{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_1656/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_1656","id":"gutenberg_1656","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1656","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Classics of Literature","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Classical literature","Harvard Classics","Philosophy","Philosophy, Ancient","Socrates, 470 BC-399 BC"],"text":"Produced by Sue Asscher, and David Widger\n\n\n\n\nApology\n\nby Plato\n\nTranslated by Benjamin Jowett\n\n\nContents\n\n INTRODUCTION\n APOLOGY\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION.\n\n\nIn what relation the \u201cApology\u201d of Plato stands to the real defence of\nSocrates, there are no means of determining. It certainly agrees in\ntone and character with the description of Xenophon, who says in the\n\u201cMemorabilia\u201d that Socrates might have been acquitted \u201cif in any\nmoderate degree he would have conciliated the favour of the dicasts;\u201d\nand who informs us in another passage, on the testimony of Hermogenes,\nthe friend of Socrates, that he had no wish to live; and that the\ndivine sign refused to allow him to prepare a defence, and also that\nSocrates himself declared this to be unnecessary, on the ground that\nall his life long he had been preparing against that hour. For the\nspeech breathes throughout a spirit of defiance, \u201c_ut non supplex aut\nreus sed magister aut dominus videretur esse judicum_\u201d (Cic. \u201cde Orat.\u201d\ni. 54); and the loose and desultory style is an imitation of the\n\u201caccustomed manner\u201d in which Socrates spoke in \u201cthe _agora_ and among\nthe tables of the money-changers.\u201d The allusion in the \u201cCrito\u201d (45 B)\nmay, perhaps, be adduced as a further evidence of the literal accuracy\nof some parts (37 C, D). But in the main it must be regarded as the\nideal of Socrates, according to Plato\u2019s conception of him, appearing in\nthe greatest and most public scene of his life, and in the height of\nhis triumph, when he is weakest, and yet his mastery over mankind is\ngreatest, and his habitual irony acquires a new meaning and a sort of\ntragic pathos in the face of death. The facts of his life are summed\nup, and the features of his character are brought out as if by accident\nin the course of the defence. The conversational manner, the seeming\nwant of arrangement, the ironical simplicity, are found to result in a\nperfect work of art, which is the portrait of Socrates.\n\nYet some of the topics may have been actually used by Socrates; and the\nrecollection of his very words may have rung in the ears of his\ndisciple. The \u201cApology\u201d of Plato may be compared generally with those\nspeeches of Thucydides in which he has embodied his conception of the\nlofty character and policy of the great Pericles, and which at the same\ntime furnish a commentary on the situation of affairs from the point of\nview of the historian. So in the \u201cApology\u201d there is an ideal rather\nthan a literal truth; much is said which was not said, and is only\nPlato\u2019s view of the situation. Plato was not, like Xenophon, a\nchronicler of facts; he does not appear in any of his writings to have\naimed at literal accuracy. He is not therefore to be supplemented from\nthe Memorabilia and Symposium of Xenophon, who belongs to an entirely\ndifferent class of writers. The Apology of Plato is not the report of\nwhat Socrates said, but an elaborate composition, quite as much so in\nfact as one of the Dialogues. And we may perhaps even indulge in the\nfancy that the actual defence of Socrates was as much greater than the\nPlatonic defence as the master was greater than the disciple. But in\nany case, some of the words used by him must have been remembered, and\nsome of the facts recorded must have actually occurred. It is\nsignificant that Plato is said to have been present at the defence\n(Apol.), as he is also said to have been absent at the last scene in\nthe \u201cPh\u00e6do\u201d. Is it fanciful to suppose that he meant to give the stamp\nof authenticity to the one and not to the other?\u2014especially when we\nconsider that these two passages are the only ones in which Plato makes\nmention of himself. The circumstance that Plato was to be one of his\nsureties for the payment of the fine which he proposed has the\nappearance of truth. More suspicious is the statement that Socrates\nreceived the first impulse to his favourite calling of cross-examining\nthe world from the Oracle of Delphi; for he must already have been\nfamous before Chaerephon went to consult the Oracle (Riddell), and the\nstory is of a kind which is very likely to have been invented. On the\nwhole we arrive at the conclusion that the \u201cApology\u201d is true to the\ncharacter of Socrates, but we cannot show that any single sentence in\nit was actually spoken by him. It breathes the spirit of Socrates, but\nhas been cast anew in the mould of Plato.\n\nThere is not much in the other Dialogues which can be compared with the\n\u201cApology\u201d. The same recollection of his master may have been present to\nthe mind of Plato when depicting the sufferings of the Just in the\n\u201cRepublic\u201d. The \u201cCrito\u201d may also be regarded as a sort of appendage to\nthe \u201cApology\u201d, in which Socrates, who has defied the judges, is\nnevertheless represented as scrupulously obedient to the laws. The\nidealization of the sufferer is carried still further in the\n\u201cGeorgias\u201d, in which the thesis is maintained, that \u201cto suffer is\nbetter than to do evil;\u201d and the art of rhetoric is described as only\nuseful for the purpose of self-accusation. The parallelisms which occur\nin the so-called \u201cApology\u201d of Xenophon are not worth noticing, because\nthe writing in which they are contained is manifestly spurious. The\nstatements of the \u201cMemorabilia\u201d respecting the trial and death of\nSocrates agree generally with Plato; but they have lost the flavour of\nSocratic irony in the narrative of Xenophon.\n\nThe \u201cApology\u201d or Platonic defence of Socrates is divided into three\nparts: 1st. The defence properly so called; 2nd. The shorter address in\nmitigation of the penalty; 3rd. The last words of prophetic rebuke and\nexhortation.\n\nThe first part commences with an apology for his colloquial style; he\nis, as he has always been, the enemy of rhetoric, and knows of no\nrhetoric but truth; he will not falsify his character by making a\nspeech. Then he proceeds to divide his accusers into two classes;\nfirst, there is the nameless accuser\u2014public opinion. All the world from\ntheir earliest years had heard that he was a corrupter of youth, and\nhad seen him caricatured in the \u201cClouds\u201d of Aristophanes. Secondly,\nthere are the professed accusers, who are but the mouth-piece of the\nothers. The accusations of both might be summed up in a formula. The\nfirst say, \u201cSocrates is an evil-doer and a curious person, searching\ninto things under the earth and above the heaven; and making the worse\nappear the better cause, and teaching all this to others.\u201d The second,\n\u201cSocrates is an evil-doer and corrupter of the youth, who does not\nreceive the gods whom the state receives, but introduces other new\ndivinities.\u201d These last words appear to have been the actual indictment\n(compare Xen. Mem.); and the previous formula, which is a summary of\npublic opinion, assumes the same legal style.\n\nThe answer begins by clearing up a confusion. In the representations of\nthe Comic poets, and in the opinion of the multitude, he had been\nidentified with the teachers of physical science and with the Sophists.\nBut this was an error. For both of them he professes a respect in the\nopen court, which contrasts with his manner of speaking about them in\nother places. (Compare for Anaxagoras, Ph\u00e6do, Laws; for the Sophists,\nMeno, Republic, Tim., Theaet., Soph., etc.) But at the same time he\nshows that he is not one of them. Of natural philosophy he knows\nnothing; not that he despises such pursuits, but the fact is that he is\nignorant of them, and never says a word about them. Nor is he paid for\ngiving instruction\u2014that is another mistaken notion:\u2014he has nothing to\nteach. But he commends Evenus for teaching virtue at such a \u201cmoderate\u201d\nrate as five min\u00e6. Something of the \u201caccustomed irony,\u201d which may\nperhaps be expected to sleep in the ear of the multitude, is lurking\nhere.\n\nHe then goes on to explain the reason why he is in such an evil name.\nThat had arisen out of a peculiar mission which he had taken upon\nhimself. The enthusiastic Chaerephon (probably in anticipation of the\nanswer which he received) had gone to Delphi and asked the oracle if\nthere was any man wiser than Socrates; and the answer was, that there\nwas no man wiser. What could be the meaning of this\u2014that he who knew\nnothing, and knew that he knew nothing, should be declared by the\noracle to be the wisest of men? Reflecting upon the answer, he\ndetermined to refute it by finding \u201ca wiser;\u201d and first he went to the\npoliticians, and then to the poets, and then to the craftsmen, but\nalways with the same result\u2014he found that they knew nothing, or hardly\nanything more than himself; and that the little advantage which in some\ncases they possessed was more than counter-balanced by their conceit of\nknowledge. He knew nothing, and knew that he knew nothing: they knew\nlittle or nothing, and imagined that they knew all things. Thus he had\npassed his life as a sort of missionary in detecting the pretended\nwisdom of mankind; and this occupation had quite absorbed him and taken\nhim away both from public and private affairs. Young men of the richer\nsort had made a pastime of the same pursuit, \u201cwhich was not unamusing.\u201d\nAnd hence bitter enmities had arisen; the professors of knowledge had\nrevenged themselves by calling him a villainous corrupter of youth, and\nby repeating the commonplaces about atheism and materialism and\nsophistry, which are the stock-accusations against all philosophers\nwhen there is nothing else to be said of them.\n\nThe second accusation he meets by interrogating Meletus, who is present\nand can be interrogated. \u201cIf he is the corrupter, who is the improver\nof the citizens?\u201d (Compare Meno.) \u201cAll men everywhere.\u201d But how absurd,\nhow contrary to analogy is this! How inconceivable too, that he should\nmake the citizens worse when he has to live with them. This surely\ncannot be intentional; and if unintentional, he ought to have been\ninstructed by Meletus, and not accused in the court.\n\nBut there is another part of the indictment which says that he teaches\nmen not to receive the gods whom the city receives, and has other new\ngods. \u201cIs that the way in which he is supposed to corrupt the youth?\u201d\n\u201cYes, it is.\u201d \u201cHas he only new gods, or none at all?\u201d \u201cNone at all.