{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_16702/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_16702","id":"gutenberg_16702","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/16702","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - European","Category: History - Modern (1750+)","Category: History - Warfare","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Politics","Current History","World War, 1914-1918"],"text":"E-text prepared by Juliet Sutherland, Linda Cantoni, and the Project\nGutenberg Online Distributed Proofreading Team\n\n\n\nNote: Project Gutenberg also has an HTML version of this\n      file which includes the original illustrations.\n      See 16702-h.htm or 16702-h.zip:\n      (https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/1/6/7/0/16702/16702-h/16702-h.htm)\n      or\n      (https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/1/6/7/0/16702/16702-h.zip)\n\n\n\n\n\nThe New York Times\n\nCURRENT HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN WAR\n\nJANUARY 9, 1915.\n\nWhat Americans Say to Europe\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n[Illustration: CHARLES W. ELIOT\n\n_(Photo (c) by Paul Thompson.)_\n\n_See Page 473_]\n\n[Illustration: JAMES M. BECK\n\n_See Page 413_]\n\n\n\n\nIn the Supreme Court of Civilization\n\nArgued by James M. Beck.\n\n\nTHE NEW YORK TIMES _submitted the evidence contained in the official\n\"White Paper\" of Great Britain, the \"Orange Paper\" of Russia, and the\n\"Gray Paper\" of Belgium to James M. Beck, late Assistant Attorney\nGeneral of the United States and a leader of the New York bar, who has\nargued many of the most important cases before the Supreme Court. On\nthis evidence Mr. Beck has argued in the following article the case of\nDual Alliance vs. Triple Entente. It has been widely circulated in\nFrance and Great Britain._\n\nLet us suppose that in this year of dis-Grace, Nineteen Hundred and\nFourteen, there had existed, as let us pray will one day exist, a\nSupreme Court of Civilization, before which the sovereign nations could\nlitigate their differences without resort to the iniquitous and less\neffective appeal to the arbitrament of arms.\n\nLet us further suppose that each of the contending nations had a\nsufficient leaven of Christianity to have its grievances adjudged not by\nthe ethics of the cannon or the rifle, but by the eternal criterion of\njustice.\n\nWhat would be the judgment of that august tribunal?\n\nAny discussion of the ethical merits of this great controversy must\nstart with the assumption that there is an international morality.\n\nThis fundamental axiom, upon which the entire basis of civilization\nnecessarily rests, is challenged by a small class of intellectual\nperverts.\n\nSome hold that moral considerations must be subordinated either to\nmilitary necessity or so-called manifest destiny. This is the Bernhardi\ndoctrine.\n\nOthers teach that war is a beneficent fatality and that all nations\nengaged in it are therefore equally justified. On this theory all of the\nnow contending nations are but victims of an irresistible current of\nevents, and the highest duty of the State is to prepare itself for the\nsystematic extermination, when necessary or expedient, of its neighbors.\n\nNotwithstanding the clever platitudes under which both these doctrines\nare veiled, all morally sane minds are agreed that this war is a great\ncrime against civilization, and the only open question is, which of the\ntwo contending groups of powers is morally responsible for that crime?\n\nWas Austria justified in declaring war against Servia?\n\nWas Germany justified in declaring war against Russia and France?\n\nWas England justified in declaring war against Germany?\n\nAs the last of these questions is the most easily disposed of, it may be\nconsidered first.\n\n\nEngland's Justification.\n\nEngland's justification rests upon the solemn Treaty of 1839, whereby\nPrussia, France, England, Austria, and Russia \"became the guarantors\" of\nthe \"perpetual neutrality\" of Belgium, as reaffirmed by Count Bismarck,\nthen Chancellor of the North German Confederation, on July 22, 1870, and\nas even more recently reaffirmed in the striking fact disclosed in the\nBelgian \"Gray Book.\"\n\nIn the Spring of 1913 a debate was in progress in the Budget Committee\nof the Reichstag with reference to the Military Budget. In the course of\nthe debate the German Secretary of State said:\n\n     \"The neutrality of Belgium is determined by international\n     conventions, _and Germany is resolved to respect these\n     conventions_.\"\n\nTo confirm this solemn assurance, the Minister of War added in the same\ndebate:\n\n     \"Belgium does not play any part in the justification of the\n     German scheme of military reorganization. The scheme is\n     justified by the position of matters in the East. _Germany\n     will not lose sight of the fact that Belgian neutrality is\n     guaranteed by international treaties._\"\n\nA year later, on July 31, 1914, Herr von Below, the German Minister at\nBrussels, assured the Belgian Department of State that he knew of a\ndeclaration which the German Chancellor had made in 1911, to the effect\n\"that Germany had no intention of violating our neutrality,\" and \"that\nhe was certain that the sentiments to which expression was given at that\ntime _had not changed_.\" (See Belgian \"Gray Book,\" Nos. 11 and 12.)\n\nApart from these treaty stipulations, which are only declaration of\nBelgium's rights as sovereign nations, The Hague Conference, in which\nforty-four nations (including Germany) participated, reaffirmed as an\naxiom of international law the inherent right of a nation to the\nsanctity of its territory.\n\nIt seems unnecessary to discuss the wanton disregard of these solemn\nobligations and protestations, when the present Chancellor of the German\nEmpire, in his speech to the Reichstag and to the world on Aug. 4, 1914,\nfrankly admitted that the action of the German military machine in\ninvading Belgium was a wrong. He said:\n\n     \"We are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no\n     law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps are\n     already on Belgian soil. _Gentlemen, that is contrary to the\n     dictates of international law._ It is true that the French\n     Government has declared at Brussels that France is willing to\n     respect the neutrality of Belgium, so long as her opponent\n     respects it. We knew, however, that France stood ready for\n     invasion. France could wait, but we could not wait. A French\n     movement upon our flank upon the lower Rhine might have been\n     disastrous. So we were compelled to override the just protest\n     of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments. _The wrong--I speak\n     openly--that we are committing_ we will endeavor to make good\n     as soon as our military goal has been reached. Anybody who is\n     threatened as we are threatened, and is fighting for his\n     highest possessions, can only have one thought--how he is to\n     hack his way through.\"\n\nThis defense is not even a plea of confession and avoidance. It is a\nplea of \"Guilty\" at the bar of the world. It has one merit, that it\ndoes not add to the crime the aggravation of hypocrisy. It virtually\nrests the case of Germany upon the gospel of Treitschke and Bernhardi,\nthat each nation is justified in exerting its physical power to the\nutmost in defense of its selfish interests and without any regard to\nconsiderations of conventional morality. Might as between nations is the\nsole criterion of right. There is no novelty in this gospel. Its only\nsurprising feature is its revival in the twentieth century. It was\ntaught far more effectively by Machiavelli in his treatise, \"The\nPrince,\" wherein he glorified the policy of Cesare Borgia in trampling\nthe weaker States of Italy under foot by ruthless terrorism, unbridled\nferocity, and the basest deception. Indeed, the wanton destruction of\nBelgium is simply Borgiaism amplified ten-thousandfold by the mechanical\nresources of modern war.\n\n\nThis Answer Cannot Satisfy.\n\nUnless our boasted civilization is the thinnest veneering of barbarism;\nunless the law of the world is in fact only the ethics of the rifle and\nthe conscience of the cannon; unless mankind after uncounted centuries\nhas made no real advance in political morality beyond that of the cave\ndweller, then this answer of Germany cannot satisfy the \"decent respect\nto the opinions of mankind.\" Germany's contention that a treaty of peace\nis \"a scrap of paper,\" to be disregarded at will when required by the\nselfish interests of one contracting party, is the negation of all that\ncivilization stands for.\n\nBelgium has been crucified in the face of the world. Its innocence of\nany offense, until it was attacked, is too clear for argument. Its\nvoluntary immolation to preserve its solemn guarantee of neutrality will\n\"plead like angels, trumpet-tongued, against the deep damnation of its\ntaking off.\" On that issue the Supreme Court could have no ground for\ndoubt or hesitation. Its judgment would be speedy and inexorable.\n\nThe remaining two issues, above referred to, are not so simple.\nPrimarily and perhaps exclusively, the ethical question turns upon the\nissues raised by the communications which passed between the various\nChancelleries of Europe in the last week of July, for it is the amazing\nfeature of this greatest of all wars that it was precipitated by\ndiplomats and rulers, and, assuming that all these statesmen sincerely\ndesired a peaceful solution of the questions raised by the Austrian\nultimatum, (which is by no means clear,) it was the result of\nineffective diplomacy and clumsy diplomacy at that.\n\nI quite appreciate the distinction between the immediate causes of a war\nand the anterior and more fundamental causes; nevertheless, with the\nworld in a state of Summer peace on July 23, 1914, an issue, gravely\naffecting the integrity of nations and the balance of power in Europe,\nis suddenly precipitated by the Austrian ultimatum, and thereafter and\nfor the space of about a week a series of diplomatic communications\npassed between the Chancelleries of Europe, designed on their face to\nprevent a war and yet so ineffective that the war is precipitated and\nthe fearful Rubicon crossed before the world knew, except imperfectly,\nthe nature of the differences between the Governments involved. The\nethical aspects of this great conflict must largely depend upon the\nrecord that has been made up by the official communications which can,\ntherefore, be treated as documentary evidence in a litigated case.\n\nA substantial part of that record is already before the court of public\nopinion in the British and German \"White Papers,\" the Russian \"Orange\nPaper,\" and the Belgian \"Gray Paper,\" and the purpose of this article is\nto discuss what judgment an impartial and dispassionate court would\nrender upon the issues thus raised and the evidence thus submitted.\n\nPrimarily such a court would be deeply impressed not only by what the\nrecord as thus made up discloses, _but also by the significant omissions\nof documents known to be in existence_.\n\nThe official defense of England and Russia does not apparently show any\nfailure on the part of either to submit all of the documents in their\npossession, _but the German \"White Paper\" on its face discloses the\nsuppression of documents of vital importance, while Austria has as yet\nfailed to submit any of the documentary evidence in its possession_.\n\nWe know from the German \"White Paper\"--even if we did not conclude as a\nmatter of irresistible inference--that many important communications\npassed in this crisis between Germany and Austria, and it is probable\nthat some communications must also have passed between those two\ncountries and Italy. Italy, despite its embarrassing position, owes to\nthe world the duty of a full disclosure. What such disclosure would\nprobably show is indicated by her deliberate conclusion that her allies\nhad commenced an _aggressive_ war, which released her from any\nobligation under the Triple Alliance.\n\nThe fact that communications passed between Berlin and Vienna, the text\nof which has never been disclosed, is not a matter of conjecture.\nGermany admits and asserts as part of her defense that she faithfully\nexercised her mediatory influence with Austria, but not only is such\nmediatory influence not disclosed by any practical results of such\nmediation, but the text of these vital communications is still kept in\nthe secret archives of Berlin and Vienna.\n\nThus in the official apology for Germany it is stated that, in spite of\nthe refusal of Austria to accept the proposition of Sir Edward Grey to\ntreat the Servian reply \"as a basis for further conversations,\"\n\n     \"we [Germany] continued our mediatory efforts to the _utmost_\n     and advised Vienna to make any possible compromise consistent\n     with the dignity of the Monarchy.\"\n\n     [German \"White Paper.\"]\n\nThis would be more convincing if the German Foreign Office in giving\nother diplomatic documents had only added the _text_ of the advice which\nit thus gave Vienna.\n\nThe same significant omission will be found when the same official\ndefense states that on July 29 the German Government advised Austria \"to\nbegin the conversations with Mr. Sazonof.\" But here again _the text_ is\nnot found among the documents which the German Foreign Office has given\nto the world. The communications, which passed between that office and\nits Ambassadors in St. Petersburg, Paris, and London, are given _in\nextenso_, but among the twenty-seven communications appended to the\nGerman official defense it is most significant that not a single\ncommunication is given of the many which passed from Berlin to Vienna\nand only two that passed from Vienna to Berlin.\n\nThis cannot be an accident. Germany has seen fit to throw the veil of\nsecrecy over the text of its communications to Vienna, although\nprofessing to give the purport of a few of them.\n\nUntil Germany is willing to put the most important documents in its\npossession in evidence, it must not be surprised that the world,\nremembering Bismarck's garbling of the Ems dispatch, which precipitated\nthe Franco-Prussian war, will be incredulous as to the sincerity of\nGermany's mediatory efforts.\n\n\nAustria's Case Against Servia.\n\nTo discuss the justice of Austria's grievances against Servia would take\nus outside the documentary record and into the realm of disputed facts\nand would expand this discussion far beyond reasonable length.\n\nLet us therefore suppose _arguendo_ that our imaginary court would\ncommence its consideration with the assumption that Austria had a just\ngrievance against Servia, and that the murder of the Archduke on June\n28, 1914, while in fact committed by Austrian citizens of Servian\nsympathies on Austrian soil, had its inspiration and encouragement in\nthe political activities either of the Servian Government or of\npolitical organizations of that country.\n\nThe question for decision would then be not whether Austria had a just\ngrievance against Servia, but whether having regard to the obligations\nwhich Austria, as well as every other country, owes to civilization, she\nproceeded in the right manner to redress her grievance.\n\nOn June 28, 1914, the Austrian Crown Prince was murdered at Serajevo.\nFor nearly a month there was no action by Austria, and no public\nstatement whatever of its intentions. The world profoundly sympathized\nwith Austria in its new trouble, and especially with its aged monarch,\nwho, like King Lear, was \"as full of grief as years and wretched in\nboth.\"\n\nThe Servian Government had formerly disclaimed any complicity with the\nassassination and had pledged itself to punish any Servian citizen\nimplicated therein.\n\nFrom time to time, from June 28 to July 23, there came semi-inspired\nintimations from Vienna that that country intended to act with great\nself-restraint and in the most pacific manner. In his speech to the\nFrench Chamber of Deputies, Viviani says that Europe had in the interval\npreceding July 23 express assurances from Austria that its course would\nbe moderate and conciliatory. Never was it even hinted that Germany and\nAustria were about to apply in a time of profound peace a match to the\npowder magazine of Europe.\n\nThis is strikingly shown by the first letter in the English \"White\nPaper\" from Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, dated July 20, 1914. It\nis one of the most significant documents in the entire correspondence.\nAt the time this letter was written it is altogether probable that\nAustria's arrogant and most unreasonable ultimatum had already been\nframed and approved in Vienna, and possibly in Berlin, and yet Sir\nEdward Grey, the Foreign Minister of a great and friendly country, had\nso little knowledge of Austria's policy that he\n\n     \"asked the German Ambassador today (July 20) if he had any\n     news of what was going on in Vienna with regard to Servia.\"\n     The German Ambassador replied \"that he had not, but Austria\n     was certainly going to take some step.\"\n\nSir Edward Grey adds that he told the German Ambassador that he had\nlearned that Count Berchtold, the Austrian Foreign Minister,\n\n     \"in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, had\n     deprecated the suggestion that the situation was grave, but\n     had said that it should be cleared up.\"\n\nThe German Minister then replied that it would be desirable \"if Russia\ncould act as a mediator with regard to Servia,\" so that the first\nsuggestion of Russia playing the part of the peacemaker came from the\nGerman Ambassador in London. Sir Edward Grey then adds that he told the\nGerman Ambassador that he\n\n     \"assumed that the Austrian Government would not do anything\n     until they had first disclosed to the public their case\n     against Servia, founded presumably upon what they had\n     discovered at the trial,\"\n\nand the German Ambassador assented to this assumption.\n\n[English \"White Paper,\" No. 1.]\n\nEither the German Ambassador was then deceiving Sir Edward Grey, on the\ntheory that the true function of an Ambassador is \"to lie for his\ncountry,\" or the thunderbolt was being launched with such secrecy that\neven the German Ambassador in England did not know what was then in\nprogress.\n\nThe British Ambassador at Vienna reports to Sir Edward Grey:\n\n     \"The delivery at Belgrade on the 23d July of the note to\n     Servia was preceded by a period of _absolute silence_ at the\n     Ballplatz.\"\n\nHe proceeds to say that with the exception of the German Ambassador at\nVienna--note the significance of the exception--not a single member of\nthe Diplomatic Corps knew anything of the Austrian ultimatum and that\nthe French Ambassador when he visited the Austrian Foreign Office on\nJuly 23 was not only kept in ignorance that the ultimatum had actually\nbeen issued, but was given the impression that its tone was moderate.\nEven the Italian Ambassador was not taken into Count Berchtold's\nconfidence.\n\n[Dispatch from Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, dated Sept. 1,\n1914.]\n\nNo better proof of this sense of security need be adduced than that the\nFrench President and her Foreign Minister were thousands of miles from\nParis, and the Russian Minister had, after the funeral of the Austrian\nArchduke, left Vienna for his annual holiday.\n\nThe interesting and important question here suggests itself whether\nGermany had knowledge of and approved in advance the Austrian ultimatum.\nIf it did, it was guilty of duplicity, for the German Ambassador at St.\nPetersburg gave to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs an express\nassurance that\n\n     \"the German Government _had no knowledge of the text of the\n     Austrian note before it was handed in and has not exercised\n     any influence on its contents. It is a mistake to attribute to\n     Germany a threatening attitude_.\"\n\n[Russian \"Orange Paper,\" No. 18.]\n\nThis statement is inherently improbable. Austria was the weaker of the\ntwo allies and it was Germany's sabre that it was rattling in the face\nof Europe. Obviously Austria could not have proceeded to extreme\nmeasures, which it was recognized from the first would antagonize\nRussia, unless it had the support of Germany, and there is a\nprobability, amounting to a moral certainty, that it would not have\ncommitted itself and Germany to the possibility of a European war\nwithout first consulting Germany.\n\nMoreover, we have the testimony of Sir M. de Bunsen, the English\nAmbassador in Vienna, who advised Sir Edward Grey that he had \"private\ninformation that the German Ambassador (at Vienna) knew the text of the\nAustrian ultimatum to Servia before it was dispatched and telegraphed it\nto the German Emperor,\" and that the German Ambassador himself \"indorses\nevery line of it.\" [English \"White Paper,\" No. 95.] As he does not\ndisclose the source of his \"private information,\" this testimony would\nnot by itself be convincing, but when we examine Germany's official\ndefense in the German \"White Paper,\" _we find that the German Foreign\nOffice admits that it was consulted by Austria previous to the ultimatum\nand not only approved of Austria's course but literally gave her a\ncarte blanche to proceed_.\n\nThis point seems so important in determining the sincerity of Germany's\nattitude and pacific protestations that we quote _in extenso_. After\nreferring to the previous friction between Austria and Servia, the\nGerman \"White Paper\" says:\n\n\"In view of these circumstances, Austria had to admit that it would not\nbe consistent either with the dignity or self-preservation of the\nmonarchy to look on longer at the operations on the other side of the\nborder without taking action. _The Austro-Hungarian Government advised\nus of this view of the situation and asked our opinion in the matter. We\nwere able to assure our ally most heartily of our agreement with her\nview of the situation and to assure her that any action that she might\nconsider it necessary to take in order to put an end to the movement in\nServia directed against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy\nwould receive our approval._ We were fully aware in this connection that\nwarlike moves on the part of Austria-Hungary against Servia would bring\nRussia into the question and might draw us into a war in accordance with\nour duties as an ally.\"\n\nSir M. de Bunsen's credible testimony is further confirmed by the fact\nthat the British Ambassador at Berlin, in his letter of July 22 to Sir\nEdward Grey, states that _on the preceding night_ (July 21) he had met\nthe German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and an allusion was\nmade to a possible action by Austria.\n\n     \"His Excellency was evidently of opinion that this step on\n     Austria's part would have been made ere this. He insisted that\n     the question at issue was one for settlement between Servia\n     and Austria alone, and that there should be no interference\n     from outside in the discussions between those two countries.\"\n\nHe adds that while he had regarded it as inadvisable that his country\nshould approach Austria-Hungary in the matter, he had\n\n     \"on several occasions in conversation with the Servian\n     Minister emphasized the extreme importance that\n     Austro-Servian relations should be put on a proper footing.\"\n\n[English \"White Paper,\" No. 2.]\n\nHere we have the first statement of Germany's position in the matter, a\nposition which subsequent events showed to be entirely untenable, but to\nwhich Germany tenaciously adhered to the very end, and which did much to\nprecipitate the war. Forgetful of the solidarity of European\ncivilization and the fact that by policy and diplomatic intercourse\ncontinuing through many centuries a United European State exists, even\nthough its organization be as yet inchoate, he took the ground that\nAustria should be permitted to proceed to aggressive measures against\nServia without interference from any other power, even though, as was\ninevitable, the humiliation of Servia would destroy the status of the\nBalkan States and even threaten the European balance of power.\n\nNo space need be taken in convincing any reasonable man that this\nAustrian ultimatum to Servia was brutal in its tone and unreasonable in\nits demands. It would be difficult to find in history a more offensive\ndocument, and its iniquity was enhanced by the short shriving time which\nit gave either Servia or Europe. Servia had forty-eight hours to answer\nwhether it would compromise its sovereignty, and virtually admit its\ncomplicity in a crime which it had steadily disavowed. As the full text\nof the ultimatum first reached the Foreign Chancelleries nearly\ntwenty-four hours after its service upon Servia, the other European\nnations had barely a day to consider what could be done to preserve the\npeace of Europe before that peace was fatally compromised.\n\n[English \"White Paper,\" No. 5; Russian \"Orange Paper,\" No. 3.]\n\nFurther confirmation that the German Foreign Office did have advance\nknowledge of at least the substance of the ultimatum is shown by the\nfact that on the same day the ultimatum was issued the Chancellor of the\nGerman Empire instructed the German Ambassadors in Paris, London, and\nSt. Petersburg to advise the English, French, and Russian Governments\nthat\n\n     \"the acts as well as _the demands_ of the Austro-Hungarian\n     Government cannot but be looked upon as justified.\"\n\n[German \"White Paper,\" Annex 1B.]\n\nHow could Germany thus indorse the \"demands\" if it did not know the\nsubstance of the ultimatum?\n\nThe hour when these instructions were sent is not given, so that it does\nnot follow that these significant instructions were necessarily prior to\nthe service of the ultimatum at Belgrade at 6 P.M. Nevertheless, as the\nultimatum did not reach the other capitals of Europe until the following\nday, as the diplomatic correspondence clearly shows, it seems improbable\nthat the German Foreign Office would have issued this very carefully\nprepared and formal warning to the other powers on July the 23d unless\nit had not only knowledge of Austria's intention to serve the ultimatum\nbut also at least of the substance thereof.\n\nWhile it may be that Germany, while indorsing in blank the policy of\nAustria, purposely refrained from examining the text of the\ncommunication, so that it could thereafter claim that it was not\nresponsible for Austria's action--a policy which would not lessen the\ndiscreditable character of the whole business--yet the more reasonable\nassumption is that the simultaneous issuance of Austria's ultimatum at\nBelgrade and Germany's warning to the powers were the result of a\nconcerted action and had a common purpose. No court or jury, reasoning\nalong the ordinary inferences of human life, would question this\nconclusion for a moment.\n\nThe communication for the German Foreign Office last referred to\nanticipates that Servia \"will refuse to comply with these demands\"--why,\nif they were justified?--and Germany suggests to France, England, and\nRussia that if, as a result of such non-compliance, Austria has\n\"recourse to military measures,\" that \"the choice of means must be left\nto it.\"\n\nThe German Ambassadors in the three capitals were instructed\n\n     \"to lay particular stress on the view that the above question\n     is one the settlement of which devolves solely upon\n     Austria-Hungary and Servia, and one which the powers should\n     earnestly strive to confine to the two countries concerned,\"\n\nand he added that Germany strongly desired\n\n     \"that the dispute be localized, since any intervention of\n     another power, on account of the various alliance obligations,\n     would bring consequences impossible to measure.\"\n\nThis is one of the most significant documents in the whole\ncorrespondence. If Germany were as ignorant as her Ambassador at London\naffected to be of the Austrian policy and ultimatum, and if Germany was\nnot then instigating and supporting Austria in its perilous course, why\nshould the German Chancellor have served this threatening notice upon\nEngland, France, and Russia, that Austria must be left free to make war\nupon Servia, and that any attempt to intervene in behalf of the weaker\nnation would \"bring consequences impossible to measure\"?\n\n[German \"White Paper,\" Annex 1B.]\n\nA few days later the Imperial Chancellor sent to the Confederated\nGovernments of Germany a _confidential communication_ in which he\nrecognized the possibility that Russia might feel it a duty \"to take the\npart of Servia in her dispute with Austria-Hungary.\" Why, again, if\nAustria's case was so clearly justified? The Imperial Chancellor added\nthat\n\n     \"if Russia feels constrained to take sides with Servia in this\n     conflict, she certainly has a right to do it,\"\n\nbut added that if Russia did this it would in effect challenge the\nintegrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and that Russia would\ntherefore alone--\n\n     \"bear the responsibility if a European war arises from the\n     Austro-Servian question, _which all the rest of the great\n     European powers wish to localize_.\"\n\nIn this significant confidential communication the German Chancellor\ndeclares the strong interest which Germany had in the punishment of\nServia by Austria. He says \"_our closest interests therefore summon us\nto the side of Austria-Hungary_,\" and he adds that\n\n     \"if contrary to hope, the trouble should spread, owing to the\n     intervention of Russia, then, true to our duty as an ally, we\n     should have to support the neighboring monarchy with the\n     entire might of the German Empire.\"\n\n[German \"White Paper,\" Annex 2.]\n\nIn reaching its conclusion our imaginary court would pay little\nattention to mere professions of a desire for peace. A nation, like an\nindividual, can covertly stab the peace of another while saying, \"Art\nthou in health, my brother?\" and even the peace of civilization can be\nbetrayed by a Judas kiss. Professions of peace belong to the cant of\ndiplomacy and have always characterized the most bellicose of nations.\n\nNo war in modern times has been begun without the aggressor pretending\nthat his nation wished nothing but peace and invoking Divine aid for its\nmurderous policy. To paraphrase the words of Lady Teazle on a noted\noccasion when Sir Joseph Surface talked much of \"honor,\" it might be as\nwell in such instances to leave the name of God out of the question.\n\nLet us, then, analyze the record as already made up; and for the sake of\nclearness the events which preceded the war will be considered\nchronologically.\n\nImmediately upon the receipt of the ultimatum in St. Petersburg on July\n24, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a formal communication\nto Austria-Hungary, suggested that the abrupt time limit \"leaves to the\npowers a delay entirely insufficient to undertake any useful steps\nwhatever for the straightening out of the complications that have\narisen,\" and added:\n\n     \"To prevent the incalculable consequences, equally disastrous\n     for all the powers, which can follow the method of action of\n     the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems indispensable to us\n     that, above all, the delay given to Servia to reply should be\n     extended.\"\n\nSazonof further suggested that time should be given for the powers to\nexamine the results of the inquiry that the Austro-Hungarian Government\nhad made in the matter of the Serajevo assassination, and stated that if\nthe powers were convinced\n\n     \"of the well-groundedness of certain of the Austrian demands\n     they would find themselves in a position to send to the\n     Servian Government consequential advice.\"\n\nHe justly observes that\n\n     \"a refusal to extend the terms of the ultimatum ... would be\n     in contradiction with the very bases of international\n     relations.\"\n\n[Russian \"Orange Paper,\" No. 4.]\n\nCould any court question the justice of this contention? The peace of\nthe world was at stake. Time only was asked to see what could be done to\npreserve that peace and satisfy Austria's grievances to the uttermost\nfarthing.