{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_15905/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_15905","id":"gutenberg_15905","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/15905","summary":null,"tags":["Agnosticism","Category: Essays, Letters & Speeches","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Category: Science - Biology","Miracles","Religion and science"],"text":"Produced by Suzanne Lybarger, Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe\nand the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at\nwww.pgdp.net.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCOLLECTED ESSAYS; VOLUME V\n\nSCIENCE AND CHRISTIAN TRADITION\n\nBY THOMAS H. HUXLEY\n\nNEW YORK, D. APPLETON AND COMPANY, 1902\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\n\"For close upon forty years I have been writing with one purpose; from\ntime to time, I have fought for that which seemed to me the truth,\nperhaps still more, against that which I have thought error; and, in\nthis way, I have reached, indeed over-stepped, the threshold of old\nage. There, every earnest man has to listen to the voice within: 'Give\nan account of thy stewardship, for thou mayest be no longer steward.'\n\n\"That I have been an unjust steward my conscience does not bear\nwitness. At times blundering, at times negligent, Heaven knows: but,\non the whole, I have done that which I felt able and called upon to\ndo; and I have done it without looking to the right or to the left;\nseeking no man's favor, fearing no man's disfavor.\n\n\"But what is it that I have been doing? In the end one's conceptions\nshould form a whole, though only parts may have found utterance, as\noccasion arose; now do these exhibit harmony and mutual connexion? In\none's zeal much of the old gets broken to pieces; but has one made\nready something new, fit to be set in the place of the old?\n\n\"That they merely destroy without reconstructing, is the especial\ncharge, with which those who work in this direction are constantly\nreproached. In a certain sense I do not defend myself against the\ncharge; but I deny that any reproach is deserved.\n\n\"I have never proposed to myself to begin outward construction;\nbecause I do not believe that the time has come for it. Our present\nbusiness is with inward preparation, especially the preparation of\nthose who have ceased to be content with the old, and find no\nsatisfaction in half measures. I have wished, and I still wish, to\ndisturb no man's peace of mind, no man's beliefs; but only to point\nout to those in whom they are already shattered, the direction in\nwhich, in my conviction, firmer ground lies.\"[1]\n\nSo wrote one of the protagonists of the New Reformation--and a\nwell-abused man if ever there was one--a score of years since, in the\nremarkable book in which he discusses the negative and the positive\nresults of the rigorous application of scientific method to the\ninvestigation of the higher problems of human life.\n\nRecent experience leads me to imagine that there may be a good many\ncountrymen of my own, even at this time, to whom it may be profitable\nto read, mark and inwardly digest, the weighty words of the author of\nthat \"Leben Jesu,\" which, half a century ago, stirred the religious\nworld so seriously that it has never settled down again quite on the\nold foundations; indeed, some think it never will. I have a personal\ninterest in the carrying out of the recommendation I venture to make.\nIt may enable many worthy persons, in whose estimation I should really\nbe glad to stand higher than I do, to become aware of the possibility\nthat my motives in writing the essays, contained in this and the\npreceding volume, were not exactly those that they ascribe to me.\n\nI too have reached the term at which the still, small voice, more\naudible than any other to the dulled ear of age, makes its demand; and\nI have found that it is of no sort of use to try to cook the accounts\nrendered. Nevertheless, I distinctly decline to admit some of the\nitems charged; more particularly that of having \"gone out of my way\"\nto attack the Bible; and I as steadfastly deny that \"hatred of\nChristianity\" is a feeling with which I have any acquaintance. There\nare very few things which I find it permissible to hate; and though,\nit may be, that some of the organisations, which arrogate to\nthemselves the Christian name, have richly earned a place in the\ncategory of hateful things, that ought to have nothing to do with\none's estimation of the religion, which they have perverted and\ndisfigured out of all likeness to the original.\n\nThe simple fact is that, as I have already more than once hinted, my\nstory is that of the wolf and the lamb over again. I have never \"gone\nout of my way\" to attack the Bible, or anything else: it was the\ndominant ecclesiasticism of my early days, which, as I believe,\nwithout any warrant from the Bible itself, thrust the book in my way.\n\nI had set out on a journey, with no other purpose than that of\nexploring a certain province of natural knowledge; I strayed no hair's\nbreadth from the course which it was my right and my duty to pursue;\nand yet I found that, whatever route I took, before long, I came to a\ntall and formidable-looking fence. Confident as I might be in the\nexistence of an ancient and indefeasible right of way, before me stood\nthe thorny barrier with its comminatory notice-board--\"No\nThoroughfare. By order. Moses.\" There seemed no way over; nor did the\nprospect of creeping round, as I saw some do, attract me. True there\nwas no longer any cause to fear the spring guns and man-traps set by\nformer lords of the manor; but one is apt to get very dirty going on\nall-fours. The only alternatives were either to give up my\njourney--which I was not minded to do--or to break the fence down and\ngo through it.\n\nNow I was and am, by nature, a law-abiding person, ready and willing\nto submit to all legitimate authority. But I also had and have a\nrooted conviction, that reasonable assurance of the legitimacy should\nprecede the submission; so I made it my business to look up the\nmanorial title-deeds. The pretensions of the ecclesiastical \"Moses\" to\nexercise a control over the operations of the reasoning faculty in the\nsearch after truth, thirty centuries after his age, might be\njustifiable; but, assuredly, the credentials produced in justification\nof claims so large required careful scrutiny.\n\nSingular discoveries rewarded my industry. The ecclesiastical \"Moses\"\nproved to be a mere traditional mask, behind which, no doubt, lay the\nfeatures of the historical Moses--just as many a mediaeval fresco has\nbeen hidden by the whitewash of Georgian churchwardens. And as the\naesthetic rector too often scrapes away the defacement, only to find\nblurred, parti-coloured patches, in which the original design is no\nlonger to be traced; so, when the successive layers of Jewish and\nChristian traditional pigment, laid on, at intervals, for near three\nthousand years, had been removed, by even the tenderest critical\noperations, there was not much to be discerned of the leader of the\nExodus.\n\nOnly one point became perfectly clear to me, namely, that Moses is not\nresponsible for nine-tenths of the Pentateuch; certainly not for the\nlegends which had been made the bugbears of science. In fact, the\nfence turned out to be a mere heap of dry sticks and brushwood, and\none might walk through it with impunity: the which I did. But I was\nstill young, when I thus ventured to assert my liberty; and young\npeople are apt to be filled with a kind of _saeva indignatio_, when\nthey discover the wide discrepancies between things as they seem and\nthings as they are. It hurts their vanity to feel that they have\nprepared themselves for a mighty struggle to climb over, or break\ntheir way through, a rampart, which turns out, on close approach, to\nbe a mere heap of ruins; venerable, indeed, and archaeologically\ninteresting, but of no other moment. And some fragment of the\nsuperfluous energy accumulated is apt to find vent in strong language.\n\nSuch, I suppose, was my case, when I wrote some passages which occur\nin an essay reprinted among \"Darwiniana.\"[2] But when, not long ago\n\"the voice\" put it to me, whether I had better not expunge, or modify,\nthese passages; whether, really, they were not a little too strong; I\nhad to reply, with all deference, that while, from a merely literary\npoint of view, I might admit them to be rather crude, I must stand by\nthe substance of these items of my expenditure. I further ventured to\nexpress the conviction that scientific criticism of the Old Testament,\nsince 1860, has justified every word of the estimate of the authority\nof the ecclesiastical \"Moses\" written at that time. And, carried away\nby the heat of self-justification, I even ventured to add, that the\ndesperate attempt now set afoot to force biblical and post-biblical\nmythology into elementary instruction, renders it useful and necessary\nto go on making a considerable outlay in the same direction. Not yet,\nhas \"the cosmogony of the semi-barbarous Hebrew\" ceased to be the\n\"incubus of the philosopher, and the opprobrium of the orthodox;\" not\nyet, has \"the zeal of the Bibliolater\" ceased from troubling; not yet,\nare the weaker sort, even of the instructed, at rest from their\nfruitless toil \"to harmonise impossibilities,\" and \"to force the\ngenerous new wine of science into the old bottles of Judaism.\"\n\nBut I am aware that the head and front of my offending lies not now\nwhere it formerly lay. Thirty years ago, criticism of \"Moses\" was held\nby most respectable people to be deadly sin; now it has sunk to the\nrank of a mere peccadillo; at least, if it stops short of the history\nof Abraham. Destroy the foundation of most forms of dogmatic\nChristianity contained in the second chapter of Genesis, if you will;\nthe new ecclesiasticism undertakes to underpin the superstructure and\nmake it, at any rate to the eye, as firm as ever: but let him be\nanathema who applies exactly the same canons of criticism to the\nopening chapters of \"Matthew\" or of \"Luke.\" School-children may be\ntold that the world was by no means made in six days, and that\nimplicit belief in the story of Noah's Ark is permissible only, as a\nmatter of business, to their toy-makers; but they are to hold for the\ncertainest of truths, to be doubted only at peril of their salvation,\nthat their Galilean fellow-child Jesus, nineteen centuries ago, had no\nhuman father.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nWell, we will pass the item of 1860, said \"the voice.\" But why all\nthis more recent coil about the Gadarene swine and the like? Do you\npretend that these poor animals got in your way, years and years after\nthe \"Mosaic\" fences were down, at any rate so far as you are\nconcerned?\n\nGot in my way? Why, my good \"voice,\" they were driven in my way. I had\nhappened to make a statement, than which, so far as I have ever been\nable to see, nothing can be more modest or inoffensive; to wit, that I\nam convinced of my own utter ignorance about a great number of things,\nrespecting which the great majority of my neighbours (not only those\nof adult years, but children repeating their catechisms) affirm\nthemselves to possess full information. I ask any candid and impartial\njudge, Is that attacking anybody or anything?\n\nYet, if I had made the most wanton and arrogant onslaught on the\nhonest convictions of other people, I could not have been more hardly\ndealt with. The pentecostal charism, I believe, exhausted itself\namongst the earliest disciples. Yet any one who has had to attend, as\nI have done, to copious objurgations, strewn with such appellations as\n\"infidel\" and \"coward,\" must be a hardened sceptic indeed if he doubts\nthe existence of a \"gift of tongues\" in the Churches of our time;\nunless, indeed, it should occur to him that some of these outpourings\nmay have taken place after \"the third hour of the day.\" I am far from\nthinking that it is worth while to give much attention to these\ninevitable incidents of all controversies, in which one party has\nacquired the mental peculiarities which are generated by the habit of\nmuch talking, with immunity from criticism. But as a rule, they are\nthe sauce of dishes of misrepresentations and inaccuracies which it\nmay be a duty, nay, even an innocent pleasure, to expose. In the\nparticular case of which I am thinking, I felt, as Strauss says, \"able\nand called upon\" to undertake the business: and it is no\nresponsibility of mine, if I found the Gospels, with their miraculous\nstories, of which the Gadarene is a typical example, blocking my way,\nas heretofore, the Pentateuch had done.\n\nI was challenged to question the authority for the theory of \"the\nspiritual world,\" and the practical consequences deducible from human\nrelations to it, contained in these documents.\n\nIn my judgment, the actuality of this spiritual world--the value of\nthe evidence for its objective existence and its influence upon the\ncourse of things--are matters, which lie as much within the province\nof science, as any other question about the existence and powers of\nthe varied forms of living and conscious activity.\n\nIt really is my strong conviction that a man has no more right to say\nhe believes this world is haunted by swarms of evil spirits, without\nbeing able to produce satisfactory evidence of the fact, than he has a\nright to say, without adducing adequate proof, that the circumpolar\nantarctic ice swarms with sea-serpents. I should not like to assert\npositively that it does not. I imagine that no cautious biologist\nwould say as much; but while quite open to conviction, he might\nproperly decline to waste time upon the consideration of talk, no\nbetter accredited than forecastle \"yarns,\" about such monsters of the\ndeep. And if the interests of ordinary veracity dictate this course,\nin relation to a matter of so little consequence as this, what must be\nour obligations in respect of the treatment of a question which is\nfundamental alike for science and for ethics? For not only does our\ngeneral theory of the universe and of the nature of the order which\npervades it, hang upon the answer; but the rules of practical life\nmust be deeply affected by it.\n\nThe belief in a demonic world is inculcated throughout the Gospels and\nthe rest of the books of the New Testament; it pervades the whole\npatristic literature; it colours the theory and the practice of every\nChristian church down to modern times. Indeed, I doubt if, even now,\nthere is any church which, officially, departs from such a fundamental\ndoctrine of primitive Christianity as the existence, in addition to\nthe Cosmos with which natural knowledge is conversant, of a world of\nspirits; that is to say, of intelligent agents, not subject to the\nphysical or mental limitations of humanity, but nevertheless competent\nto interfere, to an undefined extent, with the ordinary course of both\nphysical and mental phenomena.\n\nMore especially is this conception fundamental for the authors of the\nGospels. Without the belief that the present world, and particularly\nthat part of it which is constituted by human society, has been given\nover, since the Fall, to the influence of wicked and malignant\nspiritual beings, governed and directed by a supreme devil--the moral\nantithesis and enemy of the supreme God--their theory of salvation by\nthe Messiah falls to pieces. \"To this end was the Son of God\nmanifested, that he might destroy the works of the devil.\"[3]\n\nThe half-hearted religiosity of latter-day Christianity may choose to\nignore the fact; but it remains none the less true, that he who\nrefuses to accept the demonology of the Gospels rejects the revelation\nof a spiritual world, made in them, as much as if he denied the\nexistence of such a person as Jesus of Nazareth; and deserves, as much\nas any one can do, to be ear-marked \"infidel\" by our gentle shepherds.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nNow that which I thought it desirable to make perfectly clear, on my\nown account, and for the sake of those who find their capacity of\nbelief in the Gospel theory of the universe failing them, is the fact,\nthat, in my judgment, the demonology of primitive Christianity is\ntotally devoid of foundation; and that no man, who is guided by the\nrules of investigation which are found to lead to the discovery of\ntruth in other matters, not merely of science, but in the everyday\naffairs of life, will arrive at any other conclusion. To those who\nprofess to be otherwise guided, I have nothing to say; but to beg them\nto go their own way and leave me to mine.\n\nI think it may be as well to repeat what I have said, over and over\nagain, elsewhere, that _a priori_ notions, about the possibility, or\nthe impossibility, of the existence of a world of spirits, such as\nthat presupposed by genuine Christianity, have no influence on my\nmind. The question for me is purely one of evidence: is the evidence\nadequate to bear out the theory, or is it not? In my judgment it is\nnot only inadequate, but quite absurdly insufficient. And on that\nground, I should feel compelled to reject the theory; even if there\nwere no positive grounds for adopting a totally different conception\nof the Cosmos.\n\nFor most people, the question of the evidence of the existence of a\ndemonic world, in the long run, resolves itself into that of the\ntrustworthiness of the Gospels; first, as to the objective truth of\nthat which they narrate on this topic; second, as to the accuracy of\nthe interpretation which their authors put upon these objective facts.\nFor example, with respect to the Gadarene miracle, it is one question\nwhether, at a certain time and place, a raving madman became sane, and\na herd of swine rushed into the lake of Tiberias; and quite another,\nwhether the cause of these occurrences was the transmigration of\ncertain devils from the man into the pigs. And again, it is one\nquestion whether Jesus made a long oration on a certain occasion,\nmentioned in the first Gospel; altogether another, whether more or\nfewer of the propositions contained in the \"Sermon on the Mount\" were\nuttered on that occasion. One may give an affirmative answer to one of\neach of these pairs of questions and a negative to the other: one may\naffirm all, or deny all.\n\nIn considering the historical value of any four documents, proof when\nthey were written and who wrote them is, no doubt, highly important.\nFor if proof exists, that A B C and D wrote them, and that they were\nintelligent persons, writing independently and without prejudice,\nabout facts within their own knowledge--their statements must needs be\nworthy of the most attentive consideration.[4] But, even\necclesiastical tradition does not assert that either \"Mark\" or \"Luke\"\nwrote from his own knowledge--indeed \"Luke\" expressly asserts he did\nnot. I cannot discover that any competent authority now maintains that\nthe apostle Matthew wrote the Gospel which passes under his name. And\nwhether the apostle John had, or had not, anything to do with the\nfourth Gospel; and if he had, what his share amounted to; are, as\neverybody who has attended to these matters knows, questions still\nhotly disputed, and with regard to which the extant evidence can\nhardly carry an impartial judge beyond the admission of a possibility\nthis way or that.\n\nThus, nothing but a balancing of very dubious probabilities is to be\nattained by approaching the question from this side. It is otherwise\nif we make the documents tell their own story: if we study them, as we\nstudy fossils, to discover internal evidence, of when they arose, and\nhow they have come to be. That really fruitful line of inquiry has led\nto the statement and the discussion of what is known as the _Synoptic\nProblem_.\n\nIn the Essays (VII.--XI.) which deal with the consequences of the\napplication of the agnostic principle to Christian Evidences,\ncontained in this volume, there are several references to the results\nof the attempts which have been made, during the last hundred years,\nto solve this problem. And, though it has been clearly stated and\ndiscussed, in works accessible to, and intelligible by, every English\nreader,[5] it may be well that I should here set forth a very brief\nexposition of the matters of fact out of which the problem has arisen;\nand of some consequences, which, as I conceive, must be admitted if\nthe facts are accepted.\n\nThese undisputed and, apparently, indisputable data may be thus\nstated:\n\nI. The three books of which an ancient, but very questionable,\necclesiastical tradition asserts Matthew, Mark, and Luke to be the\nauthors, agree, not only in presenting the same general view, or\n_Synopsis_, of the nature and the order of the events narrated; but,\nto a remarkable extent, the very words which they employ coincide.\n\nII. Nevertheless, there are many equally marked, and some\nirreconcilable, differences between them. Narratives, verbally\nidentical in some portions, diverge more or less in others. The order\nin which they occur in one, or in two, Gospels may be changed in\nanother. In \"Matthew\" and in \"Luke\" events of great importance make\ntheir appearance, where the story of \"Mark\" seems to leave no place\nfor them; and, at the beginning and the end of the two former Gospels,\nthere is a great amount of matter of which there is no trace in\n\"Mark.\"\n\nIII. Obvious and highly important differences, in style and substance,\nseparate the three \"Synoptics,\" taken together, from the fourth\nGospel, connected, by ecclesiastical tradition, with the name of the\napostle John. In its philosophical proemium; in the conspicuous\nabsence of exorcistic miracles; in the self-assertive theosophy of the\nlong and diffuse monologues, which are so utterly unlike the brief\nand pregnant utterances of Jesus recorded in the Synoptics; in the\nassertion that the crucifixion took place before the Passover, which\ninvolves the denial, by implication, of the truth of the Synoptic\nstory--to mention only a few particulars--the \"Johannine\" Gospel\npresents a wide divergence from the other three.\n\nIV. If the mutual resemblances and differences of the Synoptic Gospels\nare closely considered, a curious result comes out; namely, that each\nmay be analyzed into four components. The _first_ of these consists of\npassages, to a greater or less extent verbally identical, which occur\nin all three Gospels. If this triple tradition is separated from the\nrest it will be found to comprise:\n\n_a_. A narrative, of a somewhat broken and anecdotic aspect, which\ncovers the period from the appearance of John the Baptist to the\ndiscovery of the emptiness of the tomb, on the first day of the week,\nsome six-and-thirty hours after the crucifixion.\n\n_b_. An apocalyptic address.\n\n_c_. Parables and brief discourses, or rather, centos of religious and\nethical exhortations and injunctions.\n\nThe _second_ and the _third_ set of components of each Gospel present\nequally close resemblances to passages, which are found in only one of\nthe other Gospels; therefore it may be said that, for them, the\ntradition is double. The _fourth_ component is peculiar to each\nGospel; it is a single tradition and has no representative in the\nothers.\n\nTo put the facts in another way: each Gospel is composed of a\n_threefold tradition_, two _twofold traditions_, and one _peculiar\ntradition_. If the Gospels were the work of totally independent\nwriters, it would follow that there are three witnesses for the\nstatements in the first tradition; two for each of those in the\nsecond, and only one for those in the third.\n\nV. If the reader will now take up that extremely instructive little\nbook, Abbott and Rushbrooke's \"Common Tradition\" he will easily\nsatisfy himself that \"Mark\" has the remarkable structure just\ndescribed. Almost the whole of this Gospel consists of the first\ncomponent; namely, the _threefold tradition_. But in chap. i. 23-28 he\nwill discover an exorcistic story, not to be found in \"Matthew,\" but\nrepeated, often word for word, in \"Luke.\" This, therefore, belongs to\none of the _twofold traditions_. In chap. viii. 1-10, on the other\nhand, there is a detailed account of the miracle of feeding the four\nthousand; which is closely repeated in \"Matthew\" xv. 32-39, but is not\nto be found in \"Luke.\" This is an example of the other _twofold\ntradition_, possible in \"Mark.\" Finally, the story of the blind man of\nBethsaida, \"Mark\" viii. 22-26, is _peculiar_ to \"Mark.\"\n\nVI. Suppose that, A standing for the _threefold tradition_, or the\nmatter common to all three Gospels; we call the matter common to\n\"Mark\" and \"Matthew\" only--B; that common to \"Mark\" and \"Luke\"\nonly--C; that common to \"Matthew\" and \"Luke\" only--D; while the\npeculiar components of \"Mark,\" \"Matthew,\" and \"Luke\" are severally\nindicated by E, F, G; then the structure of the Gospels may be\nrepresented thus:\n\n  Components of \"Mark\" = A + B + C + E.\n     \"       \"Matthew\" = A + B + D + F.\n     \"          \"Luke\" = A + C + D + G.\n\nVII. The analysis of the Synoptic documents need be carried no further\nthan this point, in order to suggest one extremely important, and,\napparently unavoidable conclusion; and that is, that their authors\nwere neither three independent witnesses of the things narrated; nor,\nfor the parts of the narrative about which all agree, that is to say,\nthe _threefold tradition_, did they employ independent sources of\ninformation. It is simply incredible that each of three independent\nwitnesses of any series of occurrences should tell a story so similar,\nnot only in arrangement and in small details, but in words, to that of\neach of the others.\n\nHence it follows, either that the Synoptic writers have, mediately or\nimmediately, copied one from the other: or that the three have drawn\nfrom a common source; that is to say, from one arrangement of similar\ntraditions (whether oral or written); though that arrangement may have\nbeen extant in three or more, somewhat different versions.\n\nVIII. The suppositions (_a_) that \"Mark\" had \"Matthew\" and \"Luke\"\nbefore him; and (_b_) that either of the two latter was acquainted\nwith the work of the other, would seem to involve some singular\nconsequences.\n\n_a_. The second Gospel is saturated with the lowest supernaturalism.\nJesus is exhibited as a wonder-worker and exorcist of the first rank.\nThe earliest public recognition of the Messiahship of Jesus comes from\nan \"unclean spirit\"; he himself is made to testify to the occurrence\nof the miraculous feeding twice over.\n\nThe purpose with which \"Mark\" sets out is to show forth Jesus as the\nSon of God, and it is suggested, if not distinctly stated, that he\nacquired this character at his baptism by John. The absence of any\nreference to the miraculous events of the infancy, detailed by\n\"Matthew\" and \"Luke;\" or to the appearances after the discovery of the\nemptiness of the tomb; is unintelligible, if \"Mark\" knew anything\nabout them, or believed in the miraculous conception. The second\nGospel is no summary: \"Mark\" can find room for the detailed story,\nirrelevant to his main purpose, of the beheading of John the Baptist,\nand his miraculous narrations are crowded with minute particulars. Is\nit to be imagined that, with the supposed apostolic authority of\nMatthew before him, he could leave out the miraculous conception of\nJesus and the ascension? Further, ecclesiastical tradition would have\nus believe that Mark wrote down his recollections of what Peter\ntaught. Did Peter then omit to mention these matters? Did the fact\ntestified by the oldest authority extant, that the first appearance of\nthe risen Jesus was to himself seem not worth mentioning? Did he\nreally fail to speak of the great position in the Church solemnly\nassigned to him by Jesus? The alternative would seem to be the\nimpeachment either of Mark's memory, or of his judgment. But Mark's\nmemory, is so good that he can recollect how, on the occasion of the\nstilling of the waves, Jesus was asleep \"on the cushion,\" he remembers\nthat the woman with the issue had \"spent all she had\" on her\nphysicians; that there was not room \"even about the door\" on a certain\noccasion at Capernaum. And it is surely hard to believe that \"Mark\"\nshould have failed to recollect occurrences of infinitely greater\nmoment, or that he should have deliberately left them out, as things\nnot worthy of mention.\n\n_b_. The supposition that \"Matthew\" was acquainted with \"Luke,\" or\n\"Luke\" with \"Matthew\" has equally grave implications. If that be so,\nthe one who used the other could have had but a poor opinion of his\npredecessor's historical veracity. If, as most experts agree, \"Luke\"\nis later than \"Matthew,\" it is clear that he does not credit\n\"Matthew's\" account of the infancy; does not believe the \"Sermon on\nthe Mount\" as given by Matthew was preached; does not believe in the\ntwo feeding miracles, to which Jesus himself is made to refer; wholly\ndiscredits \"Matthew's\" account of the events after the crucifixion;\nand thinks it not worth while to notice \"Matthew's\" grave admission\nthat \"some doubted.\"\n\nIX. None of these troublesome consequences pursue the hypothesis that\nthe _threefold tradition_, in one, or more, Greek versions, was extant\nbefore either of the canonical Synoptic Gospels; and that it furnished\nthe fundamental framework of their several narratives. Where and when\nthe threefold narrative arose, there is no positive evidence; though\nit is obviously probable that the traditions it embodies, and perhaps\nmany others, took their rise in Palestine and spread thence to Asia\nMinor, Greece, Egypt and Italy, in the track of the early\nmissionaries. Nor is it less likely that they formed part of the\n\"didaskalia\" of the primitive Nazarene and Christian communities.[6]\n\nX. The interest which attaches to \"Mark\" arises from the fact that it\nseems to present this early, probably earliest, Greek Gospel\nnarrative, with least addition, or modification. If, as appears likely\nfrom some internal evidences, it was compiled for the use of the\nChristian sodalities in Rome; and that it was accepted by them as an\nadequate account of the life and work of Jesus, it is evidence of the\nmost valuable kind respecting their beliefs and the limits of dogma,\nas conceived by them.\n\nIn such case, a good Roman Christian of that epoch might know nothing\nof the doctrine of the incarnation, as taught by \"Matthew\" and \"Luke\";\nstill less of the \"logos\" doctrine of \"John\"; neither need he have\nbelieved anything more than the simple fact of the resurrection. It\nwas open to him to believe it either corporeal or spiritual. He would\nnever have heard of the power of the keys bestowed upon Peter; nor\nhave had brought to his mind so much as a suggestion of trinitarian\ndoctrine. He might be a rigidly monotheistic Judaeo-Christian, and\nconsider himself bound by the law: he might be a Gentile Pauline\nconvert, neither knowing of nor caring for such restrictions. In\nneither case would he find in \"Mark\" any serious stumbling-block. In\nfact, persons of all the categories admitted to salvation by Justin,\nin the middle of the second century,[7] could accept \"Mark\" from\nbeginning to end. It may well be, that, in this wide adaptability,\nbacked by the authority of the metropolitan church, there lies the\nreason for the fact of the preservation of \"Mark,\" notwithstanding its\nlimited and dogmatically colourless character, as compared with the\nGospels of \"Luke\" and \"Matthew.\"\n\nXI. \"Mark,\" as we have seen, contains a relatively small body of\nethical and religious instruction and only a few parables. Were these\nall that existed in the primitive threefold tradition? Were none\nothers current in the Roman communities, at the time \"Mark\" wrote,\nsupposing he wrote in Rome? Or, on the other hand, was there extant,\nas early as the time at which \"Mark\" composed his Greek edition of the\nprimitive Evangel, one or more collections of parables and teachings,\nsuch as those which form the bulk of the twofold tradition, common\nexclusively to \"Matthew\" and \"Luke,\" and are also found in their\nsingle traditions? Many have assumed this, or these, collections to be\nidentical with, or at any rate based upon, the \"logia,\" of which\necclesiastical tradition says, that they were written in Aramaic by\nMatthew, and that everybody translated them as he could.\n\nHere is the old difficulty again. If such materials were known to\n\"Mark,\" what imaginable reason could he have for not using them?\nSurely displacement of the long episode of John the Baptist--even\nperhaps of the story of the Gadarene swine--by portions of the Sermon\non the Mount or by one or two of the beautiful parables in the twofold\nand single traditions would have been great improvements; and might\nhave been effected, even though \"Mark\" was as much pressed for space\nas some have imagined. But there is no ground for that imagination;\nMark has actually found room for four or five parables; why should he\nnot have given the best, if he had known of them? Admitting he was the\nmere _pedissequus et breviator_ of Matthew, that even Augustine\nsupposed him to be, what could induce him to omit the Lord's Prayer?\n\nWhether more or less of the materials of the twofold tradition D, and\nof the peculiar traditions F and G, were or were not current in some\nof the communities, as early as, or perhaps earlier than, the triple\ntradition, it is not necessary for me to discuss; nor to consider\nthose solutions of the Synoptic problem which assume that it existed\nearlier, and was already combined with more or less narrative. Those\nwho are working out the final solution of the Synoptic problem are\ntaking into account, more than hitherto, the possibility that the\nwidely separated Christian communities of Palestine, Asia Minor,\nEgypt, and Italy, especially after the Jewish war of A.D. 66-70, may\nhave found themselves in possession of very different traditional\nmaterials. Many circumstances tend to the conclusion that, in Asia\nMinor, even the narrative part of the threefold tradition had a\nformidable rival; and that, around this second narrative, teaching\ntraditions of a totally different order from those in the Synoptics,\ngrouped themselves; and, under the influence of converts imbued more\nor less with the philosophical speculations of the time, eventually\ntook shape in the fourth Gospel and its associated literature.\n\nXII. But it is unnecessary, and it would be out of place, for me to\nattempt to do more than indicate the existence of these complex and\ndifficult questions. My purpose has been to make it clear that the\nSynoptic problem must force itself upon every one who studies the\nGospels with attention; that the broad facts of the case, and some of\nthe consequences deducible from these facts, are just as plain to the\nsimple English reader as they are to the profoundest scholar.\n\nOne of these consequences is that the threefold tradition presents us\nwith a narrative believed to be historically true, in all its\nparticulars, by the major part, if not the whole, of the Christian\ncommunities. That narrative is penetrated, from beginning to end, by\nthe demonological beliefs of which the Gadarene story is a specimen;\nand, if the fourth Gospel indicates the existence of another and, in\nsome respects, irreconcilably divergent narrative, in which the\ndemonology retires into the background, it is none the less there.\n\nTherefore, the demonology is an integral and inseparable component of\nprimitive Christianity. The farther back the origin of the gospels is\ndated, the stronger does the certainty of this conclusion grow; and\nthe more difficult it becomes to suppose that Jesus himself may not\nhave shared the superstitious beliefs of his disciples.\n\nIt further follows that those who accept devils, possession, and\nexorcism as essential elements of their conception of the spiritual\nworld may consistently consider the testimony of the Gospels to be\nunimpeachable in respect of the information they give us respecting\nother matters which appertain to that world.\n\nThose who reject the gospel demonology, on the other hand, would seem\nto be as completely barred, as I feel myself to be, from professing to\ntake the accuracy of that information for granted. If the threefold\ntradition is wrong about one fundamental topic, it may be wrong about\nanother, while the authority of the single traditions, often mutually\ncontradictory as they are, becomes a vanishing quantity.\n\nIt really is unreasonable to ask any rejector of the demonology to say\nmore with respect to those other matters, than that the statements\nregarding them may be true, or may be false; and that the ultimate\ndecision, if it is to be favourable, must depend on the production of\ntestimony of a very different character from that of the writers of\nthe four gospels. Until such evidence is brought forward, that\nrefusal of assent, with willingness to re-open the question, on cause\nshown, which is what I mean by Agnosticism, is, for me, the only\ncourse open.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nA verdict of \"not proven\" is undoubtedly unsatisfactory and\nessentially provisional, so far forth as the subject of the trial is\ncapable of being dealt with by due process of reason.\n\nThose who are of opinion that the historical realities at the root of\nChristianity, lie beyond the jurisdiction of science, need not be\nconsidered. Those who are convinced that the evidence is, and must\nalways remain, insufficient to support any definite conclusion, are\njustified in ignoring the subject. They must be content to put up with\nthat reproach of being mere destroyers, of which Strauss speaks. They\nmay say that there are so many problems which are and must remain\ninsoluble, that the \"burden of the mystery\" \"of all this\nunintelligible world\" is not appreciably affected by one more or less.\n\nFor myself, I must confess that the problem of the origin of such very\nremarkable historical phenomena as the doctrines, and the social\norganization, which in their broad features certainly existed, and\nwere in a state of rapid development, within a hundred years of the\ncrucifixion of Jesus; and which have steadily prevailed against all\nrivals, among the most intelligent and civilized nations in the world\never since, is, and always has been, profoundly interesting; and,\nconsidering how recent the really scientific study of that problem,\nand how great the progress made during the last half century in\nsupplying the conditions for a positive solution of the problem, I\ncannot doubt that the attainment of such a solution is a mere question\nof time.\n\nI am well aware that it has lain far beyond my powers to take any\nshare in this great undertaking. All that I can hope is to have done\nsomewhat towards \"the preparation of those who have ceased to be\ncontented with the old and find no satisfaction in half measures\":\nperhaps, also, something towards the lessening of that great\nproportion of my countrymen, whose eminent characteristic it is that\nthey find \"full satisfaction in half measures.\"\n\nT.H.H.\nHODESLEA, EASTBOURNE,\n_December 4th, 1893_.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n      [1] D.F. Strauss, _Der alte und der neue Glaube_\n          (1872), pp. 9, 10.\n\n      [2] _Collected Essays_, vol. ii., \"On the Origin of\n          Species\" (1860).\n\n      [3] 1 John iii. 8.\n\n      [4] Not necessarily of more than this. A few centuries\n          ago the twelve most intelligent and impartial men to be\n          found in England, would have independently testified\n          that the sun moves, from east to west, across the\n          heavens every day.\n\n      [5] Nowhere more concisely and clearly than in Dr.\n          Sutherland Black's article \"Gospels\" in Chambers's\n          _Encyclopaedia_. References are given to the more\n          elaborate discussions of the problem.\n\n      [6] Those who regard the Apocalyptic discourse as a\n          \"vaticination after the event\" may draw conclusions\n          therefrom as to the date of the Gospels in which its\n          several forms occur. But the assumption is surely\n          dangerous, from an apologetic point of view, since it\n          begs the question as to the unhistorical character of\n          this solemn prophecy.\n\n      [7] See p. 287 of this volume.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n                                                      PAGE\n   I. PROLOGUE                                           1\n      (_Controverted Questions_, 1892).\n\n  II. SCIENTIFIC AND PSEUDO-SCIENTIFIC REALISM [1887]   59\n\n III. SCIENCE AND PSEUDO-SCIENCE [1887]                 90\n\n  IV. AN EPISCOPAL TRILOGY [1887]                      126\n\n   V. THE VALUE OF WITNESS TO THE MIRACULOUS [1889]    160\n\n  VI. POSSIBILITIES AND IMPOSSIBILITIES [1891]         192\n\n VII. AGNOSTICISM [1889]                               209\n\nVIII. AGNOSTICISM: A REJOINDER [1889]                  263\n\n  IX. AGNOSTICISM AND CHRISTIANITY [1889]              309\n\n   X. THE KEEPERS OF THE HERD OF SWINE [1890]          366\n\n  XI. ILLUSTRATIONS OF MR. GLADSTONE'S CONTROVERSIAL\n      METHODS [1891]                                   393\n\n\n\n\nI: PROLOGUE\n\n[_Controverted Questions_, 1892]\n\nLe plus grand service qu'on puisse rendre a la science est d'y faire\nplace nette avant d'y rien construire.--CUVIER.\n\n\nMost of the Essays comprised in the present volume have been written\nduring the last six or seven years, without premeditated purpose or\nintentional connection, in reply to attacks upon doctrines which I\nhold to be well founded; or in refutation of allegations respecting\nmatters lying within the province of natural knowledge, which I\nbelieve to be erroneous; and they bear the mark of their origin in the\ncontroversial tone which pervades them.\n\nOf polemical writing, as of other kinds of warfare, I think it may be\nsaid, that it is often useful, sometimes necessary, and always more or\nless of an evil. It is useful, when it attracts attention to topics\nwhich might otherwise be neglected; and when, as does sometimes\nhappen, those who come to see a contest remain to think. It is\nnecessary, when the interests of truth and of justice are at stake.\nIt is an evil, in so far as controversy always tends to degenerate\ninto quarrelling, to swerve from the great issue of what is right and\nwhat is wrong to the very small question of who is right and who is\nwrong. I venture to hope that the useful and the necessary were more\nconspicuous than the evil attributes of literary militancy, when these\npapers were first published; but I have had some hesitation about\nreprinting them. If I may judge by my own taste, few literary dishes\nare less appetising than cold controversy; moreover, there is an air\nof unfairness about the presentation of only one side of a discussion,\nand a flavour of unkindness in the reproduction of \"winged words,\"\nwhich, however appropriate at the time of their utterance, would find\na still more appropriate place in oblivion. Yet, since I could hardly\nask those who have honoured me by their polemical attentions to confer\nlustre on this collection, by permitting me to present their\nlucubrations along with my own; and since it would be a manifest wrong\nto them to deprive their, by no means rare, vivacities of language of\nsuch justification as they may derive from similar freedoms on my\npart; I came to the conclusion that my best course was to leave the\nessays just as they were written;[8] assuring my honourable\nadversaries that any heat of which signs may remain was generated, in\naccordance with the law of the conservation of energy, by the force of\ntheir own blows, and has long since been dissipated into space.\n\nBut, however the polemical coincomitants of these discussions may be\nregarded--or better, disregarded--there is no doubt either about the\nimportance of the topics of which they treat, or as to the public\ninterest in the \"Controverted Questions\" with which they deal. Or\nrather, the Controverted Question; for disconnected as these pieces\nmay, perhaps, appear to be, they are, in fact, concerned only with\ndifferent aspects of a single problem, with which thinking men have\nbeen occupied, ever since they began seriously to consider the\nwonderful frame of things in which their lives are set, and to seek\nfor trustworthy guidance among its intricacies.\n\nExperience speedily taught them that the shifting scenes of the\nworld's stage have a permanent background; that there is order amidst\nthe seeming confusion, and that many events take place according to\nunchanging rules. To this region of familiar steadiness and customary\nregularity they gave the name of Nature. But, at the same time, their\ninfantile and untutored reason, little more, as yet, than the\nplayfellow of the imagination, led them to believe that this tangible,\ncommonplace, orderly world of Nature was surrounded and\ninterpenetrated by another intangible and mysterious world, no more\nbound by fixed rules than, as they fancied, were the thoughts and\npassions which coursed through their minds and seemed to exercise an\nintermittent and capricious rule over their bodies. They attributed to\nthe entities, with which they peopled this dim and dreadful region, an\nunlimited amount of that power of modifying the course of events of\nwhich they themselves possessed a small share, and thus came to regard\nthem as not merely beyond, but above, Nature.\n\nHence arose the conception of a \"Supernature\" antithetic to\n\"Nature\"--the primitive dualism of a natural world \"fixed in fate\" and\na supernatural, left to the free play of volition--which has pervaded\nall later speculation and, for thousands of years, has exercised a\nprofound influence on practice. For it is obvious that, on this theory\nof the Universe, the successful conduct of life must demand careful\nattention to both worlds; and, if either is to be neglected, it may be\nsafer that it should be Nature. In any given contingency, it must\ndoubtless be desirable to know what may be expected to happen in the\nordinary course of things; but it must be quite as necessary to have\nsome inkling of the line likely to be taken by supernatural agencies\nable, and possibly willing, to suspend or reverse that course. Indeed,\nlogically developed, the dualistic theory must needs end in almost\nexclusive attention to Supernature, and in trust that its overruling\nstrength will be exerted in favour of those who stand well with its\ndenizens. On the other hand, the lessons of the great schoolmaster,\nexperience, have hardly seemed to accord with this conclusion. They\nhave taught, with considerable emphasis, that it does not answer to\nneglect Nature; and that, on the whole, the more attention paid to her\ndictates the better men fare.\n\nThus the theoretical antithesis brought about a practical antagonism.\nFrom the earliest times of which we have any knowledge, Naturalism and\nSupernaturalism have consciously, or unconsciously, competed and\nstruggled with one another; and the varying fortunes of the contest\nare written in the records of the course of civilisation, from those\nof Egypt and Babylonia, six thousand years ago, down to those of our\nown time and people.\n\nThese records inform us that, so far as men have paid attention to\nNature, they have been rewarded for their pains. They have developed\nthe Arts which have furnished the conditions of civilised existence;\nand the Sciences, which have been a progressive revelation of reality\nand have afforded the best discipline of the mind in the methods of\ndiscovering truth. They have accumulated a vast body of universally\naccepted knowledge; and the conceptions of man and of society, of\nmorals and of law, based upon that knowledge, are every day more and\nmore, either openly or tacitly, acknowledged to be the foundations of\nright action.\n\nHistory also tells us that the field of the supernatural has rewarded\nits cultivators with a harvest, perhaps not less luxuriant, but of a\ndifferent character. It has produced an almost infinite diversity of\nReligions. These, if we set aside the ethical concomitants upon which\nnatural knowledge also has a claim, are composed of information about\nSupernature; they tell us of the attributes of supernatural beings, of\ntheir relations with Nature, and of the operations by which their\ninterference with the ordinary course of events can be secured or\naverted. It does not appear, however, that supernaturalists have\nattained to any agreement about these matters, or that history\nindicates a widening of the influence of supernaturalism on practice,\nwith the onward flow of time. On the contrary, the various religions\nare, to a great extent, mutually exclusive; and their adherents\ndelight in charging each other, not merely with error, but with\ncriminality, deserving and ensuing punishment of infinite severity. In\nsingular contrast with natural knowledge, again, the acquaintance of\nmankind with the supernatural appears the more extensive and the more\nexact, and the influence of supernatural doctrines upon conduct the\ngreater, the further back we go in time and the lower the stage of\ncivilisation submitted to investigation. Historically, indeed, there\nwould seem to be an inverse relation between supernatural and natural\nknowledge. As the latter has widened, gained in precision and in\ntrustworthiness, so has the former shrunk, grown vague and\nquestionable; as the one has more and more filled the sphere of\naction, so has the other retreated into the region of meditation, or\nvanished behind the screen of mere verbal recognition.\n\nWhether this difference of the fortunes of Naturalism and of\nSupernaturalism is an indication of the progress, or of the regress,\nof humanity; of a fall from, or an advance towards, the higher life;\nis a matter of opinion. The point to which I wish to direct attention\nis that the difference exists and is making itself felt. Men are\ngrowing to be seriously alive to the fact that the historical\nevolution of humanity, which is generally, and I venture to think not\nunreasonably, regarded as progress, has been, and is being,\naccompanied by a co-ordinate elimination of the supernatural from its\noriginally large occupation of men's thoughts. The question--How far\nis this process to go?--is, in my apprehension, the Controverted\nQuestion of our time.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nControversy on this matter--prolonged, bitter, and fought out with the\nweapons of the flesh, as well as with those of the spirit--is no new\nthing to Englishmen. We have been more or less occupied with it these\nfive hundred years. And, during that time, we have made attempts to\nestablish a _modus vivendi_ between the antagonists, some of which\nhave had a world-wide influence; though, unfortunately, none have\nproved universally and permanently satisfactory.\n\nIn the fourteenth century, the controverted question among us was,\nwhether certain portions of the Supernaturalism of mediaeval\nChristianity were well-founded. John Wicliff proposed a solution of\nthe problem which, in the course of the following two hundred years,\nacquired wide popularity and vast historical importance: Lollards,\nHussites, Lutherans, Calvinists, Zwinglians, Socinians, and\nAnabaptists, whatever their disagreements, concurred in the proposal\nto reduce the Supernaturalism of Christianity within the limits\nsanctioned by the Scriptures. None of the chiefs of Protestantism\ncalled in question either the supernatural origin and infallible\nauthority of the Bible, or the exactitude of the account of the\nsupernatural world given in its pages. In fact, they could not afford\nto entertain any doubt about these points, since the infallible Bible\nwas the fulcrum of the lever with which they were endeavouring to\nupset the Chair of St. Peter. The \"freedom of private judgment\" which\nthey proclaimed, meant no more, in practice, than permission to\nthemselves to make free with the public judgment of the Roman Church,\nin respect of the canon and of the meaning to be attached to the words\nof the canonical books. Private judgment--that is to say, reason--was\n(theoretically, at any rate) at liberty to decide what books were and\nwhat were not to take the rank of \"Scripture\"; and to determine the\nsense of any passage in such books. But this sense, once ascertained\nto the mind of the sectary, was to be taken for pure truth--for the\nvery word of God. The controversial efficiency of the principle of\nbiblical infallibility lay in the fact that the conservative\nadversaries of the Reformers were not in a position to contravene it\nwithout entangling themselves in serious difficulties; while, since\nboth Papists and Protestants agreed in taking efficient measures to\nstop the mouths of any more radical critics, these did not count.\n\nThe impotence of their adversaries, however, did not remove the\ninherent weakness of the position of the Protestants. The dogma of the\ninfallibility of the Bible is no more self-evident than is that of the\ninfallibility of the Pope. If the former is held by \"faith,\" then the\nlatter may be. If the latter is to be accepted, or rejected, by\nprivate judgment, why not the former? Even if the Bible could be\nproved anywhere to assert its own infallibility, the value of that\nself-assertion to those who dispute the point is not obvious. On the\nother hand, if the infallibility of the Bible was rested on that of a\n\"primitive Church,\" the admission that the \"Church\" was formerly\ninfallible was awkward in the extreme for those who denied its present\ninfallibility. Moreover, no sooner was the Protestant principle\napplied to practice, than it became evident that even an infallible\ntext, when manipulated by private judgment, will impartially\ncountenance contradictory deductions; and furnish forth creeds and\nconfessions as diverse as the quality and the information of the\nintellects which exercise, and the prejudices and passions which sway,\nsuch judgments. Every sect, confident in the derivative infallibility\nof its wire-drawing of infallible materials, was ready to supply its\ncontingent of martyrs; and to enable history, once more, to illustrate\nthe truth, that steadfastness under persecution says much for the\nsincerity and still more for the tenacity, of the believer, but very\nlittle for the objective truth of that which he believes. No martyrs\nhave sealed their faith with their blood more steadfastly than the\nAnabaptists.\n\nLast, but not least, the Protestant principle contained within itself\nthe germs of the destruction of the finality, which the Lutheran,\nCalvinistic, and other Protestant Churches fondly imagined they had\nreached. Since their creeds were professedly based on the canonical\nScriptures, it followed that, in the long run, whoso settled the\ncanon defined the creed. If the private judgment of Luther might\nlegitimately conclude that the epistle of James was contemptible,\nwhile the epistles of Paul contained the very essence of Christianity,\nit must be permissible for some other private judgment, on as good or\nas bad grounds, to reverse these conclusions; the critical process\nwhich excluded the Apocrypha could not be barred, at any rate by\npeople who rejected the authority of the Church, from extending its\noperations to Daniel, the Canticles, and Ecclesiastes; nor, having got\nso far, was it easy to allege any good ground for staying the further\nprogress of criticism. In fact, the logical development of\nProtestantism could not fail to lay the authority of the Scriptures at\nthe feet of Reason; and, in the hands of latitudinarian and\nrationalistic theologians, the despotism of the Bible was rapidly\nconverted into an extremely limited monarchy. Treated with as much\nrespect as ever, the sphere of its practical authority was minimised;\nand its decrees were valid only so far as they were countersigned by\ncommon sense, the responsible minister.\n\nThe champions of Protestantism are much given to glorify the\nReformation of the sixteenth century as the emancipation of Reason;\nbut it may be doubted if their contention has any solid ground; while\nthere is a good deal of evidence to show, that aspirations after\nintellectual freedom had nothing whatever to do with the movement.\nDante, who struck the Papacy as hard blows as Wicliff; Wicliff himself\nand Luther himself, when they began their work; were far enough from\nany intention of meddling with even the most irrational of the dogmas\nof mediaeval Supernaturalism. From Wicliff to Socinus, or even to\nMuenzer, Rothmann, and John of Leyden, I fail to find a trace of any\ndesire to set reason free. The most that can be discovered is a\nproposal to change masters. From being the slave of the Papacy the\nintellect was to become the serf of the Bible; or, to speak more\naccurately, of somebody's interpretation of the Bible, which, rapidly\nshifting its attitude from the humility of a private judgment to the\narrogant Caesaro-papistry of a state-enforced creed, had no more\nhesitation about forcibly extinguishing opponent private judgments and\njudges, than had the old-fashioned Pontiff-papistry.\n\nIt was the iniquities, and not the irrationalities, of the Papal\nsystem that lay at the bottom of the revolt of the laity; which was,\nessentially, an attempt to shake off the intolerable burden of certain\npractical deductions from a Supernaturalism in which everybody, in\nprinciple, acquiesced. What was the gain to intellectual freedom of\nabolishing transubstantiation, image worship, indulgences,\necclesiastical infallibility; if consubstantiation, real-unreal\npresence mystifications, the bibliolatry, the \"inner-light\"\npretensions, and the demonology, which are fruits of the same\nsupernaturalistic tree, remained in enjoyment of the spiritual and\ntemporal support of a new infallibility? One does not free a prisoner\nby merely scraping away the rust from his shackles.\n\nIt will be asked, perhaps, was not the Reformation one of the products\nof that great outbreak of many-sided free mental activity included\nunder the general head of the Renascence? Melanchthon, Ulrich von\nHutten, Beza, were they not all humanists? Was not the arch-humanist,\nErasmus, fautor-in-chief of the Reformation, until he got frightened\nand basely deserted it?\n\nFrom the language of Protestant historians, it would seem that they\noften forget that Reformation and Protestantism are by no means\nconvertible terms. There were plenty of sincere and indeed zealous\nreformers, before, during, and after the birth and growth of\nProtestantism, who would have nothing to do with it. Assuredly, the\nrejuvenescence of science and of art; the widening of the field of\nNature by geographical and astronomical discovery; the revelation of\nthe noble ideals of antique literature by the revival of classical\nlearning; the stir of thought, throughout all classes of society, by\nthe printers' work, loosened traditional bonds and weakened the hold\nof mediaeval Supernaturalism. In the interests of liberal culture and\nof national welfare, the humanists were eager to lend a hand to\nanything which tended to the discomfiture of their sworn enemies, the\nmonks, and they willingly supported every movement in the direction of\nweakening ecclesiastical interference with civil life. But the bond of\na common enemy was the only real tie between the humanist and the\nprotestant; their alliance was bound to be of short duration, and,\nsooner or later, to be replaced by internecine warfare. The goal of\nthe humanists, whether they were aware of it or not, was the\nattainment of the complete intellectual freedom of the antique\nphilosopher, than which nothing could be more abhorrent to a Luther, a\nCalvin, a Beza, or a Zwingli.\n\nThe key to the comprehension of the conduct of Erasmus, seems to me to\nlie in the clear apprehension of this fact. That he was a man of many\nweaknesses may be true; in fact, he was quite aware of them and\nprofessed himself no hero. But he never deserted that reformatory\nmovement which he originally contemplated; and it was impossible he\nshould have deserted the specifically Protestant reformation in which\nhe never took part. He was essentially a theological whig, to whom\nradicalism was as hateful as it is to all whigs; or, to borrow a still\nmore appropriate comparison from modern times, a broad churchman who\nrefused to enlist with either the High Church or the Low Church\nzealots, and paid the penalty of being called coward, time-server and\ntraitor, by both. Yet really there is a good deal in his pathetic\nremonstrance that he does not see why he is bound to become a martyr\nfor that in which he does not believe; and a fair consideration of the\ncircumstances and the consequences of the Protestant reformation seems\nto me to go a long way towards justifying the course he adopted.\n\nFew men had better means of being acquainted with the condition of\nEurope; none could be more competent to gauge the intellectual\nshallowness and self-contradiction of the Protestant criticism of\nCatholic doctrine; and to estimate, at its proper value, the fond\nimagination that the waters let out by the Renascence would come to\nrest amidst the blind alleys of the new ecclesiasticism. The bastard,\nwhilom poor student and monk, become the familiar of bishops and\nprinces, at home in all grades of society, could not fail to be aware\nof the gravity of the social position, of the dangers imminent from\nthe profligacy and indifference of the ruling classes, no less than\nfrom the anarchical tendencies of the people who groaned under their\noppression. The wanderer who had lived in Germany, in France, in\nEngland, in Italy, and who counted many of the best and most\ninfluential men in each country among his friends, was not likely to\nestimate wrongly the enormous forces which were still at the command\nof the Papacy. Bad as the churchmen might be, the statesmen were\nworse; and a person of far more sanguine temperament than Erasmus\nmight have seen no hope for the future, except in gradually freeing\nthe ubiquitous organisation of the Church from the corruptions which\nalone, as he imagined, prevented it from being as beneficent as it was\npowerful. The broad tolerance of the scholar and man of the world\nmight well be revolted by the ruffianism, however genial, of one great\nlight of Protestantism, and the narrow fanaticism, however learned and\nlogical, of others; and to a cautious thinker, by whom, whatever his\nshortcomings, the ethical ideal of the Christian evangel was sincerely\nprized, it really was a fair question, whether it was worth while to\nbring about a political and social deluge, the end of which no mortal\ncould foresee, for the purpose of setting up Lutheran, Zwinglian, and\nother Peterkins, in the place of the actual claimant to the reversion\nof the spiritual wealth of the Galilean fisherman.\n\nLet us suppose that, at the beginning of the Lutheran and Zwinglian\nmovement, a vision of its immediate consequences had been granted to\nErasmus; imagine that to the spectre of the fierce outbreak of\nAnabaptist communism, which opened the apocalypse, had succeeded, in\nshadowy procession, the reign of terror and of spoliation in England,\nwith the judicial murders of his friends, More and Fisher; the bitter\ntyranny of evangelistic clericalism in Geneva and in Scotland; the\nlong agony of religious wars, persecutions, and massacres, which\ndevastated France and reduced Germany almost to savagery; finishing\nwith the spectacle of Lutheranism in its native country sunk into mere\ndead Erastian formalism, before it was a century old; while Jesuitry\ntriumphed over Protestantism in three-fourths of Europe, bringing in\nits train a recrudescence of all the corruptions Erasmus and his\nfriends sought to abolish; might not he have quite honestly thought\nthis a somewhat too heavy price to pay for Protestantism; more\nespecially, since no one was in a better position than himself to know\nhow little the dogmatic foundation of the new confessions was able to\nbear the light which the inevitable progress of humanistic criticism\nwould throw upon them? As the wiser of his contemporaries saw, Erasmus\nwas, at heart, neither Protestant nor Papist, but an \"Independent\nChristian\"; and, as the wiser of his modern biographers have\ndiscerned, he was the precursor, not of sixteenth century reform, but\nof eighteenth century \"enlightenment\"; a sort of broad-church\nVoltaire, who held by his \"Independent Christianity\" as stoutly as\nVoltaire by his Deism.\n\nIn fact, the stream of the Renascence, which bore Erasmus along, left\nProtestantism stranded amidst the mudbanks of its articles and creeds:\nwhile its true course became visible to all men, two centuries later.\nBy this time, those in whom the movement of the Renascence was\nincarnate became aware what spirit they were of; and they attacked\nSupernaturalism in its Biblical stronghold, defended by Protestants\nand Romanists with equal zeal. In the eyes of the \"Patriarch,\"\nUltramontanism, Jansenism, and Calvinism were merely three persons of\nthe one \"Infame\" which it was the object of his life to crush. If he\nhated one more than another, it was probably the last; while\nD'Holbach, and the extreme left of the free-thinking host, were\ndisposed to show no more mercy to Deism and Pantheism.\n\nThe sceptical insurrection of the eighteenth century made a terrific\nnoise and frightened not a few worthy people out of their wits; but\ncool judges might have foreseen, at the outset, that the efforts of\nthe later rebels were no more likely than those of the earlier, to\nfurnish permanent resting-places for the spirit of scientific inquiry.\nHowever worthy of admiration may be the acuteness, the common sense,\nthe wit, the broad humanity, which abound in the writings of the best\nof the free-thinkers; there is rarely much to be said for their work\nas an example of the adequate treatment of a grave and difficult\ninvestigation. I do not think any impartial judge will assert that,\nfrom this point of view, they are much better than their adversaries.\nIt must be admitted that they share to the full the fatal weakness of\n_a priori_ philosophising, no less than the moral frivolity common to\ntheir age; while a singular want of appreciation of history, as the\nrecord of the moral and social evolution of the human race, permitted\nthem to resort to preposterous theories of imposture, in order to\naccount for the religious phenomena which are natural products of that\nevolution.\n\nFor the most part, the Romanist and Protestant adversaries of the\nfree-thinkers met them with arguments no better than their own; and\nwith vituperation, so far inferior that it lacked the wit. But one\ngreat Christian Apologist fairly captured the guns of the\nfree-thinking array, and turned their batteries upon themselves.\nSpeculative \"infidelity\" of the eighteenth century type was mortally\nwounded by the _Analogy_; while the progress of the historical and\npsychological sciences brought to light the important part played by\nthe mythopoeic faculty; and, by demonstrating the extreme readiness of\nmen to impose upon themselves, rendered the calling in of sacerdotal\ncooperation, in most cases, a superfluity.\n\nAgain, as in the fourteenth and the sixteenth centuries, social and\npolitical influences came into play. The free-thinking _philosophes_,\nwho objected to Rousseau's sentimental religiosity almost as much as\nthey did to _L'Infame_, were credited with the responsibility for all\nthe evil deeds of Rousseau's Jacobin disciples, with about as much\njustification as Wicliff was held responsible for the Peasants'\nrevolt, or Luther for the _Bauern-krieg_. In England, though our\n_ancien regime_ was not altogether lovely, the social edifice was\nnever in such a bad way as in France; it was still capable of being\nrepaired; and our forefathers, very wisely, preferred to wait until\nthat operation could be safely performed, rather than pull it all down\nabout their ears, in order to build a philosophically planned house on\nbrand-new speculative foundations. Under these circumstances, it is\nnot wonderful that, in this country, practical men preferred the\ngospel of Wesley and Whitfield to that of Jean Jacques; while enough\nof the old leaven of Puritanism remained to ensure the favour and\nsupport of a large number of religious men to a revival of evangelical\nsupernaturalism. Thus, by degrees, the free-thinking, or the\nindifference, prevalent among us in the first half of the eighteenth\ncentury, was replaced by a strong supernaturalistic reaction, which\nsubmerged the work of the free-thinkers; and even seemed, for a time,\nto have arrested the naturalistic movement of which that work was an\nimperfect indication. Yet, like Lollardry, four centuries earlier,\nfree-thought merely took to running underground, safe, sooner or\nlater, to return to the surface.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nMy memory, unfortunately, carries me back to the fourth decade of the\nnineteenth century, when the evangelical flood had a little abated and\nthe tops of certain mountains were soon to appear, chiefly in the\nneighbourhood of Oxford; but when nevertheless, bibliolatry was\nrampant; when church and chapel alike proclaimed, as the oracles of\nGod, the crude assumptions of the worst informed and, in natural\nsequence, the most presumptuously bigoted, of all theological schools.\n\nIn accordance with promises made on my behalf, but certainly without\nmy authorisation, I was very early taken to hear \"sermons in the\nvulgar tongue.\" And vulgar enough often was the tongue in which some\npreacher, ignorant alike of literature, of history, of science, and\neven of theology, outside that patronised by his own narrow school,\npoured forth, from the safe entrenchment of the pulpit, invectives\nagainst those who deviated from his notion of orthodoxy. From dark\nallusions to \"sceptics\" and \"infidels,\" I became aware of the\nexistence of people who trusted in carnal reason; who audaciously\ndoubted that the world was made in six natural days, or that the\ndeluge was universal; perhaps even went so far as to question the\nliteral accuracy of the story of Eve's temptation, or of Balaam's ass;\nand, from the horror of the tones in which they were mentioned, I\nshould have been justified in drawing the conclusion that these rash\nmen belonged to the criminal classes. At the same time, those who were\nmore directly responsible for providing me with the knowledge\nessential to the right guidance of life (and who sincerely desired to\ndo so), imagined they were discharging that most sacred duty by\nimpressing upon my childish mind the necessity, on pain of reprobation\nin this world and damnation in the next, of accepting, in the strict\nand literal sense, every statement contained in the Protestant Bible.\nI was told to believe, and I did believe, that doubt about any of them\nwas a sin, not less reprehensible than a moral delict. I suppose that,\nout of a thousand of my contemporaries, nine hundred, at least, had\ntheir minds systematically warped and poisoned, in the name of the God\nof truth, by like discipline. I am sure that, even a score of years\nlater, those who ventured to question the exact historical accuracy of\nany part of the Old Testament and _a fortiori_ of the Gospels, had to\nexpect a pitiless shower of verbal missiles, to say nothing of the\nother disagreeable consequences which visit those who, in any way, run\ncounter to that chaos of prejudices called public opinion.\n\nMy recollections of this time have recently been revived by the\nperusal of a remarkable document,[9] signed by as many as thirty-eight\nout of the twenty odd thousand clergymen of the Established Church. It\ndoes not appear that the signataries are officially accredited\nspokesmen of the ecclesiastical corporation to which they belong; but\nI feel bound to take their word for it, that they are \"stewards of the\nLord, who have received the Holy Ghost,\" and, therefore, to accept\nthis memorial as evidence that, though the Evangelicism of my early\ndays may be deposed from its place of power, though so many of the\ncolleagues of the thirty-eight even repudiate the title of\nProtestants, yet the green bay tree of bibliolatry flourishes as it\ndid sixty years ago. And, as in those good old times, whoso refuses to\noffer incense to the idol is held to be guilty of \"a dishonour to\nGod,\" imperilling his salvation.\n\nIt is to the credit of the perspicacity of the memorialists that they\ndiscern the real nature of the Controverted Question of the age. They\nare awake to the unquestionable fact that, if Scripture has been\ndiscovered \"not to be worthy of unquestioning belief,\" faith \"in the\nsupernatural itself\" is, so far, undermined. And I may congratulate\nmyself upon such weighty confirmation of an opinion in which I have\nhad the fortune to anticipate them. But whether it is more to the\ncredit of the courage, than to the intelligence, of the thirty-eight\nthat they should go on to proclaim that the canonical scriptures of\nthe Old and New Testaments \"declare incontrovertibly the actual\nhistorical truth in all records, both of past events and of the\ndelivery of predictions to be thereafter fulfilled,\" must be left to\nthe coming generation to decide.\n\nThe interest which attaches to this singular document will, I think,\nbe based by most thinking men, not upon what it is, but upon that of\nwhich it is a sign. It is an open secret, that the memorial is put\nforth as a counterblast to a manifestation of opinion of a contrary\ncharacter, on the part of certain members of the same ecclesiastical\nbody, who therefore have, as I suppose, an equal right to declare\nthemselves \"stewards of the Lord and recipients of the Holy Ghost.\" In\nfact, the stream of tendency towards Naturalism, the course of which I\nhave briefly traced, has, of late years, flowed so strongly, that even\nthe Churches have begun, I dare not say to drift, but, at any rate, to\nswing at their moorings. Within the pale of the Anglican\nestablishment, I venture to doubt, whether, at this moment, there are\nas many thorough-going defenders of \"plenary inspiration\" as there\nwere timid questioners of that doctrine, half a century ago.\nCommentaries, sanctioned by the highest authority, give up the \"actual\nhistorical truth\" of the cosmogonical and diluvial narratives.\nUniversity professors of deservedly high repute accept the critical\ndecision that the Hexateuch is a compilation, in which the share of\nMoses, either as author or as editor, is not quite so clearly\ndemonstrable as it might be; highly placed Divines tell us that the\npre-Abrahamic Scripture narratives may be ignored; that the book of\nDaniel may be regarded as a patriotic romance of the second century\nB.C.; that the words of the writer of the fourth Gospel are not always\nto be distinguished from those which he puts into the mouth of Jesus.\nConservative, but conscientious, revisers decide that whole passages,\nsome of dogmatic and some of ethical importance, are interpolations.\nAn uneasy sense of the weakness of the dogma of Biblical infallibility\nseems to be at the bottom of a prevailing tendency once more to\nsubstitute the authority of the \"Church\" for that of the Bible. In my\nold age, it has happened to me to be taken to task for regarding\nChristianity as a \"religion of a book\" as gravely as, in my youth, I\nshould have been reprehended for doubting that proposition. It is a no\nless interesting symptom that the State Church seems more and more\nanxious to repudiate all complicity with the principles of the\nProtestant Reformation and to call itself \"Anglo-Catholic.\"\nInspiration, deprived of its old intelligible sense, is watered down\ninto a mystification. The Scriptures are, indeed, inspired; but they\ncontain a wholly undefined and indefinable \"human element\"; and this\nunfortunate intruder is converted into a sort of biblical whipping\nboy. Whatsoever scientific investigation, historical or physical,\nproves to be erroneous, the \"human element\" bears the blame; while the\ndivine inspiration of such statements, as by their nature are out of\nreach of proof or disproof, is still asserted with all the vigour\ninspired by conscious safety from attack. Though the proposal to treat\nthe Bible \"like any other book\" which caused so much scandal, forty\nyears ago, may not yet be generally accepted, and though Bishop\nColenso's criticisms may still lie, formally, under ecclesiastical\nban, yet the Church has not wholly turned a deaf ear to the voice of\nthe scientific tempter; and many a coy divine, while \"crying I will\nne'er consent,\" has consented to the proposals of that scientific\ncriticism which the memorialists renounce and denounce.\n\nA humble layman, to whom it would seem the height of presumption to\nassume even the unconsidered dignity of a \"steward of science,\" may\nwell find this conflict of apparently equal ecclesiastical authorities\nperplexing--suggestive, indeed, of the wisdom of postponing attention\nto either, until the question of precedence between them is settled.\nAnd this course will probably appear the more advisable, the more\nclosely the fundamental position of the memorialists is examined.\n\n\"No opinion of the fact or form of Divine Revelation, founded on\nliterary criticism [and I suppose I may add historical, or physical,\ncriticism] of the Scriptures themselves, can be admitted to interfere\nwith the traditionary testimony of the Church, when that has been once\nascertained and verified by appeal to antiquity.\"[10]\n\nGrant that it is \"the traditionary testimony of the Church\" which\nguarantees the canonicity of each and all of the books of the Old and\nNew Testaments. Grant also that canonicity means infallibility; yet,\naccording to the thirty-eight, this \"traditionary testimony\" has to be\n\"ascertained and verified by appeal to antiquity.\" But \"ascertainment\nand verification\" are purely intellectual processes, which must be\nconducted according to the strict rules of scientific investigation,\nor be self-convicted of worthlessness. Moreover, before we can set\nabout the appeal to \"antiquity,\" the exact sense of that usefully\nvague term must be defined by similar means. \"Antiquity\" may include\nany number of centuries, great or small; and whether \"antiquity\" is to\ncomprise the Council of Trent, or to stop a little beyond that of\nNicaea, or to come to an end in the time of Irenaenus, or in that of\nJustin Martyr, are knotty questions which can be decided, if at all,\nonly by those critical methods which the signataries treat so\ncavalierly. And yet the decision of these questions is fundamental,\nfor as the limits of the canonical scriptures vary, so may the dogmas\ndeduced from them require modification. Christianity is one thing, if\nthe fourth Gospel, the Epistle to the Hebrews, the pastoral Epistles,\nand the Apocalypse are canonical and (by the hypothesis) infallibly\ntrue; and another thing, if they are not. As I have already said,\nwhoso defines the canon defines the creed.\n\nNow it is quite certain with respect to some of these books, such as\nthe Apocalypse and the Epistle to the Hebrews, that the Eastern and\nthe Western Church differed in opinion for centuries; and yet neither\nthe one branch nor the other can have considered its judgment\ninfallible, since they eventually agreed to a transaction by which\neach gave up its objection to the book patronised by the other.\nMoreover, the \"fathers\" argue (in a more or less rational manner)\nabout the canonicity of this or that book, and are by no means above\nproducing evidence, internal and external, in favour of the opinions\nthey advocate. In fact, imperfect as their conceptions of scientific\nmethod may be, they not unfrequently used it to the best of their\nability. Thus it would appear that though science, like Nature, may be\ndriven out with a fork, ecclesiastical or other, yet she surely comes\nback again. The appeal to \"antiquity\" is, in fact, an appeal to\nscience, first to define what antiquity is; secondly, to determine\nwhat \"antiquity,\" so defined, says about canonicity; thirdly, to prove\nthat canonicity means infallibility. And when science, largely in the\nshape of the abhorred \"criticism,\" has answered this appeal, and has\nshown that \"antiquity\" used her own methods, however clumsily and\nimperfectly, she naturally turns round upon the appellants, and\ndemands that they should show cause why, in these days, science\nshould not resume the work the ancients did so imperfectly, and carry\nit out efficiently.\n\nBut no such cause can be shown. If \"antiquity\" permitted Eusebius,\nOrigen, Tertullian, Irenaeus, to argue for the reception of this book\ninto the canon and the rejection of that, upon rational grounds,\n\"antiquity\" admitted the whole principle of modern criticism. If\nIrenaeus produces ridiculous reasons for limiting the Gospels to four,\nit was open to any one else to produce good reasons (if he had them)\nfor cutting them down to three, or increasing them to five. If the\nEastern branch of the Church had a right to reject the Apocalypse and\naccept the Epistle to the Hebrews, and the Western an equal right to\naccept the Apocalypse and reject the Epistle, down to the fourth\ncentury, any other branch would have an equal right, on cause shown,\nto reject both, or, as the Catholic Church afterwards actually did, to\naccept both.\n\nThus I cannot but think that the thirty-eight are hoist with their own\npetard. Their \"appeal to antiquity\" turns out to be nothing but a\nround-about way of appealing to the tribunal, the jurisdiction of\nwhich they affect to deny. Having rested the world of Christian\nsupernaturalism on the elephant of biblical infallibility, and\nfurnished the elephant with standing ground on the tortoise of\n\"antiquity,\" they, like their famous Hindoo analogue, have been\ncontent to look no further; and have thereby been spared the horror of\ndiscovering that the tortoise rests on a grievously fragile\nconstruction, to a great extent the work of that very intellectual\noperation which they anathematise and repudiate.\n\nMoreover, there is another point to be considered. It is of course\ntrue that a Christian Church (whether the Christian Church, or not,\ndepends on the connotation of the definite article) existed before the\nChristian scriptures; and that the infallibility of these depends upon\nthe infallibility of the judgment of the persons who selected the\nbooks of which they are composed, out of the mass of literature\ncurrent among the early Christians. The logical acumen of Augustine\nshowed him that the authority of the Gospel he preached must rest on\nthat of the Church to which he belonged.[11] But it is no less true\nthat the Hebrew and the Septuagint versions of most, if not all, of\nthe Old Testament books existed before the birth of Jesus of Nazareth;\nand that their divine authority is presupposed by, and therefore can\nhardly depend upon, the religious body constituted by his disciples.\nAs everybody knows, the very conception of a \"Christ\" is purely\nJewish. The validity of the argument from the Messianic prophecies\nvanishes unless their infallible authority is granted; and, as a\nmatter of fact, whether we turn to the Gospels, the Epistles, or the\nwritings of the early Apologists, the Jewish scriptures are recognised\nas the highest court of appeal of the Christian.\n\nThe proposal to cite Christian \"antiquity\" as a witness to the\ninfallibility of the Old Testament, when its own claims to authority\nvanish, if certain propositions contained in the Old Testament are\nerroneous, hardly satisfies the requirements of lay logic. It is as if\na claimant to be sole legatee, under another kind of testament, should\noffer his assertion as sufficient evidence of the validity of the\nwill. And, even were not such a circular, or rather rotatory,\nargument, that the infallibility of the Bible is testified by the\ninfallible Church, whose infallibility is testified by the infallible\nBible, too absurd for serious consideration, it remains permissible to\nask, Where and when the Church, during the period of its\ninfallibility, as limited by Anglican dogmatic necessities, has\nofficially decreed the \"actual historical truth of all records\" in the\nOld Testament? Was Augustine heretical when he denied the actual\nhistorical truth of the record of the Creation? Father Suarez,\nstanding on later Roman tradition, may have a right to declare that he\nwas; but it does not lie in the mouth of those who limit their appeal\nto that early \"antiquity,\" in which Augustine played so great a part,\nto say so.