\u201d\n\u201cWhat, not even the sun and moon?\u201d \u201cNo; why, he says that the sun is a\nstone, and the moon earth.\u201d That, replies Socrates, is the old\nconfusion about Anaxagoras; the Athenian people are not so ignorant as\nto attribute to the influence of Socrates notions which have found\ntheir way into the drama, and may be learned at the theatre. Socrates\nundertakes to show that Meletus (rather unjustifiably) has been\ncompounding a riddle in this part of the indictment: \u201cThere are no\ngods, but Socrates believes in the existence of the sons of gods, which\nis absurd.\u201d\n\nLeaving Meletus, who has had enough words spent upon him, he returns to\nthe original accusation. The question may be asked, Why will he persist\nin following a profession which leads him to death? Why?\u2014because he\nmust remain at his post where the god has placed him, as he remained at\nPotidaea, and Amphipolis, and Delium, where the generals placed him.\nBesides, he is not so overwise as to imagine that he knows whether\ndeath is a good or an evil; and he is certain that desertion of his\nduty is an evil. Anytus is quite right in saying that they should never\nhave indicted him if they meant to let him go. For he will certainly\nobey God rather than man; and will continue to preach to all men of all\nages the necessity of virtue and improvement; and if they refuse to\nlisten to him he will still persevere and reprove them. This is his way\nof corrupting the youth, which he will not cease to follow in obedience\nto the god, even if a thousand deaths await him.\n\nHe is desirous that they should let him live\u2014not for his own sake, but\nfor theirs; because he is their heaven-sent friend (and they will never\nhave such another), or, as he may be ludicrously described, he is the\ngadfly who stirs the generous steed into motion. Why then has he never\ntaken part in public affairs? Because the familiar divine voice has\nhindered him; if he had been a public man, and had fought for the\nright, as he would certainly have fought against the many, he would not\nhave lived, and could therefore have done no good. Twice in public\nmatters he has risked his life for the sake of justice\u2014once at the\ntrial of the generals; and again in resistance to the tyrannical\ncommands of the Thirty.\n\nBut, though not a public man, he has passed his days in instructing the\ncitizens without fee or reward\u2014this was his mission. Whether his\ndisciples have turned out well or ill, he cannot justly be charged with\nthe result, for he never promised to teach them anything. They might\ncome if they liked, and they might stay away if they liked: and they\ndid come, because they found an amusement in hearing the pretenders to\nwisdom detected. If they have been corrupted, their elder relatives (if\nnot themselves) might surely come into court and witness against him,\nand there is an opportunity still for them to appear. But their fathers\nand brothers all appear in court (including \u201cthis\u201d Plato), to witness\non his behalf; and if their relatives are corrupted, at least they are\nuncorrupted; \u201cand they are my witnesses. For they know that I am\nspeaking the truth, and that Meletus is lying.\u201d\n\nThis is about all that he has to say. He will not entreat the judges to\nspare his life; neither will he present a spectacle of weeping\nchildren, although he, too, is not made of \u201crock or oak.\u201d Some of the\njudges themselves may have complied with this practice on similar\noccasions, and he trusts that they will not be angry with him for not\nfollowing their example. But he feels that such conduct brings\ndiscredit on the name of Athens: he feels too, that the judge has sworn\nnot to give away justice; and he cannot be guilty of the impiety of\nasking the judge to break his oath, when he is himself being tried for\nimpiety.\n\nAs he expected, and probably intended, he is convicted. And now the\ntone of the speech, instead of being more conciliatory, becomes more\nlofty and commanding. Anytus proposes death as the penalty: and what\ncounter-proposition shall he make? He, the benefactor of the Athenian\npeople, whose whole life has been spent in doing them good, should at\nleast have the Olympic victor\u2019s reward of maintenance in the Prytaneum.\nOr why should he propose any counter-penalty when he does not know\nwhether death, which Anytus proposes, is a good or an evil? And he is\ncertain that imprisonment is an evil, exile is an evil. Loss of money\nmight be an evil, but then he has none to give; perhaps he can make up\na mina. Let that be the penalty, or, if his friends wish, thirty min\u00e6;\nfor which they will be excellent securities.\n\n\n           [_He is condemned to death._]\n\n\nHe is an old man already, and the Athenians will gain nothing but\ndisgrace by depriving him of a few years of life. Perhaps he could have\nescaped, if he had chosen to throw down his arms and entreat for his\nlife. But he does not at all repent of the manner of his defence; he\nwould rather die in his own fashion than live in theirs. For the\npenalty of unrighteousness is swifter than death; that penalty has\nalready overtaken his accusers as death will soon overtake him.\n\nAnd now, as one who is about to die, he will prophesy to them. They\nhave put him to death in order to escape the necessity of giving an\naccount of their lives. But his death \u201cwill be the seed\u201d of many\ndisciples who will convince them of their evil ways, and will come\nforth to reprove them in harsher terms, because they are younger and\nmore inconsiderate.\n\nHe would like to say a few words, while there is time, to those who\nwould have acquitted him. He wishes them to know that the divine sign\nnever interrupted him in the course of his defence; the reason of\nwhich, as he conjectures, is that the death to which he is going is a\ngood and not an evil. For either death is a long sleep, the best of\nsleeps, or a journey to another world in which the souls of the dead\nare gathered together, and in which there may be a hope of seeing the\nheroes of old\u2014in which, too, there are just judges; and as all are\nimmortal, there can be no fear of any one suffering death for his\nopinions.\n\nNothing evil can happen to the good man either in life or death, and\nhis own death has been permitted by the gods, because it was better for\nhim to depart; and therefore he forgives his judges because they have\ndone him no harm, although they never meant to do him any good.\n\nHe has a last request to make to them\u2014that they will trouble his sons\nas he has troubled them, if they appear to prefer riches to virtue, or\nto think themselves something when they are nothing.\n\n\n\u201cFew persons will be found to wish that Socrates should have defended\nhimself otherwise,\u201d\u2014if, as we must add, his defence was that with which\nPlato has provided him. But leaving this question, which does not admit\nof a precise solution, we may go on to ask what was the impression\nwhich Plato in the \u201cApology\u201d intended to give of the character and\nconduct of his master in the last great scene? Did he intend to\nrepresent him (1) as employing sophistries; (2) as designedly\nirritating the judges? Or are these sophistries to be regarded as\nbelonging to the age in which he lived and to his personal character,\nand this apparent haughtiness as flowing from the natural elevation of\nhis position?\n\nFor example, when he says that it is absurd to suppose that one man is\nthe corrupter and all the rest of the world the improvers of the youth;\nor, when he argues that he never could have corrupted the men with whom\nhe had to live; or, when he proves his belief in the gods because he\nbelieves in the sons of gods, is he serious or jesting? It may be\nobserved that these sophisms all occur in his cross-examination of\nMeletus, who is easily foiled and mastered in the hands of the great\ndialectician. Perhaps he regarded these answers as good enough for his\naccuser, of whom he makes very light. Also there is a touch of irony in\nthem, which takes them out of the category of sophistry. (Compare\nEuthyph.)\n\nThat the manner in which he defends himself about the lives of his\ndisciples is not satisfactory, can hardly be denied. Fresh in the\nmemory of the Athenians, and detestable as they deserved to be to the\nnewly restored democracy, were the names of Alcibiades, Critias,\nCharmides. It is obviously not a sufficient answer that Socrates had\nnever professed to teach them anything, and is therefore not justly\nchargeable with their crimes. Yet the defence, when taken out of this\nironical form, is doubtless sound: that his teaching had nothing to do\nwith their evil lives. Here, then, the sophistry is rather in form than\nin substance, though we might desire that to such a serious charge\nSocrates had given a more serious answer.\n\nTruly characteristic of Socrates is another point in his answer, which\nmay also be regarded as sophistical. He says that \u201cif he has corrupted\nthe youth, he must have corrupted them involuntarily.\u201d But if, as\nSocrates argues, all evil is involuntary, then all criminals ought to\nbe admonished and not punished. In these words the Socratic doctrine of\nthe involuntariness of evil is clearly intended to be conveyed. Here\nagain, as in the former instance, the defence of Socrates is untrue\npractically, but may be true in some ideal or transcendental sense. The\ncommonplace reply, that if he had been guilty of corrupting the youth\ntheir relations would surely have witnessed against him, with which he\nconcludes this part of his defence, is more satisfactory.\n\nAgain, when Socrates argues that he must believe in the gods because he\nbelieves in the sons of gods, we must remember that this is a\nrefutation not of the original indictment, which is consistent\nenough\u2014\u201cSocrates does not receive the gods whom the city receives, and\nhas other new divinities\u201d\u2014but of the interpretation put upon the words\nby Meletus, who has affirmed that he is a downright atheist. To this\nSocrates fairly answers, in accordance with the ideas of the time, that\na downright atheist cannot believe in the sons of gods or in divine\nthings. The notion that demons or lesser divinities are the sons of\ngods is not to be regarded as ironical or sceptical. He is arguing \u201cad\nhominem\u201d according to the notions of mythology current in his age. Yet\nhe abstains from saying that he believed in the gods whom the State\napproved. He does not defend himself, as Xenophon has defended him, by\nappealing to his practice of religion. Probably he neither wholly\nbelieved, nor disbelieved, in the existence of the popular gods; he had\nno means of knowing about them. According to Plato (compare Ph\u00e6do;\nSymp.), as well as Xenophon (Memor.), he was punctual in the\nperformance of the least religious duties; and he must have believed in\nhis own oracular sign, of which he seemed to have an internal witness.