{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_16295/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_16295","id":"gutenberg_16295","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/16295","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Hinduism","Vedanta"],"text":"Produced by Srinivasan Sriram, David King, and the Online\nDistributed Proofreading Team\n\n\n\n\n\nVEDANTA-SUTRAS\n\n_With the Commentary by_\n\nSA@NKARACHARYA\n\n_Translated by_\nGEORGE THIBAUT\n\n_Part I_\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\nVEDANTA-SUTRAS WITH THE COMMENTARY BY SA@NKARACHARYA.\n\nADHYAYA I.\n\n  Pada I.\n\n  Pada II.\n\n  Pada III.\n\n  Pada IV.\n\nADHYAYA II.\n\n  Pada I.\n\n  Pada II.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nTransliteration of Oriental Alphabets adopted for the Translations of\nthe Sacred Books of the East.\n\n[Transcriber's Note: This book contains many words with one or two\nletters in the word printed in italics; those letters are transcribed by\nenclosing them in slashes, e.g. \"karmaka/nd/a\" has the letters \"nd\" in\nitalics.  Also, the symbol \"@\" is used before the letter \"n\" to indicate\na horizontal bar across the top.]\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION.\n\n\nTo the sacred literature of the Brahmans, in the strict sense of the\nterm, i.e. to the Veda, there belongs a certain number of complementary\nworks without whose assistance the student is, according to Hindu\nnotions, unable to do more than commit the sacred texts to memory. In\nthe first place all Vedic texts must, in order to be understood, be read\ntogether with running commentaries such as Saya/n/a's commentaries on\nthe Sa/m/hitas and Brahma/n/as, and the Bhashyas ascribed to Sa@nkara on\nthe chief Upanishads. But these commentaries do not by themselves\nconduce to a full comprehension of the contents of the sacred texts,\nsince they confine themselves to explaining the meaning of each detached\npassage without investigating its relation to other passages, and the\nwhole of which they form part; considerations of the latter kind are at\nany rate introduced occasionally only. The task of taking a\ncomprehensive view of the contents of the Vedic writings as a whole, of\nsystematising what they present in an unsystematical form, of showing\nthe mutual co-ordination or subordination of single passages and\nsections, and of reconciling contradictions--which, according to the\nview of the orthodox commentators, can be apparent only--is allotted to\na separate sastra or body of doctrine which is termed Mima/m/sa, i.e.\nthe investigation or enquiry [Greek: kat ezochaen], viz. the enquiry\ninto the connected meaning of the sacred texts.\n\nOf this Mima/m/sa two branches have to be distinguished, the so-called\nearlier (purva) Mima/m/sa, and the later (uttara) Mima/m/sa. The former\nundertakes to systematise the karmaka/nd/a, i.e. that entire portion of\nthe Veda which is concerned with action, pre-eminently sacrificial\naction, and which comprises the Sa/m/hitas and the Brahma/n/as exclusive\nof the Ara/n/yaka portions; the latter performs the same service with\nregard to the so-called j/n/anaka/nd/a, i.e. that part of the Vedic\nwritings which includes the Ara/n/yaka portions of the Brahma/n/as, and\na number of detached treatises called Upanishads. Its subject is not\naction but knowledge, viz. the knowledge of Brahman.\n\nAt what period these two /s/astras first assumed a definite form, we are\nunable to ascertain. Discussions of the nature of those which constitute\nthe subject-matter of the Purva Mima/m/sa must have arisen at a very\nearly period, and the word Mima/m/sa itself together with its\nderivatives is already employed in the Brahma/n/as to denote the doubts\nand discussions connected with certain contested points of ritual. The\nwant of a body of definite rules prescribing how to act, i.e. how to\nperform the various sacrifices in full accordance with the teaching of\nthe Veda, was indeed an urgent one, because it was an altogether\npractical want, continually pressing itself on the adhvaryus engaged in\nritualistic duties. And the task of establishing such rules was moreover\na comparatively limited and feasible one; for the members of a certain\nVedic sakha or school had to do no more than to digest thoroughly their\nown brahma/n/a and sa/m/hita, without being under any obligation of\nreconciling with the teaching of their own books the occasionally\nconflicting rules implied in the texts of other sakhas. It was assumed\nthat action, as being something which depends on the will and choice of\nman, admits of alternatives, so that a certain sacrifice may be\nperformed in different ways by members of different Vedic schools, or\neven by the followers of one and the same sakha.\n\nThe Uttara Mima/m/sa-/s/astra may be supposed to have originated\nconsiderably later than the Purva Mima/m/sa. In the first place, the\ntexts with which it is concerned doubtless constitute the latest branch\nof Vedic literature. And in the second place, the subject-matter of\nthose texts did not call for a systematical treatment with equal\nurgency, as it was in no way connected with practice; the mental\nattitude of the authors of the Upanishads, who in their lucubrations on\nBrahman and the soul aim at nothing less than at definiteness and\ncoherence, may have perpetuated itself through many generations without\nany great inconvenience resulting therefrom.\n\nBut in the long run two causes must have acted with ever-increasing\nforce, to give an impulse to the systematic working up of the teaching\nof the Upanishads also. The followers of the different Vedic sakhas no\ndoubt recognised already at an early period the truth that, while\nconflicting statements regarding the details of a sacrifice can be got\nover by the assumption of a vikalpa, i.e. an optional proceeding, it is\nnot so with regard to such topics as the nature of Brahman, the relation\nto it of the human soul, the origin of the physical universe, and the\nlike. Concerning them, one opinion only can be the true one, and it\ntherefore becomes absolutely incumbent on those, who look on the whole\nbody of the Upanishads as revealed truth, to demonstrate that their\nteaching forms a consistent whole free from all contradictions. In\naddition there supervened the external motive that, while the\nkarmaka/nd/a of the Veda concerned only the higher castes of\nbrahmanically constituted society, on which it enjoins certain\nsacrificial performances connected with certain rewards, the\nj/n/anaka/nd/a, as propounding a certain theory of the world, towards\nwhich any reflecting person inside or outside the pale of the orthodox\ncommunity could not but take up a definite position, must soon have\nbecome the object of criticism on the part of those who held different\nviews on religious and philosophic things, and hence stood in need of\nsystematic defence.\n\nAt present there exists a vast literature connected with the two\nbranches of the Mima/m/sa. We have, on the one hand, all those works\nwhich constitute the Purva Mima/m/sa-/s/astra--or as it is often,\nshortly but not accurately, termed, the Mima/m/sa-/s/astra--and, on the\nother hand, all those works which are commonly comprised under the name\nVedanta-/s/astra. At the head of this extensive literature there stand\ntwo collections of Sutras (i.e. short aphorisms constituting in their\ntotality a complete body of doctrine upon some subject), whose reputed\nauthors are Jainini and Badaraya/n/a. There can, however, be no doubt\nthat the composition of those two collections of Sutras was preceded by\na long series of preparatory literary efforts of which they merely\nrepresent the highly condensed outcome. This is rendered probable by the\nanalogy of other /s/astras, as well as by the exhaustive thoroughness\nwith which the Sutras perform their task of systematizing the teaching\nof the Veda, and is further proved by the frequent references which the\nSutras make to the views of earlier teachers. If we consider merely the\npreserved monuments of Indian literature, the Sutras (of the two\nMima/m/sas as well as of other /s/astras) mark the beginning; if we,\nhowever, take into account what once existed, although it is at present\nirretrievably lost, we observe that they occupy a strictly central\nposition, summarising, on the one hand, a series of early literary\nessays extending over many generations, and forming, on the other hand,\nthe head spring of an ever broadening activity of commentators as well\nas virtually independent writers, which reaches down to our days, and\nmay yet have some future before itself.\n\nThe general scope of the two Mima/m/sa-sutras and their relation to the\nVeda have been indicated in what precedes. A difference of some\nimportance between the two has, however, to be noted in this connexion.\nThe systematisation of the karmaka/nd/a of the Veda led to the\nelaboration of two classes of works, viz. the Kalpa-sutras on the one\nhand, and the Purva Mima/m/sa-sutras on the other hand. The former give\nnothing but a description as concise as possible of the sacrifices\nenjoined in the Brahma/n/as; while the latter discuss and establish the\ngeneral principles which the author of a Kalpa-sutra has to follow, if\nhe wishes to render his rules strictly conformable to the teaching of\nthe Veda. The j/n/anaka/nd/a of the Veda, on the other hand, is\nsystematised in a single work, viz. the Uttara Mima/m/sa or\nVedanta-sutras, which combine the two tasks of concisely stating the\nteaching of the Veda, and of argumentatively establishing the special\ninterpretation of the Veda adopted in the Sutras. This difference may be\naccounted for by two reasons. In the first place, the contents of the\nkarmaka/nd/a, as being of an entirely practical nature, called for\nsummaries such as the Kalpa-sutras, from which all burdensome\ndiscussions of method are excluded; while there was no similar reason\nfor the separation of the two topics in the case of the purely\ntheoretical science of Brahman. And, in the second place, the\nVedanta-sutras throughout presuppose the Purva Mima/m/sa-sutras, and may\ntherefore dispense with the discussion of general principles and methods\nalready established in the latter.\n\nThe time at which the two Mima/m/sa-sutras were composed we are at\npresent unable to fix with any certainty; a few remarks on the subject\nwill, however, be made later on. Their outward form is that common to\nall the so-called Sutras which aims at condensing a given body of\ndoctrine in a number of concise aphoristic sentences, and often even\nmere detached words in lieu of sentences. Besides the Mima/m/sa-sutras\nthis literary form is common to the fundamental works on the other\nphilosophic systems, on the Vedic sacrifices, on domestic ceremonies, on\nsacred law, on grammar, and on metres. The two Mima/m/sa-sutras occupy,\nhowever, an altogether exceptional position in point of style. All\nSutras aim at conciseness; that is clearly the reason to which this\nwhole species of literary composition owes its existence. This their aim\nthey reach by the rigid exclusion of all words which can possibly be\nspared, by the careful avoidance of all unnecessary repetitions, and, as\nin the case of the grammatical Sutras, by the employment of an\narbitrarily coined terminology which substitutes single syllables for\nentire words or combination of words. At the same time the manifest\nintention of the Sutra writers is to express themselves with as much\nclearness as the conciseness affected by them admits of. The aphorisms\nare indeed often concise to excess, but not otherwise intrinsically\nobscure, the manifest care of the writers being to retain what is\nessential in a given phrase, and to sacrifice only what can be supplied,\nalthough perhaps not without difficulty, and an irksome strain of memory\nand reflection. Hence the possibility of understanding without a\ncommentary a very considerable portion at any rate of the ordinary\nSutras. Altogether different is the case of the two Mima/m/sa-sutras.\nThere scarcely one single Sutra is intelligible without a commentary.\nThe most essential words are habitually dispensed with; nothing is, for\ninstance, more common than the simple ommission of the subject or\npredicate of a sentence. And when here and there a Sutra occurs whose\nwords construe without anything having to be supplied, the phraseology\nis so eminently vague and obscure that without the help derived from a\ncommentary we should be unable to make out to what subject the Sutra\nrefers. When undertaking to translate either of the Mima/m/sa-sutras we\ntherefore depend altogether on commentaries; and hence the question\narises which of the numerous commentaries extant is to be accepted as a\nguide to their right understanding.\n\nThe commentary here selected for translation, together with\nBadaraya/n/a's Sutras (to which we shall henceforth confine our\nattention to the exclusion of Jaimini's Purva Mima/m/sa-sutras), is the\none composed by the celebrated theologian /S/a@nkara or, as he is\ncommonly called, /S/a@nkara/k/arya. There are obvious reasons for this\nselection. In the first place, the /S/a@nkara-bhashya represents the\nso-called orthodox side of Brahminical theology which strictly upholds\nthe Brahman or highest Self of the Upanishads as something different\nfrom, and in fact immensely superior to, the divine beings such as\nVish/n/u or Siva, which, for many centuries, have been the chief objects\nof popular worship in India. In the second place, the doctrine advocated\nby /S/a@nkara is, from a purely philosophical point of view and apart\nfrom all theological considerations, the most important and interesting\none which has arisen on Indian soil; neither those forms of the Vedanta\nwhich diverge from the view represented by /S/a@nkara nor any of the\nnon-Vedantic systems can be compared with the so-called orthodox Vedanta\nin boldness, depth, and subtlety of speculation. In the third place,\n/S/a@nkara's bhaashya is, as far as we know, the oldest of the extant\ncommentaries, and relative antiquity is at any rate one of the\ncircumstances which have to be taken into account, although, it must be\nadmitted, too much weight may easily be attached to it. The\n/S/a@nkara-bhashya further is the authority most generally deferred to\nin India as to the right understanding of the Vedanta-sutras, and ever\nsince /S/a@nkara's time the majority of the best thinkers of India have\nbeen men belonging to his school. If in addition to all this we take\ninto consideration the intrinsic merits of /S/a@nkara's work which, as a\npiece of philosophical argumentation and theological apologetics,\nundoubtedly occupies a high rank, the preference here given to it will\nbe easily understood.\n\nBut to the European--or, generally, modern--translator of the\nVedanta-sutras with /S/a@nkara's commentary another question will of\ncourse suggest itself at once, viz. whether or not /S/a@nkara's\nexplanations faithfully render the intended meaning of the author of the\nSutras. To the Indian Pandit of /S/a@nkara's school this question has\nbecome an indifferent one, or, to state the case more accurately, he\nobjects to it being raised, as he looks on /S/a@nkara's authority as\nstanding above doubt and dispute. When pressed to make good his position\nhe will, moreover, most probably not enter into any detailed comparison\nof /S/a@nkara's comments with the text of Badaraya/n/a's Sutras, but\nwill rather endeavour to show on speculative grounds that /S/a@nkara's\nphilosophical view is the only true one, whence it of course follows\nthat it accurately represents the meaning of Badaraya/n/a, who himself\nmust necessarily be assured to have taught the true doctrine. But on the\nmodern investigator, who neither can consider himself bound by the\nauthority of a name however great, nor is likely to look to any Indian\nsystem of thought for the satisfaction of his speculative wants, it is\nclearly incumbent not to acquiesce from the outset in the\ninterpretations given of the Vedanta-sutras--and the Upanishads--by\n/S/a@nkara and his school, but to submit them, as far as that can be\ndone, to a critical investigation.\n\nThis is a task which would have to be undertaken even if /S/a@nkara's\nviews as to the true meaning of the Sutras and Upanishads had never been\ncalled into doubt on Indian soil, although in that case it could perhaps\nhardly be entered upon with much hope of success; but it becomes much\nmore urgent, and at the same time more feasible, when we meet in India\nitself with systems claiming to be Vedantic and based on interpretations\nof the Sutras and Upanishads more or less differing from those of\n/S/a@nkara. The claims of those systems to be in the possession of the\nright understanding of the fundamental authorities of the Vedanta must\nat any rate be examined, even if we should finally be compelled to\nreject them.\n\nIt appears that already at a very early period the Vedanta-sutras had\ncome to be looked upon as an authoritative work, not to be neglected by\nany who wished to affiliate their own doctrines to the Veda. At present,\nat any rate, there are very few Hindu sects not interested in showing\nthat their distinctive tenets are countenanced by Badaraya/n/a's\nteaching. Owing to this the commentaries on the Sutras have in the\ncourse of time become very numerous, and it is at present impossible to\ngive a full and accurate enumeration even of those actually existing,\nmuch less of those referred to and quoted. Mr. Fitz-Edward Hall, in his\nBibliographical Index, mentions fourteen commentaries, copies of which\nhad been inspected by himself. Some among these (as, for instance,\nRamanuja's Vedanta-sara, No. XXXV) are indeed not commentaries in the\nstrict sense of the word, but rather systematic expositions of the\ndoctrine supposed to be propounded in the Sutras; but, on the other\nhand, there are in existence several true commentaries which had not\nbeen accessible to Fitz-Edward Hall. It would hardly be practical--and\ncertainly not feasible in this place--to submit all the existing\nbhashyas to a critical enquiry at once. All we can do here is to single\nout one or a few of the more important ones, and to compare their\ninterpretations with those given by /S/a@nkara, and with the text of the\nSutras themselves.\n\nThe bhashya, which in this connexion is the first to press itself upon\nour attention, is the one composed by the famous Vaish@nava theologian\nand philosopher Ramanuja, who is supposed to have lived in the twelfth\ncentury. The Ramanuja or, as it is often called, the /S/ri-bhashya\nappears to be the oldest commentary extant next to /S/a@nkara's. It is\nfurther to be noted that the sect of the Ramanujas occupies a\npre-eminent position among the Vaishnava, sects which themselves, in\ntheir totality, may claim to be considered the most important among all\nHindu sects. The intrinsic value of the /S/ri-bhashya moreover is--as\nevery student acquainted with it will be ready to acknowledge--a very\nhigh one; it strikes one throughout as a very solid performance due to a\nwriter of extensive learning and great power of argumentation, and in\nits polemic parts, directed chiefly against the school of /S/a@nkara, it\nnot unfrequently deserves to be called brilliant even. And in addition\nto all this it shows evident traces of being not the mere outcome of\nRamanuja's individual views, but of resting on an old and weighty\ntradition.\n\nThis latter point is clearly of the greatest importance. If it could be\ndemonstrated or even rendered probable only that the oldest bhashya\nwhich we possess, i.e. the /S/a@nkara-bhashya, represents an\nuninterrupted and uniform tradition bridging over the interval between\nBadaraya/n/a, the reputed author of the Sutras, and /S/a@nkara; and if,\non the other hand, it could be shown that the more modern bhashyas are\nnot supported by old tradition, but are nothing more than bold attempts\nof clever sectarians to force an old work of generally recognised\nauthority into the service of their individual tenets; there would\ncertainly be no reason for us to raise the question whether the later\nbhashyas can help us in making out the true meaning of the Sutras. All\nwe should have to do in that case would be to accept /S/a@nkara's\ninterpretations as they stand, or at the utmost to attempt to make out,\nif at all possible, by a careful comparison of /S/a@nkara's bhashya with\nthe text of the Sutras, whether the former in all cases faithfully\nrepresents the purport of the latter.\n\nIn the most recent book of note which at all enters into the question as\nto how far we have to accept /S/a@nkara as a guide to the right\nunderstanding of the Sutras (Mr. A. Gough's Philosophy of the\nUpanishads) the view is maintained (pp. 239 ff.) that /S/a@nkara is the\ngenerally recognised expositor of true Vedanta doctrine, that that\ndoctrine was handed down by an unbroken series of teachers intervening\nbetween him and the Sutrakara, and that there existed from the beginning\nonly one Vedanta doctrine, agreeing in all essential points with the\ndoctrine known to us from /S/a@nkara's writings. Mr. Gough undertakes to\nprove this view, firstly, by a comparison of /S/a@nkara's system with\nthe teaching of the Upanishads themselves; and, secondly, by a\ncomparison of the purport of the Sutras--as far as that can be made out\nindependently of the commentaries--with the interpretations given of\nthem by /S/a@nkara. To both these points we shall revert later on.\nMeanwhile, I only wish to remark concerning the former point that, even\nif we could show with certainty that all the Upanishads propound one and\nthe same doctrine, there yet remains the undeniable fact of our being\nconfronted by a considerable number of essentially differing theories,\nall of which claim to be founded on the Upanishads. And with regard to\nthe latter point I have to say for the present that, as long as we have\nonly /S/a@nkara's bhashya before us, we are naturally inclined to find\nin the Sutras--which, taken by themselves, are for the greater part\nunintelligible--the meaning which /S/a@nkara ascribes to them; while a\nreference to other bhashyas may not impossibly change our views at\nonce.--Meanwhile, we will consider the question as to the unbroken\nuniformity of Vedantic tradition from another point or view, viz. by\nenquiring whether or not the Sutras themselves, and the\n/S/a@nkara-bhashya, furnish any indications of there having existed\nalready at an early time essentially different Vedantic systems or lines\nof Vedantic speculation.\n\nBeginning with the Sutras, we find that they supply ample evidence to\nthe effect that already at a very early time, viz. the period antecedent\nto the final composition of the Vedanta-sutras in their present shape,\nthere had arisen among the chief doctors of the Vedanta differences of\nopinion, bearing not only upon minor points of doctrine, but affecting\nthe most essential parts of the system. In addition to Badaraya/n/a\nhimself, the reputed author of the Sutras, the latter quote opinions\nascribed to the following teachers: Atreya, A/s/marathya, Au/d/ulomi,\nKarsh/n/agini, Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna, Jaimini, Badari. Among the passages\nwhere diverging views of those teachers are recorded and contrasted\nthree are of particular importance. Firstly, a passage in the fourth\npada of the fourth adhyaya (Sutras 5-7), where the opinions of various\nteachers concerning the characteristics of the released soul are given,\nand where the important discrepancy is noted that, according to\nAu/d/ulomi, its only characteristic is thought (/k/aitanya), while\nJaimini maintains that it possesses a number of exalted qualities, and\nBadaraya/n/a declares himself in favour of a combination of those two\nviews.--The second passage occurs in the third pada of the fourth\nadhyaya (Sutras 7-14), where Jaimini maintains that the soul of him who\npossesses the lower knowledge of Brahman goes after death to the highest\nBrahman, while Badari--whose opinion is endorsed by /S/a@nkara--teaches\nthat it repairs to the lower Brahman only--Finally, the third and most\nimportant passage is met with in the fourth pada of the first adhyaya\n(Sutras 20-22), where the question is discussed why in a certain passage\nof the Brhadara/n/yaka Brahman is referred to in terms which are\nstrictly applicable to the individual soul only. In connexion therewith\nthe Sutras quote the views of three ancient teachers about the relation\nin which the individual soul stands to Brahman. According to\nA/s/marathya (if we accept the interpretation of his view given by\n/S/a@nkara and /S/a@nkara's commentators) the soul stands to Brahman in\nthe bhedabheda relation, i.e. it is neither absolutely different nor\nabsolutely non-different from it, as sparks are from fire. Audulomi, on\nthe other hand, teaches that the soul is altogether different from\nBrahman up to the time when obtaining final release it is merged in it,\nand Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna finally upholds the doctrine that the soul is\nabsolutely non-different from Brahman; which, in, some way or other\npresents itself as the individual soul.\n\nThat the ancient teachers, the ripest outcome of whose speculations and\ndiscussions is embodied in the Vedanta-sutras, disagreed among\nthemselves on points of vital importance is sufficiently proved by the\nthree passages quoted. The one quoted last is specially significant as\nshowing that recognised authorities--deemed worthy of being quoted in\nthe Sutras--denied that doctrine on which the whole system of /S/a@nkara\nhinges, viz. the doctrine of the absolute identity of the individual\nsoul with Brahman.\n\nTurning next to the /S/a@nkara-bhashya itself, we there also meet with\nindications that the Vedantins were divided among themselves on\nimportant points of dogma. These indications are indeed not numerous:\n/S/a@nkara, does not on the whole impress one as an author particularly\nanxious to strengthen his own case by appeals to ancient authorities, a\npeculiarity of his which later writers of hostile tendencies have not\nfailed to remark and criticise. But yet more than once /S/a@nkara also\nrefers to the opinion of 'another,' viz., commentator of the Sutras, and\nin several places /S/a@nkara's commentators explain that the 'other'\nmeant is the V/ri/ttikara (about whom more will be said shortly). Those\nreferences as a rule concern minor points of exegesis, and hence throw\nlittle or no light on important differences of dogma; but there are two\nremarks of /S/a@nkara's at any rate which are of interest in this\nconnexion. The one is made with reference to Sutras 7-14 of the third\npada of the fourth adhyaya; 'some,' he says there, 'declare those\nSutras, which I look upon as setting forth the siddhanta view, to state\nmerely the purvapaksha;' a difference of opinion which, as we have seen\nabove, affects the important question as to the ultimate fate of those\nwho have not reached the knowledge of the highest Brahman.--And under I,\n3, 19 /S/a@nkara, after having explained at length that the individual\nsoul as such cannot claim any reality, but is real only in so far as it\nis identical with Brahman, adds the following words, 'apare tu vadina/h/\nparamarthikam eva jaiva/m/ rupam iti manyante asmadiya/s/ /k/a ke/k/it,'\ni.e. other theorisers again, and among them some of ours, are of opinion\nthat the individual soul as such is real.' The term 'ours,' here made\nuse of, can denote only the Aupanishadas or Vedantins, and it thus\nappears that /S/a@nkara himself was willing to class under the same\ncategory himself and philosophers who--as in later times the Ramanujas\nand others--looked upon the individual soul as not due to the fictitious\nlimitations of Maya, but as real in itself; whatever may be the relation\nin which they considered it to stand to the highest Self.\n\nFrom what precedes it follows that the Vedantins of the school to which\n/S/a@nkara himself belonged acknowledged the existence of Vedantic\nteaching of a type essentially different from their own. We must now\nproceed to enquire whether the Ramanuja system, which likewise claims to\nbe Vedanta, and to be founded on the Vedanta-sutras, has any title to be\nconsidered an ancient system and the heir of a respectable tradition.\n\nIt appears that Ramanuja claims--and by Hindu writers is generally\nadmitted--to follow in his bhashya the authority of Bodhayana, who had\ncomposed a v/ri/tti on the Sutras. Thus we read in the beginning of the\n/S/ri-bhashya (Pandit, New Series, VII, p. 163),\n'Bhagavad-bodhayanak/ri/ta/m/ vistirna/m/ brahmasutra-v/ri/tti/m/\npurva/k/arya/h/ sa/m/kikshipus tanmatanusare/n/a sutrakshara/n/i\nvyakhyasyante.' Whether the Bodhayana to whom that v/ri/tti is ascribed\nis to be identified with the author of the Kalpa-sutra, and other works,\ncannot at present be decided. But that an ancient v/ri/tti on the Sutras\nconnected with Bodhayana's name actually existed, there is not any\nreason to doubt. Short quotations from it are met with in a few places\nof the /S/ri-bhashya, and, as we have seen above, /S/a@nkara's\ncommentators state that their author's polemical remarks are directed\nagainst the V/ri/ttikara. In addition to Bodhayana, Ramanuja appeals to\nquite a series of ancient teachers--purva/k/aryas--who carried on the\ntrue tradition as to the teaching of the Vedanta and the meaning of the\nSutras. In the Vedarthasa@ngraha--a work composed by Ramanuja\nhimself--we meet in one place with the enumeration of the following\nauthorities: Bodhayana, /T/a@nka, Drami/d/a, Guhadeva, Kapardin,\nBharu/k/i, and quotations from the writings of some of these are not\nunfrequent in the Vedarthasa@ngraha, as well as the /S/ri-bhashya. The\nauthor most frequently quoted is Drami/d/a, who composed the\nDrami/d/a-bhashya; he is sometimes referred to as the bhashyakara.\nAnother writer repeatedly quoted as the vakyakara is, I am told, to be\nidentified with the /T/a@nka mentioned above. I refrain from inserting\nin this place the information concerning the relative age of these\nwriters which may be derived from the oral tradition of the Ramanuja\nsect. From another source, however, we receive an intimation that\nDrami/d/a/k/arya or Dravi/d/a/k/arya preceded /S/a@nkara in point of\ntime. In his /t/ika on /S/a@nkara's bhashya to the Chandogya Upanishad\nIII, 10, 4, Anandagiri remarks that the attempt made by his author to\nreconcile the cosmological views of the Upanishad with the teaching of\nSm/ri/ti on the same point is a reproduction of the analogous attempt\nmade by the Dravi/d/a/k/arya.\n\nIt thus appears that that special interpretation of the Vedanta-sutras\nwith which the /S/ri-bhashya makes us acquainted is not due to\ninnovating views on the part of Ramanuja, but had authoritative\nrepresentatives already at a period anterior to that of /S/a@nkara. This\nlatter point, moreover, receives additional confirmation from the\nrelation in which the so-called Ramanuja sect stands to earlier sects.\nWhat the exact position of Ramanuja was, and of what nature were the\nreforms that rendered him so prominent as to give his name to a new\nsect, is not exactly known at present; at the same time it is generally\nacknowledged that the Ramanujas are closely connected with the so-called\nBhagavatas or Pa/nk/aratras, who are known to have existed already at a\nvery early time. This latter point is proved by evidence of various\nkinds; for our present purpose it suffices to point to the fact that,\naccording to the interpretation of the most authoritative commentators,\nthe last Sutras of the second pada of the second adhyaya\n(Vedanta-sutras) refer to a distinctive tenet of the Bhagavatas--which\ntenet forms part of the Ramanuja system also--viz. that the highest\nbeing manifests itself in a fourfold form (vyuha) as Vasudeva,\nSa@nkarsha/n/a, Pradyumna, Aniruddha, those four forms being identical\nwith the highest Self, the individual soul, the internal organ (manas),\nand the principle of egoity (aha@nkara). Whether those Sutras embody an\napproval of the tenet referred to, as Ramanuja maintains, or are meant\nto impugn it, as /S/a@nkara thinks; so much is certain that in the\nopinion of the best commentators the Bhagavatas, the direct forerunners\nof the Ramanujas, are mentioned in the Sutras themselves, and hence must\nnot only have existed, but even reached a considerable degree of\nimportance at the time when the Sutras were composed. And considering\nthe general agreement of the systems of the earlier Bhagavatas and the\nlater Ramanujas, we have a full right to suppose that the two sects were\nat one also in their mode of interpreting the Vedanta-sutras.\n\nThe preceding considerations suffice, I am inclined to think, to show\nthat it will by no means be wasted labour to enquire how Ramanuja\ninterprets the Sutras, and wherein he differs from /S/a@nkara. This in\nfact seems clearly to be the first step we have to take, if we wish to\nmake an attempt at least of advancing beyond the interpretations of\nscholiasts to the meaning of the Sutras themselves. A full and\nexhaustive comparison of the views of the two commentators would indeed\nfar exceed the limits of the space which can here he devoted to that\ntask, and will, moreover, be made with greater ease and advantage when\nthe complete Sanskrit text of the /S/ri-bhashya has been printed, and\nthus made available for general reference. But meanwhile it is possible,\nand--as said before--even urged upon a translator of the Sutras to\ncompare the interpretations, given by the two bhashyakaras, of those\nSutras, which, more than others, touch on the essential points of the\nVedanta system. This will best be done in connexion with a succinct but\nfull review of the topics discussed in the adhikara/n/as of the\nVedanta-sutras, according to /S/a@nkara; a review which--apart from the\nside-glances at Ramanuja's comments--will be useful as a guide through\nthe Sutras and the /S/a@nkara-bhashya. Before, however, entering on that\ntask, I think it advisable to insert short sketches of the philosophical\nsystems of /S/a@nkara as well as of Ramanuja, which may be referred to\nwhen, later on discrepancies between the two commentators will be noted.\nIn these sketches I shall confine myself to the leading features, and\nnot enter into any details. Of /S/a@nkara's system we possess as it is\nmore than one trustworthy exposition; it may suffice to refer to\nDeussen's System of the Vedanta, in which the details of the entire\nsystem, as far as they can be learned from the Sutra-bhashya, are\nrepresented fully and faithfully, and to Gough's Philosophy of the\nUpanishads which, principally in its second chapter, gives a lucid\nsketch of the /S/a@nkara Vedanta, founded on the Sutra-bhashya, the\nUpanishad bhashyas, and some later writers belonging to /S/a@nkara's\nschool. With regard to Ramanuja's philosophy our chief source was,\nhitherto, the Ramanuja chapter in the Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha; the\nshort sketch about to be given is founded altogether on the\n/S/ri-bhashya itself.\n\nWhat in /S/a@nkara's opinion the Upanishads teach, is shortly as\nfollows.--Whatever is, is in reality one; there truly exists only one\nuniversal being called Brahman or Paramatman, the highest Self. This\nbeing is of an absolutely homogeneous nature; it is pure 'Being,' or,\nwhich comes to the same, pure intelligence or thought (/k/aitanya,\nj/n/ana). Intelligence or thought is not to be predicated of Brahman as\nits attribute, but constitutes its substance, Brahman is not a thinking\nbeing, but thought itself. It is absolutely destitute of qualities;\nwhatever qualities or attributes are conceivable, can only be denied of\nit.--But, if nothing exists but one absolutely simple being, whence the\nappearance of the world by which we see ourselves surrounded, and, in\nwhich we ourselves exist as individual beings?--Brahman, the answer\nruns, is associated with a certain power called Maya or avidya to which\nthe appearance of this entire world is due. This power cannot be called\n'being' (sat), for 'being' is only Brahman; nor can it be called\n'non-being' (asat) in the strict sense, for it at any rate produces the\nappearance of this world. It is in fact a principle of illusion; the\nundefinable cause owing to which there seems to exist a material world\ncomprehending distinct individual existences. Being associated with this\nprinciple of illusion, Brahman is enabled to project the appearance of\nthe world, in the same way as a magician is enabled by his\nincomprehensible magical power to produce illusory appearances of\nanimate and inanimate beings. Maya thus constitutes the upadana, the\nmaterial cause of the world; or--if we wish to call attention to the\ncircumstance that Maya belongs to Brahman as a /s/akti--we may say that\nthe material cause of the world is Brahman in so far as it is associated\nwith Maya. In this latter quality Brahman is more properly called\nI/s/vara, the Lord.\n\nMaya, under the guidance of the Lord, modifies itself by a progressive\nevolution into all the individual existences (bheda), distinguished by\nspecial names and forms, of which the world consists; from it there\nspring in due succession the different material elements and the whole\nbodily apparatus belonging to sentient Beings. In all those apparently,\nindividual forms of existence the one indivisible Brahman is present,\nbut, owing to the particular adjuncts into which Maya has specialised\nitself, it appears to be broken up--it is broken up, as it were--into a\nmultiplicity, of intellectual or sentient principles, the so-called\njivas (individual or personal souls). What is real in each jiva is only\nthe universal Brahman itself; the whole aggregate of individualising\nbodily organs and mental functions, which in our ordinary experience\nseparate and distinguish one jiva from another, is the offspring of Maya\nand as such unreal.\n\nThe phenomenal world or world of ordinary experience (vyavahara) thus\nconsists of a number of individual souls engaged in specific cognitions,\nvolitions, and so on, and of the external material objects with which\nthose cognitions and volitions are concerned. Neither the specific\ncognitions nor their objects are real in the true sense of the word, for\nboth are altogether due to Maya. But at the same time we have to reject\nthe idealistic doctrine of certain Bauddha schools according to which\nnothing whatever truly exists, but certain trains of cognitional acts or\nideas to which no external objects correspond; for external things,\nalthough not real in the strict sense of the word, enjoy at any rate as\nmuch reality as the specific cognitional acts whose objects they are.\n\nThe non-enlightened soul is unable to look through and beyond Maya,\nwhich, like a veil, hides from it its true nature. Instead of\nrecognising itself to be Brahman, it blindly identifies itself with its\nadjuncts (upadhi), the fictitious offspring of Maya, and thus looks for\nits true Self in the body, the sense organs, and the internal organ\n(manas), i.e. the organ of specific cognition. The soul, which in\nreality is pure intelligence, non-active, infinite, thus becomes limited\nin extent, as it were, limited in knowledge and power, an agent and\nenjoyer. Through its actions it burdens itself with merit and demerit,\nthe consequences of which it has to bear or enjoy in series of future\nembodied existences, the Lord--as a retributor and dispenser--allotting\nto each soul that form of embodiment to which it is entitled by its\nprevious actions. At the end of each of the great world periods called\nkalpas the Lord retracts the whole world, i.e. the whole material world\nis dissolved and merged into non-distinct Maya, while the individual\nsouls, free for the time from actual connexion with upadhis, lie in deep\nslumber as it were. But as the consequences of their former deeds are\nnot yet exhausted, they have again to enter on embodied existence as\nsoon as the Lord sends forth a new material world, and the old round of\nbirth, action, death begins anew to last to all eternity as it has\nlasted from all eternity.\n\nThe means of escaping from this endless sa/ms/ara, the way out of which\ncan never be found by the non-enlightened soul, are furnished by the\nVeda. The karmaka/nd/a indeed, whose purport it is to enjoin certain\nactions, cannot lead to final release; for even the most meritorious\nworks necessarily lead to new forms of embodied existence. And in the\nj/n/anaka/nd/a of the Veda also two different parts have to be\ndistinguished, viz., firstly, those chapters and passages which treat of\nBrahman in so far as related to the world, and hence characterised by\nvarious attributes, i.e. of I/s/vara or the lower Brahman; and,\nsecondly, those texts which set forth the nature of the highest Brahman\ntranscending all qualities, and the fundamental identity of the\nindividual soul with that highest Brahman. Devout meditation on Brahman\nas suggested by passages of the former kind does not directly lead to\nfinal emancipation; the pious worshipper passes on his death into the\nworld of the lower Brahman only, where he continues to exist as a\ndistinct individual soul--although in the enjoyment of great power and\nknowledge--until at last he reaches the highest knowledge, and, through\nit, final release.--That student of the Veda, on the other hand, whose\nsoul has been enlightened by the texts embodying the higher knowledge of\nBrahman, whom passages such as the great saying, 'That art thou,' have\ntaught that there is no difference between his true Self and the highest\nSelf, obtains at the moment of death immediate final release, i.e. he\nwithdraws altogether from the influence of Maya, and asserts himself in\nhis true nature, which is nothing else but the absolute highest Brahman.\n\nThus /S/a@nkara.--According to Ramanuja, on the other hand, the teaching\nof the Upanishads has to be summarised as follows.--There exists only\none all-embracing being called Brahman or the highest Self of the Lord.\nThis being is not destitute of attributes, but rather endowed with all\nimaginable auspicious qualities. It is not 'intelligence,'--as\n/S/a@nkara maintains,--but intelligence is its chief attribute. The Lord\nis all-pervading, all-powerful, all-knowing, all-merciful; his nature is\nfundamentally antagonistic to all evil. He contains within himself\nwhatever exists. While, according to /S/a@nkara, the only reality is to\nbe found in the non-qualified homogeneous highest Brahman which can only\nbe defined as pure 'Being' or pure thought, all plurality being a mere\nillusion; Brahman--according to Ramanuja's view--comprises within itself\ndistinct elements of plurality which all of them lay claim to absolute\nreality of one and the same kind. Whatever is presented to us by\nordinary experience, viz. matter in all its various modifications and\nthe individual souls of different classes and degrees, are essential\nreal constituents of Brahman's nature. Matter and souls (a/k/it and\n/k/it) constitute, according to Ramanuja's terminology, the body of the\nLord; they stand to him in the same relation of entire dependence and\nsubserviency in which the matter forming an animal or vegetable body\nstands to its soul or animating principle. The Lord pervades and rules\nall things which exist--material or immaterial--as their antaryamin; the\nfundamental text for this special Ramanuja tenet--which in the writings\nof the sect is quoted again and again--is the so-called antaryamin\nbrahma/n/a. (B/ri/. Up. III, 7) which says, that within all elements,\nall sense organs, and, lastly, within all individual souls, there abides\nan inward ruler whose body those elements, sense-organs, and individual\nsouls constitute.--Matter and souls as forming the body of the Lord are\nalso called modes of him (prakara). They are to be looked upon as his\neffects, but they have enjoyed the kind of individual existence which is\ntheirs from all eternity, and will never be entirely resolved into\nBrahman. They, however, exist in two different, periodically\nalternating, conditions. At some times they exist in a subtle state in\nwhich they do not possess those qualities by which they are ordinarily\nknown, and there is then no distinction of individual name and form.\nMatter in that state is unevolved (avyakta); the individual souls are\nnot joined to material bodies, and their intelligence is in a state of\ncontraction, non-manifestation (sa@nko/k/a). This is the pralaya state\nwhich recurs at the end of each kalpa, and Brahman is then said to be in\nits causal condition (kara/n/avastha). To that state all those\nscriptural passages refer which speak of Brahman or the Self as being in\nthe beginning one only, without a second. Brahman then is indeed not\nabsolutely one, for it contains within itself matter and souls in a\ngerminal condition; but as in that condition they are so subtle as not\nto allow of individual distinctions being made, they are not counted as\nsomething second in addition to Brahman.--When the pralaya state comes\nto an end, creation takes place owing to an act of volition on the\nLord's part. Primary unevolved matter then passes over into its other\ncondition; it becomes gross and thus acquires all those sensible\nattributes, visibility, tangibility, and so on, which are known from\nordinary experience. At the same time the souls enter into connexion\nwith material bodies corresponding to the degree of merit or demerit\nacquired by them in previous forms of existence; their intelligence at\nthe same time undergoes a certain expansion (vika/s/a). The Lord,\ntogether with matter in its gross state and the 'expanded' souls, is\nBrahman in the condition of an effect (karyavastha). Cause and effect\nare thus at the bottom the same; for the effect is nothing but the cause\nwhich has undergone a certain change (pari/n/ama). Hence the cause being\nknown, the effect is known likewise.\n\nOwing to the effects of their former actions the individual souls are\nimplicated in the sa/m/sara, the endless cycle of birth, action, and\ndeath, final escape from which is to be obtained only through the study\nof the j/n/anaka/nd/a of the Veda. Compliance with the injunctions of\nthe karmaka/nd/a does not lead outside the sa/m/sara; but he who,\nassisted by the grace of the Lord, cognizes--and meditates on--him in\nthe way prescribed by the Upanishads reaches at his death final\nemancipation, i.e. he passes through the different stages of the path of\nthe gods up to the world of Brahman and there enjoys an everlasting\nblissful existence from which there is no return into the sphere of\ntransmigration. The characteristics of the released soul are similar to\nthose of Brahman; it participates in all the latter's glorious qualities\nand powers, excepting only Brahman's power to emit, rule, and retract\nthe entire world.\n\nThe chief points in which the two systems sketched above agree on the\none hand and diverge on the other may be shortly stated as\nfollows.--Both systems teach advaita, i.e. non-duality or monism. There\nexist not several fundamentally distinct principles, such as the\nprak/r/iti and the purushas of the Sa@nkhyas, but there exists only one\nall-embracing being. While, however, the advaita taught by /S/a@nkara is\na rigorous, absolute one, Ramanuja's doctrine has to be characterised as\nvisish/t/a advaita, i.e. qualified non-duality, non-duality with a\ndifference. According to Sankara, whatever is, is Brahman, and Brahman\nitself is absolutely homogeneous, so that all difference and plurality\nmust be illusory. According to Ramanuja also, whatever is, is Brahman;\nbut Brahman is not of a homogeneous nature, but contains within itself\nelements of plurality owing to which it truly manifests itself in a\ndiversified world. The world with its variety of material forms of\nexistence and individual souls is not unreal Maya, but a real part of\nBrahman's nature, the body investing the universal Self. The Brahman of\n/S/a@nkara is in itself impersonal, a homogeneous mass of objectless\nthought, transcending all attributes; a personal God it becomes only\nthrough its association with the unreal principle of Maya, so\nthat--strictly speaking--/S/a@nkara's personal God, his I/s/vara, is\nhimself something unreal. Ramanuja's Brahman, on the other hand, is\nessentially a personal God, the all-powerful and all-wise ruler of a\nreal world permeated and animated by his spirit. There is thus no room\nfor the distinction between a param nirgu/n/am and an apara/m/ sagu/n/am\nbrahma, between Brahman and I/s/vara.--/S/a@nkara's individual soul is\nBrahman in so far as limited by the unreal upadhis due to Maya. The\nindividual soul of Ramanuja, on the other hand, is really individual; it\nhas indeed sprung from Brahman and is never outside Brahman, but\nnevertheless it enjoys a separate personal existence and will remain a\npersonality for ever--The release from sa/m/sara means, according to\n/S/a@nkara, the absolute merging of the individual soul in Brahman, due\nto the dismissal of the erroneous notion that the soul is distinct from\nBrahman; according to Ramanuja it only means the soul's passing from the\ntroubles of earthly life into a kind of heaven or paradise where it will\nremain for ever in undisturbed personal bliss.--As Ramanuja does not\ndistinguish a higher and lower Brahman, the distinction of a higher and\nlower knowledge is likewise not valid for him; the teaching of the\nUpanishads is not twofold but essentially one, and leads the enlightened\ndevotee to one result only [1].\n\nI now proceed to give a conspectus of the contents of the Vedanta-sutras\naccording to /S/a@nkara in which at the same time all the more important\npoints concerning which Ramanuja disagrees will be noted. We shall here\nhave to enter into details which to many may appear tedious. But it is\nonly on a broad substratum of accurately stated details that we can hope\nto establish any definite conclusions regarding the comparative value of\nthe different modes of interpretation which have been applied to the\nSutras. The line of investigation is an entirely new one, and for the\npresent nothing can be taken for granted or known.--In stating the\ndifferent heads of discussion (the so-called adhikara/n/as), each of\nwhich comprises one or more Sutras, I shall follow the subdivision into\nadhikara/n/as adopted in the Vyasadhika-ra/n/amala, the text of which is\nprinted in the second volume of the Bibliotheca Indica edition of the\nSutras.\n\n\nFIRST ADHYAYA.\nPADA I.\n\n\nThe first five adhikara/n/as lay down the fundamental positions with\nregard to Brahman. Adhik. I (1) [2] treats of what the study of the\nVedanta presupposes. Adhik. II (2) defines Brahman as that whence the\nworld originates, and so on. Adhik. III (3) declares that Brahman is the\nsource of the Veda. Adhik. IV (4) proves Brahman to be the uniform topic\nof all Vedanta-texts. Adhik. V (5-11) is engaged in proving by various\narguments that the Brahman, which the Vedanta-texts represent as the\ncause of the world, is an intelligent principle, and cannot be\nidentified with the non-intelligent pradhana from which the world\nsprings according to the Sa@nkhyas.\n\nWith the next adhikara/n/a there begins a series of discussions of\nessentially similar character, extending up to the end of the first\nadhyaya. The question is throughout whether certain terms met with in\nthe Upanishads denote Brahman or some other being, in most cases the\njiva, the individual soul. /S/a@nkara remarks at the outset that, as the\npreceding ten Sutras had settled the all-important point that all the\nVedanta-texts refer to Brahman, the question now arises why the enquiry\nshould be continued any further, and thereupon proceeds to explain that\nthe acknowledged distinction of a higher Brahman devoid of all qualities\nand a lower Brahman characterised by qualities necessitates an\ninvestigation whether certain Vedic texts of prima facie doubtful import\nset forth the lower Brahman as the object of devout meditation, or the\nhigher Brahman as the object of true knowledge. But that such an\ninvestigation is actually carried on in the remaining portion of the\nfirst adhyaya, appears neither from the wording of the Sutras nor even\nfrom /S/a@nkara's own treatment of the Vedic texts referred to in the\nSutras. In I, 1, 20, for instance, the question is raised whether the\ngolden man within the sphere of the sun, with golden hair and beard and\nlotus-coloured eyes--of whom the Chandogya Upanishad speaks in 1, 6,\n6--is an individual soul abiding within the sun or the highest Lord.\n/S/a@nkara's answer is that the passage refers to the Lord, who, for the\ngratification of his worshippers, manifests himself in a bodily shape\nmade of Maya. So that according to /S/a@nkara himself the alternative\nlies between the sagu/n/a Brahman and some particular individual soul,\nnot between the sagu/n/a Brahman and the nirgu/n/a Brahman.\n\nAdhik. VI (12-19) raises the question whether the anandamaya, mentioned\nin Taittiriya Upanishad II, 5, is merely a transmigrating individual\nsoul or the highest Self. /S/a@nkara begins by explaining the Sutras on\nthe latter supposition--and the text of the Sutras is certainly in\nfavour of that interpretation--gives, however, finally the preference to\na different and exceedingly forced explanation according to which the\nSutras teach that the anandamaya is not Brahman, since the Upanishad\nexpressly says that Brahman is the tail or support of the\nanandamaya[3].--Ramanuja's interpretation of Adhikara/n/a VI, although\nnot agreeing in all particulars with the former explanation of\n/S/a@nkara, yet is at one with it in the chief point, viz. that the\nanandamaya is Brahman. It further deserves notice that, while /S/a@nkara\nlooks on Adhik. VI as the first of a series of interpretatory\ndiscussions, all of which treat the question whether certain Vedic\npassages refer to Brahman or not, Ramanuja separates the adhikara/n/a\nfrom the subsequent part of the pada and connects it with what had\npreceded. In Adhik. V it had been shown that Brahman cannot be\nidentified with the pradhana; Adhik. VI shows that it is different from\nthe individual soul, and the proof of the fundamental position of the\nsystem is thereby completed[4].--Adhik. VII (20, 21) demonstrates that\nthe golden person seen within the sun and the person seen within the\neye, mentioned in Ch. Up. I, 6, are not some individual soul of high\neminence, but the supreme Brahman.--Adhik. VIII (22) teaches that by the\nether from which, according to Ch. Up. I, 9, all beings originate, not\nthe elemental ether has to be understood but the highest\nBrahman.--Adhik. IX (23). The pra/n/a also mentioned in Ch. Up. I, ii, 5\ndenotes the highest Brahman[5]--Adhik. X (24-27) teaches that the light\nspoken of in Ch. Up. III, 13, 7 is not the ordinary physical light but\nthe highest Brahman[6].--Adhik. XI (28-31) decides that the pra/n/a\nmentioned in Kau. Up. III, 2 is Brahman.\n\n\nPADA II.\n\n\nAdhik. I (1-8) shows that the being which consists of mind, whose body\nis breath, &c., mentioned in Ch. Up. III, 14, is not the individual\nsoul, but Brahman. The Sutras of this adhikara/n/a emphatically dwell on\nthe difference of the individual soul and the highest Self, whence\n/S/a@nkara is obliged to add an explanation--in his comment on Sutra\n6--to the effect that that difference is to be understood as not real,\nbut as due to the false limiting adjuncts of the highest Self.--The\ncomment of Ramanuja throughout closely follows the words of the Sutras;\non Sutra 6 it simply remarks that the difference of the highest Self\nfrom the individual soul rests thereon that the former as free from all\nevil is not subject to the effects of works in the same way as the soul\nis [7].--Adhik. II (9, 10) decides that he to whom the Brahmans and\nKshattriyas are but food (Ka/th/a. Up. I, 2, 25) is the highest\nSelf.--Adhik. III (11, 12) shows that the two entered into the cave\n(Ka/th/a Up. I, 3, 1) are Brahman and the individual soul[8].--Adhik. IV\n(13-17) shows that the person within the eye mentioned in Ch. Up. IV,\n15, 1 is Brahman.--Adhik. V (18-20) shows that the ruler within\n(antaraymin) described in B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 3 is Brahman. Sutra 20\nclearly enounces the difference of the individual soul and the Lord;\nhence /S/a@nkara is obliged to remark that that difference is not\nreal.--Adhik. VI (21-23) proves that that which cannot be seen, &c,\nmentioned in Mu/nd/aka Up. I, 1, 3 is Brahman.--Adhik. VII (24-32) shows\nthat the atman vai/s/vanara of Ch. Up. V, 11, 6 is Brahman.\n\n\nPADA III.\n\n\nAdhik. I (1-7) proves that that within which the heaven, the earth, &c.\nare woven (Mu/nd/. Up. II, 2, 5) is Brahman.--Adhik. II (8, 9) shows\nthat the bhuman referred to in Ch. Up. VII, 23 is Brahman.--Adhik. III\n(10-12) teaches that the Imperishable in which, according to B/ri/. Up.\nIII, 8, 8, the ether is woven is Brahman.--Adhik. IV (13) decides that\nthe highest person who is to be meditated upon with the syllable Om,\naccording to Pra/s/na Up. V, 5, is not the lower but the higher\nBrahman.--According to Ramanuja the two alternatives are Brahman and\nBrahma (jivasamash/t/irupoz/nd/adhipatis /k/aturmukha/h/).--Adhik. V and\nVI (comprising, according to /S/a@nkara, Sutras l4-2l) discuss the\nquestion whether the small ether within the lotus of the heart mentioned\nin Ch. Up. VIII, 1 is the elemental ether or the individual soul or\nBrahman; the last alternative being finally adopted. In favour of the\nsecond alternative the purvapakshin pleads the two passages Ch. Up.\nVIII, 3, 4 and VIII, 12, 3, about the serene being (samprasada); for by\nthe latter the individual soul only can be understood, and in the\nchapter, of which the latter passage forms part, there are ascribed to\nit the same qualities (viz. freeness from sin, old age, death, &c.) that\nwere predicated in VIII, 1, of the small ether within the heart.--But\nthe reply to this is, that the second passage refers not to the\n(ordinary) individual soul but to the soul in that state where its true\nnature has become manifest, i.e. in which it is Brahman; so that the\nsubject of the passage is in reality not the so-called individual soul\nbut Brahman. And in the former of the two passages the soul is mentioned\nnot on its own account, but merely for the purpose of intimating that\nthe highest Self is the cause through which the individual soul\nmanifests itself in its true nature.--What Ramanuja understands by the\navirbhava of the soul will appear from the remarks on IV, 4.\n\nThe two next Sutras (22, 23) constitute, according to /S/a@nkara, a new\nadhikara/n/a (VII), proving that he 'after whom everything shines, by\nwhose light all this is lighted' (Ka/th/a Up. II, 5, 15) is not some\nmaterial luminous body, but Brahman itself.--According to Ramanuja the\ntwo Sutras do not start a new topic, but merely furnish some further\narguments strengthening the conclusion arrived at in the preceding\nSutras.[9]\n\nAdhik. VIII (24, 25) decides that the person of the size of a thumb\nmentioned in Ka/th/a Up. II, 4, 12 is not the individual soul but\nBrahman.\n\nThe two next adhikara/n/as are of the nature of a digression. The\npassage about the a@ngush/th/amatra was explained on the ground that the\nhuman heart is of the size of a span; the question may then be asked\nwhether also such individuals as belong to other classes than mankind,\nmore particularly the Gods, are capable of the knowledge of Brahman: a\nquestion finally answered in the affirmative.--This discussion leads in\nits turn to several other digressions, among which the most important\none refers to the problem in what relation the different species of\nbeings stand to the words denoting them (Sutra 28). In connexion\nherewith /S/a@nkara treats of the nature of words (/s/abda), opposing\nthe opinion of the Mima/m/saka Upavarsha, according to whom the word is\nnothing but the aggregate of its constitutive letters, to the view of\nthe grammarians who teach that over and above the aggregate of the\nletters there exists a super-sensuous entity called 'spho/t/a,' which is\nthe direct cause of the apprehension of the sense of a word (Adhik. IX;\nSutras 26-33).\n\nAdhik. X (34-38) explains that /S/udras are altogether disqualified for\nBrahmavidya.\n\nSutra 39 constitutes, according to /S/a@nkara, a new adhikara/n/a (XI),\nproving that the pra/n/a in which everything trembles, according to\n/K/a/th/a Up. II, 6, 2, is Brahman.--According to Ramanuja the Sutra\ndoes not introduce a new topic but merely furnishes an additional reason\nfor the decision arrived at under Sutras 24, 25, viz. that the\na@ngus/th/amatra is Brahman. On this supposition, Sutras 24-39 form one\nadhikara/n/a in which 26-38 constitute a mere digression led up to by\nthe mention made of the heart in 25.--The a@ngus/th/matra is referred to\ntwice in the Ka/th/a Upanishad, once in the passage discussed (II, 4,\n12), and once in II, 6, 17 ('the Person not larger than a thumb'). To\ndetermine what is meant by the a@ngus/th/matra, Ramanuja says, we are\nenabled by the passage II, 6, 2, 3, which is intermediate between the\ntwo passages concerning the a@ngus/th/matra, and which clearly refers to\nthe highest Brahman, of which alone everything can be said to stand in\nawe.\n\nThe next Sutra (40) gives rise to a similar difference of opinion.\nAccording to /S/a@nkara it constitutes by itself a new adhikara/n/a\n(XII), proving that the 'light' (jyotis) mentioned in Ch. Up. VIII, 12,\n3 is the highest Brahman.--According to Ramanuja the Sutra continues the\npreceding adhikara/n/a, and strengthens the conclusion arrived at by a\nfurther argument, referring to Ka/th/a Up. II, 5, 15--a passage\nintermediate between the two passages about the a@ngush/th/amatra--which\nspeaks of a primary light that cannot mean anything but Brahman. The\nSutra has in that case to be translated as follows: '(The\na@ngush/th/amatra is Brahman) because (in a passage intervening between\nthe two) a light is seen to be mentioned (which can be Brahman only).'\n\nThe three last Sutras of the pada are, according to /S/a@nkara, to be\ndivided into two adhikara/n/as (XIII and XIV), Sutra 41 deciding that\nthe ether which reveals names and forms (Ch. Up. VIII, 14) is not the\nelemental ether but Brahman; and 42, 43 teaching that the vij/n/anamaya,\n'he who consists of knowledge,' of B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 7 is not the\nindividual soul but Brahman.--According to Ramanuja the three Sutras\nmake up one single adhikara/n/a discussing whether the Chandogya\nUpanishad passage about the ether refers to Brahman or to the individual\nsoul in the state of release; the latter of these two alternatives being\nsuggested by the circumstance that the released soul is the subject of\nthe passage immediately preceding ('Shaking off all evil as a horse\nshakes off his hair,' &c.). Sutra 41 decides that 'the ether (is\nBrahman) because the passage designates the nature of something else,'\n&c. (i.e. of something other than the individual soul; other because to\nthe soul the revealing of names and forms cannot be ascribed, &c.)--But,\nan objection is raised, does not more than one scriptural passage show\nthat the released soul and Brahman are identical, and is not therefore\nthe ether which reveals names and forms the soul as well as\nBrahman?--(The two, Sutra 42 replies, are different) 'because in the\nstates of deep sleep and departing (the highest Self) is designated as\ndifferent' (from the soul)--which point is proved by the same scriptural\npassages which /S/a@nkara adduces;--and 'because such terms as Lord and\nthe like' cannot be applied to the individual soul (43). Reference is\nmade to IV, 4, 14, where all jagadvyapara is said to belong to the Lord\nonly, not to the soul even when in the state of release.\n\n\nPADA IV.\n\n\nThe last pada of the first adhyaya is specially directed against the\nSa@nkhyas.\n\nThe first adhikara/n/a (1-7) discusses the passage Ka/th/a Up. I, 3, 10;\n11, where mention is made of the Great and the Undeveloped--both of them\nterms used with a special technical sense in the Sa@nkhya-/s/astra,\navyakta being a synonym for pradhana.--/S/a@nkara shows by an exhaustive\nreview of the topics of the Ka/th/a Upanishad that the term avyakta has\nnot the special meaning which the Sa@nkhyas attribute to it, but denotes\nthe body, more strictly the subtle body (sukshma /s/arira), but at the\nsame time the gross body also, in so far as it is viewed as an effect of\nthe subtle one.\n\nAdhik. II (8-10) demonstrates, according to /S/a@nkara, that the\ntricoloured aja spoken of in /S/ve. Up. IV, 5 is not the pradhana of the\nSankhyas, but either that power of the Lord from which the world\nsprings, or else the primary causal matter first produced by that\npower.--What Ramanuja in contradistinction from /S/a@nkara understands\nby the primary causal matter, follows from the short sketch given above\nof the two systems.\n\nAdhik. III (11-13) shows that the pa/nk/a pa/nk/ajana/h/ mentioned in\nB/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 17 are not the twenty-five principles of the\nSa@nkhyas.--Adhik. IV (14, 15) proves that Scripture does not contradict\nitself on the all-important point of Brahman, i.e. a being whose essence\nis intelligence, being the cause of the world.\n\nAdhik. V (16-18) is, according to /S/a@nkara, meant to prove that 'he\nwho is the maker of those persons, of whom this is the work,' mentioned\nin Kau. Up. IV, 19, is not either the vital air or the individual soul,\nbut Brahman.--The subject of the adhikara/n/a is essentially the same in\nRamanuja's view; greater stress is, however, laid on the adhikara/n/a\nbeing polemical against the Sa@nkhyas, who wish to turn the passage into\nan argument for the pradhana doctrine.\n\nThe same partial difference of view is observable with regard to the\nnext adhikara/n/a (VI; Sutras 19-22) which decides that the 'Self to be\nseen, to be heard,' &c. (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 5) is the highest Self, not\nthe individual soul. This latter passage also is, according to Ramanuja,\nmade the subject of discussion in order to rebut the Sa@nkhya who is\nanxious to prove that what is there inculcated as the object of\nknowledge is not a universal Self but merely the Sa@nkhya purusha.\n\nAdhik. VII (23-27) teaches that Brahman is not only the efficient or\noperative cause (nimitta) of the world, but its material cause as well.\nThe world springs from Brahman by way of modification (pari/n/ama; Sutra\n26).--Ramanuja views this adhikara/n/a as specially directed against the\nSe/s/vara-sa@nkhyas who indeed admit the existence of a highest Lord,\nbut postulate in addition an independent pradhana on which the Lord acts\nas an operative cause merely.\n\nAdhik. VIII (28) remarks that the refutation of the Sa@nkhya views is\napplicable to other theories also, such as the doctrine of the world\nhaving originated from atoms.\n\nAfter this rapid survey of the contents of the first adhyaya and the\nsuccinct indication of the most important points in which the views of\n/S/a@nkara and Ramanuja diverge, we turn to a short consideration of two\nquestions which here naturally present themselves, viz., firstly, which\nis the principle on which the Vedic passages referred to in the Sutras\nhave been selected and arranged; and, secondly, if, where /S/a@nkara and\nRamanuja disagree as to the subdivision of the Sutras into\nAdhikara/n/as, and the determination of the Vedic passages discussed in\nthe Sutras, there are to be met with any indications enabling us to\ndetermine which of the two commentators is right. (The more general\nquestion as to how far the Sutras favour either /S/a@nkara's or\nRamanuja's general views cannot be considered at present.)\n\nThe Hindu commentators here and there attempt to point out the reason\nwhy the discussion of a certain Vedic passage is immediately followed by\nthe consideration of a certain other one. Their explanations--which have\noccasionally been referred to in the notes to the translation--rest on\nthe assumption that the Sutrakara in arranging the texts to be commented\nupon was guided by technicalities of the Mima/m/sa-system, especially by\na regard for the various so-called means of proof which the Mima/m/saka\nemploys for the purpose of determining the proper meaning and position\nof scriptural passages. But that this was the guiding principle, is\nrendered altogether improbable by a simple tabular statement of the\nVedic passages referred to in the first adhyaya, such as given by\nDeussen on page 130; for from the latter it appears that the order in\nwhich the Sutras exhibit the scriptural passages follows the order in\nwhich those passages themselves occur in the Upanishads, and it would\ncertainly be a most strange coincidence if that order enabled us at the\nsame time to exemplify the various prama/n/as of the Mima/m/sa in their\ndue systematic succession.\n\nAs Deussen's statement shows, most of the passages discussed are taken\nfrom the Chandogya Upanishad, so many indeed that the whole first\nadhyaya may be said to consist of a discussion of all those Chandogya\npassages of which it is doubtful whether they are concerned with Brahman\nor not, passages from the other Upanishads being brought in wherever an\nopportunity offers. Considering the prominent position assigned to the\nUpanishad mentioned, I think it likely that the Sutrakara meant to begin\nthe series of doubtful texts with the first doubtful passage from the\nChandogya, and that hence the sixth adhikara/n/a which treats of the\nanandamaya mentioned in the Taittiriya Upanishad has, in agreement with\nRamanuja's views, to be separated from the subsequent adhikara/n/as, and\nto be combined with the preceding ones whose task it is to lay down the\nfundamental propositions regarding Brahman's nature.--The remaining\nadhikara/n/as of the first pada follow the order of passages in the\nChandogya Upanishad, and therefore call for no remark; with the\nexception of the last adhikara/n/a, which refers to a Kaushitaki\npassage, for whose being introduced in this place I am not able to\naccount.--The first adhikara/n/a of the second pada returns to the\nChandogya Upanishad. The second one treats of a passage in the Ka/th/a\nUpanishad where a being is referred to which eats everything. The reason\nwhy that passage is introduced in this place seems to be correctly\nassigned in the /S/ri-bhashya, which remarks that, as in the preceding\nSutra it had been argued that the highest Self is not an enjoyer, a\ndoubt arises whether by that being which eats everything the highest\nSelf can be meant[10]--The third adhikara/n/a again, whose topic is the\n'two entered into the cave' (Ka/th/a Up. I, 3, 1), appears, as Ramanuja\nremarks, to come in at this place owing to the preceding adhikara/n/a;\nfor if it could not be proved that one of the two is the highest Self, a\ndoubt would attach to the explanation given above of the 'eater' since\nthe 'two entered into the cave,' and the 'eater' stand under the same\nprakara/n/a, and must therefore be held to refer to the same\nmatter.--The fourth adhikara/n/a is again occupied with a Chandogya\npassage.--The fifth adhikara/n/a, whose topic is the Ruler within\n(antaryamin), manifestly owes its place, as remarked by Ramanuja also,\nto the fact that the Vedic passage treated had been employed in the\npreceding adhikara/n/a (I, 2, 14) for the purpose of strengthening the\nargument [11].--The sixth adhikara/n/a, again, which discusses 'that\nwhich is not seen' (adre/s/ya; Mu/nd/. Up. I, 1, 6), is clearly\nintroduced in this place because in the preceding adhikara/n/a it had\nbeen said that ad/ri/sh/t/a, &c. denote the highest Self;--The reasons\nto which the last adhikara/n/a of the second pada and the first and\nthird adhikara/n/as of the third pada owe their places are not apparent\n(the second adhikara/n/a of the third pada treats of a Chandogya\npassage). The introduction, on the other hand, of the passage from the\nPra/s/na Upanishad treating of the akshara. O/m/kara is clearly due to\nthe circumstance that an akshara, of a different nature, had been\ndiscussed in the preceding adhikara/n/a.--The fifth and sixth\nadhikara/n/as investigate Chandogya passages.--The two next Sutras (22,\n23) are, as remarked above, considered by /S/a@nkara to constitute a new\nadhikara/n/a treating of the 'being after which everything shines'\n(Mu/nd/. Up. II, 2, 10); while Ramanuja looks on them as continuing the\nsixth adhikara/n/a. There is one circumstance which renders it at any\nrate probable that Ramanuja, and not /S/a@nkara, here hits the intention\nof the author of the Sutras. The general rule in the first three padas\nis that, wherever a new Vedic passage is meant to be introduced, the\nsubject of the discussion, i.e. that being which in the end is declared\nto be Brahman is referred to by means of a special word, in most cases a\nnominative form [12]. From this rule there is in the preceding part of\nthe adhyaya only one real exception, viz. in I, 2, 1, which possibly may\nbe due to the fact that there a new pada begins, and it therefore was\nconsidered superfluous to indicate the introduction of a new topic by a\nspecial word. The exception supplied by I, 3, 19 is only an apparent\none; for, as remarked above, Sutra 19 does not in reality begin a new\nadhikara/n/a. A few exceptions occurring later on will be noticed in\ntheir places.--Now neither Sutra 22 nor Sutra 23 contains any word\nintimating that a new Vedic passage is being taken into consideration,\nand hence it appears preferable to look upon them, with Ramanuja, as\ncontinuing the topic of the preceding adhikara/n/a.--This conclusion\nreceives an additional confirmation from the position of the next\nadhikara/n/a, which treats of the being 'a span long' mentioned in\nKa/th/a Up. II, 4, 12; for the reason of this latter passage being\nconsidered here is almost certainly the reference to the alpa/s/ruti in\nSutra 21, and, if so, the a@ngush/th/amatra properly constitutes the\nsubject of the adhikara/n/a immediately following on Adhik. V, VI;\nwhich, in its turn, implies that Sutras 22, 23 do not form an\nindependent adhikara/n/a.--The two next adhikara/n/as are digressions,\nand do not refer to special Vedic passages.--Sutra 39 forms a new\nadhikara/n/a, according to /S/a@nkara, but not according to Ramanuja,\nwhose opinion seems again to be countenanced by the fact that the Sutra\ndoes not exhibit any word indicative of a new topic. The same difference\nof opinion prevails with regard to Sutra 40, and it appears from the\ntranslation of the Sutra given above, according to Ramanuja's view, that\n'jyoti/h/' need not be taken as a nominative.--The last two\nadhikara/n/as finally refer, according to Ramanuja, to one Chandogya\npassage only, and here also we have to notice that Sutra 42 does not\ncomprise any word intimating that a new passage is about to be\ndiscussed.\n\nFrom all this we seem entitled to draw the following conclusions. The\nVedic passages discussed in the three first padas of the Vedanta-sutras\ncomprise all the doubtful--or at any rate all the more important\ndoubtful--passages from the Chandogya Upanishad. These passages are\narranged in the order in which the text of the Upanishad exhibits them.\nPassages from other Upanishads are discussed as opportunities offer,\nthere being always a special reason why a certain Chandogya passage is\nfollowed by a certain passage from some other Upanishad. Those reasons\ncan be assigned with sufficient certainty in a number of cases although\nnot in all, and from among those passages whose introduction cannot be\nsatisfactorily accounted for some are eliminated by our following the\nsubdivision of the Sutras into adhikara/n/as adopted by Ramanuja, a\nsubdivision countenanced by the external form of the Sutras.\n\nThe fourth pada of the first adhyaya has to be taken by itself. It is\ndirected specially and avowedly against Sa@nkhya-interpretations of\nScripture, not only in its earlier part which discusses isolated\npassages, but also--as is brought out much more clearly in the\n/S/ri-bhashya than by /S/a@nkara--in its latter part which takes a\ngeneral survey of the entire scriptural evidence for Brahman being the\nmaterial as well as the operative cause of the world.\n\nDeussen (p. 221) thinks that the selection made by the Sutrakara of\nVedic passages setting forth the nature of Brahman is not in all cases\nan altogether happy one. But this reproach rests on the assumption that\nthe passages referred to in the first adhyaya were chosen for the\npurpose of throwing light on what Brahman is, and this assumption can\nhardly be upheld. The Vedanta-sutras as well as the Purva\nMima/m/sa-sutras are throughout Mima/m/sa i.e. critical discussions of\nsuch scriptural passages as on a prima facie view admit of different\ninterpretations and therefore necessitate a careful enquiry into their\nmeaning. Here and there we meet with Sutras which do not directly\ninvolve a discussion of the sense of some particular Vedic passage, but\nrather make a mere statement on some important point. But those cases\nare rare, and it would be altogether contrary to the general spirit of\nthe Sutras to assume that a whole adhyaya should be devoted to the task\nof showing what Brahman is. The latter point is sufficiently determined\nin the first five (or six) adhikara/n/as; but after we once know what\nBrahman is we are at once confronted by a number of Upanishad passages\nconcerning which it is doubtful whether they refer to Brahman or not.\nWith their discussion all the remaining adhikara/n/as of the first\nadhyaya are occupied. That the Vedanta-sutras view it as a particularly\nimportant task to controvert the doctrine of the Sa@nkhyas is patent\n(and has also been fully pointed out by Deussen, p. 23). The fifth\nadhikara/n/a already declares itself against the doctrine that the world\nhas sprung from a non-intelligent principle, the pradhana, and the\nfourth pada of the first adhyaya returns to an express polemic against\nSa@nkhya interpretations of certain Vedic statements. It is therefore\nperhaps not saying too much if we maintain that the entire first adhyaya\nis due to the wish, on the part of the Sutrakara, to guard his own\ndoctrine against Sa@nkhya attacks. Whatever the attitude of the other\nso-called orthodox systems may be towards the Veda, the Sa@nkhya system\nis the only one whose adherents were anxious--and actually attempted--to\nprove that their views are warranted by scriptural passages. The\nSa@nkhya tendency thus would be to show that all those Vedic texts which\nthe Vedantin claims as teaching the existence of Brahman, the\nintelligent and sole cause of the world, refer either to the pradhana or\nsome product of the pradhana, or else to the purusha in the Sankhya\nsense, i.e. the individual soul. It consequently became the task of the\nVedantin to guard the Upanishads against misinterpretations of the kind,\nand this he did in the first adhyaya of the Vedanta-sutras, selecting\nthose passages about whose interpretation doubts were, for some reason\nor other, likely to arise. Some of the passages singled out are\ncertainly obscure, and hence liable to various interpretations; of\nothers it is less apparent why it was thought requisite to discuss them\nat length. But this is hardly a matter in which we are entitled to find\nfault with the Sutrakara; for no modern scholar, either European or\nHindu, is--or can possibly be--sufficiently at home, on the one hand, in\nthe religious and philosophical views which prevailed at the time when\nthe Sutras may have been composed, and, on the other hand, in the\nintricacies of the Mima/m/sa, to judge with confidence which Vedic\npassages may give rise to discussions and which not.\n\nNotes:\n\n[Footnote 1: The only 'sectarian' feature of the Sri-bhashya is, that\nidentifies Brahman with Vish/n/u or Naraya/n/a; but this in no way\naffects the interpretations put on the Sutras and Upanishads. Naraya/n/a\nis in fact nothing but another name of Brahman.]\n\n[Footnote 2: The Roman numerals indicate the number of the adhikara/n/a;\nthe figures in parentheses state the Sutras comprised in each\nadhikara/n/a.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Deussen's supposition (pp. 30, 150) that the passage\nconveying the second interpretation is an interpolation is liable to two\nobjections. In the first place, the passage is accepted and explained by\nall commentators; in the second place, /S/a@nkara in the passage\nimmediately preceding Sutra 12 quotes the adhikara/n/a 'anandamayo s\nbhyasat' as giving rise to a discussion whether the param or the aparam\nbrahman is meant. Now this latter point is not touched upon at all in\nthat part of the bhashya which sets forth the former explanation, but\nonly in the subsequent passage, which refutes the former and advocates\nthe latter interpretation.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Eva/m/ jij/n/anasya brahma/nas/\n/ko/tanabhogvabhutaga/d/arupsattvara, istamomayapradhanad vyav/ri/ttir\nukta, idani/m/ karmava/s/vat trigu/n/atmakaprik/ri/u\nsa/m/sangammittanamavidhan intadukhasagaranimajjaoni/s/addha/h/. /k/i\npratya gaumano nyan nikhilaheyapratauika/m/ miatimyanandam brahmeti\npratipadyate, anandamayo bhyasat.]\n\n[Footnote 5: There is no reason to consider the passage 'atra ke/k/it'\nin /S/a@nkara's bhashya on Sutra 23 an interpolation as Deussen does (p.\n30). It simply contains a criticism passed by /S/a@nkara on other\ncommentators.]\n\n[Footnote 6: To the passages on pp. 150 and 153 of the Sanskrit text,\nwhich Deussen thinks to be interpolations, there likewise applies the\nremark made in the preceding note.]\n\n[Footnote 7: Givaysa iva parasyapi brahma/n/a/h/ /s/arirantarvaititvam\nabhyupagata/m/ /k/et tadvad eva\n/s/arirasainbandhaprayuktasukhadukhopabhogapraptir hi /k/en na,\nhetuvai/s/eshyat, na hi /s/arirantarvartitvam eva\nsukhadukhopabhogahetu/h/ api tu pu/n/yapaparnpakarmaparavasatva/m/ ta/k/\n/K/apahatapapmana/h/ parahatmano na sambhavati.]\n\n[Footnote 8: The second interpretation given on pp. 184-5 of the\nSanskrit text (beginning with apara aha) Deussen considers to be an\ninterpolation, caused by the reference to the Paingi upanishad in\n/S/a@nkara's comment on I, 3, 7 (p. 232). But there is no reason\nwhatsoever for such an assumption. The passage on p. 232 shows that\n/S/a@nkara considered the explanation of the mantra given in the\nPaingi-upanishad worth quoting, and is in fact fully intelligible only\nin case of its having been quoted before by /S/a@nkara himself.--That\nthe 'apara' quotes the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka not according to the Ka/n/va\ntext--to quote from which is /S/a@nkara's habit--but from the\nMadhyandina text, is due just to the circumstance of his being an\n'apara,' i.e. not /S/a@nkara.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Ita/s/ /k/aitad evam. Anuk/ri/tes tasya /k/a. Tasya\ndaharakasasya parabrahma/n/o snukarad ayam apahatapapmatvadigu/n/ako\nvimuktabandha/h/ pratyagatma na daharaka/s/a/h/ tadanukaras tatsamya/m/\ntatha hi pratyagalmanozpi vimuktasya parabrahmanukara/h/ sruyate yada\npa/s/ya/h/ pa/s/yate rukmavar/n/a/m/ kartaram i/s/a/m/ purusha/m/\nbrahmayoni/m/ tada vidvan pu/n/yapape vidhuya nira/ng/ana/h/ parama/m/\nsamyam upaitity atos'nukarta prajapativakyanirdish/t/a/h/ anukarya/m/\npara/m/ brahma na daharaka/s/a/h/. Api /k/a smaryate. Sa/m/sari/n/oszpi\nmuktavasthaya/m/ paramasamyapattilaksha/n/a/h/ parabrahmanukara/h/\nsmaryate ida/m/ j/n/anam upasritya, &c.--Ke/k/id anuk/ri/tes tasya\n/k/api smaryate iti /k/a sutradvayam adhikara/n/antara/m/ tam eva\nbhantam anubhati sarva/m/ tasya bhasa sarvam ida/m/ vibhatity asya/h/\n/s/rute/h/ parabrahmaparatvanir/n/ayaya prav/ri/tta/m/ vadanti. Tat tv\nad/ris/yatvadigu/n/ako dharmokte/h/ dyubhvadyayatana/m/ sva/s/abdad ity\nadhi kara/n/advayena tasya prakara/n/asya brahmavishayatvapratipadanat\njyoti/sk/ara/n/abhidhanat ity adishu parasya brahma/n/o\nbharupatvavagates /k/a purvapakshanutthanad ayukta/m/\nsutraksharavairupya/k/ /k/a.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Yadi paramatma na bhokta eva/m/ taihi bhokt /i/taya\npratiyamano jiva eva syad ity asankyaha atta.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Sthanadivyapade/s/a/k/ /k/a ity atra ya/h/ /k/akshushi\ntish/th/ann ity adina pratipadyamana/m/ /k/akshushi\nsthitiniyamanadika/m/ paramatmana eveti siddha/m/ k/ri/tva\nakshipurushasya paramatmatva/m/ sadhitam idani/m/ tad eva samarthayate\nantaryau.]\n\n[Footnote 12: Anandamaya/h/ I, 1, 12; anta/h/ I, i, 20; aka/s/a/h/ I, 1,\n22; prana/h/ I, 1, 23; jyoti/h/ I, 1, 24; prana/h/ I, 1, 28; atta I, 2,\n9; guha/m/ pravish/t/au I, 2, 11; antara I, 2,13; antaryami I, 2, 18;\nad/ris/yatvadigu/n/aka/h/ I, 2, 21; vai/s/vanara/h/ I, 2, 24;\ndyubhvadyayatanam I, 3, 1; bhuma I, 3, 8; aksheram I, 3, 10; sa/h/ I, 3,\n13; dahara/h/ I, 3, 14; pramita/h/ I, 3, 24; (jyoti/h/ 40;) aka/s/a/h/\nI, 3,41.]\n\n\nSECOND ADHYAYA.\n\n\nThe first adhyaya has proved that all the Vedanta-texts unanimously\nteach that there is only one cause of the world, viz. Brahman, whose\nnature is intelligence, and that there exists no scriptural passage\nwhich can be used to establish systems opposed to the Vedanta, more\nespecially the Sa@nkhya system. The task of the two first padas of the\nsecond adhyaya is to rebut any objections which may be raised against\nthe Vedanta doctrine on purely speculative grounds, apart from\nscriptural authority, and to show, again on purely speculative grounds,\nthat none of the systems irreconcilable with the Vedanta can be\nsatisfactorily established.\n\n\nPADA I.\n\n\nAdhikara/n/a I refutes the Sa@nkhya objection that the acceptation of\nthe Vedanta system involves the rejection of the Sa@nkhya doctrine which\nafter all constitutes a part of Sm/ri/ti, and as such has claims on\nconsideration.--To accept the Sa@nkhya-sm/ri/ti, the Vedantin replies,\nwould compel us to reject other Sm/ri/tis, such as the Manu-sm/ri/ti,\nwhich are opposed to the Sa@nkhya doctrine. The conflicting claims of\nSm/ri/tis can be settled only on the ground of the Veda, and there can\nbe no doubt that the Veda does not confirm the Sa@nkhya-sm/ri/ti, but\nrather those Sm/ri/tis which teach the origination of the world from an\nintelligent primary cause.\n\nAdhik. II (3) extends the same line of argumentation to the\nYoga-sm/ri/ti.\n\nAdhik. III (4-11) shows that Brahman, although of the nature of\nintelligence, yet may be the cause of the non-intelligent material\nworld, and that it is not contaminated by the qualities of the world\nwhen the latter is refunded into Brahman. For ordinary experience\nteaches us that like does not always spring from like, and that the\nqualities of effected things when the latter are refunded into their\ncauses--as when golden ornaments, for instance, are melted and thereby\nbecome simple gold again--do not continue to exist in those\ncauses.--Here also the argumentation is specially directed against the\nSa@nkhyas, who, in order to account for the materiality and the various\nimperfections of the world, think it necessary to assume a causal\nsubstance participating in the same characteristics.\n\nAdhik. IV (12) points out that the line of reasoning followed in the\npreceding adhikara/n/a is valid also against other theories, such as the\natomistic doctrine.\n\nThe one Sutra (13) constituting Adhik. V teaches, according to\n/S/a@nkara, that although the enjoying souls as well as the objects of\nfruition are in reality nothing but Brahman, and on that account\nidentical, yet the two sets may practically be held apart, just as in\nordinary life we hold apart, and distinguish as separate individual\nthings, the waves, ripples, and foam of the sea, although at the bottom\nwaves, ripples, and foam are all of them identical as being neither more\nnor less than sea-water.--The /S/ri-bhashya gives a totally different\ninterpretation of the Sutra, according to which the latter has nothing\nwhatever to do with the eventual non-distinction of enjoying souls and\nobjects to be enjoyed. Translated according to Ramanuja's view, the\nSutra runs as follows: 'If non-distinction (of the Lord and the\nindividual souls) is said to result from the circumstance of (the Lord\nhimself) becoming an enjoyer (a soul), we refute this objection by\ninstances from every-day experience.' That is to say: If it be\nmaintained that from our doctrine previously expounded, according to\nwhich this world springs from the Lord and constitutes his body, it\nfollows that the Lord, as an embodied being, is not essentially\ndifferent from other souls, and subject to fruition as they are; we\nreply that the Lord's having a body does not involve his being subject\nto fruition, not any more than in ordinary life a king, although himself\nan embodied being, is affected by the experiences of pleasure and pain\nwhich his servants have to undergo.--The construction which Ramanuja\nputs on the Sutra is not repugnant either to the words of the Sutra or\nto the context in which the latter stands, and that it rests on earlier\nauthority appears from a quotation made by Ramanuja from the\nDrami/d/abhashyakara[13].\n\nAdhik. VI (14-20) treats of the non-difference of the effect from the\ncause; a Vedanta doctrine which is defended by its adherents against the\nVai/s/eshikas according to whom the effect is something different from\nthe cause.--The divergent views of /S/a@nkara and Ramanuja on this\nimportant point have been sufficiently illustrated in the general sketch\nof the two systems.\n\nAdhik. VII (21-23) refutes the objection that, from the Vedic passages\ninsisting on the identity of the Lord and the individual soul, it\nfollows that the Lord must be like the individual soul the cause of\nevil, and that hence the entire doctrine of an all-powerful and all-wise\nLord being the cause of the world has to be rejected. For, the Sutrakira\nremarks, the creative principle of the world is additional to, i.e.\nother than, the individual soul, the difference of the two being\ndistinctly declared by Scripture.--The way in which the three Sutras\nconstituting this adhikara/n/a are treated by /S/a@nkara on the one hand\nand Ramanuja on the other is characteristic. Ramanuja throughout simply\nfollows the words of the Sutras, of which Sutra 21 formulates the\nobjection based on such texts as 'Thou art that,' while Sutra 22 replies\nthat Brahman is different from the soul, since that is expressly\ndeclared by Scripture. /S/a@nkara, on the other hand, sees himself\nobliged to add that the difference of the two, plainly maintained in\nSutra 22, is not real, but due to the soul's fictitious limiting\nadjuncts.\n\nAdhik. VIII (24, 25) shows that Brahman, although destitute of material\nand instruments of action, may yet produce the world, just as gods by\ntheir mere power create palaces, animals, and the like, and as milk by\nitself turns into curds.\n\nAdhik. IX (26-29) explains that, according to the express doctrine of\nScripture, Brahman does not in its entirety pass over into the world,\nand, although emitting the world from itself, yet remains one and\nundivided. This is possible, according to /S/a@nkara, because the world\nis unreal; according to Ramanuja, because the creation is merely the\nvisible and tangible manifestation of what previously existed in Brahman\nin a subtle imperceptible condition.\n\nAdhik. X (30, 31) teaches that Brahman, although destitute of\ninstruments of action, is enabled to create the world by means of the\nmanifold powers which it possesses.\n\nAdhik. XI (32, 33) assigns the motive of the creation, or, more properly\nexpressed, teaches that Brahman, in creating the world, has no motive in\nthe strict sense of the word, but follows a mere sportive impulse.\n\nAdhik. XII (34-36) justifies Brahman from the charges of partiality and\ncruelty which might be brought against it owing to the inequality of\nposition and fate of the various animate beings, and the universal\nsuffering of the world. Brahman, as a creator and dispenser, acts with a\nview to the merit and demerit of the individual souls, and has so acted\nfrom all eternity.\n\nAdhik. XIII (37) sums up the preceding argumentation by declaring that\nall the qualities of Brahman--omniscience and so on--are such as to\ncapacitate it for the creation of the world.\n\n\nPADA II.\n\n\nThe task of the second pada is to refute, by arguments independent of\nVedic passages, the more important philosophical theories concerning the\norigin of the world which are opposed to the Vedanta view.--The first\nadhikara/n/a (1-10) is directed against the Sa@nkhyas, whose doctrine\nhad already been touched upon incidentally in several previous places,\nand aims at proving that a non-intelligent first cause, such as the\npradhana of the Sa@nkhyas, is unable to create and dispose.--The second\nadhikara/n/a (11-17) refutes the Vai/s/eshika tenet that the world\noriginates from atoms set in motion by the ad/ri/sh/t/a.--The third and\nfourth adhikara/n/as are directed against various schools of Bauddha\nphilosophers. Adhik. III (18-27) impugns the view of the so-called\nsarvastitvavadins, or bahyarthavadins, who maintain the reality of an\nexternal as well as an internal world; Adhik. IV (28-32) is directed\nagainst the vij/n/anavadins, according to whom ideas are the only\nreality.--The last Sutra of this adhikara/n/a is treated by Ramanuja as\na separate adhikara/n/a refuting the view of the Madhyamikas, who teach\nthat everything is void, i.e. that nothing whatever is real.--Adhik. V\n(33-36) is directed against the doctrine of the Jainas; Adhik. VI\n(37-41) against those philosophical schools which teach that a highest\nLord is not the material but only the operative cause of the world.\n\nThe last adhikara/n/a of the pada (42-45) refers, according to the\nunanimous statement of the commentators, to the doctrine of the\nBhagavatas or Pa/nk/aratras. But /S/a@nkara and Ramanuja totally\ndisagree as to the drift of the Sutrakara's opinion regarding that\nsystem. According to the former it is condemned like the systems\npreviously referred to; according to the latter it is approved\nof.--Sutras 42 and 43, according to both commentators, raise objections\nagainst the system; Sutra 42 being directed against the doctrine that\nfrom the highest being, called Vasudeva, there is originated\nSa@nkarsha/n/a, i.e. the jiva, on the ground that thereby those\nscriptural passages would be contradicted which teach the soul's\neternity; and Sutra 43 impugning the doctrine that from Sa@nkarsha/n/a\nthere springs Pradyumna, i.e. the manas.--The Sutra on which the\ndifference of interpretation turns is 44. Literally translated it runs,\n'Or, on account of there being' (or, 'their being') 'knowledge and so\non, there is non-contradiction of that.'--This means, according to\n/S/a@nkara, 'Or, if in consequence of the existence of knowledge and so\non (on the part of Sa@nkarsha/n/a, &c. they be taken not as soul, mind,\n&c. but as Lords of pre-eminent knowledge, &c.), yet there is\nnon-contradiction of that (viz. of the objection raised in Sutra 42\nagainst the Bhagavata doctrine).'--According to Ramanuja, on the other\nhand, the Sutra has to be explained as follows: 'Or, rather there is\nnoncontradiction of that (i.e. the Pa/nk/aratra doctrine) on account of\ntheir being knowledge and so on (i.e. on account of their being\nBrahman).' Which means: Since Sa@nkarsha/n/a and so on are merely forms\nof manifestation of Brahman, the Pa/nk/aratra doctrine, according to\nwhich they spring from Brahman, is not contradicted.--The form of the\nSutra makes it difficult for us to decide which of the two\ninterpretations is the right one; it, however, appears to me that the\nexplanations of the 'va' and of the 'tat,' implied in Ramanuja's\ncomment, are more natural than those resulting from /S/a@nkara's\ninterpretation. Nor would it be an unnatural proceeding to close the\npolemical pada with a defence of that doctrine which--in spite of\nobjections--has to be viewed as the true one.\n\n\nPADA III.\n\n\nThe third pada discusses the question whether the different forms of\nexistence which, in their totality, constitute the world have an origin\nor not, i.e. whether they are co-eternal with Brahman, or issue from it\nand are refunded into it at stated intervals.\n\nThe first seven adhikara/n/as treat of the five elementary\nsubstances.--Adhik. I (1-7) teaches that the ether is not co-eternal\nwith Brahman, but springs from it as its first effect.--Adhik. II (8)\nshows that air springs from ether; Adhik. IV, V, VI (10; 11; 12) that\nfire springs from air, water from fire, earth from water.--Adhik. III\n(9) explains by way of digression that Brahman, which is not some\nspecial entity, but quite generally 'that which is,' cannot have\noriginated from anything else.\n\nAdhik. VII (13) demonstrates that the origination of one element from\nanother is due, not to the latter in itself, but to Brahman acting in\nit.\n\nAdhik. VIII (14) teaches that the reabsorption of the elements into\nBrahman takes place in the inverse order of their emission.\n\nAdhik. IX (15) remarks that the indicated order in which the emission\nand the reabsorption of the elementary substances take place is not\ninterfered with by the creation and reabsorption of the organs of the\nsoul, i.e. the sense organs and the internal organ (manas); for they\nalso are of elemental nature, and as such created and retracted together\nwith the elements of which they consist.\n\nThe remainder of the pada is taken up by a discussion of the nature of\nthe individual soul, the jiva.--Adhik. X (16) teaches that expressions\nsuch as 'Devadatta is born,' 'Devadatta has died,' strictly apply to the\nbody only, and are transferred to the soul in so far only as it is\nconnected with a body.\n\nAdhik. XI (17) teaches that the individual soul is, according to\nScripture, permanent, eternal, and therefore not, like the ether and the\nother elements, produced from Brahman at the time of creation.--This\nSutra is of course commented on in a very different manner by /S/a@nkara\non the one hand and Ramanuja on the other. According to the former, the\njiva is in reality identical--and as such co-eternal--with Brahman; what\noriginates is merely the soul's connexion with its limiting adjuncts,\nand that connexion is moreover illusory.--According to Ramanuja, the\njiva is indeed an effect of Brahman, but has existed in Brahman from all\neternity as an individual being and as a mode (prakara) of Brahman. So\nindeed have also the material elements; yet there is an important\ndistinction owing to which the elements may be said to originate at the\ntime of creation, while the same cannot be said of the soul. Previously\nto creation the material elements exist in a subtle condition in which\nthey possess none of the qualities that later on render them the objects\nof ordinary experience; hence, when passing over into the gross state at\nthe time of creation, they may be said to originate. The souls, on the\nother hand, possess at all times the same essential qualities, i.e. they\nare cognizing agents; only, whenever a new creation takes place, they\nassociate themselves with bodies, and their intelligence therewith\nundergoes a certain expansion or development (vikasa); contrasting with\nthe unevolved or contracted state (sanko/k/a) which characterised it\nduring the preceding pralaya. But this change is not a change of\nessential nature (svarupanyathabhava) and hence we have to distinguish\nthe souls as permanent entities from the material elements which at the\ntime of each creation and reabsorption change their essential\ncharacteristics.\n\nAdhik. XII (18) defines the nature of the individual soul. The Sutra\ndeclares that the soul is 'j/n/a.' This means, according to /S/a@nkara,\nthat intelligence or knowledge does not, as the Vai/s/eshikas teach,\nconstitute a mere attribute of the soul which in itself is essentially\nnon-intelligent, but is the very essence of the soul. The soul is not a\nknower, but knowledge; not intelligent, but intelligence.--Ramanuja, on\nthe other hand, explains 'j/n/a' by 'j/n/at/ri/,' i.e. knower, knowing\nagent, and considers the Sutra to be directed not only against the\nVai/s/eshikas, but also against those philosophers who--like the\nSa@nkhyas and the Vedantins of /S/a@nkara's school--maintain that the\nsoul is not a knowing agent, but pure /k/aitanya.--The wording of the\nSutra certainly seems to favour Ramanuja's interpretation; we can hardly\nimagine that an author definitely holding the views of /S/a@nkara\nshould, when propounding the important dogma of the soul's nature, use\nthe term j/n/a of which the most obvious interpretation j/n/at/ri/, not\nj/n/anam.\n\nAdhik. XIII (19-32) treats the question whether the individual soul is\na/n/u, i.e. of very minute size, or omnipresent, all-pervading\n(sarvagata, vyapin). Here, again, we meet with diametrically opposite\nviews.--In /S/a@nkara's opinion the Sutras 19-38 represent the\npurvapaksha view, according to which the jiva is a/n/u, while Sutra 29\nformulates the siddhanta, viz. that the jiva, which in reality is\nall-pervading, is spoken of as a/n/u in some scriptural passages,\nbecause the qualities of the internal organ--which itself is\na/n/u--constitute the essence of the individual soul as long as the\nlatter is implicated in the sa/m/sara.--According to Ramanuja, on the\nother hand, the first Sutra of the adhikara/n/a gives utterance to the\nsiddhanta view, according to which the soul is of minute size; the\nSutras 20-25 confirm this view and refute objections raised against it;\nwhile the Sutras 26-29 resume the question already mooted under Sutra\n18, viz. in what relation the soul as knowing agent (j/n/at/ri/) stands\nto knowledge (j/n/ana).--In order to decide between the conflicting\nclaims of these two interpretations we must enter into some\ndetails.--/S/a@nkara maintains that Sutras 19-28 state and enforce a\npurvapaksha view, which is finally refuted in 29. What here strikes us\nat the outset, is the unusual length to which the defence of a mere\nprima facie view is carried; in no other place the Sutras take so much\ntrouble to render plausible what is meant to be rejected in the end, and\nan unbiassed reader will certainly feel inclined to think that in 19-28\nwe have to do, not with the preliminary statement of a view finally to\nbe abandoned, but with an elaborate bona fide attempt to establish and\nvindicate an essential dogma of the system. Still it is not altogether\nimpossible that the purvapaksha should here be treated at greater length\nthan usual, and the decisive point is therefore whether we can, with\n/S/a@nkara, look upon Sutra 29 as embodying a refutation of the\npurvapaksha and thus implicitly acknowledging the doctrine that the\nindividual soul is all-pervading. Now I think there can be no doubt that\n/S/a@nkara's interpretation of the Sutra is exceedingly forced.\nLiterally translated (and leaving out the non-essential word\n'praj/n/avat') the Sutra runs as follows: 'But on account of that\nquality (or \"those qualities;\" or else \"on account of the quality--or\nqualities--of that\") being the essence, (there is) that designation (or\n\"the designation of that\").' This /S/a@nkara maintains to mean, 'Because\nthe qualities of the buddhi are the essence of the soul in the sa/m/sara\nstate, therefore the soul itself is sometimes spoken of as a/n/u.' Now,\nin the first place, nothing in the context warrants the explanation of\nthe first 'tat' by buddhi. And--which is more important--in the second\nplace, it is more than doubtful whether on /S/a@nkara's own system the\nqualities of the buddhi--such as pleasure, pain, desire, aversion,\n&c.--can with any propriety be said to constitute the essence of the\nsoul even in the sa/m/sara state. The essence of the soul in whatever\nstate, according to /S/a@nkara's system, is knowledge or intelligence;\nwhatever is due to its association with the buddhi is non-essential or,\nmore strictly, unreal, false.\n\nThere are no similar difficulties in the way of Ramanuja's\ninterpretation of the adhikara/n/a. He agrees with /S/a@nkara in the\nexplanation of Sutras 19-35, with this difference that he views them as\nsetting forth, not the purvapaksha, but the siddhanta. Sutras 26-28 also\nare interpreted in a manner not very different from /S/a@nkara's,\nspecial stress being laid on the distinction made by Scripture between\nknowledge as a mere quality and the soul as a knowing agent, the\nsubstratum of knowledge. This discussion naturally gives rise to the\nquestion how it is that Scripture in some places makes use of the term\nvij/n/ana when meaning the individual soul. The answer is given in Sutra\n29, 'The soul is designated as knowledge because it has that quality for\nits essence,' i.e. because knowledge is the essential characteristic\nquality of the soul, therefore the term 'knowledge' is employed here and\nthere to denote the soul itself. This latter interpretation gives rise\nto no doubt whatever. It closely follows the wording of the text and\ndoes not necessitate any forced supplementation. The 'tu' of the Sutra\nwhich, according to /S/a@nkara, is meant to discard the purvapaksha,\nserves on Ramanuja's view to set aside a previously-raised objection; an\naltogether legitimate assumption.\n\nOf the three remaining Sutras of the adhikara/n/a (30-32), 30 explains,\naccording to /S/a@nkara, that the soul may be called a/n/u, since, as\nlong as it exists in the sa/m/sara condition, it is connected with the\nbuddhi. According to Ramanuja the Sutra teaches that the soul may be\ncalled vij/n/ana because the latter constitutes its essential quality as\nlong as it exists.--Sutra 31 intimates, according to /S/a@nkara, that in\nthe states of deep sleep, and so on, the soul is potentially connected\nwith the buddhi, while in the waking state that connexion becomes\nactually manifest. The same Sutra, according to Ramanuja, teaches that\nj/n/at/ri/tva is properly said to constitute the soul's essential\nnature, although it is actually manifested in some states of the soul\nonly.--In Sutra 32, finally, /S/a@nkara sees a statement of the doctrine\nthat, unless the soul had the buddhi for its limiting adjunct, it would\neither be permanently cognizing or permanently non-cognizing; while,\naccording to Ramanuja, the Sutra means that the soul would either be\npermanently cognizing or permanently non-cognizing, if it were pure\nknowledge and all-pervading (instead of being /jn/at/ri/ and a/n/u, as\nit is in reality).--The three Sutras can be made to fit in with either\ninterpretation, although it must be noted that none of them explicitly\nrefers to the soul's connexion with the buddhi.\n\nAdhik. XIV and XV (33-39; 40) refer to the kart/ri/tva of the jiva, i.e.\nthe question whether the soul is an agent. Sutras 33-39 clearly say that\nit is such. But as, according to /S/a@nkara's system, this cannot be the\nfinal view,--the soul being essentially non-active, and all action\nbelonging to the world of upadhis,--he looks upon the next following\nSutra (40) as constituting an adhikara/n/a by itself, and teaching that\nthe soul is an agent when connected with the instruments of action,\nbuddhi, &c., while it ceases to be so when dissociated from them, 'just\nas the carpenter acts in both ways,' i.e. just as the carpenter works as\nlong as he wields his instruments, and rests after having laid them\naside.--Ramanuja, perhaps more naturally, does not separate Sutra 40\nfrom the preceding Sutras, but interprets it as follows: Activity is\nindeed an essential attribute of the soul; but therefrom it does not\nfollow that the soul is always actually active, just as the carpenter,\neven when furnished with the requisite instruments, may either work or\nnot work, just as he pleases.\n\nAdhik. XVI (41, 42) teaches that the soul in its activity is dependent\non the Lord who impels it with a view to its former actions.\n\nAdhik. XVII (43-53) treats of the relation of the individual soul to\nBrahman. Sutra 43 declares that the individual soul is a part (a/ms/a)\nof Brahman, and the following Sutras show how that relation does not\ninvolve either that Brahman is affected by the imperfections,\nsufferings, &c. of the souls, or that one soul has to participate in the\nexperiences of other souls. The two commentators of course take entirely\ndifferent views of the doctrine that the soul is a part of Brahman.\nAccording to Ramanuja the souls are in reality parts of Brahman[14];\naccording to Sa@nkara the 'a/ms/a' of the Sutra must be understood to\nmean 'a/ms/a iva,' 'a part as it were;' the one universal indivisible\nBrahman having no real parts, but appearing to be divided owing to its\nlimiting adjuncts.--One Sutra (50) in this adhikara/n/a calls for\nspecial notice. According to Sa@nkara the words 'abhasa eva /k/a' mean\n'(the soul is) a mere reflection,' which, as the commentators remark, is\na statement of the so-called pratibimbavada, i.e. the doctrine that the\nso-called individual soul is nothing but the reflection of the Self in\nthe buddhi; while Sutra 43 had propounded the so-called ava/kkh/edavada,\ni.e. the doctrine that the soul is the highest Self in so far as limited\nby its adjuncts.--According to Ramanuja the abhasa of the Sutra has to\nbe taken in the sense of hetvabhasa, a fallacious argument, and the\nSutra is explained as being directed against the reasoning of those\nVedantins according to whom the soul is Brahman in so far as limited by\nnon-real adjuncts[15].\n\n\nPADA IV.\n\n\nAdhik. I, II, III (1-4; 5-6; 7) teach that the pra/n/as (by which\ngeneric name are denoted the buddhindriyas, karmen-driyas, and the\nmanas) spring from Brahman; are eleven in number; and are of minute size\n(a/n/u).\n\nAdhik. IV, V, VI (8; 9-12; 13) inform us also that the mukhya pra/n/a,\ni.e. the vital air, is produced from Brahman; that it is a principle\ndistinct from air in general and from the pra/n/as discussed above; and\nthat it is minute (a/n/u).\n\nAdhik. VII and VIII (14-16; 17-19) teach that the pra/n/as are\nsuperintended and guided in their activity by special divinities, and\nthat they are independent principles, not mere modifications of the\nmukhya pra/n/a.\n\nAdhik. IX (20-22) declares that the evolution of names and forms (the\nnamarupavyakara/n/a) is the work, not of the individual soul, but of the\nLord.\n\nNotes:\n\n[Footnote 13: Lokavat, Yatha loke raja/s/asananuvartina/m/ /k/a\nrajanugrahanigrahak/ri/takhadukhayoges'pi na sa/s/ariraivamatre/n/a\nsasake rajany api /s/asananuv/ri/ttyauv/ri/ttinimittasukhadukhayor\nbhokt/ri/vaprasa@nga/h/. Yathaha Drami/d/abhashyakara/h/ yatha loke raja\npra/k/uradanda/s/uke ghores'narthasa/m/ka/t/es'pi prade/s/e\nvartamanoszpi vyajanadyavadhutadeho doshair na sprisyate abhipreta/ms/\n/k/a lokan paripipalayishati bhoga/ms/ /k/a gandhadin\navi/s/vajanopabhogyan dharayati tathasau loke/s/varo\nbhramatsvasamait/h/ya/k/amato doshair na sp/ris/yate rakshati /k/a lokan\nbrahmalokadi/ms/ /k/avi/s/vajanopabhogyan dharayatiti.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Givasya kart/ri/tva/m/ paramapurushayattam ity uktam.\nIdanim kim aya/m/ giva/h/ parasmad atyantabhinna/h/ uta param eva brahma\nbhrantam uta brahmaivopadhyava/kkh/innam atha brahma/ms/a iti\nsa/m/sayyate /s/rutivipraticpatte/h/ sa/m/saya/h/. Nanu tadananyam\narambha/n/a/s/abdadibhya/h/ adhika/m/ tu bhedanirdesad ity atraivayam\naitho nir/n/ita/h/ Satya/m/ sa eva nanatvaikatva/s/rutivipratipattya\nskshipya jivasya brahma/ms/atvopapadanena vi/s/eshato nir/n/iyate. Yavad\ndhi jivasya brahma/m/satva/m/ na nir/n/itam tavaj jivasya\nbrahmanosnanyatva/m/ brahma/n/as tasmad adhikatva/m/ /k/a na\npratitish/th/ati. Ki/m/ tavat praptam. Atyanta/m/ bhinna iti. Kuta/h/.\nJ/n/aj/n/nau dvav ityadibhedanirde/s/at. J/n/aj/n/ayor abheda/s/rutayas\ntv agnina si/nk/ed itivad viruddharthapratipadanad aupa/k/arikya/h/,\nBrahma/n/os/ms/o jiva ity api na sadhiya/h/, ekavastvekade/s/ava/k/i hy\na/ms/a/s/sabda/h/, jivasya brahmaikade/s/atve tadgata dosha brahma/n/i\nbhaveyu/h/. Na /k/a brahmakha/nd/o jiva ity a/ms/atvopapatti/h/\nkha/nd/ananarhatvad brahma/n/a/h/ praguktadoshaprasa@nga/k/ /k/a, tasmad\natyantabhinnasya tada/ms/atva/m/ durupapadam. Yadva bhranta/m/ brahmaiva\njiva/h/. Kuta/h/. Tat tvam asi ayam atma\nbrahmetyadibrahmatmabhavopade/s/at, nanatmatvavadinyas tu\npratyakshadisiddharthanuvaditvad ananyathasiddhadvaitopade/s/aparabhi/h/\n/s/rutibhi/h/ pratyakshadaya/s/ /k/a avidyantargata/h/\nkhyapyante.--Athava brahmaivanadyupadhyava/kkh/inna/m/ jiva/h/. Kuta/h/.\nTata eva brahmatmabhavopade/s/at. Na /k/ayam upadhir bhrantiparikalpita\nita vaktu/m/ sakya/m/ bandhamokshadivyavasthanupapatter. Ity eva/m/\npratptesbhidhiyate. Brahma/ms/a iti. Kuta/h/. Nanavyapade/s/ad anyatha\n/k/aikatvena vyapade/s/ad ubhayatha hi vyapade/s/o d/ris/yate.\nNavavyapade/s/as tavat\nsrash/tri/tva/rig/yatva--niyant/ri/tvaniyamyatva--sarvaj/n/atvaj/n/atva--\nsvadhinatvaparadhinatva--/s/uddhatva/s/uddhatva--\nkalya/n/agu/n/akaratvaviparitatva--patitva/s/eshatvadibhir d/ris/yate.\nAnyatha /k/abhedena vyapade/s/os pi tat tvam asi ayam atma\nbrahmetyadibhir d/ris/yate. Api da/s/akitavaditvam apy adhiyate eke,\nbrahma dasa brahma dasa brahmeme kitava ity atharva/n/ika brahma/n/o\nda/s/akitavaditvam apy adhiyate, tata/s/ /k/a sarvajivavyapitvena abhedo\nvyapadi/s/yata it artha/h/. Evam ubhayavyapade/s/amukhyatvasiddhaye\njivosya/m/ brahma/n/os/ms/a ity abhyupagantavya/h/.]\n\n[Footnote 15: Nanu bhrantabrahmajivavadeszpy avidyak/ri/topadhibhedad\nbhogavyavasthadaya upapadyanta ata aha, abhasa eva /k/a.\nAkha/nd/aikarasapraka/s/amatratvarupasya\nsvarupatirodhanapurvakopadhibhedopapadanahetur abhasa eva.\nPraka/s/aikasvarupasya praka/s/atirodhana/m/ praka/s/ana/s/a eveti prag\nevopapaditam. Abhasa eveti va pa/th/a/h/, tatha sati hetava abhasa/h/.]\n\n\nTHIRD ADHYAYA.\nPADA I.\n\n\nAdhik. I (1-7) teaches that the soul, when passing out of the body at\nthe time of death, remains invested with the subtle material elements\n(bhutasukshma) which serve as an abode to the pra/n/as attached to the\nsoul.\n\nAdhik. II (8-11) shows that, when the souls of those who had enjoyed the\nreward of their good works in the moon descend to the earth in order to\nundergo a new embodiment, there cleaves to them a remainder (anu/s/aya)\nof their former deeds which determines the nature of the new embodiment.\n\nAdhik. III (12-21) discusses the fate after death of those whom their\ngood works do not entitle to pass up to the moon.\n\nAdhik. IV, V, VI (22; 23; 24-27) teach that the subtle bodies of the\nsouls descending from the moon through the ether, air, &c., do not\nbecome identical with ether, air, &c., but only like them; that the\nentire descent occupies a short time only; and that, when the souls\nfinally enter into plants and so on, they do not participate in the life\nof the latter, but are merely in external contact with them.\n\n\nPADA II.\n\n\nAdhik. I (1-6) treats of the soul in the dreaming state. According to\n/S/a@nkara the three first Sutras discuss the question whether the\ncreative activity ascribed to the soul in some scriptural passages\nproduces things as real as those by which the waking soul is surrounded,\nor not; Sutra 3 settles the point by declaring that the creations of the\ndreaming soul are mere 'Maya,' since they do not fully manifest the\ncharacter of real objects. Sutra 4 adds that dreams, although mere Maya,\nyet have a prophetic quality. Sutras 5 and 6 finally reply to the\nquestion why the soul, which after all is a part of the Lord and as such\nparticipates in his excellencies, should not be able to produce in its\ndreams a real creation, by the remark that the soul's knowledge and\npower are obscured by its connexion with the gross body.\n\nThe considerably diverging interpretation given of this adhikara/n/a by\nRamanuja has the advantage of more closely connecting the Sutras with\neach other. According to him the question is not whether the creations\nof a dream are real or not, but whether they are the work of the\nindividual soul or of the Lord acting within the soul. Sutras 1 and 2\nset forth the purvapaksha. The creations of dreams (are the work of the\nindividual soul); for thus Scripture declares: 'And the followers of\nsome /s/akas declare (the soul to be) a creator,' &c. The third Sutra\nstates the siddhanta view: 'But the creations of dreams are Maya, i.e.\nare of a wonderful nature (and as such cannot be effected by the\nindividual soul), since (in this life) the nature (of the soul) is not\nfully manifested.' Concerning the word 'maya,' Ramanuja remarks,\n'maya/s/abdo hy a/sk/aryava/k/i janaka/s/ya kule jata devamayeva nirmita\nityadishu tatha dar/s/anat.' The three remaining Sutras are exhibited in\nthe /S/ri-bhashya in a different order, the fourth Sutra, according to\n/S/a@nkara, being the sixth according to Ramanuja. Sutras 4 and 5\n(according to Ramanuja's numeration) are explained by Ramanuja very much\nin the same way as by /S/a@nkara; but owing to the former's statement of\nthe subject-matter of the whole adhikara/n/a they connect themselves\nmore intimately with the preceding Sutras than is possible on\n/S/a@nkara's interpretation. In Sutra 6 (su/k/aka/s/ /k/a hi) Ramanuja\nsees a deduction from the siddhanta of the adhikara/n/a, 'Because the\nimages of a dream are produced by the highest Lord himself, therefore\nthey have prophetic significance.'\n\nAdhik. II teaches that in the state of deep dreamless sleep the soul\nabides within Brahman in the heart.\n\nAdhik. III (9) expounds the reasons entitling us to assume that the soul\nawakening from sleep is the same that went to sleep.--Adhik. IV (9)\nexplains the nature of a swoon.\n\nAdhik. V (11-21) is, according to /S/a@nkara, taken up with the question\nas to the nature of the highest Brahman in which the individual soul is\nmerged in the state of deep sleep. Sutra 11 declares that twofold\ncharacteristics (viz. absence and presence of distinctive attributes,\nnirvi/s/eshatva and savi/s/eshatva) cannot belong to the highest Brahman\neven through its stations, i.e. its limiting adjuncts; since all\npassages which aim at setting forth Brahman's nature declare it to be\ndestitute of all distinctive attributes.--The fact, Sutra 12 continues,\nthat in many passages Brahman is spoken of as possessing distinctive\nattributes is of no relevancy, since wherever there are mentioned\nlimiting adjuncts, on which all distinction depends, it is specially\nstated that Brahman in itself is free from all diversity; and--Sutra 13\nadds--in some places the assumption of diversity is specially objected\nto.--That Brahman is devoid of all form (Sutra 14), is the pre-eminent\nmeaning of all Vedanta-texts setting forth Brahman's nature.--That\nBrahman is represented as having different forms, as it were, is due to\nits connexion with its (unreal) limiting adjuncts; just as the light of\nthe sun appears straight or crooked, as it were, according to the nature\nof the things he illuminates (15).--The B/ri/hadara/n/yaka expressly\ndeclares that Brahman is one uniform mass of intelligence (16); and the\nsame is taught in other scriptural passages and in Sm/ri/ti (l7).--At\nthe unreality of the apparent manifoldness of the Self, caused by the\nlimiting adjuncts, aim those scriptural passages in which the Self is\ncompared to the sun, which remains one although his reflections on the\nsurface of the water are many (18).--Nor must the objection be raised\nthat that comparison is unsuitable, because the Self is not material\nlike the sun, and there are no real upadhis separate from it as the\nwater is from the sun; for the comparison merely means to indicate that,\nas the reflected image of the sun participates in the changes, increase,\ndecrease, &c., which the water undergoes while the sun himself remains\nunaffected thereby, so the true Self is not affected by the attributes\nof the upadhis, while, in so far as it is limited by the latter, it is\naffected by them as it were (19, 20).--That the Self is within the\nupadhis, Scripture declares (21).\n\nFrom the above explanation of this important adhikara/n/a the one given\nin the Sri-bhashya differs totally. According to Ramanuja the\nadhikara/n/a raises the question whether the imperfections clinging to\nthe individual soul (the discussion of which has now come to an end)\naffect also the highest Lord who, according to Scripture, abides within\nthe soul as antaryamin. 'Notwithstanding the abode (of the highest Self\nwithin the soul) (it is) not (affected by the soul's imperfections)\nbecause everywhere (the highest Self is represented) as having twofold\ncharacteristics (viz. being, on one hand, free from all evil,\napahatapapman, vijara, vim/ri/tyu, &c., and, on the other hand, endowed\nwith all auspicious qualities, satyakama, satyasa/m/kalpa, &c.)\n(11).--Should it be objected that, just as the soul although essentially\nfree from evil--according to the Prajapativakya in the Chandogya--yet is\nliable to imperfections owing to its connexion with a variety of bodies,\nso the antaryamin also is affected by abiding within bodies; we deny\nthis because in every section of the chapter referring to the antaryamin\n(in the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka) he is expressly called the Immortal, the\nruler within; which shows him to be free from the shortcomings of the\njiva (12).--Some, moreover, expressly assert that, although the Lord and\nthe soul are within one body, the soul only is imperfect, not the Lord\n(dva supar/n/a sayuja sakhaya) (13).--Should it be said that, according\nto the Chandogya, Brahman entered together with the souls into the\nelements previously to the evolution of names and forms, and hence\nparticipates in the latter, thus becoming implicated in the sa/m/sara;\nwe reply that Brahman, although connected with such and such forms, is\nin itself devoid of form, since it is the principal element (agent;\npradhana) in the bringing about of names and forms (according to\n'aka/s/o ha vai namarupayor nirvahita') (14).--But does not the passage\n'satya/m/ j/n/anam anantam brahma' teach that Brahman is nothing but\nlight (intelligence) without any difference, and does not the passage\n'neti neti' deny of it all qualities?--As in order, we reply, not to\ndeprive passages as the one quoted from the Taittiriya of their purport,\nwe admit that Brahman's nature is light, so we must also admit that\nBrahman is satyasa/m/kalpa, and so on; for if not, the passages in which\nthose qualities are asserted would become purportless (15).--Moreover\nthe Taittiriya passage only asserts so much, viz. the praka/s/arupata of\nBrahman, and does not deny other qualities (l6).--And the passage 'neti\nneti' will be discussed later on.--The ubhayali@ngatva of Brahman in the\nsense assigned above is asserted in many places /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti\n(17).--Because Brahman although abiding in many places is not touched by\ntheir imperfections, the similes of the reflected sun, of the ether\nlimited by jars, &c., are applicable to it (18).--Should it be said that\nthe illustration is not an appropriate one, because the sun is\napprehended in the water erroneously only while the antaryamin really\nabides within all things, and therefore must be viewed as sharing their\ndefects (19); we reply that what the simile means to negative is merely\nthat Brahman should, owing to its inherence in many places, participate\nin the increase, decrease, and so on, of its abodes. On this view both\nsimiles are appropriate (20).--Analogous similes we observe to be\nemployed in ordinary life, as when we compare a man to a lion (21).\n\nSutras 22-30 constitute, according to /S/a@nkara, a new adhikara/n/a\n(VI), whose object it is to show that the clause 'not so, not so' (neti\nneti; B/ri/hadar) negatives, not Brahman itself, but only the two forms\nof Brahman described in the preceding part of the chapter. Sutras 23-26\nfurther dwell on Brahman being in reality devoid of all distinctive\nattributes which are altogether due to the upadhis. The last four Sutras\nreturn to the question how, Brahman being one only, the souls are in so\nmany places spoken of as different from it, and, two explanatory\nhypotheses having been rejected, the conclusion is arrived at that all\ndifference is unreal, due to fictitious limiting adjuncts.\n\nAccording to Ramanuja, Sutras 22 ff. continue the discussion started in\nSutra 11. How, the question is asked, can the ubhayali@ngatva of Brahman\nbe maintained considering that the 'not so, not so' of the\nB/ri/hadara/n/yaka denies of Brahman all the previously mentioned modes\n(prakara), so that it can only be called that which is (sanmatra)?--The\nreply given in Sutra 22 is that 'not so, not so' does not deny of\nBrahman the distinctive qualities or modes declared previously (for it\nwould be senseless at first to teach them, and finally to deny them\nagain[16]), but merely denies the prak/ri/taitavattva, the previously\nstated limited nature of Brahman, i.e. it denies that Brahman possesses\nonly the previously mentioned qualifications. With this agrees, that\nsubsequently to 'neti neti' Scripture itself enunciates further\nqualifications of Brahman. That Brahman as stated above is not the\nobject of any other means of proof but Scripture is confirmed in Sutra\n23, 'Scripture declares Brahman to be the non-manifest.'--And the\nintuition (sakshatkkara) of Brahman ensues only upon its sa/m/radhana,\ni.e. upon its being perfectly pleased by the worshipper's devotion, as\nScripture and Sm/ri/ti declare (24).--That this interpretation of 'neti'\nis the right one, is likewise shown by the fact that in the same way as\npraka/s/a, luminousness, j/n/ana, intelligence, &c., so also the quality\nof being differentiated by the world (prapa/nk/avsish/t/ata) is intuited\nas non-different, i.e. as likewise qualifying Brahman; and that\npraka/s/a, and so on, characterise Brahman, is known through repeated\npractice (on the part of /ri/shis like Vamadeva) in the work of\nsa/m/radhana mentioned before (25).--For all these reasons Brahman is\nconnected with the infinite, i.e. the infinite number of auspicious\nqualities; for thus the twofold indications (li@nga) met with in\nScripture are fully justified (26).--In what relation, then, does the\na/k/id vastu, i.e. the non-sentient matter, which, according to the\nb/ri/hadara/n/yaka, is one of the forms of Brahman, stand to the\nlatter?--Non-sentient beings might, in the first place, be viewed as\nspecial arrangements (sa/m/sthanavisesha/h/) of Brahman, as the coils\nare of the body of the snake; for Brahman is designated as both, i.e.\nsometimes as one with the world (Brahman is all this, &c.), sometimes as\ndifferent from it (Let me enter into those elements, &c.) (27).--Or, in\nthe second place, the relation of the two might be viewed as analogous\nto that of light and the luminous object which are two and yet one, both\nbeing fire (28).--Or, in the third place, the relation is like that\nstated before, i.e. the material world is, like the individual souls\n(whose case was discussed in II, 3, 43), a part--a/ms/a--of Brahman (29,\n30).\n\nAdhik. VII (31-37) explains how some metaphorical expressions, seemingly\nimplying that there is something different from Brahman, have to be\ntruly understood.\n\nAdhik. VIII (38-41) teaches that the reward of works is not, as Jaimini\nopines, the independent result of the works acting through the so-called\napurva, but is allotted by the Lord.\n\n\nPADA III.\n\n\nWith the third pada of the second adhyaya a new section of the work\nbegins, whose task it is to describe how the individual soul is enabled\nby meditation on Brahman to obtain final release. The first point to be\ndetermined here is what constitutes a meditation on Brahman, and, more\nparticularly, in what relation those parts of the Upanishads stand to\neach other which enjoin identical or partly identical meditations. The\nreader of the Upanishads cannot fail to observe that the texts of the\ndifferent /s/akhas contain many chapters of similar, often nearly\nidentical, contents, and that in some cases the text of even one and the\nsame /s/akha exhibits the same matter in more or less varied forms. The\nreason of this clearly is that the common stock of religious and\nphilosophical ideas which were in circulation at the time of the\ncomposition of the Upanishads found separate expression in the different\npriestly communities; hence the same speculations, legends, &c. reappear\nin various places of the sacred Scriptures in more or less differing\ndress. Originally, when we may suppose the members of each Vedic school\nto have confined themselves to the study of their own sacred texts, the\nfact that the texts of other schools contained chapters of similar\ncontents would hardly appear to call for special note or comment; not\nany more than the circumstance that the sacrificial performances\nenjoined on the followers of some particular /s/akha were found\ndescribed with greater or smaller modifications in the books of other\n/s/akhas also. But already at a very early period, at any rate long\nbefore the composition of the Vedanta-sutras in their present form, the\nVedic theologians must have apprehended the truth that, in whatever\nregards sacrificial acts, one /s/akha may indeed safely follow its own\ntexts, disregarding the texts of all other /s/akhas; that, however, all\ntexts which aim at throwing light on the nature of Brahman and the\nrelation to it of the human soul must somehow or other be combined into\none consistent systematical whole equally valid for the followers of all\nVedic schools. For, as we have had occasion to remark above, while acts\nmay be performed by different individuals in different ways, cognition\nis defined by the nature of the object cognised, and hence can be one\nonly, unless it ceases to be true cognition. Hence the attempts, on the\none hand, of discarding by skilful interpretation all contradictions met\nwith in the sacred text, and, on the other hand, of showing what\nsections of the different Upanishads have to be viewed as teaching the\nsame matter, and therefore must be combined in one meditation. The\nlatter is the special task of the present pada.\n\nAdhik. I and II (1-4; 5) are concerned with the question whether those\nvidyas, which are met with in identical or similar form in more than one\nsacred text, are to be considered as constituting several vidyas, or one\nvidya only. /S/a@nkara remarks that the question affects only those\nvidyas whose object is the qualified Brahman; for the knowledge of the\nnon-qualified Brahman, which is of an absolutely uniform nature, can of\ncourse be one only wherever it is set forth. But things lie differently\nin those cases where the object of knowledge is the sagu/n/am brahma or\nsome outward manifestation of Brahman; for the qualities as well as\nmanifestations of Brahman are many. Anticipating the subject of a later\nadhikara/n/a, we may take for an example the so-called /S/a/nd/ilyavidya\nwhich is met with in Ch. Up. III, 14, again--in an abridged form--in\nB/ri/. Up. V, 6, and, moreover, in the tenth book of the\n/S/atapathabrahma/n/a (X, 6, 3). The three passages enjoin a meditation\non Brahman as possessing certain attributes, some of which are specified\nin all the three texts (as, for instance, manomayatva, bharupatva),\nwhile others are peculiar to each separate passage (pra/n/a/s/ariratva\nand satyasa/m/kalpatva, for instance, being mentioned in the Chandogya\nUpanishad and /S/atapatha-brahma/n/a, but not in the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka\nUpanishad, which, on its part, specifies sarvava/s/itva, not referred to\nin the two other texts). Here, then, there is room for a doubt whether\nthe three passages refer to one object of knowledge or not. To the\ndevout Vedantin the question is not a purely theoretical one, but of\nimmediate practical interest. For if the three texts are to be held\napart, there are three different meditations to be gone through; if, on\nthe other hand, the vidya is one only, all the different qualities of\nBrahman mentioned in the three passages have to be combined into one\nmeditation.--The decision is here, as in all similar cases, in favour of\nthe latter alternative. A careful examination of the three passages\nshows that the object of meditation is one only; hence the meditation\nalso is one only, comprehending all the attributes mentioned in the\nthree texts.\n\nAdhik. III (6-8) discusses the case of vidyas being really separate,\nalthough apparently identical. The examples selected are the\nudgithavidyas of the Chandogya Upanishad (I, 1-3) and the\nB/ri/hadara/n/yaka Upanishad (I, 3), which, although showing certain\nsimilarities--such as bearing the same name and the udgitha being in\nboth identified with pra/n/a--yet are to be held apart, because the\nsubject of the Chandogya vidya is not the whole udgitha but only the\nsacred syllabic Om, while the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka Upanishad represents\nthe whole udgitha as the object of meditation.\n\nSutra 9 constitutes in /S/a@nkara's view a new adhikara/n/a (IV),\nproving that in the passage, 'Let a man meditate' (Ch. Up. I, 1, 1), the\nO/m/kara and the udgitha stand in the relation of one specifying the\nother, the meaning being, 'Let a man meditate on that O/m/kara which,'\n&c.--According to Ramanuja's interpretation, which seems to fall in more\nsatisfactorily with the form and the wording of the Sutra, the latter\nmerely furnishes an additional argument for the conclusion arrived at in\nthe preceding adhikara/n/a.--Adhik. V (10) determines the unity of the\nso-called pra/n/a-vidyas and the consequent comprehension of the\ndifferent qualities of the pra/n/a, which are mentioned in the different\ntexts, within one meditation.\n\nAdhik. VI comprises, according to /S/a@nkara, the Sutras 11-13. The\npoint to be settled is whether in all the meditations on Brahman all its\nqualities are to be included or only those mentioned in the special\nvidya. The decision is that the essential and unalterable attributes of\nBrahman, such as bliss and knowledge, are to be taken into account\neverywhere, while those which admit of a more or less (as, for instance,\nthe attribute of having joy for its head, mentioned in the Taitt. Up.)\nare confined to special meditations.--Adhik. VII (14, 15), according to\n/S/a@nkara, aims at proving that the object of Ka/th/a. Up. III, 10, 11\nis one only, viz. to show that the highest Self is higher than\neverything, so that the passage constitutes one vidya only.--Adhik. VIII\n(16, 17) determines, according to /S/a@nkara, that the Self spoken of in\nAit. Ar. II, 4, 1, 1 is not a lower form of the Self (the so-called\nsutratman), but the highest Self; the discussion of that point in this\nplace being due to the wish to prove that the attributes of the highest\nSelf have to be comprehended in the Aitarcyaka meditation.\n\nAccording to Ramanuja the Sutras 11-17 constitute a single adhikara/n/a\nwhose subject is the same as that of /S/a@nkara's sixth adhikar/n/a.\nSutras 11-13 are, on the whole, explained as by /S/a@nkara; Sutra 12,\nhowever, is said to mean, 'Such attributes as having joy for its head,\n&c. are not to be viewed as qualities of Brahman, and therefore not to\nbe included in every meditation; for if they were admitted as qualities,\ndifference would be introduced into Brahman's nature, and that would\ninvolve a more or less on Brahman's part.' Sutras 14-17 continue the\ndiscussion of the passage about the priya/s/irastva.--If\npriya/s/irastva, &c. are not to be viewed as real qualities of Brahman,\nfor what purpose does the text mention them?--'Because,' Sutra 14\nreplies, 'there is no other purpose, Scripture mentions them for the\npurpose of pious meditation.'--But how is it known that the Self of\ndelight is the highest Self? (owing to which you maintain that having\nlimbs, head, &c. cannot belong to it as attributes.)--'Because,' Sutra\n15 replies, 'the term \"Self\" (atma anandamaya) is applied to it.'--But\nin the previous parts of the chapter the term Self (in atma pra/n/amaya,\n&c.) is applied to non-Selfs also; how then do you know that in atma\nanandamaya it denotes the real Self?--'The term Self,' Sutra 16 replies,\n'is employed here to denote the highest Self as in many other passages\n(atmaa va idam eka, &c.), as we conclude from the subsequent passage,\nviz. he wished, May I be many.'--But, an objection is raised, does not\nthe context show that the term 'Self,' which in all the preceding\nclauses about the pra/n/amaya, &c. denoted something other than the\nSelf, does the same in anandamaya atman, and is not the context of\ngreater weight than a subsequent passage?--To this question asked in the\nformer half of 17 (anvayad iti /k/et) the latter half replies, 'Still it\ndenotes the Self, owing to the affirmatory statement,' i.e. the fact of\nthe highest Self having been affirmed in a previous passage also, viz.\nII, 1, 'From that Self sprang ether.'\n\nAdhik. IX (18) discusses a minor point connected with the\npra/n/asa/m/vada.--The subject of Adhik. X (19) has been indicated\nalready above under Adhik. I.--Adhik. XI (20-22) treats of a case of a\ncontrary nature; in B/ri/. Up. V, 5, Brahman is represented first as\nabiding in the sphere of the sun, and then as abiding within the eye; we\ntherefore, in spite of certain counter-indications, have to do with two\nseparate vidyas.--Adhik. XII (23) refers to a similar case; certain\nattributes of Brahman mentioned in the Ra/n/ayaniya-khila have not to be\nintroduced into the corresponding Chandogya vidya, because the stated\ndifference of Brahman's abode involves difference of vidya.--Adhik. XIII\n(24) treats of another instance of two vidyas having to be held apart.\n\nAdhik. XIV (25) decides that certain detached mantras and brahma/n/a\npassages met with in the beginning of some Upanishads--as, for instance,\na brahma/n/a about the mahavrata ceremony at the beginning of the\nAitareya-ara/n/yaka--do, notwithstanding their position which seems to\nconnect them with the brahmavidya, not belong to the latter, since they\nshow unmistakable signs of being connected with sacrificial acts.\n\nAdhik. XV (26) treats of the passages stating that the man dying in the\npossession of true knowledge shakes off all his good and evil deeds, and\naffirms that a statement, made in some of those passages only, to the\neffect that the good and evil deeds pass over to the friends and enemies\nof the deceased, is valid for all the passages.\n\nSutras 27-30 constitute, according to /S/a@nkara, two adhikara/n/as of\nwhich the former (XVI; 27, 28) decides that the shaking off of the good\nand evil deeds takes place--not, as the Kaush. Up. states, on the road\nto Brahman's world--but at the moment of the soul's departure from the\nbody; the Kaushitaki statement is therefore not to be taken\nliterally.--The latter adhikara/n/a (XVII; 29, 30) treats of the cognate\nquestion whether the soul that has freed itself from its deeds proceeds\nin all cases on the road of the gods (as said in the Kaush. Up.), or\nnot. The decision is that he only whose knowledge does not pass beyond\nthe sagu/n/am brahma proceeds on that road, while the soul of him who\nknows the nirgu/n/am brahma becomes one with it without moving to any\nother place.\n\nThe /S/ri-bhashya treats the four Sutras as one adhikara/n/a whose two\nfirst Sutras are explained as by /S/a@nkara, while Sutra 29 raises an\nobjection to the conclusion arrived at, 'the going (of the soul on the\npath of the gods) has a sense only if the soul's freeing itself from its\nworks takes place in both ways, i.e. partly at the moment of death,\npartly on the road to Brahman; for otherwise there would be a\ncontradiction' (the contradiction being that, if the soul's works were\nall shaken off at the moment of death, the subtle body would likewise\nperish at that moment, and then the bodiless soul would be unable to\nproceed on the path of the gods). To this Sutra 30 replies, 'The\ncomplete shaking off of the works at the moment of death is possible,\nsince matters of that kind are observed in Scripture,' i.e. since\nscriptural passages show that even he whose works are entirely\nannihilated, and who has manifested himself in his true shape, is yet\nconnected with some kind of body; compare the passage, 'para/m/ jyotir\nupasampadya svena rupe/n/abhinishpadyate sa tatra paryeti kri/d/an\nramamana/h/ sa svara/d/ bhavati tasya sarveshu lokeshu kama/k/aro\nbhavati.' That subtle body is not due to karman, but to the soul's\nvidyamahatmya.--That the explanation of the /S/ri-bhashya agrees with\nthe text as well as /S/a@nkara's, a comparison of the two will show;\nespecially forced is /S/a@nkara's explanation of 'arthavattvam\nubhayatha,' which is said to mean that there is arthavattva in one case,\nand non-arthavattva in the other case.\n\nThe next Sutra (31) constitutes an adhikara/n/a (XVIII) deciding that\nthe road of the gods is followed not only by those knowing the vidyas\nwhich specially mention the going on that road, but by all who are\nacquainted with the sagu/n/a-vidyas of Brahman.--The explanation given\nin the /S/ri-bhashya (in which Sutras 31 and 32 have exchanged places)\nis similar, with the difference however that all who meditate on\nBrahman--without any reference to the distinction of nirgu/n/a and\nsagu/n/a--proceed after death on the road of the gods. (The\n/S/ri-bhashya reads 'sarvesham,' i.e. all worshippers, not 'sarvasam,'\nall sagu/n/a-vidyas.)\n\nAdhik. XIX (32) decides that, although the general effect of true\nknowledge is release from all forms of body, yet even such beings as\nhave reached perfect knowledge may retain a body for the purpose of\ndischarging certain offices.--In the /S/ri-bhashya, where the Sutra\nfollows immediately on Sutra 30, the adhikara/n/a determines, in close\nconnexion with 30, that, although those who know Brahman as a rule\ndivest themselves of the gross body--there remaining only a subtle body\nwhich enables them to move--and no longer experience pleasure and pain,\nyet certain beings, although having reached the cognition of Brahman,\nremain invested with a gross body, and hence liable to pleasure and pain\nuntil they have fully performed certain duties.\n\nAdhik. XX (33) teaches that the negative attributes of Brahman mentioned\nin some vidyas--such as its being not gross, not subtle, &c.--are to be\nincluded in all meditations on Brahman.--Adhik. XXI (34) determines that\nKa/th/a Up. III, 1, and Mu. Up. III, 1, constitute one vidya only,\nbecause both passages refer to the highest Brahman. According to\nRamanuja the Sutra contains a reply to an objection raised against the\nconclusion arrived at in the preceding Sutra.--Adhik. XXII (35, 36)\nmaintains that the two passages, B/ri/. Up. III, 4 and III, 5,\nconstitute one vidya only, the object of knowledge being in both cases\nBrahman viewed as the inner Self of all.--Adhik. XXIII (37) on the\ncontrary decides that the passage Ait. Ar. II, 2, 4, 6 constitutes not\none but two meditations.--Adhik. XXIV (38) again determines that the\nvidya of the True contained in B/ri/. Up. V, 4, 5, is one\nonly--According to Ramanuja, Sutras 35-38 constitute one adhikara/n/a\nonly whose subject is the same as that of XXII according to /S/a@nkara.\n\nAdhik. XXV (39) proves that the passages Ch. Up. VIII, 1 and B/ri/. Up.\nIV, 4, 22 cannot constitute one vidya, since the former refers to\nBrahman as possessing qualities, while the latter is concerned with\nBrahman as destitute of qualities.--Adhik. XXVI (40, 41) treats,\naccording to /S/a@nkara, of a minor question connected with Ch. Up. V,\n11 ff.--According to the /S/ri-bhashya, Sutras 39-41 form one\nadhikara/n/a whose first Sutra reaches essentially the same conclusion\nas /S/a@nkara under 39. Sutras 40, 41 thereupon discuss a general\nquestion concerning the meditations on Brahman. The qualities, an\nopponent is supposed to remark, which in the two passages discussed are\npredicated of Brahman--such as va/s/itva, satyakamatva, &c.--cannot be\nconsidered real (paramarthika), since other passages (sa esha neti neti,\nand the like) declare Brahman to be devoid of all qualities. Hence those\nqualities cannot be admitted into meditations whose purpose is final\nrelease.--To this objection Sutra 40 replies, '(Those qualities) are not\nto be left off (from the meditations on Brahman), since (in the passage\nunder discussion as well as in other passages) they are stated with\nemphasis[17].'--But, another objection is raised, Scripture says that he\nwho meditates on Brahman as satyakama, &c. obtains a mere perishable\nreward, viz. the world of the fathers, and similar results specified in\nCh. Up. VIII, 2; hence, he who is desirous of final release, must not\ninclude those qualities of Brahman in his meditation.--To this objection\nSutra 41 replies, 'Because that (i.e. the free roaming in all the\nworlds, the world of the fathers, &c.) is stated as proceeding therefrom\n(i.e. the approach to Brahman which is final release) in the case of\n(the soul) which has approached Brahman;' (therefore a person desirous\nof release, may include satyakamatva, &c. in his meditations.)\n\nAdhik. XXVII (42) decides that those meditations which are connected\nwith certain matters forming constituent parts of sacrificial actions,\nare not to be considered as permanently requisite parts of the\nlatter.--Adhik. XXVIII (43) teaches that, in a B/ri/. Up. passage and a\nsimilar Ch. Up. passage, Vayu and Pra/n/a are not to be identified, but\nto be held apart.--Adhik. XXIX (44-52) decides that the firealtars made\nof mind, &c., which are mentioned in the Agnirahasya, do not constitute\nparts of the sacrificial action (so that the mental, &c. construction of\nthe altar could optionally be substituted for the actual one), but\nmerely subjects of meditations.\n\nAdhik. XXX (53, 54) treats, according to /S/a@nkara, in the way of\ndigression, of the question whether to the Self an existence independent\nof the body can be assigned, or not (as the Materialists\nmaintain).--According to the /S/ri-bhashya the adhikara/n/a does not\nrefer to this wide question, but is concerned with a point more\nimmediately connected with the meditations on Brahman, viz. the question\nas to the form under which, in those meditations, the Self of the\nmeditating devotee has to be viewed. The two Sutras then have to be\ntranslated as follows: 'Some (maintain that the soul of the devotee has,\nin meditations, to be viewed as possessing those attributes only which\nbelong to it in its embodied state, such as j/n/at/ri/tva and the like),\nbecause the Self is (at the time of meditation) in the body.'--The next\nSutra rejects this view, 'This is not so, but the separatedness (i.e.\nthe pure isolated state in which the Self is at the time of final\nrelease when it is freed from all evil, &c.) (is to be transferred to\nthe meditating Self), because that will be[18] the state (of the Self in\nthe condition of final release).'\n\nAdhik. XXXI (55, 56) decides that meditations connected with constituent\nelements of the sacrifice, such as the udgitha, are, in spite of\ndifference of svara in the udgitha, &c., valid, not only for that\n/s/akha in which the meditation actually is met with, but for all\n/s/akhas.--Adhik. XXXII (57) decides that the Vai/s/vanara Agni of Ch.\nUp. V, 11 ff. is to be meditated upon as a whole, not in his single\nparts.--Adhik. XXXIII (58) teaches that those meditations which refer to\none subject, but as distinguished by different qualities, have to be\nheld apart as different meditations. Thus the daharavidya,\n/S/a/nd/ilyavidya, &c. remain separate.\n\nAdhik. XXXIV (59) teaches that those meditations on Brahman for which\nthe texts assign one and the same fruit are optional, there being no\nreason for their being cumulated.--Adhik. XXXV (60) decides that those\nmeditations, on the other hand, which refer to special wishes may be\ncumulated or optionally employed according to choice.--Adhik. XXXVI\n(61-66) extends this conclusion to the meditations connected with\nconstituent elements of action, such as the udgitha.\n\n\nPADA IV.\n\n\nAdhik. I (1-17) proves that the knowledge of Brahman is not kratvartha,\ni.e. subordinate to action, but independent.--Adhik. II (18-20) confirms\nthis conclusion by showing that the state of the pravrajins is enjoined\nby the sacred law, and that for them vidya only is prescribed, not\naction.--Adhik. III (21, 22) decides that certain clauses forming part\nof vidyas are not mere stutis (arthavadas), but themselves enjoin the\nmeditation.--The legends recorded in the Vedanta-texts are not to be\nused as subordinate members of acts, but have the purpose of\nglorifying--as arthavadas--the injunctions with which they are connected\n(Adhik. IV, 23, 24).--For all these reasons the urdhvaretasa/h/ require\nno actions but only knowledge (Adhik. V, 25).--Nevertheless the actions\nenjoined by Scripture, such as sacrifices, conduct of certain kinds,\n&c., are required as conducive to the rise of vidya in the mind (Adhik.\nVI, 26, 27).--Certain relaxations, allowed by Scripture, of the laws\nregarding food, are meant only for cases of extreme need (Adhik. VII,\n28-3l).--The a/s/ramakarma/n/i are obligatory on him also who does not\nstrive after mukti (Adhik. VIII, 32-35).--Those also who, owing to\npoverty and so on, are ana/s/rama have claims to vidya (Adhik. IX,\n36-39).--An urdhvaretas cannot revoke his vow (Adhik. X, 40).--Expiation\nof the fall of an urdhvaretas (Adhik. XI, 41, 42).--Exclusion of the\nfallen urdhvaretas in certain cases (Adhik. XII, 43).--Those\nmeditations, which are connected with subordinate members of the\nsacrifice, are the business of the priest, not of the yajamana (Adhik.\nXIII, 44-46).--B/ri/. Up. III, 5, 1 enjoins mauna as a third in addition\nto balya and pa/nd/itya (Adhik. XIV, 47-49).--By balya is to be\nunderstood a childlike innocent state of mind (Adhik. XV, 50).\n\nSutras 51 and 52 discuss, according to Ramanuja, the question when the\nvidya, which is the result of the means described in III, 4, arises.\nSutra 51 treats of that vidya whose result is mere exaltation\n(abhyudaya), and states that 'it takes place in the present life, if\nthere is not present an obstacle in the form of a prabalakarmantara (in\nwhich latter case the vidya arises later only), on account of Scripture\ndeclaring this (in various passages).'--Sutra 52, 'Thus there is also\nabsence of a definite rule as to (the time of origination of) that\nknowledge whose fruit is release, it being averred concerning that one\nalso that it is in the same condition (i.e. of sometimes having an\nobstacle, sometimes not).'--/S/a@nkara, who treats the two Sutras as two\nadhikara/n/as, agrees as to the explanation of 51, while, putting a\nsomewhat forced interpretation on 52, he makes it out to mean that a\nmore or less is possible only in the case of the sagu/n/a-vidyas.\n\nNotes:\n\n[Footnote 16: All the mentioned modes of Brahman are known from\nScripture only, not from ordinary experience. If the latter were the\ncase, then, and then only, Scripture might at first refer to them\n'anuvadena,' and finally negative them.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Ramanuja has here some strong remarks on the improbability\nof qualities emphatically attributed to Brahman, in more than one\npassage, having to be set aside in any meditation: 'Na /k/a\nmatapit/ri/sahasrebhyo-pi vatsalatara/m/ sastra/m/ pratarakavad\naparamarthikau nirasaniyau gu/n/au prama/n/antarapratipannau\nadare/n/opadi/s/ya sa/m/sara/k/akraparivartanena purvam eva\nbambhramyamanan mumukshun bhuyo-pi bhramayitum alam.']\n\n[Footnote 18: The /S/ri-bh-ashya as well as several other commentaries\nreads tadbhavabhavitvat for /S/an@kara's tadbhavabhavitvat.]\n\n\nFOURTH ADHYAYA.\nPADA I.\n\n\nAdhikara/n/a I (1, 2).--The meditation on the Atman enjoined by\nScripture is not an act to be accomplished once only, but is to be\nrepeated again and again.\n\nAdhik. II (3).--The devotee engaged in meditation on Brahman is to view\nit as constituting his own Self.\n\nAdhik. III (4).--To the rule laid down in the preceding adhikara/n/a the\nso-called pratikopasanas, i.e. those meditations in which Brahman is\nviewed under a symbol or outward manifestation (as, for instance, mano\nbrahmety upasita) constitute an exception, i.e. the devotee is not to\nconsider the pratika as constituting his own Self.\n\nAdhik. IV (5).--In the pratikopasanas the pratika is to be meditatively\nviewed as being one with Brahman, not Brahman as being one with the\npratika.--Ramanuja takes Sutra 5 as simply giving a reason for the\ndecision arrived at under Sutra 4, and therefore as not constituting a\nnew adhikara/n/a.\n\nAdhik. V (6).--In meditations connected with constitutives of\nsacrificial works (as, for instance, ya evasau tapati tam udgitham\nupasita) the idea of the divinity, &c. is to be transferred to the\nsacrificial item, not vice versa. In the example quoted, for instance,\nthe udgitha is to be viewed as Aditya, not Aditya as the udgitha.\n\nAdhik. VI (7-10).--The devotee is to carry on his meditations in a\nsitting posture.--/S/a@nkara maintains that this rule does not apply to\nthose meditations whose result is sa/m/yagdar/s/ana; but the Sutra gives\nno hint to that effect.\n\nAdhik. VII (11).--The meditations may be carried on at any time, and in\nany place, favourable to concentration of mind.\n\nAdhik. VIII (12).--The meditations are to be continued until\ndeath.--/S/a@nkara again maintains that those meditations which lead to\nsa/m/yagdar/s/ana are excepted.\n\nAdhik. IX (13).--When through those meditations the knowledge of Brahman\nhas been reached, the vidvan is no longer affected by the consequences\nof either past or future evil deeds.\n\nAdhik. X (14).