was the person whom they meant. Tell me,\nmy boys, whether this is the Socrates of whom you have often spoken?\n\nSON: Certainly, father, this is he.\n\nLYSIMACHUS: I am delighted to hear, Socrates, that you maintain the name\nof your father, who was a most excellent man; and I further rejoice at\nthe prospect of our family ties being renewed.\n\nLACHES: Indeed, Lysimachus, you ought not to give him up; for I can\nassure you that I have seen him maintaining, not only his father's, but\nalso his country's name. He was my companion in the retreat from Delium,\nand I can tell you that if others had only been like him, the honour\nof our country would have been upheld, and the great defeat would never\nhave occurred.\n\nLYSIMACHUS: That is very high praise which is accorded to you, Socrates,\nby faithful witnesses and for actions like those which they praise. Let\nme tell you the pleasure which I feel in hearing of your fame; and I\nhope that you will regard me as one of your warmest friends. You ought\nto have visited us long ago, and made yourself at home with us; but now,\nfrom this day forward, as we have at last found one another out, do as I\nsay--come and make acquaintance with me, and with these young men, that\nI may continue your friend, as I was your father's. I shall expect you\nto do so, and shall venture at some future time to remind you of your\nduty. But what say you of the matter of which we were beginning to\nspeak--the art of fighting in armour? Is that a practice in which the\nlads may be advantageously instructed?\n\nSOCRATES: I will endeavour to advise you, Lysimachus, as far as I can in\nthis matter, and also in every way will comply with your wishes; but as\nI am younger and not so experienced, I think that I ought certainly to\nhear first what my elders have to say, and to learn of them, and if I\nhave anything to add, then I may venture to give my opinion to them as\nwell as to you. Suppose, Nicias, that one or other of you begin.\n\nNICIAS: I have no objection, Socrates; and my opinion is that the\nacquirement of this art is in many ways useful to young men. It is an\nadvantage to them that among the favourite amusements of their leisure\nhours they should have one which tends to improve and not to injure\ntheir bodily health. No gymnastics could be better or harder exercise;\nand this, and the art of riding, are of all arts most befitting to a\nfreeman; for they only who are thus trained in the use of arms are\nthe athletes of our military profession, trained in that on which the\nconflict turns. Moreover in actual battle, when you have to fight in a\nline with a number of others, such an acquirement will be of some use,\nand will be of the greatest whenever the ranks are broken and you have\nto fight singly, either in pursuit, when you are attacking some one who\nis defending himself, or in flight, when you have to defend yourself\nagainst an assailant. Certainly he who possessed the art could not meet\nwith any harm at the hands of a single person, or perhaps of several;\nand in any case he would have a great advantage. Further, this sort of\nskill inclines a man to the love of other noble lessons; for every man\nwho has learned how to fight in armour will desire to learn the proper\narrangement of an army, which is the sequel of the lesson: and when he\nhas learned this, and his ambition is once fired, he will go on to learn\nthe complete art of the general. There is no difficulty in seeing that\nthe knowledge and practice of other military arts will be honourable and\nvaluable to a man; and this lesson may be the beginning of them. Let me\nadd a further advantage, which is by no means a slight one,--that this\nscience will make any man a great deal more valiant and self-possessed\nin the field. And I will not disdain to mention, what by some may be\nthought to be a small matter;--he will make a better appearance at the\nright time; that is to say, at the time when his appearance will strike\nterror into his enemies. My opinion then, Lysimachus, is, as I say, that\nthe youths should be instructed in this art, and for the reasons which\nI have given. But Laches may take a different view; and I shall be very\nglad to hear what he has to say.\n\nLACHES: I should not like to maintain, Nicias, that any kind of\nknowledge is not to be learned; for all knowledge appears to be a good:\nand if, as Nicias and as the teachers of the art affirm, this use of\narms is really a species of knowledge, then it ought to be learned; but\nif not, and if those who profess to teach it are deceivers only; or if\nit be knowledge, but not of a valuable sort, then what is the use of\nlearning it? I say this, because I think that if it had been really\nvaluable, the Lacedaemonians, whose whole life is passed in finding out\nand practising the arts which give them an advantage over other nations\nin war, would have discovered this one. And even if they had not, still\nthese professors of the art would certainly not have failed to discover\nthat of all the Hellenes the Lacedaemonians have the greatest interest\nin such matters, and that a master of the art who was honoured among\nthem would be sure to make his fortune among other nations, just as a\ntragic poet would who is honoured among ourselves; which is the reason\nwhy he who fancies that he can write a tragedy does not go about\nitinerating in the neighbouring states, but rushes hither straight, and\nexhibits at Athens; and this is natural. Whereas I perceive that these\nfighters in armour regard Lacedaemon as a sacred inviolable territory,\nwhich they do not touch with the point of their foot; but they make\na circuit of the neighbouring states, and would rather exhibit to\nany others than to the Spartans; and particularly to those who would\nthemselves acknowledge that they are by no means first-rate in the arts\nof war. Further, Lysimachus, I have encountered a good many of these\ngentlemen in actual service, and have taken their measure, which I can\ngive you at once; for none of these masters of fence have ever been\ndistinguished in war,--there has been a sort of fatality about them;\nwhile in all other arts the men of note have been always those who have\npractised the art, they appear to be a most unfortunate exception.