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nAmong the watchers of the course of the world of thought, some view\nwith delight and some with horror, the recrudescence of\nSupernaturalism which manifests itself among us, in shapes ranged\nalong the whole flight of steps, which, in this case, separates the\nsublime from the ridiculous--from Neo-Catholicism and Inner-light\nmysticism, at the top, to unclean things, not worthy of mention in the\nsame breath, at the bottom. In my poor opinion, the importance of\nthese manifestations is often greatly over-estimated. The extant forms\nof Supernaturalism have deep roots in human nature, and will\nundoubtedly die hard; but, in these latter days, they have to cope\nwith an enemy whose full strength is only just beginning to be put\nout, and whose forces, gathering strength year by year, are hemming\nthem round on every side. This enemy is Science, in the acceptation of\nsystematized natural knowledge, which, during the last two centuries,\nhas extended those methods of investigation, the worth of which is\nconfirmed by daily appeal to Nature, to every region in which the\nSupernatural has hitherto been recognised.\n\nWhen scientific historical criticism reduced the annals of heroic\nGreece and of regal Rome to the level of fables; when the unity of\nauthorship of the _Iliad_ was successfully assailed by scientific\nliterary criticism; when scientific physical criticism, after\nexploding the geocentric theory of the universe and reducing the solar\nsystem itself to one of millions of groups of like cosmic specks,\ncircling, at unimaginable distances from one another through infinite\nspace, showed the supernaturalistic theories of the duration of the\nearth and of life upon it, to be as inadequate as those of its\nrelative dimensions and importance had been; it needed no prophetic\ngift to see that, sooner or later, the Jewish and the early Christian\nrecords would be treated in the same manner; that the authorship of\nthe Hexateuch and of the Gospels would be as severely tested; and that\nthe evidence in favour of the veracity of many of the statements found\nin the Scriptures would have to be strong indeed, if they were to be\nopposed to the conclusions of physical science. In point of fact, so\nfar as I can discover, no one competent to judge of the evidential\nstrength of these conclusions, ventures now to say that the biblical\naccounts of the creation and of the deluge are true in the natural\nsense of the words of the narratives. The most modern Reconcilers\nventure upon is to affirm, that some quite different sense may he put\nupon the words; and that this non-natural sense may, with a little\ntrouble, be manipulated into some sort of noncontradiction of\nscientific truth.\n\nMy purpose, in the essay (XVI.) which treats of the narrative of the\nDeluge, was to prove, by physical criticism, that no such event as\nthat described ever took place; to exhibit the untrustworthy character\nof the narrative demonstrated by literary criticism; and, finally, to\naccount for its origin, by producing a form of those ancient legends\nof pagan Chaldaea, from which the biblical compilation is manifestly\nderived. I have yet to learn that the main propositions of this essay\ncan be seriously challenged.\n\nIn the essays (II., III.) on the narrative of the Creation, I have\nendeavoured to controvert the assertion that modern science supports,\neither the interpretation put upon it by Mr. Gladstone, or any\ninterpretation which is compatible with the general sense of the\nnarrative, quite apart from particular details. The first chapter of\nGenesis teaches the supernatural creation of the present forms of\nlife; modern science teaches that they have come about by evolution.\nThe first chapter of Genesis teaches the successive origin--firstly,\nof all the plants, secondly, of all the aquatic and aerial animals,\nthirdly, of all the terrestrial animals, which now exist--during\ndistinct intervals of time; modern science teaches that, throughout\nall the duration of an immensely long past so far as we have any\nadequate knowledge of it (that is as far back as the Silurian epoch),\nplants, aquatic, aerial, and terrestrial animals have co-existed; that\nthe earliest known are unlike those which at present exist; and that\nthe modern species have come into existence as the last terms of a\nseries, the members of which have appeared one after another. Thus,\nfar from confirming the account in Genesis, the results of modern\nscience, so far as they go, are in principle, as in detail, hopelessly\ndiscordant with it.\n\nYet, if the pretensions to infallibility set up, not by the ancient\nHebrew writings themselves, but by the ecclesiastical champions and\nfriends from whom they may well pray to be delivered, thus shatter\nthemselves against the rock of natural knowledge, in respect of the\ntwo most important of all events, the origin of things and the\npalingenesis of terrestrial life, what historical credit dare any\nserious thinker attach to the narratives of the fabrication of Eve, of\nthe Fall, of the commerce between the _Bene Elohim_ and the daughters\nof men, which lie between the creational and the diluvial legends?\nAnd, if these are to lose all historical worth, what becomes of the\ninfallibility of those who, according to the later scriptures, have\naccepted them, argued from them, and staked far-reaching dogmatic\nconclusions upon their historical accuracy?\n\nIt is the merest ostrich policy for contemporary ecclesiasticism to\ntry to hide its Hexateuchal head--in the hope that the inseparable\nconnection of its body with pre-Abrahamic legends may be overlooked.\nThe question will still be asked, if the first nine chapters of the\nPentateuch are unhistorical, how is the historical accuracy of the\nremainder to be guaranteed? What more intrinsic claim has the story of\nthe Exodus than that of the Deluge, to belief? If God did not walk in\nthe Garden of Eden, how can we be assured that he spoke from Sinai?\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIn some other of the following essays (IX., X., XI., XII., XIV., XV.)\nI have endeavoured to show that sober and well-founded physical and\nliterary criticism plays no less havoc with the doctrine that the\ncanonical scriptures of the New Testament \"declare incontrovertibly\nthe actual historical truth in all records.\" We are told that the\nGospels contain a true revelation of the spiritual world--a\nproposition which, in one sense of the word \"spiritual,\" I should not\nthink it necessary to dispute. But, when it is taken to signify that\neverything we are told about the world of spirits in these books is\ninfallibly true; that we are bound to accept the demonology which\nconstitutes an inseparable part of their teaching; and to profess\nbelief in a Supernaturalism as gross as that of any primitive\npeople--it is at any rate permissible to ask why? Science may be\nunable to define the limits of possibility, but it cannot escape from\nthe moral obligation to weigh the evidence in favour of any alleged\nwonderful occurrence; and I have endeavoured to show that the evidence\nfor the Gadarene miracle is altogether worthless. We have simply\nthree, partially discrepant, versions of a story, about the primitive\nform, the origin, and the authority for which we know absolutely\nnothing. But the evidence in favour of the Gadarene miracle is as good\nas that for any other.\n\nElsewhere, I have pointed out that it is utterly beside the mark to\ndeclaim against these conclusions on the ground of their asserted\ntendency to deprive mankind of the consolations of the Christian\nfaith, and to destroy the foundations of morality; still less to brand\nthem with the question-begging vituperative appellation of\n\"infidelity.\" The point is not whether they are wicked; but, whether,\nfrom the point of view of scientific method, they are irrefragably\ntrue. If they are, they will be accepted in time, whether they are\nwicked, or not wicked. Nature, so far as we have been able to attain\nto any insight into her ways, recks little about consolation and makes\nfor righteousness by very round-about paths. And, at any rate,\nwhatever may be possible for other people, it is becoming less and\nless possible for the man who puts his faith in scientific methods of\nascertaining truth, and is accustomed to have that faith justified by\ndaily experience, to be consciously false to his principle in any\nmatter. But the number of such men, driven into the use of scientific\nmethods of inquiry and taught to trust them, by their education, their\ndaily professional and business needs, is increasing and will\ncontinually increase. The phraseology of Supernaturalism may remain on\nmen's lips, but in practice they are Naturalists. The magistrate who\nlistens with devout attention to the precept \"Thou shalt not suffer a\nwitch to live\" on Sunday, on Monday, dismisses, as intrinsically\nabsurd, a charge of bewitching a cow brought against some old woman;\nthe superintendent of a lunatic asylum who substituted exorcism for\nrational modes of treatment would have but a short tenure of office;\neven parish clerks doubt the utility of prayers for rain, so long as\nthe wind is in the east; and an outbreak of pestilence sends men, not\nto the churches, but to the drains. In spite of prayers for the\nsuccess of our arms and _Te Deums_ for victory, our real faith is in\nbig battalions and keeping our powder dry; in knowledge of the science\nof warfare; in energy, courage, and discipline. In these, as in all\nother practical affairs, we act on the aphorism \"_Laborare est\norare_\"; we admit that intelligent work is the only acceptable\nworship; and that, whether there be a Supernature or not, our business\nis with Nature.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIt is important to note that the principle of the scientific\nNaturalism of the latter half of the nineteenth century, in which the\nintellectual movement of the Renascence has culminated, and which was\nfirst clearly formulated by Descartes, leads not to the denial of the\nexistence of any Supernature;[12] but simply to the denial of the\nvalidity of the evidence adduced in favour of this, or of that, extant\nform of Supernaturalism.\n\nLooking at the matter from the most rigidly scientific point of view,\nthe assumption that, amidst the myriads of worlds scattered through\nendless space, there can be no intelligence, as much greater than\nman's as his is greater than a blackbeetle's; no being endowed with\npowers of influencing the course of nature as much greater than his,\nas his is greater than a snail's seems to me not merely baseless, but\nimpertinent. Without stepping beyond the analogy of that which is\nknown, it is easy to people the cosmos with entities, in ascending\nscale, until we reach something practically indistinguishable from\nomnipotence, omnipresence, and omniscience. If our intelligence can,\nin some matters, surely reproduce the past of thousands of years ago\nand anticipate the future, thousands of years hence, it is clearly\nwithin the limits of possibility that some greater intellect, even of\nthe same order, may be able to mirror the whole past and the whole\nfuture; if the universe is penetrated by a medium of such a nature\nthat a magnetic needle on the earth answers to a commotion in the sun,\nan omnipresent agent is also conceivable; if our insignificant\nknowledge gives us some influence over events, practical omniscience\nmay confer indefinably greater power. Finally, if evidence that a\nthing may be, were equivalent to proof that it is, analogy might\njustify the construction of a naturalistic theology and demonology not\nless wonderful than the current supernatural; just as it might justify\nthe peopling of Mars, or of Jupiter, with living forms to which\nterrestrial biology offers no parallel. Until human life is longer and\nthe duties of the present press less heavily, I do not think that wise\nmen will occupy themselves with Jovian, or Martian, natural history;\nand they will probably agree to a verdict of \"not proven\" in respect\nof naturalistic theology, taking refuge in that agnostic confession,\nwhich appears to me to be the only position for people who object to\nsay that they know what they are quite aware they do not know. As to\nthe interests of morality, I am disposed to think that if mankind\ncould be got to act up to this last principle in every relation of\nlife, a reformation would be effected such as the world has not yet\nseen; an approximation to the millennium, such as no supernaturalistic\nreligion has ever yet succeeded, or seems likely ever to succeed, in\neffecting.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nI have hitherto dwelt upon scientific Naturalism chiefly in its\ncritical and destructive aspect. But the present incarnation of the\nspirit of the Renascence differs from its predecessor in the\neighteenth century, in that it builds up, as well as pulls down.\n\nThat of which it has laid the foundation, of which it is already\nraising the superstructure, is the doctrine of evolution. But so many\nstrange misconceptions are current about this doctrine--it is attacked\non such false grounds by its enemies, and made to cover so much that\nis disputable by some of its friends, that I think it well to define\nas clearly as I can, what I do not and what I do understand by the\ndoctrine.\n\nI have nothing to say to any \"Philosophy of Evolution.\" Attempts to\nconstruct such a philosophy may be as useful, nay, even as admirable,\nas was the attempt of Descartes to get at a theory of the universe by\nthe same _a priori_ road; but, in my judgment, they are as premature.\nNor, for this purpose, have I to do with any theory of the \"Origin of\nSpecies,\" much as I value that which is known as the Darwinian theory.\nThat the doctrine of natural selection presupposes evolution is quite\ntrue; but it is not true that evolution necessarily implies natural\nselection. In fact, evolution might conceivably have taken place\nwithout the development of groups possessing the characters of\nspecies.\n\nFor me, the doctrine of evolution is no speculation, but a\ngeneralisation of certain facts, which may be observed by any one who\nwill take the necessary trouble. These facts are those which are\nclassed by biologists under the heads of Embryology and of\nPalaeontology. Embryology proves that every higher form of individual\nlife becomes what it is by a process of gradual differentiation from\nan extremely low form; palaeontology proves, in some cases, and renders\nprobable in all, that the oldest types of a group are the lowest; and\nthat they have been followed by a gradual succession of more and more\ndifferentiated forms. It is simply a fact, that evolution of the\nindividual animal and plant is taking place, as a natural process, in\nmillions and millions of cases every day; it is a fact, that the\nspecies which have succeeded one another in the past, do, in many\ncases, present just those morphological relations, which they must\npossess, if they had proceeded, one from the other, by an analogous\nprocess of evolution.\n\nThe alternative presented, therefore, is: either the forms of one and\nthe same type--say, _e.g._, that of the Horse tribe[13]--arose\nsuccessively, but independently of one another, at intervals, during\nmyriads of years; or, the later forms are modified descendants of the\nearlier. And the latter supposition is so vastly more probable than\nthe former, that rational men will adopt it, unless satisfactory\nevidence to the contrary can be produced. The objection sometimes put\nforward, that no one yet professes to have seen one species pass into\nanother, comes oddly from those who believe that mankind are all\ndescended from Adam. Has any one then yet seen the production of\nnegroes from a white stock, or _vice versa_? Moreover, is it\nabsolutely necessary to have watched every step of the progress of a\nplanet, to be justified in concluding that it really does go round the\nsun? If so, astronomy is in a bad way.\n\nI do not, for a moment, presume to suggest that some one, far better\nacquainted than I am with astronomy and physics; or that a master of\nthe new chemistry, with its extraordinary revelations; or that a\nstudent of the development of human society, of language, and of\nreligions, may not find a sufficient foundation for the doctrine of\nevolution in these several regions. On the contrary, I rejoice to see\nthat scientific investigation, in all directions, is tending to the\nsame result. And it may well be, that it is only my long occupation\nwith biological matters that leads me to feel safer among them than\nanywhere else. Be that as it may, I take my stand on the facts of\nembryology and of palaeontology; and I hold that our present knowledge\nof these facts is sufficiently thorough and extensive to justify the\nassertion that all future philosophical and theological speculations\nwill have to accommodate themselves to some such common body of\nestablished truths as the following:--\n\n1. Plants and animals have existed on our planet for many hundred\nthousand, probably millions, of years. During this time, their forms,\nor species, have undergone a succession of changes, which eventually\ngave rise to the species which constitute the present living\npopulation of the earth. There is no evidence, nor any reason to\nsuspect, that this secular process of evolution is other than a part\nof the ordinary course of nature; there is no more ground for\nimagining the occurrence of supernatural intervention, at any moment\nin the development of species in the past, than there is for supposing\nsuch intervention to take place, at any moment in the development of\nan individual animal or plant, at the present day.\n\n2. At present, every individual animal or plant commences its\nexistence as an organism of extremely simple anatomical structure; and\nit acquires all the complexity it ultimately possesses by gradual\ndifferentiation into parts of various structure and function. When a\nseries of specific forms of the same type, extending over a long\nperiod of past time, is examined, the relation between the earlier and\nthe later forms is analogous to that between earlier and later stages\nof individual development. Therefore, it is a probable conclusion\nthat, if we could follow living beings back to their earlier states,\nwe should find them to present forms similar to those of the\nindividual germ, or, what comes to the same thing, of those lowest\nknown organisms which stand upon the boundary line between plants and\nanimals. At present, our knowledge of the ancient living world stops\nvery far short of this point.\n\n3. It is generally agreed, and there is certainly no evidence to the\ncontrary, that all plants are devoid of consciousness; that they\nneither feel, desire, nor think. It is conceivable that the evolution\nof the primordial living substance should have taken place only along\nthe plant line. In that case, the result might have been a wealth of\nvegetable life, as great, perhaps as varied, as at present, though\ncertainly widely different from the present flora, in the evolution of\nwhich animals have played so great a part. But the living world thus\nconstituted would be simply an admirable piece of unconscious\nmachinery, the working out of which lay potentially in its primitive\ncomposition; pleasure and pain would have no place in it; it would be\na veritable Garden of Eden without any tree of the knowledge of good\nand evil. The question of the moral government of such a world could\nno more be asked, than we could reasonably seek for a moral purpose in\na kaleidoscope.\n\n4. How far down the scale of animal life the phenomena of\nconsciousness are manifested, it is impossible to say. No one doubts\ntheir presence in his fellow-men; and, unless any strict Cartesians\nare left, no one doubts that mammals and birds are to be reckoned\ncreatures that have feelings analogous to our smell, taste, sight,\nhearing, touch, pleasure, and pain. For my own part, I should be\ndisposed to extend this analogical judgment a good deal further. On\nthe other hand, if the lowest forms of plants are to be denied\nconsciousness, I do not see on what ground it is to be ascribed to the\nlowest animals. I find it hard to believe that an infusory animalcule,\na foraminifer, or a fresh-water polype is capable of feeling; and, in\nspite of Shakspere, I have doubts about the great sensitiveness of the\n\"poor beetle that we tread upon.\" The question is equally perplexing\nwhen we turn to the stages of development of the individual. Granted a\nfowl feels; that the chick just hatched feels; that the chick when it\nchirps within the egg may possibly feel; what is to be said of it on\nthe fifth day, when the bird is there, but with all its tissues\nnascent? Still more, on the first day, when it is nothing but a flat\ncellular disk? I certainly cannot bring myself to believe that this\ndisk feels. Yet if it does not, there must be some time in the three\nweeks, between the first day and the day of hatching, when, as a\nconcomitant, or a consequence, of the attainment by the brain of the\nchick of a certain stage of structural evolution, consciousness makes\nits appearance. I have frequently expressed my incapacity to\nunderstand the nature of the relation between consciousness and a\ncertain anatomical tissue, which is thus established by observation.\nBut the fact remains that, so far as observation and experiment go,\nthey teach us that the psychical phenomena are dependent on the\nphysical.\n\nIn like manner, if fishes, insects, scorpions, and such animals as the\npearly nautilus, possess feeling, then undoubtedly consciousness was\npresent in the world as far back as the Silurian epoch. But, if the\nearliest animals were similar to our rhizopods and monads, there must\nhave been some time, between the much earlier epoch in which they\nconstituted the whole animal population and the Silurian, in which\nfeeling dawned, in consequence of the organism having reached the\nstage of evolution on which it depends.\n\n5. Consciousness has various forms, which may be manifested\nindependently of one another. The feelings of light and colour, of\nsound, of touch, though so often associated with those of pleasure and\npain, are, by nature, as entirely independent of them as is thinking.\nAn animal devoid of the feelings of pleasure and of pain, may\nnevertheless exhibit all the effects of sensation and purposive\naction. Therefore, it would be a justifiable hypothesis that, long\nafter organic evolution had attained to consciousness, pleasure and\npain were still absent. Such a world would be without either happiness\nor misery; no act could be punished and none could be rewarded; and it\ncould have no moral purpose.\n\n6. Suppose, for argument's sake, that all mammals and birds are\nsubjects of pleasure and pain. Then we may be certain that these forms\nof consciousness were in existence at the beginning of the Mesozoic\nepoch. From that time forth, pleasure has been distributed without\nreference to merit, and pain inflicted without reference to demerit,\nthroughout all but a mere fraction of the higher animals. Moreover,\nthe amount and the severity of the pain, no less than the variety and\nacuteness of the pleasure, have increased with every advance in the\nscale of evolution. As suffering came into the world, not in\nconsequence of a fall, but of a rise, in the scale of being, so every\nfurther rise has brought more suffering. As the evidence stands it\nwould appear that the sort of brain which characterizes the highest\nmammals and which, so far as we know, is the indispensable condition\nof the highest sensibility, did not come into existence before the\nTertiary epoch. The primordial anthropoid was probably, in this\nrespect, on much the same footing as his pithecoid kin. Like them he\nstood upon his \"natural rights,\" gratified all his desires to the best\nof his ability, and was as incapable of either right or wrong doing\nas they. It would be as absurd as in their case, to regard his\npleasures, any more than theirs, as moral rewards, and his pains, any\nmore than theirs, as moral punishments.\n\n7. From the remotest ages of which we have any cognizance, death has\nbeen the natural and, apparently, the necessary concomitant of life.\nIn our hypothetical world (3), inhabited by nothing but plants, death\nmust have very early resulted from the struggle for existence: many of\nthe crowd must have jostled one another out of the conditions on which\nlife depends. The occurrence of death, as far back as we have any\nfossil record of life, however, needs not to be proved by such\narguments; for, if there had been no death there would have been no\nfossil remains, such as the great majority of those we met with. Not\nonly was there death in the world, as far as the record of life takes\nus; but, ever since mammals and birds have been preyed upon by\ncarnivorous animals, there has been painful death, inflicted by\nmechanisms specially adapted for inflicting it.\n\n8. Those who are acquainted with the closeness of the structural\nrelations between the human organisation and that of the mammals which\ncome nearest to him, on the one hand; and with the palaeontological\nhistory of such animals as horses and dogs, on the other; will not be\ndisposed to question the origin of man from forms which stand in the\nsame sort of relation to _Homo sapiens_, as _Hipparion_ does to\n_Equus_. I think it a conclusion, fully justified by analogy, that,\nsooner or later, we shall discover the remains of our less specialised\nprimatic ancestors in the strata which have yielded the less\nspecialised equine and canine quadrupeds. At present, fossil remains\nof men do not take us hack further than the later part of the\nQuaternary epoch; and, as was to be expected, they do not differ more\nfrom existing men, than Quaternary horses differ from existing horses.\nStill earlier we find traces of man, in implements, such as are used\nby the ruder savages at the present day. Later, the remains of the\npalaeolithic and neolithic conditions take us gradually from the savage\nstate to the civilizations of Egypt and of Mycenae; though the true\nchronological order of the remains actually discovered may be\nuncertain.\n\n9. Much has yet to be learned, but, at present, natural knowledge\naffords no support to the notion that men have fallen from a higher to\na lower state. On the contrary, everything points to a slow natural\nevolution; which, favoured by the surrounding conditions in such\nlocalities as the valleys of the Yang-tse-kang, the Euphrates, and the\nNile, reached a relatively high pitch, five or six thousand years ago;\nwhile, in many other regions, the savage condition has persisted down\nto our day. In all this vast lapse of time there is not a trace of the\noccurrence of any general destruction of the human race; not the\nsmallest indication that man has been treated on any other principles\nthan the rest of the animal world.\n\n10. The results of the process of evolution in the case of man, and in\nthat of his more nearly allied contemporaries, have been marvellously\ndifferent. Yet it is easy to see that small primitive differences of a\ncertain order, must, in the long run, bring about a wide divergence of\nthe human stock from the others. It is a reasonable supposition that,\nin the earliest human organisms, an improved brain, a voice more\ncapable of modulation and articulation, limbs which lent themselves\nbetter to gesture, a more perfect hand, capable among other things of\nimitating form in plastic or other material, were combined with the\ncuriosity, the mimetic tendency, the strong family affection of the\nnext lower group; and that they were accompanied by exceptional length\nof life and a prolonged minority. The last two peculiarities are\nobviously calculated to strengthen the family organisation, and to\ngive great weight to its educative influences. The potentiality of\nlanguage, as the vocal symbol of thought, lay in the faculty of\nmodulating and articulating the voice. The potentiality of writing, as\nthe visual symbol of thought, lay in the hand that could draw; and in\nthe mimetic tendency, which, as we know, was gratified by drawing, as\nfar back as the days of Quaternary man. With speech as the record, in\ntradition, of the experience of more than one generation; with writing\nas the record of that of any number of generations; the experience of\nthe race, tested and corrected generation after generation, could be\nstored up and made the starting point for fresh progress. Having these\nperfectly natural factors of the evolutionary process in man before\nus, it seems unnecessary to go further a-field in search of others.\n\n11. That the doctrine of evolution implies a former state of innocence\nof mankind is quite true; but, as I have remarked, it is the innocence\nof the ape and of the tiger, whose acts, however they may run counter\nto the principles of morality, it would be absurd to blame. The lust\nof the one and the ferocity of the other are as much provided for in\ntheir organisation, are as clear evidences of design, as any other\nfeatures that can be named.\n\nObservation and experiment upon the phenomena of society soon taught\nmen that, in order to obtain the advantages of social existence,\ncertain rules must be observed. Morality commenced with society.\nSociety is possible only upon the condition that the members of it\nshall surrender more or less of their individual freedom of action. In\nprimitive societies, individual selfishness is a centrifugal force of\nsuch intensity that it is constantly bringing the social organisation\nto the verge of destruction. Hence the prominence of the positive\nrules of obedience to the elders; of standing by the family or the\ntribe in all emergencies; of fulfilling the religious rites,\nnon-observance of which is conceived to damage it with the\nsupernatural powers, belief in whose existence is one of the earliest\nproducts of human thought; and of the negative rules which restrain\neach from meddling with the life or property of another.\n\n12. The highest conceivable form of human society is that in which the\ndesire to do what is best for the whole dominates and limits the\naction of every member of that society. The more complex the social\norganisation the greater the number of acts from which each man must\nabstain if he desires to do that which is best for all. Thus the\nprogressive evolution of society means increasing restriction of\nindividual freedom in certain directions.\n\nWith the advance of civilisation, and the growth of cities and of\nnations by the coalescence of families and of tribes, the rules which\nconstitute the common foundation of morality and of law became more\nnumerous and complicated, and the temptations to break or evade many\nof them stronger. In the absence of a clear apprehension of the\nnatural sanctions of these rules, a supernatural sanction was assumed;\nand imagination supplied the motives which reason was supposed to be\nincompetent to furnish. Religion, at first independent of morality,\ngradually took morality under its protection; and the supernaturalists\nhave ever since tried to persuade mankind that the existence of ethics\nis bound up with that of supernaturalism.\n\nI am not of that opinion. But, whether it is correct or otherwise, it\nis very clear to me that, as Beelzebub is not to be cast out by the\naid of Beelzebub, so morality is not to be established by immorality.\nIt is, we are told, the special peculiarity of the devil that he was a\nliar from the beginning. If we set out in life with pretending to know\nthat which we do not know; with professing to accept for proof\nevidence which we are well aware is inadequate; with wilfully shutting\nour eyes and our ears to facts which militate against this or that\ncomfortable hypothesis; we are assuredly doing our best to deserve the\nsame character.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nI have not the presumption to imagine that, in spite of all my\nefforts, errors may not have crept into these propositions. But I am\ntolerably confident that time will prove them to be substantially\ncorrect. And if they are so, I confess I do not see how any extant\nsupernaturalistic system can also claim exactness. That they are\nirreconcilable with the biblical cosmogony, anthropology, and\ntheodicy is obvious; but they are no less inconsistent with the\nsentimental Deism of the \"Vicaire Savoyard\" and his numerous modern\nprogeny. It is as impossible, to my mind, to suppose that the\nevolutionary process was set going with full foreknowledge of the\nresult and yet with what we should understand by a purely benevolent\nintention, as it is to imagine that the intention was purely\nmalevolent. And the prevalence of dualistic theories from the earliest\ntimes to the present day--whether in the shape of the doctrine of the\ninherently evil nature of matter; of an Ahriman; of a hard and cruel\nDemiurge; of a diabolical \"prince of this world,\" show how widely this\ndifficulty has been felt.\n\nMany seem to think that, when it is admitted that the ancient\nliterature, contained in our Bibles, has no more claim to\ninfallibility than any other ancient literature; when it is proved\nthat the Israelites and their Christian successors accepted a great\nmany supernaturalistic theories and legends which have no better\nfoundation than those of heathenism, nothing remains to be done but to\nthrow the Bible aside as so much waste paper.\n\nI have always opposed this opinion. It appears to me that if there is\nanybody more objectionable than the orthodox Bibliolater it is the\nheterodox Philistine, who can discover in a literature which, in some\nrespects, has no superior, nothing but a subject for scoffing and an\noccasion for the display of his conceited ignorance of the debt he\nowes to former generations.\n\nTwenty-two years ago I pleaded for the use of the Bible as an\ninstrument of popular education, and I venture to repeat what I then\nsaid:\n\n\"Consider the great historical fact that, for three centuries, this\nbook has been woven into the life of all that is best and noblest in\nEnglish history; that it has become the national Epic of Britain and\nis as familiar to gentle and simple, from John o' Groat's House to\nLand's End, as Dante and Tasso once were to the Italians; that it is\nwritten in the noblest and purest English and abounds in exquisite\nbeauties of mere literary form; and, finally, that it forbids the\nveriest hind, who never left his village, to be ignorant of the\nexistence of other countries and other civilisations and of a great\npast, stretching back to the furthest limits of the oldest nations in\nthe world. By the study of what other book could children be so much\nhumanised and made to feel that each figure in that vast historical\nprocession fills, like themselves, but a momentary space in the\ninterval between the Eternities; and earns the blessings or the curses\nof all time, according to its effort to do good and hate evil, even as\nthey also are earning their payment for their work?\"[14]\n\nAt the same time, I laid stress upon the necessity of placing such\ninstruction in lay hands; in the hope and belief, that it would thus\ngradually accommodate itself to the coming changes of opinion; that\nthe theology and the legend would drop more and more out of sight,\nwhile the perennially interesting historical, literary, and ethical\ncontents would come more and more into view.\n\nI may add yet another claim of the Bible to the respect and the\nattention of a democratic age. Throughout the history of the western\nworld, the Scriptures, Jewish and Christian, have been the great\ninstigators of revolt against the worst forms of clerical and\npolitical despotism. The Bible has been the _Magna Charta_ of the poor\nand of the oppressed; down to modern times, no State has had a\nconstitution in which the interests of the people are so largely taken\ninto account, in which the duties, so much more than the privileges,\nof rulers are insisted upon, as that drawn up for Israel in\nDeuteronomy and in Leviticus; nowhere is the fundamental truth that\nthe welfare of the State, in the long run, depends on the uprightness\nof the citizen so strongly laid down. Assuredly, the Bible talks no\ntrash about the rights of man; but it insists on the equality of\nduties, on the liberty to bring about that righteousness which is\nsomewhat different from struggling for \"rights\"; on the fraternity of\ntaking thought for one's neighbour as for one's self.\n\nSo far as such equality, liberty, and fraternity are included under\nthe democratic principles which assume the same names, the Bible is\nthe most democratic book in the world. As such it began, through the\nheretical sects, to undermine the clerico-political despotism of the\nmiddle ages, almost as soon as it was formed, in the eleventh century;\nPope and King had as much as they could do to put down the Albigenses\nand the Waldenses in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries; the\nLollards and the Hussites gave them still more trouble in the\nfourteenth and fifteenth; from the sixteenth century onward, the\nProtestant sects have favoured political freedom in proportion to the\ndegree in which they have refused to acknowledge any ultimate\nauthority save that of the Bible.\n\nBut the enormous influence which has thus been exerted by the Jewish\nand Christian Scriptures has had no necessary connection with\ncosmogonies, demonologies, and miraculous interferences. Their\nstrength lies in their appeals, not to the reason, but to the ethical\nsense. I do not say that even the highest biblical ideal is exclusive\nof others or needs no supplement. But I do believe that the human race\nis not yet, possibly may never be, in a position to dispense with it.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n     [8]  With a few exceptions, which are duly noted when\n          they amount to more than verbal corrections.\n\n     [9]  _Declaration on the Truth of Holy Scripture._ The\n          _Times_, 18th December, 1891.\n\n     [10] _Declaration_, Article 10.\n\n     [11] Ego vero evangelio non crederem, nisi ecclesiae\n          Catholicae me commoveret auctoritas.--_Contra Epistolam\n          Manichaei_, cap. v.\n\n     [12] I employ the words \"Supernature\" and \"Supernatural\"\n          in their popular senses. For myself, I am bound to say\n          that the term \"Nature\" covers the totality of that\n          which is. The world of psychical phenomena appears to\n          me to be as much part of \"Nature\" as the world of\n          physical phenomena; and I am unable to perceive any\n          justification for cutting the Universe into two halves,\n          one natural and one supernatural.\n\n     [13] The general reader will find an admirably clear\n          and concise statement of the evidence in this case, in\n          Professor Flower's recently published work _The Horse:\n          a Study in Natural History_.\n\n     [14] \"The School Boards: What they Can do and what they\n          May do,\" 1870. _Critiques and Addresses_, p. 51.\n\n\n\n\nII: SCIENTIFIC AND PSEUDO-SCIENTIFIC REALISM\n\n[1887]\n\n\nNext to undue precipitation in anticipating the results of pending\ninvestigations, the intellectual sin which is commonest and most\nhurtful to those who devote themselves to the increase of knowledge is\nthe omission to profit by the experience of their predecessors\nrecorded in the history of science and philosophy. It is true that, at\nthe present day, there is more excuse than at any former time for such\nneglect. No small labour is needed to raise one's self to the level of\nthe acquisitions already made; and able men, who have achieved thus\nmuch, know that, if they devote themselves body and soul to the\nincrease of their store, and avoid looking back, with as much care as\nif the injunction laid on Lot and his family were binding upon them,\nsuch devotion is sure to be richly repaid by the joys of the\ndiscoverer and the solace of fame, if not by rewards of a less\nelevated character.\n\nSo, following the advice of Francis Bacon, we refuse _inter mortuos\nquaerere vivum_; we leave the past to bury its dead, and ignore our\nintellectual ancestry. Nor are we content with that. We follow the\nevil example set us, not only by Bacon but by almost all the men of\nthe Renaissance, in pouring scorn upon the work of our immediate\nspiritual forefathers, the schoolmen of the Middle Ages. It is\naccepted as a truth which is indisputable, that, for seven or eight\ncenturies, a long succession of able men--some of them of transcendent\nacuteness and encyclopaedic knowledge--devoted laborious lives to the\ngrave discussion of mere frivolities and the arduous pursuit of\nintellectual will-o'-the-wisps. To say nothing of a little modesty, a\nlittle impartial pondering over personal experience might suggest a\ndoubt as to the adequacy of this short and easy method of dealing with\na large chapter of the history of the human mind. Even an acquaintance\nwith popular literature which had extended so far as to include that\npart of the contributions of Sam Slick which contains his weighty\naphorism that \"there is a great deal of human nature in all mankind,\"\nmight raise a doubt whether, after all, the men of that epoch, who,\ntake them all round, were endowed with wisdom and folly in much the\nsame proportion as ourselves, were likely to display nothing better\nthan the qualities of energetic idiots, when they devoted their\nfaculties to the elucidation of problems which were to them, and\nindeed are to us, the most serious which life has to offer. Speaking\nfor myself, the longer I live the more I am disposed to think that\nthere is much less either of pure folly, or of pure wickedness, in the\nworld than is commonly supposed. It may be doubted if any sane man\never said to himself, \"Evil, be thou my good,\" and I have never yet\nhad the good fortune to meet with a perfect fool. When I have brought\nto the inquiry the patience and long-suffering which become a\nscientific investigator, the most promising specimens have turned out\nto have a good deal to say for themselves from their own point of\nview. And, sometimes, calm reflection has taught the humiliating\nlesson, that their point of view was not so different from my own as I\nhad fondly imagined. Comprehension is more than half-way to sympathy,\nhere as elsewhere.\n\nIf we turn our attention to scholastic philosophy in the frame of mind\nsuggested by these prefatory remarks, it assumes a very different\ncharacter from that which it bears in general estimation. No doubt it\nis surrounded by a dense thicket of thorny logomachies and obscured by\nthe dust-clouds of a barbarous and perplexing terminology. But suppose\nthat, undeterred by much grime and by many scratches, the explorer\nhas toiled through this jungle, he comes to an open country which is\namazingly like his dear native land. The hills which he has to climb,\nthe ravines he has to avoid, look very much the same; there is the\nsame infinite space above, and the same abyss of the unknown below;\nthe means of travelling are the same, and the goal is the same.\n\nThat goal for the schoolmen, as for us, is the settlement of the\nquestion how far the universe is the manifestation of a rational\norder; in other words, how far logical deduction from indisputable\npremisses will account for what which has happened and does happen.\nThat was the object of scholasticism, and, so far as I am aware, the\nobject of modern science may be expressed in the same terms. In\npursuit of this end, modern science takes into account all the\nphenomena of the universe which are brought to our knowledge by\nobservation or by experiment. It admits that there are two worlds to\nbe considered, the one physical and the other psychical; and that\nthough there is a most intimate relation and interconnection between\nthe two, the bridge from one to the other has yet to be found; that\ntheir phenomena run, not in one series, but along two parallel lines.\n\nTo the schoolmen the duality of the universe appeared under a\ndifferent aspect. How this came about will not be intelligible unless\nwe clearly apprehend the fact that they did really believe in\ndogmatic Christianity as it was formulated by the Roman Church. They\ndid not give a mere dull assent to anything the Church told them on\nSundays, and ignore her teachings for the rest of the week; but they\nlived and moved and had their being in that supersensible theological\nworld which was created, or rather grew up, during the first four\ncenturies of our reckoning, and which occupied their thoughts far more\nthan the sensible world in which their earthly lot was cast.\n\nFor the most part, we learn history from the colourless compendiums or\npartisan briefs of mere scholars, who have too little acquaintance\nwith practical life, and too little insight into speculative problems,\nto understand that about which they write. In historical science, as\nin all sciences which have to do with concrete phenomena, laboratory\npractice is indispensable; and the laboratory practice of historical\nscience is afforded, on the one hand, by active social and political\nlife, and, on the other, by the study of those tendencies and\noperations of the mind which embody themselves in philosophical and\ntheological systems. Thucydides and Tacitus, and, to come nearer our\nown time, Hume and Grote, were men of affairs, and had acquired, by\ndirect contact with social and political history in the making, the\nsecret of understanding how such history is made. Our notions of the\nintellectual history of the middle ages are, unfortunately, too often\nderived from writers who have never seriously grappled with\nphilosophical and theological problems: and hence that strange myth of\na millennium of moonshine to which I have adverted.\n\nHowever, no very profound study of the works of contemporary writers\nwho, without devoting themselves specially to theology or philosophy,\nwere learned and enlightened--such men, for example, as Eginhard or\nDante--is necessary to convince one's self, that, for them, the world\nof the theologian was an ever-present and awful reality. From the\ncentre of that world, the Divine Trinity, surrounded by a hierarchy of\nangels and saints, contemplated and governed the insignificant\nsensible world in which the inferior spirits of men, burdened with the\ndebasement of their material embodiment and continually solicited to\ntheir perdition by a no less numerous and almost as powerful hierarchy\nof devils, were constantly struggling on the edge of the pit of\neverlasting damnation.[15]\n\nThe men of the middle ages believed that through the Scriptures, the\ntraditions of the Fathers, and the authority of the Church, they were\nin possession of far more, and more trustworthy, information with\nrespect to the nature and order of things in the theological world\nthan they had in regard to the nature and order of things in the\nsensible world. And, if the two sources of information came into\nconflict, so much the worse for the sensible world, which, after all,\nwas more or less under the dominion of Satan. Let us suppose that a\ntelescope powerful enough to show us what is going on in the nebula of\nthe sword of Orion, should reveal a world in which stones fell\nupwards, parallel lines met, and the fourth dimension of space was\nquite obvious. Men of science would have only two alternatives before\nthem. Either the terrestrial and the nebular facts must be brought\ninto harmony by such feats of subtle sophistry as the human mind is\nalways capable of performing when driven into a corner; or science\nmust throw down its arms in despair, and commit suicide, either by the\nadmission that the universe is, after all, irrational, inasmuch as\nthat which is truth in one corner of it is absurdity in another, or by\na declaration of incompetency.\n\nIn the middle ages, the labours of those great men who endeavoured to\nreconcile the system of thought which started from the data of pure\nreason, with that which started from the data of Roman theology,\nproduced the system of thought which is known as scholastic\nphilosophy; the alternative of surrender and suicide is exemplified by\nAvicenna and his followers when they declared that that which is true\nin theology may be false in philosophy, and _vice versa_; and by\nSanchez in his famous defence of the thesis \"_Quod nil scitur_.\"\n\nTo those who deny the validity of one of the primary assumptions of\nthe disputants--who decline, on the ground of the utter insufficiency\nof the evidence, to put faith in the reality of that other world, the\ngeography and the inhabitants of which are so confidently described in\nthe so-called[16] Christianity of Catholicism--the long and bitter\ncontest, which engaged the best intellects for so many centuries, may\nseem a terrible illustration of the wasteful way in which the struggle\nfor existence is carried on in the world of thought, no less than in\nthat of matter. But there is a more cheerful mode of looking at the\nhistory of scholasticism. It ground and sharpened the dialectic\nimplements of our race as perhaps nothing but discussions, in the\nresult of which men thought their eternal, no less than their\ntemporal, interests were at stake, could have done. When a logical\nblunder may ensure combustion, not only in the next world but in this,\nthe construction of syllogisms acquires a peculiar interest. Moreover,\nthe schools kept the thinking faculty alive and active, when the\ndisturbed state of civil life, the mephitic atmosphere engendered by\nthe dominant ecclesiasticism, and the almost total neglect of natural\nknowledge, might well have stifled it. And, finally, it should be\nremembered that scholasticism really did thresh out pretty effectually\ncertain problems which have presented themselves to mankind ever since\nthey began to think, and which, I suppose, will present themselves so\nlong as they continue to think. Consider, for example, the controversy\nof the Realists and the Nominalists, which was carried on with varying\nfortunes, and under various names, from the time of Scotus Erigena to\nthe end of the scholastic period. Has it now a merely antiquarian\ninterest? Has Nominalism, in any of its modifications, so completely\nwon the day that Realism may be regarded as dead and buried without\nhope of resurrection? Many people seem to think so, but it appears to\nme that, without taking Catholic philosophy into consideration, one\nhas not to look about far to find evidence that Realism is still to\nthe fore, and indeed extremely lively.[17]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe other day I happened to meet with a report of a sermon recently\npreached in St. Paul's Cathedral. From internal evidence I am inclined\nto think that the report is substantially correct. But as I have not\nthe slightest intention of finding fault with the eminent theologian\nand eloquent preacher to whom the discourse is attributed, for\nemployment of scientific language in a manner for which he could find\nonly too many scientific precedents, the accuracy of the report in\ndetail is not to the purpose. I may safely take it as the embodiment\nof views which are thought to be quite in accordance with science by\nmany excellent, instructed, and intelligent people.\n\n     The preacher further contended that it was yet more\n     difficult to realise that our earthly home would become the\n     scene of a vast physical catastrophe. Imagination recoils\n     from the idea that the course of nature--the phrase helps to\n     disguise the truth--so unvarying and regular, the ordered\n     sequence of movement and life, should suddenly cease.\n     Imagination looks more reasonable when it assumes the air of\n     scientific reason. Physical law, it says, will prevent the\n     occurrence of catastrophes only anticipated by an apostle in\n     an unscientific age. Might not there, however, be a\n     suspension of a lower law by the intervention of a higher?\n     Thus every time we lifted our arms we defied the laws of\n     gravitation, and in railways and steamboats powerful laws\n     were held in check by others. The flood and the destruction\n     of Sodom and Gomorrah were brought about by the operation of\n     existing laws, and may it not be that in His illimitable\n     universe there are more important laws than those which\n     surround our puny life--moral and not merely physical\n     forces? Is it inconceivable that the day will come when\n     these royal and ultimate laws shall wreck the natural order\n     of things which seems so stable and so fair? Earthquakes\n     were not things of remote antiquity, as an island off Italy,\n     the Eastern Archipelago, Greece, and Chicago bore\n     witness.... In presence of a great earthquake men feel how\n     powerless they are, and their very knowledge adds to their\n     weakness. The end of human probation, the final dissolution\n     of organised society, and the destruction of man's home on\n     the surface of the globe, were none of them violently\n     contrary to our present experience, but only the extension\n     of present facts. The presentiment of death was common;\n     there were felt to be many things which threatened the\n     existence of society; and as our globe was a ball of fire,\n     at any moment the pent-up forces which surge and boil\n     beneath our feet might be poured out (\"Pall Mall Gazette,\"\n     December 6, 1886).\n\nThe preacher appears to entertain the notion that the occurrence of a\n\"catastrophe\"[18] involves a breach of the present order of\nnature--that it is an event incompatible with the physical laws which\nat present obtain. He seems to be of opinion that \"scientific reason\"\nlends its authority to the imaginative supposition that physical law\nwill prevent the occurrence of the \"catastrophes\" anticipated by an\nunscientific apostle.\n\nScientific reason, like Homer, sometimes nods; but I am not aware that\nit has ever dreamed dreams of this sort. The fundamental axiom of\nscientific thought is that there is not, never has been, and never\nwill be, any disorder in nature. The admission of the occurrence of\nany event which was not the logical consequence of the immediately\nantecedent events, according to these definite, ascertained, or\nunascertained rules which we call the \"laws of nature,\" would be an\nact of self-destruction on the part of science.\n\n\"Catastrophe\" is a relative conception. For ourselves it means an\nevent which brings about very terrible consequences to man, or\nimpresses his mind by its magnitude relatively to him. But events\nwhich are quite in the natural order of things to us, may be\nfrightful catastrophes to other sentient beings. Surely no\ninterruption of the order of nature is involved if, in the course of\ndescending through an Alpine pine-wood, I jump upon an anthill and in\na moment wreck a whole city and destroy a hundred thousand of its\ninhabitants. To the ants the catastrophe is worse than the earthquake\nof Lisbon. To me it is the natural and necessary consequence of the\nlaws of matter in motion. A redistribution of energy has taken place,\nwhich is perfectly in accordance with natural order, however\nunpleasant its effects may be to the ants.\n\nImagination, inspired by scientific reason, and not merely assuming\nthe airs thereof, as it unfortunately too often does in the pulpit, so\nfar from having any right to repudiate catastrophes and deny the\npossibility of the cessation of motion and life, easily finds\njustification for the exactly contrary course. Kant in his famous\n\"Theory of the Heavens\" declares the end of the world and its\nreduction to a formless condition to be a necessary consequence of the\ncauses to which it owes its origin and continuance. And, as to\ncatastrophes of prodigious magnitude and frequent occurrence, they\nwere the favourite _asylum ignorantiae_ of geologists, not a quarter of\na century ago. If modern geology is becoming more and more disinclined\nto call in catastrophes to its aid, it is not because of any _a\npriori_ difficulty in reconciling the occurrence of such events with\nthe universality of order, but because the _a posteriori_ evidence of\nthe occurrence of events of this character in past times has more or\nless completely broken down.\n\nIt is, to say the least, highly probable that this earth is a mass of\nextremely hot matter, invested by a cooled crust, through which the\nhot interior still continues to cool, though with extreme slowness. It\nis no less probable that the faults and dislocations, the foldings and\nfractures, everywhere visible in the stratified crust, its large and\nslow movements through miles of elevation and depression, and its\nsmall and rapid movements which give rise to the innumerable perceived\nand unperceived earthquakes which are constantly occurring, are due to\nthe shrinkage of the crust on its cooling and contracting nucleus.\n\nWithout going beyond the range of fair scientific analogy, conditions\nare easily conceivable which should render the loss of heat far more\nrapid than it is at present; and such an occurrence would be just as\nmuch in accordance with ascertained laws of nature, as the more rapid\ncooling of a red-hot bar, when it is thrust into cold water, than when\nit remains in the air. But much more rapid cooling might entail a\nshifting and rearrangement of the parts of the crust of the earth on a\nscale of unprecedented magnitude, and bring about \"catastrophes\" to\nwhich the earthquake of Lisbon is but a trifle. It is conceivable that\nman and his works and all the higher forms of animal life should be\nutterly destroyed; that mountain regions should he converted into\nocean depths and the floor of oceans raised into mountains; and the\nearth become a scene of horror which even the lurid fancy of the\nwriter of the Apocalypse would fail to portray. And yet, to the eye of\nscience, there would he no more disorder here than in the sabbatical\npeace of a summer sea. Not a link in the chain of natural causes and\neffects would he broken, nowhere would there be the slightest\nindication of the \"suspension of a lower law by a higher.\" If a sober\nscientific thinker is inclined to put little faith in the wild\nvaticinations of universal ruin which, in a less saintly person than\nthe seer of Patmos, might seem to be dictated by the fury of a\nrevengeful fanatic, rather than by the spirit of the teacher who bid\nmen love their enemies, it is not on the ground that they contradict\nscientific principles; but because the evidence of their scientific\nvalue does not fulfil the conditions on which weight is attached to\nevidence. The imagination which supposes that it does, simply does not\n\"assume the air of scientific reason.\"\n\nI repeat that, if imagination is used within the limits laid down by\nscience, disorder is unimaginable. If a being endowed with perfect\nintellectual and aesthetic faculties, but devoid of the capacity for\nsuffering pain, either physical or moral, were to devote his utmost\npowers to the investigation of nature, the universe would seem to him\nto be a sort of kaleidoscope, in which, at every successive moment of\ntime, a new arrangement of parts of exquisite beauty and symmetry\nwould present itself; and each of them would show itself to be the\nlogical consequence of the preceding arrangement, under the conditions\nwhich we call the laws of nature. Such a spectator might well be\nfilled with that _Amor intellectualis Dei_, the beatific vision of the\n_vita contemplativa_, which some of the greatest thinkers of all ages,\nAristotle, Aquinas, Spinoza, have regarded as the only conceivable\neternal felicity; and the vision of illimitable suffering, as if\nsensitive beings were unregarded animalcules which had got between the\nbits of glass of the kaleidoscope, which mars the prospect to us poor\nmortals, in no wise alters the fact that order is lord of all, and\ndisorder only a name for that part of the order which gives us pain.\n\nThe other fallacious employment of the names of scientific conceptions\nwhich pervades the preacher's utterance, brings me back to the proper\ntopic of the present essay. It is the use of the word \"law\" as if it\ndenoted a thing--as if a \"law of nature,\" as science understands it,\nwere a being endowed with certain powers, in virtue of which the\nphenomena expressed by that law are brought about. The preacher asks,\n\"Might not there be a suspension of a lower law by the intervention of\na higher?\" He tells us that every time we lift our arms we defy the\nlaw of gravitation. He asks whether some day certain \"royal and\nultimate laws\" may not come and \"wreck\" those laws which are at\npresent, it would appear, acting as nature's police. It is evident,\nfrom these expressions, that \"laws,\" in the mind of the preacher, are\nentities having an objective existence in a graduated hierarchy. And\nit would appear that the \"royal laws\" are by no means to be regarded\nas constitutional royalties: at any moment, they may, like Eastern\ndespots, descend in wrath among the middle-class and plebeian laws,\nwhich have hitherto done the drudgery of the world's work, and, to use\nphraseology not unknown in our seats of learning--\"make hay\" of their\nbelongings. Or perhaps a still more familiar analogy has suggested\nthis singular theory; and it is thought that high laws may \"suspend\"\nlow laws, as a bishop may suspend a curate.\n\nFar be it from me to controvert these views, if any one likes to hold\nthem. All I wish to remark is that such a conception of the nature of\n\"laws\" has nothing to do with modern science. It is scholastic\nrealism--realism as intense and unmitigated as that of Scotus Erigena\na thousand years ago. The essence of such realism is that it maintains\nthe objective existence of universals, or, as we call them nowadays,\ngeneral propositions. It affirms, for example, that \"man\" is a real\nthing, apart from individual men, having its existence, not in the\nsensible, but in the intelligible world, and clothing itself with the\naccidents of sense to make the Jack and Tom and Harry whom we know.\nStrange as such a notion may appear to modern scientific thought, it\nreally pervades ordinary language. There are few people who would, at\nonce, hesitate to admit that colour, for example, exists apart from\nthe mind which conceives the idea of colour. They hold it to be\nsomething which resides in the coloured object; and so far they are as\nmuch Realists as if they had sat at Plato's feet. Reflection on the\nfacts of the case must, I imagine, convince every one that \"colour\"\nis--not a mere name, which was the extreme Nominalist position--but a\nname for that group of states of feeling which we call blue, red,\nyellow, and so on, and which we believe to be caused by luminiferous\nvibrations which have not the slightest resemblance to colour; while\nthese again are set afoot by states of the body to which we ascribe\ncolour, but which are equally devoid of likeness to colour.\n\nIn the same way, a law of nature, in the scientific sense, is the\nproduct of a mental operation upon the facts of nature which come\nunder our observation, and has no more existence outside the mind than\ncolour has. The law of gravitation is a statement of the manner in\nwhich experience shows that bodies, which are free to move, do, in\nfact, move towards one another. But the other facts of observation,\nthat bodies are not always moving in this fashion, and sometimes move\nin a contrary direction, are implied in the words \"free to move.\" If\nit is a law of nature that bodies tend to move towards one another in\na certain way; it is another and no less true law of nature that, if\nbodies are not free to move as they tend to do, either in consequence\nof an obstacle, or of a contrary impulse from some other source of\nenergy than that to which we give the name of gravitation, they either\nstop still, or go another way.\n\nScientifically speaking, it is the acme of absurdity to talk of a man\ndefying the law of gravitation when he lifts his arm. The general\nstore of energy in the universe working through terrestrial matter is\ndoubtless tending to bring the man's arm down; but the particular\nfraction of that energy which is working through certain of his\nnervous and muscular organs is tending to drive it up, and more energy\nbeing expended on the arm in the upward than in the downward\ndirection, the arm goes up accordingly. But the law of gravitation is\nno more defied, in this case, than when a grocer throws so much sugar\ninto the empty pan of his scales that the one which contains the\nweight kicks the beam.\n\nThe tenacity of the wonderful fallacy that the laws of nature are\nagents, instead of being, as they really are, a mere record of\nexperience, upon which we base our interpretations of that which does\nhappen, and our anticipation of that which will happen, is an\ninteresting psychological fact; and would be unintelligible if the\ntendency of the human mind towards realism were less strong.\n\nEven at the present day, and in the writings of men who would at once\nrepudiate scholastic realism in any form, \"law\" is often inadvertently\nemployed in the sense of cause, just as, in common life, a man will\nsay that he is compelled by the law to do so and so, when, in point of\nfact, all he means is that the law orders him to do it, and tells him\nwhat will happen if he does not do it. We commonly hear of bodies\nfalling to the ground by reason of the law of gravitation, whereas\nthat law is simply the record of the fact that, according to all\nexperience, they have so fallen (when free to move), and of the\ngrounds of a reasonable expectation that they will so fall. If it\nshould be worth anybody's while to seek for examples of such misuse of\nlanguage on my own part, I am not at all sure he might not succeed,\nthough I have usually been on my guard against such looseness of\nexpression. If I am guilty, I do penance beforehand, and only hope\nthat I may thereby deter others from committing the like fault. And I\nventure on this personal observation by way of showing that I have no\nwish to bear hardly on the preacher for falling into an error for\nwhich he might find good precedents. But it is one of those errors\nwhich, in the case of a person engaged in scientific pursuits, do\nlittle harm, because it is corrected as soon as its consequences\nbecome obvious; while those who know physical science only by name\nare, as has been seen, easily led to build a mighty fabric of\nunrealities on this fundamental fallacy. In fact, the habitual use of\nthe word \"law,\" in the sense of an active thing, is almost a mark of\npseudo-science; it characterises the writings of those who have\nappropriated the forms of science without knowing anything of its\nsubstance.\n\nThere are two classes of these people: those who are ready to believe\nin any miracle so long as it is guaranteed by ecclesiastical\nauthority; and those who are ready to believe in any miracle so long\nas it has some different guarantee. The believers in what are\nordinarily called miracles--those who accept the miraculous narratives\nwhich they are taught to think are essential elements of religious\ndoctrine--are in the one category; the spirit-rappers, table-turners,\nand all the other devotees of the occult sciences of our day are in\nthe other: and, if they disagree in most things they agree in this,\nnamely, that they ascribe to science a dictum that is not scientific;\nand that they endeavour to upset the dictum thus foisted on science by\na realistic argument which is equally unscientific.\n\nIt is asserted, for example, that, on a particular occasion, water\nwas turned into wine; and, on the other hand, it is asserted that a\nman or a woman \"levitated\" to the ceiling, floated about there, and\nfinally sailed out by the window. And it is assumed that the\npardonable scepticism, with which most scientific men receive these\nstatements, is due to the fact that they feel themselves justified in\ndenying the possibility of any such metamorphosis of water, or of any\nsuch levitation, because such events are contrary to the laws of\nnature. So the question of the preacher is triumphantly put: How do\nyou know that there are not \"higher\" laws of nature than your chemical\nand physical laws, and that these higher laws may not intervene and\n\"wreck\" the latter?\n\nThe plain answer to this question is, Why should anybody be called\nupon to say how he knows that which he does not know? You are assuming\nthat laws are agents--efficient causes of that which happens--and that\none law can interfere with another. To us, that assumption is as\nnonsensical as if you were to talk of a proposition of Euclid being\nthe cause of the diagram which illustrates it, or of the integral\ncalculus interfering with the rule of three. Your question really\nimplies that we pretend to complete knowledge not only of all past and\npresent phenomena, but of all that are possible in the future, and we\nleave all that sort of thing to the adepts of esoteric Buddhism. Our\npretensions are infinitely more modest. We have succeeded in finding\nout the rules of action of a little bit of the universe; we call these\nrules \"laws of nature,\" not because anybody knows whether they bind\nnature or not, but because we find it is obligatory on us to take them\ninto account, both as actors under nature, and as interpreters of\nnature. We have any quantity of genuine miracles of our own, and if\nyou will furnish us with as good evidence of your miracles as we have\nof ours, we shall be quite happy to accept them and to amend our\nexpression of the laws of nature in accordance with the new facts.\n\nAs to the particular cases adduced, we are so perfectly fair-minded as\nto be willing to help your case as far as we can. You are quite\nmistaken in supposing that anybody who is acquainted with the\npossibilities of physical science will undertake categorically to deny\nthat water may be turned into wine. Many very competent judges are\nalready inclined to think that the bodies, which we have hitherto\ncalled elementary, are really composite arrangements of the particles\nof a uniform primitive matter. Supposing that view to be correct,\nthere would be no more theoretical difficulty about turning water into\nalcohol, ethereal and colouring matters, than there is, at this\npresent moment, any practical difficulty in working other such\nmiracles; as when we turn sugar into alcohol, carbonic acid,\nglycerine, and succinic acid; or transmute gas-refuse into perfumes\nrarer than musk and dyes richer than Tyrian purple. If the so-called\n\"elements,\" oxygen and hydrogen, which compose water, are aggregates\nof the same ultimate particles, or physical units, as those which\nenter into the structure of the so-called element \"carbon,\" it is\nobvious that alcohol and other substances, composed of carbon,\nhydrogen, and oxygen, may be produced by a rearrangement of some of\nthe units of oxygen and hydrogen into the \"element\" carbon, and their\nsynthesis with the rest of the oxygen and hydrogen.\n\nTheoretically, therefore, we can have no sort of objection to your\nmiracle. And our reply to the levitators is just the same. Why should\nnot your friend \"levitate\"? Fish are said to rise and sink in the\nwater by altering the volume of an internal air-receptacle; and there\nmay be many ways science, as yet, knows nothing of, by which we, who\nlive at the bottom of an ocean of air, may do the same thing.\nDialectic gas and wind appear to be by no means wanting among you, and\nwhy should not long practice in pneumatic philosophy have resulted in\nthe internal generation of something a thousand times rarer than\nhydrogen, by which, in accordance with the most ordinary natural laws,\nyou would not only rise to the ceiling and float there in\nquasi-angelic posture, but perhaps, as one of your feminine adepts is\nsaid to have done, flit swifter than train or telegram to\n\"still-vexed Bermoothes,\" and twit Ariel, if he happens to be there,\nfor a sluggard? We have not the presumption to deny the possibility of\nanything you affirm; only, as our brethren are particular about\nevidence, do give us as much to go upon as may save us from being\nroared down by their inextinguishable laughter.\n\nEnough of the realism which clings about \"laws.\" There are plenty of\nother exemplifications of its vitality in modern science, but I will\ncite only one of them.\n\nThis is the conception of \"vital force\" which comes straight from the\nphilosophy of Aristotle. It is a fundamental proposition of that\nphilosophy that a natural object is composed of two constituents--the\none its matter, conceived as inert or even, to a certain extent,\nopposed to orderly and purposive motion; the other its form, conceived\nas a quasi-spiritual something, containing or conditioning the actual\nactivities of the body and the potentiality of its possible\nactivities.\n\nI am disposed to think that the prominence of this conception in\nAristotle's theory of things arose from the circumstance that he was\nto begin with and throughout his life, devoted to biological studies.\nIn fact it is a notion which must force itself upon the mind of any\none who studies biological phenomena, without reference to general\nphysics, as they now stand. Everybody who observes the obvious\nphenomena of the development of a seed into a tree, or of an egg into\nan animal, will note that a relatively formless mass of matter\ngradually grows, takes a definite shape and structure, and, finally,\nbegins to perform actions which contribute towards a certain end,\nnamely, the maintenance of the individual in the first place, and of\nthe species in the second. Starting from the axiom that every event\nhas a cause, we have here the _causa finalis_ manifested in the last\nset of phenomena, the _causa materialis_ and _formalis_ in the first,\nwhile the existence of a _causa efficiens_ within the seed or egg and\nits product, is a corollary from the phenomena of growth and\nmetamorphosis, which proceed in unbroken succession and make up the\nlife of the animal or plant.\n\nThus, at starting, the egg or seed is matter having a \"form\" like all\nother material bodies. But this form has the peculiarity, in\ncontradistinction to lower substantial \"forms,\" that it is a power\nwhich constantly works towards an end by means of living organisation.\n\nSo far as I know, Leibnitz is the only philosopher (at the same time a\nman of science, in the modern sense, of the first rank) who has noted\nthat the modern conception of Force, as a sort of atmosphere\nenveloping the particles of bodies, and having potential or actual\nactivity, is simply a new name for the Aristotelian Form.[19] In\nmodern biology, up till within quite recent times, the Aristotelian\nconception held undisputed sway; living matter was endowed with \"vital\nforce,\" and that accounted for everything. Whosoever was not satisfied\nwith that explanation was treated to that very \"plain\nargument\"--\"confound you eternally\"--wherewith Lord Peter overcomes\nthe doubts of his brothers in the \"Tale of a Tub.\" \"Materialist\" was\nthe mildest term applied to him--fortunate if he escaped pelting with\n\"infidel\" and \"atheist.\" There may be scientific Rip Van Winkles\nabout, who still hold by vital force; but among those biologists who\nhave not been asleep for the last quarter of a century \"vital force\"\nno longer figures in the vocabulary of science. It is a patent\nsurvival of realism; the generalisation from experience that all\nliving bodies exhibit certain activities of a definite character is\nmade the basis of the notion that every living body contains an\nentity, \"vital force,\" which is assumed to be the cause of those\nactivities.\n\nIt is remarkable, in looking back, to notice to what an extent this\nand other survivals of scholastic realism arrested or, at any rate,\nimpeded the application of sound scientific principles to the\ninvestigation of biological phenomena. When I was beginning to think\nabout these matters, the scientific world was occasionally agitated by\ndiscussions respecting the nature of the \"species\" and \"genera\" of\nNaturalists, of a different order from the disputes of a later time.\nI think most were agreed that a \"species\" was something which existed\nobjectively, somehow or other, and had been created by a Divine fiat.\nAs to the objective reality of genera, there was a good deal of\ndifference of opinion. On the other hand, there were a few who could\nsee no objective reality in anything but individuals, and looked upon\nboth species and genera as hypostatised universals. As for myself, I\nseem to have unconsciously emulated William of Occam, inasmuch as\nalmost the first public discourse I ever ventured upon, dealt with\n\"Animal Individuality,\" and its tendency was to fight the Nominalist\nbattle even in that quarter.\n\nRealism appeared in still stranger forms at the time to which I refer.\nThe community of plan which is observable in each great group of\nanimals was hypostatised into a Platonic idea with the appropriate\nname of \"archetype,\" and we were told, as a disciple of Philo-Judaeus\nmight have told us, that this realistic figment was \"the archetypal\nlight\" by which Nature has been guided amidst the \"wreck of worlds.\"\nSo, again, another naturalist, who had no less earned a well-deserved\nreputation by his contributions to positive knowledge, put forward a\ntheory of the production of living things which, as nearly as the\nincrease of knowledge allowed, was a reproduction of the doctrine\ninculcated by the Jewish Cabbala.\n\nAnnexing the archetype notion, and carrying it to its full logical\nconsequence, the author of this theory conceived that the species of\nanimals and plants were so many incarnations of the thoughts of\nGod--material representations of Divine ideas--during the particular\nperiod of the world's history at which they existed. But, under the\ninfluence of the embryological and palaeontological discoveries of\nmodern times, which had already lent some scientific support to the\nrevived ancient theories of cosmical evolution or emanation, the\ningenious author of this speculation, while denying and repudiating\nthe ordinary theory of evolution by successive modification of\nindividuals, maintained and endeavoured to prove the occurrence of a\nprogressive modification in the divine ideas of successive epochs.\n\nOn the foundation of a supposed elevation of organisation in the whole\nliving population of any epoch, as compared with that of its\npredecessor, and a supposed complete difference in species between the\npopulations of any two epochs (neither of which suppositions has stood\nthe test of further inquiry), the author of this speculation based his\nconclusion that the Creator had, so to speak, improved upon his\nthoughts as time went on; and that, as each such amended scheme of\ncreation came up, the embodiment of the earlier divine thoughts was\nswept away by a universal catastrophe, and an incarnation of the\nimproved ideas took its place. Only after the last such \"wreck\" thus\nbrought about, did the embodiment of a divine thought, in the shape of\nthe first man, make its appearance as the _ne plus ultra_ of the\ncosmogonical process.\n\nI imagine that Louis Agassiz, the genial backwoodsman of the science\nof my young days, who did more to open out new tracks in the\nscientific forest than most men, would have been much surprised to\nlearn that he was preaching the doctrine of the Cabbala, pure and\nsimple. According to this modification of Neoplatonism by contact with\nHebrew speculation, the divine essence is unknowable--without form or\nattribute; but the interval between it and the world of sense is\nfilled by intelligible entities, which are nothing but the familiar\nhypostatised abstractions of the realists. These have emanated, like\nimmense waves of light, from the divine centre, and, as ten\nconsecutive zones of Sephiroth, form the universe. The farther away\nfrom the centre, the more the primitive light wanes, until the\nperiphery ends in those mere negations, darkness and evil, which are\nthe essence of matter. On this, the divine agency transmitted through\nthe Sephiroth operates after the fashion of the Aristotelian forms,\nand, at first, produces the lowest of a series of worlds. After a\ncertain duration the primitive world is demolished and its fragments\nused up in making a better; and this process is repeated, until at\nlength a final world, with man for its crown and finish, makes its\nappearance. It is needless to trace the process of retrogressive\nmetamorphosis by which, through the agency of the Messiah, the steps\nof the process of evolution here sketched are retraced. Sufficient has\nbeen said to prove that the extremist realism current in the\nphilosophy of the thirteenth century can be fully matched by the\nspeculations of our own time.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n     [15] There is no exaggeration in this brief and summary view\n          of the Catholic cosmos. But it would be unfair to leave it\n          to be supposed that the Reformation made any essential\n          alteration, except perhaps for the worse, in that cosmology\n          which called itself \"Christian.\" The protagonist of the\n          Reformation, from whom the whole of the Evangelical sects\n          are lineally descended, states the case with that plainness\n          of speech, not to say brutality, which characterised him.\n          Luther says that man is a beast of burden who only moves as\n          his rider orders; sometimes God rides him, and sometimes\n          Satan. \"Sic voluntas humana in medio posita est, ceu\n          jumentum; si insederit Deus, vult et vadit, quo vult\n          Deus.... Si insederit Satan, vult et vadit, quo vult Satan;\n          nec est in ejus arbitrio ad utrum sessorem currere, aut eum\n          quaerere, sed ipsi sessores certant ob ipsum obtinendum et\n          possidendum\" (_De Servo Arbitrio_, M. Lutheri Opera, ed.\n          1546, t. ii. p. 468). One may hear substantially the same\n          doctrine preached in the parks and at street-corners by\n          zealous volunteer missionaries of Evangelicism, any Sunday,\n          in modern London. Why these doctrines, which are conspicuous\n          by their absence in the four Gospels, should arrogate to\n          themselves the title of Evangelical, in contradistinction to\n          Catholic, Christianity, may well perplex the impartial\n          inquirer, who, if he were obliged to choose between the two,\n          might naturally prefer that which leaves the poor beast of\n          burden a little freedom of choice.\n\n     [16] I say \"so-called\" not by way of offence, but as a\n          protest against the monstrous assumption that Catholic\n          Christianity is explicitly or implicitly contained in any\n          trustworthy record of the teaching of Jesus of Nazareth.\n\n     [17] It may be desirable to observe that, in modern times,\n          the term \"Realism\" has acquired a signification wholly\n          different from that which attached to it in the middle ages.\n          We commonly use it as the contrary of Idealism. The Idealist\n          holds that the phenomenal world has only a subjective\n          existence, the Realist that it has an objective existence. I\n          am not aware that any mediaeval philosopher was an Idealist\n          in the sense in which we apply the term to Berkeley. In\n          fact, the cardinal defect of their speculations lies in\n          their oversight of the considerations which lead to\n          Idealism. If many of them regarded the material world as a\n          negation, it was an active negation; not zero, but a minus\n          quantity.\n\n     [18] At any rate a catastrophe greater than the flood,\n          which, as I observe with interest, is as calmly assumed by\n          the preacher to be an historical event as if science had\n          never had a word to say on that subject!