\n\nConcurrently with Sazonof's plea for a little time to preserve the peace\nof the world, Sir Edward Grey had seen the German Ambassador on July 24\nand had suggested to him that the only method of preventing the\ncatastrophe was\n\n     \"that the four powers, Germany, France, Italy, and ourselves,\n     (England,) should work together simultaneously at Vienna and\n     St. Petersburg.\"\n\n[English \"White Paper,\" No. 11.]\n\nGermany had only to intimate to Austria that \"a decent respect to the\nopinions of mankind,\" as well as common courtesy to great and friendly\nnations, required that sufficient time be given not only to Servia, but\nto the other nations, to concert for the common good, especially as the\nperiod was one of Summer dullness and many of the leading rulers and\nstatesmen were absent from their respective capitals.\n\nUnder these circumstances was it not natural that Russia should announce\non July 24\n\n     \"that any action taken by Austria to humiliate Servia would\n     not leave Russia indifferent,\"\n\nand that on the same day the Russian Charge d'Affaires at Vienna\nsuggested to the Austrian Foreign Office\n\n     \"that the Austrian note was drawn up in a form rendering it\n     impossible of acceptance as it stood, and that it was both\n     unusual and peremptory in its terms\"?\n\nTo which the only reply of the Austrian Foreign Minister was that their\nrepresentative in Servia\n\n     \"was under instructions to leave Belgrade unless Austrian\n     demands were accepted in their integrity by 4 P.M. tomorrow.\"\n\n[English \"White Paper,\" No. 7.]\n\nAustria's only concession then or subsequently to the cause of peace was\nthe assurance that Austria would not _after its conquest_ of Servia\ndemand any territory.\n\nThe action of Germany on this day, July 24, is most significant. Its\nAmbassador in England communicated a note to Sir Edward Grey in which it\njustified Austro-Hungarian grievances and ultimatum by saying that\n\n     \"under these circumstances the course of procedure and demands\n     of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as\n     equitable and moderate.\"\n\nThe note added:\n\n     \"The Imperial Government [Germany] want to emphasize their\n     opinion that in the present case there is only question of a\n     matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and\n     Servia, and that the great powers ought seriously to endeavor\n     to reserve it to those two immediately concerned.\"\n\n[English \"White Paper,\" No. 9.]\n\nOn July 25, probably to the great surprise of both Germany and Austria,\nwhich had definitely calculated upon Servians non-compliance with the\nultimatum, the latter country, under the conciliatory advice of Russia\nand England, made a reply in which, at some sacrifice of its\nself-respect as a sovereign State, it substantially accepted all but one\nof the demands of Austria, and as to that it did not, in terms, refuse\nit, but expressed its willingness to refer it either to arbitration or\nto a conference of the powers.\n\n[English \"White Paper,\" No. 39.]\n\nNo court would question for a moment the conclusion that the reply was a\nsubstantial acquiescence in the extreme Austrian demands, nor indeed did\neither Germany or Austria seriously contend that it was not. They\ncontented themselves with impeaching the sincerity of the assurances,\ncalling the concessions \"shams,\" and of this it is enough to say that if\nGermany and Austria had accepted Servians reply as sufficient, and\nServia had subsequently failed to fulfill its promises thus made in the\nutmost good faith, there would have been little sympathy for Servia, and\nno general war. Indeed, both Russia and England pledged their influence\nto compel Servia, if necessary, to meet fully any reasonable demand of\nAustria. The outstanding question, which Servia agreed to arbitrate or\nleave to the powers, was the participation of Austrian officials in the\nServian courts. This did not present a difficult problem. Austria's\nprofessed desire for an impartial investigation could have been easily\nattained by having the neutral powers appoint a commission of jurists to\nmake such investigation.\n\nOn July 24 Sir Edward Grey also had asked the German Ambassador to use\nhis good influences at Vienna to secure an extension of time. To this\nmost reasonable request the answer and action of the German Government\nwas disingenuous in the extreme. They agreed to \"pass on\" the\nsuggestion, but the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs added\nthat as the Austrian Prime Minister was away from Vienna there would be\ndelay and difficulty in getting the time limit extended, and\n\n     \"he admitted quite freely that the Austro-Hungarian Government\n     _wished to give the Servians a lesson and that they meant to\n     take military action. He also admitted that the Servian\n     Government could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian\n     demands_.\"\n\nHe added that Germany did not want a general war and \"he would do all in\nhis power to prevent such a calamity.\"\n\n[English \"White Paper,\" Nos. 11 and 18.]\n\nImmediately on the issuance of the ultimatum the Austrian Foreign\nMinister, Count Berchtold, had most inopportunely taken himself to\nIschl, where he remained until after the expiration of the time limit.\nAccess to him proved difficult, and the Russian Charge at Vienna, having\nlodged a pacific protest with the Acting Foreign Minister in order to\ntake no chances, telegraphed it to Berchtold at Ischl. Nevertheless,\nBerchtold's apparently designed absence from the capital was Germany's\nexcuse for its failure to get the time limit extended.\n\nIf Germany made any communication to Austria in the interests of peace\nthe text has yet to be disclosed to the world. A word from Berlin to\nVienna would have given the additional time which, with sincerely\npacific intentions, might have resulted in the preservation of peace.\nGermany, so far as the record discloses, never spoke that word.\n\nContrast this attitude with that of Russia, whose Foreign Minister on\nthe morning of July 25 offered\n\n     \"to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of\n     England, France, Germany, and Italy.\"\n\n[English \"White Paper,\" No. 17.]\n\nAs Russia was the member of the Triple Entente most interested in the\nfate of Servia, what proposal could have been more conciliatory or\nmagnanimous?\n\nOn July 25 Sir Edward Grey proposed that the four powers (including\nGermany) should unite\n\n     \"in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross\n     the frontier and to give time for the four powers, acting at\n     Vienna and St. Petersburg, to try and arrange matters. If\n     Germany will adopt this view I feel strongly that France and\n     ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly\n     co-operate.\"\n\n[English \"White Paper,\" Nos. 24 and 25.]\n\nTo this reasonable request the Imperial German Chancellor replied:\n\n     \"First and last, we take the ground that this question must be\n     localized _by the abstention of all the powers from\n     intervention in it_,\"\n\nbut added that Germany would, if an Austro-Russian dispute arose,\n\n     \"co-operate with the other great powers in mediation between\n     Russia and Austria.\"\n\n[German \"White Paper,\" Annex 13.]\n\nThis distinction is very hard to grasp. It attempts to measure the\ndifference between tweedledum and tweedledee. Russia's difference with\nAustria was over the attempt of the latter to crush Servia. Germany\nwould not interfere in the latter, but would as an abstract proposition\nmediate between Russia and Austria. For all practical purposes the two\nthings were indistinguishable.\n\nHow she \"co-operated\" we shall presently see.\n\nAll that Germany _did_ on July 25, so far as the record discloses, was\nto \"pass on\" England's and Russia's requests for more time, but\nsubsequent events indicate that it was \"passed on\" without any\nindorsement, for is it credible that Austria would have ignored its\nally's request for more time if it had ever been made?\n\nThe Austrian Foreign Minister, having launched the ultimatum, absented\nhimself from the capital, but the Russian Minister at Vienna, as already\nstated, succeeded in submitting this most reasonable request verbally to\nthe Acting Foreign Minister, who simply said that he would submit it to\nCount Berchtold, _but that he could predict with assurance a categorical\nrefusal_. Later on that day (July 25) Russia was definitely advised that\nno time extension would be granted.\n\n[Russian \"Orange Paper,\" Nos. 11 and 12.]\n\nWas ever the peace of the world shattered upon so slight a pretext? A\nlittle time, a few days, even a few hours, might have sufficed to\npreserve the world from present horrors, but no time could be granted.\nA colossal snap judgment was to be taken by these pettifogging\ndiplomats. A timely word from the German Chancellor would have saved the\nflower of the youth of Germany and Austria from perishing. It would be\ndifficult to find in recorded history a greater discourtesy to a\nfriendly power, for Austria was not at war with Russia.\n\nDefeated in their effort to get an extension of time, England, France,\nand Russia made further attempts to preserve peace by temporarily\narresting military proceedings until efforts toward conciliation could\nbe made. Sir Edward Grey proposed to Germany, France, Russia, and Italy\nthat they should unite in asking Austria and Servia not to cross the\nfrontier \"until we had had time to try and arrange matters between\nthem,\" but the German Ambassador read Sir Edward Grey a telegram that he\nhad received from the German Foreign Office that \"once she [Austria] had\nlaunched that note [the ultimatum] Austria could not draw back.\"\n\n[English \"White Paper,\" No. 25.]\n\nAs we have seen, Germany never, so far as the record discloses, sought\nin any way to influence Austria to make this or any concession. Its\nattitude was shown by the declaration of its Ambassador at Paris to the\nFrench Minister of Foreign Affairs, which, while disclaiming that\nGermany had countenanced the Austrian ultimatum, yet added that Germany\napproved its point of view,\n\n     \"and that certainly the arrow, once sent, Germany could not\n     allow herself to be guided except by her duty to her ally.\"\n\nThis seemed to be the fatal fallacy of Germany, that its duties to\ncivilization were so slight that it should support its ally, Austria,\nwhether the latter were right or wrong. Such was its policy, and it\ncarried it out with fatal consistency. To support its ally in actual war\nmay be defensible, but to support it in times of peace in an iniquitous\ndemand and a policy of gross discourtesy offends every sense of\ninternational morality.\n\nOn the following day Russia proposed to Austria that they should enter\ninto an exchange of private views, with the object of an alteration in\ncommon of some clauses of the Austrian note of July 23. _To this Austria\nnever even replied._ The Russian Minister communicated this suggestion\nto the German Minister of Foreign Affairs and expressed the hope that he\nwould \"find it possible to advise Vienna to meet our proposal,\" but this\ndid not accord with German policy, for on that day the German Ambassador\nin Paris called upon the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, and in\nreply to a similar suggestion that Germany should suggest to Vienna to\nmeet Servia in the same conciliatory spirit which Servia had shown, the\nAmbassador answered that that \"was not possible in view of the\nresolution taken not to interfere in the Austro-Servian conflict.\"\n\nOn the same day England asked France, Italy, and Germany to meet in\nLondon for an immediate conference to preserve the peace of Europe, and\nto this fruitful suggestion, which might have saved the peace of Europe,\nthe German Chancellor replied with the pitiful quibble that \"it is\nimpossible to bring our ally before a European court in its difference\nwith Servia,\" although it affected to accept \"in principle\" the policy\nof mediation.\n\nGermany's acceptance \"in principle\" of a policy which she in practice\nthwarted suggests the law-abiding tendencies of that Maine statesman who\nwas \"for the Maine prohibition liquor law, but against its enforcement.\"\n\n[English \"White Paper,\" No. 46.]\n\nGermany's refusal to have Servia's case submitted to the powers even for\ntheir consideration is the more striking when it is recalled that the\nGerman Ambassador at London quoted to Sir Edward Grey the German\nSecretary of State as saying\n\n     \"that there were some things in the Austrian note that Servia\n     could hardly be expected to accept,\"\n\nthus recognizing that Austria's ultimatum was, at least in part, unjust.\nSir Edward Grey then called the German Ambassador's attention to the\nfact that if Austria refused the conciliatory reply of Servia and\nmarched into that country\n\n     \"it meant that she was determined to crush Servia at all\n     costs, being reckless of the consequences that might be\n     involved.\"\n\nHe added that the Servian reply\n\n     \"should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and\n     pause,\"\n\nand asked that the German Government should urge this at Vienna, but the\nGerman Secretary of State on July 27 replied that such a conference \"was\nnot practicable,\" and that it \"would practically amount to a court of\narbitration,\" and could not, in his opinion, be called together \"except\nat the request of Austria and Russia.\"\n\n[English \"White Paper,\" Nos. 43 and 46.]\n\nThat this was a mere evasion is perfectly plain. Germany already knew\nthat Austria would not ask for such a conference, for Austria had\nalready refused Russia's request for an extension of time and had\nactually commenced its military operations. Germany's attitude is best\nindicated by the letter of the Russian Minister in Germany to the\nRussian Foreign Office in which he states that on July 27 he called at\nthe German Foreign Office and asked it\n\n     \"to urge upon Vienna in a more pressing fashion to take up\n     this line of conciliation. Jagow replied that he could not\n     advise Austria to yield.\"\n\n[Russian \"Orange Paper,\" No. 38.]\n\nWhy not? Russia had advised Servia to yield, and Servia had conceded\nnearly every claim. Why could not the German Foreign Office advise\nVienna to meet conciliation by conciliation, if its desire for peace\nwere sincere? All that Russia and England desired was that a little time\nand consideration should be given, without prejudice to the rights or\nclaims of Austria, before the peace of the world was hopelessly\nshattered.\n\nBefore this interview took place the French Ambassador had called at the\nGerman Foreign Office on a similar errand and urged the English\nsuggestion that action should at once be taken by England, Germany,\nRussia, and France at St. Petersburg and Vienna, to the effect that\nAustria and Servia\n\n     \"should abstain from any act which might aggravate the\n     situation at the present hour.\"\n\nBy this was meant that there should be, pending further parleys, no\ninvasion of Servia by Austria and none of Austria by Russia. _To this\nthe German Foreign Minister opposed a categorical refusal._\n\nOn the same day the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had \"a long and earnest\nconversation\" with the Austrian Under Secretary of State for Foreign\nAffairs. He expressed the earnest hope that\n\n     \"something would be done before Servia was actually invaded.\n     Baron Machio replied that this would now be difficult, as a\n     skirmish had already taken place on the Danube, in which the\n     Servians had been aggressors.\"\n\nThe Russian Ambassador then said that his country would do all it could\nto keep the Servians quiet,\n\n     \"and even to fall back before an Austrian advance in order to\n     gain time.\"\n\nHe urged that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be\nfurnished with full powers to continue discussions with the Russian\nMinister for Foreign Affairs,\n\n     \"who was very willing to advise Servia to yield all that could\n     be fairly asked of her as an independent power.\"\n\nThe only reply to this reasonable suggestion was that it would be\nsubmitted to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.\n\n[English \"White Paper,\" No. 56.]\n\nOn the same day the German Ambassador at Paris called upon the French\nForeign Office and strongly insisted on the \"_exclusion of all\npossibility of mediation or of conference_,\" and yet contemporaneously\nthe Imperial German Chancellor was advising London that he had\n\n     \"started the efforts toward mediation in Vienna, immediately\n     in the way desired by Sir Edward Grey, and had further\n     communicated to the Austrian Foreign Minister the wish of the\n     Russian Foreign Minister for a direct talk in Vienna.\"\n\nWhat hypocrisy! In the formal German defense, the official apologist for\nthat country, after stating his conviction\n\n     \"that an act of mediation could not take into consideration\n     the Austro-Servian conflict, which was purely an\n     Austro-Hungarian affair,\"\n\nclaimed that Germany had transmitted Sir Edward Grey's further\nsuggestion to Vienna, in which Austria-Hungary was urged\n\n     \"either to agree to accept the Servian answer as sufficient or\n     to look upon it as a basis for further conversations\";\n\nbut the Austro-Hungarian Government--playing the role of the wicked\npartner of the combination--\"in full appreciation of our mediatory\nactivity,\" (so says the German \"White Paper\" with sardonic humor,)\nreplied to this proposition that, coming as it did after the opening of\nhostilities, \"_it was too late_.\"\n\nDoes any reasonable man question for a moment that, if Germany had done\nsomething more than merely \"transmit\" these wise and pacific\nsuggestions, Austria would have complied with the suggestions of its\npowerful ally or that Austria would have suspended its military\noperations if Germany had given any intimation of such a wish?\n\nOn the following day, July 28, the door was further closed on any\npossibility of compromise when the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs\n\n     \"said, quietly but firmly, _that no discussion could be\n     accepted on the basis of the Servian note_; that war would be\n     declared today, and that the well-known pacific character of\n     the Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might be\n     accepted as a guarantee that the war was both just and\n     inevitable; that this was a matter that must be settled\n     directly between the two parties immediately concerned.\"\n\nTo this arrogant and unreasonable contention that Europe must accept the\nguarantee of the Austrian Foreign Minister as to the righteousness of\nAustria's quarrel the British Ambassador suggested \"the larger aspect of\nthe question,\" namely, the peace of Europe, and to this \"larger aspect,\"\nwhich should have given any reasonable official some ground for pause,\nthe Austrian Foreign Minister replied that he\n\n     \"had it also in mind, but thought that Russia ought not to\n     oppose operations like those impending, which did not aim at\n     territorial aggrandizement, and which could no longer be\n     postponed.\"\n\n[English \"White Paper,\" No. 62.]\n\nThe private conversations between Russia and Austria having thus failed,\nRussia returned to the proposition of a European conference to preserve\nits peace. Its Ambassador in Vienna on July 28 had a conference with\nBerchtold and pointed to the dangers to the peace of Europe and the\ndesirability of good relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia.\n\nTo this Count Berchtold replied that he understood perfectly well the\nseriousness of the situation and the advantages of a frank explanation\nwith the Cabinet at St. Petersburg.\n\n     \"He told me that, on the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian\n     Government, which had only reluctantly decided upon the\n     energetic measures which it had taken against Servia, _could\n     now neither withdraw nor enter upon any discussion of the\n     terms of the Austro-Hungarian note.\"_\n\n[Russian \"Orange Paper,\" No. 45.]\n\nOn the same day, July 28, the German Imperial Chancellor sent for the\nEnglish Ambassador and excused his failure to accept the proposal of\nconference of the neutral powers, on the ground that he did not think it\nwould be effective,\n\n     \"because such a conference would in his opinion have the\n     appearance of an 'Areopagus' consisting of two powers of each\n     group sitting in judgment upon the two remaining powers.\"\n\nAfter engaging in this pitiful and insincere quibble, and when reminded\nof Servia's conciliatory reply, amounting to a virtual surrender,\n\n     \"his Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss the\n     Servian note, but that Austria's standpoint, and in this he\n     agreed, was that her quarrel with Servia was a purely Austrian\n     concern, _with which Russia had nothing to do_.\"\n\n[English \"White Paper,\" No. 71.]\n\nAt this point the rules of the countries intervened in the dispute. The\nKaiser, having returned from Norway, telegraphed the Czar, under date of\nJuly 28, that he was\n\n     \"exerting all my influence to endeavor to make Austria-Hungary\n     come to an open and satisfying understanding with Russia,\"\n\nand invoked the Czar's aid.\n\n[German \"White Paper,\" Annex 20.]\n\nIf the Kaiser were sincere, and he may have been, _his attitude was not\nthat of his Foreign Office_. Upon the face of the record we have only\nhis own assurance that he was doing everything to preserve peace, but\nthe steps that he took or the communications he made to influence\nAustria _are not found in the formal defense which the German Government\nhas given to the world_. The Kaiser can only convince the world of his\ninnocence of the crime of his Potsdam camarilla by giving the world _the\ntext_ of any advice he gave the Austrian officials. He has produced his\ntelegrams to the Czar. _Where are those he presumably sent to Francis\nJoseph or Count Berchtold? Where are the instructions he gave his own\nAmbassadors or Foreign Minister?_\n\nIt is significant that on the same day Sazonof telegraphed to Count\nBenckendorff:\n\n     \"My conversations with the German Ambassador confirm my\n     impression that Germany is rather favorable to the\n     uncompromising attitude adopted by Austria,\"\n\nand he adds, and history will vindicate him in the conclusion, that\n\n     \"the Berlin Cabinet, which might have been able to arrest the\n     whole development of this crisis, seems to exercise no action\n     on its ally.\"\n\n[Russian \"Orange Paper,\" No. 43.]\n\nOn July 29 Sir Edward Goschen telegraphed Sir Edward Grey that he had\nthat night seen the German Chancellor, who had \"just returned from\nPotsdam,\" where he had presumably seen the Kaiser. The German Chancellor\nthen showed clearly how the wind was blowing in making the suggestion to\nSir Edward Goschen that if England would remain neutral, Germany would\nagree to guarantee that she would not take any French territory. When\nasked about the French colonies, no assurance was given.\n\n[English \"White Paper,\" No. 85.]\n\nLater in the day the German Chancellor again saw the English Ambassador,\nand expressed regret\n\n     \"that events had marched too rapidly, and that it was\n     therefore too late to act upon your [Sir Edward Grey's]\n     suggestion that the Servian reply might form the basis of\n     discussion.\"\n\n[English \"White Paper,\" No. 75.]\n\nOn the same day the Ambassador for Germany at St. Petersburg called upon\nSazonof and expressed himself in favor of further explanations between\nVienna and St. Petersburg, to which Sazonof assented. [Russian \"Orange\nPaper,\" No. 49.] On the same day Sir Edward Grey asked the German\nGovernment\n\n     \"_to suggest any form of procedure_ under which the idea of\n     mediation between Austria and Russia, already accepted by the\n     German Government in principle, _could be applied_.\"\n\nTo which the German Foreign Office replied that it could not act for\nfear that if they made to their ally any suggestion that looked like\npressure it might \"_cause them [Austria] to precipitate matter and\npresent a fait accompli_.\" [See letter of Sir Edward Goschen to Sir\nEdward Grey, July 29--English \"White Paper,\" No. 70.]\n\nThis was the last and worst of the quibbles put forth to gain time while\nAustria was making progress toward Belgrade. It assumes that Austria\nmight not only fail to respect the wish in a matter of common concern of\nits more powerful ally, but that it might act in disregard of Germany's\nwish. This strains human credulity to the breaking point. Did the German\nSecretary of State keep a straight face when he uttered this sardonic\npleasantry? It may be the duty of a diplomat to lie on occasion, but is\nit ever necessary to utter such a stupid falsehood? The German Secretary\nof State sardonically added in the same conversation that he was not\nsure that the effort for peace had not hastened the declaration of war,\nas though the declaration of war against Servia had not been planned and\nexpected from the first.\n\nAs a final effort to meet quibbles, the British Ambassador at Berlin\nthen suggested that after Austria had satisfied her military prestige,\nthe moment might then be favorable for four disinterested powers to\ndiscuss the situation and come forward with suggestions for preventing\ngraver complications.\n\nTo this proposal the German Secretary of State seemingly acquiesced,\nbut, as usual, _nothing whatever was done_. [English \"White Paper,\" No.\n76.] It is true that on July 29 Sir Edward Grey was assured by the\nGerman Ambassador that the German Foreign Office was\n\n     \"endeavoring to make Vienna explain in a satisfactory form at\n     St. Petersburg the scope and extension of Austrian proceedings\n     in Servia,\"\n\nbut again the communications which the German Foreign Office sent to\nVienna on this point _have never yet been disclosed to the world_.\n\n[English \"White Paper,\" No. 84.]\n\nIn this same conference Sir Edward Grey\n\n     \"urged that the _German Government should suggest any method_\n     by which the influence of the four powers could be used\n     together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. France\n     agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating\n     influence was ready to be put into operation _by any method\n     that Germany could suggest_ if mine were not acceptable. In\n     fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by any method\n     that Germany thought possible, if only Germany would 'press\n     the button' in the interests of peace.\"\n\n[English \"White Paper,\" No. 84.]\n\nThe difficulty was, however, that Germany never \"pressed the button,\"\nalthough obviously it would have been easy for her to do so, as the\nstronger and more influential member of the Double Alliance.\n\nOn the same day the Austrian Government left a memorandum with Sir\nEdward Grey to the effect that Count Mensdorff said that the war with\nServia must proceed.\n\nOn the night of July 29 the British Ambassador at Berlin was informed\nthat the German Foreign Office \"_had not had time to send an answer\nyet_\" to the proposal that Germany suggest the form of mediation, but\nthat the question had been referred to the Austro-Hungarian Government\nwith a request as to \"what would satisfy them.\"\n\n[English \"White Paper,\" No. 107.]\n\nOn the following day the German Ambassador informed Sir Edward Grey that\nthe German Government would endeavor to influence Austria, after taking\nBelgrade and Servian territory in the region of the frontier, to promise\nnot to advance further, while the powers endeavored to arrange that\nServia should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austria, but if\nGermany ever exercised any such pressure upon Vienna, _no evidence of it\nhas ever been given to the world_. Certainly it was not very effective,\nand for the reasons mentioned it is impossible to conclude that the\nadvice of Germany, if in good faith, would not have been followed by its\nweaker ally.\n\nFrom all that appears in the record, Austria made no reply to this most\nconciliatory suggestion of England, but, in the meantime, the\nirrepressible Kaiser made the crisis more acute by cabling to the Czar\nthat the mobilization of Russia to meet the mobilization of Austria was\naffecting his position of mediator, to which the Czar made a\nconciliatory reply, stating that Russia's mobilization was only for a\ndefense against Austria.\n\nThe Czar, to put at rest any anxiety of the Kaiser as to Russia's\nintentions with respect to Germany, added:\n\n     \"I thank you cordially for your mediation which permits the\n     hope that everything may yet end peaceably. It is technically\n     impossible to discontinue our military preparations which have\n     been made necessary by the Austrian mobilization. It is far\n     from us to want war. _As long as the negotiations between\n     Austria and Servia continue, my troops will undertake no\n     provocative action. I give you my solemn word thereon._ I\n     confide with all my faith in the grace of God, and I hope for\n     the success of your mediation in Vienna for the welfare of our\n     countries and the peace of Europe.\"\n\nWhat more could Russia do? If Austria continued to mobilize, why not\nRussia?\n\nOn this day, July 30, the German Ambassador had two interviews at St.\nPetersburg with Sazonof, and it was then that Sazonof drew up the\nfollowing formula as a basis for peace:\n\n     \"If Austria, recognizing that her conflict with Servia has\n     assumed character of question of European interest, declares\n     herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the points which\n     violate principle of sovereignty of Servia, _Russia engages to\n     stop all military preparations_.\"\n\n[Russian \"Orange Paper,\" No. 60.]\n\nAt this stage King George telegraphed Prince Henry of Prussia that\n\n     \"the English Government was doing its utmost, suggesting to\n     Russia and France to suspend further military preparations, if\n     Austria will consent to be satisfied with the occupation of\n     Belgrade and neighboring Servian territory as a hostage for\n     satisfactory settlement of her demands, other countries\n     meanwhile suspending their war preparation.\"\n\nThe King adds a hope that the Kaiser\n\n     \"will use his great influence to induce Austria to accept\n     this proposal, thus proving that Germany and England are\n     working together to prevent what would be an international\n     catastrophe.\"\n\n[Second German \"White Paper.\"]\n\nThis last proposition, however, was never accepted or declined, for the\nimpetuous Kaiser gave his twelve-hour ultimatum to Russia to demobilize,\nand this was an arrogant demand which no self-respecting power, much\nless so great a one as Russia, could possibly accept.\n\nWhile this demand was in progress Sir Edward Grey was making his last\nattempt to preserve peace by asking Germany to sound Vienna, as he would\nsound St. Petersburg, whether it would be possible for the four\ndisinterested powers to offer to Austria that they would\n\n     \"undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her\n     demands on Servia, provided they did not embarrass Servian\n     sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory.\"\n\nSir Edward Grey went so far as to tell the German Ambassador that if\nthis was not satisfactory, and if Germany would make any reasonable\nproposals to preserve peace and Russia and France rejected it, that\n\n     \"his Majesty's Government would have nothing to do with the\n     consequences,\"\n\nwhich obviously meant either neutrality or actual intervention in behalf\nof Germany and Austria.\n\nOn the same day the British Ambassador at Berlin besought the German\nForeign Office to\n\n     \"put pressure on the authorities at Vienna to do something in\n     the general interest to reassure Russia and to show themselves\n     disposed to continue discussions on a friendly basis.\"\n\nAnd Sir Edward Goschen reports that the German Foreign Minister replied\nthat last night he had\n\n     \"begged Austria to reply to your last proposal, and that he\n     had received a reply to the effect that the Austrian Minister\n     for Foreign Affairs would take the wishes of the Emperor this\n     morning in the matter.