{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_16170/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_16170","id":"gutenberg_16170","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/16170","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Warfare","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Military art and science"],"text":"Produced by Graeme Mackreth and the Online Distributed\nProofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nELEMENTS OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE: OR, COURSE OF INSTRUCTION IN\nSTRATEGY, FORTIFICATION, TACTICS OF BATTLES, &c.\n\n\nEMBRACING THE DUTIES OF STAFF, INFANTRY, CAVALRY, ARTILLERY, AND\nENGINEERS.\n\n\nADAPTED TO THE USE OF VOLUNTEERS AND MILITIA.\n\n\nTHIRD EDITION.\n\nWITH CRITICAL NOTES ON THE MEXICAN AND CRIMEAN WARS.\n\nBY\n\nH. WAGER HALLECK, A.M., MAJOR GENERAL, U.S.A.\n\n\n\nNEW YORK:\n\nD. APPLETON & COMPANY,\n\n443 & 445 BROADWAY.\n\nLONDON: 16 LITTLE BRITAIN\n\n1862.\n\nEntered, according to the Act of Congress, in the year 1846, BY D.\nAPPLETON & COMPANY, In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the\nUnited States for the Southern District of New York.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS PAGE PREFACE    5\n\nI. INTRODUCTION.--Dr. Wayland's Arguments on the Justifiableness of War\nbriefly examined.     7\n\nII. STRATEGY.--General Divisions of the Art.--Rules for planning a\nCampaign.--Analysis of the Military Operations of Napoleon.     35\n\nIII. FORTIFICATIONS.--Their importance in the Defence of States proved\nby numerous Historical Examples.      61\n\nIV. LOGISTICS.--Subsistence.--Forage.--Marches.--Convoys.--\nCastrametation.      88\n\nV. TACTICS.--The Twelve Orders of Battle, with Examples of\neach.--Different Formations of Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and\nEngineers on the Field of Battle, with the Modes of bringing Troops into\naction.      114\n\nVI. MILITARY POLITY.--The Means of National Defence best suited to the\ncharacter and condition of a Country, with a brief Account of those\nadopted by the several European Powers. 135\n\nVII. DEFENCE OF OUR SEA-COAST.--Brief Description of our Maritime\nFortifications, with an Examination of the several Contests that have\ntaken place between Ships and Forts, including the Attack on San Juan\nd'Ulloa, and on St. Jean d'Acre.      155\n\nVIII. OUR NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES.--Brief Description of the\nFortifications on the Frontier, and an analysis of our Northern\nCampaigns.      210\n\nIX. ARMY ORGANIZATION.--Staff and Administrative Corps.--Their History,\nDuties, Numbers, and Organization. 235\n\nX. ARMY ORGANIZATION.--Infantry and Cavalry.--Their History, Duties,\nNumbers, and Organization. 256\n\nXI. ARMY ORGANIZATION.--Artillery.--Its History and Organization, with a\nBrief Notice of the different kinds of Ordnance, the Manufacture of\nProjectiles, &c.      275\n\nXII. ARMY ORGANIZATION.--Engineers.--Their History, Duties, and\nOrganization,--with a Brief Discussion, showing their importance as a\npart of a modern Army Organization.      300\n\nXIII. PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS. Historical Notice of the progress of\nthis Art.--Description of the several parts of a Fortress, and the\nvarious Methods of fortifying a Position.      327\n\nXIV. FIELD ENGINEERING.--Field Fortifications.--Military\nCommunications.--Military Bridges.--Sapping, Mining, and the Attack and\nDefence of a Fortified Place.      342\n\nXV. MILITARY EDUCATION.--Military Schools of France, Prussia, Austria,\nRussia, England, &c.--Washington's Reasons for establishing the West\nPoint Academy.--Rules of Appointment and Promotion in Foreign\nServices.--Absurdity and Injustice of our own System.      378\n\nEXPLANATION OF PLATES      409\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nThe following pages were hastily thrown together in the form of\nlectures, and delivered, during, the past winter, before the Lowell\nInstitute of Boston. They were written without the slightest intention\nof ever publishing them; but several officers of militia, who heard them\ndelivered, or afterwards read them in manuscript, desire their\npublication, on the ground of their being useful to a class of officers\nnow likely to be called into military service. It is with this view\nalone that they are placed in the hands of the printer. No pretension is\nmade to originality in any part of the work; the sole object having been\nto embody, in a small compass, well established military principles, and\nto illustrate these by reference to the events of past history, and the\nopinions and practice of the best generals.\n\nSmall portions of two or three of the following chapters have already\nappeared, in articles furnished by the author to the New York and\nDemocratic Reviews, and in a \"Report on the Means of National Defence,\"\npublished by order of Congress.\n\nH.W.H.\n\nMAY, 1846.\n\n\n\n\nELEMENTS OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nINTRODUCTION.\n\n\nOur distance from the old world, and the favorable circumstances in\nwhich we have been placed with respect to the other nations of the new\nworld, have made it so easy for our government to adhere to a pacific\npolicy, that, in the sixty-two years that have elapsed since the\nacknowledgment of our national independence, we have enjoyed more than\nfifty-eight of general peace; our Indian border wars have been too\nlimited and local in their character to seriously affect the other parts\nof the country, or to disturb the general conditions of peace. This\nfortunate state of things has done much to diffuse knowledge, promote\ncommerce, agriculture, and manufactures; in fine, to increase the\ngreatness of the nation and the happiness of the individual. Under these\ncircumstances our people have grown up with habits and dispositions\nessentially pacific, and it is to be hoped that these feelings may not\nsoon be changed. But in all communities opinions sometimes run into\nextremes; and there are not a few among us who, dazzled by the\nbeneficial results of a long peace, have adopted the opinion that war in\nany case is not only useless, but actually immoral; nay, more, that to\nengage in war is wicked in the highest degree, and even _brutish_.\n\nAll modern ethical writers regard _unjust_ war as not only immoral, but\nas one of the greatest of crimes--murder on a large scale. Such are all\nwars of mere ambition, engaged in for the purpose of extending regal\npower or national sovereignty; wars of plunder, carried on from\nmercenary motives; wars of propagandism, undertaken for the unrighteous\nend of compelling men to adopt certain religious or political opinions,\nwhether from the alleged motives of \"introducing a more orthodox\nreligion,\" or of \"extending the area of freedom.\" Such wars are held in\njust abhorrence by all moral and religious people: and this is believed\nto be the settled conviction of the great mass of our own citizens.\n\nBut in addition to that respectable denomination of Christians who deny\nour right to use arms under any circumstances, there are many religious\nenthusiasts in other communions who, from causes already noticed, have\nadopted the same theory, and hold _all_ wars, even those in\nself-defence, as unlawful and immoral. This opinion has been, within the\nlast few years, pressed on the public with great zeal and eloquence, and\nmany able pens have been enlisted in its cause. One of the most popular,\nand by some regarded one of the most able writers on moral science, has\nadopted this view as the only one consonant with the principles of\nChristian morality.\n\nIt has been deemed proper, in commencing a course of lectures on war, to\nmake a few introductory remarks respecting this question of its\njustifiableness. We know of no better way of doing this than to give on\nthe one side the objections to war as laid down in Dr. Wayland's Moral\nPhilosophy, and on the other side the arguments by which other ethical\nwriters have justified a resort to war. We do not select Dr. Wayland's\nwork for the purpose of criticizing so distinguished an author; but\nbecause he is almost the only writer on ethics who advocates these\nviews, and because the main arguments against war are here given in\nbrief space, and in more moderate and temperate language than that used\nby most of his followers. I shall give his arguments in his own\nlanguage.\n\n\"I. All wars are contrary to the revealed will of God.\"\n\nIt is said in reply, that if the Christian religion condemns all wars,\nno matter how just the cause, or how necessary for self-defence, we must\nexpect to find in the Bible some direct prohibition of war, or at least\na prohibition fairly implied in other direct commandments. But the Bible\nnowhere prohibits war: in the Old Testament we find war and even\nconquest positively commanded, and although war was raging in the world\nin the time of Christ and his apostles, still they said not a word of\nits unlawfulness and immorality. Moreover, the fathers of the church\namply acknowledge the right of war, and directly assert, that when war\nis justly declared, the Christian may engage in it either by stratagem\nor open force. If it be of that highly wicked and immoral character\nwhich some have recently attributed to it, most assuredly it would be\ncondemned in the Bible in terms the most positive and unequivocal.\n\nBut it has been said that the use of the sword is either directly or\ntypically forbidden to the Christian, by such passages as \"Thou shalt\nnot kill,\" (Deut. v. 17,) \"I say unto you, that ye resist not evil: but\nwhosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other\nalso,\" (Matt. v. 39,) &c. If these passages are to be taken as literal\ncommands, as fanatics and religious enthusiasts would have us believe,\nnot only is war unlawful, but also all our penal statutes, the\nmagistracy, and all the institutions of the state for the defence of\nindividual rights, the protection of the innocent, and the punishment of\nthe guilty. But if taken in conjunction with the whole Bible, we must\ninfer that they are hyperbolical expressions, used to impress strongly\non our minds the general principle of love and forgiveness, and that, so\nfar as possible, we over come evil with good. Can any sober-minded man\nsuppose, for a moment, that we are commanded to encourage the attacks of\nthe wicked, by literally turning the left cheek when assaulted on the\nright, and thus induce the assailant to commit more wrong? Shall we\ninvite the thief and the robber to persevere in his depredations, by\nliterally giving him a cloak when he takes our coat; and the insolent\nand the oppressor to proceed in his path of crime, by going two miles\nwith him if he bid us to go one?\n\nAgain, if the command, \"Thou shalt not kill,\" is to be taken literally,\nit not only prohibits us from engaging in just war, and forbids the\ntaking of human life by the state, as a punishment for crime; it also\nforbids, says Dr. Leiber, our taking the life of any animal, and even\nextends to the vegetable kingdom,--for undoubtedly plants have life, and\nare liable to violent death--to be _killed_. But Dr. Wayland concedes to\nindividuals the right to take vegetable and animal life, and to society\nthe right to punish murder by death. This passage undoubtedly means,\nthou shalt not unjustly kill,--thou shalt do no murder; and so it is\nrendered in our prayer-books. It cannot have reference to war, for on\nalmost the next page we find the Israelites commanded to go forth and\nsmite the heathen nations,--to cast them out of the land,--to utterly\ndestroy them,--to show them no mercy, &c. If these passages of the Bible\nare to be taken literally, there is no book which contains so many\ncontradictions; but if taken in connection with the spirit of other\npassages, we shall find that we are permitted to use force in preventing\nor punishing crime, whether in nations or in individuals; but that we\nshould combine love with justice, and free our hearts from all evil\nmotives.\n\nII. All wars are unjustifiable, because \"God commands us to love every\nman, alien or citizen, Samaritan or Jew, as ourselves; and the act\nneither of society nor of government can render it our duty to violate\nthis command.\"\n\nIt is true that no act of society can make it our duty to violate any\ncommand of God: but is the above command to be taken literally, and as\nforbidding us to engage in just war? Is it not rather intended to\nimpress upon us, in a forcible manner, that mutual love is a great\nvirtue; that we should hate no one, not even a stranger nor an enemy,\nbut should treat all with justice, mercy, and loving-kindness? If the\nmeaning attempted to be given to this command in the above quotation be\nthe true one, it is antagonistical not only to just war, but to civil\njustice, to patriotism, and to the social and domestic affections.\n\nBut are we bound to love all human beings alike; that is, to the same\ndegree? Does the Bible, as a whole, inculcate such doctrine? On the\ncontrary, Christ himself had his _beloved_ disciple,--one whom he loved\npre-eminently, and above all the others; though he loved the others none\nthe less on that account. We are bound to love our parents, our\nbrothers, our families first, and above all other human beings; but we\ndo not, for this reason, love others any the less. A man is not only\npermitted to seek first the comfort and happiness of his own family, but\nif he neglect to do so, he is worse than an infidel. We are bound to\nprotect our families against the attacks of others; and, if necessary\nfor the defence of their lives, we are permitted to take the life of the\nassailant; nay more, we are bound to do so. But it does not follow that\nwe _hate_ him whom we thus destroy. On the contrary, we may feel\ncompassion, and even love for him. The magistrate sentences the murderer\nto suffer the penalty of the law; and the sheriff carries the sentence\ninto execution by taking, in due form, the life of the prisoner:\nnevertheless, both the magistrate and the sheriff may have the kindest\nfeelings towards him whom they thus deprive of life.\n\nSo it is in the external affairs of the state. Next to my kindred and my\nneighbors do I love my countrymen. I love them more than I do\nforeigners, because my interests, my feelings, my happiness, my ties of\nfriendship and affection, bind me to them more intimately than to the\nforeigner. I sympathize with the oppressed Greek, and the enslaved\nAfrican, and willingly contribute to their relief, although their\nsufferings affect me very remotely; but if my own countrymen become\noppressed and enslaved, nearer and dearer interests are affected, and\npeculiar duties spring from the ties and affections which God has\nformed. If my countrymen be oppressed, my neighbors and kindred will be\nmade unhappy and suffering; this I am bound to take all proper measures\nin my power to prevent. If the assailant cannot be persuaded by argument\nto desist from his wicked intentions, I unite with my fellow-citizens in\nforcibly resisting his aggressions. In doing this I am actuated by no\nfeelings of hatred towards the hostile forces; I have in my heart no\nmalice, no spirit of revenge; I have no desire to harm individuals,\nexcept so far as they are made the instruments of oppression. But as\ninstruments of evil, I am bound to destroy their power to do harm. I do\nnot shoot at my military enemy from hatred or revenge; I fight against\nhim because the paramount interests of my country cannot be secured\nwithout destroying the instrument by which they are assailed. I am\nprohibited from exercising any personal cruelty; and after the battle,\nor as soon as the enemy is rendered harmless, he is to be treated with\nkindness, and to be taken care of equally with the wounded friend. All\nconduct to the contrary is regarded by civilized nations with\ndisapprobation.\n\nThat war does not properly beget personal malignity but that, on the\ncontrary, the effects of mutual kindness and courtesy on the\nbattle-field, frequently have a beneficial influence in the political\nevents of after years, may be shown by innumerable examples in all\nhistory. Soult and Wellington were opposing generals in numerous\nbattles; but when the former visited England in 1838, he was received by\nWellington and the whole British nation with the highest marks of\nrespect; and the mutual warmth of feeling between these two\ndistinguished men has contributed much to the continuance of friendly\nrelations between the two nations. And a few years ago, when we seemed\nbrought, by our civil authorities, almost to the brink of war by the\nnortheastern boundary difficulties, the pacific arrangements concluded,\nthrough the intervention of General Scott, between the Governors of\nMaine and New Brunswick, were mainly due to ancient friendships\ncontracted by officers of the contending armies during our last war with\nGreat Britain.\n\nIII. \"It is granted that it would be better for man in general, if wars\nwere abolished, and all means, both of offence and defence, abandoned.\nNow, this seems to me to admit, that this is the law under which God has\ncreated man. But this being admitted, the question seems to be at an\nend; for God never places man under circumstances in which it is either\nwise, or necessary, or innocent, to violate his laws. Is it for the\nadvantage of him who lives among a community of thieves, to steal; or\nfor one who lives among a community of liars, to lie?\"\n\nThe fallacy of the above argument is so evident that it is scarcely\nnecessary to point out its logical defects.\n\nMy living among a community of thieves would not justify me in stealing,\nand certainly it would be no reason why I should neglect the security of\nmy property. My living among murderers would not justify me in\ncommitting murder, and on the other hand it would be no reason why I\nshould not fight in the defence of my family, if the arm of the law were\nunable to protect them. That other nations carry on unjust wars is no\nreason why we should do likewise, nor is it of itself any reason why we\nshould neglect the means of self-defence.\n\nIt may seem, to us short-sighted mortals, better that we were placed in\na world where there were no wars, or murders, or thefts; but God has\nseen fit to order it otherwise. Our duties and our relations to our\nfellow-men are made to suit the world as it is, and not such a world as\nwe would make for ourselves.\n\nWe live among thieves: we must therefore resort to force to protect our\nproperty--that is, to locks, and bars, and bolts; we build walls thick\nand high between the robber and our merchandise. And more: we enact laws\nfor his punishment, and employ civil officers to forcibly seize the\nguilty and inflict that degree of punishment necessary for the\nprevention of other thefts and robberies.\n\nWe live among murderers: if neither the law nor the ordinary physical\nprotections suffice for the defence of our own lives and the lives of\nour innocent friends, we forcibly resist the murderer, even to his\ndeath, if need be. Moreover, to deter others from like crimes, we\ninflict the punishment of death upon him who has already taken life.\n\nThese relations of individuals and of society are laid down by all\nethical writers as in accordance with the strictest rules of Christian\nmorality. Even Dr. Wayland considers it not only the right, but the duty\nof individuals and of society to resort to these means, and to enact\nthese laws for self-protection. Let us extend the same course of\nreasoning to the relations of different societies.\n\nWe live among nations who frequently wage unjust wars; who, disregarding\nthe rights of others, oppress and rob, and even murder their citizens,\nin order to reach some unrighteous end. As individuals, we build fences\nand walls for the protection of our grounds and our merchandise; so, as\na nation, we build ships and forts to protect our commerce, our harbors,\nand our cities. But the walls of our houses and stores are useless,\nunless made so strong and high that the robber cannot break through or\nscale them without great effort and personal danger; so our national\nships and forts would be utterly useless for protection, unless fully\narmed and equipped.\n\nFurther: as individuals and as societies we employ civil officers for\nthe protection of our property and lives, and, when necessary, arm them\nwith the physical means of executing the laws, even though the\nemployment of these means should cost human life. The prevention and\npunishment of crime causes much human suffering; nevertheless the good\nof community requires that crime should be prevented and punished. So,\nas a nation, we employ military officers to man our ships and forts, to\nprotect our property and our persons, and to repel and punish those who\nseek to rob us of our life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness. National\naggressions are far more terrible in their results than individual\ncrime; so also the means of prevention and punishment are far more\nstupendous, and the employment of these means causes a far greater\namount of human suffering. This may be a good reason for greater\n_caution_ in resorting to such means, but assuredly it is no argument\nagainst the _moral right_ to use them.\n\nIV. War is unjustifiable because unnecessary:\n\n\"1st. The very fact that a nation relied solely upon the justice of its\nmeasures, and the benevolence of its conduct, would do more than any\nthing else to prevent the occurrence of injury. The moral sentiment of\nevery community would rise in opposition to injury inflicted upon the\njust the kind, and the merciful.\"\n\nThe moral duty of nations in this respect is the same as that of\nindividuals. Active benevolence and forbearance should be employed, so\nfar as may be proper; but there are points at which forbearance ceases\nto be a virtue. If we entirely forbear to punish the thief, the robber,\nand the murderer, think you that crime will be diminished? Reason and\nexperience prove the contrary. Active benevolence and kindness should\nalways attend just punishment, but they were never designed to prohibit\nit. The laws of God's universe are founded on justice as well as love.\n\"The moral sentiment of every community rises in opposition to injury\ninflicted upon the just, the kind, and the merciful;\" but this fact does\nnot entirely prevent wicked men from robbing and murdering innocent\npersons, and therefore wise and just laws require that criminals shall\nbe punished, in order that those who are dead to all moral restraints\nmay be deterred from crime through fear of punishment.\n\n\"2d. But suppose the [national] injury to be done. I reply, the proper\nappeal for moral beings, upon moral questions, is not to physical force,\nbut to the consciences of men. Let the wrong be set forth, but be set\nforth in the spirit of love; and in this manner, if in any, will the\nconsciences of men be aroused to justice.\"\n\nArgument, and \"appeals to the consciences of men\" should always be\nresorted to in preference to \"physical force;\" but when they fail to\ndeter the wicked, force must be employed. I may reason with the robber\nand the murderer, to persuade him to desist from his attempt to rob my\nhouse, and murder my family; but if he refuse to listen to moral\nappeals, I employ physical force,--I call in the strong arm of the law\nto assist me; and if no other means can be found to save innocent life\nthat is assailed, the life of the assailant must be sacrificed.\n\n\"If,\" says Puffendorf, \"some one treads the laws of peace under his\nfeet, forming projects which tend to my ruin, he could not, without the\nhighest degree of impudence, (impudentissime,) pretend that after this I\nshould consider him as a sacred person, who ought not to be touched; in\nother words, that I should betray myself, and abandon the care of my own\npreservation, in order to give way to the malice of a criminal, that he\nmay act with impunity and with full liberty. On the contrary, since he\nshows himself unsociable towards me, and since he has placed himself in\na position which does not permit me safely to practice towards him the\nduties of peace, I have only to think of preventing the danger which\nmenaces me; so that if I cannot do this without hurting him, he has to\naccuse himself only, since he has reduced me to this necessity.\" _De\nJure Nat. et Gent_, lib. ii., ch. v., Sec.1. This same course of\nreasoning is also applied to the duties of a nation towards its enemy in\nrespect to war.\n\n\"3d. But suppose this method fail. Why, then, let us suffer the evil.\"\n\nThis principle, if applied to its full extent, would, we believe, be\nsubversive of all right, and soon place all power in the hands of the\nmost evil and wicked men in the community. Reason with the nation that\ninvades our soil, and tramples under foot our rights and liberties, and\nshould it not desist, why, then, suffer the evil! Reason with the\nmurderer, and if he do not desist, why, then, suffer him to murder our\nwives and our children! Reason with the robber and the defaulter, and if\nthey will not listen, why, then, let them take our property! We cannot\nappeal to the courts, for if their decisions be not respected, they\nemploy _force_ to _compel_ obedience to their mandates. But Dr. Wayland\nconsiders the law of benevolence to forbid the use of force between men.\nHe forgets this, it is true, in speaking of our duties towards our\nfellow-men of the same _society_, and even allows us to punish the\nmurderer with death; but towards the foreigner he requires a greater\nforbearance and benevolence than towards our neighbor; for if another\nnation send its armies to oppress, and rob, and murder us by the\nthousand, we have no right to employ physical force either to prevent or\nto punish them, though we may do so to prevent or punish a neighbor for\nan individual act of the same character. The greater the scale of crime,\nthen, the less the necessity of resorting to physical force to prevent\nit!\n\n\"4th. But it may be asked, what is to prevent repeated and continued\naggression? I answer, first, not instruments of destruction, but the\nmoral principle which God has placed in the bosom of every man. I think\nthat obedience to the law of God, on the part of the injured, is the\nsurest preventive against the repetition of injury. I answer, secondly,\nsuppose that acting in obedience to the law of benevolence will not\nprevent the repetition of injury, will acting on the principle of\nretaliation prevent it?\" Again; \"I believe aggression from a foreign\nnation to be the intimation from God that we are disobeying the law of\nbenevolence, and that this is his mode of teaching nations their duty,\nin this respect, to each other. So that aggression seems to me in no\nmanner to call for retaliation and injury, but rather to call for\nspecial kindness and good-will.\"\n\nThis argument, if such it can be called, is equally applicable to\nindividual aggressions. We are bound to regard them as intimations of\nour want of benevolence, and to reward the aggressors for the\nintimations! Is it true, that in this world the wicked only are\noppressed, and that the good are always the prospered and happy? Even\nsuppose this true, and that I, as a sinful man, deserve God's anger, is\nthis any reason why I should not resist the assassin, and seek to bring\nhim to punishment? The whole of this argument of Dr. Wayland applies\nwith much greater force to municipal courts than to war.\n\nV. \"Let us suppose a nation to abandon all means both of offence and of\ndefence, to lay aside all power of inflicting injury, and to rely for\nself-preservation solely upon the justice of its own conduct, and the\nmoral effect which such a course of conduct would produce upon the\nconsciences of men. * * * * How would such a nation be protected from\nexternal attack, and entire subjugation? I answer, by adopting the law\nof benevolence, a nation would render such an event in the highest\ndegree improbable. The causes of national war are, most commonly, the\nlove of plunder and the love of glory. The first of these is rarely, if\never, sufficient to stimulate men to the _ferocity necessary to war_,\nunless when assisted by the second. And by adopting as the rule of our\nconduct the law of benevolence, all motive arising from the second cause\nis taken away. There is not a nation in Europe that could be led on to\nwar against a harmless, just, forgiving, and defenceless people.\"\n\nHistory teaches us that societies as well as individuals have been\nattacked again and again notwithstanding that they either would not or\ncould not defend themselves. Did Mr. White, of Salem, escape his\nmurderers any the more for being harmless and defenceless? Did the\nQuakers escape being attacked and hung by the ancient New Englanders any\nthe more because of their non-resisting principles? Have the Jews\nescaped persecutions throughout Christendom any the more because of\ntheir imbecility and non-resistance for some centuries past? Poland was\ncomparatively harmless and defenceless when the three great European\npowers combined to attack and destroy the entire nation, dividing\nbetween themselves the Polish territory, and enslaving or driving into\nexile the Polish people.\n\n    \"Oh, bloodiest picture in the book of time,\n    Sarmatia fell, unwept, without a crime!\"\n\nWe need not multiply examples under this head; all history is filled\nwith them.\n\nLet us to-morrow destroy our forts and ships of war, disband our army\nand navy, and apply the lighted torch to our military munitions and to\nour physical means of defence of every description; let it be proclaimed\nto the world that we will rely solely upon the consciences of nations\nfor justice, and that we have no longer either the will or the ability\nto defend ourselves against aggression. Think you that the African and\nAsiatic pirates would refrain, any the more, from plundering our vessels\ntrading to China, because we had adopted \"the law of benevolence?\" Would\nEngland be any the more likely to compromise her differences with us, or\nbe any the more disposed to refrain from impressing our seamen and from\nsearching our merchant-ships? Experience shows that an undefended state,\nknown to suffer every thing, soon becomes the prey of all others, and\nhistory most abundantly proves the wisdom and justice of the words of\nWashington--\"IF WE DESIRE TO SECURE PEACE, IT MUST BE KNOWN THAT WE ARE\nAT ALL TIMES READY FOR WAR.\"\n\nBut let us bring this case still nearer home. Let it be known to-morrow\nthat the people of Boston or New York have adopted the strictly\nnon-resisting principle, and that hereafter they will rely solely on the\nconsciences of men for justice; let it be proclaimed throughout the\nwhole extent of our Union, and throughout the world, that you have\ndestroyed your jails and houses of correction, abolished your police and\nexecutive law officers, that courts may decide justice but will be\nallowed no force to compel respect to their decisions, that you will no\nlonger employ walls, and bars, and locks, to secure your property and\nthe virtue and lives of your children; but that you will trust solely\nfor protection to \"the law of active benevolence.\" Think you that the\nthieves, and robbers, and murderers of Philadelphia, and Baltimore, and\nNew Orleans, and the cities of the old world, will, on this account,\nrefrain from molesting the peace of New York and Boston, and that the\nwicked and abandoned men now in these cities, will be the more likely to\nturn from the evil of their ways?\n\nAssuredly, if this \"law of active benevolence,\" as Dr. Wayland\ndenominates the rule of non-resistance, will prevent nations from\nattacking the harmless and defenceless, it will be still more likely to\nprevent individuals from the like aggressions; for the moral sense is\nless active in communities than where the responsibility is individual\nand direct.\n\nThroughout this argument Dr. Wayland assumes that all wars are wars of\naggression, waged for \"plunder\" or \"glory,\" or through \"hatred\" or\n\"revenge,\" whereas such is far from being true. He indeed sometimes\nspeaks of war as being _generally_ of this character; at others he\nspeaks of it as being _always_ undertaken either from a spirit of\naggression or retaliation. Take either form of his argument, and the\nveriest schoolboy would pronounce it unsound: viz.,\n\n_All_ wars are undertaken either for aggression or retaliation;\n\nAggression and retaliation are forbidden by God's laws;--therefore,\n\n_All_ wars are immoral and unjustifiable.\n\nOr,\n\nWars are _generally_ undertaken either for aggression or retaliation;\n\nAggression and retaliation are forbidden by God's laws--therefore,\n\n_All_ wars are immoral and unjustifiable.\n\nVI. \"Let any man reflect upon the amount of pecuniary expenditure, and\nthe awful waste of human life, which the wars of the last hundred years\nhave occasioned, and then we will ask him whether it be not evident,\nthat the one-hundredth part of this expense and suffering, if employed\nin the honest effort to render mankind wiser and better, would, long\nbefore this time, have banished wars from the earth, and rendered the\ncivilized world like the garden of Eden? If this be true, it will follow\nthat the cultivation of a military spirit is injurious to a community,\ninasmuch as it aggravates the source of the evil, the corrupt passions\nof the human breast, by the very manner in which it attempts to correct\nthe evil itself.\"\n\nMuch has been said to show that war begets immorality, and that the\ncultivation of the military spirit has a corrupting influence on\ncommunity. And members of the clergy and of the bar have not\nunfrequently so far forgotten, if not truth and fact, at least the\ncommon courtesies and charities of life, as to attribute to the military\nprofession an unequal share of immorality and crime. We are declared not\nonly parasites on the body politic, but professed violators of God's\nlaws--men so degraded, though unconsciously, that \"in the pursuit of\njustice we renounce the human character and assume that of the beasts;\"\nit is said that \"murder, robbery, rape, arson, theft, if only plaited\nwith the soldier's garb, go unwhipped of justice.\"[1] It has never been\nthe habit of the military to retort these charges upon the other\nprofessions. We prefer to leave them unanswered. If demagogues on the\n\"stump,\" or in the legislative halls, or in their Fourth of-July\naddresses, can find no fitter subjects \"to point a moral or adorn a\ntale,\" we must be content to bear their misrepresentations and abuse.\n\n[Footnote 1: Sumner's Oration.]\n\nUnjust wars, as well as unjust litigation, are immoral in their effects\nand also in their cause. But just wars and just litigation are not\ndemoralizing. Suppose all wars and all courts of justice to be\nabolished, and the wicked nations as well as individuals to be suffered\nto commit injuries without opposition and without punishment; would not\nimmorality and unrighteousness increase rather than diminish? Few events\nrouse and elevate the patriotism and public spirit of a nation so much\nas a just and patriotic war. It raises the tone of public morality, and\ndestroys the sordid selfishness and degrading submissiveness which so\noften result from a long-protracted peace. Such was the Dutch war of\nindependence against the Spaniards; such the German war against the\naggressions of Louis XIV., and the French war against the coalition of\n1792. But without looking abroad for illustration, we find ample proof\nin our own history. Can it be said that the wars of the American\nRevolution and of 1812, were demoralizing in their effects? \"Whence do\nAmericans,\" says Dr. Lieber, \"habitually take their best and purest\nexamples of all that is connected with patriotism, public spirit,\ndevotedness to common good, purity of motive and action, if not from the\ndaring band of their patriots of the Revolution?\"\n\nThe principal actors in the military events of the Revolution and of\n1812, held, while living, high political offices in the state, and the\nmoral tone which they derived from these wars may be judged of by the\ncharacter stamped on their administration of the government. These men\nhave passed away, and their places have, for some time, been filled by\nmen who take their moral tone from the relations of peace. To the true\nbeliever in the efficacy of _non-resistance,_ and in the demoralizing\ninfluence of all wars, how striking the contrast between these\ndifferent periods in our political history! How infinitely inferior to\nthe rulers in later times were those, who, in the blindness of their\ninfatuation, appealed to physical force, rather than surrender their\nlife, liberty, and pursuit of happiness! Let us trace out this\ncontrast:--\n\nIn the earlier ages of our republic, and under the rule of those whose\nmoral character had been corrupted by war, party spirit ran higher and\nwas less pure than at later periods in our history. The object of the\nprincipal leaders of the great political parties was then to render the\nopinions of the opposite party odious: now, their only object is to\nsustain their own opinions by argument. Then, each party claimed to\nitself an exclusive love of country, and stigmatized the other as aliens\nand the natural enemies of the state: now, they both practise great\nforbearance, love, and charity, towards political opponents. Then, men\nobtained place through intrigue and corruption, and a universal scramble\nfor the loaves and fishes of office on the one side, and a universal\npolitical proscription on the other, were regarded as the natural\nresults of an election: now, this disgusting strife for office has\nceased; men no longer seek place, but wait, like Cincinnatus, to be\ncalled from their ploughs; and none are proscribed for opinion's sake.\nThen, in electing men to office the most important social and\nconstitutional principles were forgotten or violated: now, we have the\naugust spectacle of a nation-choosing its rulers under the guidance of\nstrict moral principle. Then, the halls of congress were frequently\nfilled with demagogues, and tiplers, and the _small men_ of community:\nnow, the ablest and best of the country are always sought for as\nrepresentatives. Then, the magnates of party were the mere timid,\ntemporizing slaves of expediency, looking, not to the justice and wisdom\nof their measures, but to their probable popularity with then sneaking\ntrain of followers: now, they rely for respect and support upon the\njudgment of the honest and enlightened. Then, the rank and file of party\nwere mere political hirelings, who sold their manhood for place, who\nreviled and glorified, and shouted huzzas and whispered calumnies, just\nas they were bidden; they could fawn upon those who dispensed political\npatronage with a cringing servility that would shame the courtiers of\nLouis XIV., or the parasites and hirelings of Walpole: now, all\npolitical partisans, deriving their moral tone from the piping times of\npeace, are pure, disinterested patriots, who, like the Roman farmer,\ntake office with great reluctance, and resign it again as soon as the\nstate can spare their services. Then, prize-fighters, and blacklegs, and\ngamblers, having formed themselves into political clubs, were courted by\nmen high in authority, and rewarded for their dirty and corrupting\npartisan services by offices of trust and responsibility: now, no man\nclothed with authority would dare to insult the moral sense of community\nby receiving such characters in the national councils, or by bestowing\npublic offices upon these corrupt and loathsome dregs of society.\n\nSuch, the advocates of non resistance would persuade us, are the\nlegitimate results in this country of war on the one hand and of a\nlong-protracted peace on the other. But there are men of less vivid\nimaginations, and, perhaps, of visions less distorted by fanatical zeal,\nwho fail to perceive these results, and who even think they see the\nreverse of all this. These men cannot perceive any thing in the lives of\nWashington, Hamilton, and Knox, to show that they were the less virtuous\nbecause they had borne arms in their country's service: they even fail\nto perceive the injurious effects of the cultivation of a military\nspirit on the military students of West Point, whose graduates, they\nthink, will compare favorably in moral character with the graduates of\nYale and Cambridge. Nay, more, some even go so far as to say that our\narmy, as a body, is no less moral than the corresponding classes in\ncivil life; that our common soldiers are as seldom guilty of riots,\nthefts, robberies, and murders, as similarly educated men engaged in\nother pursuits; that our military officers are not inferior in moral\ncharacter to our civil officers, and that, as a class, they will compare\nfavorably with any other class of professional men--with lawyers, for\nexample. In justification of these opinions--which may, perhaps, be\ndeemed singularly erroneous--they say, that in the many millions of\npublic money expended during the last forty years, by military officers,\nfor the army, for military defences, and for internal improvements, but\na single graduate of West Point has proved a defaulter, even to the\nsmallest sum, and that it is exceedingly rare to see an officer of the\narmy brought into court for violating the laws.\n\nBut even suppose it true that armies necessarily diffuse immorality\nthrough community, is it not equally true that habitual submission to\nthe injustice, plunder, and insult of foreign conquerors would tend\nstill more to degrade and demoralize any people?\n\nWith regard to \"pecuniary expenditures\" required in military defence,\nmany absurd as well as false statements have been put forth. With\nrespect to our own country, the entire amounts expended, under the head\nof war department, whether for Indian pensions, for the purchase of\nIndian lands, the construction of government roads, the improvement of\nrivers and harbors, the building of breakwaters and sea-walls, for the\npreservation of property, the surveying of public lands, &c., &c.; in\nfine, every expenditure made by officers of the army, under the war\ndepartment, is put down as \"expenses for military defence.\" Similar\nmisstatements are made with respect to foreign countries: for example,\nthe new fortifications of Paris are said to have already cost from fifty\nto seventy-five millions of dollars, and as much more is said to be\nrequired to complete them. Indeed, we have seen the whole estimated cost\nof those works stated at two hundred and forty millions of dollars, or\ntwelve hundred millions of francs! The facts are these: the works, when\ndone, will have cost about twenty-eight millions. We had the pleasure of\nexamining them not long since, in company with several of the engineer\nofficers employed on the works. They were then three-fourths done, and\nhad cost about twenty millions. We were assured by these officers that\nthe fortifications proper would be completed for somewhat less than the\noriginal estimate of twenty-eight millions. Had we time to enter into\ndetails, other examples of exaggeration and misrepresentation could be\ngiven.\n\nBut it is not to be denied that wars and the means of military defence\nhave cost vast amounts of money. So also have litigation and the means\ndeemed requisite for maintaining justice between individuals. It has\nbeen estimated that we have in this country, at the present time, thirty\nthousand lawyers, without including pettifoggers. Allowing each of these\nto cost the country the average sum of one thousand dollars, and we have\nthe annual cost to the country, for lawyers, thirty millions of dollars.\nAdd to this the cost of legislative halls and legislators for making\nlaws; of court-houses, jails, police offices, judges of the different\ncourts, marshals, sheriffs justices of the peace, constables, clerks,\nwitnesses, &c., employed to apply and enforce the laws when made; the\npersonal loss of time of the different plaintiffs and defendants, the\nindividual anxiety and suffering produced by litigation; add all these\ntogether, and I doubt not the result for a single year will somewhat\nastonish these modern economists. But if all the expenditures of this\nnature that have been made for the last fifty years, in this individual\n\"war of hate,\" be added together, we have no doubt a very fruitful text\nmight be obtained for preaching a crusade against law and lawyers! But\ncould any sane man be found to say that, on account of the cost of\nmaintaining them, all laws and lawyers are useless and should be\nabolished?\n\nIf, therefore, these vast sums of money are deemed necessary to secure\njustice between individuals of the same nation, can we expect that the\nmeans of international justice can be maintained without expenditures\ncommensurate with the object in view? If we cannot rely exclusively upon\nthe \"law of active benevolence\" for maintaining justice between brothers\nof the same country, can we hope that, in the present state of the\nworld, strangers and foreigners will be more ready to comply with its\nrequisitions?\n\nThe length of the preceding remarks admonishes us to greater brevity in\nthe further discussion of this subject.\n\nIt is objected to war, that men being rational beings, should contend\nwith one another by argument, and not by force, as do the brutes.\n\nTo this it is answered, that force properly begins only where argument\nends. If he who has wronged me cannot be persuaded to make restitution,\nI apply to the court,--that is, to _legal_ force,--to compel him to do\nme justice. So nations ought to resort to _military force_ only when all\nother means fail to prevent aggression and injury.\n\nBut war often fails to procure redress of grievances, or to prevent\nrepeated and continued aggression.\n\nSo does a resort to civil force; but such a resort is none the less\nproper and just on that account.\n\nBut in war the innocent party is sometimes the sufferer, while the\nguilty triumph.\n\nSo it often is in civil life: God, for some wise purpose, sometimes\npermits the wicked to triumph for a season.\n\nBut in all wars one party must be in the wrong, and frequently the war\nis unjust on both sides.\n\nSo in suits at law, one party is necessarily wrong, and frequently both\nresort to the civil tribunals in hopes of attaining unrighteous ends.\n\nBut nations do not resort to tribunals, like individuals, to settle\ntheir differences.\n\nFor the reason that it is believed a tribunal of this character--a\ncongress of nations, as it has been called,--would be more productive\nof evil than of good. By such an arrangement the old and powerful\nEuropean monarchies would acquire the authority to interfere in the\ndomestic affairs of the weaker powers. We see the effects of\nestablishing such a tribunal in the so-called Holy Alliance, whose\ninfluence is regarded by the friends of liberty as little less dangerous\nthan the Holy Inquisition. Moreover, such a tribunal would not prevent\nwar, for military force would still be resorted to to enforce its\ndecisions. For these and other reasons, it is deemed better and safer to\nrely on the present system of International Law. Under this system, and\nin this country, a resort to the arbitrament of war is not the result of\nimpulse and passion,--a yielding to the mere \"bestial propensities\" of\nour nature; it is a deliberate and solemn act of the legislative\npower,--of the representatives of the national mind, convened as the\nhigh council of the people. It is this power which must determine when\nall just and honorable means have been resorted to to obtain national\njustice, and when a resort to military force is requisite and proper. If\nthis decision be necessarily unchristian and barbarous, such, also,\nshould we expect to be the character of other laws passed by the same\nbody, and under the same circumstances. A declaration of war, in this\ncountry, is a law of the land, made by a deliberative body, under the\nhigh sanction of the constitution. It is true that such a law may be\nunjust and wrong, but we can scarcely agree that it will necessarily be\nso. The distinction between war, as thus duly declared, and\n\"international Lynch-law\" is too evident to need comment.\n\nBut it is said that the benefits of war are more than counterbalanced by\nthe evils it entails, and that, \"most commonly, the very means by which\nwe repel a despotism from abroad, only establishes over us a military\ndespotism at home.\"\n\nMuch has been said and written about _military_ despotism; but we think\nhe who studies history thoroughly, will not fail to prefer a military\ndespotism to a despotism of mere politicians. The governments of\nAlexander and Charlemagne were infinitely preferable to those of the\npetty civil tyrants who preceded and followed them; and there is no one\nso blinded by prejudice as to say that the reign of Napoleon was no\nbetter than that of Robespierre, Danton, and the other \"lawyers\" who\npreceded him, or of the Bourbons, for whom he was dethroned.\n\n\"Caesar,\" says a distinguished senator of our own country, \"was\nrightfully killed for conspiring against his country; but it was not he\nthat destroyed the liberties of Rome. That work was done by the\nprofligate politicians without him, and before his time; and his death\ndid not restore the republic. There were no more elections: rotten\npoliticians had destroyed them; and the nephew of Caesar, as heir to his\nuncle, succeeded to the empire on the principle of hereditary\nsuccession.\"\n\n\"And here History appears in her grand and instructive character, as\nPhilosophy teaching by example: and let us not be senseless to her\nwarning voice. Superficial readers believe it was the military men who\ndestroyed the Roman republic! No such thing! It was the politicians who\ndid it!--factious, corrupt, intriguing politicians--destroying public\nvirtue in their mad pursuit after office--destroying their rivals by\ncrime--deceiving and debauching the people for votes--and bringing\nelections into contempt by the frauds and violence with which they were\nconducted. From the time of the Gracchi there were no elections that\ncould bear the name. Confederate and rotten politicians bought and sold\nthe consulship. Intrigue and the dagger disposed of rivals. Fraud,\nviolence, bribes, terror, and the plunder of the public treasury\ncommanded votes. The people had no choice; and long before the time of\nCaesar, nothing remained of republican government but the name and the\nabuse. Read Plutarch. In the 'Life of Caesar,' and not three pages before\nthe crossing of the Rubicon, he paints the ruined state of the\nelections,--shows that all elective government was gone,--that the\nhereditary form had become a necessary relief from the contests of the\ncorrupt,--and that in choosing between Pompey and Caesar, many preferred\nPompey, not because they thought him republican, but because they\nthought he would make the milder king. Even arms were but a small part\nof Caesar's reliance, when he crossed the Rubicon. Gold, still more than\nthe sword, was his dependence; and he sent forward the accumulated\ntreasures of plundered Gaul, to be poured into the laps of rotten\npoliticians. There was no longer a popular government; and in taking all\npower himself, he only took advantage of the state of things which\nprofligate politicians had produced. In this he was culpable, and paid\nthe forfeit with his life. But in contemplating his fate, let us never\nforget that the politicians had undermined and destroyed the republic,\nbefore he came to seize and to master it.\"\n\nWe could point to numerous instances, where the benefits of war have\nmore than compensated for the evils which attended it; benefits not only\nto the generations who engaged in it, but also to their descendants for\nlong ages. Had Rome adopted the non-resistance principle when Hannibal\nwas at her gates, we should now be in the night of African ignorance and\nbarbarism, instead of enjoying the benefits of Roman learning and Roman\ncivilization. Had France adopted this principle when the allied armies\ninvaded her territories in 1792, her fate had followed that of Poland.\nHad our ancestors adopted this principle in 1776, what now had been,\nthink you, the character and condition of our country?\n\nDr. Lieber's remarks on this point are peculiarly just and apposite.\n\"The continued efforts,\" says he, \"requisite for a nation to protect\nthemselves against the ever-repeated attacks of a predatory foe, may be\ninfinitely greater than the evils entailed by a single and energetic\nwar, which forever secures peace from that side. Nor will it be denied,\nI suppose, that Niebuhr is right when he observes, that the advantage to\nRome of having conquered Sicily, as to power and national vigor, was\nundeniable. But even if it were not so, are there no other advantages to\nbe secured? No human mind is vast enough to comprehend in one glance,\nnor is any human life long enough to follow out consecutively, all the\nimmeasurable blessings and the unspeakable good which have resolved to\nmankind from the ever-memorable victories of little Greece over the\nrolling masses of servile Asia, which were nigh sweeping over Europe\nlike the high tides of a swollen sea, carrying its choking sand over all\nthe germs of civilization, liberty, and taste, and nearly all that is\ngood and noble. Think what we should have been had Europe become an\nAsiatic province, and the Eastern principles of power and stagnation\nshould have become deeply infused into her population, so that no\nprocess ever after could have thrown it out again! Has no advantage\nresulted from the Hebrews declining any longer to be ground in the dust,\nand ultimately annihilated, at least mentally so, by stifling servitude,\nand the wars which followed their resolution? The Netherlands war of\nindependence has had a penetrating and decided effect upon modern\nhistory, and, in the eye of all who value the most substantial parts and\nelementary ideas of modern and civil liberty, a highly advantageous one,\nboth directly and through Great Britain. Wars have frequently been, in\nthe hands of Providence, the means of disseminating civilization, if\ncarried on by a civilized people--as in the case of Alexander, whose\nwars had a most decided effect upon the intercourse of men and extension\nof civilization--or of rousing and reuniting people who had fallen into\nlethargy, if attacked by less civilized and numerous hordes. Frequently\nwe find in history that the ruder and victorious tribe is made to\nrecover as it were civilization, already on the wane with a refined\nnation. Paradoxical as it may seem at first glance, it is, nevertheless,\namply proved by history, that the closest contact and consequent\nexchange of thought and produce and enlargement of knowledge, between\ntwo otherwise severed nations, is frequently produced by war. War is a\nstruggle, a state of suffering; but as such, at times, only that\nstruggling process without which--in proportion to the good to be\nobtained, or, as would be a better expression for many cases, to the\ngood that is to be borne--no great and essential good falls ever to the\nshare of man. Suffering, merely as suffering, is not an evil. Our\nreligion, philosophy, every day's experience, prove it. No maternal\nrejoicing brightens up a mother's eve without the anxiety of labor.\"\n\nOne word more, and we must leave this subject. It has been said by some\nthat the duties of patriotism are less binding upon us than upon our\nancestors; that, whatever may have been the practice in years that are\npast the present generation can in no manner bear arms in their\ncountry's cause, such a course being not only _dishonorable_, but in the\neye of the Christian, _wicked_, and even _infamous_! It is believed,\nhowever, that such are not the general opinions and sentiments of the\nreligious people of this country. Our forefathers lighted the fires of\nReligion and Patriotism at the same altar; it is believed that their\ndescendants have not allowed either to be extinguished, but that both\nstill burn, and will continue to burn, with a purer and brighter flame.\nOur forefathers were not the less mindful of their duty to their God,\nbecause they also faithfully served their country. If we are called upon\nto excel them in works of charity, of benevolence, and of Christian\nvirtue, let it not be said of us that we have forgotten the virtue of\npatriotism.[2]\n\n[Footnote 2: For further discussion of this subject the reader is\nreferred to Lieber's Political Ethics, Part II., book vii. chap. 3;\nPaley's Moral and Political Philosophy; Legare's Report of June 13,\n1838, in the House of Representatives; Mackintosh's History of the\nRevolution of 1688, chap. x.; Bynkershock; Vatel; Puffendorf;\nClausewitz; and most other writers on international law and the laws of\nwar.\n\nDr. Wayland's view of the question is advocated with much zeal by Dymond\nin his Inquiry into the Accordancy of War with the Principles of\nChristianity; Jay's Peace and War; Judd's Sermon on Peace and War;\nPeabody's Address, &c.; Coue's Tract on What is the Use of the Navy?\nSumner's True Grandeur of Nations.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nSTRATEGY\n\n\nWar has been defined, \"A contest between nations and states carried on\nby force.\" But this definition is by some considered defective, inasmuch\nas it would exclude all civil wars.\n\nWhen war is commenced by attacking a nation in peace, it is called\n_offensive_, and when undertaken to repel invasion, or the attacks of an\nenemy, it is called _defensive_. A war may be essentially defensive even\nwhere we begin it, if intended to prevent an attack or invasion which is\nunder preparation. Besides this general division of war, military\nwriters have made numerous others, such as--\n\n_Wars of intervention_, in which one state interferes in favor of\nanother. This intervention may either have respect to the _internal_ or\nto the _external_ affairs of a nation. The interference of Russia in the\naffairs of Poland, of England in the government of India, Austria and\nthe allied powers in the affairs of France during the Revolution and\nunder the empire, are examples under the first head. The intervention of\nthe Elector Maurice of Saxony against Charles V., of King William\nagainst Louis XIV., in 1688, of Russia and France in the seven years'\nwar, of Russia again between France and Austria, in 1805, and between\nFrance and Prussia, in 1806, are examples under the second head. Most\nliberal-publicists consider intervention in the internal affairs of\nnations as indefensible; but the principle is supported by the advocates\nof the old monarchies of Europe.\n\n_Wars of insurrection_ to gain or to regain liberty; as was the case\nwith the Americans in 1776, and the modern Greeks in 1821.\n\n_Wars of independence_ from foreign dictation and control as the wars of\nPoland against Russia, of the Netherlands against Spain, of France\nagainst the several coalitions of the allied powers, of the Spanish\nPeninsula against France and of China and India against England. The\nAmerican war of 1812 partook largely of this character, and some\njudicious historians have denominated it the war of Independence, as\ndistinguished from the war of the Revolution.\n\n_Wars of opinion_, like those which the Vendeans have sustained in\nsupport of the Bourbons, and those France has sustained against the\nallies, as also those of propagandism, waged against the smaller\nEuropean states by the republican hordes of the French Revolution. To\nthis class also belong--\n\n_Religious wars_, like those of Islamism, of the crusades, and of the\nReformation.\n\n_Wars of conquest_, like those of the Romans in Gaul, of the English in\nIndia, of the French in Egypt and Africa, and of the Russians in\nCircassia.\n\n_National wars_, in which the great body of the people of a state\nengage, like those of the Swiss against Austria and the Duke of\nBurgundy, of the Catalans in 1712, of the Americans against England, of\nthe Dutch against Phillip II., and of the Poles and Circassians against\nRussia.\n\n_Civil wars_, where one portion of the state fights against the other,\nas the war of the Roses in England, of the league in France, of the\nGuelphs and Ghibelines in Italy, and of the factions in Mexico and South\nAmerica.\n\nIt is not the present intention to enter into any discussion of these\ndifferent kinds of war, but rather to consider the general subject, and\nto discuss such general principles and rules as may be applicable to all\nwars.\n\nWar in its most extensive sense may be regarded both as a _science_ and\nan _art_. It is a science so far as it investigates general principles\nand institutes an analysis of military operations; and an art when\nconsidered with reference to the practical rules for conducting\ncampaigns, sieges, battles, &c. So is engineering a science so far as it\ninvestigates the general principles of fortification, and also\nartillery, in analyzing the principles of gunnery; but both are arts\nwhen considered with reference to the practical rules for the\nconstruction, attack, and defence of forts, or for the use of cannon.\n\nThis distinction has not always been observed by writers on this\nsubject, and some have asserted that strategy is the _science_, and\ntactics the _art_ of war. This is evidently mistaking the general\ndistinction between science, which investigates principles, and art,\nwhich forms practical rules.\n\nIn popular language, however, it is usual to speak of _the military art_\nwhen we refer to the general subject of war, and of _the military\nsciences_ when we wish to call attention more particularly to the\nscientific principles upon which the art is founded. We shall here\nconsider the military art in this general sense, as including the entire\nsubject of war.\n\nAs thus defined, the military art may be divided into four distinct\nbranches, viz.: 1st. _Strategy_; 2d. Fortification, or _Engineering_;\n3d. _Logistics_; 4th. _Tactics_. Several general treatises on this art\nadd another branch, called _The Policy of War_, or the relations of war\nwith the affairs of state.\n\n_Strategy_ is defined to be the art of directing masses on decisive\npoints, or the hostile movements of armies beyond the range of each\nother's cannon. _Engineering_ embraces all dispositions made to enable\ntroops to resist a superior force the longest time possible; and also\nthe means resorted to by the opposing army to overcome these material\nobstacles. _Logistics_ embraces the practical details of moving and\nsupplying armies. _Tactics_ is the art of bringing troops into action,\nor of moving them in the presence of an enemy, that is, within his view,\nand within the reach of his artillery. All these are most intimately\nconnected. A fault in tactics may occasion the loss of strategic lines;\nthe best combined manoeuvres on the field of battle may lead to no\ndecisive results, when the position, or the direction of the operation\nis not strategic; sometimes not only battles, but entire campaigns, are\nlost through neglect of the engineer's art, or faults in his\ndispositions; again, armies would be of little use without the requisite\nmeans of locomotion and of subsistence.\n\n1. _Strategy_ regards the theatre of war, rather than the field of\nbattle. It selects the important points in this theatre, and the lines\nof communication by which they may be reached; it forms the plan and\narranges the general operations of a campaign; but it leaves it to the\nengineers to overcome material obstacles and to erect new ones; it\nleaves to logistics the means of supporting armies and of moving them on\nthe chosen lines; and to tactics, the particular dispositions for\nbattle, when the armies have reached the destined points. It is well to\nkeep in mind these distinctions, which may be rendered still more\nobvious by a few illustrations. The point where several lines of\ncommunications either intersect or meet, and the centre of an arc which\nis occupied by the enemy, are strategic points; but tactics would reject\na position equally accessible on all sides, especially with its flanks\nexposed to attack. Sempronius at Trebbia and Varro at Cannae, so placed\ntheir armies that the Carthagenians attacked them, at the same time, in\nfront, on the flanks, and in rear; the Roman consuls were defeated: but\nthe central strategic position of Napoleon at Rivoli was eminently\nsuccessful. At the battle of Austerlitz the allies had projected a\n_strategic_ movement to their left, in order to cut off Napoleon's right\nfrom Vienna; Weyrother afterwards changed his plans, and executed a\ncorresponding _tactical_ movement. By the former there had been some\nchance of success, but the latter exposed him to inevitable destruction.\nThe little fort of Koenigsten, from its advantageous position, was more\nuseful to the French, in 1813, than the vast works of Dresden. The\nlittle fort of Bard, with its handful of men, was near defeating the\noperations of Napoleon in 1800, by holding in check his entire army;\nwhereas, on the other hand, the ill-advised lines of Ticino, in 1706,\ncaused an army of 78,000 French to be defeated by only 40,000 men under\nPrince Eugene of Savoy.\n\nWar, as has already been said, may be either offensive or defensive. If\nthe attacking army be directed against an entire state, it becomes a war\nof _invasion_. If only a province, or a military position, or an army,\nbe attacked, it is simply regarded as taking the _initiative_ in\noffensive movements.\n\n_Offensive_ war is ordinarily most advantageous in its moral and\npolitical influence. It is waged on a foreign soil, and therefore spares\nthe country of the attacking force; it augments its own resources at the\nsame time that it diminishes those of the enemy; it adds to the moral\ncourage of its own army, while it disheartens its opponents. A war of\ninvasion may, however, have also its disadvantages. Its lines of\noperation may become too _deep_, which is always hazardous in an enemy's\ncountry. All the natural and artificial obstacles, such as mountains,\nrivers, defiles, fortifications, &c., are favorable for defence, but\ndifficult to be overcome by the invader. The local authorities and\ninhabitants oppose, instead of facilitating his operations; and if\npatriotism animate the defensive army to fight for the independence of\nits threatened country, the war may become long and bloody. But if a\npolitical diversion be made in favor of the invading force, and its\noperations be attended with success, it strikes the enemy at the heart,\nparalyzes all his military energies, and deprives him of his military\nresources, thus promptly terminating the contest. Regarded simply as the\ninitiative of movements, the offensive is almost always the preferable\none, as it enables the general to choose his lines for moving and\nconcentrating his masses on the decisive point.\n\nThe first and most important rule in offensive war is, to keep your\nforces as much concentrated as possible. This will not only prevent\nmisfortune, but secure victory,--since, by its necessary operation, you\npossess the power of throwing your whole force upon any exposed point of\nyour enemy's position.\n\nTo this general rule some writers have laid down the following\nexceptions:--\n\n1st. When the food and forage of the neighborhood in which you act have\nbeen exhausted and destroyed, and your magazines are, from any cause,\nunable to supply the deficiency, one of two things must be done; either\nyou must go to places where these articles abound, or you must draw from\nthem your supplies by _detachments_. The former is rarely compatible\nwith your plan, and necessarily retards its execution; and hence the\npreference which is generally given to the latter.\n\n2d. When reinforcements are about to join you, and this can only be\neffected by a march through a country actually occupied by hostile\ncorps, or liable to be so occupied, you must again waive the general\nrule, and risk one party for the security of the other; or, (which may\nbe better,) make such movements with your main body as shall accomplish\nyour object.\n\n3d. When you have complete evidence of the actual, or probable\ninsurrection in your favor, of a town or province of your enemy, or of a\ndivision of his army, you must support this inclination by strong\n_detachments_, or by movements of your main body. Napoleon's operations\nin Italy, in 1796-7, furnish examples of what is here meant.\n\n4th. When, by dispatching a _detachment_, you may be able to intercept a\nconvoy, or reinforcement, coming to the aid of your enemy.\n\nThese are apparent rather than real exceptions to the rule of\nconcentration. This rule does not require that _all the army should\noccupy the same position_. Far from it. Concentration requires the main\nbody to be in immediate and supporting reach: small detachments, for\ntemporary and important objects, like those mentioned, are perfectly\nlegitimate, and in accordance with correct principles. Napoleon's\nposition in Spain will serve as an illustration. A hand, placed on the\nmap of that country, will represent the position of the invading forces.\nWhen opened, the fingers will represent the several detachments, thrown\nout on important strategic lines, and which could readily be drawn in,\nas in closing the hand, upon the principal and central mass, preparatory\nto striking some important blow.\n\n\"If, as we have seen, it be the first great rule for an army acting on\nthe offensive principle, to keep its forces _concentrated_, it is, no\ndoubt, the second, _to keep them fully employed._ Is it your intention\nto seize a particular province of your enemy? to penetrate to his\ncapital? or to cut him off from his supplies? Whatever measure be\nnecessary to open your route to these objects must be _promptly_ taken;\nand if you mean to subsist yourself at his expense, your movements must\nbe more rapid than his. Give him time to _breathe_,--and above all, give\nhim time to _rest_, and your project is blasted; his forages will be\ncompleted, and his magazines filled and secured. The roads of approach\nwill be obstructed, bridges destroyed, and strong points everywhere\ntaken and defended. You will, in fact, like Burgoyne, in 1777, reduce\nyourself to the necessity of bleeding at every step, without equivalent\nor use.\"\n\n\"Such cannot be the fate of a commander who, knowing all the value of\nacting on the offensive, shakes, by the vigor and address of his first\nmovements, the moral as well as physical force of his enemy,--who,\nselecting his own time, and place, and mode of attack, confounds his\nantagonist by enterprises equally hardy and unexpected,--and who at last\nleaves to him only the alternative of resistance without hope, or of\nflying without resistance.\"\n\nThe British army, in the war of the American Revolution, must have been\nmost wretchedly ignorant of these leading maxims for conducting\noffensive war. Instead of concentrating their forces on some decisive\npoint, and then destroying the main body of our army by repeated and\nwell-directed blows, they scattered their forces over an immense extent\nof country, and became too weak to act with decision and effect on any\none point. On the other hand, this policy enabled us to call out and\ndiscipline our scattered and ill-provided forces.\n\nThe main object in _defensive_ war is, to protect the menaced territory,\nto retard the enemy's progress, to multiply obstacles in his way, to\nguard the vital points of the country, and--at the favorable moment,\nwhen the enemy becomes enfeebled by detachments, losses, privations, and\nfatigue--to assume the offensive, and drive him from the country. This\ncombination of the defensive and offensive has many advantages. The\nenemy, being forced to take the defensive in his turn, loses much of the\nmoral superiority due to successful offensive operations. There are\nnumerous instances of this kind of war, \"the defensive-offensive,\" as it\nis sometimes called, to be found in history. The last four campaigns of\nFrederick the Great of Prussia, are examples which may serve as models.\nWellington played a similar part in the Spanish peninsula.\n\nTo merely remain in a defensive attitude, yielding gradually to the\nadvances of the enemy, without any effort to regain such positions or\nprovinces as may have fallen into his power, or to inflict on him some\nfatal and decisive blow on the first favorable opportunity; such a\nsystem is always within the reach of ignorance, stupidity, and\ncowardice; but such is far from being the true Fabian system of\ndefensive war.\n\n\"Instead of finding security only in flight; instead of habitually\nrefusing to look the enemy in the face; instead of leaving his march\nundisturbed; instead of abandoning, without contest, points strong by\nnature or by art;--instead of all this, the true war of defence seeks\nevery occasion to meet the enemy, and loses none by which it can annoy\nor defeat him; it is always awake; it is constantly in motion, and never\nunprepared for either attack or defence. When not employed in efforts of\ncourage or address, it incessantly yields itself to those of labor and\nscience. In its front it breaks up roads or breaks down bridges; while\nit erects or repairs those in its rear: it forms abbatis, raises\nbatteries, fortifies passes, or intrenches encampments; and to the\nsystem of deprivation adds all the activity, stratagem, and boldness of\n_la petite guerre_. Dividing itself into detachments, it multiplies its\nown attacks and the alarms of the enemy. Collecting itself at a single\npoint, it obstructs his progress for days, and sometimes for weeks\ntogether. Does it even abandon the avenues it is destined to defend? It\nis but for the purpose of shielding them more securely, by the attack of\nhis hospitals, magazines, convoys, or reinforcements. In a word, by\nadopting the maxim, that the _enemy must be made to pay for whatever he\ngains_, it disputes with him every inch of ground, and if at last it\nyields to him a victory, it is of that kind which calls forth only his\nsighs.\"\n\nIn discussing the subject of strategy, certain technical terms are\nemployed, such as _theatre of war; theatre of operations; base of\noperations_, or the line from which operations start; _objective\npoints_, or points to which the operations are directed; _line of\noperations_, or the line along which an army moves; _key points_, or\npoints which it is important for the defensive army to secure; _line of\ndefence,_ or the line which it is important to defend at all hazards:\nand in general, _strategic points, strategic lines, strategic positions,\n&c._ As these terms are very generally used in military books, it may be\nwell to make ourselves thoroughly acquainted with their import. After\ndefining these terms and explaining their meaning and application, it is\ndeemed best to illustrate their use by reference to well-known and\nstriking historical examples.\n\n_The theatre of a war_ embraces not only the territory of the two\nbelligerent powers, but also that of their allies, and of such secondary\npowers as, through fear or interest, may be drawn into the contest. With\nmaritime nations it also embraces the seas, and sometimes crosses to\nanother continent. Some of the wars between France and England embraced\nthe two hemispheres.\n\n_The theatre of operations_, however, is of a more limited character,\nand should not be confounded with the theatre of war. In general, it\nincludes only the territory which an army seeks, on the one hand, to\ndefend, and on the other, to invade. If two or more armies be directed\ntowards the same object, though by different lines, their combined\noperations are included in the same theatre but if each acts\nindependently of the others, and seeks distinct and separate objects,\neach must have its own independent theatre of operations.\n\nA war between France and Austria may embrace all Italy and Germany, but\nthe theatre of operations may be limited to only a portion of these\ncountries. Should the Oregon question lead to hostilities between the\nUnited States and England, the theatre of war would embrace the greater\npart of North America and the two oceans, but the theatre of operations\nwould probably be limited to Canada and our northern frontier, with\nnaval descents upon our maritime cities.\n\nThe first point to be attended to in a plan of military operation is to\nselect a good _base_. Many circumstances influence this selection, such\nas mountains, rivers, roads, forests, cities, fortifications, military\ndepots, means of subsistence, &c. If the frontier of a state contain\nstrong natural or artificial barriers, it may serve not only as a good\nbase for offensive operations, but also as an excellent line of defence\nagainst invasion. A single frontier line may, however, be penetrated by\nthe enemy, and in that case a second or third base further in the\ninterior becomes indispensable for a good defence.\n\nA French army carrying on military operations against Germany would make\nthe Rhine its first base; but if driven from this it would form a second\nbase on the Meuse or Moselle, a third on the Seine, and a fourth on the\nLoire; or, when driven from the first base, it would take others\nperpendicular to the front of defence, either to the right, on Befort\nand Besancon, or to the left, on Mezieres and Sedan. If acting\noffensively against Prussia and Russia, the Rhine and the Main would\nform the first base the Elbe and the Oder the second, the Vistula the\nthird, the Nieman the fourth, and the Dwina and the Dnieper the fifth.\n\nA French army operating against Spain would have the Pyrenees for its\nfirst base; the line of the Ebro for a second, resting its wings on the\ngulf of Gascony and the Mediterranean. If from this position it advance\nits left, possessing itself of the kingdom of Valencia, the line of the\nSierra d'Estellas becomes its third base of operations against the\ncentre of Spain.\n\nA base may be parallel, oblique, or perpendicular to our line of\noperations, or to the enemy's line of defence. Some prefer one plan and\nsome another; the best authorities, however, think the oblique or\nperpendicular more advantageous than the parallel; but we are not often\nat liberty to choose between these, for other considerations usually\ndetermine the selection.\n\nIn 1806, the French forces first moved perpendicular to their base on\nthe Main, but afterwards effected a change of front, and moved on a line\noblique or nearly parallel to this base. They had pursued the same plan\nof operations in the Seven Years' War. The Russians, in 1812, based\nperpendicularly on the Oka and the Kalouga, and extended their flank\nmarch on Wiozma and Krasnoi; in 1813, the allies, based perpendicularly\non Bohemia, succeeded in paralyzing Napoleon's army on the Elbe.\n\nAn American army moving by Lake Champlain, would be based perpendicular\non the great line of communication between Boston and Buffalo; if moving\nfrom the New England states on Quebec and Montreal, the line of\noperations would be oblique; and if moving from the Niagara frontier by\nLake Ontario and the St. Lawrence, the line would be nearly parallel\nboth to our base and to the enemy's line of defence--an operation, under\nthe circumstances, exceedingly objectionable.\n\nAny point in the theatre of operations which gives to the possessor an\nadvantage over his opponent, is regarded as _strategic_. Their\ngeographical position and political and military character, give them a\ngreater or less influence in directing the campaign. These points are\noccupied by the defensive army, and attacked by the offensive; if on or\nnear the base, they become the _key_ points for the former, and the\n_objective_ points for the latter.[3] There are also between these two a\ngreater or less number of strategic points, which have an important\nthough inferior influence upon the result of the war.\n\n[Footnote 3: It may be well to remark that a strategic point is not\nnecessarily a geometrical point; an entire province, or a considerable\nportion of a geographical frontier, is, in military language, sometimes\ndenominated a _point_. In the same way, strategic lines, instead of\nbeing mathematical lines, are frequently many miles in width.]\n\nThe first object of the French in attacking Belgium, is to gain\npossession of the Meuse, as this position would give them a decided\nadvantage in any ulterior operations. In attacking southern Germany, the\ncourse of the Danube offers a series of points which exercise an\nimportant influence on the war. For northern Germany, Leipsic and the\ncountry bordering on the Saale and the Elbe, are objects often fiercely\ncontested by the French and other belligerent powers. In a war between\nthis country and England, Montreal and the points on the St. Lawrence\nbetween Montreal and Quebec, would become objects of the highest\nimportance, and their possession would probably determine the result of\nthe war.\n\nThe capital of a state, from its political importance as well as its\nmilitary influence, is almost always a decisive strategic point, and its\ncapture is therefore frequently the object of an entire campaign. The\npossession of Genoa, Turin, Alexandria, Milan, &c., in 1796, both from\ntheir political and military importance, had a decided influence upon\nthe results of the war in these several states. In the same way Venice,\nRome, and Naples, in 1797, Vienna, in the campaigns of 1805 and 1809,\nBerlin, in 1806, Madrid, in 1808, and Paris, in 1814 and 1815. If\nHannibal had captured the capital immediately after the battle of\nCannae;, he would thus have destroyed the Roman power. The taking of\nWashington, in 1814, had little or no influence on the war, for the\nplace was then of no importance in itself, and was a mere nominal\ncapital. It, however, greatly influenced our reputation abroad, and\nrequired many brilliant successes to wash the blot from our national\nescutcheon.\n\n_Lines of defence_ in strategy are either permanent or temporary. The\ngreat military frontiers of a state, especially when strengthened by\nnatural and artificial obstacles, such as chains of mountains, rivers,\nlines of fortresses, &c., are regarded as permanent lines of defence.\nThe Alpine range between France and Piedmont, with its fortified passes;\nthe Rhine, the Oder, and the Elbe, with their strongly-fortified places;\nthe Pyrenees, with Bayonne at one extremity and Perpignon at the other;\nthe triple range of fortresses on the Belgian frontier--are all\npermanent lines of defence. The St. Lawrence river is a permanent line\nof defence for Canada; and the line of lake Champlain, the upper St.\nLawrence, and the lakes, for the United States.\n\nTemporary lines of defence are such as are taken up merely for the\ncampaign. Napoleon's position in Saxony, in 1813; the line of the allies\nin Belgium, in 1815; the line of the Marne, in 1814, are examples of\ntemporary lines of defence.\n\nIt will be seen from these remarks that lines of defence are not\nnecessarily bases of operation.\n\n_Strategic positions_ are such as are taken up during the operations of\na war, either by a _corps d'armee_ or grand detachment, for the purpose\nof checking or observing an opposing force; they are named thus to\ndistinguish them from tactical positions or fields of battle. The\npositions of Napoleon at Rivoli, Verona, and Legnano, in 1796 and 1797,\nto watch the Adige; his positions on the Passarge, in 1807, and in\nSaxony and Silesia in front of his line of defence, in 1813; and\nMassena's positions on the Albis, along the Limmat and the Aar, in 1799,\nare examples under this head.\n\nBefore proceeding further it may be well to illustrate the strategic\nrelations of lines and positions by the use of diagrams.\n\n(Fig. 1.) The army at A covers the whole of the ground in rear of the\nline DC perpendicular to the line AB, the position of the enemy being at\nB.\n\n(Fig. 2.) AJ being equal to BJ, A will still cover every thing in rear\nof DC.\n\n(Fig. 3.) If the army A is obliged to cover the point _a_, the army B\nwill cover all the space without the circle whose radius is _a_ B; and of\ncourse A continues to cover the point _a_ so long as it remains within\nthis circle _a_ B.\n\n_A line of operations_ embraces that portion of the theatre of war which\nan army or _corps d'armee_ passes over in attaining its object; _the\nfront of operations_ is the front formed by the army as it advances on\nthis line.\n\nWhen an army acts as a single mass, without forming independent corps,\nthe line it follows is denominated a _simple line of operations_.\n\nIf two or more corps act in an isolated manner, but against the same\nopposing force, they are said to follow _double_ or _multiple lines_.\n\nThe lines by which Moreau and Jourdan entered Germany in 1796, were\ndouble lines; but Napoleon's advance by Bamberg and Gera, in 1806,\nalthough moving in seven distinct _corps d'armee,_ formed but a single\nline of operations.\n\n_Interior lines of operations_ are those followed by an army which\noperates between the enemy's lines in such a way as to be able to\nconcentrate his forces on one of these lines before the other can be\nbrought to its assistance. For example, Napoleon's line of operations\nin 1814, between the Marne and the Seine, where he manoeuvred with so\nmuch skill and success against the immensely superior forces of the\nallies.\n\n_Exterior lines_ present the opposite results; they are those which an\narmy will form in moving on the extremities of the opposing masses. For\nexample, the lines of the Marne and the Seine, followed by the army of\nSilesia and the grand Austro-Russian army, in the campaign of 1814.\nBurgoyne's line of operations, in 1777, was double and exterior.\n\n_Concentric lines_ are such as start from distant points, and are\ndirected towards the same object, either in the rear or in advance of\ntheir base.\n\nIf a mass leaves a single point and separates into several distinct\ncorps, taking divergent directions, it is said to pursue _eccentric\nlines_.\n\nLines are said to be _deep_, when the end to be attained is very distant\nfrom the base.\n\nThe lines followed by a secondary or auxiliary force are denominated\n_secondary lines_.\n\nThe lines pursued by the army of the Sombre-et-Meuse in 1796, and by\nBagration in 1812, were _secondary lines_, as the former were merely\nsecondary to the army of the Rhine, and the latter to that of Barclay.\n\n_Accidental lines_ are those which result from a change in the primitive\nplan of campaign, which give a new direction to the operations. These\nare of rare occurrence, but they sometimes lead to important results.\n\nThe direction given to a line of operations depends not only on the\ngeographical situation of the country, but also on the positions\noccupied by the enemy. The general plan of campaign is frequently\ndetermined on previous to beginning operations, but the choice of lines\nand positions must ordinarily result from the ulterior events of the\nwar, and be made by the general as these events occur.\n\nAs a general rule, _a line of operations should be directed upon the\ncentre_, or _one of the extremities of the enemy's line of defence_;\nunless our forces be infinitely superior in number, it would be absurd\nto act against the front and extremities at the same time.\n\nIf the configuration of the theatre of operations be favorable to a\nmovement against the extremity of the enemy's line of defence, this\ndirection maybe best calculated to lead to important results. (Fig. 4.)\n\nIn 1800 the army of the Rhine was directed against the extreme left of\nthe line of the Black Forest; the army of reserve was directed by the\nSt. Bernard and Milan on the extreme right and rear of Melas's line of\ndefence: both operations were most eminently successful. (Fig. 5.)\n\nIt may be well to remark that it is not enough merely to gain the\nextremity and rear of the enemy, for in that case it may be possible for\nhim to throw himself on our communications and place us in the very\ndilemma in which we had hoped to involve him. To avoid this danger it is\nnecessary to give such a direction to the line of operations that our\narmy shall preserve its communications and be able to reach its base.\n\nThus, if Napoleon, in 1800, after crossing the Alps, had marched by\nTurin on Alexandria and received battle at Marengo, without having first\nsecured Lombardy and the left of the Po, his own line of retreat would\nhave been completely cut off by Melas; whereas, by the direction which\nhe gave to his line of operations he had, in case of reverse, every\nmeans for reaching either the Var or the Valois. (Fig. 6.) Again, in\n1806, if he had marched directly from Gera to Leipsic, he would have\nbeen cut off from his base on the Rhine; whereas, by turning from Gera\ntowards Weimar, he not only cut off the Prussians from the Elbe, but at\nthe same time secured to himself the roads of Saalfield, Schleitz, and\nHoff, thus rendering perfectly safe his communications in his rear.\n(Fig. 7.)\n\nWe have said that the configuration of the ground and the position of\nthe hostile forces may _sometimes_ render it advisable to direct our\nline of operations against the extremity of the enemy's line of defence;\nbut, _as a general rule_ a central direction will lead to more important\nresults. This severs the enemy's means of resistance, and enables the\nassailant to strike, with the mass of his force, upon the dissevered and\npartially paralyzed members of the hostile body. (Fig. 8.)\n\nSuch a plan of operations enabled Napoleon, in the Italian campaigns of\n1796 and 1797, to pierce and destroy, with a small force, the large and\nsuccessive armies which Austria sent against him. In 1805 his operations\nwere both interior and central: in 1808 they were most eminently\ncentral: in 1809, by the central operations in the vicinity of\nRatisbonne, he defeated the large and almost victorious army of the\nArchduke Charles: in 1814, from his central position between the Marne\nand Seine, with only seventy thousand men against a force of more than\ntwo hundred thousand, he gained numerous victories, and barely failed of\ncomplete success. Again in 1815, with an army of only one hundred and\ntwenty thousand men against an allied force of two hundred and twenty\nthousand, by his central advance on Charleroi and Ligny, he gained a\nmost decided advantage over the enemy--an advantage lost by the\neccentric movement of Grouchy: and even in 1813, his central position at\nDresden would have secured him most decisive advantages, had not the\nfaults of his lieutenants lost these advantages in the disasters of Kulm\nand the Katzbach.\n\nFor the same frontier it is objectionable to form more than one army;\ngrand detachments and corps of observation may frequently be used with\nadvantage, but double or multiple lines of operation are far less\nfavorable than one simple line. It may however sometimes occur that the\nposition of the enemy's forces will be such as to make this operation\nthe preferable one. In that case, interior lines should always be\nadopted, unless we have a vast superiority in number. Double exterior\nlines, with corps several days' march asunder, must be fatal, if the\nenemy, whether acting on single or double interior lines, take advantage\nof his position to concentrate his masses successively against our\nisolated forces. The Roman armies under the consuls Flaminius and\nServilius opposed Hannibal on exterior lines, the one by Florence and\nArrezzio, and the other by Modena and Ariminum. Hannibal turned the\nposition of Flaminius and attacked the Roman armies separately, gaining\na complete and decisive victory. Such also was the character of the\noperations of the French in 1795, under Pichegru and Jourdan; they met\nwith a bloody and decisive defeat. Again in 1796, the French armies\nunder Jourdan and Moreau, pursued exterior lines; the Archduke Charles,\nfrom his interior position, succeeded in defeating both the opposing\ngenerals, and forcing them to retreat. If the two armies united had\npursued a single line, the republican flag had been carried in triumph\nto Vienna.\n\n_Converging_ lines of operation are preferable, under most\ncircumstances, to diverging lines. Care should be taken, however, that\nthe point of meeting be such that it may not be taken as a strategic\nposition by the enemy, and our own forces be destroyed in detail, before\nthey can effect a junction. In 1797 the main body of the Austrians,\nunder Alvinzi, advanced against Napoleon, on three separate lines,\nintending to concentrate at Rivoli, and then attack the French in mass;\nbut Napoleon took his strategic position at Rivoli, and overthrew the\nenemy's corps as they successively appeared. In the same way the\nArchduke Charles took an interior position, between Moreau and Jourdan,\nin 1796, and prevented them from concentrating their forces on a single\npoint. Wurmser and Quasdanowich attempted to concentrate their forces on\nthe Mincio, by moving on the opposite shores of Lake Garda; but Napoleon\ntook an interior position and destroyed them. In 1815 Blucher and\nWellington, from their interior position, prevented the junction of\nNapoleon and Grouchy.\n\n_Diverging_ lines may be employed with advantage against an enemy\nimmediately after a successful battle or strategic manoeuvre; for by\nthis means we separate the enemy's forces, and disperse them; and if\noccasion should require it, may again concentrate our forces by\nconverging lines. Such was the manoeuvre of Frederick the Great, in\n1757, which produced the battles of Rosbach and Leuthen; such also was\nthe manoeuvre of Napoleon at Donawert in 1805, at Jena in 1806, and at\nRatisbon in 1809.\n\n_Interior_ lines of operations, when properly conducted, have almost\ninvariably led to success: indeed every instance of failure may be\nclearly traced to great unskilfulness in their execution, or to other\nextraneous circumstances of the campaign. There may, however, be cases\nwhere it will be preferable to direct our forces on the enemy's flank;\nthe geographical character of the theatre of war, the position of other\ncollateral forces, &c., rendering such a direction necessary. But as a\ngeneral rule, interior and central lines, for an army of moderate\nforces, will lead to decisive results.\n\nNapoleon's Italian campaigns in 1796 and 1797, the campaign of the\nArchduke Charles in 1796, Napoleon's campaigns of 1805 and 1809 against\nAustria, and of 1806 and 1807 against Prussia and Russia, of 1808 in\nSpain, his manoeuvres in 1814, between the battle of Brienne and that\nof Paris, and his operations previous to the Battle of Ligny in 1815,\nare all brilliant examples under this head.\n\nTo change the line of operations, in the middle of a campaign, and\nfollow _accidental lines_, is always a delicate affair, and can only be\nresorted to by a general of great skill, and with disciplined troops. In\nsuch a case it may be attended with important results. It was one of\nNapoleon's maxims, that \"a line of operations, when once chosen, should\nnever be abandoned.\" This maxim, however, must sometimes be disregarded\nby an army of undisciplined troops, in order to avoid entire\ndestruction; but the total abandonment of a line of operations is always\nattended with great loss, and should be regarded as a mere choice of\nevils. A regular army can always avoid this result, by changing the\ndirection of its line; thus frequently gaining superior advantages in\nthe new theatre of action. If the plan of this change be the result of a\ngood _coup d'oeil_, and it be skilfully executed, the rear of the\noperating army will be secure from the enemy; and moreover, he will be\nleft in doubt respecting its weak points. But such is the uncertainty of\nthis manoeuvre, that it is very rarely taken by the best troops, unless\nactually forced upon them. If the army be of incongruous materials,\ngenerally a change of direction will be less advantageous than to\nentirely abandon the line, and save as many as possible of the troops\nfor some new plan of operations. (Maxim 20.) If, however, the\nundisciplined army be sustained by fortifications, it can take up the\n_accidental line of operations_ in the same manner, and with the same\nprobability of success, as is done by a regular force.\n\nWe have examples of accidental lines in the operations of the king of\nPrussia, after the battle of Hohenkirchen, and of Washington, in\nNew-Jersey, after the action of Princeton. This is one of the finest in\nmilitary history. Napoleon had projected a change in his line of\noperations, in case he lost the battle of Austerlitz; but victory\nrendered its execution unnecessary. Again in 1814 he had planned an\nentire change of operations; but the want of co-operation of the forces\nunder Mortier and Marmont forced him to abandon a plan which, if\nproperly executed, had probably defeated the allies. Jomini pronounced\nit one of the most brilliant of his military career.\n\nHaving explained the principal terms used in strategy, let us trace out\nthe successive operations of war in their usual strategic relations.\n\nWe will suppose war to be declared, and the army to be just entering\nupon a campaign. The political and military authorities of the state\ndetermine upon the nature of the war, and select the theatre of its\nenterprises. The chief selects certain points, on or near the borders of\nthe seat of war, where his troops are to be assembled, and his\n_materiel_ collected. These points, together, form his base of\noperations. He now selects some point, within the theatre of the war, as\nthe first object of his enterprises, and chooses the line of operations\nmost advantageous for reaching this objective point. The temporary\npositions taken on this line become strategic positions, and the line in\nhis rear, a line of defence. When he arrives in the vicinity of his\nfirst object, and the enemy begins to oppose his enterprises, he must\nforce this enemy to retreat, either by an attack or by manoeuvres. For\nthis purpose he temporarily adopts certain lines of manoeuvre, which may\ndeviate from his general line of operations. The ulterior events of the\ncampaign may possibly cause him to make these new, or accidental lines,\nhis lines of operations. The approach of hostile forces may cause him to\ndetach secondary corps on secondary lines; or to divide his army, and\npursue double or multiple lines. The primitive object may also be\nrelinquished, and new ones proposed, with new lines and new plans of\noperations. As he advances far from his primitive base, he forms new\ndepots and lines of magazines. He may encounter natural and artificial\nobstacles. To cross large rivers in the face of an enemy is a hazardous\noperation; and he requires all the art of the engineer in constructing\nbridges, and securing a safe passage for his army. If a fortified place\nis to be taken, he will detach a siege corps, and either continue his\nmarch with the main army, or take a strategic position to cover this\nsiege. Thus Napoleon, in 1796, with an army of only 50,000 combatants,\ncould not venture to penetrate into Austria, with Mantua and its\ngarrison of 25,000 men in his rear, and an Austrian force of 40,000\nbefore him. But in 1806 the great superiority of his army enabled him to\ndetach forces to besiege the principal fortresses of Silesia, and still\nto continue his operations with his principal forces. The chief of the\narmy may meet the enemy under circumstances such as to induce or compel\nhim to give battle. If he should be victorious, the enemy must be\npursued and harassed to the uttermost. If he should be defeated, he must\nform the best plan, and provide the best means of retreat. If possible,\nhe must take shelter in some line of fortifications, and prepare to\nresume the offensive. Lines of intrenchment and temporary works may\nsometimes serve him as a sufficient protection. Finally, when the\nunfavorable season compels him to suspend his operations, he will go\ninto winter cantonments, and prepare for a new campaign.\n\nSuch are the ordinary operations of war: its relations to strategy must\nbe evident, even to the most superficial reader.\n\nNot unfrequently the results of a campaign depend more upon the\nstrategic operations of an army, than upon its victories gained in\nactual combat. Tactics, or movements within the range of the enemy's\ncannon, is therefore subordinate to the _choice of positions_: if the\nfield of battle be properly chosen, success will be decisive, and the\nloss of the battle not disastrous; whereas, if selected without\nreference to the principles of the science, the victory, if gained,\nmight be barren, and defeat, if suffered, totally fatal: thus\ndemonstrating the truth of Napoleon's maxim, that success is oftener due\nto the genius of the general, and to the nature of the theatre of war,\nthan to the number and bravery of the soldiers. (Maxim 17, 18.)\n\nWe have a striking illustration of this in the French army of the\nDanube, which, from the left wing of General Kray, marched rapidly\nthrough Switzerland to the right extremity of the Austrian line, \"and by\nthis movement alone conquered all the country between the Rhine and\nDanube without pulling a trigger.\"\n\nAgain, in 1805, the army of Mack was completely paralyzed, and the main\nbody forced to surrender, at Ulm, without a single important battle. In\n1806, the Prussians were essentially defeated even before the battle of\nJena. The operations about Heilesberg, in 1807, the advance upon Madrid,\nin 1808, the manoeuvres about Ratisbon, in 1809, the operations of the\nFrench in 1814, and the first part of the campaign of 1815, against\nvastly superior numbers, are all familiar proofs of the truth of the\nmaxim.\n\nStrategy may therefore be regarded as the most important, though least\nunderstood, of all the branches of the military art.[4]\n\n[Footnote 4: Strategy may be learned from didactic works or from general\nmilitary histories. There are very few good elementary works on this\nbranch of the military art. The general treatises of the Archduke\nCharles, and of General Wagner, in German, (the former has been\ntranslated into French,) are considered as the best. The discussions of\nJomini on this subject in his great work on the military art, are\nexceedingly valuable; also the writings of Rocquancourt, Jacquinot de\nPresle, and Gay de Vernon. The last of these has been translated into\nEnglish, but the translation is exceedingly inaccurate. The military\nhistories of Lloyd, Templehoff, Jomini, the Archduke Charles, Grimoard,\nGravert, Souchet, St. Cyr, Beauvais, Laverne, Stutterheim, Wagner,\nKausler, Gourgaud and Montholon, Foy, Mathieu Dumas, Segur, Pelet, Koch,\nClausewitz, and Thiers, may be read with great advantage. Napier's\nHistory of the Peninsular War is the only English History that is of any\nvalue as a _military_ work: it is a most excellent book. Alison's great\nHistory of Europe is utterly worthless to the military man; the author\nis ignorant of the first principles of the military art, and nearly\nevery page is filled with the grossest blunders.\n\nWe subjoin the titles of a few of the best works that treat of strategy,\neither directly or in connection with military history.\n\n_Principes de la Strategie, &c._, par le Prince Charles, traduit de\nl'Allemand, 3 vols. in 8vo. This is a work of great merit. The technical\nterms, however, are very loosely employed.\n\n_Precis de l'Art de la Guerre_, par le Baron Jomini. His chapter on\nstrategy embodies the principles of this branch of the art.\n\n_Grundsaetze der Strategic_, Von Wagner.\n\n_Cours Elementaire d'Art et d'Histoire Militaire_, par Rocquancourt.\nThis work contains much valuable information connected with the history\nof the art of war; but it is far too diffuse and ill-arranged for an\nelementary book.\n\n_Cours d'Art et d'Histoire Militaire_, par Jacquinot de Presle. This\nwork is especially designed for cavalry officers, and the other branches\nof military service are but very briefly discussed.\n\nDe Vernon's Treatise on the Science of War and Fortification contains\nmuch valuable information; but, as an elementary book, it has the same\nobjections as that of Rocquancourt.\n\n_History of the Seven Years' War_, by Lloyd and Templehoff. The military\nwritings of Lloyd and Templehoff are valuable as connected with the\nhistory of strategy; but many of the principles laid down by these\nwriters are now regarded as erroneous.\n\n_Memoires de Napoleon_. The Memoirs of Napoleon, as dictated by himself\nto Gourgaud and Montholon, have been translated into English. It is\nhardly necessary to remark that they contain all the general principles\nof military art and science. No military man should fail to study them\nthoroughly. The matter is so condensed, and important principles are\nembodied in so few words, that they are not easily understood by the\nordinary reader, and probably will never be popular with the multitude.\n\n_Essai general de Tactique_, par Guibert. A work very popular in its\nday, but now far less valuable than the writings already mentioned.\n\n_Ausfuehrliche Beschreibung der Schlacht des Pirmasens_, von Gravert.\nRegarded by military men as a valuable historical fragment.\n\n_Memoires sur les Campagnes en Espagne_. Souchet.\n\n_Memoires de Gouvion St. Cyr._\n\n_Statistique de la Guerre_, par Reveroni St. Cyr.\n\n_Premiere Campagnes de la Revolution_, par Grimoard.\n\n_Victoires et Conquetes_. Beauvais.\n\n_Campagnes de Suwarrow_. Laverne.\n\n_Histoire de la Guerre de la Peninsule_. Foy.\n\n_Precis des Evenements Militaires_. Mathieu Dumas.\n\n_Histoire de Napoleon et de la Grande Armee en 1812_. Segur\n\n_Memoires sur la Guerre de 1809_. Pelet.\n\n_La Campagne de 1814_. Koch.\n\n_Vom Kriege--Die Feldzuegge, &c._ Clausewitz.\n\n_La Revolution, le Consulat et l'Empire._ Thiers.\n\n_Memoires sur la Guerre de 1812--sur la Campagne du Vice roi en Italie,\nen 1813 et 1814; Histoire de la Guerre en Allemagne en 1814; Histoire\ndes Campagnes de 1814 et 1815, en France_. Vaudoncourt.\n\n_Essai sur l'Art Militaire, &c._ Carion-Nisas.\n\n_Histoire de l'Expedition en Russie en 1812_. Chambray.\n\n_War in Spain, Portugal, and the South of France_. John Jones.\n\n_Peninsular War_. Napier.\n\n_Notices of the War of 1812_. Armstrong\n\nAll the above are works of merit; but none are more valuable to the\nmilitary man than the military histories of Jomini and Kausler, with\ntheir splendid diagrams and maps.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nFORTIFICATIONS.\n\n\n\n_Fortifications, or engineering_, may be considered with reference to\nthe defence of states and the grand operation of armies; or with\nreference to the details of the construction, and attack, and defence of\nforts, and the influence of field-works on the tactical manoeuvres of\narmies. It is proposed to speak here only of its general character, as a\nbranch of the military art, without entering into any professional\ndiscussion of details.