--Good deeds likewise lose their efficiency.--The literal\ntranslation of the Sutra is, 'There is likewise non-attachment (to the\nvidvan) of the other (i.e. of the deeds other than the evil ones, i.e.\nof good deeds), but on the fall (of the body, i.e. when death takes\nplace).' The last words of the Sutra, 'but on the fall,' are separated\nby /S/a@nkara from the preceding part of the Sutra and interpreted to\nmean, 'when death takes place (there results mukti of the vidvan, who\nthrough his knowledge has freed himself from the bonds of\nworks).'--According to Ramanuja the whole Sutra simply means, 'There is\nlikewise non-attachment of good deeds (not at once when knowledge is\nreached), but on the death of the vidvan[19].'\n\nAdhik. XI (15).--The non-operation of works stated in the two preceding\nadhikara/n/as holds good only in the case of anarabdhakarya works, i.e.\nthose works which have not yet begun to produce their effects, while it\ndoes not extend to the arabdhakarya works on which the present existence\nof the devotee depends.\n\nAdhik. XII (16, 17).--From the rule enunciated in Adhik. X are excepted\nsuch sacrificial performances as are enjoined permanently (nitya): so,\nfor instance, the agnihotra, for they promote the origination of\nknowledge.\n\nAdhik. XIII (18).--The origination of knowledge is promoted also by such\nsacrificial works as are not accompanied with the knowledge of the\nupasanas referring to the different members of those works.\n\nAdhik. XIV (19).--The arabdhakarya works have to be worked out fully by\nthe fruition of their effects; whereupon the vidvan becomes united with\nBrahman.--The 'bhoga' of the Sutra is, according to /S/a@nkara,\nrestricted to the present existence of the devotee, since the complete\nknowledge obtained by him destroys the nescience which otherwise would\nlead to future embodiments. According to Ramanuja a number of embodied\nexistences may have to be gone through before the effects of the\narabdhakarya works are exhausted.\n\n\nPADA II.\n\n\nThis and the two remaining padas of the fourth adhyaya describe the fate\nof the vidvan after death. According to /S/a@nkara we have to\ndistinguish the vidvan who possesses the highest knowledge, viz. that he\nis one with the highest Brahman, and the vidvan who knows only the lower\nBrahman, and have to refer certain Sutras to the former and others to\nthe latter. According to Ramanuja the vidvan is one only.\n\nAdhik. I, II, III (1-6).--On the death of the vidvan (i.e. of him who\npossesses the lower knowledge, according to /S/a@nkara) his senses are\nmerged in the manas, the manas in the chief vital air (pra/n/a), the\nvital air in the individual soul (jiva), the soul in the subtle\nelements.--According to Ramanuja the combination (sampatti) of the\nsenses with the manas, &c. is a mere conjunction (sa/m/yoga), not a\nmerging (laya).\n\nAdhik. IV (7).--The vidvan (i.e. according to /S/a@nkara, he who\npossesses the lower knowledge) and the avidvan, i.e. he who does not\npossess any knowledge of Brahman, pass through the same stages (i.e.\nthose described hitherto) up to the entrance of the soul, together with\nthe subtle elements, and so on into the na/d/is.--The vidvan also\nremains connected with the subtle elements because he has not yet\ncompletely destroyed avidya, so that the immortality which Scripture\nascribes to him (am/ri/tatva/m/ hi vidvan abhya/s/nute) is only a\nrelative one.--Ramanuja quotes the following text regarding the\nimmortality of the vidvan:\n\n    'Yada sarve pramu/k/yante kama yessya h/ri/di sthita/h/ atha\n    martyosm/ri/to bhavaty atra brahma sama/s/nute,'\n\nand explains that the immortality which is here ascribed to the vidvan\nas soon as he abandons all desires can only mean the\ndestruction--mentioned in the preceding pada--of all the effects of good\nand evil works, while the 'reaching of Brahman' can only refer to the\nintuition of Brahman vouchsafed to the meditating devotee.\n\nAdhik. V (8-11) raises; according to /S/a@nkara, the question whether\nthe subtle elements of which Scripture says that they are combined with\nthe highest deity (teja/h/ parasya/m/ devatayam) are completely merged\nin the latter or not. The answer is that a complete absorption of the\nelements takes place only when final emancipation is reached; that, on\nthe other hand, as long as the sa/m/sara state lasts, the elements,\nalthough somehow combined with Brahman, remain distinct so as to be able\nto form new bodies for the soul.\n\nAccording to Ramanuja the Sutras 8-11 do not constitute a new\nadhikara/n/a, but continue the discussion of the point mooted in 7. The\nimmortality there spoken of does not imply the separation of the soul\nfrom the body, 'because Scripture declares sa/m/sara, i.e. embodiedness\nup to the reaching of Brahman' (tasya tavad eva /k/ira/m/ yavan na\nvimokshye atha sampatsye) (8).--That the soul after having departed from\nthe gross body is not disconnected from the subtle elements, is also\nproved hereby, that the subtle body accompanies it, as is observed from\nauthority[20] (9).--Hence the immortality referred to in the scriptural\npassage quoted is not effected by means of the total destruction of the\nbody (10).\n\nAdhik. VI (12-14) is of special importance.--According to /S/a@nkara the\nSutras now turn from the discussion of the departure of him who\npossesses the lower knowledge only to the consideration of what becomes\nof him who has reached the higher knowledge. So far it has been taught\nthat in the case of relative immortality (ensuing on the apara vidya)\nthe subtle elements, together with the senses and so on, depart from the\nbody of the dying devotee; this implies at the same time that they do\nnot depart from the body of the dying sage who knows himself to be one\nwith Brahman.--Against this latter implied doctrine Sutra 12 is supposed\nto formulate an objection. 'If it be said that the departure of the\npra/n/as from the body of the dying sage is denied (viz. in B/ri/. Up.\nIV, 4, 5, na tasya pra/n/a utkramanti, of him the pra/n/as do not pass\nout); we reply that in that passage the genitive \"tasya\" has the sense\nof the ablative \"tasmat,\" so that the sense of the passage is, \"from\nhim, i.e. from the jiva of the dying sage, the pra/n/as do not depart,\nbut remain with it.\"'--This objection /S/a@nkara supposes to be disposed\nof in Sutra 13. 'By some there is given a clear denial of the departure\nof the pra/n/as in the case of the dying sage,' viz. in the passage\nB/ri/. Up. III, 2, 11, where Yaj/n/avalkya instructs Artabhaga that,\nwhen this man dies, the pra/n/as do not depart from it (asmat; the\ncontext showing that asmat means 'from it,' viz. from the body, and not\n'from him,' viz. the jiva).--The same view is, moreover, confirmed by\nSm/ri/ti passages.\n\nAccording to Ramanuja the three Sutras forming /S/a@nkara's sixth\nadhikara/n/a do not constitute a new adhikara/n/a at all, and, moreover,\nhave to be combined into two Sutras. The topic continuing to be\ndiscussed is the utkranti of the vidvan. If, Sutra 12 says, the utkranti\nof the pra/n/as is not admitted, on the ground of the denial supposed to\nbe contained in B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 5; the reply is that the sense of the\ntasya there is '/s/arirat' (so that the passage means, 'from him, i.e.\nthe jiva, the pra/n/as do not depart'); for this is clearly shown by the\nreading of some, viz. the Madhyandinas, who, in their text of the\npassage, do not read 'tasya' but 'tasmat.'--With reference to the\ninstruction given by Yaj/n/avalkya to Artabhaga, it is to be remarked\nthat nothing there shows the 'ayam purusha' to be the sage who knows\nBrahman.--And, finally, there are Sm/ri/ti passages declaring that the\nsage also when dying departs from the body.\n\nAdhik. VII and VIII (15, 16) teach, according to /S/a@nkara, that, on\nthe death of him who possesses the higher knowledge, his pra/n/as,\nelements, &c. are merged in Brahman, so as to be no longer distinct from\nit in any way.\n\nAccording to Ramanuja the two Sutras continue the teaching about the\npra/n/as, bhutas, &c. of the vidvan in general, and declare that they\nare finally merged in Brahman, not merely in the way of conjunction\n(sa/m/yoga), but completely.[21]\n\nAdhik. IX (17).--/S/a@nkara here returns to the owner of the apara\nvidya, while Ramanuja continues the description of the utkranti of his\nvidvan.--The jiva of the dying man passes into the heart, and thence\ndeparts out of the body by means of the na/d/is; the vidvan by means of\nthe na/d/i called sushum/n/a, the avidvan by means of some other na/d/i.\n\nAdhik. X (18, 19).--The departing soul passes up to the sun by means of\na ray of light which exists at night as well as during day.\n\nAdhik. XI (20, 21).--Also that vidvan who dies during the dakshi/n/ayana\nreaches Brahman.\n\n\nPADA III.\n\n\nAdhik. I, II, III (1-3) reconcile the different accounts given in the\nUpanishads as to the stations of the way which leads the vidvan up to\nBrahman.\n\nAdhik. IV (4-6)--By the 'stations' we have, however, to understand not\nonly the subdivisions of the way but also the divine beings which lead\nthe soul on.\n\nThe remaining part of the pada is by /S/a@nkara divided into two\nadhikara/n/as. Of these the former one (7-14) teaches that the Brahman\nto which the departed soul is led by the guardians of the path of the\ngods is not the highest Brahman, but the effected (karya) or qualified\n(/s/agu/n/a) Brahman. This is the opinion propounded in Sutras 7-11 by\nBadari, and, finally, accepted by /S/a@nkara in his commentary on Sutra\n14. In Sutras 12-14 Jaimini defends the opposite view, according to\nwhich the soul of the vidvan goes to the highest Brahman, not to the\nkaryam brahma. But Jaimini's view, although set forth in the latter part\nof the adhikara/n/a, is, according to /S/a@nkara, a mere purvapaksha,\nwhile Badari's opinion represents the siddhanta.--The latter of the two\nadhikara/n/as (VI of the whole pada; 15, 16) records the opinion of\nBadaraya/n/a on a collateral question, viz. whether, or not, all those\nwho worship the effected Brahman are led to it. The decision is that\nthose only are guided to Brahman who have not worshipped it under a\npratika form.\n\nAccording to Ramanuja, Sutras 7-16 form one adhikara/n/a only, in which\nthe views of Badari and of Jaimini represent two purvapakshas, while\nBadaraya/n/a's opinion is adopted as the siddhanta. The question is\nwhether the guardians of the path lead to Brahman only those who worship\nthe effected Brahman, i.e. Hira/n/yagarbha, or those who worship the\nhighest Brahman, or those who worship the individual soul as free from\nPrak/ri/ti, and having Brahman for its Self (ye pratyagatmana/m/\nprak/ri/tiviyukta/m/ brahmatmakam upasate).--The first view is\nmaintained by Badari in Sutra 7, 'The guardians lead to Brahman those\nwho worship the effected Brahman, because going is possible towards the\nlatter only;' for no movement can take place towards the highest and as\nsuch omnipresent Brahman.--The explanation of Sutra 9 is similar to that\nof /S/a@nkara; but more clearly replies to the objection (that, if\nHira/n/yagarbha were meant in the passage, 'purusho /s/a manava/h/ sa\netan brahma gamayati,' the text would read 'sa etan brahma/n/am\ngamayati') that Hira/n/yagarbha is called Brahman on account of his\nnearness to Brahman, i.e. on account of his prathamajatva.--The\nexplanation of 10, 11 is essentially the same as in /S/a@nkara; so also\nof l2-l4.--The siddhanta view is established in Sutra 13, 'It is the\nopinion of Badaraya/n/a that it, i.e. the ga/n/a of the guardians, leads\nto Brahman those who do not take their stand on what is pratika, i.e.\nthose who worship the highest Brahman, and those who meditate on the\nindividual Self as dissociated from prak/ri/ti, and having Brahman for\nits Self, but not those who worship Brahman under pratikas. For both\nviews--that of Jaimini as well as that of Badari--are faulty.' The karya\nview contradicts such passages as 'asma/k/ charirat samutthaya para/m/\njyotir upasampadya,' &c.; the para view, such passages as that in the\npa/nk/agni-vidya, which declares that ya ittha/m/ vidu/h/, i.e. those\nwho know the pa/nk/agni-vidya, are also led up to Brahman.\n\n\nPADA IV.\n\n\nAdhik. I (1-3) returns, according to /S/a@nkara, to the owner of the\npara vidya, and teaches that, when on his death his soul obtains final\nrelease, it does not acquire any new characteristics, but merely\nmanifests itself in its true nature.--The explanation given by Ramanuja\nis essentially the same, but of course refers to that vidvan whose going\nto Brahman had been described in the preceding pada.\n\nAdhik. II (4) determines that the relation in which the released soul\nstands to Brahman is that of avibhaga, non-separation. This, on\n/S/a@nkara's view, means absolute non-separation, identity.--According\nto Ramanuja the question to be considered is whether the released soul\nviews itself as separate (p/ri/thagbhuta) from Brahman, or as\nnon-separate because being a mode of Brahman. The former view is\nfavoured by those /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti passages which speak of the soul\nas being with, or equal to, Brahman; the latter by, such passages as tat\ntvam asi and the like.[22]\n\nAdhik. III (5-7) discusses the characteristics of the released soul\n(i.e. of the truly released soul, according to /S/a@nkara). According to\nJaimini the released soul, when manifesting itself in its true nature,\npossesses all those qualities which in Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1 and other\nplaces are ascribed to Brahman, such as apahatapapmatva,\nsatyasa/m/kalpatva, &c., ai/s/varya.--According to Au/d/ulomi the only\ncharacteristic of the released soul is /k/aitanya.--According to\nBadarayana the two views can be combined (/S/a@nkara remarking that\nsatyasa/m/kalpatva, &c. are ascribed to the released soul\nvyavaharapekshaya).\n\nAdhik. IV (8-9) returns, according to /S/a@nkara, to the apara vidya,\nand discusses the question whether the soul of the pious effects its\ndesires by its mere determination, or uses some other means. The former\nalternative is accepted--According to Ramanuja the adhikara/n/a simply\ncontinues the consideration of the state of the released, begun in the\npreceding adhikara/n/a. Of the released soul it is said in Ch. Up. VIII,\n12, 3 that after it has manifested itself in its true nature it moves\nabout playing and rejoicing with women, carriages, and so on. The\nquestion then arises whether it effects all this by its mere sa/m/kalpa\n(it having been shown in the preceding adhikara/n/a that the released\nsoul is, like the Lord, satyasa/m/kalpa), or not. The answer is in\nfavour of the former alternative, on account of the explicit declaration\nmade in Ch. Up. VIII, 2, 'By his mere will the fathers come to receive\nhim.'\n\nAdhik. V (10-14) decides that the released are embodied or disembodied\naccording to their wish and will.\n\nAdhik. VI (11, 12) explains how the soul of the released can animate\nseveral bodies at the same time.--Sutra 12 gives, according to\n/S/a@nkara, the additional explanation that those passages which declare\nthe absence of all specific cognition on the part of the released soul\ndo not refer to the partly released soul of the devotee, but either to\nthe soul in the state of deep sleep (svapyaya = sushupti), or to the\nfully released soul of the sage (sampatti = kaivalya).--Ramanuja\nexplains that the passages speaking of absence of consciousness refer\neither to the state of deep sleep, or to the time of dying (sampatti =\nmata/n/am according to 'van manasi sampadyate,' &c.).\n\nAdhik. VII (17-21).--The released jivas participate in all the\nperfections and powers of the Lord, with the exception of the power of\ncreating and sustaining the world. They do not return to new forms of\nembodied existence.\n\nAfter having, in this way, rendered ourselves acquainted with the\ncontents of the Brahma-sutras according to the views of /S/a@nkara as\nwell as Ramanuja, we have now to consider the question which of the two\nmodes of interpretation represents--or at any rate more closely\napproximates to the true meaning of the Sutras. That few of the Sutras\nare intelligible if taken by themselves, we have already remarked above;\nbut this does not exclude the possibility of our deciding with a fair\ndegree of certainty which of the two interpretations proposed agrees\nbetter with the text, at least in a certain number of cases.\n\nWe have to note in the first place that, in spite of very numerous\ndiscrepancies,--of which only the more important ones have been singled\nout in the conspectus of contents,--the two commentators are at one as\nto the general drift of the Sutras and the arrangement of topics. As a\nrule, the adhikara/n/as discuss one or several Vedic passages bearing\nupon a certain point of the system, and in the vast majority of cases\nthe two commentators agree as to which are the special texts referred\nto. And, moreover, in a very large number of cases the agreement extends\nto the interpretation to be put on those passages and on the Sutras.\nThis far-reaching agreement certainly tends to inspire us with a certain\nconfidence as to the existence of an old tradition concerning the\nmeaning of the Sutras on which the bulk of the interpretations of\n/S/a@nkara as well as of Ramanuja are based.\n\nBut at the same time we have seen that, in a not inconsiderable number\nof cases, the interpretations of /S/a@nkara and Ramanuja diverge more or\nless widely, and that the Sutras affected thereby are, most of them,\nespecially important because bearing on fundamental points of the\nVedanta system. The question then remains which of the two\ninterpretations is entitled to preference.\n\nRegarding a small number of Sutras I have already (in the conspectus of\ncontents) given it as my opinion that Ramanuja's explanation appears to\nbe more worthy of consideration. We meet, in the first place, with a\nnumber of cases in which the two commentators agree as to the literal\nmeaning of a Sutra, but where /S/a@nkara sees himself reduced to the\nnecessity of supplementing his interpretation by certain additions and\nreservations of his own for which the text gives no occasion, while\nRamanuja is able to take the Sutra as it stands. To exemplify this\nremark, I again direct attention to all those Sutras which in clear\nterms represent the individual soul as something different from the\nhighest soul, and concerning which /S/a@nkara is each time obliged to\nhave recourse to the plea of the Sutra referring, not to what is true in\nthe strict sense of the word, but only to what is conventionally looked\nupon as true. It is, I admit, not altogether impossible that\n/S/a@nkara's interpretation should represent the real meaning of the\nSutras; that the latter, indeed, to use the terms employed by Dr.\nDeussen, should for the nonce set forth an exoteric doctrine adapted to\nthe common notions of mankind, which, however, can be rightly understood\nby him only to whose mind the esoteric doctrine is all the while\npresent. This is not impossible, I say; but it is a point which requires\nconvincing proofs before it can be allowed.--We have had, in the second\nplace, to note a certain number of adhikara/n/as and Sutras concerning\nwhose interpretation /S/a@nkara and Ramanuja disagree altogether; and we\nhave seen that not unfrequently the explanations given by the latter\ncommentator appear to be preferable because falling in more easily with\nthe words of the text. The most striking instance of this is afforded by\nthe 13th adhikara/n/a of II, 3, which treats of the size of the jiva,\nand where Ramanuja's explanation seems to be decidedly superior to\n/S/a@nkara's, both if we look to the arrangement of the whole\nadhikara/n/a and to the wording of the single Sutras. The adhikara/n/a\nis, moreover, a specially important one, because the nature of the view\nheld as to the size of the individual soul goes far to settle the\nquestion what kind of Vedanta is embodied in Badaraya/n/a's work.\n\nBut it will be requisite not only to dwell on the interpretations of a\nfew detached Sutras, but to make the attempt at least of forming some\nopinion as to the relation of the Vedanta-sutras as a whole to the chief\ndistinguishing doctrines of /S/a@nkara as well as Ramanuja. Such an\nattempt may possibly lead to very slender positive results; but in the\npresent state of the enquiry even a merely negative result, viz. the\nconclusion that the Sutras do not teach particular doctrines found in\nthem by certain commentators, will not be without its value.\n\nThe first question we wish to consider in some detail is whether the\nSutras in any way favour /S/a@nkara's doctrine that we have to\ndistinguish a twofold knowledge of Brahman, a higher knowledge which\nleads to the immediate absorption, on death, of the individual soul in\nBrahman, and a lower knowledge which raises its owner merely to an\nexalted form of individual existence. The adhyaya first to be considered\nin this connexion is the fourth one. According to /S/a@nkara the three\nlatter padas of that adhyaya are chiefly engaged in describing the fate\nof him who dies in the possession of the lower knowledge, while two\nsections (IV, 2, 12-14; IV, 4, 1-7) tell us what happens to him who,\nbefore his death, had risen to the knowledge of the highest Brahman.\nAccording to Ramanuja, on the other hand, the three padas, referring\nthroughout to one subject only, give an uninterrupted account of the\nsuccessive steps by which the soul of him who knows the Lord through the\nUpanishads passes, at the time of death, out of the gross body which it\nhad tenanted, ascends to the world of Brahman, and lives there for ever\nwithout returning into the sa/m/sara.\n\nOn an a priori view of the matter it certainly appears somewhat strange\nthat the concluding section of the Sutras should be almost entirely\ntaken up with describing the fate of him who has after all acquired an\naltogether inferior knowledge only, and has remained shut out from the\ntrue sanctuary of Vedantic knowledge, while the fate of the fully\ninitiated is disposed of in a few occasional Sutras. It is, I think, not\ntoo much to say that no unbiassed student of the Sutras would--before\nhaving allowed himself to be influenced by /S/a@nkara's\ninterpretations--imagine for a moment that the solemn words, 'From\nthence is no return, from thence is no return,' with which the Sutras\nconclude, are meant to describe, not the lasting condition of him who\nhas reached final release, the highest aim of man, but merely a stage on\nthe way of that soul which is engaged in the slow progress of gradual\nrelease, a stage which is indeed greatly superior to any earthly form of\nexistence, but yet itself belongs to the essentially fictitious\nsa/m/sara, and as such remains infinitely below the bliss of true mukti.\nAnd this a priori impression--which, although no doubt significant,\ncould hardly be appealed to as decisive--is confirmed by a detailed\nconsideration of the two sets of Sutras which /S/a@nkara connects with\nthe knowledge of the higher Brahman. How these Sutras are interpreted by\n/S/a@nkara and Ramanuja has been stated above in the conspectus of\ncontents; the points which render the interpretation given by Ramanuja\nmore probable are as follows. With regard to IV, 2, 12-14, we have to\nnote, in the first place, the circumstance--relevant although not\ndecisive in itself--that Sutra 12 does not contain any indication of a\nnew topic being introduced. In the second place, it can hardly be\ndoubted that the text of Sutra 13, 'spash/t/o hy ekesham,' is more\nappropriately understood, with Ramanuja, as furnishing a reason for the\nopinion advanced in the preceding Sutra, than--with /S/a@nkara--as\nembodying the refutation of a previous statement (in which latter case\nwe should expect not 'hi' but 'tu'). And, in the third place, the 'eke,'\ni.e. 'some,' referred to in Sutra 13 would, on /S/a@nkara's\ninterpretation, denote the very same persons to whom the preceding Sutra\nhad referred, viz. the followers of the Ka/n/va-/s/akha (the two Vedic\npassages referred to in 12 and 13 being B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 5, and III, 2,\n11, according to the Ka/n/va recension); while it is the standing\npractice of the Sutras to introduce, by means of the designation 'eke,'\nmembers of Vedic /s/akhas, teachers, &c. other than those alluded to in\nthe preceding Sutras. With this practice Ramanuja's interpretation, on\nthe other hand, fully agrees; for, according to him, the 'eke' are the\nMadhyandinas, whose reading in B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 5, viz. 'tasmat,'\nclearly indicates that the 'tasya' in the corresponding passage of the\nKa/n/vas denotes the /s/arira, i.e. the jiva. I think it is not saying\ntoo much that /S/a@nkara's explanation, according to which the 'eke'\nwould denote the very same Ka/n/vas to whom the preceding Sutra had\nreferred--so that the Ka/n/vas would be distinguished from themselves as\nit were--is altogether impossible.\n\nThe result of this closer consideration of the first set of Sutras,\nalleged by /S/a@nkara to concern the owner of the higher knowledge of\nBrahman, entitles us to view with some distrust /S/a@nkara's assertion\nthat another set also--IV, 4, 1-7--has to be detached from the general\ntopic of the fourth adhyaya, and to be understood as depicting the\ncondition of those who have obtained final absolute release. And the\nSutras themselves do not tend to weaken this preliminary want of\nconfidence. In the first place their wording also gives no indication\nwhatever of their having to be separated from what precedes as well as\nwhat follows. And, in the second place, the last Sutra of the set (7)\nobliges /S/a@nkara to ascribe to his truly released souls qualities\nwhich clearly cannot belong to them; so that he finally is obliged to\nmake the extraordinary statement that those qualities belong to them\n'vyavaharapekshaya,' while yet the purport of the whole adhikara/n/a is\nsaid to be the description of the truly released soul for which no\nvyavahara exists! Very truly /S/a@nkara's commentator here remarks,\n'atra ke/k/in muhyanti akha/n/da/k/inmatrajanan muktasyajnanabhavat kuta\naj/n/anika-dharmayoga/h/,' and the way in which thereupon he himself\nattempts to get over the difficulty certainly does not improve matters.\n\nIn connexion with the two passages discussed, we meet in the fourth\nadhyaya with another passage, which indeed has no direct bearing on the\ndistinction of apara and para vidya, but may yet be shortly referred to\nin this place as another and altogether undoubted instance of\n/S/a@nkara's interpretations not always agreeing with the text of the\nSutras. The Sutras 7-16 of the third pada state the opinions of three\ndifferent teachers on the question to which Brahman the soul of the\nvidvan repairs on death, or--according to Ramanuja--the worshippers of\nwhich Brahman repair to (the highest) Brahman. Ramanuja treats the views\nof Badari and Jaimini as two purvapakshas, and the opinion of\nBadaraya/n/a--which is stated last--as the siddhanta. /S/a@nkara, on the\nother hand, detaching the Sutras in which Badaraya/n/a's view is set\nforth from the preceding part of the adhikara/n/a (a proceeding which,\nalthough not plausible, yet cannot be said to be altogether\nillegitimate), maintains that Badari's view, which is expounded first,\nrepresents the siddhanta, while Jaimini's view, set forth subsequently,\nis to be considered a mere purvapaksha. This, of course, is altogether\ninadmissible, it being the invariable practice of the Vedanta-sutras as\nwell as the Purva Mima/m/sa-sutras to conclude the discussion of\ncontested points with the statement of that view which is to be accepted\nas the authoritative one. This is so patent that /S/a@nkara feels\nhimself called upon to defend his deviation from the general rule\n(Commentary on IV, 4, 13), without, however, bringing forward any\narguments but such as are valid only if /S/a@nkara's system itself is\nalready accepted.\n\nThe previous considerations leave us, I am inclined to think, no choice\nbut to side with Ramanuja as to the general subject-matter of the fourth\nadhyaya of the Sutras. We need not accept him as our guide in all\nparticular interpretations, but we must acknowledge with him that the\nSutras of the fourth adhyaya describe the ultimate fate of one and the\nsame vidvan, and do not afford any basis for the distinction of a higher\nand lower knowledge of Brahman in /S/a@nkara's sense.\n\nIf we have not to discriminate between a lower and a higher knowledge of\nBrahman, it follows that the distinction of a lower and a higher Brahman\nis likewise not valid. But this is not a point to be decided at once on\nthe negative evidence of the fourth adhyaya, but regarding which the\nentire body of the Vedanta-sutras has to be consulted. And intimately\nconnected with this investigation--in fact, one with it from a certain\npoint of view--is the question whether the Sutras afford any evidence of\ntheir author having held the doctrine of Maya, the principle of\nillusion, by the association with which the highest Brahman, in itself\ntranscending all qualities, appears as the lower Brahman or I/s/vara.\nThat Ramanuja denies the distinction of the two Brahmans and the\ndoctrine of Maya we have seen above; we shall, however, in the\nsubsequent investigation, pay less attention to his views and\ninterpretations than to the indications furnished by the Sutras\nthemselves.\n\nPlacing myself at the point of view of a /S/a@nkara, I am startled at\nthe outset by the second Sutra of the first adhyaya, which undertakes to\ngive a definition of Brahman. 'Brahman is that whence the origination\nand so on (i.e. the sustentation and reabsorption) of this world\nproceed.' What, we must ask, is this Sutra meant to define?--That\nBrahman, we are inclined to answer, whose cognition the first Sutra\ndeclares to constitute the task of the entire Vedanta; that Brahman\nwhose cognition is the only road to final release; that Brahman in fact\nwhich /S/a@nkara calls the highest.--But, here we must object to\nourselves, the highest Brahman is not properly defined as that from\nwhich the world originates. In later Vedantic writings, whose authors\nwere clearly conscious of the distinction of the higher absolute Brahman\nand the lower Brahman related to Maya or the world, we meet with\ndefinitions of Brahman of an altogether different type. I need only\nremind the reader of the current definition of Brahman as\nsa/k/-/k/id-ananda, or, to mention one individual instance, refer to the\nintroductory /s/lokas of the Pa/nk/ada/s/i dilating on the sa/m/vid\nsvayam-prabha, the self-luminous principle of thought which in all time,\npast or future, neither starts into being nor perishes (P.D. I, 7).\n'That from which the world proceeds' can by a /S/a@nkara be accepted\nonly as a definition of I/s/vara, of Brahman which by its association\nwith Maya is enabled to project the false appearance of this world, and\nit certainly is as improbable that the Sutras should open with a\ndefinition of that inferior principle, from whose cognition there can\naccrue no permanent benefit, as, according to a remark made above, it is\nunlikely that they should conclude with a description of the state of\nthose who know the lower Brahman only, and thus are debarred from\nobtaining true release. As soon, on the other hand, as we discard the\nidea of a twofold Brahman and conceive Brahman as one only, as the\nall-enfolding being which sometimes emits the world from its own\nsubstance and sometimes again retracts it into itself, ever remaining\none in all its various manifestations--a conception which need not by\nany means be modelled in all its details on the views of the\nRamanujas--the definition of Brahman given in the second Sutra becomes\naltogether unobjectionable.\n\nWe next enquire whether the impression left on the mind by the manner in\nwhich Badaraya/n/a defines Brahman, viz. that he does not distinguish\nbetween an absolute Brahman and a Brahman associated with Maya, is\nconfirmed or weakened by any other parts of his work. The Sutras being\nthroughout far from direct in their enunciations, we shall have to look\nless to particular terms and turns of expression than to general lines\nof reasoning. What in this connexion seems specially worthy of being\ntaken into account, is the style of argumentation employed by the\nSutrakara against the Sa@nkhya doctrine, which maintains that the world\nhas originated, not from an intelligent being, but from the\nnon-intelligent pradhana. The most important Sutras relative to this\npoint are to be met with in the first pada of the second adhyaya. Those\nSutras are indeed almost unintelligible if taken by themselves, but the\nunanimity of the commentators as to their meaning enables us to use them\nas steps in our investigation. The sixth Sutra of the pada mentioned\nreplies to the Sa@nkhya objection that the non-intelligent world cannot\nspring from an intelligent principle, by the remark that 'it is thus\nseen,' i.e. it is a matter of common observation that non-intelligent\nthings are produced from beings endowed with intelligence; hair and\nnails, for instance, springing from animals, and certain insects from\ndung.--Now, an argumentation of this kind is altogether out of place\nfrom the point of view of the true /S/a@nkara. According to the latter\nthe non-intelligent world does not spring from Brahman in so far as the\nlatter is intelligence, but in so far as it is associated with Maya.\nMaya is the upadana of the material world, and Maya itself is of a\nnon-intelligent nature, owing to which it is by so many Vedantic writers\nidentified with the prak/ri/ti of the Sa@nkhyas. Similarly the\nillustrative instances, adduced under Sutra 9 for the purpose of showing\nthat effects when being reabsorbed into their causal substances do not\nimpart to the latter their own qualities, and that hence the material\nworld also, when being refunded into Brahman, does not impart to it its\nown imperfections, are singularly inappropriate if viewed in connexion\nwith the doctrine of Maya, according to which the material world is no\nmore in Brahman at the time of a pralaya than during the period of its\nsubsistence. According to /S/a@nkara the world is not merged in Brahman,\nbut the special forms into which the upadana of the world, i.e. Maya,\nhad modified itself are merged in non-distinct Maya, whose relation to\nBrahman is not changed thereby.--The illustration, again, given in Sutra\n24 of the mode in which Brahman, by means of its inherent power,\ntransforms itself into the world without employing any extraneous\ninstruments of action, 'kshiravad dhi,' 'as milk (of its own accord\nturns into curds),' would be strangely chosen indeed if meant to bring\nnearer to our understanding the mode in which Brahman projects the\nillusive appearance of the world; and also the analogous instance given\nin the Sutra next following, 'as Gods and the like (create palaces,\nchariots, &c. by the mere power of their will)'--which refers to the\nreal creation of real things--would hardly be in its place if meant to\nillustrate a theory which considers unreality to be the true character\nof the world. The mere cumulation of the two essentially heterogeneous\nillustrative instances (kshiravad dhi; devadivat), moreover, seems to\nshow that the writer who had recourse to them held no very definite\ntheory as to the particular mode in which the world springs from\nBrahman, but was merely concerned to render plausible in some way or\nother that an intelligent being can give rise to what is non-intelligent\nwithout having recourse to any extraneous means.[23]\n\nThat the Maya doctrine was not present to the mind of the Sutrakara,\nfurther appears from the latter part of the fourth pada of the first\nadhyaya, where it is shown that Brahman is not only the operative but\nalso the material cause of the world. If anywhere, there would have been\nthe place to indicate, had such been the author's view, that Brahman is\nthe material cause of the world through Maya only, and that the world is\nunreal; but the Sutras do not contain a single word to that effect.\nSutra 26, on the other hand, exhibits the significant term\n'pari/n/amat;' Brahman produces the world by means of a modification of\nitself. It is well known that later on, when the terminology of the\nVedanta became definitely settled, the term 'pari/n/avada' was used to\ndenote that very theory to which the followers of /S/a@nkara are most\nviolently opposed, viz. the doctrine according to which the world is not\na mere vivarta, i.e. an illusory manifestation of Brahman, but the\neffect of Brahman undergoing a real change, may that change be conceived\nto take place in the way taught by Ramanuja or in some other\nmanner.--With regard to the last-quoted Sutra, as well as to those\ntouched upon above, the commentators indeed maintain that whatever terms\nand modes of expression are apparently opposed to the vivartavada are in\nreality reconcilable with it; to Sutra 26, for instance, Govindananda\nremarks that the term 'pari/n/ama' only denotes an effect in general\n(karyamatra), without implying that the effect is real. But in cases of\nthis nature we are fully entitled to use our own judgment, even if we\nwere not compelled to do so by the fact that other commentators, such as\nRamanuja, are satisfied to take 'pari/n/ama' and similar terms in their\ngenerally received sense.\n\nA further section treating of the nature of Brahman is met with in III,\n2, 11 ff. It is, according to /S/a@nkara's view, of special importance,\nas it is alleged to set forth that Brahman is in itself destitute of all\nqualities, and is affected with qualities only through its limiting\nadjuncts (upadhis), the offspring of Maya. I have above (in the\nconspectus of contents) given a somewhat detailed abstract of the whole\nsection as interpreted by /S/a@nkara on the one hand, and Ramanuja on\nthe other hand, from which it appears that the latter's opinion as to\nthe purport of the group of Sutras widely diverges from that of\n/S/a@nkara. The wording of the Sutras is so eminently concise and vague\nthat I find it impossible to decide which of the two commentators--if\nindeed either--is to be accepted as a trustworthy guide; regarding the\nsense of some Sutras /S/a@nkara's explanation seems to deserve\npreference, in the case of others Ramanuja seems to keep closer to the\ntext. I decidedly prefer, for instance, Ramanuja's interpretation of\nSutra 22, as far as the sense of the entire Sutra is concerned, and more\nespecially with regard to the term 'prak/ri/taitavattvam,' whose proper\nforce is brought out by Ramanuja's explanation only. So much is certain\nthat none of the Sutras decidedly favours the interpretation proposed by\n/S/a@nkara. Whichever commentator we follow, we greatly miss coherence\nand strictness of reasoning, and it is thus by no means improbable that\nthe section is one of those--perhaps not few in number--in which both\ninterpreters had less regard to the literal sense of the words and to\ntradition than to their desire of forcing Badaraya/n/a's Sutras to bear\ntestimony to the truth of their own philosophic theories.\n\nWith special reference to the Maya doctrine one important Sutra has yet\nto be considered, the only one in which the term 'maya' itself occurs,\nviz. III, 2, 3. According to /S/a@nkara the Sutra signifies that the\nenvironments of the dreaming soul are not real but mere Maya, i.e.\nunsubstantial illusion, because they do not fully manifest the character\nof real objects. Ramanuja (as we have seen in the conspectus) gives a\ndifferent explanation of the term 'maya,' but in judging of /S/a@nkara's\nviews we may for the time accept /S/a@nkara's own interpretation. Now,\nfrom the latter it clearly follows that if the objects seen in dreams\nare to be called Maya, i.e. illusion, because not evincing the\ncharacteristics of reality, the objective world surrounding the waking\nsoul must not be called Maya. But that the world perceived by waking men\nis Maya, even in a higher sense than the world presented to the dreaming\nconsciousness, is an undoubted tenet of the /S/a@nkara Vedanta; and the\nSutra therefore proves either that Badaraya/n/a did not hold the\ndoctrine of the illusory character of the world, or else that, if after\nall he did hold that doctrine, he used the term 'maya' in a sense\naltogether different from that in which /S/a@nkara employs it.--If, on\nthe other hand, we, with Ramanuja, understand the word 'maya' to denote\na wonderful thing, the Sutra of course has no bearing whatever on the\ndoctrine of Maya in its later technical sense.\n\nWe now turn to the question as to the relation of the individual soul to\nBrahman. Do the Sutras indicate anywhere that their author held\n/S/a@nkara's doctrine, according to which the jiva is in reality\nidentical with Brahman, and separated from it, as it were, only by a\nfalse surmise due to avidya, or do they rather favour the view that the\nsouls, although they have sprung from Brahman, and constitute elements\nof its nature, yet enjoy a kind of individual existence apart from it?\nThis question is in fact only another aspect of the Maya question, but\nyet requires a short separate treatment.\n\nIn the conspectus I have given it as my opinion that the Sutras in which\nthe size of the individual soul is discussed can hardly be understood in\n/S/a@nkara's sense, and rather seem to favour the opinion, held among\nothers by Ramanuja, that the soul is of minute size. We have further\nseen that Sutra 18 of the third pada of the second adhyaya, which\ndescribes the soul as 'j/n/a,' is more appropriately understood in the\nsense assigned to it by Ramanuja; and, again, that the Sutras which\ntreat of the soul being an agent, can be reconciled with /S/a@nkara's\nviews only if supplemented in a way which their text does not appear to\nauthorise.--We next have the important Sutra II, 3, 43 in which the soul\nis distinctly said to be a part (a/ms/a) of Brahman, and which, as we\nhave already noticed, can be made to fall in with /S/a@nkara's views\nonly if a/ms/a is explained, altogether arbitrarily, by 'a/ms/a iva,'\nwhile Ramanuja is able to take the Sutra as it stands.--We also have\nalready referred to Sutra 50, 'abhasa eva /k/a,' which /S/a@nkara\ninterprets as setting forth the so-called pratibimbavada according to\nwhich the individual Self is merely a reflection of the highest Self.\nBut almost every Sutra--and Sutra 50 forms no exception--being so\nobscurely expressed, that viewed by itself it admits of various, often\ntotally opposed, interpretations, the only safe method is to keep in\nview, in the case of each ambiguous aphorism, the general drift and\nspirit of the whole work, and that, as we have seen hitherto, is by no\nmeans favourable to the pratibimba doctrine. How indeed could Sutra 50,\nif setting forth that latter doctrine, be reconciled with Sutra 43,\nwhich says distinctly that the soul is a part of Brahman? For that 43\ncontains, as /S/a@nkara and his commentators aver, a statement of the\nava/kkh/edavada, can itself be accepted only if we interpret a/ms/a by\na/ms/a iva, and to do so there is really no valid reason whatever. I\nconfess that Ramanuja's interpretation of the Sutra (which however is\naccepted by several other commentators also) does not appear to me\nparticularly convincing; and the Sutras unfortunately offer us no other\npassages on the ground of which we might settle the meaning to be\nascribed to the term abhasa, which may mean 'reflection,' but may mean\nhetvabhasa, i.e. fallacious argument, as well. But as things stand, this\none Sutra cannot, at any rate, be appealed to as proving that the\npratibimbavada which, in its turn, presupposes the mayavada, is the\nteaching of the Sutras.\n\nTo the conclusion that the Sutrakara did not hold the doctrine of the\nabsolute identity of the highest and the individual soul in the sense of\n/S/a@nkara, we are further led by some other indications to be met with\nhere and there in the Sutras. In the conspectus of contents we have had\noccasion to direct attention to the important Sutra II, 1, 22, which\ndistinctly enunciates that the Lord is adhika, i.e. additional to, or\ndifferent from, the individual soul, since Scripture declares the two to\nbe different. Analogously I, 2, 20 lays stress on the fact that the\n/s/arira is not the antaryamin, because the Madhyandinas, as well as the\nKa/n/vas, speak of him in their texts as different (bhedena enam\nadhiyate), and in 22 the /s/arira and the pradhana are referred to as\nthe two 'others' (itarau) of whom the text predicates distinctive\nattributes separating them from the highest Lord. The word 'itara' (the\nother one) appears in several other passages (I, 1, 16; I, 3, 16; II, 1,\n21) as a kind of technical term denoting the individual soul in\ncontradistinction from the Lord. The /S/a@nkaras indeed maintain that\nall those passages refer to an unreal distinction due to avidya. But\nthis is just what we should like to see proved, and the proof offered in\nno case amounts to more than a reference to the system which demands\nthat the Sutras should be thus understood. If we accept the\ninterpretations of the school of /S/a@nkara, it remains altogether\nunintelligible why the Sutrakara should never hint even at what\n/S/a@nkara is anxious again and again to point out at length, viz. that\nthe greater part of the work contains a kind of exoteric doctrine only,\never tending to mislead the student who does not keep in view what its\nnature is. If other reasons should make it probable that the Sutrakara\nwas anxious to hide the true doctrine of the Upanishads as a sort of\nesoteric teaching, we might be more ready to accept /S/a@nkara's mode of\ninterpretation. But no such reasons are forthcoming; nowhere among the\navowed followers of the /S/a@nkara system is there any tendency to treat\nthe kernel of their philosophy as something to be jealously guarded and\nhidden. On the contrary, they all, from Gau/d/apada down to the most\nmodern writer, consider it their most important, nay, only task to\ninculcate again and again in the clearest and most unambiguous language\nthat all appearance of multiplicity is a vain illusion, that the Lord\nand the individual souls are in reality one, and that all knowledge but\nthis one knowledge is without true value.\n\nThere remains one more important passage concerning the relation of the\nindividual soul to the highest Self, a passage which attracted our\nattention above, when we were reviewing the evidence for early\ndivergence of opinion among the teachers of the Vedanta. I mean I, 4,\n20-22, which three Sutras state the views of A/s/marathya, Au/d/ulomi,\nand Ka/s/akr/ri/tsna as to the reason why, in a certain passage of the\nB/ri/hadara/n/yaka, characteristics of the individual soul are ascribed\nto the highest Self. The siddhanta view is enounced in Sutra 22,\n'avasthiter iti Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna/h/' i.e. Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna (accounts for\nthe circumstance mentioned) on the ground of the 'permanent abiding or\nabode.' By this 'permanent abiding' /S/a@nkara understands the Lord's\nabiding as, i.e. existing as--or in the condition of--the individual\nsoul, and thus sees in the Sutra an enunciation of his own view that the\nindividual soul is nothing but the highest Self, 'avik/ri/ta/h/\nparame/s/varo jivo nanya/h/.' Ramanuja on the other hand, likewise\naccepting Ka/saak/ri/tsna's opinion as the siddhanta view, explains\n'avasthiti' as the Lord's permanent abiding within the individual soul,\nas described in the antaryamin-brahma/n/a.--We can hardly maintain that\nthe term 'avasthiti' cannot have the meaning ascribed to it by\nSa@/n/kara, viz. special state or condition, but so much must be urged\nin favour of Ramanuja's interpretation that in the five other places\nwhere avasthiti (or anavasthiti) is met with in the Sutras (I, 2, 17;\nII, 2, 4; II, 2, 13; II, 3, 24; III, 3, 32) it regularly means permanent\nabiding or permanent abode within something.\n\nIf, now, I am shortly to sum up the results of the preceding enquiry as\nto the teaching of the Sutras, I must give it as my opinion that they do\nnot set forth the distinction of a higher and lower knowledge of\nBrahman; that they do not acknowledge the distinction of Brahman and\nI/s/vara in /S/a@nkara's sense; that they do not hold the doctrine of\nthe unreality of the world; and that they do not, with /S/a@nkara,\nproclaim the absolute identity of the individual and the highest Self. I\ndo not wish to advance for the present beyond these negative results.\nUpon Ramanuja's mode of interpretation--although I accept it without\nreserve in some important details--I look on the whole as more useful in\nproviding us with a powerful means of criticising /S/a@nkara's\nexplanations than in guiding us throughout to the right understanding of\nthe text. The author of the Sutras may have held views about the nature\nof Brahman, the world, and the soul differing from those of /S/a@nkara,\nand yet not agreeing in all points with those of Ramanuja. If, however,\nthe negative conclusions stated above should be well founded, it would\nfollow even from them that the system of Badaraya/n/a had greater\naffinities with that of the Bhagavatas and Ramanuja than with the one of\nwhich the /S/a@nkara-bhashya is the classical exponent.\n\nIt appears from the above review of the teaching of the Sutras that only\na comparatively very small proportion of them contribute matter enabling\nus to form a judgment as to the nature of the philosophical doctrine\nadvocated by Badaraya/n/a. The reason of this is that the greater part\nof the work is taken up with matters which, according to /S/a@nkara's\nterminology, form part of the so-called lower knowledge, and throw no\nlight upon philosophical questions in the stricter sense of the word.\nThis circumstance is not without significance. In later works belonging\nto /S/a@nkara's school in which the distinction of a higher and lower\nvidya is clearly recognised, the topics constituting the latter are\ntreated with great shortness; and rightly so, for they are unable to\naccomplish the highest aim of man, i.e. final release. When we\ntherefore, on the other hand, find that the subjects of the so-called\nlower vidya are treated very fully in the Vedanta-sutras, when we\nobserve, for instance, the almost tedious length to which the\ninvestigation of the unity of vidyas (most of which are so-called\nsagu/n/a, i.e. lower vidyas) is carried in the third adhyaya, or the\nfact of almost the whole fourth adhyaya being devoted to the ultimate\nfate of the possessor of the lower vidya; we certainly feel ourselves\nconfirmed in our conclusion that what /S/a@nkara looked upon as\ncomparatively unimportant formed in Badaraya/n/a's opinion part of that\nknowledge higher than which there is none, and which therefore is\nentitled to the fullest and most detailed exposition.\n\nThe question as to what kind of system is represented by the\nVedanta-sutras may be approached in another way also. While hitherto we\nhave attempted to penetrate to the meaning of the Sutras by means of the\ndifferent commentaries, we might try the opposite road, and, in the\nfirst place, attempt to ascertain independently of the Sutras what\ndoctrine is set forth in the Upanishads, whose teaching the Sutras\ndoubtless aim at systematising. If, it might be urged, the Upanishads\ncan be convincingly shown to embody a certain settled doctrine, we must\nconsider it at the least highly probable that that very same\ndoctrine--of whatever special nature it may be--is hidden in the\nenigmatical aphorisms of Badaraya/n/a.[24]\n\nI do not, however, consider this line of argumentation a safe one. Even\nif it could be shown that the teaching of all the chief Upanishads\nagrees in all essential points (a subject to which some attention will\nbe paid later on), we should not on that account be entitled\nunhesitatingly to assume that the Sutras set forth the same doctrine.\nWhatever the true philosophy of the Upanishads may be, there remains the\nundeniable fact that there exist and have existed since very ancient\ntimes not one but several essentially differing systems, all of which\nlay claim to the distinction of being the true representatives of the\nteaching of the Upanishads as well as of the Sutras. Let us suppose, for\nargument's sake, that, for instance, the doctrine of Maya is distinctly\nenunciated in the Upanishads; nevertheless Ramanuja and, for all we know\nto the contrary, the whole series of more ancient commentators on whom\nhe looked as authorities in the interpretation of the Sutras, denied\nthat the Upanishads teach Maya, and it is hence by no means impossible\nthat Badaraya/n/a should have done the same. The a priori style of\nreasoning as to the teaching of the Sutras is therefore without much\nforce.\n\nBut apart from any intention of arriving thereby at the meaning of the\nSutras there, of course, remains for us the all-important question as to\nthe true teaching of the Upanishads, a question which a translator of\nthe Sutras and /S/a@nkara cannot afford to pass over in silence,\nespecially after reason has been shown for the conclusion that the\nSutras and the /S/a@nkara-bhashya do not agree concerning most important\npoints of Vedantic doctrine. The Sutras as well as the later\ncommentaries claim, in the first place, to be nothing more than\nsystematisations of the Upanishads, and for us a considerable part at\nleast of their value and interest lies in this their nature. Hence the\nfurther question presents itself by whom the teaching of the Upanishads\nhas been most adequately systematised, whether by Badaraya/n/a, or\n/S/a@nkara, or Ramanuja, or some other commentator. This question\nrequires to be kept altogether separate from the enquiry as to which\ncommentator most faithfully renders the contents of the Sutras, and it\nis by no means impossible that /S/a@nkara, for instance, should in the\nend have to be declared a more trustworthy guide with regard to the\nteaching of the Upanishads than concerning the meaning of the Sutras.\n\nWe must remark here at once that, whatever commentator may be found to\ndeserve preference on the whole, it appears fairly certain already at\nthe outset that none of the systems which Indian ingenuity has succeeded\nin erecting on the basis of the Upanishads can be accepted in its\nentirety. The reason for this lies in the nature of the Upanishads\nthemselves. To the Hindu commentator and philosopher the Upanishads came\ndown as a body of revealed truth whose teaching had, somehow or other,\nto be shown to be thoroughly consistent and free from contradictions; a\nsystem had to be devised in which a suitable place could be allotted to\nevery one of the multitudinous statements which they make on the various\npoints of Vedantic doctrine. But to the European scholar, or in fact to\nany one whose mind is not bound by the doctrine of /S/ruti, it will\ncertainly appear that all such attempts stand self-condemned. If\nanything is evident even on a cursory review of the Upanishads--and the\nimpression so created is only strengthened by a more careful\ninvestigation--it is that they do not constitute a systematic whole.\nThey themselves, especially the older ones, give the most unmistakable\nindications on that point. Not only are the doctrines expounded in the\ndifferent Upanishads ascribed to different teachers, but even the\nseparate sections of one and the same Upanishad are assigned to\ndifferent authorities. It would be superfluous to quote examples of what\na mere look at the Chandogya Upanishad, for instance, suffices to prove.\nIt is of course not impossible that even a multitude of teachers should\nagree in imparting precisely the same doctrine; but in the case of the\nUpanishads that is certainly not antecedently probable. For, in the\nfirst place, the teachers who are credited with the doctrines of the\nUpanishads manifestly belonged to different sections of Brahminical\nsociety, to different Vedic /s/akhas; nay, some of them the tradition\nmakes out to have been kshattriyas. And, in the second place, the\nperiod, whose mental activity is represented in the Upanishads, was a\ncreative one, and as such cannot be judged according to the analogy of\nlater periods of Indian philosophic development. The later philosophic\nschools as, for instance, the one of which /S/a@nkara is the great\nrepresentative, were no longer free in their speculations, but strictly\nbound by a traditional body of texts considered sacred, which could not\nbe changed or added to, but merely systematised and commented upon.\nHence the rigorous uniformity of doctrine characteristic of those\nschools. But there had been a time when, what later writers received as\na sacred legacy, determining and confining the whole course of their\nspeculations, first sprang from the minds of creative thinkers not\nfettered by the tradition of any school, but freely following the\npromptings of their own heads and hearts. By the absence of school\ntraditions, I do not indeed mean that the great teachers who appear in\nthe Upanishads were free to make an entirely new start, and to assign to\ntheir speculations any direction they chose; for nothing can be more\ncertain than that, at the period as the outcome of whose philosophical\nactivity the Upanishads have to be considered, there were in circulation\ncertain broad speculative ideas overshadowing the mind of every member\nof Brahminical society. But those ideas were neither very definite nor\nworked out in detail, and hence allowed themselves to be handled and\nfashioned in different ways by different individuals. With whom the few\nleading conceptions traceable in the teaching of all Upanishads first\noriginated, is a point on which those writings themselves do not\nenlighten us, and which we have no other means for settling; most\nprobably they are to be viewed not as the creation of any individual\nmind, but as the gradual outcome of speculations carried on by\ngenerations of Vedic theologians. In the Upanishads themselves, at any\nrate, they appear as floating mental possessions which may be seized and\nmoulded into new forms by any one who feels within himself the required\ninspiration. A certain vague knowledge of Brahman, the great hidden\nbeing in which all this manifold world is one, seems to be spread\neverywhere, and often issues from the most unexpected sources.\n/S/vetaketu receives instruction from his father Uddalaka; the proud\nGargya has to become the pupil of Ajata/s/atru, the king of Ka/s/i;\nBhujyu Sahyayani receives answers to his questions from a Gandharva\npossessing a maiden; Satyakama learns what Brahman is from the bull of\nthe herd he is tending, from Agni and from a flamingo; and Upako/s/ala\nis taught by the sacred fires in his teacher's house. All this is of\ncourse legend, not history; but the fact that the philosophic and\ntheological doctrines of the Upanishads are clothed in this legendary\ngarb certainly does not strengthen the expectation of finding in them a\nrigidly systematic doctrine.\n\nAnd a closer investigation of the contents of the Upanishads amply\nconfirms this preliminary impression. If we avail ourselves, for\ninstance, of M. Paul Regnaud's Materiaux pour servir a l'Histoire de la\nPhilosophie de l'Inde, in which the philosophical lucubrations of the\ndifferent Upanishads are arranged systematically according to topics, we\ncan see with ease how, together with a certain uniformity of general\nleading conceptions, there runs throughout divergence in details, and\nvery often not unimportant details. A look, for instance, at the\ncollection of passages relative to the origination of the world from the\nprimitive being, suffices to show that the task of demonstrating that\nwhatever the Upanishads teach on that point can be made to fit into a\nhomogeneous system is an altogether hopeless one. The accounts there\ngiven of the creation belong, beyond all doubt to different stages of\nphilosophic and theological development or else to different sections of\npriestly society. None but an Indian commentator would, I suppose, be\ninclined and sufficiently courageous to attempt the proof that, for\ninstance, the legend of the atman purushavidha, the Self in the shape of\na person which is as large as man and woman together, and then splits\nitself into two halves from which cows, horses, asses, goats, &c. are\nproduced in succession (B/ri/. Up. I, 1, 4), can be reconciled with the\naccount given of the creation in the Chandogya Upanishad, where it is\nsaid that in the beginning there existed nothing but the sat, 'that\nwhich is,' and that feeling a desire of being many it emitted out of\nitself ether, and then all the other elements in due succession. The\nformer is a primitive cosmogonic myth, which in its details shows\nstriking analogies with the cosmogonic myths of other nations; the\nlatter account is fairly developed Vedanta (although not Vedanta\nimplying the Maya doctrine). We may admit that both accounts show a\ncertain fundamental similarity in so far as they derive the manifold\nworld from one original being; but to go beyond this and to maintain, as\n/S/a@nkara does, that the atman purushavidha of the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka\nis the so-called Virag of the latter Vedanta--implying thereby that that\nsection consciously aims at describing only the activity of one special\nform of I/s/vara, and not simply the whole process of creation--is the\ningenious shift of an orthodox commentator in difficulties, but nothing\nmore.\n\nHow all those more or less conflicting texts came to be preserved and\nhanded down to posterity, is not difficult to understand. As mentioned\nabove, each of the great sections of Brahminical priesthood had its own\nsacred texts, and again in each of those sections there existed more\nancient texts which it was impossible to discard when deeper and more\nadvanced speculations began in their turn to be embodied in literary\ncompositions, which in the course of time likewise came to be looked\nupon as sacred. When the creative period had reached its termination,\nand the task of collecting and arranging was taken in hand, older and\nnewer pieces were combined into wholes, and thus there arose collections\nof such heterogeneous character as the Chandogya and B/ri/hadara/n/yaka\nUpanishads. On later generations, to which the whole body of texts came\ndown as revealed truth, there consequently devolved the inevitable task\nof establishing systems on which no exception could be taken to any of\nthe texts; but that the task was, strictly speaking, an impossible one,\ni.e. one which it was impossible to accomplish fairly and honestly,\nthere really is no reason to deny.\n\nFor a comprehensive criticism of the methods which the different\ncommentators employ in systematizing the contents of the Upanishads\nthere is no room in this place. In order, however, to illustrate what is\nmeant by the 'impossibility,' above alluded to, of combining the various\ndoctrines of the Upanishads into a whole without doing violence to a\ncertain number of texts, it will be as well to analyse in detail some\nfew at least of /S/a@nkara's interpretations, and to render clear the\nconsiderations by which he is guided.\n\nWe begin with a case which has already engaged our attention when\ndiscussing the meaning of the Sutras, viz. the question concerning the\nultimate fate of those who have attained the knowledge of Brahman. As we\nhave seen, /S/a@nkara teaches that the soul of him who has risen to an\ninsight into the nature of the higher Brahman does not, at the moment of\ndeath, pass out of the body, but is directly merged in Brahman by a\nprocess from which all departing and moving, in fact all considerations\nof space, are altogether excluded. The soul of him, on the other hand,\nwho has not risen above the knowledge of the lower qualified Brahman\ndeparts from the body by means of the artery called sushum/n/a, and\nfollowing the so-called devayana, the path of the gods, mounts up to the\nworld of Brahman. A review of the chief Upanishad texts on which\n/S/a@nkara founds this distinction will show how far it is justified.\n\nIn a considerable number of passages the Upanishads contrast the fate of\ntwo classes of men, viz. of those who perform sacrifices and meritorious\nworks only, and of those who in addition possess a certain kind of\nknowledge. Men of the former kind ascend after death to the moon, where\nthey live for a certain time, and then return to the earth into new\nforms of embodiment; persons of the latter kind proceed on the path of\nthe gods--on which the sun forms one stage--up to the world of Brahman,\nfrom which there is no return. The chief passages to that effect are Ch.\nUp. V, 10; Kaush. Up. I, 2 ff.; Mu/nd/. Up. I, 2, 9 ff.; B/ri/. Up. VI,\n2, 15 ff.; Pra/s/na Up. I, 9 ff.--In other passages only the latter of\nthe two paths is referred to, cp. Ch. Up. IV, 15; VIII 6, 5; Taitt. Up.\nI, 6; B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 8, 9; V, 10; Maitr. Up. VI, 30, to mention only\nthe more important ones.\n\nNow an impartial consideration of those passages shows I think, beyond\nany doubt, that what is meant there by the knowledge which leads through\nthe sun to the world of Brahman is the highest knowledge of which the\ndevotee is capable, and that the world of Brahman to which his knowledge\nenables him to proceed denotes the highest state which he can ever\nreach, the state of final release, if we choose to call it by that\nname.--Ch. Up. V, 10 says, 'Those who know this (viz. the doctrine of\nthe five fires), and those who in the forest follow faith and\nausterities go to light,' &c.--Ch. Up. IV, 15 is manifestly intended to\nconvey the true knowledge of Brahman; Upako/s/ala's teacher himself\nrepresents the instruction given by him as superior to the teaching of\nthe sacred fires.--Ch. Up. VIII, 6, 5 quotes the old /s/loka which says\nthat the man moving upwards by the artery penetrating the crown of the\nhead reaches the Immortal.--Kaush. Up. I, 2--which gives the most\ndetailed account of the ascent of the soul--contains no intimation\nwhatever of the knowledge of Brahman, which leads up to the Brahman\nworld, being of an inferior nature.--Mu/nd/. Up. I, 2, 9 agrees with the\nChandogya in saying that 'Those who practise penance and faith in the\nforest, tranquil, wise, and living on alms, depart free from passion,\nthrough the sun, to where that immortal Person dwells whose nature is\nimperishable,' and nothing whatever in the context countenances the\nassumption that not the highest knowledge and the highest Person are\nthere referred to.--B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 8 quotes old /s/lokas clearly\nreferring to the road of the gods ('the small old path'), on which\n'sages who know Brahman move on to the svargaloka and thence higher on\nas entirely free.--That path was found by Brahman, and on it goes\nwhoever knows Brahman.'--B/ri/. Up. VI, 2, 15 is another version of the\nPa/nk/agnividya, with the variation, 'Those who know this, and those who\nin the forest worship faith and the True, go to light,' &c.--Pra/s/na\nUp. 1, 10 says, 'Those who have sought the Self by penance, abstinence,\nfaith, and knowledge gain by the northern path Aditya, the sun. There is\nthe home of the spirits, the immortal free from danger, the highest.\nFrom thence they do not return, for it is the end.'--Maitr. Up. VI, 30\nquotes /s/lokas, 'One of them (the arteries) leads upwards, piercing the\nsolar orb: by it, having stepped beyond the world of Brahman, they go to\nthe highest path.'\n\nAll these passages are as clear as can be desired. The soul of the sage\nwho knows Brahman passes out by the sushum/n/a, and ascends by the path\nof the gods to the world of Brahman, there to remain for ever in some\nblissful state. But, according to /S/a@nkara, all these texts are meant\nto set forth the result of a certain inferior knowledge only, of the\nknowledge of the conditioned Brahman. Even in a passage apparently so\nentirely incapable of more than one interpretation as B/ri/. Up. VI, 2,\n15, the 'True,' which the holy hermits in the forest are said to\nworship, is not to be the highest Brahman, but only\nHira/n/yagarbha!--And why?--Only because the system so demands it, the\nsystem which teaches that those who know the highest Brahman become on\ntheir death one with it, without having to resort to any other place.\nThe passage on which this latter tenet is chiefly based is B/ri/. Up.\nIV, 4, 6, 7, where, with the fate of him who at his death has desires,\nand whose soul therefore enters a new body after having departed from\nthe old one, accompanied by all the pra/n/as, there is contrasted the\nfate of the sage free from all desires. 'But as to the man who does not\ndesire, who not desiring, freed from desires is satisfied in his\ndesires, or desires the Self only, the vital spirits of him (tasya) do\nnot depart--being Brahman he goes to Brahman.'\n\nWe have seen above (p. lxxx) that this passage is referred to in the\nimportant Sutras on whose right interpretation it, in the first place,\ndepends whether or not we must admit the Sutrakara to have acknowledged\nthe distinction of a para and an apara vidya. Here the passage interests\nus as throwing light on the way in which /S/a@nkara systematises. He\nlooks on the preceding part of the chapter as describing what happens to\nthe souls of all those who do not know the highest Brahman, inclusive of\nthose who know the lower Brahman only. They pass out of the old bodies\nfollowed by all pra/n/as and enter new bodies. He, on the other hand,\nsection 6 continues, who knows the true Brahman, does not pass out of\nthe body, but becomes one with Brahman then and there. This\ninterpretation of the purport of the entire chapter is not impossibly\nright, although I am rather inclined to think that the chapter aims at\nsetting forth in its earlier part the future of him who does not know\nBrahman at all, while the latter part of section 6 passes on to him who\ndoes know Brahman (i.e. Brahman pure and simple, the text knowing of no\ndistinction of the so-called lower and higher Brahman). In explaining\nsection 6 /S/a@nkara lays stress upon the clause 'na tasya pra/n/a\nutkramanti,' 'his vital spirits do not pass out,' taking this to signify\nthat the soul with the vital spirits does not move at all, and thus does\nnot ascend to the world of Brahman; while the purport of the clause may\nsimply be that the soul and vital spirits do not go anywhere else, i.e.\ndo not enter a new body, but are united, somehow or other, with Brahman.\nOn /S/a@nkara's interpretation there immediately arises a new\ndifficulty. In the /s/lokas, quoted under sections 8 and 9, the\ndescription of the small old path which leads to the svargaloka and\nhigher on clearly refers--as noticed already above--to the path through\nthe veins, primarily the sushum/n/a, on which, according to so many\nother passages, the soul of the wise mounts upwards. But that path is,\naccording to /S/a@nkara, followed by him only who has not risen above\nthe lower knowledge, and yet the /s/lokas have manifestly to be\nconnected with what is said in the latter half of 6 about the owner of\nthe para vidya. Hence /S/a@nkara sees himself driven to explain the\n/s/lokas in 8 and 9 (of which a faithful translation is given in\nProfessor Max Mueller's version) as follows:\n\n8. 'The subtle old path (i.e. the path of knowledge on which final\nrelease is reached; which path is subtle, i.e. difficult to know, and\nold, i.e. to be known from the eternal Veda) has been obtained and fully\nreached by me. On it the sages who know Brahman reach final release\n(svargaloka/s/abda/h/ samnihitaprakara/n/at mokshabhidhayaka/h/).\n\n9. 'On that path they say that there is white or blue or yellow or green\nor red (i.e. others maintain that the path to final release is, in\naccordance with the colour of the arteries, either white or blue, &c.;\nbut that is false, for the paths through the arteries lead at the best\nto the world of Brahman, which itself forms part of the sa/m/sara); that\npath (i.e. the only path to release, viz. the path of true knowledge) is\nfound by Brahman, i.e. by such Brahma/n/as as through true knowledge\nhave become like Brahman,' &c.\n\nA significant instance in truth of the straits to which thorough-going\nsystematisers of the Upanishads see themselves reduced occasionally!\n\nBut we return to the point which just now chiefly interests us. Whether\n/S/a@nkara's interpretation of the chapter, and especially of section 6,\nbe right or wrong, so much is certain that we are not entitled to view\nall those texts which speak of the soul going to the world of Brahman as\nbelonging to the so-called lower knowledge, because a few other passages\ndeclare that the sage does not go to Brahman. The text which declares\nthe sage free from desires to become one with Brahman could not, without\ndue discrimination, be used to define and limit the meaning of other\npassages met with in the same Upanishad even--for as we have remarked\nabove the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka contains pieces manifestly belonging to\ndifferent stages of development;--much less does it entitle us to put\narbitrary constructions on passages forming part of other Upanishads.\nHistorically the disagreement of the various accounts is easy to\nunderstand. The older notion was that the soul of the wise man proceeds\nalong the path of the gods to Brahman's abode. A later--and, if we like,\nmore philosophic--conception is that, as Brahman already is a man's\nSelf, there is no need of any motion on man's part to reach Brahman. We\nmay even apply to those two views the terms apara and para--lower and\nhigher--knowledge. But we must not allow any commentator to induce us to\nbelieve that what he from his advanced standpoint looks upon as an\ninferior kind of cognition, was viewed in the same light by the authors\nof the Upanishads.\n\nWe turn to another Upanishad text likewise touching upon the point\nconsidered in what precedes, viz. the second Brahma/n/a of the third\nadhyaya of the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka. The discussion there first turns upon\nthe grahas and atigrahas, i.e. the senses and organs and their objects,\nand Yajnavalkya thereupon explains that death, by which everything is\novercome, is itself overcome by water; for death is fire. The colloquy\nthen turns to what we must consider an altogether new topic, Artabhaga\nasking, 'When this man (ayam purusha) dies, do the vital spirits depart\nfrom him or not?' and Yajnavalkya answering, 'No, they are gathered up\nin him; he swells, he is inflated; inflated the dead (body) is\nlying.'--Now this is for /S/a@nkara an important passage, as we have\nalready seen above (p. lxxxi); for he employs it, in his comment on\nVed.-sutra IV, 2, 13, for the purpose of proving that the passage B/ri/.\nUp. IV, 4, 6 really means that the vital spirits do not, at the moment\nof death, depart from the true sage. Hence the present passage also must\nrefer to him who possesses the highest knowledge; hence the 'ayam\npurusha' must be 'that man,' i.e. the man who possesses the highest\nknowledge, and the highest knowledge then must be found in the preceding\nclause which says that death itself may be conquered by water. But, as\nRamanuja also remarks, neither does the context favour the assumption\nthat the highest knowledge is referred to, nor do the words of section\n11 contain any indication that what is meant is the merging of the Self\nof the true Sage in Brahman. With the interpretation given by Ramanuja\nhimself, viz. that the pra/n/as do not depart from the jiva of the dying\nman, but accompany it into a new body, I can agree as little (although\nhe no doubt rightly explains the 'ayam purusha' by 'man' in general),\nand am unable to see in the passage anything more than a crude attempt\nto account for the fact that a dead body appears swollen and\ninflated.--A little further on (section 13) Artabhaga asks what becomes\nof this man (ayam purusha) when his speech has entered into the fire,\nhis breath into the air, his eye into the sun, &c. So much here is clear\nthat we have no right to understand by the 'ayam purusha' of section 13\nanybody different from the 'ayam purusha' of the two preceding sections;\nin spite of this /S/a@nkara--according to whose system the organs of the\ntrue sage do not enter into the elements, but are directly merged in\nBrahman--explains the 'ayam purusha' of section 13 to be the\n'asa/m/yagdar/s/in,' i.e. the person who has not risen to the cognition\nof the highest Brahman. And still a further limiting interpretation is\nrequired by the system. The asa/m/yagdar/s/in also--who as such has to\nremain in the sa/m/sara--cannot do without the organs, since his jiva\nwhen passing out of the old body into a new one is invested with the\nsubtle body; hence section 13 cannot be taken as saying what it clearly\ndoes say, viz. that at death the different organs pass into the\ndifferent elements, but as merely indicating that the organs are\nabandoned by the divinities which, during lifetime, presided over them!\n\nThe whole third adhyaya indeed of the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka affords ample\nproof of the artificial character of /S/a@nkara's attempts to show that\nthe teaching of the Upanishads follows a definite system. The eighth\nbrahma/n/a, for instance, is said to convey the doctrine of the highest\nnon-related Brahman, while the preceding brahma/n/as had treated only of\nI/s/vara in his various aspects. But, as a matter of fact, brahma/n/a 8,\nafter having, in section 8, represented Brahman as destitute of all\nqualities, proceeds, in the next section, to describe that very same\nBrahman as the ruler of the world, 'By the command of that Imperishable\nsun and moon stand apart,' &c.; a clear indication that the author of\nthe Upanishad does not distinguish a higher and lower Brahman\nin--/S/a@nkara's sense.--The preceding brahma/n/a (7) treats of the\nantaryamin, i.e. Brahman viewed as the internal ruler of everything.\nThis, according to /S/a@nkara, is the lower form of Brahman called\nI/s/vara; but we observe that the antaryamin as well as the so-called\nhighest Brahman described in section 8 is, at the termination of the two\nsections, characterised by means of the very same terms (7, 23: Unseen\nbut seeing, unheard but hearing, &c. There is no other seer but he,\nthere is no other hearer but he, &c.; and 8, 11: That Brahman is unseen\nbut seeing, unheard but hearing, &c. There is nothing that sees but it,\nnothing that hears but it, &c.).--Nothing can be clearer than that all\nthese sections aim at describing one and the same being, and know\nnothing of the distinctions made by the developed Vedanta, however valid\nthe latter may be from a purely philosophic point of view.\n\nWe may refer to one more similar instance from the Chandogya Upanishad.\nWe there meet in III, 14 with one of the most famous vidyas describing\nthe nature of Brahman, called after its reputed author the\nSa/nd/ilya-vidya. This small vidya is decidedly one of the finest and\nmost characteristic texts; it would be difficult to point out another\npassage setting forth with greater force and eloquence and in an equally\nshort compass the central doctrine of the Upanishads. Yet this text,\nwhich, beyond doubt, gives utterance to the highest conception of\nBrahman's nature that Sa/nd/ilya's thought was able to reach, is by\n/S/a@nkara and his school again declared to form part of the lower vidya\nonly, because it represents Brahman as possessing qualities. It is,\naccording to their terminology, not j/n/ana, i.e. knowledge, but the\ninjunction of a mere upasana, a devout meditation on Brahman in so far\nas possessing certain definite attributes such as having light for its\nform, having true thoughts, and so on. The Ramanujas, on the other hand,\nquote this text with preference as clearly describing the nature of\ntheir highest, i.e. their one Brahman. We again allow that /S/a@nkara is\nfree to deny that any text which ascribes qualities to Brahman embodies\nabsolute truth; but we also again remark that there is no reason\nwhatever for supposing that Sa/nd/ilya, or whoever may have been the\nauthor of that vidya, looked upon it as anything else but a statement of\nthe highest truth accessible to man.\n\nWe return to the question as to the true philosophy of the Upanishads,\napart from the systems of the commentators.--From what precedes it will\nappear with sufficient distinctness that, if we understand by philosophy\na philosophical system coherent in all its parts, free from all\ncontradictions and allowing room for all the different statements made\nin all the chief Upanishads, a philosophy of the Upanishads cannot even\nbe spoken of. The various lucubrations on Brahman, the world, and the\nhuman soul of which the Upanishads consist do not allow themselves to be\nsystematised simply because they were never meant to form a system.\n/S/a/nd/ilya's views as to the nature of Brahman did not in all details\nagree with those of Yaj/n/avalkya, and Uddalaka differed from both. In\nthis there is nothing to wonder at, and the burden of proof rests\naltogether with those who maintain that a large number of detached\nphilosophic and theological dissertations, ascribed to different\nauthors, doubtless belonging to different periods, and not seldom\nmanifestly contradicting each other, admit of being combined into a\nperfectly consistent whole.\n\nThe question, however, assumes a different aspect, if we take the terms\n'philosophy' and 'philosophical system,' not in the strict sense in\nwhich /S/a@nkara and other commentators are not afraid of taking them,\nbut as implying merely an agreement in certain fundamental features. In\nthis latter sense we may indeed undertake to indicate the outlines of a\nphilosophy of the Upanishads, only keeping in view that precision in\ndetails is not to be aimed at. And here we finally see ourselves driven\nback altogether on the texts themselves, and have to acknowledge that\nthe help we receive from commentators, to whatever school they may\nbelong, is very inconsiderable. Fortunately it cannot be asserted that\nthe texts on the whole oppose very serious difficulties to a right\nunderstanding, however obscure the details often are. Concerning the\nlatter we occasionally depend entirely on the explanations vouchsafed by\nthe scholiasts, but as far as the general drift and spirit of the texts\nare concerned, we are quite able to judge by ourselves, and are even\nspecially qualified to do so by having no particular system to advocate.\n\nThe point we will first touch upon is the same from which we started\nwhen examining the doctrine of the Sutras, viz. the question whether the\nUpanishads acknowledge a higher and lower knowledge in /S/a@nkara's\nsense, i.e. a knowledge of a higher and a lower Brahman. Now this we\nfind not to be the case. Knowledge is in the Upanishads frequently\nopposed to avidya, by which latter term we have to understand ignorance\nas to Brahman, absence of philosophic knowledge; and, again, in several\nplaces we find the knowledge of the sacrificial part of the Veda with\nits supplementary disciplines contrasted as inferior with the knowledge\nof the Self; to which latter distinction the Mu/nd/aka Up. (I, 4)\napplies the terms apara and para vidya. But a formal recognition of the\nessential difference of Brahman being viewed, on the one hand, as\npossessing distinctive attributes, and, on the other hand, as devoid of\nall such attributes is not to be met with anywhere. Brahman is indeed\nsometimes described as sagu/n/a and sometimes as nirgu/n/a (to use later\nterms); but it is nowhere said that thereon rests a distinction of two\ndifferent kinds of knowledge leading to altogether different results.\nThe knowledge of Brahman is one, under whatever aspects it is viewed;\nhence the circumstance (already exemplified above) that in the same\nvidyas it is spoken of as sagu/n/a as well as nirgu/n/a. When the mind\nof the writer dwells on the fact that Brahman is that from which all\nthis world originates, and in which it rests, he naturally applies to it\ndistinctive attributes pointing at its relation to the world; Brahman,\nthen, is called the Self and life of all, the inward ruler, the\nomniscient Lord, and so on. When, on the other hand, the author follows\nout the idea that Brahman may be viewed in itself as the mysterious\nreality of which the whole expanse of the world is only an outward\nmanifestation, then it strikes him that no idea or term derived from\nsensible experience can rightly be applied to it, that nothing more may\nbe predicated of it but that it is neither this nor that. But these are\nonly two aspects of the cognition of one and the same entity.\n\nClosely connected with the question as to the double nature of the\nBrahman of the Upanishads is the question as to their teaching\nMaya.--From Colebrooke downwards the majority of European writers have\ninclined towards the opinion that the doctrine of Maya, i.e. of the\nunreal illusory character of the sensible world, does not constitute a\nfeature of the primitive philosophy of the Upanishads, but was\nintroduced into the system at some later period, whether by Badaraya/n/a\nor /S/a@nkara or somebody else. The opposite view, viz. that the\ndoctrine of Maya forms an integral element of the teaching of the\nUpanishads, is implied in them everywhere, and enunciated more or less\ndistinctly in more than one place, has in recent times been advocated\nwith much force by Mr. Gough in the ninth chapter of his Philosophy of\nthe Upanishads.\n\nIn his Materiaux, &c. M. Paul Regnaud remarks that 'the doctrine of\nMaya, although implied in the teaching of the Upanishads, could hardly\nbecome clear and explicit before the system had reached a stage of\ndevelopment necessitating a choice between admitting two co-existent\neternal principles (which became the basis of the Sa@nkhya philosophy),\nand accepting the predominance of the intellectual principle, which in\nthe end necessarily led to the negation of the opposite principle.'--To\nthe two alternatives here referred to as possible we, however, have to\nadd a third one, viz. that form of the Vedanta of which the theory of\nthe Bhagavatas or Ramanujas is the most eminent type, and according to\nwhich Brahman carries within its own nature an element from which the\nmaterial universe originates; an element which indeed is not an\nindependent entity like the pradhana of the Sa@nkhyas, but which at the\nsame time is not an unreal Maya but quite as real as any other part of\nBrahman's nature. That a doctrine of this character actually developed\nitself on the basis of the Upanishads, is a circumstance which we\nclearly must not lose sight of, when attempting to determine what the\nUpanishads themselves are teaching concerning the character of the\nworld.\n\nIn enquiring whether the Upanishads maintain the Maya doctrine or not,\nwe must proceed with the same caution as regards other parts of the\nsystem, i.e. we must refrain from using unhesitatingly, and without\ncareful consideration of the merits of each individual case, the\nteaching--direct or inferred--of any one passage to the end of\ndetermining the drift of the teaching of other passages. We may admit\nthat some passages, notably of the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka, contain at any\nrate the germ of the later developed Maya doctrine[25], and thus render\nit quite intelligible that a system like /S/a@nkara's should evolve\nitself, among others, out of the Upanishads; but that affords no valid\nreason for interpreting Maya into other texts which give a very\nsatisfactory sense without that doctrine, or are even clearly repugnant\nto it. This remark applies in the very first place to all the accounts\nof the creation of the physical universe. There, if anywhere, the\nillusional character of the world should have been hinted at, at least,\nhad that theory been held by the authors of those accounts; but not a\nword to that effect is met with anywhere. The most important of those\naccounts--the one given in the sixth chapter of the Chandogya\nUpanishad--forms no exception. There is absolutely no reason to assume\nthat the 'sending forth' of the elements from the primitive Sat, which\nis there described at length, was by the writer of that passage meant to\nrepresent a vivarta rather than a pari/n/ama that the process of the\norigination of the physical universe has to be conceived as anything\nelse but a real manifestation of real powers hidden in the primeval\nSelf. The introductory words, addressed to /S/vetaketu by Uddalaka,\nwhich are generally appealed to as intimating the unreal character of\nthe evolution about to be described, do not, if viewed impartially,\nintimate any such thing[26]. For what is capable of being proved, and\nmanifestly meant to be proved, by the illustrative instances of the lump\nof clay and the nugget of gold, through which there are known all things\nmade of clay and gold? Merely that this whole world has Brahman for its\ncausal substance, just as clay is the causal matter of every earthen\npot, and gold of every golden ornament, but not that the process through\nwhich any causal substance becomes an effect is an unreal one.\nWe--including Uddalaka--may surely say that all earthen pots are in\nreality nothing but earth--the earthen pot being merely a special\nmodification (vikara) of clay which has a name of its own--without\nthereby committing ourselves to the doctrine that the change of form,\nwhich a lump of clay undergoes when being fashioned into a pot, is not\nreal but a mere baseless illusion.\n\nIn the same light we have to view numerous other passages which set\nforth the successive emanations proceeding from the first principle.\nWhen, for instance, we meet in the Ka/th/a Up. I, 3, 10, in the serial\nenumeration of the forms of existence intervening between the gross\nmaterial world and the highest Self (the Person), with the\n'avyak/ri/ta,' the Undeveloped, immediately below the purusha; and when\nagain the Mu/nd/aka Up. II, 1, 2, speaks of the 'high Imperishable'\nhigher than which is the heavenly Person; there is no reason whatever to\nsee in that 'Undeveloped' and that 'high Imperishable' anything but that\nreal element in Brahman from which, as in the Ramanuja system, the\nmaterial universe springs by a process of real development. We must of\ncourse render it quite clear to ourselves in what sense the terms 'real'\nand 'unreal' have to be understood. The Upanishads no doubt teach\nemphatically that the material world does not owe its existence to any\nprinciple independent from the Lord like the pradhana of the Sa@nkhyas;\nthe world is nothing but a manifestation of the Lord's wonderful power,\nand hence is unsubstantial, if we take the term 'substance' in its\nstrict sense. And, again, everything material is immeasurably inferior\nin nature to the highest spiritual principle from which it has emanated,\nand which it now hides from the individual soul. But neither\nunsubstantiality nor inferiority of the kind mentioned constitutes\nunreality in the sense in which the Maya of /S/a@nkara is unreal.\nAccording to the latter the whole world is nothing but an erroneous\nappearance, as unreal as the snake, for which a piece of rope is\nmistaken by the belated traveller, and disappearing just as the imagined\nsnake does as soon as the light of true knowledge has risen. But this is\ncertainly not the impression left on the mind by a comprehensive review\nof the Upanishads which dwells on their general scope, and does not\nconfine itself to the undue urging of what may be implied in some\ndetached passages. The Upanishads do not call upon us to look upon the\nwhole world as a baseless illusion to be destroyed by knowledge; the\ngreat error which they admonish us to relinquish is rather that things\nhave a separate individual existence, and are not tied together by the\nbond of being all of them effects of Brahman, or Brahman itself. They do\nnot say that true knowledge sublates this false world, as /S/a@nkara\nsays, but that it enables the sage to extricate himself from the\nworld--the inferior murta rupa of Brahman, to use an expression of the\nB/ri/hadara/n/yaka--and to become one with Brahman in its highest form.\n'We are to see everything in Brahman, and Brahman in everything;' the\nnatural meaning of this is, 'we are to look upon this whole world as a\ntrue manifestation of Brahman, as sprung from it and animated by it.'\nThe mayavadin has indeed appropriated the above saying also, and\ninterpreted it so as to fall in with his theory; but he is able to do so\nonly by perverting its manifest sense. For him it would be appropriate\nto say, not that everything we see is in Brahman, but rather that\neverything we see is out of Brahman, viz. as a false appearance spread\nover it and hiding it from us.\n\nStress has been laid[27] upon certain passages of the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka\nwhich seem to hint at the unreality of this world by qualifying terms,\nindicative of duality or plurality of existence, by means of an added\n'iva,' i.e. 'as it were' (yatranyad iva syat; yatra dvaitam iva bhavati;\natma dhyayativa lelayativa). Those passages no doubt readily lend\nthemselves to Maya interpretations, and it is by no means impossible\nthat in their author's mind there was something like an undeveloped Maya\ndoctrine. I must, however, remark that they, on the other hand, also\nadmit of easy interpretations not in any way presupposing the theory of\nthe unreality of the world. If Yaj/n/avalkya refers to the latter as\nthat 'where there is something else as it were, where there is duality\nas it were,' he may simply mean to indicate that the ordinary opinion,\naccording to which the individual forms of existence of the world are\nopposed to each other as altogether separate, is a mistaken one, all\nthings being one in so far as they spring from--and are parts\nof--Brahman. This would in no way involve duality or plurality being\nunreal in /S/a@nkara's sense, not any more than, for instance, the modes\nof Spinoza are unreal because, according to that philosopher, there is\nonly one universal substance. And with regard to the clause 'the Self\nthinks as it were' it has to be noted that according to the commentators\nthe 'as it were' is meant to indicate that truly not the Self is\nthinking, but the upadhis, i.e. especially the manas with which the Self\nis connected. But whether these upadhis are the mere offspring of Maya,\nas /S/a@nkara thinks, or real forms of existence, as Ramanuja teaches,\nis an altogether different question.\n\nI do not wish, however, to urge these last observations, and am ready to\nadmit that not impossibly those iva's indicate that the thought of the\nwriter who employed them was darkly labouring with a conception akin\nto--although much less explicit than--the Maya of /S/a@nkara. But what I\nobject to is, that conclusions drawn from a few passages of, after all,\ndoubtful import should be employed for introducing the Maya doctrine\ninto other passages which do not even hint at it, and are fully\nintelligible without it.[28]\n\nThe last important point in the teaching of the Upanishads we have to\ntouch upon is the relation of the jivas, the individual souls to the\nhighest Self. The special views regarding that point held by /S/a@nkara\nand Ramanuja, as have been stated before. Confronting their theories\nwith the texts of the Upanishads we must, I think, admit without\nhesitation, that /S/a@nkara's doctrine faithfully represents the\nprevailing teaching of the Upanishads in one important point at least,\nviz. therein that the soul or Self of the sage--whatever its original\nrelation to Brahman may be--is in the end completely merged and\nindistinguishably lost in the universal Self. A distinction, repeatedly\nalluded to before, has indeed to be kept in view here also. Certain\ntexts of the Upanishads describe the soul's going upwards, on the path\nof the gods, to the world of Brahman, where it dwells for unnumbered\nyears, i.e. for ever. Those texts, as a type of which we may take, the\npassage Kaushit. Up. I--the fundamental text of the Ramanujas concerning\nthe soul's fate after death--belong to an earlier stage of philosophic\ndevelopment; they manifestly ascribe to the soul a continued individual\nexistence. But mixed with texts of this class there are others in which\nthe final absolute identification of the individual Self with the\nuniversal Self is indicated in terms of unmistakable plainness. 'He who\nknows Brahman and becomes Brahman;' 'he who knows Brahman becomes all\nthis;' 'as the flowing rivers disappear in the sea losing their name and\nform, thus a wise man goes to the divine person.' And if we look to the\nwhole, to the prevailing spirit of the Upanishads, we may call the\ndoctrine embodied in passages of the latter nature the doctrine of the\nUpanishads. It is, moreover, supported by the frequently and clearly\nstated theory of the individual souls being merged in Brahman in the\nstate of deep dreamless sleep.\n\nIt is much more difficult to indicate the precise teaching of the\nUpanishads concerning the original relation of the individual soul to\nthe highest Self, although there can be no doubt that it has to be\nviewed as proceeding from the latter, and somehow forming a part of it.\nNegatively we are entitled to say that the doctrine, according to which\nthe soul is merely brahma bhrantam or brahma mayopadhikam, is in no way\ncountenanced by the majority of the passages bearing on the question. If\nthe emission of the elements, described in the Chandogya and referred to\nabove, is a real process--of which we saw no reason to doubt--the jiva\natman with which the highest Self enters into the emitted elements is\nequally real, a true part or emanation of Brahman itself.\n\nAfter having in this way shortly reviewed the chief elements of Vedantic\ndoctrine according to the Upanishads, we may briefly consider\n/S/a@nkara's system and mode of interpretation--with whose details we\nhad frequent opportunities of finding fault--as a whole. It has been\nsaid before that the task of reducing the teaching of the whole of the\nUpanishads to a system consistent and free from contradictions is an\nintrinsically impossible one. But the task once being given, we are\nquite ready to admit that /S/a@nkara's system is most probably the best\nwhich can be devised. While unable to allow that the Upanishads\nrecognise a lower and higher knowledge of Brahman, in fact the\ndistinction of a lower and higher Brahman, we yet acknowledge that the\nadoption of that distinction furnishes the interpreter with an\ninstrument of extraordinary power for reducing to an orderly whole the\nheterogeneous material presented by the old theosophic treatises. This\nbecomes very manifest as soon as we compare /S/a@nkara's system with\nthat of Ramanuja. The latter recognises only one Brahman which is, as we\nshould say, a personal God, and he therefore lays stress on all those\npassages of the Upanishads which ascribe to Brahman the attributes of a\npersonal God, such as omniscience and omnipotence. Those passages, on\nthe other hand, whose decided tendency it is to represent Brahman as\ntranscending all qualities, as one undifferenced mass of impersonal\nintelligence, Ramanuja is unable to accept frankly and fairly, and has\nto misinterpret them more or less to make them fall in with his system.\nThe same remark holds good with regard to those texts which represent\nthe individual soul as finally identifying itself with Brahman; Ramanuja\ncannot allow a complete identification but merely an assimilation\ncarried as far as possible. /S/a@nkara, on the other hand, by skilfully\nringing the changes on a higher and a lower doctrine, somehow manages to\nfind room for whatever the Upanishads have to say. Where the text speaks\nof Brahman as transcending all attributes, the highest doctrine is set\nforth. Where Brahman is called the All-knowing ruler of the world, the\nauthor means to propound the lower knowledge of the Lord only. And where\nthe legends about the primary being and its way of creating the world\nbecome somewhat crude and gross, Hira/n/yagarbha and Viraj are summoned\nforth and charged with the responsibility. Of Viraj Mr. Gough remarks\n(p. 55) that in him a place is provided by the poets of the Upanishads\nfor the purusha of the ancient /ri/shis, the divine being out of whom\nthe visible and tangible world proceeded. This is quite true if only we\nsubstitute for the 'poets of the Upanishads' the framers of the orthodox\nVedanta system--for the Upanishads give no indication whatever that by\ntheir purusha they understand not the simple old purusha but the Viraj\noccupying a definite position in a highly elaborate system;--but the\nmere phrase, 'providing a place' intimates with sufficient clearness the\nnature of the work in which systematisers of the Vedantic doctrine are\nengaged.\n\n/S/a@nkara's method thus enables him in a certain way to do justice to\ndifferent stages of historical development, to recognise clearly\nexisting differences which other systematisers are intent on\nobliterating. And there has yet to be made a further and even more\nimportant admission in favour of his system. It is not only more\npliable, more capable of amalgamating heterogeneous material than other\nsystems, but its fundamental doctrines are manifestly in greater harmony\nwith the essential teaching of the Upanishads than those of other\nVedantic systems. Above we were unable to allow that the distinction\nmade by /S/a@nkara between Brahman and I/s/vara is known to the\nUpanishads; but we must now admit that if, for the purpose of\ndetermining the nature of the highest being, a choice has to be made\nbetween those texts which represent Brahman as nirgu/n/a, and those\nwhich ascribe to it personal attributes, /S/a@nkara is right in giving\npreference to texts of the former kind. The Brahman of the old\nUpanishads, from which the souls spring to enjoy individual\nconsciousness in their waking state, and into which they sink back\ntemporarily in the state of deep dreamless sleep and permanently in\ndeath, is certainly not represented adequately by the strictly personal\nI/s/vara of Ramanuja, who rules the world in wisdom and mercy. The older\nUpanishads, at any rate, lay very little stress upon personal attributes\nof their highest being, and hence /S/a@nkara is right in so far as he\nassigns to his hypostatised personal I/s/vara[29] a lower place than to\nhis absolute Brahman. That he also faithfully represents the prevailing\nspirit of the Upanishads in his theory of the ultimate fate of the soul,\nwe have already remarked above. And although the Maya doctrine cannot,\nin my opinion, be said to form part of the teaching of the Upanishads,\nit cannot yet be asserted to contradict it openly, because the very\npoint which it is meant to elucidate, viz. the mode in which the\nphysical universe and the multiplicity of individual souls originate, is\nleft by the Upanishads very much in the dark. The later growth of the\nMaya doctrine on the basis of the Upanishads is therefore quite\nintelligible, and I fully agree with Mr. Gough when he says regarding it\nthat there has been no addition to the system from without but only a\ndevelopment from within, no graft but only growth. The lines of thought\nwhich finally led to the elaboration of the full-blown Maya theory may\nbe traced with considerable certainty. In the first place, deepening\nspeculation on Brahman tended to the notion of advaita being taken in a\nmore and more strict sense, as implying not only the exclusion of any\nsecond principle external to Brahman, but also the absence of any\nelements of duality or plurality in the nature of the one universal\nbeing itself; a tendency agreeing with the spirit of a certain set of\ntexts from the Upanishads. And as the fact of the appearance of a\nmanifold world cannot be denied, the only way open to thoroughly\nconsistent speculation was to deny at any rate its reality, and to call\nit a mere illusion due to an unreal principle, with which Brahman is\nindeed associated, but which is unable to break the unity of Brahman's\nnature just on account of its own unreality. And, in the second place, a\nmore thorough following out of the conception that the union with\nBrahman is to be reached through true knowledge only, not unnaturally\nled to the conclusion that what separates us in our unenlightened state\nfrom Brahman is such as to allow itself to be completely sublated by an\nact of knowledge; is, in other words, nothing else but an erroneous\nnotion, an illusion.--A further circumstance which may not impossibly\nhave co-operated to further the development of the theory of the world's\nunreality will be referred to later on.[30]\n\nWe have above been obliged to leave it an open question what kind of\nVedanta is represented by the Vedanta-sutras, although reason was shown\nfor the supposition that in some important points their teaching is more\nclosely related to the system of Ramanuja than to that of /S/a@nkara. If\nso, the philosophy of /S/a@nkara would on the whole stand nearer to the\nteaching of the Upanishads than the Sutras of Badaraya/n/a. This would\nindeed be a somewhat unexpected conclusion--for, judging a priori, we\nshould be more inclined to assume a direct propagation of the true\ndoctrine of the Upanishads through Badaraya/n/a to /S/a@nkara--but a\npriori considerations have of course no weight against positive evidence\nto the contrary. There are, moreover, other facts in the history of\nIndian philosophy and theology which help us better to appreciate the\npossibility of Badaraya/n/a's Sutras already setting forth a doctrine\nthat lays greater stress on the personal character of the highest being\nthan is in agreement with the prevailing tendency of the Upanishads.\nThat the pure doctrine of those ancient Brahminical treatises underwent\nat a rather early period amalgamations with beliefs which most probably\nhad sprung up in altogether different--priestly or\nnon-priestly--communities is a well-known circumstance; it suffices for\nour purposes to refer to the most eminent of the early literary\nmonuments in which an amalgamation of the kind mentioned is observable,\nviz. the Bhagavadgita. The doctrine of the Bhagavadgita represents a\nfusion of the Brahman theory of the Upanishads with the belief in a\npersonal highest being--K/ri/sh/n/a or Vish/n/u--which in many respects\napproximates very closely to the system of the Bhagavatas; the attempts\nof a certain set of Indian commentators to explain it as setting forth\npure Vedanta, i.e. the pure doctrine of the Upanishads, may simply be\nset aside. But this same Bhagavadgita is quoted in Badaraya/n/a's Sutras\n(at least according to the unanimous explanations of the most eminent\nscholiasts of different schools) as inferior to /S/ruti only in\nauthority. The Sutras, moreover, refer in different places to certain\nVedantic portions of the Mahabharata, especially the twelfth book,\nseveral of which represent forms of Vedanta distinctly differing from\n/S/a@nkara's teaching, and closely related to the system of the\nBhagavatas.\n\nFacts of this nature--from entering into the details of which we are\nprevented by want of space--tend to mitigate the prima facie strangeness\nof the assumption that the Vedanta-sutras, which occupy an intermediate\nposition between the Upanishads and /S/a@nkara, should yet diverge in\ntheir teaching from both. The Vedanta of Gau/d/apada and /S/a@nkara\nwould in that case mark a strictly orthodox reaction against all\ncombinations of non-Vedic elements of belief and doctrine with the\nteaching of the Upanishads. But although this form of doctrine has ever\nsince /S/a@nkara's time been the one most generally accepted by\nBrahminic students of philosophy, it has never had any wide-reaching\ninfluence on the masses of India. It is too little in sympathy with the\nwants of the human heart, which, after all, are not so very different in\nIndia from what they are elsewhere. Comparatively few, even in India,\nare those who rejoice in the idea of a universal non-personal essence in\nwhich their own individuality is to be merged and lost for ever, who\nthink it sweet 'to be wrecked on the ocean of the Infinite.'[31] The\nonly forms of Vedantic philosophy which are--and can at any time have\nbeen--really popular, are those in which the Brahman of the Upanishads\nhas somehow transformed itself into a being, between which and the\ndevotee there can exist a personal relation, love and faith on the part\nof man, justice tempered by mercy on the part of the divinity. The only\nreligious books of widespread influence are such as the Ramayan of\nTulsidas, which lay no stress on the distinction between an absolute\nBrahman inaccessible to all human wants and sympathies, and a shadowy\nLord whose very conception depends on the illusory principle of Maya,\nbut love to dwell on the delights of devotion to one all-wise and\nmerciful ruler, who is able and willing to lend a gracious ear to the\nsupplication of the worshipper.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe present translation of the Vedanta-sutras does not aim at rendering\nthat sense which their author may have aimed at conveying, but strictly\nfollows /S/a@nkara's interpretation. The question as to how far the\nlatter agrees with the views held by Badaraya/n/a has been discussed\nabove, with the result that for the present it must, on the whole, be\nleft an open one. In any case it would not be feasible to combine a\ntranslation of /S/a@nkara's commentary with an independent version of\nthe Sutras which it explains. Similar considerations have determined the\nmethod followed in rendering the passages of the Upanishads referred to\nin the Sutras and discussed at length by /S/a@nkara. There also the\nviews of the commentator have to be followed closely; otherwise much of\nthe comment would appear devoid of meaning. Hence, while of course\nfollowing on the whole the critical translation published by Professor\nMax Mueller in the earlier volumes of this Series, I had, in a not\ninconsiderable number of cases, to modify it so as to render\nintelligible /S/a@nkara's explanations and reasonings. I hope to find\nspace in the introduction to the second volume of this translation for\nmaking some general remarks on the method to be followed in translating\nthe Upanishads.\n\nI regret that want of space has prevented me from extracting fuller\nnotes from later scholiasts. The notes given are based, most of them, on\nthe /t/ikas composed by Anandagiri and Govindananda (the former of which\nis unpublished as yet, so far as I know), and on the Bhamati.\n\nMy best thanks are due to Pa/nd/its Rama Mi/s/ra /S/astrin and\nGa@ngadhara /S/astrin of the Benares Sanskrit College, whom I have\nconsulted on several difficult passages. Greater still are my\nobligations to Pa/nd/it Ke/s/ava /S/astrin, of the same institution, who\nmost kindly undertook to read a proof of the whole of the present\nvolume, and whose advice has enabled me to render my version of more\nthan one passage more definite or correct.\n\nNotes:\n\n[Footnote 19: Nanu vidusho z pi setikartavyatakopasananirv/ri/ttaye\nv/ri/shyannadiphalanish/t/any eva katha/m/ tesha/m/ virodhad vina/s/a\nu/k/yate. Tatraha pate tv iti. /S/arirapate tu tesha/m/ vina/s/a/h/\n/s/arirapatad urdhv/m/ tu vidyanugu/n/ad/ri/sh/t/aphalani suk/ri/tani\nna/s/yantity artha/h/.]\n\n[Footnote 20: Upalabhyate hi devayanena pantha ga/kkh/ato vidushas tam\npratibruuyat satyam bruyad iti /k/andramasa sa/m/vadava/k/anena\n/s/arirasadbhava/h/, ata/h/ sukshma/s/ariram anuvartate.]\n\n[Footnote 21: When the jiva has passed out of the body and ascends to\nthe world of Brahman, it remains enveloped by the subtle body until it\nreaches the river Vijara. There it divests itself of the subtle body,\nand the latter is merged in Brahman.].\n\n[Footnote 22: Kim aya/m/ para/m/, yotir upasampanna/h/\nsaivabandhavinirmukta/h/ pratyagatma svatmana/m/ paramatmana/h/\np/rit/hagbhutam anubhavati uta tatpraharataya tadavibhaktam iti visnye\nso, /s/nate sarvan kaman saha brahma/n/a vipas/k/ita pasya/h/ pasyate\nrukmavar/n/a/m/ kartaram isa/m/ purusha/m/ brahmayoni/m/ tada vidvin\npu/n/yapape vidhuya nirangana/h/ parama/m/ samyam upaiti ida/m/ jnanam\nupasritya mama sadharinyam agata/h/ sarve, punopajayante pralayena\nvyathanti /k/etyadysruysm/nt/ibhyo muktasta pare/n/a\nsahityasamyasadharmyavagamat p/ri/thagbhutam anubhavatiu prapte\nu/k/yate. Avibhageneti. Parasmad brahmana/h/ svatmanam\navibhagenanubhavati mukta/h/. Kuta/h/. D/ri/shtatvat. Para/m/\nbrahmopasampadya niv/ri/ttavidyanrodhanasya yathatathyena svatamano\nd/ri/sh/ta/tvat. Svatmana/h/ ssvarupa/m/ hi tat tvam asy ayam atma\nbrahma aitadatmyam ida/m/ sarva/m/ sarva/m/ khalv ida/m/\nbrahnetyadisamanadhikara/n/yanirdesai/h/ ya atmani tishtan atmano ntaro\nyam atma na veda yastatma sarira/m/ ya atmanam antaro yamayati\natmantaryamy am/ri/tah anta/h/ pravishta/h/ sasta ananam ityadibhis /k/a\nparamatmatmaka/m/ ta/kk/haritataya tatprakatabhutam iti pratipaditam\navashitei iti kasak/ri/stnety atrato vibhagenaha/m/ brahmasmity\ncvanubhavati.]\n\n[Footnote 23: /S/a@nkara's favourite illustrative instance of the\nmagician producing illusive sights is--significantly enough--not known\nto the Sutras.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Cp. Gough's Philosophy of the Upanishads, pp. 240 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 25: It is well known that, with the exception of the\n/S/vitasvatara and Maitrayaniya, none of the chief Upanishads exhibits\nthe word 'maya.' The term indeed occurs in one place in the\nB/ri/hadara/n/yaka; but that passage is a quotation from the /Ri/k\nSa/m/bita in which maya means 'creative power.' Cp. P. Regnaud, La Maya,\nin the Revue de l'Histoire des Religions, tome xii, No. 3, 1885.]\n\n[Footnote 26: As is demonstrated very satisfactorily by Ramanuja.]\n\n[Footnote 27: Gough, Philosophy of the Upanishads pp. 213 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 28: I cannot discuss in this place the Maya passages of the\nSvetasvatara and the Maitrayaniya Upanishads. Reasons which want of\nspace prevents me from setting forth in detail induce me to believe that\nneither of those two treatises deserves to be considered by us when\nwishing to ascertain the true immixed doctrine of the Upanishads.]\n\n[Footnote 29: The I/s/vara who allots to the individual souls their new\nforms of embodiment in strict accordance with their merit or demerit\ncannot be called anything else but a personal God. That this personal\nconscious being is at the same time identified with the totality of the\nindividual souls in the unconscious state of deep dreamless sleep, is\none of those extraordinary contradictions which thorough-going\nsystematisers of Vedantic doctrine are apparently unable to avoid\naltogether.]\n\n[Footnote 30: That section of the introduction in which the point\nreferred to in the text is touched upon will I hope form part of the\nsecond volume of the translation. The same remark applies to a point\nconcerning which further information had been promised above on page v.]\n\n[Footnote 31:\n\n  Cosi tra questa\n  Immensita s'annega il pensier mio,\n  E il naufrago m' e dolce in qnesto mare.\n  LEOPARDI.\n]\n\n\n\n\nVEDANTA-SUTRAS\n\nWITH\n\n/S/A@NKARA BHASHYA.\n\n/S/A@NKARA'S INTRODUCTION\n\n\nFIRST ADHYAYA.\n\nFIRST PADA.\n\n\nREVERENCE TO THE AUGUST VASUDEVA!\n\nIt is a matter not requiring any proof that the object and the\nsubject[32] whose respective spheres are the notion of the 'Thou' (the\nNon-Ego[33]) and the 'Ego,' and which are opposed to each other as much\nas darkness and light are, cannot be identified. All the less can their\nrespective attributes be identified. Hence it follows that it is wrong\nto superimpose[34] upon the subject--whose Self is intelligence, and\nwhich has for its sphere the notion of the Ego--the object whose sphere\nis the notion of the Non-Ego, and the attributes of the object, and\n_vice versa_ to superimpose the subject and the attributes of the\nsubject on the object. In spite of this it is on the part of man a\nnatural[35] procedure--which which has its cause in wrong knowledge--not\nto distinguish the two entities (object and subject) and their\nrespective attributes, although they are absolutely distinct, but to\nsuperimpose upon each the characteristic nature and the attributes of\nthe other, and thus, coupling the Real and the Unreal[36], to make use\nof expressions such as 'That am I,' 'That is mine.[37]'--But what have\nwe to understand by the term 'superimposition?'--The apparent\npresentation, in the form of remembrance, to consciousness of something\npreviously observed, in some other thing.[38]\n\nSome indeed define the term 'superimposition' as the superimposition of\nthe attributes of one thing on another thing.[39] Others, again, define\nsuperimposition as the error founded on the non-apprehension of the\ndifference of that which is superimposed from that on which it is\nsuperimposed.[40] Others[41], again, define it as the fictitious\nassumption of attributes contrary to the nature of that thing on which\nsomething else is superimposed. But all these definitions agree in so\nfar as they represent superimposition as the apparent presentation of\nthe attributes of one thing in another thing. And therewith agrees also\nthe popular view which is exemplified by expressions such as the\nfollowing: 'Mother-of-pearl appears like silver,' 'The moon although one\nonly appears as if she were double.' But how is it possible that on the\ninterior Self which itself is not an object there should be superimposed\nobjects and their attributes? For every one superimposes an object only\non such other objects as are placed before him (i.e. in contact with his\nsense-organs), and you have said before that the interior Self which is\nentirely disconnected from the idea of the Thou (the Non-Ego) is never\nan object. It is not, we reply, non-object in the absolute sense. For it\nis the object of the notion of the Ego[42], and the interior Self is\nwell known to exist on account of its immediate (intuitive)\npresentation.[43] Nor is it an exceptionless rule that objects can be\nsuperimposed only on such other objects as are before us, i.e. in\ncontact with our sense-organs; for non-discerning men superimpose on the\nether, which is not the object of sensuous perception, dark-blue colour.\n\nHence it follows that the assumption of the Non-Self being superimposed\non the interior Self is not unreasonable.\n\nThis superimposition thus defined, learned men consider to be Nescience\n(avidya), and the ascertainment of the true nature of that which is (the\nSelf) by means of the discrimination of that (which is superimposed on\nthe Self), they call knowledge (vidya). There being such knowledge\n(neither the Self nor the Non-Self) are affected in the least by any\nblemish or (good) quality produced by their mutual superimposition[44].\nThe mutual superimposition of the Self and the Non-Self, which is termed\nNescience, is the presupposition on which there base all the practical\ndistinctions--those made in ordinary life as well as those laid down by\nthe Veda--between means of knowledge, objects of knowledge (and knowing\npersons), and all scriptural texts, whether they are concerned with\ninjunctions and prohibitions (of meritorious and non-meritorious\nactions), or with final release[45].--But how can the means of right\nknowledge such as perception, inference, &c., and scriptural texts have\nfor their object that which is dependent on Nescience[46]?--Because, we\nreply, the means of right knowledge cannot operate unless there be a\nknowing personality, and because the existence of the latter depends on\nthe erroneous notion that the body, the senses, and so on, are identical\nwith, or belong to, the Self of the knowing person. For without the\nemployment of the senses, perception and the other means of right\nknowledge cannot operate. And without a basis (i.e. the body[47]) the\nsenses cannot act. Nor does anybody act by means of a body on which the\nnature of the Self is not superimposed[48]. Nor can, in the absence of\nall that[49], the Self which, in its own nature is free from all\ncontact, become a knowing agent. And if there is no knowing agent, the\nmeans of right knowledge cannot operate (as said above). Hence\nperception and the other means of right knowledge, and the Vedic texts\nhave for their object that which is dependent on Nescience. (That human\ncognitional activity has for its presupposition the superimposition\ndescribed above), follows also from the non-difference in that respect\nof men from animals. Animals, when sounds or other sensible qualities\naffect their sense of hearing or other senses, recede or advance\naccording as the idea derived from the sensation is a comforting or\ndisquieting one. A cow, for instance, when she sees a man approaching\nwith a raised stick in his hand, thinks that he wants to beat her, and\ntherefore moves away; while she walks up to a man who advances with some\nfresh grass in his hand. Thus men also--who possess a higher\nintelligence--run away when they see strong fierce-looking fellows\ndrawing near with shouts and brandishing swords; while they confidently\napproach persons of contrary appearance and behaviour. We thus see that\nmen and animals follow the same course of procedure with reference to\nthe means and objects of knowledge. Now it is well known that the\nprocedure of animals bases on the non-distinction (of Self and\nNon-Self); we therefore conclude that, as they present the same\nappearances, men also--although distinguished by superior\nintelligence--proceed with regard to perception and so on, in the same\nway as animals do; as long, that is to say, as the mutual\nsuperimposition of Self and Non-Self lasts. With reference again to that\nkind of activity which is founded on the Veda (sacrifices and the like),\nit is true indeed that the reflecting man who is qualified to enter on\nit, does so not without knowing that the Self has a relation to another\nworld; yet that qualification does not depend on the knowledge,\nderivable from the Vedanta-texts, of the true nature of the Self as free\nfrom all wants, raised above the distinctions of the Brahma/n/a and\nKshattriya-classes and so on, transcending transmigratory existence. For\nsuch knowledge is useless and even contradictory to the claim (on the\npart of sacrificers, &c. to perform certain actions and enjoy their\nfruits). And before such knowledge of the Self has arisen, the Vedic\ntexts continue in their operation, to have for their object that which\nis dependent on Nescience. For such texts as the following, 'A\nBrahma/n/a is to sacrifice,' are operative only on the supposition that\non the Self are superimposed particular conditions such as caste, stage\nof life, age, outward circumstances, and so on. That by superimposition\nwe have to understand the notion of something in some other thing we\nhave already explained. (The superimposition of the Non-Self will be\nunderstood more definitely from the following examples.) Extra-personal\nattributes are superimposed on the Self, if a man considers himself\nsound and entire, or the contrary, as long as his wife, children, and so\non are sound and entire or not. Attributes of the body are superimposed\non the Self, if a man thinks of himself (his Self) as stout, lean, fair,\nas standing, walking, or jumping. Attributes of the sense-organs, if he\nthinks 'I am mute, or deaf, or one-eyed, or blind.' Attributes of the\ninternal organ when he considers himself subject to desire, intention,\ndoubt, determination, and so on. Thus the producer of the notion of the\nEgo (i.e. the internal organ) is superimposed on the interior Self,\nwhich, in reality, is the witness of all the modifications of the\ninternal organ, and vice versa the interior Self, which is the witness\nof everything, is superimposed on the internal organ, the senses, and so\non. In this way there goes on this natural beginning--and endless\nsuperimposition, which appears in the form of wrong conception, is the\ncause of individual souls appearing as agents and enjoyers (of the\nresults of their actions), and is observed by every one.\n\nWith a view to freeing one's self from that wrong notion which is the\ncause of all evil and attaining thereby the knowledge of the absolute\nunity of the Self the study of the Vedanta-texts is begun. That all the\nVedanta-texts have the mentioned purport we shall show in this so-called\n/S/ariraka-mima/m/sa.[50]\n\nOf this Vedanta-mima/m/sa about to be explained by us the first Sutra is\nas follows.\n\n1. Then therefore the enquiry into Brahman.\n\nThe word 'then' is here to be taken as denoting immediate consecution;\nnot as indicating the introduction of a new subject to be entered upon;\nfor the enquiry into Brahman (more literally, the desire of knowing\nBrahman) is not of that nature[51]. Nor has the word 'then' the sense of\nauspiciousness (or blessing); for a word of that meaning could not be\nproperly construed as a part of the sentence. The word 'then' rather\nacts as an auspicious term by being pronounced and heard merely, while\nit denotes at the same time something else, viz. immediate consecution\nas said above. That the latter is its meaning follows moreover from the\ncircumstance that the relation in which the result stands to the\nprevious topic (viewed as the cause of the result) is non-separate from\nthe relation of immediate consecution.[52]\n\nIf, then, the word 'then' intimates immediate consecution it must be\nexplained on what antecedent the enquiry into Brahman specially depends;\njust as the enquiry into active religious duty (which forms the subject\nof the Purva Mima/m/sa) specially depends on the antecedent reading of\nthe Veda. The reading of the Veda indeed is the common antecedent (for\nthose who wish to enter on an enquiry into religious duty as well as for\nthose desirous of knowing Brahman). The special question with regard to\nthe enquiry into Brahman is whether it presupposes as its antecedent the\nunderstanding of the acts of religious duty (which is acquired by means\nof the Purva Mima/m/sa). To this question we reply in the negative,\nbecause for a man who has read the Vedanta-parts of the Veda it is\npossible to enter on the enquiry into Brahman even before engaging in\nthe enquiry into religious duty. Nor is it the purport of the word\n'then' to indicate order of succession; a purport which it serves in\nother passages, as, for instance, in the one enjoining the cutting off\nof pieces from the heart and other parts of the sacrificial animal.[53]\n(For the intimation of order of succession could be intended only if the\nagent in both cases were the same; but this is not the case), because\nthere is no proof for assuming the enquiry into religious duty and the\nenquiry into Brahman to stand in the relation of principal and\nsubordinate matter or the relation of qualification (for a certain act)\non the part of the person qualified[54]; and because the result as well\nas the object of the enquiry differs in the two cases. The knowledge of\nactive religious duty has for its fruit transitory felicity, and that\nagain depends on the performance of religious acts. The enquiry into\nBrahman, on the other hand, has for its fruit eternal bliss, and does\nnot depend on the performance of any acts. Acts of religious duty do not\nyet exist at the time when they are enquired into, but are something to\nbe accomplished (in the future); for they depend on the activity of man.\nIn the Brahma-mima/m/sa, on the other hand, the object of enquiry, i.e.\nBrahman, is something already accomplished (existent),--for it is\neternal,--and does not depend on human energy. The two enquiries differ\nmoreover in so far as the operation of their respective fundamental\ntexts is concerned. For the fundamental texts on which active religious\nduty depends convey information to man in so far only as they enjoin on\nhim their own particular subjects (sacrifices, &c.); while the\nfundamental texts about Brahman merely instruct man, without laying on\nhim the injunction of being instructed, instruction being their\nimmediate result. The case is analogous to that of the information\nregarding objects of sense which ensues as soon as the objects are\napproximated to the senses. It therefore is requisite that something\nshould be stated subsequent to which the enquiry into Brahman is\nproposed.--Well, then, we maintain that the antecedent conditions are\nthe discrimination of what is eternal and what is non-eternal; the\nrenunciation of all desire to enjoy the fruit (of one's actions) both\nhere and hereafter; the acquirement of tranquillity, self-restraint, and\nthe other means[55], and the desire of final release. If these\nconditions exist, a man may, either before entering on an enquiry into\nactive religious duty or after that, engage in the enquiry into Brahman\nand come to know it; but not otherwise. The word 'then' therefore\nintimates that the enquiry into Brahman is subsequent to the acquisition\nof the above-mentioned (spiritual) means.\n\nThe word 'therefore' intimates a reason. Because the Veda, while\ndeclaring that the fruit of the agnihotra and similar performances which\nare means of happiness is non-eternal (as, for instance. Ch. Up. VIII,\n1, 6, 'As here on earth whatever has been acquired by action perishes so\nperishes in the next world whatever is acquired by acts of religious\nduty'), teaches at the same time that the highest aim of man is realised\nby the knowledge of Brahman (as, for instance, Taitt. Up. II, 1, 'He who\nknows Brahman attains the highest'); therefore the enquiry into Brahman\nis to be undertaken subsequently to the acquirement of the mentioned\nmeans.\n\nBy Brahman is to be understood that the definition of which will be\ngiven in the next Sutra (I, 1, 2); it is therefore not to be supposed\nthat the word Brahman may here denote something else, as, for instance,\nthe brahminical caste. In the Sutra the genitive case ('of Brahman;' the\nliteral translation of the Sutra being 'then therefore the desire of\nknowledge of Brahman') denotes the object, not something generally\nsupplementary (/s/esha[56]); for the desire of knowledge demands an\nobject of desire and no other such object is stated.--But why should not\nthe genitive case be taken as expressing the general complementary\nrelation (to express which is its proper office)? Even in that case it\nmight constitute the object of the desire of knowledge, since the\ngeneral relation may base itself on the more particular one.--This\nassumption, we reply, would mean that we refuse to take Brahman as the\ndirect object, and then again indirectly introduce it as the object; an\naltogether needless procedure.--Not needless; for if we explain the\nwords of the Sutra to mean 'the desire of knowledge connected with\nBrahman' we thereby virtually promise that also all the heads of\ndiscussion which bear on Brahman will be treated.--This reason also, we\nreply, is not strong enough to uphold your interpretation. For the\nstatement of some principal matter already implies all the secondary\nmatters connected therewith. Hence if Brahman, the most eminent of all\nobjects of knowledge, is mentioned, this implies already all those\nobjects of enquiry which the enquiry into Brahman presupposes, and those\nobjects need therefore not be mentioned, especially in the Sutra.\nAnalogously the sentence 'there the king is going' implicitly means that\nthe king together with his retinue is going there. Our interpretation\n(according to which the Sutra represents Brahman as the direct object of\nknowledge) moreover agrees with Scripture, which directly represents\nBrahman as the object of the desire of knowledge; compare, for instance,\nthe passage, 'That from whence these beings are born, &c., desire to\nknow that. That is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 1). With passages of this\nkind the Sutra only agrees if the genitive case is taken to denote the\nobject. Hence we do take it in that sense. The object of the desire is\nthe knowledge of Brahman up to its complete comprehension, desires\nhaving reference to results[57]. Knowledge thus constitutes the means by\nwhich the complete comprehension of Brahman is desired to be obtained.\nFor the complete comprehension of Brahman is the highest end of man,\nsince it destroys the root of all evil such as Nescience, the seed of\nthe entire Sa/m/sara. Hence the desire of knowing Brahman is to be\nentertained.\n\nBut, it may be asked, is Brahman known or not known (previously to the\nenquiry into its nature)? If it is known we need not enter on an enquiry\nconcerning it; if it is not known we can not enter on such an enquiry.\n\nWe reply that Brahman is known. Brahman, which is all-knowing and\nendowed with all powers, whose essential nature is eternal purity,\nintelligence, and freedom, exists. For if we consider the derivation of\nthe word 'Brahman,' from the root b/ri/h, 'to be great,' we at once\nunderstand that eternal purity, and so on, belong to Brahman[58].\nMoreover the existence of Brahman is known on the ground of its being\nthe Self of every one. For every one is conscious of the existence of\n(his) Self, and never thinks 'I am not.' If the existence of the Self\nwere not known, every one would think 'I am not.' And this Self (of\nwhose existence all are conscious) is Brahman. But if Brahman is\ngenerally known as the Self, there is no room for an enquiry into it!\nNot so, we reply; for there is a conflict of opinions as to its special\nnature. Unlearned people and the Lokayatikas are of opinion that the\nmere body endowed with the quality of intelligence is the Self; others\nthat the organs endowed with intelligence are the Self; others maintain\nthat the internal organ is the Self; others, again, that the Self is a\nmere momentary idea; others, again, that it is the Void. Others, again\n(to proceed to the opinion of such as acknowledge the authority of the\nVeda), maintain that there is a transmigrating being different from the\nbody, and so on, which is both agent and enjoyer (of the fruits of\naction); others teach that that being is enjoying only, not acting;\nothers believe that in addition to the individual souls, there is an\nall-knowing, all-powerful Lord[59]. Others, finally, (i.e. the\nVedantins) maintain that the Lord is the Self of the enjoyer (i.e. of\nthe individual soul whose individual existence is apparent only, the\nproduct of Nescience).\n\nThus there are many various opinions, basing part of them on sound\narguments and scriptural texts, part of them on fallacious arguments and\nscriptural texts misunderstood[60]. If therefore a man would embrace\nsome one of these opinions without previous consideration, he would bar\nhimself from the highest beatitude and incur grievous loss. For this\nreason the first Sutra proposes, under the designation of an enquiry\ninto Brahman, a disquisition of the Vedanta-texts, to be carried on with\nthe help of conformable arguments, and having for its aim the highest\nbeatitude.\n\nSo far it has been said that Brahman is to be enquired into. The\nquestion now arises what the characteristics of that Brahman are, and\nthe reverend author of the Sutras therefore propounds the following\naphorism.\n\n2. (Brahman is that) from which the origin, &c. (i.e. the origin,\nsubsistence, and dissolution) of this (world proceed).\n\nThe term, &c. implies subsistence and re-absorption. That the origin is\nmentioned first (of the three) depends on the declaration of Scripture\nas well as on the natural development of a substance. Scripture declares\nthe order of succession of origin, subsistence, and dissolution in the\npassage, Taitt. Up. III, 1, 'From whence these beings are born,' &c. And\nwith regard to the second reason stated, it is known that a substrate of\nqualities can subsist and be dissolved only after it has entered,\nthrough origination, on the state of existence. The words 'of this'\ndenote that substrate of qualities which is presented to us by\nperception and the other means of right knowledge; the genitive case\nindicates it to be connected with origin, &c. The words 'from which'\ndenote the cause. The full sense of the Sutra therefore is: That\nomniscient omnipotent cause from which proceed the origin, subsistence,\nand dissolution of this world--which world is differentiated by names\nand forms, contains many agents and enjoyers, is the abode of the fruits\nof actions, these fruits having their definite places, times, and\ncauses[61], and the nature of whose arrangement cannot even be conceived\nby the mind,--that cause, we say, is Brahman. Since the other forms of\nexistence (such as increase, decline, &c.) are included in origination,\nsubsistence, and dissolution, only the three latter are referred to in\nthe Sutra. As the six stages of existence enumerated by Yaska[62] are\npossible only during the period of the world's subsistence, it\nmight--were they referred to in the Sutra--be suspected that what is\nmeant are not the origin, subsistence, and dissolution (of the world) as\ndependent on the first cause. To preclude this suspicion the Sutra is to\nbe taken as referring, in addition to the world's origination from\nBrahman, only to its subsistence in Brahman, and final dissolution into\nBrahman.\n\nThe origin, &c. of a world possessing the attributes stated above cannot\npossibly proceed from anything else but a Lord possessing the stated\nqualities; not either from a non-intelligent pradhana[63], or from\natoms, or from non-being, or from a being subject to transmigration[64];\nnor, again, can it proceed from its own nature (i.e. spontaneously,\nwithout a cause), since we observe that (for the production of effects)\nspecial places, times, and causes have invariably to be employed.\n\n(Some of) those who maintain a Lord to be the cause of the world[65],\nthink that the existence of a Lord different from mere transmigrating\nbeings can be inferred by means of the argument stated just now (without\nrecourse being had to Scripture at all).--But, it might be said, you\nyourself in the Sutra under discussion have merely brought forward the\nsame argument!--By no means, we reply. The Sutras (i.e. literally 'the\nstrings') have merely the purpose of stringing together the flowers of\nthe Vedanta-passages. In reality the Vedanta-passages referred to by the\nSutras are discussed here. For the comprehension of Brahman is effected\nby the ascertainment, consequent on discussion, of the sense of the\nVedanta-texts, not either by inference or by the other means of right\nknowledge. While, however, the Vedanta-passages primarily declare the\ncause of the origin, &c., of the world, inference also, being an\ninstrument of right knowledge in so far as it does not contradict the\nVedanta-texts, is not to be excluded as a means of confirming the\nmeaning ascertained. Scripture itself, moreover, allows argumentation;\nfor the passages, B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 5 ('the Self is to be heard, to be\nconsidered'), and Ch. Up. VI, 14, 2 ('as the man, &c., having been\ninformed, and being able to judge for himself, would arrive at Gandhara,\nin the same way a man who meets with a teacher obtains knowledge'),\ndeclare that human understanding assists Scripture[66].\n\nScriptural text, &c.[67], are not, in the enquiry into Brahman, the only\nmeans of knowledge, as they are in the enquiry into active duty (i.e. in\nthe Purva Mima/m/sa), but scriptural texts on the one hand, and\nintuition[68], &c., on the other hand, are to be had recourse to\naccording to the occasion: firstly, because intuition is the final\nresult of the enquiry into Brahman; secondly, because the object of the\nenquiry is an existing (accomplished) substance. If the object of the\nknowledge of Brahman were something to be accomplished, there would be\nno reference to intuition, and text, &c., would be the only means of\nknowledge. The origination of something to be accomplished depends,\nmoreover, on man since any action either of ordinary life, or dependent\non the Veda may either be done or not be done, or be done in a different\nway. A man, for instance, may move on either by means of a horse, or by\nmeans of his feet, or by some other means, or not at all. And again (to\nquote examples of actions dependent on the Veda), we meet in Scripture\nwith sentences such as the following: 'At the atiratra he takes the\nsho/d/asin cup,' and 'at the atiratra he does not take the sho/d/asin\ncup;' or, 'he makes the oblation after the sun has risen,' and, 'he\nmakes the oblation when the sun has not yet risen.' Just as in the\nquoted instances, injunctions and prohibitions, allowances of optional\nprocedure, general rules and exceptions have their place, so they would\nhave their place with regard to Brahman also (if the latter were a thing\nto be accomplished). But the fact is that no option is possible as to\nwhether a substance is to be thus or thus, is to be or not to be. All\noption depends on the notions of man; but the knowledge of the real\nnature of a thing does not depend on the notions of man, but only on the\nthing itself. For to think with regard to a post, 'this is a post or a\nman, or something else,' is not knowledge of truth; the two ideas, 'it\nis a man or something else,' being false, and only the third idea, 'it\nis a post,' which depends on the thing itself, falling under the head of\ntrue knowledge. Thus true knowledge of all existing things depends on\nthe things themselves, and hence the knowledge of Brahman also depends\naltogether on the thing, i.e. Brahman itself.--But, it might be said, as\nBrahman is an existing substance, it will be the object of the other\nmeans of right knowledge also, and from this it follows that a\ndiscussion of the Vedanta-texts is purposeless.--This we deny; for as\nBrahman is not an object of the senses, it has no connection with those\nother means of knowledge. For the senses have, according to their\nnature, only external things for their objects, not Brahman. If Brahman\nwere an object of the senses, we might perceive that the world is\nconnected with Brahman as its effect; but as the effect only (i.e. the\nworld) is perceived, it is impossible to decide (through perception)\nwhether it is connected with Brahman or something else. Therefore the\nSutra under discussion is not meant to propound inference (as the means\nof knowing Brahman), but rather to set forth a Vedanta-text.--Which,\nthen, is the Vedanta-text which the Sutra points at as having to be\nconsidered with reference to the characteristics of Brahman?--It is the\npassage Taitt. Up. III, 1, 'Bh/ri/gu Varu/n/i went to his father\nVaru/n/a, saying, Sir, teach me Brahman,' &c., up to 'That from whence\nthese beings are born, that by which, when born, they live, that into\nwhich they enter at their death, try to know that. That is Brahman.' The\nsentence finally determining the sense of this passage is found III, 6:\n'From bliss these beings are born; by bliss, when born, they live; into\nbliss they enter at their death.' Other passages also are to be adduced\nwhich declare the cause to be the almighty Being, whose essential nature\nis eternal purity, intelligence, and freedom.\n\nThat Brahman is omniscient we have been made to infer from it being\nshown that it is the cause of the world. To confirm this conclusion, the\nSutrakara continues as follows:\n\n3. (The omniscience of Brahman follows) from its being the source of\nScripture.\n\nBrahman is the source, i.e. the cause of the great body of Scripture,\nconsisting of the /Ri/g-veda and other branches, which is supported by\nvarious disciplines (such as grammar, nyaya, pura/n/a, &c.); which\nlamp-like illuminates all things; which is itself all-knowing as it\nwere. For the origin of a body of Scripture possessing the quality of\nomniscience cannot be sought elsewhere but in omniscience itself. It is\ngenerally understood that the man from whom some special body of\ndoctrine referring to one province of knowledge only originates, as, for\ninstance, grammar from Pa/n/ini possesses a more extensive knowledge\nthan his work, comprehensive though it be; what idea, then, shall we\nhave to form of the supreme omniscience and omnipotence of that great\nBeing, which in sport as it were, easily as a man sends forth his\nbreath, has produced the vast mass of holy texts known as the\n/Ri/g-veda, &c., the mine of all knowledge, consisting of manifold\nbranches, the cause of the distinction of all the different classes and\nconditions of gods, animals, and men! See what Scripture says about him,\n'The /Ri/g-veda, &c., have been breathed forth from that great Being'\n(B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 10).\n\nOr else we may interpret the Sutra to mean that Scripture consisting of\nthe /Ri/g-veda, &c., as described above, is the source or cause, i.e.\nthe means of right knowledge through which we understand the nature of\nBrahman. So that the sense would be: through Scripture only as a means\nof knowledge Brahman is known to be the cause of the origin, &c., of the\nworld. The special scriptural passage meant has been quoted under the\npreceding Sutra 'from which these beings are born,' &c.--But as the\npreceding Sutra already has pointed out a text showing that Scripture is\nthe source of Brahman, of what use then is the present Sutra?--The words\nof the preceding Sutra, we reply, did not clearly indicate the\nscriptural passage, and room was thus left for the suspicion that the\norigin, &c., of the world were adduced merely as determining an\ninference (independent of Scripture). To obviate this suspicion the\nSutra under discussion has been propounded.\n\nBut, again, how can it be said that Scripture is the means of knowing\nBrahman? Since it has been declared that Scripture aims at action\n(according to the Purva Mima/m/sa Sutra I, 2, 1, 'As the purport of\nScripture is action, those scriptural passages whose purport is not\naction are purportless'), the Vedanta-passages whose purport is not\naction are purportless. Or else if they are to have some sense, they\nmust either, by manifesting the agent, the divinity or the fruit of the\naction, form supplements to the passages enjoining actions, or serve the\npurpose of themselves enjoining a new class of actions, such as devout\nmeditation and the like. For the Veda cannot possibly aim at conveying\ninformation regarding the nature of accomplished substances, since the\nlatter are the objects of perception and the other means of proof (which\ngive sufficient information about them; while it is the recognised\nobject of the Veda to give information about what is not known from\nother sources). And if it did give such information, it would not be\nconnected with things to be desired or shunned, and thus be of no use to\nman. For this very reason Vedic passages, such as 'he howled, &c.,'\nwhich at first sight appear purposeless, are shown to have a purpose in\nso far as they glorify certain actions (cp. Pu. Mi. Su. I, 2, 7,\n'Because they stand in syntactical connection with the injunctions,\ntherefore their purport is to glorify the injunctions'). In the same way\nmantras are shown to stand in a certain relation to actions, in so far\nas they notify the actions themselves and the means by which they are\naccomplished. So, for instance, the mantra, 'For strength thee (I cut;'\nwhich accompanies the cutting of a branch employed in the\ndar/s/apur/n/amasa-sacrifice). In short, no Vedic passage is seen or can\nbe proved to have a meaning but in so far as it is related to an action.\nAnd injunctions which are defined as having actions for their objects\ncannot refer to accomplished existent things. Hence we maintain that the\nVedanta-texts are mere supplements to those passages which enjoin\nactions; notifying the agents, divinities, and results connected with\nthose actions. Or else, if this be not admitted, on the ground of its\ninvolving the introduction of a subject-matter foreign to the\nVedanta-texts (viz. the subject-matter of the Karmaka/nd/a of the Veda),\nwe must admit (the second of the two alternatives proposed above viz.)\nthat the Vedanta-texts refer to devout meditation (upasana) and similar\nactions which are mentioned in those very (Vedanta) texts. The result of\nall of which is that Scripture is not the source of Brahman.\n\nTo this argumentation the Sutrakara replies as follows:\n\n4. But that (Brahman is to be known from Scripture), because it is\nconnected (with the Vedanta-texts) as their purport.\n\nThe word 'but' is meant to rebut the purva-paksha (the prima facie view\nas urged above). That all-knowing, all-powerful Brahman, which is the\ncause of the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of the world, is known\nfrom the Vedanta-part of Scripture. How? Because in all the\nVedanta-texts the sentences construe in so far as they have for their\npurport, as they intimate that matter (viz. Brahman). Compare, for\ninstance, 'Being only this was in the beginning, one, without a second'\n(Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1); 'In the beginning all this was Self, one only' (Ait.\nAr. II, 4, 1, 1); 'This is the Brahman without cause and without effect,\nwithout anything inside or outside; this Self is Brahman perceiving\neverything' (B/ri/. Up. II, 5, 19); 'That immortal Brahman is before'\n(Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); and similar passages. If the words contained in\nthese passages have once been determined to refer to Brahman, and their\npurport is understood thereby, it would be improper to assume them to\nhave a different sense; for that would involve the fault of abandoning\nthe direct statements of the text in favour of mere assumptions. Nor can\nwe conclude the purport of these passages to be the intimation of the\nnature of agents, divinities, &c. (connected with acts of religious\nduty); for there are certain scriptural passages which preclude all\nactions, actors, and fruits, as, for instance, B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 13,\n'Then by what should he see whom?' (which passage intimates that there\nis neither an agent, nor an object of action, nor an instrument.) Nor\nagain can Brahman, though it is of the nature of an accomplished thing,\nbe the object of perception and the other means of knowledge; for the\nfact of everything having its Self in Brahman cannot be grasped without\nthe aid of the scriptural passage 'That art thou' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7).\nNor can it rightly be objected that instruction is purportless if not\nconnected with something either to be striven after or shunned; for from\nthe mere comprehension of Brahman's Self, which is not something either\nto be avoided or endeavoured after, there results cessation of all pain,\nand thereby the attainment of man's highest aim. That passages notifying\ncertain divinities, and so on, stand in subordinate relation to acts of\ndevout meditation mentioned in the same chapters may readily be\nadmitted. But it is impossible that Brahman should stand in an analogous\nrelation to injunctions of devout meditation, for if the knowledge of\nabsolute unity has once arisen there exists no longer anything to be\ndesired or avoided, and thereby the conception of duality, according to\nwhich we distinguish actions, agents, and the like, is destroyed. If the\nconception of duality is once uprooted by the conception of absolute\nunity, it cannot arise again, and so no longer be the cause of Brahman\nbeing looked upon as the complementary object of injunctions of\ndevotion. Other parts of the Veda may have no authority except in so far\nas they are connected with injunctions; still it is impossible to impugn\non that ground the authoritativeness of passages conveying the knowledge\nof the Self; for such passages have their own result. Nor, finally, can\nthe authoritativeness of the Veda be proved by inferential reasoning so\nthat it would be dependent on instances observed elsewhere. From all\nwhich it follows that the Veda possesses authority as a means of right\nknowledge of Brahman.\n\nHere others raise the following objection:--Although the Veda is the\nmeans of gaining a right knowledge of Brahman, yet it intimates Brahman\nonly as the object of certain injunctions, just as the information which\nthe Veda gives about the sacrificial post, the ahavaniya-fire and other\nobjects not known from the practice of common life is merely\nsupplementary to certain injunctions[69]. Why so? Because the Veda has\nthe purport of either instigating to action or restraining from it. For\nmen fully acquainted with the object of the Veda have made the following\ndeclaration, 'The purpose of the Veda is seen to be the injunction of\nactions' (Bhashya on Jaimini Sutra I, 1, 1); 'Injunction means passages\nimpelling to action' (Bh. on Jaim. Su. I, 1, 2); 'Of this (viz. active\nreligious duty) the knowledge comes from injunction' (part of Jaim. Su.\nI, 1, 5); 'The (words) denoting those (things) are to be connected with\n(the injunctive verb of the vidhi-passage) whose purport is action'\n(Jaim. Su. I, 1, 25); 'As action is the purport of the Veda, whatever\ndoes not refer to action is purportless' (Jaim. Su. I, 2, 1). Therefore\nthe Veda has a purport in so far only as it rouses the activity of man\nwith regard to some actions and restrains it with regard to others;\nother passages (i.e. all those passages which are not directly\ninjunctive) have a purport only in so far as they supplement injunctions\nand prohibitions. Hence the Vedanta-texts also as likewise belonging to\nthe Veda can have a meaning in the same way only. And if their aim is\ninjunction, then just as the agnihotra-oblation and other rites are\nenjoined as means for him who is desirous of the heavenly world, so the\nknowledge of Brahman is enjoined as a means for him who is desirous of\nimmortality.