{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_1642/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_1642","id":"gutenberg_1642","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1642","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Classics of Literature","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Classical literature","Philosophy","Philosophy, Ancient","Piety -- Early works to 1800","Socrates, 470 BC-399 BC"],"text":"Produced by Sue Asscher\n\n\n\n\n\nEUTHYPHRO\n\nBy Plato\n\n\nTranslated by Benjamin Jowett\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION.\n\nIn the Meno, Anytus had parted from Socrates with the significant words:\n'That in any city, and particularly in the city of Athens, it is easier\nto do men harm than to do them good;' and Socrates was anticipating\nanother opportunity of talking with him. In the Euthyphro, Socrates is\nawaiting his trial for impiety. But before the trial begins, Plato would\nlike to put the world on their trial, and convince them of ignorance in\nthat very matter touching which Socrates is accused. An incident which\nmay perhaps really have occurred in the family of Euthyphro, a\nlearned Athenian diviner and soothsayer, furnishes the occasion of the\ndiscussion.\n\nThis Euthyphro and Socrates are represented as meeting in the porch of\nthe King Archon. (Compare Theaet.) Both have legal business in hand.\nSocrates is defendant in a suit for impiety which Meletus has brought\nagainst him (it is remarked by the way that he is not a likely man\nhimself to have brought a suit against another); and Euthyphro too is\nplaintiff in an action for murder, which he has brought against his\nown father. The latter has originated in the following manner:--A poor\ndependant of the family had slain one of their domestic slaves in Naxos.\nThe guilty person was bound and thrown into a ditch by the command of\nEuthyphro's father, who sent to the interpreters of religion at Athens\nto ask what should be done with him. Before the messenger came back the\ncriminal had died from hunger and exposure.\n\nThis is the origin of the charge of murder which Euthyphro brings\nagainst his father. Socrates is confident that before he could have\nundertaken the responsibility of such a prosecution, he must have been\nperfectly informed of the nature of piety and impiety; and as he is\ngoing to be tried for impiety himself, he thinks that he cannot do\nbetter than learn of Euthyphro (who will be admitted by everybody,\nincluding the judges, to be an unimpeachable authority) what piety is,\nand what is impiety. What then is piety?\n\nEuthyphro, who, in the abundance of his knowledge, is very willing to\nundertake all the responsibility, replies: That piety is doing as I do,\nprosecuting your father (if he is guilty) on a charge of murder; doing\nas the gods do--as Zeus did to Cronos, and Cronos to Uranus.\n\nSocrates has a dislike to these tales of mythology, and he fancies that\nthis dislike of his may be the reason why he is charged with impiety.\n'Are they really true?' 'Yes, they are;' and Euthyphro will gladly tell\nSocrates some more of them. But Socrates would like first of all to have\na more satisfactory answer to the question, 'What is piety?' 'Doing as\nI do, charging a father with murder,' may be a single instance of piety,\nbut can hardly be regarded as a general definition.\n\nEuthyphro replies, that 'Piety is what is dear to the gods, and impiety\nis what is not dear to them.' But may there not be differences of\nopinion, as among men, so also among the gods? Especially, about good\nand evil, which have no fixed rule; and these are precisely the sort of\ndifferences which give rise to quarrels. And therefore what may be dear\nto one god may not be dear to another, and the same action may be both\npious and impious; e.g. your chastisement of your father, Euthyphro, may\nbe dear or pleasing to Zeus (who inflicted a similar chastisement on his\nown father), but not equally pleasing to Cronos or Uranus (who suffered\nat the hands of their sons).\n\nEuthyphro answers that there is no difference of opinion, either among\ngods or men, as to the propriety of punishing a murderer. Yes, rejoins\nSocrates, when they know him to be a murderer; but you are assuming the\npoint at issue. If all the circumstances of the case are considered, are\nyou able to show that your father was guilty of murder, or that all the\ngods are agreed in approving of our prosecution of him? And must you\nnot allow that what is hated by one god may be liked by another? Waiving\nthis last, however, Socrates proposes to amend the definition, and\nsay that 'what all the gods love is pious, and what they all hate is\nimpious.' To this Euthyphro agrees.\n\nSocrates proceeds to analyze the new form of the definition. He shows\nthat in other cases the act precedes the state; e.g. the act of being\ncarried, loved, etc. precedes the state of being carried, loved, etc.,\nand therefore that which is dear to the gods is dear to the gods because\nit is first loved of them, not loved of them because it is dear to them.\nBut the pious or holy is loved by the gods because it is pious or holy,\nwhich is equivalent to saying, that it is loved by them because it is\ndear to them. Here then appears to be a contradiction,--Euthyphro has\nbeen giving an attribute or accident of piety only, and not the essence.\nEuthyphro acknowledges himself that his explanations seem to walk\naway or go round in a circle, like the moving figures of Daedalus, the\nancestor of Socrates, who has communicated his art to his descendants.\n\nSocrates, who is desirous of stimulating the indolent intelligence of\nEuthyphro, raises the question in another manner: 'Is all the pious\njust?' 'Yes.' 'Is all the just pious?' 'No.' 'Then what part of justice\nis piety?' Euthyphro replies that piety is that part of justice which\n'attends' to the gods, as there is another part of justice which\n'attends' to men. But what is the meaning of 'attending' to the gods?\nThe word 'attending,' when applied to dogs, horses, and men, implies\nthat in some way they are made better. But how do pious or holy acts\nmake the gods any better? Euthyphro explains that he means by pious\nacts, acts of service or ministration. Yes; but the ministrations of the\nhusbandman, the physician, and the builder have an end. To what end do\nwe serve the gods, and what do we help them to accomplish? Euthyphro\nreplies, that all these difficult questions cannot be resolved in a\nshort time; and he would rather say simply that piety is knowing how to\nplease the gods in word and deed, by prayers and sacrifices. In other\nwords, says Socrates, piety is 'a science of asking and giving'--asking\nwhat we want and giving what they want; in short, a mode of doing\nbusiness between gods and men. But although they are the givers of all\ngood, how can we give them any good in return? 