{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_15877/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_15877","id":"gutenberg_15877","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/15877","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Biographies","Category: Classics of Literature","Category: History - Ancient","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Ethics","Life","Marcus Aurelius, Emperor of Rome, 121-180","Stoics"],"text":"Produced by Juliet Sutherland, Turgut Dincer, Leonard\nJohnson and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at\nhttps://www.pgdp.net.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTHE THOUGHTS\n\nOF\n\nTHE EMPEROR\n\nMARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS\n\n[Illustration: MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS]\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n\nBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH      9\n\nPHILOSOPHY OF MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS      45\n\nTHE THOUGHTS      99\n\nINDEX OF TERMS      305\n\nGENERAL INDEX      311\n\n\n\nBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH\n\nOF\n\nMARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS.\n\n\nM. Antoninus was born at Rome, A.D. 121, on the 26th of April. His\nfather, Annius Verus, died while he was praetor. His mother was Domitia\nCalvilla, also named Lucilla. The Emperor T. Antoninus Pius married\nAnnia Galeria Faustina, the sister of Annius Verus, and was consequently\nthe uncle of M. Antoninus. When Hadrian adopted Antoninus Pius and\ndeclared him his successor in the empire, Antoninus Pius adopted both L.\nCeionius Commodus, the son of Aelius Caesar, and M. Antoninus, whose\noriginal name was M. Annius Verus. Antoninus then took the name of M.\nAelius Aurelius Verus, to which was added the title of Caesar in A.D.\n139: the name Aelius belonged to Hadrian's family, and Aurelius was the\nname of Antoninus Pius. When M. Antoninus became Augustus, he dropped\nthe name of Verus and took the name of Antoninus. Accordingly he is\ngenerally named M. Aurelius Antoninus, or simply M. Antoninus.\n\nThe youth was most carefully brought up. He thanks the gods (i. 17) that\nhe had good grandfathers, good parents, a good sister, good teachers,\ngood associates, good kinsmen and friends, nearly everything good. He\nhad the happy fortune to witness the example of his uncle and adoptive\nfather Antoninus Pius, and he has recorded in his word (i. 16; vi. 30)\nthe virtues of the excellent man and prudent ruler. Like many young\nRomans he tried his hand at poetry and studied rhetoric. Herodes Atticus\nand M. Cornelius Fronto were his teachers in eloquence. There are extant\nletters between Fronto and Marcus,[A] which show the great affection of\nthe pupil for the master, and the master's great hopes of his\nindustrious pupil. M. Antoninus mentions Fronto (i. 11) among those to\nwhom he was indebted for his education.\n\n    [A] M. Cornelii Frontonis Reliquiae, Berlin, 1816. There are a\n    few letters between Fronto and Antoninus Pius.\n\nWhen he was eleven years old, he assumed the dress of philosophers,\nsomething plain and coarse, became a hard student, and lived a most\nlaborious, abstemious life, even so far as to injure his health.\nFinally, he abandoned poetry and rhetoric for philosophy, and he\nattached himself to the sect of the Stoics. But he did not neglect the\nstudy of law, which was a useful preparation for the high place which he\nwas designed to fill. His teacher was L. Volusianus Maecianus, a\ndistinguished jurist. We must suppose that he learned the Roman\ndiscipline of arms, which was a necessary part of the education of a man\nwho afterwards led his troops to battle against a warlike race.\n\nAntoninus has recorded in his first book the names of his teachers, and\nthe obligations which he owed to each of them. The way in which he\nspeaks of what he learned from them might seem to savor of vanity or\nself-praise, if we look carelessly at the way in which he has expressed\nhimself; but if any one draws this conclusion, he will be mistaken.\nAntoninus means to commemorate the merits of his several teachers, what\nthey taught, and what a pupil might learn from them. Besides, this book,\nlike the eleven other books, was for his own use; and if we may trust\nthe note at the end of the first book, it was written during one of M.\nAntoninus' campaigns against the Quadi, at a time when the commemoration\nof the virtues of his illustrious teachers might remind him of their\nlessons and the practical uses which he might derive from them.\n\nAmong his teachers of philosophy was Sextus of Chaeroneia, a grandson of\nPlutarch. What he learned from this excellent man is told by himself (i.\n9). His favorite teacher was Q. Junius Rusticus (i. 7), a philosopher,\nand also a man of practical good sense in public affairs. Rusticus was\nthe adviser of Antoninus after he became emperor. Young men who are\ndestined for high places are not often fortunate in those who are about\nthem, their companions and teachers; and I do not know any example of a\nyoung prince having had an education which can be compared with that of\nM. Antoninus. Such a body of teachers distinguished by their\nacquirements and their character will hardly be collected again; and as\nto the pupil, we have not had one like him since.\n\nHadrian died in July A.D. 138, and was succeeded by Antoninus Pius. M.\nAntoninus married Faustina, his cousin, the daughter of Pius, probably\nabout A.D. 146, for he had a daughter born in 147. He received from his\nadoptive father the title of Caesar, and was associated with him in the\nadministration of the state. The father and the adopted son lived\ntogether in perfect friendship and confidence. Antoninus was a dutiful\nson, and the emperor Pius loved and esteemed him.\n\nAntoninus Pius died in March, A.D. 161. The Senate, it is said, urged M.\nAntoninus to take the sole administration of the empire, but he\nassociated with himself the other adopted son of Pius, L. Ceionius\nCommodus, who is generally called L. Verus. Thus Rome for the first time\nhad two emperors. Verus was an indolent man of pleasure, and unworthy of\nhis station. Antoninus however bore with him, and it is said Verus had\nsense enough to pay to his colleague the respect due to his character. A\nvirtuous emperor and a loose partner lived together in peace, and their\nalliance was strengthened by Antoninus giving to Verus for wife his\ndaughter Lucilla.\n\nThe reign of Antoninus was first troubled by a Parthian war, in which\nVerus was sent to command; but he did nothing, and the success that was\nobtained by the Romans in Armenia and on the Euphrates and Tigris was\ndue to his generals. This Parthian war ended in A.D. 165. Aurelius and\nVerus had a triumph (A.D. 166) for the victories in the East. A\npestilence followed, which carried off great numbers in Rome and Italy,\nand spread to the west of Europe.\n\nThe north of Italy was also threatened by the rude people beyond the\nAlps, from the borders of Gallia to the eastern side of the Hadriatic.\nThese barbarians attempted to break into Italy, as the Germanic nations\nhad attempted near three hundred years before; and the rest of the life\nof Antoninus, with some intervals, was employed in driving back the\ninvaders. In 169 Verus suddenly died, and Antoninus administered the\nstate alone.\n\nDuring the German wars Antoninus resided for three years on the Danube\nat Carnuntum. The Marcomanni were driven out of Pannonia and almost\ndestroyed in their retreat across the Danube; and in A.D. 174 the\nemperor gained a great victory over the Quadi.\n\nIn A.D. 175, Avidius Cassius, a brave and skilful Roman commander who\nwas at the head of the troops in Asia, revolted, and declared himself\nAugustus. But Cassius was assassinated by some of his officers, and so\nthe rebellion came to an end. Antoninus showed his humanity by his\ntreatment of the family and the partisans of Cassius; and his letter to\nthe Senate, in which he recommends mercy, is extant. (Vulcatius, Avidius\nCassius, c. 12.)\n\nAntoninus set out for the East on hearing of Cassius' revolt. Though he\nappears to have returned to Rome in A.D. 174, he went back to prosecute\nthe war against the Germans, and it is probable that he marched direct\nto the East from the German war. His wife Faustina, who accompanied him\ninto Asia, died suddenly at the foot of the Taurus, to the great grief\nof her husband. Capitolinus, who has written the life of Antoninus, and\nalso Dion Cassius, accuses the empress of scandalous infidelity to her\nhusband, and of abominable lewdness. But Capitolinus says that Antoninus\neither knew it not or pretended not to know it. Nothing is so common as\nsuch malicious reports in all ages, and the history of imperial Rome is\nfull of them. Antoninus loved his wife, and he says that she was\n\"obedient, affectionate, and simple.\" The same scandal had been spread\nabout Faustina's mother, the wife of Antoninus Pius, and yet he too was\nperfectly satisfied with his wife. Antoninus Pius says after her death,\nin a letter to Fronto, that he would rather have lived in exile with his\nwife than in his palace at Rome without her. There are not many men who\nwould give their wives a better character than these two emperors.\nCapitolinus wrote in the time of Diocletian. He may have intended to\ntell the truth, but he is a poor, feeble biographer. Dion Cassius, the\nmost malignant of historians, always reports, and perhaps he believed,\nany scandal against anybody.\n\nAntoninus continued his journey to Syria and Egypt, and on his return to\nItaly through Athens he was initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries. It\nwas the practice of the emperor to conform to the established rites of\nthe age, and to perform religious ceremonies with due solemnity. We\ncannot conclude from this that he was a superstitious man, though we\nmight perhaps do so if his book did not show that he was not. But that\nis only one among many instances that a ruler's public acts do not\nalways prove his real opinions. A prudent governor will not roughly\noppose even the superstitions of his people; and though he may wish they\nwere wiser, he will know that he cannot make them so by offending their\nprejudices.\n\nAntoninus and his son Commodus entered Rome in triumph, perhaps for some\nGerman victories, on the 23d. of December, A.D. 176. In the following\nyear Commodus was associated with his father in the empire, and took\nthe name of Augustus. This year A.D. 177 is memorable in ecclesiastical\nhistory. Attalus and others were put to death at Lyon for their\nadherence to the Christian religion. The evidence of this persecution is\na letter preserved by Eusebius (E.H. V. I; printed in Routh's Reliquiae\nSacrae, vol. i, with notes). The letter is from the Christians of Vienna\nand Lugdunum in Gallia (Vienna and Lyon) to their Christian brethren in\nAsia and Phrygia; and it is preserved perhaps nearly entire. It contains\na very particular description of the tortures inflicted on the\nChristians in Gallia, and it states that while the persecution was going\non, Attalus, a Christian and a Roman citizen, was loudly demanded by the\npopulace and brought into the amphitheatre; but the governor ordered him\nto be reserved, with the rest who were in prison, until he had received\ninstructions from the emperor. Many had been tortured before the\ngovernor thought of applying to Antoninus. The imperial rescript, says\nthe letter, was that the Christians should be punished, but if they\nwould deny their faith, they must be released. On this the work began\nagain. The Christians who were Roman citizens were beheaded; the rest\nwere exposed to the wild beasts in the amphitheatre. Some modern writers\non ecclesiastical history, when they use this letter, say nothing of the\nwonderful stories of the martyrs' sufferings. Sanctus, as the letter\nsays, was burnt with plates of hot iron till his body was one sore and\nhad lost all human form; but on being put to the rack he recovered his\nformer appearance under the torture, which was thus a cure instead of a\npunishment. He was afterwards torn by beasts, and placed on an iron\nchair and roasted. He died at last.\n\nThe letter is one piece of evidence. The writer, whoever he was that\nwrote in the name of the Gallic Christians, is our evidence both for the\nordinary and the extraordinary circumstances of the story, and we cannot\naccept his evidence for one part and reject the other. We often receive\nsmall evidence as a proof of a thing we believe to be within the limits\nof probability or possibility, and we reject exactly the same evidence,\nwhen the thing to which it refers appears very improbable or impossible.\nBut this is a false method of inquiry, though it is followed by some\nmodern writers, who select what they like from a story and reject the\nrest of the evidence; or if they do not reject it, they dishonestly\nsuppress it. A man can only act consistently by accepting all this\nletter or rejecting it all, and we cannot blame him for either. But he\nwho rejects it may still admit that such a letter may be founded on real\nfacts; and he would make this admission as the most probable way of\naccounting for the existence of the letter; but if, as he would suppose,\nthe writer has stated some things falsely, he cannot tell what part of\nhis story is worthy of credit.\n\nThe war on the northern frontier appears to have been uninterrupted\nduring the visit of Antoninus to the East, and on his return the emperor\nagain left Rome to oppose the barbarians. The Germanic people were\ndefeated in a great battle A.D. 179. During this campaign the emperor\nwas seized with some contagious malady, of which he died in the camp at\nSirmium (Mitrovitz), on the Save, in Lower Pannonia, but at Vindebona\n(Vienna), according to other authorities, on the 17th of March, A.D.\n180, in the fifty-ninth year of his age. His son Commodus was with him.\nThe body, or the ashes probably, of the emperor were carried to Rome,\nand he received the honor of deification. Those who could afford it had\nhis statue or bust; and when Capitolinus wrote, many people still had\nstatues of Antoninus among the Dei Penates or household deities. He was\nin a manner made a saint. Commodus erected to the memory of his father\nthe Antonine column which is now in the Piazza Colonna at Rome. The\n_bassi rilievi_ which are placed in a spiral line round the shaft\ncommemorate the victories of Antoninus over the Marcomanni and the\nQuadi, and the miraculous shower of rain which refreshed the Roman\nsoldiers and discomfited their enemies. The statue of Antoninus was\nplaced on the capital of the column, but it was removed at some time\nunknown, and a bronze statue of St. Paul was put in the place by Pope\nSixtus the fifth.\n\nThe historical evidence for the times of Antoninus is very defective,\nand some of that which remains is not credible. The most curious is the\nstory about the miracle which happened in A.D. 174, during the war with\nthe Quadi. The Roman army was in danger of perishing by thirst, but a\nsudden storm drenched them with rain, while it discharged fire and hail\non their enemies, and the Romans gained a great victory. All the\nauthorities which speak of the battle speak also of the miracle. The\nGentile writers assign it to their gods, and the Christians to the\nintercession of the Christian legion in the emperor's army. To confirm\nthe Christian statement it is added that the emperor gave the title of\nThundering to this legion; but Dacier and others, who maintain the\nChristian report of the miracle, admit that this title of Thundering or\nLightning was not given to this legion because the Quadi were struck\nwith lightning, but because there was a figure of lightning on their\nshields, and that this title of the legion existed in the time of\nAugustus.\n\nScaliger also had observed that the legion was called Thundering\n([Greek: keraunobolos], or [Greek: keraunophoros]) before the reign of\nAntoninus. We learn this from Dion Cassius (Lib. 55, c. 23, and the note\nof Reimarus), who enumerates all the legions of Augustus' time. The name\nThundering of Lightning also occurs on an inscription of the reign of\nTrajan, which was found at Trieste. Eusebius (v. 5), when he relates the\nmiracle, quotes Apolinarius, bishop of Hierapolis, as authority for this\nname being given to the legion Melitene by the emperor in consequence of\nthe success which he obtained through their prayers; from which we may\nestimate the value of Apolinarius' testimony. Eusebius does not say in\nwhat book of Apolinarius the statement occurs. Dion says that the\nThundering legion was stationed in Cappadocia in the time of Augustus.\nValesius also observes that in the Notitia of the Imperium Romanum there\nis mentioned under the commander of Armenia the Praefectura of the\ntwelfth legion named \"Thundering Melitene;\" and this position in Armenia\nwill agree with what Dion says of its position in Cappadocia.\nAccordingly Valesius concludes that Melitene was not the name of the\nlegion, but of the town in which it was stationed. Melitene was also the\nname of the district in which this town was situated. The legions did\nnot, he says, take their name from the place where they were on duty,\nbut from the country in which they were raised, and therefore what\nEusebius says about the Melitene does not seem probable to him. Yet\nValesius, on the authority of Apolinarius and Tertullian, believed that\nthe miracle was worked through the prayers of the Christian soldiers in\nthe emperor's army. Rufinus does not give the name of Melitene to this\nlegion, says Valesius, and probably he purposely omitted it, because he\nknew that Melitene was the name of a town in Armenia Minor, where the\nlegion was stationed in his time.\n\nThe emperor, it is said, made a report of his victory to the Senate,\nwhich we may believe, for such was the practice; but we do not know what\nhe said in his letter, for it is not extant. Dacier assumes that the\nemperor's letter was purposely destroyed by the Senate or the enemies of\nChristianity, that so honorable a testimony to the Christians and their\nreligion might not be perpetuated. The critic has however not seen that\nhe contradicts himself when he tells us the purport of the letter, for\nhe says that it was destroyed, and even Eusebius could not find it. But\nthere does exist a letter in Greek addressed by Antoninus to the Roman\npeople and the sacred Senate after this memorable victory. It is\nsometimes printed after Justin's first Apology, but it is totally\nunconnected with the apologies. This letter is one of the most stupid\nforgeries of the many which exist, and it cannot be possibly founded\neven on the genuine report of Antoninus to the Senate. If it were\ngenuine, it would free the emperor from the charge of persecuting men\nbecause they were Christians, for he says in this false letter that if a\nman accuse another only of being a Christian, and the accused confess,\nand there is nothing else against him, he must be set free; with this\nmonstrous addition, made by a man inconceivably ignorant, that the\ninformer must be burnt alive.[A]\n\n    [A] Eusebius (v. 5) quotes Tertullian's Apology to the Roman\n    Senate in confirmation of the story. Tertullian, he says,\n    writes that letters of the emperor were extant, in which he\n    declares that his army was saved by the prayers of the\n    Christians; and that he \"threatened to punish with death those\n    who ventured to accuse us.\" It is possible that the forged\n    letter which is now extant may be one of those which Tertullian\n    had seen, for he uses the plural number, \"letters.\" A great\n    deal has been written about this miracle of the Thundering\n    Legion, and more than is worth reading. There is a dissertation\n    on this supposed miracle in Moyle's Works, London, 1726.\n\nDuring the time of Antoninus Pius and Marcus Antoninus there appeared\nthe first Apology of Justinus, and under M. Antoninus the Oration of\nTatian against the Greeks, which was a fierce attack on the established\nreligions; the address of Athenagoras to M. Antoninus on behalf of the\nChristians, and the Apology of Melito, bishop of Sardes, also addressed\nto the emperor, and that of Apolinarius. The first Apology of Justinus\nis addressed to T. Antoninus Pius and his two adopted sons, M. Antoninus\nand L. Verus; but we do not know whether they read it.[A] The second\nApology of Justinus is entitled \"to the Roman Senate;\" but this\nsuperscription is from some copyist. In the first chapter Justinus\naddresses the Romans. In the second chapter he speaks of an affair that\nhad recently happened in the time of M. Antoninus and L,. Verus, as it\nseems; and he also directly addresses the emperor, saying of a certain\nwoman, \"she addressed a petition to thee, the emperor, and thou didst\ngrant the petition.\" In other passages the writer addresses the two\nemperors, from which we must conclude that the Apology was directed to\nthem. Eusebius (E.H. iv. 18) states that the second Apology was\naddressed to the successor of Antoninus Pius, and he names him Antoninus\nVerus, meaning M. Antoninus. In one passage of this second Apology (c.\n8), Justinus, or the writer, whoever he may be, says that even men who\nfollowed the Stoic doctrines, when they ordered their lives according to\nethical reason, were hated and murdered, such as Heraclitus, Musonius in\nhis own times, and others; for all those who in any way labored to live\naccording to reason and avoided wickedness were always hated; and this\nwas the effect of the work of daemons.\n\n    [A] Orosius, vii. 14, says that Justinus the philosopher\n    presented to Antonius Pius his work in defence of the Christian\n    religion, and made him merciful to the Christians.\n\nJustinus himself is said to have been put to death at Rome, because he\nrefused to sacrifice to the gods. It cannot have been in the reign of\nHadrian, as one authority states; nor in the time of Antoninus Pius, if\nthe second Apology was written in the time of M. Antoninus; and there is\nevidence that this event took place under M. Antoninus and L. Verus,\nwhen Rusticus was praefect of the city.[A]\n\n    [A] See the Martyrium Sanctorum Justini, &c., in the works of\n    Justinus, ed. Otto, vol. ii. 559. \"Junius Rusticus Praefectus\n    Urbi erat sub imperatoribus M. Aurelio et L. Vero, id quod\n    liquet ex Themistii Orat. xxxiv Dindorf. p. 451, et ex quodam\n    illorum rescripto, Dig. 49. 1. I, Sec. 2\" (Otto). The rescript\n    contains the words \"Junium Rusticum amicum nostrum Praefectum\n    Urbi.\" The Martyrium of Justinus and others is written in\n    Greek. It begins, \"In the time of the wicked defenders of\n    idolatry impious edicts were published against the pious\n    Christians both in cities and country places, for the purpose\n    of compelling them to make offerings to vain idols. Accordingly\n    the holy men (Justinus, Chariton, a woman Charito, Paeon,\n    Liberianus, and others) were brought before Rusticus, the\n    praefect of Rome.\"\n\n    The Martyrium gives the examination of the accused by Rusticus.\n    All of them professed to be Christians. Justinus was asked if\n    he expected to ascend into heaven and to receive a reward for\n    his sufferings, if he was condemned to death. He answered that\n    he did not expect: he was certain of it. Finally, the test of\n    obedience was proposed to the prisoners; they were required to\n    sacrifice to the gods. All refused, and Rusticus pronounced the\n    sentence, which was that those who refused to sacrifice to the\n    gods and obey the emperor's order should be whipped and\n    beheaded according to the law. The martyrs were then led to the\n    usual place of execution and beheaded. Some of the faithful\n    secretly carried off the bodies and deposited them in a fit\n    place.\n\nThe persecution in which Polycarp suffered at Smyrna belongs to the time\nof M. Antoninus. The evidence for it is the letter of the church of\nSmyrna to the churches of Philomelium and the other Christian churches,\nand it is preserved by Eusebius (E.H. iv. 15). But the critics do not\nagree about the time of Polycarp's death, differing in the two extremes\nto the amount of twelve years. The circumstances of Polycarp's martyrdom\nwere accompanied by miracles, one of which Eusebius (iv. 15) has\nomitted, but it appears in the oldest Latin version of the letter, which\nUsher published, and it is supposed that this version was made not long\nafter the time of Eusebius. The notice at the end of the letter states\nthat it was transcribed by Caius from the copy of Irenaeus, the disciple\nof Polycarp, then transcribed by Socrates at Corinth; \"after which I\nPionius again wrote it out from the copy above mentioned, having\nsearched it out by the revelation of Polycarp, who directed me to it,\"\n&c. The story of Polycarp's martyrdom is embellished with miraculous\ncircumstances which some modern writers on ecclesiastical history take\nthe liberty of omitting.[A]\n\n    [A] Conyers Middleton, An Inquiry into the Miraculous Powers,\n    &c. p. 126. Middleton says that Eusebius omitted to mention the\n    dove, which flew out of Polycarp's body, and Dodwell and\n    Archbishop Wake have done the same. Wake says, \"I am so little\n    a friend to such miracles that I thought it better with\n    Eusebius to omit that circumstance than to mention it from Bp.\n    Usher's Manuscript,\" which manuscript however, says Middleton,\n    he afterwards declares to be so well attested that we need not\n    any further assurance of the truth of it.\n\nIn order to form a proper notion of the condition of the Christians\nunder M. Antoninus we must go back to Trajan's time. When the younger\nPliny was governor of Bithynia, the Christians were numerous in those\nparts, and the worshipers of the old religion were falling off. The\ntemples were deserted, the festivals neglected, and there were no\npurchasers of victims for sacrifice. Those who were interested in the\nmaintenance of the old religion thus found that their profits were in\ndanger. Christians of both sexes and all ages were brought before the\ngovernor who did not know what to do with them. He could come to no\nother conclusion than this, that those who confessed to be Christians\nand persevered in their religion ought to be punished; if for nothing\nelse, for their invincible obstinancy. He found no crimes proved against\nthe Christians, and he could only characterize their religion as a\ndepraved and extravagant superstition, which might be stopped if the\npeople were allowed the opportunity of recanting. Pliny wrote this in a\nletter to Trajan (Plinius, Ep. x. 97). He asked for the emperor's\ndirections, because he did not know what to do. He remarks that he had\nnever been engaged in judicial inquiries about the Christians, and that\naccordingly he did not know what to inquire about, or how far to inquire\nand punish. This proves that it was not a new thing to examine into a\nman's profession of Christianity and to punish him for it.[A]\n\n    [A] Orosius (vii. 12) speaks of Trajan's persecution of the\n    Christians, and of Pliny's application to him having led the\n    emperor to mitigate his severity. The punishment by the Mosaic\n    law for those who attempted to seduce the Jews to follow new\n    gods was death. If a man was secretly enticed to such new\n    worship, he must kill the seducer, even if the seducer were\n    brother, son, daughter, wife, or friend. (Deut. xiii.)\n\nTrajan's rescript is extant. He approved of the governor's judgment in\nthe matter, but he said that no search must be made after the\nChristians; if a man was charged with the new religion and convicted, he\nmust not be punished if he affirmed that he was not a Christian, and\nconfirmed his denial by showing his reverence to the heathen gods. He\nadded that no notice must be taken of anonymous informations, for such\nthings were of bad example. Trajan was a mild and sensible man; and both\nmotives of mercy and policy probably also induced him to take as little\nnotice of the Christians as he could, to let them live in quiet if it\nwere possible. Trajan's rescript is the first legislative act of the\nhead of the Roman state with reference to Christianity, which is known\nto us. It does not appear that the Christians were further disturbed\nunder his reign. The martyrdom of Ignatius by the order of Trajan\nhimself is not universally admitted to be an historical fact.[A]\n\n    [A] The Martyrium Ignatii, first published in Latin by\n    Archbishop Usher, is the chief evidence for the circumstances\n    of Ignatius' death.\n\nIn the time of Hadrian it was no longer possible for the Roman\ngovernment to overlook the great increase of the Christians and the\nhostility of the common sort to them. If the governors in the provinces\nwere willing to let them alone, they could not resist the fanaticism of\nthe heathen community, who looked on the Christians as atheists. The\nJews too, who were settled all over the Roman Empire, were as hostile to\nthe Christians as the Gentiles were.[A] With the time of Hadrian begin\nthe Christian Apologies, which show plainly what the popular feeling\ntowards the Christians then was. A rescript of Hadrian to Minucius\nFundanus, the Proconsul of Asia, which stands at the end of Justin's\nfirst Apology,[B] instructs the governor that innocent people must not\nbe troubled, and false accusers must not be allowed to extort money from\nthem; the charges against the Christians must be made in due form, and\nno attention must be paid to popular clamors; when Christians were\nregularly prosecuted and convicted of illegal acts, they must be\npunished according to their deserts; and false accusers also must be\npunished. Antoninus Pius is said to have published rescripts to the same\neffect. The terms of Hadrian's rescript seem very favorable to the\nChristians; but if we understand it in this sense, that they were only\nto be punished like other people for illegal acts, it would have had no\nmeaning, for that could have been done without asking the emperor's\nadvice. The real purpose of the rescript is that Christians must be\npunished if they persisted in their belief, and would not prove their\nrenunciation of it by acknowledging the heathen religion. This was\nTrajan's rule, and we have no reason for supposing that Hadrian granted\nmore to the Christians than Trajan did. There is also printed at the end\nof Justin's first Apology a rescript of Antoninus Pius to the Commune of\n([Greek: to koinon tes Asias]), and it is also in Eusebius (E.H. iv.\n13). The date of the rescript is the third consulship of Antoninus\nPius.[C] The rescript declares that the Christians--for they are meant,\nthough the name Christians does not occur in the rescript--were not to\nbe disturbed unless they were attempting something against the Roman\nrule; and no man was to be punished simply for being a Christian. But\nthis rescript is spurious. Any man moderately acquainted with Roman\nhistory will see by the style and tenor that it is a clumsy forgery.\n\n    [A] We have the evidence of Justinus (ad Diognetum, c. 5) to\n    this effect: \"The Christians are attacked by the Jews as if\n    they were men of a different race, and are persecuted by the\n    Greeks; and those who hate them cannot give the reason of their\n    enmity.\"\n\n    [B] And in Eusebius (E.H. iv. 8, 9). Orosius (vii. 13) says\n    that Hadrian sent this rescript to Minucius Fundanus, proconsul\n    of Asia after being instructed in books written on the\n    Christian religion by Quadratus, a disciple of the Apostles,\n    and Aristides, an Athenian, an honest and wise man, and Serenus\n    Granius. In the Greek text of Hadrian's rescript there\n    is mentioned Serenius Granianus, the predecessor of Minucius\n    Fundanus in the government of _Asia_.\n\n    This rescript of Hadrian has clearly been added to the Apology\n    by some editor. The Apology ends with the words: [Greek: ho\n    philon to Oeo, touto genestho]\n\n    [C] Eusebius (E.H. iv. 12), after giving the beginning of\n    Justinus' first Apology, which contains the address to T.\n    Antoninus and his two adopted sons, adds: \"The same emperor\n    being addressed by other brethren in Asia, honored the Commune\n    of Asia with the following rescript.\" This rescript, which is\n    in the next chapter of Eusebius (E.H. iv. 13) is in the sole\n    name of Caesar Marcus Aurelius Antoninus Augustus Armenius,\n    though Eusebius had just before said that he was going to give\n    us a rescript of Antoninus Pius. There are some material\n    variations between the two copies of the rescript besides the\n    difference in the title, which difference makes it impossible\n    to say whether the forger intended to assign this rescript to\n    Pius or to M. Antoninus.\n\n    The author of the Alexandrine Chronicum says that Marcus, being\n    moved by the entreaties of Melito and other heads of the\n    church, wrote an Epistle to the Commune of Asia in which he\n    forbade the Christians to be troubled on account of their\n    religion. Valesius supposes this to be the letter or rescript\n    which is contained in Eusebius (iv. 13), and to be the answer\n    to the Apology of Melito, of which I shall soon give the\n    substance. But Marcus certainly did not write this letter which\n    is in Eusebius, and we know not what answer he made to Melito.\n\nIn the time of M. Antoninus the opposition between the old and the new\nbelief was still stronger, and the adherents of the heathen religion\nurged those in authority to a more regular resistance to the invasions\nof the Christian faith. Melito in his Apology to M. Antoninus represents\nthe Christians of Asia as persecuted under new imperial orders.\nShameless informers, he says, men who were greedy after the property of\nothers, used these orders as a means of robbing those who were doing no\nharm. He doubts if a just emperor could have ordered anything so unjust;\nand if the last order was really not from the emperor, the Christians\nentreat him not to give them up to their enemies.[A] We conclude from\nthis that there were at least imperial rescripts or constitutions of M.\nAntoninus which were made the foundation of these persecutions. The fact\nof being a Christian was now a crime and punished, unless the accused\ndenied their religion. Then come the persecutions at Smyrna, which some\nmodern critics place in A.D. 167, ten years before the persecution of\nLyon. The governors of the provinces under M. Antoninus might have found\nenough even in Trajan's rescript to warrant them in punishing\nChristians, and the fanaticism of the people would drive them to\npersecution, even if they were unwilling. But besides the fact of the\nChristians rejecting all the heathen ceremonies, we must not forget that\nthey plainly maintain that all the heathen religions were false. The\nChristians thus declared war against the heathen rites, and it is hardly\nnecessary to observe that this was a declaration of hostility against\nthe Roman government, which tolerated all the various forms of\nsuperstition that existed in the empire, and could not consistently\ntolerate another religion, which declared that all the rest were false\nand all the splendid ceremonies of the empire only a worship of devils.\n\n    [A] Eusebius, iv. 26; and Routh's Reliquiae Sacrae, vol. I, and\n    the notes. The interpretation of this Fragment is not easy.\n    Mosheim misunderstood one passage so far as to affirm that\n    Marcus promised rewards to those who denounced the Christians;\n    an interpretation which is entirely false. Melito calls the\n    Christian religion \"our philosophy,\" which began among\n    barbarians (the Jews), and flourished among the Roman subjects\n    in the time of Augustus, to the great advantage of the empire,\n    for from that time the power of the Romans grew great and\n    glorious. He says that the emperor has and will have as the\n    successor to Augustus' power the good wishes of men, if he will\n    protect that philosophy which grew up with the empire and began\n    with Augustus, which philosophy the predecessors of Antoninus\n    honored in addition to the other religions. He further says\n    that the Christian religion had suffered no harm since the time\n    of Augustus, but on the contrary had enjoyed all honor and\n    respect that any man could desire. Nero and Domitian, he says,\n    were alone persuaded by some malicious men to calumniate the\n    Christian religion, and this was the origin of the false\n    charges against the Christians. But this was corrected by the\n    emperors who immediately preceded Antoninus, who often by their\n    rescripts reproved those who attempted to trouble the\n    Christians. Hadrian, Antoninus' grandfather, wrote to many, and\n    among them to Fundanus, the governor of Asia. Antoninus Pius,\n    when Marcus was associated with him in the empire, wrote to the\n    cities that they must not trouble the Christians; among others,\n    to the people of Larissa, Thessalonica, the Athenians, and all\n    the Greeks. Melito concluded thus: \"We are persuaded that thou\n    who hast about these things the same mind that they had, nay\n    rather one much more humane and philosophical, wilt do all that\n    we ask thee.\"--This Apology was written after A.D. 169, the\n    year in which Verus died, for it speaks of Marcus only and his\n    son Commodus. According to Melito's testimony, Christians had\n    only been punished for their religion in the time of Nero and\n    Domitian, and the persecutions began again in the time of M.\n    Antoninus, and were founded on his orders, which were abused,\n    as he seems to mean. He distinctly affirms \"that the race of\n    the godly is now persecuted and harassed by fresh imperial\n    orders in Asia, a thing which had never happened before.\" But\n    we know that all this is not true, and that Christians had been\n    punished in Trajan's time.\n\nIf we had a true ecclesiastical history, we should know how the Roman\nemperors attempted to check the new religion; how they enforced their\nprinciple of finally punishing Christians, simply as Christians, which\nJustin in his Apology affirms that they did, and I have no doubt that he\ntells the truth; how far popular clamor and riots went in this matter,\nand how far many fanatical and ignorant Christians--for there were many\nsuch--contributed to excite the fanaticism on the other side and to\nembitter the quarrel between the Roman government and the new religion.\nOur extant ecclesiastical histories are manifestly falsified, and what\ntruth they contain is grossly exaggerated; but the fact is certain that\nin the time of M. Antoninus the heathen populations were in open\nhostility to the Christians, and that under Antoninus' rule men were put\nto death because they were Christians. Eusebius, in the preface to his\nfifth book, remarks that in the seventeenth year of Antoninus' reign, in\nsome parts of the world, the persecution of the Christians became more\nviolent, and that it proceeded from the populace in the cities; and he\nadds, in his usual style of exaggeration, that we may infer from what\ntook place in a single nation that myriads of martyrs were made in the\nhabitable earth. The nation which he alludes to is Gallia; and he then\nproceeds to give the letter of the churches of Vienna and Lugdunum. It\nis probable that he has assiged the true cause of the persecutions, the\nfanaticism of the populace, and that both governors and emperor had a\ngreat deal of trouble with these disturbances. How far Marcus was\ncognizant of these cruel proceedings we do not know, for the historical\nrecords of his reign are very defective. He did not make the rule\nagainst the Christians, for Trajan did that; and if we admit that he\nwould have been willing to let the Christians alone, we cannot affirm\nthat it was in his power, for it would be a great mistake to suppose\nthat Antoninus had the unlimited authority which some modern sovereigns\nhave had. His power was limited by certain constitutional forms, by the\nSenate, and by the precedents of his predecessors. We cannot admit that\nsuch a man was an active persecutor, for there is no evidence that he\nwas,[A] though it is certain that he had no good opinion of the\nChristians, as appears from his own words.[B] But he knew nothing of\nthem except their hostility to the Roman religion, and he probably\nthought that they were dangerous to the state, notwithstanding the\nprofessions, false or true, of some of the Apologists. So much I have\nsaid, because it would be unfair not to state all that can be urged\nagainst a man whom his contemporaries and subsequent ages venerated as a\nmodel of virtue and benevolence. If I admitted the genuineness of some\ndocuments, he would be altogether clear from the charge of even allowing\nany persecutions; but as I seek the truth and am sure that they are\nfalse, I leave him to bear whatever blame is his due.[C] I add that it\nis quite certain that Antoninus did not derive any of his ethical\nprinciples from a religion of which he knew nothing.[D]\n\n    [A] Except that of Orosius (vii. 15), who says that during the\n    Parthian war there were grievous persecutions of the Christians\n    in Asia and Gallia under the orders of Marcus (praecepto ejus),\n    and \"many were crowned with the martyrdom of saints.\"\n\n    [B] See xi. 3. The emperor probably speaks of such fanatics as\n    Clemens (quoted by Gataker on this passage) mentions. The\n    rational Christians admitted no fellowship with them. \"Some of\n    these heretics,\" says Clemens, \"show their impiety and\n    cowardice by loving their lives, saying that the knowledge of\n    the really existing God is true testimony (martyrdom), but that\n    a man is a self-murderer who bears witness by his death. We\n    also blame those who rush to death; for there are some, not of\n    us, but only bearing the same name, who give themselves up. We\n    say of them that they die without being martyrs, even if they\n    are publicly punished; and they give themselves up to a death\n    which avails nothing, as the Indian Gymnosophists give\n    themselves up foolishly to fire.\" Cave, in his primitive\n    Christianity (ii. c. 7), says of the Christians: \"They did\n    flock to the place of torment faster than droves of beasts that\n    are driven to the shambles. They even longed to be in the arms\n    of suffering. Ignatius, though then in his journey to Rome in\n    order to his execution, yet by the way as he went could not but\n    vent his passionate desire of it 'Oh that I might come to those\n    wild beasts that are prepared for me; I heartily wish that I\n    may presently meet with them; I would invite and encourage them\n    speedily to devour me, and not be afraid to set upon me as they\n    have been to others; nay, should they refuse it, I would even\n    force them to it;'\" and more to the same purpose from Eusebius.\n    Cave, an honest and good man, says all this in praise of the\n    Christians; but I think that he mistook the matter. We admire a\n    man who holds to his principles even to death; but these\n    fanatical Christians are the Gymnosophists whom Clemens treats\n    with disdain.\n\n    [C] Dr. F.C. Baur, in his work entitled \"Das Christenthum und\n    die Christliche Kirche der drei ersten Jahrhunderte,\" &c., has\n    examined this question with great good sense and fairness, and\n    I believe he has stated the truth as near as our authorities\n    enable us to reach it.\n\n    [D] In the Digest, 48, 19, 30, there is the following excerpt\n    from Modestinus: \"Si quis aliquid fecerit, quo leves hominum\n    animi superstitione numinis terrerentur, divus Marcus hujusmodi\n    homines in insulam relegari rescripsit.\"\n\nThere is no doubt that the Emperor's Reflections--or his Meditations, as\nthey are generally named--is a genuine work. In the first book he speaks\nof himself, his family, and his teachers; and in other books he mentions\nhimself. Suidas (v.[Greek: Markos]) notices a work of Antoninus in\ntwelve books, which he names the \"conduct of his own life;\" and he cites\nthe book under several words in his Dictionary, giving the emperor's\nname, but not the title of the work. There are also passages cited by\nSuidas from Antoninus without mention of the emperor's name. The true\ntitle of the work is unknown. Xylander, who published the first edition\nof this book (Zuerich, 1558, 8vo, with a Latin version), used a\nmanuscript which contained the twelve books, but it is not known where\nthe manuscript is now. The only other complete manuscript which is known\nto exist is in the Vatican library, but it has no title and no\ninscriptions of the several books: the eleventh only has the\ninscription, [Greek: Markou autokratoros] marked with an asterisk. The\nother Vatican manuscripts and the three Florentine contain only excerpts\nfrom the emperor's book. All the titles of the excerpts nearly agree\nwith that which Xylander prefixed to his edition, [Greek: Markou\nAntoninou Autokratoros ton eis heauton biblia ib.] This title has been\nused by all subsequent editors. We cannot tell whether Antoninus divided\nhis work into books or somebody else did it. If the inscriptions at the\nend of the first and second books are genuine, he may have made the\ndivision himself.\n\nIt is plain that the emperor wrote down his thoughts or reflections as\nthe occasions arose; and since they were intended for his own use, it is\nno improbable conjecture that he left a complete copy behind him written\nwith his own hand; for it is not likely that so diligent a man would use\nthe labor of a transcriber for such a purpose, and expose his most\nsecret thoughts to any other eye. He may have also intended the book for\nhis son Commodus, who however had no taste for his father's philosophy.\nSome careful hand preserved the precious volume; and a work by Antoninus\nis mentioned by other late writers besides Suidas.\n\nMany critics have labored on the text of Antoninus. The most complete\nedition is that by Thomas Gataker, 1652, 4to. The second edition of\nGataker was superintended by George Stanhope, 1697, 4to. There is also\nan edition of 1704. Gataker made and suggested many good corrections,\nand he also made a new Latin version, which is not a very good specimen\nof Latin, but it generally expresses the sense of the original, and\noften better than some of the more recent translations. He added in the\nmargin opposite to each paragraph references to the other parallel\npassages; and he wrote a commentary, one of the most complete that has\nbeen written on any ancient author. This commentary contains the\neditor's exposition of the more difficult passages, and quotations from\nall the Greek and Roman writers for the illustration of the text. It is\na wonderful monument of learning and labor, and certainly no Englishman\nhas yet done anything like it. At the end of his preface the editor says\nthat he wrote it at Rotherhithe near London, in a severe winter, when he\nwas in the seventy-eighth year of his age, 1651--a time when Milton,\nSelden, and other great men of the Commonwealth time were living; and\nthe great French scholar Saumaise (Salmasius), with whom Gataker\ncorresponded and received help from him for his edition of Antoninus.\nThe Greek test has also been edited by J. M. Schultz, Leipzig, 1802,\n8vo; and by the learned Greek Adamantinus Corais, Paris, 1816, 8vo. The\ntext of Schultz was republished by Tauchnitz, 1821.\n\nThere are English, German, French, Italian, and Spanish translations of\nM. Antoninus, and there may be others. I have not seen all the English\ntranslations. There is one by Jeremy Collier, 1702, 8vo, a most coarse\nand vulgar copy of the original. The latest French translation by\nAlexis Pierron in the collection of Charpentier is better than Dacier's,\nwhich has been honored with an Italian version (Udine, 1772). There is\nan Italian version (1675), which I have not seen. It is by a cardinal.\n\"A man illustrious in the church, the Cardinal Francis Barberini the\nelder, nephew of Pope Urban VIII., occupied the last years of his life\nin translating into his native language the thoughts of the Roman\nemperor, in order to diffuse among the faithful the fertilizing and\nvivifying seeds. He dedicated this translation to his soul, to make it,\nas he says in his energetic style, redder than his purple at the sight\nof the virtues of this Gentile\" (Pierron, Preface).\n\nI have made this translation at intervals after having used the book for\nmany years. It is made from the Greek, but I have not always followed\none text; and I have occasionally compared other versions with my own. I\nmade this translation for my own use, because I found that it was worth\nthe labor; but it may be useful to others also; and therefore I\ndetermined to print it. As the original is sometimes very difficult to\nunderstand and still more difficult to translate, it is not possible\nthat I have always avoided error. But I believe that I have not often\nmissed the meaning, and those who will take the trouble to compare the\ntranslation with the original should not hastily conclude that I am\nwrong, if they do not agree with me. Some passages do give the meaning,\nthough at first sight they may not appear to do so; and when I differ\nfrom the translators, I think that in some places they are wrong, and in\nother places I am sure that they are. I have placed in some passages a\n+, which indicates corruption in the text or great uncertainty in the\nmeaning. I could have made the language more easy and flowing, but I\nhave preferred a ruder style as being better suited to express the\ncharacter of the original; and sometimes the obscurity which may appear\nin the version is a fair copy of the obscurity of the Greek. If I should\never revise this version, I would gladly make use of any corrections\nwhich may be suggested. I have added an index of some of the Greek terms\nwith the corresponding English. If I have not given the best words for\nthe Greek, I have done the best that I could; and in the text I have\nalways given the same translation of the same word.\n\nThe last reflection of the Stoic philosophy that I have observed is in\nSimplicius' Commentary on the Enchiridion of Epictetus. Simplicius was\nnot a Christian, and such a man was not likely to be converted at a time\nwhen Christianity was grossly corrupted. But he was a really religious\nman, and he concludes his commentary with a prayer to the Deity which no\nChristian could improve. From the time of Zeno to Simplicius, a period\nof about nine hundred years, the Stoic philosophy formed the characters\nof some of the best and greatest men. Finally it became extinct, and we\nhear no more of it till the revival of letters in Italy. Angelo\nPoliziano met with two very inaccurate and incomplete manuscripts of\nEpictetus' Enchiridion, which he translated into Latin and dedicated to\nhis great patron Lorenzo de' Medici, in whose collection he had found\nthe book. Poliziano's version was printed in the first Bale edition of\nthe Enchiridion, A.D. 1531 (apud And. Cratandrum). Poliziano recommends\nthe Enchiridion to Lorenzo as a work well suited to his temper, and\nuseful in the difficulties by which he was surrounded.\n\nEpictetus and Antoninus have had readers ever since they were first\nprinted. The little book of Antoninus has been the companion of some\ngreat men. Machiavelli's Art of War and Marcus Antoninus were the two\nbooks which were used when he was a young man by Captain John Smith, and\nhe could not have found two writers better fitted to form the character\nof a soldier and a man. Smith is almost unknown and forgotten in\nEngland, his native country, but not in America, where he saved the\nyoung colony of Virginia. He was great in his heroic mind and his deeds\nin arms, but greater still in the nobleness of his character. For a\nman's greatness lies not in wealth and station, as the vulgar believe,\nnor yet in his intellectual capacity, which is often associated with\nthe meanest moral character, the most abject servility to those in high\nplaces, and arrogance to the poor and lowly; but a man's true greatness\nlies in the consciousness of an honest purpose in life, founded on a\njust estimate of himself and everything else, on frequent\nself-examination, and a steady obedience to the rule which he knows to\nbe right, without troubling himself, as the emperor says he should not,\nabout what others may think or say, or whether they do or do not do that\nwhich he thinks and says and does.\n\n\n\n\nTHE PHILOSOPHY\n\nOF\n\nMARCUS AURELIUS ANTONIUS\n\n\nIt has been said that the Stoic philosophy first showed its real value\nwhen it passed from Greece to Rome. The doctrines of Zeno and his\nsuccessors were well suited to the gravity and practical good sense of\nthe Romans; and even in the Republican period we have an example of a\nman, M. Cato Uticensis, who lived the life of a Stoic and died\nconsistently with the opinions which he professed. He was a man, says\nCicero, who embraced the Stoic philosophy from conviction; not for the\npurpose of vain discussion, as most did, but in order to make his life\nconformable to the Stoic precepts. In the wretched times from the death\nof Augustus to the murder of Domitian, there was nothing but the Stoic\nphilosophy which could console and support the followers of the old\nreligion under imperial tyranny and amidst universal corruption. There\nwere even then noble minds that could dare and endure, sustained by a\ngood conscience and an elevated idea of the purposes of man's existence.