\n\nThe connection of fortification and strategy may be considered under two\ndistinct heads: 1st, the choice of sites for constructing fortresses for\ndefence; 2d, their influence in offensive operations, and the\ndetermination of the question whether they can be passed with safety, or\nwhether the attacking force will be under the necessity of besieging\nthem.\n\nThe centre and extremities of _a base of operations_ should always be\nsecured either by natural or artificial obstacles. This base is\ngenerally chosen so that fortifications will be necessary for\nstrengthening only a part of the line. But if a frontier, like the side\nof France towards Belgium, be destitute of natural obstacles, the\nartificial means of defence must be proportionally increased. Great care\nshould be taken that permanent fortifications be made only on such\nplaces as may favor military operations. If otherwise, the troops\ndetached from the active army for garrisoning them, will only tend to\nweaken this force without any corresponding advantages. In this way,\nfortifications may become actually injurious to defence. A number of the\nEuropean fortresses which were built before the subject of strategy was\nproperly understood, are now regarded as utterly useless, from their\nill-advised positions.\n\nWhether a fortress may be safely passed with merely blockading or\nobserving it, depends very much upon the nature of the war, and the\nnumbers and position of the defensive army. The allies, in 1814,\ninvading France with a million of soldiers, assisted by the political\ndiversion of factions and Bourbonists within the kingdom, and treason in\nthe frontier fortresses, and even in the ranks of Napoleon's army, could\nconduct their military operations on a very different plan from that\nwhich would be adopted by either Austria, Prussia, Russia, England,\nSpain, Portugal, Holland, Italy, and the German powers, if singly waging\nwar with the French. Napoleon sometimes detached a corps to observe a\nfortress which threatened his line of operations or of manoeuvre; at\nothers, he delayed his advance till the place could be reduced.\n\n\"An army,\" says Jomini, \"may sometimes penetrate between places on an\nopen frontier, to attack the enemy's forces in the field, taking care at\nthe same time to _observe_ these places; but no invading army can cross\na great river, like the Danube, the Rhine, or the Elbe, without reducing\nat least one of the fortresses on that river, so as to secure a line of\nretreat; but being in possession of such a place, it can continue the\noffensive, while its _materiel de siege_ successively reduces the other\nplaces.\"\n\nIn case the main army is obliged to remain and cover the besieging\ncorps, it should take some central position, where it can command all\nthe avenues of approach, and fall with vigor on the enemy, should he\nattempt to raise the siege. Napoleon's operations before Mantua, in\n1796, offer the finest model for imitation.\n\nThe old system of intrenched camps and lines of contravallation is\nunsuited to the spirit of modern warfare. In ancient times, and more\nparticularly in the middle ages, too much importance was attached to\ntactical positions, and not enough to strategic points and lines. This\ngave to fortifications a character that never properly belonged to them.\nFrom the middle ages down to the period of the French Revolution, wars\nwere carried on mainly by the system of positions--one party confining\ntheir operations to the security of certain important places, while the\nother directed their whole attention to the siege and capture of these\nplaces. But Carnot and Napoleon changed this system, at the same time\nwith the system of tactics, or rather, returned from it to the old and\ntrue system of strategic operations. Some men, looking merely at the\nfact that a _change_ was made, but without examining the _character_ of\nthat change, have rushed headlong to the conclusion that fortified\nplaces are now utterly useless in war, military success depending\nentirely upon a good system of marches.\n\nOn this subject, General Jomini, the great military historian of the\nwars of the French Revolution, remarks that \"we should depend entirely\nupon neither organized masses, nor upon material obstacles, whether\nnatural or artificial. To follow exclusively either of these systems\nwould be equally absurd. The true science of war consists in choosing a\njust medium between the two extremes. The wars of Napoleon demonstrated\nthe great truth, that distance can protect no country from invasion, but\nthat a state, to be secure, must have a good system of fortresses, and a\ngood system of military reserves and military institutions.\"\n\nIn all military operations _time_ is of vast importance. If a single\ndivision of an army can be retarded for a few hours only, it not\nunfrequently decides the fate of the campaign. Had the approach of\nBlucher been delayed for a few hours, Napoleon must have been victorious\nat the battle of Waterloo. An equilibrium can seldom be sustained for\nmore than six or seven hours between forces on the field of battle; but\nin this instance, the state of the ground rendered the movements so\nslow as to prolong the battle for about twelve hours; thus enabling the\nallies to effect a concentration in time to save Wellington.\n\nMany of Napoleon's brilliant victories resulted from merely bringing\ntroops to bear suddenly upon some decisive point. Rivoli in 1796-7,\nMarengo in 1800, Ulm in 1805, Jena in 1806, Ratisbon in 1809, Brienne in\n1814, and Ligny in 1815, are familiar examples. But this concentration\nof forces, even with a regular army, cannot be calculated on by the\ngeneral with any degree of certainty, unless his communications are\nperfectly secure. And this difficulty is very much increased where the\ntroops are new and undisciplined. When a country like ours is invaded,\nlarge numbers of such troops must suddenly be called into the field. Not\nknowing the designs of the invaders, much time will be lost in marches\nand countermarches; and if there be no safe places of resort the\noperations must be indecisive and insecure.\n\nTo a defensive army fortifications are valuable as points of repose,\nupon which the troops, if beaten, may fall back, and shelter their sick\nand wounded, collect their scattered forces, repair their materials, and\ndraw together a new supply of stores and provisions; and as rallying\npoints, where new troops may be assembled with safety, and the army, in\na few days, be prepared to again meet the enemy in the open field.\nWithout these defences, undisciplined and inexperienced armies, when\nonce routed, can seldom be rallied again, except with great losses. But\nwhen supported by forts, they can select their opportunity for fighting,\nand offer or refuse battle according to the probability of success; and,\nhaving a safe place of retreat, they are far less influenced by fear in\nthe actual conflict.\n\nThe enemy, on the other hand, being compelled either to besiege or\n_observe_ these works, his army will be separated from its magazines,\nits strength and efficiency diminished by detachments, and his whole\nforce exposed to the horrors of partisan warfare. It has therefore been\nestimated by the best military writers, that an army supported by a\njudicious system of fortifications, can repel a land force _six_ times\nas large as itself.\n\nEvery government should prepare, in time of peace, its most prominent\nand durable means of defence. By securing in a permanent manner its\nimportant points, it will enable a small force to retain possession of\nthese places against a greatly superior army, for a considerable length\nof time. This serves the same purpose as a battle gained; for, in the\nbeginning of a war of invasion, the economy of time is of the utmost\nimportance to the defensive party, enabling it to organize and prepare\nthe great military resources of the state.\n\nIn all mountainous frontiers, or sides of states bordering on large\nrivers, or chains of lakes, there will necessarily be but few points by\nwhich an invader can penetrate into the interior of the country. Let us\nsuppose that, for a frontier of moderate extent, there are _five_\npasses, or avenues through which the enemy may approach the interior. To\neffectually defend these approaches against the invading army will\nrequire, for each, an army of ten thousand men. Not being able to decide\npositively on the plans of the enemy, all these communications must be\ndefended at the same time. This requires a defending army of fifty\nthousand men. Let us now suppose each of these passes to be fortified in\nsuch a way, that one thousand men will be able to hold the enemy in\ncheck, and force him to resort to the operations of a siege; or, at\nleast, to retard his advance till an active army can be organized in the\ninterior, and prepared to meet him in the field. We here see that five\nthousand men, by means of fortifications, can accomplish the same\ndefensive object as fifty thousand men without these artificial means of\nsecurity.\n\nBut let us enter a little more into the details of frontier defences,\nand examine the character of the several systems which have been\nsuccessively proposed or adopted. Frontiers are divided into four\ndistinct classes, according as the state may be open on one or more\nsides, or bounded by mountains, large rivers and lakes, or by the sea.\n\nAn open frontier is the most difficult of defence; and while there\nexists a perfect uniformity among military men upon the vast importance\nof fortifying such a frontier, there is an equal diversity of opinion\nrespecting the best manner of arranging these works. We shall here\nmention three general systems of arranging forts for the defence of an\nopen country, each of which has been advocated at different times, and\nafterwards received various modifications and additions. These three\nsystems comprise the main features of all others worthy of much\nconsideration. They are:--\n\n\n1st. The system of continuous lines, proposed by Montalembert.\n\n2d. A system of three lines of detached works, strongly recommended by\nD'Arcon and others.\n\n3d. A system proposed by Vauban, and advocated by Rogniat, consisting of\nlines of very strong works, placed at considerable distances from each\nother and covering large _intrenched camps_.\n\n\nThe first of these systems was proposed in 1790, and for a time\nattracted considerable notice in France, but has long since been\ndiscarded, as being utterly incompatible with the principles of the\nmilitary art. A writer, however, of some pretensions in this country,\nrecommends its adoption for the defence of Baltimore and the shores of\nthe Chesapeake. The same author would dispense entirely with our\npresent system of fortifications on the sea-coast, and substitute in\ntheir place wooden Martello towers! This would be very much like\nbuilding 120 gun ships at Pittsburg and Memphis, for the defence of the\nOhio and the Mississippi rivers, and sending out duck-boats to meet the\nenemy on the Atlantic!\n\nIn the second system, the works on the extreme frontier are to be placed\nabout thirty or forty miles apart, and those of the second and third\nlines respectively thirty or forty miles in rear of the first and second\nlines, and opposite the intervals.\n\nIn the third system, first recommended by Vauban and more recently by\nRogniat, the works are to be arranged in the same manner as in that of\nD'Arcon, but the distance between them is to be from seventy to one\nhundred miles, and each fort arranged for covering a large intrenched\ncamp.\n\nEither of these last two systems is well suited to the defence of an\nopen frontier. The former is applied to the side of France towards\nBelgium, and the latter, with certain modifications, to the defence of\nWestern Germany. The first line of fortifications on the northern\nfrontier of France consists of Dunkirk, Lille, Valenciennes, Conde,\nQuesnoy, Rocroi, Charlemont, Mezieres, and Sedan; the second line, of\nCalais, Andres, St. Omer, Bethune, Arras, Douai, Chambrai, Landrecies,\nand Avesnes; the third line, of Boulogne, Montreuil, Hesdin, Abbeville,\nAmiens, Bapaume, Peronne, Ham, and Laon.\n\nFor mountainous frontiers it is deemed necessary to secure all the\nimportant passes with small redoubts or military works, and to defend\nwith strong forts the grand interior strategic points on which these\ncommunications are directed. For a frontier of moderate extent there may\nbe some six or eight gorges in the mountains by which an army might\npenetrate; but it will always be found that these roads concentrate on\ntwo or three points in the great valleys below. Take, for example, the\nfrontier of France towards Switzerland and Italy. The passes of the\nmountains are secured by the little works of Fort L'Ecluse, Fort\nPierre-chatel, Fort Barraux, Briancon, Mont Dauphin, Colmars, Entrevaux,\nand Antibes; while Besancon, Grenoble, and Toulon, form a second line;\nand Lyons a grand central depot.\n\nWhere a great river or chain of lakes forms the boundary of a state, the\nsystem of defence will be much the same as that of an open land\nfrontier, the works of the first line being made to secure the great\nbridges or ferries by which the enemy might effect a passage; those of\nthe second line, to cover the passes of the highlands that generally\napproach more or less near the great watercourse; and those of the third\nline, far enough in rear to protect the great internal communications of\nthe country. Let us take, for example, the side of France bordering on\nthe Rhine. Wissembourg and Lauterbourg, Fort Louis, Haguenau,\nStrasbourg, Schelstadt, Neuf-Brisach, and Huneguen, cover the several\npassages of the river; while Bitche, Phalsbourg, and Befort form a\nsecond line; Thionville, Metz, and Toul, a third line; and Verdun a\ngrand central depot.\n\nThe following are the principal objects proposed to be accomplished by\nfortifications on a sea-coast.\n\n1st. To close all important harbors to an enemy, and secure them to the\nnavy of the country.\n\n2d. To prevent the enemy from forming an establishment on our shores,\nfrom which, by his naval superiority, he might destroy our commerce and\nkeep the whole frontier in continual alarm.\n\n3d. To cover our great cities against a maritime attack and bombardment.\n\n4th. To cover our ship-yards and great naval depots.\n\n5th. To prevent, as much as possible, the great avenues of interior\nnavigation from being blockaded by naval means at their entrance into\nthe ocean.\n\n6th. To give to our navy facilities for protecting our coast trade from\nthe enemy's ships of war, and our internal communications, which lie\nnear the coast, from maritime descents.\n\n\nLet us notice how France has attempted to accomplish this object. The\nMediterranean frontier has Fort Quarre, Fort St. Marguerite, St. Tropez,\nBrigancon, the forts of Point Man, of l'Ertissac, and of Langoustier,\nToulon, St. Nicholas, Castle of If, Marseilles, Tour de Boue,\nAigues-Montes, Fort St. Louis, Fort Brescou, Narbonne, Chateau de\nSalces, Perpignan, Collioure, Fort St. Elme, and Port Vendre. Toulon is\nthe great naval depot for this frontier, and Marseilles the great\ncommercial port. Both are well secured by strong fortifications. The\nAtlantic frontier has Bayonne; the forts of Royan, Grave, Medoc, Pate,\n&c., on the Gironde; Rochefort, with the forts of Chapus, Lapin, Aix,\nOleron, &c., to cover the roadstead; La Rochelle, with the forts of the\nIsle of Re; Sables, with the forts of St. Nicholas, and Des Moulines,\nIsle Dieu, Belle Isle, Fort du Pilier, Mindin, Ville Martin; Quiberon,\nwith Fort Penthievre; L'Orient, with its harbor defences; Fort Cigogne;\nBrest, with its harbor defences; St. Malo, with Forts Cezembre, La\nCanchee, L'Anse du Verger, and Des Rimains; Cherbourg, with its\ndefensive forts and batteries; Havre, Dieppe, Boulogne, Calais, and\nDunkirk. Cherbourg, Brest, and Rochefort, are great naval depots; and\nHavre, Nantes, and Bordeaux, the principal commercial ports. Many of the\nworks above enumerated are small in extent and antiquated in their\nconstruction, and some of them quite old and dilapidated nevertheless,\nthey have heretofore been found sufficient for the defence of the naval\ndepots and commercial seaports of France against the superior naval\nforces of her neighbor.\n\nOmitting for the present all discussion of sea-coast defences, let us\nexamine more particularly the character and influence of fortifications\non land frontiers.\n\nAll military writers agree that fortifications have heretofore exerted a\ngreat, and frequently a decisive, influence on the operations of a war.\nThose of France are frequently referred to as proofs of this influence.\nBut, while all are disposed to allow that these works contributed much\nin former times to the defence of states, yet some have said that modern\nimprovements in the mode of attack have rendered forts far less valuable\nthan formerly.\n\nSuch, however, is not the case. Improvements in the mode of attack have\nnot kept pace with the facilities of locomotion; and, although\nfortifications do not now usually sustain a siege of as _many days_ as\nin former times, still, as compared with the relative lengths of\ncampaigns in ancient and modern wars, the _proportional_ length of\nsieges is now even _greater_ than formerly. When the same is\naccomplished in a campaign of seven weeks as was formerly done in a war\nof seven years, it is not necessary that fortified places should hold\nout a very long time. A place that can sustain a siege of a month is now\ndeemed sufficiently strong for ordinary campaigns; for by the end of\nthat time the defensive army will either be destroyed, or be able to\ncome to its succor. In either case a longer defence would not be\nrequired.\n\nA reference to the most important sieges of the last century or two will\nshow that forts are, on an average, capable of sustaining a siege for\nmore than that length of time. Lille, in 1708, held the allies in check\nfor a whole year; and again, in 1792, compelled the Austrians to raise\nthe siege after an unsuccessful attack of fifteen days.\n\nAntwerp, in 1585, sustained a siege of fourteen months against greatly\nsuperior forces; in 1814 Carnot defended the citadel of this place for\nfour months, and until an armistice had been concluded between the\ncontending parties; in 1832, it sustained, with a garrison of only 4,500\nmen and 145 pieces of ordnance, a siege of twenty-five days, against a\nforce of 55,000 men and 223 cannon.\n\nNamur, near the end of the seventeenth century, sustained a siege of ten\nweeks.\n\nIsmail, in 1790, sustained a siege of more than two months against the\nRussians.\n\nMaestricht, in 1793, sustained a siege of nearly two weeks; and again,\nin 1794, sustained a blockade and siege of nearly two months.\n\nMagdeburg, in the thirty years' war, resisted the army of Wallenstein\nfor seven months; and in 1813-14, although garrisoned by only 4,000 men,\nit for a long time resisted the overwhelming forces of the allies.\n\nDantzic, at the same time, sustained a siege against superior forces for\nmore than nine months.\n\nLandau, in 1793, sustained a siege of nine months.\n\nValenciennes and Mayence, in 1793, each sustained a siege of about three\nmonths.\n\nCharleroi, Fort Vauban, and L'Ecluse, in 1794, each sustained a siege of\nabout thirty days.\n\nQuesnoy, in 1794, sustained a siege of about three weeks.\n\nRosas, in 1795, sustained a siege of some seventy days.\n\nMantua, in 1796-7, protected from invasion, for eight months, the Tyrol\nand the heart of the Austrian monarchy.\n\nKehl and Huninguen, in 1796, sheltered Moreau for three months against\nall the efforts of the Archduke Charles.\n\nSt. Jean d'Acre, in 1799, sustained a siege of sixty days of open\ntrench.\n\nUlm, in 1800, held Moreau in check for more than a month.\n\nGenoa, in 1800, sustained a blockade of sixty and a siege of forty days.\n\nSaragossa in 1808 sustained a close siege of near two months; and in\n1809 it was again besieged for two months.\n\nRosas in 1808 sustained a siege of thirty days.\n\nGerona in 1809 sustained a siege and blockade of seven months, nearly\nfour of them being of open trench.\n\nMequinenza (a very small work) in 1810 sustained a siege of more than\ntwo weeks.\n\nAstorga in 1810 sustained a siege of thirty days; twenty-four being of\nopen trench.\n\nLerida in 1810 sustained a siege of thirty days, two weeks being of open\ntrench.\n\nCiudad Rodrigo in 1810 sustained a siege of two months.\n\nAlmeida in 1810 sustained a siege of more than a month.\n\nTortosa in 1810 sustained a siege of six months.\n\nTarragona in 1811 sustained a siege of nearly two months.\n\nBadajos in 1811 sustained a siege of more than forty days open trench.\n\nLerida in 1811 sustained a siege of two weeks open trench.\n\nSaguntum in 1811 sustained a siege of a month.\n\nValencia in 1811-12 sustained a siege of two months\n\nCiudad Rodrigo in 1812 sustained a blockade of several months, and a\nclose siege of two weeks.\n\nBadajos in 1812 sustained twenty-one days of open trenches.\n\nBurgos in 1812 sustained thirty-three days of open trenches.\n\nSt. Sebastian in 1813 sustained a siege and blockade of nearly three\nmonths, with fifty-nine days of open trenches.\n\nPampeluna in 1813 sustained a siege of more than four months.\n\nMonzon in 1813-14 also sustained a siege of more than four months.\n\nThis list might be increased with numerous other examples, to show that\neven poorly fortified towns are capable of defending themselves, on an\naverage, for more than a month. These examples, be it remembered, are\nnearly all taken from a period of history since any material\nimprovements have been made in the art of attack. Since the time of\nVauban the improvements in attack have not kept pace with the increased\nmeans of defence. Moreover, these examples are taken from the sieges of\ntowns defended mainly by old and antiquated works, and entirely\nincapable of offering the same resistance as detached fortifications,\nwith all the modern improvements.\n\nThe value of fortifications, as land defences, is sufficiently proved by\nshowing their general capability of resisting an invader, even for a\nlimited period; thus affording us time and opportunity to provide other\nmeans of security. But it must not be inferred that forts besieged _en\nregle_ will necessarily fall after so many days. Such is far from being\nthe case. The besieged have usually great advantages over the besiegers;\nand unless the latter are vastly superior in number, or the work is of a\nvery inferior character, or the garrison is destitute of the requisite\nmeans and energy to resist an attack, they will not be taken.\n\nMezieres was not taken in 1520; nor Marseilles in 1524; nor Peronne in\n1536; nor Landrecies in 1543; nor Metz in 1552; nor Montauban in 1621;\nnor Lerida in 1647; nor Maestricht in 1676; nor Vienna in 1529, and\nagain in 1683; nor Turin in 1706; nor Conde in 1744; nor Lille in 1792;\nnor Landau in 1793; nor Ulm in 1800; nor Saragossa in 1808; nor Burgos\nin 1812. This list might be extended almost indefinitely with the names\nof places that could be reduced neither by force nor by starvation.\n\nBut, as has already been noticed, some have asserted that fortifications\nhave become of little comparative importance, under the new system of\nwarfare introduced during the wars of the French Revolution. On this\nsubject let us consult the opinions of the best military judges of the\npresent century.\n\nNapoleon says of fortifications, \"they are an excellent means of\nretarding, fettering, enfeebling, and disquieting a conquering foe.\"\n\n\"The possession of strategic points,\" says the Archduke Charles, \"is\ndecisive in military operations; and the most efficacious means should,\ntherefore, be employed to defend points whose preservation is the\ncountry's safeguard. This object is accomplished by fortifications,\ninasmuch as they can resist, for a given time, with a small number of\ntroops, every effort of a much larger force; fortifications should,\ntherefore, be regarded as the basis of a good system of defence.\" \"It\nshould be a maxim of state policy in every country, to fortify, in time\nof peace, all such points, and to arrange them with great care, so that\nthey can be defended by a small number of troops. For the enemy, knowing\nthe difficulty of getting possession of these works, will look twice\nbefore he involves himself in a war.\" \"Establishments which can secure\nstrategic advantages are not the works of a moment; they require time\nand labor. He who has the direction of the military forces of a state,\nshould, in time of peace, prepare for war.\" \"The proper application or\nneglect of these principles will decide the safety or the ruin of the\nstate.\" \"Fortifications arrest the enemy in the pursuit of his object,\nand direct his movements on less important points;--he must either force\nthese fortified lines, or else hazard enterprises upon lines which offer\nonly disadvantages. In fine, a country secured by a system of defences\ntruly strategic, has no cause to fear either the invasion or the yoke of\nthe enemy; for he can advance to the interior of the country only\nthrough great trouble and ruinous efforts. Of course, lines of\nfortifications thus arranged cannot shelter a state against all reverses;\nbut these reverses will not, in this case, be attended by total ruin;\nfor they cannot take from the state the means nor the time for\ncollecting new forces; nor can they ever reduce it to the cruel\nalternative of submission or destruction.\"\n\n\"Fortifications,\" says Jomini, \"fulfil two objects of capital\nimportance,--1st. The protection of the frontiers; and 2d. Assisting the\noperations of the army in the field.\" \"Every part of the frontiers of a\nstate should be secured by one or two great places of refuge, secondary\nplaces, and even small posts for facilitating the active operations of\nthe armies. Cities girt with walls and slight ditches may often be of\ngreat utility in the interior of a country, as places of deposit, where\nstores, magazines, hospitals, &c., may be sheltered from the incursions\nof the enemy's light troops. These works are more especially valuable\nwhere such stores, in order not to weaken the regular army by\ndetachments, are intrusted to the care of raw and militia forces.\" It is\nnot supposed that any system of fortifications can hermetically close a\nfrontier; \"but, although they of themselves can rarely present an\nabsolute obstacle to the advance of the hostile army, yet it is\nindisputable that they straiten its movements, change the direction of\nits marches, and force it into detachments; while, on the contrary, they\nafford all the opposite advantages to the defensive army; they protect\nits marches, favor its debouches, cover its magazines, its flanks, and\nits movements, and finally furnish it with a place of refuge in time of\nneed.\"\n\nThese opinions were uttered, be it remembered, long since the period at\nwhich modern military quacks date the downfall of fortifications as\ninland defences, by men, too, who were not engineers, and consequently\nhad no professional predilections in favor of fortifications. The\nArchduke Charles, as a general, knew no rival but Napoleon, and General\nJomini is universally regarded as the first military historian of the\nage. The truth of their remarks on fortifications is most fully\nconfirmed by the military histories of Germany and France.\n\nFor a long period previous to the Thirty Years' War, its strong castles\nand fortified cities secured the German empire from attacks from abroad,\nexcept on its extensive frontier, which was frequently assailed, but no\nenemy was able to penetrate to the interior till a want of union among\nits own princes opened its strongholds to the Swedish conqueror; nor\nthen, did the cautious Gustavus Adolphus venture far into its\nterritories till he had obtained possession of all the military works\nthat might endanger his retreat.\n\nAgain, in the Seven Years' War, when the French neglected to secure\ntheir foothold in Germany, by placing in a state of defence the\nfortifications that fell into their power, the first defeat rendered\ntheir ground untenable, and threw them from the Elbe back upon the Rhine\nand the Mayne. They afterwards took the precaution to fortify their\npositions, and to secure their magazines under shelter of strong places,\nand, consequently, were enabled to maintain themselves in the hostile\ncountry till the end of the war, notwithstanding the inefficiency of\ntheir generals, the great reverses they sustained in the field, the\nskill and perseverance of the enemy they were contending with, and the\nweak and vacillating character of the cabinet that directed them.\n\nBut this system of defence was not so carefully maintained in the latter\npart of the eighteenth century, for at the beginning of the French\nRevolution, says Jomini, \"Germany had too few fortifications; they were\ngenerally of a poor character, and improperly located.\" France, on the\ncontrary, was well fortified: and although without armies, and torn in\npieces by domestic factions, (we here use the language of the Archduke,)\n\"she sustained herself against all Europe; _and this was because her\ngovernment, since the reign of Louis XIII_., _had continually labored to\nput her frontiers into a defensive condition agreeably to the principles\nof strategy_; starting from such a system for a basis, she subdued every\ncountry on the continent that was not thus fortified; and this reason\nalone will explain how her generals sometimes succeeded in destroying an\narmy, and even an entire state, merely by a strategic success.\"\n\nThis may be illustrated by reference to particular campaigns. In 1792,\nwhen the Duke of Brunswick invaded France, she had no armies competent\nto her defence. Their numbers upon paper were somewhat formidable, it is\ntrue, but the license of the Revolution had so loosened the bonds of\ndiscipline as to effect an almost complete disorganization. \"It seemed,\nat this period,\" says the historian, \"as if the operations of the French\ngenerals were dependent upon the absence of their enemies: the moment\nthey appeared, the operations were precipitately abandoned.\" But France\nhad on her eastern frontier a triple line of good fortresses, although\nher miserable soldiery were incapable of properly defending them. The\nseveral works of the first and second lines fell, one after another,\nbefore the slow operations of a Prussian siege, and the Duke of\nBrunswick was already advancing upon the third, when Dumourier, with\nonly twenty-five thousand men, threw himself into this line, and by a\nwell-conducted war of positions, placing his raw and unsteady forces\nbehind unassailable intrenchments, succeeded in repelling a disciplined\narmy nearly four times as numerous as his own. Had no other obstacle\nthan the French troops been interposed between Paris and the Prussians,\nall agree that France must have fallen.\n\nIn the campaign, of 1793, the French army in Flanders were beaten in\nalmost every engagement, and their forces reduced to less than one half\nthe number of the allies. The French general turned traitor to his\ncountry, and the National Guards deserted their colors and returned to\nFrance. The only hope of the Republicans, at this crisis, was Vauban's\nline of Flemish fortresses. These alone saved France. The strongholds of\nLille, Conde, Valenciennes, Quesnoy, Landrecies, &c., held the Austrians\nin check till the French could raise new forces and reorganize their\narmy. \"The important breathing-time which the sieges of these\nfortresses,\" says an English historian, \"afforded to the French, and the\nimmense advantage which they derived from the new levies which they\nreceived, and fresh organization which they acquired during that\nimportant period, is a signal proof of the vital importance of\nfortresses in contributing to national defence. Napoleon has not\nhesitated to ascribe to the three months thus gained the salvation of\nFrance. It is to be constantly recollected that the Republican armies\nwere then totally unable to keep the field; that behind the frontier\nfortresses there was neither a defensive position, nor a corps to\nreinforce them; and that if driven from their vicinity, the capital was\ntaken and the war concluded.\"\n\nIn the following year, 1794, when France had completed her vast\narmaments, and, in her turn, had become the invading power, the enemy\nhad no fortified towns to check the progress of the Republican armies;\nwhich, based on strong works of defence, in a few weeks overran\nFlanders, and drove the allies beyond the Rhine.\n\nIn the campaign of 1796, when the army of Moreau had been forced into a\nprecipitate retreat by the admirable strategic operations of the\nArchduke Charles, the French forces owed their safety to the\nfortifications on the Rhine. These works arrested the enemy's pursuit\nand obliged him to resort to the tedious operations of sieges; and the\nreduction of the French advanced posts alone, Kehl and Huninguen, poorly\nas they were defended, employed all the resources of the Austrian army,\nand the skill of their engineers, from early in October till late in\nFebruary. Kehl was at first assaulted by a force _four_ times as\nnumerous as the garrison; if the enemy had succeeded, he would have cut\noff Moreau's retreat, and destroyed his army. Fortunately the place was\nstrong enough to resist all assaults; and Moreau, basing himself on the\nfortresses of Alsace, his right covered by Huninguen, Neuf-Brisach, and\nBefort, and his left by the iron barrier of the Netherlands, effectually\nchecked the waves of Austrian success.\n\nLet us now turn to the campaigns of Napoleon. In his first campaign in\nItaly, 1796, the general was directed \"to seize the forts of Savona,\ncompel the senate to furnish him with pecuniary supplies, and to\nsurrender the keys of Gavi, a fortress perched on the rocky height\ncommanding the pass of the Bocchetta.\" Setting out from Savona, he\ncrossed the mountains at a weak point between the Alps and the\nApennines, and succeeded in piercing the enemy's line of defence. The\nking of Sardinia, jealous of Austrian influence, had refused to permit\nthe Austrian army to garrison his line of fortifications. Napoleon,\nprofiting by his victorious attitude, the mutual jealousy of Austria\nand Sardinia, and the intrigues of his diplomatists, soon gained\npossession of these important works. \"_These Sardinian fortresses_,\" he\nwrote to the Directory, \"_at once put the Republicans in possession of\nthe keys of the Peninsula_.\" Basing himself on Coni, Mondovi, Ceva,\nGavi, and Alessandria, with Tortosa as his depot of magazines, he\nadvanced against Lombardy. Now basing himself on the Adda and Po, with\nthe fortress of Pizzighettone as the depot of his magazines, he advanced\nupon the line of the Adige. Pechiera became his next depot, and he now\nhad four fortresses in echelon between him and his first depot of\nmagazines; and, after the fall of Mantua, basing himself on the Po, he\nadvanced against the States of the Church, making Ferrara and then\nAncona, his places of depot.\n\nFrom the solid basis of the fortresses of Piedmont and Lombardy, \"he was\nenabled to turn his undivided attention to the destruction of the\nAustrians, and thus commence, with some security, that great career of\nconquest which he already meditated in the imperial dominions.\" In this\ncampaign of 1797, after scouring his base, he fortified Palma-Nuova,\nOsapo, &c., repaired the old fortifications of Klagenfurth, and, as he\nadvanced, established, to use his own words, \"a good _point d'appui_ at\nevery five or six marches.\"\n\nAfterwards, when the Austrians had nearly wrested Italy from the weak\ngrasp of Napoleon's successors, the French saved their army in the\nfortress of Genoa and behind the line of the Var, which had been\nfortified with care in 1794-5. Numerous attempts were made to force this\nline, the advanced post of Fort Montauban being several times assaulted\nby numerous forces. But the Austrian columns recoiled from its murderous\nfire of grape and musketry, which swept off great numbers at every\ndischarge. Again the assault was renewed with a vast superiority of\nnumbers, and again \"the brave men who headed the column almost perished\nat the foot of the intrenchment; and, after sustaining a heavy loss,\nthey were compelled to abandon the enterprise.\"\n\nWhile the forces on the Var thus stayed the waves of Austrian success,\nMassena, in the fortifications of Genoa, sustained a blockade of sixty,\nand a siege of forty days, against an army five times as large as his\nown; and when forced to yield to the stern demands of famine, he almost\ndictated to the enemy the terms of the treaty. These two defences held\nin check the _elite_ of the Austrian forces, while the French reserve\ncrossed the Alps, seized the important points of the country, and cut\noff the Austrian line of retreat. \"But even after the victory of\nMarengo,\" says Napoleon, \"I did not consider the whole of Italy\nreconquered, until all the fortified places between me and the Mincio\nshould be occupied by my troops. I gave Melas permission to return to\nMantua, on condition of his surrendering all these fortresses.\"\n\nHe now directed Chasseloup de Laubat and his engineers to repair and\nremodel the fortifications of Verona, Legnano, Pechiera, Mantua, the\nline of the Adda, Milan, Alessandria,[5] Roco d'Aufo, Genoa, and several\nsmaller works; thus forming a quadruple line of defence against Austrian\naggression in Italy. These works were of great service to the French in\n1805, enabling Massena with fifty thousand men to hold in check the\nArchduke Charles with more than ninety thousand, while Napoleon's grand\narmy, starting from the solid base of the Rhine, traversed Germany and\nseized upon the capital of Austria.\n\n[Footnote 5: More than twenty millions of money were appropriated for\nthis place alone.]\n\nThe neglect of the Prussians to place their country in a state of\nmilitary defence, previous to declaring war against Napoleon in 1806,\nhad a most disastrous influence upon the campaign. Napoleon, on the\nother hand, occupied and secured all the important military positions\nwhich he had captured in the preceding campaign. \"The Prussians,\" said\nhe, \"made no preparations for putting into a state of defence the\nfortifications on their first line, not even those within a few marches\nof our cantonments. While I was piling up bastion upon bastion at Kehl,\nCassel, and Wesel, they did not plant a single palisade at Magdeburg,\nnor put in battery a single cannon at Spandau.\" The works on the three\ngreat lines of the Oder, the Elbe, and the Weser, had they been properly\nrepaired, garrisoned, and defended, were sufficient to have held in\ncheck the French, even after the great victory of Jena, till the\nnewly-organized forces, acting in concert with the Russian army, could\nre-establish the Prussian monarchy in its ancient greatness. Profiting\nby the neglect of the Prussians, Napoleon seized upon the great\ndefensive works of the country, which, to his great joy, were readily\nsurrendered into his hands by the old and inefficient generals who\ncommanded them; and French garrisons were almost immediately established\nin the fortresses of Stettin, Custrin, Glogau, Magdeburg, Spandau,\nHameln, Nieubourg, &c. \"Spandau,\" said he in the 19th Bulletin, \"is an\ninestimable acquisition. In our hands it could sustain two months of\noperations. But such was the general confusion, that the Prussians had\nnot even armed its batteries.\" The possession of these fortifications\ninclined the scale at Eylau. All the historians of the war notice their\ninfluence on the campaigns of Friedland and Tilsit.\n\nThese Prussian fortresses were retained by Napoleon at the treaty of\nTilsit. The campaign of 1809 proved the wisdom of this policy, as they\neffectually prevented Prussia from joining Austria in rekindling the\nflames of war. And again in 1813, these works might have produced a\ndecided influence on the campaign, had not the political perfidy of\nAustria, and the treason of the French generals, prevented Napoleon from\nprofiting by the advantages of his position.\n\nThe influence of the fortifications of Spain upon the Peninsular\ncampaigns has often been alluded to by historians. Those works which had\nbeen given up to Napoleon previous to the opening of hostilities,\ncontributed very much to the success of his arms; while those which had\nbeen retained by Spain and her allies contributed in an equal degree to\nfetter and embarrass his operations. Some of these, like Saragossa,\nTarragona, Gerona, Tortosa, &c. &c., with their broken walls and\ndefective armaments, kept the enemy in check for months; and, by\ncompelling the French to resort to the tedious operations of sieges, did\nmuch to weaken the French power in the Peninsula.\n\nThe influence of the fortifications of the French frontiers in\nfurnishing a secure basis for the successful operations of Napoleon into\nthe enemy's territory, has already been noticed. If these fortresses of\nFrance, after the disasters of 1812 and '13, failed to save the nation,\nthe cause must be sought for in the peculiar features of the invasion\nitself, rather than any lack of military influence in the French\ndefences. As has been already remarked, a million of disciplined men,\nunder consummate leaders, were here assailing a single state,\nimpoverished by the fatal war in Russia,--torn in pieces by political\nfactions,--deserted by its sworn allies,--its fortresses basely betrayed\ninto the enemy's hands, and its military power paralyzed by the treason\nof generals with their entire armies. Its only hope was in the\nfortresses which had remained faithful; and Napoleon said at St. Helena,\nthat if he had collected together the garrisons of these few fortresses\nand retired to the Rhine, he could have crushed the allies even after\ntheir entrance into Paris. But political considerations prevented the\noperation.\n\nAgain in 1815, Napoleon, even after the defeat of Waterloo, possessed\nlines of defence sufficiently strong to resist all attempts at invasion.\nBut again the want of co-operation on the part of the government at\nParis, and the treason of his own generals, forced his second\nabdication. If he had retained the command of the army, and the nation\nhad seconded his efforts, the allies would never have reached Paris. But\nthe new government presented the disgraceful spectacle of opening the\nway for the enemies of their country. \"France,\" said Napoleon, \"will\neternally reproach the ministry with having forced her whole people to\npass under the Caudine-forks, by ordering the disbanding of an army that\nhad for twenty-five years been its country's glory, _and by giving up to\nour astonished enemies our still invincible fortresses_.\"\n\nHistory fully supports Napoleon's opinion of the great danger of\npenetrating far into a hostile country to attack the capital, even when\nthat capital is without fortifications. The fatal effects of such an\nadvance, without properly securing the means of retreat, is exemplified\nby his own campaign of 1812, in Russia. If, after the fall of Smolensk,\nhe had fortified that place and Vitepsk, which by their position closed\nthe narrow passage comprised between the Dnieper and the Dwina, he might\nin all probability, on the following spring, have been able to seize\nupon Moscow and St. Petersburg. But leaving the hostile army of\nTschkokoff in his rear, he pushed on to Moscow, and when the\nconflagration of that city cut off his hopes of winter quarters there,\nand the premature rigor of the season destroyed the horses of his\nartillery and provision-trains, retreat became impossible, and the awful\nfate of his immense army was closed by scenes of horror to which there\nis scarcely a parallel in history. This point might be still further\nillustrated by the Russian campaign of Charles XII., in 1708-9, the\nfatal advance of the French army on Lisbon, in the Peninsular war, and\nother examples of the same character.\n\nEven single works sometimes effect the object of lines of\nfortifications, and frustrate the operations of an entire army. Thus,\nLille suspended for a whole year the operations of Prince Eugene and\nMarlborough; the siege of Landrecies gave Villars an opportunity of\nchanging the fortunes of the war; Pavia, in 1525, lost France her\nmonarch, the flower of her nobility, and her Italian conquests; Metz, in\n1552, arrested the entire power of Charles V., and saved France from\ndestruction; Prague, in 1757, brought the greatest warrior of his age to\nthe brink of ruin; St. Jean d'Acre, in 1799, stopped the successful\ncareer of Napoleon; Burgos, in 1812, saved the beaten army of Portugal,\nenabled them to collect their scattered forces, and regain the\nascendancy; Strasburg has often been, the bulwark of the French against\nGermany, saving France from invasion, and perhaps subjugation.\n\nIn nearly the language of Napoleon, (Memoirs, vol. IX.,) If Vienna had\nbeen fortified in 1805, the battle of Ulm would not have decided the\nfate of the war. Again, in 1809, if this capital had been fortified, it\nwould have enabled the Archduke Charles, after the disaster of Eckmuhl,\nby a forced retreat on the left of the Danube, to form a junction with\nthe forces of General Hiller and the Archduke John.\n\nIf Berlin had been fortified in 1806, the army routed at Jena would have\nrallied there and been joined by the Russians. If Madrid had been\nstrongly fortified in 1808, the French army, after the victories of\nEspinosa, Tudela, Burgos, and Sommo-Sierra, would not have marched\ntowards that capital, leaving in rear of Salamanca and Valladolid, both\nthe English army of General Moore and the Spanish army of Romana. If\nMoscow had been fortified in 1812, its conflagration would have been\navoided, for, with strong defensive works, and the army of Kutusoff\nencamped on its ramparts, its capture would have been impossible.\n\nHad not Constantinople been well fortified, the empire of Constantine\nmust have terminated in the year 700, whereas the standard of the\nProphet was not planted there until 1440. This capital was therefore\nindebted to its walls for eight hundred years of existence. During this\nperiod it was besieged fifty-three times, but only one of these sieges\nwas successful. The French and Venetians took it, but not without a very\nsevere contest.\n\nParis has often owed its safety to its walls. In 885 the Normans\nbesieged it for two years without effect. In 1358 the Dauphin besieged\nit in vain. In 1359 Edward, king of England, encamped at Montrouge,\ndevastated the country to its walls, but recoiled from before it, and\nretired to Chartres. In 1429 it repulsed the attack of Charles VII. In\n1464 the Count of Charlerois surrounded the city, but was unsuccessful\nin his attacks. In 1472 it repulsed the army of the Duke of Bourgone,\nwho had already ravaged its precincts. In 1536, when attacked by Charles\nV., it again owed its safety to its walls. In 1588 and 1589 it repulsed\nthe armies of Henry III. and Henry IV. In 1636 and several succeeding\nyears the inhabitants of Paris owed their safety to its walls. If this\ncapital had been strongly fortified in 1814 and 1815, the allied armies\nwould not have dared to attempt its investment.\n\nBut it is deemed unnecessary to further specify examples; the whole\nhistory of modern warfare is one continued proof of the importance of\nfortifications as a means of national defence, and as an auxiliary in\noffensive military operations. Our illustrations have been mostly drawn\nfrom European wars, but our own brief history, as will be shown\nhereafter, is not without its proofs.\n\nThe use and importance of field-fortifications, intrenched camps, &c.,\nas well as the class of military works called coast-defences, will be\ndiscussed hereafter.[6]\n\n[Footnote 6: The use of fortifications in the defence of states is\ndiscussed by Ternay, Vauban, Cormontaigne, Napoleon, the Archduke\nCharles, Jomini, Fallot, and, incidentally, by most of the military\nhistorians of the wars of the French Revolution. The names of such\nstandard works as give the detailed arrangements of fortifications will\nbe mentioned hereafter.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nLOGISTICS.\n\n\nIII. We have defined _logistics_ to be that branch of the military art\nwhich embraces all the practical details of moving and supplying armies.\nThe term is derived from the title of a French general officer,\n_(major-general des logis,)_ who was formerly charged with directing the\nmarches, encampments, and lodging of the troops. It has been still\nfurther extended by recent military writers, and many of them now regard\nlogistics as a distinct and important branch of the art.\n\nWe shall here consider logistics as including the military duties\nordinarily attributed to the pay, subsistence, clothing, medical,\nhospital, and transportation departments; in fine, of all the civil and\ncivico-military corps of the army. We shall therefore discuss under this\nhead, the preparation of all the necessary materials for fitting out\ntroops for a campaign and for putting them in motion; the regulating of\nmarches, convoys, the means of transport for provisions, hospitals,\nmunitions, and supplies of all kinds; the preparation and protection of\nmagazines; the laying out of camps and cantonments; in fine, every thing\nconnected with preparing, moving, and guarding the _impedimenta_ of an\narmy.\n\nThe officers connected with this branch of service must consult with the\nengineers in every thing relating to the defence of their depots,\nmagazines, camps, cantonments, communications, and the passage of\nrivers, and in all that relates to their connection with the attack and\ndefence of places: but in all that relates to strategy and tactics they\nmust receive instructions directly from the chief of the staff of the\narmy, who will have the general direction of every thing connected with\nlogistics. Before commencing the operations of the campaign, or\nbeginning the execution of the plans decided upon at head-quarters,\nthis officer should satisfy himself respecting the condition of the\nvarious materials belonging to the different departments of the\narmy;--the horses and horse equipments, carriages, caissons, ponton and\nartillery equipages, siege equipages, moveable hospitals, engineer and\nartillery utensils, clothing, and munitions of all kinds; he must supply\nwhatever may be wanting, and provide means for the transportation of\nevery thing.\n\n_Subsistence_.--The art of subsisting troops during active operations in\na hostile country, is one of the most difficult subjects connected with\nwar; and it is a question well worthy of study, both for the statesman\nand the warrior, how Darius and Xerxes, Philip and Alexander, in ancient\ntimes--and the Greek emperors and the barbarians--and, later still, the\ncrusaders of the middle ages, contrived to support the immense masses of\nmen which they led to war.\n\nCaesar has said that war should be made to support war; and some modern\ngenerals have acted upon this principle to the extreme of supporting\ntheir armies entirely at the expense of the country passed over. Others\nhave adopted either in part or entirely the principle of regular\nmagazines.\n\nLouis XIV. and Frederick II. fought mostly on their own frontiers, and\nfollowed the system of regular depots and supplies. But the\nrevolutionary armies of France made war without magazines, subsisting,\nsometimes on the inhabitants, sometimes by requisitions levied on the\ncountry passed over, and at others by pillage and marauding. Napoleon\nfound little difficulty in supporting an army of a hundred or a hundred\nand twenty thousand men in Italy, Suabia, and on the rich borders of the\nRhine and the Danube; but in Spain, Poland, and Russia, the subject of\nsubsistence became one of extreme embarrassment.\n\nAll depots of provisions and other supplies for an army are denominated\n_magazines_; these are divided into _principal, secondary,_ and\n_provisional_. The first are usually on the base of operations; the\nsecond, on the line of operations; and the last in the immediate\nvicinity of the troops, and contain supplies for a few days only.\n\nThe system of _magazines_ is objected to by some, because it fetters the\nmovements of an army, and makes its military operations subordinate to\nthe means of supply. Moreover, as the movements of an army must be so\narranged as to cover these magazines, their establishment at given\npoints reveals to the enemy our plan of campaign.\n\nOn the other hand, the system of _requisitions_, either for immediate\nsupplies or for secondary magazines, gives far greater velocity and\nimpetuosity to an active army; and if it be so regulated as to repress\npillage, and be levied with uniformity and moderation, it may be relied\non with safety in well-cultivated countries; but in more barren and less\npopulous districts, an army without magazines, especially in case of a\nprolonged stay or a forced retreat, will be exposed to great suffering\nand loss, if not to total destruction.\n\nBefore commencing a campaign the general should make himself acquainted\nwith all the resources of the country to be passed over--determine the\namount of supplies which it may be necessary to take with him, and the\namount that can be obtained by requisitions; these requisitions being\nlevied in a uniform and legal manner, and through the existing local\nauthorities.\n\nIn great wars of invasion it is sometimes impracticable, at least for a\ntime, to provide for the immense forces placed on foot, by any regular\nsystem of magazines or of ordinary requisitions: in such cases their\nsubsistence is entirely intrusted to the troops themselves, who levy\ncontributions wherever they pass. The inevitable consequences of this\nsystem are universal pillage and a total relaxation of discipline; the\nloss of private property and the violation of individual rights, are\nfollowed by the massacre of all straggling parties, and the ordinary\npeaceful and non-combatant inhabitants are converted into bitter and\nimplacable enemies.\n\nIn this connection the war in the Spanish peninsula is well worthy of\nstudy. At the beginning of this war Napoleon had to choose between\nmethodical operations, with provisions carried in the train of his army,\nor purchased of the inhabitants and regularly paid for; and irregular\nwarfare, with forced requisitions--war being made to support war. The\nquestion was thoroughly discussed.\n\nOn the one hand, by sacrificing three or four millions of francs from\nthe French treasury, he would have been able to support his troops\nwithout requisitions, would have maintained good order and discipline in\nhis armies, and by the distribution of this money among a people poor\nand interested, he would have made many partisans. He could then have\noffered them, with a firm and just hand, the olive or the sword. But\nthen the drafts upon the French treasury, had the war been a protracted\none, would have been enormous for the support of an army of 200,000 men\nin Spain. Moreover, the hostile and insurrectionary state of the local\nauthorities rendered regular and legal requisitions almost impossible;\nand the want of navigable rivers, good roads, and suitable transport,\nrendered problematical the possibility of moving a sufficient quantity\nof stores in an insurrectionary country. Besides, no great detachments\ncould have been made to regulate the administration of the provinces, or\nto pursue the insurgent corps into the fastnesses of the mountains. In\nfine, by this system, he would have effected a military occupation of\nSpain without its subjugation.\n\nOn the other hand, by marching rapidly against all organized masses,\nliving from day to day upon the local resources of the country, as he\nhad done in Italy, sparing his reserves for the occupation and\npacification of the conquered provinces; this mode promised more prompt\nand decisive results than the other. Napoleon, therefore, determined to\nadopt it for his active masses, employing the system of magazines and\nregular requisitions so far as practicable. In favorable parts of the\ncountry, Soult and Souchet, with smaller armies, succeeded in obtaining\nin this way regular supplies for a considerable length of time, but the\nothers lived mainly by forced requisitions levied as necessity required.\nThis sometimes gave place to great excesses, but these were principally\nthe faults of subordinate officers who tolerated them, rather than of\nNapoleon, who punished such breaches of discipline, when they were known\nto him, with great severity. He afterwards declared that, \"had he\nsucceeded he would have indemnified the great mass of the Spanish people\nfor their losses, by the sale of the hoarded wealth of the clergy, which\nwould have rendered the church less powerful, and caused a more just\ndivision of property; thus the evil of the war would have been forgotten\nin the happy triumph of public and private interest over the interest of\nan ambitious and exclusive clergy.\"\n\nThe following maxims on subsistence have the sanction of the best\nmilitary writers:\n\n1st. Regular magazines should be formed, so far as practicable, for the\nsupplies of an army; the levying of requisitions being resorted to only\nwhere the nature of the war, and the requisite rapidity of marches,\nrender these absolutely necessary to success.\n\n2d. Depots should be formed in places strengthened by nature or art,\ndefended by small corps, or garrisons, and situated in positions least\nliable to attack.\n\n3d. All great depots should be placed on navigable rivers, canals,\nrailways, or practical roads, _communicating with the line of\noperations_, so that they may be transported with ease and rapidity, as\nthe army advances on this line.\n\n4th. An army should never be without a supply for ten or fifteen days,\notherwise the best chances of war may be lost, and the army exposed to\ngreat inconveniences. Templehoff says that the great Frederick, in the\ncampaign of 1757, always carried in the Prussian provision-train _bread_\nfor _six_, and _flour_ for _nine days_, and was therefore never at a\nloss for means to subsist his forces, in undertaking any sudden and\ndecisive operation. The Roman soldier usually carried with him\nprovisions for fifteen days. Napoleon says, \"Experience has proved that\nan army ought to carry with it a month's provisions, ten days' food\nbeing carried by the men and baggage-horses and a supply for twenty days\nby the train of wagons; so that at least four hundred and eighty wagons\nwould be required for an army of forty thousand men; two hundred and\nforty being regularly organized, and two hundred and forty being\nobtained by requisition. For this purpose there would be a battalion of\nthree companies for the military stores of each division, each company\nhaving its establishment for forty wagons, twenty being furnished by the\ncommissariat, and twenty obtained by requisition. This gives for each\ndivision one hundred and twenty wagons, and for each army, four hundred\nand eighty. Each battalion for a provision-train should have two hundred\nand ten men.\"\n\n5th. An army, while actually in motion, can find temporary resources,\nunless in a sterile country, or one already ravaged by war, or at the\nseason of the year when the old crops are nearly exhausted and the new\nones not ready for harvest; but, even supposing the army may in this way\nbe partially or wholly supplied, while in motion, it nevertheless\nfrequently happens that it may remain for some days in position, (as the\nFrench at Austerlitz and Ulm;) a supply of hard bread for some ten days\nwill therefore be important to subsist the army till a regular\ncommissariat can be established.\n\n6th. \"Supplies of bread and biscuit,\" says Napoleon, \"are no more\nessential to modern armies than to the Romans; flour, rice, and pulse,\nmay be substituted in marches without the troops suffering any harm. It\nis an error to suppose that the generals of antiquity did not pay great\nattention to their magazines; it may be seen in Caesar's Commentaries,\nhow much he was occupied with this care in his several campaigns. The\nancients knew how to avoid being slaves to any system of supplies, or to\nbeing obliged to depend on the purveyors; but all the great captains\nwell understood the art of subsistence.\"\n\n_Forage_ is a military term applied to food of any kind for horses or\ncattle,--as grass, hay, corn, oats, &c.; and also to the operation of\ncollecting such food. Forage is of two kinds, _green_ and _dry_; the\nformer being collected directly from the meadows and harvest-fields, and\nthe latter from the barns and granaries of the farmers, or the\nstorehouses of the dealers.\n\nThe animals connected with an army may be subsisted by regular\nmagazines, by forced requisitions, or by authorized _foraging_ [7] As\nhas already been remarked, it is not always politic, or even possible,\nto provide regular magazines for the entire supplies of an army during\nthe active operations of a campaign. On account of the great expense and\ndifficulty of transporting forage, the general of an army is more\nfrequently under the necessity of resorting to requisitions, or forced\ncontributions as they are called, and to foraging, for the subsistence\nof his animals, than to provide food for his men. Nor are requisitions\nand foragings for this object so objectionable as in the other case,\nbeing far less likely to produce general want and distress among the\nnon-combatant inhabitants.\n\n[Footnote 7: This term is sometimes, though improperly, applied to the\noperation of forcibly collecting food for the troops.]\n\nThe commanding officer of troops should always use his best endeavors to\nobtain his forage by purchase of the inhabitants, or by requisitions on\nthe local authorities; and even where these means are impracticable, the\nforaging parties should be strictly directed to make their levies with\nuniformity and due moderation. Accurate accounts should be kept of the\nkinds and quantities of all produce and other property taken, so that it\nmay be regularly distributed and accounted for. Under no circumstances\nshould individuals be permitted to appropriate to themselves more than\ntheir _pro rata_ allowance. Foraging parties may sometimes attain their\nobject in a peaceful manner, by representing to the inhabitants the\nnature of their instructions and the necessity of obtaining immediate\nsupplies. Even where no recompense is proposed, it may be well to offer\ncertificates to the effect that such articles have been taken for the\nuse of the army. These certificates, even when of no value in\nthemselves, frequently tend to appease excited passions and allay\ninsurrections. In defensive war, carried on in one's own country, it is\noften necessary to seize upon private property and appropriate it to the\npublic service: in all such cases the certificates of the foraging\nofficers become proofs of individual claims against the government.\n\nNo foraging party should ever be sent out till after the country has\nbeen properly reconnoitred. A good military escort and vanguard should\nalways accompany and precede the foragers, for protection against the\nenemy's light cavalry and an insurgent militia. Trustworthy troops must\nbe placed in the villages and hamlets of the country to be foraged, in\norder to prevent the foragers from engaging in irregular and\nunauthorized pillage. Officers of the staff and administrative corps\nare sent with the party to see to the proper execution of the orders,\nand to report any irregularities on the part of the troops. In case any\ncorps engage in unauthorized pillage, due restitution should be made to\nthe inhabitants, and the expense of such restitution deducted from the\npay and allowances of the corps by whom such excess is committed. A few\nexamples of this kind of justice will soon restore discipline to the\narmy, and pacify the inhabitants of the country occupied.\n\nExperience is the best guide in estimating the amount of hay or grain\nthat may be taken from a given field: the produce of an acre is, of\ncourse, very different for different soils and climates. In distributing\nthe burdens to the several pack-horses and wagons employed in conveying\nthe forage to the army, it is important for the foraging officers to\nknow the relative weight and bulk of each article.\n\n   Ordinary pressed hay in this country will average\n   about .   12 lbs. per cubic foot.\n   Wheat . . . weighs. .  60 lbs. per bushel.\n   Rye . . . .  \" . . . . 56 \" \"\n   Maize or Indian corn . 56 \" \"\n   Barley . . . \" . . . . 50 \" \"\n   Oats . . . . \" . . . . 35 \" \"\n   Meal, flour, and ground feed of all kinds, are purchased\n   by the pound.\n\n\nAs it would be exceedingly dangerous to send forward the regular train\nof the army for the conveyance of forage collected by these foraging\nparties, the country wagons and pack-horses are usually pressed into\nservice for this purpose.\n\nTroops of horse are sometimes sent into the vicinity of meadows and\ngrain-fields for temporary subsistence: in such cases the horses and\ncattle may be farmed in the neighborhood, and the grass and grain\nissued in regular rations, immediately as taken from the field; but in\nno case should the animals be turned out to pasture.\n\nIn a country like ours, where large bodies of new and irregular forces\nare to be suddenly called into the field in case of war, it is important\nto establish very rigid rules in relation to forage and subsistence;\notherwise the operations of such troops must be attended with great\nwaste of public and private property, the want of means of subsistence,\nthe consequent pillage of the inhabitants, and a general relaxation of\ndiscipline. Regular troops are far less liable to such excesses than\ninexperienced and undisciplined forces.\n\n_Marches_.--Marches are of two kinds: 1st. Route marches,--2d. Marches\nwithin reach of the enemy. The former belong to the domain of strategy;\nthe latter to that of tactics; both, however, are connected with\nlogistics in every thing that concerns the means of their execution.\n\nWhen an army is moving on a line of operations, it should be in as many\ncolumns as the facility of subsistence, celerity of movement, the nature\nof the roads, &c., may require. Large columns cannot move with the same\nrapidity as smaller ones, nor can they be so readily subsisted. But when\nan army is within striking distance of the enemy, concentration becomes\nmore important than celerity, and the forces must be kept in mass, or at\nleast within supporting distances of each other. We find only two\ninstances in the Seven Years' War, in which Frederick attempted attacks\nby several columns at considerable distances from each other; and in\nboth these instances (at Torgau and at Namiest, against Laudon, during\nthe siege of Olmutz) he was unsuccessful. His usual mode was to bring\nhis columns near together as he approached the enemy, and to form his\ntroops into line at the moment of attack. Such was his order of march at\nPrague, Kollin, Rosbach, Leuthen, Zornsdorf, and Kunersdorf. The\nfollowing is one of Frederick's orders respecting marches, (October 2d,\n1760.)\n\n\"The army will, as usual, march in three columns by lines. The first\ncolumn will consist of the first line; the second, of the second line;\nand the third, of the reserve. The wagons, and hospital wagons, of\nregiments, will follow their corps. The batteries of heavy calibre will\nfollow the infantry brigades to which they are assigned. On passing\nwoods, the regiments of cavalry will march between two infantry corps.\"\n\n\"Each column will have a vanguard of one light battalion and ten\nsquadrons of hussars or dragoons. They will be preceded by three wagons\ncarrying plank-bridges. The rear-guard is charged with taking up these\nbridges after the army has defiled over them.\"\n\n\"The parks will be divided among the columns, to avoid the embarrassment\nresulting from a great many wagons being together in a body.\"\n\n\"If any thing should happen to the second and third columns, the king\nwill be instantly apprized of it; he will be found at the head of the\nfirst column. Should any thing occur to the rear-guard, the same will be\ninstantly communicated to Lieutenant-general Zeithen, who will be with\nthe rear-guard of the first column.\"\n\n\"The officers will take care that the soldiers march with equal step,\nand that they do not stray to the right or left, and thus uselessly\nfatigue themselves and lose their distances.\"\n\n\"When orders are given to form the line, the wagons will file out of the\ncolumns to the left, and will march to be parked,\" &c.\n\nThe position of the baggage, when near the enemy, will depend on the\nnature of the march. If the march be to the front, it will be in rear of\nthe column; if the march be by the flank, and the enemy be on the outer\nflank, the baggage will be on the inner one, most remote from danger; if\nthe march be in retreat, the baggage will be in advance of the army. In\neither case it should be strongly guarded.\n\nIt was in direct violation of this rule that General Hull, in the\ncampaign of 1812, on reaching the Miami of the Lake, (Maumee,) embarked\nhis baggage, stores, sick, convalescent, and \"even the instructions of\nhis government and the returns of his army,\" on board the Cuyahoga\npacket, and dispatched them for Detroit, while the army, with the same\ndestination, resumed its march by land. The result of thus sending his\nbaggage, stores, official papers, &c., _without a guard, and on the\nflank nearest the enemy,_ was just what might have been anticipated:--in\nattempting to pass the British post of Malden the whole detachment was\nattacked and captured, \"by a subaltern and six men, in a small and open\nboat.\"\n\nTo prevent a surprise, detachments of light troops should be always\nthrown out in front, on the flanks, and in rear of the column,\ndenominated from their position, _Advanced-Guard, Flankers,_ and\n_Rear-Guard._ These scan the country which is to be passed over by the\ncolumn, watch the enemy's motions, and give notice of his approach in\ntime to allow the main force to choose a suitable field of battle, and\nto pass from the order of march to that of combat. The strength and\ncomposition of these detachments depend upon the nature of the ground,\nand the character and position of the enemy. In case of an attack they\nretire slowly, and on joining the main body, take their assigned\nposition in the line of battle.\n\nIn an open country the order of march presents but little difficulty;\nbut in a broken country, and especially in the vicinity of the enemy, a\nmarch cannot be conducted with too many precautions. Before engaging in\na _defile_ it should be thoroughly examined, and sufficient detachments\nsent out to cover the main body from attack while effecting the\npassage. A neglect of these precautions has sometimes led to the most\nterrible disasters.\n\nIn military operations very much depends upon the rapidity of marches.\nThe Roman infantry, in Scipio's campaigns in Africa, frequently marched\na distance of twenty miles in five hours, each soldier carrying from\nfifty to eighty pounds of baggage. Septimius Severus, Gibbon states,\nmarched from Vienna to Rome, a distance of eight hundred miles, in forty\ndays. Caesar marched from Rome to the Sierra-Morena, in Spain, a distance\nof four hundred and fifty leagues, in twenty-three days!\n\nNapoleon excelled all modern generals in the celerity of his movements.\nOthers have made for a single day as extraordinary marches as the\nFrench, but for general activity during a campaign they have no rivals\nin modern history. A few examples of the rapidity of their movements may\nnot be without interest.\n\nIn 1797 a part of Napoleon's army left Verona after having fought the\nbattle of St. Michaels, on the 13th of January, then marched all night\nupon Rivoli, fought in the mountains on the 14th, returned to Mantua on\nthe 15th, and defeated the army of Provera on the morning of the\n16th,--thus, in less than four days, having marched near fifty leagues,\nfought three battles, and captured more than twenty thousand prisoners!\nWell might he write to the Directory that his soldiers had surpassed the\nmuch vaunted rapidity of Caesar's legions.\n\nIn the campaign of 1800, Macdonald, wishing to prevent the escape of\nLoudon, in a single day marched forty miles, crossing rivers, and\nclimbing mountains and glaciers.\n\nIn 1805 the grand French army broke up their camp at Boulogne, in the\nearly part of September, and in two weeks reached their allotted posts\non the Rhine, averaging daily from twenty-five to thirty miles.\n\nDuring the same campaign the French infantry, pursuing the Archduke\nFerdinand in his retreat from Ulm, marched thirty miles a day in\ndreadful weather, and over roads almost impassable for artillery.\n\nAgain, in the campaign of 1806, the French infantry pursued the\nPrussians at the rate of from twenty-five to thirty miles per day.\n\nIn 1808 the advanced posts of Napoleon's army pursued Sir John Moore's\narmy at the rate of twenty-five miles a day, in the midst of winter.\nNapoleon transported an army of fifty thousand men from Madrid to\nAstorga with nearly the same rapidity, marching through deep snows,\nacross high mountains, and rivers swollen by the winter rains. The\nactivity, perseverance, and endurance of his troops, during these ten\ndays' march, are scarcely equalled in history.\n\nIn 1812, the activity of the French forces under Clausel was truly\nextraordinary. After almost unheard-of efforts at the battle of\nSalamanca, he retreated forty miles in a little more than twelve hours!\n\nIn 1814, Napoleon's army marched at the rate of ten leagues a day,\nbesides fighting a battle every twenty-four hours. Wishing to form a\njunction with other troops, for the succor of Paris, he marched his army\nthe distance of seventy-five miles in thirty-six hours; the cavalry\nmarching night and day, and the infantry travelling _en poste_.\n\nOn his return from Elba, in 1815, his guards marched fifty miles the\nfirst day after landing; reached Grenoble through a rough and\nmountainous country, a distance of two hundred miles, in six days, and\nreached-Paris, a distance of six hundred miles, in less than twenty\ndays!\n\nThe marches of the allied powers, during the wars of the French\nRevolution, were much less rapid than those of the armies of Napoleon.\nNevertheless, for a single day the English and Spaniards have made some\nof the most extraordinary marches on record.\n\nIn 1809, on the day of the battle of Talavera, General Crawford, fearing\nthat Wellington was hard pressed, made a forced march with three\nthousand men the distance of sixty-two miles in twenty-six hours!\n\nThe Spanish regiment of Romana, in their march from Jutland to Spain,\nmarched the extraordinary distance of fifty miles in twenty-one hours.\n\nCavalry, for a single day, will march a greater distance than infantry;\nbut for a campaign of several months the infantry will march over the\nmost ground. In the Russian campaign of Napoleon, his cavalry failed to\nkeep pace with the infantry in his forced march on Moskwa. But in the\nshort campaigns of 1805 and 1806, the cavalry of Murat displayed the\nmost wonderful activity, and effected more extraordinary results than\nany mounted troops of modern ages.\n\nThe English cavalry, however, have made one or two short marches with a\nrapidity truly extraordinary.\n\nIn 1803 Wellington's cavalry in India marched the distance of sixty\nmiles in thirty-two hours.\n\nBut the march of the English cavalry under Lord Lake, before the battle\nof Furruckabad, is, if we can trust the English accounts, still more\nextraordinary than any thing recorded of the Romans or the French--it is\nsaid that he marched _seventy miles in twenty-four hours!!!_\n\nAs a general rule, troops marching for many days in succession will move\nat the rate of from fifteen to twenty miles per day. In forced marches,\nor in pursuit of a flying enemy, they will average from twenty to\ntwenty-five miles per day. And for only two or three days in succession,\nwith favorable roads, thirty miles per day may be calculated on. Marches\nbeyond this are unusual, and, when they do occur, are the result of\nextraordinary circumstances.\n\n_Convoy_.--A convoy consists of provisions, military munitions, &c.,\nsent from one point to another, under the charge of a detachment of\ntroops, called an _escort_. When regular depots and magazines are\nestablished, with proper relations to the line of operations, convoys\nrequiring particular escorts are seldom necessary, because the position\nof the army will cover the space over which the magazines are to be\nmoved. But in the immediate vicinity of the enemy, or in a country whose\ninhabitants are hostile or insurrectionary, precautions of this kind\nshould always be resorted to.\n\nThe size and composition of the escort must depend upon the nature of\nthe country and the imminence of the danger. The ground to be passed\nover should be previously reconnoitred, and the line of march be taken\nup only after the most satisfactory reports. When once put in motion,\nthe convoy should be thoroughly hemmed in by flankers, to give warning\nto the escort of the approach of the enemy. Small parties of cavalry are\ndetached on all sides, but particularly in advance. The main body of the\nescort is concentrated on the most exposed point of the convoy while the\nother sides are guarded by subdivisions. In case of an attack by a large\nparty, the baggage wagons may be formed into a kind of defensive\nfield-work, which, with one or two pieces of light artillery, can in\nthis way resist a pretty strong effort to destroy or carry away the\nconvoy.\n\nAs a general rule, it is better to supply the wants of an army by small\nsuccessive convoys than by periodical and large ones. Even should some\nof the former be captured their loss would not be materially felt; but a\nlarge periodical convoy offers so great a temptation to the enterprise\nof the enemy, and is so difficult to escort, that he will venture much\nto destroy it, and its loss may frustrate our plans of a siege or of an\nimportant military operation. If the Prussian army, when besieging\nOlmutz, had observed this rule, the capture of a convoy would not have\nforced them to raise the siege and to retreat.\n\nNapoleon estimates that an army of 100,000 men in position will require\nthe daily arrival of from four to five hundred wagon loads of\nprovisions.\n\nThe difficulty of moving provisions, baggage, &c., in a retreat, is\nalways very great, and the very best generals have frequently failed on\nthis point. Indeed, the best concerted measures will sometimes fail,\namid the confusion and disorder consequent upon a retreat with an able\nand active enemy in pursuit. In such a case, the loss of the\nprovision-trains in a sterile or unfriendly country may lead to the most\nterrible disasters. We will allude to two examples of this kind: the\nretreat of the English from Spain in 1809, and that of the French from\nRussia in 1812.\n\nWhen Sir John Moore saw that a retreat had become necessary to save his\narmy from entire destruction, he directed all the baggage and stores to\nbe taken to the rear, and every possible arrangement to be made for\ntheir preservation and for the regular supplies of the army. But the\nwant of discipline in his troops, and more especially the want of a\nproper engineer organization to prepare the requisite means for\nfacilitating his own marches, and impeding the enemy's pursuit,\nprevented his plans from being fully carried into execution. Much\nsuffering and great losses were consequently inflicted upon his troops;\na large portion of his baggage and military stores was captured, and\neven the treasure of his army, amounting to some 200,000 dollars, was\nabandoned through the ignorance and carelessness of the escorting\nofficer.\n\nIn Napoleon's march into Russia, his plans had been so admirably\ncombined, that from Mentz to Moscow not a single estafette or convoy, it\nis said, was carried off in this campaign; nor was there a day passed\nwithout his receiving intelligence from France. When the retreat was\nbegun, (after the burning of Moscow,) he had six lines of magazines in\nhis rear; the 1st, at Smolensk, ten days' march from Moscow; those of\nthe 2d line at Minsk and Wilna, eight marches from Smolensk; those of\nthe 3d line at Kowno, Grodno, and Bialystok; those of the 4th line at\nElbing, Marienwerder, Thorn, Plock, Modlin, and Warsaw; those of the 5th\nline at Dantzic, Bamberg, and Posen; those of the 6th line at Stettin,\nCustrin, and Glogau. When the army left Moscow it carried with it\nprovisions sufficient for twenty days, and an abundance of ammunition,\neach piece of artillery being supplied with three hundred and fifty\nrounds; but the premature cold weather destroyed thirty thousand horses\nin less than three days, thus leaving the trains without the means of\ntransportation or suitable escorts for their protection: the horrible\nsufferings of the returning army now surpassed all description.\n\nThe officer selected to escort convoys should be a man of great\nprudence, activity, and energy, for frequently very much depends upon\nthe safe and timely arrival of the provisions and military stores which\nhe may have in charge.\n\n_Castrametation_.--Castrametation is, strictly speaking, the art of\nlaying out and disposing to advantage the several parts of the camp of\nan army. The term is sometimes more extensively used to include all the\nmeans for lodging and sheltering the soldiers during a campaign, and all\nthe arrangements for cooking, &c., either in the field or in winter\nquarters. A camp, whether composed of tents or barracks, or merely\nplaces assigned for bivouacking, must be divided and arranged in such a\nway that the several divisions shall be disposed as they are intended to\nbe drawn up in order of battle; so that, on any sudden alarm, the troops\ncan pass from it promptly, and form their line of battle without\nconfusion. Suitable places must also be assigned for cooking, for\nbaggage, and for provisions, military stores, and ammunitions.\n\nThe extent of the color front of a camp depends much on the character of\nthe ground and the means of defence, but as a general rule, it should\nnever exceed the position which the army would occupy in the line of\nbattle. The different arms should be encamped in the same order as that\nof battle; this order of course depending on the nature of the\nbattle-ground. A _corps d'armee_ is composed of battalions of infantry,\nsquadrons of cavalry, batteries of artillery, and companies of engineer\ntroops, and the art of encampments consists in arranging each of these\nelements so as to satisfy the prescribed conditions.\n\nThe choice of ground for a camp must be governed, 1st, by the general\nrules respecting military positions, and, 2d, by other rules peculiar to\nthemselves, for they may be variously arranged in a manner more or less\nsuitable on the same position.\n\nThat the ground be suitable for defence, is the first and highest\nconsideration.\n\nIt should also be commodious and dry: moist ground in the vicinity of\nswamps and stagnant waters, would endanger the health of the army: for\nthe same reason it should not be subject to overflow or to become marshy\nby heavy rains, and the melting of snow.\n\nThe proximity of good roads, canals, or navigable streams, is important\nfor furnishing the soldiers with all the necessaries of life.\n\nThe proximity of woods is also desirable for furnishing firewood,\nmaterials for huts, for repairs of military equipments, for works of\ndefence, &c.\n\nGood water within a convenient distance, is also an essential element in\nthe choice of ground for a camp; without this the soldiers' health is\nsoon undermined. The proximity of running streams is also important for\nthe purposes of washing and bathing, and for carrying off the filth of\nthe camp.\n\nThe camp should not be so placed as to be enfiladed or commanded by any\npoint within long cannon range; if bordering on a river or smaller\nstream, there should be space enough between them to form in order of\nbattle; the communications in rear should offer the means of retreating\nin case of necessity, but should not afford facilities to the enemy to\nmake his attack on that side.\n\nIf the camp is to be occupied for a considerable length of time, as for\n_cantonments_ or _winter-quarters_, the greater must be the care in\nselecting its position and in the arrangement for the health and comfort\nof the soldiers. In the latter case, (of winter-quarters,) the\nengineer's art should always be called in play to form intrenchments,\nlines of abattis, inundations, &c., to render the position as difficult\nof access to the enemy as possible.\n\nA _bivouac_ is the most simple kind of camp. It consists merely of lines\nof fires, and huts for the officers and soldiers. These huts may be made\nof straw, of wood obtained from the forest, or by dismantling houses and\nother buildings in the vicinity of the camp, and stripping them of their\ntimbers, doors, floors, &c. Troops may be kept in bivouac for a few\ndays, when in the vicinity of the enemy, but the exposure of the soldier\nin ordinary bivouacs, especially in the rainy seasons or in a rigorous\nclimate, is exceedingly destructive of human life, and moreover leads to\nmuch distress to the inhabitants of the country occupied, in the\ndestruction of their dwellings and the most common necessaries of life.\nIf the position is to be occupied for any length of time, the huts\nshould be arranged like tents, according to a regular system, and made\ncomfortable for the troops. Such should always be the system adopted in\ncamps of practice or manoeuvre, in cantonments, winter-quarters, or in\nintrenched positions.\n\nWe have adopted in our service the system of encamping in tents. These\nmay do very well under the ordinary circumstances; but in the active\noperations of a campaign they are exceedingly objectionable, as greatly\nencumbering the baggage-trains. It would seem preferable to resort to\nbivouacs for the temporary camp of a single night, and to construct a\nregular system of huts where a position is to be occupied for any length\nof time. This may be regarded as a general rule, but in certain\ncountries and climates, the tent becomes almost indispensable.\n\nNapoleon's views on this subject are certainly interesting, if not\ndecisive of the question: \"Tents,\" says he, \"are not wholesome. It is\nbetter for the soldier to bivouac, because he can sleep with his feet\ntowards the fire; he may shelter himself from the wind with a few boards\nor a little straw. The ground upon which he lies will be rapidly dried\nin the vicinity of the fire. Tents are necessary for the superior\nofficers, who have occasion to read and consult maps, and who ought to\nbe ordered never to sleep in a house--a fatal abuse, which has given\nrise to so many disasters. All the European nations have so far followed\nthe example of the French as to discard their tents; and if they be\nstill used in camps of mere parade, it is because they are economical,\nsparing woods, thatched roofs, and villages. The shade of a tree,\nagainst the heat of the sun, and any sorry shelter whatever, against the\nrain, are preferable to tents. The carriage of the tents for each\nbattalion would load five horses, who would be much better employed in\ncarrying provisions. Tents are a subject of observation for the enemies'\nspies and officers of the staff: they give them an insight into your\nnumbers, and the position that you occupy; and this inconvenience occurs\nevery day, and every instant in the day. An army ranged in two or three\nlines of bivouac is only to be perceived at a distance by the smoke,\nwhich the enemy may mistake for the vapor of the atmosphere. It is\nimpossible to count the number of fires; it is easy, however, to count\nthe number of tents, and to trace out the position that they occupy.\"\n\nThe guarding of camps is a very important matter, and requires much\nattention.\n\nThe _camp-guard_ consists of one or two rows of sentinels placed around\nthe camp, and relieved at regular intervals. The number of rows of\nsentinels, and the distance between each man, will depend upon the\ncharacter of the ground and the degree of danger apprehended.\n\nDetachments of infantry and cavalry, denominated picquets, are also\nthrown out in front and on the flanks, which, in connection with the\ncamp-guards, serve to keep good order and discipline in and around the\ncamp, to prevent desertions, intercept reconnoitering parties, and to\ngive timely notice of the enemy's approach.\n\nStill larger detachments, denominated _grand-guards_, are posted in the\nsurrounding villages, farm-houses, or small field-works, which they\noccupy as outposts, and from which they can watch the movements of the\nenemy, and prevent any attempts to surprise the camp. They detach\npatrols, videttes, and sentries, to furnish timely notice of danger.\nThey should never be so far from the camp as to be beyond succor in case\nof sudden attack. Outposts, when too far advanced, are sometimes\ndestroyed without being able to give notice of the enemy's approach.\n\nIn encamping troops in winter-quarters, it is sometimes necessary to\nscatter them over a considerable extent of ground, in order to\nfacilitate their subsistence. In such a case, the arrangement of guards\nrequires the utmost care. A chain of advanced posts should be placed\nseveral miles' distance from the line of camp; these posts should be\nsupported by other and larger detachments in their rear, and\nconcentrated on fewer points; and the whole country around should be\ncontinually reconnoitered by patrols of cavalry.\n\nThe manner in which Napoleon quartered and wintered his army on the\nPassarge, in 1806-7, furnishes a useful lesson to military men, both in\nthe matters of encampment and subsistence. An immense army of men were\nhere quartered and subsisted, in a most rigorous climate, with a not\nover fertile soil, in the midst of hostile nations, and in the very face\nof a most powerful enemy.\n\nA Roman army invariably encamped in the same order, its troops being\nalways drawn up in the same battle array. A Roman staff-officer who\nmarked out an encampment, performed nothing more than a mechanical\noperation; he had no occasion for much genius or experience. The form of\nthe camps was a square. In later times, they sometimes, in imitation of\nthe Greeks, made them circular, or adapted them to the ground. The camp\nwas always surrounded with a ditch and rampart, and divided into two\nparts by a broad street, and into subdivisions by cross-streets and\nalleys. Each tent was calculated to hold ten privates and a petty\nofficer.\n\nIn the middle ages, the form of the camp did not differ very essentially\nfrom that of the Romans, the variation consisting principally in the\ninterior arrangements, these arrangements being made to correspond to\nthe existing mode of forming a line of battle. The details of this\nsystem may be found in the military work of Machiavelli.\n\nThe art of fixing a camp in modern times is the same as taking up a line\nof battle on the same position. Of all the projectile machines must be\nin play and favorably placed. The position must neither be commanded,\nout-fronted, nor surrounded; but on the contrary ought, as far as\npossible, to command and out-front the enemy's position. But even in the\nsame position there are numerous modes of arranging an encampment, or of\nforming a line of battle, and to select the best of these modes\nrequires great experience, _coup d'oeil_, and genius. In relation to\nthis point Napoleon makes the following remarks:--\n\n\"Ought an army to be confined to one single encampment, or ought it to\nform as many as it has corps or divisions? At what distance ought the\nvanguard and the flankers to be encamped? What frontage and what depth\nought to be given to the camp? Where should the cavalry, the artillery,\nand the carriages be distributed? Should the army be ranged in battle\narray, in several lines? And if it should, what space should there be\nbetween those lines? Should the cavalry be in reserve behind the\ninfantry, or should it be placed upon the wings? As every piece has\nsufficient ammunition for keeping up its fire twenty-four hours, should\nall the artillery be brought into action at the beginning of the\nengagement, or should half of it be kept in reserve?\"\n\n\"The solution of these questions depends on the following\ncircumstances:--1st. On the number of troops, and the numbers of\ninfantry, artillery, and cavalry, of which the army is composed. 2d. On\nthe relation subsisting between the two armies. 3d. On the quality of\nthe troops. 4th. On the end in view. 5th. On the nature of the field.\nAnd 6th. On the position occupied by the enemy, and on the character of\nthe general who commands them. Nothing absolute either can or ought to\nbe prescribed on this head. In modern warfare there is no natural order\nof battle.\"\n\n\"The duty to be performed by the commander of an army is more difficult\nin modern armies, than it was in those of the ancients. It is also\ncertain that his influence is more efficacious in deciding battles. In\nthe ancient armies the general-in-chief, at a distance of eighty or a\nhundred toises from the enemy, was in no danger; and yet he was\nconveniently placed, so as to have an opportunity of directing to\nadvantage all the movements of his forces. In modern armies, a\ngeneral-in-chief, though removed four or five hundred toises, finds\nhimself in the midst of the fire of the enemy's batteries, and is very\nmuch exposed; and still he is so distant that several movements of the\nenemy escape him. In every engagement he is occasionally obliged to\napproach within reach of small-arms. The effect of modern arms is much\ninfluenced by the situation in which they are placed. A battery of guns,\nwith a great range and a commanding position that takes the enemy\nobliquely, may be decisive of a victory. Modern fields of battle are\nmuch more extended than those of the ancients, whence it becomes\nnecessary to study operations on a large scale. A much greater degree of\nexperience and military genius is requisite for the direction of a\nmodern army than was necessary for an ancient one.\"\n\nFigure 9 represents a camp (on favorable ground) of a grand-division of\nan army, composed of two brigades or twelve battalions of infantry,\ntwelve squadrons of cavalry, five batteries of artillery, and three\ncompanies of engineers.\n\nFigure 10 represents the details of a camp of a battalion of infantry\ncomposed of eight companies.\n\nFigure 11 is the camp of a squadron of cavalry.\n\nFigure 12 is the camp of two batteries of foot artillery, or two\ncompanies of foot engineers.\n\nFigure 13 is the camp of two batteries of mounted artillery, or two\ncompanies of mounted sappers and pontoniers.\n\nOn undulating or broken ground the arrangement and order of the general\ncamp, as well as the details of the encampment of each arm, would admit\nof much variation.[8]\n\n[Footnote 8: There are many valuable remarks on the various subjects\ncomprised under the head of logistics, in the works of Jomini, Grimoard,\nThiebault, Boutourlin, Guibert, Laroche Amyon, Bousmard, Ternay,\nVauchelle, Odier, Audouin, Bardin, Chemevrieres, Daznan, Ballyet,\nDremaux, Dupre d'Aulnay, Morin, and in the published regulations and\norders of the English army.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nTACTICS.\n\n\nIV. Tactics.--We have defined tactics to be the art of bringing troops\ninto action, or of moving them in the presence of the enemy;--that is,\nwithin his view, and within the reach of his artillery. This branch of\nthe military art has usually been divided into two parts: 1st. Grand\nTactics, or the tactics of battles; and 2d. Elementary Tactics, or\ntactics of instruction.[9]\n\n[Footnote 9: \"It does not come within the view of this work to say any\nthing of the merely mechanical part of the art; because it must be taken\nfor granted, that every man who accepts the command of an army knows at\nleast the alphabet of his trade. If he does not, (unless his enemy be as\nignorant as himself,) defeat and infamy await him. Without understanding\nperfectly what are called _the evolutions_, how is it possible that a\ngeneral can give to his own army that order of battle which shall be\nmost provident and skilful in each particular case in which he may be\nplaced? How know which of these evolutions the enemy employs against\nhim? and, of course, how decide on a counter-movement which may be\nnecessary to secure victory or avoid defeat? The man who shall take the\ncommand of an army without perfectly understanding this elementary\nbranch, is no less presumptuous than he who should pretend to teach\nGreek without knowing even his letters. If we have such generals, let\nthem, for their own sakes, if not for their country's, put themselves\nimmediately to school.\"]\n\nA _battle_ is a general action between armies. If only a small portion\nof the forces are engaged it is usually denominated a _combat_, an\n_affair_, an _action_, a _skirmish_, &c., according to the character of\nthe conflict. The art of combining and conducting battles of all\ndescriptions has been designated by the name of Grand Tactics.\n\nBattles may be arranged into three classes; 1st. _Defensive_ battles, or\nthose given in a chosen position by an army waiting the attack of the\nenemy. 2d. _Offensive_ battles, or those made by an army which attacks\nthe enemy in position. 3d. The _mixed_ or _unforeseen_ battles, given by\ntwo armies meeting while on the march.\n\nI. When an army awaits the attack, it takes its position and forms its\nline of battle according to the nature of the ground and the supposed\ncharacter and strength of the enemy's forces. Such is usually the case\nwhen an army wishes to cover a siege, protect a capital, guard depots of\nprovisions and military stores, or some important strategic point. The\ngeneral relations of positions with strategy and engineering have\nalready been considered; we will now discuss merely their relations to\nbattles.\n\nThe first condition to be satisfied by a tactical position is, that its\ndebouches shall be more favorable for falling on the enemy when he has\napproached to the desired point, than those which the enemy can have for\nattacking our line of battle. 2d. The artillery should have its full\neffect upon all the avenues of approach. 3d. We should have good ground\nfor manoeuvring our own troops unseen, if possible, by the enemy. 4th.\nWe should have a full view of the enemy's manoeuvres as he advances to\nthe attack. 5th. We should have the flanks of our line well protected by\nnatural or artificial obstacles. 6th. We should have some means of\neffecting a retreat without exposing our army to destruction.\n\nIt is very seldom that all these conditions can be satisfied at the same\ntime; and sometimes the very means of satisfying one, may be in direct\nviolation of another. A river, a forest, or a mountain, which secures a\nflank of a line of battle, may become an obstacle to a retreat, should\nthe defensive forces be thrown back upon that wing. Again, the position\nmay be difficult of attack in front or on the wings, and at the same\ntime unfavorable for retreat. Such was Wellington's position at\nWaterloo. The park of Hougomont, the hamlet of Haye Sainte, and the\nmarshy rivulet of Papelotte, were serious obstacles against the\nattacking force; but the marshy forest of Soignies in rear, with but a\nsingle road, cut off all hope of retreat.\n\nII. According to the strategic relations of the contending forces in a\ncampaign, will it be determined whether we are to await the enemy, or to\nseek him out and attack him wherever he may be found. We may sometimes\nbe obliged to make the attack at all hazards, for the purpose of\npreventing the junction of two corps, or to cut off forces that may be\nseparated from the main body by a river, &c. As a general rule the\nattacking force has a moral superiority over the defensive, but this\nadvantage is frequently more than counterbalanced by other conditions.\n\nThe main thing in an _offensive_ battle is to seize upon the decisive\npoint of the field. This point is determined by the configuration of the\nground, the position of the contending forces, the strategic object of\nthe battle; or, by a combination of these. For example, when one wing of\nthe enemy rests on a height that commands the remainder of his line,\nthis would seem the decisive point to be attacked, for its occupation\nwould secure the greatest advantages; but this point may be so very\ndifficult of access, or be so related to the strategic object as to\nrender its attack out of the question. Thus it was at the battle of\nBautzen: the left of the allies rested on the mountains of Bohemia,\nwhich were difficult of attack, but favorable for defence; moreover,\ntheir only line of retreat was on the right, which thus became the point\nof attack for the French, although the topographical and tactical key of\nthe field was on the left.\n\nIII. It frequently happens in modern warfare that battles result from\nthe meeting of armies in motion, both parties acting on the offensive.\nIndeed, an army that is occupying a defensive position may, on the\napproach of the enemy, advance to meet him while on the march. Battles\nof this kind may partake of the mixed character of offensive and\ndefensive actions, or they may be of the nature of a surprise to both\narmies. To this class belong the battles of Rosbach, Eylau, Lutzen,\nLuzzara, Abensberg, &c.\n\nSurprises were much more common in ancient than in modern times, for the\nnoise of musketry and the roar of artillery, belonging to the posts or\nwings assailed, will prevent any general surprise of an army. Moreover,\nthe division into separate masses, or _corps d'armee,_ will necessarily\nconfine the surprise to a part, at most, of the forces employed.\nNevertheless, in the change given to military terms, a surprise may now\nmean only an unexpected combination of manoeuvres for an attack, rather\nthan an actual falling upon troops unguarded or asleep. In this sense\nMarengo, Lutzen, Eylau, &c. are numbered with surprises. Benningsen's\nattack on Murat at Zarantin in 1812 was a true surprise, resulting from\nthe gross negligence and carelessness of the king of Naples.\n\nAn _order of battle_ is the particular disposition given to the troops\nfor a determined manoeuvre on the field of battle. A _line of battle_ is\nthe general name applied to troops drawn up in their usual order of\nexercise, without any determined manoeuvre; it may apply to defensive\npositions, or to offensive operations, where no definitive object has\nbeen decided on. Military writers lay down twelve orders of battle,\nviz.: 1st. The simple parallel order; 2d. The parallel order with a\ncrotchet; 3d. The parallel order reinforced on one or both wings; 4th.\nThe parallel order reinforced on the centre; 5th. The simple oblique\norder; 6th. The oblique order reinforced on the assailing wing; 7th. The\nperpendicular order on one or both wings; 8th. The concave order; 9th.\nThe convex order; 10th. The order by echelon on one or both wings; 11th.\nThe order by echelon on the centre; 12th. The combined orders of attack\non the centre and one wing at the same time.\n\n(Figure 14.)[10] The simple parallel order is the worst possible\ndisposition for a battle, for the two parties here fight with equal\nchances, and the combat must continue till accident, superior numbers,\nor mere physical strength decides the day; skill can have little or no\ninfluence in such a contest.\n\n[Footnote 10: In the plans, B is the army in position, and A the\nattacking force arranged according to the different orders of battle. To\nsimplify the drawings, a single line represents the position of an army,\nwhereas, in practice, troops are usually drawn up in three lines. Each\nfigure represents a grand division of twelve battalions.]\n\n(Figure 15.) The parallel order with a crotchet on the flank, is\nsometimes used in a defensive position, and also in the offensive with\nthe crotchet thrown forward. Malplaquet, Nordlingen, Prague, and Kolin,\nare examples of this order. Wellington, at Waterloo, formed the parallel\norder with the retired crotchet on the right flank.\n\n(Figure 16.) A line of battle parallel to the enemy's, if strongly\nreinforced on one point, is according to correct principles, and may in\ncertain cases secure the victory; but it has many inconveniences. The\nweak part of the line being too near the enemy, may, notwithstanding its\nefforts to the contrary, become engaged, and run the risk of a defeat,\nand thereby counterbalance the advantages gained by the strong point.\nMoreover, the reinforced part of the line will not be able to profit by\nits success by taking the enemy's line in flank and rear, without\nendangering its connection with the rest of the line.\n\n(Figure 17) represents the parallel order reinforced on the centre. The\nsame remarks are applicable to this as to the preceding.\n\nThese two orders were frequently used by the ancients: as at the battle\nof Zama, for example; and sometimes by modern generals. Turenne employed\none of them at Ensheim.\n\n(Figure 18) is the simple oblique order.\n\n(Figure 19) is the oblique order, with the attacking wing reinforced.\nThis last is better suited for an inferior army in attacking a superior,\nfor it enables it to carry the mass of its force on a single point of\nthe enemy's line, while the weak wing is not only out of reach of\nimmediate attack, but also holds the remainder of the enemy's line in\ncheck by acting as a reserve ready to be concentrated on the favorable\npoint as occasion may require.\n\nThe most distinguished examples under this order are the battles of\nLeuctra and Mantinea, under the celebrated Epaminondas; Leuthen, under\nFrederick; the Pyramids, Marengo, and Jena, under Napoleon.\n\n(Figure 20.) An army may be perpendicular upon a flank at the beginning\nof a battle, as was the army of Frederick at Rosbach, and the Russian\narmy at Kunersdorff; but this order must soon change to the oblique. An\nattack upon both wings can only be made when the attacking force is\nvastly superior. At Eylau, Napoleon made a perpendicular attack on one\nwing at the same time that he sought to pierce the enemy's centre.\n\n(Figure 21.) The concave order may be used with advantage in certain\ncases, and in particular localities. Hannibal employed it at the battle\nof Cannae, the English at Crecy and Agincourt, and the Austrians at\nEssling, in 1809.