{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_1616/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_1616","id":"gutenberg_1616","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1616","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Classics of Literature","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Classical literature","Language and languages -- Philosophy"],"text":"CRATYLUS\n\nBy Plato\n\nTranslated by Benjamin Jowett\n\n\nContents\n\n INTRODUCTION\n CRATYLUS\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\nThe Cratylus has always been a source of perplexity to the student of\nPlato. While in fancy and humour, and perfection of style and\nmetaphysical originality, this dialogue may be ranked with the best of\nthe Platonic writings, there has been an uncertainty about the motive\nof the piece, which interpreters have hitherto not succeeded in\ndispelling. We need not suppose that Plato used words in order to\nconceal his thoughts, or that he would have been unintelligible to an\neducated contemporary. In the Phaedrus and Euthydemus we also find a\ndifficulty in determining the precise aim of the author. Plato wrote\nsatires in the form of dialogues, and his meaning, like that of other\nsatirical writers, has often slept in the ear of posterity. Two causes\nmay be assigned for this obscurity: 1st, the subtlety and allusiveness\nof this species of composition; 2nd, the difficulty of reproducing a\nstate of life and literature which has passed away. A satire is\nunmeaning unless we can place ourselves back among the persons and\nthoughts of the age in which it was written. Had the treatise of\nAntisthenes upon words, or the speculations of Cratylus, or some other\nHeracleitean of the fourth century B.C., on the nature of language been\npreserved to us; or if we had lived at the time, and been \u201crich enough\nto attend the fifty-drachma course of Prodicus,\u201d we should have\nunderstood Plato better, and many points which are now attributed to\nthe extravagance of Socrates\u2019 humour would have been found, like the\nallusions of Aristophanes in the Clouds, to have gone home to the\nsophists and grammarians of the day.\n\nFor the age was very busy with philological speculation; and many\nquestions were beginning to be asked about language which were parallel\nto other questions about justice, virtue, knowledge, and were\nillustrated in a similar manner by the analogy of the arts. Was there a\ncorrectness in words, and were they given by nature or convention? In\nthe presocratic philosophy mankind had been striving to attain an\nexpression of their ideas, and now they were beginning to ask\nthemselves whether the expression might not be distinguished from the\nidea? They were also seeking to distinguish the parts of speech and to\nenquire into the relation of subject and predicate. Grammar and logic\nwere moving about somewhere in the depths of the human soul, but they\nwere not yet awakened into consciousness and had not found names for\nthemselves, or terms by which they might be expressed. Of these\nbeginnings of the study of language we know little, and there\nnecessarily arises an obscurity when the surroundings of such a work as\nthe Cratylus are taken away. Moreover, in this, as in most of the\ndialogues of Plato, allowance has to be made for the character of\nSocrates. For the theory of language can only be propounded by him in a\nmanner which is consistent with his own profession of ignorance. Hence\nhis ridicule of the new school of etymology is interspersed with many\ndeclarations \u201cthat he knows nothing,\u201d \u201cthat he has learned from\nEuthyphro,\u201d and the like. Even the truest things which he says are\ndepreciated by himself. He professes to be guessing, but the guesses of\nPlato are better than all the other theories of the ancients respecting\nlanguage put together.\n\nThe dialogue hardly derives any light from Plato\u2019s other writings, and\nstill less from Scholiasts and Neoplatonist writers. Socrates must be\ninterpreted from himself, and on first reading we certainly have a\ndifficulty in understanding his drift, or his relation to the two other\ninterlocutors in the dialogue. Does he agree with Cratylus or with\nHermogenes, and is he serious in those fanciful etymologies, extending\nover more than half the dialogue, which he seems so greatly to relish?\nOr is he serious in part only; and can we separate his jest from his\nearnest?\u2014_Sunt bona, sunt quaedum mediocria, sunt mala plura_. Most of\nthem are ridiculously bad, and yet among them are found, as if by\naccident, principles of philology which are unsurpassed in any ancient\nwriter, and even in advance of any philologer of the last century. May\nwe suppose that Plato, like Lucian, has been amusing his fancy by\nwriting a comedy in the form of a prose dialogue? And what is the final\nresult of the enquiry? Is Plato an upholder of the conventional theory\nof language, which he acknowledges to be imperfect? or does he mean to\nimply that a perfect language can only be based on his own theory of\nideas? Or if this latter explanation is refuted by his silence, then in\nwhat relation does his account of language stand to the rest of his\nphilosophy? Or may we be so bold as to deny the connexion between them?\n(For the allusion to the ideas at the end of the dialogue is merely\nintended to show that we must not put words in the place of things or\nrealities, which is a thesis strongly insisted on by Plato in many\nother passages)...These are some of the first thoughts which arise in\nthe mind of the reader of the Cratylus. And the consideration of them\nmay form a convenient introduction to the general subject of the\ndialogue.\n\nWe must not expect all the parts of a dialogue of Plato to tend equally\nto some clearly-defined end. His idea of literary art is not the\nabsolute proportion of the whole, such as we appear to find in a Greek\ntemple or statue; nor should his works be tried by any such standard.\nThey have often the beauty of poetry, but they have also the freedom of\nconversation. \u201cWords are more plastic than wax\u201d (Rep.), and may be\nmoulded into any form. He wanders on from one topic to another,\ncareless of the unity of his work, not fearing any \u201cjudge, or\nspectator, who may recall him to the point\u201d (Theat.), \u201cwhither the\nargument blows we follow\u201d (Rep.). To have determined beforehand, as in\na modern didactic treatise, the nature and limits of the subject, would\nhave been fatal to the spirit of enquiry or discovery, which is the\nsoul of the dialogue...These remarks are applicable to nearly all the\nworks of Plato, but to the Cratylus and Phaedrus more than any others.\nSee Phaedrus, Introduction.\n\nThere is another aspect under which some of the dialogues of Plato may\nbe more truly viewed:\u2014they are dramatic sketches of an argument. We\nhave found that in the Lysis, Charmides, Laches, Protagoras, Meno, we\narrived at no conclusion\u2014the different sides of the argument were\npersonified in the different speakers; but the victory was not\ndistinctly attributed to any of them, nor the truth wholly the property\nof any. And in the Cratylus we have no reason to assume that Socrates\nis either wholly right or wholly wrong, or that Plato, though he\nevidently inclines to him, had any other aim than that of personifying,\nin the characters of Hermogenes, Socrates, and Cratylus, the three\ntheories of language which are respectively maintained by them.\n\nThe two subordinate persons of the dialogue, Hermogenes and Cratylus,\nare at the opposite poles of the argument. But after a while the\ndisciple of the Sophist and the follower of Heracleitus are found to be\nnot so far removed from one another as at first sight appeared; and\nboth show an inclination to accept the third view which Socrates\ninterposes between them. First, Hermogenes, the poor brother of the\nrich Callias, expounds the doctrine that names are conventional; like\nthe names of slaves, they may be given and altered at pleasure. This is\none of those principles which, whether applied to society or language,\nexplains everything and nothing. For in all things there is an element\nof convention; but the admission of this does not help us to understand\nthe rational ground or basis in human nature on which the convention\nproceeds. Socrates first of all intimates to Hermogenes that his view\nof language is only a part of a sophistical whole, and ultimately tends\nto abolish the distinction between truth and falsehood. Hermogenes is\nvery ready to throw aside the sophistical tenet, and listens with a\nsort of half admiration, half belief, to the speculations of Socrates.\n\nCratylus is of opinion that a name is either a true name or not a name\nat all. He is unable to conceive of degrees of imitation; a word is\neither the perfect expression of a thing, or a mere inarticulate sound\n(a fallacy which is still prevalent among theorizers about the origin\nof language). He is at once a philosopher and a sophist; for while\nwanting to rest language on an immutable basis, he would deny the\npossibility of falsehood. He is inclined to derive all truth from\nlanguage, and in language he sees reflected the philosophy of\nHeracleitus. His views are not like those of Hermogenes, hastily taken\nup, but are said to be the result of mature consideration, although he\nis described as still a young man. With a tenacity characteristic of\nthe Heracleitean philosophers, he clings to the doctrine of the flux.\n(Compare Theaet.) Of the real Cratylus we know nothing, except that he\nis recorded by Aristotle to have been the friend or teacher of Plato;\nnor have we any proof that he resembled the likeness of him in Plato\nany more than the Critias of Plato is like the real Critias, or the\nEuthyphro in this dialogue like the other Euthyphro, the diviner, in\nthe dialogue which is called after him.\n\nBetween these two extremes, which have both of them a sophistical\ncharacter, the view of Socrates is introduced, which is in a manner the\nunion of the two. Language is conventional and also natural, and the\ntrue conventional-natural is the rational. It is a work not of chance,\nbut of art; the dialectician is the artificer of words, and the\nlegislator gives authority to them. They are the expressions or\nimitations in sound of things. In a sense, Cratylus is right in saying\nthat things have by nature names; for nature is not opposed either to\nart or to law. But vocal imitation, like any other copy, may be\nimperfectly executed; and in this way an element of chance or\nconvention enters in. There is much which is accidental or exceptional\nin language. Some words have had their original meaning so obscured,\nthat they require to be helped out by convention. But still the true\nname is that which has a natural meaning. Thus nature, art, chance, all\ncombine in the formation of language. And the three views respectively\npropounded by Hermogenes, Socrates, Cratylus, may be described as the\nconventional, the artificial or rational, and the natural. The view of\nSocrates is the meeting-point of the other two, just as conceptualism\nis the meeting-point of nominalism and realism.\n\nWe can hardly say that Plato was aware of the truth, that \u201clanguages\nare not made, but grow.\u201d But still, when he says that \u201cthe legislator\nmade language with the dialectician standing on his right hand,\u201d we\nneed not infer from this that he conceived words, like coins, to be\nissued from the mint of the State. The creator of laws and of social\nlife is naturally regarded as the creator of language, according to\nHellenic notions, and the philosopher is his natural advisor. We are\nnot to suppose that the legislator is performing any extraordinary\nfunction; he is merely the Eponymus of the State, who prescribes rules\nfor the dialectician and for all other artists. According to a truly\nPlatonic mode of approaching the subject, language, like virtue in the\nRepublic, is examined by the analogy of the arts. Words are works of\nart which may be equally made in different materials, and are well made\nwhen they have a meaning. Of the process which he thus describes, Plato\nhad probably no very definite notion. But he means to express generally\nthat language is the product of intelligence, and that languages belong\nto States and not to individuals.\n\nA better conception of language could not have been formed in Plato\u2019s\nage, than that which he attributes to Socrates. Yet many persons have\nthought that the mind of Plato is more truly seen in the vague realism\nof Cratylus. This misconception has probably arisen from two causes:\nfirst, the desire to bring Plato\u2019s theory of language into accordance\nwith the received doctrine of the Platonic ideas; secondly, the\nimpression created by Socrates himself, that he is not in earnest, and\nis only indulging the fancy of the hour.\n\n1. We shall have occasion to show more at length, in the Introduction\nto future dialogues, that the so-called Platonic ideas are only a\nsemi-mythical form, in which he attempts to realize abstractions, and\nthat they are replaced in his later writings by a rational theory of\npsychology. (See introductions to the Meno and the Sophist.) And in the\nCratylus he gives a general account of the nature and origin of\nlanguage, in which Adam Smith, Rousseau, and other writers of the last\ncentury, would have substantially agreed. At the end of the dialogue,\nhe speaks as in the Symposium and Republic of absolute beauty and good;\nbut he never supposed that they were capable of being embodied in\nwords. Of the names of the ideas, he would have said, as he says of the\nnames of the Gods, that we know nothing. Even the realism of Cratylus\nis not based upon the ideas of Plato, but upon the flux of Heracleitus.\nHere, as in the Sophist and Politicus, Plato expressly draws attention\nto the want of agreement in words and things. Hence we are led to\ninfer, that the view of Socrates is not the less Plato\u2019s own, because\nnot based upon the ideas; 2nd, that Plato\u2019s theory of language is not\ninconsistent with the rest of his philosophy.\n\n2. We do not deny that Socrates is partly in jest and partly in\nearnest. He is discoursing in a high-flown vein, which may be compared\nto the \u201cdithyrambics of the Phaedrus.\u201d They are mysteries of which he\nis speaking, and he professes a kind of ludicrous fear of his imaginary\nwisdom. When he is arguing out of Homer, about the names of Hector\u2019s\nson, or when he describes himself as inspired or maddened by Euthyphro,\nwith whom he has been sitting from the early dawn (compare Phaedrus and\nLysias; Phaedr.) and expresses his intention of yielding to the\nillusion to-day, and to-morrow he will go to a priest and be purified,\nwe easily see that his words are not to be taken seriously. In this\npart of the dialogue his dread of committing impiety, the pretended\nderivation of his wisdom from another, the extravagance of some of his\netymologies, and, in general, the manner in which the fun, fast and\nfurious, _vires acquirit eundo_, remind us strongly of the Phaedrus.\nThe jest is a long one, extending over more than half the dialogue. But\nthen, we remember that the Euthydemus is a still longer jest, in which\nthe irony is preserved to the very end. There he is parodying the\ningenious follies of early logic; in the Cratylus he is ridiculing the\nfancies of a new school of sophists and grammarians. The fallacies of\nthe Euthydemus are still retained at the end of our logic books; and\nthe etymologies of the Cratylus have also found their way into later\nwriters. Some of these are not much worse than the conjectures of\nHemsterhuis, and other critics of the last century; but this does not\nprove that they are serious. For Plato is in advance of his age in his\nconception of language, as much as he is in his conception of\nmythology. (Compare Phaedrus.)\n\nWhen the fervour of his etymological enthusiasm has abated, Socrates\nends, as he has begun, with a rational explanation of language. Still\nhe preserves his \u201cknow nothing\u201d disguise, and himself declares his\nfirst notions about names to be reckless and ridiculous. Having\nexplained compound words by resolving them into their original\nelements, he now proceeds to analyse simple words into the letters of\nwhich they are composed. The Socrates who \u201cknows nothing,\u201d here passes\ninto the teacher, the dialectician, the arranger of species. There is\nnothing in this part of the dialogue which is either weak or\nextravagant. Plato is a supporter of the Onomatopoetic theory of\nlanguage; that is to say, he supposes words to be formed by the\nimitation of ideas in sounds; he also recognises the effect of time,\nthe influence of foreign languages, the desire of euphony, to be\nformative principles; and he admits a certain element of chance. But he\ngives no imitation in all this that he is preparing the way for the\nconstruction of an ideal language. Or that he has any Eleatic\nspeculation to oppose to the Heracleiteanism of Cratylus.\n\nThe theory of language which is propounded in the Cratylus is in\naccordance with the later phase of the philosophy of Plato, and would\nhave been regarded by him as in the main true. The dialogue is also a\nsatire on the philological fancies of the day. Socrates in pursuit of\nhis vocation as a detector of false knowledge, lights by accident on\nthe truth. He is guessing, he is dreaming; he has heard, as he says in\nthe Phaedrus, from another: no one is more surprised than himself at\nhis own discoveries. And yet some of his best remarks, as for example\nhis view of the derivation of Greek words from other languages, or of\nthe permutations of letters, or again, his observation that in speaking\nof the Gods we are only speaking of our names of them, occur among\nthese flights of humour.\n\nWe can imagine a character having a profound insight into the nature of\nmen and things, and yet hardly dwelling upon them seriously; blending\ninextricably sense and nonsense; sometimes enveloping in a blaze of\njests the most serious matters, and then again allowing the truth to\npeer through; enjoying the flow of his own humour, and puzzling mankind\nby an ironical exaggeration of their absurdities. Such were\nAristophanes and Rabelais; such, in a different style, were Sterne,\nJean Paul, Hamann,\u2014writers who sometimes become unintelligible through\nthe extravagance of their fancies. Such is the character which Plato\nintends to depict in some of his dialogues as the Silenus Socrates; and\nthrough this medium we have to receive our theory of language.\n\nThere remains a difficulty which seems to demand a more exact answer:\nIn what relation does the satirical or etymological portion of the\ndialogue stand to the serious? Granting all that can be said about the\nprovoking irony of Socrates, about the parody of Euthyphro, or\nProdicus, or Antisthenes, how does the long catalogue of etymologies\nfurnish any answer to the question of Hermogenes, which is evidently\nthe main thesis of the dialogue: What is the truth, or correctness, or\nprinciple of names?\n\nAfter illustrating the nature of correctness by the analogy of the\narts, and then, as in the Republic, ironically appealing to the\nauthority of the Homeric poems, Socrates shows that the truth or\ncorrectness of names can only be ascertained by an appeal to etymology.\nThe truth of names is to be found in the analysis of their elements.\nBut why does he admit etymologies which are absurd, based on\nHeracleitean fancies, fourfold interpretations of words, impossible\nunions and separations of syllables and letters?\n\n1. The answer to this difficulty has been already anticipated in part:\nSocrates is not a dogmatic teacher, and therefore he puts on this wild\nand fanciful disguise, in order that the truth may be permitted to\nappear: 2. as Benfey remarks, an erroneous example may illustrate a\nprinciple of language as well as a true one: 3. many of these\netymologies, as, for example, that of dikaion, are indicated, by the\nmanner in which Socrates speaks of them, to have been current in his\nown age: 4. the philosophy of language had not made such progress as\nwould have justified Plato in propounding real derivations. Like his\nmaster Socrates, he saw through the hollowness of the incipient\nsciences of the day, and tries to move in a circle apart from them,\nlaying down the conditions under which they are to be pursued, but, as\nin the Timaeus, cautious and tentative, when he is speaking of actual\nphenomena. To have made etymologies seriously, would have seemed to him\nlike the interpretation of the myths in the Phaedrus, the task \u201cof a\nnot very fortunate individual, who had a great deal of time on his\nhands.\u201d The irony of Socrates places him above and beyond the errors of\nhis contemporaries.\n\nThe Cratylus is full of humour and satirical touches: the inspiration\nwhich comes from Euthyphro, and his prancing steeds, the light\nadmixture of quotations from Homer, and the spurious dialectic which is\napplied to them; the jest about the fifty-drachma course of Prodicus,\nwhich is declared on the best authority, viz. his own, to be a complete\neducation in grammar and rhetoric; the double explanation of the name\nHermogenes, either as \u201cnot being in luck,\u201d or \u201cbeing no speaker;\u201d the\ndearly-bought wisdom of Callias, the Lacedaemonian whose name was\n\u201cRush,\u201d and, above all, the pleasure which Socrates expresses in his\nown dangerous discoveries, which \u201cto-morrow he will purge away,\u201d are\ntruly humorous. While delivering a lecture on the philosophy of\nlanguage, Socrates is also satirizing the endless fertility of the\nhuman mind in spinning arguments out of nothing, and employing the most\ntrifling and fanciful analogies in support of a theory. Etymology in\nancient as in modern times was a favourite recreation; and Socrates\nmakes merry at the expense of the etymologists. The simplicity of\nHermogenes, who is ready to believe anything that he is told, heightens\nthe effect. Socrates in his genial and ironical mood hits right and\nleft at his adversaries: Ouranos is so called apo tou oran ta ano,\nwhich, as some philosophers say, is the way to have a pure mind; the\nsophists are by a fanciful explanation converted into heroes; \u201cthe\ngivers of names were like some philosophers who fancy that the earth\ngoes round because their heads are always going round.\u201d There is a\ngreat deal of \u201cmischief\u201d lurking in the following: \u201cI found myself in\ngreater perplexity about justice than I was before I began to learn;\u201d\n\u201cThe rho in katoptron must be the addition of some one who cares\nnothing about truth, but thinks only of putting the mouth into shape;\u201d\n\u201cTales and falsehoods have generally to do with the Tragic and goatish\nlife, and tragedy is the place of them.\u201d Several philosophers and\nsophists are mentioned by name: first, Protagoras and Euthydemus are\nassailed; then the interpreters of Homer, oi palaioi Omerikoi (compare\nArist. Met.) and the Orphic poets are alluded to by the way; then he\ndiscovers a hive of wisdom in the philosophy of Heracleitus;\u2014the\ndoctrine of the flux is contained in the word ousia (= osia the pushing\nprinciple), an anticipation of Anaxagoras is found in psuche and\nselene. Again, he ridicules the arbitrary methods of pulling out and\nputting in letters which were in vogue among the philologers of his\ntime; or slightly scoffs at contemporary religious beliefs. Lastly, he\nis impatient of hearing from the half-converted Cratylus the doctrine\nthat falsehood can neither be spoken, nor uttered, nor addressed; a\npiece of sophistry attributed to Gorgias, which reappears in the\nSophist. And he proceeds to demolish, with no less delight than he had\nset up, the Heracleitean theory of language.\n\nIn the latter part of the dialogue Socrates becomes more serious,\nthough he does not lay aside but rather aggravates his banter of the\nHeracleiteans, whom here, as in the Theaetetus, he delights to\nridicule. What was the origin of this enmity we can hardly\ndetermine:\u2014was it due to the natural dislike which may be supposed to\nexist between the \u201cpatrons of the flux\u201d and the \u201cfriends of the ideas\u201d\n(Soph.)? or is it to be attributed to the indignation which Plato felt\nat having wasted his time upon \u201cCratylus and the doctrines of\nHeracleitus\u201d in the days of his youth? Socrates, touching on some of\nthe characteristic difficulties of early Greek philosophy, endeavours\nto show Cratylus that imitation may be partial or imperfect, that a\nknowledge of things is higher than a knowledge of names, and that there\ncan be no knowledge if all things are in a state of transition. But\nCratylus, who does not easily apprehend the argument from common sense,\nremains unconvinced, and on the whole inclines to his former opinion.\nSome profound philosophical remarks are scattered up and down,\nadmitting of an application not only to language but to knowledge\ngenerally; such as the assertion that \u201cconsistency is no test of\ntruth:\u201d or again, \u201cIf we are over-precise about words, truth will say\n\u2018too late\u2019 to us as to the belated traveller in Aegina.\u201d\n\nThe place of the dialogue in the series cannot be determined with\ncertainty. The style and subject, and the treatment of the character of\nSocrates, have a close resemblance to the earlier dialogues, especially\nto the Phaedrus and Euthydemus. The manner in which the ideas are\nspoken of at the end of the dialogue, also indicates a comparatively\nearly date. The imaginative element is still in full vigour; the\nSocrates of the Cratylus is the Socrates of the Apology and Symposium,\nnot yet Platonized; and he describes, as in the Theaetetus, the\nphilosophy of Heracleitus by \u201cunsavoury\u201d similes\u2014he cannot believe that\nthe world is like \u201ca leaky vessel,\u201d or \u201ca man who has a running at the\nnose\u201d; he attributes the flux of the world to the swimming in some\nfolks\u2019 heads. On the other hand, the relation of thought to language is\nomitted here, but is treated of in the Sophist. These grounds are not\nsufficient to enable us to arrive at a precise conclusion. But we shall\nnot be far wrong in placing the Cratylus about the middle, or at any\nrate in the first half, of the series.\n\nCratylus, the Heracleitean philosopher, and Hermogenes, the brother of\nCallias, have been arguing about names; the former maintaining that\nthey are natural, the latter that they are conventional. Cratylus\naffirms that his own is a true name, but will not allow that the name\nof Hermogenes is equally true. Hermogenes asks Socrates to explain to\nhim what Cratylus means; or, far rather, he would like to know, What\nSocrates himself thinks about the truth or correctness of names?\nSocrates replies, that hard is knowledge, and the nature of names is a\nconsiderable part of knowledge: he has never been to hear the\nfifty-drachma course of Prodicus; and having only attended the\nsingle-drachma course, he is not competent to give an opinion on such\nmatters. When Cratylus denies that Hermogenes is a true name, he\nsupposes him to mean that he is not a true son of Hermes, because he is\nnever in luck. But he would like to have an open council and to hear\nboth sides.\n\nHermogenes is of opinion that there is no principle in names; they may\nbe changed, as we change the names of slaves, whenever we please, and\nthe altered name is as good as the original one.\n\nYou mean to say, for instance, rejoins Socrates, that if I agree to\ncall a man a horse, then a man will be rightly called a horse by me,\nand a man by the rest of the world? But, surely, there is in words a\ntrue and a false, as there are true and false propositions. If a whole\nproposition be true or false, then the parts of a proposition may be\ntrue or false, and the least parts as well as the greatest; and the\nleast parts are names, and therefore names may be true or false. Would\nHermogenes maintain that anybody may give a name to anything, and as\nmany names as he pleases; and would all these names be always true at\nthe time of giving them? Hermogenes replies that this is the only way\nin which he can conceive that names are correct; and he appeals to the\npractice of different nations, and of the different Hellenic tribes, in\nconfirmation of his view. Socrates asks, whether the things differ as\nthe words which represent them differ:\u2014Are we to maintain with\nProtagoras, that what appears is? Hermogenes has always been puzzled\nabout this, but acknowledges, when he is pressed by Socrates, that\nthere are a few very good men in the world, and a great many very bad;\nand the very good are the wise, and the very bad are the foolish; and\nthis is not mere appearance but reality. Nor is he disposed to say with\nEuthydemus, that all things equally and always belong to all men; in\nthat case, again, there would be no distinction between bad and good\nmen. But then, the only remaining possibility is, that all things have\ntheir several distinct natures, and are independent of our notions\nabout them. And not only things, but actions, have distinct natures,\nand are done by different processes. There is a natural way of cutting\nor burning, and a natural instrument with which men cut or burn, and\nany other way will fail;\u2014this is true of all actions. And speaking is a\nkind of action, and naming is a kind of speaking, and we must name\naccording to a natural process, and with a proper instrument. We cut\nwith a knife, we pierce with an awl, we weave with a shuttle, we name\nwith a name. And as a shuttle separates the warp from the woof, so a\nname distinguishes the natures of things. The weaver will use the\nshuttle well,\u2014that is, like a weaver; and the teacher will use the name\nwell,\u2014that is, like a teacher. The shuttle will be made by the\ncarpenter; the awl by the smith or skilled person. But who makes a\nname? Does not the law give names, and does not the teacher receive\nthem from the legislator? He is the skilled person who makes them, and\nof all skilled workmen he is the rarest. But how does the carpenter\nmake or repair the shuttle, and to what will he look? Will he not look\nat the ideal which he has in his mind? And as the different kinds of\nwork differ, so ought the instruments which make them to differ. The\nseveral kinds of shuttles ought to answer in material and form to the\nseveral kinds of webs. And the legislator ought to know the different\nmaterials and forms of which names are made in Hellas and other\ncountries. But who is to be the judge of the proper form? The judge of\nshuttles is the weaver who uses them; the judge of lyres is the player\nof the lyre; the judge of ships is the pilot. And will not the judge\nwho is able to direct the legislator in his work of naming, be he who\nknows how to use the names\u2014he who can ask and answer questions\u2014in\nshort, the dialectician? The pilot directs the carpenter how to make\nthe rudder, and the dialectician directs the legislator how he is to\nimpose names; for to express the ideal forms of things in syllables and\nletters is not the easy task, Hermogenes, which you imagine.\n\n\u201cI should be more readily persuaded, if you would show me this natural\ncorrectness of names.\u201d\n\nIndeed I cannot; but I see that you have advanced; for you now admit\nthat there is a correctness of names, and that not every one can give a\nname. But what is the nature of this correctness or truth, you must\nlearn from the Sophists, of whom your brother Callias has bought his\nreputation for wisdom rather dearly; and since they require to be paid,\nyou, having no money, had better learn from him at second-hand. \u201cWell,\nbut I have just given up Protagoras, and I should be inconsistent in\ngoing to learn of him.\u201d Then if you reject him you may learn of the\npoets, and in particular of Homer, who distinguishes the names given by\nGods and men to the same things, as in the verse about the river God\nwho fought with Hephaestus, \u201cwhom the Gods call Xanthus, and men call\nScamander;\u201d or in the lines in which he mentions the bird which the\nGods call \u201cChalcis,\u201d and men \u201cCymindis;\u201d or the hill which men call\n\u201cBatieia,\u201d and the Gods \u201cMyrinna\u2019s Tomb.\u201d Here is an important lesson;\nfor the Gods must of course be right in their use of names. And this is\nnot the only truth about philology which may be learnt from Homer. Does\nhe not say that Hector\u2019s son had two names\u2014\n\n\u201cHector called him Scamandrius, but the others Astyanax\u201d?\n\nNow, if the men called him Astyanax, is it not probable that the other\nname was conferred by the women? And which are more likely to be\nright\u2014the wiser or the less wise, the men or the women? Homer evidently\nagreed with the men: and of the name given by them he offers an\nexplanation;\u2014the boy was called Astyanax (\u201cking of the city\u201d), because\nhis father saved the city. The names Astyanax and Hector, moreover, are\nreally the same,\u2014the one means a king, and the other is \u201ca holder or\npossessor.\u201d For as the lion\u2019s whelp may be called a lion, or the\nhorse\u2019s foal a foal, so the son of a king may be called a king. But if\nthe horse had produced a calf, then that would be called a calf.\nWhether the syllables of a name are the same or not makes no\ndifference, provided the meaning is retained. For example; the names of\nletters, whether vowels or consonants, do not correspond to their\nsounds, with the exception of epsilon, upsilon, omicron, omega. The\nname Beta has three letters added to the sound\u2014and yet this does not\nalter the sense of the word, or prevent the whole name having the value\nwhich the legislator intended. And the same may be said of a king and\nthe son of a king, who like other animals resemble each other in the\ncourse of nature; the words by which they are signified may be\ndisguised, and yet amid differences of sound the etymologist may\nrecognise the same notion, just as the physician recognises the power\nof the same drugs under different disguises of colour and smell. Hector\nand Astyanax have only one letter alike, but they have the same\nmeaning; and Agis (leader) is altogether different in sound from\nPolemarchus (chief in war), or Eupolemus (good warrior); but the two\nwords present the same idea of leader or general, like the words\nIatrocles and Acesimbrotus, which equally denote a physician. The son\nsucceeds the father as the foal succeeds the horse, but when, out of\nthe course of nature, a prodigy occurs, and the offspring no longer\nresembles the parent, then the names no longer agree. This may be\nillustrated by the case of Agamemnon and his son Orestes, of whom the\nformer has a name significant of his patience at the siege of Troy;\nwhile the name of the latter indicates his savage, man-of-the-mountain\nnature. Atreus again, for his murder of Chrysippus, and his cruelty to\nThyestes, is rightly named Atreus, which, to the eye of the\netymologist, is ateros (destructive), ateires (stubborn), atreotos\n(fearless); and Pelops is o ta pelas oron (he who sees what is near\nonly), because in his eagerness to win Hippodamia, he was unconscious\nof the remoter consequences which the murder of Myrtilus would entail\nupon his race. The name Tantalus, if slightly changed, offers two\netymologies; either apo tes tou lithou talanteias, or apo tou\ntalantaton einai, signifying at once the hanging of the stone over his\nhead in the world below, and the misery which he brought upon his\ncountry. And the name of his father, Zeus, Dios, Zenos, has an\nexcellent meaning, though hard to be understood, because really a\nsentence which is divided into two parts (Zeus, Dios). For he, being\nthe lord and king of all, is the author of our being, and in him all\nlive: this is implied in the double form, Dios, Zenos, which being put\ntogether and interpreted is di on ze panta. There may, at first sight,\nappear to be some irreverence in calling him the son of Cronos, who is\na proverb for stupidity; but the meaning is that Zeus himself is the\nson of a mighty intellect; Kronos, quasi koros, not in the sense of a\nyouth, but quasi to katharon kai akeraton tou nou\u2014the pure and\ngarnished mind, which in turn is begotten of Uranus, who is so called\napo tou oran ta ano, from looking upwards; which, as philosophers say,\nis the way to have a pure mind. The earlier portion of Hesiod\u2019s\ngenealogy has escaped my memory, or I would try more conclusions of the\nsame sort. \u201cYou talk like an oracle.\u201d I caught the infection from\nEuthyphro, who gave me a long lecture which began at dawn, and has not\nonly entered into my ears, but filled my soul, and my intention is to\nyield to the inspiration to-day; and to-morrow I will be exorcised by\nsome priest or sophist. \u201cGo on; I am anxious to hear the rest.\u201d Now\nthat we have a general notion, how shall we proceed? What names will\nafford the most crucial test of natural fitness? Those of heroes and\nordinary men are often deceptive, because they are patronymics or\nexpressions of a wish; let us try gods and demi-gods. Gods are so\ncalled, apo tou thein, from the verb \u201cto run;\u201d because the sun, moon,\nand stars run about the heaven; and they being the original gods of the\nHellenes, as they still are of the Barbarians, their name is given to\nall Gods. The demons are the golden race of Hesiod, and by golden he\nmeans not literally golden, but good; and they are called demons, quasi\ndaemones, which in old Attic was used for daimones\u2014good men are well\nsaid to become daimones when they die, because they are knowing. Eros\n(with an epsilon) is the same word as eros (with an eta): \u201cthe sons of\nGod saw the daughters of men that they were fair;\u201d or perhaps they were\na species of sophists or rhetoricians, and so called apo tou erotan, or\neirein, from their habit of spinning questions; for eirein is\nequivalent to legein. I get all this from Euthyphro; and now a new and\ningenious idea comes into my mind, and, if I am not careful, I shall be\nwiser than I ought to be by to-morrow\u2019s dawn. My idea is, that we may\nput in and pull out letters at pleasure and alter the accents (as, for\nexample, Dii philos may be turned into Diphilos), and we may make words\ninto sentences and sentences into words. The name anthrotos is a case\nin point, for a letter has been omitted and the accent changed; the\noriginal meaning being o anathron a opopen\u2014he who looks up at what he\nsees. Psuche may be thought to be the reviving, or refreshing, or\nanimating principle\u2014e anapsuchousa to soma; but I am afraid that\nEuthyphro and his disciples will scorn this derivation, and I must find\nanother: shall we identify the soul with the \u201cordering mind\u201d of\nAnaxagoras, and say that psuche, quasi phuseche = e phusin echei or\nochei?