\nBut the existence of Apollo or Zeus, or the other gods whom the State\napproves, would have appeared to him both uncertain and unimportant in\ncomparison of the duty of self-examination, and of those principles of\ntruth and right which he deemed to be the foundation of religion.\n(Compare Phaedr.; Euthyph.; Republic.)\n\nThe second question, whether Plato meant to represent Socrates as\nbraving or irritating his judges, must also be answered in the\nnegative. His irony, his superiority, his audacity, \u201cregarding not the\nperson of man,\u201d necessarily flow out of the loftiness of his situation.\nHe is not acting a part upon a great occasion, but he is what he has\nbeen all his life long, \u201ca king of men.\u201d He would rather not appear\ninsolent, if he could avoid it (ouch os authadizomenos touto lego).\nNeither is he desirous of hastening his own end, for life and death are\nsimply indifferent to him. But such a defence as would be acceptable to\nhis judges and might procure an acquittal, it is not in his nature to\nmake. He will not say or do anything that might pervert the course of\njustice; he cannot have his tongue bound even \u201cin the throat of death.\u201d\nWith his accusers he will only fence and play, as he had fenced with\nother \u201cimprovers of youth,\u201d answering the Sophist according to his\nsophistry all his life long. He is serious when he is speaking of his\nown mission, which seems to distinguish him from all other reformers of\nmankind, and originates in an accident. The dedication of himself to\nthe improvement of his fellow-citizens is not so remarkable as the\nironical spirit in which he goes about doing good only in vindication\nof the credit of the oracle, and in the vain hope of finding a wiser\nman than himself. Yet this singular and almost accidental character of\nhis mission agrees with the divine sign which, according to our\nnotions, is equally accidental and irrational, and is nevertheless\naccepted by him as the guiding principle of his life. Socrates is\nnowhere represented to us as a freethinker or sceptic. There is no\nreason to doubt his sincerity when he speculates on the possibility of\nseeing and knowing the heroes of the Trojan war in another world. On\nthe other hand, his hope of immortality is uncertain;\u2014he also conceives\nof death as a long sleep (in this respect differing from the Ph\u00e6do),\nand at last falls back on resignation to the divine will, and the\ncertainty that no evil can happen to the good man either in life or\ndeath. His absolute truthfulness seems to hinder him from asserting\npositively more than this; and he makes no attempt to veil his\nignorance in mythology and figures of speech. The gentleness of the\nfirst part of the speech contrasts with the aggravated, almost\nthreatening, tone of the conclusion. He characteristically remarks that\nhe will not speak as a rhetorician, that is to say, he will not make a\nregular defence such as Lysias or one of the orators might have\ncomposed for him, or, according to some accounts, did compose for him.\nBut he first procures himself a hearing by conciliatory words. He does\nnot attack the Sophists; for they were open to the same charges as\nhimself; they were equally ridiculed by the Comic poets, and almost\nequally hateful to Anytus and Meletus. Yet incidentally the antagonism\nbetween Socrates and the Sophists is allowed to appear. He is poor and\nthey are rich; his profession that he teaches nothing is opposed to\ntheir readiness to teach all things; his talking in the marketplace to\ntheir private instructions; his tarry-at-home life to their wandering\nfrom city to city. The tone which he assumes towards them is one of\nreal friendliness, but also of concealed irony. Towards Anaxagoras, who\nhad disappointed him in his hopes of learning about mind and nature, he\nshows a less kindly feeling, which is also the feeling of Plato in\nother passages (Laws). But Anaxagoras had been dead thirty years, and\nwas beyond the reach of persecution.\n\nIt has been remarked that the prophecy of a new generation of teachers\nwho would rebuke and exhort the Athenian people in harsher and more\nviolent terms was, as far as we know, never fulfilled. No inference can\nbe drawn from this circumstance as to the probability of the words\nattributed to him having been actually uttered. They express the\naspiration of the first martyr of philosophy, that he would leave\nbehind him many followers, accompanied by the not unnatural feeling\nthat they would be fiercer and more inconsiderate in their words when\nemancipated from his control.\n\nThe above remarks must be understood as applying with any degree of\ncertainty to the Platonic Socrates only. For, although these or similar\nwords may have been spoken by Socrates himself, we cannot exclude the\npossibility, that like so much else, _e.g._ the wisdom of Critias, the\npoem of Solon, the virtues of Charmides, they may have been due only to\nthe imagination of Plato. The arguments of those who maintain that the\nApology was composed during the process, resting on no evidence, do not\nrequire a serious refutation. Nor are the reasonings of Schleiermacher,\nwho argues that the Platonic defence is an exact or nearly exact\nreproduction of the words of Socrates, partly because Plato would not\nhave been guilty of the impiety of altering them, and also because many\npoints of the defence might have been improved and strengthened, at all\nmore conclusive. (See English Translation.) What effect the death of\nSocrates produced on the mind of Plato, we cannot certainly determine;\nnor can we say how he would or must have written under the\ncircumstances. We observe that the enmity of Aristophanes to Socrates\ndoes not prevent Plato from introducing them together in the Symposium\nengaged in friendly intercourse. Nor is there any trace in the\nDialogues of an attempt to make Anytus or Meletus personally odious in\nthe eyes of the Athenian public.\n\n\n\n\nAPOLOGY\n\n\nHow you, O Athenians, have been affected by my accusers, I cannot tell;\nbut I know that they almost made me forget who I was\u2014so persuasively\ndid they speak; and yet they have hardly uttered a word of truth. But\nof the many falsehoods told by them, there was one which quite amazed\nme;\u2014I mean when they said that you should be upon your guard and not\nallow yourselves to be deceived by the force of my eloquence. To say\nthis, when they were certain to be detected as soon as I opened my lips\nand proved myself to be anything but a great speaker, did indeed appear\nto me most shameless\u2014unless by the force of eloquence they mean the\nforce of truth; for if such is their meaning, I admit that I am\neloquent. But in how different a way from theirs! Well, as I was\nsaying, they have scarcely spoken the truth at all; but from me you\nshall hear the whole truth: not, however, delivered after their manner\nin a set oration duly ornamented with words and phrases. No, by heaven!\nbut I shall use the words and arguments which occur to me at the\nmoment; for I am confident in the justice of my cause (Or, I am certain\nthat I am right in taking this course.): at my time of life I ought not\nto be appearing before you, O men of Athens, in the character of a\njuvenile orator\u2014let no one expect it of me. And I must beg of you to\ngrant me a favour:\u2014If I defend myself in my accustomed manner, and you\nhear me using the words which I have been in the habit of using in the\nagora, at the tables of the money-changers, or anywhere else, I would\nask you not to be surprised, and not to interrupt me on this account.\nFor I am more than seventy years of age, and appearing now for the\nfirst time in a court of law, I am quite a stranger to the language of\nthe place; and therefore I would have you regard me as if I were really\na stranger, whom you would excuse if he spoke in his native tongue, and\nafter the fashion of his country:\u2014Am I making an unfair request of you?\nNever mind the manner, which may or may not be good; but think only of\nthe truth of my words, and give heed to that: let the speaker speak\ntruly and the judge decide justly.\n\nAnd first, I have to reply to the older charges and to my first\naccusers, and then I will go on to the later ones. For of old I have\nhad many accusers, who have accused me falsely to you during many\nyears; and I am more afraid of them than of Anytus and his associates,\nwho are dangerous, too, in their own way. But far more dangerous are\nthe others, who began when you were children, and took possession of\nyour minds with their falsehoods, telling of one Socrates, a wise man,\nwho speculated about the heaven above, and searched into the earth\nbeneath, and made the worse appear the better cause. The disseminators\nof this tale are the accusers whom I dread; for their hearers are apt\nto fancy that such enquirers do not believe in the existence of the\ngods. And they are many, and their charges against me are of ancient\ndate, and they were made by them in the days when you were more\nimpressible than you are now\u2014in childhood, or it may have been in\nyouth\u2014and the cause when heard went by default, for there was none to\nanswer. And hardest of all, I do not know and cannot tell the names of\nmy accusers; unless in the chance case of a Comic poet. All who from\nenvy and malice have persuaded you\u2014some of them having first convinced\nthemselves\u2014all this class of men are most difficult to deal with; for I\ncannot have them up here, and cross-examine them, and therefore I must\nsimply fight with shadows in my own defence, and argue when there is no\none who answers. I will ask you then to assume with me, as I was\nsaying, that my opponents are of two kinds; one recent, the other\nancient: and I hope that you will see the propriety of my answering the\nlatter first, for these accusations you heard long before the others,\nand much oftener.\n\nWell, then, I must make my defence, and endeavour to clear away in a\nshort time, a slander which has lasted a long time. May I succeed, if\nto succeed be for my good and yours, or likely to avail me in my cause!\nThe task is not an easy one; I quite understand the nature of it. And\nso leaving the event with God, in obedience to the law I will now make\nmy defence.\n\nI will begin at the beginning, and ask what is the accusation which has\ngiven rise to the slander of me, and in fact has encouraged Meletus to\nproof this charge against me. Well, what do the slanderers say? They\nshall be my prosecutors, and I will sum up their words in an affidavit:\n\u201cSocrates is an evil-doer, and a curious person, who searches into\nthings under the earth and in heaven, and he makes the worse appear the\nbetter cause; and he teaches the aforesaid doctrines to others.\u201d Such\nis the nature of the accusation: it is just what you have yourselves\nseen in the comedy of Aristophanes (Aristoph., Clouds.), who has\nintroduced a man whom he calls Socrates, going about and saying that he\nwalks in air, and talking a deal of nonsense concerning matters of\nwhich I do not pretend to know either much or little\u2014not that I mean to\nspeak disparagingly of any one who is a student of natural philosophy.