\nSuch were Paetus Thrasae, Helvidius Priscus, Cornutus, C. Musonius\nRufus,[A] and the poets Persius and Juvenal, whose energetic language\nand manly thoughts may be as instructive to us now as they might have\nbeen to their contemporaries. Persius died under Nero's bloody reign;\nbut Juvenal had the good fortune to survive the tyrant Domitian and to\nsee the better times of Nerva, Trajan, and Hadrian.[B] His best precepts\nare derived from the Stoic school, and they are enforced in his finest\nverses by the unrivalled vigor of the Latin language.\n\n    [A] I have omitted Seneca, Nero's preceptor. He was in a sense\n    a Stoic, and he has said many good things in a very fine way.\n    There is a judgment of Gellius (xii. 2.) on Seneca, or rather a\n    statement of what some people thought of his philosophy, and it\n    is not favorable. His writings and his life must be taken\n    together, and I have nothing more to say of him here. The\n    reader will find a notice of Seneca and his philosophy in\n    \"Seekers after God,\" by the Rev. P. W. Farrar. Macmillan and\n    Co.\n\n    [B] Ribbeck has labored to prove that those Satires, which\n    contain philosophical precepts, are not the work of the real,\n    but of a false Juvenal, a Declamator. Still the verses exist,\n    and were written by somebody who was acquainted with the Stoic\n    doctrines.\n\n\nThe best two expounders of the later Stoical philosophy were a Greek\nslave and a Roman emperor. Epictetus, a Phrygian Greek, was brought to\nRome, we know not how, but he was there the slave and afterwards the\nfreedman of an unworthy master, Epaphroditus by name, himself a freedman\nand a favorite of Nero. Epictetus may have been a hearer of C. Musonius\nRufus, while he was still a slave, but he could hardly have been a\nteacher before he was made free. He was one of the philosophers whom\nDomitian's order banished from Rome. He retired to Nicopolis in Epirus,\nand he may have died there. Like other great teachers he wrote nothing,\nand we are indebted to his grateful pupil Arrian for what we have of\nEpictetus' discourses. Arrian wrote eight books of the discourses of\nEpictetus, of which only four remain and some fragments. We have also\nfrom Arrian's hand the small Enchiridion or Manual of the chief precepts\nof Epictetus. This is a valuable commentary on the Enchiridion by\nSimplicius, who lived in the time of the emperor Justinian.[A]\n\n    [A] There is a complete edition of Arrian's Epictetus with the\n    commentary of Simplicius by J. Schweighaeuser, 6 vols. 8vo.\n    1799, 1800. There is also an English translation of Epictetus\n    by Mrs. Carter.\n\nAntoninus in his first book (i. 7), in which he gratefully commemorates\nhis obligations to his teachers, says that he was made acquainted by\nJunius Rusticus with the discourses of Epictetus, whom he mentions also\nin other passages (iv. 41; xi. 34, 36). Indeed, the doctrines of\nEpictetus and Antoninus are the same, and Epictetus is the best\nauthority for the explanation of the philosophical language of Antoninus\nand the exposition of his opinions. But the method of the two\nphilosophers is entirely different. Epictetus addressed himself to his\nhearers in a continuous discourse and in a familiar and simple manner.\nAntoninus wrote down his reflections for his own use only, in short,\nunconnected paragraphs, which are often obscure.\n\nThe Stoics made three divisions of philosophy,--Physic ([Greek:\nphusikon]), Ethic ([Greek: ethikon]), and Logic ([Greek: logikon])\n(viii. 13). This division, we are told by Diogenes, was made by Zeno of\nCitium, the founder of the Stoic sect, and by Chrysippus; but these\nphilosophers placed the three divisions in the following order,--Logic,\nPhysic, Ethic. It appears, however, that this division was made before\nZeno's time, and acknowledged by Plato, as Cicero remarks (Acad. Post.\ni. 5). Logic is not synonymous with our term Logic in the narrower sense\nof that word.\n\nCleanthes, a Stoic, subdivided the three divisions and made\nsix,--Dialectic and Rhetoric, comprised in Logic; Ethic and Politic;\nPhysic and Theology. This division was merely for practical use, for all\nPhilosophy is one. Even among the earliest Stoics Logic, or Dialectic,\ndoes not occupy the same place as in Plato: it is considered only as an\ninstrument which is to be used for the other divisions of Philosophy.\nAn exposition of the earlier Stoic doctrines and of their modifications\nwould require a volume. My object is to explain only the opinions of\nAntoninus, so far as they can be collected from his book.\n\nAccording to the subdivision of Cleanthes, Physic and Theology go\ntogether, or the study of the nature of Things, and the study of the\nnature of the Deity, so far as man can understand the Deity, and of his\ngovernment of the universe. This division or subdivision is not formally\nadopted by Antoninus, for, as already observed, there is no method in\nhis book; but it is virtually contained in it.\n\nCleanthes also connects Ethic and Politic, or the study of the\nprinciples of morals and the study of the constitution of civil society;\nand undoubtedly he did well in subdividing Ethic into two parts. Ethic\nin the narrower sense and Politic; for though the two are intimately\nconnected, they are also very distinct, and many questions can only be\nproperly discussed by carefully observing the distinction. Antoninus\ndoes not treat of Politic. His subject is Ethic, and Ethic in its\npractical application to his own conduct in life as a man and as a\ngovernor. His Ethic is founded on his doctrines about man's nature, the\nUniversal Nature, and the relation of every man to everything else. It\nis therefore intimately and inseparably connected with Physic, or the\nNature of Things, and with Theology, or the Nature of the Deity. He\nadvises us to examine well all the impressions on our minds\n([Greek: phantasiai]) and to form a right judgment of them, to make just\nconclusions, and to inquire into the meanings of words, and so far to\napply Dialectic; but he has no attempt at any exposition of Dialectic,\nand his philosophy is in substance purely moral and practical. He says\n(viii. 13), \"Constantly and, if it be possible, on the occasion of every\nimpression on the soul,[A] apply to it the principles of Physic, of\nEthic, and of Dialectic:\" which is only another way of telling us to\nexamine the impression in every possible way. In another passage (iii.\n11) he says, \"To the aids which have been mentioned, let this one still\nbe added: make for thyself a definition or description of the object\n([Greek: to phantaston]) which is presented to thee, so as to see\ndistinctly what kind of a thing it is in its substance, in its nudity,\nin its complete entirety, and tell thyself its proper name, and the\nnames of the things of which it has been compounded, and into which it\nwill be resolved.\" Such an examination implies a use of Dialectic, which\nAntoninus accordingly employed as a means toward establishing his\nPhysical, Theological, and Ethical principles.\n\n    [A] The original is [Greek: epi pases phantasias]. We have no word\n    which expresses [Greek: phantasia], for it is not only the sensuous\n    appearance which comes from an external object, which object is\n    called [Greek: to phantaston], but it is also the thought or feeling\n    or opinion which is produced even when there is no\n    corresponding external object before us. Accordingly everything\n    which moves the soul is [Greek: phantaston], and produces a\n    [Greek: phantasia].\n\n    In this extract Antoninus says [Greek: physiologein, pathologein,\n    dialektikeuesthai]. I have translated [Greek: pathologein] by using\n    the word Moral (Ethic), and that is the meaning here.\n\nThere are several expositions of the Physical, Theological, and Ethical\nprinciples, which are contained in the work of Antoninus; and more\nexpositions than I have read. Ritter (Geschichte der Philosophie, iv.\n241), after explaining the doctrines of Epictetus, treats very briefly\nand insufficiently those of Antoninus. But he refers to a short essay,\nin which the work is done better.[A] There is also an essay on the\nPhilosophical Principles of M. Aurelius Antoninus by J.M. Schultz,\nplaced at the end of his German translation of Antoninus (Schleswig,\n1799). With the assistance of these two useful essays and his own\ndiligent study, a man may form a sufficient notion of the principles of\nAntoninus; but he will find it more difficult to expound them to others.\nBesides the want of arrangement in the original and of connection among\nthe numerous paragraphs, the corruption of the text, the obscurity of\nthe language and the style, and sometimes perhaps the confusion in the\nwriter's own ideas--besides all this, there is occasionally an apparent\ncontradiction in the emperor's thoughts, as if his principles were\nsometimes unsettled, as if doubt sometimes clouded his mind. A man who\nleads a life of tranquillity and reflection, who is not disturbed at\nhome and meddles not with the affairs of the world, may keep his mind at\nease and his thoughts in one even course. But such a man has not been\ntried. All his Ethical philosophy and his passive virtue might turn out\nto be idle words, if he were once exposed to the rude realities of human\nexistence. Fine thoughts and moral dissertations from men who have not\nworked and suffered may be read, but they will be forgotten. No\nreligion, no Ethical philosophy is worth anything, if the teacher has\nnot lived the \"life of an apostle,\" and been ready to die \"the death of\na martyr.\" \"Not in passivity (the passive effects) but in activity lie\nthe evil and the good of the rational social animal, just as his virtue\nand his vice lie not in passivity, but in activity\" (ix. 16). The\nemperor Antoninus was a practical moralist. From his youth he followed a\nlaborious discipline, and though his high station placed him above all\nwant or the fear of it, he lived as frugally and temperately as the\npoorest philospher. Epictetus wanted little, and it seems that he always\nhad the little that he wanted and he was content with it, as he had been\nwith his servile station! But Antoninus after his accession to the\nempire sat on an uneasy seat. He had the administration of an empire\nwhich extended from the Euphrates to the Atlantic, from the cold\nmountains of Scotland to the hot sands of Africa; and we may imagine,\nthough we cannot know it by experience, what must be the trials, the\ntroubles, the anxiety, and the sorrows of him who has the world's\nbusiness on his hands, with the wish to do the best that he can, and the\ncertain knowledge that he can do very little of the good which he\nwishes.\n\n    [A] De Marco Aurelio Antonino ... ex ipsius Commentariis.\n    Scriptio Philologica. Instituit Nicolaus Bachius, Lipsiae,\n    1826.\n\nIn the midst of war, pestilence, conspiracy, general corruption, and\nwith the weight of so unwieldy an empire upon him, we may easily\ncomprehend that Antoninus often had need of all his fortitude to support\nhim. The best and the bravest men have moments of doubt and of weakness;\nbut if they are the best and the bravest, they rise again from their\ndepression by recurring to first principles, as Antoninus does. The\nemperor says that life is smoke, a vapor, and St. James in his Epistle\nis of the same mind; that the world is full of envious, jealous,\nmalignant people, and a man might be well content to get out of it. He\nhas doubts perhaps sometimes even about that to which he holds most\nfirmly. There are only a few passages of this kind, but they are\nevidence of the struggles which even the noblest of the sons of men had\nto maintain against the hard realities of his daily life. A poor remark\nit is which I have seen somewhere, and made in a disparaging way, that\nthe emperor's reflections show that he had need of consolation and\ncomfort in life, and even to prepare him to meet his death. True that he\ndid need comfort and support, and we see how he found it. He constantly\nrecurs to his fundamental principle that the universe is wisely ordered,\nthat every man is a part of it and must conform to that order which he\ncannot change, that whatever the Deity has done is good, that all\nmankind are a man's brethren, that he must love and cherish them and try\nto make them better, even those who would do him harm. This is his\nconclusion (ii. 17): \"What then is that which is able to conduct a man?\nOne thing and only one, Philosophy. But this consists in keeping the\ndivinity within a man free from violence and unharmed, superior to pains\nand pleasures, doing nothing without a purpose nor yet falsely and with\nhypocrisy, not feeling the need of another man's doing or not doing\nanything; and besides, accepting all that happens and all that is\nallotted, as coming from thence, wherever it is, from whence he himself\ncame; and finally waiting for death with a cheerful mind as being\nnothing else than a dissolution of the elements of which every living\nbeing is compounded. But if there is no harm, to the elements themselves\nin each continually changing into another, why should a man have any\napprehension about the change and dissolution of all the elements\n[himself]? for it is according to nature; and nothing is evil that is\naccording to nature.\"\n\nThe Physic of Antoninus is the knowledge of the Nature of the Universe,\nof its government, and of the relation of man's nature to both. He names\nthe universe ([Greek: he ton hylon ousia], vi. 1),[A] \"the universal\nsubstance,\" and he adds that \"reason\" ([Greek: logos]) governs the\nuniverse. He also (vi. 9) uses the terms \"universal nature\" or \"nature\nof the universe.\" He (vi. 25) calls the universe \"the one and all, which\nwe name Cosmos or Order\" ([Greek: kosmos]). If he ever seems to use\nthese general terms as significant of the All, of all that man can in\nany way conceive to exist, he still on other occasions plainly\ndistinguishes between Matter, Material things ([Greek: hyle, hylikon]),\nand Cause, Origin, Reason ([Greek: aitia, aitiodes, logos]).[B] This is\nconformable to Zeno's doctrine that there are two original principles\n([Greek: archai]) of all things, that which acts ([Greek: to poioun])\nand that which is acted upon ([Greek: to paschon]). That which is acted\non is the formless matter ([Greek: hyle]): that which acts is the reason\n([Greek: logos]), God, who is eternal and operates through all matter,\nand produces all things. So Antoninus (v. 32) speaks of the reason\n([Greek: logos])which pervades all substance ([Greek: ousia]), and\nthrough all time by fixed periods (revolutions) administers the universe\n([Greek: to pan]). God is eternal, and Matter is eternal. It is God who\ngives form to matter, but he is not said to have created matter.\nAccording to this view, which is as old as Anaxagoras, God and matter\nexist independently, but God governs matter. This doctrine is simply the\nexpression of the fact of the existence both of matter and of God. The\nStoics did not perplex themselves with the in-soluble question of the\norigin and nature of matter.[C] Antoninus also assumes a beginning of\nthings, as we now know them; but his language is sometimes very obscure.\nI have endeavored to explain the meaning of one difficult passage (vii.\n75, and the note).\n\n    [A] As to the word [Greek: ousia], the reader may see the\n    Index. I add here a few examples of the use of the word;\n    Antoninus has (v. 24), [Greek: he sumpasa ousia], \"the\n    universal substance.\" He says (xii. 30 and iv. 40), \"there is\n    one common substance\" ([Greek: ousia]), distributed among\n    countless bodies. In Stobaeus (tom. 1, lib. 1, tit. 14) there\n    is this definition, [Greek: ousian de phasin ton onton hapanton\n    ten proten hylen]. In viii. II, Antoninus speaks of [Greek: to\n    ousiodes kai hyulikon], \"the substantial and the material;\" and\n    (vii. 10) he says that \"everything material\" ([Greek: enulon])\n    disappears in the substance of the whole ([Greek: te ton holon\n    ousia]). The [Greek: ousia] is the generic name of that existence\n    which we assume as the highest or ultimate, because we conceive\n    no existence which can be coordinated with it and none above\n    it. It is the philosopher's \"substance:\" it is the ultimate\n    expression for that which we conceive or suppose to be the\n    basis, the being of a thing. \"From the Divine, which is\n    substance in itself, or the only and sole substance, all and\n    everything that is created exists\" (Swedenborg, Angelic Wisdom,\n    198).\n\n    [B] I remark, in order to anticipate any misapprehension, that\n    all these general terms involve a contradiction. The \"one and\n    all,\" and the like, and \"the whole,\" imply limitation. \"One\" is\n    limited; \"all\" is limited; the \"whole\" is limited. We cannot\n    help it. We cannot find words to express that which we cannot\n    fully conceive. The addition of \"absolute\" or any other such\n    word does not mend the matter. Even the word God is used by\n    most people, often unconsciously, in such a way that limitation\n    is implied, and yet at the same time words are added which are\n    intended to deny limitation. A Christian martyr, when he was\n    asked what God was, is said to have answered that God has no\n    name like a man; and Justin says the same (Apol. ii. 6), \"the\n    names Father, God, Creator, Lord, and Master are not names, but\n    appellations derived from benefactions and acts.\" (Compare\n    Seneca, De Benef. iv. 8.) We can conceive the existence of a\n    thing, or rather we may have the idea of an existence, without\n    an adequate notion of it, \"adequate\" meaning coextensive and\n    coequal with the thing. We have a notion of limited space\n    derived from the dimensions of what we call a material thing,\n    though of space absolute, if I may use the term, we have no\n    notion at all; and of infinite space the notion is the same--no\n    notion at all; and yet we conceive it in a sense, though I know\n    not how, and we believe that space is infinite, and we cannot\n    conceive it to be finite.\n\n    [C] The notions of matter and of space are inseparable. We\n    derive the notion of space from matter and form. But we have no\n    adequate conception either of matter or space. Matter in its\n    ultimate resolution is as unintelligible as what men call mind,\n    spirit, or by whatever other name they may express the power\n    which makes itself known by acts. Anaxagoras laid down the\n    distinction between intelligence [Greek: nous] and matter, and\n    he said that intelligence impressed motion on matter, and so\n    separated the elements of matter and gave them order; but he\n    probably only assumed a beginning, as Simplicius says, as a\n    foundation of his philosophical teaching. Empedocles said, \"The\n    universe always existed.\" He had no idea of what is called\n    creation. Ocellus Lucanus (i, Sec. 2) maintained that the Universe\n    ([Greek: to pan]) was imperishable and uncreated. Consequently\n    it is eternal. He admitted the existence of God; but his\n    theology would require some discussion. On the contrary, the\n    Brachmans, according to Strabo (p. 713, ed. Cas.), taught that\n    the universe was created and perishable; and the creator and\n    administrator of it pervades the whole. The author of the book\n    of Solomon's Wisdom says (xi. 17): \"Thy Almighty hand made the\n    world of matter without form,\" which may mean that matter\n    existed already.\n\n    The common Greek word which we translate \"matter\" is [Greek:\n    hyle]. It is the stuff that things are made of.\n\nMatter consists of elemental parts ([Greek: stoicheia]) of which all\nmaterial objects are made. But nothing is permanent in form. The nature\nof the universe, according to Antoninus' expression (iv. 36), \"loves\nnothing so much as to change the things which are, and to make new\nthings like them. For everything that exists is in a manner the seed of\nthat which will be. But thou art thinking only of seeds which are cast\ninto the earth or into a womb: but this is a very vulgar notion.\" All\nthings then are in a constant flux and change; some things are dissolved\ninto the elements, others come in their places; and so the \"whole\nuniverse continues ever young and perfect\" (xii. 23).\n\nAntoninus has some obscure expressions about what he calls \"seminal\nprinciples\" ([Greek: spermatikoi logoi]). He opposes them to the\nEpicurean atoms (vi. 24), and consequently his \"seminal principles\" are\nnot material atoms which wander about at hazard, and combine nobody\nknows how. In one passage (iv. 21) he speaks of living principles, souls\n([Greek: psychahi]) after the dissolution of their bodies being\nreceived into the \"seminal principle of the universe.\" Schultz thinks\nthat by \"seminal principles Antoninus means the relations of the various\nelemental principles, which relations are determined by the Deity and by\nwhich alone the production of organized beings is possible.\" This may be\nthe meaning; but if it is, nothing of any value can be derived from\nit.[A] Antoninus often uses the word \"Nature\" ([Greek: physis]), and we\nmust attempt to fix its meaning, The simple etymological sense of\n[Greek: physis] is \"production,\" the birth of what we call Things. The\nRomans used Natura, which also means \"birth\" originally. But neither the\nGreeks nor the Romans stuck to this simple meaning, nor do we. Antoninus\nsays (x. 6): \"Whether the universe is [a concourse of] atoms or Nature\n[is a system], let this first be established, that I am a part of the\nwhole which is governed by nature.\" Here it might seem as if nature were\npersonified and viewed as an active, efficient power; as something\nwhich, it not independent of the Deity, acts by a power which is given\nto it by the Deity. Such, if I understand the expression right, is the\nway in which the word Nature is often used now, though it is plain that\nmany writers use the word without fixing any exact meaning to it. It is\nthe same with the expression Laws of Nature, which some writers may use\nin an intelligible sense, but others as clearly use in no definite sense\nat all. There is no meaning in this word Nature, except that which\nBishop Butler assigns to it, when he says, \"The only distinct meaning of\nthat word Natural is Stated, Fixed, or Settled; since what is natural as\nmuch requires and presupposes an intelligent agent to render it so,\n_i.e._, to effect it continually or at stated times, as what is\nsupernatural or miraculous does to effect it at once.\" This is Plato's\nmeaning (De Leg., iv. 715) when he says that God holds the beginning and\nend and middle of all that exists, and proceeds straight on his course,\nmaking his circuit according to nature (that is by a fixed order); and\nhe is continually accompanied by justice, who punishes those who deviate\nfrom the divine law, that is, from the order or course which God\nobserves.\n\n    [A] Justin (Apol. ii. 8) has the words [Greek: kata\n    spermatikou logou meros], where he is speaking of the Stoics;\n    but he uses this expression in a peculiar sense (note II). The\n    early Christian writers were familiar with the Stoic terms, and\n    their writings show that the contest was begun between the\n    Christian expositors and the Greek philosophy. Even in the\n    second Epistle of St. Peter (ii. I, v. 4) we find a Stoic\n    expression, [Greek: Ina dia touton genesthe theias koinonoi\n    physeos.]\n\nWhen we look at the motions of the planets, the action of what we call\ngravitation, the elemental combination of unorganized bodies and their\nresolution, the production of plants and of living bodies, their\ngeneration, growth, and their dissolution, which we call their death, we\nobserve a regular sequence of phenomena, which within the limits of\nexperience present and past, so far as we know the past, is fixed and\ninvariable. But if this is not so, if the order and sequence of\nphenomena, as known to us, are subject to change in the course of an\ninfinite progression,--and such change is conceivable,--we have not\ndiscovered, nor shall we ever discover, the whole of the order and\nsequence of phenomena, in which sequence there may be involved according\nto its very nature, that is, according to its fixed order, some\nvariation of what we now call the Order or Nature of Things. It is also\nconceivable that such changes have taken place,--changes in the order of\nthings, as we are compelled by the imperfection of language to call\nthem, but which are no changes; and further it is certain that our\nknowledge of the true sequence of all actual phenomena, as for instance\nthe phenomena of generation, growth, and dissolution, is and ever must\nbe imperfect.\n\nWe do not fare much better when we speak of Causes and Effects than when\nwe speak of Nature. For the practical purposes of life we may use the\nterms cause and effect conveniently, and we may fix a distinct meaning\nto them, distinct enough at least to prevent all misunderstanding. But\nthe case is different when we speak of causes and effects as of Things.\nAll that we know is phenomena, as the Greeks called them, or appearances\nwhich follow one another in a regular order, as we conceive it, so that\nif some one phenomenon should fail in the series, we conceive that there\nmust either be an interruption of the series, or that something else\nwill appear after the phenomenon which has failed to appear, and will\noccupy the vacant place; and so the series in its progression may be\nmodified or totally changed. Cause and effect then mean nothing in the\nsequence of natural phenomena beyond what I have said; and the real\ncause, or the transcendent cause, as some would call it, of each\nsuccessive phenomenon is in that which is the cause of all things which\nare, which have been, and which will be forever. Thus the word Creation\nmay have a real sense if we consider it as the first, if we can conceive\na first, in the present order of natural phenomena; but in the vulgar\nsense a creation of all things at a certain time, followed by a\nquiescence of the first cause and an abandonment of all sequences of\nPhenomena to the laws of Nature, or to the other words that people may\nUse, is absolutely absurd.[A]\n\n    [A] Time and space are the conditions of our thought; but time\n    infinite and space infinite cannot be objects of thought,\n    except in a very imperfect way. Time and space must not in any\n    way be thought of when we think of the Deity. Swedenborg says,\n    \"The natural man may believe that he would have no thought, if\n    the ideas of time, of space, and of things material were taken\n    away; for upon those is founded all the thought that man has.\n    But let him know that the thoughts are limited and confined in\n    proportion as they partake of time, of space, and of what is\n    material; and that they are not limited and are extended, in\n    proportion as they do not partake of those things; since the\n    mind is so far elevated above the things corporeal and worldly\"\n    (Concerning Heaven and Hell, 169).\n\n[Illustration: THE TEMPLE OF PALLAS]\n\nNow, though there is great difficulty in understanding all the\npassages of Antoninus, in which he speaks of Nature, of the changes of\nthings and of the economy of the universe, I am convinced that his sense\nof Nature and Natural is the same as that which I have stated; and as he\nwas a man who knew how to use words in a clear way and with strict\nconsistency, we ought to assume, even if his meaning in some passages is\ndoubtful, that his view of Nature was in harmony with his fixed belief\nin the all-pervading, ever present, and ever active energy of God. (ii.\n4; iv. 40; x. 1; vi. 40; and other passages. Compare Seneca, De Benef.,\niv. 7. Swedenborg, Angelic Wisdom, 349-357.)\n\nThere is much in Antoninus that is hard to understand, and it might be\nsaid that he did not fully comprehend all that he wrote; which would\nhowever be in no way remarkable, for it happens now that a man may write\nwhat neither he nor anybody can understand. Antoninus tells us (xii. 10)\nto look at things and see what they are, resolving them into the\nmaterial [Greek: hyle], the casual [Greek: aition], and the relation\n[Greek: anaphora], or the purpose, by which he seems to mean something\nin the nature of what we call effect, or end. The word Caus ([Greek:\naitia]) is the difficulty. There is the same word in the Sanscrit\n(hetu); and the subtle philosophers of India and of Greece, and\nthe less subtle philosophers of modern times, have all used this word,\nor an equivalent word, in a vague way. Yet the confusion sometimes may\nbe in the inevitable ambiguity of language rather than in the mind of\nthe writer, for I cannot think that some of the wisest of men did not\nknow what they intended to say. When Antoninus says (iv. 36), \"that\neverything that exists is in a manner the seed of that which will be,\"\nhe might be supposed to say what some of the Indian philosophers have\nsaid, and thus a profound truth might be converted into a gross\nabsurdity. But he says, \"in a manner,\" and in a manner he said true; and\nin another manner, if you mistake his meaning, he said false. When Plato\nsaid, \"Nothing ever is, but is always becoming\" ([Greek: aei\ngignetai]), he delivered a text, out of which we may derive something;\nfor he destroys by it not all practical, but all speculative notions of\ncause and effect. The whole series of things, as they appear to us, must\nbe contemplated in time, that is in succession, and we conceive or\nsuppose intervals between one state of things and another state of\nthings, so that there is priority and sequence, and interval, and Being,\nand a ceasing to Be, and beginning and ending. But there is nothing of\nthe kind in the Nature of Things. It is an everlasting continuity (iv.\n45; vii. 75). When Antoninus speaks of generation (x. 26), he speaks of\none cause ([Greek: aitia]) acting, and then another cause taking up the\nwork, which the former left in a certain state, and so on; and we might\nperhaps conceive that he had some notion like what has been called \"the\nself-evolving power of nature;\" a fine phrase indeed, the full import of\nwhich I believe that the writer of it did not see, and thus he laid\nhimself open to the imputation of being a follower of one of the Hindu\nsects, which makes all things come by evolution out of nature or matter,\nor out of something which takes the place of Deity, but is not Deity. I\nwould have all men think as they please, or as they can, and I only\nclaim the same freedom which I give. When a man writes anything, we may\nfairly try to find out all that his words must mean, even if the result\nis that they mean what he did not mean; and if we find this\ncontradiction, it is not our fault, but his misfortune. Now Antoninus is\nperhaps somewhat in this condition in what he says (x. 26), though he\nspeaks at the end of the paragraph of the power which acts, unseen by\nthe eyes, but still no less clearly. But whether in this passage (x. 26)\nlie means that the power is conceived to be in the different successive\ncauses ([Greek: aitiai]), or in something else, nobody can tell. From\nother passages, however, I do collect that his notion of the phenomena\nof the universe is what I have stated. The Deity works unseen, if we may\nuse such language, and perhaps I may, as Job did, or he who wrote the\nbook of Job. \"In him we live and move and are,\" said St. Paul to the\nAthenians; and to show his hearers that this was no new doctrine, he\nquoted the Greek poets. One of these poets was the Stoic Cleauthes,\nwhose noble hymn to Zeus, or God, is an elevated expression of devotion\nand philosophy. It deprives Nature of her power, and puts her under the\nimmediate government of the Deity.\n\n\"Thee all this heaven, which whirls around the earth,\n Obeys, and willing follows where thou leadest.\n Without thee, God, nothing is done on earth,\n Nor in the ethereal realms, nor in the sea,\n Save what the wicked through their folly do.\"\n\nAntoninus' conviction of the existence of a divine power and government\nwas founded on his perception of the order of the universe. Like\nSocrates (Xen. Mem., iv. 3, 13, etc.) he says that though we cannot see\nthe forms of divine powers, we know that they exist because we see their\nworks.\n\n\"To those who ask, Where hast thou seen the gods, or how dost thou\ncomprehend that they exist and so worshipest them? I answer, in the\nfirst place, that they may be seen even with the eyes; in the second\nplace, neither have I seen my own soul, and yet I honor it. Thus then\nwith respect to the gods, from what I constantly experience of their\npower, from this I comprehend that they exist, and I venerate them.\"\n(xii. 28, and the note. Comp. Aristotle de Mundo, c. 6; Xen. Mem. i. 4,\n9; Cicero, Tuscul. i. 28, 29; St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans, i. 19,\n20; and Montaigne's Apology for Raimond de Sebonde, ii. c. 12.) This is\na very old argument, which has always had great weight with most people,\nand has appeared sufficient. It does not acquire the least additional\nstrength by being developed in a learned treatise. It is as intelligible\nin its simple enunciation as it can be made. If it is rejected, there is\nno arguing with him who rejects it: and if it is worked out into\ninnumerable particulars, the value of the evidence runs the risk of\nbeing buried under a mass of words.\n\nMan being conscious that he is a spiritual power, or that he has such a\npower, in whatever way he conceives that he has it--for I wish simply to\nstate a fact--from this power which he has in himself, he is led, as\nAntoninus says, to believe that there is a greater power, which, as the\nold Stoics tell us, pervades the whole universe as the intellect[A]\n([Greek: nous]) pervades man. (Compare Epictetus' Discourses, i. 14;\nand Voltaire a Mad^e. Necker, vol. lxvii., p. 278, ed. Lequien.)\n\n    [A] I have always translated the word [Greek: nous],\n    \"intelligence\" or \"intellect.\" It appears to be the word used\n    by the oldest Greek philosophers to express the notion of\n    \"intelligence\" as opposed to the notion of \"matter.\" I have\n    always translated the word [Greek: logos] by \"reason,\" and\n    [Greek: logikos] by the word \"rational,\" or perhaps sometimes\n    \"reasonable,\" as I have translated [Greek: noeros] by the word\n    \"intellectual.\" Every man who has thought and has read any\n    philosophical writings knows the difficulty of finding words to\n    express certain notions, how imperfectly words express these\n    notions, and how carelessly the words are often used. The\n    various senses of the word [Greek: logos] are enough to perplex\n    any man. Our translators of the New Testament (St. John, c. 1.)\n    have simply translated [Greek: ho logos] by \"the word,\" as the\n    Germans translated it by \"das Wort;\" but in their theological\n    writings they sometimes retain the original term Logos. The\n    Germans have a term Vernunft, which seems to come nearest to\n    our word Reason, or the necessary and absolute truths which we\n    cannot conceive as being other than what they are. Such are\n    what some people have called the laws of thought, the\n    conceptions of space and of time, and axioms or first\n    principles, which need no proof and cannot be proved or denied.\n    Accordingly the Germans can say, \"Gott ist die hoechste\n    Vernunft,\" the Supreme Reason. The Germans have also a word\n    Verstand, which seems to represent our word \"understanding,\"\n    \"intelligence,\" \"intellect,\" not as a thing absolute which\n    exists by itself, but as a thing connected with an individual\n    being, as a man. Accordingly it is the capacity of receiving\n    impressions (Vorstellungen, [Greek: phantasiai],) and forming\n    from them distinct ideas (Begriffe), and perceiving\n    differences. I do not think that these remarks will help the\n    reader to the understanding of Antoninus, or his use of the\n    words [Greek: nous] and [Greek: logos]. The emperor's meaning\n    must be got from his own words, and if it does not agree\n    altogether with modern notions, it is not our business to force\n    it into agreement, but simply to find out what his meaning is,\n    if we can.\n\n    Justinus (ad Diognetum, c. vii.) says that the omnipotent,\n    all-creating, and invisible God has fixed truth and the holy,\n    incomprehensible Logos in men's hearts; and this Logos is the\n    architect and creator of the Universe. In the first Apology (c.\n    xxxii.), he says that the seed ([Greek: sperma]) from God is\n    the Logos, which dwells in those who believe in God. So it\n    appears that according to Justinus the Logos is only in such\n    believers. In the second Apology (c. viii.) he speaks of the\n    seed of the Logos being implanted in all mankind; but those who\n    order their lives according to Logos, such as the Stoics, have\n    only a portion of the Logos ([Greek: kata spermatikou logou\n    meros]), and have not the knowledge and contemplation of the\n    entire Logos, which is Christ. Swedenborg's remarks (Angelic\n    Wisdom, 240) are worth comparing with Justinus. The modern\n    philosopher in substance agrees with the ancient; but he is\n    more precise.\n\nGod exists then, but what do we know of his nature? Antoninus says that\nthe soul of man is an efflux from the divinity. We have bodies like\nanimals, but we have reason, intelligence, as the gods. Animals have\nlife ([Greek: psyche]) and what we call instincts or natural principles\nof action: but the rational animal man alone has a rational, intelligent\nsoul ([Greek: psyche logike noera]). Antoninus insists on this\ncontinually: God is in man,[A] and so we must constantly attend to the\ndivinity within us, for it is only in this way that we can have any\nknowledge of the nature of God. The human soul is in a sense a portion\nof the divinity, and the soul alone has any communication with the\nDeity; for as he says (xii. 2): \"With his intellectual part alone God\ntouches the intelligence only which has flowed and been derived from\nhimself into these bodies.\" In fact he says that which is hidden within\na man is life, that is, the man himself. All the rest is vesture,\ncovering, organs, instrument, which the living man, the real[B] man,\nuses for the purpose of his present existence. The air is universally\ndiffused for him who is able to respire; and so for him who is willing\nto partake of it the intelligent power, which holds within it all\nthings, is diffused as wide and free as the air (viii. 54). It is by\nliving a divine life that man approaches to a knowledge of the\ndivinity.[C] It is by following the divinity within [Greek: daimon] or\n[Greek: theos], as Antonius calls it, that man comes nearest to the\nDeity, the supreme good; for man can never attain to perfect agreement\nwith his internal guide ([Greek: to hegemonikon]). \"Live with the gods.\nAnd he does live with the gods who constantly shows to them that his own\nsoul is satisfied with that which is assigned to him, and that it does\nall the daemon ([Greek: daimon]) wishes, which Zeus hath given to every\nman for his guardian and guide, a portion of himself. And this daemon is\nevery man's understanding and reason\" (v. 27).\n\n    [A] Comp. Ep. to the Corinthians, i. 3, 17, and James iv. 8,\n    \"Drawnigh to God and he will draw nigh to you.\"\n\n    [B] This is also Swedenborg's doctrine of the soul. \"As to what\n    concerns the soul, of which it is said that it shall live after\n    death, it is nothing else but the man himself, who lives in the\n    body, that is, the interior man, who by the body acts in the\n    world and from whom the body itself lives\" (quoted by Clissold,\n    p. 456 of \"The Practical Nature of the Theological Writings of\n    Emanuel Swedenborg, in a Letter to the Archbishop of Dublin\n    (Whately),\" second edition, 1859; a book which theologians\n    might read with profit). This is an old doctrine of the soul,\n    which has been often proclaimed, but never better expressed\n    than by the \"Auctor de Mundo,\" c. 6, quoted by Gataker in his\n    \"Antoninus,\" p. 436. \"The soul by which we live and have cities\n    and houses is invisible, but it is seen by its works; for the\n    whole method of life has been devised by it and ordered, and by\n    it is held together. In like manner we must think also about\n    the Deity, who in power is most mighty, in beauty most comely,\n    in life immortal, and in virtue supreme: wherefore though he is\n    invisible to human nature, he is seen by his very works.\" Other\n    passages to the same purpose are quoted by Gataker (p. 382).\n    Bishop Butler has the same as to the soul: \"Upon the whole,\n    then, our organs of sense and our limbs are certainly\n    instruments, which the living persons, ourselves, make use of\n    to perceive and move with.\" If this is not plain enough, be\n    also says: \"It follows that our organized bodies are no more\n    ourselves, or part of ourselves, than any other matter around\n    us.\" (Compare Anton, x. 38).\n\n    [C] The reader may consult Discourse V., \"Of the existence and\n    nature of God,\" in John Smith's \"Select Discourses.\" He has\n    prefixed as a text to this Discourse, the striking passage of\n    Agapetus, Paraenes. Sec. 3: \"He who knows himself will know God;\n    and he who knows God will be made like to God; and he will be\n    made like to God, who has become worthy of God; and he becomes\n    worthy of God, who does nothing unworthy of God, but thinks the\n    things that are his, and speaks what he thinks, and does what\n    he speaks.\" I suppose that the old saying, \"Know thyself,\"\n    which is attributed to Socrates and others, had a larger\n    meaning than the narrow sense which is generally given to it.\n    (Agapetus, ed. Stephan. Schoning, Franeker, 1608. This volume\n    contains also the Paraeneses of Nilus.)\n\nThere is in man, that is in the reason, the intelligence, a superior\nfaculty which if it is exercised rules all the rest. This is the ruling\nfaculty ([Greek: to hegemonikon]), which Cicero (De Natura Deorum, ii.\n11) renders by the Latin word Principatus, \"to which nothing can or\nought to be superior.\" Antoninus often uses this term and others which\nare equivalent. He names it (vii. 64) \"the governing intelligence.\" The\ngoverning faculty is the master of the soul (v. 26). A man must\nreverence only his ruling faculty and the divinity within him. As we\nmust reverence that which is supreme in the universe, so we must\nreverence that which is supreme in ourselves; and this is that which is\nof like kind with that which is supreme in the universe (v. 21). So, as\nPlotinus says, the soul of man can only know the divine so far as it\nknows itself. In one passage (xi. 19) Antoninus speaks of a man's\ncondemnation of himself when the diviner part within him has been\noverpowered and yields to the less honorable and to the perishable part,\nthe body, and its gross pleasures. In a word, the views of Antoninus on\nthis matter, however his expressions may vary, are exactly what Bishop\nButler expresses when he speaks of \"the natural supremacy of reflection\nor conscience,\" of the faculty \"which surveys, approves, or disapproves\nthe several affections of our mind and actions of our lives.\"\n\nMuch matter might be collected from Antoninus on the notion of the\nUniverse being one animated Being. But all that he says amounts to no\nmore, as Schultz remarks, than this: the soul of man is most intimately\nunited to his body, and together they make one animal, which we call\nman; so the Deity is most intimately united to the world, or the\nmaterial universe, and together they form one whole. But Antoninus did\nnot view God and the material universe as the same, any more than he\nviewed the body and soul of man as one. Antoninus has 110 speculations\non the absolute nature of the Deity. It was not his fashion to waste his\ntime on what man cannot understand.[A] He was satisfied that God exists,\nthat he governs all things, that man can only have an imperfect\nknowledge of his nature, and he must attain this imperfect knowledge by\nreverencing the divinity which is within him, and keeping it pure.\n\n    [A] \"God, who is infinitely beyond the reach of our narrow\n    capacities\" (Locke, Essay concerning the Human Understanding,\n    ii. chap. 17).\n\nFrom all that has been said, it follows that the universe is\nadministered by the Providence of God ([Greek: pronoia]), and that all\nthings are wisely ordered. There are passages in which Antoninus\nexpresses doubts, or states different possible theories of the\nconstitution and government of the universe; but he always recurs to his\nfundamental principle, that if we admit the existence of a deity, we\nmust also admit that he orders all things wisely and well (iv. 27; vi.\n1; ix. 28; xii. 5; and many other passages). Epictetus says (i. 6) that\nwe can discern the providence which rules the world, if we possess two\nthings,--the power of seeing all that happens with respect to each\nthing, and a grateful disposition.\n\nBut if all things are wisely ordered, how is the world so full of what\nwe call evil, physical and moral? If instead of saying that there is\nevil in the world, we use the expression which I have used, \"what we\ncall evil,\" we have partly anticipated the emperor's answer. We see and\nfeel and know imperfectly very few things in the few years that we live,\nand all the knowledge and all the experience of all the human race is\npositive ignorance of the whole, which is infinite. Now, as our reason\nteaches us that everything is in some way related to and connected with\nevery other thing, all notion of evil as being in the universe of things\nis a contradiction; for if the whole comes from and is governed by an\nintelligent being, it is impossible to conceive anything in it which\ntends to the evil or destruction of the whole (viii. 55; x. 6).\nEverything is in constant mutation, and yet the whole subsists; we might\nimagine the solar system resolved into its elemental parts, and yet the\nwhole would still subsist \"ever young and perfect.\"\n\nAll things, all forms, are dissolved, and new forms appear. All living\nthings undergo the change which we call death. If we call death an evil,\nthen all change is an evil. Living beings also suffer pain, and man\nsuffers most of all, for he suffers both in and by his body and by his\nintelligent part. Men suffer also from one another, and perhaps the\nlargest part of human suffering comes to man from those whom he calls\nhis brothers. Antoninus says (viii. 55), \"Generally, wickedness does no\nharm at all to the universe; and particularly, the wickedness [of one\nman] does no harm to another. It is only harmful to him who has it in\nhis power to be released from it as soon as he shall choose.\" The first\npart of this is perfectly consistent with the doctrine that the whole\ncan sustain no evil or harm. The second part must be explained by the\nStoic principle that there is no evil in anything which is not in our\npower. What wrong we suffer from another is his evil, not ours. But this\nis an admission that there is evil in a sort, for he who does wrong does\nevil, and if others can endure the wrong, still there is evil in the\nwrong-doer. Antoninus (xi. 18) gives many excellent precepts with\nrespect to wrongs and injuries, and his precepts are practical. He\nteaches us to bear what we cannot avoid, and his lessons may be just as\nuseful to him who denies the being and the government of God as to him\nwho believes in both. There is no direct answer in Antoninus to the\nobjections which may be made to the existence and providence of God\nbecause of the moral disorder and suffering which are in the world,\nexcept this answer which he makes in reply to the supposition that even\nthe best men may be extinguished by death. He says if it is so, we may\nbe sure that if it ought to have been otherwise, the gods would have\nordered it otherwise (xii. 5). His conviction of the wisdom which we may\nobserve in the government of the world is too strong to be disturbed by\nany apparent irregularities in the order of things. That these disorders\nexist is a fact, and those who would conclude from them against the\nbeing and government of God conclude too hastily. We all admit that\nthere is an order in the material world, a Nature, in the sense in which\nthat word has been explained, a constitution ([Greek: kataskeue]), what we\ncall a system, a relation of parts to one another and a fitness of the\nwhole for something. So in the constitution of plants and of animals\nthere is an order, a fitness for some end. Sometimes the order, as we\nconceive it, is interrupted, and the end, as we conceive it, is not\nattained. The seed, the plant, or the animal sometimes perishes before\nit has passed through all its changes and done all its uses. It is\naccording to Nature, that is a fixed order, for some to perish early and\nfor others to do all their uses and leave successors to take their\nplace. So man has a corporeal and intellectual and moral constitution\nfit for certain uses, and on the whole man performs these uses, dies,\nand leaves other men in his place. So society exists, and a social state\nis manifestly the natural state of man--the state for which his nature\nfits him, and society amidst innumerable irregularities and disorders\nstill subsists; and perhaps we may say that the history of the past and\nour present knowledge give us a reasonable hope that its disorders will\ndiminish, and that order, its governing principle, may be more firmly\nestablished. As order then, a fixed order, we may say, subject to\ndeviations real or apparent, must be admitted to exist in the whole\nnature of things, that which we call disorder or evil, as it seems to\nus, does not in any way alter the fact of the general constitution of\nthings having a nature or fixed order. Nobody will conclude from the\nexistence of disorder that order is not the rule, for the existence of\norder both physical and moral is proved by daily experience and all past\nexperience. We cannot conceive how the order of the universe is\nmaintained: we cannot even conceive how our own life from day to day is\ncontinued, nor how we perform the simplest movements of the body, nor\nhow we grow and think and act, though we know many of the conditions\nwhich are necessary for all these functions. Knowing nothing then of the\nunseen power which acts in ourselves except by what is done, we know\nnothing of the power which acts through what we call all time and all\nspace; but seeing that there is a nature or fixed order in all things\nknown to us, it is conformable to the nature of our minds to believe\nthat this universal Nature has a cause which operates continually, and\nthat we are totally unable to speculate on the reason of any of those\ndisorders or evils which we perceive. This I believe is the answer which\nmay be collected from all that Antoninus has said.[A]\n\n    [A] Cleanthes says in his Hymn:--\n\n    \"For all things good and bad to One thou formest,\n    So that One everlasting reason governs all.\"\n\n    See Bishop Butler's Sermons. Sermon XV., \"Upon the Ignorance of\n    Man.\"\n\nThe origin of evil is an old question. Achilles tells Priam (Iliad,\n24, 527) that Zeus has two casks, one filled with good things, and the\nother with bad, and that he gives to men out of each according to his\npleasure; and so we must be content, for we cannot alter the will of\nZeus. One of the Greek commentators asks how must we reconcile this\ndoctrine with what we find in the first book of the Odyssey, where the\nking of the gods says, Men say that evil comes to them from us, but they\nbring it on themselves through their own folly. The answer is plain\nenough even to the Greek commentator. The poets make both Achilles and\nZeus speak appropriately to their several characters. Indeed, Zeus says\nplainly that men do attribute their sufferings to their gods, but they\ndo it falsely, for they are the cause of their own sorrows.\n\n[Illustration: THE APPIAN WAY, ROME]\n\nEpictetus in his Enchiridion (c. 27) makes short work of the question of\nevil. He says, \"As a mark is not set up for the purpose of missing it,\nso neither does the nature of evil exist in the universe.\" This will\nappear obscure enough to those who are not acquainted with Epictetus,\nbut he always knows what he is talking about. We do not set up a mark in\norder to miss it, though we may miss it. God, whose existence Epictetus\nassumes, has not ordered all things so that his purpose shall fail.\nWhatever there may be of what we call evil, the nature of evil, as he\nexpresses it, does not exist; that is, evil is not a part of the\nconstitution or nature of things. If there were a principle of evil\n([Greek: arche]) in the constitution of things, evil would no longer be\nevil, as Simplicius argues, but evil would be good. Simplicius (c. 34,\n[27]) has a long and curious discourse on this text of Epictetus, and it\nis amusing and instructive.