\nFor example, this very Stesilaus, whom you and I have just witnessed\nexhibiting in all that crowd and making such great professions of\nhis powers, I have seen at another time making, in sober truth, an\ninvoluntary exhibition of himself, which was a far better spectacle. He\nwas a marine on board a ship which struck a transport vessel, and was\narmed with a weapon, half spear, half scythe; the singularity of this\nweapon was worthy of the singularity of the man. To make a long story\nshort, I will only tell you what happened to this notable invention\nof the scythe spear. He was fighting, and the scythe was caught in the\nrigging of the other ship, and stuck fast; and he tugged, but was unable\nto get his weapon free. The two ships were passing one another. He first\nran along his own ship holding on to the spear; but as the other ship\npassed by and drew him after as he was holding on, he let the spear\nslip through his hand until he retained only the end of the handle.\nThe people in the transport clapped their hands, and laughed at his\nridiculous figure; and when some one threw a stone, which fell on the\ndeck at his feet, and he quitted his hold of the scythe-spear, the crew\nof his own trireme also burst out laughing; they could not refrain when\nthey beheld the weapon waving in the air, suspended from the transport.\nNow I do not deny that there may be something in such an art, as Nicias\nasserts, but I tell you my experience; and, as I said at first, whether\nthis be an art of which the advantage is so slight, or not an art at\nall, but only an imposition, in either case such an acquirement is not\nworth having. For my opinion is, that if the professor of this art be a\ncoward, he will be likely to become rash, and his character will be only\nmore notorious; or if he be brave, and fail ever so little, other men\nwill be on the watch, and he will be greatly traduced; for there is a\njealousy of such pretenders; and unless a man be pre-eminent in valour,\nhe cannot help being ridiculous, if he says that he has this sort of\nskill. Such is my judgment, Lysimachus, of the desirableness of this\nart; but, as I said at first, ask Socrates, and do not let him go until\nhe has given you his opinion of the matter.\n\nLYSIMACHUS: I am going to ask this favour of you, Socrates; as is the\nmore necessary because the two councillors disagree, and some one is in\na manner still needed who will decide between them. Had they agreed, no\narbiter would have been required. But as Laches has voted one way and\nNicias another, I should like to hear with which of our two friends you\nagree.\n\nSOCRATES: What, Lysimachus, are you going to accept the opinion of the\nmajority?\n\nLYSIMACHUS: Why, yes, Socrates; what else am I to do?\n\nSOCRATES: And would you do so too, Melesias? If you were deliberating\nabout the gymnastic training of your son, would you follow the advice of\nthe majority of us, or the opinion of the one who had been trained and\nexercised under a skilful master?\n\nMELESIAS: The latter, Socrates; as would surely be reasonable.\n\nSOCRATES: His one vote would be worth more than the vote of all us four?\n\nMELESIAS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And for this reason, as I imagine,--because a good decision is\nbased on knowledge and not on numbers?\n\nMELESIAS: To be sure.\n\nSOCRATES: Must we not then first of all ask, whether there is any one of\nus who has knowledge of that about which we are deliberating? If there\nis, let us take his advice, though he be one only, and not mind the\nrest; if there is not, let us seek further counsel. Is this a slight\nmatter about which you and Lysimachus are deliberating? Are you not\nrisking the greatest of your possessions? For children are your riches;\nand upon their turning out well or ill depends the whole order of their\nfather's house.\n\nMELESIAS: That is true.\n\nSOCRATES: Great care, then, is required in this matter?\n\nMELESIAS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Suppose, as I was just now saying, that we were considering,\nor wanting to consider, who was the best trainer. Should we not select\nhim who knew and had practised the art, and had the best teachers?\n\nMELESIAS: I think that we should.\n\nSOCRATES: But would there not arise a prior question about the nature of\nthe art of which we want to find the masters?\n\nMELESIAS: I do not understand.\n\nSOCRATES: Let me try to make my meaning plainer then. I do not think\nthat we have as yet decided what that is about which we are consulting,\nwhen we ask which of us is or is not skilled in the art, and has or has\nnot had a teacher of the art.\n\nNICIAS: Why, Socrates, is not the question whether young men ought or\nought not to learn the art of fighting in armour?\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, Nicias; but there is also a prior question, which I\nmay illustrate in this way: When a person considers about applying a\nmedicine to the eyes, would you say that he is consulting about the\nmedicine or about the eyes?\n\nNICIAS: About the eyes.\n\nSOCRATES: And when he considers whether he shall set a bridle on a horse\nand at what time, he is thinking of the horse and not of the bridle?\n\nNICIAS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And in a word, when he considers anything for the sake of\nanother thing, he thinks of the end and not of the means?\n\nNICIAS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And when you call in an adviser, you should see whether he too\nis skilful in the accomplishment of the end which you have in view?\n\nNICIAS: Most true.\n\nSOCRATES: And at present we have in view some knowledge, of which the\nend is the soul of youth?\n\nNICIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And we are enquiring, Which of us is skilful or successful in\nthe treatment of the soul, and which of us has had good teachers?\n\nLACHES: Well but, Socrates; did you never observe that some persons,\nwho have had no teachers, are more skilful than those who have, in some\nthings?\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, Laches, I have observed that; but you would not be very\nwilling to trust them if they only professed to be masters of their art,\nunless they could show some proof of their skill or excellence in one or\nmore works.\n\nLACHES: That is true.