{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_1643/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_1643","id":"gutenberg_1643","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1643","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Classics of Literature","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Classical literature","Ethics -- Early works to 1800","Socrates, 470 BC-399 BC","Virtue -- Early works to 1800"],"text":"Produced by Sue Asscher\n\n\n\n\n\nMENO\n\nby Plato\n\nTranslated by Benjamin Jowett\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION.\n\nThis Dialogue begins abruptly with a question of Meno, who asks,\n'whether virtue can be taught.' Socrates replies that he does not as yet\nknow what virtue is, and has never known anyone who did. 'Then he cannot\nhave met Gorgias when he was at Athens.' Yes, Socrates had met him, but\nhe has a bad memory, and has forgotten what Gorgias said. Will Meno tell\nhim his own notion, which is probably not very different from that of\nGorgias? 'O yes--nothing easier: there is the virtue of a man, of a\nwoman, of an old man, and of a child; there is a virtue of every age and\nstate of life, all of which may be easily described.'\n\nSocrates reminds Meno that this is only an enumeration of the virtues\nand not a definition of the notion which is common to them all. In a\nsecond attempt Meno defines virtue to be 'the power of command.' But to\nthis, again, exceptions are taken. For there must be a virtue of those\nwho obey, as well as of those who command; and the power of command must\nbe justly or not unjustly exercised. Meno is very ready to admit that\njustice is virtue: 'Would you say virtue or a virtue, for there are\nother virtues, such as courage, temperance, and the like; just as round\nis a figure, and black and white are colours, and yet there are other\nfigures and other colours. Let Meno take the examples of figure and\ncolour, and try to define them.' Meno confesses his inability, and after\na process of interrogation, in which Socrates explains to him the\nnature of a 'simile in multis,' Socrates himself defines figure as 'the\naccompaniment of colour.' But some one may object that he does not know\nthe meaning of the word 'colour;' and if he is a candid friend, and not\na mere disputant, Socrates is willing to furnish him with a simpler and\nmore philosophical definition, into which no disputed word is allowed to\nintrude: 'Figure is the limit of form.' Meno imperiously insists that\nhe must still have a definition of colour. Some raillery follows; and\nat length Socrates is induced to reply, 'that colour is the effluence of\nform, sensible, and in due proportion to the sight.' This definition is\nexactly suited to the taste of Meno, who welcomes the familiar language\nof Gorgias and Empedocles. Socrates is of opinion that the more abstract\nor dialectical definition of figure is far better.\n\nNow that Meno has been made to understand the nature of a general\ndefinition, he answers in the spirit of a Greek gentleman, and in the\nwords of a poet, 'that virtue is to delight in things honourable, and to\nhave the power of getting them.' This is a nearer approximation than\nhe has yet made to a complete definition, and, regarded as a piece\nof proverbial or popular morality, is not far from the truth. But the\nobjection is urged, 'that the honourable is the good,' and as every one\nequally desires the good, the point of the definition is contained in\nthe words, 'the power of getting them.' 'And they must be got justly or\nwith justice.' The definition will then stand thus: 'Virtue is the power\nof getting good with justice.' But justice is a part of virtue, and\ntherefore virtue is the getting of good with a part of virtue. The\ndefinition repeats the word defined.\n\nMeno complains that the conversation of Socrates has the effect of a\ntorpedo's shock upon him. When he talks with other persons he has plenty\nto say about virtue; in the presence of Socrates, his thoughts desert\nhim. Socrates replies that he is only the cause of perplexity in others,\nbecause he is himself perplexed. He proposes to continue the enquiry.\nBut how, asks Meno, can he enquire either into what he knows or into\nwhat he does not know? This is a sophistical puzzle, which, as Socrates\nremarks, saves a great deal of trouble to him who accepts it. But the\npuzzle has a real difficulty latent under it, to which Socrates will\nendeavour to find a reply. The difficulty is the origin of knowledge:--\n\nHe has heard from priests and priestesses, and from the poet Pindar, of\nan immortal soul which is born again and again in successive periods of\nexistence, returning into this world when she has paid the penalty of\nancient crime, and, having wandered over all places of the upper and\nunder world, and seen and known all things at one time or other, is by\nassociation out of one thing capable of recovering all. For nature is\nof one kindred; and every soul has a seed or germ which may be developed\ninto all knowledge. The existence of this latent knowledge is further\nproved by the interrogation of one of Meno's slaves, who, in the skilful\nhands of Socrates, is made to acknowledge some elementary relations\nof geometrical figures. The theorem that the square of the diagonal\nis double the square of the side--that famous discovery of primitive\nmathematics, in honour of which the legendary Pythagoras is said to\nhave sacrificed a hecatomb--is elicited from him. The first step in the\nprocess of teaching has made him conscious of his own ignorance. He\nhas had the 'torpedo's shock' given him, and is the better for the\noperation. But whence had the uneducated man this knowledge? He had\nnever learnt geometry in this world; nor was it born with him; he must\ntherefore have had it when he was not a man. And as he always either was\nor was not a man, he must have always had it. (Compare Phaedo.)\n\nAfter Socrates has given this specimen of the true nature of teaching,\nthe original question of the teachableness of virtue is renewed. Again\nhe professes a desire to know 'what virtue is' first. But he is willing\nto argue the question, as mathematicians say, under an hypothesis. He\nwill assume that if virtue is knowledge, then virtue can be taught.\n(This was the stage of the argument at which the Protagoras concluded.)\n\nSocrates has no difficulty in showing that virtue is a good, and\nthat goods, whether of body or mind, must be under the direction of\nknowledge. Upon the assumption just made, then, virtue is teachable. But\nwhere are the teachers? There are none to be found. This is extremely\ndiscouraging. Virtue is no sooner discovered to be teachable, than the\ndiscovery follows that it is not taught. Virtue, therefore, is and is\nnot teachable.\n\nIn this dilemma an appeal is made to Anytus, a respectable and\nwell-to-do citizen of the old school, and a family friend of Meno,\nwho happens to be present. He is asked 'whether Meno shall go to the\nSophists and be taught.' The suggestion throws him into a rage. 'To\nwhom, then, shall Meno go?' asks Socrates. To any Athenian gentleman--to\nthe great Athenian statesmen of past times. Socrates replies here, as\nelsewhere (Laches, Prot.), that Themistocles, Pericles, and other great\nmen, had sons to whom they would surely, if they could have done so,\nhave imparted their own political wisdom; but no one ever heard that\nthese sons of theirs were remarkable for anything except riding and\nwrestling and similar accomplishments. Anytus is angry at the imputation\nwhich is cast on his favourite statesmen, and on a class to which he\nsupposes himself to belong; he breaks off with a significant hint. The\nmention of another opportunity of talking with him, and the suggestion\nthat Meno may do the Athenian people a service by pacifying him, are\nevident allusions to the trial of Socrates.\n\nSocrates returns to the consideration of the question 'whether virtue is\nteachable,' which was denied on the ground that there are no teachers of\nit: (for the Sophists are bad teachers, and the rest of the world do\nnot profess to teach). But there is another point which we failed to\nobserve, and in which Gorgias has never instructed Meno, nor Prodicus\nSocrates. This is the nature of right opinion. For virtue may be under\nthe guidance of right opinion as well as of knowledge; and right opinion\nis for practical purposes as good as knowledge, but is incapable of\nbeing taught, and is also liable, like the images of Daedalus, to 'walk\noff,' because not bound by the tie of the cause. This is the sort of\ninstinct which is possessed by statesmen, who are not wise or knowing\npersons, but only inspired or divine. The higher virtue, which is\nidentical with knowledge, is an ideal only. If the statesman had this\nknowledge, and could teach what he knew, he would be like Tiresias in\nthe world below,--'he alone has wisdom, but the rest flit like shadows.'\n\nThis Dialogue is an attempt to answer the question, Can virtue be\ntaught? No one would either ask or answer such a question in modern\ntimes. But in the age of Socrates it was only by an effort that the mind\ncould rise to a general notion of virtue as distinct from the particular\nvirtues of courage, liberality, and the like. And when a hazy conception\nof this ideal was attained, it was only by a further effort that the\nquestion of the teachableness of virtue could be resolved.\n\nThe answer which is given by Plato is paradoxical enough, and seems\nrather intended to stimulate than to satisfy enquiry. Virtue is\nknowledge, and therefore virtue can be taught. But virtue is not taught,\nand therefore in this higher and ideal sense there is no virtue and no\nknowledge. The teaching of the Sophists is confessedly inadequate, and\nMeno, who is their pupil, is ignorant of the very nature of general\nterms. He can only produce out of their armoury the sophism, 'that you\ncan neither enquire into what you know nor into what you do not know;'\nto which Socrates replies by his theory of reminiscence.\n\nTo the doctrine that virtue is knowledge, Plato has been constantly\ntending in the previous Dialogues. But the new truth is no sooner found\nthan it vanishes away. 'If there is knowledge, there must be teachers;\nand where are the teachers?' There is no knowledge in the higher sense\nof systematic, connected, reasoned knowledge, such as may one day be\nattained, and such as Plato himself seems to see in some far off vision\nof a single science. And there are no teachers in the higher sense of\nthe word; that is to say, no real teachers who will arouse the spirit\nof enquiry in their pupils, and not merely instruct them in rhetoric or\nimpart to them ready-made information for a fee of 'one' or of 'fifty\ndrachms.' Plato is desirous of deepening the notion of education, and\ntherefore he asserts the paradox that there are no educators. This\nparadox, though different in form, is not really different from the\nremark which is often made in modern times by those who would depreciate\neither the methods of education commonly employed, or the standard\nattained--that 'there is no true education among us.'\n\nThere remains still a possibility which must not be overlooked. Even\nif there be no true knowledge, as is proved by 'the wretched state of\neducation,' there may be right opinion, which is a sort of guessing\nor divination resting on no knowledge of causes, and incommunicable to\nothers. This is the gift which our statesmen have, as is proved by the\ncircumstance that they are unable to impart their knowledge to their\nsons. Those who are possessed of it cannot be said to be men of science\nor philosophers, but they are inspired and divine.\n\nThere may be some trace of irony in this curious passage, which forms\nthe concluding portion of the Dialogue. But Plato certainly does not\nmean to intimate that the supernatural or divine is the true basis of\nhuman life. To him knowledge, if only attainable in this world, is of\nall things the most divine. Yet, like other philosophers, he is willing\nto admit that 'probability is the guide of life (Butler's Analogy.);'\nand he is at the same time desirous of contrasting the wisdom which\ngoverns the world with a higher wisdom. There are many instincts,\njudgments, and anticipations of the human mind which cannot be reduced\nto rule, and of which the grounds cannot always be given in words. A\nperson may have some skill or latent experience which he is able to use\nhimself and is yet unable to teach others, because he has no principles,\nand is incapable of collecting or arranging his ideas. He has practice,\nbut not theory; art, but not science. This is a true fact of psychology,\nwhich is recognized by Plato in this passage. But he is far from\nsaying, as some have imagined, that inspiration or divine grace is to be\nregarded as higher than knowledge. He would not have preferred the poet\nor man of action to the philosopher, or the virtue of custom to the\nvirtue based upon ideas.\n\nAlso here, as in the Ion and Phaedrus, Plato appears to acknowledge an\nunreasoning element in the higher nature of man. The philosopher only\nhas knowledge, and yet the statesman and the poet are inspired. There\nmay be a sort of irony in regarding in this way the gifts of genius. But\nthere is no reason to suppose that he is deriding them, any more than he\nis deriding the phenomena of love or of enthusiasm in the Symposium, or\nof oracles in the Apology, or of divine intimations when he is speaking\nof the daemonium of Socrates. He recognizes the lower form of right\nopinion, as well as the higher one of science, in the spirit of one who\ndesires to include in his philosophy every aspect of human life; just\nas he recognizes the existence of popular opinion as a fact, and the\nSophists as the expression of it.\n\nThis Dialogue contains the first intimation of the doctrine of\nreminiscence and of the immortality of the soul. The proof is very\nslight, even slighter than in the Phaedo and Republic. Because men had\nabstract ideas in a previous state, they must have always had them, and\ntheir souls therefore must have always existed. For they must always\nhave been either men or not men. The fallacy of the latter words is\ntransparent. And Socrates himself appears to be conscious of their\nweakness; for he adds immediately afterwards, 'I have said some things\nof which I am not altogether confident.' (Compare Phaedo.) It may be\nobserved, however, that the fanciful notion of pre-existence is combined\nwith a true but partial view of the origin and unity of knowledge,\nand of the association of ideas. Knowledge is prior to any particular\nknowledge, and exists not in the previous state of the individual, but\nof the race. It is potential, not actual, and can only be appropriated\nby strenuous exertion.\n\nThe idealism of Plato is here presented in a less developed form than in\nthe Phaedo and Phaedrus. Nothing is said of the pre-existence of ideas\nof justice, temperance, and the like. Nor is Socrates positive of\nanything but the duty of enquiry. The doctrine of reminiscence too is\nexplained more in accordance with fact and experience as arising out of\nthe affinities of nature (ate tes thuseos oles suggenous ouses). Modern\nphilosophy says that all things in nature are dependent on one another;\nthe ancient philosopher had the same truth latent in his mind when\nhe affirmed that out of one thing all the rest may be recovered. The\nsubjective was converted by him into an objective; the mental phenomenon\nof the association of ideas (compare Phaedo) became a real chain of\nexistences. The germs of two valuable principles of education may also\nbe gathered from the 'words of priests and priestesses:' (1) that\ntrue knowledge is a knowledge of causes (compare Aristotle's theory of\nepisteme); and (2) that the process of learning consists not in what is\nbrought to the learner, but in what is drawn out of him.