\u2014this might easily be refined into psyche. \u201cThat is a more\nartistic etymology.\u201d\n\nAfter psuche follows soma; this, by a slight permutation, may be either\n= (1) the \u201cgrave\u201d of the soul, or (2) may mean \u201cthat by which the soul\nsignifies (semainei) her wishes.\u201d But more probably, the word is\nOrphic, and simply denotes that the body is the place of ward in which\nthe soul suffers the penalty of sin,\u2014en o sozetai. \u201cI should like to\nhear some more explanations of the names of the Gods, like that\nexcellent one of Zeus.\u201d The truest names of the Gods are those which\nthey give themselves; but these are unknown to us. Less true are those\nby which we propitiate them, as men say in prayers, \u201cMay he graciously\nreceive any name by which I call him.\u201d And to avoid offence, I should\nlike to let them know beforehand that we are not presuming to enquire\nabout them, but only about the names which they usually bear. Let us\nbegin with Hestia. What did he mean who gave the name Hestia? \u201cThat is\na very difficult question.\u201d O, my dear Hermogenes, I believe that there\nwas a power of philosophy and talk among the first inventors of names,\nboth in our own and in other languages; for even in foreign words a\nprinciple is discernible. Hestia is the same with esia, which is an old\nform of ousia, and means the first principle of things: this agrees\nwith the fact that to Hestia the first sacrifices are offered. There is\nalso another reading\u2014osia, which implies that \u201cpushing\u201d (othoun) is the\nfirst principle of all things. And here I seem to discover a delicate\nallusion to the flux of Heracleitus\u2014that antediluvian philosopher who\ncannot walk twice in the same stream; and this flux of his may\naccomplish yet greater marvels. For the names Cronos and Rhea cannot\nhave been accidental; the giver of them must have known something about\nthe doctrine of Heracleitus. Moreover, there is a remarkable\ncoincidence in the words of Hesiod, when he speaks of Oceanus, \u201cthe\norigin of Gods;\u201d and in the verse of Orpheus, in which he describes\nOceanus espousing his sister Tethys. Tethys is nothing more than the\nname of a spring\u2014to diattomenon kai ethoumenon. Poseidon is posidesmos,\nthe chain of the feet, because you cannot walk on the sea\u2014the epsilon\nis inserted by way of ornament; or perhaps the name may have been\noriginally polleidon, meaning, that the God knew many things (polla\neidos): he may also be the shaker, apo tou seiein,\u2014in this case, pi and\ndelta have been added. Pluto is connected with ploutos, because wealth\ncomes out of the earth; or the word may be a euphemism for Hades, which\nis usually derived apo tou aeidous, because the God is concerned with\nthe invisible. But the name Hades was really given him from his knowing\n(eidenai) all good things. Men in general are foolishly afraid of him,\nand talk with horror of the world below from which no one may return.\nThe reason why his subjects never wish to come back, even if they\ncould, is that the God enchains them by the strongest of spells, namely\nby the desire of virtue, which they hope to obtain by constant\nassociation with him. He is the perfect and accomplished Sophist and\nthe great benefactor of the other world; for he has much more than he\nwants there, and hence he is called Pluto or the rich. He will have\nnothing to do with the souls of men while in the body, because he\ncannot work his will with them so long as they are confused and\nentangled by fleshly lusts. Demeter is the mother and giver of food\u2014e\ndidousa meter tes edodes. Here is erate tis, or perhaps the legislator\nmay have been thinking of the weather, and has merely transposed the\nletters of the word aer. Pherephatta, that word of awe, is pheretapha,\nwhich is only an euphonious contraction of e tou pheromenou\nephaptomene,\u2014all things are in motion, and she in her wisdom moves with\nthem, and the wise God Hades consorts with her\u2014there is nothing very\nterrible in this, any more than in the her other appellation\nPersephone, which is also significant of her wisdom (sophe). Apollo is\nanother name, which is supposed to have some dreadful meaning, but is\nsusceptible of at least four perfectly innocent explanations. First, he\nis the purifier or purger or absolver (apolouon); secondly, he is the\ntrue diviner, Aplos, as he is called in the Thessalian dialect (aplos =\naplous, sincere); thirdly, he is the archer (aei ballon), always\nshooting; or again, supposing alpha to mean ama or omou, Apollo becomes\nequivalent to ama polon, which points to both his musical and his\nheavenly attributes; for there is a \u201cmoving together\u201d alike in music\nand in the harmony of the spheres. The second lambda is inserted in\norder to avoid the ill-omened sound of destruction. The Muses are so\ncalled\u2014apo tou mosthai. The gentle Leto or Letho is named from her\nwillingness (ethelemon), or because she is ready to forgive and forget\n(lethe). Artemis is so called from her healthy well-balanced nature,\ndia to artemes, or as aretes istor; or as a lover of virginity, aroton\nmisesasa. One of these explanations is probably true,\u2014perhaps all of\nthem. Dionysus is o didous ton oinon, and oinos is quasi oionous\nbecause wine makes those think (oiesthai) that they have a mind (nous)\nwho have none. The established derivation of Aphrodite dia ten tou\nathrou genesin may be accepted on the authority of Hesiod. Again, there\nis the name of Pallas, or Athene, which we, who are Athenians, must not\nforget. Pallas is derived from armed dances\u2014apo tou pallein ta opla.\nFor Athene we must turn to the allegorical interpreters of Homer, who\nmake the name equivalent to theonoe, or possibly the word was\noriginally ethonoe and signified moral intelligence (en ethei noesis).\nHephaestus, again, is the lord of light\u2014o tou phaeos istor. This is a\ngood notion; and, to prevent any other getting into our heads, let us\ngo on to Ares. He is the manly one (arren), or the unchangeable one\n(arratos). Enough of the Gods; for, by the Gods, I am afraid of them;\nbut if you suggest other words, you will see how the horses of\nEuthyphro prance. \u201cOnly one more God; tell me about my godfather\nHermes.\u201d He is ermeneus, the messenger or cheater or thief or\nbargainer; or o eirein momenos, that is, eiremes or ermes\u2014the speaker\nor contriver of speeches. \u201cWell said Cratylus, then, that I am no son\nof Hermes.\u201d Pan, as the son of Hermes, is speech or the brother of\nspeech, and is called Pan because speech indicates everything\u2014o pan\nmenuon. He has two forms, a true and a false; and is in the upper part\nsmooth, and in the lower part shaggy. He is the goat of Tragedy, in\nwhich there are plenty of falsehoods.\n\n\u201cWill you go on to the elements\u2014sun, moon, stars, earth, aether, air,\nfire, water, seasons, years?\u201d Very good: and which shall I take first?\nLet us begin with elios, or the sun. The Doric form elios helps us to\nsee that he is so called because at his rising he gathers (alizei) men\ntogether, or because he rolls about (eilei) the earth, or because he\nvariegates (aiolei = poikillei) the earth. Selene is an anticipation of\nAnaxagoras, being a contraction of selaenoneoaeia, the light (selas)\nwhich is ever old and new, and which, as Anaxagoras says, is borrowed\nfrom the sun; the name was harmonized into selanaia, a form which is\nstill in use. \u201cThat is a true dithyrambic name.\u201d Meis is so called apo\ntou meiousthai, from suffering diminution, and astron is from astrape\n(lightning), which is an improvement of anastrope, that which turns the\neyes inside out. \u201cHow do you explain pur n udor?\u201d I suspect that pur,\nwhich, like udor n kuon, is found in Phrygian, is a foreign word; for\nthe Hellenes have borrowed much from the barbarians, and I always\nresort to this theory of a foreign origin when I am at a loss. Aer may\nbe explained, oti airei ta apo tes ges; or, oti aei rei; or, oti pneuma\nex autou ginetai (compare the poetic word aetai). So aither quasi\naeitheer oti aei thei peri ton aera: ge, gaia quasi genneteira (compare\nthe Homeric form gegaasi); ora (with an omega), or, according to the\nold Attic form ora (with an omicron), is derived apo tou orizein,\nbecause it divides the year; eniautos and etos are the same thought\u2014o\nen eauto etazon, cut into two parts, en eauto and etazon, like di on ze\ninto Dios and Zenos.\n\n\u201cYou make surprising progress.\u201d True; I am run away with, and am not\neven yet at my utmost speed. \u201cI should like very much to hear your\naccount of the virtues. What principle of correctness is there in those\ncharming words, wisdom, understanding, justice, and the rest?\u201d To\nexplain all that will be a serious business; still, as I have put on\nthe lion\u2019s skin, appearances must be maintained. My opinion is, that\nprimitive men were like some modern philosophers, who, by always going\nround in their search after the nature of things, become dizzy; and\nthis phenomenon, which was really in themselves, they imagined to take\nplace in the external world. You have no doubt remarked, that the\ndoctrine of the universal flux, or generation of things, is indicated\nin names. \u201cNo, I never did.\u201d Phronesis is only phoras kai rou noesis,\nor perhaps phoras onesis, and in any case is connected with pheresthai;\ngnome is gones skepsis kai nomesis; noesis is neou or gignomenon esis;\nthe word neos implies that creation is always going on\u2014the original\nform was neoesis; sophrosune is soteria phroneseos; episteme is e\nepomene tois pragmasin\u2014the faculty which keeps close, neither\nanticipating nor lagging behind; sunesis is equivalent to sunienai,\nsumporeuesthai ten psuche, and is a kind of conclusion\u2014sullogismos tis,\nakin therefore in idea to episteme; sophia is very difficult, and has a\nforeign look\u2014the meaning is, touching the motion or stream of things,\nand may be illustrated by the poetical esuthe and the Lacedaemonian\nproper name Sous, or Rush; agathon is ro agaston en te tachuteti,\u2014for\nall things are in motion, and some are swifter than others: dikaiosune\nis clearly e tou dikaiou sunesis. The word dikaion is more troublesome,\nand appears to mean the subtle penetrating power which, as the lovers\nof motion say, preserves all things, and is the cause of all things,\nquasi diaion going through\u2014the letter kappa being inserted for the sake\nof euphony. This is a great mystery which has been confided to me; but\nwhen I ask for an explanation I am thought obtrusive, and another\nderivation is proposed to me. Justice is said to be o kaion, or the\nsun; and when I joyfully repeat this beautiful notion, I am answered,\n\u201cWhat, is there no justice when the sun is down?\u201d And when I entreat my\nquestioner to tell me his own opinion, he replies, that justice is fire\nin the abstract, or heat in the abstract; which is not very\nintelligible. Others laugh at such notions, and say with Anaxagoras,\nthat justice is the ordering mind. \u201cI think that some one must have\ntold you this.\u201d And not the rest? Let me proceed then, in the hope of\nproving to you my originality. Andreia is quasi anpeia quasi e ano roe,\nthe stream which flows upwards, and is opposed to injustice, which\nclearly hinders the principle of penetration; arren and aner have a\nsimilar derivation; gune is the same as gone; thelu is derived apo tes\ntheles, because the teat makes things flourish (tethelenai), and the\nword thallein itself implies increase of youth, which is swift and\nsudden ever (thein and allesthai). I am getting over the ground fast:\nbut much has still to be explained. There is techne, for instance.\nThis, by an aphaeresis of tau and an epenthesis of omicron in two\nplaces, may be identified with echonoe, and signifies \u201cthat which has\nmind.\u201d\n\n\u201cA very poor etymology.\u201d Yes; but you must remember that all language\nis in process of change; letters are taken in and put out for the sake\nof euphony, and time is also a great alterer of words. For example,\nwhat business has the letter rho in the word katoptron, or the letter\nsigma in the word sphigx? The additions are often such that it is\nimpossible to make out the original word; and yet, if you may put in\nand pull out, as you like, any name is equally good for any object. The\nfact is, that great dictators of literature like yourself should\nobserve the rules of moderation. \u201cI will do my best.\u201d But do not be too\nmuch of a precisian, or you will paralyze me. If you will let me add\nmechane, apo tou mekous, which means polu, and anein, I shall be at the\nsummit of my powers, from which elevation I will examine the two words\nkakia and arete. The first is easily explained in accordance with what\nhas preceded; for all things being in a flux, kakia is to kakos ion.\nThis derivation is illustrated by the word deilia, which ought to have\ncome after andreia, and may be regarded as o lian desmos tes psuches,\njust as aporia signifies an impediment to motion (from alpha not, and\nporeuesthai to go), and arete is euporia, which is the opposite of\nthis\u2014the everflowing (aei reousa or aeireite), or the eligible, quasi\nairete. You will think that I am inventing, but I say that if kakia is\nright, then arete is also right. But what is kakon? That is a very\nobscure word, to which I can only apply my old notion and declare that\nkakon is a foreign word. Next, let us proceed to kalon, aischron. The\nlatter is doubtless contracted from aeischoroun, quasi aei ischon roun.\nThe inventor of words being a patron of the flux, was a great enemy to\nstagnation. Kalon is to kaloun ta pragmata\u2014this is mind (nous or\ndianoia); which is also the principle of beauty; and which doing the\nworks of beauty, is therefore rightly called the beautiful. The meaning\nof sumpheron is explained by previous examples;\u2014like episteme,\nsignifying that the soul moves in harmony with the world (sumphora,\nsumpheronta). Kerdos is to pasi kerannumenon\u2014that which mingles with\nall things: lusiteloun is equivalent to to tes phoras luon to telos,\nand is not to be taken in the vulgar sense of gainful, but rather in\nthat of swift, being the principle which makes motion immortal and\nunceasing; ophelimon is apo tou ophellein\u2014that which gives increase:\nthis word, which is Homeric, is of foreign origin. Blaberon is to\nblamton or boulomenon aptein tou rou\u2014that which injures or seeks to\nbind the stream. The proper word would be boulapteroun, but this is too\nmuch of a mouthful\u2014like a prelude on the flute in honour of Athene. The\nword zemiodes is difficult; great changes, as I was saying, have been\nmade in words, and even a small change will alter their meaning very\nmuch. The word deon is one of these disguised words. You know that\naccording to the old pronunciation, which is especially affected by the\nwomen, who are great conservatives, iota and delta were used where we\nshould now use eta and zeta: for example, what we now call emera was\nformerly called imera; and this shows the meaning of the word to have\nbeen \u201cthe desired one coming after night,\u201d and not, as is often\nsupposed, \u201cthat which makes things gentle\u201d (emera). So again, zugon is\nduogon, quasi desis duein eis agogen\u2014(the binding of two together for\nthe purpose of drawing.) Deon, as ordinarily written, has an evil\nsense, signifying the chain (desmos) or hindrance of motion; but in its\nancient form dion is expressive of good, quasi diion, that which\npenetrates or goes through all. Zemiodes is really demiodes, and means\nthat which binds motion (dounti to ion): edone is e pros ten onrsin\nteinousa praxis\u2014the delta is an insertion: lupe is derived apo tes\ndialuseos tou somatos: ania is from alpha and ienai, to go: algedon is\na foreign word, and is so called apo tou algeinou: odune is apo tes\nenduseos tes lupes: achthedon is in its very sound a burden: chapa\nexpresses the flow of soul: terpsis is apo tou terpnou, and terpnon is\nproperly erpnon, because the sensation of pleasure is likened to a\nbreath (pnoe) which creeps (erpei) through the soul: euphrosune is\nnamed from pheresthai, because the soul moves in harmony with nature:\nepithumia is e epi ton thumon iousa dunamis: thumos is apo tes thuseos\ntes psuches: imeros\u2014oti eimenos pei e psuche: pothos, the desire which\nis in another place, allothi pou: eros was anciently esros, and so\ncalled because it flows into (esrei) the soul from without: doxa is e\ndioxis tou eidenai, or expresses the shooting from a bow (toxon). The\nlatter etymology is confirmed by the words boulesthai, boule, aboulia,\nwhich all have to do with shooting (bole): and similarly oiesis is\nnothing but the movement (oisis) of the soul towards essence. Ekousion\nis to eikon\u2014the yielding\u2014anagke is e an agke iousa, the passage through\nravines which impede motion: aletheia is theia ale, divine motion.\nPseudos is the opposite of this, implying the principle of constraint\nand forced repose, which is expressed under the figure of sleep, to\neudon; the psi is an addition. Onoma, a name, affirms the real\nexistence of that which is sought after\u2014on ou masma estin. On and ousia\nare only ion with an iota broken off; and ouk on is ouk ion. \u201cAnd what\nare ion, reon, doun?\u201d One way of explaining them has been already\nsuggested\u2014they may be of foreign origin; and possibly this is the true\nanswer. But mere antiquity may often prevent our recognizing words,\nafter all the complications which they have undergone; and we must\nremember that however far we carry back our analysis some ultimate\nelements or roots will remain which can be no further analyzed. For\nexample; the word agathos was supposed by us to be a compound of\nagastos and thoos, and probably thoos may be further resolvable. But if\nwe take a word of which no further resolution seems attainable, we may\nfairly conclude that we have reached one of these original elements,\nand the truth of such a word must be tested by some new method. Will\nyou help me in the search?\n\nAll names, whether primary or secondary, are intended to show the\nnature of things; and the secondary, as I conceive, derive their\nsignificance from the primary. But then, how do the primary names\nindicate anything? And let me ask another question,\u2014If we had no\nfaculty of speech, how should we communicate with one another? Should\nwe not use signs, like the deaf and dumb? The elevation of our hands\nwould mean lightness\u2014heaviness would be expressed by letting them drop.\nThe running of any animal would be described by a similar movement of\nour own frames. The body can only express anything by imitation; and\nthe tongue or mouth can imitate as well as the rest of the body. But\nthis imitation of the tongue or voice is not yet a name, because people\nmay imitate sheep or goats without naming them. What, then, is a name?\nIn the first place, a name is not a musical, or, secondly, a pictorial\nimitation, but an imitation of that kind which expresses the nature of\na thing; and is the invention not of a musician, or of a painter, but\nof a namer.\n\nAnd now, I think that we may consider the names about which you were\nasking. The way to analyze them will be by going back to the letters,\nor primary elements of which they are composed. First, we separate the\nalphabet into classes of letters, distinguishing the consonants, mutes,\nvowels, and semivowels; and when we have learnt them singly, we shall\nlearn to know them in their various combinations of two or more\nletters; just as the painter knows how to use either a single colour,\nor a combination of colours. And like the painter, we may apply letters\nto the expression of objects, and form them into syllables; and these\nagain into words, until the picture or figure\u2014that is, language\u2014is\ncompleted. Not that I am literally speaking of ourselves, but I mean to\nsay that this was the way in which the ancients framed language. And\nthis leads me to consider whether the primary as well as the secondary\nelements are rightly given. I may remark, as I was saying about the\nGods, that we can only attain to conjecture of them. But still we\ninsist that ours is the true and only method of discovery; otherwise we\nmust have recourse, like the tragic poets, to a Deus ex machina, and\nsay that God gave the first names, and therefore they are right; or\nthat the barbarians are older than we are, and that we learnt of them;\nor that antiquity has cast a veil over the truth. Yet all these are not\nreasons; they are only ingenious excuses for having no reasons.\n\nI will freely impart to you my own notions, though they are somewhat\ncrude:\u2014the letter rho appears to me to be the general instrument which\nthe legislator has employed to express all motion or kinesis. (I ought\nto explain that kinesis is just iesis (going), for the letter eta was\nunknown to the ancients; and the root, kiein, is a foreign form of\nienai: of kinesis or eisis, the opposite is stasis). This use of rho is\nevident in the words tremble, break, crush, crumble, and the like; the\nimposer of names perceived that the tongue is most agitated in the\npronunciation of this letter, just as he used iota to express the\nsubtle power which penetrates through all things. The letters phi, psi,\nsigma, zeta, which require a great deal of wind, are employed in the\nimitation of such notions as shivering, seething, shaking, and in\ngeneral of what is windy. The letters delta and tau convey the idea of\nbinding and rest in a place: the lambda denotes smoothness, as in the\nwords slip, sleek, sleep, and the like. But when the slipping tongue is\ndetained by the heavier sound of gamma, then arises the notion of a\nglutinous clammy nature: nu is sounded from within, and has a notion of\ninwardness: alpha is the expression of size; eta of length; omicron of\nroundness, and therefore there is plenty of omicron in the word\ngoggulon. That is my view, Hermogenes, of the correctness of names; and\nI should like to hear what Cratylus would say. \u201cBut, Socrates, as I was\ntelling you, Cratylus mystifies me; I should like to ask him, in your\npresence, what he means by the fitness of names?\u201d To this appeal,\nCratylus replies \u201cthat he cannot explain so important a subject all in\na moment.\u201d \u201cNo, but you may \u2018add little to little,\u2019 as Hesiod says.\u201d\nSocrates here interposes his own request, that Cratylus will give some\naccount of his theory. Hermogenes and himself are mere sciolists, but\nCratylus has reflected on these matters, and has had teachers. Cratylus\nreplies in the words of Achilles: \u201c\u2018Illustrious Ajax, you have spoken\nin all things much to my mind,\u2019 whether Euthyphro, or some Muse\ninhabiting your own breast, was the inspirer.\u201d Socrates replies, that\nhe is afraid of being self-deceived, and therefore he must \u201clook fore\nand aft,\u201d as Homer remarks. Does not Cratylus agree with him that names\nteach us the nature of things? \u201cYes.\u201d And naming is an art, and the\nartists are legislators, and like artists in general, some of them are\nbetter and some of them are worse than others, and give better or worse\nlaws, and make better or worse names. Cratylus cannot admit that one\nname is better than another; they are either true names, or they are\nnot names at all; and when he is asked about the name of Hermogenes,\nwho is acknowledged to have no luck in him, he affirms this to be the\nname of somebody else. Socrates supposes him to mean that falsehood is\nimpossible, to which his own answer would be, that there has never been\na lack of liars. Cratylus presses him with the old sophistical\nargument, that falsehood is saying that which is not, and therefore\nsaying nothing;\u2014you cannot utter the word which is not. Socrates\ncomplains that this argument is too subtle for an old man to\nunderstand: Suppose a person addressing Cratylus were to say, Hail,\nAthenian Stranger, Hermogenes! would these words be true or false? \u201cI\nshould say that they would be mere unmeaning sounds, like the hammering\nof a brass pot.\u201d But you would acknowledge that names, as well as\npictures, are imitations, and also that pictures may give a right or\nwrong representation of a man or woman:\u2014why may not names then equally\ngive a representation true and right or false and wrong? Cratylus\nadmits that pictures may give a true or false representation, but\ndenies that names can. Socrates argues, that he may go up to a man and\nsay \u201cthis is year picture,\u201d and again, he may go and say to him \u201cthis\nis your name\u201d\u2014in the one case appealing to his sense of sight, and in\nthe other to his sense of hearing;\u2014may he not? \u201cYes.\u201d Then you will\nadmit that there is a right or a wrong assignment of names, and if of\nnames, then of verbs and nouns; and if of verbs and nouns, then of the\nsentences which are made up of them; and comparing nouns to pictures,\nyou may give them all the appropriate sounds, or only some of them. And\nas he who gives all the colours makes a good picture, and he who gives\nonly some of them, a bad or imperfect one, but still a picture; so he\nwho gives all the sounds makes a good name, and he who gives only some\nof them, a bad or imperfect one, but a name still. The artist of names,\nthat is, the legislator, may be a good or he may be a bad artist. \u201cYes,\nSocrates, but the cases are not parallel; for if you subtract or\nmisplace a letter, the name ceases to be a name.\u201d Socrates admits that\nthe number 10, if an unit is subtracted, would cease to be 10, but\ndenies that names are of this purely quantitative nature. Suppose that\nthere are two objects\u2014Cratylus and the image of Cratylus; and let us\nimagine that some God makes them perfectly alike, both in their outward\nform and in their inner nature and qualities: then there will be two\nCratyluses, and not merely Cratylus and the image of Cratylus. But an\nimage in fact always falls short in some degree of the original, and if\nimages are not exact counterparts, why should names be? if they were,\nthey would be the doubles of their originals, and indistinguishable\nfrom them; and how ridiculous would this be! Cratylus admits the truth\nof Socrates\u2019 remark. But then Socrates rejoins, he should have the\ncourage to acknowledge that letters may be wrongly inserted in a noun,\nor a noun in a sentence; and yet the noun or the sentence may retain a\nmeaning. Better to admit this, that we may not be punished like the\ntraveller in Egina who goes about at night, and that Truth herself may\nnot say to us, \u201cToo late.\u201d And, errors excepted, we may still affirm\nthat a name to be correct must have proper letters, which bear a\nresemblance to the thing signified. I must remind you of what\nHermogenes and I were saying about the letter rho accent, which was\nheld to be expressive of motion and hardness, as lambda is of\nsmoothness;\u2014and this you will admit to be their natural meaning. But\nthen, why do the Eritreans call that skleroter which we call sklerotes?\nWe can understand one another, although the letter rho accent is not\nequivalent to the letter s: why is this? You reply, because the two\nletters are sufficiently alike for the purpose of expressing motion.\nWell, then, there is the letter lambda; what business has this in a\nword meaning hardness? \u201cWhy, Socrates, I retort upon you, that we put\nin and pull out letters at pleasure.\u201d And the explanation of this is\ncustom or agreement: we have made a convention that the rho shall mean\ns and a convention may indicate by the unlike as well as by the like.\nHow could there be names for all the numbers unless you allow that\nconvention is used? Imitation is a poor thing, and has to be\nsupplemented by convention, which is another poor thing; although I\nagree with you in thinking that the most perfect form of language is\nfound only where there is a perfect correspondence of sound and\nmeaning. But let me ask you what is the use and force of names? \u201cThe\nuse of names, Socrates, is to inform, and he who knows names knows\nthings.\u201d Do you mean that the discovery of names is the same as the\ndiscovery of things? \u201cYes.\u201d But do you not see that there is a degree\nof deception about names? He who first gave names, gave them according\nto his conception, and that may have been erroneous. \u201cBut then, why,\nSocrates, is language so consistent? all words have the same laws.\u201d\nMere consistency is no test of truth. In geometrical problems, for\nexample, there may be a flaw at the beginning, and yet the conclusion\nmay follow consistently. And, therefore, a wise man will take especial\ncare of first principles. But are words really consistent; are there\nnot as many terms of praise which signify rest as which signify motion?\nThere is episteme, which is connected with stasis, as mneme is with\nmeno. Bebaion, again, is the expression of station and position;\nistoria is clearly descriptive of the stopping istanai of the stream;\npiston indicates the cessation of motion; and there are many words\nhaving a bad sense, which are connected with ideas of motion, such as\nsumphora, amartia, etc.: amathia, again, might be explained, as e ama\ntheo iontos poreia, and akolasia as e akolouthia tois pragmasin. Thus\nthe bad names are framed on the same principle as the good, and other\nexamples might be given, which would favour a theory of rest rather\nthan of motion. \u201cYes; but the greater number of words express motion.\u201d\nAre we to count them, Cratylus; and is correctness of names to be\ndetermined by the voice of a majority?\n\nHere is another point: we were saying that the legislator gives names;\nand therefore we must suppose that he knows the things which he names:\nbut how can he have learnt things from names before there were any\nnames? \u201cI believe, Socrates, that some power more than human first gave\nthings their names, and that these were necessarily true names.\u201d Then\nhow came the giver of names to contradict himself, and to make some\nnames expressive of rest, and others of motion? \u201cI do not suppose that\nhe did make them both.\u201d Then which did he make\u2014those which are\nexpressive of rest, or those which are expressive of motion?...But if\nsome names are true and others false, we can only decide between them,\nnot by counting words, but by appealing to things. And, if so, we must\nallow that things may be known without names; for names, as we have\nseveral times admitted, are the images of things; and the higher\nknowledge is of things, and is not to be derived from names; and though\nI do not doubt that the inventors of language gave names, under the\nidea that all things are in a state of motion and flux, I believe that\nthey were mistaken; and that having fallen into a whirlpool themselves,\nthey are trying to drag us after them. For is there not a true beauty\nand a true good, which is always beautiful and always good? Can the\nthing beauty be vanishing away from us while the words are yet in our\nmouths? And they could not be known by any one if they are always\npassing away\u2014for if they are always passing away, the observer has no\nopportunity of observing their state. Whether the doctrine of the flux\nor of the eternal nature be the truer, is hard to determine. But no man\nof sense will put himself, or the education of his mind, in the power\nof names: he will not condemn himself to be an unreal thing, nor will\nhe believe that everything is in a flux like the water in a leaky\nvessel, or that the world is a man who has a running at the nose. This\ndoctrine may be true, Cratylus, but is also very likely to be untrue;\nand therefore I would have you reflect while you are young, and find\nout the truth, and when you know come and tell me. \u201cI have thought,\nSocrates, and after a good deal of thinking I incline to Heracleitus.\u201d\nThen another day, my friend, you shall give me a lesson. \u201cVery good,\nSocrates, and I hope that you will continue to study these things\nyourself.\u201d\n\n\nWe may now consider (I) how far Plato in the Cratylus has discovered\nthe true principles of language, and then (II) proceed to compare\nmodern speculations respecting the origin and nature of language with\nthe anticipations of his genius.\n\nI. (1) Plato is aware that language is not the work of chance; nor does\nhe deny that there is a natural fitness in names. He only insists that\nthis natural fitness shall be intelligibly explained. But he has no\nidea that language is a natural organism. He would have heard with\nsurprise that languages are the common work of whole nations in a\nprimitive or semi-barbarous age. How, he would probably have argued,\ncould men devoid of art have contrived a structure of such complexity?\nNo answer could have been given to this question, either in ancient or\nin modern times, until the nature of primitive antiquity had been\nthoroughly studied, and the instincts of man had been shown to exist in\ngreater force, when his state approaches more nearly to that of\nchildren or animals. The philosophers of the last century, after their\nmanner, would have vainly endeavoured to trace the process by which\nproper names were converted into common, and would have shown how the\nlast effort of abstraction invented prepositions and auxiliaries. The\ntheologian would have proved that language must have had a divine\norigin, because in childhood, while the organs are pliable, the\nintelligence is wanting, and when the intelligence is able to frame\nconceptions, the organs are no longer able to express them. Or, as\nothers have said: Man is man because he has the gift of speech; and he\ncould not have invented that which he is. But this would have been an\n\u201cargument too subtle\u201d for Socrates, who rejects the theological account\nof the origin of language \u201cas an excuse for not giving a reason,\u201d which\nhe compares to the introduction of the \u201cDeus ex machina\u201d by the tragic\npoets when they have to solve a difficulty; thus anticipating many\nmodern controversies in which the primary agency of the divine Being is\nconfused with the secondary cause; and God is assumed to have worked a\nmiracle in order to fill up a lacuna in human knowledge. (Compare\nTimaeus.)\n\nNeither is Plato wrong in supposing that an element of design and art\nenters into language. The creative power abating is supplemented by a\nmechanical process. \u201cLanguages are not made but grow,\u201d but they are\nmade as well as grow; bursting into life like a plant or a flower, they\nare also capable of being trained and improved and engrafted upon one\nanother. The change in them is effected in earlier ages by musical and\neuphonic improvements, at a later stage by the influence of grammar and\nlogic, and by the poetical and literary use of words. They develope\nrapidly in childhood, and when they are full grown and set they may\nstill put forth intellectual powers, like the mind in the body, or\nrather we may say that the nobler use of language only begins when the\nframe-work is complete. The savage or primitive man, in whom the\nnatural instinct is strongest, is also the greatest improver of the\nforms of language. He is the poet or maker of words, as in civilised\nages the dialectician is the definer or distinguisher of them. The\nlatter calls the second world of abstract terms into existence, as the\nformer has created the picture sounds which represent natural objects\nor processes. Poetry and philosophy\u2014these two, are the two great\nformative principles of language, when they have passed their first\nstage, of which, as of the first invention of the arts in general, we\nonly entertain conjecture. And mythology is a link between them,\nconnecting the visible and invisible, until at length the sensuous\nexterior falls away, and the severance of the inner and outer world, of\nthe idea and the object of sense, becomes complete. At a later period,\nlogic and grammar, sister arts, preserve and enlarge the decaying\ninstinct of language, by rule and method, which they gather from\nanalysis and observation.\n\n(2) There is no trace in any of Plato\u2019s writings that he was acquainted\nwith any language but Greek. Yet he has conceived very truly the\nrelation of Greek to foreign languages, which he is led to consider,\nbecause he finds that many Greek words are incapable of explanation.\nAllowing a good deal for accident, and also for the fancies of the\nconditores linguae Graecae, there is an element of which he is unable\nto give an account. These unintelligible words he supposes to be of\nforeign origin, and to have been derived from a time when the Greeks\nwere either barbarians, or in close relations to the barbarians.\nSocrates is aware that this principle is liable to great abuse; and,\nlike the \u201cDeus ex machina,\u201d explains nothing. Hence he excuses himself\nfor the employment of such a device, and remarks that in foreign words\nthere is still a principle of correctness, which applies equally both\nto Greeks and barbarians.\n\n(3) But the greater number of primary words do not admit of derivation\nfrom foreign languages; they must be resolved into the letters out of\nwhich they are composed, and therefore the letters must have a meaning.\nThe framers of language were aware of this; they observed that alpha\nwas adapted to express size; eta length; omicron roundness; nu\ninwardness; rho accent rush or roar; lambda liquidity; gamma lambda the\ndetention of the liquid or slippery element; delta and tau binding;\nphi, psi, sigma, xi, wind and cold, and so on. Plato\u2019s analysis of the\nletters of the alphabet shows a wonderful insight into the nature of\nlanguage. He does not expressively distinguish between mere imitation\nand the symbolical use of sound to express thought, but he recognises\nin the examples which he gives both modes of imitation. Gesture is the\nmode which a deaf and dumb person would take of indicating his meaning.\nAnd language is the gesture of the tongue; in the use of the letter rho\naccent, to express a rushing or roaring, or of omicron to express\nroundness, there is a direct imitation; while in the use of the letter\nalpha to express size, or of eta to express length, the imitation is\nsymbolical. The use of analogous or similar sounds, in order to express\nsimilar analogous ideas, seems to have escaped him.