\n\nOne passage more will conclude this matter. It contains all that the\nemperor could say (ii. 11): \"To go from among men, if there are gods, is\nnot a thing to be afraid of, for the gods will not involve thee in evil;\nbut if indeed they do not exist, or if they have no concern about human\naffairs, what is it to me to live in a universe devoid of gods or devoid\nof providence? But in truth they do exist, and they do care for human\nthings, and they have put all the means in man's power to enable him not\nto fall into real evils. And as to the rest, if there was anything evil,\nthey would have provided for this also, that it should be altogether in\na man's power not to fall into it. But that which does not make a man\nworse, how can it make a man's life worse? But neither through\nignorance, nor having the knowledge but not the power to guard against\nor correct these things, is it possible that the nature of the universe\nhas overlooked them; nor is it possible that it has made so great a\nmistake, either through want of power or want of skill, that good and\nevil should happen indiscriminately to the good and the bad. But death\ncertainly and life, honor and dishonor, pain and pleasure, all these\nthings equally happen to good and bad men, being things which make us\nneither better nor worse. Therefore they are neither good nor evil.\"\n\nThe Ethical part of Antoninus' Philosophy follows from his general\nprinciples. The end of all his philosophy is to live conformably to\nNature, both a man's own nature and the nature of the universe. Bishop\nButler has explained what the Greek philosophers meant when they spoke\nof living according to Nature, and he says that when it is explained, as\nhe has explained it and as they understood it, it is \"a manner of\nspeaking not loose and undeterminate, but clear and distinct, strictly\njust and true.\" To live according to Nature is to live according to a\nman's whole nature, not according to a part of it, and to reverence the\ndivinity within him as the governor of all his actions. \"To the rational\nanimal the same act is according to nature and according to reason\"[A]\n(vii. 11). That which is done contrary to reason is also an act contrary\nto nature, to the whole nature, though it is certainly conformable to\nsome part of man's nature, or it could not be done. Man is made for\naction, not for idleness or pleasure. As plants and animals do the uses\nof their nature, so man must do his (v. 1).\n\n    [A] This is what Juvenal means when he says (xiv. 321),--\n\n    \"Nunquam aliud Natura aliud Sapientia dicit.\"\n\nMan must also live conformably to the universal nature, conformably to\nthe nature of all things of which he is one; and as a citizen of a\npolitical community he must direct his life and actions with reference\nto those among whom, among other purposes, he lives.[A] A man must not\nretire into solitude and cut himself off from his fellow-men. He must be\never active to do his part in the great whole. All men are his kin, not\nonly in blood, but still more by participating in the same intelligence\nand by being a portion of the same divinity. A man cannot really be\ninjured by his brethren, for no act of theirs can make him bad, and he\nmust not be angry with them nor hate them: \"For we are made for\nco-operation, like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like the rows of the\nupper and lower teeth. To act against one another then is contrary to\nnature; and it is acting against one another to be vexed and to turn\naway\" (ii. 1).\n\n    [A] See viii. 52; and Persius iii. 66\n\nFurther he says: \"Take pleasure in one thing and rest in it in passing\nfrom one social act to another social act, thinking of God\" (vi. 7).\nAgain: \"Love mankind. Follow God\" (vii. 31). It is the characteristic of\nthe rational soul for a man to love his neighbor (xi. 1). Antoninus\nteaches in various passages the forgiveness of injuries, and we know\nthat he also practised what he taught. Bishop Butler remarks that \"this\ndivine precept to forgive injuries and to love our enemies, though to be\nmet with in Gentile moralists, yet is in a peculiar sense a precept of\nChristianity, as our Saviour has insisted more upon it than on any other\nsingle virtue.\" The practice of this precept is the most difficult of\nall virtues. Antoninus often enforces it and gives us aid towards\nfollowing it. When we are injured, we feel anger and resentment, and the\nfeeling is natural, just, and useful for the conservation of society. It\nis useful that wrong-doers should feel the natural consequences of their\nactions, among which is the disapprobation of society and the resentment\nof him who is wronged. But revenge, in the proper sense of that word,\nmust not be practised. \"The best way of avenging thyself,\" says the\nemperor, \"is not to become like the wrong-doer.\" It is plain by this\nthat he does not mean that we should in any case practise revenge; but\nhe says to those who talk of revenging wrongs, Be not like him who has\ndone the wrong. Socrates in the Crito (c. 10) says the same in other\nwords, and St. Paul (Ep. to the Romans, xii. 17). \"When a man has done\nthee any wrong, immediately consider with what opinion about good or\nevil he has done wrong. For when thou hast seen this, thou wilt pity him\nand wilt neither wonder nor be angry\" (vii. 26). Antoninus would not\ndeny that wrong naturally produces the feeling of anger and resentment,\nfor this is implied in the recommendation to reflect on the nature of\nthe man's mind who has done the wrong, and then you will have pity\ninstead of resentment; and so it comes to the same as St. Paul's advice\nto be angry and sin not; which, as Butler well explains it, is not a\nrecommendation to be angry, which nobody needs, for anger is a natural\npassion, but it is a warning against allowing anger to lead us into sin.\nIn short the emperor's doctrine about wrongful acts is this: wrong-doers\ndo not know what good and bad are: they offend out of ignorance, and in\nthe sense of the Stoics this is true. Though this kind of ignorance will\nnever be admitted as a legal excuse, and ought not to be admitted as a\nfull excuse in any way by society, there may be grievous injuries, such\nas it is in a man's power to forgive without harm to society; and if he\nforgives because he sees that his enemies know not what they do, he is\nacting in the spirit of the sublime prayer, \"Father, forgive them, for\nthey know not what they do.\"\n\nThe emperor's moral philosophy was not a feeble, narrow system, which\nteaches a man to look directly to his own happiness, though a man's\nhappiness or tranquillity is indirectly promoted by living as he ought\nto do. A man must live conformably to the universal nature, which means,\nas the emperor explains it in many passages, that a man's actions must\nbe conformable to his true relations to all other human beings, both as\na citizen of a political community and as a member of the whole human\nfamily. This implies, and he often expresses it in the most forcible\nlanguage, that a man's words and actions, so far as they affect others,\nmust be measured by a fixed rule, which is their consistency with the\nconservation and the interests of the particular society of which he is\na member, and of the whole human race. To live conformably to such a\nrule, a man must use his rational faculties in order to discern clearly\nthe consequences and full effect of all his actions and of the actions\nof others: he must not live a life of contemplation and reflection only,\nthough he must often retire within himself to calm and purify his soul\nby thought,[A] but he must mingle in the work of man and be a fellow\nlaborer for the general good.\n\n    [A] Ut nemo in sese tentat descendere, nemo.--_Persius_, iv.\n    21.\n\nA man should have an object or purpose in life, that he may direct all\nhis energies to it; of course a good object (ii. 7). He who has not one\nobject or purpose of life, cannot be one and the same all through his\nlife (xi. 21). Bacon has a remark to the same effect, on the best means\nof \"reducing of the mind unto virtue and good estate; which is, the\nelecting and propounding unto a man's self good and virtuous ends of his\nlife, such as may be in a reasonable sort within his compass to attain.\"\nHe is a happy man who has been wise enough to do this when he was young\nand has had the opportunities; but the emperor seeing well that a man\ncannot always be so wise in his youth, encourages himself to do it when\nhe can, and not to let life slip away before he has begun. He who can\npropose to himself good and virtuous ends of life, and be true to them,\ncannot fail to live conformably to his own interest and the universal\ninterest, for in the nature of things they are one. If a thing is not\ngood for the hive, it is not good for the bee (vi. 54).\n\nOne passage may end this matter. \"If the gods have determined about me\nand about the things which must happen to me, they have determined well,\nfor it is not easy even to imagine a deity without forethought; and as\nto doing me harm, why should they have any desire towards that? For what\nadvantage would result to them from this or to the whole, which is the\nspecial object of their providence? But if they have not determined\nabout me individually, they have certainly determined about the whole at\nleast; and the things which happen by way of sequence in this general\narrangement I ought to accept with pleasure and to be content with them.\nBut if they determine about nothing--which it is wicked to believe, or\nif we do believe it, let us neither sacrifice nor pray nor swear by\nthem, nor do anything else which we do as if the gods were present and\nlived with us; but if however the gods determine about none of the\nthings which concern us, I am able to determine about myself, and I can\ninquire about that which is useful: and that is useful to every man\nwhich is conformable to his own constitution ([Greek: kataskeue]) and\nnature. But my nature is rational and social; and my city and country,\nso far as I am Antoninus, is Rome; but so far as I am a man, it is the\nworld. The things then which are useful to these cities are alone useful\nto me\" (vi. 44).\n\nIt would be tedious, and it is not necessary, to state the emperor's\nopinions on all the ways in which a man may profitably use his\nunderstanding towards perfecting himself in practical virtue. The\npassages to this purpose are in all parts of his book, but as they are\nin no order or connection, a man must use the book a long time before he\nwill find out all that is in it. A few words may be added here. If we\nanalyze all other things, we find how insufficient they are for human\nlife, and how truly worthless many of them are. Virtue alone is\nindivisible, one, and perfectly satisfying. The notion of Virtue cannot\nbe considered vague or unsettled, because a man may find it difficult to\nexplain the notion fully to himself, or to expound it to others in such\na way as to prevent cavilling. Virtue is a whole, and no more consists\nof parts than man's intelligence does; and yet we speak of various\nintellectual faculties as a convenient way of expressing the various\npowers which man's intellect shows by his works. In the same way we may\nspeak of various virtues or parts of virtue, in a practical sense, for\nthe purpose of showing what particular virtues we ought to practice in\norder to the exercise of the whole of virtue, that is, as man's nature\nis capable of.\n\nThe prime principle in man's constitution is social. The next in order\nis not to yield to the persuasions of the body, when they are not\nconformable to the rational principle, which must govern. The third is\nfreedom from error and from deception. \"Let then the ruling principle\nholding fast to these things go straight on, and it has what is its own\"\n(vii. 55). The emperor selects justice as the virtue which is the basis\nof all the rest (x. 11), and this had been said long before his time.\n\nIt is true that all people have some notion of what is meant by justice\nas a disposition of the mind, and some notion about acting in conformity\nto this disposition; but experience shows that men's notions about\njustice are as confused as their actions are inconsistent with the true\nnotion of justice. The emperor's notion of justice is clear enough, but\nnot practical enough for all mankind. \"Let there be freedom from\nperturbations with respect to the things which come from the external\ncause; and let there be justice in the things done by virtue of the\ninternal cause, that is, let there be movement and action terminating in\nthis, in social acts, for this is according to thy nature\" (ix. 31). In\nanother place (ix. 1) he says that \"he who acts unjustly acts\nimpiously,\" which follows of course from all that he says in various\nplaces. He insists on the practice of truth as a virtue and as a means\nto virtue, which no doubt it is: for lying even in indifferent things\nweakens the understanding; and lying maliciously is as great a moral\noffense as a man can be guilty of, viewed both as showing an habitual\ndisposition, and viewed with respect to consequences. He couples the\nnotion of justice with action. A man must not pride himself on having\nsome fine notion of justice in his head, but he must exhibit his justice\nin act, like St. James' notion of faith. But this is enough.\n\nThe Stoics, and Antoninus among them, call some things beautiful\n([Greek: kala]) and some ugly ([Greek: aischra]), and as they are beautiful\nso they are good, and as they are ugly so they are evil, or bad (ii. 1).\nAll these things, good and evil, are in our power, absolutely, some of\nthe stricter Stoics would say; in a manner only, as those who would not\ndepart altogether from common sense would say; practically they are to a\ngreat degree in the power of some persons and in some circumstances, but\nin a small degree only in other persons and in other circumstances. The\nStoics maintain man's free will as to the things which are in his power;\nfor as to the things which are out of his power, free will terminating\nin action is of course excluded by the very terms of the expression. I\nhardly know if we can discover exactly Antoninus' notion of the free\nwill of man, nor is the question worth the inquiry. What he does mean\nand does say is intelligible. All the things which are not in our power\n([Greek: aproaireta]) are indifferent: they are neither good nor bad,\nmorally. Such are life, health, wealth, power, disease, poverty, and\ndeath. Life and death are all men's portion. Health, wealth, power,\ndisease, and poverty happen to men, indifferently to the good and to the\nbad; to those who live according to nature and to those who do not.[A]\n\"Life,\" says the emperor, \"is a warfare and a stranger's sojourn, and\nafter fame is oblivion\" (ii. 17). After speaking of those men who have\ndisturbed the world and then died, and of the death of philosophers such\nas Heraclitus and Democritus, who was destroyed by lice, and of Socrates\nwhom other lice (his enemies) destroyed, he says: \"What means all this?\nThou hast embarked, thou hast made the voyage, thou art come to shore;\nget out. If indeed to another life, there is no want of gods, not even\nthere. But if to a state without sensation, thou wilt cease to be held\nby pains and pleasures, and to be a slave to the vessel which is as much\ninferior as that which serves it is superior: for the one is\nintelligence and Deity; the other is earth and corruption\" (iii. 3). It\nis not death that a man should fear, but he should fear never beginning\nto live according to nature (xii. 1). Every man should live in such a\nway as to discharge his duty, and to trouble himself about nothing else.\nHe should live such a life that he shall always be ready for death, and\nshall depart content when the summons comes. For what is death? \"A\ncessation of the impressions through the senses, and of the pulling of\nthe strings which move the appetites, and of the discursive movements of\nthe thoughts, and of the service to the flesh\" (vi. 28). Death is such\nas generation is, a mystery of nature (iv. 5). In another passage, the\nexact meaning of which is perhaps doubtful (ix. 3), he speaks of the\nchild which leaves the womb, and so he says the soul at death leaves its\nenvelope. As the child is born or comes into life by leaving the womb,\nso the soul may on leaving the body pass into another existence which is\nperfect. I am not sure if this is the emperor's meaning. Butler compares\nit with a passage in Strabo (p. 713) about the Brachmans' notion of\ndeath being the birth into real life and a happy life, to those who have\nphilosophized; and he thinks Antoninus may allude to this opinion.[B]\n\n    [A] \"All events come alike to all: there is one event to the\n    righteous and to the wicked: to the good and to the clean and\n    to the unclean,\" &c. (Ecclesiastes, ix. v. 2); and (v. 3),\n    \"This is an evil among all things that are done under the sun,\n    that there is one event unto all.\" In what sense \"evil\" is\n    meant here seems rather doubtful. There is no doubt about the\n    emperor's meaning. Compare Epictetus, Enchiridion, c. i., &c.;\n    and the doctrine of the Brachmans (Strabo p. 713, ed. Cas.):\n    [Greek: agathon de e kakon meden einai ton sumbainonton\n    anthropois].\n\n    [B] Seneca (Ep. 102) has the same, whether an expression of his\n    own opinion, or merely a fine saying of others employed to\n    embellish his writings, I know not. After speaking of the child\n    being prepared in the womb to live this life, he adds, \"Sic per\n    hoc spatium, quod ab infantia patet in senectutem, in alium\n    naturae sumimur partum. Alia origo nos expectat, alius rerum\n    status.\" See Ecclesiastes, xii. 7; and Lucan, i. 457:--\n\n                   \"Longae, canitis si cognita, vitae\n             Mors media est.\"\n\nAntoninus' opinion of a future life is nowhere clearly expressed. His\ndoctrine of the nature of the soul of necessity implies that it does not\nperish absolutely, for a portion of the divinity cannot perish. The\nopinion is at least as old as the time of Epicharmus and Euripides; what\ncomes from earth goes back to earth, and what comes from heaven, the\ndivinity, returns to him who gave it. But I find nothing clear in\nAntoninus as to the notion of the man existing after death so as to be\nconscious of his sameness with that soul which occupied his vessel of\nclay. He seems to be perplexed on this matter, and finally to have\nrested in this, that God or the gods will do whatever is best, and\nconsistent with the university of things.\n\nNor, I think, does he speak conclusively on another Stoic doctrine,\nwhich some Stoics practised,--the anticipating the regular course of\nnature by a man's own act. The reader will find some passages in which\nthis is touched on, and he may make of them what he can. But there are\npassages in which the emperor encourages himself to wait for the end\npatiently and with tranquillity; and certainly it is consistent with all\nhis best teaching that a man should bear all that falls to his lot and\ndo useful acts as he lives. He should not therefore abridge the time of\nhis usefulness by his own act. Whether he contemplates any possible\ncases in which a man should die by his own hand, I cannot tell; and the\nmatter is not worth a curious inquiry, for I believe it would not lead\nto any certain result as to his opinion on this point. I do not think\nthat Antoninus, who never mentions Seneca, though he must have known all\nabout him, would have agreed with Seneca when he gives as a reason for\nsuicide, that the eternal law, whatever he means, has made nothing\nbetter for us than this, that it has given us only one way of entering\ninto life and many ways of going out of it. The ways of going out indeed\nare many, and that is a good reason for a man taking care of himself.[A]\n\n    [A] See Plinius H.N. ii., c. 7; Seneca, De Provid. c. 6; and\n    Ep. 70: \"Nihil melius aeterna lex,\" &c.\n\nHappiness was not the direct object of a Stoic's life. There is no rule\nof life contained in the precept that a man should pursue his own\nhappiness. Many men think that they are seeking happiness when they are\nonly seeking the gratification of some particular passion, the strongest\nthat they have. The end of a man is, as already explained, to live\nconformably to nature, and he will thus obtain happiness, tranquillity\nof mind, and contentment (iii. 12; viii. 1, and other places). As a\nmeans of living conformably to nature he must study the four chief\nvirtues, each of which has its proper sphere: wisdom, or the knowledge\nof good and evil; justice, or the giving to every man his due;\nfortitude, or the enduring of labor and pain; and temperance, which is\nmoderation in all things. By thus living conformably to nature the Stoic\nobtained all that he wished or expected. His reward was in his virtuous\nlife, and he was satisfied with that. Some Greek poet long ago wrote:--\n\n   \"For virtue only of all human things\n   Takes her reward not from the hands of others.\n   Virtue herself rewards the toils of virtue.\"\n\nSome of the Stoics indeed expressed themselves in very arrogant, absurd\nterms, about the wise man's self-sufficiency; they elevated him to the\nrank of a deity.[A] But these were only talkers and lecturers, such as\nthose in all ages who utter fine words, know little of human affairs,\nand care only for notoriety. Epictetus and Antoninus both by precept and\nexample labored to improve themselves and others; and if we discover\nimperfections in their teaching, we must still honor these great men who\nattempted to show that there is in man's nature and in the constitution\nof things sufficient reason for living a virtuous life. It is difficult\nenough to live as we ought to live, difficult even for any man to live\nin such a way as to satisfy himself, if he exercises only in a moderate\ndegree the power of reflecting upon and reviewing his own conduct; and\nif all men cannot be brought to the same opinions in morals and\nreligion, it is at least worth while to give them good reasons for as\nmuch as they can be persuaded to accept.\n\n    [A] J. Smith in his Select Discourses on \"the Excellency and\n    Nobleness of True Religion\" (c. vi.) has remarked on this\n    Stoical arrogance. He finds it in Seneca and others. In Seneca\n    certainly, and perhaps something of it in Epictetus; but it is\n    not in Antoninus.\n\n\n\n\nTHE THOUGHTS\n\nOF\n\nMARCUS AURELIUS ANTONIUS.\n\n\n\n\nI.\n\n\nFrom my grandfather Verus[A] [I learned] good morals and the government\nof my temper.\n\n2. From the reputation and remembrance of my father,[B] modesty and a\nmanly character.\n\n3. From my mother,[C] piety and beneficence, and abstinence, not only\nfrom evil deeds, but even from evil thoughts; and further, simplicity in\nmy way of living, far removed from the habits of the rich.\n\n4. From my great-grandfather,[D] not to have frequented public schools,\nand to have had good teachers at home, and to know that on such things a\nman should spend liberally.\n\n    [A] Annius Verus was his grandfather's name. There is no verb\n    in this section connected with the word \"from,\" nor in the\n    following sections of this book; and it is not quite certain\n    what verb should be supplied. What I have added may express the\n    meaning here, though there are sections which it will not fit.\n    If he does not mean to say that he learned all these good\n    things from the several persons whom he mentions, he means that\n    he observed certain good qualities in them, or received certain\n    benefits from them, and it is implied that he was the better\n    for it, or at least might have been: for it would be a mistake\n    to understand Marcus as saying that he possessed all the\n    virtues which he observed in his kinsmen and teachers.\n\n    [B] His father's name was Annius Verus.\n\n    [C] His mother was Domitia Calvilla, named also Lucilla.\n\n    [D] Perhaps his mother's grandfather, Catilius Severus.\n\n5. From my governor, to be neither of the green nor of the blue party at\nthe games in the Circus, nor a partisan either of the Parmularius or the\nScutarius at the gladiators' fights; from him too I learned endurance of\nlabor, and to want little, and to work with my own hands, and not to\nmeddle with other people's affairs, and not to be ready to listen to\nslander.\n\n6. From Diognetus,[A] not to busy myself about trifling things, and not\nto give credit to what was said by miracle-workers and jugglers about\nincantations and the driving away of daemons and such things; and not to\nbreed quails [for fighting], nor to give myself up passionately to such\nthings; and to endure freedom of speech; and to have become intimate\nwith philosophy; and to have been a hearer, first of Bacchius, then of\nTandasis and Marcianus; and to have written dialogues in my youth; and\nto have desired a plank bed and skin, and whatever else of the kind\nbelongs to the Grecian discipline.\n\n    [A] In the works of Justinus there is printed a letter to one\n    Diognetus, whom the writer names \"most excellent.\" He was a\n    Gentile, but he wished very much to know what the religion of\n    the Christians was, what God they worshipped, and how this\n    worship made them despise the world and death, and neither\n    believe in the gods of the Greeks nor observe the superstition\n    of the Jews; and what was this love to one another which they\n    had, and why this new kind of religion was introduced now and\n    not before. My friend Mr. Jenkins, rector of Lyminge in Kent,\n    has suggested to me that this Diognetus may have been the tutor\n    of M. Antoninus.\n\n7. From Rusticus[A] I received the impression that my character required\nimprovement and discipline; and from him I learned not to be led astray\nto sophistic emulation, nor to writing on speculative matters, nor to\ndelivering little hortatory orations, nor to showing myself off as a man\nwho practises much discipline, or does benevolent acts in order to make\na display; and to abstain from rhetoric, and poetry, and fine writing;\nand not to walk about in the house in my outdoor dress, nor to do other\nthings of the kind; and to write my letters with simplicity, like the\nletter which Rusticus wrote from Sinuessa to my mother; and with respect\nto those who have offended me by words, or done me wrong, to be easily\ndisposed to be pacified and reconciled, as soon as they have shown a\nreadiness to be reconciled; and to read carefully, and not to be\nsatisfied with a superficial understanding of a book; nor hastily to\ngive my assent to those who talk overmuch; and I am indebted to him for\nbeing acquainted with the discourses of Epictetus, which he communicated\nto me out of his own collection.\n\n    [A] Q. Junius Rusticus was a Stoic philosopher, whom Antoninus\n    valued highly, and often took his advice (Capitol. _M. Antonin_.\n    iii).\n\n    Antoninus says, [Greek: tois Epikteteiois hypomnemasin] which\n    must not be translated, \"the writings of Epictetus,\" for\n    Epictetus wrote nothing. His pupil Arrian, who has preserved\n    for us all that we know of Epictetus, says, [Greek: tauta\n    epeirathen hypomnemata emauto diaphylaxai tes ekeinou dianoias]\n    (_Ep. ad. Gell_.)\n\n8. From Apollonius[A] I learned freedom of will and undeviating\nsteadiness of purpose; and to look to nothing else, not even for a\nmoment, except to reason; and to be always the same, in sharp pains, on\nthe occasion of the loss of a child, and in long illness; and to see\nclearly in a living example that the same man can be both most resolute\nand yielding, and not peevish in giving his instruction; and to have had\nbefore my eyes a man who clearly considered his experience and his skill\nin expounding philosophical principles as the smallest of his merits;\nand from him I learned how to receive from friends what are esteemed\nfavors, without being either humbled by them or letting them pass\nunnoticed.\n\n    [A] Apollonius of Chalcis came to Rome in the time of Pius to\n    be Marcus' preceptor. He was a rigid Stoic.\n\n9. From Sextus,[A] a benevolent disposition, and the example of a\nfamily governed in a fatherly manner, and the idea of living conformably\nto nature; and gravity without affectation, and to look carefully after\nthe interests of friends, and to tolerate ignorant persons, and those\nwho form opinions without consideration:+ he had the power of readily\naccommodating himself to all, so that intercourse with him was more\nagreeable than any flattery; and at the same time he was most highly\nvenerated by those who associated with him: and he had the faculty both\nof discovery and ordering, in an intelligent and methodical way, the\nprinciples necessary for life; and he never showed anger or any other\npassion, but was entirely free from passion, and also most affectionate;\nand he could express approbation without noisy display, and he possessed\nmuch knowledge without ostentation.\n\n10. From Alexander[B] the grammarian, to refrain from fault-finding, and\nnot in a reproachful way to chide those who uttered any barbarous or\nsolecistic or strange-sounding expression; but dexterously to introduce\nthe very expression which ought to have been used, and in the way of\nanswer or giving confirmation, or joining in an inquiry about the thing\nitself, not about the word, or by some other fit suggestion.\n\n11. From Fronto[C] I learned to observe what envy and duplicity and\nhypocrisy are in a tyrant, and that generally those among us who are\ncalled Patricians are rather deficient in paternal affection.\n\n12. From Alexander the Platonic, not frequently nor without necessity to\nsay to any one, or to write in a letter, that I have no leisure; nor\ncontinually to excuse the neglect of duties required by our relation to\nthose with whom we live, by alleging urgent occupations.\n\n13. From Catulus[D] not to be indifferent when a friend finds fault,\neven if he should find fault without reason, but to try to restore him\nto his usual disposition; and to be ready to speak well of teachers, as\nit is reported of Domitius and Athenodotus; and to love my children\ntruly.\n\n    [A] Sextus of Chaeronea, a grandson of Plutarch, or nephew, as\n    some say; but more probably a grandson.\n\n    [B] Alexander was a Grammaticus, a native of Phrygia. He wrote\n    a commentary on Homer; and the rhetorician Aristides wrote a\n    panegyric on Alexander in a funeral oration.\n\n    [C] M. Cornelius Fronto was a rhetorician, and in great favor\n    with Marcus. There are extant various letters between Marcus\n    and Fronto.\n\n    [D] Cinna Catulus, a Stoic philosopher.\n\n14. From my brother[A] Severus, to love my kin, and to love truth, and\nto love justice; and through him I learned to know Thrasea, Helvidius,\nCato, Dion, Brutus;[B] and from him I received the idea of a polity in\nwhich there is the same law for all, a polity administered with regard\nto equal rights and equal freedom of speech, and the idea of a kingly\ngovernment which respects most of all the freedom of the governed; I\nlearned from him also + consistency and undeviating steadiness in my\nregard for philosophy; and a disposition to do good, and to give to\nothers readily, and to cherish good hopes, and to believe that I am\nloved by my friends; and in him I observed no concealment of his\nopinions with respect to those whom he condemned, and that his friends\nhad no need to conjecture what he wished or did not wish, but it was\nquite plain.\n\n    [A] The word brother may not be genuine. Antoninus had no\n    brother. It has been supposed that he may mean some cousin.\n    Schultz in his translation omits \"brother,\" and says that this\n    Severus is probably Claudius Severus, a peripatetic.\n\n    [B] We know, from Tacitus (_Annal._ xiii., xvi. 21; and other\n    passages), who Thrasea and Helvidius were. Plutarch has written\n    the lives of the two Catos, and of Dion and Brutus. Antoninus\n    probably alludes to Cato of Utica, who was a Stoic.\n\n15. From Maximus[A] I learned self-government, and not to be led aside\nby anything; and cheerfulness in all circumstances, as well as in\nillness; and a just admixture in the moral character of sweetness and\ndignity, and to do what was set before me without complaining. I\nobserved that everybody believed that he thought as he spoke, and that\nin all that he did he never had any bad intention; and he never showed\namazement and surprise, and was never in a hurry, and never put off\ndoing a thing, nor was perplexed nor dejected, nor did he ever laugh to\ndisguise his vexation, nor, on the other hand, was he ever passionate or\nsuspicious. He was accustomed to do acts of beneficence, and was ready\nto forgive, and was free from all falsehood; and he presented the\nappearance of a man who could not be diverted from right, rather than of\na man who had been improved. I observed, too, that no man could ever\nthink that he was despised by Maximus, or ever venture to think himself\na better man. He had also the art of being humorous in an agreeable\nway.+\n\n    [A] Claudius Maximus was a Stoic philosopher, who was highly\n    esteemed also by Antoninus Pius, Marcus' predecessor. The\n    character of Maximus is that of a perfect man. (See viii. 25.)\n\n16. In my father[A] I observed mildness of temper, and unchangeable\nresolution in the things which he had determined after due deliberation;\nand no vain-glory in those things which men call honors; and a love of\nlabor and perseverance; and a readiness to listen to those who had\nanything to propose for the common weal; and undeviating firmness in\ngiving to every man according to his deserts; and a knowledge derived\nfrom experience of the occasions for vigorous action and for remission.\nAnd I observed that he had overcome all passion for boys; and he\nconsidered himself no more than any other citizen;[B] and he released\nhis friends from all obligation to sup with him or to attend him of\nnecessity when he went abroad, and those who had failed to accompany\nhim, by reason of any urgent circumstances, always found him the same. I\nobserved too his habit of careful inquiry in all matters of\ndeliberation, and his persistency, and that he never stopped his\ninvestigation through being satisfied with appearances which first\npresent themselves; and that his disposition was to keep his friends,\nand not to be soon tired of them, nor yet to be extravagant in his\naffection; and to be satisfied on all occasions, and cheerful; and to\nforesee things a long way off, and to provide for the smallest without\ndisplay; and to check immediately popular applause and all flattery; and\nto be ever watchful over the things which were necessary for the\nadministration of the empire, and to be a good manager of the\nexpenditure, and patiently to endure the blame which he got for such\nconduct; and he was neither superstitious with respect to the gods, nor\ndid he court men by gifts or by trying to please them, or by flattering\nthe populace; but he showed sobriety in all things, and firmness, and\nnever any mean thoughts or action, nor love of novelty. And the things\nwhich conduce in any way to the commodity of life, and of which fortune\ngives an abundant supply, he used without arrogance and without excusing\nhimself; so that when he had them, he enjoyed them without affectation,\nand when he had them not, he did not want them. No one could ever say of\nhim that he was either a sophist or a [home-bred] flippant slave or a\npedant; but every one acknowledged him to be a man ripe, perfect, above\nflattery, able to manage his own and other men's affairs. Besides this,\nhe honored those who were true philosophers, and he did not reproach\nthose who pretended to be philosophers, nor yet was he easily led by\nthem. He was also easy in conversation, and he made himself agreeable\nwithout any offensive affectation. He took a reasonable care of his\nbody's health, not as one who was greatly attached to life, nor out of\nregard to personal appearance, nor yet in a careless way, but so that\nthrough his own attention he very seldom stood in need of the\nphysician's art or of medicine or external applications. He was most\nready to give without envy to those who possessed any particular\nfaculty, such as that of eloquence or knowledge of the law or of morals,\nor of anything else; and he gave them his help, that each might enjoy\nreputation according to his deserts; and he always acted conformably to\nthe institutions of his country, without showing any affectation of\ndoing so. Further, he was not fond of change nor unsteady, but he loved\nto stay in the same places, and to employ himself about the same things;\nand after his paroxysms of headache he came immediately fresh and\nvigorous to his usual occupations. His secrets were not many, but very\nfew and very rare, and these only about public matters; and he showed\nprudence and economy in the exhibition of the public spectacles and the\nconstruction of public buildings, his donations to the people, and in\nsuch things, for he was a man who looked to what ought to be done, not\nto the reputation which is got by a man's acts. He did not take the bath\nat unseasonable hours; he was not fond of building houses, nor curious\nabout what he ate, nor about the texture and color of his clothes, nor\nabout the beauty of his slaves.[C] His dress came from Lorium, his villa\non the coast, and from Lanuvium generally.[D] We know how he behaved to\nthe toll-collector at Tusculum who asked his pardon; and such was all\nhis behavior. There was in him nothing harsh, nor implacable, nor\nviolent, nor, as one may say, anything carried to the sweating point;\nbut he examined all things severally, as if he had abundance of time,\nand without confusion, in an orderly way, vigorously and consistently.\nAnd that might be applied to him which is recorded of Socrates,[E] that\nhe was able both to abstain from, and to enjoy, those things which many\nare too weak to abstain from, and cannot enjoy without excess. But to be\nstrong enough both to bear the one and to be sober in the other is the\nmark of a man who has a perfect and invincible soul, such as he showed\nin the illness of Maximus.\n\n    [A] He means his adoptive father, his predecessor, the Emperor\n    Antoninus Pius. Compare vi. 30.\n\n    [B] He uses the word [Greek: koinonoemosune]. See Gataker's\n    note.\n\n    [C] This passage is corrupt, and the exact meaning is\n    uncertain.\n\n    [D] Lorium was a villa on the coast north of Rome, and there\n    Antoninus was brought up, and he died there. This also is\n    corrupt.\n\n    [E] Xenophon, Memorab. i. 3, 15.\n\n17. To the gods I am indebted for having good grandfathers, good\nparents, a good sister, good teachers, good associates, good kinsmen and\nfriends, nearly everything good. Further, I owe it to the gods that I\nwas not hurried into any offence against any of them, though I had a\ndisposition which, if opportunity had offered, might have led me to do\nsomething of this kind; but, through their favor, there never was such a\nconcurrence of circumstances as put me to the trial. Further, I am\nthankful to the gods that I was not longer brought up with my\ngrandfather's concubine, and that I preserved the flower of my youth,\nand that I did not make proof of my virility before the proper season,\nbut even deferred the time; that I was subjected to a ruler and father\nwho was able to take away all pride from me, and to bring me to the\nknowledge that it is possible for a man to live in a palace without\nwanting either guards or embroidered dresses, or torches and statues,\nand such-like show; but that it is in such a man's power to bring\nhimself very near to the fashion of a private person, without being for\nthis reason either meaner in thought, or more remiss in action, with\nrespect to the things which must be done for the public interest in a\nmanner that befits a ruler. I thank the gods for giving me such a\nbrother,[A] who was able by his moral character to rouse me to vigilance\nover myself, and who at the same time pleased me by his respect and\naffection; that my children have not been stupid nor deformed in body;\nthat I did not make more proficiency in rhetoric, poetry, and the other\nstudies, in which I should perhaps have been completely engaged, if I\nhad seen that I was making progress in them; that I made haste to place\nthose who brought me up in the station of honor, which they seemed to\ndesire, without putting them off with hope of my doing it some other\ntime after, because they were then still young; that I knew Apollonius,\nRusticus, Maximus; that I received clear and frequent impressions about\nliving according to nature, and what kind of a life that is, so that, so\nfar as depended on the gods, and their gifts, and help, and\ninspirations, nothing hindered me from forthwith living according to\nnature, though I still fall short of it through my own fault, and\nthrough not observing the admonitions of the gods, and, I may almost\nsay, their direct instructions; that my body has held out so long in\nsuch a kind of life; that I never touched either Benedicta or Theodotus,\nand that, after having fallen into amatory passions, I was cured, and,\nthough I was often out of humor with Rusticus, I never did anything of\nwhich I had occasion to repent; that, though it was my mother's fate to\ndie young, she spent the last years of her life with me; that, whenever\nI wished to help any man in his need, or on any other occasion, I was\nnever told that I had not the means of doing it; and that to myself the\nsame necessity never happened, to receive anything from another; that I\nhave such a wife,[B] so obedient, and so affectionate, and so simple;\nthat I had abundance of good masters for my children; and that remedies\nhave been shown to me by dreams, both others, and against bloodspitting\nand giddiness[C]...; and that, when I had an inclination to philosophy,\nI did not fall into the hands of any sophist, and that I did not waste\nmy time on writers [of histories], or in the resolution of syllogisms,\nor occupy myself about the investigation of appearances in the heavens;\nfor all these things require the help of the gods and fortune.\n\nAmong the Quadi at the Granua.[D]\n\n    [A] The emperor had no brother except L. Verus, his brother by\n    adoption.\n\n    [B] See the _Life of Antoninus_.\n\n    [C] This is corrupt.\n\n    [D] The Quadi lived in the southern part of Bohemia and\n    Moravia; and Antoninus made a campaign against them. (See the\n    _Life_.) Granua is probably the river Graan, which flows into\n    the Danube.\n\n    If these words are genuine, Antoninus may have written this\n    first book during the war with the Quadi. In the first edition\n    of Antoninus, and in the older editions, the first three\n    sections of the second book make the conclusion of the first\n    book. Gataker placed them at the beginning of the second book.\n\n\n\n\nII.\n\n\nBegin the morning by saying to thyself, I shall meet with the busybody,\nthe ungrateful, arrogant, deceitful, envious, unsocial. All these things\nhappen to them by reason of their ignorance of what is good and evil.\nBut I who have seen the nature of the good that it is beautiful, and of\nthe bad that it is ugly, and the nature of him who does wrong, that it\nis akin to me; not [only] of the same blood or seed, but that it\nparticipates in [the same] intelligence and [the same] portion of the\ndivinity, I can neither be injured by any of them, for no one can fix on\nme what is ugly, nor can I be angry with my kinsman, nor hate him. For\nwe are made for co-operation, like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like\nthe rows of the upper and lower teeth.[A] To act against one another,\nthen, is contrary to nature; and it is acting against one another to be\nvexed and to turn away.\n\n    [A] Xenophon, Mem. ii. 3. 18.\n\n2. Whatever this is that I am, it is a little flesh and breath, and the\nruling part. Throw away thy books; no longer distract thyself: it is not\nallowed; but as if thou wast now dying, despise the flesh; it is blood\nand bones and network, a contexture of nerves, veins, and arteries. See\nthe breath also, what kind of a thing it is; air, and not always the\nsame, but every moment sent out and again sucked in. The third, then, is\nthe ruling part; consider thus: Thou art an old man; no longer let this\nbe a slave, no longer be pulled by the strings like a puppet to unsocial\nmovements, no longer be either dissatisfied with thy present lot, or\nshrink from the future.\n\n3. All that is from the gods is full of providence. That which is from\nfortune is not separated from nature or without an interweaving and\ninvolution with the things which are ordered by providence. From thence\nall things flow; and there is besides necessity, and that which is for\nthe advantage of the whole universe, of which thou art a part. But that\nis good for every part of nature which the nature of the whole brings,\nand what serves to maintain this nature. Now the universe is preserved,\nas by the changes of the elements so by the changes of things compounded\nof the elements. Let these principles be enough for thee; let them\nalways be fixed opinions. But cast away the thirst after books, that\nthou mayest not die murmuring, but cheerfully, truly, and from thy heart\nthankful to the gods.\n\n4. Remember how long thou hast been putting off these things, and how\noften thou hast received an opportunity from the gods, and yet dost not\nuse it. Thou must now at last perceive of what universe thou art a\npart, and of what administrator of the universe thy existence is an\nefflux, and that a limit of time is fixed for thee, which if thou dost\nnot use for clearing away the clouds from thy mind, it will go and thou\nwilt go, and it will never return.\n\n5. Every moment think steadily as a Roman and a man to do what thou hast\nin hand with perfect and simple dignity, and feeling of affection, and\nfreedom, and justice, and to give thyself relief from all other\nthoughts. And thou wilt give thyself relief if thou doest every act of\nthy life as if it were the last, laying aside all carelessness and\npassionate aversion from the commands of reason, and all hypocrisy, and\nself-love, and discontent with the portion which has been given to thee.\nThou seest how few the things are, the which if a man lays hold of, he\nis able to live a life which flows in quiet, and is like the existence\nof the gods; for the gods on their part will require nothing more from\nhim who observes these things.\n\n6. Do wrong[A] to thyself, do wrong to thyself, my soul; but thou wilt\nno longer have the opportunity of honoring thyself. Every man's life is\nsufficient.+ But thine is nearly finished, though thy soul reverences\nnot itself, but places thy felicity in the souls of others.\n\n    [A] Perhaps it should be, \"thou art doing violence to thyself.\"\n    [Greek: hybrizeis] not [Greek: hybrize].\n\n7. Do the things external which fall upon thee distract thee? Give\nthyself time to learn something new and good, and cease to be whirled\naround. But then thou must also avoid being carried about the other way;\nfor those too are triflers who have wearied themselves in life by their\nactivity, and yet have no object to which to direct every movement, and,\nin a word, all their thoughts.\n\n8. Through not observing what is in the mind of another a man has seldom\nbeen seen to be unhappy; but those who do not observe the movements of\ntheir own minds must of necessity be unhappy.\n\n9. This thou must always bear in mind, what is the nature of the whole,\nand what is my nature, and how this is related to that, and what kind of\na part it is of what kind of a whole, and that there is no one who\nhinders thee from always doing and saying the things which are according\nto the nature of which thou art a part.\n\n10. Theophrastus, in his comparison of bad acts--such a comparison as\none would make in accordance with the common notions of mankind--says,\nlike a true philosopher, that the offenses which are committed through\ndesire are more blamable than those which are committed through anger.\nFor he who is excited by anger seems to turn away from reason with a\ncertain pain and unconscious contraction; but he who offends through\ndesire, being overpowered by pleasure, seems to be in a manner more\nintemperate and more womanish in his offences. Rightly, then, and in a\nway worthy of philosophy, he said that the offence which is committed\nwith pleasure is more blamable than that which is committed with pain;\nand on the whole the one is more like a person who has been first\nwronged and through pain is compelled to be angry, but the other is\nmoved by his own impulse to do wrong, being carried towards doing\nsomething by desire.\n\n11. Since it is possible[A] that thou mayest depart from life this very\nmoment, regulate every act and thought accordingly.[B] But to go away\nfrom among men, if there are gods, is not a thing to be afraid of, for\nthe gods will not involve thee in evil; but if indeed they do not exist,\nor if they have no concern about human affairs, what is it to me to live\nin a universe devoid of gods or devoid of providence? But in truth they\ndo exist, and they do care for human things, and they have put all the\nmeans in man's power to enable him not to fall into real evils. And as\nto the rest, if there was anything evil, they would have provided for\nthis also, that it should be altogether in a man's power not to fall\ninto it. Now that which does not make a man worse, how can it make a\nman's life worse? But neither through ignorance, nor--having the\nknowledge but not the power to guard against or correct these things, is\nit possible that the nature of the universe has overlooked them; nor is\nit possible that it has made so great a mistake, either through want of\npower or want of skill, that good and evil should happen\nindiscriminately to the good and the bad. But death certainly, and life,\nhonor and dishonor, pain and pleasure,--all these things equally happen\nto good men and bad, being things which make us neither better nor\nworse. Therefore they are neither good nor evil.\n\n    [A] Or it may mean, \"since it is in thy power to depart;\" which\n    gives a meaning somewhat different.\n\n    [B] See Cicero, Tuscul., i. 49.\n\n12. How quickly all things disappear,--in the universe the bodies\nthemselves, but in time the remembrance of them. What is the nature of\nall sensible things, and particularly those which attract with the bait\nof pleasure or terrify by pain, or are noised abroad by vapory fame; how\nworthless, and contemptible, and sordid, and perishable, and dead they\nare,--all this it is the part of the intellectual faculty to observe. To\nobserve too who these are whose opinions and voices give reputation;\nwhat death is, and the fact that, if a man looks at it in itself, and by\nthe abstractive power of reflection resolves into their parts all the\nthings which present themselves to the imagination in it, he will then\nconsider it to be nothing else than an operation of nature; and if any\none is afraid of an operation of nature, he is a child. This, however,\nis not only an operation of nature, but it is also a thing which\nconduces to the purposes of nature. To observe too how man comes near to\nthe Deity, and by what part of him, and when this part of man is so\ndisposed+ (vi. 28).\n\n13. Nothing is more wretched than a man who traverses everything in a\nround, and pries into the things beneath the earth, as the poet[A] says,\nand seeks by conjecture what is in the minds of his neighbors, without\nperceiving that it is sufficient to attend to the daemon within him, and\nto reverence it sincerely. And reverence of the daemon consists in\nkeeping it pure from passion and thoughtlessness, and dissatisfaction\nwith what comes from gods and men. For the things from the gods merit\nveneration for their excellence; and the things from men should be dear\nto us by reason of kinship; and sometimes even, in a manner, they move\nour pity by reason of men's ignorance of good and bad; this defect being\nnot less than that which deprives us of the power of distinguishing\nthings that are white and black.\n\n    [A] Pindar, in the Theaetetus of Plato. See xi. 1.\n\n14. Though thou shouldest be going to live three thousand years and as\nmany times ten thousand years, still remember that no man loses any\nother life than this which he now lives, nor lives any other than this\nwhich he now loses. The longest and shortest are thus brought to the\nsame. For the present is the same to all, though that which perish is\nnot the same;+[A] and so that which is lost appears to be a mere\nmoment. For a man cannot lose either the past or the future: for what a\nman has not, how can any one take this from him? These two things then\nthou must bear in mind; the one, that all things from eternity are of\nlike forms and come round in a circle, and that it makes no difference\nwhether a man shall see the same things during a hundred years, or two\nhundred, or an infinite time; and the second, that the longest liver and\nhe who will die soonest lose just the same. For the present is the only\nthing of which a man can be deprived, if it is true that this is the\nonly thing which he has, and that a man cannot lose a thing if he has it\nnot.\n\n    [A] See Gataker's note.