\n\n(Figure 22.) The convex order is sometimes formed to cover a defile, to\nattack a concave line, or to oppose an attack before or after the\npassage of a river. The Romans formed this order at the battle of\nCosilinum; the French at Ramilies in 1706, at Fleurus in 1794, at\nEssling in 1809, and at the second and third days of Leipsic in 1813,\nand at Brienne in 1814.\n\n(Figure 23.) The order by echelon on one wing may be frequently\nemployed with advantage; but if the echelon be made on both wings, there\nis the same objection to its use as to the perpendicular order on both\nwings. At Dresden, Napoleon attacked both wings at the same time; this\nis the only instance in his whole history of a similar attack, and this\nwas owing to peculiar circumstances in the ground and in the position of\nhis troops.\n\n(Figure 24.) The echelon order on the centre alone may be employed with\nsuccess against an army formed in a thin or too extended line of battle,\nfor it would be pretty certain to penetrate and break the line.\n\nThe echelon order possesses in general very great advantages. The\nseveral corps composing the army may manoeuvre separately, and\nconsequently with greater ease. Each echelon covers the flank of that\nwhich precedes it; and all may be combined towards a single object, and\nextended with the necessary _ensemble_. At the battle of the Pyramids,\nNapoleon formed the oblique order in echelon by squares. Portions of his\nforces were arranged in echelon in some of his other battles.\n\n(Figure 25.) The combined order in columns on the centre and one\nextremity at the same time, is better suited than either of the\npreceding for attacking a strong contiguous line. Napoleon employed this\norder at Wagram, Ligny, Bautzen, Borodino, and Waterloo.\n\nIt is impossible to lay down, as a general rule, which of these orders\nof battle should be employed, or that either should be exclusively\nfollowed throughout the whole battle. The question must be decided by\nthe general himself on the ground, where all the circumstances may be\nduly weighed. An order well suited to one position might be the worst\npossible in another. Tactics is in this respect the very reverse of\nstrategy--the latter being subject to more rigid and invariable rules.\n\nBut whatever the plan adopted by the attacking force, it should seek to\ndislodge the enemy, either by piercing or turning his line. If it can\nconceal its real intentions, and deceive him respecting the true point\nof attack, success will be more certain and decisive. A turning\nmanoeuvre may frequently be employed with advantage at the same time\nwith the main attack on the line. The operations of Davoust at Wagram,\nand Richepanse at Hohenlinden, are good examples under this head. The\nmanoeuvre is, however, a difficult one, and unless executed with skill,\nmay lead to disasters like the turning manoeuvres of the Austrians at\nRivoli and Austerlitz, and of the French under Jourdan at Stackach, and\nunder Marmont at Salamanca.\n\nWe will now discuss the particular manner of arranging the troops on the\nline of battle, or the manner of employing each arm, without entering,\nhowever, much into the detailed tactics of formation and instruction.\n\nWe shall begin with _infantry_, as the most important arm on the\nbattle-field.\n\nThere are four different ways of forming infantry for battle: 1st, as\ntirailleurs, or light troops; 2d, in deployed lines; 3d, in lines of\nbattalions, ployed on the central division of each battalion, or formed\nin squares; 4th, in deep masses.\n\nThese different modes of formation are reduced to four separate systems:\n1st, the thin formation of two deployed lines; 2d, a line of battalions\nin columns of attack on the centre, or in squares by battalions; 3d, a\ncombination of these two, or the first line deployed, and the second in\ncolumns of attack; and 4th, the deep formation of heavy columns of\nseveral battalions. The tirailleurs are merely accessories to the main\nforces, and are employed to fill up intervals, to protect the march of\nthe columns, to annoy the enemy, and to manoeuvre on the flanks.\n\n1st. Formerly the line of battle for infantry was very generally that\nof two deployed lines of troops, as shown in Fig. 26. But reason and\nexperience have demonstrated that infantry in this thin or light order,\ncan only move very slowly; that in attempting rapid movements it breaks\nand exhibits great and dangerous undulations, and would be easily\npierced through by troops of a deeper order. Hence it is that the light\nformation is only proper when the infantry is to make use of its fire,\nand to remain almost stationary.\n\n2d. If the formation of a line of battalions in columns of attack be\nemployed, the depth and mobility will depend upon the organization or\nhabitual formation of this arm.\n\nIn our service a battalion is supposed to be composed of ten companies,\neach formed in three ranks. The two flank companies are designed for\ntirailleurs. This would give a column of four divisions, and\nconsequently twelve files deep; and as only two of these files could\nemploy their fire, there would be much too large a portion of\nnon-combatants exposed to the enemy's artillery. In practice, however,\nwe employ the two-rank formation, which, if the flank companies be\ndetached, would give a column of attack eight files in depth, which is\nnot objectionable. If however, the flank companies should be present in\nthe battalion, the depth of the column would still be ten files.\n\nIn the French service, each battalion is composed of four divisions,\nformed in either two or three ranks. The two-rank formation is the one\nhabitually employed. If all the companies be present, and the formation\nin three ranks, the depth of column will be twelve files; if in two\nranks the depth will be eight, files. If the flank companies be\ndetached, the depth of column will be, for three ranks nine files, and\nfor two ranks six files. (Figs. 27 and 28.)\n\nIn the Russian service each, battalion has four divisions of three ranks\neach. But the third rank is employed as tirailleurs, which gives a depth\nof column of eight files. The employment of the third rank for\ntirailleurs is deemed objectionable on account of the difficulty of\nrallying them on the column. For this reason, the best authorities\nprefer detaching an entire division of two companies.\n\nThe formation of squares is exceedingly effective in an open country,\nand against an enemy who is superior in cavalry. Formerly very large\nsquares were employed, but they are now formed either by regiment or by\nbattalion. The former are deemed best for the defensive, and the latter\nfor offensive movements. The manner of arranging these is shown in\nFigure 29.\n\n3d. The mixed system, or the combination of the two preceding, has\nsometimes been employed with success. Napoleon used this formation at\nTagliamento, and the Russians at Eylau. Each regiment was composed of\nthree battalions, the first being deployed in line, and the other two\nformed in columns of attack by division in rear of the two extremities,\nas shown in Fig. 30. It may in some cases be better to place the second\nand third battalions in line with the first, and on the two extremities\nof this battalion, in order to prolong the line of fire. The centre of\nthe line of each regiment would be less strong, however, than when the\ntwo battalions by column are placed in rear of the other which is\ndeployed. This mixed system of formation has many advocates, and in\ncertain situations may be employed with great advantage.\n\n4th. The deep order of heavy columns of several battalions is\nobjectionable as an habitual formation for battle, inasmuch as it\nexposes large masses of men to the ravages of artillery, and diminishes\nthe mobility and impulsion of an attack without adding greatly to its\nforce. Macdonald led a column of this kind at the battle of Wagram with\ncomplete success, although he experienced enormous losses. But Ney's\nheavy columns of attack at Waterloo failed of success, and suffered\nterribly from the concentric fire of the enemy's batteries.\n\nWhenever deep columns are employed, Jomini recommends that the\ngrand-division of twelve battalions should have one battalion on each\nflank, (Fig. 31,) marching by files, in order to protect its flanks from\nthe enemy's attacks. Without this defence a column of twelve battalions\ndeep becomes an inert mass, greatly exposed to be thrown into disorder\nor broken, as was the column of Fontenoy, and the Macedonian phalanx by\nPaulus Emillus. A grand-division is sometimes arranged in two columns by\nbrigade, as is represented in Figure 32. These are less heavy than a\nsingle column of grand-division by battalion, but are subject to nearly\nthe same objections.\n\nAll offensive operations on the field of battle require _mobility,\nsolidity_, and _impulsion_; while, on the other hand, all defensive\noperations should combine _solidity_ with _the greatest possible amount\nof fire_.\n\nTroops in motion can make but little use of their fire-arms, whatever\nmay be their formation. If in very large masses, they move slower and\nare more exposed; but the moral effect of these large moveable columns\nis such, that they frequently carry positions without ever employing\ntheir fire. The French columns usually succeeded against the Austrian\nand Prussian infantry, but the English infantry could not so easily be\ndriven from their ground; hey also employed their fire to greater\nadvantage, as was shown at Talavera, Busaco, Fuente de Honore, Albuera\nand Waterloo. The smaller columns and the mixed formation were always\nmost successful against such troops.\n\nFrom these remarks we must conclude--1st. That the very thin as well as\nthe very deep formation is objectionable under ordinary circumstances,\nand can seldom be employed with safety.\n\n2d. That the attack by battalions in columns by division is the best for\ncarrying a position; the column should, however, be diminished in depth\nas much as possible, in order both to increase its own fire and to\ndiminish its exposure to the fire of the enemy; moreover, it should be\nwell covered by tirailleurs and supported by cavalry.\n\n3d. That the mixed formation of the first line deployed and the second\nin columns of battalion by division is the best for defence.\n\n4th. That either of the last two may be employed in the offensive or\ndefensive, according to the nature of the ground, the character of the\ngeneral, and the character and position of the troops. Squares are\nalways good against cavalry.\n\nTroops should be habituated to all these formations, and accustomed to\npass rapidly from one to another in the daytime or at night. None,\nhowever, but disciplined troops can do this: hence the great superiority\nof regulars on the field of battle, where skilful manoeuvres frequently\neffect more than the most undaunted courage.\n\nThe arm next in importance on the battle-field is _cavalry_. The\nprincipal merit of this arm consists in its _velocity_ and _mobility_.\nCavalry has little solidity, and cannot of itself defend any position\nagainst infantry; but in connection with the other arms, it is\nindispensable for beginning a battle, for completing a victory, and for\nreaping its full advantage by pursuing and destroying the beaten foe.\n\nThere are four different modes of forming cavalry, the same as for\ninfantry: 1st in deployed lines; 2d, a line of regiments in column of\nattack on the centre; 3d, the mixed formation; and 4th, the deep\nformation of several columns.\n\n1st. The thin formation was deemed objectionable for infantry, on\naccount of its liability to be penetrated by cavalry. The same objection\ndoes not hold so forcibly with respect to this latter arm; but full\nlines are deemed less advantageous than lines deployed checker-wise or\nin echelon. In either case the distance between the lines should be\nsufficient to prevent the second line from coming in contact with the\nfirst, in case the latter receives a slight check. This distance need\nnot be so great in lines deployed checker-wise, as when they are full,\nor in echelon.\n\n2d. The second system of formation, that is, a line of columns of attack\non the central division for infantry, is by battalion, but for cavalry,\nby regiment. If the regiment is composed of eight squadrons, the column\nwill contain four lines, two squadrons forming a division; but if\ncomposed of only six squadrons, the column will contain only three\nlines, and consequently will be six files in depth. In either case the\ndistance between the lines should be that of a demi-squadron, when the\ntroops are drawn up in battle array; but when charging, the divisions\nmay close to a less distance.\n\n3d. In forming a grand division of two brigades, by the third or mixed\nsystem, two regiments may be deployed in the first line, and three\nformed in columns of attack in rear of the flanks and centre, as is\nshown in Fig. 33, the sixth being held in reserve. This formation is\ndeemed a good one.\n\n4th. The fourth system, of deep columns of cavalry, is entirely unsuited\nfor the charge, and this formation can only be employed for troops drawn\nup in reserve.\n\nThe flanks of lines or columns of cavalry are always much exposed, and\nsquadrons should therefore be formed in echelon on the right and left,\nand a little in rear of the main body, in order to protect the flanks\nfrom the attacks of the enemy's horse. Irregular cavalry is usually\nemployed for this purpose.\n\nIn the formation of a grand division in line of battle, care should be\ntaken not to give too great an extent to the command of the generals of\nbrigade. If the formation be in two lines, neither brigade should form\nan entire line, but each should form a wing of the division, two\nregiments of the same brigade being placed in rear of each other. This\nrule is an important one, and should never be neglected.\n\nIt may also be laid down as a maxim, in the formation of cavalry on the\nbattle-field, that the first line after the charge, even if most\nsuccessful, may require reforming in rear of the second line, and that\nthis last should be prepared to act in the front line after the first\nonset. The success of the battle frequently depends upon the charge of\nthe final reserve of cavalry on the flanks of lines already engaged.\n\nIt is on account of this frequent manoeuvring of the cavalry on the\nbattle-field, its reforming for repeated charges, that great bodies\ndeployed in full lines are principally objected to. They cannot be\nhandled with the facility and rapidity of columns of regiments by\ndivisions. The attack of Nansouty's cavalry, formed in this way, on the\nPrussian cavalry, deployed in advance of Chateau-Thierry, in 1814, is a\ngood proof of this.\n\nCavalry may be brought to a charge--1st, in columns; 2d, in line; and\n3d, in route, or at random, _(a la deban-dade.)_ These may also be\nvaried by charging either at a trot or a gallop. All these modes have\nbeen employed with success. In a regular charge in line the lance offers\ngreat advantages; in the melee the sabre is the best weapon; hence some\nmilitary writers have proposed arming the front rank with lances, and\nthe second with sabres, The pistol and the carabine are useless in the\ncharge, but may sometimes be employed with advantage against convoys,\noutposts, and light cavalry; to fire the carabine with any effect, the\ntroop must be at a halt. In all charges in line, especially against\ncavalry, the fast trot is deemed preferable to the gallop, on account of\nthe difficulty of keeping up the alignment when the speed is increased.\nLances are utterly useless in a melee, and in employing troops armed in\nthis way, it is of the greatest importance to keep them in order and in\nline. In charging with the sabre against artillery the gallop may\nsometimes be employed, for velocity here may be more important than\nforce.\n\nWe will now consider the formation and use of _artillery_ on the field\nof battle. It may be laid down as a fundamental principle, that the fire\nof artillery should be directed on that part of the enemy's line which\nwe design to pierce; for this fire will not only weaken this point, but\nwill also aid the attack of the cavalry and infantry when the principal\nefforts are directed towards the intended point.\n\nIn the defence, the artillery is usually distributed throughout the\nwhole line, on ground favorable for its fire; but the reserve should be\nso placed that it can easily be brought to bear on the point where the\nenemy will be most likely to direct his principal attack.\n\nArtillery placed on a plain, or with ground slightly inclined in front,\nand using the point-blank or ricochet fire, is the most effective; very\nhigh points are unfavorable If possible, the concentric fire should be\nemployed against the enemy's columns of attack. The position of the\nEnglish artillery on the field of Waterloo, and the use of the\nconcentric fire, furnishes one of the best examples for the disposition\nof this arm to be found in modern military history.\n\nThe proper use of artillery on the battle-field is against the enemy's\ninfantry and cavalry, consequently only a small part of it should be\nemployed to respond to the fire of the enemy's batteries; not more than\none third at most can be spared for this object.\n\nIf possible, batteries should be established so as to take the enemy's\nline in flank, either by an oblique or enfilading fire. A direct fire\nagainst columns of attack, with a few light pieces thrown out to take it\nin flank at the same time, will always be advantageous. A direct and\nflank fire was employed with success by Kleist against the column of Ney\nat the battle of Bautzen; the French marshal was forced to change his\ndirection.\n\nBatteries should always be well secured on the flanks, and constantly\nsustained by infantry or cavalry. If attacked by cavalry, the artillery\nshould keep up its fire as long as possible, first with ball, and then\nwith grape when the enemy arrives within a suitable distance. The same\nrule will apply to attacks of infantry, except that the fire of solid\nshot at a great distance is much less effective than against mounted\ntroops.\n\nThe _engineer troops_ are employed on the field of battle principally by\ndetachments, acting as auxiliaries to the other arms. Each regiment of\ninfantry should have a detachment of sappers armed with axes to act as\npioneers, for the removal of obstacles that may impede its advance.\nThese sappers are of the utmost importance, for without them an entire\ncolumn might be checked and thrown into confusion by impediments which a\nfew sappers with their axes would remove in a very short time.\nDetachments of engineer troops must also act in concert with the cavalry\nand artillery for the same purpose as above. In establishing the\nbatteries of artillery, in opening roads for their manoeuvres, and in\narranging material obstacles for their defence, the axes, picks, and\nshovels of the sappers are of infinite value. Fieldworks, bridges, and\nbridge-defences, frequently have a decisive influence upon the result of\na battle, but as these are usually arranged previous to the action, they\nwill be discussed in another place. In the attack and defence of these\nfield-works, the engineer troops play a distinguished part. The\nconsideration of this part of the subject, though perhaps properly\nbelonging to the tactics of battles, will also be postponed to another\noccasion.\n\nWe will now discuss the employment of the combined arms on the field of\nbattle.\n\nBefore the French Revolution, all the infantry, formed by regiments and\nbrigades, was united in a single body and drawn up in two lines. The\ncavalry was placed on the two flanks, and the artillery distributed\nalong the entire line. In moving by wings, they formed four columns, two\nof cavalry and two of infantry: in moving by a flank, they formed only\ntwo very long columns; the cavalry, however, sometimes formed a third\nand separate column in flank movements, but this disposition was rarely\nmade.\n\nThe French Revolution introduced the system of grand divisions composed\nof the four arms combined; each division moved separately and\nindependently of the other. In the wars of the Empire, Napoleon united\ntwo or more of these divisions into a _corps d'armee,_ which formed a\nwing, the centre, or reserve of his grand army. In addition to these\ndivisions and _corps d'armee,_ he had large reserves of cavalry and\nartillery, which were employed as distinct and separate arms.\n\nIf the forces be sufficiently numerous to fight by _corps d'armee,_ each\ncorps should have its own reserve, independent of the general reserve of\nthe army. Again, if the forces be so small as to act by grand divisions\nonly, each division should then have _its_ separate reserve.\n\nAn army, whether composed of separate corps or of grand divisions,\nusually forms, on the field of battle, a centre, two wings, and a\nreserve. Each corps or division acts by itself, with its infantry,\ncavalry, artillery, and engineer troops. The reserve of cavalry may be\nformed in rear of the centre or one of the wings. In small forces of\nfifty or sixty thousand men, the cavalry may act with advantage on the\nwings, in the manner of the ancients. If the reserve of this arm be\nlarge enough to form three separate bodies, it may _itself_ very\nproperly be formed into a centre and wings. If it be formed into two\ncolumns only, they may be placed in rear of the openings between the\ncentre and the wings of the main force. The reserve of artillery is\nemployed either to reinforce the centre or a wing, and in the defensive\nis frequently distributed throughout the whole line of battle. In\noffensive operations, it may be well to concentrate as much fire as\npossible on the intended point of attack. The mounted artillery either\nacts in concert with the cavalry, of is used to reinforce that arm; the\nlight-foot acts with the infantry, and the batteries of heavy calibre\nare distributed along the line, or concentrated on some important point\nwhere their fire may be most effectual. They reach the enemy's forces at\na distance, and arrest the impulsion of his attack. They may also be\nemployed to draw the fire of his artillery; but their movements are too\nslow and difficult for a reserve.\n\nThe order of succession in which the different arms are engaged in a\nbattle, depends upon the nature of the ground and other accidental\ncircumstances, and cannot be determined by any fixed rules. The\nfollowing, however, is most frequently employed, and in ordinary cases\nmay be deemed good.\n\nThe attack is first opened by a cannonade; light troops are sent forward\nto annoy the enemy, and, if possible, to pick off his artillerists. The\nmain body then advances in two lines: the first displays itself in line\nas it arrives nearly within the range of grape-shot; the second line\nremains in columns of attack formed of battalions by division, at a\ndistance from the first sufficient to be beyond the reach of the enemy's\nmusketry, but near enough to support the first line, or to cover it, if\ndriven back. The artillery, in the mean time, concentrates its fire on\nsome weak point to open a way for the reserve, which rushes into the\nopening and takes the enemy in flank and rear. The cavalry charges at\nthe opportune moment on the flank of the enemy's columns or penetrates\nan opening in his line, and cutting to pieces his staggered troops,\nforces them into retreat, and completes the victory. During this time\nthe whole line of the enemy should be kept occupied, so as to prevent\nfresh troops from being concentrated on the threatened point.\n\nThe following maxims on battles may be studied with advantage:--1st.\n_General battles_ are not to be fought but under the occurrence of one\nof the following circumstances: when you are, from any cause, decidedly\nsuperior to the enemy; when he is on the point of receiving\nreinforcements, which will materially effect your relative strength;\nwhen, if not beaten or checked, he will deprive you of supplies or\nreinforcements, necessary to the continuance or success of your\noperations; and, generally, when the advantage of winning the battle\nwill be greater than the disadvantage of losing it.\n\n2d. Whatever may be your reason for risking a general battle, you ought\nto regard as indispensable preliminaries,--a thorough knowledge of the\nground on which you are to act; an ample supply of ammunition; the most\nperfect order in your fire-arms; hospital depots regularly established,\nwith surgeons, nurses, dressings, &c., sufficient for the accommodation\nof the wounded; points of rendezvous established and known to the\ncommanders of corps; and an entire possession of the passes in your own\nrear.\n\n3d. The battle being fought and _won_, the victory must be followed up\nwith as much alacrity and vigor, as though nothing had been gained,--a\nmaxim very difficult of observance, (from the momentary disobedience\nwhich pervades all troops flushed with conquest,) but with which an\nable general will never dispense. No one knew better the use of this\nmaxim than Napoleon, and no one was a more strict and habitual observer\nof it.\n\n4th. The battle being fought and _lost_, it is your first duty to do\naway the _moral_ effect of defeat,--the want of that self-respect and\nself-confidence, which are its immediate followers, and which, so long\nas they last, are the most powerful auxiliaries of your enemy. It is\nscarcely necessary to remark that, to effect this object,--to reinspire\na beaten army with hope, and to reassure it of victory,--we must not\nturn our backs on an enemy, without sometimes presenting to him our\nfront also;--we must not confide our safety to mere flight, but adopt\nsuch measures as shall convince him that though wounded and overpowered,\nwe are neither disabled nor dismayed; and that we still possess enough\nboth of strength and spirit to punish his faults, should he commit any.\nDo you operate in a covered or mountainous country?--avail yourself of\nits ridges and woods; for by doing so you will best evade the pressure\nof his cavalry. Have you defiles or villages to pass?--seize the heads\nof these, defend them obstinately, and make a show of fighting another\nbattle. In a word, let no error of your enemy, nor any favorable\nincident of the ground, escape your notice or your use. It is by these\nmeans that your enemy is checked, and your troops inspirited; and it was\nby these that Frederick balanced his surprise at Hohenkirchen, and the\ndefeat of his plans before Olmutz. The movement of our own Washington,\nafter losing the battle of Brandywine, was of this character. He hastily\nrecrossed the Schuylkill with the professed intention of seeking the\nenemy and renewing the combat, which was _apparently_ prevented only by\na heavy and incessant fall of rain. A rumor was now raised that the\nenemy, while refusing his left wing, was rapidly advancing upon his\nright, to intercept our passage of the river, and thus gain possession\nof Philadelphia. This report justified a retreat, which drew from the\nGeneral repeated assurances, that in quitting his present position and\ngiving to his march a retrograde direction, it was not his object to\navoid, but to follow and to fight the enemy. This movement, though no\nbattle ensued, had the effect of restoring the confidence as well of the\npeople as of the army.[11]\n\n[Footnote 11: There are innumerable works in almost every language on\nelementary tactics; very few persons, however, care to read any thing\nfurther than the manuals used in our own service. Our system of\ninfantry, cavalry, and artillery tactics is generally taken from the\nFrench; and also the course of engineer instruction, so far as matured,\nfor sappers, miners, and pontoniers, is based on the French manuals for\nthe varied duties of this arm.\n\nOn Grand Tactics, or Tactics of Battles, the military and historical\nwritings of General Jomini abound in most valuable instructions.\nNapoleon's memoirs, and the writings of Rocquancourt, Hoyer, Decker,\nOkouneff, Roguiat, Jocquinot-de-Presle, Guibert, Duhesme, Gassendi,\nWarnery, Baron Bohan, Lindneau, Maiseroy, Miller, and Ternay, are\nconsidered as being among the best authorities.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\nMILITARY POLITY AND THE MEANS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE.\n\n\n_Military Polity_.--In deciding upon a resort to arms, statesmen are\nguided by certain general rules which have been tacitly adopted in the\nintercourse of nations: so also both statesmen and generals are bound by\nrules similarly adopted for the conduct of hostile forces while actually\nengaged in military operations.\n\nIn all differences between nations, each state has a right to decide for\nitself upon the nature of its means of redress for injuries received.\nPrevious to declaring open and public war, it may resort to some other\nforcible means of redress, short of actual war. These are:--\n\n1st. Laying an embargo upon the property of the offending nation.\n\n2d. Taking forcible possession of the territory or property in dispute.\n\n3d. Resorting to some direct measure of retaliation.\n\n4th. Making reprisals upon the persons and things of the offending\nnation.\n\nIt is not the present purpose to discuss these several means of redress,\nnor even to enter into any examination of the rights and laws of public\nwar, when actually declared; it is intended to consider here merely such\nmilitary combinations as are resorted to by the state in preparation for\ndefence, or in carrying on the actual operations of a war.\n\nIn commencing hostilities against any other power, we must evidently\ntake into consideration all the political and physical circumstances of\nthe people with whom we are to contend: we must regard their general\ncharacter for courage and love of country; their attachment to their\ngovernment and political institutions; the character of their rulers and\ntheir generals; the numbers, organization, and discipline of their\narmies; and particularly the relations between the civil and military\nauthorities in the state, for if the latter be made entirely\nsubordinate, we may very safely calculate on erroneous combinations. We\nmust also regard their passive means of resistance, such as their system\nof fortifications, their military materials and munitions, their\nstatistics of agriculture, commerce, and manufactures, and especially\nthe geographical position and physical features of their country. No\ngovernment can neglect, with impunity, these considerations in its\npreparations for war, or in its manner of conducting military\noperations.\n\nNapoleon's system of carrying on war against the weak, effeminate, and\ndisorganized Italians required many modifications when directed against\nthe great military power of Russia. Moreover, the combinations of Eylau\nand Friedland were inapplicable to the contest with the maddened\nguerrillas of Minos, animated by the combined passions of hatred,\npatriotism, and religious enthusiasm.\n\nMilitary power may be regarded either as absolute or relative: the\nabsolute force of a state depending on the number of its inhabitants and\nthe extent of its revenues; the relative force, on its geographical and\npolitical position, the character of its people, and the nature of its\ngovernment. Its military preparations should evidently be in proportion\nto its resources. Wealth constitutes both the apprehension and the\nincentive to invasion. Where two or more states have equal means of war,\nwith incentives very unequal, an equilibrium cannot exist; for danger\nand temptation are no longer opposed to each other. The preparation of\nstates may, therefore, be equal without being equivalent, and the\nsmaller of the two may be most liable to be drawn into a war without the\nmeans of sustaining it.\n\nThe numerical relation between the entire population of a state, and the\narmed forces which it can maintain, must evidently vary with the wealth\nand pursuits of the people. Adam Smith thinks that a country purely\nagricultural may, at certain seasons, furnish for war one-fifth, or even\nin case of necessity one-fourth, of its entire population. A commercial\nor manufacturing country would be unable to furnish any thing like so\nnumerous a military force. On this account small agricultural states are\nsometimes able to bring into the field much larger armies than their\nmore powerful neighbors. During the Seven Years' War, Frederick\nsupported an army equal to one-twentieth of the entire Prussian\npopulation, and at the close of this memorable contest one-sixth of the\nmales capable of bearing arms had actually perished on the field of\nbattle.\n\nBut the number of troops that may be brought into the field in times of\ngreat emergency is, of course, much greater than can be supported during\na long war, or as a part of a permanent military establishment.\nMontesquieu estimates that modern nations are capable of supporting,\nwithout endangering their power, a permanent military force of about\none-hundredth part of their population. This ratio differs but little\nfrom that of the present military establishments of the great European\npowers.\n\nGreat Britain, with a population of about twenty-five millions, and a\ngeneral budget of $250,000,000, supports a military and naval force of\nabout 150,000 effective and 100,000 non-effective men, 250,000 in all,\nat an annual expense of from seventy to eighty millions of dollars.\n\nRussia, with a population of about seventy millions, supports an active\narmy of 632,000 men, with an immense reserve, at an expense of about\n$65,000,000, out of a general budget of $90,000,000; that is, the\nexpense of her military establishment is to her whole budget as 7 to 10.\n\nAustria, with a population of thirty-five millions, has an organized\npeace establishment of 370,000, (about 250,000 in active service,) and\na reserve of 260,000, at an expense of $36,000,000, out of a general\nbudget of $100,000,000.\n\nPrussia, with a population of about fifteen millions, has from 100,000\nto 120,000 men in arms, with a reserve of 200,000, at an annual expense\nof more than $18,000,000, out of a general budget of about $38,000,000.\n\nFrance, with a population of near thirty-five millions, supports a\npermanent establishment of about 350,000 men, at an expense of seventy\nor eighty millions of dollars, out of a total budget of $280,000,000.\nFrance has long supported a permanent military force of from\none-hundredth to one hundred-and-tenth of her population, at an expense\nof from one-fourth to one-fifth of her whole budget. The following\ntable, copied from the \"Spectateur Militaire,\" shows the state of the\narmy at six different periods between 1788 and 1842. It omits, of\ncourse, the extraordinary levies of the wars of the Revolution and of\nthe Empire.\n\n_Table_.\n\n                    Budget.                    Army.\nDates. Population.                                             Remarks.\n\n                    Of State.     Of the Army. Peace    War\n                                              Estab.   Estab.\n                    Livres.       Livres.      Men.     Men.\n1788   24,000,000  500,000,000   100,000,000  180,000  360,000\n                       Francs.       Francs.                   Ordinance of\n1814   28,000,000  800,000,000   180,000,000  255,000  340,000 1814\n                                                               Report of\n1823   31,000,000  900,000,000   200,000,000  280,000  390,000 Minister\n                                                               of War.\n                                                               Report of\n1830   32,000,000  1,000,000,000 220,000,000  312,000  500,000 Minister\n                                                               of War.\n1840   34,000,000  1,170,000,000 242,000,000  312 ,000   -     Budget of\n                                                                 1840.\n                                                               Estimated\n1842   35,000,000  1,200,000,000 285,000,000  370,000  520,000 Expenses\n                                                                of 1842.\n\nFrom these data we see that the great European powers at the present day\nmaintain, in time of peace, military establishments equal to about\none-hundredth part of their entire population.\n\nThe geographical position of a country also greatly influences the\ndegree and character of its military preparation. It may be bordered on\none or more sides by mountains and other obstacles calculated to\ndiminish the probability of invasion; or the whole frontier may be wide\nopen to an attack: the interior may be of such a nature as to furnish\nsecurity to its own army, and yet be fatal to the enemy should he occupy\nit; or it may furnish him advantages far superior to his own country. It\nmay be an island in the sea, and consequently exposed only to maritime\ndescents--events of rare occurrence in modern times.\n\nAgain, a nation may be placed between others who are interested in its\nsecurity, their mutual jealousy preventing the molestation of the weaker\nneighbor. On the other hand, its political institutions may be such as\nto compel the others to unite in attacking it in order to secure\nthemselves. The republics of Switzerland could remain unmolested in the\nmidst of powerful monarchies; but revolutionary France brought upon\nherself the armies of all Europe.\n\nClimate has also some influence upon military character, but this\ninfluence is far less than that of education and discipline. Northern\nnations are said to be naturally more phlegmatic and sluggish than those\nof warmer climates; and yet the armies of Gustavus Adolphus, Charles\nXII., and Suwarrow, have shown themselves sufficiently active and\nimpetuous, while the Greeks, Romans, and Spaniards, in the times of\ntheir glory, were patient, disciplined, and indefatigable,\nnotwithstanding the reputed fickleness of ardent temperaments.\n\nFor any nation to postpone the making of military preparations till such\ntime as they are actually required in defence, is to waste the public\nmoney, and endanger the public safety. The closing of an avenue of\napproach, the security of a single road or river, or even the strategic\nmovement of a small body of troops, often effects, in the beginning,\nwhat afterwards cannot be accomplished by large fortifications, and the\nmost formidable armies. Had a small army in 1812, with a well-fortified\ndepot on Lake Champlain, penetrated into Canada, and cut off all\nreinforcements and supplies by way of Quebec, that country would\ninevitably have fallen into our possession. In the winter of 1806-7,\nNapoleon crossed the Vistula, and advanced even to the walls of\nKoenigsberg, with the Austrians in his rear, and the whole power of\nRussia before him. If Austria had pushed forward one hundred thousand\nmen from Bohemia, on the Oder, she would, in all probability, says the\nbest of military judges, Jomini, have struck a fatal blow to the\noperations of Napoleon, and his army must have been exceedingly\nfortunate even to regain the Rhine. But Austria preferred remaining\nneutral till she could increase her army to four hundred thousand men.\nShe then took the offensive, and was beaten; whereas, with one hundred\nthousand men brought into action at the favorable moment, she might,\nmost probably, have decided the fate of Europe.\n\n\"Defensive war,\" says Napoleon, \"does not preclude attack, any more\nthan offensive war is exclusive of defence,\" for frequently the best way\nto counteract the enemy's operations, and prevent his conquests, is, at\nthe very outset of the war, to invade and cripple him. But this can\nnever be attempted with raw troops, ill supplied with the munitions of\nwar, and unsupported by fortifications. Such invasions must necessarily\nfail. Experience in the wars of the French revolution has demonstrated\nthis; and even our own short history is not without its proof. In 1812,\nthe conquest of Canada was determined on some time before the\ndeclaration of war; an undisciplined army, without preparation or\napparent plan, was actually put in motion, eighteen days previous to\nthis declaration, for the Canadian peninsula. With a disciplined army of\nthe same numbers, with an efficient and skilful leader, directed against\nthe vital point of the British possessions at a time when the whole\nmilitary force of the provinces did not exceed three thousand men, how\ndifferent had been the result!\n\nWhile, therefore, the permanent defences of a nation must be subordinate\nto its resources, position, and character, they can in no case be\ndispensed with. No matter how extensive or important the temporary means\nthat may be developed as necessity requires, there must be some force\nkept in a constant state of efficiency, in order to impart life and\nstability to the system. The one can never properly replace the other;\nfor while the former constitutes the basis, the latter must form the\nmain body of the military edifice, which, by its strength and\ndurability, will offer shelter and protection to the nation; or, if the\narchitecture and materials be defective, crush and destroy it in its\nfall.\n\nThe permanent means of military defence employed by modern nations,\nare--\n\n1st. An army; 2d. A navy; 3d. Fortifications.\n\nThe first two of these could hardly be called permanent, if we were, to\nregard their _personnel_; but looking upon them as institutions or\norganizations, they present all the characteristics of durability. They\nare sometimes subjected to very great and radical changes; by the\nhot-house nursing of designing ambition or rash legislation, they may\nbecome overgrown and dangerous, or the storms of popular delusion may\noverthrow and apparently sweep them away. But they will immediately\nspring up again in some form or other, so deeply are they rooted in the\norganization of political institutions.\n\nIts army and navy should always be kept within the limits of a nation's\nwants; but pity for the country which reduces them in number or support\nso as to degrade their character or endanger their organization. \"A\ngovernment,\" says one of the best historians of the age, \"which neglects\nits army, under whatever pretext, is a government culpable in the eyes\nof posterity, for it is preparing humiliations for its flag and its\ncountry, instead of laying the foundation for its glory.\"\n\nOne of our own distinguished cabinet ministers remarks, that the history\nof our relations with the Indian tribes from the beginning to the\npresent hour, is one continued proof of the necessity of maintaining an\nefficient military force in time of peace, and that the treatment we\nreceived for a long series of years from European powers, was a most\nhumiliating illustration of the folly of attempting to dispense with\nthese means of defence.\n\n\"Twice,\" says he, \"we were compelled to maintain, by open war, our\nquarrel with the principal aggressors. After many years of forbearance\nand negotiation, our claims in other cases were at length amicably\nsettled; but in one of the most noted of these cases, it was not without\nmuch delay and imminent hazard of war that the execution of the treaty\nwas finally enforced. No one acquainted with these portions of our\nhistory, can hesitate to ascribe much of the wantonness and duration of\nthe wrongs we endured, to a knowledge on the part of our assailants of\nthe scantiness and inefficiency of our military and naval force.\"\n\n\"If,\" said Mr. Calhoun, \"disregarding the sound dictates of reason and\nexperience, we, in peace, neglect our military establishment, we must,\nwith a powerful and skilful enemy, be exposed to the most distressing\ncalamities.\"\n\nThese remarks were made in opposition to the reduction of our military\nestablishment, in 1821, below the standard of thirteen thousand.\nNevertheless, the force was reduced to about six or seven thousand; and\nwe were soon made to feel the consequences. It is stated, in a report of\nhigh authority, that if there had been two regiments available near St.\nLouis, in 1832, the war with Black Hawk would have been easily avoided;\nand that it cannot be doubted that the scenes of devastation and savage\nwarfare which overspread the Floridas for nearly seven years would also\nhave been avoided, and some thirty millions have been saved the country,\nif two regiments had been available at the beginning of that\nconflict.[12]\n\n[Footnote 12: We may now add to these remarks, that if our government\nhad occupied the country between the Nueces and the Rio Grande with a\nwell-organized army of twelve thousand men, war with Mexico might have\nbeen avoided; but to push forward upon Matamoras a small force of only\ntwo thousand, in the very face of a large Mexican army was holding out\nto them the strongest inducements to attack us. The temporary economy of\na few thousands in reducing our military establishment to a mere handful\nof men, again results in a necessary expenditure of many millions of\ndollars and a large sacrifice of human life.]\n\nWe must, in this country, if we heed either the dictates of reason or\nexperience, maintain in time of peace a skeleton military and naval\nforce, capable of being greatly expanded, in the event of danger, by\nthe addition of new troops.\n\nMuch energy and enterprise will always be imparted to an army or navy by\nthe addition of new forces. The strength thus acquired is sometimes in\neven a far greater ratio than the increase of numbers. But it must be\nremembered that these new elements are, of themselves, far inferior to\nthe old ones in discipline, steady courage, and perseverance. No general\ncan rely on the accuracy of their movements in the operations of a\ncampaign, and they are exceedingly apt to fail him at the critical\nmoment on the field of battle. The same holds true with respect to\nsailors inexperienced in the discipline and duties of a man-of-war.\nThere is this difference, however: an army usually obtains its recruits\nfrom men totally unacquainted with military life, while a navy, in case\nof sudden increase, is mainly supplied from the merchant marine with\nprofessional sailors, who, though unacquainted with the use of\nartillery, &c., on ship-board, are familiar with all the other duties of\nsea life, and not unused to discipline. Moreover, raw seamen and\nmarines, from being under the immediate eye of their officers in time of\naction, and without the possibility of escape, fight much better than\ntroops of the same character on land. If years are requisite to make a\ngood sailor, surely an equal length of time is necessary to perfect the\nsoldier; and no less skill, practice, and professional study are\nrequired for the proper direction of armies than for the management of\nfleets.\n\nBut some have said that even these skeletons of military and naval\nforces are entirely superfluous, and that a brave and patriotic people\nwill make as good a defence against invasion as the most disciplined and\nexperienced. Such views are frequently urged in the halls of congress,\nand some have even attempted to confirm them by historical examples.\n\nThere are instances, it is true, where disorganized and frantic masses,\nanimated by patriotic enthusiasm, have gained the most brilliant\nvictories. Here, however, extraordinary circumstances supplied the place\nof order, and produced an equilibrium between forces that otherwise\nwould have been very unequal; but in almost every instance of this kind,\nthe loss of the undisciplined army has been unnecessarily great, human\nlife being substituted for skill and order. But victory, even with such\na drawback, cannot often attend the banners of newly raised and\ndisorderly forces. If the captain and crew of a steamship knew nothing\nof navigation, and had never been at sea, and the engineer was totally\nunacquainted with his profession, could we expect the ship to cross the\nAtlantic in safety, and reach her destined port? Would we trust our\nlives and the honor of our country to their care? Would we not say to\nthem, \"First make yourselves acquainted with the principles of your\nprofession, the use of the compass, and the means of determining whether\nyou direct your course upon a ledge of rocks or into a safe harbor?\" War\nis not, as some seem to suppose, a mere game of chance. Its principles\nconstitute one of the most intricate of modern sciences; and the general\nwho understands the art of rightly applying its rules, and possesses the\nmeans of carrying out its precepts, may be morally certain of success.\n\nHistory furnishes abundant proofs of the impolicy of relying upon\nundisciplined forces in the open field. Almost every page of Napier's\nclassic History of the Peninsular War contains striking examples of the\nuseless waste of human life and property by the Spanish militia; while,\nwith one quarter as many regulars, at a small fractional part of the\nactual expense, the French might have been expelled at the outset, or\nhave been driven, at any time afterwards, from the Peninsula.\n\nAt the beginning of the French Revolution the regular army was\nabolished, and the citizen-soldiery, who were established on the 14th of\nJuly, 1789, relied on exclusively for the national defence. \"But these\nthree millions of national guards,\" says Jomini, \"though good supporters\nof the decrees of the assembly, were nevertheless useless for\nreinforcing the army beyond the frontiers, and utterly incapable of\ndefending their own firesides.\" Yet no one can question their individual\nbravery and patriotism; for, when reorganized, disciplined, and properly\ndirected, they put to flight the best troops in Europe. At the first\noutbreak of this revolution, the privileged classes of other countries,\nupholding crumbling institutions and rotten dynasties, rushed forth\nagainst the maddened hordes of French democracy. The popular power,\nspringing upward by its own elasticity when the weight of political\noppression was removed, soon became too wild and reckless to establish\nitself on any sure basis, or even to provide for its own protection. If\nthe attacks of the enervated enemies of France were weak, so also were\nher own efforts feeble to resist these attacks. The republican armies\nrepelled the ill-planned and ill-conducted invasion by the Duke of\nBrunswick; but it was by the substitution of human life for preparation,\nsystem, and skill; enthusiasm supplied the place of discipline; robbery\nproduced military stores; and the dead bodies of her citizens formed\n_epaulements_ against the enemy. Yet this was but the strength of\nweakness; the aimless struggle of a broken and disjointed government;\nand the new revolutionary power was fast sinking away before the\ncombined opposition of Europe, when the great genius of Napoleon, with a\nstrong arm and iron rule, seizing upon the scattered fragments, and\nbinding them together into one consolidated mass, made France\nvictorious, and seated himself on the throne of empire.\n\nNo people in the world ever exhibited a more general and enthusiastic\npatriotism than the Americans during the war of our own Revolution. And\nyet our army received, even at that time, but little support from\nirregular and militia forces in the open field. Washington's opinions on\nthis subject furnish so striking a contrast to the congressional\nspeeches of modern political demagogues, who, with boastful swaggers,\nwould fain persuade us that we require no organization or discipline to\nmeet the veteran troops of Europe in the open field, and who would hurry\nus, without preparation, into war with the strongest military powers of\nthe world--so striking is the contrast between the assertions of these\nmen and the letters and reports of Washington, that it may be well for\nthe cool and dispassionate lover of truth to occasionally refresh his\nmemory by reference to the writings of Washington. The following brief\nextracts are from his letters to the President of Congress, December,\n1776:\n\n\"The saving in the article of clothing, provisions, and a thousand other\nthings, by having nothing to do with the militia, unless in cases of\nextraordinary exigency, and such as could not be expected in the common\ncourse of events, would amply support a large army, which, well\nofficered, would be daily improving, instead of continuing a\ndestructive, expensive, and disorderly mob. In my opinion, if any\ndependence is placed on the militia another year, Congress will be\ndeceived. When danger is a little removed from them they will not turn\nout at all. When it comes home to them, the well-affected, instead of\nflying to arms to defend themselves, are busily employed in removing\ntheir families and effects; while the disaffected are concerting\nmeasures to make their submission, and spread terror and dismay all\naround, to induce others to follow their example. Daily experience and\nabundant proofs warrant this information. Short enlistments, and a\nmistaken dependence upon our militia, have been the origin of all our\nmisfortunes, and the great accumulation of our debt. The militia come\nin, you cannot tell how; go, you cannot tell when; and act, you cannot\ntell where; consume your provisions, exhaust your stores, and leave you\nat last, at a critical moment.\"\n\nThese remarks of Washington will not be found too severe if we remember\nthe conduct of our militia in the open field at Princeton, Savannah\nRiver, Camden, Guilford Court-House, &c., in the war of the Revolution;\nthe great cost of the war of 1812 as compared with its military results;\nthe refusal of the New England militia to march beyond the lines of\ntheir own states, and of the New-York militia to cross the Niagara and\nsecure a victory already won; or the disgraceful flight of the Southern\nmilitia from the field of Bladensburg.\n\nBut there is another side to this picture. If our militia have\nfrequently failed to maintain their ground _when drawn up in the open\nfield_, we can point with pride to their brave and successful defence of\nCharleston, Mobile, New Orleans, Fort McHenry, Stonington, Niagara,\nPlattsburg, in proof of what may be accomplished by militia in\nconnection with fortifications.\n\nThese examples from our history must fully demonstrate the great value\nof a militia when properly employed as a defence against invasion, and\nought to silence the sneers of those who would abolish this arm of\ndefence as utterly useless. In the open field militia cannot in general\nbe manoeuvred to advantage; whereas, in the defence of fortified places\ntheir superior intelligence and activity not unfrequently render them\neven more valuable than regulars. And in reading the severe strictures\nof Washington, Greene, Morgan, and others, upon our militia, it must be\nremembered that they were at that time entirely destitute of important\nworks of defence; and the experience of all other nations, as well as\nour own, has abundantly shown that a newly-raised force cannot cope, _in\nthe open field_, with one subordinate and disciplined. Here _science_\nmust determine the contest. Habits of strict obedience, and of\nsimultaneous and united action, are indispensable to carry out what the\nhigher principles of the military profession require. New and\nundisciplined forces are often confounded at the evolutions, and\nstrategic and tactical combinations of a regular army, and lose all\nconfidence in their leaders and in themselves. But, when placed behind a\nbreastwork, they even overrate their security. They can then coolly look\nupon the approaching columns, and, unmoved by glittering armor and\nbristling bayonets, will exert all their skill in the use of their\nweapons. The superior accuracy of aim which the American has obtained by\npractice from his early youth, has enabled our militia to gain, under\nthe protection of military works, victories as brilliant as the most\nveteran troops. The moral courage necessary to await an attack behind a\nparapet, is at least equal to that exerted in the open field, where\n_movements_ generally determine the victory. To watch the approach of an\nenemy, to see him move up and display his massive columns, his long\narray of military equipments, his fascines and scaling-ladders, his\ninstruments of attack, and the professional skill with which he wields\nthem, to hear the thunder of his batteries, spreading death all around,\nand to repel, hand to hand, those tremendous assaults, which stand out\nin all their horrible relief upon the canvass of modern warfare,\nrequires a heart at least as brave as the professional warrior exhibits\nin the pitched battle.\n\nBut we must not forget that to call this force into the open field,--to\ntake the mechanic from his shop, the merchant from his counter, the\nfarmer from his plough,--will necessarily be attended with an immense\nsacrifice of human life. The lives lost on the battle-field are not the\nonly ones; militia, being unaccustomed to exposure, and unable to supply\ntheir own wants with certainty and regularity, contract diseases which\noccasion in every campaign a most frightful mortality.\n\nThere is also a vast difference in the cost of supporting regulars and\nmilitia forces. The cost of a regular army of twenty thousand men for a\ncampaign of six months, in this country, has been estimated, from data\nin the War-office, at a hundred and fifty dollars per man; while the\ncost of a militia force, under the same circumstances, making allowance\nfor the difference in the expenses from sickness, waste of\ncamp-furniture, equipments, &c., will be two hundred and fifty dollars\nper man. But in short campaigns, and in irregular warfare, like the\nexpedition against Black Hawk and his Indians in the Northwest, and\nduring the hostilities in Florida, \"the expenses of the militia,\" says\nMr. Secretary Spencer, in a report to congress in 1842, \"invariably\nexceed those of regulars by _at least three hundred per cent_.\" It is\nfurther stated that \"_fifty-five thousand militia_ were called into\nservice during the Black Hawk and Florida wars, and that _thirty\nmillions of dollars have been expended in these conflicts_!\" When it is\nremembered that during these border wars our whole regular army did not\nexceed twelve or thirteen thousand men, it will not be difficult to\nperceive why our military establishment was so enormously expensive.\nLarge sums were paid to sedentary militia who never rendered the\nslightest service. Again, during our late war with Great Britain, of\nless than three years' duration, _two hundred and eighty thousand\nmuskets were lost,_--the average cost of which is stated at twelve\ndollars,--making an aggregate loss, in muskets alone, _of three millions\nand three hundred and sixty thousand dollars_, during a service of about\ntwo years and a half;--resulting mainly from that neglect and waste of\npublic property which almost invariably attends the movements of\nnewly-raised and inexperienced forces. Facts like these should awaken us\nto the necessity of reorganizing and disciplining our militia. General\nKnox, when Secretary of War, General Harrison while in the senate, and\nMr. Poinsett in 1841, each furnished plans for effecting this purpose,\nbut the whole subject has been passed by with neglect.\n\nPermanent fortifications differ in many of their features from either of\nthe two preceding elements of national defence. They are passive in\ntheir nature, yet possess all the conservative properties of an army or\nnavy, and through these two contribute largely to the active operations\nof a campaign. When once constructed they require but very little\nexpenditure for their support. In time of peace they withdraw no\nvaluable citizens from the useful occupations of life. Of themselves\nthey can never exert an influence corrupting to public morals, or\ndangerous to public liberty; but as the means of preserving peace, and\nas obstacles to an invader, their influence and power are immense. While\ncontributing to the economical support of a peace establishment, by\nfurnishing drill-grounds, parades, quarters, &c.; and to its efficiency\nstill more, by affording facilities both to the regulars and militia for\nthat species of artillery practice so necessary in the defence of water\nfrontiers; they also serve as safe depots of arms and the immense\nquantity of materials and military munitions so indispensable in modern\nwarfare. These munitions usually require much time, skill, and expense\nin their construction, and it is of vast importance that they should be\npreserved with the utmost care.\n\nMaritime arsenals and depots of naval and military stores on the\nsea-coast are more particularly exposed to capture and destruction. Here\nan enemy can approach by stealth, striking some sudden and fatal blow\nbefore any effectual resistance can be organized. But in addition to\nthe security afforded by harbor fortifications to public property of the\nhighest military value, they also serve to protect the merchant\nshipping, and the vast amount of private wealth which a commercial\npeople always collect at these points. They furnish safe retreats, and\nthe means of repair for public vessels injured in battle, or by storms,\nand to merchantmen a refuge from the dangers of sea, or the threats of\nhostile fleets. Moreover, they greatly facilitate our naval attacks upon\nthe enemy's shipping; and if he attempt a descent, their well-directed\nfire will repel his squadrons from our harbors, and force his troops to\nland at some distant and unfavorable position.\n\nThe three means of permanent defence which have been mentioned, are, of\ncourse, intended to accomplish the same general object; but each has its\ndistinct and proper sphere of action, and neither can be regarded as\nantagonistical to the others. Any undue increase of one, at the expense\nof the other two, must necessarily be followed by a corresponding\ndiminution of national strength. We must not infer, however, that all\nmust be maintained upon the same footing. The position of the country\nand the character of the people must determine this.\n\nEngland, from her insular position and the extent of her commerce, must\nmaintain a large navy; a large army is also necessary for the defence of\nher own coasts and the protection of her colonial possessions. Her\nmen-of-war secure a safe passage for her merchant-vessels, and transport\nher troops in safety through all seas, and thus contribute much to the\nacquisition and security of colonial territory. The military forces of\nthe British empire amount to about one hundred and fifty thousand men,\nand the naval forces to about seven hundred vessels of war,[13] carrying\nin all some fifteen thousand guns and forty thousand men. France has\nless commerce, and but few colonial possessions. She has a great extent\nof sea-coast, but her fortifications secure it from maritime descents;\nher only accessible points are on the land frontiers. Her army and\nnavy, therefore, constitute _her_ principal means of defence. Her army\nnumbers some three hundred and fifty thousand men, and her navy about\nthree hundred and fifty vessels,[13] carrying about nine thousand guns\nand thirty thousand men. Russia, Austria, Prussia, Sweden, and other\ncontinental powers, have but little commerce to be protected, while\ntheir extensive frontiers are greatly exposed to land attacks: their\nfortifications and armies, therefore, constitute their principal means\nof defence. But for the protection of their own seas from the inroads of\ntheir powerful maritime neighbor, Russia and Austria support naval\nestablishments of a limited extent. Russia has, in all, some one hundred\nand eighty vessels of war, and Austria not quite half that number.[13]\n\n[Footnote 13: These numbers include _all_ vessels of war, whether in\ncommission, building, or in ordinary.]\n\nThe United States possess no colonies; but they have a sea-coast of more\nthan three thousand miles, with numerous bays, estuaries, and navigable\nrivers, which expose our most populous cities to maritime attacks. The\nnorthern land frontier is two thousand miles in extent, and in the west\nour territory borders upon the British and Mexican possessions for many\nthousand miles more. Within these limits there are numerous tribes of\nIndians, who require the watchful care of armed forces to keep them at\npeace among themselves as well as with us. Our authorized military\nestablishment amounts to 7,590 men, and our naval establishment consists\nof seventy-seven vessels of all classes, carrying 2,345 guns, and 8,724\nmen.[14] This is certainly a very small military and naval force for the\ndefence of so extended and populous a country, especially one whose\npolitical institutions and rapidly-increasing power expose it to the\ndistrust and jealousy of most other nations.\n\n[Footnote 14: Since these pages were put in the hands of the printer,\nthe above numbers have been nearly doubled, this increase having been\nmade with special reference to the present war with Mexico.]\n\nThe fortifications for the defence of our sea-coast and land frontiers\nwill be discussed hereafter.[15]\n\n[Footnote 15: Jomini's work on the Military Art contains many valuable\nremarks on this subject of Military Polity: also the writings of\nClausewitz, Dupin, Lloyd, Chambray, Tranchant de Laverne, and Rudtorfer.\nSeveral of these questions are also discussed in Rocquancourt,\nCarion-Nisas, De Vernon, and other writers on military history. The\nseveral European Annuaires Militaires, or Army Registers, and the French\nand German military periodicals, contain much valuable matter connected\nwith military statistics.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\nSEA-COAST DEFENCES.\n\n\nThe principal attacks which we have had to sustain, either as colonies\nor states, from civilized foes, have come from Canada. As colonies we\nwere continually encountering difficulties and dangers from the French\npossessions. In the war of the Revolution, it being one of national\nemancipation, the military operations were more general throughout the\nseveral states; but in the war of 1812 the attacks were confined to the\nnorthern frontier and a few exposed points along the coast. In these two\ncontests with Great Britain, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore,\nWashington, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, and New Orleans, being within\nreach of the British naval power, and offering the dazzling attraction\nof rich booty, have each been subjected to powerful assaults.\n\nSimilar attacks will undoubtedly be made in any future war with England.\nAn attempt at permanent lodgment would be based either on Canada or a\nservile insurrection in the southern states. The former project, in a\nmilitary point of view, offers the greatest advantages, but most\nprobably the latter would also be resorted to for effecting a diversion,\nif nothing more. But for inflicting upon us a sudden and severe injury\nby the destruction of large amounts of public and private property, our\nseaport towns offer inducements not likely to be disregarded. This mode\nof warfare, barbarous though it be, will certainly attend a conflict\nwith any great maritime power. How can we best prepare in time of peace\nto repel these attacks?\n\nImmediately after the war of 1812 a joint commission of our most\ndistinguished military and naval officers was formed, to devise a system\nof defensive works, to be erected in time of peace for the security of\nthe most important and the most exposed points on our sea-coast. It may\nbe well here to point out, in very general terms, the positions and\ncharacter of these works, mentioning only such as have been completed,\nor are now in course of construction, and such as are intended to be\nbuilt as soon as Congress shall grant the requisite funds. There are\nother works projected for some future period, but as they do not belong\nto the class required for immediate, use, they will not be referred to.\n\nMAINE.\n\nBeginning at the northeastern extremity of our coast, we have, for\nEastport and Wiscasset, projected works estimated to carry about fifty\nguns. Nothing has yet been done to these works.\n\nNext Portland, with works carrying about forty or fifty guns, and Fort\nPenobscot and batteries, carrying about one hundred and fifty guns.\nThese are only partly built.\n\nNEW HAMPSHIRE.\n\nDefences of Portsmouth and the vicinity, about two hundred guns. These\nworks are also only partly built.\n\nMASSACHUSETTS.\n\nProjected works east of Boston, carrying about sixty guns. These are not\nyet commenced.\n\nWorks for defence of Boston Harbor carry about five hundred guns. These\nare nearly three-quarters completed. Those of New Bedford harbor carry\nfifty guns: not yet begun.\n\nRHODE ISLAND.\n\nNewport harbor,--works carry about five hundred guns, nearly completed.\n\nCONNECTICUT.\n\nNew London harbor, New Haven, and the Connecticut river. The first of\nthese nearly completed; the two latter not yet begun.\n\nNEW YORK.\n\nThe works projected for the defence of New York harbor are estimated to\ncarry about one thousand guns. These works are not yet one-half\nconstructed.\n\nPENNSYLVANIA.\n\nThe works projected for the defence of the Delaware Bay and Philadelphia\nwill carry about one hundred and fifty guns. They are not one-quarter\nbuilt.\n\nMARYLAND AND VIRGINIA.\n\nBaltimore and Annapolis--these works will carry some two hundred and\nfifty guns. The works for the Chesapeake Bay will carry about six\nhundred guns; and those for the Potomac river about eighty guns. These\nare more than one-half completed.\n\nNORTH CAROLINA.\n\nThe works at Beaufort and Smithville carry about one hundred and fifty\nguns. They are essentially completed.\n\nSOUTH CAROLINA.\n\nThe works for the defence of Charleston carry some two hundred guns.\nThey are one-half constructed.\n\nGEORGIA.\n\nThe defences of Savannah carry about two hundred guns and are nearly\nthree-quarters finished.\n\nFLORIDA.\n\nThe works projected for the defence of St. Augustine, Key West,\nTortugas, and Pensacola will carry some eight or nine hundred guns.\nThose at St. Augustine and Pensacola are essentially completed, but\nthose at Key West and Tortugas are barely begun.\n\nALABAMA.\n\nThe works for the defence of Mobile will carry about one hundred and\nsixty guns. These are nearly constructed.\n\nLOUISIANA.\n\nThe works for the defence of New Orleans will carry some two hundred and\nfifty or three hundred guns; they are nearly completed.\n\nThe works north of the Chesapeake cost about three thousand dollars per\ngun; those south of that point about six thousand dollars per gun. This\ndifference in cost is due in part to the character of the soil on which\nthe fortifications are built, and in part to the high prices paid in the\nsouth for materials and workmanship.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nHaving pointed out the character and condition of our system of\nsea-coast defences, let us briefly examine how far these works may be\nrelied on as a means of security against a maritime descent.\n\nTo come to a proper conclusion on this subject, let us first examine the\nthree or four great maritime descents attempted by the English during\nthe wars of the French Revolution; a period at which the great naval\nsuperiority of England over other nations, gave her the title of\n_mistress of the seas_. Let us notice what have been the results of the\nseveral attempts made by this power at maritime invasions, and the means\nby which such attacks have been repelled.\n\nIn 1795, a maritime expedition was fitted out against Quiberon, at an\nexpense of eight millions of dollars. This port of the French coast had\nthen a naval defence of near thirty sail, carrying about sixteen\nhundred guns. Lord Bridport attacked it with fourteen sail of the line,\nfive frigates, and some smaller vessels, about fifteen hundred guns in\nall, captured a portion of the fleet, and forced the remainder to take\nshelter under the guns of the fortifications of L'Orient. The French\nnaval defence being destroyed, the British now entered Quiberon without\nopposition. This bay is said by Brenton, in his British Naval History,\nto be \"the finest on the coast of France, or perhaps in the world, for\nlanding an army.\" Besides these natural advantages in favor of the\nEnglish, the inhabitants of the surrounding country were in open\ninsurrection, ready to receive the invaders with open arms. A body of\nten thousand troops were landed, and clothing, arms, &c., furnished to\nas many more royalist troops; but the combined forces failed in their\nattack upon St. Barbe, and General Hoche, from his intrenchments, with\nseven thousand men, held in check a body of eighteen thousand, penned\nup, without defences, in the narrow peninsula. Reinforced by a new\ndebarkation, the allies again attempted to advance, but were soon\ndefeated, and ultimately almost entirely destroyed.\n\nIn 1799, the English and Russians made a descent upon Holland with\nfourteen ships of the line and ten frigates, carrying about eleven\nhundred guns and a great number of transports, with an army of\nthirty-six thousand men. The Dutch naval defences consisted of eight\nships of the line, three fifty-four gun ships, eight forty-eight gun\nships and eight smaller frigates, carrying in all about twelve hundred\nguns; but this force contributed little or nothing to the defence, and\nwas soon forced to hoist the hostile flag. The defensive army was at\nfirst only twelve thousand, but the Republicans afterwards increased it\nto twenty-two thousand, and finally to twenty-eight thousand men. But\nnotwithstanding this immense naval and military superiority, and the\nco-operation of the Orange party in assisting the landing of their\ntroops, the allies failed to get possession of a single strong place;\nand after a loss of six thousand men, were compelled to capitulate.\n\"Such,\" says Alison, \"was the disastrous issue of the greatest\nexpedition which had yet sailed from the British harbors during the\nwar.\"\n\nIn 1801, Nelson, with three ships of the line, two frigates, and\nthirty-five smaller vessels, made a desperate attack upon the harbor of\nBoulogne, but was repulsed with severe loss.\n\nPassing over some unimportant attacks, we come to the descent upon the\nScheldt, or as it is commonly called, the Walcheren expedition, in 1809.\nThis expedition, though a failure, has often been referred to as proving\nthe expediency of maritime descents. The following is a brief narrative\nof this expedition:--\n\nNapoleon had projected vast fortifications, dock-yards, and naval\narsenals at Flushing and Antwerp for the protection of a maritime force\nin the Scheldt. But no sooner was the execution of this project begun,\nthan the English fitted out an expedition to seize upon the defences of\nthe Scheldt, and capture or destroy the naval force. Flushing, at the\nmouth of the river, was but ill-secured, and Antwerp, some sixty or\nseventy miles further up the river, was entirely defenceless; the\nrampart was unarmed with cannon, dilapidated, and tottering, and its\ngarrison consisted of only about two hundred invalids and recruits.\nNapoleon's regular army was employed on the Danube and in the Peninsula.\nThe British attacking force consisted of thirty-seven ships of the line,\ntwenty-three frigates, thirty-three sloops of war, twenty-eight gun,\nmortar, and bomb vessels, thirty-six smaller vessels, eighty-two\ngunboats, innumerable transports, with over forty thousand troops, and\nan immense artillery train; making in all, says the English historian,\n\"an hundred thousand combatants.\" A landing was made upon the island of\nWalcheren, and siege laid to Flushing, which place was not reduced till\neighteen days after the landing; the attack upon the water was made by\nseven or eight ships of the line, and a large flotilla of bomb vessels,\nbut produced no effect. The channel at the mouth of the river was too\nbroad to be defended by the works of Flushing, and the main portion of\nthe fleet passed out of reach of the guns, and ascended the Scheldt part\nway up to Antwerp. But in the mean time, the fortifications of that\nplace had been repaired, and, after a fruitless operation of a whole\nmonth in the river, the English were gradually forced to retreat to\nWalcheren, and finally to evacuate their entire conquest.\n\nThe cost of the expedition was immense, both in treasure and in life. It\nwas certainly very poorly managed. But we cannot help noticing the\nsuperior value of fortifications as a defence against such descents.\nThey did much to retard the operations of the enemy till a defensive\narmy could be raised. The works of Flushing were never intended to close\nup the Scheldt, and of course could not intercept the passage of\nshipping; but they were not reduced by the English naval force, as has\nsometimes been alleged. Col. Mitchel, of the English service, says that\nthe fleet \"kept up so tremendous a fire upon the batteries, that the\nFrench officers who had been present at Austerlitz and Jena declared\nthat the cannonade in these battles had been a mere _jeu d'enfans_ in\ncomparison. Yet what was the effect produced on the defences of the\nplace by this fire, so formidable, to judge by the sound alone? The\nwriter can answer the question with some accuracy, for he went along the\nentire sea-line the very day after the capitulation, and found no part\nof the parapet injured so as to be of the slightest consequence, and\nonly one solitary gun dismounted, evidently by the bursting of a shell,\nand which could not, of course, have been thrown from the line of\nbattle ships, but must have been thrown from the land batteries.\"[16]\n\n[Footnote 16: The batteries constructed in the siege of this place were\narmed with fifty-two heavy guns and mortars.]\n\nBut it may be said that although great naval descents on a hostile coast\nare almost always unsuccessful, nevertheless a direct naval attack upon\na single fortified position will be attended with more favorable\nresults; and that our seaport towns, however fortified, will be exposed\nto bombardment and destruction by the enemy's fleets. In other words,\nthat in a direct contest between ships and forts the former will have at\nleast an equal chance of success.\n\nLet us suppose a fair trial of this relative strength. The fort is to be\nproperly constructed and in good repair; its guns in a position to be\nused with effect; its garrison skilful and efficient; its commander\ncapable and brave. The ship is of the very best character, and in\nperfect order; the crew disciplined and courageous; its commander\nskilful and adroit; the wind, and tide, and sea--all as could be\ndesired.[17] The numbers of the garrison and crew are to be no more than\nrequisite, with no unnecessary exposure of human life to swell the lists\nof the slain. The issue of this contest, unless attended with\nextraordinary and easily distinguishable circumstances, would be a fair\ntest of their relative strength.\n\n[Footnote 17: These conditions for a battery are easily satisfied, but\nfor the ship, are partly dependent on the elements, and seldom to be\nwholly attained.]\n\nWhat result should we anticipate from the nature of the contending\nforces? The ship, under the circumstances we have supposed, can choose\nher point of attack, selecting the one she may deem the most vulnerable;\nbut she herself is everywhere vulnerable; her men and guns are much\nconcentrated, and consequently much exposed. But in the fort the guns\nand men are more distributed, a fort with an interior area of several\nacres not having a garrison as large as the crew of a seventy-four-gun\nship. All parts of the vessel are liable to injury; while the fort\noffers but a small mark,--the opening of the embrasures, a small part of\nthe carriage, and now and then a head or arm raised above the\nparapet,--the ratio of exposed surfaces being not less than _twenty to\none_. In the vessel the guns are fired from an oscillating deck, and the\nballs go at random; in the fort the guns are fired from an immoveable\nplatform, and the balls reach their object with unerring aim. There is\nalways more or less motion in the water, so that the ship's guns, though\naccurately pointed at one moment, at the next will be thrown entirely\naway from the object, even when the motion is too slight to be otherwise\nnoticed; whereas in the battery the guns will be fired just as they are\npointed; and the motion of the vessel will merely vary to the extent of\na few inches the spot in which the shot is received. In the fort the men\nand guns are behind impenetrable walls of stone and earth; in the vessel\nthey are behind frail bulwarks, whose splinters are equally destructive\nwith the shot. The fort is incombustible; while the ship may readily be\nset on fire by incendiary projectiles. The ship has many points exposed\nthat may be called vital points. By losing her rudder, or portions of\nher rigging, or of her spars, she may become unmanageable, and unable to\nuse her strength; she may receive shots under water, and be liable to\nsink; she may receive hot shot, and be set on fire: these damages are in\naddition to those of having her guns dismounted and her people killed by\nshots that pierce her sides and scatter splinters from her timbers;\nwhile the risks of the battery are confined to those mentioned\nabove--namely, the risk that the gun, the carriage, or the men may be\nstruck.\n\nThe opinions of military writers, and the facts of history, fully\naccord with these deductions of theory. Some few individuals mistaking,\nor misstating, the facts of a few recent trials, assert that modern\nimprovements in the naval service have so far outstripped the progress\nin the art of land defence, that a floating force is now abundantly able\nto cope, upon equal terms, with a land battery. Ignorant and superficial\npersons, hearing merely that certain forts had recently yielded to a\nnaval force, and taking no trouble to learn the real facts of the case,\nhave paraded them before the public as proofs positive of a new era in\nmilitary science. This conclusion, however groundless and absurd, has\nreceived credit merely from its novelty. Let us examine the several\ntrials of strength which have taken place between ships and forts within\nthe last fifty years, and see what have been the results.\n\nIn 1792 a considerable French squadron attacked Cagliari, whose\nfortifications were at that time so dilapidated and weak, as scarcely to\ndeserve the name of defences. Nevertheless, the French fleet, after a\nbombardment of three days, was most signally defeated and obliged to\nretire.\n\nIn 1794 two British ships, \"the Fortitude of seventy-four, and the Juno\nfrigate of thirty-two guns,\" attacked a small town in the bay of\nMartello, Corsica, which was armed with one gun in barbette, and a\ngarrison of thirty men. After a bombardment of two and a half hours,\nthese ships were forced to haul off with considerable damage and loss of\nlife. The little tower had received no injury, and its garrison were\nunharmed. Here were _one hundred and six guns_ afloat against _one_ on\nshore; and yet the latter was successful.\n\nIn 1797 Nelson attacked the little inefficient batteries of Santa Crux,\nin Teneriffe, with eight vessels carrying four hundred guns. But\nnotwithstanding his great superiority in numbers, skill, and bravery, he\nwas repelled with the loss of two hundred and fifty men, while the\ngarrison received little or no damage. A single ball from the land\nbattery, striking the side of one of his vessels, instantly sunk her\nwith near a hundred seamen and marines!\n\nIn 1798, a French flotilla of fifty-two brigs and gunboats, manned with\nnear seven thousand men, attacked a little English redoubt on the island\nof Marcou, which was armed with two thirty-two-pounders, two\nsix-pounders, four four-pounders, and two carronades, and garrisoned\nwith two hundred and fifty men. Notwithstanding this great disparity of\nnumbers, the little redoubt sunk seven of the enemy's brigs and\ngunboats, captured another, and forced the remainder to retreat with\ngreat loss; while the garrison had but one man killed and three wounded.\n\nIn 1801, the French, with three frigates and six thousand men, attacked\nthe poorly-constructed works of Porto Ferrairo, whose defensive force\nwas a motley garrison of fifteen hundred Corsicans, Tuscans, and\nEnglish. Here the attacking force was _four_ times as great as that of\nthe garrison; nevertheless they were unsuccessful after several\nbombardments and a siege of five months.\n\nIn July of the same year, 1801, Admiral Saumarez, with an English fleet\nof six ships of the line and two smaller vessels, carrying in all five\nhundred and two guns, attacked the Spanish and French defences of\nAlgesiras. Supposing the floating forces of the contending parties to be\nequal, gun for gun, (which is certainly a very fair estimate for the\nattacking force, considering the circumstances of the case,) we have a\nFrench land-battery of only twelve guns opposed by an English floating\nforce of one hundred and ninety-six guns. Notwithstanding this\ninequality of nearly _seventeen_ to _one_, the little battery compelled\nthe superior naval force to retreat with great loss.\n\nShortly after this, the French and Spanish fleets attacked the same\nEnglish squadron with a force of nearly _three_ to _one_, but met with a\nmost signal defeat; whereas with a land-battery of only _one_ to\n_seventeen_, the same party had been victorious. What proof can be more\ndecisive of the superiority of guns on shore over those afloat!\n\nIn 1803 the English garrison of Diamond Rock, near Port Royal Bay, with\nonly one hundred men and some fifteen guns, repelled a French squadron\nof two seventy-four-gun ships, a frigate, and a brig, assisted by a land\nattack of two hundred troops. There was not a single man killed or\nwounded in the redoubt, while the French lost fifty men! The place was\nafterwards reduced by famine.\n\nIn 1806 a French battery on Cape Licosa, of only two guns and a garrison\nof twenty-five men, resisted the attacks of a British eighty-gun ship\nand two frigates. The carriage of one of the land-guns failed on the\nsecond shot, so that, in fact, only _one_ of them was available during\nthe action. Here was _a single piece of ordnance_ and a garrison of\n_twenty-five men,_ opposed to a naval force of _over one hundred and\nfifty guns_ and about _thirteen hundred men._ And what effects were\nproduced by this strange combat? The attacking force lost _thirty-seven_\nmen killed and wounded, the eighty-gun ship was much disabled, while the\nfort and garrison escaped entirely unharmed! What could not be effected\nby force was afterwards obtained by negotiation.\n\nIn 1808 a French land-battery of only _three_ guns, near Fort Trinidad,\ndrove off an English seventy-four-gun ship, and a bomb-vessel.\n\nIn 1813 Leghorn, whose defences were of a very mediocre character, and\nwhose garrison at that time was exceedingly weak, was attacked by an\nEnglish squadron of six ships, carrying over three hundred guns, and a\nland force of one thousand troops. The whole attempt was a perfect\nfailure.\n\n\"In 1814, when the English advanced against Antwerp,\" says Colonel\nMitchell, an English historian, \"Fort Frederick, a small work of only\ntwo guns, was established in a bend of the Polder Dyke, at some distance\nbelow Lillo. The armament was a long eighteen-pounder and a five and a\nhalf inch howitzer. From this post the French determined to dislodge the\nEnglish, and an eighty-gun ship dropped down with the tide and anchored\nnear the Flanders shore, about six hundred yards from the British\nbattery. By her position she was secured from the fire of the\neighteen-pounder, and exposed to that of the howitzer only. As soon as\nevery thing was made tight her broadside was opened; and if noise and\nsmoke were alone sufficient to ensure success in war, as so many of the\nmoderns seem to think, the result of this strange contest would not have\nbeen long doubtful, for the thunder of the French artillery actually\nmade the earth to shake again; but though the earth shook, the single\nBritish howitzer was neither dismounted nor silenced; and though the\nartillery-men could not, perfectly exposed as they were, stand to their\ngun while the iron hail was striking thick and fast around, yet no\nsooner did the enemy's fire slacken for a moment than they sprang to\ntheir post, ready to return at least one shot for eighty. This\nextraordinary combat lasted from seven o'clock in the morning till near\ntwelve at noon, when the French ship, having had forty-one men killed\nand wounded, her commander being in the list of the latter, and having\nbesides sustained serious damage in her hull and rigging, returned to\nAntwerp without effecting any thing whatever. The howitzer was not\ndismounted, the fort was not injured,--there being in fact nothing to\ninjure,--and the British had only one man killed and two wounded.\"\n\nIt is unnecessary to further specify examples from the wars of the\nFrench Revolution; the whole history of these wars is one continued\nproof of the superiority of fortifications as a maritime frontier\ndefence. The sea-coast of France is almost within stone's throw[18] of\nthe principal British naval depots; here were large towns and harbors,\nfilled with the rich commerce of the world, offering the dazzling\nattraction of rich booty. The French navy was at this time utterly\nincompetent to their defence; while England supported a maritime force\nat an annual expense of near _ninety millions of dollars._ Her largest\nfleets were continually cruising within sight of these seaports, and not\nunfrequently attempting to cut out their shipping. \"At this period,\"\nsays one of her naval historians, \"the naval force of Britain, so\nmultiplied and so expert from long practice, had acquired an intimate\nknowledge of their (the French) harbors, their bays and creeks; her\nofficers knew the depth of water, and the resistance likely to be met\nwith in every situation.\" On the other hand, these harbors and towns\nwere frequently stripped of their garrisons by the necessities of\ndistant wars, being left with no other defence than their fortifications\nand militia. And yet, notwithstanding all this, they escaped unharmed\nduring the entire contest. They were frequently attacked, and in some\ninstances the most desperate efforts were made to effect a permanent\nlodgment; but in no case was the success at all commensurate with the\nexpense of life and treasure sacrificed, and no permanent hold was made\non either the maritime frontiers of France or her allies. This certainly\nwas owing to no inferiority of skill and bravery on the part of the\nBritish navy, as the battles of Aboukir and Trafalgar, and the almost\ntotal annihilation of the French marine, have but too plainly proven.\nWhy then did these places, escape? We know of no other reason, than that\n_they were fortified_; and that the French knew how to defend their\nfortifications. The British maritime expeditions to Quiberon, Holland,\nBoulogne, the Scheldt, Constantinople, Buenos Ayres, &c., sufficiently\nprove the ill-success, and the waste of life and treasure with which\nthey must always be attended. But when her naval power was applied to\nthe destruction of the enemy's marine, and in transporting her land\nforces to solid bases of operations on the soil of her allies, in\nPortugal and Belgium, the fall of Napoleon crowned the glory of their\nachievements.\n\n[Footnote 18: Only eighteen and a half miles across the Channel at the\nnarrowest place.]\n\nLet us now examine the several British naval attacks on our own forts,\nin the wars of the Revolution and of 1812.\n\nIn 1776 Sir Peter Parker, with a British fleet of nine vessels, carrying\nabout two hundred and seventy[19] guns, attacked Fort Moultrie, in\nCharleston harbor, which was then armed with only twenty-six guns, and\ngarrisoned by only three hundred and seventy-five regulars and a few\nmilitia. In this contest the British were entirely defeated, and lost,\nin killed and wounded, two hundred and five men, while their whole two\nhundred and seventy guns killed and wounded only thirty-two men in the\nfort. Of this trial of strength, which was certainly a fair one, Cooper\nin his Naval History, says:--\"It goes fully to prove the important\nmilitary position that ships cannot withstand forts, when the latter are\nproperly armed, constructed, and garrisoned. General Moultrie says only\nthirty rounds from the battery were fired, and was of opinion that the\nwant of powder alone prevented the Americans from destroying the\nmen-of-war.\"\n\n[Footnote 19: These vessels _rated_ two hundred and fifty-four guns, but\nthe number actually carried is stated to have been two hundred and\nseventy.]\n\nIn 1814 a British fleet of four vessels, carrying ninety-two guns,\nattacked Fort Boyer, a small redoubt, located on a point of land\ncommanding the passage from the Gulf into the bay of Mobile. This\nredoubt was garrisoned by only one hundred and twenty combatants,\nofficers included; and its armament was but twenty small pieces of\ncannon, some of which were almost entirely useless, and most of them\npoorly mounted \"in batteries hastily thrown up, and leaving the gunners\nuncovered from the knee upward,\" while the enemy's land force, acting in\nconcert with the ships, consisted of twenty artillerists with a battery\nof two guns, and seven hundred and thirty marines, Indians, and negroes.\nHis ships carried five hundred and ninety men in all. This immense\ndisparity of numbers and strength did not allow to the British military\nand naval commanders the slightest apprehension \"that four British\nships, carrying ninety-two guns, and a land force somewhat exceeding\nseven hundred combatants, could fail in reducing a small work mounting\nonly twenty short carronades, and defended by a little more than a\nhundred men, unprovided alike with furnaces for heating shot, or\ncasements to cover themselves from rockets and shells.\" Nevertheless,\nthe enemy was completely repulsed; one of his largest ships was entirely\ndestroyed, and 85 men were killed and wounded on board the other; while\nour loss was only eight or nine. Here a naval force of _five_ to _one_\nwas repelled by the land-battery.\n\nAgain, in 1814, a barbette battery of one four-pounder and two\neighteen-pounder guns at Stonington, repelled a British fleet of one\nhundred and thirty-four guns. During the engagement the Americans\nexhausted their ammunition, and spiked their eighteen-pounders, and only\none of them was afterwards used. Two of the enemy's ships, carrying one\nhundred and twelve guns, were engaged during the whole time of attack,\nand during much of this time bombarded the town from a position beyond\nreach of the land-battery. They were entirely too far off for the\nfour-pounder gun to be of any use. Supposing the two eighteen-pounders\nto have been employed during the whole action, and also all the guns of\nthe fleet, _one_ eighteen-pounder on land must have been more than\nequivalent to _sixty-seven_ guns afloat, for the ships were so much\ninjured as to render it necessary for them to withdraw. The British loss\nwas twenty killed, and more than fifty wounded. Ours was only two killed\nand six wounded.[20]\n\n[Footnote 20: Perkins says two killed and six wounded. Holmes says six\nwounded, but makes no mention of any killed.]\n\nThe fleet sent to the attack of Baltimore, in 1814, consisted of forty\nsail, the largest of which were ships of the line, carrying an army of\nover six thousand combatants. The troops were landed at North Point,\nwhile sixteen of the bomb-vessels and frigates approached within reach\nof Fort McHenry, and commenced a bombardment which lasted twenty-five\nhours. During this attack, the enemy threw \"fifteen hundred shells, four\nhundred of which exploded within the walls of the fort, but without\nmaking any impression on either the strength of the work or the\ngarrison,\" and the British were compelled to retire with much loss.\n\nIn 1815, a squadron of British ships, stationed off the mouths of the\nMississippi, for the purpose of a blockade, ascended the river as high\nas Fort St. Philip, which is a small work capable of an armament of only\ntwenty guns in all. A heavy fire of shot and shells was continued with\nbut few and short pauses for nine days and nights, but making no\nimpression either on the fort or garrison, they retreated to their\nformer position at the mouth of the river.\n\nThere is but a single instance in the war of 1812, where the enemy's\nvessels succeeded in reducing a fort; and this has sometimes been\nalluded to, by persons ignorant of the real facts of the case, as a\nproof against the ability of our fortifications to resist naval attacks.\nEven if it were a case of decided failure, would this single exception\nbe sufficient to overthrow the weight of evidence on the other side? We\nallude to the reduction of the so-called Fort Washington by the British\nfleet that ascended the Potomac in 1814, to assist in the disgraceful\nand barbarous operation of burning the capitol and destroying the\narchives of the nation. Fort Washington was a very small and inefficient\nwork, incorrectly planned by an incompetent French engineer; only a\nsmall part of the fort was then built, and it has not yet been\ncompleted. The portion constructed was never, until very recently,\nproperly prepared for receiving its armament, and at the time of attack\ncould not possibly have held out a long time. But no defence whatever\nwas made. Capt. Gordon, with a squadron of eight sail, carrying one\nhundred and seventy-three guns, under orders \"to ascend the river as\nhigh as Fort Washington, and try upon it the experiment of a\nbombardment,\" approached that fort, and, upon firing a single shell,\nwhich did no injury to either the fort or the garrison, the latter\ndeserted the works, and rapidly retreated. The commanding officer was\nimmediately dismissed for his cowardice. An English naval officer, who\nwas one of the expedition, in speaking of the retreat of the garrison,\nsays: \"We were at loss to account for such an extraordinary step. The\nposition was good and the capture would have cost us at least fifty men,\nand more, had it been properly defended; besides, an unfavorable wind\nand many other chances were in their favor,\" &c. The fleet ascended the\nriver to Alexandria, but learning soon afterwards that batteries were\npreparing at White House and Indian Head to cut off its retreat, it\nretired, in much haste, but not without injury.\n\nSome have also pretended to find in modern European history a few\nexamples contradictory of the relative power which we have here assigned\nto ships and forts. Overlooking the numerous and well-authenticated\nexamples, where forts of small dimensions and of small armament have\nrepelled large fleets, they would draw their conclusions from the four\nor five instances where fleets have gained (as was at first supposed) a\nsomewhat doubtful victory over forts. But a careful and critical\nexamination of the facts in these cases, will show that even these are\nno exceptions to the general rule of the superiority of guns ashore over\nguns afloat.\n\nThe only instances where it has ever been pretended by writers of any\nnote, that ships have gained advantage, are those of the attack on\nCopenhagen in 1801; the passage of the Dardanelles, in 1807; the attack\non Algiers, in 1816; the attack on San Juan d'Ulloa, in 1838; and the\nattack on St. Jean d'Acre, in 1840.\n\nLet us examine these examples a little in detail:--\n\n_Copenhagen_.--The British fleet sent to attack Copenhagen, in 1801,\nconsisted of fifty-two sail, eighteen of them being line-of-battle\nships, four frigates, &c. They sailed from Yarmouth roads on the 12th of\nMarch, passed the Sound on the 30th, and attacked and defeated the\nDanish line on the 2d of April.\n\nThe Sound between Cronenberg and the Swedish coast is about two and a\nhalf miles wide, (vide Fig. 34.) The batteries of Cronenberg and\nElsinore were lined with one hundred pieces of cannon and mortars; but\nthe Swedish battery had been much neglected, and then mounted only six\nguns. Nevertheless, the British admiral, to avoid the damage his\nsquadron would have to sustain in the passage of this wide channel,\ndefended by a force scarcely superior to a single one of his ships,\npreferred to attempt the difficult passage of the Belt; but after a few\nof his light vessels, acting as scouts, had run on rocks, he returned to\nthe Sound.\n\nHe then tried to negotiate a peaceful passage, threatening, however, a\ndeclaration of war if his vessels should be fired upon. It must be\nremembered that at this time England was at peace with both Denmark and\nSweden, and that no just cause of war existed. Hence, the admiral\ninferred that the commanders of these batteries would be loath to\ninvolve their countries in a war with so formidable a power as England,\nby commencing hostilities, when only a free passage was asked. The\nDanish commander replied, that he should not permit a fleet to pass his\npost, whose object and destination were unknown to him. He fired upon\nthem, as he was bound to do by long-existing commercial regulations, and\nnot as an act of hostility against the English. The Swedes, on the\ncontrary, remained neutral, and allowed the British vessels to lie near\nby for several days without firing upon them. Seeing this friendly\ndisposition of the Swedes, the fleet neared their coast, and passed out\nof the reach of the Danish batteries, which opened a fire of balls and\nshells; but all of them fell more than two hundred yards short of the\nfleet, which escaped without the loss of a single man.\n\nThe Swedes excused their treachery by the plea that it would have been\nimpossible to construct batteries at that season, and that, even had it\nbeen possible, Denmark would not have consented to their doing so, for\nfear that Sweden would renew her old claim to one half of the rich\nduties levied by Denmark on all ships passing the strait. There may have\nbeen some grounds for the last excuse; but the true reason for their\nconduct was the fear of getting involved in a war with England. Napoleon\nsays that, even at that season, a few days would have been sufficient\nfor placing a hundred guns in battery, and that Sweden had much more\ntime than was requisite. And with a hundred guns on each side of the\nchannel, served with skill and energy, the fleet must necessarily have\nsustained so much damage as to render it unfit to attack Copenhagen.\n\nOn this passage, we remark:--\n\n1st. The whole number of guns and mortars in the forts of the Sound\namounted to only one hundred and six, while the fleet carried over\nseventeen hundred guns; and yet, with this immense superiority of more\nthan _sixteen_ to _one_, the British admiral preferred the dangerous\npassage of the Belt to encountering the fire of these land-batteries.\n\n2d. By negotiations, and threatening the vengeance of England, he\npersuaded the small Swedish battery to remain silent and allow the fleet\nto pass near that shore, out of reach of Cronenberg and Elsinore.\n\n3d. It is the opinion of Napoleon and the best English writers, that if\nthe Swedish battery had been put in order, and acted in concert with the\nDanish works, they might have so damaged the fleet as to render it\nincapable of any serious attempt on Copenhagen.\n\nWe now proceed to consider the circumstances attending the attack and\ndefence of Copenhagen itself. The only side of the town exposed to the\nattack of heavy shipping is the northern, where there lies a shoal\nextending out a considerable distance, leaving only a very narrow\napproach to the heart of the city, (Fig. 35) On the most advanced part\nof this shoal are the Crown-batteries, carrying in all eighty-eight\nguns.[21] The entrance into the Baltic between Copenhagen and Salthorn,\nis divided into two channels by a bank, called the Middle Ground, which\nis situated directly opposite Copenhagen. To defend the entrance on the\nleft of the Crown-batteries, they placed near the mouth of the channel\nfour ships of the line, one frigate, and two sloops, carrying in all\nthree hundred and fifty-eight guns. To secure the port and city from\nbombardment from the King's Channel, (that between the Middle Ground and\ntown,) a line of floating defences were moored near the edge of the\nshoal, and manned principally by volunteers. This line consisted of old\nhulls of vessels, block-ships, prames, rafts, &c., carrying in all six\nhundred and twenty-eight guns--a force strong enough to prevent the\napproach of bomb-vessels and gunboats, (the purpose for which it was\nintended,) but utterly incapable of contending with first-rate ships of\nwar; but these the Danes thought would be deterred from approaching by\nthe difficulties of navigation. These difficulties were certainly very\ngreat; and Nelson said, beforehand, that \"the wind which might carry him\nin would most probably not bring out a crippled ship.\" Had the Danes\nsupposed it possible for Nelson to approach with his large vessels, the\nline of floating defences would have been formed nearer Copenhagen, the\nright supported by batteries raised on the isle of Amack. \"In that\ncase,\" says Napoleon, \"it is probable that Nelson would have failed in\nhis attack; for it would have been impossible for him to pass between\nthe line and shore thus lined with cannon.\" As it was, the line was too\nextended for strength, and its right too far advanced to receive\nassistance from the battery of Amack. A part of the fleet remained as a\nreserve, under Admiral Parker, while the others, under Nelson, advanced\nto the King's Channel. This attacking force consisted of eight ships of\nthe line and thirty-six smaller vessels, carrying in all eleven hundred\nguns, (without including those in the six gun-brigs, whose armament is\nnot given.) One of the seventy-four-gun ships could not be brought into\naction, and two others grounded; but, Lord Nelson says, \"although not in\nthe situation assigned them, yet they were so placed as to be of great\nservice.\" This force was concentrated upon _a part_ of the Danish line\nof floating defences, the whole of which was not only inferior to it by\nthree hundred and eighty-two guns, but so situated as to be beyond the\nreach of succor, and without a chance of escape. The result was what\nmight have been expected. Every vessel of the right and centre of this\nouter Danish line was taken or destroyed, except one or two small ones,\nwhich cut and run under protection of the fortifications. The left of\nthe line, being supported by the Crown-battery, remained unbroken. A\ndivision of frigates, in hopes of providing an adequate substitute for\nthe ships intended to attack the batteries, ventured to engage them, but\n\"it suffered considerable loss, and, in spite of all its efforts, was\nobliged to relinquish this enterprise, and sheer off.