{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_1635/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_1635","id":"gutenberg_1635","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1635","summary":null,"tags":["Aesthetics, Ancient","Category: Classics of Literature","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Classical literature","Homer. Iliad","Philosophy","Poetics -- History -- To 1500"],"text":"Produced by Sue Asscher\n\n\n\n\n\nION\n\nBy Plato\n\n\nTranslated by Benjamin Jowett\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION.\n\nThe Ion is the shortest, or nearly the shortest, of all the writings\nwhich bear the name of Plato, and is not authenticated by any early\nexternal testimony. The grace and beauty of this little work supply the\nonly, and perhaps a sufficient, proof of its genuineness. The plan is\nsimple; the dramatic interest consists entirely in the contrast\nbetween the irony of Socrates and the transparent vanity and childlike\nenthusiasm of the rhapsode Ion. The theme of the Dialogue may possibly\nhave been suggested by the passage of Xenophon's Memorabilia in which\nthe rhapsodists are described by Euthydemus as 'very precise about the\nexact words of Homer, but very idiotic themselves.' (Compare Aristotle,\nMet.)\n\nIon the rhapsode has just come to Athens; he has been exhibiting in\nEpidaurus at the festival of Asclepius, and is intending to exhibit\nat the festival of the Panathenaea. Socrates admires and envies the\nrhapsode's art; for he is always well dressed and in good company--in\nthe company of good poets and of Homer, who is the prince of them. In\nthe course of conversation the admission is elicited from Ion that his\nskill is restricted to Homer, and that he knows nothing of inferior\npoets, such as Hesiod and Archilochus;--he brightens up and is wide\nawake when Homer is being recited, but is apt to go to sleep at the\nrecitations of any other poet. 'And yet, surely, he who knows the\nsuperior ought to know the inferior also;--he who can judge of the good\nspeaker is able to judge of the bad. And poetry is a whole; and he\nwho judges of poetry by rules of art ought to be able to judge of\nall poetry.' This is confirmed by the analogy of sculpture, painting,\nflute-playing, and the other arts. The argument is at last brought home\nto the mind of Ion, who asks how this contradiction is to be solved. The\nsolution given by Socrates is as follows:--\n\nThe rhapsode is not guided by rules of art, but is an inspired person\nwho derives a mysterious power from the poet; and the poet, in like\nmanner, is inspired by the God. The poets and their interpreters may be\ncompared to a chain of magnetic rings suspended from one another, and\nfrom a magnet. The magnet is the Muse, and the ring which immediately\nfollows is the poet himself; from him are suspended other poets; there\nis also a chain of rhapsodes and actors, who also hang from the Muses,\nbut are let down at the side; and the last ring of all is the spectator.\nThe poet is the inspired interpreter of the God, and this is the reason\nwhy some poets, like Homer, are restricted to a single theme, or,\nlike Tynnichus, are famous for a single poem; and the rhapsode is\nthe inspired interpreter of the poet, and for a similar reason some\nrhapsodes, like Ion, are the interpreters of single poets.\n\nIon is delighted at the notion of being inspired, and acknowledges that\nhe is beside himself when he is performing;--his eyes rain tears and his\nhair stands on end. Socrates is of opinion that a man must be mad who\nbehaves in this way at a festival when he is surrounded by his friends\nand there is nothing to trouble him. Ion is confident that Socrates\nwould never think him mad if he could only hear his embellishments\nof Homer. Socrates asks whether he can speak well about everything\nin Homer. 'Yes, indeed he can.' 'What about things of which he has no\nknowledge?' Ion answers that he can interpret anything in Homer. But,\nrejoins Socrates, when Homer speaks of the arts, as for example, of\nchariot-driving, or of medicine, or of prophecy, or of navigation--will\nhe, or will the charioteer or physician or prophet or pilot be the\nbetter judge? Ion is compelled to admit that every man will judge of\nhis own particular art better than the rhapsode. He still maintains,\nhowever, that he understands the art of the general as well as any one.\n'Then why in this city of Athens, in which men of merit are always being\nsought after, is he not at once appointed a general?' Ion replies that\nhe is a foreigner, and the Athenians and Spartans will not appoint a\nforeigner to be their general. 