\n\n     [19] \"Les formes des anciens ou Entelechies ne sont autre\n          chose que les forces\" (Leibnitz, _Lettre au Pere Bouvet_,\n          1697).\n\n\n\n\nIII: SCIENCE AND PSEUDO-SCIENCE\n\n[1887]\n\n\nIn the opening sentences of a contribution to the last number of this\nReview,[20] the Duke of Argyll has favoured me with a lecture on the\nproprieties of controversy, to which I should be disposed to listen\nwith more docility if his Grace's precepts appeared to me to be based\nupon rational principles, or if his example were more exemplary.\n\nWith respect to the latter point, the Duke has thought fit to entitle\nhis article \"Professor Huxley on Canon Liddon,\" and thus forces into\nprominence an element of personality, which those who read the paper\nwhich is the object of the Duke's animadversions will observe I have\nendeavoured, most carefully, to avoid. My criticisms dealt with a\nreport of a sermon, published in a newspaper, and thereby addressed to\nall the world. Whether that sermon was preached by A or B was not a\nmatter of the smallest consequence; and I went out of my way to\nabsolve the learned divine to whom the discourse was attributed from\nthe responsibility for statements which, for anything I knew to the\ncontrary, might contain imperfect, or inaccurate, representations of\nhis views. The assertion that I had the wish, or was beset, by any\n\"temptation to attack\" Canon Liddon is simply contrary to fact.\n\nBut suppose that if, instead of sedulously avoiding even the\nappearance of such attack, I had thought fit to take a different\ncourse; suppose that, after satisfying myself that the eminent\nclergyman whose name is paraded by the Duke of Argyll had really\nuttered the words attributed to him from the pulpit of St. Paul's,\nwhat right would any one have to find fault with my action on grounds\neither of justice, expediency, or good taste?\n\nEstablishment has its duties as well as its rights. The clergy of a\nState Church enjoy many advantages over those of unprivileged and\nunendowed religious persuasions; but they lie under a correlative\nresponsibility to the State, and to every member of the body politic.\nI am not aware that any sacredness attaches to sermons. If preachers\nstray beyond the doctrinal limits set by lay lawyers, the Privy\nCouncil will see to it; and, if they think fit to use their pulpits\nfor the promulgation of literary, or historical, or scientific errors,\nit is not only the right, but the duty, of the humblest layman, who\nmay happen to be better informed, to correct the evil effects of such\nperversion of the opportunities which the State affords them; and such\nmisuse of the authority which its support lends them. Whatever else it\nmay claim to be, in its relations with the State, the Established\nChurch is a branch of the Civil Service; and, for those who repudiate\nthe ecclesiastical authority of the clergy, they are merely civil\nservants, as much responsible to the English people for the proper\nperformance of their duties as any others.\n\nThe Duke of Argyll tells us that the \"work and calling\" of the clergy\nprevent them from \"pursuing disputation as others can.\" I wonder if\nhis Grace ever reads the so-called \"religious\" newspapers. It is not\nan occupation which I should commend to any one who wishes to employ\nhis time profitably; but a very short devotion to this exercise will\nsuffice to convince him that the \"pursuit of disputation,\" carried to\na degree of acrimony and vehemence unsurpassed in lay controversies,\nseems to be found quite compatible with the \"work and calling\" of a\nremarkably large number of the clergy.\n\nFinally, it appears to me that nothing can be in worse taste than the\nassumption that a body of English gentlemen can, by any possibility,\ndesire that immunity from criticism which the Duke of Argyll claims\nfor them. Nothing would be more personally offensive to me than the\nsupposition that I shirked criticism, just or unjust, of any lecture I\never gave. I should be utterly ashamed of myself if, when I stood up\nas an instructor of others, I had not taken every pains to assure\nmyself of the truth of that which I was about to say; and I should\nfeel myself bound to be even more careful with a popular assembly, who\nwould take me more or less on trust, than with an audience of\ncompetent and critical experts.\n\nI decline to assume that the standard of morality, in these matters,\nis lower among the clergy than it is among scientific men. I refuse to\nthink that the priest who stands up before a congregation, as the\nminister and interpreter of the Divinity, is less careful in his\nutterances, less ready to meet adverse comment, than the layman who\ncomes before his audience, as the minister and interpreter of nature.\nYet what should we think of the man of science who, when his ignorance\nor his carelessness was exposed, whined about the want of delicacy of\nhis critics, or pleaded his \"work and calling\" as a reason for being\nlet alone?\n\nNo man, nor any body of men, is good enough, or wise enough, to\ndispense with the tonic of criticism. Nothing has done more harm to\nthe clergy than the practice, too common among laymen, of regarding\nthem, when in the pulpit, as a sort of chartered libertines, whose\ndivagations are not to be taken seriously. And I am well assured that\nthe distinguished divine, to whom the sermon is attributed, is the\nlast person who would desire to avail himself of the dishonouring\nprotection which has been superfluously thrown over him.\n\nSo much for the lecture on propriety. But the Duke of Argyll, to whom\nthe hortatory style seems to come naturally, does me the honour to\nmake my sayings the subjects of a series of other admonitions, some on\nphilosophical, some on geological, some on biological topics. I can\nbut rejoice that the Duke's authority in these matters is not always\nemployed to show that I am ignorant of them; on the contrary, I meet\nwith an amount of agreement, even of approbation, for which I proffer\nsuch gratitude as may be due, even if that gratitude is sometimes\nalmost overshadowed by surprise.\n\nI am unfeignedly astonished to find that the Duke of Argyll, who\nprofesses to intervene on behalf of the preacher, does really, like\nanother Balaam, bless me altogether in respect of the main issue.\n\nI denied the justice of the preacher's ascription to men of science of\nthe doctrine that miracles are incredible, because they are violations\nof natural law; and the Duke of Argyll says that he believes my\n\"denial to be well-founded. The preacher was answering an objection\nwhich has now been generally abandoned.\" Either the preacher knew this\nor he did not know it. It seems to me, as a mere lay teacher, to be a\npity that the \"great dome of St. Paul's\" should have been made to\n\"echo\" (if so be that such stentorian effects were really produced) a\nstatement which, admitting the first alternative, was unfair, and,\nadmitting the second, was ignorant.[21]\n\nHaving thus sacrified one half of the preacher's arguments, the Duke\nof Argyll proceeds to make equally short work with the other half. It\nappears that he fully accepts my position that the occurrence of those\nevents, which the preacher speaks of as catastrophes, is no evidence\nof disorder, inasmuch as such catastrophes may be necessary occasional\nconsequences of uniform changes. Whence I conclude, his Grace agrees\nwith me, that the talk about royal laws \"wrecking\" ordinary laws may\nbe eloquent metaphor, but is also nonsense.\n\nAnd now comes a further surprise. After having given these superfluous\nstabs to the slain body of the preacher's argument, my good ally\nremarks, with magnificent calmness: \"So far, then, the preacher and\nthe professor are at one.\" \"Let them smoke the calumet.\" By all means:\nsmoke would be the most appropriate symbol of this wonderful attempt\nto cover a retreat. After all, the Duke has come to bury the preacher,\nnot to praise him; only he makes the funeral obsequies look as much\nlike a triumphal procession as possible.\n\nSo far as the questions between the preacher and myself are concerned,\nthen, I may feel happy. The authority of the Duke of Argyll is ranged\non my side. But the Duke has raised a number of other questions, with\nrespect to which I fear I shall have to dispense with his\nsupport--nay, even be compelled to differ from him as much, or more,\nthan I have done about his Grace's new rendering of the \"benefit of\nclergy.\"\n\nIn discussing catastrophes, the Duke indulges in statements, partly\nscientific, partly anecdotic, which appear to me to be somewhat\nmisleading. We are told, to begin with, that Sir Charles Lyell's\ndoctrine respecting the proper mode of interpreting the facts of\ngeology (which is commonly called uniformitarianism) \"does not hold\nits head quite so high as it once did.\" That is great news indeed.\nBut is it true? All I can say is that I am aware of nothing that has\nhappened of late that can in any way justify it; and my opinion is,\nthat the body of Lyell's doctrine, as laid down in that great work,\n\"The Principles of Geology,\" whatever may have happened to its head,\nis a chief and permanent constituent of the foundations of geological\nscience.\n\nBut this question cannot he advantageously discussed, unless we take\nsome pains to discriminate between the essential part of the\nuniformitarian doctrine and its accessories; and it does not appear\nthat the Duke of Argyll has carried his studies of geological\nphilosophy so far as this point. For he defines uniformitarianism to\nbe the assumption of the \"extreme slowness and perfect continuity of\nall geological changes.\"\n\nWhat \"perfect continuity\" may mean in this definition, I am by no\nmeans sure; but I can only imagine that it signifies the absence of\nany break in the course of natural order during the millions of years,\nthe lapse of which is recorded by geological phenomena.\n\nIs the Duke of Argyll prepared to say that any geologist of authority,\nat the present day, believes that there is the slightest evidence of\nthe occurrence of supernatural intervention, during the long ages of\nwhich the monuments are preserved to us in the crust of the earth? And\nif he is not, in what sense has this part of the uniformitarian\ndoctrine, as he defines it, lowered its pretensions to represent\nscientific truth?\n\nAs to the \"extreme slowness of all geological changes,\" it is simply a\npopular error to regard that as, in any wise, a fundamental and\nnecessary dogma of uniformitarianism. It is extremely astonishing to\nme that any one who has carefully studied Lyell's great work can have\nso completely failed to appreciate its purport, which yet is \"writ\nlarge\" on the very title-page: \"The Principles of Geology, being an\nattempt to explain the former changes of the earth's surface by\nreference to causes now in operation.\" The essence of Lyell's doctrine\nis here written so that those who run may read; and it has nothing to\ndo with the quickness or slowness of the past changes of the earth's\nsurface; except in so far as existing analogous changes may go on\nslowly, and therefore create a presumption in favour of the slowness\nof past changes.\n\nWith that epigrammatic force which characterises his style, Buffon\nwrote, nearly a hundred and fifty years ago, in his famous \"Theorie de\nla Terre\": \"Pour juger de ce qui est arrive, et meme de ce qui\narrivera, nous n'avons qu'a examiner ce qui arrive.\" The key of the\npast, as of the future, is to be sought in the present; and, only when\nknown causes of change have been shown to be insufficient, have we any\nright to have recourse to unknown causes. Geology is as much a\nhistorical science as archaeology; and I apprehend that all sound\nhistorical investigation rests upon this axiom. It underlay all\nHutton's work and animated Lyell and Scope in their successful efforts\nto revolutionise the geology of half a century ago.\n\nThere is no antagonism whatever, and there never was, between the\nbelief in the views which had their chief and unwearied advocate in\nLyell and the belief in the occurrence of catastrophes. The first\nedition of Lyell's \"Principles,\" published in 1830, lies before me;\nand a large part of the first volume is occupied by an account of\nvolcanic, seismic, and diluvial catastrophes which have occurred\nwithin the historical period. Moreover, the author, over and over\nagain, expressly draws the attention of his readers to the consistency\nof catastrophes with his doctrine.\n\n     Notwithstanding, therefore, that we have not witnessed\n     within the last three thousand years the devastation by\n     deluge of a large continent, yet, as we may predict the\n     future occurrence of such catastrophes, we are authorized to\n     regard them as part of the present order of nature, and they\n     may be introduced into geological speculations respecting\n     the past, provided that we do not imagine them to have been\n     more frequent or general than we expect them to be in time\n     to come (vol. i. p. 89).\n\nAgain:--\n\n     If we regard each of the causes separately, which we know to\n     be at present the most instrumental in remodelling the state\n     of the surface, we shall find that we must expect each to\n     be in action for thousands of years, without producing any\n     extensive alterations in the habitable surface, and then to\n     give rise, during a very brief period, to important\n     revolutions (vol. ii. p. 161).[22]\n\nLyell quarrelled with the catastrophists then, by no means because\nthey assumed that catastrophes occur and have occurred, but because\nthey had got into the habit of calling on their god Catastrophe to\nhelp them, when they ought to have been putting their shoulders to the\nwheel of observation of the present course of nature, in order to help\nthemselves out of their difficulties. And geological science has\nbecome what it is, chiefly because geologists have gradually accepted\nLyell's doctrine and followed his precepts.\n\nSo far as I know anything about the matter, there is nothing that can\nbe called proof, that the causes of geological phenomena operated more\nintensely or more rapidly, at any time between the older tertiary and\nthe oldest palaeozoic epochs than they have done between the older\ntertiary epoch and the present day. And if that is so, uniformitarianism,\neven as limited by Lyell,[23] has no call to lower its crest. But if\nthe facts were otherwise, the position Lyell took up remains\nimpregnable. He did not say that the geological operations of nature\nwere never more rapid, or more vast, than they are now; what he did\nmaintain is the very different proposition that there is no good\nevidence of anything of the kind. And that proposition has not yet\nbeen shown to be incorrect.\n\nI owe more than I can tell to the careful study of the \"Principles of\nGeology\" in my young days; and, long before the year 1856, my mind was\nfamiliar with the truth that \"the doctrine of uniformity is not\nincompatible with great and sudden changes,\" which, as I have shown,\nis taught _totidem verbis_ in that work. Even had it been possible for\nme to shut my eyes to the sense of what I had read in the\n\"Principles,\" Whewell's \"Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences,\"\npublished in 1840, a work with which I was also tolerably familiar,\nmust have opened them. For the always acute, if not always profound,\nauthor, in arguing against Lyell's uniformitarianism, expressly points\nout that it does not in any way contravene the occurrence of\ncatastrophes.\n\n     With regard to such occurrences [earthquakes, deluges,\n     etc.], terrible as they appear at the time, they may not\n     much affect the average rate of change: there may be a\n     _cycle_, though an irregular one, of rapid and slow change:\n     and if such cycles go on succeeding each other, we may still\n     call the order of nature uniform, notwithstanding the\n     periods of violence which it involves.[24]\n\nThe reader who has followed me through this brief chapter of the\nhistory of geological philosophy will probably find the following\npassage in the paper of the Duke of Argyll to be not a little\nremarkable:--\n\n     Many years ago, when I had the honor of being President of\n     the British Association,[25] I ventured to point out, in the\n     presence and in the hearing of that most distinguished man\n     [Sir C. Lyell] that the doctrine of uniformity was not\n     incompatible with great and sudden changes, since cycles of\n     these and other cycles of comparative rest might well be\n     constituent parts of that uniformity which he asserted.\n     Lyell did not object to this extended interpretation of his\n     own doctrine, and indeed expressed to me his entire\n     concurrence.\n\nI should think he did; for, as I have shown, there was nothing in it\nthat Lyell himself had not said, six-and-twenty years before, and\nenforced, three years before; and it is almost verbally identical\nwith the view of uniformitarianism taken by Whewell, sixteen years\nbefore, in a work with which, one would think, that any one who\nundertakes to discuss the philosophy of science should be familiar.\n\nThirty years have elapsed since the beginner of 1856 persuaded himself\nthat he enlightened the foremost geologist of his time, and one of the\nmost acute and far-seeing men of science of any time, as to the scope\nof the doctrines which the veteran philosopher had grown gray in\npromulgating; and the Duke of Argyll's acquaintance with the\nliterature of geology has not, even now, become sufficiently profound\nto dissipate that pleasant delusion.\n\nIf the Duke of Argyll's guidance in that branch of physical science,\nwith which alone he has given evidence of any practical acquaintance,\nis thus unsafe, I may breathe more freely in setting my opinion\nagainst the authoritative deliverances of his Grace about matters\nwhich lie outside the province of geology.\n\nAnd here the Duke's paper offers me such a wealth of opportunities\nthat choice becomes embarrassing. I must bear in mind the good old\nadage, \"Non multa sed multum.\" Tempting as it would be to follow the\nDuke through his labyrinthine misunderstandings of the ordinary\nterminology of philosophy and to comment on the curious\nunintelligibility which hangs about his frequent outpourings of\nfervid language, limits of space oblige me to restrict myself to those\npoints, the discussion of which may help to enlighten the public in\nrespect of matters of more importance than the competence of my Mentor\nfor the task which he has undertaken.\n\nI am not sure when the employment of the word Law, in the sense in\nwhich we speak of laws of nature, commenced, but examples of it may be\nfound in the works of Bacon, Descartes, and Spinoza. Bacon employs\n\"Law\" as the equivalent of \"Form,\" and I am inclined to think that he\nmay be responsible for a good deal of the confusion that has\nsubsequently arisen; but I am not aware that the term is used by other\nauthorities, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in any other\nsense than that of \"rule\" or \"definite order\" of the coexistence of\nthings or succession of events in nature. Descartes speaks of \"regles,\nque je nomme les lois de la nature.\" Leibnitz says \"loi ou regle\ngenerale,\" as if he considered the terms interchangeable.\n\nThe Duke of Argyll, however, affirms that the \"law of gravitation\" as\nput forth by Newton was something more than the statement of an\nobserved order. He admits that Kepler's three laws \"were an observed\norder of facts and nothing more.\" As to the law of gravitation, \"it\ncontains an element which Kepler's laws did not contain, even an\nelement of causation, the recognition of which belongs to a higher\ncategory of intellectual conceptions than that which is concerned in\nthe mere observation and record of separate and apparently unconnected\nfacts.\" There is hardly a line in these paragraphs which appears to me\nto be indisputable. But, to confine myself to the matter in hand, I\ncannot conceive that any one who had taken ordinary pains to acquaint\nhimself with the real nature of either Kepler's or Newton's work could\nhave written them. That the labours of Kepler, of all men in the\nworld, should be called \"mere observation and record,\" is truly\nwonderful. And any one who will look into the \"Principia,\" or the\n\"Optics,\" or the \"Letters to Bentley,\" will see, even if he has no\nmore special knowledge of the topics discussed than I have, that\nNewton over and over again insisted that he had nothing to do with\ngravitation as a physical cause, and that when he used the terms\nattraction, force, and the like, he employed them, as he says,\n\"_mathematice_\" and not \"_physice_.\"\n\n     How these attractions [of gravity, magnetism, and\n     electricity] may be performed, I do not here consider. What\n     I call attraction may be performed by impulse or by some\n     other means unknown to me. I use that word here to signify\n     only in a general way any force by which bodies tend towards\n     one another, whatever be the cause.[26]\n\nAccording to my reading of the best authorities upon the history of\nscience, Newton discovered neither gravitation, nor the law of\ngravitation; nor did he pretend to offer more than a conjecture as to\nthe causation of gravitation. Moreover, his assertion that the notion\nof a body acting where it is not, is one that no competent thinker\ncould entertain, is antagonistic to the whole current conception of\nattractive and repulsive forces, and therefore of \"the attractive\nforce of gravitation.\" What, then, was that labour of unsurpassed\nmagnitude and excellence and of immortal influence which Newton did\nperform? In the first place, Newton defined the laws, rules, or\nobserved order of the phenomena of motion, which come under our daily\nobservation, with greater precision than had been before attained;\nand, by following out, with marvellous power and subtlety, the\nmathematical consequences of these rules, he almost created the modern\nscience of pure mechanics. In the second place, applying exactly the\nsame method to the explication of the facts of astronomy as that which\nwas applied a century and a half later to the facts of geology by\nLyell, he set himself to solve the following problem. Assuming that\nall bodies, free to move, tend to approach one another as the earth\nand the bodies on it do; assuming that the strength of that tendency\nis directly as the mass and inversely as the squares of the distances;\nassuming that the laws of motion, determined for terrestrial bodies,\nhold good throughout the universe; assuming that the planets and\ntheir satellites were created and placed at their observed mean\ndistances, and that each received a certain impulse from the Creator;\nwill the form of the orbits, the varying rates of motion of the\nplanets, and the ratio between those rates and their distances from\nthe sun, which must follow by mathematical reasoning from these\npremisses, agree with the order of facts determined by Kepler and\nothers, or not?\n\nNewton, employing mathematical methods which are the admiration of\nadepts, but which no one but himself appears to have been able to use\nwith ease, not only answered this question in the affirmative, but\nstayed not his constructive genius before it had founded modern\nphysical astronomy.\n\nThe historians of mechanical and of astronomical science appear to be\nagreed that he was the first person who clearly and distinctly put\nforth the hypothesis that the phenomena comprehended under the general\nname of \"gravity\" follow the same order throughout the universe, and\nthat all material bodies exhibit these phenomena; so that, in this\nsense, the idea of universal gravitation may, doubtless, be properly\nascribed to him.\n\nNewton proved that the laws of Kepler were particular consequences of\nthe laws of motion and the law of gravitation--in other words, the\nreason of the first lay in the two latter. But to talk of the law of\ngravitation alone as the reason of Kepler's laws, and still more as\nstanding in any causal relation to Kepler's laws, is simply a misuse\nof language. It would really be interesting if the Duke of Argyll\nwould explain how he proposes to set about showing that the elliptical\nform of the orbits of the planets, the constant area described by the\nradius vector, and the proportionality of the squares of the periodic\ntimes to the cubes of the distances from the sun, are either caused by\nthe \"force of gravitation\" or deducible from the \"law of gravitation.\"\nI conceive that it would be about as apposite to say that the various\ncompounds of nitrogen with oxygen are caused by chemical attraction\nand deducible from the atomic theory.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nNewton assuredly lent no shadow of support to the modern\npseudo-scientific philosophy which confounds laws with causes. I have\nnot taken the trouble to trace out this commonest of fallacies to its\nfirst beginning; but I was familiar with it in full bloom more than\nthirty years ago, in a work which had a great vogue in its day--the\n\"Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation\"--of which the first\nedition was published in 1844.\n\nIt is full of apt and forcible illustrations of pseudo-scientific\nrealism. Consider, for example, this gem serene. When a boy who has\nclimbed a tree loses his hold of the branch, \"the law of gravitation\nunrelentingly pulls him to the ground, and then he is hurt,\" whereby\nthe Almighty is quite relieved from any responsibility for the\naccident. Here is the \"law of gravitation\" acting as a cause in a way\nquite in accordance with the Duke of Argyll's conception of it. In\nfact, in the mind of the author of the \"Vestiges,\" \"laws\" are\nexistences intermediate between the Creator and His works, like the\n\"ideas\" of the Platonisers or the Logos of the Alexandrians.[27] I may\ncite a passage which is quite in the vein of Philo:--\n\n     We have seen powerful evidences that the construction of\n     this globe and its associates; and, inferentially, that of\n     all the other globes in space, was the result, not of any\n     immediate or personal exertion on the part of the Deity, but\n     of natural laws which are the expression of His will. What\n     is to hinder our supposing that the organic creation is also\n     a result of natural laws which are in like manner an\n     expression of His will? (p. 154, 1st edition).\n\nAnd creation \"operating by law\" is constantly cited as relieving the\nCreator from trouble about insignificant details.\n\nI am perplexed to picture to myself the state of mind which accepts\nthese verbal juggleries. It is intelligible that the Creator should\noperate according to such rules as he might think fit to lay down for\nhimself (and therefore according to law); but that would leave the\noperation of his will just as much a direct personal act as it would\nbe under any other circumstances. I can also understand that (as in\nLeibnitz's caricature of Newton's views) the Creator might have made\nthe cosmical machine, and, after setting it going, have left it to\nitself till it needed repair. But then, by the supposition, his\npersonal responsibility would have been involved in all that it did;\njust as much as a dynamiter is responsible for what happens, when he\nhas set his machine going and left it to explode.\n\nThe only hypothesis which gives a sort of mad consistency to the\nVestigiarian's views is the supposition that laws are a kind of angels\nor demiurgoi, who, being supplied with the Great Architect's plan,\nwere permitted to settle the details among themselves. Accepting this\ndoctrine, the conception of royal laws and plebeian laws, and of those\nmore than Homeric contests in which the big laws \"wreck\" the little\nones, becomes quite intelligible. And, in fact, the honour of the\npaternity of those remarkable ideas which come into full flower in the\npreacher's discourse must, so far as my imperfect knowledge goes, be\nattributed to the author of the \"Vestiges.\"\n\nBut the author of the \"Vestiges\" is not the only writer who is\nresponsible for the current pseudo-scientific mystifications which\nhang about the term \"law.\" When I wrote my paper about \"Scientific and\nPseudo-Scientific Realism,\" I had not read a work by the Duke of\nArgyll, \"The Reign of Law,\" which, I believe, has enjoyed, possibly\nstill enjoys, a widespread popularity. But the vivacity of the Duke's\nattack led me to think it possible that criticisms directed elsewhere\nmight have come home to him. And, in fact, I find that the second\nchapter of the work in question, which is entitled \"Law; its\ndefinitions,\" is, from my point of view, a sort of \"summa\" of\npseudo-scientific philosophy. It will be worth while to examine it in\nsome detail.\n\nIn the first place, it is to be noted that the author of the \"Reign of\nLaw\" admits that \"law,\" in many cases, means nothing more than the\nstatement of the order in which facts occur, or, as he says, \"an\nobserved order of facts\" (p. 66). But his appreciation of the value of\naccuracy of expression does not hinder him from adding, almost in the\nsame breath, \"In this sense the laws of nature are simply those facts\nof nature which recur according to rule\" (p. 66). Thus \"laws,\" which\nwere rightly said to be the statement of an order of facts in one\nparagraph, are declared to be the facts themselves in the next.\n\nWe are next told that, though it may be customary and permissible to\nuse \"law\" in the sense of a statement of the order of facts, this is a\nlow use of the word; and, indeed, two pages farther on, the writer,\nflatly contradicting himself, altogether denies its admissibility.\n\n     An observed order of facts, to be entitled to the rank of a\n     law, must be an order so constant and uniform as to indicate\n     necessity, and necessity can only arise out of the action\n     of some compelling force (p. 68).\n\nThis is undoubtedly one of the most singular propositions that I have\never met with in a professedly scientific work, and its rarity is\nembellished by another direct self-contradiction which it implies. For\non the preceding page (67), when the Duke of Argyll is speaking of the\nlaws of Kepler, which he admits to be laws, and which are types of\nthat which men of science understand by \"laws,\" he says that they are\n\"simply and purely an order of facts.\" Moreover, he adds: \"A very\nlarge proportion of the laws of every science are laws of this kind\nand in this sense.\"\n\nIf, according to the Duke of Argyll's admission, law is understood, in\nthis sense, thus widely and constantly by scientific authorities,\nwhere is the justification for his unqualified assertion that such\nstatements of the observed order of facts are not \"entitled to the\nrank\" of laws?\n\nBut let us examine the consequences of the really interesting\nproposition I have just quoted. I presume that it is a law of nature\nthat \"a straight line is the shortest distance between two points.\"\nThis law affirms the constant association of a certain fact of form\nwith a certain fact of dimension. Whether the notion of necessity\nwhich attaches to it has an _a priori_, or an _a posteriori_ origin is\na question not relevant to the present discussion. But I would beg to\nbe informed, if it is necessary, where is the \"compelling force\" out\nof which the necessity arises; and further, if it is not necessary,\nwhether it loses the character of a law of nature?\n\nI take it to be the law of nature, based on unexceptionable evidence,\nthat the mass of matter remains unchanged, whatever chemical or other\nmodifications it may undergo. This law is one of the foundations of\nchemistry. But it is by no means necessary. It is quite possible to\nimagine that the mass of matter should vary according to\ncircumstances, as we know its weight does. Moreover, the determination\nof the \"force\" which makes mass constant (if there is any\nintelligibility in that form of words) would not, so far as I can see,\nconfer any more validity on the law than it has now.\n\nThere is a law of nature, so well vouched by experience, that all\nmankind, from pure logicians in search of examples to parish sextons\nin search of fees, confide in it. This is the law that \"all men are\nmortal.\" It is simply a statement of the observed order of facts that\nall men sooner or later die. I am not acquainted with any law of\nnature which is more \"constant and uniform\" than this. But will any\none tell me that death is \"necessary\"? Certainly there is no _a\npriori_ necessity in the case, for various men have been imagined to\nbe immortal. And I should be glad to be informed of any \"necessity\"\nthat can be deduced from biological considerations. It is quite\nconceivable, as has recently been pointed out, that some of the lowest\nforms of life may be immortal, after a fashion. However this may be, I\nwould further ask, supposing \"all men are mortal\" to be a real law of\nnature, where and what is that to which, with any propriety, the title\nof \"compelling force\" of the law can be given?\n\nOn page 69, the Duke of Argyll asserts that the law of gravitation \"is\na law in the sense, not merely of a rule, but of a cause.\" But this\nrevival of the teaching of the \"Vestiges\" has already been examined\nand disposed of; and when the Duke of Argyll states that the \"observed\norder\" which Kepler had discovered was simply a necessary consequence\nof the force of \"gravitation,\" I need not recapitulate the evidence\nwhich proves such a statement to be wholly fallacious. But it may be\nuseful to say, once more, that, at this present moment, nobody knows\nanything about the existence of a \"force\" of gravitation apart from\nthe fact; that Newton declared the ordinary notion of such force to be\ninconceivable; that various attempts have been made to account for the\norder of facts we call gravitation, without recourse to the notion of\nattractive force; that, if such a force exists, it is utterly\nincompetent to account for Kepler's laws, without taking into the\nreckoning a great number of other considerations; and, finally, that\nall we know about the \"force\" of gravitation, or any other so-called\n\"force,\" is that it is a name for the hypothetical cause of an\nobserved order of facts.\n\nThus, when the Duke of Argyll says: \"Force, ascertained according to\nsome measure of its operation--this is indeed one of the definitions,\nbut only one, of a scientific law\" (p. 71) I reply that it is a\ndefinition which must be repudiated by every one who possesses an\nadequate acquaintance with either the facts, or the philosophy, of\nscience, and be relegated to the limbo of pseudo-scientific fallacies.\nIf the human mind has never entertained this notion of \"force,\" nay,\nif it substituted bare invariable succession for the ordinary notion of\ncausation, the idea of law, as the expression of a constantly-observed\norder, which generates a corresponding intensity of expectation in our\nminds, would have exactly the same value, and play its part in real\nscience, exactly as it does now.\n\nIt is needless to extend further the present excursus on the origin\nand history of modern pseudo-science. Under such high patronage as it\nhas enjoyed, it has grown and flourished until, nowadays, it is\nbecoming somewhat rampant. It has its weekly \"Ephemerides,\" in which\nevery new pseudo-scientific mare's-nest is hailed and belauded with\nthe unconscious unfairness of ignorance; and an army of \"reconcilers,\"\nenlisted in its service, whose business seems to be to mix the black\nof dogma and the white of science into the neutral tint of what they\ncall liberal theology.\n\nI remember that, not long after the publication of the \"Vestiges,\" a\nshrewd and sarcastic countryman of the author defined it as \"cauld\nkail made het again.\" A cynic might find amusement in the reflection\nthat, at the present time, the principles and the methods of the\nmuch-vilified Vestigiarian are being \"made het again\"; and are not\nonly \"echoed by the dome of St. Paul's,\" but thundered from the castle\nof Inverary. But my turn of mind is not cynical, and I can but regret\nthe waste of time and energy bestowed on the endeavour to deal with\nthe most difficult problems of science, by those who have neither\nundergone the discipline, nor possess the information, which are\nindispensable to the successful issue of such an enterprise.\n\nI have already had occasion to remark that the Duke of Argyll's views\nof the conduct of controversy are different from mine; and this\nmuch-to-be lamented discrepancy becomes yet more accentuated when the\nDuke reaches biological topics. Anything that was good enough for Sir\nCharles Lyell, in his department of study, is certainly good enough\nfor me in mine; and I by no means demur to being pedagogically\ninstructed about a variety of matters with which it has been the\nbusiness of my life to try to acquaint myself. But the Duke of Argyll\nis not content with favouring me with his opinions about my own\nbusiness; he also answers for mine; and, at that point, really the\nworm must turn. I am told that \"no one knows better than Professor\nHuxley\" a variety of things which I really do not know; and I am said\nto be a disciple of that \"Positive Philosophy\" which I have, over and\nover again, publicly repudiated in language which is certainly not\nlacking in intelligibility whatever may be its other defects.\n\nI am told that I have been amusing myself with a \"metaphysical\nexercitation or logomachy\" (may I remark incidentally that these are\nnot quite convertible terms?), when, to the best of my belief, I have\nbeen trying to expose a process of mystification, based upon the use\nof scientific language by writers who exhibit no sign of scientific\ntraining, of accurate scientific knowledge, or of clear ideas\nrespecting the philosophy of science, which is doing very serious harm\nto the public. Naturally enough, they take the lion's skin of\nscientific phraseology for evidence that the voice which issues from\nbeneath it is the voice of science, and I desire to relieve them from\nthe consequences of their error.\n\nThe Duke of Argyll asks, apparently with sorrow that it should be his\nduty to subject me to reproof--\n\n     What shall we say of a philosophy which confounds the\n     organic with the inorganic, and, refusing to take note of a\n     difference so profound, assumes to explain under one common\n     abstraction, the movements due to gravitation and the\n     movements due to the mind of man?\n\nTo which I may fitly reply by another question: What shall we say to a\ncontroversialist who attributes to the subject of his attack opinions\nwhich are notoriously not his; and expresses himself in such a manner\nthat it is obvious he is unacquainted with even the rudiments of that\nknowledge which is necessary to the discussion into which he has\nrushed?\n\nWhat line of my writing can the Duke of Argyll produce which confounds\nthe organic with the inorganic?\n\nAs to the latter half of the paragraph, I have to confess a doubt\nwhether it has any definite meaning. But I imagine that the Duke is\nalluding to my assertion that the law of gravitation is nowise\n\"suspended\" or \"defied\" when a man lifts his arm; but that, under such\ncircumstances, part of the store of energy in the universe operates on\nthe arm at a mechanical advantage as against the operation of another\npart. I was simple enough to think that no one who had as much\nknowledge of physiology as is to be found in an elementary primer, or\nwho had ever heard of the greatest physical generalisation of modern\ntimes--the doctrine of the conservation of energy--would dream of\ndoubting my statement; and I was further simple enough to think that\nno one who lacked these qualifications would feel tempted to charge me\nwith error. It appears that my simplicity is greater than my powers of\nimagination.\n\nThe Duke of Argyll may not be aware of the fact, but it is\nnevertheless true, that when a man's arm is raised, in sequence to\nthat state of consciousness we call a volition, the volition is not\nthe immediate cause of the elevation of the arm. On the contrary, that\noperation is effected by a certain change of form, technically known\nas \"contraction\" in sundry masses of flesh, technically known as\nmuscles, which are fixed to the bones of the shoulder in such a manner\nthat, if these muscles contract, they must raise the arm. Now each of\nthese muscles is a machine comparable, in a certain sense, to one of\nthe donkey-engines of a steamship, but more complete, inasmuch as the\nsource of its ability to change its form, or contract, lies within\nitself. Every time that, by contracting, the muscle does work, such as\nthat involved in raising the arm, more or less of the material which\nit contains is used up, just as more or less of the fuel of a\nsteam-engine is used up, when it does work. And I do not think there\nis a doubt in the mind of any competent physicist, or physiologist,\nthat the work done in lifting the weight of the arm is the mechanical\nequivalent of a certain proportion of the energy set free by the\nmolecular changes which take place in the muscle. It is further a\ntolerably well-based belief that this, and all other forms of energy,\nare mutually convertible; and, therefore, that they all come under\nthat general law or statement of the order of facts, called the\nconservation of energy. And, as that certainly is an abstraction, so\nthe view which the Duke of Argyll thinks so extremely absurd is really\none of the commonplaces of physiology. But this Review is hardly an\nappropriate place for giving instruction in the elements of that\nscience, and I content myself with recommending the Duke of Argyll to\ndevote some study to Book II. chap. v. section 4 of my friend Dr.\nFoster's excellent text-book of Physiology (1st edition, 1877, p.\n321), which begins thus:--\n\n     Broadly speaking, the animal body is a machine for\n     converting potential into actual energy. The potential\n     energy is supplied by the food; this the metabolism of the\n     body converts into the actual energy of heat and mechanical\n     labour.\n\nThere is no more difficult problem in the world than that of the\nrelation of the state of consciousness, termed volition, to the\nmechanical work which frequently follows upon it. But no one can even\ncomprehend the nature of the problem, who has not carefully studied\nthe long series of modes of motion which, without a break, connect the\nenergy which does that work with the general store of energy. The\nultimate form of the problem is this: Have we any reason to believe\nthat a feeling, or state of consciousness, is capable of directly\naffecting the motion of even the smallest conceivable molecule of\nmatter? Is such a thing even conceivable? If we answer these questions\nin the negative, it follows that volition may be a sign, but cannot be\na cause, of bodily motion. If we answer them in the affirmative, then\nstates of consciousness become undistinguishable from material things;\nfor it is the essential nature of matter to be the vehicle or\nsubstratum of mechanical energy.\n\nThere is nothing new in all this. I have merely put into modern\nlanguage the issue raised by Descartes more than two centuries ago.\nThe philosophies of the Occasionalists, of Spinoza, of Malebranche, of\nmodern idealism and modern materialism, have all grown out of the\ncontroversies which Cartesianism evoked. Of all this the\npseudo-science of the present time appears to be unconscious;\notherwise it would hardly content itself with \"making het again\" the\npseudo-science of the past.\n\nIn the course of these observations I have already had occasion to\nexpress my appreciation of the copious and perfervid eloquence which\nenriches the Duke of Argyll's pages. I am almost ashamed that a\nconstitutional insensibility to the Sirenian charms of rhetoric has\npermitted me in wandering through these flowery meads, to be\nattracted, almost exclusively, to the bare places of fallacy and the\nstony grounds of deficient information, which are disguised, though\nnot concealed, by these floral decorations. But, in his concluding\nsentences, the Duke soars into a Tyrtaean strain which roused even my\ndull soul.\n\n     It was high time, indeed, that some revolt should be raised\n     against that Reign of Terror which had come to be\n     established in the scientific world under the abuse of a\n     great name. Professor Huxley has not joined this revolt\n     openly, for as yet, indeed, it is only beginning to raise\n     its head. But more than once--and very lately--he has\n     uttered a warning voice against the shallow dogmatism that\n     has provoked it. The time is coming when that revolt will be\n     carried further. Higher interpretations will be established.\n     Unless I am much mistaken, they are already coming in sight\n     (p. 339).\n\nI have been living very much out of the world for the last two or\nthree years, and when I read this denunciatory outburst, as of one\nfilled with the spirit of prophecy, I said to myself, \"Mercy upon us,\nwhat has happened? Can it be that X. and Y. (it would be wrong to\nmention the names of the vigorous young friends which occurred to me)\nare playing Danton and Robespierre; and that a guillotine is erected\nin the courtyard of Burlington House for the benefit of all\nanti-Darwinian Fellows of the Royal Society? Where are the secret\nconspirators against this tyranny, whom I am supposed to favour, and\nyet not have the courage to join openly? And to think of my poor\noppressed friend, Mr. Herbert Spencer, 'compelled to speak with bated\nbreath' (p. 338) certainly for the first time in my thirty-odd years'\nacquaintance with him!\" My alarm and horror at the supposition that\nwhile I had been fiddling (or at any rate physicking), my beloved Rome\nhad been burning, in this fashion, may be imagined.\n\nI am sure the Duke of Argyll will be glad to hear that the anxiety he\ncreated was of extremely short duration. It is my privilege to have\naccess to the best sources of information, and nobody in the\nscientific world can tell me anything about either the \"Reign of\nTerror\" or \"the Revolt.\" In fact, the scientific world laughs most\nindecorously at the notion of the existence of either; and some are so\nlost to the sense of the scientific dignity, that they descend to the\nuse of transatlantic slang, and call it a \"bogus scare.\" As to my\nfriend Mr. Herbert Spencer, I have every reason to know that, in the\n\"Factors of Organic Evolution,\" he has said exactly what was in his\nmind, without any particular deference to the opinions of the person\nwhom he is pleased to regard as his most dangerous critic and Devil's\nAdvocate-General, and still less of any one else.\n\nI do not know whether the Duke of Argyll pictures himself as the\nTallien of this imaginary revolt against a no less imaginary Reign of\nTerror. But if so, I most respectfully but firmly decline to join his\nforces. It is only a few weeks since I happened to read over again the\nfirst article which I ever wrote (now twenty-seven years ago) on the\n\"Origin of Species,\" and I found nothing that I wished to modify in\nthe opinions that are there expressed, though the subsequent vast\naccumulation of evidence in favour of Mr. Darwin's views would give me\nmuch to add. As is the case with all new doctrines, so with that of\nEvolution, the enthusiasm of advocates has sometimes tended to\ndegenerate into fanaticism; and mere speculation has, at times,\nthreatened to shoot beyond its legitimate bounds. I have occasionally\nthought it wise to warn the more adventurous spirits among us against\nthese dangers, in sufficiently plain language; and I have sometimes\njestingly said that I expected, if I lived long enough, to be looked\non as a reactionary by some of my more ardent friends. But nothing\nshort of midsummer madness can account for the fiction that I am\nwaiting till it is safe to join openly a revolt, hatched by some\nperson or persons unknown, against an intellectual movement with which\nI am in the most entire and hearty sympathy. It is a great many years\nsince, at the outset of my career, I had to think seriously what life\nhad to offer that was worth having. I came to the conclusion that the\nchief good, for me, was freedom to learn, think, and say what I\npleased, when I pleased. I have acted on that conviction, and have\navailed myself of the \"rara temporum felicitas ubi sentire quae velis,\net quae sentias dicere licet,\" which is now enjoyable, to the best of\nmy ability; and though strongly, and perhaps wisely, warned that I\nshould probably come to grief, I am entirely satisfied with the\nresults of the line of action I have adopted.\n\nMy career is at an end. I have\n\n    Warmed both hands before the fire of life;\n\nand nothing is left me, before I depart, but to help, or at any rate\nto abstain from hindering, the younger generation of men of science in\ndoing better service to the cause we have at heart than I have been\nable to render.\n\nAnd yet, forsooth, I am supposed to be waiting for the signal of\n\"revolt,\" which some fiery spirits among these young men are to raise\nbefore I dare express my real opinions concerning questions about\nwhich we older men had to fight, in the teeth of fierce public\nopposition and obloquy--of something which might almost justify even\nthe grandiloquent epithet of a Reign of Terror--before our excellent\nsuccessors had left school.\n\nIt would appear that the spirit of pseudo-science has impregnated even\nthe imagination of the Duke of Argyll. The scientific imagination\nalways restrains itself within the limits of probability.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n     [20] _Nineteenth Century_, March, 1887.\n\n     [21] The Duke of Argyll speaks of the recent date of the\n          demonstration of the fallacy of the doctrine in\n          question. \"Recent\" is a relative term, but I may\n          mention that the question is fully discussed in my book\n          on _Hume_; which, if I may believe my publishers, has\n          been read by a good many people since it appeared in\n          1879. Moreover, I observe, from a note at page 89 of\n          _The Reign of Law_, a work to which I shall have\n          occasion to advert by and by, that the Duke of Argyll\n          draws attention to the circumstance that, so long ago\n          as 1866, the views which I hold on this subject were\n          well known. The Duke, in fact, writing about this time,\n          says, after quoting a phrase of mine: \"The question of\n          miracles seems now to be admitted on all hands to be\n          simply a question of evidence.\" In science, we think\n          that a teacher who ignores views which have been\n          discussed _coram populo_ for twenty years, is hardly up\n          to the mark.\n\n     [22] See also vol. i. p. 460. In the ninth edition (1853),\n          published twenty-three years after the first. Lyell\n          deprives even the most careless reader of any excuse\n          for misunderstanding him: \"So in regard to subterranean\n          movements, the theory of the perpetual uniformity of\n          the force which they exert on the earth-crust is quite\n          consistent with the admission of their alternate\n          development and suspension for indefinite periods\n          within limited geographical areas\" (p. 187).\n\n     [23] A great many years ago (Presidential Address to the\n          Geological Society, 1869) I ventured to indicate that\n          which seemed to me to be the weak point, not in the\n          fundamental principles of uniformitarianism, but in\n          uniformitarianism as taught by Lyell. It lay, to my\n          mind, in the refusal by Hutton, and in a less degree by\n          Lyell, to look beyond the limits of the time recorded\n          by the stratified rocks. I said: \"This attempt to\n          limit, at a particular point, the progress of inductive\n          and deductive reasoning from the things which are to\n          the things which were--this faithlessness to its own\n          logic, seems to me to have cost uniformitarianism the\n          place as the permanent form of geological speculation\n          which it might otherwise have held\" (_Lay Sermons_, p.\n          260). The context shows that \"uniformitarianism\" here\n          means that doctrine, as limited in application by\n          Hutton and Lyell, and that what I mean by\n          \"evolutionism\" is consistent and thorough-going\n          uniformitarianism.\n\n     [24] _Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences_, vol. i. p. 670.\n          New edition, 1847.\n\n     [25] At Glasgow in 1856.\n\n     [26] _Optics_, query 31.\n\n     [27] The author recognises this in his _Explanations_.\n\n\n\n\nIV: AN EPISCOPAL TRILOGY\n\n[1887]\n\n\nIf there is any truth in the old adage that a burnt child dreads the\nfire, I ought to be very loath to touch a sermon, while the memory of\nwhat befell me on a recent occasion, possibly not yet forgotten by the\nreaders of the _Nineteenth Century_, is uneffaced. But I suppose that\neven the distinguished censor of that unheard-of audacity to which not\neven the newspaper report of a sermon is sacred, can hardly regard a\nman of science as either indelicate or presumptuous, if he ventures to\noffer some comments upon three discourses, specially addressed to the\ngreat assemblage of men of science which recently gathered at\nManchester, by three bishops of the State Church. On my return to\nEngland not long ago, I found a pamphlet[28] containing a version,\nwhich I presume to be authorised, of these sermons, among the huge\nmass of letters and papers which had accumulated during two months'\nabsence; and I have read them not only with attentive interest, but\nwith a feeling of satisfaction which is quite new to me as a result of\nhearing, or reading, sermons. These excellent discourses, in fact,\nappear to me to signalise a new departure in the course adopted by\ntheology towards science, and to indicate the possibility of bringing\nabout an honourable _modus vivendi_ between the two. How far the three\nbishops speak as accredited representatives of the Church is a\nquestion to be considered by and by. Most assuredly, I am not\nauthorised to represent any one but myself. But I suppose that there\nmust be a good many people in the Church of the bishops' way of\nthinking; and I have reason to believe that, in the ranks of science,\nthere are a good many persons who, more or less, share my views. And\nit is to these sensible people on both sides, as the bishops and I\nmust needs think those who agree with us, that my present observations\nare addressed. They will probably be astonished to learn how\ninsignificant, in principle, their differences are.\n\nIt is impossible to read the discourses of the three prelates without\nbeing impressed by the knowledge which they display, and by the spirit\nof equity, I might say of generosity, towards science which pervades\nthem. There is no trace of that tacit or open assumption that the\nrejection of theological dogmas, on scientific grounds, is due to\nmoral perversity, which is the ordinary note of ecclesiastical\nhomilies on this subject, and which makes them look so supremely silly\nto men whose lives have been spent in wrestling with these questions.\nThere is no attempt to hide away real stumbling-blocks under\nrhetorical stucco; no resort to the _tu quoque_ device of setting\nscientific blunders against theological errors; no suggestion that an\nhonest man may keep contradictory beliefs in separate pockets of his\nbrain; no question that the method of scientific investigation is\nvalid, whatever the results to which it may lead; and that the search\nafter truth, and truth only, ennobles the searcher and leaves no doubt\nthat his life, at any rate, is worth living. The Bishop of Carlisle\ndeclares himself pledged to the belief that \"the advancement of\nscience, the progress of human knowledge, is in itself a worthy aim of\nthe greatest effort of the greatest minds.\"\n\nHow often was it my fate, a quarter of a century ago, to see the whole\nartillery of the pulpit brought to bear upon the doctrine of evolution\nand its supporters! Any one unaccustomed to the amenities of\necclesiastical controversy would have thought we were too wicked to be\npermitted to live. But let us hear the Bishop of Bedford. After a\nperfectly frank statement of the doctrine of evolution and some of\nits obvious consequences, that learned prelate pleads, with all\nearnestness, against\n\n     a hasty denunciation of what _may_ be proved to have at\n     least some elements of truth in it, a contemptuous rejection\n     of theories which we _may_ some day learn to accept as\n     freely and with as little sense of inconsistency with God's\n     word as we now accept the theory of the earth's motion round\n     the sun, or the long duration of the geological epochs (p.\n     28).\n\nI do not see that the most convinced evolutionist could ask any one,\nwhether cleric or layman, to say more than this; in fact, I do not\nthink that any one has a right to say more, with respect to any\nquestion about which two opinions can he held, than that his mind is\nperfectly open to the force of evidence.\n\nThere is another portion of the Bishop of Bedford's sermon which I\nthink will be warmly appreciated by all honest and clear-headed men.\nHe repudiates the views of those who say that theology and science\n\n     occupy wholly different spheres, and need in no way\n     intermeddle with each other. They revolve, as it were, in\n     different planes, and so never meet. Thus we may pursue\n     scientific studies with the utmost freedom and, at the same\n     time, may pay the most reverent regard to theology, having\n     no fears of collision, because allowing no points of contact\n     (p. 29).\n\nSurely every unsophisticated mind will heartily concur with the\nBishop's remark upon this convenient refuge for the descendants of\nMr. Facing-both-ways. \"I have never been able to understand this\nposition though I have often seen it assumed.\" Nor can any demurrer be\nsustained when the Bishop proceeds to point out that there are, and\nmust be, various points of contact between theological and natural\nscience, and therefore that it is foolish to ignore or deny the\nexistence of as many dangers of collision.\n\nFinally, the Bishop of Manchester freely admits the force of the\nobjections which have been raised, on scientific grounds, to prayer,\nand attempts to turn them by arguing that the proper objects of prayer\nare not physical but spiritual. He tells us that natural accidents and\nmoral misfortunes are not to be taken for moral judgments of God; he\nadmits the propriety of the application of scientific methods to the\ninvestigation of the origin and growth of religions; and he is as\nready to recognise the process of evolution there, as in the physical\nworld. Mark the following striking passage:--\n\n     And how utterly all the common objections to Divine\n     revelation vanish away when they are set in the light of\n     this theory of a spiritual progression. Are we reminded that\n     there prevailed, in those earlier days, views of the nature\n     of God and man, of human life and Divine Providence, which\n     we now find to be untenable? _That_, we answer, is precisely\n     what the theory of development presupposes. If early views\n     of religion and morality had not been imperfect, where had\n     been the development? If symbolical visions and mythical\n     creations had found no place in the early Oriental\n     expression of Divine truth, where had been the development?\n     The sufficient answer to ninety-nine out of a hundred of the\n     ordinary objections to the Bible, as the record of a divine\n     education of our race, is asked in that one\n     word--development. And to what are we indebted for that\n     potent word, which, as with the wand of a magician, has at\n     the same moment so completely transformed our knowledge and\n     dispelled our difficulties? To modern science, resolutely\n     pursuing its search for truth in spite of popular obloquy\n     and--alas! that one should have to say it--in spite too\n     often of theological denunciation (p. 53).\n\nApart from its general importance, I read this remarkable statement\nwith the more pleasure, since, however imperfectly I may have\nendeavoured to illustrate the evolution of theology in a paper\npublished in the _Nineteenth Century_ last year,[29] it seems to me\nthat in principle, at any rate, I may hereafter claim high theological\nsanction for the views there set forth.\n\nIf theologians are henceforward prepared to recognise the authority of\nsecular science in the manner and to the extent indicated in the\nManchester trilogy; if the distinguished prelates who offer these\nterms are really plenipotentiaries, then, so far as I may presume to\nspeak on such a matter, there will be no difficulty about concluding a\nperpetual treaty of peace, and indeed of alliance, between the high\ncontracting powers, whose history has hitherto been little more than a\nrecord of continual warfare. But if the great Chancellor's maxim, \"Do\nut des,\" is to form the basis of negotiation, I am afraid that\nsecular science will be ruined; for it seems to me that theology,\nunder the generous impulse of a sudden conversion, has given all that\nshe hath; and indeed, on one point, has surrendered more than can\nreasonably be asked.\n\nI suppose I must be prepared to face the reproach which attaches to\nthose who criticise a gift, if I venture to observe that I do not\nthink that the Bishop of Manchester need have been so much alarmed, as\nhe evidently has been, by the objections which have often been raised\nto prayer, on the ground that a belief in the efficacy of prayer is\ninconsistent with a belief in the constancy of the order of nature.\n\nThe Bishop appears to admit that there is an antagonism between the\n\"regular economy of nature\" and the \"regular economy of prayer\" (p.\n39), and that \"prayers for the interruption of God's natural order\"\nare of \"doubtful validity\" (p. 42). It appears to me that the Bishop's\ndifficulty simply adds another example to those which I have several\ntimes insisted upon in the pages of this Review and elsewhere, of the\nmischief which has been done, and is being done, by a mistaken\napprehension of the real meaning of \"natural order\" and \"law of\nnature.\"\n\nMay I, therefore, be permitted to repeat, once more, that the\nstatements denoted by these terms have no greater value or cogency\nthan such as may attach to generalisations from experience of the\npast, and to expectations for the future based upon that experience?\nNobody can presume to say what the order of nature must be; all that\nthe widest experience (even if it extended over all past time and\nthrough all space) that events had happened in a certain way could\njustify, would be a proportionally strong expectation that events will\ngo on happening, and the demand for a proportional strength of\nevidence in favour of any assertion that they had happened otherwise.\n\nIt is this weighty consideration, the truth of which every one who is\ncapable of logical thought must surely admit, which knocks the bottom\nout of all _a priori_ objections either to ordinary \"miracles\" or to\nthe efficacy of prayer, in so far as the latter implies the miraculous\nintervention of a higher power. No one is entitled to say _a priori_\nthat any given so-called miraculous event is impossible; and no one is\nentitled to say _a priori_ that prayer for some change in the ordinary\ncourse of nature cannot possibly avail.\n\nThe supposition that there is any inconsistency between the acceptance\nof the constancy of natural order and a belief in the efficacy of\nprayer, is the more unaccountable as it is obviously contradicted by\nanalogies furnished by everyday experience. The belief in the efficacy\nof prayer depends upon the assumption that there is somebody,\nsomewhere, who is strong enough to deal with the earth and its\ncontents as men deal with the things and events which they are strong\nenough to modify or control; and who is capable of being moved by\nappeals such as men make to one another. This belief does not even\ninvolve theism; for our earth is an insignificant particle of the\nsolar system, while the solar system is hardly worth speaking of in\nrelation to the All; and, for anything that can be proved to the\ncontrary, there may be beings endowed with full powers over our\nsystem, yet, practically, as insignificant as ourselves in relation to\nthe universe. If any one pleases, therefore, to give unrestrained\nliberty to his fancy, he may plead analogy in favour of the dream that\nthere may be, somewhere, a finite being, or beings, who can play with\nthe solar system as a child plays with a toy; and that such being may\nbe willing to do anything which he is properly supplicated to do. For\nwe are not justified in saying that it is impossible for beings having\nthe nature of men, only vastly more powerful, to exist; and if they do\nexist, they may act as and when we ask them to do so, just as our\nbrother men act. As a matter of fact, the great mass of the human race\nhas believed, and still believes, in such beings, under the various\nnames of fairies, gnomes, angels, and demons. Certainly I do not lack\nfaith in the constancy of natural order. But I am not less convinced\nthat if I were to ask the Bishop of Manchester to do me a kindness\nwhich lay within his power, he would do it. And I am unable to see\nthat his action on my request involves any violation of the order of\nnature. On the contrary, as I have not the honour to know the Bishop\npersonally, my action would be based upon my faith, in that \"law of\nnature,\" or generalisation from experience, which tells me that, as a\nrule, men who occupy the Bishop's position are kindly and courteous.\nHow is the case altered if my request is preferred to some imaginary\nsuperior being, or to the Most High being, who, by the supposition, is\nable to arrest disease, or make the sun stand still in the heavens,\njust as easily as I can stop my watch, or make it indicate any hour\nthat pleases me?\n\nI repeat that it is not upon any _a priori_ considerations that\nobjections, either to the supposed efficacy of prayer in modifying the\ncourse of events, or to the supposed occurrence of miracles, can be\nscientifically based. The real objection, and, to my mind, the fatal\nobjection, to both these suppositions, is the inadequacy of the\nevidence to prove any given case of such occurrences which has been\nadduced. It is a canon of common sense, to say nothing of science,\nthat the more improbable a supposed occurrence, the more cogent ought\nto be the evidence in its favour. I have looked somewhat carefully\ninto the subject, and I am unable to find in the records of any\nmiraculous event evidence which even approximates to the fulfilment of\nthis requirement.\n\nBut, in the case of prayer, the Bishop points out a most just and\nnecessary distinction between its effect on the course of nature,\noutside ourselves, and its effect within the region of the\nsupplicator's mind.\n\nIt is a \"law of nature,\" verifiable by everyday experience, that our\nalready formed convictions, our strong desires, our intent occupation\nwith particular ideas, modify our mental operations to a most\nmarvellous extent, and produce enduring changes in the direction and\nin the intensity of our intellectual and moral activities. Men can\nintoxicate themselves with ideas as effectually as with alcohol or\nwith bang, and produce, by dint of intense thinking, mental conditions\nhardly distinguishable from monomania. Demoniac possession is\nmythical; but the faculty of being possessed, more or less completely,\nby an idea is probably the fundamental condition of what is called\ngenius, whether it show itself in the saint, the artist, or the man of\nscience. One calls it faith, another calls it inspiration, a third\ncalls it insight; but the \"intending of the mind,\" to borrow Newton's\nwell-known phrase, the concentration of all the rays of intellectual\nenergy on some one point, until it glows and colours the whole cast of\nthought with its peculiar light, is common to all.\n\nI take it that the Bishop of Manchester has psychological science with\nhim when he insists upon the subjective efficacy of prayer in faith,\nand on the seemingly miraculous effects which such \"intending of the\nmind\" upon religious and moral ideals may have upon character and\nhappiness. Scientific faith, at present, takes it no further than the\nprayer which Ajax offered; but that petition is continually granted.\n\nWhatever points of detail may yet remain open for discussion, however,\nI repeat the opinion I have already expressed, that the Manchester\nsermons concede all that science, has an indisputable right, or any\npressing need, to ask, and that not grudgingly but generously; and, if\nthe three bishops of 1887 carry the Church with them, I think they\nwill have as good title to the permanent gratitude of posterity as the\nfamous seven who went to the Tower in defence of the Church two\nhundred years ago.\n\nWill their brethren follow their just and prudent guidance? I have no\nsuch acquaintance with the currents of ecclesiastical opinion as would\njustify me in even hazarding a guess on such a difficult topic. But\nsome recent omens are hardly favourable. There seems to be an\nimpression abroad--I do not desire to give any countenance to it--that\nI am fond of reading sermons. From time to time, unknown\ncorrespondents--some apparently animated by the charitable desire to\npromote my conversion, and others unmistakably anxious to spur me to\nthe expression of wrathful antagonism--favour me with reports or\ncopies of such productions.\n\nI found one of the latter category among the accumulated arrears to\nwhich I have already referred.\n\nIt is a full, and apparently accurate, report of a discourse by a\nperson of no less ecclesiastical rank than the three authors of the\nsermons I have hitherto been considering; but who he is, and where or\nwhen the sermon was preached, are secrets which wild horses shall not\ntear from me, lest I fall again under high censure for attacking a\nclergyman. Only if the editor of this Review thinks it his duty to\nhave independent evidence that the sermon has a real existence, will\nI, in the strictest confidence, communicate it to him.\n\nThe preacher, in this case, is of a very different mind from the three\nbishops--and this mind is different in quality, different in spirit,\nand different in contents. He discourses on the _a priori_ objections\nto miracles, apparently without being aware, in spite of all the\ndiscussions of the last seven or eight years, that he is doing battle\nwith a shadow.\n\nI trust I do not misrepresent the Bishop of Manchester in saying that\nthe essence of his remarkable discourse is the insistence upon the\n\"supreme importance of the purely spiritual in our faith,\" and of the\nrelative, if not absolute, insignificance of aught else. He obviously\nperceives the bearing of his arguments against the alterability of\nthe course of outward nature by prayer, on the question of miracles in\ngeneral; for he is careful to say that \"the possibility of miracles,\nof a rare and unusual transcendence of the world order is not here in\nquestion\" (p. 38). It may be permitted me to suppose, however, that,\nif miracles were in question, the speaker who warns us \"that we must\nlook for the heart of the absolute religion in that part of it which\nprescribes our moral and religious relations\" (p. 46) would not be\ndisposed to advise those who had found the heart of Christianity to\ntake much thought about its miraculous integument.\n\nMy anonymous sermon will have nothing to do with such notions as\nthese, and its preacher is not too polite, to say nothing of\ncharitable, towards those who entertain them.\n\n     Scientific men, therefore, are perfectly right in asserting\n     that Christianity rests on miracles. If miracles never\n     happened, Christianity, in any sense which is not a mockery,\n     which does not make the term of none effect, has no reality.\n     I dwell on this because there is now an effort making to get\n     up a non-miraculous, invertebrate Christianity, which may\n     escape the ban of science. And I would warn you very\n     distinctly against this new contrivance. Christianity is\n     essentially miraculous, and falls to the ground if miracles\n     be impossible.\n\nWell, warning for warning. I venture to warn this preacher and those\nwho, with him, persist in identifying Christianity with the\nmiraculous, that such forms of Christianity are not only doomed to\nfall to the ground; but that, within the last half century, they have\nbeen driving that way with continually accelerated velocity.\n\nThe so-called religious world is given to a strange delusion. It\nfondly imagines that it possesses the monopoly of serious and constant\nreflection upon the terrible problems of existence; and that those who\ncannot accept its shibboleths are either mere Gallios, caring for none\nof these things, or libertines desiring to escape from the restraints\nof morality. It does not appear to have entered the imaginations of\nthese people that, outside their pale and firmly resolved never to\nenter it, there are thousands of men, certainly not their inferiors in\ncharacter, capacity, or knowledge of the questions at issue, who\nestimate those purely spiritual elements of the Christian faith of\nwhich the Bishop of Manchester speaks as highly as the Bishop does;\nbut who will have nothing to do with the Christian Churches, because\nin their apprehension and for them, the profession of belief in the\nmiraculous, on the evidence offered would be simply immoral.\n\nSo far as my experience goes, men of science are neither better nor\nworse than the rest of the world. Occupation with the endlessly great\nparts of the universe does not necessarily involve greatness of\ncharacter, nor does microscopic study of the infinitely little always\nproduce humility. We have our full share of original sin; need,\ngreed, and vainglory beset us as they do other mortals; and our\nprogress is, for the most part, like that of a tacking ship, the\nresultant of opposite divergencies from the straight path. But, for\nall that, there is one moral benefit which the pursuit of science\nunquestionably bestows. It keeps the estimate of the value of evidence\nup to the proper mark; and we are constantly receiving lessons, and\nsometimes very sharp ones, on the nature of proof. Men of science will\nalways act up to their standard of veracity, when mankind in general\nleave off sinning; but that standard appears to me to be higher among\nthem than in any other class of the community.\n\nI do not know any body of scientific men who could be got to listen\nwithout the strongest expressions of disgusted repudiation to the\nexposition of a pretended scientific discovery, which had no better\nevidence to show for itself than the story of the devils entering a\nherd of swine, or of the fig-tree that was blasted for bearing no figs\nwhen \"it was not the season of figs.\" Whether such events are possible\nor impossible, no man can say; but scientific ethics can and does\ndeclare that the profession of belief in them, on the evidence of\ndocuments of unknown date and of unknown authorship, is immoral.\nTheological apologists who insist that morality will vanish if their\ndogmas are exploded, would do well to consider the fact that, in the\nmatter of intellectual veracity, science is already a long way ahead\nof the Churches; and that, in this particular, it is exerting an\neducational influence on mankind of which the Churches have shown\nthemselves utterly incapable.\n\nUndoubtedly that varying compound of some of the best and some of the\nworst elements of Paganism and Judaism, moulded in practice by the\ninnate character of certain people of the Western world, which, since\nthe second century, has assumed to itself the title of orthodox\nChristianity, \"rests on miracles\" and falls to the ground, not \"if\nmiracles be impossible,\" but if those to which it is committed prove\nthemselves unable to fulfil the conditions of honest belief. That this\nChristianity is doomed to fall is, to my mind, beyond a doubt; but its\nfall will be neither sudden nor speedy. The Church, with all the aid\nlent it by the secular arm, took many centuries to extirpate the open\npractice of pagan idolatry within its own fold; and those who have\ntravelled in southern Europe will be aware that it has not extirpated\nthe essence of such idolatry even yet. _Mutato nomine_, it is probable\nthat there is as much sheer fetichism among the Roman populace now as\nthere was eighteen hundred years ago; and if Marcus Antonius could\ndescend from his horse and ascend the steps of the Ara Coeli church\nabout Twelfth Day, the only thing that need strike him would be the\nextremely contemptible character of the modern idols as works of art.\n\nScience will certainly neither ask for, nor receive, the aid of the\nsecular arm. It will trust to the much better and more powerful help\nof that education in scientific truth and in the morals of assent,\nwhich is rendered as indispensable, as it is inevitable, by the\npermeation of practical life with the products and ideas of science.\nBut no one who considers the present state of even the most developed\ncountries can doubt that the scientific light that has come into the\nworld will have to shine in the midst of darkness for a long time. The\nurban populations, driven into contact with science by trade and\nmanufacture, will more and more receive it, while the _pagani_ will\nlag behind. Let us hope that no Julian may arise among them to head a\nforlorn hope against the inevitable. Whatever happens, science may\nbide her time in patience and in confidence.\n\nBut to return to my \"Anonymous.\" I am afraid that if he represents any\ngreat party in the Church, the spirit of justice and reasonableness\nwhich animates the three bishops has as slender a chance of being\nimitated, on a large scale, as their common sense and their courtesy.\nFor, not contented with misrepresenting science on its speculative\nside, \"Anonymous\" attacks its morality.\n\n     For two whole years, investigations and conclusions which\n     would upset the theories of Darwin on the formation of coral\n     islands were actually suppressed, and that by the advice\n     even of those who accepted them, _for fear of upsetting the\n     faith and disturbing the judgment formed by the multitude\n     on the scientific character--the infallibility--of the great\n     master_!\n\nSo far as I know anything about the matters which are here referred\nto, the part of this passage which I have italicised is absolutely\nuntrue. I believe that I am intimately acquainted with all Mr.\nDarwin's immediate scientific friends: and I say that no one of them,\nnor any other man of science known to me, ever could, or would, have\ngiven such advice to any one--if for no other reason than that, with\nthe example of the most candid and patient listener to objections that\never lived fresh in their memories, they could not so grossly have at\nonce violated their highest duty and dishonoured their friend.\n\nThe charge thus brought by \"Anonymous\" affects the honour and the\nprobity of men of science; if it is true, we have forfeited all claim\nto the confidence of the general public. In my belief it is utterly\nfalse, and its real effect will be to discredit those who are\nresponsible for it. As is the way with slanders, it has grown by\nrepetition. \"Anonymous\" is responsible for the peculiarly offensive\nform which it has taken in his hands; but he is not responsible for\noriginating it. He has evidently been inspired by an article entitled\n\"A Great Lesson,\" published in the September number of this Review.\nTruly it is \"a great lesson,\" but not quite in the sense intended by\nthe giver thereof.\n\nIn the course of his doubtless well-meant admonitions, the Duke of\nArgyll commits himself to a greater number of statements which are\ndemonstrably incorrect and which any one who ventured to write upon\nthe subject ought to have known to be incorrect, than I have ever seen\ngathered together in so small a space.\n\nI submit a gathering from the rich store for the appreciation of the\npublic.\n\nFirst:--\n\n     Mr. Murray's new explanation of the structure of coral-reefs\n     and islands was communicated to the Royal Society of\n     Edinburgh in 1880, and supported with such a weight of facts\n     and such a close texture of reasoning, that no serious reply\n     has ever been attempted (p. 305).\n\n\"No serious reply has ever been attempted\"! I suppose that the Duke of\nArgyll may have heard of Professor Dana, whose years of labour devoted\nto corals and coral-reefs when he was naturalist of the American\nexpedition under Commodore Wilkes, more than forty years ago, have\never since caused him to be recognised as an authority of the first\nrank on such subjects. Now does his Grace know, or does he not know,\nthat, in the year 1885, Professor Dana published an elaborate paper\n\"On the Origin of Coral-Reefs and Islands,\" in which, after referring\nto a Presidential Address by the Director of the Geological Survey of\nGreat Britain and Ireland delivered in 1883, in which special\nattention is directed to Mr. Murray's views Professor Dana says:--\n\n     The existing state of doubt on the question has led the\n     writer to reconsider the earlier and later facts, and in the\n     following pages he gives his results.\n\nProfessor Dana then devotes many pages of his very \"serious reply\" to\na most admirable and weighty criticism of the objections which have at\nvarious times been raised to Mr. Darwin's doctrine, by Professor\nSemper, by Dr. Rein, and finally by Mr. Murray, and he states his\nfinal judgment as follows:--\n\n     With the theory of abrasion and solution incompetent, all\n     the hypotheses of objectors to Darwin's theory are alike\n     weak; for all have made these processes their chief\n     reliance, whether appealing to a calcareous, or a volcanic,\n     or a mountain-peak basement for the structure. The\n     subsidence which the Darwinian theory requires has not been\n     opposed by the mention of any fact at variance with it, nor\n     by setting aside Darwin's arguments in its favour; and it\n     has found new support in the facts from the \"Challenger's\"\n     soundings off Tahiti, that had been put in array against it,\n     and strong corroboration in the facts from the West Indies.\n\n     Darwin's theory, therefore, remains as the theory that\n     accounts for the origin of reefs and islands.[30]\n\nBe it understood that I express no opinion on the controverted points.\nI doubt if there are ten living men who, having a practical knowledge\nof what a coral-reef is, have endeavoured to master the very difficult\nbiological and geological problems involved in their study. I happen\nto have spent the best part of three years among coral-reefs and to\nhave made that attempt; and, when Mr. Murray's work appeared, I said\nto myself that until I had two or three months to give to the renewed\nstudy of the subject in all its bearings, I must be content to remain\nin a condition of suspended judgment. In the meanwhile, the man who\nwould be voted by common acclamation as the most competent person now\nliving to act as umpire, has delivered the verdict I have quoted; and,\nto go no further, has fully justified the hesitation I and others may\nhave felt about expressing an opinion. Under these circumstances, it\nseems to me to require a good deal of courage to say \"no serious reply\nhas ever been attempted\"; and to chide the men of science, in lofty\ntones, for their \"reluctance to admit an error\" which is not admitted;\nand for their \"slow and sulky acquiescence\" in a conclusion which they\nhave the gravest warranty for suspecting.\n\nSecond:--\n\n     Darwin himself had lived to hear of the new solution and,\n     with that splendid candour which was eminent in him his\n     mind, though now grown old in his own early convictions, was\n     at least ready to entertain it, and to confess that serious\n     doubts had been awakened as to the truth of his famous\n     theory (p. 305).