\"\n\n[Footnote 21: Some writers say only sixty-eight or seventy; but the\nEnglish writers generally say eighty-eight. A few, (apparently to\nincrease the brilliancy of the victory,) make this number still\ngreater.]\n\nThe Danish vessels lying in the entrance of the channel which leads to\nthe city, were not attacked, and took no material part in the contest.\nThey are to be reckoned in the defence on the same grounds that the\nBritish ships of the reserve should be included in the attacking force.\nNor was any use made of the guns on shore, for the enemy did not advance\nfar enough to be within their range.\n\nThe Crown-battery was _behind_ the Danish line, and mainly masked by it.\nA part only of its guns could be used in support of the left of this\nline, and in repelling the direct attacks of the frigates, which it did\nmost effectually. But we now come to a new feature in this battle. As\nthe Danish line of floating defences fell into the hands of the English,\nthe range of the Crown-battery enlarged, and its power was felt. Nelson\nsaw the danger to which his fleet was exposed, and, being at last\nconvinced of the prudence of the admiral's signal for retreat, \"made up\nhis mind to weigh anchor and retire from the engagement.\" To retreat,\nhowever, from his present position, was exceedingly difficult and\ndangerous. He therefore determined to endeavor to effect an armistice,\nand dispatched the following letter to the prince-regent:\n\n\"Lord Nelson has directions to spare Denmark when no longer resisting;\nbut if the firing is continued on the part of Denmark, Lord Nelson must\nbe obliged to set on fire all the floating batteries he has taken,\nwithout the power to save the brave Danes who have defended them.\"\n\nThis produced an armistice, and hostilities had hardly ceased, when\nthree of the English ships, including that in which Nelson himself was,\nstruck upon the bank. \"They were in the jaws of destruction, and would\nnever have escaped if the batteries had continued their fire. They\ntherefore owed their safety to this armistice.\" A convention was soon\nsigned, by which every thing was left _in statu quo_, and the fleet of\nAdmiral Parker allowed to proceed into the Baltic. Edward Baines, the\nable English historian of the wars of the French Revolution, in speaking\nof Nelson's request for an armistice, says: \"This letter, which\nexhibited a happy union of policy and courage, was written at a moment\nwhen Lord Nelson perceived that, in consequence of the unfavorable state\nof the wind, the admiral was not likely to get up to aid the enterprise;\nthat _the principal batteries_ of the enemy, and the ships at the mouth\nof the harbor, _were yet untouched;_ that two of his own division had\ngrounded, and others were likely to share the same fate.\" Campbell says\nthese batteries and ships \"_were still unconquered._ Two of his\n[Nelson's] own vessels were grounded and exposed to a heavy fire;\nothers, if the battle continued, might be exposed to a similar fate,\nwhile he found it would be scarcely practicable to bring off the prizes\nunder the fire of the batteries.\"\n\nWith respect to the fortifications of the town, a chronicler of the\ntimes says they were of no service while the action lasted. \"They began\nto fire when the enemy took possession of the abandoned ships, but it\nwas at the same time the parley appeared.\" The Danish commander,\nspeaking of the general contest between the two lines, says: \"The\nCrown-battery did not come at all into action.\" An English writer says\ndistinctly: \"The works (fortifications) of Copenhagen were absolutely\nuntouched at the close of the action.\" Colonel Mitchel, the English\nhistorian, says: \"Lord Nelson never fired a shot at the town or\nfortifications of Copenhagen; he destroyed a line of block-ships,\nprames, and floating batteries that defended the sea approach to the\ntown; and the Crown Prince, seeing his capital exposed, was willing to\nfinish by armistice a war, the object of which was neither very popular\nnor well understood. What the result of the action between Copenhagen\nand the British fleet might ultimately have been, is therefore\naltogether uncertain. THE BOMBARDMENT OF COPENHAGEN BY NELSON, as it is\ngenerally styled, is therefore, like most other oracular phrases of the\nday, a mere combination of words, without the slightest meaning.\"\n\nThe British lost in killed and wounded nine hundred and forty-three men;\nand the loss of the Danes, according to their own account, which is\nconfirmed by the French, was but very little higher. The English,\nhowever, say it amounted to sixteen or eighteen hundred; but let the\nloss be what it may, it was almost exclusively confined to the floating\ndefences, and can in no way determine the relative accuracy of aim of\nthe guns ashore and guns afloat.\n\nThe facts and testimony we have adduced, prove incontestably--\n\n1st. That of the fleet of fifty-two sail and seventeen hundred guns sent\nby the English to the attack upon Copenhagen, two ships carrying one\nhundred and forty-eight guns were grounded or wrecked; seven ships of\nthe line, and thirty-six smaller vessels, carrying over one thousand\nguns, were actually brought into the action; while the remainder were\nheld as a reserve to act upon the first favorable opportunity.\n\n2d. That the Danish line of floating defences, consisting mostly of\nhulls, sloops, rafts, &c., carried only six hundred and twenty-eight\nguns of all descriptions; that the fixed batteries supporting this line\ndid not carry over eighty or ninety guns at most; and that both these\nland and floating batteries were mostly manned and the guns served by\n_volunteers_.\n\n3d. That the fixed batteries in the system of defence were either so\ncompletely masked, or so far distant, as to be useless during the\ncontest between the fleet and floating force.\n\n4th. That the few guns of these batteries which were rendered available\nby the position of the floating defences, repelled, with little or no\nloss to themselves, and some injury to the enemy, a vastly superior\nforce of frigates which attacked them.\n\n5th. That the line of floating defences was conquered and mostly\ndestroyed, while the fixed batteries were uninjured.\n\n6th. That the fortifications of the city and of Amack island were not\nattacked, and had no part in the contest.\n\n7th. That, as soon as the Crown-batteries were unmasked and began to\nact, Nelson prepared to retreat, but, on account of the difficulty of\ndoing so, he opened a parley, threatening, with a cruelty unworthy of\nthe most barbarous ages, that, _unless the batteries ceased their fire\nupon his ships, he would burn all the floating defences with the Danish\nprisoners in his possession;_ and that this armistice was concluded just\nin time to save his own ships from destruction.\n\n8th. That, consequently, the battle of Copenhagen cannot be regarded as\na contest between ships and forts, or a triumph of ships over forts:\nthat, so far as the guns on shore were engaged, they showed a vast\nsuperiority over those afloat--a superiority known and confessed by the\nEnglish themselves.\n\n_Constantinople_.--The channel of the Dardanelles is about twelve\nleagues long, three miles wide at its entrance, and about three-quarters\nof a mile at its narrowest point. Its principal defences are the outer\nand inner castles of Europe and Asia, and the castles of Sestos and\nAbydos. Constantinople stands about one hundred miles from its entrance\ninto the Sea of Marmora, and at nearly the opposite extremity of this\nsea. The defences of the channel had been allowed to go to decay; but\nfew guns were mounted, and the forts were but partially garrisoned. In\nConstantinople not a gun was mounted, and no preparations for defence\nwere made; indeed, previous to the approach of the fleet, the Turks had\nnot determined whether to side with the English or the French, and even\nthen the French ambassador had the greatest difficulty in persuading\nthem to resist the demands of Duckforth.\n\nThe British fleet consisted of six sail of the line, two frigates, two\nsloops, and several bomb-vessels, carrying eight hundred and eighteen\nguns, (besides those in the bomb-ships.) Admiral Duckforth sailed\nthrough the Dardanelles on the 19th of February, 1807, with little or no\nopposition. This being a Turkish festival day, the soldiers of the\nscanty garrison were enjoying the festivities of the occasion, and none\nwere left to serve the few guns of the forts which had been prepared for\ndefence. But while the admiral was waiting on the Sea of Marmora for the\nresult of negotiations, or for a favorable wind to make the attack upon\nConstantinople, the fortifications of this city were put in order, and\nthe Turks actively employed, under French engineers and artillery\nofficers, in repairing the defences of the Straits. Campbell, in his\nNaval History, says:--\"Admiral Duckforth now fully perceived the\ncritical situation in which he was placed. He might, indeed, succeed,\nshould the weather become favorable, in bombarding Constantinople; _but\nunless the bombardment should prove completely successful in forcing\nthe Turks to pacific terms, the injury he might do to the city would not\ncompensate for the damage which his fleet must necessarily sustain. With\nthis damaged and crippled fleet, he must repass the Dardanelles, now\nrendered infinitely stronger than they were when he came through them_.\"\n\nUnder these circumstances the admiral determined to retreat; and on the\n3d of April escaped through the Dardanelles, steering midway of the\nchannel, with a favorable and strong current. \"This escape, however,\"\nsays Baines, \"was only from destruction, but by no means from serious\nloss and injury. * * * * In what instance in the whole course of our\nnaval warfare, have ships received equal damage in so short a time as in\nthis extraordinary enterprise?\" In detailing the extent of this damage,\nwe will take the ships in the order they descended. The first had her\nwheel carried away, and her hull much damaged, but escaped with the loss\nof only three men. A stone shot penetrated the second, between the poop\nand quarter deck, badly injured the mizzen-mast, carried away the wheel,\nand did other serious damage, killing and wounding twenty men. Two shot\nstruck the third, carrying away her shrouds and injuring her masts; loss\nin killed and wounded, thirty. The fourth had her mainmast destroyed,\nwith a loss of sixteen. The fifth had a large shot, six feet eight\ninches in circumference, enter her lower deck; loss fifty-five. The\nsixth, not injured. The seventh, a good deal damaged, with a loss of\nseventeen. The eighth had no loss. The ninth was so much injured that,\n\"had there been a necessity for hauling the wind on the opposite tack,\nshe must have gone down:\" her loss was eight. The tenth lost twelve. The\neleventh was much injured, with a loss of eight--making a total loss in\nrepassing the Dardanelles, of one hundred and sixty-seven; and in the\nwhole expedition two hundred and eighty-one, exclusive of two hundred\nand fifty men who perished in the burning of the Ajax.\n\nSuch was the effect produced on the British fleet, sailing with a\nfavorable wind and strong current past the half-armed and half-manned\nforts of the Dardanelles. Duckforth himself says, that \"had he remained\nbefore Constantinople much longer--till the forts had been completely\nput in order--no return would have been open to him, and the unavoidable\nsacrifice of the squadron must have been the consequence.\" Scarcely had\nthe fleet cleared the Straits, before it (the fleet) was reinforced with\neight sail of the line; but, even with this vast increase of strength,\nthe English did not venture to renew the contest. They had effected a\nmost fortunate escape. General Jomini says that if the defence had been\nconducted by a more enterprising and experienced people, the expedition\nwould have cost the English their whole squadron.\n\nGreat as was the damage done to the fleet, the forts themselves were\nuninjured. The English say their own fire did no execution, the shot in\nall probability not even striking their objects--\"the rapid change of\nposition, occasioned by a fair wind and current, preventing the\ncertainty of aim.\" The state of the batteries when the fleet first\npassed, is thus described in James's Naval History: \"Some of them were\ndilapidated, and others but partially mounted and poorly manned.\" And\nAlison says: \"They had been allowed to fall into disrepair. The castles\nof Europe and Asia, indeed, stood in frowning majesty, to assert the\ndominion of the Crescent at the narrowest part of the passage, but their\nramparts were antiquated, their guns in part dismounted, and such as\nremained, though of enormous calibre, little calculated to answer the\nrapidity and precision of an English broadside.\"\n\nMuch has been said because the fortifications of the Dardanelles did\nnot hermetically seal that channel, (an object they were never expected\nto accomplish, even had they been well armed and well served;) but it is\nforgotten, or entirely overlooked, that twelve _Turkish line-of-battle\n-ships, two of them three-deckers, with nine frigates, were with their\nsails bent and in apparent readiness, filled with troops, and lying within\nthe line of fortifications; and yet this naval force effected little or\nnothing against the invaders._ It is scarcely ever mentioned, being\nregarded of little consequence as a means of defence; and yet the number\nof its guns and the expense of its construction and support, could hardly\nhave fallen short of the incomplete and half-armed forts, some of which\nwere as ancient as the reign of Amurath!\n\n_Algiers._--The following narrative of the attack on Algiers, in 1816,\nis drawn from the reports of the English and Dutch admirals, and other\nofficial and authentic English papers.\n\nThe attack was made by the combined fleets, consisting of five sail of\nthe line, eighteen or twenty frigates and smaller vessels, besides five\nbomb-vessels and several rocket-boats, carrying in all about one\nthousand guns. The armament of some of the smaller vessels is not given,\nbut the guns of those whose armaments are known, amount to over nine\nhundred. The harbor and defences of Algiers had been previously surveyed\nby Captain Warde, royal navy, under Lord Exmouth's direction; and the\nnumber of the combined fleet was arranged according to the information\ngiven in this survey--just so many ships, and no more, being taken, as\ncould be employed to advantage against the city, without being\nneedlessly exposed. Moreover, the men and officers had been selected and\nexercised with reference to this particular attack.\n\nFrom the survey of Captain Warde, and the accompanying map, it appears\nthat the armament of all the fortifications of Algiers and the vicinity,\ncounting the water fronts and the parts that could flank the shore, was\nonly two hundred and eighty-four guns of various sizes and descriptions,\nincluding mortars. But not near all of these could act upon the fleet as\nit lay. Other English accounts state the number of guns actually opposed\nto the fleet at from two hundred and twenty to two hundred and thirty.\nSome of these were in small and distant batteries, whereas nearly all\nthe fleet was concentrated on the mole-head works. (Fig. 36.) Supposing\nonly one broadside of the ships to have been engaged, the ratio of the\nforces, as expressed by the number of guns, must have been about as 5 to\n2. This is a favorable supposition for the ships; for we know that\nseveral of them, from their position and a change of anchorage, brought\nboth broadsides to bear; moreover, at no one time could _all_ the guns\nof the water fronts of the batteries bear on the attacking ships. The\nAlgerine shipping in the harbor was considerable, including several\nvessels of war, but no use was made of them in defence, and nearly all\nwere burnt. The attacking ships commanded some of the batteries, and\nalmost immediately dismounted their guns. The walls of the casemated\nworks were so thin as to be very soon battered down. Most of the\nAlgerine guns were badly mounted, and many of them were useless after\nthe first fire. They had no furnaces for heating shot, and, as \"they\nloaded their guns with loose powder, put in with a ladle,\" they could\nnot possibly have used hot shot, even had they constructed furnaces. The\nships approached the forts, and many of them anchored in their intended\nposition, without a shot being fired from the batteries. The action\ncommenced at a quarter before three, and did not entirely cease till\nhalf-past eleven. The ships then took advantage of the land breeze, and,\nby warping and towing off, were able to get under sail and come to\nanchor beyond reach of the land-batteries. Negotiations were again\nopened, and the Dey surrendered the Christian slaves and yielded to the\nterms of the treaty.\n\nDuring the contest, the fleet \"fired nearly one hundred and eighteen\ntons of powder, and fifty thousand shot, (weighing more than five\nhundred tons of iron,) besides nine hundred and sixty thirteen and\nten-inch shells, (thrown by the bomb-vessels,) and the shells and\nrockets from the flotilla.\" The vessels were considerably crippled, and\ntheir loss in killed and wounded amounted to eight hundred and\neighty-three. The land batteries were much injured, and a large part of\ntheir guns dismounted. Their loss is not known; the English confess they\ncould obtain no account of it, but suppose it to have been very great.\nThis seems more than probable; for, besides those actually employed in\nthe defence, large numbers of people crowded into the forts to witness\nthe contest. So great was this curiosity, that, when the action\ncommenced, the parapets were covered with the multitude gazing at the\nmanoeuvres of the ships. To avoid so unnecessary and indiscriminate a\nslaughter, Lord Exmouth (showing a humanity that does him great credit)\nmotioned with his hand to the ignorant wretches to retire to some place\nof safety. This loss of life in the batteries, the burning of the\nbuildings within the town and about the mole, the entire destruction of\ntheir fleet and merchant vessels anchored within the mole and in the\nharbor, had a depressing effect upon the inhabitants, and probably did\nmore than the injuries received by the batteries in securing an\nhonorable conclusion to the treaty. We know very well that these\nbatteries, though much injured, _were not silenced_ when Lord Exmouth\ntook advantage of the land breeze and sailed beyond their reach. The\nships retired--1st, because they had become much injured, and their\nammunition nearly exhausted; 2d, in order to escape from a position so\nhazardous in case of a storm; and 3d, to get beyond the reach of the\nAlgerine batteries. Lord Exmouth himself gives these as his reasons for\nthe retreat, and says, \"the land wind saved me many a gallant fellow.\"\nAnd Vice-admiral Von de Capellan, in his report of the battle, gives the\nsame opinion: \"_in this retreat_\" says he, \"which, from want of wind and\nthe damage suffered in the rigging, was very slow, _the ships had still\nto suffer much from the new-opened and redoubled fire of the enemy's\nbatteries_; at last, the land breeze springing up,\" &c. An English\nofficer, who took part in this affair, says: \"It was well for us that\nthe land wind came off, or we should never have got out; and God knows\nwhat would have been our fate, had we remained all night.\"\n\nThe motives of the retreat cannot, therefore, be doubted. Had the Arabs\nset themselves zealously at work, during the night, to prepare for a new\ncontest, by remounting their guns, and placing others behind the ruins\nof those batteries which had fallen,--in other words, had the works now\nbeen placed in hands as skilful and experienced as the English, the\ncontest would have been far from ended. But (to use the words of the\nBoard of Defence) Lord Exmouth relied on the effects produced on the\npeople by his dreadful cannonade; and the result proves that he was\nright. His anxiety to clear the vessels from the contest shows that\nthere was a power still unconquered, which he thought it better to leave\nto be restrained by the suffering population of the city, than to keep\nin a state of exasperation and activity by his presence. What was this\npower but an unsubdued energy in the batteries?\n\nThe true solution of the question is, then, not so much the amount of\ninjury done on the one side or the other--particularly as there was on\none side a city to suffer as well as the batteries--as the relative\nefficiency of the parties when the battle closed. All political\nagitation and popular clamor aside, what would have been the result had\nthe fight been continued, or even had Lord Exmouth renewed it next\nmorning? These are questions that can be answered only on conjecture;\nbut the manner the battle ended certainly leaves room for many doubts\nwhether, had the subsequent demands of Lord Exmouth been rejected, he\nhad it in his power to enforce them by his ships; whether, indeed, if he\nhad renewed the fight, he would not have been signally defeated. On the\nwhole, we do not think that this battle, although it stands pre-eminent\nas an example of naval success over batteries, presents an argument to\nshake the confidence which fortifications, well situated, well planned,\nand well fought, deserve, as the defences of a seaboard.\n\nWe cannot help regarding these conclusions as just, when we reflect upon\nall the circumstances of the case. The high character, skill, and\nbravery of the attacking force; their immense superiority in number of\nguns, with no surplus human life to be exposed; the antiquated and\nill-managed works of defence, the entire want of skill of the Algerine\nartillerists, and the neglect of the ordinary means of preparation; the\nsevere execution which these ill-served guns did upon the enemy's\nships,--an execution far more dreadful than that effected by the French\nor Dutch fleets in their best-contested naval battles with the ships of\nthe same foe,--from these facts, we must think that those who are so\nready to draw from this case conclusions unfavorable to the use of\nland-batteries as a means of defence against shipping, know but little\nof the nature of the contest.\n\nAn English historian of some note, in speaking of this attack,\nsays:--\"It is but little to the purpose, unless to prove what may be\naccomplished by fleets against towns exactly so circumstanced, placed,\nand governed. Algiers is situated on an amphitheatre of hills, sloping\ndown towards the sea, and presenting therefore the fairest mark to the\nfire of hostile ships. But where is the capital exactly so situated that\nwe are ever likely to attack? And as to the destruction of a few\nsecond-rate towns, even when practicable, it is a mean, unworthy species\nof warfare, by which nothing was ever gained. The severe loss sustained\nbefore Algiers must also be taken into account, because it was inflicted\nby mere Algerine artillery, and was much inferior to what may be\nexpected from a contest maintained against batteries manned with\nsoldiers instructed by officers of skill and science, not only in\nworking the guns, but in the endless duty of detail necessary for\nkeeping the whole of an artillery material in a proper state of\nformidable efficiency.\"\n\n_San Juan d'Ulloa._--The following facts, relative to the attack on San\nJuan d'Ulloa by the French, in 1838, are drawn principally from the\nreport of a French engineer officer who was one of the expedition.\n\nThe French fleet consisted of four ships, carrying one hundred and\neighty-eight guns, two armed steamboats, and two bomb-ketches with four\nlarge mortars. The whole number of guns, of whatever description, found\nin the fort was one hundred and eighty-seven; a large portion of these,\nhowever, were for land defence. (Fig. 37.)\n\nWhen the French vessels were towed into the position selected for the\nattack, \"it was lucky for us,\" says the French officer in his report,\n\"that the Mexicans did not disturb this operation, which lasted nearly\ntwo hours, and that they permitted us to commence the fire.\" \"We were\nexposed to the fire of one twenty-four-pounder, five sixteen-pounders,\nseven twelve-pounders, one eight-pounder, and five eighteen-pounder\ncarronades--_in all nineteen pieces only_.\" If these be converted into\nequivalent twenty-four-pounders, in proportion to the weight of the\nballs, the whole nineteen guns will be _less than twelve twenty-four\npounders_. This estimate is much too great, for it allows three\neight-pounders to be equal to one twenty-four-pounder, and each of the\neighteen-pounder carronades to be three quarters the power of a long\ntwenty-four-pounder; whereas, at the distance at which the parties were\nengaged, these small pieces were nearly harmless. Two of the powder\nmagazines, from not being bomb-proof, were blown up during the\nengagement, by which three of the nineteen guns on the water front of\nthe castle were dismounted; thus reducing the land force to _an\nequivalent of ten twenty-four-pounders_. The other sixteen guns were\nstill effective when abandoned by the Mexicans. The cannonade and\nbombardment continued about six hours, eight thousand two hundred and\nfifty shot and shells being fired at the fort by the French. The\nprincipal injury received by the work was from the explosion of the\npowder magazine. But very few guns were dismounted by the fire of the\nFrench ships, and only three of these on the water front. The details of\nthe condition of the ships and fort are given in the report of the\nFrench officer,[22] but it is unnecessary to repeat them here.\n\n[Footnote 22: Vide also House Doc. No. 206, twenty-sixth Congress, first\nsession]\n\nIn general terms, it appears from the above-mentioned report, that the\nnumber of guns actually brought into action by the floating force,\n(counting only one broadside of the ship,) amounted to _ninety-four\nguns, besides four heavy sea-mortars_; that the whole number so employed\nin the fort was only _nineteen, including the smallest calibres_; that\nthese guns were generally so small and inefficient, that their balls\nwould not enter the sides of the ordinary attacking frigates; the\nprincipal injury sustained by the castle was produced by the explosion\nof powder magazines injudiciously placed and improperly secured; that\nthe castle, though built of poor materials, was but slightly injured by\nthe French fire; that the Mexicans proved themselves ignorant of the\nordinary means of defence, and abandoned their works when only a few of\ntheir guns had been dismounted; that notwithstanding all the\ncircumstances in favor of the French, their killed and wounded, in\nproportion to the guns acting against them, was upwards of _four times_\nas great as the loss of the English at the battle of Trafalgar!\n\n_St. Jean d'Acre_.--The narratives of the day contained most exaggerated\naccounts of the English attack on St. Jean d'Acre; now, however, the\nprincipal facts connected with this attack are fully authenticated. For\nthe amount of the fleet we quote from the British official papers, and\nfor that of the fort, from the pamphlet of Lieutenant-colonel\nMatuszewiez. These statements are mainly confirmed by the narratives,\nmore recently published, of several English and French eye-witnesses.\n\nThe fortifications were built of poor materials, antiquated in their\nplans, and much decayed. Their entire armament amounted to only two\nhundred guns, some of which were merely field-pieces. The water fronts\nwere armed with one hundred cannon and sixteen mortars, those of the\nsmaller calibre included. (Fig. 38.) When approached by the British\nfleet, the works were undergoing repairs, and, says Commodore Napier,\n\"were fast getting into a state of preparation against attack.\"\n\nThe British fleet consisted of eight ships of the line, carrying six\nhundred and forty-six guns; six frigates, carrying two hundred and\nthirty-six guns; four steamers, carrying eighteen guns; and two or three\nother vessels, whose force is not given. \"Only a few guns,\" says Napier,\n\"defended the approach from the northward,\" and most of the ships came\nin from that direction. The western front was armed with about forty\ncannon; but opposed to this were six ships and two steamers, carrying\nabout five hundred guns. Their fire was tremendous during the\nengagement, but _no breach was made_ in the walls. The south front was\narmed in part by heavy artillery and in part by field-pieces. This front\nwas attacked by six ships and two steamers, carrying over two hundred\nguns. The eastern front was armed only with light artillery; against\nthis was concentrated the remainder of the fleet, carrying about two\nhundred and forty guns. The guns of the works were so poorly mounted,\nthat but few could be used at all; and these, on account of the\nconstruction of the fort, could not reach the ships, though anchored\nclose by the walls. \"Only five of their guns,\" says Napier, \"placed in a\nflanking battery, were well served, and never missed; but they were\npointed too high, and damaged our spars and rigging only.\" The stone was\nof so poor a quality, says the narrative of Colonel Matuszewiez, that\nthe walls fired upon presented on the exterior a shattered appearance,\nbut they were nowhere seriously injured. In the words of Napier, \"_they\nwere not breached, and a determined enemy might have remained secure\nunder the breastworks, or in the numerous casemates, without suffering\nmuch loss_.\" The accidental explosion of a magazine within the fort,\ncontaining six thousand casks of powder, laid in ruins a space of sixty\nthousand square yards, opened a large breach in the walls of the\nfortifications, partially destroyed the prisons, and killed and wounded\na thousand men of the garrison. This frightful disaster, says the French\naccount, hastened the triumph of the fleet. The prisoners and\nmalefactors, thus released from confinement, rushed upon the garrison at\nthe same time with the mountaineers, who had besieged the place on the\nland side. The uselessness of the artillery, the breaches of the fort,\nthe attacks of the English, all combined to force the retreat of the\ngarrison, \"in the midst of scenes of blood and atrocious murders.\"\n\nWe will close this account with the following extract of a speech of the\nDuke of Wellington, in the House of Lords, Feb. 4, 1841: \"He had had,\"\nhe said, \"a little experience in services of this nature; and he thought\nit his duty to warn their lordships, on this occasion, that they must\nnot always expect that ships, however well commanded, or however gallant\ntheir seamen might be, were capable of commonly engaging successfully\nwith stone walls. He had no recollection, in all his experience, except\nthe recent instance on the coast of Syria, of any fort being taken by\nships, excepting two or three years ago, when the fort of San Juan\nd'Ulloa was captured by the French fleet. This was, he thought, the\nsingle instance that he recollected, though he believed that something\nof the sort had occurred at the siege of Havana, in 1763. The present\nachievement he considered one of the greatest of modern times. This was\nhis opinion, and he gave the highest credit to those who had performed\nsuch a service. It was, altogether, a most skilful proceeding. He was\ngreatly surprised at the small number of men that was lost on board the\nfleet; and, on inquiring how it happened, he discovered that it was\nbecause the vessels were moored within one-third of the ordinary\ndistance. The guns of the fortress were intended to strike objects at a\ngreater distance; and the consequence was, that the shot went over the\nships that were anchored at one-third the usual distance. By that means,\nthey sustained not more than one-tenth of the loss which they would\notherwise have experienced. Not less than five hundred pieces of\nordnance were directed against the walls, and the precision with which\nthe fire was kept up, the position of the vessels, and, lastly, the\nblowing up of the large magazine--all aided in achieving this great\nvictory in so short a time. He had thought it right to say thus much,\nbecause he wished to warn the public against supposing that such deeds\nas this could be effected every day. He would repeat that this was a\nsingular instance, in the achievement of which undoubtedly great skill\nwas manifested, but which was also connected with peculiar\ncircumstances, which they could not hope always to occur. It must not\ntherefore be expected, as a matter of course, that all such attempts\nmust necessarily succeed.\"\n\nHaving completed our examination of the ability of land batteries to\ncope, gun for gun, with a naval force, let us consider, for a few\nmoments, the objection which is sometimes made to the use of\nfortifications for the defence of the sea-coast, viz.: _that our\nmaritime cities and arsenals can be better and more economically secured\nby a home squadron_.\n\nWe have already alluded to the impossibility of substituting one means\nof defence for another. The efficiency of the bayonet can in no way\nenable us to dispense with artillery, nor the value of engineer troops\nin the passage of rivers, and the attack and defence of forts, render\ncavalry the less necessary in other operations of a campaign. To the\nnavy alone must we look for the defence of our shipping upon the high\nseas; but it cannot replace fortifications in the protection of our\nharbors, bays, rivers, arsenals, and commercial towns.\n\nLet us take a case in point. For the defence of New York city, it is\ndeemed highly important that the East River should be closed to the\napproach of a hostile fleet at least fifteen or twenty miles from the\ncity, so that an army landed there would have to cross the Westchester\ncreek, the Bronx, Harlem river, and the defiles of Harlem\nheights--obstacles of great importance in a judicious defence. Throg's\nNeck is the position selected for this purpose; cannon placed there not\nonly command the channel, but, from the windings of the river, sweep it\nfor a great distance above and below. No other position, even _in_ the\nchannel itself, possesses equal advantages. Hence, if we had only naval\nmeans of defence, it would be best, were such a thing possible, to place\nthe floating defences themselves on this point. Leaving entirely out of\nconsideration the question of relative _power, position_ alone would\ngive the superior efficiency to the fort. But there are other\nconsiderations no less important than that of position. Fort Schuyler\ncan be garrisoned and defended in part by the same militia force which\nwill be employed to prevent the march of the enemy's army on the city.\nOn the other hand, the crews of the floating defences must be seamen;\nthey will consequently be of less value in the subsequent land\noperations. Moreover, forts, situated as this is, can be so planned as\nto bring to bear upon any part of the channel a greater number of guns\nthan can be presented by any hostile squadron against the corresponding\nportion of the fort. This result can be obtained with little difficulty\nin narrow channels, as is done in most of the other works for the\ndefence of New York, the works for Boston, Newport, Philadelphia,\nBaltimore, Charleston, Savannah, New Orleans, &c., and an approximation\nto it is not incompatible with the defence of the broader estuaries,\nlike the Chesapeake.\n\nBut we will suppose that there are no such points of land, in the inlets\nto our harbors, and that we rely for defence upon a naval force\nexclusively. Let us leave out of consideration the security of all our\nother harbors and our commerce on the high seas, and also the importance\nof having at command the means of attacking the enemy's coast, in the\nabsence of his fleet. We take the single case of the attack being made\non New York harbor, and that our whole fleet is assembled there. Now, if\nthis fleet be equal in number to the enemy, the chances of success may\nbe regarded as equal; if inferior, the chances are against us--for an\nattacking force would probably be of picked men and of the best\nmaterials. But here the consequences of victory are very unequal: the\nenemy can lose his squadron only, while we put in peril both our\nsquadron and the objects it is intended to defend. If we suppose our own\nnaval force superior to that of the enemy, the defence of this harbor\nwould in all respects be complete, provided this force never left the\nharbor. But, then, all the commerce of the country upon the ocean must\nbe left to its fate; and no attempt can be made to react offensively\nupon the foe, unless we can control the chances of finding the enemy's\nfleets within his ports, and the still more uncertain chance of keeping\nhim there; the escape of a single vessel being sufficient to cause the\nloss of our harbor.\n\nThese remarks are based upon the supposition that we have but the single\nharbor of New York; whereas Portland, Portsmouth, Boston, Newport, the\nDelaware, the Chesapeake, Charleston, Savannah, Pensacola, Mobile, New\nOrleans, and numerous other places, are equally open to attack, and\ntherefore must be equally defended, for we know not to which the enemy\nwill direct his assaults. If he come to one of these in the absence of\nour fleet, his object is attained without resistance; or, if his whole\nforce be concentrated upon one but feebly defended, we involve both\nfleet and harbor in inevitable ruin. Could our fleet be so arranged as\nto meet these enterprises?\n\n\"As it cannot be denied that the enemy can select the point of attack\nout of the whole extent of coast, where is the prescience that can\nindicate the spot? And if it cannot be foretold, how is that ubiquity to\nbe imparted that shall always place our fleet in the path of the\nadvancing foe? Suppose we attempt to cover the coast by cruising in\nfront of it, shall we sweep its whole length--a distance scarcely less\nthan that which the enemy must traverse in passing from his coast to\nours? Must the Gulf of Mexico be swept, as well as the Atlantic; or\nshall we give up the Gulf to the enemy? Shall we cover the southern\ncities, or give them up also? We must unquestionably do one of two\nthings--either relinquish a great extent of coast, confining our\ncruisers to a small portion only, or include so much that the chances\nof intercepting an enemy would seem to be out of the question.\"\n\n\"On the practicability of covering a small extent of coast by cruising\nin front of it--or, in other words, the possibility of anticipating an\nenemy's operations, discovering the object of movements of which we get\nno glimpse and hear no tidings, and seeing the impress of his footsteps\non the surface of the ocean--it may be well to consult experience.\"\n\nThe naval power of Spain under Philip II. was almost unlimited. With the\ntreasures of India and America at his command, the fitting out of a\nfleet of one hundred and fifty or two hundred sail, to invade another\ncountry, was no very gigantic operation. Nevertheless, this naval force\nwas of but little avail as a coast defence. Its efficiency for this\npurpose was well tested in 1596. England and Holland attacked Cadiz with\na combined fleet of one hundred and seventy ships, which entered the Bay\nof Cadiz without, on its approach to their coast, being once seen by the\nSpanish navy. This same squadron, on its return to England, passed along\na great portion of the Spanish coast without ever meeting with the\nslightest opposition from the innumerable Spanish floating defences.\n\nIn 1744, a French fleet of twenty ships, and a land force of twenty-two\nthousand men, sailed from Brest to the English coast, without meeting\nwith any opposition from the superior British fleet which had been sent\nout, under Sir John Norris, on purpose to intercept them. The landing of\nthe troops was prevented by a storm, which drove the fleet back upon the\ncoast of France to seek shelter.\n\nIn 1755, a French fleet of twenty-five sail of the line, and many\nsmaller vessels, sailed from Brest for America. Nine of these soon\nafterwards returned to France, and the others proceeded to the gulf of\nSt. Lawrence. An English fleet of seventeen sail of the line and some\nfrigates had been sent out to intercept them; but the two fleets passed\neach other in a thick fog, and all the French vessels except two reached\nQuebec in safety.\n\nIn 1759, a French fleet, blockaded in the port of Dunkirk by a British\nforce under Commodore Bogs, seizing upon a favorable opportunity,\nescaped from the enemy, attacked the coast of Scotland, made a descent\nupon Carrickfergus, and cruised about till February, 1760, without\nmeeting a single British vessel, although sixty-one ships of the line\nwere then stationed upon the coasts of England and France, and several\nof these were actually in pursuit.\n\nIn 1796, when the French attempted to throw the army of Hoche into\nIreland, the most strenuous efforts were made by the British navy to\nintercept the French fleet in its passage. The Channel fleet, of near\nthirty sail of the line, under Lord Bridport, was stationed at Spithead;\nSir Roger Curtis, with a smaller force, was cruising to the westward;\nVice-admiral Colpoys was stationed off Brest, with thirteen sail of the\nline; and Sir Edward Pellew (afterwards Lord Exmouth) watched the\nharbor, with a small squadron of frigates. Notwithstanding this triple\nfloating bulwark, as it was called--one fleet on the enemy's coast, a\nsecond in the Downs, and a third close on their own shores--the French\nfleet of forty-four vessels, carrying a land force of twenty-five\nthousand men, reached Bantry Bay in safety! This fleet was eight days on\nthe passage, and three more in landing the troops; and most of the\nvessels might have returned to Brest in safety, had it not been for\ndisasters by storms, for only _one_ of their whole number was\nintercepted by the vast naval force which England had assembled for that\nexpress object. \"The result of this expedition,\" says Alison, \"was\npregnant with important instructions to the rulers of both countries.\nTo the French, as demonstrating the extraordinary risks which attend a\nmaritime expedition, in comparison with a land campaign; the small\nnumber of forces which can be embarked on board even a great fleet; and\nthe unforeseen disasters which frequently, on that element, defeat the\nbest concerted enterprises. To the English, as showing that _the empire\nof the seas does not always afford security against invasion;_ that, in\nthe face of superior maritime forces, her possessions were for sixteen\ndays at the mercy of the enemy; and that neither the skill of her\nsailors nor the valor of her armies, but the fury of the elements, saved\nthem from danger in the most vulnerable part of their dominions. While\nthese considerations are fitted to abate the confidence in invasion,\nthey are calculated, at the same time, to weaken an overweening\nconfidence in naval superiority, and to demonstrate that _the only base\nupon which certain reliance can be placed_, even by an insular power,\n_is a well-disciplined army and the patriotism of its own subjects_.\"\n\nSubsequent events still further demonstrated the truth of these remarks.\nIn the following year, a French squadron of two frigates and two sloops,\npassed the British fleets with perfect impunity, destroyed the shipping\nin the port of Ilfracombe, and safely landed their troops on the coast\nof Wales. Again, in 1798, the immense British naval force failed to\nprevent the landing of General Humbert's army in the bay of Killala;\nand, in the latter part of the same year, a French squadron of nine\nvessels and three thousand men escaped Sir J.B. Warren's squadron, and\nsafely reached the coast of Ireland. As a further illustration, we quote\nfrom the report of the Board of National Defence in 1839.\n\nThe Toulon fleet, in 1798, consisting of about twenty sail of the line\nand twenty smaller vessels of war, and numerous transports, making in\nall, three hundred sail and forty thousand troops, slipped out of port\nand sailed to Malta. \"It was followed by Nelson, who, thinking correctly\nthat they were bound for Egypt, shaped his course direct for Alexandria.\nThe French, steering towards Candia, took the more circuitous passage;\nso that Nelson arrived at Alexandria before them, and, not finding them\nthere, returned, by way of Caramania and Candia, to Sicily, missing his\nadversary in both passages. Sailing again for Alexandria, he found the\nFrench fleet at anchor in Aboukir bay, and, attacking them there,\nachieved the memorable victory of the Nile. When we consider the\nnarrowness of the sea; the numerous vessels in the French fleet; the\nactual crossing of the two fleets on a certain night; and that Nelson,\nnotwithstanding, could see nothing of the enemy himself, and hear\nnothing of them from merchant vessels, we may judge of the probability\nof waylaying our adversary on the broad Atlantic.\"\n\n\"The escape of another Toulon fleet in 1805; the long search for them in\nthe Mediterranean by the same able officer; the pursuit in the West\nIndies; their evasion of him among the islands; the return to Europe;\nhis vain efforts subsequently, along the coast of Portugal, in the bay\nof Biscay, and off the English channel; and the meeting at last at\nTrafalgar, brought about only because the combined fleets, trusting to\nthe superiority that the accession of several reinforcements had given,\nwere willing to try the issue of a battle--these are instances, of the\nmany that might be cited, to show how small is the probability of\nencountering upon the ocean an enemy who desires to avoid a meeting, and\nhow little the most untiring zeal, the most restless activity, the most\nexalted professional skill and judgment, can do to lessen the adverse\nchances. For more than a year Nelson most closely watched his enemy, who\nseems to have got out of port as soon as he was prepared to do so, and\nwithout attracting the notice of any of the blockading squadron. When\nout, Nelson, perfectly in the dark as to the course Villeneuve had\ntaken, sought for him in vain on the coast of Egypt. Scattered by\ntempests, the French fleet again took refuge in Toulon; whence it again\nput to sea, when refitted and ready, joining the Spanish fleet at Cadiz.\"\n\n\"On the courage, skill, vigilance, and judgment, acceded on all hands to\nbelong in a pre-eminent degree to the naval profession in this country,\nthis system of defence relies to accomplish, against a string of\nchances, objects of importance so great that not a doubt or misgiving as\nto the result is admissible. It demands of the navy to do perfectly, and\nwithout fail, that which, to do at all, seems impossible. The navy is\nrequired to know the secret purposes of the enemy, in spite of distance,\nand the broken intercourse of a state of war, even before these purposes\nare known to the leader who is to execute them; nay, more, before the\npurpose itself is formed. On an element where man is but the sport of\nstorms, the navy is required to lie in wait for the foe at the exact\nspot and moment, in spite of weather and seasons; to see him in spite of\nfogs and darkness.\"\n\n\"Finally, after all the devices and reliances of the system are\nsatisfactorily accomplished, and all the difficulties subdued, it\nsubmits to the issue of a single battle, on equal terms, the fate of the\nwar, having no hope or reserve beyond.\"\n\n\"The proper duty of our navy is, not coast or river defence; it has a\nmore glorious sphere--that of the _offensive_. In our last war, instead\nof lying in harbor, and contenting themselves with keeping a few more of\nthe enemy's vessels in watch over them than their own number--instead of\nleaving the enemy's commerce in undisturbed enjoyment of the sea, and\nour commerce without countenance or aid, they scattered themselves over\nthe wide surface of the ocean, penetrated to the most remote seas,\neverywhere acting with the most brilliant success against the enemy's\nnavigation. And we believe, moreover, that in the amount of the enemy's\nproperty thus destroyed, of American property protected or recovered,\nand in the number of hostile ships kept in pursuit of our scattered\nvessels, ships evaded if superior, and beaten if equal--they rendered\nbenefits a thousand-fold greater, to say nothing of the glory they\nacquired for the nation, and the character they imparted to it, than any\nthat would have resulted from a state of passiveness within the harbors.\nConfident that this is the true policy as regards the employment of the\nnavy proper, we doubt not that it will in the future be acted on, as it\nhas been in the past; and that the results, as regards both honor and\nadvantage, will be expanded commensurately with its own enlargement. In\norder, however, that the navy may always assume and maintain that active\nand energetic deportment, in offensive operations, which is at the same\ntime so consistent with its functions, and so consonant with its spirit,\nwe have shown that it must not be occupied with mere coast defence.\"\n\nA few remarks on the relative cost of ships and forts, and the economy\nof their support, and we will close this discussion. We do not regard\nthis question, however, as a matter of any great importance, for it can\nseldom be decisive in the choice of these two means of defence. No\nmatter what their relative cost may be, the one cannot often be\nsubstituted for the other. There are some few cases, however, where this\nmight be taken into consideration, and would be decisive. Let us\nendeavor to illustrate our meaning. For the defence of New York city,\nthe Narrows and East River must be secured by forts; ships cannot, in\nthis case, be substituted. But let us suppose that the _outer_ harbor of\nNew York furnishes no favorable place for the debarkation of troops, or\nthat the place of debarkation is so far distant that the troops cannot\nreach the city before the defensive forces can be prepared to repel\nthem. This outer harbor would be of great importance to the enemy as a\nshelter from storms, and as a place of debarkation or of rendezvous\npreparatory to a forcible passage of the Narrows; while to us its\npossession would not be absolutely essential, though very important.\nStrong fortifications on Sandy Hook, and one of the shoals, might\nprobably be so constructed as to furnish a pretty sure barrier to the\nentrance of this outer harbor; on the other hand, a naval force\nstationed within the inner harbor, and acting under the protection of\nforts at the Narrows, might also furnish a good, though perhaps less\ncertain protection for this outer roadstead. Here, then, we might well\nconsider the question of relative cost and economy of support of the\nproposed fortifications, and of a home squadron large enough to effect\nthe same object, and to be kept continually _at home_ for that special\npurpose. If we were to allow it to go to sea for the protection of our\ncommerce, its character and efficiency as a _harbor_ defence would be\nlost. We can therefore regard it only as a local force--fixed within the\nlimits of the defence of this particular place--and our estimates must\nbe made accordingly.\n\nThe average durability of ships of war in the British navy, has been\nvariously stated at seven and eight years in time of war, and from ten\nto twelve and fourteen years in time of peace. Mr. Perring, in his\n\"Brief Inquiry,\" published in 1812, estimates the average durability at\nabout eight years. His calculations seem based upon authentic\ninformation. A distinguished English writer has more recently arrived at\nthe same result, from estimates based upon the returns of the Board of\nAdmiralty during the period of the wars of the French Revolution. The\ndata in our own possession are less complete; the appropriations for\n_building_ and _repairing_ having been so expended as to render it\nimpossible to draw any accurate line of distinction. But, in the returns\nnow before us, there are generally separate and distinct amounts of the\n_timbers_ used for these two purposes; and consequently, so far as this\n(the main item of expense) is concerned, we may form pretty accurate\ncomparisons.\n\nAccording to Edge, (pp. 20, 21,) the average cost of timber, for hulls,\nmasts, and yards, in _building_ an English 74 gun ship, is L61,382. Let\nus now compare this cost of timber for _building_, with that of the same\nitem for _repairs_, for the following fifteen ships, between 1800 and\n1820. The list would have been still further enlarged, but the returns\nfor other ships during some portion of the above period are imperfect:\n\n   ============================================================\n       Name of Ship.    |No. of| When | Repaired from |  Cost.\n                        |Guns. |built.|               |\n   ------------------------------------------------------------\n   Vengeance,...........|  74  |  --  |  1800 to 1807 | L84,720\n   Ildefonso,...........|  74  |  --  |  1807 to 1808 |  85,195\n   Scipio,..............|  74  |  --  |  1807 to 1809 |  60,785\n   Tremendous,..........|  74  |  --  |  1807 to 1810 | 135,397\n   Elephant,............|  74  |  --  |  1808 to 1811 |  67,007\n   Spencer,.............|  74  | 1800 |  1809 to 1813 | 124,186\n   Romulus,.............|  74  |  --  |  1810 to 1812 |  73,141\n   Albion,..............|  74  | 1802 |  1810 to 1813 | 102,295\n   Donegal,.............|  74  |  --  |  1812 to 1815 | 101,367\n   Implacable,..........|  74  |  --  |  1813 to 1815 |  59,865\n   Illustrious,.........|  74  | 1803 |  1813 to 1816 |  74,184\n   Northumberland,......|  74  |  --  |  1814 to 1815 |  59,795\n   Kent,................|  74  |  --  |  1814 to 1818 |  88,357\n   Sultan,..............|  74  | 1807 |  1816 to 1818 |  61,518\n   Sterling Castle,.....|  74  |  --  |  1816 to 1818 |  65,280\n   ------------------------------------------------------------\n\nThis table, although incomplete, gives for the above fifteen ships,\nduring a period of less than twenty years, the cost of _timber alone_\nused in their repair, an average of about $400,000 each. More timber\nthan this was used, in all probability, upon the same vessels, and paid\nfor out of the funds appropriated \"for such as may be ordered in course\nof the year to be repaired.\" But the amount specifically appropriated\nfor timber for these fifteen ships, would, in every twelve or fifteen\nyears, equal the entire _first cost_ of the same items. If we add to\nthis amount, the cost of labor required in the application of timber to\nthe operations of repair, and take into consideration the expense of\nother materials and labor, and the decayed condition of many of the\nships at the end of this period, we should not be surprised to find the\nwhole sum _expended_ under these heads to equal the first cost, even\nwithin the minimum estimate of seven years. The whole cost of timber\nused for hulls, masts, and yards, in building between 1800 and 1820, was\nL18,727,551; in repairs and \"ordinary wear and tear,\" L17,449,780;\nmaking an annual average of $4,560,158 for building timber, and\n$4,273,371 for that used in repairs. A large portion of the vessels\n_built_ were intended to replace others which had been lost, or were so\ndecayed as to be broken up.\n\nBut it may be well to add here, the actual supplies voted for the\nsea-service, and for wear and tear, and the extraordinary expenses in\nbuilding and repairing of ships from 1800 to 1815.\n\n   ===============================================================\n        |        | For the wear|Ext. Expenses| For entire   |\n        |  Year  | and tear of |for building,| sea-service. |\n        |        |    Ships.   |repairing,&c.|              |\n        |---------------------------------------------------|\n        |  1800  | L4,350,000  |   L772,140  | L13,619,079  |\n        |  1801  |  5,850,000  |    933,900  |  16,577,037  |\n        |  1802  |  3,684,000  |    773,500  |  11,833,571  |\n        |  1803  |  3,120,000  |    901,140  |  10,211,378  |\n        |  1804  |  3,900,000  |    948,520  |  12,350,606  |\n        |  1805  |  4,680,000  |  1,553,690  |  15,035,630  |\n        |  1806  |  4,680,000  |  1,980,830  |  18,864,341  |\n        |  1807  |  5,070,000  |  2,134,903  |  17,400,337  |\n        |  1808  |  5,070,000  |  2,351,188  |  18,087,544  |\n        |  1809  |  3,295,500  |  2,296,030  |  19,578,467  |\n        |  1810  |  3,295,500  |  1,841,107  |  18,975,120  |\n        |  1811  |  3,675,750  |  2,046,200  |  19,822,000  |\n        |  1812  |  3,675,750  |  1,696,621  |  19,305,759  |\n        |  1813  |  3,549,000  |  2,822,031  |  20,096,709  |\n        |  1814  |  3,268,000  |  2,086,274  |  19,312,070  |\n        |  1815  |  2,386,500  |  2,116,710  |  19,032,700  |\n   ---------------------------------------------------------------\n\nIt appears from this table that the appropriations for the service,\nduring the first fifteen years of the present century, amounted to a\nlittle less than _ninety millions_ of dollars per annum; and for the\nwear and tear of ships, and \"the extraordinary expenses in building and\nrepairing ships, &c.,\" the annual appropriations amounted to near\n_thirty millions_.\n\nOur own naval returns are also so imperfect that it is impossible to\nform any very accurate estimate of the relative cost of construction and\nrepairs of our men-of-war. The following table, compiled from a report\nof the Secretary of the Navy, in 1841, (Senate Doc. No. 223, 26th\nCongress,) will afford data for an approximate calculation:--\n\n   ======================================================================\n   Name of       No.   Total Cost     When       Cost of    Repaired\n   Ship.         of    of building,   completed. Repairs,   between.\n                 Guns. exclusive of              exclusive\n                       armament,                 of\n                       stores,                   ordnance,\n                       &c. &c.                   &c. &c.\n   ----------------------------------------------------------------------\n   Delaware,     74     $543,368 00   1820     $354,132 56  1827 and 1838\n   N. Carolina,  74      431,852 00   1825      317,628 92  1824 and 1836\n   Constitution, 44      302,718 84   1797      266,878 34  1833 and 1839\n   United States 44      299,336 56   1797      571,972 77  1821 and 1841\n   Brandywine,   44  [23]299,218 12   1825  [23]377,665 95  1826 and 1838\n   Potomac,      44  [23]231,013 02   1822  [23] 82,597 03  1829 and 1835\n   Concord,      20      115,325 80   1828       72,796 22  1832 and 1840\n   Falmouth,     20       94,093 27   1827      130,015 43  1828 and 1837\n   John Adams,   20      110,670 69   1829      119,641 93  1834 and 1837\n   Boston,       20       91,973 19   1825      189,264 37  1826 and 1840\n   St. Louis,    20      102,461 95   1828      135,458 75  1834 and 1839\n   Vincennes,    20      111,512 79   1826      178,094 81  1830 and 1838\n   Vandalia,     20       90,977 88   1828       59,181 34  1832 and 1834\n   Lexington,    20?     114,622 35   1826       83,386 52  1827 and 1837\n   Warren,       20?      99,410 01   1826      152,596 03  1830 and 1838\n   Fairfield,    20      100,490 35   1826       65,918 26  1831 and 1837\n   Natches,[24]  20?     106,232 19   1827      129,969 80  1829 and 1836\n   Boxer,        10       30,697 88   1831       28,780 48  1834 and 1840\n   Enterprise,   10       27,938 63   1831       20,716 59  1834 and 1840\n   Grampus,      10       23,627 42   1821       96,086 36  1825 and 1840\n   Dolphin,      10       38,522 62   1836       15,013 35  1839 and 1840\n   Shark,        10       23,627 42   1821       93,395 84  1824 and 1839\n   ----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n[Footnote 23: Returns incomplete.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Broken up in 1840.]\n\nIt appears from the above table, that the cost of constructing ships of\nthe line is about $6,600 per gun; of frigates, $6,500 per gun; of\nsmaller vessels of war, a little less than $5,000 per gun: making an\naverage cost of vessels of war to be _more than six thousand dollars per\ngun._ And the expense of repairs for these vessels is _more than seven\nper cent. per annum_ on their first cost.\n\nWe have as yet had but little experience in the use of war-steamers. The\nFulton, four guns, built in 1838-'39, cost three hundred and\nthirty-three thousand seven hundred and seventy dollars and\nseventy-seven cents; the Mississippi and Missouri, ten guns each, built\nin 1841, cost about six hundred thousand dollars a piece; making an\naverage cost for war-steamers of _over sixty thousand dollars per gun._\nThe cost of repairs of steam ships will be much greater than those for\nvessels of war; but we have not yet had sufficient experience to\ndetermine the exact amount. It has been estimated, however, by competent\njudges, that when kept, the expense of repairs will at least equal\ntwelve per cent. of the first cost. The expense of keeping them in\ncommission is enormously great. \"Their engines,\" says the Secretary of\nthe Navy, in his annual report in 1842, \"consume so much fuel as to add\nenormously to their expenses; and the necessity that they should return\nto port, after short intervals of time, for fresh supplies, renders it\nimpossible to send them on any distant service. They cannot be relied on\nas cruisers, and are altogether too expensive for service in time of\npeace. I have therefore determined to take them out of commission, and\nsubstitute for them other and less expensive vessels.\"\n\nThe average cost of permanent fortifications is but _little more than\nthree thousand dollars per gun_. And it must be obvious, from the nature\nof the materials of which they are constructed, that the expense of\ntheir support must be inconsiderable. It is true that for some years\npast a large item of annual expenditure for fortifications has been\nunder the head of \"repairs;\" but much of this sum is for alterations and\nenlargements of temporary and inefficient works, erected anterior to the\nwar of 1812. Some of it, however, has been for actual repairs of decayed\nor injured portions of the forts; these injuries resulting from the\nnature of the climate, the foundations, the use of poor materials and\npoor workmanship, and from neglect and abandonment. But if we include\nthe risk of abandonment at times, it is estimated, upon data drawn from\npast experience, that _one-third of one per cent. per annum_, of the\nfirst cost, will keep in perfect repair any of our forts that have been\nconstructed since the last war.\n\nBut it is unnecessary to further discuss this question We repeat what\nhas already been said, no matter what may be the relative cost of ships\nand forts, the one, as a general thing, cannot be substituted for the\nother. Each has its own sphere of action, and each will contribute, in\nits own way, to the national defence; and any undue increase of one, at\nthe expense of the other, will be attended by a corresponding diminution\nof national power.[25]\n\n[Footnote 25: For further information concerning our system of sea-coast\ndefences, the reader is referred to House Doc. 206, twenty-sixth\nCongress, second session; Senate Doc. 85, twenty-eighth Congress, second\nsession; and to the annual reports of the Chief Engineer.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\n\nOUR NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES.\n\n\nIn discussing engineering as a branch of the military art, we spoke of\nthe use of fortifications on land frontiers, and their influence on the\nstrategic operations of a campaign. A brief notice was also given of the\ndifferent systems that have been proposed for arranging these defensive\nworks. Let us now apply this discussion to our northern frontier.\n\nThe principle laid down by Napoleon and Jomini, \"that fortifications\nshould always be constructed on important strategic points,\" is\nundoubtedly the correct one: but how to determine these points is a\nquestion that will often perplex the patience and try the skill of the\nengineer; yet determine them he must, or his fortifications will be\nworse than useless; for a fort improperly located, like a cannon with\nits fire reversed on its own artillerists, will be sure to effect the\ndestruction of the very forces it was designed to protect.\n\nThe selection of positions for fortifications on our northern frontier\nmust have reference to three distinct classes of objects, viz.: the\nsecurity, _first_, of the large frontier towns, where much public and\nprivate property is exposed to sudden dashing expeditions of the foe,\nmade either on land or by water; _second_, of lake harbors, important as\nplaces of refuge and security to our own ships, or to the enemy's fleets\nwhile engaged in landing troops or furnishing supplies to an invading\narmy; _third_, of all strategic points on the probable lines of\noffensive or defensive operations. These objects are distinct in their\nnature, and would seem to require separate and distinct means for their\naccomplishment; nevertheless, it will generally be found that positions\nselected with reference to one of these objects equally fulfil the\nothers, so intimately are they all connected. To determine the strategic\npoints of a probable line of military operations is therefore the main\nthing to be attended to in locating fortifications. That such points of\nmaximum importance are actually marked out by the peaceful or hostile\nintercourse of nations cannot be doubted.\n\nThe _relative_ importance of cities and towns is less varied by the\nfluctuations of commerce on a land frontier than on the sea-coast. The\never-changing system of \"internal improvements,\" by furnishing new\nhighways and thoroughfares for the transportation of the products of\nmanufacturers and agriculture, either continually varies the relative\nstanding of the seaports already opened, or opens new ones for the\nexportation of these products, and the importation of foreign articles\nreceived in exchange. But these \"internal improvements\" are seldom\ncarried so far as to connect together two separate and distinct\ncountries, and consequently the principal places on the dividing line\nusually retain their relative importance, no matter how often they may\nhave declined during times of hostility, or again flourished with the\nincreased commercial intercourse which results from peace. The principal\nEuropean places of traffic near the frontiers have remained the same for\nages, and in all probability ages hence the great frontier marts will be\nnearly the same as at present. This stability of rank among border towns\nis not confined to commercial influence; the same holds true with\nrespect to that established by intercourse of a hostile character.\nMilitary history teaches us that lines of hostile operations, and the\nfields upon which the principal battles between any two countries have\nbeen fought, are nearly the same, no matter how remote the periods of\ncomparison. These points and lines, so important in commerce as well as\nin war, result from the natural features of the ground, and we ought\ntherefore to expect that they would be as little liable to sudden\nchanges as the character of the earth itself.\n\nFrom these remarks it will readily be perceived that there are three\ndistinct methods of determining the strategic points between this\ncountry and Canada: 1st, by an examination of the topography of the two\ncountries; 2d, by tracing out the main channels of commercial\nintercourse; 3d, by reviewing the lines of their military operations.\nThe last method is the least liable to error, and perhaps is the most\neasily understood, inasmuch as it is sometimes difficult to point out\nthe precise degree of connection between prospective military lines and\nthe channels of commerce, or to show why these two have a fixed relation\nto the physical features of the country. In the present instance,\nmoreover, this method furnishes ample data for the formation of our\ndecision, inasmuch as the campaigns between this country and Canada have\nbeen neither few in number nor unimportant in their character and\nresults.\n\nIn tracing out the main features of the early wars upon our northern\nfrontier, it must be borne in mind that nearly the same portion of\ncountry which is now possessed by the English, was then occupied by the\nFrench, and that the English possessions in North America included the\npresent Middle and Northern States. At the period of the American\nrevolution the French and English had completely changed ground, the\narmies of the former operating in the \"States,\" while the English were\nin possession of Canada.\n\nThe first expedition to be noticed against that portion of the country,\nwas conducted by Samuel Argall, who sailed from Virginia in 1613, with a\nfleet of eleven vessels, attacked the French on the Penobscot, and\nafterwards the St. Croix.\n\nIn 1654, Sedgwick, at the head of a small New England army, attacked the\nFrench on the Penobscot, and overrun all Arcadia.\n\nIn 1666, during the contest between Charles II. and Louis XIV., it was\nproposed to march the New England troops across the country by the\nKennebec or Penobscot, and attack Quebec; but the terrors and\ndifficulties of crossing \"over rocky mountains and howling deserts\" were\nsuch as to deter them from undertaking the campaign.\n\nIn 1689, Count Frontenac, governor of Canada, made a descent into New\nYork to assist the French fleet in reducing that province. His line of\nmarch was by the river Sorrel and Lake Champlain. An attack upon\nMontreal by the Iroquois soon forced him to return; but in the following\nJanuary a party of French and Indians left Montreal in the depth of a\nCanadian winter, and after wading for two and twenty days, with\nprovisions on their backs, through snows and swamps and across a wide\nwilderness, reached the unguarded village of Schenectady. Here a\nmidnight war-whoop was raised, and the inhabitants either massacred or\ndriven half-clad through the snow to seek protection in the neighboring\ntowns.\n\nIn 1690, a congress of the colonies, called to provide means for the\ngeneral defence, assembled at New York, and resolved to carry war into\nCanada: an army was to attack Montreal by way of Lake Champlain, and a\nfleet to attempt Quebec by the St. Lawrence. The former advanced as far\nas the lake, when the quarrels of the commanding officers defeated the\nobjects of the expedition. The Massachusetts fleet of thirty-four\nvessels, (the largest carrying forty-four guns each,) and two thousand\nmen, failed to reduce Quebec, though the defences of that place were\nthen of the slightest character, and armed with only twenty-three guns.\n\nIn 1704, and again in 1707, Port Royal was attacked by costly\nexpeditions fitted out by the eastern colonies; and again, in 1709, a\nland force of fifteen hundred men advanced against Montreal by Lake\nChamplain; but nothing of importance was effected by either expedition.\n\nIn 1711, Lord Bolingbroke planned the conquest of Canada. The land\nforces, numbering five thousand men in all, were separated into two\ndistinct armies, the one sent against Detroit, and the other against\nMontreal by Lake Champlain; while a fleet of fifteen ships of war, forty\ntransports, and six store-ships, carrying a land force of six thousand\nfive hundred men, was to attack Quebec. The maritime expedition failed\nto reach its destination, and after losing a part of the fleet and more\nthan a thousand men in the St. Lawrence, this part of the project was\nabandoned. Nor was any thing important accomplished by either division\nof the land forces.\n\nThe same plan of campaign was followed in 1712. An army of four thousand\nmen marched against Montreal by Lake Champlain, but on hearing of the\nfailure of the naval expedition and of the concentration of the French\nforces on the river Sorel, they retired towards Albany.\n\nThe next expedition of any importance was the naval one of 1745 against\nLouisburg. For the attack of this place the colonies raised about four\nthousand men, and one hundred small vessels and transports, carrying\nbetween one hundred and sixty and two hundred guns. They were afterwards\njoined by ten other vessels carrying near five hundred guns. This\nattacking force now, according to some of the English writers, consisted\nof six thousand provincials, and eight hundred seamen, and a combined\nnaval force of near seven hundred guns. The troops landed, and laid\nsiege to the town. The garrison of the fortifications of Louisburg\nconsisted of six hundred regulars and one thousand Breton militia, or,\naccording to some writers, of only twelve hundred men in all. The\narmament of these works was one hundred and one cannon, seventy-six\nswivels, and six mortars. Auxiliary to the main works were an\nisland-battery of thirty twenty-two-pounders, and a battery on the main\nland armed with thirty large cannon. Frequent attempts were made to\nstorm the place, but the most persevering efforts were of no avail, many\nof the New Englanders being killed and wounded, and their boats\ndestroyed, while the garrison remained unharmed. At length, after a\nsiege of forty-nine days, want of provisions and the general\ndissatisfaction of the inhabitants, caused the garrison to surrender.\nWhen the New Englanders saw the strength of the works, and the slight\nimpression which their efforts had produced, they were not only elated\nbut greatly astonished at their success. It should be noticed, that in\nthe above attack the number of guns in the fleet was almost _three_\ntimes as great as that of all the forts combined; and yet the _naval_\npart of the attack was unsuccessful. The besieging army was more than\n_four_ times as great as all the garrisons combined; and yet the place\nheld out forty-nine days, and at last was surrendered through the want\nof provisions and the disaffection of the citizens. This place was soon\nafterwards restored to the French.\n\nWe see that, thus far in these wars, the English were vastly superior in\nstrength and numbers, yet the result of the several campaigns was\ndecidedly in favor of the French, who not only retained their\npossessions in the North, but extended their jurisdiction to the mouth\nof the Mississippi, and laid claim to the whole country west of the\nAlleghany mountains. This success must be attributed, not to any\nsuperiority of the Canadians in bravery, but to the higher military\ncharacter of their governors, _and more especially to their\nfortifications_, which were constructed in situations most judiciously\nselected, to influence the Indians and facilitate incursions into the\nEnglish colonies. The French pursued interior and central lines, while\nthe English followed exterior and divergent lines. The disparity of\nnumbers was always very great. At the beginning of the eighteenth\ncentury, the whole population of the colonies amounted to upwards of one\nmillion of souls, while that of both Canada and Louisiana did not exceed\nfifty-two thousand. But the French possessions, though situated at the\nextremities of a continent and separated by an almost boundless\nwilderness, were nevertheless connected by a line of military posts,\nstrong enough to resist the small arms that could then be brought\nagainst them. This fort-building propensity of the French became a\nmatter of serious alarm to the colonies, and in 1710 the legislature of\nNew York especially protested against it in an address to the crown.\nWhile the military art was stationary in England, France had produced\nher four great engineers--Errard, Pagan, Vauban, and Cormontaigne; and\nnowhere has the influence of their system of military defence been more\nstrikingly exhibited than in the security it afforded to the Canadian\ncolony, when assailed by such vastly superior British forces. Still\nfurther accessions were now made to these English forces by large\nreinforcements from the mother country, while the Canadians received\nlittle or no assistance from France; nevertheless they prolonged the war\ntill 1760, forcing the English to adopt at last the slow and expensive\nprocess of reducing all their fortifications. This will be shown in the\nfollowing outline of the several campaigns.\n\nVery early in 1755, a considerable body of men was sent from Great\nBritain to reinforce their troops in this country. These troops were\nagain separated into four distinct armies. The _first_, consisting of\nnear two thousand men, marched to the attack of Fort Du Quesne, but was\nmet and totally defeated by one-half that number of French and Indians.\nThe _second_ division, of fifteen hundred, proceeded to attack Fort\nNiagara by way of Oswego, but returned without success. The _third_, of\nthree thousand seven hundred men, met and defeated Dieskau's army of\ntwelve hundred regulars and six hundred Canadians and Indians, in the\nopen field, but did not attempt to drive him from his works at\nTiconderoga and Crown Point. The _fourth_, consisting of three thousand\nthree hundred men and forty-one vessels, laid waste a portion of Nova\nScotia; thus ending the campaign without a single important result. It\nwas commenced under favorable auspices, with ample preparations, and a\nvast superiority of force; _but this superiority was again more than\ncounterbalanced by the faulty plans of the English, and by the\nfortifications which the French had erected, in such positions as to\ngive them a decided advantage in their military operations._ Washington\nearly recommended the same system of defence for the English on the\nOhio; and, after Braddock's defeat, advised \"the erection of small\nfortresses at convenient places to deposit provisions in, by which means\nthe country will be eased of an immense expense in the carriage, and it\nwill also be a means of securing a retreat if we should be put to the\nrout again.\"\n\nBut this advice of Washington was unheeded, and the campaign of 1756 was\nbased upon the same erroneous principles as the preceding one. The\n_first_ division, of three thousand men, was to operate against Fort Du\nQuesne; the _second_, of six thousand men, against Niagara; the _third_,\nof ten thousand men, against Crown Point; and a _fourth_, of two\nthousand men, was to ascend the Kennebec river, destroy the settlements\non the Chaudiere, and, by alarming the country about Quebec, produce a\ndiversion in favor of the third division, which was regarded as the main\narmy, and was directed along the principal line of operations. The\nentire French forces at this time consisted of only three thousand\nregulars and a body of Canadian militia. Nevertheless, the English, with\nforces nearly _six times_ as numerous, closed the campaign without\ngaining a single advantage.\n\nWe here see that the French, with very inferior forces, still continued\nsuccessful in every campaign, uniformly gaining advantage over their\nenemy, and gaining ground upon his colonies. By the possession of Forts\nWilliam Henry, Ticonderoga, and Crown Point, they completely commanded\nLake George and Lake Champlain, which afforded the shortest and easiest\nline of communication between the British colonies and Canada. By means\nof their forts at Montreal, Frontenac, Detroit, &c., they had entire\ndominion of the lakes connecting the St. Lawrence with the Mississippi,\nand Canada with Louisiana; moreover, by means of Fort Du Quesne and a\nline of auxiliary works, their ascendency over the Indians on the Ohio\nwas well secured. But experience had at length taught the English\nwherein lay the great strength of their opponents, and a powerful effort\nwas now to be made to displace the French from their fortresses, or at\nleast to counterbalance these works by a vast and overwhelming\nsuperiority of troops.\n\nIn 1757, a British fleet of fifteen ships of the line, eighteen\nfrigates, and many smaller vessels, and a land force of twelve thousand\neffective men, were sent to attempt the reduction of the fortifications\nof Louisburg; but they failed to effect their object.\n\nIn 1758 the forces sent against this place consisted of twenty ships of\nthe line and eighteen frigates, with an army of fourteen thousand men.\nThe harbor was defended by only five ships of the line, one fifty-gun\nship, and five frigates, three of which were sunk across the mouth of\nthe basin. The fortifications of the town had been much neglected, and\nin general had fallen into ruins. The garrison consisted of only two\nthousand five hundred regulars, and six hundred militia. Notwithstanding\nthat the number of guns of the British fleet exceeded both the armaments\nof the French ships and of all the forts, these British ships did not\nrisk an attack, but merely acted as transports and as a blockading\nsquadron. Even the French naval defence, and the outer works commanding\nthe harbor, were reduced by the temporary land-batteries which Wolfe\nerected; and the main work, although besieged by an inequality of forces\nof nearly _five_ to _one_, held out for two months, and even then\nsurrendered through the fears and petitions of the non-combatant\ninhabitants, and not because it had received any material injury from\nthe besiegers. The defence, however, had been continued long enough to\nprevent, for that campaign, any further operations against Canada. The\nwhole number of the English land forces in this campaign was computed at\nfifty thousand men, of which more than forty thousand were in the field.\nThe _first_ division, of nine thousand men, was directed against Fort Du\nQuesne, whose garrison did not exceed as many hundred. The _second_\ndivision, of sixteen thousand effective troops, proceeded against\nTiconderoga and Crown Point; while a detachment of three thousand men\ncaptured Fort Frontenac, then garrisoned by only one hundred and ten\nmen. The whole force of the French amounted to only five thousand; the\nEnglish attempted to drive them from their works by storm, but were\nrepulsed with a loss of near two thousand men, while their opponents\nwere scarcely injured. The _third_ division acted, as has just been\nstated, in concert with the naval force against Louisburg.\n\nIn 1759, the _western_ division of the English army, consisting of a\nstrong body of Indians, and five thousand troops, wasted the whole\nseason in reducing Fort Niagara, which was garrisoned by only six\nhundred men. The _central_ column of thirteen thousand men was\nsufficiently successful to enable it to winter at Crown Point. The\n_eastern_ division of eight thousand men under Wolfe ascended the St.\nLawrence with a fleet of twenty-two ships, thirteen frigates, and\nfourteen sloops, and smaller vessels, carrying one thousand nine hundred\nand ninety guns, and five thousand five hundred and ninety seamen. The\nnaval defence of Quebec consisted of eight frigates, carrying two\nhundred and ten guns; the land forces numbered about nine thousand, and\nthe fortifications were armed with ninety-four guns and five mortars,\nonly a part of which could be brought to bear upon the anchorage ground.\nSeveral attempts were made by the combined forces to carry these works,\nbut they proved equally unsuccessful. Although the English fleet carried\n_twenty times_ as many guns as the forts, their inability to reduce\nthese works was acknowledged. The siege had continued for two months,\nand still the fortifications were uninjured. General Wolfe himself\ndistinctly stated, that, in any further attempt to carry the place, the\n\"guns of the shipping could not be of much use;\" and the chief engineer\nof the expedition gave it as his opinion, that \"the ships would receive\ngreat damage from the shot and bombs of the upper batteries, without\nmaking the least impression upon them.\" Under these circumstances it was\nfinally determined to endeavor to decoy Montcalm from his works, and\nmake him risk a battle in the open field. In an evil hour, the French\nconsented to forego the advantages of their fortifications, and the\ncontest was finally decided on the plains of Abraham, with forces nearly\nequal in number. Both Wolfe and Montcalm fell in this battle, but the\nformer on the field of victory; and five days afterwards the inhabitants\nof Quebec, weakened and dispirited by their losses, surrendered the\ntown, although its fortifications were still unharmed.\n\nThe French, in this campaign, had relinquished all idea of opposing the\nenemy in the open field, and confined their efforts to retard the\nadvance of the English till France could send troops to their relief;\nbut no such relief came, and when the campaign of 1760 opened, the\nlittle French army was concentrated at Montreal. As the English\ndivisions advanced, one by Oswego, one by Lake Champlain, and the third\nby Quebec, they afforded to the French a fine opportunity for the\nstrategic movement from a centre against converging lines; but the\ngarrison was too weak to hope for success in either direction, and\ntherefore awaited the enemy within their works. Montreal, being but\nslightly fortified, was soon reduced, and with it fell the French\nempire erected in this country at infinite labor and expense.\n\nAt the first outbreak of the American Revolution, it was so obviously\nimportant to get possession of the military works commanding the line of\nLake Champlain, that expeditions for this purpose were simultaneously\nfitted out by Massachusetts and Connecticut. The garrisons of these\nworks were taken by surprise. This conquest, says Botta, the able and\nelegant historian of the Revolution, \"was no doubt of high importance,\nbut it would have had a much greater influence upon the course of the\nwhole war, if these fortresses, _which are the bulwarks of the\ncolonies_, had been defended in times following, with the same prudence\nand valor with which they had been acquired.\"\n\nIn the campaign of 1775, an army of two thousand seven hundred and\neighty-four effective men, with a reserve of one thousand at Albany,\ncrossed the lake and approached the fortress of St. John's about the 1st\nof September. The work was garrisoned by only about five or six hundred\nregulars, and some two hundred militia. This was the only obstacle to\nprevent the advance of our army into the very heart of Canada; to leave\nit unreduced in rear would cut off all hope of retreat. Allen had\nalready made the rash and foolish attempt, and his whole army had been\ndestroyed, and he himself made prisoner. The reduction of this place was\ntherefore deemed absolutely necessary, but was not effected till the 3d\nof November, and after a long and tedious siege. This delay decided the\nfate of the campaign; for, although Montreal fell immediately\nafterwards, the season was so far advanced that a large portion of our\ntroops, wearied with their sufferings from cold and want of clothing,\nnow demanded their discharge. The eastern division, of one thousand men\nunder Arnold, crossing the country by the Kennebeck and Chaudiere,\nthrough difficulties and suffering almost unparalleled, arrived\nopposite Quebec on the 9th of November. The place was at this time\nalmost without defence, and, had Arnold possessed a suitable pontoon\nequipage, it might easily have been taken by surprise. But by the time\nthat the means for effecting a passage could be prepared, and a junction\ncould be effected between the two American armies, Quebec was prepared\nto sustain their attack. The result of that attack is too well known to\nrequire a repetition here.\n\nEarly the next season it was deemed necessary to withdraw the American\narmy from Canada. This retreat of undisciplined troops, in the presence\nof vastly superior numbers of the enemy, would have been extremely\nhazardous had it not been effected on a line of forts which were held by\nour own troops. As it was we sustained no considerable loss.\n\nCarleton pursued on rapidly, to co-operate with General Howe, who was\nnow lying at New York with over one hundred ships and about thirty-five\nthousand troops; but he received a decided check from the guns of\nTiconderoga, and retired again to Canada.\n\nBy the British plan of campaign in 1777, the entire force of their\nnorthern army was to concentrate at Albany. One division of fifteen\nhundred men, including Indians, advanced by Oswego, Wood Creek, and the\nMohawk; but Fort Stanwix, with a garrison of only six hundred men,\narrested their progress and forced them to return. Another, leaving New\nYork, ascended the Hudson as far as Esopus; but its progress was so much\nretarded by the small forts and water-batteries along that river, that\nit would have been too late to assist Burgoyne, even if it could\npossibly have reached Albany. The principal division of the enemy's\narmy, numbering about nine thousand men, advanced by the Champlain\nroute. Little or no preparations were made to arrest its progress. The\nworks of Ticonderoga were so out of repair as to be indefensible on the\nflanks. Its garrison consisted of only fifteen hundred continental\ntroops, and about as many militia, over whom the general had no control.\nTheir supply of provisions was exhausted, and only one man in ten of the\nmilitia had bayonets to their guns. Under these circumstances it was\ndeemed best to withdraw the garrison six days after the investment.\nBurgoyne now advanced rapidly, but with so little precaution as to leave\nhis communications in rear entirely unprotected. Being repulsed by the\nAmerican forces collected at Saratoga, his line of supplies cut off by\nour detached forts, his provisions exhausted, his troops dispirited, and\nhis Indian allies having deserted him, retreat became impossible, and\nhis whole army was forced to capitulate. This campaign closed the\nmilitary operations on our northern frontier during the war of the\nRevolution.\n\nWe now come to the war of 1812. In the beginning of this war the number\nof British regulars in the Canadas did not exceed three thousand men,\nwho were scattered along a frontier of more than nine hundred miles in\nextent. In the whole of Upper Canada there were but seven hundred and\ntwenty men, and at Montreal, Three Rivers, and on the whole line of the\nSorel the whole defensive force amounted to only thirteen hundred and\nthirty men, and the garrison of Quebec was so small, that no detachment\ncould be made without great inconvenience and danger. The fortifications\nof Isle aux Noix, then emphatically the key of central Canada, was\nwithout a garrison during nearly the whole of the first campaign. Under\nthese circumstances an American force of fifteen hundred or two thousand\nmen marching rapidly from Albany, might readily have broken the enemy's\nline of defence, and cut off all Upper Canada from supplies and\nreinforcements from England by way of Quebec. Let us see what course was\npursued.\n\nOn the 1st of June an army of two thousand men was collected at Dayton,\nin Ohio, placed under the command of an imbecile old officer of the\nRevolution, and directed by Detroit against the Canadian Peninsula. The\ndilatory march, absurd movements, and traitorous surrender of Hull's\narmy to a British force of three hundred regulars and four hundred\nmilitia, are but too well known. Another American army of about ten\nthousand men was afterwards raised in the west; the main division of\nthis army under Harrison marched by three separate routes to invade\nCanada by way of Malden; but they failed to reach their destination, and\nwintered behind the river Portage. The Eastern army was collected at\nAlbany in the early part of the summer and placed under the command of\nGeneral Dearborn, another old officer of the Revolution. Instead of\npushing this force rapidly forward upon the strategic line of Lake\nChamplain, the general was directed to divide it into three parts, and\nto send one division against the Niagara frontier, a _second_ against\nKingston, and a _third_ against Montreal. These orders were dispatched\nfrom Washington the 26th of June, nearly a month after Hull had begun\nhis march from Dayton. Dearborn's army, on the first of September,\nconsisted of six thousand five hundred regulars and seven thousand\nmilitia--thirteen thousand five hundred in all: six thousand three\nhundred for the Niagara frontier, two thousand two hundred at Sacketts\nHarbor, and five thousand for Lake Champlain. Even with this absurd plan\nof campaign and faulty division of the forces, we might have succeeded\nif the general had acted with energy, so exceedingly weak were the\nCanadian means of defence; but instead of taking advantage of his\nsuperiority in numbers and the favorable circumstances of the time, he\nentered into an armistice with the British general, and his whole army\nof thirteen thousand five hundred men lay inactive till the 13th of\nOctober, when the absurd project of crossing the Niagara at Lewiston\nfailed, because the New-York militia had _constitutional scruples_\nagainst crossing a river so long as the enemy were on the other side.\nThe Lake Champlain column, consisting of three thousand regulars and two\nthousand militia, a considerable portion of which had been collected as\nearly as the first of August, had in four months advanced as far as La\nCole river, a distance of about two hundred miles from Albany. The\nunimportant action at this place terminated the campaign, and the army\nof the North returned to winter-quarters.\n\nAll the early part of the campaign of 1813, on the northern frontier,\nwas spent in a war of detachments, in which our troops captured Fort\nGeorge and York, and repelled the predatory excursions of the enemy. In\nthese operations our troops exhibited much courage and energy, and the\nyoung officers who led them, no little skill and military talent. But\nnothing could have been more absurd than for a general, with superior\nforces in the vicinity of an enemy, to act only by detachments at a time\nwhen his opponents were daily increasing in number. This useless war of\noutposts and detachments was continued till July, when General Dearborn\nwas recalled, and General Wilkinson, another old officer of the\nRevolution, put in his place. It was now determined to make a push for\nMontreal, with the combined forces of the Northern army. Wilkinson, with\n8,000 men, descended the St. Lawrence, but did not reach Prescott till\nthe 6th of November, thus affording to the English plenty of leisure to\nprepare for his reception. Hampton, another old officer of the\nRevolution, ascended Lake Champlain with another column of 4,000 men,\nbut refused to form any co-operation with Wilkinson, and after the\nunimportant combat of Chrystler's Field, the whole army again retired\nto winter-quarters.\n\nIn the mean time the army of the West, under Harrison, who was assisted\nby the military skill and science of McCrea and Wood, and the bravery of\nCroghan and Johnson, held in check the British and Indians; and the\nbattle of the Thames and the victory of Lake Erie formed a brilliant\ntermination to the campaign in that quarter. Had such victories been\ngained on the Montreal or eastern portion of the frontier, they would\nhave led to the most important results.\n\nThe plan of operations for the campaign of 1814 was of the same diverse\nand discordant character as before. But the command of the troops had\nnow fallen into the hands of young and energetic officers, and Brown,\nassisted by such men as Wood, McCrea, Scott, Ripley, Miller, soon gained\nthe victories of Fort Erie, Chippewa, and Lundy's Lane; while McComb and\nMcDonough drove back the enemy from the line of Lake Champlain. With\nthese operations terminated the Northern campaign of 1814, the last\nwhich has been conducted on that frontier.\n\nLet us now turn to the system of works projected for the defence of this\nline.\n\nThe first works are at the Falls of St. Mary, on the western extremity\nof the line.\n\nThe second works are at Mackinaw.\n\nThe third works are at the foot of Lake Huron.\n\nThe fourth works are near Detroit.\n\nThe fifth works are near Buffalo.\n\nThe sixth works are at the mouth of the Niagara river.\n\nThe seventh works are at Oswego.\n\nThe eighth works are at Sacketts Harbor.\n\nThe ninth works are below Ogdensburg.\n\nThe tenth works are at Rouse's Point.\n\nThe eleventh works are near the head-waters of the Kennebec or the\nPenobscot.\n\nThe twelfth works are at Calais, on the St. Croix.\n\nAll these works are small, and simple in their character, well\ncalculated to assist the operations of armed forces in the field, but\nincapable of resisting a protracted siege. They are entirely different\nin their character from those on the coast, the latter being intended\nprincipally for the use of our citizen-soldiery, in the defence of our\nseaport towns, while the former are intended merely as auxiliaries to\nthe operations of more disciplined troops.\n\nThis system of defence for our Northern frontier has been much commented\non by men professing some knowledge of the military art, and various\nopinions have been advanced respecting its merits. Some have thought\nthat more and larger works should be placed on the western extremity of\nthis line; others attach by far the greatest importance to the central\nor Montreal portion of the frontier; while others, again, attach a\nhigher value to the eastern extremity of the line.\n\nThese last would have us concentrate our main forces on the head-waters\nof the Kennebec and the Penobscot, and then advance upon Quebec, a\ndistance of some 250 miles, along the isolated carriage-road, through\nthe valley of the Chaudiere. Here is only a single road, but little\ntravelled, and penetrating a wide and almost uninhabited wilderness.\nGeneral Jomini says emphatically, that _a line of operations should\nalways offer two or three roads for the movement of an army in the\nsphere of its enterprises_,--an insuperable objection to the Kennebec\nroute, except as a diversion to the main attack. But there are still\nstronger objections to this route, than its want of feasibility for the\ntransportation of the main army; for even should that army succeed in\nreaching Quebec in safety, the expedition would be entirely without\nmilitary results, unless that fortress could be immediately reduced,--a\ncontingency which would be extremely doubtful under the most favorable\ncircumstances; and even should we be ever so fortunate in our\noperations, the siege of such a place would occupy a considerable length\nof time. It would be throwing our forces along the most difficult line\nof operations, against the strongest point in the enemy's line of\ndefence, and making the success of the whole plan depend upon the\ncontingency of a reduction, in a few days, of one of the strongest\nfortresses in the world. What principle in military science would\njustify such a plan of campaign? We are fully aware of the great\nadvantages to be derived from the reduction of Quebec; and we are also\naware of the great difficulties to be encountered in any attempt to\naccomplish that object. It may, and probably will ere long, be made to\nsurrender to our arms; but it would be utter folly to base our military\noperations on the contingency of a short and successful siege. By\nadvancing upon Montreal by the Lake Champlain route, we could cut off\nthe Canadian forces in the West from all reinforcements; and then, as\ncircumstances might direct, could besiege Quebec, or attack the enemy in\nthe field, or perhaps, manoeuvring as the French did at the siege of\nMantua, accomplish both objects at the same time.\n\nWe have seen that it was one of Napoleon's maxims that _an army should\nchoose the shortest and most direct line of operations, which should\neither pierce the enemy's line of defence, or cut off his communications\nwith his base_. It is the opinion of men of the best military talent in\nour army that the Lake Champlain line satisfies all these conditions at\nthe same time;--that it is the most direct, most feasible, and most\ndecisive line which can be pursued in case of operations against Canada;\nand that it is indispensable to success in war that this line be well\nfortified in time of peace. All agree that the St. Lawrence above\nQuebec constitutes the _key_ point of the enemy's defence, and the\n_objective_ point towards which all our operations should be directed.\nTo reach this point, all our Boards of Engineers have deemed it best to\ncollect our troops at Albany and advance by Lake Champlain, a distance\nof only two hundred miles. Besides the advantages of a good water\ncommunication the whole distance for the transportation of military\nstores, there are several roads on each side, all concentrating on this\nline within our own territory. It has already been shown by the brief\nsketch of our northern wars, that this line has been the field of strife\nand blood for _fifteen campaigns_. Nature has marked it out as our\nshortest and easiest line of intercourse with Canada, both in peace and\nwar. Military diversions will always be made on the eastern and western\nextremities of this frontier, and important secondary or auxiliary\noperations be carried on by the eastern and western routes; but until we\noverthrow the whole system of military science as established by the\nRomans, revived by Frederick and practised and improved by Napoleon, the\n_central and interior line_, under all ordinary circumstances, will\nfurnish the greatest probabilities of success.\n\nIf the line of Lake Champlain is, as we have endeavored to show, the\nmost important line in the north; its security by fortifications is a\nmatter of the greatest interest. The works recommended by the Board,\nconsist of a single fort, costing $600,000, at Rouse's Point, on the\nextreme frontier, and unfortified depots at Plattsburg and Albany. But\nis this sufficient to accomplish the object? If the hostile army should\npass the extreme frontier barrier, what is to retard his advance,--what\ndefensive works are to protect the debouche of the Northern canal, or\neven to save the great central depot? We know of no foreign engineer who\nhas recommended less than _three_ lines of fortifications for the\nsecurity of a land frontier; and Napoleon, the Archduke Charles, and\nGeneral Jomini, agree in recommending at least this number of lines.\nThere may be circumstances that render it unnecessary to resort to a\nthree-fold defence throughout the whole extent of our northern frontier;\nbut upon our main line of communication with Canada,--a line of maximum\nimportance both to us and to the enemy, we know of no reason for\nviolating the positive rules of the art,--rules which have been\nestablished for ages; and sanctioned by the best engineers and greatest\ngenerals of modern times.\n\nTiconderoga has more than once stayed the waves of northern invasion;\nand we know of no change in the art of war, or in the condition of the\ncountry, that renders less important than formerly the advantages of an\nintermediate point of support between Albany and the Canadian lines.\nIndeed it would seem that the connection of the Hudson with the lake by\nthe northern canal had even increased the value of such a point.\n\nIt would seem, moreover, that the great value of a central depot near\nAlbany would warrant a resort to the best means of security which can be\nafforded by defensive works. Here we already have one of our largest\narsenals of construction; here are to be located magazines for the\ncollection and deposit, in time of peace, of gunpowder; here, in time of\nwar, is to be formed the grand military depot for our whole northern\narmies; and here is the point of junction of the lines of communication\nof our northern and eastern states, and the great central rallying point\nwhere troops are to be collected for the defence of our northern\nfrontier, or for offensive operations against Canada. Such a place\nshould never be exposed to the _coup-de-main_ of an enemy. The chance\noperations of a defensive army are never sufficient for the security of\nso important a position. We do not here pretend to say what its defences\nshould be. Perhaps strong _tetes-de-pont_ on the Mohawk and Hudson\nrivers, and detached works on the several lines of communication, may\naccomplish the desired object; perhaps more central and compact works\nmay be found necessary. But we insist on the importance of securing this\nposition by _some_ efficient means. The remarks of Napoleon, (which have\nalready been given,) on the advantages to be derived from fortifying\nsuch a central place, where the military wealth of a nation can be\nsecured, are strikingly applicable to this case.\n\nBut let us look for a moment at what is called the _western_ plan of\ndefence for our northern frontier.\n\nCertain writers and orators of the western states, in their plans of\nmilitary defence, would have the principal fortifications of the\nnorthern frontier established on Lake Erie, the Detroit river, the St.\nClair, and Lake Huron; and the money proposed for the other frontier and\ncoast works, expended in establishing military and naval depots at\nMemphis and Pittsburg, and in the construction of a ship-canal from the\nlower Illinois to Lake Michigan,--for the purpose of obtaining the naval\ncontrol of the northern lakes.\n\nIt is said that British military and steam naval forces will ascend the\nSt. Lawrence to Lake Ontario; that to counteract these operations we\nmust build an opposition steam-navy at Pittsburg and Memphis, and\ncollect out troops on the Ohio and Mississippi, ascend the Mississippi\nand Illinois, Lake Michigan, Lake Huron, and the Georgian Bay, cross\nover to the Ottawa by French river and Lake Nipissing, or Moon river and\nthe Muskago, then descend the Ottawa river to Montreal. But as there\nmight be some difficulty in conveying their war-steamers over some\ntwelve or fifteen portages between the Georgian Bay and the Ottawa, and\nas the upper waters of that river are not navigable by such craft, it\nhas, by some of the military writers before alluded to, been deemed\npreferable to descend Lake Huron, St. Clair river and lake, run the\ngauntlet past the British forts on the Detroit, descend Lake Erie and\nthe Niagara[26] into Lake Ontario, so as to meet the English as they\ncome steaming up the St. Lawrence!\n\n[Footnote 26: How they are to pass the Falls was not determined either\nby Harry Bluff or the Memphis Convention.]\n\nIt is agreed upon all sides that the British must first collect their\nforces at Quebec, and then pass along the line of the St. Lawrence and\nLake Ontario to reach the Niagara and Detroit frontiers. Our boards of\nengineers have deemed it best to collect troops on the Champlain line,\nand, by penetrating between Montreal and Quebec, separate the enemy's\nforces and cut off all the remainder of Canada from supplies and\nreinforcements from England. But it has been discovered by certain\nwestern men that to cut the _trunk_ of a tree is not the proper method\nof felling it: we must climb to the _top_ and pinch the buds, or, at\nmost, cut off a few of the smaller limbs. To blow up a house, we should\nnot place the mine under the foundation, but attach it to one of the\nshingles of the roof! We have already shown that troops collected at\nAlbany may reach the great strategic point on the St. Lawrence by an\neasy and direct route of _two hundred miles_; but forces collected at\nPittsburg and Memphis must pass over a difficult and unfrequented route\nof _two thousand miles_.