\n\n15. Remember that all is opinion. For what was said by the Cynic Monimus\nis manifest: and manifest too is the use of what was said, if a man\nreceives what may be got out of it as far as it is true.\n\n16. The soul of man does violence to itself, first of all, when it\nbecomes an abscess, and, as it were, a tumor on the universe, so far as\nit can. For to be vexed at anything which happens is a separation of\nourselves from nature, in some part of which the natures of all other\nthings are contained. In the next place, the soul does violence to\nitself when it turns away from any man, or even moves towards him with\nthe intention of injuring, such as are the souls of those who are angry.\nIn the third place, the soul does violence to itself when it is\noverpowered by pleasure or by pain. Fourthly, when it plays a part, and\ndoes or says anything insincerely and untruly. Fifthly, when it allows\nany act of its own and any movement to be without an aim, and does\nanything thoughtlessly and without considering what it is, it being\nright that even the smallest things be done with reference to an end;\nand the end of rational animals is to follow the reason and the law of\nthe most ancient city and polity.\n\n17. Of human life the time is a point, and the substance is in a flux,\nand the perception dull, and the composition of the whole body subject\nto putrefaction, and the soul a whirl, and fortune hard to divine, and\nfame a thing devoid of judgment. And, to say all in a word, everything\nwhich belongs to the body is a stream, and what belongs to the soul is a\ndream and vapor, and life is a warfare and a stranger's sojourn, and\nafter fame is oblivion. What then is that which is able to conduct a\nman? One thing, and only one, philosophy. But this consists in keeping\nthe daemon within a man free from violence and unharmed, superior to\npains and pleasures, doing nothing without a purpose, nor yet falsely\nand with hypocrisy, not feeling the need of another man's doing or not\ndoing anything; and besides, accepting all that happens, and all that\nis allotted, as coming from thence, wherever it is, from whence he\nhimself came; and, finally, waiting for death with a cheerful mind, as\nbeing nothing else than a dissolution of the elements of which every\nliving being is compounded. But if there is no harm to the elements\nthemselves in each continually changing into another, why should a man\nhave any apprehension about the change and dissolution of all the\nelements? For it is according to nature, and nothing is evil which is\naccording to nature.\n\nThis in Carnuntum.[A]\n\n    [A] Carnuntum was a town of Pannonia, on the south side of the\n    Danube, about thirty miles east of Vindobona (Vienna).\n    Orosius (vii. 15) and Eutropius (viii. 13) say that Antoninus\n    remained three years at Carmuntum during his war with the\n    Marcomanni.\n\n\n\n\nIII.\n\n\nWe ought to consider not only that our life is daily wasting away and a\nsmaller part of it is left, but another thing also must be taken into\nthe account, that if a man should live longer, it is quite uncertain\nwhether the understanding will still continue sufficient for the\ncomprehension of things, and retain the power of contemplation which\nstrives to acquire the knowledge of the divine and the human. For if he\nshall begin to fall into dotage, perspiration and nutrition and\nimagination and appetite, and whatever else there is of the kind, will\nnot fail; but the power of making use of ourselves, and filling up the\nmeasure of our duty, and clearly separating all appearances, and\nconsidering whether a man should now depart from life, and whatever else\nof the kind absolutely requires a disciplined reason,--all this is\nalready extinguished. We must make haste, then, not only because we are\ndaily nearer to death, but also because the conception of things and the\nunderstanding of them cease first.\n\n2. We ought to observe also that even the things which follow after the\nthings which are produced according to nature contain something pleasing\nand attractive. For instance, when bread is baked some parts are split\nat the surface, and these parts which thus open, and have a certain\nfashion contrary to the purpose of the baker's art, are beautiful in a\nmanner, and in a peculiar way excite a desire for eating. And again,\nfigs, when they are quite ripe, gape open; and in the ripe olives the\nvery circumstance of their being near to rottenness adds a peculiar\nbeauty to the fruit. And the ears of corn bending down, and the lion's\neyebrows, and the foam which flows from the mouth of wild boars, and\nmany other things,--though they are far from being beautiful if a man\nshould examine them severally,--still, because they are consequent upon\nthe things which are formed by nature, help to adorn them, and they\nplease the mind; so that if a man should have a feeling and deeper\ninsight with respect to the things which are produced in the universe,\nthere is hardly one of those which follow by way of consequence which\nwill not seem to him to be in a manner disposed so as to give pleasure.\nAnd so he will see even the real gaping jaws of wild beasts with no less\npleasure than those which painters and sculptors show by imitation; and\nin an old woman and an old man he will be able to see a certain maturity\nand comeliness; and the attractive loveliness of young persons he will\nbe able to look on with chaste eyes; and many such things will present\nthemselves, not pleasing to every man, but to him only who has become\ntruly familiar with Nature and her works.\n\n3. Hippocrates, after curing many diseases, himself fell sick and died.\nThe Chaldaei foretold the deaths of many, and then fate caught them too.\nAlexander and Pompeius, and Caius Caesar, after so often completely\ndestroying whole cities, and in battle cutting to pieces many ten\nthousands of cavalry and infantry, themselves too at last departed from\nlife. Heraclitus, after so many speculations on the conflagration of the\nuniverse, was filled with water internally and died smeared all over\nwith mud. And lice destroyed Democritus; and other lice killed Socrates.\nWhat means all this? Thou hast embarked, thou hast made the voyage, thou\nart come to shore; get out. If indeed to another life, there is no want\nof gods, not even there; but if to a state without sensation, thou wilt\ncease to be held by pains and pleasures, and to be a slave to the\nvessel, which is as much inferior as that which serves it is superior:+\nfor the one is intelligence and deity; the other is earth and\ncorruption.\n\n4. Do not waste the remainder of thy life in thoughts about others, when\nthou dost not refer thy thoughts to some object of common utility. For\nthou losest the opportunity of doing something else when thou hast such\nthoughts as these,--What is such a person doing, and why, and what is he\nsaying, and what is he thinking of, and what is he contriving, and\nwhatever else of the kind makes us wander away from the observation of\nour own ruling power. We ought then to check in the series of our\nthoughts everything that is without a purpose and useless, but most of\nall the over-curious feeling and the malignant; and a man should use\nhimself to think of those things only about which if one should suddenly\nask, What hast thou now in thy thoughts? with perfect openness thou\nmightest immediately answer, This or That; so that from thy words it\nshould be plain that everything in thee is simple and benevolent, and\nsuch as befits a social animal, and one that cares not for thoughts\nabout pleasure or sensual enjoyments at all, nor has any rivalry or envy\nand suspicion, or anything else for which thou wouldst blush if thou\nshouldst say that thou hadst it in thy mind. For the man who is such,\nand no longer delays being among the number of the best, is like a\npriest and minister of the gods, using too the [deity] which is planted\nwithin him, which makes the man uncontaminated by pleasure, unharmed by\nany pain, untouched by any insult, feeling no wrong, a fighter in the\nnoblest fight, one who cannot be overpowered by any passion, dyed deep\nwith justice, accepting with all his soul everything which happens and\nis assigned to him as his portion; and not often, nor yet without great\nnecessity and for the general interest, imagining what another says, or\ndoes, or thinks. For it is only what belongs to himself that he makes\nthe matter for his activity; and he constantly thinks of that which is\nallotted to himself out of the sum total of things, and he makes his own\nacts fair, and he is persuaded that his own portion is good. For the lot\nwhich is assigned to each man is carried along with him and carries him\nalong with it.+ And he remembers also that every rational animal is his\nkinsman, and that to care for all men is according to man's nature; and\na man should hold on to the opinion not of all, but of those only who\nconfessedly live according to nature. But as to those who live not so,\nhe always bears in mind what kind of men they are both at home and from\nhome, both by night and by day, and what they are, and with what men\nthey live an impure life. Accordingly, he does not value at all the\npraise which comes from such men, since they are not even satisfied with\nthemselves.\n\n5. Labor not unwillingly, nor without regard to the common interest, nor\nwithout due consideration, nor with distraction; nor let studied\nornament set off thy thoughts, and be not either a man of many words, or\nbusy about too many things. And further, let the deity which is in thee\nbe the guardian of a living being, manly and of ripe age, and engaged in\nmatter political, and a Roman, and a ruler, who has taken his post like\na man waiting for the signal which summons him from life, and ready to\ngo, having need neither of oath nor of any man's testimony. Be cheerful\nalso, and seek not external help nor the tranquillity which others\ngive. A man then must stand erect, not be kept erect by others.\n\n6. If thou findest in human life anything better than justice, truth,\ntemperance, fortitude, and, in a word, anything better than thy own\nmind's self-satisfaction in the things which it enables thee to do\naccording to right reason, and in the condition that is assigned to thee\nwithout thy own choice; if, I say, thou seest anything better than this,\nturn to it with all thy soul, and enjoy that which thou hast found to be\nthe best. But if nothing appears to be better than the Deity which is\nplanted in thee, which has subjected to itself all thy appetites, and\ncarefully examines all the impressions, and, as Socrates said, has\ndetached itself from the persuasions of sense, and has submitted itself\nto the gods, and cares for mankind; if thou findest everything else\nsmaller and of less value than this, give place to nothing else, for if\nthou dost once diverge and incline to it, thou wilt no longer without\ndistraction be able to give the preference to that good thing which is\nthy proper possession and thy own; for it is not right that anything of\nany other kind, such as praise from the many, or power, or enjoyment of\npleasure, should come into competition with that which is rationally and\npolitically [or, practically] good. All these things, even though they\nmay seem to adapt themselves [to the better things] in a small degree,\nobtain the superiority all at once, and carry us away. But do thou, I\nsay, simply and freely choose the better, and hold to it.--But that\nwhich is useful is the better.--Well, then, if it is useful to thee as a\nrational being, keep to it; but if it is only useful to thee as an\nanimal, say so, and maintain thy judgment without arrogance: only take\ncare that thou makest the inquiry by a sure method.\n\n7. Never value anything as profitable to thyself which shall compel thee\nto break thy promise, to lose thy self-respect, to hate any man, to\nsuspect, to curse, to act the hypocrite, to desire anything which needs\nwalls and curtains: for he who has preferred to everything else his own\nintelligence and daemon and the worship of its excellence, acts no\ntragic part, does not groan, will not need either solitude or much\ncompany; and, what is chief of all, he will live without either pursuing\nor flying from [death];[A] but whether for a longer or a shorter time he\nshall have the soul enclosed in the body, he cares not at all: for even\nif he must depart immediately, he will go as readily as if he were going\nto do anything else which can be done with decency and order; taking\ncare of this only all through life, that his thoughts turn not away from\nanything which belongs to an intelligent animal and a member of a civil\ncommunity.\n\n    [A] Comp. ix. 3.\n\n8. In the mind of one who is chastened and purified thou wilt find no\ncorrupt matter, nor impurity, nor any sore skinned over. Nor is his life\nincomplete when fate overtakes him, as one may say of an actor who\nleaves the stage before ending and finishing the play. Besides, there is\nin him nothing servile, nor affected, nor too closely bound [to other\nthings], nor yet detached[A] [from other things], nothing worthy of\nblame, nothing which seeks a hiding-place.\n\n    [A] viii. 34.\n\n9. Reverence the faculty which produces opinion. On this faculty it\nentirely depends whether there shall exist in thy ruling part any\nopinion inconsistent with nature and the constitution of the rational\nanimal. And this faculty promises freedom from hasty judgment, and\nfriendship towards men, and obedience to the gods.\n\n10. Throwing away then all things, hold to these only which are few; and\nbesides, bear in mind that every man lives only this present time, which\nis an indivisible point, and that all the rest of his life is either\npast or it is uncertain. Short then is the time which every man lives;\nand small the nook of the earth where he lives; and short too the\nlongest posthumous fame, and even this only continued by a succession of\npoor human beings, who will very soon die, and who know not even\nthemselves, much less him who died long ago.\n\n11. To the aids which have been mentioned let this one still be added:\nMake for thyself a definition or description of the thing which is\npresented to thee, so as to see distinctly what kind of a thing it is in\nits substance, in its nudity, in its complete entirety, and tell thyself\nits proper name, and the names of the things of which it has been\ncompounded, and into which it will be resolved. For nothing is so\nproductive of elevation of mind as to be able to examine methodically\nand truly every object which is presented to thee in life, and always to\nlook at things so as to see at the same time what kind of universe this\nis, and what kind of use everything performs in it, and what value\neverything has with reference to the whole, and what with reference to\nman, who is a citizen of the highest city, of which all other cities are\nlike families; what each thing is, and of what it is composed, and how\nlong it is the nature of this thing to endure which now makes an\nimpression on me, and what virtue I have need of with respect to it,\nsuch as gentleness, manliness, truth, fidelity, simplicity, contentment,\nand the rest. Wherefore, on every occasion a man should say: This comes\nfrom god; and this is according to the apportionment + and spinning of\nthe thread of destiny, and such-like coincidence and chance; and this is\nfrom one of the same stock, and a kinsman and partner, one who knows\nnot, however, what is according to his nature. But I know; for this\nreason I behave towards him according to the natural law of fellowship\nwith benevolence and justice. At the same time, however, in things\nindifferent[A] I attempt to ascertain the value of each.\n\n    [A] Est et horum quae media appellamus grande\n    discrimen.--_Seneca_, Ep. 82.\n\n12. If thou workest at that which is before thee, following right reason\nseriously, vigorously, calmly, without allowing anything else to\ndistract thee, but keeping thy divine part pure, as if thou shouldst be\nbound to give it back immediately; if thou holdest to this, expecting\nnothing, fearing nothing, but satisfied with thy present activity\naccording to nature, and with heroic truth in every word and sound which\nthou utterest, thou wilt live happy. And there is no man who is able to\nprevent this.\n\n13. As physicians have always their instruments and knives ready for\ncases which suddenly require their skill, so do thou have principles\nready for the understanding of things divine and human, and for doing\neverything, even the smallest, with a recollection of the bond which\nunites the divine and human to one another. For neither wilt thou do\nanything well which pertains to man without at the same time having a\nreference to things divine; nor the contrary.\n\n14. No longer wander at hazard; for neither wilt thou read thy own\nmemoirs,[A] nor the acts of the ancient Romans and Hellenes, and the\nselections from books which thou wast reserving for thy old age.[B]\nHasten then to the end which thou hast before thee, and, throwing away\nidle hopes, come to thy own aid, if thou carest at all for thyself,\nwhile it is in thy power.\n\n    [A] [Greek: hypomnemata]: or memoranda, notes, and the like.\n    See i. 17.\n\n    [B] Compare Fronto, ii. 9; a letter of Marcus to Fronto, who\n    was then consul: \"Feci tamen mihi per hos dies excerpta ex\n    libris sexaginta in quinque tomis.\" But he says some of them\n    were small books.\n\n15. They know not how many things are signified by the words stealing,\nsowing, buying, keeping quiet, seeing what ought to be done; for this is\nnot effected by the eyes, but by another kind of vision.\n\n16. Body, soul, intelligence: to the body belong sensation, to the soul\nappetites, to the intelligence principles. To receive the impressions of\nforms by means of appearances belongs even to animals; to be pulled by\nthe strings[A] of desire belongs both to wild beasts and to men who have\nmade themselves into women, and to a Phalaris and a Nero: and to have\nthe intelligence that guides to the things which appear suitable belongs\nalso to those who do not believe in the gods, and who betray their\ncountry, and do their impure deeds when they have shut the doors. If\nthen everything else is common to all that I have mentioned, there\nremains that which is peculiar to the good man, to be pleased and\ncontent with what happens, and with the thread which is spun for him;\nand not to defile the divinity which is planted in his breast, nor\ndisturb it by a crowd of images, but to preserve it tranquil, following\nit obediently as a god, neither saying anything contrary to the truth,\nnor doing anything contrary to justice. And if all men refuse to believe\nthat he lives a simple, modest, and contented life, he is neither angry\nwith any of them, nor does he deviate from the way which leads to the\nend of life, to which a man ought to come pure, tranquil, ready to\ndepart, and without any compulsion perfectly reconciled to his lot.\n\n    [A] Compare Plato, De Legibus, i. p. 644, [Greek: oti tauta ta\n    pathe] etc.; and Antoninus, ii. 2; vii. 3; xii. 19.\n\n\n\n\nIV.\n\n\nThat which rules within, when it is according to nature, is so affected\nwith respect to the events which happened, that it always easily adapts\nitself to that which is possible and is presented to it. For it requires\nno definite material, but it moves towards its purpose,[A] under certain\nconditions, however; and it makes a material for itself out of that\nwhich opposes it, as fire lays hold of what falls into it, by which a\nsmall light would have been extinguished; but when the fire is strong,\nit soon appropriates to itself the matter which is heaped on it, and\nconsumes it, and rises higher by means of this very material.\n\n    [A] [Greek: pros tha hegoumena] literally \"towards that which\n    leads.\" The exact translation is doubtful. See Gataker's note.\n\n2. Let no act be done without a purpose, nor otherwise than according to\nthe perfect principles of art.\n\n3. Men seek retreats for themselves, houses in the country, sea-shores,\nand mountains; and thou too art wont to desire such things very much.\nBut this is altogether a mark of the most common sort of men, for it is\nin thy power whenever thou shalt choose to retire into thyself. For\nnowhere either with more quiet or more freedom from trouble does a man\nretire than into his own soul, particularly when he has within him such\nthoughts that by looking into them he is immediately in perfect\ntranquillity; and I affirm that tranquillity is nothing else than the\ngood ordering of the mind. Constantly then give to thyself this retreat,\nand renew thyself; and let thy principles be brief and fundamental,\nwhich, as soon as thou shalt recur to them, will be sufficient to\ncleanse the soul completely, and to send thee back free from all\ndiscontent with the things to which thou returnest. For with what art\nthou discontented? With the badness of men? Recall to thy mind this\nconclusion, that rational animals exist for one another, and that to\nendure is a part of justice, and that men do wrong involuntarily; and\nconsider how many already, after mutual enmity, suspicion, hatred, and\nfighting, have been stretched dead, reduced to ashes; and be quiet at\nlast.--But perhaps thou art dissatisfied with that which is assigned to\nthee out of the universe.--Recall to thy recollection this alternative;\neither there is providence or atoms [fortuitous concurrence of things];\nor remember the arguments by which it has been proved that the world is\na kind of political community [and be quiet at last].--But perhaps\ncorporeal things will still fasten upon thee.--Consider then further\nthat the mind mingles not with the breath, whether moving gently or\nviolently, when it has once drawn itself apart and discovered its own\npower, and think also of all that thou hast heard and assented to about\npain and pleasure [and be quiet at last].--But perhaps the desire of the\nthing called fame will torment thee.--See how soon everything is\nforgotten, and look at the chaos of infinite time on each side of [the\npresent], and the emptiness of applause, and the changeableness and want\nof judgment in those who pretend to give praise, and the narrowness of\nthe space within which it is circumscribed [and be quiet at last]. For\nthe whole earth is a point, and how small a nook in it is this thy\ndwelling, and how few are there in it, and what kind of people are they\nwho will praise thee.\n\nThis then remains: Remember to retire into this little territory of thy\nown,[A] and above all do not distract or strain thyself, but be free,\nand look at things as a man, as a human being, as a citizen, as a\nmortal. But among the things readiest to thy hand to which thou shalt\nturn, let there be these, which are two. One is that things do not touch\nthe soul, for they are external and remain immovable; but our\nperturbations come only from the opinion which is within. The other is\nthat all these things, which thou seest, change immediately and will no\nlonger be; and constantly bear in mind how many of these changes thou\nhast already witnessed. The universe is transformation: life is opinion.\n\n    [A] Tecum habita, noris quam sit tibi curta\n    supellex.--_Perseus_, iv. 52.\n\n4. If our intellectual part is common, the reason also, in respect of\nwhich we are rational beings, is common: if this is so, common also is\nthe reason which commands us what to do, and what not to do; if this is\nso, there is a common law also; if this is so, we are fellow-citizens;\nif this is so, we are members of some political community; if this is\nso, the world is in a manner a state.[A] For of what other common\npolitical community will any one say that the whole human race are\nmembers? And from thence, from this common political community, comes\nalso our very intellectual faculty and reasoning faculty and our\ncapacity for law; or whence do they come? For as my earthly part is a\nportion given to me from certain earth, and that which is watery from\nanother element, and that which is hot and fiery from some peculiar\nsource (for nothing comes out of that which is nothing, as nothing also\nreturns to non-existence), so also the intellectual part comes from some\nsource.\n\n    [A] Compare Cicero De Legibus, i. 7.\n\n5. Death is such as generation is, a mystery of nature; composition out\nof the same elements, and a decomposition into the same; and altogether\nnot a thing of which any man should be ashamed, for it is not contrary\nto [the nature of] a reasonable animal, and not contrary to the reason\nof our constitution.\n\n6. It is natural that these things should be done by such persons, it is\na matter of necessity; and if a man will not have it so, he will not\nallow the fig-tree to have juice. But by all means bear this in mind,\nthat within a very short time both thou and he will be dead; and soon\nnot even your names will be left behind.\n\n7. Take away thy opinion, and then there is taken away the complaint, \"I\nhave been harmed.\" Take away the complaint, \"I have been harmed,\" and\nthe harm is taken away.\n\n8. That which does not make a man worse than he was, also does not make\nhis life worse, nor does it harm him either from without or from within.\n\n9. The nature of that which is [universally] useful has been compelled\nto do this.\n\n10. Consider that everything which happens, happens justly, and if thou\nobservest carefully, thou wilt find it to be so. I do not say only with\nrespect to the continuity of the series of things, but with respect to\nwhat is just, and as if it were done by one who assigns to each thing\nits value. Observe then as thou hast begun; and whatever thou doest, do\nit in conjunction with this, the being good, and in the sense in which a\nman is properly understood to be good. Keep to this in every action.\n\n11. Do not have such an opinion of things as he has who does thee wrong,\nor such as he wishes thee to have, but look at them as they are in\ntruth.\n\n12. A man should always have these two rules in readiness; the one to do\nonly whatever the reason of the ruling and legislating faculty may\nsuggest for the use of men; the other, to change thy opinion, if there\nis any one at hand who sets thee right and moves thee from any opinion.\nBut this change of opinion must proceed only from a certain persuasion,\nas of what is just or of common advantage, and the like, not because it\nappears pleasant or brings reputation.\n\n13. Hast thou reason? I have.--Why then dost not thou use it? For if\nthis does its own work, what else dost thou wish?\n\n14. Thou hast existed as a part. Thou shalt disappear in that which\nproduced thee; but rather thou shalt be received back into its seminal\nprinciple by transmutation.\n\n15. Many grains of frankincense on the same altar: one falls before,\nanother falls after; but it makes no difference.\n\n16. Within ten days thou wilt seem a god to those to whom thou art now a\nbeast and an ape, if thou wilt return to thy principles and the worship\nof reason.\n\n17. Do not act as if thou wert going to live ten thousand years. Death\nhangs over thee. While thou livest, while it is in thy power, be good.\n\n18. How much trouble he avoids who does not look to see what his\nneighbor says or does or thinks, but only to what he does himself, that\nit may be just and pure; or, as Agathon+ says, look not round at the\ndepraved morals of others, but run straight along the line without\ndeviating from it.\n\n19. He who has a vehement desire for posthumous fame does not consider\nthat every one of those who remember him will himself also die very\nsoon; then again also they who have succeeded them, until the whole\nremembrance shall have been extinguished as it is transmitted through\nmen who foolishly admire and perish. But suppose that those who will\nremember are even immortal, and that the remembrance will be immortal,\nwhat then is this to thee? And I say not what is it to the dead, but\nwhat is it to the living? What is praise, except + indeed so far as it\nhas + a certain utility? For thou now rejectest unseasonably the gift\nof nature, clinging to something else ... +.\n\n20. Everything which is in any way beautiful is beautiful in itself, and\nterminates in itself, not having praise as part of itself. Neither worse\nthen nor better is a thing made by being praised. I affirm this also of\nthe things which are called beautiful by the vulgar, for example,\nmaterial things and works of art. That which is really beautiful has no\nneed of anything; not more than law, not more than truth, not more than\nbenevolence or modesty. Which of these things is beautiful because it\nis praised, or spoiled by being blamed? Is such a thing as an emerald\nmade worse than it was, if it is not praised? or gold, ivory, purple, a\nlyre, a little knife, a flower, a shrub?\n\n[Illustration: INTERIOR OF THE PARTHENON]\n\n21. If souls continue to exist, how does the air contain them from\neternity?--But how does the earth contain the bodies of those who have\nbeen buried from time so remote? For as here the mutation of these\nbodies after a certain continuance, whatever it may be, and their\ndissolution, make room for other dead bodies, so the souls which are\nremoved into the air after subsisting for some time are transmuted and\ndiffused, and assume a fiery nature by being received into the seminal\nintelligence of the universe, and in this way make room for the fresh\nsouls which come to dwell there. And this is the answer which a man\nmight give on the hypothesis of souls continuing to exist. But we must\nnot only think of the number of bodies which are thus buried, but also\nof the number of animals which are daily eaten by us and the other\nanimals. For what a number is consumed, and thus in a manner buried in\nthe bodies of those who feed on them! And nevertheless this earth\nreceives them by reason of the changes [of these bodies] into blood, and\nthe transformations into the aerial or the fiery element.\n\nWhat is the investigation into the truth in this matter? The division\ninto that which is material and that which is the cause of form [the\nformal], (vii. 29.)\n\n22. Do not be whirled about, but in every movement have respect to\njustice, and on the occasion of every impression maintain the faculty of\ncomprehension [or understanding].\n\n23. Everything harmonizes with me, which is harmonious to thee, O\nUniverse. Nothing for me is too early nor too late, which is in due time\nfor thee. Everything is fruit to me which thy seasons bring, O Nature:\nfrom thee are all things, in thee are all things, to thee all things\nreturn. The poet says, Dear city of Cecrops; and wilt not thou say, Dear\ncity of Zeus?\n\n24. Occupy thyself with few things, says the philosopher, if thou\nwouldst be tranquil.--But consider if it would not be better to say, Do\nwhat is necessary, and whatever the reason of the animal which is\nnaturally social requires, and as it requires. For this brings not only\nthe tranquillity which comes from doing well, but also that which comes\nfrom doing few things. For the greatest part of what we say and do being\nunnecessary, if a man takes this away, he will have more leisure and\nless uneasiness. Accordingly, on every occasion a man should ask\nhimself, Is this one of the unnecessary things? Now a man should take\naway not only unnecessary acts, but also unnecessary thoughts, for thus\nsuperfluous acts will not follow after.\n\n25. Try how the life of the good man suits thee, the life of him who is\nsatisfied with his portion out of the whole, and satisfied with his own\njust acts and benevolent disposition.\n\n26. Hast thou seen those things? Look also at these. Do not disturb\nthyself. Make thyself all simplicity. Does any one do wrong? It is to\nhimself that he does the wrong. Has anything happened to thee? Well; out\nof the universe from the beginning everything which happens has been\napportioned and spun out to thee. In a word, thy life is short. Thou\nmust turn to profit the present by the aid of reason and justice. Be\nsober in thy relaxation.\n\n27. Either it is a well-arranged universe[A] or a chaos huddled\ntogether, but still a universe. But can a certain order subsist in thee,\nand disorder in the All? And this too when all things are so separated\nand diffused and sympathetic.\n\n    [A] Antoninus here uses the word [Greek: kosmos] both in the\n    sense of the Universe and of Order; and it is difficult to\n    express his meaning.\n\n28. A black character, a womanish character, a stubborn character,\nbestial, childish, animal, stupid, counterfeit, scurrilous, fraudulent,\ntyrannical.\n\n29. If he is a stranger to the universe who does not know what is in it,\nno less is he a stranger who does not know what is going on in it. He is\na runaway, who flies from social reason; he is blind, who shuts the eyes\nof understanding; he is poor, who has need of another, and has not from\nhimself all things which are useful for life. He is an abscess on the\nuniverse who withdraws and separates himself from the reason of our\ncommon nature through being displeased with the things which happen, for\nthe same nature produces this, and has produced thee too: he is a piece\nrent asunder from the state, who tears, his own soul from that of\nreasonable animals, which is one.\n\n30. The one is a philosopher without a tunic, and the other without a\nbook: here is another half naked: Bread I have not, he says, and I abide\nby reason--and I do not get the means of living out of my learning, +\nand I abide [by my reason].\n\n31. Love the art, poor as it may be, which thou hast learned, and be\ncontent with it; and pass through the rest of life like one who has\nintrusted to the gods with his whole soul all that he has, making\nthyself neither the tyrant nor the slave of any man.\n\n32. Consider, for example, the times of Vespasian. Thou wilt see all\nthese things, people marrying, bringing up children, sick, dying,\nwarring, feasting, trafficking, cultivating the ground, flattering,\nobstinately arrogant, suspecting, plotting, wishing for some to die,\ngrumbling about the present, loving, heaping up treasure, desiring\nconsulship, kingly power. Well, then, that life of these people no\nlonger exists at all. Again, remove to the times of Trajan. Again, all\nis the same. Their life too is gone. In like manner view also the other\nepochs of time and of whole nations, and see how many after great\nefforts soon fell and were resolved into the elements. But chiefly thou\nshouldst think of those whom thou hast thyself known distracting\nthemselves about idle things, neglecting to do what was in accordance\nwith their proper constitution, and to hold firmly to this and to be\ncontent with it. And herein it is necessary to remember that the\nattention given to everything has its proper value and proportion. For\nthus thou wilt not be dissatisfied, if thou appliest thyself to smaller\nmatters no further than is fit.\n\n33. The words which were formerly familiar are now antiquated: so also\nthe names of those who were famed of old, are now in a manner\nantiquated, Camillus, Caeso, Volesus, Leonnatus, and a little after also\nScipio and Cato, then Augustus, then also Hadrianus and Antoninus. For\nall things soon pass away and become a mere tale, and complete oblivion\nsoon buries them. And I say this of those who have shone in a wondrous\nway. For the rest, as soon as they have breathed out their breath they\nare gone, and no man speaks of them. And, to conclude the matter, what\nis even an eternal remembrance? A mere nothing. What then is that about\nwhich we ought to employ our serious pains? This one thing, thoughts\njust, and acts social, and words which never lie, and a disposition\nwhich gladly accepts all that happens, as necessary, as usual, as\nflowing from a principle and source of the same kind.\n\n34. Willingly give thyself up to Clotho [one of the fates], allowing her\nto spin thy thread + into whatever things she pleases.\n\n35. Everything is only for a day, both that which remembers and that\nwhich is remembered.\n\n36. Observe constantly that all things take place by change, and\naccustom thyself to consider that the nature of the universe loves\nnothing so much as to change the things which are and to make new things\nlike them. For everything that exists is in a manner the seed of that\nwhich will be. But thou art thinking only of seeds which are cast into\nthe earth or into a womb: but this is a very vulgar notion.\n\n37. Thou wilt soon die, and thou art not yet simple, nor free from\nperturbations, nor without suspicion of being hurt by external things,\nnor kindly disposed towards all; nor dost thou yet place wisdom only in\nacting justly.\n\n38. Examine men's ruling principles, even those of the wise, what kind\nof things they avoid, and what kind they pursue.\n\n39. What is evil to thee does not subsist in the ruling principle of\nanother; nor yet in any turning and mutation of thy corporeal covering.\nWhere is it then? It is in that part of thee in which subsists the power\nof forming opinions about evils. Let this power then not form [such]\nopinions, and all is well. And if that which is nearest to it, the poor\nbody, is cut, burnt, filled with matter and rottenness, nevertheless let\nthe part which forms opinions about these things be quiet; that is, let\nit judge that nothing is either bad or good which can happen equally to\nthe bad man and the good. For that which happens equally to him who\nlives contrary to nature and to him who lives according to nature, is\nneither according to nature nor contrary to nature.\n\n40. Constantly regard the universe as one living being, having one\nsubstance and one soul; and observe how all things have reference to one\nperception, the perception of this one living being; and how all things\nact with one movement; and how all things are the co-operating causes of\nall things which exist; observe too the continuous spinning of the\nthread and the contexture of the web.\n\n41. Thou art a little soul bearing about a corpse, as Epictetus used to\nsay (i. c. 19).\n\n42. It is no evil for things to undergo change, and no good for things\nto subsist in consequence of change.\n\n43. Time is like a river made up of the events which happen, and a\nviolent stream; for as soon as a thing has been seen, it is carried\naway, and another comes in its place, and this will be carried away too.\n\n44. Everything which happens is as familiar and well known as the rose\nin spring and the fruit in summer; for such is disease, and death, and\ncalumny, and treachery, and whatever else delights fools or vexes them.\n\n45. In the series of things, those which follow are always aptly fitted\nto those which have gone before: for this series is not like a mere\nenumeration of disjointed things, which has only a necessary sequence,\nbut it is a rational connection: and as all existing things are arranged\ntogether harmoniously, so the things which come into existence exhibit\nno mere succession, but a certain wonderful relationship (vi. 38; vii.\n9; vii. 75, note).\n\n46. Always remember the saying of Heraclitus, that the death of earth is\nto become water, and the death of water is to become air, and the death\nof air is to become fire, and reversely. And think too of him who\nforgets whither the way leads, and that men quarrel with that with which\nthey are most constantly in communion, the reason which governs the\nuniverse; and the things which they daily meet with seem to them\nstrange: and consider that we ought not to act and speak as if we were\nasleep, for even in sleep we seem to act and speak; and that + we ought\nnot, like children who learn from their parents, simply to act and speak\nas we have been taught. +\n\n47. If any god told thee that thou shalt die to-morrow, or certainly on\nthe day after to-morrow, thou wouldst not care much whether it was on\nthe third day or on the morrow, unless thou wast in the highest degree\nmean-spirited; for how small is the difference! So think it no great\nthing to die after as many years as thou canst name rather than\nto-morrow.\n\n48. Think continually how many physicians are dead after often\ncontracting their eyebrows over the sick; and how many astrologers after\npredicting with great pretensions the deaths of others; and how many\nphilosophers after endless discourses on death or immortality; how many\nheroes after killing thousands; and how many tyrants who have used their\npower over men's lives with terrible insolence, as if they were\nimmortal; and how many cities are entirely dead, so to speak, Helice[A]\nand Pompeii and Herculaneum, and others innumerable. Add to the\nreckoning all whom thou hast known, one after another. One man after\nburying another has been laid out dead, and another buries him; and all\nthis in a short time. To conclude, always observe how ephemeral and\nworthless human things are, and what was yesterday a little mucus,\nto-morrow will be a mummy or ashes. Pass then through this little space\nof time conformably to nature, and end thy journey in content, as an\nolive falls off when it is ripe, blessing nature who produced it, and\nthanking the tree on which it grew.\n\n    [A] Ovid, Met. xv. 293:--\n\n        \"Si quaeras Helicen et Burin Achaidas urbes,\n        Invenies sub aquis.\"\n\n49. Be like the promontory against which the waves continually break,\nbut it stands firm and tames the fury of the water around it.\n\nUnhappy am I because this has happened to me? Not so, but happy am I,\nthough this has happened to me, because I continue free from pain,\nneither crushed by the present nor fearing the future. For such a thing\nas this might have happened to every man; but every man would not have\ncontinued free from pain on such an occasion. Why then is that rather a\nmisfortune than this a good fortune? And dost thou in all cases call\nthat a man's misfortune which is not a deviation from man's nature? And\ndoes a thing seem to thee to be a deviation from man's nature, when it\nis not contrary to the will of man's nature? Well, thou knowest the will\nof nature. Will then this which has happened prevent thee from being\njust, magnanimous, temperate, prudent, secure against inconsiderate\nopinions and falsehood; will it prevent thee from having modesty,\nfreedom, and everything else, by the presence of which man's nature\nobtains all that is its own? Remember too on every occasion which leads\nthee to vexation to apply this principle; not that this is a misfortune,\nbut that to bear it nobly is good fortune.\n\n50. It is a vulgar, but still a useful help towards contempt of death,\nto pass in review those who have tenaciously stuck to life. What more\nthen have they gained than those who have died early? Certainly they\nlie in their tombs somewhere at last, Cadicianus, Fabius, Julianus,\nLepidus, or any one else like them, who have carried out many to be\nburied, and then were carried out themselves. Altogether the interval is\nsmall [between birth and death]; and consider with how much trouble, and\nin company with what sort of people, and in what a feeble body, this\ninterval is laboriously passed. Do not then consider life a thing of any\nvalue. + For look to the immensity of time behind thee, and to the time\nwhich is before thee, another boundless space. In this infinity then\nwhat is the difference between him who lives three days and him who\nlives three generations?[A]\n\n    [A] An allusion to Homer's Nestor, who was living at the war of\n    Troy among the third generation, like old Parr with his hundred\n    and fifty-two years, and some others in modern times who have\n    beaten Parr by twenty or thirty years if it is true; and yet\n    they died at last. The word is [Greek: trigereniou] in\n    Antoninus. Nestor is named [Greek: trigeron] by some writers;\n    but here perhaps there is an allusion to Homer's [Greek:\n    Gerenios hippota Nestor].\n\n51. Always run to the short way; and the short way is the natural:\naccordingly say and do everything in conformity with the soundest\nreason. For such a purpose frees a man from trouble,+ and warfare, and\nall artifice and ostentatious display.\n\n\n\n\nV.\n\n\nIn the morning when thou risest unwillingly, let this thought be\npresent,--I am rising to the work of a human being. Why then am I\ndissatisfied if I am going to do the things for which I exist and for\nwhich I was brought into the world? Or have I been made for this, to lie\nin the bed-clothes and keep myself warm?--But this is more\npleasant.--Dost thou exist then to take thy pleasure, and not at all for\naction or exertion? Dost thou not see the little plants, the little\nbirds, the ants, the spiders, the bees working together to put in order\ntheir several parts of the universe? And art thou unwilling to do the\nwork of a human being, and dost thou not make haste to do that which, is\naccording to thy nature? But it is necessary to take rest also.--It is\nnecessary. However, Nature has fixed bounds to this too: she has fixed\nbounds to eating and drinking, and yet thou goest beyond these bounds,\nbeyond what is sufficient; yet in thy acts it is not so, but thou\nstoppest short of what thou canst do. So thou lovest not thyself, for if\nthou didst, thou wouldst love thy nature and her will. But those who\nlove their several arts exhaust themselves in working at them unwashed\nand without food; but thou valuest thy own nature less than the turner\nvalues the turning art, or the dancer the dancing art, or the lover of\nmoney values his money, or the vain-glorious man his little glory. And\nsuch men, when they have a violent affection to a thing, choose neither\nto eat nor to sleep rather than to perfect the things which they care\nfor. But are the acts which concern society more vile in thy eyes and\nless worthy of thy labor?\n\n2. How easy it is to repel and to wipe away every impression which is\ntroublesome or unsuitable, and immediately to be in all tranquillity.\n\n3. Judge every word and deed which are according to nature to be fit for\nthee; and be not diverted by the blame which follows from any people,\nnor by their words, but if a thing is good to be done or said, do not\nconsider it unworthy of thee. For those persons have their peculiar\nleading principle and follow their peculiar movement; which things do\nnot thou regard, but go straight on, following thy own nature and the\ncommon nature; and the way of both is one.\n\n4. I go through the things which happen according to nature until I\nshall fall and rest, breathing out my breath into that element out of\nwhich I daily draw it in, and falling upon that earth out of which my\nfather collected the seed, and my mother the blood, and my nurse the\nmilk; out of which during so many years I have been supplied with food\nand drink; which bears me when I tread on it and abuse it for so many\npurposes.\n\n5. Thou sayest, Men cannot admire the sharpness of thy wits.--Be it so:\nbut there are many other things of which thou canst not say, I am not\nformed from them by nature. Show those qualities then which are\naltogether in thy power, sincerity, gravity, endurance of labor,\naversion to pleasure, contentment with thy portion and with few things,\nbenevolence, frankness, no love of superfluity, freedom from trifling,\nmagnanimity. Dost thou not see how many qualities thou art immediately\nable to exhibit, in which there is no excuse of natural incapacity and\nunfitness, and yet thou still remainest voluntarily below the mark? or\nart thou compelled through being defectively furnished by nature to\nmurmur, and to be stingy, and to flatter, and to find fault with thy\npoor body, and to try to please men, and to make great display, and to\nbe so restless in thy mind? No, by the gods; but thou mightest have been\ndelivered from these things long ago. Only if in truth thou canst be\ncharged with being rather slow and dull of comprehension, thou must\nexert thyself about this also, not neglecting it nor yet taking pleasure\nin thy dullness.\n\n6. One man, when he has done a service to another, is ready to set it\ndown to his account as a favor conferred. Another is not ready to do\nthis, but still in his own mind he thinks of the man as his debtor, and\nhe knows what he has done. A third in a manner does not even know what\nhe has done, but he is like a vine which has produced grapes, and seeks\nfor nothing more after it has once produced its proper fruit. As a horse\nwhen he has run, a dog when he has tackled the game, a bee when it has\nmade the honey, so a man when he has done a good act does not call out\nfor others to come and see, but he goes on to another act, as a vine\ngoes on to produce again the grapes in season.--Must a man then be one\nof these, who in a manner act thus without observing it?--Yes.--But this\nvery thing is necessary, the observation of what a man is doing: for, it\nmay be said, it is characteristic of the social animal to perceive that\nhe is working in a social manner, and indeed to wish that his social\npartner also should perceive it.--It is true that thou sayest, but thou\ndost not rightly understand what is now said: and for this reason thou\nwilt become one of those of whom I spoke before, for even they are\nmisled by a certain show of reason. But if thou wilt choose to\nunderstand the meaning of what is said, do not fear that for this reason\nthou wilt omit any social act.\n\n7. A prayer of the Athenians: Rain, rain, O dear Zeus, down on the\nploughed fields of the Athenians and on the plains.--In truth we ought\nnot to pray at all, or we ought to pray in this simple and noble\nfashion.\n\n8. Just as we must understand when it is said, That Aesculapius\nprescribed to this man horse-exercise, or bathing in cold water, or\ngoing without shoes, so we must understand it when it is said, That the\nnature of the universe prescribed to this man disease, or mutilation, or\nloss, or anything else of the kind. For in the first case Prescribed\nmeans something like this: he prescribed this for this man as a thing\nadapted to procure health; and in the second case it means, That which\nhappens[A] to [or suits] every man is fixed in a manner for him suitably\nto his destiny. For this is what we mean when we say that things are\nsuitable to us, as the workmen say of squared stones in walls or the\npyramids, that they are suitable, when they fit them to one another in\nsome kind of connection. For there is altogether one fitness [harmony].\nAnd as the universe is made up out of all bodies to be such a body as it\nis, so out of all existing causes necessity [destiny] is made up to be\nsuch a cause as it is. And even those who are completely ignorant\nunderstand what I mean; for they say, It [necessity, destiny] brought\nthis to such a person.--This then was brought and this was prescribed to\nhim. Let us then receive these things, as well as those which\nAesculapius prescribes. Many as a matter of course even among his\nprescriptions are disagreeable, but we accept them in the hope of\nhealth. Let the perfecting and accomplishment of the things which the\ncommon nature judges to be good, be judged by thee to be of the same\nkind as thy health. And so accept everything which happens, even if it\nseem disagreeable, because it leads to this, to the health of the\nuniverse and to the prosperity and felicity of Zeus [the universe]. For\nhe would not have brought on any man what he has brought, if it were not\nuseful for the whole. Neither does the nature of anything, whatever it\nmay be, cause anything which is not suitable to that which is directed\nby it. For two reasons then it is right to be content with that which\nhappens to thee; the one, because it was done for thee and prescribed\nfor thee, and in a manner had reference to thee, originally from the\nmost ancient causes spun with thy destiny; and the other, because even\nthat which comes severally to every man is to the power which\nadministers the universe a cause of felicity and perfection, nay even of\nits very continuance. For the integrity of the whole is mutilated, if\nthou cuttest off anything whatever from the conjunction and the\ncontinuity either of the parts or of the causes. And thou dost cut off,\nas far as it is in thy power, when thou art dissatisfied, and in a\nmanner triest to put anything out of the way.\n\n    [A] In this section there is a play on the meaning of [Greek:\n    sumbainein].\n\n[Illustration: THE CAPITOL AND TEMPLE OF JUPITER]\n\n9. Be not disgusted, nor discouraged, nor dissatisfied, if thou dost not\nsucceed in doing everything according to right principles, but when\nthou hast failed, return back again, and be content if the greater part\nof what thou doest is consistent with man's nature, and love this to\nwhich thou returnest; and do not return to philosophy as if she were a\nmaster, but act like those who have sore eyes and apply a bit of sponge\nand egg, or as another applies a plaster, or drenching with water. For\nthus thou wilt not fail to + obey reason, and thou wilt repose in it.\nAnd remember that philosophy requires only things which thy nature\nrequires; but thou wouldst have something else which is not according to\nnature.--It may be objected, Why, what is more agreeable than this\n[which I am doing]? But is not this the very reason why pleasure\ndeceives us? And consider if magnanimity, freedom, simplicity,\nequanimity, piety, are not more agreeable. For what is more agreeable\nthan wisdom itself, when thou thinkest of the security and the happy\ncourse of all things which depend on the faculty of understanding and\nknowledge?