\n\nI wish that Darwin's splendid candour could be conveyed by some\ndescription of spiritual \"microbe\" to those who write about him. I am\nnot aware that Mr. Darwin ever entertained \"serious doubts as to the\ntruth of his famous theory\"; and there is tolerably good evidence to\nthe contrary. The second edition of his work, published in 1876,\nproves that he entertained no such doubts then; a letter to Professor\nSemper, whose objections, in some respects, forestalled those of Mr.\nMurray, dated October 2, 1879, expresses his continued adherence to\nthe opinion \"that the atolls and barrier reefs in the middle of the\nPacific and Indian Oceans indicate subsidence\"; and the letter of my\nfriend Professor Judd, printed at the end of this article (which I had\nperhaps better say Professor Judd had not seen) will prove that this\nopinion remained unaltered to the end of his life.\n\nThird:--\n\n     ... Darwin's theory is a dream. It is not only unsound, but\n     it is in many respects the reverse of truth. With all his\n     conscientiousness, with all his caution, with all his powers\n     of observation, Darwin in this matter fell into errors as\n     profound as the abysses of the Pacific (p. 301).\n\nReally? It seems to me that, under the circumstances, it is pretty\nclear that these lines exhibit a lack of the qualities justly ascribed\nto Mr. Darwin, which plunges their author into a much deeper abyss,\nand one from which there is no hope of emergence.\n\nFourth:--\n\n     All the acclamations with which it was received were as the\n     shouts of an ignorant mob (p. 301).\n\nBut surely it should be added that the Coryphaeus of this ignorant\nmob, the fugleman of the shouts, was one of the most accomplished\nnaturalists and geologists now living--the American Dana--who, after\nyears of independent study extending over numerous reefs in the\nPacific, gave his hearty assent to Darwin's views, and after all that\nhad been said, deliberately reaffirmed that assent in the year 1885.\n\nFifth:--\n\n     The overthrow of Darwin's speculation is only beginning to\n     be known. It has been whispered for some time. The cherished\n     dogma has been dropping very slowly out of sight (p. 301).\n\nDarwin's speculation may be right or wrong, but I submit that that\nwhich has not happened cannot even begin to be known, except by those\nwho have miraculous gifts to which we poor scientific people do not\naspire. The overthrow of Darwin's views may have been whispered by\nthose who hoped for it; and they were perhaps wise in not raising\ntheir voices above a whisper. Incorrect statements, if made too\nloudly, are apt to bring about unpleasant consequences.\n\nSixth:--\n\nMr. Murray's views, published in 1880, are said to have met with \"slow\nand sulky acquiescence\" (p. 305). I have proved that they cannot be\nsaid to have met with general acquiescence of any sort, whether quick\nand cheerful, or slow and sulky; and if this assertion is meant to\nconvey the impression that Mr. Murray's views have been ignored, that\nthere has been a conspiracy of silence against them, it is utterly\ncontrary to notorious fact.\n\nProfessor Geikie's well-known \"Textbook of Geology\" was published in\n1882, and at pages 457-459 of that work there is a careful exposition\nof Mr. Murray's views. Moreover Professor Geikie has specially\nadvocated them on other occasions,[31] notably in a long article on\n\"The Origin of Coral-Reefs,\" published in two numbers of \"Nature\" for\n1883, and in a Presidential Address delivered in the same year. If, in\nso short a time after the publication of his views, Mr. Murray could\nboast of a convert, so distinguished and influential as the Director\nof the Geological Survey, it seems to me that this wonderful\n_conspiration de silence_ (which has about as much real existence as\nthe Duke of Argyll's other bogie, \"The Reign of Terror \") must have\n_ipso facto_ collapsed. I wish that, when I was a young man, my\nendeavours to upset some prevalent errors had met with as speedy and\neffectual backing.\n\nSeventh:--\n\n     ... Mr. John Murray was strongly advised against the\n     publication of his views in derogation of Darwin's\n     long-accepted theory of the coral islands, and was actually\n     induced to delay it for two years. Yet the late Sir Wyville\n     Thomson, who was at the head of the naturalists of the\n     \"Challenger\" expedition, was himself convinced by Mr.\n     Murray's reasoning (p. 307).\n\nClearly, then, it could not be Mr. Murray's official chief who gave\nhim this advice. Who was it? And what was the exact nature of the\nadvice given? Until we have some precise information on this head, I\nshall take leave to doubt whether this statement is more accurate than\nthose which I have previously cited.\n\nWhether such advice was wise or foolish, just or immoral, depends\nentirely on the motive of the person who gave it. If he meant to\nsuggest to Mr. Murray that it might be wise for a young and\ncomparatively unknown man to walk warily, when he proposed to attack a\ngeneralisation based on many years' labour of one undoubtedly\ncompetent person, and fortified by the independent results of the many\nyears' labour of another undoubtedly competent person; and even, if\nnecessary, to take two whole years in fortifying his position, I think\nthat such advice would have been sagacious and kind. I suppose that\nthere are few working men of science who have not kept their ideas to\nthemselves, while gathering and sifting evidence, for a much longer\nperiod than two years.\n\nIf, on the other hand, Mr. Murray was advised to delay the publication\nof his criticisms, simply to save Mr. Darwin's credit and to preserve\nsome reputation for infallibility, which no one ever heard of, then I\nhave no hesitation in declaring that his adviser was profoundly\ndishonest, as well as extremely foolish; and that, if he is a man of\nscience, he has disgraced his calling.\n\nBut, after all, this supposed scientific Achitophel has not yet made\ngood the primary fact of his existence. Until the needful proof is\nforthcoming, I think I am justified in suspending my judgment as to\nwhether he is much more than an anti-scientific myth. I leave it to\nthe Duke of Argyll to judge of the extent of the obligation under\nwhich, for his own sake, he may lie to produce the evidence on which\nhis aspersions of the honour of scientific men are based. I cannot\npretend that we are seriously disturbed by charges which every one who\nis acquainted with the truth of the matter knows to be ridiculous; but\nmud has a habit of staining if it lies too long, and it is as well to\nhave it brushed off as soon as may be.\n\nSo much for the \"Great Lesson.\" It is followed by a \"Little Lesson,\"\napparently directed against my infallibility--a doctrine about which I\nshould be inclined to paraphrase Wilkes's remark to George the Third,\nwhen he declared that he, at any rate, was not a Wilkite. But I really\nshould be glad to think that there are people who need the warning,\nbecause then it will be obvious that this raking up of an old story\ncannot have been suggested by a mere fanatical desire to damage men\nof science. I can but rejoice, then, that these misguided enthusiasts,\nwhose faith, in me has so far exceeded the bounds of reason, should be\nset right. But that \"want of finish\" in the matter of accuracy which\nso terribly mars the effect of the \"Great Lesson,\" is no less\nconspicuous in the case of the \"Little Lesson,\" and, instead of\nsetting my too fervent disciples right, it will set them wrong.\n\nThe Duke of Argyll, in telling the story of _Bathybius_, says that my\nmind was \"caught by this new and grand generalisation of the physical\nbasis of life.\" I never have been guilty of a reclamation about\nanything to my credit, and I do not mean to be; but if there is any\nblame going, I do not choose to be relegated to a subordinate place\nwhen I have a claim to the first. The responsibility for the first\ndescription and the naming of _Bathybius_ is mine and mine only. The\npaper on \"Some Organisms living at great Depths in the Atlantic\nOcean,\" in which I drew attention to this substance, is to be found by\nthe curious in the eighth volume of the \"Quarterly Journal of\nMicroscopical Science,\" and was published in the year 1868. Whatever\nerrors are contained in that paper are my own peculiar property; but\nneither at the meeting of the British Association in 1868, nor\nanywhere else, have I gone beyond what is there stated; except in so\nfar that, at a long-subsequent meeting of the Association, being\nimportuned about the subject, I ventured to express, somewhat\nemphatically, the wish that the thing was at the bottom of the sea.\n\nWhat is meant by my being caught by a generalisation about the\nphysical basis of life I do not know; still less can I understand the\nassertion that _Bathybius_ was accepted because of its supposed\nharmony with Darwin's speculations. That which interested me in the\nmatter was the apparent analogy of _Bathybius_ with other well-known\nforms of lower life, such as the plasmodia of the Myxomycetes and the\nRhizopods. Speculative hopes or fears had nothing to do with the\nmatter; and if _Bathybius_ were brought up alive from the bottom of\nthe Atlantic to-morrow, the fact would not have the slightest bearing,\nthat I can discern, upon Mr. Darwin's speculations, or upon any of the\ndisputed problems of biology. It would merely be one elementary\norganism the more added to the thousands already known.\n\nUp to this moment I was not aware of the universal favour with which\n_Bathybius_ was received.[32] Those simulators of an \"ignorant mob\"\nwho, according to the Duke of Argyll, welcomed Darwin's theory of\ncoral-reefs, made no demonstration in my favour, unless his Grace\nincludes Sir Wyville Thomson, Dr. Carpenter, Dr. Bessels, and\nProfessor Haeckel under that head. On the contrary, a sagacious friend\nof mine, than whom there was no more competent judge, the late Mr.\nGeorge Busk, was not to be converted; while, long before the\n\"Challenger\" work, Ehrenberg wrote to me very sceptically; and I fully\nexpected that that eminent man would favour me with pretty sharp\ncriticism. Unfortunately, he died shortly afterwards, and nothing from\nhim, that I know of, appeared. When Sir Wyville Thomson wrote to me a\nbrief account of the results obtained on board the \"Challenger\" I sent\nthis statement to \"Nature,\" in which journal it appeared the following\nweek, without any further note or comment than was needful to explain\nthe circumstances. In thus allowing judgment to go by default, I am\nafraid I showed a reckless and ungracious disregard for the feelings\nof the believers in my infallibility. No doubt I ought to have hedged\nand fenced and attenuated the effect of Sir Wyville Thomson's brief\nnote in every possible way. Or perhaps I ought to have suppressed the\nnote altogether, on the ground that it was a mere _ex parte_\nstatement. My excuse is that, notwithstanding a large and abiding\nfaith in human folly, I did not know then, any more than I know now,\nthat there was anybody foolish enough to be unaware that the only\npeople scientific or other, who never make mistakes are those who do\nnothing; or that anybody, for whose opinion I cared, would not rather\nsee me commit ten blunders than try to hide one.\n\nPending the production of further evidence, I hold that the existence\nof people who believe in the infallibility of men of science is as\npurely mythical as that of the evil counsellor who advised the\nwithholding of the truth lest it should conflict with that belief.\n\nI venture to think, then, that the Duke of Argyll might have spared\nhis \"Little Lesson\" as well as his \"Great Lesson\" with advantage. The\npaternal authority who whips the child for sins he has not committed\ndoes not strengthen his moral influence--rather excites contempt and\nrepugnance. And if, as would seem from this and former monitory\nallocutions which have been addressed to us, the Duke aspires to the\nposition of censor, or spiritual director, in relation to the men who\nare doing the work of physical science, he really must get up his\nfacts better. There will be an end to all chance of our kissing the\nrod if his Grace goes wrong a third time. He must not say again that\n\"no serious reply has been attempted\" to a view which was discussed\nand repudiated, two years before, by one of the highest extant\nauthorities on the subject; he must not say that Darwin accepted that\nwhich it can be proved he did not accept; he must not say that a\ndoctrine has dropped into the abyss when it is quite obviously alive\nand kicking at the surface; he must not assimilate a man like\nProfessor Dana to the components of an \"ignorant mob\"; he must not say\nthat things are beginning to be known which are not known at all; he\nmust not say that \"slow and sulky acquiescence\" has been given to that\nwhich cannot yet boast of general acquiescence of any kind; he must\nnot suggest that a view which has been publicly advocated by the\nDirector of the Geological Survey and no less publicly discussed by\nmany other authoritative writers has been intentionally and\nsystematically ignored; he must not ascribe ill motives for a course\nof action which is the only proper one; and finally, if any one but\nmyself were interested, I should say that he had better not waste his\ntime in raking up the errors of those whose lives have been occupied,\nnot in talking about science, but in toiling, sometimes with success\nand sometimes with failure, to get some real work done.\n\nThe most considerable difference I note among men is not in their\nreadiness to fall into error, but in their readiness to acknowledge\nthese inevitable lapses. The Duke of Argyll has now a splendid\nopportunity for proving to the world in which of these categories it\nis hereafter to rank him.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nDEAR PROFESSOR HUXLEY,--A short time before Mr. Darwin's death, I had\na conversation with, him concerning the observations which had been\nmade by Mr. Murray upon coral-reefs, and the speculations which had\nbeen founded upon those observations. I found that Mr. Darwin had very\ncarefully considered the whole subject, and that while, on the one\nhand, he did not regard the actual facts recorded by Mr. Murray as\nabsolutely inconsistent with his own theory of subsidence, on the\nother hand, he did not believe that they necessitated or supported the\nhypothesis advanced by Mr. Murray. Mr. Darwin's attitude, as I\nunderstood it, towards Mr. Murray's objections to the theory of\nsubsidence was exactly similar to that maintained by him with respect\nto Professor Semper's criticism, which was of a very similar\ncharacter; and his position with regard to the whole question was\nalmost identical with that subsequently so clearly defined by\nProfessor Dana in his well-known articles published in the \"American\nJournal of Science\" for 1885.\n\nIt is difficult to imagine how any one, acquainted with the scientific\nliterature of the last seven years, could possibly suggest that Mr.\nMurray's memoir published in 1880 had failed to secure a due amount of\nattention. Mr. Murray, by his position in the \"Challenger\" office,\noccupied an exceptionally favourable position for making his views\nwidely known; and he had, moreover, the singular good fortune to\nsecure from the first the advocacy of so able and brilliant a writer\nas Professor Archibald Geikie, who in a special discourse and in\nseveral treatises on geology and physical geology very strongly\nsupported the new theory. It would be an endless task to attempt to\ngive references to the various scientific journals which have\ndiscussed the subject, but I may add that every treatise on geology\nwhich has been published, since Mr. Murray's views were made known,\nhas dealt with his observations at considerable length. This is true\nof Professor A.H. Green's \"Physical Geology,\" published in 1882; of\nProfessor Prestwich's \"Geology, Chemical and Physical\"; and of\nProfessor James Geikie's \"Outlines of Geology,\" published in 1886.\nSimilar prominence is given to the subject in De Lapparent's \"Traite\nde Geologie,\" published in 1885, and in Credner's \"Elemente der\nGeologie,\" which has appeared during the present year. If this be a\n\"conspiracy of silence,\" where, alas! can the geological speculator\nseek for fame?--Yours very truly, JOHN W. JUDD.\n\n_October_ 10, 1887.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n     [28] _The Advance of Science_. Three sermons preached in\n          Manchester Cathedral on Sunday, September 4, 1887,\n          during the meeting of the British Association for the\n          Advancement of Science, by the Bishop of Carlisle, the\n          Bishop of Bedford, and the Bishop of Manchester.\n\n     [29] Reprinted in Vol. IV. of this collection.\n\n     [30] _American Journal of Science_, 1885, p. 190.\n\n     [31] Professor Geikie, however, though a strong, is a fair\n          and candid advocate. He says of Darwin's theory, \"That\n          it may be possibly true, in some instances, may be\n          readily granted.\" For Professor Geikie, then, it is not\n          yet over-thrown--still less a dream.\n\n     [32] I find, moreover, that I specially warned my readers\n          against hasty judgment. After stating the facts of\n          observation, I add, \"I have, hitherto, said nothing\n          about their meaning, as, in an inquiry so difficult and\n          fraught with interest as this, it seems to me to be in\n          the highest degree important to keep the questions of\n          fact and the questions of interpretation well apart\"\n          (p. 210).\n\n\n\n\nV: THE VALUE OF WITNESS TO THE MIRACULOUS\n\n[1889]\n\n\nCharles, or, more properly, Karl, King of the Franks, consecrated\nRoman Emperor in St. Peter's on Christmas Day, A.D. 800, and known to\nposterity as the Great (chiefly by his agglutinative Gallicised\ndenomination, of Charlemagne), was a man great in all ways, physically\nand mentally. Within a couple of centuries after his death Charlemagne\nbecame the centre of innumerable legends; and the myth-making process\ndoes not seem to have been sensibly interfered with by the existence\nof sober and truthful histories of the Emperor and of the times which\nimmediately preceded and followed his reign by a contemporary writer\nwho occupied a high and confidential position in his court, and in\nthat of his successor. This was one Eginhard, or Einhard, who appears\nto have been born about A.D. 770, and spent his youth at the court,\nbeing educated along with Charles's sons. There is excellent\ncontemporary testimony not only to Eginhard's existence, but to his\nabilities, and to the place which he occupied in the circle of the\nintimate friends of the great ruler whose life he subsequently wrote.\nIn fact, there is as good evidence of Eginhard's existence, of his\nofficial position, and of his being the author of the chief works\nattributed to him, as can reasonably be expected in the case of a man\nwho lived more than a thousand years ago, and was neither a great king\nnor a great warrior. The works are--1. \"The Life of the Emperor Karl.\"\n2. \"The Annals of the Franks.\" 3. \"Letters.\" 4. \"The History of the\nTranslation of the Blessed Martyrs of Christ, SS. Marcellinus and\nPetrus.\"\n\nIt is to the last, as one of the most singular and interesting records\nof the period during which the Roman world passed into that of the\nMiddle Ages, that I wish to direct attention.[33] It was written in\nthe ninth century, somewhere, apparently, about the year 830, when\nEginhard, ailing in health and weary of political life, had withdrawn\nto the monastery of Seligenstadt, of which he was the founder. A\nmanuscript copy of the work, made in the tenth century, and once the\nproperty of the monastery of St. Bavon on the Scheldt, of which\nEginhard was Abbot, is still extant, and there is no reason to believe\nthat, in this copy, the original has been in any way interpolated or\notherwise tampered with. The main features of the strange story\ncontained in the \"Historia Translationis\" are set forth in the\nfollowing pages, in which, in regard to all matters of importance, I\nshall adhere as closely as possible to Eginhard's own words.\n\n     While I was still at Court, busied with secular affairs, I\n     often thought of the leisure which I hoped one day to enjoy\n     in a solitary place, far away from the crowd, with which the\n     liberality of Prince Louis, whom I then served, had provided\n     me. This place is situated in that part of Germany which\n     lies between the Neckar and the Maine,[34] and is nowadays\n     called the Odenwald by those who live in and about it. And\n     here having built, according to my capacity and resources,\n     not only houses and permanent dwellings, but also a basilica\n     fitted for the performance of divine service and of no mean\n     style of construction, I began to think to what saint or\n     martyr I could best dedicate it. A good deal of time had\n     passed while my thoughts fluctuated about this matter, when\n     it happened that a certain deacon of the Roman Church, named\n     Deusdona, arrived at the Court for the purpose of seeking\n     the favour of the King in some affairs in which he was\n     interested. He remained some time; and then, having\n     transacted his business, he was about to return to Rome,\n     when one day, moved by courtesy to a stranger, we invited\n     him to a modest refection; and while talking of many things\n     at table, mention was made of the translation of the body of\n     the blessed Sebastian,[35] and of the neglected tombs of\n     the martyrs, of which there is such a prodigious number at\n     Rome; and the conversation having turned towards the\n     dedication of our new basilica, I began to inquire how it\n     might be possible for me to obtain some of the true relics\n     of the saints which rest at Rome. He at first hesitated, and\n     declared that he did not know how that could be done. But\n     observing that I was both anxious and curious about the\n     subject, he promised to give me an answer some other day.\n\n     When I returned to the question some time afterwards, he\n     immediately drew from his bosom a paper, which he begged me\n     to read when I was alone, and to tell him what I was\n     disposed to think of that which was therein stated. I took\n     the paper and, as he desired, read it alone and in secret.\n     (Cap. i. 2, 3.)\n\nI shall have occasion to return to Deacon Deusdona's conditions, and\nto what happened after Eginhard's acceptance of them. Suffice it, for\nthe present, to say that Eginhard's notary, Ratleicus (Ratleig), was\ndespatched to Rome and succeeded in securing two bodies, supposed to\nbe those of the holy martyrs Marcellinus and Petrus; and when he had\ngot as far on his homeward journey as the Burgundian town of\nSolothurn, or Soleure,[36] notary Ratleig despatched to his master, at\nSt. Bavon, a letter announcing the success of his mission.\n\n     As soon as by reading it I was assured of the arrival of the\n     saints, I despatched a confidential messenger to Maestricht\n     to gather together priests, other clerics, and also laymen,\n     to go out to meet the coming saints as speedily as possible.\n     And he and his companions, having lost no time, after a few\n     days met those who had charge of the saints at Solothurn.\n     Joined with them, and with a vast crowd of people who\n     gathered from all parts, singing hymns, and amidst great and\n     universal rejoicings, they travelled quickly to the city of\n     Argentoratum, which is now called Strasburg. Thence\n     embarking on the Rhine, they came to the place called\n     Portus,[37] and landing on the east bank of the river, at\n     the fifth station thence they arrived at Michilinstadt,[38]\n     accompanied by an immense multitude, praising God. This\n     place is in that forest of Germany which in modern times is\n     called the Odenwald, and about six leagues from the Maine.\n     And here, having found a basilica recently built by me, but\n     not yet consecrated, they carried the sacred remains into it\n     and deposited them therein, as if it were to be their final\n     resting-place. As soon as all this was reported to me I\n     travelled thither as quickly as I could. (Cap. ii. 14.)\n\nThree days after Eginhard's arrival began the series of wonderful\nevents which he narrates, and for which we have his personal\nguarantee. The first thing that he notices is the dream of a servant\nof Ratleig, the notary, who, being set to watch the holy relics in the\nchurch after vespers, went to sleep and, during his slumbers, had a\nvision of two pigeons, one white and one gray and white, which came\nand sat upon the bier over the relics; while, at the same time, a\nvoice ordered the man to tell his master that the holy martyrs had\nchosen another resting-place and desired to be transported thither\nwithout delay.\n\nUnfortunately, the saints seem to have forgotten to mention where\nthey wished to go; and, with the most anxious desire to gratify their\nsmallest wishes, Eginhard was naturally greatly perplexed what to do.\nWhile in this state of mind, he was one day contemplating his \"great\nand wonderful treasure, more precious than all the gold in the world,\"\nwhen it struck him that the chest in which the relics were contained\nwas quite unworthy of its contents; and, after vespers, he gave orders\nto one of the sacristans to take the measure of the chest in order\nthat a more fitting shrine might be constructed. The man, having\nlighted a wax candle and raised the pall which covered the relics, in\norder to carry out his master's orders, was astonished and terrified\nto observe that the chest was covered with a blood-like exudation\n(_loculum mirum in modum humore sanguineo undique distillantem_), and\nat once sent a message to Eginhard.\n\n     Then I and those priests who accompanied me beheld this\n     stupendous miracle, worthy of all admiration. For just as\n     when it is going to rain, pillars and slabs and marble\n     images exude moisture, and, as it were, sweat, so the chest\n     which contained the most sacred relics was found moist with\n     the blood exuding on all sides. (Cap. ii. 16.)\n\nThree days' fast was ordained in order that the meaning of the portent\nmight be ascertained. All that happened, however, was that, at the end\nof that time, the \"blood,\" which had been exuding in drops all the\nwhile, dried up. Eginhard is careful to say that the liquid \"had a\nsaline taste, something like that of tears, and was thin as water\nthough of the colour of true blood,\" and he clearly thinks this\nsatisfactory evidence that it was blood.\n\nThe same night, another servant had a vision, in which still more\nimperative orders for the removal of the relics were given; and, from\nthat time forth, \"not a single night passed without one, two, or even\nthree of our companions receiving revelations in dreams that the\nbodies of the saints were to be transferred from that place to\nanother.\" At last a priest, Hildfrid, saw, in a dream, a venerable\nwhite-haired man in a priest's vestments, who bitterly reproached\nEginhard for not obeying the repeated orders of the saints; and, upon\nthis, the journey was commenced. Why Eginhard delayed obedience to\nthese repeated visions so long does not appear. He does not say so, in\nso many words, but the general tenor of the narrative leads one to\nsuppose that Mulinheim (afterwards Seligenstadt) is the \"solitary\nplace\" in which he had built the church which awaited dedication. In\nthat case, all the people about him would know that he desired that\nthe saints should go there. If a glimmering of secular sense led him\nto be a little suspicious about the real cause of the unanimity of the\nvisionary beings who manifested themselves to his _entourage_, in\nfavour of moving on, he does not say so.\n\nAt the end of the first day's journey, the precious relics were\ndeposited in the church of St. Martin, in the village of Ostheim.\nHither, a paralytic nun (_sanctimonialis quaedam paralytica_) of the\nname of Ruodlang was brought, in a car, by her friends and relatives\nfrom a monastery a league off. She spent the night watching and\npraying by the bier of the saints; \"and health returning to all her\nmembers, on the morrow she went back to her place whence she came, on\nher feet, nobody supporting her, or in any way giving her assistance.\"\n(Cap. ii. 19.)\n\nOn the second day, the relics were carried to Upper Mulinheim; and,\nfinally, in accordance with the orders of the martyrs, deposited in\nthe church of that place, which was therefore renamed Seligenstadt.\nHere, Daniel, a beggar boy of fifteen, and so bent that \"he could not\nlook at the sky without lying on his back,\" collapsed and fell down\nduring the celebration of the Mass. \"Thus he lay a long time, as if\nasleep, and all his limbs straightening and his flesh strengthening\n(_recepta firmitate nervorum_), he arose before our eyes, quite well.\"\n(Cap. ii. 20.)\n\nSome time afterwards an old man entered the church on his hands and\nknees, being unable to use his limbs properly:--\n\n     He, in presence of all of us, by the power of God and the\n     merits of the blessed martyrs, in the same hour in which he\n     entered was so perfectly cured that he walked without so\n     much as a stick. And he said that, though he had been deaf\n     for five years, his deafness had ceased along with the\n     palsy. (Cap. iii. 33.)\n\nEginhard was now obliged to return to the Court at Aix-la-Chapelle,\nwhere his duties kept him through the winter; and he is careful to\npoint out that the later miracles which he proceeds to speak of are\nknown to him only at second hand. But, as he naturally observes,\nhaving seen such wonderful events with his own eyes, why should he\ndoubt similar narrations when they are received from trustworthy\nsources?\n\nWonderful stories these are indeed, but as they are, for the most\npart, of the same general character as those already recounted, they\nmay be passed over. There is, however, an account of a possessed\nmaiden which is worth attention. This is set forth in a memoir, the\nprincipal contents of which are the speeches of a demon who declared\nhimself to possess the singular appellation of \"Wiggo,\" and revealed\nhimself in the presence of many witnesses, before the altar, close to\nthe relics of the blessed martyrs. It is noteworthy that the\nrevelations appear to have been made in the shape of replies to the\nquestions of the exorcising priest; and there is no means of judging\nhow far the answers are, really, only the questions to which the\npatient replied yes or no.\n\nThe possessed girl, about sixteen years of age, was brought by her\nparents to the basilica of the martyrs.\n\n     When she approached the tomb containing the sacred bodies,\n     the priest, according to custom, read the formula of\n     exorcism over her head. When he began to ask how and when\n     the demon had entered her, she answered, not in the tongue\n     of the barbarians, which alone the girl knew, but in the\n     Roman tongue. And when the priest was astonished and asked\n     how she came to know Latin, when her parents, who stood by,\n     were wholly ignorant of it, \"Thou hast never seen my\n     parents,\" was the reply. To this the priest, \"Whence art\n     thou, then, if these are not thy parents?\" And the demon, by\n     the mouth of the girl, \"I am a follower and disciple of\n     Satan, and for a long time I was gatekeeper (janitor) in\n     hell; but for some years, along with eleven companions, I\n     have ravaged the kingdom of the Franks.\" (Cap. v. 49.)\n\nHe then goes on to tell how they blasted the crops and scattered\npestilence among beasts and men, because of the prevalent wickedness\nof the people.[39]\n\nThe enumeration of all these iniquities, in oratorical style, takes up\na whole octavo page; and at the end it is stated, \"All these things\nthe demon spoke in Latin by the mouth of the girl.\"\n\n     And when the priest imperatively ordered him to come out, \"I\n     shall go,\" said he, \"not in obedience to you, but on account\n     of the power of the saints, who do not allow me to remain\n     any longer.\" And having said this, he threw the girl down on\n     the floor and there compelled her to lie prostrate for a\n     time, as though she slumbered. After a little while,\n     however, he going away, the girl, by the power of Christ and\n     the merits of the blessed martyrs, as it were awaking from\n     sleep, rose up quite well, to the astonishment of all\n     present; nor after the demon had gone out was she able to\n     speak Latin: so that it was plain enough that it was not she\n     who had spoken in that tongue, but the demon by her mouth.\n     (Cap. v. 51.)\n\nIf the \"Historia Translationis\" contained nothing more than has been\nlaid before the reader, up to this time, disbelief in the miracles of\nwhich it gives so precise and full a record might well be regarded as\nhyper-scepticism. It might fairly be said, Here you have a man, whose\nhigh character, acute intelligence, and large instruction are\ncertified by eminent contemporaries; a man who stood high in the\nconfidence of one of the greatest rulers of any age, and whose other\nworks prove him to be an accurate and judicious narrator of ordinary\nevents. This man tells you, in language which bears the stamp of\nsincerity, of things which happened within his own knowledge, or\nwithin that of persons in whose veracity he has entire confidence,\nwhile he appeals to his sovereign and the court as witnesses of\nothers; what possible ground can there be for disbelieving him?\n\nWell, it is hard upon Eginhard to say so, but it is exactly the\nhonesty and sincerity of the man which are his undoing as a witness to\nthe miraculous. He himself makes it quite obvious that when his\nprofound piety comes on the stage, his good sense and even his\nperception of right and wrong, make their exit. Let us go back to the\npoint at which we left him, secretly perusing the letter of Deacon\nDeusdona. As he tells us, its contents were\n\n     that he [the deacon] had many relics of saints at home, and\n     that he would give them to me if I would furnish him with\n     the means of returning to Rome; he had observed that I had\n     two mules, and if I would let him have one of them and would\n     despatch with him a confidential servant to take charge of\n     the relics, he would at once send them to me. This plausibly\n     expressed proposition pleased me, and I made up my mind to\n     test the value of the somewhat ambiguous promise at\n     once;[40] so giving him the mule and money for his journey I\n     ordered my notary Ratleig (who already desired to go to Rome\n     to offer his devotions there) to go with him. Therefore,\n     having left Aix-la-Chapelle (where the Emperor and his Court\n     resided at the time) they came to Soissons. Here they spoke\n     with Hildoin, abbot of the monastery of St. Medardus,\n     because the said deacon had assured him that he had the\n     means of placing in his possession the body of the blessed\n     Tiburtius the Martyr. Attracted by which promises he\n     (Hildoin) sent with them a certain priest, Hunus by name, a\n     sharp man (_hominem callidum_), whom he ordered to receive\n     and bring back the body of the martyr in question. And so,\n     resuming their journey, they proceeded to Rome as fast as\n     they could. (Cap. i. 3.)\n\nUnfortunately, a servant of the notary, one Reginbald, fell ill of a\ntertian fever, and impeded the progress of the party. However, this\npiece of adversity had its sweet uses; for three days before they\nreached Rome, Reginbald had a vision. Somebody habited as a deacon\nappeared to him and asked why his master was in such a hurry to get\nto Rome; and when Reginbald explained their business, this visionary\ndeacon, who seems to have taken the measure of his brother in the\nflesh with some accuracy, told him not by any means to expect that\nDeusdona would fulfil his promises. Moreover, taking the servant by\nthe hand, he led him to the top of a high mountain and, showing him\nRome (where the man had never been), pointed out a church, adding\n\"Tell Ratleig the thing he wants is hidden there; let him get it as\nquickly as he can and go back to his master.\" By way of a sign that\nthe order was authoritative, the servant was promised that, from that\ntime forth, his fever should disappear. And as the fever did vanish to\nreturn no more, the faith of Eginhard's people in Deacon Deusdona\nnaturally vanished with it (_et fidem diaconi promissis non\nhaberent_). Nevertheless, they put up at the deacon's house near St.\nPeter ad Vincula. But time went on and no relics made their\nappearance, while the notary and the priest were put off with all\nsorts of excuses--the brother to whom the relics had been confided was\ngone to Beneventum and not expected back for some time, and so\non--until Ratleig and Hunus began to despair, and were minded to\nreturn, _infecto negotio_.\n\n     But my notary, calling to mind his servant's dream, proposed\n     to his companion that they should go to the cemetery which\n     their host had talked about without him. So, having found\n     and hired a guide, they went in the first place to the\n     basilica of the blessed Tiburtius in the Via Labicana, about\n     three thousand paces fron the town, and cautiously and\n     carefully inspected the tomb of that martyr, in order to\n     discover whether it could be opened without any one being\n     the wiser. Then they descended into the adjoining crypt, in\n     which the bodies of the blessed martyrs of Christ,\n     Marcellinus and Petrus, were buried; and, having made out\n     the nature of their tomb, they went away thinking their host\n     would not know what they had been about. But things fell out\n     differently from what they had imagined. (Cap. i. 7.)\n\nIn fact, Deacon Deusdona, who doubtless kept an eye on his guests,\nknew all about their manoeuvres and made haste to offer his services,\nin order that, \"with the help of God\" (_si Deus votis eorum favere\ndignaretur_), they should all work together. The deacon was evidently\nalarmed lest they should succeed without _his_ help.\n\nSo, by way of preparation for the contemplated _vol avec effraction_\nthey fasted three days; and then, at night, without being seen, they\nbetook themselves to the basilica of St. Tiburtius, and tried to break\nopen the altar erected over his remains. But the marble proving too\nsolid, they descended to the crypt, and, \"having evoked our Lord Jesus\nChrist and adored the holy martyrs,\" they proceeded to prise off the\nstone which covered the tomb, and thereby exposed the body of the most\nsacred martyr, Marcellinus, \"whose head rested on a marble tablet on\nwhich his name was inscribed.\" The body was taken up with the\ngreatest veneration, wrapped in a rich covering, and given over to the\nkeeping of the deacon and his brother, Lunison, while the stone was\nreplaced with such care that no sign of the theft remained.\n\nAs sacrilegious proceedings of this kind were punishable with death by\nthe Roman law, it seems not unnatural that Deacon Deusdona should have\nbecome uneasy, and have urged Ratleig to be satisfied with what he had\ngot and be off with his spoils. But the notary having thus cleverly\ncaptured the blessed Marcellinus, thought it a pity he should be\nparted from the blessed Petrus, side by side with whom he had rested,\nfor five hundred years and more, in the same sepulchre (as Eginhard\npathetically observes); and the pious man could neither eat, drink,\nnor sleep, until he had compassed his desire to re-unite the saintly\ncolleagues. This time, apparently in consequence of Deusdona's\nopposition to any further resurrectionist doings, he took counsel with\na Greek monk, one Basil, and, accompanied by Hunus, but saying nothing\nto Deusdona, they committed another sacrilegious burglary, securing\nthis time, not only the body of the blessed Petrus, but a quantity of\ndust, which they agreed the priest should take, and tell his employer\nthat it was the remains of the blessed Tiburtius. How Deusdona was\n\"squared,\" and what he got for his not very valuable complicity in\nthese transactions, does not appear. But at last the relics were sent\noff in charge of Lunison, the brother of Deusdona, and the priest\nHunus, as far as Pavia, while Ratleig stopped behind for a week to see\nif the robbery was discovered, and, presumably, to act as a blind, if\nany hue and cry was raised. But, as everything remained quiet, the\nnotary betook himself to Pavia, where he found Lunison and Hunus\nawaiting his arrival. The notary's opinion of the character of his\nworthy colleagues, however, may be gathered from the fact that, having\npersuaded them to set out in advance along the road which he told them\nhe was about to take, he immediately adopted another route, and,\ntravelling by way of St. Maurice and the Lake of Geneva, eventually\nreached Soleure.\n\nEginhard tells all this story with the most naive air of\nunconsciousness that there is anything remarkable about an abbot, and\na high officer of state to boot, being an accessory, both before and\nafter the fact, to a most gross and scandalous act of sacrilegious and\nburglarious robbery. And an amusing sequel to the story proves that,\nwhere relics were concerned, his friend Hildoin, another high\necclesiastical dignitary, was even less scrupulous than himself.\n\nOn going to the palace early one morning, after the saints were safely\nbestowed at Seligenstadt, he found Hildoin waiting for an audience in\nthe Emperor's antechamber, and began to talk to him about the miracle\nof the bloody exudation. In the course of conversation, Eginhard\nhappened to allude to the remarkable fineness of the garment of the\nblessed Marcellinus. Whereupon Abbot Hildoin observed (to Eginhard's\nstupefaction) that his observation was quite correct. Much astonished\nat this remark from a person who was supposed not to have seen the\nrelics, Eginhard asked him how he knew that? Upon this, Hildoin saw\nthat he had better make a clean breast of it, and he told the\nfollowing story, which he had received from his priestly agent, Hunus.\nWhile Hunus and Lunison were at Pavia, waiting for Eginhard's notary,\nHunus (according to his own account) had robbed the robbers. The\nrelics were placed in a church; and a number of laymen and clerics, of\nwhom Hunus was one, undertook to keep watch over them. One night,\nhowever, all the watchers, save the wide-awake Hunus, went to sleep;\nand then, according to the story which this \"sharp\" ecclesiastic\nfoisted upon his patron,\n\n     it was borne in upon his mind that there must be some great\n     reason why all the people, except himself, had suddenly\n     become somnolent; and, determining to avail himself of the\n     opportunity thus offered (_oblata occasione utendum_), he\n     rose and, having lighted a candle, silently approached the\n     chests. Then, having burnt through the threads of the seals\n     with the flame of the candle, he quickly opened the chests,\n     which had no locks;[41] and taking out portions of each of\n     the bodies which were thus exposed, he closed the chests\n     and connected the burnt ends of the threads with the seals\n     again, so that they appeared not to have been touched; and,\n     no one having seen him, he returned to his place. (Cap. iii.\n     23.)\n\nHildoin went on to tell Eginhard that Hunus at first declared to him\nthat these purloined relics belonged to St. Tiburtius; but afterwards\nconfessed, as a great secret, how he had come by them, and he wound up\nhis discourse thus:\n\n     They have a place of honour beside St. Medardus, where they\n     are worshipped with great veneration by all the people; but\n     whether we may keep them or not is for your judgment (Cap.\n     iii. 23.)\n\nPoor Eginhard was thrown into a state of great perturbation of mind by\nthis revelation. An acquaintance of his had recently told him of a\nrumour that was spread about that Hunus had contrived to abstract\n_all_ the remains of SS. Marcellinus and Petrus while Eginhard's\nagents were in a drunken sleep; and that, while the real relics were\nin Abbot Hildoin's hands at St. Medardus, the shrine at Seligenstadt\ncontained nothing but a little dust. Though greatly annoyed by this\n\"execrable rumour, spread everywhere by the subtlety of the devil,\"\nEginhard had doubtless comforted himself by his supposed knowledge of\nits falsity, and he only now discovered how considerable a foundation\nthere was for the scandal. There was nothing for it but to insist upon\nthe return of the stolen treasures. One would have thought that the\nholy man, who had admitted himself to be knowingly a receiver of\nstolen goods, would have made instant restitution and begged only for\nabsolution. But Eginhard intimates that he had very great difficulty\nin getting his brother abbot to see that even restitution was\nnecessary.\n\nHildoin's proceedings were not of such a nature as to lead any one to\nplace implicit confidence in anything he might say; still less had his\nagent, priest Hunus, established much claim to confidence; and it is\nnot surprising that Eginhard should have lost no time in summoning his\nnotary and Lunison to his presence, in order that he might hear what\nthey had to say about the business. They, however, at once protested\nthat priest Hunus's story was a parcel of lies, and that after the\nrelics left Rome no one had any opportunity of meddling with them.\nMoreover, Lunison, throwing himself at Eginhard's feet, confessed with\nmany tears what actually took place. It will be remembered that after\nthe body of St. Marcellinus was abstracted from its tomb, Ratleig\ndeposited it in the house of Deusdona, in charge of the latter's\nbrother, Lunison. But Hunus, being very much disappointed that he\ncould not get hold of the body of St. Tiburtius, and afraid to go back\nto his abbot empty-handed, bribed Lunison with four pieces of gold and\nfive of silver to give him access to the chest. This Lunison did, and\nHunus helped himself to as much as would fill a gallon measure (_vas\nsextarii mensuram_) of the sacred remains. Eginhard's indignation at\nthe \"rapine\" of this \"nequissimus nebulo\" is exquisitely droll. It\nwould appear that the adage about the receiver being as bad as the\nthief was not current in the ninth century.\n\nLet us now briefly sum up the history of the acquisition of the\nrelics. Eginhard makes a contract with Deusdona for the delivery of\ncertain relics which the latter says he possesses. Eginhard makes no\ninquiry how he came by them; otherwise, the transaction is innocent\nenough.\n\nDeusdona turns out to be a swindler, and has no relics. Thereupon\nEginhard's agent, after due fasting and prayer, breaks open the tombs\nand helps himself.\n\nEginhard discovers by the self-betrayal of his brother abbot, Hildoin,\nthat portions of his relics have been stolen and conveyed to the\nlatter. With much ado he succeeds in getting them back.\n\nHildoin's agent, Hunus, in delivering these stolen goods to him, at\nfirst declared they were the relics of St. Tiburtius, which Hildoin\ndesired him to obtain; but afterwards invented a story of their being\nthe product of a theft, which the providential drowsiness of his\ncompanions enabled him to perpetrate, from the relics which Hildoin\nwell knew were the property of his friend.\n\nLunison, on the contrary, swears that all his story is false, and that\nhe himself was bribed by Hunus to allow him to steal what he pleased\nfrom the property confided to his own and his brother's care by their\nguest Ratleig. And the honest notary himself seems to have no\nhesitation about lying and stealing to any extent, where the\nacquisition of relics is the object in view.\n\nFor a parallel to these transactions one must read a police report of\nthe doings of a \"long firm\" or of a set of horse-coupers; yet Eginhard\nseems to be aware of nothing, but that he has been rather badly used\nby his friend Hildoin, and the \"nequissimus nebulo\" Hunus.\n\nIt is not easy for a modern Protestant, still less for any one who has\nthe least tincture of scientific culture, whether physical or\nhistorical, to picture to himself the state of mind of a man of the\nninth century, however cultivated, enlightened, and sincere he may\nhave been. His deepest convictions, his most cherished hopes, were\nbound up with the belief in the miraculous. Life was a constant battle\nbetween saints and demons for the possession of the souls of men. The\nmost superstitious among our modern countrymen turn to supernatural\nagencies only when natural causes seem insufficient; to Eginhard and\nhis friends the supernatural was the rule; and the sufficiency of\nnatural causes was allowed only when there was nothing to suggest\nothers.\n\nMoreover, it must be recollected that the possession of\nmiracle-working relics was greatly coveted, not only on high, but on\nvery low grounds. To a man like Eginhard, the mere satisfaction of the\nreligious sentiment was obviously a powerful attraction. But, more\nthan, this, the possession of such a treasure was an immense practical\nadvantage. If the saints were duly flattered and worshipped, there was\nno telling what benefits might result from their interposition on your\nbehalf. For physical evils, access to the shrine was like the grant of\nthe use of a universal pill and ointment manufactory; and pilgrimages\nthereto might suffice to cleanse the performers from any amount of\nsin. A letter to Lupus, subsequently abbot of Ferrara, written while\nEginhard was smarting under the grief caused by the loss of his\nmuch-loved wife Imma, affords a striking insight into the current view\nof the relation between the glorified saints and their worshippers.\nThe writer shows that he is anything but satisfied with the way in\nwhich he has been treated by the blessed martyrs whose remains he has\ntaken such pains to \"convey\" to Seligenstadt, and to honour there as\nthey would never have been honoured in their Roman obscurity.\n\n     It is an aggravation of my grief and a reopening of my\n     wound, that our vows have been of no avail, and that the\n     faith which, we placed in the merits and intervention of the\n     martyrs has been utterly disappointed.\n\nWe may admit, then, without impeachment of Eginhard's sincerity, or\nof his honour under all ordinary circumstances, that when piety,\nself-interest, the glory of the Church in general, and that of the\nchurch at Seligenstadt in particular, all pulled one way, even the\nworkaday principles of morality were disregarded; and, _a fortiori_,\nanything like proper investigation of the reality of alleged miracles\nwas thrown to the winds.\n\nAnd if this was the condition of mind of such a man as Eginhard, what\nis it not legitimate to suppose may have been that of Deacon Deusdona,\nLunison, Hunus, and Company, thieves and cheats by their own\nconfession, or of the probably hysterical nun, or of the professional\nbeggars, for whose incapacity to walk and straighten themselves there\nis no guarantee but their own? Who is to make sure that the exorcist\nof the demon Wiggo was not just such another priest as Hunus; and is\nit not at least possible, when Eginhard's servants dreamed, night\nafter night, in such a curiously coincident fashion, that a careful\ninquirer might have found they were very anxious to please their\nmaster.\n\nQuite apart from deliberate and conscious fraud (which is a rarer\nthing than is often supposed), people, whose mythopoeic faculty is\nonce stirred, are capable of saying the thing that is not, and of\nacting as they should not, to an extent which is hardly imaginable by\npersons who are not so easily affected by the contagion of blind\nfaith. There is no falsity so gross that honest men and, still more,\nvirtuous women, anxious to promote a good cause, will not lend\nthemselves to it without any clear consciousness of the moral bearings\nof what they are doing.\n\nThe cases of miraculously-effected cures of which Eginhard is ocular\nwitness appear to belong to classes of disease in which malingering is\npossible or hysteria presumable. Without modern means of diagnosis,\nthe names given to them are quite worthless. One \"miracle,\" however,\nin which the patient, a woman, was cured by the mere sight of the\nchurch in which the relics of the blessed martyrs lay, is an\nunmistakable case of dislocation of the lower jaw; and it is obvious\nthat, as not unfrequently happens in such accidents in weakly\nsubjects, the jaws slipped suddenly back into place, perhaps in\nconsequence of a jolt, as the woman rode towards the church. (Cap. v.\n53.)[42]\n\nThere is also a good deal said about a very questionable blind\nman--one Albricus (Alberich?)--who, having been cured, not of his\nblindness, but of another disease under which he laboured, took up his\nquarters at Seligenstadt, and came out as a prophet, inspired by the\nArchangel Gabriel. Eginhard intimates that his prophecies were\nfulfilled; but as he does not state exactly what they were, or how\nthey were accomplished, the statement must be accepted with much\ncaution. It is obvious that he was not the man to hesitate to \"ease\" a\nprophecy until it fitted, if the credit of the shrine of his favourite\nsaints could be increased by such a procedure. There is no impeachment\nof his honour in the supposition. The logic of the matter is quite\nsimple, if somewhat sophistical. The holiness of the church of the\nmartyrs guarantees the reality of the appearance of the Archangel\nGabriel there; and what the archangel says must be true. Therefore, if\nanything seem to be wrong, that must be the mistake of the\ntransmitter; and, in justice to the archangel, it must be suppressed\nor set right. This sort of \"reconciliation\" is not unknown in quite\nmodern times, and among people who would be very much shocked to be\ncompared with a \"benighted papist\" of the ninth century.\n\nThe readers of this essay are, I imagine, very largely composed of\npeople who would be shocked to be regarded as anything but enlightened\nProtestants. It is not unlikely that those of them who have\naccompanied me thus far may be disposed to say, \"Well, this is all\nvery amusing as a story, but what is the practical interest of it? We\nare not likely to believe in the miracles worked by the spolia of SS.\nMarcellinus and Petrus, or by those of any other saints in the Roman\nCalendar.\"\n\nThe practical interest is this: if you do not believe in these\nmiracles recounted by a witness whose character and competency are\nfirmly established, whose sincerity cannot be doubted, and who appeals\nto his sovereign and other contemporaries as witnesses of the truth of\nwhat he says, in a document of which a MS. copy exists, probably\ndating within a century of the author's death, why do you profess to\nbelieve in stories of a like character, which are found in documents\nof the dates and of the authorship of which nothing is certainly\ndetermined, and no known copies of which come within two or three\ncenturies of the events they record? If it be true that the four\nGospels and the Acts were written by Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John,\nall that we know of these persons comes to nothing in comparison with\nour knowledge of Eginhard; and not only is there no proof that the\ntraditional authors of these works wrote them, but very strong reasons\nto the contrary may be alleged. If, therefore, you refuse to believe\nthat \"Wiggo\" was cast out of the possessed girl on Eginhard's\nauthority, with what justice can you profess to believe that the\nlegion of devils were cast out of the man among the tombs of the\nGadarenes? And if, on the other hand, you accept Eginhard's evidence,\nwhy do you laugh at the supposed efficacy of relics and the\nsaint-worship of the modern Romanists? It cannot be pretended, in the\nface of all evidence, that the Jews of the year 30 A.D., or\nthereabouts, were less imbued with the belief in the supernatural than\nwere the Franks of the year 800 A.D. The same influences were at work\nin each case, and it is only reasonable to suppose that the results\nwere the same. If the evidence of Eginhard is insufficient to lead\nreasonable men to believe in the miracles he relates, _a fortiori_ the\nevidence afforded by the Gospels and the Acts must be so.[43]\n\nBut it may be said that no serious critic denies the genuineness of\nthe four great Pauline Epistles--Galatians, First and Second\nCorinthians, and Romans--and that in three out of these four Paul lays\nclaim to the power of working miracles.[44] Must we suppose,\ntherefore, that the Apostle to the Gentiles has stated that which is\nfalse? But to how much does this so-called claim amount? It may mean\nmuch or little. Paul nowhere tells us what he did in this direction;\nand in his sore need to justify his assumption of apostleship against\nthe sneers of his enemies, it is hardly likely that, if he had any\nvery striking cases to bring forward, he would have neglected evidence\nso well calculated to put them to shame. And, without the slightest\nimpeachment of Paul's veracity, we must further remember that his\nstrongly-marked mental characteristics, displayed in unmistakable\nfashion by these Epistles, are anything but those which would justify\nus in regarding him as a critical witness respecting matters of fact,\nor as a trustworthy interpreter of their significance. When a man\ntestifies to a miracle, he not only states a fact, but he adds an\ninterpretation of the fact. We may admit his evidence as to the\nformer, and yet think his opinion as to the latter worthless. If\nEginhard's calm and objective narrative of the historical events of\nhis time is no guarantee for the soundness of his judgment where the\nsupernatural is concerned, the heated rhetoric of the Apostle of the\nGentiles, his absolute confidence in the \"inner light,\" and the\nextraordinary conceptions of the nature and requirements of logical\nproof which he betrays, in page after page of his Epistles, afford\nstill less security.\n\nThere is a comparatively modern man who shared to the full Paul's\ntrust in the \"inner light,\" and who, though widely different from the\nfiery evangelist of Tarsus in various obvious particulars, yet, if I\nam not mistaken, shares his deepest characteristics. I speak of George\nFox, who separated himself from the current Protestantism of England,\nin the seventeenth century, as Paul separated himself from the\nJudaism of the first century, at the bidding of the \"inner light\"; who\nwent through persecutions as serious as those which Paul enumerates;\nwho was beaten, stoned, cast out for dead, imprisoned nine times,\nsometimes for long periods; who was in perils on land and perils at\nsea. George Fox was an even more widely-travelled missionary; while\nhis success in founding congregations, and his energy in visiting\nthem, not merely in Great Britain and Ireland and the West India\nIslands, but on the continent of Europe and that of North America,\nwere no less remarkable. A few years after Fox began to preach, there\nwere reckoned to be a thousand Friends in prison in the various gaols\nof England; at his death, less than fifty years after the foundation\nof the sect, there were 70,000 Quakers in the United Kingdom. The\ncheerfulness with which these people--women as well as men--underwent\nmartyrdom in this country and in the New England States is one of the\nmost remarkable facts in the history of religion.\n\nNo one who reads the voluminous autobiography of \"Honest George\" can\ndoubt the man's utter truthfulness; and though, in his multitudinous\nletters, he but rarely rises for above the incoherent commonplaces of\na street preacher, there can be no question of his power as a speaker,\nnor any doubt as to the dignity and attractiveness of his personality,\nor of his possession of a large amount of practical good sense and\ngoverning faculty.\n\nBut that George Fox had full faith in his own powers as a\nmiracle-worker, the following passage of his autobiography (to which\nothers might he added) demonstrates:--\n\n     Now after I was set at liberty from Nottingham gaol (where I\n     had been kept a prisoner a pretty long time) I travelled as\n     before, in the work of the Lord. And coming to Mansfield\n     Woodhouse, there was a distracted woman, under a doctor's\n     hand, with her hair let loose all about her ears; and he was\n     about to let her blood, she being first bound, and many\n     people being about her, holding her by violence; but he\n     could get no blood from her. And I desired them to unbind\n     her and let her alone; for they could not touch the spirit\n     in her by which she was tormented. So they did unbind her,\n     and I was moved to speak to her, and in the name of the Lord\n     to bid her be quiet and still. And she was so. And the\n     Lord's power settled her mind and she mended; and afterwards\n     received the truth and continued in it to her death. And the\n     Lord's name was honoured; to whom the glory of all His works\n     belongs. Many great and wonderful things were wrought by the\n     heavenly power in those days. For the Lord made bare his\n     omnipotent arm and manifested His power to the astonishment\n     of many; by the healing virtue whereof many have been\n     delivered from great infirmities, and the devils were made\n     subject through his name: of which particular instances\n     might be given beyond what this unbelieving age is able to\n     receive or bear.[45]\n\nIt needs no long study of Fox's writings, however, to arrive at the\nconviction that the distinction between subjective and objective\nverities had not the same place in his mind as it has in that of an\nordinary mortal. When an ordinary person would say \"I thought so and\nso,\" or \"I made up my mind to do so and so,\" George Fox says, \"It was\nopened to me,\" or \"at the command of God I did so and so.\" \"Then at\nthe command of God on the ninth day of the seventh month 1643 (Fox\nbeing just nineteen), I left my relations and brake off all\nfamiliarity or friendship with young or old.\" \"About the beginning of\nthe year 1647 I was moved of the Lord to go into Darbyshire.\" Fox\nhears voices and he sees visions, some of which he brings before the\nreader with apocalyptic power in the simple and strong English, alike\nuntutored and undefiled, of which, like John Bunyan, his contemporary,\nhe was a master.\n\n\"And one morning as I was sitting by the fire, a great cloud came over\nme and a temptation beset me; and I sate still. And it was said, _All\nthings come by Nature_. And the elements and stars came over me; so\nthat I was in a manner quite clouded with it.... And as I sate still\nunder it, and let it alone, a living hope arose in me, and a true\nvoice arose in me which said, _There is a living God who made all\nthings_. And immediately the cloud and the temptation vanished away,\nand life rose over it all, and my heart was glad and I praised the\nliving God\" (p. 13).\n\nIf George Fox could speak, as he proves in this and some other\npassages he could write, his astounding influence on the\ncontemporaries of Milton and of Cromwell is no mystery. But this\nmodern reproduction of the ancient prophet, with his \"Thus saith the\nLord,\" \"This is the work of the Lord,\" steeped in supernaturalism and\nglorying in blind faith, is the mental antipodes of the philosopher,\nfounded in naturalism and a fanatic for evidence, to whom these\naffirmations inevitably suggest the previous question: \"How do you\nknow that the Lord saith it?\" \"How do you know that the Lord doeth\nit?\" and who is compelled to demand that rational ground for belief,\nwithout which, to the man of science, assent is merely an immoral\npretence.\n\nAnd it is this rational ground of belief which the writers of the\nGospels, no less than Paul, and Eginhard, and Fox, so little dream of\noffering that they would regard the demand for it as a kind of\nblasphemy.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n     [33] My citations are made from Teulet's _Einhardi omnia\n          quae extant opera_, Paris, 1840-1843, which contains a\n          biography of the author, a history of the text, with\n          translations into French, and many valuable\n          annotations.\n\n     [34] At present included in the Duchies of Hesse-Darmstadt\n          and Baden.\n\n     [35] This took place in the year 826 A.D. The relics were\n          brought from Rome and deposited in the Church of St.\n          Medardus at Soissons.\n\n     [36] Now included in Western Switzerland.\n\n     [37] Probably, according to Teulet, the present\n          Sandhoferfahrt, a little below the embouchure of the\n          Neckar.\n\n     [38] The present Michilstadt, thirty miles N.E. of\n          Heidelberg.\n\n     [39] In the Middle Ages one of the most favourite\n          accusations against witches was that they committed\n          just these enormities.\n\n     [40] It is pretty clear that Eginhard had his doubts about\n          the deacon, whose pledges he qualifies as _sponsiones\n          incertae_. But, to be sure, he wrote after events which\n          fully justified scepticism.\n\n     [41] The words are _scrinia sine clave_, which seems to mean\n          \"having no key.\" But the circumstances forbid the idea\n          of breaking open.\n\n     [42] Eginhard speaks with lofty contempt of the \"vana ac\n          superstitiosa praesumptio\" of the poor woman's\n          companions in trying to alleviate her sufferings with\n          \"herbs and frivolous incantations.\" Vain enough, no\n          doubt, but the \"mulierculae\" might have returned the\n          epithet \"superstitious\" with interest.\n\n     [43] Of course there is nothing new in this argument: but it\n          does not grow weaker by age. And the case of Eginhard\n          is far more instructive than that of Augustine, because\n          the former has so very frankly, though incidentally,\n          revealed to us not only his own mental and moral\n          habits, but those of the people about him.\n\n     [44] See 1 Cor. xii. 10-28; 2 Cor. vi. 12; Rom. xv. 19.\n\n     [45] _A Journal or Historical Account of the Life, Travels,\n          Sufferings, and Christian Experiences, &c., of George\n          Fox_, Ed. 1694, pp. 27, 28.\n\n\n\n\nVI: POSSIBILITIES AND IMPOSSIBILITIES\n\n[1891]\n\n\nIn the course of a discussion which has been going on during the last\ntwo years,[46] it has been maintained by the defenders of\necclesiastical Christianity that the demonology of the books of the\nNew Testament is an essential and integral part of the revelation of\nthe nature of the spiritual world promulgated by Jesus of Nazareth.\nIndeed, if the historical accuracy of the Gospels and of the Acts of\nthe Apostles is to be taken for granted, if the teachings of the\nEpistles are divinely inspired, and if the universal belief and\npractice of the primitive Church are the models which all later times\nmust follow, there can be no doubt that those who accept the\ndemonology are in the right. It is as plain as language can make it,\nthat the writers of the Gospels believed in the existence of Satan and\nthe subordinate ministers of evil as strongly as they believed in\nthat of God and the angels, and that they had an unhesitating faith in\npossession and in exorcism. No reader of the first three Gospels can\nhesitate to admit that, in the opinion of those persons among whom the\ntraditions out of which they are compiled arose, Jesus held, and\nconstantly acted upon, the same theory of the spiritual world. Nowhere\ndo we find the slightest hint that he doubted the theory, or\nquestioned the efficacy of the curative operations based upon it.\n\nThus, when such a story as that about the Gadarene swine is placed\nbefore us, the importance of the decision, whether it is to be\naccepted or rejected, cannot be over-estimated. If the demonological\npart of it is to be accepted, the authority of Jesus is unmistakably\npledged to the demonological system current in Judaea in the first\ncentury. The belief in devils who possess men and can be transferred\nfrom men to pigs, becomes as much a part of Christian dogma as any\narticle of the creeds. If it is to be rejected, there are two\nalternative conclusions. Supposing the Gospels to be historically\naccurate, it follows that Jesus shared in the errors, respecting the\nnature of the spiritual world, prevalent in the age in which he lived\nand among the people of his nation. If, on the other hand, the Gospel\ntraditions gives us only a popular version of the sayings and doings\nof Jesus, falsely coloured and distorted by the superstitious\nimaginings of the minds through which it had passed, what guarantee\nhave we that a similar unconscious falsification, in accordance with\npreconceived ideas, may not have taken place in respect of other\nreported sayings and doings? What is to prevent a conscientious\ninquirer from finding himself at last in a purely agnostic position\nwith respect to the teachings of Jesus, and consequently with respect\nto the fundamentals of Christianity?\n\nIn dealing with the question whether the Gadarene story was to be\nbelieved or not, I confined myself altogether to a discussion of the\nvalue of the evidence in its favour. And, as it was easy to prove that\nthis consists of nothing more than three partially discrepant, but\noften verbally coincident, versions of an original, of the authorship\nof which nobody knows anything, it appeared to me that it was wholly\nworthless. Even if the event described had been probable, such\nevidence would have required corroboration; being grossly improbable,\nand involving acts questionable in their moral and legal aspect, the\nthree accounts sank to the level of mere tales.\n\nThus far, I am unable, even after the most careful revision, to find\nany flaw in my argument; and I incline to think none has been found by\nmy critics--at least, if they have, they have kept the discovery to\nthemselves.\n\nIn another part of my treatment of the case I have been less\nfortunate. I was careful to say that, for anything I could \"absolutely\nprove to the contrary,\" there might be in the universe demonic beings\nwho could enter into and possess men, and even be transferred from\nthem to pigs; and that I, for my part, could not venture to declare _a\npriori_ that the existence of such entities was \"impossible.\" I was,\nhowever, no less careful to remark that I thought the evidence\nhitherto adduced in favour of the existence of such beings\n\"ridiculously insufficient\" to warrant the belief in them.\n\nTo my surprise, this statement of what, after the closest reflection,\nI still conceive to be the right conclusion, has been hailed as a\nsatisfactory admission by opponents, and lamented as a perilous\nconcession by sympathisers. Indeed, the tone of the comments of some\ncandid friends has been such that I began to suspect that I must be\nentering upon a process of retrogressive metamorphosis which might\neventually give me a place among the respectabilities. The prospect,\nperhaps, ought to have pleased me; but I confess I felt something of\nthe uneasiness of the tailor who said that, whenever a customer's\ncircumference was either much less, or much more, than at the last\nmeasurement, he at once sent in his bill; and I was not consoled until\nI recollected that, thirteen years ago, in discussing Hume's essay on\n\"Miracles,\" I had quoted, with entire assent, the following passage\nfrom his writings: \"Whatever is intelligible and can be distinctly\nconceived implies no contradiction, and can never be proved false by\nany demonstrative argument or abstract reasoning _a priori_.\"[47]\n\nNow, it is certain that the existence of demons can be distinctly\nconceived. In fact, from the earliest times of which we have any record\nto the present day, the great majority of mankind have had extremely\ndistinct conceptions of them, and their practical life has been more or\nless shaped by those conceptions. Further, the notion of the existence\nof such beings \"implies no contradiction.\" No doubt, in our experience,\nintelligence and volition are always found in connection with a certain\nmaterial organisation, and never disconnected with it; while, by the\nhypothesis, demons have no such material substratum. But then, as\neverybody knows, the exact relation between mental and physical\nphenomena, even in ourselves, is the subject of endless dispute. We may\nall have our opinions as to whether mental phenomena have a substratum\ndistinct from that which is assumed to underlie material phenomena, or\nnot; though if any one thinks he has demonstrative evidence of either\nthe existence or the non-existence of a \"soul,\" all I can say is, his\nnotion of demonstration differs from mine. But, if it be impossible to\ndemonstrate the non-existence of a \"substance\" of mental phenomena--that\nis, of a soul--independent of material \"substance\"; if the idea of such\na \"soul\" is \"intelligible and can be distinctly conceived,\" then it\nfollows that it is not justifiable to talk of demons as\n\"impossibilities.\" The idea of their existence implies no more\n\"contradiction\" than does the idea of the existence of pathogenic\nmicrobes in the air. Indeed, the microbes constitute a tolerably exact\nphysical analogue of the \"powers of the air\" of ancient belief.\n\nStrictly speaking, I am unaware of any thing that has a right to the\ntitle of an \"impossibility\" except a contradiction in terms. There are\nimpossibilities logical, but none natural. A \"round square,\" a\n\"present past,\" \"two parallel lines that intersect,\" are\nimpossibilities, because the ideas denoted by the predicates, _round,\npresent, intersect_, are contradictory of the ideas denoted by the\nsubjects, _square, past, parallel_. But walking on water, or turning\nwater into wine, or procreation without male intervention, or raising\nthe dead, are plainly not \"impossibilities\" in this sense.\n\nIn the affirmation, that a man walked upon water, the idea of the\nsubject is not contradictory of that in the predicate. Naturalists are\nfamiliar with insects which walk on water, and imagination has no more\ndifficulty in putting a man in place of the insect than it has in\ngiving a man some of the attributes of a bird and making an angel of\nhim; or in ascribing to him the ascensive tendencies of a balloon, as\nthe \"levitationists\" do. Undoubtedly, there are very strong physical\nand biological arguments for thinking it extremely improbable that a\nman could be supported on the surface of the water as the insect is;\nor that his organisation could be compatible with the possession and\nuse of wings; or that he could rise through the air without mechanical\naid. Indeed, if we have any reason to believe that our present\nknowledge of the nature of things exhausts the possibilities of\nnature, we might properly say that the attributes of men are\ncontradictory of walking on water, or floating in the air, and\nconsequently that these acts are truly \"impossible\" for him. But it is\nsufficiently obvious, not only that we are at the beginning of our\nknowledge of nature, instead of having arrived at the end of it, but\nthat the limitations of our faculties are such that we never can be in\na position to set bounds to the possibilities of nature. We have\nknowledge of what is happening and of what has happened; of what will\nhappen we have and can have no more than expectation, grounded on our\nmore or less correct reading of past experience and prompted by the\nfaith, begotten of that experience, that the order of nature in the\nfuture will resemble its order in the past.\n\nThe same considerations apply to the other examples of supposed\nmiraculous events. The change of water into wine undoubtedly implies a\ncontradiction, and is assuredly \"impossible,\" if we are permitted to\nassume that the \"elementary bodies\" of the chemists are, now and for\never, immutable. Not only, however, is a negative proposition of this\nkind incapable of proof, but modern chemistry is inclining towards the\ncontrary doctrine. And if carbon can be got out of hydrogen or oxygen,\nthe conversion of water into wine comes within range of scientific\npossibility--it becomes a mere question of molecular arrangement.\n\nAs for virgin procreation, it is not only clearly imaginable, but\nmodern biology recognises it as an everyday occurrence among some\ngroups of animals. So with restoration to life after death. Certain\nanimals, long as dry as mummies, and, to all appearance, as dead, when\nplaced in proper conditions resume their vitality. It may be said that\nthese creatures are not dead, but merely in a condition of suspended\nvitality. That, however, is only begging the question by making the\nincapacity for restoration to life part of the definition of death. In\nthe absence of obvious lesions of some of the more important organs,\nit is no easy matter, even for experts, to say that an apparently dead\nman is incapable of restoration to life; and, in the recorded\ninstances of such restoration, the want of any conclusive evidence\nthat the man was dead is even more remarkable than the insufficiency\nof the testimony as to his coming to life again.\n\nIt may be urged, however, that there is, at any rate, one miracle\ncertified by all three of the Synoptic Gospels which really does\n\"imply a contradiction,\" and is, therefore, \"impossible\" in the\nstrictest sense of the word. This is the well-known story of the\nfeeding of several thousand men, to the complete satisfaction of their\nhunger, by the distribution of a few loaves and fishes among them; the\nwondrousness of this already somewhat surprising performance being\nintensified by the assertion that the quantity of the fragments of the\nmeal, left over, amounted to much more than the original store.\n\nUndoubtedly, if the operation is stated in its most general form; if\nit is to be supposed that a certain quantity, or magnitude, was\ndivided into many more parts than the whole contained; and that, after\nthe subtraction of several thousands of such parts, the magnitude of\nthe remainder amounted to more than the original magnitude, there does\nseem to be an _a priori_ difficulty about accepting the proposition,\nseeing that it appears to be contradictory of the senses which we\nattach to the words \"whole\" and \"parts\" respectively. But this\ndifficulty is removed if we reflect that we are not, in this case,\ndealing with magnitude in the abstract, or with \"whole\" and \"parts\" in\ntheir mathematical sense, but with concrete things, many of which are\nknown to possess the power of growing, or increasing in magnitude.\nThey thus furnish us with a conception of growth which we may, in\nimagination, apply to loaves and fishes; just as we may, in\nimagination, apply the idea of wings to the idea of a man. It must be\nadmitted that a number of sheep might be fed on a pasture, and yet\nthere might be more grass on the pasture, when the sheep left it, than\nthere was at first. We may generalise this and other such facts into a\nperfectly definite conception of the increase of food in excess of\nconsumption; which thus becomes a possibility, the limitations of\nwhich are to be discovered only by experience. Therefore, if it is\nasserted that cooked food has been made to grow in excess of rapid\nconsumption, that statement cannot logically be rejected as an _a\npriori_ impossibility, however improbable experience of the\ncapabilities of cooked food may justify us in holding it to be.\n\nOn the strength of this undeniable improbability, however, we not only\nhave a right to demand, but are morally bound to require, strong\nevidence in its favour before we even take it into serious\nconsideration. But what is the evidence in this case? It is merely\nthat of those three books,[48] which also concur in testifying to the\ntruth of the monstrous legend of the herd of swine. In these three\nbooks, there are five accounts of a \"miraculous feeding,\" which fall\ninto two groups. Three of the stories, obviously derived from some\ncommon source, state that five loaves and two fishes sufficed to feed\nfive thousand persons, and that twelve baskets of fragments remained\nover. In the two others, also obviously derived from a common source,\ndistinct from the preceding, seven loaves and a few small fishes are\ndistributed to four thousand persons, and seven baskets of fragments\nare left.\n\nIf we were dealing with secular records, I suppose no candid and\ncompetent student of history would entertain much doubt that the\noriginals of the three stories and of the two are themselves merely\ndivergent versions of some primitive story which existed before the\nthree Synoptic gospels were compiled out of the body of traditions\ncurrent about Jesus. This view of the case, however, is incompatible\nwith a belief in the historical accuracy of the first and second\ngospels.[49] For these agree in making Jesus himself speak of both the\n\"four thousand\" and the \"five thousand\" miracle. \"When I brake the\nfive loaves among the five thousand, how many baskets full of broken\npieces took ye up? They say unto him, twelve. And when the seven among\nthe four thousand, how many baskets full of broken pieces took ye up?\nAnd they say unto him, seven.\"\n\nThus we are face to face with a dilemma the way of escape from which\nis not obvious. Either the \"four thousand\" and the \"five thousand\"\nstories are both historically true, and describe two separate events;\nor the first and second gospels testify to the very words of a\nconversation between Jesus and his disciples which cannot have been\nuttered.\n\nMy choice between these alternatives is determined by no _a priori_\nspeculations about the possibility or impossibility of such events as\nthe feeding of the four or of the five thousand. But I ask myself the\nquestion, What evidence ought to be produced before I could feel\njustified in saying that I believed such an event to have occurred?\nThat question is very easily answered. Proof must be given (1) of the\nweight of the loaves and fishes at starting; (2) of the distribution\nto 4-5,000 persons, without any additional supply, of this quantity\nand quality of food; (3) of the satisfaction of these people's\nappetites; (4) of the weight and quality of the fragments gathered up\ninto the baskets. Whatever my present notions of probability and\nimprobability may be, satisfactory testimony under these four heads\nwould lead me to believe that they were erroneous; and I should accept\nthe so-called miracle as a new and unexpected example of the\npossibilities of nature.\n\nBut when, instead of such evidence, nothing is produced but two sets\nof discrepant stories, originating nobody knows how or when, among\npersons who could believe as firmly in devils which enter pigs, I\nconfess that my feeling is one of astonishment that any one should\nexpect a reasonable man to take such testimony seriously.\n\nI am anxious to bring about a clear understanding of the difference\nbetween \"impossibilities\" and \"improbabilities,\" because mistakes on\nthis point lay us open to the attacks of ecclesiastical apologists of\nthe type of the late Cardinal Newman; acute sophists, who think it\nfitting to employ their intellects, as burglars employ dark lanterns\nfor the discovery of other people's weak places, while they carefully\nkeep the light away from their own position.\n\nWhen it is rightly stated, the Agnostic view of \"miracles\" is, in my\njudgment, unassailable. We are _not_ justifiable in the _a priori_\nassertion that the order of nature, as experience has revealed it to\nus, cannot change. In arguing about the miraculous, the assumption is\nillegitimate, because it involves the whole point in dispute.