\n\nOur merchant marine on the lakes secures to us a naval superiority in\nthat quarter at the beginning of a war; and our facilities for\nship-building are there equal if not superior to any possessed by the\nenemy. The only way, therefore, in which our ascendency on the lakes can\nbe lost, is by the introduction of steam craft from the Atlantic. The\ncanals and locks constructed for this object will pass vessels of small\ndimensions and drawing not over eight and a half feet water.\n\nHow are we to prevent the introduction of these Atlantic steamers into\nour lakes? Shall we, at the first opening of hostilities, march with\narmed forces upon the enemy's line of artificial communication and blow\nup the locks of their ship-canals, thus meeting the enemy's marine at\nthe very threshold of its introduction into the interior seas; or shall\nwe build opposition steam-navies at Pittsburg and Memphis, some two\nthousand miles distant, and then expend some forty or fifty millions[27]\nin opening an artificial channel to enable them to reach Lake Ontario,\nafter its borders have been laid waste by the hostile forces? Very few\ndisinterested judges would hesitate in forming their opinion on this\nquestion.[28]\n\n[Footnote 27: The construction of the Illinois ship-canal, for vessels\nof eight and a half feet draught, is estimated at fifteen millions; to\ngive the same draught to the Mississippi and lower Illinois, would\nrequire at least ten millions more; a ship canal of the corresponding\ndraught around Niagara Falls, will cost, say, ten millions; the navy\nyard at Memphis, with docks, storehouses, &c., will cost about two\nmillions, and steamers sent thence to the lakes will cost about fifty\nthousand dollars per gun. On the other hand, the military defences which\nit is deemed necessary to erect in time of peace for the security of the\nChamplain frontier, will cost only about two thousand dollars per gun;\nthe whole expenditure not exceeding, at most, two millions of dollars!\n\nIt is not to be denied that a water communication between the\nMississippi and the northern lakes will have great commercial\nadvantages, and that, in case of a protracted war, auxiliary troops and\nmilitary stores may be drawn from the valley of the Mississippi to\nassist the North and East in preventing any great accessions to the\nBritish military forces in the Canadas. We speak only of the policy of\nexpending vast sums of money on this _military_ (?) _project_, to the\nneglect of matters of more immediate and pressing want. We have nothing\nto say of its character as a _commercial project_, or of the ultimate\nmilitary advantages that might accrue from such a work. We speak only of\nthe present condition and wants of the country, and not of what that\ncondition and those wants may be generations hence!]\n\n[Footnote 28: There are no books devoted exclusively to the subjects\nembraced in this chapter; but the reader will find many remarks on the\nnorthern frontier defences in the histories of the war of 1812, in\ncongressional reports, (vide House Doc. 206, XXVIth Congress, 2d\nsession; and Senate Doc., No. 85, XXVIIIth Congress, 2d session,) and in\nnumerous pamphlets and essays that have appeared from the press within\nthe last few years.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX.\n\nARMY ORGANIZATION--STAFF AND ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS.\n\n\nBy the law of the 12th of December, 1790, on the organization of the\npublic force of France, the Army was defined, \"A standing force drawn\nfrom the public force, and designed to act against external enemies.\"\n[_Une force habituelle extraite de la force publique, et destinee\nessentiellement a agir contre les ennemis du dehors_.]\n\nIn time of peace, the whole organized military force of the State is\nintended when we speak of _the army_; but in time of war this force is\nbroken up into two or more fractions, each of which is called an _army_.\nThese armies are usually named from the particular duty which may be\nassigned to them--as, _army of invasion, army of occupation, army of\nobservation, army of reserve, &c._; or from the country or direction in\nwhich they operate--as, _army of the North, of the South, of Mexico, of\nCanada, of the Rhine, &c._; or from the general who commands it--as, the\n_army of Soult, army of Wellington, army of Bluecher, &c._\n\nAll modern armies are organized on the same basis. They are made up of a\nStaff and Administrative departments, and four distinct arms--Infantry,\nCavalry, Artillery, and Engineers; each having distinct duties, but all\ncombining to form one and the same military body. In the actual\noperations of a campaign, these forces are formed into _corps d'armee_,\neach _corps d'armee_ being composed of two or more _grand-divisions_;\neach grand-division, of two or more _brigades_; and each brigade, of\nseveral _companies, squadrons_, or _batteries_.\n\nIn speaking of an army in the field, it is sometimes supposed to be\ndivided into two classes of men--the _Staff_ and _the line_. We here\ninclude in the first class--\n\nAll officers, of whatever arm, above the rank of colonel;\n\nAll officers of the staff corps of whatever grade, and\n\nAll officers attached to the staff as aides, &c.;\n\nAll officers of the administrative departments;\n\nAll officers of artillery and engineer staffs;\n\nThe corps of geographical or topographical engineers, and\n\nThe guards.\n\nIn the second class are included all troops, of whatever arm, which\nbelong to the active army, in infantry, cavalry, artillery, and\nengineers. All troops on detached service, such as recruiting, guarding\nposts and depots, escorting convoys, &c., as well as all sedentary\ncorps, garrisons of fortified places, &c., are not regarded in this\nclassification as composing any part of the _line_ of the army.\n\n_Troops of the line_ is a term applied only to such troops as form the\nprincipal line on the battle-field, viz:--The heavy infantry and heavy\ncavalry. These are technically called _infantry of the line_, and\n_cavalry of the line_. In this sense of the term, light infantry, light\ncavalry or dragoons, artillery, and engineers, are not classed as troops\nof the _line_. But this distinction is now pretty much fallen into\ndisuse, and the division of an army into Staff and Administrative\ndepartments, and four arms of service--Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and\nEngineers--is now regarded as the most convenient, from being precise\nand definite in its meaning.\n\nThe _general staff_ of an army includes all general officers of the\narmy, and such officers of lower grades as are attached to this general\nduty, instead of serving with troops, or on special administrative duty.\nThe general officers are--1st, the _generalissimo_, or commander-in\n-chief; 2d, _generals_, or marshals, as they are called in\nFrance, or field-marshals and generals of infantry and cavalry, as they\nare called in England and the northern states of Europe; 3d,\n_lieutenant-generals_; 4th, _generals of division_, or major-generals,\nas they are called in England; 5th, _generals of brigade_, or\nbrigadier-generals, as they are sometimes called;--colonels, majors,\ncaptains, lieutenants, ensigns, and cornets or cadets, are also either\nattached to the staff, or form a part of the _staff corps_. The titles\nof \"adjutant-general,\" and of \"inspector-general,\" are given to staff\nofficers selected for these special services, either in the general\nstaff or in the several _corps d'armee_. No special rank is attached to\nthese offices themselves, and the grade of those who hold them is fixed\nby some special rule, or by their general rank in the army.\n\nIn the war of the Revolution, Washington held the rank of General, and\nin 1798 the rank of Lieutenant-general. In the war of 1812, the highest\ngrade held by any of our officers was that of General of Division, or\nMajor-general, as it was called. The highest grade in our army at the\npresent time is called Major-general--a title that properly belongs, not\nto the general of an army, but to the chief of staff. Hamilton had this\ntitle when chief of Washington's staff; Berthier and Soult when chief of\nNapoleon's staff, the former till the close of the campaign of 1814, and\nthe latter in the Waterloo campaign. General Jomini first greatly\ndistinguished himself as chief of Ney's staff, and afterwards on the\nstaff of the Emperor of Russia. Other generals have owed much of their\nsuccess to the chiefs of their staff:--Pichegru to Regnier, Moreau to\nDessoles, Kutusof to Toll, Barclay to Diebitsch, and Bluecher to\nSharnharst and Gneisenau.\n\nThe _generalissimo_ or commander-in-chief of an army is the person\ndesignated by the law of the land to take charge of the organized\nmilitary forces of the state. In this country the President, through his\nSecretary of War, exercises this general command. In England, Wellington\nacts in the capacity of commander-in-chief of all the British military\nforces. In France, the Minister of War, under the king, has this general\ndirection. In other European services, some prince of the blood, or\ndistinguished general, exercises the functions of generalissimo.\n\nAn active army in the field should be commanded by a _general_, or, as\nis done in some European countries, by a marshal. These may be regarded\nas of assimilated rank.\n\nA _corps d'armee_ should, be commanded by a _Lieutenant-general_. This\nrule is almost universal in Europe. The number of marshals in France\nunder Napoleon was so great, that officers of this grade were often\nassigned to _corps d'armee_.\n\nA grand division of an army should be commanded by a _General of\nDivision_. In England, the assimilated grade is that of major-general,\nand in France at the present time, the younger lieutenant-generals, or\nthe _marechaux-de-camp_, command divisions.\n\nA brigade should be commanded by a _Brigadier-general_. At the present\ntime in the French service, _marechaux-de-camp_ act as commanders of\nbrigades.\n\nThe several _corps d'armee_ are designated by numbers, 1st, 2d, 3d, &c.,\nand in the same way the several divisions in each _corps d'armee_, and\nthe several brigades in each division.\n\nWhen the number of troops are placed on a war footing, each _corps\nd'armee_ ordinarily contains from twenty to thirty thousand men.\n\nThe command of these several _corps d'armee_, divisions, and brigades,\nis taken by the officers of the corresponding grades according to\nseniority of rank, and without reference to arms, unless otherwise\ndirected by the generalissimo, who should always have the power to\ndesignate officers for special commands.\n\nThe _chief of staff_ of an army is usually selected from the grade next\nbelow that of the general commanding, and receives the title, for the\ntime being, which is used to designate this special rank. In some\nEuropean armies, and formerly in our own service, this officer was\ncalled major-general. In France, if the generalissimo commands in\nperson, a marshal is made chief of staff with the temporary title of\n_major-general_; but if a marshal commands the army, a lieutenant\n-general or _marechal-de-camp_ becomes chief of staff with the\ntitle of _aide-major-general_. The chiefs of staff of _corps d'armee_\nand of divisions, are selected in precisely the same way.\n\nThe position assigned by the commanding general for the residence of his\nstaff, is denominated the _General Head-Quarter of the army_; that of a\n_corps d'armee_ staff, the _Head-Quarters of_ [1st or 2d, &c.] _corps\nd'armee_; that of a division, the _Head-Quarters of_ [1st or 2d, &c.]\n_division_, [1st or 2d, &c.] _corps d'armee_.\n\nThe petty staffs of regiments, squadrons, &c., consisting of an\nadjutant, sergeant-major, &c., are especially organized by the\ncommandants of the regiments, &c., and have no connection whatever with\nthe general staff of an army. Of course, then, they are not embraced in\nthe present discussion.\n\nThe subordinate officers of the staff of an army, in time of war, are\ncharged with important and responsible duties connected with the\nexecution of the orders of their respective chiefs. But in time of\npeace, they are too apt to degenerate into fourth-rate clerks of the\nAdjutant-general's department, and mere military dandies, employing\ntheir time in discussing the most unimportant and really contemptible\npoints of military etiquette, or criticising the letters and dispatches\nof superior officers, to see whether the wording of the report or the\nfolding of the letter exactly corresponds to the particular regulation\napplicable to the case. Such was the character given to the first staff\nof Wellington, and a similar class of men composed the staff of the army\nof Italy when it was abolished by Napoleon and a new one formed in its\nplace. There are also some officers of this stamp in our own service,\nbut they are regarded by the army with universal contempt. The staff of\nour army requires a new and different organization, and should be\nconsiderably enlarged.\n\nThe following is the composition of a regularly organized general staff\nin the French service, for an army of forty or fifty thousand men\ndivided into two _corps d'armee_ and a reserve.\n\n1st. The marshal (or general) commanding-in-chief; and one colonel or\nlieutenant-colonel, one major, three captains and three subalterns, as\naides-de-camp.\n\n2d. A lieutenant-general as chief-of-staff, with the title of\n_major-general_, assisted by one colonel or lieutenant-colonel, three\nmajors, five captains, and one subaltern, as aides-de-camp.\n\n3d. Three lieutenant-generals, commanding the _corps d'armee_ and\nreserve. Each of these will be assisted by aides in the same way as the\n_major-general_, and each will also have his regularly-organized staff\nof _corps d'armee_, with a general of division or general of brigade as\nchief.\n\n4th. Six or nine generals commanding divisions, each having his own\ndistinct and separately organized staff. In the French army, the staff\nof an officer commanding a division is composed of one colonel, two\nmajors, three captains, and six subalterns.\n\n5th. Twelve or more generals of brigade, each having one captain, and\none subaltern for aides.\n\n6th. There is also attached to the staff of the general-in-chief of the\narmy, the commandants of artillery and engineers, with several\nsubordinates, inspector-generals, and the ranking officers of each of\nthe administrative departments, with their assistants.\n\nThe generals select their aides and assistants from the staff corps, or\nfrom either of the four arms of service.\n\nThe troops of these arms may be distributed as follows:\n\n   52 battalions of infantry,                            35,000 men.\n   42 squadrons of horse,      .         .                6,500  \"\n   13 batteries of artillery, (4 mounted and 9 foot,) .   2,500  \"\n    5 companies of sappers, 2 of pontoniers,[29] and 1 of artificers,\n        .          .          .          .          .     1,500  \"\n                                                         ------\n                                                         45,500  \"\n\n\n[Footnote 29: One bridge-equipage is required for each _corps d'armee_.]\n\nIf we add to these the staff, and the several officers and employes of\nthe administrative departments, we have an army of nearly fifty thousand\nmen.\n\nThis, it will be remembered, is the organization of an army in the\nfield; in the entire military organization of a state, the number of\nstaff officers will be still higher.\n\nIn 1788, France, with a military organization for about three hundred\nand twenty thousand men, had eighteen marshals, two hundred and\ntwenty-five lieutenant-generals, five hundred and thirty-eight\n_marechaux-de-camp_, and four hundred and eighty-three brigadiers. A\nsimilar organization of the general staff was maintained by Napoleon. At\npresent the general staff of the French army consists of nine marshals,\n(twelve in time of war;) eighty lieutenant-generals in active service,\nfifty-two in reserve, and sixty two _en retraite_--one hundred and\nninety-four in all; one hundred and sixty _marechaux-de-camp_ in active\nservice, eighty-six in reserve, and one hundred and ninety _en\nretraite_--four hundred and thirty-six in all. The officers of the\nstaff-corps are: thirty colonels, thirty lieutenant-colonels, one\nhundred majors, three hundred captains, and one hundred lieutenants.\nThose of other European armies are organized on the same basis.\n\nIt will be seen from these remarks that the organization of our own\ngeneral staff is exceedingly defective, and entirely unsuited to the\nobject for which it is created. We have two brigadier-generals for the\ncommand of two brigades, and one general of division, with the title of\nmajor-general, who acts in the fourfold capacity of general commanding\nthe army, lieutenant-general, general of division, and chief of staff of\nthe army. But as it is impossible with this number to maintain a proper\norganization, the President (with the advice and consent of the Senate)\nhas, from time to time, increased this number to three major-generals,\nand nine brigadier-generals, and numerous officers of staff with lower\ngrades. Nearly all these officers are detached from their several\nregiments and corps, thus injuring the efficiency of regiments and\ncompanies; and we have in our service, by this absurd mode of supplying\nthe defects of our system of organization by brevet rank, the anomaly\nof _officers being generals, and at the same time not generals; of\nholding certain ranks and grades, and yet not holding these ranks and\ngrades!_ Let Congress do away this absurd and ridiculous system, and\nestablish a proper and efficient organization of the general staff, and\nrestore the grades of general and lieutenant-general. In the war of\n1812, instead of resorting to a proper organization when an increase of\nthe general staff was required, we merely multiplied the number of\nmajor-generals and generals of brigade by direct appointment, or by\nconferring brevet rank. It is now conceded that there never was a more\ninefficient general staff than that with which our army was cursed\nduring the war; and the claims of brevet rank have ever since been a\nsource of endless turmoils and dissatisfaction, driving from the army\nmany of its noblest ornaments.\n\nIn the event of another war, it is to be hoped that Congress will not\nagain resort to the ruinous system of 1812. Possibly it may by some be\nobjected to the creation of generals, lieutenant-generals, &c., that it\nincreases the expense of the army and the number of its officers. This\nneed not be. The number, pay, &c., may remain the same, or nearly the\nsame, as at present. But by increasing the grades you avoid in a\nconsiderable measure the difficulties of seniority claims and brevet\nrank--the principal curses of our present system. If we merely increase\nthe number of each existing grade, giving a part of these rank above\ntheir name and office, we merely multiply evils. But we will leave this\nsubject for the present, and recur to the general discussion of staff\nduties.\n\nThe following remarks of Jomini on the importance of the staff of an\narmy are worthy of attention. \"A good staff,\" says he, \"is, more than\nall, indispensable to the constitution of an army; for it must be\nregarded as the nursery where the commanding general can raise his\nprincipal supports--as a body of officers whose intelligence can aid\nhis own. When harmony is wanting between the genius that commands, and\nthe talents of those who apply his conceptions, success cannot be sure;\nfor the most skilful combinations are destroyed by faults in execution.\nMoreover, a good staff has the advantage of being more durable than the\ngenius of any single man; it not only remedies many evils, but it may\nsafely be affirmed that it constitutes for the army the best of all\nsafeguards. The petty interests of coteries, narrow views, and misplaced\negotism, oppose this last position: nevertheless, every military man of\nreflection, and every enlightened statesman, will regard its truth as\nbeyond all dispute; for a well-appointed staff is to an army what a\nskilful minister is to a monarchy--it seconds the views of the chief,\neven though it be in condition to direct all things of itself; it\nprevents the commission of faults, even though the commanding general be\nwanting in experience, by furnishing him good councils. How many\nmediocre men of both ancient and modern times, have been rendered\nillustrious by achievements which were mainly due to their associates!\nReynier was the chief cause of the victories of Pichegru, in 1794; and\nDessoles, in like manner, contributed to the glory of Moreau. Is not\nGeneral Toll associated with the successes of Kutusof? Diebitsch with\nthose of Barclay and Witgenstein? Gneisenau and Muffling with those of\nBluecher? Numerous other instances might be cited in support of these\nassertions.\"\n\n\"A well-established staff does not always result from a good system of\neducation for the young aspirants; for a man may be a good mathematician\nand a fine scholar, without being a good warrior. The staff should\nalways possess sufficient consideration and prerogative to be sought for\nby the officers of the several arms, and to draw together, in this way,\nmen who are already known by their aptitude for war. Engineer and\nartillery officers will no longer oppose the staff, if they reflect that\nit will open to them a more extensive field for immediate distinction,\nand that it will eventually be made up exclusively of the officers of\nthose two corps who may be placed at the disposal of the commanding\ngeneral, and who are the most capable of directing the operations of\nwar.\"\n\n\"At the beginning of the wars of the Revolution,\" says this able\nhistorian elsewhere, \"in the French army the general staff, which is\nessential for directing the operations of war, had neither instruction\nnor experience.\" The several adjutant-generals attached to the army of\nItaly were so utterly incompetent, that Napoleon became prejudiced\nagainst the existing staff-corps, and virtually destroyed it, drawing\nhis staff-officers from the other corps of the army. In his earlier\nwars, a large portion of staff duties were assigned to the engineers;\nbut in his later campaigns the officers of this corps were particularly\nrequired for the sieges carried on in Germany and Spain, and\nconsiderable difficulty was encountered in finding suitable officers for\nstaff duty. Some of the defects of the first French staff-corps were\nremedied in the latter part of Napoleon's career, and in 1818 it was\nreorganized by Marshal Saint-Cyr, and a special school established for\nits instruction.\n\nSome European nations have established regular staff-corps, from which\nthe vacancies in the general staff are filled; others draw all their\nstaff-officers from the corps of the army. A combination of the two\nsystems is preferred by the best judges. Jomini recommends a regular\nstaff-corps, with special schools for its instruction; but thinks that\nits officers should be drawn, at least in part, from the other corps of\nthe army: the officers of engineers and artillery he deems, from their\ninstruction, to be peculiarly qualified for staff duty. The policy of\nholding double rank at the same time in the staff and in the corps of\nthe army, as is done in our service, is pronounced by all competent\njudges as ruinous to an army, destroying at the same time the character\nof the staff and injuring the efficiency of the line.\n\nThe following remarks on the character and duties of general-officers of\nan army, made at the beginning of the war of 1812, are from the pen of\none of the ablest military writers this country has yet produced:--\n\n\"Generals have been divided into three classes,--_Theorists_, who by\nstudy and reflection have made themselves acquainted with all the rules\nor maxims of the art they profess; _Martinets_, who have confined their\nattention merely to the mechanical part of the trade; and _Practical\nmen_, who have no other or better guide than their own experience, in\neither branch of it. This last description is in all services, excepting\nour own, the most numerous, but with us gives place to a fourth class,\nviz., men destitute alike of _theory_ and of _experience_.\"\n\n\n\"Self-respect is one thing, and presumption another. Without the former,\nno man ever became a good officer; under the influence of the latter,\ngenerals have committed great faults. The former is the necessary result\nof knowledge; the latter of ignorance. A man acquainted with his duty\ncan rarely be placed in circumstances new, surprising, or embarrassing;\na man ignorant of his duty will always find himself constrained to\n_guess_, and not knowing how to be right by _system_, will often be\nwrong by _chance_.\"\n\n\"These remarks are neither made nor offered as applying exclusively to\nthe science of war. They apply to all other sciences; but in these,\nerrors are comparatively harmless. A naturalist may amuse himself and\nthe public with false and fanciful theories of the earth; and a\nmetaphysician may reason very badly on the relations and forms of matter\nand spirit, without any ill effect but to make themselves ridiculous.\nTheir blunders but make us merry; they neither pick pockets, nor break\nlegs, nor destroy lives; while those of a general bring after them evils\nthe most compounded and mischievous,--the slaughter of an army--the\ndevastation of a state--the ruin of an empire!\"\n\n\"In proportion as ignorance may be calamitous, the reasons for acquiring\ninstruction are multiplied and strengthened. Are you an _honest_ man?\nYou will spare neither labor nor sacrifice to gain a competent knowledge\nof your duty. Are you a man of _honor_? You will be careful to avoid\nself-reproach. Does your bosom glow with the holy fervor of\n_patriotism_? You will so accomplish yourself as to avoid bringing down\nupon your country either insult or injury.\"\n\n\"Nor are the more selfish impulses without a similar tendency. Has\n_hunger_ made you a soldier? Will you not take care of your bread! Is\n_vanity_ your principle of action? Will you not guard those mighty\nblessings, your epaulets and feathers! Are you impelled by a love of\n_glory_ or a love of _power_? And can you forget that these coy\nmistresses are only to be won by intelligence and good conduct?\"\n\n\"But the _means_ of instruction, say you, where are they to be found?\nOur standing army is but a bad and ill-organized militia, and our\nmilitia not better than a mob. Nor have the defects in these been\nsupplied by Lycees, Prytanees, and Polytechnic schools. The morbid\npatriotism of some, and the false economy of others, have nearly\nobliterated every thing like military knowledge among us.\"\n\n\"This, reader, is but one motive the more for reinstating it. Thanks to\nthe noble art of printing! you still have _books_ which, if _studied_,\nwill teach the art of war.\"\n\n\"_Books_! And what are they but the dreams of pedants? They may make a\nMack, but have they ever made a Xenophon, a Caesar, a Saxe, a Frederick,\nor a Bonaparte? Who would not laugh to hear the cobbler of Athens\nlecturing Hannibal on the art of war?\"\n\n\"True; but as you are not Hannibal, listen to the cobbler. Xenophon,\nCaesar, Saxe, Frederick, and Napoleon, have all thought well of books,\nand have even composed them. Nor is this extraordinary, since they are\nbut the depositories of maxims which genius has suggested, and\nexperience confirmed; since they both enlighten and shorten the road of\nthe traveller, and render the labor and genius of past ages tributary to\nour own. _These_ teach most emphatically, that the secret of successful\nwar is not to be found in mere _legs_ and _arms_, but in the _head_ that\nshall direct them. If this be either ungifted by nature, or uninstructed\nby study and reflection, the best plans of manoeuvre and campaign avail\nnothing. The two last centuries have presented many revolutions in\nmilitary character, all of which have turned on this principle. It would\nbe useless to enumerate these. We shall quote only the greatest and the\nlast--_The troops of Frederick!_ How illustrious under him! How\ncontemptible under his successors! Yet his system was there; his double\nlines of march at full distance; his oblique order of battle; his simple\nlines of manoeuvre in the presence of an enemy; his wise conformation of\nan _etat-major;_--all, in short, that distinguished his practice from\nthat of ordinary men, survived him; but the head that truly comprehended\nand knew how to apply these, died with Frederick. What an admonition\ndoes this fact present for self-instruction,--for unwearied\ndiligence,--for study and reflection! Nor should the force of this be\nlessened by the consideration that, after all, unless nature should\nhave done her part of the work,--unless to a soul not to be shaken by\nany changes of fortune--cool, collected, and strenuous--she adds a head\nfertile in expedients, prompt in its decisions, and sound in its\njudgments, no man can ever merit the title of a _general_.\"\n\nThe celebrated Marshal Saxe has made the following remarks on the\nnecessary qualifications to form a good general. The most indispensable\none, according to his idea, is valor, without which all the rest will\nprove nugatory. The next is a sound understanding with some genius: for\nhe must not only be courageous, but be extremely fertile in expedients.\nThe third is health and a robust constitution.\n\n\"His mind must be capable of prompt and vigorous resources; he must have\nan aptitude, and a talent at discovering the designs of others, without\nbetraying the slightest trace of his own intentions; he must be,\n_seemingly_, communicative, in order to encourage others to unbosom, but\nremain tenaciously reserved in matters that concern his own army; he\nmust, in a word, possess activity with judgment, be able to make a\nproper choice of his officers, and never deviate from the strictest line\nof military justice. Old soldiers must not be rendered wretched and\nunhappy by unwarrantable promotions, nor must extraordinary talents be\nkept back to the detriment of the service on account of mere rules and\nregulations. Great abilities will justify exceptions; but ignorance and\ninactivity will not make up for years spent in the profession.\"\n\n\"In his deportment he must be affable, and always superior to\npeevishness or ill-humor; he must not know, or at least seem not to\nknow, what a spirit of resentment is; and when he is under the necessity\nof inflicting military chastisement, he must see the guilty punished\nwithout compromise or foolish humanity; and if the delinquent be from\namong the number of his most intimate friends, he must be doubly severe\ntowards the unfortunate man. For it is better, in instances of\ncorrection, that one individual should be treated with rigor (by orders\nof the person over whom he may be supposed to hold some influence) than\nthat an idea should go forth in the army of public justice being\nsacrificed to private sentiments.\"\n\n\"A modern general should always have before him the example of Manlius;\nhe must divest himself of personal sensations, and not only be convinced\nhimself, but convince others, that he is the organ of military justice,\nand that what he does is irrevocably prescribed. With these\nqualifications, and by this line of conduct, he will secure the\naffections of his followers, instill into their minds all the impulses\nof deference and respect; he will be feared, and consequently obeyed.\"\n\n\"The resources of a general's mind are as various as the occasions for\nthe exercise of them are multiplied and checkered: he must be perfectly\nmaster of the art of knowing how to support an army in all circumstances\nand situations; how to apply its strength, or be sparing of its energy\nand confidence; how to post all its different component parts, so as not\nto be forced to give or receive battle in opposition to settled plans.\nWhen once engaged, he must have presence of mind enough to grasp all the\nrelative points of disposition and arrangement, to seize favorable\nmoments for impression, and to be thoroughly conversant in the infinite\nvicissitudes that occur during the heat of a battle; on a ready\npossession of which its ultimate success depends. These requisites are\nunquestionably manifold, and grow out of the diversity of situations and\nthe chance medley of events that produce their necessity.\"\n\n\"A general to be in perfect possession of them, must on the day of\nbattle be divested of every thought, and be inaccessible to every\nfeeling, but what immediately regards the business of the day; he must\nreconnoitre with the promptitude of a skilful geographer, whose eye\ncollects instantaneously all the relative portions of locality, and\nfeels his ground as it were by instinct; and in the disposition of his\ntroops he must discover a perfect knowledge of his profession, and make\nall his arrangements with accuracy and dispatch. His order of battle\nmust be simple and unconfused, and the execution of his plan be as quick\nas if it merely consisted in uttering some few words of command; as,\n_the first line will attack! the second will support it! or, such a\nbattalion will advance and support the line._\"\n\n\"The general officers who act under such a general must be ignorant of\ntheir business indeed, if, upon the receipt of these orders, they should\nbe deficient in the immediate means of answering them, by a prompt and\nready co-operation. So that the general has only to issue out directions\naccording to the growth of circumstances, and to rest satisfied that\nevery division will act in conformity to his intentions; but if, on the\ncontrary, he should so far forget his situation as to become a\ndrill-sergeant in the heat of action, he must find himself in the case\nof the fly in the fable, which perched upon a wheel, and foolishly\nimagined that the motion of the carriage was influenced by its\nsituation. A general, therefore, ought on the day of battle to be\nthoroughly master of himself, and to have both his mind and his eye\nriveted to the immediate scene of action. He will by these means be\nenabled to see every thing; his judgment will be unembarrassed, and he\nwill instantly discover all the vulnerable points of the enemy. The\ninstant a favorable opening offers, by which the contest may be decided,\nit becomes his duty to head the nearest body of troops, and, without any\nregard to personal safety, to advance against the enemy's line. [By a\nready conception of this sort, joined to a great courage, General\nDessaix determined the issue of the battle of Marengo.] It is, however,\nimpossible for any man to lay down rules, or to specify with accuracy\nall the different ways by which a victory may be obtained. Every thing\ndepends upon a variety of situations, casualties of events, and\nintermediate occurrences, which no human foresight can positively\nascertain, but which may be converted to good purposes by a quick eye, a\nready conception, and prompt execution.\"\n\n\"Prince Eugene was singularly gifted with these qualifications,\nparticularly with that sublime possession of the mind, which constitutes\nthe essence of a military character.\"\n\n\"Many commanders-in-chief have been so limited in their ideas of\nwarfare, that when events have brought the contest to issue, and two\nrival armies have been drawn out for action, their whole attention has\ndevolved upon a straight alignment, an equality of step, or a regular\ndistance in intervals of columns. They have considered it sufficient to\ngive answers to questions proposed by their aides-de-camp, to send\norders in various directions, and to gallop themselves from one quarter\nto another, without steadily adhering to the fluctuations of the day, or\ncalmly watching for an opportunity to strike a decisive blow. They\nendeavor, in fact, to do every thing, and thereby do nothing. They\nappear like men whose presence of mind deserts them the instant they are\ntaken out of the beaten track, or reduced to supply unexpected calls by\nuncommon exertions; and from whence, continues the same sensible writer,\ndo these contradictions arise? from an ignorance of those high\nqualifications without which the mere routine of duty, methodical\narrangement, and studied discipline must fall to the ground, and defeat\nthemselves. Many officers spend their whole lives in putting a few\nregiments through a regular set of manoeuvres; and having done so, they\nvainly imagine that all the science of a real military man consists in\nthat acquirement. When, in process of time, the command of a large army\nfalls to their lot, they are manifestly lost in the magnitude of the\nundertaking, and, from not knowing how to act as they ought, they remain\nsatisfied with doing what they have partially learned.\"\n\n\"Military knowledge, as far as it regards a general or\ncommander-in-chief, may be divided into two parts, one comprehending\nmere discipline and settled systems for putting a certain number of\nrules into practice; and the other originating a sublimity of conception\nthat method may assist, but cannot give.\"\n\n\"If a man be born with faculties that are naturally adapted to the\nsituation of a general, and if his talents do not fit the extraordinary\ncasualties of war, he will never rise beyond mediocrity.\"\n\n\"It is, in fact, in war as it is in painting, or in music. Perfection in\neither art grows out of innate talent, but it never can be acquired\nwithout them. Study and perseverance may correct ideas, but no\napplication, no assiduity will give the life and energy of action; these\nare the works of nature.\"\n\n\"It has been my fate (observes the Marshal) to see several very\nexcellent colonels become indifferent generals. I have known others, who\nhave distinguished themselves at sieges, and in the different evolutions\nof an army, lose their presence of mind and appear ignorant of their\nprofession, the instant they were taken from that particular line, and\nbe incapable of commanding a few squadrons of horse. Should a man of\nthis cast be put at the head of an army, he will confine himself to mere\ndispositions and manoeuvres; to them he will look for safety; and if\nonce thwarted, his defeat will be inevitable, because his mind is not\ncapable of other resources.\"\n\n\"In order to obviate, in the best possible manner, the innumerable\ndisasters which must arise from the uncertainty of war, and the greater\nuncertainty of the means that are adopted to carry it on, some general\nrules ought to be laid down, not only for the government of the troops,\nbut for the instruction of those who have the command of them. The\nprinciples to be observed are: that when the line or the columns\nadvance, their distances should be scrupulously observed; that whenever\na body of troops is ordered to charge, every proportion of the line\nshould rush forward with intrepidity and vigor; that if openings are\nmade in the first line, it becomes the duty of the second instantly to\nfill up the chasms.\"\n\n\"These instructions issue from the dictates of plain nature, and do not\nrequire the least elucidation in writing They constitute the A, B, C of\nsoldiers. Nothing can be more simple, or more intelligible; so much so,\nthat it would be ridiculous in a general to sacrifice essential objects\nin order to attend to such minutiae. His functions in the day of battle\nare confined to those occupations of the mind, by which he is enabled to\nwatch the countenance of the enemy; to observe his movements, and to see\nwith an eagle's or a king of Prussia's eye, all the relative directions\nthat his opponents take. It must be his business to create alarms and\nsuspicions among the enemy's line in one quarter, while his real\nintention is to act against another; to puzzle and disconcert him in his\nplans; to take advantage of the manifold openings which his feints have\nproduced, and when the contest is brought to issue, to be capable of\nplunging with effect upon the weakest part, and carrying the sword of\ndeath where its blow is certain of being mortal. But to accomplish these\nimportant and indispensable points, his judgment must be clear, his mind\ncollected, his heart firm, and his eyes incapable of being diverted,\neven for a moment, by the trifling occurrences of the day.\"\n\nThe _administrative service_ of an army is usually divided into several\ndistinct departments, as--\n\n   Pay department.\n   Subsistence    \"\n   Clothing       \"\n   Medical        \"}\n                   } These in our service are united.\n   Hospital       \"\n   Barrack        \"}These in our service are combined\n   Fuel           \"}in one, called the Quartermaster's\n   Transportation \"}department\n   Recruiting     \"\n   Military Justice, or Court Martial department.\n\nIt was intended to enter into the history, organization, and use of each\nof these civico-military departments of an army; but our limits are such\nas to preclude any thing like so detailed a discussion as would be\nnecessary for a proper understanding of the subject. We therefore pass\nfrom the staff directly to the _line_ or rather the four principal arms\nof an army organization.[30]\n\n[Footnote 30: Of works that treat directly of staff organization and\nduties, those of Grimoard, Thiebault, Boutourlin, Labaume, are esteemed\namong the best. The writings of Jomini, Napoleon, Rocquancourt,\nVauchelle, Odier, Scharnhorst, also contain much valuable information on\nthis subject. The following list of books may be referred to for further\ninformation on the subjects alluded to in this chapter:\n\n_Aide-Memoire des officiers generaux et superieurs et des capitaines._\n\n_Precis de l'art de la guerre._ Jomini.\n\n_Memoires de Napoleon._ Montholon et Gourgaud.\n\n_Cours elementaire d'art et d'histoire militaires._ Rocquancourt.\n\n_Cours elementaire d'administration militaire._ Vauchelle.\n\n_Droite elementaire d'art militaire, &c._ Gay de Vernon.\n\n_Annuaire militaire historique, &c._ Sicard.\n\n_Cours abrege d'administration militaire._ Bernier.\n\n_Cours d'administration militaire, &c._ Odier.\n\n_De l'administration de l'armee d'Espagne._ Odier.\n\n_De l'organization de la force armee en France._ Carion-Nisas.\n\n_Elemens de l'art militaire, &c._ Cugnot.\n\n_Memoires sur la guerre._ Feuquieres.\n\n_Cours d'art militaire et d'histoire._ Jacquinot de Presle.\n\n_Cours d'art militaire._ Fallot.\n\n_Theorie de l'officier superieur._ Leorier.\n\n_Histoire de l'administration de la guerre._ Audouin.\n\n_Instructions diverses a l'usage de l'ecole d'application du corps royal\nd'etat-major._\n\n_Handbuch fuer offiziere, &c._ Scharnhorst.\n\nHaving omitted all discussion of the several departments of the\nadministrative service of an army organization, it is not deemed\nnecessary to give the names of books of reference on the subjects of\npay, courts-martial, medicinal and hospital departments, &c., &c.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X\n\nARMY ORGANIZATION.[31]--INFANTRY AND CAVALRY\n\n\n_Infantry_.--Infantry constitutes, in active service, by far the most\nnumerous portion of an army; in time of peace its duties are simple,\nand, in most countries, of little comparative importance; but in our\ncountry the continually recurring difficulties on the Indian frontiers,\nrender this arm peculiarly necessary and important, even in time of\ngeneral peace. From the nature of infantry service--no peculiar\ntechnical knowledge (we speak of the privates and officers of the lower\ngrades) being so absolutely indispensable as in the other arms--the\nsoldier may in a short time be trained and instructed in his duties. For\nthis reason the ratio of infantry in a peace establishment is ordinarily\nmuch less than in active service, this arm being always capable of great\nexpansion when occasion requires.\n\n[Footnote 31: In discussing our own organization, it may be well to\ncompare it with the armies of some of the principal nations of Europe.\nOur limits will not allow us to go very much into details, nor to make a\ncomparison with more than a single European power. We shall select\nFrance, inasmuch as her army organization has served as a model for the\nrest of Europe, and is still, in some respects, superior to most\nothers.]\n\nIn the early periods of society, and in countries where horses abounded,\nmen have usually preferred fighting on horseback; but civilization and a\nmore thorough acquaintance with war has always increased the importance\nof infantry.\n\nThe Hebrews, and also the Egyptians, employed this arm almost\nexclusively. The Asiatics generally employed both infantry and cavalry,\nbut with the Greeks the _infantry_ was the favorite arm. Even their\nkings and generals usually fought on foot. The Romans conquered the\nworld mainly with their infantry. This arm was also considered of the\ngreatest importance by the ancient Germans and Gauls; but the migration\nof the Huns and other Mongolic tribes mounted on small and fleet horses,\nand the acquaintance formed by the Franks of northern Spain with the\nMoors, who were mounted on beautiful horses from Arabia and the plateau\nof Asia, introduced a taste for cavalry in western Europe. This taste\nwas still further cultivated under the feudal system, for the knights\npreferred fighting on horseback to serving on foot. During the crusades\nthe infantry fell into disrepute. But the invention of gunpowder changed\nthe whole system of warfare, and restored to infantry its former\nimportance.\n\n\"The Romans,\" says Napoleon in his Memoirs, \"had two infantries; the\nfirst, lightly armed, was provided with a missile weapon; the second,\nheavily armed, bore a short sword. After the invention of powder two\nspecies of infantry were still continued: the arquebusiers, who were\nlightly armed, and intended to observe and harass the enemy; and the\npikemen, who supplied the place of the heavy-armed infantry. During the\nhundred and fifty years which have elapsed since Vauban banished lances\nand pikes from all the infantry of Europe, substituting for them the\nfirelock and bayonet, all the infantry has been lightly armed......\nThere has been since that time, properly speaking, only one kind of\ninfantry: if there was a company of chasseurs in every battalion, it was\nby way of counterpoise to the company of grenadiers; the battalion being\ncomposed of nine companies, one picked company did not appear\nsufficient. If the Emperor Napoleon created companies of voltigeurs\narmed like dragoons, it was to substitute them for those companies of\nchasseurs. He composed them of men under five feet in height, in order\nto bring into use that class of the conscription which measured from\nfour feet ten inches to five feet; and having been until that time\nexempt, made the burden of conscription fall more heavily on the other\nclasses. This arrangement served to reward a great number of old\nsoldiers, who, being under five feet in height, could not enter into the\ncompanies of grenadiers, who on account of their bravery, deserved to\nenter into a picked company: it was a powerful incentive to emulation to\nbring the giants and pigmies into competition. Had there been men of\ndifferent colors in the armies of the emperor, he would have composed\ncompanies of blacks and companies of whites: in a country where there\nwere cyclops or hunchbacks, a good use might be made of companies of\ncyclops, and others of hunchbacks.\"\n\n\"In 1789, the French army as composed of regiments of the line and\nbattalions of chasseurs; the chasseurs of the Cevennes, the Vivarais,\nthe Alps, of Corsica, and the Pyrenees, who at the Revolution formed\nhalf brigades of light infantry; but the object was not to have two\ndifferent sorts of infantry, for they were raised alike, instructed\nalike, drilled alike; only the battalions of chasseurs were recruited by\nthe men of the mountainous districts, or by the sons of the\ngarde-chasse; whence they were more fit to be employed on the frontiers\nof the Alps and Pyrenees; and when they were in the armies of the North,\nthey were always detached, in preference, for climbing heights or\nscouring a forest; when these men were placed in line, in a battle, they\nserved very well as a battalion of the line, because they had received\nthe same instructions, and were armed and disciplined in the same\nmanner. Every power occasionally raises, in war-time, irregular corps,\nunder the title of free or legionary battalions, consisting of foreign\ndeserters, or formed of individuals of a particular party or faction;\nbut that does not constitute two sorts of infantry. There is and can be\nbut one. If the apes of antiquity must needs imitate the Romans, it is\nnot light-armed troops that they ought to introduce, but heavy-armed\nsoldiers, or battalions armed with swords; for all the infantry of\nEurope serve at times as light troops.\"\n\nMost European nations, for reasons probably similar to those of\nNapoleon, keep up this nominal division of _infantry of the line_ and\n_light infantry_; but both are usually armed and equipped alike, and\nboth receive the same organization and instruction. The light infantry\nare usually made up from the class of men, or district of country, which\nfurnishes the greatest number of riflemen and sharpshooters. In France,\nthe light infantry is best supplied by the hunters of the Ardennes, the\nVosges, and the Jura districts; in Austria, by the Croates and Tyrolese;\nin Prussia, by the \"foersters,\" or woodsmen; and in Russia, by the\nCossacks. Our own western hunters, with proper discipline, make the best\ntirailleurs in the world.\n\nLight infantry is usually employed to protect the flanks of the main\narmy, to secure outposts, to reconnoitre the ground, secure avenues of\napproach, deceive the enemy by demonstrations, and secure the repose of\nthe other troops by patrolling parties. They usually begin a battle, and\nafterwards take their places in the line, either on the flanks, or in\nthe intervals between the larger bodies. The battle of Jena furnishes a\ngood example of the use of French light infantry; and at the battle of\nWaterloo, the Prussian tirailleurs were exceedingly effective in\nclearing the ground for the advance of Bluecher's heavy columns. The\nattack of Floh-hug by Augereau, of Vierzehn Heilegen by Suchet, of\nIserstaedt by Desjardins, are models well worthy of study.\n\nThe infantry of the line acts in masses, and, on the field of battle,\nconstitutes the principal fighting force. Its formations and the manner\nof engaging it have already been discussed under the head of tactics.\n\nThe importance of infantry is due, in considerable part, to the fact\nthat it can be used everywhere--in mountains or on plains, in woody or\nopen countries, in cities or in fields, on rivers or at sea, in the\nredoubt or in the attack of the breach; the infantry depends only on\nitself, whereas the other arms must depend in a considerable degree on\nthe efficiency of their materials and the will and strength of brute\nforce; and when the snows of Russia or the deserts of Egypt deprive\ntheir animals of the means of sustenance, they become perfectly useless.\n\nFoot-soldiers, in olden times, were armed with a spear and sometimes\nwith a sword, arrows, lance, and sling. At present they are armed with\na gun and bayonet, and sometimes with a sword. In some European\nservices, a few of the foot-soldiers are armed with a pike. Some of the\nlight troops used as sharpshooters carry the rifle, but this weapon is\nuseless for the great body of infantry. The short-sword is more useful\nas an instrument for cutting branches, wood, &c., than for actual\nfighting. The infantry have no defensive covering, or at least very\nlittle. The helmet or cap serves to protect the head, and the shoulders\nare somewhat defended by epaulets. It has often been proposed in modern\ntimes to restore the ancient defensive armor of the foot-soldier; but\nthis would be worse than useless against fire-arms, and moreover would\ndestroy the efficiency of these troops by impeding their movements. The\nstrength of this arm depends greatly upon its discipline; for if calm\nand firm, a mass of infantry in column or in square is almost\nimpenetrable.\n\nThe bayonet was introduced by Vauban in the wars of Louis XIV., and\nafter the years 1703 and '4, the pike was totally suppressed in the\nFrench army. This measure was warmly opposed by Marshal Montesquieu, and\nthe question was discussed by him and Marshal Vauban with an ability and\nlearning worthy of these great men. The arguments of Vauban were deemed\nmost conclusive, and his project was adopted by the king.\n\nThis question has been agitated by military writers in more recent\ntimes, Puysegur advocating the musket, and Folard and Lloyd contending\nin favor of restoring the pike. Even in our own service, so late as the\nwar of 1812, a distinguished general of the army strongly urged the use\nof the pike, and the fifteenth (and perhaps another regiment) was armed\nand equipped in part as _pikemen_; but experience soon proved the\nabsurdity of the project.\n\nNapoleon calls the infantry the _arm of battles_ and the _sinews of the\narmy_. But if it be acknowledged, that, next to the talent of the\ngeneral-in-chief, the infantry is the first instrument of victory, it\nmust also be confessed that it finds a powerful support in the cavalry,\nartillery, and engineers, and that without these it would often be\ncompromised, and could gain but a half success.\n\nThe French infantry is divided into one hundred regiments of three\nbattalions each, a battalion being composed of seven companies. There\nare also several other battalions of chasseurs, zuaves, &c., being\norganized especially for service in Africa, and composed in part of\nnative troops.\n\nIn our own army we have eight regiments of infantry, each regiment\nforming a single battalion of ten companies. The flank companies are\nintended for light infantry.\n\nIn all properly organized armies the infantry constitutes from\nthree-fourths to four-fifths of the entire active force in the field,\nand from two-thirds to three-fourths, say about seven-tenths of the\nentire military establishment. In time of peace this proportion may be\nslightly diminished.\n\n_Cavalry._--The use of cavalry is probably nearly as old as war itself.\nThe Egyptians had cavalry before the time of Moses, and the Israelites\noften encountered cavalry in their wars with their neighbors, though\nthey made no use of this arm themselves until the time of Solomon.\n\nThe Greeks borrowed their cavalry from the Asiatics, and especially from\nthe Persians, who, according to Xenophon, held this arm in great\nconsideration. After the battle of Platea, it was agreed by assembled\nGreece that each power should furnish one horseman to every ten\nfoot-soldiers. In Sparta the poorest were selected for this arm, and the\ncavalry marched to combat without any previous training. At Athens the\ncavalry service was more popular, and they formed a well-organized corps\nof twelve hundred horsemen. At Thebes also this arm had consideration in\nthe time of Epaminondas. But the cavalry of Thessaly was the most\nrenowned, and both Philip and Alexander drew their mounted troops from\nthat country.\n\nThe Romans had made but little progress in this arm when they\nencountered the Thessalians, who fought in the army of Pyrrhus. They\nthen increased their cavalry, but it was not numerous till after their\nwars with the Carthaginians. Scipio organized and disciplined the Roman\ncavalry like that of the Numidians. This arm was supplied from the ranks\nof the richest citizens, and afterwards formed an order intermediary\nbetween the Senate and the people, under the name of _knights_.\n\nAt a later period, the cavalry of the Gauls was particularly good. The\nFranks were without cavalry when they made their first irruption into\nGaul. Under the reign of Childeric I. we see for the first time the\n\"cavaliers francs\" figure as a part of the national forces. At the\nbattle of Tours the cavalry and infantry were in the proportion of one\nto five, and under Pepin and Charlemagne their numbers were nearly\nequal. Under Charles the Bald armies were composed entirely of cavalry,\nand during the middle ages the knights disdained the foot service, and\nfought only on horseback.\n\nAfter the introduction of artillery, cavalry was still employed, though\nto little advantage. Gustavus Adolphus was the first to perceive the\nreal importance of this arm in modern warfare, and he used it with great\nsuccess. But it was left for Seidlitz to perfect it under the direction\nof Frederick the Great.\n\nMarshal Saxe very justly remarked, that cavalry is the \"_arme du\nmoment,_\" for in almost every battle there are moments when a decisive\ncharge of cavalry will gain the victory, but if not made at the instant\nit may be too late. The efficiency of cavalry depends upon the moral\nimpression which it makes on the enemy, and is greater in proportion to\nthe size of the mass, and the rapidity of its motion. This last quality\nenables a commander to avail himself immediately of a decisive moment,\nwhen the enemy exposes a weak point, or when disorder appears in his\nranks. But this requires a bold and active spirit, which shrinks not\nfrom responsibility, and is able to avail itself with quickness and\ndecision of every opportunity. If it be remembered that it is essential\nthat this _coup d'oeil_, so rare and so difficult to acquire, be\naccompanied by a courage and vigor of execution which nothing can shake,\nwe shall not be astonished that history furnishes so few good cavalry\ngenerals, and that this arm so seldom does such execution as it did\nunder Frederick and Napoleon, with Seidlitz and Murat as commanders.\n\nThe soldier gains great _velocity_ by the use of the horse in war; but\nin other respects he is the loser. The great expense and care required\nof the cavalier to support his horse; the difficulty experienced in\nsurmounting ordinary obstacles, and in using his fire-arms to advantage,\nare all prejudicial to success.\n\nThe unequal size of the horse, and the great diversity in his strength\nand breed, have rendered it necessary to divide this arm into _light_\nand _heavy_ cavalry, and a mixed class called _dragoons_. The heavy\ncavalry is commonly used in masses where _force_ is mainly requisite;\nthe lighter troops are used singly and in small detachments, where\nrapidity of movement is most desired.\n\nThe _heavy_ cavalry are divided into carabiniers, cuirassiers, and\nsometimes lancers. The two latter are frequently united, the cuirassiers\nbeing armed with the lance. These troops are seldom used for scouts,\nvanguards, and convoys; but are frequently employed to sustain the light\ncavalry. Their main duty is \"_to appear on the field of battle and make\nthe decisive charges_.\"\n\nThe _light_ cavalry is composed of chasseurs, or troopers, hussars, and\nlancers. The latter, when composed of large men and mounted on heavy\nhorses, are attached to the heavy cavalry.\n\nThe _dragoons_ were formerly a mixed body of horse and foot, but it\nbeing found impossible to unite these two distinct arms in one, and the\nattempt having destroyed the usefulness of the body to act in either\ncapacity, the term was applied to a mixed kind of cavalry between the\nheavy and the light horse. In more recent wars they have also been\ninstructed as infantry and employed as foot-soldiers, till horses could\nbe found in the enemy's country with which to mount them. But we believe\nthere is no instance in more modern wars in which they have been\nemployed at the same time in both capacities.\n\nThis term is, very improperly, applied to all our cavalry; and some of\nthe congressional wiseacres have recently experimented on one of our\nso-called regiments of _dragoons_, by dismounting it one year, selling\nits horses at auction, and changing its arms and equipments, and again,\nthe next year, purchasing new horses, arms, and equipments for\nremounting it; and all this for _economy!_\n\nThe Roman cavalry at first wore a round shield and helmet, the rest of\ntheir body being nearly uncovered. Their arms were a sword and long thin\njavelin, or lance, with an iron head. They afterwards reduced the shield\nto a much smaller size, and made square, and their lance was greatly\nincreased in size and length, and armed at both ends. In other respects\nthey were armed in the same way as infantry. The use of the lance and\nthe shield at the same time, of course rendered both nearly worthless.\nThe Roman cavalry was superior to that of their enemies, except,\nperhaps, the light cavalry of the Parthians.\n\nThe heavy armor which was sometimes worn by the ancients, like the _gens\nd'armes_ of the middle ages, rendered them greatly inferior to infantry\nin a close engagement. Tigranes, king of Armenia, brought an army of one\nhundred and fifty thousand horse into the field, against the Roman\ngeneral Lucullus, who had only about six thousand horse and fifteen\nthousand foot. But the Armenian cavalry, called _cataphratti_ were so\noverburdened with armor, that when they fell from their horses they\ncould scarcely move or make any use of their arms. They were routed by a\nmere handful of Roman infantry.\n\nThe modern cavalry is much lighter, and, by dispensing with armor,\nshields, &c., it can move with much greater rapidity. A modern cavalry\nhorse carries a weight of from two hundred and fifty to three hundred\npounds, viz.:\n\n                                                Heavy      Light\n                                               cavalry.   cavalry.\n\n   The rider,       .       .       .       .    160      140 lbs.\n   His arms and equipments, .       .       .     55       40\n   His horse equipments,    .       .       .     60       45\n   Two days' rations of provisions and grain,     25       25\n                                               -----------------\n                                                 300      250\n\nThe horse moves per minute--\n\n   At a walk,              from 110 yards to 120\n   At a trot,                   220          240\n   At a gallop,                 330          360\n\nBut on a march over the ordinary average of good and bad roads, cavalry\nwill walk about one hundred yards per minute, and at an easy trot, two\nhundred.\n\nAn ordinary day's march for cavalry is about thirty miles, but on a\nforced march this arm can march fifty miles within the twenty-four\nhours. A single horseman, or a small detachment, can easily exceed this\ndistance.\n\n\"Light cavalry,\" says Napoleon, in his Memoirs, \"ought to reconnoitre\nand watch the motions of the enemy, considerably in advance of the army;\nit is not an appendage to the infantry: it should be sustained and\nprotected especially by the cavalry of the line. Rivalry and emulation\nhave always existed between the infantry and cavalry: light cavalry is\nindispensable to the vanguard, the rearguard, and the wings of the army;\nit, therefore, cannot properly be attached to, and forced to follow the\nmovements of any particular corps of infantry. It would be more natural\nto attach it to the cavalry of the line, than to leave it in dependence\nupon the infantry, with which it has no connection; but it should be\nindependent of both.\"\n\n\"If the light cavalry is to form vanguards, it must be organized into\nsquadrons, brigades, and divisions, for the purpose of manoeuvring; for\nthat is all vanguards and rearguards do: they pursue or retreat by\nplatoons, form themselves into several lines, or wheel into column, or\nchange their position with rapidity for the purpose of outfronting a\nwhole wing. By a combination of such evolutions, a vanguard, of inferior\nnumbers, avoids brisk actions and general engagements, and yet delays\nthe enemy long enough to give time for the main army to come up, for the\ninfantry to deploy, for the general-in-chief to make his dispositions,\nand for the baggage and parks to file into their stations. The art of a\ngeneral of the vanguard, or of the rear-guard, is, without hazarding a\ndefeat, to hold the enemy in check, to impede him, to compel him to\nspend three or four hours in moving a single league: tactics point out\nthe methods of effecting these important objects, and are more necessary\nfor cavalry than for infantry, and in the vanguard, or the rear-guard,\nthan in any other position. The Hungarian Insurgents, whom we saw in\n1797, 1805, and 1809, were pitiful troops. If the light troops of Maria\nTheresa's times became formidable, it was by their excellent\norganization, and, above every thing, by their numbers. To imagine that\nsuch troops could be superior to Wurmser's hussars, or to the dragoons\nof Latour, or to the Archduke John, would be entertaining strange ideas\nof things; but neither the Hungarian Insurgents, nor the Cossacks, ever\nformed the vanguards of the Austrian and Russian armies; because to\nspeak of a vanguard or a rear-guard, is to speak of troops which\nmanoeuvre. The Russians considered a regiment of Cossacks who had been\ntrained worth three regiments untrained. Every thing about these troops\nis despicable, except the Cossack himself, who is a man of fine person,\npowerful, adroit, subtle, a good horseman, and indefatigable; he is born\non horseback, and bred among civil wars; he is in the field, what the\nBedouin is in the desert, or the Barbet in the Alps; he never enters a\nhouse, never lies in a bed; and he always changes his bivouac at sunset,\nthat he may not pass a night in a place where the enemy may possibly\nhave observed him.\"\n\n\"Two Mamelukes kept three Frenchmen at bay, because they were better\narmed, better mounted, and better exercised; they had two pairs of\npistols, a _tromblon_, a carbine, a helmet with a visor, a coat of mail,\nseveral horses, and several men on foot to attend them. But a hundred\nFrench did not fear a hundred Mamelukes; three hundred were more than a\nmatch for an equal number; and one thousand would beat fifteen hundred:\nso powerful is the influence of tactics, order, and evolutions! Murat,\nLeclerc, and Lasalle, cavalry generals, presented themselves to the\nMamelukes in several lines: when the latter were upon the point of\noutfronting the first line, the second came to its assistance on the\nright and left; the Mamelukes then stopped, and wheeled, to turn the\nwings of this new line: this was the moment seized for charging them;\nthey were always broken.\"\n\n\"The duty of a vanguard, or a rear-guard, does not consist in advancing\nor retiring, but in manoeuvring. It should be composed of a good light\ncavalry, supported by a good reserve of cavalry of the line, by\nexcellent battalions of foot, and strong batteries of artillery: the\ntroops must be well trained; and the generals, officers, and soldiers,\nshould all be equally well acquainted with their tactics, each according\nto his station. An undisciplined troop would only embarrass the\nadvanced guard.\"\n\n\"It is admitted that for facility in manoeuvring, the squadron should\nconsist of one hundred men, and that every three or four squadrons\nshould have a superior officer.\"\n\n\"It is not advisable for all the cavalry of the line to wear cuirasses:\ndragoons, mounted upon horses of four feet nine inches in height, armed\nwith straight sabres, and without cuirasses, should form a part of the\nheavy cavalry; they should be furnished with infantry-muskets, with\nbayonets: should have the _shakot_ of the infantry, pantaloons covering\nthe half-boot-buskin, cloaks with sleeves, and portmanteaus small enough\nto be carried slung across the back when the men are on foot. Cavalry of\nall descriptions should be furnished with fire-arms, and should know how\nto manoeuvre on foot. Three thousand light cavalry, or three thousand\ncuirassiers, should not suffer themselves to be stopped by a thousand\ninfantry posted in a wood, or on ground impracticable to cavalry; and\nthree thousand dragoons ought not to hesitate to attack two thousand\ninfantry, should the latter, favored by their position, attempt to stop\nthem.\n\n\"Turenne, Prince Eugene of Savoy, and Vendome, attached great importance\nto dragoons, and used them successfully. The dragoons gained great glory\nin Italy, in 1796 and 1797. In Egypt and in Spain, during the campaigns\nof 1806 and 1807, a degree of prejudice sprung up against them. The\ndivisions of dragoons had been mustered at Compiegne and Amiens, to be\nembarked without horses for the expedition of England, in order to serve\non foot until they should be mounted in that country. General Baraguay\nd'Hilliers, their first inspector, commanded them; he had them equipped\nwith gaiters, and incorporated with them a considerable number of\nrecruits, whom he exercised in infantry manoeuvres alone. These were no\nlonger cavalry regiments: they served in the campaign of 1806 on foot,\nuntil after the battle of Jena, when they were mounted on horses taken\nfrom the Prussian cavalry, three-fourths of which were unserviceable.\nThese combined circumstances injured the dragoons; but in 1813 and 1814\ntheir divisions acquired honor in rivalling the cuirassiers. Dragoons\nare necessary for the support of light cavalry in the vanguard, the\nrear-guard, and the wings of an army; cuirassiers are little adapted for\nvan and rearguards: they should never be employed in this service but\nwhen it is requisite to keep them in practice and accustom them to war.\"\n\nNapoleon further recommends that light cavalry be divided into two\nkinds, chasseurs or troopers, and light horse; and the heavy to be\ncomposed of dragoons and cuirassiers; the troopers to be mounted on\nhorses of 4 ft 6 in.; light cavalry on horses of 4 ft. 7 or 8 in.;\ndragoons on horses of 4 ft. 9 in.; and cuirassiers on horses of 4 ft. 10\nor 11 in.; which employ horses of all kinds for mounting the troops.\n\nAll cavalry must receive the same instruction; and all should be\ncapable, in case of need, of performing any of the duties of mounted\ntroops. The shock is the principal effect produced by this arm;\ntherefore, the greater the velocity the greater must be this effect,\nprovided the troops can be kept in mass. But it is found, by experience,\nthat it is impossible to preserve them in line when put to the height of\ntheir speed. The best authorities therefore prefer, as we have said\nelsewhere, the charge at the trot, or at any rate the gallop should not\nbe taken up till within a very short distance of the enemy. The charge\nof a compact mass at a trot is much greater than that of a wavering one\nat a gallop.\n\nOn the field of battle the cavalry of the line is considered as the arm\nof the shock, to break through any corps that may be in opposition; but\nit is unable of itself to resist a shock, and therefore should on no\naccount wait to receive the charge of another body of mounted troops. It\nwas on this account that Frederick directed his cavalry officers, under\nthe severest penalties, never to receive a charge, but always to meet\nthe attacking force half way. This is the only mode of preventing\ndefeat.\n\nA good infantry can always sustain itself against the charges of\ncavalry. At the battle of Auerstedt, in 1806, Davoust ordered the\ndivisions of Gudin to form squares to resist the Prussian cavalry,\nwhich, by means of a fog, had gained a most advantageous position.\nBluecher led his cavalry in repeated and impetuous charges, but all was\nin vain; the French infantry presented a front of iron. At the combat of\nKrasnoi, in 1812, the cavalry of Grouchy, Nansonty, and Bordesoult,\nattacked and overthrew the dragoons of Clarkof, but the Russian infantry\nunder Neveroffskoi sustained itself against the repeated charges of\nvastly superior numbers of these French horse. At the battle of Molwitz,\nthe grenadiers sustained the charges of the enemy's cavalry, although\nthe cavalry of the great Frederick had already been completely\noverthrown.\n\nBut when the infantry is engaged with the infantry of the enemy, the\ncharges of cavalry are generally successful, and sometimes decide the\nfate of the battle, as was the case at Rosbach, Zornsdorf, Wurtsburg,\nMarengo, Eylau, Borodino, &c.\n\nCavalry may also be very efficacious against infantry in wet weather,\nwhen the rain or snow renders it impossible for the foot soldiers to use\ntheir fire-arms to advantage, as was the case with the corps of\nAugereau, at Eylau, and with the Austrian left, at the battle of\nDresden. Again, if the infantry be previously weakened, or thrown into\ndisorder by the fire of batteries. The charge of the Russian cavalry at\nHohenfriedberg, in 1745, is a remarkable example of this kind.\n\nCavalry should always be immediately sustained in its efforts either by\ninfantry or other bodies of horse; for as soon as the charge is made,\nthe strength of this arm is for a time exhausted, and, if immediately\nattacked, defeat becomes inevitable. The charge of the cavalry of Ney on\nPrince Hohenlohe at the battle of Jena, and of the French horse on Gossa\nat Leipsic, are fine examples of the successful charges of cavalry when\nproperly sustained. Kunnersdorf and Waterloo are examples of the\ndisastrous consequences of leaving such charges without support.\n\nThe choice of the field of battle is sometimes such as to render cavalry\nalmost useless. Such was the case at the battle of Cassano, between the\nDuke of Vendome and the Prince Eugene. The field was so cut up by the\nAdda and the canals of Rittorto and Pendina, that Prince Eugene could\nmake no use of his horse. If, when master of the bridge of Rittorto, he\nhad been able to charge the French with a body of cavalry, there had\nbeen no doubt of his complete success.\n\nAfter a battle, and in the pursuit of a flying enemy, cavalry is\ninvaluable. If Napoleon had possessed a suitable number of mounted\ntroops, with an able commander, at the battles of Lutzen and Ligny, the\nresults of these victories had been decisive; whereas they were really\nwithout consequence. On the other hand, the Prussian army in 1806, after\nthe battle of Jena, and Napoleon's army in 1815 at Waterloo, were\ncompletely cut to pieces by the skilful use of cavalry in the pursuit of\na defeated and dispirited foe.\n\nThe want of good cavalry was severely felt in the war of the American\nRevolution. Had Washington possessed a few good squadrons of horse, his\nsurprise and defeat in the lines of Brooklyn, and the consequent loss of\nNew York, had never taken place. The efficient employment of a few good\nsquadrons of cavalry might readily have prevented the defeat at\nBladensburg, and the loss of the capitol, in 1814.\n\nIn a well-organized army, the cavalry should be from one-fourth to\none-sixth of the infantry, according to the nature of the war.[32]\n\n[Footnote 32: To gain a competent knowledge of the duties connected with\nthe two arms of service mentioned in this chapter, the officer should\nmake himself thoroughly acquainted with Scott's System of Infantry\nTactics, for the United States' Infantry, or at least with Major\nCooper's abridged edition of Infantry Tactics, and with the system of\nCavalry Tactics, adopted in our army; also with the directions for the\nuse of these two arms in a campaign, and their employment on the\nbattle-field, given in the writings of Jomini, Decker, Okouneff,\nRocquancourt, and Jacquinot de Presle.]\n\nThe following books may be referred to for further information\nrespecting the history, organization, use, and instruction of infantry\nand cavalry:--\n\n_Essai general de tactique._ Guibert.\n\n_Considerations generales sur l'infanterie francaise,_ par un general en\nretraite. A work of merit.\n\n_De l'infanterie,_ par l'auteur de l'histoire de l'expedition de Russie.\n\n_Histoire de la guerre de la peninsule._ Foy. This work contains many\ninteresting and valuable remarks on the French and English systems of\ntactics, and particularly on the tactics of Infantry.\n\n_Cours d'art et d'histoire militaires._ Jacquinot de Presle.\n\n_Art de la guerre._ Rogniat.\n\n_Instruction destinee aux troupes legeres,_ &c., redigee sur une\ninstruction de Frederick II. a ses officiers.\n\n_English Infantry Regulations._\n\n_Ordonnance_ (French) _pour l'exercice et les manoeuvres de\nl'infanterie,_ par le commission de manoeuvres.\n\n_Aide-memoires des officiers generaux et superieurs, et des capitaines._\n\n_Essai sur l'histoire generale de l'art militaire._ Carion-Nisas.\n\n_Histoire de la milice francaise._ Daniel.\n\n_Cours elementaire d'art et d'histoire militaires._ Rocquancourt.\n\n_Traite elementaire d'art militaire,_ &c. Gay de Vernon.\n\n_Introduction a l'etude de l'art de la guerre._ La Roche-Amyou.\n\n_Tactique des trois armes._ Decker.\n\n_Examen raisonne des trois armes,_ &c. Okouneff.\n\nThe last two are works of great merit. The writings of Okouneff,\nhowever, are very diffuse.\n\n_Instruction pour le service de l'infanterie legere._ Guyard.\n\n_Instruction de l'infanterie,_ &c. Schauenbourg.\n\n_Traite de tactique._ Ternay et Koch.\n\n_Mecanism des manoeuvres de guerre de l'infanterie polonaise._\nVroniecki.\n\n_Traite sur l'infanterie legere._ Beurmann.\n\n_English Cavalry Regulations._\n\n_Ordonnance_ (French) _sur l'exercice et les evolutions de la\ncavalerie._\n\n_Les troupes a cheval de France,_ &c. De Bourge.\n\n_Avant-postes de cavalerie legere._ Brack. The author served with\ndistinction under Lassale, Colbert, Maison, Pujol, and Excelmans.\n\n_Reflexions sur l'emploi de la cavalerie,_ &c. Caraman.\n\n_Observations sur l'ordonnance, &c., de la cavalerie._ Dejean.\n\n_Tactique de la cavalerie._ Itier.\n\n_Elements de tactique pour la cavalerie,_ par Mottin de la Balme. A work\nof rare merit.\n\n_De l'emploi de la cavalerie a la guerre._ Schauenbourg.\n\n_Remarques sur la cavalerie._ Warnery. This work has long enjoyed a high\nreputation among the cavalry officers of the European services. The\nParis edition is enriched with notes by a French general officer.\n\n_Nachrichten und Betrachtungen ueber die Thaten und Schicksale der\nReiterei,_ &c. This work discusses the operations of cavalry in the\ncampaigns of Frederick the Great and of Napoleon, down to the battle of\nLutzen in 1813.\n\n_Examen du livret provisoire,_ &c. Marbot.\n\n_Le Spectateur Militaire,_ contains many essays by cavalry officers on\nthe various questions connected with the organization and use of this\narm.\n\n_Die Gefechtslehre der beiden verbundenen Waffen-Kavallerie und\nreitenden Artillerie._ Decker.\n\n_Manuel de l'officier._ Ruhle de Lilienstern.\n\n_Aide-memoire, a l'usage des officiers de cavalerie._\n\n_Journal de l'infanterie et de la cavalerie._\n\n_Traite de tactique pour les officiers d'infanterie et de cavalerie._\n\n_Histoire des exploits et des vicissitudes de la cavalerie prussienne._\nCoutz.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI.\n\nARMY ORGANIZATION.--ARTILLERY.\n\n\n_Artillery_.--Previous to the invention of gunpowder in the thirteenth\ncentury, the machines of war were divided between two classes of\nmilitary men, the engineers (_engignours_, as they were called in the\nmiddle ages) and the artillery, (_artilliers_, as they were formerly\ncalled,) the latter being particularly charged with the management of\nthe lighter and more portable projectile machines, such as the balistas\nand arco-balistas, which were used for throwing different kinds of\narrows--_fleches, viretons, carreaux, matras_, &c., while the former\nmanaged the battering-rams, cranes, helipoles, &c. And, indeed, for a\nlong time after the discovery of gunpowder, this distinction was kept\nup, and the artillery retained all the more ordinary projectile\nmachines, while the engineers constructed and managed the more ponderous\nweapons of attack and defence. But the new artillery was gradually\nintroduced, without, however, immediately displacing the old, and there\nwere for a time, if we may be allowed the expression, _two_ artilleries,\nthe one employing the old projectile machines, and the other those of\nthe new invention. The latter were called _canoniers_, to distinguish\nthem from the former, who still retained the name of _artilliers_.\n\nThe first cannon were invented in the early part of the fourteenth\ncentury, or, perhaps, among the Arabs as early as the middle of the\nthirteenth century, but they were not much known in Europe till about\n1350. Cannon are said to have been employed by the Moors as early as\n1249, and by the French in 1338. The English used artillery at the\nbattle of Crecy in 1346. Both cannon and the ancient projectile machines\nwere employed at the siege of Aiguillon in 1339, at Zara in 1345, at\nRennes in 1357, and at Naples in 1380. At this last siege the ancient\nbalista was employed to throw into the castle of Naples barrels of\ninfectious matter and mutilated limbs of prisoners of war. We read of\nthe same thing being done in Spain at a later period.\n\nCannon in France were at first called _bombards_ and _couleuverines_,\nbut were afterwards named from certain figures marked on them, such as\n_serpentines, basilisks, scorpions,_&c. In the infancy of the art they\nwere made small, weighing only from twenty to fifty pounds, and were\nmounted on small moveable carriages. This species of fire-arms became\nquite numerous about the beginning of the fifteenth century. They were\nfollowed by heavier pieces, used in the attack and defence of towns.\nThis siege artillery continued to be increased in dimensions till,\ntowards the latter part of the fifteenth century, they reached such an\nenormous size as to be almost useless as a military machine. Louis XI.\nhad an immense piece constructed at Tours, in 1770, which, it was said,\ncarried a ball from the Bastille to Charenton, (about six miles!) Its\ncaliber was that of five hundred pounds. It was intended for experiment,\nand burst on the second discharge. The famous culverin of Bolduc was\nsaid to carry a ball from that city to Bommel. The culverin of Nancy,\nmade in 1598, was more than twenty-three feet in length. There is now an\nancient cannon in the arsenal at Metz of about this length, which\ncarries a ball of one hundred and forty pounds. Cannon balls were found\nat Paris as late as 1712, weighing near two hundred pounds, and from\ntwelve to sixteen inches in diameter. At the siege of Constantinople in\n1453, there was a famous metallic bombard which threw stone balls of an\nincredible size; at the siege of Bourges in 1412, a cannon was used\nwhich, it was said, threw stone balls \"of the size of mill-stones.\" The\nGantois, under Arteville, made a bombard fifty feet in length, whose\nreport was heard at a distance of ten leagues!\n\nThe first cannon were made of wood, and covered with sheet-iron, or\nembraced by iron rings: longitudinal bars of iron were afterwards\nsubstituted for the wooden form. Towards the end of the fourteenth\ncentury, brass, tin, copper, wrought and cast iron, were successively\nused for this purpose. The bores of the pieces were first made in a\nconical shape, and it was not until a much later period that the\ncylindrical form was introduced.\n\nIn the wars between the Spaniards and Moors in the latter part of the\nfifteenth century, very great use was made of artillery in sieges and\nbattles. Ferdinand the Catholic had at this time, probably, a larger\nartillery train than any other European power. The Spanish cannon,\ngenerally very large, were composed of iron bars about two inches in\nbreadth, held together by bolts and rings of the same metal. The pieces\nwere firmly attached to their carriages, and incapable of either\nhorizontal or vertical movement. The balls thrown by them were usually\nof marble, though sometimes of iron. Many of the pieces used at the\nsiege of Baza, in 1486, are still to be seen in that city, and also the\ncannon balls then in use. Some of the latter are fourteen inches in\ndiameter, and weigh one hundred and seventy-five pounds. The length of\nthe cannon was about twelve feet. These dimensions are a proof of a\nslight improvement in this branch of military science, which was,\nnevertheless, still in its infancy. The awkwardness of artillery at this\nperiod may be judged of by its slowness of fire. At the siege of\nZeteuel, in 1407, five \"bombards,\" as the heavy pieces of ordnance were\nthen called, were able to discharge only forty shot in the course of a\nday; and it is noticed as a remarkable circumstance at the siege of\nAlbahar, that two batteries discharged one hundred and forty balls in\nthe course of the twenty-four hours!\n\nIn the Italian wars between France and Spain, in the beginning of the\nsixteenth century, the difficulty of moving the heavy cannon then in use\nwas so great that only a very small number of pieces were brought upon\nthe battle-field. At the battle of Cerignola, in 1503, the number of\ncannon in the French army was only thirteen. Indeed, during the greater\npart of this century, four or five pieces were considered sufficient for\nan ordinary army in the field, and many agreed to the doctrine of\nMachiavelli, that the only legitimate use of artillery was in the attack\nand defence of places. But in the wars of Henry IV. of France, this arm\nof service was again increased, and the troops which this king destined\nagainst the house of Austria had an artillery train of fifty pieces.\nGreat improvements were also made about this period in the manufacture\nof powder, and all kinds of fire-arms. Sully gave greater development\nto this arm of service, improving its materials, and increasing its\nefficiency. Then, as at most other periods, the French were in advance\nof most other nations in artillery.\n\nIt was near the close of the sixteenth or the beginning of the\nseventeenth century, that the heavy and ill-shaped artillery began to\ngive place to more wieldy and useful pieces. A certain M. de Linar\ndemonstrated, in the latter part of the sixteenth century, that cannon\ntwelve feet in length would give a greater range than those seventeen\nfeet in length, the calibre being the same; but some years elapsed\nbefore advantage was taken of this discovery. In 1624, Gustavus Adolphus\ncaused experiments to be made to verify this point, and, on being\nconvinced of its truth, caused his batteries to be furnished with\nshorter and lighter pieces. This great king introduced, about the same\ntime, a new and lighter kind of artillery, made of sheet iron and\nleather. Each piece had its chamber formed of thin metal and embraced by\nstrong iron rings; over these was placed a form of hardened leather,\nwhich was again encircled with rings and held compactly together. These\npieces were mounted on light carriages, so that two men could easily\nmanoeuvre them. It was said that they would fire from eight to ten\nrounds without requiring repairs. Gustavus made use of them in all his\nmilitary operations from 1628 to the time of his death. They did him\nexcellent service on numerous occasions; being so very light they could\nbe easily transported, and, on the field of battle, their movements\ncould be made to conform to the movements of his troops.\n\nAs cannon and small arms were gradually introduced into general use,\nvarious inventions and improvements were proposed and introduced from\ntime to time. Cannon were constructed with two or more barrels; some\nwere arranged for being loaded in the breech, and others at the mouth of\nthe piece; two pieces were sometimes connected by horizontal timbers,\nwhich revolved about a vertical axis, so that the recoil of one piece\nwould bring the other into battery; and various other arrangements of\nthis description, which have recently been revived and some of them\npatented as new inventions. The small arms employed at this period were\nmuch the same as those used at the present day, except the matchlock,\nwhich afterwards gave place to flint-locks. Arms of this description\nwere sometimes made to be loaded at the breach, and guns with two,\nthree, and even as many as eight barrels, were at one time in fashion.\nIn the _Musee de l'Artillerie_ at Paris may be found many arms of this\nkind, which have been reproduced in this country and England as new\ninventions. In this Museum are two ancient pieces, invented near the end\nof the sixteenth or the beginning of the seventeenth century, which very\nnearly correspond with _Colt's patent_, with the single exception of the\nlock![33]\n\n[Footnote 33: It is not to be inferred that the modern _improvements_\n(as they are called) are copied from the more ancient _inventions_. Two\nmen of different ages, or even of the same age, sometimes fall upon the\nsame identical discovery, without either's borrowing from the other.]\n\nThe _materiel_ of artillery employed in modern warfare is divided into\ntwo general classes: 1st. _Siege Artillery_, or such as is employed in\nthe attack and defence of places. 2d. _Field Artillery_, or such as is\nused in battle, or in the field-operations of an army.\n\n1. _Siege Artillery_ is composed of _mortars, large howitzers, Paixhan\nguns_ or _Columbiads_,[34] and _all cannon_ of _a large calibre._ In our\nservice this class of ordnance includes the twelve, eighteen,\ntwenty-four, thirty-two, and forty-two-pounder guns, the eight, ten, and\nthirteen-inch mortars, the sixteen-inch stone mortar, the\ntwenty-four-pounder coehorn mortar, the twenty-four-pounder carronade,\nand the eight, ten, and twelve-inch howitzers.\n\n[Footnote 34: These pieces were first invented by Colonel Bomford, of\nthe U.S. army, and used in the war of 1812. The dimensions of these guns\nwere first taken to Europe by a young French officer, and thus fell into\nthe hands of General Paixhan, who immediately introduced them into the\nFrench service. They were by this means first made known to the rest of\nEurope, and received the name of the person who introduced them into the\nEuropean services, rather than that of the original inventor. All these\nfacts are so fully susceptible of proof, that Europeans now acknowledge\nthemselves indebted to us for the invention; even General Paixhan gives\nup all claim to originality in his gun, and limits himself to certain\nimprovements which he introduced. The original gun, which was invented\nby Colonel Bomford, and whose dimensions were carried to General Paixhan\nin France, is now lying at the ordnance depot, in New York harbor.]\n\nAll these, except the smaller mortars, are made of cast iron. This\nsubstance is less tenacious than wrought iron or bronze, and the cannon\nmade of it are, on this account, much heavier than of the other\nmaterials; but for the naval service, and the attack and defence of\nfortifications, the weight required to secure the necessary strength is\nnot very objectionable. Wrought iron and bronze are much more expensive\nand less durable. Moreover, the difficulty of forging wrought iron in\nmasses of sufficient size has been such as to prevent its being brought\ninto general use for artillery. Numerous attempts have been made, at\ndifferent periods, to construct large guns of this material, but none\nhave yet been successful. Improvements which are now making in the\nmanufacture of wrought iron, may render this the preferable material for\nthe smaller pieces of artillery; but the best informed military men deem\nit objectionable for the heavier cannon, both on account of its cost and\nthe imperfection of its manufacture. Even should the latter objection be\nremoved, its cost must prevent its general application to the\nconstruction of siege artillery. Charlatans in military science, both in\nthis country and in Europe, bring this subject up every fifteen or\ntwenty years as a new _invention_, and flaming notices of the\n_improvement_, and predictions of the revolution it is to effect in the\nart of war, are circulated in the newspapers to \"gull\" a credulous\npublic; and after some fifty or one hundred thousand dollars have been\nsquandered on some court-favorite, the whole matter ends in the\nexplosion of the \"_improvement_,\" and probably the destruction of the\n\"_inventor_,\" and perhaps also of his spectators. Let us be distinctly\nunderstood on this subject. There may be _inventions_ and _improvements_\nin the manufacture of wrought iron, but there is nothing _new_ in its\n_application_ to the construction of cannon, for it has been used for\nthis purpose as long ago as the first invention of the art.\n\n2. _Field Artillery_ is composed of the smaller guns and howitzers. In\nour service this class of cannon includes the six and twelve-pounder\nguns, and the twelve and twenty-four-pounder howitzers. All these are\nnow made of bronze. This material is more expensive than cast-iron, but\nits superior tenacity renders it more useful where great weight is\nobjectionable. Improvements in the manufacture of cast iron may render\nit safe to employ this metal in the construction of field-pieces. It is\nalso possible the wrought iron may be forged in masses large enough, and\nthe cost be so reduced as to bring it into use for field-pieces. It is\nhere important to combine strength with lightness, and additional\nexpense may very properly be incurred to secure this important object.\n\nThe _projectiles_ now in use are solid shot, shells, strap-shot, case or\ncanister-shot, grape-shot, light and fire-balls, carcasses, grenades,\nand rockets.\n\n_Solid shot_ are now almost invariably made of cast iron,[35] formed in\nmoulds of sand or iron. This projectile is used under almost every\ncircumstance, whether in the battle-field or in the attack and defence\nof places, and is the only one that is effectual against the stone walls\nof forts. _Hot shot_ are used against shipping and wooden structures of\nevery description. Red-hot balls were first employed by the king of\nPoland, in 1575, but, on account of the difficulty of heating them with\nrapidity, and the danger of loading the piece with them, this kind of\nprojectile was not in general use till a much later period. It was at\nfirst supposed that the expansion of the metal would be so great, when\nheated to a red or white heat, as to prevent the ball from entering the\npiece; it is found, however, that the windage is still sufficient for\nloading with facility. These red-hot balls are principally used to fire\nwooden buildings, ships, and other combustible matter. They are\ntherefore much used as a projectile for coast defence, and all\nfortifications on the seaboard should be provided with furnaces and\ngrates, arranged so as to heat them with facility and rapidity.\n\n[Footnote 35: In Mexico, where iron is scarce, copper is used for shot\nand shells; but it is a poor substitute.]\n\nThere are several kinds of _hollow-shot_ and _shells_, called _bombs,\nhowitzes, grenades_, &c. They are made of cast iron, and usually in a\nspherical shape, the cavity being concentric with the exterior surface.\nThe cavity was formerly made eccentric with the exterior, under the\nbelief that the heavier side would always strike first. The rotary\nmotion of the shell during its flight rendered this precaution of no\nuse. Fire is communicated to the combustible matter within the shell by\nmeans of a fuse, which is so regulated that the explosion shall take\nplace at the desired moment. Hollow-shot are used with advantage to\ndestroy ordinary buildings, ships, earthwork, and thin walls of masonry;\nthey, however, are of little avail in breaking the massive walls of\nwell-constructed forts. Howitzes and grenades are particularly effective\nagainst cavalry and columns of infantry, and are much employed on the\nbattle-field; they are also much used in the attack and defence of\nplaces.\n\nWe find that as early as 1486 the Spaniards made use of a projectile\nsimilar to the modern bomb. \"They threw from their engines large\nglobular masses, composed of certain inflammable ingredients mixed with\ngunpowder, which, scattering long trains of light,\" says an eye-witness,\n\"in their passage through the air, filled the beholders with dismay, and\ndescending on the roofs of edifices, frequently occasioned extensive\nconflagration.\" In the siege of Constantinople by Mahomet II., shells\nwere used, and also mortars of enormous size. In 1572 Valturus proposed\nto throw, with a kind of mortar, \"globes of copper filled with powder.\"\nIn 1588, an artificer of Venloo burned Wachtendeck by throwing bombs\ninto the place. A similar attempt had just been made at Berg-op-Zoom.\nThe use of this projectile became quite common in France under Louis\nXIII. Howitzes were not much used till the seventeenth century. They are\nof German origin, and the howitzer first bore the name of _hausmitz_.\n\nThe _strap-shot_ consists of a round ball attached to a _sabot_ of the\nsame calibre, by means of two strips of tin passing over the shot at\nright angles, and fastened to a third, which is soldered around the\nsabot. One end of the sabot is arranged for attaching it to the\ncartridge, the other being hollowed out to receive the shot. The\nsupposed advantages of this arrangement are, 1st, a diminution of the\nwindage; 2d, the gun may be loaded with greater rapidity; and, 3d, the\ncartridge is transported with greater safety.\n\nThe _case_ or _canister-shot_ is prepared by filling a tin canister with\ngrape-shot or musket-balls, and attaching it to the cartridge by means\nof a sabot. There being two sizes of grape-shot, and one of\nmusket-balls, we have three kinds of canister-shot calculated to reach\nat different distances. The three sizes of shot are frequently mixed in\nthe same canister. This projectile is particularly effective against\nlines of infantry and cavalry, when the distance is short.\n\nThe _grape-shot_ is composed of small balls arranged round an upright\npin attached to a plate of wood or iron. The concave cast-iron plate is\npreferable, as it increases the range of the shot. The balls are covered\nwith canvass, and thoroughly confined by a quilting of strong twine.\nThis shot is used for the same purposes as the canister.\n\n_Light_ and _fire-balls_ are formed of an oval case of sacking, filled\nwith combustible matter, and attached to a culot of cast-iron. The whole\nis covered with a net of spun-yarn. Light-balls are used to light up our\nown works, and are not armed; fire-balls being employed to light up the\nworks or approaches of an enemy, it is necessary to arm them with\npistol-barrels, in order to prevent, any one from extinguishing them.\nWhen made of very combustible materials, and used for setting fire to\nwooden structures, they are denominated _incendiary balls_.\n\n_Carcasses_ are employed for the same purpose as incendiary balls; they\nare of two kinds: 1st, the _shell-carcass_; and, 2d, the _ribbed-carcass_.\nThe first is composed of a spherical shell, cast with five fuse-holes, one\nbeing at the top, and the other four in a plane perpendicular to this and\nat right angles with each other; the shell is filled with matter highly\ncombustible. The second is formed of iron ribs connected by iron straps,\nand attached at the ends to culots of the same material, the whole being\nfilled with combustible composition. This is more expensive than the shell\ncarcass, and cannot be fired with as great accuracy; it is now seldom used.\nCarcasses may be armed in the same manner as fire-balls.\n\n_Smoke_ and _suffocating balls_ are used to drive an enemy from\ngalleries and mines. They are thrown by hand.\n\nThe _personnel_ of the French artillery was for a long time retained,\ntogether with the engineers, under the general direction of the \"Grand\nMaster of Cross-bows.\" In 1420 the master-general of artillery was made\nindependent of the grand-master of cross-bows; but previous to the reign\nof Louis XIV., the artillery troops had no organization as a separate\ncorps. In 1668 six companies of _canoniers_ were created, and soon after\ntwo companies of _bombardiers_. In 1693 the first regiment of fusiliers\nwas changed into a _royal regiment of artillery_, and both the canoniers\nand bombardiers were eventually incorporated with it. The staff of\nartillery, towards the close of this reign, was composed of one\ngrand-master, sixty lieutenants, sixty commissaries, and eighty\n_officiers-pointeurs_. In 1721 the artillery was divided into five\nbattalions and stationed at Metz, Strasbourg, Grenoble, Perpignan, and\nLa Fere, where they established schools of theory and practice. In 1756\nthe artillery was organized into seven regiments, each regiment having\nits own separate school. This organization continued without any\nremarkable change till the Revolution.\n\nDuring the earlier campaigns of the French Revolution it is impossible\nto trace out the changes that took place in army organization, every\nthing was then so irregular and confused, the troops of different arms\nbeing frequently united together. In the campaign of 1792 there were\nsome six or seven regiments of foot artillery, and ten companies of\nhorse. This arm was greatly increased during the subsequent campaigns,\nand its organization was completely remodelled by Napoleon on his\nelevation to the head of the government. The _personnel_ of the\nartillery was then composed of a general staff, nine regiments of foot\nand six of horse. In 1815 it was reduced to eight regiments of foot and\nfour of horse.\n\nThe _personnel_ of artillery in modern army organization is divided into\nfour classes: the _staff, guards, artificers,_ and _troops_.\n\nI. The _Staff_, or _Ordnance_, as it is called in our service, is\ncharged with the construction of all the materials of artillery, and the\ncollection of powder and military stores. As the lives of persons using\nthese materials, and, in a considerable degree, the success of war,\ndepend upon the nature and quality of the stores thus manufactured and\ncollected, it is obvious that the members of this branch of the\nartillery service should possess high and peculiar qualifications. In\nthe French army the artillery staff is composed of two hundred and\neighty-three officers of different grades: also twenty-four officers of\nthe general staff are attached to this service. In our army the\n_ordnance_ is composed of twenty-eight officers of different grades.\n\nII. _Artillery-guards._--These in our service are divided into two\nclasses: 1st. _Military Store-keepers._ 2d. _Ordnance Sergeants._ Both\nare alike charged with the care and preservation of the artillery\nproperty and stores at the several garrisons, arsenals, and magazines.\nIn our army we have fifty-eight of these guards, viz: fifteen\ncommissioned military store-keepers, and forty-three ordnance sergeants.\nWe seldom have more than this number of permanent posts; each one can\ntherefore be supplied with an artillery guard for the care of the\nartillery stores. In the French service there are three hundred and\nfifteen of these artillery guards; they are divided into three classes.\n\nIII. _Artificers._--This class of men are employed in the construction\nand repairs of military materials. In most of our arsenals and armories\nit is thought to be best to employ unenlisted workmen, by the piece or\ncontract. Nevertheless a limited number of enlisted men of this\ndescription are found to be both useful and necessary. We have three\nhundred and thirty of these in our army, viz: two hundred and fifty\nenlisted \"ordnance men,\" and eighty \"artificers\" attached to the\nregiments. In the French army they have for the service of the arsenals\nand establishments, one hundred and forty-nine \"ouvriers,\" and twelve\n\"artificers;\" there are also three hundred and sixty \"ouvriers\" and\nseventeen \"armuriers\" attached to the corps of artillery, making in all\nfive hundred and thirty-eight.\n\nIV. _Artillery Troops._--Artillery, as an arm of service, is divided in\nthe same manner as its _materiel_; the _field_-artillery being intended\nfor field service, and the garrison or _siege_-artillery, for the attack\nand defence of places. The troops of the artillery corps of a modern\narmy usually do duty either in the field, or in sieges, or garrison, as\noccasion may require. When employed in the service of a campaign,\nartillery is usually divided into two classes: 1st. _Foot_ Artillery;\nand 2d. _Horse_ Artillery.\n\nIn the early history of artillery, as has already been shown, but few\npieces were ever brought upon the battle-field. Charles VIII. crossed\nthe Alps with a pretty large train; but a part of these were hand-guns,\nand but very few of the larger pieces were ever brought into battle;\nindeed, it was then thought that this arm would be of little use except\nin sieges. At the battle of Gravelines the army of Philip II. had only\nseventeen pieces of artillery; and at the battle of Ivry the French had\nonly four pieces of cannon, and two culverins: the army of the League\nhad also only four pieces. At the battle of Moncontour the opposing\narmies had but eight pieces each.\n\nGustavus Adolphus of Sweden not only improved the character of\nartillery, but also gave to it great development as an arm of service.\nAt the battle of Breetenfield he had one hundred pieces of artillery,\ngreat and small, and at the camp of Nuremberg he numbered about three\nhundred. This king also made a more skilful use of his cannon by uniting\nthem more in mass than had been done by his predecessors; his system was\nnevertheless very imperfect. In the disposition of this arm on the field\nof battle, a vast improvement was made by Conde, Turenne, and Prince\nEugene of Savoy. Frederick the Great also made great use of this arm,\nand was the first to introduce horse artillery. This mode of using\nfield-pieces has peculiar properties which in many circumstances render\nit an invaluable arm. The promptness and rapidity of its movements\nenable it to act with other troops without embarrassing them. The French\nsoon introduced into their army the improvements made by the king of\nPrussia, and in 1763 the celebrated Gribeauval appeared. He improved the\nform of the cannon and greatly diminished the weight of field artillery,\ngiving it an organization which has been but slightly changed since his\ntime.\n\nThe successive improvements in artillery have for a long time\nconstituted a prominent feature in war. The power of this arm to throw\nprojectiles to a great distance, and to overturn and destroy opposing\nobstacles, renders it a necessary arm on the battle-field, and a strong\nbarrier and safeguard of states. It is an essential element in all army\norganization.\n\nIn our army we have four regiments of artillery, forming the basis of\nforty batteries. In the French service there are fourteen regiments,\nforming the basis of two hundred and six field batteries.