--But--somebody might object--it has been declared that\nthere is a difference in the character of the objects enquired into, the\nobject of enquiry in the karma-ka/nd/a (that part of the Veda which\ntreats of active religious duty) being something to be accomplished,\nviz. duty, while here the object is the already existent absolutely\naccomplished Brahman. From this it follows that the fruit of the\nknowledge of Brahman must be of a different nature from the fruit of the\nknowledge of duty which depends on the performance of actions[70].--We\nreply that it must not be such because the Vedanta-texts give\ninformation about Brahman only in so far as it is connected with\ninjunctions of actions. We meet with injunctions of the following kind,\n'Verily the Self is to be seen' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 5); 'The Self which\nis free from sin that it is which we must search out, that it is which\nwe must try to understand' (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1); 'Let a man worship him\nas Self' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 7); 'Let a man worship the Self only as his\ntrue state' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 15); 'He who knows Brahman becomes\nBrahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9). These injunctions rouse in us the desire\nto know what that Brahman is. It, therefore, is the task of the\nVedanta-texts to set forth Brahman's nature, and they perform that task\nby teaching us that Brahman is eternal, all-knowing, absolutely\nself-sufficient, ever pure, intelligent and free, pure knowledge,\nabsolute bliss. From the devout meditation on this Brahman there results\nas its fruit, final release, which, although not to be discerned in the\nordinary way, is discerned by means of the /s/astra. If, on the other\nhand, the Vedanta-texts were considered to have no reference to\ninjunctions of actions, but to contain statements about mere\n(accomplished) things, just as if one were saying 'the earth comprises\nseven dvipas,' 'that king is marching on,' they would be purportless,\nbecause then they could not possibly be connected with something to be\nshunned or endeavoured after.--Perhaps it will here be objected that\nsometimes a mere statement about existent things has a purpose, as, for\ninstance, the affirmation, 'This is a rope, not a snake,' serves the\npurpose of removing the fear engendered by an erroneous opinion, and\nthat so likewise the Vedanta-passages making statements about the\nnon-transmigrating Self, have a purport of their own (without reference\nto any action), viz. in so far as they remove the erroneous opinion of\nthe Self being liable to transmigration.--We reply that this might be so\nif just as the mere hearing of the true nature of the rope dispels the\nfear caused by the imagined snake, so the mere hearing of the true\nnature of Brahman would dispel the erroneous notion of one's being\nsubject to transmigration. But this is not the case; for we observe that\neven men to whom the true nature of Brahman has been stated continue to\nbe affected by pleasure, pain, and the other qualities attaching to the\ntransmigratory condition. Moreover, we see from the passage, /Bri/. Up.\nII, 4, 5, 'The Self is to be heard, to be considered, to be reflected\nupon,' that consideration and reflection have to follow the mere\nhearing. From all this it results that the sastra can be admitted as a\nmeans of knowing Brahman in so far only as the latter is connected with\ninjunctions.\n\nTo all this, we, the Vedantins, make the following reply:--The preceding\nreasoning is not valid, on account of the different nature of the fruits\nof actions on the one side, and of the knowledge of Brahman on the other\nside. The enquiry into those actions, whether of body, speech, or mind,\nwhich are known from /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti, and are comprised under the\nname 'religious duty' (dharma), is carried on in the Jaimini Sutra,\nwhich begins with the words 'then therefore the enquiry into duty;' the\nopposite of duty also (adharma), such as doing harm, &c., which is\ndefined in the prohibitory injunctions, forms an object of enquiry to\nthe end that it may be avoided. The fruits of duty, which is good, and\nits opposite, which is evil, both of which are defined by original Vedic\nstatements, are generally known to be sensible pleasure and pain, which\nmake themselves felt to body, speech, and mind only, are produced by the\ncontact of the organs of sense with the objects, and affect all animate\nbeings from Brahman down to a tuft of grass. Scripture, agreeing with\nobservation, states that there are differences in the degree of pleasure\nof all embodied creatures from men upward to Brahman. From those\ndifferences it is inferred that there are differences in the degrees of\nthe merit acquired by actions in accordance with religious duty;\ntherefrom again are inferred differences in degree between those\nqualified to perform acts of religious duty. Those latter differences\nare moreover known to be affected by the desire of certain results\n(which entitles the man so desirous to perform certain religious acts),\nworldly possessions, and the like. It is further known from Scripture\nthat those only who perform sacrifices proceed, in consequence of the\npre-eminence of their knowledge and meditation, on the northern path (of\nthe sun; Ch. Up. V, 10, 1), while mere minor offerings, works of public\nutility and alms, only lead through smoke and the other stages to the\nsouthern path. And that there also (viz. in the moon which is finally\nreached by those who have passed along the southern path) there are\ndegrees of pleasure and the means of pleasure is understood from the\npassage 'Having dwelt there till their works are consumed.' Analogously\nit is understood that the different degrees of pleasure which are\nenjoyed by the embodied creatures, from man downward to the inmates of\nhell and to immovable things, are the mere effects of religious merit as\ndefined in Vedic injunctions. On the other hand, from the different\ndegrees of pain endured by higher and lower embodied creatures, there is\ninferred difference of degree in its cause, viz. religious demerit as\ndefined in the prohibitory injunctions, and in its agents. This\ndifference in the degree of pain and pleasure, which has for its\nantecedent embodied existence, and for its cause the difference of\ndegree of merit and demerit of animated beings, liable to faults such as\nignorance and the like, is well known--from /S/ruti, Sm/ri/ti, and\nreasoning--to be non-eternal, of a fleeting, changing nature\n(sa/m/sara). The following text, for instance, 'As long as he is in the\nbody he cannot get free from pleasure and pain' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 1),\nrefers to the sa/m/sara-state as described above. From the following\npassage, on the other hand, 'When he is free from the body then neither\npleasure nor pain touches him,' which denies the touch of pain or\npleasure, we learn that the unembodied state called 'final release'\n(moksha) is declared not to be the effect of religious merit as defined\nby Vedic injunctions. For if it were the effect of merit it would not be\ndenied that it is subject to pain and pleasure. Should it be said that\nthe very circumstance of its being an unembodied state is the effect of\nmerit, we reply that that cannot be, since Scripture declares that state\nto be naturally and originally an unembodied one. 'The wise who knows\nthe Self as bodiless within the bodies, as unchanging among changing\nthings, as great and omnipresent does never grieve' (Ka. Up. II, 22);\n'He is without breath, without mind, pure' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2); 'That\nperson is not attached to anything' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 15)[71]. All\nwhich passages establish the fact that so-called release differs from\nall the fruits of action, and is an eternally and essentially\ndisembodied state. Among eternal things, some indeed may be 'eternal,\nalthough changing' (pari/n/aminitya), viz. those, the idea of whose\nidentity is not destroyed, although they may undergo changes; such, for\ninstance, are earth and the other elements in the opinion of those who\nmaintain the eternity of the world, or the three gu/n/as in the opinion\nof the Sa@nkhyas. But this (moksha) is eternal in the true sense, i.e.\neternal without undergoing any changes (ku/ta/sthanitya), omnipresent as\nether, free from all modifications, absolutely self-sufficient, not\ncomposed of parts, of self-luminous nature. That bodiless entity in\nfact, to which merit and demerit with their consequences and threefold\ntime do not apply, is called release; a definition agreeing with\nscriptural passages, such as the following: 'Different from merit and\ndemerit, different from effect and cause, different from past and\nfuture' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 14). It[72] (i.e. moksha) is, therefore, the same\nas Brahman in the enquiry into which we are at present engaged. If\nBrahman were represented as supplementary to certain actions, and\nrelease were assumed to be the effect of those actions, it would be\nnon-eternal, and would have to be considered merely as something holding\na pre-eminent position among the described non-eternal fruits of actions\nwith their various degrees. But that release is something eternal is\nacknowledged by whoever admits it at all, and the teaching concerning\nBrahman can therefore not be merely supplementary to actions.\n\nThere are, moreover, a number of scriptural passages which declare\nrelease to follow immediately on the cognition of Brahman, and which\nthus preclude the possibility of an effect intervening between the two;\nfor instance, 'He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2,\n9); 'All his works perish when He has been beheld, who is the higher and\nthe lower' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8); 'He who knows the bliss of Brahman fears\nnothing' (Taitt. Up. II, 9); 'O Janaka, you have indeed reached\nfearlessness' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 2, 4); 'That Brahman knew its Self only,\nsaying, I am Brahman. From it all this sprang' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 10);\n'What sorrow, what trouble can there be to him who beholds that unity?'\n(Is. Up. 7.) We must likewise quote the passage,--B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 10,\n('Seeing this the /Ri/shi Vamadeva understood: I was Manu, I was the\nsun,') in order to exclude the idea of any action taking place between\none's seeing Brahman and becoming one with the universal Self; for that\npassage is analogous to the following one, 'standing he sings,' from\nwhich we understand that no action due to the same agent intervenes\nbetween the standing and the singing. Other scriptural passages show\nthat the removal of the obstacles which lie in the way of release is the\nonly fruit of the knowledge of Brahman; so, for instance, 'You indeed\nare our father, you who carry us from our ignorance to the other shore'\n(Pr. Up. VI, 8); 'I have heard from men like you that he who knows the\nSelf overcomes grief. I am in grief. Do, Sir, help me over this grief of\nmine' (Ch. Up. VII, 1, 3); 'To him after his faults had been rubbed out,\nthe venerable Sanatkumara showed the other side of darkness' (Ch. Up.\nVII, 26, 2). The same is the purport of the Sutra, supported by\narguments, of (Gautama) Akarya, 'Final release results from the\nsuccessive removal of wrong knowledge, faults, activity, birth, pain,\nthe removal of each later member of the series depending on the removal\nof the preceding member' (Nyay. Su. I, i, 2); and wrong knowledge itself\nis removed by the knowledge of one's Self being one with the Self of\nBrahman.\n\nNor is this knowledge of the Self being one with Brahman a mere\n(fanciful) combination[73], as is made use of, for instance, in the\nfollowing passage, 'For the mind is endless, and the Vi/s/vedevas are\nendless, and he thereby gains the endless world' (B/ri/. Up. III, 1,\n9)[74]; nor is it an (in reality unfounded) ascription\n(superimposition)[75], as in the passages, 'Let him meditate on mind as\nBrahman,' and 'Aditya is Brahman, this is the doctrine' (Ch. Up. III,\n18, 1; 19, 1), where the contemplation as Brahman is superimposed on the\nmind, Aditya and so on; nor, again, is it (a figurative conception of\nidentity) founded on the connection (of the things viewed as identical)\nwith some special activity, as in the passage, 'Air is indeed the\nabsorber; breath is indeed the absorber[76]' (Ch. Up. IV, 3, 1; 3); nor\nis it a mere (ceremonial) purification of (the Self constituting a\nsubordinate member) of an action (viz. the action of seeing, &c.,\nBrahman), in the same way as, for instance, the act of looking at the\nsacrificial butter[77]. For if the knowledge of the identity of the Self\nand Brahman were understood in the way of combination and the like,\nviolence would be done thereby to the connection of the words whose\nobject, in certain passages, it clearly is to intimate the fact of\nBrahman and the Self being really identical; so, for instance, in the\nfollowing passages, 'That art thou' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7); 'I am Brahman'\n(B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 10); 'This Self is Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. II, 5, 19).\nAnd other texts which declare that the fruit of the cognition of Brahman\nis the cessation of Ignorance would be contradicted thereby; so, for\ninstance, 'The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved'\n(Mu. Up. II, 2, 8). Nor, finally, would it be possible, in that case,\nsatisfactorily to explain the passages which speak of the individual\nSelf becoming Brahman: such as 'He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman'\n(Mu. Up. III, 2, 9). Hence the knowledge of the unity of Brahman and the\nSelf cannot be of the nature of figurative combination and the like. The\nknowledge of Brahman does, therefore, not depend on the active energy of\nman, but is analogous to the knowledge of those things which are the\nobjects of perception, inference, and so on, and thus depends on the\nobject of knowledge only. Of such a Brahman or its knowledge it is\nimpossible to establish, by reasoning, any connection with actions.\n\nNor, again, can we connect Brahman with acts by representing it as the\nobject of the action of knowing. For that it is not such is expressly\ndeclared in two passages, viz. 'It is different from the known and again\nabove (i.e. different from) the unknown' (Ken. Up. I, 3); and 'How\nshould he know him by whom he knows all this?' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 13.)\nIn the same way Brahman is expressly declared not to be the object of\nthe act of devout meditation, viz. in the second half of the verse, Ken.\nUp. I, 5, whose first half declares it not to be an object (of speech,\nmind, and so on), 'That which is not proclaimed by speech, by which\nspeech is proclaimed, that only know to be Brahman, not that on which\npeople devoutly meditate as this.' If it should be objected that if\nBrahman is not an object (of speech, mind, &c.) the sastra can\nimpossibly be its source, we refute this objection by the remark that\nthe aim of the sastra is to discard all distinctions fictitiously\ncreated by Nescience. The sastra's purport is not to represent Brahman\ndefinitely as this or that object, its purpose is rather to show that\nBrahman as the eternal subject (pratyagatman, the inward Self) is never\nan object, and thereby to remove the distinction of objects known,\nknowers, acts of knowledge, &c., which is fictitiously created by\nNescience. Accordingly the sastra says, 'By whom it is not thought by\nhim it is thought, by whom it is thought he does not know it; unknown by\nthose who know it, it is known by those who do not know it' (Ken. Up.\nII, 3); and 'Thou couldst not see the seer of sight, thou couldst not\nhear the hearer of hearing, nor perceive the perceiver of perception,\nnor know the knower of knowledge' (B/ri/. Up. III, 4, 2). As thereby\n(i.e. by the knowledge derived from the sastra) the imagination of the\ntransitoriness of Release which is due to Nescience is discarded, and\nRelease is shown to be of the nature of the eternally free Self, it\ncannot be charged with the imperfection of non-eternality. Those, on the\nother hand, who consider Release to be something to be effected properly\nmaintain that it depends on the action of mind, speech, or body. So,\nlikewise, those who consider it to be a mere modification.\nNon-eternality of Release is the certain consequence of these two\nopinions; for we observe in common life that things which are\nmodifications, such as sour milk and the like, and things which are\neffects, such as jars, &c., are non-eternal. Nor, again, can it be said\nthat there is a dependance on action in consequence of (Brahman or\nRelease) being something which is to be obtained[78]; for as Brahman\nconstitutes a person's Self it is not something to be attained by that\nperson. And even if Brahman were altogether different from a person's\nSelf still it would not be something to be obtained; for as it is\nomnipresent it is part of its nature that it is ever present to every\none, just as the (all-pervading) ether is. Nor, again, can it be\nmaintained that Release is something to be ceremonially purified, and as\nsuch depends on an activity. For ceremonial purification (sa/m/skara)\nresults either from the accretion of some excellence or from the removal\nof some blemish. The former alternative does not apply to Release as it\nis of the nature of Brahman, to which no excellence can be added; nor,\nagain, does the latter alternative apply, since Release is of the nature\nof Brahman, which is eternally pure.--But, it might be said, Release\nmight be a quality of the Self which is merely hidden and becomes\nmanifest on the Self being purified by some action; just as the quality\nof clearness becomes manifest in a mirror when the mirror is cleaned by\nmeans of the action of rubbing.--This objection is invalid, we reply,\nbecause the Self cannot be the abode of any action. For an action cannot\nexist without modifying that in which it abides. But if the Self were\nmodified by an action its non-eternality would result therefrom, and\ntexts such as the following, 'unchangeable he is called,' would thus be\nstultified; an altogether unacceptable result. Hence it is impossible to\nassume that any action should abide in the Self. On the other hand, the\nSelf cannot be purified by actions abiding in something else as it\nstands in no relation to that extraneous something. Nor will it avail to\npoint out (as a quasi-analogous case) that the embodied Self (dehin, the\nindividual soul) is purified by certain ritual actions which abide in\nthe body, such as bathing, rinsing one's mouth, wearing the sacrificial\nthread, and the like. For what is purified by those actions is that Self\nmerely which is joined to the body, i.e. the Self in so far as it is\nunder the power of Nescience. For it is a matter of perception that\nbathing and similar actions stand in the relation of inherence to the\nbody, and it is therefore only proper to conclude that by such actions\nonly that something is purified which is joined to the body. If a person\nthinks 'I am free from disease,' he predicates health of that entity\nonly which is connected with and mistakenly identifies itself with the\nharmonious condition of matter (i.e. the body) resulting from\nappropriate medical treatment applied to the body (i.e. the 'I'\nconstituting the subject of predication is only the individual embodied\nSelf). Analogously that I which predicates of itself, that it is\npurified by bathing and the like, is only the individual soul joined to\nthe body. For it is only this latter principle of egoity\n(aha/m/kart/ri/), the object of the notion of the ego and the agent in\nall cognition, which accomplishes all actions and enjoys their results.\nThus the mantras also declare, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit, the\nother looks on without eating' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1); and 'When he is in\nunion with the body, the senses, and the mind, then wise people call him\nthe Enjoyer' (Ka. Up. III, 1, 4). Of Brahman, on the other hand, the two\nfollowing passages declare that it is incapable of receiving any\naccretion and eternally pure, 'He is the one God, hidden in all beings,\nall-pervading, the Self within all beings, watching over all works,\ndwelling in all beings, the witness, the perceiver, the only one; free\nfrom qualities' (/S/v. Up. VI, 11); and 'He pervaded all, bright,\nincorporeal, scatheless, without muscles, pure, untouched by evil'\n(I/s/. Up. 8). But Release is nothing but being Brahman. Therefore\nRelease is not something to be purified. And as nobody is able to show\nany other way in which Release could be connected with action, it is\nimpossible that it should stand in any, even the slightest, relation to\nany action, excepting knowledge.\n\nBut, it will be said here, knowledge itself is an activity of the mind.\nBy no means, we reply; since the two are of different nature. An action\nis that which is enjoined as being independent of the nature of existing\nthings and dependent on the energy of some person's mind; compare, for\ninstance, the following passages, 'To whichever divinity the offering is\nmade on that one let him meditate when about to say vasha/t/' (Ait.\nBrahm. III, 8, 1); and 'Let him meditate in his mind on the sandhya.'\nMeditation and reflection are indeed mental, but as they depend on the\n(meditating, &c.) person they may either be performed or not be\nperformed or modified. Knowledge, on the other hand, is the result of\nthe different means of (right) knowledge, and those have for their\nobjects existing things; knowledge can therefore not be either made or\nnot made or modified, but depends entirely on existing things, and not\neither on Vedic statements or on the mind of man. Although mental it\nthus widely differs from meditation and the like.\n\nThe meditation, for instance, on man and woman as fire, which is founded\non Ch. Up. V, 7, 1; 8, 1, 'The fire is man, O Gautama; the fire is\nwoman, O Gautama,' is on account of its being the result of a Vedic\nstatement, merely an action and dependent on man; that conception of\nfire, on the other hand, which refers to the well-known (real) fire, is\nneither dependent on Vedic statements nor on man, but only on a real\nthing which is an object of perception; it is therefore knowledge and\nnot an action. The same remark applies to all things which are the\nobjects of the different means of right knowledge. This being thus that\nknowledge also which has the existent Brahman for its object is not\ndependent on Vedic injunction. Hence, although imperative and similar\nforms referring to the knowledge of Brahman are found in the Vedic\ntexts, yet they are ineffective because they refer to something which\ncannot be enjoined, just as the edge of a razor becomes blunt when it is\napplied to a stone. For they have for their object something which can\nneither be endeavoured after nor avoided.--But what then, it will be\nasked, is the purport of those sentences which, at any rate, have the\nappearance of injunctions; such as, 'The Self is to be seen, to be heard\nabout?'--They have the purport, we reply, of diverting (men) from the\nobjects of natural activity. For when a man acts intent on external\nthings, and only anxious to attain the objects of his desire and to\neschew the objects of his aversion, and does not thereby reach the\nhighest aim of man although desirous of attaining it; such texts as the\none quoted divert him from the objects of natural activity and turn the\nstream of his thoughts on the inward (the highest) Self. That for him\nwho is engaged in the enquiry into the Self, the true nature of the Self\nis nothing either to be endeavoured after or to be avoided, we learn\nfrom texts such as the following: 'This everything, all is that Self'\n(B/ri/, Up. II, 4, 6); 'But when the Self only is all this, how should\nhe see another, how should he know another, how should he know the\nknower?' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 15); 'This Self is Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. II,\n5, 19). That the knowledge of Brahman refers to something which is not a\nthing to be done, and therefore is not concerned either with the pursuit\nor the avoidance of any object, is the very thing we admit; for just\nthat constitutes our glory, that as soon as we comprehend Brahman, all\nour duties come to an end and all our work is over. Thus /S/ruti says,\n'If a man understands the Self, saying, \"I am he,\" what could he wish or\ndesire that he should pine after the body?' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 12.) And\nsimilarly Sm/ri/ti declares, 'Having understood this the understanding\nman has done with all work, O Bharata' (Bha. Gita XV, 20). Therefore\nBrahman is not represented as the object of injunctions.\n\nWe now proceed to consider the doctrine of those who maintain that there\nis no part of the Veda which has the purport of making statements about\nmere existent things, and is not either an injunction or a prohibition,\nor supplementary to either. This opinion is erroneous, because the soul\n(purusha), which is the subject of the Upanishads, does not constitute a\ncomplement to anything else. Of that soul which is to be comprehended\nfrom the Upanishads only, which is non-transmigratory, Brahman,\ndifferent in nature from the four classes of substances[79], which forms\na topic of its own and is not a complement to anything else; of that\nsoul it is impossible to say that it is not or is not apprehended; for\nthe passage, 'That Self is to be described by No, no!' (B/ri/. Up. III,\n9, 26) designates it as the Self, and that the Self is cannot be denied.\nThe possible objection that there is no reason to maintain that the soul\nis known from the Upanishads only, since it is the object of\nself-consciousness, is refuted by the fact that the soul of which the\nUpanishads treat is merely the witness of that (i.e. of the object of\nself-consciousness, viz. the jivatman). For neither from that part of\nthe Veda which enjoins works nor from reasoning, anybody apprehends that\nsoul which, different from the agent that is the object of\nself-consciousness, merely witnesses it; which is permanent in all\n(transitory) beings; uniform; one; eternally unchanging; the Self of\neverything. Hence it can neither be denied nor be represented as the\nmere complement of injunctions; for of that very person who might deny\nit it is the Self. And as it is the Self of all, it can neither be\nstriven after nor avoided. All perishable things indeed perish, because\nthey are mere modifications, up to (i.e. exclusive of) the soul. But the\nsoul is imperishable[80], as there is no cause why it should perish; and\neternally unchanging, as there is no cause for its undergoing any\nmodification; hence it is in its essence eternally pure and free. And\nfrom passages, such as 'Beyond the soul there is nothing; this is the\ngoal, the highest road' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 11), and 'That soul, taught in\nthe Upanishads, I ask thee' (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 26), it appears that the\nattribute of resting on the Upanishads is properly given to the soul, as\nit constitutes their chief topic. To say, therefore, that there is no\nportion of the Veda referring to existing things, is a mere bold\nassertion.\n\nWith regard to the quotations made of the views of men acquainted with\nthe purport of the /S/astra (who alone were stated to have declared that\nthe Veda treats of actions) it is to be understood that they, having to\ndo with the enquiry into duty, refer to that part of the /S/astra which\nconsists of injunctions and prohibitions. With regard to the other\npassage quoted ('as action is the purport of the Veda, whatever does not\nrefer to action is purportless') we remark that if that passage were\ntaken in an absolutely strict sense (when it would mean that only those\nwords which denote action have a meaning), it would follow that all\ninformation about existent things is meaningless[81]. If, on the other\nhand, the Veda--in addition to the injunctions of activity and cessation\nof activity--does give information about existent things as being\nsubservient to some action to be accomplished, why then should it not\ngive information also about the existent eternally unchangeable Self?\nFor an existent thing, about which information is given, does not become\nan act (through being stated to be subservient to an act).--But, it will\nbe said, although existent things are not acts, yet, as they are\ninstrumental to action, the information given about such things is\nmerely subservient to action.--This, we reply, does not matter; for\nalthough the information may be subservient to action, the things\nthemselves about which information is given are already intimated\nthereby as things which have the power of bringing about certain\nactions. Their final end (prayojana) indeed may be subserviency to some\naction, but thereby they do not cease to be, in the information given\nabout them, intimated in themselves.--Well, and if they are thus\nintimated, what is gained thereby for your purpose[82]? We reply that\nthe information about the Self, which is an existing thing not\ncomprehended from other sources, is of the same nature (as the\ninformation about other existent things); for by the comprehension of\nthe Self a stop is put to all false knowledge, which is the cause of\ntransmigration, and thus a purpose is established which renders the\npassages relative to Brahman equal to those passages which give\ninformation about things instrumental to actions. Moreover, there are\nfound (even in that part of the Veda which treats of actions) such\npassages as 'a Brahma/n/a is not to be killed,' which teach abstinence\nfrom certain actions. Now abstinence from action is neither action nor\ninstrumental to action. If, therefore, the tenet that all those passages\nwhich do not express action are devoid of purport were insisted on, it\nwould follow that all such passages as the one quoted, which teach\nabstinence from action, are devoid of purport--a consequence which is of\ncourse unacceptable. Nor, again, can the connexion in which the word\n'not' stands with the action expressed by the verb 'is to be\nkilled'--which action is naturally established[83]--be used as a reason\nfor assuming that 'not' denotes an action non-established elsewhere[84],\ndifferent from the state of mere passivity implied in the abstinence\nfrom the act of killing. For the peculiar function of the particle 'not'\nis to intimate the idea of the non-existence of that with which it is\nconnected, and the conception of the non-existence (of something to be\ndone) is the cause of the state of passivity. (Nor can it be objected\nthat, as soon as that momentary idea has passed away, the state of\npassivity will again make room for activity; for) that idea itself\npasses away (only after having completely destroyed the natural impulse\nprompting to the murder of a Brahma/n/a, &c., just as a fire is\nextinguished only after having completely consumed its fuel). Hence we\nare of opinion that the aim of prohibitory passages, such as 'a\nBrahma/n/a is not to be killed,' is a merely passive state, consisting\nin the abstinence from some possible action; excepting some special\ncases, such as the so-called Prajapati-vow, &c.[85] Hence the charge of\nwant of purpose is to be considered as referring (not to the\nVedanta-passages, but only) to such statements about existent things as\nare of the nature of legends and the like, and do not serve any purpose\nof man.\n\nThe allegation that a mere statement about an actually existent thing\nnot connected with an injunction of something to be done, is purposeless\n(as, for instance, the statement that the earth contains seven dvipas)\nhas already been refuted on the ground that a purpose is seen to exist\nin some such statements, as, for instance, 'this is not a snake, but a\nrope.'--But how about the objection raised above that the information\nabout Brahman cannot be held to have a purpose in the same way as the\nstatement about a rope has one, because a man even after having heard\nabout Brahman continues to belong to this transmigratory world?--We\nreply as follows: It is impossible to show that a man who has once\nunderstood Brahman to be the Self, belongs to the transmigratory world\nin the same sense as he did before, because that would be contrary to\nthe fact of his being Brahman. For we indeed observe that a person who\nimagines the body, and so on, to constitute the Self, is subject to fear\nand pain, but we have no right to assume that the same person after\nhaving, by means of the Veda, comprehended Brahman to be the Self, and\nthus having got over his former imaginings, will still in the same\nmanner be subject to pain and fear whose cause is wrong knowledge. In\nthe same way we see that a rich householder, puffed up by the conceit of\nhis wealth, is grieved when his possessions are taken from him; but we\ndo not see that the loss of his wealth equally grieves him after he has\nonce retired from the world and put off the conceit of his riches. And,\nagain, we see that a person possessing a pair of beautiful earrings\nderives pleasure from the proud conceit of ownership; but after he has\nlost the earrings and the conceit established thereon, the pleasure\nderived from them vanishes. Thus /S/ruti also declares, 'When he is free\nfrom the body, then neither pleasure nor pain touches him' (Ch. Up.\nVIII, 12, 1). If it should be objected that the condition of being free\nfrom the body follows on death only, we demur, since the cause of man\nbeing joined to the body is wrong knowledge. For it is not possible to\nestablish the state of embodiedness upon anything else but wrong\nknowledge. And that the state of disembodiedness is eternal on account\nof its not having actions for its cause, we have already explained. The\nobjection again, that embodiedness is caused by the merit and demerit\neffected by the Self (and therefore real), we refute by remarking that\nas the (reality of the) conjunction of the Self with the body is itself\nnot established, the circumstance of merit and demerit being due to the\naction of the Self is likewise not established; for (if we should try to\nget over this difficulty by representing the Self's embodiedness as\ncaused by merit and demerit) we should commit the logical fault of\nmaking embodiedness dependent on merit and demerit, and again merit and\ndemerit on embodiedness. And the assumption of an endless retrogressive\nchain (of embodied states and merit and demerit) would be no better than\na chain of blind men (who are unable to lead one another). Moreover, the\nSelf can impossibly become an agent, as it cannot enter into intimate\nrelation to actions. If it should be said that the Self may be\nconsidered as an agent in the same way as kings and other great people\nare (who without acting themselves make others act) by their mere\npresence, we deny the appositeness of this instance; for kings may\nbecome agents through their relation to servants whom they procure by\ngiving them wages, &c., while it is impossible to imagine anything,\nanalogous to money, which could be the cause of a connexion between the\nSelf as lord and the body, and so on (as servants). Wrong imagination,\non the other hand, (of the individual Self, considering itself to be\njoined to the body,) is a manifest reason of the connexion of the two\n(which is not based on any assumption). This explains also in how far\nthe Self can be considered as the agent in sacrifices and similar\nacts[86]. Here it is objected that the Self's imagination as to the\nbody, and so on, belonging to itself is not false, but is to be\nunderstood in a derived (figurative) sense. This objection we invalidate\nby the remark that the distinction of derived and primary senses of\nwords is known to be applicable only where an actual difference of\nthings is known to exist. We are, for instance, acquainted with a\ncertain species of animals having a mane, and so on, which is the\nexclusive primary object of the idea and word 'lion,' and we are\nlikewise acquainted with persons possessing in an eminent degree certain\nleonine qualities, such as fierceness, courage, &c.; here, a well\nsettled difference of objects existing, the idea and the name 'lion' are\napplied to those persons in a derived or figurative sense. In those\ncases, however, where the difference of the objects is not well\nestablished, the transfer of the conception and name of the one to the\nother is not figurative, but simply founded on error. Such is, for\ninstance, the case of a man who at the time of twilight does not discern\nthat the object before him is a post, and applies to it the conception\nand designation of a man; such is likewise the case of the conception\nand designation of silver being applied to a shell of mother-of-pearl\nsomehow mistaken for silver. How then can it be maintained that the\napplication of the word and the conception of the Ego to the body, &c.,\nwhich application is due to the non-discrimination of the Self and the\nNot-Self, is figurative (rather than simply false)? considering that\neven learned men who know the difference of the Self and the Not-Self\nconfound the words and ideas just as common shepherds and goatherds do.\n\nAs therefore the application of the conception of the Ego to the body on\nthe part of those who affirm the existence of a Self different from the\nbody is simply false, not figurative, it follows that the embodiedness\nof the Self is (not real but) caused by wrong conception, and hence that\nthe person who has reached true knowledge is free from his body even\nwhile still alive. The same is declared in the /S/ruti passages\nconcerning him who knows Brahman: 'And as the slough of a snake lies on\nan ant-hill, dead and cast away, thus lies this body; but that\ndisembodied immortal spirit is Brahman only, is only light' (B/ri/. Up.\nIV, 4, 7); and 'With eyes he is without eyes as it were, with ears\nwithout ears as it were, with speech without speech as it were, with a\nmind without mind as it were, with vital airs without vital airs as it\nwere.' Sm/ri/ti also, in the passage where the characteristic marks are\nenumerated of one whose mind is steady (Bha. Gita II, 54), declares that\nhe who knows is no longer connected with action of any kind. Therefore\nthe man who has once comprehended Brahman to be the Self, does not\nbelong to this transmigratory world as he did before. He, on the other\nhand, who still belongs to this transmigratory world as before, has not\ncomprehended Brahman to be the Self. Thus there remain no unsolved\ncontradictions.\n\nWith reference again to the assertion that Brahman is not fully\ndetermined in its own nature, but stands in a complementary relation to\ninjunctions, because the hearing about Brahman is to be followed by\nconsideration and reflection, we remark that consideration and\nreflection are themselves merely subservient to the comprehension of\nBrahman. If Brahman, after having been comprehended, stood in a\nsubordinate relation to some injunctions, it might be said to be merely\nsupplementary. But this is not the case, since consideration and\nreflection no less than hearing are subservient to comprehension. It\nfollows that the /S/astra cannot be the means of knowing Brahman only in\nso far as it is connected with injunctions, and the doctrine that on\naccount of the uniform meaning of the Vedanta-texts, an independent\nBrahman is to be admitted, is thereby fully established. Hence there is\nroom for beginning the new /S/astra indicated in the first Sutra, 'Then\ntherefore the enquiry into Brahman.' If, on the other hand, the\nVedanta-texts were connected with injunctions, a new /S/astra would\neither not be begun at all, since the /S/astra concerned with\ninjunctions has already been introduced by means of the first Sutra of\nthe Purva Mima/m/sa, 'Then therefore the enquiry into duty;' or if it\nwere begun it would be introduced as follows: 'Then therefore the\nenquiry into the remaining duties;' just as a new portion of the Purva\nMima/m/sa Sutras is introduced with the words, 'Then therefore the\nenquiry into what subserves the purpose of the sacrifice, and what\nsubserves the purpose of man' (Pu. Mi. Su. IV, 1, 1). But as the\ncomprehension of the unity of Brahman and the Self has not been\npropounded (in the previous /S/astra), it is quite appropriate that a\nnew /S/astra, whose subject is Brahman, should be entered upon. Hence\nall injunctions and all other means of knowledge end with the cognition\nexpressed in the words, 'I am Brahman;' for as soon as there supervenes\nthe comprehension of the non-dual Self, which is not either something to\nbe eschewed or something to be appropriated, all objects and knowing\nagents vanish, and hence there can no longer be means of proof. In\naccordance with this, they (i.e. men knowing Brahman) have made the\nfollowing declaration:--'When there has arisen (in a man's mind) the\nknowledge, \"I am that which is, Brahman is my Self,\" and when, owing to\nthe sublation of the conceptions of body, relatives, and the like, the\n(imagination of) the figurative and the false Self has come to an\nend[87]; how should then the effect[88] (of that wrong imagination)\nexist any longer? As long as the knowledge of the Self, which Scripture\ntells us to search after, has not arisen, so long the Self is knowing\nsubject; but that same subject is that which is searched after, viz.\n(the highest Self) free from all evil and blemish. Just as the idea of\nthe Self being the body is assumed as valid (in ordinary life), so all\nthe ordinary sources of knowledge (perception and the like) are valid\nonly until the one Self is ascertained.'\n\n(Herewith the section comprising the four Sutras is finished[89].)\n\nSo far it has been declared that the Vedanta-passages, whose purport is\nthe comprehension of Brahman being the Self, and which have their object\ntherein, refer exclusively to Brahman without any reference to actions.\nAnd it has further been shown that Brahman is the omniscient omnipotent\ncause of the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of the world. But now\nthe Sa@nkhyas and others being of opinion that an existent substance is\nto be known through other means of proof (not through the Veda) infer\ndifferent causes, such as the pradhana and the like, and thereupon\ninterpret the Vedanta-passages as referring to the latter. All the\nVedanta-passages, they maintain, which treat of the creation of the\nworld distinctly point out that the cause (of the world) has to be\nconcluded from the effect by inference; and the cause which is to be\ninferred is the connexion of the pradhana with the souls (purusha). The\nfollowers of Ka/n/ada again infer from the very same passages that the\nLord is the efficient cause of the world while the atoms are its\nmaterial cause. And thus other argumentators also taking their stand on\npassages apparently favouring their views and on fallacious arguments\nraise various objections. For this reason the teacher\n(Vyasa)--thoroughly acquainted as he is with words, passages, and means\nof proof--proceeds to state as prima facie views, and afterwards to\nrefute, all those opinions founded on deceptive passages and fallacious\narguments. Thereby he at the same time proves indirectly that what the\nVedanta-texts aim at is the comprehension of Brahman.\n\nThe Sa@nkhyas who opine that the non-intelligent pradhana consisting of\nthree constituent elements (gu/n/a) is the cause of the world argue as\nfollows. The Vedanta-passages which you have declared to intimate that\nthe all-knowing all-powerful Brahman is the cause of the world can be\nconsistently interpreted also on the doctrine of the pradhana being the\ngeneral cause. Omnipotence (more literally: the possession of all\npowers) can be ascribed to the pradhana in so far as it has all its\neffects for its objects. All-knowingness also can be ascribed to it,\nviz. in the following manner. What you think to be knowledge is in\nreality an attribute of the gu/n/a of Goodness[90], according to the\nSm/ri/ti passage 'from Goodness springs knowledge' (Bha. Gita XIV, 17).\nBy means of this attribute of Goodness, viz. knowledge, certain men\nendowed with organs which are effects (of the pradhana) are known as\nall-knowing Yogins; for omniscience is acknowledged to be connected with\nthe very highest degree of 'Goodness.' Now to the soul (purusha) which\nis isolated, destitute of effected organs, consisting of pure\n(undifferenced) intelligence it is quite impossible to ascribe either\nall-knowingness or limited knowledge; the pradhana, on the other hand,\nbecause consisting of the three gu/n/as, comprises also in its pradhana\nstate the element of Goodness which is the cause of all-knowingness. The\nVedanta-passages therefore in a derived (figurative) sense ascribe\nall-knowingness to the pradhana, although it is in itself\nnon-intelligent. Moreover you (the Vedantin) also who assume an\nall-knowing Brahman can ascribe to it all-knowingness in so far only as\nthat term means capacity for all knowledge. For Brahman cannot always be\nactually engaged in the cognition of everything; for from this there\nwould follow the absolute permanency of his cognition, and this would\ninvolve a want of independence on Brahman's part with regard to the\nactivity of knowing. And if you should propose to consider Brahman's\ncognition as non-permanent it would follow that with the cessation of\nthe cognition Brahman itself would cease. Therefore all-knowingness is\npossible only in the sense of capacity for all knowledge. Moreover you\nassume that previously to the origination of the world Brahman is\nwithout any instruments of action. But without the body, the senses, &c.\nwhich are the instruments of knowledge, cognition cannot take place in\nany being. And further it must be noted that the pradhana, as consisting\nof various elements, is capable of undergoing modifications, and may\ntherefore act as a (material) cause like clay and other substances;\nwhile the uncompounded homogeneous Brahman is unable to do so.\n\nTo these conclusions he (Vyasa) replies in the following Sutra.\n\n5. On account of seeing (i.e. thinking being attributed in the\nUpanishads to the cause of the world; the pradhana) is not (to be\nidentified with the cause indicated by the Upanishads; for) it is not\nfounded on Scripture.\n\nIt is impossible to find room in the Vedanta-texts for the\nnon-intelligent pradhana, the fiction of the Sa@nkhyas; because it is\nnot founded on Scripture. How so? Because the quality of seeing, i.e.\nthinking, is in Scripture ascribed to the cause. For the passage, Ch.\nUp. VI, 2, (which begins: 'Being only, my dear, this was in the\nbeginning, one only, without a second,' and goes on, 'It thought (saw),\nmay I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth fire,') declares that\nthis world differentiated by name and form, which is there denoted by\nthe word 'this,' was before its origination identical with the Self of\nthat which is and that the principle denoted by the term 'the being' (or\n'that which is') sent forth fire and the other elements after having\nthought. The following passage also ('Verily in the beginning all this\nwas Self, one only; there was nothing else blinking whatsoever. He\nthought, shall I send forth worlds? He sent forth these worlds,' Ait.\nAr. II, 4, 1, 2) declares the creation to have had thought for its\nantecedent. In another passage also (Pr. Up. VI, 3) it is said of the\nperson of sixteen parts, 'He thought, &c. He sent forth Pra/n/a.' By\n'seeing' (i.e. the verb 'seeing' exhibited in the Sutra) is not meant\nthat particular verb only, but any verbs which have a cognate sense;\njust as the verb 'to sacrifice' is used to denote any kind of offering.\nTherefore other passages also whose purport it is to intimate that an\nall-knowing Lord is the cause of the world are to be quoted here, as,\nfor instance, Mu. Up. I, 1, 9, 'From him who perceives all and who knows\nall, whose brooding consists of knowledge, from him is born that\nBrahman, name and form and food.'\n\nThe argumentation of the Sa@nkhyas that the pradhana may be called\nall-knowing on account of knowledge constituting an attribute of the\ngu/n/a Goodness is inadmissible. For as in the pradhana-condition the\nthree gu/n/as are in a state of equipoise, knowledge which is a quality\nof Goodness only is not possible[91]. Nor can we admit the explanation\nthat the pradhana is all-knowing because endowed with the capacity for\nall knowledge. For if, in the condition of equipoise of the gu/n/as, we\nterm the pradhana all-knowing with reference to the power of knowledge\nresiding in Goodness, we must likewise term it little-knowing, with\nreference to the power impeding knowledge which resides in Passion and\nDarkness.\n\nMoreover a modification of Goodness which is not connected with a\nwitnessing (observing) principle (sakshin) is not called knowledge, and\nthe non-intelligent pradhana is destitute of such a principle. It is\ntherefore impossible to ascribe to the pradhana all-knowingness. The\ncase of the Yogins finally does not apply to the point under\nconsideration; for as they possess intelligence, they may, owing to an\nexcess of Goodness in their nature, rise to omniscience[92].--Well then\n(say those Sa@nkhyas who believe in the existence of a Lord) let us\nassume that the pradhana possesses the quality of knowledge owing to the\nwitnessing principle (the Lord), just as the quality of burning is\nimparted to an iron ball by fire.--No, we reply; for if this were so, it\nwould be more reasonable to assume that that which is the cause of the\npradhana having the quality of thought i.e. the all-knowing primary\nBrahman itself is the cause of the world.\n\nThe objection that to Brahman also all-knowingness in its primary sense\ncannot be ascribed because, if the activity of cognition were permanent,\nBrahman could not be considered as independent with regard to it, we\nrefute as follows. In what way, we ask the Sa@nkhya, is Brahman's\nall-knowingness interfered with by a permanent cognitional activity? To\nmaintain that he, who possesses eternal knowledge capable to throw light\non all objects, is not all-knowing, is contradictory. If his knowledge\nwere considered non-permanent, he would know sometimes, and sometimes he\nwould not know; from which it would follow indeed that he is not\nall-knowing. This fault is however avoided if we admit Brahman's\nknowledge to be permanent.--But, it may be objected, on this latter\nalternative the knower cannot be designated as independent with\nreference to the act of knowing.--Why not? we reply; the sun also,\nalthough his heat and light are permanent, is nevertheless designated as\nindependent when we say, 'he burns, he gives light[93].'--But, it will\nagain be objected, we say that the sun burns or gives light when he\nstands in relation to some object to be heated or illuminated; Brahman,\non the other hand, stands, before the creation of the world, in no\nrelation to any object of knowledge. The cases are therefore not\nparallel.--This objection too, we reply, is not valid; for as a matter\nof fact we speak of the Sun as an agent, saying 'the sun shines' even\nwithout reference to any object illuminated by him, and hence Brahman\nalso may be spoken of as an agent, in such passages as 'it thought,'\n&c., even without reference to any object of knowledge. If, however, an\nobject is supposed to be required ('knowing' being a transitive verb\nwhile 'shining' is intransitive), the texts ascribing thought to Brahman\nwill fit all the better.--What then is that object to which the\nknowledge of the Lord can refer previously to the origin of the\nworld?--Name and form, we reply, which can be defined neither as being\nidentical with Brahman nor as different from it, unevolved but about to\nbe evolved. For if, as the adherents of the Yoga-/s/astra assume, the\nYogins have a perceptive knowledge of the past and the future through\nthe favour of the Lord; in what terms shall we have to speak of the\neternal cognition of the ever pure Lord himself, whose objects are the\ncreation, subsistence, and dissolution of the world! The objection that\nBrahman, previously to the origin of the world, is not able to think\nbecause it is not connected with a body, &c. does not apply; for\nBrahman, whose nature is eternal cognition--as the sun's nature is\neternal luminousness--can impossibly stand in need of any instruments of\nknowledge. The transmigrating soul (sa/m/sarin) indeed, which is under\nthe sway of Nescience, &c., may require a body in order that knowledge\nmay arise in it; but not so the Lord, who is free from all impediments\nof knowledge. The two following Mantras also declare that the Lord does\nnot require a body, and that his knowledge is without any obstructions.\n'There is no effect and no instrument known of him, no one is seen like\nunto him or better; his high power is revealed as manifold, as inherent,\nacting as knowledge and force.' 'Grasping without hands, hasting without\nfeet, he sees without eyes, he hears without ears. He knows what can be\nknown, but no one knows him; they call him the first, the great person'\n(/S/v. Up. VI, 8; III, 19).\n\nBut, to raise a new objection, there exists no transmigrating soul\ndifferent from the Lord and obstructed by impediments of knowledge; for\n/S/ruti expressly declares that 'there is no other seer but he; there is\nno other knower but he' (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23). How then can it be said\nthat the origination of knowledge in the transmigrating soul depends on\na body, while it does not do so in the case of the Lord?--True, we\nreply. There is in reality no transmigrating soul different from the\nLord. Still the connexion (of the Lord) with limiting adjuncts,\nconsisting of bodies and so on, is assumed, just as we assume the ether\nto enter into connexion with divers limiting adjuncts such as jars,\npots, caves, and the like. And just as in consequence of connexion of\nthe latter kind such conceptions and terms as 'the hollow (space) of a\njar,' &c. are generally current, although the space inside a jar is not\nreally different from universal space, and just as in consequence\nthereof there generally prevails the false notion that there are\ndifferent spaces such as the space of a jar and so on; so there prevails\nlikewise the false notion that the Lord and the transmigrating soul are\ndifferent; a notion due to the non-discrimination of the (unreal)\nconnexion of the soul with the limiting conditions, consisting of the\nbody and so on. That the Self, although in reality the only existence,\nimparts the quality of Selfhood to bodies and the like which are\nNot-Self is a matter of observation, and is due to mere wrong\nconception, which depends in its turn on antecedent wrong conception.\nAnd the consequence of the soul thus involving itself in the\ntransmigratory state is that its thought depends on a body and the like.\n\nThe averment that the pradhana, because consisting of several elements,\ncan, like clay and similar substances, occupy the place of a cause while\nthe uncompounded Brahman cannot do so, is refuted by the fact of the\npradhana not basing on Scripture. That, moreover, it is possible to\nestablish by argumentation the causality of Brahman, but not of the\npradhana and similar principles, the Sutrakara will set forth in the\nsecond Adhyaya (II, 1, 4, &c.).\n\nHere the Sa@nkhya comes forward with a new objection. The difficulty\nstated by you, he says, viz. that the non-intelligent pradhana cannot be\nthe cause of the world, because thought is ascribed to the latter in the\nsacred texts, can be got over in another way also, viz. on the ground\nthat non-intelligent things are sometimes figuratively spoken of as\nintelligent beings. We observe, for instance, that people say of a\nriver-bank about to fall, 'the bank is inclined to fall (pipatishati),'\nand thus speak of a non-intelligent bank as if it possessed\nintelligence. So the pradhana also, although non-intelligent, may, when\nabout to create, be figuratively spoken of as thinking. Just as in\nordinary life some intelligent person after having bathed, and dined,\nand formed the purpose of driving in the afternoon to his village,\nnecessarily acts according to his purpose, so the pradhana also acts by\nthe necessity of its own nature, when transforming itself into the\nso-called great principle and the subsequent forms of evolution; it may\ntherefore figuratively be spoken of as intelligent.--But what reason\nhave you for setting aside the primary meaning of the word 'thought' and\nfor taking it in a figurative sense?--The observation, the Sa@nkhya\nreplies, that fire and water also are figuratively spoken of as\nintelligent beings in the two following scriptural passages, 'That fire\nthought; that water thought' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3; 4). We therefrom\nconclude that thought is to be taken in a figurative sense there also\nwhere Being (Sat) is the agent, because it is mentioned in a chapter\nwhere (thought) is generally taken in a figurative sense[94].\n\nTo this argumentation of the Sadkhya the next Sutra replies:\n\n6. If it is said that (the word 'seeing') has a figurative meaning, we\ndeny that, on account of the word Self (being applied to the cause of\nthe world).\n\nYour assertion that the term 'Being' denotes the non-intelligent\npradhana, and that thought is ascribed to it in a figurative sense only,\nas it is to fire and water, is untenable. Why so? On account of the term\n'Self.' For the passage Ch. Up. VI, 2, which begins 'Being only, my\ndear, this was in the beginning,' after having related the creation of\nfire, water, and earth ('it thought,' &c.; 'it sent forth fire,' &c.),\ngoes on--denoting the thinking principle of which the whole chapter\ntreats, and likewise fire, water, and earth, by the\nterm--'divinities'--as follows, 'That divinity thought: Let me now enter\nthose three divinities with this living Self (jiva. atman) and evolve\nnames and forms.' If we assumed that in this passage the non-intelligent\npradhana is figuratively spoken of as thinking, we should also have to\nassume that the same pradhana--as once constituting the subject-matter\nof the chapter--is referred to by the term 'that divinity.' But in that\ncase the divinity would not speak of the jiva as 'Self.' For by the term\n'Jiva' we must understand, according to the received meaning and the\netymology of the word, the intelligent (principle) which rules over the\nbody and sustains the vital airs. How could such a principle be the Self\nof the non-intelligent pradhana? By 'Self' we understand (a being's) own\nnature, and it is clear that the intelligent Jiva cannot constitute the\nnature of the non-intelligent pradhana. If, on the other hand, we refer\nthe whole chapter to the intelligent Brahman, to which thought in its\nprimary sense belongs, the use of the word 'Self' with reference to the\nJiva is quite adequate. Then again there is the other passage, 'That\nwhich is that subtle essence, in it all that exists has its self. It is\nthe true. It is the Self. That art thou, O /S/vetaketu' (Ch. Up. VI, 8,\n7, &c.). Here the clause 'It is the Self' designates the Being of which\nthe entire chapter treats, viz. the subtle Self, by the word 'Self,' and\nthe concluding clause, 'that art thou, O /S/vetaketu,' declares the\nintelligent /S/vetaketu to be of the nature of the Self. Fire and water,\non the other hand, are non-intelligent, since they are objects (of the\nmind), and since they are declared to be implicated in the evolution of\nnames and forms. And as at the same time there is no reason for\nascribing to them thought in its primary sense--while the employment of\nthe word 'Self' furnishes such a reason with reference to the Sat--the\nthought attributed to them must be explained in a figurative sense, like\nthe inclination of the river-bank. Moreover, the thinking on the part of\nfire and water is to be understood as dependent on their being ruled\nover by the Sat. On the other hand, the thought of the Sat is, on\naccount of the word 'Self,' not to be understood in a figurative\nsense.[95]\n\nHere the Sa@nkhya comes forward with a new objection. The word 'Self,'\nhe says, may be applied to the pradhana, although unintelligent, because\nit is sometimes figuratively used in the sense of 'that which effects\nall purposes of another;' as, for instance, a king applies the word\n'Self' to some servant who carries out all the king's intentions,\n'Bhadrasena is my (other) Self.' For the pradhana, which effects the\nenjoyment and the emancipation of the soul, serves the latter in the\nsame way as a minister serves his king in the affairs of peace and war.\nOr else, it may be said, the one word 'Self' may refer to\nnon-intelligent things as well as to intelligent beings, as we see that\nsuch expressions as 'the Self of the elements,' 'the Self of the\nsenses,' are made use of, and as the one word 'light' (jyotis) denotes a\ncertain sacrifice (the jyotish/t/oma) as well as a flame. How then does\nit follow from the word 'Self' that the thinking (ascribed to the cause\nof the world) is not to be taken in a figurative sense?\n\nTo this last argumentation the Sutrakara replies:\n\n7. (The pradhana cannot be designated by the term 'Self') because\nrelease is taught of him who takes his stand on that (the Sat).\n\nThe non-intelligent pradhana cannot be the object of the term 'Self'\nbecause in the passage Ch. Up. VI, 2 ff., where the subtle Sat which is\nunder discussion is at first referred to in the sentence, 'That is the\nSelf,' and where the subsequent clause, 'That art thou, O /S/vetaketu,'\ndeclares the intelligent /S/vetaketu to have his abode in the Self, a\npassage subsequent to the two quoted (viz. 'a man who has a teacher\nobtains true knowledge; for him there is only delay as long as he is not\ndelivered, then he will be perfect') declares final release. For if the\nnon-intelligent pradhana were denoted by the term 'Sat' and did\ncomprehend--by means of the phrase 'That art thou'--persons desirous of\nfinal release who as such are intelligent, the meaning could only be\n'Thou art non-intelligent;' so that Scripture would virtually make\ncontradictory statements to the disadvantage of man, and would thus\ncease to be a means of right knowledge. But to assume that the faultless\n/s/astra is not a means of right knowledge, would be contrary to reason.\nAnd if the /s/astra, considered as a means of right knowledge, should\npoint out to a man desirous of release, but ignorant of the way to it, a\nnon-intelligent Self as the real Self, he would--comparable to the blind\nman who had caught hold of the ox's tail[96]--cling to the view of that\nbeing the Self, and thus never be able to reach the real Self different\nfrom the false Self pointed out to him; hence he would be debarred from\nwhat constitutes man's good, and would incur evil. We must therefore\nconclude that, just as the /s/astra teaches the agnihotra and similar\nperformances in their true nature as means for those who are desirous of\nthe heavenly world, so the passage 'that is the Self, that art thou, O\n/S/vetaketu,' teaches the Self in its true nature also. Only on that\ncondition release for him whose thoughts are true can be taught by means\nof the simile in which the person to be released is compared to the man\ngrasping the heated axe (Ch. Up. VI, 16). For in the other case, if the\ndoctrine of the Sat constituting the Self had a secondary meaning only,\nthe cognition founded on the passage 'that art thou' would be of the\nnature of a fanciful combination only[97], like the knowledge derived\nfrom the passage, 'I am the hymn' (Ait. Ar. II, 1, 2, 6), and would lead\nto a mere transitory reward; so that the simile quoted could not convey\nthe doctrine of release. Therefore the word 'Self' is applied to the\nsubtle Sat not in a merely figurative sense. In the case of the faithful\nservant, on the other hand, the word 'Self' can--in such phrases as\n'Bhadrasena is my Self'--be taken in a figurative sense, because the\ndifference between master and servant is well established by perception.\nMoreover, to assume that, because words are sometimes seen to be used in\nfigurative senses, a figurative sense may be resorted to in the case of\nthose things also for which words (i.e. Vedic words) are the only means\nof knowledge, is altogether indefensible; for an assumption of that\nnature would lead to a general want of confidence. The assertion that\nthe word 'Self' may (primarily) signify what is non-intelligent as well\nas what is intelligent, just as the word 'jyotis' signifies a certain\nsacrifice as well as light, is inadmissible, because we have no right to\nattribute to words a plurality of meanings. Hence (we rather assume\nthat) the word 'Self' in its primary meaning refers to what is\nintelligent only and is then, by a figurative attribution of\nintelligence, applied to the elements and the like also; whence such\nphrases as 'the Self of the elements,' 'the Self of the senses.' And\neven if we assume that the word 'Self' primarily signifies both classes\nof beings, we are unable to settle in any special case which of the two\nmeanings the word has, unless we are aided either by the general heading\nunder which it stands, or some determinative attributive word. But in\nthe passage under discussion there is nothing to determine that the word\nrefers to something non-intelligent, while, on the other hand, the Sat\ndistinguished by thought forms the general heading, and /S/vetaketu,\ni.e. a being endowed with intelligence, is mentioned in close proximity.\nThat a non-intelligent Self does not agree with /S/vetaketu, who\npossesses intelligence, we have already shown. All these circumstances\ndetermine the object of the word 'Self' here to be something\nintelligent. The word 'jyotis' does moreover not furnish an appropriate\nexample; for according to common use it has the settled meaning of\n'light' only, and is used in the sense of sacrifice only on account of\nthe arthavada assuming a similarity (of the sacrifice) to light.\n\nA different explanation of the Sutra is also possible. The preceding\nSutra may be taken completely to refute all doubts as to the word 'Self'\nhaving a figurative or double sense, and then the present Sutra is to be\nexplained as containing an independent reason, proving that the doctrine\nof the pradhana being the general cause is untenable.\n\nHence the non-intelligent pradhana is not denoted by the word 'Self.'\nThis the teacher now proceeds to prove by an additional reason.\n\n8. And (the pradhana cannot be denoted by the word 'Self') because there\nis no statement of its having to be set aside.\n\nIf the pradhana which is the Not-Self were denoted by the term 'Being'\n(Sat), and if the passage 'That is the Self, that art thou, O\n/S/vetaketu,' referred to the pradhana; the teacher whose wish it is to\nimpart instruction about the true Brahman would subsequently declare\nthat the pradhana is to be set aside (and the true Brahman to be\nconsidered); for otherwise his pupil, having received the instruction\nabout the pradhana, might take his stand on the latter, looking upon it\nas the Non-Self. In ordinary life a man who wishes to point out to a\nfriend the (small) star Arundhati at first directs his attention to a\nbig neighbouring star, saying 'that is Arundhati,' although it is really\nnot so; and thereupon he withdraws his first statement and points out\nthe real Arundhati. Analogously the teacher (if he intended to make his\npupil understand the Self through the Non-Self) would in the end\ndefinitely state that the Self is not of the nature of the pradhana. But\nno such statement is made; for the sixth Prapa/th/aka arrives at a\nconclusion based on the view that the Self is nothing but that which is\n(the Sat).\n\nThe word 'and' (in the Sutra) is meant to notify that the contradiction\nof a previous statement (which would be implied in the rejected\ninterpretation) is an additional reason for the rejection. Such a\ncontradiction would result even if it were stated that the pradhana is\nto be set aside. For in the beginning of the Prapa/th/aka it is\nintimated that through the knowledge of the cause everything becomes\nknown. Compare the following consecutive sentences, 'Have you ever asked\nfor that instruction by which we hear what cannot be heard, by which we\nperceive what cannot be perceived, by which we know what cannot be\nknown? What is that instruction? As, my dear, by one clod of clay all\nthat is made of clay is known, the modification (i.e. the effect) being\na name merely which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it\nis clay merely,' &c. Now if the term 'Sat' denoted the pradhana, which\nis merely the cause of the aggregate of the objects of enjoyment, its\nknowledge, whether to be set aside or not to be set aside, could never\nlead to the knowledge of the aggregate of enjoyers (souls), because the\nlatter is not an effect of the pradhana. Therefore the pradhana is not\ndenoted by the term 'Sat.'--For this the Sutrakara gives a further\nreason.\n\n9. On account of (the individual Soul) going to the Self (the Self\ncannot be the pradhana).\n\nWith reference to the cause denoted by the word 'Sat,' Scripture says,\n'When a man sleeps here, then, my dear, he becomes united with the Sat,\nhe is gone to his own (Self). Therefore they say of him, \"he sleeps\"\n(svapiti), because he is gone to his own (svam apita).' (Ch. Up. VI, 8,\n1.) This passage explains the well-known verb 'to sleep,' with reference\nto the soul. The word, 'his own,' denotes the Self which had before been\ndenoted by the word Sat; to the Self he (the individual soul) goes, i.e.\ninto it it is resolved, according to the acknowledged sense of api-i,\nwhich means 'to be resolved into.' The individual soul (jiva) is called\nawake as long as being connected with the various external objects by\nmeans of the modifications of the mind--which thus constitute limiting\nadjuncts of the soul--it apprehends those external objects, and\nidentifies itself with the gross body, which is one of those external\nobjects[98]. When, modified by the impressions which the external\nobjects have left, it sees dreams, it is denoted by the term 'mind[99].'\nWhen, on the cessation of the two limiting adjuncts (i.e. the subtle and\nthe gross bodies), and the consequent absence of the modifications due\nto the adjuncts, it is, in the state of deep sleep, merged in the Self\nas it were, then it is said to be asleep (resolved into the Self). A\nsimilar etymology of the word 'h/ri/daya' is given by /s/ruti, 'That\nSelf abides in the heart. And this is the etymological explanation: he\nis in the heart (h/ri/di ayam).' (Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 3.) The words\na/s/anaya and udanya are similarly etymologised: 'water is carrying away\nwhat has been eaten by him;' 'fire carries away what has been drunk by\nhim' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 3; 5). Thus the passage quoted above explains the\nresolution (of the soul) into the Self, denoted by the term 'Sat,' by\nmeans of the etymology of the word 'sleep.' But the intelligent Self can\nclearly not resolve itself into the non-intelligent pradhana. If, again,\nit were said that the pradhana is denoted by the word 'own,' because\nbelonging to the Self (as being the Self's own), there would remain the\nsame absurd statement as to an intelligent entity being resolved into a\nnon-intelligent one. Moreover another scriptural passage (viz. 'embraced\nby the intelligent--praj/n/a--Self he knows nothing that is without,\nnothing that is within,' B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 21) declares that the soul in\nthe condition of dreamless sleep is resolved into an intelligent entity.\nHence that into which all intelligent souls are resolved is an\nintelligent cause of the world, denoted by the word 'Sat,' and not the\npradhana.--A further reason for the pradhana not being the cause is\nsubjoined.\n\n10. On account of the uniformity of view (of the Vedanta-texts, Brahman\nis to be considered the cause).\n\nIf, as in the argumentations of the logicians, so in the Vedanta-texts\nalso, there were set forth different views concerning the nature of the\ncause, some of them favouring the theory of an intelligent Brahman being\nthe cause of the world, others inclining towards the pradhana doctrine,\nand others again tending in a different direction; then it might perhaps\nbe possible to interpret such passages as those, which speak of the\ncause of the world as thinking, in such a manner as to make them fall in\nwith the pradhana theory. But the stated condition is absent since all\nthe Vedanta-texts uniformly teach that the cause of the world is the\nintelligent Brahman. Compare, for instance, 'As from a burning fire\nsparks proceed in all directions, thus from that Self the pra/n/as\nproceed each towards its place; from the pra/n/as the gods, from the\ngods the worlds' (Kau. Up. III, 3). And 'from that Self sprang ether'\n(Taitt. Up. II, 1). And 'all this springs from the Self' (Ch. Up. VII,\n26, 1). And 'this pra/n/a is born from the Self' (Pr. Up. III, 3); all\nwhich passages declare the Self to be the cause. That the word 'Self'\ndenotes an intelligent being, we have already shown.\n\nAnd that all the Vedanta-texts advocate the same view as to an\nintelligent cause of the world, greatly strengthens their claim to be\nconsidered a means of right knowledge, just as the corresponding claims\nof the senses are strengthened by their giving us information of a\nuniform character regarding colour and the like. The all-knowing Brahman\nis therefore to be considered the cause of the world, 'on account of the\nuniformity of view (of the Vedanta-texts).'--A further reason for this\nconclusion is advanced.\n\n11. And because it is directly stated in Scripture (therefore the\nall-knowing Brahman is the cause of the world).\n\nThat the all-knowing Lord is the cause of the world, is also declared in\na text directly referring to him (viz. the all-knowing one), viz. in the\nfollowing passage of the mantropanishad of the /S/veta/s/vataras (VI, 9)\nwhere the word 'he' refers to the previously mentioned all-knowing Lord,\n'He is the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of\nhim neither parent nor lord.' It is therefore finally settled that the\nall-knowing Brahman is the general cause, not the non-intelligent\npradhana or anything else.\n\nIn what precedes we have shown, availing ourselves of appropriate\narguments, that the Vedanta-texts exhibited under Sutras I, 1-11, are\ncapable of proving that the all-knowing, all-powerful Lord is the cause\nof the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of the world. And we have\nexplained, by pointing to the prevailing uniformity of view (I, 10),\nthat all Vedanta-texts whatever maintain an intelligent cause. The\nquestion might therefore be asked, 'What reason is there for the\nsubsequent part of the Vedanta-sutras?' (as the chief point is settled\nalready.)\n\nTo this question we reply as follows: Brahman is apprehended under two\nforms; in the first place as qualified by limiting conditions owing to\nthe multiformity of the evolutions of name and form (i.e. the\nmultiformity of the created world); in the second place as being the\nopposite of this, i.e. free from all limiting conditions whatever.\nCompare the following passages: B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 15, 'For where there\nis duality as it were, then one sees the other; but when the Self only\nis all this, how should he see another?' Ch. Up. VII, 24, 1, 'Where one\nsees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is\nthe greatest. Where one sees something else, hears something else,\nunderstands something else, that is the little. The greatest is\nimmortal; the little is mortal;' Taitt. Up. III, 12, 7, 'The wise one,\nwho having produced all forms and made all names, sits calling (the\nthings by their names[100]);' /S/v. Up. VI, 19, 'Who is without parts,\nwithout actions, tranquil, without faults, without taint, the highest\nbridge of immortality, like a fire that has consumed its fuel;' B/ri/.\nUp. II, 3, 6, 'Not so, not so;' B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 8, 'It is neither\ncoarse nor fine, neither short nor long;' and 'defective is one place,\nperfect the other.' All these passages, with many others, declare\nBrahman to possess a double nature, according as it is the object either\nof Knowledge or of Nescience. As long as it is the object of Nescience,\nthere are applied to it the categories of devotee, object of devotion,\nand the like[101]. The different modes of devotion lead to different\nresults, some to exaltation, some to gradual emancipation, some to\nsuccess in works; those modes are distinct on account of the distinction\nof the different qualities and limiting conditions[102]. And although\nthe one highest Self only, i.e. the Lord distinguished by those\ndifferent qualities constitutes the object of devotion, still the fruits\n(of devotion) are distinct, according as the devotion refers to\ndifferent qualities. Thus Scripture says, 'According as man worships\nhim, that he becomes;' and, 'According to what his thought is in this\nworld, so will he be when he has departed this life' (Ch. Up. III, 14,\n1). Sm/ri/ti also makes an analogous statement, 'Remembering whatever\nform of being he leaves this body in the end, into that form he enters,\nbeing impressed with it through his constant meditation' (Bha. Gita\nVIII, 6).\n\nAlthough one and the same Self is hidden in all beings movable as well\nas immovable, yet owing to the gradual rise of excellence of the minds\nwhich form the limiting conditions (of the Self), Scripture declares\nthat the Self, although eternally unchanging and uniform, reveals\nitself[103] in a graduated series of beings, and so appears in forms of\nvarious dignity and power; compare, for instance (Ait. Ar. II, 3, 2, 1),\n'He who knows the higher manifestation of the Self in him[104],' &c.\nSimilarly Sm/ri/ti remarks, 'Whatever being there is of power, splendour\nor might, know it to have sprung from portions of my glory' (Bha. Gita,\nX, 41); a passage declaring that wherever there is an excess of power\nand so on, there the Lord is to be worshipped. Accordingly here (i.e. in\nthe Sutras) also the teacher will show that the golden person in the\ndisc of the Sun is the highest Self, on account of an indicating sign,\nviz. the circumstance of his being unconnected with any evil (Ved. Su.\nI, 1, 20); the same is to be observed with regard to I, 1, 22 and other\nSutras. And, again, an enquiry will have to be undertaken into the\nmeaning of the texts, in order that a settled conclusion may be reached\nconcerning that knowledge of the Self which leads to instantaneous\nrelease; for although that knowledge is conveyed by means of various\nlimiting conditions, yet no special connexion with limiting conditions\nis intended to be intimated, in consequence of which there arises a\ndoubt whether it (the knowledge) has the higher or the lower Brahman for\nits object; so, for instance, in the case of Sutra I, 1, 12[105]. From\nall this it appears that the following part of the /S/astra has a\nspecial object of its own, viz. to show that the Vedanta-texts teach, on\nthe one hand, Brahman as connected with limiting conditions and forming\nan object of devotion, and on the other hand, as being free from the\nconnexion with such conditions and constituting an object of knowledge.\nThe refutation, moreover, of non-intelligent causes different from\nBrahman, which in I, 1, 10 was based on the uniformity of the meaning of\nthe Vedanta-texts, will be further detailed by the Sutrakara, who, while\nexplaining additional passages relating to Brahman, will preclude all\ncauses of a nature opposite to that of Brahman.\n\n12. (The Self) consisting of bliss (is the highest Self) on account of\nthe repetition (of the word 'bliss,' as denoting the highest Self).\n\nThe Taittiriya-upanishad (II, 1-5), after having enumerated the Self\nconsisting of food, the Self consisting of the vital airs, the Self\nconsisting of mind, and the Self consisting of understanding, says,\n'Different from this which consists of understanding is the other inner\nSelf which consists of bliss.' Here the doubt arises whether the phrase,\n'that which consists of bliss,' denotes the highest Brahman of which it\nhad been said previously, that 'It is true Being, Knowledge, without\nend,' or something different from Brahman, just as the Self consisting\nof food, &c., is different from it.--The purvapakshin maintains that the\nSelf consisting of bliss is a secondary (not the principal) Self, and\nsomething different from Brahman; as it forms a link in a series of\nSelfs, beginning with the Self consisting of food, which all are not the\nprincipal Self. To the objection that even thus the Self consisting of\nbliss may be considered as the primary Self, since it is stated to be\nthe innermost of all, he replies that this cannot be admitted, because\nthe Self of bliss is declared to have joy and so on for its limbs, and\nbecause it is said to be embodied. If it were identical with the primary\nSelf, joy and the like would not touch it; but the text expressly says\n'Joy is its head;' and about its being embodied we read, 'Of that former\none this one is the embodied Self' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), i.e. of that\nformer Self of Understanding this Self of bliss is the embodied Self.\nAnd of what is embodied, the contact with joy and pain cannot be\nprevented. Therefore the Self which consists of bliss is nothing but the\ntransmigrating Soul.\n\nTo this reasoning we make the following reply:--By the Self consisting\nof bliss we have to understand the highest Self, 'on account of\nrepetition.' For the word 'bliss' is repeatedly applied to the highest\nSelf. So Taitt. Up. II, 7, where, after the clause 'That is\nflavour'--which refers back to the Self consisting of bliss, and\ndeclares it to be of the nature of flavour--we read, 'For only after\nhaving perceived flavour can any one perceive delight. Who could\nbreathe, who could breathe forth if that Bliss existed not in the ether\n(of the heart)? For he alone causes blessedness;' and again, II, 8, 'Now\nthis is an examination of Bliss;' 'He reaches that Self consisting of\nBliss;' and again, II, 9, 'He who knows the Bliss of Brahman fears\nnothing;' and in addition, 'He understood that Bliss is Brahman' (III,\n6). And in another scriptural passage also (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 28),\n'Knowledge and bliss is Brahman,' we see the word 'bliss' applied just\nto Brahman. As, therefore, the word 'bliss' is repeatedly used with\nreference to Brahman, we conclude that the Self consisting of bliss is\nBrahman also. The objection that the Self consisting of bliss can only\ndenote the secondary Self (the Sa/m/sarin), because it forms a link in a\nseries of secondary Selfs, beginning with the one consisting of food, is\nof no force, for the reason that the Self consisting of bliss is the\ninnermost of all. The /S/astra, wishing to convey information about the\nprimary Self, adapts itself to common notions, in so far as it at first\nrefers to the body consisting of food, which, although not the Self, is\nby very obtuse people identified with it; it then proceeds from the body\nto another Self, which has the same shape with the preceding one, just\nas the statue possesses the form of the mould into which the molten\nbrass had been poured; then, again, to another one, always at first\nrepresenting the Non-Self as the Self, for the purpose of easier\ncomprehension; and it finally teaches that the innermost Self[106],\nwhich consists of bliss, is the real Self. Just as when a man, desirous\nof pointing out the star Arundhati to another man, at first points to\nseveral stars which are not Arundhati as being Arundhati, while only the\nstar pointed out in the end is the real Arundhati; so here also the Self\nconsisting of bliss is the real Self on account of its being the\ninnermost (i.e. the last). Nor can any weight be allowed to the\nobjection that the attribution of joy and so on, as head, &c., cannot\npossibly refer to the real Self; for this attribution is due to the\nimmediately preceding limiting condition (viz. the Self consisting of\nunderstanding, the so-called vij/n/anakosa), and does not really belong\nto the real Self. The possession of a bodily nature also is ascribed to\nthe Self of bliss, only because it is represented as a link in the chain\nof bodies which begins with the Self consisting of food, and is not\nascribed to it in the same direct sense in which it is predicated of the\ntransmigrating Self. Hence the Self consisting of bliss is the highest\nBrahman.\n\n13. If (it be objected that the term anandamaya, consisting of bliss,\ncan) not (denote the highest Self) on account of its being a word\ndenoting a modification (or product); (we declare the objection to be)\nnot (valid) on account of abundance, (the idea of which may be expressed\nby the affix maya.)\n\nHere the purvapakshin raises the objection that the word anandamaya\n(consisting of bliss) cannot denote the highest Self.--Why?--Because the\nword anandamaya is understood to denote something different from the\noriginal word (i.e. the word ananda without the derivative affix maya),\nviz. a modification; according to the received sense of the affix maya.\n'Anandamaya' therefore denotes a modification, just as annamaya\n(consisting of food) and similar words do.\n\nThis objection is, however, not valid, because 'maya' is also used in\nthe sense of abundance, i.e. denotes that where there is abundance of\nwhat the original word expresses. So, for instance, the phrase 'the\nsacrifice is annamaya' means 'the sacrifice is abounding in food' (not\n'is some modification or product of food'). Thus here Brahman also, as\nabounding in bliss, is called anandamaya. That Brahman does abound in\nbliss follows from the passage (Taitt. Up. II, 8), where, after the\nbliss of each of the different classes of beings, beginning with man,\nhas been declared to be a hundred times greater than the bliss of the\nimmediately preceding class, the bliss of Brahman is finally proclaimed\nto be absolutely supreme. Maya therefore denotes abundance.\n\n14. And because he is declared to be the cause of it, (i.e. of bliss;\ntherefore maya is to be taken as denoting abundance.)\n\nMaya must be understood to denote abundance, for that reason also that\nScripture declares Brahman to be the cause of bliss, 'For he alone\ncauses bliss' (Taitt. Up. II, 7). For he who causes bliss must himself\nabound in bliss; just as we infer in ordinary life, that a man who\nenriches others must himself possess abundant wealth. As, therefore,\nmaya may be taken to mean 'abundant,' the Self consisting of bliss is\nthe highest Self.\n\n15. Moreover (the anandamaya is Brahman because) the same (Brahman)\nwhich had been referred to in the mantra is sung, (i.e. proclaimed in\nthe Brahma/n/a passage as the anandamaya.)\n\nThe Self, consisting of joy, is the highest Brahman for the following\nreason also[107]. On the introductory words 'he who knows Brahman\nattains the highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1), there follows a mantra\nproclaiming that Brahman, which forms the general topic of the chapter,\npossesses the qualities of true existence, intelligence, infinity; after\nthat it is said that from Brahman there sprang at first the ether and\nthen all other moving and non-moving things, and that, entering into the\nbeings which it had emitted, Brahman stays in the recess, inmost of all;\nthereupon, for its better comprehension, the series of the different\nSelfs ('different from this is the inner Self,' &c.) are enumerated, and\nthen finally the same Brahman which the mantra had proclaimed, is again\nproclaimed in the passage under discussion, 'different from this is the\nother inner Self, which consists of bliss.' To assume that a mantra and\nthe Brahma/n/a passage belonging to it have the same sense is only\nproper, on account of the absence of contradiction (which results\ntherefrom); for otherwise we should be driven to the unwelcome inference\nthat the text drops the topic once started, and turns to an altogether\nnew subject.\n\nNor is there mentioned a further inner Self different from the Self\nconsisting of bliss, as in the case of the Self consisting of food,\n&c.[108] On the same (i.e. the Self consisting of bliss) is founded,\n'This same knowledge of Bh/ri/gu and Varu/n/a; he understood that bliss\nis Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 6). Therefore the Self consisting of bliss\nis the highest Self.\n\n16. (The Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self,) not the other\n(i.e. the individual Soul), on account of the impossibility (of the\nlatter assumption).\n\nAnd for the following reason also the Self consisting of bliss is the\nhighest Self only, not the other, i.e. the one which is other than the\nLord, i.e. the transmigrating individual soul. The personal soul cannot\nbe denoted by the term 'the one consisting of bliss.' Why? On account of\nthe impossibility. For Scripture says, with reference to the Self\nconsisting of bliss, 'He wished, may I be many, may I grow forth. He\nbrooded over himself. After he had thus brooded, he sent forth whatever\nthere is.' Here, the desire arising before the origination of a body,\n&c., the non-separation of the effects created from the creator, and the\ncreation of all effects whatever, cannot possibly belong to any Self\ndifferent from the highest Self.\n\n17. And on account of the declaration of the difference (of the two, the\nanandamaya cannot be the transmigrating soul).\n\nThe Self consisting of bliss cannot be identical with the transmigrating\nsoul, for that reason also that in the section treating of the Self of\nbliss, the individual soul and the Self of bliss are distinctly\nrepresented as different; Taitt. Up. II, 7, 'It (i.e. the Self\nconsisting of bliss) is a flavour; for only after perceiving a flavour\ncan this (soul) perceive bliss.' For he who perceives cannot be that\nwhich is perceived.--But, it may be asked, if he who perceives or\nattains cannot be that which is perceived or attained, how about the\nfollowing /S/ruti- and Smr/ri/ti-passages, 'The Self is to be sought;'\n'Nothing higher is known than the attainment of the Self[109]?'--This\nobjection, we reply, is legitimate (from the point of view of absolute\ntruth). Yet we see that in ordinary life, the Self, which in reality is\nnever anything but the Self, is, owing to non-comprehension of the\ntruth, identified with the Non-Self, i.e. the body and so on; whereby it\nbecomes possible to speak of the Self in so far as it is identified with\nthe body, and so on, as something not searched for but to be searched\nfor, not heard but to be heard, not seized but to be seized, not\nperceived but to be perceived, not known but to be known, and the like.\nScripture, on the other hand, denies, in such passages as 'there is no\nother seer but he' (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23), that there is in reality any\nseer or hearer different from the all-knowing highest Lord. (Nor can it\nbe said that the Lord is unreal because he is identical with the unreal\nindividual soul; for)[110] the Lord differs from the soul\n(vij/n/anatman) which is embodied, acts and enjoys, and is the product\nof Nescience, in the same way as the real juggler who stands on the\nground differs from the illusive juggler, who, holding in his hand a\nshield and a sword, climbs up to the sky by means of a rope; or as the\nfree unlimited ether differs from the ether of a jar, which is\ndetermined by its limiting adjunct, (viz. the jar.) With reference to\nthis fictitious difference of the highest Self and the individual Self,\nthe two last Sutras have been propounded.\n\n18. And on account of desire (being mentioned as belonging to the\nanandamaya) no regard is to be had to what is inferred, (i.e. to the\npradhana inferred by the Sa@nkhyas.)\n\nSince in the passage 'he desired, may I be many, may I grow forth,'\nwhich occurs in the chapter treating of the anandamaya (Taitt. Up. II,\n6), the quality of feeling desire is mentioned, that which is inferred,\ni.e. the non-intelligent pradhana assumed by the Sa@nkhyas, cannot be\nregarded as being the Self consisting of bliss and the cause of the\nworld. Although the opinion that the pradhana is the cause of the world,\nhas already been refuted in the Sutra I, 1, 5, it is here, where a\nfavourable opportunity presents itself, refuted for a second time on the\nbasis of the scriptural passage about the cause of the world feeling\ndesire, for the purpose of showing the uniformity of view (of all\nscriptural passages).\n\n19. And, moreover, it (i.e. Scripture) teaches the joining of this (i.e.\nthe individual soul) with that, (i.e. the Self consisting of bliss), on\nthat (being fully known).\n\nAnd for the following reason also the term, 'the Self consisting of\nbliss,' cannot denote either the pradhana or the individual soul.\nScripture teaches that the individual soul when it has reached knowledge\nis joined, i.e. identified, with the Self of bliss under discussion,\ni.e. obtains final release. Compare the following passage (Taitt. Up.\nII, 7), 'When he finds freedom from fear, and rest in that which is\ninvisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported, then he has obtained the\nfearless. For if he makes but the smallest distinction in it there is\nfear for him.' That means, if he sees in that Self consisting of bliss\neven a small difference in the form of non-identity, then he finds no\nrelease from the fear of transmigratory existence. But when he, by means\nof the cognition of absolute identity, finds absolute rest in the Self\nconsisting of bliss, then he is freed from the fear of transmigratory\nexistence. But this (finding absolute rest) is possible only when we\nunderstand by the Self consisting of bliss, the highest Self, and not\neither the pradhana or the individual soul. Hence it is proved that the\nSelf consisting of bliss is the highest Self.\n\nBut, in reality, the following remarks have to be made concerning the\ntrue meaning of the word 'anandamaya[111].' On what grounds, we ask, can\nit be maintained that the affix 'maya' after having, in the series of\ncompounds beginning with annamaya and ending with vij/n/anamaya, denoted\nmere modifications, should all at once, in the word anandamaya, which\nbelongs to the same series, denote abundance, so that anandamaya would\nrefer to Brahman? If it should be said that the assumption is made on\naccount of the governing influence of the Brahman proclaimed in the\nmantra (which forms the beginning of the chapter, Taitt. Up. II), we\nreply that therefrom it would follow that also the Selfs consisting of\nfood, breath, &c., denote Brahman (because the governing influence of\nthe mantra extends to them also).--The advocate of the former\ninterpretation will here, perhaps, restate an argument already made use\nof above, viz. as follows: To assume that the Selfs consisting of food,\nand so on, are not Brahman is quite proper, because after each of them\nan inner Self is mentioned. After the Self of bliss, on the other hand,\nno further inner Self is mentioned, and hence it must be considered to\nbe Brahman itself; otherwise we should commit the mistake of dropping\nthe subject-matter in hand (as which Brahman is pointed out by the\nmantra), and taking up a new topic.--But to this we reply that, although\nunlike the case of the Selfs consisting of food, &c., no inner Self is\nmentioned after the Self consisting of bliss, still the latter cannot be\nconsidered as Brahman, because with reference to the Self consisting of\nbliss Scripture declares, 'Joy is its head. Satisfaction is its right\narm. Great satisfaction is its left arm. Bliss is its trunk. Brahman is\nits tail, its support.' Now, here the very same Brahman which, in the\nmantra, had been introduced as the subject of the discussion, is called\nthe tail, the support; while the five involucra, extending from the\ninvolucrum of food up to the involucrum of bliss, are merely introduced\nfor the purpose of setting forth the knowledge of Brahman. How, then,\ncan it be maintained that our interpretation implies the needless\ndropping of the general subject-matter and the introduction of a new\ntopic?--But, it may again be objected, Brahman is called the tail, i.e.\na member of the Self consisting of bliss; analogously to those passages\nin which a tail and other members are ascribed to the Selfs consisting\nof food and so on. On what grounds, then, can we claim to know that\nBrahman (which is spoken of as a mere member, i.e. a subordinate matter)\nis in reality the chief matter referred to?--From the fact, we reply, of\nBrahman being the general subject-matter of the chapter.--But, it will\nagain be said, that interpretation also according to which Brahman is\ncognised as a mere member of the anandamaya does not involve a dropping\nof the subject-matter, since the anandamaya himself is Brahman.--But, we\nreply, in that case one and the same Brahman would at first appear as\nthe whole, viz. as the Self consisting of bliss, and thereupon as a mere\npart, viz. as the tail; which is absurd. And as one of the two\nalternatives must be preferred, it is certainly appropriate to refer to\nBrahman the clause 'Brahman is the tail' which contains the word\n'Brahman,' and not the sentence about the Self of Bliss in which Brahman\nis not mentioned. Moreover, Scripture, in continuation of the phrase,\n'Brahman is the tail, the support,' goes on, 'On this there is also the\nfollowing /s/loka: He who knows the Brahman as non-existing becomes\nhimself non-existing. He who knows Brahman as existing him we know\nhimself as existing.' As this /s/loka, without any reference to the Self\nof bliss, states the advantage and disadvantage connected with the\nknowledge of the being and non-being of Brahman only, we conclude that\nthe clause, 'Brahman is the tail, the support,' represents Brahman as\nthe chief matter (not as a merely subordinate matter). About the being\nor non-being of the Self of bliss, on the other hand, a doubt is not\nwell possible, since the Self of bliss distinguished by joy,\nsatisfaction, &c., is well known to every one.--But if Brahman is the\nprincipal matter, how can it be designated as the mere tail of the Self\nof bliss ('Brahman is the tail, the support')?--Its being called so, we\nreply, forms no objection; for the word tail here denotes that which is\nof the nature of a tail, so that we have to understand that the bliss of\nBrahman is not a member (in its literal sense), but the support or\nabode, the one nest (resting-place) of all worldly bliss. Analogously\nanother scriptural passage declares, 'All other creatures live on a\nsmall portion of that bliss' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 32). Further, if by the\nSelf consisting of bliss we were to understand Brahman we should have to\nassume that the Brahman meant is the Brahman distinguished by qualities\n(savi/s/esha), because it is said to have joy and the like for its\nmembers. But this assumption is contradicted by a complementary passage\n(II, 9) which declares that Brahman is the object neither of mind nor\nspeech, and so shows that the Brahman meant is the (absolute) Brahman\n(devoid of qualities), 'From whence all speech, with the mind, turns\naway unable to reach it, he who knows the bliss of that Brahman fears\nnothing.' Moreover, if we speak of something as 'abounding in\nbliss[112],' we thereby imply the co-existence of pain; for the word\n'abundance' in its ordinary sense implies the existence of a small\nmeasure of what is opposed to the thing whereof there is abundance. But\nthe passage so understood would be in conflict with another passage (Ch.\nUp. VII, 24), 'Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else,\nunderstands nothing else, that is the Infinite;' which declares that in\nthe Infinite, i.e. Brahman, there is nothing whatever different from it.\nMoreover, as joy, &c. differ in each individual body, the Self\nconsisting of bliss also is a different one in each body. Brahman, on\nthe other hand, does not differ according to bodies; for the mantra at\nthe beginning of the chapter declares it to be true Being, knowledge,\ninfinite, and another passage says, 'He is the one God, hidden in all\nbeings, all-pervading, the Self within all beings' (/S/v. Up. VI, 11).\nNor, again, does Scripture exhibit a frequent repetition of the word\n'anandamaya;' for merely the radical part of the compound (i.e. the word\nananda without the affix maya) is repeated in all the following\npassages; 'It is a flavour, for only after seizing flavour can any one\nseize bliss. Who could breathe, who could breathe forth, if that bliss\nexisted not in the ether? For he alone causes blessedness;' 'Now this is\nan examination of bliss;' 'He who knows the bliss of that Brahman fears\nnothing;' 'He understood that bliss is Brahman.' If it were a settled\nmatter that Brahman is denoted by the term, 'the Self consisting of\nbliss,' then we could assume that in the subsequent passages, where\nmerely the word 'bliss' is employed, the term 'consisting of bliss' is\nmeant to be repeated; but that the Self consisting of bliss is not\nBrahman, we have already proved by means of the reason of joy being its\nhead, and so on. Hence, as in another scriptural passage, viz. 'Brahman\nis knowledge and bliss' (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 28), the mere word 'bliss'\ndenotes Brahman, we must conclude that also in such passages as, 'If\nthat bliss existed not in the ether,' the word bliss is used with\nreference to Brahman, and is not meant to repeat the term 'consisting of\nbliss.' The repetition of the full compound, 'consisting of bliss,'\nwhich occurs in the passage, 'He reaches that Self consisting of bliss'\n(Taitt. Up. II, 8), does not refer to Brahman, as it is contained in the\nenumeration of Non-Selfs, comprising the Self of food, &c., all of which\nare mere effects, and all of which are represented as things to be\nreached.--But, it may be said, if the Self consisting of bliss, which is\nsaid to have to be reached, were not Brahman--just as the Selfs\nconsisting of food, &c. are not Brahman--then it would not be declared\n(in the passage immediately following) that he who knows obtains for his\nreward Brahman.--This objection we invalidate by the remark that the\ntext makes its declaration as to Brahman--which is the tail, the\nsupport--being reached by him who knows, by the very means of the\ndeclaration as to the attainment of the Self of bliss; as appears from\nthe passage, 'On this there is also this /s/loka, from which all speech\nreturns,' &c. With reference, again, to the passage, 'He desired: may I\nbe many, may I grow forth,' which is found in proximity to the mention\nof the Self consisting of bliss, we remark that it is in reality\nconnected (not with the Self of bliss but with) Brahman, which is\nmentioned in the still nearer passage, 'Brahman is the tail, the\nsupport,' and does therefore not intimate that the Self of bliss is\nBrahman. And, on account of its referring to the passage last quoted\n('it desired,' &c.), the later passage also, 'That is flavour,' &c., has\nnot the Self of bliss for its subject.--But, it may be objected, the\n(neuter word) Brahman cannot possibly be designated by a masculine word\nas you maintain is done in the passage, 'He desired,' &c.--In reply to\nthis objection we point to the passage (Taitt. Up. II, 1), 'From that\nSelf sprang ether,' where, likewise, the masculine word 'Self' can refer\nto Brahman only, since the latter is the general topic of the chapter.\nIn the knowledge of Bh/ri/gu and Varu/n/a finally ('he knew that bliss\nis Brahman'), the word 'bliss' is rightly understood to denote Brahman,\nsince we there meet neither with the affix 'maya,' nor with any\nstatement as to joy being its head, and the like. To ascribe to Brahman\nin itself joy, and so on, as its members, is impossible, unless we have\nrecourse to certain, however minute, distinctions qualifying Brahman;\nand that the whole chapter is not meant to convey a knowledge of the\nqualified (savi/s/esha) Brahman is proved by the passage (quoted above),\nwhich declares that Brahman transcends speech and mind. We therefore\nmust conclude that the affix maya, in the word anandamaya, does not\ndenote abundance, but expresses a mere effect, just as it does in the\nwords annamaya and the subsequent similar compounds.\n\nThe Sutras are therefore to be explained as follows. There arises the\nquestion whether the passage, 'Brahman is the tail, the support,' is to\nbe understood as intimating that Brahman is a mere member of the Self\nconsisting of bliss, or that it is the principal matter. If it is said\nthat it must be considered as a mere member, the reply is, 'The Self\nconsisting of bliss on account of the repetition.' That means: Brahman,\nwhich in the passage 'the Self consisting of bliss,' &c., is spoken of\nas the tail, the support, is designated as the principal matter (not as\nsomething subordinate). On account of the repetition; for in the\nmemorial /s/loka, 'he becomes himself non-existing,' Brahman alone is\nreiterated. 'If not, on account of the word denoting a modification; not\nso, on account of abundance.' In this Sutra the word 'modification' is\nmeant to convey the sense of member. The objection that on account of\nthe word 'tail,' which denotes a mere member, Brahman cannot be taken as\nthe principal matter must be refuted. This we do by remarking that there\nis no difficulty, since a word denoting a member may be introduced into\nthe passage on account of pra/k/urya[113]. Pra/k/urya here means a\nphraseology abounding in terms denoting members. After the different\nmembers, beginning with the head and ending with the tail, of the Selfs,\nconsisting of food, &c. have been enumerated, there are also mentioned\nthe head and the other limbs of the Self of bliss, and then it is added,\n'Brahman is the tail, the support;' the intention being merely to\nintroduce some more terms denoting members, not to convey the meaning of\n'member,' (an explanation which is impossible) because the preceding\nSutra already has proved Brahman (not to be a member, but) to be the\nprincipal matter. 'And because he is declared to be the cause of it.'\nThat means: Brahman is declared to be the cause of the entire aggregate\nof effects, inclusive of the Self, consisting of bliss, in the following\npassage, 'He created all whatever there is' (Taitt. Up. II, 6). And as\nBrahman is the cause, it cannot at the same time be called the member,\nin the literal sense of the word, of the Self of bliss, which is nothing\nbut one of Brahman's effects. The other Sutras also (which refer to the\nSelf of bliss[114]) are to be considered, as well as they may, as\nconveying a knowledge of Brahman, which (Brahman) is referred to in the\npassage about the tail.\n\n20. The one within (the sun and the eye) (is the highest Lord), on\naccount of his qualities being declared[115].\n\nThe following passage is found in Scripture (Ch. Up. I, 6, 6 ff.), 'Now\nthat person bright as gold who is seen within the sun, with beard bright\nas gold and hair bright as gold, bright as gold altogether to the very\ntips of his nails, whose eyes are like blue lotus; his name is Ut, for\nhe has risen (udita) above all evil. He also who knows this rises above\nall evil. So much with reference to the devas.' And further on, with\nreference to the body, 'Now the person who is seen in the eye,' &c. Here\nthe following doubt presents itself. Do these passages point out, as the\nobject of devotion directed on the sphere of the sun and the eye, merely\nsome special individual soul, which, by means of a large measure of\nknowledge and pious works, has raised itself to a position of eminence;\nor do they refer to the eternally perfect highest Lord?\n\nThe purvapakshin takes the former view. An individual soul, he says, is\nreferred to, since Scripture speaks of a definite shape. To the person\nin the sun special features are ascribed, such as the possession of a\nbeard as bright as gold and so on, and the same features manifestly\nbelong to the person in the eye also, since they are expressly\ntransferred to it in the passage, 'The shape of this person is the same\nas the shape of that person.' That, on the other hand, no shape can be\nascribed to the highest Lord, follows from the passage (Kau. Up. I, 3,\n15), 'That which is without sound, without touch, without form, without\ndecay.' That an individual soul is meant follows moreover from the fact\nthat a definite abode is mentioned, 'He who is in the sun; he who is in\nthe eye.' About the highest Lord, who has no special abode, but abides\nin his own glory, no similar statement can be made; compare, for\ninstance, the two following passages, 'Where does he rest? In his own\nglory?' (Ch. Up. VII, 24, 1); and 'like the ether he is omnipresent,\neternal.' A further argument for our view is supplied by the fact that\nthe might (of the being in question) is said to be limited; for the\npassage, 'He is lord of the worlds beyond that, and of the wishes of the\ndevas,' indicates the limitation of the might of the person in the sun;\nand the passage, 'He is lord of the worlds beneath that and of the\nwishes of men,' indicates the limitation of the might of the person in\nthe eye. No limit, on the other hand, can be admitted of the might of\nthe highest Lord, as appears from the passage (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 22),\n'He is the Lord of all, the king of all things, the protector of all\nthings. He is a bank and a boundary so that these worlds may not be\nconfounded;' which passage intimates that the Lord is free from all\nlimiting distinctions. For all these reasons the person in the eye and\nthe sun cannot be the highest Lord.\n\nTo this reasoning the Sutra replies, 'The one within, on account of his\nqualities being declared.' The person referred to in the passages\nconcerning the person within the sun and the person within the eye is\nnot a transmigrating being, but the highest Lord. Why? Because his\nqualities are declared. For the qualities of the highest Lord are\nindicated in the text as follows. At first the name of the person within\nthe sun is mentioned--'his name is Ut'--and then this name is explained\non the ground of that person being free from all evil, 'He has risen\nabove all evil.' The same name thus explained is then transferred to the\nperson in the eye, in the clause, 'the name of the one is the name of\nthe other.' Now, entire freedom from sin is attributed in Scripture to\nthe highest Self only; so, for instance (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1), 'The Self\nwhich is free from sin,' &c. Then, again, there is the passage, 'He is\n/Ri/k, he is Saman, Uktha, Yajus, Brahman,' which declares the person in\nthe eye to be the Self of the /Ri/k, Saman, and so on; which is possible\nonly if that person is the Lord who, as being the cause of all, is to be\nconsidered as the Self of all. Moreover, the text, after having stated\nin succession /Ri/k and Saman to have earth and fire for their Self with\nreference to the Devas, and, again, speech and breath with reference to\nthe body, continues, '/Ri/k and Saman are his joints,' with reference to\nthe Devas, and 'the joints of the one are the joints of the other,' with\nreference to the body. Now this statement also can be made only with\nregard to that which is the Self of all. Further, the passage,\n'Therefore all who sing to the Vina sing him, and from him also they\nobtain wealth,' shows that the being spoken of is the sole topic of all\nworldly songs; which again holds true of the highest Lord only. That\nabsolute command over the objects of worldly desires (as displayed, for\ninstance, in the bestowal of wealth) entitles us to infer that the Lord\nis meant, appears also from the following passage of the Bhagavad-gita\n(X, 41), 'Whatever being there is possessing power, glory, or strength,\nknow it to be produced from a portion of my energy[116].' To the\nobjection that the statements about bodily shape contained in the\nclauses, 'With a beard bright as gold,' &c., cannot refer to the highest\nLord, we reply that the highest Lord also may, when he pleases, assume a\nbodily shape formed of Maya, in order to gratify thereby his devout\nworshippers. Thus Sm/ri/ti also says, 'That thou seest me, O Narada, is\nthe Maya emitted by me; do not then look on me as endowed with the\nqualities of all beings.' We have further to note that expressions such\nas, 'That which is without sound, without touch, without form, without\ndecay,' are made use of where instruction is given about the nature of\nthe highest Lord in so far as he is devoid of all qualities; while\npassages such as the following one, 'He to whom belong all works, all\ndesires, all sweet odours and tastes' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 2), which\nrepresent the highest Lord as the object of devotion, speak of him, who\nis the cause of everything, as possessing some of the qualities of his\neffects. Analogously he may be spoken of, in the passage under\ndiscussion, as having a beard bright as gold and so on. With reference\nto the objection that the highest Lord cannot be meant because an abode\nis spoken of, we remark that, for the purposes of devout meditation, a\nspecial abode may be assigned to Brahman, although it abides in its own\nglory only; for as Brahman is, like ether, all-pervading, it may be\nviewed as being within the Self of all beings. The statement, finally,\nabout the limitation of Brahman's might, which depends on the\ndistinction of what belongs to the gods and what to the body, has\nlikewise reference to devout meditation only. From all this it follows\nthat the being which Scripture states to be within the eye and the sun\nis the highest Lord.\n\n21. And there is another one (i.e. the Lord who is different from the\nindividual souls animating the sun, &c.), on account of the declaration\nof distinction.\n\nThere is, moreover, one distinct from the individual souls which animate\nthe sun and other bodies, viz. the Lord who rules within; whose\ndistinction (from all individual souls) is proclaimed in the following\nscriptural passage, 'He who dwells in the sun and within the sun, whom\nthe sun does not know, whose body the sun is, and who rules the sun\nwithin; he is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal' (B/ri/. Up. III,\n7, 9). Here the expression, 'He within the sun whom the sun does not\nknow,' clearly indicates that the Ruler within is distinct from that\ncognising individual soul whose body is the sun. With that Ruler within\nwe have to identify the person within the sun, according to the tenet of\nthe sameness of purport of all Vedanta-texts. It thus remains a settled\nconclusion that the passage under discussion conveys instruction about\nthe highest Lord.\n\n22. The aka/s/a, i.e. ether (is Brahman) on account of characteristic\nmarks (of the latter being mentioned).\n\nIn the Chandogya (I, 9) the following passage is met with, 'What is the\norigin of this world?' 'Ether,' he replied. 'For all these beings take\ntheir rise from the ether only, and return into the ether. Ether is\ngreater than these, ether is their rest.'--Here the following doubt\narises. Does the word 'ether' denote the highest Brahman or the\nelemental ether?--Whence the doubt?--Because the word is seen to be used\nin both senses. Its use in the sense of 'elemental ether' is well\nestablished in ordinary as well as in Vedic speech; and, on the other\nhand, we see that it is sometimes used to denote Brahman, viz. in cases\nwhere we ascertain, either from some complementary sentence or from the\nfact of special qualities being mentioned, that Brahman is meant. So,\nfor instance, Taitt. Up. II, 7, 'If that bliss existed not in the\nether;' and Ch. Up. VIII, 14, 'That which is called ether is the\nrevealer of all forms and names; that within which forms and names\nare[117] that is Brahman.' Hence the doubt.--Which sense is then to be\nadopted in our case?--The sense of elemental ether, the purvapakshin\nreplies; because this sense belongs to the word more commonly, and\ntherefore presents itself to the mind more readily. The word 'ether'\ncannot be taken in both senses equally, because that would involve a\n(faulty) attribution of several meanings to one and the same word. Hence\nthe term 'ether' applies to Brahman in a secondary (metaphorical) sense\nonly; on account of Brahman being in many of its attributes, such as all\npervadingness and the like, similar to ether. The rule is, that when the\nprimary sense of a word is possible, the word must not be taken in a\nsecondary sense. And in the passage under discussion only the primary\nsense of the word 'ether' is admissible. Should it be objected that, if\nwe refer the passage under discussion to the elemental ether, a\ncomplementary passage ('for all these beings take their rise from the\nether only, &c.') cannot be satisfactorily accounted for; we reply that\nthe elemental ether also may be represented as a cause, viz. of air,\nfire, &c. in due succession. For we read in Scripture (Taitt. Up. II,\n1), 'From that Self sprang ether, from ether air, from air fire, and so\non.' The qualities also of being greater and of being a place of rest\nmay be ascribed to the elemental ether, if we consider its relations to\nall other beings. Therefore we conclude that the word 'ether' here\ndenotes the elemental ether.\n\nTo this we reply as follows:--The word ether must here be taken to\ndenote Brahman, on account of characteristic marks of the latter being\nmentioned. For the sentence, 'All these beings take their rise from the\nether only,' clearly indicates the highest Brahman, since all\nVedanta-texts agree in definitely declaring that all beings spring from\nthe highest Brahman.--But, the opponent may say, we have shown that the\nelemental ether also may be represented as the cause, viz. of air, fire,\nand the other elements in due succession.--We admit this. But still\nthere remains the difficulty, that, unless we understand the word to\napply to the fundamental cause of all, viz. Brahman, the affirmation\ncontained in the word 'only' and the qualification expressed by the word\n'all' (in 'all beings') would be out of place. Moreover, the clause,\n'They return into the ether,' again points to Brahman, and so likewise\nthe phrase, 'Ether is greater than these, ether is their rest;' for\nabsolute superiority in point of greatness Scripture attributes to the\nhighest Self only; cp. Ch. Up. III, 14, 3, 'Greater than the earth,\ngreater than the sky, greater than heaven, greater than all these\nworlds.' The quality of being a place of rest likewise agrees best with\nthe highest Brahman, on account of its being the highest cause. This is\nconfirmed by the following scriptural passage: 'Knowledge and bliss is\nBrahman, it is the rest of him who gives gifts' (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 28).\nMoreover, Jaivali finding fault with the doctrine of /S/alavatya, on\naccount of (his saman) having an end (Ch. Up. I, 8, 8), and wishing to\nproclaim something that has no end chooses the ether, and then, having\nidentified the ether with the Udgitha, concludes, 'He is the Udgitha\ngreater than great; he is without end.' Now this endlessness is a\ncharacteristic mark of Brahman. To the remark that the sense of\n'elemental ether' presents itself to the mind more readily, because it\nis the better established sense of the word aka/s/a, we reply, that,\nalthough it may present itself to the mind first, yet it is not to be\naccepted, because we see that qualities of Brahman are mentioned in the\ncomplementary sentences. That the word aka/s/a is also used to denote\nBrahman has been shown already; cp. such passages as, 'Ether is the\nrevealer of all names and forms.' We see, moreover, that various\nsynonyma of aka/s/a are employed to denote Brahman. So, for instance,\n/Ri/k Sa/m/h. I, 164, 39, 'In which the Vedas are[118], in the\nImperishable one (i.e. Brahman), the highest, the ether (vyoman), on\nwhich all gods have their seat.' And Taitt. Up. III, 6, 'This is the\nknowledge of Bh/ri/gu and Varu/n/a, founded on the highest ether\n(vyoman).' And again, 'Om, ka is Brahman, ether (kha) is Brahman' (Ch.\nUp. IV, 10, 5), and 'the old ether' (B/ri/. Up. V, 1)[119]. And other\nsimilar passages. On account of the force of the complementary passage\nwe are justified in deciding that the word 'ether,' although occurring\nin the beginning of the passage, refers to Brahman. The case is\nanalogous to that of the sentence, 'Agni (lit. the fire) studies a\nchapter,' where the word agni, although occurring in the beginning, is\nat once seen to denote a boy[120]. It is therefore settled that the word\n'ether' denotes Brahman.\n\n23. For the same reason breath (is Brahman).\n\nConcerning the udgitha it is said (Ch. Up. I, 10, 9), 'Prastot/ri/, that\ndeity which belongs to the prastava, &c.,' and, further on (I, 11, 4;\n5), 'Which then is that deity? He said: Breath. For all these beings\nmerge into breath alone, and from breath they arise. This is the deity\nbelonging to the prastava.' With reference to this passage doubt and\ndecision are to be considered as analogous to those stated under the\npreceding Sutra. For while in some passages--as, for instance, 'For\nindeed, my son, mind is fastened to pra/n/a,' Ch. Up. VI, 8, 2; and,\n'the pra/n/a of pra/n/a,' B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 18--the word 'breath' is\nseen to denote Brahman, its use in the sense of a certain modification\nof air is better established in common as well as in Vedic language.\nHence there arises a doubt whether in the passage under discussion the\nword pra/n/a denotes Brahman or (ordinary) breath. In favour of which\nmeaning have we then to decide?\n\nHere the purvapakshin maintains that the word must be held to denote the\nfivefold vital breath, which is a peculiar modification of wind (or\nair); because, as has been remarked already, that sense of the word\npra/n/a is the better established one.--But no, an objector will say,\njust as in the case of the preceding Sutra, so here also Brahman is\nmeant, on account of characteristic marks being mentioned; for here also\na complementary passage gives us to understand that all beings spring\nfrom and merge into pra/n/a; a process which can take place in connexion\nwith the highest Lord only.--This objection, the purvapakshin replies,\nis futile, since we see that the beings enter into and proceed from the\nprincipal vital air also. For Scripture makes the following statement\n(Sat. Br. X, 3, 3, 6), 'When man sleeps, then into breath indeed speech\nmerges, into breath the eye, into breath the ear, into breath the mind;\nwhen he awakes then they spring again from breath alone.' What the Veda\nhere states is, moreover, a matter of observation, for during sleep,\nwhile the process of breathing goes on uninterruptedly, the activity of\nthe sense organs is interrupted and again becomes manifest at the time\nof awaking only. And as the sense organs are the essence of all material\nbeings, the complementary passage which speaks of the merging and\nemerging of the beings can be reconciled with the principal vital air\nalso. Moreover, subsequently to pra/n/a being mentioned as the divinity\nof the prastava the sun and food are designated as the divinities of the\nudgitha and the pratibara. Now as they are not Brahman, the pra/n/a\nalso, by parity of reasoning, cannot be Brahman.\n\nTo this argumentation the author of the Sutras replies: For the same\nreason pra/n/a--that means: on account of the presence of characteristic\nmarks--which constituted the reason stated in the preceding Sutra--the\nword pra/n/a also must be held to denote Brahman. For Scripture says of\npra/n/a also, that it is connected with marks characteristic of Brahman.\nThe sentence, 'All these beings merge into breath alone, and from breath\nthey arise,' which declares that the origination and retractation of all\nbeings depend on pra/n/a, clearly shows pra/n/a to be Brahman. In reply\nto the assertion that the origination and retractation of all beings can\nbe reconciled equally well with the assumption of pra/n/a denoting the\nchief vital air, because origination and retractation take place in the\nstate of waking and of sleep also, we remark that in those two states\nonly the senses are merged into, and emerge from, the chief vital air,\nwhile, according to the scriptural passage, 'For all these beings, &c.,'\nall beings whatever into which a living Self has entered, together with\ntheir senses and bodies, merge and emerge by turns. And even if the word\n'beings' were taken (not in the sense of animated beings, but) in the\nsense of material elements in general, there would be nothing in the way\nof interpreting the passage as referring to Brahman.--But, it may be\nsaid, that the senses together with their objects do, during sleep,\nenter into pra/n/a, and again issue from it at the time of waking, we\ndistinctly learn from another scriptural passage, viz. Kau. Up. III, 3,\n'When a man being thus asleep sees no dream whatever, he becomes one\nwith that pra/n/a alone. Then speech goes to him with all names,'\n&c.--True, we reply, but there also the word pra/n/a denotes (not the\nvital air) but Brahman, as we conclude from characteristic marks of\nBrahman being mentioned. The objection, again, that the word pra/n/a\ncannot denote Brahman because it occurs in proximity to the words 'food'\nand 'sun' (which do not refer to Brahman), is altogether baseless; for\nproximity is of no avail against the force of the complementary passage\nwhich intimates that pra/n/a is Brahman. That argument, finally, which\nrests on the fact that the word pra/n/a commonly denotes the vital air\nwith its five modifications, is to be refuted in the same way as the\nparallel argument which the purvapakshin brought forward with reference\nto the word 'ether.' From all this it follows that the pra/n/a, which is\nthe deity of the prastava, is Brahman.\n\nSome (commentators)[121] quote under the present Sutra the following\npassages, 'the pra/n/a of pra/n/a' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 18), and 'for to\npra/n/a mind is fastened' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 2). But that is wrong since\nthese two passages offer no opportunity for any discussion, the former\non account of the separation of the words, the latter on account of the\ngeneral topic. When we meet with a phrase such as 'the father of the\nfather' we understand at once that the genitive denotes a father\ndifferent from the father denoted by the nominative. Analogously we\ninfer from the separation of words contained in the phrase, 'the breath\nof breath,' that the 'breath of breath' is different from the ordinary\nbreath (denoted by the genitive 'of breath'). For one and the same thing\ncannot, by means of a genitive, be predicated of--and thus distinguished\nfrom--itself. Concerning the second passage we remark that, if the\nmatter constituting the general topic of some chapter is referred to in\nthat chapter under a different name, we yet conclude, from the general\ntopic, that that special matter is meant. For instance, when we meet in\nthe section which treats of the jyotish/t/oma sacrifice with the\npassage, 'in every spring he is to offer the jyotis sacrifice,' we at\nonce understand that the word denotes the jyotish/t/oma. If we therefore\nmeet with the clause 'to pra/n/a mind is fastened' in a section of which\nthe highest Brahman is the topic, we do not for a moment suppose that\nthe word pra/n/a should there denote the ordinary breath which is a mere\nmodification of air. The two passages thus do not offer any matter for\ndiscussion, and hence do not furnish appropriate instances for the\nSutra. We have shown, on the other hand, that the passage about the\npra/n/a, which is the deity of the prastava, allows room for doubt,\npurvapaksha and final decision.\n\n24. The 'light' (is Brahman), on account of the mention of feet (in a\npassage which is connected with the passage about the light).\n\nScripture says (Ch. Up. III, 13, 7), 'Now that light which shines above\nthis heaven, higher than all, higher than everything, in the highest\nworlds beyond which there are no other worlds that is the same light\nwhich is within man.' Here the doubt presents itself whether the word\n'light' denotes the light of the sun and the like, or the highest Self.\nUnder the preceding Sutras we had shown that some words which ordinarily\nhave different meanings yet in certain passages denote Brahman, since\ncharacteristic marks of the latter are mentioned. Here the question has\nto be discussed whether, in connexion with the passage quoted,\ncharacteristic marks of Brahman are mentioned or not.\n\nThe purvapakshin maintains that the word 'light' denotes nothing else\nbut the light of the sun and the like, since that is the ordinary\nwell-established meaning of the term. The common use of language, he\nsays, teaches us that the two words 'light' and 'darkness' denote\nmutually opposite things, darkness being the term for whatever\ninterferes with the function of the sense of sight, as, for instance,\nthe gloom of the night, while sunshine and whatever else favours the\naction of the eye is called light. The word 'shines' also, which the\ntext exhibits, is known ordinarily to refer to the sun and similar\nsources of light; while of Brahman, which is devoid of colour, it cannot\nbe said, in the primary sense of the word, that it 'shines.' Further,\nthe word jyotis must here denote light because it is said to be bounded\nby the sky ('that light which shines above this heaven'). For while it\nis impossible to consider the sky as being the boundary of Brahman,\nwhich is the Self of all and the source of all things movable or\nimmovable, the sky may be looked upon as forming the boundary of light,\nwhich is a mere product and as such limited; accordingly the text says,\n'the light beyond heaven.'--But light, although a mere product, is\nperceived everywhere; it would therefore be wrong to declare that it is\nbounded by the sky!--Well, then, the purvapakshin replies, let us assume\nthat the light meant is the first-born (original) light which has not\nyet become tripartite[122]. This explanation again cannot be admitted,\nbecause the non-tripartite light does not serve any purpose.--But, the\npurvapakshin resumes, Why should its purpose not be found therein that\nit is the object of devout meditation?--That cannot be, we reply; for we\nsee that only such things are represented as objects of devotion as have\nsome other independent use of their own; so, for instance, the sun\n(which dispels darkness and so on). Moreover the scriptural passage,\n'Let me make each of these three (fire, water, and earth) tripartite,'\ndoes not indicate any difference[123]. And even of the non-tripartite\nlight it is not known that the sky constitutes its boundary.--Well, then\n(the purvapakshin resumes, dropping the idea of the non-tripartite\nlight), let us assume that the light of which the text speaks is the\ntripartite (ordinary) light. The objection that light is seen to exist\nalso beneath the sky, viz. in the form of fire and the like, we\ninvalidate by the remark that there is nothing contrary to reason in\nassigning a special locality to fire, although the latter is observed\neverywhere; while to assume a special place for Brahman, to which the\nidea of place does not apply at all, would be most unsuitable. Moreover,\nthe clause 'higher than everything, in the highest worlds beyond which\nthere are no other worlds,' which indicates a multiplicity of abodes,\nagrees much better with light, which is a mere product (than with\nBrahman). There is moreover that other clause, also, 'That is the same\nlight which is within man,' in which the highest light is identified\nwith the gastric fire (the fire within man). Now such identifications\ncan be made only where there is a certain similarity of nature; as is\nseen, for instance, in the passage, 'Of that person Bhu/h/ is the head,\nfor the head is one and that syllable is one' (B/ri/. Up. V, 5, 3). But\nthat the fire within the human body is not Brahman clearly appears from\nthe passage, 'Of this we have visible and audible proof' (Ch. Up. III,\n13, 7; 8), which declares that the fire is characterised by the noise it\nmakes, and by heat; and likewise from the following passage, 'Let a man\nmeditate on this as that which is seen and heard.' The same conclusion\nmay be drawn from the passage, 'He who knows this becomes conspicuous\nand celebrated,' which proclaims an inconsiderable reward only, while to\nthe devout meditation on Brahman a high reward would have to be\nallotted. Nor is there mentioned in the entire passage about the light\nany other characteristic mark of Brahman, while such marks are set forth\nin the passages (discussed above) which refer to pra/n/a and the ether.\nNor, again, is Brahman indicated in the preceding section, 'the Gayatri\nis everything whatsoever exists,' &c. (III, 12); for that passage makes\na statement about the Gayatri metre only. And even if that section did\nrefer to Brahman, still Brahman would not be recognised in the passage\nat present under discussion; for there (in the section referred to) it\nis declared in the clause, 'Three feet of it are the Immortal in\nheaven'--that heaven constitutes the abode; while in our passage the\nwords 'the light above heaven' declare heaven to be a boundary. For all\nthese reasons the word jyotis is here to be taken in its ordinary\nmeaning, viz. light.\n\nTo this we make the following reply. The word jyotis must be held to\ndenote Brahman. Why? On account of the feet (quarters) being mentioned.\nIn a preceding passage Brahman had been spoken of as having four feet\n(quarters). 'Such is the greatness of it; greater than it is the Person\n(purusha). One foot of it are all the beings, three feet of it are the\nImmortal in heaven.' That which in this passage is said to constitute\nthe three-quarter part, immortal and connected with heaven, of Brahman,\nwhich altogether comprises four quarters; this very same entity we\nrecognise as again referred to in the passage under discussion, because\nthere also it is said to be connected with heaven. If therefore we\nshould set it aside in our interpretation of the passage and assume the\nlatter to refer to the ordinary light, we should commit the mistake of\ndropping, without need, the topic started and introducing a new subject.\nBrahman, in fact, continues to form the subject-matter, not only of the\npassage about the light, but likewise of the subsequent section, the\nso-called Sa/nd/ilya-vidya (Ch. Up. III, 14). Hence we conclude that in\nour passage the word 'light' must be held to denote Brahman. The\nobjection (raised above) that from common use the words 'light' and 'to\nshine' are known to denote effected (physical) light is without force;\nfor as it is known from the general topic of the chapter that Brahman is\nmeant, those two words do not necessarily denote physical light only to\nthe exclusion of Brahman[124], but may also denote Brahman itself, in so\nfar as it is characterised by the physical shining light which is its\neffect. Analogously another mantra declares, 'that by which the sun\nshines kindled with heat' (Taitt. Br. III, 12, 9, 7). Or else we may\nsuppose that the word jyotis here does not denote at all that light on\nwhich the function of the eye depends. For we see that in other passages\nit has altogether different meanings; so, for instance, B/ri/. Up. IV,\n3, 5, 'With speech only as light man sits,' and Taitt. Sa. I, 6, 3, 3,\n'May the mind, the light, accept,' &c. It thus appears that whatever\nilluminates (in the different senses of the word) something else may be\nspoken of as 'light.' Hence to Brahman also, whose nature is\nintelligence, the term 'light' may be applied; for it gives light to the\nentire world. Similarly, other scriptural passages say, 'Him the shining\none, everything shines after; by his light all this is lighted' (Kau.\nUp. II, 5, 15); and 'Him the gods worship as the light of lights, as the\nimmortal' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 16). Against the further objection that the\nomnipresent Brahman cannot be viewed as bounded by heaven we remark that\nthe assignment, to Brahman, of a special locality is not contrary to\nreason because it subserves the purpose of devout meditation. Nor does\nit avail anything to say that it is impossible to assign any place to\nBrahman because Brahman is out of connexion with all place. For it is\npossible to make such an assumption, because Brahman is connected with\ncertain limiting adjuncts. Accordingly Scripture speaks of different\nkinds of devout meditation on Brahman as specially connected with\ncertain localities, such as the sun, the eye, the heart. For the same\nreason it is also possible to attribute to Brahman a multiplicity of\nabodes, as is done in the clause (quoted above) 'higher than all.' The\nfurther objection that the light beyond heaven is the mere physical\nlight because it is identified with the gastric fire, which itself is a\nmere effect and is inferred from perceptible marks such as the heat of\nthe body and a certain sound, is equally devoid of force; for the\ngastric fire may be viewed as the outward appearance (or symbol) of\nBrahman, just as Brahman's name is a mere outward symbol. Similarly in\nthe passage, 'Let a man meditate on it (the gastric light) as seen and\nheard,' the visibility and audibility (here implicitly ascribed to\nBrahman) must be considered as rendered possible through the gastric\nfire being the outward appearance of Brahman. Nor is there any force in\nthe objection that Brahman cannot be meant because the text mentions an\ninconsiderable reward only; for there is no reason compelling us to have\nrecourse to Brahman for the purpose of such and such a reward only, and\nnot for the purpose of such and such another reward. Wherever the text\nrepresents the highest Brahman--which is free from all connexion with\ndistinguishing attributes--as the universal Self, it is understood that\nthe result of that instruction is one only, viz. final release.\nWherever, on the other hand, Brahman is taught to be connected with\ndistinguishing attributes or outward symbols, there, we see, all the\nvarious rewards which this world can offer are spoken of; cp. for\ninstance, B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 24, 'This is he who eats all food, the giver\nof wealth. He who knows this obtains wealth.' Although in the passage\nitself which treats of the light no characteristic mark of Brahman is\nmentioned, yet, as the Sutra intimates, the mark stated in a preceding\npassage (viz. the mantra, 'Such is the greatness of it,' &c.) has to be\ntaken in connexion with the passage about the light as well. The\nquestion how the mere circumstance of Brahman being mentioned in a not\ndistant passage can have the power of divorcing from its natural object\nand transferring to another object the direct statement about light\nimplied in the word 'light,' may be answered without difficulty. The\npassage under discussion runs[125], 'which above this heaven, the\nlight.' The relative pronoun with which this clause begins intimates,\naccording to its grammatical force[126], the same Brahman which was\nmentioned in the previous passage, and which is here recognised (as\nbeing the same which was mentioned before) through its connexion with\nheaven; hence the word jyotis also--which stands in grammatical\nco-ordination to 'which'--must have Brahman for its object. From all\nthis it follows that the word 'light' here denotes Brahman.\n\n25. If it be objected that (Brahman is) not (denoted) on account of the\nmetre being denoted; (we reply) not so, because thus (i.e. by means of\nthe metre) the direction of the mind (on Brahman) is declared; for thus\nit is seen (in other passages also).\n\nWe now address ourselves to the refutation of the assertion (made in the\npurvapaksha of the preceding Sutra) that in the previous passage also\nBrahman is not referred to, because in the sentence, 'Gayatri is\neverything whatsoever here exists,' the metre called Gayatri is spoken\nof.--How (we ask the purvapakshin) can it be maintained that, on account\nof the metre being spoken of, Brahman is not denoted, while yet the\nmantra 'such is the greatness of it,' &c., clearly sets forth Brahman\nwith its four quarters?--You are mistaken (the purvapakshin replies).\nThe sentence, 'Gayatri is everything,' starts the discussion of Gayatri.\nThe same Gayatri is thereupon described under the various forms of all\nbeings, earth, body, heart, speech, breath; to which there refers also\nthe verse, 'that Gayatri has four feet and is sixfold.' After that we\nmeet with the mantra, 'Such is the greatness of it.' &c. How then, we\nask, should this mantra, which evidently is quoted with reference to the\nGayatri (metre) as described in the preceding clauses, all at once\ndenote Brahman with its four quarters? Since therefore the metre Gayatri\nis the subject-matter of the entire chapter, the term 'Brahman' which\noccurs in a subsequent passage ('the Brahman which has thus been\ndescribed') must also denote the metre. This is analogous to a previous\npassage (Ch. Up. III, 11, 3, 'He who thus knows this Brahma-upanishad'),\nwhere the word Brahma-upanishad is explained to mean Veda-upanishad. As\ntherefore the preceding passage refers (not to Brahman, but) to the\nGayatri metre, Brahman does not constitute the topic of the entire\nsection.\n\nThis argumentation, we reply, proves nothing against our position.\n'Because thus direction of the mind is declared,' i.e. because the\nBrahma/n/a passage, 'Gayatri indeed is all this,' intimates that by\nmeans of the metre Gayatri the mind is to be directed on Brahman which\nis connected with that metre. Of the metre Gayatri, which is nothing but\na certain special combination of syllables, it could not possibly be\nsaid that it is the Self of everything. We therefore have to understand\nthe passage as declaring that Brahman, which, as the cause of the world,\nis connected with that product also whose name is Gayatri, is 'all\nthis;' in accordance with that other passage which directly says, 'All\nthis indeed is Brahman' (Kh. Up. III, 14, 1). That the effect is in\nreality not different from the cause, we shall prove later on, under\nSutra II, 1, 14. Devout meditation on Brahman under the form of certain\neffects (of Brahman) is seen to be mentioned in other passages also, so,\nfor instance, Ait. Ar. III, 2, 3, 12, 'For the Bahv/rik/as consider him\nin the great hymn, the Adhvaryus in the sacrificial fire, the Chandogas\nin the Mahavrata ceremony.' Although, therefore, the previous passage\nspeaks of the metre, Brahman is what is meant, and the same Brahman is\nagain referred to in the passage about the light, whose purport it is to\nenjoin another form of devout meditation.\n\nAnother commentator[127] is of opinion that the term Gayatri (does not\ndenote Brahman in so far as viewed under the form of Gayatri, but)\ndirectly denotes Brahman, on account of the equality of number; for just\nas the Gayatri metre has four feet consisting of six syllables each, so\nBrahman also has four feet, (i.e. quarters.) Similarly we see that in\nother passages also the names of metres are used to denote other things\nwhich resemble those metres in certain numerical relations; cp. for\ninstance, Ch. Up. IV, 3, 8, where it is said at first, 'Now these five\nand the other five make ten and that is the K/ri/ta,' and after that\n'these are again the Viraj which eats the food.' If we adopt this\ninterpretation, Brahman only is spoken of, and the metre is not referred\nto at all. In any case Brahman is the subject with which the previous\npassage is concerned.\n\n26. And thus also (we must conclude, viz. that Brahman is the subject of\nthe previous passage), because (thus only) the declaration as to the\nbeings, &c. being the feet is possible.\n\nThat the previous passage has Brahman for its topic, we must assume for\nthat reason also that the text designates the beings and so on as the\nfeet of Gayatri. For the text at first speaks of the beings, the earth,\nthe body, and the heart[128], and then goes on 'that Gayatri has four\nfeet and is sixfold.' For of the mere metre, without any reference to\nBrahman, it would be impossible to say that the beings and so on are its\nfeet. Moreover, if Brahman were not meant, there would be no room for\nthe verse, 'Such is the greatness,' &c. For that verse clearly describes\nBrahman in its own nature; otherwise it would be impossible to represent\nthe Gayatri as the Self of everything as is done in the words, 'One foot\nof it are all the beings; three feet of it are what is immortal in\nheaven.' The purusha-sukta also (/Ri/k Sa/m/h. X, 90) exhibits the verse\nwith sole reference to Brahman. Sm/ri/ti likewise ascribes to Brahman a\nlike nature, 'I stand supporting all this world by a single portion of\nmyself' (Bha. Gita X, 42). Our interpretation moreover enables us to\ntake the passage, 'that Brahman indeed which,' &c. (III, 12, 7), in its\nprimary sense, (i.e. to understand the word Brahman to denote nothing\nbut Brahman.) And, moreover, the passage, 'these are the five men of\nBrahman' (III, 13, 6), is appropriate only if the former passage about\nthe Gayatri is taken as referring to Brahman (for otherwise the\n'Brahman' in 'men of Brahman' would not be connected with the previous\ntopic). Hence Brahman is to be considered as the subject-matter of the\nprevious passage also. And the decision that the same Brahman is\nreferred to in the passage about the light where it is recognised (to be\nthe same) from its connexion with heaven, remains unshaken.\n\n27. The objection that (the Brahman of the former passage cannot be\nrecognised in the latter) on account of the difference of designation,\nis not valid because in either (designation) there is nothing contrary\n(to the recognition).\n\nThe objection that in the former passage ('three feet of it are what is\nimmortal in heaven'), heaven is designated as the abode, while in the\nlatter passage ('that light which shines above this heaven'), heaven is\ndesignated as the boundary, and that, on account of this difference of\ndesignation, the subject-matter of the former passage cannot be\nrecognised in the latter, must likewise be refuted. This we do by\nremarking that in either designation nothing is contrary to the\nrecognition. Just as in ordinary language a falcon, although in contact\nwith the top of a tree, is not only said to be on the tree but also\nabove the tree, so Brahman also, although being in heaven, is here\nreferred to as being beyond heaven as well.\n\nAnother (commentator) explains: just as in ordinary language a falcon,\nalthough not in contact with the top of a tree, is not only said to be\nabove the top of the tree but also on the top of the tree, so Brahman\nalso, which is in reality beyond heaven, is (in the former of the two\npassages) said to be in heaven. Therefore the Brahman spoken of in the\nformer passage can be recognised in the latter also, and it remains\ntherefore a settled conclusion that the word 'light' denotes Brahman.\n\n28. Pra/n/a (breath) is Brahman, that being understood from a connected\nconsideration (of the passages referring to pra/n/a).\n\nIn the Kaushitaki-brahma/n/a-upanishad there is recorded a legend of\nIndra and Pratardana which begins with the words, 'Pratardana, forsooth,\nthe son of Divodasa came by means of fighting and strength to the\nbeloved abode of Indra' (Kau. Up. III, 1). In this legend we read: 'He\nsaid: I am pra/n/a, the intelligent Self (praj/n/atman), meditate on me\nas Life, as Immortality' (III, 2). And later on (III, 3), 'Pra/n/a\nalone, the intelligent Self, having laid hold of this body, makes it\nrise up.' Then, again (III, 8), 'Let no man try to find out what speech\nis, let him know the speaker.' And in the end (III, 8), 'That breath\nindeed is the intelligent Self, bliss, imperishable, immortal.'--Here\nthe doubt presents itself whether the word pra/n/a denotes merely\nbreath, the modification of air, or the Self of some divinity, or the\nindividual soul, or the highest Brahman.--But, it will be said at the\noutset, the Sutra I, 1, 21 already has shown that the word pra/n/a\nrefers to Brahman, and as here also we meet with characteristic marks of\nBrahman, viz. the words 'bliss, imperishable, immortal,' what reason is\nthere for again raising the same doubt?--We reply: Because there are\nobserved here characteristic marks of different kinds. For in the legend\nwe meet not only with marks indicating Brahman, but also with marks\npointing to other beings Thus Indra's words, 'Know me only' (III, 1)\npoint to the Self of a divinity; the words, 'Having laid hold of this\nbody it makes it rise up,' point to the breath; the words, 'Let no man\ntry to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker,' point to the\nindividual soul. There is thus room for doubt.\n\nIf, now, the purvapakshin maintains that the term pra/n/a here denotes\nthe well-known modification of air, i.e. breath, we, on our side, assert\nthat the word pra/n/a must be understood to denote Brahman.--For what\nreason?--On account of such being the consecutive meaning of the\npassages. For if we examine the connexion of the entire section which\ntreats of the pra/n/a, we observe that all the single passages can be\nconstrued into a whole only if they are viewed as referring to Brahman.\nAt the beginning of the legend Pratardana, having been allowed by Indra\nto choose a boon, mentions the highest good of man, which he selects for\nhis boon, in the following words, 'Do you yourself choose that boon for\nme which you deem most beneficial for a man.' Now, as later on pra/n/a\nis declared to be what is most beneficial for man, what should pra/n/a\ndenote but the highest Self? For apart from the cognition of that Self a\nman cannot possibly attain what is most beneficial for him, as many\nscriptural passages declare. Compare, for instance, /S/ve. Up. III, 8,\n'A man who knows him passes over death; there is no other path to go.'\nAgain, the further passage, 'He who knows me thus by no deed of his is\nhis life harmed, not by theft, not by bhru/n/ahatya' (III, 1), has a\nmeaning only if Brahman is supposed to be the object of knowledge. For,\nthat subsequently to the cognition of Brahman all works and their\neffects entirely cease, is well known from scriptural passages, such as\nthe following, 'All works perish when he has been beheld who is the\nhigher and the lower' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8). Moreover, pra/n/a can be\nidentified with the intelligent Self only if it is Brahman. For the air\nwhich is non-intelligent can clearly not be the intelligent Self. Those\ncharacteristic marks, again, which are mentioned in the concluding\npassage (viz. those intimated by the words 'bliss,' 'imperishable,'\n'immortal') can, if taken in their full sense, not be reconciled with\nany being except Brahman. There are, moreover, the following passages,\n'He does not increase by a good action, nor decrease by a bad action.\nFor he makes him whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds do a good\ndeed; and the same makes him whom he wishes to lead down from these\nworlds do a bad deed;' and, 'He is the guardian of the world, he is the\nking of the world, he is the Lord of the world' (Kau. Up. III, 8). All\nthis can be properly understood only if the highest Brahman is\nacknowledged to be the subject-matter of the whole chapter, not if the\nvital air is substituted in its place. Hence the word pra/n/a denotes\nBrahman.\n\n29. If it be said that (Brahman is) not (denoted) on account of the\nspeaker denoting himself; (we reply that this objection is not valid)\nbecause there is in that (chapter) a multitude of references to the\ninterior Self.