\n\nIn passing from the gesture of the body to the movement of the tongue,\nPlato makes a great step in the physiology of language. He was probably\nthe first who said that \u201clanguage is imitative sound,\u201d which is the\ngreatest and deepest truth of philology; although he is not aware of\nthe laws of euphony and association by which imitation must be\nregulated. He was probably also the first who made a distinction\nbetween simple and compound words, a truth second only in importance to\nthat which has just been mentioned. His great insight in one direction\ncuriously contrasts with his blindness in another; for he appears to be\nwholly unaware (compare his derivation of agathos from agastos and\nthoos) of the difference between the root and termination. But we must\nrecollect that he was necessarily more ignorant than any schoolboy of\nGreek grammar, and had no table of the inflexions of verbs and nouns\nbefore his eyes, which might have suggested to him the distinction.\n\n(4) Plato distinctly affirms that language is not truth, or\n\u201cphilosophie une langue bien faite.\u201d At first, Socrates has delighted\nhimself with discovering the flux of Heracleitus in language. But he is\ncovertly satirising the pretence of that or any other age to find\nphilosophy in words; and he afterwards corrects any erroneous inference\nwhich might be gathered from his experiment. For he finds as many, or\nalmost as many, words expressive of rest, as he had previously found\nexpressive of motion. And even if this had been otherwise, who would\nlearn of words when he might learn of things? There is a great\ncontroversy and high argument between Heracleiteans and Eleatics, but\nno man of sense would commit his soul in such enquiries to the imposers\nof names...In this and other passages Plato shows that he is as\ncompletely emancipated from the influence of \u201cIdols of the tribe\u201d as\nBacon himself.\n\nThe lesson which may be gathered from words is not metaphysical or\nmoral, but historical. They teach us the affinity of races, they tell\nus something about the association of ideas, they occasionally preserve\nthe memory of a disused custom; but we cannot safely argue from them\nabout right and wrong, matter and mind, freedom and necessity, or the\nother problems of moral and metaphysical philosophy. For the use of\nwords on such subjects may often be metaphorical, accidental, derived\nfrom other languages, and may have no relation to the contemporary\nstate of thought and feeling. Nor in any case is the invention of them\nthe result of philosophical reflection; they have been commonly\ntransferred from matter to mind, and their meaning is the very reverse\nof their etymology. Because there is or is not a name for a thing, we\ncannot argue that the thing has or has not an actual existence; or that\nthe antitheses, parallels, conjugates, correlatives of language have\nanything corresponding to them in nature. There are too many words as\nwell as too few; and they generalize the objects or ideas which they\nrepresent. The greatest lesson which the philosophical analysis of\nlanguage teaches us is, that we should be above language, making words\nour servants, and not allowing them to be our masters.\n\nPlato does not add the further observation, that the etymological\nmeaning of words is in process of being lost. If at first framed on a\nprinciple of intelligibility, they would gradually cease to be\nintelligible, like those of a foreign language, he is willing to admit\nthat they are subject to many changes, and put on many disguises. He\nacknowledges that the \u201cpoor creature\u201d imitation is supplemented by\nanother \u201cpoor creature,\u201d\u2014convention. But he does not see that \u201chabit\nand repute,\u201d and their relation to other words, are always exercising\nan influence over them. Words appear to be isolated, but they are\nreally the parts of an organism which is always being reproduced. They\nare refined by civilization, harmonized by poetry, emphasized by\nliterature, technically applied in philosophy and art; they are used as\nsymbols on the border-ground of human knowledge; they receive a fresh\nimpress from individual genius, and come with a new force and\nassociation to every lively-minded person. They are fixed by the\nsimultaneous utterance of millions, and yet are always imperceptibly\nchanging;\u2014not the inventors of language, but writing and speaking, and\nparticularly great writers, or works which pass into the hearts of\nnations, Homer, Shakespear, Dante, the German or English Bible, Kant\nand Hegel, are the makers of them in later ages. They carry with them\nthe faded recollection of their own past history; the use of a word in\na striking and familiar passage gives a complexion to its use\neverywhere else, and the new use of an old and familiar phrase has also\na peculiar power over us. But these and other subtleties of language\nescaped the observation of Plato. He is not aware that the languages of\nthe world are organic structures, and that every word in them is\nrelated to every other; nor does he conceive of language as the joint\nwork of the speaker and the hearer, requiring in man a faculty not only\nof expressing his thoughts but of understanding those of others.\n\nOn the other hand, he cannot be justly charged with a desire to frame\nlanguage on artificial principles. Philosophers have sometimes dreamed\nof a technical or scientific language, in words which should have fixed\nmeanings, and stand in the same relation to one another as the\nsubstances which they denote. But there is no more trace of this in\nPlato than there is of a language corresponding to the ideas; nor,\nindeed, could the want of such a language be felt until the sciences\nwere far more developed. Those who would extend the use of technical\nphraseology beyond the limits of science or of custom, seem to forget\nthat freedom and suggestiveness and the play of association are\nessential characteristics of language. The great master has shown how\nhe regarded pedantic distinctions of words or attempts to confine their\nmeaning in the satire on Prodicus in the Protagoras.\n\n(5) In addition to these anticipations of the general principles of\nphilology, we may note also a few curious observations on words and\nsounds. \u201cThe Eretrians say sklerotes for skleroter;\u201d \u201cthe Thessalians\ncall Apollo Amlos;\u201d \u201cThe Phrygians have the words pur, udor, kunes\nslightly changed;\u201d \u201cthere is an old Homeric word emesato, meaning \u2018he\ncontrived\u2019;\u201d \u201cour forefathers, and especially the women, who are most\nconservative of the ancient language, loved the letters iota and delta;\nbut now iota is changed into eta and epsilon, and delta into zeta; this\nis supposed to increase the grandeur of the sound.\u201d Plato was very\nwilling to use inductive arguments, so far as they were within his\nreach; but he would also have assigned a large influence to chance. Nor\nindeed is induction applicable to philology in the same degree as to\nmost of the physical sciences. For after we have pushed our researches\nto the furthest point, in language as in all the other creations of the\nhuman mind, there will always remain an element of exception or\naccident or free-will, which cannot be eliminated.\n\nThe question, \u201cwhether falsehood is impossible,\u201d which Socrates\ncharacteristically sets aside as too subtle for an old man (compare\nEuthyd.), could only have arisen in an age of imperfect consciousness,\nwhich had not yet learned to distinguish words from things. Socrates\nreplies in effect that words have an independent existence; thus\nanticipating the solution of the mediaeval controversy of Nominalism\nand Realism. He is aware too that languages exist in various degrees of\nperfection, and that the analysis of them can only be carried to a\ncertain point. \u201cIf we could always, or almost always, use likenesses,\nwhich are the appropriate expressions, that would be the most perfect\nstate of language.\u201d These words suggest a question of deeper interest\nthan the origin of language; viz. what is the ideal of language, how\nfar by any correction of their usages existing languages might become\nclearer and more expressive than they are, more poetical, and also more\nlogical; or whether they are now finally fixed and have received their\nlast impress from time and authority.\n\nOn the whole, the Cratylus seems to contain deeper truths about\nlanguage than any other ancient writing. But feeling the uncertain\nground upon which he is walking, and partly in order to preserve the\ncharacter of Socrates, Plato envelopes the whole subject in a robe of\nfancy, and allows his principles to drop out as if by accident.\n\nII. What is the result of recent speculations about the origin and\nnature of language? Like other modern metaphysical enquiries, they end\nat last in a statement of facts. But, in order to state or understand\nthe facts, a metaphysical insight seems to be required. There are more\nthings in language than the human mind easily conceives. And many\nfallacies have to be dispelled, as well as observations made. The true\nspirit of philosophy or metaphysics can alone charm away metaphysical\nillusions, which are always reappearing, formerly in the fancies of\nneoplatonist writers, now in the disguise of experience and common\nsense. An analogy, a figure of speech, an intelligible theory, a\nsuperficial observation of the individual, have often been mistaken for\na true account of the origin of language.\n\nSpeaking is one of the simplest natural operations, and also the most\ncomplex. Nothing would seem to be easier or more trivial than a few\nwords uttered by a child in any language. Yet into the formation of\nthose words have entered causes which the human mind is not capable of\ncalculating. They are a drop or two of the great stream or ocean of\nspeech which has been flowing in all ages. They have been transmitted\nfrom one language to another; like the child himself, they go back to\nthe beginnings of the human race. How they originated, who can tell?\nNevertheless we can imagine a stage of human society in which the\ncircle of men\u2019s minds was narrower and their sympathies and instincts\nstronger; in which their organs of speech were more flexible, and the\nsense of hearing finer and more discerning; in which they lived more in\ncompany, and after the manner of children were more given to express\ntheir feelings; in which \u201cthey moved all together,\u201d like a herd of wild\nanimals, \u201cwhen they moved at all.\u201d Among them, as in every society, a\nparticular person would be more sensitive and intelligent than the\nrest. Suddenly, on some occasion of interest (at the approach of a wild\nbeast, shall we say?), he first, they following him, utter a cry which\nresounds through the forest. The cry is almost or quite involuntary,\nand may be an imitation of the roar of the animal. Thus far we have not\nspeech, but only the inarticulate expression of feeling or emotion in\nno respect differing from the cries of animals; for they too call to\none another and are answered. But now suppose that some one at a\ndistance not only hears the sound, but apprehends the meaning: or we\nmay imagine that the cry is repeated to a member of the society who had\nbeen absent; the others act the scene over again when he returns home\nin the evening. And so the cry becomes a word. The hearer in turn gives\nback the word to the speaker, who is now aware that he has acquired a\nnew power. Many thousand times he exercises this power; like a child\nlearning to talk, he repeats the same cry again, and again he is\nanswered; he tries experiments with a like result, and the speaker and\nthe hearer rejoice together in their newly-discovered faculty. At first\nthere would be few such cries, and little danger of mistaking or\nconfusing them. For the mind of primitive man had a narrow range of\nperceptions and feelings; his senses were microscopic; twenty or thirty\nsounds or gestures would be enough for him, nor would he have any\ndifficulty in finding them. Naturally he broke out into speech\u2014like the\nyoung infant he laughed and babbled; but not until there were hearers\nas well as speakers did language begin. Not the interjection or the\nvocal imitation of the object, but the interjection or the vocal\nimitation of the object understood, is the first rudiment of human\nspeech.\n\nAfter a while the word gathers associations, and has an independent\nexistence. The imitation of the lion\u2019s roar calls up the fears and\nhopes of the chase, which are excited by his appearance. In the moment\nof hearing the sound, without any appreciable interval, these and other\nlatent experiences wake up in the mind of the hearer. Not only does he\nreceive an impression, but he brings previous knowledge to bear upon\nthat impression. Necessarily the pictorial image becomes less vivid,\nwhile the association of the nature and habits of the animal is more\ndistinctly perceived. The picture passes into a symbol, for there would\nbe too many of them and they would crowd the mind; the vocal imitation,\ntoo, is always in process of being lost and being renewed, just as the\npicture is brought back again in the description of the poet. Words now\ncan be used more freely because there are more of them. What was once\nan involuntary expression becomes voluntary. Not only can men utter a\ncry or call, but they can communicate and converse; they can not only\nuse words, but they can even play with them. The word is separated both\nfrom the object and from the mind; and slowly nations and individuals\nattain to a fuller consciousness of themselves.\n\nParallel with this mental process the articulation of sounds is\ngradually becoming perfected. The finer sense detects the differences\nof them, and begins, first to agglomerate, then to distinguish them.\nTimes, persons, places, relations of all kinds, are expressed by\nmodifications of them. The earliest parts of speech, as we may call\nthem by anticipation, like the first utterances of children, probably\npartook of the nature of interjections and nouns; then came verbs; at\nlength the whole sentence appeared, and rhythm and metre followed. Each\nstage in the progress of language was accompanied by some corresponding\nstage in the mind and civilisation of man. In time, when the family\nbecame a nation, the wild growth of dialects passed into a language.\nThen arose poetry and literature. We can hardly realize to ourselves\nhow much with each improvement of language the powers of the human mind\nwere enlarged; how the inner world took the place of outer; how the\npictorial or symbolical or analogical word was refined into a notion;\nhow language, fair and large and free, was at last complete.\n\nSo we may imagine the speech of man to have begun as with the cries of\nanimals, or the stammering lips of children, and to have attained by\ndegrees the perfection of Homer and Plato. Yet we are far from saying\nthat this or any other theory of language is proved by facts. It is not\ndifficult to form an hypothesis which by a series of imaginary\ntransitions will bridge over the chasm which separates man from the\nanimals. Differences of kind may often be thus resolved into\ndifferences of degree. But we must not assume that we have in this way\ndiscovered the true account of them. Through what struggles the\nharmonious use of the organs of speech was acquired; to what extent the\nconditions of human life were different; how far the genius of\nindividuals may have contributed to the discovery of this as of the\nother arts, we cannot say: Only we seem to see that language is as much\nthe creation of the ear as of the tongue, and the expression of a\nmovement stirring the hearts not of one man only but of many, \u201cas the\ntrees of the wood are stirred by the wind.\u201d The theory is consistent or\nnot inconsistent with our own mental experience, and throws some degree\nof light upon a dark corner of the human mind.\n\nIn the later analysis of language, we trace the opposite and contrasted\nelements of the individual and nation, of the past and present, of the\ninward and outward, of the subject and object, of the notional and\nrelational, of the root or unchanging part of the word and of the\nchanging inflexion, if such a distinction be admitted, of the vowel and\nthe consonant, of quantity and accent, of speech and writing, of poetry\nand prose. We observe also the reciprocal influence of sounds and\nconceptions on each other, like the connexion of body and mind; and\nfurther remark that although the names of objects were originally\nproper names, as the grammarian or logician might call them, yet at a\nlater stage they become universal notions, which combine into\nparticulars and individuals, and are taken out of the first rude\nagglomeration of sounds that they may be replaced in a higher and more\nlogical order. We see that in the simplest sentences are contained\ngrammar and logic\u2014the parts of speech, the Eleatic philosophy and the\nKantian categories. So complex is language, and so expressive not only\nof the meanest wants of man, but of his highest thoughts; so various\nare the aspects in which it is regarded by us. Then again, when we\nfollow the history of languages, we observe that they are always slowly\nmoving, half dead, half alive, half solid, half fluid; the breath of a\nmoment, yet like the air, continuous in all ages and countries,\u2014like\nthe glacier, too, containing within them a trickling stream which\ndeposits debris of the rocks over which it passes. There were happy\nmoments, as we may conjecture, in the lives of nations, at which they\ncame to the birth\u2014as in the golden age of literature, the man and the\ntime seem to conspire; the eloquence of the bard or chief, as in later\ntimes the creations of the great writer who is the expression of his\nage, became impressed on the minds of their countrymen, perhaps in the\nhour of some crisis of national development\u2014a migration, a conquest, or\nthe like. The picture of the word which was beginning to be lost, is\nnow revived; the sound again echoes to the sense; men find themselves\ncapable not only of expressing more feelings, and describing more\nobjects, but of expressing and describing them better. The world before\nthe flood, that is to say, the world of ten, twenty, a hundred thousand\nyears ago, has passed away and left no sign. But the best conception\nthat we can form of it, though imperfect and uncertain, is gained from\nthe analogy of causes still in action, some powerful and sudden, others\nworking slowly in the course of infinite ages. Something too may be\nallowed to \u201cthe persistency of the strongest,\u201d to \u201cthe survival of the\nfittest,\u201d in this as in the other realms of nature.\n\nThese are some of the reflections which the modern philosophy of\nlanguage suggests to us about the powers of the human mind and the\nforces and influences by which the efforts of men to utter articulate\nsounds were inspired. Yet in making these and similar generalizations\nwe may note also dangers to which we are exposed. (1) There is the\nconfusion of ideas with facts\u2014of mere possibilities, and generalities,\nand modes of conception with actual and definite knowledge. The words\n\u201cevolution,\u201d \u201cbirth,\u201d \u201claw,\u201d development,\u201d \u201cinstinct,\u201d \u201cimplicit,\u201d\n\u201cexplicit,\u201d and the like, have a false clearness or comprehensiveness,\nwhich adds nothing to our knowledge. The metaphor of a flower or a\ntree, or some other work of nature or art, is often in like manner only\na pleasing picture. (2) There is the fallacy of resolving the languages\nwhich we know into their parts, and then imagining that we can discover\nthe nature of language by reconstructing them. (3) There is the danger\nof identifying language, not with thoughts but with ideas. (4) There is\nthe error of supposing that the analysis of grammar and logic has\nalways existed, or that their distinctions were familiar to Socrates\nand Plato. (5) There is the fallacy of exaggerating, and also of\ndiminishing the interval which separates articulate from inarticulate\nlanguage\u2014the cries of animals from the speech of man\u2014the instincts of\nanimals from the reason of man. (6) There is the danger which besets\nall enquiries into the early history of man\u2014of interpreting the past by\nthe present, and of substituting the definite and intelligible for the\ntrue but dim outline which is the horizon of human knowledge.\n\nThe greatest light is thrown upon the nature of language by analogy. We\nhave the analogy of the cries of animals, of the songs of birds (\u201cman,\nlike the nightingale, is a singing bird, but is ever binding up\nthoughts with musical notes\u201d), of music, of children learning to speak,\nof barbarous nations in which the linguistic instinct is still\nundecayed, of ourselves learning to think and speak a new language, of\nthe deaf and dumb who have words without sounds, of the various\ndisorders of speech; and we have the after-growth of mythology, which,\nlike language, is an unconscious creation of the human mind. We can\nobserve the social and collective instincts of animals, and may remark\nhow, when domesticated, they have the power of understanding but not of\nspeaking, while on the other hand, some birds which are comparatively\ndevoid of intelligence, make a nearer approach to articulate speech. We\nmay note how in the animals there is a want of that sympathy with one\nanother which appears to be the soul of language. We can compare the\nuse of speech with other mental and bodily operations; for speech too\nis a kind of gesture, and in the child or savage accompanied with\ngesture. We may observe that the child learns to speak, as he learns to\nwalk or to eat, by a natural impulse; yet in either case not without a\npower of imitation which is also natural to him\u2014he is taught to read,\nbut he breaks forth spontaneously in speech. We can trace the impulse\nto bind together the world in ideas beginning in the first efforts to\nspeak and culminating in philosophy. But there remains an element which\ncannot be explained, or even adequately described. We can understand\nhow man creates or constructs consciously and by design; and see, if we\ndo not understand, how nature, by a law, calls into being an organised\nstructure. But the intermediate organism which stands between man and\nnature, which is the work of mind yet unconscious, and in which mind\nand matter seem to meet, and mind unperceived to herself is really\nlimited by all other minds, is neither understood nor seen by us, and\nis with reluctance admitted to be a fact.\n\nLanguage is an aspect of man, of nature, and of nations, the\ntransfiguration of the world in thought, the meeting-point of the\nphysical and mental sciences, and also the mirror in which they are\nreflected, present at every moment to the individual, and yet having a\nsort of eternal or universal nature. When we analyze our own mental\nprocesses, we find words everywhere in every degree of clearness and\nconsistency, fading away in dreams and more like pictures, rapidly\nsucceeding one another in our waking thoughts, attaining a greater\ndistinctness and consecutiveness in speech, and a greater still in\nwriting, taking the place of one another when we try to become\nemancipated from their influence. For in all processes of the mind\nwhich are conscious we are talking to ourselves; the attempt to think\nwithout words is a mere illusion,\u2014they are always reappearing when we\nfix our thoughts. And speech is not a separate faculty, but the\nexpression of all our faculties, to which all our other powers of\nexpression, signs, looks, gestures, lend their aid, of which the\ninstrument is not the tongue only, but more than half the human frame.\n\nThe minds of men are sometimes carried on to think of their lives and\nof their actions as links in a chain of causes and effects going back\nto the beginning of time. A few have seemed to lose the sense of their\nown individuality in the universal cause or nature. In like manner we\nmight think of the words which we daily use, as derived from the first\nspeech of man, and of all the languages in the world, as the\nexpressions or varieties of a single force or life of language of which\nthe thoughts of men are the accident. Such a conception enables us to\ngrasp the power and wonder of languages, and is very natural to the\nscientific philologist. For he, like the metaphysician, believes in the\nreality of that which absorbs his own mind. Nor do we deny the enormous\ninfluence which language has exercised over thought. Fixed words, like\nfixed ideas, have often governed the world. But in such representations\nwe attribute to language too much the nature of a cause, and too little\nof an effect,\u2014too much of an absolute, too little of a relative\ncharacter,\u2014too much of an ideal, too little of a matter-of-fact\nexistence.\n\nOr again, we may frame a single abstract notion of language of which\nall existent languages may be supposed to be the perversion. But we\nmust not conceive that this logical figment had ever a real existence,\nor is anything more than an effort of the mind to give unity to\ninfinitely various phenomena. There is no abstract language \u201cin rerum\nnatura,\u201d any more than there is an abstract tree, but only languages in\nvarious stages of growth, maturity, and decay. Nor do other logical\ndistinctions or even grammatical exactly correspond to the facts of\nlanguage; for they too are attempts to give unity and regularity to a\nsubject which is partly irregular.\n\nWe find, however, that there are distinctions of another kind by which\nthis vast field of language admits of being mapped out. There is the\ndistinction between biliteral and triliteral roots, and the various\ninflexions which accompany them; between the mere mechanical cohesion\nof sounds or words, and the \u201cchemical\u201d combination of them into a new\nword; there is the distinction between languages which have had a free\nand full development of their organisms, and languages which have been\nstunted in their growth,\u2014lamed in their hands or feet, and never able\nto acquire afterwards the powers in which they are deficient; there is\nthe distinction between synthetical languages like Greek and Latin,\nwhich have retained their inflexions, and analytical languages like\nEnglish or French, which have lost them. Innumerable as are the\nlanguages and dialects of mankind, there are comparatively few classes\nto which they can be referred.\n\nAnother road through this chaos is provided by the physiology of\nspeech. The organs of language are the same in all mankind, and are\nonly capable of uttering a certain number of sounds. Every man has\ntongue, teeth, lips, palate, throat, mouth, which he may close or open,\nand adapt in various ways; making, first, vowels and consonants; and\nsecondly, other classes of letters. The elements of all speech, like\nthe elements of the musical scale, are few and simple, though admitting\nof infinite gradations and combinations. Whatever slight differences\nexist in the use or formation of these organs, owing to climate or the\nsense of euphony or other causes, they are as nothing compared with\ntheir agreement. Here then is a real basis of unity in the study of\nphilology, unlike that imaginary abstract unity of which we were just\nnow speaking.\n\nWhether we regard language from the psychological, or historical, or\nphysiological point of view, the materials of our knowledge are\ninexhaustible. The comparisons of children learning to speak, of\nbarbarous nations, of musical notes, of the cries of animals, of the\nsong of birds, increase our insight into the nature of human speech.\nMany observations which would otherwise have escaped us are suggested\nby them. But they do not explain why, in man and in man only, the\nspeaker met with a response from the hearer, and the half articulate\nsound gradually developed into Sanscrit and Greek. They hardly enable\nus to approach any nearer the secret of the origin of language, which,\nlike some of the other great secrets of nature,\u2014the origin of birth and\ndeath, or of animal life,\u2014remains inviolable. That problem is\nindissolubly bound up with the origin of man; and if we ever know more\nof the one, we may expect to know more of the other.[1]\n\n [1] Compare W. Humboldt, _Ueber die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen\n Sprachbaues_, and M. M\u00fcller, _Lectures on the Science of Language_.\n\n\n\nIt is more than sixteen years since the preceding remarks were written,\nwhich with a few alterations have now been reprinted. During the\ninterval the progress of philology has been very great. More languages\nhave been compared; the inner structure of language has been laid bare;\nthe relations of sounds have been more accurately discriminated; the\nmanner in which dialects affect or are affected by the literary or\nprincipal form of a language is better understood. Many merely verbal\nquestions have been eliminated; the remains of the old traditional\nmethods have died away. The study has passed from the metaphysical into\nan historical stage. Grammar is no longer confused with language, nor\nthe anatomy of words and sentences with their life and use. Figures of\nspeech, by which the vagueness of theories is often concealed, have\nbeen stripped off; and we see language more as it truly was. The\nimmensity of the subject is gradually revealed to us, and the reign of\nlaw becomes apparent. Yet the law is but partially seen; the traces of\nit are often lost in the distance. For languages have a natural but not\na perfect growth; like other creations of nature into which the will of\nman enters, they are full of what we term accident and irregularity.\nAnd the difficulties of the subject become not less, but greater, as we\nproceed\u2014it is one of those studies in which we seem to know less as we\nknow more; partly because we are no longer satisfied with the vague and\nsuperficial ideas of it which prevailed fifty years ago; partly also\nbecause the remains of the languages with which we are acquainted\nalways were, and if they are still living, are, in a state of\ntransition; and thirdly, because there are lacunae in our knowledge of\nthem which can never be filled up. Not a tenth, not a hundredth part of\nthem has been preserved. Yet the materials at our disposal are far\ngreater than any individual can use. Such are a few of the general\nreflections which the present state of philology calls up.\n\n(1) Language seems to be composite, but into its first elements the\nphilologer has never been able to penetrate. However far he goes back,\nhe never arrives at the beginning; or rather, as in Geology or in\nAstronomy, there is no beginning. He is too apt to suppose that by\nbreaking up the existing forms of language into their parts he will\narrive at a previous stage of it, but he is merely analyzing what never\nexisted, or is never known to have existed, except in a composite form.\nHe may divide nouns and verbs into roots and inflexions, but he has no\nevidence which will show that the omega of tupto or the mu of tithemi,\nthough analogous to ego, me, either became pronouns or were generated\nout of pronouns. To say that \u201cpronouns, like ripe fruit, dropped out of\nverbs,\u201d is a misleading figure of speech. Although all languages have\nsome common principles, there is no primitive form or forms of language\nknown to us, or to be reasonably imagined, from which they are all\ndescended. No inference can be drawn from language, either for or\nagainst the unity of the human race. Nor is there any proof that words\nwere ever used without any relation to each other. Whatever may be the\nmeaning of a sentence or a word when applied to primitive language, it\nis probable that the sentence is more akin to the original form than\nthe word, and that the later stage of language is the result rather of\nanalysis than of synthesis, or possibly is a combination of the two.\nNor, again, are we sure that the original process of learning to speak\nwas the same in different places or among different races of men. It\nmay have been slower with some, quicker with others. Some tribes may\nhave used shorter, others longer words or cries: they may have been\nmore or less inclined to agglutinate or to decompose them: they may\nhave modified them by the use of prefixes, suffixes, infixes; by the\nlengthening and strengthening of vowels or by the shortening and\nweakening of them, by the condensation or rarefaction of consonants.\nBut who gave to language these primeval laws; or why one race has\ntriliteral, another biliteral roots; or why in some members of a group\nof languages b becomes p, or d, t, or ch, k; or why two languages\nresemble one another in certain parts of their structure and differ in\nothers; or why in one language there is a greater development of\nvowels, in another of consonants, and the like\u2014are questions of which\nwe only \u201centertain conjecture.\u201d We must remember the length of time\nthat has elapsed since man first walked upon the earth, and that in\nthis vast but unknown period every variety of language may have been in\nprocess of formation and decay, many times over.\n\n(Compare Plato, Laws):\u2014\n\n\u201cATHENIAN STRANGER: And what then is to be regarded as the origin of\ngovernment? Will not a man be able to judge best from a point of view\nin which he may behold the progress of states and their transitions to\ngood and evil?\n\nCLEINIAS: What do you mean?\n\nATHENIAN STRANGER: I mean that he might watch them from the point of\nview of time, and observe the changes which take place in them during\ninfinite ages.\n\nCLEINIAS: How so?\n\nATHENIAN STRANGER: Why, do you think that you can reckon the time which\nhas elapsed since cities first existed and men were citizens of them?\n\nCLEINIAS: Hardly.\n\nATHENIAN STRANGER: But you are quite sure that it must be vast and\nincalculable?\n\nCLEINIAS: No doubt.\n\nATHENIAN STRANGER: And have there not been thousands and thousands of\ncities which have come into being and perished during this period? And\nhas not every place had endless forms of government, and been sometimes\nrising, and at other times falling, and again improving or waning?\u201d\n\nAristot. Metaph.:\u2014\n\n\u201cAnd if a person should conceive the tales of mythology to mean only\nthat men thought the gods to be the first essences of things, he would\ndeem the reflection to have been inspired and would consider that,\nwhereas probably every art and part of wisdom had been DISCOVERED AND\nLOST MANY TIMES OVER, such notions were but a remnant of the past which\nhas survived to our day.\u201d)\n\nIt can hardly be supposed that any traces of an original language still\nsurvive, any more than of the first huts or buildings which were\nconstructed by man. Nor are we at all certain of the relation, if any,\nin which the greater families of languages stand to each other. The\ninfluence of individuals must always have been a disturbing element.\nLike great writers in later times, there may have been many a barbaric\ngenius who taught the men of his tribe to sing or speak, showing them\nby example how to continue or divide their words, charming their souls\nwith rhythm and accent and intonation, finding in familiar objects the\nexpression of their confused fancies\u2014to whom the whole of language\nmight in truth be said to be a figure of speech. One person may have\nintroduced a new custom into the formation or pronunciation of a word;\nhe may have been imitated by others, and the custom, or form, or\naccent, or quantity, or rhyme which he introduced in a single word may\nhave become the type on which many other words or inflexions of words\nwere framed, and may have quickly ran through a whole language. For\nlike the other gifts which nature has bestowed upon man, that of speech\nhas been conveyed to him through the medium, not of the many, but of\nthe few, who were his \u201claw-givers\u201d\u2014\u201cthe legislator with the\ndialectician standing on his right hand,\u201d in Plato\u2019s striking image,\nwho formed the manners of men and gave them customs, whose voice and\nlook and behaviour, whose gesticulations and other peculiarities were\ninstinctively imitated by them,\u2014the \u201cking of men\u201d who was their priest,\nalmost their God...But these are conjectures only: so little do we know\nof the origin of language that the real scholar is indisposed to touch\nthe subject at all.\n\n(2) There are other errors besides the figment of a primitive or\noriginal language which it is time to leave behind us. We no longer\ndivide languages into synthetical and analytical, or suppose similarity\nof structure to be the safe or only guide to the affinities of them. We\ndo not confuse the parts of speech with the categories of Logic. Nor do\nwe conceive languages any more than civilisations to be in a state of\ndissolution; they do not easily pass away, but are far more tenacious\nof life than the tribes by whom they are spoken. \u201cWhere two or three\nare gathered together,\u201d they survive. As in the human frame, as in the\nstate, there is a principle of renovation as well as of decay which is\nat work in all of them. Neither do we suppose them to be invented by\nthe wit of man. With few exceptions, e.g. technical words or words\nnewly imported from a foreign language, and the like, in which art has\nimitated nature, \u201cwords are not made but grow.\u201d Nor do we attribute to\nthem a supernatural origin. The law which regulates them is like the\nlaw which governs the circulation of the blood, or the rising of the\nsap in trees; the action of it is uniform, but the result, which\nappears in the superficial forms of men and animals or in the leaves of\ntrees, is an endless profusion and variety. The laws of vegetation are\ninvariable, but no two plants, no two leaves of the forest are\nprecisely the same. The laws of language are invariable, but no two\nlanguages are alike, no two words have exactly the same meaning. No two\nsounds are exactly of the same quality, or give precisely the same\nimpression.\n\nIt would be well if there were a similar consensus about some other\npoints which appear to be still in dispute. Is language conscious or\nunconscious? In speaking or writing have we present to our minds the\nmeaning or the sound or the construction of the words which we are\nusing?