\n\nThe term _battery_, when applied to artillery as an arm of service,\nrefers to a permanent organization of a certain number of cannon, with\nthe men and other accessaries required to serve them. This is the unit\nof force in this arm. The regimental organization is a mere nominal\narrangement, for in actual service artillery acts by batteries, and\nnever by regiments. Its strength is therefore invariably estimated by\nthe number of its batteries.\n\nA battery is ordinarily composed of six pieces, two of them being\nhowitzers. The lighter batteries would, in our service, be formed of\nsix-pounder guns and twelve-pounder howitzers; and the heavier of\ntwelve-pounder guns and twenty-four-pounder howitzers. These heavy\nbatteries would usually form the reserve. Each piece being attended by\nits caisson, this formation would give twelve carriages to each battery,\nsix for the guns and six for the caissons. The extra caissons form a\npart of the reserve, and move with the train. In some foreign services a\nbattery is composed of eight pieces with their caissons.\n\nThis arm admits of three formations--_in column, in battle_, and _in\nbattery_. In column it ordinarily moves by sections of two pieces, each\npiece being followed or preceded by its caisson. Columns of\nhalf-batteries are sometimes formed, and also columns of single pieces;\nbut the latter ought never to be employed except in cases of necessity\nin passing a narrow defile, and at a distance from the enemy.\n\nIn order of battle, the pieces are drawn up in line, their caissons\nforming a second line, at the distance of a few paces.\n\nWhen in order of battery, the pieces are formed in the same way as for\nbattle, except that the guns are directed towards the enemy and prepared\nfor firing.\n\nThe movements and manoeuvres of foot artillery correspond with those of\ninfantry, and of mounted artillery with those of cavalry, a battery\nbeing regarded as a battalion or squadron, of which the pieces form the\nplatoons. Mounted batteries can seldom move with greater rapidity than\nthe trot, except in cases of emergency, and even then the gallop can be\nkept up only for a very short time; but this is of no great importance,\nas the batteries never accompany cavalry in the charge.\n\nThe French and German writers discuss artillery as employed in battle,\nunder two distinct heads--1st, as an arm of preparation, and 2d, as an\narm of succor.\n\nI. As an arm of preparation it serves, 1st, to protect the deploying of\nthe other troops; 2d, to disorganize the enemy's masses, and to\nfacilitate the action of infantry and cavalry, by weakening the intended\npoints of attack; 3d, to force an enemy to evacuate a position by\noverthrowing obstacles with which he has covered himself; 4th, to keep\nup the action till the other troops can be prepared to strike the\ndecisive blow.\n\nThe force of this arm depends upon the rapidity and accuracy of its\nfire; rash valor is therefore far less desirable in artillery than\nskill, patience, and cool courage. Artillery always acts at a distance,\nand in mass; single pieces are seldom employed, except to cover\nreconnoitring parties, or to sustain the light infantry in a skirmish.\nMounted batteries sometimes approach within two or three hundred yards\nof the enemy's infantry; but this is only done with a strong support of\nother troops, and to prepare the way for a charge of cavalry. The\nbatteries do not accompany the charge, but they should always follow up\nand complete the success; mounted batteries are particularly useful in\npursuit. If Murat, in 1812, had accompanied his attacks upon\nNeveroffskoi's retreating columns of sixty thousand infantry by two or\nthree batteries of mounted artillery, the whole column must have been\ncaptured or destroyed.\n\nArtillery, on the field of battle, is very liable to allow its fire to\nbe drawn, and its projectiles wasted, while the enemy is at too great a\ndistance to be reached. It is a very common thing in a battle, to employ\ntwo or three pieces of heavy calibre at the beginning of the fight, in\norder to provoke the opposing batteries to open their fire before the\nproper time. The waste of material is not the only loss attending this\nerror; the troops are fatigued and disheartened, while the courage and\nconfidence of their opponents are always revived by a weak and\ninaccurate fire. To avoid such an error the commanding officer of a\nbattery of artillery should be perfectly familiar with the effective\nranges of his pieces, and accustomed to form a correct estimate of\ndistances. For this purpose the eye should be frequently practised in\ntime of peace in estimating the ranges for different calibres.\n\nThe effective range of a 12-pounder field-piece\n\n   is about .     .     .     .     .     .       1000 yds.\n   \"      \"      \"      \"    6     \"      \"        800  \"\n   \"      \"      \"      \"    24    \"     howitzer, 600  \"\n   \"      \"      \"      \"    12    \"      \"        500  \"\n   \"      \"      \"      \"    grape and case shot is\n   from .     .     .     .     .     .     300 to 500  \"\n\nEven at these distances the aim is usually so inaccurate that a large\nportion of the projectiles are lost. In the attack on Spires, a whole\ncolumn of artillery expended its fire while at a distance of 900 yards\nfrom the enemy, who, of course, received little or no injury. In firing\nfrom fortifications, the aim is far more accurate, and the artillery may\ntherefore be employed to advantage as soon as the enemy comes within the\nlongest range.\n\nII. As an arm of succor, the artillery serves, 1st, to give impulsive\nforce to the attacking columns; 2d, to assist in arresting, or at least\nin retarding, the offensive movements of an enemy; 3d, to protect the\navenues of approach, and to defend obstacles that cover a position; and,\n4th, to cover a retrograde movement.\n\nMounted artillery is, like cavalry, much the most effective in attack;\nbut batteries of foot are better calculated for defence. The cannoniers\nare so armed as to be capable of defending their pieces to the last\nextremity; they therefore cannot be easily captured by opposing columns\nof infantry. \"As to pretending to rush upon the guns,\" says Napoleon,\n\"and carry them by the bayonet, or to pick off the gunners by musketry,\nthese are chimerical ideas. Such things do sometimes happen; but have we\nnot examples of still more extraordinary captures by a _coup de main?_\nAs a general rule, there is no infantry, however intrepid it may be,\nthat can, without artillery, march with impunity the distance of five or\nsix hundred toises, against two well-placed batteries (16 pieces) of\ncannon, served by good gunners; before they could pass over two-thirds\nof the way, the men would be killed, wounded, or dispersed. * * * * A\ngood infantry forms, no doubt, the sinews of an army; but if it were\nrequired to fight for a long time against a very superior artillery, its\ngood quality would be exhausted, and its efficiency destroyed. In the\nfirst campaigns of the wars of the Revolution, what France had in the\ngreatest perfection was artillery; we know not a single instance in\nwhich twenty pieces of cannon, judiciously placed, and in battery, were\never carried by the bayonet. In the affair at Valmy, at the battles of\nJemmapes, Nordlingen, and Fleurus, the French had an artillery superior\nto that of the enemy, although they had often only two guns to one\nthousand men; but that was because their armies were very numerous. It\nmay happen that a general, more skilful in manoeuvring, more expert than\nhis adversary, and commanding a better infantry, may obtain successes\nduring a part of a campaign, although his artillery may be far inferior\nto that of his opponent; but on the critical day of a general\nengagement, his inferiority in point of metal will be severely felt.\"\n\nHistory furnishes us numerous examples of the use of artillery in\nprotecting avenues of approach:--such as the defile of Koeesen at the\nbattle of Auerstedt; the avenues between the redoubts of Pultowa, &c.,\n&c.\n\nWhen an army is forced to retreat, it covers its rear by that portion of\nits cavalry and mounted artillery which has suffered least during the\nbattle. By placing the squadrons of horse and the light batteries in\nechelon, the retiring column may be well protected. The artillery, by\nusing the prolonge, may also continue its retreat while in battery and\nfiring. It was in this way that at the battle of Albuera, in 1811, the\nFrench artillery on the left wing held in check the right and centre of\nthe Anglo-Spaniards till the army effected its retreat; the artillery\nthen retired in echelons, by batteries and fractions of batteries, under\nthe protection of the cavalry.\n\nWe have already discussed, under the general head of tactics, the\nposition and use of artillery on the battle-field a few additional\nremarks must suffice.\n\nAs a general rule, batteries should be placed in positions from which\nthey can employ their fire to advantage, and also be free to move in any\ndirection that the progress of the battle may require. Advantage should\nalways be taken of natural or artificial obstacles, such as hedges,\nclumps of trees, logs, mounds of earth, &c., to cover and conceal the\nguns till the moment they open their fire. Elevated positions are,\ncontrary to the common opinion, generally unfavorable, for artillery\ncannot fire to advantage at any considerable angle of depression. The\nslopes in front should be of considerable length, otherwise the balls\nwould do very little execution upon that portion of the column of attack\nwhich occupied the valley. The ground should also be smooth, for if\nrough the balls will either bury themselves in the earth, or ricochet at\na high angle of deflection, thus destroying a considerable part of the\neffect of the fire. The counterforts or spurs of hills are favorable for\nartillery, as they enable it to see, with an enfilading fire, the slopes\nof the principal range. Batteries should seldom be placed so as to fire\nover other troops, for they will not only be intimidated by this fire,\nbut also exposed to the opposing fire of the enemy's artillery. A large\nnumber of pieces should never be crowded into the same place, but an\ninterval should be left between the guns of forty or fifty feet,\naccording to the locality. The most favorable position for this arm in\nordinary ground, is in the intervals between the regiments or brigades\nof the line, and far enough in advance of this line not to draw upon the\nother troops the fire of the enemy's artillery. The flanks of the line\nare also favorable for the action of this arm.\n\nSometimes artillery has been employed to form a part of the line of\nbattle; but such instances are exceptions, and can never be comprised in\ngeneral rules. Whenever this disposition has been made, it has resulted\nfrom the defective character of the other arms, or from some peculiar\ncircumstance in the battle which enabled a bold and skilful commander to\ndeviate from the ordinary rules of tactics. Such was the case with\nNapoleon at Wagram. In Saxony, in 1813, he was several times obliged to\nsubstitute his artillery to supply the want of other arms.\n\nIn the defence and attack of field-works, and in the passage of rivers,\nartillery plays an important and indispensable part; but it here becomes\nan auxiliary to the dispositions of the engineers, or at least acts in\nconcert with that arm.\n\nThe troops of artillery, in all well-regulated army organizations,\nshould equal about two-thirds of the cavalry, or one-seventh of the\ninfantry.[36]\n\n[Footnote 36: To qualify himself for the duties connected with his arm\nof service, the artillery officer must make himself thoroughly\nacquainted with--.\n\n_The Instruction for United States Field Artillery, horse and foot;\n\nCapt. Anderson's Instruction for Garrison Artillery;\n\nKinsley's Notes on Pyrotechny;\n\nKnowlton's Notes on Gunpowder_,&c.; and\n\nThe writings of Thiroux and Piobert on theoretical and practical\ninstruction, and the writings of Jomini, Decker, and Okotmeff, on the\nuse of this arm on the field of battle.\n\nThe following list of books of reference may be of use to those who wish\nto make themselves perfectly familiar with all the branches of\nartillery.\n\n_Histoire general de l'artillerie_. Brunet.\n\n_L'artillerie a cheval dans les combats de cavalerie_. Par un officier\nde l'artillerie Prussienne.\n\n_Considerations et experiences sur le tir des obus a bulles_. Bormann.\n_Essai sur les obusiers_. Dusaert.\n\n_Essai sur l'organisation de l'artillerie_. Le Bourg.\n\n_Traite sur l'artillerie_, (traduit de l'Allemand.) Rouvroy.\n\n_Bombardier Francais_. Belidor.\n\n_Memoires d'artillerie_. St. Remy.\n\n_Essai sur l'usage de l'artillerie dans la guerre de campagne et celle\nde siege_. Dupuget.\n\n_Memoires sur les nouveaux systemes d'artillerie_. St. Aubin.\n\n_Treatise on Artillery_. Mueller.\n\n_Artificial Fire-Works_. Jones.\n\n_Table de tir les canons et obusiers_. Lombard.\n\n_On Gunpowder_. Antoni.\n\n_Recherches sur l'artillerie en general_. Texier de Norbec.\n\n_Description de l'art de fabriquer les canons_. Monge.\n\n_Procedes de la fabrication des armes blanches_. Vandermonde.\n\n_Manuel de l'artilleur_. Durtubie.\n\n_Traite du mouvement des projectiles_. Lombard.\n\n_Treatise on Artillery_. Scheel. (Translated from the German.)\n\n_Traite pratique des feux d'artifice_. Morel.\n\n_Manuel du canonnier marin_. Cornibert.\n\n_New Principles of Gunnery_. Robins.\n\n_Memoires sur la fabrication des armes portatives_. Cotty.\n\n_Recherches sur la poudre_. Cossigny.\n\n_Supplement_. Cossigny.\n\n_Fabrication de la poudre_. Renaud.\n\n_American Artillerist's Companion_. Toussard.\n\n_Tables des portees des canons et canonades de la marine_. Cornilwert.\n\n_Traite d'artifices de guerre_. Bigot.\n\n_Traite elementaire de la fabrication des bouches a feu_. Dartein.\n\n_Traite de l'art de fabriquer la poudre a canon_. Bottee et Riffault.\n\n_L'art du salpetrier_. Bottee et Riffault.\n\n_Dictionary of Artillery_. Hoyer. (German.)\n\n_New Experiments on Gunnery_. Hutton--(Hutton's Tracts.)\n\n_Des bois propres au service des Arsenaux_. Herbin de Halles.\n\n_Instruction sur le service de l'artillerie_. Hulot.\n\n_Manoeuvres de force_. Bigot.\n\n_Balistique_. Obenheim.\n\n_Treatise on Artillery_. German. Scharnhorst. (Translated into French,\n1840.)\n\n_Essai sur l'art de pointer_. Poumet.\n\n_Reflexions sur la fabrication des bouches a feu_. Lamartilliere.\n\n_Memoire sur la planchette du canonnier_. Obenheim.\n\n_Aide-Memoire_. Gassendi.\n\n_Observations on the use of Artillery at the sieges of Badajos, St.\nSebastian, &c_.\n\n_Treatise on Artillery_. Lallemand.\n\n_Elemens de pyrotechnie_. Ruggieri.\n\n_Nouvelle force maritime_. Paixhans.\n\n_Dictionnaire d'artillerie_. Cotty.\n\n_Recherches balistiques_. Coste.\n\n_Poudres fulminantes_. Vergnaud.\n\n_Manuel de la metallurgie du fer_. Culman.\n\n_Pyrotechnic militaire,_ (traduit de l'Allemand, par R. de Peretsdorff.)\n\n_Journal des Sciences Militaires_.\n\n_Pyrotechny_. Cutbush.\n\n_Traite elementaire d'artillerie_. Decker.\n\n_Fusees de guerre_. Montgery.\n\n_Documens sur la matiere a canons_. Herve.\n\n_Observations sur le nouveau systeme d'artillerie_. Allix.\n\n_Systeme d'artillerie de campagne_. Allix.\n\n_Pocket Gunner_. Adye.\n\n_On the Rocket System_. Congreve.\n\n_Essai sur l'art des fontes_. Serres.\n\n_Receuil de Memoires sur la poudre a canon_. Proust.\n\n_Memorial de l'artilleur marin_. Michel.\n\n_Observations sur le nouveau systeme de l'artillerie_. Poumet.\n\n_Memorial d'artillerie_.\n\n_British Gunner_. Spearman.\n\n_Regles de pointage a bord des vaisseaux_. Montgery.\n\n_Manuel du maitre de forges_. Landrin.\n\n_Naval Gunnery_. Douglass.\n\n_Metallurgie du fer_ (traduit de l'Allemand, par Culman.) Karsten.\n\n_Aide-Memoire a l'usage des officers d'artillerie_. (Strasbourg.)\n\n_Traite de l'organisation et de la tactique de l'artillerie,_ (traduit\nde l'Allemand par Peretsdorff.) Grewenitz.\n\n_Supplement au dictionnaire d'artillerie_. Cotty.\n\n_Memoir on Gunpowder_. Braddock.\n\n_Manuel de l'armurier_. Paulin-Desormeaux.\n\n_Journal des armes speciales_.\n\n_Cours sur le service des officiers dans les fonderies_. Serres.\n\n_Experiences sur la fabrication et la duree des bouches a feu en fer et\nbronze,_ (traduit de l'Allemand par Peretsdorff.) Meyer.\n\n_Applications du fer aux constructions de l'artillerie_. Thierry.\n\n_Aide-Memoire d'art militaire_. Lebas.\n\n_Memorial a l'usage de l'armee Belge_.\n\n_Instructions and Regulations for the service and management of heavy\nordnance in the British service_.\n\n_Experiences sur les principes du tir,_ faites a Metz, en 1834.\n\n_Traite d'artillerie theorique et pratique_. Piobert.\n\n_Aide-Memoire a l'usage des officiers d'artillerie,_ (avec approbation\ndu comite d'artillerie.)\n\n_Manuel d'artillerie a l'usage des officiers de la Republique\nHelvetique._ Bonaparte, (Napoleon Louis.)\n\n_Experiences comparatives entre des bouches a feu en fonte de fer,\nd'origine Franzaise, Anglaise et Suedoise,_ faites a Gavres, en 1836.\n\n_Experiences faites a Brest en_ 1831, _sur les canons._ Paixhans.\n\n_Essai sur l'organisation de l'artillerie._ Le Bourg.\n\n_Experiences sur des projectiles creux,_ faites en 1829, '30, '31.\n\n_Instruction pratique sur l'emploi des projectiles,_ (traduit de\nl'Allemand par Peretsdorff.) Decker.\n\n_Effects of heavy ordnance as applied to ships of war._ Simmons.\n\n_Experiences sur les poudres de guerre,_ faites a Esquerdes, en 1832,\n'33, '34, and '35. Maguin.\n\n_Cours d'artillerie a l'usage des sous-officiers._ De Crepy.\n\n_Instruction theorique et pratique d'artillerie,_ a l'usage des eleves\nde St. Cyr. Thiroux.\n\n_Cours sur le service des officiers d'artillerie dans les forges._\n\n_Manuel historique de la technologie des armes a feu,_ (traduit de\nl'Allemand par M. Rieffel.) Meyer.\n\n_Formules relatives aux effets du tir sur affut._ Poisson.\n\n_Manuel de l'artificer._ Vergnaud.\n\n_Etat actuel de l'artillerie de campagne de toutes les puissances de\nl'Europe,_ (traduit par Maze; Ire partie, Artillerie Anglaise.) Jacobi.\n(Six other parts have been published in German, containing descriptions\nof the French, Belgian, Hessian, Wirtemburg, Nassau, and Swedish\nsystems.)\n\n_Introduction a l'etude de l'artillerie._ Madelaine.\n\n_Cours sur le service des officiers d'artillerie dans les fonderies.\nDescription de la fabrication des bouches u feu a la fonderie royale de\nLiege._ Huguenin.\n\n_Poudre u canon._ Timmerhans.\n\n_Procedes de fabrication dans les forges,_ (extrait du cours sur le\nservice des officiers dans les forges.)\n\n_Renseignements sur le materiel de l'artillerie navale de la Grande\nBretagne._ Zeni et des Hays.\n\n_Theorie des affuts et des voitures de l'artillerie._ Migout et Bergery\n\n_Artillerist's Manual._ Griffith.\n\n_Handbuch fuer die K.K. Oesterreichische Artillerie Offiziere,_ (manual\nfor the Austrian artillery officers.)\n\n_Sammlung von Steindruckzeichnungen der Preussischen Artillerie,_ _mit\nErlaeuterungen_, (collection of plates of the Prussian artillery, with\nexplanatory text.)\n\n_Histoire des fusees de guerre._\n\n_Ordnance Manual_, for the use of the officers of the United States\nArmy.\n\n_Experiments on Gunpowder_. Capt. Mordecai.\n\n_Pyrotechny_, for the use of the Cadets at the United States Military\nAcademy. Kinsley.\n\n_Notes on Gunpowder, Percussion Powder, Cannon, and Projectiles_. Lt.\nKnowlton.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII.\n\nARMY ORGANIZATION--ENGINEERS.\n\n\n\n_Engineers_.--The term _engineer_ is derived from the unclassical Latin\nword _ingenium_, which was applied both to a _machine_ and the _mind_ or\n_skill_ of the person who devised or constructed it.\n\nIt was Philip Augustus, say the French writers, who first introduced\nengineers (_engigneurs_, or _engignours_, as they were called) into\nFrance, and restored the art of sieges. The engineers of that age were\nseldom charged with the construction of works of military defence, but,\nlike Archimedes at Syracuse, and Longinus at Palmyra, they directed\ntheir attention principally to devising implements of war and the most\neffective manner of using them. Engines of war were at that time divided\nbetween the _engigneurs_ and the _artilliers_; the former being charged\nwith the heavier machines, and the latter with the smaller weapons used\nfor throwing projectiles. After the invention of gunpowder, the old\nbattering-rams, cranes, helipoles, &c., disappeared, and with them the\n_engigneurs_, or masters of engines. The new inventions were united with\nthe few old projectile machines that remained in the artillery, and the\nengineers were for a time left almost without employment. The revival of\nthe art of fortification was very slow, and the modern system scarcely\nbegan to be developed till near the sixteenth century.\n\nWe must omit for the present giving even an outline of the history of\nmilitary engineering, and pass to the troops of this arm, as\nconstituting an essential element of an army organization. The subject\nof fortification, and the history of its various changes, will be\nexamined in the next chapter.\n\nThe engineers, in modern army organization, constitute the fourth arm of\nservice, as, compared with artillery, their relative numbers are about\nas two to three. They are divided in the same manner as the artillery,\nviz.:--1st, the staff; 2d, guards, or fort-keepers; 3d, artificers; and\n4th, the troops.\n\nI. The officers constituting the staff of this corps are charged in time\nof peace with planning, constructing, and repairing all fortifications\nand other defensive works; the construction and preparation of all\nmilitary materials, and stores connected with this arm; and (in our\nservice) with the disbursements of money connected with these\noperations: in time of war they are charged with the attack and defence\nof military works, the laying out and construction of field defences,\nredoubts, intrenchments, roads, &c.; in the attack they form a part of\nthe vanguard, to remove obstructions; and in retreat they form a part\nof the rear-guard, to erect obstacles, destroy roads, bridges, &c., so\nas to retard an enemy's pursuit.\n\nFrom the important character of these duties as connected with the means\nessential to a national defence, and the vast amount of money expended\nin these operations, it is evident that a high order of acquirements\nshould be deemed necessary to qualify one to perform the duties of a\nmilitary engineer. This officer requires a knowledge of chemistry, to\nguide his choice of materials for mortars, cements, and mastics; of\nmineralogy and geology, for selecting stone; of botany, for timber and\nthe means of preventing its decay; of mathematics, in laying out his\nwork and calculating the thickness and stability of his walls,\nembankments, &c.; of mechanical philosophy, in constructing his\nmachinery; of military engineering, in his plans of fortifications; and\nof all the higher branches of military science, in selecting positions\nfor these works, such that they shall have the proper relations to the\nmeans of national defence, and to the grand operations of armies in the\nfield. The avenues to appointment to this corps are guarded, in most\nEuropean armies, with special care, to prevent the influence of money,\npolitics, or family connections; and in our own army it is now specified\nby law of Congress, that the vacancies shall be filled only from the\nmost distinguished graduates of the military academy. Formerly our\nservice suffered most severely from the employment of incompetent\npersons, introduced through political influence from civil life, and\nforeign charlatans, the refuse of European armies. Many of our earlier\nmilitary works (as will be mentioned hereafter) were modelled upon\nsystems for a long time discarded by the profession in Europe, and even\nsome of those which have been constructed within the last thirty years\nare made of such wretched materials and workmanship, that they are\nalready crumbling into ruins. While the existing laws and regulations\nseem well calculated to prevent the recurrence of similar abuses and\nerrors, it nevertheless can be shown that the organization of this arm\nof our service requires modifications and extensions to give it the\nrequisite degree of efficiency, and to economize the public\nexpenditures.\n\nThe wars of Louis XIV. first led to a regular military organization, and\na regular system of defence. In these wars the engineers received great\ndevelopment, and have ever since occupied a prominent position as parts\nof an army organization. We therefore find in all the great sieges and\nbattles of this era a large and continually increasing number of\nengineers and engineer troops, this force being gradually augmented as\nthe true principles of war became better understood, and as the wants of\nthe service required. Even in the earliest of these battles we find the\nengineers taking a prominent and distinguished part. In the war of 1688,\ntwenty-four engineers were killed and wounded at the siege of\nPhilipsbourg, eighteen at Namur, eight at Huy, ten at Charleroi, eight\nat Ath, thirty at Barcelona, &c. Such losses were good proofs of the\nusefulness of these officers, and before this war was closed, their\nnumber was increased to six hundred; and in 1706 the army contained\neight brigades of engineers and four companies of miners.\n\nThe engineer corps being partially disbanded in the early part of the\nFrench Revolution, great difficulty was experienced in reorganizing it\nand in finding competent men to supply the places of those who had been\ndriven into exile or sacrificed during the reign of terror. Energy and\nactivity, combined with republican zeal, could supply the place of skill\nin the other arms, but the science of the engineer could not be acquired\nin a day.\n\nIn 1799, the staff of the engineer corps consisted of four hundred and\nforty-nine officers, without including the general officers, commanding\ndepartments, or those connected with the engineer troops. The same\norganization was continued in 1804. The engineer staff of the French\narmy now numbers four hundred and thirty-two officers. We have in our\nservice forty-three engineer officers, for staff duty, who are now\nengaged in the construction and repairs of some sixty or seventy\nfortifications, and other works of a civil and military character.\n\nII. _Engineer Guards_, or _Fort-Keepers_, are a class of men charged\nwith the general care of forts, and all public property deposited in the\nseveral engineer depots and garrisons, and in the public works during\ntheir construction.\n\nThere are five hundred and fifty of these \"_gardes du Genie_\" in the\nFrench army, who rank next the sub-lieutenants of engineers, and are\nassimilated with the sub-lieutenants of infantry in the hospitals,\nmarches, &c. _In our service we have no engineer guards or\nfort-keepers._\n\nThis defect in our organization has been the cause of serious\ninconvenience, and the consequent waste of public property. The expense\nof hiring civil agents for this purpose has more than trebled the cost\nof supporting a suitable number of non-commissioned guards to maintain\nthe good order and efficiency of our forts, in the absence of engineer\nofficers, and to preserve and keep in repair the military implements and\nstores connected with this department of the army. It has already been\nshown that we have fifty-eight of these guards for the artillery\nservice, and it really seems somewhat singular that the engineers, with\na much greater amount of public property in their charge, are allowed no\nassistants of this kind.\n\nIII. _Engineer artificers_ are a class of men employed in the practical\noperations of constructing forts and other military defences, and in\nmaking and repairing all the implements used by the engineer troops in\nthe operations of sapping and mining, in crossing rivers, in\nconstructing field-defences, and in the attack and defence of\nfieldworks.\n\nAs very few new fortifications are now required in France, the services\nof engineer artificers are less necessary and important than in our\nservice, where large sums of money are annually expended upon military\ndefences, There are, however, in the French army a corps of engineer\nartificers, consisting of eight officers and a cadre of fifty-four\nnon-commissioned officers, with a variable number of privates, organized\ninto two companies. _But in our army we have no regular engineer\nartificers!_ In our artillery service we have three hundred and thirty\nenlisted artillery artificers. If these are useful and necessary to the\nartillery service, which no one doubts, for still stronger reasons would\nit be advantageous to the public service to employ at least an equal\nnumber of enlisted engineer artificers on our fortifications; for the\nannual expenditure of public money is here much greater than in the\ncorresponding branch of the artillery service.\n\nIV. _Engineer troops_ are divided into three classes--1st, _sappers and\npioneers_; 2d, _miners_; and 3d, _pontoniers_.\n\nIn the French army of 1799, there were four battalions of sappers,\nconsisting of 120 officers and 7,092 men. In 1804, Napoleon organized\nfive battalions of these troops, consisting of 165 officers and 8,865\nmen. Even this number was found insufficient in his campaigns in Germany\nand Spain, and he was obliged to organize an additional number of\nsappers from the Italian and French auxiliaries. The pioneers were then\npartly attached to other branches of the service. There is, at present,\nin the French army a considerable number of sappers or pioneers detached\nfor the service of the infantry regiments, three companies of\n_sapeurs-conducteurs_, and forty-two companies of _sapeurs_. In the\nFrench army of 1799, there were six companies of miners, consisting of\n24 officers and 576 men. In 1804, Napoleon increased these troops to\nnine companies, containing 36 officers and 864 men. The present French\npeace establishment contains six companies of miners, organized much the\nsame as under Napoleon. In the French army of 1799 there were two\nregiments of pontoniers, of 38 officers and 960 men. But this number was\nfound too small in the remaining campaigns, and the deficiency was\ntemporarily supplied by organizing sailors for these duties. In the\npresent French army organization, there are eleven companies of\npontoniers, forming a regiment of sixty-three officers.\n\n_We have in our service no sappers, miners, or pontoniers_, and, in case\nof war, would be found without the means of executing any military\nworks, or performing any military operation which would require engineer\ntroops.\n\nIn the preliminary stages of army organization under Louis XIV.,\ninfantry troops were detailed as sappers, and instructed in these duties\nby the engineers. This irregularity of service soon caused difficulties\nand losses, and the evils springing from it were so great, that Vauban\nurged the propriety of a separate organization. In 1670 he officially\nrecommended to the king to establish a regiment of twelve hundred\nsappers and _ouvriers_, and in a subsequent report on the value of these\ntroops, used the following language: \"They would be useful in peace as\nwell as in war, and would be the means of saving much in all\nfortifications where they should be employed. In fact, I have not the\nleast doubt that they would save annually to the king much more than\ntheir pay. I assert all I have said on this subject with as much\nconfidence as if I had seen the result; and I can, with the same\ncertainty, add, that this small troop will be the means of saving large\nnumbers of good engineers and brave officers and soldiers, from the\nstern necessity to which we are reduced of exposing, almost always, the\nlaborers and those who support them; which necessity would not arise\nhad we at command a sufficient number of this kind of workmen well\ninstructed. To such a degree have I felt the necessity of sappers, at\nevery siege at which I have been present, that I have always had reason\nto repent of not having more urgently solicited the creation of this\ncompany.\"\n\nSuch are the views of the greatest of military engineers, a man who\nfought one hundred and forty battles, conducted fifty-eight sieges, and\nbuilt or repaired three hundred fortifications. His anticipations of the\nusefulness of engineer troops were fully realized, and they have ever\nsince received the most careful attention, and now form, as has just\nbeen shown, one of the most important and efficient arms in the French\nservice. The fortifications constructed by the engineers, as organized\nby Vauban, have ever since constituted one of the principal elements of\nthe French military power.\n\nIn the wars of Napoleon there are innumerable instances in illustration\nof the delays and disasters attending the operations of armies not\nsupplied with engineer troops; and, on the other hand, the advantages\nresulting from their services when properly organized and instructed. We\nhave already pointed out the influence which the fortifications in the\nhands of the French exerted on the results of these wars, and the fatal\nconsequences to the Allies of neglecting these works of national\ndefence. Every student of military history will immediately call to mind\nthe influence of Savona, Coni, Mondovi, Ceva, Govi, Alessandria,\nTortona, Pizzighitone, Peschiera, Mantua, Palma-Nuova, Osopo,\nKlagenfurth, &c., in the campaigns of 1796-7; of Genoa, Port Bard, the\nfortifications of the Var, Ulm, Ingoldstadt, &c., in 1800; of Milan,\nTurin, Mantua, Roco d'Aufo, Genoa, Alessandria, &c., in 1805; the\nimportance of Kehl, Cassel, Wesel, &c., to the French in 1806, and the\nfatal consequences to the Prussians in that campaign, of their total\nand culpable neglect of their own fortifications.\n\nAll military historians speak of the influence of fortifications in the\nPeninsular campaigns: those which had been given up to Napoleon previous\nto the opening of hostilities, contributed very much to the success of\nhis arms, while those which were retained by Spain and her allies,\ncontributed in an equal degree to hamper and embarrass his operations.\nSome of these, like Saragossa and Tarragona, with their broken walls and\ndefective armaments, kept the enemy in check some sixty days each, and\ndid much to weaken the French power in the Peninsula.\n\nTemporary or field-fortifications also had an important influence here.\nThe lines of Torres-Vedras, the field-works of Ronda, the intrenched\ncamps of the Pyrenees, Bayonne, Toulouse, &c., are examples under this\nhead. In fact, field-works played a most important part in all of\nNapoleon's wars. We might mention the redoubt of Montenotte, the\nintrenchments at Milesimo, the batteries of Lobau, the field-defences of\nHougomont, La Haye-Sainte, and Papelotte at Waterloo, and numerous other\ncases equally striking. Just before the battle of Waterloo, Wellington\nemployed some eighteen thousand peasants and two thousand horses, under\nthe direction of British officers of engineers. In speaking of these\ndefences, Colonel Pasley says: \"It may be easily conceived that to have\ndirected such a great body of workmen to proper advantage, by means of a\nfew officers of engineers, would have been impossible, but for the\nsystem adopted of subdividing the various works among the\nnon-commissioned officers and privates of the engineer troops, each of\nwhom was made responsible for laying out the details of his own portion,\nand for the direction of a party of from twenty to one hundred men, or\neven more, according to circumstances.\"\n\nBut to return to the Peninsular war. These campaigns exhibit in strong\ncolors the advantages derived, on the one side, from a well-organized\nengineer corps, and the losses, delays, and defects suffered on the\nother, until the defects of the organization were remedied. Napoleon\nentered Spain with a well-appointed army, and soon, through strategy and\nwell-directed force, gained possession of the important fortresses of\nthe Peninsula; seizing in this way the strategic routes and important\ngeographical points, he was enabled to retain possession of the country\nfor eight years, in spite of the numerous forces arrayed against him,\nthe absence of himself and his best generals in Germany, and the great\ninefficiency of Joseph and of many of his generals. These fortifications\nwere old, and of strength inferior to modern works of defence, but it\nrequired years and the expenditure of millions in blood and treasure to\nexpel from the country those who had possession of them.\n\nFor the first five years of this war the English struggled with a most\nimperfect army organization.[37] When \"the first serious siege,\" says\nNapier, was undertaken by the British army, \"to the discredit of the\nEnglish government, no army was ever so ill provided with the means of\nprosecuting such an enterprise. The engineer officers were exceedingly\nzealous; and many of them were well versed in the theory of their\nbusiness. But the ablest trembled when reflecting on their utter\ndestitution of all that belonged to real service. Without a corps of\nsappers and miners, without a single private who knew how to carry on an\napproach under fire, they were compelled to attack fortresses defended\nby the most warlike, practised, and scientific troops of the age.\"\n\n[Footnote 37: In a letter dated February 11th, 1812, Wellington wrote\nto the Secretary of State as follows:--\"I would beg leave to suggest to\nyour lordship the expediency of adding to the engineer establishment a\ncorps of sappers and miners. It is inconceivable with what disadvantages\nwe undertake any thing like a siege for want of assistance of this\ndescription. There is no French _corps d'armee_ which has not a\nbattalion of sappers and a company of miners; but we are obliged to\ndepend for assistance of this description upon the regiments of the\nline; and although the men are brave and willing, they want the\nknowledge and training which are necessary. Many casualties among them\nconsequently occur, and much valuable time is lost at the most critical\nperiod of the siege.\"]\n\n\"The best officers and finest soldiers were obliged to sacrifice\nthemselves in a lamentable manner, to compensate for the negligence and\nincapacity of a government, always ready to plunge the nation into war,\nwithout the slightest care of what was necessary to obtain success. The\nsieges carried on by the British in Spain were a succession of\nbutcheries; because the commonest materials, and the means necessary to\ntheir art, were denied the engineers.\" Colonel J.T. Jones writes in\nnearly the same terms of the early sieges in the Peninsula, and with\nrespect to the siege of Badajos, adds in express terms, that \"a body of\nsappers and miners, and the necessary fascines and gabions, would have\nrendered the reduction of the work certain.\"[38] Soon after this siege a\nbody of engineer troops arrived from England, but their number was\ninsufficient, and Wellington, having learned by sad experience the\nimportance of engineer troops, ordered a body of two hundred volunteers\nto be detached from the line, \"and daily instructed in the practice of\nsapping, making and laying fascines and gabions, and the construction of\nbatteries, &c.\" The siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, which immediately followed\nthis organization, was conducted with greater skill and success than any\nother till nearly the close of the war; and all military writers have\nattributed this result to the greater efficiency of the engineer force\nengaged in the siege. This arm was now gradually increased, and the last\nyear of the war the engineer force with the English army in the field\nconsisted of seventy-seven officers, seven assistant-engineers and\nsurveyors, four surgeons and assistants, one thousand six hundred and\nforty-six sappers, miners, artificers, &c., one thousand three hundred\nand forty horses and one hundred and sixty carriages.\n\n[Footnote 38: Colonel Pasley states that only _one and a half yards of\nexcavation_, per man, was executed _in a whole night_, by the untrained\ntroops in the Peninsular war; whereas an instructed sapper can easily\naccomplish this _in twenty minutes_, and that it has been done by one of\nhis most skilful sappers, at Chatham, _in seven minutes!_]\n\nDuring all this time the French furnished their armies in Spain with\nwell-organized engineer forces. We have endeavored to form a comparison\nof the number of French engineers and artillerists employed on these\npeninsular sieges. But from the loose manner in which these details are\nusually given by historians, it is almost impossible to distinguish\nbetween the two. Both are not unfrequently given under the same head,\nand when a distinction is apparently kept up, only the engineer _staff_\nis mentioned under the head of engineers--the sappers, miners,\nartificers, the train, &c., all being put down as artillery. In the\nfollowing table we have endeavored to arrange them as is done in our own\narmy. The trains of both arms are left out, for frequently that of one\narm performed the duties of the other. Moreover, in our service a\nportion of these duties of engineer and artillery trains is performed by\nthe quartermaster's department. For those who wish to know the exact\norganization of the French engineer train, we give it as it existed in\n1811, viz.:--seven troops, each troop consisting of three officers, one\nhundred and forty-one non-commissioned officers and privates, two\nhundred and fifty horses, and fifty wagons, conveying five thousand two\nhundred and seventy intrenching tools, one thousand seven hundred\ncutting tools, one thousand eight hundred and two artificers' tools, two\nhundred and fifty-three miners' tools, and eight thousand three hundred\nand eighteen kilogrammes' weight of machinery and stores, each article\nbeing made to a particular pattern. The pioneers in Spain acted\nsometimes with one arm and sometimes with the other, and we have\nassigned them accordingly in the table. The pontoniers, however, in our\nservice are included with the engineers; we have therefore put them, in\nour table, in the same column with the engineers.\n\n_____________________________________________________________________\n                |   Engineer    |Artillery staff,|  Total    |  Total of\n                |staff, sappers,| horse and foot |    of     | artillery\n                |    miners,    |   artillery,   |engineers, |staff, horse\n                | pontoniers,   | ouvriers, and  | sappers,  |  and foot\n                |and pioneers.  |   pioneers.    |  miners,  |artillery,\nName of Siege.  |________________________________|pontoniers,|ouvriers,\n                |       |       |       |        |    and    |     and\n                |Offic. | Men.  |Offic. | Men.   | pioneers. | pioneers.\n _______________|_______|_______|_______|________|___________|____________\nSaragossa,      |   86  | 1189  |   90  |  1276  |    1275   |    1360\nRosas,          |   21  |  211  |   --  |   --   |     232   |     461\nGirona,         |   54  |  603  |   62  |  1299  |     657   |    1361\nAstorga,        |    7  |   91  |   17  |   427  |      98   |     444\nLerida,         |   15  |  316  |   11  |   208  |     331   |     219\nMeguinenza,     |   31  |  278  |   --  |   --   |     312   |     136\n1st Ciudad      |       |       |       |        |           |\nRodrigo,        |   34  |  441  |   --  |   --   |     475   |    1019\nAlmeida,        |   34  |  489  |   --  |   --   |     523   |    1019\nTortosa,        |   43  |  429  |   32  |   381  |     472   |     413\nTarragona,      |   50  |  681  |   46  |   701  |     731   |     747\nOlivensa,       |   10  |  106  |   --  |   --   |     116   |     186\n1st Badajos,    |   25  |  707  |   41  |   699  |     732   |     740\nTarifa,         |   12  |  235  |   17  |   148  |     247   |     165\nPeniscola,      |   13  |  138  |    9  |   183  |     151   |     192\n2d Ciudad       |       |       |       |        |           |\nRodrigo,        |    3  |   12  |    8  |   160  |      15   |     168\n2d Badajos,     |    9  |  256  |   --  |   --   |     265   |     268\nBurgos,         |    4  |  124  |    3  |   126  |     128   |     129\nCastio Udiales, |    5  |   68  |    8  |   197  |      73   |     205\nSt. Sebastian,  |   13  |  248  |    7  |   166  |     261   |     173\n________________|_______|_______|_______|________|___________|____________\n\nFrom this table it appears that the ratio of the two arms at these\nsieges, making the comparison on the basis of our own organization, is\nabout the same as for the present French army in Algeria, or a little\nmore than five of engineers to six of artillery.\n\nThus far we have spoken of the field-operations of engineer troops in\nconnection with fortifications, alluding only incidentally to the use of\nmilitary bridges and the passage of rivers. In the early wars of the\nFrench Revolution the want of pontoniers was severely felt, and from the\ndeficiency of this branch of service, the operations of the French\ngenerals were on several occasions very much restricted. The evil was\nafterwards remedied in a great degree by the introduction of several\nbattalions of ponioniers in the regular army organization. On many\noccasions, during his wars, did Napoleon feel and acknowledge the\nimportance of these troops; but on none, perhaps, was this importance\nmore clearly shown than in the passage of the Beresina during his\nretreat from Moscow with the wreck of his army. The Russians had cut the\nbridge of Borisow and taken position in great strength on the right bank\nof the river, both at this point and below; the French, wearied with\nlong and difficult marches, destitute of artillery, provisions, and\nmilitary stores, with a wide and deep river in front, and a powerful\nenemy on their flank and rear, benumbed by the rigors of a merciless\nclimate, and dispirited by defeat--every thing seemed to promise their\ntotal destruction. \"General Eble,\" says an English general officer, in\nhis remarks on this retreat, \"who, from the beginning of the campaign,\nhad made all the arrangements for the equipment and construction of\nmilitary bridges, was specially charged with the important duty of\nproviding for the passage of this river; and he discharged that duty\nwith a degree of forecast and ability to which certainly Napoleon owed\nhis escape and the wreck of his army its safety. General Eble had begun\nto prepare, at Smolensko, for the difficulties which he foresaw in this\noperation. He formed, with every care, a train sufficient for the\ntransport of all the tools and stores that might be required; and,\nfurther to provide against casualties and accidents, every man belonging\nto the companies of pontoniers was obliged to carry from Smolensko a\ntool or implement of some kind, and a proportion of nails: and fortunate\nwas it for the army that he did so; for such was the difficulty in\ngetting through the carriages containing stores, that only two\nforge-wagons and six caissons of tools and nails could be preserved. To\nthese the general added a quantity of iron-work taken from the wheels of\ncarriages that were abandoned on the march. Much was sacrificed to bring\noff these valuable materials for making clamps and fastenings, but, as\nSegur observes, that exertion '_sauva l'armee_.'\"\n\nBut it is not always in the possession of a thing that we are most\nlikely to appreciate its utility; the evils and inconveniences resulting\nfrom the want of it not unfrequently impress us most powerfully with its\nimportance and the advantages to be derived from its possession. A few\nexamples of this nature, drawn from military history, may be\ninstructive. We need not go back to the disastrous passage of the\nVistula by Charles XII., the failure of Marlborough to pass the Dyle,\nand Eugene to cross the Adda in 1705, nor of the three unsuccessful\nattempts of Charles of Lorraine to cross the Rhine in 1743. The wars\nfollowing the French Revolution are sufficiently replete with useful\ninstruction on this subject.[39]\n\n[Footnote 39: Before recurring to these, it might be useful to give one\nexample, as it is often referred to, in the campaign of 1702. It was\ndeemed important for the success of the campaign to attack the Prince of\nBaden in his camp at Friedlingen. Accordingly, a bridge was thrown\nacross the Rhine at Huningen, the passage effected, and the victory\ngained. But Villars was several times on the point of losing all for\nwant of a sufficient ponton equipage. Having but a _single_ bridge, the\npassage was necessarily slow; the artillery and stores were frequently\ninterrupted by the infantry hurrying to the field of battle; disorder\nensued, and the whole movement was retarded; Villars could bring only a\nsmall part of his artillery into action, and towards the close of the\nbattle the infantry were in want of ammunition: moreover, the whole\noperation had nearly failed from the attempt of the enemy to destroy\nthis bridge, but the skill of the French pontoniers saved it. We here\nremark, 1st, the passage secured to Villars an important victory; 2d,\nfrom having an inefficient bridge-equipage his whole army was placed in\ngreat peril, and the operation had nearly failed; 3d, if the Prince of\nBaden had possessed a skilful corps to oppose that of Villars, this\nsingle bridge would have been destroyed, and the army cut to pieces;\n4th, the skill of the little corps of French pontoniers saved the\nbridge, and of consequence, the army.]\n\nIn 1794 so great was the disorder in the direction of affairs, that the\nboats of the bridges across the Wahal and the Rhine were disposed of for\ncommercial purposes; and in the beginning of 1795, says Jomini, \"the\nconquerors of Belgium and Holland had not even a bridge equipage, at a\ntime too when the success of the campaign depended solely on the means\nof crossing a river.\" A few boats were procured from the Wahal and the\nMeuse, and others manufactured in the forests of the Moselle; but \"these\noperations consumed precious time, and _four months_ thus passed away in\npreparations.\" Even after other things were all ready, the army was\nobliged to wait thirty days for the arrival of boats for ponton bridges;\nduring this delay the Austrians strengthened their position, and with\nvery little exertion they might easily have prevented the passage.\n\nIn 1796, profiting by the errors of the former campaigns, the French\ncollected more suitable bridge equipages, and the two armies passed the\nRhine at Neuweid and Kehl without loss or delay. The latter of these\npassages has often been referred to as a model for such operations, and\ncertainly does credit to the general who directed it. But Moreau's\nbridge equipage having been destroyed during this disastrous campaign,\nhis operations the following year were considerably delayed in preparing\na new one, and even then he was under the necessity of seizing all\nprivate boats that could be found within reach; but the difficulty of\ncollecting and using boats of all sizes and descriptions was so great as\nentirely to defeat his plan of surprising the enemy on the opposite\nbank of the river. The necessity of co-operating with Hoche admitted of\nno further delay, and he was now obliged to force his passage in the\nopen day, and in face of the enemy. Undertaken under such circumstances,\n\"the enterprise was extremely sanguinary, and at one time very\ndoubtful;\" and had it failed, \"Moreau's army would have been ruined for\nthe campaign.\"\n\nNapoleon's celebrated passage of the Po, at Placentia, shows plainly how\nimportant it is for a general to possess the means of crossing rivers.\n\"I felt the importance of hastening the enterprise in order not to allow\nthe enemy time to prevent it. But the Po, which is a river as wide and\ndeep as the Rhine, is a barrier difficult to be overcome. We had no\nmeans of constructing a bridge, and were obliged to content ourselves\nwith the means of embarkation found at Placentia and its environs.\nLannes, chief of brigade, crossed in the first boats, with the advanced\nguard. The Austrians had only ten squadrons on the other side, and these\nwere easily overcome. The passage was now continued without\ninterruption, but very slowly. _If I had had a good ponton-equipage, the\nfate of the enemy's army had been sealed; but the necessity of passing\nthe river by successive embarkations saved it.\"_\n\nIn the campaign of 1799, the Archduke attempted to pass the Aar, and\nattacked the French on the opposite side, but for want of suitable\nequipage his operation was delayed till the enemy had collected\nsufficient forces to intercept the passage; he was now obliged to enter\ninto a stipulation for a suspension of hostilities, and to withdraw his\nbridges.\n\nThe operations of the French in the campaign of 1800, led to the most\nglorious results, but their execution was attended with the greatest\ndifficulties. The passage of the Alps was greatly facilitated by the\nability of the chief engineer, Marescot, and the skill of the troops\nunder his command; and the facility of passing rivers afforded Napoleon\nby his pontoniers, had an important influence upon the success of the\ncampaign. \"The army of the reserve had many companies of pontoniers and\nsappers; the pontons of course could not be taken across the St.\nBernard, but the pontoniers soon found materials on the Po and Tesin for\nconstructing bridge equipages.\" Moreau's army in the same year profited\nwell by his pontoniers, in the passages of the Inn, the Salza, the\nTraun, the Alza, &c., and in the pursuit of the Austrian army--a pursuit\nthat has but a single parallel example in modern history.\n\nThe facility with which Napoleon crossed rivers, made forced marches,\nconstructed redoubts, fortified depots, and grasped the great strategic\npoints of the enemy in the campaign of 1805, resulted from the skilful\norganization of his army, and the efficiency given to the forces\nemployed in these important operations. The engineer staff of the French\narmy at this period, consisted of four hundred and forty-nine officers,\nand there were four battalions of sappers, of one hundred and twenty\nofficers and seven thousand and ninety-two men; six companies of miners,\nof twenty-four officers and five hundred and seventy-six men; and two\nregiments of pontoniers, of thirty-eight officers and nine hundred and\nsixty men. On the contrary, the enemy's neglect of these things is one\nof the most striking of the many faults of the war, and his ill-directed\nefforts to destroy the great wooden bridge across the Danube, and the\nsuccessful operations of the French sappers in securing it, formed one\nof the principal turning points in the campaign.\n\nThe same organization enabled the French to perform their wonderfully\nrapid and decisive movements in the Prussian campaign of 1806, and the\nnorthern operations of 1807.\n\nIn 1809, Napoleon's army crossed, with the most wonderful rapidity, the\nInn, the Salza, the Traun, and other rivers emptying into the Danube,\nand reached Vienna before the wonder-stricken Austrians could prepare\nfor its defence. It was then necessary for the French to effect a\npassage of the Danube, which was much swollen by recent rains and the\nmelting snow of the mountains. Considering the depth and width of the\nriver, the positions of the enemy, and his preparations to oppose a\npassage, with the disastrous consequences that would result to the\nFrench from any failure in its execution; taking all these things into\nconsideration, Jomini pronounced it \"one of the most hazardous and\ndifficult of all the operations of War.\" Here the fate of the army\ndepended, apparently, upon the skill and efficiency of the engineers and\npontoniers, and nobly did they discharge the trust reposed in them. When\nthe pontons failed, tressel-bridges were substituted, and even\nfifty-four enormous boats were put in requisition. So skilfully were\nthese operations conducted, that Napoleon's immense army crossed over in\nsafety, directly in the face of a superior enemy, and the same day\nfought the memorable battle of Esling. Forced to retire before numbers\nvastly superior to his own, Napoleon concentrated his forces on the\nisland of Lobau, and intrenched his position. Surrounded by the broad\nand deep channel of the Danube, and watched by numerous and skilful\nenemies, it required the most constant activity and the greatest good\nfortune to effect a passage. Here the skill and efficiency of the\nengineers shone conspicuously; a number of bridges were thrown across\nthe river in the face of the Austrians, and against obstacles almost\ninsurmountable; the whole French army passed in safety, and soon put the\nfinishing stroke to that brilliant campaign. So high an estimate did\nNapoleon attach to the construction of these bridges, that, when the\npassage was completed, he offered to place Bertrand, the constructing\nengineer, though of comparatively low rank, at the head of the French\n_corps du genie_.\n\nOn many occasions during the retreat in 1812-13, from the Beresina to\nthe left of the Rhine, across the Niemen, the Vistula, the Oder, the\nElbe, and the numerous other rivers which divide that immense country,\nthe French derived vast advantages from the experience and skill of\ntheir engineers and pontoniers, several times whole corps escaping\nthrough their means from the grasp of their pursuers. When, however, the\ndisasters of this retreat had absorbed most of the material of the army,\nand had sadly thinned the ranks of men of skill and experience, they\nsustained many severe, and, in other circumstances, unnecessary losses.\nOf this character we may mention the passage of the Elster by the bridge\nof Lindnau, where, through the ignorance and carelessness of those\ncharged with the mines, and through the want of suitable bridge\narrangements, thousands of brave men were buried in the muddy waters of\nthis small river. So sensibly did Napoleon feel this want of bridge\nequipages, in the winter of 1813-14, that he addressed to his minister\nof war, on this subject, the following remarkable words: \"If I had had\npontons, I should have already annihilated the army of Schwartzenberg,\nand closed the war; I should have taken from him eight or ten thousand\nwagons, and his entire army in detail; but for want of the proper means\nI could not pass the Seine.\" Again, on the 2d of March he wrote: \"If I\nhad had a bridge equipage this morning, Bluecher's army had been lost.\"\nWhoever will examine the details of the operations of this campaign,\nwill be convinced of the full force of these remarks.\n\nIn Spain in 1808, Sir John Moore, in order to assist the native forces,\nhad penetrated so near the army of Napoleon, that retreat became\nexceedingly difficult, and he was several times on the point of being\nlost. The English army was at this time very deficient in engineer\ntroops, and Moore suffered much for want of miners to destroy bridges,\nand pontoniers to construct new ones. In order to cover his retreat and\nimpede the advance of the French, the commander-in-chief, says Napier,\n\"directed several bridges to be destroyed, but the engineers [for want\nof miners and miner's tools] failed of success in every attempt.\"\n\nIn Soult's retreat, in 1809, he crossed the Duero at Oporto, and\ndestroyed the bridges so as to cut off the pursuit of Wellington. But\nwhile Soult, deceived by treachery in his own corps, neglected to guard\nthe river with proper vigilance, Wellington collected boats at different\npoints, crossed over his army, surprised the French, and, had it not\nbeen for the singular delay and indecision of General Murray, would most\ncertainly have forced the entire army to capitulate; as it was, his\noperation produced a decided influence on the campaign, and effected the\nsafety of Beresford's corps. Soult destroyed his artillery and baggage,\nand hastily retreated through the mountain passes; but his army was\nagain arrested at the river Cavado, and placed on the very brink of\ndestruction, when the brave and skilful Dulong succeeded in effecting a\npassage at the Ponte Nova; the same daring officer opened, on the same\nday, a way for the further escape of the French across the Misarella by\nthe Saltador.\n\nIn the pursuit of Massena, in 1810, it was important to the English to\ncross the Guadiana, and attack the French before Badajos could be put in\na state of defence. Beresford was directed by Wellington to pass this\nriver at Jerumina, where the Portuguese had promised to furnish pontons;\nbut they neglected to fulfil their engagement, and the army had to wait\ntill Capt. Squire, an able and efficient officer of engineers, could\nconstruct other means for effecting a passage. Every thing was done\nthat genius could devise and industry execute; nevertheless, the\noperations of the army were greatly delayed--\"_a delay,_\" says the\nhistorian, \"_that may be considered as the principal cause of those long\nand bloody operations which afterwards detained Lord Wellington more\nthan a year on the frontiers of Portugal._\"\n\nWe might prolong these remarks by discussing the passages of the Ceira\nand Alva, and their influence on the pursuit of Massena; Wellington's\npassage of the Tagus, and his retreat from Burgos in 1812; the passage\nof the Adour and Garonne in 1814; and the failure of the mines to blow\nup the bridges of Saltador, Alcantara, &c.; but a sufficient number of\nexamples, it is believed, has already been adduced to show the advantage\nof maintaining a properly organized and instructed body of sappers,\nminers, and pontoniers, and the fatal results attending the want of such\ntroops, as a component part of an army organization.\n\nIt has already been remarked that the infantry of an army must always\nform the basis of the apportionment; and by the general rule laid down\nby military writers, the cavalry should be from one-fourth to one-sixth\nof the infantry, according to the character of the war; the artillery\nabout two-thirds of the cavalry, or one-seventh of the infantry; and the\nengineers from one-half to three-fourths of the artillery,--say about\ntwo-thirds. The staff and administrative corps must vary according to\nthe nature of the organization, and the character of the theatre of war.\nThe former ought to be from two to five in a thousand, and the latter\nfrom twenty-five to seventy-five,[40] as a general rule. These ratios\nwould give for a good army organization;\n\n   Staff, about  ................................... 5\n   Administrative service--pay, medical, commissary,\n   quarter-master, &c. .............................65\n   Infantry, ......................................650\n   Cavalry, .......................................130\n   Artillery, ......................................90\n   Engineers, ......................................60\n                                                 -----\n                       Total, ...................1,000\n\nIn a broken country, and against savage and undisciplined foes, like the\nIndians in this country, the natives opposed to the English in India, to\nthe French in Algeria, or to the Russians in Circassia, the cavalry,\nartillery, and engineers would be diminished, and the infantry and\nadministrative corps proportionably increased; the former because light\ntroops are always preferable against an undisciplined foe, and the\nlatter because of the difficulty of moving and procuring supplies in new\nand uncultivated countries. The French forces in Algeria, in 1844,\namounted to about sixty thousand men, in the following proportion:--\n\n   Staff, ...................................4.7\n   Administrative, &c., ...................112.3\n   Infantry, ..............................687.3\n   Cavalry, ................................86.6\n   Artillery, ..............................61.2\n   Engineers, ..............................47.9\n                                           ---------\n                                            1000 men.\n\n[Footnote 40: This supposes the teamsters, wagon-masters,\nhospital-servants, &c., to be enlisted men, and not persons hired for\nthe occasion as is done in our army.]\n\nIn small peace establishments the relative proportion of infantry and\ncavalry should be much less than when prepared for the field, because\ntroops for these two arms can be much more readily formed in case of\nemergency, than for those which require more scientific information, and\ntechnical skill and instruction. The staff and engineers are evidently\nthe most difficult to be formed in case of war, and next to these the\nartillery and administrative corps.\n\nIn this country we can maintain, in time of peace, only the framework of\nan army, looking to our citizen soldiery to form, in case of need, the\ngreat mass of our military force. This is the starting point in our\nmilitary system, and the basis of our army organization. Let us see\nwhether this principle is carried out in practice.\n\nFor every thousand men in our present organization[41] we have,\n\n\n   For the staff,        2\n   Administrative,      20[42]\n   Infantry,           513\n   Cavalry,            150\n   Artillery,          310\n   Engineers,            5\n                      ----\n                      1000\n\n[Footnote 41: These numbers are the real rather than the _nominal_\nproportions, many of our officers being called _staff_, who properly\nbelong to one of the other classes.]\n\n[Footnote 42: Much of the administrative duty in our army is done by\nunenlisted men, or by soldiers detached from their companies. Where such\nis the case, the ratio of this branch of the service ought to be no\nhigher than is represented above.]\n\nWe see from this table, that while our artillery is nearly six times as\nnumerous as in ordinary armies, our staff is less by one-half, and our\nengineers not more than one-half what ought to be their proportion in a\nwar establishment. To this excess of artillery over infantry and cavalry\nin our army in time of peace there is no objection, inasmuch as the\nlatter could be more easily expanded in case of war than the artillery.\nBut for a still stronger reason our staff and engineers should also be\nproportionally increased, instead of being vastly diminished, as is\nactually the case.\n\nExperience in the first campaigns of the American Revolution strongly\nimpressed on the mind of Washington the absolute necessity of forming a\nregular and systematic army organization. But so difficult was it to\nobtain properly instructed engineers, that he was obliged to seek his\nengineer officers in the ranks of foreign adventurers, and to make\ndrafts from the other arms of service, and have them regularly\ninstructed in the duties of engineer troops, and commanded by the\nofficers of this corps. An order, in his own handwriting, giving the\ndetails of this temporary arrangement, is dated March 30th, 1779. Until\nmen are enlisted for the purpose, companies of sappers and miners shall\nbe formed by drafts from the line. \"The duties of the companies of\nsappers and miners,\" he continues, \"shall be under the direction of the\nengineers, to construct field-works of every kind, and all works\nnecessary for the attack or defence of places, as circumstances may\nrequire. On a march in the vicinity of an enemy, a detachment of the\ncompanies of sappers and miners shall be stationed at the head of the\ncolumn, directly after the vanguard, for the purpose of opening and\nmending the roads, and removing obstructions,\" &c. &c.\n\nThe great difficulties encountered by Washington in instructing his\ninexperienced forces in the more difficult branches of the art, made him\nthe more earnest, in after years, to impress on us how important it was\nfor us _In peace to prepare for war._ The preparation here meant is not\nthe keeping up, in time of peace, of a large standing army, ever ready\nto take the field; but rather the formation of a small body, educated\nand practised in all the scientific and difficult parts of the\nprofession; a body which shall serve as the _cadre_ or framework of a\nlarge army, capable of imparting to the new and inexperienced soldiers\nof the republic that skill and efficiency which has been acquired by\npractice. How far have we accomplished this object, and what will be the\nprobable operations in case of another contest with a European power?\nNew and inexperienced troops will be called into the field to oppose a\nveteran and disciplined army. From these troops we shall expect all the\nbravery and energy resulting from ardent patriotism and an enthusiastic\nlove of liberty. But we cannot here expect much discipline, military\nskill, or knowledge of the several branches of the military art. The\npeaceful habits of our citizens tend but little to the cultivation of\nthe military character. How, then, are we to oppose the hostile force?\nMust human blood be substituted for skill and preparation, and dead\nbodies of our citizens serve as epaulements against the inroads of the\nenemy? To some extent, we fear it must be the case; but not entirely so,\nfor government has not altogether neglected to make preparation for such\nan event. Fortifications have been planned or erected on the most\nimportant and exposed positions; military materials and munitions have\nbeen collected in the public arsenals; a military school has been\norganized to instruct in the military sciences; there are regularly kept\nup small bodies of infantry and cavalry, weak in numbers, but capable of\nsoon making good soldiers of a population so well versed as ours is in\nthe use of the musket and the horse; an artillery force, proportionally\nmuch larger, is also regularly maintained, with a sufficient number of\nmen and officers to organize and make good artillery-men of citizens\nalready partially acquainted with the use of the cannon. But an\nacquaintance with infantry, cavalry, and artillery duties is not the\nonly practical knowledge requisite in war. In the practical operations\nof an army in the field, rivers are to be crossed, bridges suddenly\nerected and suddenly destroyed, fieldworks constructed and defended,\nbatteries captured and destroyed; fortifications are to be put in order\nand defended, or to be besieged and recaptured; trenches must be opened,\nmines sprung, batteries established, breaches made and stormed;\ntrous-de-loup, abattis, palisades, gabions, fascines, and numerous other\nmilitary implements and machinery are to be constructed. Have our\ncitizens a knowledge of these things, or have we provided in our\nmilitary establishment for a body of men instructed and practised in\nthis branch of the military art, and capable of imparting to an army the\nnecessary efficiency for this service? Unfortunately this question must\nbe answered in the negative; and it is greatly to be feared that the\nfuture historian will have to say of us, as Napier has said of the\nEnglish:--\"_The best officers and soldiers were obliged to sacrifice\nthemselves in a lamentable manner, to compensate for the negligence and\nincapacity of a government always ready to plunge the nation into a war,\nwithout the slightest care of what was necessary to obtain success.\nTheir sieges were a succession of butcheries; because the commonest\nmaterials, and the means necessary to their art, were denied the\nengineers_.\"[43]\n\n[Footnote 43: The subjects discussed in this chapter are also treated by\nmost authors on Military Organization and Military History, and by the\nseveral writers on Military Engineering. Allent, Vauban, Cormontaigne,\nRocquancourt, Pasley, Douglas, Jones, Belmas, Napier, Gay de Vernon, may\nbe referred to with advantage. Pasley, Douglas, Jones, and Napier, speak\nin the strongest terms of the importance of engineer troops in the\nactive operations of a war, and of the absolute necessity of organizing\nthis force in time of peace. A list of books of reference on Military\nEngineering will be given at the close of the following chapters.\n\nWhile these pages are passing through the press, Congress has authorized\nthe President to raise _one company_ of engineer troops! This number is\naltogether too small to be of any use in time of war.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII.\n\nPERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS.\n\n\n_Fortification_ is defined,--the art of disposing the ground in such a\nmanner as to enable a small number of troops to resist a larger army the\nlongest time possible. If the work be placed in a position of much\nimportance, and its materials be of a durable character, it is called\npermanent; if otherwise, it receives the appellation of _field_, or\n_temporary_. Fieldworks are properly confined to operations of a single\ncampaign, and are used to strengthen positions which are to be occupied\nonly for a short period. Generally these works are of earth, thrown up\nby the troops in a single day. They are intimately connected with a\nsystem of permanent fortifications, but from the facility of their\nconstruction, no provision need be made for them before the actual\nbreaking out of war. Indeed, they could not well be built before\nhostilities commenced, as their locality in each case must be determined\nby the position of the hostile forces.\n\nHaving already described the general influence of permanent\nfortifications as a means of national defence, we shall here speak\nmerely of the principles of their construction. It is not proposed to\nenter into any technical discussion of matters that especially belong\nto the instruction of the engineer, but merely to give the nomenclature\nand use of the more important parts of a military work; in a word, such\ngeneral information as should belong to officers of every grade and\ncorps of an army.\n\nThe first species of fortification among the ancients was of course very\nsimple, consisting merely of an earthen mound, or palisades. A wall was\nafterwards used, and a ditch was then added to the wall. It was found\nthat a straight wall could be easily breached by the enemy's\nbattering-rams; to remedy this evil, towers were built at short\nintervals from each other, forming a broken line of salient and\nre-entering parts. These towers or salient points gradually assumed a\nshape approximating to the modern bastion.\n\nAfter the invention of gunpowder and the application of cannon to the\nattack and defence of places, it became necessary to arrange earthen\nramparts behind the thin walls of the ancient works, for the reception\nof the new artillery. Moreover these walls were soon found inadequate to\nresist the missiles of the besiegers, and it became necessary to replace\nthem by parapets of earth. In order to cover the retaining walls of\nthese parapets from the besieging batteries, it was also found to be\nnecessary to lower these walls as much as possible, and to raise the\ncounterscarps. The traces or plans of the works, however, received no\nmaterial change till about the close of the fifteenth century.\n\nIt is not known who first changed the ancient towers into bastions. Some\nattribute it to an Italian, and with considerable show of reason, for a\nbastion was built at Turin as early as 1461. Achmet Pacha, it is said,\nfortified Otranto in this way, in 1480, but whether the system was\npreviously known among the Turks cannot be determined. Others attribute\nthe invention to Ziska, the celebrated leader of the Hussites. It is\nmost probable that the transition from the tower to the bastion was a\nvery gradual one, and that the change was perfected in several countries\nat about the same time.\n\nFortifications, like other arts and sciences, greatly flourished in\nItaly under the Medicis, and that country furnished Europe with its most\nskilful engineers. Catharine of Medicis introduced into France many of\nher countrymen, distinguished in this profession; among these may be\nnamed Bellamat, Bephano, Costritio, Relogio, Vorganno, the two Marini,\nCampi, and Hieronimo, who built several important places and directed\nthe sieges of others. These able foreigners were rivalled by some\ndistinguished French engineers, who laid the foundation of the \"_corps\ndu Genie_\" which has since become a school of military instruction for\nthe world. Among the early French engineers may be distinguished\nLafontaine De Serre, Feuquieres, and St. Remy. Pedro Navarro had been\nappointed a member of this corps, but his attention was more specially\ndirected to mining, and we do not learn that he distinguished himself in\nthe construction of any fortification.\n\nIn Germany, in the beginning of the sixteenth century, Albert Durer\ndistinguished himself as a writer on fortification; his book is\nremarkable as containing the germs of many of the improvements which\nwere made by those who followed him. This is the more to be wondered at\nas he was not a professed engineer. After him followed Spekel, a native\nof Strasburg, who died in 1589. His writings are valuable as showing the\nstate of the art at that time, and the changes which he himself\nintroduced. He was an engineer of much practical knowledge and\nexperience, having assisted at the sieges of Malta, Golletta, Vienna,\nJula, Nicosia, Famagusta, &c.\n\nThe first French engineer who wrote on fortification was Errard de\nBar-le-Duc, who published near the close of the sixteenth century. As an\nengineer, he was rivalled by Chatillon, a man of distinguished merit.\nErrard fortified Amiens, built a part of the castle of Sedan, and a\nportion of the defences of Calais. Under the reign of Louis XIII.,\nDesnoyers, Deville, Pagan, and Fabre were greatly distinguished. Deville\npublished in 1628. He was a man of much learning and experience; but he\nis said to have adopted, both in his theory and practice, the principles\nof the Italian school, with most of its errors. Pagan began his military\ncareer while young, and became _marechal de champ_ at the age of 38,\nwhen, having the misfortune to become blind, he was compelled to\nrelinquish his brilliant hopes. He was the ablest engineer of his age,\nand was also greatly distinguished in other branches of science. In his\nplans he inclined to the Dutch rather than the Italian school of\nfortification. He published in 1645.\n\nAt the close of the sixteenth century, the Dutch had been forced to\nresort to military defences to protect themselves against the\naggressions of the Spaniards. As the Dutch were inferior in other\nmilitary means, fortification became one of the vital resources of the\ncountry. Their works, however, thrown up in much haste, were in many\nrespects defective, although well adapted to the exigencies of the time.\nFreytag, their principal engineer, wrote in 1630. Some of his\nimprovements were introduced into France by Pagan. He was preceded by\nMarolois, (a cotemporary of Pagan,) who published in 1613.\n\nIn Germany, Rimpler, a Saxon, wrote on fortification in 1671. He was a\nman of great experience, having served at the sieges of Candia,\nPhillipsburg, Bonn, Riga, Bremen, Dansburg, Bommeln, &c. He fell at the\nsiege of Vienna in 1683. His writings are said to contain the groundwork\nof Montalembert's system.\n\nIn Italy, after the time of Tartaglia, Marchi, Campi, &c., we find no\ngreat improvement in this art. Several Italians, however, distinguished\nthemselves as engineers under the Spaniards. The fortifications of\nBadajos are a good example of the state of the art in Italy and Spain a\nthat epoch. The citadel of Antwerp, built by two Italian engineers,\nPacciotti and Cerbelloni, in 1568, has become celebrated for the siege\nit sustained in 1832.\n\nThe age of Louis XIV. effected a great revolution in the art of\nfortification, and carried it to such a degree of perfection, that it\nhas since received but slight improvement. The years 1633 and 1634 are\ninteresting dates in the history of this art, as having given birth\nrespectively to Vauban and Coehorn. The former was chief engineer of\nFrance under Louis XIV., and the latter held a corresponding position\nunder the Dutch republic. Coehorn's ideas upon fortification are\nconceived with an especial view to the marshy soil of his own country,\nand, although well suited to the object in view, are consequently of\nless general application than those of his more distinguished\ncotemporary and rival. The best specimens of his mode of construction\nthat exist at the present day, are the fortresses of Manheim,\nBergen-op-Zoom, Nimiguen, and Breda.\n\nCoehorn was followed in Holland by Landsberg, an able and practical\nengineer, who to much reading added extensive experience, having himself\nserved at sixteen sieges. His system was in many respects peculiar, both\nin trace and relief; it dispensed with the glacis, and all revertments\nof masonry. His plans could be applied only to marshy soils. The first\nedition of his work was published in 1685.\n\nBut the career of Vauban forms the most marked and prominent era in the\nhistory of fortification; it constitutes the connecting link between the\nrude sketches of the earlier engineers, and the well-established form\nwhich the art has since assumed. In his earlier works we find many of\nthe errors of his predecessors; but a gradual change seems to have been\nwrought in his mind by reflection and experience, and these faults were\nsoon remedied and a new and distinct system developed. Vauban has left\nno treatise upon his favorite art, and his ideas upon fortification have\nbeen deduced from his constructions, and from detached memoirs left\namong his papers. The nature of his labors, and the extent of his\nactivity and industry, may be imagined from the fact that he fought one\nhundred and forty battles, conducted fifty-eight sieges, and built or\nrepaired three hundred fortifications. His memoirs, found among his\nmanuscript papers, on various military and political subjects, are\nnumerous, and highly praised even at the present day. But his beautiful\nand numerous constructions, both of a civil and military character, are\nreal monuments to his genius. The best illustrations of his principles\nof fortification occur at Lille, Strasbourg, Landau, Givet, and\nNeuf-Brisack. His writings on mines, and the attack and defence of\nplaces, are, by the profession, regarded as classic. His improvements in\nthe existing method of attack gave great superiority to the arms of his\ncountrymen, and even enabled him to besiege and capture his rival\nCoehorn, in his own works. He died in 1707, and was soon succeeded by\nCormontaigne.\n\nThe latter did not attempt the introduction of any new system, but\nlimited himself to improving and perfecting the plans of his illustrious\npredecessors. His improvements, however, were both extensive and\njudicious, and are sufficient to entitle him to the place he holds as\none of the ablest military engineers the world has ever produced. His\nworks on the subject of fortification, besides being elegantly written,\ncontain the most valuable information of any works we have. His most\nadmired constructions are to be found at Metz, Thionville, and Bitche.\nThe beautiful crown works of Billecroix, at Metz, are perfect models of\ntheir kind. Cormontaigne died in 1750.\n\nCotemporary with him were Sturin and Glasser. The former deviated but\nslightly from the systems of his predecessors, but the latter invented\nseveral ingenious improvements which gave him great reputation.\n\nNext follows Rosard, a Bavarian engineer; and Frederick Augustus, king\nof Poland, who devoted himself particularly to this art. The former\ncasemated only the flanks of his works, but the latter introduced\ncasemate fire more extensively than any one who had preceded him.\n\nIn France, Belidor and De Filey published about the middle of the last\ncentury. They were both able engineers but their systems were inferior\nto that of Cormontaigne.\n\nIn 1767 De la Chiche introduced a system of fortification in many\nrespects original. He raised his covered-ways so as to conceal all his\nmasonry, and casemated a great portion of his _enceinte_. For exterior\ndefence, he employed direct fire from his barbettes, and curvated fire\nfrom his casemates; the direct fire of the latter secured his ditches.\n\nNext to De la Chiche follows Montalembert, who published in 1776. He was\na man of much experience and considerable originality, but of no great\nability as an engineer. Most of his ideas were derived from De la Chiche\nand the German school of Rimpler. His plans have generally been rejected\nby his own countrymen, but they still have advocates among the Germans.\n\nGeneral Virgin, a distinguished Swedish engineer, wrote in 1781. His\nidea of strongly fortifying the smaller towns to the comparative neglect\nof the larger cities, constitutes one of the principal novelties in his\nsystem.\n\nIn 1794, Reveroni devised a system in which the casemates of\nMontalembert were employed, but his guns were so arranged as to be\nemployed in barbette while the besiegers were at a distance, and\nafterwards to be used for casemated fire. The casemate gun-carriage,\nwhich formed a part of his invention, was ingenious, but never much\nemployed in practice.\n\nBousmard, a French emigrant, published in 1790. He adopted the general\ntrace of Vauban, but introduced modifications in the details essentially\ndifferent from those of Cormontaigne. Some of these modifications are\nvery valuable improvements, while others are of a more doubtful\ncharacter. Bousmard is, on the whole, a very able writer, and his works\nshould be found in the library of every military engineer.\n\nCarnot's celebrated treatise was published in 1810. He was evidently a\nman of genius, and during his career at the head of the War Department\nof France, numerous and very important improvements were made in the\nseveral branches of the military art, and especially in strategy. His\nwork on fortification exhibits much originality and genius, but it is\ndoubtful whether it has very much contributed to the improvement of this\nart. His ideas have been very severely, and rather unfairly criticised\nby the English, and particularly by Sir Howard Douglas.\n\nChasseloup de Laubat early distinguished himself as an engineer of much\ncapacity and talent. He followed Napoleon in nearly all his campaigns,\nand conducted many of his sieges. He remodelled the fortifications of\nNorthern Italy and of the Lower Rhine. He published in 1811. The\nimprovements which he introduced are numerous and valuable, and he\nprobably contributed more to advance his art, and to restore the\nequilibrium between attack and defence, than any other engineer since\nCormontaigne. After the fall of Napoleon and the partition of his\nempire, the allies mutilated or destroyed the constructions of\nChasseloup, so that, it is believed, no perfect specimen of his system\nremains.\n\nThe cotemporaries of Chasseloup were mostly engaged in active field\nservice and sieges, and few had either leisure or opportunity to devote\nthemselves to improvements in permanent fortification.\n\nChoumara published in 1827. His system contains much originality, and\nhis writings give proof of talent and genius. He has very evidently more\noriginality than judgment, and it is hardly probable that his system\nwill ever be generally adopted in practice.\n\nThe Metz system, as arranged by Noizet, as a theoretical study, is\nundoubtedly the very best that is now known. It, however, requires great\nmodifications to suit it to different localities. For a horizontal site,\nit is probably the most perfect system ever devised. It is based on the\nsystem of Vauban as improved by Cormontaigne, and contains several of\nthe modifications suggested by modern engineers. It is applied in a\nmodified form to the new fortifications of Paris.\n\nBaron Rohault de Fleury has introduced many modifications of the\nordinary French system in his new defences of Lyons. We have seen no\nwritten account of these works, but from a hasty examination in 1844,\nthey struck us as being too complicated and expensive.\n\nThe new fortifications of Western Germany are modifications of Rempler's\nsystem, as improved by De la Chiche and Montalembert. It is said that\nGeneral Aster, the directing engineer, has also introduced some of the\nleading principles of Chasseloup and Carnot.\n\nThe English engineers have satisfied themselves with following in the\ntrack of their continental neighbors, and can offer no claims to\noriginality.\n\nOf the system of fortification now followed in our service we must\ndecline expressing any opinion; the time has not yet arrived for\nsubjecting it to a severe and judicious criticism. But of the system\npursued previous to 1820, we may say, without much fear of\ncontradiction, that a worse one could scarcely have been devised.\nInstead of men of talent and attainments in military science, most of\nour engineers were then either foreigners, or civilians who owed their\ncommissions to mere political influence. The qualifications of the\nformer were probably limited to their recollection of some casual visit\nto two or three of the old European fortresses; and the latter probably\nderived all their military science from some old military book, which,\nhaving become useless in Europe, had found its way into this country,\nand which they had read without understanding, and probably without even\nlooking at its date. The result was what might have been anticipated--a\ntotal waste of the public money. We might illustrate this by numerous\nexamples. A single one, however, must suffice. About the period of the\nlast war, eight new forts were constructed for the defence of New York\nharbor, at an expense of some two millions of dollars. Six of these were\n_circular_, and the other two were _star forts_--systems which had been\ndiscarded in Europe for nearly two thousand years! Three of these works\nare now entirely abandoned, two others are useless, and large sums of\nmoney have recently been expended on the other three in an attempt to\nremedy their faults, and render them susceptible of a good defence.\nMoreover, a number of the works which were constructed by our engineers\nbefore that corps was made to feel the influence of the scientific\neducation introduced through the medium of the Military Academy--we say,\na considerable number of our fortifications, constructed by engineers\nwho owed their appointment to political influence, are not only wrong\nin their plans, but have been made of such wretched materials and\nworkmanship that they are already crumbling into ruins.\n\nA fortification, in its most simple form, consists of a mound of earth,\ntermed, the _rampart_, which encloses the space fortified; a _parapet_,\nsurmounting the rampart and covering the men and guns from the enemy's\nprojectiles; a _scarp wall,_ which sustains the pressure of the earth of\nthe rampart and parapet, and presents an insurmountable obstacle to an\nassault by storm; a wide and deep _ditch_, which prevents the enemy from\napproaching near the body of the place; a _counterscarp wall_, which\nsustains the earth on the exterior of the ditch; a _covered way_, which\noccupies the space between the counterscarp and a mound of earth called\na _glacis_, thrown up a few yards in front of the ditch for the purpose\nof covering the scarp of the main work.\n\nThe work by which the space fortified is immediately enveloped, is\ncalled the _enceinte_, or _body of the place_. Other works are usually\nadded to the enceinte to strengthen the weak points of the\nfortification, or to lengthen the siege by forcing the enemy to gain\npossession of them before he can breach the body of the place: these are\ntermed _outworks_, when enveloped by the covered way, and _advanced\nworks_, when placed exterior to the covered way, but in some way\nconnected with the main work; but if entirely beyond the glacis, and not\nwithin supporting distance of the fortress, they are called _detached\nworks_.\n\nIn a bastioned front the principal outwork is the _demi-lune_, which is\nplaced in front of the curtain; it serves to cover the main entrance to\nthe work, and to place the adjacent bastions in strong re-enterings.\n\nThe _tenaille_ is a small low work placed in the ditch, to cover the\nscarp wall of the curtain and flanks from the fire of the besieger's\nbatteries erected along the crest of the glacis.\n\nThe _places of arms_, are points where troops are assembled in order to\nact on the exterior of the work. The _re-entering places of arms_, are\nsmall redans arranged at the points of junction of the covered ways of\nthe bastion and demi-lune. The _salient places of arms_ are the parts of\nthe covered way in front of the salients of the bastion and demi-lune.\n\nSmall permanent works, termed _redoubts_, are placed within the\ndemi-lune and re-entering places of arms for strengthening those works.\nWorks of this character constructed within the bastion are termed\n_interior retrenchments;_ when sufficiently elevated to command the\nexterior ground, they are called _cavaliers._\n\n_Caponniers_ are works constructed to cover the passage of the ditch\nfrom the tenaille to the gorge of the demi-lune, and also from the\ndemi-lune to the covered way, by which communication may be maintained\nbetween the enceinte and outworks.\n\n_Posterns_ are underground communications made through the body of the\nplace or some of the outworks.\n\n_Sortie-passages_ are narrow openings made through the crest of the\nglacis, which usually rise in the form of a ramp from the covered way,\nby means of which communication may be kept up with the exterior. These\npassages are so arranged that they cannot be swept by the fire of the\nenemy. The other communications above ground are called _ramps, stairs,_\n&c.\n\n_Traverses_ are small works erected on the covered way to intercept the\nfire of the besieger's batteries.\n\n_Scarp_ and _counterscarp_ galleries are sometimes constructed for the\ndefence of the ditch. They are arranged with loop-holes, through which\nthe troops of the garrison fire on the besiegers when they have entered\nthe ditch, without being themselves exposed to the batteries of the\nenemy.\n\nIn sea-coast defences, and sometimes in a land front for the defence of\nthe ditch, embrasures are made in the scarp wall for the fire of\nartillery; the whole being protected from shells by a bomb-proof\ncovering over head: this arrangement is termed a _casemate_.\n\nSometimes double ramparts and parapets are formed, so that the interior\none shall fire over the more advanced; the latter in this case is called\n_a faussebraie_.\n\nIf the inner work be separated from the other it is called a\n_retrenchment_[44] and if in addition it has a commanding fire, it is\ntermed, as was just remarked, a _cavalier_.\n\n[Footnote 44: The term _retrenchment_ implies an interior work, which is\nconstructed within or in rear of another, for the purpose of\nstrengthening it; the term _intrenchment_, on the contrary, implies an\nindependent work, constructed in the open field, without reference to\nany other adjoining work.]\n\nThe _capital_ of a bastion is a line bisecting its salient angle. All\nthe works comprehended between the capitals of two adjacent bastions is\ntermed a _front_: it is taken as the unit in permanent fortification.\n\nFig. 39 represents the ground plan of a modern bastioned front, of a\nregular and simple form, on a horizontal site.\n\n   _A, A, A_--Is the enceinte, or body\n             of the place.\n   _B_--The bastions.\n   _C_--The main ditch.\n   _D_--The covered ways.\n   _E_--The re-entering places of arms.\n   _F_--The salient places of arms.\n   _G_--The demi-lune.\n   _H_--The demi-lune ditch.\n   _J_--The demi-lune redoubt.\n   _L_--The ditch of the demi-lune\n             redoubt.\n   _M_--The redoubt of the re-entering\n             places of arms.\n   _N_--The ditches of the redoubts.\n   _O_--The tenaille.\n   _P_--The double caponier.\n   _a_--The traverses.\n   _b_--The sortie-passages.\n   _c_--Stairs.\n   _d_--Cut in the demi-lune to flank\n              the redoubt of the re-entering\n              place of arms.\n\nFig. 40 represents a section through the line _mn'_ of the preceding\nfigure.\n\n\n   _A_--Is the rampart.\n   _B_--The parapet.\n   _C_--The ditch.\n   _D_--The scarp wall.\n   _E_--The counterscarp wall.\n   _F_--The glacis.\n   _G_--The covered way.\n   _H_--The terre-plain.\n   _J_--The parade.\n\nSometimes half embrasures are cut in the earthen parapet of a fort, so\nas to sink the gun below the crest, and thus more effectually cover the\nmen from the enemy's fire.\n\nBut guns in embrasure have a far less extended field of fire than when\nmounted in barbette; moreover, the embrasures present openings through\nwhich an enemy may penetrate in an assault. Owing to these objections,\nthey are employed only for the protection of particular points; that is,\nwhere it is important to cover the artillerists from the enemy's fire,\nor where the guns are to be used merely to protect a ditch, or to\nenfilade a road, &c. The bottom of the embrasure is called the _sole_,\nthe sides are called _cheeks_, and the mass of earth between two\nembrasures, the _merlon_. Embrasures may be made either direct or\noblique, according as the fire is required to be perpendicular or\noblique to the parapet.\n\nA _coverport_ is a small outwork of any convenient form, erected\nimmediately in front of a gateway, to screen it from the enemy's fire.\n\nA _counterguard_ is a more extensive work, constructed in front of a\npart of the fortress itself, or of some other outwork of greater\nimportance, which it is intended to cover. These are sometimes called\n_coverfaces_, from their situation and object; but the former term is\nmost commonly used.\n\nSometimes outworks, called _tenaillons_, consisting of one long and one\nshort face, are placed on each side of the demi-lune of a front of\nfortification, for the purpose of prolonging the siege. (Fig. 41.)\n\nSmall, or _demi_-tenaillons, are frequently so arranged as to cover only\none-half of the demi-lune, and then a _bonnet_ constructed in front of\nthe salient of the demi-lune. (Fig.42.) In this case the bonnet is\nflanked by the short faces of the demi-tenaillons; these short faces are\nthemselves flanked by the demi-lune, while the bastions flank the long\nfaces.\n\nA _horn-work_ consists of a front of fortification, and two wings\nresting on the faces of bastions of a front of the fortress. It\nsometimes has also a demi-lune or bonnet, as in the case of\ndemi-tenaillons. (Fig. 43.)\n\nA _crown-work_ consists of two fronts of fortification, and two wings.\n(Fig. 44.) It is sometimes made _double_, and even _triple_.\n\nThese works are also employed as advanced works, and placed entirely in\nfront of the glacis. They have generally been added to a fortress for\nthe purpose of occupying some important piece of ground not included\nwithin the limits of the main work. They may be constructed with covered\nways, and sometimes it may be found advantageous to secure them by\nretrenchments.\n\nA _detached work_ may be made in any form deemed best suited to the\nsite. Being but remotely connected with the fortress, the latter will\nexercise but slight influence on the character of its plan or\nconstruction. They are usually of limited extent and slight relief,\npartaking much of the nature of field-works.[45]\n\n[Footnote 45: The general principles of permanent fortification may be\nbest learned from the writings of Cormontaigne, St. Paul de Noizet, and\nLaurillard-Fallot. A list of valuable books of reference on the several\nbranches of military engineering will be given at the close of the next\nchapter.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV.\n\nFIELD-ENGINEERING.\n\n\n_Field-Engineering_ includes the making of military reconnaissances,\ntemporary fortifications, and military roads; the planning and\nconstruction of military bridges; the attack and defence of military\nworks;--in fine, all the various duties of engineer troops, either in\nthe operations of a campaign, or in the dispositions on the\nbattle-field.\n\n_Military reconnaissance._--By this term is meant an examination of a\nportion of the theatre of war, to ascertain its military character and\nresources. If the examination be made of a large district of country,\nand for an entire campaign, the reconnaissance is _general_; if made for\ncollecting detailed information respecting a proposed line of march, the\npassage of a river, the position of an enemy, &c., it is termed\n_special_.\n\nIn making a general reconnaissance, great care should be taken to\ncollect accurate information respecting the general topography of the\ncountry; the character of the mountains, forests, and water-courses; the\nnature of the roads, canals, and railways; the quality of the soil, and\nthe amount of provisions and forage it produces; the population and\ncharacter of the cities, towns, and villages, the commercial and\nmanufacturing resources of every part of the country, and the means of\ntransportation to be found in each district. The plan of military\noperations will be based on the information thus obtained, and any\nserious error in the reconnaissance may involve the results of the\ncampaign, and even the fate of the war.\n\nIn a special reconnaissance, not only accurate but minute information\nwill be required: the character of the roads must be given in detail;\nthe nature of the water-courses, their depth and velocity; the position\nand character of bridges, and fords;--in fine, a full description of all\nobstacles to be encountered, and the means that can be made available\nfor overcoming these obstacles.\n\nA reconnoitring officer may usually derive much valuable information\nfrom the published maps and descriptions of the country to be examined;\nadditional matters of detail may be obtained from woodsmen, hunters, and\nfishermen; and also from the innkeepers and local authorities of the\ndistrict. But the officer should always verify this information, so far\nas practical, by personal examination. In making a reconnaissance in the\nvicinity of an enemy, he must be supported by a strong escort of mounted\ntroops, and in all his operations the greatest precaution will be\nrequisite to ensure success.\n\nSome simple instrument, such as a pocket sextant, or compass, will be\nsufficient to enable the reconnoitring officer to measure, with\nconsiderable accuracy, the height of mountains, the width of streams,\n&c., and an ordinary scale and dividers will enable him to make a\nsuitable military sketch.\n\n_Temporary Fortification._--It has been stated in the preceding chapter\nthat temporary fortifications are properly confined to the operations of\na single campaign, and are used to strengthen positions which are to be\noccupied only for a short period; and that they are usually made of\nearth, thrown up by the troops in a single day. Temporary\nfortifications, as a part of field-engineering, may therefore be\nregarded rather as an _arm_ than an _art_. The principles of their\nconstruction are derived, of course, from the theory of permanent\nfortification, but in applying these principles to practice in the\nfield, much greater latitude is allowed than in the exact scientific\narrangement of permanent works.\n\nThe purpose of field-works (or intrenchments, as they are commonly\ncalled) is to arrest, or at least to impede, the march of the attacking\nfoe; to shelter the defensive troops from the missive weapons of the\nassailants, and to detain them in a position where they will be exposed\nto the fire of the defensive force. The numerical and positive strength\nof the assailed may be much less than that of the assailant, and yet an\nequilibrium exist; the material obstacles compensating for the\ndifference in numbers. Intrenchments, though inert masses, must\ntherefore be regarded as most valuable and important accessaries in the\ndefence of a position.\n\nIntrenchments consist either of _lines_ of works made to cover extended\npositions, or of _detached_ works designed simply to defend the ground\nthey occupy. The former generally present a front against the enemy in\nbut one direction, while the latter are usually closed on all their\nsides.\n\nThe following figures have been employed for the plan of simple\nintrenchments, viz.: the polygon, redan, lunette, mitre, star-fort, and\nbastion.\n\n_Square_ or _polygonal redoubts_ are the most common forms given to\nfield-works, on account of the ease of their construction. But they have\nmany defects. There is a sector without fire in front of each salient,\nand the ditches are without protection. The latter objection also holds\ngood against all circular works.\n\nThe _redan_ (Fig. 45) is frequently used to cover a point in rear, as a\nbridge, a ford, or a defile. When used alone, its gorge should be closed\nby palisades. Its ditches are unprotected.\n\nThe _lunette_ (Fig. 46) has nearly the same defects as the redan.\n\nThe _mitre_, or _priest-cap,_ (Fig. 47,) may be employed with advantage\nwhen a cross-fire is required on the capital of the work. The\n_star-fort_ has all the defects, without the merit of simplicity, which\nbelong to the polygonal redoubt.\n\nThe _bastion-fort_ (Fig. 48) more fully satisfies the conditions of a\ngood defence than any other plan; but it is less simple and easy of\nexecution. It is usually composed of four or five fronts, but it may be\napplied to a polygon of any number of sides.\n\nFor the details of the construction of these several works, we must\nrefer to the special treatises on field-fortification.\n\nLines of intrenchments may be made either continuous or with intervals.\nIn adopting either plan, the engineer should avail himself of all the\nnatural obstacles presented by the position, so as to diminish the labor\nof erecting artificial means of defence.\n\nThe simplest arrangement for a continuous intrenchment is the\n_cremailliere_ or indented line. When applied to an irregular site, or\nused to connect together distant and detached works, the indented line\nmay be regarded as a good disposition. Mitres and redans, connected by\nstraight curtains, are sometimes employed, as also a combination of\nlarge and small redans, forming alternate salient and re-entering\nangles. A continuous line of bastions is preferable to any other\narrangement, when there is plenty of time for their construction.\n\nLines with intervals are frequently formed of alternate lunettes and\nsquare redoubts. Other detached works may be employed in the same way.\nThis manner of intrenching a position has several advantages, with\ndisciplined troops. The first shock of the assailant is sustained by the\ndetached works, and when he attempts to penetrate in the intervals, his\nflanks become exposed to a deadly cross fire. These intervals also allow\nthe assailed to act on the offensive, by charging the enemy at the\nopportune moment. But with raw and militia forces it will be safer to\nresort to continuous lines. If cavalry form any part of the defensive\nforce, it will be absolutely necessary to leave intervals through which\nthese troops may charge.