\"\n\n_Again the text of the letter in which Germany \"begged\" Austria to be\nconciliatory is not found in the record._\n\nThe excuse of Germany that the mobilization of Russia compelled it to\nmobilize does not justify the war. Mobilization does not necessarily\nmean aggression, but simply preparation. If Russia had the right to\nmobilize because Austria mobilized, Germany equally had the right to\nmobilize when Russia mobilized, but it does not follow that either of\nthe three nations could justify a war to compel the other parties to\ndemobilize. Mobilization is only a preparation against eventualities. It\nis the right of the sovereign State and by no code of ethics a _casus\nbelli_. The demand of Germany that Russia could not arm to defend\nitself, when Austria was preparing for a possible attack on Russia, has\nfew, if any, parallels in history for bullying effrontery. It treated\nRussia as an inferior, almost a vassal, State.\n\nIt must be observed that, while Germany insisted that Russia should\ndemobilize, the Kaiser offered no reciprocal promise. On his theory\nGermany and Austria were to be left free to complete their preparations,\nbut Russia was to tie her own hands and leave herself \"naked to her\nenemies.\" This is shown by the last telegrams which passed between the\nCzar and Kaiser. The Czar telegraphed:\n\n     \"I have received your telegram. I comprehend that you are\n     forced to mobilize, but I should like to have from you the\n     same guaranty which I have given you, viz., that these\n     measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue to\n     negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the\n     universal peace which is so dear to our hearts. With the aid\n     of God it must be possible to our long-tried friendship to\n     prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence\n     your urgent reply.\"\n\nTo this the Kaiser replied:\n\n     \"I thank you for your telegram. I have shown yesterday to your\n     Government the way through which alone war may yet be averted.\n     Although I asked for a reply by today noon, no telegram from\n     my Ambassador has reached me with the reply of your\n     Government. I therefore have been forced to mobilize my army.\n     An immediate, clear, and unmistakable reply of your Government\n     is the sole way to avoid endless misery. Until I receive this\n     reply I am unable, to my great grief, to enter upon the\n     subject of your telegram. I must ask most earnestly that you,\n     without delay, order your troops to commit, under no\n     circumstances, the slightest violation of our frontiers.\"\n\nThis impetuous step of Germany to compel its great neighbor to desist\nfrom military preparations to defend itself came most inopportunely, for\non Aug. 1 the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador _for the first time_ declared\nto the Russian Government its willingness to discuss the terms of the\nAustrian ultimatum to Servia, and it was then suggested that the form of\nthe ultimatum and the questions arising thereon should be discussed in\nLondon. (Dispatch from British Ambassador at Vienna to Sir Edward Grey,\ndated Sept. 1, 1914.) Sir Edward Grey at once advised the English\nAmbassador in Berlin of the fact, and urged that it was still possible\nto maintain peace\n\n     \"if only a little respite in time can be gained before any\n     great power begins war,\"\n\n     [English \"White Paper,\" No. 131.]\n\nbut the Kaiser, having issued the arrogant ultimatum to Russia to\ndemobilize in twelve hours, had gone too far for retreat, and, spurred\non by the arrogant Potsdam military party, he \"let slip the dogs of\nwar.\" After the fatal Rubicon had been crossed and the die was cast the\nCzar telegraphed King George:\n\n\"In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once more I have done all in\nmy power to avert war.\"\n\nSuch will be the verdict of history.\n\n\nThe Judgment.\n\nThese are _the facts_ as shown by the record, and upon them, in my\njudgment, an impartial court would not hesitate to pass the following\njudgment:\n\n1--_That Germany and Austria in a time of profound peace secretly\nconcerted together to impose their will upon Europe and upon Servia in a\nmatter affecting the balance of power in Europe. Whether in so doing\nthey intended to precipitate a European war to determine the mastery of\nEurope is not satisfactorily established, although their whole course of\nconduct suggests this as a possibility. They made war almost inevitable\nby (a) issuing an ultimatum that was grossly unreasonable and\ndisproportionate to any grievance that Austria had and (b) in giving to\nServia, and Europe, insufficient time to consider the rights and\nobligations of all interested nations._\n\n2--_That Germany had at all times the power to compel Austria to\npreserve a reasonable and conciliatory course, but at no time\neffectively exerted that influence. On the contrary, she certainly\nabetted, and possibly instigated, Austria in its unreasonable course._\n\n3--_That England, France, Italy, and Russia at all times sincerely\nworked for peace, and for this purpose not only overlooked the original\nmisconduct of Austria but made every reasonable concession in the hope\nof preserving peace._\n\n4--_That Austria, having mobilized its army, Russia was reasonably\njustified in mobilizing its forces. Such act of mobilization was the\nright of any sovereign State, and as long as the Russian armies did not\ncross the border or take any aggressive action no other nation had any\njust right to complain, each having the same right to make similar\npreparations._\n\n5--_That Germany, in abruptly declaring war against Russia for failure\nto demobilize when the other powers had offered to make any reasonable\nconcession and peace parleys were still in progress, precipitated the\nwar._\n\n6--_That Belgium as a sovereign State has as an inherent right the power\nto determine when and under what conditions an alien can cross her\nfrontiers. This right exists independently of treaties, but is, in the\ncase of Belgium, reinforced by the Treaty of 1839 and The Hague\nConvention, whereby the leading European nations (including Germany)\nguarantee its \"perpetual neutrality.\" The invasion of Belgium by Germany\nwas in violation of these rights, and England only respected its own\nsolemn covenant when, in defense of that neutrality, it declared war\nagainst Germany._\n\n\nIn Conclusion.\n\nThe writer of this article has reached these conclusions with\nreluctance, as he has a feeling of deep affection for the German people\nand equal admiration for their ideals and matchless progress. Even more\nhe admires the magnificent courage with which the German Nation, beset\non every hand by powerful antagonists, is now defending its prestige as\na nation. The whole-hearted devotion of this great nation to its flag is\nworthy of the best traditions of the Teutonic race. Nevertheless, this\ncannot alter the ethical truth, which stands apart from any\nconsiderations of nationality; nor can it affect the conclusion that the\nGerman Nation has been plunged into this abyss by its scheming statesmen\nand its self-centred and highly neurotic Kaiser, who in the twentieth\ncentury sincerely believes that he is the proxy of Almighty God on\nearth, and therefore infallible.\n\nIn visiting its condemnation, the Supreme Court of Civilization should\ntherefore distinguish between the military caste, headed by the Kaiser\nand the Crown Prince, which precipitated this great calamity, and the\nGerman people.\n\nThe very secrecy of the plot against the peace of the world and the\nfailure to disclose to the German people the diplomatic communications\nhereinbefore quoted, strongly suggest that this detestable war is not\nmerely a crime against civilization, _but also against the deceived and\nmisled German people_. They have a vision and are essentially\nprogressive and peace-loving in their national characteristics, while\nthe ideals of their military caste are those of the Dark Ages.\n\nOne day the German people will know the full truth and then there will\nbe a dreadful reckoning for those who have plunged a noble and\npeace-loving nation into this fathomless chasm of misfortune.\n\n    \"Though the mills of God grind slowly,\n      Yet they grind exceeding small,\n    Though with patience He stands waiting,\n      With exactness grinds He all.\"\n\n\n\n\nCritics Dispute Mr. Beck\n\n\n_To the Editor of The New York Times:_\n\nIt is regrettable that President Wilson's admirable policy of strict\nneutrality is not more sincerely and carefully observed by the press and\npublic of this country.\n\nWe are a cosmopolitan nation. Citizens of the five great warring\ncountries and their descendants, to a very great extent, constitute our\npopulation. Partiality of any kind tends to destroy the elemental ties\nwhich bind us together, to disrupt our Union, and to make us a house\ndivided against itself. James M. Beck's article in last Sunday's TIMES\nis of the kind which, serving no good purpose, helps to loosen, if not\nsever, our most vital domestic ties. While not for an instant doubting\nMr. Beck's sincerity, we must take issue with his inadvertently\nill-timed expression of opinion.\n\nThe article in question is based on the following statement: \"Any\ndiscussion of the ethical merits of this great controversy must start\nwith the assumption that there is such a thing as international\nmorality.\" How does Mr. Beck define \"international morality\"? How can he\nassume that to exist which each of the contending nations by their\ndiverse actions prove to be non-extant? How can he claim that there is\nan \"international morality\" of accepted form when each nation claims\nthat its interpretation must be accepted by the others?\n\nMr. Beck's allegation that the question \"Was England justified in\ndeclaring war against Germany?\" is more easily disposed of than the\nquestions \"Was Austria justified in declaring war against Servia?\" and\n\"Was Germany justified in declaring war against Russia and France?\"\nproves two things--first, that his interest lies primarily in the\nvindication of England; second, that he disregards the fundamental\ncauses and recognizes only the precipitating causes of the war.\n\nThe precipitating cause of the war between England and Germany is\nverbosely if inadequately covered by his article. We must admit that a\ntreaty was broken by Germany, yet we contend that this broken agreement\nwas a pretext for a war fomented and impelled by basic economic causes.\nAt the outset, let us distinguish between a contract and a treaty. A\ncontract is an agreement between individuals contemplating enforcement\nby a court of law; punishment by money damages in the great majority of\ncases, by a specific performance in a very few. A treaty is an agreement\nbetween nations contemplating enforcement by a court of international\npublic opinion; punishment by money indemnity in the great majority of\ncases, by specific performance (i.e., force of arms) in a very few.\n\n\nGermany's Existence Threatened.\n\nGermany contends that her breach of treaty obligation is punishable by\nthe payment of money indemnity to the aggrieved party. This she has\noffered to do in the case of Belgium, as she has already done in the\ncase of Luxemburg. Germany's existence was so seriously threatened that\nher action seems justifiable, and there remains a sole moral obligation\nto compensate any neutral country injured by her.\n\nThe mere fact that Belgium had made an unfortunate alliance with England\nis deplorable in that Belgium has suffered terribly; but this suffering\nis not attributable to Germany. When Japan violated Chinese neutrality,\nChina protested. Though she was entitled to a money indemnity, there is\nno valid reason under the sun why the United States as a guarantor of\nthe integrity of China should declare war against Japan. England's\njustification, in so far as there can be any justification for adding to\nthe toll of death, is the same as that of Germany, the preservation of\nnational sovereignty.\n\nFurther: \"It seems unnecessary to discuss the wanton disregard of these\nsolemn obligations.\" There can be nothing wanton in a struggle for\nexistence, and that this European war is such a struggle is the only\npossible explanation of its magnitude, ferocity, and vast possible\nconsequences. Then, too, though deplorable, treaty obligations are not\nsolemn, as Italy has proved to the complete satisfaction of so many.\nItaly's contention that this is an aggressive war on the part of Germany\nand Austria is as untenable as the German contention that it is an\naggressive war on the part of England. For this war was not an\naggressive war on the part of any nation, but an unavoidable war caused\nby the simultaneous bursting of the long-gathering economic storm\nclouds.\n\nAgain: \"The ethical aspects of this great conflict must largely depend\nupon the record that has been made up by the official communications.\"\nThis is similar to a contention that the ethical rights in a case in\ncourt must depend upon the astuteness of counsel in summing up to the\njury. \"A court would be deeply impressed ... by the significant\nomissions of documents known to be in existence.\" A court of law, as our\nformer Assistant Attorney General of the United States surely knows,\ncompels no one to give testimony that tends to incriminate, and,\nfurthermore, does not construe failure to testify on the grounds that it\nwill tend to incriminate against the defendant. In the law the defendant\nis entitled to every reasonable doubt. It is also conceivable that a\nreasonable time for the defense to present its case would be granted\nbefore passing judgment.\n\nPassing on: \"To discuss the justice of Austria's grievances against\nServia would take us ... into the realm of disputed facts.\" This seems a\ndelectable bit of humor. We respectfully submit that Mr. Beck's other\nassertions might also be considered as \"in the realm of disputed facts.\"\nMr. Beck admits that Austria had a just grievance against Servia, though\nhe questions her method of redress. Though we conceive that in the\nunfortunate European tangle Austria relied on German support in the\nevent of international conflict, we submit that reliance on Russian\nsupport was a bigger factor in encouraging little Servia to defy her big\nneighbor than the remoter help that Germany would furnish Austria in the\nevent of the conflict spreading.\n\nAustria, in the exercise of her right to engage in a punitive expedition\nagainst Servia, guaranteed that she would do nothing to generalize the\nconflict by her assurances to Russia and to the world that there would\nbe no annexation of Servian territory or annihilation of the Servian\nKingdom. Whether these assurances were genuine or not is impossible of\ndetermination. We have no right to constitute ourselves arbiters of\ntheir sincerity.\n\n\nNo European Solidarity.\n\nMr. Beck speaks of \"the solidarity of European civilization and the fact\nthat by policy and diplomatic intercourse ... a United European State\nexists, even though its organization be as yet inchoate.\" This\nsolidarity is conspicuous only by its utter non-existence. Whatever may\nhave been achieved by policy and diplomatic intercourse has been marred\nand rendered useless by the lines of demarkation of the spheres of\ninfluence of the great powers of Europe and by the racial and\ntemperamental incongruities of Europe's population.\n\nWe read: \"Servia had forty-eight hours to answer; ... the other European\nnations had barely a day to consider what could be done to preserve the\npeace of Europe. Why should an Austro-Servian war compromise the peace\nof Europe?\" Was it not because of the tangled web of international\ndiplomacy, the Triple Entente as well as the Triple Alliance?\n\nReferring to a German warning in regard to Austria's demands on Servia,\n\"the German Foreign Office anticipates that Servia 'will refuse to\ncomply with these demands'--why, if they were justified?\" We grieve at\nthe shattered ideal of Mr. Beck, who, in the face of the international\ncalamity which has befallen the world, still can believe that all\njustifiable demands are complied with.\n\nAgain, quoting German \"White Paper,\" Annex 1B, Germany desired \"that\nthe dispute be localized, since any intervention of another power, on\naccount of the various alliance obligations, would bring consequences\nimpossible to measure.\" The explanation of this statement is not--an\naggressor threatens his adversary, but, rather, a prudent man begs\nopposing factions to keep cool.\n\nGreat space is devoted in the article in question to Germany's\nunwillingness to place the Austro-Servian controversy in the hands of\nFrance, England, Germany, and Italy. As Germany disavows all interest in\nthe controversy, if she speaks truly, it was not within her power to\ndictate to her ally in a matter which she could in nowise control except\nby force of arms. Furthermore, had she had the power, how could she be\nexpected to exert pressure on her ally to leave a vital controversy to a\ncourt of four, two of whom were bound by alliances with Russia,\nAustria's real antagonist, and a third, (Italy,) as subsequent events\nhave shown, Austria's natural, geographical, and hereditary enemy? At\nbest, had each power held to its treaty obligations, there would have\nbeen a deadlock.\n\nFurther: \"The Russian Minister ... called at the German Foreign Office\nand asked it 'to urge upon Vienna ... to take up this line of\nconciliation. Jagow replied that he could not advise Austria to yield.'\"\nElsewhere in the article a statement is made that the Austro-Servian and\nAustro-Russian questions \"for all practical purposes ... were\nindistinguishable.\" This inconsistency of having Servia in the light of\na principal and then again in the light of an agent is the greatest\nstumbling block to a clear analysis of the precipitating cause of the\nwar. The logical explanation of Servia's position is that of Russia's\nagent. Hence Germany could not be expected to exert the same pressure on\nan allied principal that Russia could exert on her agent.\n\nIt is true that Germany engaged in many blundering diplomatic quibbles\nin the final stages of preparation for the war; but it is also true that\nEngland quibbled, though with greater diplomatic finesse; for instance,\n\"Sir Edward Grey went so far as to tell the German Ambassador that ...\nif Germany would make any reasonable proposals to preserve peace, and\nRussia and France rejected it, that 'his Majesty's Government would have\nnothing to do with the consequences.'\" Here it is apparent to every one\nthat the word \"reasonable\" begs the questions.\n\n\nSlav and Teuton.\n\nThe German people were encouraged to relish the idea of a war against\nRussia once that war became likely, for sooner or later it seemed\ninevitable that Slav and Teuton would clash, and Germany felt confident\nthat at the present time she outmatched her enemy. The Russians, too,\nwere encouraged to desire the Slav provinces of Austria, which racially\nare a part of the Russian domain. The English people were made to relish\nthis opportunity to strike their great commercial competitor, especially\nwhen they could do so with little likelihood of unfavorable criticisms.\nFinally, the impressionable French people were stirred to thoughts of\nrevenge and recovery of their lost provinces.\n\nSympathy with any country in this most disgraceful yet most inevitable\nof wars brands the sympathizer as a party to the material and lustful\npurposes of at least one of the combatants. There is no ethical\njustification of this war from any standpoint. There is no justification\nof this war from any standpoint. There is only an explanation of the war\nfrom an economic standpoint. All these specious arguments on the\nprecipitating causes of the war can be but for the display of brilliant\nforensic oratory and matchless diction. Let us thrust aside in these\ndark moments of peril and horror all subterfuge.\n\nEngland, overburdened with taxation, was on the verge of civil war.\nRussia, whose masses were overridden roughshod by a bureaucracy\nweighting down the peasants with onerous national burdens, expected\nsooner or later the cataclysmic upheaval with which the Nihilistic\nsocieties have long been threatening its tyrannical Government. France,\nseriously financially embarrassed because of crop impoverishment and\nbad foreign investments in Brazil, Russia, and the Balkans, was subject\nto continued internal political upheavals, with ever-changing Ministries\nand a growing Socialist Party.\n\nAustria, \"the ramshackle empire,\" was in danger of disintegrating from a\nvariety of causes, not the least of which was the infusibility of its\nracially different elements. Germany, in a blind race for commercial\nsupremacy, suffered from industrial overproduction, thus creating an\nunhealthy financial condition which fortified the Socialist Party to an\nextent which threatened her imperialistic form of government itself.\n\nSo these monarchies whose days were numbered, because of dissatisfaction\nat the waste and extravagance of a world gone mad with national excesses\ncommitted in the name of civilization, in reality the price of our\nmodernization, in a final desperate effort to rally their waning\nfortunes stampeded their awakening masses into a ruinous interracial war\nin order to stave off the torch and the guillotine.\n\nGEORGE E. BERNHEIMER.\n\nNew York, Oct. 30, 1914.\n\n\n\n\nRussia to Blame\n\n\n_To the Editor of The New York Times:_\n\nAllow me to submit the following in answer to the article of James M.\nBeck, entitled \"Case of the Double Alliance vs. the Triple Entente,\"\npublished in THE NEW YORK TIMES of Oct. 25, 1914:\n\nThe case of \"Russian Mobilization vs. German Mediation.\" Q.--Upon whom\nwas the duty to yield?\n\nMr. Beck has spent considerable time and effort to prove, at least by\ninference, that Germany must have been informed beforehand of the\nAustrian ultimatum to Servia. Personally, I am convinced that the\nultimatum in question was sent with the full knowledge and consent of\nGermany; and, whether this is true or not, I maintain that it was\nAustria's duty to inform her ally before taking a step which was likely\nto endanger the peace of Europe.\n\nThe concession of this point takes me immediately to the ultimatum\nitself and to the question, \"Was the tenor of the ultimatum justified?\"\nMr. Beck, in his judgment, says: \"The ultimatum is grossly unreasonable\nand disappropriate to any grievance that Austria had.\" Perhaps Mr. Beck\nis right, but I have good reasons to think that the tenor of the\nultimatum was fully justified, in view of Servia's former conduct.\n\nAustria was dealing here with a Government the real spirits of which had\ncome into power by the commission of one of the most dastardly crimes of\nmodern times. A crime which, at the time of its commission, sent a shock\nof horror through the entire civilized world, to wit, \"the outrageous\nmurder of the former King and Queen of Servia,\" outrageous because it\nwas perpetrated by the so-called aristocracy of Servia. The\nlong-continued agitation carried on by Servia against Austria, at the\ninstigation of Russia, which finally culminated in another no less\noutrageous assassination, that of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his\nconsort, to my idea fully justified Austria in making demands which\nunder ordinary circumstances might have been termed \"unreasonable.\"\n\nThe question whether Austria was justified in going to war against\nServia is a debatable one, but I respectfully refer to the fact that our\nown country, the United States, was only very recently on the verge of\nprecipitating war with a \"much weaker\" nation than ours, on account of\nthe latter's refusal to salute the American flag. Neither did we stop on\nthat occasion with the ultimatum, but we followed it up with dispatching\na fleet of warships, the landing of troops, and the seizure of Vera\nCruz.\n\nFrom the time Austria's ultimatum was sent all the great powers seemed\nto have professed a great eagerness for the preservation of peace. Mr.\nBeck asserts that Germany was not sincere in its desire for peace and\ncould have avoided the war if it had seriously tried to exert its\ninfluence over Austria. This finding is based on the inference drawn\nfrom the fact that Germany failed to achieve any results.\n\nTo determine whether Mr. Beck is justified in finding as he does, it is\nnecessary, first of all, to examine the exact status of the powers at\nthe time the ultimatum was sent. We find that Austria had a just\ngrievance against Servia, for which it was seeking redress. An issue was\ntherefore raised between Austria and Servia. Germany, although Austria's\nally, immediately defined its attitude by declaring emphatically that\n\"the question at issue was one for settlement between Servia and Austria\nalone.\"\n\n\nWhy Did Russia Mobilize?\n\nI beg to ask Mr. Beck to answer the following question: By what\nright--moral, legal, or equitable--did Russia make Servia's cause its\nown? Did Russia have any alliance with Servia? I further ask: What\nprivity existed between Austria, Servia, and Russia?\n\nSuppose Mr. Beck can justify the action of Russia, although a \"rank\noutsider,\" in taking Servia's part, how can he possibly justify the\npositively unreasonable and, under the circumstances, most dangerous\nstep of \"actual mobilization\" on the part of Russia?\n\nMr. Beck has tried to justify the mobilization by quoting the Russian\nexcuse \"that Russia's mobilization was only for a defense against\nAustria.\" On close examination what does this amount to? It resolves\nitself into a situation somewhat like this: A sends an ultimatum to B\nseeking redress for a wrong committed by B upon A, whereupon C mobilizes\n\"for defense against A.\" I leave it to the average American of ordinary\nintelligence to find a reason for C's mobilization \"for defense against\nA.\" Mr. Beck might as well try to justify a mobilization on the part of\nJapan if the United States was preparing to invade Mexico for the\npurpose of redressing an insult to the American flag. Does Mr. Beck\nrealize the seriousness of actual mobilization by Russia at that\ncritical moment? Not one of the other powers dared to take this one step\nwhich among nations is regarded as tantamount to a declaration of war.\n\nAnd what did the Kaiser do at this moment? He did the only thing he\ncould do, and, I dare say, the only thing our American Nation could have\ndone under the same circumstances. He wired the Czar and stated: \"I am\nwilling to bring my influences to bear upon Austria, provided you agree\nto cease mobilization.\" Was this demand unreasonable? What else could\nGermany have done, I ask, with the Russian bear standing on the border\nwith the sword already drawn? This moment was the crucial and decisive\none in the prologue to this awful world drama.\n\nThe only question therefore and the all-important one to be submitted to\nthe Court of Civilization, is, Whose duty was it to yield? Was it\nRussia's, with the sword already drawn against a country which had not\nattacked it, not even threatened it, or was it Germany's, with the sword\nin the sheath?\n\nIn his \"conclusion,\" Mr. Beck speaks of Germany as \"beset on every hand\nby powerful antagonists.\" Does he really mean to deprive the German\nEmperor of the right to demand as a condition precedent to mediation on\nhis part the discontinuance of mobilization by Russia?\n\nMr. Beck in his \"judgment\" under Paragraph 4 says \"that Austria, having\nmobilized its army, Russia was reasonably justified in mobilizing its\nforces.\" The use of the qualifying word \"reasonably\" seems to indicate\nthat even Mr. Beck is not quite certain that Russia was in fact\njustified in mobilizing its forces.\n\nIs it reasonable, just, and fair of Mr. Beck to expect Germany, \"beset\non every hand by powerful antagonists,\" to permit Russia to continue\nmobilizing its 18,000,000 soldiers and have Germany believe that Russia\nwas sincere in its \"peaceful intentions\" in the face of actual\nmobilization? At this moment the German Kaiser made a very reasonable\ndemand upon Russia to cease mobilization, and I ask every fair-minded\nAmerican, whether lawyer or layman, \"whose duty it was to yield\" at this\nmoment. The answer to this question will settle the much-disputed point\nas to the actual cause of the war.\n\nIn conclusion, I beg to ask Mr. Beck: Why expect so much of Germany and\nnothing of Russia, when Germany had not merely professed her peaceful\nintentions, but actually maintained peace for over forty years, during\nwhich period not a foot of territory had been acquired by her through\nconquest? This is a fact.\n\nComing into a court of law supported by such a reputation, does Mr. Beck\nreally believe that the decision of the court would have been in favor\nof Russia? Does Mr. Beck really believe that the decision would have\nbeen against Germany, whose war lord was begging the Czar almost on his\nknees to avoid the awful calamity by the discontinuance of mobilization?\n\nPicture the United States about to invade Mexico to redress an insult to\nthe American flag. Picture England as the ally of the United States, and\nJapan supporting Mexico, without any alliance existing between the two\nlatter countries. To make this example conform to the actual facts under\ndiscussion, we must, of course, assume that both Japan and England are\nsituated in the North American Continent, and across the border from the\nUnited States and England. Japan, with an army of 18,000,000 soldiers,\n(assumed for the purpose of argument,) mobilizes her army, professedly\nfor defense against the United States. Could any fair-minded American\npossibly expect England to intercede with her ally, the United States,\nwithout first demanding the demobilization of Japan? Whose duty was it\nto yield?\n\nThe actual fact is that Germany even then did not declare war against\nRussia until Russian soldiers had actually crossed not the Austrian but\nthe German border.\n\nI may add that in writing the above I am prompted only by the very\nnatural desire, viz., to impress upon the jury composed of the American\npeople the one fact which should be given the most careful consideration\nin order to enable it to arrive at a just verdict in the case submitted,\nand this fact is \"the mobilization of Russia.\"\n\nFRANK SEGGEBRUCH.\n\nNew York, Oct. 29, 1914.\n\n\n\n\nIn Defense of Austria\n\n\n_To the Editor of The New York Times:_\n\nReferring to your editorial, \"The Evidence Examined,\" in your Sunday\nedition, I wish to protest emphatically against your assertion that a\n\"Court of Civilization\" must inevitably come to the conclusion that\nGermany precipitated the war. There are still millions of civilized\npeople who see these things quite differently.\n\nMr. Beck makes out a case from the viewpoint of the accusing party--of\ncourse, nobody will doubt the legal abilities of Mr. Beck--but before\nthe Supreme Court of Civilization there is also a law: audiatur et\naltera pars. Mr. Beck, as he presents the case to the court, has not\nmentioned very important points which, for the decision of the Supreme\nCourt, would be most vital ones.\n\nAt first the breach of Belgian neutrality, admitted and regretted by the\nGerman Government, has nothing to do with the question--who precipitated\nthe war? It constituted only an action of the war itself. On the other\nhand, you call in your editorial the Austrian ultimatum a savage one\nand take it for granted that this ultimatum started the stone rolling\nand brought finally the general clash in Europe about. This presumption,\nwhen presented to the court, will have to be thoroughly proved, because\nthere are many people, fair and just, as you consider yourself, who are\nconvinced of the ample justification of this ultimatum.\n\nIt is hardly describable how many criminal acts have been committed by\nServians against the very existence of the Dual Monarchy for the last\nsix years, under the eyes of the Servian Government and approved by it,\nby intriguing against Austria's right to cultivate her own territory,\nBosnia, spreading secret societies all over the empire, &c.