\n\nSome lesser points of the dialogue may be noted, such as (1) the\nacute observation that Meno prefers the familiar definition, which is\nembellished with poetical language, to the better and truer one; or (2)\nthe shrewd reflection, which may admit of an application to modern\nas well as to ancient teachers, that the Sophists having made large\nfortunes; this must surely be a criterion of their powers of teaching,\nfor that no man could get a living by shoemaking who was not a good\nshoemaker; or (3) the remark conveyed, almost in a word, that the verbal\nsceptic is saved the labour of thought and enquiry (ouden dei to toiouto\nzeteseos). Characteristic also of the temper of the Socratic enquiry\nis, (4) the proposal to discuss the teachableness of virtue under\nan hypothesis, after the manner of the mathematicians; and (5) the\nrepetition of the favourite doctrine which occurs so frequently in\nthe earlier and more Socratic Dialogues, and gives a colour to all\nof them--that mankind only desire evil through ignorance; (6) the\nexperiment of eliciting from the slave-boy the mathematical truth which\nis latent in him, and (7) the remark that he is all the better for\nknowing his ignorance.\n\nThe character of Meno, like that of Critias, has no relation to the\nactual circumstances of his life. Plato is silent about his treachery\nto the ten thousand Greeks, which Xenophon has recorded, as he is also\nsilent about the crimes of Critias. He is a Thessalian Alcibiades,\nrich and luxurious--a spoilt child of fortune, and is described as the\nhereditary friend of the great king. Like Alcibiades he is inspired\nwith an ardent desire of knowledge, and is equally willing to learn of\nSocrates and of the Sophists. He may be regarded as standing in the same\nrelation to Gorgias as Hippocrates in the Protagoras to the other\ngreat Sophist. He is the sophisticated youth on whom Socrates tries his\ncross-examining powers, just as in the Charmides, the Lysis, and\nthe Euthydemus, ingenuous boyhood is made the subject of a similar\nexperiment. He is treated by Socrates in a half-playful manner suited to\nhis character; at the same time he appears not quite to understand the\nprocess to which he is being subjected. For he is exhibited as ignorant\nof the very elements of dialectics, in which the Sophists have failed\nto instruct their disciple. His definition of virtue as 'the power and\ndesire of attaining things honourable,' like the first definition\nof justice in the Republic, is taken from a poet. His answers have a\nsophistical ring, and at the same time show the sophistical incapacity\nto grasp a general notion.\n\nAnytus is the type of the narrow-minded man of the world, who is\nindignant at innovation, and equally detests the popular teacher and\nthe true philosopher. He seems, like Aristophanes, to regard the new\nopinions, whether of Socrates or the Sophists, as fatal to Athenian\ngreatness. He is of the same class as Callicles in the Gorgias, but of\na different variety; the immoral and sophistical doctrines of Callicles\nare not attributed to him. The moderation with which he is described is\nremarkable, if he be the accuser of Socrates, as is apparently indicated\nby his parting words. Perhaps Plato may have been desirous of showing\nthat the accusation of Socrates was not to be attributed to badness or\nmalevolence, but rather to a tendency in men's minds. Or he may have\nbeen regardless of the historical truth of the characters of his\ndialogue, as in the case of Meno and Critias. Like Chaerephon (Apol.)\nthe real Anytus was a democrat, and had joined Thrasybulus in the\nconflict with the thirty.\n\nThe Protagoras arrived at a sort of hypothetical conclusion, that if\n'virtue is knowledge, it can be taught.' In the Euthydemus, Socrates\nhimself offered an example of the manner in which the true teacher\nmay draw out the mind of youth; this was in contrast to the quibbling\nfollies of the Sophists. In the Meno the subject is more developed; the\nfoundations of the enquiry are laid deeper, and the nature of knowledge\nis more distinctly explained. There is a progression by antagonism of\ntwo opposite aspects of philosophy. But at the moment when we approach\nnearest, the truth doubles upon us and passes out of our reach. We seem\nto find that the ideal of knowledge is irreconcilable with experience.\nIn human life there is indeed the profession of knowledge, but right\nopinion is our actual guide. There is another sort of progress from the\ngeneral notions of Socrates, who asked simply, 'what is friendship?'\n'what is temperance?' 'what is courage?' as in the Lysis, Charmides,\nLaches, to the transcendentalism of Plato, who, in the second stage of\nhis philosophy, sought to find the nature of knowledge in a prior and\nfuture state of existence.\n\nThe difficulty in framing general notions which has appeared in this and\nin all the previous Dialogues recurs in the Gorgias and Theaetetus as\nwell as in the Republic. In the Gorgias too the statesmen reappear, but\nin stronger opposition to the philosopher. They are no longer allowed to\nhave a divine insight, but, though acknowledged to have been clever men\nand good speakers, are denounced as 'blind leaders of the blind.' The\ndoctrine of the immortality of the soul is also carried further, being\nmade the foundation not only of a theory of knowledge, but of a doctrine\nof rewards and punishments. In the Republic the relation of knowledge\nto virtue is described in a manner more consistent with modern\ndistinctions. The existence of the virtues without the possession\nof knowledge in the higher or philosophical sense is admitted to be\npossible. Right opinion is again introduced in the Theaetetus as\nan account of knowledge, but is rejected on the ground that it is\nirrational (as here, because it is not bound by the tie of the cause),\nand also because the conception of false opinion is given up as\nhopeless. The doctrines of Plato are necessarily different at different\ntimes of his life, as new distinctions are realized, or new stages of\nthought attained by him. We are not therefore justified, in order to\ntake away the appearance of inconsistency, in attributing to him hidden\nmeanings or remote allusions.\n\nThere are no external criteria by which we can determine the date of the\nMeno. There is no reason to suppose that any of the Dialogues of Plato\nwere written before the death of Socrates; the Meno, which appears to be\none of the earliest of them, is proved to have been of a later date by\nthe allusion of Anytus.\n\nWe cannot argue that Plato was more likely to have written, as he has\ndone, of Meno before than after his miserable death; for we have already\nseen, in the examples of Charmides and Critias, that the characters in\nPlato are very far from resembling the same characters in history. The\nrepulsive picture which is given of him in the Anabasis of Xenophon,\nwhere he also appears as the friend of Aristippus 'and a fair youth\nhaving lovers,' has no other trait of likeness to the Meno of Plato.\n\nThe place of the Meno in the series is doubtfully indicated by internal\nevidence. The main character of the Dialogue is Socrates; but to the\n'general definitions' of Socrates is added the Platonic doctrine of\nreminiscence. The problems of virtue and knowledge have been discussed\nin the Lysis, Laches, Charmides, and Protagoras; the puzzle about\nknowing and learning has already appeared in the Euthydemus. The\ndoctrines of immortality and pre-existence are carried further in the\nPhaedrus and Phaedo; the distinction between opinion and knowledge is\nmore fully developed in the Theaetetus. The lessons of Prodicus, whom he\nfacetiously calls his master, are still running in the mind of Socrates.\nUnlike the later Platonic Dialogues, the Meno arrives at no conclusion.\nHence we are led to place the Dialogue at some point of time later than\nthe Protagoras, and earlier than the Phaedrus and Gorgias. The place\nwhich is assigned to it in this work is due mainly to the desire to\nbring together in a single volume all the Dialogues which contain\nallusions to the trial and death of Socrates.\n\n\n*****\n\n\n\n\nON THE IDEAS OF PLATO.\n\nPlato's doctrine of ideas has attained an imaginary clearness and\ndefiniteness which is not to be found in his own writings. The popular\naccount of them is partly derived from one or two passages in his\nDialogues interpreted without regard to their poetical environment. It\nis due also to the misunderstanding of him by the Aristotelian school;\nand the erroneous notion has been further narrowed and has become fixed\nby the realism of the schoolmen. This popular view of the Platonic ideas\nmay be summed up in some such formula as the following: 'Truth consists\nnot in particulars, but in universals, which have a place in the mind of\nGod, or in some far-off heaven. These were revealed to men in a former\nstate of existence, and are recovered by reminiscence (anamnesis) or\nassociation from sensible things. The sensible things are not\nrealities, but shadows only, in relation to the truth.' These unmeaning\npropositions are hardly suspected to be a caricature of a great theory\nof knowledge, which Plato in various ways and under many figures of\nspeech is seeking to unfold. Poetry has been converted into dogma; and\nit is not remarked that the Platonic ideas are to be found only in about\na third of Plato's writings and are not confined to him. The forms which\nthey assume are numerous, and if taken literally, inconsistent with one\nanother. At one time we are in the clouds of mythology, at another among\nthe abstractions of mathematics or metaphysics; we pass imperceptibly\nfrom one to the other. Reason and fancy are mingled in the same\npassage. The ideas are sometimes described as many, coextensive with\nthe universals of sense and also with the first principles of ethics; or\nagain they are absorbed into the single idea of good, and subordinated\nto it. They are not more certain than facts, but they are equally\ncertain (Phaedo). They are both personal and impersonal. They are\nabstract terms: they are also the causes of things; and they are even\ntransformed into the demons or spirits by whose help God made the world.\nAnd the idea of good (Republic) may without violence be converted into\nthe Supreme Being, who 'because He was good' created all things (Tim.).\n\nIt would be a mistake to try and reconcile these differing modes of\nthought. They are not to be regarded seriously as having a distinct\nmeaning. They are parables, prophecies, myths, symbols, revelations,\naspirations after an unknown world. They derive their origin from a deep\nreligious and contemplative feeling, and also from an observation of\ncurious mental phenomena. They gather up the elements of the previous\nphilosophies, which they put together in a new form. Their great\ndiversity shows the tentative character of early endeavours to think.\nThey have not yet settled down into a single system. Plato uses them,\nthough he also criticises them; he acknowledges that both he and others\nare always talking about them, especially about the Idea of Good; and\nthat they are not peculiar to himself (Phaedo; Republic; Soph.). But in\nhis later writings he seems to have laid aside the old forms of them.\nAs he proceeds he makes for himself new modes of expression more akin to\nthe Aristotelian logic.\n\nYet amid all these varieties and incongruities, there is a common\nmeaning or spirit which pervades his writings, both those in which he\ntreats of the ideas and those in which he is silent about them. This is\nthe spirit of idealism, which in the history of philosophy has had many\nnames and taken many forms, and has in a measure influenced those\nwho seemed to be most averse to it. It has often been charged with\ninconsistency and fancifulness, and yet has had an elevating effect on\nhuman nature, and has exercised a wonderful charm and interest over\na few spirits who have been lost in the thought of it. It has been\nbanished again and again, but has always returned. It has attempted to\nleave the earth and soar heavenwards, but soon has found that only\nin experience could any solid foundation of knowledge be laid. It has\ndegenerated into pantheism, but has again emerged. No other knowledge\nhas given an equal stimulus to the mind. It is the science of sciences,\nwhich are also ideas, and under either aspect require to be defined.\nThey can only be thought of in due proportion when conceived in relation\nto one another. They are the glasses through which the kingdoms of\nscience are seen, but at a distance. All the greatest minds, except when\nliving in an age of reaction against them, have unconsciously fallen\nunder their power.\n\nThe account of the Platonic ideas in the Meno is the simplest and\nclearest, and we shall best illustrate their nature by giving this first\nand then comparing the manner in which they are described elsewhere,\ne.g. in the Phaedrus, Phaedo, Republic; to which may be added the\ncriticism of them in the Parmenides, the personal form which is\nattributed to them in the Timaeus, the logical character which they\nassume in the Sophist and Philebus, and the allusion to them in the\nLaws. In the Cratylus they dawn upon him with the freshness of a\nnewly-discovered thought.\n\nThe Meno goes back to a former state of existence, in which men did and\nsuffered good and evil, and received the reward or punishment of them\nuntil their sin was purged away and they were allowed to return to\nearth. This is a tradition of the olden time, to which priests and poets\nbear witness. The souls of men returning to earth bring back a latent\nmemory of ideas, which were known to them in a former state. The\nrecollection is awakened into life and consciousness by the sight of the\nthings which resemble them on earth. The soul evidently possesses such\ninnate ideas before she has had time to acquire them. This is proved by\nan experiment tried on one of Meno's slaves, from whom Socrates elicits\ntruths of arithmetic and geometry, which he had never learned in this\nworld. He must therefore have brought them with him from another.\n\nThe notion of a previous state of existence is found in the verses\nof Empedocles and in the fragments of Heracleitus. It was the natural\nanswer to two questions, 'Whence came the soul? What is the origin of\nevil?' and prevailed far and wide in the east. It found its way into\nHellas probably through the medium of Orphic and Pythagorean rites and\nmysteries. It was easier to think of a former than of a future life,\nbecause such a life has really existed for the race though not for the\nindividual, and all men come into the world, if not 'trailing clouds of\nglory,' at any rate able to enter into the inheritance of the past. In\nthe Phaedrus, as well as in the Meno, it is this former rather than a\nfuture life on which Plato is disposed to dwell. There the Gods, and men\nfollowing in their train, go forth to contemplate the heavens, and are\nborne round in the revolutions of them. There they see the divine forms\nof justice, temperance, and the like, in their unchangeable beauty, but\nnot without an effort more than human. The soul of man is likened to\na charioteer and two steeds, one mortal, the other immortal. The\ncharioteer and the mortal steed are in fierce conflict; at length the\nanimal principle is finally overpowered, though not extinguished, by the\ncombined energies of the passionate and rational elements. This is one\nof those passages in Plato which, partaking both of a philosophical\nand poetical character, is necessarily indistinct and inconsistent. The\nmagnificent figure under which the nature of the soul is described has\nnot much to do with the popular doctrine of the ideas. Yet there is one\nlittle trait in the description which shows that they are present to\nPlato's mind, namely, the remark that the soul, which had seen truths\nin the form of the universal, cannot again return to the nature of an\nanimal.