\n\nA vertical section of all intrenchments is of the same general form; the\ndimensions will, of course, vary with the nature of the soil, and the\ntime and means employed in their construction. The minimum dimensions\nthat can be used with any considerable advantage are given in Fig. 49.\n\nIn laying out field-works advantage should be taken of all available\nartificial obstacles, such as hedges, walls, houses, outbuildings, &c. A\nthickset hedge may be rendered defensible by throwing up against it a\nslight parapet of earth. Stone fences may be employed in the same way.\nWalls of masonry may be pierced with loop-holes and arranged for one or\ntwo tiers of fire. The walls of houses are pierced in the same manner,\nand a projecting wooden structure, termed a _machicoulis gallery_, is\nsometimes made from the floor of the second story, to enable the\nassailed to fire down upon their opponents. This arrangement is\nfrequently employed to advantage in wooden blockhouses against a savage\nfoe; but it is of little avail when exposed to the fire of artillery.\nSome have proposed galleries of this description in permanent works of\nmasonry, but the project is too obviously absurd to merit discussion.\n\nIn addition to the parapet of an intrenchment, a good engineer will\nalways find time and means for constructing other artificial obstacles,\nsuch as trous-de-loup, abattis, palisades, stockades, fraises,\nchevaux-de-frise, crows'-feet, mines, &c.\n\n_Trous-de-loup_ are pits dug in the earth in the form of an inverted\ntruncated cone, some six feet in diameter, and about the same number of\nfeet in depth. They are usually placed a few yards in front of the\nditch, and concealed by some slight covering.\n\n_Abattis_ are tops and large limbs of trees arranged along the glacis of\na work; the ends of the branches are lopped off and sharpened.\n\n_Palisades_ are stakes some eight or ten feet long, with one end\nfastened in the ground and the other made sharp. They are placed in\njuxtaposition and connected together by horizontal riband-pieces. This\narrangement is frequently placed at the foot of the counterscarp. When\nthe timbers are large and the work is intended as a part of a primary\ndefence, it is called a _stockade_; when the stakes are placed at the\nfoot of the scarp, either horizontally or inclined, they receive the\nname of _fraises_.\n\nA _cheval-de-frise_ consists of a horizontal piece of timber armed with\nwooden or iron lances, which project some eight or ten feet. It is much\nemployed against cavalry, and on rocky soils serves as a substitute for\npalisades.\n\n_Crows'-feet_ are small wooden or iron forms filled with sharp spikes.\nThey are thrown, with their points upward, on ground which is to be\npassed over by cavalry.\n\n_Mines_ are sometimes used in connection with intrenchments, but more\ncommonly in the attack and defence of permanent works. They will be\nnoticed further on.\n\nFieldworks which are to be occupied for a considerable length of time\nwill usually have their steeper slopes revetted, and be arranged with\nscarp and counterscarp, galleries, traverses, blindages, &c. Such works\nhold an intermediary rank between temporary and permanent fortification.\n\nAs examples of the importance of field fortifications and of the manner\nof organizing them, the reader is referred to the celebrated battle of\nFontenoy, in 1745, where the carefully-arranged intrenchments of Marshal\nSaxe enabled the French to repel, with immense destruction, the attacks\nof greatly superior numbers; to the battle of Fleurus, in 1690, where\nthe Prince of Waldeck exposed himself to a most disastrous defeat \"by\nneglecting the resources of fortification and other indispensable\nprecautions;\" to the battle of Malplaquet, in 1709, where Marshal\nVillars, by neglecting to occupy and intrench the farm that closed the\npassage between the woods of Sars and Laniere, exposed himself to a\ndisastrous defeat; to the operations of 1792, where General Custine, by\nneglecting to intrench the heights that covered Bingen, as the engineers\nhad recommended, exposed himself to those terrible disasters which\nforced him to a precipitate retreat; to the works of Wervike, which, by\na vigorous resistance on the 10th of September, 1793, saved the Dutch\narmy from total destruction; to the intrenched camp of Ulm, in 1800,\nwhich for six weeks held in check the victorious army of Moreau; to the\nintrenched lines of Torres Vedras, in 1810, which saved from destruction\nthe English army of Wellington; to the field-defences of Hougomont,\nwhich contributed so much to the victory of Waterloo, &c.\n\n_Military communications._--The movements of armies are always much\nembarrassed by forests, marshes, and water-courses, and nothing\ncontributes more to the dispatch of military operations than the means\nof opening practical and easy communication through these various\nobstacles.\n\nIt is not necessary here to enter into any detailed discussion of the\nmanner of constructing military communications through forests or\nmarshes. In a new country like ours, where almost every one has had some\nexperience in road-making, no very great technical knowledge is required\nfor the construction of temporary works of this character; but much\nprofessional skill and experience will be requisite for the engineers\nwho make the preliminary reconnaissances, and fix the location of these\nroads.\n\nWater-courses may be crossed by means of fords, on the ice, or by\nferries and bridges. When temporary bridges or ferries are constructed\nby the army in the field, they are classed under the general head of\n_military bridges_, or more properly, _pontoniering_.\n\nWhere the depth of the stream is not great, the current slight, and the\nbottom smooth and hard, the passage may be effected by _fording_. If the\nbottom be of mud, or large stones, the passage will be difficult and\ndangerous, even where the depth and current are favorable. Under\nfavorable circumstances infantry can ford a stream where the depth is\nnot greater than four feet; cavalry to a depth of four or five feet; but\nartillery, and engineer trains, cannot go to a depth of more than two\nand a half feet, without greatly exposing their ammunition and military\nstores The fords should be accurately staked out before the passage is\nattempted, and ropes ought to be stretched across the stream, or cavalry\nand small boats stationed below, to prevent the loss of life.\n\nIce may be crossed by infantry, in small detachments. Its strength may\nbe increased by covering it with boards, or straw, so as to distribute\nthe weight over a greater surface. By sprinkling water over the straw,\nand allowing it to freeze, the mass may be made still more compact. But\nlarge bodies of cavalry, and heavy artillery, cannot venture on the ice\nunless it be of great thickness and strength. An army can never trust,\nfor any length of time, to either fords or ice; if it did a freshet or a\nthaw would place it in a most critical state. Military bridges will,\ntherefore, become its only safe reliance for keeping open its\ncommunications.\n\nMilitary bridges are made with trestles, rafts, boats, and other\nfloating bodies. Rope bridges are also sometimes resorted to by troops\nfor passing rivers.\n\n_Trestle bridges_ are principally used for crossing small streams not\nmore than seven or eight feet in depth: they also serve to connect\nfloating bridges with the shore, in shallow water. The form of the\ntrestle is much the same as that of an ordinary _carpenter's horse,_\ni.e., a horizontal beam supported by four inclined legs. These trestles\nare placed in the stream, from twelve to twenty feet apart, and\nconnected by string-pieces, (or _balks_ as they are termed in technical\nlanguage,) which are covered over with plank. The action of the current\nagainst the bridge may be counteracted by anchors and cables, or by\nmeans of boxes or baskets attached to the legs of the trestles, and\nfilled with stones. A more substantial form may be given to the bridge\nby substituting for the trestles, piles, or the ordinary framed supports\nso much used in the newer parts of our country.\n\nFor examples of the use of bridges of this description we would refer to\nCaesar's celebrated bridge across the Rhine; the passage of the Scheldt\nin 1588 by the Spaniards; the passage of the Lech in 1631 by Gustavus\nAdolphus; the passage of the Danube in 1740 by Marshal Saxe; the great\nbridge across the Var during Napoleon's Italian campaigns; the passage\nof the Lech in 1800 by Lecourbe; the bridges across the Piava, the\nIsonso, &c., in the subsequent operations of the army in Italy; the\ncelebrated passage of the Danube at the island of Lobau in 1809; the\npassage of the Agueda in 1811 by the English; the passages of the Dwina,\nthe Moscowa, the Dneiper, the Beresina, &c., in the campaign of 1812;\nthe repairing of the bridge near Dresden, and the passage of the Elbe in\n1813, &c.\n\n_Rafts_ formed of timbers, casks, barrels, &c., are frequently used as\nmilitary bridges. They may be made to bear almost any weight, and will\nanswer for the passage of rivers of any depth and width, provided the\ncurrent be not rapid.\n\nWhere the bridge is to be supported by rafts made of solid timbers,\nthese timbers should be first placed in the water, to ascertain their\nnatural position of stability, and then the larger ends cut away on the\nunder side, so as to present the least possible resistance to the action\nof the current. They are afterwards lashed together by strong rope or\nwithe lashing, or fastened by cross-pieces let into the timbers, and\nheld firm by bolts, or wooden pins. These rafts are kept in place by\nanchors and cables placed up and down stream. The roadway is formed in\nnearly the same manner as for a bridge supported on trestles. Empty\ncasks, and other floating bodies, may be substituted in place of logs in\nthe construction of rafts.\n\nFor examples of the use of rafts in the construction of military\nbridges, we would refer to the passage of the Seine in 1465 by Count\nCharolais; the passage of the Meuse in 1579, by Alexander Farnese; the\npassage of the Vistula in 1704, the Borysthenese in 1709, and the Sound\nin 1718, by Charles XII.; the passage of the Adige in 1796; the passage\nof the Po in 1807; and the subsequent military operations in the Spanish\nPeninsula.\n\nMilitary bridges are frequently made of _boats_, and the ordinary\nriver-craft found in the vicinity of the intended passage. Flat-bottomed\nboats are the most suitable for this purpose, but if these cannot be\nobtained, keel boats will serve as a substitute. When these water-craft\nare of very unequal sizes, (as is frequently the case,) two smaller\nones may be lashed together to form a single support; they can be\nbrought to the same level by means of stone ballast. The gunwales must\nbe suitably arranged for supporting the balks, or else frameworks should\nbe erected for this purpose from the centre of the boat. The arrangement\nof the roadway, anchors, &c., is the same as before.\n\nA _bridge-equipage_ made to follow an army in its movements in the\nfield, is generally composed of light skiffs or batteaux, and the\nnecessary timbers, planks, anchors, &c., for forming the roadway, and\nkeeping the bridge in its position. All these articles are constructed\nespecially for this purpose. All the wood-work should be of tough and\nwell-seasoned timber, so as to impose no unnecessary weight on the wagon\ntrains. The bateaux should also be made of strong and light materials.\nFor convenience in transportation, these boats are sometimes made with\nhinges so as to fold up. The ribs are usually of oak, and the sides and\nbottom of pine. Instead of plank, a covering of tin, copper,\nIndia-rubber, &c., has sometimes been substituted. Floating supports of\nthis character are often made in compartments, so as to prevent their\nsinking when injured by the enemy's projectiles. Indian-rubber pontons\nmay be folded up into a small space, and their slight weight renders\nthem convenient for transportation.\n\nOn navigable streams a part of the bridge resting on one or two bateaux\nshould be so arranged that it can be shipped out of its place, forming a\n_draw_ for the passage of river-craft. Indeed, it would be well, even\nwhere the river is not navigable, to form a draw for the passage of\ntrees, and other floating bodies, sent down by the enemy against the\nbridge.\n\nAn ordinary bridge-equipage of bateaux, or light pontons, for crossing a\nriver of from three to four hundred yards in width, and of moderate\ncurrent, will require a train of from sixty to eighty wagons.[46] Under\nfavorable circumstances, and with a well-instructed corps of pontoniers,\nthe bridge may be thrown across the river, and prepared for the passage\nof an army in a few hours at most.[47] After the troops have passed\nover, the bridge may be taken up, and replaced on the wagons in from a\nquarter to half an hour.\n\n[Footnote 46: The number of wagons in a ponton train will be greatly\ndiminished if it be found that Indian-rubber boats may be used as\nsupports for the bridge. The engineer department of our army are making\nexperiments to determine this point.]\n\n[Footnote 47: In 1746, three bridges of bateaux were thrown across the\nPo, near Placentia, each fifteen hundred feet in length, and entirely\ncompleted in eight hours. In 1757, two bridges of bateaux were thrown\nacross the Rhine, at Wesel, in half an hour; again, in the same year, a\nthird bridge was thrown across this river near Dusseldorf, in six hours.\nIn 1841, Col. Birago, of the Austrian army, arrived on the bank of the\nWeisgerben arm of the Danube, with his bridge-equipage, at a round trot,\nand immediately began the construction of his bridge, without any\nprevious preparation or examination. In less than three-quarters of an\nhour the bridge was completed, and three loaded four-horse wagons passed\nover on a trot, followed by a column of infantry.]\n\nThe following examples will serve to illustrate the use of different\nkinds of boat-bridges in military operations:--the passage of the Rhine,\nin 1702, by Villars; the passage of the Dnieper and the Bog, in 1739, by\nthe Russians; the passage of the Danube, in 1740, by Marshal Saxe; the\npassage of the Rhine, near Cologne, in 1758, by the Prince of Clermont;\nthe passage of the Rhine, in 1795, by Jourdan; the passage of the Rhine,\nat Kehl, in 1796, by Moreau; and again the same year, at Weissenthurn,\nand at Neuwied, by Jourdan; the bridges across the Rhine, at the sieges\nof Kehl and Huninguen, in 1797; the passage of the Limmat, in 1799, by\nMassena; the passages of the Mincio, the Adige, the Brenta, the Piava,\n&c., in 1800; the passages of these rivers again in 1805; the passages\nof the Narew, in 1807, by the Russians; the several passages of the\nDanube, in 1809, by the French and Austrian armies; the passages of the\nTagus and Douro, in 1810, by the English; the passages of the Niemen,\nthe Dwina, the Moskwa, and the Beresina, in 1812, by the French; and of\nthe great rivers of Germany and France, in 1813 and 1814.\n\nA floating body, propelled from one bank to the other by the current of\nthe stream, is termed a _flying-bridge._ The usual mode of establishing\na ferry of this kind, is to attach the head of the boat by means of a\ncable and anchor to some point near the middle of the stream. By\nsteering obliquely to the current, the boat may be made to cross and\nrecross at the same point. A single passage may be made in the same way,\nby the action of the current without the cable and anchor, but the boat\nin this case will be carried some distance down the stream. Rowboats are\nemployed for crossing over infantry by successive debarkations; but this\nprocess is too slow for the passage of a large force; it may very well\nbe resorted to as auxiliary to other means.\n\nSteam craft are so common at the present day on all navigable streams,\nthat an army in the field will frequently be able to avail itself of\nthis means of passing the larger rivers. But, in a hostile country, or\nin one already passed over by the enemy, it will not be safe to rely\nwith confidence upon obtaining craft of this character. A well-organized\narmy will always carry in its train the means of effecting a certain and\nspeedy passage of all water-courses that may intercept its line of\nmarch.\n\nFlying-bridges or rowboats were employed in the passage of the Dwina, in\n1701, by the Swedes; the passage of the Po, in 1701, by Prince Eugene;\nthe passage of the Rhine, at Huninguen, in 1704; Jourdan's passage of\nthe Rhine in 1795; Moreau's passage in 1796; the sieges of Kehl and\nHuninguen in 1797; Massena's passage of the Limmat, and Soult's passage\nof the Linth, in 1799; the passage of the Rhine, at Lucisteig in 1800;\nthe passage of the Po, by the French, just before the battle of Marengo;\nand others in Italy, Germany, and Spain, in the subsequent campaigns of\nNapoleon.\n\nMilitary bridges have sometimes been formed of ropes, cables stretched\nacross the stream, and firmly attached at each end to trees, or posts\nlet into the earth. If the shore is of rock, rings with staples let into\nthe stone form the best means for securing the ends of the main ropes.\nPlank are laid on these cables to form the roadway. The ropes forming\nthe \"side-rail\" of the bridge are passed over trestles at each shore,\nand then fastened as before. Short vertical ropes attach the main\nsupports to these side ropes, in order that they may sustain a part of\nthe weight passing over the bridge. Constructions of this character are\nfully described in Douglas's Essay on Military Bridges. For example, see\nthe passage of the Po, near Casal, in 1515, by the Swiss; the bridge\nthrown over the Clain by Admiral Coligni, at the siege of Poitiers, in\n1569; the operations of the Prince of Orange against Ghent and Bruges,\nin 1631; the passage of the Tagus, at Alcantara, in 1810, by the\nEnglish; the bridge constructed across the Zezere, by the French, in\n1810; the bridge thrown across the Scarpe, near Douai, in 1820; the\nexperiments made at Fere in 1823, &c.\n\nThe passage of a river in the presence of an enemy, whether acting\noffensively or in retreat, is an operation of great delicacy and danger.\nIn either case the army is called upon to show the coolest and most\ndetermined courage, for its success will depend on its maintaining the\nstrictest discipline and good order.\n\nIn the case of a retreat the bridge should be covered by field\nintrenchments, called a _tete de pont_, and defended by a strong guard.\nIf the river be of moderate width, the enemy may be kept at a distance\nby heavy batteries on the opposite shore. As soon as the passage is\neffected by the main body, the bridge, if permanent, will be blown up,\nor otherwise destroyed by the miners, and if floating, will be swung\nround to the other shore. The rear-guard will pass over in rowboats, or\nthe end pontons detached for that purpose. An army retreating in the\nface of an enemy should never rely upon one single bridge, no matter\nwhat may be its character: for the slightest accident happening to it\nmight expose the whole army to inevitable destruction.\n\nThe passage of a river by main force, against an enterprising and active\nenemy on the opposite shore, is always an operation of the greatest\ndifficulty, and not unfrequently accompanied with the most bloody\nresults.\n\nThe most effectual method of accomplishing this object is by stratagem.\nDemonstrations are made at several points at the same time: bodies of\ntroops are thrown across, after nightfall, in rowboats or by\nflying-bridges, to get possession of the opposite bank. The vanguard of\nlight cavalry may cross by swimming. The pontoniers should have their\nbridge equipage in readiness near the intended point of passage, so that\nit can be thrown across with the greatest possible rapidity, while the\nadvanced guards are still able to keep the enemy at a distance. Under\nfavorable circumstances the pontoniers will have the bridge in readiness\nfor the passage of the army before the enemy can collect his troops upon\nthe threatened point.\n\nCannon-balls and hollow shot are the most effectual means for destroying\nan enemy's bridge when our batteries can be planted within reach. When\nthis cannot be done, we must resort to fire-boats, floating rafts, &c.,\nto accomplish our object. Operations of this kind carried on in the\nnight, are most likely to succeed.\n\nTo protect bridges from the action of these floating bodies, stockades,\nor floating chevaux-de-frise are constructed across the stream at some\ndistance above the bridge; strong cables, or chains stretched directly\nacross the river, or with an angle up stream, may be used in place of\nstockades, or in conjunction with them. Guards should be stationed above\nthe bridge, with boats, ropes, grapnels, &c., for the purpose of\narresting all floating bodies and drawing thorn ashore, or directing\nthem safely through the _draw_ in the bridge arrangement.\n\nThe troops especially charged with the construction and management of\nthe various kinds of military bridges, are denominated _pontoniers_. The\nduties of these troops are arduous and important, and, in a country like\nours, intersected by numerous water-courses, the success of a campaign\nwill often depend upon their skill and efficiency.\n\n_Sapping_.--This is a general term applied to the operations of forming\ntrenches, along which troops may approach a work without being exposed\nto the fire of the besieged.\n\nIn addition to the ordinary sapping-tools, such as shovels, picks,\ngabion-forks, &c., used in constructing trenches, there will also be\nrequired a considerable amount of sapping materials, such as gabions,\nfascines, sap-fagots, sandbags, &c.\n\nThe _gabion_ is a cylindrical basket of twigs, about two feet in\ndiameter, and some three feet in length, and without a bottom. It is\nmade by driving into the ground, in a circular form, a number of small\npickets about an inch in diameter, and of the length required for the\ngabion. Twigs are wattled between the pickets like ordinary basket-work,\nand fastened at the ends by withs or packthread. Gabions are used in\nforming saps, batteries, blindages, powder-magazines, and in revetting\nthe steep slopes of field-works.\n\nThe _fascine_ is a bundle of twigs closely bound up, from nine to twelve\ninches in diameter, and from ten to fifteen or twenty feet in length.\nThe largest are sometimes called _saucissons_. In making a fascine,\nstraight twigs about the thickness of a man's finger are laid side by\nside, and firmly compressed together by a strong rope or chain attached\nto the extremities of two levers. While held in this position the twigs\nare firmly bound together by withs or cords. Fascines are used in\nconstructing trenches, batteries, &c., and for filling up wet ditches.\n\nThe _sap-fagot_ is a strong fascine about ten inches in diameter and two\nfeet in length, with a picket inserted through the middle. It is used in\nthe double sap in connection with gabions.\n\n_Sand-bags_ are usually made of coarse canvass. When filled with earth\nthey are some six or eight inches in diameter, and from eighteen inches\nto two feet in length. From their perishable nature, they are used only\nwhen other materials cannot be procured, and where it is important to\nplace the troops speedily under cover from the enemy's fire.\n\nBales of wool, cotton, hay, straw, &c., may be employed in sapping for\nthe same purposes as the above materials, when they can be procured in\nsufficient quantity. Pork and flour barrels, which are usually in\nabundance in a camp, are frequently filled with sand and used for\nforming magazines, blindages, &c., in field-works.\n\nA trench constructed in ordinary soil beyond the range of the enemy's\ngrape, is called a _simple sap_, or ordinary trench. The earth is thrown\nup on the side towards the place besieged, so as to form a kind of\nparapet to cover the men in the trench. The labor is here executed under\nthe supervision of engineer soldiers, by working parties detached from\nthe other arms. Fig. 50 represents a vertical section of a simple sap.\n\nWhen within range of the enemy's grape, the _flying sap_ is resorted to\nin order to place the workmen speedily under cover. In this operation,\ngabions are placed in juxtaposition on the side towards the besieged\nwork, and filled with all possible speed by the workmen. Three rows of\nfascines are usually placed on the top of the gabions to increase the\nheight. The most difficult part of the flying sap is executed by\nengineer troops, and the trench is completed by the ordinary working\nparties. Fig. 51 represents a section of this sap.\n\nThe _full-sap_ is employed when the works of the besiegers are within\nrange of musketry, or when the grape fire of the besieged is so deadly\nthat the flying sap can no longer be used. This is a difficult\noperation, and unless executed with great care and by well-instructed\nengineer troops, the construction of the trench will be attended with an\nimmense loss of life. The work must be executed under cover of a\n_sap-roller,_ which is a cylindrical mass of fascines, wool, or cotton,\nsome two feet in diameter. On very smooth ground a ball-proof shelter on\nwheels might be used as a substitute. The sap-roller being placed along\nthe line of the trench so as to cover the sapper in front, who is armed\nwith a musket-proof headpiece and cuirass, this sapper commences the sap\nby placing a gabion on the line of the proposed trench and fills it with\nearth, working on his hands and knees. Having filled the first gabion,\nhe pushes forward the sap-roller and places a second one next the first,\nstopping the open joint between the two with a stop-fagot. The second\ngabion being filled in the same manner as the first, others are\nsuccessively established. When the first sapper has advanced a few feet,\nhe is followed by a second, also in defensive armor, who increases the\nexcavation and embankment; this sapper is then followed in the same way\nby a third and a fourth, after which the trench will be sufficiently\nadvanced to be turned over to the ordinary workmen. The sap-fagots may\nbe removed when the embankment becomes thick enough to resist grape.\nFig. 52 represents a plan and section of a full-sap.\n\nWhen the direction of the trench is such that the men are exposed on\nboth sides, it will be necessary to throw up an embankment both to the\nright and left. This operation is called the _double sap,_ and is\nexecuted by two parties of sappers, working side by side. In this sap it\nwill be necessary to frequently change the direction of the trench, or\nto throw up traverses, in order to cover the men at a distance from the\nsap-roller. Wing-traverses, on the side of the trench which is least\nexposed, some times serve the same purpose as a double sap.\n\n_Mines_.--By _mining_, as a military term, we understand the operations\nresorted to for the demolition, with powder, of a military structure of\nany description. The term _mine_ is applied both to the excavation\ncharged with powder for the purpose of producing an explosion, and to\nthe communications which lead to this excavation.\n\nThe place in which the charge of powder is lodged is called the\n_chamber_, the communication by which this place is reached the\n_gallery_, and the excavation made by the explosion is termed the\n_crater_.\n\nThe form of the crater caused by an explosion in ordinary soils is\nassumed to be a truncated cone, the diameter, _c d_, (Fig. 53,) of the\nlower circle being one-half the diameter, _a b_, of the upper circle.\nThis form has never been ascertained to be exactly correct, but the\ntheoretical results deduced from a mathematical discussion of this\nfigure have been fully verified in practice. The radius, _p b_, of the\nupper circle is termed the _crater radius_; the line _o p_, drawn from\nthe centre of the charge perpendicular to the surface where the\nexplosion takes place, is termed the _line of least resistance_; the\nline _o b_, drawn from the centre of the powder to any point in the\ncircumference of the upper circle, is termed the _radius of explosion_.\n\nWhen the crater radius is equal to the line of least resistance, the\nmine is termed _common_; when this radius is greater than the line of\nleast resistance, the mine is termed _overcharged_; and when the radius\nis less, _undercharged_. A mine of small dimensions, formed by sinking a\nshaft in the ground, is termed a _fougasse_. The term _camouflet_ is\napplied to a mine used to suffocate the enemy's miner, without producing\nan explosion. Small mines made in rock or masonry, merely for the\npurpose of excavation, without any considerable external explosion, are\ncalled _blasts_.\n\nFrom experiments made on common mines, whose line of least resistance\ndid not exceed fifteen feet, it has been ascertained that the tenacity\nof the earth is completely destroyed around the crater to a distance\nequal to the crater radius, and that empty galleries would be broken in\nat once and a half that distance. It has also been proved by experiment,\nthat the crater radius in overcharged mines may be increased to six\ntimes the line of least resistance, but not much beyond this; that\nwithin this limit the diameter of the crater increases nearly in the\nratio of the square roots of the charge; and that empty galleries may be\ndestroyed by overcharged mines at the distance of four times the line of\nleast resistance.\n\nBy means of the deductions of physico-mathematical theory, and the\nresults of experiments, rules have been determined by which the miner\ncan calculate, with much accuracy, the charge necessary to produce a\nrequired result in any given soil.\n\nIn the earlier stages of the history of this art, mines were only used\nto open breaches and demolish masses of masonry; but in later times they\nhave been employed as important elements in the attack and defence of\nplaces.\n\nAn isolated wall, only two or three feet thick, may readily be\ndemolished by exploding one or two casks of powder placed in contact\nwith its base. If the wall be five or six feet thick, the charges should\nbe placed under the foundation. For walls of still greater thickness it\nwill be best to open a gallery to the centre of the wall, a foot or two\nabove its base, and place the powder in chambers thus excavated.\nRevetment walls may be overturned by placing the charges at the back of\nthe wall, about one-third or one-quarter of the way up from the base. If\nplaced too near the base, a breach will be made in the wall without\noverturning it.\n\nTo demolish a bridge of masonry the powder should be lodged in chambers\nexcavated in the centre of the piers. When there is not time for\nexcavating these chambers in the piers, a trench may be cut over the key\nof the arch, in which the powder is placed and exploded; or, the casks\nof powder may be suspended immediately under the arch, with the same\nresults. Where a saving of powder is of consequence, small chambers may\nbe excavated in the haunches of the arch, and the mine carefully\n_tamped_ before firing it.\n\nBridges of wood may be destroyed by suspending casks of powder under the\nprincipal timbers, or attaching them to the supports.\n\nPalisading, gates, doors, &c., may be destroyed in the same way, by\nsuspending casks or bags of powder against their sides; or still more\neffectually, by burying the charges just beneath their base.\n\nTo demolish a tower, magazine, or house, of masonry, place charges of\npowder under the piers and principal walls of the building. In wooden\nstructures the powder should be placed under, or attached to the\nprincipal supports. Where time is wanting to effect these arrangements,\na building may be blown down by placing a large mass of powder in the\ninterior. The powder may be economized, in this case, by putting it in a\nstrong case, which should be connected with the walls of the building on\nall sides by wooden props.\n\nSpecial treatises on military mining contain full instructions for\nregulating the size and position of the charge for the various cases\nthat may be met with in the practical operations of field-engineering.\n\nAs applied to the attack and defence of a fortified place, mines are\ndivided into two general classes--_offensive_ and _defensive_ mines. The\nformer are employed by the besiegers to overthrow the scarps and\ncounterscarps of the place, to demolish barriers, palisades, walls, and\nother temporary means of defence, and to destroy the mines of the\nbesieged. The latter are employed by the opposite party to blow up the\nbesiegers' works of attack, and to defend the passage of ditches against\nan assault. Small mines called _fougasses_ may be employed for the last\nnamed object. The _shell-fougasse_ is composed of a wooden box filled\nwith one or more tiers of shells, and buried just below the surface of\nthe earth. Sometimes a quantity of powder is placed under the shells, so\nas to project them into the air previous to their explosion. The _stone\nfougasse_ is formed by making a funnel-shaped excavation, some five or\nsix feet deep, and placing at the bottom a charge of powder enclosed in\na box, and covered with a strong wooden shield; several cubic yards of\npebbles, broken stone, or brickbats, are placed against the shield, and\nearth well rammed round, to prevent the explosion from taking place in\nthe wrong direction. These mines are fired by means of powder hose, or\nby wires connected with a galvanic battery.\n\nThe defensive mines employed to blow up the besiegers' works, are\ngenerally common mines with the lines of least resistance seldom greater\nthan fifteen feet. All the main galleries and principal branches of\nmines for a permanent fortification are constructed at the same time\nwith the other portions of the work, leaving only the secondary\nbranches, chambers, &c., to be made during the siege. For the general\narrangement of these galleries, and the precautions necessary for their\nprotection from the operations of the besiegers, reference must be made\nto treatises specially devoted to the discussion of this subject.\n\nMines can seldom be employed with advantage in works of slight relief,\nand liable to an assault. But if judiciously arranged in the plan of\ntheir construction, and well managed during the operations of the siege,\nthey contribute very materially to the length of the defence.\n\n_Attack and defence_.--This subject admits of two natural divisions:\n1st, of intrenchments, and 2d, of permanent works.\n\nI. Intrenchments maybe attacked either by _surprise_, or by _open\nforce_. In either case the operations should be based on exact\ninformation of the strength of the works and the number and character of\nthe garrison--information that can be obtained from spies, deserters,\nand prisoners, and confirmed by examinations or reconnaissances made by\nofficers of engineers. By these means a pretty accurate knowledge may be\nobtained of the natural features of the ground exterior to the works;\ntheir weak and strong points; and their interior arrangements for\ndefence.\n\nIn an attack by surprise, the troops should consist of a storming party\nand a reserve of picked men. The attacking column is preceded by a\ncompany of sappers armed with axes, shovels, picks, crowbars, &c.; bags\nof powder are also used for blowing down gates, palisades, &c. All the\noperations must be carried on with the utmost dispatch. The time most\nfavorable for a surprise is an hour or two before day, as at this moment\nthe sentinels are generally less vigilant, and the garrison in a\nprofound sleep; moreover, the subsequent operations, after the first\nsurprise, will be facilitated by the approach of day. Under certain\ncircumstances, it may be advisable to make false attacks at the same\ntime with the true one, in order to distract the attention of the\ngarrison from the true point of danger. But false attacks have, in\ngeneral, the objection of dividing the forces of the assailants as well\nas of the assailed. In all attacks by surprise, secrecy is the soul of\nthe enterprise.\n\nIn an open assault, if artillery be employed, the troops should be drawn\nup in a sheltered position, until the fire of the works is silenced, and\nbreaches effected in the parapet. But if the bayonet alone be resorted\nto, the troops are immediately brought forward at the beginning of the\nassault. The attack is begun by a storming party of picked men: they are\npreceded, as before, by a body of sappers, provided with necessary means\nfor removing obstacles, and followed by a second detachment of\nengineers, who will widen the passages, and render them more accessible\nto the main body of troops who now advance to the assistance of the\nstorming party. If the assailants should be arrested at the counterscarp\nby obstacles which must be removed before any farther progress can be\nmade, the infantry troops of the detachment display and open a fire upon\nthe assailed, in order to divert their fire from the sappers. A few\npieces of light artillery, on the flanks of the column, may sometimes be\nemployed for this purpose with great advantage.\n\nThe storming party should always be provided with scaling-ladders,\nplanks, fascines, &c., for crossing the ditch, and mounting the scarp.\nIf the counterscarp be revetted with masonry, the troops must either\ndescend by ladders, or fill up the ditch with fascines, bales of straw,\nbundles of wool, &c.: if not revetted, a passage for the troops into the\nditch will soon be formed by the shovels of the sappers. When the ditch\nis gained, shelter is sought in a dead angle till the means are prepared\nfor mounting the scarp, and storming the work. If the scarp be of earth\nonly, the sappers will soon prepare a passage for the escalade; but if\nrevetted with masonry, the walls must be breached with hollow shot, or\nscaled by means of ladders.\n\nIn the defence, the strictest vigilance should be at all times exerted\nto guard against a surprise: sentinels are posted on all the most\ncommanding points of the work; all the avenues of approach are most\nthoroughly guarded; and patroles are constantly scouring the ground in\nall directions. At night all these precautions are redoubled. Light and\nfire-balls are thrown out in front of the work to light up the ground,\nand discover the movements and approach of the enemy. Each man should\nhave his particular post assigned to him, and be thoroughly instructed\nin the duties he will have to perform. All auxiliary arrangements, such\nas palisades, abattis, &c., should be defended with the utmost\nobstinacy; the longer the enemy is held in check by these obstacles, the\nlonger will he be exposed to the grape and musketry of the main work.\nWhen he assaults the parapet, he will be opposed by the bayonet in front\nand a well-aimed fire in flank. While in the ditch, or as he mounts the\nscarp, hollow projectiles, incendiary preparations, stones, logs, &c.,\nwill be rolled down upon his head. But when the assaulting column has\ngained the top of the scarp, the bayonet forms the most effective means\nof resistance.\n\nThe measures resorted to in the attack and defence of the larger class\nof field-works, will necessarily partake much of the nature of the\noperations employed in the attack and defence of permanent\nfortifications.\n\nII. The attack and defence of a fortress may be carried on either by a\nregular siege, or by irregular operations and an assault. The latter\nplan has sometimes been adopted when the works of the place were weak\nand improperly defended; where the time and means were wanting for\nconducting a regular siege; or where the assailants were ignorant of the\nmeans proper to be resorted to for the reduction of the fortress. Such\noperations, however, are usually attended by an immense sacrifice of\nhuman life, and the general who neglects to employ all the resources of\nthe engineer's art in carrying on a siege, is justly chargeable with the\nlives of his men. In the siege of Cambrai, Louis XIV., on the\nsolicitation of Du Metz, but contrary to the advice of Vauban, ordered\nthe demi-lune to be taken by assault, instead of waiting for the result\nof a regular siege. The assault was made, but it was unsuccessful, and\nthe French sustained great losses. The king now directed Vauban to take\nthe demi-lune by regular approaches, which was done in a very short\ntime, and with a loss of _only five men!_ Again, at the siege of Ypres,\nthe generals advised an assault before the breaches were ready. \"You\nwill gain a day by the assault,\" said Vauban, \"but you will lose a\nthousand men.\" The king directed the regular works to be continued, and\nthe next day the place was taken with but little loss to the besiegers.\n\nBut a work may be of such a character as to render it unnecessary to\nresort to all the works of attack which would be required for the\nreduction of a regular bastioned fort, on a horizontal site. For\nexample: the nature of the ground may be such as to enable the troops to\napproach to the foot of the glacis, without erecting any works whatever;\nof course, all the works up to the third parallel may in this case be\ndispensed with without any violation of the rules of a siege. Again, the\npoint of attack may be such that the other parts of the place will not\nflank the works of approach; here a single line of _boyaux_ and short\nparallels may be all-sufficient.\n\nBut for the purpose of discussion, we will here suppose the place\nbesieged to be a regular bastioned work on a horizontal site, (Fig.\n54.)\n\nThe operations of the siege may be divided into three distinct periods.\n\n1st. The preliminary operations of the attack and defence previous to\nthe opening of the trenches.\n\n2d. The operations of the two parties from the opening of the trenches\nto the establishment of the third parallel.\n\n3d. From the completion of the third parallel to the reduction of the\nplace.\n\n_First period._ The object of the _investment of the place_ is to cut\noff all communication between the work and the exterior, thus preventing\nit from receiving succors, provisions, and military munitions, and also\nto facilitate a close reconnoissance of the place by the engineers, who\nshould always accompany the investing corps, and pursue their labors\nunder its protection. This corps should be composed chiefly of light\ntroops--cavalry, light infantry, horse artillery, \"brigades of engineers\nand mounted sappers,\"--who march in advance of the besieging army, and,\nby a sudden movement, surround the work, seize upon all the avenues of\napproach, and carry off every thing without the work that can be of\nservice either to the garrison or to the besiegers. To effect this\nobject, the enterprise must be conducted with secrecy and dispatch.\n\nThe investing corps is now distributed around the work in the most\nfavorable positions for cutting off all access to it, and also to\nprevent any communication with the exterior by detachments from the\ngarrison, and even single individuals are sent out to give intelligence\nto a succoring army or to reconnoitre the operations of the besieging\ncorps. These posts and sentinels, called the _daily cordon_, are placed\nsome mile or mile and a half from the work, and beyond the reach of the\nguns. But in the night-time these posts are insufficient to accomplish\ntheir object, and consequently as soon as it is dark the troops move up\nas close to the work as possible without being exposed to the fire of\nmusketry. This arrangement constitutes the _nightly cordon_.\n\nBy the time the main army arrives the reconnoissance will be\nsufficiently complete to enable the chief engineer to lay before the\ngeneral the outline of his plan of attack, so as to establish the\nposition of his depots and camp. These will be placed some two miles\nfrom the work, according to the nature of the ground. As they occupy a\nconsiderable extent of ground around the work, it will generally be\nnecessary to form intrenchments strong enough to prevent succors of\ntroops, provisions, &c., from being thrown into the place, and also to\nrestrain the excursions of the garrison. The works thrown up between the\ncamp and besieged place are termed the _line of countervallation_, and\nthose on the exterior side of the camp form the _line of\ncircumvallation_. These lines are generally about six hundred yards\napart. It is not unusual in modern warfare to dispense with lines of\ncircumvallation, (except a few detached works for covering the parks of\nthe engineers and artillery,) and to hold the succoring army in check by\nmeans of an opposing force, called the _army of observation_.\n\nThe measures of defence resorted to by the garrison will, of course, be\nsubordinate, in some degree, to those of attack. As soon as any danger\nof an investment is apprehended, the commanding general should collect\ninto the place all the necessary provisions, forage, military munitions,\n&c., to be found in the surrounding country; all useless persons should\nbe expelled from the garrison; a supply of timber for the works of the\nengineers and artillery, fascines, gabions, palisades, &c., prepared;\nall ground within cannon range around the work levelled; hedges and\ntrees cut down; holes filled up; temporary buildings demolished or\nburnt; and all obstacles capable of covering an enemy and interrupting\nthe fire of the work, removed.\n\nDuring this period the engineer troops and working parties detached from\nthe other arms will be most actively employed. As soon as the investing\ncorps makes its appearance, bodies of light troops are thrown out to cut\noff reconnoitring parties, and, if possible, to draw the enemy into\nambush. To facilitate these exterior operations, and to prevent a\nsurprise, several guns of long range are placed on the salients of the\nbastions and demi-lunes, and others, loaded with grape, in the\nembrasures of the flanks, so as to sweep the ditches. About one-third of\nthe garrison may be employed in exterior operations, and the other\ntwo-thirds in arranging the means of defence in the interior.\n\n_Second period._--As soon as the engineers have completed their\nreconnaissances and determined on the front of attack, and all the other\npreparations are made, the general will direct the opening of the\ntrenches. The ground being previously marked out, battalions of light\ntroops, termed _guards of the trenches_, as soon as it is dark, are\nplaced about thirty yards in front of the first parallel, (A. Fig. 54,)\nwith smaller sections, and sentinels about the same distance further in\nadvance. These guards lie down, or otherwise conceal themselves from the\nfire of the work. The engineer troops and detachments of workmen being\nfirst marched to the depots and supplied with all the necessary tools\nfor carrying on the work, now commence their labors under the protection\nof these guards. By daybreak the construction of the first parallel, and\nthe trenches connecting it with the depots, will be sufficiently\nadvanced to cover the men from the fire of the place; the guards will\ntherefore be withdrawn, and the workmen continue their labors during the\nday to give the trenches the proper size and form.\n\nThe _parallels_ are the long lines of trench which envelop the besieged\nwork, and serve both as covered ways for the circulation of the\nbesiegers, and as means of defence against sorties from the garrison;\nthey are therefore arranged with banquettes for musketry fire. The\nboyaux are trenches run in a zigzag direction along the capitals of the\nfront of attack, and are intended exclusively for the circulation of the\ntroops; they have no banquettes. The first parallel is about six hundred\nyards from the place, and consequently beyond the reach of grape. It is\nconstructed by the _simple sap_. After the first night, the guards,\ninstead of advancing in front of the work, are placed in the trenches.\n\nThe second parallel (B) is made some three hundred or three hundred and\nfifty yards from the place, and being much exposed to grape, the\n_flying-sap_ is employed in its construction. Batteries (H) are\nestablished between the first and second parallels to silence the fire\nof the demi-lunes of the collateral bastions, and others (I) near the\nsecond parallel, to enfilade the faces of the front of attack. These are\narmed in part with mortars and in part with heavy siege-pieces.\n\nThe works are now gradually pushed forward to the third parallel, (C),\nwhich is constructed about sixty yards from the salients of the place.\nAs the operations of the besiegers are here greatly exposed to musketry\nfire, the trenches are constructed by the _full-sap_. The third\nparallel, having to contain the guards of the trenches, and being of\nless development than the two preceding, is made much wider. The second\nparallel now contains the reserve, and the first parallel becomes the\ndepot of materials. _Demi-parallels_ (G) are frequently established\nbetween the second and third, to be occupied by detachments of guards.\n\nThe operations of defence during this period are so directed as to\nharass the workmen in the trenches and retard the advance of the works\nof attack. Garrison pieces of long range and large howitzers are brought\nforward on the salients of the bastions and demi-lunes of attack, so as\nto fire in ricochet along the capitals on which the boyaux must be\npushed: light and fire-balls are thrown out as soon as it becomes dark,\nto light up the ground occupied by the besiegers, thus exposing them to\nthe fire of the work and to the attacks of the sortie parties. These\nparties are composed of light troops who charge the guards and compel\nthe workmen to abandon their sapping tools and stand upon the defence.\nThey are most effective when the besiegers commence the second parallel,\nas the guards in the first parallel are not so immediately at hand to\nprotect the workmen. When the sortie detachment has driven these workmen\nfrom the trenches, instead of pursuing them into the first parallel, it\nwill display itself in battle order to cover the engineer troops, (who\nshould always accompany the detachment in this enterprise,) while they\nfill up the trenches and destroy the implements of the besiegers. When\nthe guards of the trenches appear in force, the detachment will retire\nin such a way, if possible, as to draw the enemy within range of the\ngrape and musketry of the collateral works. These sorties, if\nsuccessful, may be frequently repeated, for they tend very much to\nprolong the siege. The best time for making them is an hour or two\nbefore day, when the workmen and guards are fatigued with the labors of\nthe night. While the besiegers are establishing their enfilading\nbatteries, a strong fire of solid shot and shells will be concentrated\non the points selected for their construction. The garrison will also\nlabor during this period to put the work into a complete state of\ndefence: constructing all necessary palisadings, traverses, blindages,\nbarriers; and strengthening, if necessary, the covering of the\nmagazines.\n\n_Third period._--After the completion of the third parallel, the\ncrowning of the covered way may be effected by storm, by regular\napproaches, or (if the work is secured by defensive mines) by a\nsubterranean warfare.\n\nIn the first case stone mortar-batteries are established in front of the\nthird parallel, which, on a given signal, will open their fire in\nconcert with all the enfilading and mortar batteries. When this fire has\nproduced its effect in clearing the outworks, picked troops will sally\nforth and carry the covered way with the bayonet, sheltering themselves\nbehind the traverses until the sappers throw up a trench some four or\nfive yards from the crest of the glacis, high enough to protect the\ntroops from the fire of the besieged. It may afterwards be connected\nwith the third parallel by boyaux.\n\nWhen the covered way is to be crowned by regular approaches, a _double\nsap_ is pushed forward from the third parallel to within thirty yards of\nthe salient of the covered way; the trench is then extended some fifteen\nor twenty yards to the right or left, and the earth thrown up high\nenough to enable the besiegers to obtain a plunging fire into the\ncovered way, and thus prevent the enemy from occupying it. This mound of\nearth is termed a _trench cavalier_, (O). Boyaux are now pushed forward\nto the crowning of the covered way and the establishing of breach\nbatteries, (J). Descents are then constructed into the ditches, and as\nsoon as these batteries have made a breach into the walls of the\nbastions and outworks, the boyaux are pushed across the ditches and\nlodgments effected in the breaches. The demi-lune is first carried; next\nthe demi-lune redoubt and bastion; and lastly, the interior\nretrenchments and citadel. In some cases the breaches are carried by\nassault, but the same objection is applicable here as in the storming of\nthe covered way; _time is gained, but at an immense expense of human\nlife._\n\nIf the place is defended by mines it will be necessary for the\nbesiegers to counteract the effects of these works by resorting to the\nslow and tedious operations of a subterranean warfare. In this case a\nfourth trench is formed in front of the third parallel; shafts are sunk\nin this, about six yards apart, for establishing overcharged mines; as\nsoon as the galleries of the besieged are destroyed by the explosion of\nthese mines, the covered way is attacked by storm; other mines are\nestablished on the _terre-plain_ of the covered way to destroy the\nentrance to the galleries, and thus deprive the besieged of the use of\ntheir entire system of mines.\n\nThe measures of defence during this period must embrace every thing\ncalculated to retard the works of the besiegers. This may be most\neffectually accomplished by maintaining a constant fire of grape and\nmusketry on the heads of the sap, and throwing grenades, shells, &c.,\ninto the trenches, to harass and destroy the workmen. As the musketry\nfire of the besiegers now becomes very destructive to the artillerists\nat the guns, strong musket-proof blinds are arranged to mask the mouths\nof the embrasures when the guns are not in battery, and also sloping\nblindages to cover the men when serving at the pieces. The possession of\nthe outworks should be disputed inch by inch, and when the besiegers\nhave reached the ditch of the body of the place, sorties, and every\nspecies of projectile, should be employed to drive off the sappers, and\nto retard the construction of their works. In fine, all the resources of\nthe engineer's art should be put in requisition for the defence of the\nbreach, and the final assault should be vigorously resisted by the\nbayonet, and by a well-sustained fire from all the collateral works.\n\nWith respect to the relative strength of the opposing forces it may be\nwell to remark, that if the fortress is properly constructed the\ngarrison will be able to resist a besieging army _six times_ as numerous\nas itself. Such is the estimate of the best engineers.[48]\n\n[Footnote 48: A good knowledge of the several subjects discussed in this\nchapter may be derived from the writings of Vauban, Cormontaigne, and\nNoizet de St. Paul, on the attack and defence of places and field\nfortification; the several _manuels_ used in the French service on\nsapping, mining, and pontoniering; Col. Pasley's experiments on the\noperations of a siege, sapping, mining, &c.; Douglas's work on military\nbridges; Macauley's work on field fortification; and Professor Mahan's\n_Treatise on Field Fortification._ This last is undoubtedly the very\nbest work that has ever been written on field fortification, and every\nofficer going into the field should supply himself with a copy.\n\nThe following are recommended as books of reference on subjects\ndiscussed in the three preceding chapters.\n\n_Memorial pour la fortification permanente et passagere._ Cormontaigne.\n\n_Defense des places._ Cormontaigne.\n\n_Attaque des places._ Cormontaigne.\n\n_Attaque des places._ Vauban.\n\n_Traite des mines._ Vauban.\n\n_Memorial pour la castrametation et la fortification passagere._\nLafitte-Clave.\n\n_Exercice sur les fortifications._ Davigneau.\n\n_Memorial de l'officier du genie._ A periodical of rare merit,\ncontaining most valuable military and scientific matter. It is conducted\nby officers of the French corps of engineers. It has already reached its\nfourteenth number, each number forming a volume.\n\n_Traite complet de fortification._ Noizet de St. Paul.\n\n_Traite d'art militaire et de la fortification._ Gay de Vernon.\n\n_Art de la guerre._ Rogniat.\n\n_Essai general de fortification, &c._ Bousmard.\n\n_Aide-memoire portatif a l'usage des officiers du genie._ Laisne. A very\nvaluable and useful book.\n\n_Aide-memoire de l'ingenieur militaire._ Grivet.\n\n_Cours d'art militaire._ Laurillard Fallot.\n\n_Cours de fortification, &c._ Lavart.\n\n_Le livre de la guerre._ Perrot.\n\n_Journaux des sieges dans la peninsule._ Belmas.\n\n_Journal of Sieges in Spain._ John Jones.\n\nBoth of the above are works of great value.\n\n_Cours d'art militaire et de fortification militaire._ Francois.\n\n_Architettura militare._ Marchi.\n\n_Essai sur la fortification._ Baltard.\n\n_La fortification._ Bar-le-Duc.\n\n_Elemens de fortification._ Bellaire.\n\n_La science des ingenieurs._ Belidor.\n\n_L'art universel des fortifications._ Bitainvieu.\n\n_Nouvelle maniere de fortifier les places._ Blondel.\n\n_Les sept sieges de Lille._ Brun Lavaine.\n\n_Defense des places fortes._ Carnot.\n\n_Memoire sur la fortification._ Carnot.\n\n_Defense de Saragosse._ Cavallero.\n\n_Memoires sur la fortification._ Choumara.\n\n_Nouvelle fortification._ Coehorn.\n\n_Theorie de la fortification._ Cugnot.\n\n_Des fortifications,_ &c. &c. Darcon.\n\n_Relation de la defense de Dantzik._ D'Artois.\n\n_Les fortifications._ Deville.\n\n_Peribologie._ Dilich.\n\n_De la fortification permanente._ Dufour. A work of merit.\n\n_Essai sur la defense des etats par les fortifications._ Duviviet.\n\n_Attaque et defense des places du camp de St. Omer.\n\n_L'ecole de la fortification._ Fallois.\n\n_Introduction a la fortification._ De Fer.\n\n_Precis de la defense de Valenciennes._ Ferrand.\n\n_Traite theorique,_ &c. Foissac-Latour.\n\n_Examen detaille,_ &c. Foissac-Latour.\n\n_Les ouvrages militaires de Fosse.\n\n_Instruction sur la fortification,_ &c. Gaillard.\n\n_Memoires pour l'attaque et defense d'une place._ Goulon.\n\n_Siege of Peschiera._ Henin.\n\n_Journal du siege de Philisbourg.\n\n_Precis du siege de Dantzick._ Kirgener.\n\n_Deuxieme defense de Badajos._ Lamare.\n\n_Fortification, et l'attaque et defense des places._ Lebloud.\n\n_OEuvres de Lefebvre.\n\n_L'architecture des forteresses._ Mandar.\n\n_Traite sur l'art des sieges._ Mazeroy.\n\n_La surete des etats par le moyen des forteresses._ Maigret.\n\n_Defense d'Ancone._ Mangourit.\n\n_Fortification._ Marolois.\n\n_Siege de Turin._ Mengin.\n\n_Recherches sur l'art defensif,_ &c. Michaloz.\n\n_La fortification de campagne,_ &c. Miller.\n\n_L'art defensif,_ &c. Montalembert.\n\n_Journaux des sieges de Flandre.\n\n_Relations des sieges en Europe,_ &c, Musset-Fathay. A very valuable and\ninteresting work.\n\n_Relation du siege de Metz.\n\n_Relation du siege d'Anvers.\n\n_Les sieges de Jaffa et de St. Jean d'Acre.\n\n_Les sieges de Saragosse et de Tortose._ Rogniat.\n\n_Siege de Dantzick._ Sainte-Susanne.\n\n_Memoire sur la fortification permanente.--_Sea.\n\n_Le siege de Constantine._\n\n_Elemens de fortification._ Trincano.\n\n_Des places fortes._ Valaze.\n\n_Essay on Military Bridges._Douglas. A valuable work.\n\n_Guide du pontonier._ Drieu.\n\n_Memoire sur la guerre souterraine._ Contele.\n\n_Traite des mines._ Etienne.\n\n_Traite de l'art du mineur._ Geuss.\n\n_Traite de fortification souterraine._ Gillot.\n\n_Traite pratique et theorique des mines._ Lebrun.\n\n_Nouveau traite des mines,_ &c. Prudhomme.\n\n_Manuel du sapeur._ Used in the French service.\n\n_Manuel du mineur._ \" \"\"\n\n_Manuel du pontonier. \" \"\"\n\n_Essay on Field Fortifications._ Pleydell.\n\n_Elements of Field Fortifications._ Lochee.\n\n_Relation du siege de Grave et Mayence._\n\n_Sieges de Genes._ Thiebault.\n\n_Traite de fortification souterraine._ Mouze.\n\n_Militairische Mittheilungen._ Xilander.\n\n_Die Befestigung der Statten._ Hauser.\n\n_Abhandlung ueber die Befestigungskunst,_&c. Hauser\n\n_Versuch ueber die Verschanzungskunst._ Muller.\n\n_Course of Elementary Fortification. _Pasley. This is a work of much\ndetail--useful, no doubt, to an uneducated engineer soldier, but to an\nofficer at all acquainted with his profession, it must seem ridiculously\nminute.\n\nTo the above list might be added a long list of books on that branch of\nthe engineer's art called _constructions_; but as this part of the\nprofession is, in some degree, common both to the civil and military\nengineer, it is not deemed necessary to include works of this character\nin a list of books strictly military.]\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XV.\n\nMILITARY EDUCATION APPOINTMENT AND PROMOTION.\n\n\nWith the Romans, six years' instruction was required to make a soldier;\nand so great importance did these ancient conquerors of the world attach\nto military education and discipline, that the very name of their army\nwas derived from the verb _to practise._\n\nModern nations, learning from experience that military success depends\nmore upon skill and discipline than upon numbers, have generally adopted\nthe same rule as the Romans; and nearly all of the European powers have\nestablished military schools for the education of their officers and the\ninstruction of their soldiers.\n\nFrance, which has long taken the lead in military science, has six\nmilitary schools for the instruction of officers, containing in all more\nthan one thousand pupils, and numerous division and regimental schools\nfor the sub-officers and soldiers.\n\nPrussia maintains some twelve general schools for military education,\nwhich contain about three thousand pupils, and also numerous division,\nbrigade, garrison, and company schools for practical instruction.\n\nAustria has some fifty military schools, which contain in all about four\nthousand pupils.\n\nRussia has thirty-five engineer and artillery technical schools, with\nabout two thousand pupils; twenty-five military schools for the\nnoblesse, containing eight thousand seven hundred pupils; _corps\nd'armee_ schools, with several thousand pupils; regimental schools, with\neleven thousand pupils; and brigade-schools, with upwards of one hundred\nand fifty-six thousand scholars;--making in all about two hundred\nthousand pupils in her military schools!\n\nEngland has five military schools of instruction for officers, number of\npupils not known; a military orphan school, with about twelve thousand\npupils; and numerous depot and regimental schools of practice.\n\nThe smaller European powers--Belgium, Sardinia, Naples, Spain, Portugal,\nDenmark, Sweden, Wurtemberg, Bavaria, Baden, have each several military\nschools, with a large number of pupils.\n\nIt is seen from these statistics, that the European powers are not so\nnegligent in educating their officers, and in instructing and\ndisciplining their soldiers, as some in this country would have us\nbelieve.\n\nWashington, Hamilton, Knox, Pickering, and others, learning, by their\nown experience in the war of the American revolution, the great\nnecessity of military education, urged upon our government, as early as\n1783, the importance of establishing a military academy in this country,\nbut the subject continued to be postponed from year to year till 1802.\nIn 1794, the subaltern grade of _cadet_ was created by an act of\nCongress, the officers of this grade being attached to their regiments,\nand \"furnished at the public expense with the necessary books,\ninstruments, and apparatus\" for their instruction. But this plan of\neducating young officers at their posts was found impracticable, and in\nhis last annual message, Dec. 7th, 1796, Washington urged again, in\nstrong language, the establishment of a military academy, where a\nregular course of military instruction could be given. \"Whatever\nargument,\" said he, \"may be drawn from particular examples,\nsuperficially viewed, a thorough examination of the subject will evince\nthat the art of war is both comprehensive and complicated; that it\ndemands much previous study; and that the possession of it in its most\nimproved and perfect state is always of great moment to the security of\na nation.\"\n\nThe subject was however postponed from time to time, till March, 1802,\nwhen a bill was passed establishing the _Military Academy_. It was at\nfirst on a small scale, and its course of instruction meager and\ndeficient. It gradually became enlarged, but lingered along, with no\ngreat improvement, till 1817, when Capt. Patridge was dismissed from the\nsuperintendency, and Col. Thayer put in charge. From this period we date\nthe commencement of the success and reputation which the Military\nAcademy has since enjoyed.\n\nThis institution, as now organized, consists of one cadet from each\ncongressional district, and a few at large, making an average of two\nhundred and thirty-seven. The course of instruction is four years, after\nwhich time the cadet is sent to his regiment or corps, with higher rank\nif there are vacancies, but if there are no vacancies, he goes as a\ncadet, with the brevet rank of the next higher grade.\n\nThe examination for admission to the institution is a very limited one,\nbeing confined to the elementary branches of an English education.\n\nThe annual course at the academy is divided into two distinct periods,\nthe first extending from June till September, and the second from\nSeptember to the following June. During the first period, the cadets\nleave their barracks and encamp in tents, and are made subject to the\npolice and discipline of an army in time of war. In addition to the\nthorough and severe course of practical exercises and drills in the\ndifferent arms during these three summer months of each year, they are\nmade to perform the same tours of guard-duty, night and day, as is\nrequired of the common soldier in time of actual war. This continues\ntill the first of September of each year, when the cadets return to\ntheir barracks, and for the remaining nine months devote themselves to\nthe prescribed course of scientific and military studies, intermixed\nwith military exercises and practical operations in the laboratory and\non the field.\n\nTo test the progress of the cadets in their studies, there are held\nsemi-annual public examinations. These examinations are strict and\nsevere, and all who fail to come up to the fixed standard are obliged to\nwithdraw from the institution, to allow some one else from the same\ndistrict to make the trial.\n\nDuring their course of studies the cadets, as warrant-officers of the\narmy, draw pay barely sufficient to defray their necessary expenses. The\nallowance to each is twenty-six dollars per month, but none of this is\npaid to the cadet, but is applied to the purchase of books, fuel,\nlights, clothing, board, &c.\n\nThis institution furnishes each year to the army about forty subaltern\nofficers, thoroughly instructed in all the theoretical and practical\nduties of their profession. After completing this course, the cadet is\nusually promoted from the grade of warrant-officer to that of a\ncommissioned officer, and is immediately put on duty with his regiment\nor corps.\n\nThis system of appointment to the army has produced the most\nsatisfactory results, and has received the commendation of our best\nmilitary men, and the approbation of all our presidents and most able\nstatesmen. Nevertheless, it has occasionally met with strong opposition;\nthis opposition springing in part from a want of proper information\nrespecting the character and working of the system, and in part from the\ncombined efforts of those who from negligence or incapacity have failed\nto pass their examinations for promotion, and of those who, from a\nconscious want of qualifications or merit, feel assured that they cannot\nobtain commissions in the army so long as this system of merit, as fixed\nby examination, shall exist. Hence the effort to destroy the Military\nAcademy and to throw the army entirely open to _political_ appointment.\n\nSeveral legislative bodies, acting under these combined influences, have\npassed resolutions, giving various objections to the Military Academy,\nand recommending that it be abolished. The objections made by the\nlegislatures of Tennessee, Ohio, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Maine,\nare mostly founded on false information, and may be readily answered by\nreference to the official records of the War-office. But it is not the\npresent object to enter into a general discussion of the charges against\nthat institution, except so far as they are connected with the\nimportance of military education, and the rules of military appointment\nand promotion.\n\nIt has been alleged by many of the opponents of the West Point Academy,\nthat military instruction is of little or no advantage to a\ngeneral;--that in the wars of Napoleon, and in the American Revolution,\nand the American war of 1812, armies were generally led to victory by\nmen without a military education, and unacquainted with military\nscience;--and that in the event of another war in this country, we must\nseek our generals in the ranks of civil life, rather than among the\ngraduates of our Military Academy.\n\nThe objection here made to military education will hold with equal\nforce against education in any other profession. We sometimes find men\nwho have become eminent in the pulpit and at the bar, or in medicine and\nthe sciences, without ever having enjoyed the advantages of an education\nin academic or collegiate halls, and perhaps even without that\npreliminary instruction usually deemed necessary for professional\npursuits. Shall we therefore abolish all our colleges, theological\nseminaries, schools of law and medicine, our academies and primary\nschools, and seek for our professional men among the uneducated and the\nignorant? If professional ignorance be a recommendation in our generals,\nwhy not also in our lawyers and our surgeons? If we deem professional\ninstruction requisite for the care of our individual property and\nhealth, shall we require less for guarding the honor and safety of our\ncountry, the reputation of our arms, and the lives of thousands of our\ncitizens?\n\nBut in reality, were not these men to whom we have alluded eminent in\ntheir several professions _in spite of,_ rather than _by means of_ their\nwant of a professional education? And have not such men, feeling the\ndisadvantages under which they were forced to labor, been almost without\nexception the advocates of education in others?\n\nBut is it true that most of the generals of distinction in the more\nrecent wars were men destitute of military education,--men who rose from\nthe ranks to the pinnacle of military glory, through the combined\ninfluence of ignorance of military science and contempt for military\ninstruction? Let us glance at the lives of the most distinguished of the\ngenerals of the French Revolution, for these are the men to whom\nreference is continually made to prove that the Military Academy is an\nunnecessary and useless institution, the best generals being invariably\nfound in the ranks of an army, and _not_ in the ranks of military\nschools. Facts may serve to convince, where reasoning is of no avail.\n\nNapoleon himself was a pupil of the military schools of Brienne and\nParis, and had all the advantages of the best military and scientific\ninstruction given in France.\n\nDessaix was a pupil of the military school of Effiat, with all the\nadvantages which wealth and nobility could procure. Davoust was a pupil\nof the military school of Auxerre, and a fellow-pupil with Napoleon in\nthe military school of Paris. Kleber was educated at the military school\nof Bavaria. Eugene Beauharnais was a pupil of St. Germain-en-Loye, and\nhad for his military instructor the great captain of the age. His whole\nlife was devoted to the military art. Berthier and Marmont were both\nsons of officers, and, being early intended for the army, they received\nmilitary educations. Lecourbe had also the advantages of a military\neducation before entering the army. Pichegru and Duroc were pupils of\nthe military school of Brienne. Drouet was a pupil of the artillery\nschool. Foy was first educated in the college of Soissons, and\nafterwards in the military schools of La Fere and Chalons. Carnot,\ncalled the \"Organizer of French victory,\" received a good early\neducation, and was also a pupil of the engineer school of Mezieres.\n\nSeveral of the distinguished French generals at first received good\nscientific and literary educations in the colleges of France, and then\nacquired their military instruction in the subordinate grades of the\narmy; and by this means, before their promotion to responsible offices,\nacquired a thorough practical instruction, founded on a basis of a\nthorough preliminary education. Such was Suchet, a pupil of the college\nof Lisle-Barbe; Lannes, a pupil of the college of Lectoure; and Mortier,\nwho was most carefully educated at Cambrai; Lefebvre and Murat were both\neducated for the church, though the latter profited but little by his\ninstruction; Moreau and Joubert were educated for the bar; Massena was\nnot a college graduate, but he received a good preliminary education,\nand for several years before he entered the army as an officer, he had\nenjoyed all the advantages afforded by leisure and affluent\ncircumstances; Ney, though poor, received a good preliminary education,\nand entered a notary's office to study a profession. Hoche was destitute\nof the advantages of early education, but, anxious to supply this\ndeficiency, he early distinguished himself by his efforts to procure\nbooks, and by his extraordinary devotion to military studies. By several\nyears devoted in this way to professional studies and the practical\nduties of a subordinate grade in the army, Hoche acquired a military\nknowledge which early distinguished him among the generals of the French\nRevolution. Soult and Gouvion-Saint-Cyr, being of parents in limited\ncircumstances, had not the advantages of extensive education, but close\nand diligent application, an ardent ambition, and strong and powerful\nintellect, combined with long years of service in the practical\noperations of the field, at length enabled these men to overcome all\nobstacles, and force their way to the higher walks of their professions.\nBut both knew from experience the advantages of military instruction,\nand the importance of professional education in the army, and they have\nconsequently both been the warmest friends and strongest advocates of\nthe military schools of France.\n\nThe Polytechnic School was established too late to furnish officers for\nany of the earlier wars of Napoleon; but in his last campaigns he began\nto reap the advantages of an institution which had been under his\nfostering care, and Bertrand, Dode, Duponthon, Haxo, Rogniat, Fleury,\nValaze, Gourgaud, Chamberry, and a host of other distinguished young\ngenerals, fully justified the praises which the emperor lavished on his\n\"_poulet aux oeufs d'or\"_--the hen that laid him golden eggs!\n\nIn our own revolutionary war, Generals Washington, Hamilton, Gates,\nSchuyler, Knox, Alexander, (Lord Stirling,) the two Clintons, the Lees,\nand others, were men of fine education, and a part of them of high\nliterary and scientific attainments; Washington, Gates, Charles Lee, the\nClintons, and some others, had considerable military experience even\nbefore the war: nevertheless, so destitute was the army, generally, of\nmilitary science, that the government was under the necessity of seeking\nit in foreigners--in the La Fayettes, the Kosciuskos, the Steubens, the\nDe Kalbs, the Pulaskis, the Duportails--who were immediately promoted to\nthe highest ranks in our army. In fact the officers of our scientific\ncorps were then nearly all foreigners.\n\nBut, say the opponents of the Academy, military knowledge and education\nare not the only requisites for military success; youthful enterprise\nand efficiency are far more important than a mere acquaintance with\nmilitary science and the military art: long service in garrison,\ncombined with the indolent habits acquired by officers of a\npeace-establishment, so deadens the enterprise of the older officers of\nthe army, that it must inevitably result, in case of war, that military\nenergy and efficiency will be derived from the ranks of civil life.\n\nWe are not disposed to question the importance of youthful energy in the\ncommander of an army, and we readily admit that while seeking to secure\nto our service a due degree of military knowledge, we should also be\nvery careful not to destroy its influence by loading it down with the\ndead weights of effete seniority. But we do question the wisdom of the\nmeans proposed for supplying our army with this desired efficiency.\nMinds stored with vast funds of professional knowledge, and the rich\nlore of past history; judgments ripened by long study and experience;\nwith passions extinguished, or at least softened by the mellowing\ninfluence of age--these may be best suited for judges and statesmen, for\nhere there is time for deliberation, for the slow and mature judgment of\nyears. But for a general in the field, other qualities are also\nrequired. Not only is military knowledge requisite for _directing_ the\nblow, but he must also have the military energy necessary for _striking_\nthat blow, and the military activity necessary for parrying the attacks\nof the enemy. A rapid _coup d'oeil_ prompt decision, active movements,\nare as indispensable as sound judgment; for the general must _see_, and\n_decide_, and _act_, all in the same instant. Accordingly we find that\nmost great generals of ancient and modern times have gained their\nlaurels while still young.\n\nPhilip of Macedon ascended the throne at the age of twenty-two, and soon\ndistinguished himself in his wars with the neighboring states. At the\nage of forty-five he had conquered all Greece. He died at forty-seven.\n\nAlexander the Great had defeated the celebrated Theban band at the\nbattle of Cheronea, and gained a military reputation at the age of\neighteen. He ascended the throne of his father Philip before twenty, and\nat twenty-five had reached the zenith of his military glory, having\nalready conquered the world. He died before the age of thirty-two.\n\nJulius Caesar commanded the fleet sent to blockade Mitylene, where he\ngreatly distinguished himself before the age of twenty-two. He soon\nafter held the important offices of tribune, quaestor, and edile. He had\ncompleted his first war in Spain, and was made consul at Rome before the\nage of forty. He twice crossed the Rhine, and conquered all Gaul, and\nhad twice passed over to Britain, before the age of forty-five; at\nfifty-two he had won the field of Pharsalia, and attained the supreme\npower. He died in the fifty-sixth year of his age, the victor of five\nhundred battles, and the conqueror of a thousand cities.\n\nHannibal joined the Carthaginian army in Spain at twenty-two, and was\nmade commander-in-chief at twenty-six. Victorious in Spain and France,\nhe crossed the Alps and won the battle of Cannae before the age of\nthirty-one.\n\nScipio Africanus, (the elder,) at the age of sixteen distinguished\nhimself at the battle of Ticinus; at twenty was made edile, and soon\nafter pro-consul in Spain; at twenty-nine he won the great battle of\nZama, and closed his military career. Scipio Africanus (the younger)\nalso distinguished himself in early life; at the age of thirty six he\nhad conquered the Carthaginian armies and completed the destruction of\nCarthage.\n\nGengis-Khan succeeded to the domain of his father at the age of\nthirteen, and almost immediately raised an army of thirty thousand men,\nwith which he defeated a numerous force of rebels, who had thought to\ntake advantage of his extreme youth to withdraw from his dominion. He\nsoon acquired a military reputation by numerous conquests, and before\nthe age of forty had made himself emperor of Mogul.\n\nCharlemagne was crowned king at twenty-six, conquered Aquitania at\ntwenty-eight, made himself master of France and the greater part of\nGermany at twenty-nine, placed on his brows the iron crown of Italy at\nthirty-two, and conquered Spain at thirty-six.\n\nGonsalvo de Cordova, the \"great captain,\" entered the army at fifteen,\nand before the age of seventeen had acquired a brilliant military\nreputation, and was knighted by the king himself on the field of battle;\nat forty-one he was promoted over the heads of older veterans and made\ncommander-in-chief of the army in Italy.\n\nHenry IV. of France was placed at the head of the Huguenot army at the\nage of sixteen, at nineteen he became king of Navarre; at forty he had\noverthrown all his enemies, placed himself on the throne of France, and\nbecome the founder of a new dynasty.\n\nMontecuculi, at the age of thirty-one, with two thousand horse, attacked\nten thousand Swedes and captured all their baggage and artillery; at\nthirty-two he gained the victory of Triebel, at forty-nine defeated the\nSwedes and saved Denmark, and at fifty-three defeated the Turks at the\ngreat battle of St. Gothard. In his campaigns against the French at a\nlater age, he made it his chief merit, \"not that he conquered, but that\nhe was not conquered.\"\n\nSaxe entered the army at the early age of twelve, and soon obtained the\ncommand of a regiment of horse; at twenty-four he became\n_marechal-de-camp_, at forty-four marshal of France, and at forty-nine\ngained the celebrated victory of Fontenoy. He died at the age of\nfifty-four.\n\nVauban entered the army of Conde as a cadet at the age of seventeen, at\ntwenty was made a lieutenant, at twenty-four he commanded two companies,\nat forty-one was a brigadier, at forty-three a _marechal-de-camp_, and\nat forty-five commissaire-general of all the fortifications of France.\nAt the age of twenty-five he had himself conducted several sieges, and\nhad assisted at many others.\n\nTurenne entered the army before the age of fourteen; he served one year\nas a volunteer, four years as a captain, four years as a colonel, three\nyears as a major-general, five years as a lieutenant-general, and became\na marshal of France at thirty-two. He had won all his military\nreputation by the age of forty.\n\nPrince Maurice commanded an army at the age of sixteen, and acquired his\nmilitary reputation in very early life. He died at fifty-eight.\n\nThe great Conde immortalized his name at the battle of Rocroi, in which,\nat the age of twenty-two, he defeated the Spaniards. He had won all his\ngreat military fame before the age of twenty-five.\n\nPrince Eugene of Savoy was a colonel at twenty-one, a\nlieutenant-field-marshal at twenty-four, and soon after, a\ngeneral-field-marshal. He gained the battle of Zenta at thirty-four, and\nof Blenheim at forty-one. At the opening of the war of 1733, he again\nappeared at the head of the army at the advanced age of sixty-nine, but\nhaving lost the vigor and fire of youth, he effected nothing of\nimportance.\n\nPeter the Great of Russia was proclaimed czar at ten years of age; at\ntwenty he organized a large army and built several ships; at twenty-four\nhe fought the Turks and captured Asoph; at twenty-eight he made war with\nSweden; at thirty he entered Moscow in triumph after the victory of\nEmbach, and the capture of Noteburg and Marienburg; at thirty-one he\nbegan the city of St. Petersburg; at thirty-nine he was defeated by the\nTurks and forced to ransom himself and army. His latter years were\nmostly devoted to civil and maritime affairs. He died at the age of\nfifty-five.\n\nCharles the XII. of Sweden ascended the throne at the age of fifteen,\ncompleted his first successful campaign against Denmark at eighteen,\noverthrew eighty thousand Russians at Narva before nineteen, conquered\nPoland and Saxony at twenty-four, and died at thirty-six.\n\nFrederick the Great of Prussia ascended the throne at twenty-eight, and\nalmost immediately entered on that career of military glory which has\nimmortalized his name. He established his reputation in the first\nSilesian war, which he terminated at the age of thirty. The second\nSilesian war was terminated at thirty-three; and at forty-three, with a\npopulation of five millions, he successfully opposed a league of more\nthan one hundred millions of people.\n\nPrince Henry of Prussia served his first campaign as colonel of a\nregiment at sixteen; at the age of thirty-one he decided the victory of\nPrague, and the same year was promoted to the command of a separate\narmy. The military reputation he acquired in the Seven Years' War was\nsecond only to that of Frederick.\n\nCortes had effected the conquest of Mexico, and completed his military\ncareer, at the age of thirty-six.\n\nSandoval, the most eminent of his great captains, died at the age of\nthirty-one. He had earned his great renown, and closed his military\nachievements, before the age of twenty-five.\n\nPizarro completed the conquest of Peru at thirty-five, and died about\nforty.\n\nLord Clive began his military career at twenty-two, and had reached the\nzenith of his military fame at thirty-five; he was raised to the peerage\nat thirty-six, and died at fifty.\n\nHastings began his military service at about twenty-five, and became\ngovernor of Bengal at forty.\n\nNapoleon was made a lieutenant at seventeen, a captain at twenty,\n_chef-de-bataillon_ at twenty-four, general of brigade at twenty-five,\nand commander-in-chief of the army of Italy at twenty-six. All his most\ndistinguished generals were, like him, young men, and they seconded him\nin his several campaigns with all the energy and activity of youthful\nvalor and enthusiasm.\n\nDessaix entered the army at fifteen; at the opening of the war he\nquickly passed through the lower grades, and became a general of brigade\nbefore the age of twenty-five, and a general of division at twenty-six;\nhe died before the age of thirty-two, with a reputation second only to\nthat of Napoleon.\n\nKleber did not enter the army till later in life, but he quickly passed\nthrough the subordinate grades, and was made a general of brigade at\nthirty-eight, a general of division at forty, and general-in-chief of\nan army at forty-one: he died at forty-six. On his death, and in\nNapoleon's absence, Menau, aged and inefficient, succeeded by right of\nseniority to the command of the army of Egypt. Its utter ruin was the\nalmost immediate consequence.\n\nMassena first entered the army at seventeen, but soon married a rich\nwife, and retired to civil life. He returned to the army at the opening\nof the revolution, and in two years, before the age of thirty-five, was\npromoted to the rank of general of division. He immediately acquired\nthat high reputation which he sustained through a long career of\nmilitary glory.\n\nSoult became a sub-lieutenant at twenty-two, a captain at twenty-four;\nthe following year he passed through the several grades of\n_chef-de-bataillon_, colonel, and general of brigade, and became general\nof division at twenty-nine.\n\nDavoust was a sub-lieutenant at seventeen, a general of brigade at\ntwenty-three, and general of division at twenty-five.\n\nEugene Beauharnais entered the army at a very early age. He became\n_chef-de-bataillon_ at nineteen, colonel at twenty-one, general of\nbrigade at twenty-three, and Viceroy of Italy at twenty-five. He soon\nproved himself one of Napoleon's ablest generals. At twenty-eight he\ncommanded the army of Italy, and at thirty-one gained great glory in the\nRussian campaign, at the head of the fourth _corps d'armee._\n\nGouvion-Saint-Cyr enured the army at the beginning of the Revolution,\nand passing rapidly through the lower grades, became a general of\nbrigade at twenty-nine, and a general of division at thirty.\n\nSuchet became a _chef-de-bataillon_ at twenty, general of brigade at\ntwenty-five, major-general of Brune's army at twenty-seven, and general\nof division and of a _corps d'armee_ at twenty-eight.\n\nOudinot became a captain at twenty-three, _chef-de-bataillon_ at\ntwenty-four, general of brigade at twenty-five, and general of division\nat twenty-eight.\n\nNey was a captain at twenty-three, adjutant-general at twenty-six,\ngeneral of brigade at twenty-seven, and general of division at\ntwenty-nine.\n\nLannes was a colonel at twenty-seven, general of brigade at\ntwenty-eight, and very soon after general of division.\n\nJoubert became adjutant-general at twenty-five, general of brigade at\ntwenty-six, general of division at twenty-eight, and general-in-chief of\nthe army of Italy at twenty-nine. He died at thirty.\n\nVictor was a _chef-de-bataillon_ at twenty-seven, general of brigade at\ntwenty-nine, and general of division at thirty-two.\n\nMurat was a lieutenant at twenty, and passing rapidly through the lower\ngrades, he became a general of brigade at twenty-five, and a general of\ndivision at twenty-seven.\n\nMortier was a captain at twenty-three, adjutant-general at twenty-five,\ngeneral of brigade at thirty, and general of division at thirty-one.\n\nMacdonald was a colonel at twenty-seven, a general of brigade at\ntwenty-seven, and a general of division at thirty.\n\nMarmont was a captain at twenty-one, _chef-de-bataillon_ at twenty-two,\ngeneral of brigade at twenty-four, inspector general at twenty-seven,\nand general-in-chief of an army at thirty-two.\n\nBernadotte was a colonel at twenty-eight, general of brigade at\ntwenty-nine, and general of division at thirty.\n\nLefebvre was made a captain at the organization of the army in 1793; he\nbecame a general of brigade at thirty-eight, and general of division at\nthirty-nine.\n\nBessieres entered the army at twenty-six, became a colonel at thirty,\ngeneral of brigade at thirty-two, and general of division at\nthirty-four. He died at forty-seven.\n\nDuroc was a captain at twenty-three, _chef-de-bataillon_ at twenty-six,\ncolonel and _chef-de-brigade_ at twenty-seven, and general of division\nat thirty. He died at forty-one.\n\nThis list might be still further extended with the same results, but\nnames enough have been given to show that the generals who assisted\nNapoleon in his immortal campaigns were all, with scarcely an exception,\n_young men_, still burning with the fires of youthful ardor and\nenthusiasm. The grade of marshal was not created till after Napoleon\nbecame emperor. On ascending the throne of the empire, he nominated to\nthis rank eighteen of the most distinguished generals of France. Some of\nthese were generals of the earlier wars of the Revolution, and had never\nserved under him. Others were younger men, several being only\nthirty-four, thirty-five, and thirty-six years of age. The mean age of\nall was forty-four. He afterwards made seven more marshals, whose mean\nage was forty-three. These appointments, however, were regarded as\nrewards for _past_ services, rather than as a grade from which service\nwas expected, for several of the older marshals were never called into\nthe field after their promotion.\n\nHaving noticed the ages of the principal generals who commanded in the\narmies of Napoleon, let us look for a moment at those who opposed him.\nIn the campaign of 1796 the enemy's forces were directed by Beaulieu,\nthen nearly eighty years of age; Wurmser, also an octogenarian, and\nAlvinzi, then over seventy: these had all three distinguished themselves\nin earlier life, but had now lost that youthful energy and activity so\nessential for a military commander.\n\nIn the campaign of 1800 the general-in-chief of the Austrian forces was\nMelas, an old general, who had served some fifty years in the army; he\nhad distinguished himself so long ago as the Seven Years' War, but he\nhad now become timid and inefficient, age having destroyed his energy.\n\nIn the campaign of 1805 the French were opposed by Kutusof, then sixty,\nand Mack, then fifty-three; the plan of operations was drawn up by still\nmore aged generals of the Aulic council.\n\nIn the campaign of 1806 the French were opposed by the Duke of\nBrunswick, then seventy-one, Hohenlohe, then sixty, and Mollendorf,\nKleist, and Massenbach, old generals, who had served under the great\nFrederick,--men, says Jomini, \"exhumed from the Seven Years'\nWar,\"--\"whose faculties were frozen by age,\"--\"who had been buried for\nthe last ten years in a lethargic sleep.\"\n\nIn the campaign of 1807 the French were opposed by Kamenski, then eighty\nyears of age, Benningsen, then sixty, and Buxhowden, then fifty-six. The\nAllies now began to profit by their experience, and in 1809 the Austrian\narmy was led by the young, active, skilful, and energetic Archduke\nCharles; and this campaign, although the commander-in-chief was somewhat\nfettered by the foolish projects of the old generals of the Aulic\ncouncil, and thwarted by the disobedience of his brother, was\nnevertheless the most glorious in the Austrian annals of the wars of the\nRevolution.\n\nAt the opening of the campaign of 1812 the Emperor Alexander, young,\n(only thirty-five,) active, intelligent, and ambitious, had remodelled\nhis army, and infused into it his own energy and enthusiastic love of\nglory. He was himself at its head, and directed its operations. Kutusof\nwas for a short time the nominal commander-in-chief, and exhibited an\nactivity unusual at his age, but he was surrounded by younger\ngenerals--Barclay-de-Tolley, and Miloradowich, then forty-nine,\nWintzengerode, then forty-three, Schouvalof, then thirty-five, and the\nArchduke Constantine, then thirty-three,--generals who, at the heads of\ntheir corps, and under the young emperor and his able staff of young\nofficers, in the two succeeding campaigns, rolled back the waves of\nFrench conquest, and finally overthrew the French empire. Wellington,\nwho led the English in these campaigns, was of the same age as Napoleon,\nand had been educated at the same time with him in the military schools\nof France. The Austrians were led by Schwartzenburg, then only about\nthirty, and the Prussians by Yorck, Bulow, and Bluecher. The last of\nthese was then well advanced in life, but all his movements being\ndirected by younger men,--Scharnhorst and Gneisenau,--his operations\npartook of the energy of his able chiefs of staff.\n\nIn the campaign of 1815, Napoleon was opposed by the combinations of\nWellington and Gneisenau, both younger men than most of his own\ngenerals, who, it is well known, exhibited, in this campaign, less than\nin former ones, the ardent energy and restless activity which had\ncharacterized their younger days. Never were Napoleon's, plans better\nconceived, never did his troops fight with greater bravery; but the\ndilatory movements of his generals enabled his active enemies to parry\nthe blow intended for their destruction.\n\nIn the American war of 1812, we pursued the same course as Austria,\nPrussia, and Russia, in their earlier contests with Napoleon, _i.e._, to\nsupply our armies with generals, we dug up the Beaulieus, the Wurmsers,\nthe Alvinzis, the Melases, the Macks, the Brunswicks, and the Kamenskis\nof our revolutionary war; but after we had suffered sufficiently from\nthe Hulls, the Armstrongs, the Winchesters, the Dearborns, the\nWilkinsons, the Hamptons, and other veterans of the Revolution, we also\nchanged our policy, and permitted younger men--the Jacksons, the\nHarrisons, the Browns, the McReas, the Scotts,[49] the Ripleys, the\nWoods, the McCombs, the Wools, and the Millers--to lead our forces to\nvictory and to glory. In the event of another war, with any nation\ncapable of opposing to us any thing like a powerful resistance, shall we\nagain exhume the veterans of former days, and again place at the head of\nour armies respectable and aged inefficiency; or shall we seek out\nyouthful enterprise and activity combined with military science and\ninstruction? The results of the war, the honor of the country, the glory\nof our arms, depend, in a great measure, upon the answer that will be\ngiven to this question.\n\n[Footnote 49: Scott had acquired his military reputation, and attained\nthe rank of major-general at twenty-eight.]\n\nBut it may be asked, how are we to secure this combination of military\ninstruction and military energy; how are we to fill the higher grades of\nour army with young and active men possessing due military instruction\nand talent? The question is not a difficult one, and our government can\neasily attain the desired object, if it will only set at work honestly,\ndisregarding all party prejudices and the mercenary and selfish\ninterests of its own members and advisers. Other governments have\npointed out to us the way. It is this: let _merit_ be the main test for\nall appointments and promotions in the army. Let one or more of the\nsubordinate grades be thrown open to the youth of the whole country,\nwithout distinction as to birth, or wealth, or politics; let them be\nkept on probation in this subordinate grade, and be thoroughly\ninstructed in all that relates to the military profession; after strict\nexamination let them be promoted to the vacancies in the higher grades\nas rapidly as they shall show themselves qualified for the duties of\nthose grades, merit and services being here as elsewhere the only tests.\n\nThe first part of this rule is already accomplished by the Military\nAcademy. One young man is selected from each congressional district, on\nan average, once in about two years, the selection being made by the\nrepresentative of the district; these young men are made warrant\nofficers in the army, and sent to a military post for instruction;\nfrequent and strict examinations are instituted to determine their\ncapacity and fitness for military service; after a probation of a\ncertain length of time, the _best_ are selected for commission in the\narmy, relative rank and appointments to corps being made strictly with\nreference to merit; birth, wealth, influence of political friends--all\nextraneous circumstances being excluded from consideration. What can be\nmore truly and thoroughly democratic than this? What scheme can be\nbetter devised to supply our army with good officers, and to exclude\nfrom the military establishment the corrupting influence of party\npolitics, and to prevent commissions in the army from being given to\n\"the sons of wealthy and influential men, to the almost total exclusion\nof the sons of the poor and less influential men, regardless alike of\nqualifications and of merit?\"\n\nUnfortunately for the army and for the country this system ends here,\nand all further advancement is made by mere seniority, or by executive\nfavoritism, the claims of merit having but little or no further\ninfluence. Indeed, executive patronage is not infrequently permitted to\nencroach even upon these salutary rules of appointment, and to place\nrelatives and political friends into the higher ranks of commissioned\nofficers directly from civil life, \"regardless alike of qualifications\nand of merit,\" while numbers \"of sons of the poor and less influential\nmen,\" who have served a probation of four or five years in military\nstudies and exercises, and have proved themselves, in some thirty\nexaminations made by competent boards of military officers, to be most\neminently qualified for commissions, are passed by in utter neglect! Our\narmy is much more open to this kind of favoritism and political\npartiality, than that of almost any of the governments of Europe, which\nwe have been accustomed to regard as aristocratic and wholly unfriendly\nto real merit.\n\nIn the Prussian service, in time of peace, the government can appoint no\none, even to the subordinate grade of ensign, till he has followed the\ncourses of instruction of the division or brigade-school of his arm, and\nhas passed a satisfactory examination. And, \"no ensign can be promoted\nto a higher grade till after his promotion has been agreed to by the\nsuperior board or commission of examiners at Berlin, and his name has\nbeen placed on the list of those whose knowledge and acquirements\n(_connaissances_) render them qualified (_aptes_) for the responsible\nduties of their profession. The nomination to the grade of\nsecond-lieutenant is not, even after all these conditions are fulfilled,\nleft to the choice of the government. When a vacancy occurs in this\ngrade, the subaltern officers present to the commandant of the regiment\na list of three ensigns who have completed their course of study; the\ncommandant, after taking the advice of the superior officers of the\nregiment, nominates the most meritorious of these three to the king, who\nmakes the appointment.\" The government can appoint to the engineers and\nartillery only those who have been instructed as _eleves_ in the Berlin\nschool of cadets and the school of artillery and engineers, and these\nappointments must be made in the order in which the pupils have passed\ntheir final examination. In these corps the lieutenants and second\ncaptains can be promoted to a higher grade only after they have passed a\nsatisfactory examination. No political influence, nor even royal\npartiality, can interfere with this rule.\n\nEven in the arbitrary monarchies of Austria and Russia it is deemed\nnecessary to subject all military appointments and promotions, in the\npeace establishments, to certain fixed rules. In the Austrian army all\nsub-lieutenants must be taken from the military schools, or the\nspecially-instructed corps of cadets and imperial guards; from this\ngrade to that of captain all promotions are made by the commandants of\nregiments and corps on the advice of the other superior officers. Above\nthe grade of captain all nominations for promotion are made to the\nemperor by the Aulic Council, in the order of seniority of rank, except\nthe claims of superior merit interfere. \"In the Russian army,\" says\nHaillot, \"no one, not even a prince of the imperial family, can reach\nthe grade of officer till he has satisfactorily passed his several\nexaminations, or finished the severe novitiate to which the cadets in\nthe corps are subjected.\" Promotion below the grade of colonel is made\npartly by seniority, and partly by merit; above that grade, by selection\nalone.\n\nIn the British service, rank in the line of the army is obtained by\npurchase, and the higher grades are in this way filled with young men of\nenergy and enterprise; but this efficiency is gained by injustice to the\npoor man, who is without the means of purchasing rank. In some respects\nit is preferable to our ruinous system of exclusive seniority and\nexecutive favoritism, but far more objectionable than that based on\nmerit. Wellington has recently said that the system of exclusive\nseniority would soon utterly destroy the efficiency of the army, by\npreventing young men from reaching the higher grades. \"At first,\" says\nan officer of some distinction in the British navy, in speaking of\npromotions in that arm of service, \"it certainly looks very hard to see\nold stagers grumbling away their existence in disappointed hopes; yet\nthere can be little doubt that the navy, and, of course, the country at\nlarge, are essentially better served by the present system of employing\nactive, young, and cheerful-minded officers, than they ever could be by\nany imaginable system by seniority. It must not be forgotten, indeed,\nthat at a certain stage of the profession, the arrangement by which\nofficers are promoted in turn is already made the rule, and has long\nbeen so: but, by a wise regulation, it does not come into operation\nbefore the rank of post-captain be attained. Antecedent to this point,\nthere must occur ample opportunities of weeding out those persons, who,\nif the rule of mere seniority were adopted, would exceedingly embarrass\nthe navy list.\" We fully agree with this writer respecting the evils of\na system of exclusive seniority, but not respecting the best means of\nremedying these evils. In England, where the wealthy and aristocratic\nclasses govern the state, they may very well prefer a system of military\nappointment and promotion based exclusively on wealth and political\ninfluence; but in this country we are taught to consider _merit_ as a\nclaim much higher than wealth, or rank, or privilege.\n\nThe various changes in the rules of appointment and promotion in the\nFrench service, and the various results of these changes, both on the\ncharacter of the army and the welfare of the state, are so instructive\nthat we regret that our limits will not allow us to enter into a full\ndiscussion of them. We can give only a very brief outline.\n\nPrevious to the Revolution, military appointment and promotion were\nwholly subject to the rules of nobility, certain grades in the army\nbelonging of right to certain grades of the _noblesse_; merit and\nservice being excluded from consideration. But the constituent assembly\nchanged this order of things, and established the rule that\nthree-fourths of the sub-lieutenants be appointed by selection, _after a\nconcours_, and the other quarter be appointed from the sub-officers,\nalternately by seniority and selection, without _concours_; the captains\nand lieutenants by seniority; the colonels and lieutenant-colonels\ntwo-thirds by seniority and one-third by selection; _marechaux-de-camp_\nand lieutenant-generals one-half by seniority and one-half by selection.\nIn 1793 the grades were still further opened to selection, and in the\nturbulent times that followed, a part of them were even thrown open to\nelection by the soldiers. But in 1795 the combined system of merit and\nseniority, with certain improvements, was restored. In 1796 and the wars\nthat followed, _merit_ was the only qualification required, and\nBonaparte, Moreau, and other young generals were actually placed in\ncommand of their seniors in rank. Military talent and military services,\nnot rank, were the recognised claims for promotion, the _baptism of\nblood_, as it was called, having equalized all grades. Bonaparte, in\nleaving Egypt, paid no attention to seniority of rank, but gave the\ncommand to Kleber, who was then only a general of brigade, while Menou\nwas a general of division. Everybody knows that on the death of Kleber,\nGeneral Menou succeeded in the command; and that Egypt, saved by the\n_selection_ of Kleber, was lost by the _seniority_ of Menou.