\n\nThe awful crime, the assassination of the heir to the throne, was only\nthe finish of a long chain of like acts. These facts, which immediately\nlead up to the ultimatum, ought to be considered in the first place by\njudging Austria's justification for sending this ultimatum to Servia. A\njust Judge in the Court of Civilization will, I am convinced, carefully\nstudy the ante-history and in all probability arrive at the conclusion\nthat the ultimatum was amply justified and Servia fully deserved the\nseverest punishment possible.\n\nMr. Beck presents to the court the Russian interference with this\nintended punishment and forgets to tell the Judge that Russia had not\nthe least right to this interference. No foreign power had.\n\nTherefore, Austria was entirely within her right to decline any\nnegotiations with Russia about this punishment before its completion.\nNevertheless, the German Government brought these negotiations about,\nand, while these negotiations proceeded satisfactorily, Russia\nmobilized, mobilized all along her western frontier against Austria and\nGermany, notwithstanding the fact that she had promised not to do so and\nofficials in Petrograd had pledged their words to the contrary.\n\nRussia knew there could be no such thing as a war with Austria alone, as\nwell as Germany knew that a war with Russia meant a war with France. If\nthe laws of morality rule in the Court of Civilization, they should\nabove all be applied to the conduct of Servia and Russia. Austria was in\na state of self-defense, when she decided not to bear any longer\nServia's treacherous and murderous attacks against her existence; this\nis entirely within the boundaries of the laws of morality. Russia,\nhowever, without the slightest right, moral or legal, attacked Austria\nfrom the back by interfering with Austria's own affairs.\n\nTherefore I wish to point out that a careful student of the papers, by\nconsidering the ante-history of the war, which, as you will admit, is\nvery essential, may come to a quite different conclusion and Mr. Beck as\nState's attorney will have a hard stand against the counsel of the\ndefendant.\n\nEDWARD PICK.\n\nNew York, Oct. 27, 1914.\n\n[Illustration]\n\n\n\n\nDefense of the Dual Alliance--A Reply\n\nBy Dr. Edmund von Mach.\n\n     Instructor of Fine Arts, Harvard, 1899-1903; Instructor in\n     History of Art, Wellesley College, 1899-1902; Lecturer in\n     History of Art, Bradford Academy, Cambridge, Mass. Author of\n     many books on Greek and Roman sculpture and the history of\n     painting. Served in the German Army, 1889-91.\n\n\nHon. James M. Beck has eloquently argued the case of the Allies against\nGermany and Austria-Hungary, and submitted his findings with confident\nassurance of their acceptance by the Supreme Court of Civilization.\nCarried away by his zeal he has at times used terms not warranted by the\nevidence, such as \"the irrepressible Kaiser,\" \"stupid falsehood,\"\n\"duplicity,\" and the like, but since the court can be trusted to\ndisregard such expressions no further attention will be paid to them.\n\nTo a certain extent this article is not a reply but a continuation of\nMr. Beck's argument, for, wherever our personal sympathies may lie, we\nare all equally interested in discovering the truth. In the final\nsettlement of peace American public opinion may, nay, will, have a\nprominent voice. If it is exerted on the strength of a true\nunderstanding of European events, it will contribute to the\nestablishment of a lasting peace.\n\nAs to the evidence submitted Mr. Beck seems to err in believing that\nGovernments are accustomed to publish in their various white, gray, or\norange papers \"the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.\"\nThis is nowhere done, for there are many bits of information which come\nto a Government through its diplomatic connections which it would be\nindelicate, discourteous, or unwise to give to the public. The official\ndocuments on American foreign relations and all white, gray, or orange\npapers are \"edited.\" They are understood to be so by Congress,\nParliament, the Reichstag, the Duma, &c., and no charge of dishonesty\ncan be maintained against the respective Governments on that score.\n\nIf the Chancellor says that Germany was using her good offices in\nVienna, this is as valuable a bit of evidence as the reprint of a\ndispatch in the \"White Paper,\" unless we wish to impugn his veracity,\nand in that case the copy of a dispatch would be valueless, for he might\nhave forged it. The entire argument, therefore, against Germany and\nAustria, based on what Mr. Beck calls the \"suppression of vitally\nimportant documents,\" is void, unless you will apply it equally to Great\nBritain and the other countries.\n\nIn Sir Edward Grey's \"White Paper\" Mr. Beck has missed no important\ndocuments because he looked at England's well-prepared case through\nsympathetic eyes, and it did not occur to him to ask, \"Where are all the\ndocuments bearing on Italian neutrality?\" Does he believe that England\nwas so little interested in the question whether she would have to fight\ntwo or three foes, and whether her way to Egypt and India would be safe\nor threatened? There are many dispatches to and from Rome included in\nthe \"White Paper,\" but not a mention of Italy's position.\n\nThe first paper contains a letter to the British Ambassador in Berlin\nconcerning the Austro-Servian relations. Is it not probable that Sir\nEdward Grey's attention was called to this question by his Ambassador in\nVienna? Where is his letter? Or, if Sir Edward thought of it himself,\nwhy did he not mention his conversation also to Sir M. de Bunsen in\nVienna? Where is this note? Are we to assume that Sir M. de Bunsen made\nhis first report on July 23, although Sir Edward Goschen in Berlin had\nan interesting report to make a day earlier?\n\nWe can thus go through the whole British \"White Paper\" and discover the\nomission of many interesting documents.\n\nNo. 38 is a letter from Sir Rennell Rodd in Rome, dated on July 23 and\nreceived on July 27. He had no doubt sent also a telegram. What did it\ncontain, and why was it not published under the date of its arrival\ninstead of the letter which had been delayed in transit?\n\n\nWhere Is No. 28?\n\nIn No. 29 Sir Edward Grey refers in a telegram to Sir R. Rodd to what \"I\nhad said to the German Ambassador.\" Such a reference could have a\nmeaning for Sir R. Rodd only if he had been informed of this\nconversation. There is no dispatch printed in the \"White Paper\"\ncontaining this information. Possibly it was so entwined with other\ninstructions, which Sir Edward Grey did not care to have known, that it\ncould not be published. Was it perhaps sent to the printer first as No.\n28, and removed at the last moment when it was too late to change the\nsubsequent numbers? Or, if this assumption is wrong, what was printed\noriginally as No. 28? Where is No. 28? There are other omissions, and\none especially noteworthy one between Nos. 80 and 106 which will be\ndiscussed later.\n\nViewed in this light, the English \"White Paper\" loses much of the value\nof a complete record, which it has had in the eyes of many. There is\nabsolutely no reason to doubt the accuracy of those dispatches which\nhave been printed, but it becomes incumbent upon the searcher after the\ntruth to inquire whether the existence of unprinted (in the case of the\nGerman \"White Paper\" Mr. Beck uses the term \"suppressed\") papers may not\nat times alter the interpretation which should be given to those that\nare printed.\n\nSince we have no published records anywhere concerning the advice given\nto Italy by the Allies, and the gradual steps leading up to Italy's\ndecision to remain neutral; nor any hint as to the day when her decision\nwas communicated to England and the other powers, it would be futile to\nspeculate on this subject. Since, however, the Queen of Italy and the\nwife of the Commander in Chief of the Russian forces are sisters, and\nsince it was in the interest of the Allies to keep Italy neutral, it is\nnot unreasonable to assume that an exchange of opinion took place\nbetween Italy and the Allies concerning the conditions under which Italy\nwould remain neutral.\n\nIf the actual opening of hostilities could be so managed that Germany\ncould be called the aggressor, then Italy probably declared that she\nwould not enter the war. This is a very important phase of the case, and\nthe omission from Sir Edward Grey's \"White Paper\" of all dispatches\ndealing with Italian neutrality is much to be regretted.\n\nSince we are dealing with the Italian dispatches here, it may be\nadvisable to consider at once all the communications which are published\nas having passed between Sir Edward Grey and the British Ambassador, Sir\nRennell Rodd, in Rome. They are numbered 19, (perhaps 28,) 29, 35, 36,\n38, 49, 57, 63, 64, 80, 81, 86, 92, 100, and 106, of which the important\nnumbers are 38, 57, 64, 80, and 86.\n\nOn July 23 Sir Edward Grey was informed that \"the gravity of the\nsituation lay in the conviction of the Austro-Hungarian Government that\nit was absolutely necessary for their prestige, after the many\ndisillusions which the turn of events in the Balkans has occasioned, to\nscore a definite success.\" (No. 38.)\n\nAustria, in other words, believed that to let the murder of her\nheir-apparent pass unpunished would have meant a deathblow to her\nprestige, and consequently, as any one familiar with her conditions will\nagree, to her existence. Russia, on the other hand, on July 25 said (see\nNo. 17, report from Sir G. Buchanan) that she could not \"allow (note the\nword) Austria to crush Servia and become the predominant power in the\nBalkans, and if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face\nall the risks of war.\"\n\nThese two dispatches to Sir Edward Grey tell the whole story in a\nnutshell. Austria believed, rightly or wrongly, that it was a question\nof life or death for her, while Russia claimed the right of preventing\nAustria from becoming the predominate power in the Balkans, and actually\nthreatened war. Russia did not claim to be concerned with the justice of\nAustria's demands on Servia.\n\nNo such definite word of Russia's intention was sent to Germany, for on\nJuly 26 Sir M. de Bunsen reported Germany's confident belief that\n\"Russia will keep quiet during the chastisement of Servia.\" (No. 32.)\n\nOn the next day Sir Rennell Rodd reports from Rome (No. 57) that the\nMinister of Foreign Affairs believes that \"if Servia will even now\naccept it (the Austrian note) Austria will be satisfied\" and refrain\nfrom a punitive war. He, moreover, believes--and this is very\nimportant--that Servia may be induced to accept the note in its entirety\non the advice of the four powers invited to the conference, and this\nwould enable her to say that she had yielded to Europe and not to\nAustria-Hungary alone. Since Italy was to be one of the four powers, the\nMinister's belief was doubtless based on accurate information. There is\nthen as late as July 27 no claim made by Servia that Austria's demands\nare unreasonable. She only hates to yield to Austria alone. Austria, in\nthe meanwhile, (No. 57,) repeats her assurance that she demands no\nterritorial sacrifices from Servia.\n\nOn the next day, July 28, Sir Rennell Rodd reports (No. 64) that \"Servia\nmight still accept the whole Austrian note, if some explanation were\ngiven regarding mode in which Austrian agents would require to\nintervene.\" Austria, on her part, had explained that \"the co-operation\nof the Austrian agents in Servia was to be only in investigation, not in\njudicial or administrative measures. Servia was said to have willfully\nmisinterpreted this.\" (No. 64.)\n\nFrom these reports it appears that the differences between Austria and\nServia were on the way to a solution. Austria claimed that her demands\nwere just, and Servia did not deny this. Austria further claimed that\nher prestige, her very existence, demanded the prompt compliance with\nher requests by Servia. She explained in a satisfactory way the one\npoint on which Servia had taken exceptions, and Servia was on the point\nof complying, and would have complied, if the powers had been willing to\nlet her do so. Such a conclusion of the incident would have strengthened\nAustria's prestige and assured the punishment of the murderers of\nSerajevo.\n\n\nRussia's Remark About Austria.\n\nThe reason why Servia was not allowed to submit was Russia's remark,\nquoted above, that she would not \"allow\" Austria to become the\npredominant power in the Balkans. It was, therefore, Russia's task to\nprevent Servia from accepting Austria's note. Since war was her\nalternative, baldly stated to England from the first, she had to do\nthree things--first, to secure as many allies as possible; secondly, to\nweaken her enemies, preferably by detaching from them Italy, and,\nthirdly, to get as much of a start in her mobilization as possible.\n\nThe treaties between Russia, France, and Great Britain, unlike those\nbetween Germany, Austria, and Italy, have never been published. Whatever\ntheir wording may be, Russia was at first apparently not absolutely sure\nof the support of France, (No. 17,) and France, it would seem, was\nunwilling to tempt fate without the help of England. That England should\nbe willing to join such a combination for such a cause seemed so\npreposterous to Germany that she did not believe it. Without England no\nFrance, without France no war, for alone Russia could not measure\nherself against Austria. Austria would not have attacked her of her own\nfree will, but if Russia had attacked Austria, the whole world knew from\nthe published treaties that Germany was bound to come to the assistance\nof her ally. It would have been two against one, and the two could have\nwaited until Russia had finished her cumbersome mobilization. For even\nif she had her whole army of many million men on the frontier, Austria\nand Germany together were strong enough to stem her advance.\n\nRussia's only chance, therefore, when Servia was on the point of\nyielding, and Austria had almost re-established her prestige, was to\nsecure the help of France, but this meant also the promise of England.\n\nThe demands made on England by Russia, some of which are quoted in the\n\"White Paper,\" are too well known to deserve repetition. This was the\nchief thing that counted, to get England's promise. The next was to\ndetach Italy from her allies, (but of this there are no documents\navailable,) and the third to gain time for her mobilization. All the\nother suggestions and counter-suggestions which fill the English \"White\nPaper\" are insignificant, as soon as the fundamental positions of\nAustria and Russia are understood.\n\nGermany has claimed that England promised her support to Russia and\nFrance on July 30, or in the night of July 29, and, to prove it, has\npublished the letter from the Belgian Minister in St. Petersburg to his\nMinister of Foreign Affairs, printed in translation in THE NEW YORK\nTIMES on Oct. 7. This letter, which has not been officially denied by\nthe Allies, states that the promise of England's support gave the\nRussian war party the upper hand and resulted in the order of complete\nmobilization.\n\n\nEnglish \"White Paper's\" Testimony.\n\nStrangely enough, and doubtless by an oversight, the English \"White\nPaper\" contains two dispatches (Nos. 80 and 106) which seem to confirm\nthe accuracy of M. de l'Escaille's statement, viz., that England\npromised the Russian-French combination her support.\n\nOn July 29 Sir Rennell Rodd wrote to Sir Edward Grey (No. 80) that the\nItalian Minister of Foreign Affairs had told him \"there seemed to be a\ndifficulty in making Germany believe that Russia was in earnest. As\nGermany, however, was really anxious for good relations with ourselves,\nif she believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France, he\nthought it would have a great effect.\"\n\nIn a later dispatch of the same day (No. 86) he deprecates Russia's\npartial mobilization, which he fears has spoiled the chances of\nGermany's exerting any pressure on Austria.\n\nBut on the next day, July 30, these remarkable words occur: \"He [the\nItalian Minister] had reason to believe that Germany was now disposed to\ngive more conciliatory advice to Austria, as she seemed convinced that\nwe should act with France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid\nissue with us.\" (No. 106.)\n\nReaders of the \"White Paper\" will look in vain for an explanation of\nsuch a change of heart on Germany's part. What does \"now\" mean in the\nlast letter? And why does Germany seem \"convinced\" that England will act\nwith Russia--if not that she has heard of the promise mentioned by M. de\nl'Escaille, as given early on July 30 or late the 29th? The dates agree,\nand unless Sir Edward Grey publishes further papers to explain the\nchange that had taken place between July 29 and July 30 one seems forced\nto accept this explanation.\n\nWhat is Germany's attitude? Does she rush into war? Not at all, for she\nis \"most anxious to avoid issue\" with England. (No. 106.) Germany knew\nthat Russia had begun to mobilize. Every day, every hour counted; for\nagainst the masses of Russia she had only her greater speed to match.\nShe knew that England had gone over to Russia, although she was probably\nhoping that the alliance between the Saxon and the Slav was not yet\nirrefragable. Still, the prospects were dark. But in spite of this the\nefforts were renewed to see what could be done in Vienna.\n\nThe famous exchange of telegrams between royalty began in the evening of\nJuly 29; and here it is wise to halt for a moment. On July 30 the Czar\ntelegraphed to the Emperor in reply to the Emperor's expression of\nregret that Russia should be mobilizing, as follows: \"The military\nmeasures in force now were decreed five days ago.\" That is, according to\nthe Czar, the Russian mobilization had begun on July 25. On July 27,\nhowever, the Russian Minister of War, M. Suchomlinow, had declared to\nthe German Military Attache \"on his word of honor\" that no mobilization\norder had been issued. July 25, however, it will be remembered, was the\nday on which Sir G. Buchanan had reported from St. Petersburg that\nRussia will \"face all risks of war\" if she can feel sure of the support\nof France.\n\nOn July 31 Russia mobilized her entire army, which led to Germany's\nultimatum that Russia demobilize within twelve hours. No reply was\nreceived to the request, and orders for the mobilization of the German\nArmy were issued at 5:15 P.M., Aug. 1, after the German Ambassador in\nSt. Petersburg had been instructed to declare that, owing to the\ncontinued mobilization of the Russian Army, a state of war existed\nbetween the two countries.\n\n\nKaiser Tried to Keep Peace.\n\nIn order to understand this step one should read the book \"La France\nVictorieuse dans la Guerre de Demain,\" (\"France Victorious in the Next\nWar,\") by Col. Arthur Boucher, published in 1911. Col. Boucher has\nstated the case baldly and so simply that every one can understand it.\nIn substance his argument is this: \"Alone France has no chance, but\ntogether with Russia she will win against Germany. Suppose the three\ncountries are beginning mobilization on the same day. Germany finishes\nfirst, France second, and Russia last. Germany must leave some of her\ntroops on her eastern frontier, the rest she throws against France. All\nFrance has to do is to hold them for a few days. [Col. Boucher mentions\nthe exact number of days. This book is not at hand, and the writer\nprefers not to quote from memory.] Then Russia comes into play, more\nGerman troops will be needed in the East, the French proceed to an\nattack on their weakened enemy, and La France sera victorieuse.\"\n\nEverything hinges on just a couple of days or so. A couple of days! And\nhow much of a start had Russia? She had begun on July 25; on July 27\ndefinite news of the Russian mobilization was reported in Berlin,\nalthough the Minister of War denied it \"on his honor.\" On July 30\nEngland was understood to have promised her support to Russia, and the\nCzar acknowledged that Russia had been mobilizing for the past five\ndays. Five days! And Col. Boucher, expressing the opinion of military\nexperts, had counted on victory on a much smaller margin!\n\nDo the Judges of the Supreme Court of Civilization realize the almost\nsuper-human efforts in the interest of peace made by the German Emperor?\nRussia has a start of five days, and on July 31 a start of six days. Can\nwe not hear all the military leaders imploring the Emperor not to\nhesitate any longer? But in the interest of peace the Emperor delays. He\nhas kept the peace for Germany through the almost thirty years of his\nreign. He prays to his God, in Whom he has placed his trust through all\nhis upright life, with a fervor which has often brought him ridicule.\nAlso, he still believes in England, and hopes through her efforts to be\nable to keep the peace. He waits another day. A start of seven days for\nRussia! The odds against Germany have grown tremendously. At last he\norders mobilization. For a longer delay he would not have been able to\nanswer to his country. As it is, there are many people who blame him\nseverely for having waited so long.\n\nBut William II. was right, for when the world will begin to realize the\nagonies through which he must have passed during these days of waiting,\nand the sacrifices he made in his effort to preserve peace, it will\njudge Germany rightly, and call the Emperor the great prince of peace\nthat he is.\n\nBut, it has been said, why did he not avoid war, either by forcing\nAustria to yield to Russia, or, if she refused, by withdrawing from her?\nIn common with the whole of Germany, he probably felt that Austria's\nposition was right. Servia herself, as has been seen above, did not\nclaim that she was unjustly treated, whatever outsiders thought of\nAustria's demands; and Austria was fully justified by past events in\nbelieving that it was with her a question of life and death. Should\nGermany sacrifice her faithful friend under such circumstances, and for\nwhat? For the arrogance of Russia, who would not \"allow\" her to\nre-establish her prestige in a righteous cause? The word \"righteous\" is\nused advisedly, because in the early stages of the controversy nobody,\nnot even Russia nor Servia herself, denied the justice of Austria's\ndemands. The writer is informed that even the liberal English press\nfound no fault with the course taken by Austria, although it commented\nadversely on the language used in the note.\n\nWhat would have been the result of peace bought by Germany at such a\ncost? It would have alienated her only faithful friend without laying\nthe foundations for a lasting friendship with her opponents. This at\nleast was Germany's honest belief. She may have been wrong. History more\nprobably will call her right. To desert Austria might have postponed the\nwar, but when it would have come Germany would have stood alone, and,\nworse, she would have lost her self-respect.\n\nThis claim may sound strange in the ears of those who have just\nwitnessed and will never forget the suffering of that beautiful little\ncountry, Belgium. They hold that, since Germany invaded Belgium, it is\nGermany who broke a treaty and who is to blame.\n\nMr. Beck considers this to be so self-evident that he deems it\nunnecessary to advance any proof. He quotes the Chancellor's speech,\nand, moving for a quick verdict, declares his motion of guilty carried.\nThe matter, however, is not quite so simple for the man who is seeking\nfor the whole truth. Let us look at the facts.\n\nBelgium was a neutral country, just as any country has the right to\ndeclare itself neutral, with this difference: that in 1839 she had\npromised to five powers--Great Britain, France, Russia, Austria, and\nPrussia--that she would remain perpetually neutral. These five powers in\ntheir turn had promised to guarantee her neutrality. She was, however, a\nsovereign State, and as such had the undoubted right to cease being\nneutral whenever she chose by abrogating the Treaty of 1839. If the\nother high contracting parties did not agree with her, it was their\nright to try to coerce Belgium to keep to her pledges, although this\nwould undoubtedly have been an infringement of her sovereignty.\n\nThe Treaty of 1839 contains the word \"perpetual,\" but so does the treaty\nbetween France and Germany, in which Alsace and Lorraine are ceded by\nFrance to be perpetually an integral part of the German Empire. Does\nthis mean that France, if the Allies should win, could not retake these\nprovinces? Nobody probably will believe this.\n\nThe Treaty of 1839 was a treaty just like the Treaty of 1871, with this\ndifference, that the latter treaty was concluded between two powers, and\nthe earlier one between five powers on one side and Belgium and Holland\non the other. This gave certain rights to all the signatory powers, any\none of whom had the right to feel itself sufficiently aggrieved to go to\nwar if any other power disregarded the treaty.\n\n\nRights of Neutrals.\n\nThere was once another neutral State, the city and district of Cracow,\nalso established by a treaty to which Great Britain was a signatory.\nThree of the signers considered the conditions developing in Cracow to\nbe so threatening that they abolished Cracow as an independent State.\nGreat Britain sent a polite note of protest, and dropped the matter.\n\nSince that time, however, two Hague Conferences have been held and\ncertain rules agreed upon concerning the rights and duties of neutrals.\nThe Belgian status of inviolability rests on these rules, called\nconventions, rather than on the Treaty of 1839. During the\nFranco-Prussian War of 1870 Mr. Gladstone very clearly stated that he\ndid not consider the Treaty of 1839 enforceable. Great Britain,\ntherefore, made two new treaties, one with France and one with Prussia\n(quoted and discussed in Boston Evening Transcript, Oct. 14, 1914) in\nwhich she promised to defend Belgian neutrality, by the side of either\nFrance or Prussia, against that one of them who should infringe the\nneutrality.\n\nThese treaties were to terminate one year after peace had been\nconcluded between the contestants. A treaty, like the one of 1839,\nhowever, which was considered unenforceable in 1870, can hardly be\nclaimed to have gained new rights in 1914. In calm moments nobody will\nclaim that a greater sanctity attaches to it than to the treaty in which\nAlsace and Lorraine are ceded forever to Germany.\n\nNo, it is The Hague Conventions to which we must look. The first\nconvention (1899) contained no rules forbidding belligerents from\nentering neutral territory. In the second conference it was thought\ndesirable to formulate such rules, because it was felt that in war\nbelligerents are at liberty to do what is not expressly forbidden. At\nthe request of France, therefore, a new set of rules was suggested, to\nwhich Great Britain and Belgium offered valuable amendments. The rules\nwere finally accepted, and are today parts of international law. They\nread; \"Article I. The territory of neutral powers is inviolable. Article\nII. Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either\nmunitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral power.\"\n\nThese articles, together with the whole convention called \"Rights and\nduties of neutral powers and persons in case of war on land,\" have been\nratified and therefore accepted as law by the United States of America,\nAustria, Belgium, France, Germany, Japan, and Russia and other minor\npowers. Great Britain experienced a change of heart, and, although her\nown delegates had moved these articles, she refused to ratify them, when\nshe ratified most of the other conventions on Nov. 27, 1909. (A table\nshowing the ratifications of conventions has been published by The World\nPeace Foundation, Boston.)\n\n\nThe Case of Belgium.\n\nSince Great Britain did not accept these articles as law, she was not\nbound by them, for the principle of The Hague Conferences is that a\nnation is bound only by those laws which it accepts. The remarkable\nfact, therefore, appears that the only one of the big nations which had\nrefused to accept these articles, and which, therefore, might have moved\nher troops across a neutral country and have claimed that she could do\nso with a clear conscience because she broke no law which was binding on\nher, was Great Britain. And the world now sees the spectacle of Great\nBritain claiming to have gone to war because another power did what she\nherself could have done, according to her own interpretation, with\nimpunity. Japan has broken the international law by infringing the\nneutrality of China, but Great Britain can claim that she did not break\na law by doing exactly what Japan did.\n\nIt is not asserted here that the citizens of Great Britain are not\nabsolutely sincere in their belief of the causes which have allied them\nwith the Russians and the Japanese, and the Indians and the Zouaves, and\nthe negroes and the French and the Belgians against Germany. Their\nGovernment, however, should have known that the presumption of\ninsincerity exists when one charges against others a crime which one\nwould have felt at liberty to commit one's self. Yet, more, the British\nGovernment knew better than anybody else that Germany had not even\ncommitted this crime; for, according to all laws of justice, no person\nor nation can claim the inviolability of a neutral when he has committed\n\"hostile acts against a belligerent, or acts in favor of a belligerent.\"\n(Article XVII. of The Hague Conference of 1907.)\n\nThe question, therefore, arises, \"Did Belgium commit acts in favor of\none of Germany's opponents, if not actually hostile acts against\nGermany?\" In order to understand Germany's charge that Belgium had\ncommitted such acts, attention must be directed to one of the most\nunfortunate stipulations of the Treaty of 1839, which compelled Belgium\nto maintain several fortresses. This meant that a small neutral people,\nsandwiched in between two great powers, had to keep itself informed on\nmilitary affairs. Instead of being able to foster a peaceful state of\nmind, which is the surest guarantee of neutrality, the Belgians were\nforced to think military thoughts.\n\n[Illustration: ANDREW CARNEGIE\n\n_(Photo (c) by Underwood & Underwood.)_\n\n_See Page 415_]\n\n[Illustration: JACOB H. SCHIFF\n\n_(Photo by American Press Assn.)_\n\n_See Page 459_]\n\nIn the eighties and early nineties they suspected France of designs on\ntheir integrity. Since then a change in the popular feeling has taken\nplace and in recent years the instruction of the Belgian artillery, for\ninstance, was intrusted to French officers in active service. These\nofficers were constantly at home and very properly concerned with\nsolving military problems such as a future war with Germany might\npresent. What was more natural than that these same officers, when they\nwere detached for a few months or years to Liege or Namur or Huy, taught\ntheir Belgian charges to prepare against a German attack, and to look\nupon the French as their friends and the Germans as their enemies? If\nconditions had been different, and German officers had been in charge of\nBelgian fortresses, the Belgian guns in practice would always have been\ntrained on imaginary French invaders.\n\n\nFrench Officers in Belgian Forts.\n\nIf this is understood it will be seen that in the case of war the actual\nneutrality of the Belgian garrisons would naturally be determined by the\nposition taken by that nation whose officers had been in charge of the\nBelgian fortresses. And this might be entirely independent of the\nprofessed wishes of the Belgian people or their Government. If French\nofficers in active service remained in the several fortresses, or even\nonly in one after the beginning of hostilities, and if the French\ncampaign plans contemplated an attack through Belgium, then Belgium had\ncommitted an \"act in favor of France\" by not forcing the French officers\nto leave, and had forfeited the rights and privileges granted by The\nHague Convention of 1907 to a neutral State.\n\nDid French officers remain in Liege or in any other Belgian fortress\nafter hostilities had begun, and did France plan to go through Belgium?\nGermany has officially made both claims. The first can easily be\nsubstantiated by the Supreme Court of Civilization by an investigation\nof the prisoners of war taken in Belgium. Until an impartial\ninvestigation becomes possible no further proof than the claim made by\nthe German Government can be produced.