\n\nSOCRATES: And therefore, Laches and Nicias, as Lysimachus and Melesias,\nin their anxiety to improve the minds of their sons, have asked our\nadvice about them, we too should tell them who our teachers were, if we\nsay that we have had any, and prove them to be in the first place men\nof merit and experienced trainers of the minds of youth and also to have\nbeen really our teachers. Or if any of us says that he has no teacher,\nbut that he has works of his own to show; then he should point out\nto them what Athenians or strangers, bond or free, he is generally\nacknowledged to have improved. But if he can show neither teachers nor\nworks, then he should tell them to look out for others; and not run the\nrisk of spoiling the children of friends, and thereby incurring the\nmost formidable accusation which can be brought against any one by those\nnearest to him. As for myself, Lysimachus and Melesias, I am the\nfirst to confess that I have never had a teacher of the art of virtue;\nalthough I have always from my earliest youth desired to have one. But\nI am too poor to give money to the Sophists, who are the only professors\nof moral improvement; and to this day I have never been able to discover\nthe art myself, though I should not be surprised if Nicias or Laches may\nhave discovered or learned it; for they are far wealthier than I am,\nand may therefore have learnt of others. And they are older too; so that\nthey have had more time to make the discovery. And I really believe that\nthey are able to educate a man; for unless they had been confident in\ntheir own knowledge, they would never have spoken thus decidedly of\nthe pursuits which are advantageous or hurtful to a young man. I repose\nconfidence in both of them; but I am surprised to find that they differ\nfrom one another. And therefore, Lysimachus, as Laches suggested that\nyou should detain me, and not let me go until I answered, I in turn\nearnestly beseech and advise you to detain Laches and Nicias, and\nquestion them. I would have you say to them: Socrates avers that he has\nno knowledge of the matter--he is unable to decide which of you speaks\ntruly; neither discoverer nor student is he of anything of the kind.\nBut you, Laches and Nicias, should each of you tell us who is the most\nskilful educator whom you have ever known; and whether you invented the\nart yourselves, or learned of another; and if you learned, who were your\nrespective teachers, and who were their brothers in the art; and then,\nif you are too much occupied in politics to teach us yourselves, let us\ngo to them, and present them with gifts, or make interest with them,\nor both, in the hope that they may be induced to take charge of our\nchildren and of yours; and then they will not grow up inferior, and\ndisgrace their ancestors. But if you are yourselves original discoverers\nin that field, give us some proof of your skill. Who are they who,\nhaving been inferior persons, have become under your care good and\nnoble? For if this is your first attempt at education, there is a danger\nthat you may be trying the experiment, not on the 'vile corpus' of a\nCarian slave, but on your own sons, or the sons of your friend, and,\nas the proverb says, 'break the large vessel in learning to make pots.'\nTell us then, what qualities you claim or do not claim. Make them tell\nyou that, Lysimachus, and do not let them off.\n\nLYSIMACHUS: I very much approve of the words of Socrates, my friends;\nbut you, Nicias and Laches, must determine whether you will be\nquestioned, and give an explanation about matters of this sort.\nAssuredly, I and Melesias would be greatly pleased to hear you answer\nthe questions which Socrates asks, if you will: for I began by saying\nthat we took you into our counsels because we thought that you would\nhave attended to the subject, especially as you have children who, like\nour own, are nearly of an age to be educated. Well, then, if you have no\nobjection, suppose that you take Socrates into partnership; and do you\nand he ask and answer one another's questions: for, as he has well said,\nwe are deliberating about the most important of our concerns. I hope\nthat you will see fit to comply with our request.\n\nNICIAS: I see very clearly, Lysimachus, that you have only known\nSocrates' father, and have no acquaintance with Socrates himself: at\nleast, you can only have known him when he was a child, and may have\nmet him among his fellow-wardsmen, in company with his father, at a\nsacrifice, or at some other gathering. You clearly show that you have\nnever known him since he arrived at manhood.\n\nLYSIMACHUS: Why do you say that, Nicias?\n\nNICIAS: Because you seem not to be aware that any one who has an\nintellectual affinity to Socrates and enters into conversation with\nhim is liable to be drawn into an argument; and whatever subject he may\nstart, he will be continually carried round and round by him, until at\nlast he finds that he has to give an account both of his present and\npast life; and when he is once entangled, Socrates will not let him go\nuntil he has completely and thoroughly sifted him. Now I am used to his\nways; and I know that he will certainly do as I say, and also that\nI myself shall be the sufferer; for I am fond of his conversation,\nLysimachus. And I think that there is no harm in being reminded of any\nwrong thing which we are, or have been, doing: he who does not fly from\nreproof will be sure to take more heed of his after-life; as Solon says,\nhe will wish and desire to be learning so long as he lives, and will not\nthink that old age of itself brings wisdom. To me, to be cross-examined\nby Socrates is neither unusual nor unpleasant; indeed, I knew all along\nthat where Socrates was, the argument would soon pass from our sons to\nourselves; and therefore, I say that for my part, I am quite willing to\ndiscourse with Socrates in his own manner; but you had better ask our\nfriend Laches what his feeling may be.