\nFurthermore, it is an assumption which takes us beyond the range of\nour faculties. Obviously, no amount of past experience can warrant us\nin anything more than a correspondingly strong expectation for the\npresent and future. We find, practically, that expectations, based\nupon careful observations of events, are, as a rule, trustworthy. We\nshould be foolish indeed not to follow the only guide we have through\nlife. But, for all that, our highest and surest generalisations remain\non the level of justifiable expectations; that is, very high\nprobabilities. For my part, I am unable to conceive of an intelligence\nshaped on the model of that of man, however superior it might be,\nwhich could be any better off than our own in this respect; that is,\nwhich could possess logically justifiable grounds for certainty about\nthe constancy of the order of things, and therefore be in a position\nto declare that such and such events are impossible. Some of the old\nmythologies recognised this clearly enough. Beyond and above Zeus and\nOdin, there lay the unknown and inscrutable Fate which, one day or\nother, would crumple up them and the world they ruled to give place to\na new order of things.\n\nI sincerely hope that I shall not be accused of Pyrrhonism, or of any\ndesire to weaken the foundations of rational certainty. I have merely\ndesired to point out that rational certainty is one thing, and talk\nabout \"impossibilities,\" or \"violation of natural laws,\" another.\nRational certainty rests upon two grounds--the one that the evidence\nin favour of a given statement is as good as it can be; the other that\nsuch evidence is plainly insufficient. In the former case, the\nstatement is to be taken as true, in the latter as untrue; until\nsomething arises to modify the verdict, which, however properly\nreached, may always be more or less wrong, the best information being\nnever complete, and the best reasoning being liable to fallacy.\n\nTo quarrel with the uncertainty that besets us in intellectual\naffairs, would be about as reasonable as to object to live one's life,\nwith due thought for the morrow, because no man can be sure he will be\nalive an hour hence. Such are the conditions imposed upon us by\nnature, and we have to make the best of them. And I think that the\ngreatest mistake those of us who are interested in the progress of\nfree thought can make is to overlook these limitations, and to deck\nourselves with the dogmatic feathers which are the traditional\nadornment of our opponents. Let us be content with rational certainty,\nleaving irrational certainties to those who like to muddle their minds\nwith them. I cannot see my way to say that demons are impossibilities;\nbut I am not more certain about anything, than I am that the evidence\ntendered in favour of the demonology, of which the Gadarene story is a\ntypical example, is utterly valueless. I cannot see my way to say that\nit is \"impossible\" that the hunger of thousands of men should be\nsatisfied out of the food supplied by half-a-dozen loaves and a fish\nor two; but it seems to me monstrous that I should be asked to believe\nit on the faith of the five stories which testify to such an\noccurrence. It is true that the position that miracles are\n\"impossible\" cannot be sustained. But I know of nothing which calls\nupon me to qualify the grave verdict of Hume: \"There is not to be\nfound, in all history, any miracle attested by a sufficient number of\nmen, of such unquestioned goodness, education, and learning as to\nsecure us against all delusion in themselves; of such undoubted\nintegrity as to place them beyond all suspicion of any design to\ndeceive others; of such credit and reputation in the eyes of mankind\nas to have a great deal to lose in case of their being detected in any\nfalsehood; and at the same time attesting facts performed in such a\npublic manner, and in so celebrated a part of the world, as to render\nthe detection unavoidable: _all which circumstances are requisite to\ngive us a full assurance in the testimony of men_.\"[50]\n\n     The preceding paper called forth the following criticism\n     signed \"Agnosco,\" to which I append my reply:--\n\n     While agreeing generally with Professor Huxley's remarks\n     respecting miracles, in \"The Agnostic Annual for 1892,\" it\n     has seemed to me that one of his arguments at least requires\n     qualification. The Professor, in maintaining that so-called\n     miraculous events are possible, although the evidence\n     adduced is not sufficient to render them probable, refers to\n     the possibility of changing water into wine by molecular\n     recomposition. He tells us that, \"if carbon can be got out\n     of hydrogen or oxygen, the conversion of water into wine\n     comes within range of scientific possibility.\" But in\n     maintaining that miracles (so-called) have a _prospective_\n     possibility, Professor Huxley loses sight--at least, so it\n     appears to me--of the question of their _retrospective_\n     possibility. For, if it requires a certain degree of\n     knowledge and experience, yet far from having been attained,\n     to perform those acts which have been called miraculous, it\n     is not only improbable, but impossible likewise, that they\n     should have been done by men whose knowledge and experience\n     were considerably less than our own. It has seemed to me, in\n     fact, that this question of the retrospective possibility of\n     miracles is more important to us Rationalists, and, for the\n     matter of that, to Christians also, than the question of\n     their prospective possibility, with which Professor Huxley's\n     article mainly deals. Perhaps the Professor himself could\n     help those of us who think so, by giving us his opinion.\n\n     I am not sure that I fully appreciate the point raised by\n     \"Agnosco,\" nor the distinction between the prospective and\n     the retrospective \"possibility\" of such a miracle as the\n     conversion of water into wine. If we may contemplate such an\n     event as \"possible\" in London in the year 1900, it must, in\n     the same sense, have been \"possible\" in the year 30 (or\n     thereabouts) at Cana in Galilee. If I should live so long, I\n     shall take great interest in the announcement of the\n     performance of this operation, say, nine years hence; and,\n     if there is no objection raised by chemical experts, I shall\n     accept the fact that the feat has been performed, without\n     hesitation. But I shall have no more ground for believing\n     the Cana story than I had before; simply because the\n     evidence in its favour will remain, for me, exactly where it\n     is. Possible or impossible, that evidence is worth nothing.\n     To leave the safe ground of \"no evidence\" for speculations\n     about impossibilities, consequent upon the want of\n     scientific knowledge of the supposed workers of miracles,\n     appears to me to be a mistake; especially in view of the\n     orthodox contention that they possessed supernatural power\n     and supernatural knowledge. T.H. HUXLEY.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n     [46] 1889-1891. See the next Essay (VII) and those which\n          follow it.\n\n     [47] _Inquiry Concerning the Human Understanding_, p. 5;\n          1748. The passage is cited and discussed in my\n          _Hume_, pp. 132, 133.\n\n     [48] The story in John vi. 5-14 is obviously derived from\n          the \"five thousand\" narrative of the Synoptics.\n\n     [49] Matthew xvi. 5-12; Mark viii. 14-21.\n\n     [50] Hume, _Inquiry_, sec. X., part ii.\n\n\n\n\nVII: AGNOSTICISM\n\n[1889]\n\n\nWithin the last few months, the public has received much and varied\ninformation on the subject of agnostics, their tenets, and even their\nfuture. Agnosticism exercised the orators of the Church Congress at\nManchester.[51] It has been furnished with a set of \"articles\" fewer,\nbut not less rigid, and certainly not less consistent than the\nthirty-nine; its nature has been analysed, and its future severely\npredicted by the most eloquent of that prophetical school whose Samuel\nis Auguste Comte. It may still be a question, however, whether the\npublic is as much the wiser as might be expected, considering all the\ntrouble that has been taken to enlighten it. Not only are the three\naccounts of the agnostic position sadly out of harmony with one\nanother, but I propose to show cause for my belief that all three\nmust be seriously questioned by any one who employs the term\n\"agnostic\" in the sense in which it was originally used. The learned\nPrincipal of King's College, who brought the topic of Agnosticism\nbefore the Church Congress, took a short and easy way of settling the\nbusiness:--\n\n     But if this be so, for a man to urge, as an escape from this\n     article of belief, that he has no means of a scientific\n     knowledge of the unseen world, or of the future, is\n     irrelevant. His difference from Christians lies not in the\n     fact that he has no knowledge of these things, but that he\n     does not believe the authority on which they are stated. He\n     may prefer to call himself an Agnostic; but his real name is\n     an older one--he is an infidel; that is to say, an\n     unbeliever. The word infidel, perhaps, carries an unpleasant\n     significance. Perhaps it is right that it should. It is, and\n     it ought to be, an unpleasant thing for a man to have to say\n     plainly that he does not believe in Jesus Christ.[52]\n\nSo much of Dr. Wace's address either explicitly or implicitly concerns\nme, that I take upon myself to deal with it; but, in so doing, it must\nbe understood that I speak for myself alone. I am not aware that there\nis any sect of Agnostics; and if there be, I am not its acknowledged\nprophet or pope. I desire to leave to the Comtists the entire monopoly\nof the manufacture of imitation ecclesiasticism.\n\nLet us calmly and dispassionately consider Dr. Wace's appreciation of\nagnosticism. The agnostic, according to his view, is a person who says\nhe has no means of attaining a scientific knowledge of the unseen\nworld or of the future; by which somewhat loose phraseology Dr. Wace\npresumably means the theological unseen world and future. I cannot\nthink this description happy, either in form or substance, but for the\npresent it may pass. Dr. Wace continues, that it is not \"his\ndifference from Christians.\" Are there then any Christians who say\nthat they know nothing about the unseen world and the future? I was\nignorant of the fact, but I am ready to accept it on the authority of\na professional theologian, and I proceed to Dr. Wace's next\nproposition.\n\nThe real state of the case, then, is that the agnostic \"does not\nbelieve the authority\" on which \"these things\" are stated, which\nauthority is Jesus Christ. He is simply an old-fashioned \"infidel\" who\nis afraid to own to his right name. As \"Presbyter is priest writ\nlarge,\" so is \"agnostic\" the mere Greek equivalent for the Latin\n\"infidel.\" There is an attractive simplicity about this solution of\nthe problem; and it has that advantage of being somewhat offensive to\nthe persons attacked, which is so dear to the less refined sort of\ncontroversialist. The agnostic says, \"I cannot find good evidence that\nso and so is true.\" \"Ah,\" says his adversary, seizing his opportunity,\n\"then you declare that Jesus Christ was untruthful, for he said so and\nso;\" a very telling method of rousing prejudice. But suppose that the\nvalue of the evidence as to what Jesus may have said and done, and as\nto the exact nature and scope of his authority, is just that which the\nagnostic finds it most difficult to determine. If I venture to doubt\nthat the Duke of Wellington gave the command \"Up, Guards, and at 'em!\"\nat Waterloo, I do not think that even Dr. Wace would accuse me of\ndisbelieving the Duke. Yet it would be just as reasonable to do this\nas to accuse any one of denying what Jesus said, before the\npreliminary question as to what he did say is settled.\n\nNow, the question as to what Jesus really said and did is strictly a\nscientific problem, which is capable of solution by no other methods\nthan those practised by the historian and the literary critic. It is a\nproblem of immense difficulty, which has occupied some of the best\nheads in Europe for the last century; and it is only of late years\nthat their investigations have begun to converge towards one\nconclusion.[53]\n\nThat kind of faith which Dr. Wace describes and lauds is of no use\nhere. Indeed, he himself takes pains to destroy its evidential value.\n\n\"What made the Mahommedan world? Trust and faith in the declarations\nand assurances of Mahommed. And what made the Christian world? Trust\nand faith in the declarations and assurances of Jesus Christ and His\nApostles\" (l.c. p. 253). The triumphant tone of this imaginary\ncatechism leads me to suspect that its author has hardly appreciated\nits full import. Presumably, Dr. Wace regards Mahommed as an\nunbeliever, or, to use the term which he prefers, infidel; and\nconsiders that his assurances have given rise to a vast delusion which\nhas led, and is leading, millions of men straight to everlasting\npunishment. And this being so, the \"Trust and faith\" which have \"made\nthe Mahommedan world,\" in just the same sense as they have \"made the\nChristian world,\" must be trust and faith in falsehoods. No man who\nhas studied history, or even attended to the occurrences of everyday\nlife, can doubt the enormous practical value of trust and faith; but\nas little will he be inclined to deny that this practical value has\nnot the least relation to the reality of the objects of that trust and\nfaith. In examples of patient constancy of faith and of unswerving\ntrust, the \"Acta Martyrum\" do not excel the annals of Babism.[54]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe discussion upon which we have now entered goes so thoroughly to\nthe root of the whole matter; the question of the day is so\ncompletely, as the author of \"Robert Elsmere\" says, the value of\ntestimony, that I shall offer no apology for following it out somewhat\nin detail; and, by way of giving substance to the argument, I shall\nbase what I have to say upon a case, the consideration of which lies\nstrictly within the province of natural science, and of that\nparticular part of it known as the physiology and pathology of the\nnervous system.\n\nI find, in the second Gospel (chap. v.), a statement, to all\nappearance intended to have the same evidential value as any other\ncontained in that history. It is the well-known story of the devils\nwho were cast out of a man, and ordered, or permitted, to enter into a\nherd of swine, to the great loss and damage of the innocent Gerasene,\nor Gadarene, pig owners. There can be no doubt that the narrator\nintends to convey to his readers his own conviction that this casting\nout and entering in were effected by the agency of Jesus of Nazareth;\nthat, by speech and action, Jesus enforced this conviction; nor does\nany inkling of the legal and moral difficulties of the case manifest\nitself.\n\nOn the other hand, everything that I know of physiological and\npathological science leads me to entertain a very strong conviction\nthat the phenomena ascribed to possession are as purely natural as\nthose which constitute small-pox; everything that I know of\nanthropology leads me to think that the belief in demons and\ndemoniacal possession is a mere survival of a once universal\nsuperstition, and that its persistence, at the present time, is pretty\nmuch in the inverse ratio of the general instruction, intelligence,\nand sound judgment of the population among whom it prevails.\nEverything that I know of law and justice convinces me that the wanton\ndestruction of other people's property is a misdemeanour of evil\nexample. Again, the study of history, and especially of that of the\nfifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries, leaves no shadow of\ndoubt on my mind that the belief in the reality of possession and of\nwitchcraft, justly based, alike by Catholics and Protestants, upon\nthis and innumerable other passages in both the Old and New\nTestaments, gave rise, through the special influence of Christian\necclesiastics, to the most horrible persecutions and judicial murders\nof thousands upon thousands of innocent men, women, and children. And\nwhen I reflect that the record of a plain and simple declaration upon\nsuch an occasion as this, that the belief in witchcraft and possession\nis wicked nonsense, would have rendered the long agony of mediaeval\nhumanity impossible, I am prompted to reject, as dishonouring, the\nsupposition that such declaration was withheld out of condescension to\npopular error.\n\n\"Come forth, thou unclean spirit, out of the man\" (Mark v. 8),[55] are\nthe words attributed to Jesus. If I declare, as I have no hesitation\nin doing, that I utterly disbelieve in the existence of \"unclean\nspirits,\" and, consequently, in the possibility of their \"coming\nforth\" out of a man, I suppose that Dr. Wace will tell me I am\ndisregarding the testimony \"of our Lord.\" For, if these words were\nreally used, the most resourceful of reconcilers can hardly venture to\naffirm that they are compatible with a disbelief \"in these things.\" As\nthe learned and fair-minded, as well as orthodox, Dr. Alexander\nremarks, in an editorial note to the article \"Demoniacs,\" in the\n\"Biblical Cyclopaedia\" (vol. i. p. 664, note):--\n\n     ... On the lowest grounds on which our Lord and His Apostles\n     can be placed they must, at least, be regarded as _honest_\n     men. Now, though honest speech does not require that words\n     should be used always and only in their etymological sense,\n     it does require that they should not be used so as to affirm\n     what the speaker knows to be false. Whilst, therefore, our\n     Lord and His Apostles might use the word [Greek: daimonizesthai],\n     or the phrase, [Greek: daimonion echein] as a popular\n     description of certain diseases, without giving in to the\n     belief which lay at the source of such a mode of expression,\n     they could not speak of demons entering into a man, or being\n     cast out of him, without pledging themselves to the belief of\n     an actual possession of the man by the demons. (Campbell,\n     _Prel. Diss._ vi. 1, 10.) If, consequently, they did not hold\n     this belief, they spoke not as honest men.\n\nThe story which we are considering does not rest on the authority of\nthe second Gospel alone. The third confirms the second, especially in\nthe matter of commanding the unclean spirit to come out of the man\n(Luke viii. 29); and, although the first Gospel either gives a\ndifferent version of the same story, or tells another of like kind,\nthe essential point remains: \"If thou cast us out, send us away into\nthe herd of swine. And He said unto them: Go!\" (Matt. viii. 31, 32).\n\nIf the concurrent testimony of the three synoptics, then, is really\nsufficient to do away with all rational doubt as to a matter of fact\nof the utmost practical and speculative importance--belief or\ndisbelief in which may affect, and has affected, men's lives and their\nconduct towards other men, in the most serious way--then I am bound to\nbelieve that Jesus implicitly affirmed himself to possess a \"knowledge\nof the unseen world,\" which afforded full confirmation of the belief\nin demons and possession current among his contemporaries. If the\nstory is true, the mediaeval theory of the invisible world may be, and\nprobably is, quite correct; and the witch-finders, from Sprenger to\nHopkins and Mather, are much-maligned men.\n\nOn the other hand, humanity, noting the frightful consequences of this\nbelief; common sense, observing the futility of the evidence on which\nit is based, in all cases that have been properly investigated;\nscience, more and more seeing its way to inclose all the phenomena of\nso-called \"possession\" within the domain of pathology, so far as they\nare not to be relegated to that of the police--all these powerful\ninfluences concur in warning us, at our peril, against accepting the\nbelief without the most careful scrutiny of the authority on which it\nrests.\n\nI can discern no escape from this dilemma: either Jesus said what he\nis reported to have said, or he did not. In the former case, it is\ninevitable that his authority on matters connected with the \"unseen\nworld\" should be roughly shaken; in the latter, the blow falls upon\nthe authority of the synoptic Gospels. If their report on a matter of\nsuch stupendous and far-reaching practical import as this is\nuntrustworthy, how can we be sure of its trustworthiness in other\ncases? The favourite \"earth,\" in which the hard-pressed reconciler\ntakes refuge, that the Bible does not profess to teach science,[56] is\nstopped in this instance. For the question of the existence of demons\nand of possession by them, though it lies strictly within the province\nof science, is also of the deepest moral and religious significance.\nIf physical and mental disorders are caused by demons, Gregory of\nTours and his contemporaries rightly considered that relics and\nexorcists were more useful than doctors; the gravest questions arise\nas to the legal and moral responsibilities of persons inspired by\ndemoniacal impulses; and our whole conception of the universe and of\nour relations to it becomes totally different from what it would be on\nthe contrary hypothesis.\n\nThe theory of life of an average mediaeval Christian was as different\nfrom that of an average nineteenth-century Englishman as that of a\nWest African negro is now, in these respects. The modern world is\nslowly, but surely, shaking off these and other monstrous survivals of\nsavage delusions; and, whatever happens, it will not return to that\nwallowing in the mire. Until the contrary is proved, I venture to\ndoubt whether, at this present moment, any Protestant theologian, who\nhas a reputation to lose, will say that he believes the Gadarene\nstory.\n\nThe choice then lies between discrediting those who compiled the\nGospel biographies and disbelieving the Master, whom they, simple\nsouls, thought to honour by preserving such traditions of the exercise\nof his authority over Satan's invisible world. This is the dilemma. No\ndeep scholarship, nothing but a knowledge of the revised version (on\nwhich it is to be supposed all that mere scholarship can do has been\ndone), with the application thereto of the commonest canons of common\nsense, is needful to enable us to make a choice between its\nalternatives. It is hardly doubtful that the story, as told in the\nfirst Gospel, is merely a version of that told in the second and\nthird. Nevertheless, the discrepancies are serious and irreconcilable;\nand, on this ground alone, a suspension of judgment, at the least, is\ncalled for. But there is a great deal more to be said. From the dawn\nof scientific biblical criticism until the present day, the evidence\nagainst the long-cherished notion that the three synoptic Gospels are\nthe works of three independent authors, each prompted by Divine\ninspiration, has steadily accumulated, until, at the present time,\nthere is no visible escape from the conclusion that each of the three\nis a compilation consisting of a groundwork common to all three--the\nthreefold tradition; and of a superstructure, consisting, firstly, of\nmatter common to it with one of the others, and, secondly, of matter\nspecial to each. The use of the terms \"groundwork\" and \"superstructure\"\nby no means implies that the latter must be of later date than the\nformer. On the contrary, some parts of it may be, and probably are,\nolder than some parts of the groundwork.[57]\n\nThe story of the Gadarene swine belongs to the groundwork; at least,\nthe essential part of it, in which the belief in demoniac possession\nis expressed, does; and therefore the compilers of the first, second,\nand third Gospels, whoever they were, certainly accepted that belief\n(which, indeed, was universal among both Jews and pagans at that\ntime), and attributed it to Jesus.\n\nWhat, then, do we know about the originator, or originators, of this\ngroundwork--of that threefold tradition which all three witnesses (in\nPaley's phrase) agree upon--that we should allow their mere statements\nto outweigh the counter arguments of humanity, of common sense, of\nexact science, and to imperil the respect which all would be glad to\nbe able to render to their Master?\n\nAbsolutely nothing.[58] There is no proof, nothing more than a fair\npresumption, that any one of the Gospels existed, in the state in\nwhich we find it in the authorised version of the Bible, before the\nsecond century, or, in other words, sixty or seventy years after the\nevents recorded. And, between that time and the date of the oldest\nextant manuscripts of the Gospels, there is no telling what additions\nand alterations and interpolations may have been made. It may be said\nthat this is all mere speculation, but it is a good deal more. As\ncompetent scholars and honest men, our revisers have felt compelled to\npoint out that such things have happened even since the date of the\noldest known manuscripts. The oldest two copies of the second Gospel\nend with the 8th verse of the 16th chapter; the remaining twelve\nverses are spurious, and it is noteworthy that the maker of the\naddition has not hesitation to introduce a speech in which Jesus\npromises his disciples that \"in My name shall they cast out devils.\"\n\nThe other passage \"rejected to the margin\" is still more instructive.\nIt is that touching apologue, with its profound ethical sense, of the\nwoman taken in adultery--which, if internal evidence were an\ninfallible guide, might well be affirmed to be a typical example of\nthe teachings of Jesus. Yet, say the revisers, pitilessly, \"Most of\nthe ancient authorities emit John vii. 53-viii. 11.\" Now let any\nreasonable man ask himself this question. If, after an approximate\nsettlement of the canon of the New Testament, and even later than the\nfourth and fifth centuries, literary fabricators had the skill and the\naudacity to make such additions and interpolations as these, what may\nthey have done when no one had thought of a canon; when oral\ntradition, still unfixed, was regarded as more valuable than such\nwritten records as may have existed in the latter portion of the first\ncentury? Or, to take the other alternative, if those who gradually\nsettled the canon did not know of the existence of the oldest codices\nwhich have come down to us; or if, knowing them, they rejected their\nauthority, what is to be thought of their competency as critics of the\ntext?\n\nPeople who object to free criticism of the Christian Scriptures forget\nthat they are what they are in virtue of very free criticism; unless\nthe advocates of inspiration are prepared to affirm that the majority\nof influential ecclesiastics during several centuries were safeguarded\nagainst error. For, even granting that some books of the period were\ninspired, they were certainly few amongst many; and those who selected\nthe canonical books, unless they themselves were also inspired, must\nbe regarded in the light of mere critics, and, from the evidence they\nhave left of their intellectual habits, very uncritical critics. When\none thinks that such delicate questions as those involved fell into\nthe hands of men like Papias (who believed in the famous millenarian\ngrape story); of Irenaeus with his \"reasons\" for the existence of only\nfour Gospels; and of such calm and dispassionate judges as Tertullian,\nwith his \"Credo quia impossibile\": the marvel is that the selection\nwhich constitutes our New Testament is as free as it is from obviously\nobjectionable matter. The apocryphal Gospels certainly deserve to be\napocryphal; but one may suspect that a little more critical\ndiscrimination would have enlarged the Apocrypha not inconsiderably.\n\nAt this point a very obvious objection arises and deserves full and\ncandid consideration. It may be said that critical scepticism carried\nto the length suggested is historical pyrrhonism; that if we are\naltogether to discredit an ancient or a modern historian, because he\nhas assumed fabulous matter to be true, it will be as well to give up\npaying any attention to history. It may be said, and with great\njustice, that Eginhard's \"Life of Charlemagne\" is none the less\ntrustworthy because of the astounding revelation of credulity, of lack\nof judgment, and even of respect for the eighth commandment, which he\nhas unconsciously made in the \"History of the Translation of the\nBlessed Martyrs Marcellinus and Paul.\" Or, to go no further back than\nthe last number of the _Nineteenth Century_, surely that excellent\nlady, Miss Strickland, is not to be refused all credence, because of\nthe myth about the second James's remains which she seems to have\nunconsciously invented.\n\nOf course this is perfectly true. I am afraid there is no man alive\nwhose witness could be accepted, if the condition precedent were proof\nthat he had never invented and promulgated a myth. In the minds of all\nof us there are little places here and there, like the indistinguishable\nspots on a rock which give foothold to moss or stonecrop; on which, if\nthe germ of a myth fall, it is certain to grow, without in the least\ndegree affecting our accuracy or truthfulness elsewhere. Sir Walter\nScott knew that he could not repeat a story without, as he said,\n\"giving it a new hat and stick.\" Most of us differ from Sir Walter\nonly in not knowing about this tendency of the mythopoeic faculty to\nbreak out unnoticed. But it is also perfectly true that the mythopoeic\nfaculty is not equally active in all minds, nor in all regions and\nunder all conditions of the same mind. David Hume was certainly not so\nliable to temptation as the Venerable Bede, or even as some recent\nhistorians who could be mentioned; and the most imaginative of\ndebtors, if he owes five pounds, never makes an obligation to pay a\nhundred out of it. The rule of common sense is _prima facie_ to trust\na witness in all matters, in which neither his self-interest, his\npassions, his prejudices, nor that love of the marvellous, which is\ninherent to a greater or less degree in all mankind, are strongly\nconcerned; and, when they are involved, to require corroborative\nevidence in exact proportion to the contravention of probability by\nthe thing testified.\n\nNow, in the Gadarene affair, I do not think I am unreasonably\nsceptical, if I say that the existence of demons who can be\ntransferred from a man to a pig, does thus contravene probability. Let\nme be perfectly candid. I admit I have no _a priori_ objection to\noffer. There are physical things, such as _taeniae_ and _trichinae_,\nwhich can be transferred from men to pigs, and _vice versa_, and which\ndo undoubtedly produce most diabolical and deadly effects on both.\nFor anything I can absolutely prove to the contrary, there may be\nspiritual things capable of the same transmigration, with like\neffects. Moreover I am bound to add that perfectly truthful persons,\nfor whom I have the greatest respect, believe in stories about spirits\nof the present day, quite as improbable as that we are considering.\n\nSo I declare, as plainly as I can, that I am unable to show cause why\nthese transferable devils should not exist; nor can I deny that, not\nmerely the whole Roman Church, but many Wacean \"infidels\" of no mean\nrepute, do honestly and firmly believe that the activity of such like\ndemonic beings is in full swing in this year of grace 1889.\n\nNevertheless, as good Bishop Butler says, \"probability is the guide of\nlife;\" and it seems to me that this is just one of the cases in which\nthe canon of credibility and testimony, which I have ventured to lay\ndown, has full force. So that, with the most entire respect for many\n(by no means for all) of our witnesses for the truth of demonology,\nancient and modern, I conceive their evidence on this particular\nmatter to be ridiculously insufficient to warrant their\nconclusion.[59]\n\nAfter what has been said I do not think that any sensible man, unless\nhe happen to be angry, will accuse me of \"contradicting the Lord and\nHis Apostles\" if I reiterate my total disbelief in the whole Gadarene\nstory. But, if that story is discredited, all the other stories of\ndemoniac possession fall under suspicion. And if the belief in demons\nand demoniac possession, which forms the sombre background of the\nwhole picture of primitive Christianity, presented to us in the New\nTestament, is shaken, what is to be said, in any case, of the\nuncorroborated testimony of the Gospels with respect to \"the unseen\nworld\"?\n\nI am not aware that I have been influenced by any more bias in regard\nto the Gadarene story than I have been in dealing with other cases of\nlike kind the investigation of which has interested me. I was brought\nup in the strictest school of evangelical orthodoxy; and when I was\nold enough to think for myself, I started upon my journey of inquiry\nwith little doubt about the general truth of what I had been taught;\nand with that feeling of the unpleasantness of being called an\n\"infidel\" which, we are told, is so right and proper. Near my\njourney's end, I find myself in a condition of something more than\nmere doubt about these matters.\n\nIn the course of other inquiries, I have had to do with fossil remains\nwhich looked quite plain at a distance, and became more and more\nindistinct as I tried to define their outline by close inspection.\nThere was something there--something which, if I could win assurance\nabout it, might mark a new epoch in the history of the earth; but,\nstudy as long as I might, certainty eluded my grasp. So had it been\nwith me in my efforts to define the grand figure of Jesus as it lies\nin the primary strata of Christian literature. Is he the kindly,\npeaceful Christ depicted in the Catacombs? Or is he the stern Judge\nwho frowns upon the altar of SS. Cosmas and Damianus? Or can he be\nrightly represented by the bleeding ascetic, broken down by physical\npain, of too many mediaeval pictures? Are we to accept the Jesus of the\nsecond, or the Jesus of the fourth Gospel, as the true Jesus? What did\nhe really say and do; and how much that is attributed to him, in\nspeech and action, is the embroidery of the various parties into which\nhis followers tended to split themselves within twenty years of his\ndeath, when even the threefold tradition was only nascent?\n\nIf any one will answer these questions for me with something more to\nthe point than feeble talk about the \"cowardice of agnosticism,\" I\nshall be deeply his debtor. Unless and until they are satisfactorily\nanswered, I say of agnosticism in this matter, \"_J'y suis, et j'y\nreste_.\"\n\nBut, as we have seen, it is asserted that I have no business to call\nmyself an agnostic; that, if I am not a Christian I am an infidel; and\nthat I ought to call myself by that name of \"unpleasant significance.\"\nWell, I do not care much what I am called by other people, and if I\nhad at my side all those who, since the Christian era, have been\ncalled infidels by other folks, I could not desire better company. If\nthese are my ancestors, I prefer, with the old Frank, to be with them\nwherever they are. But there are several points in Dr. Wace's\ncontention which must be elucidated before I can even think of\nundertaking to carry out his wishes. I must, for instance, know what a\nChristian is. Now what is a Christian? By whose authority is the\nsignification of that term defined? Is there any doubt that the\nimmediate followers of Jesus, the \"sect of the Nazarenes,\" were\nstrictly orthodox Jews differing from other Jews not more than the\nSadducees, the Pharisees, and the Essenes differed from one another;\nin fact, only in the belief that the Messiah, for whom the rest of\ntheir nation waited, had come? Was not their chief, \"James, the\nbrother of the Lord,\" reverenced alike by Sadducee, Pharisee, and\nNazarene? At the famous conference which, according to the Acts, took\nplace at Jerusalem, does not James declare that \"myriads\" of Jews,\nwho, by that time, had become Nazarenes, were \"all zealous for the\nLaw\"? Was not the name of \"Christian\" first used to denote the\nconverts to the doctrine promulgated by Paul and Barnabas at Antioch?\nDoes the subsequent history of Christianity leave any doubt that, from\nthis time forth, the \"little rift within the lute\" caused by the new\nteaching, developed, if not inaugurated, at Antioch, grew wider and\nwider, until the two types of doctrines irreconcilably diverged? Did\nnot the primitive Nazarenism, or Ebionism, develop into the\nNazarenism, and Ebionism, and Elkasaitism of later ages, and finally\ndie out in obscurity and condemnation, as damnable heresy; while the\nyounger doctrine throve and pushed out its shoots into that endless\nvariety of sects, of which the three strongest survivors are the Roman\nand Greek Churches and modern Protestantism?\n\nSingular state of things! If I were to profess the doctrine which was\nheld by \"James, the brother of the Lord,\" and by every one of the\n\"myriads\" of his followers and co-religionists in Jerusalem up to\ntwenty or thirty years after the Crucifixion (and one knows not how\nmuch later at Pella), I should be condemned, with unanimity, as an\nebionising heretic by the Roman, Greek, and Protestant Churches! And,\nprobably, this hearty and unanimous condemnation of the creed, held by\nthose who were in the closest personal relation with their Lord, is\nalmost the only point upon which they would be cordially of one mind.\nOn the other hand, though I hardly dare imagine such a thing, I very\nmuch fear that the \"pillars\" of the primitive Hierosolymitan Church\nwould have considered Dr. Wace an infidel. No one can read the famous\nsecond chapter of Galatians and the book of Revelation without seeing\nhow narrow was even Paul's escape from a similar fate. And, if\necclesiastical history is to be trusted, the thirty-nine articles, be\nthey right or wrong, diverge from the primitive doctrine of the\nNazarenes vastly more than even Pauline Christianity did.\n\nBut, further than this, I have great difficulty in assuring myself\nthat even James, \"the brother of the Lord,\" and his \"myriads\" of\nNazarenes, properly represented the doctrines of their Master. For it\nis constantly asserted by our modern \"pillars\" that one of the chief\nfeatures of the work of Jesus was the instauration of Religion by the\nabolition of what our sticklers for articles and liturgies, with,\nunconscious humour, call the narrow restrictions of the Law. Yet, if\nJames knew this, how could the bitter controversy with Paul have\narisen; and why did not one or the other side quote any of the various\nsayings of Jesus, recorded in the Gospels, which directly bear on the\nquestion--sometimes, apparently, in opposite directions?\n\nSo, if I am asked to call myself an \"infidel,\" I reply: To what\ndoctrine do you ask me to be faithful? Is it that contained in the\nNicene and the Athanasian Creeds? My firm belief is that the\nNazarenes, say of the year 40, headed by James, would have stopped\ntheir ears and thought worthy of stoning the audacious man who\npropounded it to them. Is it contained in the so-called Apostle's\nCreed? I am pretty sure that even that would have created a\nrecalcitrant commotion at Pella in the year 70, among the Nazarenes of\nJerusalem, who had fled from the soldiers of Titus. And yet, if the\nunadulterated tradition of the teachings of \"the Nazarene\" were to be\nfound anywhere, it surely should have been amidst those not very aged\ndisciples who may have heard them as they were delivered.\n\nTherefore, however sorry I may be to be unable to demonstrate that, if\nnecessary, I should not be afraid to call myself an \"infidel,\" I\ncannot do it. \"Infidel\" is a term of reproach, which Christians and\nMahommedans, in their modesty, agree to apply to those who differ from\nthem. If he had only thought of it, Dr. Wace might have used the term\n\"miscreant,\" which, with the same etymological signification, has the\nadvantage of being still more \"unpleasant\" to the persons to whom it\nis applied. But why should a man be expected to call himself a\n\"miscreant\" or an \"infidel\"? That St. Patrick \"had two birthdays\nbecause he was a twin\" is a reasonable and intelligible utterance\nbeside that of the man who should declare himself to be an infidel on\nthe ground of denying his own belief. It may be logically, if not\nethically, defensible that a Christian should call a Mahommedan an\ninfidel and _vice versa_; but, on Dr. Wace's principles, both ought to\ncall themselves infidels, because each applies the term to the other.\n\nNow I am afraid that all the Mahommedan world would agree in\nreciprocating that appellation to Dr. Wace himself. I once visited the\nHazar Mosque, the great University of Mohammedanism, in Cairo, in\nignorance of the fact that I was unprovided with proper authority. A\nswarm of angry undergraduates, as I suppose I ought to call them, came\nbuzzing about me and my guide; and if I had known Arabic, I suspect\nthat \"dog of an infidel\" would have been by no means the most\n\"unpleasant\" of the epithets showered upon me, before I could explain\nand apologise for the mistake. If I had had the pleasure of Dr. Wace's\ncompany on that occasion, the undiscriminative followers of the\nProphet would, I am afraid, have made no difference between us; not\neven if they had known that he was the head of an orthodox Christian\nseminary. And I have not the smallest doubt that even one of the\nlearned mollahs, if his grave courtesy would have permitted him to say\nanything offensive to men of another mode of belief, would have told\nus that he wondered we did not find it \"very unpleasant\" to disbelieve\nin the Prophet of Islam.\n\nFrom what precedes, I think it becomes sufficiently clear that Dr.\nWace's account of the origin of the name of \"Agnostic\" is quite wrong.\nIndeed, I am bound to add that very slight effort to discover the\ntruth would have convinced him that, as a matter of fact, the term\narose otherwise. I am loath to go over an old story once more; but\nmore than one object which I have in view will be served by telling it\na little more fully than it has yet been told.\n\nLooking back nearly fifty years, I see myself as a boy, whose\neducation has been interrupted, and who, intellectually, was left, for\nsome years, altogether to his own devices. At that time, I was a\nvoracious and omnivorous reader; a dreamer and speculator of the first\nwater, well endowed with that splendid courage in attacking any and\nevery subject, which is the blessed compensation of youth and\ninexperience. Among the books and essays, on all sorts of topics from\nmetaphysics to heraldry, which I read at this time, two left indelible\nimpressions on my mind. One was Guizot's \"History of Civilization,\"\nthe other was Sir William Hamilton's essay \"On the Philosophy of the\nUnconditioned,\" which I came upon, by chance, in an odd volume of the\n\"Edinburgh Review.\" The latter was certainly strange reading for a\nboy, and I could not possibly have understood a great deal of it;[60]\nnevertheless, I devoured it with avidity, and it stamped upon my mind\nthe strong conviction that, on even the most solemn and important of\nquestions, men are apt to take cunning phrases for answers; and that\nthe limitation of our faculties, in a great number of cases, renders\nreal answers to such questions, not merely actually impossible, but\ntheoretically inconceivable.\n\nPhilosophy and history having laid hold of me in this eccentric\nfashion, have never loosened their grip. I have no pretension to be an\nexpert in either subject; but the turn for philosophical and\nhistorical reading, which rendered Hamilton and Guizot attractive to\nme, has not only filled many lawful leisure hours, and still more\nsleepless ones, with the repose of changed mental occupation, but has\nnot unfrequently disputed my proper work-time with my liege lady,\nNatural Science. In this way I have found it possible to cover a good\ndeal of ground in the territory of philosophy; and all the more easily\nthat I have never cared much about A's or B's opinions, but have\nrather sought to know what answer he had to give to the questions I\nhad to put to him--that of the limitation of possible knowledge being\nthe chief. The ordinary examiner, with his \"State the views of\nSo-and-so,\" would have floored me at any time. If he had said what do\n_you_ think about any given problem, I might have got on fairly well.\n\nThe reader who has had the patience to follow the enforced, but\nunwilling, egotism of this veritable history (especially if his\nstudies have led him in the same direction), will now see why my mind\nsteadily gravitated towards the conclusions of Hume and Kant, so well\nstated by the latter in a sentence, which I have quoted elsewhere.\n\n\"The greatest and perhaps the sole use of all philosophy of pure\nreason is, after all, merely negative, since it serves not as an\norganon for the enlargement [of knowledge], but as a discipline for\nits delimitation; and, instead of discovering truth, has only the\nmodest merit of preventing error.\"[61]\n\nWhen I reached intellectual maturity and began to ask myself whether I\nwas an atheist, a theist, or a pantheist; a materialist or an\nidealist; a Christian or a freethinker; I found that the more I\nlearned and reflected, the less ready was the answer; until, at last,\nI came to the conclusion that I had neither art nor part with any of\nthese denominations, except the last. The one thing in which most of\nthese good people were agreed was the one thing in which I differed\nfrom them. They were quite sure they had attained a certain\n\"gnosis,\"--had, more or less successfully, solved the problem of\nexistence; while I was quite sure I had not, and had a pretty strong\nconviction that the problem was insoluble. And, with Hume and Kant on\nmy side, I could not think myself presumptuous in holding fast by that\nopinion. Like Dante,\n\n    Nel mezzo del cammin di nostra vita\n      Mi ritrovai per una selva oscura,\n\nbut, unlike Dante, I cannot add,\n\n    Che la diritta via era smarrita.\n\nOn the contrary, I had, and have, the firmest conviction that I never\nleft the \"verace via\"--the straight road; and that this road led\nnowhere else but into the dark depths of a wild and tangled forest.\nAnd though I have found leopards and lions in the path; though I have\nmade abundant acquaintance with the hungry wolf, that \"with privy paw\ndevours apace and nothing said,\" as another great poet says of the\nravening beast; and though no friendly spectre has even yet offered\nhis guidance, I was, and am, minded to go straight on, until I either\ncome out on the other side of the wood, or find there is no other\nside to it, at least, none attainable by me.\n\nThis was my situation when I had the good fortune to find a place\namong the members of that remarkable confraternity of antagonists,\nlong since deceased, but of green and pious memory, the Metaphysical\nSociety. Every variety of philosophical and theological opinion was\nrepresented there, and expressed itself with entire openness; most of\nmy colleagues were _-ists_ of one sort or another; and, however kind\nand friendly they might be, I, the man without a rag of a label to\ncover himself with, could not fail to have some of the uneasy feelings\nwhich must have beset the historical fox when, after leaving the trap\nin which his tail remained, he presented himself to his normally\nelongated companions. So I took thought, and invented what I conceived\nto be the appropriate title of \"agnostic.\" It came into my head as\nsuggestively antithetic to the \"gnostic\" of Church history, who\nprofessed to know so much about the very things of which I was\nignorant; and I took the earliest opportunity of parading it at our\nSociety, to show that I, too, had a tail, like the other foxes. To my\ngreat satisfaction, the term took; and when the _Spectator_ had stood\ngodfather to it, any suspicion in the minds of respectable people,\nthat a knowledge of its parentage might have awakened was, of course,\ncompletely lulled.\n\nThat is the history of the origin of the terms \"agnostic\" and\n\"agnosticism\"; and it will be observed that it does not quite agree\nwith the confident assertion of the reverend Principal of King's\nCollege, that \"the adoption of the term agnostic is only an attempt to\nshift the issue, and that it involves a mere evasion\" in relation to\nthe Church and Christianity.[62]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe last objection (I rejoice as much as my readers must do, that it\nis the last) which I have to take to Dr. Wace's deliverance before the\nChurch Congress arises, I am sorry to say, on a question of morality.\n\n\"It is, and it ought to be,\" authoritatively declares this official\nrepresentative of Christian ethics, \"an unpleasant thing for a man to\nhave to say plainly that he does not believe in Jesus Christ\" (_l.c._\np. 254).\n\nWhether it is so depends, I imagine, a good deal on whether the man\nwas brought up in a Christian household or not. I do not see why it\nshould be \"unpleasant\" for a Mahommedan or Buddhist to say so. But\nthat \"it ought to be\" unpleasant for any man to say anything which he\nsincerely, and after due deliberation, believes, is, to my mind, a\nproposition of the most profoundly immoral character. I verily believe\nthat the great good which has been effected in the world by\nChristianity has been largely counteracted by the pestilent doctrine\non which all the Churches have insisted, that honest disbelief in\ntheir more or less astonishing creeds is a moral offence, indeed a sin\nof the deepest dye, deserving and involving the same future\nretribution as murder and robbery. If we could only see, in one view,\nthe torrents of hypocrisy and cruelty, the lies, the slaughter, the\nviolations of every obligation of humanity, which have flowed from\nthis source along the course of the history of Christian nations, our\nworst imaginations of Hell would pale beside the vision.\n\nA thousand times, no! It ought _not_ to be unpleasant to say that\nwhich one honestly believes or disbelieves. That it so constantly is\npainful to do so, is quite enough obstacle to the progress of mankind\nin that most valuable of all qualities, honesty of word or of deed,\nwithout erecting a sad concomitant of human weakness into something to\nbe admired and cherished. The bravest of soldiers often, and very\nnaturally, \"feel it unpleasant\" to go into action; but a court-martial\nwhich did its duty would make short work of the officer who\npromulgated the doctrine that his men _ought_ to feel their duty\nunpleasant.\n\nI am very well aware, as I suppose most thoughtful people are in these\ntimes, that the process of breaking away from old beliefs is extremely\nunpleasant; and I am much disposed to think that the encouragement,\nthe consolation, and the peace afforded to earnest believers in even\nthe worst forms of Christianity are of great practical advantage to\nthem. What deductions must be made from this gain on the score of the\nharm done to the citizen by the ascetic other-worldliness of logical\nChristianity; to the ruler, by the hatred, malice, and all\nuncharitableness of sectarian bigotry; to the legislator, by the\nspirit of exclusiveness and domination of those that count themselves\npillars of orthodoxy; to the philosopher, by the restraints on the\nfreedom of learning and teaching which every Church exercises, when it\nis strong enough; to the conscientious soul, by the introspective\nhunting after sins of the mint and cummin type, the fear of\ntheological error, and the overpowering terror of possible damnation,\nwhich have accompanied the Churches like their shadow, I need not now\nconsider; but they are assuredly not small. If agnostics lose heavily\non the one side, they gain a good deal on the other. People who talk\nabout the comforts of belief appear to forget its discomforts; they\nignore the fact that the Christianity of the Churches is something\nmore than faith in the ideal personality of Jesus, which they create\nfor themselves, _plus_ so much as can be carried into practice,\nwithout disorganising civil society, of the maxims of the Sermon on\nthe Mount. Trip in morals or in doctrine (especially in doctrine),\nwithout due repentance or retractation, or fail to get properly\nbaptized before you die, and a _plebiscite_ of the Christians of\nEurope, if they were true to their creeds, would affirm your\neverlasting damnation by an immense majority.\n\nPreachers, orthodox and heterodox, din into our ears that the world\ncannot get on without faith of some sort. There is a sense in which\nthat is as eminently as obviously true; there is another, in which, in\nmy judgment, it is as eminently as obviously false, and it seems to me\nthat the hortatory, or pulpit, mind is apt to oscillate between the\nfalse and the true meanings, without being aware of the fact.\n\nIt is quite true that the ground of every one of our actions, and the\nvalidity of all our reasonings, rest upon the great act of faith,\nwhich leads us to take the experience of the past as a safe guide in\nour dealings with the present and the future. From the nature of\nratiocination, it is obvious that the axioms, on which it is based,\ncannot be demonstrated by ratiocination. It is also a trite\nobservation that, in the business of life, we constantly take the most\nserious action upon evidence of an utterly insufficient character. But\nit is surely plain that faith is not necessarily entitled to dispense\nwith ratiocination because ratiocination cannot dispense with faith as\na starting-point; and that because we are often obliged, by the\npressure of events, to act on very bad evidence, it does not follow\nthat it is proper to act on such evidence when the pressure is absent.\n\nThe writer of the epistle to the Hebrews tells us that \"faith is the\nassurance of things hoped for, the proving of things not seen.\" In the\nauthorised version, \"substance\" stands for \"assurance,\" and \"evidence\"\nfor \"proving.\" The question of the exact meaning of the two words,\n[Greek: hypostasis] and [Greek: elegchos] affords a fine field of\ndiscussion for the scholar and the metaphysician. But I fancy we shall\nbe not far from the mark if we take the writer to have had in his mind\nthe profound psychological truth, that men constantly feel certain\nabout things for which they strongly hope, but have no evidence, in\nthe legal or logical sense of the word; and he calls this feeling\n\"faith.\" I may have the most absolute faith that a friend has not\ncommitted the crime of which he is accused. In the early days of\nEnglish history, if my friend could have obtained a few more\ncompurgators of a like robust faith, he would have been acquitted. At\nthe present day, if I tendered myself as a witness on that score, the\njudge would tell me to stand down, and the youngest barrister would\nsmile at my simplicity. Miserable indeed is the man who has not such\nfaith in some of his fellow-men--only less miserable than the man who\nallows himself to forget that such faith is not, strictly speaking,\nevidence; and when his faith is disappointed, as will happen now and\nagain, turns Timon and blames the universe for his own blunders. And\nso, if a man can find a friend, the hypostasis of all his hopes, the\nmirror of his ethical ideal, in the Jesus of any, or all, of the\nGospels, let him live by faith in that ideal. Who shall or can forbid\nhim? But let him not delude himself with the notion that his faith is\nevidence of the objective reality of that in which he trusts. Such\nevidence is to be obtained only by the use of the methods of science,\nas applied to history and to literature, and it amounts at present to\nvery little.\n\nIt appears that Mr. Gladstone some time ago asked Mr. Laing if he\ncould draw up a short summary of the negative creed; a body of\nnegative propositions, which have so far been adopted on the negative\nside as to be what the Apostles' and other accepted creeds are on the\npositive; and Mr. Laing at once kindly obliged Mr. Gladstone with the\ndesired articles--eight of them.\n\nIf any one had preferred this request to me, I should have replied\nthat, if he referred to agnostics, they have no creed; and, by the\nnature of the case, cannot have any. Agnosticism, in fact, is not a\ncreed, but a method, the essence of which lies in the rigorous\napplication of a single principle. That principle is of great\nantiquity; it is as old as Socrates; as old as the writer who said,\n\"Try all things, hold fast by that which is good;\" it is the\nfoundation of the Reformation, which simply illustrated the axiom that\nevery man should be able to give a reason for the faith that is in\nhim; it is the great principle of Descartes; it is the fundamental\naxiom of modern science. Positively the principle may be expressed: In\nmatters of the intellect, follow your reason as far as it will take\nyou, without regard to any other consideration. And negatively: In\nmatters of the intellect do not pretend that conclusions are certain\nwhich are not demonstrated or demonstrable. That I take to be the\nagnostic faith, which if a man keep whole and undefiled, he shall not\nbe ashamed to look the universe in the face, whatever the future may\nhave in store for him.\n\nThe results of the working out of the agnostic principle will vary\naccording to individual knowledge and capacity, and according to the\ngeneral condition of science. That which is unproven to-day may be\nproven by the help of new discoveries to-morrow. The only negative\nfixed points will be those negations which flow from the demonstrable\nlimitation of our faculties. And the only obligation accepted is to\nhave the mind always open to conviction. Agnostics who never fail in\ncarrying out their principles are, I am afraid, as rare as other\npeople of whom the same consistency can be truthfully predicated. But,\nif you were to meet with such a phoenix and to tell him that you had\ndiscovered that two and two make five, he would patiently ask you to\nstate your reasons for that conviction, and express his readiness to\nagree with you if he found them satisfactory. The apostolic\ninjunction to \"suffer fools gladly\" should be the rule of life of a\ntrue agnostic. I am deeply conscious how far I myself fall short of\nthis ideal, but it is my personal conception of what agnostics ought\nto be.\n\nHowever, as I began by stating, I speak only for myself; and I do not\ndream of anathematizing and excommunicating Mr. Laing. But, when I\nconsider his creed and compare it with the Athanasian, I think I have\non the whole a clearer conception of the meaning of the latter.\n\"Polarity,\" in Article VIII, for example, is a word about which I\nheard a good deal in my youth, when \"Naturphilosophie\" was in fashion,\nand greatly did I suffer from it. For many years past, whenever I have\nmet with \"polarity\" anywhere but in a discussion of some purely\nphysical topic, such as magnetism, I have shut the book. Mr. Laing\nmust excuse me if the force of habit was too much for me when I read\nhis eighth article.\n\nAnd now, what is to be said to Mr. Harrison's remarkable deliverance\n\"On the future of agnosticism \"?[63] I would that it were not my\nbusiness to say anything, for I am afraid I can say nothing which\nshall manifest my great personal respect for this able writer, and for\nthe zeal and energy with which he ever and anon galvanises the weakly\nframe of Positivism until it looks, more than ever, like John Bunyan's\nPope and Pagan rolled into one. There is a story often repeated, and I\nam afraid none the less mythical on that account, of a valiant and\nloud-voiced corporal in command of two full privates who, falling in\nwith a regiment of the enemy in the dark, orders it to surrender under\npain of instant annihilation by his force; and the enemy surrenders\naccordingly. I am always reminded of this tale when I read the\npositivist commands to the forces of Christianity and of Science; only\nthe enemy show no more signs of intending to obey now than they have\ndone any time these forty years.\n\nThe allocution under consideration has a certain papal flavour. Mr.\nHarrison speaks with authority and not as one of the common scribes of\nthe period. He knows not only what agnosticism is and how it has come\nabout, but what will become of it. The agnostic is to content himself\nwith being the precursor of the positivist. In his place, as a sort of\nnavvy levelling the ground and cleansing it of such poor stuff as\nChristianity, he is a useful creature who deserves patting on the\nback, on condition that he does not venture beyond his last. But let\nnot these scientific Sanballats presume that they are good enough to\ntake part in the building of the Temple--they are mere Samaritans,\ndoomed to die out in proportion as the Religion of Humanity is\naccepted by mankind. Well, if that is their fate, they have time to be\ncheerful. But let us hear Mr. Harrison's pronouncement of their doom.\n\n\"Agnosticism is a stage in the evolution of religion, an entirely\nnegative stage, the point reached by physicists, a purely mental\nconclusion, with no relation to things social at all\" (p. 154). I am\nquite dazed by this declaration. Are there, then, any \"conclusions\"\nthat are not \"purely mental\"? Is there \"no relation to things social\"\nin \"mental conclusions\" which affect men's whole conception of life?\nWas that prince of agnostics, David Hume, particularly imbued with\nphysical science? Supposing physical science to be non-existent, would\nnot the agnostic principle, applied by the philologist and the\nhistorian, lead to exactly the same results? Is the modern more or\nless complete suspension of judgment as to the facts of the history of\nregal Rome, or the real origin of the Homeric poems, anything but\nagnosticism in history and in literature? And if so, how can\nagnosticism be the \"mere negation of the physicist\"?\n\n\"Agnosticism is a stage in the evolution of religion.\" No two people\nagree as to what is meant by the term \"religion\"; but if it means, as\nI think it ought to mean, simply the reverence and love for the\nethical ideal, and the desire to realise that ideal in life, which\nevery man ought to feel--then I say agnosticism has no more to do\nwith it than it has to do with music or painting. If, on the other\nhand, Mr. Harrison, like most people, means by \"religion\" theology,\nthen, in my judgment, agnosticism can be said to be a stage in its\nevolution, only as death may be said to be the final stage in the\nevolution of life.\n\n     When agnostic logic is simply one of the canons of thought,\n     agnosticism, as a distinctive faith, will have spontaneously\n     disappeared (p. 155).\n\nI can but marvel that such sentences as this, and those already\nquoted, should have proceeded from Mr. Harrison's pen. Does he really\nmean to suggest that agnostics have a logic peculiar to themselves?\nWill lie kindly help me out of my bewilderment when I try to think of\n\"logic\" being anything else than the canon (which, I believe, means\nrule) of thought? As to agnosticism being a distinctive faith, I have\nalready shown that it cannot possibly be anything of the kind, unless\nperfect faith in logic is distinctive of agnostics; which, after all,\nit may be.\n\n     Agnosticism as a religious philosophy _per se_ rests on an\n     almost total ignoring of history and social evolution (p.\n     152).\n\nBut neither _per se_ nor _per aliud_ has agnosticism (if I know\nanything about it) the least pretension to be a religious philosophy;\nso far from resting on ignorance of history, and that social evolution\nof which history is the account, it is and has been the inevitable\nresult of the strict adherence to scientific methods by historical\ninvestigators. Our forefathers were quite confident about the\nexistence of Romulus and Remus, of King Arthur, and of Hengist and\nHorsa. Most of us have become agnostics in regard to the reality of\nthese worthies. It is a matter of notoriety of which Mr. Harrison, who\naccuses us all so freely of ignoring history, should not be ignorant,\nthat the critical process which has shattered the foundations of\northodox Christian doctrine owes its origin, not to the devotees of\nphysical science, but, before all, to Richard Simon, the learned\nFrench Oratorian, just two hundred years ago. I cannot find evidence\nthat either Simon, or any one of the great scholars and critics of the\neighteenth and nineteenth centuries who have continued Simon's work,\nhad any particular acquaintance with physical science. I have already\npointed out that Hume was independent of it. And certainly one of the\nmost potent influences in the same direction, upon history in the\npresent century, that of Grote, did not come from the physical side.\nPhysical science, in fact, has had nothing directly to do with the\ncriticism of the Gospels; it is wholly incompetent to furnish\ndemonstrative evidence that any statement made in these histories is\nuntrue. Indeed, modern physiology can find parallels in nature for\nevents of apparently the most eminently supernatural kind recounted\nin some of those histories.\n\nIt is a comfort to hear, upon Mr. Harrison's authority, that the laws\nof physical nature show no signs of becoming \"less definite, less\nconsistent, or less popular as time goes on\" (p. 154). How a law of\nnature is to become indefinite, or \"inconsistent,\" passes my poor\npowers of imagination. But with universal suffrage and the coach-dog\ntheory of premiership in full view; the theory, I mean, that the whole\nduty of a political chief is to look sharp for the way the social\ncoach is driving, and then run in front and bark loud--as if being the\nleading noise-maker and guiding were the same things--it is truly\nsatisfactory to me to know that the laws of nature are increasing in\npopularity. Looking at recent developments of the policy which is said\nto express the great heart of the people, I have had my doubts of the\nfact; and my love for my fellow-countrymen has led me to reflect, with\ndread, on what will happen to them, if any of the laws of nature ever\nbecome so unpopular in their eyes, as to be voted down by the\ntranscendent authority of universal suffrage. If the legion of demons,\nbefore they set out on their journey in the swine, had had time to\nhold a meeting and to resolve unanimously \"That the law of gravitation\nis oppressive and ought to be repealed,\" I am afraid it would have\nmade no sort of difference to the result, when their two thousand\nunwilling porters were once launched down the steep slopes of the\nfatal shore of Gennesaret.\n\n     The question of the place of religion as an element of human\n     nature, as a force of human society, its origin, analysis,\n     and functions, has never been considered at all from an\n     agnostic point of view (p. 152).\n\nI doubt not that Mr. Harrison knows vastly more about history than I\ndo; in fact, he tells the public that some of my friends and I have\nhad no opportunity of occupying ourselves with that subject. I do not\nlike to contradict any statement which Mr. Harrison makes on his own\nauthority; only, if I may be true to my agnostic principles, I humbly\nask how he has obtained assurance on this head. I do not profess to\nknow anything about the range of Mr. Harrison's studies; but as he has\nthought it fitting to start the subject, I may venture to point out\nthat, on evidence adduced, it might be equally permissible to draw the\nconclusion that Mr. Harrison's other labours have not allowed him to\nacquire that acquaintance with the methods and results of physical\nscience, or with the history of philosophy, or of philological and\nhistorical criticism, which is essential to any one who desires to\nobtain a right understanding of agnosticism. Incompetence in\nphilosophy, and in all branches of science except mathematics, is the\nwell-known mental characteristic of the founder of positivism.\nFaithfulness in disciples is an admirable quality in itself; the pity\nis that it not unfrequently leads to the imitation of the weaknesses\nas well as of the strength of the master. It is only such\nover-faithfulness which can account for a \"strong mind really\nsaturated with the historical sense\" (p. 153) exhibiting the\nextraordinary forgetfulness of the historical fact of the existence of\nDavid Hume implied by the assertion that\n\n     it would be difficult to name a single known agnostic who\n     has given to history anything like the amount of thought and\n     study which he brings to a knowledge of the physical world\n     (p. 153).\n\nWhoso calls to mind what I may venture to term the bright side of\nChristianity--that ideal of manhood, with its strength and its\npatience, its justice and its pity for human frailty, its helpfulness\nto the extremity of self-sacrifice, its ethical purity and nobility,\nwhich apostles have pictured, in which armies of martyrs have placed\ntheir unshakable faith, and whence obscure men and women, like\nCatherine of Sienna and John Knox, have derived the courage to rebuke\npopes and kings--is not likely to underrate the importance of the\nChristian faith as a factor in human history, or to doubt that if that\nfaith should prove to be incompatible with our knowledge, or necessary\nwant of knowledge, some other hypostasis of men's hopes, genuine\nenough and worthy enough to replace it, will arise. But that the\nincongruous mixture of bad science with eviscerated papistry, out of\nwhich Comte manufactured the positivist religion, will be the heir of\nthe Christian ages, I have too much respect for the humanity of the\nfuture to believe. Charles the Second told his brother, \"They will not\nkill me, James, to make you king.\" And if critical science is\nremorselessly destroying the historical foundations of the noblest\nideal of humanity which mankind have yet worshipped, it is little\nlikely to permit the pitiful reality to climb into the vacant shrine.\n\nThat a man should determine to devote himself to the service of\nhumanity--including intellectual and moral self-culture under that\nname; that this should be, in the proper sense of the word, his\nreligion--is not only an intelligible, but, I think, a laudable\nresolution. And I am greatly disposed to believe that it is the only\nreligion which will prove itself to be unassailably acceptable so long\nas the human race endures. But when the Comtist asks me to worship\n\"Humanity\"--that is to say, to adore the generalised conception of men\nas they ever have been and probably ever will be--I must reply that I\ncould just as soon bow down and worship the generalised conception of\na \"wilderness of apes.\" Surely we are not going back to the days of\nPaganism, when individual men were deified, and the hard good sense of\na dying Vepasian could prompt the bitter jest, \"Ut puto Deus fio.\" No\ndivinity doth hedge a modern man, be he even a sovereign ruler. Nor is\nthere any one, except a municipal magistrate, who is officially\ndeclared worshipful. But if there is no spark of worship-worthy\ndivinity in the individual twigs of humanity, whence comes that\ngodlike splendour which the Moses of Positivism fondly imagines to\npervade the whole bush?\n\nI know no study which is so unutterably saddening as that of the\nevolution of humanity, as it is set forth in the annals of history.\nOut of the darkness of prehistoric ages man emerges with the marks of\nhis lowly origin strong upon him. He is a brute, only more intelligent\nthan the other brutes, a blind prey to impulses, which as often as not\nlead him to destruction; a victim to endless illusions, which make his\nmental existence a terror and a burden, and fill his physical life\nwith barren toil and battle. He attains a certain degree of physical\ncomfort, and develops a more or less workable theory of life, in such\nfavourable situations as the plains of Mesopotamia or of Egypt, and\nthen, for thousands and thousands of years, struggles, with varying\nfortunes, attended by infinite wickedness, bloodshed, and misery, to\nmaintain himself at this point against the greed and the ambition of\nhis fellow-men. He makes a point of killing and otherwise persecuting\nall those who first try to get him to move on; and when he has moved\non a step, foolishly confers post-mortem deification on his victims.\nHe exactly repeats the process with all who want to move a step yet\nfarther. And the best men of the best epochs are simply those who make\nthe fewest blunders and commit the fewest sins.\n\nThat one should rejoice in the good man, forgive the bad man, and pity\nand help all men to the best of one's ability, is surely indisputable.\nIt is the glory of Judaism and of Christianity to have proclaimed this\ntruth, through all their aberrations. But the worship of a God who\nneeds forgiveness and help, and deserves pity every hour of his\nexistence, is no better than that of any other voluntarily selected\nfetish. The Emperor Julian's project was hopeful in comparison with\nthe prospects of the Comtist Anthropolatry.\n\nWhen the historian of religion in the twentieth century is writing\nabout the nineteenth, I foresee he will say something of this kind:\n\nThe most curious and instructive events in the religious history of\nthe preceding century are the rise and progress of two new sects\ncalled Mormons and Positivists. To the student who has carefully\nconsidered these remarkable phenomena nothing in the records of\nreligious self-delusion can appear improbable.\n\nThe Mormons arose in the midst of the great Republic, which, though\ncomparatively insignificant, at that time, in territory as in the\nnumber of its citizens, was (as we know from the fragments of the\nspeeches of its orators which have come down to us) no less remarkable\nfor the native intelligence of its population than for the wide extent\nof their information, owing to the activity of their publishers in\ndiffusing all that they could invent, beg, borrow, or steal. Nor were\nthey less noted for their perfect freedom from all restraints in\nthought, or speech, or deed; except, to be sure, the beneficent and\nwise influence of the majority, exerted, in case of need, through an\ninstitution known as \"tarring and feathering,\" the exact nature of\nwhich is now disputed.\n\nThere is a complete consensus of testimony that the founder of\nMormonism, one Joseph Smith, was a low-minded, ignorant scamp, and\nthat he stole the \"Scriptures\" which he propounded; not being clever\nenough to forge even such contemptible stuff as they contain.\nNevertheless he must have been a man of some force of character, for a\nconsiderable number of disciples soon gathered about him. In spite of\nrepeated outbursts of popular hatred and violence--during one of which\npersecutions Smith was brutally murdered--the Mormon body steadily\nincreased, and became a flourishing community. But the Mormon\npractices being objectionable to the majority, they were, more than\nonce, without any pretence of law, but by force of riot, arson, and\nmurder, driven away from the land they had occupied. Harried by these\npersecutions, the Mormon body eventually committed itself to the\ntender mercies of a desert as barren as that of Sinai; and after\nterrible sufferings and privations, reached the Oasis of Utah. Here it\ngrew and flourished, sending out missionaries to, and receiving\nconverts from, all parts of Europe, sometimes to the number of 10,000\nin a year; until, in 1880, the rich and flourishing community numbered\n110,000 souls in Utah alone, while there were probably 30,000 or\n40,000 scattered abroad elsewhere. In the whole history of religions\nthere is no more remarkable example of the power of faith; and, in\nthis case, the founder of that faith was indubitably a most despicable\ncreature. It is interesting to observe that the course taken by the\ngreat Republic and its citizens runs exactly parallel with that taken\nby the Roman Empire and its citizens towards the early Christians,\nexcept that the Romans had a certain legal excuse for their acts of\nviolence, inasmuch as the Christian \"sodalitia\" were not licensed, and\nconsequently were, _ipso facto_, illegal assemblages. Until, in the\nlatter part of the nineteenth century, the United States legislature\ndecreed the illegality of polygamy, the Mormons were wholly within the\nlaw.\n\nNothing can present a greater contrast to all this than the history of\nthe Postivists. This sect arose much about the same time as that of\nthe Mormons, in the upper and most instructed stratum of the\nquick-witted, sceptical population of Paris. The founder, Auguste\nComte, was a teacher of mathematics, but of no eminence in that\ndepartment of knowledge, and with nothing but an amateur's\nacquaintance with physical, chemical, and biological science. His\nworks are repulsive, on account of the dull diffuseness of their\nstyle, and a certain air, as of a superior person, which characterises\nthem; but nevertheless they contain good things here and there. It\nwould take too much space to reproduce in detail a system which\nproposes to regulate all human life by the promulgation of a Gentile\nLeviticus. Suffice it to say, that M. Comte may be described as a\nsyncretic, who, like the Gnostics of early Church history, attempted\nto combine the substance of imperfectly comprehended contemporary\nscience with the form of Roman Christianity. It may be that this is\nthe reason why his disciples were so very angry with some obscure\npeople called Agnostics, whose views, if we may judge by the account\nleft in the works of a great Positivist controversial writer, were\nvery absurd.\n\nTo put the matter briefly, M. Comte, finding Christianity and Science\nat daggers drawn, seems to have said to Science, \"You find\nChristianity rotten at the core, do you? Well, I will scoop out the\ninside of it.\" And to Romanism: \"You find Science mere dry light--cold\nand bare. Well, I will put your shell over it, and so, as schoolboys\nmake a spectre out of a turnip and a tallow candle, behold the new\nreligion of Humanity complete!\"\n\nUnfortunately neither the Romanists, nor the people who were something\nmore than amateurs in science, could be got to worship M. Comte's new\nidol properly. In the native country of Positivism, one distinguished\nman of letters and one of science, for a time, helped to make up a\nroomful of the faithful, but their love soon grew cold. In England, on\nthe other hand, there appears to be little doubt that, in the ninth\ndecade of the century, the multitude of disciples reached the grand\ntotal of several score. They had the advantage of the advocacy of one\nor two most eloquent and learned apostles, and, at any rate, the\nsympathy of several persons of light and leading; and, if they were\nnot seen, they were heard, all over the world. On the other hand, as a\nsect, they laboured under the prodigious disadvantage of being\nrefined, estimable people, living in the midst of the worn-out\ncivilisation of the old world; where any one who had tried to\npersecute them, as the Mormons were persecuted, would have been\ninstantly hanged. But the majority never dreamed of persecuting them;\non the contrary, they were rather given to scold and otherwise try the\npatience of the majority.\n\nThe history of these sects in the closing years of the century is\nhighly instructive. Mormonism ...\n\nBut I find I have suddenly slipped off Mr. Harrison's tripod, which I\nhad borrowed for the occasion. The fact is, I am not equal to the\nprophetical business, and ought not to have undertaken it.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[It did not occur to me, while writing the latter part of this essay,\nthat it could be needful to disclaim the intention of putting the\nreligious system of Comte on a level with Mormonism. And I was unaware\nof the fact that Mr. Harrison rejects the greater part of the\nPositivist Religion, as taught by Comte. I have, therefore, erased one\nor two passages, which implied his adherence to the \"Religion of\nHumanity\" as developed by Comte, 1893.]\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n     [51] See the _Official Report of the Church Congress held\n          at Manchester_, October 1888, pp. 253, 254.\n\n     [52] In this place and in the eleventh essay, there are\n          references to the late Archbishop of York which are of\n          no importance to my main argument, and which I have\n          expunged because I desire to obliterate the traces of a\n          temporary misunderstanding with a man of rare ability,\n          candour, and wit, for whom I entertained a great liking\n          and no less respect. I rejoice to think now of the\n          (then) Bishop's cordial hail the first time we met\n          after our little skirmish, \"Well, is it to be peace or\n          war?\" I replied, \"A little of both.\" But there was only\n          peace when we parted, and ever after.\n\n     [53] Dr. Wace tells us, \"It may be asked how far we can rely\n          on the accounts we possess of our Lord's teaching on\n          these subjects.\" And he seems to think the question\n          appropriately answered by the assertion that it \"ought\n          to be regarded as settled by M. Renan's practical\n          surrender of the adverse case.\" I thought I knew M.\n          Renan's works pretty well, but I have contrived to miss\n          this \"practical\" (I wish Dr. Wace had defined the scope\n          of that useful adjective) surrender. However, as Dr.\n          Wace can find no difficulty in pointing out the passage\n          of M. Renan's writings, by which he feels justified in\n          making his statement, I shall wait for further\n          enlightenment, contenting myself, for the present, with\n          remarking that if M. Renan were to retract and do\n          penance in Notre-Dame to-morrow for any contributions\n          to Biblical criticism that may be specially his\n          property, the main results of that criticism, as they\n          are set forth in the works of Strauss, Baur, Reuss, and\n          Volkmar, for example, would not be sensibly affected.\n\n     [54] See De Gobineau, _Les Religions et les Philosophies\n          dans l'Asie Centrale_; and the recently published work\n          of Mr. E.G. Browne, _The Episode of the Bab_.\n\n     [55] Here, as always, the revised version is cited.\n\n     [56] Does any one really mean to say that there is any\n          internal or external criterion by which the reader of a\n          biblical statement, in which scientific matter is\n          contained, is enabled to judge whether it is to betaken\n          _au serieux_ or not? Is the account of the Deluge,\n          accepted as true in the New Testament, less precise and\n          specific than that of the call of Abraham, also\n          accepted as true therein? By what mark does the story\n          of the feeding with manna in the wilderness, which\n          involves some very curious scientific problems, show\n          that it is meant merely for edification, while the\n          story of the inscription of the Law on stone by the\n          hand of Jahveh is literally true? If the story of the\n          Fall is not the true record of an historical\n          occurrence, what becomes of Pauline theology? Yet the\n          story of the Fall as directly conflicts with\n          probability, and is as devoid of trustworthy evidence,\n          as that of the creation or that of the Deluge, with\n          which it forms an harmoniously legendary series.\n\n     [57] See, for an admirable discussion of the whole subject,\n          Dr. Abbott's article on the Gospels in the\n          _Encyclopaedia Britannica_; and the remarkable monograph\n          by Professor Volkmar, _Jesus Nazarenus und die erste\n          christliche Zeit_ (1882). Whether we agree with the\n          conclusions of these writers or not, the method of\n          critical investigation which, they adopt is\n          unimpeachable.\n\n     [58] Notwithstanding the hard words shot at me from behind\n          the hedge of anonymity by a writer in a recent number\n          of the _Quarterly Review_, I repeat, without the\n          slightest fear of refutation, that the four Gospels, as\n          they have come to us, are the work of unknown writers.\n\n     [59] Their arguments, in the long run, are always reducible\n          to one form. Otherwise trustworthy witnesses affirm\n          that such and such events took place. These events are\n          inexplicable, except the agency of \"spirits\" is\n          admitted. Therefore \"spirits\" were the cause of the\n          phenomena.