\n\nAn objection is raised against the assertion that pra/n/a denotes\nBrahman. The word pra/n/a, it is said, does not denote the highest\nBrahman, because the speaker designates himself. The speaker, who is a\ncertain powerful god called Indra, at first says, in order to reveal\nhimself to Pratardana, 'Know me only,' and later on, 'I am pra/n/a, the\nintelligent Self.' How, it is asked, can the pra/n/a, which this latter\npassage, expressive of personality as it is, represents as the Self of\nthe speaker, be Brahman to which, as we know from Scripture, the\nattribute of being a speaker cannot be ascribed; compare, for instance,\nB/ri/. Up. III, 8, 8, 'It is without speech, without mind.' Further on,\nalso, the speaker, i.e. Indra, glorifies himself by enumerating a number\nof attributes, all of which depend on personal existence and can in no\nway belong to Brahman, 'I slew the three-headed son of Tvash/tri/; I\ndelivered the Arunmukhas, the devotees, to the wolves,' and so on. Indra\nmay be called pra/n/a on account of his strength. Scripture says,\n'Strength indeed is pra/n/a,' and Indra is known as the god of strength;\nand of any deed of strength people say, 'It is Indra's work.' The\npersonal Self of a deity may, moreover, be called an intelligent Self;\nfor the gods, people say, possess unobstructed knowledge. It thus being\na settled matter that some passages convey information about the\npersonal Self of some deity, the other passages also--as, for instance,\nthe one about what is most beneficial for man--must be interpreted as\nwell as they may with reference to the same deity. Hence pra/n/a does\nnot denote Brahman.\n\nThis objection we refute by the remark that in that chapter there are\nfound a multitude of references to the interior Self. For the passage,\n'As long as pra/n/a dwells in this body so long surely there is life,'\ndeclares that that pra/n/a only which is the intelligent interior\nSelf--and not some particular outward deity--has power to bestow and to\ntake back life. And where the text speaks of the eminence of the\npra/n/as as founded on the existence of the pra/n/a, it shows that that\npra/n/a is meant which has reference to the Self and is the abode of the\nsense-organs.[129]\n\nOf the same tendency is the passage, 'Pra/n/a, the intelligent Self,\nalone having laid hold of this body makes it rise up;' and the passage\n(which occurs in the passus, 'Let no man try to find out what speech\nis,' &c.), 'For as in a car the circumference of the wheel is set on the\nspokes and the spokes on the nave, thus are these objects set on the\nsubjects (the senses) and the subjects on the pra/n/a. And that pra/n/a\nindeed is the Self of pra/n/a, blessed, imperishable, immortal.' So also\nthe following passage which, referring to this interior Self, forming as\nit were the centre of the peripherical interaction of the objects and\nsenses, sums up as follows, 'He is my Self, thus let it be known;' a\nsumming up which is appropriate only if pra/n/a is meant to denote not\nsome outward existence, but the interior Self. And another scriptural\npassage declares 'this Self is Brahman, omniscient'[130] (B/ri/. Up. II,\n5, 19). We therefore arrive at the conclusion that, on account of the\nmultitude of references to the interior Self, the chapter contains\ninformation regarding Brahman, not regarding the Self of some\ndeity.--How then can the circumstance of the speaker (Indra) referring\nto himself be explained?\n\n30. The declaration (made by Indra about himself, viz. that he is one\nwith Brahman) (is possible) through intuition vouched for by Scripture,\nas in the case of Vamadeva.\n\nThe individual divine Self called Indra perceiving by means of\n/ri/shi-like intuition[131]--the existence of which is vouched for by\nScripture--its own Self to be identical with the supreme Self, instructs\nPratardana (about the highest Self) by means of the words 'Know me\nonly.'\n\nBy intuition of the same kind the /ri/shi Vamadeva reached the knowledge\nexpressed in the words, 'I was Manu and Surya;' in accordance with the\npassage, 'Whatever deva was awakened (so as to know Brahman) he indeed\nbecame that' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 10). The assertion made above (in the\npurvapaksha of the preceding Sutra) that Indra after saying, 'Know me\nonly,' glorifies himself by enumerating the slaying of Tvash/tri/'s son\nand other deeds of strength, we refute as follows. The death of\nTvash/tri/'s son and similar deeds are referred to, not to the end of\nglorifying Indra as the object of knowledge--in which case the sense of\nthe passage would be, 'Because I accomplished such and such deeds,\ntherefore know me'--but to the end of glorifying the cognition of the\nhighest Self. For this reason the text, after having referred to the\nslaying of Tvash/tri/'s son and the like, goes on in the clause next\nfollowing to exalt knowledge, 'And not one hair of me is harmed there.\nHe who knows me thus by no deed of his is his life harmed.'--(But how\ndoes this passage convey praise of knowledge?)--Because, we reply, its\nmeaning is as follows: 'Although I do such cruel deeds, yet not even a\nhair of mine is harmed because I am one with Brahman; therefore the life\nof any other person also who knows me thus is not harmed by any deed of\nhis.' And the object of the knowledge (praised by Indra) is nothing else\nbut Brahman which is set forth in a subsequent passage, 'I am pra/n/a,\nthe intelligent Self.' Therefore the entire chapter refers to Brahman.\n\n31. If it be said (that Brahman is) not (meant), on account of\ncharacteristic marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air\n(being mentioned); we say no, on account of the threefoldness of devout\nmeditation (which would result from your interpretation); on account of\n(the meaning advocated by us) being accepted (elsewhere); and on account\nof (characteristic marks of Brahman) being connected (with the passage\nunder discussion).\n\nAlthough we admit, the purvapakshin resumes, that the chapter about the\npra/n/a does not furnish any instruction regarding some outward deity,\nsince it contains a multitude of references to the interior Self; still\nwe deny that it is concerned with Brahman.--For what reason?--Because it\nmentions characteristic marks of the individual soul on the one hand,\nand of the chief vital air on the other hand. The passage, 'Let no man\ntry to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker,' mentions a\ncharacteristic mark of the individual soul, and must therefore be held\nto point out as the object of knowledge the individual soul which rules\nand employs the different organs of action such as speech and so on. On\nthe other hand, we have the passage, 'But pra/n/a alone, the intelligent\nSelf, having laid hold of this body makes it rise up,' which points to\nthe chief vital air; for the chief attribute of the vital air is that it\nsustains the body. Similarly, we read in the colloquy of the vital airs\n(Pra. Up. II, 3), concerning speech and the other vital airs, 'Then\npra/n/a (the chief vital air) as the best said to them: Be not deceived;\nI alone dividing myself fivefold support this body and keep it.' Those,\nagain, who in the passage quoted above read 'this one (masc.), the\nbody[132]' must give the following explanation, Pra/n/a having laid hold\nof this one, viz. either the individual soul or the aggregate of the\nsense organs, makes the body rise up. The individual soul as well as the\nchief vital air may justly be designated as the intelligent Self; for\nthe former is of the nature of intelligence, and the latter (although\nnon-intelligent in itself) is the abode of other pra/n/as, viz. the\nsense organs, which are the instruments of intelligence. Moreover, if\nthe word pra/n/a be taken to denote the individual soul as well as the\nchief vital air, the pra/n/a and the intelligent Self may be spoken of\nin two ways, either as being non-different on account of their mutual\nconcomitance, or as being different on account of their (essentially\ndifferent) individual character; and in these two different ways they\nare actually spoken of in the two following passages, 'What is pra/n/a\nthat is praj/n/a, what is praj/n/a that is pra/n/a;' and, 'For together\ndo these two live in the body and together do they depart.' If, on the\nother hand, pra/n/a denoted Brahman, what then could be different from\nwhat? For these reasons pra/n/a does not denote Brahman, but either the\nindividual soul or the chief vital air or both.\n\nAll this argumentation, we reply, is wrong, 'on account of the\nthreefoldness of devout meditation.' Your interpretation would involve\nthe assumption of devout meditation of three different kinds, viz. on\nthe individual soul, on the chief vital air, and on Brahman. But it is\ninappropriate to assume that a single sentence should enjoin three kinds\nof devout meditation; and that all the passages about the pra/n/a really\nconstitute one single sentence (one syntactical whole) appears from the\nbeginning and the concluding part. In the beginning we have the clause\n'Know me only,' followed by 'I am pra/n/a, the intelligent Self,\nmeditate on me as Life, as Immortality;' and in the end we read, 'And\nthat pra/n/a indeed is the intelligent Self, blessed, imperishable,\nimmortal.' The beginning and the concluding part are thus seen to be\nsimilar, and we therefore must conclude that they refer to one and the\nsame matter. Nor can the characteristic mark of Brahman be so turned as\nto be applied to something else; for the ten objects and the ten\nsubjects (subjective powers)[133] cannot rest on anything but Brahman.\nMoreover, pra/n/a must denote Brahman 'on account of (that meaning)\nbeing accepted,' i.e. because in the case of other passages where\ncharacteristic marks of Brahman are mentioned the word pra/n/a is taken\nin the sense of 'Brahman.' And another reason for assuming the passage\nto refer to Brahman is that here also, i.e. in the passage itself there\nis 'connexion' with characteristic marks of Brahman, as, for instance,\nthe reference to what is most beneficial for man. The assertion that the\npassage, 'Having laid hold of this body it makes it rise up,' contains a\ncharacteristic mark of the chief vital air, is untrue; for as the\nfunction of the vital air also ultimately rests on Brahman it can\nfiguratively be ascribed to the latter. So Scripture also declares, 'No\nmortal lives by the breath that goes up and by the breath that goes\ndown. We live by another in whom these two repose' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 5).\nNor does the indication of the individual soul which you allege to occur\nin the passage, 'Let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know\nthe speaker,' preclude the view of pra/n/a denoting Brahman. For, as the\npassages, 'I am Brahman,' 'That art thou,' and others, prove, there is\nin reality no such thing as an individual soul absolutely different from\nBrahman, but Brahman, in so far as it differentiates itself through the\nmind (buddhi) and other limiting conditions, is called individual soul,\nagent, enjoyer. Such passages therefore as the one alluded to, (viz.\n'let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker,')\nwhich, by setting aside all the differences due to limiting conditions,\naim at directing the mind on the internal Self and thus showing that the\nindividual soul is one with Brahman, are by no means out of place. That\nthe Self which is active in speaking and the like is Brahman appears\nfrom another scriptural passage also, viz. Ke. Up. I, 5, 'That which is\nnot expressed by speech and by which speech is expressed that alone know\nas Brahman, not that which people here adore.' The remark that the\nstatement about the difference of pra/n/a and praj/n/a (contained in the\npassage, 'Together they dwell in this body, together they depart') does\nnot agree with that interpretation according to which pra/n/a is\nBrahman, is without force; for the mind and the vital air which are the\nrespective abodes of the two powers of cognition and action, and\nconstitute the limiting conditions of the internal Self may be spoken of\nas different. The internal Self, on the other hand, which is limited by\nthose two adjuncts, is in itself non-differentiated, so that the two may\nbe identified, as is done in the passage 'pra/n/a is praj/n/a.'\n\nThe second part of the Sutra is explained in a different manner\nalso[134], as follows: Characteristic marks of the individual soul as\nwell as of the chief vital air are not out of place even in a chapter\nwhose topic is Brahman. How so? 'On account of the threefoldness of\ndevout meditation.' The chapter aims at enjoining three kinds of devout\nmeditation on Brahman, according as Brahman is viewed under the aspect\nof pra/n/a, under the aspect of praj/n/a, and in itself. The passages,\n'Meditate (on me) as life, as immortality. Life is pra/n/a,' and 'Having\nlaid hold of this body it makes it rise up. Therefore let man worship it\nalone as uktha,' refer to the pra/n/a aspect. The introductory passage,\n'Now we shall explain how all things become one in that praj/n/a,' and\nthe subsequent passages, 'Speech verily milked one portion thereof; the\nword is its object placed outside;' and, 'Having by praj/n/a taken\npossession of speech he obtains by speech all words &c.,' refer to the\npraj/n/a aspect. The Brahman aspect finally is referred to in the\nfollowing passage, 'These ten objects have reference to praj/n/a, the\nten subjects have reference to objects. If there were no objects there\nwould be no subjects; and if there were no subjects there would be no\nobjects. For on either side alone nothing could be achieved. But that is\nnot many. For as in a car the circumference of the wheel is set on the\nspokes and the spokes on the nave, thus are these objects set on the\nsubjects and the subjects on the pra/n/a.' Thus we see that the one\nmeditation on Brahman is here represented as threefold, according as\nBrahman is viewed either with reference to two limiting conditions or in\nitself. In other passages also we find that devout meditation on Brahman\nis made dependent on Brahman being qualified by limiting adjuncts; so,\nfor instance (Ch. Up. III, 14, 2), 'He who consists of mind, whose body\nis pra/n/a.' The hypothesis of Brahman being meditated upon under three\naspects perfectly agrees with the pra/n/a chapter[135]; as, on the one\nhand, from a comparison of the introductory and the concluding clauses\nwe infer that the subject-matter of the whole chapter is one only, and\nas, on the other hand, we meet with characteristic marks of pra/n/a,\npraj/n/a, and Brahman in turns. It therefore remains a settled\nconclusion that Brahman is the topic of the whole chapter.\n\nNotes:\n\n[Footnote 32: The subject is the universal Self whose nature is\nintelligence (/k/u); the object comprises whatever is of a\nnon-intelligent nature, viz. bodies with their sense organs, internal\norgans, and the objects of the senses, i.e. the external material\nworld.]\n\n[Footnote 33: The object is said to have for its sphere the notion of\nthe 'thou' (yushmat), not the notion of the 'this' or 'that' (idam), in\norder better to mark its absolute opposition to the subject or Ego.\nLanguage allows of the co-ordination of the pronouns of the first and\nthe third person ('It is I,' 'I am he who,' &c.; ete vayam, ame vayam\nasmahe), but not of the co-ordination of the pronouns of the first and\nsecond person.]\n\n[Footnote 34: Adhyasa, literally 'superimposition' in the sense of\n(mistaken) ascription or imputation, to something, of an essential\nnature or attributes not belonging to it. See later on.]\n\n[Footnote 35: Natural, i.e. original, beginningless; for the modes of\nspeech and action which characterise transmigratory existence have\nexisted, with the latter, from all eternity.]\n\n[Footnote 36: I.e. the intelligent Self which is the only reality and\nthe non-real objects, viz. body and so on, which are the product of\nwrong knowledge.]\n\n[Footnote 37: 'The body, &c. is my Self;' 'sickness, death, children,\nwealth, &c., belong to my Self.']\n\n[Footnote 38: Literally 'in some other place.' The clause 'in the form\nof remembrance' is added, the Bhamati remarks, in order to exclude those\ncases where something previously observed is recognised in some other\nthing or place; as when, for instance, the generic character of a cow\nwhich was previously observed in a black cow again presents itself to\nconsciousness in a grey cow, or when Devadatta whom we first saw in\nPa/t/aliputra again appears before us in Mahishmati. These are cases of\nrecognition where the object previously observed again presents itself\nto our senses; while in mere remembrance the object previously perceived\nis not in renewed contact with the senses. Mere remembrance operates in\nthe case of adhyasa, as when we mistake mother-of-pearl for silver which\nis at the time not present but remembered only.]\n\n[Footnote 39: The so-called anyathakhyativadins maintain that in the act\nof adhyasa the attributes of one thing, silver for instance, are\nsuperimposed on a different thing existing in a different place,\nmother-of-pearl for instance (if we take for our example of adhyasa the\ncase of some man mistaking a piece of mother-of-pearl before him for a\npiece of silver). The atmakhyativadins maintain that in adhyasa the\nmodification, in the form of silver, of the internal organ and action\nwhich characterise transmigratory existence have existed, with the\nlatter, from all eternity.]\n\n[Footnote 40: This is the definition of the akhyativadins.]\n\n[Footnote 41: Some anyathakhyativadins and the Madhyamikas according to\nAnanda Giri.]\n\n[Footnote 42: The pratyagatman is in reality non-object, for it is\nsvayampraka/s/a, self-luminous, i.e. the subjective factor in all\ncognition. But it becomes the object of the idea of the Ego in so far as\nit is limited, conditioned by its adjuncts which are the product of\nNescience, viz. the internal organ, the senses and the subtle and gross\nbodies, i.e. in so far as it is jiva, individual or personal soul. Cp.\nBhamati, pp. 22, 23: '/k/idatmaiva svayampraka/s/oszpi\nbuddhyadivishayavi/kkh/ura/n/at katha/mk/id asm\nupratyayavishayoszha/m/karaspada/m/ jiva iti /k/a jantur iti /k/a\nksheuajna iti /k/akhyayate.']\n\n[Footnote 43: Translated according to the Bhamati. We deny, the objector\nsays, the possibility of adhyasa in the case of the Self, not on the\nground that it is not an object because self-luminous (for that it may\nbe an object although it is self-luminous you have shown), but on the\nground that it is not an object because it is not manifested either by\nitself or by anything else.--It is known or manifest, the Vedantin\nreplies, on account of its immediate presentation (aparokshatvat), i.e.\non account of the intuitional knowledge we have of it. Ananda Giri\nconstrues the above clause in a different way:\nasmatpratyayavishayatveszpy aparokshatvad ekantenavishayatvabbavat\ntasminn aha@nkaradyadhyasa ity artha/h/. Aparokshatvam api kai/sk/id\natmano nesh/t/am ity asa@nkyaha pratyagatmeti.]\n\n[Footnote 44: Tatraiva/m/ sati evambhutavastutattvavadhara/n/e sati.\nBha. Tasminn adhyase uktarityazvidyavmake sati. Go. Yatratmani\nbuddhyadau va yasya buddhyader atmano vadhyasa/h/ tena\nbuddhyadi-nasztmana va k/ri/tenasz/s/anayadidoshe/n/a /k/aitanyagu/n/ena\n/k/atmanatma va vastuto na svalpenapi yujyate. Ananda Giri.]\n\n[Footnote 45: Whether they belong to the karmaka/nd/a, i.e. that part of\nthe Veda which enjoins active religious duty or the j/n/anaka/nd/a, i.e.\nthat part of the Veda which treats of Brahman.]\n\n[Footnote 46: It being of course the function of the means of right\nknowledge to determine Truth and Reality.]\n\n[Footnote 47: The Bhamati takes adhish/th/anam in the sense of\nsuperintendence, guidance. The senses cannot act unless guided by a\nsuperintending principle, i.e. the individual soul.]\n\n[Footnote 48: If activity could proceed from the body itself,\nnon-identified with the Self, it would take place in deep sleep also.]\n\n[Footnote 49: I.e. in the absence of the mutual superimposition of the\nSelf and the Non-Self and their attributes.]\n\n[Footnote 50: The Mima/m/sa, i.e. the enquiry whose aim it is to show\nthat the embodied Self, i.e. the individual or personal soul is one with\nBrahman. This Mima/m/sa being an enquiry into the meaning of the\nVedanta-portions of the Veda, it is also called Vedanta mima/m/sa.]\n\n[Footnote 51: Nadhikarartha iti. Tatra hetur brahmeti. Asyartha/h/, kam\nayam atha/s/abdo brahmaj/n/ane/kkh/ya/h/ kim vantar/n/itavi/k/arasya\nathave/kkh/avi/s/esha/n/aj/n/anasyarambhartha/h/. Nadya/h/ tasya\nmima/m/sapravartikayas tadapravartyatvad anarabhyatvat tasya/s/\n/k/ottaratra pratyadhikara/n/am apratipadanat. Na\ndvitiyoztha/s/abdenanantaryoktidvara vi/s/ish/t/adhikaryasamarpa/n/e\nsadhana/k/atush/t/ayasampannana/m/ brahmadhitadvi/k/arayor anarthitvad\nvi/k/aranarambhan na /k/a vi/k/aravidhiva/s/ad adhikari kalpya/h/\nprarambhasyapi tulyatvad adhikari/n/a/s/ /k/a vidhyapekshitopadhitvan na\nt/ri/tiya/h/ brahmaj/n/anasyanandasakshatkaratvenadhikaryatve z\npyapradhanyad atha/s/abdasambandhat tasman narambharthateti. Ananda\nGiri.]\n\n[Footnote 52: Any relation in which the result, i.e. here the enquiry\ninto Brahman may stand to some antecedent of which it is the effect may\nbe comprised under the relation of anantarya.]\n\n[Footnote 53: He cuts off from the heart, then from the tongue, then\nfrom the breast.]\n\n[Footnote 54: Where one action is subordinate to another as, for\ninstance, the offering of the prayajas is to the\ndar/s/apur/n/amasa-sacrifice, or where one action qualifies a person for\nanother as, for instance, the offering of the dar/s/apur/n/amasa\nqualifies a man for the performance of the Soma-sacrifice, there is\nunity of the agent, and consequently an intimation of the order of\nsuccession of the actions is in its right place.]\n\n[Footnote 55: The 'means' in addition to /s/ama and dama are\ndiscontinuance of religious ceremonies (uparati), patience in suffering\n(titiksha), attention and concentration of the mind (samadhana), and\nfaith (/s/raddha).]\n\n[Footnote 56: According to Pa/n/ini II, 3, 50 the sixth (genitive) case\nexpresses the relation of one thing being generally supplementary to, or\nconnected with, some other thing.]\n\n[Footnote 57: In the case of other transitive verbs, object and result\nmay be separate; so, for instance, when it is said 'grama/m/\nga/kkh/ati,' the village is the object of the action of going, and the\narrival at the village its result. But in the case of verbs of desiring\nobject and result coincide.]\n\n[Footnote 58: That Brahman exists we know, even before entering on the\nBrahma-mima/m/sa, from the occurrence of the word in the Veda, &c., and\nfrom the etymology of the word we at once infer Brahman's chief\nattributes.]\n\n[Footnote 59: The three last opinions are those of the followers of the\nNyaya, the Sa@nkhya, and the Yoga-philosophy respectively. The three\nopinions mentioned first belong to various materialistic schools; the\ntwo subsequent ones to two sects of Bauddha philosophers.]\n\n[Footnote 60: As, for instance, the passages 'this person consists of\nthe essence of food;' 'the eye, &c. spoke;' 'non-existing this was in\nthe beginning,' &c.]\n\n[Footnote 61: So the compound is to be divided according to An. Gi. and\nGo.; the Bha. proposes another less plausible division.]\n\n[Footnote 62: According to Nirukta I, 2 the six bhavavikara/h/ are:\norigination, existence, modification, increase, decrease, destruction.]\n\n[Footnote 63: The pradhana, called also prak/ri/ti, is the primal causal\nmatter of the world in the /S/a@nkhya-system. It will be fully discussed\nin later parts of this work. To avoid ambiguities, the term pradhana has\nbeen left untranslated. Cp. Sa@nkhya Karika 3.]\n\n[Footnote 64: Ke/k/it tu hira/n/yagaroha/m/ sa/m/sari/n/am evagamaj\njagaddhetum a/k/akshate. Ananada Giri.]\n\n[Footnote 65: Viz. the Vai/s/eshikas.]\n\n[Footnote 66: Atmana/h/ /s/ruter ity artha/h/. Ananda Giri.]\n\n[Footnote 67: Text (or direct statement), suggestive power (linga),\nsyntactical connection (vakya), &c., being the means of proof made use\nof in the Purva Mima/m/sa.]\n\n[Footnote 68: The so-called sakshatkara of Brahman. The &c. comprises\ninference and so on.]\n\n[Footnote 69: So, for instance, the passage 'he carves the sacrificial\npost and makes it eight-cornered,' has a purpose only as being\nsupplementary to the injunction 'he ties the victim to the sacrificial\npost.']\n\n[Footnote 70: If the fruits of the two /s/astras were not of a different\nnature, there would be no reason for the distinction of two /s/astras;\nif they are of a different nature, it cannot be said that the knowledge\nof Brahman is enjoined for the purpose of final release, in the same way\nas sacrifices are enjoined for the purpose of obtaining the heavenly\nworld and the like.]\n\n[Footnote 71: The first passage shows that the Self is not joined to the\ngross body; the second that it is not joined to the subtle body; the\nthird that is independent of either.]\n\n[Footnote 72: Ananda Giri omits 'ata/h/.' His comment is:\np/ri/thagjij/n/asavishayatva/k/ /k/a dharmadyasp/ri/sh/t/atva/m/\nbrahma/n/o yuktam ityaha; tad iti; ata/h/ /s/abdapa/th/e dharmadyasparse\nkarmaphalavailaksba/n/ya/m/ hetuk/ri/tam.--The above translation follows\nGovindananda's first explanation. Tat kaivalyam brahmaiva\nkarmaphalavilaksha/n/atvad ity artha/h/.]\n\n[Footnote 73: Sampat. Sampan namalpe vastuny alambane samanyena\nkena/k/in mahato vastuna/h/ sampadanam. Ananda Giri.]\n\n[Footnote 74: In which passage the mind, which may be called endless on\naccount of the infinite number of modifications it undergoes, is\nidentified with the Vi/s/vedevas, which thereby constitute the chief\nobject of the meditation; the fruit of the meditation being immortality.\nThe identity of the Self with Brahman, on the other hand, is real, not\nonly meditatively imagined, on account of the attribute of intelligence\nbeing common to both.]\n\n[Footnote 75: Adhyasa/h/ /s/astratoitasmi/m/s taddhi/h/. Sampadi\nsampadyamanasya pradhanyenanudhyanam, adhyase tu alambanasyeti\nvi/s/esha/h/. Ananda Giri.]\n\n[Footnote 76: Air and breath each absorb certain things, and are,\ntherefore, designated by the same term 'absorber.' Seya/m/\nsa/m/vargad/ri/sh/t/ir vayau pra/n/e /k/a da/s/a/s/agata/m/ jagad\ndar/s/ayati yatha jivatmani b/rim/ha/n/akriyaya\nbrahmad/ri/sh/t/iram/ri/tatvayaphalayakalpata iti. Bhamati.]\n\n[Footnote 77: The butter used in the upa/ms/uyaja is ceremonially\npurified by the wife of the sacrificer looking at it; so, it might be\nsaid, the Self of him who meditates on Brahman (and who as\nkart/ri/--agent--stands in a subordinate anga-relation to the karman of\nmeditation) is merely purified by the cognition of its being one with\nBrahman.]\n\n[Footnote 78: An hypothesis which might be proposed for the purpose of\nobviating the imputation to moksha of non-eternality which results from\nthe two preceding hypotheses.]\n\n[Footnote 79: Viz. things to be originated (for instance, gha/t/a/m/\nkaroti), things to be obtained (grama/m/ ga/kkh/ati), things to be\nmodified (suvar/n/a/m/ ku/nd/ala/m/ karoti), and things to be\nceremonially purified (vrihin prokshati).]\n\n[Footnote 80: Whence it follows that it is not something to be avoided\nlike transitory things.]\n\n[Footnote 81: That, for instance, in the passage 'he is to sacrifice\nwith Soma,' the word 'soma,' which does not denote an action, is devoid\nof sense.]\n\n[Footnote 82: I.e. for the purpose of showing that the passages\nconveying information about Brahman as such are justified. You have (the\nobjector maintains) proved hitherto only that passages containing\ninformation about existent things are admissible, if those things have a\npurpose; but how does all this apply to the information about Brahman of\nwhich no purpose has been established?]\n\n[Footnote 83: It is 'naturally established' because it has natural\nmotives--not dependent on the injunctions of the Veda, viz. passion and\nthe like.]\n\n[Footnote 84: Elsewhere, i.e. outside the Veda.]\n\n[Footnote 85: The above discussion of the prohibitory passages of the\nVeda is of a very scholastic nature, and various clauses in it are\ndifferently interpreted by the different commentators. /S/a@nkara\nendeavours to fortify his doctrine, that not all parts of the Veda refer\nto action by an appeal to prohibitory passages which do not enjoin\naction but abstinence from action. The legitimacy of this appeal might\nbe contested on the ground that a prohibitory passage also, (as, for\ninstance, 'a Brahma/n/a is not to be killed,') can be explained as\nenjoining a positive action, viz. some action opposed in nature to the\none forbidden, so that the quoted passage might be interpreted to mean\n'a determination, &c. of not killing a Brahma/n/a is to be formed;' just\nas we understand something positive by the expression 'a\nnon-Brahma/n/a,' viz. some man who is a kshattriya or something else. To\nthis the answer is that, wherever we can, we must attribute to the word\n'not' its primary sense which is the absolute negation of the word to\nwhich it is joined; so that passages where it is joined to words\ndenoting action must be considered to have for their purport the entire\nabsence of action. Special cases only are excepted, as the one alluded\nto in the text where certain prohibited actions are enumerated under the\nheading of vows; for as a vow is considered as something positive, the\nnon-doing of some particular action must there be understood as\nintimating the performance of some action of an opposite nature. The\nquestion as to the various meanings of the particle 'not' is discussed\nin all treatises on the Purva Mima/m/sa; see, for instance,\nArthasamgraha, translation, p. 39 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 86: The Self is the agent in a sacrifice, &c. only in so far\nas it imagines itself to be joined to a body; which imagination is\nfinally removed by the cognition of Brahman.]\n\n[Footnote 87: The figurative Self, i.e. the imagination that wife,\nchildren, possessions, and the like are a man's Self; the false Self,\ni.e. the imagination that the Self acts, suffers, enjoys, &c.]\n\n[Footnote 88: I.e. the apparent world with all its distinctions.]\n\n[Footnote 89: The words in parentheses are not found in the best\nmanuscripts.]\n\n[Footnote 90: The most exalted of the three constituent elements whose\nstate of equipoise constitutes the pradhana.]\n\n[Footnote 91: Knowledge can arise only where Goodness is predominant,\nnot where the three qualities mutually counterbalance one another.]\n\n[Footnote 92: The excess of Sattva in the Yogin would not enable him to\nrise to omniscience if he did not possess an intelligent principle\nindependent of Sattva.]\n\n[Footnote 93: Ananda Giri comments as follows: paroktanupapatlim\nnirasitum p/rikkh/ati idam iti. Prak/ri/tyarthabhavat pratyayarthabhavad\nva brahma/n/o sarvaj/n/ateti pra/s/nam eva praka/t/ayati katham iti.\nPrathama/m/ pratyaha yasyeti. Ukta/m/ vyatirckadvara viyz/rin/oti\nanityatve hiti. Dvitiya/m/ /s/a@nkate j/n/aneti. Svato nityasyapi\nj/n/anasya tattadarthava/kkh/innasya karyatvat tatra svatantryam\npratyayartho brahma/n/a/h/ sidhyatity aha.--The knowledge of Brahman is\neternal, and in so far Brahman is not independent with regard to it, but\nit is independent with regard to each particular act of knowledge; the\nverbal affix in 'janati' indicating the particularity of the act.]\n\n[Footnote 94: In the second Kha/nd/a of the sixth Prapa/th/aka of the\nCh. Up. 'aikshata' is twice used in a figurative sense (with regard to\nfire and water); it is therefore to be understood figuratively in the\nthird passage also where it occurs.]\n\n[Footnote 95: So that, on this latter explanation, it is unnecessary to\nassume a figurative sense of the word 'thinking' in any of the three\npassages.]\n\n[Footnote 96: A wicked man meets in a forest a blind person who has lost\nhis way, and implores him to lead him to his village; instead of doing\nso the wicked man persuades the blind one to catch hold of the tail of\nan ox, which he promises would lead him to his place. The consequence is\nthat the blind man is, owing to his trustfulness, led even farther\nastray, and injured by the bushes, &c., through which the ox drags him.]\n\n[Footnote 97: Cp. above, p. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 98: So according to the commentators, not to accept whose\nguidance in the translation of scholastic definitions is rather\nhazardous. A simpler translation of the clause might however be given.]\n\n[Footnote 99: With reference to Ch. Up. VI, 8, 2.]\n\n[Footnote 100: The wise one, i.e. the highest Self; which as jivatman is\nconversant with the names and forms of individual things.]\n\n[Footnote 101: I.e. it is looked upon as the object of the devotion of\nthe individual souls; while in reality all those souls and Brahman are\none.]\n\n[Footnote 102: Qualities, i.e. the attributes under which the Self is\nmeditated on; limiting conditions, i.e. the localities--such as the\nheart and the like--which in pious meditation are ascribed to the Self.]\n\n[Footnote 103: Ananda Giri reads avish/t/asya for avishk/ri/tasya.]\n\n[Footnote 104: Cp. the entire passage. All things are manifestations of\nthe highest Self under certain limiting conditions, but occupying\ndifferent places in an ascending scale. In unsentient things, stones,\n&c. only the satta, the quality of being manifests itself; in plants,\nanimals, and men the Self manifests itself through the vital sap; in\nanimals and men there is understanding; higher thought in man alone.]\n\n[Footnote 105: Ananda Giri on the preceding passage beginning from 'thus\nhere also:' na kevala/m/ dvaividhyam brahma/n/a/h/ /s/rutism/ri/tyor eva\nsiddha/m/ ki/m/ tu sutrak/ri/to api matam ity aha, evam iti,\n/s/rutism/ri/tyor iva prak/ri/te pi /s/astre dvairupyam brahma/n/o\nbhavati; tatra sopadhikabrahmavishayam antastaddharmadhikara/n/am\nudaharati adityeti; uktanyaya/m/ tulyade/s/eshu prasarayati evam iti;\nsopadhikopade/s/avan nirupadhikopade/s/a/m/ dar/s/ayati evam ityadina,\natmaj/n/@ana/m/ nir/n/etavyam iti sambandha/h/; ayaprasa@ngam aha\npareti; annamayadyupadhidvarokasya katham paravidyavishayatva/m/ tatraha\nupadhiti; nir/n/ayakramam aha vakyeti, uktartham adhikara/n/a/m/\nkvastity asa@nkyokta/m/ yatheti.]\n\n[Footnote 106: After which no other Self is mentioned.]\n\n[Footnote 107: The previous proofs were founded on li@nga; the argument\nwhich is now propounded is founded on prakara/n/a.]\n\n[Footnote 108: While, in the case of the Selfs consisting of food and so\non, a further inner Self is duly mentioned each time. It cannot,\ntherefore, be concluded that the Selfs consisting of food, &c., are\nlikewise identical with the highest Self referred to in the mantra.]\n\n[Footnote 109: Yadi labdha na labdhavya/h/ katha/m/ tarhi paramatmano\nvastutobhinnena jivatmana paramatma labhyata ity artha/h/. Bhamati.]\n\n[Footnote 110: Yatha paramesvarad bhinno jivatma drash/t/a na bhavaty\nevam givatmanozpi drash/t/ur na bhinna/h/ parame/s/vara iti,\njivasyanirva/k/yarve parame/s/varozpy anirva/k/ya/h/ syad ity ata aha\nparame/s/varas tv avidyakalpitad iti. Ananda Giri.]\n\n[Footnote 111: The explanation of the anandamaya given hitherto is here\nrecalled, and a different one given. The previous explanation is\nattributed by Go. An. to the v/ri/ttikara.]\n\n[Footnote 112: In which sense, as shown above, the word anandamaya must\nbe taken if understood to denote Brahman.]\n\n[Footnote 113: I.e. the word translated hitherto by abundance.]\n\n[Footnote 114: See I, 1, 15-19. ]\n\n[Footnote 115: The preceding adhikara/n/a had shown that the five Selfs\n(consisting of food, mind, and so on), which the Taitt. Up. enumerates,\nare introduced merely for the purpose of facilitating the cognition of\nBrahman considered as devoid of all qualities; while that Brahman itself\nis the real object of knowledge. The present adhikara/n/a undertakes to\nshow that the passage about the golden person represents the savi/s/esha\nBrahman as the object of devout meditation.]\n\n[Footnote 116: So that the real giver of the gifts bestowed by princes\non poets and singers is Brahman.]\n\n[Footnote 117: Or else 'that which is within forms and names.']\n\n[Footnote 118: Viz. as intimating it. Thus An. Gi. and Go. An. against\nthe accent of /rik/a/h/. Saya/n/a explains /rik/a/h/ as genitive.]\n\n[Footnote 119: O/m/karasya pratikatvena va/k/akatvena lakshakatvena va\nbrahmatvam uktam, om iti, ka/m/ sukha/m/ tasyarthendriyayogajatva/m/\nvarayitu/m/ kham iti, tasya bhutaka/s/atva/m/ vyaseddhum pura/n/am ity\nuktam. An. Gi.]\n\n[Footnote 120: The doubt about the meaning of a word is preferably to be\ndecided by means of a reference to preceding passages; where that is not\npossible (the doubtful word occurring at the beginning of some new\nchapter) complementary, i.e. subsequent passages have to be taken into\nconsideration.]\n\n[Footnote 121: The v/ri/ttikara, the commentators say.]\n\n[Footnote 122: I.e. which has not been mixed with water and earth,\naccording to Ch. Up. VI, 3, 3. Before that mixture took place light was\nentriely separated from the other elements, and therefore bounded by the\nlatter.]\n\n[Footnote 123: So as to justify the assumption that such a thing as\nnon-tripartite light exists at all.]\n\n[Footnote 124: Brahma/n/o vyava/kkh/idya teja/h/samarpakatva/m/\nvi/s/eshakatvam, tadabhavozvi/s/eshakatvam. An. Gi.]\n\n[Footnote 125: If we strictly follow the order of words in the\noriginal.]\n\n[Footnote 126: Svasamarthyena sarvanamna/h/\nsannihitaparamar/s/itvava/s/ena.]\n\n[Footnote 127: The v/ri/ttikara according to Go. An. in his /t/ika on\nthe bhashya to the next Sutra.]\n\n[Footnote 128: Concerning the difficulty involved in this\ninterpretation, cp. Deussen, p. 183, note.]\n\n[Footnote 129: The text runs, 'astitve /k/a pra/n/ana/m/ ni/hs/reyasam,'\nand Go. An. explains 'astitve pra/n/asthitau pra/n/ana/m/ indriya/n/am\nsthitir ity arthata/h/ /s/rutim aha.' He as well as An. Gi. quotes as\nthe text of the scriptural passage referred to 'athato ni/hs/reyasadanam\nity adi.' But if instead of 'astitve /k/a' we read 'asti tv eva,' we get\nthe concluding clause of Kau. Up. III, 2, as given in Cowell's\nedition.].\n\n[Footnote 130: Whence we know that the interior Self referred to in the\nKau. Up. is Brahman.]\n\n[Footnote 131: I.e. spontaneous intuition of supersensible truth,\nrendered possible through the knowledge acquired in former existences.]\n\n[Footnote 132: Ima/m/ /s/ariram instead of ida/m/ /s/ariram.]\n\n[Footnote 133: Pa/nk/a /s/abdadaya/h/ pa/nk/a p/ri/thivyadaya/s/ /k/a\nda/s/a bhutamatra/h/ pa/nk/a buddhindriya/n/i pa/nk/a buddhaya iti\nda/s/a praj/n/amatra/h/. Yadva j/n/anendriyartha/h/ pa/nk/a\nkarzmendriyartha/s/ /ka/ pa/nk/eti da/s/a bhutamatra/h/\ndvividhanindriya/n/i praj/n/amatra da/s/eti bhava/h/. An. Gi.]\n\n[Footnote 134: Viz. by the v/ri/ttikara.]\n\n[Footnote 135: Ihapi tad yujyate explaining the 'iha tadyogat' of the\nSutra.]\n\n\n\n\nSECOND PADA.\n\nREVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!\n\n\nIn the first pada Brahman has been shown to be the cause of the origin,\nsubsistence, and reabsorption of the entire world, comprising the ether\nand the other elements. Moreover, of this Brahman, which is the cause of\nthe entire world, certain qualities have (implicitly) been declared,\nsuch as all-pervadingness, eternity, omniscience, its being the Self of\nall, and so on. Further, by producing reasons showing that some words\nwhich are generally used in a different sense denote Brahman also, we\nhave been able to determine that some passages about whose sense doubts\nare entertained refer to Brahman. Now certain other passages present\nthemselves which because containing only obscure indications of Brahman\ngive rise to the doubt whether they refer to the highest Self or to\nsomething else. We therefore begin the second and third padas in order\nto settle those doubtful points.\n\n1. (That which consists of mind is Brahman) because there is taught what\nis known from everywhere.\n\nScripture says, 'All this indeed is Brahman, beginning, ending, and\nbreathing in it; thus knowing let a man meditate with calm mind. Now man\nis made of determination (kratu); according to what his determination is\nin this world so will he be when he has departed this life. Let him\ntherefore form this determination: he who consists of mind, whose body\nis breath (the subtle body),' &c. (Ch. Up. III, 14). Concerning this\npassage the doubt presents itself whether what is pointed out as the\nobject of meditation, by means of attributes such as consisting of mind,\n&c., is the embodied (individual) soul or the highest Brahman.\n\nThe embodied Self, the purvapakshin says.--Why?--Because the embodied\nSelf as the ruler of the organs of action is well known to be connected\nwith the mind and so on, while the highest Brahman is not, as is\ndeclared in several scriptural passages, so, for instance (Mu. Up. II,\n1, 2), 'He is without breath, without mind, pure.'--But, it may be\nobjected, the passage, 'All this indeed is Brahman,' mentions Brahman\ndirectly; how then can you suppose that the embodied Self forms the\nobject of meditation?--This objection does not apply, the purvapakshin\nrejoins, because the passage does not aim at enjoining meditation on\nBrahman, but rather at enjoining calmness of mind, the sense being:\nbecause Brahman is all this, tajjalan, let a man meditate with a calm\nmind. That is to say: because all this aggregate of effects is Brahman\nonly, springing from it, ending in it, and breathing in it; and because,\nas everything constitutes one Self only, there is no room for passion;\ntherefore a man is to meditate with a calm mind. And since the sentence\naims at enjoining calmness of mind, it cannot at the same time enjoin\nmeditation on Brahman[136]; but meditation is separately enjoined in the\nclause, 'Let him form the determination, i.e. reflection.' And thereupon\nthe subsequent passage, 'He who consists of mind, whose body is breath,'\n&c. states the object of the meditation in words indicatory of the\nindividual soul. For this reason we maintain that the meditation spoken\nof has the individual soul for its object. The other attributes also\nsubsequently stated in the text, 'He to whom all works, all desires\nbelong,' &c. may rightly be held to refer to the individual soul. The\nattributes, finally, of being what abides in the heart and of being\nextremely minute which are mentioned in the passage, 'He is my Self\nwithin the heart, smaller than a corn of rice, smaller than a corn of\nbarley,' may be ascribed to the individual soul which has the size of\nthe point of a goad, but not to the unlimited Brahman. If it be objected\nthat the immediately following passage, 'greater than the earth,' &c.,\ncannot refer to something limited, we reply that smallness and greatness\nwhich are mutually opposite cannot indeed be ascribed to one and the\nsame thing; and that, if one attribute only is to be ascribed to the\nsubject of the passage, smallness is preferable because it is mentioned\nfirst; while the greatness mentioned later on may be attributed to the\nsoul in so far as it is one with Brahman. If it is once settled that the\nwhole passage refers to the individual soul, it follows that the\ndeclaration of Brahman also, contained in the passage, 'That is Brahman'\n(III, 14, 4), refers to the individual soul[137], as it is clearly\nconnected with the general topic. Therefore the individual soul is the\nobject of meditation indicated by the qualities of consisting of mind\nand so on.\n\nTo all this we reply: The highest Brahman only is what is to be\nmeditated upon as distinguished by the attributes of consisting of mind\nand so on.--Why?--'On account of there being taught here what is known\nfrom everywhere.' What is known from all Vedanta-passages to be the\nsense of the word Brahman, viz. the cause of the world, and what is\nmentioned here in the beginning words of the passage, ('all this indeed\nis Brahman,') the same we must assume to be taught here as distinguished\nby certain qualities, viz. consisting of mind and so on. Thus we avoid\nthe fault of dropping the subject-matter under discussion and needlessly\nintroducing a new topic.--But, it may be said, it has been shown that\nBrahman is, in the beginning of the passage, introduced merely for the\npurpose of intimating the injunction of calmness of mind, not for the\npurpose of intimating Brahman itself.--True, we reply; but the fact\nnevertheless remains that, where the qualities of consisting of mind,\n&c. are spoken of, Brahman only is proximate (i.e. mentioned not far off\nso that it may be concluded to be the thing referred to), while the\nindividual soul is neither proximate nor intimated by any word directly\npointing to it. The cases of Brahman and the individual soul are\ntherefore not equal.\n\n2. And because the qualities desired to be expressed are possible (in\nBrahman; therefore the passage refers to Brahman).\n\nAlthough in the Veda which is not the work of man no wish in the strict\nsense can be expressed[138], there being no speaker, still such phrases\nas 'desired to be expressed,' may be figuratively used on account of the\nresult, viz. (mental) comprehension. For just as in ordinary language we\nspeak of something which is intimated by a word and is to be received\n(by the hearer as the meaning of the word), as 'desired to be\nexpressed;' so in the Veda also whatever is denoted as that which is to\nbe received is 'desired to be expressed,' everything else 'not desired\nto be expressed.' What is to be received as the meaning of a Vedic\nsentence, and what not, is inferred from the general purport of the\npassage. Those qualities which are here desired to be expressed, i.e.\nintimated as qualities to be dwelt on in meditation, viz. the qualities\nof having true purposes, &c. are possible in the highest Brahman; for\nthe quality of having true purposes may be ascribed to the highest Self\nwhich possesses unimpeded power over the creation, subsistence, and\nreabsorption of this world. Similarly the qualities of having true\ndesires and true purposes are attributed to the highest Self in another\npassage, viz. the one beginning, 'The Self which is free from sin' (Ch.\nUp. VIII, 7, 1). The clause, 'He whose Self is the ether,' means 'he\nwhose Self is like the ether;' for Brahman may be said to be like the\nether on account of its omnipresence and other qualities. This is also\nexpressed by the clause, 'Greater than the earth.' And the other\nexplanation also, according to which the passage means 'he whose Self is\nthe ether' is possible, since Brahman which as the cause of the whole\nworld is the Self of everything is also the Self of the ether. For the\nsame reasons he is called 'he to whom all works belong, and so on.' Thus\nthe qualities here intimated as topics of meditation agree with the\nnature of Brahman. We further maintain that the terms 'consisting of\nmind,' and 'having breath for its body,' which the purvapakshin asserts\ncannot refer to Brahman, may refer to it. For as Brahman is the Self of\neverything, qualities such as consisting of mind and the like, which\nbelong to the individual soul, belong to Brahman also. Accordingly\n/S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti say of Brahman, 'Thou art woman, thou art man; thou\nart youth, thou art maiden; thou as an old man totterest along on thy\nstaff; thou art born with thy face turned everywhere' (/S/ve. Up. IV,\n3), and 'its hands and feet are everywhere, its eyes and head are\neverywhere, its ears are everywhere, it stands encompassing all in the\nworld' (Bha. Gita III, 13).\n\nThe passage (quoted above against our view), 'Without breath, without\nmind, pure,' refers to the pure (unrelated) Brahman. The terms\n'consisting of mind; having breath for its body,' on the other hand,\nrefer to Brahman as distinguished by qualities. Hence, as the qualities\nmentioned are possible in Brahman, we conclude that the highest Brahman\nonly is represented as the object of meditation.\n\n3. On the other hand, as (those qualities) are not possible (in it), the\nembodied (soul is) not (denoted by manomaya, &c.).\n\nThe preceding Sutra has declared that the qualities mentioned are\npossible in Brahman; the present Sutra states that they are not possible\nin the embodied Self. Brahman only possesses, in the manner explained,\nthe qualities of consisting of mind, and so on; not the embodied\nindividual soul. For qualities such as expressed in the words, 'He whose\npurposes are true, whose Self is the ether, who has no speech, who is\nnot disturbed, who is greater than the earth,' cannot easily be\nattributed to the embodied Self. By the term 'embodied' (/s/arira) we\nhave to understand 'residing' in a body. If it be objected that the Lord\nalso resides in the body[139], we reply, True, he does reside in the\nbody, but not in the body only; for /s/ruti declares him to be\nall-pervading; compare, 'He is greater than the earth; greater than the\natmosphere, omnipresent like the ether, eternal.' The individual soul,\non the other hand, is in the body only, apart from which as the abode of\nfruition it does not exist.\n\n4. And because there is a (separate) denotation of the object of\nactivity and of the agent.\n\nThe attributes of consisting of mind, and so on, cannot belong to the\nembodied Self for that reason also, that there is a (separate)\ndenotation of the object of activity and of the agent. In the passage,\n'When I shall have departed from hence I shall obtain him' (Ch. Up. III,\n14, 4), the word 'him' refers to that which is the topic of discussion,\nviz. the Self which is to be meditated upon as possessing the attributes\nof consisting of mind, &c., as the object of an activity, viz. as\nsomething to be obtained; while the words, 'I shall obtain,' represent\nthe meditating individual Self as the agent, i.e. the obtainer. Now,\nwherever it can be helped, we must not assume that one and the same\nbeing is spoken of as the agent and the object of the activity at the\nsame time. The relation existing between a person meditating and the\nthing meditated upon requires, moreover, different abodes.--And thus for\nthe above reason, also, that which is characterised by the attributes of\nconsisting of mind, and so on, cannot be the individual soul.\n\n5. On account of the difference of words.\n\nThat which possesses the attributes of consisting of mind, and so on,\ncannot be the individual soul, for that reason also that there is a\ndifference of words.\n\nThat is to say, we meet with another scriptural passage of kindred\nsubject-matter (/S/at. Bra. X, 6, 3, 2), 'Like a rice grain, or a barley\ngrain, or a canary seed or the kernel of a canary seed, thus that golden\nperson is in the Self.' There one word, i.e. the locative 'in the Self,'\ndenotes the embodied Self, and a different word, viz. the nominative\n'person,' denotes the Self distinguished by the qualities of consisting\nof mind, &c. We therefrom conclude that the two are different.\n\n6. And on account of Sm/ri/ti.\n\nSm/ri/ti also declares the difference of the embodied Self and the\nhighest Self, viz. Bha. Gita XVIII, 61, 'The Lord, O Arjuna, is seated\nin the heart of all beings, driving round by his magical power all\nbeings (as if they were) mounted on a machine.'\n\nBut what, it may be asked, is that so-called embodied Self different\nfrom the highest Self which is to be set aside according to the\npreceding Sutras? /S/ruti passages, as well as Sm/ri/ti, expressly deny\nthat there is any Self apart from the highest Self; compare, for\ninstance, B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23, 'There is no other seer but he; there\nis no other hearer but he;' and Bha. Gita XIII, 2, 'And know me also, O\nBharata, to be the kshetiaj/n/a in all kshetras.'\n\nTrue, we reply, (there is in reality one universal Self only.) But the\nhighest Self in so far as it is limited by its adjuncts, viz. the body,\nthe senses, and the mind (mano-buddhi), is, by the ignorant, spoken of\nas if it were embodied. Similarly the ether, although in reality\nunlimited, appears limited owing to certain adjuncts, such as jars and\nother vessels. With regard to this (unreal limitation of the one Self)\nthe distinction of objects of activity and of agents may be practically\nassumed, as long as we have not learned--from the passage, 'That art\nthou'--that the Self is one only. As soon, however, as we grasp the\ntruth that there is only one universal Self, there is an end to the\nwhole practical view of the world with its distinction of bondage, final\nrelease, and the like.\n\n7. If it be said that (the passage does) not (refer to Brahman) on\naccount of the smallness of the abode (mentioned), and on account of the\ndenotations of that (i.e. of minuteness); we say, no; because (Brahman)\nhas thus to be contemplated, and because the case is analogous to that\nof ether.\n\nOn account of the limitation of its abode, which is mentioned in the\nclause, 'He is my Self within the heart,' and on account of the\ndeclaration as to its minuteness contained in the direct statement, 'He\nis smaller than a grain of rice,' &c.; the embodied soul only, which is\nof the size of an awl's point, is spoken of in the passage under\ndiscussion, and not the highest Self. This assertion made above (in the\npurvapaksha of Sutra I, and restated in the purvapaksha of the present\nSutra) has to be refuted. We therefore maintain that the objection\nraised does not invalidate our view of the passage. It is true that a\nthing occupying a limited space only cannot in any way be spoken of as\nomnipresent; but, on the other hand, that which is omnipresent, and\ntherefore in all places may, from a certain point of view, be said to\noccupy a limited space. Similarly, a prince may be called the ruler of\nAyodhya although he is at the same time the ruler of the whole\nearth.--But from what point of view can the omnipresent Lord be said to\noccupy a limited space and to be minute?--He may, we reply, be spoken of\nthus, 'because he is to be contemplated thus.' The passage under\ndiscussion teaches us to contemplate the Lord as abiding within the\nlotus of the heart, characterised by minuteness and similar\nqualities--which apprehension of the Lord is rendered possible through a\nmodification of the mind--just as Hari is contemplated in the sacred\nstone called /S/alagram. Although present everywhere, the Lord is\npleased when meditated upon as dwelling in the heart. The case is,\nmoreover, to be viewed as analogous to that of the ether. The ether,\nalthough all-pervading, is spoken of as limited and minute, if\nconsidered in its connexion with the eye of a needle; so Brahman also.\nBut it is an understood matter that the attributes of limitation of\nabode and of minuteness depend, in Brahman's case, entirely on special\nforms of contemplation, and are not real. The latter consideration\ndisposes also of the objection, that if Brahman has its abode in the\nheart, which heart-abode is a different one in each body, it would\nfollow that it is affected by all the imperfections which attach to\nbeings having different abodes, such as parrots shut up in different\ncages, viz. want of unity, being made up of parts, non-permanency, and\nso on.\n\n8. If it is said that (from the circumstance of Brahman and the\nindividual soul being one) there follows fruition (on the part of\nBrahman); we say, no; on account of the difference of nature (of the\ntwo).\n\nBut, it may be said, as Brahman is omnipresent like ether, and therefore\nconnected with the hearts of all living beings, and as it is of the\nnature of intelligence and therefore not different from the individual\nsoul, it follows that Brahman also has the same fruition of pleasure,\npain, and so on (as the individual soul). The same result follows from\nits unity. For in reality there exists no transmigratory Self different\nfrom the highest Self; as appears from the text, 'There is no other\nknower but he' (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23), and similar passages. Hence the\nhighest Self is subject to the fruition connected with transmigratory\nexistence.\n\nThis is not so, we reply; because there is a difference of nature. From\nthe circumstance that Brahman is connected with the hearts of all living\nbeings it does not follow that it is, like the embodied Self, subject to\nfruition. For, between the embodied Self and the highest Self, there is\nthe difference that the former acts and enjoys, acquires merit and\ndemerit, and is affected by pleasure, pain, and so on; while the latter\nis of the opposite nature, i.e. characterised by being free from all\nevil and the like. On account of this difference of the two, the\nfruition of the one does not extend to the other. To assume merely on\nthe ground of the mutual proximity of the two, without considering their\nessentially different powers, that a connexion with effects exists (in\nBrahman's case also), would be no better than to suppose that space is\non fire (when something in space is on fire). The same objection and\nrefutation apply to the case of those also who teach the existence of\nmore than one omnipresent Self. In reply to the assertion, that because\nBrahman is one and there are no other Selfs outside it, Brahman must be\nsubject to fruition since the individual soul is so, we ask the\nquestion: How have you, our wise opponent, ascertained that there is no\nother Self? You will reply, we suppose, from scriptural texts such as,\n'That art thou,' 'I am Brahman,' 'There is no other knower but he,' and\nso on. Very well, then, it appears that the truth about scriptural\nmatters is to be ascertained from Scripture, and that Scripture is not\nsometimes to be appealed to, and on other occasions to be disregarded.\n\nScriptural texts, such as 'that art thou,' teach that Brahman which is\nfree from all evil is the Self of the embodied soul, and thus dispel\neven the opinion that the embodied soul is subject to fruition; how then\nshould fruition on the part of the embodied soul involve fruition on the\npart of Brahman?--Let, then, the unity of the individual soul and\nBrahman not be apprehended on the ground of Scripture.--In that case, we\nreply, the fruition on the part of the individual soul has wrong\nknowledge for its cause, and Brahman as it truly exists is not touched\nthereby, not any more than the ether becomes really dark-blue in\nconsequence of ignorant people presuming it to be so. For this reason\nthe Sutrakara says[140] 'no, on account of the difference.' In spite of\ntheir unity, fruition on the part of the soul does not involve fruition\non the part of Brahman; because there is a difference. For there is a\ndifference between false knowledge and perfect knowledge, fruition being\nthe figment of false knowledge while the unity (of the Self) is revealed\nby perfect knowledge. Now, as the substance revealed by perfect\nknowledge cannot be affected by fruition which is nothing but the\nfigment of false knowledge, it is impossible to assume even a shadow of\nfruition on Brahman's part.\n\n9. The eater (is the highest Self) since what is movable and what is\nimmovable is mentioned (as his food).\n\nWe read in the Ka/th/avalli (I, 2, 25), 'Who then knows where He is, He\nto whom the Brahmans and Kshattriyas are but food, and death itself a\ncondiment?' This passage intimates, by means of the words 'food' and\n'condiment,' that there is some eater. A doubt then arises whether the\neater be Agni or the individual soul or the highest Self; for no\ndistinguishing characteristic is stated, and Agni as well as the\nindividual soul and the highest Self is observed to form, in that\nUpanishad, the subjects of questions[141].\n\nThe purvapakshin maintains that the eater is Agni, fire being known from\nScripture as well (cp. B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 6) as from ordinary life to be\nthe eater of food. Or else the individual soul may be the eater,\naccording to the passage, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit' (Mu. Up.\nIII, 1, 1). On the other hand, the eater cannot be Brahman on account of\nthe passage (which forms the continuation of the one quoted from the Mu.\nUp.), 'The other looks on without eating.'\n\nThe eater, we reply, must be the highest Self 'because there is\nmentioned what is movable and what is immovable.' For all things movable\nand immovable are here to be taken as constituting the food, while death\nis the condiment. But nothing beside the highest Self can be the\nconsumer of all these things in their totality; the highest Self,\nhowever, when reabsorbing the entire aggregate of effects may be said to\neat everything. If it is objected that here no express mention is made\nof things movable and things immovable, and that hence we have no right\nto use the (alleged) mention made of them as a reason, we reply that\nthis objection is unfounded; firstly, because the aggregate of all\nliving beings is seen to be meant from the circumstance of death being\nthe condiment; and, secondly, because the Brahmans and Kshattriyas may\nhere, on account of their pre-eminent position, be viewed as instances\nonly (of all beings). Concerning the objection that the highest Self\ncannot be an eater on account of the passage quoted ('the other looks on\nwithout eating'), we remark that that passage aims at denying the\nfruition (on the part of the highest Self) of the results of works, such\nfruition being mentioned in immediate proximity, but is not meant to\nnegative the reabsorption of the world of effects (into Brahman); for it\nis well established by all the Vedanta-texts that Brahman is the cause\nof the creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of the world. Therefore\nthe eater can here be Brahman only.\n\n10. And on account of the topic under discussion. That the highest Self\nonly can be the eater referred to is moreover evident from the passage\n(Ka. Up. I, 2, 18), ('The knowing Self is not born, it dies not'), which\nshows that the highest Self is the general topic. And to adhere to the\ngeneral topic is the proper proceeding. Further, the clause, 'Who then\nknows where he is,' shows that the cognition is connected with\ndifficulties; which circumstance again points to the highest Self.\n\n11. The 'two entered into the cave' (are the individual soul and the\nhighest Self), for the two are (intelligent) Selfs (and therefore of the\nsame nature), as it is seen (that numerals denote beings of the same\nnature).\n\nIn the same Ka/th/avalli we read (I, 3, 1), 'There are the two drinking\nthe reward of their works in the world, (i.e. the body,) entered into\nthe cave, dwelling on the highest summit. Those who know Brahman call\nthem shade and light; likewise those householders who perform the\nTri/n/a/k/iketa sacrifice.'\n\nHere the doubt arises whether the mind (buddhi) and the individual soul\nare referred to, or the individual soul and the highest Self. If the\nmind and the individual soul, then the individual soul is here spoken of\nas different from the aggregate of the organs of action, (i.e. the\nbody,) among which the mind occupies the first place. And a statement on\nthis point is to be expected, as a question concerning it is asked in a\npreceding passage, viz. I, 1, 20, 'There is that doubt when a man is\ndead--some saying he is; others, he is not. This I should like to know\ntaught by thee; this is the third of my boons.' If, on the other hand,\nthe passage refers to the individual soul and the highest Self, then it\nintimates that the highest Self is different from the individual soul;\nand this also requires to be declared here, on account of the question\ncontained in the passage (I, 2, 14), 'That which thou seest as different\nfrom religious duty and its contrary, from effect and cause, from the\npast and the future, tell me that.'\n\nThe doubt to which the passage gives rise having thus been stated, a\ncaviller starts the following objection: neither of the stated views can\nbe maintained.--Why?--On account of the characteristic mark implied in\nthe circumstance that the two are said to drink, i.e. to enjoy, the\nfruit of their works in the world. For this can apply to the intelligent\nindividual soul only, not to the non-intelligent buddhi. And as the dual\nform 'drinking' (pibantau) shows that both are drinking, the view of the\ntwo being the buddhi and the individual soul is not tenable. For the\nsame reason the other opinion also, viz. of the two being the individual\nsoul and the highest Self, cannot be maintained; for drinking (i.e. the\nfruition of reward) cannot be predicated of the highest Self, on account\nof the mantra (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1), 'The other looks on without eating.'\n\nThese objections, we reply, are without any force. Just as we see that\nin phrases such as 'the men with the umbrella (lit. the umbrella-men)\nare walking,' the attribute of being furnished with an umbrella which\nproperly speaking belongs to one man only is secondarily ascribed to\nmany, so here two agents are spoken of as drinking because one of them\nis really drinking. Or else we may explain the passage by saying that,\nwhile the individual soul only drinks, the Lord also is said to drink\nbecause he makes the soul drink. On the other hand, we may also assume\nthat the two are the buddhi and the individual soul, the instrument\nbeing figuratively spoken of as the agent--a figure of speech\nexemplified by phrases such as 'the fuel cooks (the food).' And in a\nchapter whose topic is the soul no two other beings can well be\nrepresented as enjoying rewards. Hence there is room for the doubt\nwhether the two are the buddhi and the individual soul, or the\nindividual soul and the highest Self.\n\nHere the purvapakshin maintains that the former of the two stated views\nis the right one, because the two beings are qualified as 'entered into\nthe cave.' Whether we understand by the cave the body or the heart, in\neither case the buddhi and the individual soul may be spoken of as\n'entered into the cave.' Nor would it be appropriate, as long as another\ninterpretation is possible, to assume that a special place is here\nascribed to the omnipresent Brahman. Moreover, the words 'in the world\nof their good deeds' show that the two do not pass beyond the sphere of\nthe results of their good works. But the highest Self is not in the\nsphere of the results of either good or bad works; according to the\nscriptural passage, 'It does not grow larger by works nor does it grow\nsmaller.' Further, the words 'shade and light' properly designate what\nis intelligent and what is non-intelligent, because the two are opposed\nto each other like light and shade. Hence we conclude that the buddhi\nand the individual soul are spoken of.\n\nTo this we make the following reply:--In the passage under discussion\nthe individual soul (vij/n/anatman) and the highest Self are spoken of,\nbecause these two, being both intelligent Selfs, are of the same nature.\nFor we see that in ordinary life also, whenever a number is mentioned,\nbeings of the same class are understood to be meant; when, for instance,\nthe order is given, 'Look out for a second (i.e. a fellow) for this\nbull,' people look out for a second bull, not for a horse or a man. So\nhere also, where the mention of the fruition of rewards enables us to\ndetermine that the individual soul is meant, we understand at once, when\na second is required, that the highest Self has to be understood; for\nthe highest Self is intelligent, and therefore of the same nature as the\nsoul.--But has it not been said above that the highest Self cannot be\nmeant here, on account of the text stating that it is placed in the\ncave?--Well, we reply, /s/ruti as well as sm/ri/ti speaks of the highest\nSelf as placed in the cave. Compare, for instance (Ka. Up. I, 2, 12),\n'The Ancient who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss;' Taitt.\nUp. II, 1, 'He who knows him hidden in the cave, in the highest ether;'\nand, 'Search for the Self entered into the cave.' That it is not\ncontrary to reason to assign to the omnipresent Brahman a special\nlocality, for the purpose of clearer perception, we have already\ndemonstrated. The attribute of existing in the world of its good works,\nwhich properly belongs to one of the two only, viz. to the individual\nsoul, may be assigned to both, analogously to the case of the men, one\nof whom carries an umbrella. Their being compared to light and shade\nalso is unobjectionable, because the qualities of belonging and not\nbelonging to this transmigratory world are opposed to each other, like\nlight and shade; the quality of belonging to it being due to Nescience,\nand the quality of not belonging to it being real. We therefore\nunderstand by the two 'entered into the cave,' the individual soul and\nthe highest Self.--Another reason for this interpretation follows.\n\n12. And on account of the distinctive qualities (mentioned).\n\nMoreover, the distinctive qualities mentioned in the text agree only\nwith the individual Self and the highest Self. For in a subsequent\npassage (I, 3, 3), 'Know the Self to be the charioteer, the body to be\nthe chariot,' which contains the simile of the chariot, the individual\nsoul is represented as a charioteer driving on through transmigratory\nexistence and final release, while the passage (9), 'He reaches the end\nof his journey, and that is the highest place of Vish/n/u,' represents\nthe highest Self as the goal of the driver's course. And in a preceding\npassage also, (I, 2, 12, 'The wise, who by means of meditation on his\nSelf, recognises the Ancient who is difficult to be seen, who has\nentered into the dark, who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the\nabyss, as God, he indeed leaves joy and sorrow far behind,') the same\ntwo beings are distinguished as thinker and as object of thought. The\nhighest Self is, moreover, the general topic. And further, the clause,\n'Those who know Brahman call them,' &c., which brings forward a special\nclass of speakers, is in its place only if the highest Self is accepted\n(as one of the two beings spoken of). It is therefore evident that the\npassage under discussion refers to the individual soul and the highest\nSelf.\n\nThe same reasoning applies to the passage (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1), 'Two\nbirds, inseparable friends,' &c. There also the Self is the general\ntopic, and hence no two ordinary birds can be meant; we therefore\nconclude from the characteristic mark of eating, mentioned in the\npassage, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit,' that the individual soul is\nmeant, and from the characteristic marks of abstinence from eating and\nof intelligence, implied in the words, 'The other looks on without\neating,' that the highest Self is meant. In a subsequent mantra again\nthe two are distinguished as the seer and the object of sight. 'Merged\ninto the same tree (as it were into water) man grieves at his own\nimpotence (ani/s/a), bewildered; but when he sees the other Lord\n(i/s/a.) contented and knows his glory, then his grief passes away.'\n\nAnother (commentator) gives a different interpretation of the mantra,\n'Two birds inseparable,' &c. To that mantra, he says, the final decision\nof the present head of discussion does not apply, because it is\ndifferently interpreted in the Pai@ngi-rahasya Brahma/n/a. According to\nthe latter the being which eats the sweet fruit is the sattva; the other\nbeing which looks on without eating, the individual soul (j/n/a); so\nthat the two are the sattva and the individual soul (kshetraj/n/a). The\nobjection that the word sattva might denote the individual soul, and the\nword kshetraj/n/a, the highest Self, is to be met by the remark that, in\nthe first place, the words sattva and kshetraj/n/a have the settled\nmeaning of internal organ and individual soul, and are in the second\nplace, expressly so interpreted there, (viz. in the Pai@ngi-rahasya,)\n'The sattva is that by means of which man sees dreams; the embodied one,\nthe seer, is the kshetraj/n/a; the two are therefore the internal organ\nand the individual soul.' Nor does the mantra under discussion fall\nunder the purvapaksha propounded above. For it does not aim at setting\nforth the embodied individual soul, in so far as it is characterised by\nthe attributes connected with the transmigratory state, such as acting\nand enjoying; but in so far rather as it transcends all attributes\nconnected with the sa/m/sara and is of the nature of Brahman, i.e. is\npure intelligence; as is evident from the clause, 'The other looks on\nwithout eating.' That agrees, moreover, with /s/ruti and sm/ri/ti\npassages, such as, 'That art thou,' and 'Know me also to be the\nindividual soul' (Bha. Gita XIII, 2). Only on such an explanation of the\npassage as the preceding one there is room for the declaration made in\nthe concluding passage of the section, 'These two are the sattva and the\nkshetraj/n/a; to him indeed who knows this no impurity\nattaches[142].'--But how can, on the above interpretation, the\nnon-intelligent sattva (i.e. the internal organ) be spoken of as an\nenjoyer, as is actually done in the clause, 'One of them eats the sweet\nfruit?'--The whole passage, we reply, does not aim at setting forth the\nfact that the sattva is an enjoyer, but rather the fact that the\nintelligent individual soul is not an enjoyer, but is of the nature of\nBrahman. To that end[143] the passage under discussion metaphorically\nascribes the attribute of being an enjoyer to the internal organ, in so\nfar as it is modified by pleasure, pain, and the like. For all acting\nand enjoying is at the bottom based on the non-discrimination (by the\nsoul) of the respective nature of internal organ and soul: while in\nreality neither the internal organ nor the soul either act or enjoy; not\nthe former, because it is non-intelligent; not the latter, because it is\nnot capable of any modification. And the internal organ can be\nconsidered as acting and enjoying, all the less as it is a mere\npresentment of Nescience. In agreement with what we have here\nmaintained, Scripture ('For where there is as it were duality there one\nsees the other,' &c.; B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 15) declares that the practical\nassumption of agents, and so on--comparable to the assumption of the\nexistence of elephants, and the like, seen in a dream--holds good in the\nsphere of Nescience only; while the passage, 'But when the Self only is\nall this, how should he see another?' declares that all that practically\npostulated existence vanishes for him who has arrived at discriminative\nknowledge.\n\n13. The person within (the eye) (is Brahman) on account of the agreement\n(of the attributes of that person with the nature of Brahman).\n\nScripture says, 'He spoke: The person that is seen in the eye that is\nthe Self. This is the immortal, the fearless, this is Brahman. Even\nthough they drop melted butter or water on it (the eye) it runs away on\nboth sides,' &c. (Ch. Up. IV, 15, 1).\n\nThe doubt here arises whether this passage refers to the reflected Self\nwhich resides in the eye, or to the individual Self, or to the Self of\nsome deity which presides over the sense of sight, or to the Lord.\n\nWith reference to this doubt the purvapakshin argues as follows: What is\nmeant (by the person in the eye) is the reflected Self, i.e. the image\nof a person (reflected in the eye of another): for of that it is well\nknown that it is seen, and the clause, 'The person that is seen in the\neye,' refers to it as something well known. Or else we may appropriately\ntake the passage as referring to the individual Self. For the individual\nSelf (cognitional Self, vij/n/anatman) which perceives the colours by\nmeans of the eye is, on that account, in proximity to the eye; and,\nmoreover, the word 'Self' (which occurs in the passage) favours this\ninterpretation. Or else the passage is to be understood as referring to\nthe soul animating the sun which assists the sense of sight; compare the\npassage (B/ri/. Up. V, 5, 2), 'He (the person in the sun) rests with his\nrays in him (the person in the right eye).' Moreover, qualities such as\nimmortality and the like (which are ascribed to the subject of the\nscriptural passage) may somehow belong to individual deities. The Lord,\non the other hand[144], cannot be meant, because a particular locality\nis spoken of.\n\nAgainst this we remark that the highest Lord only can be meant here by\nthe person within the eye.--Why?--'On account of the agreement.' For the\nqualities mentioned in the passage accord with the nature of the highest\nLord. The quality of being the Self, in the first place, belongs to the\nhighest Lord in its primary (non-figurative or non-derived) sense, as we\nknow from such texts as 'That is the Self,' 'That art thou.' Immortality\nand fearlessness again are often ascribed to him in Scripture. The\nlocation in the eye also is in consonance with the nature of the highest\nLord. For just as the highest Lord whom Scripture declares to be free\nfrom all evil is not stained by any imperfections, so the station of the\neye also is declared to be free from all stain, as we see from the\npassage, 'Even though they drop melted butter or water on it it runs\naway on both sides.' The statement, moreover, that he possesses the\nqualities of sa/m/yadvama, &c. can be reconciled with the highest Lord\nonly (Ch. Up. IV, 15, 2, 'They call him Sa/m/yadvama, for all blessings\n(vama) go towards him (sa/m/yanti). He is also vamani, for he leads\n(nayati) all blessings (vama). He is also Bhamani, for he shines (bhati)\nin all worlds'). Therefore, on account of agreement, the person within\nthe eye is the highest Lord.\n\n14. And on account of the statement of place, and so on.\n\nBut how does the confined locality of the eye agree with Brahman which\nis omnipresent like the ether?--To this question we reply that there\nwould indeed be a want of agreement if that one locality only were\nassigned to the Lord. For other localities also, viz. the earth and so\non, are attributed to him in the passage, 'He who dwells in the earth,'\n&c. (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 3). And among those the eye also is mentioned,\nviz. in the clause, 'He who dwells in the eye,' &c. The phrase 'and so\non,' which forms part of the Sutra, intimates that not only locality is\nassigned to Brahman, although not (really) appropriate to it, but that\nalso such things as name and form, although not appropriate to Brahman\nwhich is devoid of name and form, are yet seen to be attributed to it.\nThat, in such passages as 'His name is ut, he with the golden beard'\n(Ch. Up. I, 6, 7, 6), Brahman although devoid of qualities is spoken of,\nfor the purposes of devotion, as possessing qualities depending on name\nand form, we have already shown. And we have, moreover, shown that to\nattribute to Brahman a definite locality, in spite of his omnipresence,\nsubserves the purposes of contemplation, and is therefore not contrary\nto reason[145]; no more than to contemplate Vish/n/u in the sacred\n/s/alagram.\n\n15. And on account of the passage referring to that which is\ndistinguished by pleasure (i.e. Brahman).\n\nThere is, moreover, really no room for dispute whether Brahman be meant\nin the passage under discussion or not, because the fact of Brahman\nbeing meant is established 'by the reference to that which is\ndistinguished by pleasure.' For the same Brahman which is spoken of as\ncharacterised by pleasure in the beginning of the chapter[146], viz. in\nthe clauses, 'Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman,' that\nsame Brahman we must suppose to be referred to in the present passage\nalso, it being proper to adhere to the subject-matter under discussion;\nthe clause, 'The teacher will tell you the way[147],' merely announcing\nthat the way will be proclaimed [by the teacher; not that a new subject\nwill be started].--How then, it may be asked, is it known that Brahman,\nas distinguished by pleasure, is spoken of in the beginning of the\npassage?--We reply: On hearing the speech of the fires, viz. 'Breath is\nBrahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman,' Upako/s/ala says, 'I understand\nthat breath is Brahman, but I do not understand that Ka or Kha is\nBrahman.' Thereupon the fires reply, 'What is Ka is Kha, what is Kha is\nKa.' Now the word Kha denotes in ordinary language the elemental ether.\nIf therefore the word Ka which means pleasure were not applied to\nqualify the sense of 'Kha,' we should conclude that the name Brahman is\nhere symbolically[148] given to the mere elemental ether as it is (in\nother places) given to mere names and the like. Thus also with regard to\nthe word Ka, which, in ordinary language, denotes the imperfect pleasure\nspringing from the contact of the sense-organs with their objects. If\nthe word Kha were not applied to qualify the sense of Ka we should\nconclude that ordinary pleasure is here called Brahman. But as the two\nwords Ka and Kha (occur together and therefore) qualify each other, they\nintimate Brahman whose Self is pleasure. If[149] in the passage referred\nto (viz. 'Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman') the second\nBrahman (i.e. the word Brahman in the clause 'Ka is Brahman') were not\nadded, and if the sentence would run 'Ka, Kha is Brahman,' the word Ka\nwould be employed as a mere qualifying word, and thus pleasure as being\na mere quality would not be represented as a subject of meditation. To\nprevent this, both words--Ka as well as Kha--are joined with the word\nBrahman ('Ka (is) Brahman, Kha (is) Brahman'). For the passage wishes to\nintimate that pleasure also, although a quality, should be meditated\nupon as something in which qualities inhere. It thus appears that at the\nbeginning of the chapter Brahman, as characterised by pleasure, is\nspoken of. After that the Garhapatya and the other sacred fires proclaim\nin turns their own glory, and finally conclude with the words, 'This is\nour knowledge, O friend, and the knowledge of the Self;' wherein they\npoint back to the Brahman spoken of before. The words, 'The teacher will\ntell you the way' (which form the last clause of the concluding\npassage), merely promise an explanation of the way, and thus preclude\nthe idea of another topic being started. The teacher thereupon saying,\n'As water does not cling to a lotus leaf, so no evil deed clings to one\nwho knows it' (which words intervene between the concluding speech of\nthe fires and the information given by the teacher about the person\nwithin the eye) declares that no evil attacks him who knows the person\nwithin the eye, and thereby shows the latter to be Brahman. It thus\nappears that the teacher's intention is to speak about that Brahman\nwhich had formed the topic of the instruction of the fires; to represent\nit at first as located in the eye and possessing the qualities of\nSa/m/yadvama and the like, and to point out afterwards that he who thus\nknows passes on to light and so on. He therefore begins by saying, 'That\nperson that is seen in the eye that is the Self.'\n\n16. And on account of the statement of the way of him who has heard the\nUpanishads.\n\nThe person placed in the eye is the highest lord for the following\nreason also. From /s/ruti as well as sm/ri/ti we are acquainted with the\nway of him who has heard the Upanishads or the secret knowledge, i.e.\nwho knows Brahman. That way, called the path of the gods, is described\n(Pra. Up. I, 10), 'Those who have sought the Self by penance,\nabstinence, faith, and knowledge gain by the northern path the sun. This\nis the home of the spirits, the immortal, free from fear, the highest.\nFrom thence they do not return;' and also (Bha. Gita VIII, 24), 'Fire,\nlight, the bright fortnight, the six months of the northern progress of\nthe sun, on that way those who know Brahman go, when they have died, to\nBrahman.' Now that very same way is seen to be stated, in our text, for\nhim who knows the person within the eye. For we read (Ch. Up. IV, 15,\n5), 'Now whether people perform obsequies for him or no he goes to\nlight;' and later on, 'From the sun (he goes) to the moon, from the moon\nto lightning. There is a person not human, he leads them to Brahman.\nThis is the path of the gods, the path that leads to Brahman. Those who\nproceed on that path do not return to the life of man.' From this\ndescription of the way which is known to be the way of him who knows\nBrahman we ascertain that the person within the eye is Brahman.\n\n17. (The person within the eye is the highest), not any other Self; on\naccount of the non-permanency (of the other Selfs) and on account of the\nimpossibility (of the qualities of the person in the eye being ascribed\nto the other Selfs).\n\nTo the assertion made in the purvapaksha that the person in the eye is\neither the reflected Self or the cognitional Self (the individual soul)\nor the Self of some deity the following answer is given.--No other Self\nsuch as, for instance, the reflected Self can be assumed here, on\naccount of non-permanency.--The reflected Self, in the first place, does\nnot permanently abide in the eye. For when some person approaches the\neye the reflection of that person is seen in the eye, but when the\nperson moves away the reflection is seen no longer. The passage 'That\nperson within the eye' must, moreover, be held, on the ground of\nproximity, to intimate that the person seen in a man's own eye is the\nobject of (that man's) devout meditation (and not the reflected image of\nhis own person which he may see in the eye of another man). [Let, then,\nanother man approach the devout man, and let the latter meditate on the\nimage reflected in his own eye, but seen by the other man only. No, we\nreply, for] we have no right to make the (complicated) assumption that\nthe devout man is, at the time of devotion, to bring close to his eye\nanother man in order to produce a reflected image in his own eye.\nScripture, moreover, (viz. Ch. Up. VIII, 9, 1, 'It (the reflected Self)\nperishes as soon as the body perishes,') declares the non-permanency of\nthe reflected Self.--And, further, 'on account of impossibility' (the\nperson in the eye cannot be the reflected Self). For immortality and the\nother qualities ascribed to the person in the eye are not to be\nperceived in the reflected Self.--Of the cognitional Self, in the second\nplace, which is in general connexion with the whole body and all the\nsenses, it can likewise not be said that it has its permanent station in\nthe eye only. That, on the other hand, Brahman although all-pervading\nmay, for the purpose of contemplation, be spoken of as connected with\nparticular places such as the heart and the like, we have seen already.\nThe cognitional Self shares (with the reflected Self) the impossibility\nof having the qualities of immortality and so on attributed to it.\nAlthough the cognitional Self is in reality not different from the\nhighest Self, still there are fictitiously ascribed to it (adhyaropita)\nthe effects of nescience, desire and works, viz, mortality and fear; so\nthat neither immortality nor fearlessness belongs to it. The qualities\nof being the sa/m/yadvama, &c. also cannot properly be ascribed to the\ncognitional Self, which is not distinguished by lordly power\n(ai/s/varya).--In the third place, although the Self of a deity (viz.\nthe sun) has its station in the eye--according to the scriptural\npassage, 'He rests with his rays in him'--still Selfhood cannot be\nascribed to the sun, on account of his externality (paragrupatva).\nImmortality, &c. also cannot be predicated of him, as Scripture speaks\nof his origin and his dissolution. For the (so-called) deathlessness of\nthe gods only means their (comparatively) long existence. And their\nlordly power also is based on the highest Lord and does not naturally\nbelong to them; as the mantra declares, 'From terror of it (Brahman) the\nwind blows, from terror the sun rises; from terror of it Agni and Indra,\nyea, Death runs as the fifth.'--Hence the person in the eye must be\nviewed as the highest Lord only. In the case of this explanation being\nadopted the mention (of the person in the eye) as something well known\nand established, which is contained in the words 'is seen' (in the\nphrase 'the person that is seen in the eye'), has to be taken as\nreferring to (the mental perception founded on) the /s/astra which\nbelongs to those who know; and the glorification (of devout meditation)\nhas to be understood as its purpose.\n\n18. The internal ruler over the devas and so on (is Brahman), because\nthe attributes of that (Brahman) are designated.\n\nIn B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 1 ff. we read, 'He who within rules this world and\nthe other world and all beings,' and later on, 'He who dwells in the\nearth and within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the\nearth is, who rules the earth within, he is thy Self, the ruler within,\nthe immortal,' &c. The entire chapter (to sum up its contents) speaks of\na being, called the antaryamin (the internal ruler), who, dwelling\nwithin, rules with reference to the gods, the world, the Veda, the\nsacrifice, the beings, the Self.--Here now, owing to the unusualness of\nthe term (antaryamin), there arises a doubt whether it denotes the Self\nof some deity which presides over the gods and so on, or some Yogin who\nhas acquired extraordinary powers, such as, for instance, the capability\nof making his body subtle, or the highest Self, or some other being.\nWhat alternative then does recommend itself?\n\nAs the term is an unknown one, the purvapakshin says, we must assume\nthat the being denoted by it is also an unknown one, different from all\nthose mentioned above.--Or else it may be said that, on the one hand, we\nhave no right to assume something of an altogether indefinite character,\nand that, on the other hand, the term antaryamin--which is derived from\nantaryamana (ruling within)--cannot be called altogether unknown, that\ntherefore antaryamin may be assumed to denote some god presiding over\nthe earth, and so on. Similarly, we read (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 16), 'He\nwhose dwelling is the earth, whose sight is fire, whose mind is light,'\n&c. A god of that kind is capable of ruling the earth, and so on,\ndwelling within them, because he is endowed with the organs of action;\nrulership is therefore rightly ascribed to him.--Or else the rulership\nspoken of may belong to some Yogin whom his extraordinary powers enable\nto enter within all things.--The highest Self, on the other hand, cannot\nbe meant, as it does not possess the organs of action (which are\nrequired for ruling).\n\nTo this we make the following reply.--The internal ruler, of whom\nScripture speaks with reference to the gods, must be the highest Self,\ncannot be anything else.--Why so?--Because its qualities are designated\nin the passage under discussion. The universal rulership implied in the\nstatement that, dwelling within, it rules the entire aggregate of\ncreated beings, inclusive of the gods, and so on, is an appropriate\nattribute of the highest Self, since omnipotence depends on (the\nomnipotent ruler) being the cause of all created things.--The qualities\nof Selfhood and immortality also, which are mentioned in the passage,\n'He is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal,' belong in their\nprimary sense to the highest Self.--Further, the passage, 'He whom the\nearth does not know,' which declares that the internal ruler is not\nknown by the earth-deity, shows him to be different from that deity; for\nthe deity of the earth knows itself to be the earth.--The attributes\n'unseen,' 'unheard,' also point to the highest Self, which is devoid of\nshape and other sensible qualities.--The objection that the highest Self\nis destitute of the organs of action, and hence cannot be a ruler, is\nwithout force, because organs of action may be ascribed to him owing to\nthe organs of action of those whom he rules.--If it should be objected\nthat [if we once admit an internal ruler in addition to the individual\nsoul] we are driven to assume again another and another ruler ad\ninfinitum; we reply that this is not the case, as actually there is no\nother ruler (but the highest Self[150]). The objection would be valid\nonly in the case of a difference of rulers actually existing.--For all\nthese reasons, the internal ruler is no other but the highest Self.\n\n19. And (the internal ruler is) not that which the Sm/ri/ti assumes,\n(viz. the pradhana,) on account of the statement of qualities not\nbelonging to it.\n\nGood so far, a Sa@nkhya opponent resumes. The attributes, however, of\nnot being seen, &c., belong also to the pradhana assumed by the\nSa@nkhya-sm/ri/ti, which is acknowledged to be devoid of form and other\nsensible qualities. For their Sm/ri/ti says, 'Undiscoverable,\nunknowable, as if wholly in sleep' (Manu I, 5). To this pradhana also\nthe attribute of rulership belongs, as it is the cause of all effects.\nTherefore the internal ruler may be understood to denote the pradhana.\nThe pradhana has, indeed, been set aside already by the Sutra I, 1, 5,\nbut we bring it forward again, because we find that attributes belonging\nto it, such as not being seen and the like, are mentioned in Scripture.\n\nTo this argumentation the Sutrakara replies that the word 'internal\nruler' cannot denote the pradhana, because qualities not belonging to\nthe latter are stated. For, although the pradhana may be spoken of as\nnot being seen, &c, it cannot be spoken of as seeing, since the\nSa@nkhyas admit it to be non-intelligent. But the scriptural passage\nwhich forms the complement to the passage about the internal ruler\n(B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23) says expressly, 'Unseen but seeing, unheard but\nhearing, unperceived but perceiving, unknown but knowing.'--And Selfhood\nalso cannot belong to the pradhana.\n\nWell, then, if the term 'internal ruler' cannot be admitted to denote\nthe pradhana, because the latter is neither a Self nor seeing; let us\nsuppose it to denote the embodied (individual) soul, which is\nintelligent, and therefore hears, sees, perceives, knows; which is\ninternal (pratya/nk/), and therefore of the nature of Self; and which is\nimmortal, because it is able to enjoy the fruits of its good and evil\nactions. It is, moreover, a settled matter that the attributes of not\nbeing seen, &c., belong to the embodied soul, because the agent of an\naction, such as seeing, cannot at the same time be the object of the\naction. This is declared in scriptural passages also, as, for instance\n(B/ri/. Up. III, 4, 2), 'Thou couldst not see the seer of sight.' The\nindividual soul is, moreover, capable of inwardly ruling the complex of\nthe organs of action, as it is the enjoyer. Therefore the internal ruler\nis the embodied soul.--To this reasoning the following Sutra replies.\n\n20. And the embodied soul (also cannot be understood by the internal\nruler), for both also (i.e. both recensions of the B/ri/had Ara/n/yaka)\nspeak of it as different (from the internal ruler).\n\nThe word 'not' (in the Sutra) has to be supplied from the preceding\nSutra. Although the attributes of seeing, &c., belong to the individual\nsoul, still as the soul is limited by its adjuncts, as the ether is by a\njar, it is not capable of dwelling completely within the earth and the\nother beings mentioned, and to rule them. Moreover, the followers of\nboth /s/akhas, i.e. the Ka/n/vas as well as the Madhyandinas, speak in\ntheir texts of the individual soul as different from the internal ruler,\nviz. as constituting, like the earth, and so on, his abode and the\nobject of his rule. The Ka/n/vas read (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 22), 'He who\ndwells in knowledge;' the Madhyandinas, 'He who dwells in the Self.' If\nthe latter reading is adopted, the word 'Self' denotes the individual\nsoul; if the former, the individual soul is denoted by the word\n'knowledge;' for the individual soul consists of knowledge. It is\ntherefore a settled matter that some being different from the individual\nsoul, viz. the lord, is denoted by the term 'internal ruler.'--But how,\nit may be asked, is it possible that there should be within one body two\nseers, viz. the lord who rules internally and the individual soul\ndifferent from him?--Why--we ask in return--should that be\nimpossible?--Because, the opponent replies, it is contrary to scriptural\npassages, such as, 'There is no other seer but he,' &c., which deny that\nthere is any seeing, hearing, perceiving, knowing Self, but the internal\nruler under discussion.--May, we rejoin, that passage not have the\npurpose of denying the existence of another ruler?--No, the opponent\nreplies, for there is no occasion for another ruler (and therefore no\noccasion for denying his existence), and the text does not contain any\nspecification, (but merely denies the existence of any other seer in\ngeneral.)\n\nWe therefore advance the following final refutation of the opponent's\nobjection.--The declaration of the difference of the embodied Self and\nthe internal ruler has its reason in the limiting adjunct, consisting of\nthe organs of action, presented by Nescience, and is not absolutely\ntrue. For the Self within is one only; two internal Selfs are not\npossible. But owing to its limiting adjunct the one Self is practically\ntreated as if it were two; just as we make a distinction between the\nether of the jar and the universal ether. Hence there is room for those\nscriptural passages which set forth the distinction of knower and object\nof knowledge, for perception and the other means of proof, for the\nintuitive knowledge of the apparent world, and for that part of\nScripture which contains injunctions and prohibitions. In accordance\nwith this, the scriptural passage, 'Where there is duality, as it were,\nthere one sees another,' declares that the whole practical world exists\nonly in the sphere of Nescience; while the subsequent passage, 'But when\nthe Self only is all this, how should he see another?' declares that the\npractical world vanishes in the sphere of true knowledge.\n\n21. That which possesses the attributes of invisibility and so on (is\nBrahman), on account of the declaration of attributes.\n\nScripture says, 'The higher knowledge is this by which the\nIndestructible is apprehended. That which cannot be seen nor seized,\nwhich is without origin and qualities, without eyes and ears, without\nhands and feet, the eternal, all-pervading, omnipresent, infinitesimal,\nthat which is imperishable, that it is which the wise regard as the\nsource of all beings' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 5; 6).--Here the doubt arises\nwhether the source of all beings which is spoken of as characterised by\ninvisibility, &c. be the pradhana or the embodied soul, or the highest\nLord.\n\nWe must, the purvapakshin says, understand by the source of all beings\nthe non-intelligent pradhana because (in the passage immediately\nsubsequent to the one quoted) only non-intelligent beings are mentioned\nas parallel instances. 'As the spider sends forth and draws in its\nthread, as plants grow on the earth, as from the living man hairs spring\nforth on the head and the body, thus everything arises here from the\nIndestructible.'--But, it may be objected, men and spiders which are\nhere quoted as parallel instances are of intelligent nature.--No, the\npurvapakshin replies; for the intelligent being as such is not the\nsource of the threads and the hair, but everybody knows that the\nnon-intelligent body of the spider ruled by intelligence is the source\nof the threads; and so in the case of man also.--While, moreover, in the\ncase of the preceding Sutra, the pradhana hypothesis could not be\naccepted, because, although some qualities mentioned, such as\ninvisibility and so on, agreed with it, others such as being the seer\nand the like did not; we have here to do only with attributes such as\ninvisibility which agree with the pradhana, no attribute of a contrary\nnature being mentioned.--But the qualities mentioned in the\ncomplementary passage (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9), 'He who knows all and perceives\nall,' do not agree with the non-intelligent pradhana; how, then, can the\nsource of all beings be interpreted to mean the pradhana?--To this the\npurvapakshin replies: The passage, 'The higher knowledge is that by\nwhich the Indestructible is apprehended, that which cannot be seen,'\n&c., points, by means of the term 'the Indestructible,' to the source of\nall beings characterised by invisibility and similar attributes. This\nsame 'Indestructible' is again mentioned later on in the passage, 'It is\nhigher than the high Imperishable.' Now that which in this latter\npassage is spoken of as higher than the Imperishable may possess the\nqualities of knowing and perceiving everything, while the pradhana\ndenoted by the term 'the Imperishable' is the source of all beings.--If,\nhowever, the word 'source' (yoni) be taken in the sense of operative\ncause, we may by 'the source of the beings' understand the embodied Self\nalso, which, by means of merit and demerit, is the cause of the origin\nof the complex of things.\n\nTo this we make the following reply.--That which here is spoken of as\nthe source of all beings, distinguished by such qualities as\ninvisibility and so on, can be the highest Lord only, nothing\nelse.--Whereupon is this conclusion founded?--On the statement of\nattributes. For the clause, 'He who is all-knowing, all-perceiving,'\nclearly states an attribute belonging to the highest Lord only, since\nthe attributes of knowing all and perceiving all cannot be predicated\neither of the non-intelligent pradhana or the embodied soul whose power\nof sight is narrowed by its limiting conditions. To the objection that\nthe qualities of knowing and perceiving all are, in the passage under\ndiscussion, attributed to that which is higher than the source of all\nbeings--which latter is denoted by the term 'the Imperishable'--not to\nthe source itself, we reply that this explanation is inadmissible\nbecause the source of all beings, which--in the clause, 'From the\nIndestructible everything here arises'--is designated as the material\ncause of all created beings, is later on spoken of as all-knowing, and\nagain as the cause of all created beings, viz. in the passage (I, 1, 9),\n'From him who knows all and perceives all, whose brooding consists of\nknowledge, from him is born that Brahman, name, form, and food.' As\ntherefore the Indestructible which forms the general topic of discussion\nis, owing to the identity of designation, recognised (as being referred\nto in the later passage also), we understand that it is the same\nIndestructible to which the attributes of knowing and perceiving all are\nascribed.--We further maintain that also the passage, 'Higher than the\nhigh Imperishable,' does not refer to any being different from the\nimperishable source of all beings which is the general topic of\ndiscussion. We conclude this from the circumstance that the passage, 'He\ntruly told that knowledge of Brahman through which he knows the\nimperishable true person,' (I, 2, 13; which passage leads on to the\npassage about that which is higher than the Imperishable,) merely\ndeclares that the imperishable source of all beings, distinguished by\ninvisibility and the like--which formed the subject of the preceding\nchapter--will be discussed. The reason why that imperishable source is\ncalled higher than the high Imperishable, we shall explain under the\nnext Sutra.--Moreover, two kinds of knowledge are enjoined there (in the\nUpanishad), a lower and a higher one. Of the lower one it is said that\nit comprises the /Ri/g-veda and so on, and then the text continues, 'The\nhigher knowledge is that by which the Indestructible is apprehended.'\nHere the Indestructible is declared to be the subject of the higher\nknowledge. If we now were to assume that the Indestructible\ndistinguished by invisibility and like qualities is something different\nfrom the highest Lord, the knowledge referring to it would not be the\nhigher one. For the distinction of lower and higher knowledge is made on\naccount of the diversity of their results, the former leading to mere\nworldly exaltation, the latter to absolute bliss; and nobody would\nassume absolute bliss to result from the knowledge of the\npradhana.--Moreover, as on the view we are controverting the highest\nSelf would be assumed to be something higher than the imperishable\nsource of all beings, three kinds of knowledge would have to be\nacknowledged, while the text expressly speaks of two kinds\nonly.--Further, the reference to the knowledge of everything being\nimplied in the knowledge of one thing--which is contained in the passage\n(I, 1, 3), 'Sir, what is that through which if it is known everything\nelse becomes known?'--is possible only if the allusion is to Brahman the\nSelf of all, and not either to the pradhana which comprises only what is\nnon-intelligent or to the enjoyer viewed apart from the objects of\nenjoyment.--The text, moreover, by introducing the knowledge of Brahman\nas the chief subject--which it does in the passage (I, 1, 1), 'He told\nthe knowledge of Brahman, the foundation of all knowledge, to his eldest\nson Atharvan'--and by afterwards declaring that out of the two kinds of\nknowledge, viz. the lower one and the higher one, the higher one leads\nto the comprehension of the Imperishable, shows that the knowledge of\nthe Imperishable is the knowledge of Brahman. On the other hand, the\nterm 'knowledge of Brahman' would become meaningless if that\nImperishable which is to be comprehended by means of it were not\nBrahman. The lower knowledge of works which comprises the /Ri/g-veda,\nand so on, is mentioned preliminarily to the knowledge of Brahman for\nthe mere purpose of glorifying the latter; as appears from the passages\nin which it (the lower knowledge) is spoken of slightingly, such as (I,\n2, 7), 'But frail indeed are those boats, the sacrifices, the eighteen\nin which this lower ceremonial has been told. Fools who praise this as\nthe highest good are subject again and again to old age and death.'\nAfter these slighting remarks the text declares that he who turns away\nfrom the lower knowledge is prepared for the highest one (I, 2, 12),\n'Let a Brahama/n/a after he has examined all these worlds which are\ngained by works acquire freedom from all desires. Nothing that is\neternal (not made) can be gained by what is not eternal (made). Let him\nin order to understand this take fuel in his hand and approach a guru\nwho is learned and dwells entirely in Brahman.'--The remark that,\nbecause the earth and other non-intelligent things are adduced as\nparallel instances, that also which is compared to them, viz. the source\nof all beings must be non-intelligent, is without foundation, since it\nis not necessary that two things of which one is compared to the other\nshould be of absolutely the same nature. The things, moreover, to which\nthe source of all beings is compared, viz. the earth and the like, are\nmaterial, while nobody would assume the source of all beings to be\nmaterial.--For all these reasons the source of all beings, which\npossesses the attributes of invisibility and so on, is the highest Lord.\n\n22. The two others (i.e. the individual soul and the pradhana) are not\n(the source of all beings) because there are stated distinctive\nattributes and difference.\n\nThe source of all beings is the highest Lord, not either of the two\nothers, viz. the pradhana and the individual soul, on account of the\nfollowing reason also. In the first place, the text distinguishes the\nsource of all beings from the embodied soul, as something of a different\nnature; compare the passage (II, 1, 2), 'That heavenly person is without\nbody, he is both without and within, not produced, without breath and\nwithout mind, pure.' The distinctive attributes mentioned here, such as\nbeing of a heavenly nature, and so on, can in no way belong to the\nindividual soul, which erroneously considers itself to be limited by\nname and form as presented by Nescience, and erroneously imputes their\nattributes to itself. Therefore the passage manifestly refers to the\nPerson which is the subject of all the Upanishads.--In the second place,\nthe source of all beings which forms the general topic is represented in\nthe text as something different from the pradhana, viz. in the passage,\n'Higher than the high Imperishable.' Here the term 'Imperishable' means\nthat undeveloped entity which represents the seminal potentiality of\nnames and forms, contains the fine parts of the material elements,\nabides in the Lord, forms his limiting adjunct, and being itself no\neffect is high in comparison to all effects; the whole phrase, 'Higher\nthan the high Imperishable,' which expresses a difference then clearly\nshows that the highest Self is meant here.--We do not on that account\nassume an independent entity called pradhana and say that the source of\nall beings is stated separately therefrom; but if a pradhana is to be\nassumed at all (in agreement with the common opinion) and if being\nassumed it is assumed of such a nature as not to be opposed to the\nstatements of Scripture, viz. as the subtle cause of all beings denoted\nby the terms 'the Undeveloped' and so on, we have no objection to such\nan assumption, and declare that, on account of the separate statement\ntherefrom, i.e. from that pradhana, 'the source of all beings' must mean\nthe highest Lord.--A further argument in favour of the same conclusion\nis supplied by the next Sutra.\n\n23. And on account of its form being mentioned.\n\nSubsequently to the passage, 'Higher than the high Imperishable,' we\nmeet (in the passage, 'From him is born breath,' &c.) with a description\nof the creation of all things, from breath down to earth, and then with\na statement of the form of this same source of beings as consisting of\nall created beings, 'Fire is his head, his eyes the sun and the moon,\nthe quarters his ears, his speech the Vedas disclosed, the wind his\nbreath, his heart the universe; from his feet came the earth; he is\nindeed the inner Self of all things.' This statement of form can refer\nonly to the highest Lord, and not either to the embodied soul, which, on\naccount of its small power, cannot be the cause of all effects, or to\nthe pradhana, which cannot be the inner Self of all beings. We therefore\nconclude that the source of all beings is the highest Lord, not either\nof the other two.--But wherefrom do you conclude that the quoted\ndeclaration of form refers to the source of all beings?--From the\ngeneral topic, we reply. The word 'he' (in the clause, 'He is indeed the\ninner Self of all things') connects the passage with the general topic.\nAs the source of all beings constitutes the general topic, the whole\npassage, from 'From him is born breath,' up to, 'He is the inner Self of\nall beings,' refers to that same source. Similarly, when in ordinary\nconversation a certain teacher forms the general topic of the talk, the\nphrase, 'Study under him; he knows the Veda and the Veda@ngas\nthoroughly,' as a matter of course, refers to that same teacher.--But\nhow can a bodily form be ascribed to the source of all beings which is\ncharacterised by invisibility and similar attributes?--The statement as\nto its nature, we reply, is made for the purpose of showing that the\nsource of all beings is the Self of all beings, not of showing that it\nis of a bodily nature. The case is analogous to such passages as, 'I am\nfood, I am food, I am the eater of food' (Taitt. Up. III, 10,\n6).--Others, however, are of opinion[151] that the statement quoted does\nnot refer to the source of all beings, because that to which it refers\nis spoken of as something produced. For, on the one hand, the\nimmediately preceding passage ('From him is born health, mind, and all\norgans of sense, ether, air, light, water, and the earth, the support of\nall') speaks of the aggregate of beings from air down to earth as\nsomething produced, and, on the other hand, a passage met with later on\n('From him comes Agni, the sun being his fuel,' up to 'All herbs and\njuices') expresses itself to the same purpose. How then should all at\nonce, in the midst of these two passages (which refer to the creation),\na statement be made about the nature of the source of all beings?--The\nattribute of being the Self of all beings, (which above was said to be\nmentioned in the passage about the creation, 'Fire is his head,' &c., is\nnot mentioned there but) is stated only later on in a passage subsequent\nto that which refers to the creation, viz. 'The Person is all this,\nsacrifice,' &c. (II, 1, 10).--Now, we see that /s/ruti as well as\nsm/ri/ti speaks of the birth of Prajapati, whose body is this threefold\nworld; compare /Ri/g-veda Sa/m/h. X, 121, 1, 'Hira/n/ya-garbha arose in\nthe beginning; he was the one born Lord of things existing. He\nestablished the earth and this sky; to what God shall we offer our\noblation?' where the expression 'arose' means 'he was born.' And in\nsm/ri/ti we read, 'He is the first embodied one, he is called the\nPerson; as the primal creator of the beings Brahman was evolved in the\nbeginning.' This Person which is (not the original Brahman but) an\neffect (like other created beings) may be called the internal Self of\nall beings (as it is called in II, 1, 4), because in the form of the\nSelf of breath it abides in the Selfs of all beings.--On this latter\nexplanation (according to which the passage, 'Fire is his head,' &c.,\ndoes not describe the nature of the highest Lord, and can therefore not\nbe referred to in the Sutra) the declaration as to the Lord being the\n'nature' of all which is contained in the passage, 'The Person is all\nthis, sacrifice,' &c., must be taken as the reason for establishing the\nhighest Lord, (i.e. as the passage which, according to the Sutra, proves\nthat the source of all beings is the highest Lord[152].)\n\n24. Vai/s/vanara (is the highest Lord) on account of the distinction\nqualifying the common terms (Vai/s/vanara and Self).\n\n(In Ch. Up. V, 11 ff.) a discussion begins with the words, 'What is our\nSelf, what is Brahman?' and is carried on in the passage, 'You know at\npresent that Vai/s/vanara Self, tell us that;' after that it is declared\nwith reference to Heaven, sun, air, ether, water, and earth, that they\nare connected with the qualities of having good light, &c., and, in\norder to disparage devout meditation on them singly, that they stand to\nthe Vai/s/vanara in the relation of being his head, &c., merely; and\nthen finally (V, 18) it is said, 'But he who meditates on the\nVai/s/vanara Self as measured by a span, as abhivimana[153], he eats\nfood in all worlds, in all beings, in all Selfs. Of that Vai/s/vanara\nSelf the head is Sutejas (having good light), the eye Vi/s/varupa\n(multiform), the breath P/ri/thagvartman (moving in various courses),\nthe trunk Bahula (full), the bladder Rayi (wealth), the feet the earth,\nthe chest the altar, the hairs the grass on the altar, the heart the\nGarhapatya fire, the mind the Anvaharya fire, the mouth the Ahavaniya\nfire.'--Here the doubt arises whether by the term 'Vai/s/vanara' we have\nto understand the gastric fire, or the elemental fire, or the divinity\npresiding over the latter, or the embodied soul, or the highest\nLord.--But what, it may be asked, gives rise to this doubt?--The\ncircumstance, we reply, of 'Vai/s/vanara' being employed as a common\nterm for the gastric fire, the elemental fire, and the divinity of the\nlatter, while 'Self' is a term applying to the embodied soul as well as\nto the highest Lord. Hence the doubt arises which meaning of the term is\nto be accepted and which to be set aside.\n\nWhich, then, is the alternative to be embraced?--Vai/s/vanara, the\npurvapakshin maintains, is the gastric fire, because we meet, in some\npassages, with the term used in that special sense; so, for instance\n(B/ri/. Up. V, 9), 'Agni Vai/s/vanara is the fire within man by which\nthe food that is eaten is cooked.'--Or else the term may denote fire in\ngeneral, as we see it used in that sense also; so, for instance\n(/Ri/g-veda Sa/m/h. X, 88, 12), 'For the whole world the gods have made\nthe Agni Vai/s/vanara a sign of the days.' Or, in the third place, the\nword may denote that divinity whose body is fire. For passages in which\nthe term has that sense are likewise met with; compare, for instance,\n/Ri/g-veda Sa/m/h. I, 98, 1, 'May we be in the favour of Vai/s/vanara;\nfor he is the king of the beings, giving pleasure, of ready grace;' this\nand similar passages properly applying to a divinity endowed with power\nand similar qualities. Perhaps it will be urged against the preceding\nexplanations, that, as the word Vai/s/vanara is used in co-ordination\nwith the term 'Self,' and as the term 'Self' alone is used in the\nintroductory passage ('What is our Self, what is Brahman?'),\nVai/s/vanara has to be understood in a modified sense, so as to be in\nharmony with the term Self. Well, then, the purvapakshin rejoins, let us\nsuppose that Vai/s/vanara is the embodied Self which, as being an\nenjoyer, is in close vicinity to the Vai/s/vanara fire,[154] (i.e. the\nfire within the body,) and with which the qualification expressed by the\nterm, 'Measured by a span,' well agrees, since it is restricted by its\nlimiting condition (viz. the body and so on).--In any case it is evident\nthat the term Vai/s/vanara does not denote the highest Lord.\n\nTo this we make the following reply.--The word Vai/s/vanara denotes the\nhighest Self, on account of the distinction qualifying the two general\nterms.--Although the term 'Self,' as well as the term 'Vai/s/vanara,'\nhas various meanings--the latter term denoting three beings while the\nformer denotes two--yet we observe a distinction from which we conclude\nthat both terms can here denote the highest Lord only; viz. in the\npassage, 'Of that Vai/s/vanara Self the head is Sutejas,' &c. For it is\nclear that that passage refers to the highest Lord in so far as he is\ndistinguished by having heaven, and so on, for his head and limbs, and\nin so far as he has entered into a different state (viz. into the state\nof being the Self of the threefold world); represents him, in fact, for\nthe purpose of meditation, as the internal Self of everything. As such\nthe absolute Self may be represented, because it is the cause of\neverything; for as the cause virtually contains all the states belonging\nto its effects, the heavenly world, and so on, may be spoken of as the\nmembers of the highest Self.--Moreover, the result which Scripture\ndeclares to abide in all worlds--viz. in the passage, 'He eats food in\nall worlds, in all beings, in all Selfs'--is possible only if we take\nthe term Vai/s/vanara to denote the highest Self.--The same remark\napplies to the declaration that all the sins are burned of him who has\nthat knowledge, 'Thus all his sins are burned,' &c. (Ch. Up. V, 24,\n3).--Moreover, we meet at the beginning of the chapter with the words\n'Self' and 'Brahman;' viz. in the passage, 'What is our Self, what is\nBrahman?' Now these are marks of Brahman, and indicate the highest Lord\nonly. Hence he only can be meant by the term Vai/s/vanara.\n\n25. (And) because that which is stated by Sm/ri/ti (i.e. the shape of\nthe highest Lord as described by Sm/ri/ti) is an inference (i.e. an\nindicatory mark from which we infer the meaning of /S/ruti).\n\nThe highest Lord only is Vai/s/vanara, for that reason also that\nSm/ri/ti ascribes to the highest Lord only a shape consisting of the\nthreefold world, the fire constituting his mouth, the heavenly world his\nhead, &c. So, for instance, in the following passage, 'He whose mouth is\nfire, whose head the heavenly world, whose navel the ether, whose feet\nthe earth, whose eye the sun, whose ears the regions, reverence to him\nthe Self of the world.' The shape described here in Sm/ri/ti allows us\nto infer a /S/ruti passage on which the Sm/ri/ti rests, and thus\nconstitutes an inference, i.e. a sign indicatory of the word\n'Vai/s/vanara' denoting the highest Lord. For, although the quoted\nSm/ri/ti passage contains a glorification[155], still even a\nglorification in the form in which it there appears is not possible,\nunless it has a Vedic passage to rest on.--Other Sm/ri/ti passages also\nmay be quoted in connexion with this Sutra, so, for instance, the\nfollowing one, 'He whose head the wise declare to be the heavenly world,\nwhose navel the ether, whose eyes sun and moon, whose ears the regions,\nand whose feet the earth, he is the inscrutable leader of all beings.'\n\n26. If it be maintained that (Vai/s/vanara is) not (the highest Lord) on\naccount of the term (viz. Vai/s/vanara, having a settled different\nmeaning), &c., and on account of his abiding within (which is a\ncharacteristic of the gastric fire); (we say) no, on account of the\nperception (of the highest Lord), being taught thus (viz. in the gastric\nfire), and on account of the impossibility (of the heavenly world, &c.\nbeing the head, &c. of the gastric fire), and because they (the\nVajasaneyins) read of him (viz. the Vai/s/vanara) as man (which term\ncannot apply to the gastric fire).\n\nHere the following objection is raised.--Vai/s/vanara cannot be the\nhighest Lord, on account of the term, &c., and on account of the abiding\nwithin. The term, viz. the term Vai/s/vanara, cannot be applied to the\nhighest Lord, because the settled use of language assigns to it a\ndifferent sense. Thus, also, with regard to the term Agni (fire) in the\npassage (/S/at. Bra. X, 6, 1, 11), 'He is the Agni Vai/s/vanara.' The\nword '&c.' (in the Sutra) hints at the fiction concerning the three\nsacred fires, the garhapatya being represented as the heart, and so on,\nof the Vai/s/vanara Self (Ch. Up. V, 18, 2[156]).--Moreover, the\npassage, 'Therefore the first food which a man may take is in the place\nof homa' (Ch. Up. V, 19, 1), contains a glorification of (Vai/s/vanara)\nbeing the abode of the oblation to Pra/n/a[157]. For these reasons we\nhave to understand by Vai/s/vanara the gastric fire.--Moreover,\nScripture speaks of the Vai/s/vanara as abiding within. 'He knows him\nabiding within man;' which again applies to the gastric fire only.--With\nreference to the averment that on account of the specifications\ncontained in the passage, 'His head is Sutejas,' &c., Vai/s/vanara is to\nbe explained as the highest Self, we (the purvapakshin) ask: How do you\nreach the decision that those specifications, although agreeing with\nboth interpretations, must be assumed to refer to the highest Lord only,\nand not to the gastric fire?--Or else we may assume that the passage\nspeaks of the elemental fire which abides within and without; for that\nthat fire is also connected with the heavenly world, and so on, we\nunderstand from the mantra, 'He who with his light has extended himself\nover earth and heaven, the two halves of the world, and the atmosphere'\n(/Ri/g-veda Sa/m/h. X, 88, 3).--Or else the attribute of having the\nheavenly world, and so on, for its members may, on account of its power,\nbe attributed to that divinity which has the elemental fire for its\nbody.--Therefore Vai/s/vanara is not the highest Lord.\n\nTo all this we reply as follows.--Your assertions are unfounded,\n'because there is taught the perception in this manner.' The reasons\n(adduced in the former part of the Sutra), viz. the term, and so on, are\nnot sufficient to make us abandon the interpretation according to which\nVai/s/vanara is the highest Lord.--Why?--On account of perception being\ntaught in this manner, i.e. without the gastric fire being set aside.\nFor the passages quoted teach the perception of the highest Lord in the\ngastric fire, analogously to such passages as 'Let a man meditate on the\nmind as Brahman' (Ch. Up. III, 18, 1).--Or else they teach that the\nobject of perception is the highest Lord, in so far as he has the\ngastric fire called Vai/s/vanara for his limiting condition; analogously\nto such passages as 'He who consists of mind, whose body is breath,\nwhose form is light' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 2[158]). If it were the aim of\nthe passages about the Vai/s/vanara to make statements not concerning\nthe highest Lord, but merely concerning the gastric fire, there would be\nno possibility of specifications such as contained in the passage 'His\nhead is Sutejas,' &c. That also on the assumption of Vai/s/vanara being\neither the divinity of fire or the elemental fire no room is to be found\nfor the said specifications, we shall show under the following\nSutra.--Moreover, if the mere gastric fire were meant, there would be\nroom only for a declaration that it abides within man, not that it is\nman. But, as a matter of fact, the Vajasaneyins speak of him--in their\nsacred text--as man, 'This Agni Vai/s/vanara is man; he who knows this\nAgni Vai/s/vanara as man-like, as abiding within man,' &c. (/S/at. Bra.\nX, 6, 1, 11). The highest Lord, on the other hand, who is the Self of\neverything, may be spoken of as well as man, as abiding within\nman.--Those who, in the latter part of the Sutra, read 'man-like'\n(puru-shavidham) instead of 'man' (purusham), wish to express the\nfollowing meaning: If Vai/s/vanara were assumed to be the gastric fire\nonly, he might be spoken of as abiding within man indeed, but not as\nman-like. But the Vajasaneyins do speak of him as man-like, 'He who\nknows him as man-like, as abiding within man.'--The meaning of the term\nman-like is to be concluded from the context, whence it will be seen\nthat, with reference to nature, it means that the highest Lord has the\nheaven for his head, &c., and is based on the earth; and with reference\nto man, that he forms the head, &c., and is based on the chin (of the\ndevout worshipper[159]).\n\n27. For the same reasons (the Vai/s/vanara) cannot be the divinity (of\nfire), or the element (of fire).\n\nThe averment that the fanciful attribution of members contained in the\npassage 'His head is Sutejas,' &c. may apply to the elemental fire also\nwhich from the mantras is seen to be connected with the heavenly world,\n&c., or else to the divinity whose body is fire, on account of its\npower, is refuted by the following remark: For the reasons already\nstated Vai/s/vanara is neither the divinity nor the element. For to the\nelemental fire which is mere heat and light the heavenly world and so on\ncannot properly be ascribed as head and so on, because an effect cannot\nbe the Self of another effect.--Again, the heavenly world cannot be\nascribed as head, &c. to the divinity of fire, in spite of the power of\nthe latter; for, on the one hand, it is not a cause (but a mere effect),\nand on the other hand its power depends on the highest Lord. Against all\nthese interpretations there lies moreover the objection founded on the\ninapplicability of the term 'Self.'\n\n28. Jaimini (declares that there is) no contradiction even on the\nassumption of a direct (worship of the highest Lord as Vai/s/vanara).\n\nAbove (Sutra 26) it has been said that Vai/s/vanara is the highest Lord,\nto be meditated upon as having the gastric fire either for his outward\nmanifestation or for his limiting condition; which interpretation was\naccepted in deference to the circumstance that he is spoken of as\nabiding within--and so on.--The teacher Jaimini however is of opinion\nthat it is not necessary to have recourse to the assumption of an\noutward manifestation or limiting condition, and that there is no\nobjection to refer the passage about Vai/s/vanara to the direct worship\nof the highest Lord.--But, if you reject the interpretation based on the\ngastric fire, you place yourself in opposition to the statement that\nVai/s/vanara abides within, and to the reasons founded on the term, &c.\n(Su. 26).--To this we reply that we in no way place ourselves in\nopposition to the statement that Vai/s/vanara abides within. For the\npassage, 'He knows him as man-like, as abiding within man,' does not by\nany means refer to the gastric fire, the latter being neither the\ngeneral topic of discussion nor having been mentioned by name\nbefore.--What then does it refer to?--It refers to that which forms the\nsubject of discussion, viz. that similarity to man (of the highest Self)\nwhich is fancifully found in the members of man from the upper part of\nthe head down to the chin; the text therefore says, 'He knows him as\nman-like, as abiding within man,' just as we say of a branch that it\nabides within the tree[160].--Or else we may adopt another\ninterpretation and say that after the highest Self has been represented\nas having the likeness to man as a limiting condition, with regard to\nnature as well as to man, the passage last quoted ('He knows him as\nabiding within man') speaks of the same highest Self as the mere witness\n(sakshin; i.e. as the pure Self, non-related to the limiting\nconditions).--The consideration of the context having thus shown that\nthe highest Self has to be resorted to for the interpretation of the\npassage, the term 'Vai/s/vanara' must denote the highest Self in some\nway or other. The word 'Vi/s/vanara' is to be explained either as 'he\nwho is all and man (i.e. the individual soul),' or 'he to whom souls\nbelong' (in so far as he is their maker or ruler), and thus denotes the\nhighest Self which is the Self of all. And the form 'Vai/s/vanara' has\nthe same meaning as 'Vi/s/vanara,' the taddhita-suffix, by which the\nformer word is derived from the latter, not changing the meaning; just\nas in the case of rakshasa (derived from rakshas), and vayasa (derived\nfrom vayas).--The word 'Agni' also may denote the highest Self if we\nadopt the etymology agni=agra/n/i, i.e. he who leads in front.--As the\nGarhapatya-fire finally, and as the abode of the oblation to breath the\nhighest Self may be represented because it is the Self of all.\n\nBut, if it is assumed that Vai/s/vanara denotes the highest Self, how\ncan Scripture declare that he is measured by a span?--On the explanation\nof this difficulty we now enter.\n\n29. On account of the manifestation, so A/s/marathya opines.\n\nThe circumstance of the highest Lord who transcends all measure being\nspoken of as measured by a span has for its reason 'manifestation.' The\nhighest Lord manifests himself as measured by a span, i.e. he specially\nmanifests himself for the benefit of his worshippers in some special\nplaces, such as the heart and the like, where he may be perceived.\nHence, according to the opinion of the teacher A/s/marathya, the\nscriptural passage which speaks of him who is measured by a span may\nrefer to the highest Lord.\n\n30. On account of remembrance; so Badari opines.\n\nOr else the highest Lord may be called 'measured by a span' because he\nis remembered by means of the mind which is seated in the heart which is\nmeasured by a span. Similarly, barley-corns which are measured by means\nof prasthas are themselves called prasthas. It must be admitted that\nbarley-grains themselves have a certain size which is merely rendered\nmanifest through their being connected with a prastha measure; while the\nhighest Lord himself does not possess a size to be rendered manifest by\nhis connexion with the heart. Still the remembrance (of the Lord by\nmeans of the mind) may be accepted as offering a certain foundation for\nthe /S/ruti passage concerning him who is measured by a span.--Or\nelse[161] the Sutra may be interpreted to mean that the Lord, although\nnot really measured by a span, is to be remembered (meditated upon) as\nbeing of the measure of a span; whereby the passage is furnished with an\nappropriate sense.--Thus the passage about him who is measured by a span\nmay, according to the opinion of the teacher Badari, be referred to the\nhighest Lord, on account of remembrance.\n\n31. On the ground of imaginative identification (the highest Lord may be\ncalled prade/s/amatra), Jaimini thinks; for thus (Scripture) declares.\n\nOr else the passage about him who is measured by a span may be\nconsidered to rest on imaginative combination.--Why?--Because the\npassage of the Vajasaneyibrahma/n/a which treats of the same topic\nidentifies heaven, earth, and so on--which are the members of\nVai/s/vanara viewed as the Self of the threefold world--with certain\nparts of the human frame, viz. the parts comprised between the upper\npart of the head and the chin, and thus declares the imaginative\nidentity of Vai/s/vanara with something whose measure is a span. There\nwe read, 'The Gods indeed reached him, knowing him as measured by a span\nas it were. Now I will declare them (his members) to you so as to\nidentify him (the Vai/s/vanara) with that whose measure is a span; thus\nhe said. Pointing to the upper part of the head he said: This is what\nstands above (i.e. the heavenly world) as Vai/s/vanara (i.e. the head of\nVai/s/vanara[162]). Pointing to the eyes he said: This is he with good\nlight (i.e. the sun) as Vai/s/vanara (i.e. the eye of V.). Pointing to\nthe nose he said: This is he who moves on manifold paths (i.e. the air)\nas Vai/s/vanara (i.e. the breath of V.). Pointing to the space (ether)\nwithin his mouth he said: This is the full one (i.e. the ether) as\nVai/s/vanara. Pointing to the saliva within his mouth he said: This is\nwealth as Vai/s/vanara (i.e. the water in the bladder of V.). Pointing\nto the chin he said: This is the base as Vai/s/vanara (i.e. the feet of\nV.).'--Although in the Vajasaneyi-brahma/n/a the heaven is denoted as\nthat which has the attribute of standing above and the sun as that which\nhas the attribute of good light, while in the Chandogya the heaven is\nspoken of as having good light and the sun as being multiform; still\nthis difference does not interfere (with the unity of the vidya)[163],\nbecause both texts equally use the term 'measured by a span,' and\nbecause all /s/akhas intimate the same.--The above explanation of the\nterm 'measured by a span,' which rests on imaginative identification,\nthe teacher Jaimini considers the most appropriate one.\n\n32. Moreover they (the Jabalas) speak of him (the highest Lord) in that\n(i.e. the interstice between the top of the head and the chin which is\nmeasured by a span).\n\nMoreover the Jabalas speak in their text of the highest Lord as being in\nthe interstice between the top of the head and the chin. 'The unevolved\ninfinite Self abides in the avimukta (i.e. the non-released soul). Where\ndoes that avimukta abide? It abides in the Vara/n/a and the Nasi, in the\nmiddle. What is that Vara/n/a, what is that Nasi?' The text thereupon\netymologises the term Vara/n/a as that which wards off (varayati) all\nevil done by the senses, and the term Nasi as that which destroys\n(na/s/ayati) all evil done by the senses; and then continues, 'And what\nis its place?--The place where the eyebrows and the nose join. That is\nthe joining place of the heavenly world (represented by the upper part\nof the head) and of the other (i.e. the earthly world represented by the\nchin).' (Jabala Up. I.)--Thus it appears that the scriptural statement\nwhich ascribes to the highest Lord the measure of a span is appropriate.\nThat the highest Lord is called abhivimana refers to his being the\ninward Self of all. As such he is directly measured, i.e. known by all\nanimate beings. Or else the word may be explained as 'he who is near\neverywhere--as the inward Self--and who at the same time is measureless'\n(as being infinite). Or else it may denote the highest Lord as him who,\nas the cause of the world, measures it out, i.e. creates it. By all this\nit is proved that Vai/s/vanara is the highest Lord.\n\nNotes:\n\n[Footnote 136: The clause 'he is to meditate with a calm mind' if taken\nas a gu/n/avidhi, i.e. as enjoining some secondary matter, viz. calmness\nof mind of the meditating person, cannot at the same time enjoin\nmeditation; for that would involve a so-called split of the sentence\n(vakyabheda).]\n\n[Footnote 137: Jivezpi dehadib/rim/hanaj jyastvanyayad va brahmatety\nartha/h/. An. Gi.]\n\n[Footnote 138: The discussion is brought on by the term 'vivakshita' in\nthe Sutra whose meaning is 'expressed, aimed at,' but more literally\n'desired to be expressed.']\n\n[Footnote 139: Because he is vyapin.]\n\n[Footnote 140: Another interpretation of the later part of Sutra.]\n\n[Footnote 141: Cp. Ka/th/a Up, I, 1, 13; 20; I, 2, 14.]\n\n[Footnote 142: Freedom from impurity can result only from the knowledge\nthat the individual soul is in reality Brahman. The commentators explain\nrajas by avidya.]\n\n[Footnote 143: Tadartham iti, jivasya brahmasiddhyartham iti yavat,\n/k/aitanya/kh/ayapanna dhi/h/sukhadina pari/n/amata iti, tatra\npurushozpi bhakt/ri/tvam ivanubhavati na tattvata iti vaktum\nadhyaropayati. Ananda Giri.]\n\n[Footnote 144: Who, somebody might say, is to be understood here,\nbecause immortality and similar qualities belong to him not somehow\nonly, but in their true sense.]\n\n[Footnote 145: The /t/ikas say that the contents of this last sentence\nare hinted at by the word 'and' in the Sutra.]\n\n[Footnote 146: I.e. at the beginning of the instruction which the sacred\nfires give to Upako/s/ala, Ch. Up. IV, 10 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 147: Which words conclude the instruction given by the fires,\nand introduce the instruction given by the teacher, of which the passage\n'the person that is seen in the eye,' &c. forms a part.]\n\n[Footnote 148: A/s/rayantarapratyayasya/s/rayantare kshepa/h/\npratika/h/, yatha brahma/s/abda/h/ paramatmavishayo namadishu kshipyate.\nBha.]\n\n[Footnote 149: The following sentences give the reason why, although\nthere is only one Brahman, the word Brahman is repeated.]\n\n[Footnote 150: According to Scripture, Nira@nku/s/a/m/\nsarvaniyantritva/m/ /s/rauta/m/ na /k/a tadri/s/e sarvaniyantari bhedo\nna /k/anumana/m/ /s/rutibhaditam uttish/th/ati. Ananda Giri. Or else, as\nGo. An. remarks, we may explain: as the highest Self is not really\ndifferent from the individual soul. So also Bhamati: Na /h/anavastha, na\nhi niyantrantara/m/ tena niyamyate ki/m/ tu yo jivo niyanta\nlokasiddha/h/ sa paramatmevopadhyava/kkh/edakalpitabheda/h/.]\n\n[Footnote 151: V/ri/ttik/ri/dvyakhyam dushayati, Go. An.; ekade/s/ina/m/\ndushayati, Ananda Giri; tad etat paramatenakshepasamadhanabhya/m/\nvyakhyaya svamatena vya/k/ash/t/e, puna/h/ /s/abdozpi purvasmad\nvi/s/esha/m/ dyotayann asyesh/t/ata/m/ su/k/ayati, Bhamati.--The\nstatement of the two former commentators must be understood to mean--in\nagreement with the Bhamati--that /S/a@nkara is now going to refute the\npreceding explanation by the statement of his own view. Thus Go. An.\nlater on explains 'asmin pakshe' by 'svapakshe.']\n\n[Footnote 152: The question is to what passage the 'rupopanyasat' of the\nSutra refers.--According to the opinion set forth first it refers to Mu.\nUp. II, 1, 4 ff.--But, according to the second view, II, 1, 4 to II, 1,\n9, cannot refer to the source of all beings, i.e. the highest Self,\nbecause that entire passage describes the creation, the inner Self of\nwhich is not the highest Self but Prajapati, i.e. the Hira/n/yagarbha or\nSutratman of the later Vedanta, who is himself an 'effect,' and who is\ncalled the inner Self, because he is the breath of life (pra/n/a) in\neverything.--Hence the Sutra must be connected with another passage, and\nthat passage is found in II, 1, 10, where it is said that the Person\n(i.e. the highest Self) is all this, &c.]\n\n[Footnote 153: About which term see later on.]\n\n[Footnote 154: Sarire laksha/n/aya vai/s/vanara/s/abdopapattim aha\ntasyeti. An. Gi.]\n\n[Footnote 155: And as such might be said not to require a basis for its\nstatements.]\n\n[Footnote 156: Na /k/a garhapatyadih/ri/dayadita brahma/n/a/h/\nsambhavini. Bhamati.]\n\n[Footnote 157: Na /k/a pra/n/ahutyadhikara/n/ata z nyatra ja/th/aragner\nyujyate. Bhamati.]\n\n[Footnote 158: According to the former explanation the gastric fire is\nto be looked on as the outward manifestation (pratika) of the highest\nLord; according to the latter as his limiting condition.]\n\n[Footnote 159: I.e. that he may be fancifully identified with the head\nand so on of the devout worshipper.]\n\n[Footnote 160: Whereby we mean not that it is inside the tree, but that\nit forms a part of the tree.--The Vai/s/vanara Self is identified with\nthe different members of the body, and these members abide within, i.e.\nform parts of the body.]\n\n[Footnote 161: Parima/n/asya h/ri/da/y/advararopitasya smaryama/n/e\nkatham aropo vishayavishayitvena bhedad ity a/s/a@nkya vyakhyantaram aha\nprade/s/eti. Ananda Giri.]\n\n[Footnote 162: Atra sarvatra vai/s/vanara/s/abdas tada@ngapara/h/. Go.\nAn.]\n\n[Footnote 163: Which unity entitles us to use the passage from the\n/S/at. Bra. for the explanation of the passage from the Ch. Up.]\n\n\n\n\nTHIRD PADA.\n\nREVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!\n\n\n1. The abode of heaven, earth, and so on (is Brahman), on account of the\nterm 'own,' i.e. Self.\n\nWe read (Mu. Up. II, 2, 5), 'He in whom the heaven, the earth, and the\nsky are woven, the mind also with all the vital airs, know him alone as\nthe Self, and leave off other words! He is the bridge of the\nImmortal.'--Here the doubt arises whether the abode which is intimated\nby the statement of the heaven and so on being woven in it is the\nhighest Brahman or something else.\n\nThe purvapakshin maintains that the abode is something else, on account\nof the expression, 'It is the bridge of the Immortal.' For, he says, it\nis known from every-day experience that a bridge presupposes some\nfurther bank to which it leads, while it is impossible to assume\nsomething further beyond the highest Brahman, which in Scripture is\ncalled 'endless, without a further shore' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 12). Now if\nthe abode is supposed to be something different from Brahman, it must be\nsupposed to be either the pradhana known from Sm/ri/ti, which, as being\nthe (general) cause, may be called the (general) abode; or the air known\nfrom /S/ruti, of which it is said (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 2, 'Air is that\nthread, O Gautama. By air as by a thread, O Gautama, this world and the\nother world and all beings are strung together'), that it supports all\nthings; or else the embodied soul which, as being the enjoyer, may be\nconsidered as an abode with reference to the objects of its fruition.\n\nAgainst this view we argue with the sutrakara as follows:--'Of the world\nconsisting of heaven, earth, and so on, which in the quoted passage is\nspoken of as woven (upon something), the highest Brahman must be the\nabode.'--Why?--On account of the word 'own,' i.e. on account of the word\n'Self.' For we meet with the word 'Self' in the passage, 'Know him alone\nas the Self.' This term 'Self' is thoroughly appropriate only if we\nunderstand the highest Self and not anything else.--(To propound another\ninterpretation of the phrase 'sva/s/abdat' employed in the Sutra.)\nSometimes also Brahman is spoken of in /S/ruti as the general abode by\nits own terms (i.e. by terms properly designating Brahman), as, for\ninstance (Ch. Up. VI. 8, 4), 'All these creatures, my dear, have their\nroot in the being, their abode in the being, their rest in the\nbeing[164].'--(Or else we have to explain 'sva/s/abdena' as follows), In\nthe passages preceding and following the passage under discussion\nBrahman is glorified with its own names[165]; cp. Mu. Up. II, 1, 10,\n'The Person is all this, sacrifice, penance, Brahman, the highest\nImmortal,' and II, 2, 11, 'That immortal Brahman is before, is behind,\nBrahman is to the right and left.' Here, on account of mention being\nmade of an abode and that which abides, and on account of the\nco-ordination expressed in the passage, 'Brahman is all' (Mu. Up. II, 2,\n11), a suspicion might arise that Brahman is of a manifold variegated\nnature, just as in the case of a tree consisting of different parts we\ndistinguish branches, stem, and root. In order to remove this suspicion\nthe text declares (in the passage under discussion), 'Know him alone as\nthe Self.' The sense of which is: The Self is not to be known as\nmanifold, qualified by the universe of effects; you are rather to\ndissolve by true knowledge the universe of effects, which is the mere\nproduct of Nescience, and to know that one Self, which is the general\nabode, as uniform. Just as when somebody says, 'Bring that on which\nDevadatta sits,' the person addressed brings the chair only (the abode\nof Devadatta), not Devadatta himself; so the passage, 'Know him alone as\nthe Self,' teaches that the object to be known is the one uniform Self\nwhich constitutes the general abode. Similarly another scriptural\npassage reproves him who believes in the unreal world of effects, 'From\ndeath to death goes he who sees any difference here' (Ka. Up. II, 4,\n11). The statement of co-ordination made in the clause 'All is Brahman'\naims at dissolving (the wrong conception of the reality of) the world,\nand not in any way at intimating that Brahman is multiform in\nnature[166]; for the uniformity (of Brahman's nature) is expressly\nstated in other passages such as the following one, 'As a mass of salt\nhas neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of taste, thus\nindeed has that Self neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a\nmass of knowledge' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 13).--For all these reasons the\nabode of heaven, earth, &c. is the highest Brahman.--Against the\nobjection that on account of the text speaking of a 'bridge,' and a\nbridge requiring a further bank, we have to understand by the abode of\nheaven and earth something different from Brahman, we remark that the\nword 'bridge' is meant to intimate only that that which is called a\nbridge supports, not that it has a further bank. We need not assume by\nany means that the bridge meant is like an ordinary bridge made of clay\nand wood. For as the word setu (bridge) is derived from the root si,\nwhich means 'to bind,' the idea of holding together, supporting is\nrather implied in it than the idea of being connected with something\nbeyond (a further bank).\n\nAccording to the opinion of another (commentator) the word 'bridge' does\nnot glorify the abode of heaven, earth, &c., but rather the knowledge of\nthe Self which is glorified in the preceding clause, 'Know him alone as\nthe Self,' and the abandonment of speech advised in the clause, 'leave\noff other words;' to them, as being the means of obtaining immortality,\nthe expression 'the bridge of the immortal' applies[167]. On that\naccount we have to set aside the assertion that, on account of the word\n'bridge,' something different from Brahman is to be understood by the\nabode of heaven, earth, and so on.\n\n2. And on account of its being designated as that to which the Released\nhave to resort.\n\nBy the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, we have to understand the\nhighest Brahman for that reason also that we find it denoted as that to\nwhich the Released have to resort.--The conception that the body and\nother things contained in the sphere of the Not-self are our Self,\nconstitutes Nescience; from it there spring desires with regard to\nwhatever promotes the well-being of the body and so on, and aversions\nwith regard to whatever tends to injure it; there further arise fear and\nconfusion when we observe anything threatening to destroy it. All this\nconstitutes an endless series of the most manifold evils with which we\nall are acquainted. Regarding those on the other hand who have freed\nthemselves from the stains of Nescience desire aversion and so on, it is\nsaid that they have to resort to that, viz. the abode of heaven, earth,\n&c. which forms the topic of discussion. For the text, after having\nsaid, 'The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved, all his\nworks perish when He has been beheld who is the higher and the lower'\n(Mu. Up. II, 2, 8), later on remarks, 'The wise man freed from name and\nform goes to the divine Person who is greater than the great' (Mu. Up.\nIII, 2, 8). That Brahman is that which is to be resorted to by the\nreleased, is known from other scriptural passages, such as 'When all\ndesires which once entered his heart are undone then does the mortal\nbecome immortal, then he obtains Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 7). Of the\npradhana and similar entities, on the other hand, it is not known from\nany source that they are to be resorted to by the released. Moreover,\nthe text (in the passage, 'Know him alone as the Self and leave off\nother words') declares that the knowledge of the abode of heaven and\nearth, &c. is connected with the leaving off of all speech; a condition\nwhich, according to another scriptural passage, attaches to (the\nknowledge of) Brahman; cp. B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 21, 'Let a wise Brahma/n/a,\nafter he has discovered him, practise wisdom. Let him not seek after\nmany words, for that is mere weariness of the tongue.'--For that reason\nalso the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, is the highest Brahman.\n\n3. Not (i.e. the abode of heaven, earth, &c. cannot be) that which is\ninferred, (i.e. the pradhana), on account of the terms not denoting it.\n\nWhile there has been shown a special reason in favour of Brahman (being\nthe abode), there is no such special reason in favour of anything else.\nHence he (the sutrakara) says that that which is inferred, i.e. the\npradhana assumed by the Sa@nkhya-sm/ri/ti, is not to be accepted as the\nabode of heaven, earth, &c.--Why?--On account of the terms not denoting\nit. For the sacred text does not contain any term intimating the\nnon-intelligent pradhana, on the ground of which we might understand the\nlatter to be the general cause or abode; while such terms as 'he who\nperceives all and knows all' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9) intimate an intelligent\nbeing opposed to the pradhana in nature.--For the same reason the air\nalso cannot be accepted as the abode of heaven, earth, and so on.\n\n4. (Nor) also the individual soul (pra/n/abh/ri/t).\n\nAlthough to the cognitional (individual) Self the qualities of Selfhood\nand intelligence do belong, still omniscience and similar qualities do\nnot belong to it as its knowledge is limited by its adjuncts; thus the\nindividual soul also cannot be accepted as the abode of heaven, earth,\n&c., for the same reason, i.e. on account of the terms not denoting\nit.--Moreover, the attribute of forming the abode of heaven, earth, and\nso on, cannot properly be given to the individual soul because the\nlatter is limited by certain adjuncts and therefore non-pervading (not\nomnipresent)[168].--The special enunciation (of the individual soul) is\ncaused by what follows[169].--The individual soul is not to be accepted\nas the abode of heaven, earth, &c. for the following reason also.\n\n5. On account of the declaration of difference.\n\nThe passage 'Know him alone as the Self' moreover implies a declaration\nof difference, viz. of the difference of the object of knowledge and the\nknower. Here the individual soul as being that which is desirous of\nrelease is the knower, and consequently Brahman, which is denoted by the\nword 'self' and represented as the object of knowledge, is understood to\nbe the abode of heaven, earth, and so on.--For the following reason also\nthe individual soul cannot be accepted as the abode of heaven, earth,\n&c.\n\n6. On account of the subject-matter.\n\nThe highest Self constitutes the subject-matter (of the entire chapter),\nas we see from the passage, 'Sir, what is that through which, when it is\nknown, everything else becomes known?' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 3) in which the\nknowledge of everything is declared to be dependent on the knowledge of\none thing. For all this (i.e. the entire world) becomes known if Brahman\nthe Self of all is known, not if only the individual soul is\nknown.--Another reason against the individual soul follows.\n\n7. And on account of the two conditions of standing and eating (of which\nthe former is characteristic of the highest Lord, the latter of the\nindividual soul).\n\nWith reference to that which is the abode of heaven, earth, and so on,\nthe text says, 'Two birds, inseparable friends,' &c. (Mu. Up. III, 1,\n1). This passage describes the two states of mere standing, i.e. mere\npresence, and of eating, the clause, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit,'\nreferring to the eating, i.e. the fruition of the results of works, and\nthe clause, 'The other one looks on without eating,' describing the\ncondition of mere inactive presence. The two states described, viz. of\nmere presence on the one hand and of enjoyment on the other hand, show\nthat the Lord and the individual soul are referred to. Now there is room\nfor this statement which represents the Lord as separate from the\nindividual soul, only if the passage about the abode of heaven and earth\nlikewise refers to the Lord; for in that case only there exists a\ncontinuity of topic. On any other supposition the second passage would\ncontain a statement about something not connected with the general\ntopic, and would therefore be entirely uncalled for.--But, it may be\nobjected, on your interpretation also the second passage makes an\nuncalled-for statement, viz. in so far as it represents the individual\nsoul as separate from the Lord.--Not so, we reply. It is nowhere the\npurpose of Scripture to make statements regarding the individual soul.\nFrom ordinary experience the individual soul, which in the different\nindividual bodies is joined to the internal organs and other limiting\nadjuncts, is known to every one as agent and enjoyer, and we therefore\nmust not assume that it is that which Scripture aims at setting forth.\nThe Lord, on the other hand, about whom ordinary experience tells us\nnothing, is to be considered as the special topic of all scriptural\npassages, and we therefore cannot assume that any passage should refer\nto him merely casually[170].--That the mantra 'two birds,' &c. speaks of\nthe Lord--and the individual soul we have already shown under I, 2,\n11.