'Nay, but we give them\nhonour.' Then we give them not what is beneficial, but what is pleasing\nor dear to them; and this is the point which has been already disproved.\n\nSocrates, although weary of the subterfuges and evasions of Euthyphro,\nremains unshaken in his conviction that he must know the nature of\npiety, or he would never have prosecuted his old father. He is still\nhoping that he will condescend to instruct him. But Euthyphro is in a\nhurry and cannot stay. And Socrates' last hope of knowing the nature\nof piety before he is prosecuted for impiety has disappeared. As in the\nEuthydemus the irony is carried on to the end.\n\nThe Euthyphro is manifestly designed to contrast the real nature of\npiety and impiety with the popular conceptions of them. But when the\npopular conceptions of them have been overthrown, Socrates does not\noffer any definition of his own: as in the Laches and Lysis, he prepares\nthe way for an answer to the question which he has raised; but true to\nhis own character, refuses to answer himself.\n\nEuthyphro is a religionist, and is elsewhere spoken of, if he be the\nsame person, as the author of a philosophy of names, by whose 'prancing\nsteeds' Socrates in the Cratylus is carried away. He has the conceit and\nself-confidence of a Sophist; no doubt that he is right in prosecuting\nhis father has ever entered into his mind. Like a Sophist too, he is\nincapable either of framing a general definition or of following the\ncourse of an argument. His wrong-headedness, one-sidedness, narrowness,\npositiveness, are characteristic of his priestly office. His failure\nto apprehend an argument may be compared to a similar defect which\nis observable in the rhapsode Ion. But he is not a bad man, and he is\nfriendly to Socrates, whose familiar sign he recognizes with interest.\nThough unable to follow him he is very willing to be led by him, and\neagerly catches at any suggestion which saves him from the trouble\nof thinking. Moreover he is the enemy of Meletus, who, as he says, is\navailing himself of the popular dislike to innovations in religion in\norder to injure Socrates; at the same time he is amusingly confident\nthat he has weapons in his own armoury which would be more than a match\nfor him. He is quite sincere in his prosecution of his father, who has\naccidentally been guilty of homicide, and is not wholly free from blame.\nTo purge away the crime appears to him in the light of a duty, whoever\nmay be the criminal.\n\nThus begins the contrast between the religion of the letter, or of the\nnarrow and unenlightened conscience, and the higher notion of religion\nwhich Socrates vainly endeavours to elicit from him. 'Piety is doing\nas I do' is the idea of religion which first occurs to him, and to many\nothers who do not say what they think with equal frankness. For men are\nnot easily persuaded that any other religion is better than their own;\nor that other nations, e.g. the Greeks in the time of Socrates, were\nequally serious in their religious beliefs and difficulties. The chief\ndifference between us and them is, that they were slowly learning what\nwe are in process of forgetting. Greek mythology hardly admitted of the\ndistinction between accidental homicide and murder: that the pollution\nof blood was the same in both cases is also the feeling of the Athenian\ndiviner. He had not as yet learned the lesson, which philosophy was\nteaching, that Homer and Hesiod, if not banished from the state, or\nwhipped out of the assembly, as Heracleitus more rudely proposed, at any\nrate were not to be appealed to as authorities in religion; and he is\nready to defend his conduct by the examples of the gods. These are the\nvery tales which Socrates cannot abide; and his dislike of them, as he\nsuspects, has branded him with the reputation of impiety. Here is one\nanswer to the question, 'Why Socrates was put to death,' suggested by\nthe way. Another is conveyed in the words, 'The Athenians do not care\nabout any man being thought wise until he begins to make other men wise;\nand then for some reason or other they are angry:' which may be said to\nbe the rule of popular toleration in most other countries, and not at\nAthens only. In the course of the argument Socrates remarks that the\ncontroversial nature of morals and religion arises out of the difficulty\nof verifying them. There is no measure or standard to which they can be\nreferred.\n\nThe next definition, 'Piety is that which is loved of the gods,' is\nshipwrecked on a refined distinction between the state and the act,\ncorresponding respectively to the adjective (philon) and the participle\n(philoumenon), or rather perhaps to the participle and the verb\n(philoumenon and phileitai). The act is prior to the state (as in\nAristotle the energeia precedes the dunamis); and the state of being\nloved is preceded by the act of being loved. But piety or holiness is\npreceded by the act of being pious, not by the act of being loved; and\ntherefore piety and the state of being loved are different. Through such\nsubtleties of dialectic Socrates is working his way into a deeper region\nof thought and feeling. He means to say that the words 'loved of the\ngods' express an attribute only, and not the essence of piety.\n\nThen follows the third and last definition, 'Piety is a part of\njustice.' Thus far Socrates has proceeded in placing religion on a\nmoral foundation. He is seeking to realize the harmony of religion and\nmorality, which the great poets Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Pindar had\nunconsciously anticipated, and which is the universal want of all men.\nTo this the soothsayer adds the ceremonial element, 'attending upon the\ngods.' When further interrogated by Socrates as to the nature of\nthis 'attention to the gods,' he replies, that piety is an affair of\nbusiness, a science of giving and asking, and the like. Socrates points\nout the anthropomorphism of these notions, (compare Symp.; Republic;\nPoliticus.) But when we expect him to go on and show that the true\nservice of the gods is the service of the spirit and the co-operation\nwith them in all things true and good, he stops short; this was a lesson\nwhich the soothsayer could not have been made to understand, and which\nevery one must learn for himself.\n\nThere seem to be altogether three aims or interests in this little\nDialogue: (1) the dialectical development of the idea of piety; (2) the\nantithesis of true and false religion, which is carried to a certain\nextent only; (3) the defence of Socrates.