\n\nThe second charge is contained in No. 157 of the English \"White Paper\"\nin these words of instruction from the German Foreign Secretary to the\nGerman Ambassador in London: \"Please impress upon Sir Edward Grey that\nGerman Army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which\nwas planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information.\"\n\nSir Edward Grey has attacked Germany for invading Belgium, but has\nnowhere denied that Germany had the unimpeachable evidence she said she\nhad, and which of course nullified any previous assurance from France.\n\nIt is not known whether Sir Edward Grey was shown this evidence or not,\nbut if the preservation of Belgian neutrality was Great Britain's chief\nconcern, why did she not offer to negotiate treaties with Germany and\nFrance as she had done in 1870? It will be remembered that then she\nbound herself to join with either of the contestants in defending\nBelgian neutrality against the attacks of the other.\n\nAs the case stands today, on the evidence of Sir Edward Grey's own\n\"White Paper\" and speeches, Great Britain is making war on Germany\nbecause:\n\n1. She broke the Treaty of 1839, although her own Gladstone had declared\nthis treaty to be without force, and although the status of neutral\nStates had been removed by The Hague Convention from the uncertainty of\ntreaties to the security of international law.\n\n2. Great Britain makes war against Germany because Germany has broken\nArticles I. and II. of Chapter 1 of The Hague Convention referring to\nneutrals, although Great Britain herself has refused to recognize these\narticles as binding upon her own conduct.\n\n3. She makes war on Germany although she has never denied the\ncorrectness of Germany's assertion that she had unimpeachable proof of\nFrance's intentions of going through Belgium, which, together with the\nsojourn of French officers in Belgium, constitutes the offense which,\naccording to The Hague Convention, deprives a so-called neutral State of\nthe privileges granted in Articles I. and II.\n\nIt is impossible to say here exactly what these proofs are which Germany\npossesses, and which for military reasons she has not yet been able to\ndivulge. She has published some of them, namely, the proof of the\ncontinued presence of French officers on Belgian soil, and has given the\nnames and numbers of the several army corps which France had planned to\npush through Belgium.\n\nThe case then stands as follows:\n\n1. Was the inviolability of Belgium guaranteed by Articles I. and II. of\nThe Hague Convention? Yes.\n\n2. Had Germany ratified these articles? Yes.\n\n3. Had Great Britain ratified these articles? No.\n\n4. Would Belgium have forfeited the right of having her country held\ninviolable if she had committed \"acts in favor of France,\" even if these\nacts were not actually hostile acts? Yes, according to Article XVII. of\nThe Hague Convention.\n\n5. Did Belgium commit \"acts in favor of France,\" and was Germany,\ntherefore, justified in disregarding the inviolability of her territory?\n\n\nThe Main Question.\n\nThis is the important question, and the answer must be left to the\nSupreme Court of Civilization. The weight of the evidence would seem to\npoint to a justification of Germany. Yet no friend of Germany can find\nfault with those who would wish to defer a verdict until such a time\nwhen Germany can present her complete proof to the world, and this may\nbe when the war is over.\n\nThroughout this argument the famous passage of the Chancellor's speech\nin the Reichstag has been disregarded. It reads:\n\n     Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps are already on\n     Belgian soil. Gentlemen, that is contrary to the dictates of\n     international law. It is true that the French Government has\n     declared at Brussels that France is willing to respect the\n     neutrality of Belgium so long as her opponents respect it. We\n     knew, however, that France stood ready for invasion. The\n     wrong--I speak openly--that we are committing we will endeavor\n     to make good.\n\nThis has been understood to mean that the Chancellor acknowledged that\nGermany was breaking the Treaty of 1839 without warrant, and that\nGermany, therefore, deserved the contempt of the world. May it not bear\nanother interpretation? Thus:\n\nThe Chancellor, like Gladstone in 1870, did not consider the 1839 Treaty\nenforceable, but saw the guarantee for Belgium in The Hague Convention.\nHe did not wish to offend Belgium by announcing to the world that she\nhad lost her rights as a neutral because of her acts favorable to\nFrance, for when he spoke he was still of the opinion that she would\naccept the German offer which guaranteed to her both her independence\nand integrity.\n\nAnd just as Servia would have accepted Austria's note if Russia had\npermitted her, so Belgium would not have resisted the German demand if\nit had not been for England.\n\nThis can be proved by the British \"White Paper,\" Nos. 153 and 155. In\nthe former the King of the Belgians appeals \"to the diplomatic\nintervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of\nBelgium,\" being apparently of the impression that Germany wished to\nannex parts, if not the whole, of his country. The London reply advises\nthe Belgians \"to resist by any means in their power, and that his\nMajesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and\nthat his Majesty's Government in this event are prepared to join Russia\nand France, if desired, in offering to the Belgian Government at once\ncommon action for the purpose of resisting use of force by Germany\nagainst them, and a guarantee to maintain their independence and\nintegrity in future years.\"\n\nHas Mr. Beck really not noticed in this promise the omission of the word\nneutrality? By the Treaty of 1839 Belgium enjoyed not only independence\nand integrity, but also perpetual neutrality. Does Great Britain offer\nto fight Germany for the enforcement of the Treaty of 1839? No! Because\nhereafter the word neutrality is dropped from her guarantee, and since\nshe alone of all the great powers has not ratified the articles of The\nHague Convention concerning neutrals she alone will be able to disregard\nthe inviolability of Belgian soil, even though Belgium kept strictly\nneutral in a future war.\n\nAnd what, finally, does she guarantee her? Independence and integrity!\nThat is exactly the same that Germany had promised her. For this Belgium\nhad to be dragged through the horrors of war, and the good name of\nGermany as that of an honest nation had to be dragged through the mire,\nand hatred and murder had to be started, that Belgium might get on the\nbattlefield, from the insufficient support of Russia and France and\nEngland, what Germany had freely offered her--independence and\nintegrity.\n\nCasual readers would not miss the word neutrality from Sir Edward Grey's\nguarantee, because they do not differentiate between the words\nintegrity, independence, and neutrality. Great Britain and her ally\nJapan, marching through China into Kiao-Chau, may be said to have\nviolated China's neutrality, but not her independence, nor, so long as\nthey refrain from annexing any Chinese territory, her integrity.\n\n\nFixing the Blame.\n\nNobody familiar with the careful work of Sir Edward Grey can for one\nmoment believe that Sir Edward inadvertently dropped the word, just as\nlittle as J. Ramsay Macdonald and other British leaders believe that he\ninadvertently dropped one of the two remaining words, integrity and\nindependence, when he told Parliament of Germany's guarantee, and why\nGreat Britain should not accept it, but go to war.\n\nWhen the blame for the horrors committed in Belgium are assessed these\nfacts must be remembered:\n\n1. Belgium was by treaty bound to maintain fortresses.\n\n2. France tempted her to commit \"acts friendly\" to herself, by which\nBelgium forfeited her rights to the protection of The Hague articles\ngoverning the rights and duties of neutrals.\n\n3. England urged her to take up arms, when she had only asked to have\nher integrity guaranteed by diplomatic intervention. (Nos. 153, 155.)\n\n4. Germany promised her independence and integrity and peace, while\nEngland, quietly dropping her guarantee of neutrality \"in future years,\"\npromised her independence and integrity and war.\n\n5. And Sir Edward Grey was able to sway Parliament, according to one of\nthe leaders of Parliament himself, only because he misrepresented\nGermany's guarantee, and, having dropped, in his note to Belgium, the\nword \"neutrality,\" dropped yet another of the two remaining words,\nintegrity and independence.\n\nThis is the case as it appears on the evidence contained in the various\n\"White Papers.\" Austria was attending properly to her own affairs;\nServia was willing to yield; Russia, however, was determined to\nhumiliate Austria or to go to war. Germany proved a loyal friend to her\nally, Austria; she trusted in the British professions of friendship to\nthe last, and sacrificed seven valuable days in the interest of peace.\nFrance was willing to do \"what might be required by her interests,\"\nwhile Great Britain yielded to Russia and France, promising them their\nsupport without which France, and therefore Russia, would not have\ndecided on war.\n\nAs to Belgium, Germany told Sir Edward Grey that she had unimpeachable\nevidence that France was planning to go through Belgium, and she\npublished her evidence concerning the French officers who remained in\nBelgium. Although Belgium had thus lost any rights attaching to her\nstate of neutrality, Germany promised to respect her integrity and\nindependence, and to pay for any damage done. She preferred, however, to\nlisten to Great Britain, who promised exactly the same except pay for\nany damage done.\n\nUnlike Mr. Beck, who in the same article pleads his case as the counsel\nfor the Allies and casts his verdict as the Supreme Court of\nCivilization, the present writer prefers to leave the judgment to his\nreaders as a whole, and further still, to the whole American\npeople--yea, to all the peoples of the world. Nor is he in a hurry, for\nhe is willing to wait and have the Judges weigh the evidence and call\nfor more, if they consider insufficient what has already been submitted.\n\nSnap judgments are ever unsatisfactory. They have often to be reversed.\nThe present case, however, is too important to warrant a hasty decision.\nThe final judgment, if it is based on truth, will very strongly\ninfluence the nature of the peace, which will either establish good-will\nand stable conditions in the world, or lead to another and even more\ncomplete breakdown of civilization.\n\n\n\n\nWhat Gladstone Said About Belgium\n\nBy George Louis Beer.\n\n     Historian; winner of the first Loubat Prize, 1913, for his\n     book on the origins of the British Colonial system.\n\n\nIn the course of his solemn speech of Aug. 8, 1914, in the House of\nCommons Sir Edward Grey quoted some remarks made by Gladstone in 1870 on\nthe extent of the obligation incurred by the signatory powers to the\nQuintuple Treaty of 1839 guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium. Shorn\nfrom their context as they were, these sentences are by no means\nilluminating, and it cannot be said that their citation in this form by\nSir Edward Grey was a very felicitous one. During the paper polemics of\nthe past months these detached words of Gladstone have been freely used\nby Germany's defenders and apologists to maintain that Great Britain of\n1870 would not have deemed the events of 1914 a casus belli, and that\nits entrance into the present war on account of the violation of\nBelgium's neutrality was merely a pretext. During the course of this\ncontroversy Gladstone's attitude has in various ways been grossly\nmisrepresented, Dr. von Mach of Harvard even stating in the columns of\nTHE NEW YORK TIMES that Gladstone had declared the Treaty of 1839 \"to be\nwithout force.\" But, apart from such patent distortions, Gladstone's\nreal position is apparently not clearly defined in the mind of the\ngeneral public, which is merely seeking for the unadulterated truth,\nregardless of its effect upon the case of any one of the belligerents.\n\nShortly after the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war in 1870 the\nPrussian Ambassador in London informed Gladstone, then Prime Minister,\nthat some time prior to the existing war France had asked Prussia to\nconsent to the former country's absorption of Belgium, and that there\nwas in the possession of the Prussian Government the draft of a treaty\nto this effect in the handwriting of M. Benedetti, then French\nAmbassador at Berlin. This communication was obviously made, as Lord\nMorley tells us, with the object of prompting Gladstone to be the agent\nin making the evil news public and thus of prejudicing France in the\njudgment of Europe. Gladstone thought this \"no part of his duty,\" and\nvery shortly thereafter, at the direct instance of Bismarck, this draft\ntreaty of 1866-7 was communicated by Baron Krause of the Prussian\nEmbassy in London to Delane, the editor of The Times. On July 25, 1870,\nit was published in the columns of that paper and aroused considerable\nanxiety in England.\n\nIt immediately became imperative upon the British Government to take\nsome action. As Gladstone wrote to Bright, the publication of this\ntreaty\n\n     has thrown upon us the necessity of doing something fresh to\n     secure Belgium, or else of saying that under no circumstances\n     would we take any step to secure her from absorption. This\n     publication has wholly altered the feeling of the House of\n     Commons, and no Government could at this moment venture to\n     give utterance to such an intention about Belgium. But neither\n     do we think it would be right, even if it were safe, to\n     announce that we would in any case stand by with folded arms\n     and see actions done which would amount to a total extinction\n     of the public right in Europe.\n\n\nThe Special Identical Treaties.\n\nA simple declaration of Great Britain's intention to defend the\nneutrality of Belgium by arms in case it were infringed seemed to\nGladstone not to meet the special requirements of the case as revealed\nby the proposed Treaty of 1866-7 between Prussia and France. His main\nobject was to prevent the actual execution of such an agreement, by\nmeans of which the two belligerent powers would settle their quarrels\nand satisfy their ambitions at the expense of helpless Belgium. Hence,\non July 30, the British Government opened negotiations with France and\nPrussia and within a fortnight had concluded separate but identical\ntreaties with each of these powers. According to these treaties, in case\nthe neutrality of Belgium were violated by either France or Germany,\nGreat Britain agreed to co-operate with the other in its defense. The\npreamble of these treaties states that the contracting powers\n\n     being desirous at the present time of recording in a solemn\n     act their fixed determination to maintain the independence and\n     neutrality of Belgium,\n\nas provided in the Treaty of 1839, have concluded this separate treaty,\nwhich,\n\n     without impairing or invalidating the conditions of the said\n     Quintuple Treaty, shall be subsidiary and accessory to it.\n\nArticle III. further provided that these Treaties of 1870 were to expire\ntwelve months after the conclusion of the existing war, and that\nthereafter the independence and neutrality of Belgium would \"continue to\nrest, as heretofore,\" on the Treaty of 1839.\n\nThese documents tell a plain tale, which is amply confirmed by the\nproceedings in Parliament in connection with this matter. On Aug. 5,\n1870, while the negotiations leading to the above-mentioned treaties\nwere still pending, questions were raised in the House of Commons about\nthe recently published abortive Treaty of 1866-7 between Prussia and\nFrance. In reply Gladstone stated that\n\n     the Treaty of 1839 is that under which the relations of the\n     contracting powers with Belgium are at present regulated;\n\nand that, while he could not explain the intentions of the Government\n\"in a matter of this very grave character in answer to a question,\" he\nhoped to be able to communicate some further information in an authentic\nmanner. Three days later, as these treaties with France and Prussia had\nbeen virtually concluded, Gladstone was able to satisfy the anxiety of\nthe House and outlined their terms. He explicitly stated that, after\ntheir expiration,\n\n     the respective parties, being parties to the Treaty of 1839,\n     shall fall back upon the obligations they took upon themselves\n     under that treaty.\n\nAfter Gladstone had finished speaking the leader of the opposition,\nDisraeli, took the floor and pointed out that, as a general proposition,\n\n     when there is a treaty guarantee so explicit as that expressed\n     in the Treaty of 1839, I think the wisdom of founding on that\n     another treaty which involves us in engagements may be open to\n     doubt.\n\nBut he accepted Gladstone's statement\n\n     as the declaration of the Cabinet, that they are resolved to\n     maintain the neutrality and independence of Belgium, I accept\n     it as a wise and spirited policy, and a policy, in my opinion,\n     not the less wise because it is spirited.\n\nGladstone then replied, saying that the reason the Government had not\nmade a general declaration of its intentions regarding Belgium was that\nmuch danger might arise from such a declaration and that inadvertently\nthey might have given utterance to words\n\n     that might be held to import obligations almost unlimited and\n     almost irrespectively of circumstances.\n\nWe had made up our minds, he continued, that we had a duty to perform,\nand we thought a specific declaration of what we thought the obligations\nof this country better than any general declaration. Referring to the\ntwo treaties in process of ratification, he concluded:\n\n     We thought that by contracting a joint engagement we might\n     remove the difficulty and prevent Belgium from being\n     sacrificed.\n\nThe policy of the Government continued, however, to be criticised,\nmainly on the ground that the Treaty of 1839 amply covered the case. On\nAug. 10 Gladstone defended his policy in the House of Commons in a\nspeech pitched on a high moral plane, in which he dilated upon Belgium's\nhistoric past and splendid present and on Great Britain's duty to this\nlittle nation irrespective of all questions of its own self-interest.\nWith genuine fervor, he exclaimed:\n\n     If, in order to satisfy a greedy appetite for aggrandisement,\n     coming whence it may, Belgium were absorbed, the day that\n     witnessed that absorption would hear the knell of public right\n     and public law in Europe.... We have an interest in the\n     independence of Belgium which is wider than that which we may\n     have in the literal operation of the guarantee. It is found in\n     answer to the question whether under the circumstance of the\n     case this country, endowed as it is with influence and power,\n     would quietly stand by and witness the perpetration of the\n     direst crime that ever stained the pages of history, and thus\n     become participators in the sin.\n\n\nWhat Gladstone Had in Mind.\n\nWhat Gladstone had in mind was the scheme of 1866-7, by which France was\nto absorb Belgium, with Prussia's consent and aid. He distinctly stated\nthat the Treaties of 1870 were devised to meet the new state of affairs\ndisclosed by the publication of this incomplete treaty. It was in order\nto prevent the revival of such a conspiracy that Gladstone made separate\nand identical treaties in 1870 with France and Prussia. They were a\npractical device to secure an effectual enforcement of the Treaty of\n1839 under unforeseen and difficult circumstances. The agreement of 1870\nwas, as Gladstone said, a cumulative treaty added to that of 1839, and\nthe latter treaty\n\n     loses nothing of its force, even during the existence of this\n     present treaty.\n\nDuring the course of this speech defending the Government's action\nagainst those critics who claimed that the Treaty of 1839 adequately met\nthe situation, Gladstone made some general remarks about the extent of\nthe obligation incurred by the signatories to the Treaty of 1839:\n\n     It is not necessary, nor would time permit me, to enter into\n     the complicated question of the nature of the obligations of\n     that treaty, but I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of\n     those who have held in this House what plainly amounts to an\n     assertion that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee\n     is binding on every party to it, irrespectively altogether of\n     the particular position in which it may find itself at the\n     time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises.\n\nIt is, of course, impossible to state precisely what were those\nunuttered thoughts that passed through Gladstone's mind as he spoke\nthese characteristically cautious words, but what in general they were\ncan be satisfactorily gleaned from a letter that he had written six days\nbefore this to John Bright:\n\n     That we should simply declare _we_ will defend the neutrality\n     of Belgium by arms in case it should be attacked. Now, the\n     sole or single-handed defense of Belgium would be an\n     enterprise which we incline to think quixotic; if these two\n     great military powers [France and Prussia] combined against\n     it--that combination is the only serious danger; and this it\n     is which by our proposed engagements we should, I hope, render\n     improbable to the very last degree. I add for myself this\n     confession of faith: If the Belgian people desire, on their\n     own account, to join France or any other country, I for one\n     will be no party to taking up arms to prevent it. But that the\n     Belgians, whether they would or not, should go \"plump\" down\n     the maw of another country to satisfy dynastic greed is\n     another matter. The accomplishment of such a crime as this\n     implies would come near to an extinction of public right in\n     Europe, and I do not think we could look on while the\n     sacrifice of freedom and independence was in course of\n     consummation.\n\n\n\n\nFight to the Bitter End\n\nAN INTERVIEW WITH ANDREW CARNEGIE.\n\n     Retired ironmaster and philanthropist; builder of the Peace\n     Temple at The Hague; founder of the Carnegie Institution at\n     Washington; founder and patron of a chain of libraries in the\n     United States and Great Britain, and benefactor of many\n     societies and institutions.\n\nBy Edward Marshall.\n\n\nHere is the report of a truly remarkable statement by Mr. Carnegie. He\nis the world's most notable peace advocate, and in this interview he\nvoices the reflections suggested to him by the great European war.\n\nThey are unusual, and make this interview especially worthy of a place\nupon the pages of the Christmas issue of THE TIMES, although it\nprincipally deals with war, and Christmas is the festival of peace.\n\n\"Has war ever settled anything which might not have been settled better\nby arbitration?\" I asked Mr. Carnegie.\n\n\"No; never,\" he replied. \"No truer inference was ever made than may be\nfound in Milton's query, penned three centuries ago and never answered:\n'What can war but wars breed?'\n\n\"War can breed only war. Of course, peace inevitably must follow war,\nbut, truly, no peace ever was born of war. We all revere the memory of\nhim who voiced the warning: 'In time of peace prepare for war'; but, as\na matter of fact, we all know that when one nation prepares for war\nothers inevitably must follow its dangerous lead.\n\n\"Hence, and hence only, the huge armaments which have oppressed the\nworld, making its most peaceful years a spectacle of sadness--a\nspectacle of men preparing and prepared to fight with one another.\nSooner or later men prepared to fight will fight; huge armaments and\narmies mean huge battles; huge battles mean huge tragedies.\n\n\"This never has been otherwise, and never can be. Peace can come only\nwhen mankind abandons warful preparation. And so I seem to have replied\nto your inquiry with an answer with a tail to it; and the tail is more\nimportant than the answer, for the answer merely says that war never\nsettled anything which might not have been settled better by\narbitration, while the tail proclaims the folly of a world prepared for\nwar.\"\n\n\nHow to Prevent War.\n\n\"Armament must mean the use of armament, and that is war. If we are to\nprevent war we must prevent preparation for war, just as if we are to\nprevent burglary we must prevent preparation for burglary by prohibiting\nthe carrying of the instruments of burglary. The only cure for war\" [Mr.\nCarnegie in speaking italicized the word \"cure\"] \"is war which defeats\nsome one; but two men who are unarmed are certain not to shoot at one\nanother. Here, as in medicine, prevention is much better than cure.\n\n\"Plainly it must be through such prevention, not through such a cure as\nvictory sometimes is supposed to represent, that warfare can be stopped.\nWarfare means some one's defeat, of course, and that implies his\ntemporary incapacity for further war, but it goes without saying that\nall conquered nations must be embittered by their defeat.\n\n\"Few nations ever have fought wars in which the majority of at least\ntheir fighting men did not believe the side they fought for to be in the\nright. Defeat by force of arms, therefore, always has meant the general\nconviction throughout conquered nations that injustice has been done.\"\n\n\nNations Like Individuals.\n\n\"In such circumstances nations must be like individuals under similar\nconditions. The individual believing himself to have been in the right,\nyet finding himself beaten in his efforts to maintain it, will not\naccept the situation philosophically; he will be angry and rebellious;\nhe will nurse what he believes to be his wrong.\n\n\"To nurse a wrong, whether it be real or fancied, is to help it grow in\nthe imagination, and that must mean at least the wish to find some\nfuture means of righting it, either by strategy or increased strength.\n\n\"There are two things which humanity does not forget--one is an injury,\nand, no matter how strongly some may argue against the truth of this\ncontention, the other is a kindness.\n\n\"In the long run both will be repaid. And nations, like individuals,\nprefer the coin which pays the latter debt. Military force never has\naccomplished kindness. Kindness means industrial armies decked with the\ngarlands of peace; military armies, armed and epauletted, must mean\nminds obsessed with the spirit of revenge or conquest, hands clenched to\nstrike, hearts eager to invade.\n\n\"Every military implement is designed to cut or crush, to wound and\nkill. Nations at peace help one another with humanity's normal\ntenderness of heart at times of pestilence, of famine, of disaster.\nNations at war exert their every ounce of strength to force upon their\nadversaries hunger, destruction, and death. Starvation of the enemy\nbecomes a detail of what is considered good military strategy in war\ntime, just as world-embracing charity has become a characteristic of\nall civilization during times of peace. Must we not admit flotillas\ncarrying grain to famine-stricken peoples to be more admirable than\nfleets which carry death to lands in which prosperity might reign if\nundisturbed by war?\"\n\n\"But do you not admit that wars sometimes have helped the forces of\ncivilization in their conquest against barbarism?\"\n\n\"War has not been the chief force of civilization against barbarism,\"\nMr. Carnegie replied with emphasis. Then he continued more thoughtfully:\n\n\"That is one way of saying it. Another is, no effort of the forces of\ncivilization against barbarism is war in the true sense of the word.\n\n\"Such an armed effort is a part of the force pushing barbarism backward,\nand therefore, in the last analysis, tends toward kindness and peace;\nwhile, in the sense in which we use the word, war means the\nretrogression of civilization into barbarism. It is usually born of\ngreed--greed for territory or for power.\n\n\"Such war as that of which we all are thinking in these days is war\nbetween civilized men. One civilized man cannot improve another\ncivilized man by killing him, although it is not inconceivable that a\ncivilized man may do humanity a service by destroying human savages, for\nwith the savages he must destroy their savagery.\n\n\"But a war in civilized Europe destroys no savagery; it breeds it, so\nthat it and its spawn may defile future generations.\n\n\"There has been much balderdash in talk about unselfish motives as the\norigin of warfare. It is safe to say that 99 per cent of all the\nslaughter wrought by civilization under the cloak of a desire to better\nbad conditions really has been evil. It is impossible to conceive of\ngeneral betterment through general slaughter. There have been few\naltruistic wars.\"\n\n\"But how about our Spanish war?\" I asked. \"Surely it was not greed which\nsent our men and ships to Cuba.\"\n\n\"No,\" said Mr. Carnegie, \"that was not war, but world-police work.\n\n\"Our skirmish with Spain was a most unusual international episode. We\nharmed none of the people of the land wherein we fought, but taught them\nwhat we could of wise self-government and gave them independence. To\nbattle for the liberation of the slave is worthy work, and this of ours\nwas such a battle.\n\n\"Our Spanish war was not the outgrowth of our rivalry with any one or\nany one's with us; it was the manifestation of our high sense of\nresponsibility as strong and healthy human beings for the welfare of the\nweak and oppressed.\"\n\n\nThat Was Police Work.\n\n\"It did not make toward militarism on this continent, but the reverse;\nin a few months it established permanent peace where peace had been a\nstranger. It was police work on the highest plane, substituting order\nfor disorder.\"\n\n\"But did it not emphasize the need for the maintenance, even here, of a\ncompetent and efficient naval and military force?\" I asked.\n\nMr. Carnegie shook his head emphatically.\n\n\"That is the old, old argument cropping up again,\" said he, \"the\nargument that a provocative is a preventive. For us to maintain a great\narmy for the purpose of preventing war thereby would be as sensible as\nfor each of us to be afraid to walk about except with a lightning rod\ndown his back, since men have been struck by lightning. No nation wants\nto fight us. We have friends throughout the world.\n\n\"Millions now resident in military nations are hoping that some day they\nmay be able to become citizens of our beloved republic, principally\nbecause it now is not, nor is it every likely to be, military. Humanity\nloves peace. Here peace abides, and, if we follow reason, will remain\nunbroken.\n\n\"Note the advantages of our own position. Imagine what the task would be\nof landing seventy thousand hostile soldiers on our shores! First they\nwould need to cross three thousand miles of the Atlantic or five\nthousand miles of the Pacific.\n\n\"And what if they should come? My plan of operation would be to bid them\nwelcome as our visitors, considering them as men, not soldiers; to take\nthem to our great interior, say, as far west as Chicago, and there to\nsay to them:\n\n\"'Here we shall leave you. Make yourselves at home, if that thought\npleases you; fight us if it does not. If you think you can conquer us,\ntry it.'\n\n\"They would make themselves at home and, learning the advantages of\nstaying with us, would become applicants for our citizenship, rather\nthan our opponents in warfare.\n\n\"And if they tried to fight us, what would happen to them? Our nation is\nunique in an important respect. Its individuals are the best armed in\nthe world. Not only, for example, are its farmers armed, but they can\nshoot, which is far more than can be said of those of Britain or of any\nother nation.\n\n\"The Governments of Europe cannot afford to give their citizenry arms,\nand, as for the European citizenry, it not only cannot afford to\npurchase arms, but cannot afford even to pay the license fees which\nGovernment demands of those possessing arms with the right to use them.