\n\nLACHES: I have but one feeling, Nicias, or (shall I say?) two feelings,\nabout discussions. Some would think that I am a lover, and to others I\nmay seem to be a hater of discourse; for when I hear a man discoursing\nof virtue, or of any sort of wisdom, who is a true man and worthy of\nhis theme, I am delighted beyond measure: and I compare the man and his\nwords, and note the harmony and correspondence of them. And such an one\nI deem to be the true musician, attuned to a fairer harmony than that of\nthe lyre, or any pleasant instrument of music; for truly he has in his\nown life a harmony of words and deeds arranged, not in the Ionian, or in\nthe Phrygian mode, nor yet in the Lydian, but in the true Hellenic mode,\nwhich is the Dorian, and no other. Such an one makes me merry with the\nsound of his voice; and when I hear him I am thought to be a lover\nof discourse; so eager am I in drinking in his words. But a man whose\nactions do not agree with his words is an annoyance to me; and the\nbetter he speaks the more I hate him, and then I seem to be a hater of\ndiscourse. As to Socrates, I have no knowledge of his words, but of old,\nas would seem, I have had experience of his deeds; and his deeds show\nthat free and noble sentiments are natural to him. And if his words\naccord, then I am of one mind with him, and shall be delighted to be\ninterrogated by a man such as he is, and shall not be annoyed at having\nto learn of him: for I too agree with Solon, 'that I would fain grow\nold, learning many things.' But I must be allowed to add 'of the good\nonly.' Socrates must be willing to allow that he is a good teacher, or I\nshall be a dull and uncongenial pupil: but that the teacher is younger,\nor not as yet in repute--anything of that sort is of no account with\nme. And therefore, Socrates, I give you notice that you may teach and\nconfute me as much as ever you like, and also learn of me anything which\nI know. So high is the opinion which I have entertained of you ever\nsince the day on which you were my companion in danger, and gave a proof\nof your valour such as only the man of merit can give. Therefore, say\nwhatever you like, and do not mind about the difference of our ages.\n\nSOCRATES: I cannot say that either of you show any reluctance to take\ncounsel and advise with me.\n\nLYSIMACHUS: But this is our proper business; and yours as well as ours,\nfor I reckon you as one of us. Please then to take my place, and find\nout from Nicias and Laches what we want to know, for the sake of the\nyouths, and talk and consult with them: for I am old, and my memory is\nbad; and I do not remember the questions which I am going to ask, or\nthe answers to them; and if there is any interruption I am quite lost.\nI will therefore beg of you to carry on the proposed discussion by\nyour selves; and I will listen, and Melesias and I will act upon your\nconclusions.\n\nSOCRATES: Let us, Nicias and Laches, comply with the request of\nLysimachus and Melesias. There will be no harm in asking ourselves\nthe question which was first proposed to us: 'Who have been our own\ninstructors in this sort of training, and whom have we made better?' But\nthe other mode of carrying on the enquiry will bring us equally to the\nsame point, and will be more like proceeding from first principles.\nFor if we knew that the addition of something would improve some other\nthing, and were able to make the addition, then, clearly, we must\nknow how that about which we are advising may be best and most easily\nattained. Perhaps you do not understand what I mean. Then let me make my\nmeaning plainer in this way. Suppose we knew that the addition of sight\nmakes better the eyes which possess this gift, and also were able to\nimpart sight to the eyes, then, clearly, we should know the nature of\nsight, and should be able to advise how this gift of sight may be best\nand most easily attained; but if we knew neither what sight is, nor what\nhearing is, we should not be very good medical advisers about the eyes\nor the ears, or about the best mode of giving sight and hearing to them.\n\nLACHES: That is true, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: And are not our two friends, Laches, at this very moment\ninviting us to consider in what way the gift of virtue may be imparted\nto their sons for the improvement of their minds?\n\nLACHES: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: Then must we not first know the nature of virtue? For how can\nwe advise any one about the best mode of attaining something of which we\nare wholly ignorant?\n\nLACHES: I do not think that we can, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: Then, Laches, we may presume that we know the nature of\nvirtue?\n\nLACHES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And that which we know we must surely be able to tell?\n\nLACHES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: I would not have us begin, my friend, with enquiring about\nthe whole of virtue; for that may be more than we can accomplish; let\nus first consider whether we have a sufficient knowledge of a part; the\nenquiry will thus probably be made easier to us.\n\nLACHES: Let us do as you say, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: Then which of the parts of virtue shall we select? Must we\nnot select that to which the art of fighting in armour is supposed to\nconduce? And is not that generally thought to be courage?\n\nLACHES: Yes, certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Then, Laches, suppose that we first set about determining the\nnature of courage, and in the second place proceed to enquire how the\nyoung men may attain this quality by the help of studies and pursuits.\nTell me, if you can, what is courage.\n\nLACHES: Indeed, Socrates, I see no difficulty in answering; he is a man\nof courage who does not run away, but remains at his post and fights\nagainst the enemy; there can be no mistake about that.\n\nSOCRATES: Very good, Laches; and yet I fear that I did not express\nmyself clearly; and therefore you have answered not the question which I\nintended to ask, but another.\n\nLACHES: What do you mean, Socrates?\n\nSOCRATES: I will endeavour to explain; you would call a man courageous\nwho remains at his post, and fights with the enemy?\n\nLACHES: Certainly I should.\n\nSOCRATES: And so should I; but what would you say of another man, who\nfights flying, instead of remaining?\n\nLACHES: How flying?\n\nSOCRATES: Why, as the Scythians are said to fight, flying as well as\npursuing; and as Homer says in praise of the horses of Aeneas, that they\nknew 'how to pursue, and fly quickly hither and thither'; and he passes\nan encomium on Aeneas himself, as having a knowledge of fear or flight,\nand calls him 'an author of fear or flight.'\n\nLACHES: Yes, Socrates, and there Homer is right: for he was speaking of\nchariots, as you were speaking of the Scythian cavalry, who have that\nway of fighting; but the heavy-armed Greek fights, as I say, remaining\nin his rank.\n\nSOCRATES: And yet, Laches, you must except the Lacedaemonians at\nPlataea, who, when they came upon the light shields of the Persians, are\nsaid not to have been willing to stand and fight, and to have fled; but\nwhen the ranks of the Persians were broken, they turned upon them like\ncavalry, and won the battle of Plataea.