\n\n10. Things are in such a kind of envelopment that they have seemed to\nphilosophers, not a few nor those common philosophers, altogether\nunintelligible; nay even to the Stoics themselves they seem difficult to\nunderstand. And all our assent is changeable; for where is the man who\nnever changes? Carry thy thoughts then to the objects themselves, and\nconsider how short-lived they are and worthless, and that they may be in\nthe possession of a filthy wretch or a whore or a robber. Then turn to\nthe morals of those who live with thee, and it is hardly possible to\nendure even the most agreeable of them, to say nothing of a man being\nhardly able to endure himself. In such darkness then and dirt, and in so\nconstant a flux both of substance and of time, and of motion and of\nthings moved, what there is worth being highly prized, or even an object\nof serious pursuit, I cannot imagine. But on the contrary it is a man's\nduty to comfort himself, and to wait for the natural dissolution, and\nnot to be vexed at the delay, but to rest in these principles only: the\none, that nothing will happen to me which is not conformable to the\nnature of the universe; and the other, that it is in my power never to\nact contrary to my god and daemon: for there is no man who will compel\nme to this.\n\n11. About what am I now employing my own soul? On every occasion I must\nask myself this question, and inquire, What have I now in this part of\nme which they call the ruling principle? and whose soul have I\nnow,--that of a child, or of a young man, or of a feeble woman, or of a\ntyrant, or of a domestic animal, or of a wild beast?\n\n12. What kind of things those are which appear good to the many, we may\nlearn even from this. For if any man should conceive certain things as\nbeing really good, such as prudence, temperance, justice, fortitude, he\nwould not after having first conceived these endure to listen to\nanything+ which should not be in harmony with what is really good.+ But\nif a man has first conceived as good the things which appear to the many\nto be good, he will listen and readily receive as very applicable that\nwhich was said by the comic writer. +Thus even the many perceive the\ndifference.+ For were it not so, this saying would not offend and would\nnot be rejected [in the first case], while we receive it when it is said\nof wealth, and of the means which further luxury and fame, as said fitly\nand wittily. Go on then and ask if we should value and think those\nthings to be good, to which after their first conception in the mind the\nwords of the comic writer might be aptly applied,--that he who has them,\nthrough pure abundance has not a place to ease himself in.\n\n13. I am composed of the formal and the material; and neither of them\nwill perish into non-existence, as neither of them came into existence\nout of non-existence. Every part of me then will be reduced by change\ninto some part of the universe, and that again will change into another\npart of the universe, and so on forever. And by consequence of such a\nchange I too exist, and those who begot me, and so on forever in the\nother direction. For nothing hinders us from saying so, even if the\nuniverse is administered according to definite periods [of revolution].\n\n14. Reason and the reasoning art [philosophy] are powers which are\nsufficient for themselves and for their own works. They move then from a\nfirst principle which is their own, and they make their way to the end\nwhich is proposed to them; and this is the reason why such acts are\nnamed Catorthoseis or right acts, which word signifies that they proceed\nby the right road.\n\n15. None of these things ought to be called a man's, which do not belong\nto a man, as man. They are not required of a man, nor does man's nature\npromise them, nor are they the means of man's nature attaining its end.\nNeither then does the end of man lie in these things, nor yet that which\naids to the accomplishment of this end, and that which aids toward this\nend is that which is good. Besides, if any of these things did belong to\nman, it would not be right for a man to despise them and to set himself\nagainst them; nor would a man be worthy of praise who snowed that he did\nnot want these things, nor would he who stinted himself in any of them\nbe good, if indeed these things were good. But now the more of these\nthings a man deprives himself of, or of other things like them, or even\nwhen he is deprived of any of them, the more patiently he endures the\nloss, just in the same degree he is a better man.\n\n16. Such as are thy habitual thoughts, such also will be the character\nof thy mind; for the soul is dyed by the thoughts. Dye it then with a\ncontinuous series of such thoughts as these: for instance, that where a\nman can live, there he can also live well. But he must live in a palace;\nwell then, he can also live well in a palace. And again, consider that\nfor whatever purpose each thing has been constituted, for this it has\nbeen constituted, and towards this it is carried; and its end is in that\ntowards which it is carried; and where the end is, there also is the\nadvantage and the good of each thing. Now the good for the reasonable\nanimal is society; for that we are made for society has been shown\nabove.[A] Is it not plain that the inferior exists for the sake of the\nsuperior? But the things which have life are superior to those which\nhave not life, and of those which have life the superior are those which\nhave reason.\n\n    [A] ii. 1.\n\n17. To seek what is impossible is madness: and it is impossible that the\nbad should not do something of this kind.\n\n18. Nothing happens to any man which he is not formed by nature to bear.\nThe same things happen to another, and either because he does not see\nthat they have happened, or because he would show a great spirit, he is\nfirm and remains unharmed. It is a shame then that ignorance and conceit\nshould be stronger than wisdom.\n\n19. Things themselves touch not the soul, not in the least degree; nor\nhave they admission to the soul, nor can they turn or move the soul: but\nthe soul turns and moves itself alone, and whatever judgments it may\nthink proper to make, such it makes for itself the things which present\nthemselves to it.\n\n20. In one respect man is the nearest thing to me, so far as I must do\ngood to men and endure them. But so far as some men make themselves\nobstacles to my proper acts, man becomes to me one of the things which\nare indifferent, no less than the sun or wind or a wild beast. Now it is\ntrue that these may impede my action, but they are no impediments to my\naffects and disposition, which have the power of acting conditionally\nand changing: for the mind converts and changes every hindrance to its\nactivity into an aid; and so that which is a hindrance is made a\nfurtherance to an act; and that which is an obstacle on the road helps\nus on this road.\n\n21. Reverence that which is best in the universe; and this is that which\nmakes use of all things and directs all things. And in like manner also\nreverence that which is best in thyself; and this is of the same kind as\nthat. For in thyself also, that which makes use of everything else is\nthis, and thy life is directed by this.\n\n22. That which does no harm to the state, does no harm to the citizen.\nIn the case of every appearance of harm apply this rule: if the state\nis not harmed by this, neither am I harmed. But if the state is harmed,\nthou must not be angry with him who does harm to the state. Show him\nwhere his error is.\n\n23. Often think of the rapidity with which things pass by and disappear,\nboth the things which are and the things which are produced. For\nsubstance is like a river in a continual flow, and the activities of\nthings are in constant change, and the causes work in infinite\nvarieties; and there is hardly anything which stands still. And consider\nthis which is near to thee, this boundless abyss of the past and of the\nfuture in which all things disappear. How then is he not a fool who is\npuffed up with such things or plagued about them and makes himself\nmiserable? for they vex him only for a time, and a short time.\n\n24. Think of the universal substance, of which thou hast a very small\nportion; and of universal time, of which a short and indivisible\ninterval has been assigned to thee; and of that which is fixed by\ndestiny, and how small a part of it thou art.\n\n25. Does another do me wrong? Let him look to it. He has his own\ndisposition, his own activity. I now have what the universal nature now\nwills me to have; and I do what my nature now wills me to do.\n\n26. Let the part of thy soul which leads and governs be undisturbed by\nthe movements in the flesh, whether of pleasure or of pain; and let it\nnot unite with them, but let it circumscribe itself and limit those\naffects to their parts. But when these affects rise up to the mind by\nvirtue of that other sympathy that naturally exists in a body which is\nall one, then thou must not strive to resist the sensation, for it is\nnatural: but let not the ruling part of itself add to the sensation the\nopinion that it is either good or bad.\n\n27. Live with the gods. And he does live with the gods who constantly\nshows to them that his own soul is satisfied with that which is assigned\nto him, and that it does all that the daemon wishes, which Zeus hath\ngiven to every man for his guardian and guide, a portion of himself. And\nthis is every man's understanding and reason.\n\n28. Art thou angry with him whose armpits stink? art thou angry with him\nwhose mouth smells foul? What good will this anger do thee? He has such\na mouth, he has such armpits: it is necessary that such an emanation\nmust come from such things: but the man has reason, it will be said, and\nhe is able, if he takes pains, to discover wherein he offends; I wish\nthee well of thy discovery. Well then, and thou hast reason: by thy\nrational faculty stir up his rational faculty; show him his error,\nadmonish him. For if he listens, thou wilt cure him, and there is no\nneed of anger. [+ Neither tragic actor nor whore. +][A]\n\n    [A] This is imperfect or corrupt, or both. There is also\n    something wrong or incomplete in the beginning of S. 29, where\n    he says [Greek: hos exelthon zen dianoe], which Gataker\n    translates \"as if thou wast about to quit life;\" but we cannot\n    translate [Greek: exelthon] in that way. Other translations are\n    not much more satisfactory. I have translated it literally and\n    left it imperfect.\n\n29. As thou intendest to live when them art gone out, ... so it is in\nthy power to live here. But if men do not permit thee, then get away out\nof life, yet so as if thou wert suffering no harm. The house is smoky,\nand I quit it.[A] Why dost thou think that this is any trouble? But so\nlong as nothing of the kind drives me out, I remain, am free, and no man\nshall hinder me from doing what I choose; and I choose to do what is\naccording to the nature of the rational and social animal.\n\n    [A] Epictetus, i. 25, 18.\n\n30. The intelligence of the universe is social. Accordingly it has made\nthe inferior things for the sake of the superior, and it has fitted the\nsuperior to one another. Thou seest how it has subordinated,\nco-ordinated, and assigned to everything its proper portion, and has\nbrought together into concord with one another the things which are the\nbest.\n\n31. How hast thou behaved hitherto to the gods, thy parents, brethren,\nchildren, teachers, to those who looked after thy infancy, to thy\nfriends, kinsfolk, to thy slaves? Consider if thou hast hitherto behaved\nto all in such a way that this may be said of thee,--\n\n      \"Never has wronged a man in deed or word.\"\n\nAnd call to recollection both how many things thou hast passed through,\nand how many things thou hast been able to endure, and that the history\nof thy life is now complete and thy service is ended; and how many\nbeautiful things thou hast seen; and how many pleasures and pains thou\nhast despised; and how many things called honorable thou hast spurned;\nand to how many ill-minded folks thou hast shown a kind disposition.\n\n32. Why do unskilled and ignorant souls disturb him who has skill and\nknowledge? What soul then has skill and knowledge? That which knows\nbeginning and end, and knows the reason which pervades all substance,\nand though all time by fixed periods [revolutions] administers the\nuniverse.\n\n33. Soon, very soon, thou wilt be ashes, or a skeleton, and either a\nname or not even a name; but name is sound and echo. And the things\nwhich are much valued in life are empty and rotten and trifling, and\n[like] little dogs biting one another, and little children quarreling,\nlaughing, and then straightway weeping. But fidelity and modesty and\njustice and truth are fled\n\n      Up to Olympus from the wide-spread earth.\n                 HESIOD, _Works, etc_. v. 197.\n\nWhat then is there which still detains thee here, if the objects of\nsense are easily changed and never stand still, and the organs of\nperception are dull and easily receive false impressions, and the poor\nsoul itself is an exhalation from blood? But to have good repute amid\nsuch a world as this is an empty thing. Why then dost thou not wait in\ntranquillity for thy end, whether it is extinction or removal to another\nstate? And until that time comes, what is sufficient? Why, what else\nthan to venerate the gods and bless them, and to do good to men, and to\npractise tolerance and self-restraint;[A] but as to everything which is\nbeyond the limits of the poor flesh and breath, to remember that this is\nneither thine nor in thy power.\n\n    [A] This is the Stoic precept [Greek: anechou kai apechou]. The\n    first part teaches us to be content with men and things as they\n    are. The second part teaches us the virtue of self-restraint,\n    or the government of our passions.\n\n34. Thou canst pass thy life in an equable flow of happiness, if thou\ncanst go by the right way, and think and act in the right way. These two\nthings are common both to the soul of God and to the soul of man, and to\nthe soul of every rational being: not to be hindered by another; and to\nhold good to consist in the disposition to justice and the practice of\nit, and in this to let thy desire find its termination.\n\n35. If this is neither my own badness, nor an effect of my own badness,\nand the common weal is not injured, why am I troubled about it, and what\nis the harm to the common weal?\n\n36. Do not be carried along inconsiderately by the appearance of\nthings, but give help [to all] according to thy ability and their\nfitness; and if they should have sustained loss in matters which are\nindifferent, do not imagine this to be a damage; for it is a bad habit.\nBut as the old man, when he went away, asked back his foster-child's\ntop, remembering that it was a top, so do thou in this case also.\n\nWhen thou art calling out on the Rostra, hast thou forgotten, man, what\nthese things are?--Yes; but they are objects of great concern to these\npeople--wilt thou too then be made a fool for these things? I was once a\nfortunate man, but I lost it, I know not how.--But fortunate means that\na man has assigned to himself a good fortune: and a good fortune is good\ndisposition of the soul, good emotions, good actions.[A]\n\n    [A] This section is unintelligible. Many of the words may be\n    corrupt, and the general purport of the section cannot be\n    discovered. Perhaps several things have been improperly joined\n    in one section. I have translated it nearly literally.\n    Different translators give the section a different turn, and\n    the critics have tried to mend what they cannot understand.\n\n\n\n\nVI.\n\n\nThe substance of the universe is obedient and compliant; and the reason\nwhich governs it has in itself no cause for doing evil, for it has no\nmalice, nor does it do evil to anything, nor is anything harmed by it.\nBut all things are made and perfected according to this reason.\n\n2. Let it make no difference to thee whether thou art cold or warm, if\nthou art doing thy duty; and whether thou art drowsy or satisfied with\nsleep; and whether ill-spoken of or praised; and whether dying or doing\nsomething else. For it is one of the acts of life, this act by which we\ndie; it is sufficient then in this act also to do well what we have in\nhand (vi. 22, 28).\n\n3. Look within. Let neither the peculiar quality of anything nor its\nvalue escape thee.\n\n4. All existing things soon change, and they will either be reduced to\nvapor, if indeed all substance is one, or they will be dispersed.\n\n5. The reason which governs knows what its own disposition is, and what\nit does, and on what material it works.\n\n6. The best way of avenging thyself is not to become like [the\nwrong-doer].\n\n7. Take pleasure in one thing and rest in it, in passing from one social\nact to another social act, thinking of God.\n\n8. The ruling principle is that which rouses and turns itself, and while\nit makes itself such as it is and such as it wills to be, it also makes\neverything which happens appear to itself to be such as it wills.\n\n9. In conformity to the nature of the universe every single thing is\naccomplished; for certainly it is not in conformity to any other nature\nthat each thing is accomplished, either a nature which externally\ncomprehends this, or a nature which is comprehended within this nature,\nor a nature external and independent of this (xi. 1; vi. 40; viii. 50).\n\n10. The universe is either a confusion, and a mutual involution of\nthings, and a dispersion, or it is unity and order and providence. If\nthen it is the former, why do I desire to tarry in a fortuitous\ncombination of things and such a disorder? and why do I care about\nanything else than how I shall at last become earth? and why am I\ndisturbed, for the dispersion of my elements will happen whatever I do?\nBut if the other supposition is true, I venerate, and I am firm, and I\ntrust in him who governs (iv. 27).\n\n11. When thou hast been compelled by circumstances to be disturbed in a\nmanner, quickly return to thyself, and do not continue out of tune\nlonger than the compulsion lasts; for thou wilt have more mastery over\nthe harmony by continually recurring to it.\n\n12. If thou hadst a step-mother and a mother at the same time, thou\nwouldst be dutiful to thy step-mother, but still thou wouldst constantly\nreturn to thy mother. Let the court and philosophy now be to thee\nstep-mother and mother: return to philosophy frequently and repose in\nher, through whom what thou meetest with in the court appears to thee\ntolerable, and thou appearest tolerable in the court.\n\n13. When we have meat before us and such eatables, we receive the\nimpression that this is the dead body of a fish, and this the dead body\nof a bird or of a pig; and again, that this Falernian is only a little\ngrape-juice, and this purple robe some sheep's wool dyed with the blood\nof a shell-fish: such then are these impressions, and they reach the\nthings themselves and penetrate them, and so we see what kind of things\nthey are. Just in the same way ought we to act all through life, and\nwhere there are things which appear most worthy of our approbation, we\nought to lay them bare and look at their worthlessness and strip them of\nall the words by which they are exalted. For outward show is a wonderful\nperverter of the reason, and when thou art most sure that thou art\nemployed about things worth thy pains, it is then that it cheats thee\nmost. Consider then what Crates says of Xenocrates himself.\n\n14. Most of the things which the multitude admire are referred to\nobjects of the most general kind, those which are held together by\ncohesion or natural organization, such as stones, wood, fig-trees,\nvines, olives. But those which are admired by men, who are a little more\nreasonable, are referred to the things which are held together by a\nliving principle, as flocks, herds. Those which are admired by men who\nare still more instructed are the things which are held together by a\nrational soul, not however a universal soul, but rational so far as it\nis a soul skilled in some art, or expert in some other way, or simply\nrational so far as it possesses a number of slaves. But he who values a\nrational soul, a soul universal and fitted for political life, regards\nnothing else except this; and above all things he keeps his soul in a\ncondition and in an activity conformable to reason and social life, and\nhe co-operates to this end with those who are of the same kind as\nhimself.\n\n15. Some things are hurrying into existence, and others are hurrying out\nof it; and of that which is coming into existence part is already\nextinguished. Motions and changes are continually renewing the world,\njust as the uninterrupted course of time is always renewing the infinite\nduration of ages. In this flowing stream then, on which there is no\nabiding, what is there of the things which hurry by on which a man would\nset a high price? It would be just as if a man should fall in love with\none of the sparrows which fly by, but it has already passed out of\nsight. Something of this kind is the very life of every man, like the\nexhalation of the blood and the respiration of the air. For such as it\nis to have once drawn in the air and to have given it back, which we do\nevery moment, just the same is it with the whole respiratory power,\nwhich thou didst receive at thy birth yesterday and the day before, to\ngive it back to the element from which thou didst first draw it.\n\n16. Neither is transpiration, as in plants, a thing to be valued, nor\nrespiration, as in domesticated animals and wild beasts, nor the\nreceiving of impressions by the appearances of things, nor being moved\nby desires as puppets by strings, nor assembling in herds, nor being\nnourished by food; for this is just like the act of separating and\nparting with the useless part of our food. What then is worth being\nvalued? To be received with clapping of hands? No. Neither must we value\nthe clapping of tongues; for the praise which comes from the many is a\nclapping of tongues. Suppose then that thou hast given up this worthless\nthing called fame, what remains that is worth valuing? This, in my\nopinion: to move thyself and to restrain thyself in conformity to thy\nproper constitution, to which end both all employments and arts lead.\nFor every art aims at this, that the thing which has been made should be\nadapted to the work for which it has been made; and both the\nvine-planter who looks after the vine, and the horse-breaker, and he who\ntrains the dog, seek this end. But the education and the teaching of\nyouth aim at something. In this then is the value of the education and\nthe teaching. And if this is well, thou wilt not seek anything else.\nWilt thou not cease to value many other things too? Then thou wilt be\nneither free, nor sufficient for thy own happiness, nor without passion.\nFor of necessity thou must be envious, jealous, and suspicious of those\nwho can take away those things, and plot against those who have that\nwhich is valued by thee. Of necessity a man must be altogether in a\nstate of perturbation who wants any of these things; and besides, he\nmust often find fault with the gods. But to reverence and honor thy own\nmind will make thee content with thyself, and in harmony with society,\nand in agreement with the gods, that is, praising all that they give and\nhave ordered.\n\n17. Above, below, all around are the movements of the elements. But the\nmotion of virtue is in none of these: it is something more divine, and\nadvancing by a way hardly observed, it goes happily on its road.\n\n18. How strangely men act! They will not praise those who are living at\nthe same time and living with themselves; but to be themselves praised\nby posterity, by those whom they have never seen nor ever will see, this\nthey set much value on. But this is very much the same as if thou\nshouldst be grieved because those who have lived before thee did not\npraise thee.\n\n19. If a thing is difficult to be accomplished by thyself, do not think\nthat it is impossible for man: but if anything is possible for man and\nconformable to his nature, think that this can be attained by thyself\ntoo.\n\n20. In the gymnastic exercises suppose that a man has torn thee with his\nnails, and by dashing against thy head has inflicted a wound. Well, we\nneither show any signs of vexation, nor are we offended, nor do we\nsuspect him afterwards as a treacherous fellow; and yet we are on our\nguard against him, not however as an enemy, nor yet with suspicion, but\nwe quietly get out of his way. Something like this let thy behavior be\nin all the other parts of life; let us overlook many things in those who\nare like antagonists in the gymnasium. For it is in our power, as I\nsaid, to get out of the way, and to have no suspicion nor hatred.\n\n21. If any man is able to convince me and show me that I do not think or\nact right, I will gladly change; for I seek the truth, by which no man\nwas ever injured. But he is injured who abides in his error and\nignorance.\n\n22. I do my duty: other things trouble me not; for they are either\nthings without life, or things without reason, or things that have\nrambled and know not the way.\n\n23. As to the animals which have no reason, and generally all things\nand objects, do thou, since thou hast reason and they have none, make\nuse of them with a generous and liberal spirit. But towards human\nbeings, as they have reason, behave in a social spirit. And on all\noccasions call on the gods, and do not perplex thyself about the length\nof time in which thou shalt do this; for even three hours so spent are\nsufficient.\n\n24. Alexander the Macedonian and his groom by death were brought to the\nsame state; for either they were received among the same seminal\nprinciples of the universe, or they were alike dispersed among the\natoms.\n\n25. Consider how many things in the same indivisible time take place in\neach of us,--things which concern the body and things which concern the\nsoul: and so thou wilt not wonder if many more things, or rather all\nthings which come into existence in that which is the one and all, which\nwe call Cosmos, exist in it at the same time.\n\n26. If any man should propose to thee the question, how the name\nAntoninus is written, wouldst thou with a straining of the voice utter\neach letter? What then if they grow angry, wilt thou be angry too? Wilt\nthou not go on with composure and number every letter? Just so then in\nthis life also remember that every duty is made up of certain parts.\nThese it is thy duty to observe, and without being disturbed or showing\nanger towards those who are angry with thee, to go on thy way and\nfinish that which is set before thee.\n\n27. How cruel it is not to allow men to strive After the things which\nappear to them to be suitable to their nature and profitable! And yet in\na manner thou dost not allow them to do this, when thou art vexed\nbecause they do wrong. For they are certainly moved towards things\nbecause they suppose them to be suitable to their nature and profitable\nto them. But it is not so. Teach them then, and show them without being\nangry.\n\n28. Death is a cessation of the impressions through the senses, and of\nthe pulling of the strings which move the appetites, and of the\ndiscursive movements of the thoughts, and of the service to the flesh\n(ii. 12).\n\n29. It is a shame for the soul to be first to give way in this life,\nwhen thy body does not give way.\n\n30. Take care that thou art not made into a Caesar, that thou art not\ndyed with this dye; for such things happen. Keep thyself then simple,\ngood, pure, serious, free from affectation, a friend of justice, a\nworshipper of the gods, kind, affectionate, strenuous in all proper\nacts. Strive to continue to be such as philosophy wished to make thee.\nReverence the gods, and help men. Short is life. There is only one fruit\nof this terrene life--a pious disposition and social acts. Do everything\nas a disciple of Antoninus. Remember his constancy in every act which\nwas conformable to reason, and his evenness in all things, and his\npiety, and the serenity of his countenance, and his sweetness, and his\ndisregard of empty fame, and his efforts to understand things; and how\nhe would never let anything pass without having first most carefully\nexamined it and clearly understood it; and how he bore with those who\nblamed him unjustly without blaming them in return; how he did nothing\nin a hurry; and how he listened not to calumnies, and how exact an\nexaminer of manners and actions he was; and not given to reproach\npeople, nor timid, nor suspicious, nor a sophist; and with how little he\nwas satisfied, such as lodging, bed, dress, food, servants; and how\nlaborious and patient; and how he was able on account of his sparing\ndiet to hold out to the evening, not even requiring to relieve himself\nby any evacuations except at the usual hour; and his firmness and\nuniformity in his friendships; and how he tolerated freedom of speech in\nthose who opposed his opinions; and the pleasure that he had when any\nman showed him anything better; and how religious he was without\nsuperstition. Imitate all this, that thou mayest have as good a\nconscience, when thy last hour comes, as he had (i. 16).\n\n31. Return to thy sober senses and call thyself back; and when thou hast\nroused thyself from sleep and hast perceived that they were only dreams\nwhich troubled thee, now in thy waking hours look at these [the things\nabout thee] as thou didst look at those [the dreams].\n\n32. I consist of a little body and a soul. Now to this little body all\nthings are indifferent, for it is not able to perceive differences. But\nto the understanding those things only are indifferent which are not the\nworks of its own activity. But whatever things are the works of its own\nactivity, all these are in its power. And of these however only those\nwhich are done with reference to the present; for as to the future and\nthe past activities of the mind, even these are for the present\nindifferent.\n\n33. Neither the labor which the hand does nor that of the foot is\ncontrary to nature, so long as the foot does the foot's work and the\nhand the hand's. So then neither to a man as a man is his labor contrary\nto nature, so long as it does the things of a man. But if the labor is\nnot contrary to his nature, neither is it an evil to him.\n\n34. How many pleasures have been enjoyed by robbers, patricides,\ntyrants.\n\n35. Dost thou not see how the handicrafts-men accommodate themselves up\nto a certain point to those who are not skilled in their\ncraft--nevertheless they cling to the reason [the principles] of their\nart, and do not endure to depart from it? Is it not strange if the\narchitect and the physician shall have more respect to the reason [the\nprinciples] of their own arts than man to his own reason, which is\ncommon to him and the gods?\n\n36. Asia, Europe, are corners of the universe; all the sea a drop in the\nuniverse; Athos a little clod of the universe: all the present time is a\npoint in eternity. All things are little, changeable, perishable. All\nthings come from thence, from that universal ruling power, either\ndirectly proceeding or by way of sequence. And accordingly the lion's\ngaping jaws, and that which is poisonous, and every harmful thing, as a\nthorn, as mud, are after-products of the grand and beautiful. Do not\nthen imagine that they are of another kind from that which thou dost\nvenerate, but form a just opinion of the source of all (vii. 75).\n\n37. He who has seen present things has seen all, both everything which\nhas taken place from all eternity and everything which will be for time\nwithout end; for all things are of one kin and of one form.\n\n38. Frequently consider the connection of all things in the universe and\ntheir relation to one another. For in a manner all things are implicated\nwith one another, and all in this way are friendly to one another; for\none thing comes in order after another, and this is by virtue of the +\nactive movement and mutual conspiration and the unity of the substance\n(ix. 1).\n\n39. Adapt thyself to the things with which thy lot has been cast: and\nthe men among whom thou hast received thy portion, love them, but do it\ntruly [sincerely].\n\n40. Every instrument, tool, vessel, if it does that for which it has\nbeen made, is well, and yet he who made it is not there. But in the\nthings which are held together by nature there is within, and there\nabides in them the power which made them; wherefore the more is it fit\nto reverence this power, and to think, that, if thou dost live and act\naccording to its will, everything in thee is in conformity to\nintelligence. And thus also in the universe the things which belong to\nit are in conformity to intelligence.\n\n41. Whatever of the things which are not within thy power thou shalt\nsuppose to be good for thee or evil, it must of necessity be that, if\nsuch a bad thing befall thee, or the loss of such a good thing, thou\nwilt not blame the gods, and hate men too, those who are the cause of\nthe misfortune or the loss, or those who are suspected of being likely\nto be the cause; and indeed we do much injustice because we make a\ndifference between these things [because we do not regard these things\nas indifferent+].[A] But if we judge only those things which are in our\npower to be good or bad, there remains no reason either for finding\nfault with God or standing in a hostile attitude to man.[B]\n\n    [A] Gataker translates this \"because we strive to get these\n    things,\" comparing the use of [Greek: diapheresthai] in v. I, and x.\n    27, and ix. 38, where it appears that his reference should be\n    xi. 10. He may be right in his interpretation, but I doubt.\n\n    [B] Cicero, De Natura Deorum. iii. 32.\n\n42. We are all working together to one end, some with knowledge and\ndesign, and others without knowing what they do; as men also when they\nare asleep, of whom it is Heraclitus, I think, who says that they are\nlaborers and co-operators in the things which take place in the\nuniverse. But men co-operate after different fashions: and even those\nco-operate abundantly, who find fault with what happens and those who\ntry to oppose it and to hinder it; for the universe had need even of\nsuch men as these. It remains then for thee to understand among what\nkind of workmen thou placest thyself; for he who rules all things will\ncertainly make a right use of thee, and he will receive thee among some\npart of the co-operators and of those whose labors conduce to one end.\nBut be not thou such a part as the mean and ridiculous verse in the\nplay, which Chrysippus speaks of.[A]\n\n    [A] Plutarch, adversus Stoicos, c. 14.\n\n43. Does the sun undertake to do the work of the rain, or Aesculapius\nthe work of the Fruit-bearer [the earth]? And how is it with respect to\neach of the stars--are they not different and yet they work together to\nthe same end?\n\n44. If the gods have determined about me and about the things which must\nhappen to me, they have determined well, for it is not easy even to\nimagine a deity without forethought; and as to doing me harm, why\nshould they have any desire towards that? for what advantage would\nresult to them from this or to the whole, which is the special object of\ntheir providence? But if they have not determined about me individually,\nthey have certainly determined about the whole at least, and the things\nwhich happen by way of sequence in this general arrangement I ought to\naccept with pleasure and to be content with them. But if they determine\nabout nothing,--which it is wicked to believe, or if we do believe it,\nlet us neither sacrifice nor pray nor swear by them, nor do anything\nelse which we do as if the gods were present and lived with us,--but if\nhowever the gods determine about none of the things which concern us, I\nam able to determine about myself, and I can inquire about that which is\nuseful; and that is useful to every man which is conformable to his own\nconstitution and nature. But my nature is rational and social; and my\ncity and country, so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome, but so far as I am\na man, it is the world. The things then which are useful to these cities\nare alone useful to me.\n\n45. Whatever happens to every man, this is for the interest of the\nuniversal: this might be sufficient. But further thou wilt observe this\nalso as a general truth, if thou dost observe, that whatever is\nprofitable to any man is profitable also to other men. But let the word\nprofitable be taken here in the common sense as said of things of the\nmiddle kind [neither good nor bad].\n\n46. As it happens to thee in the amphitheatre and such places, that the\ncontinual sight of the same things, and the uniformity, make the\nspectacle wearisome, so it is in the whole of life; for all things\nabove, below, are the same and from the same. How long then?\n\n47. Think continually that all kinds of men and all kinds of pursuits\nand of all nations are dead, so that thy thoughts come down even to\nPhilistion and Phoebus and Origanion. Now turn thy thoughts to the other\nkinds [of men]. To that place then we must remove, where there are so\nmany great orators, and so many noble philosophers, Heraclitus,\nPythagoras, Socrates; so many heroes of former days, and so many\ngenerals after them, and tyrants; besides these, Eudoxus, Hipparchus,\nArchimedes, and other men of acute natural talents, great minds, lovers\nof labor, versatile, confident, mockers even of the perishable and\nephemeral life of man, as Menippus and such as are like him. As to all\nthese consider that they have long been in the dust. What harm then is\nthis to them; and what to those whose names are altogether unknown? One\nthing here is worth a great deal, to pass thy life in truth and justice,\nwith a benevolent disposition even to liars and unjust men.\n\n48. When thou wishest to delight thyself, think of the virtues of those\nwho live with thee; for instance, the activity of one, and the modesty\nof another, and the liberality of a third, and some other good quality\nof a fourth. For nothing delights so much as the examples of the\nvirtues, when they are exhibited in the morals of those who live with us\nand present themselves in abundance, as far as is possible. Wherefore we\nmust keep them before us.\n\n49. Thou art not dissatisfied. I suppose, because thou weighest only so\nmany litrae and not three hundred. Be not dissatisfied then that thou\nmust live only so many years and not more; for as thou art satisfied\nwith the amount of substance which has been assigned to thee, so be\ncontent with the time.\n\n50. Let us try to persuade them [men]. But act even against their will,\nwhen the principles of justice lead that way. If however any man by\nusing force stands in thy way, betake thyself to contentment and\ntranquillity, and at the same time employ the hindrance towards the\nexercise of some other virtue; and remember that thy attempt was with a\nreservation [conditionally], that thou didst not desire to do\nimpossibilities. What then didst thou desire?--Some such effort as\nthis.--But thou attainest thy object, if the things to which thou wast\nmoved are [not] accomplished. +\n\n51. He who loves fame considers another man's activity to be his own\ngood; and he who loves pleasure, his own sensations; but he who has\nunderstanding considers his own acts to be his own good.\n\n52. It is in our power to have no opinion about a thing, and not to be\ndisturbed in our soul; for things themselves have no natural power to\nform our judgments.\n\n53. Accustom thyself to attend carefully to what is said by another, and\nas much as it is possible, be in the speaker's mind.\n\n54. That which is not good for the swarm, neither is it good for the\nbee.\n\n55. If sailors abused the helmsman, or the sick the doctor, would they\nlisten to anybody else? or how could the helmsman secure the safety of\nthose in the ship, or the doctor the health of those whom he attends?\n\n56. How many together with whom I came into the world are already gone\nout of it.\n\n57. To the jaundiced honey tastes bitter, and to those bitten by mad\ndogs water causes fear; and to little children the ball is a fine thing.\nWhy then am I angry? Dost thou think that a false opinion has less power\nthan the bile in the jaundiced or the poison in him who is bitten by a\nmad dog?\n\n58. No man will hinder thee from living according to the reason of thy\nown nature: nothing will happen to thee contrary to the reason of the\nuniversal nature.\n\n59. What kind of people are those whom men wish to please, and for what\nobjects, and by what kind of acts? How soon will time cover all things,\nand how many it has covered already.\n\n\n\n\nVII.\n\n\nWhat is badness? It is that which thou hast often seen. And on the\noccasion of everything which happens keep this in mind, that it is that\nwhich thou hast often seen. Everywhere up and down thou wilt find the\nsame things, with which the old histories are filled, those of the\nmiddle ages and those of our own day; with which cities and houses are\nfilled now. There is nothing new: all things are both familiar and\nshort-lived.\n\n2. How can our principles become dead, unless the impressions [thoughts]\nwhich correspond to them are extinguished? But it is in thy power\ncontinuously to fan these thoughts into a flame. I can have that opinion\nabout anything which I ought to have. If I can, why am I disturbed? The\nthings which are external to my mind have no relation at all to my\nmind.--Let this be the state of thy affects, and thou standest erect. To\nrecover thy life is in thy power. Look at things again as thou didst use\nto look at them; for in this consists the recovery of thy life.\n\n3. The idle business of show, plays on the stage, flocks of sheep,\nherds, exercises with spears, a bone cast to little dogs, a bit of bread\ninto fishponds, laborings of ants and burden-carrying, runnings about\nof frightened little mice, puppets pulled by strings--[all alike]. It is\nthy duty then in the midst of such things to show good humor and not a\nproud air; to understand however that every man is worth just so much as\nthe things are worth about which he busies himself.\n\n4. In discourse thou must attend to what is said, and in every movement\nthou must observe what is doing. And in the one thou shouldst see\nimmediately to what end it refers, but in the other watch carefully what\nis the thing signified.\n\n5. Is my understanding sufficient for this or not? If it is sufficient,\nI use it for the work as an instrument given by the universal nature.\nBut if it is not sufficient, then either I retire from the work and give\nway to him who is able to do it better, unless there be some reason why\nI ought not to do so; or I do it as well as I can, taking to help me the\nman who with the aid of my ruling principle can do what is now fit and\nuseful for the general good. For what-soever either by myself or with\nanother I can do, ought to be directed to this only, to that which is\nuseful and well suited to society.\n\n6. How many after being celebrated by fame have been given up to\noblivion; and how many who have celebrated the fame of others have long\nbeen dead.\n\n7. Be not ashamed to be helped; for it is thy business to do thy duty\nlike a soldier in the assault on a town. How then, if being lame thou\ncanst not mount up on the battlements alone, but with the help of\nanother it is possible?\n\n8. Let not future things disturb thee, for thou wilt come to them, if it\nshall be necessary, having with thee the same reason which now thou\nusest for present things.\n\n9. All things are implicated with one another, and the bond is holy; and\nthere is hardly anything unconnected with any other thing. For things\nhave been co-ordinated, and they combine to form the same universe\n[order]. For there is one universe made up of all things, and one god\nwho pervades all things, and one substance,[A] and one law, [one] common\nreason in all intelligent animals, and one truth; if indeed there is\nalso one perfection for all animals which are of the same stock and\nparticipate in the reason.\n\n    [A] \"One substance,\" p. 42, note 1.\n\n10. Everything material soon disappears in the substance of the whole;\nand everything formal [causal] is very soon taken back into the\nuniversal reason; and the memory of everything is very soon overwhelmed\nin time.\n\n11. To the rational animal the same act is according to nature and\naccording to reason.\n\n12. Be thou erect, or be made erect (iii. 5).\n\n13. Just as it is with the members in those bodies which are united in\none, so it is with rational beings which exist separate, for they have\nbeen constituted for one co-operation. And the perception of this will\nbe more apparent to thee if thou often sayest to thyself that I am a\nmember [Greek: melos] of the system of rational beings. But if [using\nthe letter _r_] thou sayest that thou art a part [Greek: meros], thou\ndost not yet love men from thy heart; beneficence does not yet delight\nthee for its own sake;[A] thou still doest it barely as a thing of\npropriety, and not yet as doing good to thyself.\n\n    [A] I have used Gataker's conjecture [Greek: katalektikos]\n    instead of the common reading [Greek: kataleptikos]: compare\n    iv. 20; ix. 42.\n\n14. Let there fall externally what will on the parts which can feel the\neffects of this fall. For those parts which have felt will complain, if\nthey choose. But I, unless I think that what has happened is an evil, am\nnot injured. And it is in my power not to think so.\n\n15. Whatever any one does or says, I must be good; just as if the gold,\nor the emerald, or the purple, were always saying this. Whatever any one\ndoes or says, I must be emerald and keep my color.\n\n16. The ruling faculty does not disturb itself; I mean, does not\nfrighten itself or cause itself pain.+ But if any one else can frighten\nor pain it, let him do so. For the faculty itself will not by its own\nopinion turn itself into such ways. Let the body itself take care, if it\ncan, that it suffer nothing, and let it speak, if it suffers. But the\nsoul itself, that which is subject to fear, to pain, which has\ncompletely the power of forming an opinion about these things, will\nsuffer nothing, for it will never deviate+ into such a judgment. The\nleading principle in itself wants nothing, unless it makes a want for\nitself; and therefore it is both free from perturbation and unimpeded,\nif it does not disturb and impede itself.\n\n17. Eudaemonia [happiness] is a good daemon, or a good thing. What then\nart thou doing here, O imagination? Go away, I entreat thee by the gods,\nas thou didst come, for I want thee not. But thou art come according to\nthy old fashion. I am not angry with thee: only go away.\n\n18. Is any man afraid of change? Why, what can take place without\nchange? What then is more pleasing or more suitable to the universal\nnature? And canst thou take a bath unless the wood undergoes a change?\nand canst thou be nourished, unless the food undergoes a change? And can\nanything else that is useful be accomplished without change? Dost thou\nnot see then that for thyself also to change is just the same, and\nequally necessary for the universal nature?\n\n19. Through the universal substance as through a furious torrent all\nbodies are carried, being by their nature united with and co-operating\nwith the whole, as the parts of our body with one another. How many a\nChrysippus, how many a Socrates, how many an Epictetus has time already\nswallowed up! And let the same thought occur to thee with reference to\nevery man and thing (v. 23; vi. 15).\n\n20. One thing only troubles me, lest I should do something which the\nconstitution of man does not allow, or in the way which it does not\nallow, or what it does not allow now.\n\n21. Near is thy forgetfulness of all things; and near the forgetfulness\nof thee by all.\n\n22. It is peculiar to man to love even those who do wrong. And this\nhappens, if when they do wrong it occurs to thee that they are kinsmen,\nand that they do wrong through ignorance and unintentionally, and that\nsoon both of you will die; and above all, that the wrong-doer has done\nthee no harm, for he has not made thy ruling faculty worse than it was\nbefore.\n\n23. The universal nature out of the universal substance, as if it were\nwax, now moulds a horse, and when it has broken this up, it uses the\nmaterial for a tree, then for a man, then for something else; and each\nof these things subsists for a very short time. But it is no hardship\nfor the vessel to be broken up, just as there was none in its being\nfastened together (viii. 50).\n\n24. A scowling look is altogether unnatural; when it is often\nassumed,[A] the result is that all comeliness dies away, and at last is\nso completely extinguished that it cannot be again lighted up at\nall. Try to conclude from this very fact that it is contrary to reason.\nFor if even the perception of doing wrong shall depart, what reason is\nthere for living any longer?\n\n    [A] This is corrupt.\n\n25. Nature which governs the whole will soon change all things thou\nseest, and out of their substance will make other things, and again\nother things from the substance of them, in order that the world may be\never new (xii. 23).\n\n26. When a man has done thee any wrong, immediately consider with what\nopinion about good or evil he has done wrong. For when thou hast seen\nthis, thou wilt pity him, and wilt neither wonder nor be angry. For\neither thou thyself thinkest the same thing to be good that he does, or\nanother thing of the same kind. It is thy duty then to pardon him. But\nif thou dost not think such things to be good or evil, thou wilt more\nreadily be well disposed to him who is in error.\n\n27. Think not so much of what thou hast not as of what thou hast: but of\nthe things which thou hast select the best, and then reflect how eagerly\nthey would have been sought, if thou hadst them not. At the same time,\nhowever, take care that thou dost not through being so pleased with them\naccustom thyself to overvalue them, so as to be disturbed if ever thou\nshouldst not have them.\n\n28. Retire into thyself. The rational principle which rules has this\nnature, that it is content with itself when it does what is just, and so\nsecures tranquillity.\n\n29. Wipe out the imagination. Stop the pulling of the strings. Confine\nthyself to the present. Understand well what happens either to thee or\nto another. Divide and distribute every object into the causal [formal]\nand the material. Think of thy last hour. Let the wrong which is done by\na man stay there where the wrong was done (viii. 29).\n\n30. Direct thy attention to what is said. Let thy understanding enter\ninto the things that are doing and the things which do them (vii. 4).\n\n31. Adorn thyself with simplicity and modesty, and with indifference\ntowards the things which lie between virtue and vice. Love mankind.\nFollow God. The poet says that law rules all--+ And it is enough to\nremember that law rules all.+[A]\n\n    [A] The end of this section is unintelligible.\n\n32. About death: whether it is a dispersion, or a resolution into atoms,\nor annihilation, it is either extinction or change.\n\n33. About pain: the pain which is intolerable carries us off; but that\nwhich lasts a long time is tolerable; and the mind maintains its own\ntranquillity by retiring into itself, and the ruling faculty is not made\nworse. But the parts which are harmed by pain, let them, if they can,\ngive their opinion about it.\n\n34. About fame: look at the minds [of those who seek fame], observe what\nthey are, and what kind of things they avoid, and what kind of things\nthey pursue. And consider that as the heaps of sand piled on one another\nhide the former sands; so in life the events which go before are soon\ncovered by those which come after.\n\n35. From Plato:[A] The man who has an elevated mind and takes a view of\nall time and of all substance, dost thou suppose it possible for him to\nthink that human life is anything great? It is not possible, he\nsaid.--Such a man then will think that death also is no evil.--Certainly\nnot.\n\n36. From Antisthenes: It is royal to do good and to be abused.\n\n37. It is a base thing for the countenance to be obedient and to\nregulate and compose itself as the mind commands, and for the mind not\nto be regulated and composed by itself.\n\n38. It is not right to vex ourselves at things, For they care nought\nabout it.[B]\n\n39. To the immortal gods and us give joy.\n\n40. Life must be reaped like the ripe ears of corn.\n    One man is born; another dies.[C]\n\n    [A] Plato, Pol. vi. 486.\n\n    [B] From the Bellerophon of Euripides.\n\n    [C] From the Hypsipyle of Euripides. Cicero (Tuscul. iii. 25)\n    has translated six lines from Euripides, and among them are\n    these two lines,--\n\n       \"Reddenda terrae est terra: tum vita omnibus\n       Metenda ut fruges: Sic jubet necessitas.\"\n\n41. If gods care not for me and my children,\n    There is a reason for it.\n\n42. For the good is with me, and the just.[A]\n\n43. No joining others in their wailing,\n    no violent emotion.\n\n44. From Plato:[B] But I would make this man a sufficient answer, which\nis this: Thou sayest not well, if thou thinkest that a man who is good\nfor anything at all ought to compute the hazard of life or death, and\nshould not rather look to this only in all that he does, whether he is\ndoing what is just or unjust, and the works of a good or bad man.