'No, that is not the real reason; there\nare many examples to the contrary. But Ion has long been playing tricks\nwith the argument; like Proteus, he transforms himself into a variety of\nshapes, and is at last about to run away in the disguise of a general.\nWould he rather be regarded as inspired or dishonest?' Ion, who has no\nsuspicion of the irony of Socrates, eagerly embraces the alternative of\ninspiration.\n\nThe Ion, like the other earlier Platonic Dialogues, is a mixture of jest\nand earnest, in which no definite result is obtained, but some Socratic\nor Platonic truths are allowed dimly to appear.\n\nThe elements of a true theory of poetry are contained in the notion\nthat the poet is inspired. Genius is often said to be unconscious, or\nspontaneous, or a gift of nature: that 'genius is akin to madness' is a\npopular aphorism of modern times. The greatest strength is observed to\nhave an element of limitation. Sense or passion are too much for\nthe 'dry light' of intelligence which mingles with them and becomes\ndiscoloured by them. Imagination is often at war with reason and fact.\nThe concentration of the mind on a single object, or on a single aspect\nof human nature, overpowers the orderly perception of the whole. Yet the\nfeelings too bring truths home to the minds of many who in the way of\nreason would be incapable of understanding them. Reflections of this\nkind may have been passing before Plato's mind when he describes the\npoet as inspired, or when, as in the Apology, he speaks of poets as the\nworst critics of their own writings--anybody taken at random from the\ncrowd is a better interpreter of them than they are of themselves. They\nare sacred persons, 'winged and holy things' who have a touch of madness\nin their composition (Phaedr.), and should be treated with every sort\nof respect (Republic), but not allowed to live in a well-ordered state.\nLike the Statesmen in the Meno, they have a divine instinct, but they\nare narrow and confused; they do not attain to the clearness of ideas,\nor to the knowledge of poetry or of any other art as a whole.\n\nIn the Protagoras the ancient poets are recognized by Protagoras himself\nas the original sophists; and this family resemblance may be traced in\nthe Ion. The rhapsode belongs to the realm of imitation and of opinion:\nhe professes to have all knowledge, which is derived by him from Homer,\njust as the sophist professes to have all wisdom, which is contained\nin his art of rhetoric. Even more than the sophist he is incapable of\nappreciating the commonest logical distinctions; he cannot explain the\nnature of his own art; his great memory contrasts with his inability\nto follow the steps of the argument. And in his highest moments of\ninspiration he has an eye to his own gains.\n\nThe old quarrel between philosophy and poetry, which in the Republic\nleads to their final separation, is already working in the mind of\nPlato, and is embodied by him in the contrast between Socrates and Ion.\nYet here, as in the Republic, Socrates shows a sympathy with the poetic\nnature. Also, the manner in which Ion is affected by his own recitations\naffords a lively illustration of the power which, in the Republic,\nSocrates attributes to dramatic performances over the mind of the\nperformer. His allusion to his embellishments of Homer, in which\nhe declares himself to have surpassed Metrodorus of Lampsacus and\nStesimbrotus of Thasos, seems to show that, like them, he belonged to\nthe allegorical school of interpreters. The circumstance that nothing\nmore is known of him may be adduced in confirmation of the argument that\nthis truly Platonic little work is not a forgery of later times.\n\n\n\n\nION\n\n\nPERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, Ion.\n\n\nSOCRATES: Welcome, Ion. Are you from your native city of Ephesus?\n\nION: No, Socrates; but from Epidaurus, where I attended the festival of\nAsclepius.\n\nSOCRATES: And do the Epidaurians have contests of rhapsodes at the\nfestival?\n\nION: O yes; and of all sorts of musical performers.\n\nSOCRATES: And were you one of the competitors--and did you succeed?\n\nION: I obtained the first prize of all, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: Well done; and I hope that you will do the same for us at the\nPanathenaea.\n\nION: And I will, please heaven.\n\nSOCRATES: I often envy the profession of a rhapsode, Ion; for you have\nalways to wear fine clothes, and to look as beautiful as you can is a\npart of your art. Then, again, you are obliged to be continually in the\ncompany of many good poets; and especially of Homer, who is the best\nand most divine of them; and to understand him, and not merely learn\nhis words by rote, is a thing greatly to be envied. And no man can be\na rhapsode who does not understand the meaning of the poet. For the\nrhapsode ought to interpret the mind of the poet to his hearers, but\nhow can he interpret him well unless he knows what he means? All this is\ngreatly to be envied.