\n\n          And the heads of the reply are always the same.\n          Remember Goethe's aphorism: \"Alles factische ist schon\n          Theorie.\" Trustworthy witnesses are constantly\n          deceived, or deceive themselves, in their\n          interpretation of sensible phenomena. No one can prove\n          that the sensible phenomena, in these cases, could be\n          caused only by the agency of spirits: and there is\n          abundant ground for believing that they may be produced\n          in other ways. Therefore, the utmost that can be\n          reasonably asked for, on the evidence as it stands, is\n          suspension of judgment. And, on the necessity for even\n          that suspension, reasonable men may differ, according\n          to their views of probability.\n\n     [60] Yet I must somehow have laid hold of the pith of the\n          matter, for, many years afterwards, when Dean Mansel's\n          Bampton Lectures were published, it seemed to me I\n          already knew all that this eminently agnostic thinker\n          had to tell me.\n\n     [61] _Kritik der reinen Vernunft_. Edit. Hartenstein, p. 256.\n\n     [62] _Report of the Church Congress_, Manchester, 1888, p. 252.\n\n     [63] _Fortnightly Review_, Jan. 1889.\n\n\n\n\nVIII: AGNOSTICISM: A REJOINDER\n\n[1889]\n\n\nThose who passed from Dr. Wace's article in the last number of the\n\"Nineteenth Century\" to the anticipatory confutation of it which\nfollowed in \"The New Reformation,\" must have enjoyed the pleasure of a\ndramatic surprise--just as when the fifth act of a new play proves\nunexpectedly bright and interesting. Mrs. Ward will, I hope, pardon\nthe comparison, if I say that her effective clearing away of\nantiquated incumbrances from the lists of the controversy, reminds me\nof nothing so much as of the action of some neat-handed, but\nstrong-wristed, Phyllis, who, gracefully wielding her long-handled\n\"Turk's head,\" sweeps away the accumulated results of the toil of\ngenerations of spiders. I am the more indebted to this luminous sketch\nof the results of critical investigation, as it is carried out among\nthese theologians who are men of science and not mere counsel for\ncreeds, since it has relieved me from the necessity of dealing with\nthe greater part of Dr. Wace's polemic, and enables me to devote more\nspace to the really important issues which have been raised.[64]\n\nPerhaps, however, it may be well for me to observe that approbation of\nthe manner in which a great biblical scholar, for instance, Reuss,\ndoes his work does not commit me to the adoption of all, or indeed any\nof his views; and, further, that the disagreements of a series of\ninvestigators do not in any way interfere with the fact that each of\nthem has made important contributions to the body of truth ultimately\nestablished. If I cite Buffon, Linnaeus, Lamarck, and Cuvier, as having\neach and all taken a leading share in building up modern biology, the\nstatement that every one of these great naturalists disagreed with,\nand even more or less contradicted, all the rest is quite true; but\nthe supposition that the latter assertion is in any way inconsistent\nwith the former, would betray a strange ignorance of the manner in\nwhich all true science advances.\n\nDr. Wace takes a great deal of trouble to make it appear that I have\ndesired to evade the real questions raised by his attack upon me at\nthe Church Congress. I assure the reverend Principal that in this, as\nin some other respects, he has entertained a very erroneous conception\nof my intentions. Things would assume more accurate proportions in Dr.\nWace's mind, if he would kindly remember that it is just thirty years\nsince ecclesiastical thunderbolts began to fly about my ears. I have\nhad the \"Lion and the Bear\" to deal with, and it is long since I got\nquite used to the threatenings of episcopal Goliaths, whose croziers\nwere like unto a weaver's beam. So that I almost think I might not\nhave noticed Dr. Wace's attack, personal as it was; and although, as\nhe is good enough to tell us, separate copies are to be had for the\nmodest equivalent of twopence, as a matter of fact, it did not come\nunder my notice for a long time after it was made. May I further\nventure to point out that (reckoning postage) the expenditure of\ntwopence-halfpenny, or, at the most, threepence, would have enabled\nDr. Wace so far to comply with ordinary conventions as to direct my\nattention to the fact that he had attacked me before a meeting at\nwhich I was not present? I really am not responsible for the five\nmonths' neglect of which Dr. Wace complains. Singularly enough, the\nEnglishry who swarmed about the Engadine, during the three months that\nI was being brought back to life by the glorious air and perfect\ncomfort of the Maloja, did not, in my hearing, say anything about the\nimportant events which had taken place at the Church Congress; and I\nthink I can venture to affirm that there was not a single copy of Dr.\nWace's pamphlet in any of the hotel libraries which I rummaged, in\nsearch of something more edifying than dull English or questionable\nFrench novels.\n\nAnd now, having, as I hope, set myself right with the public as\nregards the sins of commission and omission with which I have been\ncharged, I feel free to deal with matters to which time and type may\nbe more profitably devoted.\n\nI believe that there is not a solitary argument I have used, or that I\nam about to use, which is original, or has anything to do with the\nfact that I have been chiefly occupied with natural science. They are\nall, facts and reasoning alike, either identical with, or\nconsequential upon, propositions which are to be found in the works of\nscholars and theologians of the highest repute in the only two\ncountries, Holland and Germany,[65] in which, at the present time,\nprofessors of theology are to be found, whose tenure of their posts\ndoes not depend upon the results to which their inquiries lead\nthem.[66] It is true that, to the best of my ability, I have satisfied\nmyself of the soundness of the foundations on which my arguments are\nbuilt, and I desire to be held fully responsible for everything I say.\nBut, nevertheless, my position is really no more than that of an\nexpositor; and my justification for undertaking it is simply that\nconviction of the supremacy of private judgment (indeed, of the\nimpossibility of escaping it) which is the foundation of the\nProtestant Reformation, and which was the doctrine accepted by the\nvast majority of the Anglicans of my youth, before that backsliding\ntowards the \"beggarly rudiments\" of an effete and idolatrous\nsacerdotalism which has, even now, provided us with the saddest\nspectacle which has been offered to the eyes of Englishmen in this\ngeneration. A high court of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, with a host\nof great lawyers in battle array, is and, for Heaven knows how long,\nwill be, occupied with these very questions of \"washing of cups and\npots and brazen vessels,\" which the Master, whose professed\nrepresentatives are rending the Church over these squabbles, had in\nhis mind when, as we are told, he uttered the scathing rebuke:--\n\n    Well did Isaiah prophesy of you hypocrites, as it is written,\n        This people honoureth me with their lips,\n        But their heart is far from me.\n        But in vain do they worship me,\n        Teaching as their doctrines the precepts of men.\n                                          (Mark vii. 6-7.)\n\nMen who can be absorbed in bickerings over miserable disputes of this\nkind can have but little sympathy with the old evangelical doctrine of\nthe \"open Bible,\" or anything but a grave misgiving of the results of\ndiligent reading of the Bible, without the help of ecclesiastical\nspectacles, by the mass of the people. Greatly to the surprise of many\nof my friends, I have always advocated the reading of the Bible, and\nthe diffusion of the study of that most remarkable collection of books\namong the people. Its teachings are so infinitely superior to those of\nthe sects, who are just as busy now as the Pharisees were eighteen\nhundred years ago, in smothering them under \"the precepts of men\"; it\nis so certain, to my mind, that the Bible contains within itself the\nrefutation of nine-tenths of the mixture of sophistical metaphysics\nand old-world superstition which has been piled round it by the\nso-called Christians of later times; it is so clear that the only\nimmediate and ready antidote to the poison which has been mixed with\nChristianity, to the intoxication and delusion of mankind, lies in\ncopious draughts from the undefiled spring, that I exercise the right\nand duty of free judgment on the part of every man, mainly for the\npurpose of inducing other laymen to follow my example. If the New\nTestament is translated into Zulu by Protestant missionaries, it must\nbe assumed that a Zulu convert is competent to draw from its contents\nall the truths which it is necessary for him to believe. I trust that\nI may, without immodesty, claim to be put on the same footing as a\nZulu.\n\nThe most constant reproach which is launched against persons of my way\nof thinking is that it is all very well for us to talk about the\ndeductions of scientific thought, but what are the poor and the\nuneducated to do? Has it ever occurred to those who talk in this\nfashion, that their creeds and the articles of their several\nconfessions, their determination of the exact nature and extent of the\nteachings of Jesus, their expositions of the real meaning of that\nwhich is written in the Epistles (to leave aside all questions\nconcerning the Old Testament), are nothing more than deductions which,\nat any rate, profess to be the result of strictly scientific thinking,\nand which are not worth attending to unless they really possess that\ncharacter? If it is not historically true that such and such things\nhappened in Palestine eighteen centuries ago, what becomes of\nChristianity? And what is historical truth but that of which the\nevidence bears strict scientific investigation? I do not call to mind\nany problem of natural science which has come under my notice which is\nmore difficult, or more curiously interesting as a mere problem, than\nthat of the origin of the Synoptic Gospels and that of the historical\nvalue of the narratives which they contain. The Christianity of the\nChurches stands or falls by the results of the purely scientific\ninvestigation of these questions. They were first taken up, in a\npurely scientific spirit, about a century ago; they have been studied\nover and over again by men of vast knowledge and critical acumen; but\nhe would be a rash man who should assert that any solution of these\nproblems, as yet formulated, is exhaustive. The most that can be said\nis that certain prevalent solutions are certainly false, while others\nare more or less probably true.\n\nIf I am doing my best to rouse my countrymen out of their dogmatic\nslumbers, it is not that they may be amused by seeing who gets the\nbest of it in a contest between a \"scientist\" and a theologian. The\nserious question is whether theological men of science, or theological\nspecial pleaders, are to have the confidence of the general public; it\nis the question whether a country in which it is possible for a body\nof excellent clerical and lay gentlemen to discuss, in public meeting\nassembled, how much it is desirable to let the congregations of the\nfaithful know of the results of biblical criticism, is likely to wake\nup with anything short of the grasp of a rough lay hand upon its\nshoulder; it is the question whether the New Testament books, being,\nas I believe they were, written and compiled by people who, according\nto their lights, were perfectly sincere, will not, when properly\nstudied as ordinary historical documents, afford us the means of\nself-criticism. And it must be remembered that the New Testament books\nare not responsible for the doctrine invented by the Churches that\nthey are anything but ordinary historical documents. The author of the\nthird gospel tells us, as straightforwardly as a man can, that he has\nno claim to any other character than that of an ordinary compiler and\neditor, who had before him the works of many and variously qualified\npredecessors.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIn my former papers, according to Dr. Wace, I have evaded giving an\nanswer to his main proposition, which he states as follows--\n\n     Apart from all disputed points of criticism, no one\n     practically doubts that our Lord lived, and that He died on\n     the cross, in the most intense sense of filial relation to\n     His Father in Heaven, and that He bore testimony to that\n     Father's providence, love, and grace towards mankind. The\n     Lord's Prayer affords a sufficient evidence on these points.\n     If the Sermon on the Mount alone be added, the whole unseen\n     world, of which the Agnostic refuses to know anything,\n     stands unveiled before us.... If Jesus Christ preached that\n     Sermon, made those promises, and taught that prayer, then\n     any one who says that we know nothing of God, or of a future\n     life, or of an unseen world, says that he does not believe\n     Jesus Christ (pp. 354-355).\n\nAgain--\n\n     The main question at issue, in a word, is one which\n     Professor Huxley has chosen to leave entirely on one\n     side--whether, namely, allowing for the utmost uncertainty\n     on other points of the criticism to which he appeals, there\n     is any reasonable doubt that the Lord's Prayer and the\n     Sermon on the Mount afford a true account of our Lord's\n     essential belief and cardinal teaching (p. 355.)\n\nI certainly was not aware that I had evaded the questions here stated;\nindeed I should say that I have indicated my reply to them pretty\nclearly; but, as Dr. Wace wants a plainer answer, he shall certainly\nbe gratified. If, as Dr. Wace declares it is, his \"whole case is\ninvolved in\" the argument as stated in the latter of these two\nextracts, so much the worse for his whole case. For I am of opinion\nthat there is the gravest reason for doubting whether the \"Sermon on\nthe Mount\" was ever preached, and whether the so-called \"Lord's\nPrayer\" was ever prayed, by Jesus of Nazareth. My reasons for this\nopinion are, among others, these:--There is now no doubt that the\nthree Synoptic Gospels, so far from being the work of three\nindependent writers, are closely interdependent,[67] and that in one\nof two ways. Either all three contain, as their foundation, versions,\nto a large extent verbally identical, of one and the same tradition;\nor two of them are thus closely dependent on the third; and the\nopinion of the majority of the best critics has of late years more and\nmore converged towards the conviction that our canonical second gospel\n(the so-called \"Mark's\" Gospel) is that which most closely represents\nthe primitive groundwork of the three.[68] That I take to be one of\nthe most valuable results of New Testament criticism, of immeasurably\ngreater importance than the discussion about dates and authorship.\n\nBut if, as I believe to be the case, beyond any rational doubt or\ndispute, the second gospel is the nearest extant representative of the\noldest tradition, whether written or oral, how comes it that it\ncontains neither the \"Sermon on the Mount\" nor the \"Lord's Prayer,\"\nthose typical embodiments, according to Dr. Wace, of the \"essential\nbelief and cardinal teaching\" of Jesus? Not only does \"Mark's\" gospel\nfail to contain the \"Sermon on the Mount,\" or anything but a very few\nof the sayings contained in that collection; but, at the point of the\nhistory of Jesus where the \"Sermon\" occurs in \"Matthew,\" there is in\n\"Mark\" an apparently unbroken narrative from the calling of James and\nJohn to the healing of Simon's wife's mother. Thus the oldest\ntradition not only ignores the \"Sermon on the Mount,\" but, by\nimplication, raises a probability against its being delivered when and\nwhere the later \"Matthew\" inserts it in his compilation.\n\nAnd still more weighty is the fact that the third gospel, the author\nof which tells us that he wrote after \"many\" others had \"taken in\nhand\" the same enterprise; who should therefore have known the first\ngospel (if it existed), and was bound to pay to it the deference due\nto the work of an apostolic eye-witness (if he had any reason for\nthinking it was so)--this writer, who exhibits far more literary\ncompetence than the other two, ignores any \"Sermon on the Mount,\" such\nas that reported by \"Matthew,\" just as much as the oldest authority\ndoes. Yet \"Luke\" has a great many passages identical, or parallel,\nwith those in \"Matthew's\" \"Sermon on the Mount,\" which are, for the\nmost part, scattered about in a totally different connection.\n\nInterposed, however, between the nomination of the Apostles and a\nvisit to Capernaum; occupying, therefore, a place which answers to\nthat of the \"Sermon on the Mount,\" in the first gospel, there is in\nthe third gospel a discourse which is as closely similar to the\n\"Sermon on the Mount,\" in some particulars, as it is widely unlike it\nin others.\n\nThis discourse is said to have been delivered in a \"plain\" or \"level\nplace\" (Luke vi. 17), and by way of distinction we may call it the\n\"Sermon on the Plain.\"\n\nI see no reason to doubt that the two Evangelists are dealing, to a\nconsiderable extent, with the same traditional material; and a\ncomparison of the two \"Sermons\" suggests very strongly that \"Luke's\"\nversion is the earlier. The correspondences between the two forbid the\nnotion that they are independent. They both begin with a series of\nblessings, some of which are almost verbally identical. In the middle\nof each (Luke vi. 27-38, Matt. v. 43-48) there is a striking\nexposition of the ethical spirit of the command given in Leviticus\nxix. 18. And each ends with a passage containing the declaration that\na tree is to be known by its fruit, and the parable of the house built\non the sand. But while there are only 29 verses in the \"Sermon on the\nPlain\" there are 107 in the \"Sermon on the Mount;\" the excess in\nlength of the latter being chiefly due to the long interpolations,\none of 30 verses before and one of 34 verses after, the middlemost\nparallelism with Luke. Under these circumstances it is quite\nimpossible to admit that there is more probability that \"Matthew's\"\nversion of the Sermon is historically accurate, than there is that\nLuke's version is so; and they cannot both be accurate.\n\n\"Luke\" either knew the collection of loosely-connected and aphoristic\nutterances which appear under the name of the \"Sermon on the Mount\" in\n\"Matthew\"; or he did not. If he did not, he must have been ignorant of\nthe existence of such a document as our canonical \"Matthew,\" a fact\nwhich does not make for the genuineness, or the authority, of that\nbook. If he did, he has shown that he does not care for its authority\non a matter of fact of no small importance; and that does not permit\nus to conceive that he believed the first gospel to be the work of an\nauthority to whom he ought to defer, let alone that of an apostolic\neye-witness.\n\nThe tradition of the Church about the second gospel, which I believe\nto be quite worthless, but which is all the evidence there is for\n\"Mark's\" authorship, would have us believe that \"Mark\" was little more\nthan the mouthpiece of the apostle Peter. Consequently, we are to\nsuppose that Peter either did not know, or did not care very much for,\nthat account of the \"essential belief and cardinal teaching\" of Jesus\nwhich is contained in the Sermon on the Mount; and, certainly, he\ncould not have shared Dr. Wace's view of its importance.[69]\n\nI thought that all fairly attentive and intelligent students of the\ngospels, to say nothing of theologians of reputation, knew these\nthings. But how can any one who does know them have the conscience to\nask whether there is \"any reasonable doubt\" that the Sermon on the\nMount was preached by Jesus of Nazareth? If conjecture is permissible,\nwhere nothing else is possible, the most probable conjecture seems to\nbe that \"Matthew,\" having a _cento_ of sayings attributed--rightly or\nwrongly it is impossible to say--to Jesus among his materials, thought\nthey were, or might be, records of a continuous discourse, and put\nthem in at the place he thought likeliest. Ancient historians of the\nhighest character saw no harm in composing long speeches which never\nwere spoken, and putting them into the mouths of statesmen and\nwarriors; and I presume that whoever is represented by \"Matthew\" would\nhave been grievously astonished to find that any one objected to his\nfollowing the example of the best models accessible to him.\n\nSo with the \"Lord's Prayer.\" Absent in our representative of the\noldest tradition, it appears in both \"Matthew\" and \"Luke.\" There is\nreason to believe that every pious Jew, at the commencement of our\nera, prayed three times a day, according to a formula which is\nembodied in the present \"Schmone-Esre\"[70] of the Jewish prayer-book.\nJesus, who was assuredly, in all respects, a pious Jew, whatever else\nhe may have been, doubtless did the same. Whether he modified the\ncurrent formula, or whether the so-called \"Lord's Prayer\" is the\nprayer substituted for the \"Schmone-Esre\" in the congregations of the\nGentiles, is a question which can hardly be answered.\n\nIn a subsequent passage of Dr. Wace's article (p. 356) he adds to the\nlist of the verities which he imagines to be unassailable, \"The Story\nof the Passion.\" I am not quite sure what he means by this. I am not\naware that any one (with the exception of certain ancient heretics)\nhas propounded doubts as to the reality of the crucifixion; and\ncertainly I have no inclination to argue about the precise accuracy of\nevery detail of that pathetic story of suffering and wrong. But, if\nDr. Wace means, as I suppose he does, that that which, according to\nthe orthodox view, happened after the crucifixion, and which is, in a\ndogmatic sense, the most important part of the story, is founded on\nsolid historical proofs, I must beg leave to express a diametrically\nopposite conviction.\n\nWhat do we find when the accounts of the events in question, contained\nin the three Synoptic gospels, are compared together? In the oldest,\nthere is a simple, straightforward statement which, for anything that\nI have to urge to the contrary, may be exactly true. In the other two,\nthere is, round this possible and probable nucleus, a mass of\naccretions of the most questionable character.\n\nThe cruelty of death by crucifixion depended very much upon its\nlingering character. If there were a support for the weight of the\nbody, as not unfrequently was the practice, the pain during the first\nhours of the infliction was not, necessarily, extreme; nor need any\nserious physical symptoms, at once, arise from the wounds made by the\nnails in the hands and feet, supposing they were nailed, which was not\ninvariably the case. When exhaustion set in, and hunger, thirst, and\nnervous irritation had done their work, the agony of the sufferer must\nhave been terrible; and the more terrible that, in the absence of any\neffectual disturbance of the machinery of physical life, it might be\nprolonged for many hours, or even days. Temperate, strong men, such as\nwere the ordinary Galilean peasants, might live for several days on\nthe cross. It is necessary to bear these facts in mind when we read\nthe account contained in the fifteenth chapter of the second gospel.\n\nJesus was crucified at the third hour (xv. 25), and the narrative\nseems to imply that he died immediately after the ninth hour (_v_.\n34). In this case, he would have been crucified only six hours; and\nthe time spent on the cross cannot have been much longer, because\nJoseph of Arimathaea must have gone to Pilate, made his preparations,\nand deposited the body in the rock-cut tomb before sunset, which, at\nthat time of the year, was about the twelfth hour. That any one should\ndie after only six hours' crucifixion could not have been at all in\naccordance with Pilate's large experience of the effects of that\nmethod of punishment. It, therefore, quite agrees with what might be\nexpected, that Pilate \"marvelled if he were already dead\" and required\nto be satisfied on this point by the testimony of the Roman officer\nwho was in command of the execution party. Those who have paid\nattention to the extraordinary difficult question, What are the\nindisputable signs of death?--will be able to estimate the value of\nthe opinion of a rough soldier on such a subject; even if his report\nto the Procurator were in no wise affected by the fact that the friend\nof Jesus, who anxiously awaited his answer, was a man of influence and\nof wealth.\n\nThe inanimate body, wrapped in linen, was deposited in a\nspacious,[71] cool rock chamber, the entrance of which was closed, not\nby a well-fitting door, but by a stone rolled against the opening,\nwhich would of course allow free passage of air. A little more than\nthirty-six hours afterwards (Friday 6 P.M., to Sunday 6 A.M., or a\nlittle after) three women visit the tomb and find it empty. And they\nare told by a young man \"arrayed in a white robe\" that Jesus is gone\nto his native country of Galilee, and that the disciples and Peter\nwill find him there.\n\nThus it stands, plainly recorded, in the oldest tradition that, for\nany evidence to the contrary, the sepulchre may have been emptied at\nany time during the Friday or Saturday nights. If it is said that no\nJew would have violated the Sabbath by taking the former course, it is\nto be recollected that Joseph of Arimathaea might well be familiar with\nthat wise and liberal interpretation of the fourth commandment, which\npermitted works of mercy to men--nay, even the drawing of an ox or an\nass out of a pit--on the Sabbath. At any rate, the Saturday night was\nfree to the most scrupulous of observers of the Law.\n\nThese are the facts of the case as stated by the oldest extant\nnarrative of them. I do not see why any one should have a word to say\nagainst the inherent probability of that narrative; and, for my part,\nI am quite ready to accept it as an historical fact, that so much and\nno more is positively known of the end of Jesus of Nazareth. On what\ngrounds can a reasonable man be asked to believe any more? So far as\nthe narrative in the first gospel, on the one hand, and those in the\nthird gospel and the Acts, on the other, go beyond what is stated in\nthe second gospel, they are hopelessly discrepant with one another.\nAnd this is the more significant because the pregnant phrase \"some\ndoubted,\" in the first gospel, is ignored in the third.\n\nBut it is said that we have the witness Paul speaking to us directly\nin the Epistles. There is little doubt that we have, and a very\nsingular witness he is. According to his own showing, Paul, in the\nvigour of his manhood, with every means of becoming acquainted, at\nfirst hand, with the evidence of eye-witnesses, not merely refused to\ncredit them, but \"persecuted the church of God and made havoc of it.\"\nThe reasoning of Stephen fell dead upon the acute intellect of this\nzealot for the traditions of his fathers: his eyes were blind to the\necstatic illumination of the martyr's countenance \"as it had been the\nface of an angel;\" and when, at the words \"Behold, I see the heavens\nopened and the Son of Man standing on the right hand of God,\" the\nmurderous mob rushed upon and stoned the rapt disciple of Jesus, Paul\nostentatiously made himself their official accomplice.\n\nYet this strange man, because he has a vision, one day, at once, and\nwith equally headlong zeal, flies to the opposite pole of opinion. And\nhe is most careful to tell us that he abstained from any\nre-examination of the facts.\n\n     Immediately I conferred not with flesh and blood; neither\n     went I up to Jerusalem to them which were Apostles before\n     me; but I went away into Arabia. (Galatians i. 16, 17.)\n\nI do not presume to quarrel with Paul's procedure. If it satisfied\nhim, that was his affair; and, if it satisfies anyone else, I am not\ncalled upon to dispute the right of that person to be satisfied. But I\ncertainly have the right to say that it would not satisfy me, in like\ncase; that I should be very much ashamed to pretend that it could, or\nought to, satisfy me; and that I can entertain but a very low estimate\nof the value of the evidence of people who are to be satisfied in this\nfashion, when questions of objective fact, in which their faith is\ninterested, are concerned. So that when I am called upon to believe a\ngreat deal more than the oldest gospel tells me about the final events\nof the history of Jesus on the authority of Paul (1 Corinthians xv.\n5-8) I must pause. Did he think it, at any subsequent time, worth\nwhile \"to confer with flesh and blood,\" or, in modern phrase, to\nre-examine the facts for himself? or was he ready to accept anything\nthat fitted in with his preconceived ideas? Does he mean, when he\nspeaks of all the appearances of Jesus after the crucifixion as if\nthey were of the same kind, that they were all visions, like the\nmanifestation to himself? And, finally, how is this account to be\nreconciled with those in the first and third gospels--which, as we\nhave seen, disagree with one another?\n\nUntil these questions are satisfactorily answered, I am afraid that,\nso far as I am concerned, Paul's testimony cannot be seriously\nregarded, except as it may afford evidence of the state of traditional\nopinion at the time at which he wrote, say between 55 and 60 A.D.;\nthat is, more than twenty years after the event; a period much more\nthan sufficient for the development of any amount of mythology about\nmatters of which nothing was really known. A few years later, among\nthe contemporaries and neighbours of the Jews, and, if the most\nprobable interpretation of the Apocalypse can he trusted, among the\nfollowers of Jesus also, it was fully believed, in spite of all the\nevidence to the contrary, that the Emperor Nero was not really dead,\nbut that he was hidden away somewhere in the East, and would speedily\ncome again at the head of a great army, to be revenged upon his\nenemies.[72]\n\nThus, I conceive that I have shown cause for the opinion that Dr.\nWace's challenge touching the Sermon on the Mount, the Lord's Prayer,\nand the Passion was more valorous than discreet. After all this\ndiscussion, I am still at the agnostic point. Tell me, first, what\nJesus can be proved to have been, said, and done, and I will say\nwhether I believe him, or in him,[73] or not. As Dr. Wace admits that\nI have dissipated his lingering shade of unbelief about the\nbedevilment of the Gadarene pigs, he might have done something to help\nmine. Instead of that, he manifests a total want of conception of the\nnature of the obstacles which impede the conversion of his \"infidels.\"\n\nThe truth I believe to be, that the difficulties in the way of\narriving at a sure conclusion as to these matters, from the Sermon on\nthe Mount, the Lord's Prayer, or any other data offered by the\nSynoptic gospels (and _a fortiori_ from the fourth gospel), are\ninsuperable. Every one of these records is coloured by the\nprepossessions of those among whom the primitive traditions arose, and\nof those by whom they were collected and edited: and the difficulty of\nmaking allowance for these prepossessions is enhanced by our ignorance\nof the exact dates at which the documents were first put together; of\nthe extent to which they have been subsequently worked over and\ninterpolated; and of the historical sense, or want of sense, and the\ndogmatic tendencies of their compilers and editors. Let us see if\nthere is any other road which will take us into something better than\nnegation.\n\nThere is a widespread notion that the \"primitive Church,\" while under\nthe guidance of the Apostles and their immediate successors, was a\nsort of dogmatic dovecot, pervaded by the most loving unity and\ndoctrinal harmony. Protestants, especially, are fond of attributing to\nthemselves the merit of being nearer \"the Church of the Apostles\" than\ntheir neighbours; and they are the less to be excused for their\nstrange delusion because they are great readers of the documents which\nprove the exact contrary. The fact is that, in the course of the first\nthree centuries of its existence, the Church rapidly underwent a\nprocess of evolution of the most remarkable character, the final stage\nof which is far more different from the first than Anglicanism is from\nQuakerism. The key to the comprehension of the problem of the origin\nof that which is now called \"Christianity,\" and its relation to Jesus\nof Nazareth, lies here. Nor can we arrive at any sound conclusion as\nto what it is probable that Jesus actually said and did, without being\nclear on this head. By far the most important and subsequently\ninfluential steps in the evolution of Christianity took place in the\ncourse of the century, more or less, which followed upon the\ncrucifixion. It is almost the darkest period of Church history, but,\nmost fortunately, the beginning and the end of the period are brightly\nilluminated by the contemporary evidence of two writers of whose\nhistorical existence there is no doubt,[74] and against the\ngenuineness of whose most important works there is no widely-admitted\nobjection. These are Justin, the philosopher and martyr, and Paul, the\nApostle to the Gentiles. I shall call upon these witnesses only to\ntestify to the condition of opinion among those who called themselves\ndisciples of Jesus in their time.\n\nJustin, in his Dialogue with Trypho the Jew, which was written\nsomewhere about the middle of the second century, enumerates certain\ncategories of persons who, in his opinion, will, or will not, be\nsaved,[75] These are:--\n\n1. Orthodox Jews who refuse to believe that those who do observe it to\nbe heretics. _Saved_.\n\n2. Jews who observe the Law; believe Jesus to be the Christ; but who\ninsist on the observance of the Law by Gentile converts. _Not Saved_.\n\n3. Jews who observe the Law; believe Jesus to be the Christ, and hold\nthat Gentile converts need not observe the Law. _Saved_ (in Justin's\nopinion; but some of his fellow-Christians think the contrary).\n\n4. Gentile converts to the belief in Jesus as the Christ, who observe\nthe Law. _Saved_ (possibly).\n\n5. Gentile believers in Jesus as the Christ, who do not observe the\nLaw themselves (except so far as the refusal of idol sacrifices), but\ndo not consider those who do observe it heretics. _Saved_ (this is\nJustin's own view).\n\n6. Gentile believers who do not observe the Law, except in refusing\nidol sacrifices, and hold those who do observe it to be heretics.\n_Saved_.\n\n7. Gentiles who believe Jesus to be the Christ and call themselves\nChristians, but who eat meats sacrificed to idols. _Not Saved_.\n\n8. Gentiles who disbelieve in Jesus as the Christ. _Not Saved_.\n\nJustin does not consider Christians who believe in the natural birth\nof Jesus, of whom he implies that there is a respectable minority, to\nbe heretics, though he himself strongly holds the preternatural birth\nof Jesus and his pre-existence as the \"Logos\" or \"Word.\" He conceives\nthe Logos to be a second God, inferior to the first, unknowable God,\nwith respect to whom Justin, like Philo, is a complete agnostic. The\nHoly Spirit is not regarded by Justin as a separate personality, and\nis often mixed up with the \"Logos.\" The doctrine of the natural\nimmortality of the soul is, for Justin, a heresy; and he is as firm a\nbeliever in the resurrection of the body, as in the speedy Second\nComing and the establishment of the millennium.\n\nThe pillar of the Church in the middle of the second century--a\nmuch-travelled native of Samaria--was certainly well acquainted with\nRome, probably with Alexandria; and it is likely that he knew the\nstate of opinion throughout the length and breadth of the Christian\nworld as well as any man of his time. If the various categories above\nenumerated are arranged in a series thus:--\n\n                     _Justin's Christianity_\n                        ________/\\__________\n                       /                    \\\n_Orthodox_    _Judaeo-Christianity_     _Idolothytic_\n_Judaism_      ______/\\______          _Christianity_   _Paganism_\n              /              \\\n      I.     II.  III.  IV.    V.       VI.  VII.          VIII.\n\nit is obvious that they form a gradational series from orthodox\nJudaism, on the extreme left, to Paganism, whether philosophic or\npopular, on the extreme right; and it will further be observed that,\nwhile Justin's conception of Christianity is very broad, he rigorously\nexcludes two classes of persons who, in his time, called themselves\nChristians; namely, those who insist on circumcision and other\nobservances of the Law on the part of Gentile converts; that is to\nsay, the strict Judaeo-Christians (II.); and, on the other hand, those\nwho assert the lawfulness of eating meat offered to idols--whether\nthey are Gnostic or not (VII.). These last I have called \"idolothytic\"\nChristians, because I cannot devise a better name, not because it is\nstrictly defensible etymologically.\n\nAt the present moment, I do not suppose there is an English missionary\nin any heathen land who would trouble himself whether the materials of\nhis dinner had been previously offered to idols or not. On the other\nhand, I suppose there is no Protestant sect within the pale of\northodoxy, to say nothing of the Roman and Greek Churches, which would\nhesitate to declare the practice of circumcision and the observance of\nthe Jewish Sabbath and dietary rules, shockingly heretical.\n\nModern Christianity has, in fact, not only shifted far to the right of\nJustin's position, but it is of much narrower compass.\n\n                             _Justin_\n                     ___________/\\________________\n                    /                             \\\n           _Judaeo-Christianity_   _Modern Christianity_  _Paganism_\n_Judaism_     _____/\\_____                   _______/\\_______\n             /            \\                 /                \\\n    I.     II.    III.     IV.        V.   VI.    VII.     VIII.\n\nFor, though it includes VII., and even, in saint and relic worship,\ncuts a \"monstrous cantle\" out of paganism, it excludes, not only all\nJudaeo-Christians, but all who doubt that such are heretics. Ever since\nthe thirteenth century, the Inquisition would have cheerfully burned,\nand in Spain did abundantly burn, all persons who came under the\ncategories II., III., IV., V. And the wolf would play the same havoc\nnow, if it could only get its blood-stained jaws free from the muzzle\nimposed by the secular arm.\n\nFurther, there is not a Protestant body except the Unitarian, which\nwould not declare Justin himself a heretic, on account of his doctrine\nof the inferior godship of the Logos; while I am very much afraid\nthat, in strict logic, Dr. Wace would be under the necessity, so\npainful to him, of calling him an \"infidel,\" on the same and on other\ngrounds.\n\nNow let us turn to our other authority. If there is any result of\ncritical investigations of the sources of Christianity which is\ncertain,[76] it is that Paul of Tarsus wrote the Epistle to the\nGalatians somewhere between the years 55 and 60 A.D., that is to say,\nroughly, twenty, or five-and-twenty years after the crucifixion. If\nthis is so, the Epistle to the Galatians is one of the oldest, if not\nthe very oldest, of extant documentary evidences of the state of the\nprimitive Church. And, be it observed, if it is Paul's writing, it\nunquestionably furnishes us with the evidence of a participator in the\ntransactions narrated. With the exception of two or three of the other\nPauline Epistles, there is not one solitary book in the New Testament\nof the authorship and authority of which we have such good evidence.\n\nAnd what is the state of things we find disclosed? A bitter quarrel,\nin his account of which Paul by no means minces matters, or hesitates\nto hurl defiant sarcasms against those who were \"reputed to be\npillars\": James \"the brother of the Lord,\" Peter, the rock on whom\nJesus is said to have built his Church, and John, \"the beloved\ndisciple.\" And no deference toward \"the rock\" withholds Paul from\ncharging Peter to his face with \"dissimulation.\"\n\nThe subject of the hot dispute was simply this. Were Gentile converts\nbound to obey the Law or not? Paul answered in the negative; and,\nacting upon his opinion, he had created at Antioch (and elsewhere) a\nspecifically \"Christian\" community, the sole qualifications for\nadmission into which were the confession of the belief that Jesus was\nthe Messiah, and baptism upon that confession. In the epistle in\nquestion, Paul puts this--his \"gospel,\" as he calls it--in its most\nextreme form. Not only does he deny the necessity of conformity with\nthe Law, but he declares such conformity to have a negative value.\n\"Behold, I, Paul, say unto you, that if ye receive circumcision,\nChrist will profit you nothing\" (Galatians v. 2). He calls the legal\nobservances \"beggarly rudiments,\" and anathematises every one who\npreaches to the Galatians any other gospel than his own. That is to\nsay, by direct consequence, he anathematises the Nazarenes of\nJerusalem, whose zeal for the Law is testified by James in a passage\nof the Acts cited further on. In the first Epistle to the Corinthians,\ndealing with the question of eating meat offered to idols, it is clear\nthat Paul himself thinks it a matter of indifference; but he advises\nthat it should not he done, for the sake of the weaker brethren. On\nthe other hand, the Nazarenes of Jerusalem most strenuously opposed\nPaul's \"gospel,\" insisting on every convert becoming a regular Jewish\nproselyte, and consequently on his observance of the whole Law; and\nthis party was led by James and Peter and John (Galatians ii. 9). Paul\ndoes not suggest that the question of principle was settled by the\ndiscussion referred to in Galatians. All he says is, that it ended in\nthe practical agreement that he and Barnabas should do as they had\nbeen doing, in respect to the Gentiles; while James and Peter and John\nshould deal in their own fashion with Jewish converts. Afterwards, he\ncomplains bitterly of Peter, because, when on a visit to Antioch, he,\nat first, inclined to Paul's view and ate with the Gentile converts;\nbut when \"certain came from James,\" \"drew back, and separated himself,\nfearing them that were of the circumcision. And the rest of the Jews\ndissembled likewise with him; insomuch as even Barnabas was carried\naway with their dissimulation\" (Galatians ii. 12-13).\n\nThere is but one conclusion to be drawn from Paul's account of this\nfamous dispute, the settlement of which determined the fortunes of\nthe nascent religion. It is that the disciples at Jerusalem, headed by\n\"James, the Lord's brother,\" and by the leading apostles, Peter and\nJohn, were strict Jews, who had objected to admit any converts into\ntheir body, unless these, either by birth, or by becoming proselytes,\nwere also strict Jews. In fact, the sole difference between James and\nPeter and John, with the body of the disciples whom they led and the\nJews by whom they were surrounded, and with whom they, for many years,\nshared the religious observances of the Temple, was that they believed\nthat the Messiah, whom the leaders of the nation yet looked for, had\nalready come in the person of Jesus of Nazareth.\n\nThe Acts of the Apostles is hardly a very trustworthy history; it is\ncertainly of later date than the Pauline Epistles, supposing them to\nbe genuine. And the writer's version of the conference of which Paul\ngives so graphic a description, if that is correct, is unmistakably\ncoloured with all the art of a reconciler, anxious to cover up a\nscandal. But it is none the less instructive on this account. The\njudgment of the \"council\" delivered by James is that the Gentile\nconverts shall merely \"abstain from things sacrificed to idols, and\nfrom blood and from things strangled, and from fornication.\" But\nnotwithstanding the accommodation in which the writer of the Acts\nwould have us believe, the Jerusalem Church held to its endeavour to\nretain the observance of the Law. Long after the conference, some time\nafter the writing of the Epistles to the Galatians and Corinthians,\nand immediately after the despatch of that to the Romans, Paul makes\nhis last visit to Jerusalem, and presents himself to James and all the\nelders. And this is what the Acts tells us of the interview:--\n\n     And they said unto him, Thou seest, brother, how many\n     thousands [or myriads] there are among the Jews of them\n     which have believed; and they are all zealous for the law;\n     and they have been informed concerning thee, that thou\n     teachest all the Jews which are among the Gentiles to\n     forsake Moses, telling them not to circumcise their\n     children, neither to walk after the customs. (Acts xxi. 20,\n     21.)\n\nThey therefore request that he should perform a certain public\nreligious act in the Temple, in order that\n\n     all shall know that there is no truth in the things whereof\n     they have been informed concerning thee; but that thou\n     thyself walkest orderly, keeping the law (_ibid_. 24).[77]\n\nHow far Paul could do what he is here requested to do, and which the\nwriter of the Acts goes on to say he did, with a clear conscience, if\nhe wrote the Epistles to the Galatians and Corinthians, I may leave\nany candid reader of these epistles to decide. The point to which I\nwish to direct attention is the declaration that the Jerusalem\nChurch, led by the brother of Jesus and by his personal disciples and\nfriends, twenty years and more after his death, consisted of strict\nand zealous Jews.\n\nTertullus, the orator, caring very little about the internal\ndissensions of the followers of Jesus, speaks of Paul as a \"ringleader\nof the sect of the Nazarenes\" (Acts xxiv. 5), which must have affected\nJames much in the same way as it would have moved the Archbishop of\nCanterbury, in George Fox's day, to hear the latter called a\n\"ringleader of the sect of Anglicans.\" In fact, \"Nazarene\" was, as is\nwell known, the distinctive appellation applied to Jesus; his\nimmediate followers were known as Nazarenes; while the congregation of\nthe disciples, and, later, of converts at Jerusalem--the Jerusalem\nChurch--was emphatically the \"sect of the Nazarenes,\" no more, in\nitself, to be regarded as anything outside Judaism than the sect of\nthe Sadducees, or that of the Essenes.[78] In fact, the tenets of both\nthe Sadducees and the Essenes diverged much more widely from the\nPharisaic standard of orthodoxy than Nazarenism did.\n\nLet us consider the condition of affairs now (A.D. 50-60) in relation\nto that which obtained in Justin's time, a century later. It is plain\nthat the Nazarenes--presided over by James, \"the brother of the Lord,\"\nand comprising within their body all the twelve apostles--belonged to\nJustin's second category of \"Jews who observe the Law, believe Jesus\nto be the Christ, but who insist on the observance of the Law by\nGentile converts,\" up till the time at which the controversy reported\nby Paul arose. They then, according to Paul, simply allowed him to\nform his congregations of non-legal Gentile converts at Antioch and\nelsewhere; and it would seem that it was to these converts, who would\ncome under Justin's fifth category, that the title of \"Christian\" was\nfirst applied. If any of these Christians had acted upon the more than\nhalf-permission given by Paul, and had eaten meats offered to idols,\nthey would have belonged to Justin's seventh category.\n\nHence, it appears that, if Justin's opinion, which was probably that\nof the Church generally in the middle of the second century, was\ncorrect, James and Peter and John and their followers could not be\nsaved; neither could Paul, if he carried into practice his views as to\nthe indifference of eating meats offered to idols. Or, to put the\nmatter another way, the centre of gravity of orthodoxy, which is at\nthe extreme right of the series in the nineteenth century, was at the\nextreme left just before the middle of the first century, when the\n\"sect of the Nazarenes\" constituted the whole church founded by Jesus\nand the apostles; while, in the time of Justin, it lay mid-way between\nthe two. It is therefore a profound mistake to imagine that the\nJudaeo-Christians (Nazarenes and Ebionites) of later times were\nheretical outgrowths from a primitive universalist \"Christianity.\" On\nthe contrary, the universalist \"Christianity\" is an outgrowth from the\nprimitive, purely Jewish, Nazarenism; which, gradually eliminating all\nthe ceremonial and dietary parts of the Jewish law, has thrust aside\nits parent, and all the intermediate stages of its development, into\nthe position of damnable heresies.\n\nSuch being the case, we are in a position to form a safe judgment of\nthe limits within which the teaching of Jesus of Nazareth must have\nbeen confined. Ecclesiastical authority would have us believe that the\nwords which are given at the end of the first Gospel, \"Go ye,\ntherefore, and make disciples of all the nations, baptizing them in\nthe name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost,\" are part\nof the last commands of Jesus, issued at the moment of his parting\nwith the eleven. If so, Peter and John must have heard these words;\nthey are too plain to be misunderstood; and the occasion is too solemn\nfor them ever to be forgotten. Yet the \"Acts\" tells us that Peter\nneeded a vision to enable him so much as to baptize Cornelius; and\nPaul, in the Galatians, knows nothing of words which would have\ncompletely borne him out as against those who, though they heard, must\nbe supposed to have either forgotten, or ignored them. On the other\nhand, Peter and John, who are supposed to have heard the \"Sermon on\nthe Mount,\" know nothing of the saying that Jesus had not come to\ndestroy the Law, but that every jot and tittle of the Law must be\nfulfilled, which surely would have been pretty good evidence for their\nview of the question.\n\nWe are sometimes told that the personal friends and daily companions\nof Jesus remained zealous Jews and opposed Paul's innovations, because\nthey were hard of heart and dull of comprehension. This hypothesis is\nhardly in accordance with the concomitant faith of those who adopt it,\nin the miraculous insight and superhuman sagacity of their Master; nor\ndo I see any way of getting it to harmonise with the orthodox\npostulate; namely, that Matthew was the author of the first gospel and\nJohn of the fourth. If that is so, then, most assuredly, Matthew was\nno dullard; and as for the fourth gospel--a theosophic romance of the\nfirst order--it could have been written by none but a man of\nremarkable literary capacity, who had drunk deep of Alexandrian\nphilosophy. Moreover, the doctrine of the writer of the fourth gospel\nis more remote from that of the \"sect of the Nazarenes\" than is that\nof Paul himself. I am quite aware that orthodox critics have been\ncapable of maintaining that John, the Nazarene, who was probably well\npast fifty years of age, when he is supposed to have written the most\nthoroughly Judaising book in the New Testament--the Apocalypse--in the\nroughest of Greek, underwent an astounding metamorphosis of both\ndoctrine and style by the time he reached the ripe age of ninety or\nso, and provided the world with a history in which the acutest critic\ncannot [always] make out where the speeches of Jesus end and the text\nof the narrative begins; while that narrative is utterly\nirreconcilable, in regard to matters of fact, with that of his\nfellow-apostle, Matthew.\n\nThe end of the whole matter is this:--The \"sect of the Nazarenes,\" the\nbrother and the immediate followers of Jesus, commissioned by him as\napostles, and those who were taught by them up to the year 50 A.D.,\nwere not \"Christians\" in the sense in which that term has been\nunderstood ever since its asserted origin at Antioch, but Jews--strict\northodox Jews--whose belief in the Messiahship of Jesus never led to\ntheir exclusion from the Temple services, nor would have shut them out\nfrom the wide embrace of Judaism.[79] The open proclamation of their\nspecial view about the Messiah was doubtless offensive to the\nPharisees, just as rampant Low Churchism is offensive to bigoted High\nChurchism in our own country; or as any kind of dissent is offensive\nto fervid religionists of all creeds. To the Sadducees, no doubt, the\npolitical danger of any Messianic movement was serious; and they would\nhave been glad to put down Nazarenism, lest it should end in useless\nrebellion against their Roman masters, like that other Galilean\nmovement headed by Judas, a generation earlier. Galilee was always a\nhotbed of seditious enthusiasm against the rule of Rome; and high\npriest and procurator alike had need to keep a sharp eye upon natives\nof that district. On the whole, however, the Nazarenes were but little\ntroubled for the first twenty years of their existence; and the\nundying hatred of the Jews against those later converts, whom they\nregarded as apostates and fautors of a sham Judaism, was awakened by\nPaul. From their point of view, he was a mere renegade Jew, opposed\nalike to orthodox Judaism and to orthodox Nazarenism; and whose\nteachings threatened Judaism with destruction. And, from their point\nof view, they were quite right. In the course of a century, Pauline\ninfluences had a large share in driving primitive Nazarenism from\nbeing the very heart of the new faith into the position of scouted\nerror; and the spirit of Paul's doctrine continued its work of\ndriving Christianity farther and farther away from Judaism, until\n\"meats offered to idols\" might be eaten without scruple, while the\nNazarene methods of observing even the Sabbath, or the Passover, were\nbranded with the mark of Judaising heresy.\n\nBut if the primitive Nazarenes of whom the Acts speak were orthodox\nJews, what sort of probability can there be that Jesus was anything\nelse? How can he have founded the universal religion which was not\nheard of till twenty years after his death?[80] That Jesus possessed,\nin a rare degree, the gift of attaching men to his person and to his\nfortunes; that he was the author of many a striking saying, and the\nadvocate of equity, of love, and of humility; that he may have\ndisregarded the subtleties of the bigots for legal observance, and\nappealed rather to those noble conceptions of religion which\nconstituted the pith and kernel of the teaching of the great prophets\nof his nation seven hundred years earlier; and that, in the last\nscenes of his career, he may have embodied the ideal sufferer of\nIsaiah, may be, as I think it is, extremely probable. But all this\ninvolves not a step beyond the borders of orthodox Judaism. Again,\nwho is to say whether Jesus proclaimed himself the veritable Messiah,\nexpected by his nation since the appearance of the pseudoprophetic\nwork of Daniel, a century and a half before his time; or whether the\nenthusiasm of his followers gradually forced him to assume that\nposition?\n\nBut one thing is quite certain: if that belief in the speedy second\ncoming of the Messiah which was shared by all parties in the primitive\nChurch, whether Nazarene or Pauline; which Jesus is made to prophesy,\nover and over again, in the Synoptic gospels; and which dominated the\nlife of Christians during the first century after the crucifixion;--if\nhe believed and taught that, then assuredly he was under an illusion,\nand he is responsible for that which the mere effluxion of time has\ndemonstrated to be a prodigious error.\n\nWhen I ventured to doubt \"whether any Protestant theologian who has a\nreputation to lose will say that he believes the Gadarene story,\" it\nappears that I reckoned without Dr. Wace, who, referring to this\npassage in my paper, says:--\n\n     He will judge whether I fall under his description; but I\n     repeat that I believe it, and that he has removed the only\n     objection to my believing it (p. 363).\n\nFar be it from me to set myself up as a judge of any such delicate\nquestion as that put before me; but I think I may venture to express\nthe conviction that, in the matter of courage, Dr. Wace has raised for\nhimself a monument _aere perennius._ For really, in my poor judgment, a\ncertain splendid intrepidity, such as one admires in the leader of a\nforlorn hope, is manifested by Dr. Wace when he solemnly affirms that\nhe believes the Gadarene story on the evidence offered. I feel less\ncomplimented perhaps than I ought to do, when I am told that I have\nbeen an accomplice in extinguishing in Dr. Wace's mind the last\nglimmer of doubt which common sense may have suggested. In fact, I\nmust disclaim all responsibility for the use to which the information\nI supplied has been put. I formally decline to admit that the\nexpression of my ignorance whether devils, in the existence of which I\ndo not believe, if they did exist, might or might not be made to go\nout of men into pigs, can, as a matter of logic, have been of any use\nwhatever to a person who already believed in devils and in the\nhistorical accuracy of the gospels.\n\nOf the Gadarene story, Dr. Wace, with all solemnity and twice over,\naffirms that he \"believes it.\" I am sorry to trouble him further, but\nwhat does he mean by \"it\"? Because there are two stories, one in\n\"Mark\" and \"Luke,\" and the other in \"Matthew.\" In the former, which I\nquoted in my previous paper, there is one possessed man; in the\nlatter there are two. The story is told fully, with the vigorous\nhomely diction and the picturesque details of a piece of folklore, in\nthe second gospel. The immediately antecedent event is the storm on\nthe Lake of Gennesaret. The immediately consequent events are the\nmessage from the ruler of the synagogue and the healing of the woman\nwith an issue of blood. In the third gospel, the order of events is\nexactly the same, and there is an extremely close general and verbal\ncorrespondence between the narratives of the miracle. Both agree in\nstating that there was only one possessed man, and that he was the\nresidence of many devils, whose name was \"Legion.\"\n\nIn the first gospel, the event which immediately precedes the Gadarene\naffair is, as before, the storm; the message from the ruler and the\nhealing of the issue are separated from it by the accounts of the\nhealing of a paralytic, of the calling of Matthew, and of a discussion\nwith some Pharisees. Again, while the second gospel speaks of the\ncountry of the \"Gerasenes\" as the locality of the event, the third\ngospel has \"Gerasenes,\" \"Gergesenes,\" and \"Gadarenes\" in different\nancient MSS.; while the first has \"Gadarenes.\"\n\nThe really important points to be noticed, however, in the narrative\nof the first gospel, are these--that there are two possessed men\ninstead of one; and that while the story is abbreviated by omissions,\nwhat there is of it is often verbally identical with the corresponding\npassages in the other two gospels. The most unabashed of reconcilers\ncannot well say that one man is the same as two, or two as one; and,\nthough the suggestion really has been made, that two different\nmiracles, agreeing in all essential particulars, except the number of\nthe possessed, were effected immediately after the storm on the lake,\nI should be sorry to accuse any one of seriously adopting it. Nor will\nit he pretended that the allegory refuge is accessible in this\nparticular case.\n\nSo, when Dr. Wace says that he believes in the synoptic evangelists'\naccount of the miraculous bedevilment of swine, I may fairly ask which\nof them does he believe? Does he hold by the one evangelist's story,\nor by that of the two evangelists? And having made his election, what\nreasons has he to give for his choice? If it is suggested that the\nwitness of two is to be taken against that of one, not only is the\ntestimony dealt with in that common-sense fashion against which the\ntheologians of his school protest so warmly; not only is all question\nof inspiration at an end, but the further inquiry arises, After all,\nis it the testimony of two against one? Are the authors of the\nversions in the second and third gospels really independent witnesses?\nIn order to answer this question, it is only needful to place the\nEnglish versions of the two side by side, and compare them carefully.\nIt will then be seen that the coincidences between them, not merely in\nsubstance, but in arrangement, and in the use of identical words in\nthe same order, are such, that only two alternatives are conceivable:\neither one evangelist freely copied from the other, or both based\nthemselves upon a common source, which may either have been a written\ndocument, or a definite oral tradition learned by heart. Assuredly,\nthese two testimonies are not those of independent witnesses. Further,\nwhen the narrative in the first gospel is compared with that in the\nother two, the same fact comes out.\n\nSupposing, then, that Dr. Wace is right in his assumption that\nMatthew, Mark, and Luke wrote the works which we find attributed to\nthem by tradition, what is the value of their agreement, even that\nsomething more or less like this particular miracle occurred, since it\nis demonstrable, either that all depend on some antecedent statement,\nof the authorship of which nothing is known, or that two are dependent\nupon the third?\n\nDr. Wace says he believes the Gadarene story; whichever version of it\nhe accepts, therefore, he believes that Jesus said what he is stated\nin all the versions to have said, and thereby virtually declared that\nthe theory of the nature of the spiritual world involved in the story\nis true. Now I hold that this theory is false, that it is a monstrous\nand mischievous fiction; and I unhesitatingly express my disbelief in\nany assertion that it is true, by whomsoever made. So that, if Dr.\nWace is right in his belief, he is also quite right in classing me\namong the people he calls \"infidels\"; and although I cannot fulfil the\neccentric expectation that I shall glory in a title which, from my\npoint of view, it would be simply silly to adopt, I certainly shall\nrejoice not to be reckoned among \"Christians\" so long as the\nprofession of belief in such stories as the Gadarene pig affair, on\nthe strength of a tradition of unknown origin, of which two discrepant\nreports, also of unknown origin, alone remain, forms any part of the\nChristian faith. And, although I have, more than once, repudiated the\ngift of prophecy, yet I think I may venture to express the\nanticipation, that if \"Christians\" generally are going to follow the\nline taken by Dr. Wace, it will not be long before all men of common\nsense qualify for a place among the \"infidels.\"\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n     [64] I may perhaps return to the question of the authorship\n          of the Gospels. For the present I must content myself\n          with warning my readers against any reliance upon Dr.\n          Wace's statements as to the results arrived at by\n          modern criticism. They are as gravely as surprisingly\n          erroneous.\n\n     [65] The United States ought, perhaps, to be added, but\n          I am not sure.\n\n     [66] Imagine that all our chairs of astronomy had been\n          founded in the fourteenth century, and that their\n          incumbents were bound to sign Ptolemaic articles. In\n          that case, with every respect for the efforts of\n          persons thus hampered to attain and expound the truth,\n          I think men of common sense would go elsewhere to learn\n          astronomy. Zeller's _Vortraege und Abhandlungen_ were\n          published and came into my hands a quarter of a century\n          ago. The writer's rank, as a theologian to begin with,\n          and subsequently as a historian of Greek philosophy, is\n          of the highest. Among these essays are two--_Das\n          Urchirstenthum_ and _Die Tuebinger historische\n          Schule_--which are likely to be of more use to those\n          who wish to know the real state of the case than all\n          that the official \"apologists,\" with their one eye on\n          truth and the other on the tenets of their sect, have\n          written. For the opinion of a scientific theologian\n          about theologians of this stamp see pp. 225 and 227 of\n          the _Vortraege_.\n\n     [67] I suppose this is what Dr. Wace is thinking about when\n          he says that I allege that there \"is no visible escape\"\n          from the supposition of an _Ur-Marcus_ (p. 367). That a\n          \"theologian of repute\" should confound an indisputable\n          fact with one of the modes of explaining that fact is\n          not so singular as those who are unaccustomed to the\n          ways of theologians might imagine.\n\n     [68] Any examiner whose duty it has been to examine into a\n          case of \"copying\" will be particularly well prepared to\n          appreciate the force of the case stated in that most\n          excellent little book, _The Common Tradition of the\n          Synoptic Gospels_, by Dr. Abbott and Mr. Rushbrooke\n          (Macmillan, 1884). To those who have not passed through\n          such painful experiences I may recommend the brief\n          discussion of the genuineness of the \"Casket Letters\"\n          in my friend Mr. Skelton's interesting book, _Maitland\n          of Lethington_. The second edition of Holtzmann's\n          _Lehrbuch_, published in 1886, gives a remarkably fair\n          and full account of the present results of criticism.\n          At p. 366 he writes that the present burning question\n          is whether the \"relatively primitive narrative and the\n          root of the other synoptic texts is contained in\n          Matthew or in Mark. It is only on this point that\n          properly-informed (_sachkundige_) critics differ,\" and\n          he decides in favour of Mark.\n\n     [69] Holtzmann (_Die synoptischen Evangelien_, 1863, p. 75),\n          following Ewald, argues that the \"Source A\" (= the\n          threefold tradition, more or less) contained something\n          that answered to the \"Sermon on the Plain\" immediately\n          after the words of our present Mark, \"And he cometh\n          into a house\" (iii. 19). But what conceivable motive\n          could \"Mark\" have for omitting it? Holtzmann has no\n          doubt, however, that the \"Sermon on the Mount\" is a\n          compilation, or, as he calls it in his\n          recently-published _Lehrbuch_ (p. 372), \"an artificial\n          mosaic work.\"\n\n     [70] See Schuerer, _Geschichte des juedischen Volkes_,\n          Zweiter Thiel, p. 384.\n\n     [71] Spacious, because a young man could sit in it \"on the\n          right side\" (xv. 5), and therefore with plenty of room\n          to spare.\n\n     [72] King Herod had not the least difficulty in supposing\n          the resurrection of John the Baptist--\"John, whom I\n          beheaded, he is risen\" (Mark vi. 16).\n\n     [73] I am very sorry for the interpolated \"in,\" because\n          citation ought to be accurate in small things as in\n          great. But what difference it makes whether one\n          \"believes Jesus\" or \"believes in Jesus\" much thought\n          has not enabled me to discover. If you \"believe him\"\n          you must believe him to be what he professed to\n          be--that is, \"believe in him;\" and if you \"believe in\n          him\" you must necessarily \"believe him.\"\n\n     [74] True for Justin: but there is a school of theological\n          critics, who more or less question the historical\n          reality of Paul, and the genuineness of even the four\n          cardinal epistles.\n\n     [75] See _Dial. cum Tryphone_, Sec.47 and Sec.35. It is to be\n          understood that Justin does not arrange these\n          categories in order, as I have done.\n\n     [76] I guard myself against being supposed to affirm that\n          even the four cardinal epistles of Paul may not have\n          been seriously tampered with. See note 1, p. 287 above.\n\n     [77] Paul, in fact, is required to commit in Jerusalem, an act\n          of the same character as that which he brands as\n          \"dissimulation\" on the part of Peter in Antioch.\n\n     [78] All this was quite clearly pointed out by Ritschl nearly\n          forty years ago. See _Die Entstchung der\n          alt-katholischen Kirche_ (1850), p. 108.\n\n     [79] \"If every one was baptized as soon as he acknowledged\n          Jesus to be the Messiah, the first Christians can have\n          been aware of no other essential differences from the\n          Jews.\"--Zeller, _Vortraege_ (1865), p. 26.\n\n     [80] Dr. Harnack, in the lately-published second edition of\n          his _Dogmengeschichte_, says (p. 39), \"Jesus Christ\n          brought forward no new doctrine;\" and again (p. 65),\n          \"It is not difficult to set against every portion of\n          the utterances of Jesus an observation which deprives\n          him of originality.\" See also Zusatz 4, on the same\n          page.\n\n\n\n\nIX: AGNOSTICISM AND CHRISTIANITY\n\n[1889]\n\nNemo ergo ex me scire quaerat, quod me nescire scio, nisi\nforte ut nescire discat.--AUGUSTINUS, _De Civ. Dei_, xii. 7.\n\n\n[81] The present discussion has arisen out of the use, which has\nbecome general in the last few years, of the terms \"Agnostic\" and\n\"Agnosticism.\"\n\nThe people who call themselves \"Agnostics\" have been charged with\ndoing so because they have not the courage to declare themselves\n\"Infidels.\" It has been insinuated that they have adopted a new name\nin order to escape the unpleasantness which attaches to their proper\ndenomination. To this wholly erroneous imputation, I have replied by\nshowing that the term \"Agnostic\" did, as a matter of fact, arise in a\nmanner which negatives it; and my statement has not been, and cannot\nbe, refuted. Moreover, speaking for myself, and without impugning the\nright of any other person to use the term in another sense, I further\nsay that Agnosticism is not properly described as a \"negative\" creed,\nnor indeed as a creed of any kind, except in so far as it expresses\nabsolute faith in the validity of a principle, which is as much\nethical as intellectual. This principle may be stated in various ways,\nbut they all amount to this: that it is wrong for a man to say that he\nis certain of the objective truth of any proposition unless he can\nproduce evidence which logically justifies that certainty. This is\nwhat Agnosticism asserts; and, in my opinion, it is all that is\nessential to Agnosticism. That which Agnostics deny and repudiate, as\nimmoral, is the contrary doctrine, that there are propositions which\nmen ought to believe, without logically satisfactory evidence; and\nthat reprobation ought to attach to the profession of disbelief in\nsuch inadequately supported propositions. The justification of the\nAgnostic principle lies in the success which follows upon its\napplication, whether in the field of natural, or in that of civil,\nhistory; and in the fact that, so far as these topics are concerned,\nno sane man thinks of denying its validity.\n\nStill speaking for myself, I add, that though Agnosticism is not, and\ncannot be, a creed, except in so far as its general principle is\nconcerned; yet that the application of that principle results in the\ndenial of, or the suspension of judgment concerning, a number of\npropositions respecting which our contemporary ecclesiastical\n\"gnostics\" profess entire certainty. And, in so far as these\necclesiastical persons can be justified in their old-established\ncustom (which many nowadays think more honoured in the breach than the\nobservance) of using opprobrious names to those who differ from them,\nI fully admit their right to call me and those who think with me\n\"Infidels\"; all I have ventured to urge is that they must not expect\nus to speak of ourselves by that title.\n\nThe extent of the region of the uncertain, the number of the problems\nthe investigation of which ends in a verdict of not proven, will vary\naccording to the knowledge and the intellectual habits of the\nindividual Agnostic. I do not very much care to speak of anything as\n\"unknowable.\"[82] What I am sure about is that there are many topics\nabout which I know nothing; and which, so far as I can see, are out of\nreach of my faculties. But whether these things are knowable by any\none else is exactly one of those matters which is beyond my knowledge,\nthough I may have a tolerably strong opinion as to the probabilities\nof the case. Relatively to myself, I am quite sure that the region of\nuncertainty--the nebulous country in which words play the part of\nrealities--is far more extensive than I could wish. Materialism and\nIdealism; Theism and Atheism; the doctrine of the soul and its\nmortality or immortality--appear in the history of philosophy like the\nshades of Scandinavian heroes, eternally slaying one another and\neternally coming to life again in a metaphysical \"Nifelheim.\" It is\ngetting on for twenty-five centuries, at least, since mankind began\nseriously to give their minds to these topics. Generation after\ngeneration, philosophy has been doomed to roll the stone uphill; and,\njust as all the world swore it was at the top, down it has rolled to\nthe bottom again. All this is written in innumerable books; and he who\nwill toil through them will discover that the stone is just where it\nwas when the work began. Hume saw this; Kant saw it; since their time,\nmore and more eyes have been cleansed of the films which prevented\nthem from seeing it; until now the weight and number of those who\nrefuse to be the prey of verbal mystifications has begun to tell in\npractical life.\n\nIt was inevitable that a conflict should arise between Agnosticism and\nTheology; or rather, I ought to say, between Agnosticism and\nEcclesiasticism. For Theology, the science, is one thing; and\nEcclesiasticism, the championship of a foregone conclusion[83] as to\nthe truth of a particular form of Theology, is another. With\nscientific Theology, Agnosticism has no quarrel. On the contrary, the\nAgnostic, knowing too well the influence of prejudice and\nidiosyncrasy, even on those who desire most earnestly to be impartial,\ncan wish for nothing more urgently than that the scientific theologian\nshould not only be at perfect liberty to thresh out the matter in his\nown fashion; but that he should, if he can, find flaws in the Agnostic\nposition; and, even if demonstration is not to be had, that he should\nput, in their full force, the grounds of the conclusions he thinks\nprobable. The scientific theologian admits the Agnostic principle,\nhowever widely his results may differ from those reached by the\nmajority of Agnostics.\n\nBut, as between Agnosticism and Ecclesiasticism, or, as our neighbours\nacross the Channel call it, Clericalism, there can be neither peace\nnor truce. The Cleric asserts that it is morally wrong not to believe\ncertain propositions, whatever the results of a strict scientific\ninvestigation of the evidence of these propositions. He tells us \"that\nreligious error is, in itself, of an immoral nature.\"[84] He declares\nthat he has prejudged certain conclusions, and looks upon those who\nshow cause for arrest of judgment as emissaries of Satan. It\nnecessarily follows that, for him, the attainment of faith, not the\nascertainment of truth, is the highest aim of mental life. And, on\ncareful analysis of the nature of this faith, it will too often be\nfound to be, not the mystic process of unity with the Divine,\nunderstood by the religious enthusiast; but that which the candid\nsimplicity of a Sunday scholar once defined it to be. \"Faith,\" said\nthis unconscious plagiarist of Tertullian, \"is the power of saying you\nbelieve things which are incredible.\"\n\nNow I, and many other Agnostics, believe that faith, in this sense, is\nan abomination; and though we do not indulge in the luxury of\nself-righteousness so far as to call those who are not of our way of\nthinking hard names, we do not feel that the disagreement between\nourselves and those who hold this doctrine is even more moral than\nintellectual. It is desirable there should be an end of any mistakes\non this topic. If our clerical opponents were clearly aware of the\nreal state of the case, there would be an end of the curious delusion,\nwhich often appears between the lines of their writings, that those\nwhom they are so fond of calling \"Infidels\" are people who not only\nought to be, but in their hearts are, ashamed of themselves. It would\nbe discourteous to do more than hint the antipodal opposition of this\npleasant dream of theirs to facts.\n\nThe clerics and their lay allies commonly tell us, that if we refuse\nto admit that there is good ground for expressing definite convictions\nabout certain topics, the bonds of human society will dissolve and\nmankind lapse into savagery. There are several answers to this\nassertion. One is that the bonds of human society were formed without\nthe aid of their theology; and, in the opinion of not a few competent\njudges, have been weakened rather than strengthened by a good deal of\nit. Greek science, Greek art, the ethics of old Israel, the social\norganisation of old Rome, contrived to come into being, without the\nhelp of any one who believed in a single distinctive article of the\nsimplest of the Christian creeds. The science, the art, the\njurisprudence, the chief political and social theories, of the modern\nworld have grown out of those of Greece and Rome--not by favour of,\nbut in the teeth of, the fundamental teachings of early Christianity,\nto which science, art, and any serious occupation with the things of\nthis world, were alike despicable.\n\nAgain, all that is best in the ethics of the modern world, in so far\nas it has not grown out of Greek thought, or Barbarian manhood, is the\ndirect development of the ethics of old Israel. There is no code of\nlegislation, ancient or modern, at once so just and so merciful, so\ntender to the weak and poor, as the Jewish law; and, if the Gospels\nare to be trusted, Jesus of Nazareth himself declared that he taught\nnothing but that which lay implicitly, or explicitly, in the religious\nand ethical system of his people.\n\n     And the scribe said unto him, Of a truth, Teacher, thou hast\n     well said that he is one; and there is none other but he,\n     and to love him with all the heart, and with all the\n     understanding, and with all the strength, and to love his\n     neighbour as himself, is much more than all whole burnt\n     offerings and sacrifices. (Mark xii. 32, 33.)\n\nHere is the briefest of summaries of the teaching of the prophets of\nIsrael of the eighth century; does the Teacher, whose doctrine is thus\nset forth in his presence, repudiate the exposition? Nay; we are told,\non the contrary, that Jesus saw that he \"answered discreetly,\" and\nreplied, \"Thou art not far from the kingdom of God.\"\n\nSo that I think that even if the creeds, from the so-called\n\"Apostles,\" to the so-called \"Athanasian,\" were swept into oblivion;\nand even if the human race should arrive at the conclusion that,\nwhether a bishop washes a cup or leaves it unwashed, is not a matter\nof the least consequence, it will get on very well. The causes which\nhave led to the development of morality in mankind, which have guided\nor impelled us all the way from the savage to the civilised state,\nwill not cease to operate because a number of ecclesiastical\nhypotheses turn out to be baseless. And, even if the absurd notion\nthat morality is more the child of speculation than of practical\nnecessity and inherited instinct, had any foundation; if all the world\nis going to thieve, murder, and otherwise misconduct itself as soon as\nit discovers that certain portions of ancient history are mythical,\nwhat is the relevance of such arguments to any one who holds by the\nAgnostic principle?\n\nSurely, the attempt to cast out Beelzebub by the aid of Beelzebub is a\nhopeful procedure as compared to that of preserving morality by the\naid of immorality. For I suppose it is admitted that an Agnostic may\nbe perfectly sincere, may be competent, and may have studied the\nquestion at issue with as much care as his clerical opponents. But, if\nthe Agnostic really believes what he says, the \"dreadful consequence\"\nargufier (consistently, I admit, with his own principles) virtually\nasks him to abstain from telling the truth, or to say what he believes\nto be untrue, because of the supposed injurious consequences to\nmorality. \"Beloved brethren, that we may be spotlessly moral, before\nall things let us lie,\" is the sum total of many an exhortation\naddressed to the \"Infidel.\" Now, as I have already pointed out, we\ncannot oblige our exhorters. We leave the practical application of the\nconvenient doctrines of \"Reserve\" and \"Non-natural interpretation\" to\nthose who invented them.\n\nI trust that I have now made amends for any ambiguity, or want of\nfulness, in my previous exposition of that which I hold to be the\nessence of the Agnostic doctrine. Henceforward, I might hope to hear\nno more of the assertion that we are necessarily Materialists,\nIdealists, Atheists, Theists, or any other _ists_, if experience had\nled me to think that the proved falsity of a statement was any\nguarantee against its repetition. And those who appreciate the nature\nof our position will see, at once, that when Ecclesiasticism declares\nthat we ought to believe this, that, and the other, and are very\nwicked if we don't, it is impossible for us to give any answer but\nthis: We have not the slightest objection to believe anything you\nlike, if you will give us good grounds for belief; but, if you cannot,\nwe must respectfully refuse, even if that refusal should wreck\nmortality and insure our own damnation several times over. We are\nquite content to leave that to the decision of the future. The course\nof the past has impressed us with the firm conviction that no good\never comes of falsehood, and we feel warranted in refusing even to\nexperiment in that direction.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIn the course of the present discussion it has been asserted that the\n\"Sermon on the Mount\" and the \"Lord's Prayer\" furnish a summary and\ncondensed view of the essentials of the teaching of Jesus of Nazareth,\nset forth by himself. Now this supposed _Summa_ of Nazarene theology\ndistinctly affirms the existence of a spiritual world, of a Heaven,\nand of a Hell of fire; it teaches the Fatherhood of God and the\nmalignity of the Devil; it declares the superintending providence of\nthe former and our need of deliverance from the machinations of the\nlatter; it affirms the fact of demoniac possession and the power of\ncasting out devils by the faithful. And from these premises, the\nconclusion is drawn, that those Agnostics who deny that there is any\nevidence of such a character as to justify certainty, respecting the\nexistence and the nature of the spiritual world, contradict the\nexpress declarations of Jesus. I have replied to this argumentation by\nshowing that there is strong reason to doubt the historical accuracy\nof the attribution to Jesus of either the \"Sermon on the Mount\" or the\n\"Lord's Prayer\"; and, therefore, that the conclusion in question is\nnot warranted, at any rate, on the grounds set forth.\n\nBut, whether the Gospels contain trustworthy statements about this and\nother alleged historical facts or not, it is quite certain that from\nthem, taken together with the other books of the New Testament, we may\ncollect a pretty complete exposition of that theory of the spiritual\nworld which was held by both Nazarenes and Christians; and which was\nundoubtedly supposed by them to be fully sanctioned by Jesus, though\nit is just as clear that they did not imagine it contained any\nrevelation by him of something heretofore unknown. If the\npneumatological doctrine which pervades the whole New Testament is\nnowhere systematically stated, it is everywhere assumed. The writers\nof the Gospels and of the Acts take it for granted, as a matter of\ncommon knowledge; and it is easy to gather from these sources a series\nof propositions, which only need arrangement to form a complete\nsystem.