\u2014No more than the separate drops of water with which we quench\nour thirst are present: the whole draught may be conscious, but not the\nminute particles of which it is made up: So the whole sentence may be\nconscious, but the several words, syllables, letters are not thought of\nseparately when we are uttering them. Like other natural operations,\nthe process of speech, when most perfect, is least observed by us. We\ndo not pause at each mouthful to dwell upon the taste of it: nor has\nthe speaker time to ask himself the comparative merits of different\nmodes of expression while he is uttering them. There are many things in\nthe use of language which may be observed from without, but which\ncannot be explained from within. Consciousness carries us but a little\nway in the investigation of the mind; it is not the faculty of internal\nobservation, but only the dim light which makes such observation\npossible. What is supposed to be our consciousness of language is\nreally only the analysis of it, and this analysis admits of innumerable\ndegrees. But would it not be better if this term, which is so\nmisleading, and yet has played so great a part in mental science, were\neither banished or used only with the distinct meaning of \u201cattention to\nour own minds,\u201d such as is called forth, not by familiar mental\nprocesses, but by the interruption of them? Now in this sense we may\ntruly say that we are not conscious of ordinary speech, though we are\ncommonly roused to attention by the misuse or mispronunciation of a\nword. Still less, even in schools and academies, do we ever attempt to\ninvent new words or to alter the meaning of old ones, except in the\ncase, mentioned above, of technical or borrowed words which are\nartificially made or imported because a need of them is felt. Neither\nin our own nor in any other age has the conscious effort of reflection\nin man contributed in an appreciable degree to the formation of\nlanguage. \u201cWhich of us by taking thought\u201d can make new words or\nconstructions? Reflection is the least of the causes by which language\nis affected, and is likely to have the least power, when the linguistic\ninstinct is greatest, as in young children and in the infancy of\nnations.\n\nA kindred error is the separation of the phonetic from the mental\nelement of language; they are really inseparable\u2014no definite line can\nbe drawn between them, any more than in any other common act of mind\nand body. It is true that within certain limits we possess the power of\nvarying sounds by opening and closing the mouth, by touching the palate\nor the teeth with the tongue, by lengthening or shortening the vocal\ninstrument, by greater or less stress, by a higher or lower pitch of\nthe voice, and we can substitute one note or accent for another. But\nbehind the organs of speech and their action there remains the\ninforming mind, which sets them in motion and works together with them.\nAnd behind the great structure of human speech and the lesser varieties\nof language which arise out of the many degrees and kinds of human\nintercourse, there is also the unknown or over-ruling law of God or\nnature which gives order to it in its infinite greatness, and variety\nin its infinitesimal minuteness\u2014both equally inscrutable to us. We need\nno longer discuss whether philology is to be classed with the Natural\nor the Mental sciences, if we frankly recognize that, like all the\nsciences which are concerned with man, it has a double aspect,\u2014inward\nand outward; and that the inward can only be known through the outward.\nNeither need we raise the question whether the laws of language, like\nthe other laws of human action, admit of exceptions. The answer in all\ncases is the same\u2014that the laws of nature are uniform, though the\nconsistency or continuity of them is not always perceptible to us. The\nsuperficial appearances of language, as of nature, are irregular, but\nwe do not therefore deny their deeper uniformity. The comparison of the\ngrowth of language in the individual and in the nation cannot be wholly\ndiscarded, for nations are made up of individuals. But in this, as in\nthe other political sciences, we must distinguish between collective\nand individual actions or processes, and not attribute to the one what\nbelongs to the other. Again, when we speak of the hereditary or\npaternity of a language, we must remember that the parents are alive as\nwell as the children, and that all the preceding generations survive\n(after a manner) in the latest form of it. And when, for the purposes\nof comparison, we form into groups the roots or terminations of words,\nwe should not forget how casual is the manner in which their\nresemblances have arisen\u2014they were not first written down by a\ngrammarian in the paradigms of a grammar and learned out of a book, but\nwere due to many chance attractions of sound or of meaning, or of both\ncombined. So many cautions have to be borne in mind, and so many first\nthoughts to be dismissed, before we can proceed safely in the path of\nphilological enquiry. It might be well sometimes to lay aside figures\nof speech, such as the \u201croot\u201d and the \u201cbranches,\u201d the \u201cstem,\u201d the\n\u201cstrata\u201d of Geology, the \u201ccompounds\u201d of Chemistry, \u201cthe ripe fruit of\npronouns dropping from verbs\u201d (see above), and the like, which are\nalways interesting, but are apt to be delusive. Yet such figures of\nspeech are far nearer the truth than the theories which attribute the\ninvention and improvement of language to the conscious action of the\nhuman mind...Lastly, it is doubted by recent philologians whether\nclimate can be supposed to have exercised any influence worth speaking\nof on a language: such a view is said to be unproven: it had better\ntherefore not be silently assumed.\n\n\u201cNatural selection\u201d and the \u201csurvival of the fittest\u201d have been applied\nin the field of philology, as well as in the other sciences which are\nconcerned with animal and vegetable life. And a Darwinian school of\nphilologists has sprung up, who are sometimes accused of putting words\nin the place of things. It seems to be true, that whether applied to\nlanguage or to other branches of knowledge, the Darwinian theory,\nunless very precisely defined, hardly escapes from being a truism. If\nby \u201cthe natural selection\u201d of words or meanings of words or by the\n\u201cpersistence and survival of the fittest\u201d the maintainer of the theory\nintends to affirm nothing more than this\u2014that the word \u201cfittest to\nsurvive\u201d survives, he adds not much to the knowledge of language. But\nif he means that the word or the meaning of the word or some portion of\nthe word which comes into use or drops out of use is selected or\nrejected on the ground of economy or parsimony or ease to the speaker\nor clearness or euphony or expressiveness, or greater or less demand\nfor it, or anything of this sort, he is affirming a proposition which\nhas several senses, and in none of these senses can be assisted to be\nuniformly true. For the laws of language are precarious, and can only\nact uniformly when there is such frequency of intercourse among\nneighbours as is sufficient to enforce them. And there are many reasons\nwhy a man should prefer his own way of speaking to that of others,\nunless by so doing he becomes unintelligible. The struggle for\nexistence among words is not of that fierce and irresistible kind in\nwhich birds, beasts and fishes devour one another, but of a milder\nsort, allowing one usage to be substituted for another, not by force,\nbut by the persuasion, or rather by the prevailing habit, of a\nmajority. The favourite figure, in this, as in some other uses of it,\nhas tended rather to obscure than explain the subject to which it has\nbeen applied. Nor in any case can the struggle for existence be deemed\nto be the sole or principal cause of changes in language, but only one\namong many, and one of which we cannot easily measure the importance.\nThere is a further objection which may be urged equally against all\napplications of the Darwinian theory. As in animal life and likewise in\nvegetable, so in languages, the process of change is said to be\ninsensible: sounds, like animals, are supposed to pass into one another\nby imperceptible gradation. But in both cases the newly-created forms\nsoon become fixed; there are few if any vestiges of the intermediate\nlinks, and so the better half of the evidence of the change is wanting.\n\n(3) Among the incumbrances or illusions of language may be reckoned\nmany of the rules and traditions of grammar, whether ancient grammar or\nthe corrections of it which modern philology has introduced. Grammar,\nlike law, delights in definition: human speech, like human action,\nthough very far from being a mere chaos, is indefinite, admits of\ndegrees, and is always in a state of change or transition. Grammar\ngives an erroneous conception of language: for it reduces to a system\nthat which is not a system. Its figures of speech, pleonasms, ellipses,\nanacolutha, pros to semainomenon, and the like have no reality; they do\nnot either make conscious expressions more intelligible or show the way\nin which they have arisen; they are chiefly designed to bring an\nearlier use of language into conformity with the later. Often they seem\nintended only to remind us that great poets like Aeschylus or Sophocles\nor Pindar or a great prose writer like Thucydides are guilty of taking\nunwarrantable liberties with grammatical rules; it appears never to\nhave occurred to the inventors of them that these real \u201cconditores\nlinguae Graecae\u201d lived in an age before grammar, when \u201cGreece also was\nliving Greece.\u201d It is the anatomy, not the physiology of language,\nwhich grammar seeks to describe: into the idiom and higher life of\nwords it does not enter. The ordinary Greek grammar gives a complete\nparadigm of the verb, without suggesting that the double or treble\nforms of Perfects, Aorists, etc. are hardly ever contemporaneous. It\ndistinguishes Moods and Tenses, without observing how much of the\nnature of one passes into the other. It makes three Voices, Active,\nPassive, and Middle, but takes no notice of the precarious existence\nand uncertain character of the last of the three. Language is a thing\nof degrees and relations and associations and exceptions: grammar ties\nit up in fixed rules. Language has many varieties of usage: grammar\ntries to reduce them to a single one. Grammar divides verbs into\nregular and irregular: it does not recognize that the irregular,\nequally with the regular, are subject to law, and that a language which\nhad no exceptions would not be a natural growth: for it could not have\nbeen subjected to the influences by which language is ordinarily\naffected. It is always wanting to describe ancient languages in the\nterms of a modern one. It has a favourite fiction that one word is put\nin the place of another; the truth is that no word is ever put for\nanother. It has another fiction, that a word has been omitted: words\nare omitted because they are no longer needed; and the omission has\nceased to be observed. The common explanation of kata or some other\npreposition \u201cbeing understood\u201d in a Greek sentence is another fiction\nof the same kind, which tends to disguise the fact that under cases\nwere comprehended originally many more relations, and that prepositions\nare used only to define the meaning of them with greater precision.\nThese instances are sufficient to show the sort of errors which grammar\nintroduces into language. We are not considering the question of its\nutility to the beginner in the study. Even to him the best grammar is\nthe shortest and that in which he will have least to unlearn. It may be\nsaid that the explanations here referred to are already out of date,\nand that the study of Greek grammar has received a new character from\ncomparative philology. This is true; but it is also true that the\ntraditional grammar has still a great hold on the mind of the student.\n\nMetaphysics are even more troublesome than the figments of grammar,\nbecause they wear the appearance of philosophy and there is no test to\nwhich they can be subjected. They are useful in so far as they give us\nan insight into the history of the human mind and the modes of thought\nwhich have existed in former ages; or in so far as they furnish wider\nconceptions of the different branches of knowledge and of their\nrelation to one another. But they are worse than useless when they\noutrun experience and abstract the mind from the observation of facts,\nonly to envelope it in a mist of words. Some philologers, like\nSchleicher, have been greatly influenced by the philosophy of Hegel;\nnearly all of them to a certain extent have fallen under the dominion\nof physical science. Even Kant himself thought that the first\nprinciples of philosophy could be elicited from the analysis of the\nproposition, in this respect falling short of Plato. Westphal holds\nthat there are three stages of language: (1) in which things were\ncharacterized independently, (2) in which they were regarded in\nrelation to human thought, and (3) in relation to one another. But are\nnot such distinctions an anachronism? for they imply a growth of\nabstract ideas which never existed in early times. Language cannot be\nexplained by Metaphysics; for it is prior to them and much more nearly\nallied to sense. It is not likely that the meaning of the cases is\nultimately resolvable into relations of space and time. Nor can we\nsuppose the conception of cause and effect or of the finite and\ninfinite or of the same and other to be latent in language at a time\nwhen in their abstract form they had never entered into the mind of\nman...If the science of Comparative Philology had possessed \u201cenough of\nMetaphysics to get rid of Metaphysics,\u201d it would have made far greater\nprogress.\n\n(4) Our knowledge of language is almost confined to languages which are\nfully developed. They are of several patterns; and these become altered\nby admixture in various degrees,\u2014they may only borrow a few words from\none another and retain their life comparatively unaltered, or they may\nmeet in a struggle for existence until one of the two is overpowered\nand retires from the field. They attain the full rights and dignity of\nlanguage when they acquire the use of writing and have a literature of\ntheir own; they pass into dialects and grow out of them, in proportion\nas men are isolated or united by locality or occupation. The common\nlanguage sometimes reacts upon the dialects and imparts to them also a\nliterary character. The laws of language can be best discerned in the\ngreat crises of language, especially in the transitions from ancient to\nmodern forms of them, whether in Europe or Asia. Such changes are the\nsilent notes of the world\u2019s history; they mark periods of unknown\nlength in which war and conquest were running riot over whole\ncontinents, times of suffering too great to be endured by the human\nrace, in which the masters became subjects and the subject races\nmasters, in which driven by necessity or impelled by some instinct,\ntribes or nations left their original homes and but slowly found a\nresting-place. Language would be the greatest of all historical\nmonuments, if it could only tell us the history of itself.\n\n(5) There are many ways in which we may approach this study. The\nsimplest of all is to observe our own use of language in conversation\nor in writing, how we put words together, how we construct and connect\nsentences, what are the rules of accent and rhythm in verse or prose,\nthe formation and composition of words, the laws of euphony and sound,\nthe affinities of letters, the mistakes to which we are ourselves most\nliable of spelling or pronunciation. We may compare with our own\nlanguage some other, even when we have only a slight knowledge of it,\nsuch as French or German. Even a little Latin will enable us to\nappreciate the grand difference between ancient and modern European\nlanguages. In the child learning to speak we may note the inherent\nstrength of language, which like \u201ca mountain river\u201d is always forcing\nits way out. We may witness the delight in imitation and repetition,\nand some of the laws by which sounds pass into one another. We may\nlearn something also from the falterings of old age, the searching for\nwords, and the confusion of them with one another, the forgetfulness of\nproper names (more commonly than of other words because they are more\nisolated), aphasia, and the like. There are philological lessons also\nto be gathered from nicknames, from provincialisms, from the slang of\ngreat cities, from the argot of Paris (that language of suffering and\ncrime, so pathetically described by Victor Hugo), from the imperfect\narticulation of the deaf and dumb, from the jabbering of animals, from\nthe analysis of sounds in relation to the organs of speech. The\nphonograph affords a visible evidence of the nature and divisions of\nsound; we may be truly said to know what we can manufacture. Artificial\nlanguages, such as that of Bishop Wilkins, are chiefly useful in\nshowing what language is not. The study of any foreign language may be\nmade also a study of Comparative Philology. There are several points,\nsuch as the nature of irregular verbs, of indeclinable parts of speech,\nthe influence of euphony, the decay or loss of inflections, the\nelements of syntax, which may be examined as well in the history of our\nown language as of any other. A few well-selected questions may lead\nthe student at once into the heart of the mystery: such as, Why are the\npronouns and the verb of existence generally more irregular than any\nother parts of speech? Why is the number of words so small in which the\nsound is an echo of the sense? Why does the meaning of words depart so\nwidely from their etymology? Why do substantives often differ in\nmeaning from the verbs to which they are related, adverbs from\nadjectives? Why do words differing in origin coalesce in the same sound\nthough retaining their differences of meaning? Why are some verbs\nimpersonal? Why are there only so many parts of speech, and on what\nprinciple are they divided? These are a few crucial questions which\ngive us an insight from different points of view into the true nature\nof language.\n\n(6) Thus far we have been endeavouring to strip off from language the\nfalse appearances in which grammar and philology, or the love of system\ngenerally, have clothed it. We have also sought to indicate the sources\nof our knowledge of it and the spirit in which we should approach it,\nwe may now proceed to consider some of the principles or natural laws\nwhich have created or modified it.\n\ni. The first and simplest of all the principles of language, common\nalso to the animals, is imitation. The lion roars, the wolf howls in\nthe solitude of the forest: they are answered by similar cries heard\nfrom a distance. The bird, too, mimics the voice of man and makes\nanswer to him. Man tells to man the secret place in which he is hiding\nhimself; he remembers and repeats the sound which he has heard. The\nlove of imitation becomes a passion and an instinct to him. Primitive\nmen learnt to speak from one another, like a child from its mother or\nnurse. They learnt of course a rudimentary, half-articulate language,\nthe cry or song or speech which was the expression of what we now call\nhuman thoughts and feelings. We may still remark how much greater and\nmore natural the exercise of the power is in the use of language than\nin any other process or action of the human mind.\n\nii. Imitation provided the first material of language: but it was\n\u201cwithout form and void.\u201d During how many years or hundreds or thousands\nof years the imitative or half-articulate stage continued there is no\npossibility of determining. But we may reasonably conjecture that there\nwas a time when the vocal utterance of man was intermediate between\nwhat we now call language and the cry of a bird or animal. Speech\nbefore language was a rudis indigestaque materies, not yet distributed\ninto words and sentences, in which the cry of fear or joy mingled with\nmore definite sounds recognized by custom as the expressions of things\nor events. It was the principle of analogy which introduced into this\n\u201cindigesta moles\u201d order and measure. It was Anaxagoras\u2019 omou panta\nchremata, eita nous elthon diekosmese: the light of reason lighted up\nall things and at once began to arrange them. In every sentence, in\nevery word and every termination of a word, this power of forming\nrelations to one another was contained. There was a proportion of sound\nto sound, of meaning to meaning, of meaning to sound. The cases and\nnumbers of nouns, the persons, tenses, numbers of verbs, were generally\non the same or nearly the same pattern and had the same meaning. The\nsounds by which they were expressed were rough-hewn at first; after a\nwhile they grew more refined\u2014the natural laws of euphony began to\naffect them. The rules of syntax are likewise based upon analogy. Time\nhas an analogy with space, arithmetic with geometry. Not only in\nmusical notes, but in the quantity, quality, accent, rhythm of human\nspeech, trivial or serious, there is a law of proportion. As in things\nof beauty, as in all nature, in the composition as well as in the\nmotion of all things, there is a similarity of relations by which they\nare held together.\n\nIt would be a mistake to suppose that the analogies of language are\nalways uniform: there may be often a choice between several, and\nsometimes one and sometimes another will prevail. In Greek there are\nthree declensions of nouns; the forms of cases in one of them may\nintrude upon another. Similarly verbs in -omega and -mu iota\ninterchange forms of tenses, and the completed paradigm of the verb is\noften made up of both. The same nouns may be partly declinable and\npartly indeclinable, and in some of their cases may have fallen out of\nuse. Here are rules with exceptions; they are not however really\nexceptions, but contain in themselves indications of other rules. Many\nof these interruptions or variations of analogy occur in pronouns or in\nthe verb of existence of which the forms were too common and therefore\ntoo deeply imbedded in language entirely to drop out. The same verbs in\nthe same meaning may sometimes take one case, sometimes another. The\nparticiple may also have the character of an adjective, the adverb\neither of an adjective or of a preposition. These exceptions are as\nregular as the rules, but the causes of them are seldom known to us.\n\nLanguage, like the animal and vegetable worlds, is everywhere\nintersected by the lines of analogy. Like number from which it seems to\nbe derived, the principle of analogy opens the eyes of men to discern\nthe similarities and differences of things, and their relations to one\nanother. At first these are such as lie on the surface only; after a\ntime they are seen by men to reach farther down into the nature of\nthings. Gradually in language they arrange themselves into a sort of\nimperfect system; groups of personal and case endings are placed side\nby side. The fertility of language produces many more than are wanted;\nand the superfluous ones are utilized by the assignment to them of new\nmeanings. The vacuity and the superfluity are thus partially\ncompensated by each other. It must be remembered that in all the\nlanguages which have a literature, certainly in Sanskrit, Greek, Latin,\nwe are not at the beginning but almost at the end of the linguistic\nprocess; we have reached a time when the verb and the noun are nearly\nperfected, though in no language did they completely perfect\nthemselves, because for some unknown reason the motive powers of\nlanguages seem to have ceased when they were on the eve of completion:\nthey became fixed or crystallized in an imperfect form either from the\ninfluence of writing and literature, or because no further\ndifferentiation of them was required for the intelligibility of\nlanguage. So not without admixture and confusion and displacement and\ncontamination of sounds and the meanings of words, a lower stage of\nlanguage passes into a higher. Thus far we can see and no further. When\nwe ask the reason why this principle of analogy prevails in all the\nvast domain of language, there is no answer to the question; or no\nother answer but this, that there are innumerable ways in which, like\nnumber, analogy permeates, not only language, but the whole world, both\nvisible and intellectual. We know from experience that it does not (a)\narise from any conscious act of reflection that the accusative of a\nLatin noun in \u201cus\u201d should end in \u201cum;\u201d nor (b) from any necessity of\nbeing understood,\u2014much less articulation would suffice for this; nor\n(c) from greater convenience or expressiveness of particular sounds.\nSuch notions were certainly far enough away from the mind of primitive\nman. We may speak of a latent instinct, of a survival of the fittest,\neasiest, most euphonic, most economical of breath, in the case of one\nof two competing sounds; but these expressions do not add anything to\nour knowledge. We may try to grasp the infinity of language either\nunder the figure of a limitless plain divided into countries and\ndistricts by natural boundaries, or of a vast river eternally flowing\nwhose origin is concealed from us; we may apprehend partially the laws\nby which speech is regulated: but we do not know, and we seem as if we\nshould never know, any more than in the parallel case of the origin of\nspecies, how vocal sounds received life and grew, and in the form of\nlanguages came to be distributed over the earth.\n\niii. Next in order to analogy in the formation of language or even\nprior to it comes the principle of onomatopea, which is itself a kind\nof analogy or similarity of sound and meaning. In by far the greater\nnumber of words it has become disguised and has disappeared; but in no\nstage of language is it entirely lost. It belongs chiefly to early\nlanguage, in which words were few; and its influence grew less and less\nas time went on. To the ear which had a sense of harmony it became a\nbarbarism which disturbed the flow and equilibrium of discourse; it was\nan excrescence which had to be cut out, a survival which needed to be\ngot rid of, because it was out of keeping with the rest. It remained\nfor the most part only as a formative principle, which used words and\nletters not as crude imitations of other natural sounds, but as symbols\nof ideas which were naturally associated with them. It received in\nanother way a new character; it affected not so much single words, as\nlarger portions of human speech. It regulated the juxtaposition of\nsounds and the cadence of sentences. It was the music, not of song, but\nof speech, in prose as well as verse. The old onomatopea of primitive\nlanguage was refined into an onomatopea of a higher kind, in which it\nis no longer true to say that a particular sound corresponds to a\nmotion or action of man or beast or movement of nature, but that in all\nthe higher uses of language the sound is the echo of the sense,\nespecially in poetry, in which beauty and expressiveness are given to\nhuman thoughts by the harmonious composition of the words, syllables,\nletters, accents, quantities, rhythms, rhymes, varieties and contrasts\nof all sorts. The poet with his \u201cBreak, break, break\u201d or his e pasin\nnekuessi kataphthimenoisin anassein or his \u201clongius ex altoque sinum\ntrahit,\u201d can produce a far finer music than any crude imitations of\nthings or actions in sound, although a letter or two having this\nimitative power may be a lesser element of beauty in such passages. The\nsame subtle sensibility, which adapts the word to the thing, adapts the\nsentence or cadence to the general meaning or spirit of the passage.\nThis is the higher onomatopea which has banished the cruder sort as\nunworthy to have a place in great languages and literatures.\n\nWe can see clearly enough that letters or collocations of letters do by\nvarious degrees of strength or weakness, length or shortness, emphasis\nor pitch, become the natural expressions of the finer parts of human\nfeeling or thought. And not only so, but letters themselves have a\nsignificance; as Plato observes that the letter rho accent is\nexpressive of motion, the letters delta and tau of binding and rest,\nthe letter lambda of smoothness, nu of inwardness, the letter eta of\nlength, the letter omicron of roundness. These were often combined so\nas to form composite notions, as for example in tromos (trembling),\ntrachus (rugged), thrauein (crush), krouein (strike), thruptein\n(break), pumbein (whirl),\u2014in all which words we notice a parallel\ncomposition of sounds in their English equivalents. Plato also remarks,\nas we remark, that the onomatopoetic principle is far from prevailing\nuniformly, and further that no explanation of language consistently\ncorresponds with any system of philosophy, however great may be the\nlight which language throws upon the nature of the mind. Both in Greek\nand English we find groups of words such as string, swing, sling,\nspring, sting, which are parallel to one another and may be said to\nderive their vocal effect partly from contrast of letters, but in which\nit is impossible to assign a precise amount of meaning to each of the\nexpressive and onomatopoetic letters. A few of them are directly\nimitative, as for example the omega in oon, which represents the round\nform of the egg by the figure of the mouth: or bronte (thunder), in\nwhich the fulness of the sound of the word corresponds to the thing\nsignified by it; or bombos (buzzing), of which the first syllable, as\nin its English equivalent, has the meaning of a deep sound. We may\nobserve also (as we see in the case of the poor stammerer) that speech\nhas the co-operation of the whole body and may be often assisted or\nhalf expressed by gesticulation. A sound or word is not the work of the\nvocal organs only; nearly the whole of the upper part of the human\nframe, including head, chest, lungs, have a share in creating it; and\nit may be accompanied by a movement of the eyes, nose, fingers, hands,\nfeet which contributes to the effect of it.\n\nThe principle of onomatopea has fallen into discredit, partly because\nit has been supposed to imply an actual manufacture of words out of\nsyllables and letters, like a piece of joiner\u2019s work,\u2014a theory of\nlanguage which is more and more refuted by facts, and more and more\ngoing out of fashion with philologians; and partly also because the\ntraces of onomatopea in separate words become almost obliterated in the\ncourse of ages. The poet of language cannot put in and pull out\nletters, as a painter might insert or blot out a shade of colour to\ngive effect to his picture. It would be ridiculous for him to alter any\nreceived form of a word in order to render it more expressive of the\nsense. He can only select, perhaps out of some dialect, the form which\nis already best adapted to his purpose. The true onomatopea is not a\ncreative, but a formative principle, which in the later stage of the\nhistory of language ceases to act upon individual words; but still\nworks through the collocation of them in the sentence or paragraph, and\nthe adaptation of every word, syllable, letter to one another and to\nthe rhythm of the whole passage.\n\niv. Next, under a distinct head, although not separable from the\npreceding, may be considered the differentiation of languages, i.e. the\nmanner in which differences of meaning and form have arisen in them.\nInto their first creation we have ceased to enquire: it is their\naftergrowth with which we are now concerned. How did the roots or\nsubstantial portions of words become modified or inflected? and how did\nthey receive separate meanings? First we remark that words are\nattracted by the sounds and senses of other words, so that they form\ngroups of nouns and verbs analogous in sound and sense to one another,\neach noun or verb putting forth inflexions, generally of two or three\npatterns, and with exceptions. We do not say that we know how sense\nbecame first allied to sound; but we have no difficulty in ascertaining\nhow the sounds and meanings of words were in time parted off or\ndifferentiated. (1) The chief causes which regulate the variations of\nsound are (a) double or differing analogies, which lead sometimes to\none form, sometimes to another (b) euphony, by which is meant chiefly\nthe greater pleasure to the ear and the greater facility to the organs\nof speech which is given by a new formation or pronunciation of a word\n(c) the necessity of finding new expressions for new classes or\nprocesses of things. We are told that changes of sound take place by\ninnumerable gradations until a whole tribe or community or society find\nthemselves acquiescing in a new pronunciation or use of language. Yet\nno one observes the change, or is at all aware that in the course of a\nlifetime he and his contemporaries have appreciably varied their\nintonation or use of words. On the other hand, the necessities of\nlanguage seem to require that the intermediate sounds or meanings of\nwords should quickly become fixed or set and not continue in a state of\ntransition. The process of settling down is aided by the organs of\nspeech and by the use of writing and printing. (2) The meaning of words\nvaries because ideas vary or the number of things which is included\nunder them or with which they are associated is increased. A single\nword is thus made to do duty for many more things than were formerly\nexpressed by it; and it parts into different senses when the classes of\nthings or ideas which are represented by it are themselves different\nand distinct. A figurative use of a word may easily pass into a new\nsense: a new meaning caught up by association may become more important\nthan all the rest. The good or neutral sense of a word, such as Jesuit,\nPuritan, Methodist, Heretic, has been often converted into a bad one by\nthe malevolence of party spirit. Double forms suggest different\nmeanings and are often used to express them; and the form or accent of\na word has been not unfrequently altered when there is a difference of\nmeaning. The difference of gender in nouns is utilized for the same\nreason. New meanings of words push themselves into the vacant spaces of\nlanguage and retire when they are no longer needed. Language equally\nabhors vacancy and superfluity. But the remedial measures by which both\nare eliminated are not due to any conscious action of the human mind;\nnor is the force exerted by them constraining or necessary.\n\n(7) We have shown that language, although subject to laws, is far from\nbeing of an exact and uniform nature. We may now speak briefly of the\nfaults of language. They may be compared to the faults of Geology, in\nwhich different strata cross one another or meet at an angle, or mix\nwith one another either by slow transitions or by violent convulsions,\nleaving many lacunae which can be no longer filled up, and often\nbecoming so complex that no true explanation of them can be given. So\nin language there are the cross influences of meaning and sound, of\nlogic and grammar, of differing analogies, of words and the inflexions\nof words, which often come into conflict with each other. The\ngrammarian, if he were to form new words, would make them all of the\nsame pattern according to what he conceives to be the rule, that is,\nthe more common usage of language. The subtlety of nature goes far\nbeyond art, and it is complicated by irregularity, so that often we can\nhardly say that there is a right or wrong in the formation of words.\nFor almost any formation which is not at variance with the first\nprinciples of language is possible and may be defended.\n\nThe imperfection of language is really due to the formation and\ncorrelation of words by accident, that is to say, by principles which\nare unknown to us. Hence we see why Plato, like ourselves unable to\ncomprehend the whole of language, was constrained to \u201csupplement the\npoor creature imitation by another poor creature convention.\u201d But the\npoor creature convention in the end proves too much for all the rest:\nfor we do not ask what is the origin of words or whether they are\nformed according to a correct analogy, but what is the usage of them;\nand we are compelled to admit with Hermogenes in Plato and with Horace\nthat usage is the ruling principle, \u201cquem penes arbitrium est, et jus\net norma loquendi.\u201d\n\n(8) There are two ways in which a language may attain permanence or\nfixity. First, it may have been embodied in poems or hymns or laws,\nwhich may be repeated for hundreds, perhaps for thousands of years with\na religious accuracy, so that to the priests or rhapsodists of a nation\nthe whole or the greater part of a language is literally preserved;\nsecondly, it may be written down and in a written form distributed more\nor less widely among the whole nation. In either case the language\nwhich is familiarly spoken may have grown up wholly or in a great\nmeasure independently of them. (1) The first of these processes has\nbeen sometimes attended by the result that the sound of the words has\nbeen carefully preserved and that the meaning of them has either\nperished wholly, or is only doubtfully recovered by the efforts of\nmodern philology. The verses have been repeated as a chant or part of a\nritual, but they have had no relation to ordinary life or speech. (2)\nThe invention of writing again is commonly attributed to a particular\nepoch, and we are apt to think that such an inestimable gift would have\nimmediately been diffused over a whole country. But it may have taken a\nlong time to perfect the art of writing, and another long period may\nhave elapsed before it came into common use. Its influence on language\nhas been increased ten, twenty or one hundred fold by the invention of\nprinting.\n\nBefore the growth of poetry or the invention of writing, languages were\nonly dialects. So they continued to be in parts of the country in which\nwriting was not used or in which there was no diffusion of literature.\nIn most of the counties of England there is still a provincial style,\nwhich has been sometimes made by a great poet the vehicle of his\nfancies. When a book sinks into the mind of a nation, such as Luther\u2019s\nBible or the Authorized English Translation of the Bible, or again\ngreat classical works like Shakspere or Milton, not only have new\npowers of expression been diffused through a whole nation, but a great\nstep towards uniformity has been made. The instinct of language demands\nregular grammar and correct spelling: these are imprinted deeply on the\ntablets of a nation\u2019s memory by a common use of classical and popular\nwriters. In our own day we have attained to a point at which nearly\nevery printed book is spelt correctly and written grammatically.