\n\n45. [C]For thus it is, men of Athens, in truth: wherever a man has\nplaced himself thinking it the best place for him, or has been placed by\na commander, there in my opinion he ought to stay and to abide the\nhazard, taking nothing into the reckoning, either death or anything\nelse, before the baseness [of deserting his post].\n\n[A] See Aristophanes, Acharnenses, v. 661.\n\n[B] From the Apologia, c. 16.\n\n[C] From the Apologia, c. 16.\n\n46. But, my good friend, reflect whether that which is noble and good is\nnot something different from saving and being saved; for+ as to a man\nliving such or such a time, at least one who is really a man, consider\nif this is not---a thing to be dismissed from the thoughts:+ and there\nmust be no love of life: but as to these matters a man must intrust them\nto the Deity and believe what the women say, that no man can escape his\ndestiny, the next inquiry being how he may best live the time that he\nhas to live.[A]\n\n47. Look round at the courses of the stars, as if thou wert going along\nwith them; and constantly consider the changes of the elements into one\nanother, for such thoughts purge away the filth of the terrene life.\n\n48. This is a fine saying of Plato:[B] That he who is discoursing about\nmen should look also at earthly things as if he viewed them from some\nhigher place; should look at them in their assemblies, armies,\nagricultural labors, marriages, treaties, births, deaths, noise of the\ncourts of justice, desert places, various nations of barbarians, feasts,\nlamentations, markets, a mixture of all things and an orderly\ncombination of contraries.\n\n    [A] Plato, Gorgias, c. 68 (512). In this passage the text of\n    Antoninus has [Greek: eateon], which is perhaps right; but\n    there is a difficulty in the words [Greek: me gar touto men,\n    to zen hoposonde chronon tonge hos alethos andra eateon esti, kai\n    ou] &C. The conjecture [Greek: eukteon] for [Greek: eateon]\n    does not mend the matter.\n\n    [B] It is said that this is not in the extant writings of\n    Plato.\n\n49. Consider the past,--such great changes of political supremacies;\nthou mayest foresee also the things which will be. For they will\ncertainly be of like form, and it is not possible that they should\ndeviate from the order of the things which take place now; accordingly\nto have contemplated human life for forty years is the same as to have\ncontemplated it for ten thousand years. For what more wilt thou see?\n\n50. That which has grown from the earth to the earth,\n    But that which has sprung from heavenly seed,\n    Back to the heavenly realms returns.[A]\n\nThis is either a dissolution of the mutual involution of the atoms, or a\nsimilar dispersion of the unsentient elements.\n\n51. With food and drinks and cunning magic arts\n    Turning the channel's course to 'scape from death.[B]\n          The breeze which heaven has sent\n    We must endure, and toil without complaining.\n\n    [A] From the Chrysippus of Euripides.\n\n    [B] The first two lines are from the Supplices of Euripides, v.\n    1110.\n\n52. Another may be more expert in casting his opponent; but he is not\nmore social, nor more modest, nor better disciplined to meet all that\nhappens, nor more considerate with respect to the faults of his\nneighbors.\n\n53. Where any work can be done conformably to the reason which is common\nto gods and men, there we have nothing to fear; for where we are able\nto get profit by means of the activity which is successful and proceeds\naccording to our constitution, there no harm is to be suspected.\n\n54. Everywhere and at all times it is in thy power piously to acquiesce\nin thy present condition, and to behave, justly to those who are about\nthee, and to exert thy skill upon thy present thoughts, that nothing\nshall steal into them without being well examined.\n\n55. Do not look around thee to discover other men's ruling principles,\nbut look straight to this, to what nature leads thee, both the universal\nnature through the things which happen to thee, and thy own nature\nthrough the acts which must be done by thee. But every being ought to do\nthat which is according to its constitution; and all other things have\nbeen constituted for the sake of rational beings, just as among\nirrational things the inferior for the sake of the superior, but the\nrational for the sake of one another.\n\nThe prime principle then in man's constitution is the social. And the\nsecond is not to yield to the persuasions of the body,--for it is the\npeculiar office of the rational and intelligent motion to circumscribe\nitself, and never to be overpowered either by the motion of the senses\nor of the appetites, for both are animal: but the intelligent motion\nclaims superiority, and does not permit itself to be overpowered by the\nothers. And with good reason, for it is formed by nature to use all of\nthem. The third thing in the rational constitution is freedom from error\nand from deception. Let then the ruling principle holding fast to these\nthings go straight on, and it has what is its own.\n\n56. Consider thyself to be dead, and to have completed thy life up to\nthe present time; and live according to nature the remainder which is\nallowed thee.\n\n57. Love that only which happens to thee and is spun with the thread of\nthy destiny. For what is more suitable?\n\n58. In everything which happens keep before thy eyes those to whom the\nsame things happened, and how they were vexed, and treated them as\nstrange things, and found fault with them: and now where are they?\nNowhere. Why then dost thou too choose to act in the same way? and why\ndost thou not leave these agitations which are foreign to nature to\nthose who cause them and those who are moved by them; and why art thou\nnot altogether intent upon the right way of making use of the things\nwhich happen to thee? For then thou wilt use them well, and they will be\na material for thee [to work on]. Only attend to thyself, and resolve to\nbe a good man in every act which thou doest: and remember ...[A]\n\n    [A] This section is obscure, and the conclusion is so corrupt\n    that it is impossible to give any probable meaning to it. It is\n    better to leave it as it is than to patch it up, as some\n    critics and translators have done.\n\n59. Look within. Within is the fountain of good, and it will ever bubble\nup, if thou wilt ever dig.\n\n60. The body ought to be compact, and to show no irregularity either in\nmotion or attitude. For what the mind shows in the face by maintaining\nin it the expression of intelligence and propriety, that ought to be\nrequired also in the whole body. But all these things should be observed\nwithout affectation.\n\n61. The art of life is more like the wrestler's art than the dancer's,\nin respect of this, that it should stand ready and firm to meet onsets\nwhich are sudden and unexpected.\n\n62. Constantly observe who those are whose approbation thou wishest to\nhave, and what ruling principles they possess. For then thou wilt\nneither blame those who offend involuntarily, nor wilt thou want their\napprobation, if thou lookest to the sources of their opinions and\nappetites.\n\n63. Every soul, the philosopher says, is involuntarily deprived of\ntruth; consequently in the same way it is deprived of justice and\ntemperance and benevolence and everything of the kind. It is most\nnecessary to bear this constantly in mind, for thus thou wilt be more\ngentle towards all.\n\n64. In every pain let this thought be present, that there is no dishonor\nin it, nor does it make the governing intelligence worse, for it does\nnot damage the intelligence either so far as the intelligence is\nrational[A] or so far as it is social. Indeed in the case of most pains\nlet this remark of Epicurus aid thee, that pain is neither intolerable\nnor everlasting, if thou bearest in mind that it has its limits, and if\nthou addest nothing to it in imagination: and remember this too, that we\ndo not perceive that many things which are disagreeable to us are the\nsame as pain, such as excessive drowsiness, and the being scorched by\nheat, and the having no appetite. When then thou art discontented about\nany of these things, say to thyself that thou art yielding to pain.\n\n65. Take care not to feel towards the inhuman as they feel towards\nmen.[B]\n\n66. How do we know if Telauges was not superior in character to\nSocrates? For it is not enough that Socrates died a more noble death,\nand disputed more skilfully with the sophists, and passed the night in\nthe cold with more endurance, and that when he was bid to arrest Leon[C]\nof Salamis, he considered it more noble to refuse, and that he walked in\na swaggering way in the streets[D]--though as to this fact one may have\ngreat doubts if it was true. But we ought to inquire what kind of a soul\nit was that Socrates possessed, and if he was able to be content with\nbeing just towards men and pious towards the gods, neither idly vexed on\naccount of men's villainy, nor yet making himself a slave to any man's\nignorance, nor receiving as strange anything that fell to his share out\nof the universal, nor enduring it as intolerable, nor allowing his\nunderstanding to sympathize with the affects of the miserable flesh.\n\n    [A] The text has [Greek: hylike], which it has been proposed to\n    alter to [Greek: logike], and this change is necessary. We\n    shall then have in this section [Greek: logike] and [Greek:\n    koinonike] associated, as we have in s. 68 [Greek: logike] and\n    [Greek: politike], and in s. 72.\n\n    [B] I have followed Gataker's conjecture [Greek: ohi\n    apanthropoi] instead of the MSS. reading [Greek: ohi anthropoi]\n\n    [C] Leon of Salamis. See Plato, Epist. 7; Apolog. c. 20;\n    Epictetus, iv. I, 160; iv. 7, 30.\n\n    [D] Aristophan. Nub. 362. [Greek: hoti brenthuei t' en taisis\n    hodois kai to ophthalmo paraballei.]\n\n67. Nature has not so mingled+ [the intelligence] with the composition\nof the body, as not to have allowed thee the power of circumscribing\nthyself and of bringing under subjection to thyself all that is thy own;\nfor it is very possible to be a divine man and to be recognized as such\nby no one. Always bear this in mind; and another thing too, that very\nlittle indeed is necessary for living a happy life. And because thou\nhast despaired of becoming a dialectician and skilled in the knowledge\nof nature, do not for this reason renounce the hope of being both free\nand modest, and social and obedient to God.\n\n68. It is in thy power to live free from all compulsion in the greatest\ntranquillity of mind, even if all the world cry out against thee as\nmuch as they choose, and even if wild beasts tear in pieces the members\nof this kneaded matter which has grown around thee. For what hinders the\nmind in the midst of all this from maintaining itself in tranquillity\nand in a just judgment of all surrounding things and in a ready use of\nthe objects which are presented to it, so that the judgment may say to\nthe thing which falls under its observation: This thou art in substance\n[reality], though in men's opinion thou mayest appear to be of a\ndifferent kind; and the use shall say to that which falls under the\nhand: Thou art the thing that I was seeking; for to me that which\npresents itself is always a material for virtue both rational and\npolitical, and in a word, for the exercise of art, which belongs to man\nor God. For everything which happens has a relationship either to God or\nman, and is neither new nor difficult to handle, but usual and apt\nmatter to work on.\n\n69. The perfection of moral character consists in this, in passing every\nday as the last, and in being neither violently excited nor torpid nor\nplaying the hypocrite.\n\n70. The gods who are immortal are not vexed because during so long a\ntime they must tolerate continually men such as they are and so many of\nthem bad; and besides this, they also take care of them in all ways.\nBut thou, who art destined to end so soon, art thou wearied of enduring\nthe bad, and this too when thou art one of them?\n\n71. It is a ridiculous thing for a man not to fly from his own badness,\nwhich is indeed possible, but to fly from other men's badness, which is\nimpossible.\n\n72. Whatever the rational and political [social] faculty finds to be\nneither intelligent nor social, it properly judges to be inferior to\nitself.\n\n73. When thou hast done a good act and another has received it, why dost\nthou still look for a third thing besides these, as fools do, either to\nhave the reputation of having done a good act or to obtain a return?\n\n74. No man is tired of receiving what is useful. But it is useful to act\naccording to nature. Do not then be tired of receiving what is useful by\ndoing it to others.\n\n75. The nature of the All moved to make the universe. But now either\neverything that takes place comes by way of consequence or [continuity];\nor even the chief things towards which the ruling power of the universe\ndirects its own movement are governed by no rational principle. If this\nis remembered, it will make thee more tranquil in many things (vi. 44;\nix. 28).[A]\n\n    [A] It is not easy to understand this section. It has been\n    suggested that there is some error in [Greek: e alogista] &c.\n    Some of the translators have made nothing of the passage, and\n    they have somewhat perverted the words. The first proposition\n    is, that the universe was made by some sufficient power. A\n    beginning of the universe is assumed, and a power which framed\n    an order. The next question is, How are things produced now?\n    Or, in other words, by what power do forms appear in continuous\n    succession? The answer, according to Antoninus, may be this: It\n    is by virtue of the original constitution of things that all\n    change and succession have been effected and are effected. And\n    this is intelligible in a sense, if we admit that the universe\n    is always one and the same, a continuity of identity; as much\n    one and the same as man is one and the same--which he believes\n    himself to be, though he also believes, and cannot help\n    believing, that both in his body and in his thoughts there is\n    change and succession. There is no real discontinuity then in\n    the universe; and if we say that there was an order framed in\n    the beginning, and that the things which are now produced are a\n    consequence of a previous arrangement, we speak of things as we\n    are compelled to view them, as forming a series of succession,\n    just as we speak of the changes in our own bodies and the\n    sequence of our own thoughts. But as there are no intervals,\n    not even intervals infinitely small, between any two supposed\n    states of any one thing, so there are no intervals, not even\n    infinitely small, between what we call one thing and any other\n    thing which we speak of as immediately preceding or following\n    it. What we call time is an idea derived from our notion of a\n    succession of things or events, an idea which is a part of our\n    constitution, but not an idea which we can suppose to belong to\n    an infinite intelligence and power. The conclusion then is\n    certain that the present and the past, the production of\n    present things and the supposed original order, out of which we\n    say that present things now come, are one, and the present\n    productive power and the so-called past arrangement are only\n    different names for one thing. I suppose then that Antoninus\n    wrote here as people sometimes talk now, and that his real\n    meaning is not exactly expressed by his words. There are\n    certainly other passages from which I think that we may collect\n    that he had notions of production something like what I have\n    expressed. We now come to the alternate: \"or even the chief\n    things ... principle.\" I do not exactly know what he means by\n    [Greek: ta kureotata] \"the chief,\" or \"the most excellent,\" or\n    whatever it is. But as he speaks elsewhere of inferior and\n    superior things, and of the inferior being for the use of the\n    superior, and of rational beings being the highest, he may here\n    mean rational beings. He also in this alternative assumes a\n    governing power of the universe, and that it acts by directing\n    its power towards these chief objects, or making its special,\n    proper motion towards them. And here he uses the noun ([Greek:\n    horme]) \"movement,\" which contains the same notion as the verb\n    ([Greek: ormese]) \"moved,\" which he used at the beginning of\n    the paragraph, when he was speaking of the making of the\n    universe. If we do not accept the first hypothesis, he says, we\n    must take the conclusion of the second, that the \"chief things\n    towards which the ruling power of the universe directs its own\n    movement are governed by no rational principle.\" The meaning\n    then is, if there is a meaning in it, that though there is a\n    governing power which strives to give effect to its efforts, we\n    must conclude that there is no rational direction of anything,\n    if the power which first made the universe does not in some way\n    govern it still. Besides, if we assume that anything is now\n    produced or now exists without the action of the supreme\n    intelligence, and yet that this intelligence makes an effort to\n    act, we obtain a conclusion which cannot be reconciled with the\n    nature of a supreme power, whose existence Antoninus always\n    assumes. The tranquillity that a man may gain from these\n    reflections must result from his rejecting the second\n    hypothesis and accepting the first--whatever may be the exact\n    sense in which the emperor understood the first. Or, as he says\n    elsewhere, if there is no Providence which governs the world,\n    man has at least the power of governing himself according to\n    the constitution of his nature; and so he may be tranquil if he\n    does the best that he can.\n\n    If there is no error in the passage, it is worth the labor to\n    discover the writer's exact meaning--for I think that he had a\n    meaning, though people may not agree what it was. (Compare ix.\n    28.) If I have rightly explained the emperor's meaning in this\n    and other passages, he has touched the solution of a great\n    question.\n\n\n\n\nVIII.\n\n\nThis reflection also tends to the removal of the desire of empty fame,\nthat it is no longer in thy power to have lived the whole of thy life,\nor at least thy life from thy youth upwards, like a philosopher; but\nboth to many others and to thyself it is plain that thou art far from\nphilosophy. Thou hast fallen into disorder then, so that it is no longer\neasy for thee to get the reputation of a philosopher; and thy plan of\nlife also opposes it. If then thou hast truly seen where the matter\nlies, throw away the thought, How thou shall seem [to others], and be\ncontent if thou shalt live the rest of thy life in such wise as thy\nnature wills. Observe then what it wills, and let nothing else distract\nthee; for thou hast had experience of many wanderings without having\nfound happiness anywhere,--not in syllogisms, nor in wealth, nor in\nreputation, nor in enjoyment, nor anywhere. Where is it then? In doing\nwhat man's nature requires. How then shall a man do this? If he has\nprinciples from which come his affects and his acts. What principles?\nThose which relate to good and bad: the belief that there is nothing\ngood for man which does not make him just, temperate, manly, free; and\nthat there is nothing bad which does not do the contrary to what has\nbeen mentioned.\n\n2. On the occasion of every act ask thyself, How is this with respect to\nme? Shall I repent of it? A little time and I am dead, and all is gone.\nWhat more do I seek, if what I am now doing is the work of an\nintelligent living being, and a social being, and one who is under the\nsame law with God?\n\n3. Alexander and Caius[A] and Pompeius, what are they in comparison with\nDiogenes and Heraclitus and Socrates? For they were acquainted with\nthings, and their causes [forms], and their matter, and the ruling\nprinciples of these men were the same [or conformable to their\npursuits]. But as to the others, how many things had they to care for,\nand to how many things were they slaves!\n\n    [A] Caius is C. Julius Caesar, the dictator; and Pompeius is\n    Cn. Pompeius, named Magnus.\n\n4. [Consider] that men will do the same things nevertheless, even though\nthou shouldst burst.\n\n5. This is the chief thing: Be not perturbed, for all things are\naccording to the nature of the universal; and in a little time thou wilt\nbe nobody and nowhere, like Hadrianus and Augustus. In the next place,\nhaving fixed thy eyes steadily on thy business, look at it, and at the\nsame time remembering that it is thy duty to be a good man, and what\nman's nature demands, do that without turning aside; and speak as it\nseems to thee most just, only let it be with a good disposition and with\nmodesty and without hypocrisy.\n\n6. The nature of the universal has this work to do,--to remove to that\nplace the things which are in this, to change them, to take, them away\nhence, and to carry them there. All things are change, yet we need not\nfear anything new. All things are familiar [to us]; but the distribution\nof them still remains the same.\n\n7. Every nature is contented with itself when it goes on its way well;\nand a rational nature goes on its way well when in its thoughts it\nassents to nothing false or uncertain, and when it directs its movements\nto social acts only, and when it confines its desires and aversions to\nthe things which are in its power, and when it is satisfied with\neverything that is assigned to it by the common nature. For of this\ncommon nature every particular nature is a part, as the nature of the\nleaf is a part of the nature of the plant; except that in the plant the\nnature of the leaf is part of a nature which has not perception or\nreason, and is subject to be impeded; but the nature of man is part of a\nnature which is not subject to impediments, and is intelligent and just,\nsince it gives to everything in equal portions and according to its\nworth, times, substance, cause [form], activity, and incident. But\nexamine, not to discover that any one thing compared with any other\nsingle thing is equal in all respects, but by taking all the parts\ntogether of one thing and comparing them with all the parts together of\nanother.\n\n8. Thou hast not leisure [or ability] to read. But thou hast leisure [or\nability] to check arrogance: thou hast leisure to be superior to\npleasure and pain: thou hast leisure to be superior to love of fame, and\nnot to be vexed at stupid and ungrateful people, nay even to care for\nthem.\n\n9. Let no man any longer hear thee finding fault with the court life or\nwith thy own (v. 16).\n\n10. Repentance is a kind of self-reproof for having neglected something\nuseful; but that which is good must be something useful, and the perfect\ngood man should look after it. But no such man would ever repent of\nhaving refused any sensual pleasure. Pleasure then is neither good nor\nuseful.\n\n11. This thing, what is it in itself, in its own constitution? What is\nits substance and material? And what its causal nature [or form]? And\nwhat is it doing in the world? And how long does it subsist?\n\n12. When thou risest from sleep with reluctance, remember that it is\naccording to thy constitution and according to human nature to perform\nsocial acts, but sleeping is common also to irrational animals. But that\nwhich is according to each individual's nature is also more peculiarly\nits own, and more suitable to its nature, and indeed also more agreeable\n(v. 1).\n\n13. Constantly, and, if it be possible, on the occasion of every\nimpression on the soul, apply to it the principles of Physic, of Ethic,\nand of Dialectic.\n\n14. Whatever man thou meetest with, immediately say to thyself: What\nopinions has this man about good and bad? For if with respect to\npleasure and pain and the causes of each, and with respect to fame and\nignominy, death and life, he has such and such opinions, it will seem\nnothing wonderful or strange to me if he does such and such things; and\nI shall bear in mind that he is compelled to do so.[A]\n\n    [A] Antoninus v. 16. Thucydides, iii 10: [Greek: en gar to\n    diallassonti tes gnomes kai ai diaphorai ton ergon\n    kathistantai].\n\n15. Remember that as it is a shame to be surprised if the fig-tree\nproduces figs, so it is to be surprised if the world produces such and\nsuch things of which it is productive; and for the physician and the\nhelmsman it is a shame to be surprised if a man has a fever, or if the\nwind is unfavorable.\n\n16. Remember that to change thy opinion and to follow him who corrects\nthy error is as consistent with freedom as it is to persist in thy\nerror. For it is thy own, the activity which is exerted according to thy\nown movement and judgment, and indeed according to thy own understanding\ntoo.\n\n17. If a thing is in thy own power, why dost thou do it? but if it is in\nthe power of another, whom dost thou blame,--the atoms [chance] or the\ngods? Both are foolish. Thou must blame nobody. For if thou canst,\ncorrect [that which is the cause]; but if thou canst not do this,\ncorrect at least the thing itself; but if thou canst not do even this,\nof what use is it to thee to find fault? for nothing should be done\nwithout a purpose.\n\n18. That which has died falls not out of the universe. If it stays here,\nit also changes here, and is dissolved into its proper parts, which are\nelements of the universe and of thyself. And these too change, and they\nmurmur not.\n\n19. Everything exists for some end,--a horse, a vine. Why dost thou\nwonder? Even the sun will say, I am for some purpose, and the rest of\nthe gods will say the same. For what purpose then art thou,--to enjoy\npleasure? See if common sense allows this.\n\n20. Nature has had regard in everything no less to the end than to the\nbeginning and the continuance, just like the man who throws up a ball.\nWhat good is it then for the ball to be thrown up, or harm for it to\ncome down, or even to have fallen? and what good is it to the bubble\nwhile it holds together, or what harm when it is burst? The same may be\nsaid of a light also.\n\n21. Turn it [the body] inside out, and see what kind of thing it is; and\nwhen it has grown old, what kind of thing it becomes, and when it is\ndiseased.\n\nShort lived are both the praiser and the praised, and the rememberer and\nthe remembered: and all this in a nook of this part of the world; and\nnot even here do all agree, no, not any one with himself: and the whole\nearth too is a point.\n\n22. Attend to the matter which is before thee, whether it is an opinion\nor an act or a word.\n\nThou sufferest this justly: for thou choosest rather to become good\nto-morrow than to be good to-day.\n\n23. Am I doing anything? I do it with reference to the good of mankind.\nDoes anything happen to me? I receive it and refer it to the gods, and\nthe source of all things, from which all that happens is derived.\n\n24. Such as bathing appears to thee,--oil, sweat, dirt, filthy water,\nall things disgusting,--so is every part of life and everything.\n\n25. Lucilla saw Verus die, and then Lucilla died. Secunda saw Maximus\ndie, and then Secunda died. Epitynchanus saw Diotimus die, and then\nEpitynchanus died. Antoninus saw Faustina die, and then Antoninus died.\nSuch is everything. Celer saw Hadrianus die, and then Celer died. And\nthose sharp-witted men, either seers or men inflated with pride, where\nare they,--for instance the sharp-witted men, Charax and Demetrius the\nPlatonist, and Eudaemon, and any one else like them? All ephemeral,\ndead long ago. Some indeed have not been remembered even for a short\ntime, and others have become the heroes of fables, and again others have\ndisappeared even from fables. Remember this then, that this little\ncompound, thyself, must either be dissolved, or thy poor breath must be\nextinguished, or be removed and placed elsewhere.\n\n26. It is satisfaction to a man to do the proper works of a man. Now it\nis a proper work of a man to be benevolent to his own kind, to despise\nthe movements of the senses, to form a just judgment of plausible\nappearances, and to take a survey of the nature of the universe and of\nthe things which happen in it.\n\n27. There are three relations [between thee and other things]: the one\nto the body[A] which surrounds thee; the second to the divine cause from\nwhich all things come to all; and the third to those who live with thee.\n\n    [A] The text has [Greek: aition], which in Antoninus means\n    \"form,\" \"formal.\" Accordingly Schultz recommends either\n    Valkenaer's emendation [Greek: angeion], \"body,\" or Corais'\n    [Greek: somation]. Compare xii. 13; x. 38.\n\n28. Pain is either an evil to the body--then let the body say what it\nthinks of it--or to the soul; but it is in the power of the soul to\nmaintain its own serenity and tranquillity, and not to think that pain\nis an evil. For every judgment and movement and desire and aversion is\nwithin, and no evil ascends so high.\n\n29. Wipe out thy imaginations by often saying to thyself: Now it is in\nmy power to let no badness be in this soul, nor desire, nor any\nperturbation at all; but looking at all things I see what is their\nnature, and I use each according to its value.--Remember this power\nwhich thou hast from nature.\n\n30. Speak both in the senate and to every man, whoever he may be,\nappropriately, not with any affectation: use plain discourse.\n\n31. Augustus' court, wife, daughter, descendants, ancestors, sister,\nAgrippa, kinsmen, intimates, friends; Areius,[A] Maecenas, physicians,\nand sacrificing priests,--the whole court is dead. Then turn to the\nrest, not considering the death of a single man [but of a whole race],\nas of the Pompeii; and that which is inscribed on the tombs,--The last\nof his race. Then consider what trouble those before them have had that\nthey might leave a successor; and then, that of necessity some one must\nbe the last. Again, here consider the death of a whole race.\n\n    [A] Areius ([Greek: Areios]) was a philosopher, who was\n    intimate with Augustus; Sueton. Augustus, c. 89; Plutarch,\n    Antoninus, 80; Dion Cassius, 51, c. 16.\n\n32. It is thy duty to order thy life well in every single act; and if\nevery act does its duty as far as is possible, be content; and no one is\nable to hinder thee so that each act shall not do its duty.--But\nsomething external will stand in the way. Nothing will stand in the way\nof thy acting justly and soberly and considerately.--But perhaps some\nother active power will be hindered. Well, but by acquiescing in the\nhindrance and by being content to transfer thy efforts to that which is\nallowed, another opportunity of action is immediately put before thee in\nplace of that which was hindered, and one which will adapt itself to\nthis ordering of which we are speaking.\n\n33. Receive [wealth or prosperity] without arrogance; and be ready to\nlet it go.\n\n34. If thou didst ever see a hand cut off, or a foot, or a head, lying\nanywhere apart from the rest of the body, such does a man make himself,\nas far as he can, who is not content with what happens, and separates\nhimself from others, or does anything unsocial. Suppose that thou hast\ndetached thyself from the natural unity,--for thou wast made by nature a\npart, but now thou hast cut thyself off,--yet here there is this\nbeautiful provision, that it is in thy power again to unite thyself. God\nhas allowed this to no other part, after it has been separated and cut\nasunder, to come together again. But consider the kindness by which he\nhas distinguished man, for he has put it in his power not to be\nseparated at all from the universal; and when he has been separated, he\nhas allowed him to return and to be united and to resume his place as a\npart.\n\n35. As the nature of the universal has given to every rational being\nall the other powers that it has, + so we have received from it this\npower also. For as the universal nature converts and fixes in its\npredestined place everything which stands in the way and opposes it, and\nmakes such things a part of itself, so also the rational animal is able\nto make every hindrance its own material, and to use it for such\npurposes as it may have designed.[A]\n\n36. Do not disturb thyself by thinking of the whole of thy life. Let not\nthy thoughts at once embrace all the various troubles which thou mayest\nexpect to befall thee: but on every occasion ask thyself, What is there\nin this which is intolerable and past bearing? for thou wilt be ashamed\nto confess. In the next place remember that neither the future nor the\npast pains thee, but only the present. But this is reduced to a very\nlittle, if thou only circumscribest it, and chidest thy mind if it is\nunable to hold out against even this.\n\n37. Does Panthea or Fergamus now sit by the tomb of Verus?[B] Does\nChaurias or Diotimus sit by the tomb of Hadrianus? That would be\nridiculous. Well, suppose they did sit there, would the dead be\nconscious of it? and if the dead were conscious, would they be pleased?\nand if they were pleased, would that make them immortal? Was it not in\nthe order of destiny that these persons too should first become old\nwomen and old men and then die? What then would those do after these\nwere dead? All this is foul smell and blood in a bag.\n\n    [A] The text is corrupt at the beginning of the paragraph, but\n    the meaning will appear if the second [Greek: logikon] is\n    changed into [Greek: holon] though this change alone will not\n    establish the grammatical completeness of the text.\n\n    [B] \"Verus\" is a conjecture of Saumaise, and perhaps the true\n    reading.\n\n38. If thou canst see sharp, look and judge wisely, + says the\nphilosopher.\n\n39. In the constitution of the rational animal I see no virtue which is\nopposed to justice; but I see a virtue which is opposed to love of\npleasure, and that is temperance.\n\n40. If thou takest away thy opinion about that which appears to give\nthee pain, thou thyself standest in perfect security.--Who is this\nself?--The reason.--But I am not reason.--Be it so. Let then the reason\nitself not trouble itself. But if any other part of thee suffers, let it\nhave its own opinion about itself (vii. 16).\n\n41. Hindrance to the perceptions of sense is an evil to the animal\nnature. Hindrance to the movements [desires] is equally an evil to the\nanimal nature. And something else also is equally an impediment and an\nevil to the constitution of plants. So then that which is a hindrance to\nthe intelligence is an evil to the intelligent nature. Apply all these\nthings then to thyself. Does pain or sensuous pleasure affect thee? The\nsenses will look to that. Has any obstacle opposed thee in thy efforts\ntowards an object? If indeed thou wast making this effort absolutely\n[unconditionally, or without any reservation], certainly this obstacle\nis an evil to thee considered as a rational animal. But if thou takest\n[into consideration] the usual course of things, thou hast not yet been\ninjured nor even impeded. The things however which are proper to the\nunderstanding no other man is used to impede, for neither fire, nor\niron, nor tyrant, nor abuse, touches it in any way. When it has been\nmade a sphere, it continues a sphere (xi. 12).\n\n42. It is not fit that I should give myself pain, for I have never\nintentionally given pain even to another.\n\n43. Different things delight different people; but it is my delight to\nkeep the ruling faculty sound without turning away either from any man\nor from any of the things which happen to men, but looking at and\nreceiving all with welcome eyes and using everything according to its\nvalue.\n\n44. See that thou secure this present time to thyself: for those who\nrather pursue posthumous fame do not consider that the men of after time\nwill be exactly such as these whom they cannot bear now; and both are\nmortal. And what is it in any way to thee if these men of after time\nutter this or that sound, or have this or that opinion about thee?\n\n45. Take me and cast me where thou wilt; for there I shall keep my\ndivine part tranquil, that is, content, if it can feel and act\ncomformably to its proper constitution. Is this [change of place]\nsufficient reason why my soul should be unhappy and worse than it was,\ndepressed, expanded, shrinking, affrighted? and what wilt thou find\nwhich is sufficient reason for this?[A]\n\n    [A] [Greek: oregomene] in this passage seems to have a passive\n    sense. It is difficult to find an apt expression for it and\n    some of the other words. A comparison with xi. 12, will help to\n    explain the meaning.\n\n46. Nothing can happen to any man which is not a human accident, nor to\nan ox which is not according to the nature of an ox, nor to a vine which\nis not according to the nature of a vine, nor to a stone which is not\nproper to a stone. If then there happens to each thing both what is\nusual and natural, why shouldst thou complain? For the common nature\nbrings nothing which may not be borne by thee.\n\n47. If thou art pained by any external thing, it is not this thing that\ndisturbs thee, but thy own judgment about it. And it is in thy power to\nwipe out this judgment now. But if anything in thy own disposition gives\nthee pain, who hinders thee from correcting thy opinion? And even if\nthou art pained because thou art not doing some particular thing which\nseems to thee to be right, why dost thou not rather act than\ncomplain?--But some insuperable obstacle is in the way?--Do not be\ngrieved then, for the cause of its not being done depends not on\nthee.--But it is not worth while to live, if this cannot be done.--Take\nthy departure then from life contentedly, just as he dies who is in full\nactivity, and well pleased too with the things which are obstacles.\n\n48. Remember that the ruling faculty is invincible, when self-collected\nit is satisfied with itself, if it does nothing which it does not choose\nto do, even if it resist from mere obstinacy. What then will it be when\nit forms a judgment about anything aided by reason and deliberately?\nTherefore the mind which is free from passions is a citadel, for man has\nnothing more secure to which he can fly for refuge and for the future be\ninexpugnable. He then who has not seen this is an ignorant man; but he\nwho has seen it and does not fly to this refuge is unhappy.\n\n49. Say nothing more to thyself than what the first appearances report.\nSuppose that it has been reported to thee that a certain person speaks\nill of thee. This has been reported; but that thou hast been injured,\nthat has not been reported. I see that my child is sick. I do see; but\nthat he is in danger, I do not see. Thus then always abide by the first\nappearances, and add nothing thyself from within, and then nothing\nhappens to thee. Or rather add something like a man who knows everything\nthat happens in the world.\n\n50. A cucumber is bitter--Throw it away.--There are briers in the\nroad--Turn aside from them.--This is enough. Do not add, And why were\nsuch things made in the world? For thou wilt be ridiculed by a man who\nis acquainted with nature, as thou wouldst be ridiculed by a carpenter\nand shoemaker if thou didst find fault because thou seest in their\nworkshop shavings and cuttings from the things which they make. And yet\nthey have places into which they can throw these shavings and cuttings,\nand the universal nature has no external space; but the wondrous part of\nher art is that though she has circumscribed herself, everything within\nher which appears to decay and to grow old and to be useless she changes\ninto herself, and again makes other new things from these very same, so\nthat she requires neither substance from without nor wants a place into\nwhich she may cast that which decays. She is content then with her own\nspace, and her own matter, and her own art.\n\n51. Neither in thy actions be sluggish nor in thy conversation without\nmethod, nor wandering in thy thoughts, nor let there be in thy soul\ninward contention nor external effusion, nor in life be so busy as to\nhave no leisure.\n\nSuppose that men kill thee, cut thee in pieces, curse thee. What then\ncan these things do to prevent thy mind from remaining pure, wise,\nsober, just? For instance, if a man should stand by a limpid pure\nspring, and curse it, the spring never ceases sending up potable water;\nand if he should cast clay into it or filth, it will speedily disperse\nthem and wash them out, and will not be at all polluted. How then shalt\nthou possess a perpetual fountain [and not a mere well]? By forming +\nthyself hourly to freedom conjoined with contentment, simplicity, and\nmodesty.\n\n52. He who does not know what the world is, does not know where he is.\nAnd he who does not know for what purpose the world exists, does not\nknow who he is, nor what the world is. But he who has failed in any one\nof these things could not even say for what purpose he exists himself.\nWhat then dost thou think of him who [avoids or] seeks the praise of\nthose who applaud, of men who know not either where they are or who they\nare?\n\n53. Dost thou wish to be praised by a man who curses himself thrice\nevery hour? wouldst thou wish to please a man who does not please\nhimself? Does a man please himself who repents of nearly everything that\nhe does?\n\n54. No longer let thy breathing only act in concert with the air which\nsurrounds thee, but let thy intelligence also now be in harmony with the\nintelligence which embraces all things. For the intelligent power is no\nless diffused in all parts and pervades all things for him who is\nwilling to draw it to him than the aerial power for him who is able to\nrespire it.\n\n55. Generally, wickedness does no harm at all to the universe; and\nparticularly the wickedness [of one man] does no harm to another. It is\nonly harmful to him who has it in his power to be released from it as\nsoon as he shall choose.\n\n56. To my own free will the free will of my neighbor is just as\nindifferent as his poor breath and flesh. For though we are made\nespecially for the sake of one another, still the ruling power of each\nof us has its own office, for otherwise my neighbor's wickedness would\nbe my harm, which God has not willed, in order that my unhappiness may\nnot depend on another.\n\n57. The sun appears to be poured down, and in all directions indeed it\nis diffused, yet it is not effused. For this diffusion is extension:\nAccordingly its rays are called Extensions [[Greek: aktines]] because\nthey are extended [[Greek: apo tou ekteinesthai]].[A] But one may judge\nwhat kind of a thing a ray is, if he looks at the sun's light passing\nthrough a narrow opening into a darkened room, for it is extended in a\nright line, and as it were is divided when it meets with any solid body\nwhich stands in the way and intercepts the air beyond; but there the\nlight remains fixed and does not glide or fall off. Such then ought to\nbe the outpouring and diffusion of the understanding, and it should in\nno way be an effusion, but an extension, and it should make no violent\nor impetuous collision with the obstacles which are in its way; nor yet\nfall down, but be fixed, and enlighten that which receives it. For a\nbody will deprive itself of the illumination, if it does not admit it.\n\n    [A] A piece of bad etymology.\n\n58. He who fears death either fears the loss of sensation or a different\nkind of sensation. But if thou shalt have no sensation, neither wilt\nthou feel any harm; and if thou shalt acquire another kind of sensation,\nthou wilt be a different kind of living being and thou wilt not cease to\nlive.\n\n59. Men exist for the sake of one another. Teach them then, or bear with\nthem.\n\n60. In one way an arrow moves, in another way the mind. The mind indeed,\nboth when it exercises caution and when it is employed about inquiry,\nmoves straight onward not the less, and to its object.\n\n61. Enter into every man's ruling faculty; and also let every other man\nenter into thine.[A]\n\n    [A] Compare Epictetus, iii. 9, 12.\n\n\n\n\nIX.\n\n\nHe who acts unjustly acts impiously. For since the universal nature has\nmade rational animals for the sake of one another, to help one another\naccording to their deserts, but in no way to injure one another, he who\ntransgresses her will is clearly guilty of impiety towards the highest\ndivinity. And he too who lies is guilty of impiety to the same divinity;\nfor the universal nature is the nature of things that are; and things\nthat are have a relation to all things that come into existence.[A] And\nfurther, this universal nature is named truth, and is the prime cause of\nall things that are true. He then who lies intentionally is guilty of\nimpiety, inasmuch as he acts unjustly by deceiving; and he also who lies\nunintentionally, inasmuch as he is at variance with the universal\nnature, and inasmuch as he disturbs the order by fighting against the\nnature of the world; for he fights against it, who is moved of himself\nto that which is contrary to truth, for he had received powers from\nnature through the neglect of which he is not able now to distinguish\nfalsehood from truth. And indeed he who pursues pleasure as good, and\navoids pain as evil, is guilty of impiety. For of necessity such a man\nmust often find fault with the universal nature, alleging that it\nassigns things to the bad and the good contrary to their deserts,\nbecause frequently the bad are in the enjoyment of pleasure and possess\nthe things which procure pleasure, but the good have pain for their\nshare and the things which cause pain. And further, he who is afraid of\npain will sometimes also be afraid of some of the things which will\nhappen in the world, and even this is impiety. And he who pursues\npleasure will not abstain from injustice, and this is plainly impiety.\nNow with respect to the things towards which the universal nature is\nequally affected--for it would not have made both, unless it was equally\naffected towards both--towards these they who wish to follow nature\nshould be of the same mind with it, and equally affected. With respect\nto pain, then, and pleasure, or death and life, or honor and dishonor,\nwhich the universal nature employs equally, whoever is not equally\naffected is manifestly acting impiously. And I say that the universal\nnature employs them equally, instead of saying that they happen alike to\nthose who are produced in continuous series and to those who come after\nthem by virtue of a certain original movement of Providence, according\nto which it moved from a certain beginning to this ordering of things,\nhaving conceived certain principles of the things which were to be, and\nhaving determined powers productive of beings and of changes and of such\nlike successions (vii. 75).\n\n    [A] \"As there is not any action or natural event, which we are\n    acquainted with, so single and unconnected as not to have a\n    respect to some other actions and events, so possibly each of\n    them, when it has not an immediate, may yet have a remote,\n    natural relation to other actions and events, much beyond the\n    compass of this present world.\" Again: \"Things seemingly the\n    most insignificant imaginable are perpetually observed to be\n    necessary conditions to other things of the greatest\n    importance, so that any one thing whatever may, for aught we\n    know to the contrary, be a necessary condition to any\n    other.\"--Butler's Analogy, Chap. 7. See all the chapter. Some\n    critics take [Greek: ta hyparchonta] in this passage of\n    Antoninus to be the same as [Greek: ta honta]: but if that were\n    so he might have said [Greek: pros allela] instead of [Greek:\n    pros ta hyparchonta]. Perhaps the meaning of [Greek: pros ta\n    hyparchonta] may be \"to all prior things.\" If so, the\n    translation is still correct. See vi. 38.\n\n2. It would be a man's happiest lot to depart from mankind without\nhaving had any taste of lying and hypocrisy and luxury and pride.\nHowever, to breathe out one's life when a man has had enough of these\nthings is the next best voyage, as the saying is. Hast thou determined\nto abide with vice, and hast not experience yet induced thee to fly from\nthis pestilence? For the destruction of the understanding is a\npestilence, much more, indeed, than any such corruption and change of\nthis atmosphere which surrounds us. For this corruption is a pestilence\nof animals so far as they are animals; but the other is a pestilence of\nmen so far as they are men.\n\n3. Do not despise death, but be well content with it, since this too is\none of those things which nature wills. For such as it is to be young\nand to grow old, and to increase and to reach maturity, and to have\nteeth and beard and gray hairs, and to beget and to be pregnant and to\nbring forth, and all the other natural operations which the seasons of\nthy life bring, such also is dissolution. This, then, is consistent with\nthe character of a reflecting man--to be neither careless nor impatient\nnor contemptuous with respect to death, but to wait for it as one of the\noperations of nature. As thou now waitest for the time when the child\nshall come out of thy wife's womb, so be ready for the time when thy\nsoul shall fall out of this envelope.[A] But if thou requirest also a\nvulgar kind of comfort which shall reach thy heart, thou wilt be made\nbest reconciled to death by observing the objects from which thou art\ngoing to be removed, and the morals of those with whom thy soul will no\nlonger be mingled. For it is no way right to be offended with men, but\nit is thy duty to care for them and to bear with them gently; and yet to\nremember that thy departure will not be from men who have the same\nprinciples as thyself. For this is the only thing, if there be any,\nwhich could draw us the contrary way and attach us to life,--to be\npermitted to live with those who have the same principles as ourselves.\nBut now thou seest how great is the trouble arising from the discordance\nof those who live together, so that thou mayst say, Come quick, O death,\nlest perchance I, too, should forget myself.\n\n    [A] Note 1 of the Philosophy, p. 76.\n\n4. He who does wrong does wrong against himself. He who acts unjustly\nacts unjustly to himself, because he makes himself bad.\n\n5. He often acts unjustly who does not do a certain thing; not only he\nwho does a certain thing.\n\n6. Thy present opinion founded on understanding, and thy present conduct\ndirected to social good, and thy present disposition of contentment with\neverything which happens+--that is enough.\n\n7. Wipe out imagination; check desire: extinguish appetite: keep the\nruling faculty in its own power.\n\n8. Among the animals which have not reason one life is distributed; but\namong reasonable animals one intelligent soul is distributed: just as\nthere is one earth of all things which are of an earthly nature, and we\nsee by one light, and breathe one air, all of us that have the faculty\nof vision and all that have life.\n\n9. All things which participate in anything which is common to them all,\nmove towards that which is of the same kind with themselves. Everything\nwhich is earthy turns towards the earth, everything which is liquid\nflows together, and everything which is of an aerial kind does the\nsame, so that they require something to keep them asunder, and the\napplication of force. Fire indeed moves upwards on account of the\nelemental fire, but it is so ready to be kindled together with all the\nfire which is here, that even every substance which is somewhat dry is\neasily ignited, because there is less mingled with it of that which is a\nhindrance to ignition. Accordingly, then, everything also which\nparticipates in the common intelligent nature moves in like manner\ntowards that which is of the same kind with itself, or moves even more.\nFor so much as it is superior in comparison with all other things, in\nthe same degree also is it more ready to mingle with and to be fused\nwith that which is akin to it. Accordingly among animals devoid of\nreason we find swarms of bees, and herds of cattle, and the nurture of\nyoung birds, and in a manner, loves; for even in animals there are\nsouls, and that power which brings them together is seen to exert itself\nin a superior degree, and in such a way as never has been observed in\nplants nor in stones nor in trees. But in rational animals there are\npolitical communities and friendships, and families and meetings of\npeople; and in wars, treaties, and armistices. But in the things which\nare still superior, even though they are separated from one another,\nunity in a manner exists, as in the stars. Thus the ascent to the higher\ndegree is able to produce a sympathy even in things which are\nseparated. See, then, what now takes place; for only intelligent animals\nhave now forgotten this mutual desire and inclination, and in them alone\nthe property of flowing together is not seen. But still, though men\nstrive to avoid [this union], they are caught and held by it, for their\nnature is too strong for them; and thou wilt see what I say, if thou\nonly observest. Sooner, then, will one find anything earthy which comes\nin contact with no earthy thing, than a man altogether separated from\nother men.