--And if, according to the interpretation given in the\nPai@ngi-upanishad (and quoted under I, 2, 11), the verse is understood\nto refer to the internal organ (sattva) and the individual soul (not to\nthe individual soul and the Lord), even then there is no contradiction\n(between that interpretation and our present averment that the\nindividual soul is not the abode of heaven and earth).--How so?--Here\n(i.e. in the present Sutra and the Sutras immediately preceding) it is\ndenied that the individual soul which, owing to its imagined connexion\nwith the internal organ and other limiting adjuncts, has a separate\nexistence in separate bodies--its division being analogous to the\ndivision of universal space into limited spaces such as the spaces\nwithin jars and the like--is that which is called the abode of heaven\nand earth. That same soul, on the other hand, which exists in all\nbodies, if considered apart from the limiting adjuncts, is nothing else\nbut the highest Self. Just as the spaces within jars, if considered\napart from their limiting conditions, are merged in universal space, so\nthe individual soul also is incontestably that which is denoted as the\nabode of heaven and earth, since it (the soul) cannot really be separate\nfrom the highest Self. That it is not the abode of heaven and earth, is\ntherefore said of the individual soul in so far only as it imagines\nitself to be connected with the internal organ and so on. Hence it\nfollows that the highest Self is the abode of heaven, earth, and so\non.--The same conclusion has already been arrived at under I, 2, 21; for\nin the passage concerning the source of all beings (which passage is\ndiscussed under the Sutra quoted) we meet with the clause, 'In which\nheaven and earth and the sky are woven.' In the present adhikara/n/a the\nsubject is resumed for the sake of further elucidation.\n\n8. The bhuman (is Brahman), as the instruction about it is additional to\nthat about the state of deep sleep (i.e. the vital air which remains\nawake even in the state of deep sleep).\n\nWe read (Ch. Up. VII, 23; 24), 'That which is much (bhuman) we must\ndesire to understand.--Sir, I desire to understand it.--Where one sees\nnothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is what\nis much (bhuman). Where one sees something else, hears something else,\nunderstands something else, that is the Little.'--Here the doubt arises\nwhether that which is much is the vital air (pra/n/a) or the highest\nSelf.--Whence the doubt?--The word 'bhuman,' taken by itself, means the\nstate of being much, according to its derivation as taught by Pa/n/ani,\nVI, 4, 158. Hence there is felt the want of a specification showing what\nconstitutes the Self of that muchness. Here there presents itself at\nfirst the approximate passage, 'The vital air is more than hope' (Ch.\nUp. VII, 15, 1), from which we may conclude that the vital air is\nbhuman.--On the other hand, we meet at the beginning of the chapter,\nwhere the general topic is stated, with the following passage, 'I have\nheard from men like you that he who knows the Self overcomes grief. I am\nin grief. Do, Sir, help me over this grief of mine;' from which passage\nit would appear that the bhuman is the highest Self.--Hence there arises\na doubt as to which of the two alternatives is to be embraced, and which\nis to be set aside.\n\nThe purvapakshin maintains that the bhuman is the vital air, since there\nis found no further series of questions and answers as to what is more.\nFor while we meet with a series of questions and answers (such as, 'Sir,\nis there something which is more than a name?'--'Speech is more than\nname.'--'Is there something which is more than speech?'--'Mind is more\nthan speech'), which extends from name up to vital air, we do not meet\nwith a similar question and answer as to what might be more than vital\nair (such as, 'Is there something which is more than vital air?'--'Such\nand such a thing is more than vital air'). The text rather at first\ndeclares at length (in the passage, 'The vital air is more than hope,'\n&c.) that the vital air is more than all the members of the series from\nname up to hope; it then acknowledges him who knows the vital air to be\nan ativadin, i.e. one who makes a statement surpassing the preceding\nstatements (in the passage, 'Thou art an ativadin. He may say I am an\nativadin; he need not deny it'); and it thereupon (in the passage, 'But\nhe in reality is an ativadin who declares something beyond by means of\nthe True'[171]),--not leaving off, but rather continuing to refer to the\nquality of an ativadin which is founded on the vital air,--proceeds, by\nmeans of the series beginning with the True, to lead over to the bhuman;\nso that we conclude the meaning to be that the vital air is the\nbhuman.--But, if the bhuman is interpreted to mean the vital air, how\nhave we to explain the passage in which the bhuman is characterised.\n'Where one sees nothing else?' &c.--As, the purvapakshin replies, in the\nstate of deep sleep we observe a cessation of all activity, such as\nseeing, &c., on the part of the organs merged in the vital air, the\nvital air itself may be characterised by a passage such as, 'Where one\nsees nothing else.' Similarly, another scriptural passage (Pra. Up. IV,\n2; 3) describes at first (in the words, 'He does not hear, he does not\nsee,' &c.) the state of deep sleep as characterised by the cessation of\nthe activity of all bodily organs, and then by declaring that in that\nstate the vital air, with its five modifications, remains awake ('The\nfires of the pra/n/as are awake in that town'), shows the vital air to\noccupy the principal position in the state of deep sleep.--That passage\nalso, which speaks of the bliss of the bhuman ('The bhuman is bliss,'\nCh. Up. VII, 23), can be reconciled with our explanation, because Pra.\nUp. IV, 6 declares bliss to attach to the state of deep sleep ('Then\nthat god sees no dreams and at that time that happiness arises in his\nbody').--Again, the statement, 'The bhuman is immortality' (Ch. Up. VII,\n24, 1), may likewise refer to the vital air; for another scriptural\npassage says, 'Pra/n/a is immortality' (Kau. Up. III, 2).--But how can\nthe view according to which the bhuman is the vital air be reconciled\nwith the fact that in the beginning of the chapter the knowledge of the\nSelf is represented as the general topic ('He who knows the Self\novercomes grief,' &c.)?--By the Self there referred to, the purvapakshin\nreplies, nothing else is meant but the vital air. For the passage, 'The\nvital air is father, the vital air is mother, the vital air is brother,\nthe vital air is sister, the vital air is teacher, the vital air is\nBrahma/n/a' (Ch. Up. VII, 15, 1), represents the vital air as the Self\nof everything. As, moreover, the passage, 'As the spokes of a wheel rest\nin the nave, so all this rests in pra/n/a,' declares the pra/n/a to be\nthe Self of all--by means of a comparison with the spokes and the nave\nof a wheel--the pra/n/a may be conceived under the form of bhuman, i.e.\nplenitude.--Bhuman, therefore, means the vital air.\n\nTo this we make the following reply.--Bhuman can mean the highest Self\nonly, not the vital air.--Why?--'On account of information being given\nabout it, subsequent to bliss.' The word 'bliss' (samprasada) means the\nstate of deep sleep, as may be concluded, firstly, from the etymology of\nthe word ('In it he, i.e. man, is altogether\npleased--samprasidati')--and, secondly, from the fact of samprasada\nbeing mentioned in the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka together with the state of\ndream and the waking state. And as in the state of deep sleep the vital\nair remains awake, the word 'samprasada' is employed in the Sutra to\ndenote the vital air; so that the Sutra means, 'on account of\ninformation being given about the bhuman, subsequently to (the\ninformation given about) the vital air.' If the bhuman were the vital\nair itself, it would be a strange proceeding to make statements about\nthe bhuman in addition to the statements about the vital air. For in the\npreceding passages also we do not meet, for instance, with a statement\nabout name subsequent to the previous statement about name (i.e. the\ntext does not say 'name is more than name'), but after something has\nbeen said about name, a new statement is made about speech, which is\nsomething different from name (i.e. the text says, 'Speech is more than\nname'), and so on up to the statement about vital air, each subsequent\nstatement referring to something other than the topic of the preceding\none. We therefore conclude that the bhuman also, the statement about\nwhich follows on the statement about the vital air, is something other\nthan the vital air. But--it may be objected--we meet here neither with a\nquestion, such as, 'Is there something more than vital air?' nor with an\nanswer, such as, 'That and that is more than vital air.' How, then, can\nit be said that the information about the bhuman is given subsequently\nto the information about the vital air?--Moreover, we see that the\ncircumstance of being an ativadin, which is exclusively connected with\nthe vital air, is referred to in the subsequent passage (viz. 'But in\nreality he is an ativadin who makes a statement surpassing (the\npreceding statements) by means of the True'). There is thus no\ninformation additional to the information about the vital air.--To this\nobjection we reply that it is impossible to maintain that the passage\nlast quoted merely continues the discussion of the quality of being an\nativadin, as connected with the knowledge of the vital air; since the\nclause, 'He who makes a statement surpassing, &c. by means of the True,'\nstates a specification.--But, the objector resumes, this very statement\nof a specification may be explained as referring to the vital air. If\nyou ask how, we refer you to an analogous case. If somebody says, 'This\nAgnihotrin speaks the truth,' the meaning is not that the quality of\nbeing an Agnihotrin depends on speaking the truth; that quality rather\ndepends on the (regular performance of the) agnihotra only, and speaking\nthe truth is mentioned merely as a special attribute of that special\nAgnihotrin. So our passage also ('But in reality he is an ativadin who\nmakes a statement, &c. by means of the True') does not intimate that the\nquality of being an ativadin depends on speaking the truth, but merely\nexpresses that speaking the truth is a special attribute of him who\nknows the vital air; while the quality of being an ativadin must be\nconsidered to depend on the knowledge of the vital air.--This objection\nwe rebut by the remark that it involves an abandonment of the direct\nmeaning of the sacred text. For from the text, as it stands, we\nunderstand that the quality of being an ativadin depends on speaking the\ntruth; the sense being: An ativadin is he who is an ativadin by means of\nthe True. The passage does not in anyway contain a eulogisation of the\nknowledge of the vital air. It could be connected with the latter only\non the ground of general subject-matter (prakara/n/a)[172]; which would\ninvolve an abandonment of the direct meaning of the text in favour of\nprakara/n/a[173].--Moreover, the particle but ('But in reality he is,'\n&c.), whose purport is to separate (what follows) from the\nsubject-matter of what precedes, would not agree (with the pra/n/a\nexplanation). The following passage also, 'But we must desire to know\nthe True' (VII, 16), which presupposes a new effort, shows that a new\ntopic is going to be entered upon.--For these reasons we have to\nconsider the statement about the ativadin in the same light as we should\nconsider the remark--made in a conversation which previously had turned\non the praise of those who study one Veda--that he who studies the four\nVedas is a great Brahma/n/a; a remark which we should understand to be\nlaudatory of persons different from those who study one Veda, i.e. of\nthose who study all the four Vedas. Nor is there any reason to assume\nthat a new topic can be introduced in the form of question and answer\nonly; for that the matter propounded forms a new topic is sufficiently\nclear from the circumstance that no connexion can be established between\nit and the preceding topic. The succession of topics in the chapter\nunder discussion is as follows: Narada at first listens to the\ninstruction which Sanatkumara gives him about various matters, the last\nof which is Pra/n/a, and then becomes silent. Thereupon Sanatkumara\nexplains to him spontaneously (without being asked) that the quality of\nbeing an ativadin, if merely based on the knowledge of the vital\nair--which knowledge has for its object an unreal product,--is devoid of\nsubstance, and that he only is an ativadin who is such by means of the\nTrue. By the term 'the True' there is meant the highest Brahman; for\nBrahman is the Real, and it is called the 'True' in another scriptural\npassage also, viz. Taitt. Up. II, 1, 'The True, knowledge, infinite is\nBrahman.' Narada, thus enlightened, starts a new line of enquiry ('Might\nI, Sir, become an ativadin by the True?') and Sanatkumara then leads\nhim, by a series of instrumental steps, beginning with understanding, up\nto the knowledge of bhuman. We therefrom conclude that the bhuman is\nthat very True whose explanation had been promised in addition to the\n(knowledge of the) vital air. We thus see that the instruction about the\nbhuman is additional to the instruction about the vital air, and bhuman\nmust therefore mean the highest Self, which is different from the vital\nair. With this interpretation the initial statement, according to which\nthe enquiry into the Self forms the general subject-matter, agrees\nperfectly well. The assumption, on the other hand (made by the\npurvapakshin), that by the Self we have here to understand the vital air\nis indefensible. For, in the first place, Self-hood does not belong to\nthe vital air in any non-figurative sense. In the second place,\ncessation of grief cannot take place apart from the knowledge of the\nhighest Self; for, as another scriptural passage declares, 'There is no\nother path to go' (/S/vet. Up. VI, 15). Moreover, after we have read at\nthe outset, 'Do, Sir, lead me over to the other side of grief' (Ch. Up.\nVII, 1, 3), we meet with the following concluding words (VII, 26, 2),\n'To him, after his faults had been rubbed out, the venerable Sanatkumara\nshowed the other side of darkness.' The term 'darkness' here denotes\nNescience, the cause of grief, and so on.--Moreover, if the instruction\nterminated with the vital air, it would not be said of the latter that\nit rests on something else. But the brahma/n/a (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 1) does\nsay, 'The vital air springs from the Self.' Nor can it be objected\nagainst this last argument that the concluding part of the chapter may\nrefer to the highest Self, while, all the same, the bhuman (mentioned in\nan earlier part of the chapter) may be the vital air. For, from the\npassage (VII, 24, 1), ('Sir, in what does the bhuman rest? In its own\ngreatness,' &c.), it appears that the bhuman forms the continuous topic\nup to the end of the chapter.--The quality of being the bhuman--which\nquality is plenitude--agrees, moreover, best with the highest Self,\nwhich is the cause of everything.\n\n9. And on account of the agreement of the attributes (mentioned in the\ntext).\n\nThe attributes, moreover, which the sacred text ascribes to the bhuman\nagree well with the highest Self. The passage, 'Where one sees nothing\nelse, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the bhuman,'\ngives us to understand that in the bhuman the ordinary activities of\nseeing and so on are absent; and that this is characteristic of the\nhighest Self, we know from another scriptural passage, viz. 'But when\nthe Self only is all this, how should he see another?' &c. (B/ri/. Up.\nIV, 5, 15). What is said about the absence of the activities of seeing\nand so on in the state of deep sleep (Pra. Up. IV, 2) is said with the\nintention of declaring the non-attachedness of the Self, not of\ndescribing the nature of the pra/n/a; for the highest Self (not the\nvital air) is the topic of that passage. The bliss also of which\nScripture speaks as connected with that state is mentioned only in order\nto show that bliss constitutes the nature of the Self. For Scripture\nsays (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 32), 'This is his highest bliss. All other\ncreatures live on a small portion of that bliss.'--The passage under\ndiscussion also ('The bhuman is bliss. There is no bliss in that which\nis little (limited). The bhuman only is bliss') by denying the reality\nof bliss on the part of whatever is perishable shows that Brahman only\nis bliss as bhuman, i.e. in its plenitude,--Again, the passage, 'The\nbhuman is immortality,' shows that the highest cause is meant; for the\nimmortality of all effected things is a merely relative one, and another\nscriptural passage says that 'whatever is different from that (Brahman)\nis perishable' (B/ri/. Up. III, 4, 2).--Similarly, the qualities of\nbeing the True, and of resting in its own greatness, and of being\nomnipresent, and of being the Self of everything which the text mentions\n(as belonging to the bhuman) can belong to the highest Self only, not to\nanything else.--By all this it is proved that the bhuman is the highest\nSelf.\n\n10. The Imperishable (is Brahman) on account of (its) supporting (all\nthings) up to ether.\n\nWe read (B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 7; 8). 'In what then is the ether woven,\nlike warp and woof?--He said: O Gargi, the Brahma/n/as call this the\nakshara (the Imperishable). It is neither coarse nor fine,' and so\non.--Here the doubt arises whether the word 'akshara' means 'syllable'\nor 'the highest Lord.'\n\nThe purvapakshin maintains that the word 'akshara' means 'syllable'\nmerely, because it has, in such terms as akshara-samamnaya, the meaning\nof 'syllable;' because we have no right to disregard the settled meaning\nof a word; and because another scriptural passage also ('The syllable Om\nis all this,' Ch. Up. II, 23, 4) declares a syllable, represented as the\nobject of devotion, to be the Self of all.\n\nTo this we reply that the highest Self only is denoted by the word\n'akshara.'--Why?--Because it (the akshara) is said to support the entire\naggregate of effects, from earth up to ether. For the sacred text\ndeclares at first that the entire aggregate of effects beginning with\nearth and differentiated by threefold time is based on ether, in which\nit is 'woven like warp and woof;' leads then (by means of the question,\n'In what then is the ether woven, like warp and woof?') over to the\nakshara, and, finally, concludes with the words, 'In that akshara then,\nO Gargi, the ether is woven, like warp and woof.'--Now the attribute of\nsupporting everything up to ether cannot be ascribed to any being but\nBrahman. The text (quoted from the Ch. Up.) says indeed that the\nsyllable Om is all this, but that statement is to be understood as a\nmere glorification of the syllable Om considered as a means to obtain\nBrahman.--Therefore we take akshara to mean either 'the Imperishable' or\n'that which pervades;' on the ground of either of which explanations it\nmust be identified with the highest Brahman.\n\nBut--our opponent resumes--while we must admit that the above reasoning\nholds good so far that the circumstance of the akshara supporting all\nthings up to ether is to be accepted as a proof of all effects depending\non a cause, we point out that it may be employed by those also who\ndeclare the pradhana to be the general cause. How then does the previous\nargumentation specially establish Brahman (to the exclusion of the\npradhana)?--The reply to this is given in the next Sutra.\n\n11. This (supporting can), on account of the command (attributed to the\nImperishable, be the work of the highest Lord only).\n\nThe supporting of all things up to ether is the work of the highest Lord\nonly.--Why?--On account of the command.--For the sacred text speaks of a\ncommand ('By the command of that akshara, O Gargi, sun and moon stand\napart!' III, 8, 9), and command can be the work of the highest Lord\nonly, not of the non-intelligent pradhana. For non-intelligent causes\nsuch as clay and the like are not capable of command, with reference to\ntheir effects, such as jars and the like.\n\n12. And on account of (Scripture) separating (the akshara) from that\nwhose nature is different (from Brahman).\n\nAlso on account of the reason stated in this Sutra Brahman only is to be\nconsidered as the Imperishable, and the supporting of all things up to\nether is to be looked upon as the work of Brahman only, not of anything\nelse. The meaning of the Sutra is as follows. Whatever things other than\nBrahman might possibly be thought to be denoted by the term 'akshara,'\nfrom the nature of all those things Scripture separates the akshara\nspoken of as the support of all things up to ether. The scriptural\npassage alluded to is III, 8, 11, 'That akshara, O Gargi, is unseen but\nseeing, unheard but hearing, unperceived but perceiving, unknown but\nknowing.' Here the designation of being unseen, &c. agrees indeed with\nthe pradhana also, but not so the designation of seeing, &c., as the\npradhana is non-intelligent.--Nor can the word akshara denote the\nembodied soul with its limiting conditions, for the passage following on\nthe one quoted declares that there is nothing different from the Self\n('there is nothing that sees but it, nothing that hears but it, nothing\nthat perceives but it, nothing that knows but it'); and, moreover,\nlimiting conditions are expressly denied (of the akshara) in the\npassage, 'It is without eyes, without ears, without speech, without\nmind,' &c. (III, 8, 8). An embodied soul without limiting conditions\ndoes not exist[174].--It is therefore certain beyond doubt that the\nImperishable is nothing else but the highest Brahman.\n\n13. On account of his being designated as the object of sight (the\nhighest Self is meant, and) the same (is meant in the passage speaking\nof the meditation on the highest person by means of the syllable Om).\n\n(In Pra. Up. V, 2) the general topic of discussion is set forth in the\nwords, 'O Satyakama, the syllable Om is the highest and also the other\nBrahman; therefore he who knows it arrives by the same means at one of\nthe two.' The text then goes on, 'Again, he who meditates with this\nsyllable Om of three matras on the highest Person,' &c.--Here the doubt\npresents itself, whether the object of meditation referred to in the\nlatter passage is the highest Brahman or the other Brahman; a doubt\nbased on the former passage, according to which both are under\ndiscussion.\n\nThe purvapakshin maintains that the other, i.e. the lower Brahman, is\nreferred to, because the text promises only a reward limited by a\ncertain locality for him who knows it. For, as the highest Brahman is\nomnipresent, it would be inappropriate to assume that he who knows it\nobtains a fruit limited by a certain locality. The objection that, if\nthe lower Brahman were understood, there would be no room for the\nqualification, 'the highest person,' is not valid, because the vital\nprincipal (pra/n/a) may be called 'higher' with reference to the\nbody[175].\n\nTo this we make the following reply: What is here taught as the object\nof meditation is the highest Brahman only.--Why?--On account of its\nbeing spoken of as the object of sight. For the person to be meditated\nupon is, in a complementary passage, spoken of as the object of the act\nof seeing, 'He sees the person dwelling in the castle (of the body;\npurusham puri/s/ayam), higher than that one who is of the shape of the\nindividual soul, and who is himself higher (than the senses and their\nobjects).' Now, of an act of meditation an unreal thing also can be the\nobject, as, for instance, the merely imaginary object of a wish. But of\nthe act of seeing, real things only are the objects, as we know from\nexperience; we therefore conclude, that in the passage last quoted, the\nhighest (only real) Self which corresponds to the mental act of complete\nintuition[176] is spoken of as the object of sight. This same highest\nSelf we recognise in the passage under discussion as the object of\nmeditation, in consequence of the term, 'the highest person.'--But--an\nobjection will be raised--as the object of meditation we have the\nhighest person, and as the object of sight the person higher than that\none who is himself higher, &c.; how, then, are we to know that those two\nare identical?--The two passages, we reply, have in common the terms\n'highest' (or 'higher,' para) and 'person.' And it must not by any means\nbe supposed that the term jivaghana[177] refers to that highest person\nwhich, considered as the object of meditation, had previously been\nintroduced as the general topic. For the consequence of that supposition\nwould be that that highest person which is the object of sight would be\ndifferent from that highest person which is represented as the object of\nmeditation. We rather have to explain the word jivaghana as 'He whose\nshape[178] is characterised by the jivas;' so that what is really meant\nby that term is that limited condition of the highest Self which is\nowing to its adjuncts, and manifests itself in the form of jivas, i.e.\nindividual souls; a condition analogous to the limitation of salt (in\ngeneral) by means of the mass of a particular lump of salt. That limited\ncondition of the Self may itself be called 'higher,' if viewed with\nregard to the senses and their objects.\n\nAnother (commentator) says that we have to understand by the word\n'jivaghana' the world of Brahman spoken of in the preceding sentence\n('by the Saman verses he is led up to the world of Brahman'), and again\nin the following sentence (v. 7), which may be called 'higher,' because\nit is higher than the other worlds. That world of Brahman may be called\njivaghana because all individual souls (jiva) with their organs of\naction may be viewed as comprised (sa@nghata = ghana) within\nHira/n/yagarbha, who is the Self of all organs, and dwells in the\nBrahma-world. We thus understand that he who is higher than that\njivaghana, i.e. the highest Self, which constitutes the object of sight,\nalso constitutes the object of meditation. The qualification, moreover,\nexpressed in the term 'the highest person' is in its place only if we\nunderstand the highest Self to be meant. For the name, 'the highest\nperson,' can be given only to the highest Self, higher than which there\nis nothing. So another scriptural passage also says, 'Higher than the\nperson there is nothing--this is the goal, the highest road.' Hence the\nsacred text, which at first distinguishes between the higher and the\nlower Brahman ('the syllable Om is the higher and the lower Brahman'),\nand afterwards speaks of the highest Person to be meditated upon by\nmeans of the syllable Om, gives us to understand that the highest Person\nis nothing else but the highest Brahman. That the highest Self\nconstitutes the object of meditation, is moreover intimated by the\npassage declaring that release from evil is the fruit (of meditation),\n'As a snake is freed from its skin, so is he freed from evil.'--With\nreference to the objection that a fruit confined to a certain place is\nnot an appropriate reward for him who meditates on the highest Self, we\nfinally remark that the objection is removed, if we understand the\npassage to refer to emancipation by degrees. He who meditates on the\nhighest Self by means of the syllable Om, as consisting of three matras,\nobtains for his (first) reward the world of Brahman, and after that,\ngradually, complete intuition.\n\n14. The small (ether) (is Brahman) on account of the subsequent\n(arguments).\n\nWe read (Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 1), 'There is this city of Brahman, and in it\nthe palace, the small lotus, and in it that small ether. Now what exists\nwithin that small ether that is to be sought for, that is to be\nunderstood,' &c.--Here the doubt arises whether the small ether within\nthe small lotus of the heart of which Scripture speaks, is the elemental\nether, or the individual soul (vij/n/anatman), or the highest Self. This\ndoubt is caused by the words 'ether' and 'city of Brahman.' For the word\n'ether,' in the first place, is known to be used in the sense of\nelemental ether as well as of highest Brahman. Hence the doubt whether\nthe small ether of the text be the elemental ether or the highest ether,\ni.e. Brahman. In explanation of the expression 'city of Brahman,' in the\nsecond place, it might be said either that the individual soul is here\ncalled Brahman and the body Brahman's city, or else that the city of\nBrahman means the city of the highest Brahman. Here (i.e. in consequence\nof this latter doubt) a further doubt arises as to the nature of the\nsmall ether, according as the individual soul or the highest Self is\nunderstood by the Lord of the city.\n\nThe purvapakshin maintains that by the small ether we have to understand\nthe elemental ether, since the latter meaning is the conventional one of\nthe word aka/s/a. The elemental ether is here called small with\nreference to its small abode (the heart).--In the passage, 'As large as\nthis ether is, so large is that ether within the heart,' it is\nrepresented as constituting at the same time the two terms of a\ncomparison, because it is possible to make a distinction between the\nouter and the inner ether[179]; and it is said that 'heaven and earth\nare contained within it,' because the whole ether, in so far as it is\nspace, is one[180].--Or else, the purvapakshin continues, the 'small\none' may be taken to mean the individual soul, on account of the term,\n'the city of Brahman.' The body is here called the city of Brahman\nbecause it is the abode of the individual soul; for it is acquired by\nmeans of the actions of the soul. On this interpretation we must assume\nthat the individual soul is here called Brahman metaphorically. The\nhighest Brahman cannot be meant, because it is not connected with the\nbody as its lord. The lord of the city, i.e. the soul, is represented as\ndwelling in one spot of the city (viz. the heart), just as a real king\nresides in one spot of his residence. Moreover, the mind (manas)\nconstitutes the limiting adjunct of the individual soul, and the mind\nchiefly abides in the heart; hence the individual soul only can be\nspoken of as dwelling in the heart. Further, the individual soul only\ncan be spoken of as small, since it is (elsewhere; /S/vet. Up. V, 8)\ncompared in size to the point of a goad. That it is compared (in the\npassage under discussion) to the ether must be understood to intimate\nits non difference from Brahman.--Nor does the scriptural passage say\nthat the 'small' one is to be sought for and to be understood, since in\nthe clause, 'That which is within that,' &c., it is represented as a\nmere distinguishing attribute of something else[181].\n\nTo all this we make the following reply:--The small ether can mean the\nhighest Lord only, not either the elemental ether or the individual\nsoul.--Why?--On account of the subsequent reasons, i.e. on account of\nthe reasons implied in the complementary passage. For there, the text\ndeclares at first, with reference to the small ether, which is enjoined\nas the object of sight, 'If they should say to him,' &c.; thereupon\nfollows an objection, 'What is there that deserves to be sought for or\nthat is to be understood?' and thereon a final decisive statement, 'Then\nhe should say: As large as this ether is, so large is that ether within\nthe heart. Both heaven and earth are contained within it.' Here the\nteacher, availing himself of the comparison of the ether within the\nheart with the known (universal) ether, precludes the conception that\nthe ether within the heart is small--which conception is based on the\nstatement as to the smallness of the lotus, i.e. the heart--and thereby\nprecludes the possibility of our understanding by the term 'the small\nether,' the elemental ether. For, although the ordinary use of language\ngives to the word 'ether' the sense of elemental ether, here the\nelemental ether cannot be thought of, because it cannot possibly be\ncompared with itself.--But, has it not been stated above, that the\nether, although one only, may be compared with itself, in consequence of\nan assumed difference between the outer and the inner ether?--That\nexplanation, we reply, is impossible; for we cannot admit that a\ncomparison of a thing with itself may be based upon a merely imaginary\ndifference. And even if we admitted the possibility of such a\ncomparison, the extent of the outer ether could never be ascribed to the\nlimited inner ether. Should it be said that to the highest Lord also the\nextent of the (outer) ether cannot be ascribed, since another scriptural\npassage declares that he is greater than ether (/S/a. Bra, X, 6, 3, 2),\nwe invalidate this objection by the remark, that the passage (comparing\nthe inner ether with the outer ether) has the purport of discarding the\nidea of smallness (of the inner ether), which is prima facie established\nby the smallness of the lotus of the heart in which it is contained, and\nhas not the purport of establishing a certain extent (of the inner\nether). If the passage aimed at both, a split of the sentence[182] would\nresult.--Nor, if we allowed the assumptive difference of the inner and\nthe outer ether, would it be possible to represent that limited portion\nof the ether which is enclosed in the lotus of the heart, as containing\nwithin itself heaven, earth, and so on. Nor can we reconcile with the\nnature of the elemental ether the qualities of Self-hood, freeness from\nsin, and so on, (which are ascribed to the 'small' ether) in the\nfollowing passage, 'It is the Self free from sin, free from old age,\nfrom death and grief, from hunger and thirst, of true desires, of true\npurposes.'--Although the term 'Self' (occurring in the passage quoted)\nmay apply to the individual soul, yet other reasons exclude all idea of\nthe individual soul being meant (by the small ether). For it would be\nimpossible to dissociate from the individual soul, which is restricted\nby limiting conditions and elsewhere compared to the point of a goad,\nthe attribute of smallness attaching to it, on account of its being\nenclosed in the lotus of the heart.--Let it then be assumed--our\nopponent remarks--that the qualities of all-pervadingness, &c. are\nascribed to the individual soul with the intention of intimating its\nnon-difference from Brahman.--Well, we reply, if you suppose that the\nsmall ether is called all-pervading because it is one with Brahman, our\nown supposition, viz. that the all-pervadingness spoken of is directly\npredicated of Brahman itself, is the much more simple one.--Concerning\nthe assertion that the term 'city of Brahman' can only be understood, on\nthe assumption that the individual soul dwells, like a king, in one\nparticular spot of the city of which it is the Lord, we remark that the\nterm is more properly interpreted to mean 'the body in so far as it is\nthe city of the highest Brahman;' which interpretation enables us to\ntake the term 'Brahman' in its primary sense[183]. The highest Brahman\nalso is connected with the body, for the latter constitutes an abode for\nthe perception of Brahman[184]. Other scriptural passages also express\nthe same meaning, so, for instance, Pra. Up. V, 5, 'He sees the highest\nperson dwelling in the city' (purusha = puri/s/aya), &c., and B/ri/. Up.\nII, 5, 18, 'This person (purusha) is in all cities (bodies) the dweller\nwithin the city (puri/s/aya).'--Or else (taking brahmapura to mean\njivapura) we may understand the passage to teach that Brahman is, in the\ncity of the individual soul, near (to the devout worshipper), just as\nVish/n/u is near to us in the Salagrama-stone.--Moreover, the text\n(VIII, 1, 6) at first declares the result of works to be perishable ('as\nhere on earth whatever has been acquired by works perishes, so perishes\nwhatever is acquired for the next world by good actions,' &c.), and\nafterwards declares the imperishableness of the results flowing from a\nknowledge of the small ether, which forms the general subject of\ndiscussion ('those who depart from hence after having discovered the\nSelf and those true desires, for them there is freedom in all worlds').\nFrom this again it is manifest that the small ether is the highest\nSelf.--We now turn to the statement made by the purvapakshin,'that the\nsacred text does not represent the small ether as that which is to be\nsought for and to be understood, because it is mentioned as a\ndistinguishing attribute of something else,' and reply as follows: If\nthe (small) ether were not that which is to be sought for and to be\nunderstood, the description of the nature of that ether, which is given\nin the passage ('as large as this ether is, so large is that ether\nwithin the heart'), would be devoid of purport.--But--the opponent might\nsay--that descriptive statement also has the purport of setting forth\nthe nature of the thing abiding within (the ether); for the text after\nhaving raised an objection (in the passage, 'And if they should say to\nhim: Now with regard to that city of Brahman and the palace in it, i.e.\nthe small lotus of the heart, and the small ether within the heart, what\nis there within it that deserves to be sought for or that is to be\nunderstood?') declares, when replying to that objection, that heaven,\nearth, and so on, are contained within it (the ether), a declaration to\nwhich the comparison with the ether forms a mere introduction.--Your\nreasoning, we reply, is faulty. If it were admitted, it would follow\nthat heaven, earth, &c., which are contained within the small ether,\nconstitute the objects of search and enquiry. But in that case the\ncomplementary passage would be out of place. For the text carrying on,\nas the subject of discussion, the ether that is the abode of heaven,\nearth, &c.--by means of the clauses, 'In it all desires are contained,'\n'It is the Self free from sin,' &c., and the passage, 'But those who\ndepart from hence having discovered the Self, and the true desires' (in\nwhich passage the conjunction 'and' has the purpose of joining the\ndesires to the Self)--declares that the Self as well, which is the abode\nof the desires, as the desires which abide in the Self, are the objects\nof knowledge. From this we conclude that in the beginning of the passage\nalso, the small ether abiding within the lotus of the heart, together\nwith whatever is contained within it as earth, true desires, and so on,\nis represented as the object of knowledge. And, for the reasons\nexplained, that ether is the highest Lord.\n\n15. (The small ether is Brahman) on account of the action of going (into\nBrahman) and of the word (brahmaloka); for thus it is seen (i.e. that\nthe individual souls go into Brahman is seen elsewhere in Scripture);\nand (this going of the souls into Brahman constitutes) an inferential\nsign (by means of which we may properly interpret the word\n'brahmaloka').\n\nIt has been declared (in the preceding Sutra) that the small (ether) is\nthe highest Lord, on account of the reasons contained in the subsequent\npassages. These subsequent reasons are now set forth.--For this reason\nalso the small (ether) can be the highest Lord only, because the passage\ncomplementary to the passage concerning the small (ether) contains a\nmention of going and a word, both of which intimate the highest Lord. In\nthe first place, we read (Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 2), 'All these creatures, day\nafter day going into that Brahma-world, do not discover it.' This\npassage which refers back, by means of the word 'Brahma-world,' to the\nsmall ether which forms the general subject-matter, speaks of the going\nto it of the creatures, i.e. the individual souls, wherefrom we conclude\nthat the small (ether) is Brahman. For this going of the individual\nsouls into Brahman, which takes place day after day in the state of deep\nsleep, is seen, i.e. is met with in another scriptural passage, viz. Ch.\nUp. VI, 8, 1, 'He becomes united with the True,' &c. In ordinary life\nalso we say of a man who lies in deep sleep, 'he has become Brahman,'\n'he is gone into the state of Brahman.'--In the second place, the word\n'Brahma-world,' which is here applied to the small (ether) under\ndiscussion, excludes all thought of the individual soul or the elemental\nether, and thus gives us to understand that the small (ether) is\nBrahman.--But could not the word 'Brahma-world' convey as well the idea\nof the world of him whose throne is the lotus[185]?--It might do so\nindeed, if we explained the compound 'Brahma-world' as 'the world of\nBrahman.' But if we explain it on the ground of the coordination of both\nmembers of the compound--so that 'Brahma-world' denotes that world which\nis Brahman--then it conveys the idea of the highest Brahman only.--And\nthat daily going (of the souls) into Brahman (mentioned above) is,\nmoreover, an inferential sign for explaining the compound\n'Brahma-world,' on the ground of the co-ordination of its two\nconstituent members. For it would be impossible to assume that all those\ncreatures daily go into the world of the effected (lower) Brahman; which\nworld is commonly called the Satyaloka, i.e. the world of the True.\n\n16. And on account of the supporting also (attributed to it), (the small\nether must be the Lord) because that greatness is observed in him\n(according to other scriptural passages).\n\nAnd also on account of the 'supporting' the small ether can be the\nhighest Lord only.--How?--The text at first introduces the general\nsubject of discussion in the passage, 'In it is that small ether;'\ndeclares thereupon that the small one is to be compared with the\nuniversal ether, and that everything is contained in it; subsequently\napplies to it the term 'Self,' and states it to possess the qualities of\nbeing free from sin, &c.; and, finally, declares with reference to the\nsame general subject of discussion, 'That Self is a bank, a limitary\nsupport (vidh/ri/ti), that these worlds may not be confounded.' As\n'support' is here predicated of the Self, we have to understand by it a\nsupporting agent. Just as a dam stems the spreading water so that the\nboundaries of the fields are not confounded, so that Self acts like a\nlimitary dam in order that these outer and inner worlds, and all the\ndifferent castes and a/s/ramas may not be confounded. In accordance with\nthis our text declares that greatness, which is shown in the act of\nholding asunder, to belong to the small (ether) which forms the subject\nof discussion; and that such greatness is found in the highest Lord\nonly, is seen from other scriptural passages, such as 'By the command of\nthat Imperishable, O Gargi, sun and moon; are held apart' (B/ri/. Up.\nIII, 8, 9). Similarly, we read in another passage also, about whose\nreferring to the highest Lord there is no doubt, 'He is the Lord of all,\nthe king of all things, the protector of all things. He is a bank and a\nlimitary support, so that these worlds may not be confounded' (B/ri/.\nUp. IV, 4, 22)--Hence, on account of the 'supporting,' also the small\n(ether) is nothing else but the highest Lord.\n\n17. And on account of the settled meaning.\n\nThe small ether within cannot denote anything but the highest Lord for\nthis reason also, that the word 'ether' has (among other meanings) the\nsettled meaning of 'highest Lord.' Compare, for instance, the sense in\nwhich the word 'ether' is used in Ch. Up. VIII, 14, 'He who is called\nether is the revealer of all forms and names;' and Ch. Up. I, 9, 1, 'All\nthese beings take their rise from the ether,' &c. On the other hand, we\ndo not meet with any passage in which the word 'ether' is used in the\nsense of 'individual soul.'--We have already shown that the word cannot,\nin our passage, denote the elemental ether; for, although the word\ncertainly has that settled meaning, it cannot have it here, because the\nelemental ether cannot possibly be compared to itself, &c. &c.\n\n18. If it be said that the other one (i.e. the individual soul) (is\nmeant) on account of a reference to it (made in a complementary\npassage), (we say) no, on account of the impossibility.\n\nIf the small (ether) is to be explained as the highest Lord on account\nof a complementary passage, then, the purvapakshin resumes, we point out\nthat another complementary passage contains a reference to the other\none, i.e. to the individual soul: 'Now that serene being (literally:\nserenity, complete satisfaction), which after having risen out from this\nearthly body and having reached the highest light, appears in its true\nform, that is, the Self; thus he spoke' (Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 4). For there\nthe word 'serenity,' which is known to denote, in another scriptural\npassage, the state of deep sleep, can convey the idea of the individual\nsoul only when it is in that state, not of anything else. The 'rising\nfrom the body' also can be predicated of the individual soul only whose\nabode the body is; just as air, &c., whose abode is the ether, are said\nto arise from the ether. And just as the word 'ether,' although in\nordinary language not denoting the highest Lord, yet is admitted to\ndenote him in such passages as, 'The ether is the revealer of forms and\nnames,' because it there occurs in conjunction with qualities of the\nhighest Lord, so it may likewise denote the individual soul Hence the\nterm 'the small ether' denotes in the passage under discussion the\nindividual soul, 'on account of the reference to the other.'\n\nNot so, we reply, 'on account of the impossibility.' In the first place,\nthe individual soul, which imagines itself to be limited by the internal\norgan and its other adjuncts, cannot be compared with the ether. And, in\nthe second place, attributes such as freedom from evil, and the like,\ncannot be ascribed to a being which erroneously transfers to itself the\nattributes of its limiting adjuncts. This has already been set forth in\nthe first Sutra of the present adhikara/n/a, and is again mentioned here\nin order to remove all doubt as to the soul being different from the\nhighest Self. That the reference pointed out by the purvapakshin is not\nto the individual soul will, moreover, be shown in one of the next\nSutras (I, 3, 21).\n\n19. If it be said that from the subsequent (chapter it appears that the\nindividual soul is meant), (we point out that what is there referred to\nis) rather (the individual soul in so far) as its true nature has become\nmanifest (i.e. as it is non-different from Brahman).\n\nThe doubt whether, 'on account of the reference to the other,' the\nindividual soul might not possibly be meant, has been discarded on the\nground of 'impossibility.' But, like a dead man on whom am/ri/ta has\nbeen sprinkled, that doubt rises again, drawing new strength from the\nsubsequent chapter which treats of Prajapati. For there he (Prajapati)\nat the outset declares that the Self, which is free from sin and the\nlike, is that which is to be searched out, that which we must try to\nunderstand (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1); after that he points out that the seer\nwithin the eye, i.e. the individual soul, is the Self ('that person that\nis seen in the eye is the Self,' VIII, 7, 3); refers again and again to\nthe same entity (in the clauses 'I shall explain him further to you,'\nVIII, 9, 3; VIII, 10, 4); and (in the explanations fulfilling the given\npromises) again explains the (nature of the) same individual soul in its\ndifferent states ('He who moves about happy in dreams is the Self,'\nVIII, 10, 1; 'When a man being asleep, reposing, and at perfect rest\nsees no dreams, that is the Self,' VIII, 11, 1). The clause attached to\nboth these explanations (viz. 'That is the immortal, the fearless; that\nis Brahman') shows, at the same time, the individual soul to be free\nfrom sin, and the like. After that Prajapati, having discovered a\nshortcoming in the condition of deep sleep (in consequence of the\nexpostulation of Indra, 'In that way he does not know himself that he is\nI, nor does he know these beings,' VIII, 11, 2), enters on a further\nexplanation ('I shall explain him further to you, and nothing more than\nthis'), begins by blaming the (soul's) connexion with the body, and\nfinally declares the individual soul, when it has risen from the body,\nto be the highest person. ('Thus does that serene being, arising from\nthis body, appear in its own form as soon as it has approached the\nhighest light. That is the highest person.')--From this it appears that\nthere is a possibility of the qualities of the highest Lord belonging to\nthe individual soul also, and on that account we maintain that the term,\n'the small ether within it,' refers to the individual soul.\n\nThis position we counter-argue as follows. 'But in so far as its nature\nhas become manifest.' The particle 'but' (in the Sutra) is meant to set\naside the view of the purvapakshin, so that the sense of the Sutra is,\n'Not even on account of the subsequent chapter a doubt as to the small\nether being the individual soul is possible, because there also that\nwhich is meant to be intimated is the individual soul, in so far only as\nits (true) nature has become manifest.' The Sutra uses the expression\n'he whose nature has become manifest,' which qualifies jiva., the\nindividual soul, with reference to its previous condition[186].--The\nmeaning is as follows. Prajapati speaks at first of the seer\ncharacterised by the eye ('That person which is within the eye,' &c.);\nshows thereupon, in the passage treating of (the reflection in) the\nwaterpan, that he (viz. the seer) has not his true Self in the body;\nrefers to him repeatedly as the subject to be explained (in the clauses\n'I shall explain him further to you'); and having then spoken of him as\nsubject to the states of dreaming and deep sleep, finally explains the\nindividual soul in its real nature, i.e. in so far as it is the highest\nBrahman, not in so far as it is individual soul ('As soon as it has\napproached the highest light it appears in its own form'). The highest\nlight mentioned, in the passage last quoted, as what is to be\napproached, is nothing else but the highest Brahman, which is\ndistinguished by such attributes as freeness from sin, and the like.\nThat same highest Brahman constitutes--as we know from passages such as\n'that art thou'--the real nature of the individual soul, while its\nsecond nature, i.e. that aspect of it which depends on fictitious\nlimiting conditions, is not its real nature. For as long as the\nindividual soul does not free itself from Nescience in the form of\nduality--which Nescience may be compared to the mistake of him who in\nthe twilight mistakes a post for a man--and does not rise to the\nknowledge of the Self, whose nature is unchangeable, eternal\nCognition--which expresses itself in the form 'I am Brahman'--so long it\nremains the individual soul. But when, discarding the aggregate of body,\nsense-organs and mind, it arrives, by means of Scripture, at the\nknowledge that it is not itself that aggregate, that it does not form\npart of transmigratory existence, but is the True, the Real, the Self,\nwhose nature is pure intelligence; then knowing itseif to be of the\nnature of unchangeable, eternal Cognition, it lifts itself above the\nvain conceit of being one with this body, and itself becomes the Self,\nwhose nature is unchanging, eternal Cognition. As is declared in such\nscriptural passages as 'He who knows the highest Brahman becomes even\nBrahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9). And this is the real nature of the\nindividual soul by means of which it arises from the body and appears in\nits own form.\n\nHere an objection may be raised. How, it is asked, can we speak of the\ntrue nature (svarupa) of that which is unchanging and eternal, and then\nsay that 'it appears in its own form (true nature)?' Of gold and similar\nsubstances, whose true nature becomes hidden, and whose specific\nqualities are rendered non-apparent by their contact with some other\nsubstance, it may be said that their true nature is rendered manifest\nwhen they are cleaned by the application of some acid substance; so it\nmay be said, likewise, that the stars, whose light is during daytime\noverpowered (by the superior brilliancy of the sun), become manifest in\ntheir true nature at night when the overpowering (sun) has departed. But\nit is impossible to speak of an analogous overpowering of the eternal\nlight of intelligence by whatever agency, since, like ether, it is free\nfrom all contact, and since, moreover, such an assumption would be\ncontradicted by what we actually observe. For the (energies of) seeing,\nhearing, noticing, cognising constitute the character of the individual\nsoul, and that character is observed to exist in full perfection, even\nin the case of that individual soul which has not yet risen beyond the\nbody. Every individual soul carries on the course of its practical\nexistence by means of the activities of seeing, hearing, cognising;\notherwise no practical existence at all would be possible. If, on the\nother hand, that character would realise itself in the case of that soul\nonly which has risen above the body, the entire aggregate of practical\nexistence, as it actually presents itself prior to the soul's rising,\nwould thereby be contradicted. We therefore ask: Wherein consists that\n(alleged) rising from the body? Wherein consists that appearing (of the\nsoul) in its own form?\n\nTo this we make the following reply.--Before the rise of discriminative\nknowledge the nature of the individual soul, which is (in reality) pure\nlight, is non-discriminated as it were from its limiting adjuncts\nconsisting of body, senses, mind, sense-objects and feelings, and\nappears as consisting of the energies of seeing and so on. Similarly--to\nquote an analogous case from ordinary experience--the true nature of a\npure crystal, i.e. its transparency and whiteness, is, before the rise\nof discriminative knowledge (on the part of the observer),\nnon-discriminated as it were from any limiting adjuncts of red or blue\ncolour; while, as soon as through some means of true cognition\ndiscriminative knowledge has arisen, it is said to have now accomplished\nits true nature, i.e. transparency and whiteness, although in reality it\nhad already done so before. Thus the discriminative knowledge, effected\nby /S/ruti, on the part of the individual soul which previously is\nnon-discriminated as it were from its limiting adjuncts, is (according\nto the scriptural passage under discussion) the soul's rising from the\nbody, and the fruit of that discriminative knowledge is its\naccomplishment in its true nature, i.e. the comprehension that its\nnature is the pure Self. Thus the embodiedness and the non-embodiedness\nof the Self are due merely to discrimination and non-discrimination, in\nagreement with the mantra, 'Bodiless within the bodies,' &c. (Ka. Up. I,\n2, 22), and the statement of Sm/ri/ti as to the non-difference between\nembodiedness and non-embodiedness 'Though dwelling in the body, O\nKaunteya, it does not act and is not tainted' (Bha. Gi. XIII, 31). The\nindividual soul is therefore called 'That whose true nature is\nnon-manifest' merely on account of the absence of discriminative\nknowledge, and it is called 'That whose nature has become manifest' on\naccount of the presence of such knowledge. Manifestation and\nnon-manifestation of its nature of a different kind are not possible,\nsince its nature is nothing but its nature (i.e. in reality is always\nthe same). Thus the difference between the individual soul and the\nhighest Lord is owing to wrong knowledge only, not to any reality,\nsince, like ether, the highest Self is not in real contact with\nanything.\n\nAnd wherefrom is all this to be known?--From the instruction given by\nPrajapati who, after having referred to the jiva ('the person that is\nseen in the eye,' &c.), continues 'This is the immortal, the fearless,\nthis is Brahman.' If the well-known seer within the eye were different\nfrom Brahman which is characterised as the immortal and fearless, it\nwould not be co-ordinated (as it actually is) with the immortal, the\nfearless, and Brahman. The reflected Self, on the other hand, is not\nspoken of as he who is characterised by the eye (the seer within the\neye), for that would render Prajapati obnoxious to the reproach of\nsaying deceitful things.--So also, in the second section, the passage,\n'He who moves about happy in dreams,' &c. does not refer to a being\ndifferent from the seeing person within the eye spoken of in the first\nchapter, (but treats of the same topic) as appears from the introductory\nclause, 'I shall explain him further to you.' Moreover[187], a person\nwho is conscious of having seen an elephant in a dream and of no longer\nseeing it when awake discards in the waking state the object which he\nhad seen (in his sleep), but recognises himself when awake to be the\nsame person who saw something in the dream.--Thus in the third section\nalso Prajapati does indeed declare the absence of all particular\ncognition in the state of deep sleep, but does not contest the identity\nof the cognising Self ('In that way he does not know himself that he is\nI, nor all these beings'). The following clause also, 'He is gone to\nutter annihilation,' is meant to intimate only the annihilation of all\nspecific cognition, not the annihilation of the cogniser. For there is\nno destruction of the knowing of the knower as--according to another\nscriptural passage (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 30)--that is imperishable.--Thus,\nagain, in the fourth section the introductory phrase of Prajapati is, 'I\nshall explain him further to you and nothing different from this;' he\nthereupon refutes the connexion (of the Self) with the body and other\nlimiting conditions ('Maghavat, this body is mortal,' &c.), shows the\nindividual soul--which is there called 'the serene being'--in the state\nwhen it has reached the nature of Brahman ('It appears in its own\nform'), and thus proves the soul to be non-different from the highest\nBrahman whose characteristics are immortality and fearlessness.\n\nSome (teachers) however are of opinion that if the highest Self is meant\n(in the fourth section) it would be inappropriate to understand the\nwords 'This (him) I will explain further,' &c., as referring to the\nindividual soul, and therefore suppose that the reference is (not to the\nindividual soul forming the topic of the three preceding sections, but)\nto the Self possessing the qualities of freeness from sin, &c., which\nSelf is pointed out at the beginning of the entire chapter (VII,\n1).--Against this interpretation we remark that, in the first place, it\ndisregards the direct enunciation of the pronoun (i.e. the 'this' in\n'this I will explain') which rests on something approximate (i.e. refers\nto something mentioned not far off), and, in the second place, is\nopposed to the word 'further' (or 'again') met with in the text, since\nfrom that interpretation it would follow that what had been discussed in\nthe preceding sections is not again discussed in the subsequent section.\nMoreover, if Prajapati, after having made a promise in the clause, 'This\nI shall explain' (where that clause occurs for the first time), did\npreviously to the fourth section explain a different topic in each\nsection, we should have to conclude that he acted deceitfully.--Hence\n(our opinion about the purport of the whole chapter remains valid, viz.\nthat it sets forth how) the unreal aspect of the individual soul as\nsuch--which is a mere presentation of Nescience, is stained by all the\ndesires and aversions attached to agents and enjoyers, and is connected\nwith evils of various kinds--is dissolved by true knowledge, and how the\nsoul is thus led over into the opposite state, i.e. into its true state\nin which it is one with the highest Lord and distinguished by freedom\nfrom sin and similar attributes. The whole process is similar to that by\nwhich an imagined snake passes over into a rope as soon as the mind of\nthe beholder has freed itself from its erroneous imagination.\n\nOthers again, and among them some of ours (asmadiya/s/ /k/a. ke/k/it),\nare of opinion that the individual soul as such is real. To the end of\nrefuting all these speculators who obstruct the way to the complete\nintuition of the unity of the Self this /s/ariraka-/s/astra has been set\nforth, whose aim it is to show that there is only one highest Lord ever\nunchanging, whose substance is cognition[188], and who, by means of\nNescience, manifests himself in various ways, just as a thaumaturg\nappears in different shapes by means of his magical power. Besides that\nLord there is no other substance of cognition.--If, now, the Sutrakara\nraises and refutes the doubt whether a certain passage which (in\nreality) refers to the Lord does refer to the individual soul, as he\ndoes in this and the preceding Sutras[189], he does so for the following\npurpose. To the highest Self which is eternally pure, intelligent and\nfree, which is never changing, one only, not in contact with anything,\ndevoid of form, the opposite characteristics of the individual soul are\nerroneously ascribed; just as ignorant men ascribe blue colour to the\ncolourless ether. In order to remove this erroneous opinion by means of\nVedic passages tending either to prove the unity of the Self or to\ndisprove the doctrine of duality--which passages he strengthens by\narguments--he insists on the difference of the highest Self from the\nindividual soul, does however not mean to prove thereby that the soul is\ndifferent from the highest Self, but, whenever speaking of the soul,\nrefers to its distinction (from the Self) as forming an item of ordinary\nthought, due to the power of Nescience. For thus, he thinks, the Vedic\ninjunctions of works which are given with a view to the states of acting\nand enjoying, natural (to the non-enlightened soul), are not\nstultified.--That, however, the absolute unity of the Self is the real\npurport of the /s/astra's teaching, the Sutrakara declares, for\ninstance, in I, 1, 30[190]. The refutation of the reproach of futility\nraised against the injunctions of works has already been set forth by\nus, on the ground of the distinction between such persons as possess\nfull knowledge, and such as do not.\n\n20. And the reference (to the individual soul) has a different meaning.\n\nThe alleged reference to the individual soul which has been pointed out\n(by the purvapakshin) in the passage complementary to the passage about\nthe small ether ('Now that serene being,' &c., VIII, 3, 4) teaches, if\nthe small ether is interpreted to mean the highest Lord, neither the\nworship of the individual soul nor any qualification of the subject\nunder discussion (viz. the small ether), and is therefore devoid of\nmeaning.--On that account the Sutra declares that the reference has\nanother meaning, i.e. that the reference to the individual soul is not\nmeant to determine the nature of the individual soul, but rather the\nnature of the highest Lord. In the following manner. The individual soul\nwhich, in the passage referred to, is called the serene being, acts in\nthe waking state as the ruler of the aggregate comprising the body and\nthe sense-organs; permeates in sleep the na/d/is of the body, and enjoys\nthe dream visions resulting from the impressions of the waking state;\nand, finally, desirous of reaching an inner refuge, rises in the state\nof deep sleep beyond its imagined connexion with the gross and the\nsubtle body, reaches the highest light, i.e. the highest Brahman\npreviously called ether, and thus divesting itself of the state of\nspecific cognition appears in its own (true) nature. The highest light\nwhich the soul is to reach and through which it is manifested in its\ntrue nature is the Self, free from sin and so on, which is there\nrepresented as the object of worship.--In this sense the reference to\nthe individual soul can be admitted by those also who maintain that in\nreality the highest Lord is meant.\n\n21. If it be said that on account of the scriptural declaration of the\nsmallness (of the ether) (the Lord cannot be meant; we reply that) that\nhas been explained (before).\n\nThe purvapakshin has remarked that the smallness of the ether stated by\nScripture ('In it is that small ether') does not agree with the highest\nLord, that it may however be predicated of the individual soul which (in\nanother passage) is compared to the point of a goad. As that remark\ncalls for a refutation we point out that it has been refuted already, it\nhaving been shown--under I, 2, 7--that a relative smallness may be\nattributed to the Lord. The same refutation is--as the Sutra points\nout--to be applied here also.--That smallness is, moreover, contradicted\nby that scriptural passage which compares (the ether within the heart)\nwith the known (universal) ether. ('As large as is this ether so large\nis the ether within the heart.')\n\n22. On account of the acting after (i.e. the shining after), (that after\nwhich sun, moon, &c. are said to shine is the highest Self), and\n(because by the light) of him (all this is said to be lighted).\n\nWe read (Mu. Up. II, 2, 10, and Ka. Up. V, 15), 'The sun does not shine\nthere, nor the moon and the stars, nor these lightnings, much less this\nfire. After him when he shines everything shines; by the light of him\nall this is lighted.' The question here arises whether he 'after whom\nwhen he shines everything shines, and by whose light all this is\nlighted,' is some luminous substance, or the highest Self (praj/n/a\natman).\n\nA luminous substance, the purvapakshin maintains.--Why?--Because the\npassage denies the shining only of such luminous bodies as the sun and\nthe like. It is known (from every-day experience) that luminous bodies\nsuch as the moon and the stars do not shine at daytime when the sun,\nwhich is itself a luminous body, is shining. Hence we infer that that\nthing on account of which all this, including the moon, the stars, and\nthe sun himself, does not shine is likewise a thing of light. The\n'shining after' also is possible only if there is a luminous body\nalready, for we know from experience that 'acting after' (imitation) of\nany kind takes place only when there are more than one agent of similar\nnature; one man, for instance, walks after another man who walks\nhimself. Therefore we consider it settled that the passage refers to\nsome luminous body.\n\nTo this we reply that the highest Self only can be meant.--Why?--On\naccount of the acting after. The shining after mentioned in the passage,\n'After him when he shines everything shines,' is possible only if the\npraj/n/a Self, i.e. the highest Self, is understood. Of that praj/n/a\nSelf another scriptural passage says, 'His form is light, his thoughts\nare true' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 2). On the other hand, it is not by any\nmeans known that the sun, &c. shines after some other luminous body.\nMoreover, on account of the equality of nature of all luminous bodies\nsuch as the sun and the like, there is no need for them of any other\nluminous body after which they should shine; for we see that a lamp, for\ninstance, does not 'shine after' another lamp. Nor is there any such\nabsolute rule (as the purvapakshin asserted) that acting after is\nobserved only among things of similar nature. It is rather observed\namong things of dissimilar nature also; for a red-hot iron ball acts\nafter, i.e. burns after the burning fire, and the dust of the ground\nblows (is blown) after the blowing wind.--The clause 'on account of the\nacting after' (which forms part of the Sutra) points to the shining\nafter (mentioned in the scriptural /s/loka under discussion); the clause\n'and of him' points to the fourth pada of the same /s/loka. The meaning\nof this latter clause is that the cause assigned for the light of the\nsun, &c. (in the passage 'by the light of him everything is lighted')\nintimates the praj/n/a Self. For of that Self Scripture says, 'Him the\ngods worship as the light of lights, as immortal time' (B/ri/. Up. IV,\n4, 16). That, on the other hand, the light of the sun, the moon, &c,\nshould shine by some other (physical) light is, in the first place, not\nknown; and, in the second place, absurd as one (physical) light is\ncounteracted by another.--Or else the cause assigned for the shining\ndoes not apply only to the sun and the other bodies mentioned in the\n/s/loka; but the meaning (of the last pada) rather is--as we may\nconclude from the comprehensive statement 'all this'--that the\nmanifestation of this entire world consisting of names and forms, acts,\nagents and fruits (of action) has for its cause the existence of the\nlight of Brahman; just as the existence of the light of the sun is the\ncause of the manifestation of all form and colour.--Moreover, the text\nshows by means of the word 'there' ('the sun does not shine there,' &c.)\nthat the passage is to be connected with the general topic, and that\ntopic is Brahman as appears from Mu. Up. II, 2, 5, 'In whom the heaven,\nthe earth, and the sky are woven,' &c. The same appears from a passage\nsubsequent (on the one just quoted and immediately preceding the passage\nunder discussion). 'In the highest golden sheath there is the Brahman\nwithout passion and without parts; that is pure, that is the light of\nlights, that is it which they know who know the Self.' This passage\ngiving rise to the question, 'How is it the light of lights?' there is\noccasion for the reply given in 'The sun does not shine there,' &c.--In\nrefutation of the assertion that the shining of luminous bodies such as\nthe sun and the moon can be denied only in case of there being another\nluminous body--as, for instance, the light of the moon and the stars is\ndenied only when the sun is shining--we point out that it has been shown\nthat he (the Self) only can be the luminous being referred to, nothing\nelse. And it is quite possible to deny the shining of sun, moon, and so\non with regard to Brahman; for whatever is perceived is perceived by the\nlight of Brahman only so that sun, moon, &c. can be said to shine in it;\nwhile Brahman as self-luminous is not perceived by means of any other\nlight. Brahman manifests everything else, but is not manifested by\nanything else; according to such scriptural passages as, 'By the Self\nalone as his light man sits,' &c. (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 6), and 'He is\nincomprehensible, for he cannot be comprehended '(B/ri/. Up. IV, 2, 4).\n\n23. Moreover Sm/ri/ti also speaks of him (i.e. of the praj/n/a Self as\nbeing the universal light).\n\nMoreover that aspect of the praj/n/a Self is spoken of in Sm/ri/ti also,\nviz. in the Bhagavad Gita (XV, 6, 12), 'Neither the sun, nor the moon,\nnor the fire illumines that; having gone into which men do not return,\nthat is my highest seat.' And 'The light which abiding in the sun\nillumines the whole world, and that which is in the moon and that which\nis in the fire, all that light know to be mine.'\n\n24. On account of the term, (viz. the term 'lord' applied to it) the\n(person) measured (by a thumb) (is the highest Lord).\n\nWe read (Ka. Up. II, 4, 12), 'The person of the size of a thumb stands\nin the middle of the Self,' &c., and (II, 4, 13), 'That person, of the\nsize of a thumb, is like a light without smoke, lord of the past and of\nthe future, he is the same to-day and to-morrow. This is that.'--The\nquestion here arises whether the person of the size of a thumb mentioned\nin the text is the cognitional (individual) Self or the highest Self.\n\nThe purvapakshin maintains that on account of the declaration of the\nperson's size the cognitional Self is meant. For to the highest Self\nwhich is of infinite length and breadth Scripture would not ascribe the\nmeasure of a span; of the cognitional Self, on the other hand, which is\nconnected with limiting adjuncts, extension of the size of a span may,\nby means of some fictitious assumption, be predicated. Sm/ri/ti also\nconfirms this, 'Then Yama drew forth, by force, from the body of\nSatyavat the person of the size of a thumb tied to Yama's noose and\nhelpless' (Mahabh. III, 16763). For as Yama could not pull out by force\nthe highest Self, the passage is clearly seen to refer to the\ntransmigrating (individual soul) of the size of a thumb, and we thence\ninfer that the same Self is meant in the Vedic passage under discussion.\n\nTo this we reply that the person a thumb long can only be the highest\nLord.--Why?--On account of the term 'lord of the past and of the\nfuture.' For none but the highest Lord is the absolute ruler of the past\nand the future.--Moreover, the clause 'this is that' connects the\npassage with that which had been enquired about, and therefore forms the\ntopic of discussion. And what had been enquired about is Brahman, 'That\nwhich thou seest as neither this nor that, as neither effect nor cause,\nas neither past nor future, tell me that' (I, 2, 14).--'On account of\nthe term,' i.e. on account of the direct statement, in the text, of a\ndesignation, viz. the term 'Lord,' we understand that the highest Lord\nis meant[191].--But still the question remains how a certain extension\ncan be attributed to the omnipresent highest Self.--The reply to this is\ngiven, in the next Sutra.\n\n25. But with reference to the heart (the highest Self is said to be of\nthe size of a span), as men are entitled (to the study of the Veda).\n\nThe measure of a span is ascribed to the highest Lord, although\nomnipresent with reference to his abiding within the heart; just as to\nether (space) the measure of a cubit is ascribed with reference to the\njoint of a bamboo. For, on the one hand, the measure of a span cannot be\nascribed directly to the highest Self which exceeds all measure, and, on\nthe other hand, it has been shown that none but the highest Lord can be\nmeant here, on account of the term 'Lord,' and so on.--But--an objection\nmay be raised--as the size of the heart varies in the different classes\nof living beings it cannot be maintained that the declaration of the\nhighest Self being of the size of a thumb can be explained with\nreference to the heart.--To this objection the second half of the Sutra\nreplies: On account of men (only) being entitled. For the /s/astra,\nalthough propounded without distinction (i.e. although not itself\nspecifying what class of beings is to proceed according to its\nprecepts), does in reality entitle men[192] only (to act according to\nits precepts); for men only (of the three higher castes) are, firstly,\ncapable (of complying with the precepts of the /s/astra); are, secondly,\ndesirous (of the results of actions enjoined by the /s/astra); are,\nthirdly, not excluded by prohibitions; and are, fourthly, subject to the\nprecepts about the upanayana ceremony and so on[193]. This point has\nbeen explained in the section treating of the definition of adhikara\n(Purva Mim. S. VI, 1).--Now the human body has ordinarily a fixed size,\nand hence the heart also has a fixed size, viz. the size of a thumb.\nHence, as men (only) are entitled to study and practise the /s/astra,\nthe highest Self may, with reference to its dwelling in the human heart,\nbe spoken of as being of the size of a thumb.--In reply to the\npurvapakshin's reasoning that on account of the statement of size and on\naccount of Sm/ri/ti we can understand by him who is of the size of a\nthumb the transmigrating soul only, we remark that--analogously to such\npassages as 'That is the Self,' 'That art thou'--our passage teaches\nthat the transmigrating soul which is of the size of a thumb is (in\nreality) Brahman. For the Vedanta-passages have a twofold purport; some\nof them aim at setting forth the nature of the highest Self, some at\nteaching the unity of the individual soul with the highest Self. Our\npassage teaches the unity of the individual soul with the highest Self,\nnot the size of anything. This point is made clear further on in the\nUpanishad, 'The person of the size of a thumb, the inner Self, is always\nsettled in the heart of men. Let a man draw that Self forth from his\nbody with steadiness, as one draws the pith from a reed. Let him know\nthat Self as the Bright, as the Immortal' (II, 6, 17).\n\n26. Also (beings) above them, (viz. men) (are qualified for the study\nand practice of the Veda), on account of the possibility (of it),\naccording to Badaraya/n/a.\n\nIt has been said above that the passage about him who is of the size of\na thumb has reference to the human heart, because men are entitled to\nstudy and act according to the /s/astra. This gives us an occasion for\nthe following discussion.--It is true that the /s/astra entitles men,\nbut, at the same time, there is no exclusive rule entitling men only to\nthe knowledge of Brahman; the teacher, Badaraya/n/a, rather thinks that\nthe /s/astra entitles those (classes of beings) also which are above\nmen, viz. gods, and so on.--On what account?--On the account of\npossibility.--For in their cases also the different causes on which the\nqualification depends, such as having certain desires, and so on, may\nexist. In the first place, the gods also may have the desire of final\nrelease, caused by the reflection that all effects, objects, and powers\nare non-permanent. In the second place, they may be capable of it as\ntheir corporeality appears from mantras, arthavadas, itihasas,\npura/n/as, and ordinary experience. In the third place, there is no\nprohibition (excluding them like /S/udras). Nor does, in the fourth\nplace, the scriptural rule about the upanayana-ceremony annul their\ntitle; for that ceremony merely subserves the study of the Veda, and to\nthe gods the Veda is manifest of itself (without study). That the gods,\nmoreover, for the purpose of acquiring knowledge, undergo discipleship,\nand the like, appears from such scriptural passages as 'One hundred and\none years Indra lived as a disciple with Prajapati' (Ch. Up. VIII, 11,\n3), and 'Bh/ri/gu Varu/n/i went to his father Varu/n/a, saying, \"Sir,\nteach me Brahman\"' (Taitt. Up. III, 1).--And the reasons which have been\ngiven above against gods and /ri/shis being entitled to perform\nreligious works (such as sacrifices), viz. the circumstance of there\nbeing no other gods (to whom the gods could offer sacrifices), and of\nthere being no other /ri/shis (who could be invoked during the\nsacrifice), do not apply to the case of branches of knowledge. For Indra\nand the other gods, when applying themselves to knowledge, have no acts\nto perform with a view to Indra, and so on; nor have Bh/ri/gu and other\n/ri/shis, in the same case, to do anything with the circumstance of\ntheir belonging to the same gotra as Bh/ri/gu, &c. What, then, should\nstand in the way of the gods' and /ri/shis' right to acquire\nknowledge?--Moreover, the passage about that which is of the size of a\nthumb remains equally valid, if the right of the gods, &c. is admitted;\nit has then only to be explained in each particular case by a reference\nto the particular size of the thumb (of the class of beings spoken of).\n\n27. If it be said that (the corporeal individuality of the gods\ninvolves) a contradiction to (sacrificial) works; we deny that, on\naccount of the observation of the assumption (on the part of the gods)\nof several (forms).\n\nIf the right of the gods, and other beings superior to men, to the\nacquisition of knowledge is founded on the assumption of their\ncorporeality, &c., we shall have to admit, in consequence of that\ncorporeality, that Indra and the other gods stand in the relation of\nsubordinate members (a@nga) to sacrificial acts, by means of their being\npresent in person just as the priests are. But this admission will lead\nto 'a contradiction in the sacrificial acts,' because the circumstance\nof the gods forming the members of sacrificial acts by means of their\npersonal presence, is neither actually observed nor possible. For it is\nnot possible that one and the same Indra should, at the same time, be\npresent in person at many sacrifices.\n\nTo this we reply, that there is no such contradiction.--Why?--On account\nof the assumption of several (forms). For it is possible for one and the\nsame divine Self to assume several forms at the same time.--How is that\nknown?--From observation.--For a scriptural passage at first replies to\nthe question how many gods there are, by the declaration that there are\n'Three and three hundred, three and three thousand,' and subsequently,\non the question who they are, declares 'They (the 303 and 3003) are only\nthe various powers of them, in reality there are only thirty-three gods'\n(B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 1, 2); showing thereby that one and the same divine\nSelf may at the same time appear in many forms. After that it proceeds\nto show that these thirty-three gods themselves are in reality contained\nin six, five, &c., and, finally, by replying to the question, 'Who is\nthe one god?' that Breath is the one god, shows that the gods are all\nforms of Breath, and that Breath, therefore, can at the same time appear\nin many forms.--Sm/ri/ti also has a similar statement, 'A Yogin, O hero\nof the Bharatas, may, by his power, multiply his Self in many thousand\nshapes, and in them walk about on the earth. In some he may enjoy the\nobjects, in others he may undergo dire penance, and, finally, he may\nagain retract them all, just as the sun retracts the multitude of his\nrays.' If such Sm/ri/ti passages as the above declare that even Yogins,\nwho have merely acquired various extraordinary powers, such as subtlety\nof body, and the like, may animate several bodies at the same time, how\nmuch more capable of such feats must the gods be, who naturally possess\nall supernatural powers. The gods thus being able to assume several\nshapes, a god may divide himself into many forms and enter into relation\nwith many sacrifices at the same time, remaining all the while unseen by\nothers, in consequence of his power to render himself invisible.\n\nThe latter part of the Sutra may be explained in a different manner\nalso, viz. as meaning that even beings enjoying corporeal individuality\nare seen to enter into mere subordinate relation to more than one\naction. Sometimes, indeed, one individual does not at the same time\nenter into subordinate relation to different actions; one Brahma/n/a,\nfor instance, is not at the same time entertained by many entertainers.\nBut in other cases one individual stands in subordinate relation to many\nactions at the same time; one Brahma/n/a, for instance, may constitute\nthe object of the reverence done to him by many persons at the same\ntime. Similarly, it is possible that, as the sacrifice consists in the\nparting (on the part of the sacrificer with some offering) with a view\n(to some divinity), many persons may at the same time part with their\nrespective offerings, all of them having in view one and the same\nindividual divinity. The individuality of the gods does not, therefore,\ninvolve any contradiction in sacrificial works.\n\n28. If it be said (that a contradiction will result) in respect of the\nword; we refute this objection on the ground that (the world) originates\nfrom the word, as is shown by perception and inference.\n\nLet it then be granted that, from the admission of the corporeal\nindividuality of the gods, no contradiction will result in the case of\nsacrificial works. Still a contradiction will result in respect of the\n'word' (/s/abda).--How?--The authoritativeness of the Veda has been\nproved 'from its independence,' basing on the original (eternal)\nconnection of the word with its sense ('the thing signified')[194]. But\nnow, although a divinity possessing corporeal individuality, such as\nadmitted above, may, by means of its supernatural powers, be able to\nenjoy at the same time the oblations which form part of several\nsacrifices yet it will, on account of its very individuality, be subject\nto birth and death just as we men are, and hence, the eternal connexion\nof the eternal word with a non-eternal thing being destroyed, a\ncontradiction will arise with regard to the authoritativeness proved to\nbelong to the word of the Veda.\n\nTo this we reply that no such contradiction exists.--Why?--'On account\nof their origin from it.' For from that very same word of the Veda the\nworld, with the gods and other beings, originates.--But--an objection\nwill be raised--in Sutra I, 1, 2 ('That whence there is the origin, &c.\nof this world') it has been proved that the world originates from\nBrahman; how then can it be said here that it originates from the word?\nAnd, moreover, even if the origin of the world from the word of the Veda\nbe admitted, how is the contradiction in regard to the word removed\nthereby, inasmuch as the Vasus, the Rudras, the Adityas, the\nVi/s/vedevas, and the Maruts[195] are non-eternal beings, because\nproduced; and if they are non-eternal, what is there to preclude the\nnon-eternality of the Vedic words Vasu, &c. designating them? For it is\nknown from every-day life that only when the son of Devadatta is born,\nthe name Yaj/n/adatta is given to him (lit. made for him)[196]. Hence we\nadhere to our opinion that a contradiction does arise with regard to the\n'word.'\n\nThis objection we negative, on the ground that we observe the eternity\nof the connexion between such words as cow, and so on, and the things\ndenoted by them. For, although the individuals of the (species denoted\nby the word) cow have an origin, their species[197] does not have an\norigin, since of (the three categories) substances, qualities, and\nactions the individuals only originate, not the species. Now it is with\nthe species that the words are connected, not with the individuals,\nwhich, as being infinite in number, are not capable of entering into\nthat connexion. Hence, although the individuals do not originate, no\ncontradiction arises in the case of words such as cow, and the like,\nsince the species are eternal. Similarly, although individual gods are\nadmitted to originate, there arises no contradiction in the case of such\nwords as Vasu, and the like, since the species denoted by them are\neternal. And that the gods, and so on, belong to different species, is\nto be concluded from the descriptions of their various personal\nappearance, such as given in the mantras, arthavadas, &c. Terms such as\n'Indra' rest on the connexion (of some particular being) with some\nparticular place, analogously to terms such as 'army-leader;' hence,\nwhoever occupies that particular place is called by that particular\nname.--The origination of the world from the 'word' is not to be\nunderstood in that sense, that the word constitutes the material cause\nof the world, as Brahman does; but while there exist the everlasting\nwords, whose essence is the power of denotation in connexion with their\neternal sense (i.e. the ak/r/itis denoted), the accomplishment of such\nindividual things as are capable of having those words applied to them\nis called an origination from those words.\n\nHow then is it known that the world originates from the word?--'From\nperception and inference.' Perception here denotes Scripture which, in\norder to be authoritative, is independent (of anything else).\n'Inference' denotes Sm/r/iti which, in order to be authoritative,\ndepends on something else (viz. Scripture). These two declare that\ncreation is preceded by the word. Thus a scriptural passage says, 'At\nthe word these Prajapati created the gods; at the words were poured out\nhe created men; at the word drops he created the fathers; at the words\nthrough the filter he created the Soma cups; at the words the swift ones\nhe created the stotra; at the words to all he created the /s/astra; at\nthe word blessings he created the other beings.' And another passage\nsays, 'He with his mind united himself with speech (i.e. the word of the\nVeda.--B/ri/. Up. I, 2, 4). Thus Scripture declares in different places\nthat the word precedes the creation.--Sm/r/ti also delivers itself as\nfollows, 'In the beginning a divine voice, eternal, without beginning or\nend, formed of the Vedas was uttered by Svayambhu, from which all\nactivities proceeded.' By the 'uttering' of the voice we have here to\nunderstand the starting of the oral tradition (of the Veda), because of\na voice without beginning or end 'uttering' in any other sense cannot be\npredicated.--Again, we read, 'In the beginning Mahe/s/vara shaped from\nthe words of the Veda the names and forms of all beings and the\nprocedure of all actions.' And again, 'The several names, actions, and\nconditions of all things he shaped in the beginning from the words of\nthe Veda' (Manu I, 21). Moreover, we all know from observation that any\none when setting about some thing which he wishes to accomplish first\nremembers the word denoting the thing, and after that sets to work. We\ntherefore conclude that before the creation the Vedic words became\nmanifest in the mind of Prajapati the creator, and that after that he\ncreated the things conesponding to those words. Scripture also, where it\nsays (Taitt. Bra. II, 2, 4, 2) 'uttering bhur he created the earth,'\n&c., shows that the worlds such as the earth, &c. became manifest, i.e.\nwere created from the words bhur, &c. which had become manifest in the\nmind (of Prajapati).\n\nOf what nature then is the 'word' with a view to which it is said that\nthe world originates from the 'word?'--It is the spho/t/a, the\npurvapakshin says.[198] For on the assumption that the letters are the\nword, the doctrine that the individual gods, and so on, originates from\nthe eternal words of the Veda could not in any way be proved, since the\nletters perish as soon as they are produced (i.e. pronounced). These\nperishable letters are moreover apprehended as differing according to\nthe pronunciation of the individual speaker. For this reason we are able\nto determine, merely from the sound of the voice of some unseen person\nwhom we hear reading, who is reading, whether Devadatta or Yaj/n/adatta\nor some other man. And it cannot be maintained that this apprehension of\ndifference regarding the letters is an erroneous one; for we do not\napprehend anything else whereby it is refuted. Nor is it reasonable to\nmaintain that the apprehension of the sense of a word results from the\nletters. For it can neither be maintained that each letter by itself\nintimates the sense, since that would be too wide an assumption;[199]\nnor that there takes place a simultaneous apprehension of the whole\naggregate of letters; since the letters succeed one another in time. Nor\ncan we admit the explanation that the last letter of the word together\nwith the impressions produced by the perception of the preceding letters\nis that which makes us apprehend the sense. For the word makes us\napprehend the sense only if it is itself apprehended in so far as having\nreference to the mental grasp of the constant connexion (of the word and\nthe sense), just as smoke makes us infer the existence of fire only when\nit is itself apprehended; but an apprehension of the last letter\ncombined with the impressions produced by the preceding letters does not\nactually take place, because those impressions are not objects of\nperception.[200] Nor, again, can it be maintained that (although those\nimpressions are not objects of perception, yet they may be inferred from\ntheir effects, and that thus) the actual perception of the last letter\ncombined with the impressions left by the preceding letters--which\nimpressions are apprehended from their effects--is that which intimates\nthe sense of the word; for that effect of the impressions, viz. the\nremembrance of the entire word, is itself something consisting of parts\nwhich succeed each other in time.--From all this it follows that the\nspho/t/a is the word. After the apprehending agent, i.e. the buddhi,\nhas, through the apprehension of the several letters of the word,\nreceived rudimentary impressions, and after those impressions have been\nmatured through the apprehension of the last letter, the spho/t/a\npresents itself in the buddhi all at once as the object of one mental\nact of apprehension.--And it must not be maintained that that one act of\napprehension is merely an act of remembrance having for its object the\nletters of the word; for the letters which are more than one cannot form\nthe object of one act of apprehension.--As that spho/t/a is recognised\nas the same as often as the word is pronounced, it is eternal; while the\napprehension of difference referred to above has for its object the\nletters merely. From this eternal word, which is of the nature of the\nspho/t/a and possesses denotative power, there is produced the object\ndenoted, i.e. this world which consists of actions, agents, and results\nof action.\n\nAgainst this doctrine the reverend Upavarsha maintains that the letters\nonly are the word.--But--an objection is raised--it has been said above\nthat the letters no sooner produced pass away!--That assertion is not\ntrue, we reply; for they are recognised as the same letters (each time\nthey are produced anew).--Nor can it be maintained that the recognition\nis due to similarity only, as in the case of hairs, for instance; for\nthe fact of the recognition being a recognition in the strict sense of\nthe word is not contradicted by any other means of proof.--Nor, again,\ncan it be said that the recognition has its cause in the species (so\nthat not the same individual letter would be recognised, but only a\nletter belonging to the same species as other letters heard before);\nfor, as a matter of fact, the same individual letters are recognised.\nThat the recognition of the letters rests on the species could be\nmaintained only if whenever the letters are pronounced different\nindividual letters were apprehended, just as several cows are\napprehended as different individuals belonging to the same species. But\nthis is actually not the case; for the (same) individual letters are\nrecognised as often as they are pronounced. If, for instance, the word\ncow is pronounced twice, we think not that two different words have been\npronounced, but that the same individual word has been repeated.--But,\nour opponent reminds us, it has been shown above, that the letters are\napprehended as different owing to differences of pronunciation, as\nappears from the fact that we apprehend a difference when merely hearing\nthe sound of Devadatta or Yaj/n/adatta reading.--Although, we reply, it\nis a settled matter that the letters are recognised as the same, yet we\nadmit that there are differences in the apprehension of the letters; but\nas the letters are articulated by means of the conjunction and\ndisjunction (of the breath with the palate, the teeth, &c.), those\ndifferences are rightly ascribed to the various character of the\narticulating agents and not to the intrinsic nature of the letters\nthemselves. Those, moreover, who maintain that the individual letters\nare different have, in order to account for the fact of recognition, to\nassume species of letters, and further to admit that the apprehension of\ndifference is conditioned by external factors. Is it then not much\nsimpler to assume, as we do, that the apprehension of difference is\nconditioned by external factors while the recognition is due to the\nintrinsic nature of the letters? And this very fact of recognition is\nthat mental process which prevents us from looking on the apprehension\nof difference as having the letters for its object (so that the opponent\nwas wrong in denying the existence of such a process). For how should,\nfor instance, the one syllable ga, when it is pronounced in the same\nmoment by several persons, be at the same time of different nature, viz.\naccented with the udatta, the anudatta, and the Svarita and nasal as\nwell as non-nasal[201]? Or else[202]--and this is the preferable\nexplanation--we assume that the difference of apprehension is caused not\nby the letters but by the tone (dhvani). By this tone we have to\nunderstand that which enters the ear of a person who is listening from a\ndistance and not able to distinguish the separate letters, and which,\nfor a person standing near, affects the letters with its own\ndistinctions, such as high or low pitch and so on. It is on this tone\nthat all the distinctions of udatta, anudatta, and so on depend, and not\non the intrinsic nature of the letters; for they are recognised as the\nsame whenever they are pronounced. On this theory only we gain a basis\nfor the distinctive apprehension of the udatta, the anudatta, and the\nlike. For on the theory first propounded (but now rejected), we should\nhave to assume that the distinctions of udatta and so on are due to the\nprocesses of conjunction and disjunction described above, since the\nletters themselves, which are ever recognised as the same, are not\ndifferent. But as those processes of conjunction and disjunction are not\nmatter of perception, we cannot definitely ascertain in the letters any\ndifferences based on those processes, and hence the apprehension of the\nudatta and so on remains without a basis.--Nor should it be urged that\nfrom the difference of the udatta and so on there results also a\ndifference of the letters recognised. For a difference in one matter\ndoes not involve a difference in some other matter which in itself is\nfree from difference. Nobody, for instance, thinks that because the\nindividuals are different from each other the species also contains a\ndifference in itself.\n\nThe assumption of the spho/t/a is further gratuitous, because the sense\nof the word may be apprehended from the letters.--But--our opponent here\nobjects--I do not assume the existence of the spho/t/a. I, on the\ncontrary, actually perceive it; for after the buddhi has been impressed\nby the successive apprehension of the letters of the word, the spho/t/a\nall at once presents itself as the object of cognition.--You are\nmistaken, we reply. The object of the cognitional act of which you speak\nis simply the letters of the word. That one comprehensive cognition\nwhich follows upon the apprehension of the successive letters of the\nword has for its object the entire aggregate of the letters constituting\nthe word, and not anything else. We conclude this from the circumstance\nthat in that final comprehensive cognition there are included those\nletters only of which a definite given word consists, and not any other\nletters. If that cognitional act had for its object the spho/t/a--i.e.\nsomething different from the letters of the given word--then those\nletters would be excluded from it just as much as the letters of any\nother word. But as this is not the case, it follows that that final\ncomprehensive act of cognition is nothing but an act of remembrance\nwhich has the letters of the word for its object.--Our opponent has\nasserted above that the letters of a word being several cannot form the\nobject of one mental act. But there he is wrong again. The ideas which\nwe have of a row, for instance, or a wood or an army, or of the numbers\nten, hundred, thousand, and so on, show that also such things as\ncomprise several unities can become the objects of one and the same\ncognitional act. The idea which has for its object the word as one whole\nis a derived one, in so far as it depends on the determination of one\nsense in many letters[203]; in the same way as the idea of a wood, an\narmy, and so on. But--our opponent may here object--if the word were\nnothing else but the letters which in their aggregate become the object\nof one mental act, such couples of words as jara and raja or pika and\nkapi would not be cognised as different words; for here the same letters\nare presented to consciousness in each of the words constituting one\ncouple.--There is indeed, we reply, in both cases a comprehensive\nconsciousness of the same totality of letters; but just as ants\nconstitute the idea of a row only if they march one after the other, so\nthe letters also constitute the idea of a certain word only if they\nfollow each other in a certain order. Hence it is not contrary to reason\nthat the same letters are cognised as different words, in consequence of\nthe different order in which they are arranged.\n\nThe hypothesis of him who maintains that the letters are the word may\ntherefore be finally formulated as follows. The letters of which a word\nconsists--assisted by a certain order and number--have, through\ntraditional use, entered into a connexion with a definite sense. At the\ntime when they are employed they present themselves as such (i.e. in\ntheir definite order and number) to the buddhi, which, after having\napprehended the several letters in succession, finally comprehends the\nentire aggregate, and they thus unerringly intimate to the buddhi their\ndefinite sense. This hypothesis is certainly simpler than the\ncomplicated hypothesis of the grammarians who teach that the spho/t/a is\nthe word. For they have to disregard what is given by perception, and to\nassume something which is never perceived; the letters apprehended in a\ndefinite order are said to manifest the spho/t/a, and the spho/t/a in\nits turn is said to manifest the sense.\n\nOr let it even be admitted that the letters are different ones each time\nthey are pronounced; yet, as in that case we necessarily must assume\nspecies of letters as the basis of the recognition of the individual\nletters, the function of conveying the sense which we have demonstrated\nin the case of the (individual) letters has then to be attributed to the\nspecies.\n\nFrom all this it follows that the theory according to which the\nindividual gods and so on originate from the eternal words is\nunobjectionable.\n\n29. And from this very reason there follows the eternity of the Veda.\n\nAs the eternity of the Veda is founded on the absence of the remembrance\nof an agent only, a doubt with regard to it had been raised owing to the\ndoctrine that the gods and other individuals have sprung from it. That\ndoubt has been refuted in the preceding Sutra.--The present Sutra now\nconfirms the, already established, eternity of the Veda. The eternity of\nthe word of the Veda has to be assumed for this very reason, that the\nworld with its definite (eternal) species, such as gods and so on,\noriginates from it.--A mantra also ('By means of the sacrifice they\nfollowed the trace of speech; they found it dwelling in the /ri/shis,'\n/Ri/g-veda Sa/m/h. X, 71, 3) shows that the speech found (by the\n/ri/shis) was permanent.--On this point Vedavyasa also speaks as\nfollows: 'Formerly the great /ri/shis, being allowed to do so by\nSvayambhu, obtained, through their penance, the Vedas together with the\nitihasas, which had been hidden at the end of the yuga.'\n\n30. And on account of the equality of names and forms there is no\ncontradiction (to the eternity of the word of the Veda) in the\nrenovation (of the world); as is seen from /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti.\n\nIf--the purvapakshin resumes--the individual gods and so on did, like\nthe individual animals, originate and pass away in an unbroken\nsuccession so that there would be no break of the course of practical\nexistence including denominations, things denominated and agents\ndenominating; the connexion (between word and thing) would be eternal,\nand the objection as to a contradiction with reference to the word\n(raised in Sutra 27) would thereby be refuted. But if, as /S/ruti and\nSm/ri/ti declare, the whole threefold world periodically divests itself\nof name and form, and is entirely dissolved (at the end of a kalpa), and\nis after that produced anew; how can the contradiction be considered to\nhave been removed?\n\nTo this we reply: 'On account of the sameness of name and form.'--Even\nthen the beginninglessness of the world will have to be admitted (a\npoint which the teacher will prove later on: II, 1, 36). And in the\nbeginningless sa/m/sara we have to look on the (relative) beginning, and\nthe dissolution connected with a new kalpa in the same light in which we\nlook on the sleeping and waking states, which, although in them\naccording to Scripture (a kind of) dissolution and origination take\nplace, do not give rise to any contradiction, since in the later waking\nstate (subsequent to the state of sleep) the practical existence is\ncarried on just as in the former one. That in the sleeping and the\nwaking states dissolution and origination take place is stated Kaush.\nUp. III, 3, 'When a man being asleep sees no dream whatever he becomes\none with that pra/n/a alone. Then speech goes to him with all names, the\neye with all forms, the ear with all sounds, the mind with all thoughts.\nAnd when he awakes then, as from a burning fire, sparks proceed in all\ndirections, thus from that Self the pra/n/as proceed, each towards its\nplace; from the pra/n/as the gods, from the gods the worlds.'\n\nWell, the purvapakshin resumes, it may be that no contradiction arises\nin the case of sleep, as during the sleep of one person the practical\nexistence of other persons suffers no interruption, and as the sleeping\nperson himself when waking from sleep may resume the very same form of\npractical existence which was his previously to his sleep. The case of a\nmahapralaya (i.e. a general annihilation of the world) is however a\ndifferent one, as then the entire current of practical existence is\ninterrupted, and the form of existence of a previous kalpa can be\nresumed in a subsequent kalpa no more than an individual can resume that\nform of existence which it enjoyed in a former birth.\n\nThis objection, we reply, is not valid. For although a mahapralaya does\ncut short the entire current of practical existence, yet, by the favour\nof the highest Lord, the Lords (i/s/vara), such as Hira/n/yagarbha and\nso on, may continue the same form of existence which belonged to them in\nthe preceding kalpa. Although ordinary animated beings do not, as we\nsee, resume that form of existence which belonged to them in a former\nbirth; still we cannot judge of the Lords as we do of ordinary beings.\nFor as in the series of beings which descends from man to blades of\ngrass a successive diminution of knowledge, power, and so on, is\nobserved--although they all have the common attribute of being\nanimated--so in the ascending series extending from man up to\nHira/n/yagarbha, a gradually increasing manifestation of knowledge,\npower, &c. takes place; a circumstance which /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti\nmention in many places, and which it is impossible to deny. On that\naccount it may very well be the case that the Lords, such as\nHira/n/yagarbha and so on, who in a past kalpa were distinguished by\nsuperior knowledge and power of action, and who again appear in the\npresent kalpa, do, if favoured by the highest Lord, continue (in the\npresent kalpa) the same kind of existence which they enjoyed in the\npreceding kalpa; just as a man who rises from sleep continues the same\nform of existence which he enjoyed previously to his sleep. Thus\nScripture also declares, 'He who first creates Brahman (Hira/n/yagarbha)\nand delivers the Vedas to him, to that God who is the light of his own\nthoughts, I, seeking for release, go for refuge' (/S/vet. Up. VI, 18).\n/S/aunaka and others moreover declare (in the Anukrama/n/is of the Veda)\nthat the ten books (of the /Ri/g-veda) were seen by Madhu/kkh/andas and\nother /ri/shis.[204] And, similarly, Sm/ri/ti tells us, for every Veda,\nof men of exalted mental vision (/ri/shis) who 'saw' the subdivisions of\ntheir respective Vedas, such as ka/nd/as and so on. Scripture also\ndeclares that the performance of the sacrificial action by means of the\nmantra is to be preceded by the knowledge of the /ri/shi and so on, 'He\nwho makes another person sacrifice or read by means of a mantra of which\nhe does not know the /ri/shi, the metre, the divinity, and the\nBrahma/n/a, runs against a post, falls into a pit[205], &c. &c.,\ntherefore one must know all those matters for each mantra' (Arsheya\nBrahma/n/a, first section).--Moreover, religious duty is enjoined and\nits opposite is forbidden, in order that the animate beings may obtain\npleasure and escape pain. Desire and aversion have for their objects\npleasure and pain, known either from experience or from Scripture, and\ndo not aim at anything of a different nature. As therefore each new\ncreation is (nothing but) the result of the religious merit and demerit\n(of the animated beings of the preceding creation), it is produced with\na nature resembling that of the preceding creation. Thus Sm/ri/ti also\ndeclares, 'To whatever actions certain of these (animated beings) had\nturned in a former creation, to the same they turn when created again\nand again. Whether those actions were harmful or harmless, gentle or\ncruel, right or wrong, true or untrue, influenced by them they proceed;\nhence a certain person delights in actions of a certain\nkind.'--Moreover, this world when being dissolved (in a mahapralaya) is\ndissolved to that extent only that the potentiality (/s/akti) of the\nworld remains, and (when it is produced again) it is produced from the\nroot of that potentiality; otherwise we should have to admit an effect\nwithout a cause. Nor have we the right to assume potentialities of\ndifferent kind (for the different periods of the world). Hence, although\nthe series of worlds from the earth upwards, and the series of different\nclasses of animate beings such as gods, animals, and men, and the\ndifferent conditions based on caste, a/s/rama, religious duty and fruit\n(of works), although all these we say are again and again interrupted\nand thereupon produced anew; we yet have to understand that they are, in\nthe beginningless sa/m/sara, subject to a certain determinateness\nanalogous to the determinateness governing the connexion between the\nsenses and their objects. For it is impossible to imagine that the\nrelation of senses and sense-objects should be a different one in\ndifferent creations, so that, for instance, in some new creation a sixth\nsense and a corresponding sixth sense-object should manifest themselves.\nAs, therefore, the phenomenal world is the same in all kalpas and as the\nLords are able to continue their previous forms of existence, there\nmanifest themselves, in each new creation, individuals bearing the same\nnames and forms as the individuals of the preceding creations, and,\nowing to this equality of names and forms, the admitted periodical\nrenovations of the world in the form of general pralayas and general\ncreations do not conflict with the authoritativeness of the word of the\nVeda. The permanent identity of names and forms is declared in /S/ruti\nas well as Sm/ri/ti; compare, for instance, /Ri/k. Sa/m/h. X, 190, 3,\n'As formerly the creator ordered sun and moon, and the sky, and the air,\nand the heavenly world;' which passage means that the highest Lord\narranged at the beginning of the present kalpa the entire world with sun\nand moon, and so on, just as it had been arranged in the preceding\nkalpa. Compare also Taitt. Brahm. III, 1, 4, 1, 'Agni desired: May I\nbecome the consumer of the food of the gods; for that end he offered a\ncake on eight potsherds to Agni and the K/ri/ttikas.' This passage,\nwhich forms part of the injunction of the ish/t/i to the Nakshatras,\ndeclares equality of name and form connecting the Agni who offered and\nthe Agni to whom he offered.[206]\n\nSm/ri/ti also contains similar statements to be quoted here; so, for\ninstance, 'Whatever were the names of the /ri/shis and their powers to\nsee the Vedas, the same the Unborn one again gives to them when they are\nproduced afresh at the end of the night (the mahapralaya). As the\nvarious signs of the seasons return in succession in their due time,\nthus the same beings again appear in the different yugas. And of\nwhatever individuality the gods of the past ages were, equal to them are\nthe present gods in name and form.'\n\n31. On account of the impossibility of (the gods being qualified) for\nthe madhu-vidya, &c., Jaimini (maintains) the non-qualification (of the\ngods for the Brahma-vidya).\n\nA new objection is raised against the averment that the gods, &c. also\nare entitled to the knowledge of Brahman. The teacher, Jaimini,\nconsiders the gods and similar beings not to have any claim.--Why?--On\naccount of the impossibility, in the case of the so-called Madhu-vidya,\n&c. If their claim to the knowledge of Brahman were admitted, we should\nhave to admit their claim to the madhu-vidya ('the knowledge of the\nhoney') also, because that also is a kind of knowledge not different\n(from the knowledge of Brahman). But to admit this latter claim is not\npossible; for, according to the passage, 'The Sun is indeed the honey of\nthe devas' (Ch. Up. III, 1, 1), men are to meditate on the sun (the god\nAditya) under the form of honey, and how, if the gods themselves are\nadmitted as meditating worshippers, can Aditya meditate upon another\nAditya?--Again, the text, after having enumerated five kinds of nectar,\nthe red one, &c. residing in the sun, and after having stated that the\nfive classes of gods, viz. the Vasus, Rudras, Adityas, Maruts, and\nSadhyas, live on one of these nectars each, declares that 'he who thus\nknows this nectar becomes one of the Vasus, with Agni at their head, he\nsees the nectar and rejoices, &c., and indicates thereby that those who\nknow the nectars enjoyed by the Vasus, &c., attain the greatness of the\nVasus, &c.' But how should the Vasus themselves know other Vasus\nenjoying the nectar, and what other Vasu-greatness should they desire to\nattain?--We have also to compare the passages 'Agni is one foot, Aditya\nis one foot, the quarters are one foot' (Ch. Up. III, 18, 2); 'Air is\nindeed the absorber' (Ch. Up. IV, 3, 1); 'Aditya is Brahman, this is the\ndoctrine.' All these passages treat of the meditation on the Self of\ncertain divinities, for which meditation these divinities themselves are\nnot qualified.--So it is likewise impossible that the /ri/shis\nthemselves should be qualified for meditations connected with /ri/shis,\nsuch as expressed in passages like B/ri/. Up. II, 2, 4, 'These two are\nthe /ri/shis Gautama and Bharadvaja; the right Gautama, the left\nBharadvaja.'--Another reason for the non-qualification of the gods is\nstated in the following Sutra.\n\n32. And (the devas, &c. are not qualified) on account of (the words\ndenoting the devas, &c.) being (used) in the sense of (sphere of) light.\n\nTo that sphere of light, the purvapakshin resumes, which is stationed in\nthe sky, and during its diurnal revolutions illumines the world, terms\nsuch as Aditya, i.e. the names of devas, are applied, as we know from\nthe use of ordinary language, and from Vedic complementary\npassages[207]. But of a mere sphere of light we cannot understand how it\nshould be endowed with either a bodily form, consisting of the heart and\nthe like, or intelligence, or the capability of forming wishes[208]. For\nmere light we know to be, like earth, entirely devoid of intelligence.\nThe same observation applies to Agni (fire), and so on. It will perhaps\nbe said that our objection is not valid, because the personality of the\ndevas is known from the mantras, arthavadas, itihasas, pura/n/as, and\nfrom the conceptions of ordinary life[209]; but we contest the relevancy\nof this remark. For the conceptions of ordinary life do not constitute\nan independent means of knowledge; we rather say that a thing is known\nfrom ordinary life if it is known by the (acknowledged) means of\nknowledge, perception, &c. But none of the recognised means of\nknowledge, such as perception and the like, apply to the matter under\ndiscussion. Itihasas and pura/n/as again being of human origin, stand\nthemselves in need of other means of knowledge on which to base. The\narthavada passages also, which, as forming syntactical wholes with the\ninjunctory passages, have merely the purpose of glorifying (what is\nenjoined in the latter), cannot be considered to constitute by\nthemselves reasons for the existence of the personality, &c. of the\ndevas. The mantras again, which, on the ground of direct enunciation,\n&c., are to be employed (at the different stages of the sacrificial\naction), have merely the purpose of denoting things connected with the\nsacrificial performance, and do not constitute an independent means of\nauthoritative knowledge for anything[210].--For these reasons the devas,\nand similar beings, are not qualified for the knowledge of Brahman.\n\n33. Badaraya/n/a, on the other hand, (maintains) the existence (of\nqualification for Brahma-vidya on the part of the gods); for there are\n(passages indicatory of that).\n\nThe expression 'on the other hand' is meant to rebut the purvapaksha.\nThe teacher, Badaraya/n/a, maintains the existence of the qualification\non the part of the gods, &c. For, although the qualification of the gods\ncannot be admitted with reference to the madhu-vidya, and similar topics\nof knowledge, in which the gods themselves are implicated, still they\nmay be qualified for the pure knowledge of Brahman, qualification in\ngeneral depending on the presence of desire, capability, &c.[211] Nor\ndoes the impossibility of qualification in certain cases interfere with\nthe presence of qualification in those other cases where it is not\nimpossible. To the case of the gods the same reasoning applies as to the\ncase of men; for among men also, all are not qualified for everything,\nBrahma/n/as, for instance, not for the rajasuya-sacrifice[212].\n\nAnd, with reference to the knowledge of Brahman, Scripture, moreover,\ncontains express hints notifying that the devas are qualified; compare,\nfor instance, /Br/i. Up. I, 4, 10, 'Whatever Deva was awakened (so as to\nknow Brahman) he indeed became that; and the same with /ri/shis;' Ch.\nUp. VIII, 7, 2, 'They said: Well, let us search for that Self by which,\nif one has searched it out, all worlds and all desires are obtained.\nThus saying, Indra went forth from the Devas, Viro/k/ana from the\nAsuras.' Similar statements are met with in Sm/ri/ti, so, for instance,\nin the colloquy of the Gandharva and Yaj/n/avalkya[213].--Against the\nobjection raised in the preceding Sutra (32) we argue as follows. Words\nlike aditya, and so on, which denote devas, although having reference to\nlight and the like, yet convey the idea of certain divine Selfs\n(persons) endowed with intelligence and pre-eminent power; for they are\nused in that sense in mantras and arthavada passages. For the devas\npossess, in consequence of their pre-eminent power, the capability of\nresiding within the light, and so on, and to assume any form they like.\nThus we read in Scripture, in the arthavada passage explaining the words\n'ram of Medhatithi,' which form part of the Subrahma/n/ya-formula, that\n'Indra, having assumed the shape of a ram, carried off Medhatithi, the\ndescendant of Ka/n/va' (Sha/d/v. Br. I, 1). And thus Sm/ri/ti says that\n'Aditya, having assumed the shape of a man, came to Kunti.' Moreover,\neven in such substances as earth, intelligent ruling beings must be\nadmitted to reside, for that appears from such scriptural passages as\n'the earth spoke,' 'the waters spoke,' &c. The non-intelligence of light\nand the like, in so far as they are mere material elements, is admitted\nin the case of the sun (aditya), &c. also; but--as already\nremarked--from the use of the words in mantras and arthavadas it appears\nthat there are intelligent beings of divine nature (which animate those\nmaterial elements).\n\nWe now turn to the objection (raised above by the purvapakshin) that\nmantras and arthavadas, as merely subserving other purposes, have no\npower of setting forth the personality of the devas, and remark that not\nthe circumstance of subordination or non-subordination to some other\npurpose, but rather the presence or absence of a certain idea furnishes\na reason for (our assuming) the existence of something. This is\nexemplified by the case of a person who, having set out for some other\npurpose, (nevertheless) forms the conviction of the existence of leaves,\ngrass, and the like, which he sees lying on the road.--But, the\npurvapakshin may here object, the instance quoted by you is not strictly\nanalogous. In the case of the wanderer, perception, whose objects the\ngrass and leaves are, is active, and through it he forms the conception\nof their existence. In the case of an arthavada, on the other hand,\nwhich, as forming a syntactical unity with the corresponding injunctory\npassage, merely subserves the purpose of glorifying (the latter), it is\nimpossible to determine any energy having a special object of its own.\nFor in general any minor syntactical unity, which is included in a more\ncomprehensive syntactical unity conveying a certain meaning, does not\npossess the power of expressing a separate meaning of its own. Thus, for\ninstance, we derive, from the combination of the three words\nconstituting the negative sentence, '(Do) not drink wine,' one meaning\nonly, i.e. a prohibition of drinking wine, and do not derive an\nadditional meaning, viz. an order to drink wine, from the combination of\nthe last two words, 'drink wine.'--To this objection we reply, that the\ninstance last quoted is not analogous (to the matter under discussion).\nThe words of the sentence prohibiting the drinking of wine form only one\nwhole, and on that account the separate sense which any minor\nsyntactical unity included in the bigger sentence may possess cannot be\naccepted. In the case of injunction and arthavada, on the other hand,\nthe words constituting the arthavada form a separate group of their own\nwhich refers to some accomplished thing[214], and only subsequently to\nthat, when it comes to be considered what purpose they subserve, they\nenter on the function of glorifying the injunction. Let us examine, as\nan illustrative example, the injunctive passage, 'He who is desirous of\nprosperity is to offer to Vayu a white animal.' All the words contained\nin this passage are directly connected with the injunction. This is,\nhowever, not the case with the words constituting the corresponding\narthavada passage, 'For Vayu is the swiftest deity; Vayu he approaches\nwith his own share; he leads him to prosperity.' The single words of\nthis arthavada are not grammatically connected with the single words of\nthe injunction, but form a subordinate unity of their own, which\ncontains the praise of Vayu, and glorify the injunction, only in so far\nas they give us to understand that the action enjoined is connected with\na distinguished divinity. If the matter conveyed by the subordinate\n(arthavada) passage can be known by some other means of knowledge, the\narthavada acts as a mere anuvada, i.e. a statement referring to\nsomething (already known)[215]. When its contents are contradicted by\nother means of knowledge it acts as a so-called gu/n/avada, i.e. a\nstatement of a quality[216]. Where, again, neither of the two mentioned\nconditions is found, a doubt may arise whether the arthavada is to be\ntaken as a gu/n/avada on account of the absence of other means of\nknowledge, or as an arthavada referring to something known (i.e. an\nanuvada) on account of the absence of contradiction by other means of\nproof. The latter alternative is, however, to be embraced by reflecting\npeople.--The same reasoning applies to mantras also.\n\nThere is a further reason for assuming the personality of the gods. The\nVedic injunctions, as enjoining sacrificial offerings to Indra and the\nother gods, presuppose certain characteristic shapes of the individual\ndivinities, because without such the sacrificer could not represent\nIndra and the other gods to his mind. And if the divinity were not\nrepresented to the mind it would not be possible to make an offering to\nit. So Scripture also says, 'Of that divinity for which the offering is\ntaken he is to think when about to say vausha/t/' (Ai. Br. III, 8, 1).\nNor is it possible to consider the essential form (or character) of a\nthing to consist in the word only[217]; for word (denoting) and thing\n(denoted) are different. He therefore who admits the authoritativeness\nof the scriptural word has no right to deny that the shape of Indra, and\nthe other gods, is such as we understand it to be from the mantras and\narthavadas.--Moreover, itihasas and pura/n/as also--because based on\nmantra and arthavada which possess authoritative power in the manner\ndescribed--are capable of setting forth the personality, &c. of the\ndevas. Itihasa and pura/n/a can, besides, be considered as based on\nperception also. For what is not accessible to our perception may have\nbeen within the sphere of perception of people in ancient times.\nSm/ri/ti also declares that Vyasa and others conversed with the gods\nface to face. A person maintaining that the people of ancient times were\nno more able to converse with the gods than people are at present, would\nthereby deny the (incontestable) variety of the world. He might as well\nmaintain that because there is at present no prince ruling over the\nwhole earth, there were no such princes in former times; a position by\nwhich the scriptural injunction of the rajasuya-sacrifice[218] would be\nstultified. Or he might maintain that in former times the spheres of\nduty of the different castes and a/s/ramas were as generally unsettled\nas they are now, and, on that account, declare those parts of Scripture\nwhich define those different duties to be purposeless. It is therefore\naltogether unobjectionable to assume that the men of ancient times, in\nconsequence of their eminent religious merit, conversed with the gods\nface to face. Sm/ri/ti also declares that 'from the reading of the Veda\nthere results intercourse with the favourite divinity' (Yoga Sutra II,\n44). And that Yoga does, as Sm/ri/ti declares, lead to the acquirement\nof extraordinary powers, such as subtlety of body, and so on, is a fact\nwhich cannot be set aside by a mere arbitrary denial. Scripture also\nproclaims the greatness of Yoga, 'When, as earth, water, light, heat,\nand ether arise, the fivefold quality of Yoga takes place, then there is\nno longer illness, old age, or pain for him who has obtained a body\nproduced by the fire of Yoga' (/S/vet. Up. II, 12). Nor have we the\nright to measure by our capabilities the capability of the /ri/shis who\nsee the mantras and brahma/n/a passages (i.e. the Veda).--From all this\nit appears that the itihasas and pura/n/as have an adequate basis.--And\nthe conceptions of ordinary life also must not be declared to be\nunfounded, if it is at all possible to accept them.\n\nThe general result is that we have the right to conceive the gods as\npossessing personal existence, on the ground of mantras, arthavadas,\nitihasas, pura/n/as, and ordinarily prevailing ideas. And as the gods\nmay thus be in the condition of having desires and so on, they must be\nconsidered as qualified for the knowledge of Brahman. Moreover, the\ndeclarations which Scripture makes concerning gradual emancipation[219]\nagree with this latter supposition only.\n\n34. Grief of him (i.e. of Jana/s/ruti) (arose) on account of his hearing\na disrespectful speech about himself; on account of the rushing on of\nthat (grief) (Raikva called him /S/udra); for it (the grief) is pointed\nat (by Raikva).\n\n(In the preceding adhikara/n/a) the exclusiveness of the claim of men to\nknowledge has been refuted, and it has been declared that the gods, &c.\nalso possess such a claim. The present adhikara/n/a is entered on for\nthe purpose of removing the doubt whether, as the exclusiveness of the\nclaim of twice-born men is capable of refutation, the /S/udras also\npossess such a claim.\n\nThe purvapakshin maintains that the /S/udras also have such a claim,\nbecause they may be in the position of desiring that knowledge, and\nbecause they are capable of it; and because there is no scriptural\nprohibition (excluding them from knowledge) analogous to the text,\n'Therefore[220] the /S/udra is unfit for sacrificing' (Taitt. Sa/m/h.\nVII, 1, 1, 6). The reason, moreover, which disqualifies the /S/udras for\nsacrificial works, viz. their being without the sacred fires, does not\ninvalidate their qualification for knowledge, as knowledge can be\napprehended by those also who are without the fires. There is besides an\ninferential mark supporting the claim of the /S/udras; for in the\nso-called sa/m/varga-knowledge he (Raikva) refers to Jana/s/ruti\nPautraya/n/a, who wishes to learn from him, by the name of /S/udra 'Fie,\nnecklace and carnage be thine, O /S/udra, together with the cows' (Ch.\nUp. IV, 2, 3). Sm/ri/ti moreover speaks of Vidura and others who were\nborn from /S/udra mothers as possessing eminent knowledge.--Hence the\n/S/udra has a claim to the knowledge of Brahman.\n\nTo this we reply that the /S/udras have no such claim, on account of\ntheir not studying the Veda. A person who has studied the Veda and\nunderstood its sense is indeed qualified for Vedic matters; but a\n/S/udra does not study the Veda, for such study demands as its\nantecedent the upanayana-ceremony, and that ceremony belongs to the\nthree (higher) castes only. The mere circumstance of being in a\ncondition of desire does not furnish a reason for qualification, if\ncapability is absent. Mere temporal capability again does not constitute\na reason for qualification, spiritual capability being required in\nspiritual matters. And spiritual capability is (in the case of the\n/S/udras) excluded by their being excluded from the study of the\nVeda.--The Vedic statement, moreover, that the /S/udra is unfit for\nsacrifices intimates, because founded on reasoning, that he is unfit for\nknowledge also; for the argumentation is the same in both\ncases[221].--With reference to the purvapakshin's opinion that the fact\nof the word '/S/udra' being enounced in the sa/m/varga-knowledge\nconstitutes an inferential mark (of the /S/udra's qualification for\nknowledge), we remark that that inferential mark has no force, on\naccount of the absence of arguments. For the statement of an inferential\nmark possesses the power of intimation only in consequence of arguments\nbeing adduced; but no such arguments are brought forward in the passage\nquoted.[222] Besides, the word '/S/udra' which occurs in the\nsa/m/varga-vidya would establish a claim on the part of the /S/udras to\nthat one vidya only, not to all vidyas. In reality, however, it is\npowerless, because occurring in an arthavada, to establish the /S/udras'\nclaim to anything.--The word '/S/udra' can moreover be made to agree\nwith the context in which it occurs in the following manner. When\nJana/s/ruti Pautraya/n/a heard himself spoken of with disrespect by the\nflamingo ('How can you speak of him, being what he is, as if he were\nlike Raikva with the car?' IV, 1, 3), grief (su/k/) arose in his mind,\nand to that grief the /ri/shi Raikva alludes with the word /S/udra, in\norder to show thereby his knowledge of what is remote. This explanation\nmust be accepted because a (real) born /S/udra is not qualified (for the\nsa/m/varga-vidya). If it be asked how the grief (su/k/) which had arisen\nin Janasruti's mind can be referred to by means of the word /S/udra, we\nreply: On account of the rushing on (adrava/n/a) of the grief. For we\nmay etymologise the word /S/udra by dividing it into its parts, either\nas 'he rushed into grief (/S/u/k/am abhidudrava) or as 'grief rushed on\nhim,' or as 'he in his grief rushed to Raikva;' while on the other hand\nit is impossible to accept the word in its ordinary conventional sense.\nThe circumstance (of the king actually being grieved) is moreover\nexpressly touched upon in the legend[223].\n\n35. And because the kshattriyahood (of Jana/s/ruti) is understood from\nthe inferential mark (supplied by his being mentioned) later on with\n/K/aitraratha (who was a kshattriya himself).\n\nJana/s/ruti cannot have been a /S/udra by birth for that reason also\nthat his being a kshattriya is understood from an inferential sign, viz.\nhis being mentioned together (in one chapter) with the kshattriya\n/K/aitraratha Abhipratarin. For, later on, i.e. in the passage\ncomplementary to the sa/m/varga-vidya, a kshattriya /K/aitrarathi\nAbhipratarin is glorified, 'Once while /S/aunaka Kapeya and Abhipratarin\nKakshaseni were being waited on at their meal a religious student begged\nof them' (Ch. Up. IV, 3, 5). That this Abhipratarin was a /K/aitrarathi\n(i.e. a descendant of /K/itraratha) we have to infer from his connexion\nwith a Kapeya. For we know (from /S/ruti) about the connexion of\n/K/itraratha himself with the Kapeyas ('the Kapeyas made /K/itraratha\nperform that sacrifice;' Ta/nd/ya. Br. XX, 12, 5), and as a rule\nsacrificers of one and the same family employ officiating priests of one\nand the same family. Moreover, as we understand from Scripture ('from\nhim a /K/aitrarathi descended who was a prince[224]') that he\n(/K/aitraratha) was a prince, we must understand him to have been a\nkshattriya. The fact now of Jana/s/ruti being praised in the same vidya\nwith the kshattriya Abhipratarin intimates that the former also was a\nkshattriya. For as a rule equals are mentioned together with equals.\nThat Jana/s/ruti was a kshattriya we moreover conclude from his sending\nhis door-keeper and from other similar signs of power (mentioned in the\ntext).--Hence the /S/udras are not qualified (for the knowledge of\nBrahman).\n\n36. On account of the reference to ceremonial purifications (in the case\nof the higher castes) and on account of their absence being declared (in\nthe case of the /S/udras).\n\nThat the /S/udras are not qualified, follows from that circumstance also\nthat in different places of the vidyas such ceremonies as the upanayana\nand the like are referred to. Compare, for instance, /S/at. Br. XI, 5,\n3, 13, 'He initiated him as a pupil;' Ch. Up. VII, 1, 1, 'Teach me, Sir!\nthus he approached him;' Pra. Up. I, 1, 'Devoted to Brahman, firm in\nBrahman, seeking for the highest Brahman they, carrying fuel in their\nhands, approached the venerable Pippalada, thinking that he would teach\nthem all that.'--Thus the following passage also, 'He without having\nmade them undergo the upanayana (said) to them' (Ch. Up. V, 11, 7),\nshows that the upanayana is a well-established ceremony[225].--With\nreference to the /S/udras, on the other hand, the absence of ceremonies\nis frequently mentioned; so, for instance, Manu X, 4, where they are\nspoken of as 'once born' only ('the /S/udra is the fourth caste,\nonce-born'), and Manu X, 126, 'In the /S/udra there is not any sin, and\nhe is not fit for any ceremony.'\n\n37. And on account of (Gautama) proceeding (to initiate Jabala) on the\nascertainment of (his) not being that (i.e. a /S/udra).\n\nThe /S/udras are not qualified for that reason also that Gautama, having\nascertained Jabala not to be a /S/udra from his speaking the truth,\nproceeded to initiate and instruct him. 'None who is not a Brahma/n/a\nwould thus speak out. Go and fetch fuel, friend, I shall initiate you.\nYou have not swerved from the truth' (Ch. Up. IV, 4, 5); which\nscriptural passage furnishes an inferential sign (of the /S/udras not\nbeing capable of initiation).\n\n38. And on account of the prohibition, in Sm/ri/ti, of (the /S/udras')\nhearing and studying (the Veda) and (knowing and performing) (Vedic)\nmatters.\n\nThe /S/udras are not qualified for that reason also that Sm/ri/ti\nprohibits their hearing the Veda, their studying the Veda, and their\nunderstanding and performing Vedic matters. The prohibition of hearing\nthe Veda is conveyed by the following passages: 'The ears of him who\nhears the Veda are to be filled with (molten) lead and lac,' and 'For a\n/S/udra is (like) a cemetery, therefore (the Veda) is not to be read in\nthe vicinity of a /S/udra.' From this latter passage the prohibition of\nstudying the Veda results at once; for how should he study Scripture in\nwhose vicinity it is not even to be read? There is, moreover, an express\nprohibition (of the /S/udras studying the Veda). 'His tongue is to be\nslit if he pronounces it; his body is to be cut through if he preserves\nit.' The prohibitions of hearing and studying the Veda already imply the\nprohibition of the knowledge and performance of Vedic matters; there\nare, however, express prohibitions also, such as 'he is not to impart\nknowledge to the /S/udra,' and 'to the twice-born belong study,\nsacrifice, and the bestowal of gifts.'--From those /S/udras, however,\nwho, like Vidura and 'the religious hunter,' acquire knowledge in\nconsequence of the after effects of former deeds, the fruit of their\nknowledge cannot be withheld, since knowledge in all cases brings about\nits fruit. Sm/ri/ti, moreover, declares that all the four castes are\nqualified for acquiring the knowledge of the itihasas and pura/n/as;\ncompare the passage, 'He is to teach the four castes' (Mahabh.).--It\nremains, however, a settled point that they do not possess any such\nqualification with regard to the Veda.\n\n39. (The pra/n/a is Brahman), on account of the trembling (predicated of\nthe whole world).\n\nThe discussion of qualification for Brahma-knowledge--on which we\nentered as an opportunity offered--being finished we return to our chief\ntopic, i.e. the enquiry into the purport of the Vedanta-texts.--We read\n(Ka. Up. II, 6, 2), 'Whatever there is, the whole world when gone forth\ntrembles in the pra/n/a. It (the pra/n/a) is a great terror, a raised\nthunderbolt. Those who know it become immortal[226].'--This passage\ndeclares that this whole world trembles, abiding in pra/n/a, and that\nthere is raised something very terrible, called a thunderbolt, and that\nthrough its knowledge immortality is obtained. But as it is not\nimmediately clear what the pra/n/a is, and what that terrible\nthunderbolt, a discussion arises.\n\nThe purvapakshin maintains that, in accordance with the ordinary meaning\nof the term, pra/n/a denotes the air with its five modifications, that\nthe word 'thunderbolt' also is to be taken in its ordinary sense, and\nthat thus the whole passage contains a glorification of air. For, he\nsays, this whole world trembles, abiding within air with its five\nforms--which is here called pra/n/a--and the terrible thunderbolts also\nspring from air (or wind) as their cause. For in the air, people say,\nwhen it manifests itself in the form of Parjanya, lightning, thunder,\nrain, and thunderbolts manifest themselves.--Through the knowledge of\nthat air immortality also can be obtained; for another scriptural\npassage says, 'Air is everything by itself, and air is all things\ntogether. He who knows this conquers death.'--We therefore conclude that\nthe same air is to be understood in the passage under discussion.\n\nTo this we make the following reply.--Brahman only can be meant, on\naccount of what precedes as well as what follows. In the preceding as\nwell as the subsequent part of the chapter Brahman only is spoken of;\nhow then can it be supposed that in the intermediate part all at once\nthe air should be referred to? The immediately preceding passage runs as\nfollows, 'That only is called the Bright, that is called Brahman, that\nalone is called the Immortal. All worlds are contained in it, and no one\ngoes beyond it.' That the Brahman there spoken of forms the topic of our\npassage also, we conclude, firstly, from proximity; and, secondly, from\nthe circumstance that in the clause, 'The whole world trembles in\npra/n/a' we recognise a quality of Brahman, viz. its constituting the\nabode of the whole world. That the word pra/n/a can denote the highest\nSelf also, appears from such passages as 'the pra/n/a of pra/n/a'\n(B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 18). Being the cause of trembling, moreover, is a\nquality which properly appertains to the highest Self only, not to mere\nair. Thus Scripture says, 'No mortal lives by the pra/n/a and the breath\nthat goes down. We live by another in whom these two repose' (Ka. Up.\nII, 5 5). And also in the passage subsequent to the one under\ndiscussion, ('From terror of it fire burns, from terror the sun burns,\nfrom terror Indra and Vayu, and Death as the fifth run away,') Brahman,\nand not the air, must be supposed to be spoken of, since the subject of\nthat passage is represented as the cause of fear on the part of the\nwhole world inclusive of the air itself. Thence we again conclude that\nthe passage under discussion also refers to Brahman, firstly, on the\nground of proximity; and, secondly, because we recognise a quality of\nBrahman, viz. its being the cause of fear, in the words, 'A great\nterror, a raised thunderbolt.' The word 'thunderbolt' is here used to\ndenote a cause of fear in general. Thus in ordinary life also a man\nstrictly carries out a king's command because he fearfully considers in\nhis mind, 'A thunderbolt (i.e. the king's wrath, or threatened\npunishment) is hanging over my head; it might fall if I did not carry\nout his command.' In the same manner this whole world inclusive of fire,\nair, sun, and so on, regularly carries on its manifold functions from\nfear of Brahman; hence Brahman as inspiring fear is compared to a\nthunderbolt. Similarly, another scriptural passage, whose topic is\nBrahman, declares, 'From terror of it the wind blows, from terror the\nsun rises; from terror of it Agni and Indra, yea, Death runs as the\nfifth.'--That Brahman is what is referred to in our passage, further\nfollows from the declaration that the fruit of its cognition is\nimmortality. For that immortality is the fruit of the knowledge of\nBrahman is known, for instance, from the mantra, 'A man who knows him\nonly passes over death, there is no other path to go' (/S/vet. Up. VI,\n15).--That immortality which the purvapakshin asserts to be sometimes\nrepresented as the fruit of the knowledge of the air is a merely\nrelative one; for there (i.e. in the chapter from which the passage is\nquoted) at first the highest Self is spoken of, by means of a new topic\nbeing started (B/ri/. Up. III, 4), and thereupon the inferior nature of\nthe air and so on is referred to. ('Everything else is evil.')--That in\nthe passage under discussion the highest Self is meant appears finally\nfrom the general subject-matter; for the question (asked by Na/k/iketas\nin I, 2, 14, 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that, as neither\neffect nor cause, as neither past nor future tell me that') refers to\nthe highest Self.\n\n40. The light (is Brahman), on account of that (Brahman) being seen (in\nthe scriptural passage).\n\nWe read in Scripture, 'Thus does that serene being, arising from this\nbody, appear in its own form as soon as it has approached the highest\nlight' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3). Here the doubt arises whether the word\n'light' denotes the (physical) light, which is the object of sight and\ndispels darkness, or the highest Brahman.\n\nThe purvapakshin maintains that the word 'light' denotes the well-known\n(physical) light, because that is the conventional sense of the word.\nFor while it is to be admitted that in another passage, discussed under\nI, 1, 24, the word 'light' does, owing to the general topic of the\nchapter, divest itself of its ordinary meaning and denote Brahman, there\nis in our passage no similar reason for setting the ordinary meaning\naside. Moreover, it is stated in the chapter treating of the na/d/is of\nthe body, that a man going to final release reaches the sun ('When he\ndeparts from this body then he departs upwards by those very rays;' Ch.\nUp. VIII, 6, 5). Hence we conclude that the word 'light' denotes, in our\npassage, the ordinary light.\n\nTo this we make the following reply.--The word 'light' can denote the\nhighest Brahman only, on account of that being seen. We see that in the\nwhole chapter Brahman is carried on as the topic of discussion. For the\nSelf, which is free from sin, &c. is introduced as the general\nsubject-matter in VIII, 7, 1 ('the Self which is free from sin'); it is\nthereupon set forth as that which is to be searched out and to be\nunderstood (VIII, 7, 1); it is carried on by means of the clauses, 'I\nshall explain that further to you' (VIII, 9, 3 ff.); after that freedom\nfrom body is said to belong to it, because it is one with light ('when\nhe is free from the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches him,'\nVIII, 12, 1)--and freedom from body is not possible outside Brahman--and\nit is finally qualified as 'the highest light, the highest person'\n(VIII, 12, 3).--Against the statement, made by the purvapakshin, that\nScripture speaks of a man going to release as reaching the sun, we\nremark, that the release there referred to is not the ultimate one,\nsince it is said to be connected with going and departing upwards. That\nthe ultimate release has nothing to do with going and departing upwards\nwe shall show later on.\n\n41. The ether is (Brahman), as it is designated as something different,\n&c. (from name and form).\n\nScripture says, 'He who is called ether, (aka/s/a) is the revealer of\nall forms and names. That within which these forms and names are\ncontained is the Brahman, the Immortal, the Self (Ch. Up. VIII, 14, 1).\n\nThere arising a doubt whether that which here is called ether is the\nhighest Brahman or the ordinary elemental ether, the purvapakshin\ndeclares that the latter alternative is to be embraced, firstly, because\nit is founded on the conventional meaning of the word 'ether;' and,\nsecondly, because the circumstance of revealing names and forms can very\nwell be reconciled with the elemental ether, as that which affords room\n(for all things). Moreover, the passage contains no clear indicatory\nmark of Brahman, such as creative power, and the like.\n\nTo this we reply, that the word 'ether' can here denote the highest\nBrahman only, because it is designated as a different thing, &c. For the\nclause, 'That within which these two are contained is Brahman,'\ndesignates the ether as something different from names and forms. But,\nexcepting Brahman, there is nothing whatever different from name and\nform, since the entire world of effects is evolved exclusively by names\nand forms. Moreover, the complete revealing of names and forms cannot be\naccomplished by anything else but Brahman, according to the text which\ndeclares Brahman's creative agency, 'Let me enter (into those beings)\nwith this living Self (jiva atman), and evolve names and forms' (Ch. Up.\nVI, 3, 2). But--it may be said--from this very passage it is apparent\nthat the living Self also (i.e. the individual soul) possesses revealing\npower with regard to names and forms.--True, we reply, but what the\npassage really wishes to intimate, is the non-difference (of the\nindividual soul from the highest Self). And the very statement\nconcerning the revealing of names and forms implies the statement of\nsigns indicatory of Brahman, viz. creative power and the\nlike.--Moreover, the terms 'the Brahman, the Immortal, the Self' (VIII,\n14) indicate that Brahman is spoken of.\n\n42. And (on account of the designation) (of the highest Self) as\ndifferent (from the individual soul) in the states of deep sleep and\ndeparting.\n\nIn the sixth prapa/th/aka of the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka there is given, in\nreply to the question, 'Who is that Self?' a lengthy exposition of the\nnature of the Self, 'He who is within the heart, among the pra/n/as, the\nperson of light, consisting of knowledge' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 7). Here\nthe doubt arises, whether the passage merely aims at making an\nadditional statement about the nature of the transmigrating soul (known\nalready from other sources), or at establishing the nature of the\nnon-transmigrating Self.\n\nThe purvapakshin maintains that the passage is concerned with the nature\nof the transmigrating soul, on account of the introductory and\nconcluding statements. For the introductory statement, 'He among the\npra/n/as who consists of knowledge,' contains marks indicatory of the\nembodied soul, and so likewise the concluding passage, 'And that great\nunborn Self is he who consists of cognition,' &c. (IV, 4, 22). We must\ntherefore adhere to the same subject-matter in the intermediate passages\nalso, and look on them as setting forth the same embodied Self,\nrepresented in its different states, viz. the waking state, and so on.\n\nIn reply to this, we maintain that the passage aims only at giving\ninformation about the highest Lord, not at making additional statements\nabout the embodied soul.--Why?--On account of the highest Lord being\ndesignated as different from the embodied soul, in the states of deep\nsleep and of departing from the body. His difference from the embodied\nsoul in the state of deep sleep is declared in the following passage,\n'This person embraced by the intelligent (praj/n/a) Self knows nothing\nthat is without, nothing that is within.' Here the term, 'the person,'\nmust mean the embodied soul; for of him it is possible to deny that he\nknows, because he, as being the knower, may know what is within and\nwithout. The 'intelligent Self,' on the other hand, is the highest Lord,\nbecause he is never dissociated from intelligence, i.e.--in his\ncase--all-embracing knowledge.--Similarly, the passage treating of\ndeparture, i.e. death ('this bodily Self mounted by the intelligent Self\nmoves along groaning'), refers to the highest Lord as different from the\nindividual Self. There also we have to understand by the 'embodied one'\nthe individual soul which is the Lord of the body, while the\n'intelligent one' is again the Lord. We thus understand that 'on account\nof his being designated as something different, in the states of deep\nsleep and departure,' the highest Lord forms the subject of the\npassage.--With reference to the purvapakshin's assertion that the entire\nchapter refers to the embodied Self, because indicatory marks of the\nlatter are found in its beginning, middle, and end, we remark that in\nthe first place the introductory passage ('He among the pra/n/as who\nconsists of cognition') does not aim at setting forth the character of\nthe transmigrating Self, but rather, while merely referring to the\nnature of the transmigrating Self as something already known, aims at\ndeclaring its identity with the highest Brahman; for it is manifest that\nthe immediately subsequent passage, 'as if thinking, as if moving'[227],\naims at discarding the attributes of the transmigrating Self. The\nconcluding passage again is analogous to the initial one; for the words,\n'And that great unborn Self is he who,' &c., mean: We have shown that\nthat same cognitional Self, which is observed among the pra/n/as, is the\ngreat unborn Self, i.e. the highest Lord--He, again, who imagines that\nthe passages intervening (between the two quoted) aim at setting forth\nthe nature of the transmigrating Self by representing it in the waking\nstate, and so on, is like a man who setting out towards the east, wants\nto set out at the same time towards the west. For in representing the\nstates of waking, and so on, the passage does not aim at describing the\nsoul as subject to different states or transmigration, but rather as\nfree from all particular conditions and transmigration. This is evident\nfrom the circumstance that on Janaka's question, which is repeated in\nevery section, 'Speak on for the sake of emancipation,' Yaj/n/avalkya\nreplies each time, 'By all that he is not affected, for that person is\nnot attached to anything' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 14-16). And later on he\nsays (IV, 3, 22), 'He is not followed by good, not followed by evil, for\nhe has then overcome all the sorrows of the heart.' We have, therefore,\nto conclude that the chapter exclusively aims at setting forth the\nnature of the non-transmigrating Self.\n\n43. And on account of such words as Lord, &c.\n\nThat the chapter aims at setting forth the nature of the\nnon-transmigrating Self, we have to conclude from that circumstance also\nthat there occur in it terms such as Lord and so on, intimating the\nnature of the non-transmigrating Self, and others excluding the nature\nof the transmigrating Self. To the first class belongs, for instance,\n'He is the lord of all, the king of all things, the protector of all\nthings.' To the latter class belongs the passage, 'He does not become\ngreater by good works, nor smaller by evil works.'--From all which we\nconclude that the chapter refers to the non-transmigrating highest Lord.\n\nNotes:\n\n[Footnote 164: From passages of which nature we may infer that in the\npassage under discussion also the 'abode' is Brahman.]\n\n[Footnote 165: From which circumstance we may conclude that the passage\nunder discussion also refers to Brahman.]\n\n[Footnote 166: Yat sarvam avidyaropita/m/ tat sarva/m/ paramarthato\nbrahma na tu yad brahma tat sarvam ity artha/h/. Bhamati.]\n\n[Footnote 167: So that the passage would have to be translated, 'That,\nviz. knowledge, &c. is the bridge of the Immortal.']\n\n[Footnote 168: Bhogyasya bhokt/ris/eshatvat tasyayatanatvam uktam\na/s/a@nkyaha na /k/eti, jivasyad/ri/sh/t/advara dyubhvadinimittatvezpi\nna sakshat tadayatanatvam aupadhikatvenavibhutvad ity artha/h/. Ananda\nGiri.]\n\n[Footnote 169: It would not have been requisite to introduce a special\nSutra for the individual soul--which, like the air, is already excluded\nby the preceding Sutra--if it were not for the new argument brought\nforward in the following Sutra which applies to the individual soul\nonly.]