\nI should be very sorry if Meletus could bring so grave a charge against\nme. But the simple truth is, O Athenians, that I have nothing to do\nwith physical speculations. Very many of those here present are\nwitnesses to the truth of this, and to them I appeal. Speak then, you\nwho have heard me, and tell your neighbours whether any of you have\never known me hold forth in few words or in many upon such\nmatters...You hear their answer. And from what they say of this part of\nthe charge you will be able to judge of the truth of the rest.\n\nAs little foundation is there for the report that I am a teacher, and\ntake money; this accusation has no more truth in it than the other.\nAlthough, if a man were really able to instruct mankind, to receive\nmoney for giving instruction would, in my opinion, be an honour to him.\nThere is Gorgias of Leontium, and Prodicus of Ceos, and Hippias of\nElis, who go the round of the cities, and are able to persuade the\nyoung men to leave their own citizens by whom they might be taught for\nnothing, and come to them whom they not only pay, but are thankful if\nthey may be allowed to pay them. There is at this time a Parian\nphilosopher residing in Athens, of whom I have heard; and I came to\nhear of him in this way:\u2014I came across a man who has spent a world of\nmoney on the Sophists, Callias, the son of Hipponicus, and knowing that\nhe had sons, I asked him: \u201cCallias,\u201d I said, \u201cif your two sons were\nfoals or calves, there would be no difficulty in finding some one to\nput over them; we should hire a trainer of horses, or a farmer\nprobably, who would improve and perfect them in their own proper virtue\nand excellence; but as they are human beings, whom are you thinking of\nplacing over them? Is there any one who understands human and political\nvirtue? You must have thought about the matter, for you have sons; is\nthere any one?\u201d \u201cThere is,\u201d he said. \u201cWho is he?\u201d said I; \u201cand of what\ncountry? and what does he charge?\u201d \u201cEvenus the Parian,\u201d he replied; \u201che\nis the man, and his charge is five min\u00e6.\u201d Happy is Evenus, I said to\nmyself, if he really has this wisdom, and teaches at such a moderate\ncharge. Had I the same, I should have been very proud and conceited;\nbut the truth is that I have no knowledge of the kind.\n\nI dare say, Athenians, that some one among you will reply, \u201cYes,\nSocrates, but what is the origin of these accusations which are brought\nagainst you; there must have been something strange which you have been\ndoing? All these rumours and this talk about you would never have\narisen if you had been like other men: tell us, then, what is the cause\nof them, for we should be sorry to judge hastily of you.\u201d Now I regard\nthis as a fair challenge, and I will endeavour to explain to you the\nreason why I am called wise and have such an evil fame. Please to\nattend then. And although some of you may think that I am joking, I\ndeclare that I will tell you the entire truth. Men of Athens, this\nreputation of mine has come of a certain sort of wisdom which I\npossess. If you ask me what kind of wisdom, I reply, wisdom such as may\nperhaps be attained by man, for to that extent I am inclined to believe\nthat I am wise; whereas the persons of whom I was speaking have a\nsuperhuman wisdom which I may fail to describe, because I have it not\nmyself; and he who says that I have, speaks falsely, and is taking away\nmy character. And here, O men of Athens, I must beg you not to\ninterrupt me, even if I seem to say something extravagant. For the word\nwhich I will speak is not mine. I will refer you to a witness who is\nworthy of credit; that witness shall be the God of Delphi\u2014he will tell\nyou about my wisdom, if I have any, and of what sort it is. You must\nhave known Chaerephon; he was early a friend of mine, and also a friend\nof yours, for he shared in the recent exile of the people, and returned\nwith you. Well, Chaerephon, as you know, was very impetuous in all his\ndoings, and he went to Delphi and boldly asked the oracle to tell him\nwhether\u2014as I was saying, I must beg you not to interrupt\u2014he asked the\noracle to tell him whether anyone was wiser than I was, and the Pythian\nprophetess answered, that there was no man wiser. Chaerephon is dead\nhimself; but his brother, who is in court, will confirm the truth of\nwhat I am saying.\n\nWhy do I mention this? Because I am going to explain to you why I have\nsuch an evil name. When I heard the answer, I said to myself, What can\nthe god mean? and what is the interpretation of his riddle? for I know\nthat I have no wisdom, small or great. What then can he mean when he\nsays that I am the wisest of men? And yet he is a god, and cannot lie;\nthat would be against his nature. After long consideration, I thought\nof a method of trying the question. I reflected that if I could only\nfind a man wiser than myself, then I might go to the god with a\nrefutation in my hand. I should say to him, \u201cHere is a man who is wiser\nthan I am; but you said that I was the wisest.\u201d Accordingly I went to\none who had the reputation of wisdom, and observed him\u2014his name I need\nnot mention; he was a politician whom I selected for examination\u2014and\nthe result was as follows: When I began to talk with him, I could not\nhelp thinking that he was not really wise, although he was thought wise\nby many, and still wiser by himself; and thereupon I tried to explain\nto him that he thought himself wise, but was not really wise; and the\nconsequence was that he hated me, and his enmity was shared by several\nwho were present and heard me. So I left him, saying to myself, as I\nwent away: Well, although I do not suppose that either of us knows\nanything really beautiful and good, I am better off than he is,\u2014for he\nknows nothing, and thinks that he knows; I neither know nor think that\nI know. In this latter particular, then, I seem to have slightly the\nadvantage of him. Then I went to another who had still higher\npretensions to wisdom, and my conclusion was exactly the same.\nWhereupon I made another enemy of him, and of many others besides him.\n\nThen I went to one man after another, being not unconscious of the\nenmity which I provoked, and I lamented and feared this: but necessity\nwas laid upon me,\u2014the word of God, I thought, ought to be considered\nfirst. And I said to myself, Go I must to all who appear to know, and\nfind out the meaning of the oracle. And I swear to you, Athenians, by\nthe dog I swear!\u2014for I must tell you the truth\u2014the result of my mission\nwas just this: I found that the men most in repute were all but the\nmost foolish; and that others less esteemed were really wiser and\nbetter. I will tell you the tale of my wanderings and of the\n\u201cHerculean\u201d labours, as I may call them, which I endured only to find\nat last the oracle irrefutable. After the politicians, I went to the\npoets; tragic, dithyrambic, and all sorts. And there, I said to myself,\nyou will be instantly detected; now you will find out that you are more\nignorant than they are. Accordingly, I took them some of the most\nelaborate passages in their own writings, and asked what was the\nmeaning of them\u2014thinking that they would teach me something. Will you\nbelieve me? I am almost ashamed to confess the truth, but I must say\nthat there is hardly a person present who would not have talked better\nabout their poetry than they did themselves. Then I knew that not by\nwisdom do poets write poetry, but by a sort of genius and inspiration;\nthey are like diviners or soothsayers who also say many fine things,\nbut do not understand the meaning of them. The poets appeared to me to\nbe much in the same case; and I further observed that upon the strength\nof their poetry they believed themselves to be the wisest of men in\nother things in which they were not wise. So I departed, conceiving\nmyself to be superior to them for the same reason that I was superior\nto the politicians.\n\nAt last I went to the artisans. I was conscious that I knew nothing at\nall, as I may say, and I was sure that they knew many fine things; and\nhere I was not mistaken, for they did know many things of which I was\nignorant, and in this they certainly were wiser than I was. But I\nobserved that even the good artisans fell into the same error as the\npoets;\u2014because they were good workmen they thought that they also knew\nall sorts of high matters, and this defect in them overshadowed their\nwisdom; and therefore I asked myself on behalf of the oracle, whether I\nwould like to be as I was, neither having their knowledge nor their\nignorance, or like them in both; and I made answer to myself and to the\noracle that I was better off as I was.\n\nThis inquisition has led to my having many enemies of the worst and\nmost dangerous kind, and has given occasion also to many calumnies. And\nI am called wise, for my hearers always imagine that I myself possess\nthe wisdom which I find wanting in others: but the truth is, O men of\nAthens, that God only is wise; and by his answer he intends to show\nthat the wisdom of men is worth little or nothing; he is not speaking\nof Socrates, he is only using my name by way of illustration, as if he\nsaid, He, O men, is the wisest, who, like Socrates, knows that his\nwisdom is in truth worth nothing. And so I go about the world, obedient\nto the god, and search and make enquiry into the wisdom of any one,\nwhether citizen or stranger, who appears to be wise; and if he is not\nwise, then in vindication of the oracle I show him that he is not wise;\nand my occupation quite absorbs me, and I have no time to give either\nto any public matter of interest or to any concern of my own, but I am\nin utter poverty by reason of my devotion to the god.\n\nThere is another thing:\u2014young men of the richer classes, who have not\nmuch to do, come about me of their own accord; they like to hear the\npretenders examined, and they often imitate me, and proceed to examine\nothers; there are plenty of persons, as they quickly discover, who\nthink that they know something, but really know little or nothing; and\nthen those who are examined by them instead of being angry with\nthemselves are angry with me: This confounded Socrates, they say; this\nvillainous misleader of youth!