\n\nION: Very true, Socrates; interpretation has certainly been the most\nlaborious part of my art; and I believe myself able to speak about\nHomer better than any man; and that neither Metrodorus of Lampsacus, nor\nStesimbrotus of Thasos, nor Glaucon, nor any one else who ever was, had\nas good ideas about Homer as I have, or as many.\n\nSOCRATES: I am glad to hear you say so, Ion; I see that you will not\nrefuse to acquaint me with them.\n\nION: Certainly, Socrates; and you really ought to hear how exquisitely I\nrender Homer. I think that the Homeridae should give me a golden crown.\n\nSOCRATES: I shall take an opportunity of hearing your embellishments\nof him at some other time. But just now I should like to ask you a\nquestion: Does your art extend to Hesiod and Archilochus, or to Homer\nonly?\n\nION: To Homer only; he is in himself quite enough.\n\nSOCRATES: Are there any things about which Homer and Hesiod agree?\n\nION: Yes; in my opinion there are a good many.\n\nSOCRATES: And can you interpret better what Homer says, or what Hesiod\nsays, about these matters in which they agree?\n\nION: I can interpret them equally well, Socrates, where they agree.\n\nSOCRATES: But what about matters in which they do not agree?--for\nexample, about divination, of which both Homer and Hesiod have something\nto say,--\n\nION: Very true:\n\nSOCRATES: Would you or a good prophet be a better interpreter of what\nthese two poets say about divination, not only when they agree, but when\nthey disagree?\n\nION: A prophet.\n\nSOCRATES: And if you were a prophet, would you not be able to interpret\nthem when they disagree as well as when they agree?\n\nION: Clearly.\n\nSOCRATES: But how did you come to have this skill about Homer only, and\nnot about Hesiod or the other poets? Does not Homer speak of the same\nthemes which all other poets handle? Is not war his great argument? and\ndoes he not speak of human society and of intercourse of men, good and\nbad, skilled and unskilled, and of the gods conversing with one another\nand with mankind, and about what happens in heaven and in the world\nbelow, and the generations of gods and heroes? Are not these the themes\nof which Homer sings?\n\nION: Very true, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: And do not the other poets sing of the same?\n\nION: Yes, Socrates; but not in the same way as Homer.\n\nSOCRATES: What, in a worse way?\n\nION: Yes, in a far worse.\n\nSOCRATES: And Homer in a better way?\n\nION: He is incomparably better.\n\nSOCRATES: And yet surely, my dear friend Ion, in a discussion about\narithmetic, where many people are speaking, and one speaks better than\nthe rest, there is somebody who can judge which of them is the good\nspeaker?\n\nION: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And he who judges of the good will be the same as he who\njudges of the bad speakers?\n\nION: The same.\n\nSOCRATES: And he will be the arithmetician?\n\nION: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, and in discussions about the wholesomeness of food, when\nmany persons are speaking, and one speaks better than the rest, will\nhe who recognizes the better speaker be a different person from him who\nrecognizes the worse, or the same?\n\nION: Clearly the same.\n\nSOCRATES: And who is he, and what is his name?\n\nION: The physician.\n\nSOCRATES: And speaking generally, in all discussions in which the\nsubject is the same and many men are speaking, will not he who knows the\ngood know the bad speaker also? For if he does not know the bad, neither\nwill he know the good when the same topic is being discussed.\n\nION: True.\n\nSOCRATES: Is not the same person skilful in both?\n\nION: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And you say that Homer and the other poets, such as Hesiod and\nArchilochus, speak of the same things, although not in the same way; but\nthe one speaks well and the other not so well?\n\nION: Yes; and I am right in saying so.\n\nSOCRATES: And if you knew the good speaker, you would also know the\ninferior speakers to be inferior?\n\nION: That is true.\n\nSOCRATES: Then, my dear friend, can I be mistaken in saying that Ion\nis equally skilled in Homer and in other poets, since he himself\nacknowledges that the same person will be a good judge of all those who\nspeak of the same things; and that almost all poets do speak of the same\nthings?