\n\nLACHES: That is true.\n\nSOCRATES: That was my meaning when I said that I was to blame in having\nput my question badly, and that this was the reason of your answering\nbadly. For I meant to ask you not only about the courage of heavy-armed\nsoldiers, but about the courage of cavalry and every other style of\nsoldier; and not only who are courageous in war, but who are courageous\nin perils by sea, and who in disease, or in poverty, or again in\npolitics, are courageous; and not only who are courageous against pain\nor fear, but mighty to contend against desires and pleasures, either\nfixed in their rank or turning upon their enemy. There is this sort of\ncourage--is there not, Laches?\n\nLACHES: Certainly, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: And all these are courageous, but some have courage in\npleasures, and some in pains: some in desires, and some in fears, and\nsome are cowards under the same conditions, as I should imagine.\n\nLACHES: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: Now I was asking about courage and cowardice in general. And I\nwill begin with courage, and once more ask, What is that common quality,\nwhich is the same in all these cases, and which is called courage? Do\nyou now understand what I mean?\n\nLACHES: Not over well.\n\nSOCRATES: I mean this: As I might ask what is that quality which is\ncalled quickness, and which is found in running, in playing the lyre,\nin speaking, in learning, and in many other similar actions, or rather\nwhich we possess in nearly every action that is worth mentioning of\narms, legs, mouth, voice, mind;--would you not apply the term quickness\nto all of them?\n\nLACHES: Quite true.\n\nSOCRATES: And suppose I were to be asked by some one: What is that\ncommon quality, Socrates, which, in all these uses of the word, you call\nquickness? I should say the quality which accomplishes much in a little\ntime--whether in running, speaking, or in any other sort of action.\n\nLACHES: You would be quite correct.\n\nSOCRATES: And now, Laches, do you try and tell me in like manner, What\nis that common quality which is called courage, and which includes all\nthe various uses of the term when applied both to pleasure and pain, and\nin all the cases to which I was just now referring?\n\nLACHES: I should say that courage is a sort of endurance of the soul, if\nI am to speak of the universal nature which pervades them all.\n\nSOCRATES: But that is what we must do if we are to answer the question.\nAnd yet I cannot say that every kind of endurance is, in my opinion,\nto be deemed courage. Hear my reason: I am sure, Laches, that you would\nconsider courage to be a very noble quality.\n\nLACHES: Most noble, certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And you would say that a wise endurance is also good and\nnoble?\n\nLACHES: Very noble.\n\nSOCRATES: But what would you say of a foolish endurance? Is not that, on\nthe other hand, to be regarded as evil and hurtful?\n\nLACHES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And is anything noble which is evil and hurtful?\n\nLACHES: I ought not to say that, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: Then you would not admit that sort of endurance to be\ncourage--for it is not noble, but courage is noble?\n\nLACHES: You are right.\n\nSOCRATES: Then, according to you, only the wise endurance is courage?\n\nLACHES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: But as to the epithet 'wise,'--wise in what? In all things\nsmall as well as great? For example, if a man shows the quality of\nendurance in spending his money wisely, knowing that by spending he will\nacquire more in the end, do you call him courageous?\n\nLACHES: Assuredly not.\n\nSOCRATES: Or, for example, if a man is a physician, and his son, or some\npatient of his, has inflammation of the lungs, and begs that he may be\nallowed to eat or drink something, and the other is firm and refuses; is\nthat courage?\n\nLACHES: No; that is not courage at all, any more than the last.\n\nSOCRATES: Again, take the case of one who endures in war, and is willing\nto fight, and wisely calculates and knows that others will help him,\nand that there will be fewer and inferior men against him than there are\nwith him; and suppose that he has also advantages of position; would you\nsay of such a one who endures with all this wisdom and preparation,\nthat he, or some man in the opposing army who is in the opposite\ncircumstances to these and yet endures and remains at his post, is the\nbraver?\n\nLACHES: I should say that the latter, Socrates, was the braver.\n\nSOCRATES: But, surely, this is a foolish endurance in comparison with\nthe other?\n\nLACHES: That is true.\n\nSOCRATES: Then you would say that he who in an engagement of cavalry\nendures, having the knowledge of horsemanship, is not so courageous as\nhe who endures, having no such knowledge?\n\nLACHES: So I should say.\n\nSOCRATES: And he who endures, having a knowledge of the use of the\nsling, or the bow, or of any other art, is not so courageous as he who\nendures, not having such a knowledge?\n\nLACHES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And he who descends into a well, and dives, and holds out in\nthis or any similar action, having no knowledge of diving, or the\nlike, is, as you would say, more courageous than those who have this\nknowledge?\n\nLACHES: Why, Socrates, what else can a man say?\n\nSOCRATES: Nothing, if that be what he thinks.\n\nLACHES: But that is what I do think.\n\nSOCRATES: And yet men who thus run risks and endure are foolish, Laches,\nin comparison of those who do the same things, having the skill to do\nthem.\n\nLACHES: That is true.\n\nSOCRATES: But foolish boldness and endurance appeared before to be base\nand hurtful to us.\n\nLACHES: Quite true.\n\nSOCRATES: Whereas courage was acknowledged to be a noble quality.\n\nLACHES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And now on the contrary we are saying that the foolish\nendurance, which was before held in dishonour, is courage.\n\nLACHES: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: And are we right in saying so?\n\nLACHES: Indeed, Socrates, I am sure that we are not right.\n\nSOCRATES: Then according to your statement, you and I, Laches, are not\nattuned to the Dorian mode, which is a harmony of words and deeds; for\nour deeds are not in accordance with our words. Any one would say that\nwe had courage who saw us in action, but not, I imagine, he who heard us\ntalking about courage just now.