\n\nIn the Phaedo, as in the Meno, the origin of ideas is sought for in a\nprevious state of existence. There was no time when they could have been\nacquired in this life, and therefore they must have been recovered from\nanother. The process of recovery is no other than the ordinary law of\nassociation, by which in daily life the sight of one thing or person\nrecalls another to our minds, and by which in scientific enquiry from\nany part of knowledge we may be led on to infer the whole. It is also\nargued that ideas, or rather ideals, must be derived from a previous\nstate of existence because they are more perfect than the sensible forms\nof them which are given by experience. But in the Phaedo the doctrine\nof ideas is subordinate to the proof of the immortality of the soul.\n'If the soul existed in a previous state, then it will exist in a future\nstate, for a law of alternation pervades all things.' And, 'If the ideas\nexist, then the soul exists; if not, not.' It is to be observed, both\nin the Meno and the Phaedo, that Socrates expresses himself with\ndiffidence. He speaks in the Phaedo of the words with which he has\ncomforted himself and his friends, and will not be too confident that\nthe description which he has given of the soul and her mansions is\nexactly true, but he 'ventures to think that something of the kind is\ntrue.' And in the Meno, after dwelling upon the immortality of the\nsoul, he adds, 'Of some things which I have said I am not altogether\nconfident' (compare Apology; Gorgias). From this class of uncertainties\nhe exempts the difference between truth and appearance, of which he is\nabsolutely convinced.\n\nIn the Republic the ideas are spoken of in two ways, which though not\ncontradictory are different. In the tenth book they are represented as\nthe genera or general ideas under which individuals having a common name\nare contained. For example, there is the bed which the carpenter makes,\nthe picture of the bed which is drawn by the painter, the bed existing\nin nature of which God is the author. Of the latter all visible beds\nare only the shadows or reflections. This and similar illustrations or\nexplanations are put forth, not for their own sake, or as an exposition\nof Plato's theory of ideas, but with a view of showing that poetry and\nthe mimetic arts are concerned with an inferior part of the soul and a\nlower kind of knowledge. On the other hand, in the 6th and 7th books\nof the Republic we reach the highest and most perfect conception, which\nPlato is able to attain, of the nature of knowledge. The ideas are now\nfinally seen to be one as well as many, causes as well as ideas, and to\nhave a unity which is the idea of good and the cause of all the rest.\nThey seem, however, to have lost their first aspect of universals under\nwhich individuals are contained, and to have been converted into forms\nof another kind, which are inconsistently regarded from the one side as\nimages or ideals of justice, temperance, holiness and the like; from the\nother as hypotheses, or mathematical truths or principles.\n\nIn the Timaeus, which in the series of Plato's works immediately follows\nthe Republic, though probably written some time afterwards, no mention\noccurs of the doctrine of ideas. Geometrical forms and arithmetical\nratios furnish the laws according to which the world is created. But\nthough the conception of the ideas as genera or species is forgotten or\nlaid aside, the distinction of the visible and intellectual is as\nfirmly maintained as ever. The IDEA of good likewise disappears and is\nsuperseded by the conception of a personal God, who works according to\na final cause or principle of goodness which he himself is. No doubt is\nexpressed by Plato, either in the Timaeus or in any other dialogue, of\nthe truths which he conceives to be the first and highest. It is not the\nexistence of God or the idea of good which he approaches in a tentative\nor hesitating manner, but the investigations of physiology. These he\nregards, not seriously, as a part of philosophy, but as an innocent\nrecreation (Tim.).\n\nPassing on to the Parmenides, we find in that dialogue not an exposition\nor defence of the doctrine of ideas, but an assault upon them, which is\nput into the mouth of the veteran Parmenides, and might be ascribed to\nAristotle himself, or to one of his disciples. The doctrine which is\nassailed takes two or three forms, but fails in any of them to escape\nthe dialectical difficulties which are urged against it. It is admitted\nthat there are ideas of all things, but the manner in which individuals\npartake of them, whether of the whole or of the part, and in which\nthey become like them, or how ideas can be either within or without\nthe sphere of human knowledge, or how the human and divine can have any\nrelation to each other, is held to be incapable of explanation. And\nyet, if there are no universal ideas, what becomes of philosophy?\n(Parmenides.) In the Sophist the theory of ideas is spoken of as a\ndoctrine held not by Plato, but by another sect of philosophers, called\n'the Friends of Ideas,' probably the Megarians, who were very distinct\nfrom him, if not opposed to him (Sophist). Nor in what may be termed\nPlato's abridgement of the history of philosophy (Soph.), is any mention\nmade such as we find in the first book of Aristotle's Metaphysics,\nof the derivation of such a theory or of any part of it from the\nPythagoreans, the Eleatics, the Heracleiteans, or even from Socrates. In\nthe Philebus, probably one of the latest of the Platonic Dialogues,\nthe conception of a personal or semi-personal deity expressed under the\nfigure of mind, the king of all, who is also the cause, is retained. The\none and many of the Phaedrus and Theaetetus is still working in the mind\nof Plato, and the correlation of ideas, not of 'all with all,' but of\n'some with some,' is asserted and explained. But they are spoken of in\na different manner, and are not supposed to be recovered from a former\nstate of existence. The metaphysical conception of truth passes into a\npsychological one, which is continued in the Laws, and is the final\nform of the Platonic philosophy, so far as can be gathered from his own\nwritings (see especially Laws). In the Laws he harps once more on the\nold string, and returns to general notions:--these he acknowledges to\nbe many, and yet he insists that they are also one. The guardian must be\nmade to recognize the truth, for which he has contended long ago in the\nProtagoras, that the virtues are four, but they are also in some sense\none (Laws; compare Protagoras).\n\nSo various, and if regarded on the surface only, inconsistent, are the\nstatements of Plato respecting the doctrine of ideas. If we attempted to\nharmonize or to combine them, we should make out of them, not a system,\nbut the caricature of a system. They are the ever-varying expression\nof Plato's Idealism. The terms used in them are in their substance and\ngeneral meaning the same, although they seem to be different. They\npass from the subject to the object, from earth (diesseits) to\nheaven (jenseits) without regard to the gulf which later theology and\nphilosophy have made between them. They are also intended to supplement\nor explain each other. They relate to a subject of which Plato himself\nwould have said that 'he was not confident of the precise form of his\nown statements, but was strong in the belief that something of the kind\nwas true.' It is the spirit, not the letter, in which they agree--the\nspirit which places the divine above the human, the spiritual above the\nmaterial, the one above the many, the mind before the body.\n\nThe stream of ancient philosophy in the Alexandrian and Roman times\nwidens into a lake or sea, and then disappears underground to reappear\nafter many ages in a distant land. It begins to flow again under new\nconditions, at first confined between high and narrow banks, but finally\nspreading over the continent of Europe. It is and is not the same with\nancient philosophy. There is a great deal in modern philosophy which is\ninspired by ancient. There is much in ancient philosophy which was 'born\nout of due time; and before men were capable of understanding it. To the\nfathers of modern philosophy, their own thoughts appeared to be new\nand original, but they carried with them an echo or shadow of the past,\ncoming back by recollection from an elder world. Of this the enquirers\nof the seventeenth century, who to themselves appeared to be working out\nindependently the enquiry into all truth, were unconscious. They stood\nin a new relation to theology and natural philosophy, and for a time\nmaintained towards both an attitude of reserve and separation. Yet the\nsimilarities between modern and ancient thought are greater far than the\ndifferences. All philosophy, even that part of it which is said to be\nbased upon experience, is really ideal; and ideas are not only derived\nfrom facts, but they are also prior to them and extend far beyond them,\njust as the mind is prior to the senses.\n\nEarly Greek speculation culminates in the ideas of Plato, or rather in\nthe single idea of good. His followers, and perhaps he himself, having\narrived at this elevation, instead of going forwards went backwards from\nphilosophy to psychology, from ideas to numbers. But what we perceive to\nbe the real meaning of them, an explanation of the nature and origin\nof knowledge, will always continue to be one of the first problems of\nphilosophy.\n\nPlato also left behind him a most potent instrument, the forms of\nlogic--arms ready for use, but not yet taken out of their armoury. They\nwere the late birth of the early Greek philosophy, and were the only\npart of it which has had an uninterrupted hold on the mind of Europe.\nPhilosophies come and go; but the detection of fallacies, the framing\nof definitions, the invention of methods still continue to be the main\nelements of the reasoning process.\n\nModern philosophy, like ancient, begins with very simple conceptions.\nIt is almost wholly a reflection on self. It might be described as\na quickening into life of old words and notions latent in the\nsemi-barbarous Latin, and putting a new meaning into them. Unlike\nancient philosophy, it has been unaffected by impressions derived from\noutward nature: it arose within the limits of the mind itself. From the\ntime of Descartes to Hume and Kant it has had little or nothing to do\nwith facts of science. On the other hand, the ancient and mediaeval\nlogic retained a continuous influence over it, and a form like that\nof mathematics was easily impressed upon it; the principle of ancient\nphilosophy which is most apparent in it is scepticism; we must doubt\nnearly every traditional or received notion, that we may hold fast one\nor two. The being of God in a personal or impersonal form was a mental\nnecessity to the first thinkers of modern times: from this alone all\nother ideas could be deduced. There had been an obscure presentiment of\n'cognito, ergo sum' more than 2000 years previously. The Eleatic notion\nthat being and thought were the same was revived in a new form by\nDescartes. But now it gave birth to consciousness and self-reflection:\nit awakened the 'ego' in human nature. The mind naked and abstract has\nno other certainty but the conviction of its own existence. 'I think,\ntherefore I am;' and this thought is God thinking in me, who has also\ncommunicated to the reason of man his own attributes of thought and\nextension--these are truly imparted to him because God is true (compare\nRepublic). It has been often remarked that Descartes, having begun by\ndismissing all presuppositions, introduces several: he passes almost\nat once from scepticism to dogmatism. It is more important for the\nillustration of Plato to observe that he, like Plato, insists that God\nis true and incapable of deception (Republic)--that he proceeds from\ngeneral ideas, that many elements of mathematics may be found in him. A\ncertain influence of mathematics both on the form and substance of their\nphilosophy is discernible in both of them. After making the greatest\nopposition between thought and extension, Descartes, like Plato,\nsupposes them to be reunited for a time, not in their own nature but by\na special divine act (compare Phaedrus), and he also supposes all\nthe parts of the human body to meet in the pineal gland, that alone\naffording a principle of unity in the material frame of man. It is\ncharacteristic of the first period of modern philosophy, that having\nbegun (like the Presocratics) with a few general notions, Descartes\nfirst falls absolutely under their influence, and then quickly discards\nthem. At the same time he is less able to observe facts, because they\nare too much magnified by the glasses through which they are seen.\nThe common logic says 'the greater the extension, the less the\ncomprehension,' and we may put the same thought in another way and say\nof abstract or general ideas, that the greater the abstraction of them,\nthe less are they capable of being applied to particular and concrete\nnatures.\n\nNot very different from Descartes in his relation to ancient philosophy\nis his successor Spinoza, who lived in the following generation. The\nsystem of Spinoza is less personal and also less dualistic than that\nof Descartes. In this respect the difference between them is like that\nbetween Xenophanes and Parmenides. The teaching of Spinoza might be\ndescribed generally as the Jewish religion reduced to an abstraction\nand taking the form of the Eleatic philosophy. Like Parmenides, he is\noverpowered and intoxicated with the idea of Being or God. The greatness\nof both philosophies consists in the immensity of a thought which\nexcludes all other thoughts; their weakness is the necessary separation\nof this thought from actual existence and from practical life. In\nneither of them is there any clear opposition between the inward and\noutward world. The substance of Spinoza has two attributes, which alone\nare cognizable by man, thought and extension; these are in extreme\nopposition to one another, and also in inseparable identity. They may be\nregarded as the two aspects or expressions under which God or substance\nis unfolded to man. Here a step is made beyond the limits of the Eleatic\nphilosophy. The famous theorem of Spinoza, 'Omnis determinatio est\nnegatio,' is already contained in the 'negation is relation' of Plato's\nSophist. The grand description of the philosopher in Republic VI, as the\nspectator of all time and all existence, may be paralleled with\nanother famous expression of Spinoza, 'Contemplatio rerum sub specie\neternitatis.' According to Spinoza finite objects are unreal, for they\nare conditioned by what is alien to them, and by one another. Human\nbeings are included in the number of them. Hence there is no reality\nin human action and no place for right and wrong. Individuality is\naccident. The boasted freedom of the will is only a consciousness of\nnecessity. Truth, he says, is the direction of the reason towards the\ninfinite, in which all things repose; and herein lies the secret of\nman's well-being. In the exaltation of the reason or intellect, in the\ndenial of the voluntariness of evil (Timaeus; Laws) Spinoza approaches\nnearer to Plato than in his conception of an infinite substance. As\nSocrates said that virtue is knowledge, so Spinoza would have maintained\nthat knowledge alone is good, and what contributes to knowledge useful.\nBoth are equally far from any real experience or observation of nature.\nAnd the same difficulty is found in both when we seek to apply their\nideas to life and practice. There is a gulf fixed between the infinite\nsubstance and finite objects or individuals of Spinoza, just as there is\nbetween the ideas of Plato and the world of sense.\n\nRemoved from Spinoza by less than a generation is the philosopher\nLeibnitz, who after deepening and intensifying the opposition between\nmind and matter, reunites them by his preconcerted harmony (compare\nagain Phaedrus). To him all the particles of matter are living beings\nwhich reflect on one another, and in the least of them the whole is\ncontained. Here we catch a reminiscence both of the omoiomere, or\nsimilar particles of Anaxagoras, and of the world-animal of the Timaeus.