\n\nNapoleon formed rules for promotion, both for peace and war, based on\nmerit. His peace regulations were much the same as the system of 1795;\nhis field regulations, however, from the circumstances of the times,\nwere almost the only ones used. The following extract from the\n_Reglement de Campagne_ of 1809, (title XX.,) gives the spirit of this\nsystem:--\"The next day after an action the generals of brigade will\npresent to the generals of division the names of all such as have\ndistinguished themselves in a particular manner; the generals of\ndivision will immediately report these to the commander-in-chief, and\nalso the names of the generals and superior officers whose conduct has\ncontributed most to secure success, so that the general-in-chief may\nimmediately inform his majesty.\"\n\nOn the restoration of the Bourbons there were also restored many of the\nancient privileges and claims of rank by the officers of the _maison\nmilitaire du roi,_ and court favoritism was substituted for merit and\nservice. But the revolution of 1830 produced a different order of\nthings. \"The laws now regulate military promotion; the king can appoint\nor promote only in conformity to legal prescriptions; and even in the\nexercise of this prerogative, he is wise enough to restrain himself by\ncertain fixed rules, which protect him from intrigues, and from the\nobsessions of persons of influence, and of party politicians.\" Would\nthat the same could always be said of the executive of this country in\nmaking appointments and promotions in the army.\n\nThe existing laws and regulations of the French service differ slightly\nfor different corps, but the general rule is as follows: No one can be\nappointed to the grade of officer in the army who has not graduated at\none of the military schools, or has not served at least two years as a\nsub-officer in a _corps d'armee_. In time of peace, no one can be\npromoted to the rank of lieutenant, captain, or major, (_chef-d'escadron_\nand _chef-de-bataillon_,) till he has served two years in the next\nlower grade; no one can be made lieutenant-colonel till he has served four\nyears, nor be made colonel till he has served three years, in the next\nlower grade; no one can be made _marechal-de-camp_, lieutenant-general,\nor marshal of France, till he has served two years in the next lower\ngrade. These numbers are all diminished one half in time of war. For the\ngrades of first-lieutenant and captain, two-thirds of the promotions are\nby seniority, and one-third by selection; for the _chef-de-bataillon_\nand _chef-d'escadron_, one-half by seniority and one-half by selection;\nfor all the other grades by selection only. In time of war, one-half of the\npromotions to the grades of first-lieutenant and captain are filled by\nselection, and all the promotions to other grades in this way. For\npromotion by selection, a list of the authorized candidates for each\ngrade is made out every year by inspectors, and boards of examiners\nappointed _ad hoc_, and the name, qualifications, and particular claim\nare given of each officer admitted to the _concours_. The\nrecommendations of these inspectors and examiners are almost invariably\nfollowed by the government in its selections. This combined system of\nseniority and merit secures a gradual promotion to all, and at the same\ntime enables officers of great talents and acquirements to attain the\nhigher grades while still young and efficient. Merit need not,\ntherefore, always linger in the subaltern grades, and be held\nsubordinate to ignorance and stupidity, merely because they happen to be\nendowed with the privileges of seniority. Moreover, government is\nprecluded from thrusting its own favorites into the higher grades, and\nplacing them over the heads of abler and better men.\n\nIf such a system of appointment were introduced into our army, and fixed\nby legal enactments, and no one were allowed to receive a commission\ntill he had either distinguished himself in the field, or had passed an\nexamination before a board of competent officers, we are confident that\nbetter selections would be made in the appointments from civil life than\nhave been within the last ten years by the present system of political\ninfluence. It would scarcely be possible to make worse selections.[50]\nAnd if the combined system of seniority and examination were pursued in\npromoting the subalterns already in service, it certainly would produce\nless injustice, and give greater efficiency to the army, than the\npresent one of exclusive seniority and brevet rank, obtained through\nintrigue and political influence, or high military appointments bestowed\nas a reward for dirty and corrupt party services. As a military maxim,\n_secure efficiency, by limiting the privileges of rank; exclude\nfavoritism, by giving the power of selection to boards of competent\nofficers, totally independent of party politics_. Such a system has been\nfor some time pursued in the medical department of our army; it has\nproduced the most satisfactory results; stupidity, ignorance, and aged\ninefficiency have been _overslaughed_, and will soon entirely disappear\nfrom that corps; they have been replaced by young men of activity,\ntalent, character, intelligence, and great professional skill. Is it\nless important to have competent military officers to command where the\nlives of thousands, the honor of our flag, the safety of the country\ndepend upon their judgment and conduct, than it is to have competent\nsurgeons to attend the sick and the wounded?\n\n[Footnote 50: To show the working of this system of political\nappointments, we would call attention to a single fact. On the formation\nof an additional regiment of dragoons in 1836, _thirty_ of its officers\nwere appointed from civil life, and only _four_ from the graduates of\nthe Military Academy. Of those appointed to that regiment from civil\nlife, _twenty-two_ have already been dismissed or resigned, (most of the\nlatter to save themselves from being dismissed,) and only _eight_ of the\nwhole _thirty_ political appointments are now left, their places having\nbeen mainly supplied by graduates of the Military Academy.\n\nIn case of another increase of our military establishment, what course\nwill our government pursue? Will it again pass by the meritorious young\nofficers of our army,--graduates of the Military Academy,--who have\nspent ten or twelve of the best years of their life in qualifying\nthemselves for the higher duties of their profession, and place over\ntheir heads civilians of less education and inferior character--men\ntotally ignorant of military duties, mere pothouse politicians, and the\nbase hirelings of party,--those who screech the loudest in favor of\nparty measures, and degrade themselves the most in order to serve party\nends?--and by thus devoting the army, like the custom-house and\npost-office, to political purposes, will it seek to increase that vast\npatronage of the executive which is already debasing individual\nmorality, and destroying the national character? Should any\nadministration of the government be so unmindful of the interests and\nhonor of the country as to again pursue such a course, it is to be hoped\nthat the sword of political justice will not long slumber in its\nscabbard.]\n\nWe wish to call particular attention to this subject. It deserves\nattention at all times, but at the present moment it more especially\ndemands a close and candid consideration. The higher grades of our peace\nestablishment are now filled with men so far advanced in life that, in\ncase of an increase of the army, many of them must undoubtedly be\neither passed over, or put on a retired list. Sooner or later some\nchange of this kind will undoubtedly be made. It is demanded by the good\nof service, even in time of peace; and in time of war, it will be\nabsolutely necessary to the success of our arms.[51] But the great\ndanger is that the change may be made for the worse--that all the\nappointments and promotions to the higher grades will be made through\npolitical influence, thus converting the army and navy into political\nengines. Let proper measures be taken to prevent so dangerous a result;\nlet executive patronage in the army be limited by wholesome laws, like\nthose in France and Prussia; and let military merit and services, as\ndetermined by boards of competent military officers, be the only\nrecognised claims to appointment and promotion, thus giving to the poor\nand meritorious at least an equal chance with the man of wealth and the\nbase hireling of party. In actual service the system of exclusive\nseniority cannot exist; it would deaden and paralyze all our energies.\nTaking advantage of this, politicians will drive us to the opposite\nextreme, unless the executive authority be limited by wholesome laws,\nbased on the just principles of _merit_ and _service_.\n\n[Footnote 51: Even at the present moment, in ordering troops to Texas,\nwhere immediate and active service is anticipated, it is found necessary\nto break up regiments and send only the young and efficient officers\ninto the field, leaving most of the higher officers behind with mere\nnominal commands. Very many of the officers now in Texas are acting in\ncapacities far above their nominal grades, but without receiving the\nrank, pay, and emoluments due to their services.]\n\nBut the importance of maintaining in our military organization a\nsuitable system of military instruction is not confined to the\nexigencies of our actual condition. It mainly rests upon the absolute\nnecessity of having in the country a body of men who shall devote\nthemselves to the cultivation of military science, so as to be able to\ncompete with the military science of the transatlantic powers. It is not\nto be expected that our citizen soldiery, however intelligent,\npatriotic, and brave they may be, can make any very great progress in\nmilitary studies. They have neither the time nor opportunities for such\npursuits, and if they can acquire a practical acquaintance with\nelementary tactics--the mere alphabet of the military art--it is as much\nas can reasonably be expected of them. As a general rule, the militia\nare individually more capable and intelligent than the men who compose a\nregular army. But they must of necessity be inferior in practical\nprofessional knowledge.\n\nTechnical education is necessary in every pursuit of life. It is\npossible that the lawyer may succeed in some particular cases without a\nknowledge of law, but he will probably have few clients if he remain\nignorant of the laws and precedents that govern the courts. The\nunlearned chemist may succeed in performing some single experiment, but\nhis progress will be slow and uncertain if he neglect to make himself\nfamiliar with the experiments and discoveries of his predecessors.\n\nLearning, when applied to agriculture, raises it from a mere mechanical\ndrudgery to the dignity of a science. By analyzing the composition of\nthe soil we cultivate, we learn its capacity for improvement, and gain\nthe power to stimulate the earth to the most bountiful production. How\ndifferent the results attending the labors of the intelligent\nagriculturist, guided by the lamp of learning, from those of the\nignorant drudge who follows the barren formula of traditional precepts!\nAs applied to manufactures and the mechanical arts, learning develops\nnew powers of labor, and new facilities for subsistence and enjoyment.\nPersonal comforts of every kind are greatly increased, and placed within\nthe reach of the humbler classes; while at the same time the \"appliances\nof art are made to minister to the demands of elegant taste, and a\nhigher moral culture.\" As applied to commerce, it not only greatly\nincreases the facilities for the more general diffusion of civilization\nand knowledge, but is also vastly influential in harmonizing the\nconflicting interests of nations.\n\nNor is learning less humanizing and pacific in its influence when\napplied to the military art. \"During the dark ages which followed the\nwreck of the Roman power, the military science by which that power had\nbeen reared, was lost with other branches of learning. When learning\nrevived, the military art revived with it, and contributed not a little\nto the restoration of the empire of mind over that of brute force. Then,\ntoo, every great discovery in the art of war has a life-saving and\npeace-promoting influence. The effects of the invention of gunpowder are\na familiar proof of this remark; and the same principle applies to the\ndiscoveries of modern times. By perfecting ourselves in military\nscience, paradoxical as it may seem, we are therefore assisting in the\ndiffusion of peace, and hastening on the approach of that period when\nswords shall be beaten into ploughshares and spears into pruning-hooks.\"\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX.\n\n\nSince the first edition of this work was published, two important wars\nhave been commenced and terminated--that between the United States and\nthe Republic of Mexico, and that between Russia and the Western Powers\nof Europe--and another is now being waged between France and Austria,\nupon the old battle fields of Northern Italy. In issuing a new edition\nof these Elements of Military Art and Science, it is deemed proper to\nrefer to these wars, and to apply the principles here discussed to the\nmilitary operations carried on in Mexico and in the Crimea. It is\nproposed to do this in the form of Notes to the several Chapters. The\nwar in Italy being still undetermined, and the details of the several\nbattles which have already been fought being but imperfectly known, it\nis obviously improper to attempt to criticize their strategic character\nor tactical arrangement.\n\nH.W.H.\n\nNEW YORK, _July_, 1859.\n\n\n\nNOTE TO CHAPTER II.--STRATEGY.\n\nIn the invasion of Mexico, the United States formed four separate\narmies, moving on _four distinct lines of operation:_ 1st. The \"Army of\nthe West,\" under General Kearny, moving from St. Louis on New Mexico and\nCalifornia; 2d. The \"Army of the Centre,\" under General Wool, moving\nfrom San Antonio de Bexar on Chihuahua; 3d. The \"Army of Occupation,\" on\nthe Rio Grande, under General Taylor, moving from Corpus Christi on\nMatamoras, Monterey, and Saltillo; and 4th. The \"Main Army,\" under\nGeneral Scott, moving from Vera Cruz on the capital of Mexico.\n\nThe Army of the West, under General Kearny, moved upon a separate and\ndistinct line of operations, having no strategic relations to the other\nthree; its objects were the conquest and occupation of New Mexico and\nUpper California. The first was readily accomplished; but the general\nthen detached so large a force to operate on Chihuahua after the\ndiversion of Wool's column, that his expedition to California must have\nutterly failed without the assistance of the naval forces in the\nPacific.\n\nThe lines of Taylor and Wool were evidently ill chosen, being so distant\nas to afford the enemy an opportunity to take a central position between\nthem. Fortunately Wool proceeded no further than Monclova, and then\nturned off to occupy Parras, thus coming under the immediate command of\nGeneral Taylor. The latter fought the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de\nla Palma, and sustained the siege of Fort Brown; then crossing the Rio\nGrande at Matamoras, he captured Monterey, and, forming a junction with\nWool, defeated the army of Santa Anna at Buena Vista. This battle ended\nthe campaign, which, however brilliantly conducted, was entirely without\nstrategic results.\n\nScott landed his army near the Island of Sacrificios without opposition,\nand immediately invested Vera Cruz, which surrendered after a short\nsiege and bombardment. Having thus secured his base, he immediately\nadvanced to the city of Puebla, meeting and defeating the army of Santa\nAnna at Cerro Gordo. Remaining some time at Puebla to reinforce his\narmy, he advanced into the valley of Mexico, and after the brilliant\nvictories of Contreras, Churubusco, Molino del Rey, and Chapultepec,\ncaptured the city and terminated the war.\n\nWith respect to the double line of operations of Taylor and Scott it may\nbe sufficient to remark, that Santa Anna, from his central position,\nfought, with the same troops, the battles of Buena Vista and Cerro\nGordo. It should also be remarked, that the line of operations of the\narmy of the Rio Grande was not approved by either Scott or Taylor, nor,\nit is believed, by any other officer of our army. Scott's line of\noperations, however, was truly strategic, and in turning the Mexican\nflank by Lake Chalco and the Pedregal, he exhibited the skill of a great\ngeneral.\n\nThe war in the Crimea, from the limited extent of the theatre of\noperations, afforded but little opportunity for the display of strategic\nskill on either side. Nevertheless, the movements of both parties, prior\nto the investment and siege of Sebastopol, are fair subjects for\nmilitary criticism with respect to the plans of operation.\n\nWhen the allies landed their troops at the Old Fort, three plans were\nopen for the consideration of the Russian general: 1st. To destroy or\nclose the harbors of Balaklava, Kamiesch, Kazatch and Strelitzka, and,\ngarrisoning Sebastopol with a strong force, to occupy with the rest of\nhis army the strong plateau south of the city, and thus force the allies\nto besiege the strong works on the north. 2d. Having closed the harbors\non the south, and secured Sebastopol from being carried by the assault\nof any detachment of the allies, to operate on their left flank,\nannoying and harassing them with his Cossacks, and thus delay them many\ndays in the difficult and precarious position which they would have\noccupied. 3d. To advance with his whole force and offer them battle at\nthe Alma. The last and least advantageous of these plans was adopted,\nand as the garrison of Sebastopol, during the battle, consisted of only\nfour battalions and the sailors of the fleet, it might, considering the\nweakness of its works, have been easily carried by a detachment of the\nallied forces.\n\nFor the allies at the Alma two plans presented themselves: 1st. To turn\nthe Russian left, cut him off from Sebastopol, and occupy that city in\nforce. 2d. To turn the Russian right, and, throwing him back upon\nSebastopol, cut him off from all external succor. Neither plan was fully\ncarried out. The column of General Bosquet turned the Russian left and\ndecided his retreat; but no strategic advantage was taken of the\nvictory. The battle was fought on the 20th of September, and by noon of\nthe 26th the allies had only advanced to the Balbeck, a distance of a\nlittle more than ten miles in six days! On the 27th they regained their\ncommunication with the fleet at Balaklava, without attempting to occupy\nSebastopol, and having exposed themselves to destruction by an\nill-conducted flank march. Fortunately for the allies, the Russians\nfailed to avail themselves of the advantages which the enemy had thus\ngratuitously afforded. The fleet having entered the open harbor of\nBalaklava, the allies now commenced the labor of landing and moving up\ntheir siege material and of opening their trenches, while the Russians\nprepared their fortifications on the south of Sebastopol for resisting\nthe operations of that gigantic siege which stands without a parallel in\nhistory.\n\n\n\nNOTE TO CHAPTER III.--FORTIFICATIONS.\n\nIn the war between the United States and Mexico, the latter had no\nfortifications on her land frontiers, and, with the single exception of\nVera Cruz, her harbors were entirely destitute of defensive works. The\nAmericans, therefore, had no obstacles of this kind to overcome on three\nof their lines of operation; and, when Scott had reduced Vera Cruz, his\nline of march was open to the capital. Moreover, nearly every seaport on\nthe Gulf and Pacific coast fell into our hands without a blow. Had the\nlanding of Scott been properly opposed, and Vera Cruz been strongly\nfortified and well defended, it would have been taken only after a long\nand difficult siege. Moreover, had the invading army encountered strong\nand well-defended fortifications on the line of march to Mexico, the war\nwould, necessarily, have been prolonged, and possibly with a different\nresult.\n\nThe Russian fortifications in the Baltic prevented the allies from\nattempting any serious operations in that quarter, and those in the\nBlack Sea confined the war to a single point of the Heracleidan\nChersonese. Had Russia relied exclusively upon her fleet to prevent a\nmaritime descent, and left Sebastopol entirely undefended by\nfortifications, how different had been the result of the Crimean war.\n\nThis subject will be alluded to again in the Notes on Sea-coast\nDefences, and Permanent Fortifications.\n\n\nNOTE TO CHAPTER IV.--LOGISTICS.\n\nThe war in Mexico exhibited, in a striking manner, our superiority over\nthe enemy in this branch of the military art. No army was better\nsupplied than ours in all matters of subsistence, clothing, medical and\nhospital stores, and in means of transportation. Two points, however,\nare worthy of remark in this connection: 1st. The great waste of\nmaterial, which resulted from the employment of raw troops under short\nenlistments, and commanded by officers appointed from civil life, who\nwere without experience and destitute of military instruction; and, 2d.\nThe immense expense of transportation, which was due in part to the\nabove cause and in part to the employment, in the administrative\ndepartments, of civilians who were utterly ignorant of the rules and\nroutine of military service. This war was conducted on the system of\nmagazines and provisions carried in the train of the army, or purchased\nof the inhabitants and regularly paid for, forced requisitions being\nseldom resorted to, and then in very moderate quantities. The wisdom of\nthis plan was proved by the general good order and discipline of our\ntroops, and the general good-will of the non-combatant inhabitants of\nthe country which was passed over or occupied by the army.\n\nThe war in the Crimea proved most conclusively the vast superiority of\nthe French administrative system over that of the English--of the\nmilitary over a civil organization of the administrative corps of an\narmy. The French troops before Sebastopol were regularly, cheaply, and\nabundantly supplied with every requisite of provisions, clothing,\nmunitions, medical stores, military utensils, and hospital and camp\nequipages; while the English army, notwithstanding an immense\nexpenditure of money, was often paralyzed in its operations by the want\nof proper military material, and not unfrequently was destitute of even\nthe necessaries of life.\n\nInstead of profiting by this lesson, the recent tendency of our own\ngovernment has been (especially in supplying the army in Utah) to\nimitate the sad example of the English, and to convert the supplying of\nour armies into a system of political patronage to be used for party\npurposes. If fully carried out, it must necessarily result in the ruin\nof the army, the robbery of the treasury, and the utter corruption of\nthe government.\n\n\nNOTE TO CHAPTER V.--TACTICS.\n\nThe war in Mexico, from the small number of troops engaged, and the\npeculiar character of the ground in most cases, afforded but few\nopportunities for the display of that skill in the tactics of battle\nwhich has so often determined the victory upon the great fields of\nEurope. Nevertheless, the history of that war is not without useful\nlessons in the use which may be made of the several arms in the attack\nand defence of positions. The limit assigned to these Notes will admit\nof only a few brief remarks upon these battles.\n\nThe affairs of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma properly constitute only\na single battle. In the first, which was virtually a cannonade, the\nlines were nearly parallel, and Arista's change of front to an oblique\nposition during the engagement, was followed by a corresponding movement\non the part of General Taylor. Being made sensible of the superiority of\nthe American artillery, the Mexican general fell back upon the Ravine of\nResaca de la Palma, drawing up his troops in a concave line to suit the\nphysical character of the ground. The Americans attacked the whole line\nwith skirmishers, and with dragoons supported by light artillery, and\nthe charge of a heavy column of infantry decided the victory. General\nTaylor's operations at Monterey partook more of the nature of an attack\nupon an intrenched position than of a regular battle upon the field. No\ndoubt Worth's movement to the right had an important influence in\ndeciding the contest, but the separation of his column from the main\nbody, by a distance of some five miles, was, to say the least, a most\nhazardous operation. The Mexicans, however, took no advantage of the\nopening to operate between the separate masses into which the American\narmy was divided. The loss which the Mexicans inflicted upon us resulted\nmore from the strength of their position than from any skilful use of\ntheir defensive works. In the battle of Buena Vista, the efforts of\nSanta Anna were principally directed to turning the American left. If he\nhad concentrated his masses more upon the centre at the plateau, the\nsuccess gained in the early part of the contest would probably have been\ndecisive. The American right at La Angostura was made almost\ninaccessible by the deep ravines in its front, and the skilful use made\nof the artillery from this point enabled General Taylor to gain the\nvictory, even after his left had been completely turned, and a portion\nof the volunteers had actually fled from the field.\n\nThe manner in which Scott handled his troops in the various battles on\nhis line of march from Vera Cruz to the capital, proved him to be one of\nthe best generals of the age. At Cerro Gordo he so completely turned\nSanta Anna's left as to cut off his line of retreat, and nearly\ndestroyed his army, the general himself barely escaping capture. The\nturning of Valencia's position by the village of San Geronimo, at the\nbattle of Contreras, and the charge by Riley's columns of infantry, were\nmovements well planned and admirably executed, as were also the rapid\npursuit of Santa Anna to Churubusco, and the flank and rear attacks by\nthe brigades of Pierce and Shields. The victory of Molino del Rey was\nmostly won with the musket, without very material assistance from heavy\nartillery, and was one of the most brilliant but dearly bought\nachievements of the war. The assault upon Chapultepec was preceded by a\nlong and heavy cannonade, which produced a decided moral effect upon the\nenemy and greatly facilitated the assault.\n\nWith respect to the battles of the Crimean war, only that of the Alma is\nsubject to the tactical criticism of ordinary battles; those of\nBalaklava, Inkerman, and the Tchernaya, were of the nature of sorties\nmade to prevent an assault of the unfinished works of defence, and to\nprolong the operations of the siege. They must therefore be judged as\nsuch, and not according to the ordinary rules applicable to contests in\nthe open field. At the battle of the Alma the Russians were attacked in\nposition, the two lines of battle being nearly parallel. According to\nthe original plan of attack, the Turks and Bosquet's division was to\nturn the Russian left, while the main attack was made upon the centre.\nBut, on account of the division of command in the allied army, there was\nno concert of action. The heavy column of Bosquet probably decided the\nvictory, although the battle was general throughout the whole line. The\nEnglish army advanced in columns of brigades at deploying distances, its\nright connected with the French, and its left protected by a line of\nskirmishers, of cavalry and horse artillery. With respect to the\nformation and use of troops in the other battles, it may be remarked\nthat the charge of the English light cavalry at Balaklava was apparently\nwithout necessity or object, and led to its inevitable destruction. In\nthe battle of Inkerman the Russians directed their main attack upon the\nEnglish right and centre, with false attacks upon the French left and\ntowards Balaklava. But these false attacks, as is usual in such cases,\nwere not conducted with sufficient energy and decision, and Bosquet was\nthus enabled to perceive the real intentions of the enemy upon the\nEnglish portion of the line and move to its assistance. Moreover, the\nmain body of the Russians moved in too heavy and unwieldy masses, which\nexposed them to terrible losses, and rendered impossible a rapid and\neffective deployment of their numerical force. The same criticism is\napplicable to their formation at the battle of the Tehernaya.\n\n\nNOTE TO CHAPTER VI.--MEANS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE.\n\nOn the invasion of Mexico by the United States, the former republic had\na large army of tolerably good troops, though badly officered, still\nworse equipped, and almost destitute of proper military stores; but she\nwas entirely wanting in two important elements of national\ndefence--fortifications and a navy. Her weakness was shown by the rapid\nand easy conquest of almost the entire country.\n\nWe have already remarked that the fortifications of Russia confined the\ntheatre of war to a single point of the Crimea, and limited the military\noperations of the allies to the prolonged and only partially successful\nsiege of Sebastopol.\n\n\nNOTE TO CHAPTER VII.--SEA-COAST DEFENCES.\n\nAllusion has already been made to the weakness of Mexico, resulting from\nher want of sea-coast defences, as shown by the war between that\nrepublic and the United States. This would have been still more manifest\nhad she possessed any thing like a commercial marine, exposed to capture\nby our naval forces. As it was, the Mexican war afforded not a single\ncontest between ships and forts, no opposition being made to the\noccupation of Mexican ports by our naval force. The only coast defence,\nthe castle of San Juan d'Ulica was not attacked, but after the\nbombardment and capture of Vera Cruz, it surrendered without a blow.\n\nThe Crimean war, on the contrary, exhibited in a most marked degree the\nimportance of a well-fortified sea-coast. Notwithstanding the immense\nforce of the combined fleets of England and France, no naval attack was\nmade upon either Cronstadt or Sebastopol, and the large naval force of\nRussia proved utterly useless as a defence against a maritime descent.\nThere was, indeed, a simulachre of a \"naval cannonade\" on the latter\nplace on the 17th of October, 1854, intended as a diversion of the\nattention and strength of the garrison from the land side, where the\nreal struggle for predominance was going on between the besieged and the\nbesiegers. The inutility of this attempt was so manifest that no\nserious naval attack was undertaken, notwithstanding that the allies\nwere ready to bring to bear upon the antiquated and ill-armed Russian\nworks the most powerful naval armaments the world had ever seen.\n\nThe results of this \"simulachre of a naval cannonade,\" as it has been\ncalled, is worthy of note. The details are taken from Major Barnard's\nable pamphlet on \"The Dangers and Defences of New York,\" and Commander\nDahlgren's interesting and valuable work on \"Shells and Shell Guns.\"\n\n\"The allied fleet consisted of 14 French, 10 British, and 2 Turkish\nships-of-the-line (some few of which had auxiliary steam power), and a\nnumber of side-wheel steamers to tow these; and carried in all about\n2,500 guns. It was opposed by about 280 guns from the works. The fleet\nkept itself (in general) at a respectable distance (from 1500 to 2000\nyards); too far to inflict any material injury with its armament\n(32-pounders, with a moderate proportion of 8-inch shell-guns) upon the\nworks;--too far to receive much from the inefficient armament of the\nRussian works.\"\n\n\"The only exception to this remark applies to the detached English\nsquadron under Sir Edmund Lyons, consisting of the _Agamemnon_,\n_Sanspareil_, _London_, _Arethusa_, and _Albion_, the first-named of\nwhich vessels took a position at 750 or 800 yards from Fort Constantine,\nwhile the others stretched along at about the same distance from Fort\nConstantine, the 'Wasp Tower,' and 'Telegraph Battery.' Dahlgren describes\nthe result as follows:--\"\n\n\"The _Agamemnon_ was very seriously maltreated, though not to such an\nextent as to impair her power of battery or engine. She was on fire\nseveral times; was struck by 240 shot or shells; and, singular to say,\nonly lost 29, while her second, just by, lost 70 men. The _Albion_\nsuffered still more, and in an hour was towed out crippled, and on fire\nin more than one place, with a loss of 81 men. The crews of the _London_\nand _Arethusa_, fared rather better, but the ships nearly as ill; and\nthey too remained in station but a little time after the _Albion_. The\n_Queen_ was driven off soon after she got into her new position, in\ngreat danger; and the _Rodney_ had the bare satisfaction of getting\naground and afloat after experiencing some damage.\"\n\n\"The value of the small works on the cape and bluffs, was clearly\ndefined in these results; being above the dense cloud of smoke that\nenveloped the ships and the lower forts, their aim was not embarrassed,\nwhile the seamen labored under the difficulty of firing, with an\ninconvenient elevation, at objects that they saw but seldom, and then\nbut dimly and briefly. As a consequence, three line-of-battle ships and\na frigate were driven off very shortly and in great peril, and a fourth\nbadly cut up; while the _Agamemnon_ lay opposed to one of the heaviest\nsea-forts with two tiers of casemates, and at the end of five-hours came\noff with comparatively little loss.\"\n\n\"Whatever superiority of effect the batteries on the heights may have\nhad (and we have so few details about these works that we can draw no\nsure conclusion from this mere naked statement of damages received by\nthe vessels), it evidently was not for want of being _hit_ often enough\n(smoke or no smoke), that the _Agamemnon_ escaped with so little injury.\nShe 'was struck by 240 shot and shells;' and it is only due to the\ninefficiency of the projectiles by which she was struck, that she was\nnot destroyed.\"\n\n\"With respect to the damages received by Fort Constantine, Dahlgren\nsays:--\"\n\n\"The distance of the _Agamemnon_ and _Sanspareil_ from Fort\nConstantine (17th October, 1854), was assumed to be about 800 yards;\nLord Raglan states it to have been rather less. These two ships could\nbring to bear about 87 guns, and the firing from them probably lasted\nsome four hours. There can be no doubt that it inflicted much damage,\nfor the Russian Commander-in-chief-admits it in his official report; but\nnot sufficient to impair the strength of the masonry, and far short of\neffecting a breach in it.\"\n\n\"At Bomarsund, the results were rather different:--Three 32-pounders of\n42 cwt. (guns of inferior weight), were landed from a ship's spar deck,\nand placed in battery at 950 yards from the North Tower--the masonry of\ngood quality and 6-1/2 feet thick. In eight hours, the wall between two\nembrasures was cut through from top to bottom, offering a practicable\nbreach, to effect which 487 shot and 45 shells were fired, being at the\nrate of one round from the battery in rather less than a minute; or,\nfrom each gun, one in 2-3/4 minutes. The Tower surrendered.\"\n\n\"It seems almost incredible that three pieces should be able to\naccomplish fully that which eighty-seven pieces utterly failed to do,\nthe distances from the object being alike--particularly when it is\nconsidered that many of the latter were of greater calibre, and most of\nthem employed much heavier charges where the calibres were similar. The\nguns of the ship, if fired at the same rate as those of the battery,\nwhich was not unusually rapid (one round in two and three-fourth\nminutes), would have discharged some seven thousand seven hundred shot\nand shells in the course of the four hours, supposing no interruption; a\nnumber which, if properly applied, would appear, from the results of\nthree guns, to have been sufficient to breach the wall of the fort in\nfourteen places; whereas they did not effect a single breach, which is\nabundant proof of the lack of accuracy. They must either have been\ndispersed over the surface of the fort, or else missed it altogether,\nand this could have been due only to a want of the precision which was\nattained by the battery. The constantly preferred complaint of motion in\nthe ships was not to be urged, because on the day of cannonading\nSebastopol, there was scarcely a breath of wind, and the ships were too\nlarge to be easily moved by the swell, unless very considerable. That\nthe fort did no greater damage to the ships than it received from them,\nproves no more than that its fire was quite as illy directed, and the\ncalibres too low. It is said that the _Agamemnon_ was struck in the hull\nby two hundred and forty shot and shells, which must have been but a\nsmall portion of what was fired, though sufficient to be decisive, if,\nas already observed, the calibre had been heavier.\"\n\nHere, then, a number of projectiles thrown from the ships, which were\nsufficient, had they been thrown from a land battery, according to the\nresult at Bomarsund, to produce fourteen practicable breaches, failed\nnot only to produce a single breach, but even \"to impair the strength of\nthe masonry.\"\n\nThe reason of this is obvious. That degree of precision of fire by which\na breach is effected by a land battery is utterly unattainable from a\nfloating structure, for the motion of the water, even in the calmest\ndays, is quite sufficient to prevent accuracy of aim at an object at a\ndistance, as in this case, of seven and eight hundred yards.\n\nWith respect to the action of the shot and shells upon the _Agamemnon_,\nit is to be remarked that we have as yet had no fair trial of the power\nof the fire of modern shell-guns of large calibre from land batteries\nagainst ships of war. The Russians had some of them in their fleet, and\nat Sinope, with their shell-guns, they blew up two Turkish frigates _in\nfifteen minutes_. It does not appear that in the Crimean war they had\nyet provided their fortifications with the modern armaments, for where\nshells were thrown from their sea-coast batteries, they were in every\ninstance of inferior calibre.\n\nWith respect to the naval attack upon Kinburn, which has been referred\nto as showing the importance of floating batteries as an auxiliary to\nships in reducing harbor defences, we have no official reports of the\nRussians from which to derive accurate information of the strength of\nthe works attacked. Dahlgren, drawing his information from the official\naccounts of the \"English and French admirals,\" describes the works and\ntheir location is follows:--\n\n\"The Boug and the Dnieper issue into a large basin, formed partly by\nthe projection of the main shore, partly by a long narrow strip of\nSand-beach, which continues from it and takes a north-westerly direction\nuntil it passes the promontory of Otchakov, where it terminates, and\nfrom which it is separated by the channel, whereby the waters of the\nestuary empty into the Black Sea.\"\n\n\"The distance between the spit or extremity of this tongue and the\nPoint of Otchakov, or the main shore opposite, is about two miles; but\nthe water is too shoal to admit of the passage of large vessels of war,\nexcept in the narrow channel that runs nearest to the spit and its\nnorthern shore. Here, therefore, are placed the works designed to\ncommand the entrance. They are three in number. Near the extreme point\nof the spit is a covered battery built of logs, which are filled in and\noverlaid with sand,--pierced for eighteen guns, but mounting only ten.\"\n\n\"Advancing further along the beach is a circular redoubt, connected\nwith the spit battery by a covered way. This work, built of stone, and\nriveted with turf, is open, and said to be the most substantial of the\nthree; it has eleven cannon, and within is a furnace for heating shot.\"\n\n\"Further on, and where the beach has widened considerably, is Fort\nKinburn, a square bastioned work, extending to the sea on the south, and\nto the waters of the estuary on the north. It is casemated in part,\nthough but few of these embrasures were armed,--its chief force being in\nthe pieces _en barbette, _and some nine or ten mortars. The masonry,\nthough solid, is represented by an eye-witness not to be bomb-proof, and\nso dilapidated by age that the mortar was falling out from the\ninterstices, leaving the stone to disintegrate. The interior space was\noccupied by ranges of wooden buildings, slightly constructed and\nplastered over.\"\n\n\"This fort is said to be armed with sixty pieces. The English admiral\nstates, that all three of the works mounted eighty-one guns and mortars.\nThe calibres are not given officially, but stated in private letters to\nbe 18-pounders and 32-pounders.\"\n\n\"The above description will quite justify the further remark as to\nthese works:--\"\n\n\"They were inferior in every respect, and manifestly incapable of\nwithstanding any serious operation by sea or land. The main fort was\nparticularly weak in design, and dilapidated; all of them were\nindifferently armed and garrisoned.\"\n\n\"So much for the works. As to the character of the armament brought to\nthe assault, the same authority says:--\"\n\n\"The allied force was admirably adapted to the operation, embracing\nevery description of vessel, from the largest to the smallest, and all\npropelled by steam. There were screw-liners, and like vessels of\ninferior class, side-wheel steamers, screw gunboats, floating-batteries,\nmortar-vessels, etc., each armed in what was considered the most\napproved manner. And this truly formidable naval force carried\n_besides_ 'some thousand troops' on board, all designed to attack these\n'dilapidated' works of Kinburn.\"\n\n\"Without going into the particulars, we simply give Dahlgren's account\nof the affair:--\"\n\n\"The French floating-batteries (_Devastation, Lave_, and _Tonnante_)\nsteamed in to make their first essay, anchoring some six or seven\nhundred yards off the S.E. bastion of Fort Kinburn, and at 9.20 opened\nfire, supported by the mortar-vessels, of which six were English, by the\ngunboats, five French and six English, and by the steamer _Odin_, 16.\"\n\n\"The heavy metal of the floating-batteries (said to be twelve\n50-pounders on the broadside of each) soon told on the walls of the\nfort; and the vertical fire was so good that the French admiral\nattributed to it, in great part, the speedy surrender of the place. The\ngunboats also made good ricochet practice, which was noticed to be\nsevere on the barbette batteries.\"\n\n\"The Russian gunners, in nowise daunted by this varied fire, plied\ntheir guns rapidly in return, directing their attention chiefly to the\nfloating-batteries, which were nearest.\"\n\n\"Exactly at noon, the admirals steamed in with the _Royal Albert _, 121,\n_Algiers_, 91, _Agamemnon_, 90, and _Princess Royal_, 90, with the four\nFrench liners in close order, taking position in line, ranging N.W. and\nS.E., about one mile from the fort, in twenty-eight feet water.\"\n\n\"At the same time, a squadron of steam-frigates, under Rear-Admirals\nStewart and Pellion, dashed in through the passage to the basin, opening\nfire on the spit and central batteries in passing, and anchoring well\ninside of Fort Nicholaiev and Otchakov. The attack seaward was completed\nby the _Acre_, 100, _Curacoa_, 30, _Tribune_, 30, and _Sphynx_, 6,\nopening on the central battery; while the _Hannibal_, 91, _Dauntless_,\n24, and _Terrible_, 21, assailed that on the spit. To this storm of shot\nand shells, the Russians could not reply long. In the spit battery, the\nsand falling through between the logs, displaced by shot and shells,\nchoked the embrasures, and blocked up the guns. In the fort, the light\nwooden buildings were in flames at an early hour; then the walls began\nto crumble before the balls which came from every quarter, front, flank,\nand rear; and as the guns were disabled successively, the return became\nfeeble, until few were in condition to be fired, the central redoubt\nalone discharging single guns at long intervals. The Russian commander,\nhowever, made no sign of surrender; but the admirals, seeing that his\nfire had ceased, and further defence was unavailing, hoisted the white\nflag at 1.35 P.M., upon which the works were given up on honorable\nterms.\"\n\n\"The garrison consisted of about fourteen hundred men; their loss is\ndifferently stated,--the French admiral says eighty wounded,--another,\nforty-three killed and one hundred and fourteen wounded.\"\n\n\"The English suffered the least, having but two men wounded; besides\ntwo killed and two wounded in the _Arrow_, by the bursting of her two\n68-pounder Lancaster guns.\"\n\n\"The superiority of the allied vessels in number and calibre of\nordnance was very decided; they must have had at least six hundred and\nfifty pieces in play, chiefly 32-pounders, and 8-inch shell guns, with a\nfair proportion of 68-pounders and mortars, besides the 50-pounders of\nthe French floating batteries. To which the Russians could only reply\nwith eighty-one cannon and mortars, and no guns of heavier calibre than\n32-pounders, while many were lower. The great disparity in offensive\npower was not compensated to the works by the advantage of commanding\nposition, the Russian fort and redoubt being upon nearly the same level\nwith the ships' batteries, and also very deficient in proper strength.\nOn the other hand, the depth of water did not allow the liners to\napproach nearer than one mile; and thus their fire was by no means so\nintense as it would have been at shorter range.\"\n\n\"This was the sole occasion in which the floating batteries had an\nopportunity of proving their endurance; which was the question of most\nimportance, as no one could doubt the effect of long 50-pounders, or\n68-pounders, when brought within a few hundred yards of masonry, and\nable to retain the steadiness indispensable to a breaching fire.\"\n\n\"No siege operation had ever embraced batteries of such power, for\nthough the English had employed long 68-pounders at Sebastopol, yet the\ndistance from the objects exceeded a thousand yards; and the\nconcentration of fire, so far as any opinion can be formed from the\npublished statements, was far inferior to that of the thirty-six\n50-pounders, in the broadsides of the three batteries anchored in close\norder.\"\n\n\"They were hulled repeatedly by shot; one of them (the _Devastation_),\nit is said, sixty-seven times, without any other effect on the stout\niron plates than to dint them, at the most, one and a half\ninches,--still, there were ten men killed and wounded in this battery by\nshot and shell which entered the ports,--and the majority of damage to\nthe French personnel (twenty-seven men) occurred in the three\nfloating-batteries.\"\n\nMajor Barnard, in commenting upon this affair, says that it \"proves\nnothing, unless it be, that dilapidated, and ill-designed, and\nill-constructed works, armed with inferior calibres, cannot contend\nagainst such an overwhelming array of force as was here displayed. * * *\nThe Fort of Kinburn surrendered, _not because_ it was breached--not\nbecause the defenders were so far diminished by their losses as to be\nunable to protract the contest,--but simply because the guns and\ngunners, exposed in all possible ways, were put hors-du-combat, and the\ncalibres (of the guns in Kinburn) were incapable of doing any great\ndamage to the vessels, at the distance they were stationed.\"\n\n\nThe guns in the low _open_ batteries were exposed to a ricochet and\nvertical fire, to which latter the French admiral attributed, in good\npart, the surrender of the place. The buildings behind the batteries,\nbuilt of wood, \"slightly constructed and plastered over,\" were set on\nfire, and the heat and smoke must have rendered the service of the guns\nalmost impracticable. Nevertheless, out of a garrison of 1,400, only 157\nwere killed and wounded--a very small loss under all the circumstances.\nIf the works had been well-constructed casemates, covering the men from\nthe ricochet and vertical fires and the sharpshooters of the troops who\ninvested the land fronts, the loss of the garrison would have been still\nless; and if they had been armed with heavier projectiles, much greater\ndamage would have been inflicted upon the attacking force.\n\nWith respect to the use of floating-batteries in this case, Commander\nDahlgren very judiciously remarks:--\n\n   \"The use that can be made of floating-batteries, as auxiliaries in\n   attacking shore-works, must depend on further confirmation of their\n   asserted invulnerability. It may be that the performance at Kinburn\n   answered the expectation of the French emperor as regards offensive\n   power, for that is a mere question of the battering capacity of the\n   heaviest calibres, which is undoubted; but the main issue, which\n   concerns their endurance, cannot be settled by the impact of 32-pounder\n   shot, fired at 600 and 700 yards. Far heavier projectiles will in future\n   be found on all seaboard fortifications; and the ingenuity of the\n   artillerist may also be exerted more successfully than at Kinburn.\n   Still, it is not to be doubted that the floating-battery is a formidable\n   element in assailing forts, even if its endurance falls short of\n   absolute invulnerability; and the defence will do well to provide\n   against its employment.\"\n\nThe works at Bomarsund were taken by means of _land-batteries_, which\nbreached the exposed walls of the towers and main works. An auxiliary\nfire was opened upon the water front by the fleet, but it produced very\nlittle effect. But after the work had been reduced, an experimental\nfiring was made by the _Edinburgh_, armed with the largest and most\npowerful guns in the British navy.\n\nIn speaking of the effects of the siege batteries upon the walls of\nBomarsund, and the experimental fire of the _Edinburgh_, Sir Howard\nDouglas remarks:--\n\n   \"This successful operation (of the land batteries) is very generally,\n   but erroneously, stated to have been effected by the fire of the ships,\n   and it is even strongly held up as a proof of what ships can do, and\n   ought to attempt elsewhere.\"\n\n   \"But the results of the experimental firing at the remnant of the\n   fort, which, unless the previous firing of the ships during the attack\n   was absolutely harmless, must have been somewhat damaged, and moreover\n   shaken by the blowing-up of the contiguous portions, do not warrant\n   this conclusion, even should the attacking ships be permitted, like\n   the _Edinburgh_, to take up, quietly and coolly, positions within 500\n   yards, and then deliberately commence and continue their firing, without\n   being fired at! The firing of the _Edinburgh_, at 1,060 yards, was\n   unsatisfactory. 390 shot and shells were fired, from the largest and\n   most powerful guns in the British navy (viz., from the Lancaster gun\n   of 95 cwt., with an elongated shell of 100 lbs.;--from 68-pounders of 95\n   cwt., and 32-pounders of 56 cwt., solid shot guns;--from 10-inch shell\n   guns of 84 cwt., with hollow shot of 84 lbs.;--from 8-inch shell guns of\n   65 and 60 cwt., with hollow shot of 56 lbs.), and did but little injury\n   to the work. At 480 yards, 250 shot, shells, and hollow shot were fired.\n   A small breach was formed in the facing of the outer wall, of extremely\n   bad masonry, and considerable damage done to the embrasures and\n   other portions of the wall; but no decisive result was obtained--no\n   practicable breach formed, by which the work might be assaulted,\n   taken, and effectually destroyed, although 640 shot and shells (40,000\n   lbs. of metal) were fired into the place, first at 1,060, and then at\n   480 yards.\"\n\nSurely, this \"naval attack,\" taken in connection with the true facts of\nthe capture of Kinburn, the abortive attempt of the British fleet in the\nPacific upon the Russian works of Petropauloski, is not calculated to\naffect the well established opinion of the ability of forts to resist\nmaritime attacks.\n\nFew are now disposed to dispute the general superiority of guns ashore\nover guns afloat; but some think that works of masonry are incapable of\nresisting the heavy and continuous fire which may now be brought against\nit by fleets and floating-batteries, and would therefore extend the area\nof the works and rely mainly upon earthen parapets, with guns in\nbarbette. This conclusion they form from the results of the maritime\nattack on Kinburn, and of the land-batteries on Bomarsund.\n\nMajor Barnard, in his valuable work on \"The Dangers and Defences of New\nYork,\" draws a very different conclusion from these attacks, and\ncontends that they abundantly prove the capability of well-constructed\nstone masonry to resist the fire of ships and floating-batteries, if the\nlatter are opposed by proper armaments in the forts; moreover, that they\nproved the superiority of casemated forts over low open batteries, with\nguns in barbette, in covering the garrison from the effects of a\nvertical and ricochet fire. Unquestionably the masonry at Bomarsund was\npoorly constructed; nevertheless, the fire of the shipping produced very\nlittle effect upon it. It is also equally certain that Kinburn Was\ntaken, not by a breaching fire, but mainly by the effects of vertical\nand ricochet fires.\n\nWith respect to our own system of sea-coast defences, it may be\nremarked, that, since this chapter was written, the works mentioned\ntherein as having been commenced, have been gradually advanced towards\ncompletion, and that the acquisition of Texas and California, and the\nsettlement of Oregon and Washington Territory, by greatly extending our\nline of maritime defence, have rendered necessary the fortification of\nother points. It should also be noted that while the value and necessity\nof these works are generally admitted, and while the general outline of\nthe system is almost universally approved, many are of the opinion that\nthe increased facilities for naval attacks, and the immense power of\nmodern maritime expeditions, like that upon Sebastopol, render it\nnecessary to more strongly fortify the great naval and commercial ports\nof New York and San Francisco--one the _key point_ of the Atlantic, and\nthe other of the Pacific coast. Perhaps the system adopted by our Boards\nof Engineers may be open to the objection that they have adopted _too\nmany_ points of defence, without giving sufficient prominence to our\ngreat seaports, which are necessarily the strategic points of coast\ndefence. However this may have been _at the time the system was\nadopted_, there can be no question that the relative strength of the\nworks designed for the different points of our coast does not correspond\nto _the present_ relative importance of the places to be defended, and\nthe relative temptations they offer to an enemy capable of organizing\nthe means of maritime attack. On this subject we quote from the work of\nMajor Barnard:--\n\n   \"While the means of maritime attack have of late years assumed\n   a magnitude and formidableness not dreamed of when our defensive\n   system was planned, and our country has so increased in population,\n   wealth and military resources, that no enemy can hope to make any\n   impression by an invasion of our territory,--our great maritime places\n   like New York, have, on the other hand, increased in even greater\n   proportion, in every thing that could make them objects of attack.\"\n\n   \"The works deemed adequate in former years for the defence of\n   New York could not, therefore, in the nature of things, be adequate at\n   the present day.\"\n\n   \"The recent war of England and France against Russia may illustrate\n   my meaning; for it has taught us what to expect were either of\n   these nations to wage war against the United States.\"\n\n   \"No invasion of territory, no attempt at territorial conquest was\n   made, or thought of; for it was well foreseen that no decisive results\n   would flow from such means. The war consisted exclusively in attacks\n   upon maritime places--great seaports--seats of commercial and naval\n   power. Such places, by their vast importance to the well-being and\n   prosperity of a nation--by the large populations and immense amount\n   of wealth concentrated in them, and by their exposure to maritime\n   attack, offer themselves at once as points at which the most decisive\n   results may be produced. Cronstadt, Sebastopol, Sweaborg, Kinburn,\n   Odessa, Kertch, Petropauloski, and other places of less note, were in\n   succession or simultaneously objects of attack; while such as the first\n   named became, indeed, the true seats of war.\"\n\n   \"Around Sebastopol assailed and assailant gathered their resources,\n   and on the result of the arduous struggle may be said to have\n   turned the issue of the war. Had it not been so decided _there_,\n   Cronstadt would have been the next field of combat,--for which, indeed,\n   the allies had made the most enormous preparations.\"\n\n   \"Is it not _certain_ that in future all war of maritime powers against\n   the United States, will take a similar course? All territorial invasion\n   being out of the question, it is against our _great_ seaports and\n   strategic points of coast defence--such as New York, New Orleans, and\n   San Francisco--pre-eminently New York,--that an enemy will concentrate\n   his efforts. Against these he will prepare such immense armaments,\n   --against these he will call into existence special agencies of attack,\n   which (unless met by an inexpugnable defensive system) shall _insure_\n   success.\"\n\n   \"The mere defense of the city against _ordinary fleets_, is no longer\n   the question; but _through the defensive works to be here erected, the\n   nation is to measure its strength against the most lavish use of the\n   resources of a great maritime power, aided by all that modern science\n   and mechanical ingenuity in creating or inventing means of attack, can\n   bring against them_; in short, in fortifying New York, _we are really\n   preparing the battle-field on which the issue of future momentous\n   contests is to be decided_.\"\n\nA few, however, object to the system at present adopted, on the ground\nthat casemated works do not offer sufficient resistance to ships and\nfloating-batteries, and that earthen works, covering a greater area,\nwill accomplish that object much more effectually, while their longer\nland fronts will be more difficult of reduction by siege.\n\nIt cannot be doubted that earthen batteries, with guns in barbette, can,\nas a general rule, be more easily taken by assault, that they are more\nexposed to vertical and ricochet firing, and more expose their gunners\nto be picked off by sharpshooters. Moreover, they give but a very\nlimited fire upon the most desirable point, as the entrance to a harbor.\nOn the other hand, it has not been proved that masonry-casemated works,\nwhen properly constructed and properly armed, will not effectually\nresist a naval cannonade, whether from ships or floating-batteries. The\nresults of recent wars, and of the West Point experiments by General\nTotten, would seem to prove them abundantly capable of doing this.\nAgainst such proofs the mere _ad captandum_ assertion of their\nincapacity can have but little weight--certainly not enough to justify\nthe abandonment of a system approved by the best military authorities\nof this country and Europe, and sanctioned by long experience.\n\nMajor Barnard, in speaking of the capacity of masonry casemated forts to\nresist the fire of a hostile armament, and of the propriety of\nabandoning them for earthen batteries in our system of Coast Defences,\nuses the following forcible language:--\"When we bear in mind that the\nhostile 'floating batteries,' of whatever description, will themselves\nbe exposed to the most formidable projectiles that can be thrown from\nshore batteries,--that when they choose to come to 'close quarters,' to\nattempt to breach, _their_ 'embrasures' present openings through which\ndeluges of grape, canister, and musket balls can be poured upon the\ngunners; and consider what experience has so far shown, and reason has\ntaught us, with regard to the casemate,--we need not be under\napprehension that our casemated works will be battered down; nor doubt\nthat they will, as they did in Russia, answer the important purposes for\nwhich they were designed.\"\n\n\"It only remains to show the _necessity_ of such works. It, in general,\ncosts much less to place a gun behind an earthen parapet, than to build\na masonry structure covered with bomb-proof arches, in which to mount\nit. All authorities agree that an open barbette battery (Grivel's very\nforcible admission has been quoted), on a low site, and to which vessels\ncan approach within 300 or 400 yards, is utterly inadmissible. It may\nsafely be said, that in nine cases out of ten, the sites which furnish\nthe efficient raking and cross fires upon the channels, are exactly of\nthis character; and indeed it very often happens that there are _no\nothers_.\"\n\n\"When such sites _are_ found, it rarely happens that they afford room\nfor sufficient number of guns in open batteries. Hence the necessity of\nputting them tier above tier, which involves, of course, the casemated\nstructure. Such works, furnishing from their lower tier a low, raking\nfire, and (if of several tiers) a plunging fire from their barbettes,\noffer as favorable emplacements for guns as can be contrived, and afford\nto their gunners a degree of security quite as great as _can_ be given\nto men thus engaged.\"\n\n\"On subjects which have a mere speculative importance, there is no\ndanger in giving rein to speculation; but on those of such real and\nintense practical importance as the security against hostile aggression\nof the great city and port of New York, it is not admissible to set\naside the experience of the past, or the opinions of the best minds who\nhave devoted themselves to such subjects. A means of defence, sanctioned\nby its being confided in to protect the great ports of Europe--which\n_has_ protected the great ports of Russia against the most formidable\nnaval armament that ever floated on the ocean, has a claim upon our\nconfidence which mere criticism cannot diminish; and a claim to be\nadhered to in place of all new 'systems,' until time and trial shall\nhave _necessitated_ (not merely justified) the change.\"\n\n\"If, then, we refer to the practice of other nations, to find what has\nbeen judged necessary for the defence of important ports,--to\nexperience, to find how such defensive systems have stood the test of\nactual trial,--we may draw useful conclusions with regard to what is now\nrequired to defend New York. We shall find at _Sebastopol_--a narrow\nharbor, which owed its importance to its being the great naval depot of\nRussia on the Black Sea--an array of 700 guns, about 500 of which were\nplaced in five 'masonry-casemated' works (several of them of great\nsize), and the remainder in open batteries. These defensive works\nfulfilled their object, and sustained the attack of the allied fleet, on\nthe 17th of October, 1854, without sensible damage.\"\n\n\"The facility with which seaports are attacked by fleets--the enormous\npreparations required--the great risks encountered in landing a\nbesieging army on the coast of a formidable enemy (while, for protection\nagainst the _former_ species of attack, costly works are necessary, and\nagainst the latter, field works and men can, in emergency, afford\nprotection), naturally caused the Russians to make these water defences\ntheir _first_ object. Yet, though almost unprotected on the land side,\nSebastopol resisted, for a whole year, an attack on that quarter; and\nillustrated how, with plenty of men and material, an energetic and\neffectual _land defence_ may be improvised, where the _sea defence_ is\nprovided for, as thoroughly as it was at that place.\"\n\n\"Let Cronstadt be another example. Great as was the importance of its\ndefence to Russia, it was not greater,--it was by no means _as great_,\nas that of New York to our own country. This port, and military and\nnaval depot, was defended (in its main approach) by upwards of 600 guns,\n500 of which were mounted in five 'masonry-casemated' works; the\nremainder in an open barbette battery, which enfiladed the main channel.\nThis number is formidable in itself; yet the same number mounted in New\nYork harbor would not afford anything like such a formidable defence as\nwas found at Cronstadt, owing to its great area, and long line of\napproach, compared with the latter.\"\n\n\"_These works fulfilled their object._ They protected the great port and\ndepot of Cronstadt and the capital of the empire from invasion. For two\nsuccessive years did the mighty armaments of France and England\nthreaten; but they were overawed by the frowning array of 'casemated\ncastles' which presented itself, and declined the contest.\"\n\n\"Let us turn our eyes now to the great naval depot of France. After the\nalmost incredible expenditure lavished here, in creating a harbor facing\nthe shores of her great rival, England, and an equally profuse\nexpenditure in providing all that constitutes a great naval depot, we\nmay suppose that the best means, without regard to cost, which the\nscience of man could devise, would be employed here to make this great\nseat of naval power secure against the formidable means of attack\npossessed by the great maritime power most likely to be the assailant.\nThe means there employed are (so far as regards mere _harbor_ defence)\nprecisely the same (viz., casemated works in several tiers, combined\nwith open batteries where the locations are favorable); and the\napplication of means is the same as we have found so successful in\nRussia,--the same which constitute the system of harbor defence of New\nYork.\"\n\nCaptain McClelland, in his official report to the War Department, on the\nsiege of Sebastopol, uses language equally strong and pertinent:--\n\n   \"The permanent defences of Sebastopol against an attack by water,\n   although inferior in material and the details of construction to our own\n   most recent works, proved fully equal to the purpose for which they\n   were intended. Indeed, the occurrences on the Pacific, the Baltic, and\n   the Black Sea, all seem to establish beyond controversy, the soundness\n   of the view so long entertained by all intelligent military men, that\n   well constructed fortifications must always prove more than a match for\n   the strongest fleet.\"\n\n   \"It is deemed that a calm consideration of the events so hastily and\n   imperfectly narrated in the preceding pages must lead all unprejudiced\n   persons among our countrymen to a firm conviction on two vital points:\"\n\n   \"1st. That our system of permanent coast defences is a wise and\n   proper one, which ought to be completed and armed with the least\n   possible delay.\"\n\n   \"2d. That mere individual courage cannot suffice to overcome the\n   forces that would be brought against us, were we involved in an European\n   war, but that it must be rendered manageable by discipline, and\n   directed by that consummate and mechanical skill which can only be\n   acquired by a course of education, instituted for the special purpose,\n   and by long habit.\"\n\n   \"In the day of sailing-vessels the successful siege of Sebastopol\n   would have been impossible. It is evident that the Russians did not\n   appreciate the advantages afforded by steamers, and were unprepared\n   to sustain a siege.\"\n\n   \"This same power of steam would enable European nations to disembark\n   upon our shores even a larger force than that which finally encamped\n   around Sebastopol. To resist such an attack, should it ever be\n   made, our cities and harbors must be fortified, and those fortifications\n   must be provided with guns, ammunition, and instructed artillerists.\n   To repel the advance of such an army into the interior, it is not enough\n   to trust to the number of brave but undisciplined men that we can\n   bring to bear against it. An invading army of 15,000 or 20,000 men\n   could easily be crushed by the unremitting attacks of superior numbers;\n   but when it comes to the case of more than 100,000 disciplined\n   veterans, the very multitude brought to bear against them works its\n   own destruction; because, if without discipline and instruction, they\n   cannot be handled, and are in their own way. We cannot afford a Moscow\n   campaign.\"\n\n   \"Our regular army never can, and, perhaps, never ought to be, large\n   enough to provide for all the contingencies that may arise, but it\n   should be as large as its ordinary avocations in the defence of the\n   frontier will justify; the number of officers and non-commissioned\n   officers should be unusually large, to provide for a sudden increase;\n   and the greatest possible care should be bestowed upon the instruction\n   of the special arms of the artillery and engineer troops. The militia\n   and volunteer system should be placed upon some tangible and effective\n   basis; instructors furnished them from the regular army, and all\n   possible means taken to spread sound military information among them.\n   In the vicinity of our sea-coast fortifications, it would be well to\n   provide a sufficient number of volunteer companies with the means of\n   instruction in heavy artillery, detailing officers of the regular\n   artillery for instructors.\"\n\nOn this subject of instructing our volunteers and militia in the use of\nsea-coast batteries, we add the following quotation from Major Barnard's\npamphlet:--\n\n   \"One of the main causes of inefficiency in coast batteries, which\n   has given color to the idea that they may be passed, or even _attacked_\n   with impunity, I conceive to be the want of _skill_ and _care_ in the\n   use of the guns. The result is a prodigious smoke, and a prodigious\n   throwing away of balls, and very little damage done. This has been,\n   however, by no means a _peculiarity_ of coast defences. The same system\n   of random firing has hitherto prevailed, both in the use of small arms\n   in land and of heavy ordnance in sea battles; nor has it occurred\n   apparently to even the greatest masters of the art of war, to ask why,\n   for one man wounded, or for one effective shot in a vessel's hull, so\n   many thousands of shot should be thrown uselessly into the air.\"\n\n   \"But this question is _now_ asked, both in the use of the soldier's\n   rifled musket, and in the management of ships' guns, as well as of\n   artillery of all kinds.\"\n\n   \"It is at last discovered that it is of more importance to teach the\n   soldier to direct his piece with accuracy of aim, than to perform\n   certain motions on parade with the precision of an automaton. The same\n   idea is now infused into all the departments of military and naval\n   science, and is a _necessary_ result of the recent great\n   improvements in the construction of arms. In short, the truth has at\n   last become apparent that the old-fashioned system of random firing,\n   though perhaps like the 'charge of the six hundred' at Balaklava, 'bien\n   magnifique, _n'est pas la guerre_.'\"\n\n   \"It is of the utmost importance that we should apply this principle\n   to the management of our sea-coast batteries, and give it a practical\n   effect. The _volunteers_ of our cities will constitute _mainly_, in\n   time of war, the gunners of our forts and manipulators of our sea-coast\n   guns. In time of war, they will probably be exercised in these duties.\n   But it is most desirable that we should have at _all times_ a body of\n   gunners, practised in these exercises. The result would be, not only to\n   give to our _citizens_, as well as citizen-soldiers, confidence in the\n   defences provided for their security, but it would disseminate military\n   knowledge, and an intelligent idea of the bearing and objects of the\n   different defensive works. To carry out this idea, it would be\n   desirable that there should be at each considerable seaport town, a\n   sufficient garrison of _artillery_ troops to aid in the instruction\n   of the volunteers. In the present condition of the army _this_ cannot\n   be hoped; but perhaps it might, at least, be found practicable to detail\n   an artillery officer or two for the purpose.\"\n\n\nNOTE TO CHAPTER VIII.--OUR NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES.\n\nThe author has seen nothing since this chapter was written to induce him\nto change the views therein expressed with respect to the superior\nstrategic importance of the line of Lake Champlain, both as a line of\nmilitary operations, and as a line of defence. The mutual commercial\ninterests of the United States and the Canadas render a war between the\ntwo countries less probable than formerly; nevertheless, such an event\nis by no means impossible, and common prudence should induce us to\nprepare in the best possible manner for such a contingency.\n\n\nNOTE TO CHAPTERS IX., X., XI. AND XII.--ARMY ORGANIZATION.\n\nSince these chapters were written, several important changes have been\nmade in our army organization. The rank of Lieutenant-General (at\nleast, by brevet) has been revived, the staff, administrative corps,\ninfantry and cavalry have been increased, and a company of engineer\ntroops organized. But this company is mainly employed at West Point for\ninstruction of the cadets in the several branches of military\nengineering, and thus serves to supply a deficiency long felt in the\nsystem of education at the Military Academy. The want, however, of\ntroops of this arm for the construction, care, and preservation of our\npermanent fortifications, and for the general duties of field\nengineering, still remains to be supplied. Of all the arms of military\norganization, this one most requires instruction in time of peace; it\ncannot be supplied at the moment a war is declared.\n\nIn speaking of our present army organization, as compared with those of\nthe different European powers which he was sent to examine and report\nupon, Captain McClelland says:--\n\n   \"Our force of artillery is large in proportion to the other arms of\n   service, while the number of our engineer troops is ridiculously and\n   shamefully small; it is, therefore, more than probable that in any\n   future siege it will be easy for the artillery to construct their own\n   batteries, while the engineers will be sufficiently burdened by the\n   construction of the other works of attack; we have now, at last, the\n   germ of an artillery school of practice; I would then suggest, for the\n   consideration of the Secretary, the propriety of causing the artillery\n   to construct their own batteries. The position and armament of siege\n   batteries should be determined by consultation between the engineers and\n   the artillery, the former having the preponderating voice, in order to\n   secure the necessary harmony and connection between all parts of the\n   works of attack. This change,\" he says, \"will require to be introduced\n   into the artillery manual and course of instruction everything in\n   relation to the preparation of the fascines, gabions, platforms, and\n   magazines, the dimensions of batteries, manner of arranging, working\n   parties, etc.\"\n\nWith regard to the suggestion of Captain McClellan, it is sufficient to\nremark, that it seeks to remedy one evil by introducing another equally\nas great and equally as objectionable. The defect in our present army\norganization is that one of its arms is too small for the duties which,\nfrom the very nature of military service, naturally and properly belong\nto it; and it surely is no remedy for this defect to permanently\ntransfer a part of these duties to another arm. As well might it be\nsaid, if our artillery force were \"ridiculously and shamefully small\" in\nproportion to the infantry and cavalry, that the field batteries should\nbe permanently transferred to those arms, and that light artillery\ntactics should be comprised in our infantry and cavalry manuals.\n\nThere are certain duties which the military experience of ages has shown\nto properly and almost necessarily belong to each particular arm of an\narmy organization, and every attempt to make one branch perform the\nappropriate duties of another has invariably destroyed its efficiency\nfor either service. Suppose our medical corps were \"ridiculously and\nshamefully small\" in proportion to our pay department, shall our\npaymasters perform the duties of surgery, and be instructed in the use\nof the scalpel and amputating instruments! This is, perhaps, an extreme\ncase, but it serves to illustrate the principle.\n\nThe defect referred to by Captain McClelland, and which has so often\nbeen pointed out by our best military men, cannot be obviated by any\ntransfer or assignment, whether temporary or permanent, of the\nappropriate duties of one corps to another. Indeed, such a measure would\nonly tend to make this defect permanent, and to convert a temporary into\na lasting evil. It can readily be remedied by legislative action, but in\nno other way. The executive action suggested would be deprecated by all.\nMoreover, the evil is now so obvious and so generally admitted, that\nthere can be little doubt that Congress will soon perceive the\nimportance of applying the only proper and effective remedy.\n\n\nNOTE TO CHAPTER XIII.--PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS.\n\nAlthough the general principles of the plan and arrangement of a\npermanent fortification, as established by the great masters of this\nbranch of military science, remain the same; nevertheless, the vast\nimprovements which have, within the last few years, been made in\nprojectiles, require some changes in the details of defensive works of\nthis character. These changes consist mainly in an increased thickness\nof stone and earthen parapets and of the covering of magazines, in the\narrangement of embrasures, and in protecting the garrison from an\nenemy's sharpshooters. The introduction of heavier siege guns, and of\nheavier ordnance on ships of war, and especially on those propelled by\nsteam, require much larger ordnance in forts designed for the defence of\nharbors. In the Russian war, Sweaborg was made to suffer from a distant\nbombardment which left her fortifications intact. These modifications in\nthe arrangements and armaments of forts are absolutely necessary in\norder to restore the relative power of defence against the improvements\nmade in the means of attack. They can very easily be introduced without\nchanging the form or general character of the works, and they are really\nso very essential that, without them, a fort constructed 25 or 30 years\nago, and well suited to the then existing state of the military art,\nwill be likely to offer no very considerable resistance to modern siege\nbatteries or well organized maritime attacks.\n\nSome have gone much further in their estimate of the effect produced by\nthe increased size and force of military projectiles, and boldly assert\nthat masonry works of strong relief can no longer be used, and that the\nincreased range of small arms requires an entire change of the bastioned\nfront, with lines more extended.\n\nWith respect to the effect of the increased range of small arms, it is\nvery natural that a superficial observer should adopt the opinion that\nthis improvement must be followed by an extension of the lines of a\ndefensive military work; but a close study of the subject will probably\nlead to a different conclusion. Such at least is the opinion of the\nablest military engineers of Europe. The lines of the bastioned front\nnow generally in use, were really too long for a good defence with the\narms in use at the time it was adopted; and, in theory, the \"rampart\ngun\" was to be relied upon for the defence of certain exposed points.\nBut this weapon is no longer in use; its place, however, is better\nsupplied by the increased range of the musket and rifle. The latter\nweapon is almost invaluable for defending the approaches to a permanent\nwork.\n\nWith respect to the breaching of stone masonry by siege batteries, it\nhas long been an established principle that all masonry exposed to the\nfire of land batteries should be masked by earthen works. The neglect of\nthis rule caused the fall of Bomarsund. Those who so readily draw, from\nthe results of that siege, the inference that the present mode of\nfortifying land fronts must be abandoned, exhibit their ignorance of\nmilitary engineering. The facts do not justify their conclusions.\n\nWith respect to sea fronts, which can be reached only by guns afloat,\nthe case is very different. They are usually casemates of masonry, not\nmasked by earthen works. Whether the increased efficiency of projectiles\nthrown by ships and floating batteries now require a resort to this mode\nof protecting masonry on the water fronts of fortifications, is a\nquestion well worthy of discussion. This subject has already been\nalluded to in the Note on Sea-coast Defences, and it is there shown that\nno facts have yet been developed which require or authorize any change\nin our present system.\n\n\nNOTE TO CHAPTER XIV.--FIELD ENGINEERING.\n\nAs Mexico had no permanent fortifications to be besieged, the war in\nthat country afforded very little practice in that branch of engineering\nwhich is connected with the attack and defence of permanent works,\nparticularly sapping and mining. The only operation resembling a siege\nwas the investment and bombardment of Vera Cruz, and it is worthy of\nremark that if General Scott had stormed that place, weak as it was, he\nmust have lost a large number of his men, while from his trenches and\nbatteries he reduced it with scarcely the sacrifice of a single life.\n\nNor did either party in this war make much use of field works in the\nattack and defence of positions. Nevertheless, no one can read the\nhistory of the war without appreciating the important influence which\nFort Brown had upon General Taylor's defence of the left bank of the Rio\nGrande. Again if we compare our loss in other Mexican battles with that\nwhich the Americans sustained in their attacks upon Monterey,\nChurubusco, Molino del Key, and Chapultepec,--places partially secured\nby field works--we shall be still more convinced of the value of\ntemporary fortifications for the defence of military positions, although\nit was manifest that the Mexicans neither knew how to construct nor how\nto defend them.\n\nNor was there much practice in this war in the use of military bridges,\nfor, with the exception of the Rio Grande, our armies had no important\nrivers to cross. We must not, however, omit to note the important fact\nthat General Taylor was unable to take advantage of the victories of\nPalo Alto and Resacade La Palma to pursue and destroy the army of\nArista, _because_ he had no pontoon equipage to enable him to follow\nthem across the Rio Grande. It should also be remarked that even a very\nsmall bridge equipage would have been of very great use in crossing\nother streams and ravines during the operations of this war. One of our\ncavalry officers writes:--\n\n   \"On our march from Matamaras to Victoria and Tampico, in 1846\n   and 1847, we had infinite difficulty in bridging boggy streams (there\n   being no suitable timber), and in crossing ravines with vertical banks;\n   a few ways of the Birago trestles would have saved us many days and\n   a vast amount of labor. In the operations in the valley of Mexico, our\n   movements, checked as they so often were by impassable wet ditches\n   and sometimes by dry ravines, would have been rendered so much more\n   free and rapid by the use of the Birago trestles, that our successes\n   could have been gained at far less cost, and probably with more rapidity\n   than they were.\"\n\nWith regard to military reconnaissance, the splendid achievements of Lee\nand others connected with the operations of General Scott, proved the\nvalue and importance of this particular branch of field engineering.\n\nBut field engineering, as a branch or arm of the military service,\nreceived its greatest development and most brilliant application in the\nCrimean war, particularly in the siege of Sebastopol, and the measures\nresorted to by General Todtleben to defend that place against the attack\nof superior forces.\n\nA brief sketch of these defensive works may be of interest to the\nreader:--\n\nWhen the allies reached Balaklava, Sebastopol was defended on the south\nside only by a loop-holed wall about four feet and a half thick, and\nfrom eighteen to twenty feet high, and a semicircular redoubt with two\nstories of loop-holes, and five guns in barbette. These works would have\nafforded some protection against a _coup-de-main_ by infantry and\ncavalry, but could have offered no very considerable obstacle to a\ncombined attack of these arms with artillery.\n\nThe Russian engineer commenced his operations for strengthening this\nposition by occupying the most important points in his line of defence\nwith detached field works of sufficient relief to resist an assault, and\ngenerally closed at the gorge. These works were afterwards connected by\nre-entering lines of a weaker profile, which served to enfilade the\nravines and to flank the advanced works. The old wall was strengthened\nwith earth, and rifle-pits for sharpshooters were constructed at a\nconsiderable distance in front.\n\nThe most important points of the main line of defence were: 1st. The\nFlag-staff Bastion. 2d. The Central Bastion. 3d. The Malakoff. 4th. The\nRedan. 5th. The little Redan. The command of the first was about fifteen\nfeet, its ditch thirty feet wide and from twelve to fifteen feet deep. A\nportion of the scarp was provided with palisades some ten feet high. The\nconstruction of the Central Bastion was similar to that of the\nFlag-staff, but weaker in profile. The relief of the other works was\nstill less. The command of the Malakoff was about fourteen feet, its\nditch eighteen feet wide and twelve feet deep. The thickness of parapet\nin these works was generally about eighteen feet, and the bombproofs\nwere covered with timber eighteen inches thick and six feet of earth.\nThe loop-holed walls connecting these works were covered by a rampart\nand parapet, or entirely replaced by a simple parapet. Many of the\nembrasures were revetted with the common boiler iron ships' water-tanks\nfilled with earth. The same material was sometimes used for traverses.\nRope mantelets were used to protect the artillerists at the pieces from\nrifle balls and small grape. Great attention was given to the\nconstruction of bombproofs to cover the men from vertical firing. These\nwere sometimes under the rampart and the second line of defence (where\nthere was one), often under special traverses, or entirely under ground,\nand occasionally excavated in the solid rock. Some had fireplaces and\nchimneys, and were well ventilated. Interior slopes were revetted with\ngabions, crowned by fascines and sand bags. Gabions were also employed\nto repair the damage caused by the enemy's artillery. Abattis, military\npits, caltrops and spikes, stuck through planks, and explosive machines\nwere employed in front of different parts of the defences. Mines were\nresorted to in front of the Flag-staff Bastion to retard the French\napproaches. They were made in rocky soil with craters from twelve to\nfifteen feet deep. The Russian counter-approaches generally consisted of\nfleches, united by a simple trench.\n\nCaptain McClelland, one of our officers sent to the Crimea, from whose\nvaluable Report most of the foregoing details are gathered, adds the\nfollowing remarks upon these works of defence:--\n\n   \"From the preceding hasty and imperfect account of the defences\n   of Sebastopol, it will appear how little foundation there was for\n   the generally-received accounts of the stupendous dimensions of the\n   works, and of new systems of fortifications brought into play. The\n   plain truth is, that these defences were simple temporary fortifications\n   of rather greater dimensions than usual, and that not a single new\n   principle of engineering was developed. It is true, that there were\n   several novel minor details, such as the rope mantelets, the use of\n   iron tanks, etc., but the whole merit consisted in the admirable\n   adaptation of well-known principles to the peculiar locality and\n   circumstances of the case. Neither can it be asserted that the plans\n   of the various works were perfect. On the contrary, there is no\n   impropriety in believing that if Todtleben were called upon to do\n   the same work over again, he would probably introduce better close\n   flanking arrangements.\"\n\n   \"These remarks are not intended to, nor can they, detract from the\n   reputation of the Russian engineer. His labors and their results will\n   be handed down in history as the most triumphant and enduring monument\n   of the value of fortifications, and his name must ever be placed in the\n   first rank of military engineers. But, in our admiration of the\n   talent and energy of the engineer, it must not be forgotten that the\n   inert masses which he raised would have been useless without the skilful\n   artillery and heroic infantry who defended them. Much stronger places\n   than Sebastopol have often fallen under far less obstinate and\n   well-combined attacks than that to which it was subjected. There can be\n   no danger in expressing the conviction that the siege of Sebastopol\n   called forth the most magnificent defence of fortifications that has\n   ever yet occurred.\"\n\nWe will now pass to the works of attack. When the allies decided that\nthe works of Sebastopol could not be carried by a simple cannonade and\nassault, but must be reduced by a regular siege, the first thing to be\nconsidered was to secure the forces covering the siege works from\nlateral sorties and the efforts of a relieving army. The field works\nplanned for this purpose were not of any great strength, and many of\nthem \"were only undertaken when a narrow escape from some imminent\ndanger had demonstrated their necessity.\" The French line of defence\nconsisted of eight pentagonal redoubts, connected by an infantry\nparapet. The English seemed to attach but little importance to field\nworks for the defence of their position; the terrible slaughter at\nInkerman was the natural consequence of this neglect.\n\nIn describing the engineering operations of the allies at this siege.\nCaptain McClelland says:--\n\n   \"In regard to the detailed execution of the French attacks, little or\n   nothing novel is to be observed. Even when coolly examining the\n   direction of their trenches, after the close of the siege, it was very\n   rare that a faulty direction could be detected; they always afforded\n   excellent cover, and were well defiladed; in some cases the excavation\n   of the double direct sap was carried to the depth of six and a half feet\n   in the solid rock! The execution of many of the saps and batteries was\n   worthy of a school of practice. In the parallels, bombproofs were\n   provided as temporary hospitals, offices for the generals on duty, etc.\n   They did not use the sapper armor. The use of the sap-roller was\n   often attempted, but it could be employed only during the latter part of\n   the attack upon the Malakoff, when the fire of the Russian artillery was\n   nearly extinguished by the mortars; before that, as soon as a sap-roller\n   was placed in position--some thirty guns would be brought to bear\n   upon it, the result being its immediate destruction. It may justly be\n   said of the French approaches, that they admirably carried into practice\n   their system of sapping. The technical skill and patient courage\n   evinced by their officers and men in pushing forward such excellent\n   approaches, under a most deadly fire, is worthy of all commendation, and\n   is such as might have been expected from the antecedents of their\n   corps of engineers.\"\n\n   \"With regard to the English, the case was different; it seemed as\n   if they systematically abandoned the excellent system taught and\n   perfected with so much care at Chatham. Whenever the ground was\n   difficult, their trenches generally ceased to afford shelter; a\n   shallow excavation in the rock, and a few stones thrown up in front,\n   appeared to be all that was considered necessary in such cases. They\n   were often faulty in direction as well as in profile, being not\n   unfrequently badly defiladed, or not gaining ground enough and\n   entirely too cramped; nor were they pushed as close to the Redan as\n   they ought to have been before giving the assault. In too many\n   cases the expression '_tatonnement_ of the French would seem\n   to convey the best idea of their operations. Their batteries, however,\n   were very well constructed. The magazines, platforms, etc., were\n    usually similar to those adopted at Chatham, although\n   unnecessary deviations were sometimes complained of. They\n   employed neither armor nor the full sap, sometimes the half-full, but\n   generally the flying-sap were employed.\"\n\nIt may also be added, that, at the time of the assault, the French\napproaches had been pushed to the distance of thirty-two paces of the\ncounterscarp of the Malakoff, while the English had scarcely reached\nwithin two hundred and twenty-five yards of the ditch of the Redan.\n\nThis description of the operations of the English at the siege of\nSebastopol carries the professional reader directly back to their sieges\nin the Spanish Peninsula. It certainly is very strange that a great\nnation leading the van of civilization should, after such experience,\nhave neglected to provide its army with a proper number of engineer\nofficers and engineer troops, well instructed in the peculiar and\ndifficult duties of that arm. What excuse can ever be offered for\nsubstituting human life for professional skill in the operations of a\nsiege, when that skill may so readily be acquired in time of peace, and\nis always so necessary an element of a good military organization!\n\nWhile every one admits that the siege of Sebastopol proved the immense\nimportance of fieldworks against land attacks, some would conclude from\nthe operations of that siege that good earthen works of a large\ndevelopment are better suited for the defence of a large city than\npermanent fortifications with masonry revetments, and which will\nnecessarily have a less extended line of fire and less capacity for men\nand military stores. We quote the remarks of Captain McClelland on this\npoint, and also make a short extract from the recently published Journal\nof the siege of Sebastopol by General Niel.\n\nCaptain McClelland says:--\n\n   \"This would seem to be the proper place to notice a popular fallacy,\n   which, for a time at least, gained extensive credence. It was, that the\n   siege of Sebastopol proved the superiority of temporary (earthen)\n   fortifications over those of a permanent nature. It is easy to show that\n   it proved nothing of the kind; but that it only proved that temporary\n   works in the hands of a brave and skillful garrison are susceptible of a\n   longer defence than was generally supposed. They were attacked as\n   field works never were before, and were defended as field works never\n   had been defended. The main difference between properly constructed\n   permanent fortifications (intended to resist a siege) and temporary\n   works, is that the latter seldom present an insuperable obstacle against\n   assault, while the former always do. In addition, permanent works\n   have a better command over the adjacent country, and are more carefully\n   and perfectly planned. The masonry walls, which render an assault\n   impossible, cannot be seen from the distance, and can be destroyed\n   only by establishing batteries on the crest of the glacis, or the\n   edge of the ditch; the earthen parapet alone being visible beyond that\n   point, they may, until the besiegers arrive there, be regarded in the\n   same light as field works, with the difference that the garrison are not\n   harassed by the necessity of being constantly prepared to repel an\n   assault.\"\n\n   \"Now, in the siege of Sebastopol, the trenches of the besiegers\n   never reached the edge of the ditch; so that, had the fortification been\n   a permanent one, the most difficult, slow, and dangerous part of the\n   siege remained to be undertaken, viz., the crowning of the covered\n   way, the establishment of the breach batteries, the descent and passage\n   of the ditch, and the assault of the breach; in other words, at the\n   moment when the weakness of the temporary works became apparent and\n   fatal, the true strength of the permanent defences would have commenced\n   coming into play.\"\n\n   \"Assuming the progress of the attack to have been as rapid as it was\n   under existing circumstances, the besiegers, on the 8th of September,\n   would not yet have been in a condition to crown the covered way, the\n   siege would certainly have extended into the winter; and it may even\n   be doubted whether the place would eventually have fallen, until the\n   allies were in sufficient force to invest the north as well as the\n   southside.\"\n\nGeneral Neil remarks:--\n\n   \"Struck by the length of the siege of Sebastopol, certain foreign\n   officers have expressed the opinion that masonry-revetted scarps are not\n   of incontestable utility in fortified places.\"\n\n   \"Sebastopol, a vast retrenched camp, defended by field fortifications\n   of strong profile, derived its principal strength from an armament\n   such as could only exist in an extensive maritime arsenal, and from a\n   large army which always preserved its free communications with the\n   interior of Russia.\"\n\n   \"If the enceinte had been provided with good revetted scarps;\n   if it had been necessary to breach these, and subsequently have been\n   compelled to penetrate through difficult passages, in rear of which the\n   heads of our columns would have met an army, Sebastopol would have\n   been an impregnable fortress.\"\n\n   \"When we compare, in effect, the works of attack at Sebastopol\n   with those of an ordinary siege, we will see that on the 8th of\n   September, 1855, the day of the last assault, we had only executed,\n   after the greatest effort, the besieging works which precede the\n   crowning of the covered way; we had not then, as yet, entered upon that\n   period of the works of a siege which is the most difficult and the most\n   murderous; and there was no occasion to engage ourselves in them, since\n   the ditches and parapets of the enceinte were not insurmountable, as the\n   sequel has proved.\"\n\n   \"The difficulty consisted in conquering the Russian army upon a\n   position prepared long beforehand for its defence, quite as much as in\n   surmounting the material obstacle of the fortification.\"\n\n   \"Our places of arms being established at thirty metres from the\n   besieged works, we were able to choose our own time for action, and to\n   throw ourselves unexpectedly upon the enemy when the fire of our\n   artillery had forced him to shelter himself, up to the last minute,\n   behind his numerous blindages; to have gone further would have been\n   inviting the initiative in the attack on the part of the Russian army.\"\n\n   \"The absence of scarp walls, which would have secured the place\n   from escalade, did not exercise a less influence upon the defence;\n   for the besieged were compelled to keep permanently at the gorges\n   of the works, strong reserves, in readiness to repulse the assault,\n   which they saw themselves menaced with from the commencement of\n   the siege.\"\n\n   \"Finally, it can be remarked, that these reserves, which were decimated\n   night and day by the concentric fire of our batteries, were able\n   to issue out from the enceinte through wide debouches, without having\n   to pass through the narrow defiles which are formed by the drawbridges\n   of revetted places; they were, then, a permanent threat for the\n   besiegers, who were exposed to seeing their trenches unexpectedly\n   invaded by the greater part of the Russian army.\"\n\n   \"Neither side, consequently, was in a position analogous to that\n   which is presented in the siege of a fortified place, protected from\n   insult by good masonry scarps.'\" (Note to page 443.)\n\nAnd again, page 423, the same authority remarks:\n\n   \"Now, it (the Russian army) is no longer able to escape from the\n   concentric fires of our batteries; for, _not being protected by masonry\n   scarps_, it is obliged constantly to keep united strong reserves, in\n   order to repulse the assault with which it is at every instant menaced'\"\n\n\nNOTE TO CHAPTER XV.--MILITARY EDUCATION, &C.\n\nWith regard to the subjects discussed in this chapter it will, perhaps,\nbe sufficient to remark that the Mexican war incontestably proved the\nvalue of the West Point Military Academy; for the superior efficiency of\nproperly-educated officers over those who had been appointed from civil\nlife without any knowledge of the profession they were called upon to\npractice, fully satisfied the country of the importance of that\ninstitution, and even silenced the clamors of the few who refused to be\nconvinced.\n\nThe recent abortive attempt to give efficiency to our navy by means of a\nretired list, has, it is feared, destroyed for a time all hopes of\nintroducing this very necessary measure into our military service;\nalthough it is very certain that without this we can never have our\nsystem of promotion placed upon an effective and satisfactory basis,\nwhich shall give efficiency to the army by rewarding merit, while it\nprevents injustice by closing the avenues of political favoritism.\n\nThe Mexican war also most abundantly proved that our objections to the\nsystem of military appointment were well founded, and it is hoped that\nthe more recent abuses of that system will call public attention to the\nnecessity of a change; for if military office continue to be conferred\nfor partisan services, it will soon destroy the integrity as well as the\nefficiency of our army.\n\n\n\n\nEXPLANATION OF PLATES\n\nFigs. 1, 2, 3.--Used to illustrate the strategic relations of the armies\nA and B.\n\nFig. 4.--Line of operations directed against the extremity of the\nenemy's line of defence, as was done by Napoleon in the Marengo\ncampaign.\n\nFig. 5.--Napoleon's plan of campaign in 1800, for the army of the Rhine,\nand the army of reserve.\n\nFig. 6 shows the plan adopted by Napoleon in the campaign of 1800, to\npreserve his communications.\n\nFig. 7 illustrates the same thing in the campaign of 1806.\n\nFig. 8.--Interior and central line of operations.\n\nFig. 9 represents a camp of a grand division of an army. The distance\nfrom the front row of tents to the line of camp-guards should be from\n350 to 400 feet; thence to the line of posts, from 150 to 200 feet;\nthence to the line of sentinels, from 100 to 200 feet. In many cases,\nthe line of posts between the camp-guards and sentinels may be dispensed\nwith. The distance between battalions will be from 50 to 100 feet; and\nthe same between squadrons and batteries.\n\nFig. 10.--Details of encampment for a battalion of infantry. The width\nof company streets will depend upon the strength of a company, and will\nbe so arranged that the front of the camp shall not exceed the length of\nthe battalion, when drawn up in line of battle. This width will be from\n50 to 100 feet. The distance between the tents of each row will be 2 or\n3 feet; the distance between the tents of one company and those of\nanother, from 4 to 6 feet.\n\nFig. 11 is the camp of a squadron of cavalry. A single company encamping\nalone, would be arranged in the same way as an entire squadron. The\nhorses are picketed in two lines parallel to the tents, and at a\ndistance from them of about 12 feet. The forage is placed between the\ntents. A squadron of two companies will occupy a front of about 180\nfeet. The fires, or company kitchens, should be 50 or 60 feet in rear of\nthe non-commissioned officers' tents.\n\nFig 12 is the camp of two batteries of foot artillery, or two companies\nof foot engineers.\n\n[The plan of encampment for artillery, as given in the \"Instruction of\nU.S. Field Artillery, horse and foot,\" may be employed where a single\nbattery encamps by itself, or where only the skeleton of companies is\nmaintained; but it will be found exceedingly inconvenient, where a full\nbattery, with a large train, encamps on the same line with other troops.\nThe plan we have given is that which is employed in most European\nservices.]\n\nFig. 13.--In this plan for mounted artillery and engineers, the fires\nare so arranged as to expose the ammunition as little as possible to the\nsparks from the kitchens.\n\nFig. 14.--Simple parallel order of battle.\n\n15.--Parallel order, with a crochet on the flank.\n\n16.--Parallel order, reinforced on a wing.\n\n17.--Parallel order, reinforced on the centre.\n\n18.--Simple oblique order.\n\n19.--Oblique order, reinforced on the assailing wing.\n\n20.--Perpendicular order.\n\n21.--Concave order.\n\n22.--Convex order.\n\n23.--Order by echelon on a wing.\n\n24.--Order by echelon on the centre.\n\n25.--Combined order of attack.\n\n26.--Formation of infantry by two deployed lines.\n\n27, 28.--- Arrangements corresponding to depth of column.\n\n29.--Formation by squares.\n\n30.--Mixed formation of three battalions.\n\n31.--Deep formation of heavy columns.\n\n32.--Formation in columns by brigade.\n\n33.--Formation of two brigades of cavalry, by the mixed system.\n\n34.--Passage of the Sound by the British fleet, in 1807.\n\n35.--Attack on Copenhagen.\n\n36.--Attack on Algiers.\n\n37.--Attack on San Juan d'Ulloa.\n\n38.--Attack on St. Jean d'Acre.\n\n39.--Plan of a regular bastioned front of a fortification.\n\n40.--Section of do.    do.\n\n41.--Tenaillons.\n\nFig. 42.--Demi-tenaillons, with a bonnet.\n\n43.--A horn-work.\n\n44.--A crown-work.\n\n45.--A redan.\n\n46.--A lunette.\n\n47.--A mitre or priest-cap.\n\n48.--A bastioned fort.\n\n49.--Vertical section of a field intrenchment.\n\n50.--Simple sap.\n\n51.--Flying sap.\n\n52.--Full sap.\n\n53.--Crater of a military mine.\n\n54.--Plan of the attack of a regular bastioned work.\n\n[Illustration]\n\n[Illustration]\n\n[Illustration]\n\n[Illustration]\n\n[Illustration]\n\n[Illustration]\n\n[Illustration]\n\n[Illustration]\n\n[Illustration]\n\n[Illustration]\n\n[Illustration]\n\n[Illustration]","title":"Elements of Military Art and Science: Or, Course Of Instruction In Strategy, Fortification, Tactics Of Battles, &C.; Embracing The Duties Of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, And Engineers; Adapted To The Use Of Volunteers And Militia; Third Edition; With Critical Notes On The Mexican And Crimean Wars.","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":139912}