\u2014and then if somebody asks them, Why,\nwhat evil does he practise or teach? they do not know, and cannot tell;\nbut in order that they may not appear to be at a loss, they repeat the\nready-made charges which are used against all philosophers about\nteaching things up in the clouds and under the earth, and having no\ngods, and making the worse appear the better cause; for they do not\nlike to confess that their pretence of knowledge has been\ndetected\u2014which is the truth; and as they are numerous and ambitious and\nenergetic, and are drawn up in battle array and have persuasive\ntongues, they have filled your ears with their loud and inveterate\ncalumnies. And this is the reason why my three accusers, Meletus and\nAnytus and Lycon, have set upon me; Meletus, who has a quarrel with me\non behalf of the poets; Anytus, on behalf of the craftsmen and\npoliticians; Lycon, on behalf of the rhetoricians: and as I said at the\nbeginning, I cannot expect to get rid of such a mass of calumny all in\na moment. And this, O men of Athens, is the truth and the whole truth;\nI have concealed nothing, I have dissembled nothing. And yet, I know\nthat my plainness of speech makes them hate me, and what is their\nhatred but a proof that I am speaking the truth?\u2014Hence has arisen the\nprejudice against me; and this is the reason of it, as you will find\nout either in this or in any future enquiry.\n\nI have said enough in my defence against the first class of my\naccusers; I turn to the second class. They are headed by Meletus, that\ngood man and true lover of his country, as he calls himself. Against\nthese, too, I must try to make a defence:\u2014Let their affidavit be read:\nit contains something of this kind: It says that Socrates is a doer of\nevil, who corrupts the youth; and who does not believe in the gods of\nthe state, but has other new divinities of his own. Such is the charge;\nand now let us examine the particular counts. He says that I am a doer\nof evil, and corrupt the youth; but I say, O men of Athens, that\nMeletus is a doer of evil, in that he pretends to be in earnest when he\nis only in jest, and is so eager to bring men to trial from a pretended\nzeal and interest about matters in which he really never had the\nsmallest interest. And the truth of this I will endeavour to prove to\nyou.\n\nCome hither, Meletus, and let me ask a question of you. You think a\ngreat deal about the improvement of youth?\n\nYes, I do.\n\nTell the judges, then, who is their improver; for you must know, as you\nhave taken the pains to discover their corrupter, and are citing and\naccusing me before them. Speak, then, and tell the judges who their\nimprover is.\u2014Observe, Meletus, that you are silent, and have nothing to\nsay. But is not this rather disgraceful, and a very considerable proof\nof what I was saying, that you have no interest in the matter? Speak\nup, friend, and tell us who their improver is.\n\nThe laws.\n\nBut that, my good sir, is not my meaning. I want to know who the person\nis, who, in the first place, knows the laws.\n\nThe judges, Socrates, who are present in court.\n\nWhat, do you mean to say, Meletus, that they are able to instruct and\nimprove youth?\n\nCertainly they are.\n\nWhat, all of them, or some only and not others?\n\nAll of them.\n\nBy the goddess Here, that is good news! There are plenty of improvers,\nthen. And what do you say of the audience,\u2014do they improve them?\n\nYes, they do.\n\nAnd the senators?\n\nYes, the senators improve them.\n\nBut perhaps the members of the assembly corrupt them?\u2014or do they too\nimprove them?\n\nThey improve them.\n\nThen every Athenian improves and elevates them; all with the exception\nof myself; and I alone am their corrupter? Is that what you affirm?\n\nThat is what I stoutly affirm.\n\nI am very unfortunate if you are right. But suppose I ask you a\nquestion: How about horses? Does one man do them harm and all the world\ngood? Is not the exact opposite the truth? One man is able to do them\ngood, or at least not many;\u2014the trainer of horses, that is to say, does\nthem good, and others who have to do with them rather injure them? Is\nnot that true, Meletus, of horses, or of any other animals? Most\nassuredly it is; whether you and Anytus say yes or no. Happy indeed\nwould be the condition of youth if they had one corrupter only, and all\nthe rest of the world were their improvers. But you, Meletus, have\nsufficiently shown that you never had a thought about the young: your\ncarelessness is seen in your not caring about the very things which you\nbring against me.\n\nAnd now, Meletus, I will ask you another question\u2014by Zeus I will: Which\nis better, to live among bad citizens, or among good ones? Answer,\nfriend, I say; the question is one which may be easily answered. Do not\nthe good do their neighbours good, and the bad do them evil?\n\nCertainly.\n\nAnd is there anyone who would rather be injured than benefited by those\nwho live with him? Answer, my good friend, the law requires you to\nanswer\u2014does any one like to be injured?\n\nCertainly not.\n\nAnd when you accuse me of corrupting and deteriorating the youth, do\nyou allege that I corrupt them intentionally or unintentionally?\n\nIntentionally, I say.\n\nBut you have just admitted that the good do their neighbours good, and\nthe evil do them evil. Now, is that a truth which your superior wisdom\nhas recognized thus early in life, and am I, at my age, in such\ndarkness and ignorance as not to know that if a man with whom I have to\nlive is corrupted by me, I am very likely to be harmed by him; and yet\nI corrupt him, and intentionally, too\u2014so you say, although neither I\nnor any other human being is ever likely to be convinced by you. But\neither I do not corrupt them, or I corrupt them unintentionally; and on\neither view of the case you lie. If my offence is unintentional, the\nlaw has no cognizance of unintentional offences: you ought to have\ntaken me privately, and warned and admonished me; for if I had been\nbetter advised, I should have left off doing what I only did\nunintentionally\u2014no doubt I should; but you would have nothing to say to\nme and refused to teach me. And now you bring me up in this court,\nwhich is a place not of instruction, but of punishment.\n\nIt will be very clear to you, Athenians, as I was saying, that Meletus\nhas no care at all, great or small, about the matter. But still I\nshould like to know, Meletus, in what I am affirmed to corrupt the\nyoung. I suppose you mean, as I infer from your indictment, that I\nteach them not to acknowledge the gods which the state acknowledges,\nbut some other new divinities or spiritual agencies in their stead.\nThese are the lessons by which I corrupt the youth, as you say.\n\nYes, that I say emphatically.\n\nThen, by the gods, Meletus, of whom we are speaking, tell me and the\ncourt, in somewhat plainer terms, what you mean! for I do not as yet\nunderstand whether you affirm that I teach other men to acknowledge\nsome gods, and therefore that I do believe in gods, and am not an\nentire atheist\u2014this you do not lay to my charge,\u2014but only you say that\nthey are not the same gods which the city recognizes\u2014the charge is that\nthey are different gods. Or, do you mean that I am an atheist simply,\nand a teacher of atheism?\n\nI mean the latter\u2014that you are a complete atheist.\n\nWhat an extraordinary statement! Why do you think so, Meletus? Do you\nmean that I do not believe in the godhead of the sun or moon, like\nother men?\n\nI assure you, judges, that he does not: for he says that the sun is\nstone, and the moon earth.\n\nFriend Meletus, you think that you are accusing Anaxagoras: and you\nhave but a bad opinion of the judges, if you fancy them illiterate to\nsuch a degree as not to know that these doctrines are found in the\nbooks of Anaxagoras the Clazomenian, which are full of them. And so,\nforsooth, the youth are said to be taught them by Socrates, when there\nare not unfrequently exhibitions of them at the theatre (Probably in\nallusion to Aristophanes who caricatured, and to Euripides who borrowed\nthe notions of Anaxagoras, as well as to other dramatic poets.) (price\nof admission one drachma at the most); and they might pay their money,\nand laugh at Socrates if he pretends to father these extraordinary\nviews. And so, Meletus, you really think that I do not believe in any\ngod?\n\nI swear by Zeus that you believe absolutely in none at all.\n\nNobody will believe you, Meletus, and I am pretty sure that you do not\nbelieve yourself. I cannot help thinking, men of Athens, that Meletus\nis reckless and impudent, and that he has written this indictment in a\nspirit of mere wantonness and youthful bravado. Has he not compounded a\nriddle, thinking to try me? He said to himself:\u2014I shall see whether the\nwise Socrates will discover my facetious contradiction, or whether I\nshall be able to deceive him and the rest of them. For he certainly\ndoes appear to me to contradict himself in the indictment as much as if\nhe said that Socrates is guilty of not believing in the gods, and yet\nof believing in them\u2014but this is not like a person who is in earnest.\n\nI should like you, O men of Athens, to join me in examining what I\nconceive to be his inconsistency; and do you, Meletus, answer. And I\nmust remind the audience of my request that they would not make a\ndisturbance if I speak in my accustomed manner:\n\nDid ever man, Meletus, believe in the existence of human things, and\nnot of human beings?...I wish, men of Athens, that he would answer, and\nnot be always trying to get up an interruption. Did ever any man\nbelieve in horsemanship, and not in horses? or in flute-playing, and\nnot in flute-players? No, my friend; I will answer to you and to the\ncourt, as you refuse to answer for yourself. There is no man who ever\ndid. But now please to answer the next question: Can a man believe in\nspiritual and divine agencies, and not in spirits or demigods?\n\nHe cannot.\n\nHow lucky I am to have extracted that answer, by the assistance of the\ncourt! But then you swear in the indictment that I teach and believe in\ndivine or spiritual agencies (new or old, no matter for that); at any\nrate, I believe in spiritual agencies,\u2014so you say and swear in the\naffidavit; and yet if I believe in divine beings, how can I help\nbelieving in spirits or demigods;\u2014must I not? To be sure I must; and\ntherefore I may assume that your silence gives consent. Now what are\nspirits or demigods? Are they not either gods or the sons of gods?\n\nCertainly they are.\n\nBut this is what I call the facetious riddle invented by you: the\ndemigods or spirits are gods, and you say first that I do not believe\nin gods, and then again that I do believe in gods; that is, if I\nbelieve in demigods. For if the demigods are the illegitimate sons of\ngods, whether by the nymphs or by any other mothers, of whom they are\nsaid to be the sons\u2014what human being will ever believe that there are\nno gods if they are the sons of gods? You might as well affirm the\nexistence of mules, and deny that of horses and asses. Such nonsense,\nMeletus, could only have been intended by you to make trial of me. You\nhave put this into the indictment because you had nothing real of which\nto accuse me. But no one who has a particle of understanding will ever\nbe convinced by you that the same men can believe in divine and\nsuperhuman things, and yet not believe that there are gods and demigods\nand heroes.