\n\nIn Bacon and Locke we have another development in which the mind of\nman is supposed to receive knowledge by a new method and to work by\nobservation and experience. But we may remark that it is the idea\nof experience, rather than experience itself, with which the mind is\nfilled. It is a symbol of knowledge rather than the reality which is\nvouchsafed to us. The Organon of Bacon is not much nearer to actual\nfacts than the Organon of Aristotle or the Platonic idea of good. Many\nof the old rags and ribbons which defaced the garment of philosophy have\nbeen stripped off, but some of them still adhere. A crude conception of\nthe ideas of Plato survives in the 'forms' of Bacon. And on the other\nhand, there are many passages of Plato in which the importance of the\ninvestigation of facts is as much insisted upon as by Bacon. Both are\nalmost equally superior to the illusions of language, and are constantly\ncrying out against them, as against other idols.\n\nLocke cannot be truly regarded as the author of sensationalism any more\nthan of idealism. His system is based upon experience, but with him\nexperience includes reflection as well as sense. His analysis and\nconstruction of ideas has no foundation in fact; it is only the\ndialectic of the mind 'talking to herself.' The philosophy of Berkeley\nis but the transposition of two words. For objects of sense he would\nsubstitute sensations. He imagines himself to have changed the relation\nof the human mind towards God and nature; they remain the same as\nbefore, though he has drawn the imaginary line by which they are divided\nat a different point. He has annihilated the outward world, but it\ninstantly reappears governed by the same laws and described under the\nsame names.\n\nA like remark applies to David Hume, of whose philosophy the central\nprinciple is the denial of the relation of cause and effect. He would\ndeprive men of a familiar term which they can ill afford to lose; but\nhe seems not to have observed that this alteration is merely verbal and\ndoes not in any degree affect the nature of things. Still less did he\nremark that he was arguing from the necessary imperfection of language\nagainst the most certain facts. And here, again, we may find a parallel\nwith the ancients. He goes beyond facts in his scepticism, as they did\nin their idealism. Like the ancient Sophists, he relegates the more\nimportant principles of ethics to custom and probability. But crude and\nunmeaning as this philosophy is, it exercised a great influence on his\nsuccessors, not unlike that which Locke exercised upon Berkeley and\nBerkeley upon Hume himself. All three were both sceptical and ideal in\nalmost equal degrees. Neither they nor their predecessors had any true\nconception of language or of the history of philosophy. Hume's\nparadox has been forgotten by the world, and did not any more than the\nscepticism of the ancients require to be seriously refuted. Like some\nother philosophical paradoxes, it would have been better left to die\nout. It certainly could not be refuted by a philosophy such as Kant's,\nin which, no less than in the previously mentioned systems, the history\nof the human mind and the nature of language are almost wholly ignored,\nand the certainty of objective knowledge is transferred to the subject;\nwhile absolute truth is reduced to a figment, more abstract and narrow\nthan Plato's ideas, of 'thing in itself,' to which, if we reason\nstrictly, no predicate can be applied.\n\nThe question which Plato has raised respecting the origin and nature of\nideas belongs to the infancy of philosophy; in modern times it would no\nlonger be asked. Their origin is only their history, so far as we know\nit; there can be no other. We may trace them in language, in philosophy,\nin mythology, in poetry, but we cannot argue a priori about them. We may\nattempt to shake them off, but they are always returning, and in every\nsphere of science and human action are tending to go beyond facts. They\nare thought to be innate, because they have been familiar to us all our\nlives, and we can no longer dismiss them from our mind. Many of them\nexpress relations of terms to which nothing exactly or nothing at all in\nrerum natura corresponds. We are not such free agents in the use of\nthem as we sometimes imagine. Fixed ideas have taken the most complete\npossession of some thinkers who have been most determined to renounce\nthem, and have been vehemently affirmed when they could be least\nexplained and were incapable of proof. The world has often been led away\nby a word to which no distinct meaning could be attached. Abstractions\nsuch as 'authority,' 'equality,' 'utility,' 'liberty,' 'pleasure,'\n'experience,' 'consciousness,' 'chance,' 'substance,' 'matter,' 'atom,'\nand a heap of other metaphysical and theological terms, are the source\nof quite as much error and illusion and have as little relation\nto actual facts as the ideas of Plato. Few students of theology or\nphilosophy have sufficiently reflected how quickly the bloom of a\nphilosophy passes away; or how hard it is for one age to understand the\nwritings of another; or how nice a judgment is required of those who are\nseeking to express the philosophy of one age in the terms of another.\nThe 'eternal truths' of which metaphysicians speak have hardly ever\nlasted more than a generation. In our own day schools or systems of\nphilosophy which have once been famous have died before the founders of\nthem. We are still, as in Plato's age, groping about for a new method\nmore comprehensive than any of those which now prevail; and also more\npermanent. And we seem to see at a distance the promise of such a\nmethod, which can hardly be any other than the method of idealized\nexperience, having roots which strike far down into the history of\nphilosophy. It is a method which does not divorce the present from the\npast, or the part from the whole, or the abstract from the concrete,\nor theory from fact, or the divine from the human, or one science\nfrom another, but labours to connect them. Along such a road we have\nproceeded a few steps, sufficient, perhaps, to make us reflect on the\nwant of method which prevails in our own day. In another age, all the\nbranches of knowledge, whether relating to God or man or nature, will\nbecome the knowledge of 'the revelation of a single science' (Symp.),\nand all things, like the stars in heaven, will shed their light upon one\nanother.\n\n\n\n\nMENO\n\n\nPERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Meno, Socrates, A Slave of Meno (Boy), Anytus.\n\n\nMENO: Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue is acquired by teaching\nor by practice; or if neither by teaching nor by practice, then whether\nit comes to man by nature, or in what other way?\n\nSOCRATES: O Meno, there was a time when the Thessalians were famous\namong the other Hellenes only for their riches and their riding; but\nnow, if I am not mistaken, they are equally famous for their wisdom,\nespecially at Larisa, which is the native city of your friend\nAristippus. And this is Gorgias' doing; for when he came there, the\nflower of the Aleuadae, among them your admirer Aristippus, and the\nother chiefs of the Thessalians, fell in love with his wisdom. And he\nhas taught you the habit of answering questions in a grand and bold\nstyle, which becomes those who know, and is the style in which he\nhimself answers all comers; and any Hellene who likes may ask him\nanything. How different is our lot! my dear Meno. Here at Athens there\nis a dearth of the commodity, and all wisdom seems to have emigrated\nfrom us to you. I am certain that if you were to ask any Athenian\nwhether virtue was natural or acquired, he would laugh in your face,\nand say: 'Stranger, you have far too good an opinion of me, if you think\nthat I can answer your question. For I literally do not know what virtue\nis, and much less whether it is acquired by teaching or not.' And I\nmyself, Meno, living as I do in this region of poverty, am as poor as\nthe rest of the world; and I confess with shame that I know literally\nnothing about virtue; and when I do not know the 'quid' of anything how\ncan I know the 'quale'? How, if I knew nothing at all of Meno, could\nI tell if he was fair, or the opposite of fair; rich and noble, or the\nreverse of rich and noble? Do you think that I could?\n\nMENO: No, indeed. But are you in earnest, Socrates, in saying that you\ndo not know what virtue is? And am I to carry back this report of you to\nThessaly?\n\nSOCRATES: Not only that, my dear boy, but you may say further that I\nhave never known of any one else who did, in my judgment.\n\nMENO: Then you have never met Gorgias when he was at Athens?\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, I have.\n\nMENO: And did you not think that he knew?\n\nSOCRATES: I have not a good memory, Meno, and therefore I cannot now\ntell what I thought of him at the time. And I dare say that he did know,\nand that you know what he said: please, therefore, to remind me of what\nhe said; or, if you would rather, tell me your own view; for I suspect\nthat you and he think much alike.\n\nMENO: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: Then as he is not here, never mind him, and do you tell me:\nBy the gods, Meno, be generous, and tell me what you say that virtue is;\nfor I shall be truly delighted to find that I have been mistaken, and\nthat you and Gorgias do really have this knowledge; although I have been\njust saying that I have never found anybody who had.\n\nMENO: There will be no difficulty, Socrates, in answering your question.\nLet us take first the virtue of a man--he should know how to administer\nthe state, and in the administration of it to benefit his friends\nand harm his enemies; and he must also be careful not to suffer harm\nhimself. A woman's virtue, if you wish to know about that, may also\nbe easily described: her duty is to order her house, and keep what is\nindoors, and obey her husband. Every age, every condition of life, young\nor old, male or female, bond or free, has a different virtue: there are\nvirtues numberless, and no lack of definitions of them; for virtue is\nrelative to the actions and ages of each of us in all that we do. And\nthe same may be said of vice, Socrates (Compare Arist. Pol.).\n\nSOCRATES: How fortunate I am, Meno! When I ask you for one virtue, you\npresent me with a swarm of them (Compare Theaet.), which are in your\nkeeping. Suppose that I carry on the figure of the swarm, and ask of\nyou, What is the nature of the bee? and you answer that there are many\nkinds of bees, and I reply: But do bees differ as bees, because there\nare many and different kinds of them; or are they not rather to be\ndistinguished by some other quality, as for example beauty, size, or\nshape? How would you answer me?\n\nMENO: I should answer that bees do not differ from one another, as bees.\n\nSOCRATES: And if I went on to say: That is what I desire to know, Meno;\ntell me what is the quality in which they do not differ, but are all\nalike;--would you be able to answer?\n\nMENO: I should.\n\nSOCRATES: And so of the virtues, however many and different they may be,\nthey have all a common nature which makes them virtues; and on this he\nwho would answer the question, 'What is virtue?' would do well to have\nhis eye fixed: Do you understand?\n\nMENO: I am beginning to understand; but I do not as yet take hold of the\nquestion as I could wish.\n\nSOCRATES: When you say, Meno, that there is one virtue of a man, another\nof a woman, another of a child, and so on, does this apply only to\nvirtue, or would you say the same of health, and size, and strength? Or\nis the nature of health always the same, whether in man or woman?\n\nMENO: I should say that health is the same, both in man and woman.\n\nSOCRATES: And is not this true of size and strength? If a woman is\nstrong, she will be strong by reason of the same form and of the same\nstrength subsisting in her which there is in the man. I mean to say that\nstrength, as strength, whether of man or woman, is the same. Is there\nany difference?\n\nMENO: I think not.\n\nSOCRATES: And will not virtue, as virtue, be the same, whether in a\nchild or in a grown-up person, in a woman or in a man?\n\nMENO: I cannot help feeling, Socrates, that this case is different from\nthe others.\n\nSOCRATES: But why? Were you not saying that the virtue of a man was to\norder a state, and the virtue of a woman was to order a house?\n\nMENO: I did say so.\n\nSOCRATES: And can either house or state or anything be well ordered\nwithout temperance and without justice?\n\nMENO: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: Then they who order a state or a house temperately or justly\norder them with temperance and justice?\n\nMENO: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Then both men and women, if they are to be good men and women,\nmust have the same virtues of temperance and justice?\n\nMENO: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And can either a young man or an elder one be good, if they\nare intemperate and unjust?\n\nMENO: They cannot.\n\nSOCRATES: They must be temperate and just?\n\nMENO: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then all men are good in the same way, and by participation in\nthe same virtues?\n\nMENO: Such is the inference.\n\nSOCRATES: And they surely would not have been good in the same way,\nunless their virtue had been the same?\n\nMENO: They would not.\n\nSOCRATES: Then now that the sameness of all virtue has been proven, try\nand remember what you and Gorgias say that virtue is.\n\nMENO: Will you have one definition of them all?\n\nSOCRATES: That is what I am seeking.\n\nMENO: If you want to have one definition of them all, I know not what to\nsay, but that virtue is the power of governing mankind.\n\nSOCRATES: And does this definition of virtue include all virtue? Is\nvirtue the same in a child and in a slave, Meno? Can the child govern\nhis father, or the slave his master; and would he who governed be any\nlonger a slave?\n\nMENO: I think not, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: No, indeed; there would be small reason in that. Yet once\nmore, fair friend; according to you, virtue is 'the power of governing;'\nbut do you not add 'justly and not unjustly'?\n\nMENO: Yes, Socrates; I agree there; for justice is virtue.\n\nSOCRATES: Would you say 'virtue,' Meno, or 'a virtue'?\n\nMENO: What do you mean?\n\nSOCRATES: I mean as I might say about anything; that a round, for\nexample, is 'a figure' and not simply 'figure,' and I should adopt this\nmode of speaking, because there are other figures.\n\nMENO: Quite right; and that is just what I am saying about virtue--that\nthere are other virtues as well as justice.\n\nSOCRATES: What are they? tell me the names of them, as I would tell you\nthe names of the other figures if you asked me.\n\nMENO: Courage and temperance and wisdom and magnanimity are virtues; and\nthere are many others.\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, Meno; and again we are in the same case: in searching\nafter one virtue we have found many, though not in the same way as\nbefore; but we have been unable to find the common virtue which runs\nthrough them all.\n\nMENO: Why, Socrates, even now I am not able to follow you in the attempt\nto get at one common notion of virtue as of other things.\n\nSOCRATES: No wonder; but I will try to get nearer if I can, for you know\nthat all things have a common notion. Suppose now that some one asked\nyou the question which I asked before: Meno, he would say, what is\nfigure? And if you answered 'roundness,' he would reply to you, in\nmy way of speaking, by asking whether you would say that roundness is\n'figure' or 'a figure;' and you would answer 'a figure.'\n\nMENO: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And for this reason--that there are other figures?\n\nMENO: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And if he proceeded to ask, What other figures are there? you\nwould have told him.\n\nMENO: I should.