\n\n\"But ours? Most Americans can afford to and do own guns with which to\nshoot, and, furthermore, most Americans, when they shoot, can hit the\nthings at which they shoot.\n\n\"Combine this powerful protective influence with the fact that thousands\nof any army coming to invade us would not want to fight when once they\ngot here, but would want to settle here and enjoy peace, and we find\nthat we thus are protected as no nation in the world ever has been\nprotected or can be.\n\n\"Imagine the effect upon the European fighting man's psychology if he\nfound that an army transport had conveyed him to a land where one man's\nprivilege is every man's right! Learning this, it is not a joke to say,\nbut is a statement of the probable fact, that the invading soldiery\nwould not want to fire its first volleys, but would want to file its\nfirst papers. They would not ask for cartridges, but for citizenship.\n\n\"America is protected by a force incomparable, which I may call its\npeaceful militia, and the man who, above all other men, I most should\nwish to see appointed to its command would be Gen. Leonard Wood were it\nnot for the fact that there would be some danger that in such an\neventuation his professional training would carry him beyond the rule of\nreason.\n\n\"That is likely to be the most serious trouble with the trained soldier.\nThe doctor wants to dose, the parson to preach, and the soldier to\nfight. Professional habit may make any of us dangerous.\n\n\"But if it came to fighting I do not consider it within the bounds of\npossibility that we could lose. I once asked Gen. Sherman how the troops\nwhich he commanded during the civil war compared for efficiency with\nEuropean troops. His answer was:\n\n\"'The world never has seen the army that I would be afraid to trust my\nboys with, man for man.'\"\n\n\nWould Surprise the Enemy.\n\n\"That thought of welcoming an invading army appeals strongly to me. The\nhostile General would be amazed by the ease with which he got his forces\nin, but he would be more startled by the difficulty he would find if he\ntried to get them out. If they once learned the advantages of our\nliberties they would find it hard not to get away, but to go away. I\nrestrain my temper with difficulty when I contemplate the foolishness of\nthe people who discuss with gravity the possibility of a successful\ninvasion of these United States by a foreign foe. The thought always\narises when I hear these cries from our army and naval officers for a\ngreater armament: 'Are these men cowards?' I don't believe it. It is\ntheir profession which makes them alarmists.\n\n\"Not only are the physical difficulties which would hamper an invasion\npractically insuperable, but the reception enemies would get, if any of\nthem landed, would be wholly without parallel in the world's history.\n\n\"If our liberties really were threatened, every man, and very nearly\nevery woman, in our vast population would rise to their defense as never\nany people yet has risen to any national defense. Americans, young and\nold, en masse, would sweep to the protection of what they know, and what\nthe world knows, would be the cause of right and human liberty.\n\n\"I, myself, should wish to be invited to advance and meet invading\nforces if they came. I would approach them without any weapons on my\nperson. I would not shoot at them. I would make a speech to them.\n\n\"'Gentlemen,' I would say, 'here's the chance of your life to win life's\nchief prize. Now you are peasant soldiers. You have the opportunity to\nbecome citizen kings. We are all kings here. Here the least of you can\ntake a rank much higher than that of any General in your army. He can\nbecome a sovereign in a republic.'\n\n\"I think they would hurrah for me, not harm me, after they had heard my\nspeech.\n\n\"Striving for peace, we shall become so powerful that if war comes we\nshall be invincible. Peace, not war, makes riches; the rich nation is\nthe powerful nation.\n\n\"Perhaps I was as much a peace man in my youth as I am now, but when I\nwas asked, during the civil war, to organize a corps of telegraph\noperators and railroad conductors and engineers and take them to\nWashington, I considered it the greatest of all privileges to obey the\norder.\n\n\"I was the last man to get on the last train leaving Burkes Station,\nafter Bull Run, and, now, if the country ever should be invaded, I would\nbe, I hope, one of the first to rush to meet the enemy--but I think my\nhaste would be to convert, not to kill, him.\n\n\"The man who has done well in business, however, learns to abhor all\nwaste, and I must admit that it does pain me to see hundreds of millions\nof our dollars spent on battleships which will but rust away, and\nthousands of our able men vegetating on them or in an army.\n\n\"The men who urge this vast waste of our money and men mean well, no\ndoubt, but they do not know the nation of which they have the good\nfortune to be citizens--they do not realize how very potent a force we\nhave become in the wide world, nor the fact that one of the great\nreasons why we have become a force lies in the circumstance that our\nnational development has not been hampered by the vast expense of\nmilitarism.\"\n\nMr. Carnegie paused.\n\nSome weeks ago, in an interview granted me for publication in THE NEW\nYORK TIMES, Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia\nUniversity, predicted that the present war would find its final outcome\nin the establishment of the United States of Europe. I asked Mr.\nCarnegie to express his view upon this subject.\n\n\"Nothing else could occur which would be of such immense advantage to\nEurope,\" he replied.\n\n\"United we stand, and divided they fall. If the territory now occupied\nby the homogeneous and co-operative federation known as the United\nStates of America were occupied instead by a large number of small,\nindependent competitive nations, that is, if each section of our\nterritory which now is a State were an independent country, America\nwould be constantly in turmoil.\n\n\"Europe has been set back a century because she substituted the present\nwar of nations for the promotion of a federation plan. The latter would\nhave meant peace and prosperity, the former means ruin.\n\n\"If in Europe this year such a federation as Dr. Butler regards as a\nfuture probability had been a present actuality, 1914 would have left a\nrecord very different from that which it is making.\n\n\"For instance, it would have been as difficult for the State of Germany\nto fight the State of Russia, or the State of France, or that of\nEngland, or all of them, and to trample neutral Belgium, as it now\nwould be, here, for the State of Pennsylvania to declare war on the\nStates of New York and Connecticut and to wreck New Jersey as she sent\nher troops to the invasion.\n\n\"Originally we had thirteen States, and thirteen only, but there was\nother territory here, and the attractive force of the successful union\nof the thirteen States brought the other territory in as it was\norganized.\n\n\"Thus we started right. Europe had begun before men had become so wise,\nand, having begun wrong, has found herself, through the centuries,\nunable to correct old errors.\"\n\n\nA Federation of Europe.\n\n\"Certainly I hope that out of the great crime of this vast war some good\nwill come. The greatest good which could come would be a general\nEuropean federation. I do not believe that this will come at once; but\nthe world will be infinitely the better if it comes at length--if the\nnatural law of mutual attraction for mutual advantage draws these\nnations now at war into a union which shall make such wars impossible in\nfuture, as wars between our States, here, are impossible.\n\n\"But before this can come peace must come, and before peace can come one\nor the other of the nations now at war must at least ask for an\narmistice.\n\n\"If I were in the place of that great General, Lord Kitchener, and\nshould receive the news that such a request had been made by the\ncommander of the opposing forces, I should say: 'No armistice!\nSurrender!'\n\n\"But, then, if the surrender should be made, I should say, in effect:\n\n\"'Gentlemen, we have made up our minds that these terrible explosions\nmust mark the end of war between our civilized nations. Our sacrifices\nin this war have been too great to permit us to be satisfied with less\nthan this.\n\n\"'If we now cannot feel assured of such a federation of nations as will\nresult in the settlement of all future disputes by peaceful arbitration\nat The Hague, then we shall keep on fighting till the day comes when we\ncan achieve that end.\n\n\"'Upon the other side of the Atlantic,' I should continue if I were Lord\nKitchener and should be confronted by such a situation, 'we see in the\nUnited States of America an example which must satisfy us that world\npeace now can be maintained.\n\n\"'There,' I should go on, 'thirteen States were banded into union in\n1776. Their total population was less than the present population of\ntheir largest city and their area has spread until it links two oceans\nand offers homes in forty-eight States to one hundred millions, and the\npopulation still increases rapidly. An experiment of world significance\nwas tried, and is a success, for the aggregated nation has grown and now\nis growing in power more rapidly than any other nation on the surface of\nthe earth.'\"\n\n\nWould Mean World Peace.\n\n\"'It is plain to me and should be plain to all of us,' I should\ncontinue, if I were Lord Kitchener, so placed, 'that we in Europe have\nbut to follow this example which America has set for us in order to\nachieve an ultimate result as notably desirable. When we have\naccomplished it world peace will be enthroned and all the peoples of the\nearth will be able safely to go about the pleasant and progressive\nbusiness of their lives without apprehension of their neighbors.\nHumanity, thus freed of its most dreadful burden, will be able to leap\nforward toward the realization of its ultimate possibilities of\nprogress.'\"\n\n\"And do you really think there is the immediate possibility of an\neffective European league for permanent peace and general disarmament?\"\nI asked Mr. Carnegie.\n\n\"Naturally my mind has dwelt much on this problem,\" he replied. \"The\nculmination of the European situation in the present war is very\ndreadful, but no good ever came out of crying over spilled milk.\nHowever, it seems safe to conclude that a majority of the people of the\ncivilized world will presently decide that a step forward must be taken.\n\n\"Everywhere in Europe, when the present conflict ends, this fact will be\nemphasized by shell-wrecked, fire-blackened buildings; by the vacant\nchairs of sons and fathers who have fallen victims; by innumerable\ngraves and by a general impoverishment, the inevitable result of war's\ngreat waste, which will touch and punish every man, every woman, every\nchild.\n\n\"In the face of such an emphasis no denial of the facts will be among\nthe possibilities, and I scarcely think that any even will be attempted.\nIf the federation Dr. Butler has predicted does not come about at once,\nit will be admitted almost universally that future disputes occurring\nbetween the Governments of Europe shall be settled, not by force of\nfighting men, but by arbitration at The Hague.\n\n\"And now a serious question obtrudes itself. Must there not be a\ncarefully considered and cautiously worked out understanding, which may\nbe considered the preliminary of peace? Later on the foremost men of\nevery nation can meet in conference to consider with an earnestness\nhitherto unknown the great problems which will be involved in the\npermanent abolition of war and establishment of peace; but for this the\nway must be prepared.\n\n\"Here, again, I think The Hague Tribunal is the proper body to assemble\nfor the purpose of devising means for the accomplishment of the great\nend, which must be such legislation as will accomplish, at the end of\nthis war, the ending of all war among the nations.\n\n\"An important duty of the conference would be some arrangement for a\nunion of the forces of the nations now at war, charged with and\nqualified to perform the duty of maintaining peace pending the\ncompletion of the final comprehensive plan.\"\n\n\nFor One Purpose Only.\n\n\"It is possible and even probable that as a part of the accomplishment\nof this it may be found to be desirable and even necessary to organize\nand provide for the maintenance of a joint naval and military body of\nstrength sufficient to enforce world peace during the period necessary\nfor the preparation of a plan to be submitted to all powers. But if this\nforce is to be established, it must be done with the clear understanding\nthat it is designed for one thing only, the maintenance of peace, and\nmust not be used at any time for any other service.\n\n\"In the selection of the commanding officer to be intrusted with this\ntask, it will be conceded that the victors in this war, or those who\nhave a notable advantage at the time of the beginning of the armistice,\nshall have the right of his appointment.\n\n\"No protest ever will arise from the mass of the people of Europe\nagainst the abolishment of militarism. Even the people of Germany, as a\nwhole, have not found militarism attractive. It has been the influence\nof the military aristocracy of Germany, the most powerful caste in the\nworld, which not only has encouraged the national tendency, but has\nforced the Emperor, as I believe, to action against his will and\njudgment.\n\n\"But a change was notable in Germany before the war began, and will be\nfar more notable after it has ended. The socialistic movement waxes\nstrong throughout the nation, and the proceedings of the Reichstag show\nus that the nation is marching steadily, though perhaps slowly, toward a\nreal democracy.\n\n\"I believe the first election to follow peace will result in a demand by\nthe Reichstag that it, alone, shall be given power to declare war. It\nwill be argued, and it is evident that it then will be amply provable,\nthat it is the people who suffer most through war, and that, therefore,\ntheir representatives should utterly control it.\n\n\"That itself would be a most important step toward peace, and I feel\ncertain that it is among the probabilities.\n\n\"As things stand in Germany, although the Reichstag has its powerful\ninfluence in regard to war expenditure and might accomplish important\nresults by refusing to vote amounts demanded, the fact remains that\nuntil it has been given the power of making or withholding declaration\nof war the most important results cannot be accomplished.\"\n\n\"In Fried's volume,\" I suggested to Mr. Carnegie, \"you are credited with\nsaying that Emperor William, himself and by himself, might establish\npeace. Granting that that might have been the fact before this war\nbegan, is it your opinion that he, or any other one man, could now\ncontrol the situation to that extent?\"\n\n\"Assuming that the Germans should come out victorious,\" Mr. Carnegie\nreplied, \"the Emperor would become a stronger power than ever toward the\nmaintenance of peace among the nations. At one time I believed him to be\nthe anointed of God for this purpose, and did not fail to tell him so.\n\n\"Even if his forces should be defeated in this present carnage, I am\nsure he would be welcomed by the conference I have suggested as the\nproposer of the great world peace, thus fulfilling the glorious destiny\nfor which at one time I considered that he had been chosen from on\nhigh.\"\n\nI asked Mr. Carnegie what part he thought this country, the United\nStates, should play in the great movement which he has in mind and\nthoroughly believes is even now upon its way.\n\n\"The United States,\" he answered, \"although, happily, not a party to the\nworld crime which is now in progress, seems entitled to preference as\nthe one to call the nations of the world to the consideration of the\ngreatest of all blessings--universal, lasting peace.\"\n\n\n\n\nWoman and War\n\n\"SHOT. TELL HIS MOTHER.\"\n\nBy W.E.P. French, Captain, U.S. Army.\n\n\nWhat have I done to you, Brothers,--War-Lord and Land-Lord and Priest,--\nThat my son should rot on the blood-smeared earth where the raven and\n     buzzard feast?\nHe was my baby, my man-child, that soldier with shell-torn breast,\nWho was slain for your power and profit--aye, murdered at your behest.\nI bore him, my boy and my manling, while the long months ebbed away;\nHe was part of me, part of my body, which nourished him day by day.\nHe was mine when the birth-pang tore me, mine when he lay on my heart,\nWhen the sweet mouth mumbled my bosom and the milk-teeth made it smart,\nBabyhood, boyhood, and manhood, and a glad mother proud of her son--\nSee the carrion birds, too gorged to fly! Ah! Brothers, what have you\n     done?\n\nYou prate of duty and honor, of a patriot's glorious death,\nOf love of country, heroic deeds--nay, for shame's sake, spare your\n     breath!\nPray, what have you done for your country? Whose was the blood that was\n     shed\nIn the hellish warfare that served your ends? My boy was shot in your\n     stead.\n\nAnd for what were our children butchered, men makers of cruel law?\nBy the Christ, I am glad no woman made the Christless code of war!\nShirks and schemers, why don't you answer? Is the foul truth hard to\n     tell?\nThen a mother will tell it for you, of a deed that shames fiends in\n     hell:--\nOur boys were killed that some faction or scoundrel might win mad race\nFor goals of stained gold, shamed honors, and the sly self-seeker's\n     place;\nThat money's hold on our country might be tightened and made more sure;\nThat the rich could inherit earth's fullness and their loot be quite\n     secure;\nThat the world-mart be wider opened to the product mulct from toil;\nThat the labor and land of our neighbors should become your war-won\n     spoil;\nThat the eyes of an outraged people might be turned from your graft and\n     greed\nIn the misruled, plundered home-land by lure of war's ghastly deed;\nAnd that priests of the warring nations could pray to the selfsame God\nFor His blessing on battle and murder and corpse-strewn, blood-soaked\n     sod.\nOh, fools! if God were a woman, think you She would let kin slay\nFor gold-lust and craft of gamesters, or cripple that trade might pay?\n\nThis quarrel was not the fighters':--the cheated, red pawns in your\n     game:--\nYou stay-at-homes garnered the plunder, but the pawns,--wounds, death,\n     and \"Fame\"!\nYou paid them a beggarly pittance, your substitute prey-of-the-sword,\nBut, ye canny beasts of prey, they paid, in life and limb, for your\n     hoard.\nAnd, behold! you have other victims: a widow sobs by my side,\nWho clasps to her breast a girl-child. Men, she was my slain son's\n     bride!\n\nI can smell the stench of the shambles, where the mangled bodies lie;\nI can hear the moans of the wounded; I can see the brave lads die;\nAnd across the heaped, red trenches and the tortured, bleeding rows\nI cry out a mother's pity to all mothers of dear, dead \"foes.\"\nIn love and a common sorrow, I weep with them o'er our dead,\nAnd invoke my sister woman for a curse on each scheming head.\n\nNay, why should we mothers curse you? Lo! flesh of our flesh are ye;\nBut, by soul of Mary who bore the Christ-man murdered at Calvary,\nInto our own shall the mothers come, and the glad day speed apace\nWhen the law of peace shall be the law of the women that bear the race;\nWhen a man shall stand by his mother, for the worldwide common good,\nAnd not bring her tears and heart-break nor make mock of her motherhood.\n\n\n\n\nThe Way to Peace\n\nAN INTERVIEW WITH JACOB H. SCHIFF.\n\n     One of the leading American financiers and noted\n     philanthropist; founder of Jewish Theological Seminary and of\n     Semitic Museum at Harvard University; a native of Germany and\n     member of the firm of Kuhn, Loeb & Co., bankers.\n\nBy Edward Marshall.\n\n\nAmerican as I am in every fibre, and in accord as I feel with every\ninterest of the country of my adoption, I cannot find myself in\nagreement with what appears to be, to a considerable extent, American\nopinion as to the origin and responsibility for the deplorable conflict\nin which almost all of Europe has become involved.\n\nFor many reasons my personal sympathies are with Germany. I cannot feel\nconvinced that she has been the real aggressor; I believe that war was\nforced upon her, almost as if by prearrangement among the nations with\nwhom she now contends; I cannot but believe that they had become jealous\nand envious of her rapid and unprecedented peaceful development and had\nconcluded that the moment had arrived when all was favorable for a union\nagainst her.\n\nAlthough I left Germany half a century ago, I would think as little of\narraying myself against her, the country of my birth, in this the moment\nof her struggle for existence, as of arraying myself against my parents.\n\nBut while I steadfastly believe this war to have been forced upon\nGermany against her will, I also believe that circumstances which were\nstronger than the Governments of England and France, her present\nenemies, were necessary to overcome an equally definite reluctance upon\ntheir part.\n\nIn other words, I cannot wholly blame the English Government, or the\nFrench Government, any more than I can wholly blame the German\nGovernment.\n\nLet us see how the great tragedy came about. It is safe to pass rapidly\nover the Servian-Bosnian-Herzegovinian-Austro-Hungarian complication\nwhich served as the immediate precipitant of hostilities. It has been\ndetailed repeatedly in THE TIMES and other American publications.\n\nIt had reached a point at which the Austro-Hungarian Government felt\ncompelled to take extreme measures by means of which to safeguard the\nintegrity of the empire.\n\nThe firm but fatal ultimatum to Servia followed, the reply to which,\nsuffice it to say, was unsatisfactory to Austria, who could not accept\nthe suggestion of an investigation into the circumstances attending the\nassassination of the Archduke Ferdinand through a commission or court on\nwhich she was not represented.\n\n\nLike Maine Case.\n\nThe situation really was analogous to that which existed between the\nUnited States and Spain when the Maine was blown up in Havana Harbor. In\norder to fix the responsibility for this dastardly affair we then\nsimilarly demanded an investigation by Spain, to be carried out with the\nassistance of representatives of this Government. Spain, too, then\noffered to conduct an investigation, but she peremptorily declined to\nallow us to take part in it.\n\nThis attitude on her part quickly brought about our declaration of war\nagainst her. It is important that Americans should realize the\nsimilarity in the two situations and the likeness of the Austrian action\nof 1914 to that which our own Government took in 1898.\n\nAs soon as Austria had rejected as unsatisfactory Servia's reply to her\nultimatum she prepared to undertake a punitive armed expedition against\nServia, and Russia at once declared that she would rank herself as\nServia's protector.\n\nIndeed, without any further parley, and to give effect to this threat,\nRussia immediately mobilized her army. Since then it has been averred\nthat this mobilization had been in progress for several weeks previous\nto Servia's rejection of the Austrian ultimatum.\n\nThis made it obligatory upon Germany to go to Austria's aid, under the\nprovisions of their treaty of alliance, although she was well aware that\nsuch an action would bring France into the conflict under the terms of\nher alliance with Russia. Indeed, an unsatisfactory reply had been\nreceived from France as to the latter's intentions, but Germany\nendeavored to secure at least an assurance of England's neutrality. This\nproved to be impossible.\n\nHow the German Government could indulge for a moment in the hope that in\na war with Russia and France on the one side and Germany and Austria on\nthe other, England could be induced to remain neutral passes\ncomprehension, but that it did believe this seems a certainty.\n\nThe English Government, no doubt, correctly felt that without the aid of\nits immense resources, and particularly without the operations of its\ngreat navy against Germany and Austria, the latter nations would find it\nnot so very difficult a task to dispose of both Russia and France.\n\nEnglish statesmen very promptly must have become alive to the\nprobability that a Germany which had subdued Russia and France, and thus\nhad made itself master of the Continent, would be unlikely long to\ntolerate a continuance of England's world leadership.\n\nSo, even if the neutrality of Belgium had not been violated, other\nreasons would have been found by England for joining France and Russia\nin the war against Germany, for England would not risk, without any\neffort to protect them, the loss of her continued domination of the\nhigh seas and her undisputed possession of her vast colonial empire.\n\n\nGermany Fighting for Life.\n\nI am not defending the violation of Belgian neutrality. This,\nundeniably, was a most unjustifiable action, in spite of German claims\nthat she was forced into it by the necessities of the situation. But I\nam explaining that, even had it not occurred, still England would have\ngone to war.\n\nThat was the situation.\n\nGermany is now fighting for her very existence, and I, who am not\nwithout knowledge of German conditions, am convinced that never has\nthere been a war more wholly that of a whole people than is this present\nconflict, as far as Germany is concerned.\n\nAny one who has been in even superficial touch with German public\nopinion and individual feeling in any part of the empire, since the war\nbegan, must know that there is hardly a man, woman, or child throughout\nthe empire who would hesitate if called upon to sacrifice possessions or\nlife in order to insure victory to the Fatherland. Seventy million\npeople who are animated by unanimous sentiment of this sort cannot be\ncrushed, probably not subdued.\n\nAnd England is confronted by the certainty that her world leadership is\nthe stake for which she is fighting; that her defeat would mean the end\nof the vast dominance which she has exercised throughout the world,\nsince the time of the Armada, through the power of her great navy.\n\nIs it not apparent, therefore, that these nations, if left to\nthemselves, inevitably must continue the war until one side or the\nother, or both, shall become exhausted--an eventuation which may be\npostponed not for mere months but for years?\n\nIn our own civil war Grant for almost two years stood within a hundred\nor a hundred and fifty miles of Richmond, the heart of the Confederacy,\nand was not able to sufficiently subdue Lee's forces to enable him to\nget possession of the city until the complete exhaustion of the\nConfederacy's resources in men and money had been accomplished.\n\n[Illustration: VISCOUNT JAMES BRYCE\n\n_(Photo from George G. Bain.)_\n\n_See Page 477_]\n\n[Illustration: DR. BERNHARD DERNBURG\n\n_(Photo by Campbell Studios.)_\n\n_See Page 487_]\n\n[Illustration: DAVID STARR JORDAN\n\n_See Page 502_]\n\n[Illustration: JOHN GRIER HIBBEN\n\n_(Photo by McManus.)_\n\n_See Page 503_]\n\nWhile that situation may not offer a true parallel in all respects to\nthat in which we find the belligerent forces in the present European\nwar, it nevertheless may be taken as a precedent proving that frontal\nencounters of powerful opponents generally do not yield final results\nuntil actual exhaustion compels one side or the other to abandon hope.\n\nSuch an exhaustion hardly can be expected within measurable time on the\npart of either one or the other of the combatants in the existing\nEuropean conflict, and this means the probable continuation for a long\nperiod of the merciless slaughter which has marked the last few months.\nWe hold up our hands in horror at the stories of human sacrifices in the\nearly ages when, after all, these were, perhaps, less brutal and less\nappalling than the wholesale slaughter of the flower of these warring\npeoples of which we now read almost daily.\n\nAs I see the situation there really are only three contestants in the\nwar--England, Russia, and Germany. France, Belgium, and Austria are\nimportant auxiliaries, but they are playing to a certain extent\nsecondary roles.\n\nEngland's real object is the utter defeat of Germany--nothing more nor\nless than that--and if this is accomplished England will have control of\nEurope. It must be remembered that the English Government and English\npeople frequently have asserted that they would not be satisfied with\nmere defeat of Germany's armed forces, but that her power must be\npermanently paralyzed.\n\nIf England should accomplish this, with Germany, its army and its navy,\nthus wholly out of the way, no one would be left for England to fear in\nfuture upon the high seas.\n\nThat might be the chief significance of England's complete victory, and\nits complete significance would be that every nation in the world would\nhave to do the British bidding, for should any one refuse she could\ncompletely destroy its commerce and shut off its overseas supplies.\n\nIn the cases of most nations overseas supplies include material vital\nto the continuance of life and happiness; to every nation, in these days\nof a developed and habitual foreign trade, overseas supplies are\nactually essential, even when they do not necessarily include meats and\nwheat and other foodstuffs.\n\nThe effect upon the United States of such an English victory would be\nmost disastrous.\n\nThe alliance between England and Japan is likely to be permanent. That\nis something which Americans cannot afford to forget for a moment.\n\nEngland needs Japan in the Far East, especially as an ally in case of\nneed, which at some time is certain to arrive, against Russia; and Japan\nfor many reasons needs the strength of English backing, without which\nher financial and political situation soon would become most dangerous,\nif not collapse.\n\nSuch a permanent alliance would have this consequence upon us, that\nwithout even the probability of difficulties with either England or\nJapan--and, personally, I do not believe that such a probability need be\nfeared--we nevertheless year after year would be compelled to\nincreasingly prepare for what may be defined as the disagreeable\npossibility of the eventuation of a disagreeable possibility.\n\nCertainly we should be under the necessity of notably and, therefore,\nvery expensively, increasing our naval armament; we should be under the\nnecessity of large expenditures for coast defense.\n\nCorollary military cost would be enormous and burdensome. The\npreparation which would be imposed on us as a necessity by such a\npermanent alliance would be sufficiently extensive and expensive to\nburden our people heavily and handicap our national progress.\n\nIt might involve, perhaps, even a greater hardship in our case than\nmilitarism has involved in Germany. It is improbable that the average\nAmerican realizes the part which absence of such burdens has played in\nour national development so far; it would be difficult for the average\nAmerican who has not studied the whole subject carefully to estimate\naccurately the part which the imposition of such a burden would be sure\nto play in our future.\n\nWe have been measurably a free people. If we were under the necessity of\nsupporting vast military and naval establishments we should be that no\nlonger, no matter how completely we adhered to our democratic political\nsystem and ideals. It is not Kings, but what they do, which burdens\ncountries, and the most burdensome, act of any King is to load his\ncountry up with non-productive, threatening, and expensive war\nmachinery.\n\n\nThe Real Peril.\n\nI fear that the American people as a whole have visualized only\nslightly, if at all, the real peril involved in this contingency; but I\ncannot feel otherwise than sure that soon they must awake to the great\ndanger that militarism and navalism may be imposed upon them through no\nfault of their own.\n\nAmerican impulses trend away from armament toward peaceful development\nalong industrial lines, but even now political leaders in Washington\nbegin to see what may be coming. The propositions which already have\nbeen made for considerable increases in our naval and military forces\nmay be regarded as only the forerunners of what is to be expected later.