\n\nIn this system, Man is considered to be a duality formed of a\nspiritual element, the soul; and a corporeal[85] element, the body.\nAnd this duality is repeated in the Universe, which consists of a\ncorporeal world embraced and interpenetrated by a spiritual world. The\nformer consists of the earth, as its principal and central\nconstituent, with the subsidiary sun, planets, and stars. Above the\nearth is the air, and below is the watery abyss. Whether the heaven,\nwhich is conceived to be above the air, and the hell in, or below, the\nsubterranean deeps, are to be taken as corporeal or incorporeal is not\nclear. However this may be, the heaven and the air, the earth and the\nabyss, are peopled by innumerable beings analogous in nature to the\nspiritual element in man, and these spirits are of two kinds, good and\nbad. The chief of the good spirits, infinitely superior to all the\nothers, and their creator, as well as the creator of the corporeal\nworld and of the bad spirits, is God. His residence is heaven, where\nhe is surrounded by the ordered hosts of good spirits; his angels, or\nmessengers, and the executors of his will throughout the universe.\n\nOn the other hand, the chief of the bad spirits is Satan, _the_ devil\n_par excellence_. He and his company of demons are free to roam\nthrough all parts of the universe, except the heaven. These bad\nspirits are far superior to man in power and subtlety; and their whole\nenergies are devoted to bringing physical and moral evils upon him,\nand to thwarting, so far as his power goes, the benevolent intentions\nof the Supreme Being. In fact, the souls and bodies of men form both\nthe theatre and the prize of an incessant warfare between the good and\nthe evil spirits--the powers of light and the powers of darkness. By\nleading Eve astray, Satan brought sin and death upon mankind. As the\ngods of the heathen, the demons are the founders and maintainers of\nidolatry; as the \"powers of the air\" they afflict mankind with\npestilence and famine; as \"unclean spirits\" they cause disease of mind\nand body.\n\nThe significance of the appearance of Jesus, in the capacity of the\nMessiah, or Christ, is the reversal of the satanic work by putting an\nend to both sin and death. He announces that the kingdom of God is at\nhand, when the \"Prince of this world\" shall be finally \"cast out\"\n(John xii. 31) from the cosmos, as Jesus, during his earthly career,\ncast him out from individuals. Then will Satan and all his devilry,\nalong with the wicked whom they have seduced to their destruction, be\nhurled into the abyss of unquenchable fire--there to endure continual\ntorture, without a hope of winning pardon from the merciful God, their\nFather; or of moving the glorified Messiah to one more act of pitiful\nintercession; or even of interrupting, by a momentary sympathy with\ntheir wretchedness, the harmonious psalmody of their brother angels\nand men, eternally lapped in bliss unspeakable.\n\nThe straitest Protestant, who refuses to admit the existence of any\nsource of Divine truth, except the Bible, will not deny that every\npoint of the pneumatological theory here set forth has ample\nscriptural warranty. The Gospels, the Acts, the Epistles, and the\nApocalypse assert the existence of the devil, of his demons and of\nHell, as plainly as they do that of God and his angels and Heaven. It\nis plain that the Messianic and the Satanic conceptions of the writers\nof these books are the obverse and the reverse of the same\nintellectual coinage. If we turn from Scripture to the traditions of\nthe Fathers and the confessions of the Churches, it will appear that,\nin this one particular, at any rate, time has brought about no\nimportant deviation from primitive belief. From Justin onwards, it may\noften be a fair question whether God, or the devil, occupies a larger\nshare of the attention of the Fathers. It is the devil who instigates\nthe Roman authorities to persecute; the gods and goddesses of paganism\nare devils, and idolatry itself is an invention of Satan; if a saint\nfalls away from grace, it is by the seduction of the demon; if heresy\narises, the devil has suggested it; and some of the Fathers[86] go so\nfar as to challenge the pagans to a sort of exorcising match, by way\nof testing the truth of Christianity. Mediaeval Christianity is at one\nwith patristic, on this head. The masses, the clergy, the theologians,\nand the philosophers alike, live and move and have their being in a\nworld full of demons, in which sorcery and possession are everyday\noccurrences. Nor did the Reformation make any difference. Whatever\nelse Luther assailed, he left the traditional demonology untouched;\nnor could any one have entertained a more hearty and uncompromising\nbelief in the devil, than he and, at a later period, the Calvinistic\nfanatics of New England did. Finally, in these last years of the\nnineteenth century, the demonological hypotheses of the first century\nare, explicitly or implicitly, held and occasionally acted upon by the\nimmense majority of Christians of all confessions.\n\nOnly here and there has the progress of scientific thought, outside\nthe ecclesiastical world, so far affected Christians, that they and\ntheir teachers fight shy of the demonology of their creed. They are\nfain to conceal their real disbelief in one half of Christian doctrine\nby judicious silence about it; or by flight to those refuges for the\nlogically destitute, accommodation or allegory. But the faithful who\nfly to allegory in order to escape absurdity resemble nothing so much\nas the sheep in the fable who--to save their lives--jumped into the\npit. The allegory pit is too commodious, is ready to swallow up so\nmuch more than one wants to put into it. If the story of the\ntemptation is an allegory; if the early recognition of Jesus as the\nSon of God by the demons is an allegory; if the plain declaration of\nthe writer of the first Epistle of John (iii. 8), \"To this end was the\nSon of God manifested, that He might destroy the works of the devil,\"\nis allegorical, then the Pauline version of the Fall may be\nallegorical, and still more the words of consecration of the\nEucharist, or the promise of the second coming; in fact, there is not\na dogma of ecclesiastical Christianity the scriptural basis of which\nmay not be whittled away by a similar process.\n\nAs to accommodation, let any honest man who can read the New Testament\nask himself whether Jesus and his immediate friends and disciples can\nbe dishonoured more grossly than by the supposition that they said\nand did that which is attributed to them; while, in reality, they\ndisbelieved in Satan and his demons, in possession and in\nexorcism?[87]\n\nAn eminent theologian has justly observed that we have no right to\nlook at the propositions of the Christian faith with one eye open and\nthe other shut. (Tract 85, p. 29.) It really is not permissible to\nsee, with one eye, that Jesus is affirmed to declare the personality\nand the Fatherhood of God, His loving providence and His accessibility\nto prayer; and to shut the other to the no less definite teaching\nascribed to Jesus, in regard to the personality and the misanthropy of\nthe devil, his malignant watchfulness, and his subjection to\nexorcistic formula and rites. Jesus is made to say that the devil \"was\na murderer from the beginning\" (John viii. 44) by the same authority\nas that upon which we depend for his asserted declaration that \"God is\na spirit\" (John iv. 24).\n\nTo those who admit the authority of the famous Vincentian dictum that\nthe doctrine which has been held \"always, everywhere, and by all\" is\nto be received as authoritative, the demonology must possess a higher\nsanction than any other Christian dogma, except, perhaps, those of the\nResurrection and of the Messiahship of Jesus; for it would be\ndifficult to name any other points of doctrine on which the Nazarene\ndoes not differ from the Christian, and the different historical\nstages and contemporary subdivisions of Christianity from one another.\nAnd, if the demonology is accepted, there can be no reason for\nrejecting all those miracles in which demons play a part. The Gadarene\nstory fits into the general scheme of Christianity; and the evidence\nfor \"Legion\" and their doings is just as good as any other in the New\nTestament for the doctrine which the story illustrates.\n\nIt was with the purpose of bringing this great fact into prominence;\nof getting people to open both their eyes when they look at\nEcclesiasticism; that I devoted so much space to that miraculous story\nwhich happens to be one of the best types of its class. And I could\nnot wish for a better justification of the course I have adopted, than\nthe fact that my heroically consistent adversary has declared his\nimplicit belief in the Gadarene story and (by necessary consequence)\nin the Christian demonology as a whole. It must be obvious, by this\ntime, that, if the account of the spiritual world given in the New\nTestament, professedly on the authority of Jesus, is true, then the\ndemonological half of that account must be just as true as the other\nhalf. And, therefore, those who question the demonology, or try to\nexplain it away, deny the truth of what Jesus said, and are, in\necclesiastical terminology, \"Infidels\" just as much as those who deny\nthe spirituality of God. This is as plain as anything can well be, and\nthe dilemma for my opponent was either to assert that the Gadarene\npig-bedevilment actually occurred, or to write himself down an\n\"Infidel.\" As was to be expected, he chose the former alternative; and\nI may express my great satisfaction at finding that there is one spot\nof common ground on which both he and I stand. So far as I can judge,\nwe are agreed to state one of the broad issues between the\nconsequences of agnostic principles (as I draw them), and the\nconsequences of ecclesiastical dogmatism (as he accepts it), as\nfollows.\n\nEcclesiasticism says: The demonology of the Gospels is an essential\npart of that account of that spiritual world, the truth of which it\ndeclares to be certified by Jesus.\n\nAgnosticism (_me judice_) says: There is no good evidence of the\nexistence of a demoniac spiritual world, and much reason for doubting\nit.\n\nHereupon the ecclesiastic may observe: Your doubt means that you\ndisbelieve Jesus; therefore you are an \"Infidel\" instead of an\n\"Agnostic.\" To which the agnostic may reply: No; for two reasons:\nfirst, because your evidence that Jesus said what you say he said is\nworth very little; and secondly, because a man may be an agnostic, in\nthe sense of admitting he has no positive knowledge, and yet consider\nthat he has more or less probable ground for accepting any given\nhypothesis about the spiritual world. Just as a man may frankly\ndeclare that he has no means of knowing whether the planets generally\nare inhabited or not, and yet may think one of the two possible\nhypotheses more likely that the other, so he may admit that he has no\nmeans of knowing anything about the spiritual world, and yet may think\none or other of the current views on the subject, to some extent,\nprobable.\n\nThe second answer is so obviously valid that it needs no discussion. I\ndraw attention to it simply in justice to those agnostics who may\nattach greater value that I do to any sort of pneumatological\nspeculations; and not because I wish to escape the responsibility of\ndeclaring that, whether Jesus sanctioned the demonological part of\nChristianity or not, I unhesitatingly reject it. The first answer, on\nthe other hand, opens up the whole question of the claim of the\nbiblical and other sources, from which hypotheses concerning the\nspiritual world are derived, to be regarded as unimpeachable\nhistorical evidence as to matters of fact.\n\nNow, in respect of the trustworthiness of the Gospel narratives, I was\nanxious to get rid of the common assumption that the determination of\nthe authorship and of the dates of these works is a matter of\nfundamental importance. That assumption is based upon the notion that\nwhat contemporary witnesses say must be true, or, at least, has always\na _prima facie_ claim to be so regarded; so that if the writers of any\nof the Gospels were contemporaries of the events (and still more if\nthey were in the position of eye-witnesses) the miracles they narrate\nmust be historically true, and, consequently, the demonology which\nthey involve must be accepted. But the story of the \"Translation of\nthe blessed martyrs Marcellinus and Petrus,\" and the other\nconsiderations (to which endless additions might have been made from\nthe Fathers and the mediaeval writers) set forth in a preceding essay,\nyield, in my judgment, satisfactory proof that, where the miraculous\nis concerned, neither considerable intellectual ability, nor undoubted\nhonesty, nor knowledge of the world, nor proved faithfulness as civil\nhistorians, nor profound piety, on the part of eye-witnesses and\ncontemporaries, affords any guarantee of the objective truth of their\nstatements, when we know that a firm belief in the miraculous was\ningrained in their minds, and was the pre-supposition of their\nobservations and reasonings.\n\nTherefore, although it be, as I believe, demonstrable that we have no\nreal knowledge of the authorship, or of the date of composition of the\nGospels, as they have come down to us, and that nothing better than\nmore or less probable guesses can be arrived at on that subject, I\nhave not cared to expend any space on the question. It will be\nadmitted, I suppose; that the authors of the works attributed to\nMatthew, Mark, Luke, and John, whoever they may be, are personages\nwhose capacity and judgment in the narration of ordinary events are\nnot quite so well certified as those of Eginhard; and we have seen\nwhat the value of Eginhard's evidence is when the miraculous is in\nquestion.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nI have been careful to explain that the arguments which I have used in\nthe course of this discussion are not new; that they are historical\nand have nothing to do with what is commonly called science; and that\nthey are all, to the best of my belief, to be found in the works of\ntheologians of repute.\n\nThe position which I have taken up, that the evidence in favour of\nsuch miracles as those recorded by Eginhard, and consequently of\nmediaeval demonology, is quite as good as that in favour of such\nmiracles as the Gadarene, and consequently of Nazarene demonology, is\nnone of my discovery. Its strength was, wittingly or unwittingly,\nsuggested, a century and a half ago, by a theological scholar of\neminence; and it has been, if not exactly occupied, yet so fortified\nwith bastions and redoubts by a living ecclesiastical Vauban, that, in\nmy judgment, it has been rendered impregnable. In the early part of\nthe last century, the ecclesiastical mind in this country was much\nexercised by the question, not exactly of miracles, the occurrence of\nwhich in biblical times was axiomatic, but by the problem: When did\nmiracles cease? Anglican divines were quite sure that no miracles had\nhappened in their day, nor for some time past; they were equally sure\nthat they happened sixteen or seventeen centuries earlier. And it was\na vital question for them to determine at what point of time, between\nthis _terminus a quo_ and that _terminus ad quem_, miracles came to an\nend.\n\nThe Anglicans and the Romanists agreed in the assumption that the\npossession of the gift of miracle-working was _prima facie_ evidence\nof the soundness of the faith of the miracle-workers. The supposition\nthat miraculous powers might be wielded by heretics (though it might\nbe supported by high authority) led to consequences too frightful to\nbe entertained by people who were busied in building their dogmatic\nhouse on the sands of early Church history. If, as the Romanists\nmaintained, an unbroken series of genuine miracles adorned the records\nof their Church, throughout the whole of its existence, no Anglican\ncould lightly venture to accuse them of doctrinal corruption. Hence,\nthe Anglicans, who indulged in such accusations, were bound to prove\nthe modern, the mediaeval Roman, and the later Patristic miracles\nfalse; and to shut off the wonder-working power from the Church at\nthe exact point of time when Anglican doctrine ceased and Roman\ndoctrine began. With a little adjustment--a squeeze here and a pull\nthere--the Christianity of the first three or four centuries might be\nmade to fit, or seem to fit, pretty well into the Anglican scheme. So\nthe miracles, from Justin say to Jerome, might be recognised; while,\nin later times, the Church having become \"corrupt\"--that is to say,\nhaving pursued one and the same line of development further than was\npleasing to Anglicans--its alleged miracles must needs be shams and\nimpostures.\n\nUnder these circumstances, it may be imagined that the establishment\nof a scientific frontier between the earlier realm of supposed fact\nand the later of asserted delusion, had its difficulties; and torrents\nof theological special pleading about the subject flowed from clerical\npens; until that learned and acute Anglican divine, Conyers Middleton,\nin his \"Free Inquiry,\" tore the sophistical web they had laboriously\nwoven to pieces, and demonstrated that the miracles of the patristic\nage, early and late, must stand or fall together, inasmuch as the\nevidence for the later is just as good as the evidence for the earlier\nwonders. If the one set are certified by contemporaneous witnesses of\nhigh repute, so are the other; and, in point of probability, there is\nnot a pin to choose between the two. That is the solid and\nirrefragable, result of Middleton's contribution to the subject. But\nthe Free Inquirer's freedom had its limits; and he draws a sharp line\nof demarcation between the patristic and the New Testament\nmiracles--on the professed ground that the accounts of the latter,\nbeing inspired, are out of the reach of criticism.\n\nA century later, the question was taken up by another divine,\nMiddleton's equal in learning and acuteness, and far his superior in\nsubtlety and dialectic skill; who, though an Anglican, scorned the\nname of Protestant; and, while yet a Churchman, made it his business\nto parade, with infinite skill, the utter hollowness of the arguments\nof those of his brother Churchmen who dreamed that they could be both\nAnglicans and Protestants. The argument of the \"Essay on the Miracles\nrecorded in the Ecclesiastical History of the Early Ages\"[88] by the\npresent [1889] Roman Cardinal, but then Anglican Doctor, John Henry\nNewman, is compendiously stated by himself in the following passage:--\n\n     If the miracles of Church history cannot be defended by the\n     arguments of Leslie, Lyttleton, Paley, or Douglas, how many\n     of the Scripture miracles satisfy their conditions? (p. cvii).\n\nAnd, although the answer is not given in so many words, little doubt\nis left on the mind of the reader, that, in the mind of the writer,\nit is: None. In fact, this conclusion is one which cannot be resisted,\nif the argument in favour of the Scripture miracles is based upon that\nwhich laymen, whether lawyers, or men of science, or historians, or\nordinary men of affairs, call evidence. But there is something really\nimpressive in the magnificent contempt with which, at times, Dr.\nNewman sweeps aside alike those who offer and those who demand such\nevidence.\n\n     Some infidel authors advise us to accept no miracles which\n     would not have a verdict in their favour in a court of\n     justice; that is, they employ against Scripture a weapon\n     which Protestants would confine to attacks upon the Church;\n     as if moral and religious questions required legal proof,\n     and evidence were the test of truth[89] (p. cvii).\n\n\"As if evidence were the test of truth\"!--although the truth in\nquestion is the occurrence, or the non-occurrence, of certain\nphenomena at a certain time and in a certain place. This sudden\nrevelation of the great gulf fixed between the ecclesiastical and the\nscientific mind is enough to take away the breath of any one\nunfamiliar with the clerical organon. As if, one may retort, the\nassumption that miracles may, or have, served a moral or a religious\nend, in any way alters the fact that they profess to be historical\nevents, things that actually happened; and, as such, must needs be\nexactly those subjects about which evidence is appropriate and legal\nproofs (which are such merely because they afford adequate evidence)\nmay be justly demanded. The Gadarene miracle either happened, or it\ndid not. Whether the Gadarene \"question\" is moral or religious, or\nnot, has nothing to do with the fact that it is a purely historical\nquestion whether the demons said what they are declared to have said,\nand the devil-possessed pigs did, or did not, rush over the heights\nbounding the Lake of Gennesaret on a certain day of a certain year,\nafter A.D. 26 and before A.D. 36; for vague and uncertain as New\nTestament chronology is, I suppose it may be assumed that the event in\nquestion, if it happened at all, took place during the procuratorship\nof Pilate. If that is not a matter about which evidence ought to be\nrequired, and not only legal, but strict scientific proof demanded by\nsane men who are asked to believe the story--what is? Is a reasonable\nbeing to be seriously asked to credit statements which, to put the\ncase gently, are not exactly probable, and on the acceptance or\nrejection of which his whole view of life may depend, without asking\nfor as much \"legal\" proof as would send an alleged pickpocket to gaol,\nor as would suffice to prove the validity of a disputed will?\n\n\"Infidel authors\" (if, as I am assured, I may answer for them) will\ndecline to waste time on mere darkenings of counsel of this sort; but\nto those Anglicans who accept his premises, Dr. Newman is a truly\nformidable antagonist. What, indeed, are they to reply when he puts\nthe very pertinent question:--\n\n     whether persons who not merely question, but prejudge the\n     Ecclesiastical miracles on the ground of their want of\n     resemblance, whatever that be, to those contained in\n     Scripture--as if the Almighty could not do in the Christian\n     Church what He had not already done at the time of its\n     foundation, or under the Mosaic Covenant--whether such\n     reasoners are not siding with the sceptic,\n\nand\n\n     whether it is not a happy inconsistency by which they\n     continue to believe the Scriptures while they reject the\n     Church[90] (p. liii).\n\nAgain, I invite Anglican orthodoxy to consider this passage:--\n\n     the narrative of the combats of St. Anthony with evil\n     spirits, is a development rather than a contradiction of\n     revelation, viz. of such texts as speak of Satan being cast\n     out by prayer and fasting. To be shocked, then, at the\n     miracles of Ecclesiastical history, or to ridicule them for\n     their strangeness, is no part of a scriptural philosophy\n     (pp. liii-liv).\n\nFurther on, Dr. Newman declares that it has been admitted\n\n     that a distinct line can be drawn in point of character and\n     circumstance between the miracles of Scripture and of Church\n     history; but this is by no means the case (p. lv) ...\n     specimens are not wanting in the history of the Church, of\n     miracles as awful in their character and as momentous in\n     their effects as those which are recorded in Scripture. The\n     fire interrupting the rebuilding of the Jewish temple, and\n     the death of Arius, are instances, in Ecclesiastical\n     history, of such solemn events. On the other hand, difficult\n     instances in the Scripture history are such as these: the\n     serpent in Eden, the Ark, Jacob's vision for the\n     multiplication of his cattle, the speaking of Balaam's ass,\n     the axe swimming at Elisha's word, the miracle on the swine,\n     and various instances of prayers or prophecies, in which, as\n     in that of Noah's blessing and curse, words which seem the\n     result of private feeling are expressly or virtually\n     ascribed to a Divine suggestion (p. lvi).\n\nWho is to gainsay our ecclesiastical authority here? \"Infidel authors\"\nmight be accused of a wish to ridicule the Scripture miracles by\nputting them on a level with the remarkable story about the fire which\nstopped the rebuilding of the Temple, or that about the death of\nArius--but Dr. Newman is above suspicion. The pity is that his list of\nwhat he delicately terms \"difficult\" instances is so short. Why omit\nthe manufacture of Eve out of Adam's rib, on the strict historical\naccuracy of which the chief argument of the defenders of an iniquitous\nportion of our present law depends? Why leave out the account of the\n\"Bene Elohim\" and their gallantries, on which a large part of the\nworst practices of the mediaeval inquisitors into witchcraft was based?\nWhy forget the angel who wrestled with Jacob, and, as the account\nsuggests, somewhat over-stepped the bounds of fair play, at the end of\nthe struggle? Surely, we must agree with Dr. Newman that, if all these\ncamels have gone down, it savours of affectation to strain at such\ngnats as the sudden ailment of Arius in the midst of his deadly, if\nprayerful,[91] enemies; and the fiery explosion which stopped the\nJulian building operations. Though the _words_ of the \"Conclusion\" of\nthe \"Essay on Miracles\" may, perhaps, be quoted against me, I may\nexpress my satisfaction at finding myself in substantial accordance\nwith a theologian above all suspicion of heterodoxy. With all my\nheart, I can declare my belief that there is just as good reason for\nbelieving in the miraculous slaying of the man who fell short of the\nAthanasian power of affirming contradictories, with respect to the\nnature of the Godhead, as there is for believing in the stories of the\nserpent and the ark told in Genesis, the speaking of Balaam's ass in\nNumbers, or the floating of the axe, at Elisha's order, in the second\nbook of Kings.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIt is one of the peculiarities of a really sound argument that it is\nsusceptible of the fullest development; and that it sometimes leads to\nconclusions unexpected by those who employ it. To my mind, it is\nimpossible to refuse to follow Dr. Newman when he extends his\nreasoning, from the miracles of the patristic and mediaeval ages\nbackward in time, as far as miracles are recorded. But, if the rules\nof logic are valid, I feel compelled to extend the argument forwards\nto the alleged Roman miracles of the present day, which Dr. Newman\nmight not have admitted, but which Cardinal Newman may hardly reject.\nBeyond question, there is as good, or perhaps better, evidence for the\nmiracles worked by our Lady of Lourdes, as there is for the floating\nof Elisha's axe, or the speaking of Balaam's ass. But we must go still\nfurther; there is a modern system of thaumaturgy and demonology which\nis just as well certified as the ancient.[92] Veracious, excellent,\nsometimes learned and acute persons, even philosophers of no mean\npretensions, testify to the \"levitation\" of bodies much heavier than\nElisha's axe; to the existence of \"spirits\" who, to the mere tactile\nsense, have been indistinguishable from flesh and blood; and,\noccasionally, have wrested with all the vigour of Jacob's opponent;\nyet, further, to the speech, in the language of raps, of spiritual\nbeings, whose discourses, in point of coherence and value, are far\ninferior to that of Balaam's humble but sagacious steed. I have not\nthe smallest doubt that, if these were persecuting times, there is\nmany a worthy \"spiritualist\" who would cheerfully go to the stake in\nsupport of his pneumatological faith; and furnish evidence, after\nPaley's own heart, in proof of the truth of his doctrines. Not a few\nmodern divines, doubtless struck by the impossibility of refusing the\nspiritualist evidence, if the ecclesiastical evidence is accepted, and\ndeprived of any _a priori_ objection by their implicit belief in\nChristian Demonology, show themselves ready to take poor Sludge\nseriously, and to believe that he is possessed by other devils than\nthose of need, greed, and vainglory.\n\nUnder these circumstances, it was to be expected, though it is none\nthe less interesting to note the fact, that the arguments of the\nlatest school of \"spiritualists\" present a wonderful family likeness\nto those which adorn the subtle disquisitions of the advocate of\necclesiastical miracles of forty years ago. It is unfortunate for the\n\"spiritualists\" that, over and over again, celebrated and trusted\nmedia, who really, in some respects, call to mind the Montanist[93]\nand gnostic seers of the second century, are either proved in courts\nof law to be fraudulent impostors; or, in sheer weariness, as it would\nseem, of the honest dupes who swear by them, spontaneously confess\ntheir long-continued iniquities, as the Fox women did the other day\nin New York.[94] But, whenever a catastrophe of this kind takes place,\nthe believers are no wise dismayed by it. They freely admit that not\nonly the media, but the spirits whom they summon, are sadly apt to\nlose sight of the elementary principles of right and wrong; and they\ntriumphantly ask: How does the occurrence of occasional impostures\ndisprove the genuine manifestations (that is to say, all those which\nhave not yet been proved to be impostures or delusions)? And, in this,\nthey unconsciously plagiarise from the churchman, who just as freely\nadmits that many ecclesiastical miracles may have been forged; and\nasks, with calm contempt, not only of legal proofs, but of\ncommon-sense probability, Why does it follow that none are to be\nsupposed genuine? I must say, however, that the spiritualists, so far\nas I know, do not venture to outrage right reason so boldly as the\necclesiastics. They do not sneer at \"evidence\"; nor repudiate the\nrequirement of legal proofs. In fact, there can be no doubt that the\nspiritualists produce better evidence for their manifestations than\ncan be shown either for the miraculous death of Arius, or for the\nInvention of the Cross.[95]\n\nFrom the \"levitation\" of the axe at one end of a period of near three\nthousand years to the \"levitation\" of Sludge & Co. at the other end,\nthere is a complete continuity of the miraculous, with every gradation,\nfrom the childish to the stupendous, from the gratification of a\ncaprice to the illustration of sublime truth. There is no drawing a\nline in the series that might be set out of plausibly attested cases\nof spiritual intervention. If one is true, all may be true; if one is\nfalse, all may be false.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThis is, to my mind, the inevitable result of that method of reasoning\nwhich is applied to the confutation of Protestantism, with so much\nsuccess, by one of the acutest and subtlest disputants who have ever\nchampioned Ecclesiasticism--and one cannot put his claims to acuteness\nand subtlety higher.\n\n     ... the Christianity of history is not Protestantism. If\n     ever there were a safe truth it is this.... \"To be deep in\n     history is to cease to be a Protestant.\"[96]\n\nI have not a shadow of doubt that these anti-Protestant epigrams are\nprofoundly true. But I have as little that, in the same sense, the\n\"Christianity of history is not\" Romanism; and that to be deeper in\nhistory is to cease to be a Romanist. The reasons which compel my\ndoubts about the compatibility of the Roman doctrine, or any other\nform of Catholicism, with history, arise out of exactly the same line\nof argument as that adopted by Dr. Newman in the famous essay which I\nhave just cited. If, with one hand, Dr. Newman has destroyed\nProtestantism, he has annihilated Romanism with the other; and the\ntotal result of his ambidextral efforts is to shake Christianity to\nits foundations. Nor was any one better aware that this must be the\ninevitable result of his arguments--if the world should refuse to\naccept Roman doctrines and Roman miracles--than the writer of Tract\n85.\n\nDr. Newman made his choice and passed over to the Roman Church half a\ncentury ago. Some of those who were essentially in harmony with his\nviews preceded, and many followed him. But many remained; and, as the\nquondam Puseyite and present Ritualistic party, they are continuing\nthat work of sapping and mining the Protestantism of the Anglican\nChurch which he and his friends so ably commenced. At the present\ntime, they have no little claim to be considered victorious all along\nthe line. I am old enough to recollect the small beginnings of the\nTractarian party; and I am amazed when I consider the present position\nof their heirs. Their little leaven has leavened if not the whole,\nyet a very large lump of the Anglican Church; which is now pretty much\nof a preparatory school for Papistry. So that it really behoves\nEnglishmen (who, as I have been informed by high authority, are all\nlegally, members of the State Church, if they profess to belong to no\nother sect) to wake up to what that powerful organization is about,\nand whither it is tending. On this point, the writings of Dr. Newman,\nwhile he still remained within the Anglican fold, are a vast store of\nthe best and the most authoritative information. His doctrines on\nEcclesiastical miracles and on Development are the corner-stones of\nthe Tractarian fabric. He believed that his arguments led either\nRomeward, or to what ecclesiastics call \"Infidelity,\" and I call\nAgnosticism. I believe that he was quite right in this conviction; but\nwhile he chooses the one alternative, I choose the other; as he\nrejects Protestantism on the ground of its incompatibility with\nhistory, so, _a fortiori_, I conceive that Romanism ought to be\nrejected; and that an impartial consideration of the evidence must\nrefuse the authority of Jesus to anything more than the Nazarenism of\nJames and Peter and John. And let it not be supposed that this is a\nmere \"infidel\" perversion of the facts. No one has more openly and\nclearly admitted the possibility that they may be fairly interpreted\nin this way than Dr. Newman. If, he says, there are texts which seem\nto show that Jesus contemplated the evangelisation of the heathen:\n\n     ... Did not the Apostles hear our Lord? and what was _their_\n     impression from what they heard? Is it not certain that the\n     Apostles did not gather this truth from His teaching? (Tract\n     85, p. 63).\n\n     He said, \"Preach the Gospel to every creature.\" These words\n     _need_ have only meant \"Bring all men to Christianity\n     through Judaism.\" Make them Jews, that they may enjoy\n     Christ's privileges, which are lodged in Judaism; teach them\n     those rites and ceremonies, circumcision and the like, which\n     hitherto have been dead ordinances, and now are living; and\n     so the Apostles seem to have understood them (_ibid_. p.\n     65).\n\nSo far as Nazarenism differentiated itself from contemporary orthodox\nJudaism, it seems to have tended towards a revival of the ethical and\nreligious spirit of the prophetic age, accompanied by the belief in\nJesus as the Messiah, and by various accretions which had grown round\nJudaism subsequently to the exile. To these belong the doctrines of\nthe Resurrection, of the Last Judgment, of Heaven and Hell; of the\nhierarchy of good angels; of Satan and the hierarchy of evil spirits.\nAnd there is very strong ground for believing that all these\ndoctrines, at least in the shapes in which they were held by the\npost-exilic Jews, were derived from Persian and Babylonian[97]\nsources, and are essentially of heathen origin.\n\nHow far Jesus positively sanctioned all these indrainings of\ncircumjacent Paganism into Judaism; how far any one has a right to\ndeclare, that the refusal to accept one or other of these doctrines,\nas ascertained verities, comes to the same thing as contradicting\nJesus, it appears to me not easy to say. But it is hardly less\ndifficult to conceive that he could have distinctly negatived any of\nthem; and, more especially, that demonology which has been accepted by\nthe Christian Churches, in every age and under all their mutual\nantagonisms. But, I repeat my conviction that, whether Jesus\nsanctioned the demonology of his time and nation or not, it is doomed.\nThe future of Christianity, as a dogmatic system and apart from the\nold Israelitish ethics which it has appropriated and developed, lies\nin the answer which mankind will eventually give to the question,\nwhether they are prepared to believe such stories as the Gadarene and\nthe pneumatological hypotheses which go with it, or not. My belief is\nthey will decline to do anything of the sort, whenever and wherever\ntheir minds have been disciplined by science. And that discipline\nmust, and will, at once follow and lead the footsteps of advancing\ncivilisation.\n\nThe preceding pages were written before I became acquainted with the\ncontents of the May number of the \"Nineteenth Century,\" wherein I\ndiscover many things which are decidedly not to my advantage. It would\nappear that \"evasion\" is my chief resource, \"incapacity for strict\nargument\" and \"rottenness of ratiocination\" my main mental\ncharacteristics, and that it is \"barely credible\" that a statement\nwhich I profess to make of my own knowledge is true. All which things\nI notice, merely to illustrate the great truth, forced on me by long\nexperience, that it is only from those who enjoy the blessing of a\nfirm hold of the Christian faith that such manifestations of meekness,\npatience, and charity are to be expected.\n\nI had imagined that no one who had read my preceding papers, could\nentertain a doubt as to my position in respect of the main issue, as\nit has been stated and restated by my opponent:\n\n     an Agnosticism which knows nothing of the relation of man to\n     God must not only refuse belief to our Lord's most undoubted\n     teaching, but must deny the reality of the spiritual\n     convictions in which He lived.[98]\n\nThat is said to be \"the simple question which is at issue between us,\"\nand the three testimonies to that teaching and those convictions\nselected are the Sermon on the Mount, the Lord's Prayer, and the Story\nof the Passion.\n\nMy answer, reduced to its briefest form, has been: In the first\nplace, the evidence is such that the exact nature of the teachings and\nthe convictions of Jesus is extremely uncertain; so that what\necclesiastics are pleased to call a denial of them may be nothing of\nthe kind. And, in the second place, if Jesus taught the demonological\nsystem involved in the Gadarene story--if a belief in that system\nformed a part of the spiritual convictions in which he lived and\ndied--then I, for my part, unhesitatingly refuse belief in that\nteaching, and deny the reality of those spiritual convictions. And I\ngo further and add, that, exactly in so far as it can be proved that\nJesus sanctioned the essentially pagan demonological theories current\namong the Jews of his age, exactly in so far, for me, will his\nauthority in any matter touching the spiritual world be weakened.\n\nWith respect to the first half of my answer, I have pointed out that\nthe Sermon on the Mount, as given in the first Gospel, is, in the\nopinion of the best critics, a \"mosaic work\" of materials derived from\ndifferent sources, and I do not understand that this statement is\nchallenged. The only other Gospel--the third--which contains something\nlike it, makes, not only the discourse, but the circumstances under\nwhich it was delivered, very different. Now, it is one thing to say\nthat there was something real at the bottom of the two discourses--which\nis quite possible; and another to affirm that we have any right to\nsay what that something was, or to fix upon any particular phrase and\ndeclare it to be a genuine utterance. Those who pursue theology as a\nscience, and bring to the study an adequate knowledge of the ways of\nancient historians, will find no difficulty in providing illustrations\nof my meaning. I may supply one which has come within range of my own\nlimited vision.\n\nIn Josephus's \"History of the Wars of the Jews\" (chap, xix.), that\nwriter reports a speech which he says Herod made at the opening of a\nwar with the Arabians. It is in the first person, and would naturally\nbe supposed by the reader to be intended for a true version of what\nHerod said. In the \"Antiquities,\" written some seventeen years later,\nthe same writer gives another report, also in the first person, of\nHerod's speech on the same occasion. This second oration is twice as\nlong as the first and, though the general tenor of the two speeches is\npretty much the same, there is hardly any verbal identity, and a good\ndeal of matter is introduced into the one, which is absent from the\nother. Josephus prides himself on his accuracy; people whose fathers\nmight have heard Herod's oration were his contemporaries; and yet his\nhistorical sense is so curiously undeveloped that he can, quite\ninnocently, perpetrate an obvious literary fabrication; for one of the\ntwo accounts must be incorrect. Now, if I am asked whether I believe\nthat Herod made some particular statement on this occasion; whether,\nfor example, he uttered the pious aphorism, \"Where God is, there is\nboth multitude and courage,\" which is given in the \"Antiquities,\" but\nnot in the \"Wars,\" I am compelled to say I do not know. One of the two\nreports must be erroneous, possibly both are: at any rate, I cannot\ntell how much of either is true. And, if some fervent admirer of the\nIdumean should build up a theory of Herod's piety upon Josephus's\nevidence that he propounded the aphorism, it is a \"mere evasion\" to\nsay, in reply, that the evidence that he did utter it is worthless?\n\nIt appears again that, adopting the tactics of Conachar when brought\nface to face with Hal o' the Wynd, I have been trying to get my\nsimple-minded adversary to follow me on a wild-goose chase through the\nearly history of Christianity, in the hope of escaping impending\ndefeat on the main issue. But I may be permitted to point out that\nthere is an alternative hypothesis which equally fits the facts; and\nthat, after all, there may have been method in the madness of my\nsupposed panic.\n\nFor suppose it to be established that Gentile Christianity was a\ntotally different thing from the Nazarenism of Jesus and his immediate\ndisciples; suppose it to be demonstrable that, as early as the sixth\ndecade of our era at least, there were violent divergencies of opinion\namong the followers of Jesus; suppose it to be hardly doubtful that\nthe Gospels and the Acts took their present shapes under the influence\nof those divergencies; suppose that their authors, and those through\nwhose hands they passed, had notions of historical veracity not more\neccentric than those which Josephus occasionally displays: surely the\nchances that the Gospels are altogether trustworthy records of the\nteachings of Jesus become very slender. And, since the whole of the\ncase of the other side is based on the supposition that they are\naccurate records (especially of speeches, about which ancient\nhistorians are so curiously loose), I really do venture to submit that\nthis part of my argument bears very seriously on the main issue; and,\nas ratiocination, is sound to the core.\n\nAgain, when I passed by the topic of the speeches of Jesus on the\nCross, it appears that I could have had no other motive than the\ndictates of my native evasiveness. An ecclesiastical dignitary may\nhave respectable reasons for declining a fencing match \"in sight of\nGethsemane and Calvary\"; but an ecclesiastical \"Infidel\"! Never. It is\nobviously impossible that in the belief that \"the greater includes the\nless,\" I, having declared the Gospel evidence in general, as to the\nsayings of Jesus, to be of questionable value, thought it needless to\nselect for illustration of my views, those particular instances which\nwere likely to be most offensive to persons of another way of\nthinking. But any supposition that may have been entertained that the\nold familiar tones of the ecclesiastical war-drum will tempt me to\nengage in such needless discussion had better be renounced. I shall do\nnothing of the kind. Let it suffice that I ask my readers to turn to\nthe twenty-third chapter of Luke (revised version), verse thirty-four,\nand he will find in the margin\n\n     Some ancient authorities omit: And Jesus said \"Father,\n     forgive them, for they know not what they do.\"\n\nSo that, even as late as the fourth century, there were ancient\nauthorities, indeed some of the most ancient and weightiest, who\neither did not know of this utterance, so often quoted as\ncharacteristic of Jesus, or did not believe it had been uttered.\n\nMany years ago, I received an anonymous letter, which abused me\nheartily for my want of moral courage in not speaking out. I thought\nthat one of the oddest charges an anonymous letter-writer could bring.\nBut I am not sure that the plentiful sowing of the pages of the\narticle with which I am dealing with accusations of evasion, may not\nseem odder to those who consider that the main strength of the answers\nwith which I have been favoured (in this review and elsewhere) is\ndevoted not to anything in the text of my first paper, but to a note\nwhich occurs at p. 212. In this I say:\n\n     Dr. Wace tells us: \"It may be asked how far we can rely on\n     the accounts we possess of our Lord's teaching on these\n     subjects.\" And he seems to think the question appropriately\n     answered by the assertion that it \"ought to be regarded as\n     settled by M. Renan's practical surrender of the adverse\n     case.\"\n\nI requested Dr. Wace to point out the passages of M. Renan's works in\nwhich, as he affirms, this \"practical surrender\" (not merely as to the\nage and authorship of the Gospels, be it observed, but as to their\nhistorical value) is made, and he has been so good as to do so. Now\nlet us consider the parts of Dr. Wace's citation from Renan which are\nrelevant to the issue:--\n\n     The author of this Gospel [Luke] is certainly the same as\n     the author of the Acts of the Apostles. Now the author of\n     the Acts seems to be a companion of St. Paul--a character\n     which accords completely with St. Luke. I know that more\n     than one objection may be opposed to this reasoning: but one\n     thing, at all events, is beyond doubt, namely, that the\n     author of the third Gospel and of the Acts is a man who\n     belonged to the second apostolic generation; and this\n     suffices for our purpose.\n\nThis is a curious \"practical surrender of the adverse case.\" M. Renan\nthinks that there is no doubt that the author of the third Gospel is\nthe author of the Acts--a conclusion in which I suppose critics\ngenerally agree. He goes on to remark that this person _seems_ to be a\ncompanion of St. Paul, and adds that Luke was a companion of St. Paul.\nThen, somewhat needlessly, M. Renan points out that there is more than\none objection to jumping, from such data as these, to the conclusion\nthat \"Luke\" is the writer of the third Gospel. And, finally, M. Renan\nis content to reduce that which is \"beyond doubt\" to the fact that the\nauthor of the two books is a man of the second apostolic generation.\nWell, it seems to me that I could agree with all that M. Renan\nconsiders \"beyond doubt\" here, without surrendering anything, either\n\"practically\" or theoretically.\n\nDr. Wace (\"Nineteenth Century,\" March, p. 363) states that he derives\nthe above citation from the preface to the 15th edition of the \"Vie de\nJesus.\" My copy of \"Les Evangiles,\" dated 1877, contains a list of\nRenan's \"Oeuvres Completes,\" at the head of which I find \"Vie de\nJesus,\" 15^e edition. It is, therefore, a later work than the edition\nof the \"Vie de Jesus\" which Dr. Wace quotes. Now \"Les Evangiles,\" as\nits name implies, treats fully of the questions respecting the date\nand authorship of the Gospels; and any one who desired, not merely to\nuse M. Renan's expressions for controversial purposes, but to give a\nfair account of his views in their full significance, would, I think,\nrefer to the later source.\n\nIf this course had been taken, Dr. Wace might have found some as\ndecided expressions of opinion, in favour of Luke's authorship of the\nthird Gospel, as he has discovered in \"The Apostles.\" I mention this\ncircumstance, because I desire to point out that, taking even the\nstrongest of Renan's statements, I am still at a loss to see how it\njustifies that large-sounding phrase, \"practical surrender of the\nadverse case.\" For, on p. 438 of \"Les Evangiles,\" Renan speaks of the\nway in which Luke's \"excellent intentions\" have led him to torture\nhistory in the Acts; he declares Luke to be the founder of that\n\"eternal fiction which is called ecclesiastical history\"; and, on the\npreceding page, he talks of the \"myth\" of the Ascension--with its\n\"_mise en scene voulue_.\" At p. 435, I find \"Luc, ou l'auteur quel\nqu'il soit du troisieme Evangile\"; at p. 280, the accounts of the\nPassion, the death and the resurrection of Jesus, are said to be \"peu\nhistoriques\"; at p. 283, \"La valeur historique du troisieme Evangile\nest surement moindre que celles des deux premiers.\" A Pyrrhic sort of\nvictory for orthodoxy, this \"surrender\"! And, all the while, the\nscientific student of theology knows that, the more reason there may\nbe to believe that Luke was the companion of Paul, the more doubtful\nbecomes his credibility if he really wrote the Acts. For, in that\ncase, he could not fail to have been acquainted with Paul's account of\nthe Jerusalem conference and he must have consciously misrepresented\nit.\n\nWe may next turn to the essential part of Dr. Wace's citation\n(\"Nineteenth Century,\" p. 365) touching the first Gospel:--\n\n     St. Matthew evidently deserves peculiar confidence for the\n     discourses. Here are the \"oracles\"--the very notes taken\n     while the memory of the instruction of Jesus was living and\n     definite.\n\nM. Renan here expresses the very general opinion as to the existence\nof a collection of \"logia,\" having a different origin from the text in\nwhich they are embedded, in Matthew. \"Notes\" are somewhat suggestive\nof a shorthand writer, but the suggestion is unintentional, for M.\nRenan assumes that these \"notes\" were taken, not at the time of the\ndelivery of the \"logia\" but subsequently, while (as he assumes) the\nmemory of them was living and definite; so that, in this very\ncitation, M. Renan leaves open the question of the general historical\nvalue of the first Gospel; while it is obvious that the accuracy of\n\"Notes\" taken, not at the time of delivery, but from memory, is a\nmatter about which more than one opinion may be fairly held. Moreover,\nRenan expressly calls attention to the difficulty of distinguishing\nthe authentic \"logia\" from later additions of the same kind (\"Les\nEvangiles,\" p. 201). The fact is, there is no contradiction here to\nthat opinion about the first Gospel which is expressed in \"Les\nEvangiles\" (p. 175).\n\n     The text of the so-called Matthew supposes the pre-existence\n     of that of Mark, and does little more than complete it. He\n     completes it in two fashions--first, by the insertion of\n     those long discourses which gave their chief value to the\n     Hebrew Gospels; then by adding traditions of a more modern\n     formation, results of successive developments of the legend,\n     and to which the Christian consciousness already attached\n     infinite value.\n\nM. Renan goes on to suggest that besides \"Mark,\" \"pseudo-Matthew\"\nused an Aramaic version of the Gospel, originally set forth in that\ndialect. Finally, as to the second Gospel (\"Nineteenth Century,\" p.\n365):--\n\n     He [Mark] is full of minute observations, proceeding, beyond\n     doubt, from an eye-witness. There is nothing to conflict\n     with the supposition that this eye-witness ... was the\n     Apostle Peter himself, as Papias has it.\n\nLet us consider this citation by the light of \"Les Evangiles\":--\n\n     This work, although composed after the death of Peter, was,\n     in a sense, the work of Peter; it represents the way in\n     which Peter was accustomed to relate the life of Jesus (p.\n     116).\n\nM. Renan goes on to say that, as an historical document, the Gospel of\nMark has a great superiority (p. 116); but Mark has a motive for\nomitting the discourses, and he attaches a \"puerile importance\" to\nmiracles (p. 117). The Gospel of Mark is less a legend, than a\nbiography written with credulity (p. 118). It would be rash to say\nthat Mark has not been interpolated and retouched (p. 120).\n\nIf any one thinks that I have not been warranted in drawing a sharp\ndistinction between \"scientific theologians\" and \"counsels for\ncreeds\"; or that my warning against the too ready acceptance of\ncertain declarations as to the state of biblical criticism was\nneedless; or that my anxiety as to the sense of the word \"practical\"\nwas superfluous; let him compare the statement that M. Renan has made\na \"practical surrender of the adverse case\" with the facts just set\nforth. For what is the adverse case? The question, as Dr. Wace puts\nit, is, \"It may be asked how far can we rely on the accounts we\npossess of our Lord's teaching on these subjects.\" It will be obvious\nthat M. Renan's statements amount to an adverse answer--to a\n\"practical\" denial that any great reliance can be placed on these\naccounts. He does not believe that Matthew, the apostle, wrote the\nfirst Gospel; he does not profess to know who is responsible for the\ncollection of \"logia,\" or how many of them are authentic; though he\ncalls the second Gospel the most historical, he points out that it is\nwritten with credulity, and may have been interpolated and retouched;\nand, as to the author, \"quel qu'il soit,\" of the third Gospel, who is\nto \"rely on the accounts\" of a writer, who deserves the cavalier\ntreatment which \"Luke\" meets with at M. Renan's hands.\n\nI repeat what I have already more than once said, that the question of\nthe age and the authorship of the Gospels has not, in my judgment, the\nimportance which is so commonly assigned to it; for the simple reason\nthat the reports, even of eye-witnesses, would not suffice to justify\nbelief in a large and essential part of their contents; on the\ncontrary, these reports would discredit the witnesses. The Gadarene\nmiracle, for example, is so extremely improbable, that the fact of its\nbeing reported by three, even independent, authorities could not\njustify belief in it, unless we had the clearest evidence as to their\ncapacity as observers and as interpreters of their observations. But\nit is evident that the three authorities are not independent; that\nthey have simply adopted a legend, of which there were two versions;\nand instead of their proving its truth, it suggests their\nsuperstitious credulity: so that if \"Matthew,\" \"Mark,\" and \"Luke\" are\nreally responsible for the Gospels, it is not the better for the\nGadarene story, but the worse for them.\n\nA wonderful amount of controversial capital has been made out of my\nassertion in the note to which I have referred, as an _obiter dictum_\nof no consequence to my argument, that if Renan's work[99] were\nnon-extant, the main results of biblical criticism, as set forth in\nthe works of Strauss, Baur, Reuss, and Volkmar, for example, would not\nbe sensibly affected. I thought I had explained it satisfactorily\nalready, but it seems that my explanation has only exhibited still\nmore of my native perversity, so I ask for one more chance.\n\nIn the course of the historical development of any branch of science,\nwhat is universally observed is this: that the men who make epochs,\nand are the real architects of the fabric of exact knowledge, are\nthose who introduce fruitful ideas or methods. As a rule, the man who\ndoes this pushes his idea, or his method, too far; or, if he does not,\nhis school is sure to do so; and those who follow have to reduce his\nwork to its proper value, and assign it its place in the whole. Not\nunfrequently, they, in their turn, overdo the critical process, and,\nin trying to eliminate error, throw away truth.\n\nThus, as I said, Linnaeus, Buffon, Cuvier, Lamarck, really \"set forth\nthe results\" of a developing science, although they often heartily\ncontradict one another. Notwithstanding this circumstance, modern\nclassificatory method and nomenclature have largely grown out of the\nwork of Linnaeus; the modern conception of biology, as a science, and\nof its relation to climatology, geography, and geology, are, as\nlargely, rooted in the results of the labours of Buffon; comparative\nanatomy and palaeontology owe a vast debt to Cuvier's results; while\ninvertebrate zoology and the revival of the idea of evolution are\nintimately dependent on the results of the work of Lamarck. In other\nwords, the main results of biology up to the early years of this\ncentury are to be found in, or spring out of, the works of these men.\n\nSo, if I mistake not, Strauss, if he did not originate the idea of\ntaking the mythopoeic faculty into account in the development of the\nGospel narratives, and though he may have exaggerated the influence of\nthat faculty, obliged scientific theology, hereafter, to take that\nelement into serious consideration; so Baur, in giving prominence to\nthe cardinal fact of the divergence of the Nazarene and Pauline\ntendencies in the primitive Church; so Reuss, in setting a marvellous\nexample of the cool and dispassionate application of the principles of\nscientific criticism over the whole field of Scripture; so Volkmar, in\nhis clear and forcible statement of the Nazarene limitations of Jesus,\ncontributed results of permanent value in scientific theology. I took\nthese names as they occurred to me. Undoubtedly, I might have\nadvantageously added to them; perhaps, I might have made a better\nselection. But it really is absurd to try to make out that I did not\nknow that these writers widely disagree; and I believe that no\nscientific theologian will deny that, in principle, what I have said\nis perfectly correct. Ecclesiastical advocates, of course, cannot be\nexpected to take this view of the matter. To them, these mere seekers\nafter truth, in so far as their results are unfavourable to the creed\nthe clerics have to support, are more or less \"infidels,\" or favourers\nof \"infidelity\"; and the only thing they care to see, or probably can\nsee, is the fact that, in a great many matters, the truth-seekers\ndiffer from one another, and therefore can easily be exhibited to the\npublic, as if they did nothing else; as if any one who referred to\ntheir having, each and all, contributed his share to the results of\ntheological science, was merely showing his ignorance; and as if a\ncharge of inconsistency could be based on the fact that he himself\noften disagrees with what they say. I have never lent a shadow of\nfoundation to the assumption that I am a follower of either Strauss,\nor Baur, or Reuss, or Volkmar, or Renan; my debts to these eminent\nmen--so far my superiors in theological knowledge--is, indeed, great;\nyet it is not for their opinions, but for those I have been able to\nform for myself, by their help.\n\nIn _Agnosticism: a Rejoinder_ (p. 266), I have referred to the\ndifficulties under which those professors of the science of theology,\nwhose tenure of their posts depends on the results of their\ninvestigations, must labour; and, in a note, I add--\n\n     Imagine that all our chairs of Astronomy had been founded in\n     the fourteenth century, and that their incumbents were bound\n     to sign Ptolemaic articles. In that case, with every respect\n     for the efforts of persons thus hampered to attain and\n     expound the truth, I think men of common sense would go\n     elsewhere to learn astronomy.\n\nI did not write this paragraph without a knowledge that its sense\nwould be open to the kind of perversion which it has suffered; but, if\nthat was clear, the necessity for the statement was still clearer. It\nis my deliberate opinion: I reiterate it; and I say that, in my\njudgment, it is extremely inexpedient that any subject which calls\nitself a science should be intrusted to teachers who are debarred from\nfreely following out scientific methods to their legitimate\nconclusions, whatever those conclusions may be. If I may borrow a\nphrase paraded at the Church Congress, I think it \"ought to be\nunpleasant\" for any man of science to find himself in the position of\nsuch a teacher.\n\nHuman nature is not altered by seating it in a professorial chair,\neven of theology. I have very little doubt that if, in the year 1859,\nthe tenure of my office had depended upon my adherence to the\ndoctrines of Cuvier, the objections to them set forth in the \"Origin\nof Species\" would have had a halo of gravity about them that, being\nfree to teach what I pleased, I failed to discover. And, in making\nthat statement, it does not appear to me that I am confessing that I\nshould have been debarred by \"selfish interests\" from making candid\ninquiry, or that I should have been biassed by \"sordid motives.\" I\nhope that even such a fragment of moral sense as may remain in an\necclesiastical \"infidel\" might have got me through the difficulty; but\nit would be unworthy to deny, or disguise, the fact that a very\nserious difficulty must have been created for me by the nature of my\ntenure. And let it be observed that the temptation, in my case, would\nhave been far slighter than in that of a professor of theology;\nwhatever biological doctrine I had repudiated, nobody I cared for\nwould have thought the worse of me for so doing. No scientific\njournals would have howled me down, as the religious newspapers howled\ndown my too honest friend, the late Bishop of Natal; nor would my\ncolleagues of the Royal Society have turned their backs upon me, as\nhis episcopal colleagues boycotted him.\n\nI say these facts are obvious, and that it is wholesome and needful\nthat they should be stated. It is in the interests of theology, if it\nbe a science, and it is in the interests of those teachers of theology\nwho desire to be something better than counsel for creeds, that it\nshould be taken to heart. The seeker after theological truth and that\nonly, will no more suppose that I have insulted him, than the prisoner\nwho works in fetters will try to pick a quarrel with me, if I suggest\nthat he would get on better if the fetters were knocked off: unless\nindeed, as it is said does happen in the course of long captivities,\nthat the victim at length ceases to feel the weight of his chains, or\neven takes to hugging them, as if they were honourable ornaments.[100]\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n     [81] The substance of a paragraph which precedes this has\n          been transferred to the Prologue.\n\n     [82] I confess that, long ago, I once or twice made this\n          mistake; even to the waste of a capital 'U.' 1893.\n\n     [83] \"Let us maintain, before we have proved. This seeming\n          paradox is the secret of happiness\" (Dr. Newman: Tract\n          85, p. 85).\n\n     [84] Dr. Newman, _Essay on Development_, p. 357.\n\n     [85] It is by no means to be assumed that \"spiritual\" and\n          \"corporeal\" are exact equivalents of \"immaterial\" and\n          \"material\" in the minds of ancient speculators on\n          these topics. The \"spiritual body\" of the risen dead\n          (1 Cor. xv.) is not the \"natural\" \"flesh and blood\"\n          body. Paul does not teach the resurrection of the body\n          in the ordinary sense of the word \"body\"; a fact,\n          often overlooked, but pregnant with many consequences.\n\n     [86] Tertullian (_Apolog. Adv. Gentes_, cap. xxiii) thus\n          challenges the Roman authorities: let them bring a\n          possessed person into the presence of a Christian\n          before their tribunal, and if the demon does not\n          confess himself to be such, on the order of the\n          Christian, let the Christian be executed out of hand.\n\n     [87] See the expression of orthodox opinion upon the\n          \"accommodation\" subterfuge already cited above, p. 217.\n\n     [88] I quote the first edition (1843). A second edition\n          appeared in 1870. Tract 85 of the _Tracts for the\n          Times_ should be read with this _Essay_. If I were\n          called upon to compile a Primer of \"Infidelity,\" I\n          think I should save myself trouble by making a\n          selection from these works, and from the _Essay on\n          Development_ by the same author.\n\n     [89] Yet, when it suits his purpose, as in the Introduction\n          to the _Essay on Development_, Dr. Newman can demand\n          strict evidence in religious questions as sharply as\n          any \"infidel author;\" and he can even profess to yield\n          to its force (_Essay on Miracles_, 1870; note, p. 391).\n\n     [90] Compare Tract 85, p. 110; \"I am persuaded that were men\n          but consistent who oppose the Church doctrines as being\n          unscriptural, they would vindicate the Jews for\n          rejecting the Gospel.\"\n\n     [91] According to Dr. Newman, \"This prayer [that of Bishop\n          Alexander, who begged God to 'take Arius away'] is said\n          to have been offered about 3 P.M. on the Saturday; that\n          same evening Arius was in the great square of\n          Constantine, when he was suddenly seized with\n          indisposition\" (p. clxx). The \"infidel\" Gibbon seems to\n          have dared to suggest that \"an option between poison\n          and miracle\" is presented by this case; and it must be\n          admitted, that, if the Bishop had been within the reach\n          of a modern police magistrate, things might have gone\n          hardly with him. Modern \"Infidels,\" possessed of a\n          slight knowledge of chemistry, are not unlikely, with\n          no less audacity, to suggest an \"option between\n          fire-damp and miracle\" in seeking for the cause of the\n          fiery outburst at Jerusalem.\n\n     [92] A writer in a spiritualist journal takes me roundly\n          to task for venturing to doubt the historical and\n          literal truth of the Gadarene story. The following\n          passage in his letter is worth quotation: \"Now to the\n          materialistic and scientific mind, to the uninitiated\n          in spiritual verities, certainly this story of the\n          Gadarene or Gergesene swine presents insurmountable\n          difficulties; it seems grotesque and nonsensical. To\n          the experienced, trained, and cultivated Spiritualist\n          this miracle is, as I am prepared to show, one of the\n          most instructive, the most profoundly useful, and the\n          most beneficent which Jesus ever wrought in the whole\n          course of His pilgrimage of redemption on earth.\" Just\n          so. And the first page of this same journal presents\n          the following advertisement, among others of the same\n          kidney:\n\n          \"To WEALTHY SPIRITUALISTS--A Lady Medium of tried power\n          wishes to meet with an elderly gentleman who would be\n          willing to give her a comfortable home and maintenance\n          in Exchange for her Spiritualistic services, as her\n          guides consider her health is too delicate for public\n          sittings: London preferred.--Address 'Mary,' Office of\n          _Light_.\"\n\n          Are we going back to the days of the Judges, when\n          wealthy Micah set up his private ephod, teraphim, and\n          Levite?\n\n     [93] Consider Tertullian's \"sister\" (\"hodie apud nos\"),\n          who conversed with angels, saw and heard mysteries,\n          knew men's thoughts, and prescribed medicine for their\n          bodies (_De Anima_, cap. 9). Tertullian tells us that\n          this woman saw the soul as corporeal, and described its\n          colour and shape. The \"infidel\" will probably be unable\n          to refrain from insulting the memory of the ecstatic\n          saint by the remark, that Tertullian's known views\n          about the corporeality of the soul may have had\n          something to do with the remarkable perceptive powers\n          of the Montanist medium, in whose revelations of the\n          spiritual world he took such profound interest.\n\n     [94] See the New York _World_ for Sunday, 21st October,\n          1888; and the _Report of the Seybert Commission_,\n          Philadelphia, 1887.\n\n     [95] Dr. Newman's observation that the miraculous\n          multiplication of the pieces of the true cross (with\n          which \"the whole world is filled,\" according to Cyril\n          of Jerusalem; and of which some say there are enough\n          extant to build a man-of-war) is no more wonderful\n          than that of the loaves and fishes, is one that I do\n          not see my way to contradict. See _Essay on Miracles_.\n          2d ed. p. 163.\n\n     [96] _An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine_,\n          by J.H. Newman, D.D., pp. 7 and 8. (1878.)\n\n     [97] Dr. Newman faces this question with his customary\n          ability. \"Now, I own, I am not at all solicitous to\n          deny that this doctrine of an apostate Angel and his\n          hosts was gained from Babylon: it might still be\n          Divine nevertheless. God who made the prophet's ass\n          speak, and thereby instructed the prophet, might\n          instruct His Church by means of heathen Babylon\"\n          (Tract 85, p. 83). There seems to be no end to the\n          apologetic burden that Balaam's ass may carry.\n\n     [98] _Nineteenth Century_, May 1889 (p. 701).\n\n     [99] I trust it may not be supposed that I undervalue M.\n          Renan's labours, or intended to speak slightingly of\n          them.\n\n    [100] To-day's _Times_ contains a report of a remarkable\n          speech by Prince Bismarck, in which he tells the\n          Reichstag that he has long given up investing in\n          foreign stock, lest so doing should mislead his\n          judgment in his transactions with foreign states. Does\n          this declaration prove that the Chancellor accuses\n          himself of being \"sordid\" and \"selfish\"; or does it not\n          rather show that, even in dealing with himself, he\n          remains the man of realities?\n\n\n\n\nX: THE KEEPERS OF THE HERD OF SWINE\n\n[1890]\n\n\nI had fondly hoped that Mr. Gladstone and I had come to an end of\ndisputation, and that the hatchet of war was finally superseded by the\ncalumet, which, as Mr. Gladstone, I believe, objects to tobacco, I was\nquite willing to smoke for both. But I have had, once again, to\ndiscover that the adage that whoso seeks peace will ensue it, is a\nsomewhat hasty generalisation. The renowned warrior with whom it is my\nmisfortune to be opposed in most things has dug up the axe and is on\nthe war-path once more. The weapon has been wielded with all the\ndexterity which long practice has conferred on a past master in craft,\nwhether of wood or state. And I have reason to believe that the\nsimpler sort of the great tribe which he heads, imagine that my scalp\nis already on its way to adorn their big chief's wigwam. I am glad\ntherefore to be able to relieve any anxieties which my friends may\nentertain without delay. I assure them that my skull retains its\nnormal covering, and that though, naturally, I may have felt alarmed,\nnothing serious has happened. My doughty adversary has merely\nperformed a war dance, and his blows have for the most part cut the\nair. I regret to add, however, that by misadventure, and I am afraid I\nmust say carelessness, he has inflicted one or two severe contusions\non himself.\n\nWhen the noise of approaching battle roused me from the dreams of\npeace which occupy my retirement, I was glad to observe (since I must\nfight) that the campaign was to be opened upon a new field. When the\ncontest raged over the Pentateuchal myth of the creation, Mr.\nGladstone's manifest want of acquaintance with the facts and\nprinciples involved in the discussion, no less than with the best\nliterature on his own side of the subject, gave me the uncomfortable\nfeeling that I had my adversary at a disadvantage. The sun of science,\nat my back, was in his eyes. But, on the present occasion, we are\nhappily on an equality. History and Biblical criticism are as much, or\nas little, my vocation as they are that of Mr. Gladstone; the blinding\nfrom too much light, or the blindness from too little, may be presumed\nto be equally shared by both of us.\n\nMr. Gladstone takes up his new position in the country of the\nGadarenes. His strategic sense justly leads him to see that the\nauthority of the teachings of the synoptic Gospels, touching the\nnature of the spiritual world, turns upon the acceptance, or the\nrejection, of the Gadarene and other like stories. As we accept, or\nrepudiate, such histories as that of the possessed pigs, so shall we\naccept, or reject, the witness of the synoptics to such miraculous\ninterventions.\n\nIt is exactly because these stories constitute the key-stone of the\northodox arch, that I originally drew attention to them; and, in spite\nof my longing for peace, I am truly obliged to Mr. Gladstone for\ncompelling me to place my case before the public once more. It may be\nthought that this is a work of supererogation by those who are aware\nthat my essay is the subject of attack in a work so largely circulated\nas the \"Impregnable Rock of Holy Scripture\"; and who may possibly, in\ntheir simplicity, assume that it must be truthfully set forth in that\nwork. But the warmest admirers of Mr. Gladstone will hardly be\nprepared to maintain that mathematical accuracy in stating the\nopinions of an opponent is the most prominent feature of his\ncontroversial method. And what follows will show that, in the present\ncase, the desire to be fair and accurate, the existence of which I am\nbound to assume, has not borne as much fruit as might have been\nexpected.\n\nIn referring to the statement of the narrators, that the herd of\nswine perished in consequence of the entrance into them of the demons\nby the permission, or order, of Jesus of Nazareth, I said:\n\n\"Everything that I know of law and justice convinces me that the\nwanton destruction of other people's property is a misdemeanour of\nevil example\" (\"Nineteenth Century,\" February, 1889, p. 172).\n\nMr. Gladstone has not found it convenient to cite this passage; and,\nin view of various considerations, I dare not assume that he would\nassent to it, without sundry subtle modifications which, for me, might\npossibly rob it of its argumentative value. But, until the proposition\nis seriously controverted, I shall assume it to be true, and content\nmyself with warning the reader that neither he nor I have any grounds\nfor assuming Mr. Gladstone's concurrence. With this caution, I proceed\nto remark that I think it may be granted that the people whose herd of\n2000 swine (more or fewer) was suddenly destroyed suffered great loss\nand damage. And it is quite certain that the narrators of the Gadarene\nstory do not, in any way, refer to the point of morality and legality\nthus raised; as I said, they show no inkling of the moral and legal\ndifficulties which arise.\n\nSuch being the facts of the case, I submit that for those who admit\nthe principle laid down, the conclusion which I have drawn necessarily\nfollows; though I repeat that, since Mr. Gladstone does not\nexplicitly admit the principle, I am far from suggesting that he is\nbound by its logical consequences. However, I distinctly reiterate the\nopinion that any one who acted in the way described in the story\nwould, in my judgment, be guilty of \"a misdemeanour of evil example.\"\nAbout that point I desire to leave no ambiguity whatever; and it\nfollows that, if I believed the story, I should have no hesitation in\napplying this judgment to the chief actor in it.\n\nBut, if any one will do me the favour to turn to the paper in which\nthese passages occur, he will find that a considerable part of it is\ndevoted to the exposure of the familiar trick of the \"counsel for\ncreeds,\" who, when they wish to profit by the easily stirred _odium\ntheologicum_, are careful to confuse disbelief in a narrative of a\nman's act, or disapproval of the acts as narrated, with disbelieving\nand vilipending the man himself. If I say that \"according to\nparagraphs in several newspapers, my valued Separatist friend A.B. has\nhoughed a lot of cattle, which he considered to be unlawfully in the\npossession of an Irish land-grabber; that, in my opinion, any such act\nis a misdemeanour of evil example; but, that I utterly disbelieve the\nwhole story and have no doubt that it is a mere fabrication:\" it\nreally appears to me that, if any one charges me with calling A.B. an\nimmoral misdemeanant I should be justified in using very strong\nlanguage respecting either his sanity or his veracity. And, if an\nanalogous charge has been brought in reference to the Gadarene story,\nthere is certainly no excuse producible, on account of any lack of\nplain speech on my part. Surely no language can be more explicit than\nthat which follows:\n\n\"I can discern no escape from this dilemma; either Jesus said what he\nis reported to have said, or he did not. In the former case, it is\ninevitable that his authority on matters connected with the 'unseen\nworld' should be roughly shaken; in the latter, the blow falls upon\nthe authority of the synoptic Gospels\" (p. 173). \"The choice then lies\nbetween discrediting those who compiled the Gospel biographies and\ndisbelieving the Master, whom they, simple souls, thought to honour by\npreserving such traditions of the exercise of his authority over\nSatan's invisible world\" (p. 174). And I leave no shadow of doubt as\nto my own choice: \"After what has been said, I do not think that any\nsensible man, unless he happen to be angry, will accuse me of\n'contradicting the Lord and his Apostles' if I reiterate my total\ndisbelief in the whole Gadarene story\" (p. 178).\n\nI am afraid, therefore, that Mr. Gladstone must have been exceedingly\nangry when he committed himself to such a statement as follows:\n\n     So, then, after eighteen centuries of worship offered to our\n     Lord by the most cultivated, the most developed, and the\n     most progressive portion of the human race, it has been\n     reserved to a scientific inquirer to discover that He was no\n     better than a law-breaker and an evil-doer.... How, in such\n     a matter, came the honours of originality to be reserved to\n     our time and to Professor Huxley? (Pp. 269, 270.)\n\nTruly, the hatchet is hardly a weapon of precision, but would seem to\nhave rather more the character of the boomerang, which returns to\ndamage the reckless thrower. Doubtless such incidents are somewhat\nludicrous. But they have a very serious side; and, if I rated the\nopinion of those who blindly follow Mr. Gladstone's leading, but not\nlight, in these matters, much higher than the great Duke of\nWellington's famous standard of minimum value, I think I might fairly\nbeg them to reflect upon the general bearings of this particular\nexample of his controversial method. I imagine it can hardly commend\nitself to their cool judgment.\n\nAfter this tragi-comical ending to what an old historian calls a\n\"robustious and rough coming on\"; and after some praises of the\nprovisions of the Mosaic law in the matter of not eating pork--in\nwhich, as pork disagrees with me and for some other reasons, I am much\ndisposed to concur, though I do not see what they have to do with the\nmatter in hand--comes the serious onslaught.\n\n     Mr. Huxley, exercising his rapid judgment on the text, does\n     not appear to have encumbered himself with the labour of\n     inquiring what anybody else had known or said about it. He\n     has thus missed a point which might have been set up in\n     support of his accusation against our Lord. (P. 273.)\n\nUnhappily for my conduct, I have been much exercised in controversy\nduring the past thirty years; and the only compensation for the loss\nof time and the trials of temper which it has inflicted upon me, is\nthat I have come to regard it as a branch of the fine arts, and to\ntake an impartial and aesthetic interest in the way in which it is\nconducted, even by those whose efforts are directed against myself.\nNow, from the purely artistic point of view (which, as we are all\nbeing told, has nothing to do with morals), I consider it an axiom,\nthat one should never appear to doubt that the other side has\nperformed the elementary duty of acquiring proper elementary\ninformation, unless there is demonstrative evidence to the contrary.\nAnd I think, though I admit that this may be a purely subjective\nappreciation, that (unless you are quite certain) there is a \"want of\nfinish,\" as a great master of disputation once put it, about the\nsuggestion that your opponent has missed a point on his own side.\nBecause it may happen that he has not missed it at all, but only\nthought it unworthy of serious notice. And if he proves that, the\nsuggestion looks foolish.\n\nMerely noting the careful repetition of a charge, the absurdity of\nwhich has been sufficiently exposed above, I now ask my readers to\naccompany me on a little voyage of discovery in search of the side on\nwhich the rapid judgment and the ignorance of the literature of the\nsubject lie. I think I may promise them very little trouble, and a\ngood deal of entertainment.\n\nMr. Gladstone is of opinion that the Gadarene swinefolk were \"Hebrews\nbound by the Mosaic law\" (p. 274); and he conceives that it has not\noccurred to me to learn what may be said in favour of and against this\nview. He tells us that\n\n     Some commentators have alleged the authority of Josephus for\n     stating that Gadara was a city of Greeks rather than of\n     Jews, from whence it might be inferred that to keep swine\n     was innocent and lawful. (P. 273.)\n\nMr. Gladstone then goes on to inform his readers that in his\npainstaking search after truth he has submitted to the labour of\npersonally examining the writings of Josephus. Moreover, in a note, he\npositively exhibits an acquaintance, in addition, with the works of\nBishop Wordsworth and of Archbishop Trench; and even shows that he has\nread Hudson's commentary on Josephus. And yet people say that our\nBiblical critics do not equal the Germans in research! But Mr.\nGladstone's citation of Cuvier and Sir John Herschel about the\nCreation myth, and his ignorance of all the best modern writings on\nhis own side, produced a great impression on my mind. I have had the\naudacity to suspect that his acquaintance with what has been done in\nBiblical history might stand at no higher level than his information\nabout the natural sciences. However unwillingly, I have felt bound to\nconsider the possibility that Mr. Gladstone's labours in this matter\nmay have carried him no further than Josephus and the worthy, but\nsomewhat antique, episcopal and other authorities to whom he refers;\nthat even his reading of Josephus may have been of the most cursory\nnature, directed not to the understanding of his author, but to the\ndiscovery of useful controversial matter; and that, in view of the not\ninconsiderable misrepresentation of my statements to which I have\ndrawn attention, it might be that Mr. Gladstone's exposition of the\nevidence of Josephus was not more trustworthy. I proceed to show that\nmy previsions have been fully justified. I doubt if controversial\nliterature contains anything more _piquant_ than the story I have to\nunfold.