\n\nThe subtle connection with the Apology and the Crito; the holding back\nof the conclusion, as in the Charmides, Lysis, Laches, Protagoras, and\nother Dialogues; the deep insight into the religious world; the dramatic\npower and play of the two characters; the inimitable irony, are reasons\nfor believing that the Euthyphro is a genuine Platonic writing. The\nspirit in which the popular representations of mythology are denounced\nrecalls Republic II. The virtue of piety has been already mentioned\nas one of five in the Protagoras, but is not reckoned among the four\ncardinal virtues of Republic IV. The figure of Daedalus has occurred in\nthe Meno; that of Proteus in the Euthydemus and Io. The kingly science\nhas already appeared in the Euthydemus, and will reappear in the\nRepublic and Statesman. But neither from these nor any other indications\nof similarity or difference, and still less from arguments respecting\nthe suitableness of this little work to aid Socrates at the time of his\ntrial or the reverse, can any evidence of the date be obtained.\n\n\n\n\nEUTHYPHRO\n\n\nPERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, Euthyphro.\n\nSCENE: The Porch of the King Archon.\n\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Why have you left the Lyceum, Socrates? and what are you\ndoing in the Porch of the King Archon? Surely you cannot be concerned in\na suit before the King, like myself?\n\nSOCRATES: Not in a suit, Euthyphro; impeachment is the word which the\nAthenians use.\n\nEUTHYPHRO: What! I suppose that some one has been prosecuting you, for I\ncannot believe that you are the prosecutor of another.\n\nSOCRATES: Certainly not.\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Then some one else has been prosecuting you?\n\nSOCRATES: Yes.\n\nEUTHYPHRO: And who is he?\n\nSOCRATES: A young man who is little known, Euthyphro; and I hardly know\nhim: his name is Meletus, and he is of the deme of Pitthis. Perhaps you\nmay remember his appearance; he has a beak, and long straight hair, and\na beard which is ill grown.\n\nEUTHYPHRO: No, I do not remember him, Socrates. But what is the charge\nwhich he brings against you?\n\nSOCRATES: What is the charge? Well, a very serious charge, which shows\na good deal of character in the young man, and for which he is certainly\nnot to be despised. He says he knows how the youth are corrupted and\nwho are their corruptors. I fancy that he must be a wise man, and seeing\nthat I am the reverse of a wise man, he has found me out, and is going\nto accuse me of corrupting his young friends. And of this our mother the\nstate is to be the judge. Of all our political men he is the only one\nwho seems to me to begin in the right way, with the cultivation of\nvirtue in youth; like a good husbandman, he makes the young shoots his\nfirst care, and clears away us who are the destroyers of them. This is\nonly the first step; he will afterwards attend to the elder branches;\nand if he goes on as he has begun, he will be a very great public\nbenefactor.\n\nEUTHYPHRO: I hope that he may; but I rather fear, Socrates, that the\nopposite will turn out to be the truth. My opinion is that in attacking\nyou he is simply aiming a blow at the foundation of the state. But in\nwhat way does he say that you corrupt the young?\n\nSOCRATES: He brings a wonderful accusation against me, which at first\nhearing excites surprise: he says that I am a poet or maker of gods, and\nthat I invent new gods and deny the existence of old ones; this is the\nground of his indictment.\n\nEUTHYPHRO: I understand, Socrates; he means to attack you about the\nfamiliar sign which occasionally, as you say, comes to you. He thinks\nthat you are a neologian, and he is going to have you up before the\ncourt for this. He knows that such a charge is readily received by the\nworld, as I myself know too well; for when I speak in the assembly about\ndivine things, and foretell the future to them, they laugh at me and\nthink me a madman. Yet every word that I say is true. But they are\njealous of us all; and we must be brave and go at them.\n\nSOCRATES: Their laughter, friend Euthyphro, is not a matter of much\nconsequence. For a man may be thought wise; but the Athenians, I\nsuspect, do not much trouble themselves about him until he begins to\nimpart his wisdom to others, and then for some reason or other, perhaps,\nas you say, from jealousy, they are angry.\n\nEUTHYPHRO: I am never likely to try their temper in this way.\n\nSOCRATES: I dare say not, for you are reserved in your behaviour, and\nseldom impart your wisdom. But I have a benevolent habit of pouring out\nmyself to everybody, and would even pay for a listener, and I am afraid\nthat the Athenians may think me too talkative. Now if, as I was saying,\nthey would only laugh at me, as you say that they laugh at you, the\ntime might pass gaily enough in the court; but perhaps they may be in\nearnest, and then what the end will be you soothsayers only can predict.\n\nEUTHYPHRO: I dare say that the affair will end in nothing, Socrates, and\nthat you will win your cause; and I think that I shall win my own.\n\nSOCRATES: And what is your suit, Euthyphro? are you the pursuer or the\ndefendant?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: I am the pursuer.\n\nSOCRATES: Of whom?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: You will think me mad when I tell you.\n\nSOCRATES: Why, has the fugitive wings?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Nay, he is not very volatile at his time of life.\n\nSOCRATES: Who is he?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: My father.\n\nSOCRATES: Your father! my good man?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And of what is he accused?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Of murder, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: By the powers, Euthyphro! how little does the common herd know\nof the nature of right and truth. A man must be an extraordinary man,\nand have made great strides in wisdom, before he could have seen his way\nto bring such an action.\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Indeed, Socrates, he must.\n\nSOCRATES: I suppose that the man whom your father murdered was one of\nyour relatives--clearly he was; for if he had been a stranger you would\nnever have thought of prosecuting him.\n\nEUTHYPHRO: I am amused, Socrates, at your making a distinction between\none who is a relation and one who is not a relation; for surely the\npollution is the same in either case, if you knowingly associate with\nthe murderer when you ought to clear yourself and him by proceeding\nagainst him. The real question is whether the murdered man has been\njustly slain. If justly, then your duty is to let the matter alone; but\nif unjustly, then even if the murderer lives under the same roof with\nyou and eats at the same table, proceed against him. Now the man who is\ndead was a poor dependant of mine who worked for us as a field labourer\non our farm in Naxos, and one day in a fit of drunken passion he got\ninto a quarrel with one of our domestic servants and slew him. My father\nbound him hand and foot and threw him into a ditch, and then sent to\nAthens to ask of a diviner what he should do with him. Meanwhile he\nnever attended to him and took no care about him, for he regarded him as\na murderer; and thought that no great harm would be done even if he did\ndie. Now this was just what happened. For such was the effect of cold\nand hunger and chains upon him, that before the messenger returned from\nthe diviner, he was dead. And my father and family are angry with me for\ntaking the part of the murderer and prosecuting my father. They say\nthat he did not kill him, and that if he did, the dead man was but a\nmurderer, and I ought not to take any notice, for that a son is impious\nwho prosecutes a father. Which shows, Socrates, how little they know\nwhat the gods think about piety and impiety.