\n\n(9) Proceeding further to trace the influence of literature on language\nwe note some other causes which have affected the higher use of it:\nsuch as (1) the necessity of clearness and connexion; (2) the fear of\ntautology; (3) the influence of metre, rhythm, rhyme, and of the\nlanguage of prose and verse upon one another; (4) the power of idiom\nand quotation; (5) the relativeness of words to one another.\n\nIt has been usual to depreciate modern languages when compared with\nancient. The latter are regarded as furnishing a type of excellence to\nwhich the former cannot attain. But the truth seems to be that modern\nlanguages, if through the loss of inflections and genders they lack\nsome power or beauty or expressiveness or precision which is possessed\nby the ancient, are in many other respects superior to them: the\nthought is generally clearer, the connexion closer, the sentence and\nparagraph are better distributed. The best modern languages, for\nexample English or French, possess as great a power of self-improvement\nas the Latin, if not as the Greek. Nor does there seem to be any reason\nwhy they should ever decline or decay. It is a popular remark that our\ngreat writers are beginning to disappear: it may also be remarked that\nwhenever a great writer appears in the future he will find the English\nlanguage as perfect and as ready for use as in the days of Shakspere or\nMilton. There is no reason to suppose that English or French will ever\nbe reduced to the low level of Modern Greek or of Mediaeval Latin. The\nwide diffusion of great authors would make such a decline impossible.\nNor will modern languages be easily broken up by amalgamation with each\nother. The distance between them is too wide to be spanned, the\ndifferences are too great to be overcome, and the use of printing makes\nit impossible that one of them should ever be lost in another.\n\nThe structure of the English language differs greatly from that of\neither Latin or Greek. In the two latter, especially in Greek,\nsentences are joined together by connecting particles. They are\ndistributed on the right hand and on the left by men, de, alla, kaitoi,\nkai de and the like, or deduced from one another by ara, de, oun,\ntoinun and the like. In English the majority of sentences are\nindependent and in apposition to one another; they are laid side by\nside or slightly connected by the copula. But within the sentence the\nexpression of the logical relations of the clauses is closer and more\nexact: there is less of apposition and participial structure. The\nsentences thus laid side by side are also constructed into paragraphs;\nthese again are less distinctly marked in Greek and Latin than in\nEnglish. Generally French, German, and English have an advantage over\nthe classical languages in point of accuracy. The three concords are\nmore accurately observed in English than in either Greek or Latin. On\nthe other hand, the extension of the familiar use of the masculine and\nfeminine gender to objects of sense and abstract ideas as well as to\nmen and animals no doubt lends a nameless grace to style which we have\na difficulty in appreciating, and the possible variety in the order of\nwords gives more flexibility and also a kind of dignity to the period.\nOf the comparative effect of accent and quantity and of the relation\nbetween them in ancient and modern languages we are not able to judge.\n\nAnother quality in which modern are superior to ancient languages is\nfreedom from tautology. No English style is thought tolerable in which,\nexcept for the sake of emphasis, the same words are repeated at short\nintervals. Of course the length of the interval must depend on the\ncharacter of the word. Striking words and expressions cannot be allowed\nto reappear, if at all, except at the distance of a page or more.\nPronouns, prepositions, conjunctions may or rather must recur in\nsuccessive lines. It seems to be a kind of impertinence to the reader\nand strikes unpleasantly both on the mind and on the ear that the same\nsounds should be used twice over, when another word or turn of\nexpression would have given a new shade of meaning to the thought and\nwould have added a pleasing variety to the sound. And the mind equally\nrejects the repetition of the word and the use of a mere synonym for\nit,\u2014e.g. felicity and happiness. The cultivated mind desires something\nmore, which a skilful writer is easily able to supply out of his\ntreasure-house.\n\nThe fear of tautology has doubtless led to the multiplications of words\nand the meanings of words, and generally to an enlargement of the\nvocabulary. It is a very early instinct of language; for ancient poetry\nis almost as free from tautology as the best modern writings. The\nspeech of young children, except in so far as they are compelled to\nrepeat themselves by the fewness of their words, also escapes from it.\nWhen they grow up and have ideas which are beyond their powers of\nexpression, especially in writing, tautology begins to appear. In like\nmanner when language is \u201ccontaminated\u201d by philosophy it is apt to\nbecome awkward, to stammer and repeat itself, to lose its flow and\nfreedom. No philosophical writer with the exception of Plato, who is\nhimself not free from tautology, and perhaps Bacon, has attained to any\nhigh degree of literary excellence.\n\nTo poetry the form and polish of language is chiefly to be attributed;\nand the most critical period in the history of language is the\ntransition from verse to prose. At first mankind were contented to\nexpress their thoughts in a set form of words having a kind of rhythm;\nto which regularity was given by accent and quantity. But after a time\nthey demanded a greater degree of freedom, and to those who had all\ntheir life been hearing poetry the first introduction of prose had the\ncharm of novelty. The prose romances into which the Homeric Poems were\nconverted, for a while probably gave more delight to the hearers or\nreaders of them than the Poems themselves, and in time the relation of\nthe two was reversed: the poems which had once been a necessity of the\nhuman mind became a luxury: they were now superseded by prose, which in\nall succeeding ages became the natural vehicle of expression to all\nmankind. Henceforward prose and poetry formed each other. A\ncomparatively slender link between them was also furnished by proverbs.\nWe may trace in poetry how the simple succession of lines, not without\nmonotony, has passed into a complicated period, and how in prose,\nrhythm and accent and the order of words and the balance of clauses,\nsometimes not without a slight admixture of rhyme, make up a new kind\nof harmony, swelling into strains not less majestic than those of\nHomer, Virgil, or Dante.\n\nOne of the most curious and characteristic features of language,\naffecting both syntax and style, is idiom. The meaning of the word\n\u201cidiom\u201d is that which is peculiar, that which is familiar, the word or\nexpression which strikes us or comes home to us, which is more readily\nunderstood or more easily remembered. It is a quality which really\nexists in infinite degrees, which we turn into differences of kind by\napplying the term only to conspicuous and striking examples of words or\nphrases which have this quality. It often supersedes the laws of\nlanguage or the rules of grammar, or rather is to be regarded as\nanother law of language which is natural and necessary. The word or\nphrase which has been repeated many times over is more intelligible and\nfamiliar to us than one which is rare, and our familiarity with it more\nthan compensates for incorrectness or inaccuracy in the use of it.\nStriking expressions also which have moved the hearts of nations or are\nthe precious stones and jewels of great authors partake of the nature\nof idioms: they are taken out of the sphere of grammar and are exempt\nfrom the proprieties of language. Every one knows that we often put\nwords together in a manner which would be intolerable if it were not\nidiomatic. We cannot argue either about the meaning of words or the use\nof constructions that because they are used in one connexion they will\nbe legitimate in another, unless we allow for this principle. We can\nbear to have words and sentences used in new senses or in a new order\nor even a little perverted in meaning when we are quite familiar with\nthem. Quotations are as often applied in a sense which the author did\nnot intend as in that which he did. The parody of the words of\nShakspere or of the Bible, which has in it something of the nature of a\nlie, is far from unpleasing to us. The better known words, even if\ntheir meaning be perverted, are more agreeable to us and have a greater\npower over us. Most of us have experienced a sort of delight and\nfeeling of curiosity when we first came across or when we first used\nfor ourselves a new word or phrase or figure of speech.\n\nThere are associations of sound and of sense by which every word is\nlinked to every other. One letter harmonizes with another; every verb\nor noun derives its meaning, not only from itself, but from the words\nwith which it is associated. Some reflection of them near or distant is\nembodied in it. In any new use of a word all the existing uses of it\nhave to be considered. Upon these depends the question whether it will\nbear the proposed extension of meaning or not. According to the famous\nexpression of Luther, \u201cWords are living creatures, having hands and\nfeet.\u201d When they cease to retain this living power of adaptation, when\nthey are only put together like the parts of a piece of furniture,\nlanguage becomes unpoetical, inexpressive, dead.\n\nGrammars would lead us to suppose that words have a fixed form and\nsound. Lexicons assign to each word a definite meaning or meanings.\nThey both tend to obscure the fact that the sentence precedes the word\nand that all language is relative. (1) It is relative to its own\ncontext. Its meaning is modified by what has been said before and after\nin the same or in some other passage: without comparing the context we\nare not sure whether it is used in the same sense even in two\nsuccessive sentences. (2) It is relative to facts, to time, place, and\noccasion: when they are already known to the hearer or reader, they may\nbe presupposed; there is no need to allude to them further. (3) It is\nrelative to the knowledge of the writer and reader or of the speaker\nand hearer. Except for the sake of order and consecutiveness nothing\nought to be expressed which is already commonly or universally known. A\nword or two may be sufficient to give an intimation to a friend; a long\nor elaborate speech or composition is required to explain some new idea\nto a popular audience or to the ordinary reader or to a young pupil.\nGrammars and dictionaries are not to be despised; for in teaching we\nneed clearness rather than subtlety. But we must not therefore forget\nthat there is also a higher ideal of language in which all is\nrelative\u2014sounds to sounds, words to words, the parts to the whole\u2014in\nwhich besides the lesser context of the book or speech, there is also\nthe larger context of history and circumstances.\n\nThe study of Comparative Philology has introduced into the world a new\nscience which more than any other binds up man with nature, and distant\nages and countries with one another. It may be said to have thrown a\nlight upon all other sciences and upon the nature of the human mind\nitself. The true conception of it dispels many errors, not only of\nmetaphysics and theology, but also of natural knowledge. Yet it is far\nfrom certain that this newly-found science will continue to progress in\nthe same surprising manner as heretofore; or that even if our materials\nare largely increased, we shall arrive at much more definite\nconclusions than at present. Like some other branches of knowledge, it\nmay be approaching a point at which it can no longer be profitably\nstudied. But at any rate it has brought back the philosophy of language\nfrom theory to fact; it has passed out of the region of guesses and\nhypotheses, and has attained the dignity of an Inductive Science. And\nit is not without practical and political importance. It gives a new\ninterest to distant and subject countries; it brings back the dawning\nlight from one end of the earth to the other. Nations, like\nindividuals, are better understood by us when we know something of\ntheir early life; and when they are better understood by us, we feel\nmore kindly towards them. Lastly, we may remember that all knowledge is\nvaluable for its own sake; and we may also hope that a deeper insight\ninto the nature of human speech will give us a greater command of it\nand enable us to make a nobler use of it.[2]\n\n [2] Compare again W. Humboldt, _Ueber die Verschiedenheit des\n menschlichen Sprachbaues_; M. M\u00fcller, _Lectures on the Science of\n Language_; Steinthal, _Einleitung in die Psychologie und\n Sprachwissenschaft_: and for the latter part of the Essay, Delbruck,\n _Study of Language_; Paul\u2019s _Principles of the History of Language_:\n to the latter work the author of this Essay is largely indebted.\n\n\n\n\nCRATYLUS\n\nBy Plato\n\nTranslated by Benjamin Jowett\n\n\nPERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, Hermogenes, Cratylus.\n\n\nHERMOGENES: Suppose that we make Socrates a party to the argument?\n\nCRATYLUS: If you please.\n\nHERMOGENES: I should explain to you, Socrates, that our friend Cratylus\nhas been arguing about names; he says that they are natural and not\nconventional; not a portion of the human voice which men agree to use;\nbut that there is a truth or correctness in them, which is the same for\nHellenes as for barbarians. Whereupon I ask him, whether his own name\nof Cratylus is a true name or not, and he answers \u201cYes.\u201d And Socrates?\n\u201cYes.\u201d Then every man\u2019s name, as I tell him, is that which he is\ncalled. To this he replies\u2014\u201cIf all the world were to call you\nHermogenes, that would not be your name.\u201d And when I am anxious to have\na further explanation he is ironical and mysterious, and seems to imply\nthat he has a notion of his own about the matter, if he would only\ntell, and could entirely convince me, if he chose to be intelligible.\nTell me, Socrates, what this oracle means; or rather tell me, if you\nwill be so good, what is your own view of the truth or correctness of\nnames, which I would far sooner hear.\n\nSOCRATES: Son of Hipponicus, there is an ancient saying, that \u201chard is\nthe knowledge of the good.\u201d And the knowledge of names is a great part\nof knowledge. If I had not been poor, I might have heard the\nfifty-drachma course of the great Prodicus, which is a complete\neducation in grammar and language\u2014these are his own words\u2014and then I\nshould have been at once able to answer your question about the\ncorrectness of names. But, indeed, I have only heard the single-drachma\ncourse, and therefore, I do not know the truth about such matters; I\nwill, however, gladly assist you and Cratylus in the investigation of\nthem. When he declares that your name is not really Hermogenes, I\nsuspect that he is only making fun of you;\u2014he means to say that you are\nno true son of Hermes, because you are always looking after a fortune\nand never in luck. But, as I was saying, there is a good deal of\ndifficulty in this sort of knowledge, and therefore we had better leave\nthe question open until we have heard both sides.\n\nHERMOGENES: I have often talked over this matter, both with Cratylus\nand others, and cannot convince myself that there is any principle of\ncorrectness in names other than convention and agreement; any name\nwhich you give, in my opinion, is the right one, and if you change that\nand give another, the new name is as correct as the old\u2014we frequently\nchange the names of our slaves, and the newly-imposed name is as good\nas the old: for there is no name given to anything by nature; all is\nconvention and habit of the users;\u2014such is my view. But if I am\nmistaken I shall be happy to hear and learn of Cratylus, or of any one\nelse.\n\nSOCRATES: I dare say that you may be right, Hermogenes: let us\nsee;\u2014Your meaning is, that the name of each thing is only that which\nanybody agrees to call it?\n\nHERMOGENES: That is my notion.\n\nSOCRATES: Whether the giver of the name be an individual or a city?\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, now, let me take an instance;\u2014suppose that I call a man\na horse or a horse a man, you mean to say that a man will be rightly\ncalled a horse by me individually, and rightly called a man by the rest\nof the world; and a horse again would be rightly called a man by me and\na horse by the world:\u2014that is your meaning?\n\nHERMOGENES: He would, according to my view.\n\nSOCRATES: But how about truth, then? you would acknowledge that there\nis in words a true and a false?\n\nHERMOGENES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And there are true and false propositions?\n\nHERMOGENES: To be sure.\n\nSOCRATES: And a true proposition says that which is, and a false\nproposition says that which is not?\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes; what other answer is possible?\n\nSOCRATES: Then in a proposition there is a true and false?\n\nHERMOGENES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: But is a proposition true as a whole only, and are the parts\nuntrue?\n\nHERMOGENES: No; the parts are true as well as the whole.\n\nSOCRATES: Would you say the large parts and not the smaller ones, or\nevery part?\n\nHERMOGENES: I should say that every part is true.\n\nSOCRATES: Is a proposition resolvable into any part smaller than a\nname?\n\nHERMOGENES: No; that is the smallest.\n\nSOCRATES: Then the name is a part of the true proposition?\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, and a true part, as you say.\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And is not the part of a falsehood also a falsehood?\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then, if propositions may be true and false, names may be\ntrue and false?\n\nHERMOGENES: So we must infer.\n\nSOCRATES: And the name of anything is that which any one affirms to be\nthe name?\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And will there be so many names of each thing as everybody\nsays that there are? and will they be true names at the time of\nuttering them?\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes, Socrates, I can conceive no correctness of names other\nthan this; you give one name, and I another; and in different cities\nand countries there are different names for the same things; Hellenes\ndiffer from barbarians in their use of names, and the several Hellenic\ntribes from one another.\n\nSOCRATES: But would you say, Hermogenes, that the things differ as the\nnames differ? and are they relative to individuals, as Protagoras tells\nus? For he says that man is the measure of all things, and that things\nare to me as they appear to me, and that they are to you as they appear\nto you. Do you agree with him, or would you say that things have a\npermanent essence of their own?\n\nHERMOGENES: There have been times, Socrates, when I have been driven in\nmy perplexity to take refuge with Protagoras; not that I agree with him\nat all.\n\nSOCRATES: What! have you ever been driven to admit that there was no\nsuch thing as a bad man?\n\nHERMOGENES: No, indeed; but I have often had reason to think that there\nare very bad men, and a good many of them.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, and have you ever found any very good ones?\n\nHERMOGENES: Not many.\n\nSOCRATES: Still you have found them?\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And would you hold that the very good were the very wise, and\nthe very evil very foolish? Would that be your view?\n\nHERMOGENES: It would.\n\nSOCRATES: But if Protagoras is right, and the truth is that things are\nas they appear to any one, how can some of us be wise and some of us\nfoolish?\n\nHERMOGENES: Impossible.\n\nSOCRATES: And if, on the other hand, wisdom and folly are really\ndistinguishable, you will allow, I think, that the assertion of\nProtagoras can hardly be correct. For if what appears to each man is\ntrue to him, one man cannot in reality be wiser than another.\n\nHERMOGENES: He cannot.\n\nSOCRATES: Nor will you be disposed to say with Euthydemus, that all\nthings equally belong to all men at the same moment and always; for\nneither on his view can there be some good and others bad, if virtue\nand vice are always equally to be attributed to all.\n\nHERMOGENES: There cannot.\n\nSOCRATES: But if neither is right, and things are not relative to\nindividuals, and all things do not equally belong to all at the same\nmoment and always, they must be supposed to have their own proper and\npermanent essence: they are not in relation to us, or influenced by us,\nfluctuating according to our fancy, but they are independent, and\nmaintain to their own essence the relation prescribed by nature.\n\nHERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that you have said the truth.\n\nSOCRATES: Does what I am saying apply only to the things themselves, or\nequally to the actions which proceed from them? Are not actions also a\nclass of being?\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes, the actions are real as well as the things.\n\nSOCRATES: Then the actions also are done according to their proper\nnature, and not according to our opinion of them? In cutting, for\nexample, we do not cut as we please, and with any chance instrument;\nbut we cut with the proper instrument only, and according to the\nnatural process of cutting; and the natural process is right and will\nsucceed, but any other will fail and be of no use at all.\n\nHERMOGENES: I should say that the natural way is the right way.\n\nSOCRATES: Again, in burning, not every way is the right way; but the\nright way is the natural way, and the right instrument the natural\ninstrument.\n\nHERMOGENES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And this holds good of all actions?\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And speech is a kind of action?\n\nHERMOGENES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And will a man speak correctly who speaks as he pleases? Will\nnot the successful speaker rather be he who speaks in the natural way\nof speaking, and as things ought to be spoken, and with the natural\ninstrument? Any other mode of speaking will result in error and\nfailure.\n\nHERMOGENES: I quite agree with you.\n\nSOCRATES: And is not naming a part of speaking? for in giving names men\nspeak.\n\nHERMOGENES: That is true.\n\nSOCRATES: And if speaking is a sort of action and has a relation to\nacts, is not naming also a sort of action?\n\nHERMOGENES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And we saw that actions were not relative to ourselves, but\nhad a special nature of their own?\n\nHERMOGENES: Precisely.\n\nSOCRATES: Then the argument would lead us to infer that names ought to\nbe given according to a natural process, and with a proper instrument,\nand not at our pleasure: in this and no other way shall we name with\nsuccess.\n\nHERMOGENES: I agree.\n\nSOCRATES: But again, that which has to be cut has to be cut with\nsomething?\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And that which has to be woven or pierced has to be woven or\npierced with something?\n\nHERMOGENES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And that which has to be named has to be named with\nsomething?\n\nHERMOGENES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: What is that with which we pierce?\n\nHERMOGENES: An awl.\n\nSOCRATES: And with which we weave?\n\nHERMOGENES: A shuttle.\n\nSOCRATES: And with which we name?\n\nHERMOGENES: A name.\n\nSOCRATES: Very good: then a name is an instrument?\n\nHERMOGENES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Suppose that I ask, \u201cWhat sort of instrument is a shuttle?\u201d\nAnd you answer, \u201cA weaving instrument.\u201d\n\nHERMOGENES: Well.\n\nSOCRATES: And I ask again, \u201cWhat do we do when we weave?\u201d\u2014The answer\nis, that we separate or disengage the warp from the woof.\n\nHERMOGENES: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: And may not a similar description be given of an awl, and of\ninstruments in general?\n\nHERMOGENES: To be sure.\n\nSOCRATES: And now suppose that I ask a similar question about names:\nwill you answer me? Regarding the name as an instrument, what do we do\nwhen we name?\n\nHERMOGENES: I cannot say.\n\nSOCRATES: Do we not give information to one another, and distinguish\nthings according to their natures?\n\nHERMOGENES: Certainly we do.\n\nSOCRATES: Then a name is an instrument of teaching and of\ndistinguishing natures, as the shuttle is of distinguishing the threads\nof the web.\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And the shuttle is the instrument of the weaver?\n\nHERMOGENES: Assuredly.\n\nSOCRATES: Then the weaver will use the shuttle well\u2014and well means like\na weaver? and the teacher will use the name well\u2014and well means like a\nteacher?\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And when the weaver uses the shuttle, whose work will he be\nusing well?\n\nHERMOGENES: That of the carpenter.\n\nSOCRATES: And is every man a carpenter, or the skilled only?\n\nHERMOGENES: Only the skilled.\n\nSOCRATES: And when the piercer uses the awl, whose work will he be\nusing well?\n\nHERMOGENES: That of the smith.\n\nSOCRATES: And is every man a smith, or only the skilled?\n\nHERMOGENES: The skilled only.\n\nSOCRATES: And when the teacher uses the name, whose work will he be\nusing?\n\nHERMOGENES: There again I am puzzled.\n\nSOCRATES: Cannot you at least say who gives us the names which we use?\n\nHERMOGENES: Indeed I cannot.\n\nSOCRATES: Does not the law seem to you to give us them?\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes, I suppose so.\n\nSOCRATES: Then the teacher, when he gives us a name, uses the work of\nthe legislator?\n\nHERMOGENES: I agree.\n\nSOCRATES: And is every man a legislator, or the skilled only?\n\nHERMOGENES: The skilled only.\n\nSOCRATES: Then, Hermogenes, not every man is able to give a name, but\nonly a maker of names; and this is the legislator, who of all skilled\nartisans in the world is the rarest.\n\nHERMOGENES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And how does the legislator make names? and to what does he\nlook? Consider this in the light of the previous instances: to what\ndoes the carpenter look in making the shuttle? Does he not look to that\nwhich is naturally fitted to act as a shuttle?\n\nHERMOGENES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And suppose the shuttle to be broken in making, will he make\nanother, looking to the broken one? or will he look to the form\naccording to which he made the other?\n\nHERMOGENES: To the latter, I should imagine.\n\nSOCRATES: Might not that be justly called the true or ideal shuttle?\n\nHERMOGENES: I think so.\n\nSOCRATES: And whatever shuttles are wanted, for the manufacture of\ngarments, thin or thick, of flaxen, woollen, or other material, ought\nall of them to have the true form of the shuttle; and whatever is the\nshuttle best adapted to each kind of work, that ought to be the form\nwhich the maker produces in each case.\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And the same holds of other instruments: when a man has\ndiscovered the instrument which is naturally adapted to each work, he\nmust express this natural form, and not others which he fancies, in the\nmaterial, whatever it may be, which he employs; for example, he ought\nto know how to put into iron the forms of awls adapted by nature to\ntheir several uses?\n\nHERMOGENES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And how to put into wood forms of shuttles adapted by nature\nto their uses?\n\nHERMOGENES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: For the several forms of shuttles naturally answer to the\nseveral kinds of webs; and this is true of instruments in general.\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then, as to names: ought not our legislator also to know how\nto put the true natural name of each thing into sounds and syllables,\nand to make and give all names with a view to the ideal name, if he is\nto be a namer in any true sense? And we must remember that different\nlegislators will not use the same syllables. For neither does every\nsmith, although he may be making the same instrument for the same\npurpose, make them all of the same iron. The form must be the same, but\nthe material may vary, and still the instrument may be equally good of\nwhatever iron made, whether in Hellas or in a foreign country;\u2014there is\nno difference.\n\nHERMOGENES: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: And the legislator, whether he be Hellene or barbarian, is\nnot therefore to be deemed by you a worse legislator, provided he gives\nthe true and proper form of the name in whatever syllables; this or\nthat country makes no matter.\n\nHERMOGENES: Quite true.\n\nSOCRATES: But who then is to determine whether the proper form is given\nto the shuttle, whatever sort of wood may be used? the carpenter who\nmakes, or the weaver who is to use them?\n\nHERMOGENES: I should say, he who is to use them, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: And who uses the work of the lyre-maker? Will not he be the\nman who knows how to direct what is being done, and who will know also\nwhether the work is being well done or not?\n\nHERMOGENES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And who is he?\n\nHERMOGENES: The player of the lyre.\n\nSOCRATES: And who will direct the shipwright?\n\nHERMOGENES: The pilot.\n\nSOCRATES: And who will be best able to direct the legislator in his\nwork, and will know whether the work is well done, in this or any other\ncountry? Will not the user be the man?\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And this is he who knows how to ask questions?\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And how to answer them?\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And him who knows how to ask and answer you would call a\ndialectician?\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes; that would be his name.\n\nSOCRATES: Then the work of the carpenter is to make a rudder, and the\npilot has to direct him, if the rudder is to be well made.\n\nHERMOGENES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And the work of the legislator is to give names, and the\ndialectician must be his director if the names are to be rightly given?\n\nHERMOGENES: That is true.\n\nSOCRATES: Then, Hermogenes, I should say that this giving of names can\nbe no such light matter as you fancy, or the work of light or chance\npersons; and Cratylus is right in saying that things have names by\nnature, and that not every man is an artificer of names, but he only\nwho looks to the name which each thing by nature has, and is able to\nexpress the true forms of things in letters and syllables.\n\nHERMOGENES: I cannot answer you, Socrates; but I find a difficulty in\nchanging my opinion all in a moment, and I think that I should be more\nreadily persuaded, if you would show me what this is which you term the\nnatural fitness of names.\n\nSOCRATES: My good Hermogenes, I have none to show. Was I not telling\nyou just now (but you have forgotten), that I knew nothing, and\nproposing to share the enquiry with you? But now that you and I have\ntalked over the matter, a step has been gained; for we have discovered\nthat names have by nature a truth, and that not every man knows how to\ngive a thing a name.\n\nHERMOGENES: Very good.\n\nSOCRATES: And what is the nature of this truth or correctness of names?\nThat, if you care to know, is the next question.\n\nHERMOGENES: Certainly, I care to know.\n\nSOCRATES: Then reflect.\n\nHERMOGENES: How shall I reflect?\n\nSOCRATES: The true way is to have the assistance of those who know, and\nyou must pay them well both in money and in thanks; these are the\nSophists, of whom your brother, Callias, has\u2014rather dearly\u2014bought the\nreputation of wisdom. But you have not yet come into your inheritance,\nand therefore you had better go to him, and beg and entreat him to tell\nyou what he has learnt from Protagoras about the fitness of names.\n\nHERMOGENES: But how inconsistent should I be, if, whilst repudiating\nProtagoras and his truth (\u201cTruth\u201d was the title of the book of\nProtagoras; compare Theaet.), I were to attach any value to what he and\nhis book affirm!\n\nSOCRATES: Then if you despise him, you must learn of Homer and the\npoets.\n\nHERMOGENES: And where does Homer say anything about names, and what\ndoes he say?\n\nSOCRATES: He often speaks of them; notably and nobly in the places\nwhere he distinguishes the different names which Gods and men give to\nthe same things. Does he not in these passages make a remarkable\nstatement about the correctness of names? For the Gods must clearly be\nsupposed to call things by their right and natural names; do you not\nthink so?\n\nHERMOGENES: Why, of course they call them rightly, if they call them at\nall. But to what are you referring?\n\nSOCRATES: Do you not know what he says about the river in Troy who had\na single combat with Hephaestus?\n\n\u201cWhom,\u201d as he says, \u201cthe Gods call Xanthus, and men call Scamander.\u201d\n\nHERMOGENES: I remember.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, and about this river\u2014to know that he ought to be called\nXanthus and not Scamander\u2014is not that a solemn lesson? Or about the\nbird which, as he says,\n\n\u201cThe Gods call Chalcis, and men Cymindis:\u201d\n\nto be taught how much more correct the name Chalcis is than the name\nCymindis\u2014do you deem that a light matter? Or about Batieia and Myrina?\n(Compare Il. \u201cThe hill which men call Batieia and the immortals the\ntomb of the sportive Myrina.\u201d) And there are many other observations of\nthe same kind in Homer and other poets. Now, I think that this is\nbeyond the understanding of you and me; but the names of Scamandrius\nand Astyanax, which he affirms to have been the names of Hector\u2019s son,\nare more within the range of human faculties, as I am disposed to\nthink; and what the poet means by correctness may be more readily\napprehended in that instance: you will remember I dare say the lines to\nwhich I refer? (Il.)\n\nHERMOGENES: I do.\n\nSOCRATES: Let me ask you, then, which did Homer think the more correct\nof the names given to Hector\u2019s son\u2014Astyanax or Scamandrius?\n\nHERMOGENES: I do not know.\n\nSOCRATES: How would you answer, if you were asked whether the wise or\nthe unwise are more likely to give correct names?\n\nHERMOGENES: I should say the wise, of course.\n\nSOCRATES: And are the men or the women of a city, taken as a class, the\nwiser?\n\nHERMOGENES: I should say, the men.\n\nSOCRATES: And Homer, as you know, says that the Trojan men called him\nAstyanax (king of the city); but if the men called him Astyanax, the\nother name of Scamandrius could only have been given to him by the\nwomen.\n\nHERMOGENES: That may be inferred.\n\nSOCRATES: And must not Homer have imagined the Trojans to be wiser than\ntheir wives?\n\nHERMOGENES: To be sure.\n\nSOCRATES: Then he must have thought Astyanax to be a more correct name\nfor the boy than Scamandrius?\n\nHERMOGENES: Clearly.\n\nSOCRATES: And what is the reason of this? Let us consider:\u2014does he not\nhimself suggest a very good reason, when he says,\n\n\u201cFor he alone defended their city and long walls\u201d?\n\nThis appears to be a good reason for calling the son of the saviour\nking of the city which his father was saving, as Homer observes.\n\nHERMOGENES: I see.\n\nSOCRATES: Why, Hermogenes, I do not as yet see myself; and do you?\n\nHERMOGENES: No, indeed; not I.\n\nSOCRATES: But tell me, friend, did not Homer himself also give Hector\nhis name?\n\nHERMOGENES: What of that?\n\nSOCRATES: The name appears to me to be very nearly the same as the name\nof Astyanax\u2014both are Hellenic; and a king (anax) and a holder (ektor)\nhave nearly the same meaning, and are both descriptive of a king; for a\nman is clearly the holder of that of which he is king; he rules, and\nowns, and holds it. But, perhaps, you may think that I am talking\nnonsense; and indeed I believe that I myself did not know what I meant\nwhen I imagined that I had found some indication of the opinion of\nHomer about the correctness of names.\n\nHERMOGENES: I assure you that I think otherwise, and I believe you to\nbe on the right track.\n\nSOCRATES: There is reason, I think, in calling the lion\u2019s whelp a lion,\nand the foal of a horse a horse; I am speaking only of the ordinary\ncourse of nature, when an animal produces after his kind, and not of\nextraordinary births;\u2014if contrary to nature a horse have a calf, then I\nshould not call that a foal but a calf; nor do I call any inhuman birth\na man, but only a natural birth. And the same may be said of trees and\nother things. Do you agree with me?\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes, I agree.\n\nSOCRATES: Very good. But you had better watch me and see that I do not\nplay tricks with you. For on the same principle the son of a king is to\nbe called a king. And whether the syllables of the name are the same or\nnot the same, makes no difference, provided the meaning is retained;\nnor does the addition or subtraction of a letter make any difference so\nlong as the essence of the thing remains in possession of the name and\nappears in it.\n\nHERMOGENES: What do you mean?\n\nSOCRATES: A very simple matter. I may illustrate my meaning by the\nnames of letters, which you know are not the same as the letters\nthemselves with the exception of the four epsilon, upsilon, omicron,\nomega; the names of the rest, whether vowels or consonants, are made up\nof other letters which we add to them; but so long as we introduce the\nmeaning, and there can be no mistake, the name of the letter is quite\ncorrect. Take, for example, the letter beta\u2014the addition of eta, tau,\nalpha, gives no offence, and does not prevent the whole name from\nhaving the value which the legislator intended\u2014so well did he know how\nto give the letters names.\n\nHERMOGENES: I believe you are right.