\n\nION: Why then, Socrates, do I lose attention and go to sleep and have\nabsolutely no ideas of the least value, when any one speaks of any\nother poet; but when Homer is mentioned, I wake up at once and am all\nattention and have plenty to say?\n\nSOCRATES: The reason, my friend, is obvious. No one can fail to see that\nyou speak of Homer without any art or knowledge. If you were able to\nspeak of him by rules of art, you would have been able to speak of all\nother poets; for poetry is a whole.\n\nION: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And when any one acquires any other art as a whole, the same\nmay be said of them. Would you like me to explain my meaning, Ion?\n\nION: Yes, indeed, Socrates; I very much wish that you would: for I love\nto hear you wise men talk.\n\nSOCRATES: O that we were wise, Ion, and that you could truly call us so;\nbut you rhapsodes and actors, and the poets whose verses you sing, are\nwise; whereas I am a common man, who only speak the truth. For consider\nwhat a very commonplace and trivial thing is this which I have said--a\nthing which any man might say: that when a man has acquired a knowledge\nof a whole art, the enquiry into good and bad is one and the same. Let\nus consider this matter; is not the art of painting a whole?\n\nION: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And there are and have been many painters good and bad?\n\nION: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And did you ever know any one who was skilful in pointing\nout the excellences and defects of Polygnotus the son of Aglaophon, but\nincapable of criticizing other painters; and when the work of any other\npainter was produced, went to sleep and was at a loss, and had no ideas;\nbut when he had to give his opinion about Polygnotus, or whoever the\npainter might be, and about him only, woke up and was attentive and had\nplenty to say?\n\nION: No indeed, I have never known such a person.\n\nSOCRATES: Or did you ever know of any one in sculpture, who was skilful\nin expounding the merits of Daedalus the son of Metion, or of Epeius\nthe son of Panopeus, or of Theodorus the Samian, or of any individual\nsculptor; but when the works of sculptors in general were produced, was\nat a loss and went to sleep and had nothing to say?\n\nION: No indeed; no more than the other.\n\nSOCRATES: And if I am not mistaken, you never met with any one among\nflute-players or harp-players or singers to the harp or rhapsodes who\nwas able to discourse of Olympus or Thamyras or Orpheus, or Phemius the\nrhapsode of Ithaca, but was at a loss when he came to speak of Ion of\nEphesus, and had no notion of his merits or defects?\n\nION: I cannot deny what you say, Socrates. Nevertheless I am conscious\nin my own self, and the world agrees with me in thinking that I do speak\nbetter and have more to say about Homer than any other man. But I do not\nspeak equally well about others--tell me the reason of this.\n\nSOCRATES: I perceive, Ion; and I will proceed to explain to you what I\nimagine to be the reason of this. The gift which you possess of speaking\nexcellently about Homer is not an art, but, as I was just saying, an\ninspiration; there is a divinity moving you, like that contained in the\nstone which Euripides calls a magnet, but which is commonly known as\nthe stone of Heraclea. This stone not only attracts iron rings, but also\nimparts to them a similar power of attracting other rings; and sometimes\nyou may see a number of pieces of iron and rings suspended from one\nanother so as to form quite a long chain: and all of them derive their\npower of suspension from the original stone. In like manner the Muse\nfirst of all inspires men herself; and from these inspired persons a\nchain of other persons is suspended, who take the inspiration. For all\ngood poets, epic as well as lyric, compose their beautiful poems not by\nart, but because they are inspired and possessed. And as the Corybantian\nrevellers when they dance are not in their right mind, so the lyric\npoets are not in their right mind when they are composing their\nbeautiful strains: but when falling under the power of music and metre\nthey are inspired and possessed; like Bacchic maidens who draw milk and\nhoney from the rivers when they are under the influence of Dionysus but\nnot when they are in their right mind. And the soul of the lyric poet\ndoes the same, as they themselves say; for they tell us that they bring\nsongs from honeyed fountains, culling them out of the gardens and dells\nof the Muses; they, like the bees, winging their way from flower to\nflower. And this is true. For the poet is a light and winged and holy\nthing, and there is no invention in him until he