\n\nSOCRATES: Good heavens, Euthyphro! and is your knowledge of religion\nand of things pious and impious so very exact, that, supposing the\ncircumstances to be as you state them, you are not afraid lest you too\nmay be doing an impious thing in bringing an action against your father?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: The best of Euthyphro, and that which distinguishes him,\nSocrates, from other men, is his exact knowledge of all such matters.\nWhat should I be good for without it?\n\nSOCRATES: Rare friend! I think that I cannot do better than be your\ndisciple. Then before the trial with Meletus comes on I shall challenge\nhim, and say that I have always had a great interest in religious\nquestions, and now, as he charges me with rash imaginations and\ninnovations in religion, I have become your disciple. You, Meletus, as\nI shall say to him, acknowledge Euthyphro to be a great theologian, and\nsound in his opinions; and if you approve of him you ought to approve of\nme, and not have me into court; but if you disapprove, you should begin\nby indicting him who is my teacher, and who will be the ruin, not of the\nyoung, but of the old; that is to say, of myself whom he instructs,\nand of his old father whom he admonishes and chastises. And if Meletus\nrefuses to listen to me, but will go on, and will not shift the\nindictment from me to you, I cannot do better than repeat this challenge\nin the court.\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Yes, indeed, Socrates; and if he attempts to indict me I am\nmistaken if I do not find a flaw in him; the court shall have a great\ndeal more to say to him than to me.\n\nSOCRATES: And I, my dear friend, knowing this, am desirous of becoming\nyour disciple. For I observe that no one appears to notice you--not even\nthis Meletus; but his sharp eyes have found me out at once, and he has\nindicted me for impiety. And therefore, I adjure you to tell me the\nnature of piety and impiety, which you said that you knew so well, and\nof murder, and of other offences against the gods. What are they? Is\nnot piety in every action always the same? and impiety, again--is it not\nalways the opposite of piety, and also the same with itself, having, as\nimpiety, one notion which includes whatever is impious?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: To be sure, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: And what is piety, and what is impiety?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Piety is doing as I am doing; that is to say, prosecuting any\none who is guilty of murder, sacrilege, or of any similar crime--whether\nhe be your father or mother, or whoever he may be--that makes no\ndifference; and not to prosecute them is impiety. And please to\nconsider, Socrates, what a notable proof I will give you of the truth\nof my words, a proof which I have already given to others:--of the\nprinciple, I mean, that the impious, whoever he may be, ought not to go\nunpunished. For do not men regard Zeus as the best and most righteous of\nthe gods?--and yet they admit that he bound his father (Cronos) because\nhe wickedly devoured his sons, and that he too had punished his own\nfather (Uranus) for a similar reason, in a nameless manner. And yet when\nI proceed against my father, they are angry with me. So inconsistent are\nthey in their way of talking when the gods are concerned, and when I am\nconcerned.\n\nSOCRATES: May not this be the reason, Euthyphro, why I am charged with\nimpiety--that I cannot away with these stories about the gods? and\ntherefore I suppose that people think me wrong. But, as you who are well\ninformed about them approve of them, I cannot do better than assent to\nyour superior wisdom. What else can I say, confessing as I do, that\nI know nothing about them? Tell me, for the love of Zeus, whether you\nreally believe that they are true.\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates; and things more wonderful still, of which the\nworld is in ignorance.\n\nSOCRATES: And do you really believe that the gods fought with one\nanother, and had dire quarrels, battles, and the like, as the poets\nsay, and as you may see represented in the works of great artists?\nThe temples are full of them; and notably the robe of Athene, which is\ncarried up to the Acropolis at the great Panathenaea, is embroidered\nwith them. Are all these tales of the gods true, Euthyphro?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates; and, as I was saying, I can tell you, if you\nwould like to hear them, many other things about the gods which would\nquite amaze you.\n\nSOCRATES: I dare say; and you shall tell me them at some other time when\nI have leisure. But just at present I would rather hear from you a\nmore precise answer, which you have not as yet given, my friend, to the\nquestion, What is 'piety'? When asked, you only replied, Doing as you\ndo, charging your father with murder.\n\nEUTHYPHRO: And what I said was true, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: No doubt, Euthyphro; but you would admit that there are many\nother pious acts?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: There are.\n\nSOCRATES: Remember that I did not ask you to give me two or three\nexamples of piety, but to explain the general idea which makes all pious\nthings to be pious. Do you not recollect that there was one idea which\nmade the impious impious, and the pious pious?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: I remember.\n\nSOCRATES: Tell me what is the nature of this idea, and then I shall\nhave a standard to which I may look, and by which I may measure actions,\nwhether yours or those of any one else, and then I shall be able to say\nthat such and such an action is pious, such another impious.\n\nEUTHYPHRO: I will tell you, if you like.\n\nSOCRATES: I should very much like.\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Piety, then, is that which is dear to the gods, and impiety\nis that which is not dear to them.