\n\nSOCRATES: And if he similarly asked what colour is, and you answered\nwhiteness, and the questioner rejoined, Would you say that whiteness is\ncolour or a colour? you would reply, A colour, because there are other\ncolours as well.\n\nMENO: I should.\n\nSOCRATES: And if he had said, Tell me what they are?--you would have\ntold him of other colours which are colours just as much as whiteness.\n\nMENO: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And suppose that he were to pursue the matter in my way, he\nwould say: Ever and anon we are landed in particulars, but this is not\nwhat I want; tell me then, since you call them by a common name, and\nsay that they are all figures, even when opposed to one another, what\nis that common nature which you designate as figure--which contains\nstraight as well as round, and is no more one than the other--that would\nbe your mode of speaking?\n\nMENO: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And in speaking thus, you do not mean to say that the round\nis round any more than straight, or the straight any more straight than\nround?\n\nMENO: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: You only assert that the round figure is not more a figure\nthan the straight, or the straight than the round?\n\nMENO: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: To what then do we give the name of figure? Try and answer.\nSuppose that when a person asked you this question either about figure\nor colour, you were to reply, Man, I do not understand what you want,\nor know what you are saying; he would look rather astonished and say:\nDo you not understand that I am looking for the 'simile in multis'? And\nthen he might put the question in another form: Meno, he might say, what\nis that 'simile in multis' which you call figure, and which includes\nnot only round and straight figures, but all? Could you not answer that\nquestion, Meno? I wish that you would try; the attempt will be good\npractice with a view to the answer about virtue.\n\nMENO: I would rather that you should answer, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: Shall I indulge you?\n\nMENO: By all means.\n\nSOCRATES: And then you will tell me about virtue?\n\nMENO: I will.\n\nSOCRATES: Then I must do my best, for there is a prize to be won.\n\nMENO: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, I will try and explain to you what figure is. What do\nyou say to this answer?--Figure is the only thing which always follows\ncolour. Will you be satisfied with it, as I am sure that I should be, if\nyou would let me have a similar definition of virtue?\n\nMENO: But, Socrates, it is such a simple answer.\n\nSOCRATES: Why simple?\n\nMENO: Because, according to you, figure is that which always follows\ncolour.\n\n(SOCRATES: Granted.)\n\nMENO: But if a person were to say that he does not know what colour is,\nany more than what figure is--what sort of answer would you have given\nhim?\n\nSOCRATES: I should have told him the truth. And if he were a philosopher\nof the eristic and antagonistic sort, I should say to him: You have my\nanswer, and if I am wrong, your business is to take up the argument and\nrefute me. But if we were friends, and were talking as you and I are\nnow, I should reply in a milder strain and more in the dialectician's\nvein; that is to say, I should not only speak the truth, but I should\nmake use of premises which the person interrogated would be willing to\nadmit. And this is the way in which I shall endeavour to approach you.\nYou will acknowledge, will you not, that there is such a thing as an\nend, or termination, or extremity?--all which words I use in the same\nsense, although I am aware that Prodicus might draw distinctions about\nthem: but still you, I am sure, would speak of a thing as ended or\nterminated--that is all which I am saying--not anything very difficult.\n\nMENO: Yes, I should; and I believe that I understand your meaning.\n\nSOCRATES: And you would speak of a surface and also of a solid, as for\nexample in geometry.\n\nMENO: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Well then, you are now in a condition to understand my\ndefinition of figure. I define figure to be that in which the solid\nends; or, more concisely, the limit of solid.\n\nMENO: And now, Socrates, what is colour?\n\nSOCRATES: You are outrageous, Meno, in thus plaguing a poor old man to\ngive you an answer, when you will not take the trouble of remembering\nwhat is Gorgias' definition of virtue.\n\nMENO: When you have told me what I ask, I will tell you, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: A man who was blindfolded has only to hear you talking, and he\nwould know that you are a fair creature and have still many lovers.\n\nMENO: Why do you think so?\n\nSOCRATES: Why, because you always speak in imperatives: like all\nbeauties when they are in their prime, you are tyrannical; and also,\nas I suspect, you have found out that I have weakness for the fair, and\ntherefore to humour you I must answer.\n\nMENO: Please do.\n\nSOCRATES: Would you like me to answer you after the manner of Gorgias,\nwhich is familiar to you?\n\nMENO: I should like nothing better.\n\nSOCRATES: Do not he and you and Empedocles say that there are certain\neffluences of existence?\n\nMENO: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And passages into which and through which the effluences pass?\n\nMENO: Exactly.\n\nSOCRATES: And some of the effluences fit into the passages, and some of\nthem are too small or too large?\n\nMENO: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And there is such a thing as sight?\n\nMENO: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And now, as Pindar says, 'read my meaning:'--colour is an\neffluence of form, commensurate with sight, and palpable to sense.\n\nMENO: That, Socrates, appears to me to be an admirable answer.\n\nSOCRATES: Why, yes, because it happens to be one which you have been in\nthe habit of hearing: and your wit will have discovered, I suspect, that\nyou may explain in the same way the nature of sound and smell, and of\nmany other similar phenomena.\n\nMENO: Quite true.\n\nSOCRATES: The answer, Meno, was in the orthodox solemn vein, and\ntherefore was more acceptable to you than the other answer about figure.\n\nMENO: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And yet, O son of Alexidemus, I cannot help thinking that\nthe other was the better; and I am sure that you would be of the\nsame opinion, if you would only stay and be initiated, and were not\ncompelled, as you said yesterday, to go away before the mysteries.\n\nMENO: But I will stay, Socrates, if you will give me many such answers.\n\nSOCRATES: Well then, for my own sake as well as for yours, I will do\nmy very best; but I am afraid that I shall not be able to give you very\nmany as good: and now, in your turn, you are to fulfil your promise, and\ntell me what virtue is in the universal; and do not make a singular into\na plural, as the facetious say of those who break a thing, but deliver\nvirtue to me whole and sound, and not broken into a number of pieces: I\nhave given you the pattern.\n\nMENO: Well then, Socrates, virtue, as I take it, is when he, who desires\nthe honourable, is able to provide it for himself; so the poet says, and\nI say too--\n\n'Virtue is the desire of things honourable and the power of attaining\nthem.'\n\nSOCRATES: And does he who desires the honourable also desire the good?\n\nMENO: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Then are there some who desire the evil and others who desire\nthe good? Do not all men, my dear sir, desire good?\n\nMENO: I think not.\n\nSOCRATES: There are some who desire evil?\n\nMENO: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Do you mean that they think the evils which they desire, to be\ngood; or do they know that they are evil and yet desire them?\n\nMENO: Both, I think.\n\nSOCRATES: And do you really imagine, Meno, that a man knows evils to be\nevils and desires them notwithstanding?\n\nMENO: Certainly I do.\n\nSOCRATES: And desire is of possession?\n\nMENO: Yes, of possession.\n\nSOCRATES: And does he think that the evils will do good to him who\npossesses them, or does he know that they will do him harm?\n\nMENO: There are some who think that the evils will do them good, and\nothers who know that they will do them harm.\n\nSOCRATES: And, in your opinion, do those who think that they will do\nthem good know that they are evils?\n\nMENO: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: Is it not obvious that those who are ignorant of their nature\ndo not desire them; but they desire what they suppose to be goods\nalthough they are really evils; and if they are mistaken and suppose the\nevils to be goods they really desire goods?\n\nMENO: Yes, in that case.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, and do those who, as you say, desire evils, and think\nthat evils are hurtful to the possessor of them, know that they will be\nhurt by them?\n\nMENO: They must know it.\n\nSOCRATES: And must they not suppose that those who are hurt are\nmiserable in proportion to the hurt which is inflicted upon them?\n\nMENO: How can it be otherwise?\n\nSOCRATES: But are not the miserable ill-fated?\n\nMENO: Yes, indeed.\n\nSOCRATES: And does any one desire to be miserable and ill-fated?\n\nMENO: I should say not, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: But if there is no one who desires to be miserable, there is\nno one, Meno, who desires evil; for what is misery but the desire and\npossession of evil?\n\nMENO: That appears to be the truth, Socrates, and I admit that nobody\ndesires evil.\n\nSOCRATES: And yet, were you not saying just now that virtue is the\ndesire and power of attaining good?\n\nMENO: Yes, I did say so.\n\nSOCRATES: But if this be affirmed, then the desire of good is common to\nall, and one man is no better than another in that respect?\n\nMENO: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And if one man is not better than another in desiring good, he\nmust be better in the power of attaining it?\n\nMENO: Exactly.\n\nSOCRATES: Then, according to your definition, virtue would appear to be\nthe power of attaining good?\n\nMENO: I entirely approve, Socrates, of the manner in which you now view\nthis matter.\n\nSOCRATES: Then let us see whether what you say is true from another\npoint of view; for very likely you may be right:--You affirm virtue to\nbe the power of attaining goods?\n\nMENO: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And the goods which you mean are such as health and wealth and\nthe possession of gold and silver, and having office and honour in the\nstate--those are what you would call goods?\n\nMENO: Yes, I should include all those.\n\nSOCRATES: Then, according to Meno, who is the hereditary friend of the\ngreat king, virtue is the power of getting silver and gold; and would\nyou add that they must be gained piously, justly, or do you deem this to\nbe of no consequence? And is any mode of acquisition, even if unjust and\ndishonest, equally to be deemed virtue?\n\nMENO: Not virtue, Socrates, but vice.\n\nSOCRATES: Then justice or temperance or holiness, or some other part\nof virtue, as would appear, must accompany the acquisition, and without\nthem the mere acquisition of good will not be virtue.\n\nMENO: Why, how can there be virtue without these?\n\nSOCRATES: And the non-acquisition of gold and silver in a dishonest\nmanner for oneself or another, or in other words the want of them, may\nbe equally virtue?\n\nMENO: True.\n\nSOCRATES: Then the acquisition of such goods is no more virtue than the\nnon-acquisition and want of them, but whatever is accompanied by justice\nor honesty is virtue, and whatever is devoid of justice is vice.\n\nMENO: It cannot be otherwise, in my judgment.\n\nSOCRATES: And were we not saying just now that justice, temperance, and\nthe like, were each of them a part of virtue?\n\nMENO: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And so, Meno, this is the way in which you mock me.\n\nMENO: Why do you say that, Socrates?\n\nSOCRATES: Why, because I asked you to deliver virtue into my hands whole\nand unbroken, and I gave you a pattern according to which you were to\nframe your answer; and you have forgotten already, and tell me that\nvirtue is the power of attaining good justly, or with justice; and\njustice you acknowledge to be a part of virtue.\n\nMENO: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then it follows from your own admissions, that virtue is doing\nwhat you do with a part of virtue; for justice and the like are said by\nyou to be parts of virtue.\n\nMENO: What of that?\n\nSOCRATES: What of that! Why, did not I ask you to tell me the nature\nof virtue as a whole? And you are very far from telling me this; but\ndeclare every action to be virtue which is done with a part of virtue;\nas though you had told me and I must already know the whole of virtue,\nand this too when frittered away into little pieces. And, therefore, my\ndear Meno, I fear that I must begin again and repeat the same question:\nWhat is virtue? for otherwise, I can only say, that every action done\nwith a part of virtue is virtue; what else is the meaning of saying\nthat every action done with justice is virtue? Ought I not to ask the\nquestion over again; for can any one who does not know virtue know a\npart of virtue?\n\nMENO: No; I do not say that he can.\n\nSOCRATES: Do you remember how, in the example of figure, we rejected any\nanswer given in terms which were as yet unexplained or unadmitted?\n\nMENO: Yes, Socrates; and we were quite right in doing so.\n\nSOCRATES: But then, my friend, do not suppose that we can explain to any\none the nature of virtue as a whole through some unexplained portion of\nvirtue, or anything at all in that fashion; we should only have to ask\nover again the old question, What is virtue? Am I not right?\n\nMENO: I believe that you are.\n\nSOCRATES: Then begin again, and answer me, What, according to you and\nyour friend Gorgias, is the definition of virtue?\n\nMENO: O Socrates, I used to be told, before I knew you, that you were\nalways doubting yourself and making others doubt; and now you are\ncasting your spells over me, and I am simply getting bewitched and\nenchanted, and am at my wits' end. And if I may venture to make a jest\nupon you, you seem to me both in your appearance and in your power over\nothers to be very like the flat torpedo fish, who torpifies those who\ncome near him and touch him, as you have now torpified me, I think. For\nmy soul and my tongue are really torpid, and I do not know how to answer\nyou; and though I have been delivered of an infinite variety of speeches\nabout virtue before now, and to many persons--and very good ones they\nwere, as I thought--at this moment I cannot even say what virtue is. And\nI think that you are very wise in not voyaging and going away from home,\nfor if you did in other places as you do in Athens, you would be cast\ninto prison as a magician.\n\nSOCRATES: You are a rogue, Meno, and had all but caught me.\n\nMENO: What do you mean, Socrates?\n\nSOCRATES: I can tell why you made a simile about me.\n\nMENO: Why?\n\nSOCRATES: In order that I might make another simile about you. For I\nknow that all pretty young gentlemen like to have pretty similes made\nabout them--as well they may--but I shall not return the compliment. As\nto my being a torpedo, if the torpedo is torpid as well as the cause of\ntorpidity in others, then indeed I am a torpedo, but not otherwise;\nfor I perplex others, not because I am clear, but because I am utterly\nperplexed myself. And now I know not what virtue is, and you seem to be\nin the same case, although you did once perhaps know before you touched\nme. However, I have no objection to join with you in the enquiry.\n\nMENO: And how will you enquire, Socrates, into that which you do not\nknow? What will you put forth as the subject of enquiry? And if you find\nwhat you want, how will you ever know that this is the thing which you\ndid not know?