\n\n[Footnote 170: If the individual soul were meant by the abode of heaven,\nearth, &c., the statement regarding I/s/vara made in the passage about\nthe two birds would be altogether abrupt, and on that ground\nobjectionable. The same difficulty does not present itself with regard\nto the abrupt mention of the individual soul which is well known to\neverybody, and to which therefore casual allusions may be made.--I\nsubjoin Ananda Giri's commentary on the entire passage:\nJivasyopadhyaikyenavivakshitatvat tadj/n/anezpi sarvaj/n/anasiddhes\ntasyayatanatvadyabhave hetvantara/m/ va/k/yam ity a/s/a@nkya sutre/n/a\npariharati kuta/sk/etyadina. Tad vya/k/ash/t/e dyubhvaditi. Nirde/s/am\neva dar/s/ayati tayor iti. Vibhaktyartham aha tabhya/m/ /k/eti.\nSthitye/s/varasyadanaj jivasa/m/grahezpi katham i/s/varasyaiva\nvi/s/vayatanatva/m/ tadaha yaditi. I/s/varasyayanatvenaprak/ri/tatve\njivap/ri/thakkathananupapattir ity uktam eva vyatirekadvaraha anyatheti.\nJivasyayatanatvenaprak/ri/tatve tulyanupapattir iti /s/a@nkate nanviti.\nTasyaikyartha/m/ lokasiddhasyanuvadatvan naivam ity aha neti.\nJivasyapurvatvabhavenapratipadyatvam eva praka/t/ayati kshetraj/n/o\nhiti. I/s/varasyapi lokavadisiddhatvad apratipadyatety a/s/a@nkyaha\ni/s/varas tv iti.]\n\n[Footnote 171: As might be the prima facie conclusion from the particle\n'but' introducing the sentence 'but he in reality,' &c.]\n\n[Footnote 172: It being maintained that the passage referred to is to be\nviewed in connexion with the general subject-matter of the preceding\npast of the chapter.]\n\n[Footnote 173: And would thus involve a violation of a fundamental\nprinciple of the Mima/m/sa.]\n\n[Footnote 174: A remark directed against the possible attempt to explain\nthe passage last quoted as referring to the embodied soul.]\n\n[Footnote 175: Pi/nd/a/h/ sthulo deha/h/, pra/n/a/h/ sutratma. Ananda\nGiri.-The lower Brahman (hira/n/yagarbha on sutratman) is the vital\nprinciple (pra/n/a) in all creatures.]\n\n[Footnote 176: Sa/m/yagdar/s/ana, i.e. complete seeing or intuition; the\nsame term which in other places--where it is not requisite to insist on\nthe idea of 'seeing' in contradistinction from 'reflecting' or\n'meditating'--is rendered by perfect knowledge.]\n\n[Footnote 177: Translated above by 'of the shape of the individual\nsoul.']\n\n[Footnote 178: Pa/n/ini III, 3, 77, 'murtta/m/ ghana/h/.']\n\n[Footnote 179: So that the interpretation of the purvapakshin cannot be\nobjected to on the ground of its involving the comparison of a thing to\nitself.]\n\n[Footnote 180: So that no objection can be raised on the ground that\nheaven and earth cannot be contained in the small ether of the heart.]\n\n[Footnote 181: Viz. of that which is within it. Ananda Giri proposes two\nexplanations: na /k/eti, paravi/s/esha/n/atvenety atra paro daharaka/s/a\nupadanat tasminn iti saptamyanta-ta/kkh/abdasyeti /s/esha/h/. Yadva\npara/s/abdo s nta/h/sthavastuvishayas tadvi/s/esha/n/alvena tasminn iti\ndaharaka/s/asyokter ity artha/h/. Ta/kkh/abdasya\nsamnik/ri/sh/t/anvayayoge viprak/ri/sh/t/anvayasya jaghanyatvad\naka/s/antargata/m/ dhyeyam iti bhava/h/.]\n\n[Footnote 182: A vakyabheda--split of the sentence--takes place\naccording to the Mimam/s/a when one and the same sentence contains two\nnew statements which are different.]\n\n[Footnote 183: While the explanation of Brahman by jiva would compel us\nto assume that the word Brahman secondarily denotes the individual\nsoul.]\n\n[Footnote 184: Upalabdher adhish/th/anam brahma/n/a deha ishyate.\nTenasadhara/n/atvena deho brahmapuram bhavet. Bhamati.]\n\n[Footnote 185: I.e. Brahma, the lower Brahman.]\n\n[Footnote 186: The masculine 'avirbhutasvarupa/h/' qualifies the\nsubstantive jiva/h/ which has to be supplied. Properly speaking the jiva\nwhose true nature has become manifest, i.e. which has become Brahman, is\nno longer jiva; hence the explanatory statement that the term jiva is\nused with reference to what the jiva was before it became Brahman.]\n\n[Footnote 187: To state another reason showing that the first and second\nchapters of Prajapati's instruction refer to the same subject.]\n\n[Footnote 188: I.e. of whom cognition is not a mere attribute.]\n\n[Footnote 189: Although in reality there is no such thing as an\nindividual soul.]\n\n[Footnote 190: Nanu jivabrahma/n/or aikyam na kvapi sutrakaro mukhato\nvadati kim tu sarvatra bhedam eva, ato naikyam ish/t/am tatraha\npratipadyam tv iti.]\n\n[Footnote 191: This last sentence is directed against the possible\nobjection that '/s/abda,' which the Sutra brings forward as an argument\nin favour of the highest Lord being meant, has the sense of 'sentence'\n(vakya), and is therefore of less force than li@nga, i.e. indicatory or\ninferential mark which is represented in our passage by the\na@ngush/th/amatrata of the purusha, and favours the jiva interpretation.\n/S/abda, the text remarks, here means /s/ruti, i.e. direct enunciation,\nand /s/ruti ranks, as a means of proof, higher than li@nga.]\n\n[Footnote 192: I.e. men belonging to the three upper castes.]\n\n[Footnote 193: The first reason excludes animals, gods, and /ri/shis.\nGods cannot themselves perform sacrifices, the essential feature of\nwhich is the parting, on the part of the sacrificer, with an offering\nmeant for the gods. /Ri/shis cannot perform sacrifices in the course of\nwhose performance the ancestral /ri/shis of the sacrificer are\ninvoked.--The second reason excludes those men whose only desire is\nemancipation and who therefore do not care for the perishable fruits of\nsacrifices.--The third and fourth reasons exclude the /S/udras who are\nindirectly disqualified for /s/astric works because the Veda in\ndifferent places gives rules for the three higher castes only, and for\nwhom the ceremony of the upanayana--indispensable for all who wish to\nstudy the Veda--is not prescribed.--Cp. Purva Mima/m/sa Sutras VI, 1.]\n\n[Footnote 194: The reference is to Purva Mima/m/sa Sutras I, 1, 5 (not\nto I, 2, 21, as stated in Muir's Sanskrit Texts, III, p. 69).]\n\n[Footnote 195: In which classes of beings all the gods are comprised.]\n\n[Footnote 196: Which shows that together with the non-eternality of the\nthing denoted there goes the non-eternality of the denoting word.]\n\n[Footnote 197: Ak/ri/ti, best translated by [Greek: eidos].]\n\n[Footnote 198: The purvapakshin, i.e. here the grammarian maintains, for\nthe reasons specified further on, that there exists in the case of words\na supersensuous entity called spho/t/a which is manifested by the\nletters of the word, and, if apprehended by the mind, itself manifests\nthe sense of the word. The term spho/t/a may, according as it is viewed\nin either of these lights, be explained as the manifestor or that which\nis manifested.--The spho/t/a is a grammatical fiction, the word in so\nfar as it is apprehended by us as a whole. That we cannot identify it\nwith the 'notion' (as Deussen seems inclined to do, p. 80) follows from\nits being distinctly called va/k/aka or abhidhayaka, and its being\nrepresented as that which causes the conception of the sense of a word\n(arthadhihetu).]\n\n[Footnote 199: For that each letter by itself expresses the sense is not\nobserved; and if it did so, the other letters of the word would have to\nbe declared useless.]\n\n[Footnote 200: In order to enable us to apprehend the sense from the\nword, there is required the actual consciousness of the last letter plus\nthe impressions of the preceding letters; just as smoke enables us to\ninfer the existence of fire only if we are actually conscious of the\nsmoke. But that actual consciousness does not take place because the\nimpressions are not objects of perceptive consciousness.]\n\n[Footnote 201: 'How should it be so?' i.e. it cannot be so; and on that\naccount the differences apprehended do not belong to the letters\nthemselves, but to the external conditions mentioned above.]\n\n[Footnote 202: With 'or else' begins the exposition of the finally\naccepted theory as to the cause why the same letters are apprehended as\ndifferent. Hitherto the cause had been found in the variety of the\nupadhis of the letters. Now a new distinction is made between\narticulated letters and non-articulated tone.]\n\n[Footnote 203: I.e. it is not directly one idea, for it has for its\nobject more than one letter; but it may be called one in a secondary\nsense because it is based on the determinative knowledge that the\nletters, although more than one, express one sense only.]\n\n[Footnote 204: Which circumstance proves that exalted knowledge\nappertains not only to Hira/n/yagarbha, but to many beings.]\n\n[Footnote 205: Viz. naraka, the commentaries say.]\n\n[Footnote 206: Asmin kalpe sarvesham pra/n/inam dahapakapraka/s/akari\nyozyam agnir d/ris/yate sozyam agni/h/ purvasmin kalpe manushya/h/ san\ndevatvapadaprapaka/m/ karmanush/th/ayasmin kalpa etaj janma labdhavan\nata/h/ purvasmin kalpe sa manushyo bhavini/m/ sa/m/j/n/am a/sri/tyagnir\niti vyapadi/s/yate.--Saya/n/a on the quoted passage.]\n\n[Footnote 207: As, for instance, 'So long as Aditya rises in the east\nand sets in the west' (Ch. Up. III, 6, 4).]\n\n[Footnote 208: Whence it follows that the devas are not personal beings,\nand therefore not qualified for the knowledge of Brahman.]\n\n[Footnote 209: Yama, for instance, being ordinarily represented as a\nperson with a staff in his hand, Varu/n/a with a noose, Indra with a\nthunderbolt, &c. &c.]\n\n[Footnote 210: On the proper function of arthavada and mantra according\nto the Mima/m/sa, cp. Arthasa/m/graha, Introduction.]\n\n[Footnote 211: See above, p. 197.]\n\n[Footnote 212: Which can be offered by kshattriyas only.]\n\n[Footnote 213: /S/rautali@ngenanumanabadha/m/ dar/s/ayitva smartenapi\ntadbadha/m/ dar/s/ayati smartam iti. Ki/m/ atra brahma am/ri/tam ki/m/\nsvid vedyam anuttamam, /k/intayet tatra vai gatva gandharvo mam\nap/rikkh/ata, Vi/s/vavasus tato rajan vedantaj/n/anakovida iti\nmokshadharme janakayaj/n/avalkyasa/m/vadat prahladajagarasa/m/vada/k/\n/k/oktanumanasiddhir ity artha/h/.]\n\n[Footnote 214: As opposed to an action to be accomplished.]\n\n[Footnote 215: Of this nature is, for instance, the arthavada, 'Fire is\na remedy for cold.']\n\n[Footnote 216: Of this nature is, for instance, the passage 'the\nsacrificial post is the sun' (i.e. possesses the qualities of the sun,\nluminousness, &c.; a statement contradicted by perception).]\n\n[Footnote 217: And therefore to suppose that a divinity is nothing but a\ncertain word forming part of a mantra.]\n\n[Footnote 218: The rajasuya-sacrifice is to be offered by a prince who\nwishes to become the ruler of the whole earth.]\n\n[Footnote 219: In one of whose stages the being desirous of final\nemancipation becomes a deva.]\n\n[Footnote 220: The commentaries explain 'therefore' by 'on account of\nhis being devoid of the three sacred fires.' This explanation does not,\nhowever, agree with the context of the Taitt. Sa/m/h.]\n\n[Footnote 221: The /S/udra not having acquired a knowledge of Vedic\nmatters in the legitimate way, i.e. through the study of the Veda under\nthe guidance of a guru, is unfit for sacrifices as well as for vidya.]\n\n[Footnote 222: The li@nga contained in the word '/S/udra' has no proving\npower as it occurs in an arthavada-passage which has no authority if not\nconnected with a corresponding injunctive passage. In our case the\nli@nga in the arthavada-passage is even directly contradicted by those\ninjunctions which militate against the /S/udras' qualification for Vedic\nmatters.]\n\n[Footnote 223: Ha/m/savakyad atmanoznadara/m/ /s/rutva jana/s/rute/h/\n/s/ug utpannety etad eva katha/m/ gamyate yenasau /s/udra/s/abdena\nsa/k/yate tatraha sp/ris/yate /k/eti. Ananda Giri.]\n\n[Footnote 224: I translate this passage as I find it in all MSS. of\n/S/a@nkara consulted by me (noting, however, that some MSS. read\n/k/aitrarathinamaika/h/). Ananda Giri expressly explains tasmad by\n/k/aitrarathad ity artha/h/.--The text of the Ta/nd/ya Br. runs:\ntasma/k/ /k/aitrarathinam eka/h/ kshatrapatir gayate, and the commentary\nexplains: tasmat kara/n/ad adyapi /k/itrava/ms/otpannana/m/ madhye eka\neva raja kshatrapatir baladhipatir bhavati.--Grammar does not authorise\nthe form /k/ahraratha used in the Sutra.]\n\n[Footnote 225: The king A/s/vapati receives some Brahma/n/as as his\npupils without insisting on the upanayana. This express statement of the\nupanayana having been omitted in a certain case shows it to be the\ngeneral rule.]\n\n[Footnote 226: As the words stand in the original they might be\ntranslated as follows (and are so translated by the purvapakshin),\n'Whatever there is, the whole world trembles in the pra/n/a, there goes\nforth (from it) a great terror, viz. the raised thunderbolt.']\n\n[Footnote 227: The stress lies here on the 'as if.' which intimate that\nthe Self does not really think or move.]\n\n\n\n\nFOURTH PADA.\n\nREVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!\n\n\n1. If it be said that some (mention) that which is based on inference\n(i.e. the pradhana); we deny this, because (the term alluded to) refers\nto what is contained in the simile of the body (i.e. the body itself);\nand (that the text) shows.\n\nIn the preceding part of this work--as whose topic there has been set\nforth an enquiry into Brahman--we have at first defined Brahman (I, 1,\n2); we have thereupon refuted the objection that that definition applies\nto the pradhana also, by showing that there is no scriptural authority\nfor the latter (I, 1, 5), and we have shown in detail that the common\npurport of all Vedanta-texts is to set forth the doctrine that Brahman,\nand not the pradha/n/a, is the cause of the world. Here, however, the\nSa@nkhya again raises an objection which he considers not to have been\nfinally disposed of.\n\nIt has not, he says, been satisfactorily proved that there is no\nscriptural authority for the pradhana; for some /s/akhas contain\nexpressions which seem to convey the idea of the pradhana. From this it\nfollows that Kapila and other supreme /ri/shis maintain the doctrine of\nthe pradhana being the general cause only because it is based on the\nVeda.--As long therefore as it has not been proved that those passages\nto which the Sa@nkhyas refer have a different meaning (i.e. do not\nallude to the pradhana), all our previous argumentation as to the\nomniscient Brahman being the cause of the world must be considered as\nunsettled. We therefore now begin a new chapter which aims at proving\nthat those passages actually have a different meaning.\n\nThe Sa@nkhyas maintain that that also which is based on inference, i.e.\nthe pradhana, is perceived in the text of some /s/akhas. We read, for\ninstance, they say, in the Ka/th/aka (I, 3, 11), 'Beyond the Great there\nis the Undeveloped, beyond the Undeveloped there is the Person.' There\nwe recognise, named by the same names and enumerated in the same order,\nthe three entities with which we are acquainted from the\nSa@nkhya-sm/ri/ti, viz. the great principle, the Undeveloped (the\npradhana), and the soul[228]. That by the Undeveloped is meant the\npradhana is to be concluded from the common use of Sm/ri/ti and from the\netymological interpretation of which the word admits, the pradhana being\ncalled undeveloped because it is devoid of sound and other qualities. It\ncannot therefore be asserted that there is no scriptural authority for\nthe pradhana. And this pradhana vouched for by Scripture we declare to\nbe the cause of the world, on the ground of Scripture, Sm/ri/ti, and\nratiocination.\n\nYour reasoning, we reply, is not valid. The passage from the Ka/th/aka\nquoted by you intimates by no means the existence of that great\nprinciple and that Undeveloped which are known from the\nSa@nkhya-sm/ri/ti. We do not recognise there the pradhana of the\nSa@nkhyas, i.e. an independent general cause consisting of three\nconstituting elements; we merely recognise the word 'Undeveloped,' which\ndoes not denote any particular determined thing, but may--owing to its\netymological meaning, 'that which is not developed, not\nmanifest'--denote anything subtle and difficult to distinguish. The\nSa@nkhyas indeed give to the word a settled meaning, as they apply it to\nthe pradhana; but then that meaning is valid for their system only, and\nhas no force in the determination of the sense of the Veda. Nor does\nmere equality of position prove equality of being, unless the latter be\nrecognised independently. None but a fool would think a cow to be a\nhorse because he sees it tied in the usual place of a horse. We,\nmoreover, conclude, on the strength of the general subject-matter, that\nthe passage does not refer to the pradhana the fiction of the Sa@nkhyas,\n'on account of there being referred to that which is contained in the\nsimile of the body.' This means that the body which is mentioned in the\nsimile of the chariot is here referred to as the Undeveloped. We infer\nthis from the general subject-matter of the passage and from the\ncircumstance of nothing else remaining.--The immediately preceding part\nof the chapter exhibits the simile in which the Self, the body, and so\non, are compared to the lord of a chariot, a chariot, &c., 'Know the\nSelf to be the lord of the chariot, the body to be the chariot, the\nintellect the charioteer, and the mind the reins. The senses they call\nthe horses, the objects of the senses their roads. When he (the Self) is\nin union with the body, the senses and the mind, then wise people call\nhim the enjoyer.' The text then goes on to say that he whose senses, &c.\nare not well controlled enters into sa/m/sara, while he who has them\nunder control reaches the end of the journey, the highest place of\nVish/n/u. The question then arises: What is the end of the journey, the\nhighest place of Vish/n/u? Whereupon the text explains that the highest\nSelf which is higher than the senses, &c., spoken of is the end of the\njourney, the highest place of Vish/n/u. 'Beyond the senses there are the\nobjects, beyond the objects there is the mind, beyond the mind there is\nthe intellect, the great Self is beyond the intellect. Beyond the great\nthere is the Undeveloped, beyond the Undeveloped there is the Person.\nBeyond the Person there is nothing--this is the goal, the highest Road.'\nIn this passage we recognise the senses, &c. which in the preceding\nsimile had been compared to horses and so on, and we thus avoid the\nmistake of abandoning the matter in hand and taking up a new subject.\nThe senses, the intellect, and the mind are referred to in both passages\nunder the same names. The objects (in the second passage) are the\nobjects which are (in the former passage) designated as the roads of the\nsenses; that the objects are beyond (higher than) the senses is known\nfrom the scriptural passage representing the senses as grahas, i.e.\ngraspers, and the objects as atigrahas, i.e. superior to the grahas\n(B/ri/ Up. III, 2). The mind (manas) again is superior to the objects,\nbecause the relation of the senses and their objects is based on the\nmind. The intellect (buddhi) is higher than the mind, since the objects\nof enjoyment are conveyed to the soul by means of the intellect. Higher\nthan the intellect is the great Self which was represented as the lord\nof the chariot in the passage, 'Know the Self to be the lord of the\nchariot.' That the same Self is referred to in both passages is manifest\nfrom the repeated use of the word 'Self;' that the Self is superior to\nintelligence is owing to the circumstance that the enjoyer is naturally\nsuperior to the instrument of enjoyment. The Self is appropriately\ncalled great as it is the master.--Or else the phrase 'the great Self'\nmay here denote the intellect of the first-born Hira/n/yagarbha which is\nthe basis of all intellects; in accordance with the following\nSm/ri/ti-passage it is called mind, the great one; reflection, Brahman;\nthe stronghold, intellect; enunciation, the Lord; highest knowledge,\nconsciousness; thought, remembrance[229], and likewise with the\nfollowing scriptural passage, 'He (Hira/n/ya-garbha) who first creates\nBrahman and delivers the Vedas to him' (/S/vet. Up. VI, 18). The\nintellect, which in the former passage had been referred to under its\ncommon name buddhi, is here mentioned separately, since it may be\nrepresented as superior to our human intellects. On this latter\nexplanation of the term 'the great Self,' we must assume that the\npersonal Self which in the simile had been compared to the charioteer\nis, in the latter passage, included in the highest person (mentioned\nlast); to which there is no objection, since in reality the personal\nSelf and the highest Self are identical.--Thus there remains now the\nbody only which had before been compared to a chariot. We therefore\nconclude that the text after having enumerated the senses and all the\nother things mentioned before, in order to point out the highest place,\npoints out by means of the one remaining word, viz. avyakta, the only\nthing remaining out of those which had been mentioned before, viz. the\nbody. The entire passage aims at conveying the knowledge of the unity of\nthe inward Self and Brahman, by describing the soul's passing through\nsa/m/sara and release under the form of a simile in which the body, &c.\nof the soul--which is affected by Nescience and therefore joined to a\nbody, senses, mind, intellect, objects, sensations, &c.--are compared to\na chariot, and so on.--In accordance with this the subsequent verse\nstates the difficulty of knowing the highest place of Vish/n/u ('the\nSelf is hidden in all beings and does not shine forth, but it is seen by\nsubtle seers through their sharp and subtle intellect'), and after that\nthe next verse declares Yoga to be the means of attaining that\ncognition. 'A wise man should keep down speech in the mind, he should\nkeep down the mind in intelligence, intelligence he should keep down\nwithin the great Self, and he should keep that within the quiet\nSelf.'--That means: The wise man should restrain the activity of the\nouter organs such as speech, &c., and abide within the mind only; he\nshould further restrain the mind which is intent on doubtful external\nobjects within intelligence, whose characteristic mark is decision,\nrecognising that indecision is evil; he should further restrain\nintelligence within the great Self, i.e. the individual soul or else the\nfundamental intellect; he should finally fix the great Self on the calm\nSelf, i.e. the highest Self, the highest goal, of which the whole\nchapter treats.--If we in this manner review the general context, we\nperceive that there is no room for the pradhana imagined by the\nSankhyas.\n\n2. But the subtle (body is meant by the term avyakta) on account of its\ncapability (of being so designated).\n\nIt has been asserted, under the preceding Sutra, that the term 'the\nUndeveloped' signifies, on account of the general subject-matter and\nbecause the body only remains, the body and not the pradhana of the\nSa@nkhyas.--But here the following doubt arises: How can the word\n'undeveloped' appropriately denote the body which, as a gross and\nclearly appearing thing, should rather be called vyakta, i.e. that which\nis developed or manifested?\n\nTo this doubt the Sutra replies that what the term avyakta denotes is\nthe subtle causal body. Anything subtle may be spoken of as Undeveloped.\nThe gross body indeed cannot directly be termed 'undeveloped,' but the\nsubtle parts of the elements from which the gross body originates may be\ncalled so, and that the term denoting the causal substance is applied to\nthe effect also is a matter of common occurrence; compare, for instance,\nthe phrase 'mix the Soma with cows, i.e. milk' (/Ri/g-veda. S. IX, 46,\n4). Another scriptural passage also--'now all this was then undeveloped'\n(B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 7)--shows that this, i.e. this developed world with\nits distinction of names and forms, is capable of being termed\nundeveloped in so far as in a former condition it was in a merely\nseminal or potential state, devoid of the later evolved distinctions of\nname and form.\n\n3. (Such a previous seminal condition of the world may be admitted) on\naccount of its dependency on him (the Lord); (for such an admission is)\naccording to reason.\n\nHere a new objection is raised.--If, the opponent says, in order to\nprove the possibility of the body being called undeveloped you admit\nthat this world in its antecedent seminal condition before either names\nor forms are evolved can be called undeveloped, you virtually concede\nthe doctrine that the pradhana is the cause of the world. For we\nSa@nkhyas understand by the term pradhana nothing but that antecedent\ncondition of the world.\n\nThings lie differently, we rejoin. If we admitted some antecedent state\nof the world as the independent cause of the actual world, we should\nindeed implicitly, admit the pradhana doctrine. What we admit is,\nhowever, only a previous state dependent on the highest Lord, not an\nindependent state. A previous stage of the world such as the one assumed\nby us must necessarily be admitted, since it is according to sense and\nreason. For without it the highest Lord could not be conceived as\ncreator, as he could not become active if he were destitute of the\npotentiality of action. The existence of such a causal potentiality\nrenders it moreover possible that the released souls should not enter on\nnew courses of existence, as it is destroyed by perfect knowledge. For\nthat causal potentiality is of the nature of Nescience; it is rightly\ndenoted by the term 'undeveloped;' it has the highest Lord for its\nsubstratum; it is of the nature of an illusion; it is a universal sleep\nin which are lying the transmigrating souls destitute for the time of\nthe consciousness of their individual character.[230] This undeveloped\nprinciple is sometimes denoted by the term aka/s/a, ether; so, for\ninstance, in the passage, 'In that Imperishable then, O Gargi, the ether\nis woven like warp and woof' (B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 11). Sometimes, again,\nit is denoted by the term akshara, the Imperishable; so, for instance\n(Mu. Up. II, 1, 2), 'Higher, than the high Imperishable.' Sometimes it\nis spoken of as Maya, illusion; so, for instance (/S/ve. Up. IV, 10),\n'Know then Prak/ri/ti is Maya, and the great Lord he who is affected\nwith Maya.' For Maya is properly called undeveloped or non-manifested\nsince it cannot be defined either as that which is or that which is\nnot.--The statement of the Ka/th/aka that 'the Undeveloped is beyond the\nGreat one' is based on the fact of the Great one originating from the\nUndeveloped, if the Great one be the intellect of Hira/n/yagarbha. If,\non the other hand, we understand by the Great one the individual soul,\nthe statement is founded on the fact of the existence of the individual\nsoul depending on the Undeveloped, i.e. Nescience. For the continued\nexistence of the individual soul as such is altogether owing to the\nrelation in which it stands to Nescience. The quality of being beyond\nthe Great one which in the first place belongs to the Undeveloped, i.e.\nNescience, is attributed to the body which is the product of Nescience,\nthe cause and the effect being considered as identical. Although the\nsenses, &c. are no less products of Nescience, the term 'the\nUndeveloped' here refers to the body only, the senses, &c. having\nalready been specially mentioned by their individual names, and the body\nalone being left.--Other interpreters of the two last Sutras give a\nsomewhat different explanation[231].--There are, they say, two kinds of\nbody, the gross one and the subtle one. The gross body is the one which\nis perceived; the nature of the subtle one will be explained later on.\n(Ved. Su. III, 1, 1.) Both these bodies together were in the simile\ncompared to the chariot; but here (in the passage under discussion) only\nthe subtle body is referred to as the Undeveloped, since the subtle body\nonly is capable of being denoted by that term. And as the soul's passing\nthrough bondage and release depends on the subtle body, the latter is\nsaid to be beyond the soul, like the things (arthavat), i.e. just as the\nobjects are said to be beyond the senses because the activity of the\nlatter depends on the objects.--But how--we ask interpreters--is it\npossible that the word 'Undeveloped' should refer to the subtle body\nonly, while, according to your opinion, both bodies had in the simile\nbeen represented as a chariot, and so equally constitute part of the\ntopic of the chapter, and equally remain (to be mentioned in the passage\nunder discussion)?--If you should rejoin that you are authorised to\nsettle the meaning of what the text actually mentions, but not to find\nfault with what is not mentioned, and that the word avyakta which occurs\nin the text can denote only the subtle body, but not the gross body\nwhich is vyakta, i.e. developed or manifest; we invalidate this\nrejoinder by remarking that the determination of the sense depends on\nthe circumstance of the passages interpreted constituting a syntactical\nwhole. For if the earlier and the later passage do not form a whole they\nconvey no sense, since that involves the abandonment of the subject\nstarted and the taking up of a new subject. But syntactical unity cannot\nbe established unless it be on the ground of there being a want of a\ncomplementary part of speech or sentence. If you therefore construe the\nconnexion of the passages without having regard to the fact that the\nlatter passage demands as its complement that both bodies (which had\nbeen spoken of in the former passage) should be understood as referred\nto, you destroy all syntactical unity and so incapacitate yourselves\nfrom arriving at the true meaning of the text. Nor must you think that\nthe second passage occupies itself with the subtle body only, for that\nreason that the latter is not easily distinguished from the Self, while\nthe gross body is easily so distinguished on account of its readily\nperceived loathsomeness. For the passage does not by any means refer to\nsuch a distinction--as we conclude from the circumstance of there being\nno verb enjoining it--but has for its only subject the highest place of\nVish/n/u, which had been mentioned immediately before. For after having\nenumerated a series of things in which the subsequent one is always\nsuperior to the one preceding it, it concludes by saying that nothing is\nbeyond the Person.--We might, however, accept the interpretation just\ndiscussed without damaging our general argumentation; for whichever\nexplanation we receive, so much remains clear that the Ka/th/aka passage\ndoes not refer to the pradhana.\n\n4. And (the pradhana cannot be meant) because there is no statement as\nto (the avyakta) being something to be cognised.\n\nThe Sa@nkhyas, moreover, represent the pradhana as something to be\ncognised in so far as they say that from the knowledge of the difference\nof the constitutive elements of the pradhana and of the soul there\nresults the desired isolation of the soul. For without a knowledge of\nthe nature of those constitutive elements it is impossible to cognise\nthe difference of the soul from them. And somewhere they teach that the\npradhana is to be cognised by him who wishes to attain special\npowers.--Now in the passage under discussion the avyakta is not\nmentioned as an object of knowledge; we there meet with the mere word\navyakta, and there is no sentence intimating that the avyakta is to be\nknown or meditated upon. And it is impossible to maintain that a\nknowledge of things which (knowledge) is not taught in the text is of\nany advantage to man.--For this reason also we maintain that the word\navyakta cannot denote the pradhana.--Our interpretation, on the other\nhand, is unobjectionable, since according to it the passage mentions the\nbody (not as an object of knowledge, but merely) for the purpose of\nthrowing light on the highest place of Vish/n/u, in continuation of the\nsimile in which the body had been compared to a chariot.\n\n5. And if you maintain that the text does speak (of the pradhana as an\nobject of knowledge) we deny that; for the intelligent (highest) Self is\nmeant, on account of the general subject-matter.\n\nHere the Sa@nkhya raises a new objection, and maintains that the\naverment made in the last Sutra is not proved, since the text later on\nspeaks of the pradhana--which had been referred to as the\nUndeveloped--as an object of knowledge. 'He who has perceived that which\nis without sound, without touch, without form, without decay, without\ntaste, eternal, without smell, without beginning, without end, beyond\nthe great and unchangeable, is freed from the jaws of death' (Ka. Up.\nII, 3, 15). For here the text speaks of the pradhana, which is beyond\nthe great, describing it as possessing the same qualities which the\nSa@nkhya-sm/ri/ti ascribes to it, and designating it as the object of\nperception. Hence we conclude that the pradhana is denoted by the term\navyakta.\n\nTo this we reply that the passage last quoted does represent as the\nobject of perception not the pradhana but the intelligent, i.e. the\nhighest Self. We conclude this from the general subject-matter. For that\nthe highest Self continues to form the subject-matter is clear from the\nfollowing reasons. In the first place, it is referred to in the passage,\n'Beyond the person there is nothing, this is the goal, the highest\nRoad;' it has further to be supplied as the object of knowledge in the\npassage, 'The Self is hidden in all beings and does not shine forth,'\nbecause it is there spoken of as difficult to know; after that the\nrestraint of passion, &c. is enjoined as conducive to its cognition, in\nthe passage, 'A wise man should keep down speech within the mind;' and,\nfinally, release from the jaws of death is declared to be the fruit of\nits knowledge. The Sa@nkhyas, on the other hand, do not suppose that a\nman is freed from the jaws of death merely by perceiving the pradhana,\nbut connect that result rather with the cognition of the intelligent\nSelf.--The highest Self is, moreover, spoken of in all Vedanta-texts as\npossessing just those qualities which are mentioned in the passage\nquoted above, viz. absence of sound, and the like. Hence it follows,\nthat the pradhana is in the text neither spoken of as the object of\nknowledge nor denoted by the term avyakta.\n\n6. And there is question and explanation relative to three things only\n(not to the pradhana).\n\nTo the same conclusion we are led by the consideration of the\ncircumstance that the Ka/th/avalli-upanishad brings forward, as subjects\nof discussion, only three things, viz. the fire sacrifice, the\nindividual soul, and the highest Self. These three things only Yama\nexplains, bestowing thereby the boons he had granted, and to them only\nthe questions of Na/k/iketas refer. Nothing else is mentioned or\nenquired about. The question relative to the fire sacrifice is contained\nin the passage (Ka. Up. I, 1, 13), 'Thou knowest, O Death, the fire\nsacrifice which leads us to Heaven; tell it to me, who am full of\nfaith.' The question as to the individual soul is contained in I, 1, 20,\n'There is that doubt when a man is dead, some saying, he is; others, he\nis not. This I should like to know, taught by thee; this is the third of\nmy boons.' And the question about the highest Self is asked in the\npassage (I, 2, 14), 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that, as\nneither effect nor cause, as neither past nor future, tell me\nthat.'--The corresponding answers are given in I, 1, 15, 'Yama then told\nhim that fire sacrifice, the beginning of all the worlds, and what\nbricks are required for the altar, and how many;' in the passage met\nwith considerably later on (II, 5, 6; 7), 'Well then, O Gautama, I shall\ntell thee this mystery, the old Brahman and what happens to the Self\nafter reaching death. Some enter the womb in order to have a body as\norganic beings, others go into inorganic matter according to their work\nand according to their knowledge;' and in the passage (I, 2, 18), 'The\nknowing Self is not born nor does it die,' &c.; which latter passage\ndilates at length on the highest Self. But there is no question relative\nto the pradhana, and hence no opportunity for any remarks on it.\n\nHere the Sa@nkhya advances a new objection. Is, he asks, the question\nrelative to the Self which is asked in the passage, 'There is that doubt\nwhen a man is dead,' &c., again resumed in the passage, 'That which thou\nseest as neither this nor that,' &c, or does the latter passage raise a\ndistinct new question? If the former, the two questions about the Self\ncoalesce into one, and there are therefore altogether two questions\nonly, one relative to the fire sacrifice, the other relative to the\nSelf. In that case the Sutra has no right to speak of questions and\nexplanations relating to three subjects.--If the latter, you do not\nconsider it a mistake to assume a question in excess of the number of\nboons granted, and can therefore not object to us if we assume an\nexplanation about the pradhana in excess of the number of questions\nasked.\n\nTo this we make the following reply.--We by no means assume a question\nin excess of the number of boons granted, being prevented from doing so\nby the influence of the opening part of that syntactical whole which\nconstitutes the Ka/th/avalli-upanishad. The Upanishad starts with the\ntopic of the boons granted by Yama, and all the following part of the\nUpanishad--which is thrown into the form of a colloquy of Yama and\nNa/k/iketas--carries on that topic up to the very end. Yama grants to\nNa/k/iketas, who had been sent by his father, three boons. For his first\nboon Na/k/iketas chooses kindness on the part of his father towards him,\nfor his second boon the knowledge of the fire sacrifice, for his third\nboon the knowledge of the Self. That the knowledge of the Self is the\nthird boon appears from the indication contained in the passage (I, 1,\n20), 'There is that doubt--; this is the third of my boons.'--If we\ntherefore supposed that the passage, 'That which thou seest as neither\nthis nor that,' &c., raises a new question, we should thereby assume a\nquestion in excess of the number of boons granted, and thus destroy the\nconnexion of the entire Upanishad.--But--the Sa@nkhya will perhaps\ninterpose--it must needs be admitted that the passage last quoted does\nraise a new question, because the subject enquired about is a new one.\nFor the former question refers to the individual soul, as we conclude\nfrom the doubt expressed in the words, 'There is that doubt when a man\nis dead--some saying, he is; others, he is not.' Now this individual\nsoul, as having definite attributes, &c., cannot constitute the object\nof a question expressed in such terms as, 'This which thou seest as\nneither this nor that,' &c.; the highest Self, on the other hand, may be\nenquired about in such terms, since it is above all attributes. The\nappearance of the two questions is, moreover, seen to differ; for the\nformer question refers to existence and non-existence, while the latter\nis concerned with an entity raised above all definite attributes, &c.\nHence we conclude that the latter question, in which the former one\ncannot be recognised, is a separate question, and does not merely resume\nthe subject of the former one.--All this argumentation is not valid, we\nreply, since we maintain the unity of the highest Self and the\nindividual Self. If the individual Self were different from the highest\nSelf, we should have to declare that the two questions are separate\nindependent questions, but the two are not really different, as we know\nfrom other scriptural passages, such as 'Thou art that.' And in the\nUpanishad under discussion also the answer to the question, 'That which\nthou seest as neither this nor that,' viz. the passage, 'The knowing\nSelf is not born, it dies not'--which answer is given in the form of a\ndenial of the birth and death of the Self-clearly shows that the\nembodied Self and the highest Self are non-different. For there is room\nfor a denial of something only when that something is possible, and the\npossibility of birth and death exists in the embodied Self only, since\nit is connected with the body, but not in the highest Self.--There is,\nmoreover, another passage conveying the same meaning, viz. II, 4, 4,\n'The wise when he knows that that by which he perceives all objects in\nsleep or in waking, is the great omnipresent Self, grieves no more.'\nThis passage makes the cessation of all grief dependent on the knowledge\nof the individual Self, in so far as it possesses the qualities of\ngreatness and omnipresence, and thereby declares that the individual\nSelf is not different from the highest Self. For that the cessation of\nall sorrow is consequent on the knowledge of the highest Self, is a\nrecognised Vedanta tenet.--There is another passage also warning men not\nto look on the individual Self and the highest Self as different\nentities, viz. II, 4, 10, 'What is here the same is there; and what is\nthere the same is here. He who sees any difference here goes from death\nto death.'--The following circumstance, too, is worthy of consideration.\nWhen Na/k/iketas has asked the question relating to the existence or\nnon-existence of the soul after death, Yama tries to induce him to\nchoose another boon, tempting him with the offer of various objects of\ndesire. But Na/k/iketas remains firm. Thereupon Death, dwelling on the\ndistinction of the Good and the Pleasant, and the distinction of wisdom\nand ignorance, praises Na/k/iketas, 'I believe Na/k/iketas to be one who\ndesires knowledge, for even many pleasures did not tear thee away' (I,\n2, 4); and later on praises the question asked by Na/k/iketas, 'The wise\nwho, by means of meditation on his Self, recognises the Ancient who is\ndifficult to be seen, who has entered into the dark, who is hidden in\nthe cave, who dwells in the abyss, as God, he indeed leaves joy and\nsorrow far behind' (I, 2, 12). Now all this means to intimate that the\nindividual Self and the highest Self are non-different. For if\nNa/k/iketas set aside the question, by asking which he had earned for\nhimself the praise of Yama, and after having received that praise asked\na new question, all that praise would have been bestowed on him unduly.\nHence it follows that the question implied in I, 2, 14, 'That which thou\nseest as neither this nor that,' merely resumes the topic to which the\nquestion in I, 1, 20 had referred.--Nor is there any basis to the\nobjection that the two questions differ in form. The second question, in\nreality, is concerned with the same distinction as the first. The first\nenquires about the existence of the soul apart from the body, &c.; the\nsecond refers to the circumstance of that soul not being subject to\nsa/m/sara. For as long as Nescience remains, so long the soul is\naffected with definite attributes, &c.; but as soon as Nescience comes\nto an end, the soul is one with the highest Self, as is taught by such\nscriptural texts as 'Thou art that.' But whether Nescience be active or\ninactive, no difference is made thereby in the thing itself (viz. the\nsoul). A man may, in the dark, mistake a piece of rope lying on the\nground for a snake, and run away from it, frightened and trembling;\nthereon another man may tell him, 'Do not be afraid, it is only a rope,\nnot a snake;' and he may then dismiss the fear caused by the imagined\nsnake, and stop running. But all the while the presence and subsequent\nabsence of his erroneous notion, as to the rope being a snake, make no\ndifference whatever in the rope itself. Exactly analogous is the case of\nthe individual soul which is in reality one with the highest soul,\nalthough Nescience makes it appear different. Hence the reply contained\nin the passage, 'It is not born, it dies not,' is also to be considered\nas furnishing an answer to the question asked in I, 1, 20.--The Sutra is\nto be understood with reference to the distinction of the individual\nSelf and the highest Self which results from Nescience. Although the\nquestion relating to the Self is in reality one only, yet its former\npart (I, 1, 20) is seen specially to refer to the individual Self, since\nthere a doubt is set forth as to the existence of the soul when, at the\ntime of death, it frees itself from the body, and since the specific\nmarks of the sa/m/sara-state, such as activity, &c. are not denied;\nwhile the latter part of the question (I, 2, 14), where the state of\nbeing beyond all attributes is spoken of, clearly refers to the highest\nSelf.--For these reasons the Sutra is right in assuming three topics of\nquestion and explanation, viz. the fire sacrifice, the individual soul,\nand the highest Self. Those, on the other hand, who assume that the\npradhana constitutes a fourth subject discussed in the Upanishad, can\npoint neither to a boon connected with it, nor to a question, nor to an\nanswer. Hence the pradhana hypothesis is clearly inferior to our own.\n\n7. And (the case of the term avyakta) is like that of the term mahat.\n\nWhile the Sa@nkhyas employ the term 'the Great one,' to denote the\nfirst-born entity, which is mere existence[232] (? viz. the intellect),\nthe term has a different meaning in Vedic use. This we see from its\nbeing connected with the Self, &c. in such passages as the following,\n'The great Self is beyond the Intellect' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 10); 'The great\nomnipresent Self' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 23); 'I know that great person' (/S/ve.\nUp. III, 8). We thence conclude that the word avyakta also, where it\noccurs in the Veda, cannot denote the pradhana.--The pradhana is\ntherefore a mere thing of inference, and not vouched for by Scripture.\n\n8. (It cannot be maintained that aja means the pradhana) because no\nspecial characteristic is stated; as in the case of the cup.\n\nHere the advocate of the pradhana comes again forward and maintains that\nthe absence of scriptural authority for the pradhana is not yet proved.\nFor, he says, we have the following mantra (/S/ve. Up. IV, 5), 'There is\none aja[233], red, white, and black, producing manifold offspring of the\nsame nature. There is one aja who loves her and lies by her; there is\nanother who leaves her after having enjoyed her.'--In this mantra the\nwords 'red,' 'white,' and 'black' denote the three constituent elements\nof the pradhana. Passion is called red on account of its colouring, i.e.\ninfluencing property; Goodness is called white, because it is of the\nnature of Light; Darkness is called black on account of its covering and\nobscuring property. The state of equipoise of the three constituent\nelements, i.e. the pradhana, is denoted by the attributes of its parts,\nand is therefore called red-white-black. It is further called aja, i.e.\nunborn, because it is acknowledged to be the fundamental matter out of\nwhich everything springs, not a mere effect.--But has not the word aja\nthe settled meaning of she-goat?--True; but the ordinary meaning of the\nword cannot be accepted in this place, because true knowledge forms the\ngeneral subject-matter.--That pradhana produces many creatures\nparticipating in its three constituent elements. One unborn being loves\nher and lies by her, i.e. some souls, deluded by ignorance, approach\nher, and falsely imagining that they experience pleasure or pain, or are\nin a state of dulness, pass through the course of transmigratory\nexistence. Other souls, again, which have attained to discriminative\nknowledge, lose their attachment to prak/ri/ti, and leave her after\nhaving enjoyed her, i.e. after she has afforded to them enjoyment and\nrelease.--On the ground of this passage, as interpreted above, the\nfollowers of Kapila claim the authority of Scripture for their pradhana\nhypothesis.\n\nTo this argumentation we reply, that the quoted mantra by no means\nproves the Sa@nkhya doctrine to be based on Scripture. That mantra,\ntaken by itself, is not able to give additional strength to any\ndoctrine. For, by means of some supposition or other, the terms aja, &c.\ncan be reconciled with any doctrine, and there is no reason for the\nspecial assertion that the Sa@nkhya doctrine only is meant. The case is\nanalogous to that of the cup mentioned in the mantra, 'There is a cup\nhaving its mouth below and its bottom above' (B/ri/. Up. II, 2, 3). Just\nas it is impossible to decide on the ground of this mantra taken by\nitself what special cup is meant--it being possible to ascribe, somehow\nor other, the quality of the mouth being turned downward to any cup--so\nhere also there is no special quality stated, so that it is not possible\nto decide from the mantra itself whether the pradhana is meant by the\nterm aja, or something else.--But in connexion with the mantra about the\ncup we have a supplementary passage from which we learn what kind of cup\nis meant, 'What is called the cup having its mouth below and its bottom\nabove is this head.'--Whence, however, can we learn what special being\nis meant by the aja of the /S/veta/s/vatara-upanishad?--To this question\nthe next Sutra replies.\n\n9. But the (elements) beginning with light (are meant by the term aja);\nfor some read so in their text.\n\nBy the term aja we have to understand the causal matter of the four\nclasses of beings, which matter has sprung from the highest Lord and\nbegins with light, i.e. comprises fire, water, and earth.--The word\n'but' (in the Sutra) gives emphasis to the assertion.--This aja is to be\nconsidered as comprising three elementary substances, not as consisting\nof three gu/n/as in the Sa@nkhya sense. We draw this conclusion from the\nfact that one /s/akha, after having related how fire, water, and earth\nsprang from the highest Lord, assigns to them red colour, and so on.\n'The red colour of burning fire (agni) is the colour of the elementary\nfire (tejas), its white colour is the colour of water, its black\ncolour the colour of earth,' &c. Now those three elements--fire, water,\nand earth--we recognise in the /S/veta/s/vatara passage, as the words\nred, white, and black are common to both passages, and as these words\nprimarily denote special colours and can be applied to the Sa@nkhya\ngu/n/as in a secondary sense only. That passages whose sense is beyond\ndoubt are to be used for the interpretation of doubtful passages, is a\ngenerally acknowledged rule. As we therefore find that in the\n/S/veta/s/vatara--after the general topic has been started in I, 1, 'The\nBrahman-students say, Is Brahman the cause?'--the text, previous to the\npassage under discussion, speaks of a power of the highest Lord which\narranges the whole world ('the Sages devoted to meditation and\nconcentration have seen the power belonging to God himself, hidden in\nits own qualities'); and as further that same power is referred to in\ntwo subsequent complementary passages ('Know then, Prak/ri/ti is Maya,\nand the great Lord he who is affected with Maya;' 'who being one only\nrules over every germ;' IV, 10, 11); it cannot possibly be asserted that\nthe mantra treating of the aja refers to some independent causal matter\ncalled pradhana. We rather assert, on the ground of the general\nsubject-matter, that the mantra describes the same divine power referred\nto in the other passages, in which names and forms lie unevolved, and\nwhich we assume as the antecedent condition of that state of the world\nin which names and forms are evolved. And that divine power is\nrepresented as three-coloured, because its products, viz. fire, water,\nand earth, have three distinct colours.--But how can we maintain, on the\nground of fire, water, and earth having three colours, that the causal\nmatter is appropriately called a three-coloured aja? if we consider, on\nthe one hand, that the exterior form of the genus aja (i.e. goat) does\nnot inhere in fire, water, and earth; and, on the other hand, that\nScripture teaches fire, water, and earth to have been produced, so that\nthe word aja cannot be taken in the sense 'non-produced[234].'--To this\nquestion the next Sutra replies.\n\n10. And on account of the statement of the assumption (of a metaphor)\nthere is nothing contrary to reason (in aja denoting the causal matter);\njust as in the case of honey (denoting the sun) and similar cases.\n\nThe word aja neither expresses that fire, water, and earth belong to the\ngoat species, nor is it to be explained as meaning 'unborn;' it rather\nexpresses an assumption, i.e. it intimates the assumption of the source\nof all beings (which source comprises fire, water, and earth), being\ncompared to a she-goat. For as accidentally some she-goat might be\npartly red, partly white, partly black, and might have many young goats\nresembling her in colour, and as some he-goat might love her and lie by\nher, while some other he-goat might leave her after having enjoyed her;\nso the universal causal matter which is tri-coloured, because comprising\nfire, water, and earth, produces many inanimate and animate beings\nsimilar to itself, and is enjoyed by the souls fettered by Nescience,\nwhile it is abandoned by those souls which have attained true\nknowledge.--Nor must we imagine that the distinction of individual\nsouls, which is implied in the preceding explanation, involves that\nreality of the multiplicity of souls which forms one of the tenets of\nother philosophical schools. For the purport of the passage is to\nintimate, not the multiplicity of souls, but the distinction of the\nstates of bondage and release. This latter distinction is explained with\nreference to the multiplicity of souls as ordinarily conceived; that\nmultiplicity, however, depends altogether on limiting adjuncts, and is\nthe unreal product of wrong knowledge merely; as we know from scriptural\npassages such as, 'He is the one God hidden in all beings,\nall-pervading, the Self in all beings,' &c.--The words 'like the honey'\n(in the Sutra) mean that just as the sun, although not being honey, is\nrepresented as honey (Ch. Up. III, 1), and speech as a cow (B/ri/. Up.\nV, 8), and the heavenly world, &c. as the fires (B/ri/. Up. VI, 2, 9),\nso here the causal matter, although not being a she-goat, is\nmetaphorically represented as one. There is therefore nothing contrary\nto reason in the circumstance of the term aja being used to denote the\naggregate of fire, water, and earth.\n\n11. (The assertion that there is scriptural authority for the pradhana,\n&c. can) also not (be based) on the mention of the number (of the\nSankhya categories), on account of the diversity (of the categories) and\non account of the excess (over the number of those categories).\n\nThe attempt to base the Sa@nkhya doctrine on the mantra speaking of the\naja having failed, the Sa@nkhya again comes forward and points to\nanother mantra: 'He in whom the five \"five-people\" and the ether rest,\nhim alone I believe to be the Self; I who know believe him to be\nBrahman' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 17). In this mantra we have one word which\nexpresses the number five, viz. the five-people, and then another word,\nviz. five, which qualifies the former; these two words together\ntherefore convey the idea of five pentads, i.e. twenty-five. Now as many\nbeings as the number twenty-five presupposes, just so many categories\nthe Sankhya system counts. Cp. Sa@nkhya Karika, 3: 'The fundamental\ncausal substance (i.e. the pradhana) is not an effect. Seven\n(substances), viz. the Great one (Intellect), and so on, are causal\nsubstances as well as effects. Sixteen are effects. The soul is neither\na causal substance nor an effect.' As therefore the number twenty-five,\nwhich occurs in the scriptural passage quoted, clearly refers to the\ntwenty-five categories taught in the Sa@nkhya-sm/ri/ti, it follows that\nthe doctrine of the pradhana, &c. rests on a scriptural basis.\n\nTo this reasoning we make the following reply.--It is impossible to base\nthe assertion that the pradhana, &c. have Scripture in their favour on\nthe reference to their number which you pretend to find in the text, 'on\naccount of the diversity of the Sa@nkhya categories.' The Sa@nkhya\ncategories have each their individual difference, and there are no\nattributes belonging in common to each pentad on account of which the\nnumber twenty-five could be divided into five times five. For a number\nof individually separate things can, in general, not be combined into\nsmaller groups of two or three, &c. unless there be a special reason for\nsuch combination.--Here the Sa@nkhya will perhaps rejoin that the\nexpression five (times) five is used only to denote the number\ntwenty-five which has five pentads for its constituent parts; just as\nthe poem says, 'five years and seven Indra did not rain,' meaning only\nthat there was no rain for twelve years.--But this explanation also is\nnot tenable. In the first place, it is liable to the objection that it\nhas recourse to indirect indication.[235] In the second place, the\nsecond 'five' constitutes a compound with the word 'people,' the\nBrahma/n/a-accent showing that the two form one word only.[236] To the\nsame conclusion we are led by another passage also (Taitt. Sa/m/h. I, 6,\n2, 2, pa/nk/ana/m/ tva pa/nk/ajananam, &c.) where the two terms\nconstitute one word, have one accent and one case-termination. The word\nthus being a compound there is neither a repetition of the word 'five,'\ninvolving two pentads, nor does the one five qualify the other, as the\nmere secondary member of a compound cannot be qualified by another\nword.--But as the people are already denoted to be five by the compound\n'five-people,' the effect of the other 'five' qualifying the compound\nwill be that we understand twenty-five people to be meant; just as the\nexpression 'five five-bundles' (pa/nk/a pa/nk/apulya/h/) conveys the\nidea of twenty-five bundles.--The instance is not an analogous one, we\nreply. The word 'pa/nk/apuli' denotes a unity (i.e. one bundle made up\nof five bundles) and hence when the question arises, 'How many such\nbundles are there?' it can be qualified by the word 'five,' indicating\nthat there are five such bundles. The word pa/nk/ajana/h/, on the other\nhand, conveys at once the idea of distinction (i.e. of five distinct\nthings), so that there is no room at all for a further desire to know\nhow many people there are, and hence no room for a further\nqualification. And if the word 'five' be taken as a qualifying word it\ncan only qualify the numeral five (in five-people); the objection\nagainst which assumption has already been stated.--For all these reasons\nthe expression the five five-people cannot denote the twenty-five\ncategories of the Sa@nkhyas.--This is further not possible 'on account\nof the excess.' For on the Sa@nkhya interpretation there would be an\nexcess over the number twenty-five, owing to the circumstance of the\nether and the Self being mentioned separately. The Self is spoken of as\nthe abode in which the five five-people rest, the clause 'Him I believe\nto be the Self' being connected with the 'in whom' of the antecedent\nclause. Now the Self is the intelligent soul of the Sa@nkhyas which is\nalready included in the twenty-five categories, and which therefore, on\ntheir interpretation of the passage, would here be mentioned once as\nconstituting the abode and once as what rests in the abode! If, on the\nother hand, the soul were supposed not to be compiled in the twenty-five\ncategories, the Sa@nkhya would thereby abandon his own doctrine of the\ncategories being twenty-five. The same remarks apply to the separate\nmention made of the ether.--How, finally, can the mere circumstance of a\ncertain number being referred to in the sacred text justify the\nassumption that what is meant are the twenty-five Sa@nkhya categories of\nwhich Scripture speaks in no other place? especially if we consider that\nthe word jana has not the settled meaning of category, and that the\nnumber may be satisfactorily accounted for on another interpretation of\nthe passage.\n\nHow, then, the Sa@nkhya will ask, do you interpret the phrase 'the five\nfive-people?'--On the ground, we reply, of the rule Pa/n/ini II, 1, 50,\naccording to which certain compounds formed with numerals are mere\nnames. The word pa/nk/ajana/h/ thus is not meant to convey the idea of\nthe number five, but merely to denote certain classes of beings. Hence\nthe question may present itself, How many such classes are there? and to\nthis question an answer is given by the added numeral 'five.' There are\ncertain classes of beings called five-people, and these classes are\nfive. Analogously we may speak of the seven seven-/ri/shis, where again\nthe compound denotes a class of beings merely, not their number.--Who\nthen are those five-people?--To this question the next Sutra replies.\n\n12. (The pa/nk/ajana/h/ are) the breath and so on, (as is seen) from the\ncomplementary passage.\n\nThe mantra in which the pa/nk/ajana/h/ are mentioned is followed by\nanother one in which breath and four other things are mentioned for the\npurpose of describing the nature of Brahman. 'They who know the breath\nof breath, the eye of the eye, the ear of the ear, the food of food, the\nmind of mind[237].' Hence we conclude, on the ground of proximity, that\nthe five-people are the beings mentioned in this latter mantra.--But\nhow, the Sa@nkhya asks, can the word 'people' be applied to the breath,\nthe eye, the ear, and so on?--How, we ask in return, can it be applied\nto your categories? In both cases the common meaning of the word\n'people' has to be disregarded; but in favour of our explanation is the\nfact that the breath, the eye, and so on, are mentioned in a\ncomplementary passage. The breath, the eye, &c. may be denoted by the\nword 'people' because they are connected with people. Moreover, we find\nthe word 'person,' which means as much as 'people,' applied to the\npra/n/as in the passage, 'These are the five persons of Brahman' (Ch.\nUp. III, 13, 6); and another passage runs, 'Breath is father, breath is\nmother,' &c. (Ch. Up. VII, 15, 1). And, owing to the force of\ncomposition, there is no objection to the compound being taken in its\nsettled conventional meaning[238].--But how can the conventional meaning\nbe had recourse to, if there is no previous use of the word in that\nmeaning?--That may be done, we reply, just as in the case of udbhid and\nsimilar words[239]. We often infer that a word of unknown meaning refers\nto some known thing because it is used in connexion with the latter. So,\nfor instance, in the case of the following words: 'He is to sacrifice\nwith the udbhid; he cuts the yupa; he makes the vedi.' Analogously we\nconclude that the term pa/nk/ajana/h/, which, from the grammatical rule\nquoted, is known to be a name, and which therefore demands a thing of\nwhich it is the name, denotes the breath, the eye, and so on, which are\nconnected with it through their being mentioned in a complementary\npassage.--Some commentators explain the word pa/nk/ajana/h/ to mean the\nGods, the Fathers, the Gandharvas, the Asuras, and the Rakshas. Others,\nagain, think that the four castes together with the Nishadas are meant.\nAgain, some scriptural passage (/Ri/g-veda Sa/m/h. VIII, 53, 7) speaks\nof the tribe of 'the five-people,' meaning thereby the created beings in\ngeneral; and this latter explanation also might be applied to the\npassage under discussion. The teacher (the Sutrakara), on the other\nhand, aiming at showing that the passage does not refer to the\ntwenty-five categories of the Sa@nkhyas, declares that on the ground of\nthe complementary passage breath, &c. have to be understood.\n\nWell, let it then be granted that the five-people mentioned in the\nMadhyandina-text are breath, &c. since that text mentions food also (and\nso makes up the number five). But how shall we interpret the\nKa/n/va-text which does not mention food (and thus altogether speaks of\nfour things only)?--To this question the next Sutra replies.\n\n13. In the case of (the text of) some (the Ka/n/vas) where food is not\nmentioned, (the number five is made full) by the light (mentioned in the\npreceding mantra).\n\nThe Ka/n/va-text, although not mentioning food, makes up the full number\nfive, by the light mentioned in the mantra preceding that in which the\nfive-people are spoken of. That mantra describes the nature of Brahman\nby saying, 'Him the gods worship as the light of lights.'--If it be\nasked how it is accounted for that the light mentioned in both texts\nequally is in one text to be employed for the explanation of the\nfive-people, and not in the other text; we reply that the reason lies in\nthe difference of the requirements. As the Madhyandinas meet in one and\nthe same mantra with breath and four other entities enabling them to\ninterpret the term, 'the five-people,' they are in no need of the light\nmentioned in another mantra. The Ka/n/vas, on the other hand, cannot do\nwithout the light. The case is analogous to that of the\nSho/d/a/s/in-cup, which, according to different passages, is either to\nbe offered or not to be offered at the atiratra-sacrifice.\n\nWe have proved herewith that Scripture offers no basis for the doctrine\nof the pradhana. That this doctrine cannot be proved either by Sm/ri/ti\nor by ratiocination will be shown later on.\n\n14. (Although there is a conflict of the Vedanta-passages with regard to\nthe things created, such as) ether and so on; (there is no such conflict\nwith regard to the Lord) on account of his being represented (in one\npassage) as described (in other passages), viz. as the cause (of the\nworld).\n\nIn the preceding part of the work the right definition of Brahman has\nbeen established; it has been shown that all the Vedanta-texts have\nBrahman for their common topic; and it has been proved that there is no\nscriptural authority for the doctrine of the pradhana.--But now a new\nobjection presents itself.\n\nIt is not possible--our opponent says--to prove either that Brahman is\nthe cause of the origin, &c. of the world, or that all Vedanta-texts\nrefer to Brahman; because we observe that the Vedanta-texts contradict\none another. All the Vedanta-passages which treat of the creation\nenumerate its successive steps in different order, and so in reality\nspeak of different creations. In one place it is said that from the Self\nthere sprang the ether (Taitt. Up. II, 1); in another place that the\ncreation began with fire (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3); in another place, again,\nthat the Person created breath and from breath faith (Pr. Up. VI, 4); in\nanother place, again, that the Self created these worlds, the water\n(above the heaven), light, the mortal (earth), and the water (below the\nearth) (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 2; 3). There no order is stated at all.\nSomewhere else it is said that the creation originated from the\nNon-existent. 'In the beginning this was non-existent; from it was born\nwhat exists' (Taitt. Up. II, 7); and, 'In the beginning this was\nnon-existent; it became existent; it grew' (Ch. Up. III, 19, 1). In\nanother place, again, the doctrine of the Non-existent being the\nantecedent of the creation is impugned, and the Existent mentioned in\nits stead. 'Others say, in the beginning there was that only which is\nnot; but how could it be thus, my dear? How could that which is be born\nof that which is not?' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1; 2.) And in another place,\nagain, the development of the world is spoken of as having taken place\nspontaneously, 'Now all this was then undeveloped. It became developed\nby form and name' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 7).--As therefore manifold\ndiscrepancies are observed, and as no option is possible in the case of\nan accomplished matter[240], the Vedanta-passages cannot be accepted as\nauthorities for determining the cause of the world, but we must rather\naccept some other cause of the world resting on the authority of\nSm/ri/ti and Reasoning.\n\nTo this we make the following reply.--Although the Vedanta-passages may\nbe conflicting with regard to the order of the things created, such as\nether and so on, they do not conflict with regard to the creator, 'on\naccount of his being represented as described.' That means: such as the\ncreator is described in any one Vedanta-passage, viz. as all-knowing,\nthe Lord of all, the Self of all, without a second, so he is represented\nin all other Vedanta-passages also. Let us consider, for instance, the\ndescription of Brahman (given in Taitt. Up. II, 1 ff.). There it is said\nat first, 'Truth, knowledge, infinite is Brahman.' Here the word\n'knowledge,' and so likewise the statement, made later on, that Brahman\ndesired (II, 6), intimate that Brahman is of the nature of intelligence.\nFurther, the text declares[241] that the cause of the world is the\ngeneral Lord, by representing it as not dependent on anything else. It\nfurther applies to the cause of the world the term 'Self' (II, 1), and\nit represents it as abiding within the series of sheaths beginning with\nthe gross body; whereby it affirms it to be the internal Self within all\nbeings. Again--in the passage, 'May I be many, may I grow forth'--it\ntells how the Self became many, and thereby declares that the creator is\nnon-different from the created effects. And--in the passage, 'He created\nall this whatever there is'--it represents the creator as the Cause of\nthe entire world, and thereby declares him to have been without a second\npreviously to the creation. The same characteristics which in the above\npassages are predicated of Brahman, viewed as the Cause of the world, we\nfind to be predicated of it in other passages also, so, for instance,\n'Being only, my dear, was this in the beginning, one only, without a\nsecond. It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth fire'\n(Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1; 3), and 'In the beginning all this was Self, one\nonly; there was nothing else blinking whatsoever. He thought, shall I\nsend forth worlds?' (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 1; 2.) The Vedanta-passages\nwhich are concerned with setting forth the cause of the world are thus\nin harmony throughout.--On the other hand, there are found conflicting\nstatements concerning the world, the creation being in some places said\nto begin with ether, in other places with fire, and so on. But, in the\nfirst place, it cannot be said that the conflict of statements\nconcerning the world affects the statements concerning the cause, i.e.\nBrahman, in which all the Vedanta-texts are seen to agree--for that\nwould be an altogether unfounded generalization;--and, in the second\nplace, the teacher will reconcile later on (II, 3) those conflicting\npassages also which refer to the world. And, to consider the matter more\nthoroughly, a conflict of statements regarding the world would not even\nmatter greatly, since the creation of the world and similar topics are\nnot at all what Scripture wishes to teach. For we neither observe nor\nare told by Scripture that the welfare of man depends on those matters\nin any way; nor have we the right to assume such a thing; because we\nconclude from the introductory and concluding clauses that the passages\nabout the creation and the like form only subordinate members of\npassages treating of Brahman. That all the passages setting forth the\ncreation and so on subserve the purpose of teaching Brahman, Scripture\nitself declares; compare Ch. Up. VI, 8, 4, 'As food too is an offshoot,\nseek after its root, viz. water. And as water too is an offshoot, seek\nafter its root, viz. fire. And as fire too is an offshoot, seek after\nits root, viz. the True.' We, moreover, understand that by means of\ncomparisons such as that of the clay (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 4) the creation is\ndescribed merely for the purpose of teaching us that the effect is not\nreally different from the cause. Analogously it is said by those who\nknow the sacred tradition, 'If creation is represented by means of (the\nsimiles of) clay, iron, sparks, and other things; that is only a means\nfor making it understood that (in reality) there is no difference\nwhatever' (Gau/d/ap. Ka. III, 15).--On the other hand, Scripture\nexpressly states the fruits connected with the knowledge of Brahman, 'He\nwho knows Brahman obtains the highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'He who knows\nthe Self overcomes grief' (Ch. Up. VII, 1, 3); 'A man who knows him\npasses over death' (/S/ve. Up. III, 8). That fruit is, moreover,\napprehended by intuition (pratyaksha), for as soon as, by means of the\ndoctrine, 'That art thou,' a man has arrived at the knowledge that the\nSelf is non-transmigrating, its transmigrating nature vanishes for him.\n\nIt remains to dispose of the assertion that passages such as 'Non-being\nthis was in the beginning' contain conflicting statements about the\nnature of the cause. This is done in the next Sutra.\n\n15. On account of the connexion (with passages treating of Brahman, the\npassages speaking of the Non-being do not intimate absolute\nNon-existence).\n\nThe passage 'Non-being indeed was this in the beginning' (Taitt. Up. II,\n7) does not declare that the cause of the world is the absolutely\nNon-existent which is devoid of all Selfhood. For in the preceding\nsections of the Upanishad Brahman is distinctly denied to be the\nNon-existing, and is defined to be that which is ('He who knows the\nBrahman as non-existing becomes himself non-existing. He who knows the\nBrahman as existing him we know himself as existing'); it is further, by\nmeans of the series of sheaths, viz. the sheath of food, &c.,\nrepresented as the inner Self of everything. This same Brahman is again\nreferred to in the clause, 'He wished, may I be many;' is declared to\nhave originated the entire creation; and is finally referred to in the\nclause, 'Therefore the wise call it the true.' Thereupon the text goes\non to say, with reference to what has all along been the topic of\ndiscussion, 'On this there is also this /s/loka, Non-being indeed was\nthis in the beginning,' &c.--If here the term 'Non-being' denoted the\nabsolutely Non-existent, the whole context would be broken; for while\nostensibly referring to one matter the passage would in reality treat of\na second altogether different matter. We have therefore to conclude\nthat, while the term 'Being' ordinarily denotes that which is\ndifferentiated by names and forms, the term 'Non-being' denotes the same\nsubstance previous to its differentiation, i.e. that Brahman is, in a\nsecondary sense of the word, called Non-being, previously to the\norigination of the world. The same interpretation has to be applied to\nthe passage 'Non-being this was in the beginning' (Ch. Up. III, 19, 1);\nfor that passage also is connected with another passage which runs, 'It\nbecame being;' whence it is evident that the 'Non-being' of the former\npassage cannot mean absolute Non-existence. And in the passage, 'Others\nsay, Non-being this was in the beginning' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1), the\nreference to the opinion of 'others' does not mean that the doctrine\nreferred, to (according to which the world was originally absolutely\nnon-existent) is propounded somewhere in the Veda; for option is\npossible in the case of actions but not in the case of substances. The\npassage has therefore to be looked upon as a refutation of the tenet of\nprimitive absolute non-existence as fancifully propounded by some\nteachers of inferior intelligence; a refutation undertaken for the\npurpose of strengthening the doctrine that this world has sprung from\nthat which is.--The following passage again, 'Now this was then\nundeveloped,' &c. (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 7), does not by any means assert\nthat the evolution of the world took place without a ruler; as we\nconclude from the circumstance of its being connected with another\npassage in which the ruler is represented as entering into the evolved\nworld of effects, 'He entered thither to the very tips of the\nfinger-nails' &c. If it were supposed that the evolution of the world\ntakes place without a ruler, to whom could the subsequent pronoun 'he'\nrefer (in the passage last quoted) which manifestly is to be connected\nwith something previously intimated? And as Scripture declares that the\nSelf, after having entered into the body, is of the nature of\nintelligence ('when seeing, eye by name; when hearing, ear by name; when\nthinking, mind by name'), it follows that it is intelligent at the time\nof its entering also.--We, moreover, must assume that the world was\nevolved at the beginning of the creation in the same way as it is at\npresent seen to develop itself by names and forms, viz. under the\nrulership of an intelligent creator; for we have no right to make\nassumptions contrary to what is at present actually observed. Another\nscriptural passage also declares that the evolution of the world took\nplace under the superintendence of a ruler, 'Let me now enter these\nbeings with this living Self, and let me then evolve names and forms'\n(Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2). The intransitive expression 'It developed itself'\n(vyakriyata; it became developed) is to be viewed as having reference to\nthe ease with which the real agent, viz. the Lord, brought about that\nevolution. Analogously it is said, for instance, that 'the cornfield\nreaps itself' (i.e. is reaped with the greatest ease), although there is\nthe reaper sufficient (to account for the work being done).--Or else we\nmay look on the form vyakriyata as having reference to a necessarily\nimplied agent; as is the case in such phrases as 'the village is being\napproached' (where we necessarily have to supply 'by Devadatta or\nsomebody else').\n\n16. (He whose work is this is Brahman), because (the 'work') denotes the\nworld.\n\nIn the Kaushitaki-brahma/n/a, in the dialogue of Balaki and\nAjata/s/atru, we read, 'O Balaki, he who is the maker of those persons,\nhe of whom this is the work, he alone is to be known' (Kau. Up. IV, 19).\nThe question here arises whether what is here inculcated as the object\nof knowledge is the individual soul or the chief vital air or the\nhighest Self.\n\nThe purvapakshin maintains that the vital air is meant. For, in the\nfirst place, he says, the clause 'of whom this is the work' points to\nthe activity of motion, and that activity rests on the vital air. In the\nsecond place, we meet with the word 'pra/n/a' in a complementary passage\n('Then he becomes one with that pra/n/a alone'), and that word is well\nknown to denote the vital air. In the third place, pra/n/a is the maker\nof all the persons, the person in the sun, the person in the moon, &c.,\nwho in the preceding part of the dialogue had been enumerated by Balaki;\nfor that the sun and the other divinities are mere differentiations of\npra/n/a we know from another scriptural passage, viz. 'Who is that one\ngod (in whom all the other gods are contained)? Pra/n/a and he is\nBrahman, and they call him That' (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 9).--Or else, the\npurvapakshin continues, the passage under discussion represents the\nindividual soul as the object of knowledge. For of the soul also it can\nbe said that 'this is the work,' if we understand by 'this' all\nmeritorious and non-meritorious actions; and the soul also, in so far as\nit is the enjoyer, can be viewed as the maker of the persons enumerated\nin so far as they are instrumental to the soul's fruition. The\ncomplementary passage, moreover, contains an inferential mark of the\nindividual soul. For Ajata/s/atru, in order to instruct Balaki about the\n'maker of the persons' who had been proposed as the object of knowledge,\ncalls a sleeping man by various names and convinces Balaki, by the\ncircumstance that the sleeper does not hear his shouts, that the pra/n/a\nand so on are not the enjoyers; he thereupon wakes the sleeping man by\npushing him with his stick, and so makes Balaki comprehend that the\nbeing capable of fruition is the individual soul which is distinct from\nthe pra/n/a. A subsequent passage also contains an inferential mark of\nthe individual soul, viz. 'And as the master feeds with his people, nay,\nas his people feed on the master, thus does this conscious Self feed\nwith the other Selfs, thus those Selfs feed on the conscious Self' (Kau.\nUp. IV, 20). And as the individual soul is the support of the pra/n/a,\nit may itself be called pra/n/a.--We thus conclude that the passage\nunder discussion refers either to the individual soul or to the chief\nvital air; but not to the Lord, of whom it contains no inferential marks\nwhatever.\n\nTo this we make the following reply.--The Lord only can be the maker of\nthe persons enumerated, on account of the force of the introductory part\nof the section. Balaki begins his colloquy with Ajata/s/atru with the\noffer, 'Shall I tell you Brahman?' Thereupon he enumerates some\nindividual souls residing in the sun, the moon, and so on, which\nparticipate in the sight of the secondary Brahman, and in the end\nbecomes silent. Ajata/s/atru then sets aside Balaki's doctrine as not\nreferring to the chief Brahman--with the words, 'Vainly did you\nchallenge me, saying, Shall I tell you Brahman,' &c.--and proposes the\nmaker of all those individual souls as a new object of knowledge. If now\nthat maker also were merely a soul participating in the sight of the\nsecondary Brahman, the introductory statement which speaks of Brahman\nwould be futile. Hence it follows that the highest Lord himself is\nmeant.--None, moreover, but the highest Lord is capable of being the\nmaker of all those persons as he only is absolutely\nindependent.--Further, the clause 'of whom this is the work' does not\nrefer either to the activity of motion nor to meritorious and\nnon-meritorious actions; for neither of those two is the topic of\ndiscussion or has been mentioned previously. Nor can the term 'work'\ndenote the enumerated persons, since the latter are mentioned\nseparately--in the clause, 'He who is the maker of those persons'--and\nas inferential marks (viz. the neuter gender and the singular number of\nthe word karman, work) contradict that assumption. Nor, again, can the\nterm 'work' denote either the activity whose object the persons are, or\nthe result of that activity, since those two are already implied in the\nmention of the agent (in the clause, 'He who is the maker'). Thus there\nremains no other alternative than to take the pronoun 'this' (in 'He of\nwhom this is the work') as denoting the perceptible world and to\nunderstand the same world--as that which is made--by the term\n'work.'--We may indeed admit that the world also is not the previous\ntopic of discussion and has not been mentioned before; still, as no\nspecification is mentioned, we conclude that the term 'work' has to be\nunderstood in a general sense, and thus denotes what first presents\nitself to the mind, viz. everything which exists in general. It is,\nmoreover, not true that the world is not the previous topic of\ndiscussion; we are rather entitled to conclude from the circumstance\nthat the various persons (in the sun, the moon, &c.) which constitute a\npart of the world had been specially mentioned before, that the passage\nin question is concerned with the whole world in general. The\nconjunction 'or' (in 'or he of whom,' &c.) is meant to exclude the idea\nof limited makership; so that the whole passage has to be interpreted as\nfollows, 'He who is the maker of those persons forming a part of the\nworld, or rather--to do away with this limitation--he of whom this\nentire world without any exception is the work.' The special mention\nmade of the persons having been created has for its purpose to show that\nthose persons whom Balaki had proclaimed to be Brahman are not Brahman.\nThe passage therefore sets forth the maker of the world in a double\naspect, at first as the creator of a special part of the world and\nthereupon as the creator of the whole remaining part of the world; a way\nof speaking analogous to such every-day forms of expression as, 'The\nwandering mendicants are to be fed, and then the Brahma/n/as[242].' And\nthat the maker of the world is the highest Lord is affirmed in all\nVedanta-texts.\n\n17. If it be said that this is not so, on account of the inferential\nmarks of the individual soul and the chief vital air; we reply that that\nhas already been explained.\n\nIt remains for us to refute the objection that on account of the\ninferential marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air, which\nare met with in the complementary passage, either the one or the other\nmust be meant in the passage under discussion, and not the highest\nLord.--We therefore remark that that objection has already been disposed\nof under I, 1, 31. There it was shown that from an interpretation\nsimilar to the one here proposed by the purvapakshin there would result\na threefold meditation one having Brahman for its object, a second one\ndirected on the individual soul, and a third one connected with the\nchief vital air. Now the same result would present itself in our case,\nand that would be unacceptable as we must infer from the introductory as\nwell as the concluding clauses, that the passage under discussion refers\nto Brahman. With reference to the introductory clause this has been\nalready proved; that the concluding passage also refers to Brahman, we\ninfer from the fact of there being stated in it a pre-eminently high\nreward, 'Warding off all evil he who knows this obtains pre-eminence\namong all beings, sovereignty, supremacy.'--But if this is so, the sense\nof the passage under discussion is already settled by the discussion of\nthe passage about Pratarda/n/a (I, 1, 31); why, then, the present\nSutra?--No, we reply; the sense of our passage is not yet settled, since\nunder I, 1, 31 it has not been proved that the clause, 'Or he whose work\nis this,' refers to Brahman. Hence there arises again, in connexion with\nthe present passage, a doubt whether the individual soul and the chief\nvital air may not be meant, and that doubt has again to be refuted.--The\nword pra/n/a occurs, moreover, in the sense of Brahman, so in the\npassage, 'The mind settles down on pra/n/a' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 2).--The\ninferential marks of the individual soul also have, on account of the\nintroductory and concluding clauses referring to Brahman, to be\nexplained so as not to give rise to any discrepancy.\n\n18. But Jaimini thinks that (the reference to the individual soul) has\nanother purport, on account of the question and answer; and thus some\nalso (read in their text).\n\nWhether the passage under discussion is concerned with the individual\nsoul or with Brahman, is, in the opinion of the teacher Jaimini, no\nmatter for dispute, since the reference to the individual soul has a\ndifferent purport, i.e. aims at intimating Brahman. He founds this his\nopinion on a question and a reply met with in the text. After\nAjata/s/atru has taught Balaki, by waking the sleeping man, that the\nsoul is different from the vital air, he asks the following question,\n'Balaki, where did this person here sleep? Where was he? Whence came he\nthus back?' This question clearly refers to something different from the\nindividual soul. And so likewise does the reply, 'When sleeping he sees\nno dream, then he becomes one with that pra/n/a alone;' and, 'From that\nSelf all pra/n/as proceed, each towards its place, from the pra/n/as the\ngods, from the gods the worlds.'--Now it is the general Vedanta doctrine\nthat at the time of deep sleep the soul becomes one with the highest\nBrahman, and that from the highest Brahman the whole world proceeds,\ninclusive of pra/n/a, and so on. When Scripture therefore represents as\nthe object of knowledge that in which there takes place the deep sleep\nof the soul, characterised by absence of consciousness and utter\ntranquillity, i.e. a state devoid of all those specific cognitions which\nare produced by the limiting adjuncts of the soul, and from which the\nsoul returns when the sleep is broken; we understand that the highest\nSelf is meant.--Moreover, the Vajasaneyi/s/akha, which likewise contains\nthe colloquy of Balaki and Ajata/s/atru, clearly refers to the\nindividual soul by means of the term, 'the person consisting of\ncognition' (vij/n/anamaya), and distinguishes from it the highest Self\n('Where was then the person consisting of cognition? and from whence did\nhe thus come back?' B/ri/. Up. II, 1, 16); and later on, in the reply to\nthe above question, declares that 'the person consisting of cognition\nlies in the ether within the heart.' Now we know that the word 'ether'\nmay be used to denote the highest Self, as, for instance, in the passage\nabout the small ether within the lotus of the heart (Ch. Up. VIII, 1,\n1). Further on the B/ri/. Up. says, 'All the Selfs came forth from that\nSelf;' by which statement of the coming forth of all the conditioned\nSelfs it intimates that the highest Self is the one general cause.--The\ndoctrine conveyed by the rousing of the sleeping person, viz. that the\nindividual soul is different from the vital air, furnishes at the same\ntime a further argument against the opinion that the passage under\ndiscussion refers to the vital air.\n\n19. (The Self to be seen, to be heard, &c. is the highest Self) on\naccount of the connected meaning of the sentences.\n\nWe read in the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka, in the Maitreyi-brahma/n/a the\nfollowing passage, 'Verily, a husband is not dear that you may love the\nhusband, &c. &c.; verily, everything is not dear that you may love\neverything; but that you may love the Self therefore everything is dear.\nVerily, the Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be\nmarked, O Maitreyi! When the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and\nknown, then all this is known' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 6).--Here the doubt\narises whether that which is represented as the object to be seen, to be\nheard, and so on, is the cognitional Self (the individual soul) or the\nhighest Self.--But whence the doubt?--Because, we reply, the Self is, on\nthe one hand, by the mention of dear things such as husband and so on,\nindicated as the enjoyer whence it appears that the passage refers to\nthe individual soul; and because, on the other hand, the declaration\nthat through the knowledge of the Self everything becomes known points\nto the highest Self.\n\nThe purvapakshin maintains that the passage refers to the individual\nsoul, on account of the strength of the initial statement. The text\ndeclares at the outset that all the objects of enjoyment found in this\nworld, such as husband, wife, riches, and so on, are dear on account of\nthe Self, and thereby gives us to understand that the enjoying (i.e. the\nindividual) Self is meant; if thereupon it refers to the Self as the\nobject of sight and so on, what other Self should it mean than the same\nindividual Self?--A subsequent passage also (viz. 'Thus does this great\nBeing, endless, unlimited, consisting of nothing but knowledge, rise\nfrom out of these elements, and vanish again after them. When he has\ndeparted there is no more knowledge'), which describes how the great\nBeing under discussion rises, as the Self of knowledge, from the\nelements, shows that the object of sight is no other than the\ncognitional Self, i.e. the individual soul. The concluding clause\nfinally, 'How, O beloved, should he know the knower?' shows, by means of\nthe term 'knower,' which denotes an agent, that the individual soul is\nmeant. The declaration that through the cognition of the Self everything\nbecomes known must therefore not be interpreted in the literal sense,\nbut must be taken to mean that the world of objects of enjoyment is\nknown through its relation to the enjoying soul.\n\nTo this we make the following reply.--The passage makes a statement\nabout the highest Self, on account of the connected meaning of the\nentire section. If we consider the different passages in their mutual\nconnexion, we find that they all refer to the highest Self. After\nMaitreyi has heard from Yaj/n/avalkya that there is no hope of\nimmortality by wealth, she expresses her desire of immortality in the\nwords, 'What should I do with that by which I do not become immortal?\nWhat my Lord knoweth tell that to me;' and thereupon Yaj/n/avalkya\nexpounds to her the knowledge of the Self. Now Scripture as well as\nSm/ri/ti declares that immortality is not to be reached but through the\nknowledge of the highest Self.--The statement further that through the\nknowledge of the Self everything becomes known can be taken in its\ndirect literal sense only if by the Self we understand the highest\ncause. And to take it in a non-literal sense (as the purvapakshin\nproposes) is inadmissible, on account of the explanation given of that\nstatement in a subsequent passage, viz. 'Whosoever looks for the Brahman\nclass elsewhere than in the Self, is abandoned by the Brahman class.'\nHere it is said that whoever erroneously views this world with its\nBrahmans and so on, as having an independent existence apart from the\nSelf, is abandoned by that very world of which he has taken an erroneous\nview; whereby the view that there exists any difference is refuted. And\nthe immediately subsequent clause, 'This everything is the Self,' gives\nus to understand that the entire aggregate of existing things is\nnon-different from the Self; a doctrine further confirmed by the similes\nof the drum and so on.--By explaining further that the Self about which\nhe had been speaking is the cause of the universe of names, forms, and\nworks ('There has been breathed forth from this great Being what we have\nas /Ri/gveda,' &c.) Yaj/n/avalkya again shows that it is the highest\nSelf.--To the same conclusion he leads us by declaring, in the paragraph\nwhich treats of the natural centres of things, that the Self is the\ncentre of the whole world with the objects, the senses and the mind,\nthat it has neither inside nor outside, that it is altogether a mass of\nknowledge.--From all this it follows that what the text represents as\nthe object of sight and so on is the highest Self.\n\nWe now turn to the remark made by the purvapakshin that the passage\nteaches the individual soul to be the object of sight, because it is, in\nthe early part of the chapter denoted as something dear.\n\n20. (The circumstance of the soul being represented as the object of\nsight) indicates the fulfilment of the promissory statement; so\nA/s/marathya thinks.\n\nThe fact that the text proclaims as the object of sight that Self which\nis denoted as something, dear indicates the fulfilment of the promise\nmade in the passages, 'When the Self is known all this is known,' 'All\nthis is that Self.' For if the individual soul were different from the\nhighest Self, the knowledge of the latter would not imply the knowledge\nof the former, and thus the promise that through the knowledge of one\nthing everything is to be known would not be fulfilled. Hence the\ninitial statement aims at representing the individual Self and the\nhighest Self as non-different for the purpose of fulfilling the promise\nmade.--This is the opinion of the teacher A/s/marathya[243].\n\n21. (The initial statement identifies the individual soul and the\nhighest Self) because the soul when it will depart (from the body) is\nsuch (i.e. one with the highest Self); thus Au/d/ulomi thinks.\n\nThe individual soul which is inquinated by the contact with its\ndifferent limiting adjuncts, viz. body, senses, and mind (mano-buddhi),\nattains through the instrumentality of knowledge, meditation, and so on,\na state of complete serenity, and thus enables itself, when passing at\nsome future time out of the body, to become one with the highest Self;\nhence the initial statement in which it is represented as non-different\nfrom the highest Self. This is the opinion of the teacher\nAu/d/ulomi.--Thus Scripture says, 'That serene being arising from this\nbody appears in its own form as soon as it has approached the highest\nlight' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3).--In another place Scripture intimates, by\nmeans of the simile of the rivers, that name and form abide in the\nindividual soul, 'As the flowing rivers disappear in the sea, having\nlost their name and their form, thus a wise man freed from name and form\ngoes to the divine Person who is greater than the great' (Mu. Up. III,\n2, 8). I.e. as the rivers losing the names and forms abiding in them\ndisappear in the sea, so the individual soul also losing the name and\nform abiding in it becomes united with the highest person. That the\nlatter half of the passage has the meaning here assigned to it, follows\nfrom the parallelism which we must assume to exist between the two\nmembers of the comparison[244].\n\n22. (The initial statement is made) because (the highest Self) exists in\nthe condition (of the individual soul); so Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna thinks.\n\nBecause the highest Self exists also in the condition of the individual\nsoul, therefore, the teacher Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna thinks, the initial\nstatement which aims at intimating the non-difference of the two is\npossible. That the highest Self only is that which appears as the\nindividual soul, is evident from the Brahma/n/a-passage, 'Let me enter\ninto them with this living Self and evolve names and forms,' and similar\npassages. We have also mantras to the same effect, for instance, 'The\nwise one who, having produced all forms and made all names, sits calling\nthe things by their names' (Taitt. Ar. III, 12, 7)[245]. And where\nScripture relates the creation of fire and the other elements, it does\nnot at the same time relate a separate creation of the individual soul;\nwe have therefore no right to look on the soul as a product of the\nhighest Self, different from the latter.--In the opinion of the teacher\nKa/s/ak/ri/tsna the non-modified highest Lord himself is the individual\nsoul, not anything else. A/s/marathya, although meaning to say that the\nsoul is not (absolutely) different from the highest Self, yet intimates\nby the expression, 'On account of the fulfilment of the promise'--which\ndeclares a certain mutual dependence--that there does exist a certain\nrelation of cause and effect between the highest Self and the individual\nsoul[246]. The opinion of Au/d/ulomi again clearly implies that the\ndifference and non-difference of the two depend on difference of\ncondition[247]. Of these three opinions we conclude that the one held by\nKa/s/ak/ri/tsna accords with Scripture, because it agrees with what all\nthe Vedanta-texts (so, for instance, the passage, 'That art thou') aim\nat inculcating. Only on the opinion of Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna immortality can\nbe viewed as the result of the knowledge of the soul; while it would be\nimpossible to hold the same view if the soul were a modification\n(product) of the Self and as such liable to lose its existence by being\nmerged in its causal substance. For the same reason, name and form\ncannot abide in the soul (as was above attempted to prove by means of\nthe simile of the rivers), but abide in the limiting adjunct and are\nascribed to the soul itself in a figurative sense only. For the same\nreason the origin of the souls from the highest Self, of which Scripture\nspeaks in some places as analogous to the issuing of sparks from the\nfire, must be viewed as based only on the limiting adjuncts of the soul.\n\nThe last three Sutras have further to be interpreted so as to furnish\nreplies to the second of the purvapakshin's arguments, viz. that the\nB/ri/hadara/n/yaka passage represents as the object of sight the\nindividual soul, because it declares that the great Being which is to be\nseen arises from out of these elements. 'There is an indication of the\nfulfilment of the promise; so A/s/marathya thinks.' The promise is made\nin the two passages, 'When the Self is known, all this is known,' and\n'All this is that Self.' That the Self is everything, is proved by the\ndeclaration that the whole world of names, forms, and works springs from\none being, and is merged in one being[248]; and by its being\ndemonstrated, with the help of the similes of the drum, and so on, that\neffect and cause are non-different. The fulfilment of the promise is,\nthen, finally indicated by the text declaring that that great Being\nrises, in the form of the individual soul, from out of these elements;\nthus the teacher A/s/marathya thinks. For if the soul and the highest\nSelf are non-different, the promise that through the knowledge of one\neverything becomes known is capable of fulfilment.--'Because the soul\nwhen it will depart is such; thus Au/d/ulomi thinks.' The statement as\nto the non-difference of the soul and the Self (implied in the\ndeclaration that the great Being rises, &c.) is possible, because the\nsoul when--after having purified itself by knowledge, and so on--it will\ndepart from the body, is capable of becoming one with the highest Self.\nThis is Au/d/ulomi's opinion.--'Because it exists in the condition of\nthe soul; thus Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna opines.' Because the highest Self itself\nis that which appears as the individual soul, the statement as to the\nnon-difference of the two is well-founded. This is the view of the\nteacher Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna.\n\nBut, an objection may be raised, the passage, 'Rising from out of these\nelements he vanishes again after them. When he has departed there is no\nmore knowledge,' intimates the final destruction of the soul, not its\nidentity with the highest Self!--By no means, we reply. The passage\nmeans to say only that on the soul departing from the body all specific\ncognition vanishes, not that the Self is destroyed. For an objection\nbeing raised--in the passage, 'Here thou hast bewildered me, Sir, when\nthou sayest that having departed there is no more knowledge'. Scripture\nitself explains that what is meant is not the annihilation of the Self,\n'I say nothing that is bewildering. Verily, beloved, that Self is\nimperishable, and of an indestructible nature. But there takes place\nnon-connexion with the matras.' That means: The eternally unchanging\nSelf, which is one mass of knowledge, cannot possibly perish; but by\nmeans of true knowledge there is effected its dissociation from the\nmatras, i.e. the elements and the sense organs, which are the product of\nNescience. When the connexion has been solved, specific cognition, which\ndepended on it, no longer takes place, and thus it can be said, that\n'When he has departed there is no more knowledge.'\n\nThe third argument also of the purvapakshin, viz. that the word\n'knower'--which occurs in the concluding passage, 'How should he know\nthe knower?'--denotes an agent, and therefore refers to the individual\nsoul as the object of sight, is to be refuted according to the view of\nKa/s/ak/ri/tsna.--Moreover, the text after having enumerated--in the\npassage, 'For where there is duality as it were, there one sees the\nother,' &c.--all the kinds of specific cognition which belong to the\nsphere of Nescience declares--in the subsequent passage, 'But when the\nSelf only is all this, how should he see another?'--that in the sphere\nof true knowledge all specific cognition such as seeing, and so on, is\nabsent. And, again, in order to obviate the doubt whether in the absence\nof objects the knower might not know himself, Yaj/n/avalkya goes on,\n'How, O beloved, should he know himself, the knower?' As thus the latter\npassage evidently aims at proving the absence of specific cognition, we\nhave to conclude that the word 'knower' is here used to denote that\nbeing which is knowledge, i.e. the Self.--That the view of\nKa/s/ak/ri/tsna is scriptural, we have already shown above. And as it is\nso, all the adherents of the Vedanta must admit that the difference of\nthe soul and the highest Self is not real, but due to the limiting\nadjuncts, viz. the body, and so on, which are the product of name and\nform as presented by Nescience. That view receives ample confirmation\nfrom Scripture; compare, for instance, 'Being only, my dear, this was in\nthe beginning, one, without a second' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1); 'The Self is\nall this' (Ch. Up. VII, 25, 2); 'Brahman alone is all this' (Mu. Up. II,\n2, 11); 'This everything is that Self' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 6); 'There is\nno other seer but he' (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23); 'There is nothing that\nsees but it' (B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 11).--It is likewise confirmed by\nSm/ri/ti; compare, for instance, 'Vasudeva is all this' (Bha. Gi. VII,\n19); 'Know me, O Bharata, to be the soul in all bodies' (Bha. Gi. XIII,\n2); 'He who sees the highest Lord abiding alike within all creatures'\n(Bha. Gi. XIII, 27).--The same conclusion is supported by those passages\nwhich deny all difference; compare, for instance, 'If he thinks, that is\none and I another; he does not know' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 10); 'From death\nto death he goes who sees here any diversity' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 19).\nAnd, again, by those passages which negative all change on the part of\nthe Self; compare, for instance, 'This great unborn Self, undecaying,\nundying, immortal, fearless is indeed Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. IV,\n24).--Moreover, if the doctrine of general identity were not true, those\nwho are desirous of release could not be in the possession of\nirrefutable knowledge, and there would be no possibility of any matter\nbeing well settled; while yet the knowledge of which the Self is the\nobject is declared to be irrefutable and to satisfy all desire, and\nScripture speaks of those, 'Who have well ascertained the object of the\nknowledge of the Vedanta' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 6). Compare also the passage,\n'What trouble, what sorrow can there be to him who has once beheld that\nunity?' (I/s/. Up. 7.)--And Sm/ri/ti also represents the mind of him who\ncontemplates the Self as steady (Bha. Gi. II, 54).\n\nAs therefore the individual soul and the highest Self differ in name\nonly, it being a settled matter that perfect knowledge has for its\nobject the absolute oneness of the two; it is senseless to insist (as\nsome do) on a plurality of Selfs, and to maintain that the individual\nsoul is different from the highest Self, and the highest Self from the\nindividual soul. For the Self is indeed called by many different names,\nbut it is one only. Nor does the passage, 'He who knows Brahman which is\nreal, knowledge, infinite, as hidden in the cave' (Taitt. Up. II, 1),\nrefer to some one cave (different from the abode of the individual\nsoul)[249]. And that nobody else but Brahman is hidden in the cave we\nknow from a subsequent passage, viz. 'Having sent forth he entered into\nit' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), according to which the creator only entered into\nthe created beings.--Those who insist on the distinction of the\nindividual and the highest Self oppose themselves to the true sense of\nthe Vedanta-texts, stand thereby in the way of perfect knowledge, which\nis the door to perfect beatitude, and groundlessly assume release to be\nsomething effected, and therefore non-eternal[250]. (And if they attempt\nto show that moksha, although effected, is eternal) they involve\nthemselves in a conflict with sound logic.\n\n23. (Brahman is) the material cause also, on account of (this view) not\nbeing in conflict with the promissory statements and the illustrative\ninstances.\n\nIt has been said that, as practical religious duty has to be enquired\ninto because it is the cause of an increase of happiness, so Brahman has\nto be enquired into because it is the cause of absolute beatitude. And\nBrahman has been defined as that from which there proceed the\norigination, sustentation, and retractation of this world. Now as this\ndefinition comprises alike the relation of substantial causality in\nwhich clay and gold, for instance, stand to golden ornaments and earthen\npots, and the relation of operative causality in which the potter and\nthe goldsmith stand to the things mentioned; a doubt arises to which of\nthese two kinds the causality of Brahman belongs.\n\nThe purvapakshin maintains that Brahman evidently is the operative cause\nof the world only, because Scripture declares his creative energy to be\npreceded by reflection. Compare, for instance, Pra. Up. VI, 3; 4: 'He\nreflected, he created pra/n/a.' For observation shows that the action of\noperative causes only, such as potters and the like, is preceded by\nreflection, and moreover that the result of some activity is brought\nabout by the concurrence of several factors[251]. It is therefore\nappropriate that we should view the prime creator in the same light. The\ncircumstance of his being known as 'the Lord' furnishes another\nargument. For lords such as kings and the son of Vivasvat are known only\nas operative causes, and the highest Lord also must on that account be\nviewed as an operative cause only.--Further, the effect of the creator's\nactivity, viz. this world, is seen to consist of parts, to be\nnon-intelligent and impure; we therefore must assume that its cause also\nis of the same nature; for it is a matter of general observation that\ncause and effect are alike in kind. But that Brahman does not resemble\nthe world in nature, we know from many scriptural passages, such as 'It\nis without parts, without actions, tranquil, without fault, without\ntaint' (/Sv/e. Up. VI, 19). Hence there remains no other alternative but\nto admit that in addition to Brahman there exists a material cause of\nthe world of impure nature, such as is known from Sm/ri/ti[252], and to\nlimit the causality of Brahman, as declared by Scripture, to operative\ncausality.\n\nTo this we make the following reply.--Brahman is to be acknowledged as\nthe material cause as well as the operative cause; because this latter\nview does not conflict with the promissory statements and the\nillustrative instances. The promissory statement chiefly meant is the\nfollowing one, 'Have you ever asked for that instruction by which that\nwhich is not heard becomes heard; that which is not perceived,\nperceived; that which is not known, known?' (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 3.) This\npassage intimates that through the cognition of one thing everything\nelse, even if (previously) unknown, becomes known. Now the knowledge of\neverything is possible through the cognition of the material cause,\nsince the effect is non-different from the material cause. On the other\nhand, effects are not non-different from their operative causes; for we\nknow from ordinary experience that the carpenter, for instance, is\ndifferent from the house he has built.--The illustrative example\nreferred to is the one mentioned (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 4), 'My dear, as by one\nclod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the modification (i.e.\nthe effect) being a name merely which has its origin in speech, while\nthe truth is that it is clay merely;' which passage again has reference\nto the material cause. The text adds a few more illustrative instances\nof similar nature, 'As by one nugget of gold all that is made of gold is\nknown; as by one pair of nail-scissors all that is made of iron is\nknown.'--Similar promissory statements are made in other places also,\nfor instance, 'What is that through which if it is known everything else\nbecomes known?' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 3.) An illustrative instance also is\ngiven in the same place, 'As plants grow on the earth' (I, 1,\n7).--Compare also the promissory statement in B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 6, 'When\nthe Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and known, then all this is\nknown;' and the illustrative instance quoted (IV, 5, 8), 'Now as the\nsounds of a drum if beaten cannot be seized externally, but the sound is\nseized when the drum is seized or the beater of the drum.'--Similar\npromissory statements and illustrative instances which are to be found\nin all Vedanta-texts are to be viewed as proving, more or less, that\nBrahman is also the material cause of the world. The ablative case also\nin the passage, 'That from whence (yata/h/) these beings are born,' has\nto be considered as indicating the material cause of the beings,\naccording to the grammatical rule, Pa/n/. I, 4, 30.--That Brahman is at\nthe same time the operative cause of the world, we have to conclude from\nthe circumstance that there is no other guiding being. Ordinarily\nmaterial causes, indeed, such as lumps of clay and pieces of gold, are\ndependent, in order to shape themselves into vessels and ornaments, on\nextraneous operative causes such as potters and goldsmiths; but outside\nBrahman as material cause there is no other operative cause to which the\nmaterial cause could look; for Scripture says that previously to\ncreation Brahman was one without a second.--The absence of a guiding\nprinciple other than the material cause can moreover be established by\nmeans of the argument made use of in the Sutra, viz. accordance with the\npromissory statements and the illustrative examples. If there were\nadmitted a guiding principle different from the material cause, it would\nfollow that everything cannot be known through one thing, and thereby\nthe promissory statements as well as the illustrative instances would be\nstultified.--The Self is thus the operative cause, because there is no\nother ruling principle, and the material cause because there is no other\nsubstance from which the world could originate.\n\n24. And on account of the statement of reflection (on the part of the\nSelf).\n\nThe fact of the sacred texts declaring that the Self reflected likewise\nshows that it is the operative as well as the material cause. Passages\nlike 'He wished, may I be many, may I grow forth,' and 'He thought, may\nI be many, may I grow forth,' show, in the first place, that the Self is\nthe agent in the independent activity which is preceded by the Self's\nreflection; and, in the second place, that it is the material cause\nalso, since the words 'May I be many' intimate that the reflective\ndesire of multiplying itself has the inward Self for its object.\n\n25. And on account of both (i.e. the origin and the dissolution of the\nworld) being directly declared (to have Brahman for their material\ncause).\n\nThis Sutra supplies a further argument for Brahman's being the general\nmaterial cause.--Brahman is the material cause of the world for that\nreason also that the origination as well as the dissolution of the world\nis directly spoken of in the sacred texts as having Brahman for their\nmaterial cause, 'All these beings take their rise from the ether and\nreturn into the ether' (Ch. Up. I, 9, 1). That that from which some\nother thing springs and into which it returns is the material cause of\nthat other thing is well known. Thus the earth, for instance, is the\nmaterial cause of rice, barley, and the like.--The word 'directly' (in\nthe Sutra) notifies that there is no other material cause, but that all\nthis sprang from the ether only.--Observation further teaches that\neffects are not re-absorbed into anything else but their material\ncauses.\n\n26. (Brahman is the material cause) on account of (the Self) making\nitself; (which is possible) owing to modification.\n\nBrahman is the material cause for that reason also that Scripture--in\nthe passage, 'That made itself its Self' (Taitt. Up. II, 7)--represents\nthe Self as the object of action as well as the agent.--But how can the\nSelf which as agent was in full existence previously to the action be\nmade out to be at the same time that which is effected by the\naction?--Owing to modification, we reply. The Self, although in full\nexistence previously to the action, modifies itself into something\nspecial, viz. the Self of the effect. Thus we see that causal\nsubstances, such as clay and the like, are, by undergoing the process of\nmodification, changed into their products.--The word 'itself' in the\npassage quoted intimates the absence of any other operative cause but\nthe Self.\n\nThe word 'pari/n/amat' (in the Sutra) may also be taken as constituting\na separate Sutra by itself, the sense of which would be: Brahman is the\nmaterial cause of the world for that reason also, that the sacred text\nspeaks of Brahman and its modification into the Self of its effect as\nco-ordinated, viz. in the passage, 'It became sat and tyat, defined and\nundefined' (Taitt. Up. II, 6).\n\n27. And because Brahman is called the source.\n\nBrahman is the material cause for that reason also that it is spoken of\nin the sacred texts as the source (yoni); compare, for instance, 'The\nmaker, the Lord, the person who has his source in Brahman' (Mu. Up. III,\n1, 3); and 'That which the wise regard as the source of all beings' (Mu.\nUp. I, 1, 6). For that the word 'source' denotes the material cause is\nwell known from the use of ordinary language; the earth, for instance,\nis called the yoni of trees and herbs. In some places indeed the word\nyoni means not source, but merely place; so, for instance, in the\nmantra, 'A yoni, O Indra, was made for you to sit down upon' (/Ri/k.\nSa/m/h. I, 104, 1). But that in the passage quoted it means 'source'\nfollows from a complementary passage, 'As the spider sends forth and\ndraws in its threads,' &c.--It is thus proved that Brahman is the\nmaterial cause of the world.--Of the objection, finally, that in\nordinary life the activity of operative causal agents only, such as\npotters and the like, is preceded by reflection, we dispose by the\nremark that, as the matter in hand is not one which can be known through\ninferential reasoning, ordinary experience cannot be used to settle it.\nFor the knowledge of that matter we rather depend on Scripture\naltogether, and hence Scripture only has to be appealed to. And that\nScripture teaches that the Lord who reflects before creation is at the\nsame time the material cause, we have already explained. The subject\nwill, moreover, be discussed more fully later on.\n\n28. Hereby all (the doctrines concerning the origin of the world which\nare opposed to the Vedanta) are explained, are explained.\n\nThe doctrine according to which the pradhana is the cause of the world\nhas, in the Sutras beginning with I, 1, 5, been again and again brought\nforward and refuted. The chief reason for the special attention given to\nthat doctrine is that the Vedanta-texts contain some passages which, to\npeople deficient in mental penetration, may appear to contain\ninferential marks pointing to it. The doctrine, moreover, stands\nsomewhat near to the Vedanta doctrine since, like the latter, it admits\nthe non-difference of cause and effect, and it, moreover, has been\naccepted by some of the authors of the Dharma-sutras, such as Devala,\nand so on. For all these reasons we have taken special trouble to refute\nthe pradhana doctrine, without paying much attention to the atomic and\nother theories. These latter theories, however, must likewise be\nrefuted, as they also are opposed to the doctrine of Brahman being the\ngeneral cause, and as slow-minded people might think that they also are\nreferred to in some Vedic passages. Hence the Sutrakara formally\nextends, in the above Sutra, the refutation already accomplished of the\npradhana doctrine to all similar doctrines which need not be demolished\nin detail after their great protagonist, the pradhana doctrine, has been\nso completely disposed of. They also are, firstly, not founded on any\nscriptural authority; and are, secondly, directly contradicted by\nvarious Vedic passages.--The repetition of the phrase 'are explained' is\nmeant to intimate that the end of the adhyaya has been reached.\n\nNotes:\n\n[Footnote 228: The Great one is the technical Sa@nkhya-term for buddhi,\navyakta is a common designation of pradhana or prak/ri/ti, and purusha\nis the technical name of the soul. Compare, for instance, Sa@nkhya Kar.\n2, 3.]\n\n[Footnote 229: Sa/m/kalpavikalparupamanana/s/aktya haira/n/yagarbhi\nbuddhir manas tasya/h/ vyash/t/imana/h/su samash/t/itaya vyaptim aha\nmahan iti. Sa/m/kalpadi/s/ktitaya tarhi sa/m/dehatmatva/m/ tatraha matir\niti. Mahatvam upapadayati brahmeti. Bhogyajatadharatvam aha pur iti.\nNi/sk/ayatmakatvam aha buddhir iti. Kirti/s/aktimattvam aha khyatir iti.\nNiyamana/s/aktimatvam aha i/s/vara iti. Loke yat prak/ri/sh/t/a/m/\nj/n/anam tatosnatirekam aha praj/n/eti. Tatphalam api tato\nnarthantaravishayam ity aha sa/m/vid iti. /K/itpradhanatvam aha /k/itir\niti. J/n/atasarvartbanusa/m/dhana/s/aktim aha sm/ri/tis /k/eti. Ananda\nGiri.]\n\n[Footnote 230: Nanu na bija/s/aktir vidyaya dahyate vastutvad atmavan\nnety aha avidyeti. Ke/k/it tu pratijivam avidya/s/aktibhedam i/kkh/anti\ntan na avyaktavyak/ri/tadi/s/abdayas tasya bhedakabhavad ekatvexpi\nsva/s/aktya vi/k/itrakaryakaratvad ity aha avyakteti. Na /k/a tasya\njiva/s/rayatva/m/ jiva/s/abdava/k/yasya kalpitatvad avidyarupatvat\nta/kkh/abdalakshyasya brahmavyatirekad ity aha parame/s/vareti.\nMayavidyayor bhedad i/s/varasya maya/s/rayatva/m/ jivanam\navidya/s/rayateti vadanta/m/ pratyaha mayamayiti. Yatha mayavino maya\nparatantra tathaishapity artha/h/. Pratitau tasya/s/ /k/etanapeksham aha\nmahasuptir iti. Ananda Giri.]\n\n[Footnote 231: Sutradvayasya v/ri/ttik/ri/dvyakhyanam utthapayati. Go.\nAn. A/k/aryade/s/iyamatam utthapayati. An. Gi.]\n\n[Footnote 232: The commentators give different explanations of the\nSattamatra of the text.--Sattamatre sattvapradhanaprak/ri/ter\nadyapari/n/ame. Go. An.--Bhogapavargapurusharthasya\nmaha/kkh/abditabuddhikaryatvat purushapekshitaphalakara/n/a/m/ sad\nu/k/yate tatra bhavapratyayos'pi svarupartho na samanyava/k/i\nkaryanumeya/m/ mahan na pratyaksham iti matra/s/abda/h/. Ananda Giri.]\n\n[Footnote 233: As the meaning of the word aja is going to be discussed,\nand as the author of the Sutras and /S/a@nkara seem to disagree as to\nits meaning (see later on), I prefer to leave the word untranslated in\nthis place.--/S/a@nkara reads--and explains,--in the mantra, sarupa/h/\n(not sarupam) and bhuktabhogam, not bhuktabhogyam.]\n\n[Footnote 234: Here there seems to be a certain discrepancy between the\nviews of the Sutra writer and /S/a@nkara. Govindananda notes that\naccording to the Bhashyak/ri/t aja means simply maya--which\ninterpretation is based on prakara/n/a--while, according to the\nSutra-k/ri/t, who explains aja on the ground of the Chandogya-passage\ntreating of the three primary elements, aja denotes the aggregate of\nthose three elements constituting an avantaraprak/ri/ti.--On\n/S/a@nkara's explanation the term aja presents no difficulties, for maya\nis aja, i.e. unborn, not produced. On the explanation of the Sutra\nwriter, however, aja cannot mean unborn, since the three primary\nelements are products. Hence we are thrown back on the ru/dh/i\nsignification of aja, according to which it means she-goat. But how can\nthe avantara-prak/ri/ti be called a she-goat? To this question the next\nSutra replies.]\n\n[Footnote 235: Indication (laksha/n/a, which consists in this case in\nfive times five being used instead of twenty-five) is considered as an\nobjectionable mode of expression, and therefore to be assumed in\ninterpretation only where a term can in no way be shown to have a direct\nmeaning.]\n\n[Footnote 236: That pa/nk/ajana/h/ is only one word appears from its\nhaving only one accent, viz. the udatta on the last syllable, which\nudatta becomes anudatta according to the rules laid down in the Bhashika\nSutra for the accentuation of the /S/atapatha-brahma/n/a.]\n\n[Footnote 237: So in the Madhyandina recension of the Upanishad; the\nKa/n/va recension has not the clause 'the food of food.']\n\n[Footnote 238: This in answer to the Sankhya who objects to jana when\napplied to the prana, &c. being interpreted with the help of laksha/n/a;\nwhile if referred to the pradhana, &c. it may be explained to have a\ndirect meaning, on the ground of yaugika interpretation (the pradhana\nbeing jana because it produces, the mahat &c. being jana because they\nare produced). The Vedantin points out that the compound pa/nk/ajana/h/\nhas its own ru/dh/i-meaning, just as a/s/vakar/n/a, literally horse-ear,\nwhich conventionally denotes a certain plant.]\n\n[Footnote 239: We infer that udbhid is the name of a sacrifice because\nit is mentioned in connexion with the act of sacrificing; we infer that\nthe yupa is a wooden post because it is said to be cut, and so on.]\n\n[Footnote 240: Option being possible only in the case of things to be\naccomplished, i.e. actions.]\n\n[Footnote 241: According to Go. An. in the passage, 'That made itself\nits Self' (II, 7); according to An. Giri in the passage, 'He created\nall' (II, 6).]\n\n[Footnote 242: By the Brahma/n/as being meant all those Brahma/n/as who\nare not at the same time wandering mendicants.]\n\n[Footnote 243: The comment of the Bhamati on the Sutra runs as follows:\nAs the sparks issuing from a fire are not absolutely different from the\nfire, because they participate in the nature of the fire; and, on the\nother hand, are not absolutely non-different from the fire, because in\nthat case they could be distinguished neither from the fire nor from\neach other; so the individual souls also--which are effects of\nBrahman--are neither absolutely different from Brahman, for that would\nmean that they are not of the nature of intelligence; nor absolutely\nnon-different from Brahman, because in that case they could not be\ndistinguished from each other, and because, if they were identical with\nBrahman and therefore omniscient, it would be useless to give them any\ninstruction. Hence the individual souls are somehow different from\nBrahman and somehow non-different.--The technical name of the doctrine\nhere represented by A/s/marathya is bhedabhedavada.]\n\n[Footnote 244: Bhamati: The individual soul is absolutely different from\nthe highest Self; it is inquinated by the contact with its different\nlimiting adjuncts. But it is spoken of, in the Upanishad, as\nnon-different from the highest Self because after having purified itself\nby means of knowledge and meditation it may pass out of the body and\nbecome one with the highest Self. The text of the Upanishad thus\ntransfers a future state of non-difference to that time when difference\nactually exists. Compare the saying of the Pa/nk/aratrikas: 'Up to the\nmoment of emancipation being reached the soul and the highest Self are\ndifferent. But the emancipated soul is no longer different from the\nhighest Self, since there is no further cause of difference.'--The\ntechnical name of the doctrine advocated by Au/d/ulomi is\nsatyabhedavada.]\n\n[Footnote 245: Compare the note to the same mantra as quoted above under\nI, 1, 11.]\n\n[Footnote 246: And not the relation of absolute identity.]\n\n[Footnote 247: I.e. upon the state of emancipation and its absence.]\n\n[Footnote 248: Upapadita/m/ /k/eti, sarvasyatmamatratvam iti /s/esha/h/.\nUpapadanaprakara/m/ su/k/ayati eketi. Sa yathardrendhanagner\nityadinaikaprasavatvam, yatha sarvasam apam ityadina\n/k/aikapralayatva/m/ sarvasyoktam. An. Gi.]\n\n[Footnote 249: So according to Go. An. and An. Gi., although their\ninterpretations seem not to account sufficiently for the ekam of the\ntext.--Ka/mk/id evaikam iti jivasthanad anyam ity artha/h/. Go.\nAn.--Jivabhavena pratibimbadharatiriktam ity artha/h/. An. Gi.]\n\n[Footnote 250: While release, as often remarked, is eternal, it being in\nfact not different from the eternally unchanging Brahman.]\n\n[Footnote 251: I.e. that the operative cause and the substantial cause\nare separate things.]\n\n[Footnote 252: Viz. the Sa@nkhya-sm/ri/ti.]\n\n\n\n\nSECOND ADHYAYA.\n\nFIRST PADA.\n\nREVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!\n\n\n1. If it be objected that (from the doctrine expounded hitherto) there\nwould result the fault of there being no room for (certain) Sm/ri/tis;\nwe do not admit that objection, because (from the rejection of our\ndoctrine) there would result the fault of want of room for other\nSm/ri/tis.\n\nIt has been shown in the first adhyaya that the omniscient Lord of all\nis the cause of the origin of this world in the same way as clay is the\nmaterial cause of jars and gold of golden ornaments; that by his\nrulership he is the cause of the subsistence of this world once\noriginated, just as the magician is the cause of the subsistence of the\nmagical illusion; and that he, lastly, is the cause of this emitted\nworld being finally reabsorbed into his essence, just as the four\nclasses of creatures are reabsorbed into the earth. It has further been\nproved, by a demonstration of the connected meaning of all the\nVedanta-texts, that the Lord is the Self of all of us. Moreover, the\ndoctrines of the pradhana, and so on, being the cause of this world have\nbeen refuted as not being scriptural.--The purport of the second\nadhyaya, which we now begin, is to refute the objections (to the\ndoctrine established hitherto) which might be founded on Sm/ri/ti and\nReasoning, and to show that the doctrines of the pradhana, &c. have only\nfallacious arguments to lean upon, and that the different Vedanta-texts\ndo not contradict one another with regard to the mode of creation and\nsimilar topics.--The first point is to refute the objections based on\nSm/ri/ti.\n\nYour doctrine (the purvapakshin says) that the omniscient Brahman only\nis the cause of this world cannot be maintained, 'because there results\nfrom it the fault of there being no room for (certain) Sm/ri/tis.' Such\nSm/ri/tis are the one called Tantra which was composed by a /ri/shi and\nis accepted by authoritative persons, and other Sm/ri/tis based on\nit[253]; for all of which there would be no room if your interpretation\nof the Veda were the true one. For they all teach that the\nnon-intelligent pradhana is the independent cause of the world. There is\nindeed room (a raison d'etre) for Sm/ri/tis like the Manu-sm/ri/ti,\nwhich give information about matters connected with the whole body of\nreligious duty, characterised by injunction[254] and comprising the\nagnihotra and similar performances. They tell us at what time and with\nwhat rites the members of the different castes are to be initiated; how\nthe Veda has to be studied; in what way the cessation of study has to\ntake place; how marriage has to be performed, and so on. They further\nlay down the manifold religious duties, beneficial to man, of the four\ncastes and a/s/ramas[255]. The Kapila Sm/ri/ti, on the other hand, and\nsimilar books are not concerned with things to be done, but were\ncomposed with exclusive reference to perfect knowledge as the means of\nfinal release. If then no room were left for them in that connexion\nalso, they would be altogether purposeless; and hence we must explain\nthe Vedanta-texts in such a manner as not to bring them into conflict\nwith the Sm/ri/tis mentioned[256].--But how, somebody may ask the\npurvapakshin, can the eventual fault of there being left no room for\ncertain Sm/ri/tis be used as an objection against that sense of /S/ruti\nwhich--from various reasons as detailed under I, 1 and ff.--has been\nascertained by us to be the true one, viz. that the omniscient Brahman\nalone is the cause of the world?--Our objection, the purvapakshin\nreplies, will perhaps not appear valid to persons of independent\nthought; but as most men depend in their reasonings on others, and are\nunable to ascertain by themselves the sense of /S/ruti, they naturally\nrely on Sm/ri/tis, composed by celebrated authorities, and try to arrive\nat the sense of /S/ruti with their assistance; while, owing to their\nesteem for the authors of the Sm/ri/tis, they have no trust in our\nexplanations. The knowledge of men like Kapila Sm/ri/ti declares to have\nbeen /ri/shi-like and unobstructed, and moreover there is the following\n/S/ruti-passage, 'It is he who, in the beginning, bears in his thoughts\nthe son, the /ri/shi, kapila[257], whom he wishes to look on while he is\nborn' (/S/ve. Up. V, 2). Hence their opinion cannot be assumed to be\nerroneous, and as they moreover strengthen their position by\nargumentation, the objection remains valid, and we must therefore\nattempt to explain the Vedanta-texts in conformity with the Sm/ri/tis.\n\nThis objection we dispose of by the remark, 'It is not so because\ntherefrom would result the fault of want of room for other\nSm/ri/tis.'--If you object to the doctrine of the Lord being the cause\nof the world on the ground that it would render certain Sm/ri/tis\npurposeless, you thereby render purposeless other Sm/ri/tis which\ndeclare themselves in favour of the said doctrine. These latter\nSm/ri/ti-texts we will quote in what follows. In one passage the highest\nBrahman is introduced as the subject of discussion, 'That which is\nsubtle and not to be known;' the text then goes on, 'That is the\ninternal Self of the creatures, their soul,' and after that remarks\n'From that sprang the Unevolved, consisting of the three gu/n/as, O best\nof Brahma/n/as.' And in another place it is said that 'the Unevolved is\ndissolved in the Person devoid of qualities, O Brahma/n/a.'--Thus we\nread also in the Pura/n/a, 'Hear thence this short statement: The\nancient Naraya/n/a is all this; he produces the creation at the due\ntime, and at the time of reabsorption he consumes it again.' And so in\nthe Bhagavadgita also (VII, 6), 'I am the origin and the place of\nreabsorption of the whole world.' And Apastamba too says with reference\nto the highest Self, 'From him spring all bodies; he is the primary\ncause, he is eternal, he is unchangeable' (Dharma Sutra I, 8, 23, 2). In\nthis way Sm/ri/ti, in many places, declares the Lord to be the efficient\nas well as the material cause of the world. As the purvapakshin opposes\nus on the ground of Sm/ri/ti, we reply to him on the ground of Sm/ri/ti\nonly; hence the line of defence taken up in the Sutra. Now it has been\nshown already that the /S/ruti-texts aim at conveying the doctrine that\nthe Lord is the universal cause, and as wherever different Sm/ri/tis\nconflict those maintaining one view must be accepted, while those which\nmaintain the opposite view must be set aside, those Sm/ri/tis which\nfollow /S/ruti are to be considered as authoritative, while all others\nare to be disregarded; according to the Sutra met with in the chapter\ntreating of the means of proof (Mim. Sutra I, 3, 3), 'Where there is\ncontradiction (between /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti) (Sm/ri/ti) is to be\ndisregarded; in case of there being no (contradiction) (Sm/ri/ti is to\nbe recognised) as there is inference (of Sm/ri/ti being founded on\n/S/ruti).'--Nor can we assume that some persons are able to perceive\nsupersensuous matters without /S/ruti, as there exists no efficient\ncause for such perception. Nor, again, can it be said that such\nperception may be assumed in the case of Kapila and others who possessed\nsupernatural powers, and consequently unobstructed power of cognition.\nFor the possession of supernatural powers itself depends on the\nperformance of religious duty, and religious duty is that which is\ncharacterised by injunction[258]; hence the sense of injunctions (i.e.\nof the Veda) which is established first must not be fancifully\ninterpreted in reference to the dicta of men 'established' (i.e. made\nperfect, and therefore possessing supernatural powers) afterwards only.\nMoreover, even if those 'perfect' men were accepted as authorities to be\nappealed to, still, as there are many such perfect men, we should have,\nin all those cases where the Sm/ri/tis contradict each other in the\nmanner described, no other means of final decision than an appeal to\n/S/ruti.--As to men destitute of the power of independent judgment, we\nare not justified in assuming that they will without any reason attach\nthemselves to some particular Sm/ri/ti; for if men's inclinations were\nso altogether unregulated, truth itself would, owing to the multiformity\nof human opinion, become unstable. We must therefore try to lead their\njudgment in the right way by pointing out to them the conflict of the\nSm/ri/tis, and the distinction founded on some of them following /S/ruti\nand others not.--The scriptural passage which the purvapakshin has\nquoted as proving the eminence of Kapila's knowledge would not justify\nus in believing in such doctrines of Kapila (i.e. of some Kapila) as are\ncontrary to Scripture; for that passage mentions the bare name of Kapila\n(without specifying which Kapila is meant), and we meet in tradition\nwith another Kapila, viz. the one who burned the sons of Sagara and had\nthe surname Vasudeva. That passage, moreover, serves another purpose,\n(viz. the establishment of the doctrine of the highest Self,) and has on\nthat account no force to prove what is not proved by any other means,\n(viz. the supereminence of Kapila's knowledge.) On the other hand, we\nhave a /S/ruti-passage which proclaims the excellence of Manu[259], viz.\n'Whatever Manu said is medicine' (Taitt. Sa/m/h. II, 2, 10, 2). Manu\nhimself, where he glorifies the seeing of the one Self in everything\n('he who equally sees the Self in all beings and all beings in the Self,\nhe as a sacrificer to the Self attains self-luminousness,' i.e. becomes\nBrahman, Manu Sm/ri/ti XII, 91), implicitly blames the doctrine of\nKapila. For Kapila, by acknowledging a plurality of Selfs, does not\nadmit the doctrine of there being one universal Self. In the Mahabharata\nalso the question is raised whether there are many persons (souls) or\none; thereupon the opinion of others is mentioned, 'There are many\npersons, O King, according to the Sa@nkhya and Yoga philosophers;' that\nopinion is controverted 'just as there is one place of origin, (viz. the\nearth,) for many persons, so I will proclaim to you that universal\nperson raised by his qualities;' and, finally, it is declared that there\nis one universal Self, 'He is the internal Self of me, of thee, and of\nall other embodied beings, the internal witness of all, not to be\napprehended by any one. He the all-headed, all-armed, all-footed,\nall-eyed, all-nosed one moves through all beings according to his will\nand liking.' And Scripture also declares that there is one universal\nSelf, 'When to a man who understands the Self has become all things,\nwhat sorrow, what trouble can there be to him who once beheld that\nunity?' (I/s/. Up 7); and other similar passages. All which proves that\nthe system of Kapila contradicts the Veda, and the doctrine of Manu who\nfollows the Veda, by its hypothesis of a plurality of Selfs also, not\nonly by the assumption of an independent pradhana. The authoritativeness\nof the Veda with regard to the matters stated by it is independent and\ndirect, just as the light of the sun is the direct means of our\nknowledge of form and colour; the authoritativeness of human dicta, on\nthe other hand, is of an altogether different kind, as it depends on an\nextraneous basis (viz. the Veda), and is (not immediate but) mediated by\na chain of teachers and tradition.\n\nHence the circumstance that the result (of our doctrine) is want of room\nfor certain Sm/ri/tis, with regard to matters contradicted by the Veda,\nfurnishes no valid objection.--An additional reason for this our opinion\nis supplied by the following Sutra.\n\n2. And on account of the non-perception of the others (i.e. the effects\nof the pradhana, according to the Sa@nkhya system).\n\nThe principles different from the pradhana, but to be viewed as its\nmodifications which the (Sa@nkhya) Sm/ri/ti assumes, as, for instance,\nthe great principle, are perceived neither in the Veda nor in ordinary\nexperience. Now things of the nature of the elements and the sense\norgans, which are well known from the Veda, as well as from experience,\nmay be referred to in Sm/ri/ti; but with regard to things which, like\nKapila's great principle, are known neither from the Veda nor from\nexperience--no more than, for instance, the objects of a sixth\nsense--Sm/ri/ti is altogether impossible. That some scriptural passages\nwhich apparently refer to such things as the great principle have in\nreality quite a different meaning has already been shown under I, 4, 1.\nBut if that part of Sm/ri/ti which is concerned with the effects (i.e.\nthe great principle, and so on) is without authority, the part which\nrefers to the cause (the pradhana) will be so likewise. This is what the\nSutra means to say.--We have thus established a second reason, proving\nthat the circumstance of there being no room left for certain Sm/ri/tis\ndoes not constitute a valid objection to our doctrine.--The weakness of\nthe trust in reasoning (apparently favouring the Sa@nkhya doctrine) will\nbe shown later on under II, 1, 4 ff.\n\n3. Thereby the Yoga (Sm/ri/ti) is refuted.\n\nThis Sutra extends the application of the preceding argumentation, and\nremarks that by the refutation of the Sa@nkhya-sm/ri/ti the\nYoga-sm/ri/ti also is to be considered as refuted; for the latter also\nassumes, in opposition to Scripture, a pradhana as the independent cause\nof the world, and the 'great principle,' &c. as its effects, although\nneither the Veda nor common experience favour these views.--But, if the\nsame reasoning applies to the Yoga also, the latter system is already\ndisposed of by the previous arguments; of what use then is it formally\nto extend them to the Yoga? (as the Sutra does.)--We reply that here an\nadditional cause of doubt presents itself, the practice of Yoga being\nenjoined in the Veda as a means of obtaining perfect knowledge; so, for\ninstance, B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 5, '(The Self) is to be heard, to be\nthought, to be meditated upon[260].' In the /S/veta/s/vatara Upanishad,\nmoreover, we find various injunctions of Yoga-practice connected with\nthe assumption of different positions of the body; &c.; so, for\ninstance, 'Holding his body with its three erect parts even,' &c. (II,\n8).\n\nFurther, we find very many passages in the Veda which (without expressly\nenjoining it) point to the Yoga, as, for instance, Ka. Up. II, 6, 11,\n'This, the firm holding back of the senses, is what is called Yoga;'\n'Having received this knowledge and the whole rule of Yoga' (Ka. Up. II,\n6, 18); and so on. And in the Yoga-/s/astra itself the passage, 'Now\nthen Yoga, the means of the knowledge of truth,' &c. defines the Yoga as\na means of reaching perfect knowledge. As thus one topic of the /s/astra\nat least (viz. the practice of Yoga) is shown to be authoritative, the\nentire Yoga-sm/ri/ti will have to be accepted as unobjectionable, just\nas the Sm/ri/ti referring to the ash/t/akas[261].--To this we reply that\nthe formal extension (to the Yoga, of the arguments primarily directed\nagainst the Sa@nkhya) has the purpose of removing the additional doubt\nstated in the above lines; for in spite of a part of the Yoga-sm/ri/ti\nbeing authoritative, the disagreement (between Sm/ri/ti and /S/ruti) on\nother topics remains as shown above.--Although[262] there are many\nSm/ri/tis treating of the soul, we have singled out for refutation the\nSa@nkhya and Yoga because they are widely known as offering the means\nfor accomplishing the highest end of man and have found favour with many\ncompetent persons. Moreover, their position is strengthened by a Vedic\npassage referring to them, 'He who has known that cause which is to be\napprehended by Sa@nkhya and Yoga he is freed from all fetters' (/S/ve.\nUp. VI, 13). (The claims which on the ground of this last passage might\nbe set up for the Sa@nkhya and Yoga-sm/ri/tis in their entirety) we\nrefute by the remark that the highest beatitude (the highest aim of man)\nis not to be attained by the knowledge of the Sa@nkhya-sm/ri/ti\nirrespective of the Veda, nor by the road of Yoga-practice. For\nScripture itself declares that there is no other means of obtaining the\nhighest beatitude but the knowledge of the unity of the Self which is\nconveyed by the Veda, 'Over death passes only the man who knows him;\nthere is no other path to go' (/S/ve. Up. III, 8). And the Sa@nkhya and\nYoga-systems maintain duality, do not discern the unity of the Self. In\nthe passage quoted ('That cause which is to be apprehended by Sa@nkhya\nand Yoga') the terms 'Sa@nkhya' and 'Yoga' denote Vedic knowledge and\nmeditation, as we infer from proximity[263]. We willingly allow room for\nthose portions of the two systems which do not contradict the Veda. In\ntheir description of the soul, for instance, as free from all qualities\nthe Sa@nkhyas are in harmony with the Veda which teaches that the person\n(purusha) is essentially pure; cp. B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 16. 'For that\nperson is not attached to anything.' The Yoga again in giving rules for\nthe condition of the wandering religious mendicant admits that state of\nretirement from the concerns of life which is known from scriptural\npassages such as the following one, 'Then the parivrajaka with\ndiscoloured (yellow) dress, shaven, without any possessions,' &c.\n(Jabala Upan. IV).\n\nThe above remarks will serve as a reply to the claims of all\nargumentative Sm/ri/tis. If it be said that those Sm/ri/tis also assist,\nby argumentation and proof, the cognition of truth, we do not object to\nso much, but we maintain all the same that the truth can be known from\nthe Vedanta-texts only; as is stated by scriptural passages such as\n'None who does not know the Veda perceives that great one' (Taitt. Br.\nIII, 12, 9, 7); 'I now ask thee that person taught in the Upanishads'\n(B/ri/. Up, III, 9, 26); and others.\n\n4. (Brahman can) not (be the cause of the world) on account of the\ndifference of character of that, (viz. the world); and its being such,\n(i.e. different from Brahman) (we learn) from Scripture.\n\nThe objections, founded on Sm/ri/ti, against the doctrine of Brahman\nbeing the efficient and the material cause of this world have been\nrefuted; we now proceed to refute those founded on Reasoning.--But (to\nraise an objection at the outset) how is there room for objections\nfounded on Reasoning after the sense of the sacred texts has once been\nsettled? The sacred texts are certainly to be considered absolutely\nauthoritative with regard to Brahman as well as with regard to religious\nduty (dharma).--(To this the purvapakshin replies), The analogy between\nBrahman and dharma would hold good if the matter in hand were to be\nknown through the holy texts only, and could not be approached by the\nother means of right knowledge also. In the case of religious duties,\ni.e. things to be done, we indeed entirely depend on Scripture. But now\nwe are concerned with Brahman which is an accomplished existing thing,\nand in the case of accomplished things there is room for other means of\nright knowledge also, as, for instance, the case of earth and the other\nelements shows. And just as in the case of several conflicting\nscriptural passages we explain all of them in such a manner as to make\nthem accord with one, so /S/ruti, if in conflict with other means of\nright knowledge, has to be bent so as to accord with the letter.\nMoreover, Reasoning, which enables us to infer something not actually\nperceived in consequence of its having a certain equality of attributes\nwith what is actually perceived, stands nearer to perception than\n/S/ruti which conveys its sense by tradition merely. And the knowledge\nof Brahman which discards Nescience and effects final release terminates\nin a perception (viz. the intuition--sakshatkara--of Brahman), and as\nsuch must be assumed to have a seen result (not an unseen one like\ndharma)[264]. Moreover, the scriptural passage, 'He is to be heard, to\nbe thought,' enjoins thought in addition to hearing, and thereby shows\nthat Reasoning also is to be resorted to with regard to Brahman. Hence\nan objection founded on Reasoning is set forth, 'Not so, on account of\nthe difference of nature of this (effect).'--The Vedantic opinion that\nthe intelligent Brahman is the material cause of this world is untenable\nbecause the effect would in that case be of an altogether different\ncharacter from the cause. For this world, which the Vedantin considers\nas the effect of Brahman, is perceived to be non-intelligent and impure,\nconsequently different in character from Brahman; and Brahman again is\ndeclared by the sacred texts to be of a character different from the\nworld, viz. intelligent and pure. But things of an altogether different\ncharacter cannot stand to each other in the relation of material cause\nand effect. Such effects, for instance, as golden ornaments do not have\nearth for their material cause, nor is gold the material cause of\nearthen vessels; but effects of an earthy nature originate from earth\nand effects of the nature of gold from gold. In the same manner this\nworld, which is non-intelligent and comprises pleasure, pain, and\ndulness, can only be the effect of a cause itself non-intelligent and\nmade up of pleasure, pain, and dulness; but not of Brahman which is of\nan altogether different character. The difference in character of this\nworld from Brahman must be understood to be due to its impurity and its\nwant of intelligence. It is impure because being itself made up of\npleasure, pain, and dulness, it is the cause of delight, grief,\ndespondency, &c., and because it comprises in itself abodes of various\ncharacter such as heaven, hell, and so on. It is devoid of intelligence\nbecause it is observed to stand to the intelligent principle in the\nrelation of subserviency, being the instrument of its activity. For the\nrelation of subserviency of one thing to another is not possible on the\nbasis of equality; two lamps, for instance, cannot be said to be\nsubservient to each other (both being equally luminous).--But, it will\nbe said, an intelligent instrument also might be subservient to the\nenjoying soul; just as an intelligent servant is subservient to his\nmaster.--This analogy, we reply, does not hold good, because in the case\nof servant and master also only the non-intelligent element in the\nformer is subservient to the intelligent master. For a being endowed\nwith intelligence subserves another intelligent being only with the\nnon-intelligent part belonging to it, viz. its internal organ, sense\norgans, &c.; while in so far as it is intelligent itself it acts neither\nfor nor against any other being. For the Sa@nkhyas are of opinion that\nthe intelligent beings (i.e. the souls) are incapable of either taking\nin or giving out anything[265], and are non-active. Hence that only\nwhich is devoid of intelligence can be an instrument. Nor[266] is there\nanything to show that things like pieces of wood and clods of earth are\nof an intelligent nature; on the contrary, the dichotomy of all things\nwhich exist into such as are intelligent and such as are non-intelligent\nis well established. This world therefore cannot have its material cause\nin Brahman from which it is altogether different in character.--Here\nsomebody might argue as follows. Scripture tells us that this world has\noriginated from an intelligent cause; therefore, starting from the\nobservation that the attributes of the cause survive in the effect, I\nassume this whole world to be intelligent. The absence of manifestation\nof intelligence (in this world) is to be ascribed to the particular\nnature of the modification[267]. Just as undoubtedly intelligent beings\ndo not manifest their intelligence in certain states such as sleep,\nswoon, &c., so the intelligence of wood and earth also is not manifest\n(although it exists). In consequence of this difference produced by the\nmanifestation and non-manifestation of intelligence (in the case of men,\nanimals, &c., on the one side, and wood, stones, &c. on the other side),\nand in consequence of form, colour, and the like being present in the\none case and absent in the other, nothing prevents the instruments of\naction (earth, wood, &c.) from standing to the souls in the relation of\na subordinate to a superior thing, although in reality both are equally\nof an intelligent nature. And just as such substances as flesh, broth,\npap, and the like may, owing to their individual differences, stand in\nthe relation of mutual subserviency, although fundamentally they are all\nof the same nature, viz. mere modifications of earth, so it will be in\nthe case under discussion also, without there being done any violence to\nthe well-known distinction (of beings intelligent and\nnon-intelligent).--This reasoning--the purvapakshin replies--if valid\nmight remove to a certain extent that difference of character between\nBrahman and the world which is due to the circumstance of the one being\nintelligent and the other non-intelligent; there would, however, still\nremain that other difference which results from the fact that the one is\npure and the other impure. But in reality the argumentation of the\nobjector does not even remove the first-named difference; as is declared\nin the latter part of the Sutra, 'And its being such we learn from\nScripture.' For the assumption of the intellectuality of the entire\nworld--which is supported neither by perception nor by inference,\n&c.