\n\nSOCRATES: Very good, Euthyphro; you have now given me the sort of answer\nwhich I wanted. But whether what you say is true or not I cannot as yet\ntell, although I make no doubt that you will prove the truth of your\nwords.\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Of course.\n\nSOCRATES: Come, then, and let us examine what we are saying. That thing\nor person which is dear to the gods is pious, and that thing or person\nwhich is hateful to the gods is impious, these two being the extreme\nopposites of one another. Was not that said?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: It was.\n\nSOCRATES: And well said?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates, I thought so; it was certainly said.\n\nSOCRATES: And further, Euthyphro, the gods were admitted to have\nenmities and hatreds and differences?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Yes, that was also said.\n\nSOCRATES: And what sort of difference creates enmity and anger? Suppose\nfor example that you and I, my good friend, differ about a number; do\ndifferences of this sort make us enemies and set us at variance with one\nanother? Do we not go at once to arithmetic, and put an end to them by a\nsum?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: True.\n\nSOCRATES: Or suppose that we differ about magnitudes, do we not quickly\nend the differences by measuring?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: And we end a controversy about heavy and light by resorting to\na weighing machine?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: To be sure.\n\nSOCRATES: But what differences are there which cannot be thus decided,\nand which therefore make us angry and set us at enmity with one another?\nI dare say the answer does not occur to you at the moment, and therefore\nI will suggest that these enmities arise when the matters of difference\nare the just and unjust, good and evil, honourable and dishonourable.\nAre not these the points about which men differ, and about which when we\nare unable satisfactorily to decide our differences, you and I and all\nof us quarrel, when we do quarrel? (Compare Alcib.)\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates, the nature of the differences about which we\nquarrel is such as you describe.\n\nSOCRATES: And the quarrels of the gods, noble Euthyphro, when they\noccur, are of a like nature?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Certainly they are.\n\nSOCRATES: They have differences of opinion, as you say, about good and\nevil, just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable: there would\nhave been no quarrels among them, if there had been no such\ndifferences--would there now?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: You are quite right.\n\nSOCRATES: Does not every man love that which he deems noble and just and\ngood, and hate the opposite of them?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: But, as you say, people regard the same things, some as just\nand others as unjust,--about these they dispute; and so there arise wars\nand fightings among them.\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: Then the same things are hated by the gods and loved by the\ngods, and are both hateful and dear to them?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And upon this view the same things, Euthyphro, will be pious\nand also impious?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: So I should suppose.\n\nSOCRATES: Then, my friend, I remark with surprise that you have not\nanswered the question which I asked. For I certainly did not ask you\nto tell me what action is both pious and impious: but now it would seem\nthat what is loved by the gods is also hated by them. And therefore,\nEuthyphro, in thus chastising your father you may very likely be doing\nwhat is agreeable to Zeus but disagreeable to Cronos or Uranus, and what\nis acceptable to Hephaestus but unacceptable to Here, and there may be\nother gods who have similar differences of opinion.\n\nEUTHYPHRO: But I believe, Socrates, that all the gods would be agreed as\nto the propriety of punishing a murderer: there would be no difference\nof opinion about that.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, but speaking of men, Euthyphro, did you ever hear any\none arguing that a murderer or any sort of evil-doer ought to be let\noff?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: I should rather say that these are the questions which they\nare always arguing, especially in courts of law: they commit all sorts\nof crimes, and there is nothing which they will not do or say in their\nown defence.\n\nSOCRATES: But do they admit their guilt, Euthyphro, and yet say that\nthey ought not to be punished?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: No; they do not.\n\nSOCRATES: Then there are some things which they do not venture to say\nand do: for they do not venture to argue that the guilty are to be\nunpunished, but they deny their guilt, do they not?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then they do not argue that the evil-doer should not be\npunished, but they argue about the fact of who the evil-doer is, and\nwhat he did and when?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And the gods are in the same case, if as you assert they\nquarrel about just and unjust, and some of them say while others deny\nthat injustice is done among them. For surely neither God nor man will\never venture to say that the doer of injustice is not to be punished?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: That is true, Socrates, in the main.\n\nSOCRATES: But they join issue about the particulars--gods and men alike;\nand, if they dispute at all, they dispute about some act which is called\nin question, and which by some is affirmed to be just, by others to be\nunjust. Is not that true?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Quite true.\n\nSOCRATES: Well then, my dear friend Euthyphro, do tell me, for my better\ninstruction and information, what proof have you that in the opinion of\nall the gods a servant who is guilty of murder, and is put in chains by\nthe master of the dead man, and dies because he is put in chains before\nhe who bound him can learn from the interpreters of the gods what he\nought to do with him, dies unjustly; and that on behalf of such an one\na son ought to proceed against his father and accuse him of murder. How\nwould you show that all the gods absolutely agree in approving of his\nact? Prove to me that they do, and I will applaud your wisdom as long as\nI live.\n\nEUTHYPHRO: It will be a difficult task; but I could make the matter very\nclear indeed to you.\n\nSOCRATES: I understand; you mean to say that I am not so quick of\napprehension as the judges: for to them you will be sure to prove that\nthe act is unjust, and hateful to the gods.\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Yes indeed, Socrates; at least if they will listen to me.