\n\nLACHES: That is most true.\n\nSOCRATES: And is this condition of ours satisfactory?\n\nLACHES: Quite the reverse.\n\nSOCRATES: Suppose, however, that we admit the principle of which we are\nspeaking to a certain extent.\n\nLACHES: To what extent and what principle do you mean?\n\nSOCRATES: The principle of endurance. We too must endure and persevere\nin the enquiry, and then courage will not laugh at our faint-heartedness\nin searching for courage; which after all may, very likely, be\nendurance.\n\nLACHES: I am ready to go on, Socrates; and yet I am unused to\ninvestigations of this sort. But the spirit of controversy has been\naroused in me by what has been said; and I am really grieved at being\nthus unable to express my meaning. For I fancy that I do know the nature\nof courage; but, somehow or other, she has slipped away from me, and I\ncannot get hold of her and tell her nature.\n\nSOCRATES: But, my dear friend, should not the good sportsman follow the\ntrack, and not be lazy?\n\nLACHES: Certainly, he should.\n\nSOCRATES: And shall we invite Nicias to join us? he may be better at the\nsport than we are. What do you say?\n\nLACHES: I should like that.\n\nSOCRATES: Come then, Nicias, and do what you can to help your friends,\nwho are tossing on the waves of argument, and at the last gasp: you see\nour extremity, and may save us and also settle your own opinion, if you\nwill tell us what you think about courage.\n\nNICIAS: I have been thinking, Socrates, that you and Laches are not\ndefining courage in the right way; for you have forgotten an excellent\nsaying which I have heard from your own lips.\n\nSOCRATES: What is it, Nicias?\n\nNICIAS: I have often heard you say that 'Every man is good in that in\nwhich he is wise, and bad in that in which he is unwise.'\n\nSOCRATES: That is certainly true, Nicias.\n\nNICIAS: And therefore if the brave man is good, he is also wise.\n\nSOCRATES: Do you hear him, Laches?\n\nLACHES: Yes, I hear him, but I do not very well understand him.\n\nSOCRATES: I think that I understand him; and he appears to me to mean\nthat courage is a sort of wisdom.\n\nLACHES: What can he possibly mean, Socrates?\n\nSOCRATES: That is a question which you must ask of himself.\n\nLACHES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Tell him then, Nicias, what you mean by this wisdom; for you\nsurely do not mean the wisdom which plays the flute?\n\nNICIAS: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: Nor the wisdom which plays the lyre?\n\nNICIAS: No.\n\nSOCRATES: But what is this knowledge then, and of what?\n\nLACHES: I think that you put the question to him very well, Socrates;\nand I would like him to say what is the nature of this knowledge or\nwisdom.\n\nNICIAS: I mean to say, Laches, that courage is the knowledge of that\nwhich inspires fear or confidence in war, or in anything.\n\nLACHES: How strangely he is talking, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: Why do you say so, Laches?\n\nLACHES: Why, surely courage is one thing, and wisdom another.\n\nSOCRATES: That is just what Nicias denies.\n\nLACHES: Yes, that is what he denies; but he is so silly.\n\nSOCRATES: Suppose that we instruct instead of abusing him?\n\nNICIAS: Laches does not want to instruct me, Socrates; but having been\nproved to be talking nonsense himself, he wants to prove that I have\nbeen doing the same.\n\nLACHES: Very true, Nicias; and you are talking nonsense, as I shall\nendeavour to show. Let me ask you a question: Do not physicians know\nthe dangers of disease? or do the courageous know them? or are the\nphysicians the same as the courageous?\n\nNICIAS: Not at all.\n\nLACHES: No more than the husbandmen who know the dangers of husbandry,\nor than other craftsmen, who have a knowledge of that which inspires\nthem with fear or confidence in their own arts, and yet they are not\ncourageous a whit the more for that.\n\nSOCRATES: What is Laches saying, Nicias? He appears to be saying\nsomething of importance.\n\nNICIAS: Yes, he is saying something, but it is not true.\n\nSOCRATES: How so?\n\nNICIAS: Why, because he does not see that the physician's knowledge only\nextends to the nature of health and disease: he can tell the sick man no\nmore than this. Do you imagine, Laches, that the physician knows whether\nhealth or disease is the more terrible to a man? Had not many a man\nbetter never get up from a sick bed? I should like to know whether you\nthink that life is always better than death. May not death often be the\nbetter of the two?\n\nLACHES: Yes certainly so in my opinion.\n\nNICIAS: And do you think that the same things are terrible to those who\nhad better die, and to those who had better live?\n\nLACHES: Certainly not.\n\nNICIAS: And do you suppose that the physician or any other artist knows\nthis, or any one indeed, except he who is skilled in the grounds of fear\nand hope? And him I call the courageous.\n\nSOCRATES: Do you understand his meaning, Laches?\n\nLACHES: Yes; I suppose that, in his way of speaking, the soothsayers are\ncourageous. For who but one of them can know to whom to die or to live\nis better? And yet Nicias, would you allow that you are yourself a\nsoothsayer, or are you neither a soothsayer nor courageous?\n\nNICIAS: What! do you mean to say that the soothsayer ought to know the\ngrounds of hope or fear?\n\nLACHES: Indeed I do: who but he?\n\nNICIAS: Much rather I should say he of whom I speak; for the soothsayer\nought to know only the signs of things that are about to come to pass,\nwhether death or disease, or loss of property, or victory, or defeat\nin war, or in any sort of contest; but to whom the suffering or not\nsuffering of these things will be for the best, can no more be decided\nby the soothsayer than by one who is no soothsayer.\n\nLACHES: I cannot understand what Nicias would be at, Socrates; for he\nrepresents the courageous man as neither a soothsayer, nor a physician,\nnor in any other character, unless he means to say that he is a god. My\nopinion is that he does not like honestly to confess that he is talking\nnonsense, but that he shuffles up and down in order to conceal the\ndifficulty into which he has got himself. You and I, Socrates, might\nhave practised a similar shuffle just now, if we had only wanted to\navoid the appearance of inconsistency. And if we had been arguing in a\ncourt of law there might have been reason in so doing; but why should\na man deck himself out with vain words at a meeting of friends such as\nthis?