has been inspired and\nis out of his senses, and the mind is no longer in him: when he has\nnot attained to this state, he is powerless and is unable to utter his\noracles. Many are the noble words in which poets speak concerning the\nactions of men; but like yourself when speaking about Homer, they do\nnot speak of them by any rules of art: they are simply inspired to utter\nthat to which the Muse impels them, and that only; and when inspired,\none of them will make dithyrambs, another hymns of praise, another\nchoral strains, another epic or iambic verses--and he who is good at\none is not good at any other kind of verse: for not by art does the poet\nsing, but by power divine. Had he learned by rules of art, he would have\nknown how to speak not of one theme only, but of all; and therefore God\ntakes away the minds of poets, and uses them as his ministers, as he\nalso uses diviners and holy prophets, in order that we who hear them\nmay know them to be speaking not of themselves who utter these priceless\nwords in a state of unconsciousness, but that God himself is the\nspeaker, and that through them he is conversing with us. And Tynnichus\nthe Chalcidian affords a striking instance of what I am saying: he wrote\nnothing that any one would care to remember but the famous paean which\nis in every one's mouth, one of the finest poems ever written, simply\nan invention of the Muses, as he himself says. For in this way the\nGod would seem to indicate to us and not allow us to doubt that these\nbeautiful poems are not human, or the work of man, but divine and the\nwork of God; and that the poets are only the interpreters of the Gods by\nwhom they are severally possessed. Was not this the lesson which the God\nintended to teach when by the mouth of the worst of poets he sang the\nbest of songs? Am I not right, Ion?\n\nION: Yes, indeed, Socrates, I feel that you are; for your words touch\nmy soul, and I am persuaded that good poets by a divine inspiration\ninterpret the things of the Gods to us.\n\nSOCRATES: And you rhapsodists are the interpreters of the poets?\n\nION: There again you are right.\n\nSOCRATES: Then you are the interpreters of interpreters?\n\nION: Precisely.\n\nSOCRATES: I wish you would frankly tell me, Ion, what I am going to ask\nof you: When you produce the greatest effect upon the audience in the\nrecitation of some striking passage, such as the apparition of Odysseus\nleaping forth on the floor, recognized by the suitors and casting his\narrows at his feet, or the description of Achilles rushing at Hector,\nor the sorrows of Andromache, Hecuba, or Priam,--are you in your right\nmind? Are you not carried out of yourself, and does not your soul in\nan ecstasy seem to be among the persons or places of which you are\nspeaking, whether they are in Ithaca or in Troy or whatever may be the\nscene of the poem?\n\nION: That proof strikes home to me, Socrates. For I must frankly confess\nthat at the tale of pity my eyes are filled with tears, and when I speak\nof horrors, my hair stands on end and my heart throbs.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, Ion, and what are we to say of a man who at a sacrifice\nor festival, when he is dressed in holiday attire, and has golden\ncrowns upon his head, of which nobody has robbed him, appears weeping\nor panic-stricken in the presence of more than twenty thousand friendly\nfaces, when there is no one despoiling or wronging him;--is he in his\nright mind or is he not?\n\nION: No indeed, Socrates, I must say that, strictly speaking, he is not\nin his right mind.\n\nSOCRATES: And are you aware that you produce similar effects on most of\nthe spectators?\n\nION: Only too well; for I look down upon them from the stage, and behold\nthe various emotions of pity, wonder, sternness, stamped upon their\ncountenances when I am speaking: and I am obliged to give my very best\nattention to them; for if I make them cry I myself shall laugh, and if I\nmake them laugh I myself shall cry when the time of payment arrives.