\n\nSOCRATES: But they will be sure to listen if they find that you are a\ngood speaker. There was a notion that came into my mind while you were\nspeaking; I said to myself: 'Well, and what if Euthyphro does prove to\nme that all the gods regarded the death of the serf as unjust, how do I\nknow anything more of the nature of piety and impiety? for granting that\nthis action may be hateful to the gods, still piety and impiety are not\nadequately defined by these distinctions, for that which is hateful\nto the gods has been shown to be also pleasing and dear to them.' And\ntherefore, Euthyphro, I do not ask you to prove this; I will suppose, if\nyou like, that all the gods condemn and abominate such an action. But I\nwill amend the definition so far as to say that what all the gods hate\nis impious, and what they love pious or holy; and what some of them\nlove and others hate is both or neither. Shall this be our definition of\npiety and impiety?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Why not, Socrates?\n\nSOCRATES: Why not! certainly, as far as I am concerned, Euthyphro, there\nis no reason why not. But whether this admission will greatly assist you\nin the task of instructing me as you promised, is a matter for you to\nconsider.\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Yes, I should say that what all the gods love is pious and\nholy, and the opposite which they all hate, impious.\n\nSOCRATES: Ought we to enquire into the truth of this, Euthyphro, or\nsimply to accept the mere statement on our own authority and that of\nothers? What do you say?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: We should enquire; and I believe that the statement will\nstand the test of enquiry.\n\nSOCRATES: We shall know better, my good friend, in a little while. The\npoint which I should first wish to understand is whether the pious or\nholy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is\nbeloved of the gods.\n\nEUTHYPHRO: I do not understand your meaning, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: I will endeavour to explain: we, speak of carrying and we\nspeak of being carried, of leading and being led, seeing and being seen.\nYou know that in all such cases there is a difference, and you know also\nin what the difference lies?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: I think that I understand.\n\nSOCRATES: And is not that which is beloved distinct from that which\nloves?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Well; and now tell me, is that which is carried in this state\nof carrying because it is carried, or for some other reason?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: No; that is the reason.\n\nSOCRATES: And the same is true of what is led and of what is seen?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And a thing is not seen because it is visible, but conversely,\nvisible because it is seen; nor is a thing led because it is in the\nstate of being led, or carried because it is in the state of being\ncarried, but the converse of this. And now I think, Euthyphro, that\nmy meaning will be intelligible; and my meaning is, that any state of\naction or passion implies previous action or passion. It does not become\nbecause it is becoming, but it is in a state of becoming because it\nbecomes; neither does it suffer because it is in a state of suffering,\nbut it is in a state of suffering because it suffers. Do you not agree?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Is not that which is loved in some state either of becoming or\nsuffering?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And the same holds as in the previous instances; the state of\nbeing loved follows the act of being loved, and not the act the state.\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And what do you say of piety, Euthyphro: is not piety,\naccording to your definition, loved by all the gods?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Because it is pious or holy, or for some other reason?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: No, that is the reason.\n\nSOCRATES: It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And that which is dear to the gods is loved by them, and is in\na state to be loved of them because it is loved of them?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Then that which is dear to the gods, Euthyphro, is not holy,\nnor is that which is holy loved of God, as you affirm; but they are two\ndifferent things.\n\nEUTHYPHRO: How do you mean, Socrates?\n\nSOCRATES: I mean to say that the holy has been acknowledged by us to be\nloved of God because it is holy, not to be holy because it is loved.\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: But that which is dear to the gods is dear to them because it\nis loved by them, not loved by them because it is dear to them.\n\nEUTHYPHRO: True.\n\nSOCRATES: But, friend Euthyphro, if that which is holy is the same with\nthat which is dear to God, and is loved because it is holy, then that\nwhich is dear to God would have been loved as being dear to God; but if\nthat which is dear to God is dear to him because loved by him, then that\nwhich is holy would have been holy because loved by him. But now you see\nthat the reverse is the case, and that they are quite different from\none another. For one (theophiles) is of a kind to be loved cause it\nis loved, and the other (osion) is loved because it is of a kind to\nbe loved. Thus you appear to me, Euthyphro, when I ask you what is\nthe essence of holiness, to offer an attribute only, and not the\nessence--the attribute of being loved by all the gods. But you still\nrefuse to explain to me the nature of holiness. And therefore, if you\nplease, I will ask you not to hide your treasure, but to tell me once\nmore what holiness or piety really is, whether dear to the gods or not\n(for that is a matter about which we will not quarrel); and what is\nimpiety?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: I really do not know, Socrates, how to express what I mean.\nFor somehow or other our arguments, on whatever ground we rest them,\nseem to turn round and walk away from us.\n\nSOCRATES: Your words, Euthyphro, are like the handiwork of my ancestor\nDaedalus; and if I were the sayer or propounder of them, you might say\nthat my arguments walk away and will not remain fixed where they are\nplaced because I am a descendant of his. But now, since these notions\nare your own, you must find some other gibe, for they certainly, as you\nyourself allow, show an inclination to be on the move.\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Nay, Socrates, I shall still say that you are the Daedalus\nwho sets arguments in motion; not I, certainly, but you make them\nmove or go round, for they would never have stirred, as far as I am\nconcerned.