\n\nSOCRATES: And may not the same be said of a king? a king will often be\nthe son of a king, the good son or the noble son of a good or noble\nsire; and similarly the offspring of every kind, in the regular course\nof nature, is like the parent, and therefore has the same name. Yet the\nsyllables may be disguised until they appear different to the ignorant\nperson, and he may not recognize them, although they are the same, just\nas any one of us would not recognize the same drugs under different\ndisguises of colour and smell, although to the physician, who regards\nthe power of them, they are the same, and he is not put out by the\naddition; and in like manner the etymologist is not put out by the\naddition or transposition or subtraction of a letter or two, or indeed\nby the change of all the letters, for this need not interfere with the\nmeaning. As was just now said, the names of Hector and Astyanax have\nonly one letter alike, which is tau, and yet they have the same\nmeaning. And how little in common with the letters of their names has\nArchepolis (ruler of the city)\u2014and yet the meaning is the same. And\nthere are many other names which just mean \u201cking.\u201d Again, there are\nseveral names for a general, as, for example, Agis (leader) and\nPolemarchus (chief in war) and Eupolemus (good warrior); and others\nwhich denote a physician, as Iatrocles (famous healer) and Acesimbrotus\n(curer of mortals); and there are many others which might be cited,\ndiffering in their syllables and letters, but having the same meaning.\nWould you not say so?\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: The same names, then, ought to be assigned to those who\nfollow in the course of nature?\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And what of those who follow out of the course of nature, and\nare prodigies? for example, when a good and religious man has an\nirreligious son, he ought to bear the name not of his father, but of\nthe class to which he belongs, just as in the case which was before\nsupposed of a horse foaling a calf.\n\nHERMOGENES: Quite true.\n\nSOCRATES: Then the irreligious son of a religious father should be\ncalled irreligious?\n\nHERMOGENES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: He should not be called Theophilus (beloved of God) or\nMnesitheus (mindful of God), or any of these names: if names are\ncorrectly given, his should have an opposite meaning.\n\nHERMOGENES: Certainly, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: Again, Hermogenes, there is Orestes (the man of the\nmountains) who appears to be rightly called; whether chance gave the\nname, or perhaps some poet who meant to express the brutality and\nfierceness and mountain wildness of his hero\u2019s nature.\n\nHERMOGENES: That is very likely, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: And his father\u2019s name is also according to nature.\n\nHERMOGENES: Clearly.\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, for as his name, so also is his nature; Agamemnon\n(admirable for remaining) is one who is patient and persevering in the\naccomplishment of his resolves, and by his virtue crowns them; and his\ncontinuance at Troy with all the vast army is a proof of that admirable\nendurance in him which is signified by the name Agamemnon. I also think\nthat Atreus is rightly called; for his murder of Chrysippus and his\nexceeding cruelty to Thyestes are damaging and destructive to his\nreputation\u2014the name is a little altered and disguised so as not to be\nintelligible to every one, but to the etymologist there is no\ndifficulty in seeing the meaning, for whether you think of him as\nateires the stubborn, or as atrestos the fearless, or as ateros the\ndestructive one, the name is perfectly correct in every point of view.\nAnd I think that Pelops is also named appropriately; for, as the name\nimplies, he is rightly called Pelops who sees what is near only (o ta\npelas oron).\n\nHERMOGENES: How so?\n\nSOCRATES: Because, according to the tradition, he had no forethought or\nforesight of all the evil which the murder of Myrtilus would entail\nupon his whole race in remote ages; he saw only what was at hand and\nimmediate,\u2014or in other words, pelas (near), in his eagerness to win\nHippodamia by all means for his bride. Every one would agree that the\nname of Tantalus is rightly given and in accordance with nature, if the\ntraditions about him are true.\n\nHERMOGENES: And what are the traditions?\n\nSOCRATES: Many terrible misfortunes are said to have happened to him in\nhis life\u2014last of all, came the utter ruin of his country; and after his\ndeath he had the stone suspended (talanteia) over his head in the world\nbelow\u2014all this agrees wonderfully well with his name. You might imagine\nthat some person who wanted to call him Talantatos (the most weighted\ndown by misfortune), disguised the name by altering it into Tantalus;\nand into this form, by some accident of tradition, it has actually been\ntransmuted. The name of Zeus, who is his alleged father, has also an\nexcellent meaning, although hard to be understood, because really like\na sentence, which is divided into two parts, for some call him Zena,\nand use the one half, and others who use the other half call him Dia;\nthe two together signify the nature of the God, and the business of a\nname, as we were saying, is to express the nature. For there is none\nwho is more the author of life to us and to all, than the lord and king\nof all. Wherefore we are right in calling him Zena and Dia, which are\none name, although divided, meaning the God through whom all creatures\nalways have life (di on zen aei pasi tois zosin uparchei). There is an\nirreverence, at first sight, in calling him son of Cronos (who is a\nproverb for stupidity), and we might rather expect Zeus to be the child\nof a mighty intellect. Which is the fact; for this is the meaning of\nhis father\u2019s name: Kronos quasi Koros (Choreo, to sweep), not in the\nsense of a youth, but signifying to chatharon chai acheraton tou nou,\nthe pure and garnished mind (sc. apo tou chorein). He, as we are\ninformed by tradition, was begotten of Uranus, rightly so called (apo\ntou oran ta ano) from looking upwards; which, as philosophers tell us,\nis the way to have a pure mind, and the name Uranus is therefore\ncorrect. If I could remember the genealogy of Hesiod, I would have gone\non and tried more conclusions of the same sort on the remoter ancestors\nof the Gods,\u2014then I might have seen whether this wisdom, which has come\nto me all in an instant, I know not whence, will or will not hold good\nto the end.\n\nHERMOGENES: You seem to me, Socrates, to be quite like a prophet newly\ninspired, and to be uttering oracles.\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, Hermogenes, and I believe that I caught the inspiration\nfrom the great Euthyphro of the Prospaltian deme, who gave me a long\nlecture which commenced at dawn: he talked and I listened, and his\nwisdom and enchanting ravishment has not only filled my ears but taken\npossession of my soul, and to-day I shall let his superhuman power work\nand finish the investigation of names\u2014that will be the way; but\nto-morrow, if you are so disposed, we will conjure him away, and make a\npurgation of him, if we can only find some priest or sophist who is\nskilled in purifications of this sort.\n\nHERMOGENES: With all my heart; for am very curious to hear the rest of\nthe enquiry about names.\n\nSOCRATES: Then let us proceed; and where would you have us begin, now\nthat we have got a sort of outline of the enquiry? Are there any names\nwhich witness of themselves that they are not given arbitrarily, but\nhave a natural fitness? The names of heroes and of men in general are\napt to be deceptive because they are often called after ancestors with\nwhose names, as we were saying, they may have no business; or they are\nthe expression of a wish like Eutychides (the son of good fortune), or\nSosias (the Saviour), or Theophilus (the beloved of God), and others.\nBut I think that we had better leave these, for there will be more\nchance of finding correctness in the names of immutable essences;\u2014there\nought to have been more care taken about them when they were named, and\nperhaps there may have been some more than human power at work\noccasionally in giving them names.\n\nHERMOGENES: I think so, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: Ought we not to begin with the consideration of the Gods, and\nshow that they are rightly named Gods?\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes, that will be well.\n\nSOCRATES: My notion would be something of this sort:\u2014I suspect that the\nsun, moon, earth, stars, and heaven, which are still the Gods of many\nbarbarians, were the only Gods known to the aboriginal Hellenes. Seeing\nthat they were always moving and running, from their running nature\nthey were called Gods or runners (Theous, Theontas); and when men\nbecame acquainted with the other Gods, they proceeded to apply the same\nname to them all. Do you think that likely?\n\nHERMOGENES: I think it very likely indeed.\n\nSOCRATES: What shall follow the Gods?\n\nHERMOGENES: Must not demons and heroes and men come next?\n\nSOCRATES: Demons! And what do you consider to be the meaning of this\nword? Tell me if my view is right.\n\nHERMOGENES: Let me hear.\n\nSOCRATES: You know how Hesiod uses the word?\n\nHERMOGENES: I do not.\n\nSOCRATES: Do you not remember that he speaks of a golden race of men\nwho came first?\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes, I do.\n\nSOCRATES: He says of them\u2014\n\n\u201cBut now that fate has closed over this race They are holy demons upon\nthe earth, Beneficent, averters of ills, guardians of mortal men.\u201d\n(Hesiod, Works and Days.)\n\nHERMOGENES: What is the inference?\n\nSOCRATES: What is the inference! Why, I suppose that he means by the\ngolden men, not men literally made of gold, but good and noble; and I\nam convinced of this, because he further says that we are the iron\nrace.\n\nHERMOGENES: That is true.\n\nSOCRATES: And do you not suppose that good men of our own day would by\nhim be said to be of golden race?\n\nHERMOGENES: Very likely.\n\nSOCRATES: And are not the good wise?\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes, they are wise.\n\nSOCRATES: And therefore I have the most entire conviction that he\ncalled them demons, because they were daemones (knowing or wise), and\nin our older Attic dialect the word itself occurs. Now he and other\npoets say truly, that when a good man dies he has honour and a mighty\nportion among the dead, and becomes a demon; which is a name given to\nhim signifying wisdom. And I say too, that every wise man who happens\nto be a good man is more than human (daimonion) both in life and death,\nand is rightly called a demon.\n\nHERMOGENES: Then I rather think that I am of one mind with you; but\nwhat is the meaning of the word \u201chero\u201d? (Eros with an eta, in the old\nwriting eros with an epsilon.)\n\nSOCRATES: I think that there is no difficulty in explaining, for the\nname is not much altered, and signifies that they were born of love.\n\nHERMOGENES: What do you mean?\n\nSOCRATES: Do you not know that the heroes are demigods?\n\nHERMOGENES: What then?\n\nSOCRATES: All of them sprang either from the love of a God for a mortal\nwoman, or of a mortal man for a Goddess; think of the word in the old\nAttic, and you will see better that the name heros is only a slight\nalteration of Eros, from whom the heroes sprang: either this is the\nmeaning, or, if not this, then they must have been skilful as\nrhetoricians and dialecticians, and able to put the question (erotan),\nfor eirein is equivalent to legein. And therefore, as I was saying, in\nthe Attic dialect the heroes turn out to be rhetoricians and\nquestioners. All this is easy enough; the noble breed of heroes are a\ntribe of sophists and rhetors. But can you tell me why men are called\nanthropoi?\u2014that is more difficult.\n\nHERMOGENES: No, I cannot; and I would not try even if I could, because\nI think that you are the more likely to succeed.\n\nSOCRATES: That is to say, you trust to the inspiration of Euthyphro.\n\nHERMOGENES: Of course.\n\nSOCRATES: Your faith is not vain; for at this very moment a new and\ningenious thought strikes me, and, if I am not careful, before\nto-morrow\u2019s dawn I shall be wiser than I ought to be. Now, attend to\nme; and first, remember that we often put in and pull out letters in\nwords, and give names as we please and change the accents. Take, for\nexample, the word Dii Philos; in order to convert this from a sentence\ninto a noun, we omit one of the iotas and sound the middle syllable\ngrave instead of acute; as, on the other hand, letters are sometimes\ninserted in words instead of being omitted, and the acute takes the\nplace of the grave.\n\nHERMOGENES: That is true.\n\nSOCRATES: The name anthropos, which was once a sentence, and is now a\nnoun, appears to be a case just of this sort, for one letter, which is\nthe alpha, has been omitted, and the acute on the last syllable has\nbeen changed to a grave.\n\nHERMOGENES: What do you mean?\n\nSOCRATES: I mean to say that the word \u201cman\u201d implies that other animals\nnever examine, or consider, or look up at what they see, but that man\nnot only sees (opope) but considers and looks up at that which he sees,\nand hence he alone of all animals is rightly anthropos, meaning\nanathron a opopen.\n\nHERMOGENES: May I ask you to examine another word about which I am\ncurious?\n\nSOCRATES: Certainly.\n\nHERMOGENES: I will take that which appears to me to follow next in\norder. You know the distinction of soul and body?\n\nSOCRATES: Of course.\n\nHERMOGENES: Let us endeavour to analyze them like the previous words.\n\nSOCRATES: You want me first of all to examine the natural fitness of\nthe word psuche (soul), and then of the word soma (body)?\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: If I am to say what occurs to me at the moment, I should\nimagine that those who first used the name psuche meant to express that\nthe soul when in the body is the source of life, and gives the power of\nbreath and revival (anapsuchon), and when this reviving power fails\nthen the body perishes and dies, and this, if I am not mistaken, they\ncalled psyche. But please stay a moment; I fancy that I can discover\nsomething which will be more acceptable to the disciples of Euthyphro,\nfor I am afraid that they will scorn this explanation. What do you say\nto another?\n\nHERMOGENES: Let me hear.\n\nSOCRATES: What is that which holds and carries and gives life and\nmotion to the entire nature of the body? What else but the soul?\n\nHERMOGENES: Just that.\n\nSOCRATES: And do you not believe with Anaxagoras, that mind or soul is\nthe ordering and containing principle of all things?\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes; I do.\n\nSOCRATES: Then you may well call that power phuseche which carries and\nholds nature (e phusin okei, kai ekei), and this may be refined away\ninto psuche.\n\nHERMOGENES: Certainly; and this derivation is, I think, more scientific\nthan the other.\n\nSOCRATES: It is so; but I cannot help laughing, if I am to suppose that\nthis was the true meaning of the name.\n\nHERMOGENES: But what shall we say of the next word?\n\nSOCRATES: You mean soma (the body).\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: That may be variously interpreted; and yet more variously if\na little permutation is allowed. For some say that the body is the\ngrave (sema) of the soul which may be thought to be buried in our\npresent life; or again the index of the soul, because the soul gives\nindications to (semainei) the body; probably the Orphic poets were the\ninventors of the name, and they were under the impression that the soul\nis suffering the punishment of sin, and that the body is an enclosure\nor prison in which the soul is incarcerated, kept safe (soma, sozetai),\nas the name soma implies, until the penalty is paid; according to this\nview, not even a letter of the word need be changed.\n\nHERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that we have said enough of this class\nof words. But have we any more explanations of the names of the Gods,\nlike that which you were giving of Zeus? I should like to know whether\nany similar principle of correctness is to be applied to them.\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, indeed, Hermogenes; and there is one excellent principle\nwhich, as men of sense, we must acknowledge,\u2014that of the Gods we know\nnothing, either of their natures or of the names which they give\nthemselves; but we are sure that the names by which they call\nthemselves, whatever they may be, are true. And this is the best of all\nprinciples; and the next best is to say, as in prayers, that we will\ncall them by any sort or kind of names or patronymics which they like,\nbecause we do not know of any other. That also, I think, is a very good\ncustom, and one which I should much wish to observe. Let us, then, if\nyou please, in the first place announce to them that we are not\nenquiring about them; we do not presume that we are able to do so; but\nwe are enquiring about the meaning of men in giving them these\nnames,\u2014in this there can be small blame.\n\nHERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that you are quite right, and I would\nlike to do as you say.\n\nSOCRATES: Shall we begin, then, with Hestia, according to custom?\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes, that will be very proper.\n\nSOCRATES: What may we suppose him to have meant who gave the name\nHestia?\n\nHERMOGENES: That is another and certainly a most difficult question.\n\nSOCRATES: My dear Hermogenes, the first imposers of names must surely\nhave been considerable persons; they were philosophers, and had a good\ndeal to say.\n\nHERMOGENES: Well, and what of them?\n\nSOCRATES: They are the men to whom I should attribute the imposition of\nnames. Even in foreign names, if you analyze them, a meaning is still\ndiscernible. For example, that which we term ousia is by some called\nesia, and by others again osia. Now that the essence of things should\nbe called estia, which is akin to the first of these (esia = estia), is\nrational enough. And there is reason in the Athenians calling that\nestia which participates in ousia. For in ancient times we too seem to\nhave said esia for ousia, and this you may note to have been the idea\nof those who appointed that sacrifices should be first offered to\nestia, which was natural enough if they meant that estia was the\nessence of things. Those again who read osia seem to have inclined to\nthe opinion of Heracleitus, that all things flow and nothing stands;\nwith them the pushing principle (othoun) is the cause and ruling power\nof all things, and is therefore rightly called osia. Enough of this,\nwhich is all that we who know nothing can affirm. Next in order after\nHestia we ought to consider Rhea and Cronos, although the name of\nCronos has been already discussed. But I dare say that I am talking\ngreat nonsense.\n\nHERMOGENES: Why, Socrates?\n\nSOCRATES: My good friend, I have discovered a hive of wisdom.\n\nHERMOGENES: Of what nature?\n\nSOCRATES: Well, rather ridiculous, and yet plausible.\n\nHERMOGENES: How plausible?\n\nSOCRATES: I fancy to myself Heracleitus repeating wise traditions of\nantiquity as old as the days of Cronos and Rhea, and of which Homer\nalso spoke.\n\nHERMOGENES: How do you mean?\n\nSOCRATES: Heracleitus is supposed to say that all things are in motion\nand nothing at rest; he compares them to the stream of a river, and\nsays that you cannot go into the same water twice.\n\nHERMOGENES: That is true.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, then, how can we avoid inferring that he who gave the\nnames of Cronos and Rhea to the ancestors of the Gods, agreed pretty\nmuch in the doctrine of Heracleitus? Is the giving of the names of\nstreams to both of them purely accidental? Compare the line in which\nHomer, and, as I believe, Hesiod also, tells of\n\n\u201cOcean, the origin of Gods, and mother Tethys (Il.\u2014the line is not\nfound in the extant works of Hesiod.).\u201d\n\nAnd again, Orpheus says, that\n\n\u201cThe fair river of Ocean was the first to marry, and he espoused his\nsister Tethys, who was his mother\u2019s daughter.\u201d\n\nYou see that this is a remarkable coincidence, and all in the direction\nof Heracleitus.\n\nHERMOGENES: I think that there is something in what you say, Socrates;\nbut I do not understand the meaning of the name Tethys.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, that is almost self-explained, being only the name of a\nspring, a little disguised; for that which is strained and filtered\n(diattomenon, ethoumenon) may be likened to a spring, and the name\nTethys is made up of these two words.\n\nHERMOGENES: The idea is ingenious, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: To be sure. But what comes next?\u2014of Zeus we have spoken.\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then let us next take his two brothers, Poseidon and Pluto,\nwhether the latter is called by that or by his other name.\n\nHERMOGENES: By all means.\n\nSOCRATES: Poseidon is Posidesmos, the chain of the feet; the original\ninventor of the name had been stopped by the watery element in his\nwalks, and not allowed to go on, and therefore he called the ruler of\nthis element Poseidon; the epsilon was probably inserted as an\nornament. Yet, perhaps, not so; but the name may have been originally\nwritten with a double lamda and not with a sigma, meaning that the God\nknew many things (Polla eidos). And perhaps also he being the shaker of\nthe earth, has been named from shaking (seiein), and then pi and delta\nhave been added. Pluto gives wealth (Ploutos), and his name means the\ngiver of wealth, which comes out of the earth beneath. People in\ngeneral appear to imagine that the term Hades is connected with the\ninvisible (aeides) and so they are led by their fears to call the God\nPluto instead.\n\nHERMOGENES: And what is the true derivation?\n\nSOCRATES: In spite of the mistakes which are made about the power of\nthis deity, and the foolish fears which people have of him, such as the\nfear of always being with him after death, and of the soul denuded of\nthe body going to him (compare Rep.), my belief is that all is quite\nconsistent, and that the office and name of the God really correspond.\n\nHERMOGENES: Why, how is that?\n\nSOCRATES: I will tell you my own opinion; but first, I should like to\nask you which chain does any animal feel to be the stronger? and which\nconfines him more to the same spot,\u2014desire or necessity?\n\nHERMOGENES: Desire, Socrates, is stronger far.\n\nSOCRATES: And do you not think that many a one would escape from Hades,\nif he did not bind those who depart to him by the strongest of chains?\n\nHERMOGENES: Assuredly they would.\n\nSOCRATES: And if by the greatest of chains, then by some desire, as I\nshould certainly infer, and not by necessity?\n\nHERMOGENES: That is clear.\n\nSOCRATES: And there are many desires?\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And therefore by the greatest desire, if the chain is to be\nthe greatest?\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And is any desire stronger than the thought that you will be\nmade better by associating with another?\n\nHERMOGENES: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: And is not that the reason, Hermogenes, why no one, who has\nbeen to him, is willing to come back to us? Even the Sirens, like all\nthe rest of the world, have been laid under his spells. Such a charm,\nas I imagine, is the God able to infuse into his words. And, according\nto this view, he is the perfect and accomplished Sophist, and the great\nbenefactor of the inhabitants of the other world; and even to us who\nare upon earth he sends from below exceeding blessings. For he has much\nmore than he wants down there; wherefore he is called Pluto (or the\nrich). Note also, that he will have nothing to do with men while they\nare in the body, but only when the soul is liberated from the desires\nand evils of the body. Now there is a great deal of philosophy and\nreflection in that; for in their liberated state he can bind them with\nthe desire of virtue, but while they are flustered and maddened by the\nbody, not even father Cronos himself would suffice to keep them with\nhim in his own far-famed chains.\n\nHERMOGENES: There is a deal of truth in what you say.\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, Hermogenes, and the legislator called him Hades, not\nfrom the unseen (aeides)\u2014far otherwise, but from his knowledge\n(eidenai) of all noble things.\n\nHERMOGENES: Very good; and what do we say of Demeter, and Here, and\nApollo, and Athene, and Hephaestus, and Ares, and the other deities?\n\nSOCRATES: Demeter is e didousa meter, who gives food like a mother;\nHere is the lovely one (erate)\u2014for Zeus, according to tradition, loved\nand married her; possibly also the name may have been given when the\nlegislator was thinking of the heavens, and may be only a disguise of\nthe air (aer), putting the end in the place of the beginning. You will\nrecognize the truth of this if you repeat the letters of Here several\ntimes over. People dread the name of Pherephatta as they dread the name\nof Apollo,\u2014and with as little reason; the fear, if I am not mistaken,\nonly arises from their ignorance of the nature of names. But they go\nchanging the name into Phersephone, and they are terrified at this;\nwhereas the new name means only that the Goddess is wise (sophe); for\nseeing that all things in the world are in motion (pheromenon), that\nprinciple which embraces and touches and is able to follow them, is\nwisdom. And therefore the Goddess may be truly called Pherepaphe\n(Pherepapha), or some name like it, because she touches that which is\nin motion (tou pheromenon ephaptomene), herein showing her wisdom. And\nHades, who is wise, consorts with her, because she is wise. They alter\nher name into Pherephatta now-a-days, because the present generation\ncare for euphony more than truth. There is the other name, Apollo,\nwhich, as I was saying, is generally supposed to have some terrible\nsignification. Have you remarked this fact?\n\nHERMOGENES: To be sure I have, and what you say is true.\n\nSOCRATES: But the name, in my opinion, is really most expressive of the\npower of the God.\n\nHERMOGENES: How so?\n\nSOCRATES: I will endeavour to explain, for I do not believe that any\nsingle name could have been better adapted to express the attributes of\nthe God, embracing and in a manner signifying all four of them,\u2014music,\nand prophecy, and medicine, and archery.\n\nHERMOGENES: That must be a strange name, and I should like to hear the\nexplanation.\n\nSOCRATES: Say rather an harmonious name, as beseems the God of Harmony.\nIn the first place, the purgations and purifications which doctors and\ndiviners use, and their fumigations with drugs magical or medicinal, as\nwell as their washings and lustral sprinklings, have all one and the\nsame object, which is to make a man pure both in body and soul.\n\nHERMOGENES: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: And is not Apollo the purifier, and the washer, and the\nabsolver from all impurities?\n\nHERMOGENES: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: Then in reference to his ablutions and absolutions, as being\nthe physician who orders them, he may be rightly called Apolouon\n(purifier); or in respect of his powers of divination, and his truth\nand sincerity, which is the same as truth, he may be most fitly called\nAplos, from aplous (sincere), as in the Thessalian dialect, for all the\nThessalians call him Aplos; also he is aei Ballon (always shooting),\nbecause he is a master archer who never misses; or again, the name may\nrefer to his musical attributes, and then, as in akolouthos, and\nakoitis, and in many other words the alpha is supposed to mean\n\u201ctogether,\u201d so the meaning of the name Apollo will be \u201cmoving\ntogether,\u201d whether in the poles of heaven as they are called, or in the\nharmony of song, which is termed concord, because he moves all together\nby an harmonious power, as astronomers and musicians ingeniously\ndeclare. And he is the God who presides over harmony, and makes all\nthings move together, both among Gods and among men. And as in the\nwords akolouthos and akoitis the alpha is substituted for an omicron,\nso the name Apollon is equivalent to omopolon; only the second lambda\nis added in order to avoid the ill-omened sound of destruction\n(apolon). Now the suspicion of this destructive power still haunts the\nminds of some who do not consider the true value of the name, which, as\nI was saying just now, has reference to all the powers of the God, who\nis the single one, the everdarting, the purifier, the mover together\n(aplous, aei Ballon, apolouon, omopolon). The name of the Muses and of\nmusic would seem to be derived from their making philosophical\nenquiries (mosthai); and Leto is called by this name, because she is\nsuch a gentle Goddess, and so willing (ethelemon) to grant our\nrequests; or her name may be Letho, as she is often called by\nstrangers\u2014they seem to imply by it her amiability, and her smooth and\neasy-going way of behaving. Artemis is named from her healthy\n(artemes), well-ordered nature, and because of her love of virginity,\nperhaps because she is a proficient in virtue (arete), and perhaps also\nas hating intercourse of the sexes (ton aroton misesasa). He who gave\nthe Goddess her name may have had any or all of these reasons.\n\nHERMOGENES: What is the meaning of Dionysus and Aphrodite?\n\nSOCRATES: Son of Hipponicus, you ask a solemn question; there is a\nserious and also a facetious explanation of both these names; the\nserious explanation is not to be had from me, but there is no objection\nto your hearing the facetious one; for the Gods too love a joke.\nDionusos is simply didous oinon (giver of wine), Didoinusos, as he\nmight be called in fun,\u2014and oinos is properly oionous, because wine\nmakes those who drink, think (oiesthai) that they have a mind (noun)\nwhen they have none. The derivation of Aphrodite, born of the foam\n(aphros), may be fairly accepted on the authority of Hesiod.\n\nHERMOGENES: Still there remains Athene, whom you, Socrates, as an\nAthenian, will surely not forget; there are also Hephaestus and Ares.\n\nSOCRATES: I am not likely to forget them.\n\nHERMOGENES: No, indeed.\n\nSOCRATES: There is no difficulty in explaining the other appellation of\nAthene.\n\nHERMOGENES: What other appellation?\n\nSOCRATES: We call her Pallas.\n\nHERMOGENES: To be sure.\n\nSOCRATES: And we cannot be wrong in supposing that this is derived from\narmed dances. For the elevation of oneself or anything else above the\nearth, or by the use of the hands, we call shaking (pallein), or\ndancing.\n\nHERMOGENES: That is quite true.\n\nSOCRATES: Then that is the explanation of the name Pallas?\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes; but what do you say of the other name?\n\nSOCRATES: Athene?\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: That is a graver matter, and there, my friend, the modern\ninterpreters of Homer may, I think, assist in explaining the view of\nthe ancients. For most of these in their explanations of the poet,\nassert that he meant by Athene \u201cmind\u201d (nous) and \u201cintelligence\u201d\n(dianoia), and the maker of names appears to have had a singular notion\nabout her; and indeed calls her by a still higher title, \u201cdivine\nintelligence\u201d (Thou noesis), as though he would say: This is she who\nhas the mind of God (Theonoa);\u2014using alpha as a dialectical variety for\neta, and taking away iota and sigma (There seems to be some error in\nthe MSS. The meaning is that the word theonoa = theounoa is a curtailed\nform of theou noesis, but the omitted letters do not agree.). Perhaps,\nhowever, the name Theonoe may mean \u201cshe who knows divine things\u201d (Theia\nnoousa) better than others. Nor shall we be far wrong in supposing that\nthe author of it wished to identify this Goddess with moral\nintelligence (en ethei noesin), and therefore gave her the name\nethonoe; which, however, either he or his successors have altered into\nwhat they thought a nicer form, and called her Athene.\n\nHERMOGENES: But what do you say of Hephaestus?\n\nSOCRATES: Speak you of the princely lord of light (Phaeos istora)?\n\nHERMOGENES: Surely.\n\nSOCRATES: Ephaistos is Phaistos, and has added the eta by attraction;\nthat is obvious to anybody.\n\nHERMOGENES: That is very probable, until some more probable notion gets\ninto your head.\n\nSOCRATES: To prevent that, you had better ask what is the derivation of\nAres.\n\nHERMOGENES: What is Ares?\n\nSOCRATES: Ares may be called, if you will, from his manhood (arren) and\nmanliness, or if you please, from his hard and unchangeable nature,\nwhich is the meaning of arratos: the latter is a derivation in every\nway appropriate to the God of war.\n\nHERMOGENES: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: And now, by the Gods, let us have no more of the Gods, for I\nam afraid of them; ask about anything but them, and thou shalt see how\nthe steeds of Euthyphro can prance.\n\nHERMOGENES: Only one more God! I should like to know about Hermes, of\nwhom I am said not to be a true son. Let us make him out, and then I\nshall know whether there is any meaning in what Cratylus says.\n\nSOCRATES: I should imagine that the name Hermes has to do with speech,\nand signifies that he is the interpreter (ermeneus), or messenger, or\nthief, or liar, or bargainer; all that sort of thing has a great deal\nto do with language; as I was telling you, the word eirein is\nexpressive of the use of speech, and there is an often-recurring\nHomeric word emesato, which means \u201che contrived\u201d\u2014out of these two\nwords, eirein and mesasthai, the legislator formed the name of the God\nwho invented language and speech; and we may imagine him dictating to\nus the use of this name: \u201cO my friends,\u201d says he to us, \u201cseeing that he\nis the contriver of tales or speeches, you may rightly call him\nEirhemes.\u201d And this has been improved by us, as we think, into Hermes.\nIris also appears to have been called from the verb \u201cto tell\u201d (eirein),\nbecause she was a messenger.\n\nHERMOGENES: Then I am very sure that Cratylus was quite right in saying\nthat I was no true son of Hermes (Ermogenes), for I am not a good hand\nat speeches.\n\nSOCRATES: There is also reason, my friend, in Pan being the\ndouble-formed son of Hermes.\n\nHERMOGENES: How do you make that out?\n\nSOCRATES: You are aware that speech signifies all things (pan), and is\nalways turning them round and round, and has two forms, true and false?\n\nHERMOGENES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Is not the truth that is in him the smooth or sacred form\nwhich dwells above among the Gods, whereas falsehood dwells among men\nbelow, and is rough like the goat of tragedy; for tales and falsehoods\nhave generally to do with the tragic or goatish life, and tragedy is\nthe place of them?\n\nHERMOGENES: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: Then surely Pan, who is the declarer of all things (pan) and\nthe perpetual mover (aei polon) of all things, is rightly called\naipolos (goat-herd), he being the two-formed son of Hermes, smooth in\nhis upper part, and rough and goatlike in his lower regions. And, as\nthe son of Hermes, he is speech or the brother of speech, and that\nbrother should be like brother is no marvel. But, as I was saying, my\ndear Hermogenes, let us get away from the Gods.\n\nHERMOGENES: From these sort of Gods, by all means, Socrates. But why\nshould we not discuss another kind of Gods\u2014the sun, moon, stars, earth,\naether, air, fire, water, the seasons, and the year?\n\nSOCRATES: You impose a great many tasks upon me. Still, if you wish, I\nwill not refuse.\n\nHERMOGENES: You will oblige me.\n\nSOCRATES: How would you have me begin? Shall I take first of all him\nwhom you mentioned first\u2014the sun?\n\nHERMOGENES: Very good.\n\nSOCRATES: The origin of the sun will probably be clearer in the Doric\nform, for the Dorians call him alios, and this name is given to him\nbecause when he rises he gathers (alizoi) men together or because he is\nalways rolling in his course (aei eilein ion) about the earth; or from\naiolein, of which the meaning is the same as poikillein (to variegate),\nbecause he variegates the productions of the earth.\n\nHERMOGENES: But what is selene (the moon)?\n\nSOCRATES: That name is rather unfortunate for Anaxagoras.\n\nHERMOGENES: How so?\n\nSOCRATES: The word seems to forestall his recent discovery, that the\nmoon receives her light from the sun.\n\nHERMOGENES: Why do you say so?\n\nSOCRATES: The two words selas (brightness) and phos (light) have much\nthe same meaning?\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: This light about the moon is always new (neon) and always old\n(enon), if the disciples of Anaxagoras say truly. For the sun in his\nrevolution always adds new light, and there is the old light of the\nprevious month.\n\nHERMOGENES: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: The moon is not unfrequently called selanaia.\n\nHERMOGENES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And as she has a light which is always old and always new\n(enon neon aei) she may very properly have the name selaenoneoaeia; and\nthis when hammered into shape becomes selanaia.\n\nHERMOGENES: A real dithyrambic sort of name that, Socrates. But what do\nyou say of the month and the stars?\n\nSOCRATES: Meis (month) is called from meiousthai (to lessen), because\nsuffering diminution; the name of astra (stars) seems to be derived\nfrom astrape, which is an improvement on anastrope, signifying the\nupsetting of the eyes (anastrephein opa).\n\nHERMOGENES: What do you say of pur (fire) and udor (water)?\n\nSOCRATES: I am at a loss how to explain pur; either the muse of\nEuthyphro has deserted me, or there is some very great difficulty in\nthe word. Please, however, to note the contrivance which I adopt\nwhenever I am in a difficulty of this sort.\n\nHERMOGENES: What is it?\n\nSOCRATES: I will tell you; but I should like to know first whether you\ncan tell me what is the meaning of the pur?\n\nHERMOGENES: Indeed I cannot.\n\nSOCRATES: Shall I tell you what I suspect to be the true explanation of\nthis and several other words?\u2014My belief is that they are of foreign\norigin. For the Hellenes, especially those who were under the dominion\nof the barbarians, often borrowed from them.\n\nHERMOGENES: What is the inference?