\n\nI have said enough in answer to the charge of Meletus: any elaborate\ndefence is unnecessary, but I know only too well how many are the\nenmities which I have incurred, and this is what will be my destruction\nif I am destroyed;\u2014not Meletus, nor yet Anytus, but the envy and\ndetraction of the world, which has been the death of many good men, and\nwill probably be the death of many more; there is no danger of my being\nthe last of them.\n\nSome one will say: And are you not ashamed, Socrates, of a course of\nlife which is likely to bring you to an untimely end? To him I may\nfairly answer: There you are mistaken: a man who is good for anything\nought not to calculate the chance of living or dying; he ought only to\nconsider whether in doing anything he is doing right or wrong\u2014acting\nthe part of a good man or of a bad. Whereas, upon your view, the heroes\nwho fell at Troy were not good for much, and the son of Thetis above\nall, who altogether despised danger in comparison with disgrace; and\nwhen he was so eager to slay Hector, his goddess mother said to him,\nthat if he avenged his companion Patroclus, and slew Hector, he would\ndie himself\u2014\u201cFate,\u201d she said, in these or the like words, \u201cwaits for\nyou next after Hector;\u201d he, receiving this warning, utterly despised\ndanger and death, and instead of fearing them, feared rather to live in\ndishonour, and not to avenge his friend. \u201cLet me die forthwith,\u201d he\nreplies, \u201cand be avenged of my enemy, rather than abide here by the\nbeaked ships, a laughing-stock and a burden of the earth.\u201d Had Achilles\nany thought of death and danger? For wherever a man\u2019s place is, whether\nthe place which he has chosen or that in which he has been placed by a\ncommander, there he ought to remain in the hour of danger; he should\nnot think of death or of anything but of disgrace. And this, O men of\nAthens, is a true saying.\n\nStrange, indeed, would be my conduct, O men of Athens, if I who, when I\nwas ordered by the generals whom you chose to command me at Potidaea\nand Amphipolis and Delium, remained where they placed me, like any\nother man, facing death\u2014if now, when, as I conceive and imagine, God\norders me to fulfil the philosopher\u2019s mission of searching into myself\nand other men, I were to desert my post through fear of death, or any\nother fear; that would indeed be strange, and I might justly be\narraigned in court for denying the existence of the gods, if I\ndisobeyed the oracle because I was afraid of death, fancying that I was\nwise when I was not wise. For the fear of death is indeed the pretence\nof wisdom, and not real wisdom, being a pretence of knowing the\nunknown; and no one knows whether death, which men in their fear\napprehend to be the greatest evil, may not be the greatest good. Is not\nthis ignorance of a disgraceful sort, the ignorance which is the\nconceit that a man knows what he does not know? And in this respect\nonly I believe myself to differ from men in general, and may perhaps\nclaim to be wiser than they are:\u2014that whereas I know but little of the\nworld below, I do not suppose that I know: but I do know that injustice\nand disobedience to a better, whether God or man, is evil and\ndishonourable, and I will never fear or avoid a possible good rather\nthan a certain evil. And therefore if you let me go now, and are not\nconvinced by Anytus, who said that since I had been prosecuted I must\nbe put to death; (or if not that I ought never to have been prosecuted\nat all); and that if I escape now, your sons will all be utterly ruined\nby listening to my words\u2014if you say to me, Socrates, this time we will\nnot mind Anytus, and you shall be let off, but upon one condition, that\nyou are not to enquire and speculate in this way any more, and that if\nyou are caught doing so again you shall die;\u2014if this was the condition\non which you let me go, I should reply: Men of Athens, I honour and\nlove you; but I shall obey God rather than you, and while I have life\nand strength I shall never cease from the practice and teaching of\nphilosophy, exhorting any one whom I meet and saying to him after my\nmanner: You, my friend,\u2014a citizen of the great and mighty and wise city\nof Athens,\u2014are you not ashamed of heaping up the greatest amount of\nmoney and honour and reputation, and caring so little about wisdom and\ntruth and the greatest improvement of the soul, which you never regard\nor heed at all? And if the person with whom I am arguing, says: Yes,\nbut I do care; then I do not leave him or let him go at once; but I\nproceed to interrogate and examine and cross-examine him, and if I\nthink that he has no virtue in him, but only says that he has, I\nreproach him with undervaluing the greater, and overvaluing the less.\nAnd I shall repeat the same words to every one whom I meet, young and\nold, citizen and alien, but especially to the citizens, inasmuch as\nthey are my brethren. For know that this is the command of God; and I\nbelieve that no greater good has ever happened in the state than my\nservice to the God. For I do nothing but go about persuading you all,\nold and young alike, not to take thought for your persons or your\nproperties, but first and chiefly to care about the greatest\nimprovement of the soul. I tell you that virtue is not given by money,\nbut that from virtue comes money and every other good of man, public as\nwell as private. This is my teaching, and if this is the doctrine which\ncorrupts the youth, I am a mischievous person. But if any one says that\nthis is not my teaching, he is speaking an untruth. Wherefore, O men of\nAthens, I say to you, do as Anytus bids or not as Anytus bids, and\neither acquit me or not; but whichever you do, understand that I shall\nnever alter my ways, not even if I have to die many times.\n\nMen of Athens, do not interrupt, but hear me; there was an\nunderstanding between us that you should hear me to the end: I have\nsomething more to say, at which you may be inclined to cry out; but I\nbelieve that to hear me will be good for you, and therefore I beg that\nyou will not cry out. I would have you know, that if you kill such an\none as I am, you will injure yourselves more than you will injure me.\nNothing will injure me, not Meletus nor yet Anytus\u2014they cannot, for a\nbad man is not permitted to injure a better than himself. I do not deny\nthat Anytus may, perhaps, kill him, or drive him into exile, or deprive\nhim of civil rights; and he may imagine, and others may imagine, that\nhe is inflicting a great injury upon him: but there I do not agree. For\nthe evil of doing as he is doing\u2014the evil of unjustly taking away the\nlife of another\u2014is greater far.\n\nAnd now, Athenians, I am not going to argue for my own sake, as you may\nthink, but for yours, that you may not sin against the God by\ncondemning me, who am his gift to you. For if you kill me you will not\neasily find a successor to me, who, if I may use such a ludicrous\nfigure of speech, am a sort of gadfly, given to the state by God; and\nthe state is a great and noble steed who is tardy in his motions owing\nto his very size, and requires to be stirred into life. I am that\ngadfly which God has attached to the state, and all day long and in all\nplaces am always fastening upon you, arousing and persuading and\nreproaching you. You will not easily find another like me, and\ntherefore I would advise you to spare me. I dare say that you may feel\nout of temper (like a person who is suddenly awakened from sleep), and\nyou think that you might easily strike me dead as Anytus advises, and\nthen you would sleep on for the remainder of your lives, unless God in\nhis care of you sent you another gadfly. When I say that I am given to\nyou by God, the proof of my mission is this:\u2014if I had been like other\nmen, I should not have neglected all my own concerns or patiently seen\nthe neglect of them during all these years, and have been doing yours,\ncoming to you individually like a father or elder brother, exhorting\nyou to regard virtue; such conduct, I say, would be unlike human\nnature. If I had gained anything, or if my exhortations had been paid,\nthere would have been some sense in my doing so; but now, as you will\nperceive, not even the impudence of my accusers dares to say that I\nhave ever exacted or sought pay of any one; of that they have no\nwitness. And I have a sufficient witness to the truth of what I say\u2014my\npoverty.\n\nSome one may wonder why I go about in private giving advice and busying\nmyself with the concerns of others, but do not venture to come forward\nin public and advise the state. I will tell you why. You have heard me\nspeak at sundry times and in divers places of an oracle or sign which\ncomes to me, and is the divinity which Meletus ridicules in the\nindictment. This sign, which is a kind of voice, first began to come to\nme when I was a child; it always forbids but never commands me to do\nanything which I am going to do. This is what deters me from being a\npolitician. And rightly, as I think. For I am certain, O men of Athens,\nthat if I had engaged in politics, I should have perished long ago, and\ndone no good either to you or to myself. And do not be offended at my\ntelling you the truth: for the truth is, that no man who goes to war\nwith you or any other multitude, honestly striving against the many\nlawless and unrighteous deeds which are done in a state, will save his\nlife; he who will fight for the right, if he would live even for a\nbrief space, must have a private station and not a public one.\n\nI can give you convincing evidence of what I say, not words only, but\nwhat you value far more\u2014actions. Let me relate to you a passage of my\nown life which will prove to you that I should never have yielded to\ninjustice from any fear of death, and that \u201cas I should have refused to\nyield\u201d I must have died at once. I will tell you a tale of the courts,\nnot very interesting perhaps, but nevertheless true. The only office of\nstate which I ever held, O men of Athens, was that of senator: the\ntribe Antiochis, which is my tribe, had the presidency at the trial of\nthe generals who had not taken up the bodies of the slain after the\nbattle of Arginusae; and you proposed to try them in a body, contrary\nto law, as you all thought afterwards; but at the time I was the only\none of the Prytanes who was opposed to the illegality, and I gave my\nvote against you; and when the orators threatened to impeach and arrest\nme, and you called and shouted, I made up my mind that I would run the\nrisk, having law and justice with me, rather than take part in your\ninjustice because I feared imprisonment and death. This happened in the\ndays of the democracy. But when the oligarchy of the Thirty was in\npower, they sent for me and four others into the rotunda, and bade us\nbring Leon the Salaminian from Salamis, as they wanted to put him to\ndeath. This was a specimen of the sort of commands which they were\nalways giving with the view of implicating as many as possible in their\ncrimes; and then I showed, not in word only but in deed, that, if I may\nbe allowed to use such an expression, I cared not a straw for death,\nand that my great and only care was lest I should do an unrighteous or\nunholy thing. For the strong arm of that oppressive power did not\nfrighten me into doing wrong; and when we came out of the rotunda the\nother four went to Salamis and fetched Leon, but I went quietly home.