\n\nSOCRATES: I know, Meno, what you mean; but just see what a tiresome\ndispute you are introducing. You argue that a man cannot enquire either\nabout that which he knows, or about that which he does not know; for if\nhe knows, he has no need to enquire; and if not, he cannot; for he does\nnot know the very subject about which he is to enquire (Compare Aristot.\nPost. Anal.).\n\nMENO: Well, Socrates, and is not the argument sound?\n\nSOCRATES: I think not.\n\nMENO: Why not?\n\nSOCRATES: I will tell you why: I have heard from certain wise men and\nwomen who spoke of things divine that--\n\nMENO: What did they say?\n\nSOCRATES: They spoke of a glorious truth, as I conceive.\n\nMENO: What was it? and who were they?\n\nSOCRATES: Some of them were priests and priestesses, who had studied how\nthey might be able to give a reason of their profession: there have been\npoets also, who spoke of these things by inspiration, like Pindar, and\nmany others who were inspired. And they say--mark, now, and see whether\ntheir words are true--they say that the soul of man is immortal, and at\none time has an end, which is termed dying, and at another time is born\nagain, but is never destroyed. And the moral is, that a man ought to\nlive always in perfect holiness. 'For in the ninth year Persephone sends\nthe souls of those from whom she has received the penalty of ancient\ncrime back again from beneath into the light of the sun above, and these\nare they who become noble kings and mighty men and great in wisdom\nand are called saintly heroes in after ages.' The soul, then, as being\nimmortal, and having been born again many times, and having seen all\nthings that exist, whether in this world or in the world below, has\nknowledge of them all; and it is no wonder that she should be able\nto call to remembrance all that she ever knew about virtue, and about\neverything; for as all nature is akin, and the soul has learned all\nthings; there is no difficulty in her eliciting or as men say learning,\nout of a single recollection all the rest, if a man is strenuous and\ndoes not faint; for all enquiry and all learning is but recollection.\nAnd therefore we ought not to listen to this sophistical argument about\nthe impossibility of enquiry: for it will make us idle; and is sweet\nonly to the sluggard; but the other saying will make us active and\ninquisitive. In that confiding, I will gladly enquire with you into the\nnature of virtue.\n\nMENO: Yes, Socrates; but what do you mean by saying that we do not\nlearn, and that what we call learning is only a process of recollection?\nCan you teach me how this is?\n\nSOCRATES: I told you, Meno, just now that you were a rogue, and now you\nask whether I can teach you, when I am saying that there is no teaching,\nbut only recollection; and thus you imagine that you will involve me in\na contradiction.\n\nMENO: Indeed, Socrates, I protest that I had no such intention. I only\nasked the question from habit; but if you can prove to me that what you\nsay is true, I wish that you would.\n\nSOCRATES: It will be no easy matter, but I will try to please you to\nthe utmost of my power. Suppose that you call one of your numerous\nattendants, that I may demonstrate on him.\n\nMENO: Certainly. Come hither, boy.\n\nSOCRATES: He is Greek, and speaks Greek, does he not?\n\nMENO: Yes, indeed; he was born in the house.\n\nSOCRATES: Attend now to the questions which I ask him, and observe\nwhether he learns of me or only remembers.\n\nMENO: I will.\n\nSOCRATES: Tell me, boy, do you know that a figure like this is a square?\n\nBOY: I do.\n\nSOCRATES: And you know that a square figure has these four lines equal?\n\nBOY: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And these lines which I have drawn through the middle of the\nsquare are also equal?\n\nBOY: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: A square may be of any size?\n\nBOY: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And if one side of the figure be of two feet, and the other\nside be of two feet, how much will the whole be? Let me explain: if in\none direction the space was of two feet, and in the other direction of\none foot, the whole would be of two feet taken once?\n\nBOY: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: But since this side is also of two feet, there are twice two\nfeet?\n\nBOY: There are.\n\nSOCRATES: Then the square is of twice two feet?\n\nBOY: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And how many are twice two feet? count and tell me.\n\nBOY: Four, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: And might there not be another square twice as large as this,\nand having like this the lines equal?\n\nBOY: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And of how many feet will that be?\n\nBOY: Of eight feet.\n\nSOCRATES: And now try and tell me the length of the line which forms the\nside of that double square: this is two feet--what will that be?\n\nBOY: Clearly, Socrates, it will be double.\n\nSOCRATES: Do you observe, Meno, that I am not teaching the boy anything,\nbut only asking him questions; and now he fancies that he knows how long\na line is necessary in order to produce a figure of eight square feet;\ndoes he not?\n\nMENO: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And does he really know?\n\nMENO: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: He only guesses that because the square is double, the line is\ndouble.\n\nMENO: True.\n\nSOCRATES: Observe him while he recalls the steps in regular order. (To\nthe Boy:) Tell me, boy, do you assert that a double space comes from\na double line? Remember that I am not speaking of an oblong, but of a\nfigure equal every way, and twice the size of this--that is to say\nof eight feet; and I want to know whether you still say that a double\nsquare comes from double line?\n\nBOY: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: But does not this line become doubled if we add another such\nline here?\n\nBOY: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And four such lines will make a space containing eight feet?\n\nBOY: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Let us describe such a figure: Would you not say that this is\nthe figure of eight feet?\n\nBOY: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And are there not these four divisions in the figure, each of\nwhich is equal to the figure of four feet?\n\nBOY: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And is not that four times four?\n\nBOY: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And four times is not double?\n\nBOY: No, indeed.\n\nSOCRATES: But how much?\n\nBOY: Four times as much.\n\nSOCRATES: Therefore the double line, boy, has given a space, not twice,\nbut four times as much.\n\nBOY: True.\n\nSOCRATES: Four times four are sixteen--are they not?\n\nBOY: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: What line would give you a space of eight feet, as this gives\none of sixteen feet;--do you see?\n\nBOY: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And the space of four feet is made from this half line?\n\nBOY: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Good; and is not a space of eight feet twice the size of this,\nand half the size of the other?\n\nBOY: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Such a space, then, will be made out of a line greater than\nthis one, and less than that one?\n\nBOY: Yes; I think so.\n\nSOCRATES: Very good; I like to hear you say what you think. And now tell\nme, is not this a line of two feet and that of four?\n\nBOY: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then the line which forms the side of eight feet ought to be\nmore than this line of two feet, and less than the other of four feet?\n\nBOY: It ought.\n\nSOCRATES: Try and see if you can tell me how much it will be.\n\nBOY: Three feet.\n\nSOCRATES: Then if we add a half to this line of two, that will be the\nline of three. Here are two and there is one; and on the other side,\nhere are two also and there is one: and that makes the figure of which\nyou speak?\n\nBOY: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: But if there are three feet this way and three feet that way,\nthe whole space will be three times three feet?\n\nBOY: That is evident.\n\nSOCRATES: And how much are three times three feet?\n\nBOY: Nine.\n\nSOCRATES: And how much is the double of four?\n\nBOY: Eight.\n\nSOCRATES: Then the figure of eight is not made out of a line of three?\n\nBOY: No.\n\nSOCRATES: But from what line?--tell me exactly; and if you would rather\nnot reckon, try and show me the line.\n\nBOY: Indeed, Socrates, I do not know.\n\nSOCRATES: Do you see, Meno, what advances he has made in his power of\nrecollection? He did not know at first, and he does not know now, what\nis the side of a figure of eight feet: but then he thought that he knew,\nand answered confidently as if he knew, and had no difficulty; now he\nhas a difficulty, and neither knows nor fancies that he knows.\n\nMENO: True.\n\nSOCRATES: Is he not better off in knowing his ignorance?\n\nMENO: I think that he is.\n\nSOCRATES: If we have made him doubt, and given him the 'torpedo's\nshock,' have we done him any harm?\n\nMENO: I think not.\n\nSOCRATES: We have certainly, as would seem, assisted him in some degree\nto the discovery of the truth; and now he will wish to remedy his\nignorance, but then he would have been ready to tell all the world again\nand again that the double space should have a double side.\n\nMENO: True.\n\nSOCRATES: But do you suppose that he would ever have enquired into or\nlearned what he fancied that he knew, though he was really ignorant of\nit, until he had fallen into perplexity under the idea that he did not\nknow, and had desired to know?\n\nMENO: I think not, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: Then he was the better for the torpedo's touch?\n\nMENO: I think so.\n\nSOCRATES: Mark now the farther development. I shall only ask him, and\nnot teach him, and he shall share the enquiry with me: and do you watch\nand see if you find me telling or explaining anything to him, instead of\neliciting his opinion. Tell me, boy, is not this a square of four feet\nwhich I have drawn?\n\nBOY: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And now I add another square equal to the former one?\n\nBOY: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And a third, which is equal to either of them?\n\nBOY: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Suppose that we fill up the vacant corner?\n\nBOY: Very good.\n\nSOCRATES: Here, then, there are four equal spaces?\n\nBOY: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And how many times larger is this space than this other?\n\nBOY: Four times.\n\nSOCRATES: But it ought to have been twice only, as you will remember.\n\nBOY: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And does not this line, reaching from corner to corner, bisect\neach of these spaces?\n\nBOY: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And are there not here four equal lines which contain this\nspace?\n\nBOY: There are.\n\nSOCRATES: Look and see how much this space is.\n\nBOY: I do not understand.\n\nSOCRATES: Has not each interior line cut off half of the four spaces?\n\nBOY: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And how many spaces are there in this section?\n\nBOY: Four.\n\nSOCRATES: And how many in this?\n\nBOY: Two.\n\nSOCRATES: And four is how many times two?\n\nBOY: Twice.\n\nSOCRATES: And this space is of how many feet?\n\nBOY: Of eight feet.\n\nSOCRATES: And from what line do you get this figure?\n\nBOY: From this.\n\nSOCRATES: That is, from the line which extends from corner to corner of\nthe figure of four feet?\n\nBOY: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And that is the line which the learned call the diagonal.\nAnd if this is the proper name, then you, Meno's slave, are prepared to\naffirm that the double space is the square of the diagonal?\n\nBOY: Certainly, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: What do you say of him, Meno? Were not all these answers given\nout of his own head?\n\nMENO: Yes, they were all his own.\n\nSOCRATES: And yet, as we were just now saying, he did not know?\n\nMENO: True.\n\nSOCRATES: But still he had in him those notions of his--had he not?\n\nMENO: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then he who does not know may still have true notions of that\nwhich he does not know?\n\nMENO: He has.\n\nSOCRATES: And at present these notions have just been stirred up in him,\nas in a dream; but if he were frequently asked the same questions, in\ndifferent forms, he would know as well as any one at last?\n\nMENO: I dare say.\n\nSOCRATES: Without any one teaching him he will recover his knowledge for\nhimself, if he is only asked questions?\n\nMENO: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And this spontaneous recovery of knowledge in him is\nrecollection?\n\nMENO: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And this knowledge which he now has must he not either have\nacquired or always possessed?\n\nMENO: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: But if he always possessed this knowledge he would always have\nknown; or if he has acquired the knowledge he could not have acquired it\nin this life, unless he has been taught geometry; for he may be made to\ndo the same with all geometry and every other branch of knowledge. Now,\nhas any one ever taught him all this? You must know about him, if, as\nyou say, he was born and bred in your house.\n\nMENO: And I am certain that no one ever did teach him.\n\nSOCRATES: And yet he has the knowledge?\n\nMENO: The fact, Socrates, is undeniable.\n\nSOCRATES: But if he did not acquire the knowledge in this life, then he\nmust have had and learned it at some other time?\n\nMENO: Clearly he must.\n\nSOCRATES: Which must have been the time when he was not a man?\n\nMENO: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And if there have been always true thoughts in him, both at\nthe time when he was and was not a man, which only need to be awakened\ninto knowledge by putting questions to him, his soul must have always\npossessed this knowledge, for he always either was or was not a man?\n\nMENO: Obviously.\n\nSOCRATES: And if the truth of all things always existed in the soul,\nthen the soul is immortal. Wherefore be of good cheer, and try to\nrecollect what you do not know, or rather what you do not remember.\n\nMENO: I feel, somehow, that I like what you are saying.\n\nSOCRATES: And I, Meno, like what I am saying. Some things I have said\nof which I am not altogether confident. But that we shall be better and\nbraver and less helpless if we think that we ought to enquire, than\nwe should have been if we indulged in the idle fancy that there was no\nknowing and no use in seeking to know what we do not know;--that is a\ntheme upon which I am ready to fight, in word and deed, to the utmost of\nmy power.\n\nMENO: There again, Socrates, your words seem to me excellent.\n\nSOCRATES: Then, as we are agreed that a man should enquire about that\nwhich he does not know, shall you and I make an effort to enquire\ntogether into the nature of virtue?\n\nMENO: By all means, Socrates. And yet I would much rather return to my\noriginal question, Whether in seeking to acquire virtue we should regard\nit as a thing to be taught, or as a gift of nature, or as coming to men\nin some other way?