\n\nMy sympathies and interests, in other words my patriotic sentiments, are\ndefinitely American. I must repeat that I am of German origin, and that\nas regards the present struggle I am pro-German, yet it would be\nimpossible for me to say that I am anti-English, although I am\nanti-Russian for reasons that are obvious.\n\nI already have expressed the belief that the complete humiliation of\nEngland would be disastrous to us. Now, it seems to me that if Germany\nshould be completely successful, if she should be able to wear out the\nAllies, break down France, hold Russia in check, and cripple or even\ninvade England, (which many German leaders actually believe can be done,\nincredible as it may seem to us,) Germany would acquire a position such\nas never has been held by any nation since the beginning of history. Not\neven the power of the Roman Empire would approach it.\n\nThe advance which has marked the development of every means of\ncommunication, transportation, manufacturing, &c., since Rome's day\nwould give Germany, in the case of such an eventuation, a power which\nwould have been inconceivable to the most ambitious Roman Emperor. It\nwould make her a menace not only to her immediate neighbors, but to the\nentire globe.\n\nCould she be trusted with such power? Notwithstanding my personal\nsympathies, which I have taken pains to clearly outline, I must admit\nthat I cannot think so. The German character is not only self-reliant,\nwhich is admirable, but it readily becomes domineering, particularly\nwhen in the ascendency.\n\nIn the role of a world conqueror Germany would become a world\ndictator--would indulge in a domination which would be almost unbearable\nto every other nation. Particularly would this be the case in respect to\nher relations with the United States, a nation with which she always has\nhad and always must have intimate trade and commercial relations.\n\nShould Germany make England impotent and France powerless we should\nbecome more or less dependent upon German good-will, and it is highly\nprobable, indeed I regard it as a certainty, that before long, in such\nan event, the Monroe Doctrine would cease to exercise any important\ninfluence on world events. It would become a thing of the past--a \"scrap\nof paper.\"\n\nYou see that while I am not neutral to the extreme, while I fervently\nhope and pray that Germany may not be wrecked and that she may emerge\nfrom the war with full ability to maintain her own, I cannot believe\nthat it would be good for her or good for the world in general if she\nfound herself absolutely and incontrovertibly victorious at the end of\nthe great struggle. In other words, I wish Germany to be victorious, but\nI do not wish her to be too victorious.\n\nThis brings us definitely to the question as to what can be done to stop\nthis war. Its continuance is infinitely costly of men and treasure; its\nprosecution to the bitter end would mean complete disaster for one\ncontestant and only less complete destruction for the other, and it\nwould give to the victor, no matter what his sufferings and losses might\nhave been, a power dangerous to the entire world.\n\nHow shall it end? We do not want its end to mean a new European map.\nAnything of the sort would include the seed of another European war, to\nbe fought out later and at even greater probable cost, with all the\nworld-disturbance implied in such an eventuation.\n\nWhat the United States should desire and does desire is an understanding\nbetween these nations, of just what they are fighting for, which I\nalmost believe they no longer know themselves, and a conference between\nthem now, a pause to think, which at least may help toward stimulating\neach side to make concessions, before the ultimate of damage has been\ndone.\n\nSuch a conference might be called even without any interval in warfare\nand induced without definite outside intervention from ourselves or any\none else. I believe it not to be beyond the bounds of possibility that\nif this course could be brought about importantly enough, a way out of\nthis brutal struggle and carnage might be discovered even now, and I\nknow I am not alone in this belief.\n\nThe situation is unprecedented. No congress such as in former times more\nthan once has settled wars and brought about peace by the give-and-take\nprocess could be of avail in the existing circumstances. Something far\nhigher than such a conference is needed. This peace must not be\ntemporary. It must mark not the ending of this war alone but the ending\nof all war.\n\nSome means must be devised and generally agreed to which, after the\nre-establishment of peace, will do away with jealousies among European\nnations, so that the continual increase of armament on land and sea no\nlonger will be necessary, and humanity will be freed from its tremendous\nburden.\n\nIt is not at present possible to point out any concrete means by which\nthese things may be accomplished, but it is not impossible that, when\nreason shall be returned to the Governments now at war, they themselves\nmay suggest to one another plans and ways and means how this may be\neffectuated.\n\nToward this end America may help tremendously, and herein lies, it seems\nto me, the greatest opportunity ever offered by events to the American\npress.\n\nLet the newspapers of America stop futile philosophizing upon the merits\nand demerits of each case, let them measurably cease their comment upon\nwhat each side has accomplished or failed to accomplish during the\ntragic four months which have traced their bloody mark on history.\n\nLet them begin to stimulate public opinion in favor of a rational\nadjustment of the points at issue--such an adjustment as will leave each\ncontestant unhumiliated and intact, such an adjustment as will avoid, as\nfar as may be possible, the complete defeat of any one, such an\nadjustment as will do what can be done toward righting wrongs already\nwrought, and such an adjustment as will let the world return as soon as\nmay be to the paths of peace, productiveness, prosperity, and happiness.\n\nIn suggesting that America should regard this effort as an obligation I\nam assuming for this country no rights which are not properly hers. We,\na nation of a hundred million people, laboring constantly for peace and\nhuman progress, have a right to make our voice heard, and if we raise it\nproperly it will find listeners among those who can help toward the\naccomplishment of what we seek. But if we would make it heard we must be\nearnest, be honest, and be ceaseless in the reiteration of our demand.\n\nHave we not the right to insist that the interests of neutral nations,\nof whom, with our South American cousins, (for the better intercourse\nwith whom we have just spent several hundred millions upon the\nconstruction of the Panama Canal,) we form so large a percentage, shall\nbefore long be given some consideration by the nations whose great\nquarrel is harming us incalculably?\n\n\nAmericans Should Speak Out.\n\nThe interruption of our economic development already has become marked\nand the war's baneful influence upon moral conditions in our midst shows\nitself through constantly increasing unemployment and, as a logical\nconsequence of that, the rapid filling of our eleemosynary and penal\ninstitutions. May we not reasonably demand that this shall speedily be\nbrought to an end?\n\nIt probably is true that under the rules of the game the President of\nthe United States cannot offer his good offices again to the\nbelligerents without first being invited by one or the other side to do\nthis, but the people of the United States have a voice even more\npowerful than his; if that of the people of South America should be\njoined with it, and if the combined sound should be made unquestionably\napparent to the warring nations, it could not pass unheeded.\n\nPublic opinion in the United States should firmly seek to impress upon\nthe warring nations the conviction that nothing can secure a lasting\npeace except assurance of conditions under which not mighty armies\nand tremendous navies are held to be the factors through which\ntrade expansion and the conquest of the markets of the world are\nto be obtained, but that this can be accomplished better and more\nlastingly through rigid adherence to the qualities and methods which\ngenerally make for success in commercial or any other peaceful\ncompetition--fairness, thorough efficiency, and hard work.\n\nThe concentrated power of the American press and people would be\ntremendous. I am sure that, in this instance, it is possible to\nconcentrate it for righteousness and the future good of all humanity.\n\n\n\n\nProf. Mather on Mr. Schiff\n\n     Professor of Art at Princeton University; editorial writer for\n     The New York Evening Post and Assistant Editor of The Nation,\n     1901-06.\n\n\n_To the Editor of The New York Times:_\n\nIt seems to me that the Belgian previous question ought to be moved with\nall candid pro-Germans. Mr. Schiff is plainly candid, so I have framed\nan open letter to elicit his opinion:\n\n[_An Open Letter to Jacob H. Schiff._]\n\nMr. Jacob H. Schiff, New York.\n\nMy Dear Sir: The universal esteem which you enjoy in the country of your\nadoption lends great weight to any utterance of yours on public matters.\nYour interview on the war in THE TIMES of Nov. 22 will everywhere have\ninfluence for its gravity and fineness of feeling. It is with\ncompunction that I call your attention to the fact that your statement\nis ambiguous on precisely those issues of the conflict which your\nfellow-citizens have nearest at heart.\n\nYour general position may be described as a desire for prompt peace and\nrestoration of the former balance of power. More specifically you wish\n\"Germany to be victorious, but not too victorious.\" If this be merely an\ninstinctive expression of the residual German in you, an expression made\nwith no practical implications of any sort, no American will do\notherwise than respect such a sentiment. But if you deliberately desire\na moderate victory for Germany, with all that such moderate victory\npractically implies, it behooves your fellow-citizens to judge your\nviews in the light of what these really call for.\n\nAn ever so slightly victorious Germany would presumably retain Belgium,\nin whole or in part. Does such a conquest have your moral assent?\n\nOr suppose the rather improbable event of a Germany driven out of\nBelgium, but otherwise slightly victorious. In such case not a pfennig\nof indemnity would come to Belgium. Do you believe that no indemnity is\nmorally due Belgium?\n\nKnowing your reputation as a man and philanthropist, I can hardly\nbelieve that your desire for a \"not too victorious\" Germany includes its\nlogical implication of a subjugated or uncompensated Belgium. But if\nthis be so, candor expects an avowal. Until you have made yourself clear\non the issue that most concerns your fellow-citizens they will remain in\ndoubt as to your whole moral attitude on the war. Does your pacificism\ncontemplate a German Belgium? I feel sure you will admit that no fairer\nquestion could be set to any one who comments on the sequels of the war.\nI am, most respectfully yours,\n\nFRANK JEWETT MATHER, Jr.\n\nPrinceton University, Oct. 23, 1914.\n\n\n\n\nThe Eliot-Schiff Letters\n\n     _On Nov. 22_ THE NEW YORK TIMES _printed this interview with\n     Jacob H. Schiff on the European war reproduced above. Two days\n     later Dr. Charles W. Eliot, President Emeritus of Harvard, who\n     is an old friend of Mr. Schiff, wrote him a letter of comment\n     on THE TIMES interview. This letter resulted in considerable\n     correspondence between the two. At the time this\n     correspondence was penned there was not the least thought in\n     the mind of either of the writers of giving the letters to the\n     public. It was simply an interchange of ideas between men who\n     had long known each other. When they were convinced, however,\n     that publication might serve a useful purpose in shaping\n     public opinion, both Mr. Schiff and Dr. Eliot cordially\n     assented to their being printed._\n\n\nDr. Eliot to Mr. Schiff.\n\nCAMBRIDGE, Mass., Nov. 24, 1914.\n\nDear Mr. Schiff: It was a great relief to me to read just now your\ninterview in THE NEW YORK TIMES of Nov. 22, for I have been afraid that\nyour judgment and mine, concerning the desirable outcome of this\nhorrible war, were very different. I now find that at many points they\ncoincide.\n\nOne of my strongest hopes is that one result of the war may be the\nacceptance by the leading nations of the world of the precept or\nlaw--there shall be no world empire for any single nation. If I\nunderstand you correctly, you hold the same opinion. You wish neither\nGermany nor England to possess world empire. You also look forward, as I\ndo, to some contract or agreement among the leading nations which shall\nprevent competitive armaments. I entirely agree with you that it is in\nthe highest degree undesirable that this war should be prolonged to the\nexhaustion of either side.\n\nWhen, however, I come to your discussion of the means by which a good\nresult toward European order and peace may be brought out of the present\nconvulsion I do not find clear guidance to present action on your part\nor mine, or on the part of our Government and people. Was it your\nthought that a congress of the peoples of North and South America should\nnow be convened to bring to bear American opinion on the actual\ncombatants while the war is going on? Or is it your thought that the\nAmerican nations wait until there is a lull or pause in the indecisive\nfighting?\n\nSo far as I can judge from the very imperfect information which reaches\nus from Germany, the confidence of the German Emperor and people in\ntheir \"invincible\" army is not much abated, although it clearly ought to\nbe. It is obvious that American opinion has some weight in Germany; but\nhas it not enough weight to induce Germany to abandon her intense desire\nfor Belgium and Holland and extensive colonial possessions? To my\nthinking, without the abandonment of that desire and ambition on the\npart of Germany, there can be no lasting peace in Europe and no\nreduction of armaments. Sincerely yours,\n\nCHARLES W. ELIOT.\n\nJacob H. Schiff, Esq.\n\n\nMr. Schiff to Dr. Eliot.\n\nNEW YORK, Nov. 25, 1914.\n\nMy Dear Dr. Eliot:\n\nI am just in receipt of your thoughtful letter of yesterday, which it\nhas given me genuine pleasure to receive. While it is true that I have\nnot found myself in accord with many of the views to which you have\ngiven public expression concerning the responsibility for this\ndeplorable conflict and the unfortunate conditions it has created, I\nnever doubted that as to its desirable outcome we would find ourselves\nin accord, and I am very glad to have this confirmed by you, though as\nto this our views could not have diverged.\n\nAs to the means by which a desirable result toward European order and\npeace may be brought about out of the chaos which has become created, it\nis, I confess, difficult to give guidance at present. What needs first,\nin my opinion, to be done is to bring forth a healthy and insistent\npublic opinion here for an early peace without either side becoming\nfirst exhausted, and it was my purpose in the interview I have given to\nset the American people thinking concerning this. I have no idea that I\nshall have immediate success; but if men like you and others follow in\nthe same line, I am sure American public opinion can before long be made\nto express itself emphatically and insistently in favor of an early\npeace. Without this it is not unlikely that this horrible slaughter and\ndestruction may continue for a very, very long time.\n\nYours most faithfully,\n\nJACOB H. SCHIFF.\n\nPresident Emeritus Charles W. Eliot, Cambridge, Mass.\n\n\nDr. Eliot to Mr. Schiff.\n\nCAMBRIDGE, Mass., Nov. 28, 1914.\n\nDear Mr. Schiff:\n\nI think, just as you do, that the thing which most needs to be done is\nto induce Germany to modify its present opinion that the nation must\nfight for its very life to its last mark and the last drop of its blood.\nNow, every private letter that I have received from Germany, and every\nprinted circular, pamphlet, or book on the war which has come to me from\nGerman sources insists on the view that, for Germany, it is a question\nbetween world empire or utter downfall. There is no sense or reason in\nthis view, but the German philosophers, historians, and statesmen are\nall maintaining it at this moment.\n\nEngland, France, and Russia have no such expectations or desires as\nregards the fate of Germany. What they propose to do is to put a stop to\nGermany's plan of attaining world empire by militarism. Have you any\nmeans of getting into the minds of some of the present rulers of Germany\nthe idea that no such alternative as life or death is presented to\nGermany in this war, and that the people need only abandon their\nworld-empire ambitions while securing safety in the heart of Europe and\na chance to develop all that is good in German civilization? Sincerely\nyours,\n\nCHARLES W. ELIOT.\n\nJacob H. Schiff, Esq.\n\n\nMr. Schiff to Dr. Eliot.\n\nThe Greenbrier,\nWHITE SULPHUR SPRINGS, W. Va.,\nDec. 1, 1914.\n\nDear Dr. Eliot:\n\nI have received today your letter of the 28th ult., and I hasten to\nreply to it, for I know of nought that is of more importance than the\ndiscussion between earnest men of what might be done to bring to\ncessation this horrible and senseless war.\n\nI believe you are mistaken--though in this I am stating nothing,\nabsolutely, but my personal opinion--that Germany would not listen to\nthe suggestion for a restoration of peace until it has either come into\na position to dictate the terms or until it is utterly crushed. Indeed,\nI rather feel, and I have indications that such is the case, that\nEngland is unwilling to stop short of crushing Germany, and it is now\nusing all the influence it can bring to bear in this country to prevent\npublic opinion being aroused in favor of the stoppage of hostilities and\nre-establishment of peace.\n\nThe same mail which brought your letter this morning brought me also a\nletter from a leading semi-military man, whom I know by name, but not\npersonally. It is so fine and timely that I venture to inclose a copy\nfor your perusal. Why would not you, and perhaps Dr. Andrew D. White,\nwho--is it not a coincidence--has likewise written me today on the\nsubject of my recent TIMES interview, be the very men to carry out the\nsuggestion made by my correspondent?\n\nPerhaps no other two men in the entire country are so greatly looked up\nto by its people for guidance as you--in the first instance--and Dr.\nWhite. You could surely bestow no greater gift upon the entire civilized\nworld than if now, in the evening of a life which has been of such great\nvalue to mankind, you would call around you a number of leading, earnest\nAmericans with the view of discussing and framing plans through which\nAmerican public opinion could be crystallized and aroused to the point\nwhere it will insistently demand that these warring nations come\ntogether and, with the experience they have made to their great cost,\nmake at least an attempt to find a way out. I cannot but believe that\nthe Governments of England, France, and Germany--if not Russia--will\nhave to listen, if the American people speak with no uncertain voice.\nDo it, and you will deserve and receive the blessing of this and of\ncoming generations! Yours most faithfully,\n\nJACOB H. SCHIFF.\n\n\nDr. Eliot to Mr. Schiff.\n\nCAMBRIDGE, Mass., Dec. 8, 1914.\n\nDear Mr. Schiff:\n\nI thank you for your letter of Dec. 1 and its interesting inclosure.\n\nAlthough every thoughtful person must earnestly desire that the waste\nand destruction of this greatest of wars should be stopped as soon as\npossible, there is an overpowering feeling that the war should go on\nuntil all the combatants, including Germany, have been brought to see\nthat the Governmental regime and the state of the public mind in Germany\nwhich have made this war possible are not consistent with the security\nand well-being of Europe in the future.\n\nPersonally, I feel strongly that the war ought to go on so long as\nGermany persists in its policies of world empire, dynastic rule,\nautocratic bureaucracy, and the use of force in international dealings.\nIf the war stops before Germany sees that those policies cannot prevail\nin twentieth-century Europe, the horrible wrongs and evils which we are\nnow witnessing will recur; and all the nations will have to continue the\ndestructive process of competitive armaments. If peace should be made\nnow, before the Allies have arrived at attacking Germany on her own\nsoil, there would result only a truce of moderate length, and then a\nrenewal of the present horrors.\n\nI cannot but think that Europe now has a chance to make a choice between\nthe German ideal of the State and the Anglo-American ideal. These two\nideals are very different; and the present conflict shows that they\ncannot coexist longer in modern Europe.\n\nIn regard to the suggestion which your correspondent made to you that a\nconference of private persons should now be called in the hope of\narriving at an agreed-upon appeal to the combatants to desist from\nfighting and consider terms of settlement, I cannot but feel (1) that\nsuch a conference would have no assured status; (2) that the combatants\nwould not listen; and (3) that the effort would, therefore, be untimely\nnow, though perhaps useful later.\n\nOne idea might possibly bring about peace, if it fructified in the mind\nof the German Emperor--the idea, namely, that the chance of Germany's\nobtaining dominating power in either Europe or the world having already\ngone, the wise thing for him to do is to save United Germany within her\nnatural boundaries for secure development as a highly civilized strong\nnation in the heart of Europe. Surplus population can always emigrate\nhappily in the future as in the past.\n\nThe security of Germany would rest, however, on an international\nagreement to be maintained by an international force; whereas, the\nexample which Germany has just given of the reckless violation of\ninternational agreements is extremely discouraging in regard to the\npossibility of securing the peace of Europe in the future.\n\nAlthough this war has already made quite impossible the domination of\nGermany in Europe or in the world, the leaders of Germany do not yet see\nor apprehend that impossibility. Hence, many earnest peace-seekers have\nto confess that they do not see any means whatever available for\npromoting peace in Europe now, or even procuring a short truce.\n\nI wish I could believe with you that the Governments of England, France,\nGermany, and Russia would listen to the voice of the American people.\nThey all seem to desire the good opinion and moral support of America;\nbut I see no signs that they would take American advice or imitate\nAmerican example. President Wilson seems to think that this country will\nbe accepted as a kind of umpire in this formidable contest; but surely\nwe have no right to any such position. Our example in avoiding\naggression on other nations, and in declining to enter the contest for\nworld power, ought to have some effect in abating European ambitions in\nthat direction; but our exhortations to peace and good-will will, I\nfear, have little influence. There is still a real contest on between\ndemocracy and oligarchical methods.\n\nYou see, my dear Mr. Schiff, that I regard this war as the result of\nlong-continuing causes which have been gathering force for more than\nfifty years. In Germany all the forces of education, finance, commercial\ndevelopment, a pagan philosophy, and Government have been preparing this\nwar since 1860. To stop it now, before these forces have been\noverwhelmingly defeated, and before the whole German people is convinced\nthat they are defeated, would be to leave humanity exposed to the\ncertain recurrence of the fearful convulsions we are now witnessing.\n\nIf anybody can show me any signs that the leaders of Germany are\nconvinced that there is to be no world empire for Germany or any other\nnation, and no despotic Government in Europe, I shall be ready to take\npart in any effectual advocacy of peace. Sincerely yours.\n\nCHARLES W. ELIOT.\n\nJacob H. Schiff, Esq.\n\n\nMr. Schiff to Dr. Eliot.\n\nNEW YORK, Dec. 5, 1914.\n\nPresident Emeritus Charles W. Eliot, Cambridge, Mass.\n\nDear Dr. Eliot:\n\nYour letter of Dec. 3 reached me this morning, and has given me much\nfood for thought.\n\nI wish I could follow you in the position you have taken, for I like\nnothing better than to sit at the feet of a master like you and be\ninstructed. But, much as I have tried, even before our recent\ncorrespondence was begun, to get at your viewpoint as from time to time\npublished, I have not been able to convince myself that you occupy a\ncorrect position. Please accept this as expressed in all modesty, for I\nknow were you not thoroughly convinced of the justice of the position\nyou have taken from the start you would not be so determined in holding\nto it.\n\nI am perfectly frank to say that I am amazed and chagrined when you say\nthat you feel strongly that the war ought to go on until the Allies\nhave arrived at attacking Germany on her own soil, which, if this is at\nall likely to come, may take many months yet, and will mean sacrifice of\nhuman life on both sides more appalling than anything we have seen yet\nsince the war began. So you are willing that, with all the human life\nthat has already perished, practically the entire flower of the warring\nnations shall become exterminated before even an effort be made to see\nwhether these nations cannot be brought to reason, cannot be made to\nstop and to consider whether, with the experience of the past four\nmonths before them, it would not be better to even now make an effort to\nfind a way in which the causes that have led to this deplorable conflict\ncan be once and forever eradicated?\n\nThat it will be possible to find at this time any method or basis\nthrough the adoption of which the world would become entirely immune\nagainst war I do not believe, even by the establishment of the\ninternational police force such as you and others appear to have in\nmind.\n\nThe perpetual cessation of all war between the civilized nations of the\nworld can, as I see it, only be brought about in two ways, both Utopian\nand likely impracticable, for many years to come. War could be made only\nto cease entirely if all the nations of Europe could be organized into a\nUnited States of Europe and if free trade were established throughout\nthe world. In the first instance, the extreme nationalism, which has\nbecome so rampant during the past fifty years and which has been more or\nless at the bottom of every war, would then cease to exist and prevail,\nand in the second event, namely, if free trade became established\nthroughout the world the necessity for territorial expansion and\naggression would no longer be needed, for, with the entire world open on\nequal terms to the commerce and industry of every nation, territorial\npossession would not be much of a consideration to any peoples.\n\nYou continually lay stress upon the danger of the domination of Germany\nin Europe and in the world. I believe I have already made myself quite\nclear in my recent NEW YORK TIMES interview, which has called forth this\ncorrespondence between us, that neither would I wish to have Germany\ncome into a position where it might dominate Europe, and more or less\nthe world, nor do I believe that the German Nation, except perhaps a\nhandful of extremists, has any such desires.\n\nI believe I have also made myself quite clear in the interview to which\nI have referred that my feelings are not anti-English, for I shall never\nforget that liberal government and all forms of liberalism have had\ntheir origin, ever since the Magna Charta, in that great nation whom we\nso often love to call our cousins. But, with all of this, can you ignore\nthe fact that England even today, without the further power and prestige\nvictory in the present conflict would give her, practically dominates\nthe high seas, that she treats the ocean as her own and enforces her\ndictates upon the waters even to our very shores? That this is true the\npast four months have amply proved. I am not one of those who fear that\nthe United States, as far as can now be foreseen, will get into any\narmed conflict with Great Britain or with Japan, her permanent ally, but\nI can well understand that many in our country are of a different\nopinion, and it takes no prophet to foresee that, with England coming\nout of this war victorious and her and Japan's power on the high seas\nincreased, the demand from a large section of our people for the\nacquisition and possession of the United States of an increased powerful\nnavy and for the erection of vast coast defenses, both on the Atlantic\nand Pacific shores, will become so insistent that it cannot be\nwithstood. What this will mean to the American people in lavish\nexpenditures and in increased taxation I need not here further go into.\n\nYes, my dear and revered friend, I can see nought but darkness if a way\ncannot be soon found out of the present deplorable situation as it\nexists in Europe.\n\nBut even if the Allies are victorious it will mean, as I am convinced,\nthe beginning of the descent of England as the world's leader and the\nhastened ascendency of Russia, who, not today or tomorrow, but in times\nto come, is sure to crowd out England from the world's leadership. A\nRussia that will have become democratic in its government, be it as a\nrepublic or under a truly constitutional monarchy; a Russia in which\neducation will be as free as it is in our own country; a Russia in which\nthe people can move about and make homes in the vast territory she\npossesses wherever they can find most happiness and prosperity; a Russia\nwith its vast natural resources of every kind fully developed, is bound\nto be the greatest and most powerful nation on the earth.\n\nBut I am going too far into the future and I must return to the sad and\ndeplorable present. I only wanted to show how England's alliance with\nthis present-day Russia and its despotic, autocratic, and inhuman\nGovernment may, if the Allies shall be victorious, prove possibly in the\nnearer future, but certainly in the long run, England's Nemesis.\n\nBefore closing I want to correct the impression you appear to have\nreceived that I have meant to suggest a conference of private persons\nfor the purpose of agreeing upon an appeal by them to the nations of\nEurope to desist from fighting and consider terms of settlement. I know\nthis would be entirely impracticable and useless, but what I meant to\nconvey to you was my conviction that if you and men like you, of whom I\nconfess there are but too few, were to make the endeavor to rouse public\nopinion in the United States to a point where it should insistently\ndemand that this terrific carnage of blood and destruction cease, it\nwould not be long before these warring Governments would take notice of\nsuch sentiments on the part of the American people; and what should be\ndone at once is the stoppage of the furnishing of munitions of war to\nany of the belligerents, as is unfortunately done to so great an extent\nat present from this country.\n\nWe freely and abundantly give to the Red Cross and the many other relief\nsocieties, but we do this, even if indirectly, out of the very profits\nwe derive from the war material we sell to the belligerents, and with\nwhich the wounds the Red Cross and other relief societies endeavor to\nassuage are inflicted. Yours most faithfully,\n\nJACOB H. SCHIFF.\n\n\nDr. Eliot to Mr. Schiff.\n\nCAMBRIDGE, Mass., Dec. 8, 1914.\n\nDear Mr. Schiff:\n\nYour letter of Dec. 5 tells me what the difference is between you and me\nin respect to the outcome of the war--I am much more hopeful or sanguine\nof the world's getting good out of it than you are. Since you do not\nhope to get any good to speak of out of it, you want to stop it as soon\nas possible. You look forward to future war from time to time between\nthe nations of Europe and to the maintenance of competitive armaments.\nYou think that the lust of dominion must continue to be felt and\ngratified, now by one nation and now by another; that Great Britain can\ngratify it now, but that she will be overpowered by Russia by and by.