\n\nSOCRATES: I quite agree with you, Laches, that he should not. But\nperhaps Nicias is serious, and not merely talking for the sake of\ntalking. Let us ask him just to explain what he means, and if he has\nreason on his side we will agree with him; if not, we will instruct him.\n\nLACHES: Do you, Socrates, if you like, ask him: I think that I have\nasked enough.\n\nSOCRATES: I do not see why I should not; and my question will do for\nboth of us.\n\nLACHES: Very good.\n\nSOCRATES: Then tell me, Nicias, or rather tell us, for Laches and I\nare partners in the argument: Do you mean to affirm that courage is the\nknowledge of the grounds of hope and fear?\n\nNICIAS: I do.\n\nSOCRATES: And not every man has this knowledge; the physician and the\nsoothsayer have it not; and they will not be courageous unless they\nacquire it--that is what you were saying?\n\nNICIAS: I was.\n\nSOCRATES: Then this is certainly not a thing which every pig would know,\nas the proverb says, and therefore he could not be courageous.\n\nNICIAS: I think not.\n\nSOCRATES: Clearly not, Nicias; not even such a big pig as the\nCrommyonian sow would be called by you courageous. And this I say not as\na joke, but because I think that he who assents to your doctrine, that\ncourage is the knowledge of the grounds of fear and hope, cannot allow\nthat any wild beast is courageous, unless he admits that a lion, or a\nleopard, or perhaps a boar, or any other animal, has such a degree of\nwisdom that he knows things which but a few human beings ever know\nby reason of their difficulty. He who takes your view of courage must\naffirm that a lion, and a stag, and a bull, and a monkey, have equally\nlittle pretensions to courage.\n\nLACHES: Capital, Socrates; by the gods, that is truly good. And I hope,\nNicias, that you will tell us whether these animals, which we all admit\nto be courageous, are really wiser than mankind; or whether you will\nhave the boldness, in the face of universal opinion, to deny their\ncourage.\n\nNICIAS: Why, Laches, I do not call animals or any other things which\nhave no fear of dangers, because they are ignorant of them, courageous,\nbut only fearless and senseless. Do you imagine that I should call\nlittle children courageous, which fear no dangers because they know\nnone? There is a difference, to my way of thinking, between fearlessness\nand courage. I am of opinion that thoughtful courage is a quality\npossessed by very few, but that rashness and boldness, and fearlessness,\nwhich has no forethought, are very common qualities possessed by many\nmen, many women, many children, many animals. And you, and men in\ngeneral, call by the term 'courageous' actions which I call rash;--my\ncourageous actions are wise actions.\n\nLACHES: Behold, Socrates, how admirably, as he thinks, he dresses\nhimself out in words, while seeking to deprive of the honour of courage\nthose whom all the world acknowledges to be courageous.\n\nNICIAS: Not so, Laches, but do not be alarmed; for I am quite willing to\nsay of you and also of Lamachus, and of many other Athenians, that you\nare courageous and therefore wise.\n\nLACHES: I could answer that; but I would not have you cast in my teeth\nthat I am a haughty Aexonian.\n\nSOCRATES: Do not answer him, Laches; I rather fancy that you are not\naware of the source from which his wisdom is derived. He has got all\nthis from my friend Damon, and Damon is always with Prodicus, who, of\nall the Sophists, is considered to be the best puller to pieces of words\nof this sort.\n\nLACHES: Yes, Socrates; and the examination of such niceties is a much\nmore suitable employment for a Sophist than for a great statesman whom\nthe city chooses to preside over her.\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, my sweet friend, but a great statesman is likely to have\na great intelligence. And I think that the view which is implied in\nNicias' definition of courage is worthy of examination.\n\nLACHES: Then examine for yourself, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: That is what I am going to do, my dear friend. Do not,\nhowever, suppose I shall let you out of the partnership; for I shall\nexpect you to apply your mind, and join with me in the consideration of\nthe question.\n\nLACHES: I will if you think that I ought.\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, I do; but I must beg of you, Nicias, to begin again. You\nremember that we originally considered courage to be a part of virtue.\n\nNICIAS: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: And you yourself said that it was a part; and there were many\nother parts, all of which taken together are called virtue.\n\nNICIAS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Do you agree with me about the parts? For I say that justice,\ntemperance, and the like, are all of them parts of virtue as well as\ncourage. Would you not say the same?\n\nNICIAS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Well then, so far we are agreed. And now let us proceed a\nstep, and try to arrive at a similar agreement about the fearful and the\nhopeful: I do not want you to be thinking one thing and myself another.\nLet me then tell you my own opinion, and if I am wrong you shall set me\nright: in my opinion the terrible and the hopeful are the things which\ndo or do not create fear, and fear is not of the present, nor of the\npast, but is of future and expected evil. Do you not agree to that,\nLaches?\n\nLACHES: Yes, Socrates, entirely.\n\nSOCRATES: That is my view, Nicias; the terrible things, as I should say,\nare the evils which are future; and the hopeful are the good or not evil\nthings which are future. Do you or do you not agree with me?\n\nNICIAS: I agree.\n\nSOCRATES: And the knowledge of these things you call courage?\n\nNICIAS: Precisely.\n\nSOCRATES: And now let me see whether you agree with Laches and myself as\nto a third point.\n\nNICIAS: What is that?