--must be considered as resting on Scripture only in so far as the\nlatter speaks of the world as having originated from an intelligent\ncause; but that scriptural statement itself is contradicted by other\ntexts which declare the world to be 'of such a nature,' i.e. of a nature\ndifferent from that of its material cause. For the scriptural passage,\n'It became that which is knowledge and that which is devoid of\nknowledge' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), which teaches that a certain class of\nbeings is of a non-intelligent nature intimates thereby that the\nnon-intelligent world is different from the intelligent\nBrahman.--But--somebody might again object--the sacred texts themselves\nsometimes speak of the elements and the bodily organs, which are\ngenerally considered to be devoid of intelligence, as intelligent\nbeings. The following passages, for instance, attribute intelligence to\nthe elements. 'The earth spoke;' 'The waters spoke' (/S/at. Br. VI, 1,\n3, 2; 4); and, again, 'Fire thought;' 'Water thought' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3;\n4). Other texts attribute intelligence to the bodily organs, 'These\npra/n/as when quarrelling together as to who was the best went to\nBrahman' (B/ri/. Up. VI, 1, 7); and, again, 'They said to Speech: Do\nthou sing out for us' (B/ri/. Up. I, 3, 2).--To this objection the\npurvapakshin replies in the following Sutra.\n\n5. But (there takes place) denotation of the superintending (deities),\non account of the difference and the connexion.\n\nThe word 'but' discards the doubt raised. We are not entitled to base\nthe assumption of the elements and the sense organs being of an\nintellectual nature on such passages as 'the earth spoke,' &c. because\n'there takes place denotation of that which presides.' In the case of\nactions like speaking, disputing, and so on, which require intelligence,\nthe scriptural passages denote not the mere material elements and\norgans, but rather the intelligent divinities which preside over earth,\n&c., on the one hand, and Speech, &c., on the other hand. And why so?\n'On account of the difference and the connexion.' The difference is the\none previously referred to between the enjoying souls, on the one hand,\nand the material elements and organs, on the other hand, which is\nfounded on the distinction between intelligent and non-intelligent\nbeings; that difference would not be possible if all beings were\nintelligent. Moreover, the Kaushitakins in their account of the dispute\nof the pra/n/as make express use of the word 'divinities' in order to\npreclude the idea of the mere material organs being meant, and in order\nto include the superintending intelligent beings. They say, 'The deities\ncontending with each for who was the best;' and, again, 'All these\ndeities having recognised the pre-eminence in pra/n/a' (Kau. Up. II,\n14).--And, secondly, Mantras, Arthavadas, Itihasas, Pura/n/as, &c. all\ndeclare that intelligent presiding divinities are connected with\neverything. Moreover, such scriptural passages as 'Agni having become\nSpeech entered into the mouth' (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 2, 4) show that each\nbodily organ is connected with its own favouring divinity. And in the\npassages supplementary to the quarrel of the pra/n/as we read in one\nplace how, for the purpose of settling their relative excellence, they\nwent to Prajapati, and how they settled their quarrel on the ground of\npresence and absence, each of them, as Prajapati had advised, departing\nfrom the body for some time ('They went to their father Prajapati and\nsaid,' &c,; Ch. Up. V, 1, 7); and in another place it is said that they\nmade an offering to pra/n/a (B/ri/. Up. VI, 1, 13), &c.; all of them\nproceedings which are analogous to those of men, &c., and therefore\nstrengthen the hypothesis that the text refers to the superintending\ndeities. In the case of such passages as, 'Fire thought,' we must assume\nthat the thought spoken of is that of the highest deity which is\nconnected with its effects as a superintending principle.--From all this\nit follows that this world is different in nature from Brahman, and\nhence cannot have it for its material cause.\n\nTo this objection raised by the purvapakshin the next Sutra replies.\n\n6. But it is seen.\n\nThe word 'but' discards the purvapaksha.\n\nYour assertion that this world cannot have originated from Brahman on\naccount of the difference of its character is not founded on an\nabsolutely true tenet. For we see that from man, who is acknowledged to\nbe intelligent, non-intelligent things such as hair and nails originate,\nand that, on the other hand, from avowedly non-intelligent matter, such\nas cow-dung, scorpions and similar animals are produced.--But--to state\nan objection--the real cause of the non-intelligent hair and nails is\nthe human body which is itself non-intelligent, and the non-intelligent\nbodies only of scorpions are the effects of non-intelligent dung.--Even\nthus, we reply, there remains a difference in character (between the\ncause, for instance, the dung, and the effect, for instance, the body of\nthe scorpion), in so far as some non-intelligent matter (the body) is\nthe abode of an intelligent principle (the scorpion's soul), while other\nnon-intelligent matter (the dung) is not. Moreover, the difference of\nnature--due to the cause passing over into the effect--between the\nbodies of men on the one side and hair and nails on the other side, is,\non account of the divergence of colour, form, &c., very considerable\nafter all. The same remark holds good with regard to cow-dung and the\nbodies of scorpions, &c. If absolute equality were insisted on (in the\ncase of one thing being the effect of another), the relation of material\ncause and effect (which after all requires a distinction of the two)\nwould be annihilated. If, again, it be remarked that in the case of men\nand hair as well as in that of scorpions and cow-dung there is one\ncharacteristic feature, at least, which is found in the effect as well\nas in the cause, viz. the quality of being of an earthy nature; we reply\nthat in the case of Brahman and the world also one characteristic\nfeature, viz. that of existence (satta), is found in ether, &c. (which\nare the effects) as well as in Brahman (which is the cause).--He,\nmoreover, who on the ground of the difference of the attributes tries to\ninvalidate the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world, must\nassert that he understands by difference of attributes either the\nnon-occurrence (in the world) of the entire complex of the\ncharacteristics of Brahman, or the non-occurrence of any (some or other)\ncharacteristic, or the non-occurrence of the characteristic of\nintelligence. The first assertion would lead to the negation of the\nrelation of cause and effect in general, which relation is based on the\nfact of there being in the effect something over and above the cause\n(for if the two were absolutely identical they could not be\ndistinguished). The second assertion is open to the charge of running\ncounter to what is well known; for, as we have already remarked, the\ncharacteristic quality of existence which belongs to Brahman is found\nlikewise in ether and so on. For the third assertion the requisite\nproving instances are wanting; for what instances could be brought\nforward against the upholder of Brahman, in order to prove the general\nassertion that whatever is devoid of intelligence is seen not to be an\neffect of Brahman? (The upholder of Brahman would simply not admit any\nsuch instances) because he maintains that this entire complex of things\nhas Brahman for its material cause. And that all such assertions are\ncontrary to Scripture, is clear, as we have already shown it to be the\npurport of Scripture that Brahman is the cause and substance of the\nworld. It has indeed been maintained by the purvapakshin that the other\nmeans of proof also (and not merely sacred tradition) apply to Brahman,\non account of its being an accomplished entity (not something to be\naccomplished as religious duties are); but such an assertion is entirely\ngratuitous. For Brahman, as being devoid of form and so on, cannot\nbecome an object of perception; and as there are in its case no\ncharacteristic marks (on which conclusions, &c. might be based),\ninference also and the other means of proof do not apply to it; but,\nlike religious duty, it is to be known solely on the ground of holy\ntradition. Thus Scripture also declares, 'That doctrine is not to be\nobtained by argument, but when it is declared by another then, O\ndearest! it is easy to understand' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 9). And again, 'Who in\ntruth knows it? Who could here proclaim it, whence this creation\nsprang?' (/Ri/g-v. Sa/m/h. X, 129, 6). These two mantras show that the\ncause of this world is not to be known even by divine beings\n(i/s/vara)[268] of extraordinary power and wisdom.\n\nThere are also the following Sm/ri/ti passages to the same effect: 'Do\nnot apply reasoning to those things which are uncognisable[269];'\n'Unevolved he is called, uncognisable, unchangeable;' 'Not the legions\nof the gods know my origin, not the great /ri/shis. For I myself am in\nevery way the origin of the gods and great /ri/shis' (Bha. Gi. X,\n2).--And if it has been maintained above that the scriptural passage\nenjoining thought (on Brahman) in addition to mere hearing (of the\nsacred texts treating of Brahman) shows that reasoning also is to be\nallowed its place, we reply that the passage must not deceitfully be\ntaken as enjoining bare independent ratiocination, but must be\nunderstood to represent reasoning as a subordinate auxiliary of\nintuitional knowledge. By reasoning of the latter type we may, for\ninstance, arrive at the following conclusions; that because the state of\ndream and the waking state exclude each other the Self is not connected\nwith those states; that, as the soul in the state of deep sleep leaves\nthe phenomenal world behind and becomes one with that whose Self is pure\nBeing, it has for its Self pure Being apart from the phenomenal world;\nthat as the world springs from Brahman it cannot be separate from\nBrahman, according to the principle of the non-difference of cause and\neffect, &c.[270] The fallaciousness of mere reasoning will moreover be\ndemonstrated later on (II, 1, 11).--He[271], moreover, who merely on the\nground of the sacred tradition about an intelligent cause of the world\nwould assume this entire world to be of an intellectual nature would\nfind room for the other scriptural passage quoted above ('He became\nknowledge and what is devoid of knowledge') which teaches a distinction\nof intellect and non-intellect; for he could avail himself of the\ndoctrine of intellect being sometimes manifested and sometimes\nnon-manifested. His antagonist, on the other hand (i.e. the Sa@nkhya),\nwould not be able to make anything of the passage, for it distinctly\nteaches that the highest cause constitutes the Self of the entire world.\n\nIf, then, on account of difference of character that which is\nintelligent cannot pass over into what is non-intelligent, that also\nwhich is non-intelligent (i.e. in our case, the non-intelligent pradhana\nof the Sa@nkhyas) cannot pass over into what is intelligent.--(So much\nfor argument's sake,) but apart from that, as the argument resting on\ndifference of character has already been refuted, we must assume an\nintelligent cause of the world in agreement with Scripture.\n\n7. If (it is said that the effect is) non-existent (before its\norigination); we do not allow that because it is a mere negation\n(without an object).\n\nIf Brahman, which is intelligent, pure, and devoid of qualities such as\nsound, and so on, is supposed to be the cause of an effect which is of\nan opposite nature, i.e. non-intelligent, impure, possessing the\nqualities of sound, &c., it follows that the effect has to be considered\nas non-existing before its actual origination. But this consequence\ncannot be acceptable to you--the Vedantin--who maintain the doctrine of\nthe effect existing in the cause already.\n\nThis objection of yours, we reply, is without any force, on account of\nits being a mere negation. If you negative the existence of the effect\nprevious to its actual origination, your negation is a mere negation\nwithout an object to be negatived. The negation (implied in\n'non-existent') can certainly not have for its object the existence of\nthe effect previous to its origination, since the effect must be viewed\nas 'existent,' through and in the Self of the cause, before its\norigination as well as after it; for at the present moment also this\neffect does not exist independently, apart from the cause; according to\nsuch scriptural passages as, 'Whosoever looks for anything elsewhere\nthan in the Self is abandoned by everything' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 6). In\nso far, on the other hand, as the effect exists through the Self of the\ncause, its existence is the same before the actual beginning of the\neffect (as after it).--But Brahman, which is devoid of qualities such as\nsound, &c., is the cause of this world (possessing all those\nqualities)!--True, but the effect with all its qualities does not exist\nwithout the Self of the cause either now or before the actual beginning\n(of the effect); hence it cannot be said that (according to our\ndoctrine) the effect is non-existing before its actual beginning.--This\npoint will be elucidated in detail in the section treating of the\nnon-difference of cause and effect.\n\n8. On account of such consequences at the time of reabsorption (the\ndoctrine maintained hitherto) is objectionable.\n\nThe purvapakshin raises further objections.--If an effect which is\ndistinguished by the qualities of grossness, consisting of parts,\nabsence of intelligence, limitation, impurity, &c., is admitted to have\nBrahman for its cause, it follows that at the time of reabsorption (of\nthe world into Brahman), the effect, by entering into the state of\nnon-division from its cause, inquinates the latter with its properties.\nAs therefore--on your doctrine--the cause (i.e. Brahman) as well as the\neffect is, at the time of reabsorption, characterised by impurity and\nsimilar qualities, the doctrine of the Upanishads, according to which an\nomniscient Brahman is the cause of the world, cannot be upheld.--Another\nobjection to that doctrine is that in consequence of all distinctions\npassing at the time of reabsorption into the state of non-distinction\nthere would be no special causes left at the time of a new beginning of\nthe world, and consequently the new world could not arise with all the\ndistinctions of enjoying souls, objects to be enjoyed and so on (which\nare actually observed to exist).--A third objection is that, if we\nassume the origin of a new world even after the annihilation of all\nworks, &c. (which are the causes of a new world arising) of the enjoying\nsouls which enter into the state of non-difference from the highest\nBrahman, we are led to the conclusion that also those (souls) which have\nobtained final release again appear in the new world.--If you finally\nsay, 'Well, let this world remain distinct from the highest Brahman even\nat the time of reabsorption,' we reply that in that case a reabsorption\nwill not take place at all, and that, moreover, the effect's existing\nseparate from the cause is not possible.--For all these reasons the\nVedanta doctrine is objectionable.\n\nTo this the next Sutra replies.\n\n9. Not so; as there are parallel instances.\n\nThere is nothing objectionable in our system.--The objection that the\neffect when being reabsorbed into its cause would inquinate the latter\nwith its qualities does not damage our position 'because there are\nparallel instances,' i.e. because there are instances of effects not\ninquinating with their qualities the causes into which they are\nreabsorbed. Things, for instance, made of clay, such as pots, &c., which\nin their state of separate existence are of various descriptions, do\nnot, when they are reabsorbed into their original matter (i.e. clay),\nimpart to the latter their individual qualities; nor do golden ornaments\nimpart their individual qualities to their elementary material, i.e.\ngold, into which they may finally be reabsorbed. Nor does the fourfold\ncomplex of organic beings which springs from earth impart its qualities\nto the latter at the time of reabsorption. You (i.e. the purvapakshin),\non the other hand, have not any instances to quote in your favour. For\nreabsorption could not take place at all if the effect when passing back\ninto its causal substance continued to subsist there with all its\nindividual properties. And[272] that in spite of the non-difference of\ncause and effect the effect has its Self in the cause, but not the cause\nin the effect, is a point which we shall render clear later on, under\nII, 1, 14.\n\nMoreover, the objection that the effect would impart its qualities to\nthe cause at the time of reabsorption is formulated too narrowly\nbecause, the identity of cause and effect being admitted, the same would\ntake place during the time of the subsistence (of the effect, previous\nto its reabsorption). That the identity of cause and effect (of Brahman\nand the world) holds good indiscriminately with regard to all time (not\nonly the time of reabsorption), is declared in many scriptural passages,\nas, for instance, 'This everything is that Self' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 6);\n'The Self is all this' (Ch. Up. VII, 25, 2); 'The immortal Brahman is\nthis before' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); 'All this is Brahman' (Ch. Up. III,\n14, 1).\n\nWith regard to the case referred to in the /S/ruti-passages we refute\nthe assertion of the cause being affected by the effect and its\nqualities by showing that the latter are the mere fallacious\nsuperimpositions of nescience, and the very same argument holds good\nwith reference to reabsorption also.--We can quote other examples in\nfavour of our doctrine. As the magician is not at any time affected by\nthe magical illusion produced by himself, because it is unreal, so the\nhighest Self is not affected by the world-illusion. And as one dreaming\nperson is not affected by the illusory visions of his dream because they\ndo not accompany the waking state and the state of dreamless sleep; so\nthe one permanent witness of the three states (viz. the highest Self\nwhich is the one unchanging witness of the creation, subsistence, and\nreabsorption of the world) is not touched by the mutually exclusive\nthree states. For that the highest Self appears in those three states,\nis a mere illusion, not more substantial than the snake for which the\nrope is mistaken in the twilight. With reference to this point teachers\nknowing the true tradition of the Vedanta have made the following\ndeclaration, 'When the individual soul which is held in the bonds of\nslumber by the beginningless Maya awakes, then it knows the eternal,\nsleepless, dreamless non-duality' (Gau/d/ap. Kar. I, 16).\n\nSo far we have shown that--on our doctrine--there is no danger of the\ncause being affected at the time of reabsorption by the qualities of the\neffect, such as grossness and the like.--With regard to the second\nobjection, viz. that if we assume all distinctions to pass (at the time\nof reabsorption) into the state of non-distinction there would be no\nspecial reason for the origin of a new world affected with distinctions,\nwe likewise refer to the 'existence of parallel instances.' For the case\nis parallel to that of deep sleep and trance. In those states also the\nsoul enters into an essential condition of non-distinction;\nnevertheless, wrong knowledge being not yet finally overcome, the old\nstate of distinction re-establishes itself as soon as the soul awakes\nfrom its sleep or trance. Compare the scriptural passage, 'All these\ncreatures when they have become merged in the True, know not that they\nare merged in the True. Whatever these creatures are here, whether a\nlion, or a wolf, or a boar, or a worm, or a midge, or a gnat, or a\nmosquito, that they become again' (Ch. Up. VI, 9, 2; 3) For just as\nduring the subsistence of the world the phenomenon of multifarious\ndistinct existence, based on wrong knowledge, proceeds unimpeded like\nthe vision of a dream, although there is only one highest Self devoid of\nall distinction; so, we conclude, there remains, even after\nreabsorption, the power of distinction (potential distinction) founded\non wrong knowledge.--Herewith the objection that--according to our\ndoctrine--even the finally released souls would be born again is already\ndisposed of. They will not be born again because in their case wrong\nknowledge has been entirely discarded by perfect knowledge.--The last\nalternative finally (which the purvapakshin had represented as open to\nthe Vedantin), viz. that even at the time of reabsorption the world\nshould remain distinct from Brahman, precludes itself because it is not\nadmitted by the Vedantins themselves.--Hence the system founded on the\nUpanishads is in every way unobjectionable.\n\n10. And because the objections (raised by the Sa@nkhya against the\nVedanta doctrine) apply to his view also.\n\nThe doctrine of our opponent is liable to the very same objections which\nhe urges against us, viz. in the following manner.--The objection that\nthis world cannot have sprung from Brahman on account of its difference\nof character applies no less to the doctrine of the pradhana being the\ncause of the world; for that doctrine also assumes that from a pradhana\ndevoid of sound and other qualities a world is produced which possesses\nthose very qualities. The beginning of an effect different in character\nbeing thus admitted, the Sa@nkhya is equally driven to the doctrine that\nbefore the actual beginning the effect was non-existent. And, moreover,\nit being admitted (by the Sa@nkhya also) that at the time of\nreabsorption the effect passes back into the state of non-distinction\nfrom the cause, the case of the Sa@nkhya here also is the same as\nours.--And, further, if (as the Sa@nkhya also must admit) at the time of\nreabsorption the differences of all the special effects are obliterated\nand pass into a state of general non-distinction, the special fixed\nconditions, which previous to reabsorption were the causes of the\ndifferent worldly existence of each soul, can, at the time of a new\ncreation, no longer be determined, there being no cause for them; and if\nyou assume them to be determined without a cause, you are driven to the\nadmission that even the released souls have to re-enter a state of\nbondage, there being equal absence of a cause (in the case of the\nreleased and the non-released souls). And if you try to avoid this\nconclusion by assuming that at the time of reabsorption some individual\ndifferences pass into the state of non-distinction, others not, we reply\nthat in that case the latter could not be considered as effects of the\npradhana[273].--It thus appears that all those difficulties (raised by\nthe Sa@nkhya) apply to both views, and cannot therefore be urged against\neither only. But as either of the two doctrines must necessarily be\naccepted, we are strengthened--by the outcome of the above\ndiscussion--in the opinion that the alleged difficulties are no real\ndifficulties[274].\n\n11. If it be said that, in consequence of the ill-foundedness of\nreasoning, we must frame our conclusions otherwise; (we reply that) thus\nalso there would result non-release.\n\nIn matters to be known from Scripture mere reasoning is not to be relied\non for the following reason also. As the thoughts of man are altogether\nunfettered, reasoning which disregards the holy texts and rests on\nindividual opinion only has no proper foundation. We see how arguments,\nwhich some clever men had excogitated with great pains, are shown, by\npeople still more ingenious, to be fallacious, and how the arguments of\nthe latter again are refuted in their turn by other men; so that, on\naccount of the diversity of men's opinions, it is impossible to accept\nmere reasoning as having a sure foundation. Nor can we get over this\ndifficulty by accepting as well-founded the reasoning of some person of\nrecognised mental eminence, may he now be Kapila or anybody else; since\nwe observe that even men of the most undoubted mental eminence, such as\nKapila, Ka/n/ada, and other founders of philosophical schools, have\ncontradicted one another.\n\nBut (our adversary may here be supposed to say), we will fashion our\nreasoning otherwise, i.e. in such a manner as not to lay it open to the\ncharge of having no proper foundation. You cannot, after all, maintain\nthat no reasoning whatever is well-founded; for you yourself can found\nyour assertion that reasoning has no foundation on reasoning only; your\nassumption being that because some arguments are seen to be devoid of\nfoundation other arguments as belonging to the same class are likewise\ndevoid of foundation. Moreover, if all reasoning were unfounded, the\nwhole course of practical human life would have to come to an end. For\nwe see that men act, with a view to obtaining pleasure and avoiding pain\nin the future time, on the assumption that the past, the present, and\nthe future are uniform.--Further, in the case of passages of Scripture\n(apparently) contradicting each other, the ascertainment of the real\nsense, which depends on a preliminary refutation of the apparent sense,\ncan be effected only by an accurate definition of the meaning of\nsentences, and that involves a process of reasoning. Thus Manu also\nexpresses himself: 'Perception, inference, and the /s/astra according to\nthe various traditions, this triad is to be known well by one desiring\nclearness in regard to right.--He who applies reasoning not contradicted\nby the Veda to the Veda and the (Sm/ri/ti) doctrine of law, he, and no\nother, knows the law' (Manu Sm/ri/ti XII, 105, 106). And that 'want of\nfoundation', to which you object, really constitutes the beauty of\nreasoning, because it enables us to arrive at unobjectionable arguments\nby means of the previous refutation of objectionable arguments[275]. (No\nfear that because the purvapaksha is ill-founded the siddhanta should be\nill-founded too;) for there is no valid reason to maintain that a man\nmust be stupid because his elder brother was stupid.--For all these\nreasons the want of foundation cannot be used as an argument against\nreasoning.\n\nAgainst this argumentation we remark that thus also there results 'want\nof release.' For although with regard to some things reasoning is\nobserved to be well founded, with regard to the matter in hand there\nwill result 'want of release,' viz. of the reasoning from this very\nfault of ill-foundedness. The true nature of the cause of the world on\nwhich final emancipation depends cannot, on account of its excessive\nabstruseness, even be thought of without the help of the holy texts;\nfor, as already remarked, it cannot become the object of perception,\nbecause it does not possess qualities such as form and the like, and as\nit is devoid of characteristic signs, it does not lend itself to\ninference and the other means of right knowledge.--Or else (if we adopt\nanother explanation of the word 'avimoksha') all those who teach the\nfinal release of the soul are agreed that it results from perfect\nknowledge. Perfect knowledge has the characteristic mark of uniformity,\nbecause it depends on accomplished actually existing things; for\nwhatever thing is permanently of one and the same nature is acknowledged\nto be a true or real thing, and knowledge conversant about such is\ncalled perfect knowledge; as, for instance, the knowledge embodied in\nthe proposition, 'fire is hot.' Now, it is clear that in the case of\nperfect knowledge a mutual conflict of men's opinions is impossible. But\nthat cognitions founded on reasoning do conflict is generally known; for\nwe continually observe that what one logician endeavours to establish as\nperfect knowledge is demolished by another, who, in his turn, is treated\nalike by a third. How therefore can knowledge, which is founded on\nreasoning, and whose object is not something permanently uniform, be\nperfect knowledge?--Nor can it be said that he who maintains the\npradhana to be the cause of the world (i.e. the Sa@nkhya) is the best of\nall reasoners, and accepted as such by all philosophers; which would\nenable us to accept his opinion as perfect knowledge.--Nor can we\ncollect at a given moment and on a given spot all the logicians of the\npast, present, and future time, so as to settle (by their agreement)\nthat their opinion regarding some uniform object is to be considered\nperfect knowledge. The Veda, on the other hand, which is eternal and the\nsource of knowledge, may be allowed to have for its object firmly\nestablished things, and hence the perfection of that knowledge which is\nfounded on the Veda cannot be denied by any of the logicians of the\npast, present, or future. We have thus established the perfection of\nthis our knowledge which reposes on the Upanishads, and as apart from it\nperfect knowledge is impossible, its disregard would lead to 'absence of\nfinal release' of the transmigrating souls. Our final position therefore\nis, that on the ground of Scripture and of reasoning subordinate to\nScripture, the intelligent Brahman is to be considered the cause and\nsubstance of the world.\n\n12. Thereby those (theories) also which are not accepted by competent\npersons are explained.\n\nHitherto we have refuted those objections against the Vedanta-texts\nwhich, based on reasoning, take their stand on the doctrine of the\npradhana being the cause of the world; (which doctrine deserves to be\nrefuted first), because it stands near to our Vedic system, is supported\nby somewhat weighty arguments, and has, to a certain extent, been\nadopted by some authorities who follow the Veda.--But now some\ndull-witted persons might think that another objection founded on\nreasoning might be raised against the Vedanta, viz. on the ground of the\natomic doctrine. The Sutrakara, therefore, extends to the latter\nobjection the refutation of the former, considering that by the conquest\nof the most dangerous adversary the conquest of the minor enemies is\nalready virtually accomplished. Other doctrines, as, for instance, the\natomic doctrine of which no part has been accepted by either Manu or\nVyasa or other authorities, are to be considered as 'explained,' i.e.\nrefuted by the same reasons which enabled us to dispose of the pradhana\ndoctrine. As the reasons on which the refutation hinges are the same,\nthere is no room for further doubt. Such common arguments are the\nimpotence of reasoning to fathom the depth of the transcendental cause\nof the world, the ill-foundedness of mere Reasoning, the impossibility\nof final release, even in case of the conclusions being shaped\n'otherwise' (see the preceding Sutra), the conflict of Scripture and\nReasoning, and so on.\n\n13. If it be said that from the circumstance of (the objects of\nenjoyment) passing over into the enjoyer (and vice versa) there would\nresult non-distinction (of the two); we reply that (such distinction)\nmay exist (nevertheless), as ordinary experience shows.\n\nAnother objection, based on reasoning, is raised against the doctrine of\nBrahman being the cause of the world.--Although Scripture is\nauthoritative with regard to its own special subject-matter (as, for\ninstance, the causality of Brahman), still it may have to be taken in a\nsecondary sense in those cases where the subject-matter is taken out of\nits grasp by other means of right knowledge; just as mantras and\narthavadas have occasionally to be explained in a secondary sense (when\nthe primary, literal sense is rendered impossible by other means of\nright knowledge[276]). Analogously reasoning is to be considered invalid\noutside its legitimate sphere; so, for instance, in the case of\nreligious duty and its opposite[277].--Hence Scripture cannot be\nacknowledged to refute what is settled by other means of right\nknowledge. And if you ask, 'Where does Scripture oppose itself to what\nis thus established?' we give you the following instance. The\ndistinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment is well known from\nordinary experience, the enjoyers being intelligent, embodied souls,\nwhile sound and the like are the objects of enjoyment. Devadatta, for\ninstance, is an enjoyer, the dish (which he eats) an object of\nenjoyment. The distinction of the two would be reduced to non-existence\nif the enjoyer passed over into the object of enjoyment, and vice versa.\nNow this passing over of one thing into another would actually result\nfrom the doctrine of the world being non-different from Brahman. But the\nsublation of a well-established distinction is objectionable, not only\nwith regard to the present time when that distinction is observed to\nexist, but also with regard to the past and the future, for which it is\ninferred. The doctrine of Brahman's causality must therefore be\nabandoned, as it would lead to the sublation of the well-established\ndistinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment.\n\nTo the preceding objection we reply, 'It may exist as in ordinary\nexperience.' Even on our philosophic view the distinction may exist, as\nordinary experience furnishes us with analogous instances. We see, for\ninstance, that waves, foam, bubbles, and other modifications of the sea,\nalthough they really are not different from the sea-water, exist,\nsometimes in the state of mutual separation, sometimes in the state of\nconjunction, &c. From the fact of their being non-different from the\nsea-water, it does not follow that they pass over into each other; and,\nagain, although they do not pass over into each other, still they are\nnot different from the sea. So it is in the case under discussion also.\nThe enjoyers and the objects of enjoyment do not pass over into each\nother, and yet they are not different from the highest Brahman. And\nalthough the enjoyer is not really an effect of Brahman, since the\nunmodified creator himself, in so far as he enters into the effect, is\ncalled the enjoyer (according to the passage, 'Having created he entered\ninto it,' Taitt. Up. II, 6), still after Brahman has entered into its\neffects it passes into a state of distinction, in consequence of the\neffect acting as a limiting adjunct; just as the universal ether is\ndivided by its contact with jars and other limiting adjuncts. The\nconclusion is, that the distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment\nis possible, although both are non-different from Brahman, their highest\ncause, as the analogous instance of the sea and its waves demonstrates.\n\n14. The non-difference of them (i.e. of cause and effect) results from\nsuch terms as 'origin' and the like.\n\nThe[278] refutation contained in the preceding Sutra was set forth on\nthe condition of the practical distinction of enjoyers and objects of\nenjoyment being acknowledged. In reality, however, that distinction does\nnot exist because there is understood to be non-difference (identity) of\ncause and effect. The effect is this manifold world consisting of ether\nand so on; the cause is the highest Brahman. Of the effect it is\nunderstood that in reality it is non-different from the cause, i.e. has\nno existence apart from the cause.--How so?--'On account of the\nscriptural word \"origin\" and others.' The word 'origin' is used in\nconnexion with a simile, in a passage undertaking to show how through\nthe knowledge of one thing everthing is known; viz. Ch. Up. VI, 1, 4,\n'As, my dear, by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the\nmodification (i.e. the effect; the thing made of clay) being a name\nmerely which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it is\nclay merely; thus,' &c.--The meaning of this passage is that, if there\nis known a lump of clay which really and truly is nothing but clay[279],\nthere are known thereby likewise all things made of clay, such as jars,\ndishes, pails, and so on, all of which agree in having clay for their\ntrue nature. For these modifications or effects are names only, exist\nthrough or originate from speech only, while in reality there exists no\nsuch thing as a modification. In so far as they are names (individual\neffects distinguished by names) they are untrue; in so far as they are\nclay they are true.--This parallel instance is given with reference to\nBrahman; applying the phrase 'having its origin in speech' to the case\nillustrated by the instance quoted we understand that the entire body of\neffects has no existence apart from Brahman.--Later on again the text,\nafter having declared that fire, water, and earth are the effects of\nBrahman, maintains that the effects of these three elements have no\nexistence apart from them, 'Thus has vanished the specific nature of\nburning fire, the modification being a mere name which has its origin in\nspeech, while only the three colours are what is true' (Ch. Up. VI, 4,\n1).--Other sacred texts also whose purport it is to intimate the unity\nof the Self are to be quoted here, in accordance with the 'and others'\nof the Sutra. Such texts are, 'In that all this has its Self; it is the\nTrue, it is the Self, thou art that' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7); 'This\neverything, all is that Self' (/Bri/. Up. II, 4, 6); 'Brahman alone is\nall this' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); 'The Self is all this' (Ch. Up. VII, 25,\n2); 'There is in it no diversity' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 25).--On any other\nassumption it would not be possible to maintain that by the knowledge of\none thing everything becomes known (as the text quoted above declares).\nWe therefore must adopt the following view. In the same way as those\nparts of ethereal space which are limited by jars and waterpots are not\nreally different from the universal ethereal space, and as the water of\na mirage is not really different from the surface of the salty\nsteppe--for the nature of that water is that it is seen in one moment\nand has vanished in the next, and moreover, it is not to be perceived by\nits own nature (i.e. apart from the surface of the desert[280])--; so\nthis manifold world with its objects of enjoyment, enjoyers and so on\nhas no existence apart from Brahman.--But--it might be objected--Brahman\nhas in itself elements of manifoldness. As the tree has many branches,\nso Brahman possesses many powers and energies dependent on those powers.\nUnity and manifoldness are therefore both true. Thus, a tree considered\nin itself is one, but it is manifold if viewed as having branches; so\nthe sea in itself is one, but manifold as having waves and foam; so the\nclay in itself is one, but manifold if viewed with regard to the jars\nand dishes made of it. On this assumption the process of final release\nresulting from right knowledge may be established in connexion with the\nelement of unity (in Brahman), while the two processes of common worldly\nactivity and of activity according to the Veda--which depend on the\nkarmaka/nd/a--may be established in connexion with the element of\nmanifoldness. And with this view the parallel instances of clay &c.\nagree very well.\n\nThis theory, we reply, is untenable because in the instance (quoted in\nthe Upanishad) the phrase 'as clay they are true' asserts the cause only\nto be true while the phrase 'having its origin in speech' declares the\nunreality of all effects. And with reference to the matter illustrated\nby the instance given (viz. the highest cause, Brahman) we read, 'In\nthat all this has its Self;' and, again, 'That is true;' whereby it is\nasserted that only the one highest cause is true. The following passage\nagain, 'That is the Self; thou art that, O /S/vetaketu!' teaches that\nthe embodied soul (the individual soul) also is Brahman. (And we must\nnote that) the passage distinctly teaches that the fact of the embodied\nsoul having its Self in Brahman is self-established, not to be\naccomplished by endeavour. This doctrine of the individual soul having\nits Self in Brahman, if once accepted as the doctrine of the Veda, does\naway with the independent existence of the individual soul, just as the\nidea of the rope does away with the idea of the snake (for which the\nrope had been mistaken). And if the doctrine of the independent\nexistence of the individual soul has to be set aside, then the opinion\nof the entire phenomenal world--which is based on the individual\nsoul--having an independent existence is likewise to be set aside. But\nonly for the establishment of the latter an element of manifoldness\nwould have to be assumed in Brahman, in addition to the element of\nunity.--Scriptural passages also (such as, 'When the Self only is all\nthis, how should he see another?' B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 13) declare that for\nhim who sees that everything has its Self in Brahman the whole\nphenomenal world with its actions, agents, and results of actions is\nnon-existent. Nor can it be said that this non-existence of the\nphenomenal world is declared (by Scripture) to be limited to certain\nstates; for the passage 'Thou art that' shows that the general fact of\nBrahman being the Self of all is not limited by any particular state.\nMoreover, Scripture, showing by the instance of the thief (Ch. VI, 16)\nthat the false-minded is bound while the true-minded is released,\ndeclares thereby that unity is the one true existence while manifoldness\nis evolved out of wrong knowledge. For if both were true how could the\nman who acquiesces in the reality of this phenomenal world be called\nfalse-minded[281]? Another scriptural passage ('from death to death goes\nhe who perceives therein any diversity,' B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 19) declares\nthe same, by blaming those who perceive any distinction.--Moreover, on\nthe doctrine, which we are at present impugning, release cannot result\nfrom knowledge, because the doctrine does not acknowledge that some kind\nof wrong knowledge, to be removed by perfect knowledge, is the cause of\nthe phenomenal world. For how can the cognition of unity remove the\ncognition of manifoldness if both are true?\n\nOther objections are started.--If we acquiesce in the doctrine of\nabsolute unity, the ordinary means of right knowledge, perception, &c.,\nbecome invalid because the absence of manifoldness deprives them of\ntheir objects; just as the idea of a man becomes invalid after the right\nidea of the post (which at first had been mistaken for a man) has\npresented itself. Moreover, all the texts embodying injunctions and\nprohibitions will lose their purport if the distinction on which their\nvalidity depends does not really exist. And further, the entire body of\ndoctrine which refers to final release will collapse, if the distinction\nof teacher and pupil on which it depends is not real. And if the\ndoctrine of release is untrue, how can we maintain the truth of the\nabsolute unity of the Self, which forms an item of that doctrine?\n\nThese objections, we reply, do not damage our position because the\nentire complex of phenomenal existence is considered as true as long as\nthe knowledge of Brahman being the Self of all has not arisen; just as\nthe phantoms of a dream are considered to be true until the sleeper\nwakes. For as long as a person has not reached the true knowledge of the\nunity of the Self, so long it does not enter his mind that the world of\neffects with its means and objects of right knowledge and its results of\nactions is untrue; he rather, in consequence of his ignorance, looks on\nmere effects (such as body, offspring, wealth, &c.) as forming part of\nand belonging to his Self, forgetful of Brahman being in reality the\nSelf of all. Hence, as long as true knowledge does not present itself,\nthere is no reason why the ordinary course of secular and religious\nactivity should not hold on undisturbed. The case is analogous to that\nof a dreaming man who in his dream sees manifold things, and, up to the\nmoment of waking, is convinced that his ideas are produced by real\nperception without suspecting the perception to be a merely apparent\none.--But how (to restate an objection raised above) can the\nVedanta-texts if untrue convey information about the true being of\nBrahman? We certainly do not observe that a man bitten by a rope-snake\n(i.e. a snake falsely imagined in a rope) dies, nor is the water\nappearing in a mirage used for drinking or bathing[282].--This\nobjection, we reply, is without force (because as a matter of fact we do\nsee real effects to result from unreal causes), for we observe that\ndeath sometimes takes place from imaginary venom, (when a man imagines\nhimself to have been bitten by a venomous snake,) and effects (of what\nis perceived in a dream) such as the bite of a snake or bathing in a\nriver take place with regard to a dreaming person.--But, it will be\nsaid, these effects themselves are unreal!--These effects themselves, we\nreply, are unreal indeed; but not so the consciousness which the\ndreaming person has of them. This consciousness is a real result; for it\nis not sublated by the waking consciousness. The man who has risen from\nsleep does indeed consider the effects perceived by him in his dream\nsuch as being bitten by a snake, bathing in a river, &c. to be unreal,\nbut he does not on that account consider the consciousness he had of\nthem to be unreal likewise.--(We remark in passing that) by this fact of\nthe consciousness of the dreaming person not being sublated (by the\nwaking consciousness) the doctrine of the body being our true Self is to\nbe considered as refuted[283].--Scripture also (in the passage, 'If a\nman who is engaged in some sacrifice undertaken for some special wish\nsees in his dream a woman, he is to infer therefrom success in his\nwork') declares that by the unreal phantom of a dream a real result such\nas prosperity may be obtained. And, again, another scriptural passage,\nafter having declared that from the observation of certain unfavourable\nomens a man is to conclude that he will not live long, continues 'if\nsomebody sees in his dream a black man with black teeth and that man\nkills him,' intimating thereby that by the unreal dream-phantom a real\nfact, viz. death, is notified.--It is, moreover, known from the\nexperience of persons who carefully observe positive and negative\ninstances that such and such dreams are auspicious omens, others the\nreverse. And (to quote another example that something true can result\nfrom or be known through something untrue) we see that the knowledge of\nthe real sounds A. &c. is reached by means of the unreal written\nletters. Moreover, the reasons which establish the unity of the Self are\naltogether final, so that subsequently to them nothing more is required\nfor full satisfaction[284]. An injunction as, for instance, 'He is to\nsacrifice' at once renders us desirous of knowing what is to be\neffected, and by what means and in what manner it is to be effected; but\npassages such as, 'Thou art that,' 'I am Brahman,' leave nothing to be\ndesired because the state of consciousness produced by them has for its\nobject the unity of the universal Self. For as long as something else\nremains a desire is possible; but there is nothing else which could be\ndesired in addition to the absolute unity of Brahman. Nor can it be\nmaintained that such states of consciousness do not actually arise; for\nscriptural passages such as, 'He understood what he said' (Ch. Up. VII,\n18, 2), declare them to occur, and certain means are enjoined to bring\nthem about, such as the hearing (of the Veda from a teacher) and the\nrecital of the sacred texts. Nor, again, can such consciousness be\nobjected to on the ground either of uselessness or of erroneousness,\nbecause, firstly, it is seen to have for its result the cessation of\nignorance, and because, secondly, there is no other kind of knowledge by\nwhich it could be sublated. And that before the knowledge of the unity\nof the Self has been reached the whole real-unreal course of ordinary\nlife, worldly as well as religious, goes on unimpeded, we have already\nexplained. When, however, final authority having intimated the unity of\nthe Self, the entire course of the world which was founded on the\nprevious distinction is sublated, then there is no longer any\nopportunity for assuming a Brahman comprising in itself various\nelements.\n\nBut--it may be said--(that would not be a mere assumption, but)\nScripture itself, by quoting the parallel instances of clay and so on,\ndeclares itself in favour of a Brahman capable of modification; for we\nknow from experience that clay and similar things do undergo\nmodifications.--This objection--we reply--is without force, because a\nnumber of scriptural passages, by denying all modification of Brahman,\nteach it to be absolutely changeless (ku/t/astha). Such passages are,\n'This great unborn Self; undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless, is\nindeed Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 25); 'That Self is to be described by\nNo, no' (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 26); 'It is neither coarse nor fine' (B/ri/.\nUp. III, 8, 8). For to the one Brahman the two qualities of being\nsubject to modification and of being free from it cannot both be\nascribed. And if you say, 'Why should they not be both predicated of\nBrahman (the former during the time of the subsistence of the world, the\nlatter during the period of reabsorption) just as rest and motion may be\npredicated (of one body at different times)?' we remark that the\nqualification, 'absolutely changeless' (ku/t/astha), precludes this. For\nthe changeless Brahman cannot be the substratum of varying attributes.\nAnd that, on account of the negation of all attributes, Brahman really\nis eternal and changeless has already been demonstrated.--Moreover,\nwhile the cognition of the unity of Brahman is the instrument of final\nrelease, there is nothing to show that any independent result is\nconnected with the view of Brahman, by undergoing a modification,\npassing over into the form of this world. Scripture expressly declares\nthat the knowledge of the changeless Brahman being the universal Self\nleads to a result; for in the passage which begins, 'That Self is to be\ndescribed by No, no,' we read later on, 'O Janaka, you have indeed\nreached fearlessness' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 2, 4). We have then[285] to accept\nthe following conclusion that, in the sections treating of Brahman, an\nindependent result belongs only to the knowledge of Brahman as devoid of\nall attributes and distinctions, and that hence whatever is stated as\nhaving no special fruit of its own--as, for instance, the passages about\nBrahman modifying itself into the form of this world--is merely to be\napplied as a means for the cognition of the absolute Brahman, but does\nnot bring about an independent result; according to the principle that\nwhatever has no result of its own, but is mentioned in connexion with\nsomething else which has such a result, is subordinate to the\nlatter[286]. For to maintain that the result of the knowledge of Brahman\nundergoing modifications would be that the Self (of him who knows that)\nwould undergo corresponding modifications[287] would be inappropriate,\nas the state of filial release (which the soul obtains through the\nknowledge of Brahman) is eternally unchanging.\n\nBut, it is objected, he who maintains the nature of Brahman to be\nchangeless thereby contradicts the fundamental tenet according to which\nthe Lord is the cause of the world, since the doctrine of absolute unity\nleaves no room for the distinction of a Ruler and something ruled.--This\nobjection we ward off by remarking that omniscience, &c. (i.e. those\nqualities which belong to Brahman only in so far as it is related to a\nworld) depend on the evolution of the germinal principles called name\nand form, whose essence is Nescience. The fundamental tenet which we\nmaintain (in accordance with such scriptural passages as, 'From that\nSelf sprang ether,' &c.; Taitt. Up. II, 1) is that the creation,\nsustentation, and reabsorption of the world proceed from an omniscient,\nomnipotent Lord, not from a non-intelligent pradhana or any other\nprinciple. That tenet we have stated in I, 1, 4, and here we do not\nteach anything contrary to it.--But how, the question may be asked, can\nyou make this last assertion while all the while you maintain the\nabsolute unity and non-duality of the Self?--Listen how. Belonging to\nthe Self, as it were, of the omniscient Lord, there are name and form,\nthe figments of Nescience, not to be defined either as being (i.e.\nBrahman), nor as different from it[288], the germs of the entire expanse\nof the phenomenal world, called in /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti the illusion\n(maya), power (/s/akti), or nature (prak/ri/ti) of the omniscient Lord.\nDifferent from them is the omniscient Lord himself, as we learn from\nscriptural passages such as the following, 'He who is called ether is\nthe revealer of all forms and names; that within which these forms and\nnames are contained is Brahman' (Ch. Up. VIII, 14, 1); 'Let me evolve\nnames and forms' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2); 'He, the wise one, who having\ndivided all forms and given all names, sits speaking (with those names)'\n(Taitt. Ar. III, 12, 7); 'He who makes the one seed manifold' (/S/ve.\nUp. VI, l2).--Thus the Lord depends (as Lord) upon the limiting adjuncts\nof name and form, the products of Nescience; just as the universal ether\ndepends (as limited ether, such as the ether of a jar, &c.) upon the\nlimiting adjuncts in the shape of jars, pots, &c. He (the Lord) stands\nin the realm of the phenomenal in the relation of a ruler to the\nso-called jivas (individual souls) or cognitional Selfs (vij/n/anatman),\nwhich indeed are one with his own Self--just as the portions of ether\nenclosed in jars and the like are one with the universal ether--but are\nlimited by aggregates of instruments of action (i.e. bodies) produced\nfrom name and form, the presentations of Nescience. Hence the Lord's\nbeing a Lord, his omniscience, his omnipotence, &c. all depend on the\nlimitation due to the adjuncts whose Self is Nescience; while in reality\nnone of these qualities belong to the Self whose true nature is cleared,\nby right knowledge, from all adjuncts whatever. Thus Scripture also\nsays, 'Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands\nnothing else, that is the Infinite' (Ch. Up. VII, 24, 1); 'But when the\nSelf only has become all this, how should he see another?' (B/ri/. Up.\nII, 4, 13.) In this manner the Vedanta-texts declare that for him who\nhas reached the state of truth and reality the whole apparent world does\nnot exist. The Bhagavadgita also ('The Lord is not the cause of actions,\nor of the capacity of performing actions, or of the connexion of action\nand fruit; all that proceeds according to its own nature. The Lord\nreceives no one's sin or merit. Knowledge is enveloped by Ignorance;\nhence all creatures are deluded;' Bha. Gi. V, 14; 15) declares that in\nreality the relation of Ruler and ruled does not exist. That, on the\nother hand, all those distinctions are valid, as far as the phenomenal\nworld is concerned, Scripture as well as the Bhagavadgita states;\ncompare B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 22, 'He is the Lord of all, the king of all\nthings, the protector of all things; he is a bank and boundary, so that\nthese worlds may not be confounded;' and Bha. Gi. XVIII, 61, 'The Lord,\nO Arjuna, is seated in the region of the heart of all beings, turning\nround all beings, (as though) mounted on a machine, by his delusion.'\nThe Sutrakara also asserts the non-difference of cause and effect only\nwith regard to the state of Reality; while he had, in the preceding\nSutra, where he looked to the phenomenal world, compared Brahman to the\nocean, &c., that comparison resting on the assumption of the world of\neffects not yet having been refuted (i.e. seen to be unreal).--The view\nof Brahman as undergoing modifications will, moreover, be of use in the\ndevout meditations on the qualified (sagu/n/a) Brahman.\n\n15. And because only on the existence (of the cause) (the effect) is\nobserved.\n\nFor the following reason also the effect is non-different from the\ncause, because only when the cause exists the effect is observed to\nexist, not when it does not exist. For instance, only when the clay\nexists the jar is observed to exist, and the cloth only when the threads\nexist. That it is not a general rule that when one thing exists another\nis also observed to exist, appears, for instance, from the fact, that a\nhorse which is other (different) from a cow is not observed to exist\nonly when a cow exists. Nor is the jar observed to exist only when the\npotter exists; for in that case non-difference does not exist, although\nthe relation between the two is that of an operative cause and its\neffect[289].--But--it may be objected--even in the case of things other\n(i.e. non-identical) we find that the observation of one thing regularly\ndepends on the existence of another; smoke, for instance, is observed\nonly when fire exists.--We reply that this is untrue, because sometimes\nsmoke is observed even after the fire has been extinguished; as, for\ninstance, in the case of smoke being kept by herdsmen in jars.--Well,\nthen--the objector will say--let us add to smoke a certain qualification\nenabling us to say that smoke of such and such a kind[290] does not\nexist unless fire exists.--Even thus, we reply, your objection is not\nvalid, because we declare that the reason for assuming the\nnon-difference of cause and effect is the fact of the internal organ\n(buddhi) being affected (impressed) by cause and effect jointly[291].\nAnd that does not take place in the case of fire and smoke.--Or else we\nhave to read (in the Sutra) 'bhavat,' and to translate, 'and on account\nof the existence or observation.' The non-difference of cause and effect\nresults not only from Scripture but also from the existence of\nperception. For the non-difference of the two is perceived, for\ninstance, in an aggregate of threads, where we do not perceive a thing\ncalled 'cloth,' in addition to the threads, but merely threads running\nlengthways and crossways. So again, in the threads we perceive finer\nthreads (the aggregate of which is identical with the grosser threads),\nin them again finer threads, and so on. On the ground of this our\nperception we conclude that the finest parts which we can perceive are\nultimately identical with their causes, viz. red, white, and black (the\ncolours of fire, water, and earth, according to Ch. Up. VI, 4); those,\nagain, with air, the latter with ether, and ether with Brahman, which is\none and without a second. That all means of proof lead back to Brahman\n(as the ultimate cause of the world; not to pradhana, &c.), we have\nalready explained.\n\n16. And on account of that which is posterior (i.e. the effect) being\nthat which is.\n\nFor the following reason also the effect is to be considered as\nnon-different (from the cause). That which is posterior in time, i.e.\nthe effect, is declared by Scripture to have, previous to its actual\nbeginning, its Being in the cause, by the Self of the cause merely. For\nin passages like, 'In the beginning, my dear, this was that only which\nis' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3); and, 'Verily, in the beginning this was Self,\none only' (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 1), the effect which is denoted by the\nword 'this' appears in grammatical co-ordination with (the word\ndenoting) the cause (from which it appears that both inhere in the same\nsubstratum). A thing, on the other hand, which does not exist in another\nthing by the Self of the latter is not produced from that other thing;\nfor instance, oil is not produced from sand. Hence as there is\nnon-difference before the production (of the effect), we understand that\nthe effect even after having been produced continues to be non-different\nfrom the cause. As the cause, i.e. Brahman, is in all time neither more\nnor less than that which is, so the effect also, viz. the world, is in\nall time only that which is. But that which is is one only; therefore\nthe effect is non-different from the cause.\n\n17. If it be said that on account of being denoted as that which is not\n(the effect does) not (exist before it is actually produced); (we reply)\nnot so, (because the term 'that which is not' denotes) another quality\n(merely); (as appears) from the complementary sentence.\n\nBut, an objection will be raised, in some places Scripture speaks of the\neffect before its production as that which is not; so, for instance, 'In\nthe beginning this was that only which is not' (Ch. Up. III, 19, 1); and\n'Non-existent[292] indeed this was in the beginning' (Taitt. Up. II, 7).\nHence Being (sattvam) cannot be ascribed to the effect before its\nproduction.\n\nThis we deny. For by the Non-existence of the effect previous to its\nproduction is not meant absolute Non-existence, but only a different\nquality or state, viz. the state of name and form being unevolved, which\nstate is different from the state of name and form being evolved. With\nreference to the latter state the effect is called, previous to its\nproduction, non-existent although then also it existed identical with\nits cause. We conclude this from the complementary passage, according to\nthe rule that the sense of a passage whose earlier part is of doubtful\nmeaning is determined by its complementary part. With reference to the\npassage. 'In the beginning this was non-existent only,' we remark that\nwhat is there denoted by the word 'Non-existing' is--in the\ncomplementary passage, 'That became existent'--referred to by the word\n'that,' and qualified as 'Existent.'\n\nThe word 'was' would, moreover, not apply to the (absolutely)\nNon-existing, which cannot be conceived as connected with prior or\nposterior time.--Hence with reference to the other passage also,\n'Non-existing indeed,' &c., the complementary part, 'That made itself\nits Self,' shows, by the qualification which it contains, that absolute\nNon-existence is not meant.--It follows from all this that the\ndesignation of 'Non-existence' applied to the effect before its\nproduction has reference to a different state of being merely. And as\nthose things which are distinguished by name and form are in ordinary\nlanguage called 'existent,' the term 'non-existent' is figuratively\napplied to them to denote the state in which they were previously to\ntheir differentiation.\n\n18. From reasoning and from another Vedic passage.\n\nThat the effect exists before its origination and is non-different from\nthe cause, follows from reasoning as well as from a further scriptural\npassage.\n\nWe at first set forth the argumentation.--Ordinary experience teaches us\nthat those who wish to produce certain effects, such as curds, or\nearthen jars, or golden ornaments, employ for their purpose certain\ndetermined causal substances such as milk, clay, and gold; those who\nwish to produce sour milk do not employ clay, nor do those who intend to\nmake jars employ milk and so on. But, according to that doctrine which\nteaches that the effect is non-existent (before its actual production),\nall this should be possible. For if before their actual origination all\neffects are equally non-existent in any causal substance, why then\nshould curds be produced from milk only and not from clay also, and jars\nfrom clay only and not from milk as well?--Let us then maintain, the\nasatkaryavadin rejoins, that there is indeed an equal non-existence of\nany effect in any cause, but that at the same time each causal substance\nhas a certain capacity reaching beyond itself (ati/s/aya) for some\nparticular effect only and not for other effects; that, for instance,\nmilk only, and not clay, has a certain capacity for curds; and clay\nonly, and not milk, an analogous capacity for jars.--What, we ask in\nreturn, do you understand by that 'ati/s/aya?' If you understand by it\nthe antecedent condition of the effect (before its actual origination),\nyou abandon your doctrine that the effect does not exist in the cause,\nand prove our doctrine according to which it does so exist. If, on the\nother hand, you understand by the ati/s/aya a certain power of the cause\nassumed to the end of accounting for the fact that only one determined\neffect springs from the cause, you must admit that the power can\ndetermine the particular effect only if it neither is other (than cause\nand effect) nor non-existent; for if it were either, it would not be\ndifferent from anything else which is either non-existent or other than\ncause and effect, (and how then should it alone be able to produce the\nparticular effect?) Hence it follows that that power is identical with\nthe Self of the cause, and that the effect is identical with the Self of\nthat power.--Moreover, as the ideas of cause and effect on the one hand\nand of substance and qualities on the other hand are not separate ones,\nas, for instance, the ideas of a horse and a buffalo, it follows that\nthe identity of the cause and the effect as well as of the substance and\nits qualities has to be admitted. Let it then be assumed, the opponent\nrejoins, that the cause and the effect, although really different, are\nnot apprehended as such, because they are connected by the so-called\nsamavaya connexion[293].--If, we reply, you assume the samavaya\nconnexion between cause and effect, you have either to admit that the\nsamavaya itself is joined by a certain connexion to the two terms which\nare connected by samavaya, and then that connexion will again require a\nnew connexion (joining it to the two terms which it binds together), and\nyou will thus be compelled to postulate an infinite series of\nconnexions; or else you will have to maintain that the samavaya is not\njoined by any connexion to the terms which it binds together, and from\nthat will result the dissolution of the bond which connects the two\nterms of the samavaya relation[294].--Well then, the opponent rejoins,\nlet us assume that the samavaya connexion as itself being a connexion\nmay be connected with the terms which it joins without the help of any\nfurther connexion.--Then, we reply, conjunction (sa/m/yoga) also must be\nconnected with the two terms which it joins without the help of the\nsamavaya connexion; for conjunction also is a kind of\nconnexion[295].--Moreover, as substances, qualities, and so on are\napprehended as standing in the relation of identity, the assumption of\nthe samavaya relation has really no purport.\n\nIn what manner again do you--who maintain that the cause and the effect\nare joined by the samavaya relation--assume a substance consisting of\nparts which is an effect to abide in its causes, i.e. in the material\nparts of which it consists? Does it abide in all the parts taken\ntogether or in each particular part?--If you say that it abides in all\nparts together, it follows that the whole as such cannot be perceived,\nas it is impossible that all the parts should be in contact with the\norgans of perception. (And let it not be objected that the whole may be\napprehended through some of the parts only), for manyness which abides\nin all its substrates together (i.e. in all the many things), is not\napprehended so long as only some of those substrates are\napprehended.--Let it then be assumed that the whole abides in all the\nparts by the mediation of intervening aggregates of parts[296].--In that\ncase, we reply, we should have to assume other parts in addition to the\nprimary originative parts of the whole, in order that by means of those\nother parts the whole could abide in the primary parts in the manner\nindicated by you. For we see (that one thing which abides in another\nabides there by means of parts different from those of that other\nthing), that the sword, for instance, pervades the sheath by means of\nparts different from the parts of the sheath. But an assumption of that\nkind would lead us into a regressus in infinitum, because in order to\nexplain how the whole abides in certain given parts we should always\nhave to assume further parts[297].--Well, then, let us maintain the\nsecond alternative, viz. that the whole abides in each particular\npart.--That also cannot be admitted; for if the whole is present in one\npart it cannot be present in other parts also; not any more than\nDevadatta can be present in /S/rughna and in Pa/t/aliputra on one and\nthe same day. If the whole were present in more than one part, several\nwholes would result, comparable to Devadatta and Yaj/n/adatta, who, as\nbeing two different persons, may live one of them at /S/rughna and the\nother at Pa/t/aliputra.--If the opponent should rejoin that the whole\nmay be fully present in each part, just as the generic character of the\ncow is fully present in each individual cow; we point out that the\ngeneric attributes of the cow are visibly perceived in each individual\ncow, but that the whole is not thus perceived in each particular part.\nIf the whole were fully present in each part, the consequence would be\nthat the whole would produce its effects indifferently with any of its\nparts; a cow, for instance, would give milk from her horns or her tail.\nBut such things are not seen to take place.\n\nWe proceed to consider some further arguments opposed to the doctrine\nthat the effect does not exist in the cause.--That doctrine involves the\nconclusion that the actual origination of an effect is without an agent\nand thus devoid of substantial being. For origination is an action, and\nas such requires an agent[298], just as the action of walking does. To\nspeak of an action without an agent would be a contradiction. But if you\ndeny the pre-existence of the effect in the cause, it would have to be\nassumed that whenever the origination of a jar, for instance, is spoken\nof the agent is not the jar (which before its origination did not exist)\nbut something else, and again that when the origination of the two\nhalves of the jar is spoken of the agent is not the two halves but\nsomething else. From this it would follow that the sentence, 'the jar is\noriginated' means as much as 'the potter and the other (operative)\ncauses are originated[299].' But as a matter of fact the former sentence\nis never understood to mean the latter; and it is, moreover, known that\nat the time when the jar originates, the potter, &c. are already in\nexistence.--Let us then say, the opponent resumes, that origination is\nthe connexion of the effect with the existence of its cause and its\nobtaining existence as a Self.--How, we ask in reply, can something\nwhich has not yet obtained existence enter into connexion with something\nelse? A connexion is possible of two existing things only, not of one\nexisting and one non-existing thing or of two non-existing things. To\nsomething non-existing which on that account is indefinable, it is\nmoreover not possible to assign a limit as the opponent does when\nmaintaining that the effect is non-existing before its origination; for\nexperience teaches us that existing things only such as fields and\nhouses have limits, but not non-existing things. If somebody should use,\nfor instance, a phrase such as the following one, 'The son of a barren\nwoman was king previously to the coronation of Pur/n/avarman' the\ndeclaration of a limit in time implied in that phrase does not in\nreality determine that the son of the barren woman, i.e. a mere\nnon-entity, either was or is or will be king. If the son of a barren\nwoman could become an existing thing subsequently to the activity of\nsome causal agent, in that case it would be possible also that the\nnon-existing effect should be something existing, subsequently to the\nactivity of some causal agent. But we know that the one thing can take\nplace no more than the other thing; the non-existing effect and the son\nof the barren woman are both equally non-entities and can never\nbe.--But, the asatkaryavadin here objects, from your doctrine there\nfollows the result that the activity of causal agents is altogether\npurposeless. For if the effect were lying already fully accomplished in\nthe cause and were non-different from it, nobody would endeavour to\nbring it about, no more than anybody endeavours to bring about the cause\nwhich is already fully accomplished previously to all endeavour. But as\na matter of fact causal agents do endeavour to bring about effects, and\nit is in order not to have to condemn their efforts as altogether\nuseless that we assume the non-existence of the effect previously to its\norigination.--Your objection is refuted, we reply, by the consideration\nthat the endeavour of the causal agent may be looked upon as having a\npurpose in so far as it arranges the causal substance in the form of the\neffect. That, however, even the form of the effect (is not something\npreviously non-existing, but) belongs to the Self of the cause already\nbecause what is devoid of Selfhood cannot be begun at all, we have\nalready shown above.--Nor does a substance become another substance\nmerely by appearing under a different aspect. Devadatta may at one time\nbe seen with his arms and legs closely drawn up to his body, and another\ntime with his arms and legs stretched out, and yet he remains the same\nsubstantial being, for he is recognised as such. Thus the persons also\nby whom we are surrounded, such as fathers, mothers, brothers, &c.,\nremain the same, although we see them in continually changing states and\nattitudes; for they are always recognised as fathers, mothers, brothers,\nand so on. If our opponent objects to this last illustrative example on\nthe ground that fathers, mothers, and so on remain the same substantial\nbeings, because the different states in which they appear are not\nseparated from each other by birth or death, while the effect, for\ninstance a jar, appears only after the cause, for instance the clay, has\nundergone destruction as it were (so that the effect may be looked upon\nas something altogether different from the cause); we rebut this\nobjection by remarking that causal substances also such as milk, for\ninstance, are perceived to exist even after they have entered into the\ncondition of effects such as curds and the like (so that we have no\nright to say that the cause undergoes destruction). And even in those\ncases where the continued existence of the cause is not perceived, as,\nfor instance, in the case of seeds of the fig-tree from which there\nspring sprouts and trees, the term 'birth' (when applied to the sprout)\nonly means that the causal substance, viz. the seed, becomes visible by\nbecoming a sprout through the continual accretion of similar particles\nof matter; and the term 'death' only means that, through the secession\nof those particles, the cause again passes beyond the sphere of\nvisibility. Nor can it be said that from such separation by birth and\ndeath as described just now it follows that the non-existing becomes\nexisting, and the existing non-existing; for if that were so, it would\nalso follow that the unborn child in the mother's womb and the new-born\nbabe stretched out on the bed are altogether different beings.\n\nIt would further follow that a man is not the same person in childhood,\nmanhood, and old age, and that terms such as father and the like are\nillegitimately used.--The preceding arguments may also be used to refute\nthe (Bauddha doctrine) of all existence being momentary only[300].\n\nThe doctrine that the effect is non-existent previously to its actual\norigination, moreover, leads to the conclusion that the activity of the\ncausal agent has no object; for what does not exist cannot possibly be\nan object; not any more than the ether can be cleft by swords and other\nweapons for striking or cutting. The object can certainly not be the\ninherent cause; for that would lead to the erroneous conclusion that\nfrom the activity of the causal agent, which has for its object the\ninherent cause, there results something else (viz. the effect). And if\n(in order to preclude this erroneous conclusion) the opponent should say\nthat the effect is (not something different from the cause, but) a\ncertain relative power (ati/s/aya) of the inherent cause; he thereby\nwould simply concede our doctrine, according to which the effect exists\nin the cause already.\n\nWe maintain, therefore, as our final conclusion, that milk and other\nsubstances are called effects when they are in the state of curds and so\non, and that it is impossible, even within hundreds of years, ever to\nbring about an effect which is different from its cause. The fundamental\ncause of all appears in the form of this and that effect, up to the last\neffect of all, just as an actor appears in various robes and costumes,\nand thereby becomes the basis for all the current notions and terms\nconcerning the phenomenal world.\n\nThe conclusion here established, on the ground of reasoning, viz. that\nthe effect exists already before its origination, and is non-different\nfrom its cause, results also from a different scriptural passage. As\nunder the preceding Sutra a Vedic passage was instanced which speaks of\nthe non-existing, the different passage referred to in the present Sutra\nis the one (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1) which refers to that which is. That\npassage begins, 'Being only was this in the beginning, one without a\nsecond,' refers, thereupon, to the doctrine of the Non-existent being\nthe cause of the world ('Others say, Non-being was this in the\nbeginning'), raises an objection against that doctrine ('How could that\nwhich is be born of that which is not?'), and, finally, reaffirms the\nview first set forth, 'Only Being was this in the beginning.' The\ncircumstance that in this passage the effect, which is denoted by the\nword 'this,' is by Scripture, with reference to the time previous to its\norigination, coordinated with the cause denoted by the term 'Being,'\nproves that the effect exists in--and is non-different from--the cause.\nIf it were before its origination non-existing and after it inhered in\nits cause by samavaya, it would be something different from the cause,\nand that would virtually imply an abandonment of the promise made in the\npassage, 'That instruction by which we hear what is not heard,' &c. (VI,\n1, 3). The latter assertion is ratified, on the other hand, through the\ncomprehension that the effect exists in--and is not different from-the\ncause.\n\n19. And like a piece of cloth.\n\nAs of a folded piece of cloth we do not know clearly whether it is a\npiece of cloth or some other thing, while on its being unfolded it\nbecomes manifest that the folded thing was a piece of cloth; and as, so\nlong as it is folded, we perhaps know that it is a piece of cloth but\nnot of what definite length and width it is, while on its being unfolded\nwe know these particulars, and at the same time that the cloth is not\ndifferent from the folded object; in the same way an effect, such as a\npiece of cloth, is non-manifest as long as it exists in its causes, i.e.\nthe threads, &c. merely, while it becomes manifest and is clearly\napprehended in consequence of the operations of shuttle, loom, weaver,\nand so on.--Applying this instance of the piece of cloth, first folded\nand then unfolded, to the general case of cause and effect, we conclude\nthat the latter is non-different from the former.\n\n20. And as in the case of the different vital airs.\n\nIt is a matter of observation that when the operations of the different\nkinds of vital air--such as pra/n/a the ascending vital air, apana the\ndescending vital air, &c.--are suspended, in consequence of the breath\nbeing held so that they exist in their causes merely, the only effect\nwhich continues to be accomplished is life, while all other effects,\nsuch as the bending and stretching of the limbs and so on, are stopped.\nWhen, thereupon, the vital airs again begin to act, those other effects\nalso are brought about, in addition to mere life.--Nor must the vital\nairs, on account of their being divided into classes, be considered as\nsomething else than vital air; for wind (air) constitutes their common\ncharacter. Thus (i.e. in the manner illustrated by the instance of the\nvital airs) the non-difference of the effect from the cause is to be\nconceived.--As, therefore, the whole world is an effect of Brahman and\nnon-different from it, the promise held out in the scriptural passage\nthat 'What is not heard is heard, what is not perceived is perceived,\nwhat is not known is known' (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 3) is fulfilled[301].\n\n21. On account of the other (i.e. the individual soul) being designated\n(as non-different from Brahman) there would attach (to Brahman) various\nfaults, as, for instance, not doing what is beneficial.\n\nAnother objection is raised against the doctrine of an intelligent cause\nof the world.--If that doctrine is accepted, certain faults, as, for\ninstance, doing what is not beneficial, will attach (to the intelligent\ncause, i.e. Brahman), 'on account of the other being designated.' For\nScripture declares the other, i.e. the embodied soul, to be one with\nBrahman, as is shown by the passage, 'That is the Self; that art thou, O\n/S/vetaketu!' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7.)--Or else (if we interpret 'the other'\nof the Sutra in a different way) Scripture declares the other, i.e.\nBrahman, to be the Self of the embodied soul. For the passage, 'Having\ncreated that he entered into it,' declares the creator, i.e. the\nunmodified Brahman, to constitute the Self of the embodied soul, in\nconsequence of his entering into his products. The following passage\nalso, 'Entering (into them) with this living Self I will evolve names\nand forms' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2), in which the highest divinity designates\nthe living (soul) by the word 'Self,' shows that the embodied Self is\nnot different from Brahman. Therefore the creative power of Brahman\nbelongs to the embodied Self also, and the latter, being thus an\nindependent agent, might be expected to produce only what is beneficial\nto itself, and not things of a contrary nature, such as birth, death,\nold age, disease, and whatever may be the other meshes of the net of\nsuffering. For we know that no free person will build a prison for\nhimself, and take up his abode in it. Nor would a being, itself\nabsolutely stainless, look on this altogether unclean body as forming\npart of its Self. It would, moreover, free itself, according to its\nliking, of the consequences of those of its former actions which result\nin pain, and would enjoy the consequences of those actions only which\nare rewarded by pleasure. Further, it would remember that it had created\nthis manifold world; for every person who has produced some clearly\nappearing effect remembers that he has been the cause of it. And as the\nmagician easily retracts, whenever he likes, the magical illusion which\nhe had emitted, so the embodied soul also would be able to reabsorb this\nworld into itself. The fact is, however, that the embodied soul cannot\nreabsorb its own body even. As we therefore see that 'what would be\nbeneficial is not done,' the hypothesis of the world having proceeded\nfrom an intelligent cause is unacceptable.\n\n22. But the separate (Brahman, i.e. the Brahman separate from the\nindividual souls) (is the creator); (the existence of which separate\nBrahman we learn) from the declaration of difference.\n\nThe word 'but' discards the purvapaksha.--We rather declare that that\nomniscient, omnipotent Brahman, whose essence is eternal pure cognition\nand freedom, and which is additional to, i.e. different from the\nembodied Self, is the creative principle of the world. The faults\nspecified above, such as doing what is not beneficial, and the like, do\nnot attach to that Brahman; for as eternal freedom is its characteristic\nnature, there is nothing either beneficial to be done by it or\nnon-beneficial to be avoided by it. Nor is there any impediment to its\nknowledge and power; for it is omniscient and omnipotent. The embodied\nSelf, on the other hand, is of a different nature, and to it the\nmentioned faults adhere. But then we do not declare it to be the creator\nof the world, on account of 'the declaration of difference.' For\nscriptural passages (such as, 'Verily, the Self is to be seen, to be\nheard, to be perceived, to be marked,' B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 5; 'The Self we\nmust search out, we must try to understand,' Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1; 'Then\nhe becomes united with the True,' Ch. Up. VI, 8, 1; 'This embodied Self\nmounted by the intelligent Self,' B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 35) declare\ndifferences founded on the relations of agent, object, and so on, and\nthereby show Brahman to be different from the individual soul.--And if\nit be objected that there are other passages declaratory of\nnon-difference (for instance, 'That art thou'), and that difference and\nnon-difference cannot co-exist because contradictory, we reply that the\npossibility of the co-existence of the two is shown by the parallel\ninstance of the universal ether and the ether limited by a\njar.--Moreover, as soon as, in consequence of the declaration of\nnon-difference contained in such passages as 'that art thou,' the\nconsciousness of non-difference arises in us, the transmigratory state\nof the individual soul and the creative quality of Brahman vanish at\nonce, the whole phenomenon of plurality, which springs from wrong\nknowledge, being sublated by perfect knowledge, and what becomes then of\nthe creation and the faults of not doing what is beneficial, and the\nlike? For that this entire apparent world, in which good and evil\nactions are done, &c., is a mere illusion, owing to the\nnon-discrimination of (the Self's) limiting adjuncts, viz. a body, and\nso on, which spring from name and form the presentations of Nescience,\nand does in reality not exist at all, we have explained more than once.\nThe illusion is analogous to the mistaken notion we entertain as to the\ndying, being born, being hurt, &c. of ourselves (our Selfs; while in\nreality the body only dies, is born, &c.). And with regard to the state\nin which the appearance of plurality is not yet sublated, it follows\nfrom passages declaratory of such difference (as, for instance, 'That we\nmust search for,' &c.) that Brahman is superior to the individual soul;\nwhereby the possibility of faults adhering to it is excluded.\n\n23. And because the case is analogous to that of stones, &c. (the\nobjections raised) cannot be established.\n\nAs among minerals, which are all mere modifications of earth,\nnevertheless great variety is observed, some being precious gems, such\nas diamonds, lapis lazuli, &c., others, such as crystals and the like,\nbeing of medium value, and others again stones only fit to be flung at\ndogs or crows; and as from seeds which are placed in one and the same\nground various plants are seen to spring, such as sandalwood and\ncucumbers, which show the greatest difference in their leaves, blossoms,\nfruits, fragrancy, juice, &c.; and as one and the same food produces\nvarious effects, such as blood and hair; so the one Brahman also may\ncontain in itself the distinction of the individual Selfs and the\nhighest Self, and may produce various effects. Hence the objections\nimagined by others (against the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of\nthe world) cannot be maintained.--Further[302] arguments are furnished\nby the fact of all effect having, as Scripture declares, their origin in\nspeech only, and by the analogous instance of the variety of dream\nphantoms (while the dreaming person remains one).\n\n24. If you object on the ground of the observation of the employment (of\ninstruments); (we say), No; because as milk (transforms itself, so\nBrahman does).\n\nYour assertion that the intelligent Brahman alone, without a second, is\nthe cause of the world cannot be maintained, on account of the\nobservation of employment (of instruments). For in ordinary life we see\nthat potters, weavers, and other handicraftsmen produce jars, cloth, and\nthe like, after having put themselves in possession of the means thereto\nby providing themselves with various implements, such as clay, staffs,\nwheels, string, &c.; Brahman, on the other hand, you conceive to be\nwithout any help; how then can it act as a creator without providing\nitself with instruments to work with? We therefore maintain that Brahman\nis not the cause of the world.\n\nThis objection is not valid, because causation is possible in\nconsequence of a peculiar constitution of the causal substance, as in\nthe case of milk. Just as milk and water turn into curds and ice\nrespectively, without any extraneous means, so it is in the case of\nBrahman also. And if you object to this analogy for the reason that\nmilk, in order to turn into curds, does require an extraneous agent,\nviz. heat, we reply that milk by itself also undergoes a certain amount\nof definite change, and that its turning is merely accelerated by heat.\nIf milk did not possess that capability of itself, heat could not compel\nit to turn; for we see that air or ether, for instance, is not compelled\nby the action of heat to turn into sour milk. By the co-operation of\nauxiliary means the milk's capability of turning into sour milk is\nmerely completed. The absolutely complete power of Brahman, on the other\nhand, does not require to be supplemented by any extraneous help. Thus\nScripture also declares, 'There is no effect and no instrument known of\nhim, no one is seen like unto him or better; his high power is revealed\nas manifold, as inherent, acting as force and knowledge' (/S/ve. Up. VI,\n8). Therefore Brahman, although one only, is, owing to its manifold\npowers, able to transform itself into manifold effects; just as milk is.\n\n25. And (the case of Brahman is) like that of gods and other beings in\nordinary experience.\n\nWell, let it be admitted that milk and other non-intelligent things have\nthe power of turning themselves into sour milk, &c. without any\nextraneous means, since it is thus observed. But we observe, on the\nother hand, that intelligent agents, as, for instance, potters, proceed\nto their several work only after having provided themselves with a\ncomplete set of instruments. How then can it be supposed that Brahman,\nwhich is likewise of an intelligent nature, should proceed without any\nauxiliary?\n\nWe reply, 'Like gods and others.' As gods, fathers, /ri/shis, and other\nbeings of great power, who are all of intelligent nature, are seen to\ncreate many and various objects, such as palaces, chariots, &c., without\navailing themselves of any extraneous means, by their mere intention,\nwhich is effective in consequence of those beings' peculiar power--a\nfact vouchsafed by mantras, arthavadas, itihasas, and pura/n/as;--and as\nthe spider emits out of itself the threads of its web; and as the female\ncrane conceives without a male; and as the lotus wanders from one pond\nto another without any means of conveyance; so the intelligent Brahman\nalso may be assumed to create the world by itself without extraneous\nmeans.\n\nPerhaps our opponent will argue against all this in the following\nstyle.--The gods and other beings, whom you have quoted as parallel\ninstances, are really of a nature different from that of Brahman. For\nthe material causes operative in the production of palaces and other\nmaterial things are the bodies of the gods, and not their intelligent\nSelfs. And the web of the spider is produced from its saliva which,\nowing to the spider's devouring small insects, acquires a certain degree\nof consistency. And the female crane conceives from hearing the sound of\nthunder. And the lotus flower indeed derives from its indwelling\nintelligent principle the impulse of movement, but is not able actually\nto move in so far as it is a merely intelligent being[303]; it rather\nwanders from pond to pond by means of its non-intelligent body, just as\nthe creeper climbs up the tree.--Hence all these illustrative examples\ncannot be applied to the case of Brahman.\n\nTo this we reply, that we meant to show merely that the case of Brahman\nis different from that of potters and similar agents. For while potters,\n&c., on the one side, and gods, &c., on the other side, possess the\ncommon attribute of intelligence, potters require for their work\nextraneous means (i.e. means lying outside their bodies) and gods do\nnot. Hence Brahman also, although intelligent, is assumed to require no\nextraneous means. So much only we wanted to show by the parallel\ninstance of the gods, &c. Our intention is to point out that a\npeculiarly conditioned capability which is observed in some one case (as\nin that of the potter) is not necessarily to be assumed in all other\ncases also.\n\n26. Either the consequence of the entire (Brahman undergoing change) has\nto be accepted, or else a violation of the texts declaring Brahman to be\nwithout parts.\n\nHitherto we have established so much that Brahman, intelligent, one,\nwithout a second, modifying itself without the employment of any\nextraneous means, is the cause of the world.--Now, another objection is\nraised for the purpose of throwing additional light on the point under\ndiscussion.--The consequence of the Vedanta doctrine, it is said, will\nbe that we must assume the entire Brahman to undergo the change into its\neffects, because it is not composed of parts. If Brahman, like earth and\nother matter, consisted of parts, we might assume that a part of it\nundergoes the change, while the other part remains as it is. But\nScripture distinctly declares Brahman to be devoid of parts. Compare,\n'He who is without parts, without actions, tranquil, without fault,\nwithout taint' (/Sv/e. Up. VI, 19); 'That heavenly person is without\nbody, he is both without and within, not produced' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2);\n'That great Being is endless, unlimited, consisting of nothing but\nknowledge' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 12); 'He is to be described by No, no'\n(B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 2,6); 'It is neither coarse nor fine' (B/ri/. Up.\nIII, 8, 8); all which passages deny the existence of any distinctions in\nBrahman.--As, therefore, a partial modification is impossible, a\nmodification of the entire Brahman has to be assumed. But that involves\na cutting off of Brahman from its very basis.--Another consequence of\nthe Vedantic view is that the texts exhorting us to strive 'to see'\nBrahman become purposeless; for the effects of Brahman may be seen\nwithout any endeavour, and apart from them no Brahman exists.--And,\nfinally, the texts declaring Brahman to be unborn are contradicted\nthereby.--If, on the other hand--in order to escape from these\ndifficulties--we assume Brahman to consist of parts, we thereby do\nviolence to those texts which declare Brahman not to be made up of\nparts. Moreover, if Brahman is made up of parts, it follows that it is\nnon-eternal.--Hence the Vedantic point of view cannot be maintained in\nany way.\n\n27. But (this is not so), on account of scriptural passages, and on\naccount of (Brahman) resting on Scripture (only).\n\nThe word 'but' discards the objection.--We deny this and maintain that\nour view is not open to any objections.--That the entire Brahman\nundergoes change, by no means follows from our doctrine, 'on account of\nsacred texts.' For in the same way as Scripture speaks of the origin of\nthe world from Brahman, it also speaks of Brahman subsisting apart from\nits effects. This appears from the passages indicating the difference of\ncause and effect '(That divinity thought) let me enter into these three\ndivinities with this living Self and evolve names and forms;' and, 'Such\nis the greatness of it, greater than it is the Person; one foot of him\nare all things, three feet are what is immortal in heaven' (Ch. Up. III,\n12, 6); further, from the passages declaring the unmodified Brahman to\nhave its abode in the heart, and from those teaching that (in dreamless\nsleep) the individual soul is united with the True. For if the entire\nBrahman had passed into its effects, the limitation (of the soul's union\nwith Brahman) to the state of dreamless sleep which is declared in the\npassage, 'then it is united with the True, my dear,' would be out of\nplace; since the individual soul is always united with the effects of\nBrahman, and since an unmodified Brahman does not exist (on that\nhypothesis). Moreover, the possibility of Brahman becoming the object of\nperception by means of the senses is denied while its effects may thus\nbe perceived. For these reasons the existence of an unmodified Brahman\nhas to be admitted.--Nor do we violate those texts which declare Brahman\nto be without parts; we rather admit Brahman to be without parts just\nbecause Scripture reveals it. For Brahman which rests exclusively on the\nholy texts, and regarding which the holy texts alone are\nauthoritative--not the senses, and so on--must be accepted such as the\ntexts proclaim it to be. Now those texts declare, on the one hand, that\nnot the entire Brahman passes over into its effects, and, on the other\nhand, that Brahman is without parts. Even certain ordinary things such\nas gems, spells, herbs, and the like possess powers which, owing to\ndifference of time, place, occasion, and so on, produce various opposite\neffects, and nobody unaided by instruction is able to find out by mere\nreflection the number of these powers, their favouring conditions, their\nobjects, their purposes, &c.; how much more impossible is it to conceive\nwithout the aid of Scripture the true nature of Brahman with its powers\nunfathomable by thought! As the Pura/n/a says: 'Do not apply reasoning\nto what is unthinkable! The mark of the unthinkable is that it is above\nall material causes[304].' Therefore the cognition of what is\nsupersensuous is based on the holy texts only.\n\nBut--our opponent will say--even the holy texts cannot make us\nunderstand what is contradictory. Brahman, you say, which is without\nparts undergoes a change, but not the entire Brahman. If Brahman is\nwithout parts, it does either not change at all or it changes in its\nentirety. If, on the other hand, it be said that it changes partly and\npersists partly, a break is effected in its nature, and from that it\nfollows that it consists of parts. It is true that in matters connected\nwith action (as, for instance, in the case of the two Vedic injunctions\n'at the atiratra he is to take the sho/d/a/s/in-cup,' and 'at the\natiratra he is not to take the sho/d/a/s/in-cup') any contradiction\nwhich may present itself to the understanding is removed by the optional\nadoption of one of the two alternatives presented as action is dependent\non man; but in the case under discussion the adoption of one of the\nalternatives does not remove the contradiction because an existent thing\n(like Brahman) does not (like an action which is to be accomplished)\ndepend on man. We are therefore met here by a real difficulty.\n\nNo, we reply, the difficulty is merely an apparent one; as we maintain\nthat the (alleged) break in Brahman's nature is a mere figment of\nNescience. By a break of that nature a thing is not really broken up\ninto parts, not any more than the moon is really multiplied by appearing\ndouble to a person of defective vision. By that element of plurality\nwhich is the fiction of Nescience, which is characterised by name and\nform, which is evolved as well as non-evolved, which is not to be\ndefined either as the Existing or the Non-existing, Brahman becomes the\nbasis of this entire apparent world with its changes, and so on, while\nin its true and real nature it at the same time remains unchanged,\nlifted above the phenomenal universe. And as the distinction of names\nand forms, the fiction of Nescience, originates entirely from speech\nonly, it does not militate against the fact of Brahman being without\nparts.--Nor have the scriptural passages which speak of Brahman as\nundergoing change the purpose of teaching the fact of change; for such\ninstruction would have no fruit. They rather aim at imparting\ninstruction about Brahman's Self as raised above this apparent world;\nthat being an instruction which we know to have a result of its own. For\nin the scriptural passage beginning 'He can only be described by No, no'\n(which passage conveys instruction about the absolute Brahman) a result\nis stated at the end, in the words 'O Janaka, you have indeed reached\nfearlessness' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 2, 4).--Hence our view does not involve\nany real difficulties.\n\n28. For thus it is in the (individual) Self also, and various (creations\nexist in gods[305], &c.).\n\nNor is there any reason to find fault with the doctrine that there can\nbe a manifold creation in the one Self, without destroying its\ncharacter. For Scripture teaches us that there exists a multiform\ncreation in the one Self of a dreaming person, 'There are no chariots in\nthat state, no horses, no roads, but he himself creates chariots,\nhorses, and roads' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 10). In ordinary life too\nmultiform creations, elephants, horses, and the like are seen to exist\nin gods, &c., and magicians without interfering with the unity of their\nbeing. Thus a multiform creation may exist in Brahman also, one as it\nis, without divesting it of its character of unity.\n\n29. And because the objection (raised against our view) lies against his\n(the opponent's) view likewise.\n\nThose also who maintain that the world has sprung from the pradhana\nimplicitly teach that something not made up of parts, unlimited, devoid\nof sound and other qualities--viz. the pradhana--is the cause of an\neffect--viz. the world--which is made up of parts, is limited and is\ncharacterised by the named qualities. Hence it follows from that\ndoctrine also either that the pradhana as not consisting of parts has to\nundergo a change in its entirety, or else that the view of its not\nconsisting of parts has to be abandoned.--But--it might be pleaded in\nfavour of the Sa@nkhyas--they do not maintain their pradhana to be\nwithout parts; for they define it as the state of equilibrium of the\nthree gu/n/as, Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, so that the pradhana\nforms a whole containing the three gu/n/as as its parts.--We reply that\nsuch a partiteness as is here proposed does not remove the objection in\nhand because still each of the three qualities is declared to be in\nitself without parts[306]. And each gu/n/a by itself assisted merely by\nthe two other gu/n/as constitutes the material cause of that part of the\nworld which resembles it in its nature[307].--So that the objection lies\nagainst the Sa@nkhya view likewise.--Well, then, as the reasoning (on\nwhich the doctrine of the impartiteness of the pradhana rests) is not\nabsolutely safe, let us assume that the pradhana consists of parts.--If\nyou do that, we reply, it follows that the pradhana cannot be eternal,\nand so on.--Let it then be said that the various powers of the pradhana\nto which the variety of its effects is pointing are its parts.--Well, we\nreply, those various powers are admitted by us also who see the cause of\nthe world in Brahman.\n\nThe same objections lie against the doctrine of the world having\noriginated from atoms. For on that doctrine one atom when combining with\nanother must, as it is not made up of parts, enter into the combination\nwith its whole extent, and as thus no increase of bulk takes place we do\nnot get beyond the first atom.[308] If, on the other hand, you maintain\nthat the atom enters into the combination with a part only, you offend\nagainst the assumption of the atoms having no parts.\n\nAs therefore all views are equally obnoxious to the objections raised,\nthe latter cannot be urged against any one view in particular, and the\nadvocate of Brahman has consequently cleared his doctrine.\n\n30. And (the highest divinity is) endowed with all (powers) because that\nis seen (from Scripture).\n\nWe have stated that this multiform world of effects is possible to\nBrahman, because, although one only, it is endowed with various\npowers.--How then--it may be asked--do you know that the highest Brahman\nis endowed with various powers?--He is, we reply, endowed with all\npowers, 'because that is seen.' For various scriptural passages declare\nthat the highest divinity possesses all powers, 'He to whom all actions,\nall desires, all odours, all tastes belong, he who embraces all this,\nwho never speaks, and is never surprised' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 4); 'He who\ndesires what is true and imagines what is true' (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1);\n'He who knows all (in its totality), and cognizes all (in its detail')\n(Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); 'By the command of that Imperishable, O Gargi, sun\nand moon stand apart' (B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 9); and other similar\npassages.\n\n31. If it be said that (Brahman is devoid of powers) on account of the\nabsence of organs; (we reply that) this has been explained (before).\n\nLet this be granted.--Scripture, however, declares the highest divinity\nto be without (bodily) organs of action[309]; so, for instance, in the\npassage, 'It is without eyes, without ears, without speech, without\nmind' (B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 8). Being such, how should it be able to\nproduce effects, although it may be endowed with all powers? For we know\n(from mantras, arthavadas, &c.) that the gods and other intelligent\nbeings, though endowed with all powers, are capable of producing certain\neffects only because they are furnished with bodily instruments of\naction. And, moreover, how can the divinity, to whom the scriptural\npassage, 'No, no,' denies all attributes, be endowed with all powers?\n\nThe appropriate reply to this question has been already given above. The\ntranscendent highest Brahman can be fathomed by means of Scripture only,\nnot by mere reasoning. Nor are we obliged to assume that the capacity of\none being is exactly like that which is observed in another. It has\nlikewise been explained above that although all qualities are denied of\nBrahman we nevertheless may consider it to be endowed with powers, if we\nassume in its nature an element of plurality, which is the mere figment\nof Nescience. Moreover, a scriptural passage ('Grasping without hands,\nhastening without feet, he sees without eyes, he hears without ears'\n/S/ve. Up. III, 19) declares that Brahman although devoid of bodily\norgans, possesses all possible capacities.\n\n32. (Brahman is) not (the creator of the world), on account of (beings\nengaging in any action) having a motive.\n\nAnother objection is raised against the doctrine of an intelligent cause\nof the world.--The intelligent highest Self cannot be the creator of the\nsphere of this world, 'on account of actions having a purpose.'--We know\nfrom ordinary experience that man, who is an intelligent being, begins\nto act after due consideration only, and does not engage even in an\nunimportant undertaking unless it serves some purpose of his own; much\nless so in important business. There is also a scriptural passage\nconfirming this result of common experience, 'Verily everything is not\ndear that you may have everything; but that you may love the Self\ntherefore everything is dear' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 5). Now the undertaking\nof creating the sphere of this world, with all its various contents, is\ncertainly a weighty one. If, then, on the one hand, you assume it to\nserve some purpose of the intelligent highest Self, you thereby sublate\nits self-sufficiency vouched for by Scripture; if, on the other hand,\nyou affirm absence of motive on its part, you must affirm absence of\nactivity also.--Let us then assume that just as sometimes an intelligent\nperson when in a state of frenzy proceeds, owing to his mental\naberration, to action without a motive, so the highest Self also created\nthis world without any motive.--That, we reply, would contradict the\nomniscience of the highest Self, which is vouched for by\nScripture.--Hence the doctrine of the creation proceeding from an\nintelligent Being is untenable.\n\n33. But (Brahman's creative activity) is mere sport, such as we see in\nordinary life.\n\nThe word 'but' discards the objection raised.--We see in every-day life\nthat certain doings of princes or other men of high position who have no\nunfulfilled desires left have no reference to any extraneous purpose;\nbut proceed from mere sportfulness, as, for instance, their recreations\nin places of amusement. We further see that the process of inhalation\nand exhalation is going on without reference to any extraneous purpose,\nmerely following the law of its own nature. Analogously, the activity of\nthe Lord also may be supposed to be mere sport, proceeding from his own\nnature[310], without reference to any purpose. For on the ground neither\nof reason nor of Scripture can we construe any other purpose of the\nLord. Nor can his nature be questioned.[311]--Although the creation of\nthis world appears to us a weighty and difficult undertaking, it is mere\nplay to the Lord, whose power is unlimited. And if in ordinary life we\nmight possibly, by close scrutiny, detect some subtle motive, even for\nsportful action, we cannot do so with regard to the actions of the Lord,\nall whose wishes are fulfilled, as Scripture says.--Nor can it be said\nthat he either does not act or acts like a senseless person; for\nScripture affirms the fact of the creation on the one hand, and the\nLord's omniscience on the other hand. And, finally, we must remember\nthat the scriptural doctrine of creation does not refer to the highest\nreality; it refers to the apparent world only, which is characterised by\nname and form, the figments of Nescience, and it, moreover, aims at\nintimating that Brahman is the Self of everything.\n\n34. Inequality (of dispensation) and cruelty (the Lord can) not (be\nreproached with), on account of his regarding (merit and demerit); for\nso (Scripture) declares.\n\nIn order to strengthen the tenet which we are at present defending, we\nfollow the procedure of him who shakes a pole planted in the ground (in\norder to test whether it is firmly planted), and raise another objection\nagainst the doctrine of the Lord being the cause of the world.--The\nLord, it is said, cannot be the cause of the world, because, on that\nhypothesis, the reproach of inequality of dispensation and cruelty would\nattach to him. Some beings, viz. the gods and others, he renders\neminently happy; others, as for instance the animals, eminently unhappy;\nto some again, as for instance men, he allots an intermediate position.\nTo a Lord bringing about such an unequal condition of things, passion\nand malice would have to be ascribed, just as to any common person\nacting similarly; which attributes would be contrary to the essential\ngoodness of the Lord affirmed by /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti. Moreover, as the\ninfliction of pain and the final destruction of all creatures would form\npart of his dispensation, he would have to be taxed with great cruelty,\na quality abhorred by low people even. For these two reasons Brahman\ncannot be the cause of the world.\n\nThe Lord, we reply, cannot be reproached with inequality of dispensation\nand cruelty, \"because he is bound by regards.\" If the Lord on his own\naccount, without any extraneous regards, produced this unequal creation,\nhe would expose himself to blame; but the fact is, that in creating he\nis bound by certain regards, i.e. he has to look to merit and demerit.\nHence the circumstance of the creation being unequal is due to the merit\nand demerit of the living creatures created, and is not a fault for\nwhich the Lord is to blame. The position of the Lord is to be looked on\nas analogous to that of Parjanya, the Giver of rain. For as Parjanya is\nthe common cause of the production of rice, barley, and other plants,\nwhile the difference between the various species is due to the various\npotentialities lying hidden in the respective seeds, so the Lord is the\ncommon cause of the creation of gods, men, &c., while the differences\nbetween these classes of beings are due to the different merit belonging\nto the individual souls. Hence the Lord, being bound by regards, cannot\nbe reproached with inequality of dispensation and cruelty.--And if we\nare asked how we come to know that the Lord, in creating this world with\nits various conditions, is bound by regards, we reply that Scripture\ndeclares that; compare, for instance, the two following passages, 'For\nhe (the Lord) makes him, whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds, do\na good deed; and the same makes him, whom he wishes to lead down from\nthese worlds, do a bad deed' (Kaush. Up. III, 8)[312]; and, 'A man\nbecomes good by good work, bad by bad work' (B/ri/. Up. III, 2, 13).\nSm/ri/ti passages also declare the favour of the Lord and its opposite\nto depend on the different quality of the works of living beings; so,\nfor instance, 'I serve men in the way in which they approach me' (Bha.\nGi. IV, 11).\n\n35. If it be objected that it (viz. the Lord's having regard to merit\nand demerit) is impossible on account of the non-distinction (of merit\nand demerit, previous to the first creation); we refute the objection on\nthe ground of (the world) being without a beginning.\n\nBut--an objection is raised--the passage, 'Being only this was in the\nbeginning, one, without a second,' affirms that before the creation\nthere was no distinction and consequently no merit on account of which\nthe creation might have become unequal. And if we assume the Lord to\nhave been guided in his dispensations by the actions of living beings\nsubsequent to the creation, we involve ourselves in the circular\nreasoning that work depends on diversity of condition of life, and\ndiversity of condition again on work. The Lord may be considered as\nacting with regard to religious merit after distinction had once arisen;\nbut as before that the cause of inequality, viz. merit, did not exist,\nit follows that the first creation must have been free, from\ninequalities.\n\nThis objection we meet by the remark, that the transmigratory world is\nwithout beginning.--The objection would be valid if the world had a\nbeginning; but as it is without beginning, merit and inequality are,\nlike seed and sprout, caused as well as causes, and there is therefore\nno logical objection to their operation.--To the question how we know\nthat the world is without a beginning, the next Sutra replies.\n\n36. (The beginninglessness of the world) recommends itself to reason and\nis seen (from Scripture).\n\nThe beginninglessness of the world recommends itself to reason. For if\nit had a beginning it would follow that, the world springing into\nexistence without a cause, the released souls also would again enter\ninto the circle of transmigratory existence; and further, as then there\nwould exist no determining cause of the unequal dispensation of pleasure\nand pain, we should have to acquire in the doctrine of rewards and\npunishments being allotted, without reference to previous good or bad\naction. That the Lord is not the cause of the inequality, has already\nbeen remarked. Nor can Nescience by itself be the cause, and it is of a\nuniform nature. On the other hand, Nescience may be the cause of\ninequality, if it be considered as having regard to merit accruing from\naction produced by the mental impressions or wrath, hatred, and other\nafflicting passions[313]. Without merit and demerit nobody can enter\ninto existence, and again, without a body merit and demerit cannot be\nformed; so that--on the doctrine of the world having a beginning--we are\nled into a logical see-saw. The opposite doctrine, on the other hand,\nexplains all matters in a manner analogous to the case of the seed and\nsprout, so that no difficulty remains.--Moreover, the fact of the world\nbeing without a beginning, is seen in /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti. In the first\nplace, we have the scriptural passage, 'Let me enter with this living\nSelf (jiva)', &c. (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2). Here the circumstance of the\nembodied Self (the individual soul) being called, previously to\ncreation, 'the living Self'--a name applying to it in so far as it is\nthe sustaining principle of the pra/n/as--shows that this phenomenal\nworld is without a beginning. For if it had a beginning, the pra/n/as\nwould not exist before that beginning, and how then could the embodied\nSelf be denoted, with reference to the time of the world's beginning, by\na name which depends on the existence of those pra/n/as. Nor can it be\nsaid that it is so designated with a view to its future relation to the\npra/n/as; it being a settled principle that a past relation, as being\nalready existing, is of greater force than a mere future\nrelation.--Moreover, we have the mantra, 'As the creator formerly\ndevised (akalpaya) sun and moon (/Ri/. Sa/m/h. X, 190, 3), which\nintimates the existence of former Kalpas. Sm/ri/ti also declares the\nworld to be without a beginning, 'Neither its form is known here, nor\nits end, nor its beginning, nor its support' (Bha. Gi. XV, 3). And the\nPura/n/a also declares that there is no measure of the past and the\nfuture Kalpas.\n\n37. And because all the qualities (required in the cause of the world)\nare present (in Brahman).\n\nThe teacher has now refuted all the objections, such as difference of\ncharacter, and the like, which other teachers have brought forward\nagainst what he had established as the real sense of the Veda, viz. that\nthe intelligent Brahman is the cause and matter of this world.\n\nNow, before entering on a new chapter, whose chief aim it will be to\nrefute the (positive) opinions held by other teachers, he sums up the\nforegoing chapter, the purport of which it was to show why his view\nshould be accepted.--Because, if that Brahman is acknowledged as the\ncause of the world, all attributes required in the cause (of the world)\nare seen to be present--Brahman being all-knowing, all-powerful, and\npossessing the great power of Maya,--on that account this our system,\nfounded on the Upanishads, is not open to any objections.\n\nNotes:\n\n[Footnote 253: The Sm/ri/ti called Tantra is the Sa@nkhya/s/astra as\ntaught by Kapila; the Sm/ri/ti-writers depending on him are Asuri,\nPa/nk/a/s/ikha, and others.]\n\n[Footnote 254: Mima/m/sa Su. I, 1, 2: /k/odanalaksha/n/osxrtho\ndharma/h/. Commentary: /k/odana iti kriyaya/h/ pravartaka/m/ va/k/anam\nahu/h/.]\n\n[Footnote 255: Purushartha; in opposition to the rules referred to in\nthe preceding sentence which are kratvartha, i.e. the acting according\nto which secures the proper performance of certain rites.]\n\n[Footnote 256: It having been decided by the Purva Mima/m/sa already\nthat Sm/ri/tis contradicted by /S/ruti are to be disregarded.]\n\n[Footnote 257: On the meaning of 'kapila' in the above passage, compare\nthe Introduction to the Upanishads, translated by Max Mueller, vol. ii,\np. xxxviii ff.--As will be seen later on, /S/a@nkara, in this bhashya,\ntakes the Kapila referred to to be some /ri/shi.]\n\n[Footnote 258: I.e. religious duty is known only from the injunctive\npassages of the Veda.]\n\n[Footnote 259: After it has been shown that Kapila the dvaitavadin is\nnot mentioned in /S/ruti, it is now shown that Manu the sarvatmavadin is\nmentioned there.]\n\n[Footnote 260: In which passage the phrase 'to be meditated upon'\n(nididhyasa) indicates the act of mental concentration characteristic of\nthe Yoga.]\n\n[Footnote 261: The ash/t/akas (certain oblations to be made on the\neighth days after the full moons of the seasons hemanta and /s/i/s/ira)\nfurnish the stock illustration for the doctrine of the Purva Mim. that\nSm/ri/ti is authoritative in so far as it is based on /S/ruti.]\n\n[Footnote 262: But why--it will be asked--do you apply yourself to the\nrefutation of the Sa@nkhya and Yoga only, and not also to that of other\nSm/ri/tis conflicting with the Vedanta views?]\n\n[Footnote 263: I.e. from the fact of these terms being employed in a\npassage standing close to other passages which refer to Vedic\nknowledge.]\n\n[Footnote 264: The cognition of Brahman terminates in an act of\nanubhava; hence as it has been shown that reasoning is more closely\nconnected with anubhava than /S/ruti is, we have the right to apply\nreasoning to /S/ruti.--Ananda Giri comments on the passage from\nanubhavavasanam as follows: brahmasakshatkarasya mokshopayataya\npradhanyat tatra /s/abdad api parokshago/k/arad\naparoksharthasadharmyago/k/aras tarkosxntara@ngam iti tasyaiva\nbalavatvam ity artha/h/. Aitihyamatre/n/a pravadaparamparyamatre/n/a\nparokshatayeti yavat. Anubhavasya pradhanye tarkasyoktanyayena tasminn\nantara@ngatvad agamasya /k/a bahira@ngatvad antara@ngabahira@ngayor\nantara@nga/m/ balavad ity nyayad ukta/m/ tarkasya balavattvam.\nAnubhavapradhanya/m/ tu nadyapi siddham ity a/s/a@nkyahanubhaveti. Nanu\nBrahmaj/n/adna/m/ vaidikatvad dharmavad ad/ri/sh/t/aphalam esh/t/avya/m/\ntat kutosxsyanubhavavasanavidyanivartakatva/m/ tatraha moksheti.\nAdhish/th/anasakshatkarasya /s/uktyadj/n/ane\ntadavidyatatkaryanivartakatvad/ri/sh/t/e/h/, brahmaj/n/anasyapi\ntarkava/s/ad asambhavanadinirasadvara sakshatkaravasayinas\ntadavidyadinivartakatvenaiva muktihetuteti nad/ri/sh/t/aphalatety\nartha/h/.]\n\n[Footnote 265: Nirati/s/aya/h/, upajanapayadharma/s/unyatva/m/\nnirati/s/ayatvam. An. Gi.]\n\n[Footnote 266: A sentence replying to the possible objection that the\nworld, as being the effect of the intelligent Brahman, might itself be\nintelligent.]\n\n[Footnote 267: In the case of things commonly considered\nnon-intelligent, intelligence is not influenced by an internal organ,\nand on that account remains unperceived; samaste jagati satoszpi\n/k/aitanyasya tatra tatranta/h/kara/n/apari/n/amanuparagad anupalabdhir\naviruddha. An. Gi.]\n\n[Footnote 268: On i/s/vara in the above meaning, compare Deussen, p. 69,\nnote 41.]\n\n[Footnote 269: The line 'prak/ri/tibhya/h/ param,' &c. is wanting in all\nMSS. I have consulted.]\n\n[Footnote 270: Ananda Giri on the above passage: /s/rutyaka@nkshita/m/\ntarkam eva mananavidhivishayam udaharati svapnanteti. Svapnajagaritayor\nmithovyabhi/k/arad atmana/h/ svabhavatas tadvattvabhavad avastha dvayena\ntasya svatosxsa/m/p/ri/ktatvam ato jivasyavasthavatvena nabrahmatvam ity\nartha/h/. Tathapi dehaditadatmyenatmano bhavan na\nni/h/prapa/nk/abrahmatety a/s/a@nkyaha sa/m/prasade /k/eti. Sata somya\ntada sa/m/panno bhavatiti /s/rute/h/ sushupte\nni/h/prapa/nk/asadatmatvavagamad atmanas tathavidhabrahmatvasiddhir ity\nartha/h/. Dvaitagrahipratyakshadivirodhat katham\natmanosxdvitiyabrahmatvam ity a/s/a@nkya tajjatvadihetuna\nbrahmatiriktavastvabhavasiddher adhyakshadinam atatvavedakaprama/n/yad\navirodhad yuktam atmano xsvitiyabrahmatvam ity aha prapa/nk/asyeti.]\n\n[Footnote 271: Let us finally assume, merely for argument's sake, that a\nvailaksha/n/ya of cause and effect is not admissible, and enquire\nwhether that assumption can be reconciled more easily with an\nintelligent or a non-intelligent cause of the world.]\n\n[Footnote 272: Nanu pralayakale karyadharma/s/ /k/en navatish/th/eran na\ntarhi kara/n/adharma api tish/th/eyus tayor abhedat\ntatrahananyatveszpiti. An. Gi.]\n\n[Footnote 273: For if they are effects of the pradhana they must as such\nbe reabsorbed into it at the time of general reabsorption.]\n\n[Footnote 274: And that the Vedanta view is preferable because the\nnullity of the objections has already been demonstrated in its case.]\n\n[Footnote 275: The whole style of argumentation of the Mima/m/sa would\nbe impossible, if all reasoning were sound; for then no purvapaksha view\ncould be maintained.]\n\n[Footnote 276: The following arthavada-passage, for instance, 'the\nsacrificial post is the sun,' is to be taken in a metaphorical sense;\nbecause perception renders it impossible for us to take it in its\nliteral meaning.]\n\n[Footnote 277: Which are to be known from the Veda only.]\n\n[Footnote 278: Pari/n/amavadam avalambyapatato virodha/m/ samadhaya\nvivartavadam a/s/ritya paramasamadhanam aha. An. Gi.]\n\n[Footnote 279: Ananda Giri construes differently: etad uktam iti,\nparamarthato vij/n/atam iti sambandha/h/.]\n\n[Footnote 280: D/ri/sh/t/eti kada/k/id dr/ri/sh/t/a/m/ punar nash/t/am\nanityam iti yavat.--D/ri/sh/t/agraha/n/asu/k/ita/m/ pratitikalesxpi\nsattarahitya/m/ tatraiva hetvantaram aha svarupe/n/eti. An. Gi.]\n\n[Footnote 281: In the passage alluded to he is called so by implication,\nbeing compared to the 'false-minded' thief who, knowing himself to be\nguilty, undergoes the ordeal of the heated hatchet.]\n\n[Footnote 282: I.e. ordinary experience does not teach us that real\neffects spring from unreal causes.]\n\n[Footnote 283: Svapnajagraddehayor vyabhi/k/arezpi pratyabhij/n/anat\ntadanugatatmaikyasiddhe/s/ /k/aitanyasya /k/a dehadharmatve rutmano\ndehadvayatiredkasiddher dehatratmavado na yukta ity artha/h/. An. Gi.]\n\n[Footnote 284: As long as the 'vyavahara' presents itself to our mind,\nwe might feel inclined to assume in Brahman an element of manifoldness\nwhereby to account for the vyavahara; but as soon as we arrive at true\nknowledge, the vyavahara vanishes, and there remains no longer any\nreason for qualifying in any way the absolute unity of Brahman.]\n\n[Footnote 285: Tatreti, s/ri/sh/t/yadi/s/rutina/m/ svarthe phatavaikalye\nsatiti yavat. An. Gi.]\n\n[Footnote 286: A Mima/m/sa principle. A sacrificial act, for instance,\nis independent when a special result is assigned to it by the sacred\ntexts; an act which is enjoined without such a specification is merely\nauxiliary to another act.]\n\n[Footnote 287: According to the /S/ruti 'in whatever mode he worships\nhim into that mode he passes himself.']\n\n[Footnote 288: Tattvanyatvabhyam iti, na hisvaratvena te niru/k/yete\nja/d/ajadayor abhedayogat napi tatoxnyatvenax niruktim arhata/h/\nsvatantrye/n/a sattasphurtyasambhavat na hi j/ad/am aga/d/anapekshya/m/\nsattasphurtimad upalakshyate ja/d/atvabha@ngaprasa@ngat tasmad\navidyatmake namarupe ity artha/h/. An. Gi.]\n\n[Footnote 289: So that from the instance of the potter and the jar we\ncannot conclude that the relation of clay and the jar is only that of\nnimitta and naimittika, not that of non-difference.]\n\n[Footnote 290: For instance, smoke extending in a long line whose base\nis connected with some object on the surface of the earth.]\n\n[Footnote 291: I.e. (as An. Gi. explains) because we assume the relation\nof cause and effect not merely on the ground of the actual existence of\none thing depending on that upon another, but on the additional ground\nof the mental existence, the consciousness of the one not being possible\nwithout the consciousness of the other.--Tadbhavanuvidhayibhavatvam\ntadbhananuvidhayibhanatva/m/ /k/a karyasya kara/n/ananyatve hetur\ndhumavi/s/eshasya /k/agnibhavanuvidhayibhavatvesxpi na\ntadbhananuvidhayibhanatvam agnibhanasya dhumabhanadhinatvat.]\n\n[Footnote 292: For simplicity's sake, asat will be translated henceforth\nby non-existing.]\n\n[Footnote 293: Samavaya, commonly translated by inherence or intimate\nrelation, is, according to the Nyaya, the relation connecting a whole\nand its parts, substances, and qualities, &c.]\n\n[Footnote 294: Samavayasya svatantryapaksha/m/ dushayati\nanabhyupagamyamane/k/eti. Samavayasya samavayibhi/h/ sambandho neshyate\nki/m/ tu svatantryam evety atravayavavayavinor dravyagu/n/adina/m/ /k/a.\nviprakarsha/h/ syat sa/m/nidhayakabhavad ity artha/h/. An. Gi.]\n\n[Footnote 295: A conclusion which is in conflict with the Nyaya tenet\nthat sa/m/yoga, conjunction, as, for instance, of the jar and the ground\non which it stands, is a quality (gu/n/a) inherent in the two conjoined\nsubstances by means of the samavaya relation.]\n\n[Footnote 296: So that the whole can be apprehended by us as such if we\napprehend a certain part only; analogously to our apprehending the whole\nthread on which a garland of flowers is strung as soon as we apprehend\nsome few of the flowers.]\n\n[Footnote 297: Kalpantaram utthapayati atheti, tatha /k/a\nyathavayavai/h/ sutra/m/ kusumani vyapnuvat katipayakusumagraha/n/expi\ng/r/ihyate tatha katipayavayavagraha/n/expi bhavaty avayavino graha/n/am\nity artha/h/. Tatra kim arambhakavayavair eva teshv avayavi vartteta\nki/m/ va tadatiriklavayavair iti vikalpyadyam pratyaha tadapiti. Yatra\nyad varttate tat tadatiriktavayavair eva tatra vartamana/m/ drish/l/am\niti d/ri/sh/t/antagarbha/m/ hetum a/k/ash/l/e ko/s/eti. Dvitiyam\ndushayati anavastheti. Kalpitanantavayavavyavahitataya\nprak/ri/tavayavino duraviprakarshat tantunish/th/atvam pa/t/asya na syad\niti bhava/h/. An. Gi.]\n\n[Footnote 298: I.e. a something in which the action inheres; not a\ncausal agent.]\n\n[Footnote 299: Every action, /S/a@nkara says, requires an agent, i.e. a\nsubstrate in which the action takes place. If we deny that the jar\nexists in the clay even before it is actually originated, we lose the\nsubstrate for the action of origination, i.e. entering into existence\n(for the non-existing jar cannot be the substratum of any action), and\nhave to assume, for that action, other substrates, such as the operative\ncauses of the jar.]\n\n[Footnote 300: Which doctrine will be fully discussed in the second pada\nof this adhyaya.]\n\n[Footnote 301: Because it has been shown that cause and effect are\nidentical; hence if the cause is known, the effect is known also.]\n\n[Footnote 302: Which arguments, the commentators say, are hinted at by\nthe 'and' of the Sutra.]\n\n[Footnote 303: The right reading appears to be 'svayam eva /k/etana' as\nfound in some MSS. Other MSS. read /k/etana/h/.]\n\n[Footnote 304: Prak/ri/tibhya iti,\npratyakshad/ri/sh/t/apadarthasvabhavebhyo yat para/m/ vilaksha/n/am\na/k/aryadyupade/s/agamya/m/ tad a/k/intyam ity arta/h/ An. Gi.]\n\n[Footnote 305: This is the way in which /S/a@nkara divides the Sutra;\nAn. Gi. remarks to 'lokezspo, &c.: atmani /k/eti vyakhyaya vi/k/itra/s/\n/k/a hiti vya/k/ash/t/e.']\n\n[Footnote 306: So that if it undergoes modifications it must either\nchange in its entirety, or else--against the assumption--consist of\nparts.]\n\n[Footnote 307: The last clause precludes the justificatory remark that\nthe stated difficulties can be avoided if we assume the three gu/n/as in\ncombination only to undergo modification; if this were so the inequality\nof the different effects could not be accounted for.]\n\n[Footnote 308: As an atom has no parts it cannot enter into partial\ncontact with another, and the only way in which the two can combine is\nentire interpenetration; in consequence of which the compound of two\natoms would not occupy more space than one atom.]\n\n[Footnote 309: The Sutra is concerned with the body only as far as it is\nan instrument; the case of extraneous instruments having already been\ndisposed of in Sutra 24.]\n\n[Footnote 310: The nature (svabhava) of the Lord is, the commentators\nsay, Maya joined with time and karman.]\n\n[Footnote 311: This clause is an answer to the objection that the Lord\nmight remain at rest instead of creating a world useless to himself and\nthe cause of pain to others. For in consequence of his conjunction with\nMaya the creation is unavoidable. Go. An. Avidya naturally tends towards\neffects, without any purpose. Bha.\n\nAn. Gi. remarks: Nanu liladav asmadadinam akasmad eva niv/ri/tter api\ndarsanad i/s/varasyapi mayamayyam lilayam tatha-bhave vinapi\nsa/my/agj/n/ana/m/ sa/m/sarasamu/kkh/ittir ili tatraha na /ke/ti.\nAnirva/ky/a khalv avidya paras/yes/varasya /k/a. svabhavo lileti\n/kok/yate tatra na pratitikasvabhavayam anupapattir avataratity\nartha/h/.]\n\n[Footnote 312: From this passage we must not--the commentators\nsay--infer injustice on the part of the Lord; for the previous merit or\ndemerit of a being determines the specific quality of the actions which\nhe performs in his present existence, the Lord acting as the common\ncause only (as Parjanya does).]\n\n[Footnote 313: Ragadveshamoha ragadayas le /k/a purusha/m/ dukhadibhi/h/\nkli/s/yantita kle/s/as tesb/am/ kartneapia/vi/uyanugu/rr/as tabhir\naksbipta/m/ dharmadilaksbilaksha/n/a/m/ kurma tadapekshavidya. An. Gi.]\n\n\n\n\nSECOND PADA.\n\nREVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!\n\n\n1. That which is inferred (by the Sa@nkhyas, viz. the pradhana) cannot\nbe the cause (of the world), on account of the orderly arrangement (of\nthe world) being impossible (on that hypothesis).\n\nAlthough it is the object of this system to define the true meaning of\nthe Vedanta-texts and not, like the science of Logic, to establish or\nrefute some tenet by mere ratiocination, still it is incumbent on\nthorough students of the Vedanta to refute the Sa@nkhya and other\nsystems which are obstacles in the way of perfect knowledge. For this\npurpose a new chapter is begun. (Nor must it be said that the refutation\nof the other systems ought to have preceded the establishment of the\nVedanta position; for) as the determination of the sense of the\nVedanta-passages directly subserves perfect knowledge, we have at first,\nby means of such a determination, established our own position, since\nthis is a task more important than the refutation of the views\nentertained by others.\n\nHere an opponent might come forward and say that we are indeed entitled\nto establish our own position, so as to define perfect knowledge which\nis the means of release to those desirous of it, but that no use is\napparent of a refutation of other opinions, a proceeding productive of\nnothing but hate and anger.--There is a use, we reply. For there is some\ndanger of men of inferior intelligence looking upon the Sa@nkhya and\nsimilar systems as requisite for perfect knowledge, because those\nsystems have a weighty appearance, have been adopted by authoritative\npersons, and profess to lead to perfect knowledge. Such people might\ntherefore think that those systems with their abstruse arguments were\npropounded by omniscient sages, and might on that account have faith in\nthem. For this reason we must endeavour to demonstrate their intrinsic\nworthlessness.\n\nBut, it might be said, the Sa@nkhya and similar systems have already\nbeen impugned in several Sutras of the first adhyaya (I, 1, 5, 18; I, 4,\n28); why, then, controvert them again?--The task--we reply--which we are\nnow about to undertake differs from what we have already accomplished.\nAs the Sa@nkhyas and other philosophers also quote, in order to\nestablish their own positions, the Vedanta-passages and interpret them\nin such a manner as to make them agree with their own systems, we have\nhitherto endeavoured to show that their interpretations are altogether\nfallacious. Now, however, we are going to refute their arguments in an\nindependent manner, without any reference to the Vedanta-texts.\n\nThe Sa@nkhyas, to make a beginning with them, argue as follows.--Just as\njars, dishes, and other products which possess the common quality of\nconsisting of clay are seen to have for their cause clay in general; so\nwe must suppose that all the outward and inward (i.e. inanimate and\nanimate) effects which are endowed with the characteristics of pleasure,\npain, and dulness[314] have for their causes pleasure, pain, and dulness\nin general. Pleasure, pain, and dulness in their generality together\nconstitute the threefold pradhana. This pradhana which is\nnon-intelligent evolves itself spontaneously into multiform\nmodifications[315], in order thus to effect the purposes (i.e.\nenjoyment, release, and so on) of the intelligent soul.--The existence\nof the pradhana is to be inferred from other circumstances also, such as\nthe limitation of all effects and the like[316].\n\nAgainst this doctrine we argue as follows.--If you Sankhyas base your\ntheory on parallel instances merely, we point out that a non-intelligent\nthing which, without being guided by an intelligent being, spontaneously\nproduces effects capable of subserving the purposes of some particular\nperson is nowhere observed in the world. We rather observe that houses,\npalaces, couches, pleasure-grounds, and the like--things which according\nto circumstances are conducive to the obtainment of pleasure or the\navoidance of pain--are made by workmen endowed with intelligence. Now\nlook at this entire world which appears, on the one hand, as external\n(i.e. inanimate) in the form of earth and the other elements enabling\n(the souls) to enjoy the fruits of their various actions, and, on the\nother hand, as animate, in the form of bodies which belong to the\ndifferent classes of beings, possess a definite arrangement of organs,\nand are therefore capable of constituting the abodes of fruition; look,\nwe say, at this world, of which the most ingenious workmen cannot even\nform a conception in their minds, and then say if a non-intelligent\nprinciple like the pradhana is able to fashion it! Other non-intelligent\nthings such as stones and clods of earth are certainly not seen to\npossess analogous powers. We rather must assume that just as clay and\nsimilar substances are seen to fashion themselves into various forms, if\nworked upon by potters and the like, so the pradhana also (when\nmodifying itself into its effects) is ruled by some intelligent\nprinciple. When endeavouring to determine the nature of the primal cause\n(of the world), there is no need for us to take our stand on those\nattributes only which form part of the nature of material causes such as\nclay, &c., and not on those also which belong to extraneous agents such\nas potters, &c.[317] Nor (if remembering this latter point) do we enter\ninto conflict with any means of right knowledge; we, on the contrary,\nare in direct agreement with Scripture which teaches that an intelligent\ncause exists.--For the reason detailed in the above, i.e. on account of\nthe impossibility of the 'orderly arrangement' (of the world), a\nnon-intelligent cause of the world is not to be inferred.--The word\n'and' (in the Sutra) adds other reasons on account of which the pradhana\ncannot be inferred, viz. 'on account of the non-possibility of\nendowment,' &c. For it cannot be maintained[318] that all outward and\ninward effects are 'endowed' with the nature of pleasure, pain, and\ndulness, because pleasure, &c. are known as inward (mental) states,\nwhile sound, &c. (i.e. the sense-objects) are known as being of a\ndifferent nature (i.e. as outward things), and moreover as being the\noperative causes of pleasure, &c.[319] And, further, although the\nsense-object such as sound and so on is one, yet we observe that owing\nto the difference of the mental impressions (produced by it) differences\nexist in the effects it produces, one person being affected by it\npleasantly, another painfully, and so on[320].--(Turning to the next\nSa@nkhya argument which infers the existence of the pradhana from the\nlimitation of all effects), we remark that he who concludes that all\ninward and outward effects depend on a conjunction of several things,\nbecause they are limited (a conclusion based on the observation that\nsome limited effects such as roof and sprout, &c. depend on the\nconjunction of several things), is driven to the conclusion that the\nthree constituents of the pradhana, viz. Goodness, Passion, and\nDarkness, likewise depend on the conjunction of several\nantecedents[321]; for they also are limited[322].--Further[323], it is\nimpossible to use the relation of cause and effect as a reason for\nassuming that all effects whatever have a non-intelligent principle for\ntheir antecedent; for we have shown already that that relation exists in\nthe case of couches and chairs also, over whose production intelligence\npresides.\n\n2. And on account of (the impossibility of) activity.\n\nLeaving the arrangement of the world, we now pass on to the activity by\nwhich it is produced.--The three gu/n/as, passing out of the state of\nequipoise and entering into the condition of mutual subordination and\nsuperordination, originate activities tending towards the production of\nparticular effects.--Now these activities also cannot be ascribed to a\nnon-intelligent pradhana left to itself, as no such activity is seen in\nclay and similar substances, or in chariots and the like. For we observe\nthat clay and the like, and chariots--which are in their own nature\nnon-intelligent--enter on activities tending towards particular effects\nonly when they are acted upon by intelligent beings such as potters, &c.\nin the one case, and horses and the like in the other case. From what is\nseen we determine what is not seen. Hence a non-intelligent cause of the\nworld is not to be inferred because, on that hypothesis, the activity\nwithout which the world cannot be produced would be impossible.\n\nBut, the Sa@nkhya rejoins, we do likewise not observe activity on the\npart of mere intelligent beings.--True; we however see activity on the\npart of non-intelligent things such as chariots and the like when they\nare in conjunction with intelligent beings.--But, the Sa@nkhya again\nobjects, we never actually observe activity on the part of an\nintelligent being even when in conjunction with a non-intelligent\nthing.--Very well; the question then arises: Does the activity belong to\nthat in which it is actually observed (as the Sa@nkhya says), or to that\non account of the conjunction with which it is observed (as the Vedantin\navers)?--We must, the Sa@nkhya replies, attribute activity to that in\nwhich it is actually seen, since both (i.e. the activity and its abode)\nare matter of observation. A mere intelligent being, on the other hand,\nis never observed as the abode of activity while a chariot is. The[324]\nexistence of an intelligent Self joined to a body and so on which are\nthe abode of activity can be established (by inference) only; the\ninference being based on the difference observed between living bodies\nand mere non-intelligent things, such as chariots and the like. For this\nvery reason, viz. that intelligence is observed only where a body is\nobserved while it is never seen without a body, the Materialists\nconsider intelligence to be a mere attribute of the body.--Hence\nactivity belongs only to what is non-intelligent.\n\nTo all this we--the Vedantins--make the following reply.--We do not mean\nto say that activity does not belong to those non-intelligent things in\nwhich it is observed; it does indeed belong to them; but it results from\nan intelligent principle, because it exists when the latter is present\nand does not exist when the latter is absent. Just as the effects of\nburning and shining, which have their abode in wood and similar\nmaterial, are indeed not observed when there is mere fire (i.e. are not\ndue to mere fire; as mere fire, i.e. fire without wood, &c., does not\nexist), but at the same time result from fire only as they are seen when\nfire is present and are not seen when fire is absent; so, as the\nMaterialists also admit, only intelligent bodies are observed to be the\nmovers of chariots and other non-intelligent things. The motive power of\nintelligence is therefore incontrovertible.--But--an objection will be\nraised--your Self even if joined to a body is incapable of exercising\nmoving power, for motion cannot be effected by that the nature of which\nis pure intelligence.--A thing, we reply, which is itself devoid of\nmotion may nevertheless move other things. The magnet is itself devoid\nof motion, and yet it moves iron; and colours and the other objects of\nsense, although themselves devoid of motion, produce movements in the\neyes and the other organs of sense. So the Lord also who is all-present,\nthe Self of all, all-knowing and all-powerful may, although himself\nunmoving, move the universe.--If it finally be objected that (on the\nVedanta doctrine) there is no room for a moving power as in consequence\nof the oneness (aduality) of Brahman no motion can take place; we reply\nthat such objections have repeatedly been refuted by our pointing to the\nfact of the Lord being fictitiously connected with Maya, which consists\nof name and form presented by Nescience.--Hence motion can be reconciled\nwith the doctrine of an all-knowing first cause; but not with the\ndoctrine of a non-intelligent first cause.\n\n3. If it be said (that the pradhana moves) like milk or water, (we reply\nthat) there also (the motion is due to intelligence).\n\nWell, the Sa@nkhya resumes, listen then to the following instances.--As\nnon-sentient milk flows forth from its own nature merely for the\nnourishment of the young animal, and as non-sentient water, from its own\nnature, flows along for the benefit of mankind, so the pradhana also,\nalthough non-intelligent, may be supposed to move from its own nature\nmerely for the purpose of effecting the highest end of man.\n\nThis argumentation, we reply, is unsound again; for as the adherents of\nboth doctrines admit that motion is not observed in the case of merely\nnon-intelligent things such as chariots, &c., we infer that water and\nmilk also move only because they are directed by intelligent powers.\nScriptural passages, moreover (such as 'He who dwells in the water and\nwithin the water, who rules the water within,' B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 4;\nand, 'By the command of that Akshara, O Gargi, some rivers flow to the\nEast,' &c., B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 9), declare that everything in this world\nwhich flows is directed by the Lord. Hence the instances of milk and\nwater as belonging themselves to that class of cases which prove our\ngeneral principle[325] cannot be used to show that the latter is too\nwide.--Moreover, the cow, which is an intelligent being and loves her\ncalf, makes her milk flow by her wish to do so, and the milk is in\naddition drawn forth by the sucking of the calf. Nor does water move\neither with absolute independence--for its flow depends on the declivity\nof the soil and similar circumstances--or independently of an\nintelligent principle, for we have shown that the latter is present in\nall cases.--If, finally, our opponent should point to Sutra II, 1, 24 as\ncontradicting the present Sutra, we remark that there we have merely\nshown on the ground of ordinary experience that an effect may take place\nin itself independently of any external instrumental cause; a conclusion\nwhich does not contradict the doctrine, based on Scripture, that all\neffects depend on the Lord.\n\n4. And because (the pradhana), on account of there existing nothing\nbeyond it, stands in no relation; (it cannot be active.)\n\nThe three gu/n/as of the Sa@nkhyas when in a state of equipoise form the\npradhana. Beyond the pradhana there exists no external principle which\ncould either impel the pradhana to activity or restrain it from\nactivity. The soul (purusha), as we know, is indifferent, neither moves\nto--nor restrains from--action. As therefore the pradhana stands in no\nrelation, it is impossible to see why it should sometimes modify itself\ninto the great principle (mahat) and sometimes not. The activity and\nnon-activity (by turns) of the Lord, on the other hand, are not contrary\nto reason, on account of his omniscience and omnipotence, and his being\nconnected with the power of illusion (maya).\n\n5. Nor (can it be said that the pradhana modifies itself spontaneously)\nlike grass, &c. (which turn into milk); for (milk) does not exist\nelsewhere (but in the female animal).\n\nLet this be (the Sa@nkhya resumes). Just as grass, herbs, water, &c.\nindependently of any other instrumental cause transform themselves, by\ntheir own nature, into milk; so, we assume, the pradhana also transforms\nitself into the great principle, and so on. And, if you ask how we know\nthat grass transforms itself independently of any instrumental cause; we\nreply, 'Because no such cause is observed.' For if we did perceive some\nsuch cause, we certainly should apply it to grass, &c. according to our\nliking, and thereby produce milk. But as a matter of fact we do no such\nthing. Hence the transformation of grass and the like must be considered\nto be due to its own nature merely; and we may infer therefrom that the\ntransformation of the pradhana is of the same kind.\n\nTo this we make the following reply.--The transformation of the pradhana\nmight be ascribed to its own nature merely if we really could admit that\ngrass modifies itself in the manner stated by you; but we are unable to\nadmit that, since another instrumental cause is observed. How? 'Because\nit does not exist elsewhere.' For grass becomes milk only when it is\neaten by a cow or some other female animal, not if it is left either\nuneaten or is eaten by a bull. If the transformation had no special\ncause, grass would become milk even on other conditions than that of\nentering a cow's body. Nor would the circumstance of men not being able\nto produce milk according to their liking prove that there is no\ninstrumental cause; for while some effects can be produced by men,\nothers result from divine action only[326]. The fact, however, is that\nmen also are able, by applying a means in their power, to produce milk\nfrom grass and herbs; for when they wish to procure a more abundant\nsupply of milk they feed the cow more plentifully and thus obtain more\nmilk from her.--For these reasons the spontaneous modification of the\npradhana cannot be proved from the instance of grass and the like.\n\n6. Even if we admit (the Sa@nkhya position refuted in what precedes, it\nis invalidated by other objections) on account of the absence of a\npurpose (on the part of the pradhana).\n\nEven if we, accommodating ourselves to your (the Sa@nkhya's) belief,\nshould admit what has been disproved in the preceding Sutra, viz. that\nthe pradhana is spontaneously active, still your opinion would lie open\nto an objection 'on account of the absence of a purpose.' For if the\nspontaneous activity of the pradhana has, as you say, no reference to\nanything else, it will have no reference not only to any aiding\nprinciple, but also to any purpose or motive, and consequently your\ndoctrine that the pradhana is active in order to effect the purpose of\nman will become untenable. If you reply that the pradhana does not\nindeed regard any aiding principle, but does regard a purpose, we remark\nthat in that case we must distinguish between the different possible\npurposes, viz. either enjoyment (on the part of the soul), or final\nrelease, or both. If enjoyment, what enjoyment, we ask, can belong to\nthe soul which is naturally incapable of any accretion (of pleasure or\npain)[327]? Moreover, there would in that case be no opportunity for\nrelease[328].--If release, then the activity of the pradhana would be\npurposeless, as even antecedently to it the soul is in the state of\nrelease; moreover, there would then be no occasion for the perception of\nsounds, &c.[329]--If both, then, on account of the infinite number of\nthe objects of pradhana to be enjoyed (by the soul)[330], there would be\nno opportunity for final release. Nor can the satisfaction of a desire\nbe considered as the purpose of the activity of the pradhana; for\nneither the non-intelligent pradhana nor the essentially pure soul can\nfeel any desire.--If, finally, you should assume the pradhana to be\nactive, because otherwise the power of sight (belonging to the soul on\naccount of its intelligent nature) and the creative power (belonging to\nthe pradhana) would be purposeless; it would follow that, as the\ncreative power of the pradhana does not cease at any time any more than\nthe soul's power of sight does, the apparent world would never come to\nan end, so that no final release of the soul could take place[331].--It\nis, therefore, impossible to maintain that the pradhana enters on its\nactivity for the purposes of the soul.\n\n7. And if you say (that the soul may move the pradhana) as the (lame)\nman (moves the blind one) or as the magnet (moves the iron); thus also\n(the difficulty is not overcome).\n\nWell then--the Sa@nkhya resumes, endeavouring to defend his position by\nparallel instances--let us say that, as some lame man devoid of the\npower of motion, but possessing the power of sight, having mounted the\nback of a blind man who is able to move but not to see, makes the latter\nmove; or as the magnet not moving itself, moves the iron, so the soul\nmoves the pradhana.--Thus also, we reply, you do not free your doctrine\nfrom all shortcomings; for this your new position involves an\nabandonment of your old position, according to which the pradhana is\nmoving of itself, and the (indifferent, inactive) soul possesses no\nmoving power. And how should the indifferent soul move the pradhana? A\nman, although lame, may make a blind man move by means of words and the\nlike; but the soul which is devoid of action and qualities cannot\npossibly put forth any moving energy. Nor can it be said that it moves\nthe pradhana by its mere proximity as the magnet moves the iron; for\nfrom the permanency of proximity (of soul and pradhana) a permanency of\nmotion would follow. The proximity of the magnet, on the other hand (to\nthe iron), is not permanent, but depends on a certain activity and the\nadjustment of the magnet in a certain position; hence the (lame) man and\nthe magnet do not supply really parallel instances.