\nFor which I might have lost my life, had not the power of the Thirty\nshortly afterwards come to an end. And many will witness to my words.\n\nNow do you really imagine that I could have survived all these years,\nif I had led a public life, supposing that like a good man I had always\nmaintained the right and had made justice, as I ought, the first thing?\nNo indeed, men of Athens, neither I nor any other man. But I have been\nalways the same in all my actions, public as well as private, and never\nhave I yielded any base compliance to those who are slanderously termed\nmy disciples, or to any other. Not that I have any regular disciples.\nBut if any one likes to come and hear me while I am pursuing my\nmission, whether he be young or old, he is not excluded. Nor do I\nconverse only with those who pay; but any one, whether he be rich or\npoor, may ask and answer me and listen to my words; and whether he\nturns out to be a bad man or a good one, neither result can be justly\nimputed to me; for I never taught or professed to teach him anything.\nAnd if any one says that he has ever learned or heard anything from me\nin private which all the world has not heard, let me tell you that he\nis lying.\n\nBut I shall be asked, Why do people delight in continually conversing\nwith you? I have told you already, Athenians, the whole truth about\nthis matter: they like to hear the cross-examination of the pretenders\nto wisdom; there is amusement in it. Now this duty of cross-examining\nother men has been imposed upon me by God; and has been signified to me\nby oracles, visions, and in every way in which the will of divine power\nwas ever intimated to any one. This is true, O Athenians, or, if not\ntrue, would be soon refuted. If I am or have been corrupting the youth,\nthose of them who are now grown up and have become sensible that I gave\nthem bad advice in the days of their youth should come forward as\naccusers, and take their revenge; or if they do not like to come\nthemselves, some of their relatives, fathers, brothers, or other\nkinsmen, should say what evil their families have suffered at my hands.\nNow is their time. Many of them I see in the court. There is Crito, who\nis of the same age and of the same deme with myself, and there is\nCritobulus his son, whom I also see. Then again there is Lysanias of\nSphettus, who is the father of Aeschines\u2014he is present; and also there\nis Antiphon of Cephisus, who is the father of Epigenes; and there are\nthe brothers of several who have associated with me. There is\nNicostratus the son of Theosdotides, and the brother of Theodotus (now\nTheodotus himself is dead, and therefore he, at any rate, will not seek\nto stop him); and there is Paralus the son of Demodocus, who had a\nbrother Theages; and Adeimantus the son of Ariston, whose brother Plato\nis present; and Aeantodorus, who is the brother of Apollodorus, whom I\nalso see. I might mention a great many others, some of whom Meletus\nshould have produced as witnesses in the course of his speech; and let\nhim still produce them, if he has forgotten\u2014I will make way for him.\nAnd let him say, if he has any testimony of the sort which he can\nproduce. Nay, Athenians, the very opposite is the truth. For all these\nare ready to witness on behalf of the corrupter, of the injurer of\ntheir kindred, as Meletus and Anytus call me; not the corrupted youth\nonly\u2014there might have been a motive for that\u2014but their uncorrupted\nelder relatives. Why should they too support me with their testimony?\nWhy, indeed, except for the sake of truth and justice, and because they\nknow that I am speaking the truth, and that Meletus is a liar.\n\nWell, Athenians, this and the like of this is all the defence which I\nhave to offer. Yet a word more. Perhaps there may be some one who is\noffended at me, when he calls to mind how he himself on a similar, or\neven a less serious occasion, prayed and entreated the judges with many\ntears, and how he produced his children in court, which was a moving\nspectacle, together with a host of relations and friends; whereas I,\nwho am probably in danger of my life, will do none of these things. The\ncontrast may occur to his mind, and he may be set against me, and vote\nin anger because he is displeased at me on this account. Now if there\nbe such a person among you,\u2014mind, I do not say that there is,\u2014to him I\nmay fairly reply: My friend, I am a man, and like other men, a creature\nof flesh and blood, and not \u201cof wood or stone,\u201d as Homer says; and I\nhave a family, yes, and sons, O Athenians, three in number, one almost\na man, and two others who are still young; and yet I will not bring any\nof them hither in order to petition you for an acquittal. And why not?\nNot from any self-assertion or want of respect for you. Whether I am or\nam not afraid of death is another question, of which I will not now\nspeak. But, having regard to public opinion, I feel that such conduct\nwould be discreditable to myself, and to you, and to the whole state.\nOne who has reached my years, and who has a name for wisdom, ought not\nto demean himself. Whether this opinion of me be deserved or not, at\nany rate the world has decided that Socrates is in some way superior to\nother men. And if those among you who are said to be superior in wisdom\nand courage, and any other virtue, demean themselves in this way, how\nshameful is their conduct! I have seen men of reputation, when they\nhave been condemned, behaving in the strangest manner: they seemed to\nfancy that they were going to suffer something dreadful if they died,\nand that they could be immortal if you only allowed them to live; and I\nthink that such are a dishonour to the state, and that any stranger\ncoming in would have said of them that the most eminent men of Athens,\nto whom the Athenians themselves give honour and command, are no better\nthan women. And I say that these things ought not to be done by those\nof us who have a reputation; and if they are done, you ought not to\npermit them; you ought rather to show that you are far more disposed to\ncondemn the man who gets up a doleful scene and makes the city\nridiculous, than him who holds his peace.\n\nBut, setting aside the question of public opinion, there seems to be\nsomething wrong in asking a favour of a judge, and thus procuring an\nacquittal, instead of informing and convincing him. For his duty is,\nnot to make a present of justice, but to give judgment; and he has\nsworn that he will judge according to the laws, and not according to\nhis own good pleasure; and we ought not to encourage you, nor should\nyou allow yourselves to be encouraged, in this habit of perjury\u2014there\ncan be no piety in that. Do not then require me to do what I consider\ndishonourable and impious and wrong, especially now, when I am being\ntried for impiety on the indictment of Meletus. For if, O men of\nAthens, by force of persuasion and entreaty I could overpower your\noaths, then I should be teaching you to believe that there are no gods,\nand in defending should simply convict myself of the charge of not\nbelieving in them. But that is not so\u2014far otherwise. For I do believe\nthat there are gods, and in a sense higher than that in which any of my\naccusers believe in them. And to you and to God I commit my cause, to\nbe determined by you as is best for you and me.\n\n\nThere are many reasons why I am not grieved, O men of Athens, at the\nvote of condemnation. I expected it, and am only surprised that the\nvotes are so nearly equal; for I had thought that the majority against\nme would have been far larger; but now, had thirty votes gone over to\nthe other side, I should have been acquitted. And I may say, I think,\nthat I have escaped Meletus. I may say more; for without the assistance\nof Anytus and Lycon, any one may see that he would not have had a fifth\npart of the votes, as the law requires, in which case he would have\nincurred a fine of a thousand drachmae.\n\nAnd so he proposes death as the penalty. And what shall I propose on my\npart, O men of Athens? Clearly that which is my due. And what is my\ndue? What return shall be made to the man who has never had the wit to\nbe idle during his whole life; but has been careless of what the many\ncare for\u2014wealth, and family interests, and military offices, and\nspeaking in the assembly, and magistracies, and plots, and parties.\nReflecting that I was really too honest a man to be a politician and\nlive, I did not go where I could do no good to you or to myself; but\nwhere I could do the greatest good privately to every one of you,\nthither I went, and sought to persuade every man among you that he must\nlook to himself, and seek virtue and wisdom before he looks to his\nprivate interests, and look to the state before he looks to the\ninterests of the state; and that this should be the order which he\nobserves in all his actions. What shall be done to such an one?\nDoubtless some good thing, O men of Athens, if he has his reward; and\nthe good should be of a kind suitable to him. What would be a reward\nsuitable to a poor man who is your benefactor, and who desires leisure\nthat he may instruct you? There can be no reward so fitting as\nmaintenance in the Prytaneum, O men of Athens, a reward which he\ndeserves far more than the citizen who has won the prize at Olympia in\nthe horse or chariot race, whether the chariots were drawn by two\nhorses or by many. For I am in want, and he has enough; and he only\ngives you the appearance of happiness, and I give you the reality. And\nif I am to estimate the penalty fairly, I should say that maintenance\nin the Prytaneum is the just return.\n\nPerhaps you think that I am braving you in what I am saying now, as in\nwhat I said before about the tears and prayers. But this is not so. I\nspeak rather because I am convinced that I never intentionally wronged\nany one, although I cannot convince you\u2014the time has been too short; if\nthere were a law at Athens, as there is in other cities, that a capital\ncause should not be decided in one day, then I believe that I should\nhave convinced you. But I cannot in a moment refute great slanders;\nand, as I am convinced that I never wronged another, I will assuredly\nnot wrong myself. I will not say of myself that I deserve any evil, or\npropose any penalty. Why should I? because I am afraid of the penalty\nof death which Meletus proposes? When I do not know whether death is a\ngood or an evil, why should I propose a penalty which would certainly\nbe an evil? Shall I say imprisonment? And why should I live in prison,\nand be the slave of the magistrates of the year\u2014of the Eleven? Or shall\nthe penalty be a fine, and imprisonment until the fine is paid? There\nis the same objection. I should have to lie in prison, for money I have\nnone, and cannot pay. And if I say exile (and this may possibly be the\npenalty which you will affix), I must indeed be blinded by the love of\nlife, if I am so irrational as to expect that when you, who are my own\ncitizens, cannot endure my discourses and words, and have found them so\ngrievous and odious that you will have no more of them, others are\nlikely to endure me. No indeed, men of Athens, that is not very likely.