\n\n10. Both man and God and the universe produce fruit; at the proper\nseasons each produces it. But and if usage has especially fixed these\nterms to the vine and like things, this is nothing. Reason produces\nfruit both for all and for itself, and there are produced from it other\nthings of the same kind as reason itself.\n\n11. If thou art able, correct by teaching those who do wrong; but if\nthou canst not, remember that indulgence is given to thee for this\npurpose. And the gods, too, are indulgent to such persons; and for some\npurposes they even help them to get health, wealth, reputation; so kind\nthey are. And it is in thy power also; or say, who hinders thee?\n\n12. Labor not as one who is wretched, nor yet as one who would be pitied\nor admired; but direct thy will to one thing only--to put thyself in\nmotion and to check thyself, as the social reason requires.\n\n13. To-day I have got out of all trouble, or rather I have cast out all\ntrouble, for it was not outside, but within and in my opinions.\n\n14. All things are the same, familiar in experience, and ephemeral in\ntime, and worthless in the matter. Everything now is just as it was in\nthe time of those whom we have buried.\n\n15. Things stand outside of us, themselves by themselves, neither\nknowing aught of themselves, nor expressing any judgment. What is it,\nthen, which does judge about them? The ruling faculty.\n\n16. Not in passivity but in activity lie the evil and the good of the\nrational social animal, just as his virtue and his vice lie not in\npassivity but in activity.[A]\n\n    [A] Virtutis omnis laus in actione consistit.--_Cicero_, De\n    Off., 1. 6.\n\n17. For the stone which has been thrown up it is no evil to come down,\nnor indeed any good to have been carried up (viii. 20).\n\n18. Penetrate inwards into men's leading principles, and thou wilt see\nwhat judges thou art afraid of, and what kind of judges they are of\nthemselves.\n\n19. All things are changing: and thou thyself art in continuous mutation\nand in a manner in continuous destruction, and the whole universe too.\n\n20. It is thy duty to leave another man's wrongful act there where it is\n(vii. 29; ix. 38).\n\n21. Termination of activity, cessation from movement and opinion, and\nin a sense their death, is no evil. Turn thy thoughts now to the\nconsideration of thy life, thy life as a child, as a youth, thy manhood,\nthy old age, for in these also every change was a death. Is this\nanything to fear? Turn thy thoughts now to thy life under thy\ngrandfather, then to thy life under thy mother, then to thy life under\nthy father; and as thou findest many other differences and changes and\nterminations, ask thyself, Is this anything to fear? In like manner,\nthen, neither are the termination and cessation and change of thy whole\nlife a thing to be afraid of.\n\n[Illustration: THE FORUM]\n\n22. Hasten [to examine] thy own ruling faculty and that of the universe\nand that of thy neighbor: thy own, that thou mayst make it just: and\nthat of the universe, that thou mayst remember of what thou art a part;\nand that of thy neighbor, that thou mayst know whether he has acted\nignorantly or with knowledge, and thou mayst also consider that his\nruling faculty is akin to thine.\n\n23. As thou thyself art a component part of a social system, so let\nevery act of thine be a component part of social life. Whatever act of\nthine then has no reference either immediately or remotely to a social\nend, this tears asunder thy life, and does not allow it to be one, and\nit is of the nature of a mutiny, just as when in a popular assembly a\nman acting by himself stands apart from the general agreement.\n\n24. Quarrels of little children and their sports, and poor spirits\ncarrying about dead bodies [such is everything]; and so what is\nexhibited in the representation of the mansions of the dead[A] strikes\nour eyes more clearly.\n\n    [A] [Greek: to tes Nekuias] may be, as Gataker conjectures, a\n    dramatic representation of the state of the dead. Schultz\n    supposes that it may be also a reference to the [Greek: Nekuia]\n    of the Odyssey (lib. xi.).\n\n25. Examine into the quality of the form of an object, and detach it\naltogether from its material part, and then contemplate it; then\ndetermine the time, the longest which a thing of this peculiar form is\nnaturally made to endure.\n\n26. Thou hast endured infinite troubles through not being contented with\nthy ruling faculty when it does the things which it is constituted by\nnature to do. But enough + [of this].\n\n27. When another blames thee or hates thee, or when men say about thee\nanything injurious, approach their poor souls, penetrate within, and see\nwhat kind of men they are. Thou wilt discover that there is no reason to\ntake any trouble that these men may have this or that opinion about\nthee. However, thou must be well disposed towards them, for by nature\nthey are friends. And the gods too aid them in all ways, by dreams, by\nsigns, towards the attainment of those things on which they set a value.+\n\n28. The periodic movements of the universe are the same, up and down\nfrom age to age. And either the universal intelligence puts itself in\nmotion for every separate effect, and if this is so, be thou content\nwith that which is the result of its activity; or it puts itself in\nmotion once, and everything else comes by way of sequence[A] in a\nmanner; or indivisible elements are the origin of all things.--In a\nword, if there is a god, all is well; and if chance rules, do not thou\nalso be governed by it (vi. 44; vii. 75).\n\n    [A] The words which immediately follow [Greek: kat'\n    epakolouthesin] are corrupt. But the meaning is hardly\n    doubtful. (Compare vii. 75.)\n\nSoon will the earth cover us all: then the earth, too, will change, and\nthe things also which result from change will continue to change\nforever, and these again forever. For if a man reflects on the changes\nand transformations which follow one another like wave after wave and\ntheir rapidity, he will despise everything which is perishable (xii.\n21).\n\n29. The universal cause is like a winter torrent: it carries everything\nalong with it. But how worthless are all these poor people who are\nengaged in matters political, and, as they suppose, are playing the\nphilosopher! All drivellers. Well then, man: do what nature now\nrequires. Set thyself in motion, if it is in thy power, and do not look\nabout thee to see if any one will observe it; nor yet expect Plato's\nRepublic:[A] but be content if the smallest thing goes on well, and\nconsider such an event to be no small matter. For who can change men's\nopinions? and without a change of opinions what else is there than the\nslavery of men who groan while they pretend to obey? Come now and tell\nme of Alexander and Philippus and Demetrius of Phalerum. They themselves\nshall judge whether they discovered what the common nature required, and\ntrained themselves accordingly. But if they acted like tragedy heroes,\nno one has condemned me to imitate them. Simple and modest is the work\nof philosophy. Draw me not aside to insolence and pride.\n\n    [A] Those who wish to know what Plato's Republic is may now\n    study it in the accurate translation of Davies and Vaughan.\n\n30. Look down from above on the countless herds of men and their\ncountless solemnities, and the infinitely varied voyagings in storms and\ncalms, and the differences among those who are born, who live together,\nand die. And consider, too, the life lived by others in olden time, and\nthe life of those who will live after thee, and the life now lived among\nbarbarous nations, and how many know not even thy name, and how many\nwill soon forget it, and how they who perhaps now are praising thee will\nvery soon blame thee, and that neither a posthumous name is of any\nvalue, nor reputation, nor anything else.\n\n31. Let there be freedom from perturbations with respect to the things\nwhich come from the external cause; and let there be justice in the\nthings done by virtue of the internal cause, that is, let there be\nmovement and action terminating in this, in social acts, for this is\naccording to thy nature.\n\n32. Thou canst remove out of the way many useless things among those\nwhich disturb thee, for they lie entirely in thy opinion; and thou wilt\nthen gain for thyself ample space by comprehending the whole universe in\nthy mind, and by contemplating the eternity of time, and observing the\nrapid change of every several thing, how short is the time from birth to\ndissolution, and the illimitable time before birth as well as the\nequally boundless time after dissolution!\n\n33. All that thou seest will quickly perish, and those who have been\nspectators of its dissolution will very soon perish too. And he who dies\nat the extremest old age will be brought into the same condition with\nhim who died prematurely.\n\n34. What are these men's leading principles, and about what kind of\nthings are they busy, and for what kind of reasons do they love and\nhonor? Imagine that thou seest their pool souls laid bare. When they\nthink that they do harm by their blame or good by their praise, what an\nidea!\n\n35. Loss is nothing else than change. But the universal nature delights\nin change, and in obedience to her all things are now done well, and\nfrom eternity have been in like form, and will be such to time without\nend. What, then, dost thou say,--that all things have been and all\nthings always will be bad, and that no power has ever been found in so\nmany gods to rectify these things, but the world has been condemned to\nbe bound in never ceasing evil (iv. 45, vii. 18)?\n\n36. The rottenness of the matter which is the foundation of everything!\nwater, dust, bones, filth: or again, marble rocks, the callosities of\nthe earth; and gold and silver, the sediments; and garments, only bits\nof hair; and purple dye, blood; and everything else is of the same kind.\nAnd that which is of the nature of breath is also another thing of the\nsame kind, changing from this to that.\n\n37. Enough of this wretched life and murmuring and apish tricks. Why art\nthou disturbed? What is there new in this? What unsettles thee? Is it\nthe form of the thing? Look at it. Or is it the matter? Look at it. But\nbesides these there is nothing. Towards the gods then, now become at\nlast more simple and better. It is the same whether we examine these\nthings for a hundred years or three.\n\n38. If a man has done wrong the harm is his own. But perhaps he has not\ndone wrong.\n\n39. Either all things proceed from one intelligent source and come\ntogether as in one body, and the part ought not to find fault with what\nis done for the benefit of the whole; or there are only atoms, and\nnothing else than mixture and dispersion. Why, then, art thou disturbed?\nSay to the ruling faculty, Art thou dead, art thou corrupted, art thou\nplaying the hypocrite, art thou become a beast, dost thou herd and feed\nwith the rest?[A]\n\n    [A] There is some corruption at the end of this section, but I\n    think that the translation expresses the emperor's meaning.\n    Whether intelligence rules all things or chance rules, a man\n    must not be disturbed. He must use the power that he has and be\n    tranquil.\n\n40. Either the gods have no power or they have power. If, then, they\nhave no power, why dost thou pray to them? But if they have power, why\ndost thou not pray for them to give thee the faculty of not fearing any\nof the things which thou fearest, or of not desiring any of the things\nwhich thou desirest, or not being pained at anything, rather than pray\nthat any of these things should not happen or happen? for certainly if\nthey can co-operate with men, they can co-operate for these purposes.\nBut perhaps thou wilt say the gods have placed them in thy power. Well,\nthen, is it not better to use what is in thy power like a free man than\nto desire in a slavish and abject way what is not in thy power? And who\nhas told thee that the gods do not aid us, even in the things which are\nin our power? Begin, then, to pray for such things, and thou wilt see.\nOne man prays thus: How shall I be able to lie with that woman? Do thou\npray thus: How shall I not desire to lie with her? Another prays thus:\nHow shall I be released from this? Pray thou: How shall I not desire to\nbe released? Another thus: How shall I not lose my little son? Thou\nthus: How shall I not be afraid to lose him? In fine, turn thy prayers\nthis way, and see what comes.\n\n41. Epicurus says, In my sickness my conversation was not about my\nbodily sufferings, nor, says he, did I talk on such subjects to those\nwho visited me; but I continued to discourse on the nature of things as\nbefore, keeping to this main point, how the mind, while participating in\nsuch movements as go on in the poor flesh, shall be free from\nperturbations and maintain its proper good. Nor did I, he says, give the\nphysicians an opportunity of putting on solemn looks, as if they were\ndoing something great, but my life went on well and happily. Do, then,\nthe same that he did both in sickness, if thou art sick, and in any\nother circumstances; for never to desert philosophy in any events that\nmay befall us, nor to hold trifling talks either with an ignorant man or\nwith one unacquainted with nature, is a principle of all schools of\nphilosophy; but to be intent only on that which thou art now doing and\non the instrument by which thou doest it.\n\n42. When thou art offended with any man's shameless conduct, immediately\nask thyself, Is it possible, then, that shameless men should not be in\nthe world? It is not possible. Do not, then, require what is impossible.\nFor this man also is one of those shameless men who must of necessity be\nin the world. Let the same considerations be present to thy mind in the\ncase of the knave, and the faithless man, and of every man who does\nwrong in any way. For at the same time that thou dost remind thyself\nthat it is impossible that such kind of men should not exist, thou wilt\nbecome more kindly disposed towards every one individually. It is useful\nto perceive this, too, immediately when the occasion arises, what virtue\nnature has given to man to oppose to every wrongful act. For she has\ngiven to man, as an antidote against the stupid man, mildness, and\nagainst another kind of man some other power. And in all cases it is\npossible for thee to correct by teaching the man who is gone astray; for\nevery man who errs misses his object and is gone astray. Besides,\nwherein hast thou been injured? For thou wilt find that no one among\nthose against whom thou art irritated has done anything by which thy\nmind could be made worse; but that which is evil to thee and harmful has\nits foundation only in the mind. And what harm is done or what is there\nstrange, if the man who has not been instructed does the acts of an\nuninstructed man? Consider whether thou shouldst not rather blame\nthyself, because thou didst not expect such a man to err in such a way.\nFor thou hadst means given thee by thy reason to suppose that it was\nlikely that he would commit this error, and yet thou hast forgotten and\nart amazed that he has erred. But most of all when thou blamest a man as\nfaithless or ungrateful, turn to thyself. For the fault is manifestly\nthy own, whether thou didst trust that a man who had such a disposition\nwould keep his promise, or when conferring thy kindness thou didst not\nconfer it absolutely, nor yet in such way as to have received from thy\nvery act all the profit. For what more dost thou want when thou hast\ndone a man a service? art thou not content that thou hast done something\nconformable to thy nature, and dost thou seek to be paid for it? just as\nif the eye demanded a recompense for seeing, or the feet for walking.\nFor as these members are formed for a particular purpose, and by working\naccording to their several constitutions obtain what is their own;[A] so\nalso as man is formed by nature to acts of benevolence, when he has done\nanything benevolent or in any other way conducive to the common\ninterest, he has acted conformably to his constitution, and he gets what\nis his own.\n\n    [A] [Greek: Apechei to idion]. This sense of [Greek: apechein]\n    occurs in xi. 1, and iv. 49; also in St. Matthew, vi. 2,\n    [Greek: apechousi ton misthon], and in Epictetus.\n\n\n\n\nX.\n\n\nWilt thou, then, my soul, never be good and simple and one and naked,\nmore manifest than the body which surrounds thee? Wilt thou never enjoy\nan affectionate and contented disposition? Wilt thou never be full and\nwithout a want of any kind, longing for nothing more, nor desiring\nanything, either animate or inanimate, for the enjoyment of pleasures?\nnor yet desiring time wherein thou shalt have longer enjoyment, or\nplace, or pleasant climate, or society of men with whom thou mayst live\nin harmony? but wilt thou be satisfied with thy present condition, and\npleased with all that is about thee, and wilt thou convince thyself that\nthou hast everything, and that it comes from the gods, that everything\nis well for thee, and will be well whatever shall please them, and\nwhatever they shall give for the conservation of the perfect living\nbeing,[A] the good and just and beautiful, which generates and holds\ntogether all things, and contains and embraces all things which are\ndissolved for the production of other like things? Wilt thou never be\nsuch that thou shalt so dwell in community with gods and men as neither\nto find fault with them at all, nor to be condemned by them?\n\n    [A] That is, God (iv. 40), as he is defined by Zeno. But the\n    confusion between gods and God is strange.\n\n2. Observe what thy nature requires, so far as thou art governed by\nnature only: then do it and accept it, if thy nature, so far as thou art\na living being, shall not be made worse by it. And next thou must\nobserve what thy nature requires so far as thou art a living being. And\nall this thou mayst allow thyself, if thy nature, so far as thou art a\nrational animal, shall not be made worse by it. But the rational animal\nis consequently also a political [social] animal. Use these rules, then,\nand trouble thyself about nothing else.\n\n3. Everything which happens either happens in such wise as thou art\nformed by nature to bear it, or as thou art not formed by nature to bear\nit. If, then, it happens to thee in such way as thou art formed by\nnature to bear it, do not complain, but bear it as thou art formed by\nnature to bear it. But if it happens in such wise as thou art not formed\nby nature to bear it, do not complain, for it will perish after it has\nconsumed thee. Remember, however, that thou art formed by nature to bear\neverything, with respect to which it depends on thy own opinion to make\nit endurable and tolerable, by thinking that it is either thy interest\nor thy duty to do this.\n\n4. If a man is mistaken, instruct him kindly and show him his error. But\nif thou art not able, blame thyself, or blame not even thyself.\n\n5. Whatever may happen to thee, it was prepared for thee from all\neternity; and the implication of causes was from eternity spinning the\nthread of thy being, and of that which is incident to it (iii. 11; iv.\n26).\n\n6. Whether the universe is [a concourse of] atoms, or nature [is a\nsystem], let this first be established, that I am a part of the whole\nwhich is governed by nature; next, I am in a manner intimately related\nto the parts which are of the same kind with myself. For remembering\nthis, inasmuch as I am a part, I shall be discontented with none of the\nthings which are assigned to me out of the whole; for nothing is\ninjurious to the part if it is for the advantage of the whole. For the\nwhole contains nothing which is not for its advantage; and all natures\nindeed have this common principle, but the nature of the universe has\nthis principle besides, that it cannot be compelled even by any external\ncause to generate anything harmful to itself. By remembering, then, that\nI am a part of such a whole, I shall be content with everything that\nhappens. And inasmuch as I am in a manner intimately related to the\nparts which are of the same kind with myself, I shall do nothing\nunsocial, but I shall rather direct myself to the things which are of\nthe same kind with myself, and I shall turn all my efforts to the common\ninterest, and divert them from the contrary. Now, if these things are\ndone so, life must flow on happily, just as thou mayst observe that the\nlife of a citizen is happy, who continues a course of action which is\nadvantageous to his fellow-citizens, and is content with whatever the\nstate may assign to him.\n\n7. The parts of the whole, everything, I mean, which is naturally\ncomprehended in the universe, must of necessity perish; but let this be\nunderstood in this sense, that they must undergo change. But if this is\nnaturally both an evil and a necessity for the parts, the whole would\nnot continue to exist in a good condition, the parts being subject to\nchange and constituted so as to perish in various ways. For whether did\nNature herself design to do evil to the things which are parts of\nherself, and to make them subject to evil and of necessity fall into\nevil, or have such results happened without her knowing it? Both these\nsuppositions, indeed, are incredible. But if a man should even drop the\nterm Nature [as an efficient power], and should speak of these things as\nnatural, even then it would be ridiculous to affirm at the same time\nthat the parts of the whole are in their nature subject to change, and\nat the same time to be surprised or vexed as if something were happening\ncontrary to nature, particularly as the dissolution of things is into\nthose things of which each thing is composed. For there is either a\ndispersion of the elements out of which everything has been compounded,\nor a change from the solid to the earthy and from the airy to the\naerial, so that these parts are taken back into the universal reason,\nwhether this at certain periods is consumed by fire or renewed by\neternal changes. And do not imagine that the solid and the airy part\nbelong to thee from the time of generation. For all this received its\naccretion only yesterday and the day before, as one may say, from the\nfood and the air which is inspired. This, then, which has received [the\naccretion], changes, not that which thy mother brought forth. But\nsuppose that this [which thy mother brought forth] implicates thee very\nmuch with that other part, which has the peculiar quality [of change],\nthis is nothing in fact in the way of objection to what is said.[A]\n\n    [A] The end of this section is perhaps corrupt. The meaning is\n    very obscure. I have given that meaning which appears to be\n    consistent with the whole argument. The emperor here maintains\n    that the essential part of man is unchangeable, and that the\n    other parts, if they change or perish, do not affect that which\n    really constitutes the man. See the Philosophy of Antoninus, p.\n    56, note 2. Schultz supposed \"thy mother\" to mean nature,\n    [Greek: he physis]. But I doubt about that.\n\n8. When thou hast assumed these names, good, modest, true, rational, a\nman of equanimity, and magnanimous, take care that thou dost not change\nthese names; and if thou shouldst lose them, quickly return to them. And\nremember that the term Rational was intended to signify a discriminating\nattention to every several thing, and freedom from negligence; and that\nEquanimity is the voluntary acceptance of the things which are assigned\nto thee by the common nature; and that Magnanimity is the elevation of\nthe intelligent part above the pleasurable or painful sensations of the\nflesh, and above that poor thing called fame, and death, and all such\nthings. If, then, thou maintainest thyself in the possession of these\nnames, without desiring to be called by these names by others, thou wilt\nbe another person and wilt enter on another life. For to continue to be\nsuch as thou hast hitherto been, and to be torn in pieces and defiled in\nsuch a life, is the character of a very stupid man and one over-fond of\nhis life, and like those half-devoured fighters with wild beasts, who\nthough covered with wounds and gore, still intreat to be kept to the\nfollowing day, though they will be exposed in the same state to the same\nclaws and bites.[A] Therefore fix thyself in the possession of these few\nnames: and if thou art able to abide in them, abide as if thou wast\nremoved to certain islands of the Happy.[B] But if thou shalt perceive\nthat thou fallest out of them and dost not maintain thy hold, go\ncourageously into some nook where thou shalt maintain them, or even\ndepart at once from life, not in passion, but with simplicity and\nfreedom and modesty, after doing this one [laudable] thing at least in\nthy life, to have gone out of it thus. In order, however to the\nremembrance of these names, it will greatly help thee if thou\nrememberest the gods, and that they wish not to be flattered, but wish\nall reasonable beings to be made like themselves; and if thou\nrememberest that what does the work of a fig-tree is a fig-tree, and\nthat what does the work of a dog is a dog, and that what does the work\nof a bee is a bee, and that what does the work of a man is a man.\n\n    [A] See Seneca, Epp. 70, on these exhibitions which amused the\n    people of those days. These fighters were the Bestiarri, some\n    of whom may have been criminals; but even if they were, the\n    exhibition was equally characteristic of the depraved habits of\n    the spectators.\n\n    [B] The islands of the Happy, or the Fortunatae Insulae, are\n    spoken of by the Greek and Roman writers. They were the abode\n    of Heroes, like Achilles and Diomedes, as we see in the Scolion\n    of Harmodius and Aristogiton. Sertorius heard of the islands at\n    Cadiz from some sailors who had been there; and he had a wish\n    to go and live in them and rest from his troubles (Plutarch,\n    Sertorius, c. 8). In the Odyssey, Proteus told Menelaus that he\n    should not die in Argos, but be removed to a place at the\n    boundary of the earth where Rhadamanthus dwelt (Odyssey, iv.\n    565):--\n\n       \"For there in sooth man's life is easiest:\n       Nor snow nor raging storm nor rain is there\n       But ever gently breathing gales of Zephyr\n       Oceanus sends up to gladden man.\"\n\n    It is certain that the writer of the Odyssey only follows some\n    old legend, without having any knowledge of any place which\n    corresponds to his description. The two islands which Sertorius\n    heard of may be Madeira and the adjacent island. Compare\n    Pindar, Ol. ii. 129.\n\n9. Mimi,[A] war, astonishment, torpor, slavery, will daily wipe out\nthose holy principles of thine. + How many things without studying\nnature dost thou imagine, and how many dost thou neglect?[B] But it is\nthy duty so to look on and so to do everything, that at the same time\nthe power of dealing with circumstances is perfected, and the\ncontemplative faculty is exercised, and the confidence which comes from\nthe knowledge of each several thing is maintained without showing it,\nbut yet not concealed. For when wilt thou enjoy simplicity, when\ngravity, and when the knowledge of every several thing, both what it is\nin substance, and what place it has in the universe, and how long it is\nformed to exist, and of what things it is compounded, and to whom it can\nbelong, and who are able both to give it and take it away?\n\n    [A] Corais conjectured [Greek: misos] \"hatred\" in place of\n    Mimi, Roman plays in which action and gesticulation were all or\n    nearly all.\n\n    [B] This is corrupt. See the addition of Schultz.\n\n10. A spider is proud when it has caught a fly, and another when he has\ncaught a poor hare, and another when he has taken a little fish in a\nnet, and another when he has taken wild boars, and another when he has\ntaken bears, and another when he has taken Sarmatians. Are not these\nrobbers, if thou examinest their opinions?[A]\n\n11. Acquire the contemplative way of seeing how all things change into\none another, and constantly attend to it, and exercise thyself about\nthis part [of philosophy]. For nothing is so much adapted to produce\nmagnanimity. Such a man has put off the body, and as he sees that he\nmust, no one knows how soon, go away from among men and leave everything\nhere, he gives himself up entirely to just doing in all his actions, and\nin everything else that happens he resigns himself to the universal\nnature. But as to what any man shall say or think about him or do\nagainst him, he never even thinks of it, being himself contented with\nthese two things--with acting justly in what he now does, and being\nsatisfied with what is now assigned to him; and he lays aside all\ndistracting and busy pursuits, and desires nothing else than to\naccomplish the straight course through the law[B] and by accomplishing\nthe straight course to follow God.\n\n    [A] Marcus means to say that conquerors are robbers. He himself\n    warred against Sarmatians, and was a robber, as he says, like\n    the rest. But compare the life of Avidius Cassius, c. 4, by\n    Vulcatius.\n\n    [B] By the law he means the divine law, obedience to the will\n    of God.\n\n12. What need is there of suspicious fear, since it is in thy power to\ninquire what ought to be done? And if thou seest clear, go by this way\ncontent, without turning back; but if thou dost not see clear, stop and\ntake the best advisers. But if any other things oppose thee, go on\naccording to thy powers with due consideration, keeping to that which\nappears to be just. For it is best to reach this object, and if thou\ndost fail, let thy failure be in attempting this. He who follows reason\nin all things is both tranquil and active at the same time, and also\ncheerful and collected.\n\n13. Inquire of thyself as soon as thou wakest from sleep whether it will\nmake any difference to thee if another does what is just and right. It\nwill make no difference (vi. 32; viii. 55).\n\nThou hast not forgotten, I suppose, that those who assume arrogant airs\nin bestowing their praise or blame on others are such as they are at bed\nand at board, and thou hast not forgotten what they do, and what they\navoid, and what they pursue, and how they steal and how they rob, not\nwith hands and feet, but with their most valuable part, by means of\nwhich there is produced, when a man chooses, fidelity, modesty, truth,\nlaw, a good daemon [happiness] (vii. 17)?\n\n14. To her who gives and takes back all, to nature, the man who is\ninstructed and modest says, Give what thou wilt; take back what thou\nwilt. And he says this not proudly, but obediently, and well pleased\nwith her.\n\n15. Short is the little which remains to thee of life. Live as on a\nmountain. For it makes no difference whether a man lives there or here,\nif he lives everywhere in the world as in a state [political community].\nLet me see, let them know a real man who lives according to nature. If\nthey cannot endure him, let them kill him. For that is better than to\nlive thus [as men do].\n\n16. No longer talk at all about the kind of man that a good man ought to\nbe, but be such.\n\n17. Constantly contemplate the whole of time and the whole of substance,\nand consider that all individual things as to substance are a grain of a\nfig, and as to time the turning of a gimlet.\n\n18. Look at everything that exists, and observe that it is already in\ndissolution and in change, and as it were putrefaction or dispersion, or\nthat everything is so constituted by nature as to die.\n\n19. Consider what men are when they are eating, sleeping, generating,\neasing themselves, and so forth. Then what kind of men they are when\nthey are imperious + and arrogant, or angry and scolding from their\nelevated place. But a short time ago to how many they were slaves and\nfor what things; and after a little time consider in what a condition\nthey will be.\n\n20. That is for the good of each thing, which the universal nature\nbrings to each. And it is for its good at the time when nature brings\nit.\n\n21. \"The earth loves the shower;\" and \"the solemn ether loves;\" and the\nuniverse loves to make whatever is about to be. I say then to the\nuniverse, that I love as thou lovest. And is not this too said that\n\"this or that loves [is wont] to be produced?\"[A]\n\n22. Either thou livest here and hast already accustomed thyself to it,\nor thou art going away, and this was thy own will; or thou art dying and\nhast discharged thy duty. But besides these things there is nothing. Be\nof good cheer, then.\n\n23. Let this always be plain to thee, that this piece of land is like\nany other; and that all things here are the same with things on the top\nof a mountain, or on the sea-shore, or wherever thou choosest to be. For\nthou wilt find just what Plato says, Dwelling within the walls of a city\nas in a shepherd's fold on a mountain. [The three last words are omitted\nin the translation.][B]\n\n    [A] These words are from Euripides. They are cited by\n    Aristotle, Ethic. Nicom. viii. 1. Athenaeus (xiii. 296) and\n    Stobaeus quote seven complete lines beginning [Greek: era men\n    ombrou gaia]. There is a similar fragment of Aeschylus,\n    Danaides, also quoted by Athenaeus.\n\n    It was the fashion of the Stoics to work on the meanings of\n    words. So Antoninus here takes the verb [Greek: philei],\n    \"loves,\" which has also the sense of \"is wont,\" \"uses,\" and the\n    like. He finds in the common language of mankind a\n    philosophical truth, and most great truths are expressed in the\n    common language of life; some understand them, but most people\n    utter them without knowing how much they mean.\n\n    [B] Plato, Theaet. 174 D.E. But compare the original with the\n    use that Antoninus has made of it.\n\n24. What is my ruling faculty now to me? and of what nature am I now\nmaking it? and for what purpose am I now using it? is it void of\nunderstanding? is it loosed and rent asunder from social life? is it\nmelted into and mixed with the poor flesh so as to move together with\nit?\n\n25. He who flies from his master is a runaway; but the law is master,\nand he who breaks the law is a runaway. And he also who is grieved or\nangry or afraid, + is dissatisfied because something has been or is or\nshall be of the things which are appointed by him who rules all things,\nand he is Law and assigns to every man what is fit. He then who fears or\nis grieved or is angry is a runaway.[A]\n\n    [A] Antoninus is here playing on the etymology, of [Greek:\n    nomos], law, assignment, that which assigns ([Greek: nemei]) to\n    every man his portion.\n\n26. A man deposits seed in a womb and goes away, and then another cause\ntakes it and labors on it, and makes a child. What a thing from such a\nmaterial! Again, the child passes food down through the throat, and then\nanother cause takes it and makes perception and motion, and in fine,\nlife and strength and other things; how many and how strange! Observe\nthen the things which are produced in such a hidden way, and see the\npower, just as we see the power which carries things downwards and\nupwards, not with the eyes, but still no less plainly (vii. 85).\n\n27. Constantly consider how all things such as they now are, in time\npast also were; and consider that they will be the same again. And place\nbefore thy eyes entire dramas and stages of the same form, whatever thou\nhast learned from thy experience or from older history; for example, the\nwhole court of Hadrianus, and the whole court of Antoninus, and the\nwhole court of Philippus, Alexander, Croesus; for all those were such\ndramas as we see now, only with different actors.\n\n28. Imagine every man who is grieved at anything or discontented to be\nlike a pig which is sacrificed and kicks and screams.\n\nLike this pig also is he who on his bed in silence laments the bonds in\nwhich we are held. And consider that only to the rational animal is it\ngiven to follow voluntarily what happens; but simply to follow is a\nnecessity imposed on all.\n\n29. Severally on the occasion of everything that thou dost, pause and\nask thyself if death is a dreadful thing because it deprives thee of\nthis.\n\n30. When thou art offended at any man's fault, forthwith turn to thyself\nand reflect in what like manner thou dost err thyself; for example, in\nthinking that money is a good thing, or pleasure, or a bit of\nreputation, and the like. For by attending to this thou wilt quickly\nforget thy anger, if this consideration also is added, that the man is\ncompelled: for what else could he do? or, if thou art able, take away\nfrom him the compulsion.\n\n31. When thou hast seen Satyron[A] the Socratic,+ think of either\nEutyches or Hymen, and when thou hast seen Euphrates, think of Eutychion\nor Silvanus, and when thou hast seen Alciphron think of Tropaeophorus,\nand when thou hast seen Xenophon, think of Crito[B] or Severus, and when\nthou hast looked on thyself, think of any other Caesar, and in the case\nof every one do in like manner. Then let this thought be in thy mind,\nWhere then are those men? Nowhere, or nobody knows where. For thus\ncontinuously thou wilt look at human things as smoke and nothing at all;\nespecially if thou reflectest at the same time that what has once\nchanged will never exist again in the infinite duration of time. But\nthou, in what a brief space of time is thy existence? And why art thou\nnot content to pass through this short time in an orderly way? What\nmatter and opportunity [for thy activity] art thou avoiding? For what\nelse are all these things, except exercises for the reason, when it has\nviewed carefully and by examination into their nature the things which\nhappen in life? Persevere then until thou shalt have made these things\nthy own, as the stomach which is strengthened makes all things its own,\nas the blazing fire makes flame and brightness out of everything that is\nthrown into it.\n\n32. Let it not be in any man's power to say truly of thee that thou are\nnot simple or that thou art not good; but let him be a liar whoever\nshall think anything of this kind about thee; and this is altogether in\nthy power. For who is he that shall hinder thee from being good and\nsimple? Do thou only determine to live no longer unless thou shalt be\nsuch. For neither does reason allow [thee to live], if thou art not\nsuch.[C]\n\n    [A] Nothing is known of Satyron or Satyrion; nor, I believe, of\n    Eutyches or Hymen. Euphrates is honorably mentioned by\n    Epictetus (iii. 15, 8; iv. 8, 17). Pliny (Epp. i. 10) speaks\n    very highly of him. He obtained the permission of the Emperor\n    Hadrian to drink poison, because he was old and in bad health\n    (Dion Cassius, 69, c. 8).\n\n    [B] Crito is the friend of Socrates; and he was, it appears,\n    also a friend of Xenophon. When the emperor says \"seen\"\n    ([Greek: idon]), he does not mean with the eyes.\n\n    [C] Compare Epictetus, i. 29, 28.\n\n33. What is that which as to this material [our life] can be done or\nsaid in the way most conformable to reason? For whatever this may be, it\nis in thy power to do it or to say it, and do not make excuses that thou\nart hindered. Thou wilt not cease to lament till thy mind is in such a\ncondition that what luxury is to those who enjoy pleasure, such shall be\nto thee, in the matter which is subjected and presented to thee, the\ndoing of the things which are conformable to man's constitution; for a\nman ought to consider as an enjoyment everything which it is in his\npower to do according to his own nature. And it is in his power\neverywhere. Now, it is not given to a cylinder to move everywhere by its\nown motion, nor yet to water nor to fire, nor to anything else which is\ngoverned by nature or an irrational soul, for the things which check\nthem and stand in the way are many. But intelligence and reason are able\nto go through everything that opposes them, and in such manner as they\nare formed by nature and as they choose. Place before thy eyes this\nfacility with which the reason will be carried through all things, as\nfire upwards, as a stone downwards, as a cylinder down an inclined\nsurface, and seek for nothing further. For all other obstacles either\naffect the body only, which is a dead thing; or, except through opinion\nand the yielding of the reason itself, they do not crush nor do any harm\nof any kind; for if they did, he who felt it would immediately become\nbad. Now, in the case of all things which have a certain constitution,\nwhatever harm may happen to any of them, that which is so affected\nbecomes consequently worse; but in the like case, a man becomes both\nbetter, if one may say so, and more worthy of praise by making a right\nuse of these accidents. And finally remember that nothing harms him who\nis really a citizen, which does not harm the state; nor yet does\nanything harm the state, which does not harm law [order]; and of these\nthings which are called misfortunes not one harms law. What then does\nnot harm law does not harm either state or citizen.\n\n34. To him who is penetrated by true principles even the briefest\nprecept is sufficient, and any common precept, to remind him that he\nshould be free from grief and fear. For example:--\n\n     \"Leaves, some the wind scatters on the ground--\n     So is the race of men.\"[A]\n\nLeaves, also, are thy children; and leaves, too, are they who cry out as\nif they were worthy of credit and bestow their praise, or on the\ncontrary curse, or secretly blame and sneer; and leaves, in like manner,\nare those who shall receive and transmit a man's fame to after-times.\nFor all such things as these \"are produced in the season of spring,\" as\nthe poet says; then the wind casts them down; then the forest produces\nother leaves in their places. But a brief existence is common to all\nthings, and yet thou avoidest and pursuest all things as if they would\nbe eternal. A little time, and thou shalt close thy eyes; and him who\nhas attended thee to thy grave another soon will lament.\n\n    [A] Homer, II., vi. 146.\n\n35. The healthy eye ought to see all visible things and not to say, I\nwish for green things; for this is the condition of a diseased eye. And\nthe healthy hearing and smelling ought to be ready to perceive all that\ncan be heard and smelled. And the healthy stomach ought to be with\nrespect to all food just as the mill with respect to all things which it\nis formed to grind. And accordingly the healthy understanding ought to\nbe prepared for everything which happens; but that which says, Let my\ndear children live, and let all men praise whatever I may do, is an eye\nwhich seeks for green things, or teeth which seek for soft things.\n\n36. There is no man so fortunate that there shall not be by him when he\nis dying some who are pleased with what is going to happen.[A] Suppose\nthat he was a good and wise man, will there not be at least some one to\nsay to himself, Let us at last breathe freely, being relieved from this\nschoolmaster? It is true that he was harsh to none of us, but I\nperceived that he tacitly condemns us.--This is what is said of a good\nman. But in our own case how many other things are there for which there\nare many who wish to get rid of us? Thou wilt consider this, then, when\nthou art dying, and thou wilt depart more contentedly by reflecting\nthus: I am going away from such a life, in which even my associates in\nbehalf of whom I have striven so much, prayed, and cared, themselves\nwish me to depart, hoping perchance to get some little advantage by it.\nWhy then should a man cling to a longer stay here? Do not, however, for\nthis reason go away less kindly disposed to them, but preserving thy own\ncharacter, and friendly and benevolent and mild, and on the other hand\nnot as if thou wast torn away; but as when a man dies a quiet death, the\npoor soul is easily separated from the body, such also ought thy\ndeparture from men to be, for nature united thee to them and associated\nthee. But does she now dissolve the union? Well, I am separated as from\nkinsmen, not however dragged resisting, but without compulsion; for\nthis, too, is one of the things according to nature.\n\n    [A] He says [Greek: kakon], but as he affirms in other places\n    that death is no evil, he must mean what others may call an\n    evil, and he means only \"what is going to happen.\"\n\n37. Accustom thyself as much as possible on the occasion of anything\nbeing done by any person to inquire with thyself, For what object is\nthis man doing this? But begin with thyself, and examine thyself first.\n\n38. Remember that this which pulls the strings is the thing which is\nhidden within: this is the power of persuasion, this is life, this, if\none may so say, is man. In contemplating thyself never include the\nvessel which surrounds thee and these instruments which are attached\nabout it. For they are like to an axe, differing only in this, that they\ngrow to the body. For indeed there is no more use in these parts without\nthe cause which moves and checks them than in the weaver's shuttle, and\nthe writer's pen, and the driver's whip.[A]\n\n    [A] See the Philosophy of Antoninus, p. 72, note.\n\n\n\n\nXI.\n\n\nThese are the properties of the rational soul: it sees itself, analyzes\nitself, and makes itself such as it chooses; the fruit which it bears\nitself enjoys--for the fruits of plants and that in animals which\ncorresponds to fruits others enjoy--it obtains its own end, wherever the\nlimit of life may be fixed. Not as in a dance and in a play and in such\nlike things, where the whole action is incomplete if anything cuts it\nshort; but in every part, and wherever it may be stopped, it makes what\nhas been set before it full and complete, so that it can say, I have\nwhat is my own. And further it traverses the whole universe, and the\nsurrounding vacuum, and surveys its form, and it extends itself into the\ninfinity of time, and embraces and comprehends the[A] periodical\nrenovation of all things, and it comprehends that those who come after\nus will see nothing new, nor have those before us seen anything more,\nbut in a manner he who is forty years old, if he has any understanding\nat all, has seen by virtue of the uniformity that prevails all things\nwhich have been and all that will be. This too is a property of the\nrational soul, love of one's neighbor, and truth and modesty, and to\nvalue nothing more than itself, which is also the property of Law.[B]\nThus the right reason differs not at all from the reason of justice.\n\n    [A] [Greek: Ten periodiken palingenesian]. See v. 13, 32; x.\n    7.\n\n    [B] Law is the order by which all things are governed.\n\n2. Thou wilt set little value on pleasing song and dancing and the\npancratium, if thou wilt distribute the melody of the voice into its\nseveral sounds, and ask thyself as to each, if thou art mastered by\nthis; for thou wilt be prevented by shame from confessing it: and in the\nmatter of dancing, if at each movement and attitude thou wilt do the\nsame; and the like also in the matter of the pancratium. In all things,\nthen, except virtue and the acts of virtue, remember to apply thyself to\ntheir several parts, and by this division to come to value them little:\nand apply this rule also to thy whole life.\n\n3. What a soul that is which is ready, if at any moment it must be\nseparated from the body, and ready either to be extinguished or\ndispersed or continue to exist; but so that this readiness comes from a\nman's own judgment, not from mere obstinacy, as with the Christians,[A]\nbut considerately and with dignity and in a way to persuade another,\nwithout tragic show.\n\n    [A] See the Life of Antoninus. This is the only passage in\n    which the emperor speaks of the Christians. Epictetus (iv. 7,\n    6) names them Galilaei.\n\n4. Have I done something for the general interest? Well then, I have\nhad my reward. Let this always be present to thy mind, and never stop\n[doing such good].\n\n5. What is thy art? To be good. And how is this accomplished well except\nby general principles, some about the nature of the universe, and others\nabout the proper constitution of man?\n\n6. At first tragedies were brought on the stage as means of reminding\nmen of the things which happen to them, and that it is according to\nnature for things to happen so, and that, if you are delighted with what\nis shown on the stage, you should not be troubled with that which takes\nplace on the larger stage. For you see that these things must be\naccomplished thus, and that even they bear them who cry out,[A] \"O\nCithaeron.\" And, indeed, some things are said well by the dramatic\nwriters, of which kind is the following especially:--\n\n      \"Me and my children if the gods neglect,\n      This has its reason too.\"[B]\n\nAnd again,--\n\n      \"We must not chafe and fret at that which happens.\"\n\nAnd,--\n\n      \"Life's harvest reap like the wheat's fruitful ear.\"\n\nAnd other things of the same kind.\n\nAfter tragedy the old comedy was introduced, which had a magisterial\nfreedom of speech, and by its very plainness of speaking was useful in\nreminding men to beware of insolence; and for this purpose too Diogenes\nused to take from these writers.\n\n    [A] Sophocles, Oedipus Rex.\n\n    [B] See vii. 41, 38, 40.\n\nBut as to the middle comedy, which came next, observe what it was, and\nagain, for what object the new comedy was introduced, which gradually\nsank down into a mere mimic artifice. That some good things are said\neven by these writers, everybody knows: but the whole plan of such\npoetry and dramaturgy, to what end does it look?\n\n7. How plain does it appear that there is not another condition of life\nso well suited for philosophizing as this in which thou now happenest to\nbe.\n\n8. A branch cut off from the adjacent branch must of necessity be cut\noff from the whole tree also. So too a man when he is separated from\nanother man has fallen off from the whole social community. Now as to a\nbranch, another cuts it off; but a man by his own act separates himself\nfrom his neighbor when he hates him and turns away from him, and he does\nnot know that he has at the same time cut himself off from the whole\nsocial system. Yet he has this privilege certainly from Zeus, who framed\nsociety, for it is in our power to grow again to that which is near to\nus, and again to become a part which helps to make up the whole.\nHowever, if it often happens, this kind of separation, it makes it\ndifficult for that which detaches itself to be brought to unity and to\nbe restored to its former condition. Finally, the branch, which from the\nfirst grew together with the tree, and has continued to have one life\nwith it, is not like that which after being cut off is then ingrafted,\nfor this is something like what the gardeners mean when they say that it\ngrows with the rest of the tree, but+ that it has not the same mind with\nit.\n\n9. As those who try to stand in thy way when thou art proceeding\naccording to right reason will not be able to turn thee aside from thy\nproper action, so neither let them drive thee from thy benevolent\nfeelings toward them, but be on thy guard equally in both matters, not\nonly in the matter of steady judgment and action, but also in the matter\nof gentleness to those who try to hinder or otherwise trouble thee. For\nthis also is a weakness, to be vexed at them, as well as to be diverted\nfrom thy course of action and to give way through fear; for both are\nequally deserters from their post,--the man who does it through fear,\nand the man who is alienated from him who is by nature a kinsman and a\nfriend.\n\n10. There is no nature which is inferior to art, for the arts imitate\nthe natures of things. But if this is so, that nature which is the most\nperfect and the most comprehensive of all natures, cannot fall short of\nthe skill of art Now all arts do the inferior things for the sake of\nthe superior; therefore the universal nature does so too. And, indeed,\nhence is the origin of justice, and in justice the other virtues have\ntheir foundation: for justice will not be observed, if we either care\nfor middle things [things indifferent], or are easily deceived and\ncareless and changeable (v. 16. 30; vii. 55).\n\n11. If the things do not come to thee, the pursuits and avoidances of\nwhich disturb thee, still in a manner thou goest to them. Let then thy\njudgment about them be at rest, and they will remain quiet, and thou\nwilt not be seen either pursuing or avoiding.\n\n12. The spherical form of the soul maintains its figure when it is\nneither extended towards any object, nor contracted inwards, nor\ndispersed, nor sinks down, but is illuminated by light, by which it sees\nthe truth,--the truth of all things and the truth that is in itself\n(viii. 41, 45; xii. 3).\n\n13. Suppose any man shall despise me. Let him look to that himself. But\nI will look to this, that I be not discovered doing or saying anything\ndeserving of contempt. Shall any man hate me? Let him look to it. But I\nwill be mild and benevolent towards every man, and ready to show even\nhim his mistake, not reproachfully, nor yet as making a display of my\nendurance, but nobly and honestly, like the great Phocion, unless indeed\nhe only assumed it. For the interior [parts] ought to be such, and a\nman ought to be seen by the gods neither dissatisfied with anything nor\ncomplaining. For what evil is it to thee, if thou art now doing what is\nagreeable to thy own nature, and art satisfied with that which at this\nmoment is suitable to the nature of the universe, since thou art a human\nbeing placed at thy post in order that what is for the common advantage\nmay be done in some way?