\n\nSOCRATES: Then I must be a greater than Daedalus: for whereas he only\nmade his own inventions to move, I move those of other people as well.\nAnd the beauty of it is, that I would rather not. For I would give the\nwisdom of Daedalus, and the wealth of Tantalus, to be able to detain\nthem and keep them fixed. But enough of this. As I perceive that you are\nlazy, I will myself endeavour to show you how you might instruct me in\nthe nature of piety; and I hope that you will not grudge your labour.\nTell me, then--Is not that which is pious necessarily just?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And is, then, all which is just pious? or, is that which is\npious all just, but that which is just, only in part and not all, pious?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: I do not understand you, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: And yet I know that you are as much wiser than I am, as you\nare younger. But, as I was saying, revered friend, the abundance of your\nwisdom makes you lazy. Please to exert yourself, for there is no\nreal difficulty in understanding me. What I mean I may explain by an\nillustration of what I do not mean. The poet (Stasinus) sings--\n\n'Of Zeus, the author and creator of all these things, You will not tell:\nfor where there is fear there is also reverence.'\n\nNow I disagree with this poet. Shall I tell you in what respect?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: By all means.\n\nSOCRATES: I should not say that where there is fear there is also\nreverence; for I am sure that many persons fear poverty and disease, and\nthe like evils, but I do not perceive that they reverence the objects of\ntheir fear.\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: But where reverence is, there is fear; for he who has a\nfeeling of reverence and shame about the commission of any action, fears\nand is afraid of an ill reputation.\n\nEUTHYPHRO: No doubt.\n\nSOCRATES: Then we are wrong in saying that where there is fear there\nis also reverence; and we should say, where there is reverence there is\nalso fear. But there is not always reverence where there is fear; for\nfear is a more extended notion, and reverence is a part of fear, just as\nthe odd is a part of number, and number is a more extended notion than\nthe odd. I suppose that you follow me now?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Quite well.\n\nSOCRATES: That was the sort of question which I meant to raise when\nI asked whether the just is always the pious, or the pious always the\njust; and whether there may not be justice where there is not piety; for\njustice is the more extended notion of which piety is only a part. Do\nyou dissent?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: No, I think that you are quite right.\n\nSOCRATES: Then, if piety is a part of justice, I suppose that we should\nenquire what part? If you had pursued the enquiry in the previous cases;\nfor instance, if you had asked me what is an even number, and what part\nof number the even is, I should have had no difficulty in replying,\na number which represents a figure having two equal sides. Do you not\nagree?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Yes, I quite agree.\n\nSOCRATES: In like manner, I want you to tell me what part of justice\nis piety or holiness, that I may be able to tell Meletus not to do me\ninjustice, or indict me for impiety, as I am now adequately instructed\nby you in the nature of piety or holiness, and their opposites.\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Piety or holiness, Socrates, appears to me to be that part of\njustice which attends to the gods, as there is the other part of justice\nwhich attends to men.\n\nSOCRATES: That is good, Euthyphro; yet still there is a little point\nabout which I should like to have further information, What is the\nmeaning of 'attention'? For attention can hardly be used in the same\nsense when applied to the gods as when applied to other things. For\ninstance, horses are said to require attention, and not every person is\nable to attend to them, but only a person skilled in horsemanship. Is it\nnot so?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: I should suppose that the art of horsemanship is the art of\nattending to horses?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Nor is every one qualified to attend to dogs, but only the\nhuntsman?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And I should also conceive that the art of the huntsman is the\nart of attending to dogs?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: As the art of the oxherd is the art of attending to oxen?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: In like manner holiness or piety is the art of attending to\nthe gods?--that would be your meaning, Euthyphro?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And is not attention always designed for the good or benefit\nof that to which the attention is given? As in the case of horses,\nyou may observe that when attended to by the horseman's art they are\nbenefited and improved, are they not?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: True.\n\nSOCRATES: As the dogs are benefited by the huntsman's art, and the oxen\nby the art of the oxherd, and all other things are tended or attended\nfor their good and not for their hurt?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Certainly, not for their hurt.\n\nSOCRATES: But for their good?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Of course.\n\nSOCRATES: And does piety or holiness, which has been defined to be the\nart of attending to the gods, benefit or improve them? Would you say\nthat when you do a holy act you make any of the gods better?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: No, no; that was certainly not what I meant.\n\nSOCRATES: And I, Euthyphro, never supposed that you did. I asked you the\nquestion about the nature of the attention, because I thought that you\ndid not.\n\nEUTHYPHRO: You do me justice, Socrates; that is not the sort of\nattention which I mean.\n\nSOCRATES: Good: but I must still ask what is this attention to the gods\nwhich is called piety?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: It is such, Socrates, as servants show to their masters.\n\nSOCRATES: I understand--a sort of ministration to the gods.\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Exactly.\n\nSOCRATES: Medicine is also a sort of ministration or service, having in\nview the attainment of some object--would you not say of health?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: I should.\n\nSOCRATES: Again, there is an art which ministers to the ship-builder\nwith a view to the attainment of some result?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates, with a view to the building of a ship.\n\nSOCRATES: As there is an art which ministers to the house-builder with a\nview to the building of a house?