\n\nSOCRATES: Why, you know that any one who seeks to demonstrate the\nfitness of these names according to the Hellenic language, and not\naccording to the language from which the words are derived, is rather\nlikely to be at fault.\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes, certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Well then, consider whether this pur is not foreign; for the\nword is not easily brought into relation with the Hellenic tongue, and\nthe Phrygians may be observed to have the same word slightly changed,\njust as they have udor (water) and kunes (dogs), and many other words.\n\nHERMOGENES: That is true.\n\nSOCRATES: Any violent interpretations of the words should be avoided;\nfor something to say about them may easily be found. And thus I get rid\nof pur and udor. Aer (air), Hermogenes, may be explained as the element\nwhich raises (airei) things from the earth, or as ever flowing (aei\nrei), or because the flux of the air is wind, and the poets call the\nwinds \u201cair-blasts,\u201d (aetai); he who uses the term may mean, so to\nspeak, air-flux (aetorroun), in the sense of wind-flux (pneumatorroun);\nand because this moving wind may be expressed by either term he employs\nthe word air (aer = aetes rheo). Aither (aether) I should interpret as\naeitheer; this may be correctly said, because this element is always\nrunning in a flux about the air (aei thei peri tou aera reon). The\nmeaning of the word ge (earth) comes out better when in the form of\ngaia, for the earth may be truly called \u201cmother\u201d (gaia, genneteira), as\nin the language of Homer (Od.) gegaasi means gegennesthai.\n\nHERMOGENES: Good.\n\nSOCRATES: What shall we take next?\n\nHERMOGENES: There are orai (the seasons), and the two names of the\nyear, eniautos and etos.\n\nSOCRATES: The orai should be spelt in the old Attic way, if you desire\nto know the probable truth about them; they are rightly called the orai\nbecause they divide (orizousin) the summers and winters and winds and\nthe fruits of the earth. The words eniautos and etos appear to be the\nsame,\u2014\u201cthat which brings to light the plants and growths of the earth\nin their turn, and passes them in review within itself (en eauto\nexetazei)\u201d: this is broken up into two words, eniautos from en eauto,\nand etos from etazei, just as the original name of Zeus was divided\ninto Zena and Dia; and the whole proposition means that his power of\nreviewing from within is one, but has two names, two words etos and\neniautos being thus formed out of a single proposition.\n\nHERMOGENES: Indeed, Socrates, you make surprising progress.\n\nSOCRATES: I am run away with.\n\nHERMOGENES: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: But am not yet at my utmost speed.\n\nHERMOGENES: I should like very much to know, in the next place, how you\nwould explain the virtues. What principle of correctness is there in\nthose charming words\u2014wisdom, understanding, justice, and the rest of\nthem?\n\nSOCRATES: That is a tremendous class of names which you are\ndisinterring; still, as I have put on the lion\u2019s skin, I must not be\nfaint of heart; and I suppose that I must consider the meaning of\nwisdom (phronesis) and understanding (sunesis), and judgment (gnome),\nand knowledge (episteme), and all those other charming words, as you\ncall them?\n\nHERMOGENES: Surely, we must not leave off until we find out their\nmeaning.\n\nSOCRATES: By the dog of Egypt I have a not bad notion which came into\nmy head only this moment: I believe that the primeval givers of names\nwere undoubtedly like too many of our modern philosophers, who, in\ntheir search after the nature of things, are always getting dizzy from\nconstantly going round and round, and then they imagine that the world\nis going round and round and moving in all directions; and this\nappearance, which arises out of their own internal condition, they\nsuppose to be a reality of nature; they think that there is nothing\nstable or permanent, but only flux and motion, and that the world is\nalways full of every sort of motion and change. The consideration of\nthe names which I mentioned has led me into making this reflection.\n\nHERMOGENES: How is that, Socrates?\n\nSOCRATES: Perhaps you did not observe that in the names which have been\njust cited, the motion or flux or generation of things is most surely\nindicated.\n\nHERMOGENES: No, indeed, I never thought of it.\n\nSOCRATES: Take the first of those which you mentioned; clearly that is\na name indicative of motion.\n\nHERMOGENES: What was the name?\n\nSOCRATES: Phronesis (wisdom), which may signify phoras kai rhou noesis\n(perception of motion and flux), or perhaps phoras onesis (the blessing\nof motion), but is at any rate connected with pheresthai (motion);\ngnome (judgment), again, certainly implies the ponderation or\nconsideration (nomesis) of generation, for to ponder is the same as to\nconsider; or, if you would rather, here is noesis, the very word just\nnow mentioned, which is neou esis (the desire of the new); the word\nneos implies that the world is always in process of creation. The giver\nof the name wanted to express this longing of the soul, for the\noriginal name was neoesis, and not noesis; but eta took the place of a\ndouble epsilon. The word sophrosune is the salvation (soteria) of that\nwisdom (phronesis) which we were just now considering. Epioteme\n(knowledge) is akin to this, and indicates that the soul which is good\nfor anything follows (epetai) the motion of things, neither\nanticipating them nor falling behind them; wherefore the word should\nrather be read as epistemene, inserting epsilon nu. Sunesis\n(understanding) may be regarded in like manner as a kind of conclusion;\nthe word is derived from sunienai (to go along with), and, like\nepistasthai (to know), implies the progression of the soul in company\nwith the nature of things. Sophia (wisdom) is very dark, and appears\nnot to be of native growth; the meaning is, touching the motion or\nstream of things. You must remember that the poets, when they speak of\nthe commencement of any rapid motion, often use the word esuthe (he\nrushed); and there was a famous Lacedaemonian who was named Sous\n(Rush), for by this word the Lacedaemonians signify rapid motion, and\nthe touching (epaphe) of motion is expressed by sophia, for all things\nare supposed to be in motion. Good (agathon) is the name which is given\nto the admirable (agasto) in nature; for, although all things move,\nstill there are degrees of motion; some are swifter, some slower; but\nthere are some things which are admirable for their swiftness, and this\nadmirable part of nature is called agathon. Dikaiosune (justice) is\nclearly dikaiou sunesis (understanding of the just); but the actual\nword dikaion is more difficult: men are only agreed to a certain extent\nabout justice, and then they begin to disagree. For those who suppose\nall things to be in motion conceive the greater part of nature to be a\nmere receptacle; and they say that there is a penetrating power which\npasses through all this, and is the instrument of creation in all, and\nis the subtlest and swiftest element; for if it were not the subtlest,\nand a power which none can keep out, and also the swiftest, passing by\nother things as if they were standing still, it could not penetrate\nthrough the moving universe. And this element, which superintends all\nthings and pierces (diaion) all, is rightly called dikaion; the letter\nk is only added for the sake of euphony. Thus far, as I was saying,\nthere is a general agreement about the nature of justice; but I,\nHermogenes, being an enthusiastic disciple, have been told in a mystery\nthat the justice of which I am speaking is also the cause of the world:\nnow a cause is that because of which anything is created; and some one\ncomes and whispers in my ear that justice is rightly so called because\npartaking of the nature of the cause, and I begin, after hearing what\nhe has said, to interrogate him gently: \u201cWell, my excellent friend,\u201d\nsay I, \u201cbut if all this be true, I still want to know what is justice.\u201d\nThereupon they think that I ask tiresome questions, and am leaping over\nthe barriers, and have been already sufficiently answered, and they try\nto satisfy me with one derivation after another, and at length they\nquarrel. For one of them says that justice is the sun, and that he only\nis the piercing (diaionta) and burning (kaonta) element which is the\nguardian of nature. And when I joyfully repeat this beautiful notion, I\nam answered by the satirical remark, \u201cWhat, is there no justice in the\nworld when the sun is down?\u201d And when I earnestly beg my questioner to\ntell me his own honest opinion, he says, \u201cFire in the abstract\u201d; but\nthis is not very intelligible. Another says, \u201cNo, not fire in the\nabstract, but the abstraction of heat in the fire.\u201d Another man\nprofesses to laugh at all this, and says, as Anaxagoras says, that\njustice is mind, for mind, as they say, has absolute power, and mixes\nwith nothing, and orders all things, and passes through all things. At\nlast, my friend, I find myself in far greater perplexity about the\nnature of justice than I was before I began to learn. But still I am of\nopinion that the name, which has led me into this digression, was given\nto justice for the reasons which I have mentioned.\n\nHERMOGENES: I think, Socrates, that you are not improvising now; you\nmust have heard this from some one else.\n\nSOCRATES: And not the rest?\n\nHERMOGENES: Hardly.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, then, let me go on in the hope of making you believe in\nthe originality of the rest. What remains after justice? I do not think\nthat we have as yet discussed courage (andreia),\u2014injustice (adikia),\nwhich is obviously nothing more than a hindrance to the penetrating\nprinciple (diaiontos), need not be considered. Well, then, the name of\nandreia seems to imply a battle;\u2014this battle is in the world of\nexistence, and according to the doctrine of flux is only the\ncounterflux (enantia rhon): if you extract the delta from andreia, the\nname at once signifies the thing, and you may clearly understand that\nandreia is not the stream opposed to every stream, but only to that\nwhich is contrary to justice, for otherwise courage would not have been\npraised. The words arren (male) and aner (man) also contain a similar\nallusion to the same principle of the upward flux (te ano rhon). Gune\n(woman) I suspect to be the same word as goun (birth): thelu (female)\nappears to be partly derived from thele (the teat), because the teat is\nlike rain, and makes things flourish (tethelenai).\n\nHERMOGENES: That is surely probable.\n\nSOCRATES: Yes; and the very word thallein (to flourish) seems to figure\nthe growth of youth, which is swift and sudden ever. And this is\nexpressed by the legislator in the name, which is a compound of thein\n(running), and allesthai (leaping). Pray observe how I gallop away when\nI get on smooth ground. There are a good many names generally thought\nto be of importance, which have still to be explained.\n\nHERMOGENES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: There is the meaning of the word techne (art), for example.\n\nHERMOGENES: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: That may be identified with echonoe, and expresses the\npossession of mind: you have only to take away the tau and insert two\nomichrons, one between the chi and nu, and another between the nu and\neta.\n\nHERMOGENES: That is a very shabby etymology.\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, my dear friend; but then you know that the original\nnames have been long ago buried and disguised by people sticking on and\nstripping off letters for the sake of euphony, and twisting and\nbedizening them in all sorts of ways: and time too may have had a share\nin the change. Take, for example, the word katoptron; why is the letter\nrho inserted? This must surely be the addition of some one who cares\nnothing about the truth, but thinks only of putting the mouth into\nshape. And the additions are often such that at last no human being can\npossibly make out the original meaning of the word. Another example is\nthe word sphigx, sphiggos, which ought properly to be phigx, phiggos,\nand there are other examples.\n\nHERMOGENES: That is quite true, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: And yet, if you are permitted to put in and pull out any\nletters which you please, names will be too easily made, and any name\nmay be adapted to any object.\n\nHERMOGENES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, that is true. And therefore a wise dictator, like\nyourself, should observe the laws of moderation and probability.\n\nHERMOGENES: Such is my desire.\n\nSOCRATES: And mine, too, Hermogenes. But do not be too much of a\nprecisian, or \u201cyou will unnerve me of my strength (Iliad.).\u201d When you\nhave allowed me to add mechane (contrivance) to techne (art) I shall be\nat the top of my bent, for I conceive mechane to be a sign of great\naccomplishment\u2014anein; for mekos has the meaning of greatness, and these\ntwo, mekos and anein, make up the word mechane. But, as I was saying,\nbeing now at the top of my bent, I should like to consider the meaning\nof the two words arete (virtue) and kakia (vice); arete I do not as yet\nunderstand, but kakia is transparent, and agrees with the principles\nwhich preceded, for all things being in a flux (ionton), kakia is kakos\nion (going badly); and this evil motion when existing in the soul has\nthe general name of kakia, or vice, specially appropriated to it. The\nmeaning of kakos ienai may be further illustrated by the use of deilia\n(cowardice), which ought to have come after andreia, but was forgotten,\nand, as I fear, is not the only word which has been passed over. Deilia\nsignifies that the soul is bound with a strong chain (desmos), for lian\nmeans strength, and therefore deilia expresses the greatest and\nstrongest bond of the soul; and aporia (difficulty) is an evil of the\nsame nature (from a (alpha) not, and poreuesthai to go), like anything\nelse which is an impediment to motion and movement. Then the word kakia\nappears to mean kakos ienai, or going badly, or limping and halting; of\nwhich the consequence is, that the soul becomes filled with vice. And\nif kakia is the name of this sort of thing, arete will be the opposite\nof it, signifying in the first place ease of motion, then that the\nstream of the good soul is unimpeded, and has therefore the attribute\nof ever flowing without let or hindrance, and is therefore called\narete, or, more correctly, aeireite (ever-flowing), and may perhaps\nhave had another form, airete (eligible), indicating that nothing is\nmore eligible than virtue, and this has been hammered into arete. I\ndaresay that you will deem this to be another invention of mine, but I\nthink that if the previous word kakia was right, then arete is also\nright.\n\nHERMOGENES: But what is the meaning of kakon, which has played so great\na part in your previous discourse?\n\nSOCRATES: That is a very singular word about which I can hardly form an\nopinion, and therefore I must have recourse to my ingenious device.\n\nHERMOGENES: What device?\n\nSOCRATES: The device of a foreign origin, which I shall give to this\nword also.\n\nHERMOGENES: Very likely you are right; but suppose that we leave these\nwords and endeavour to see the rationale of kalon and aischron.\n\nSOCRATES: The meaning of aischron is evident, being only aei ischon\nroes (always preventing from flowing), and this is in accordance with\nour former derivations. For the name-giver was a great enemy to\nstagnation of all sorts, and hence he gave the name aeischoroun to that\nwhich hindered the flux (aei ischon roun), and that is now beaten\ntogether into aischron.\n\nHERMOGENES: But what do you say of kalon?\n\nSOCRATES: That is more obscure; yet the form is only due to the\nquantity, and has been changed by altering omicron upsilon into\nomicron.\n\nHERMOGENES: What do you mean?\n\nSOCRATES: This name appears to denote mind.\n\nHERMOGENES: How so?\n\nSOCRATES: Let me ask you what is the cause why anything has a name; is\nnot the principle which imposes the name the cause?\n\nHERMOGENES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And must not this be the mind of Gods, or of men, or of both?\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Is not mind that which called (kalesan) things by their\nnames, and is not mind the beautiful (kalon)?\n\nHERMOGENES: That is evident.\n\nSOCRATES: And are not the works of intelligence and mind worthy of\npraise, and are not other works worthy of blame?\n\nHERMOGENES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Physic does the work of a physician, and carpentering does\nthe works of a carpenter?\n\nHERMOGENES: Exactly.\n\nSOCRATES: And the principle of beauty does the works of beauty?\n\nHERMOGENES: Of course.\n\nSOCRATES: And that principle we affirm to be mind?\n\nHERMOGENES: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: Then mind is rightly called beauty because she does the works\nwhich we recognize and speak of as the beautiful?\n\nHERMOGENES: That is evident.\n\nSOCRATES: What more names remain to us?\n\nHERMOGENES: There are the words which are connected with agathon and\nkalon, such as sumpheron and lusiteloun, ophelimon, kerdaleon, and\ntheir opposites.\n\nSOCRATES: The meaning of sumpheron (expedient) I think that you may\ndiscover for yourself by the light of the previous examples,\u2014for it is\na sister word to episteme, meaning just the motion (pora) of the soul\naccompanying the world, and things which are done upon this principle\nare called sumphora or sumpheronta, because they are carried round with\nthe world.\n\nHERMOGENES: That is probable.\n\nSOCRATES: Again, cherdaleon (gainful) is called from cherdos (gain),\nbut you must alter the delta into nu if you want to get at the meaning;\nfor this word also signifies good, but in another way; he who gave the\nname intended to express the power of admixture (kerannumenon) and\nuniversal penetration in the good; in forming the word, however, he\ninserted a delta instead of a nu, and so made kerdos.\n\nHERMOGENES: Well, but what is lusiteloun (profitable)?\n\nSOCRATES: I suppose, Hermogenes, that people do not mean by the\nprofitable the gainful or that which pays (luei) the retailer, but they\nuse the word in the sense of swift. You regard the profitable\n(lusiteloun), as that which being the swiftest thing in existence,\nallows of no stay in things and no pause or end of motion, but always,\nif there begins to be any end, lets things go again (luei), and makes\nmotion immortal and unceasing: and in this point of view, as appears to\nme, the good is happily denominated lusiteloun\u2014being that which looses\n(luon) the end (telos) of motion. Ophelimon (the advantageous) is\nderived from ophellein, meaning that which creates and increases; this\nlatter is a common Homeric word, and has a foreign character.\n\nHERMOGENES: And what do you say of their opposites?\n\nSOCRATES: Of such as are mere negatives I hardly think that I need\nspeak.\n\nHERMOGENES: Which are they?\n\nSOCRATES: The words axumphoron (inexpedient), anopheles (unprofitable),\nalusiteles (unadvantageous), akerdes (ungainful).\n\nHERMOGENES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: I would rather take the words blaberon (harmful), zemiodes\n(hurtful).\n\nHERMOGENES: Good.\n\nSOCRATES: The word blaberon is that which is said to hinder or harm\n(blaptein) the stream (roun); blapton is boulomenon aptein (seeking to\nhold or bind); for aptein is the same as dein, and dein is always a\nterm of censure; boulomenon aptein roun (wanting to bind the stream)\nwould properly be boulapteroun, and this, as I imagine, is improved\ninto blaberon.\n\nHERMOGENES: You bring out curious results, Socrates, in the use of\nnames; and when I hear the word boulapteroun I cannot help imagining\nthat you are making your mouth into a flute, and puffing away at some\nprelude to Athene.\n\nSOCRATES: That is the fault of the makers of the name, Hermogenes; not\nmine.\n\nHERMOGENES: Very true; but what is the derivation of zemiodes?\n\nSOCRATES: What is the meaning of zemiodes?\u2014let me remark, Hermogenes,\nhow right I was in saying that great changes are made in the meaning of\nwords by putting in and pulling out letters; even a very slight\npermutation will sometimes give an entirely opposite sense; I may\ninstance the word deon, which occurs to me at the moment, and reminds\nme of what I was going to say to you, that the fine fashionable\nlanguage of modern times has twisted and disguised and entirely altered\nthe original meaning both of deon, and also of zemiodes, which in the\nold language is clearly indicated.\n\nHERMOGENES: What do you mean?\n\nSOCRATES: I will try to explain. You are aware that our forefathers\nloved the sounds iota and delta, especially the women, who are most\nconservative of the ancient language, but now they change iota into eta\nor epsilon, and delta into zeta; this is supposed to increase the\ngrandeur of the sound.\n\nHERMOGENES: How do you mean?\n\nSOCRATES: For example, in very ancient times they called the day either\nimera or emera (short e), which is called by us emera (long e).\n\nHERMOGENES: That is true.\n\nSOCRATES: Do you observe that only the ancient form shows the intention\nof the giver of the name? of which the reason is, that men long for\n(imeirousi) and love the light which comes after the darkness, and is\ntherefore called imera, from imeros, desire.\n\nHERMOGENES: Clearly.\n\nSOCRATES: But now the name is so travestied that you cannot tell the\nmeaning, although there are some who imagine the day to be called emera\nbecause it makes things gentle (emera different accents).\n\nHERMOGENES: Such is my view.\n\nSOCRATES: And do you know that the ancients said duogon and not zugon?\n\nHERMOGENES: They did so.\n\nSOCRATES: And zugon (yoke) has no meaning,\u2014it ought to be duogon, which\nword expresses the binding of two together (duein agoge) for the\npurpose of drawing;\u2014this has been changed into zugon, and there are\nmany other examples of similar changes.\n\nHERMOGENES: There are.\n\nSOCRATES: Proceeding in the same train of thought I may remark that the\nword deon (obligation) has a meaning which is the opposite of all the\nother appellations of good; for deon is here a species of good, and is,\nnevertheless, the chain (desmos) or hinderer of motion, and therefore\nown brother of blaberon.\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes, Socrates; that is quite plain.\n\nSOCRATES: Not if you restore the ancient form, which is more likely to\nbe the correct one, and read dion instead of deon; if you convert the\nepsilon into an iota after the old fashion, this word will then agree\nwith other words meaning good; for dion, not deon, signifies the good,\nand is a term of praise; and the author of names has not contradicted\nhimself, but in all these various appellations, deon (obligatory),\nophelimon (advantageous), lusiteloun (profitable), kerdaleon (gainful),\nagathon (good), sumpheron (expedient), euporon (plenteous), the same\nconception is implied of the ordering or all-pervading principle which\nis praised, and the restraining and binding principle which is\ncensured. And this is further illustrated by the word zemiodes\n(hurtful), which if the zeta is only changed into delta as in the\nancient language, becomes demiodes; and this name, as you will\nperceive, is given to that which binds motion (dounti ion).\n\nHERMOGENES: What do you say of edone (pleasure), lupe (pain), epithumia\n(desire), and the like, Socrates?\n\nSOCRATES: I do not think, Hermogenes, that there is any great\ndifficulty about them\u2014edone is e (eta) onesis, the action which tends\nto advantage; and the original form may be supposed to have been eone,\nbut this has been altered by the insertion of the delta. Lupe appears\nto be derived from the relaxation (luein) which the body feels when in\nsorrow; ania (trouble) is the hindrance of motion (alpha and ienai);\nalgedon (distress), if I am not mistaken, is a foreign word, which is\nderived from aleinos (grievous); odune (grief) is called from the\nputting on (endusis) sorrow; in achthedon (vexation) \u201cthe word too\nlabours,\u201d as any one may see; chara (joy) is the very expression of the\nfluency and diffusion of the soul (cheo); terpsis (delight) is so\ncalled from the pleasure creeping (erpon) through the soul, which may\nbe likened to a breath (pnoe) and is properly erpnoun, but has been\naltered by time into terpnon; eupherosune (cheerfulness) and epithumia\nexplain themselves; the former, which ought to be eupherosune and has\nbeen changed euphrosune, is named, as every one may see, from the soul\nmoving (pheresthai) in harmony with nature; epithumia is really e epi\nton thumon iousa dunamis, the power which enters into the soul; thumos\n(passion) is called from the rushing (thuseos) and boiling of the soul;\nimeros (desire) denotes the stream (rous) which most draws the soul dia\nten esin tes roes\u2014because flowing with desire (iemenos), and expresses\na longing after things and violent attraction of the soul to them, and\nis termed imeros from possessing this power; pothos (longing) is\nexpressive of the desire of that which is not present but absent, and\nin another place (pou); this is the reason why the name pothos is\napplied to things absent, as imeros is to things present; eros (love)\nis so called because flowing in (esron) from without; the stream is not\ninherent, but is an influence introduced through the eyes, and from\nflowing in was called esros (influx) in the old time when they used\nomicron for omega, and is called eros, now that omega is substituted\nfor omicron. But why do you not give me another word?\n\nHERMOGENES: What do you think of doxa (opinion), and that class of\nwords?\n\nSOCRATES: Doxa is either derived from dioxis (pursuit), and expresses\nthe march of the soul in the pursuit of knowledge, or from the shooting\nof a bow (toxon); the latter is more likely, and is confirmed by oiesis\n(thinking), which is only oisis (moving), and implies the movement of\nthe soul to the essential nature of each thing\u2014just as boule (counsel)\nhas to do with shooting (bole); and boulesthai (to wish) combines the\nnotion of aiming and deliberating\u2014all these words seem to follow doxa,\nand all involve the idea of shooting, just as aboulia, absence of\ncounsel, on the other hand, is a mishap, or missing, or mistaking of\nthe mark, or aim, or proposal, or object.\n\nHERMOGENES: You are quickening your pace now, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: Why yes, the end I now dedicate to God, not, however, until I\nhave explained anagke (necessity), which ought to come next, and\nekousion (the voluntary). Ekousion is certainly the yielding (eikon)\nand unresisting\u2014the notion implied is yielding and not opposing,\nyielding, as I was just now saying, to that motion which is in\naccordance with our will; but the necessary and resistant being\ncontrary to our will, implies error and ignorance; the idea is taken\nfrom walking through a ravine which is impassable, and rugged, and\novergrown, and impedes motion\u2014and this is the derivation of the word\nanagkaion (necessary) an agke ion, going through a ravine. But while my\nstrength lasts let us persevere, and I hope that you will persevere\nwith your questions.\n\nHERMOGENES: Well, then, let me ask about the greatest and noblest, such\nas aletheia (truth) and pseudos (falsehood) and on (being), not\nforgetting to enquire why the word onoma (name), which is the theme of\nour discussion, has this name of onoma.\n\nSOCRATES: You know the word maiesthai (to seek)?\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes;\u2014meaning the same as zetein (to enquire).\n\nSOCRATES: The word onoma seems to be a compressed sentence, signifying\non ou zetema (being for which there is a search); as is still more\nobvious in onomaston (notable), which states in so many words that real\nexistence is that for which there is a seeking (on ou masma); aletheia\nis also an agglomeration of theia ale (divine wandering), implying the\ndivine motion of existence; pseudos (falsehood) is the opposite of\nmotion; here is another ill name given by the legislator to stagnation\nand forced inaction, which he compares to sleep (eudein); but the\noriginal meaning of the word is disguised by the addition of psi; on\nand ousia are ion with an iota broken off; this agrees with the true\nprinciple, for being (on) is also moving (ion), and the same may be\nsaid of not being, which is likewise called not going (oukion or ouki\non = ouk ion).\n\nHERMOGENES: You have hammered away at them manfully; but suppose that\nsome one were to say to you, what is the word ion, and what are reon\nand doun?\u2014show me their fitness.\n\nSOCRATES: You mean to say, how should I answer him?\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: One way of giving the appearance of an answer has been\nalready suggested.\n\nHERMOGENES: What way?\n\nSOCRATES: To say that names which we do not understand are of foreign\norigin; and this is very likely the right answer, and something of this\nkind may be true of them; but also the original forms of words may have\nbeen lost in the lapse of ages; names have been so twisted in all\nmanner of ways, that I should not be surprised if the old language when\ncompared with that now in use would appear to us to be a barbarous\ntongue.\n\nHERMOGENES: Very likely.\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, very likely. But still the enquiry demands our earnest\nattention and we must not flinch. For we should remember, that if a\nperson go on analysing names into words, and enquiring also into the\nelements out of which the words are formed, and keeps on always\nrepeating this process, he who has to answer him must at last give up\nthe enquiry in despair.\n\nHERMOGENES: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: And at what point ought he to lose heart and give up the\nenquiry? Must he not stop when he comes to the names which are the\nelements of all other names and sentences; for these cannot be supposed\nto be made up of other names? The word agathon (good), for example, is,\nas we were saying, a compound of agastos (admirable) and thoos (swift).\nAnd probably thoos is made up of other elements, and these again of\nothers. But if we take a word which is incapable of further resolution,\nthen we shall be right in saying that we have at last reached a primary\nelement, which need not be resolved any further.\n\nHERMOGENES: I believe you to be in the right.\n\nSOCRATES: And suppose the names about which you are now asking should\nturn out to be primary elements, must not their truth or law be\nexamined according to some new method?\n\nHERMOGENES: Very likely.\n\nSOCRATES: Quite so, Hermogenes; all that has preceded would lead to\nthis conclusion. And if, as I think, the conclusion is true, then I\nshall again say to you, come and help me, that I may not fall into some\nabsurdity in stating the principle of primary names.\n\nHERMOGENES: Let me hear, and I will do my best to assist you.\n\nSOCRATES: I think that you will acknowledge with me, that one principle\nis applicable to all names, primary as well as secondary\u2014when they are\nregarded simply as names, there is no difference in them.\n\nHERMOGENES: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: All the names that we have been explaining were intended to\nindicate the nature of things.\n\nHERMOGENES: Of course.\n\nSOCRATES: And that this is true of the primary quite as much as of the\nsecondary names, is implied in their being names.\n\nHERMOGENES: Surely.\n\nSOCRATES: But the secondary, as I conceive, derive their significance\nfrom the primary.\n\nHERMOGENES: That is evident.\n\nSOCRATES: Very good; but then how do the primary names which precede\nanalysis show the natures of things, as far as they can be shown; which\nthey must do, if they are to be real names? And here I will ask you a\nquestion: Suppose that we had no voice or tongue, and wanted to\ncommunicate with one another, should we not, like the deaf and dumb,\nmake signs with the hands and head and the rest of the body?\n\nHERMOGENES: There would be no choice, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: We should imitate the nature of the thing; the elevation of\nour hands to heaven would mean lightness and upwardness; heaviness and\ndownwardness would be expressed by letting them drop to the ground; if\nwe were describing the running of a horse, or any other animal, we\nshould make our bodies and their gestures as like as we could to them.\n\nHERMOGENES: I do not see that we could do anything else.\n\nSOCRATES: We could not; for by bodily imitation only can the body ever\nexpress anything.\n\nHERMOGENES: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: And when we want to express ourselves, either with the voice,\nor tongue, or mouth, the expression is simply their imitation of that\nwhich we want to express.\n\nHERMOGENES: It must be so, I think.\n\nSOCRATES: Then a name is a vocal imitation of that which the vocal\nimitator names or imitates?\n\nHERMOGENES: I think so.\n\nSOCRATES: Nay, my friend, I am disposed to think that we have not\nreached the truth as yet.\n\nHERMOGENES: Why not?\n\nSOCRATES: Because if we have we shall be obliged to admit that the\npeople who imitate sheep, or cocks, or other animals, name that which\nthey imitate.\n\nHERMOGENES: Quite true.\n\nSOCRATES: Then could I have been right in what I was saying?\n\nHERMOGENES: In my opinion, no. But I wish that you would tell me,\nSocrates, what sort of an imitation is a name?\n\nSOCRATES: In the first place, I should reply, not a musical imitation,\nalthough that is also vocal; nor, again, an imitation of what music\nimitates; these, in my judgment, would not be naming. Let me put the\nmatter as follows: All objects have sound and figure, and many have\ncolour?\n\nHERMOGENES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: But the art of naming appears not to be concerned with\nimitations of this kind; the arts which have to do with them are music\nand drawing?\n\nHERMOGENES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: Again, is there not an essence of each thing, just as there\nis a colour, or sound? And is there not an essence of colour and sound\nas well as of anything else which may be said to have an essence?\n\nHERMOGENES: I should think so.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, and if any one could express the essence of each thing\nin letters and syllables, would he not express the nature of each\nthing?\n\nHERMOGENES: Quite so.\n\nSOCRATES: The musician and the painter were the two names which you\ngave to the two other imitators. What will this imitator be called?\n\nHERMOGENES: I imagine, Socrates, that he must be the namer, or\nname-giver, of whom we are in search.\n\nSOCRATES: If this is true, then I think that we are in a condition to\nconsider the names ron (stream), ienai (to go), schesis (retention),\nabout which you were asking; and we may see whether the namer has\ngrasped the nature of them in letters and syllables in such a manner as\nto imitate the essence or not.\n\nHERMOGENES: Very good.\n\nSOCRATES: But are these the only primary names, or are there others?\n\nHERMOGENES: There must be others.\n\nSOCRATES: So I should expect. But how shall we further analyse them,\nand where does the imitator begin? Imitation of the essence is made by\nsyllables and letters; ought we not, therefore, first to separate the\nletters, just as those who are beginning rhythm first distinguish the\npowers of elementary, and then of compound sounds, and when they have\ndone so, but not before, they proceed to the consideration of rhythms?\n\nHERMOGENES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Must we not begin in the same way with letters; first\nseparating the vowels, and then the consonants and mutes (letters which\nare neither vowels nor semivowels), into classes, according to the\nreceived distinctions of the learned; also the semivowels, which are\nneither vowels, nor yet mutes; and distinguishing into classes the\nvowels themselves? And when we have perfected the classification of\nthings, we shall give them names, and see whether, as in the case of\nletters, there are any classes to which they may be all referred (cf.\nPhaedrus); and hence we shall see their natures, and see, too, whether\nthey have in them classes as there are in the letters; and when we have\nwell considered all this, we shall know how to apply them to what they\nresemble\u2014whether one letter is used to denote one thing, or whether\nthere is to be an admixture of several of them; just, as in painting,\nthe painter who wants to depict anything sometimes uses purple only, or\nany other colour, and sometimes mixes up several colours, as his method\nis when he has to paint flesh colour or anything of that kind\u2014he uses\nhis colours as his figures appear to require them; and so, too, we\nshall apply letters to the expression of objects, either single letters\nwhen required, or several letters; and so we shall form syllables, as\nthey are called, and from syllables make nouns and verbs; and thus, at\nlast, from the combinations of nouns and verbs arrive at language,\nlarge and fair and whole; and as the painter made a figure, even so\nshall we make speech by the art of the namer or the rhetorician, or by\nsome other art. Not that I am literally speaking of ourselves, but I\nwas carried away\u2014meaning to say that this was the way in which (not we\nbut) the ancients formed language, and what they put together we must\ntake to pieces in like manner, if we are to attain a scientific view of\nthe whole subject, and we must see whether the primary, and also\nwhether the secondary elements are rightly given or not, for if they\nare not, the composition of them, my dear Hermogenes, will be a sorry\npiece of work, and in the wrong direction.\n\nHERMOGENES: That, Socrates, I can quite believe.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, but do you suppose that you will be able to analyse\nthem in this way? for I am certain that I should not.\n\nHERMOGENES: Much less am I likely to be able.\n\nSOCRATES: Shall we leave them, then? or shall we seek to discover, if\nwe can, something about them, according to the measure of our ability,\nsaying by way of preface, as I said before of the Gods, that of the\ntruth about them we know nothing, and do but entertain human notions of\nthem. And in this present enquiry, let us say to ourselves, before we\nproceed, that the higher method is the one which we or others who would\nanalyse language to any good purpose must follow; but under the\ncircumstances, as men say, we must do as well as we can. What do you\nthink?