\n\n14. Men despise one another and flatter one another; and men wish to\nraise themselves above one another, and crouch before one another.\n\n15. How unsound and insincere is he who says, I have determined to deal\nwith thee in a fair way!--What are thou doing, man? There is no occasion\nto give this notice. It will soon show itself by acts. The voice ought\nto be plainly written on the forehead. Such as a man's character is,+ he\nimmediately shows it in his eyes, just as he who is beloved forthwith\nreads everything in the eyes of lovers. The man who is honest and good\nought to be exactly like a man who smells strong, so that the bystander\nas soon as he comes near him must smell whether he choose or not. But\nthe affectation of simplicity is like a crooked stick.[A] Nothing is\nmore disgraceful than a wolfish friendship [false friendship]. Avoid\nthis most of all. The good and simple and benevolent show all these\nthings in the eyes, and there is no mistaking.\n\n    [A] Instead of [Greek: skalme] Saumaise reads [Greek: skambe].\n    There is a Greek proverb, [Greek: skambon xylon oudepot\n    orthon]: \"You cannot make a crooked stick straight.\"\n\n    The wolfish friendship is an allusion to the fable of the sheep\n    and the wolves.\n\n16. As to living in the best way, this power is in the soul, if it be\nindifferent to things which are indifferent. And it will be indifferent,\nif it looks on each of these things separately and all together, and if\nit remembers that not one of them produces in us an opinion about\nitself, nor comes to us; but these things remain immovable, and it is we\nourselves who produce the judgments about them, and, as we may say,\nwrite them in ourselves, it being in our power not to write them, and it\nbeing in our power, if perchance these judgments have imperceptibly got\nadmission to our minds, to wipe them out; and if we remember also that\nsuch attention will only be for a short time, and then life will be at\nan end. Besides, what trouble is there at all in doing this? For if\nthese things are according to nature, rejoice in them and they will be\neasy to thee: but if contrary to nature, seek what is conformable to thy\nown nature, and strive towards this, even if it bring no reputation; for\nevery man is allowed to seek his own good.\n\n17. Consider whence each thing is come, and of what it consists, + and\ninto what it changes, and what kind of a thing it will be when it has\nchanged, and that it will sustain no harm.\n\n18. [If any have offended against thee, consider first]: What is my\nrelation to men, and that we are made for one another; and in another\nrespect I was made to be set over them, as a ram over the flock or a\nbull over the herd. But examine the matter from first principles, from\nthis. If all things are not mere atoms, it is nature which orders all\nthings: if this is so, the inferior things exist for the sake of the\nsuperior, and these for the sake of one another (ii. 1; ix. 39; v. 16;\niii. 4).\n\nSecond, consider what kind of men they are at table, in bed, and so\nforth; and particularly, under what compulsions in respect of opinions\nthey are; and as to their acts, consider with what pride they do what\nthey do (viii. 14; ix. 34).\n\nThird, that if men do rightly what they do, we ought not to be\ndispleased: but if they do not right, it is plain that they do so\ninvoluntarily and in ignorance. For as every soul is unwillingly\ndeprived of the truth, so also is it unwillingly deprived of the power\nof behaving to each man according to his deserts. Accordingly men are\npained when they are called unjust, ungrateful, and greedy, and in a\nword wrong-doers to their neighbors (vii. 62, 63; ii. 1; vii. 26; viii.\n29).\n\nFourth, consider that thou also doest many things wrong, and that thou\nart a man like others; and even if thou dost abstain from certain\nfaults, still thou hast the disposition to commit them, though either\nthrough cowardice, or concern about reputation, or some such mean\nmotive, thou dost abstain from such faults (i. 17).\n\nFifth, consider that thou dost not even understand whether men are doing\nwrong or not, for many things are done with a certain reference to\ncircumstances. And in short, a man must learn a great deal to enable him\nto pass a correct judgment on another man's acts (ix. 38; iv. 51).\n\nSixth, consider when thou art much vexed or grieved, that man's life is\nonly a moment, and after a short time we are all laid out dead (vii. 58;\niv. 48).\n\nSeventh, that it is not men's acts which disturb us, for those acts have\ntheir foundation in men's ruling principles, but it is our own opinions\nwhich disturb us. Take away these opinions then, and resolve to dismiss\nthy judgment about an act as if it were something grievous, and thy\nanger is gone. How then shall I take away these opinions? By reflecting\nthat no wrongful act of another brings shame on thee: for unless that\nwhich is shameful is alone bad, thou also must of necessity do many\nthings wrong, and become a robber and everything else (v. 25; vii. 16).\n\nEighth, consider how much more pain is brought on us by the anger and\nvexation caused by such acts than by the acts themselves, at which we\nare angry and vexed (iv. 39, 49; vii. 24).\n\nNinth, consider that a good disposition is invincible if it be genuine,\nand not an affected smile and acting a part. For what will the most\nviolent man do to thee, if thou continuest to be of a kind disposition\ntowards him, and if, as opportunity offers, thou gently admonishest him\nand calmly correctest his errors at the very time when he is trying to\ndo thee harm, saying, Not so, my child: we are constituted by nature for\nsomething else: I shall certainly not be injured, but thou art injuring\nthyself, my child.--And show him with gentle tact and by general\nprinciples that this is so, and that even bees do not do as he does, nor\nany animals which are formed by nature to be gregarious. And thou must\ndo this neither with any double meaning nor in the way of reproach, but\naffectionately and without any rancor in thy soul; and not as if thou\nwert lecturing him, nor yet that any bystander may admire, but either\nwhen he is alone, and if others are present ...[A]\n\n    [A] It appears that there is a defect in the text here.\n\nRemember these nine rules, as if thou hadst received them as a gift from\nthe Muses, and begin at last to be a man while thou livest. But thou\nmust equally avoid nattering men and being vexed at them, for both are\nunsocial and lead to harm. And let this truth be present to thee in the\nexcitement of anger, that to be moved by passion is not manly, but that\nmildness and gentleness, as they are more agreeable to human nature, so\nalso are they more manly; and he who possesses these qualities possesses\nstrength, nerves, and courage, and not the man who is subject to fits of\npassion and discontent. For in the same degree in which a man's mind is\nnearer to freedom from all passion, in the same degree also is it nearer\nto strength: and as the sense of pain is a characteristic of weakness,\nso also is anger. For he who yields to pain and he who yields to anger,\nboth are wounded and both submit.\n\nBut if thou wilt, receive also a tenth present from the leader of the\nMuses [Apollo], and it is this,--that to expect bad men not to do wrong\nis madness, for he who expects this desires an impossibility. But to\nallow men to behave so to others, and to expect them not to do thee any\nwrong, is irrational and tyrannical.\n\n19. There are four principal aberrations of the superior faculty against\nwhich thou shouldst be constantly on thy guard, and when thou hast\ndetected them, thou shouldst wipe them out and say on each occasion\nthus: This thought is not necessary: this tends to destroy social union:\nthis which thou art going to say comes not from the real thoughts; for\nthou shouldst consider it among the most absurd of things for a man not\nto speak from his real thoughts. But the fourth is when thou shalt\nreproach thyself for anything, for this is an evidence of the diviner\npart within thee being overpowered and yielding to the less honorable\nand to the perishable part, the body, and to its gross pleasures (iv.\n24; ii. 16).\n\n20. Thy aerial part and all the fiery parts which are mingled in thee,\nthough by nature they have an upward tendency, still in obedience to the\ndisposition of the universe they are overpowered here in the compound\nmass [the body]. And also the whole of the earthy part in thee and the\nwatery, though their tendency is downward, still are raised up and\noccupy a position which is not their natural one. In this manner then\nthe elemental parts obey the universal; for when they have been fixed in\nany place, perforce they remain there until again the universal shall\nsound the signal for dissolution. Is it not then strange that thy\nintelligent part only should be disobedient and discontented with its\nown place? And yet no force is imposed on it, but only those things\nwhich are conformable to its nature: still it does not submit, but is\ncarried in the opposite direction. For the movement towards injustice\nand intemperance and to anger and grief and fear is nothing else than\nthe act of one who deviates from nature. And also when the ruling\nfaculty is discontented with anything that happens, then too it deserts\nits post: for it is constituted for piety and reverence towards the gods\nno less than for justice. For these qualities also are comprehended\nunder the generic term of contentment with the constitution of things,\nand indeed they are prior[A] to acts of justice.\n\n    [A] The word [Greek: presbytera], which is here translated\n    \"prior,\" may also mean \"superior;\" but Antoninus seems to say\n    that piety and reverence of the gods precede all virtues, and\n    that other virtues are derived from them, even justice, which\n    in another passage (xi. 10) he makes the foundation of all\n    virtues. The ancient notion of justice is that of giving to\n    every one his due. It is not a legal definition, as some have\n    supposed, but a moral rule which law cannot in all cases\n    enforce. Besides, law has its own rules, which are sometimes\n    moral and sometimes immoral; but it enforces them all simply\n    because they are general rules, and if it did not or could not\n    enforce them, so far Law would not be Law. Justice, or the\n    doing what is just, implies a universal rule and obedience to\n    it; and as we all live under universal Law, which commands both\n    our body and our intelligence, and is the law of our nature,\n    that is, the law of the whole constitution of a man, we must\n    endeavor to discover what this supreme Law is. It is the will\n    of the power that rules all. By acting in obedience to this\n    will, we do justice, and by consequence everything else that we\n    ought to do.\n\n21. He who has not one and always the same object in life, cannot be one\nand the same all through his life. But what I have said is not enough,\nunless this also is added, what this object ought to be. For as there is\nnot the same opinion about all the things which in some way or other are\nconsidered by the majority to be good, but only about some certain\nthings, that is, things which concern the common interest, so also ought\nwe to propose to ourselves an object which shall be of a common kind\n[social] and political. For he who directs all his own efforts to this\nobject, will make all his acts alike, and thus will always be the same.\n\n22. Think of the country mouse and of the town mouse, and of the alarm\nand trepidation of the town mouse.[A]\n\n23. Socrates used to call the opinions of the many by the name of\nLamiae,--bugbears to frighten children.\n\n24. The Lacedaemonians at their public spectacles used to set seats in\nthe shade for strangers, but themselves sat down anywhere.\n\n25. Socrates excused himself to Perdiccas[B] for not going to him,\nsaying, It is because I would not perish by the worst of all ends; that\nis, I would not receive a favor and then be unable to return it.\n\n26. In the writings of the [Ephesians][C] there was this precept,\nconstantly to think of some one of the men of former times who practiced\nvirtue.\n\n    [A] The story is told by Horace in his Satires (ii. 6), and by\n    others since but not better.\n\n    [B] Perhaps the emperor made a mistake here, for other writers\n    say that it was Archelaus, the son of Perdiccas, who invited\n    Socrates to Macedonia.\n\n    [C] Gataker suggested [Greek: Epekoureion] for [Greek:\n    Ephesion].\n\n27. The Pythagoreans bid us in the morning look to the heavens that we\nmay be reminded of those bodies which continually do the same things\nand in the same manner perform their work, and also be reminded of their\npurity and nudity. For there is no veil over a star.\n\n28. Consider what a man Socrates was when he dressed himself in a skin,\nafter Xanthippe had taken his cloak and gone out, and what Socrates said\nto his friends who were ashamed of him and drew back from him when they\nsaw him dressed thus.\n\n29. Neither in writing nor in reading wilt thou be able to lay down\nrules for others before thou shalt have first learned to obey rules\nthyself. Much more is this so in life.\n\n30. A slave thou art: free speech is not for thee.\n\n31. And my heart laughed within.\n                          _Odyssey_, ix. 413.\n\n32. And virtue they will curse, speaking harsh words.\n                 HESIOD, _Works and Days_, 184.\n\n33. To look for the fig in winter is a mad-man's act: such is he who\nlooks for his child when it is no longer allowed (Epictetus, iii. 24,\n87).\n\n34. When a man kisses his child, said Epictetus, he should whisper to\nhimself, \"To-morrow perchance thou wilt die.\"--But those are words of\nbad omen.--\"No word is a word of bad omen,\" said Epictetus, \"which\nexpresses any work of nature; or if it is so, it is also a word of bad\nomen to speak of the ears of corn being reaped\" (Epictetus, iii. 24, 88).\n\n35. The unripe grape, the ripe bunch, the dried grape, are all changes,\nnot into nothing, but into something which exists not yet (Epictetus,\niii. 24).\n\n36. No man can rob us of our free will (Epictetus, iii. 22, 105).\n\n37. Epictetus also said, a man must discover an art [or rules] with\nrespect to giving his assent; and in respect to his movements he must be\ncareful that they be made with regard to circumstances, that they be\nconsistent with social interests, that they have regard to the value of\nthe object; and as to sensual desire, he should altogether keep away\nfrom it; and as to avoidance [aversion], he should not show it with\nrespect to any of the things which are not in our power.\n\n38. The dispute then, he said, is not about any common matter, but about\nbeing mad or not.\n\n39. Socrates used to say, What do you want, souls of rational men or\nirrational?--Souls of rational men.--Of what rational men, sound or\nunsound?--Sound.--Why then do you not seek for them?--Because we have\nthem.--Why then do you fight and quarrel?\n\n\n\n\nXII.\n\n\nAll those things at which thou wishest to arrive by a circuitous road\nthou canst have now, if thou dost not refuse them to thyself. And this\nmeans, if thou wilt take no notice of all the past, and trust the future\nto providence, and direct the present only conformably to piety and\njustice. Conformably to piety that thou mayest be content with the lot\nwhich is assigned to thee, for nature designed it for thee and thee for\nit. Conformably to justice, that thou mayst always speak the truth\nfreely and without disguise, and do the things which are agreeable to\nlaw and according to the worth of each. And let neither another man's\nwickedness hinder thee, nor opinion nor voice, nor yet the sensations of\nthe poor flesh which has grown about thee; for the passive part will\nlook to this. If, then, whatever the time may be when thou shalt be near\nto thy departure, neglecting everything else thou shalt respect only thy\nruling faculty and the divinity within thee, and if thou shalt be afraid\nnot because thou must some time cease to live, but if thou shalt fear\nnever to have begun to live according to nature--then thou wilt be a man\nworthy of the universe which has produced thee, and thou wilt cease to\nbe a stranger in thy native land, and to wonder at things which happen\ndaily as if they were something unexpected, and to be dependent on this\nor that.\n\n2. God sees the minds [ruling principles] of all men bared of the\nmaterial vesture and rind and impurities. For with his intellectual part\nalone he touches the intelligence only which has flowed and been derived\nfrom himself into these bodies. And if thou also usest thyself to do\nthis, thou wilt rid thyself of thy much trouble. For he who regards not\nthe poor flesh which envelops him, surely will not trouble himself by\nlooking after raiment and dwelling and fame and such like externals and\nshow.\n\n3. The things are three of which thou art composed: a little body, a\nlittle breath [life], intelligence. Of these the first two are thine, so\nfar as it is thy duty to take care of them; but the third alone is\nproperly thine. Therefore if thou shalt separate from thyself, that is,\nfrom thy understanding, whatever others do or say, and whatever thou\nhast done or said thyself, and whatever future things trouble thee\nbecause they may happen, and whatever in the body which envelops thee or\nin the breath [life], which is by nature associated with the body, is\nattached to thee independent of thy will, and whatever the external\ncircumfluent vortex whirls round, so that the intellectual power exempt\nfrom the things of fate can live pure and free by itself, doing what is\njust and accepting what happens and saying the truth: if thou wilt\nseparate, I say, from this ruling faculty the things which are attached\nto it by the impressions of sense, and the things of time to come and of\ntime that is past, and wilt make thyself like Empedocles' sphere,\n\n   \"All round and in its joyous rest reposing;\"[A]\n\nand if thou shalt strive to live only what is really thy life, that is,\nthe present,--then thou wilt be able to pass that portion of life which\nremains for thee up to the time of thy death free from perturbations,\nnobly, and obedient to thy own daemon [to the god that is within thee]\n(ii. 13, 17; iii. 5, 6; xi. 12).\n\n4. I have often wondered how it is that every man loves himself more\nthan all the rest of men, but yet sets less value on his own opinion of\nhimself than on the opinion of others. If then a god or a wise teacher\nshould present himself to a man and bid him to think of nothing and to\ndesign nothing which he would not express as soon as he conceived it, he\ncould not endure it even for a single day.[B] So much more respect have\nwe to what our neighbors shall think of us than to what we shall think\nof ourselves.\n\n    [A] The verse of Empedocles is corrupt in Antoninus. It has\n    been restored by Peyron from a Turin manuscript, thus:--\n\n         [Greek: Sphairos kykloteres monie perigethei gaion.]\n\n    [B] iii. 4.\n\n5. How can it be that the gods, after having arranged all things well\nand benevolently for mankind, have overlooked this alone, that some men,\nand very good men, and men who, as we may say, have had most communion\nwith the divinity, and through pious acts and religious observances have\nbeen most intimate with the divinity, when they have once died should\nnever exist again, but should be completely extinguished?\n\nBut if this is so, be assured that if it ought to have been otherwise,\nthe gods would have done it. For if it were just, it would also be\npossible; and if it were according to nature, nature would have had it\nso. But because it is not so, if in fact it is not so, be thou convinced\nthat it ought not to have been so: for thou seest even of thyself that\nin this inquiry thou art disputing with the Deity; and we should not\nthus dispute with the gods, unless they were most excellent and most\njust; but if this is so, they would not have allowed anything in the\nordering of the universe to be neglected unjustly and irrationally.\n\n6. Practise thyself even in the things which thou despairest of\naccomplishing. For even the left hand, which is ineffectual for all\nother things for want of practice, holds the bridle more vigorously than\nthe right hand; for it has been practised in this.\n\n7. Consider in what condition both in body and soul a man should be when\nhe is overtaken by death; and consider the shortness of life, the\nboundless abyss of time past and future, the feebleness of all matter.\n\n8. Contemplate the formative principles [forms] of things bare of their\ncoverings; the purposes of actions; consider what pain is, what pleasure\nis, and death, and fame; who is to himself the cause of his uneasiness;\nhow no man is hindered by another; that everything is opinion.\n\n9. In the application of thy principles thou must be like the\npancratiast, not like the gladiator; for the gladiator lets fall the\nsword which he uses and is killed; but the other always has his hand,\nand needs to do nothing else than use it.\n\n10. See what things are in themselves, dividing them into matter, form,\nand purpose.\n\n11. What a power man has to do nothing except what God will approve, and\nto accept all that God may give him.\n\n12. With respect to that which happens conformably to nature, we ought\nto blame neither gods, for they do nothing wrong either voluntarily or\ninvoluntarily, nor men, for they do nothing wrong except involuntarily.\nConsequently we should blame nobody (ii. 11, 12, 13; vii. 62; 18 viii.\n17).\n\n13. How ridiculous and what a stranger he is who is surprised at\nanything which happens in life.\n\n14. Either there is a fatal necessity and invincible order, or a kind\nprovidence, or a confusion without a purpose and without a director\n(iv. 27). If then there is an invincible necessity, why dost thou\nresist? But if there is a providence which allows itself to be\npropitiated, make thyself worthy of the help of the divinity. But if\nthere is a confusion without a governor, be content that in such a\ntempest thou hast in thyself a certain ruling intelligence. And even if\nthe tempest carry thee away, let it carry away the poor flesh, the poor\nbreath, everything else; for the intelligence at least it will not carry\naway.\n\n15. Does the light of the lamp shine without losing its splendor until\nit is extinguished? and shall the truth which is in thee and justice and\ntemperance be extinguished [before thy death]?\n\n16. When a man has presented the appearance of having done wrong [say],\nHow then do I know if this is a wrongful act? And even if he has done\nwrong, how do I know that he has not condemned himself? And so this is\nlike tearing his own face. Consider that he who would not have the bad\nman do wrong, is like the man who would not have the fig-tree to bear\njuice in the figs, and infants to cry, and the horse to neigh, and\nwhatever else must of necessity be. For what must a man do who has such\na character? If then thou art irritable, + cure this man's\ndisposition.[A]\n\n17. If it is not right, do not do it: if it is not true, do not say it.\n[For let thy efforts be--][B]\n\n    [A] The interpreters translate [Greek: gorgos] by the words\n    \"acer, validusque,\" and \"skilful.\" But in Epictetus (ii. 16,\n    20; iii. 12, 10) [Greek: gorgos] means \"vehement,\" \"prone to\n    anger,\" \"irritable.\"\n\n    [B] There is something wrong here, or incomplete.\n\n18. In everything always observe what the thing is which produces for\nthee an appearance, and resolve it by dividing it into the formal, the\nmaterial, the purpose, and the time within which it must end.\n\n19. Perceive at last that thou hast in thee something better and more\ndivine than the things which cause the various affects, and as it were\npull thee by the strings. What is there now in my mind,--is it fear, or\nsuspicion, or desire, or anything of the kind (v. 11)?\n\n20. First, do nothing inconsiderately, nor without a purpose. Second,\nmake thy acts refer to nothing else than to a social end.\n\n21. Consider that before long thou wilt be nobody and nowhere, nor will\nany of the things exist which thou now seest, nor any of those who are\nnow living. For all things are formed by nature to change and be turned\nand to perish, in order that other things in continuous succession may\nexist (ix. 28).\n\n22. Consider that everything is opinion, and opinion is in thy power.\nTake away then, when thou choosest, thy opinion, and like a mariner who\nhas doubled the promontory, thou wilt find calm, everything stable, and\na waveless bay.\n\n23. Any one activity, whatever it may be, when it has ceased at its\nproper time, suffers no evil because it has ceased; nor he who has done\nthis act, does he suffer any evil for this reason, that the act has\nceased. In like manner then the whole, which consists of all the acts,\nwhich is our life, if it cease at its proper time, suffers no evil for\nthis reason, that it has ceased; nor he who has terminated this series\nat the proper time, has he been ill dealt with. But the proper time and\nthe limit nature fixes, sometimes as in old age the peculiar nature of\nman, but always the universal nature, by the change of whose parts the\nwhole universe continues ever young and perfect.[A] And everything which\nis useful to the universal is always good and in season. Therefore the\ntermination of life for every man is no evil, because neither is it\nshameful, since it is both independent of the will and not opposed to\nthe general interest, but it is good, since it is seasonable, and\nprofitable to and congruent with the universal. For thus too he is moved\nby the Deity who is moved in the same manner with the Deity, and moved\ntowards the same thing in his mind.\n\n    [A] vii. 25.\n\n24. These three principles thou must have in readiness: In the things\nwhich thou doest, do nothing either inconsiderately or otherwise than as\njustice herself would act; but with respect to what may happen to thee\nfrom without, consider that it happens either by chance or according to\nprovidence, and thou must neither blame chance nor accuse providence.\nSecond, consider what every being is from the seed to the time of its\nreceiving a soul, and from the reception of a soul to the giving back of\nthe same, and of what things every being is compounded, and into what\nthings it is resolved. Third, if thou shouldst suddenly be raised up\nabove the earth, and shouldst look down on human things, and observe the\nvariety of them how great it is, and at the same time also shouldst see\nat a glance how great is the number of beings who dwell all around in\nthe air and the ether, consider that as often as thou shouldst be raised\nup, thou wouldst see the same things, sameness of form and shortness of\nduration. Are these things to be proud of?\n\n25. Cast away opinion: thou art saved. Who then hinders thee from\ncasting it away?\n\n26. When thou art troubled about anything, thou hast forgotten this,\nthat all things happen according to the universal nature; and forgotten\nthis, that a man's wrongful act is nothing to thee; and further thou\nhast forgotten this, that everything which happens, always happened so\nand will happen so, and now happens so everywhere; forgotten this too,\nhow close is the kinship between a man and the whole human race, for it\nis a community, not of a little blood or seed, but of intelligence. And\nthou hast forgotten this too, that every man's intelligence is a god and\nis an efflux of the Deity;[A] and forgotten this, that nothing is a\nman's own, but that his child and his body and his very soul came from\nthe Deity; forgotten this, that everything is opinion; and lastly thou\nhast forgotten that every man lives the present time only, and loses\nonly this.\n\n    [A] See Epictetus, ii. 8, 9, etc.\n\n27. Constantly bring to thy recollection those who have complained\ngreatly about anything, those who have been most conspicuous by the\ngreatest fame or misfortunes or enmities or fortunes of any kind: then\nthink where are they all now? Smoke and ash and a tale, or not even a\ntale. And let there be present to thy mind also everything of this sort,\nhow Fabius Catellinus lived in the country, and Lucius Lupus in his\ngardens, and Stertinius at Briae, and Tiberius at Capreae, and Velius\nRufus [or Rufus at Velia]; and in fine think of the eager pursuit of\nanything conjoined with pride;[A] and how worthless everything is after\nwhich men violently strain; and how much more philosophical it is for a\nman in the opportunities presented to him to show himself just,\ntemperate, obedient to the gods, and to do this with all simplicity: for\nthe pride which is proud of its want of pride is the most intolerable of\nall.\n\n    [A] [Greek: met' oieseos. Oiesis kai typhos], Epict. i. 8, 6.\n\n28. To those who ask, Where hast thou seen the gods, or how dost thou\ncomprehend that they exist and so worshippest them, I answer, in the\nfirst place, they may be seen even with the eyes;[A] in the second\nplace, neither have I seen even my own soul, and yet I honor it. Thus\nthen with respect to the gods, from what I constantly experience of\ntheir power, from this I comprehend that they exist, and I venerate\nthem.\n\n    [A] \"Seen even with the eyes.\" It is supposed that this may be\n    explained by the Stoic doctrine, that the universe is a god or\n    living being (iv. 40), and that the celestial bodies are gods\n    (viii. 19). But the emperor may mean that we know that the gods\n    exist, as he afterwards states it, because we see what they do;\n    as we know that man has intellectual powers, because we see\n    what he does, and in no other way do we know it. This passage\n    then will agree with the passage in the Epistle to the Romans\n    (i. _v_. 20), and with the Epistle to the Colossians (i. _v_.\n    15), in which Jesus Christ is named \"the image of the invisible\n    god;\" and with the passage in the Gospel of St. John (xiv. _v_.\n    9).\n\n    Gataker, whose notes are a wonderful collection of learning,\n    and all of it sound and good, quotes a passage of Calvin which\n    is founded on St. Paul's language (Rom. i. _v_. 20): \"God by\n    creating the universe [or world, mundum], being himself\n    invisible, has presented himself to our eyes conspicuously in a\n    certain visible form.\" He also quotes Seneca (De Benef. iv. c.\n    8): \"Quocunque te flexeris, ibi illum videbis occurrentem tibi:\n    nihil ab illo vacat, opus suum ipse implet.\" Compare also\n    Cicero, De Senectute (c. 22), Xenophon's Cyropaedia (viii. 7),\n    and Mem. iv. 3; also Epictetus, i. 6, de Providentia. I think\n    that my interpretation of Antoninus is right.\n\n29. The safety of life is this, to examine everything all through, what\nit is itself, that is its material, what the formal part; with all thy\nsoul to do justice and to say the truth. What remains, except to enjoy\nlife by joining one good thing to another so as not to leave even the\nsmallest intervals between?\n\n30. There is one light of the sun, though it is interrupted by walls,\nmountains, and other things infinite. There is one common substance,[A]\nthough it is distributed among countless bodies which have their several\nqualities. There is one soul, though it is distributed among infinite\nnatures and individual circumscriptions [or individuals]. There is one\nintelligent soul, though it seems to be divided. Now in the things which\nhave been mentioned, all the other parts, such as those which are air\nand matter, are without sensation and have no fellowship: and yet even\nthese parts the intelligent principle holds together and the gravitation\ntowards the same. But intellect in a peculiar manner tends to that which\nis of the same kin, and combines with it, and the feeling for communion\nis not interrupted.\n\n    [A] iv. 40.\n\n31. What dost thou wish--to continue to exist? Well, dost thou wish to\nhave sensation, movement, growth, and then again to cease to grow, to\nuse thy speech, to think? What is there of all these things which seems\nto thee worth desiring? But if it is easy to set little value on all\nthese things, turn to that which remains, which is to follow reason and\nGod. But it is inconsistent with honoring reason and God to be troubled\nbecause by death a man will be deprived of the other things.\n\n32. How small a part of the boundless and unfathomable time is assigned\nto every man, for it is very soon swallowed up in the eternal! And how\nsmall a part of the whole substance; and how small a part of the\nuniversal soul; and on what a small clod of the whole earth thou\ncreepest! Reflecting on all this, consider nothing to be great, except\nto act as thy nature leads thee, and to endure that which the common\nnature brings.\n\n33. How does the ruling faculty make use of itself? for all lies in\nthis. But everything else, whether it is in the power of thy will or\nnot, is only lifeless ashes and smoke.\n\n34. This reflection is most adapted to move us to contempt of death,\nthat even those who think pleasure to be a good and pain an evil still\nhave despised it.\n\n35. The man to whom that only is good which comes in due season, and to\nwhom it is the same thing whether he has done more or fewer acts\nconformable to right reason, and to whom it makes no difference whether\nhe contemplates the world for a longer or a shorter time--for this man\nneither is death a terrible thing (iii. 7; vi. 23; x. 20; xii. 23).\n\n36. Man, thou hast been a citizen in this great state [the world];[A]\nwhat difference does it make to thee whether for five years [or three]?\nfor that which is conformable to the laws is just for all. Where is the\nhardship then, if no tyrant nor yet an unjust judge sends thee away\nfrom the state, but nature, who brought thee into it? the same as if a\npraetor who has employed an actor dismisses him from the stage.[B]--\"But\nI have not finished the five acts, but only three of them.\"--Thou sayest\nwell, but in life the three acts are the whole drama; for what shall be\na complete drama is determined by him who was once the cause of its\ncomposition, and now of its dissolution: but thou art the cause of\nneither. Depart then satisfied, for he also who releases thee is\nsatisfied.\n\n    [A] ii. 16; iii. 11; iv. 29.\n\n    [B] iii. 8; xi. 1.\n\n\n\n\nINDEXES.\n\n\nINDEX OF TERMS.\n\n\n[Greek: adiaphora] (indifferentia, Cicero, Seneca, Epp. 82); things\n  indifferent, neither good nor bad; the same as [Greek: mesa].\n\n[Greek: aischros] (turpis, Cic.), ugly; morally ugly.\n\n[Greek: aitia], cause.\n\n[Greek: aitiodes], [Greek: aition], [Greek: to], the formal or formative\n  principle, the cause.\n\n[Greek: akoinonetos], unsocial.\n\n[Greek: anaphora], reference, relation to a purpose.\n\n[Greek: anypexairetos], unconditionally.\n\n[Greek: aporroia], efflux.\n\n[Greek: aproaireta], [Greek: ta], the things which are not in our will\n  or power.\n\n[Greek: arche], a first principle.\n\n[Greek: atomoi] (corpora individua, Cic.), atoms.\n\n[Greek: autarkeia] est quae parvo contenta omne id respuit quod abundat\n  (Cic.); contentment.\n\n[Greek: autarkes], sufficient in itself; contented.\n\n[Greek: aphormai], means, principles. The word has also other\n  significations in Epictetus. Index ed. Schweig.\n\n[Greek: gignomena], [Greek: ta], things which are produced, come into\n  existence.\n\n[Greek: daimon], god, god in man, man's intelligent principle.\n\n[Greek: diathesis], disposition, affection of the mind.\n\n[Greek: diairesis], division of things into their parts, dissection,\n  resolution, analysis.\n\n[Greek: dialektike], ars bene disserendi et vera ac falsa dijudicandi\n  (Cic.).\n\n[Greek: dialysis], dissolution, the opposite of [Greek: sygkrisis].\n\n[Greek: dianoia], understanding; sometimes, the mind generally,\n  the whole intellectual power.\n\n[Greek: dogmata] (decreta, Cic.), principles.\n\n[Greek: dynamis noera], intellectual faculty.\n\n[Greek: enkrateia], temperance, self-restraint.\n\n[Greek: eidos] in divisione formae sunt, quas Graeci [Greek: eide]\n  vocant; nostri, si qui haec forte tractant, species appellant (Cic.).\n  But [Greek: eidos] is used by Epictetus and Antoninus less exactly and\n  as a general term, like _genus_. Index Epict. ed. Schweig.--[Greek:\n  Hos de ge ahi protai ousiai pros ta alla echousin, outo kai to eidos\n  pros to genos echei hypokeitai gar to eidos to genei]. (Aristot. Cat.\n  c. 5.)\n\n[Greek: eimarmene] (fatalis necessitas, fatum, Cic.), destiny,\n  necessity.\n\n[Greek: ekkliseis], aversions, avoidance, the turning away from\n  things; the opposite of [Greek: orexeiz.]\n\n[Greek: empsycha, ta] things which have life.\n\n[Greek: energeia], action, activity.\n\n[Greek: ennoia], [Greek: ennoiai], notio, notiones (Cic.), or \"notitiae\n  rerum;\" notions of things. (Notionem appello quam Graeci tum [Greek:\n  ennoian], tum [Greek: prolepsin], Cic.).\n\n[Greek: enosis], [Greek: e], the unity.\n\n[Greek: epistrophe], attention to an object.\n\n[Greek: euthymia], animi tranquillitas (Cic.).\n\n[Greek: eumenes], [Greek: to], [Greek: eumeneia], benevolence; [Greek:\n  eumenes] sometimes means well-contented.\n\n[Greek: eunoia], benevolence.\n\n[Greek: exousia], power, faculty.\n\n[Greek: epakolouthesin], [Greek: kata], by way of sequence.\n\n[Greek: hegemonikon], [Greek: to], the ruling faculty or part; principatus\n  (Cic.).\n\n[Greek: theoremata], percepta (Cic.), things perceived, general\n  principles.\n\n[Greek: kathekein], [Greek: to], duty, \"officium.\"\n\n[Greek: kalos], beautiful.\n\n[Greek: katalepsis], comprehension; cognitio, perceptio, comprehensio\n  (Cic.).\n\n[Greek: kataskeue], constitution.\n\n[Greek: katorthoseis, katorthomata]; recta, recte facta (Cic.); right\n  acts, those acts to which we proceed by the right or straight road.\n\n[Greek: kosmos], order, world, universe.\n\n[Greek: kosmos, ho olos], the universe, that which is the One and\n  the all (vi. 25).\n\n[Greek: krima], a judgment.\n\n[Greek: kyrieuon, to endon], that which rules within (iv. 1), the same\n  as [Greek: to hegemonikon]. Diogenes Laertius vii., Zeno. [Greek:\n  hegemonikon de einai to kyriotaton tes psyches].\n\n[Greek: logika, ta], the things which have reason.\n\n[Greek: logikos], rational.\n\n[Greek: logos], reason.\n\n[Greek: logos spermatikos], seminal principle.\n\n[Greek: mesa, ta], things indifferent, viewed with respect to\n  virtue.\n\n[Greek: noeros], intellectual.\n\n[Greek: nomos], law.\n\n[Greek: nous], intelligence, understanding.\n\n[Greek: oiesis], arrogance, pride. It sometimes means in Antoninus\n  the same as [Greek: typhos]; but it also means \"opinion.\"\n\n[Greek: oikonomia] (dispositio, ordo, Cic.) has sometimes the peculiar\n  sense of artifice, or doing something with an apparent purpose\n  different from the real purpose.\n\n[Greek: holon, to], the universe, the whole: [Greek: he ton olon physis].\n\n[Greek: onta, ta], things which exist; existence, being.\n\n[Greek: orexis], desire of a thing, which is opposed to [Greek: ekklisis],\naversion.\n\n[Greek: horme], movement towards an object, appetite; appetitio,\nnaturalis appetitus, appetitus animi (Cic.).\n\n[Greek: ousia], substance (vi. 49). Modern writers sometimes incorrectly\n  translate it \"essentia.\" It is often used by Epictetus in the same\n  sense as [Greek: hyle]. Aristotle (Cat. c. 5) defines [Greek: ousia],\n  and it is properly translated \"substantia\" (ed. Jul. Pacius).\n  Porphyrius (Isag. c. 2): [Greek: he ousia anotato ousa to meden pro\n  autes genos hen to genikotaton].\n\n[Greek: parakolouthetike dynamis, he], the power which enables us\n  to observe and understand.\n\n[Greek: peisis], passivity, opposed to [Greek: energeia]: also, affect.\n\n[Greek: peristaseis], circumstances, the things which surround\n  us; troubles, difficulties.\n\n[Greek: pepromene, he], destiny.\n\n[Greek: proairesis], purpose, free will (Aristot. Rhet. i. 13).\n\n[Greek: proaireta, ta], things which are within our will or power.\n\n[Greek: proairetikon, to], free will.\n\n[Greek: prothesis], a purpose, proposition.\n\n[Greek: pronoia] (providentia, Cic.), providence.\n\n[Greek: skopos], object, purpose.\n\n[Greek: stoicheion], element.\n\n[Greek: synkatathesis] (assensio, approbatio, Cic.), assent; [Greek:\n  synkatatheseis] (probationes, Gellius, xix. 1).\n\n[Greek: synkrimata], things compounded (ii. 3).\n\n[Greek: synkrisis], the act of combining elements out of which\n  a body is produced, combination.\n\n[Greek: synthesis], ordering, arrangement (compositio).\n\n[Greek: systema], system, a thing compounded of parts which\n  have a certain relation to one another.\n\n[Greek: hyle], matter, material.\n\n[Greek: hylikon, to], the material principle.\n\n[Greek: hypexairesis], exception, reservation; [Greek: meth'\n  hypexaireseos], conditionally.\n\n[Greek: hypothesis], material to work on; thing to employ the reason on;\n  proposition, thing assumed as matter for argument and to lead to\n  conclusions. (Quaestionum duo sunt genera; alterum infinitum, definitum\n  alterum. Definitum est, quod [Greek: hypothesin] Graeci, nos\n  _causam_: infinitum, quod [Greek: thesin] illi appellant, nos\n  _propositum_ possumus nominare. Cic. See Aristot. Anal. Post.\n  i. c. 2).\n\n[Greek: hypokeimena, ta], things present or existing, vi. 4; or\n  things which are a basis or foundation.\n\n[Greek: hypolepsis], opinion.\n\n[Greek: hypostasis], basis, substance, being, foundation (x. 5).\n  Epictetus has [Greek: to hypostatikon kai ousiodes]. (Justinus\n  ad Diogn. c. 2.)\n\n[Greek: hyphistasthai], to subsist, to be.\n\n[Greek: phantasiai] (visus, Cic.); appearances, thoughts, impressions\n  (visa animi, Gellius, xix. 1): [Greek: phantasia esti\n  typosis en psyche].\n\n[Greek: phantasma], seems to be used by Antoninus in the same\n  sense as [Greek: phantasia]. Epictetus uses only [Greek: phantasia].\n\n[Greek: phantaston], that which produces a [Greek: phantasia: phantaston\n  to tepsiekos ten phantasian aistheton]\n\n[Greek: physis], nature.\n\n[Greek: physis he ton olon], the nature of the universe.\n\n[Greek: psyche], soul, life, living principle.\n\n[Greek: psyche logike, noera], a rational soul, an intelligent soul\n\n\n\n\nGENERAL INDEX.\n\n*** The paragraphs (par.) and lines (l.) are those of the sections.\n\n\nActive, man is by nature, ix. 16.\n\nAdvice from the good to be taken, vii. 21; viii. 16.\n\nAffectation, vii. 60; viii. 30; xi. 18 (par. 9), 19.\n\nAnger discouraged, vi. 26, 27; xi. 18.\n\nAnger, offenses of, ii. 10.\n\nAnger, uselessness of, v. 28; viii. 4.\n\nAppearances not to be regarded, v. 36; vi. 3, 13.\n\nAstonishment should not be felt at any thing that happens, viii. 15;\n  xii. 1 (sub fine), 13.\n\nAttainment, what is within every one's, vii. 67; viii. 8.\n\nAttention to what is said or done, vi. 53; vii. 4, 30; viii. 22.\n\n\nBad, the, ii. 1.\n\nBeautiful, the, ii. 1.\n\n\nCasual. _See_ Formal.\n\nChange keeps the world ever new, vii. 25; viii. 50 (l. 13); xii. 23 (l.\n  10).\n\nChange, law of, iv. 3 (sub f.), 36, v. 13, 23; vi. 4, 15, 36; vii. 18;\n  viii. 6; ix. 19, 28 (par. 2), 35; x. 7, 18; xii. 21.\n\nChange, no evil in, iv. 42.\n\nChristians, the xi. 3.\n\nCircle, things come round in a, ii. 14.\n\nComedy, new, xi. 6.\n\nComedy, Old, xi. 6.\n\nComplaining, uselessness of, viii. 17, 50.\n\nConnection. _See_ Universe.\n\nConquerers are robbers, x. 10.\n\nContentment. _See_ Resignation.\n\nCo-operation. _See_ Mankind and Universe.\n\nDaemon, the, ii. 13, 17; iii. 6 (l. 8), 7, 16 (l. 18); v. 10 (sub f.)\n  27; xii. 3 (sub. f.).\n\nDeath, ii. 11, 12, 17; iii. 3, 7; iv. 5; v. 33; vi. 2, 24, 28; vii. 32;\n  viii. 20, 58; ix. 3, 21; x. 36; xii. 23, 34, 35.\n\nDeath inevitable, iii. 3; iv. 3 (l. 22), 6, 32, 48, 50; v. 33; vi. 47;\n  viii. 25, 31.\n\nDesire, offenses of, ii. 10.\n\nDestiny, iii. 11 (l. 19); iv. 26; v. 8 (l. 13, etc.), 24; vii. 57; x. 5.\n\nDiscontent. _See_ Resignation.\n\nDoubts discussed, vi. 10; vii. 75; ix. 28, 39; xii. 5, 14.\n\nDuty, all-importance of, vi. 2, 22; x. 22.\n\n\nEarth, insignificance of the, iii. 10; iv. 3 (par. 1, sub f.); vi. 36;\n  viii. 21; xii. 32.\n\nEarthly things, transitory nature of, ii. 12, 17; iv. 32, 33, 35, 48; v.\n  23; vi. 15, 36; vii. 21, 34; viii. 21, 25; x. 18, 31; xii. 27.\n\nEarthly things, worthlessness of, ii. 12; v. 10, 33; vi. 15; vii. 3; ix.\n  24, 36; xi. 2; xii. 27.\n\nEquanimity, x. 8.\n\nExample, we should not follow bad, vi. 6; vii. 65.\n\nExistence, meanness of, viii. 24.\n\nExistence, the object of, v. 1; viii. 19.\n\nExternal things cannot really harm a man, or affect the soul, ii, 11 (l.\n  22); iv. 3 (par. 2, sub f.); 8, 39, 49 (par. 2); v. 35; vii. 64;\n  viii. 1 (sub f.); 32, 51 (par. 2); ix. 31; x. 33.\n\n\nFailure, x. 12.\n\nFame, worthlessness of, iii. 10; iv. 3 (l. 45), 19, 33 (l. 10); v. 33;\n  vi. 16, 18; vii. 34; viii. 1, 44; ix. 30.\n\nFear, what we ought to, xii. 1 (l. 18).\n\nFellowship. _See_ Mankind.\n\nFew things necessary for a virtuous and happy life, ii. 5; iii. 10; vii.\n  67; x. 8 (l. 22).\n\nFlattery, xi. 18 (par. 10).\n\nFormal, the, and the material, iv. 21 (par. 2); v. 13; vii. 10, 29;\n  viii. 11; ix. 25; xii. 8, 10, 18.\n\nFuture, we should not be anxious about the, vii. 8; viii. 11; ix. 25;\n  xii. 1.\n\n\nGods, perfect justice of the, xii. 5 (par. 2).\n\nGods, the, vi. 44; xii. 28.\n\nGods, the, cannot be evil, ii. 11; vi. 44.\n\nGood, the, ii. 1.\n\n\nHabit of thought, v. 16.\n\nHappiness, what is true, v. 9 (sub f.), 34; viii. 1; x. 33.\n\nHelp to be accepted from others, xii. 7.\n\nHeroism, true, xi. 18 (par. 10).\n\n\nIgnorance. _See_ Wrong-doing.\n\nIndependence. _See_ Self-reliance.\n\nIndifferent things, ii. 11 (sub f.); ix. 39; vi 32; ix, 1; (l. 30).\n\nIndividual, the. _See_ Interests.\n\nInfinity. _See_ Time.\n\nIngratitude. _See_ Mankind.\n\nInjustice, ix. 1.\n\nIntelligent soul, rational beings participate in the same, iv. 40; ix.\n  8, 9; x. 1 (l. 15); xii. 26, 30.\n\nInterests of the whole and the individual identical, iv. 23; v. 8 (l.\n  34); vi. 45, 54; x. 6, 20, 33 (sub f.); xii. 23 (l. 12).\n\n\nJustice, v. 34; x. 11; xi. 10.\n\nJustice and reason identical, xi. 1 (sub f.).\n\nJustice prevails everywhere, iv. 10.\n\n\nLeisure, we ought to have some, viii. 51.\n\nLife, a good, everywhere possible, v. 16.\n\nLife can only be lived once, ii. 14; x. 31 (l. 11).\n\nLife, shortness of, ii. 4, 17; iii. 10, 14; iv. 17, 48 (sub f.). 50; vi.\n  15, 36, 56; x. 31, 34.\n\nLife to be made a proper use of, without delay, ii. 4; iii. 1, 14; iv.\n  17, 37; vii. 56; viii. 22; x. 31 (l. 14); xii. 1 (l. 18).\n\nLife, whether long or short, matters not, vi. 49; ix. 33; xii. 36.\n\n\nMagnanimity, x. 8.\n\nMankind, co-operation and fellowship of, one with another; ii. 1 (l.\n  11), 16; iii. 4 (sub f.); 11 (sub f.); iv. 4, 33 (sub f.); v.\n  16 (l. 11), 20; vi. 7, 14 (sub f.), 23, 39; vii. 5, 13, 22, 55;\n  viii. 12, 26, 34, 43, 59; ix. 1, 9 (sub f.), 23, 31, 42 (sub.\n  f.); x. 36, (l. 16); xi. 8, 21; xii. 20.\n\nMankind, folly and baseness of, v. 10 (l. 9); ix. 2, 3 (l. 13), 29; x.\n  15, 19.\n\nMankind, ingratitude of, x. 36.\n\nMaterial, the. _See_ Formal.\n\n\nNature, after products of, iii. 2; vi. 36.\n\nNature, bounds fixed by, v. 1.\n\nNature, man formed by, to bear all that happens to him, v. 18; viii. 46.\n\nNature, nothing evil, which is according to, ii. 17 (sub f.); vi. 33.\n\nNature of the universe. _See_ Universe, nothing that happens is contrary\n  to the nature of the.\n\nNature, perfect beauty of, iii. 2; vi. 36.\n\nNature, we should live according to, iv. 48 (sub. f.), 51; v. 3. 25; vi.\n  16 (l. 12); vii. 15, 55; viii. 1, 54; x. 33.\n\nNew, nothing, under the sun, ii. 14 (l. 11); iv. 44; vi. 37, 46; vii. 1,\n  49; viii. 6; ix. 14; x. 27; xi. 1.\n\n\nObject, we should always act with a view to some, ii. 7, 16 (l. 12);\n  iii. 4; iv. 2; viii. 17; x. 37; xi. 21; xii. 20.\n\nObsolete, all things become, iv. 33.\n\nOmissions, sins of, ix. 5.\n\nOpinion, iv. 3 (par. 2) (sub f.), 7, 12, 39; vi. 52, 57; vii. 2, 14, 16,\n  26, 68; viii. 14, 29, 40, 47, 49; ix. 13, 29 (l. 12), 32, 42\n  (l. 21); x. 3; xi. 16, 18; xii. 22, 25.\n\nOthers' conduct not to be inquired into, iii. 4; iv. 18; v. 25.\n\nOthers, opinion of, to be disregarded, viii. 1 (l. 12); x. 8 (l. 12),\n  11; xi. 13; xii. 4.\n\nOthers, we should be lenient towards, ii. 13 (sub f.); iii. 11 (sub f.);\n  iv. 3 (l. 16); v. 33 (l. 17); vi. 20, 27; vii. 26, 62, 63, 70;\n  ix. 11, 27; x. 4; xi. 9, 13, 18; xii. 16.\n\nOthers, we should examine the ruling principles of; iv. 38; ix. 18, 22,\n  27, 34.\n\nOurselves often to blame for expecting men to act contrary to their\n  nature, ix. 42 (l. 31).\n\nOurselves, reformation should begin with, xi. 29.\n\nOurselves, we should judge, x. 30; xi. 18 (par. 4).\n\n\nPain, vii. 33, 64; viii. 28.\n\nPerfection not to be expected in this world, ix. 29 (l. 7).\n\nPerseverance, v. 9; x. 12.\n\nPersuasion, to be used, vi. 50.\n\nPerturbation, vi. 16 (sub f.); viii. 58; ix. 31.\n\nPessimism, ix. 35.\n\nPhilosophy, v. 9; vi. 12; ix. 41 (l. 15).\n\nPleasure, he who pursues, is guilty of impiety, ix. 1 (l. 24).\n\nPleasures are enjoyed by the bad, vi. 34; ix. 1 (l. 30).\n\nPower, things in our own, v. 5, 10 (sub f.); vi. 32, 41, 52, 58; vii. 2,\n  14, 54, 68; x. 32, 33.\n\nPower, things not in our own, v. 33 (sub f.); vi. 41.\n\nPractice is good, even in things which we despair of accomplishing, xii.\n  6.\n\nPraise, worthlessness of, iii. 4 (sub f.); iv. 20: vi. 16, 59; vii. 62;\n  viii. 52, 53; ix. 34.\n\nPrayer, the right sort of, v. 7; ix. 40.\n\nPresent time the only thing a man really possesses, ii. 14; iii. 10;\n  viii. 44; xii. 3 (sub f.)\n\nProcrastination, _See_ Life to be made a proper use of, etc.\n\nPuppet pulled by strings of desire, ii. 2; iii. 16; vi. 16, 28; vii. 3,\n  29; xii. 19.\n\n\nRational soul. _See_ Ruling part.\n\nRational soul, spherical form of the, viii. 41 (sub f.); xi. 12; xii. 3\n  (and _see_ Ruling part).\n\nReason, all-prevailing, v. 32; vi. 1, 40.\n\nReason and nature identical, vii. 11.\n\nReason the, can adapt everything that happens to its own use, v. 20; vi.\n  8; vii. 68 (l. 16); viii. 35; x. 31 (sub f.).\n\nReason, we should live according to. _See_ Nature.\n\nRepentance does not follow renouncement of pleasure, viii. 10.\n\nResignation and contentment, iii. 4 (l. 27, etc.), 16 (l. 10, etc.); iv.\n  23, 31, 33 (sub f.), 34; v. 8 (sub f.), 33 (l. 16); vi. 16 (sub f.),\n  44, 49; vii. 27, 57; ix. 37; x. 1, 11, 14, 25, 28, 35.\n\nRevenge, best kind of, vi. 6.\n\nRising from bed, v. 1; viii. 11.\n\nRuling part, the, ii. 2; iv. 11, 19, 21, 26; vi. 14, 35; vii. 16, 55\n  (par. 2); viii. 45, 48, 56, 57, 60, 61; ix. 15, 26; x. 24,\n  33 (l. 21), 38; xi. 1, 19, 20; xii. 3, 14.\n\n\nSelf-reliance and steadfastness of soul, iii. 5 (sub f.), 12; iv. 14, 29\n  (l. 5), 49 (par. 1); v. 3, 34 (l. 5); vi. 44 (l. 15); vii. 12, 15; ix.\n  28 (l. 8), 29 (sub f.); xii. 14.\n\nSelf-restraint, v. 33 (sub f.).\n\nSelf, we should retire into, iv. 3 (l. 4 and par. 2); vii. 28, 33, 59;\n  viii. 48.\n\nSenses, movements of the, to be disregarded, v. 31 (l. 10); vii. 55\n  (par. 2); viii. 26, 39; x. 8 (l. 13); xi. 19; xii. 1 (l. 18).\n\nSickness, behavior in, ix. 41.\n\nSocial. _See_ Mankind.\n\nSteadfastness of soul. _See_ Self-reliance.\n\nSubstance, the universal, iv. 40; v. 24; vii. 19, 23; xii. 30.\n\nSuicide, v. 29; viii. 47 (sub f.); x. 8 (l. 35).\n\n\nTime compared to a river, iv. 43.\n\nTime, infinity of, iv. 3 (l. 35), 50 (sub f.); v. 24; ix. 32; xii. 7,\n  32.\n\nTragedy, xi. 6.\n\nTranquillity of soul, iv. 3; vi. 11; vii. 68; viii. 28.\n\n\nUgly, the, ii. 1.\n\nUnintelligible things, v. 10.\n\nUniverse, harmony of the, iv. 27, 45; v. 8 (l. 14).\n\nUniverse, intimate connection and co-operation of all things in the, one\n  with another, ii. 3, 9; iv. 29; v. 8, 30; vi. 38, 42, 43; vii. 9, 19,\n  68 (sub f.); viii. 7; ix. 1; x. 1.\n\nUniverse, nothing that dies falls out of the, viii. 18, 50 (l. 13); x. 7\n  (l. 25).\n\nUniverse, nothing that happens is contrary to the nature of the, v. 8,\n  10 (sub f.); vi. 9, 58; viii. 5; xii. 26.\n\nUnnecessary things, v. 45.\n\nUnnecessary thoughts, words, and actions, iii. 4; iv. 24.\n\n\nVain professions, x. 16; xi. 15.\n\nVirtue, vi. 17.\n\nVirtue its own reward, v. 6; vii. 73; ix. 42 (l. 47); xi. 4.\n\nVirtue, omnipotence of, iv. 16.\n\nVirtue, pleasure in contemplating, vi. 48.\n\n\nWhole, integrity of the, to be preserved, v. 8 (sub f.).\n\nWhole, the. _See_ Interests.\n\nWickedness has always existed, vii. 1.\n\nWickedness must exist in the world, viii. 15, 50; ix. 42; xi. 18 (par.\n  ii); xii. 16.\n\nWorst evil, the, ix. 2 (l. 9.)\n\nWorth and importance, things of real, iv. 33 (sub f.); v. 10 (l. 16);\n  vi. 16, 30 (l. 7), 47 (sub f.); vii. 20, 44, 46, 58, 66; viii. 2,\n  3, 5; ix. 6, 12; x. 8 (l. 27), 11; xii. 1, 27, 31, 33.\n\nWrong-doing cannot really harm any one, vii. 22; viii. 55; ix. 42 (l.\n  25); x. 13 (par. 1); xi. 18 (par. 7).\n\nWrong-doing injures the wrong-doer, iv. 26; ix. 4, 38; xi. 18 (par. 3).\n\nWrong-doing owing to ignorance, ii. 1, 13; vi. 27; vii. 22, 26, 62, 63;\n  xi. 18 (par. 3); xii. 22.\n\nWrong-doing to be left where it is, vii. 29; ix. 20.\n\n\n\n\nTHE END.","title":"Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":75941}