\n\nSOCRATES: Had I the command of you as well as of myself, Meno, I would\nnot have enquired whether virtue is given by instruction or not,\nuntil we had first ascertained 'what it is.' But as you think only\nof controlling me who am your slave, and never of controlling\nyourself,--such being your notion of freedom, I must yield to you,\nfor you are irresistible. And therefore I have now to enquire into the\nqualities of a thing of which I do not as yet know the nature. At any\nrate, will you condescend a little, and allow the question 'Whether\nvirtue is given by instruction, or in any other way,' to be argued upon\nhypothesis? As the geometrician, when he is asked whether a certain\ntriangle is capable being inscribed in a certain circle (Or, whether a\ncertain area is capable of being inscribed as a triangle in a certain\ncircle.), will reply: 'I cannot tell you as yet; but I will offer a\nhypothesis which may assist us in forming a conclusion: If the figure be\nsuch that when you have produced a given side of it (Or, when you apply\nit to the given line, i.e. the diameter of the circle (autou).), the\ngiven area of the triangle falls short by an area corresponding to\nthe part produced (Or, similar to the area so applied.), then one\nconsequence follows, and if this is impossible then some other; and\ntherefore I wish to assume a hypothesis before I tell you whether\nthis triangle is capable of being inscribed in the circle':--that is\na geometrical hypothesis. And we too, as we know not the nature and\nqualities of virtue, must ask, whether virtue is or is not taught, under\na hypothesis: as thus, if virtue is of such a class of mental goods,\nwill it be taught or not? Let the first hypothesis be that virtue is or\nis not knowledge,--in that case will it be taught or not? or, as we were\njust now saying, 'remembered'? For there is no use in disputing about\nthe name. But is virtue taught or not? or rather, does not every one see\nthat knowledge alone is taught?\n\nMENO: I agree.\n\nSOCRATES: Then if virtue is knowledge, virtue will be taught?\n\nMENO: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Then now we have made a quick end of this question: if virtue\nis of such a nature, it will be taught; and if not, not?\n\nMENO: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: The next question is, whether virtue is knowledge or of\nanother species?\n\nMENO: Yes, that appears to be the question which comes next in order.\n\nSOCRATES: Do we not say that virtue is a good?--This is a hypothesis\nwhich is not set aside.\n\nMENO: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Now, if there be any sort of good which is distinct from\nknowledge, virtue may be that good; but if knowledge embraces all good,\nthen we shall be right in thinking that virtue is knowledge?\n\nMENO: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And virtue makes us good?\n\nMENO: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And if we are good, then we are profitable; for all good\nthings are profitable?\n\nMENO: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then virtue is profitable?\n\nMENO: That is the only inference.\n\nSOCRATES: Then now let us see what are the things which severally profit\nus. Health and strength, and beauty and wealth--these, and the like of\nthese, we call profitable?\n\nMENO: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And yet these things may also sometimes do us harm: would you\nnot think so?\n\nMENO: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And what is the guiding principle which makes them profitable\nor the reverse? Are they not profitable when they are rightly used, and\nhurtful when they are not rightly used?\n\nMENO: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Next, let us consider the goods of the soul: they are\ntemperance, justice, courage, quickness of apprehension, memory,\nmagnanimity, and the like?\n\nMENO: Surely.\n\nSOCRATES: And such of these as are not knowledge, but of another sort,\nare sometimes profitable and sometimes hurtful; as, for example, courage\nwanting prudence, which is only a sort of confidence? When a man has no\nsense he is harmed by courage, but when he has sense he is profited?\n\nMENO: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And the same may be said of temperance and quickness of\napprehension; whatever things are learned or done with sense are\nprofitable, but when done without sense they are hurtful?\n\nMENO: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: And in general, all that the soul attempts or endures, when\nunder the guidance of wisdom, ends in happiness; but when she is under\nthe guidance of folly, in the opposite?\n\nMENO: That appears to be true.\n\nSOCRATES: If then virtue is a quality of the soul, and is admitted to be\nprofitable, it must be wisdom or prudence, since none of the things of\nthe soul are either profitable or hurtful in themselves, but they are\nall made profitable or hurtful by the addition of wisdom or of folly;\nand therefore if virtue is profitable, virtue must be a sort of wisdom\nor prudence?\n\nMENO: I quite agree.\n\nSOCRATES: And the other goods, such as wealth and the like, of which we\nwere just now saying that they are sometimes good and sometimes evil,\ndo not they also become profitable or hurtful, accordingly as the soul\nguides and uses them rightly or wrongly; just as the things of the soul\nherself are benefited when under the guidance of wisdom and harmed by\nfolly?\n\nMENO: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And the wise soul guides them rightly, and the foolish soul\nwrongly.\n\nMENO: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And is not this universally true of human nature? All other\nthings hang upon the soul, and the things of the soul herself hang upon\nwisdom, if they are to be good; and so wisdom is inferred to be that\nwhich profits--and virtue, as we say, is profitable?\n\nMENO: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And thus we arrive at the conclusion that virtue is either\nwholly or partly wisdom?\n\nMENO: I think that what you are saying, Socrates, is very true.\n\nSOCRATES: But if this is true, then the good are not by nature good?\n\nMENO: I think not.\n\nSOCRATES: If they had been, there would assuredly have been discerners\nof characters among us who would have known our future great men; and on\ntheir showing we should have adopted them, and when we had got them, we\nshould have kept them in the citadel out of the way of harm, and set a\nstamp upon them far rather than upon a piece of gold, in order that no\none might tamper with them; and when they grew up they would have been\nuseful to the state?\n\nMENO: Yes, Socrates, that would have been the right way.\n\nSOCRATES: But if the good are not by nature good, are they made good by\ninstruction?\n\nMENO: There appears to be no other alternative, Socrates. On the\nsupposition that virtue is knowledge, there can be no doubt that virtue\nis taught.\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, indeed; but what if the supposition is erroneous?\n\nMENO: I certainly thought just now that we were right.\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, Meno; but a principle which has any soundness should\nstand firm not only just now, but always.\n\nMENO: Well; and why are you so slow of heart to believe that knowledge\nis virtue?\n\nSOCRATES: I will try and tell you why, Meno. I do not retract the\nassertion that if virtue is knowledge it may be taught; but I fear that\nI have some reason in doubting whether virtue is knowledge: for consider\nnow and say whether virtue, and not only virtue but anything that is\ntaught, must not have teachers and disciples?\n\nMENO: Surely.\n\nSOCRATES: And conversely, may not the art of which neither teachers nor\ndisciples exist be assumed to be incapable of being taught?\n\nMENO: True; but do you think that there are no teachers of virtue?\n\nSOCRATES: I have certainly often enquired whether there were any, and\ntaken great pains to find them, and have never succeeded; and many have\nassisted me in the search, and they were the persons whom I thought the\nmost likely to know. Here at the moment when he is wanted we fortunately\nhave sitting by us Anytus, the very person of whom we should make\nenquiry; to him then let us repair. In the first place, he is the son\nof a wealthy and wise father, Anthemion, who acquired his wealth, not\nby accident or gift, like Ismenias the Theban (who has recently made\nhimself as rich as Polycrates), but by his own skill and industry, and\nwho is a well-conditioned, modest man, not insolent, or overbearing, or\nannoying; moreover, this son of his has received a good education, as\nthe Athenian people certainly appear to think, for they choose him to\nfill the highest offices. And these are the sort of men from whom you\nare likely to learn whether there are any teachers of virtue, and who\nthey are. Please, Anytus, to help me and your friend Meno in answering\nour question, Who are the teachers? Consider the matter thus: If we\nwanted Meno to be a good physician, to whom should we send him? Should\nwe not send him to the physicians?\n\nANYTUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Or if we wanted him to be a good cobbler, should we not send\nhim to the cobblers?\n\nANYTUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And so forth?\n\nANYTUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Let me trouble you with one more question. When we say that we\nshould be right in sending him to the physicians if we wanted him to be\na physician, do we mean that we should be right in sending him to those\nwho profess the art, rather than to those who do not, and to those who\ndemand payment for teaching the art, and profess to teach it to any one\nwho will come and learn? And if these were our reasons, should we not be\nright in sending him?\n\nANYTUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And might not the same be said of flute-playing, and of the\nother arts? Would a man who wanted to make another a flute-player refuse\nto send him to those who profess to teach the art for money, and be\nplaguing other persons to give him instruction, who are not professed\nteachers and who never had a single disciple in that branch of knowledge\nwhich he wishes him to acquire--would not such conduct be the height of\nfolly?\n\nANYTUS: Yes, by Zeus, and of ignorance too.\n\nSOCRATES: Very good. And now you are in a position to advise with me\nabout my friend Meno. He has been telling me, Anytus, that he desires\nto attain that kind of wisdom and virtue by which men order the state or\nthe house, and honour their parents, and know when to receive and when\nto send away citizens and strangers, as a good man should. Now, to\nwhom should he go in order that he may learn this virtue? Does not the\nprevious argument imply clearly that we should send him to those who\nprofess and avouch that they are the common teachers of all Hellas, and\nare ready to impart instruction to any one who likes, at a fixed price?\n\nANYTUS: Whom do you mean, Socrates?\n\nSOCRATES: You surely know, do you not, Anytus, that these are the people\nwhom mankind call Sophists?\n\nANYTUS: By Heracles, Socrates, forbear! I only hope that no friend or\nkinsman or acquaintance of mine, whether citizen or stranger, will ever\nbe so mad as to allow himself to be corrupted by them; for they are\na manifest pest and corrupting influence to those who have to do with\nthem.\n\nSOCRATES: What, Anytus? Of all the people who profess that they know how\nto do men good, do you mean to say that these are the only ones who not\nonly do them no good, but positively corrupt those who are entrusted to\nthem, and in return for this disservice have the face to demand money?\nIndeed, I cannot believe you; for I know of a single man, Protagoras,\nwho made more out of his craft than the illustrious Pheidias, who\ncreated such noble works, or any ten other statuaries. How could that\nbe? A mender of old shoes, or patcher up of clothes, who made the shoes\nor clothes worse than he received them, could not have remained thirty\ndays undetected, and would very soon have starved; whereas during more\nthan forty years, Protagoras was corrupting all Hellas, and sending his\ndisciples from him worse than he received them, and he was never found\nout. For, if I am not mistaken, he was about seventy years old at his\ndeath, forty of which were spent in the practice of his profession;\nand during all that time he had a good reputation, which to this day he\nretains: and not only Protagoras, but many others are well spoken of;\nsome who lived before him, and others who are still living. Now, when\nyou say that they deceived and corrupted the youth, are they to be\nsupposed to have corrupted them consciously or unconsciously? Can those\nwho were deemed by many to be the wisest men of Hellas have been out of\ntheir minds?\n\nANYTUS: Out of their minds! No, Socrates; the young men who gave their\nmoney to them were out of their minds, and their relations and guardians\nwho entrusted their youth to the care of these men were still more out\nof their minds, and most of all, the cities who allowed them to come in,\nand did not drive them out, citizen and stranger alike.\n\nSOCRATES: Has any of the Sophists wronged you, Anytus? What makes you so\nangry with them?\n\nANYTUS: No, indeed, neither I nor any of my belongings has ever had, nor\nwould I suffer them to have, anything to do with them.\n\nSOCRATES: Then you are entirely unacquainted with them?\n\nANYTUS: And I have no wish to be acquainted.\n\nSOCRATES: Then, my dear friend, how can you know whether a thing is good\nor bad of which you are wholly ignorant?\n\nANYTUS: Quite well; I am sure that I know what manner of men these are,\nwhether I am acquainted with them or not.\n\nSOCRATES: You must be a diviner, Anytus, for I really cannot make out,\njudging from your own words, how, if you are not acquainted with them,\nyou know about them. But I am not enquiring of you who are the teachers\nwho will corrupt Meno (let them be, if you please, the Sophists); I only\nask you to tell him who there is in this great city who will teach him\nhow to become eminent in the virtues which I was just now describing. He\nis the friend of your family, and you will oblige him.\n\nANYTUS: Why do you not tell him yourself?\n\nSOCRATES: I have told him whom I supposed to be the teachers of these\nthings; but I learn from you that I am utterly at fault, and I dare say\nthat you are right. And now I wish that you, on your part, would tell me\nto whom among the Athenians he should go. Whom would you name?\n\nANYTUS: Why single out individuals? Any Athenian gentleman, taken at\nrandom, if he will mind him, will do far more good to him than the\nSophists.\n\nSOCRATES: And did those gentlemen grow of themselves; and without having\nbeen taught by any one, were they nevertheless able to teach others that\nwhich they had never learned themselves?\n\nANYTUS: I imagine that they learned of the previous generation of\ngentlemen. Have there not been many good men in this city?\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, certainly, Anytus; and many good statesmen also there\nalways have been and there are still, in the city of Athens. But\nthe question is whether they were also good teachers of their own\nvirtue;--not whether there are, or have been, good men in this part of\nthe world, but whether virtue can be taught, is the question which we\nhave been discussing. Now, do we mean to say that the good men of our\nown and of other times knew how to impart to others that virtue\nwhich they had themselves; or is virtue a thing incapable of being\ncommunicated or imparted by one man to another? That is the question\nwhich I and Meno have been arguing. Look at the matter in your own way:\nWould you not admit that Themistocles was a good man?\n\nANYTUS: Certainly; no man better.\n\nSOCRATES: And must not he then have been a good teacher, if any man ever\nwas a good teacher, of his own virtue?\n\nANYTUS: Yes certainly,--if he wanted to be so.\n\nSOCRATES: But would he not have wanted? He would, at any rate, have\ndesired to make his own son a good man and a gentleman; he could not\nhave been jealous of him, or have intentionally abstained from\nimparting to him his own virtue. Did you never hear that he made his son\nCleophantus a famous horseman; and had him taught to stand upright on\nhorseback and hurl a javelin, and to do many other marvellous things;\nand in anything which could be learned from a master he was well\ntrained? Have you not heard from our elders of him?\n\nANYTUS: I have.\n\nSOCRATES: Then no one could say that his son showed any want of\ncapacity?\n\nANYTUS: Very likely not.