\n\nThat I should be reproved for rapidity of judgment is very just;\nhowever quaint the situation of Mr. Gladstone, as the reprover, may\nseem to people blessed with a sense of humour. But it is a quality,\nthe defects of which have been painfully obvious to me all my life;\nand I try to keep my Pegasus--at best, a poor Shetland variety of that\nspecies of quadruped--at a respectable jog-trot, by loading him\nheavily with bales of reading. Those who took the trouble to study my\npaper in good faith and not for mere controversial purposes, have a\nright to know, that something more than a hasty glimpse of two or\nthree passages of Josephus (even with as many episcopal works thrown\nin) lay at the back of the few paragraphs I devoted to the Gadarene\nstory. I proceed to set forth, as briefly as I can, some results of\nthat preparatory work. My artistic principles do not permit me, at\npresent, to express a doubt that Mr. Gladstone was acquainted with the\nfacts I am about to mention when he undertook to write. But, if he did\nknow them, then both what he has said and what he has not said, his\nassertions and his omissions alike, will require a paragraph to\nthemselves.\n\nThe common consent of the synoptic Gospels affirms that the miraculous\ntransference of devils from a man, or men, to sundry pigs, took place\nsomewhere on the eastern shore of the Lake of Tiberias; \"on the other\nside of the sea over against Galilee,\" the western shore being,\nwithout doubt, included in the latter province. But there is no such\nconcord when we come to the name of the part of the eastern shore, on\nwhich, according to the story, Jesus and his disciples landed. In the\nrevised version, Matthew calls it the \"country of the Gadarenes:\" Luke\nand Mark have \"Gerasenes.\" In sundry very ancient manuscripts\n\"Gergesenes\" occurs.\n\nThe existence of any place called Gergesa, however, is declared by the\nweightiest authorities whom I have consulted to be very questionable;\nand no such town is mentioned in the list of the cities of the\nDecapolis, in the territory of which (as it would seem from Mark v.\n20) the transaction was supposed to take place. About Gerasa, on the\nother hand, there hangs no such doubt. It was a large and important\nmember of the group of the Decapolitan cities. But Gerasa is more than\nthirty miles distant from the nearest part of the Lake of Tiberias,\nwhile the city mentioned in the narrative could not have been very far\noff the scene of the event. However, as Gerasa was a very important\nHellenic city, not much more than a score of miles from Gadara, it is\neasily imaginable that a locality which was part of Decapolitan\nterritory may have been spoken of as belonging to one of the two\ncities, when it really appertained to the other. After weighing all\nthe arguments, no doubt remains on my mind that \"Gadarene\" is the\nproper reading. At the period under consideration, Gadara appears to\nhave been a good-sized fortified town, about two miles in\ncircumference. It was a place of considerable strategic importance,\ninasmuch as it lay on a high ridge at the point of intersection of the\nroads from Tiberias, Scythopolis, Damascus, and Gerasa. Three miles\nnorth from it, where the Tiberias road descended into the valley of\nthe Hieromices, lay the famous hot springs and the fashionable baths\nof Amatha. On the north-east side, the remains of the extensive\nnecropolis of Gadara are still to be seen. Innumerable sepulchral\nchambers are excavated in the limestone cliffs, and many of them still\ncontain sarcophaguses of basalt; while not a few are converted into\ndwellings by the inhabitants of the present village of Um Keis. The\ndistance of Gadara from the south-eastern shore of the Lake of\nTiberias is less than seven miles. The nearest of the other cities of\nthe Decapolis, to the north, is Hippos, which also lay some seven\nmiles off, in the south-eastern corner of the shore of the lake. In\naccordance with the ancient Hellenic practice, that each city should\nbe surrounded by a certain amount of territory amenable to its\njurisdiction,[101] and on other grounds, it may be taken for certain\nthat the intermediate country was divided between Gadara and Hippos;\nand that the citizens of Gadara had free access to a port on the lake.\nHence the title of \"country of the Gadarenes\" applied to the locality\nof the porcine catastrophe becomes easily intelligible. The swine may\nwell be imagined to have been feeding (as they do now in the adjacent\nregion) on the hillsides, which slope somewhat steeply down to the\nlake from the northern boundary wall of the valley of the Hieromices\n(_Nahr Yarmuk_), about half-way between the city and the shore, and\ndoubtless lay well within the territory of the _polis_ of Gadara.\n\nThe proof that Gadara was, to all intents and purposes, a Gentile, and\nnot a Jewish, city is complete. The date and the occasion of its\nfoundation are unknown; but it certainly existed in the third century\nB.C. Antiochus the Great annexed it to his dominions in B.C. 198.\nAfter this, during the brief revival of Jewish autonomy, Alexander\nJannaeus took it; and for the first time, so far as the records go, it\nfell under Jewish rule.[102] From this it was rescued by Pompey (B.C.\n63), who rebuilt the city and incorporated it with the province of\nSyria. In gratitude to the Romans for the dissolution of a hated\nunion, the Gadarenes adopted the Pompeian era of their coinage. Gadara\nwas a commercial centre of some importance, and therefore, it may be\nassumed, Jews settled in it, as they settled in almost all\nconsiderable Gentile cities. But a wholly mistaken estimate of the\nmagnitude of the Jewish colony has been based upon the notion that\nGabinius, proconsul of Syria in 57-55 B.C., seated one of the five\nsanhedrins in Gadara. Schuerer has pointed out that what he really did\nwas to lodge one of them in Gadara, far away on the other side of the\nJordan. This is one of the many errors which have arisen out of the\nconfusion of the names Ga_d_ara, Ga_z_ara, and Ga_b_ara.\n\nAugustus made a present of Gadara to Herod the Great, as an appanage\npersonal to himself; and, upon Herod's death, recognising it to be a\n\"Grecian city\" like Hippos and Gaza,[103] he transferred it back to\nits former place in the province of Syria. That Herod made no effort\nto judaise his temporary possession, but rather the contrary, is\nobvious from the fact that the coins of Gadara, while under his rule,\nbear the image of Augustus with the superscription [Greek: Sebastos]--a\nflying in the face of Jewish prejudices which, even he, did not dare\nto venture upon in Judaea. And I may remark that, if my co-trustee of\nthe British Museum had taken the trouble to visit the splendid\nnumismatic collection under our charge, he might have seen two coins\nof Gadara, one of the time of Tiberius and the other of that of Titus,\neach bearing the effigies of the emperor on the obverse: while the\npersonified genius of the city is on the reverse of the former.\nFurther, the well-known works of De Saulcy and of Ekhel would have\nsupplied the information that, from the time of Augustus to that of\nGordian, the Gadarene coinage had the same thoroughly Gentile\ncharacter. Curious that a city of \"Hebrews bound by the Mosaic law\"\nshould tolerate such a mint!\n\nWhatever increase in population the Ghetto of Gadara may have\nundergone, between B.C. 4 and A.D. 66, it nowise affected the gentile\nand anti-judaic character of the city at the outbreak of the great\nwar; for Josephus tells us that, immediately after the great massacre\nof Caesarea, the revolted Jews \"laid waste the villages of the Syrians\nand their neighbouring cities, Philadelphia and Sebonitis and Gerasa\nand Pella and Scythopolis, and after them Gadara and Hippos\" (\"Wars,\"\nII. xviii. 1). I submit that, if Gadara had been a city of \"Hebrews\nbound by the Mosaic law,\" the ravaging of their territory by their\nbrother Jews, in revenge for the massacre of the Caesarean Jews by the\nGentile population of that place, would surely have been a somewhat\nunaccountable proceeding. But when we proceed a little further, to the\nfifth section of the chapter in which this statement occurs, the whole\naffair becomes intelligible enough.\n\n     Besides this murder at Scythopolis, the other cities rose up\n     against the Jews that were among them: those of Askelon slew\n     two thousand five hundred, and those of Ptolemais two\n     thousand, and put not a few into bonds; those of Tyre also\n     put a great number to death, but kept a great number in\n     prison; moreover, those of Hippos and those of Gadara did\n     the like, while they put to death the boldest of the Jews,\n     but kept those of whom they were most afraid in custody; as\n     did the rest of the cities of Syria according as they every\n     one either hated them or were afraid of them.\n\nJosephus is not always trustworthy, but he has no conceivable motive\nfor altering facts here; he speaks of contemporary events, in which he\nhimself took an active part, and he characterises the cities in the\nway familiar to him. For Josephus, Gadara is just as much a Gentile\ncity as Ptolemais; it was reserved for his latest commentator, either\nignoring, or ignorant of, all this, to tell us that Gadara had a\nHebrew population, bound by the Mosaic law.\n\nIn the face of all this evidence, most of which has been put before\nserious students, with full reference to the needful authorities and\nin a thoroughly judicial manner, by Schuerer in his classical\nwork,[104] one reads with stupefaction the statement which Mr.\nGladstone has thought fit to put before the uninstructed public:\n\n     Some commentators have alleged the authority of Josephus for\n     stating that Gadara was a city of Greeks rather than of\n     Jews, from whence it might be inferred that to keep swine\n     was innocent and lawful. This is not quite the place for a\n     critical examination of the matter; but I have examined it,\n     and have satisfied myself that Josephus gives no reason\n     whatever to suppose that the population of Gadara, and still\n     less (if less may be) the population of the neighbourhood,\n     and least of all the swine-herding or lower portion of that\n     population, were other than Hebrews bound by the Mosaic law.\n     (Pp. 373-4.)\n\nEven \"rapid judgment\" cannot be pleaded in excuse for this surprising\nstatement, because a \"Note on the Gadarene miracle\" is added (in a\nspecial appendix), in which the references are given to the passages\nof Josephus, by the improved interpretation of which, Mr. Gladstone\nhas thus contrived to satisfy himself of the thing which is not. One\nof these is \"Antiquities\" XVII. xiii. 4, in which section, I regret to\nsay, I can find no mention of Gadara. In \"Antiquities,\" XVII. xi. 4,\nhowever, there is a passage which would appear to be that Mr.\nGladstone means; and I will give it in full, although I have already\ncited part of it:\n\n     There were also certain of the cities which paid tribute to\n     Archelaus; Strato's tower, and Sebaste, with Joppa and\n     Jerusalem; for, as to Gaza, Gadara, and Hippos, they were\n     Grecian cities, which Caesar separated from his government,\n     and added them to the province of Syria.\n\nThat is to say, Augustus simply restored the state of things which\nexisted before he gave Gadara, then certainly a Gentile city, lying\noutside Judaea, to Herod as a mark of great personal favour. Yet Mr.\nGladstone can gravely tell those who are not in a position to check\nhis statements:\n\n     The sense seems to be, not that these cities were inhabited\n     by a Greek population, but that they had politically been\n     taken out of Judaea and added to Syria, which I presume was\n     classified as simply Hellenic, a portion of the great Greek\n     empire erected by Alexander. (Pp. 295-6.)\n\nMr. Gladstone's next reference is to the \"Wars,\" III. vii. 1:\n\n     So Vespasian marched to the city Gadara, and took it upon\n     the first onset, because he found it destitute of a\n     considerable number of men grown up for war. He then came\n     into it, and slew all the youth, the Romans having no mercy\n     on any age whatsoever; and this was done out of the hatred\n     they bore the nation, and because of the iniquity they had\n     been guilty of in the affair of Cestius.\n\nObviously, then, Gadara was an ultra-Jewish city. Q.E.D. But a student\ntrained in the use of weapons of precision, rather than in that of\nrhetorical tomahawks, has had many and painful warnings to look well\nabout him, before trusting an argument to the mercies of a passage,\nthe context of which he has not carefully considered. If Mr. Gladstone\nhad not been too much in a hurry to turn his imaginary prize to\naccount--if he had paused just to look at the preceding chapter of\nJosephus--he would have discovered that his much haste meant very\nlittle speed. He would have found (\"Wars,\" III. vi. 2) that Vespasian\nmarched from his base, the port of Ptolemais (Acre), on the shores of\nthe Mediterranean, into Galilee; and, having dealt with the so-called\n\"Gadara,\" was minded to finish with Jotapata, a strong place about\nfourteen miles south-east of Ptolemais, into which Josephus, who at\nfirst had fled to Tiberias, eventually threw himself--Vespasian\narriving before Jotapata \"the very next day.\" Now, if any one will\ntake a decent map of Ancient Palestine in hand, he will see that\nJotapata, as I have said, lies about fourteen miles in a straight line\neast-south-east of Ptolemais, while a certain town, \"Gabara\" (which\nwas also held by the Jews), is situated, about the same distance, to\nthe east of that port. Nothing can be more obvious than that\nVespasian, wishing to advance from Ptolemais into Galilee, could not\nafford to leave these strongholds in the possession of the enemy; and,\nas Gabara would lie on his left flank when he moved to Jotapata, he\ntook that city, whence his communications with his base could easily\nbe threatened, first. It might really have been fair evidence of\ndemoniac possession, if the best general of Rome had marched forty odd\nmiles, as the crow flies, through hostile Galilee, to take a city\n(which, moreover, had just tried to abolish its Jewish population) on\nthe other side of the Jordan; and then marched back again to a place\nfourteen miles off his starting-point.[105] One would think that the\nmost careless of readers must be startled by this incongruity into\ninquiring whether there might not be something wrong with the text;\nand, if he had done so, he would have easily discovered that since the\ntime of Reland, a century and a half ago, careful scholars have read\nGa_b_ara for Ga_d_ara.[106]\n\nOnce more, I venture to point out that training in the use of the\nweapons of precision of science may have its value in historical\nstudies, if only in preventing the occurrence of droll blunders in\ngeography.\n\nIn the third citation (\"Wars,\" IV. vii.) Josephus tells us that\nVespasian marched against \"Gadara,\" which he calls the metropolis of\nPeraea (it was possibly the seat of a common festival of the\nDecapolitan cities), and entered it, without opposition, the wealthy\nand powerful citizens having opened negotiations with him without the\nknowledge of an opposite party, who, \"as being inferior in number to\ntheir enemies, who were within the city, and seeing the Romans very\nnear the city,\" resolved to fly. Before doing so, however, they, after\na fashion unfortunately too common among the Zealots, murdered and\nshockingly mutilated Dolesus, a man of the first rank, who had\npromoted the embassy to Vespasian; and then \"ran out of the city.\"\nHereupon, \"the people of Gadara\" (surely not this time \"Hebrews bound\nby the Mosaic law\") received Vespasian with joyful acclamations,\nvoluntarily pulled down their wall, so that the city could not in\nfuture be used as a fortress by the Jews, and accepted a Roman\ngarrison for their future protection. Granting that this Gadara really\nis the city of the Gadarenes, the reference, without citation, to the\npassage, in support of Mr. Gladstone's contention seems rather\nremarkable. Taken in conjunction with the shortly antecedent ravaging\nof the Gadarene territory by the Jews, in fact, better proof could\nhardly be expected of the real state of the case; namely, that the\npopulation of Gadara (and notably the wealthy and respectable part of\nit) was thoroughly Hellenic; though, as in Caesarea and elsewhere among\nthe Palestinian cities, the rabble contained a considerable body of\nfanatical Jews, whose reckless ferocity made them, even though a mere\nminority of the population, a standing danger to the city.\n\nThus Mr. Gladstone's conclusion from his study of Josephus, that the\npopulation of Gadara were \"Hebrews bound by the Mosaic law,\" turns out\nto depend upon nothing better than the marvellously complete\nmisinterpretation of what that author says, combined with equally\nmarvellous geographical misunderstandings, long since exposed and\nrectified; while the positive evidence that Gadara, like other cities\nof the Decapolis, was thoroughly Hellenic in organisation, and\nessentially Gentile in population, is overwhelming.\n\nAnd, that being the fact of the matter, patent to all who will take\nthe trouble to enquire about what has been said about it, however\nobscure to those who merely talk of so doing, the thesis that the\nGadarene swineherds, or owners, were Jews violating the Mosaic law\nshows itself to be an empty and most unfortunate guess. But really,\nwhether they that kept the swine were Jews, or whether they were\nGentiles, is a consideration which has no relevance whatever to my\ncase. The legal provisions, which alone had authority over an\ninhabitant of the country of the Gadarenes, were the Gentile laws\nsanctioned by the Roman suzerain of the province of Syria, just as the\nonly law, which has authority in England, is that recognised by the\nsovereign Legislature. Jewish communities in England may have their\nprivate code, as they doubtless had in Gadara. But an English\nmagistrate, if called upon to enforce their peculiar laws, would\ndismiss the complainants from the judgment seat, let us hope with more\npoliteness than Gallio did in a like case, but quite as firmly.\nMoreover, in the matter of keeping pigs, we may be quite certain that\nGadarene law left everybody free to do as he pleased, indeed\nencouraged the practice rather than otherwise. Not only was pork one\nof the commonest and one of the most favourite articles of Roman diet;\nbut, to both Greeks and Romans, the pig was a sacrificial animal of\nhigh importance. Sucking pigs played an important part in Hellenic\npurificatory rites; and everybody knows the significance of the Roman\nsuovetaurilia, depicted on so many bas-reliefs.\n\nUnder these circumstances, only the extreme need of a despairing\n\"reconciler\" drowning in a sea of adverse facts, can explain the\ncatching at such a poor straw as the reckless guess that the\nswineherds of the \"country of the Gadarenes\" were erring Jews, doing a\nlittle clandestine business on their own account. The endeavour to\njustify the asserted destruction of the swine by the analogy of\nbreaking open a cask of smuggled spirits, and wasting their contents\non the ground, is curiously unfortunate. Does Mr. Gladstone mean to\nsuggest that a Frenchman landing at Dover, and coming upon a cask of\nsmuggled brandy in the course of a stroll along the cliffs, has the\nright to break it open and waste its contents on the ground? Yet the\nparty of Galileans who, according to the narrative, landed and took a\nwalk on the Gadarene territory, were as much foreigners in the\nDecapolis as Frenchmen would be at Dover. Herod Antipas, their\nsovereign, had no jurisdiction in the Decapolis--they were strangers\nand aliens, with no more right to interfere with a pig-keeping Hebrew,\nthan I have a right to interfere with an English professor of the\nIsraelitic faith, if I see a slice of ham on his plate. According to\nthe law of the country in which these Galilean foreigners found\nthemselves, men might keep pigs if they pleased. If the men who kept\nthem were Jews, it might be permissible for the strangers to inform\nthe religious authority acknowledged by the Jews of Gadara; but to\ninterfere themselves, in such a matter, was a step devoid of either\nmoral or legal justification.\n\nSuppose a modern English Sabbatarian fanatic, who believes, on the\nstrength of his interpretation of the fourth commandment, that it is a\ndeadly sin to work on the \"Lord's Day,\" sees a fellow Puritan yielding\nto the temptation of getting in his harvest on a fine Sunday\nmorning--is the former justified in setting fire to the latter's corn?\nWould not an English court of justice speedily teach him better?\n\nIn truth, the government which permits private persons, on any pretext\n(especially pious and patriotic pretexts), to take the law into their\nown hands, fails in the performance of the primary duties of all\ngovernments; while those who set the example of such acts, or who\napprove them, or who fail to disapprove them, are doing their best to\ndissolve civil society; they are compassers of illegality and fautors\nof immorality.\n\nI fully understand that Mr. Gladstone may not see the matter in this\nlight. He may possibly consider that the union of Gadara with the\nDecapolis, by Augustus, was a \"blackguard\" transaction, which deprived\nHellenic Gadarene law of all moral force; and that it was quite proper\nfor a Jewish Galilean, going back to the time when the land of the\nGirgashites was given to his ancestors, some 1500 years before, to\nact, as if the state of things which ought to obtain, in territory\nwhich traditionally, at any rate, belonged to his forefathers, did\nreally exist. And, that being so, I can only say I do not agree with\nhim, but leave the matter to the appreciation of those of our\ncountrymen, happily not yet the minority, who believe that the first\ncondition of enduring liberty is obedience to the law of the land.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe end of the month drawing nigh, I thought it well to send away the\nmanuscript of the foregoing pages yesterday, leaving open, in my own\nmind, the possibility of adding a succinct characterisation of Mr.\nGladstone's controversial methods as illustrated therein. This\nmorning, however, I had the pleasure of reading a speech which I think\nmust satisfy the requirements of the most fastidious of controversial\nartists; and there occurs in it so concise, yet so complete, a\ndelineation of Mr. Gladstone's way of dealing with disputed questions\nof another kind, that no poor effort of mine could better it as a\ndescription of the aspect which his treatment of scientific,\nhistorical, and critical questions presents to me.\n\n     The smallest examination would have told a man of his\n     capacity and of his experience that he was uttering the\n     grossest exaggerations, that he was basing arguments upon\n     the slightest hypotheses, and that his discussions only had\n     to be critically examined by the most careless critic in\n     order to show their intrinsic hollowness.\n\nThose who have followed me through this paper will hardly dispute the\njustice of this judgment, severe as it is. But the Chief Secretary\nfor Ireland has science in the blood; and has the advantage of a\nnatural, as well as a highly cultivated, aptitude for the use of\nmethods of precision in investigation, and for the exact enunciation\nof the results thereby obtained.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n    [101] Thus Josephus (lib. ix.) says that his rival, Justus,\n          persuaded the citizens of Tiberias to \"set the villages\n          that belonged to Gadara and Hippos on fire; which\n          villages were situated on the borders of Tiberias and\n          of the region of Scythopolis.\"\n\n    [102] It is said to have been destroyed by its captors.\n\n    [103] \"But as to the Grecian cities, Gaza and Gadara and\n          Hippos, he cut them off from the kingdom and added them\n          to Syria.\"--Josephus, _Wars_, II. vi. 3. See also\n          _Antiquities_, XVII. xi. 4.\n\n    [104] _Geschichte des juedischen Volkes im Zeitalter Christi_,\n          1886-90.\n\n    [105] If William the Conqueror, after fighting the battle\n          of Hastings, had marched to capture Chichester and then\n          returned to assault Rye, being all the while anxious to\n          reach London, his proceedings would not have been more\n          eccentric than Mr. Gladstone must imagine those of\n          Vespasian were.\n\n    [106] See Reland, _Palestina_ (1714), t. ii. p. 771. Also\n          Robinson, _Later Biblical Researches_ (1856), p. 87\n          _note_.\n\n\n\n\nXI: ILLUSTRATIONS OF MR. GLADSTONE'S CONTROVERSIAL METHODS\n\n[1891]\n\n\nThe series of essays, in defence of the historical accuracy of the\nJewish and Christian Scriptures, contributed by Mr. Gladstone to \"Good\nWords,\" having been revised and enlarged by their author, appeared\nlast year as a separate volume, under the somewhat defiant title of\n\"The Impregnable Rock of Holy Scripture.\"\n\nThe last of these Essays, entitled \"Conclusion,\" contains an attack,\nor rather several attacks, couched in language which certainly does\nnot err upon the side of moderation or of courtesy, upon statements\nand opinions of mine. One of these assaults is a deliberately devised\nattempt, not merely to rouse the theological prejudices ingrained in\nthe majority of Mr. Gladstone's readers, but to hold me up as a person\nwho has endeavoured to besmirch the personal character of the object\nof their veneration. For Mr. Gladstone asserts that I have undertaken\nto try \"the character of our Lord\" (p. 268); and he tells the many who\nare, as I think unfortunately, predisposed to place implicit credit in\nhis assertions, that it has been reserved for me to discover that\nJesus \"was no better than a law-breaker and an evil-doer!\" (p. 269).\n\nIt was extremely easy for me to prove, as I did in the pages of this\nReview last December, that, under the most favourable interpretation,\nthis amazing declaration must be ascribed to extreme confusion of\nthought. And, by bringing an abundance of good-will to the\nconsideration of the subject, I have now convinced myself that it is\nright for me to admit that a person of Mr. Gladstone's intellectual\nacuteness really did mistake the reprobation of the course of conduct\nascribed to Jesus, in a story of which I expressly say I do not\nbelieve a word, for an attack on his character and a declaration that\nhe was \"no better than a law-breaker, and an evil-doer.\" At any rate,\nso far as I can see, this is what Mr. Gladstone wished to be believed\nwhen he wrote the following passage:--\n\n     I must, however, in passing, make the confession that I did\n     not state with accuracy, as I ought to have done, the\n     precise form of the accusation. I treated it as an\n     imputation on the action of our Lord; he replies that it is\n     only an imputation on the narrative of three evangelists\n     respecting Him. The difference, from his point of view, is\n     probably material, and I therefore regret that I overlooked\n     it.[107]\n\nConsidering the gravity of the error which is here admitted, the\nfashion of the withdrawal appears more singular than admirable. From\nmy \"point of view\"--not from Mr. Gladstone's apparently--the little\ndiscrepancy between the facts and Mr. Gladstone's carefully offensive\ntravesty of them is \"probably\" (only \"probably\") material. However, as\nMr. Gladstone concludes with an official expression of regret for his\nerror, it is my business to return an equally official expression of\ngratitude for the attenuated reparation with which I am favoured.\n\nHaving cleared this specimen of Mr. Gladstone's controversial method\nout of the way, I may proceed to the next assault, that on a passage\nin an article on Agnosticism (\"Nineteenth Century,\" February 1889),\npublished two years ago. I there said, in referring to the Gadarene\nstory, \"Everything I know of law and justice convinces me that the\nwanton destruction of other people's property is a misdemeanour of\nevil example.\" On this, Mr. Gladstone, continuing his candid and\nurbane observations, remarks (\"Impregnable Rock,\" p. 273) that,\n\"Exercising his rapid judgment on the text,\" and \"not inquiring what\nanybody else had known or said about it,\" I had missed a point in\nsupport of that \"accusation against our Lord\" which he has now been\nconstrained to admit I never made.\n\nThe \"point\" in question is that \"Gadara was a city of Greeks rather\nthan of Jews, from whence it might be inferred that to keep swine was\ninnocent and lawful.\" I conceive that I have abundantly proved that\nGadara answered exactly to the description here given of it; and I\nshall show, by and by, that Mr. Gladstone has used language which, to\nmy mind, involves the admission that the authorities of the city were\nnot Jews. But I have also taken a good deal of pains to show that the\nquestion thus raised is of no importance in relation to the main\nissue.[108] If Gadara was, as I maintain it was, a city of the\nDecapolis, Hellenistic in constitution and containing a predominantly\nGentile population, my case is superabundantly fortified. On the other\nhand, if the hypothesis that Gadara was under Jewish government, which\nMr. Gladstone seems sometimes to defend and sometimes to give up,\nwere accepted, my case would be nowise weakened. At any rate, Gadara\nwas not included within the jurisdiction of the tetrach of Galilee; if\nit had been, the Galileans who crossed over the lake to Gadara had no\nofficial status; and they had no more civil right to punish\nlaw-breakers than any other strangers.\n\nIn my turn, however, I may remark that there is a \"point\" which\nappears to have escaped Mr. Gladstone's notice. And that is somewhat\nunfortunate, because his whole argument turns upon it. Mr. Gladstone\nassumes, as a matter of course, that pig-keeping was an offence\nagainst the \"Law of Moses\"; and, therefore, that Jews who kept pigs\nwere as much liable to legal pains and penalties as Englishmen who\nsmuggle brandy (\"Impregnable Rock,\" p. 274).\n\nThere can be no doubt that, according to the Law, as it is defined in\nthe Pentateuch, the pig was an \"unclean\" animal, and that pork was a\nforbidden article of diet. Moreover, since pigs are hardly likely to\nbe kept for the mere love of those unsavoury animals, pig-owning, or\nswine-herding, must have been, and evidently was, regarded as a\nsuspicious and degrading occupation by strict Jews, in the first\ncentury A.D. But I should like to know on what provision of the Mosaic\nLaw, as it is laid down in the Pentateuch, Mr. Gladstone bases the\nassumption, which is essential to his case, that the possession of\npigs and the calling of a swineherd were actually illegal. The\ninquiry was put to me the other day; and, as I could not answer it, I\nturned up the article \"Schwein\" in Riehm's standard \"Handwoerterbuch,\"\nfor help out of my difficulty; but unfortunately without success.\nAfter speaking of the martyrdom which the Jews, under Antiochus\nEpiphanes, preferred to eating pork, the writer proceeds:--\n\n     It may be, nevertheless, that the practice of keeping pigs\n     may have found its way into Palestine in the Graeco-Roman\n     time, in consequence of the great increase of the non-Jewish\n     population; yet there is no evidence of it in the New\n     Testament; the great herd of swine, 2,000 in number,\n     mentioned in the narrative of the possessed, was feeding in\n     the territory of Gadara, which belonged to the Decapolis;\n     and the prodigal son became a swineherd with the native of a\n     far country into which he had wandered; in neither of these\n     cases is there reason for thinking that the possessors of\n     these herds were Jews.[109]\n\nHaving failed in my search, so far, I took up the next book of\nreference at hand, Kitto's \"Cyclopaedia\" (vol. iii. 1876). There, under\n\"Swine,\" the writer, Colonel Hamilton Smith, seemed at first to give\nme what I wanted, as he says that swine \"appear to have been\nrepeatedly introduced and reared by the Hebrew people,[110]\nnotwithstanding the strong prohibition in the Law of Moses (Is. lxv.\n4).\" But, in the first place, Isaiah's writings form no part of the\n\"Law of Moses\"; and, in the second place, the people denounced by the\nprophet in this passage are neither the possessors of pigs, nor\nswineherds, but these \"which eat swine's flesh and broth of abominable\nthings is in their vessels.\" And when, in despair, I turned to the\nprovisions of the Law itself, my difficulty was not cleared up.\nLeviticus xi. 8 (Revised Version) says, in reference to the pig and\nother unclean animals: \"Of their flesh ye shall not eat, and their\ncarcasses ye shall not touch.\" In the revised version of Deuteronomy,\nxiv. 8, the words of the prohibition are identical, and a skilful\nrefiner might possibly satisfy himself, even if he satisfied nobody\nelse, that \"carcase\" means the body of a live animal as well as a dead\none; and that, since swineherds could hardly avoid contact with their\ncharges, their calling was implicitly forbidden.[111] Unfortunately,\nthe authorised version expressly says \"dead carcase\"; and thus the\nmost rabbinically minded of reconcilers might find his casuistry\nfoiled by that great source of surprises, the \"original Hebrew.\" That\nsuch check is at any rate possible, is clear from the fact that the\nlegal uncleanness of some animals, as food, did not interfere with\ntheir being lawfully possessed, cared for, and sold by Jews. The\nprovisions for the ransoming of unclean beasts (Lev. xxvii. 27) and\nfor the redemption of their sucklings (Numbers xviii. 15) sufficiently\nprove this. As the late Dr. Kalisch has observed in his \"Commentary\"\non Leviticus, part ii. p. 129, note:--\n\n     Though asses and horses, camels and dogs, were kept by the\n     Israelites, they were, to a certain extent, associated with\n     the notion of impurity; they might be turned to profitable\n     account by their labour or otherwise, but in respect to food\n     they were an abomination.\n\nThe same learned commentator (_loc. cit._ p. 88) proves that the\nTalmudists forbade the rearing of pigs by Jews, unconditionally and\neverywhere; and even included it under the same ban as the study of\nGreek philosophy, \"since both alike were considered to lead to the\ndesertion of the Jewish faith.\" It is very possible, indeed probable,\nthat the Pharisees of the fourth decade of our first century took as\nstrong a view of pig-keeping as did their spiritual descendants. But,\nfor all that, it does not follow that the practice was illegal. The\nstricter Jews could not have despised and hated swineherds more than\nthey did publicans; but, so far as I know, there is no provision in\nthe Law against the practice of the calling of a tax-gatherer by a\nJew. The publican was in fact very much in the position of an Irish\nprocess-server at the present day--more, rather than less, despised\nand hated on account of the perfect legality of his occupation. Except\nfor certain sacrificial purposes, pigs were held in such abhorrence by\nthe ancient Egyptians, that swineherds were not permitted to enter a\ntemple, or to intermarry with other castes; and any one who had\ntouched a pig, even accidentally, was unclean. But these very\nregulations prove that pig-keeping was not illegal; it merely involved\ncertain civil and religious disabilities. For the Jews, dogs were\ntypically \"unclean animals\"; but when that eminently pious Hebrew,\nTobit, \"went forth\" with the angel \"the young man's dog\" went \"with\nthem\" (Tobit v. 16) without apparent remonstrance from the celestial\nguide. I really do not see how an appeal to the Law could have\njustified any one in drowning Tobit's dog, on the ground that his\nmaster was keeping and feeding an animal quite as \"unclean\" as any\npig. Certainly the excellent Raguel must have failed to see the harm\nof dog-keeping, for we are told that, on the traveller's return\nhomewards, \"the dog went after them\" (xi. 4).\n\nUntil better light than I have been able to obtain is thrown upon the\nsubject, therefore, it is obvious that Mr. Gladstone's argumentative\nhouse has been built upon an extremely slippery quick-sand; perhaps\neven has no foundation at all.\n\nYet another \"point\" does not seem to have occurred to Mr. Gladstone,\nwho is so much shocked that I attach no overwhelming weight to the\nassertions contained in the synoptic Gospels, even when all three\nconcur. These Gospels agree in stating, in the most express, and to\nsome extent verbally identical, terms, that the devils entered the\npigs at their own request,[112] and the third Gospel (viii. 31) tells\nus what the motive of the demons was in asking the singular boon:\n\"They intreated him that he would not command them to depart into the\nabyss.\" From this, it would seem that the devils thought to exchange\nthe heavy punishment of transportation to the abyss for the lighter\npenalty of imprisonment in swine. And some commentators, more\ningenious than respectful to the supposed chief actor in this\nextraordinary fable, have dwelt, with satisfaction, upon the very\nunpleasant quarter of an hour which the evil spirits must have had,\nwhen the headlong rush of their maddened tenements convinced them how\ncompletely they were taken in. In the whole story, there is not one\nsolitary hint that the destruction of the pigs was intended as a\npunishment of their owners, or of the swineherds. On the contrary, the\nconcurrent testimony of the three narratives is to the effect that\nthe catastrophe was the consequence of diabolic suggestion. And,\nindeed, no source could be more appropriate for an act of such\nmanifest injustice and illegality.\n\nI can but marvel that modern defenders of the faith should not be glad\nof any reasonable excuse for getting rid of a story which, if it had\nbeen invented by Voltaire, would have justly let loose floods of\northodox indignation.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThus, the hypothesis, to which Mr. Gladstone so fondly clings, finds\nno support in the provisions of the \"Law of Moses\" as that law is\ndefined in the Pentateuch; while it is wholly inconsistent with the\nconcurrent testimony of the synoptic Gospels, to which Mr. Gladstone\nattaches so much weight. In my judgment, it is directly contrary to\neverything which profane history tells us about the constitution and\nthe population of the city of Gadara; and it commits those who accept\nit to a story which, if it were true, would implicate the founder of\nChristianity in an illegal and inequitable act.\n\nSuch being the case, I consider myself excused from following Mr.\nGladstone through all the meanderings of his late attempt to extricate\nhimself from the maze of historical and exegetical difficulties in\nwhich he is entangled. I content myself with assuring those who, with\nmy paper (not Mr. Gladstone's version of my arguments) in hand,\nconsult the original authorities, that they will find full\njustification for every statement I have made. But in order to dispose\nthose who cannot, or will not, take that trouble, to believe that the\nproverbial blindness of one that judges his own cause plays no part in\ninducing me to speak thus decidedly, I beg their attention to the\nfollowing examination, which shall be as brief as I can make it, of\nthe seven propositions in which Mr. Gladstone professes to give a\nfaithful summary of my \"errors.\"\n\nWhen, in the middle of the seventeenth century, the Holy See declared\nthat certain propositions contained in the work of Bishop Jansen were\nheretical, the Jansenists of Port Royal replied that, while they were\nready to defer to the Papal authority about questions of faith and\nmorals, they must be permitted to judge about questions of fact for\nthemselves; and that, really, the condemned propositions were not to\nbe found in Jansen's writings. As everybody knows, His Holiness and\nthe Grand Monarque replied to this, surely not unreasonable, plea\nafter the manner of Lord Peter in the \"Tale of a Tub.\" It is,\ntherefore, not without some apprehension of meeting with a similar\nfate, that I put in a like plea against Mr. Gladstone's Bull. The\nseven propositions declared to be false and condemnable, in that\nkindly and gentle way which so pleasantly compares with the\nauthoritative style of the Vatican (No. 5 more particularly), may or\nmay not be true. But they are not to be found in anything I have\nwritten. And some of them diametrically contravene that which I have\nwritten. I proceed to prove my assertions.\n\nPROP. 1. _Throughout the paper he confounds together what I had\ndistinguished, namely, the city of Gadara and the vicinage attached to\nit, not as a mere pomoerium, but as a rural district_.\n\nIn my judgment, this statement is devoid of foundation. In my paper on\n\"The Keepers of the Herd of Swine\" I point out, at some length, that,\n\"in accordance with the ancient Hellenic practice,\" each city of the\nDecapolis must have been \"surrounded by a certain amount of territory\namenable to its jurisdiction\": and, to enforce this conclusion, I\nquote what Josephus says about the \"villages that belonged to Gadara\nand Hippos.\" As I understand the term _pomerium_ or _pomoerium_,[113]\nit means the space which, according to Roman custom, was kept free\nfrom buildings, immediately within and without the walls of a city;\nand which defined the range of the _auspicia urbana_. The conception\nof a _pomoerium_ as a \"vicinage attached to\" a city, appears to be\nsomething quite novel and original. But then, to be sure, I do not\nknow how many senses Mr. Gladstone may attach to the word \"vicinage.\"\n\nWhether Gadara had a _pomoerium_, in the proper technical sense, or\nnot, is a point on which I offer no opinion. But that the city had a\nvery considerable \"rural district\" attached to it and notwithstanding\nits distinctness, amenable to the jurisdiction of the Gentile\nmunicipal authorities, is one of the main points of my case.\n\nPROP. 2. _He more fatally confounds the local civil government and its\nfollowing, including, perhaps, the whole wealthy class and those\nattached to it, with the ethnical character of a general population._\n\nHaving survived confusion No. 1, which turns out not to be on my side,\nI am now confronted in No. 2 with a \"more fatal\" error--and so it is,\nif there be degrees of fatality; but, again, it is Mr. Gladstone's and\nnot mine. It would appear, from this proposition (about the\ngrammatical interpretation of which, however, I admit there are\ndifficulties), that Mr. Gladstone holds that the \"local civil\ngovernment and its following among the wealthy,\" were ethnically\ndifferent from the \"general population.\" On p. 348, he further admits\nthat the \"wealthy and the local governing power\" were friendly to the\nRomans. Are we then to suppose that it was the persons of Jewish\n\"ethnical character\" who favoured the Romans, while those of Gentile\n\"ethnical character\" were opposed to them? But, if that supposition is\nabsurd, the only alternative is that the local civil government was\nethnically Gentile. This is exactly my contention.\n\nAt pp. 379 to 391 of the essay on \"The Keepers of the Herd of Swine\" I\nhave fully discussed the question of the ethnical character of the\ngeneral population. I have shown that, according to Josephus, who\nsurely ought to have known, Gadara was as much a Gentile city as\nPtolemais; I have proved that he includes Gadara amongst the cities\n\"that rose up against the Jews that were amongst them,\" which is a\npretty definite expression of his belief that the \"ethnical character\nof the general population\" was Gentile. There is no question here of\nJews of the Roman party fighting with Jews of the Zealot party, as Mr.\nGladstone suggests. It is the non-Jewish and anti-Jewish general\npopulation which rises up against the Jews who had settled \"among\nthem.\"\n\nPROP. 3. _His one item of direct evidence as to the Gentile character\nof the city refers only to the former and not to the latter_.\n\nMore fatal still. But, once more, not to me. I adduce not one, but a\nvariety of \"items\" in proof of the non-Judaic character of the\npopulation of Gadara: the evidence of history; that of the coinage of\nthe city; the direct testimony of Josephus, just cited--to mention no\nothers. I repeat, if the wealthy people and those connected with\nthem--the \"classes\" and the \"hangers on\" of Mr. Gladstone's\nwell-known taxonomy--were, as he appears to admit they were, Gentiles;\nif the \"civil government\" of the city was in their hands, as the\ncoinage proves it was; what becomes of Mr. Gladstone's original\nproposition in \"The Impregnable Rock of Scripture\" that \"the\npopulation of Gadara, and still less (if less may be) the population\nof the neighbourhood,\" were \"Hebrews bound by the Mosaic law\"? And\nwhat is the importance of estimating the precise proportion of Hebrews\nwho may have resided, either in the city of Gadara or in its\nindependent territory, when, as Mr. Gladstone now seems to admit (I am\ncareful to say \"seems\"), the government, and consequently the law,\nwhich ruled in that territory and defined civil right and wrong was\nGentile and not Judaic? But perhaps Mr. Gladstone is prepared to\nmaintain that the Gentile \"local civil government\" of a city of the\nDecapolis administered Jewish law; and showed their respect for it,\nmore particularly, by stamping their coinage with effigies of the\nEmperors.\n\nIn point of fact, in his haste to attribute to me errors which I have\nnot committed, Mr. Gladstone has given away his case.\n\nPROP. 4. _He fatally confounds the question of political party with\nthose of nationality and of religion, and assumes that those who took\nthe side of Rome in the factions that prevailed could not be subject\nto the Mosaic Law_.\n\nIt would seem that I have a feline tenacity of life; once more, a\n\"fatal error.\" But Mr. Gladstone has forgotten an excellent rule of\ncontroversy; say what is true, of course, but mind that it is decently\nprobable. Now it is not decently probable, hardly indeed conceivable,\nthat any one who has read Josephus, or any other historian of the\nJewish war, should be unaware that there were Jews (of whom Josephus\nhimself was one) who \"Romanised\" and, more or less openly, opposed the\nwar party. But, however that may be, I assert that Mr. Gladstone\nneither has produced, nor can produce, a passage of my writing which\naffords the slightest foundation for this particular article of his\nindictment.\n\nPROP. 5. _His examination of the text of Josephus is alike one-sided,\ninadequate, and erroneous._\n\nEasy to say, hard to prove. So long as the authorities whom I have\ncited are on my side, I do not know why this singularly temperate and\nconvincing dictum should trouble me. I have yet to become acquainted\nwith Mr. Gladstone's claims to speak with an authority equal to that\nof scholars of the rank of Schuerer, whose obviously just and necessary\nemendations he so unceremoniously pooh-poohs.\n\nPROP. 6. _Finally, he sets aside, on grounds not critical or\nhistorical, but partly subjective, the primary historical testimony on\nthe subject, namely, that of the three Synoptic Evangelists, who\nwrite as contemporaries and deal directly with the subject, neither of\nwhich is done by any other authority_.\n\nReally this is too much! The fact is, as anybody can see who will turn\nto my article of February 1889 [VII. _supra_], out of which all this\ndiscussion has arisen, that the arguments upon which I rest the\nstrength of my case touching the swine-miracle, are exactly\n\"historical\" and \"critical.\" Expressly, and in words that cannot be\nmisunderstood, I refuse to rest on what Mr. Gladstone calls\n\"subjective\" evidence. I abstain from denying the possibility of the\nGadarene occurrence, and I even go so far as to speak of some physical\nanalogies to possession. In fact, my quondam opponent, Dr. Wace,\nshrewdly, but quite fairly, made the most of these admissions; and\nstated that I had removed the only \"consideration which would have\nbeen a serious obstacle\" in the way of his belief in the Gadarene\nstory.[114]\n\nSo far from setting aside the authority of the synoptics on\n\"subjective\" grounds, I have taken a great deal of trouble to show\nthat my non-belief in the story is based upon what appears to me to be\nevident; firstly, that the accounts of the three synoptic Gospels are\nnot independent, but are founded upon a common source; secondly, that,\neven if the story of the common tradition proceeded from a\ncontemporary, it would still be worthy of very little credit, seeing\nthe manner in which the legends about mediaeval miracles have been\npropounded by contemporaries. And in illustration of this position I\nwrote a special essay about the miracles reported by Eginhard.[115]\n\nIn truth, one need go no further than Mr. Gladstone's sixth\nproposition to be convinced that contemporary testimony, even of\nwell-known and distinguished persons, may be but a very frail reed for\nthe support of the historian, when theological prepossession blinds\nthe witness.[116]\n\nPROP. 7. _And he treats the entire question, in the narrowed form in\nwhich it arises upon secular testimony, as if it were capable of a\nsolution so clear and summary as to warrant the use of the extremest\nweapons of controversy against those who presume to differ from him._\n\nThe six heretical propositions which have gone before are enunciated\nwith sufficient clearness to enable me to prove, without any\ndifficulty, that, whosesoever they are, they are not mine. But number\nseven, I confess, is too hard for me. I cannot undertake to contradict\nthat which I do not understand.\n\nWhat is the \"entire question\" which \"arises\" in a \"narrowed form\" upon\n\"secular testimony\"? After much guessing, I am fain to give up the\nconundrum. The \"question\" may be the ownership of the pigs; or the\nethnological character of the Gadarenes; or the propriety of meddling\nwith other people's property without legal warrant. And each of these\nquestions might be so \"narrowed\" when it arose on \"secular testimony\"\nthat I should not know where I was. So I am silent on this part of the\nproposition.\n\nBut I do dimly discern, in the latter moiety of this mysterious\nparagraph, a reproof of that use of \"the extremest weapons of\ncontroversy\" which is attributed to me. Upon which I have to observe\nthat I guide myself, in such matters, very much by the maxim of a\ngreat statesman, \"Do ut des.\" If Mr. Gladstone objects to the\nemployment of such weapons of defence, he would do well to abstain\nfrom them in attack. He should not frame charges which he has,\nafterwards, to admit are erroneous, in language of carefully\ncalculated offensiveness (\"Impregnable Rock,\" pp. 269-70); he should\nnot assume that persons with whom he disagrees are so recklessly\nunconscientious as to evade the trouble of inquiring what has been\nsaid or known about a grave question (\"Impregnable Rock,\" p. 273); he\nshould not qualify the results of careful thought as \"hand-over-head\nreasoning\" (\"Impregnable Rock,\" p. 274); he should not, as in the\nextraordinary propositions which I have just analysed, make assertions\nrespecting his opponent's position and arguments which are\ncontradicted by the plainest facts.\n\nPersons who, like myself, have spent their lives outside the political\nworld, yet take a mild and philosophical concern in what goes on in\nit, often find it difficult to understand what our neighbours call the\npsychological moment of this or that party leader, and are,\noccasionally, loth to believe in the seeming conditions of certain\nkinds of success. And when some chieftain, famous in political\nwarfare, adventures into the region of letters or of science, in full\nconfidence that the methods which have brought fame and honour in his\nown province will answer there, he is apt to forget that he will be\njudged by these people, on whom rhetorical artifices have long ceased\nto take effect; and to whom mere dexterity in putting together\ncleverly ambiguous phrases, and even the great art of offensive\nmisrepresentation, are unspeakably wearisome. And, if that weariness\nfinds its expression in sarcasm, the offender really has no right to\ncry out. Assuredly ridicule is no test of truth, but it is the\nrighteous meed of some kinds of error. Nor ought the attempt to\nconfound the expression of a revolted sense of fair dealing with\narrogant impatience of contradiction, to restrain those to whom \"the\nextreme weapons of controversy\" come handy from using them. The\nfunction of police in the intellectual, if not in the civil, economy\nmay sometimes be legitimately discharged by volunteers.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nSome time ago in one of the many criticisms with which I am favoured,\nI met with the remark that, at our time of life, Mr. Gladstone and I\nmight be better occupied than in fighting over the Gadarene pigs. And,\nif these too famous swine were the only parties to the suit, I, for my\npart, should fully admit the justice of the rebuke. But, under the\nbeneficent rule of the Court of Chancery, in former times, it was not\nuncommon, that a quarrel about a few perches of worthless land, ended\nin the ruin of ancient families and the engulfing of great estates;\nand I think that our admonisher failed to observe the analogy--to note\nthe momentous consequences of the judgment which may be awarded in the\npresent apparently insignificant action _in re_ the swineherds of\nGadara.\n\nThe immediate effect of such judgment will be the decision of the\nquestion, whether the men of the nineteenth century are to adopt the\ndemonology of the men of the first century, as divinely revealed\ntruth, or to reject it, as degrading falsity. The reverend Principal\nof King's College has delivered his judgment in perfectly clear and\ncandid terms. Two years since, Dr. Wace said that he believed the\nstory as it stands; and consequently he holds, as a part of divine\nrevelation, that the spiritual world comprises devils, who, under\ncertain circumstances, may enter men and be transferred from them to\nfour-footed beasts. For the distinguished Anglican Divine and Biblical\nscholar, that is part and parcel of the teachings respecting the\nspiritual world which we owe to the founder of Christianity. It is an\ninseparable part of that Christian orthodoxy which, if a man rejects,\nhe is to be considered and called an \"infidel.\" According to the\nordinary rules of interpretation of language, Mr. Gladstone must hold\nthe same view.\n\nIf antiquity and universality are valid tests of the truth of any\nbelief, no doubt this is one of the beliefs so certified. There are no\nknown savages, nor people sunk in the ignorance of partial\ncivilisation, who do not hold them. The great majority of Christians\nhave held them and still hold them. Moreover the oldest records we\npossess of the early conceptions of mankind in Egypt and in\nMesopotamia prove that exactly such demonology, as is implied in the\nGadarene story, formed the substratum, and, among the early Accadians,\napparently the greater part, of their supposed knowledge of the\nspiritual world. M. Lenormant's profoundly interesting work on\nBabylonian magic and the magical texts given in the Appendix to\nProfessor Sayce's \"Hibbert Lectures\" leave no doubt on this head. They\nprove that the doctrine of possession, and even the particular case of\npig, possession,[117] were firmly believed in by the Egyptians and the\nMesopotamians before the tribes of Israel invaded Palestine. And it is\nevident that these beliefs, from some time after the exile and\nprobably much earlier, completely interpenetrated the Jewish mind, and\nthus became inseparably interwoven with the fabric of the synoptic\nGospels.\n\nTherefore, behind the question of the acceptance of the doctrines of\nthe oldest heathen demonology as part of the fundamental beliefs of\nChristianity, there lies the question of the credibility of the\nGospels, and of their claim to act as our instructors, outside that\nethical province in which they appeal to the consciousness of all\nthoughtful men. And still, behind this problem, there lies\nanother--how far do these ancient records give a sure foundation to\nthe prodigious fabric of Christian dogma, which has been built upon\nthem by the continuous labours of speculative theologians, during\neighteen centuries?\n\nI submit that there are few questions before the men of the rising\ngeneration, on the answer to which the future hangs more fatally, than\nthis. We are at the parting of the ways. Whether the twentieth century\nshall see a recrudescence of the superstitions of mediaeval papistry,\nor whether it shall witness the severance of the living body of the\nethical ideal of prophetic Israel from the carcase, foul with savage\nsuperstitions and cankered with false philosophy, to which the\ntheologians have bound it, turns upon their final judgment of the\nGadarene tale.\n\nThe gravity of the problems ultimately involved in the discussion of\nthe legend of Gadara will, I hope, excuse a persistence in returning\nto the subject, to which I should not have been moved by merely\npersonal considerations.\n\nWith respect to the diluvial invective which overflowed thirty-three\npages of the \"Nineteenth Century\" last January, I doubt not that it\nhas a catastrophic importance in the estimation of its author. I, on\nthe other hand, may be permitted to regard it as a mere spate; noisy\nand threatening while it lasted, but forgotten almost as soon as it\nwas over. Without my help, it will be judged by every instructed and\nclear-headed reader; and that is fortunate, because, were aid\nnecessary, I have cogent reasons for withholding it.\n\nIn an article characterised by the same qualities of thought and\ndiction, entitled \"A Great Lesson,\" which appeared in the \"Nineteenth\nCentury\" for September 1887, the Duke of Argyll, firstly, charged the\nwhole body of men of science, interested in the question, with having\nconspired to ignore certain criticisms of Mr. Darwin's theory of the\norigin of coral reefs; and, secondly, he asserted that some person\nunnamed had \"actually induced\" Mr. John Murray to delay the\npublication of his views on that subject \"for two years.\"\n\nIt was easy for me and for others to prove that the first statement\nwas not only, to use the Duke of Argyll's favourite expression,\n\"contrary to fact,\" but that it was without any foundation whatever.\nThe second statement rested on the Duke of Argyll's personal\nauthority. All I could do was to demand the production of the evidence\nfor it. Up to the present time, so far as I know, that evidence has\nnot made its appearance; nor has there been any withdrawal of, or\napology for, the erroneous charge.\n\nUnder these circumstances most people will understand why the Duke of\nArgyll may feel quite secure of having the battle all to himself,\nwhenever it pleases him to attack me.\n\n[See the note at the end of \"Hasisadra's Adventure\" (vol iv. p. 283).\nThe discussion on coral reefs, at the meeting of the British\nAssociation this year, proves that Mr. Darwin's views are defended\nnow, as strongly as in 1891, by highly competent authorities. October\n25, 1893.]\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n    [107] _Nineteenth Century_, February 1891, pp. 339-40.\n\n    [108] Neither is it of any consequence whether the locality\n          of the supposed miracle was Gadara, or Gerasa, or\n          Gergesa. But I may say that I was well acquainted with\n          Origen's opinion respecting Gergesa. It is fully\n          discussed and rejected in Riehm's _Handwoerterbuch_. In\n          Kitto's _Biblical Cyclopaedia_ (ii. p. 51) Professor\n          Porter remarks that Origen merely \"_conjectures_\" that\n          Gergesa was indicated: and he adds, \"Now, in a question\n          of this kind conjectures cannot be admitted. We must\n          implicitly follow the most ancient and creditable\n          testimony, which clearly pronounces in favour of\n          Gadarenhon. This reading is adopted by Tischendorf,\n          Alford, and Tregelles.\"\n\n    [109] I may call attention, in passing, to the fact that this\n          authority, at any rate, has no sort of doubt of the\n          fact that Jewish Law did not rule in Gadara (indeed,\n          under the head of \"Gadara,\" in the same work, it is\n          expressly stated that the population of the place\n          consisted \"predominantly of heathens\"), and that he\n          scouts the notion that the Gadarene swineherds were\n          Jews.\n\n    [110] The evidence adduced, so far as post-exile times are\n          concerned, appears to me insufficient to prove this\n          assertion.\n\n    [111] Even Leviticus xi. 26, cited without reference to the\n          context, will not serve the purpose; because the swine\n          _is_ \"cloven-footed\" (Lev. xi. 7).\n\n    [112] 1st Gospel: \"And the devils _besought him_, saying,\n          If Thou cast us out send us away _into_ the herd of\n          swine.\" 2d Gospel: \"They _besought him_, saying, Send\n          us _into_ the swine.\" 3d Gospel: \"They _intreated him_\n          that he would give them leave to enter _into_ them.\"\n\n    [113] See Marquardt, _Roemische Staatsverwaltung_, Bd. III.\n          p. 408.\n\n    [114] _Nineteenth Century_, March 1889 (p. 362).\n\n    [115] \"The Value of Witness to the Miraculous.\" _Nineteenth\n          Century_, March 1889.\n\n    [116] I cannot ask the Editor of this Review to reprint pages\n          of an old article,--but the following passages\n          sufficiently illustrate the extent and the character of\n          the discrepancy between the facts of the case and Mr.\n          Gladstone's account of them:--\n\n          \"Now, in the Gadarene affair, I do not think I am\n          unreasonably sceptical if I say that the existence of\n          demons who can be transferred from a man to a pig does\n          thus contravene probability. Let me be perfectly\n          candid. I admit I have no _a priori_ objection to\n          offer.... I declare, as plainly as I can, that I am\n          unable to show cause why these transferable devils\n          should not exist.\" ... (\"Agnosticism,\" _Nineteenth\n          Century_, 1889, p. 177).\n\n          \"What then do we know about the originator, or\n          originators, of this groundwork--of that threefold\n          tradition which all three witnesses (in Paley's phrase)\n          agree upon--that we should allow their mere statements\n          to outweigh the counter arguments of humanity, of\n          common sense, of exact science, and to imperil the\n          respect which all would be glad to be able to render to\n          their Master?\" (_ibid._ p. 175).\n\n          I then go on through a couple of pages to discuss the\n          value of the evidence of the synoptics on critical and\n          historical grounds. Mr. Gladstone cites the essay from\n          which these passages are taken, whence I suppose he has\n          read it; though it may be that he shares the impatience\n          of Cardinal Manning where my writings are concerned.\n          Such impatience will account for, though it will not\n          excuse, his sixth proposition.\n\n    [117] The wicked, before being annihilated, returned to the\n          world to disturb men; they entered into the body of\n          unclean animals, \"often that of a pig, as on the\n          Sarcophagus of Seti I. in the Soane\n          Museum.\"--Lenormant, _Chaldean Magic,_ p. 88, Editorial\n          Note.\n\n\nEND OF VOL. V\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nTHOMAS H. HUXLEY'S WORKS.\n\nCollected. Essays, 12mo, cloth, $1.25 per volume.\n  Vol. 1. Method and Results.\n    \"  2. Darwiniana.\n    \"  3. Science and Education.\n    \"  4. Science and Hebrew Tradition.\n    \"  5. Science and Christian Tradition.\n    \"  6. 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Ecclesiastical Institutions.\n         VII. Professional Institutions.\n        VIII. Industrial Institutions.\n\n     9. The Principles of Ethics. Vol. 1.\n           I. The Data of Ethics.\n          II. The Inductions of Ethics.\n         III. The Ethics of Individual Life.\n\n    10. The Principles of Ethics. Vol. 2.\n          IV. The Ethics of Social Life: Justice.\n           V. The Ethics of Social Life: Negative Beneficence.\n          VI. The Ethics of Social Life: Positive Beneficence.\n\nD. APPLETON AND COMPANY, NEW YORK.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nBOOKS BY PROF. G. FREDERICK WRIGHT.\n\nTHE SCIENTIFIC ASPECTS OF CHRISTIAN EVIDENCES.\n     By G. FREDERICK WRIGHT, D.D., LL.D., F.G.S.A.,\n     Professor of the Harmony of Science and Revelation, Oberlin College;\n     Author of \"The Logic of Christian Evidences,\"\n     \"The Ice Age in North America,\" etc.\n     Illustrated. 12mo. Cloth, $1.50.\n\n     This volume contains the ripest fruit of the author's varied\n     studies along the several cognate lines of evidence which\n     converge with special power in recent times to shed light\n     upon the foundations of Christianity. Among the subjects\n     discussed are Limits of Scientific Thought, Paradoxes of\n     Science, God and Nature, Darwinism and Design, Mediate\n     Miracles, Beyond Reasonable Doubt, The Newly Discovered\n     External Evidences, The Evidence of Textual Criticism,\n     Internal Evidence of the Early Date of the Gospel, and\n     Positive Results of the Cumulative Evidence. These chapters\n     are an elaboration of the Lowell Institute Lectures\n     delivered in Boston in 1896.\n\nGREENLAND ICEFIELDS, AND LIFE IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC.\n     With a New Discussion of the Causes of the Ice Age.\n     By G. FREDERICK WRIGHT, D.D., LL.D., F.G.S.A., Author of\n     \"The Ice Age in North America,\" \"Man and the Glacial\n     Period,\" etc., and WARREN UPHAM, A.M., F.G.S.A., late of the\n     Geological Surveys of New Hampshire, Minnesota, and the\n     United States. With numerous Maps and Illustrations. 12mo.\n     Cloth, $2.00.\n\nTHE ICE AGE IN NORTH AMERICA, and its Bearings upon the Antiquity of Man.\n     With an Appendix on \"The Probable Cause of Glaciation,\" by\n     WARREN UPHAM, F.G.S.A., Assistant on the Geological Surveys\n     of New Hampshire, Minnesota, and the United States. New and\n     enlarged edition. With 150 Maps and Illustrations. 8vo, 625\n     pages, and Index. Cloth, $5.00.\n\nMAN AND THE GLACIAL PERIOD.\n     International Scientific Series.\n     With numerous Illustrations. 12mo. Cloth, $1.75.\n\n     \"The earlier chapters describing glacial action, and the\n     traces of it in North America--especially the defining of\n     its limits, such as the terminal moraine of the great\n     movement itself--are of great interest and value The maps\n     and diagrams are of much assistance in enabling the reader\n     to grasp the vast extent of the movement.\"--_London\n     Spectator_.\n\nD. APPLETON AND COMPANY, NEW YORK.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nD. APPLETON AND COMPANY'S PUBLICATIONS.\n\nMISCELLANEOUS WORKS OF HERBERT SPENCER.\n\nSOCIAL STATICS.\n     New and revised edition, including \"The Man _versus_ The\n     State.\" A series of essays on political tendencies\n     heretofore published separately. 12mo. 420 pages. Cloth,\n     $2.00.\n\n     \"Mr. Spencer has thoroughly studied the issues which are\n     behind the social and political life of our own time, not\n     exactly those issues which are discussed in Parliament or in\n     Congress, but the principles of all modern government, which\n     are slowly changing in response to the broader industrial\n     and general development of human experience. One will obtain\n     no suggestions out of his book for guiding a political party\n     or carrying a point in economics, but he will find the\n     principles of sociology, as they pertain to the whole of\n     life, better stated in these pages than he can find them\n     expressed anywhere else. It is in this sense that this work\n     is important and fresh and vitalizing. It goes constantly to\n     the foundation of things.\"--_Boston Herald_.\n\nVARIOUS FRAGMENTS,\n     12mo. Cloth, $1.25.\n\n     Along with a considerable variety of other matter, these\n     \"Fragments\" include a number of replies to criticisms, among\n     which will be found some of the best specimens of Mr.\n     Spencer's controversial writings, notably his letter to the\n     London _Athenaeum_ on Professor Huxley's famous address on\n     Evolutionary Ethics. His views on copyright, national and\n     international, \"Social Evolution and Social Duty,\" and\n     \"Anglo-American Arbitration,\" also form a part of the\n     contents.\n\nEDUCATION: Intellectual, Moral, and Physical.\n     12mo. Paper, 50 cents; cloth, $1.25.\n\n     CONTENTS: What Knowledge is of most Worth? Intellectual\n     Education. Moral Education. Physical Education.\n\nTHE STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY.\n     The fifth volume in the International scientific Series.\n     12mo. Cloth, $1.50.\n\n     CONTENTS: Our need of it. Is there a Social Science? Nature\n     of the Social Science. Difficulties of the Social Science.\n     Objective Difficulties. Subjective Difficulties,\n     Intellectual. Subjective Difficulties, Emotional, The\n     Educational Bias. The Bias of Patriotism. The Class Bias.\n     The Political Bias. The Theological Bias. Discipline.\n     Preparation in Biology. Preparation in Psychology.\n     Conclusion.\n\nTHE INADEQUACY OF \"NATURAL SELECTION.\"\n     12mo. Paper, 30 cents.\n\n     This essay, in which Professor Weismann's theories are\n     criticised, is reprinted from the _Contemporary Review_, and\n     comprises a forcible presentation of Mr. Spencer's views\n     upon the general subject indicated in the title.\n\nD. APPLETON AND COMPANY, NEW YORK.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nPIONEERS OF SCIENCE IN AMERICA.\n     Sketches of their Lives and Scientific Work.\n     Edited and revised by WILLIAM JAY YOUMANS, M.D.\n     With Portraits. 8vo, Cloth, $4.00.\n\n     Impelled solely by an enthusiastic love of Nature, and\n     neither asking nor receiving outside aid, these early\n     workers opened the way and initiated the movement through\n     which American science has reached its present commanding\n     position. This book gives some account of these men, their\n     early struggles, their scientific labors, and, whenever\n     possible, something of their personal characteristics. This\n     information, often very difficult to obtain, has been\n     collected from a great variety of sources, with the utmost\n     care to secure accuracy. It is presented in a series of\n     sketches, some fifty in all, each with a single exception\n     accompanied with a well-authenticated portrait.\n\n     \"Fills a place that needed filling, and is likely to be\n     widely read.\"--_N.Y. Sun_.\n\n     \"It is certainly a useful and convenient volume, and\n     readable too, if we judge correctly of the degree of\n     accuracy of the whole by critical examination of those cases\n     in which our own knowledge enables us to form an opinion....\n     In general, it seems to us that the handy volume is\n     specially to be commended for setting in just historical\n     perspective many of the earlier scientists who are neither\n     very generally nor very well known.\"--_New York Evening\n     Post_.\n\n     \"A wonderfully interesting volume. Many a young man will\n     find it fascinating. The compilation of the book is a work\n     well done, well worth the doing.\"--_Philadelphia Press_.\n\n     \"One of the most valuable books which we have\n     received.\"--_Boston Advertiser_.\n\n     \"A book of no little educational value.... An extremely\n     valuable work of reference.\"--_Boston Beacon_.\n\n     \"A valuable handbook for those whose work runs on these same\n     lines, and is likely to prove of lasting interest to those\n     for whom '_les documents humain_' are second only to history\n     in importance--nay, are a vital part of history.\"--_Boston\n     Transcript_.\n\n     \"A biographical history of science in America, noteworthy\n     for its completeness and scope.... All of the sketches are\n     excellently prepared and unusually interesting.\"--_Chicago\n     Record_.\n\n     \"One of the most valuable contributions to American\n     literature recently made.... The pleasing style in which\n     these sketches are written, the plans taken to secure\n     accuracy, and the information conveyed, combine to give them\n     great value and interest. No better or more inspiring\n     reading could be placed in the hands of an intelligent and\n     aspiring young man.\"--_New York Christian Work_.\n\n     \"A book whose interest and value are not for to-day or\n     to-morrow, but for indefinite time.\"--_Rochester Herald_.\n\n     \"It is difficult to imagine a reader of ordinary\n     intelligence who would not be entertained by the book....\n     Conciseness, exactness, urbanity of tone, and\n     interestingness are the four qualities which chiefly impress\n     the reader of these sketches.\"--_Buffalo Express_.\n\n     \"Full of interesting and valuable matter.\"--_The Churchman_.\n\nNew York: D. APPLETON & CO., 72 Fifth Avenue.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nPIONEERS OF EVOLUTION, from Thales to Huxley.\n     By EDWARD CLODD, President of the Folk-Lore Society;\n     Author of \"The Story of Creation,\"\n     \"The Story of 'Primitive' Man,\" etc.\n     With Portraits. 12mo. Cloth. $1.50.\n\n     \"The mass of interesting material which Mr. Clodd has got\n     together and woven into a symmetrical story of the progress\n     from ignorance and theory to knowledge and the intelligent\n     recording of fact is prodigious.... The 'goal' to which Mr.\n     Clodd leads us in so masterly a fashion is but the starting\n     point of fresh achievements, and, in due course, fresh\n     theories. His book furnishes an important contribution to a\n     liberal education.\"--_London Daily Chronicle_.\n\n     \"We are always glad to meet Mr. Clodd. He is never dull; he\n     is always well informed, and he says what he has to say with\n     clearness and precision.... The interest intensifies as Mr.\n     Clodd attempts to show the part really played in the growth\n     of the doctrine of evolution by men like Wallace, Darwin,\n     Huxley, and Spencer.... We commend the book to those who\n     want to know what evolution really means.\"--_London Times_.\n\n     \"This is a book which was needed.... Altogether, the book\n     could hardly be better done. It is luminous, lucid, orderly,\n     and temperate. Above all, it is entirely free from personal\n     partisanship. Each chief actor is sympathetically treated,\n     and friendship is seldom or never allowed to overweight\n     sound judgment.\"--_London Academy_.\n\n     \"We can assure the reader that he will find in this work a\n     very useful guide to the lives and labors of leading\n     evolutionists of the past and present. Especially\n     serviceable is the account of Mr. Herbert Spencer and his\n     share in rediscovering evolution, and illustrating its\n     relations to the whole field of human knowledge. His\n     forcible style and wealth of metaphor make all that Mr.\n     Clodd writes arrestive and interesting.\"--_London Literary\n     World_.\n\n     \"Can not but prove welcome to fair-minded men.... To read it\n     is to have an object-lesson in the meaning of evolution....\n     There is no better book on the subject for the general\n     reader.... No one could go through the book without being\n     both refreshed and newly instructed by its masterly survey\n     of the growth of the most powerful idea of modern\n     times.\"--_The Scotsman_.\n\nD. APPLETON AND COMPANY, NEW YORK.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nEVOLUTION OF MAN AND CHRISTIANITY.\n     New edition. By the Rev. HOWARD MACQUEARY.\n     With a new Preface, in which the Author answers his Critics,\n     and with some important Additions. 12mo. Cloth, $1.75.\n\n     \"This is a revised and enlarged edition of a book published\n     last year. The author reviews criticisms upon the first\n     edition, denies that he rejects the doctrine of the\n     incarnation, admits his doubts of the physical resurrection\n     of Christ, and his belief in evolution. The volume is to be\n     marked as one of the most profound expressions of the modern\n     movement toward broader theological positions.\"--_Brooklyn\n     Times_.\n\n     \"He does not write with the animus of the destructive\n     school; he intends to be, and honestly believes he is, doing\n     a work of construction, or at least of reconstruction.... He\n     writes with manifest earnestness and conviction, and in a\n     style which is always clear and energetic.\"--_Churchman_.\n\nHISTORY OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE.\n     By Dr. JOHN WILLIAM DRAPER.\n     12mo. Cloth, $1.75.\n\n     \"The key-note to this volume is found in the antagonism\n     between the progressive tendencies of the human mind and the\n     pretensions of ecclesiastical authority, as developed in the\n     history of modern science. No previous writer has treated\n     the subject from this point of view, and the present\n     monograph will be found to possess no less originality of\n     conception than vigor of reasoning and wealth of\n     erudition.\"--_New York Tribune_.\n\nA CRITICAL HISTORY OF FREE THOUGHT IN REFERENCE TO THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION.\n     By Rev. Canon ADAM STOREY FARRAR, D.D., F.R.S., etc.\n     12mo. Cloth, $2.00.\n\n     \"A conflict might naturally be anticipated between the\n     reasoning faculties of man and a religion which claims the\n     right, on superhuman authority, to impose limits on the\n     field or manner of their exercise. It is the chief of the\n     movements of free thought which it is my purpose to\n     describe, in their historic succession, and their connection\n     with intellectual causes. We must ascertain the facts,\n     discover the causes, and read the moral.\"--_The Author_.\n\nCREATION OR EVOLUTION? A Philosophical Inquiry.\n     By GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS,\n     12mo. Cloth, $2.00.\n\n     \"A treatise on the great question of Creation or Evolution\n     by one who is neither a naturalist nor theologian, and who\n     does not profess to bring to the discussion a special\n     equipment in either of the sciences which the controversy\n     arrays against each other, may seem strange at first sight;\n     but Mr. Curtis will satisfy the reader, before many pages\n     have been turned, that he has a substantial contribution to\n     make to the debate, and that his book is one to be treated\n     with respect. His part is to apply to the reasonings of the\n     men of science the rigid scrutiny with which the lawyer is\n     accustomed to test the value and pertinency of testimony,\n     and the legitimacy of inferences from established\n     facts.\"--_New York Tribune_.\n\n     \"Mr. Curtis's book is honorably distinguished from a sadly\n     too great proportion of treatises which profess to discuss\n     the relation of scientific theories to religion, by its\n     author's thorough acquaintance with his subject, his\n     scrupulous fairness, and remarkable freedom from\n     passion.\"--_London Literary World_.\n\nD. APPLETON & CO., 72 Fifth Avenue, New York.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nTHE WARFARE OF SCIENCE WITH THEOLOGY.\nA History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom.\n     By ANDREW D. WHITE, LL.D., late President and\n     Professor of History at Cornell University.\n     In two volumes. 8vo. Cloth, $5.00.\n\n     \"The story of the struggle of searchers after truth with the\n     organized forces of ignorance, bigotry, and superstition is\n     the most inspiring chapter in the whole history of mankind.\n     That story has never been better told than by the\n     ex-President of Cornell University in these two volumes....\n     A wonderful story it is that he tells.\"--_London Daily\n     Chronicle_.\n\n     \"A literary event of prime importance is the appearance of\n     'A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in\n     Christendom.'\"--_Philadelphia Press_.\n\n     \"Such an honest and thorough treatment of the subject in all\n     its bearings that it will carry weight and be accepted as an\n     authority in tracing the process by which the scientific\n     method has come to be supreme in modern thought and\n     life.\"--_Boston Herald_.\n\n     \"A great work of a great man upon great subjects, and will\n     always be a religio-scientific classic.\"--_Chicago Evening\n     Post_.\n\n     \"It is graphic, lucid, even-tempered--never bitter nor\n     vindictive. No student of human progress should fail to read\n     these volumes. While they have about them the fascination of\n     a well-told tale, they are also crowded with the facts of\n     history that have had a tremendous bearing upon the\n     development of the race.\"--_Brooklyn Eagle_.\n\n     \"The same liberal spirit that marked his public life is seen\n     in the pages of his book, giving it a zest and interest that\n     can not fail to secure for it hearty commendation and honest\n     praise.\"--_Philadelphia Public Ledger_.\n\n     \"A conscientious summary of the body of learning to which it\n     relates accumulated during long years of research.... A\n     monument of industry.\"--_N.Y. Evening Post_.\n\n     \"A work which constitutes in many ways the most instructive\n     review that has ever been written of the evolution of human\n     knowledge in its conflict with dogmatic belief.... As a\n     contribution to the literature of liberal thought, the book\n     is one the importance of which can not be easily\n     overrated.\"--_Boston Beacon_.\n\n     \"The most valuable contribution that has yet been made to\n     the history of the conflicts between the theologists and the\n     scientists.\"--_Buffalo Commercial_.\n\n     \"Undoubtedly the most exhaustive treatise which has been\n     written on this subject.... Able, scholarly, critical,\n     impartial in tone and exhaustive in treatment.\"--_Boston\n     Advertiser_.\n\nNew York: D. APPLETON & CO., 72 Fifth Avenue.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nA NEW BOOK BY PROF. GROOS.\n\nTHE PLAY OF MAN.\n     By KARL GROOS, Professor of Philosophy in the University of\n     Basel, and author of \"The Play of Animals.\" Translated, with\n     the author's cooperation, by Elizabeth L. Baldwin, and\n     edited, with a Preface and Appendix, by Prof. J. Mark\n     Baldwin, of Princeton University. 12mo. Cloth, $1.50 net;\n     postage, 12 cents additional.\n\n     The results of Professor Groos's original and acute\n     investigations are of peculiar value to those who are\n     interested in psychology and sociology, and they are of\n     great importance to educators. He presents the\n     anthropological aspects of the subject treated in his\n     psychological study of the Play of Animals, which has\n     already become a classic. Professor Groos, who agrees with\n     the followers of Weismann, develops the great importance of\n     the child's play as tending to strengthen his inheritance in\n     the acquisition of adaptations to his environment. The\n     influence of play on character, and its relation to\n     education, are suggestively indicated. The playful\n     manifestations affecting the child himself and those\n     affecting his relations to others have been carefully\n     classified, and the reader is led from the simpler exercises\n     of the sensory apparatus through a variety of divisions to\n     inner imitations and social play. The biological, aesthetic,\n     ethical, and pedagogical standpoints receive much attention\n     from the investigator. While this book is an illuminating\n     contribution to scientific literature, it is of eminently\n     practical value. Its illustrations and lessons will be\n     studied and applied by educators, and the importance of this\n     original presentation of a most fertile subject will be\n     appreciated by parents as well as by those who are\n     interested as general students of sociological and\n     psychological themes.\n\nD. APPLETON AND COMPANY, NEW YORK.","title":"Collected Essays, Volume V: Science and Christian Tradition: Essays","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":112934}