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And now tell me, my good friend, about the art which ministers\nto the gods: what work does that help to accomplish? For you must surely\nknow if, as you say, you are of all men living the one who is best\ninstructed in religion.\n\nEUTHYPHRO: And I speak the truth, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: Tell me then, oh tell me--what is that fair work which the\ngods do by the help of our ministrations?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Many and fair, Socrates, are the works which they do.\n\nSOCRATES: Why, my friend, and so are those of a general. But the chief\nof them is easily told. Would you not say that victory in war is the\nchief of them?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Many and fair, too, are the works of the husbandman, if I\nam not mistaken; but his chief work is the production of food from the\nearth?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Exactly.\n\nSOCRATES: And of the many and fair things done by the gods, which is the\nchief or principal one?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: I have told you already, Socrates, that to learn all these\nthings accurately will be very tiresome. Let me simply say that piety or\nholiness is learning how to please the gods in word and deed, by prayers\nand sacrifices. Such piety is the salvation of families and states,\njust as the impious, which is unpleasing to the gods, is their ruin and\ndestruction.\n\nSOCRATES: I think that you could have answered in much fewer words the\nchief question which I asked, Euthyphro, if you had chosen. But I see\nplainly that you are not disposed to instruct me--clearly not: else why,\nwhen we reached the point, did you turn aside? Had you only answered\nme I should have truly learned of you by this time the nature of\npiety. Now, as the asker of a question is necessarily dependent on the\nanswerer, whither he leads I must follow; and can only ask again, what\nis the pious, and what is piety? Do you mean that they are a sort of\nscience of praying and sacrificing?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Yes, I do.\n\nSOCRATES: And sacrificing is giving to the gods, and prayer is asking of\nthe gods?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: Upon this view, then, piety is a science of asking and giving?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: You understand me capitally, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, my friend; the reason is that I am a votary of your\nscience, and give my mind to it, and therefore nothing which you say\nwill be thrown away upon me. Please then to tell me, what is the nature\nof this service to the gods? Do you mean that we prefer requests and\ngive gifts to them?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Yes, I do.\n\nSOCRATES: Is not the right way of asking to ask of them what we want?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And the right way of giving is to give to them in return what\nthey want of us. There would be no meaning in an art which gives to any\none that which he does not want.\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Very true, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: Then piety, Euthyphro, is an art which gods and men have of\ndoing business with one another?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: That is an expression which you may use, if you like.\n\nSOCRATES: But I have no particular liking for anything but the truth. I\nwish, however, that you would tell me what benefit accrues to the gods\nfrom our gifts. There is no doubt about what they give to us; for there\nis no good thing which they do not give; but how we can give any good\nthing to them in return is far from being equally clear. If they give\neverything and we give nothing, that must be an affair of business in\nwhich we have very greatly the advantage of them.\n\nEUTHYPHRO: And do you imagine, Socrates, that any benefit accrues to the\ngods from our gifts?\n\nSOCRATES: But if not, Euthyphro, what is the meaning of gifts which are\nconferred by us upon the gods?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: What else, but tributes of honour; and, as I was just now\nsaying, what pleases them?\n\nSOCRATES: Piety, then, is pleasing to the gods, but not beneficial or\ndear to them?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: I should say that nothing could be dearer.\n\nSOCRATES: Then once more the assertion is repeated that piety is dear to\nthe gods?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And when you say this, can you wonder at your words not\nstanding firm, but walking away? Will you accuse me of being the\nDaedalus who makes them walk away, not perceiving that there is another\nand far greater artist than Daedalus who makes them go round in a\ncircle, and he is yourself; for the argument, as you will perceive,\ncomes round to the same point. Were we not saying that the holy or\npious was not the same with that which is loved of the gods? Have you\nforgotten?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: I quite remember.\n\nSOCRATES: And are you not saying that what is loved of the gods is holy;\nand is not this the same as what is dear to them--do you see?\n\nEUTHYPHRO: True.\n\nSOCRATES: Then either we were wrong in our former assertion; or, if we\nwere right then, we are wrong now.\n\nEUTHYPHRO: One of the two must be true.\n\nSOCRATES: Then we must begin again and ask, What is piety? That is an\nenquiry which I shall never be weary of pursuing as far as in me lies;\nand I entreat you not to scorn me, but to apply your mind to the utmost,\nand tell me the truth. For, if any man knows, you are he; and therefore\nI must detain you, like Proteus, until you tell. If you had not\ncertainly known the nature of piety and impiety, I am confident that\nyou would never, on behalf of a serf, have charged your aged father with\nmurder. You would not have run such a risk of doing wrong in the sight\nof the gods, and you would have had too much respect for the opinions\nof men. I am sure, therefore, that you know the nature of piety and\nimpiety. Speak out then, my dear Euthyphro, and do not hide your\nknowledge.\n\nEUTHYPHRO: Another time, Socrates; for I am in a hurry, and must go now.\n\nSOCRATES: Alas! my companion, and will you leave me in despair? I was\nhoping that you would instruct me in the nature of piety and impiety;\nand then I might have cleared myself of Meletus and his indictment. I\nwould have told him that I had been enlightened by Euthyphro, and had\ngiven up rash innovations and speculations, in which I indulged only\nthrough ignorance, and that now I am about to lead a better life.","title":"Euthyphro","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":9206}