\n\nSOCRATES: But did any one, old or young, ever say in your hearing that\nCleophantus, son of Themistocles, was a wise or good man, as his father\nwas?\n\nANYTUS: I have certainly never heard any one say so.\n\nSOCRATES: And if virtue could have been taught, would his father\nThemistocles have sought to train him in these minor accomplishments,\nand allowed him who, as you must remember, was his own son, to be\nno better than his neighbours in those qualities in which he himself\nexcelled?\n\nANYTUS: Indeed, indeed, I think not.\n\nSOCRATES: Here was a teacher of virtue whom you admit to be among\nthe best men of the past. Let us take another,--Aristides, the son of\nLysimachus: would you not acknowledge that he was a good man?\n\nANYTUS: To be sure I should.\n\nSOCRATES: And did not he train his son Lysimachus better than any other\nAthenian in all that could be done for him by the help of masters? But\nwhat has been the result? Is he a bit better than any other mortal?\nHe is an acquaintance of yours, and you see what he is like. There is\nPericles, again, magnificent in his wisdom; and he, as you are aware,\nhad two sons, Paralus and Xanthippus.\n\nANYTUS: I know.\n\nSOCRATES: And you know, also, that he taught them to be unrivalled\nhorsemen, and had them trained in music and gymnastics and all sorts of\narts--in these respects they were on a level with the best--and had\nhe no wish to make good men of them? Nay, he must have wished it. But\nvirtue, as I suspect, could not be taught. And that you may not suppose\nthe incompetent teachers to be only the meaner sort of Athenians and\nfew in number, remember again that Thucydides had two sons, Melesias and\nStephanus, whom, besides giving them a good education in other things,\nhe trained in wrestling, and they were the best wrestlers in Athens: one\nof them he committed to the care of Xanthias, and the other of Eudorus,\nwho had the reputation of being the most celebrated wrestlers of that\nday. Do you remember them?\n\nANYTUS: I have heard of them.\n\nSOCRATES: Now, can there be a doubt that Thucydides, whose children were\ntaught things for which he had to spend money, would have taught them\nto be good men, which would have cost him nothing, if virtue could have\nbeen taught? Will you reply that he was a mean man, and had not many\nfriends among the Athenians and allies? Nay, but he was of a great\nfamily, and a man of influence at Athens and in all Hellas, and, if\nvirtue could have been taught, he would have found out some Athenian\nor foreigner who would have made good men of his sons, if he could not\nhimself spare the time from cares of state. Once more, I suspect, friend\nAnytus, that virtue is not a thing which can be taught?\n\nANYTUS: Socrates, I think that you are too ready to speak evil of men:\nand, if you will take my advice, I would recommend you to be careful.\nPerhaps there is no city in which it is not easier to do men harm than\nto do them good, and this is certainly the case at Athens, as I believe\nthat you know.\n\nSOCRATES: O Meno, think that Anytus is in a rage. And he may well be\nin a rage, for he thinks, in the first place, that I am defaming these\ngentlemen; and in the second place, he is of opinion that he is one\nof them himself. But some day he will know what is the meaning of\ndefamation, and if he ever does, he will forgive me. Meanwhile I will\nreturn to you, Meno; for I suppose that there are gentlemen in your\nregion too?\n\nMENO: Certainly there are.\n\nSOCRATES: And are they willing to teach the young? and do they profess\nto be teachers? and do they agree that virtue is taught?\n\nMENO: No indeed, Socrates, they are anything but agreed; you may hear\nthem saying at one time that virtue can be taught, and then again the\nreverse.\n\nSOCRATES: Can we call those teachers who do not acknowledge the\npossibility of their own vocation?\n\nMENO: I think not, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: And what do you think of these Sophists, who are the only\nprofessors? Do they seem to you to be teachers of virtue?\n\nMENO: I often wonder, Socrates, that Gorgias is never heard promising to\nteach virtue: and when he hears others promising he only laughs at them;\nbut he thinks that men should be taught to speak.\n\nSOCRATES: Then do you not think that the Sophists are teachers?\n\nMENO: I cannot tell you, Socrates; like the rest of the world, I am in\ndoubt, and sometimes I think that they are teachers and sometimes not.\n\nSOCRATES: And are you aware that not you only and other politicians have\ndoubts whether virtue can be taught or not, but that Theognis the poet\nsays the very same thing?\n\nMENO: Where does he say so?\n\nSOCRATES: In these elegiac verses (Theog.):\n\n'Eat and drink and sit with the mighty, and make yourself agreeable to\nthem; for from the good you will learn what is good, but if you mix with\nthe bad you will lose the intelligence which you already have.'\n\nDo you observe that here he seems to imply that virtue can be taught?\n\nMENO: Clearly.\n\nSOCRATES: But in some other verses he shifts about and says (Theog.):\n\n'If understanding could be created and put into a man, then they' (who\nwere able to perform this feat) 'would have obtained great rewards.'\n\nAnd again:--\n\n'Never would a bad son have sprung from a good sire, for he would have\nheard the voice of instruction; but not by teaching will you ever make a\nbad man into a good one.'\n\nAnd this, as you may remark, is a contradiction of the other.\n\nMENO: Clearly.\n\nSOCRATES: And is there anything else of which the professors are\naffirmed not only not to be teachers of others, but to be ignorant\nthemselves, and bad at the knowledge of that which they are professing\nto teach? or is there anything about which even the acknowledged\n'gentlemen' are sometimes saying that 'this thing can be taught,' and\nsometimes the opposite? Can you say that they are teachers in any true\nsense whose ideas are in such confusion?\n\nMENO: I should say, certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: But if neither the Sophists nor the gentlemen are teachers,\nclearly there can be no other teachers?\n\nMENO: No.\n\nSOCRATES: And if there are no teachers, neither are there disciples?\n\nMENO: Agreed.\n\nSOCRATES: And we have admitted that a thing cannot be taught of which\nthere are neither teachers nor disciples?\n\nMENO: We have.\n\nSOCRATES: And there are no teachers of virtue to be found anywhere?\n\nMENO: There are not.\n\nSOCRATES: And if there are no teachers, neither are there scholars?\n\nMENO: That, I think, is true.\n\nSOCRATES: Then virtue cannot be taught?\n\nMENO: Not if we are right in our view. But I cannot believe, Socrates,\nthat there are no good men: And if there are, how did they come into\nexistence?\n\nSOCRATES: I am afraid, Meno, that you and I are not good for much, and\nthat Gorgias has been as poor an educator of you as Prodicus has been of\nme. Certainly we shall have to look to ourselves, and try to find\nsome one who will help in some way or other to improve us. This I say,\nbecause I observe that in the previous discussion none of us remarked\nthat right and good action is possible to man under other guidance than\nthat of knowledge (episteme);--and indeed if this be denied, there is no\nseeing how there can be any good men at all.\n\nMENO: How do you mean, Socrates?\n\nSOCRATES: I mean that good men are necessarily useful or profitable.\nWere we not right in admitting this? It must be so.\n\nMENO: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And in supposing that they will be useful only if they are\ntrue guides to us of action--there we were also right?\n\nMENO: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: But when we said that a man cannot be a good guide unless he\nhave knowledge (phrhonesis), this we were wrong.\n\nMENO: What do you mean by the word 'right'?\n\nSOCRATES: I will explain. If a man knew the way to Larisa, or anywhere\nelse, and went to the place and led others thither, would he not be a\nright and good guide?\n\nMENO: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And a person who had a right opinion about the way, but had\nnever been and did not know, might be a good guide also, might he not?\n\nMENO: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And while he has true opinion about that which the other\nknows, he will be just as good a guide if he thinks the truth, as he who\nknows the truth?\n\nMENO: Exactly.\n\nSOCRATES: Then true opinion is as good a guide to correct action as\nknowledge; and that was the point which we omitted in our speculation\nabout the nature of virtue, when we said that knowledge only is the\nguide of right action; whereas there is also right opinion.\n\nMENO: True.\n\nSOCRATES: Then right opinion is not less useful than knowledge?\n\nMENO: The difference, Socrates, is only that he who has knowledge will\nalways be right; but he who has right opinion will sometimes be right,\nand sometimes not.\n\nSOCRATES: What do you mean? Can he be wrong who has right opinion, so\nlong as he has right opinion?\n\nMENO: I admit the cogency of your argument, and therefore, Socrates, I\nwonder that knowledge should be preferred to right opinion--or why they\nshould ever differ.\n\nSOCRATES: And shall I explain this wonder to you?\n\nMENO: Do tell me.\n\nSOCRATES: You would not wonder if you had ever observed the images of\nDaedalus (Compare Euthyphro); but perhaps you have not got them in your\ncountry?\n\nMENO: What have they to do with the question?\n\nSOCRATES: Because they require to be fastened in order to keep them, and\nif they are not fastened they will play truant and run away.\n\nMENO: Well, what of that?\n\nSOCRATES: I mean to say that they are not very valuable possessions if\nthey are at liberty, for they will walk off like runaway slaves; but\nwhen fastened, they are of great value, for they are really beautiful\nworks of art. Now this is an illustration of the nature of true\nopinions: while they abide with us they are beautiful and fruitful,\nbut they run away out of the human soul, and do not remain long, and\ntherefore they are not of much value until they are fastened by the tie\nof the cause; and this fastening of them, friend Meno, is recollection,\nas you and I have agreed to call it. But when they are bound, in the\nfirst place, they have the nature of knowledge; and, in the second\nplace, they are abiding. And this is why knowledge is more honourable\nand excellent than true opinion, because fastened by a chain.\n\nMENO: What you are saying, Socrates, seems to be very like the truth.\n\nSOCRATES: I too speak rather in ignorance; I only conjecture. And yet\nthat knowledge differs from true opinion is no matter of conjecture with\nme. There are not many things which I profess to know, but this is most\ncertainly one of them.\n\nMENO: Yes, Socrates; and you are quite right in saying so.\n\nSOCRATES: And am I not also right in saying that true opinion leading\nthe way perfects action quite as well as knowledge?\n\nMENO: There again, Socrates, I think you are right.\n\nSOCRATES: Then right opinion is not a whit inferior to knowledge, or\nless useful in action; nor is the man who has right opinion inferior to\nhim who has knowledge?\n\nMENO: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And surely the good man has been acknowledged by us to be\nuseful?\n\nMENO: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Seeing then that men become good and useful to states, not\nonly because they have knowledge, but because they have right opinion,\nand that neither knowledge nor right opinion is given to man by nature\nor acquired by him--(do you imagine either of them to be given by\nnature?\n\nMENO: Not I.)\n\nSOCRATES: Then if they are not given by nature, neither are the good by\nnature good?\n\nMENO: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: And nature being excluded, then came the question whether\nvirtue is acquired by teaching?\n\nMENO: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: If virtue was wisdom (or knowledge), then, as we thought, it\nwas taught?\n\nMENO: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And if it was taught it was wisdom?\n\nMENO: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And if there were teachers, it might be taught; and if there\nwere no teachers, not?\n\nMENO: True.\n\nSOCRATES: But surely we acknowledged that there were no teachers of\nvirtue?\n\nMENO: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then we acknowledged that it was not taught, and was not\nwisdom?\n\nMENO: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And yet we admitted that it was a good?\n\nMENO: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And the right guide is useful and good?\n\nMENO: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And the only right guides are knowledge and true\nopinion--these are the guides of man; for things which happen by chance\nare not under the guidance of man: but the guides of man are true\nopinion and knowledge.\n\nMENO: I think so too.\n\nSOCRATES: But if virtue is not taught, neither is virtue knowledge.\n\nMENO: Clearly not.\n\nSOCRATES: Then of two good and useful things, one, which is knowledge,\nhas been set aside, and cannot be supposed to be our guide in political\nlife.\n\nMENO: I think not.\n\nSOCRATES: And therefore not by any wisdom, and not because they were\nwise, did Themistocles and those others of whom Anytus spoke govern\nstates. This was the reason why they were unable to make others like\nthemselves--because their virtue was not grounded on knowledge.\n\nMENO: That is probably true, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: But if not by knowledge, the only alternative which remains\nis that statesmen must have guided states by right opinion, which is in\npolitics what divination is in religion; for diviners and also prophets\nsay many things truly, but they know not what they say.\n\nMENO: So I believe.\n\nSOCRATES: And may we not, Meno, truly call those men 'divine' who,\nhaving no understanding, yet succeed in many a grand deed and word?\n\nMENO: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Then we shall also be right in calling divine those whom we\nwere just now speaking of as diviners and prophets, including the whole\ntribe of poets. Yes, and statesmen above all may be said to be divine\nand illumined, being inspired and possessed of God, in which condition\nthey say many grand things, not knowing what they say.\n\nMENO: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And the women too, Meno, call good men divine--do they not?\nand the Spartans, when they praise a good man, say 'that he is a divine\nman.'\n\nMENO: And I think, Socrates, that they are right; although very likely\nour friend Anytus may take offence at the word.\n\nSOCRATES: I do not care; as for Anytus, there will be another\nopportunity of talking with him. To sum up our enquiry--the result\nseems to be, if we are at all right in our view, that virtue is neither\nnatural nor acquired, but an instinct given by God to the virtuous. Nor\nis the instinct accompanied by reason, unless there may be supposed to\nbe among statesmen some one who is capable of educating statesmen. And\nif there be such an one, he may be said to be among the living\nwhat Homer says that Tiresias was among the dead, 'he alone has\nunderstanding; but the rest are flitting shades'; and he and his virtue\nin like manner will be a reality among shadows.\n\nMENO: That is excellent, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: Then, Meno, the conclusion is that virtue comes to the\nvirtuous by the gift of God. But we shall never know the certain truth\nuntil, before asking how virtue is given, we enquire into the actual\nnature of virtue. I fear that I must go away, but do you, now that you\nare persuaded yourself, persuade our friend Anytus. And do not let him\nbe so exasperated; if you can conciliate him, you will have done good\nservice to the Athenian people.","title":"Meno","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":22182}