\n\nSOCRATES: I will tell you. He and I have a notion that there is not one\nknowledge or science of the past, another of the present, a third of\nwhat is likely to be best and what will be best in the future; but\nthat of all three there is one science only: for example, there is one\nscience of medicine which is concerned with the inspection of health\nequally in all times, present, past, and future; and one science of\nhusbandry in like manner, which is concerned with the productions of the\nearth in all times. As to the art of the general, you yourselves will be\nmy witnesses that he has an excellent foreknowledge of the future, and\nthat he claims to be the master and not the servant of the soothsayer,\nbecause he knows better what is happening or is likely to happen in war:\nand accordingly the law places the soothsayer under the general, and not\nthe general under the soothsayer. Am I not correct in saying so, Laches?\n\nLACHES: Quite correct.\n\nSOCRATES: And do you, Nicias, also acknowledge that the same science has\nunderstanding of the same things, whether future, present, or past?\n\nNICIAS: Yes, indeed Socrates; that is my opinion.\n\nSOCRATES: And courage, my friend, is, as you say, a knowledge of the\nfearful and of the hopeful?\n\nNICIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And the fearful, and the hopeful, are admitted to be future\ngoods and future evils?\n\nNICIAS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And the same science has to do with the same things in the\nfuture or at any time?\n\nNICIAS: That is true.\n\nSOCRATES: Then courage is not the science which is concerned with the\nfearful and hopeful, for they are future only; courage, like the other\nsciences, is concerned not only with good and evil of the future, but of\nthe present and past, and of any time?\n\nNICIAS: That, as I suppose, is true.\n\nSOCRATES: Then the answer which you have given, Nicias, includes only a\nthird part of courage; but our question extended to the whole nature of\ncourage: and according to your view, that is, according to your present\nview, courage is not only the knowledge of the hopeful and the fearful,\nbut seems to include nearly every good and evil without reference to\ntime. What do you say to that alteration in your statement?\n\nNICIAS: I agree, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: But then, my dear friend, if a man knew all good and evil,\nand how they are, and have been, and will be produced, would he not be\nperfect, and wanting in no virtue, whether justice, or temperance,\nor holiness? He would possess them all, and he would know which were\ndangers and which were not, and guard against them whether they were\nsupernatural or natural; and he would provide the good, as he would know\nhow to deal both with gods or men.\n\nNICIAS: I think, Socrates, that there is a great deal of truth in what\nyou say.\n\nSOCRATES: But then, Nicias, courage, according to this new definition of\nyours, instead of being a part of virtue only, will be all virtue?\n\nNICIAS: It would seem so.\n\nSOCRATES: But we were saying that courage is one of the parts of virtue?\n\nNICIAS: Yes, that was what we were saying.\n\nSOCRATES: And that is in contradiction with our present view?\n\nNICIAS: That appears to be the case.\n\nSOCRATES: Then, Nicias, we have not discovered what courage is.\n\nNICIAS: We have not.\n\nLACHES: And yet, friend Nicias, I imagined that you would have made the\ndiscovery, when you were so contemptuous of the answers which I made to\nSocrates. I had very great hopes that you would have been enlightened by\nthe wisdom of Damon.\n\nNICIAS: I perceive, Laches, that you think nothing of having displayed\nyour ignorance of the nature of courage, but you look only to see\nwhether I have not made a similar display; and if we are both equally\nignorant of the things which a man who is good for anything should know,\nthat, I suppose, will be of no consequence. You certainly appear to me\nvery like the rest of the world, looking at your neighbour and not at\nyourself. I am of opinion that enough has been said on the subject which\nwe have been discussing; and if anything has been imperfectly said, that\nmay be hereafter corrected by the help of Damon, whom you think to laugh\ndown, although you have never seen him, and with the help of others. And\nwhen I am satisfied myself, I will freely impart my satisfaction to you,\nfor I think that you are very much in want of knowledge.\n\nLACHES: You are a philosopher, Nicias; of that I am aware: nevertheless\nI would recommend Lysimachus and Melesias not to take you and me as\nadvisers about the education of their children; but, as I said at first,\nthey should ask Socrates and not let him off; if my own sons were old\nenough, I would have asked him myself.\n\nNICIAS: To that I quite agree, if Socrates is willing to take them\nunder his charge. I should not wish for any one else to be the tutor\nof Niceratus. But I observe that when I mention the matter to him he\nrecommends to me some other tutor and refuses himself. Perhaps he may be\nmore ready to listen to you, Lysimachus.\n\nLYSIMACHUS: He ought, Nicias: for certainly I would do things for him\nwhich I would not do for many others. What do you say, Socrates--will\nyou comply? And are you ready to give assistance in the improvement of\nthe youths?\n\nSOCRATES: Indeed, Lysimachus, I should be very wrong in refusing to aid\nin the improvement of anybody. And if I had shown in this conversation\nthat I had a knowledge which Nicias and Laches have not, then I admit\nthat you would be right in inviting me to perform this duty; but as we\nare all in the same perplexity, why should one of us be preferred\nto another? I certainly think that no one should; and under these\ncircumstances, let me offer you a piece of advice (and this need not go\nfurther than ourselves). I maintain, my friends, that every one of us\nshould seek out the best teacher whom he can find, first for ourselves,\nwho are greatly in need of one, and then for the youth, regardless of\nexpense or anything. But I cannot advise that we remain as we are. And\nif any one laughs at us for going to school at our age, I would quote to\nthem the authority of Homer, who says, that\n\n'Modesty is not good for a needy man.'\n\nLet us then, regardless of what may be said of us, make the education of\nthe youths our own education.\n\nLYSIMACHUS: I like your proposal, Socrates; and as I am the oldest, I am\nalso the most eager to go to school with the boys. Let me beg a favour\nof you: Come to my house to-morrow at dawn, and we will advise about\nthese matters. For the present, let us make an end of the conversation.\n\nSOCRATES: I will come to you to-morrow, Lysimachus, as you propose, God\nwilling.","title":"Laches","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":12253}