\n\nSOCRATES: Do you know that the spectator is the last of the rings\nwhich, as I am saying, receive the power of the original magnet from\none another? The rhapsode like yourself and the actor are intermediate\nlinks, and the poet himself is the first of them. Through all these the\nGod sways the souls of men in any direction which he pleases, and makes\none man hang down from another. Thus there is a vast chain of dancers\nand masters and under-masters of choruses, who are suspended, as if from\nthe stone, at the side of the rings which hang down from the Muse. And\nevery poet has some Muse from whom he is suspended, and by whom he is\nsaid to be possessed, which is nearly the same thing; for he is taken\nhold of. And from these first rings, which are the poets, depend others,\nsome deriving their inspiration from Orpheus, others from Musaeus; but\nthe greater number are possessed and held by Homer. Of whom, Ion, you\nare one, and are possessed by Homer; and when any one repeats the words\nof another poet you go to sleep, and know not what to say; but when any\none recites a strain of Homer you wake up in a moment, and your\nsoul leaps within you, and you have plenty to say; for not by art or\nknowledge about Homer do you say what you say, but by divine inspiration\nand by possession; just as the Corybantian revellers too have a quick\nperception of that strain only which is appropriated to the God by whom\nthey are possessed, and have plenty of dances and words for that, but\ntake no heed of any other. And you, Ion, when the name of Homer is\nmentioned have plenty to say, and have nothing to say of others. You\nask, 'Why is this?' The answer is that you praise Homer not by art but\nby divine inspiration.\n\nION: That is good, Socrates; and yet I doubt whether you will ever have\neloquence enough to persuade me that I praise Homer only when I am mad\nand possessed; and if you could hear me speak of him I am sure you would\nnever think this to be the case.\n\nSOCRATES: I should like very much to hear you, but not until you have\nanswered a question which I have to ask. On what part of Homer do you\nspeak well?--not surely about every part.\n\nION: There is no part, Socrates, about which I do not speak well: of\nthat I can assure you.\n\nSOCRATES: Surely not about things in Homer of which you have no\nknowledge?\n\nION: And what is there in Homer of which I have no knowledge?\n\nSOCRATES: Why, does not Homer speak in many passages about arts? For\nexample, about driving; if I can only remember the lines I will repeat\nthem.\n\nION: I remember, and will repeat them.\n\nSOCRATES: Tell me then, what Nestor says to Antilochus, his son,\nwhere he bids him be careful of the turn at the horserace in honour of\nPatroclus.\n\nION: 'Bend gently,' he says, 'in the polished chariot to the left of\nthem, and urge the horse on the right hand with whip and voice; and\nslacken the rein. And when you are at the goal, let the left horse draw\nnear, yet so that the nave of the well-wrought wheel may not even seem\nto touch the extremity; and avoid catching the stone (Il.).'\n\nSOCRATES: Enough. Now, Ion, will the charioteer or the physician be the\nbetter judge of the propriety of these lines?\n\nION: The charioteer, clearly.\n\nSOCRATES: And will the reason be that this is his art, or will there be\nany other reason?\n\nION: No, that will be the reason.\n\nSOCRATES: And every art is appointed by God to have knowledge of a\ncertain work; for that which we know by the art of the pilot we do not\nknow by the art of medicine?\n\nION: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: Nor do we know by the art of the carpenter that which we know\nby the art of medicine?\n\nION: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: And this is true of all the arts;--that which we know with one\nart we do not know with the other? But let me ask a prior question: You\nadmit that there are differences of arts?\n\nION: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: You would argue, as I should, that when one art is of one kind\nof knowledge and another of another, they are different?\n\nION: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, surely; for if the subject of knowledge were the same,\nthere would be no meaning in saying that the arts were different,--if\nthey both gave the same knowledge. For example, I know that here are\nfive fingers, and you know the same. And if I were to ask whether I\nand you became acquainted with this fact by the help of the same art of\narithmetic, you would acknowledge that we did?\n\nION: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Tell me, then, what I was intending to ask you,--whether this\nholds universally? Must the same art have the same subject of knowledge,\nand different arts other subjects of knowledge?\n\nION: That is my opinion, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: Then he who has no knowledge of a particular art will have no\nright judgment of the sayings and doings of that art?\n\nION: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: Then which will be a better judge of the lines which you were\nreciting from Homer, you or the charioteer?\n\nION: The charioteer.\n\nSOCRATES: Why, yes, because you are a rhapsode and not a charioteer.\n\nION: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And the art of the rhapsode is different from that of the\ncharioteer?