--The pradhana then\nbeing non-intelligent and the soul indifferent, and there being no third\nprinciple to connect them, there can be no connexion of the two. If we\nattempted to establish a connexion on the ground of capability (of being\nseen on the part of the pradhana, of seeing on the part of the soul),\nthe permanency of such capability would imply the impossibility of final\nrelease.--Moreover, here as well as before (in the preceding Sutra) the\ndifferent alternatives connected with the absence of purpose (on the\npradhana's part) have to be considered[332].--The highest Self, on the\nother hand (which is the cause of the world, according to the\nVedantins), is characterised by non-activity inherent in its own nature,\nand, at the same time, by moving power inherent in Maya and is thus\nsuperior (to the soul of the Sa@nkhyas).\n\n8. And, again, (the pradhana cannot be active) because the relation of\nprincipal (and subordinate matter) is impossible (between the three\ngu/n/as).\n\nFor the following reason also activity on the part of the pradhana is\nnot possible.--The condition of the pradhana consists in the three\ngu/n/as, viz. goodness, passion, and darkness, abiding in themselves in\na state of equipoise without standing to one another in the relation of\nmutual superiority or inferiority. In that state the gu/n/as cannot\npossibly enter into the relation of mutual subserviency because thereby\nthey would forfeit their essential characteristic, viz. absolute\nindependence. And as there exists no extraneous principle to stir up the\ngu/n/as, the production of the great principle and the other\neffects--which would acquire for its operative cause a non-balanced\nstate of the gu/n/as--is impossible.\n\n9. And although another inference be made, (the objections remain in\nforce) on account of the (pradhana) being devoid of the power of\nintelligence.\n\nBut--the Sa@nkhya resumes--we draw another inference, so as to leave no\nroom for the objection just stated. We do not acknowledge the gu/n/as to\nbe characterised by absolute irrelativity and unchangeableness, since\nthere is no proof for such an assumption. We rather infer the\ncharacteristics of the gu/n/as from those of their effects, presuming\nthat their nature must be such as to render the production of the\neffects possible. Now the gu/n/as are admitted to be of an unsteady\nnature; hence the gu/n/as themselves are able to enter into the relation\nof mutual inequality, even while they are in a state of equipoise.\n\nEven in that case, we reply, the objections stated above which were\nfounded on the impossibility of an orderly arrangement of the world,\n&c., remain in force on account of the pradhana being devoid of the\npower of intelligence. And if (to escape those objections) the Sa@nkhya\nshould infer (from the orderly arrangement of the world, &c.), that the\nprimal cause is intelligent, he would cease to be an antagonist, since\nthe doctrine that there is one intelligent cause of this multiform world\nwould be nothing else but the Vedantic doctrine of Brahman.--Moreover,\nif the gu/n/as were capable of entering into the relation of mutual\ninequality even while in the state of equipoise, one of two things would\nhappen; they would either not be in the condition of inequality on\naccount of the absence of an operative cause; or else, if they were in\nthat condition, they would always remain in it; the absence of an\noperative cause being a non-changing circumstance. And thus the doctrine\nwould again be open to the objection stated before[333].\n\n10. And moreover (the Sa@nkhya doctrine) is objectionable on account of\nits contradictions.\n\nThe doctrine of the Sa@nkhyas, moreover, is full of contradictions.\nSometimes they enumerate seven senses, sometimes eleven[334]. In some\nplaces they teach that the subtle elements of material things proceed\nfrom the great principle, in other places again that they proceed from\nself-consciousness. Sometimes they speak of three internal organs,\nsometimes of one only[335]. That their doctrine, moreover, contradicts\n/S/ruti, which teaches that the Lord is the cause of the world, and\nSm/ri/ti, based on /S/ruti, is well known.--For these reasons also the\nSa@nkhya system is objectionable.\n\nHere the Sa@nkhya again brings a countercharge--The system of the\nVedantins also, he says, must be declared to be objectionable; for it\ndoes not admit that that which suffers and that which causes\nsuffering[336] are different classes of things (and thereby renders\nfutile the well-established distinction of causes of suffering and\nsuffering beings). For those who admit the one Brahman to be the Self of\neverything and the cause of the whole world, have to admit also that the\ntwo attributes of being that which causes suffering and that which\nsuffers belong to the one supreme Self (not to different classes of\nbeings). If, then, these two attributes belong to one and the same Self,\nit never can divest itself of them, and thus Scripture, which teaches\nperfect knowledge for the purpose of the cessation of all suffering,\nloses all its meaning. For--to adduce a parallel case--a lamp as long as\nit subsists as such is never divested of the two qualities of giving\nheat and light. And if the Vedantin should adduce the case of water with\nits waves, ripples, foam, &c.[337], we remark that there also the waves,\n&c. constitute attributes of the water which remain permanently,\nalthough they by turns manifest themselves, and again enter into the\nstate of non-manifestation; hence the water is never really destitute of\nwaves, not any more than the lamp is ever destitute of heat and\nlight.--That that which causes suffering, and that which suffers\nconstitute different classes of things is, moreover, well known from\nordinary experience. For (to consider the matter from a more general\npoint of view) the person desiring and the thing desired[338] are\nunderstood to be separate existences. If the object of desire were not\nessentially different and separate from the person desiring, the state\nof being desirous could not be ascribed to the latter, because the\nobject with reference to which alone he can be called desiring would\nalready essentially be established in him (belong to him). The latter\nstate of things exists in the case of a lamp and its light, for\ninstance. Light essentially belongs to the lamp, and hence the latter\nnever can stand in want of light; for want or desire can exist only if\nthe thing wanted or desired is not yet obtained.\n\n(And just as there could be no desiring person, if the object of desire\nand the desiring person were not essentially separate), so the object of\ndesire also would cease to be an object for the desiring person, and\nwould be an object for itself only. As a matter of fact, however, this\nis not the case; for the two ideas (and terms), 'object of desire' and\n'desiring person,' imply a relation (are correlative), and a relation\nexists in two things, not in one only. Hence the desiring person and the\nobject of desire are separate.--The same holds good with regard to what\nis not desired (object of aversion; anartha) and the non-desiring person\n(anarthin).\n\nAn object of desire is whatever is of advantage to the desiring person,\nan object of aversion whatever is of disadvantage; with both one person\nenters into relation by turns. On account of the comparative paucity of\nthe objects of desire, and the comparative multitude of the objects of\naversion, both may be comprised under the general term, 'object of\naversion.' Now, these objects of aversion we mean when we use the term\n'causes of suffering,' while by the term 'sufferer' we understand the\nsoul which, being one, enters into successive relations with both (i.e.\nthe objects of desire and the objects of aversion). If, then, the causes\nof suffering and the sufferer constitute one Self (as the Vedanta\nteaches), it follows that final release is impossible.--But if, on the\nother hand, the two are assumed to constitute separate classes, the\npossibility of release is not excluded, since the cause of the connexion\nof the two (viz. wrong knowledge) may be removed.\n\nAll this reasoning--we, the Vedantins, reply--is futile, because on\naccount of the unity of the Self the relation, whose two terms are the\ncauses of suffering, and the sufferer cannot exist (in the Self).--Our\ndoctrine would be liable to your objection if that which causes\nsuffering and that which suffers did, while belonging to one and the\nsame Self, stand to each other in the relation of object and subject.\nBut they do not stand in that relation just because they are one. If\nfire, although it possesses different attributes, such as heat and\nlight, and is capable of change, does neither burn nor illumine itself\nsince it is one only; how can the one unchangeable Brahman enter with\nreference to itself into the relation of cause of suffering and\nsufferer?--Where then, it may be asked, does the relation discussed\n(which after all cannot be denied altogether) exist?--That, we reply, is\nnot difficult to see[339]. The living body which is the object of the\naction of burning is the sufferer; the sun, for instance, is a cause of\nsuffering (burning).--But, the opponent rejoins, burning is a pain, and\nas such can affect an intelligent being only, not the non-intelligent\nbody; for if it were an affection of the mere body, it would, on the\ndestruction of the body, cease of itself, so that it would be needless\nto seek for means to make it cease.--But it is likewise not observed, we\nreply, that a mere intelligent being destitute of a body is burned and\nsuffers pain.--Nor would you (the Sa@nkhya) also assume that the\naffection called burning belongs to a mere intelligent being. Nor can\nyou admit[340] a real connexion of the soul and the body, because\nthrough such a connexion impurity and similar imperfections would attach\nto the soul[341]. Nor can suffering itself be said to suffer. And how\nthen, we ask, can you explain the relation existing between a sufferer\nand the causes of suffering? If (as a last refuge) you should maintain\nthat the sattva-gu/n/a is that which suffers, and the gu/n/a called\npassion that which causes suffering, we again object, because the\nintelligent principle (the soul) cannot be really connected with these\ntwo[342]. And if you should say that the soul suffers as it were because\nit leans towards[343] the sattva-gu/n/a, we point out that the\nemployment of the phrase, 'as it were,' shows that the soul does not\nreally suffer.\n\nIf it is understood that its suffering is not real, we do not object to\nthe phrase 'as it were[344].' For the amphisbena also does not become\nvenomous because it is 'a serpent as it were' ('like a serpent'), nor\ndoes the serpent lose its venom because it is 'like an amphisbena.' You\nmust therefore admit that the relation of causes of suffering and of\nsufferers is not real, but the effect of Nescience. And if you admit,\nthat, then my (the Vedantic) doctrine also is free from objections[345].\n\nBut perhaps you (the Sa@nkhya) will say that, after all, suffering (on\nthe part of the soul) is real[346]. In that case, however, the\nimpossibility of release is all the more undeniable[347], especially as\nthe cause of suffering (viz. the pradhana) is admitted to be\neternal.--And if (to get out of this difficulty) you maintain that,\nalthough the potentialities of suffering (on the part of the soul) and\nof causing suffering (on the part of the pradhana) are eternal, yet\nsuffering, in order to become actual, requires the conjunction of the\ntwo--which conjunction in its turn depends on a special reason, viz. the\nnon-discrimination of the pradhana by the soul--and that hence, when\nthat reason no longer exists, the conjunction of the two comes to an\nabsolute termination, whereby the absolute release of the soul becomes\npossible; we are again unable to accept your explanation, because that\non which the non-discrimination depends, viz. the gu/n/a, called\nDarkness, is acknowledged by you to be eternal.\n\nAnd as[348] there is no fixed rule for the (successive) rising and\nsinking of the influence of the particular gu/n/as, there is also no\nfixed rule for the termination of the cause which effects the\nconjunction of soul and pradhana (i.e. non-discrimination); hence the\ndisjunction of the two is uncertain, and so the Sa@nkhyas cannot escape\nthe reproach of absence of final release resulting from their doctrine.\nTo the Vedantin, on the other hand, the idea of final release being\nimpossible cannot occur in his dreams even; for the Self he acknowledges\nto be one only, and one thing cannot enter into the relation of subject\nand object, and Scripture, moreover, declares that the plurality of\neffects originates from speech only. For the phenomenal world, on the\nother hand, we may admit the relation of sufferer and suffering just as\nit is observed, and need neither object to it nor refute it.\n\nHerewith we have refuted the doctrine which holds the pradhana to be the\ncause of the world. We have now to dispose of the atomic theory.\n\nWe begin by refuting an objection raised by the atomists against the\nupholders of Brahman.--The Vai/s/eshikas argue as follows: The qualities\nwhich inhere in the substance constituting the cause originate qualities\nof the same kind in the substance constituting the effect; we see, for\ninstance, that from white threads white cloth is produced, but do not\nobserve what is contrary (viz. white threads resulting in a piece of\ncloth of a different colour). Hence, if the intelligent Brahman is\nassumed as the cause of the world, we should expect to find intelligence\ninherent in the effect also, viz. the world. But this is not the case,\nand consequently the intelligent Brahman cannot be the cause of the\nworld.--This reasoning the Sutrakara shows to be fallacious, on the\nground of the system of the Vai/s/eshikas themselves.\n\nII. Or (the world may originate from Brahman) as the great and the long\noriginate from the short and the atomic.\n\nThe system of the Vai/s/eshikas is the following:--The atoms which\npossess, according to their special kind[349], the qualities of colour,\n&c., and which are of spherical form[350], subsist during a certain\nperiod[351] without producing any effects[352]. After that, the unseen\nprinciple (ad/ri/sh/ta/), &c.[353], acting as operative causes and\nconjunction constituting the non-inherent cause[354], they produce the\nentire aggregate of effected things, beginning with binary atomic\ncompounds. At the same time the qualities of the causes (i.e. of the\nsimple atoms) produce corresponding qualities in the effects. Thus, when\ntwo atoms produce a binary atomic compound, the special qualities\nbelonging to the simple atoms, such as white colour, &c., produce a\ncorresponding white colour in the binary compound. One special quality,\nhowever, of the simple atoms, viz. atomic sphericity, does not produce\ncorresponding sphericity in the binary compound; for the forms of\nextension belonging to the latter are said to be minuteness (a/n/utva)\nand shortness. And, again, when two binary compounds combining produce a\nquaternary atomic compound, the qualities, such as whiteness, &c.,\ninherent in the binary compounds produce corresponding qualities in the\nquaternary compounds; with the exception, however, of the two qualities\nof minuteness and shortness. For it is admitted that the forms of\nextension belonging to quaternary compounds are not minuteness and\nshortness, but bigness (mahattva) and length. The same happens[355] when\nmany simple atoms or many binary compounds or a simple atom and a binary\ncompound combine to produce new effects.\n\nWell, then, we say, just as from spherical atoms binary compounds are\nproduced, which are minute and short, and ternary compounds which are\nbig and long, but not anything spherical; or as from binary compounds,\nwhich are minute and short, ternary compounds, &c., are produced which\nare big and long, not minute and short; so this non-intelligent world\nmay spring from the intelligent Brahman. This is a doctrine to which\nyou--the Vai/s/eshika--cannot, on your own principles, object.\n\nHere the Vai/s/eshika will perhaps come forward with the following\nargumentation[356]. As effected substances, such as binary compounds and\nso on, are engrossed by forms of extension contrary to that of the\ncausal substances, the forms of extension belonging to the latter, viz.\nsphericity and so on, cannot produce similar qualities in the effects.\nThe world, on the other hand, is not engrossed by any quality contrary\nto intelligence owing to which the intelligence inherent in the cause\nshould not be able to originate a new intelligence in the effect. For\nnon-intelligence is not a quality contrary to intelligence, but merely\nits negation. As thus the case of sphericity is not an exactly parallel\none, intelligence may very well produce an effect similar to itself.\n\nThis argumentation, we rejoin, is not sound. Just as the qualities of\nsphericity and so on, although existing in the cause, do not produce\ncorresponding effects, so it is with intelligence also; so that the two\ncases are parallel so far. Nor can the circumstance of the effects being\nengrossed by a different form of extension be alleged as the reason of\nsphericity, &c. not originating qualities similar to themselves; for the\npower of originating effects belongs to sphericity, &c. before another\nform of extension begins to exist. For it is admitted that the substance\nproduced remains for a moment devoid of qualities, and that thereupon\nonly (i.e. after that moment) its qualities begin to exist. Nor, again,\ncan it be said that sphericity, &c. concentrate their activity on\noriginating other forms of extension[357], and therefore do not\noriginate forms of extension belonging to the same class as their own;\nfor it is admitted that the origin of other forms is due to other\ncauses; as the Sutras of Ka/n/abhuj (Ka/n/ada) themselves declare\n(Vai/s/. Sut. VII, 1, 9, 'Bigness is produced from plurality inherent in\nthe causes, from bigness of the cause and from a kind of accumulation;'\nVII, 1, 10, 'The contrary of this (the big) is the minute;' VII, 1, 17,\n'Thereby length and shortness are explained[358]').--Nor, again, can it\nbe said that plurality, &c. inherent in the cause originate (like\neffects) in consequence of some peculiar proximity (in which they are\nsupposed to stand to the effected substance), while sphericity, &c. (not\nstanding in a like proximity) do not; for when a new substance or a new\nquality is originated, all the qualities of the cause stand in the same\nrelation of inherence to their abode (i.e. the causal substance in which\nthey inhere). For these reasons the fact of sphericity, &c. not\noriginating like effects can be explained from the essential nature of\nsphericity, &c. only, and the same may therefore be maintained with\nregard to intelligence[359].\n\nMoreover, from that observed fact also, that from conjunction\n(sa/m/yoga) there originate substances, &c. belonging to a class\ndifferent (from that to which conjunction itself belongs), it follows\nthat the doctrine of effects belonging to the same class as the causes\nfrom which they spring is too wide. If you remark against this last\nargument that, as we have to do at present with a substance (viz.\nBrahman), it is inappropriate to instance a quality (viz. conjunction)\nas a parallel case; we point out that at present we only wish to explain\nthe origination of effects belonging to a different class in general.\nNor is there any reason for the restriction that substances only are to\nbe adduced as examples for substances, and qualities only for qualities.\nYour own Sutrakara adduces a quality as furnishing a parallel case for a\nsubstance (Vai/s/. Sut. IV, 2, 2, 'On account of the conjunction of\nthings perceptible and things imperceptible being imperceptible the body\nis not composed of five elements'). Just as the conjunction which\ninheres in the perceptible earth and the imperceptible ether is not\nperceptible, the body also, if it had for its inherent cause the five\nelements which are part of them perceptible, part of them imperceptible,\nwould itself be imperceptible; but, as a matter of fact, it is\nperceptible; hence it is not composed of the five elements. Here\nconjunction is a quality and the body a substance.--The origin of\neffects different in nature (from the cause) has, moreover, been already\ntreated of under II, 1; 6.--Well then, this being so, the matter has\nbeen settled there already (why then is it again discussed\nhere?)-Because, we reply, there we argued against the Sa@nkhya, and at\npresent we have to do with the Vai/s/eshika.--But, already once, before\n(II, 1, 3) a line of argument equally applicable to a second case was\nsimply declared to extend to the latter also; (why then do you not\nsimply state now that the arguments used to defeat the Sa@nkhya are\nequally valid against the Vai/s/eshika?)--Because here, we reply, at the\nbeginning of the examination of the Vai/s/eshika system we prefer to\ndiscuss the point with arguments specially adapted to the doctrine of\nthe Vai/s/eshikas.\n\n12. In both cases also (in the cases of the ad/ri/sh/t/a inhering either\nin the atoms or the soul) action (of the atoms) is not (possible); hence\nabsence of that (viz. creation and pralaya).\n\nThe Sutrakara now proceeds to refute the doctrine of atoms being the\ncause of the world.--This doctrine arises in the following manner. We\nsee that all ordinary substances which consist of parts as, for\ninstance, pieces of cloth originate from the substances connected with\nthem by the relation of inherence, as for instance threads, conjunction\nco-operating (with the parts to form the whole). We thence draw the\ngeneral conclusion that whatever consists of parts has originated from\nthose substances with which it is connected by the relation of\ninherence, conjunction cooperating. That thing now at which the\ndistinction of whole and parts stops and which marks the limit of\ndivision into minuter parts is the atom.--This whole world, with its\nmountains, oceans, and so on, is composed of parts; because it is\ncomposed of parts it has a beginning and an end[360]; an effect may not\nbe assumed without a cause; therefore the atoms are the cause of the\nworld. Such is Ka/n/ada's doctrine.--As we observe four elementary\nsubstances consisting of parts, viz. earth, water, fire, and air (wind),\nwe have to assume four different kinds of atoms. These atoms marking the\nlimit of subdivision into minuter parts cannot be divided themselves;\nhence when the elements are destroyed they can be divided down to atoms\nonly; this state of atomic division of the elements constitutes the\npralaya (the periodical destruction of the world). After that when the\ntime for creation comes, motion (karman) springs up in the aerial atoms.\nThis motion which is due to the unseen principle[361] joins the atom in\nwhich it resides to another atom; thus binary compounds, &c. are\nproduced, and finally the element of air. In a like manner are produced\nfire, water, earth, the body with its organs. Thus the whole world\noriginates from atoms. From the qualities inhering in the atoms the\nqualities belonging to the binary compounds are produced, just as the\nqualities of the cloth result from the qualities of the threads.--Such,\nin short, is the teaching of the followers of Ka/n/ada.\n\nThis doctrine we controvert in the following manner.--It must be\nadmitted that the atoms when they are in a state of isolation require\naction (motion) to bring about their conjunction; for we observe that\nthe conjunction of threads and the like is effected by action. Action\nagain, which is itself an effect, requires some operative cause by which\nit is brought about; for unless some such cause exists, no original\nmotion can take place in the atoms. If, then, some operative cause is\nassumed, we may, in the first place, assume some cause analogous to seen\ncauses, such as endeavour or impact. But in that case original motion\ncould not occur at all in the atoms, since causes of that kind are, at\nthe time, impossible. For in the pralaya state endeavour, which is a\nquality of the soul, cannot take place because no body exists then. For\nthe quality of the soul called endeavour originates when the soul is\nconnected with the internal organ which abides in the body. The same\nreason precludes the assumption of other seen causes such as impact and\nthe like. For they all are possible only after the creation of the world\nhas taken place, and cannot therefore be the causes of the original\naction (by which the world is produced).--If, in the second place, the\nunseen principle is assumed as the cause of the original motion of the\natoms, we ask: Is this unseen principle to be considered as inhering in\nthe soul or in the atom? In both cases it cannot be the cause of motion\nin the atoms, because it is non-intelligent. For, as we have shown above\nin our examination of the Sa@nkhya system, a non-intelligent thing which\nis not directed by an intelligent principle cannot of itself either act\nor be the cause of action, and the soul cannot be the guiding principle\nof the ad/ri/sh/t/a because at the time of pralaya its intelligence has\nnot yet arisen[362]. If, on the other hand, the unseen principle is\nsupposed to inhere in the soul, it cannot be the cause of motion in the\natoms, because there exists no connexion of it with the latter. If you\nsay that the soul in which the unseen principle inheres is connected\nwith the atoms, then there would result, from the continuity of\nconnexion[363], continuity of action, as there is no other restricting\nprinciple.--Hence, there being no definite cause of action, original\naction cannot take place in the atoms; there being no action,\nconjunction of the atoms which depends on action cannot take place;\nthere being no conjunction, all the effects depending on it, viz. the\nformation of binary atomic compounds, &c., cannot originate.\n\nHow, moreover, is the conjunction of one atom with another to be\nimagined? Is it to be total interpenetration of the two or partial\nconjunction? If the former, then no increase of bulk could take place,\nand consequently atomic size only would exist; moreover, it would be\ncontrary to what is observed, as we see that conjunction takes place\nbetween substances having parts (prade/s/a). If the latter, it would\nfollow that the atoms are composed of parts.--Let then the atoms be\nimagined to consist of parts.--If so, imagined things being unreal, the\nconjunction also of the atoms would be unreal and thus could not be the\nnon-inherent cause of real things. And without non-inherent causes\neffected substances such as binary compounds, &c. could not originate.\nAnd just as at the time of the first creation motion of the atoms\nleading to their conjunction could not take place, there being no cause\nof such motion; thus at the time of a general pralaya also no action\ncould take place leading to their separation, since for that occurrence\nalso no definite seen cause could be alleged. Nor could the unseen\nprinciple be adduced as the cause, since its purport is to effect\nenjoyment (of reward and punishment on the part of the soul), not to\nbring about the pralaya. There being then no possibility of action to\neffect either the conjunction or the separation of the atoms, neither\nconjunction nor separation would actually take place, and hence neither\ncreation nor pralaya of the world.--For these reasons the doctrine of\nthe atoms being the cause of the world must be rejected.\n\n13. And because in consequence of samavaya being admitted a regressus in\ninfinitum results from parity of reasoning.\n\nYou (the Vai/s/eshika) admit that a binary compound which originates\nfrom two atoms, while absolutely different from them, is connected with\nthem by the relation of inherence; but on that assumption the doctrine\nof the atoms being the general cause cannot be established, 'because\nparity involves here a retrogressus ad infinitum.' For just as a binary\ncompound which is absolutely different from the two constituent atoms is\nconnected with them by means of the relation of inherence (samavaya), so\nthe relation of inherence itself being absolutely different from the two\nthings which it connects, requires another relation of inherence to\nconnect it with them, there being absolute difference in both cases. For\nthis second relation of inherence again, a third relation of inherence\nwould have to be assumed and so on ad infinitum.--But--the Vai/s/eshika\nis supposed to reply--we are conscious of the so-called samavaya\nrelation as eternally connected with the things between which it exists,\nnot as either non-connected with them or as depending on another\nconnexion; we are therefore not obliged to assume another connexion, and\nagain another, and so on, and thus to allow ourselves to be driven into\na regressus in infinitum.--Your defence is unavailing, we reply, for it\nwould involve the admission that conjunction (sa/m/yoga) also as being\neternally connected with the things which it joins does, like samavaya,\nnot require another connexion[364]. If you say that conjunction does\nrequire another connexion because it is a different thing[365] we reply\nthat then samavaya also requires another connexion because it is\nlikewise a different thing. Nor can you say that conjunction does\nrequire another connexion because it is a quality (gu/n/a), and samavaya\ndoes not because it is not a quality; for (in spite of this difference)\nthe reason for another connexion being required is the same in both\ncases[366], and not that which is technically called 'quality' is the\ncause (of another connexion being required)[367].--For these reasons\nthose who acknowledge samavaya to be a separate existence are driven\ninto a regressus in infinitum, in consequence of which, the\nimpossibility of one term involving the impossibility of the entire\nseries, not even the origination of a binary compound from two atoms can\nbe accounted for.--For this reason also the atomic doctrine is\ninadmissible.\n\n14. And on account of the permanent existence (of activity or\nnon-activity).\n\nMoreover, the atoms would have to be assumed as either essentially\nactive (moving) or essentially non-active, or both or neither; there\nbeing no fifth alternative. But none of the four alternatives stated is\npossible. If they were essentially active, their activity would be\npermanent so that no pralaya could take place. If they were essentially\nnon-active, their non-activity would be permanent, and no creation could\ntake place. Their being both is impossible because self-contradictory.\nIf they were neither, their activity and non-activity would have to\ndepend on an operative cause, and then the operative causes such as the\nad/ri/sh/t/a being in permanent proximity to the atoms, permanent\nactivity would result; or else the ad/ri/sh/t/a and so on not being\ntaken as operative causes, the consequence would be permanent\nnon-activity on the part of the atoms.--For this reason also the atomic\ndoctrine is untenable.\n\n15. And on account of the atoms having colour, &c., the reverse (of the\nVai/s/eshika tenet would take place); as thus it is observed.\n\nLet us suppose, the Vai/s/eshikas say, all substances composed of parts\nto be disintegrated into their parts; a limit will finally be reached\nbeyond which the process of disintegration cannot be continued. What\nconstitutes that limit are the atoms, which are eternal (permanent),\nbelong to four different classes, possess the qualities of colour, &c.,\nand are the originating principles of this whole material world with its\ncolour, form, and other qualities.\n\nThis fundamental assumption of the Vai/s/eshikas we declare to be\ngroundless because from the circumstance of the atoms having colour and\nother qualities there would follow the contrary of atomic minuteness and\npermanency, i.e. it would follow that, compared to the ultimate cause,\nthey are gross and non-permanent. For ordinary experience teaches that\nwhatever things possess colour and other qualities are, compared to\ntheir cause, gross and non-permanent. A piece of cloth, for instance, is\ngross compared to the threads of which it consists, and non permanent;\nand the threads again are non-permanent and gross compared to the\nfilaments of which they are made up. Therefore the atoms also which the\nVai/s/eshikas admit to have colour, &c. must have causes compared to\nwhich they are gross and non-permanent. Hence that reason also which\nKa/n/ada gives for the permanence of the atoms (IV, 1, 1, 'that which\nexists without having a cause is permanent') does not apply at all to\nthe atoms because, as we have shown just now, the atoms are to be\nconsidered as having a cause.--The second reason also which Ka/n/ada\nbrings forward for the permanency of the atoms, viz. in IV, 1, 4, 'the\nspecial negation implied in the term non-eternal would not be\npossible[368]' (if there did not exist something eternal, viz. the\natoms), does not necessarily prove the permanency of the atoms; for\nsupposing that there exists not any permanent thing, the formation of a\nnegative compound such as 'non-eternal' is impossible. Nor does the\nexistence of the word 'non-permanent' absolutely presuppose the\npermanency of atoms; for there exists (as we Vedantins maintain) another\npermanent ultimate Cause, viz. Brahman. Nor can the existence of\nanything be established merely on the ground of a word commonly being\nused in that sense, since there is room for common use only if word and\nmatter are well-established by some other means of right knowledge.--The\nthird reason also given in the Vai/s/. Sutras (IV, 1, 5) for the\npermanency of the atoms ('and Nescience') is unavailing. For if we\nexplain that Sutra to mean 'the non-perception of those actually\nexisting causes whose effects are seen is Nescience,' it would follow\nthat the binary atomic compounds also are permanent[369]. And if we\ntried to escape from that difficulty by including (in the explanation of\nthe Sutra as given above) the qualification 'there being absence of\n(originating) substances,' then nothing else but the absence of a cause\nwould furnish the reason for the permanency of the atoms, and as that\nreason had already been mentioned before (in IV, 1, 1) the Sutra IV, 1,\n5 would be a useless restatement.--Well, then (the Vai/s/eshika might\nsay), let us understand by 'Nescience' (in the Sutra) the impossibility\nof conceiving a third reason of the destruction (of effects), in\naddition to the division of the causal substance into its parts, and the\ndestruction of the causal substance; which impossibility involves the\npermanency of the atoms[370].--There is no necessity, we reply, for\nassuming that a thing when perishing must perish on account of either of\nthose two reasons. That assumption would indeed have to be made if it\nwere generally admitted that a new substance is produced only by the\nconjunction of several causal substances. But if it is admitted that a\ncausal substance may originate a new substance by passing over into a\nqualified state after having previously existed free from\nqualifications, in its pure generality, it follows that the effected\nsubstance may be destroyed by its solidity being dissolved, just as the\nhardness of ghee is dissolved by the action of fire[371].--Thus there\nwould result, from the circumstance of the atoms having colour, &c., the\nopposite of what the Vai/s/eshikas mean. For this reason also the atomic\ndoctrine cannot be maintained.\n\n16. And as there are difficulties in both cases.\n\nEarth has the qualities of smell, taste, colour, and touch, and is\ngross; water has colour, taste, and touch, and is fine; fire has colour\nand touch, and is finer yet; air is finest of all, and has the quality\nof touch only. The question now arises whether the atoms constituting\nthe four elements are to be assumed to possess the same greater or\nsmaller number of qualities as the respective elements.--Either\nassumption leads to unacceptable consequences. For if we assume that\nsome kinds of atoms have more numerous qualities, it follows that their\nsolid size (murti) will be increased thereby, and that implies their\nbeing atoms no longer. That an increase of qualities cannot take place\nwithout a simultaneous increase of size we infer from our observations\nconcerning effected material bodies.--If, on the other hand, we assume,\nin order to save the equality of atoms of all kinds, that there is no\ndifference in the number of their qualities, we must either suppose that\nthey have all one quality only; but in that case we should not perceive\ntouch in fire nor colour and touch in water, nor taste, colour, and\ntouch in earth, since the qualities of the effects have for their\nantecedents the qualities of the causes. Or else we must suppose all\natoms to have all the four qualities; but in that case we should\nnecessarily perceive what we actually do not perceive, viz. smell in\nwater, smell and taste in fire, smell, taste, and colour in air.--Hence\non this account also the atomic doctrine shows itself to be\nunacceptable.\n\n17. And as the (atomic theory) is not accepted (by any authoritative\npersons) it is to be disregarded altogether.\n\nWhile the theory of the pradhana being the cause of the world has been\naccepted by some adherents of the Veda--as, for instance, Manu--with a\nview to the doctrines of the effect existing in the cause already, and\nso on, the atomic doctrine has not been accepted by any persons of\nauthority in any of its parts, and therefore is to be disregarded\nentirely by all those who take their stand on the Veda.\n\nThere are, moreover, other objections to the Vai/s/eshika doctrine.--The\nVai/s/eshikas assume six categories, which constitute the subject-matter\nof their system, viz. substance, quality, action, generality,\nparticularity, and inherence. These six categories they maintain to be\nabsolutely different from each other, and to have different\ncharacteristics; just as a man, a horse, a hare differ from one another.\nSide by side with this assumption they make another which contradicts\nthe former one, viz. that quality, action, &c. have the attribute of\ndepending on substance. But that is altogether inappropriate; for just\nas ordinary things, such as animals, grass, trees, and the like, being\nabsolutely different from each other do not depend on each other, so the\nqualities, &c. also being absolutely different from substance, cannot\ndepend on the latter. Or else let the qualities, &c. depend on\nsubstance; then it follows that, as they are present where substance is\npresent, and absent where it is absent, substance only exists, and,\naccording to its various forms, becomes the object of different terms\nand conceptions (such as quality, action, &c.); just as Devadatta, for\ninstance, according to the conditions in which he finds himself is the\nobject of various conceptions and names. But this latter alternative\nwould involve the acceptation of the Sa@nkhya doctrine[372] and the\nabandonment of the Vai/s/eshika standpoint.--But (the Vai/s/eshika may\nsay) smoke also is different from fire and yet it is dependent on\nit.--True, we reply; but we ascertain the difference of smoke and fire\nfrom the fact of their being apperceived in separation. Substance and\nquality, on the other hand, are not so apperceived; for when we are\nconscious of a white blanket, or a red cow, or a blue lotus, the\nsubstance is in each case cognised by means of the quality; the latter\ntherefore has its Self in the substance. The same reasoning applies to\naction, generality, particularity, and inherence.\n\nIf you (the Vai/s/eshika) say that qualities, actions, &c. (although not\nnon-different from substances) may yet depend on the latter because\nsubstances and qualities stand in the relation of one not being able to\nexist without the other (ayutasiddhi[373]); we point out that things\nwhich are ayutasiddha must either be non-separate in place, or\nnon-separate in time, or non-separate in nature, and that none of these\nalternatives agrees with Vai/s/eshika principles. For the first\nalternative contradicts your own assumptions according to which the\ncloth originating from the threads occupies the place of the threads\nonly, not that of the cloth, while the qualities of the cloth, such as\nits white colour, occupy the place of the cloth only, not that of the\nthreads. So the Vai/s/eshika-sutras say (I, 1, 10), 'Substances\noriginate another substance and qualities another quality.' The threads\nwhich constitute the causal substance originate the effected substance,\nviz. the cloth, and the qualities of the threads, such as white colour,\n&c., produce in the cloth new corresponding qualities. But this doctrine\nis clearly contradicted by the assumption of substance and quality being\nnon-separate in place.--If, in the second place, you explain\nayutasiddhatva as non-separation in time, it follows also that, for\ninstance, the right and the left horn of a cow would be\nayutasiddha.--And if, finally, you explain it to mean 'non-separation in\ncharacter,' it is impossible to make any further distinction between the\nsubstance and the quality, as then quality is conceived as being\nidentical with substance.\n\nMoreover, the distinction which the Vai/s/eshikas make between\nconjunction (sa/m/yoga) as being the connexion of things which can exist\nseparately, and inherence (samavaya) as being the connexion of things\nwhich are incapable of separate existence is futile, since the cause\nwhich exists before the effect[374] cannot be said to be incapable of\nseparate existence. Perhaps the Vai/s/eshika will say that his\ndefinition refers to one of the two terms only, so that samavaya is the\nconnexion, with the cause, of the effect which is incapable of separate\nexistence. But this also is of no avail; for as a connexion requires two\nterms, the effect as long as it has not yet entered into being cannot be\nconnected with the cause. And it would be equally unavailing to say that\nthe effect enters into the connexion after it has begun to exist; for if\nthe Vai/s/eshika admits that the effect may exist previous to its\nconnexion with the cause, it is no longer ayutasiddha (incapable of\nseparate existence), and thereby the principle that between effect and\ncause conjunction and disjunction do not take place is violated.[375]\nAnd[376] just as conjunction, and not samavaya, is the connexion in\nwhich every effected substance as soon as it has been produced stands\nwith the all-pervading substances as ether, &c.--although no motion has\ntaken place on the part of the effected substance--so also the connexion\nof the effect with the cause will be conjunction merely, not samavaya.\n\nNor is there any proof for the existence of any connexion, samavaya or\nsa/m/yoga, apart from the things which it connects. If it should be\nmaintained that sa/m/yoga and samavaya have such an existence because we\nobserve that there are names and ideas of them in addition to the names\nand ideas of the things connected, we point out that one and the same\nthing may be the subject of several names and ideas if it is considered\nin its relations to what lies without it. Devadatta although being one\nonly forms the object of many different names and notions according as\nhe is considered in himself or in his relations to others; thus he is\nthought and spoken of as man, Brahma/n/a learned in the Veda, generous,\nboy, young man, father, grandson, brother, son-in-law, &c. So, again,\none and the same stroke is, according to the place it is connected with,\nspoken of and conceived as meaning either ten, or hundred, or thousand,\n&c. Analogously, two connected things are not only conceived and denoted\nas connected things, but in addition constitute the object of the ideas\nand terms 'conjunction' or 'inherence' which however do not prove\nthemselves to be separate entities.--Things standing thus, the\nnon-existence of separate entities (conjunction, &c.), which entities\nwould have to be established on the ground of perception, follows from\nthe fact of their non-perception.--Nor, again[377], does the\ncircumstance of the word and idea of connexion having for its object the\nthings connected involve the connexion's permanent existence, since we\nhave already shown above that one thing may, on account of its relations\nto other things, be conceived and denoted in different ways.\n\nFurther[378], conjunction cannot take place between the atoms, the soul,\nand the internal organ, because they have no parts; for we observe that\nconjunction takes place only of such substances as consist of parts. If\nthe Vai/s/eshika should say that parts of the atoms, soul and mind may\nbe assumed (in order to explain their alleged conjunction), we remark\nthat the assumption of actually non-existing things would involve the\nresult that anything might be established; for there is no restrictive\nrule that only such and such non-existing things--whether contradictory\nto reason or not--should be assumed and not any other, and assumptions\ndepend on one's choice only and may be carried to any extent. If we once\nallow assumptions, there is no reason why there should not be assumed a\nfurther hundred or thousand things, in addition to the six categories\nassumed by the Vai/s/eshikas. Anybody might then assume anything, and we\ncould neither stop a compassionate man from assuming that this\ntransmigratory world which is the cause of so much misery to living\nbeings is not to be, nor a malicious man from assuming that even the\nreleased souls are to enter on a new cycle of existences.\n\nFurther, it is not possible that a binary atomic compound, which\nconsists of parts, should be connected with the simple indivisible atoms\nby an intimate connexion (sa/ms/lesha) any more than they can thus be\nconnected with ether; for between ether and earth, &c. there does not\nexist that kind of intimate connexion which exists, for instance,\nbetween wood and varnish[379].\n\nLet it then be said (the Vai/s/eshika resumes) that the samavaya\nrelation must be assumed, because otherwise the relation of that which\nabides and that which forms the abode--which relation actually exists\nbetween the effected substance and the causal substance--is not\npossible.--That would, we reply, involve the vice of mutual dependence;\nfor only when the separateness of cause and effect is established, the\nrelation of the abode and that which abides can be established; and only\nwhen the latter relation is established, the relation of separateness\ncan be established. For the Vedantins acknowledge neither the\nseparateness of cause and effect, nor their standing to each other in\nthe relation of abode and thing abiding, since according to their\ndoctrine the effect is only a certain state of the\ncause[380].--Moreover, as the atoms are limited (not of infinite\nextension), they must in reality consist of as many parts as we\nacknowledge regions of space[381], whether those be six or eight or ten,\nand consequently they cannot be permanent; conclusions contrary to the\nVai/s/eshika doctrine of the indivisibility and permanency of the\natoms.--If the Vai/s/eshika replies that those very parts which are\nowing to the existence of the different regions of space are his\n(indestructible) atoms; we deny that because all things whatever,\nforming a series of substances of ever-increasing minuteness, are\ncapable of dissolution, until the highest cause (Brahman) is reached.\nEarth--which is, in comparison with a binary compound, the grossest\nthing of all--undergoes decomposition; so do the substances following\nnext which belong to the same class as earth; so does the binary\ncompound; and so does, finally, the atom which (although the minutest\nthing of all) still belongs to the same general class (i.e. matter) with\nearth, &c. The objection (which the Vai/s/eshika might possibly raise\nhere again) that things can be decomposed only by the separation of\ntheir parts[382], we have already disposed of above, where we pointed\nout that decomposition may take place in a manner analogous to the\nmelting of ghee. Just as the hardness of ghee, gold, and the like, is\ndestroyed in consequence of those substances being rendered liquid by\ntheir contact with fire, no separation of the parts taking place all the\nwhile; so the solid shape of the atoms also may be decomposed by their\npassing back into the indifferenced condition of the highest cause. In\nthe same way the origination of effects also is brought about not merely\nin the way of conjunction of parts; for we see that milk, for instance,\nand water originate effects such as sour milk and ice without there\ntaking place any conjunction of parts.\n\nIt thus appears that the atomic doctrine is supported by very weak\narguments only, is opposed to those scriptural passages which declare\nthe Lord to be the general cause, and is not accepted by any of the\nauthorities taking their stand on Scripture, such as Manu and others.\nHence it is to be altogether disregarded by highminded men who have a\nregard for their own spiritual welfare.\n\n18. (If there be assumed) the (dyad of) aggregates with its two causes,\n(there takes place) non-establishment of those (two aggregates).\n\nThe reasons on account of which the doctrine of the Vai/s/eshikas cannot\nbe accepted have been stated above. That doctrine may be called\nsemi-destructive (or semi-nihilistic[383]). That the more thorough\ndoctrine which teaches universal non-permanency is even less worthy of\nbeing taken into consideration, we now proceed to show.\n\nThat doctrine is presented in a variety of forms, due either to the\ndifference of the views (maintained by Buddha at different times), or\nelse to the difference of capacity on the part of the disciples (of\nBuddha). Three principal opinions may, however, be distinguished; the\nopinion of those who maintain the reality of everything (Realists,\nsarvastitvavadin); the opinion of those who maintain that thought only\nis real (Idealists, vij/n/anavadin); and the opinion of those who\nmaintain that everything is void (unreal; Nihilists,\n/s/unyavadin[384]).--We first controvert those who maintain that\neverything, external as well as internal, is real. What is external is\neither element (bhuta) or elementary (bhautika); what is internal is\neither mind (/k/itta) or mental (/k/aitta). The elements are earth,\nwater, and so on; elemental are colour, &c. on the one hand, and the eye\nand the other sense-organs on the other hand. Earth and the other three\nelements arise from the aggregation of the four different kinds of\natoms; the atoms of earth being hard, those of water viscid, those of\nfire hot, those of air mobile.:--The inward world consists of the five\nso-called 'groups' (skandha), the group of sensation (rupaskandha), the\ngroup of knowledge (vij/n/anaskandha), the group of feeling\n(vedanaskandha), the group of verbal knowledge (samj/n/askandha), and\nthe group of impressions (sa/m/skaraskandha)[385]; which taken together\nconstitute the basis of all personal existence[386].\n\nWith reference to this doctrine we make the following remarks.--Those\ntwo aggregates, constituting two different classes, and having two\ndifferent causes which the Bauddhas assume, viz. the aggregate of the\nelements and elementary things whose cause the atoms are, and the\naggregate of the five skandhas whose cause the skandhas are, cannot, on\nBauddha principles, be established, i.e. it cannot be explained how the\naggregates are brought about. For the parts constituting the (material)\naggregates are devoid of intelligence, and the kindling (abhijvalana) of\nintelligence depends on an aggregate of atoms having been brought about\npreviously[387]. And the Bauddhas do not admit any other permanent\nintelligent being, such as either an enjoying soul or a ruling Lord,\nwhich could effect the aggregation of the atoms. Nor can the atoms and\nskandhas be assumed to enter on activity on their own account; for that\nwould imply their never ceasing to be active[388]. Nor can the cause of\naggregation be looked for in the so-called abode (i.e. the\nalayavij/n/ana-pravaha, the train of self-cognitions); for the latter\nmust be described either as different from the single cognitions or as\nnot different from them. (In the former case it is either permanent, and\nthen it is nothing else but the permanent soul of the Vedantins; or\nnon-permanent;) then being admitted to be momentary merely, it cannot\nexercise any influence and cannot therefore be the cause of the motion\nof the atoms[389]. (And in the latter case we are not further advanced\nthan before.)--For all these reasons the formation of aggregates cannot\nbe accounted for. But without aggregates there would be an end of the\nstream of mundane existence which presupposes those aggregates.\n\n19. If it be said that (the formation of aggregates may be explained)\nthrough (Nescience, &c.) standing in the relation of mutual causality;\nwe say 'No,' because they merely are the efficient causes of the origin\n(of the immediately subsequent links).\n\nAlthough there exists no permanent intelligent principle of the nature\neither of a ruling Lord or an enjoying soul, under whose influence the\nformation of aggregates could take place, yet the course of mundane\nexistence is rendered possible through the mutual causality[390] of\nNescience and so on, so that we need not look for any other combining\nprinciple.\n\nThe series beginning with Nescience comprises the following members:\nNescience, impression, knowledge, name and form, the abode of the six,\ntouch, feeling, desire, activity, birth, species, decay, death, grief,\nlamentation, pain, mental affliction, and the like[391]. All these terms\nconstitute a chain of causes and are as such spoken of in the Bauddha\nsystem, sometimes cursorily, sometimes at length. They are, moreover,\nall acknowledged as existing, not by the Bauddhas only, but by the\nfollowers of all systems. And as the cycles of Nescience, &c. forming\nuninterrupted chains of causes and effects revolve unceasingly like\nwater-wheels, the existence of the aggregates (which constitute bodies\nand minds) must needs be assumed, as without such Nescience and so on\ncould not take place.\n\nThis argumentation of the Bauddha we are unable to accept, because it\nmerely assigns efficient causes for the origination of the members of\nthe series, but does not intimate an efficient cause for the formation\nof the aggregates. If the Bauddha reminds us of the statement made above\nthat the existence of aggregates must needs be inferred from the\nexistence of Nescience and so on, we point out that, if he means thereby\nthat Nescience and so on cannot exist without aggregates and hence\nrequire the existence of such, it remains to assign an efficient cause\nfor the formation of the aggregates. But, as we have already shown--when\nexamining the Vaijeshika doctrine--that the formation of aggregates\ncannot be accounted for even on the assumption of permanent atoms and\nindividual souls in which the ad/ri/sh/t/a abides[392]; how much less\nthen are aggregates possible if there exist only momentary atoms not\nconnected with enjoying souls and devoid of abodes (i.e. souls), and\nthat which abides in them (the ad/ri/sh/t/a).--Let us then assume (the\nBauddha says) that Nescience, &c. themselves are the efficient cause of\nthe aggregate.--But how--we ask--can they be the cause of that without\nwhich--as their abode--they themselves are not capable of existence?\nPerhaps you will say that in the eternal sa/m/sara the aggregates\nsucceed one another in an unbroken chain, and hence also Nescience, and\nso on, which abide in those aggregates. But in that case you will have\nto assume either that each aggregate necessarily produces another\naggregate of the same kind, or that, without any settled rule, it may\nproduce either a like or an unlike one. In the former case a human body\ncould never pass over into that of a god or an animal or a being of the\ninfernal regions; in the latter case a man might in an instant be turned\ninto an elephant or a god and again become a man; either of which\nconsequences would be contrary to your system.--Moreover, that for the\npurpose of whose enjoyment the aggregate is formed is, according to your\ndoctrine, not a permanent enjoying soul, so that enjoyment subserves\nitself merely and cannot be desired by anything else; hence final\nrelease also must, according to you, be considered as subserving itself\nonly, and no being desirous of release can be assumed. If a being\ndesirous of both were assumed, it would have to be conceived as\npermanently existing up to the time of enjoyment and release, and that\nwould be contrary to your doctrine of general impermanency.--There may\ntherefore exist a causal relation between the members of the series\nconsisting of Nescience, &c., but, in the absence of a permanent\nenjoying soul, it is impossible to establish on that ground the\nexistence of aggregates.\n\n20. (Nor can there be a causal relation between Nescience, &c.), because\non the origination of the subsequent (moment) the preceding one ceases\nto be.\n\nWe have hitherto argued that Nescience, and so on, stand in a causal\nrelation to each other merely, so that they cannot be made to account\nfor the existence of aggregates; we are now going to prove that they\ncannot even be considered as efficient causes of the subsequent members\nof the series to which they belong.\n\nThose who maintain that everything has a momentary existence only admit\nthat when the thing existing in the second moment[393] enters into being\nthe thing existing in the first moment ceases to be. On this admission\nit is impossible to establish between the two things the relation of\ncause and effect, since the former momentary existence which ceases or\nhas ceased to be, and so has entered into the state of non-existence,\ncannot be the cause of the later momentary existence.--Let it then be\nsaid that the former momentary existence when it has reached its full\ndevelopment becomes the cause of the later momentary existence.--That\nalso is impossible; for the assumption that a fully developed existence\nexerts a further energy, involves the conclusion that it is connected\nwith a second moment (which contradicts the doctrine of universal\nmomentariness).--Then let the mere existence of the antecedent entity\nconstitute its causal energy.--That assumption also is fruitless,\nbecause we cannot conceive the origination of an effect which is not\nimbued with the nature of the cause (i.e. in which the nature of the\ncause does not continue to exist). And to assume that the nature of the\ncause does continue to exist in the effect is impossible (on the Bauddha\ndoctrine), as that would involve the permanency of the cause, and thus\nnecessitate the abandonment of the doctrine of general\nnon-permanency.--Nor can it be admitted that the relation of cause and\neffect holds good without the cause somehow giving its colouring to the\neffect; for that doctrine might unduly be extended to all\ncases[394].--Moreover, the origination and cessation of things of which\nthe Bauddha speaks must either constitute a thing's own form or another\nstate of it, or an altogether different thing. But none of these\nalternatives agrees with the general Bauddha principles. If, in the\nfirst place, origination and cessation constituted the form of a thing,\nit would follow that the word 'thing' and the words 'origination' and\n'cessation' are interchangeable (which is not the case).--Let then,\nsecondly, the Bauddha says, a certain difference be assumed, in\nconsequence of which the terms 'origination' and 'cessation' may denote\nthe initial and final states of that which in the intermediate state is\ncalled thing.--In that case, we reply, the thing will be connected with\nthree moments, viz. the initial, the intermediate, and the final one, so\nthat the doctrine of general momentariness will have to be\nabandoned.--Let then, as the third alternative, origination and\ncessation be altogether different from the thing, as much as a buffalo\nis from a horse.--That too cannot be, we reply; for it would lead to the\nconclusion that the thing, because altogether disconnected with\norigination and cessation, is everlasting. And the same conclusion would\nbe led up to, if we understood by the origination and cessation of a\nthing merely its perception and non-perception; for the latter are\nattributes of the percipient mind only, not of the thing itself.--Hence\nwe have again to declare the Bauddha doctrine to be untenable.\n\n21. On the supposition of there being no (cause: while yet the effect\ntakes place), there results contradiction of the admitted principle;\notherwise simultaneousness (of cause and effect).\n\nIt has been shown that on the doctrine of general non-permanency, the\nformer momentary existence, as having already been merged in\nnon-existence, cannot be the cause of the later one.--Perhaps now the\nBauddha will say that an effect may arise even when there is no\ncause.--That, we reply, implies the abandonment of a principle admitted\nby yourself, viz. that the mind and the mental modifications originate\nwhen in conjunction with four kinds of causes[395]. Moreover, if\nanything could originate without a cause, there would be nothing to\nprevent that anything might originate at any time.--If, on the other\nhand, you should say that we may assume the antecedent momentary\nexistence to last until the succeeding one has been produced, we point\nout that that would imply the simultaneousness of cause and effect, and\nso run counter to an accepted Bauddha tenet, viz. that all things[396]\nare momentary merely.\n\n22. Cessation dependent on a sublative act of the mind, and cessation\nnot so dependent cannot be established, there being no (complete)\ninterruption.\n\nThe Bauddhas who maintain that universal destruction is going on\nconstantly, assume that 'whatever forms an object of knowledge and is\ndifferent from the triad is produced (sa/m/sk/ri/ta) and momentary.' To\nthe triad there mentioned they give the names 'cessation dependent on a\nsublative act of the mind,' 'cessation not dependent on such an act,'\nand 'space.' This triad they hold to be non-substantial, of a merely\nnegative character (abhavamatra), devoid of all positive\ncharacteristics. By 'cessation dependent on a sublative act of the\nmind,' we have to understand such destruction of entities as is preceded\nby an act of thought[397]; by 'cessation not so dependent' is meant\ndestruction of the opposite kind[398]; by 'space' is meant absence in\ngeneral of something covering (or occupying space). Out of these three\nnon-existences 'space' will be refuted later on (Sutra 24), the two\nother ones are refuted in the present Sutra.\n\nCessation which is dependent on a sublative act of the mind, and\ncessation which is not so dependent are both impossible, 'on account of\nthe absence of interruption.' For both kinds of cessation must have\nreference either to the series (of momentary existences) or to the\nsingle members constituting the series.--The former alternative is\nimpossible, because in all series (of momentary existences) the members\nof the series stand in an unbroken relation of cause and effect so that\nthe series cannot be interrupted[399].--The latter alternative is\nlikewise inadmissible, for it is impossible to maintain that any\nmomentary existence should undergo complete annihilation entirely\nundefinable and disconnected (with the previous state of existence),\nsince we observe that a thing is recognised in the various states\nthrough which it may pass and thus has a connected existence[400]. And\nin those cases also where a thing is not clearly recognised (after\nhaving undergone a change) we yet infer, on the ground of actual\nobservations made in other cases, that one and the same thing continues\nto exist without any interruption.--For these reasons the two kinds of\ncessation which the Bauddhas assume cannot be proved.\n\n23. And on account of the objections presenting themselves in either\ncase.\n\nThe cessation of Nescience, &c. which, on the assumption of the\nBauddhas, is included in the two kinds of cessation discussed hitherto,\nmust take place either in consequence of perfect knowledge together with\nits auxiliaries, or else of its own accord. But the former alternative\nwould imply the abandonment of the Bauddha doctrine that destruction\ntakes place without a cause, and the latter alternative would involve\nthe uselessness of the Bauddha instruction as to the 'path'[401]. As\ntherefore both alternatives are open to objections, the Bauddha doctrine\nmust be declared unsatisfactory.\n\n24. And in the case of space also (the doctrine of its being a\nnon-entity is untenable) on account of its not differing (from the two\nother kinds of non-entity).\n\nWe have shown so far that of the triad declared by the Bauddhas to be\ndevoid of all positive characteristics, and therefore non-definable, two\n(viz. prati-sa/m/khyavirodha and aprati) cannot be shown to be such; we\nnow proceed to show the same with regard to space (ether, aka/s/a).\n\nWith regard to space also it cannot be maintained that it is\nnon-definable, since substantiality can be established in the case of\nspace no less than in the case of the two so-called non-entities treated\nof in the preceding Sutras. That space is a real thing follows in the\nfirst place from certain scriptural passages, such as 'space sprang from\nthe Self.'--To those, again, who (like the Bauddhas) disagree with us as\nto the authoritativeness of Scripture we point out that the real\nexistence of space is to be inferred from the quality of sound, since we\nobserve that earth and other real things are the abodes of smell and the\nother qualities.--Moreover, if you declare that space is nothing but the\nabsence in general of any covering (occupying) body, it would follow\nthat while one bird is flying--whereby space is occupied--there would be\nno room for a second bird wanting to fly at the same time. And if you\nshould reply that the second bird may fly there where there is absence\nof a covering body, we point out that that something by which the\nabsence of covering bodies is distinguished must be a positive entity,\nviz. space in our sense, and not the mere non-existence of covering\nbodies[402].--Moreover, the Bauddha places himself, by his view of\nspace, in opposition to other parts of his system. For we find, in the\nBauddha Scriptures, a series of questions and answers (beginning, 'On\nwhat, O reverend Sir, is the earth founded?'), in which the following\nquestion occurs, 'On what is the air founded?' to which it is replied\nthat the air is founded on space (ether). Now it is clear that this\nstatement is appropriate only on the supposition of space being a\npositive entity, not a mere negation.--Further, there is a\nself-contradiction in the Bauddha statements regarding all the three\nkinds of negative entities, it being said, on the one hand, that they\nare not positively definable, and, on the other hand, that they are\neternal. Of what is not real neither eternity nor non-eternity can be\npredicated, since the distinction of subjects and predicates of\nattribution is founded entirely on real things. Anything with regard to\nwhich that distinction holds good we conclude to be a real thing, such\nas jars and the like are, not a mere undefinable negation.\n\n25. And on account of remembrance.\n\nThe philosopher who maintains that all things are momentary only would\nhave to extend that doctrine to the perceiving person (upalabdh/ri/)\nalso; that is, however, not possible, on account of the remembrance\nwhich is consequent on the original perception. That remembrance can\ntake place only if it belongs to the same person who previously made the\nperception; for we observe that what one man has experienced is not\nremembered by another man. How, indeed, could there arise the conscious\nstate expressed in the sentences, 'I saw that thing, and now I see this\nthing,' if the seeing person were not in both cases the same? That the\nconsciousness of recognition takes place only in the case of the\nobserving and remembering subject being one, is a matter known to every\none; for if there were, in the two cases, different subjects, the state\nof consciousness arising in the mind of the remembering person would be,\n'_I_ remember; another person made the observation.' But no such state\nof consciousness does arise.--When, on the other hand, such a state of\nconsciousness does arise, then everybody knows that the person who made\nthe original observation, and the person who remembers, are different\npersons, and then the state of consciousness is expressed as follows, 'I\nremember that that other person saw that and that.'--In the case under\ndiscussion, however, the Vaina/s/ika himself--whose state of\nconsciousness is, 'I saw that and that'--knows that there is one\nthinking subject only to which the original perception as well as the\nremembrance belongs, and does not think of denying that the past\nperception belonged to himself, not any more than he denies that fire is\nhot and gives light.\n\nAs thus one agent is connected with the two moments of perception and\nsubsequent remembrance, the Vaina/s/ika has necessarily to abandon the\ndoctrine of universal momentariness. And if he further recognises all\nhis subsequent successive cognitions, up to his last breath, to belong\nto one and the same subject, and in addition cannot but attribute all\nhis past cognitions, from the moment of his birth, to the same Self, how\ncan he maintain, without being ashamed of himself, that everything has a\nmomentary existence only? Should he maintain that the recognition (of\nthe subject as one and the same) takes place on account of the\nsimilarity (of the different self-cognitions; each, however, being\nmomentary only), we reply that the cognition of similarity is based on\ntwo things, and that for that reason the advocate of universal\nmomentariness who denies the existence of one (permanent) subject able\nmentally to grasp the two similar things simply talks deceitful nonsense\nwhen asserting that recognition is founded on similarity. Should he\nadmit, on the other hand, that there is one mind grasping the similarity\nof two successive momentary existences, he would thereby admit that one\nentity endures for two moments and thus contradict the tenet of\nuniversal momentariness.--Should it be said that the cognition 'this is\nsimilar to that' is a different (new) cognition, not dependent on the\napperception of the earlier and later momentary existences, we refute\nthis by the remark that the fact of different terms--viz. 'this' and\n'that'--being used points to the existence of different things (which\nthe mind grasps in a judgment of similarity). If the mental act of which\nsimilarity is the object were an altogether new act (not concerned with\nthe two separate similar entities), the expression 'this is similar to\nthat' would be devoid of meaning; we should in that case rather speak of\n'similarity' only.--Whenever (to add a general reflexion) something\nperfectly well known from ordinary experience is not admitted by\nphilosophers, they may indeed establish their own view and demolish the\ncontrary opinion by means of words, but they thereby neither convince\nothers nor even themselves. Whatever has been ascertained to be such and\nsuch must also be represented as such and such; attempts to represent it\nas something else prove nothing but the vain talkativeness of those who\nmake those attempts. Nor can the hypothesis of mere similarity being\ncognised account for ordinary empirical life and thought; for (in\nrecognising a thing) we are conscious of it being that which we were\nformerly conscious of, not of it being merely similar to that. We admit\nthat sometimes with regard to an external thing a doubt may arise\nwhether it is that or merely is similar to that; for mistakes may be\nmade concerning what lies outside our minds. But the conscious subject\nnever has any doubt whether it is itself or only similar to itself; it\nrather is distinctly conscious that it is one and the same subject which\nyesterday had a certain sensation and to-day remembers that\nsensation.--For this reason also the doctrine of the Nihilists is to be\nrejected.\n\n26. (Entity) does not spring from non-entity on account of that not\nbeing observed.\n\nThe system of the Vaina/s/ikas is objectionable for this reason also\nthat those who deny the existence of permanent stable causes are driven\nto maintain that entity springs from non-entity. This latter tenet is\nexpressly enunciated by the Bauddhas where they say, 'On account of the\nmanifestation (of effects) not without previous destruction (of the\ncause).' For, they say, from the decomposed seed only the young plant\nsprings, spoilt milk only turns into curds, and the lump of clay has\nceased to be a lump when it becomes a jar. If effects did spring from\nthe unchanged causes, all effects would originate from all causes at\nonce, as then no specification would be required[403]. Hence, as we see\nthat young plants, &c. spring from seeds, &c. only after the latter have\nbeen merged in non-existence, we hold that entity springs from\nnon-entity.\n\nTo this Bauddha tenet we reply, '(Entity does) not (spring) from\nnon-entity, on account of that not being observed.' If entity did spring\nfrom non-entity, the assumption of special causes would be purportless,\nsince non-entity is in all cases one and the same. For the non-existence\nof seeds and the like after they have been destroyed is of the same kind\nas the non-existence of horns of hares and the like, i.e. non-existence\nis in all cases nothing else but the absence of all character of\nreality, and hence there would be no sense (on the doctrine of\norigination from non-existence) in assuming that sprouts are produced\nfrom seeds only, curds from milk only, and so on. And if\nnon-distinguished non-existence were admitted to have causal efficiency,\nwe should also have to assume that sprouts, &c. originate from the horns\nof hares, &c.--a thing certainly not actually observed.--If, again, it\nshould be assumed that there are different kinds of non-existence having\nspecial distinctions--just as, for instance, blueness and the like are\nspecial qualities of lotuses and so on--we point out that in that case\nthe fact of there being such special distinctions would turn the\nnon-entities into entities no less real than lotuses and the like. In no\ncase non-existence would possess causal efficiency, simply because, like\nthe horn of a hare, it is non-existence merely.--Further, if existence\nsprang from non-existence, all effects would be affected with\nnon-existence; while as a matter of fact they are observed to be merely\npositive entities distinguished by their various special\ncharacteristics. Nor[404] does any one think that things of the nature\nof clay, such as pots and the like, are the effects of threads and the\nlike; but everybody knows that things of the nature of clay are the\neffects of clay only.--The Bauddha's tenet that nothing can become a\ncause as long as it remains unchanged, but has to that end to undergo\ndestruction, and that thus existence springs from non-existence only is\nfalse; for it is observed that only things of permanent nature which are\nalways recognised as what they are, such as gold, &c., are the causes of\neffects such as golden ornaments, and so on. In those cases where a\ndestruction of the peculiar nature of the cause is observed to take\nplace, as in the case of seeds, for instance, we have to acknowledge as\nthe cause of the subsequent condition (i.e. the sprout) not the earlier\ncondition in so far as it is destroyed, but rather those permanent\nparticles of the seed which are not destroyed (when the seed as a whole\nundergoes decomposition).--Hence as we see on the one hand that no\nentities ever originate from nonentities such as the horns of a hare,\nand on the other hand that entities do originate from entities such as\ngold and the like the whole Bauddha doctrine of existence springing from\nnon-existence has to be rejected.--We finally point out that, according\nto the Bauddhas, all mind and all mental modifications spring from the\nfour skandhas discussed above and all material aggregates from the\natoms; why then do they stultify this their own doctrine by the fanciful\nassumption of entity springing from non-entity and thus needlessly\nperplex the mind of every one?\n\n27. And thus (on that doctrine) there would be an accomplishment (of\nends) in the case of non-active people also.\n\nIf it were admitted that entity issues from non-entity, lazy inactive\npeople also would obtain their purposes, since 'non-existence' is a\nthing to be had without much trouble. Rice would grow for the husbandman\neven if he did not cultivate his field; vessels would shape themselves\neven if the potter did not fashion the clay; and the weaver too lazy to\nweave the threads into a whole, would nevertheless have in the end\nfinished pieces of cloth just as if he had been weaving. And nobody\nwould have to exert himself in the least either for going to the\nheavenly world or for obtaining final release. All which of course is\nabsurd and not maintained by anybody.--Thus the doctrine of the\norigination of entity from non-entity again shows itself to be futile.\n\n28. The non-existence (of external things) cannot be maintained, on\naccount of (our) consciousness (of them).\n\nThere having been brought forward, in what precedes, the various\nobjections which lie against the doctrine of the reality of the external\nworld (in the Bauddha sense), such as the impossibility of accounting\nfor the existence of aggregates, &c., we are now confronted by those\nBauddhas who maintain that only cognitions (or ideas, vij/n/ana)\nexist.--The doctrine of the reality of the external world was indeed\npropounded by Buddha conforming himself to the mental state of some of\nhis disciples whom he perceived to be attached to external things; but\nit does not represent his own true view according to which cognitions\nalone are real.\n\nAccording to this latter doctrine the process, whose constituting\nmembers are the act of knowledge, the object of knowledge, and the\nresult of knowledge[405], is an altogether internal one, existing in so\nfar only as it is connected with the mind (buddhi). Even if external\nthings existed, that process could not take place but in connexion with\nthe mind. If, the Bauddhas say, you ask how it is known that that entire\nprocess is internal and that no outward things exist apart from\nconsciousness, we reply that we base our doctrine on the impossibility\nof external things. For if external things are admitted, they must be\neither atoms or aggregates of atoms such as posts and the like. But\natoms cannot be comprehended under the ideas of posts and the like, it\nbeing impossible for cognition to represent (things as minute as) atoms.\nNor, again, can the outward things be aggregates of atoms such as\npillars and the like, because those aggregates can neither be defined as\ndifferent nor as non-different from the atoms[406].--In the same way we\ncan show that the external things are not universals and so on[407].\n\nMoreover, the cognitions--which are of a uniform nature only in so far\nas they are states of consciousness--undergo, according to their\nobjects, successive modifications, so that there is presented to the\nmind now the idea of a post, now the idea of a wall, now the idea of a\njar, and so on. Now this is not possible without some distinction on the\npart of the ideas themselves, and hence we must necessarily admit that\nthe ideas have the same forms as their objects. But if we make this\nadmission, from which it follows that the form of the objects is\ndetermined by the ideas, the hypothesis of the existence of external\nthings becomes altogether gratuitous. From the fact, moreover, of our\nalways being conscious of the act of knowledge and the object of\nknowledge simultaneously it follows that the two are in reality\nidentical. When we are conscious of the one we are conscious of the\nother also; and that would not happen if the two were essentially\ndistinct, as in that case there would be nothing to prevent our being\nconscious of one apart from the other. For this reason also we maintain\nthat there are no outward things.--\n\nPerception is to be considered as similar to a dream and the like. The\nideas present to our minds during a dream, a magical illusion, a mirage\nand so on, appear in the twofold form of subject and object, although\nthere is all the while no external object; hence we conclude that the\nideas of posts and the like which occur in our waking state are likewise\nindependent of external objects; for they also are simply ideas.--If we\nbe asked how, in the absence of external things, we account for the\nactual variety of ideas, we reply that that variety is to be explained\nfrom the impressions left by previous ideas[408]. In the beginningless\nsa/m/sara ideas and mental impressions succeed each other as causes and\neffects, just as the plant springs from the seed and seeds are again\nproduced from the plant, and there exists therefore a sufficient reason\nfor the variety of ideas actually experienced. That the variety of ideas\nis solely due to the impressions left on the mind by past ideas follows,\nmoreover, from the following affirmative and negative judgments: we both\n(the Vedantins as well as the Bauddhas) admit that in dreams, &c. there\npresents itself a variety of ideas which arise from mental impressions,\nwithout any external object; we (the Bauddhas) do not admit that any\nvariety of ideas can arise from external objects, without mental\nimpressions.--Thus we are again led to conclude that no outward things\nexist.\n\nTo all this we (the Vedantins) make the following reply.--The\nnon-existence of external things cannot be maintained because we are\nconscious of external things. In every act of perception we are\nconscious of some external thing corresponding to the idea, whether it\nbe a post or a wall or a piece of cloth or a jar, and that of which we\nare conscious cannot but exist. Why should we pay attention to the words\nof a man who, while conscious of an outward thing through its\napproximation to his senses, affirms that he is conscious of no outward\nthing, and that no such thing exists, any more than we listen to a man\nwho while he is eating and experiencing the feeling of satisfaction\navers that he does not eat and does not feel satisfied?--If the Bauddha\nshould reply that he does not affirm that he is conscious of no object\nbut only that he is conscious of no object apart from the act of\nconsciousness, we answer that he may indeed make any arbitrary statement\nhe likes, but that he has no arguments to prove what he says. That the\noutward thing exists apart from consciousness, has necessarily to be\naccepted on the ground of the nature of consciousness itself. Nobody\nwhen perceiving a post or a wall is conscious of his perception only,\nbut all men are conscious of posts and walls and the like as objects of\ntheir perceptions. That such is the consciousness of all men, appears\nalso from the fact that even those who contest the existence of external\nthings bear witness to their existence when they say that what is an\ninternal object of cognition appears like something external. For they\npractically accept the general consciousness, which testifies to the\nexistence of an external world, and being at the same time anxious to\nrefute it they speak of the external things as 'like something\nexternal.' If they did not themselves at the bottom acknowledge the\nexistence of the external world, how could they use the expression 'like\nsomething external?' No one says, 'Vish/n/umitra appears like the son of\na barren mother.' If we accept the truth as it is given to us in our\nconsciousness, we must admit that the object of perception appears to us\nas something external, not like something external.--But--the Bauddha\nmay reply--we conclude that the object of perception is only like\nsomething external because external things are impossible.--This\nconclusion we rejoin is improper, since the possibility or impossibility\nof things is to be determined only on the ground of the operation or\nnon-operation of the means of right knowledge; while on the other hand,\nthe operation and non-operation of the means of right knowledge are not\nto be made dependent on preconceived possibilities or impossibilities.\nPossible is whatever is apprehended by perception or some other means of\nproof; impossible is what is not so apprehended. Now the external things\nare, according to their nature, apprehended by all the instruments of\nknowledge; how then can you maintain that they are not possible, on the\nground of such idle dilemmas as that about their difference or\nnon-difference from atoms?--Nor, again, does the non-existence of\nobjects follow from the fact of the ideas having the same form as the\nobjects; for if there were no objects the ideas could not have the forms\nof the objects, and the objects are actually apprehended as\nexternal.--For the same reason (i.e. because the distinction of thing\nand idea is given in consciousness) the invariable concomitance of idea\nand thing has to be considered as proving only that the thing\nconstitutes the means of the idea, not that the two are identical.\nMoreover, when we are conscious first of a pot and then of a piece of\ncloth, consciousness remains the same in the two acts while what varies\nare merely the distinctive attributes of consciousness; just as when we\nsee at first a black and then a white cow, the distinction of the two\nperceptions is due to the varying blackness and whiteness while the\ngeneric character of the cow remains the same. The difference of the one\npermanent factor (from the two--or more--varying factors) is proved\nthroughout by the two varying factors, and vice versa the difference of\nthe latter (from the permanent factor) by the presence of the one\n(permanent factor). Therefore thing and idea are distinct. The same view\nis to be held with regard to the perception and the remembrance of a\njar; there also the perception and the remembrance only are distinct\nwhile the jar is one and the same; in the same way as when conscious of\nthe smell of milk and the taste of milk we are conscious of the smell\nand taste as different things but of the milk itself as one only.\n\nFurther, two ideas which occupy different moments of time and pass away\nas soon as they have become objects of consciousness cannot\napprehend--or be apprehended by--each other. From this it follows that\ncertain doctrines forming part of the Bauddha system cannot be upheld;\nso the doctrine that ideas are different from each other; the doctrine\nthat everything is momentary, void, &c.; the doctrine of the distinction\nof individuals and classes; the doctrine that a former idea leaves an\nimpression giving rise to a later idea; the doctrine of the distinction,\nowing to the influence of Nescience, of the attributes of existence and\nnon-existence; the doctrine of bondage and release (depending on absence\nand presence of right knowledge)[409].\n\nFurther, if you say that we are conscious of the idea, you must admit\nthat we are also conscious of the external thing. And if you rejoin that\nwe are conscious of the idea on its own account because it is of a\nluminous nature like a lamp, while the external thing is not so; we\nreply that by maintaining the idea to be illuminated by itself you make\nyourself guilty of an absurdity no less than if you said that fire burns\nitself. And at the same time you refuse to accept the common and\naltogether rational opinion that we are conscious of the external thing\nby means of the idea different from the thing! Indeed a proof of\nextraordinary philosophic insight!--It cannot, moreover, be asserted in\nany way that the idea apart from the thing is the object of our\nconsciousness; for it is absurd to speak of a thing as the object of its\nown activity. Possibly you (the Bauddha) will rejoin that, if the idea\nis to be apprehended by something different from it, that something also\nmust be apprehended by something different and so on ad infinitum. And,\nmoreover, you will perhaps object that as each cognition is of an\nessentially illuminating nature like a lamp, the assumption of a further\ncognition is uncalled for; for as they are both equally illuminating the\none cannot give light to the other.--But both these objections are\nunfounded. As the idea only is apprehended, and there is consequently no\nnecessity to assume something to apprehend the Self which witnesses the\nidea (is conscious of the idea), there results no regressus ad\ninfinitum. And the witnessing Self and the idea are of an essentially\ndifferent nature, and may therefore stand to each other in the relation\nof knowing subject and object known. The existence of the witnessing\nSelf is self-proved and cannot therefore be denied.--Moreover, if you\nmaintain that the idea, lamplike, manifests itself without standing in\nneed of a further principle to illuminate it, you maintain thereby that\nideas exist which are not apprehended by any of the means of knowledge,\nand which are without a knowing being; which is no better than to assert\nthat a thousand lamps burning inside some impenetrable mass of rocks\nmanifest themselves. And if you should maintain that thereby we admit\nyour doctrine, since it follows from what we have said that the idea\nitself implies consciousness; we reply that, as observation shows, the\nlamp in order to become manifest requires some other intellectual agent\nfurnished with instruments such as the eye, and that therefore the idea\nalso, as equally being a thing to be illuminated, becomes manifest only\nthrough an ulterior intelligent principle. And if you finally object\nthat we, when advancing the witnessing Self as self-proved, merely\nexpress in other words the Bauddha tenet that the idea is\nself-manifested, we refute you by remarking that your ideas have the\nattributes of originating, passing away, being manifold, and so on\n(while our Self is one and permanent).--We thus have proved that an\nidea, like a lamp, requires an ulterior intelligent principle to render\nit manifest.\n\n29. And on account of their difference of nature (the ideas of the\nwaking state) are not like those of a dream.\n\nWe now apply ourselves to the refutation of the averment made by the\nBauddha, that the ideas of posts, and so on, of which we are conscious\nin the waking state, may arise in the absence of external objects, just\nas the ideas of a dream, both being ideas alike.--The two sets of ideas,\nwe maintain, cannot be treated on the same footing, on account of the\ndifference of their character. They differ as follows.--The things of\nwhich we are conscious in a dream are negated by our waking\nconsciousness. 'I wrongly thought that I had a meeting with a great man;\nno such meeting took place, but my mind was dulled by slumber, and so\nthe false idea arose.' In an analogous manner the things of which we are\nconscious when under the influence of a magic illusion, and the like,\nare negated by our ordinary consciousness. Those things, on the other\nhand, of which we are conscious in our waking state, such as posts and\nthe like, are never negated in any state.--Moreover, the visions of a\ndream are acts of remembrance, while the visions of the waking state are\nacts of immediate consciousness; and the distinction between remembrance\nand immediate consciousness is directly cognised by every one as being\nfounded on the absence or presence of the object. When, for instance, a\nman remembers his absent son, he does not directly perceive him, but\nmerely wishes so to perceive him. As thus the distinction between the\ntwo states is evident to every one, it is impossible to formulate the\ninference that waking consciousness is false because it is mere\nconsciousness, such as dreaming consciousness; for we certainly cannot\nallow would-be philosophers to deny the truth of what is directly\nevident to themselves. Just because they feel the absurdity of denying\nwhat is evident to themselves, and are consequently unable to\ndemonstrate the baselessness of the ideas of the waking state from those\nideas themselves, they attempt to demonstrate it from their having\ncertain attributes in common with the ideas of the dreaming state. But\nif some attribute cannot belong to a thing on account of the latter's\nown nature, it cannot belong to it on account of the thing having\ncertain attributes in common with some other thing. Fire, which is felt\nto be hot, cannot be demonstrated to be cold, on the ground of its\nhaving attributes in common with water. And the difference of nature\nbetween the waking and the sleeping state we have already shown.\n\n30. The existence (of mental impressions) is not possible on the\nBauddha view, on account of the absence of perception (of external\nthings).\n\nWe now proceed to that theory of yours, according to which the variety\nof ideas can be explained from the variety of mental impressions,\nwithout any reference to external things, and remark that on your\ndoctrine the existence of mental impressions is impossible, as you do\nnot admit the perception of external things. For the variety of mental\nimpressions is caused altogether by the variety of the things perceived.\nHow, indeed, could various impressions originate if no external things\nwere perceived? The hypothesis of a beginningless series of mental\nimpressions would lead only to a baseless regressus ad infinitum,\nsublative of the entire phenomenal world, and would in no way establish\nyour position.--The same argument, i.e. the one founded on the\nimpossibility of mental impressions which are not caused by external\nthings, refutes also the positive and negative judgments, on the ground\nof which the denier of an external world above attempted to show that\nideas are caused by mental impressions, not by external things. We\nrather have on our side a positive and a negative judgment whereby to\nestablish our doctrine of the existence of external things, viz. 'the\nperception of external things is admitted to take place also without\nmental impressions,' and 'mental impressions are not admitted to\noriginate independently of the perception of external\nthings.'--Moreover, an impression is a kind of modification, and\nmodifications cannot, as experience teaches, take place unless there is\nsome substratum which is modified. But, according to your doctrine, such\na substratum of impressions does not exist, since you say that it cannot\nbe cognised through any means of knowledge.\n\n31. And on account of the momentariness (of the alayavij/n/ana, it\ncannot be the abode of mental impressions).\n\nIf you maintain that the so-called internal cognition\n(alayavij/n/ana[410]) assumed by you may constitute the abode of the\nmental impressions, we deny that, because that cognition also being\nadmittedly momentary, and hence non-permanent, cannot be the abode of\nimpressions any more than the quasi-external cognitions\n(prav/ri/ttivij/n/ana). For unless there exists one continuous principle\nequally connected with the past, the present, and the future[411], or an\nabsolutely unchangeable (Self) which cognises everything, we are unable\nto account for remembrance, recognition, and so on, which are subject to\nmental impressions dependent on place, time, and cause. If, on the other\nhand, you declare your alayavij/n/ana to be something permanent, you\nthereby abandon your tenet of the alayavij/n/ana as well as everything\nelse being momentary.--Or (to explain the Sutra in a different way) as\nthe tenet of general momentariness is characteristic of the systems of\nthe idealistic as well as the realistic Bauddhas, we may bring forward\nagainst the doctrines of the former all those arguments dependent on the\nprinciple of general momentariness which we have above urged against the\nlatter.\n\nWe have thus refuted both nihilistic doctrines, viz. the doctrine which\nmaintains the (momentary) reality of the external world, and the\ndoctrine which asserts that ideas only exist. The third variety of\nBauddha doctrine, viz. that everything is empty (i.e. that absolutely\nnothing exists), is contradicted by all means of right knowledge, and\ntherefore requires no special refutation. For this apparent world, whose\nexistence is guaranteed by all the means of knowledge, cannot be denied,\nunless some one should find out some new truth (based on which he could\nimpugn its existence)--for a general principle is proved by the absence\nof contrary instances.\n\n32. And on account of its general deficiency in probability.\n\nNo further special discussion is in fact required. From whatever new\npoints of view the Bauddha system is tested with reference to its\nprobability, it gives way on all sides, like the walls of a well dug in\nsandy soil. It has, in fact, no foundation whatever to rest upon, and\nhence the attempts to use it as a guide in the practical concerns of\nlife are mere folly.--Moreover, Buddha by propounding the three mutually\ncontradictory systems, teaching respectively the reality of the external\nworld, the reality of ideas only, and general nothingness, has himself\nmade it clear either that he was a man given to make incoherent\nassertions, or else that hatred of all beings induced him to propound\nabsurd doctrines by accepting which they would become thoroughly\nconfused.--So that--and this the Sutra means to indicate--Buddha's\ndoctrine has to be entirely disregarded by all those who have a regard\nfor their own happiness.\n\n33. On account of the impossibility (of contradictory attributes) in one\nthing, (the Jaina doctrine is) not (to be accepted).\n\nHaving disposed of the Bauddha doctrine we now turn to the system of the\nGymnosophists (Jainas).\n\nThe Jainas acknowledge seven categories (tattvas), viz. soul (jiva),\nnon-soul (ajiva), the issuing outward (asrava), restraint (sa/m/vara),\ndestruction (nirjara), bondage (bandha), and release (moksha)[412].\nShortly it may be said that they acknowledge two categories, viz. soul\nand non-soul, since the five other categories may be subsumed under\nthese two.--They also set forth a set of categories different from the\ntwo mentioned. They teach that there are five so-called astikayas\n('existing bodies,' i.e. categories), viz. the categories of soul\n(jiva), body (pudgala), merit (dharma), demerit (adharma), and space\n(aka/s/a). All these categories they again subdivide in various fanciful\nways[413].--To all things they apply the following method of reasoning,\nwhich they call the saptabha@nginaya: somehow it is; somehow it is not;\nsomehow it is and is not; somehow it is indescribable; somehow it is and\nis indescribable; somehow it is not and is indescribable; somehow it is\nand is not and is indescribable.\n\nTo this unsettling style of reasoning they submit even such conceptions\nas that of unity and eternity[414].\n\nThis doctrine we meet as follows.--Your reasoning, we say, is\ninadmissible 'on account of the impossibility in one thing.' That is to\nsay, it is impossible that contradictory attributes such as being and\nnon-being should at the same time belong to one and the same thing; just\nas observation teaches us that a thing cannot be hot and cold at the\nsame moment. The seven categories asserted by you must either be so many\nand such or not be so many and such; the third alternative expressed in\nthe words 'they either are such or not such' results in a cognition of\nindefinite nature which is no more a source of true knowledge than doubt\nis. If you should plead that the cognition that a thing is of more than\none nature is definite and therefore a source of true knowledge, we deny\nthis. For the unlimited assertion that all things are of a non-exclusive\nnature is itself something, falls as such under the alternative\npredications 'somehow it is,' 'somehow it is not,' and so ceases to be a\ndefinite assertion. The same happens to the person making the assertion\nand to the result of the assertion; partly they are, partly they are\nnot. As thus the means of knowledge, the object of knowledge, the\nknowing subject, and the act of knowledge are all alike indefinite, how\ncan the Tirthakara (Jina) teach with any claim to authority, and how can\nhis followers act on a doctrine the matter of which is altogether\nindeterminate? Observation shows that only when a course of action is\nknown to have a definite result people set about it without hesitation.\nHence a man who proclaims a doctrine of altogether indefinite contents\ndoes not deserve to be listened to any more than a drunken man or a\nmadman.--Again, if we apply the Jaina reasoning to their doctrine of the\nfive categories, we have to say that on one view of the matter they are\nfive and on another view they are not five; from which latter point of\nview it follows that they are either fewer or more than five. Nor is it\nlogical to declare the categories to be indescribable. For if they are\nso, they cannot be described; but, as a matter of fact, they are\ndescribed so that to call them indescribable involves a contradiction.\nAnd if you go on to say that the categories on being described are\nascertained to be such and such, and at the same time are not\nascertained to be such and such, and that the result of their being\nascertained is perfect knowledge or is not perfect knowledge, and that\nimperfect knowledge is the opposite of perfect knowledge or is not the\nopposite; you certainly talk more like a drunken or insane man than like\na sober, trustworthy person.--If you further maintain that the heavenly\nworld and final release exist or do not exist and are eternal or\nnon-eternal, the absence of all determinate knowledge which is implied\nin such statements will result in nobody's acting for the purpose of\ngaining the heavenly world and final release. And, moreover, it follows\nfrom your doctrine that soul, non-soul, and so on, whose nature you\nclaim to have ascertained, and which you describe as having existed from\nall eternity, relapse all at once into the condition of absolute\nindetermination.--As therefore the two contradictory attributes of being\nand non-being cannot belong to any of the categories--being excluding\nnon-being and vice versa non-being excluding being--the doctrine of the\nArhat must be rejected.--The above remarks dispose likewise of the\nassertions made by the Jainas as to the impossibility of deciding\nwhether of one thing there is to be predicated oneness or plurality,\npermanency or non-permanency, separateness or norn-separateness, and so\non.--The Jaina doctrine that aggregates are formed from the atoms--by\nthem called pudgalas--we do not undertake to refute separately as its\nrefutation is already comprised in that of the atomistic doctrine given\nin a previous part of this work.\n\n34. And likewise (there results from the Jaina, doctrine)\nnon-universality of the Self.\n\nWe have hitherto urged against the Jaina doctrine an objection resulting\nfrom the syadvada, viz. that one thing cannot have contradictory\nattributes. We now turn to the objection that from their doctrine it\nwould follow that the individual Self is not universal, i.e. not\nomnipresent.--The Jainas are of opinion that the soul has the same size\nas the body. From this it would follow that the soul is not of infinite\nextension, but limited, and hence non-eternal like jars and similar\nthings. Further, as the bodies of different classes of creatures are of\ndifferent size, it might happen that the soul of a man--which is of the\nsize of the human body--when entering, in consequence of its former\ndeeds, on a new state of existence in the body of an elephant would not\nbe able to fill the whole of it; or else that a human soul being\nrelegated to the body of an ant would not be able to find sufficient\nroom in it. The same difficulty would, moreover, arise with regard to\nthe successive stages of one state of existence, infancy, youth, and old\nage.--But why, the Jaina may ask, should we not look upon the soul as\nconsisting of an infinite number of parts capable of undergoing\ncompression in a small body and dilatation in a big one?--Do you, we ask\nin return, admit or not admit that those countless particles of the soul\nmay occupy the same place or not?--If you do not admit it, it follows\nthat the infinite number of particles cannot be contained in a body of\nlimited dimensions.--If you do admit it, it follows that, as then the\nspace occupied by all the particles may be the space of one particle\nonly, the extension of all the particles together will remain\ninconsiderable, and hence the soul be of minute size (not of the size of\nthe body). You have, moreover, no right to assume that a body of limited\nsize contains an infinite number of soul particles.\n\nWell the, the Jaina may reply, let us assume that by turns whenever the\nsoul enters a big body some particles accede to it while some withdraw\nfrom it whenever it enters a small body.--To this hypothesis the next\nSutra furnishes a reply.\n\n35. Nor is non-contradiction to be derived from the succession (of parts\nacceding to and departing from the soul), on account of the change, &c.\n(of the soul).\n\nNor can the doctrine of the soul having the same size as the body be\nsatisfactorily established by means of the hypothesis of the successive\naccession and withdrawal of particles. For this hypothesis would involve\nthe soul's undergoing changes and the like. If the soul is continually\nbeing repleted and depleted by the successive addition and withdrawal of\nparts, it of course follows that it undergoes change, and if it is\nliable to change it follows that it is non-permanent, like the skin and\nsimilar substances. From that, again, it follows that the Jaina doctrine\nof bondage and release is untenable; according to which doctrine 'the\nsoul, which in the state of bondage is encompassed by the ogdoad of\nworks and sunk in the ocean of sa/m/sara, rises when its bonds are\nsundered, as the gourd rises to the surface of the water when it is\nfreed from the encumbering clay[415].'--Moreover, those particles which\nin turns come and depart have the attributes of coming and going, and\ncannot, on that account, be of the nature of the Self any more than the\nbody is. And if it be said that the Self consists of some permanently\nremaining parts, we remark that it would be impossible to determine\nwhich are the permanent and which the temporary parts.--We have further\nto ask from whence those particles originate when they accede to the\nsoul, and into what they are merged when they detach themselves from it.\nThey cannot spring from the material elements and re-enter the elements;\nfor the soul is immaterial. Nor have we any means to prove the existence\nof some other, general or special, reservoir of\nsoul-particles.--Moreover, on the hypothesis under discussion the soul\nwould be of indefinite nature, as the size of the particles acceding and\ndeparting is itself indefinite.--On account of all these and similar\ndifficulties it cannot be maintained that certain particles by turns\nattach themselves to, and detach themselves from, the soul.\n\nThe Sutra may be taken in a different sense also. The preceding Sutra\nhas proved that the soul if of the same size as the body cannot be\npermanent, as its entering into bigger and smaller bodies involves its\nlimitation. To this the Gymnosophist may be supposed to rejoin that\nalthough the soul's size successively changes it may yet be permanent,\njust as the stream of water is permanent (although the water continually\nchanges). An analogous instance would be supplied by the permanency of\nthe stream of ideas while the individual ideas, as that of a red cloth\nand so on, are non-permanent.--To this rejoinder our Sutra replies that\nif the stream is not real we are led back to the doctrine of a general\nvoid, and that, if it is something real, the difficulties connected with\nthe soul's changing, &c. present themselves and render the Jaina view\nimpossible.\n\n36. And on account of the permanency of the final (size of the soul) and\nthe resulting permanency of the two (preceding sizes) there is no\ndifference (of size, at any time).\n\nMoreover, the Jainas themselves admit the permanency of the final size\nof the soul which it has in the state of release. From this it follows\nalso that its initial size and its intervening sizes must be\npermanent[416], and that hence there is no difference between the three\nsizes. But this would involve the conclusion that the different bodies\nof the soul have one and the same size, and that the soul cannot enter\ninto bigger and smaller bodies.--Or else (to explain the Sutra in a\nsomewhat different way) from the fact that the final size of the soul is\npermanent, it follows that its size in the two previous conditions also\nis permanent. Hence the soul must be considered as being always of the\nsame size--whether minute or infinite--and not of the varying size of\nits bodies.--For this reason also the doctrine of the Arhat has to be\nset aside as not in any way more rational than the doctrine of Buddha.\n\n37. The Lord (cannot be the cause of the world), on account of the\ninappropriateness (of that doctrine).\n\nThe Sutrakara now applies himself to the refutation of that doctrine,\naccording to which the Lord is the cause of the world only in so far as\nhe is the general ruler.--But how do you know that that is the purport\nof the Sutra (which speaks of the Lord 'without any\nqualification')?--From the circumstance, we reply, that the teacher\nhimself has proved, in the previous sections of the work, that the Lord\nis the material cause as well as the ruler of the world. Hence, if the\npresent Sutra were meant to impugn the doctrine of the Lord in general,\nthe earlier and later parts of the work would be mutually contradictory,\nand the Sutrakara would thus be in conflict with himself. We therefore\nmust assume that the purport of the present Sutra is to make an\nenergetic attack on the doctrine of those who maintain that the Lord is\nnot the material cause, but merely the ruler, i.e. the operative cause\nof the world; a doctrine entirely opposed to the Vedantic tenet of the\nunity of Brahman.\n\nThe theories about the Lord which are independent of the Vedanta are of\nvarious nature. Some taking their stand on the Sa@nkhya and Yoga systems\nassume that the Lord acts as a mere operative cause, as the ruler of the\npradhana and of the souls, and that pradhana, soul, and Lord are of\nmutually different nature.--The Mahe/s/varas (/S/aivas) maintain that\nthe five categories, viz. effect, cause, union, ritual, the end of pain,\nwere taught by the Lord Pa/s/upati (/S/iva) to the end of breaking the\nbonds of the animal (i.e. the soul); Pa/s/upati is, according to them,\nthe Lord, the operative cause.--Similarly, the Vai/s/eshikas and others\nalso teach, according to their various systems, that the Lord is somehow\nthe operative cause of the world.\n\nAgainst all these opinions the Sutra remarks 'the Lord, on account of\nthe inappropriateness.' I.e. it is not possible that the Lord as the\nruler of the pradhana and the soul should be the cause of the world, on\naccount of the inappropriateness of that doctrine. For if the Lord is\nsupposed to assign to the various classes of animate creatures low,\nintermediate, and high positions, according to his liking, it follows\nthat he is animated by hatred, passion, and so on, is hence like one of\nus, and is no real Lord. Nor can we get over this difficulty by assuming\nthat he makes his dispositions with a view to the merit and demerit of\nthe living beings; for that assumption would lead us to a logical\nsee-saw, the Lord as well as the works of living beings having to be\nconsidered in turns both as acting and as acted upon. This difficulty is\nnot removed by the consideration that the works of living beings and the\nresulting dispositions made by the Lord form a chain which has no\nbeginning; for in past time as well as in the present mutual\ninterdependence of the two took place, so that the beginningless series\nis like an endless chain of blind men leading other blind men. It is,\nmoreover, a tenet set forth by the Naiyayikas themselves that\n'imperfections have the characteristic of being the causes of action'\n(Nyaya Sutra I, 1, 18). Experience shows that all agents, whether they\nbe active for their own purposes or for the purposes of something else,\nare impelled to action by some imperfection. And even if it is admitted\nthat an agent even when acting for some extrinsic purpose is impelled by\nan intrinsic motive, your doctrine remains faulty all the same; for the\nLord is no longer a Lord, even if he is actuated by intrinsic motives\nonly (such as the desire of removing the painful feeling connected with\npity).--Your doctrine is finally inappropriate for that reason also that\nyou maintain the Lord to be a special kind of soul; for from that it\nfollows that he must be devoid of all activity.\n\n38. And on account of the impossibility of the connexion (of the Lord\nwith the souls and the pradhana).\n\nAgainst the doctrine which we are at present discussing there lies the\nfurther objection that a Lord distinct from the pradhana and the souls\ncannot be the ruler of the latter without being connected with them in a\ncertain way. But of what nature is that connexion to be? It cannot be\nconjunction (sa/m/yoga), because the Lord, as well as the pradhana and\nthe souls, is of infinite extent and devoid of parts. Nor can it be\ninherence, since it would be impossible to define who should be the\nabode and who the abiding thing. Nor is it possible to assume some other\nconnexion, the special nature of which would have to be inferred from\nthe effect, because the relation of cause and effect is just what is not\nsettled as yet[417].--How, then, it may be asked, do you--the\nVedantins--establish the relation of cause and effect (between the Lord\nand the world)?--There is, we reply, no difficulty in our case, as the\nconnexion we assume is that of identity (tadatmya). The adherent of\nBrahman, moreover, defines the nature of the cause, and so on, on the\nbasis of Scripture, and is therefore not obliged to render his tenets\nthroughout conformable to observation. Our adversary, on the other hand,\nwho defines the nature of the cause and the like according to instances\nfurnished by experience, may be expected to maintain only such doctrines\nas agree with experience. Nor can he put forward the claim that\nScripture, because it is the production of the omniscient Lord, may be\nused to confirm his doctrine as well as that of the Vedantin; for that\nwould involve him in a logical see-saw, the omniscience of the Lord\nbeing established on the doctrine of Scripture, and the authority of\nScripture again being established on the omniscience of the Lord.--For\nall these reasons the Sa@nkhya-yoga hypothesis about the Lord is devoid\nof foundation. Other similar hypotheses which likewise are not based on\nthe Veda are to be refuted by corresponding arguments.\n\n39. And on account of the impossibility of rulership (on the part of the\nLord).\n\nThe Lord of the argumentative philosophers is an untenable hypothesis,\nfor the following reason also.--Those philosophers are obliged to assume\nthat by his influence the Lord produces action in the pradhana, &c. just\nas the potter produces motion in the clay, &c. But this cannot be\nadmitted; for the pradhana, which is devoid of colour and other\nqualities, and therefore not an object of perception, is on that account\nof an altogether different nature from clay and the like, and hence\ncannot be looked upon as the object of the Lord's action.\n\n40. If you say that as the organs (are ruled by the soul so the pradhana\nis ruled by the Lord), we deny that on account of the enjoyment, &c.\n\nWell, the opponent might reply, let us suppose that the Lord rules the\npradhana in the same way as the soul rules the organ of sight and the\nother organs which are devoid of colour, and so on, and hence not\nobjects of perception.\n\nThis analogy also, we reply, proves nothing. For we infer that the\norgans are ruled by the soul, from the observed fact that the soul feels\npleasure, pain, and the like (which affect the soul through the organs).\nBut we do not observe that the Lord experiences pleasure, pain, &c.\ncaused by the pradhana. If the analogy between the pradhana and the\nbodily organs were a complete one, it would follow that the Lord is\naffected by pleasure and pain no less than the transmigrating souls are.\n\nOr else the two preceding Sutras may be explained in a different way.\nOrdinary experience teaches us that kings, who are the rulers of\ncountries, are never without some material abode, i.e. a body; hence, if\nwe wish to infer the existence of a general Lord from the analogy of\nearthly rulers, we must ascribe to him also some kind of body to serve\nas the substratum of his organs. But such a body cannot be ascribed to\nthe Lord, since all bodies exist only subsequently to the creation, not\npreviously to it. The Lord, therefore, is not able to act because devoid\nof a material substratum; for experience teaches us that action requires\na material substrate.--Let us then arbitrarily assume that the Lord\npossesses some kind of body serving as a substratum for his organs (even\npreviously to creation).--This assumption also will not do; for if the\nLord has a body he is subject to the sensations of ordinary\ntransmigratory souls, and thus no longer is the Lord.\n\n41. And (there would follow from that doctrine) either finite duration\nor absence of omniscience (on the Lord's part).\n\nThe hypothesis of the argumentative philosophers is invalid, for the\nfollowing reason also.--They teach that the Lord is omniscient and of\ninfinite duration, and likewise that the pradhana, as well as the\nindividual souls, is of infinite duration. Now, the omniscient Lord\neither defines the measure of the pradhana, the souls, and himself, or\ndoes not define it. Both alternatives subvert the doctrine under\ndiscussion. For, on the former alternative, the pradhana, the souls, and\nthe Lord, being all of them of definite measure, must necessarily be of\nfinite duration; since ordinary experience teaches that all things of\ndefinite extent, such as jars and the like, at some time cease to exist.\nThe numerical measure of pradhana, souls, and Lord is defined by their\nconstituting a triad, and the individual measure of each of them must\nlikewise be considered as defined by the Lord (because he is\nomniscient). The number of the souls is a high one[418]. From among this\nlimited number of souls some obtain release from the sa/m/sara, that\nmeans their sa/m/sara comes to an end, and their subjection to the\nsamsara comes to an end. Gradually all souls obtain release, and so\nthere will finally be an end of the entire sa/m/sara and the sa/m/sara\nstate of all souls. But the pradhana which is ruled by the Lord and\nwhich modifies itself for the purposes of the soul is what is meant by\nsa/m/sara. Hence, when the latter no longer exists, nothing is left for\nthe Lord to rule, and his omniscience and ruling power have no longer\nany objects. But if the pradhana, the souls, and the Lord, all have an\nend, it follows that they also have a beginning, and if they have a\nbeginning as well as an end, we are driven to the doctrine of a general\nvoid.--Let us then, in order to avoid these untoward conclusions,\nmaintain the second alternative, i.e. that the measure of the Lord\nhimself, the pradhana, and the souls, is not defined by the Lord.--But\nthat also is impossible, because it would compel us to abandon a tenet\ngranted at the outset, viz. that the Lord is omniscient.\n\nFor all these reasons the doctrine of the argumentative philosophers,\naccording to which the Lord is the operative cause of the world, appears\nunacceptable.\n\n42. On account of the impossibility of the origination (of the\nindividual soul from the highest Lord, the doctrine of the Bhagavatas\ncannot be accepted).\n\nWe have, in what precedes, refuted the opinion of those who think that\nthe Lord is not the material cause but only the ruler, the operative\ncause of the world. We are now going to refute the doctrine of those\naccording to whom he is the material as well as the operative\ncause.--But, it may be objected, in the previous portions of the present\nwork a Lord of exactly the same nature, i.e. a Lord who is the material,\nas well as the operative, cause of the world, has been ascertained on\nthe basis of Scripture, and it is a recognised principle that Sm/ri/ti,\nin so far as it agrees with Scripture, is authoritative; why then should\nwe aim at controverting the doctrine stated?--It is true, we reply, that\na part of the system which we are going to discuss agrees with the\nVedanta system, and hence affords no matter for controversy; another\npart of the system, however, is open to objection, and that part we\nintend to attack.\n\nThe so-called Bhagavatas are of opinion that the one holy (bhagavat)\nVasudeva, whose nature is pure knowledge, is what really exists, and\nthat he, dividing himself fourfold, appears in four forms (vyuha), as\nVasudeva, Sa@nkarsha/n/a, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha. Vasudeva denotes the\nhighest Self, Sa@nkarsha/n/a the individual soul, Pradyumna the mind\n(manas), Aniruddha the principle of egoity (aha@nkara). Of these four\nVasudeva constitutes the ultimate causal essence, of which the three\nothers are the effects.--The believer after having worshipped Vasudeva\nfor a hundred years by means of approach to the temple (abhigamana),\nprocuring of things to be offered (upadana), oblation (ijya), recitation\nof prayers, &c. (svadhyaya), and devout meditation (yoga), passes beyond\nall affliction and reaches the highest Being.\n\nConcerning this system we remark that we do not intend to controvert the\ndoctrine that Naraya/n/a, who is higher than the Undeveloped, who is the\nhighest Self, and the Self of all, reveals himself by dividing himself\nin multiple ways; for various scriptural passages, such as 'He is\nonefold, he is threefold' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2), teach us that the\nhighest Self appears in manifold forms. Nor do we mean to object to the\ninculcation of unceasing concentration of mind on the highest Being\nwhich appears in the Bhagavata doctrine under the forms of reverential\napproach, &c.; for that we are to meditate on the Lord we know full well\nfrom Sm/ri/ti and Scripture. We, however, must take exception to the\ndoctrine that Sa@nkarsha/n/a springs from Vasudeva, Pradyumna from\nSa@nkarsha/n/a, Aniruddha from Pradyumna. It is not possible that from\nVasudeva, i.e. the highest Self, there should originate Sa@nkarsha/n/a,\ni.e. the individual soul; for if such were the case, there would attach\nto the soul non-permanency, and all the other imperfections which belong\nto things originated. And thence release, which consists in reaching the\nhighest Being, could not take place; for the effect is absorbed only by\nentering into its cause.--That the soul is not an originated thing, the\nteacher will prove later on (II, 3, 17). For this reason the Bhagavata\nhypothesis is unacceptable.\n\n43. And (it is) not (observed that) the instrument is produced from the\nagent.\n\nThe Bhagavata hypothesis is to be rejected for that reason also, that\nobservation never shows us an instrument, such as a hatchet and the\nlike, to spring from an agent such as Devadatta, or any other workman.\nBut the Bhagavatas teach that from an agent, viz. the individual soul\ntermed Sa@nkarsha/n/a, there springs its instrument, viz. the internal\norgan termed Pradyumna, and again from this offspring of the agent\nanother instrument, viz. the aha@nkara termed Aniruddha. Such doctrines\ncannot be settled without observed instances. And we do not meet with\nany scriptural passage in their favour.\n\n44. Or (if) in consequence of the existence of knowledge, &c. (Vasudeva,\n&c. be taken as Lords), yet there is non-exclusion of that (i.e. the\nobjection raised in Sutra 42).\n\nLet us then--the Bhagavatas may say--understand by Sa@nkarsha/n/a, and\nso on, not the individual soul, the mind, &c., but rather Lords, i.e.\npowerful beings distinguished by all the qualities characteristic of\nrulers, such as pre-eminence of knowledge and ruling capacity, strength,\nvalour, glory. All these are Vasudevas free from faults, without a\nsubstratum (not sprung from pradhana), without any imperfections. Hence\nthe objection urged in Sutra 42 does not apply.\n\nEven on this interpretation of your doctrine, we reply, the\n'non-exclusion of that,' i.e. the non-exclusion of the impossibility of\norigination, can be established.--Do you, in the first place, mean to\nsay that the four individual Lords, Vasudeva, and so on, have the same\nattributes, but do not constitute one and the same Self?--If so, you\ncommit the fault of uselessly assuming more than one Lord, while all the\nwork of the Lord can be done by one. Moreover, you offend thereby\nagainst your own principle, according to which there is only one real\nessence, viz. the holy Vasudeva.--Or do you perhaps mean to say that\nfrom the one highest Being there spring those four forms possessing\nequal attributes?--In that case the objection urged in Sutra 42 remains\nvalid. For Sa@nkarsha/n/a cannot be produced from Vasudeva, nor\nPradyumna from Sa@nkarsha/n/a, nor Aniruddha from Pradyumna, since (the\nattributes of all of them being the same) there is no supereminence of\nany one of them. Observation shows that the relation of cause and effect\nrequires some superiority on the part of the cause--as, for instance, in\nthe case of the clay and the jar (where the cause is more extensive than\nthe effect)--and that without such superiority the relation is simply\nimpossible. But the followers of the Pa/nk/aratra do not acknowledge any\ndifference founded on superiority of knowledge, power, &c. between\nVasudeva and the other Lords, but simply say that they all are forms of\nVasudeva, without any special distinctions. The forms of Vasudeva cannot\nproperly be limited to four, as the whole world, from Brahman down to a\nblade of grass, is understood to be a manifestation of the supreme\nBeing.\n\n45. And on account of contradictions.\n\nMoreover, manifold contradictions are met with in the Bhagavata system,\nwith reference to the assumption of qualities and their bearers.\nEminence of knowledge and ruling capacity, strength, valour, and glory\nare enumerated as qualities, and then they are in some other place\nspoken of as Selfs, holy Vasudevas, and so on.--Moreover, we meet with\npassages contradictory of the Veda. The following passage, for instance,\nblames the Veda, 'Not having found the highest bliss in the Vedas\n/S/a/nd/ilya studied this /s/astra.'--For this reason also the\nBhagavata doctrine cannot be accepted.\n\nNotes:\n\n[Footnote 314: The characteristics of Goodness, Passion, and Darkness,\nthe three constituent elements (gu/n/a) of the pradhana. Sa. Ka. 12,\n13.]\n\n[Footnote 315: Viz. the great principle (mahat). ahanka a, &c. Sa. Ka.\n3.]\n\n[Footnote 316: The arguments here referred to are enumerated in the Sa.\nKa. 15: Sa. Sutras I, 189 ff.]\n\n[Footnote 317: If we attempt to infer the nature of the universal cause\nfrom its effects on the ground of parallel instances, as, for instance,\nthat of an earthen jar whose material cause is clay, we must remember\nthat the jar has sprung from clay not without the co-operation of an\nintelligent being, viz. the potter.]\n\n[Footnote 318: As had been asserted above for the purpose of inferring\ntherefrom, according to the principle of the equality of cause and\neffect, the existence of the three constituents of the pradhana.]\n\n[Footnote 319: And a thing cannot consist of that of which it is the\ncause.]\n\n[Footnote 320: Which differences cannot be reconciled with the Sa@nkhya\nhypothesis of the object itself consisting of either pleasure or pain,\n&c.--'If things consisted in themselves of pleasure, pain, &c., then\nsandal ointment (which is cooling, and on that account pleasant in\nsummer) would be pleasant in winter also; for sandal never is anything\nbut sandal.--And as thistles never are anything but thistles they ought,\non the Sa@nkhya hypothesis, to be eaten with enjoyment not only by\ncamels but by men also.' Bha.]\n\n[Footnote 321: Sa/m/sargapurvakatvaprasa@nga iti gu/n/ana/m/\nsa/m/s/ri/sh/t/anekavastuprak/ri/tikatvaprasaktir ity artha/h/. An. Gi.]\n\n[Footnote 322: For they limit one another.]\n\n[Footnote 323: To proceed to the argument 'from the separateness of\ncause and effect' (Sa. Ka. 15).]\n\n[Footnote 324: The next sentences furnish the answer to the question how\nthe intelligent Self is known at all if it is not the object of\nperception.--Pratyakshatvabhave katham atmasiddhir ity asa@nkya anumanad\nity aha, prav/ri/ttiti. Anumanasiddhasya /k/etanasya na\npravr/i/ttya/s/rayateti dar/s/ayitum evakara/h/. Katham anumanam ity\napekshaya/m/ tatprakara/m/; su/k/ayati kevaleti. Vailaksha/n/ya/m/\npra/n/adimattvam. An. Gi.]\n\n[Footnote 325: Viz. that whatever moves or acts does so under the\ninfluence of intelligence.--Sadhyapakshanikshiptatva/m/ sadhyavati\npakshe pravish/t/atvam eva ta/k/ /k/a sapakshanizkshiptatvasyapy\nupalaksha/n/am, anpanyaso na vyabhi/k/arabhumin ity artha/h/. An. Gi.]\n\n[Footnote 326: It might be held that for the transformation of grass\ninto milk no other cause is required than the digestive heat of the\ncow's body; but a reflecting person will acknowledge that there also the\nomniscient Lord is active. Bha.]\n\n[Footnote 327: Anadheyati/s/ayasya\nsukhadukhapraptiparihararupati/s/aya/s/unyasyety artha/h/. An. Gi.]\n\n[Footnote 328: For the soul as being of an entirely inactive nature\ncannot of itself aim at release, and the pradhana aims--ex\nhypothesi--only at the soul's undergoing varied experience.]\n\n[Footnote 329: I.e. for the various items constituting enjoyment or\nexperience.]\n\n[Footnote 330: T/ri/tiyes'pi katipaya/s/abdadyupalabdhir va\nsamastatadupalabdhir va bhoga iti vikalpyadye sarvesham ekadaiva\nmukti/h/ syad iti manvano dvitiya/m/ pratyaha ubhayarthateti. An. Gi.]\n\n[Footnote 331: The MSS. of Ananda Giri omit sa/m/saranu/kkh/edat; the\nBhamati's reading is: Sarga/s/aktyanu/kkh/edavad\nd/ri/k/s/aktyanu/kkh/edat.]\n\n[Footnote 332: On the theory that the soul is the cause of the\npradhana's activity we again have to ask whether the pradhana acts for\nthe soul's enjoyment or for its release, &c.]\n\n[Footnote 333: Anantaro dosho mahadadikaryotpadayoga/h/. An. Gi.]\n\n[Footnote 334: In the former case the five intellectual senses are\nlooked upon as mere modifications of the sense of touch.]\n\n[Footnote 335: Buddhi in the latter case being the generic name for\nbuddhi, aha@nkara, and manas.]\n\n[Footnote 336: Lit. that which burns and that which is burned, which\nliteral rendering would perhaps be preferable throughout. As it is, the\ncontext has necessitated its retention in some places.--The sufferers\nare the individual souls, the cause of suffering the world in which the\nsouls live.]\n\n[Footnote 337: In the case of the lamp, light and heat are admittedly\nessential; hence the Vedantin is supposed to bring forward the sea with\nits waves, and so on, as furnishing a case where attributes pass away\nwhile the substance remains.]\n\n[Footnote 338: 'Artha,' a useful or beneficial thing, an object of\ndesire.]\n\n[Footnote 339: In reality neither suffering nor sufferers exist, as the\nVedantin had pointed out in the first sentences of his reply; but there\ncan of course be no doubt as to who suffers and what causes suffering in\nthe vyavaharika-state, i.e. the phenomenal world.]\n\n[Footnote 340: In order to explain thereby how the soul can experience\npain.]\n\n[Footnote 341: And that would be against the Sa@nkhya dogma of the\nsoul's essential purity.]\n\n[Footnote 342: So that the fact of suffering which cannot take place\napart from an intelligent principle again remains unexplained.]\n\n[Footnote 343: Atmanas tapte sattve pratibimitatvad yukta taptir iti\n/s/a@nkate sattveti. An. Gi.]\n\n[Footnote 344: For it then indicates no more than a fictitious\nresemblance.]\n\n[Footnote 345: The Sa@nkhya Purvapakshin had objected to the Vedanta\ndoctrine that, on the latter, we cannot account for the fact known from\nordinary experience that there are beings suffering pain and things\ncausing suffering.--The Vedantin in his turn endeavours to show that on\nthe Sa@nkhya doctrine also the fact of suffering remains inexplicable,\nand is therefore to be considered not real, but fictitious merely, the\nproduct of Nescience.]\n\n[Footnote 346: Not only 'suffering as it were,' as it had been called\nabove.]\n\n[Footnote 347: For real suffering cannot be removed by mere distinctive\nknowledge on which--according to the Sa@nkhya also--release depends.]\n\n[Footnote 348: This in answer to the remark that possibly the\nconjunction of soul and pradhana may come to an end when the influence\nof Darkness declines, it being overpowered by the knowledge of Truth.]\n\n[Footnote 349: I.e. according as they are atoms of earth, water, fire,\nor air.]\n\n[Footnote 350: Parima/nd/ala, spherical is the technical term for the\nspecific form of extension of the atoms, and, secondarily, for the atoms\nthemselves. The latter must apparently be imagined as infinitely small\nspheres. Cp. Vi/s/. Sut. VII, 1, 20.]\n\n[Footnote 351: Viz. during the period of each pralaya. At that time all\nthe atoms are isolated and motionless.]\n\n[Footnote 352: When the time for a new creation has come.]\n\n[Footnote 353: The &c. implies the activity of the Lord.]\n\n[Footnote 354: The inherent (material) cause of an atomic compound are\nthe constituent atoms, the non-inheient cause the conjunction of those\natoms, the operative causes the ad/ri/sh/ta/ and the Lord's activity\nwhich make them enter into conjunction.]\n\n[Footnote 355: I.e. in all cases the special form of extension of the\neffect depends not on the special extension of the cause, but on the\nnumber of atoms composing the cause (and thereby the effect).]\n\n[Footnote 356: In order to escape the conclusion that the non-acceptance\nof the doctrine of Brahman involves the abandonment of a fundamental\nVai/s/eshika principle.]\n\n[Footnote 357: I.e. forms of extension different from sphericity, &c.]\n\n[Footnote 358: The first of the three Sutras quoted comprises, in the\npresent text of the Vai/s/eshika-sutras, only the following words,\n'Kara/n/abahutva/k/ /k/a;' the /k/a of the Sutra implying, according to\nthe commentators, mahattva and pra/k/aya.--According to the\nVai/s/eshikas the form of extension called a/n/u, minute, has for its\ncause the dvitva inherent in the material causes, i.e. the two atoms\nfrom which the minute binary atomic compound originates.--The form of\nextension called mahat, big, has different causes, among them bahutva,\ni.e. the plurality residing in the material causes of the resulting\n'big' thing; the cause of the mahattva of a ternary atomic compound, for\ninstance, is the tritva inherent in the three constituent atoms. In\nother cases mahattva is due to antecedent mahattva, in others to\npra/k/aya, i.e. accumulation. See the Upaskara on Vai/s/. Sut. VII, 1,\n9; 10.]\n\n[Footnote 359: I.e. if the Vai/s/eshikas have to admit that it is the\nnature of sphericity, &c. not to produce like effects, the Vedantin also\nmay maintain that Brahman produces an unlike effect, viz. the\nnon-intelligent world.]\n\n[Footnote 360: Like other things, let us say a piece of cloth, which\nconsists of parts.]\n\n[Footnote 361: Or, more particularly, to the conjunction of the atoms\nwith the souls to which merit and demerit belong.--Ad/ri/sh/t/apeksham\nad/ri/sh/t/avatkshetraj/n/asa/my/ogapeksham iti yavat. An. Gi.]\n\n[Footnote 362: According to the Vai/s/eshikas intelligence is not\nessential to the soul, but a mere adventitious quality arising only when\nthe soul is joined to an internal organ.]\n\n[Footnote 363: The soul being all-pervading.]\n\n[Footnote 364: Which is inadmissible on Vai/s/eshika principles, because\nsa/m/yoga as being a quality is connected with the things it joins by\nsamavaya.]\n\n[Footnote 365: Viz. from those things which are united by conjunction.\nThe argument is that conjunction as an independent third entity requires\nanother connexion to connect it with the two things related to each\nother in the way of conjunction.]\n\n[Footnote 366: Viz. the absolute difference of samavaya and sa/m/yoga\nfrom the terms which they connect.]\n\n[Footnote 367: Action (karman), &c. also standing in the samavaya\nrelation to their substrates.]\n\n[Footnote 368: Our Vai/s/eshika-sutras read 'pratishedhabhava/h/;' but\nas all MSS. of Sa@nkara have 'pratishedhabhava/h/' I have kept the\nlatter reading and translated according to Anandagiri's explanation:\nKaryam anityam iti karye vireshato nityatvanishedho na syad yadi\nkara/n/eszpy anityatvam atozs/n/una/m/ kara/n/ana/m/ nityateti\nsutrartha/h/.]\n\n[Footnote 369: Because they also are not perceptible; the ternary\naggregates, the so-called trasare/n/us, constituting the minima\nperceptibilia.]\n\n[Footnote 370: As they have no cause which could either be disintegrated\nor destroyed.]\n\n[Footnote 371: This according to the Vedanta view. If atoms existed they\nmight have originated from avidya by a mere pari/n/ama and might again\nbe dissolved into avidya, without either disintegration or destruction\nof their cause taking place.]\n\n[Footnote 372: The Sa@nkhyas looking on everything (except the soul) as\nbeing the pradhana in various forms.--There is no need of assuming with\nGovindananda that by the Sa@nkhya of the text we have to understand the\nVedanta.]\n\n[Footnote 373: Yayor dvayor madhya ekam avina/s/yad apara/s/ritam\nevavatish/th/ate tav ayutasiddhau yathavayavavayavinau.]\n\n[Footnote 374: The connexion of cause and effect is of course samavaya.]\n\n[Footnote 375: If the effect can exist before having entered into\nconnexion with the cause, the subsequent connexion of the two is no\nlonger samavaya but sa/m/yoga; and that contradicts a fundamental\nVai/s/eshika principle.]\n\n[Footnote 376: This clause replies to the objection that only those\nconnexions which have been produced by previous motion are to be\nconsidered conjunctions.]\n\n[Footnote 377: A clause meant to preclude the assumption that the\npermanent existence of the things connected involves the permanent\nexistence of the connexion.]\n\n[Footnote 378: It having been shown above that atoms cannot enter into\nsa/m/yoga with each other, it is shown now that sa/m/yoga of the soul\nwith the atoms cannot be the cause of the motion of the latter, and that\nsa/m/yoga of soul and manas cannot be the cause of cognition.]\n\n[Footnote 379: Ekasambandhyakarsha/n/e yatra\nsambandhyantarakarsha/n/a/m/ tatra sa/m/slesha/h/, sa tu savayavana/m/\njatukash/th/adina/m/ d/ri/sh/t/o na tu niravayavai/h/ savayavanam, ato\ndvya/n/ukasya savayavasya niravayavena parama/n/una sa nopapadyate.\nBrahmavidyabh.]\n\n[Footnote 380: In answer to the question how, in that case, the\npractically recognised relation of abode, &c. existing between the cause\nand the effect is accounted for.]\n\n[Footnote 381: For they must in that case have a northern end, an\neastern end, &c.]\n\n[Footnote 382: And that on that account the atoms which he considers as\nthe ultimate simple constituents of matter cannot be decomposed.]\n\n[Footnote 383: Because according to their opinion difference of size\nconstitutes difference of substance, so that the continuous change of\nsize in animal bodies, for instance, involves the continual perishing of\nold and the continual origination of new substances.]\n\n[Footnote 384: The following notes on Bauddha doctrines are taken\nexclusively from the commentaries on the /S/a@nkarabhashya, and no\nattempt has been made to contrast or reconcile the Brahminical accounts\nof Bauddha psychology with the teaching of genuine Bauddha books. Cp. on\nthe chief sects of the Buddhistic philosophers the Bauddha chapter of\nthe Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha.--The Nihilists are the Madhyamikas; the\nIdealists are the Yoga/k/aras; the Sautrantikas and the Vaibhashikas\ntogether constitute the class of the Realists.--I subjoin the account\ngiven of those sects in the Brahmavidyabhara/n/a.--Buddhasya hi\nmadhyamika-yoga/k/ara-sautrantika-vaibhashikasamj/n/akas /k/atvara/h/\n/s/ishya/h/. Tatra buddhena prathama/m/ yan prati sarva/m/ /s/unyam ity\nupadish/t/a/m/ te madhyamikas te hi guru/n/a yathokta/m/ tathaiva\n/s/raddhaya g/ri/hitavanta iti k/ri/tva napak/ri/sh/t/a/h/ puna/s/ /k/a\ntaduktasyarthasya buddhyanusare/n/akshepasyak/ri/tatvan\nnotk/ri/sh/t/abuddhaya iti madhyamika/h/. Anyais tu /s/ishyair guru/n/a\nsarva/s/unyatva upadish/t/e j/n/anatiriktasya sarvasya /s/unyatvam astu\nnameti guruktir yoga iti bauddai/h/ paribhashitopeta/h/ tad upari /k/a\nj/n/anasya tu /s/unyatva/m/ na sa/m/bhavati tathatve\njagadandhyaprasa@ngat sunyasiddher apy asa/m/bhava/k/ /k/eti buddhamate\na/k/aratvena paribhashita akshepos'pi k/ri/ta iti yoga/k/ara/h/\nvij/n/anamatrastitvavadina/h/. Tadanataram anyai/h/ /s/ishyai/h/\npratitisiddhasya katha/m/ /s/unyatva/m/ vaktu/m/ /s/akyam ato j/n/anavad\nvahyarthos'pi satya ity ukte tarhi tathaiva sos'stu, para/m/ tu so\ns'numeyo na tu pratyaksha ity ukte tatha@ngik/ri/tyaiva/m/ /s/ishyamatim\nanus/ri/tya kiyatparyanta/m/ sutra/m/ bhavishyatiti tai/h/ p/ri/sh/t/am\natas te sautrantika/h/. Anye punar yady aya/m/ gha/t/a iti pratitibalad\nvahyos'rtha upeyate tarhi tasya eva pratiter aparokshatvat sa katha/m/\nparokshos'to vahyos'rtho na pratyaksha iti bhasha viruddhety akshipann\natas te vaibhashika/h/.]\n\n[Footnote 385: The rupaskandha comprises the senses and their objects,\ncolour, &c.; the sense-organs were above called bhautika, they here\nre-appear as /k/aittika on account of their connexion with thought.\nTheir objects likewise are classed as /k/aittika in so far as they are\nperceived by the senses.--The vij/n/anaskandha comprises the series of\nself-cognitions (ahamaham ity alayavj/n/anapravaha/h/), according to all\ncommentators; and in addition, according to the Brahmavidyabhara/n/a,\nthe knowledge, determinate and indeterminate, of external things\n(savikalpaka/m/ nirvikalpaka/m/ /k/a prav/ri/ttivij/n/anasamj/n/itam).--\nThe vedanaskandha comprises pleasure, pain, &c.--The samj/n/askandha\ncomprises the cognition of things by their names (gaur a/s/va\nityadi/s/abdasamjalpitapratyaya/h/, An. Gi.; gaur a/s/va ityeva/m/\nnamavi/s/ish/t/asavikalpaka/h/ pratyaya/h/, Go. An.; sa/m/j/n/a\nyaj/n/adattadipadatadullekhi savikalpapratyayo va, dvitiyapakshe\nvij/n/anapadena savikalpapratyayo na grahy/h/, Brahmavidyabh.). The\nsa/m/skaraskandha comprises passion, aversion, &c., dharma and\nadharma.--Compare also the Bhamati.--The vij/n/anaskandha is /k/itta,\nthe other skandhas /k/aitta.]\n\n[Footnote 386: It has to be kept in view that the sarvastitvavadins as\nwell as the other Bauddha sects teach the momentariness (ksha/n/ikatva),\nthe eternal flux of everything that exists, and are on that ground\ncontroverted by the upholders of the permanent Brahman.]\n\n[Footnote 387: Mind, on the Bauddha doctrine, presupposes the existence\nof an aggregate of atoms, viz. the body.]\n\n[Footnote 388: In consequence of which no release could take place.]\n\n[Footnote 389: The Brahmavidyabhara/n/a explains the last clause--from\nksha/n/ikatva/k/ /k/a--somewhat differently: Api /k/a parama/n/unam api\nksha/n/ikatvabhyupagaman melana/m/ na sambhavati, parama/n/una/m/\nmelana/m/ parama/n/ukriyadhinam, tatha /k/a svakriya/m/ prati\nparama/n/una/m/ kara/n/atvat kriyapuraksha/n/e parama/n/ubhir bhavyam\nkriya /s/rayataya kriyaksha/n/eszpi tesham avasthanam apekshitam eva/m/\nmelanakshaneszpi, nahi melana/s/rayasyabhave melanarupa prav/ri/ttir\nupapadyate, tatha /k/a sthiraparama/n/usadhya melanarupa prav/ri/tti/h/\nkatha/m/ tesham ksha/n/ikatve bhavet.--Ananda Giri also divides and\ntranslates differently from the translation in the text.]\n\n[Footnote 390: The kara/n/atvat of /S/a@nkara explains the pratyayatvat\nof the Sutra; karya/m/ praty ayate janakatvena ga/kkh/ati.]\n\n[Footnote 391: The commentators agree on the whole in their explanations\nof the terms of this series.--The following is the substance of the\ncomment of the Brahmavidyabhara/n/a: Nescience is the error of\nconsidering that which is momentary, impure, &c. to be permanent, pure,\n&c.--Impression (affection, sa/m/skara) comprises desire, aversion, &c.,\nand the activity caused by them.--Knowledge (vij/n/ana) is the\nself-consciousness (aham ity alayavij/n/anasya v/ri/ttilabha/h/)\nspringing up in the embryo.--Name and form is the rudimentary flake--or\nbubble-like condition of the embryo.--The abode of the six\n(sha/d/ayatana) is the further developed stage of the embryo in which\nthe latter is the abode of the six senses.--Touch (spar/s/a) is the\nsensations of cold, warmth, &c. on the embryo's part.--Feeling (vedana)\nthe sensations of pleasure and pain resulting therefrom.--Desire\n(t/ri/sh/n/a) is the wish to enjoy the pleasurable sensations and to\nshun the painful ones.--Activity (upadana) is the effort resulting from\ndesire,--Birth is the passing out from the uterus.--Species (jati) is\nthe class of beings to which the new-born creature belongs.--Decay\n(jara).--Death (mara/n/am) is explained as the condition of the creature\nwhen about to die (mumursha).--Grief (/s/oka) the frustration of wishes\nconnected therewith.--Lament (paridevanam) the lamentations on that\naccount.--Pain (du/h/kha) is such pain as caused by the five\nsenses.--Durmanas is mental affliction.--The 'and the like' implies\ndeath, the departure to another world and the subsequent return from\nthere.]\n\n[Footnote 392: Ananda Giri and Go. Ananda explain:\nA/s/raya/s/rayibhuteshv iti bhokt/ri/vi/s/esha/n/am\nad/ri/sh/t/a/s/rayeshv ity artha/h/.--The Brahrma-vidyabhara/n/a says:\nNityeshv a/s/raya/s/rayibhuteshv a/n/ushv abhyupagamyamaneshu\nbhokt/ri/shu /k/a satsv ity anvaya/h/. A/s/raya/s/rayibhuteshv ity\nasyopakaryopakarakabhavaprapteshv ity artha/h/.--And with regard to the\nsubsequent a/s/raya/s/rayi/s/unyeshu: a/s/raya/s/rayitva/s/unyeshu,\naya/m/ bhava/h/, sthireshu parama/n/ushu yadanvaye parama/n/una/m/\nsa/m/ghatapatti/h/ yadvyatireke /k/a na tad upakarakam upakarya/h/\nparama/n/ava/h/ yena tatk/ri/to bhoga/h/ prarthyate sa tatra karteti\ngrahitu/m/ /s/akyate, ksha/n/ikeshu tu param/n/ushu\nanvayavyatirekagrahasyanekaksha/n/asadhyasyasa/m/bhavan\nnopakaryopakarakabhavo nirdharayitu/m/ /s/akya/h/.--Ananda Giri remarks\non the latter: Ad/ri/sh/t/a/s/rayakart/ri/rahityam aha/s/rayeti. Another\nreading appears to be a/s/aya/s/raya/s/unyeshu.]\n\n[Footnote 393: Bauddhana/m/ ksha/n/apadena gha/t/adir eva padartho\nvyavahriyate na tu tadatinkta/h/ ka/sk/it ksha/n/o nama halosti.\nBrahmavidyabh.]\n\n[Footnote 394: And whereupon then could be established the difference of\nmere efficient causes such as the potter's staff, &c., and material\ncauses such as clay, &c.?]\n\n[Footnote 395: These four causes are the so-called defining cause\n(adhipati-pratyaya), the auxiliary cause (sahakaripratyaya), the\nimmediate cause (samanantarapratyaya), and the substantial cause\n(alambanapratyaya).--I extract the explanation from the\nBrahmavidyabhara/n/a: Adhipatir indriya/m/ tad dhi /k/akshuradirupam\nutpannasya j/n/anasya rupadivishayata/m/ niya/kkh/ati niyamaka/s/ /k/a\nlokedhipatir ity u/k/yate. Sahakari aloka/h/.\nSamanantarapratyaya/h/purvaj/n/anam, bauddhamate hi\nksha/n/ikaj/n/anasa/m/tatau purvaj/n/anam uttaraj/n/asya karana/m/ tad\neva /k/a mana ity u/k/yate. Alambana/m/ gha/t/adi/h/. Etan hetun pratiya\nprapya /k/akshuradijanyam ity adi.]\n\n[Footnote 396: Sa/m/skara iti, tanmate purvaksha/n/a eva hetubhuta/h/\nsa/m/skaro vasaneti /k/a vyavahriyate karya/m/ tu tadvishayataya\nkarmavyutpattya sa/m/skara/h/, tatha /k/a karyakara/n/atmaka/m/ sarva/m/\nbhavarupa/m/ ksha/n/ikam iti pratij/n/artha/h/. Brahmavidyabhara/n/a.]\n\n[Footnote 397: As when a man smashes a jar having previously formed the\nintention of doing so.]\n\n[Footnote 398: I.e. the insensible continual decay of things.--Viparita\niti pratiksha/n/a/m/ gha/t/adina/m/ yuktya sadhyamanoku/s/alair\navagantum a/s/akya/h/ sukshmo vina/s/opratisa/m/khyanirodha/h/.\nBrahmav.]\n\n[Footnote 399: A series of momentary existences constituting a chain of\ncauses and effects can never be entirely stopped; for the last momentary\nexistence must be supposed either to produce its effect or not to\nproduce it. In the former case the series is continued; the latter\nalternative would imply that the last link does not really exist, since\nthe Bauddhas define the satta of a thing as its causal efficiency (cp.\nSarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha). And the non-existence of the last link\nwould retrogressively lead to the non-existence of the whole series.]\n\n[Footnote 400: Thus clay is recognised as such whether it appears in the\nform of a jar, or of the potsherds into which the jar is broken, or of\nthe powder into which the potsherds are ground.--Analogously we infer\nthat even things which seem to vanish altogether, such as a drop of\nwater which has fallen on heated iron, yet continue to exist in some\nform.]\n\n[Footnote 401: The knowledge that everything is transitory, pain, &c.]\n\n[Footnote 402: What does enable us to declare that there is\navara/n/abhava in one place and not in another? Space; which therefore\nis something real.]\n\n[Footnote 403: If the cause were able, without having undergone any\nchange, to produce effects, it would at the same moment produce all the\neffects of which it is capable.--Cp. on this point the\nSarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha.]\n\n[Footnote 404: This is added to obviate the remark that it is not a\ngeneral rule that effects are of the same nature as their causes, and\nthat therefore, after all, existent things may spring from\nnon-existence.]\n\n[Footnote 405: According to the vij/n/anavadin the cognition specialised\nby its various contents, such as, for instance, the idea of blue colour\nis the object of knowledge; the cognition in so far as it is\nconsciousness (avabhasa) is the result of knowledge; the cognition in so\nfar as it is power is mana, knowledge; in so far as it is the abode of\nthat power it is pramat/ri/, knowing subject.]\n\n[Footnote 406: If they are said to be different from the atoms they can\nno longer be considered as composed of atoms; if they are non-different\nfrom atoms they cannot be the cause of the mental representations of\ngross non-atomic bodies.]\n\n[Footnote 407: Avayavavayavirupo vahyosrtho nasti /k/en ma bhud\njativyaktyadirupas tu syad ity a/s/rankyaha evam iti. Jatyadina/m/\nvyaktyadinam /k/atyantabhinnatve svatantryaprasa@ngad atyantabhinnatve\ntadvadevatadbhavad bhinnabhinnatvasya viruddhatvad avayavavayavibhedavaj\ngativyaktyadibhedosxpi nastity artha/h/.]\n\n[Footnote 408: Vasana, above translated by mental impression, strictly\nmeans any member of the infinite series of ideas which precedes the\npresent actual idea.]\n\n[Footnote 409: For all these doctrines depend on the comparison of ideas\nwhich is not possible unless there be a permanent knowing subject in\naddition to the transitory ideas.]\n\n[Footnote 410: The vij/n/anaskandha comprises vij/n/anas of two\ndifferent kinds, the alayavij/n/ana and the prav/ri/ttivij/n/ana. The\nalayavij/n/ana comprises the series of cognitions or ideas which refer\nto the ego; the prav/ri/ttivij/n/ana comprises those ideas which refer\nto apparently external objects, such as colour and the like. The ideas\nof the latter class are due to the mental impressions left by the\nantecedent ideas of the former class.]\n\n[Footnote 411: Viz. in the present case the principle that what presents\nitself to consciousness is not non-existent.]\n\n[Footnote 412: Soul and non-soul are the enjoying souls and the objects\nof their enjoyment; asrava is the forward movement of the senses towards\ntheir objects; sa/m/vara is the restraint of the activity of the senses;\nnirjara is self-mortification by which sin is destroyed; the works\nconstitute bondage; and release is the ascending of the soul, after\nbondage has ceased, to the highest regions.--For the details, see\nProfessor Cowell's translation of the Arhata chapter of the\nSarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha.]\n\n[Footnote 413: Cp. translation of Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha, p. 59.]\n\n[Footnote 414: And so impugn the doctrine of the one eternal Brahman.]\n\n[Footnote 415: Cp. Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha translation, p. 58.]\n\n[Footnote 416: The inference being that the initial and intervening\nsizes of the soul must be permanent because they are sizes of the soul,\nlike its final size.]\n\n[Footnote 417: The special nature of the connexion between the Lord and\nthe pradhana and the souls cannot be ascertained from the world\nconsidered as the effect of the pradhana acted upon by the Lord; for\nthat the world is the effect of the pradhana is a point which the\nVedantins do not accept as proved.]\n\n[Footnote 418: I.e. a high one, but not an indefinite one; since the\nomniscient Lord knows its measure.]","title":"The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Sankaracarya: Sacred Books of the East, Volume 1","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":202130}