\nAnd what a life should I lead, at my age, wandering from city to city,\never changing my place of exile, and always being driven out! For I am\nquite sure that wherever I go, there, as here, the young men will flock\nto me; and if I drive them away, their elders will drive me out at\ntheir request; and if I let them come, their fathers and friends will\ndrive me out for their sakes.\n\nSome one will say: Yes, Socrates, but cannot you hold your tongue, and\nthen you may go into a foreign city, and no one will interfere with\nyou? Now I have great difficulty in making you understand my answer to\nthis. For if I tell you that to do as you say would be a disobedience\nto the God, and therefore that I cannot hold my tongue, you will not\nbelieve that I am serious; and if I say again that daily to discourse\nabout virtue, and of those other things about which you hear me\nexamining myself and others, is the greatest good of man, and that the\nunexamined life is not worth living, you are still less likely to\nbelieve me. Yet I say what is true, although a thing of which it is\nhard for me to persuade you. Also, I have never been accustomed to\nthink that I deserve to suffer any harm. Had I money I might have\nestimated the offence at what I was able to pay, and not have been much\nthe worse. But I have none, and therefore I must ask you to proportion\nthe fine to my means. Well, perhaps I could afford a mina, and\ntherefore I propose that penalty: Plato, Crito, Critobulus, and\nApollodorus, my friends here, bid me say thirty min\u00e6, and they will be\nthe sureties. Let thirty min\u00e6 be the penalty; for which sum they will\nbe ample security to you.\n\n\nNot much time will be gained, O Athenians, in return for the evil name\nwhich you will get from the detractors of the city, who will say that\nyou killed Socrates, a wise man; for they will call me wise, even\nalthough I am not wise, when they want to reproach you. If you had\nwaited a little while, your desire would have been fulfilled in the\ncourse of nature. For I am far advanced in years, as you may perceive,\nand not far from death. I am speaking now not to all of you, but only\nto those who have condemned me to death. And I have another thing to\nsay to them: you think that I was convicted because I had no words of\nthe sort which would have procured my acquittal\u2014I mean, if I had\nthought fit to leave nothing undone or unsaid. Not so; the deficiency\nwhich led to my conviction was not of words\u2014certainly not. But I had\nnot the boldness or impudence or inclination to address you as you\nwould have liked me to do, weeping and wailing and lamenting, and\nsaying and doing many things which you have been accustomed to hear\nfrom others, and which, as I maintain, are unworthy of me. I thought at\nthe time that I ought not to do anything common or mean when in danger:\nnor do I now repent of the style of my defence; I would rather die\nhaving spoken after my manner, than speak in your manner and live. For\nneither in war nor yet at law ought I or any man to use every way of\nescaping death. Often in battle there can be no doubt that if a man\nwill throw away his arms, and fall on his knees before his pursuers, he\nmay escape death; and in other dangers there are other ways of escaping\ndeath, if a man is willing to say and do anything. The difficulty, my\nfriends, is not to avoid death, but to avoid unrighteousness; for that\nruns faster than death. I am old and move slowly, and the slower runner\nhas overtaken me, and my accusers are keen and quick, and the faster\nrunner, who is unrighteousness, has overtaken them. And now I depart\nhence condemned by you to suffer the penalty of death,\u2014they too go\ntheir ways condemned by the truth to suffer the penalty of villainy and\nwrong; and I must abide by my award\u2014let them abide by theirs. I suppose\nthat these things may be regarded as fated,\u2014and I think that they are\nwell.\n\nAnd now, O men who have condemned me, I would fain prophesy to you; for\nI am about to die, and in the hour of death men are gifted with\nprophetic power. And I prophesy to you who are my murderers, that\nimmediately after my departure punishment far heavier than you have\ninflicted on me will surely await you. Me you have killed because you\nwanted to escape the accuser, and not to give an account of your lives.\nBut that will not be as you suppose: far otherwise. For I say that\nthere will be more accusers of you than there are now; accusers whom\nhitherto I have restrained: and as they are younger they will be more\ninconsiderate with you, and you will be more offended at them. If you\nthink that by killing men you can prevent some one from censuring your\nevil lives, you are mistaken; that is not a way of escape which is\neither possible or honourable; the easiest and the noblest way is not\nto be disabling others, but to be improving yourselves. This is the\nprophecy which I utter before my departure to the judges who have\ncondemned me.\n\nFriends, who would have acquitted me, I would like also to talk with\nyou about the thing which has come to pass, while the magistrates are\nbusy, and before I go to the place at which I must die. Stay then a\nlittle, for we may as well talk with one another while there is time.\nYou are my friends, and I should like to show you the meaning of this\nevent which has happened to me. O my judges\u2014for you I may truly call\njudges\u2014I should like to tell you of a wonderful circumstance. Hitherto\nthe divine faculty of which the internal oracle is the source has\nconstantly been in the habit of opposing me even about trifles, if I\nwas going to make a slip or error in any matter; and now as you see\nthere has come upon me that which may be thought, and is generally\nbelieved to be, the last and worst evil. But the oracle made no sign of\nopposition, either when I was leaving my house in the morning, or when\nI was on my way to the court, or while I was speaking, at anything\nwhich I was going to say; and yet I have often been stopped in the\nmiddle of a speech, but now in nothing I either said or did touching\nthe matter in hand has the oracle opposed me. What do I take to be the\nexplanation of this silence? I will tell you. It is an intimation that\nwhat has happened to me is a good, and that those of us who think that\ndeath is an evil are in error. For the customary sign would surely have\nopposed me had I been going to evil and not to good.\n\nLet us reflect in another way, and we shall see that there is great\nreason to hope that death is a good; for one of two things\u2014either death\nis a state of nothingness and utter unconsciousness, or, as men say,\nthere is a change and migration of the soul from this world to another.\nNow if you suppose that there is no consciousness, but a sleep like the\nsleep of him who is undisturbed even by dreams, death will be an\nunspeakable gain. For if a person were to select the night in which his\nsleep was undisturbed even by dreams, and were to compare with this the\nother days and nights of his life, and then were to tell us how many\ndays and nights he had passed in the course of his life better and more\npleasantly than this one, I think that any man, I will not say a\nprivate man, but even the great king will not find many such days or\nnights, when compared with the others. Now if death be of such a\nnature, I say that to die is gain; for eternity is then only a single\nnight. But if death is the journey to another place, and there, as men\nsay, all the dead abide, what good, O my friends and judges, can be\ngreater than this? If indeed when the pilgrim arrives in the world\nbelow, he is delivered from the professors of justice in this world,\nand finds the true judges who are said to give judgment there, Minos\nand Rhadamanthus and Aeacus and Triptolemus, and other sons of God who\nwere righteous in their own life, that pilgrimage will be worth making.\nWhat would not a man give if he might converse with Orpheus and Musaeus\nand Hesiod and Homer? Nay, if this be true, let me die again and again.\nI myself, too, shall have a wonderful interest in there meeting and\nconversing with Palamedes, and Ajax the son of Telamon, and any other\nancient hero who has suffered death through an unjust judgment; and\nthere will be no small pleasure, as I think, in comparing my own\nsufferings with theirs. Above all, I shall then be able to continue my\nsearch into true and false knowledge; as in this world, so also in the\nnext; and I shall find out who is wise, and who pretends to be wise,\nand is not. What would not a man give, O judges, to be able to examine\nthe leader of the great Trojan expedition; or Odysseus or Sisyphus, or\nnumberless others, men and women too! What infinite delight would there\nbe in conversing with them and asking them questions! In another world\nthey do not put a man to death for asking questions: assuredly not. For\nbesides being happier than we are, they will be immortal, if what is\nsaid is true.\n\nWherefore, O judges, be of good cheer about death, and know of a\ncertainty, that no evil can happen to a good man, either in life or\nafter death. He and his are not neglected by the gods; nor has my own\napproaching end happened by mere chance. But I see clearly that the\ntime had arrived when it was better for me to die and be released from\ntrouble; wherefore the oracle gave no sign. For which reason, also, I\nam not angry with my condemners, or with my accusers; they have done me\nno harm, although they did not mean to do me any good; and for this I\nmay gently blame them.\n\nStill I have a favour to ask of them. When my sons are grown up, I\nwould ask you, O my friends, to punish them; and I would have you\ntrouble them, as I have troubled you, if they seem to care about\nriches, or anything, more than about virtue; or if they pretend to be\nsomething when they are really nothing,\u2014then reprove them, as I have\nreproved you, for not caring about that for which they ought to care,\nand thinking that they are something when they are really nothing. And\nif you do this, both I and my sons will have received justice at your\nhands.\n\nThe hour of departure has arrived, and we go our ways\u2014I to die, and you\nto live. Which is better God only knows.","title":"Apology","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":16094}