\n\nION: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And if a different knowledge, then a knowledge of different\nmatters?\n\nION: True.\n\nSOCRATES: You know the passage in which Hecamede, the concubine of\nNestor, is described as giving to the wounded Machaon a posset, as he\nsays,\n\n'Made with Pramnian wine; and she grated cheese of goat's milk with a\ngrater of bronze, and at his side placed an onion which gives a relish\nto drink (Il.).'\n\nNow would you say that the art of the rhapsode or the art of medicine\nwas better able to judge of the propriety of these lines?\n\nION: The art of medicine.\n\nSOCRATES: And when Homer says,\n\n'And she descended into the deep like a leaden plummet, which, set in\nthe horn of ox that ranges in the fields, rushes along carrying death\namong the ravenous fishes (Il.),'--\n\nwill the art of the fisherman or of the rhapsode be better able to judge\nwhether these lines are rightly expressed or not?\n\nION: Clearly, Socrates, the art of the fisherman.\n\nSOCRATES: Come now, suppose that you were to say to me: 'Since you,\nSocrates, are able to assign different passages in Homer to their\ncorresponding arts, I wish that you would tell me what are the passages\nof which the excellence ought to be judged by the prophet and prophetic\nart'; and you will see how readily and truly I shall answer you. For\nthere are many such passages, particularly in the Odyssee; as, for\nexample, the passage in which Theoclymenus the prophet of the house of\nMelampus says to the suitors:--\n\n'Wretched men! what is happening to you? Your heads and your faces\nand your limbs underneath are shrouded in night; and the voice of\nlamentation bursts forth, and your cheeks are wet with tears. And the\nvestibule is full, and the court is full, of ghosts descending into the\ndarkness of Erebus, and the sun has perished out of heaven, and an evil\nmist is spread abroad (Od.).'\n\nAnd there are many such passages in the Iliad also; as for example in\nthe description of the battle near the rampart, where he says:--\n\n'As they were eager to pass the ditch, there came to them an omen: a\nsoaring eagle, holding back the people on the left, bore a huge bloody\ndragon in his talons, still living and panting; nor had he yet resigned\nthe strife, for he bent back and smote the bird which carried him on the\nbreast by the neck, and he in pain let him fall from him to the ground\ninto the midst of the multitude. And the eagle, with a cry, was borne\nafar on the wings of the wind (Il.).'\n\nThese are the sort of things which I should say that the prophet ought\nto consider and determine.\n\nION: And you are quite right, Socrates, in saying so.\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, Ion, and you are right also. And as I have selected from\nthe Iliad and Odyssee for you passages which describe the office of the\nprophet and the physician and the fisherman, do you, who know Homer so\nmuch better than I do, Ion, select for me passages which relate to the\nrhapsode and the rhapsode's art, and which the rhapsode ought to examine\nand judge of better than other men.\n\nION: All passages, I should say, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: Not all, Ion, surely. Have you already forgotten what you were\nsaying? A rhapsode ought to have a better memory.\n\nION: Why, what am I forgetting?\n\nSOCRATES: Do you not remember that you declared the art of the rhapsode\nto be different from the art of the charioteer?\n\nION: Yes, I remember.\n\nSOCRATES: And you admitted that being different they would have\ndifferent subjects of knowledge?\n\nION: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then upon your own showing the rhapsode, and the art of the\nrhapsode, will not know everything?\n\nION: I should exclude certain things, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: You mean to say that you would exclude pretty much the\nsubjects of the other arts. As he does not know all of them, which of\nthem will he know?\n\nION: He will know what a man and what a woman ought to say, and what\na freeman and what a slave ought to say, and what a ruler and what a\nsubject.\n\nSOCRATES: Do you mean that a rhapsode will know better than the pilot\nwhat the ruler of a sea-tossed vessel ought to say?\n\nION: No; the pilot will know best.\n\nSOCRATES: Or will the rhapsode know better than the physician what the\nruler of a sick man ought to say?\n\nION: He will not.\n\nSOCRATES: But he will know what a slave ought to say?\n\nION: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Suppose the slave to be a cowherd; the rhapsode will know\nbetter than the cowherd what he ought to say in order to soothe the\ninfuriated cows?