\n\nHERMOGENES: I very much approve.\n\nSOCRATES: That objects should be imitated in letters and syllables, and\nso find expression, may appear ridiculous, Hermogenes, but it cannot be\navoided\u2014there is no better principle to which we can look for the truth\nof first names. Deprived of this, we must have recourse to divine help,\nlike the tragic poets, who in any perplexity have their gods waiting in\nthe air; and must get out of our difficulty in like fashion, by saying\nthat \u201cthe Gods gave the first names, and therefore they are right.\u201d\nThis will be the best contrivance, or perhaps that other notion may be\neven better still, of deriving them from some barbarous people, for the\nbarbarians are older than we are; or we may say that antiquity has cast\na veil over them, which is the same sort of excuse as the last; for all\nthese are not reasons but only ingenious excuses for having no reasons\nconcerning the truth of words. And yet any sort of ignorance of first\nor primitive names involves an ignorance of secondary words; for they\ncan only be explained by the primary. Clearly then the professor of\nlanguages should be able to give a very lucid explanation of first\nnames, or let him be assured he will only talk nonsense about the rest.\nDo you not suppose this to be true?\n\nHERMOGENES: Certainly, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: My first notions of original names are truly wild and\nridiculous, though I have no objection to impart them to you if you\ndesire, and I hope that you will communicate to me in return anything\nbetter which you may have.\n\nHERMOGENES: Fear not; I will do my best.\n\nSOCRATES: In the first place, the letter rho appears to me to be the\ngeneral instrument expressing all motion (kinesis). But I have not yet\nexplained the meaning of this latter word, which is just iesis (going);\nfor the letter eta was not in use among the ancients, who only employed\nepsilon; and the root is kiein, which is a foreign form, the same as\nienai. And the old word kinesis will be correctly given as iesis in\ncorresponding modern letters. Assuming this foreign root kiein, and\nallowing for the change of the eta and the insertion of the nu, we have\nkinesis, which should have been kieinsis or eisis; and stasis is the\nnegative of ienai (or eisis), and has been improved into stasis. Now\nthe letter rho, as I was saying, appeared to the imposer of names an\nexcellent instrument for the expression of motion; and he frequently\nuses the letter for this purpose: for example, in the actual words rein\nand roe he represents motion by rho; also in the words tromos\n(trembling), trachus (rugged); and again, in words such as krouein\n(strike), thrauein (crush), ereikein (bruise), thruptein (break),\nkermatixein (crumble), rumbein (whirl): of all these sorts of movements\nhe generally finds an expression in the letter R, because, as I\nimagine, he had observed that the tongue was most agitated and least at\nrest in the pronunciation of this letter, which he therefore used in\norder to express motion, just as by the letter iota he expresses the\nsubtle elements which pass through all things. This is why he uses the\nletter iota as imitative of motion, ienai, iesthai. And there is\nanother class of letters, phi, psi, sigma, and xi, of which the\npronunciation is accompanied by great expenditure of breath; these are\nused in the imitation of such notions as psuchron (shivering), xeon\n(seething), seiesthai, (to be shaken), seismos (shock), and are always\nintroduced by the giver of names when he wants to imitate what is\nphusodes (windy). He seems to have thought that the closing and\npressure of the tongue in the utterance of delta and tau was expressive\nof binding and rest in a place: he further observed the liquid movement\nof lambda, in the pronunciation of which the tongue slips, and in this\nhe found the expression of smoothness, as in leios (level), and in the\nword oliothanein (to slip) itself, liparon (sleek), in the word\nkollodes (gluey), and the like: the heavier sound of gamma detained the\nslipping tongue, and the union of the two gave the notion of a\nglutinous clammy nature, as in glischros, glukus, gloiodes. The nu he\nobserved to be sounded from within, and therefore to have a notion of\ninwardness; hence he introduced the sound in endos and entos: alpha he\nassigned to the expression of size, and nu of length, because they are\ngreat letters: omicron was the sign of roundness, and therefore there\nis plenty of omicron mixed up in the word goggulon (round). Thus did\nthe legislator, reducing all things into letters and syllables, and\nimpressing on them names and signs, and out of them by imitation\ncompounding other signs. That is my view, Hermogenes, of the truth of\nnames; but I should like to hear what Cratylus has more to say.\n\nHERMOGENES: But, Socrates, as I was telling you before, Cratylus\nmystifies me; he says that there is a fitness of names, but he never\nexplains what is this fitness, so that I cannot tell whether his\nobscurity is intended or not. Tell me now, Cratylus, here in the\npresence of Socrates, do you agree in what Socrates has been saying\nabout names, or have you something better of your own? and if you have,\ntell me what your view is, and then you will either learn of Socrates,\nor Socrates and I will learn of you.\n\nCRATYLUS: Well, but surely, Hermogenes, you do not suppose that you can\nlearn, or I explain, any subject of importance all in a moment; at any\nrate, not such a subject as language, which is, perhaps, the very\ngreatest of all.\n\nHERMOGENES: No, indeed; but, as Hesiod says, and I agree with him, \u201cto\nadd little to little\u201d is worth while. And, therefore, if you think that\nyou can add anything at all, however small, to our knowledge, take a\nlittle trouble and oblige Socrates, and me too, who certainly have a\nclaim upon you.\n\nSOCRATES: I am by no means positive, Cratylus, in the view which\nHermogenes and myself have worked out; and therefore do not hesitate to\nsay what you think, which if it be better than my own view I shall\ngladly accept. And I should not be at all surprized to find that you\nhave found some better notion. For you have evidently reflected on\nthese matters and have had teachers, and if you have really a better\ntheory of the truth of names, you may count me in the number of your\ndisciples.\n\nCRATYLUS: You are right, Socrates, in saying that I have made a study\nof these matters, and I might possibly convert you into a disciple. But\nI fear that the opposite is more probable, and I already find myself\nmoved to say to you what Achilles in the \u201cPrayers\u201d says to Ajax,\u2014\n\n\u201cIllustrious Ajax, son of Telamon, lord of the people, You appear to\nhave spoken in all things much to my mind.\u201d\n\nAnd you, Socrates, appear to me to be an oracle, and to give answers\nmuch to my mind, whether you are inspired by Euthyphro, or whether some\nMuse may have long been an inhabitant of your breast, unconsciously to\nyourself.\n\nSOCRATES: Excellent Cratylus, I have long been wondering at my own\nwisdom; I cannot trust myself. And I think that I ought to stop and ask\nmyself What am I saying? for there is nothing worse than\nself-deception\u2014when the deceiver is always at home and always with\nyou\u2014it is quite terrible, and therefore I ought often to retrace my\nsteps and endeavour to \u201clook fore and aft,\u201d in the words of the\naforesaid Homer. And now let me see; where are we? Have we not been\nsaying that the correct name indicates the nature of the thing:\u2014has\nthis proposition been sufficiently proven?\n\nCRATYLUS: Yes, Socrates, what you say, as I am disposed to think, is\nquite true.\n\nSOCRATES: Names, then, are given in order to instruct?\n\nCRATYLUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And naming is an art, and has artificers?\n\nCRATYLUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And who are they?\n\nCRATYLUS: The legislators, of whom you spoke at first.\n\nSOCRATES: And does this art grow up among men like other arts? Let me\nexplain what I mean: of painters, some are better and some worse?\n\nCRATYLUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: The better painters execute their works, I mean their\nfigures, better, and the worse execute them worse; and of builders\nalso, the better sort build fairer houses, and the worse build them\nworse.\n\nCRATYLUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And among legislators, there are some who do their work\nbetter and some worse?\n\nCRATYLUS: No; there I do not agree with you.\n\nSOCRATES: Then you do not think that some laws are better and others\nworse?\n\nCRATYLUS: No, indeed.\n\nSOCRATES: Or that one name is better than another?\n\nCRATYLUS: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: Then all names are rightly imposed?\n\nCRATYLUS: Yes, if they are names at all.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, what do you say to the name of our friend Hermogenes,\nwhich was mentioned before:\u2014assuming that he has nothing of the nature\nof Hermes in him, shall we say that this is a wrong name, or not his\nname at all?\n\nCRATYLUS: I should reply that Hermogenes is not his name at all, but\nonly appears to be his, and is really the name of somebody else, who\nhas the nature which corresponds to it.\n\nSOCRATES: And if a man were to call him Hermogenes, would he not be\neven speaking falsely? For there may be a doubt whether you can call\nhim Hermogenes, if he is not.\n\nCRATYLUS: What do you mean?\n\nSOCRATES: Are you maintaining that falsehood is impossible? For if this\nis your meaning I should answer, that there have been plenty of liars\nin all ages.\n\nCRATYLUS: Why, Socrates, how can a man say that which is not?\u2014say\nsomething and yet say nothing? For is not falsehood saying the thing\nwhich is not?\n\nSOCRATES: Your argument, friend, is too subtle for a man of my age. But\nI should like to know whether you are one of those philosophers who\nthink that falsehood may be spoken but not said?\n\nCRATYLUS: Neither spoken nor said.\n\nSOCRATES: Nor uttered nor addressed? For example: If a person, saluting\nyou in a foreign country, were to take your hand and say: \u201cHail,\nAthenian stranger, Hermogenes, son of Smicrion\u201d\u2014these words, whether\nspoken, said, uttered, or addressed, would have no application to you\nbut only to our friend Hermogenes, or perhaps to nobody at all?\n\nCRATYLUS: In my opinion, Socrates, the speaker would only be talking\nnonsense.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, but that will be quite enough for me, if you will tell\nme whether the nonsense would be true or false, or partly true and\npartly false:\u2014which is all that I want to know.\n\nCRATYLUS: I should say that he would be putting himself in motion to no\npurpose; and that his words would be an unmeaning sound like the noise\nof hammering at a brazen pot.\n\nSOCRATES: But let us see, Cratylus, whether we cannot find a\nmeeting-point, for you would admit that the name is not the same with\nthe thing named?\n\nCRATYLUS: I should.\n\nSOCRATES: And would you further acknowledge that the name is an\nimitation of the thing?\n\nCRATYLUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And you would say that pictures are also imitations of\nthings, but in another way?\n\nCRATYLUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: I believe you may be right, but I do not rightly understand\nyou. Please to say, then, whether both sorts of imitation (I mean both\npictures or words) are not equally attributable and applicable to the\nthings of which they are the imitation.\n\nCRATYLUS: They are.\n\nSOCRATES: First look at the matter thus: you may attribute the likeness\nof the man to the man, and of the woman to the woman; and so on?\n\nCRATYLUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And conversely you may attribute the likeness of the man to\nthe woman, and of the woman to the man?\n\nCRATYLUS: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: And are both modes of assigning them right, or only the\nfirst?\n\nCRATYLUS: Only the first.\n\nSOCRATES: That is to say, the mode of assignment which attributes to\neach that which belongs to them and is like them?\n\nCRATYLUS: That is my view.\n\nSOCRATES: Now then, as I am desirous that we being friends should have\na good understanding about the argument, let me state my view to you:\nthe first mode of assignment, whether applied to figures or to names, I\ncall right, and when applied to names only, true as well as right; and\nthe other mode of giving and assigning the name which is unlike, I call\nwrong, and in the case of names, false as well as wrong.\n\nCRATYLUS: That may be true, Socrates, in the case of pictures; they may\nbe wrongly assigned; but not in the case of names\u2014they must be always\nright.\n\nSOCRATES: Why, what is the difference? May I not go to a man and say to\nhim, \u201cThis is your picture,\u201d showing him his own likeness, or perhaps\nthe likeness of a woman; and when I say \u201cshow,\u201d I mean bring before the\nsense of sight.\n\nCRATYLUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And may I not go to him again, and say, \u201cThis is your\nname\u201d?\u2014for the name, like the picture, is an imitation. May I not say\nto him\u2014\u201cThis is your name\u201d? and may I not then bring to his sense of\nhearing the imitation of himself, when I say, \u201cThis is a man\u201d; or of a\nfemale of the human species, when I say, \u201cThis is a woman,\u201d as the case\nmay be? Is not all that quite possible?\n\nCRATYLUS: I would fain agree with you, Socrates; and therefore I say,\nGranted.\n\nSOCRATES: That is very good of you, if I am right, which need hardly be\ndisputed at present. But if I can assign names as well as pictures to\nobjects, the right assignment of them we may call truth, and the wrong\nassignment of them falsehood. Now if there be such a wrong assignment\nof names, there may also be a wrong or inappropriate assignment of\nverbs; and if of names and verbs then of the sentences, which are made\nup of them. What do you say, Cratylus?\n\nCRATYLUS: I agree; and think that what you say is very true.\n\nSOCRATES: And further, primitive nouns may be compared to pictures, and\nin pictures you may either give all the appropriate colours and\nfigures, or you may not give them all\u2014some may be wanting; or there may\nbe too many or too much of them\u2014may there not?\n\nCRATYLUS: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: And he who gives all gives a perfect picture or figure; and\nhe who takes away or adds also gives a picture or figure, but not a\ngood one.\n\nCRATYLUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: In like manner, he who by syllables and letters imitates the\nnature of things, if he gives all that is appropriate will produce a\ngood image, or in other words a name; but if he subtracts or perhaps\nadds a little, he will make an image but not a good one; whence I infer\nthat some names are well and others ill made.\n\nCRATYLUS: That is true.\n\nSOCRATES: Then the artist of names may be sometimes good, or he may be\nbad?\n\nCRATYLUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And this artist of names is called the legislator?\n\nCRATYLUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then like other artists the legislator may be good or he may\nbe bad; it must surely be so if our former admissions hold good?\n\nCRATYLUS: Very true, Socrates; but the case of language, you see, is\ndifferent; for when by the help of grammar we assign the letters alpha\nor beta, or any other letters to a certain name, then, if we add, or\nsubtract, or misplace a letter, the name which is written is not only\nwritten wrongly, but not written at all; and in any of these cases\nbecomes other than a name.\n\nSOCRATES: But I doubt whether your view is altogether correct,\nCratylus.\n\nCRATYLUS: How so?\n\nSOCRATES: I believe that what you say may be true about numbers, which\nmust be just what they are, or not be at all; for example, the number\nten at once becomes other than ten if a unit be added or subtracted,\nand so of any other number: but this does not apply to that which is\nqualitative or to anything which is represented under an image. I\nshould say rather that the image, if expressing in every point the\nentire reality, would no longer be an image. Let us suppose the\nexistence of two objects: one of them shall be Cratylus, and the other\nthe image of Cratylus; and we will suppose, further, that some God\nmakes not only a representation such as a painter would make of your\noutward form and colour, but also creates an inward organization like\nyours, having the same warmth and softness; and into this infuses\nmotion, and soul, and mind, such as you have, and in a word copies all\nyour qualities, and places them by you in another form; would you say\nthat this was Cratylus and the image of Cratylus, or that there were\ntwo Cratyluses?\n\nCRATYLUS: I should say that there were two Cratyluses.\n\nSOCRATES: Then you see, my friend, that we must find some other\nprinciple of truth in images, and also in names; and not insist that an\nimage is no longer an image when something is added or subtracted. Do\nyou not perceive that images are very far from having qualities which\nare the exact counterpart of the realities which they represent?\n\nCRATYLUS: Yes, I see.\n\nSOCRATES: But then how ridiculous would be the effect of names on\nthings, if they were exactly the same with them! For they would be the\ndoubles of them, and no one would be able to determine which were the\nnames and which were the realities.\n\nCRATYLUS: Quite true.\n\nSOCRATES: Then fear not, but have the courage to admit that one name\nmay be correctly and another incorrectly given; and do not insist that\nthe name shall be exactly the same with the thing; but allow the\noccasional substitution of a wrong letter, and if of a letter also of a\nnoun in a sentence, and if of a noun in a sentence also of a sentence\nwhich is not appropriate to the matter, and acknowledge that the thing\nmay be named, and described, so long as the general character of the\nthing which you are describing is retained; and this, as you will\nremember, was remarked by Hermogenes and myself in the particular\ninstance of the names of the letters.\n\nCRATYLUS: Yes, I remember.\n\nSOCRATES: Good; and when the general character is preserved, even if\nsome of the proper letters are wanting, still the thing is\nsignified;\u2014well, if all the letters are given; not well, when only a\nfew of them are given. I think that we had better admit this, lest we\nbe punished like travellers in Aegina who wander about the street late\nat night: and be likewise told by truth herself that we have arrived\ntoo late; or if not, you must find out some new notion of correctness\nof names, and no longer maintain that a name is the expression of a\nthing in letters or syllables; for if you say both, you will be\ninconsistent with yourself.\n\nCRATYLUS: I quite acknowledge, Socrates, what you say to be very\nreasonable.\n\nSOCRATES: Then as we are agreed thus far, let us ask ourselves whether\na name rightly imposed ought not to have the proper letters.\n\nCRATYLUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And the proper letters are those which are like the things?\n\nCRATYLUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Enough then of names which are rightly given. And in names\nwhich are incorrectly given, the greater part may be supposed to be\nmade up of proper and similar letters, or there would be no likeness;\nbut there will be likewise a part which is improper and spoils the\nbeauty and formation of the word: you would admit that?\n\nCRATYLUS: There would be no use, Socrates, in my quarrelling with you,\nsince I cannot be satisfied that a name which is incorrectly given is a\nname at all.\n\nSOCRATES: Do you admit a name to be the representation of a thing?\n\nCRATYLUS: Yes, I do.\n\nSOCRATES: But do you not allow that some nouns are primitive, and some\nderived?\n\nCRATYLUS: Yes, I do.\n\nSOCRATES: Then if you admit that primitive or first nouns are\nrepresentations of things, is there any better way of framing\nrepresentations than by assimilating them to the objects as much as you\ncan; or do you prefer the notion of Hermogenes and of many others, who\nsay that names are conventional, and have a meaning to those who have\nagreed about them, and who have previous knowledge of the things\nintended by them, and that convention is the only principle; and\nwhether you abide by our present convention, or make a new and opposite\none, according to which you call small great and great small\u2014that, they\nwould say, makes no difference, if you are only agreed. Which of these\ntwo notions do you prefer?\n\nCRATYLUS: Representation by likeness, Socrates, is infinitely better\nthan representation by any chance sign.\n\nSOCRATES: Very good: but if the name is to be like the thing, the\nletters out of which the first names are composed must also be like\nthings. Returning to the image of the picture, I would ask, How could\nany one ever compose a picture which would be like anything at all, if\nthere were not pigments in nature which resembled the things imitated,\nand out of which the picture is composed?\n\nCRATYLUS: Impossible.\n\nSOCRATES: No more could names ever resemble any actually existing\nthing, unless the original elements of which they are compounded bore\nsome degree of resemblance to the objects of which the names are the\nimitation: And the original elements are letters?\n\nCRATYLUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Let me now invite you to consider what Hermogenes and I were\nsaying about sounds. Do you agree with me that the letter rho is\nexpressive of rapidity, motion, and hardness? Were we right or wrong in\nsaying so?\n\nCRATYLUS: I should say that you were right.\n\nSOCRATES: And that lamda was expressive of smoothness, and softness,\nand the like?\n\nCRATYLUS: There again you were right.\n\nSOCRATES: And yet, as you are aware, that which is called by us\nsklerotes, is by the Eretrians called skleroter.\n\nCRATYLUS: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: But are the letters rho and sigma equivalents; and is there\nthe same significance to them in the termination rho, which there is to\nus in sigma, or is there no significance to one of us?\n\nCRATYLUS: Nay, surely there is a significance to both of us.\n\nSOCRATES: In as far as they are like, or in as far as they are unlike?\n\nCRATYLUS: In as far as they are like.\n\nSOCRATES: Are they altogether alike?\n\nCRATYLUS: Yes; for the purpose of expressing motion.\n\nSOCRATES: And what do you say of the insertion of the lamda? for that\nis expressive not of hardness but of softness.\n\nCRATYLUS: Why, perhaps the letter lamda is wrongly inserted, Socrates,\nand should be altered into rho, as you were saying to Hermogenes and in\nmy opinion rightly, when you spoke of adding and subtracting letters\nupon occasion.\n\nSOCRATES: Good. But still the word is intelligible to both of us; when\nI say skleros (hard), you know what I mean.\n\nCRATYLUS: Yes, my dear friend, and the explanation of that is custom.\n\nSOCRATES: And what is custom but convention? I utter a sound which I\nunderstand, and you know that I understand the meaning of the sound:\nthis is what you are saying?\n\nCRATYLUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And if when I speak you know my meaning, there is an\nindication given by me to you?\n\nCRATYLUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: This indication of my meaning may proceed from unlike as well\nas from like, for example in the lamda of sklerotes. But if this is\ntrue, then you have made a convention with yourself, and the\ncorrectness of a name turns out to be convention, since letters which\nare unlike are indicative equally with those which are like, if they\nare sanctioned by custom and convention. And even supposing that you\ndistinguish custom from convention ever so much, still you must say\nthat the signification of words is given by custom and not by likeness,\nfor custom may indicate by the unlike as well as by the like. But as we\nare agreed thus far, Cratylus (for I shall assume that your silence\ngives consent), then custom and convention must be supposed to\ncontribute to the indication of our thoughts; for suppose we take the\ninstance of number, how can you ever imagine, my good friend, that you\nwill find names resembling every individual number, unless you allow\nthat which you term convention and agreement to have authority in\ndetermining the correctness of names? I quite agree with you that words\nshould as far as possible resemble things; but I fear that this\ndragging in of resemblance, as Hermogenes says, is a shabby thing,\nwhich has to be supplemented by the mechanical aid of convention with a\nview to correctness; for I believe that if we could always, or almost\nalways, use likenesses, which are perfectly appropriate, this would be\nthe most perfect state of language; as the opposite is the most\nimperfect. But let me ask you, what is the force of names, and what is\nthe use of them?\n\nCRATYLUS: The use of names, Socrates, as I should imagine, is to\ninform: the simple truth is, that he who knows names knows also the\nthings which are expressed by them.\n\nSOCRATES: I suppose you mean to say, Cratylus, that as the name is, so\nalso is the thing; and that he who knows the one will also know the\nother, because they are similars, and all similars fall under the same\nart or science; and therefore you would say that he who knows names\nwill also know things.\n\nCRATYLUS: That is precisely what I mean.\n\nSOCRATES: But let us consider what is the nature of this information\nabout things which, according to you, is given us by names. Is it the\nbest sort of information? or is there any other? What do you say?\n\nCRATYLUS: I believe that to be both the only and the best sort of\ninformation about them; there can be no other.\n\nSOCRATES: But do you believe that in the discovery of them, he who\ndiscovers the names discovers also the things; or is this only the\nmethod of instruction, and is there some other method of enquiry and\ndiscovery.\n\nCRATYLUS: I certainly believe that the methods of enquiry and discovery\nare of the same nature as instruction.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, but do you not see, Cratylus, that he who follows names\nin the search after things, and analyses their meaning, is in great\ndanger of being deceived?\n\nCRATYLUS: How so?\n\nSOCRATES: Why clearly he who first gave names gave them according to\nhis conception of the things which they signified\u2014did he not?\n\nCRATYLUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And if his conception was erroneous, and he gave names\naccording to his conception, in what position shall we who are his\nfollowers find ourselves? Shall we not be deceived by him?\n\nCRATYLUS: But, Socrates, am I not right in thinking that he must surely\nhave known; or else, as I was saying, his names would not be names at\nall? And you have a clear proof that he has not missed the truth, and\nthe proof is\u2014that he is perfectly consistent. Did you ever observe in\nspeaking that all the words which you utter have a common character and\npurpose?\n\nSOCRATES: But that, friend Cratylus, is no answer. For if he did begin\nin error, he may have forced the remainder into agreement with the\noriginal error and with himself; there would be nothing strange in\nthis, any more than in geometrical diagrams, which have often a slight\nand invisible flaw in the first part of the process, and are\nconsistently mistaken in the long deductions which follow. And this is\nthe reason why every man should expend his chief thought and attention\non the consideration of his first principles:\u2014are they or are they not\nrightly laid down? and when he has duly sifted them, all the rest will\nfollow. Now I should be astonished to find that names are really\nconsistent. And here let us revert to our former discussion: Were we\nnot saying that all things are in motion and progress and flux, and\nthat this idea of motion is expressed by names? Do you not conceive\nthat to be the meaning of them?\n\nCRATYLUS: Yes; that is assuredly their meaning, and the true meaning.\n\nSOCRATES: Let us revert to episteme (knowledge) and observe how\nambiguous this word is, seeming rather to signify stopping the soul at\nthings than going round with them; and therefore we should leave the\nbeginning as at present, and not reject the epsilon, but make an\ninsertion of an iota instead of an epsilon (not pioteme, but\nepiisteme). Take another example: bebaion (sure) is clearly the\nexpression of station and position, and not of motion. Again, the word\nistoria (enquiry) bears upon the face of it the stopping (istanai) of\nthe stream; and the word piston (faithful) certainly indicates\ncessation of motion; then, again, mneme (memory), as any one may see,\nexpresses rest in the soul, and not motion. Moreover, words such as\namartia and sumphora, which have a bad sense, viewed in the light of\ntheir etymologies will be the same as sunesis and episteme and other\nwords which have a good sense (compare omartein, sunienai, epesthai,\nsumpheresthai); and much the same may be said of amathia and akolasia,\nfor amathia may be explained as e ama theo iontos poreia, and akolasia\nas e akolouthia tois pragmasin. Thus the names which in these instances\nwe find to have the worst sense, will turn out to be framed on the same\nprinciple as those which have the best. And any one I believe who would\ntake the trouble might find many other examples in which the giver of\nnames indicates, not that things are in motion or progress, but that\nthey are at rest; which is the opposite of motion.\n\nCRATYLUS: Yes, Socrates, but observe; the greater number express\nmotion.\n\nSOCRATES: What of that, Cratylus? Are we to count them like votes? and\nis correctness of names the voice of the majority? Are we to say of\nwhichever sort there are most, those are the true ones?\n\nCRATYLUS: No; that is not reasonable.\n\nSOCRATES: Certainly not. But let us have done with this question and\nproceed to another, about which I should like to know whether you think\nwith me. Were we not lately acknowledging that the first givers of\nnames in states, both Hellenic and barbarous, were the legislators, and\nthat the art which gave names was the art of the legislator?\n\nCRATYLUS: Quite true.\n\nSOCRATES: Tell me, then, did the first legislators, who were the givers\nof the first names, know or not know the things which they named?\n\nCRATYLUS: They must have known, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: Why, yes, friend Cratylus, they could hardly have been\nignorant.\n\nCRATYLUS: I should say not.\n\nSOCRATES: Let us return to the point from which we digressed. You were\nsaying, if you remember, that he who gave names must have known the\nthings which he named; are you still of that opinion?\n\nCRATYLUS: I am.\n\nSOCRATES: And would you say that the giver of the first names had also\na knowledge of the things which he named?\n\nCRATYLUS: I should.\n\nSOCRATES: But how could he have learned or discovered things from names\nif the primitive names were not yet given? For, if we are correct in\nour view, the only way of learning and discovering things, is either to\ndiscover names for ourselves or to learn them from others.\n\nCRATYLUS: I think that there is a good deal in what you say, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: But if things are only to be known through names, how can we\nsuppose that the givers of names had knowledge, or were legislators\nbefore there were names at all, and therefore before they could have\nknown them?\n\nCRATYLUS: I believe, Socrates, the true account of the matter to be,\nthat a power more than human gave things their first names, and that\nthe names which are thus given are necessarily their true names.\n\nSOCRATES: Then how came the giver of the names, if he was an inspired\nbeing or God, to contradict himself? For were we not saying just now\nthat he made some names expressive of rest and others of motion? Were\nwe mistaken?\n\nCRATYLUS: But I suppose one of the two not to be names at all.\n\nSOCRATES: And which, then, did he make, my good friend; those which are\nexpressive of rest, or those which are expressive of motion? This is a\npoint which, as I said before, cannot be determined by counting them.\n\nCRATYLUS: No; not in that way, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: But if this is a battle of names, some of them asserting that\nthey are like the truth, others contending that THEY are, how or by\nwhat criterion are we to decide between them? For there are no other\nnames to which appeal can be made, but obviously recourse must be had\nto another standard which, without employing names, will make clear\nwhich of the two are right; and this must be a standard which shows the\ntruth of things.\n\nCRATYLUS: I agree.\n\nSOCRATES: But if that is true, Cratylus, then I suppose that things may\nbe known without names?\n\nCRATYLUS: Clearly.\n\nSOCRATES: But how would you expect to know them? What other way can\nthere be of knowing them, except the true and natural way, through\ntheir affinities, when they are akin to each other, and through\nthemselves? For that which is other and different from them must\nsignify something other and different from them.\n\nCRATYLUS: What you are saying is, I think, true.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, but reflect; have we not several times acknowledged\nthat names rightly given are the likenesses and images of the things\nwhich they name?\n\nCRATYLUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Let us suppose that to any extent you please you can learn\nthings through the medium of names, and suppose also that you can learn\nthem from the things themselves\u2014which is likely to be the nobler and\nclearer way; to learn of the image, whether the image and the truth of\nwhich the image is the expression have been rightly conceived, or to\nlearn of the truth whether the truth and the image of it have been duly\nexecuted?\n\nCRATYLUS: I should say that we must learn of the truth.\n\nSOCRATES: How real existence is to be studied or discovered is, I\nsuspect, beyond you and me. But we may admit so much, that the\nknowledge of things is not to be derived from names. No; they must be\nstudied and investigated in themselves.\n\nCRATYLUS: Clearly, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: There is another point. I should not like us to be imposed\nupon by the appearance of such a multitude of names, all tending in the\nsame direction. I myself do not deny that the givers of names did\nreally give them under the idea that all things were in motion and\nflux; which was their sincere but, I think, mistaken opinion. And\nhaving fallen into a kind of whirlpool themselves, they are carried\nround, and want to drag us in after them. There is a matter, master\nCratylus, about which I often dream, and should like to ask your\nopinion: Tell me, whether there is or is not any absolute beauty or\ngood, or any other absolute existence?\n\nCRATYLUS: Certainly, Socrates, I think so.\n\nSOCRATES: Then let us seek the true beauty: not asking whether a face\nis fair, or anything of that sort, for all such things appear to be in\na flux; but let us ask whether the true beauty is not always beautiful.\n\nCRATYLUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And can we rightly speak of a beauty which is always passing\naway, and is first this and then that; must not the same thing be born\nand retire and vanish while the word is in our mouths?\n\nCRATYLUS: Undoubtedly.\n\nSOCRATES: Then how can that be a real thing which is never in the same\nstate? for obviously things which are the same cannot change while they\nremain the same; and if they are always the same and in the same state,\nand never depart from their original form, they can never change or be\nmoved.\n\nCRATYLUS: Certainly they cannot.\n\nSOCRATES: Nor yet can they be known by any one; for at the moment that\nthe observer approaches, then they become other and of another nature,\nso that you cannot get any further in knowing their nature or state,\nfor you cannot know that which has no state.\n\nCRATYLUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: Nor can we reasonably say, Cratylus, that there is knowledge\nat all, if everything is in a state of transition and there is nothing\nabiding; for knowledge too cannot continue to be knowledge unless\ncontinuing always to abide and exist. But if the very nature of\nknowledge changes, at the time when the change occurs there will be no\nknowledge; and if the transition is always going on, there will always\nbe no knowledge, and, according to this view, there will be no one to\nknow and nothing to be known: but if that which knows and that which is\nknown exists ever, and the beautiful and the good and every other thing\nalso exist, then I do not think that they can resemble a process or\nflux, as we were just now supposing. Whether there is this eternal\nnature in things, or whether the truth is what Heracleitus and his\nfollowers and many others say, is a question hard to determine; and no\nman of sense will like to put himself or the education of his mind in\nthe power of names: neither will he so far trust names or the givers of\nnames as to be confident in any knowledge which condemns himself and\nother existences to an unhealthy state of unreality; he will not\nbelieve that all things leak like a pot, or imagine that the world is a\nman who has a running at the nose. This may be true, Cratylus, but is\nalso very likely to be untrue; and therefore I would not have you be\ntoo easily persuaded of it. Reflect well and like a man, and do not\neasily accept such a doctrine; for you are young and of an age to\nlearn. And when you have found the truth, come and tell me.\n\nCRATYLUS: I will do as you say, though I can assure you, Socrates, that\nI have been considering the matter already, and the result of a great\ndeal of trouble and consideration is that I incline to Heracleitus.\n\nSOCRATES: Then, another day, my friend, when you come back, you shall\ngive me a lesson; but at present, go into the country, as you are\nintending, and Hermogenes shall set you on your way.\n\nCRATYLUS: Very good, Socrates; I hope, however, that you will continue\nto think about these things yourself.","title":"Cratylus","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":52804}