\n\nION: No, he will not.\n\nSOCRATES: But he will know what a spinning-woman ought to say about the\nworking of wool?\n\nION: No.\n\nSOCRATES: At any rate he will know what a general ought to say when\nexhorting his soldiers?\n\nION: Yes, that is the sort of thing which the rhapsode will be sure to\nknow.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, but is the art of the rhapsode the art of the general?\n\nION: I am sure that I should know what a general ought to say.\n\nSOCRATES: Why, yes, Ion, because you may possibly have a knowledge of\nthe art of the general as well as of the rhapsode; and you may also have\na knowledge of horsemanship as well as of the lyre: and then you would\nknow when horses were well or ill managed. But suppose I were to ask\nyou: By the help of which art, Ion, do you know whether horses are well\nmanaged, by your skill as a horseman or as a performer on the lyre--what\nwould you answer?\n\nION: I should reply, by my skill as a horseman.\n\nSOCRATES: And if you judged of performers on the lyre, you would\nadmit that you judged of them as a performer on the lyre, and not as a\nhorseman?\n\nION: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And in judging of the general's art, do you judge of it as a\ngeneral or a rhapsode?\n\nION: To me there appears to be no difference between them.\n\nSOCRATES: What do you mean? Do you mean to say that the art of the\nrhapsode and of the general is the same?\n\nION: Yes, one and the same.\n\nSOCRATES: Then he who is a good rhapsode is also a good general?\n\nION: Certainly, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: And he who is a good general is also a good rhapsode?\n\nION: No; I do not say that.\n\nSOCRATES: But you do say that he who is a good rhapsode is also a good\ngeneral.\n\nION: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And you are the best of Hellenic rhapsodes?\n\nION: Far the best, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: And are you the best general, Ion?\n\nION: To be sure, Socrates; and Homer was my master.\n\nSOCRATES: But then, Ion, what in the name of goodness can be the reason\nwhy you, who are the best of generals as well as the best of rhapsodes\nin all Hellas, go about as a rhapsode when you might be a general? Do\nyou think that the Hellenes want a rhapsode with his golden crown, and\ndo not want a general?\n\nION: Why, Socrates, the reason is, that my countrymen, the Ephesians,\nare the servants and soldiers of Athens, and do not need a general; and\nyou and Sparta are not likely to have me, for you think that you have\nenough generals of your own.\n\nSOCRATES: My good Ion, did you never hear of Apollodorus of Cyzicus?\n\nION: Who may he be?\n\nSOCRATES: One who, though a foreigner, has often been chosen their\ngeneral by the Athenians: and there is Phanosthenes of Andros, and\nHeraclides of Clazomenae, whom they have also appointed to the command\nof their armies and to other offices, although aliens, after they had\nshown their merit. And will they not choose Ion the Ephesian to be\ntheir general, and honour him, if he prove himself worthy? Were not\nthe Ephesians originally Athenians, and Ephesus is no mean city? But,\nindeed, Ion, if you are correct in saying that by art and knowledge you\nare able to praise Homer, you do not deal fairly with me, and after\nall your professions of knowing many glorious things about Homer, and\npromises that you would exhibit them, you are only a deceiver, and so\nfar from exhibiting the art of which you are a master, will not, even\nafter my repeated entreaties, explain to me the nature of it. You have\nliterally as many forms as Proteus; and now you go all manner of ways,\ntwisting and turning, and, like Proteus, become all manner of people\nat once, and at last slip away from me in the disguise of a general, in\norder that you may escape exhibiting your Homeric lore. And if you have\nart, then, as I was saying, in falsifying your promise that you would\nexhibit Homer, you are not dealing fairly with me. But if, as I believe,\nyou have no art, but speak all these beautiful words about Homer\nunconsciously under his inspiring influence, then I acquit you of\ndishonesty, and shall only say that you are inspired. Which do you\nprefer to be thought, dishonest or inspired?\n\nION: There is a great difference, Socrates, between the two\nalternatives; and inspiration is by far the nobler.\n\nSOCRATES: Then, Ion, I shall assume the nobler alternative; and\nattribute to you in your praises of Homer inspiration, and not art.","title":"Ion","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":6533}