\n\nI am unwilling to accept these conditions for Europe, or for the world,\nwithout urging the freer nations to make extraordinary efforts to reach\na better solution of the European international problem which, unsolved,\nhas led down to this horrible pit of general war.\n\nI have just finished another letter to THE NEW YORK TIMES, which will\nprobably be in print by the time you get back to New York, so I will not\ntrouble you with any exposition of the grounds of my hopefulness. It is\nbecause I am hopeful that I want to see this war fought out until\nGermany is persuaded that she cannot dominate Europe, or, indeed, make\nher will prevail anywhere by force of arms. When that change of mind has\nbeen effected I hope that Germany will become a member of a federation\nfirm enough and powerful enough to prevent any single nation from\naiming at world empire, or even pouncing on a smaller neighbor.\n\nThere is another point on which I seem to differ from you: I do not\nbelieve that any single nation has now, or can ever hereafter have, the\nleadership of the world, whereas you look forward to the existence of\nsuch leadership or domination in the hands of a single great power. Are\nthere not many signs already, both in the East and in the West, that the\ntime has past for world empire? Very sincerely and cordially yours,\n\nCHARLES W. ELIOT.\n\nJacob H. Schiff, Esq.\n\n\nMr. Schiff to Dr. Eliot.\n\nNEW YORK, Dec. 14, 1914.\n\nDear Dr. Eliot:\n\nI have delayed replying to your valued letter of the 8th inst. until\nafter the appearance of your further letter to THE NEW YORK TIMES, to\nwhich you had made reference, and, like everything emanating from you,\nthe contents of your last TIMES letter have evoked my deepest interest.\n\nHad our recent correspondence not already become more extended than you\nlikely had intended it to become when you first wrote me on the subject\nof my TIMES interview of some weeks ago, I should go into your latest\narguments at greater length. As it is, I shall only reiterate that I\nfind myself unable to follow you in your belief and hope, that world\nempire and world leadership, as this now exists, is likely to cease as a\nconsequence of the present war, much as we all may desire this.\n\nEngland has taken up arms to retain her world dominion and leadership;\nand to gain it, Germany is fighting. How can you, then, expect that\nEngland, if victorious, would be willing to surrender her control of the\noceans and the dominion over the trade of the world she possesses in\nconsequence, and where is there, then, room for the hope you express\nthat world leadership may become a thing of the past with the\ntermination of the present conflict?\n\nI repeat, with all my attachment for my native land and its people, I\nhave no inimical feeling toward England, have warm sentiments for\nFrance, and the greatest compassion for brave, stricken Belgium.\n\nThus, \"with malice toward none,\" and with the highest respect for your\nexpressed views, I am still of the opinion that there can be no greater\nservice rendered to mankind than to make the effort, either through the\nforce of public opinion of the two Americas, or otherwise, to bring\nthese warring Governments together at an early moment, even if this can\nonly be done without stopping their conflict, so that they may make the\nendeavor, whether--with their costly experience of the last five months,\nwith the probability that they now know better what need be done to make\nthe extreme armaments on land and sea as unnecessary as they are\nundesirable in the future--a basis cannot be found upon which\ndisarmament can be effectively and permanently brought about.\n\nThis, at some time, they will have come to, in any event, and must there\nfirst more human lives be sacrificed into the hundreds and hundreds of\nthousands, and still greater havoc be wrought, before passions can be\nmade to cease and reason be made to return?\n\nIf, as you seem to think, the war need go on until one country is beaten\ninto a condition where it must accept the terms the victor chooses to\nimpose, because it can no longer help itself to do else, the peace thus\nobtained will only be the harbinger of another war in the near or\ndistant future, bloodier probably than the present sanguinary conflict,\nand through no compact which might be entered into will it be possible\nto actually prevent this.\n\nTwenty centuries ago Christianity came into the world with its lofty\nmessage of \"peace on earth and good-will to men,\" and now, after two\nthousand years, and at the near approach of the season when Christianity\ncelebrates the birth of its founder, it is insisted that the merciless\nslaughter of man by man we have been witnessing these last months must\nbe permitted to be continued into the infinite. Most faithfully yours,\n\nJACOB H. SCHIFF.\n\nPresident Emeritus Charles W. Eliot, Cambridge, Mass.\n\n\n\n\nLA CATHEDRALE.\n\nFrom Figaro.\n\nBy EDMOND ROSTAND.\n\n\n    Ils n'ont fait que la rendre un peu plus immortelle.\n    L'Oeuvre ne perit pas, que mutile un gredin.\n    Demande a Phidias et demande a Rodin\n    Si, devant ses morceaux, on ne dit plus: \"C'est Elle!\"\n\n    La Forteresse meurt quand on la demantele.\n    Mais le Temple, brise, vit plus noble; et soudain\n    Les yeux, se souvenant du toit avec dedain,\n    Preferent voir le ciel dans la pierre en dentelle.\n\n    Rendons grace--attendu qu'il nous manquait encor\n    D'avoir ce qu'ont les Grecs sur la colline d'or;\n    Le Symbole du Beau consacre par l'insulte!--\n\n    Rendons grace aux pointeurs du stupide canon,\n    Puisque de leur adresse allemande il resulte\n    Une Honte pour eux, pour nous un Parthenon!\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nTHE CATHEDRAL.\n\nA Free Translation of Rostand's Sonnet.\n\nBy FRANCES C. FAY.\n\n    \"Deathless\" is graven deeper on thy brow;\n    Ghouls have no power to end thy endless sway.\n    The Greek of old, the Frenchman of today,\n    Before thy riven shrine are bending now.\n\n    A wounded fortress straightway lieth prone,\n    Not so the Temple dies; its roof may fall,\n    The sky its covering vault, an azure pall,\n    Doth droop to crown its wealth of lacework stone.\n\n    Praise to you, Vandal guns of dull intent!\n    We lacked till now our Beauty's monument\n    Twice hallowed o'er by insult's brutal hand,\n\n    As Pallas owns on Athens' golden hill,\n    We have it now, thanks to your far-flung brand!\n    Your shame--our gain, misguided German skill!\n\n\n\n\nProbable Causes and Outcome of the War\n\nBy Charles W. Eliot.\n\n     President Emeritus of Harvard University; Officer Legion\n     d'Honneur (France); Imperial Order of the Rising Sun, first\n     class (Japan); Royal Prussian Order of the Crown, first class;\n     Grand Officer of the Crown of Italy; Member of the General\n     Education Board, and an original investigator for the cause of\n     international peace.\n\n     _Following Is Reproduced a Series of Five Letters to_ THE NEW\n     YORK TIMES _from Dr. Eliot, Together with the Comments Thereon\n     by Eminent Critics._\n\n\nDR. ELIOT'S FIRST LETTER.\n\n_To the Editor of The New York Times:_\n\nThe American people without distinction of party are highly content with\nthe action of their National Administration on all the grave problems\npresented to the Government by the sudden outbreak of long-prepared war\nin Europe--a war which already involves five great States and two small\nones. They heartily approve of the action of the Administration on\nmediation, neutrality, aid to Americans in Europe, discouragement of\nspeculation in foods, and, with the exception of extreme protectionists,\nadmission to American registery of foreign-built ships; although the\nlegislation on the last subject, which has already passed Congress, is\nmanifestly inadequate.\n\nOur people cannot see that the war will necessarily be short, and they\ncannot imagine how it can last long. They realize that history gives no\nexample of such a general interruption of trade and all other\ninternational intercourse as has already taken place, or of such a\nstoppage of the production and distribution of the necessaries of life\nas this war threatens. They shudder at the floods of human woe which are\nabout to overwhelm Europe.\n\nHence, thinking Americans cannot help reflecting on the causes of this\nmonstrous outbreak of primitive savagery--part of them come down from\nthe seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and part developed in the\nnineteenth--and wondering what good for mankind, if any, can possibly\ncome out of the present cataclysm.\n\nThe whole people of the United States, without regard to racial origin,\nare of one mind in hoping that mankind may gain out of this prodigious\nphysical combat, which uses for purposes of destruction and death all\nthe new forces of nineteenth-century applied science, some new liberties\nand new securities in the pursuit of happiness; but at this moment they\ncan cherish only a remote hope of such an issue. The military force\nwhich Austria-Hungary and Germany are now using on a prodigious scale,\nand with long-studied skill, can only be met by similar military force,\nand this resisting force is summoned more slowly than that of\nAustria-Hungary and Germany, although the ultimate battalions will be\nheavier. In this portentous physical contest the American people have no\npart; their geographical position, their historical development, and\ntheir political ideals combine to make them for the present mere\nspectators, although their interests--commercial, industrial, and\npolitical--are deeply involved. For the moment, the best thing our\nGovernment can do is to utilize all existing neutrality rights, and, if\npossible, to strengthen or develop those rights, for out of this war\nought to come more neutral States in Europe and greater security for\nneutralized territory.\n\n\nThe Need for Discussion.\n\nThe chances of getting some gains for mankind out of this gigantic\nstruggle will be somewhat increased if the American people, and all\nother neutral peoples, arrive through public discussion at some clear\nunderstanding of the causes and the possible and desirable issues of the\nwar, and the sooner this public discussion begins, and the more\nthoroughly it is pursued, the sounder will probably be the tendencies of\npublic sentiment outside of the contending nations and the conclusions\nwhich the peace negotiations will ultimately reach.\n\nWhen one begins, however, to reflect on the probable causes of the\nsudden lapse of the most civilized parts of Europe into worse than\nprimitive savagery, he comes at once on two old and widespread evils in\nEurope from which America has been exempt for at least 150 years. The\nfirst is secret diplomacy with power to make issues and determine\nevents, and the second is autocratic national Executives who can swing\nthe whole physical force of the nation to this side or that without\nconsulting the people or their representatives.\n\nThe actual catastrophe proves that secret negotiations like those\nhabitually conducted on behalf of the \"concert of Europe,\" and alliances\nbetween selected nations, the terms of which are secret, or at any rate\nnot publicly stated, cannot avert in the long run outrageous war, but\ncan only produce postponements of war, or short truces. Free\ninstitutions, like those of the United States, take the public into\nconfidence, because all important movements of the Government must rest\non popular desires, needs, and volitions. Autocratic institutions have\nno such necessity for publicity. This Government secrecy as to motives,\nplans, and purposes must often be maintained by disregarding truth, fair\ndealing, and honorable obligations, in order that, when the appeal to\nforce comes, one Government may secure the advantage of taking the other\nby surprise. Duplicity during peace and the breaking of treaties during\nwar come to be regarded as obvious military necessities.\n\nThe second great evil under which certain large nations of\nEurope--notably Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary--have long suffered\nand still suffer is the permanent national Executive, independent of\npopular control through representative bodies, holding strong views\nabout rights of birth and religious sanctions of its authority, and\nreally controlling the national forces through some small council and a\nstrong bureaucracy. So long as Executives of this sort endure, so long\nwill civilization be liable to such explosions as have taken place this\nAugust, though not always on so vast a scale.\n\nAmericans now see these things more clearly than European lovers of\nliberty, because Americans are detached from the actual conflicts by the\nAtlantic, and because Americans have had no real contact with the feudal\nor the imperial system for nearly 300 years. Pilgrim and Puritan,\nCovenanter and Quaker, Lutheran and Catholic alike left the feudal\nsystem and autocratic government behind them when they crossed the\nAtlantic. Americans, therefore, cannot help hoping that two results of\nthe present war will be: (1) The abolition of secret diplomacy and\nsecret understandings, and the substitution therefor of treaties\npublicly discussed and sanctioned, and (2) the creation of national\nExecutives--Emperors, Sultans, Kings, or Presidents--which cannot use\nthe national forces in fight until a thoroughly informed national\nassembly, acting with deliberation, has agreed to that use.\n\n\nOpposite Tendencies.\n\nThe American student of history since the middle of the seventeenth\ncentury sees clearly two strong though apparently opposite tendencies in\nEurope: First, the tendency to the creation and maintenance of small\nStates such as those which the Peace of Westphalia (1648) recognized and\nfor two centuries secured in a fairly independent existence, and,\nsecondly, a tendency from the middle of the nineteenth century toward\nlarger national units, created by combining several kindred States\nunder one executive. This second tendency was illustrated strongly in\nthe case of both Germany and Italy, although the Prussian domination in\nGermany has no parallel in Italy. Somewhat earlier in the nineteenth\ncentury the doctrine of the neutralization of the territories of small\nStates was established as firmly as solemn treaties could do it. The\nlarger national units had a more or less federative quality, the\ncomponents yielding some of their functions to a central power, but\nretaining numerous independent functions. This tendency to limited\nunification is one which Americans easily understand and appreciate. We\nbelieve in the federative principle, and must therefore hope that out of\nthe present European horror will come a new development of that\nprinciple, and new security for small States which are capable of\nguaranteeing to their citizens \"life, liberty, and the pursuit of\nhappiness\"--a security which no citizen of any European country seems\ntoday to possess.\n\nSome of the underlying causes of the horrible catastrophe the American\npeople are now watching from afar are commercial and economic. Imperial\nGermany's desire for colonies in other continents--such as Great Britain\nand France secured earlier as a result of keen commercial ambitions--is\nintense. Prussia's seizure of Schleswig in 1864-5 had the commercial\nmotive; and it is with visions of ports on the North Sea that Germany\njustifies her present occupation of Belgium. The Russians have for\ngenerations desired to extend their national territory southward to the\nAegean and the Bosphorus, and eastward to good harbors on the Pacific.\nLater they pushed into Mongolia and Manchuria, but were resisted\nsuccessfully by Japan. Austria-Hungary has long been seeking ports on\nthe Adriatic, and lately seized without warrant Herzegovina and Bosnia\nto promote her approach toward the Aegean, and is now trying to seize\nServia with the same ends in view. With similar motives Italy lately\ndescended on Tripoli, without any excuse except this intense desire for\ncolonies--profitable or unprofitable. On the other hand, the American\npeople, looking to the future as well as to the past, object to\nacquisitions of new territory by force of arms; and since the twentieth\ncentury opened they have twice illustrated in their own practice--first\nin Cuba, and then in Mexico--this democratic objection. They believe\nthat extensions of national territory should be brought about only with\nthe indubitable consent of the majority of the people most nearly\nconcerned. They also believe that commerce should always be a means of\npromoting good-will, and not ill-will, among men, and that all\nlegitimate and useful extensions of the commerce of a manufacturing and\ncommercial nation may be procured through the policy of the \"open\ndoor\"--which means nothing more than that all nations should be allowed\nto compete on equal terms for the trade of any foreign people, whether\nbackward or advanced in civilization. No American Administration has\naccepted a \"concession\" of land in China. They also believe that\npeaceable extensions of territory and trade will afford adequate relief\nfrom the economic pressure on a population too large for the territory\nit occupies, and that there is no need of forcible seizure of territory\nto secure relief. It is inevitable, therefore, that the American people\nshould hope that one outcome of the present war should be--no\nenlargement of a national territory by force or without the free consent\nof the population to be annexed, and no colonization except by peaceable\ncommercial and industrial methods.\n\n\nAggressive Force a Failure.\n\nOne of the most interesting and far-reaching effects of the present\noutbreak of savagery is likely to be the conviction it carries to the\nminds of thinking people that the whole process of competitive\narmaments, the enlistment of the entire male population in national\narmies, and the incessant planning of campaigns against neighbors, is\nnot a trustworthy method for preserving peace. It now appears that the\nmilitary preparations of the last fifty years in Europe have resulted\nin the most terrific war of all time, and that a fierce ultimate\noutbreak is the only probable result of the system. For the future of\ncivilization this is a lesson of high value. It teaches that if modern\ncivilization is to be preserved, national Executives--whether imperial\nor republican--must not have at their disposal immense armaments and\ndrilled armies held ready in the leash; that armaments must be limited,\nan international Supreme Court established, national armies changed to\nthe Swiss form, and an international force adequate to deal with any\nnation that may suddenly become lawless agreed upon by treaty and held\nalways in readiness. The occasional use of force will continue to be\nnecessary even in the civilized world; but it must be made not an\naggressive but a protective force and used as such--just as protective\nforce has to be used sometimes in families, schools, cities, and\nCommonwealths.\n\nAt present Americans do not close their eyes to the plain fact that the\nbrute force which Germany and Austria-Hungary are now using can only be\novercome by brute force of the same sort in larger measure. It is only\nwhen negotiations for peace begin that the great lesson of the futility\nof huge preparations for fighting to preserve peace can be given effect.\nIs it too much to expect that the whole civilized world will take to\nheart the lessons of this terrible catastrophe and co-operate to prevent\nthe recurrence of such losses and woes? Should Germany and\nAustria-Hungary succeed in their present undertakings, the whole\ncivilized world would be obliged to bear continuously, and to an\never-increasing amount, the burdens of great armaments, and would live\nin constant fear of sudden invasion, now here, now there--a terrible\nfear, against which neither treaties nor professions of peaceable\nintentions would offer the least security.\n\nIt must be admitted, however, that the whole military organization,\nwhich has long been compulsory on the nations of Continental Europe, is\ninconsistent in the highest degree with American ideals of individual\nliberty and social progress. Democracies can fight with ardor, and\nsometimes with success, when the whole people is moved by a common\nsentiment or passion; but the structure and discipline of a modern army\nlike that of Germany, Austria-Hungary, or Russia, has a despotic or\nautocratic quality which is inconsistent with the fundamental principles\nof democratic society. To make war in countries like France, Great\nBritain, and the United States requires the widespread, simultaneous\nstirring of the passions of the people on behalf of their own ideals.\nThis stirring requires publicity before and after the declaration of war\nand public discussion; and the delays which discussion causes are\nsecurities for peace. Out of the present struggle should come a check on\nmilitarism--a strong revulsion against the use of force as means of\nsettling international disputes.\n\n\nAmerica Cannot Be Indifferent.\n\nIt must also be admitted that it is impossible for the American people\nto sympathize with the tone of the imperial and royal addresses which,\nin summoning the people to war, use such phrases as \"My monarchy,\" \"My\nloyal people,\" \"My loyal subjects\"; for there is implied in such phrases\na dynastic or personal ownership of peoples which shocks the average\nAmerican. Americans inevitably think that the right way for a ruler to\nbegin an exhortation to the people he rules is President Wilson's way:\n\"My fellow-countrymen.\"\n\nIt follows from the very existence of these American instincts and hopes\nthat, although the people of the United States mean to maintain\nfaithfully a legal neutrality, they are not, and can not be, neutral or\nindifferent as to the ultimate outcome of this titanic struggle. It\nalready seems to them that England, France, and Russia are fighting for\nfreedom and civilization. It does not follow that thinking Americans\nwill forget the immense services which Germany has rendered to\ncivilization during the last hundred years, or desire that her power to\nserve letters, science, art, and education should be in the least\nabridged in the outcome of this war upon which she has entered so\nrashly and selfishly and in so barbarous a spirit. Most educated\nAmericans hope and believe that by defeating the German barbarousness\nthe Allies will only promote the noble German civilization.\n\n[Illustration: JOHN W. BURGESS\n\n_(Photo by Alman & Co.)_\n\n_See Page 507_]\n\n[Illustration: WILLIAM M. SLOANE\n\n_(Photo by Pach.)_\n\n_See Page 515_]\n\nThe presence of Russia in the combination against Germany and\nAustria-Hungary seems to the average American an abnormal phenomenon;\nbecause Russia is itself a military monarchy with marked territorial\nambitions; and its civilization is at a more elementary stage than that\nof France or England; but he resists present apprehension on this score\nby recalling that Russia submitted to the \"Concert of Europe\" when her\nvictorious armies were within seventeen miles of Constantinople, that\nshe emancipated her serfs, proposed The Hague Conferences, initiated the\n\"Duma,\" and has lately offered--perhaps as war measures only--autonomy\nto her Poles and equal rights of citizenship to her Jews. He also\ncannot help believing that a nation which has produced such a literature\nas Russia has produced during the last fifty years must hold within its\nmultitudinous population a large minority which is seething with high\naspirations and a fine idealism.\n\nFor the clarification of the public mind on the issue involved, it is\nimportant that the limits of American neutrality should be discussed and\nunderstood. The action of the Government must be neutral in the best\nsense; but American sympathies and hopes cannot possibly be neutral, for\nthe whole history and present state of American liberty forbids. For the\npresent, thinking Americans can only try to appreciate the scope and\nreal issues of this formidable convulsion, and so be ready to seize\nevery opportunity that may present itself to further the cause of human\nfreedom, and of peace at last.\n\nCHARLES W. ELIOT.\n\nAsticou, Me., Sept. 1, 1914.\n\n\n\n\nAppreciation from Lord Bryce\n\n     Late Ambassador at Washington from Great Britain; Chief\n     Secretary for Ireland, 1905-6; author of \"The American\n     Commonwealth,\" and of studies in history and biography.\n\n\nIt has been a great pleasure to see from your published letter, which\nhas just reached us, that you so clearly understand the motive and\nfeelings with which Great Britain has entered on the present war.\nNeither commercial rivalry nor any fancied jealousy of Germany's\ngreatness has led us into it, and to the German people our people bear\nno ill-will whatever. Along with many others I have worked steadily\nduring long years for the maintenance of friendship with Germany,\nadmiring the splendid gifts of the German race, and recognizing their\nenormous services to science, philosophy, and literature. We had hoped,\nas some thoughtful statesmen in Germany had also hoped, that by a\ncordial feeling between Germany and Britain the peace of Europe might be\nsecured and something done to bring about permanently better relations\nbetween Germany and her two great neighbors with whom we found ourselves\non friendly terms; and we had confidently looked to the United States to\njoin with us in this task. But the action of the German Government in\nviolating the neutrality of Belgium when France had assured us that she\nwould respect it, the invasion of a small State whose neutrality and\nindependence she and England had joined in guaranteeing, evoked in this\ncountry an almost unanimous sentiment that the faith of treaties and the\nsafety of small States must be protected. There has been no war for more\nthan a century--perhaps two centuries--into which the nation has entered\nwith so general a belief that its action is justified. We rejoice to be\nassured that this is the general feeling of the people of the United\nStates, whose opinion we naturally value more than we do that of any\nother people.\n\nMost persons in this country, including all those who work for peace,\nagree with you in deploring the vast armaments which European States\nhave been piling up, and will hope with you that after this war they may\nbe reduced--and safely reduced--to slender dimensions. Their existence\nis a constant menace to peace. They foster that spirit of militarism\nwhich has brought these horrors on the world; for they create in the\ngreat countries of the Continent a large and powerful military and naval\ncaste which lives for war, talks and writes incessantly of war, and\nglorifies war as a thing good in itself.\n\nIt is (as you say) to the peoples that we must henceforth look to\nsafeguard international concord. They bear the miseries of war, they\nought to have the power to arrest the action of those who are hurrying\nthem into it.\n\nTo get rid of secret diplomacy is more difficult in Europe than in\nAmerica, whose relations with foreign States are fewer and simpler, but\nwhat you say upon that subject also will find a sympathetic echo here\namong the friends of freedom and of peace. I am always sincerely yours,\n\nJAMES BRYCE.\n\nForest Row, Sussex, Sept. 17, 1914.\n\n\n\n\nA Reply by Dr. Francke\n\n     Professor of the History of German Culture at Harvard\n     University and Curator of the Germanic Museum; author of works\n     on German literature.\n\n\n_To the Editor of The New York Times:_\n\nIn his letter of Sept. 1 President Eliot expresses the opinion that in\nthe present war \"England, France, and Russia are fighting for freedom\nand civilization.\" And he adds:\n\n     It does not follow that thinking Americans will forget the\n     immense services which Germany has rendered to civilization\n     during the last hundred years, or desire that her power to\n     serve letters, science, art, and education should be in the\n     least abridged in the outcome of this war, upon which she has\n     entered so rashly and selfishly and in so barbarous a spirit.\n     Most educated Americans hope and believe that by defeating the\n     German barbarousness the Allies will only promote the noble\n     German civilization.\n\nIn other words, German military and political power is to be crushed in\norder to set free the German genius for science, literature, and art. It\nis interesting to contrast with such views as these the following words\nof Goethe, uttered in 1813:\n\n     I have often felt a bitter grief at the thought of the German\n     people, which is so noble individually and so wretched as a\n     whole. A comparison of the German people with other nations\n     gives us painful feelings, which I try to overcome by all\n     possible means; and in science and art I have found the wings\n     which lift me above them. But the comfort which they afford\n     is, after all, only a miserable comfort, and does not make up\n     for the proud consciousness of belonging to a nation strong,\n     respected, and feared. However, I am comforted by the thought\n     of Germany's future. Yes, the German people has a future. The\n     destiny of the Germans is not yet fulfilled. The time, the\n     right time, no human eye can foresee, nor can human power\n     hasten it on. To us individuals, meanwhile, is it given, to\n     every one according to his talents, his inclinations, and his\n     position, to increase, to strengthen, and to spread national\n     culture. In order that in this respect, at least, Germany may\n     be ahead of other nations and that the national spirit,\n     instead of being stifled and discouraged, may be kept alive\n     and hopeful and ready to rise in all its might when the day of\n     glory dawns.\n\nIf I am not mistaken, these words of Germany's greatest poet express\naccurately what the German people during the last hundred years has been\nstriving for--national culture and national pre-eminence in every field\nof human activity. To advocate the reduction of Germany to a land of\nisolated scientists, poets, artists, and educators is tantamount to a\ncall for the destruction of the German Nation.\n\nKUNO FRANCKE.\n\nHarvard University, Sept. 5, 1914.\n\n\n\n\nDR. ELIOT'S SECOND LETTER\n\nThe Stout and Warlike Breed\n\n\n_To the Editor of The New York Times:_\n\nThere is nothing new in the obsession of the principal European nations\nthat, in order to be great and successful in the world as it is, they\nmust possess military power available for instant aggression on weak\nnations, as well as for effective defense against strong ones.\n\nWhen Sir Francis Bacon wrote his essay on \"The True Greatness of\nKingdoms and Estates\" he remarked that forts, arsenals, goodly races of\nhorses, armaments, and the like would all be useless \"except the breed\nand disposition of the people be stout and warlike.\" He denied that\nmoney is the sinews of war, giving preference to the sinews of men's\narms, and quoted Solon's remark to Croesus, \"Sir, if any other come that\nhath better iron than you, he will be master of all this gold\"--a truly\nBismarckian proposition. Indeed, Sir Francis Bacon says explicitly \"that\nthe principal point of greatness in any State is to have a race of\nmilitary men.\"\n\nGoethe, reflecting on the wretchedness of the German people as a whole,\nfound no comfort in the German genius for science, literature, and art,\nor only a miserable comfort which \"does not make up for the proud\nconsciousness of belonging to a nation strong, respected, and feared.\"\nBecause Germany in his time was weak in the military sense, he could\nwrite: \"I have often felt a bitter grief at the thought of the German\npeople, which is so noble individually, and so wretched as a whole\"; and\nhe longed for the day when the national spirit, kept alive and hopeful,\nshould be \"ready to rise in all its might when the day of glory dawns.\"\n\n\"The day of glory\" was to be the day of military power. Carlyle said of\nGermany and France in November, 1870, \"that noble, patient, deep, pious,\nand solid Germany should be at length welded into a nation, and become\nQueen of the Continent, instead of vaporing, vainglorious,\ngesticulating, quarrelsome, restless, and oversensitive France, seems to\nme that hopefulest public fact that has occurred in my time.\" How did\nGermany attain to this position of \"Queen of the Continent\"? By creating\nand maintaining, with utmost intelligence and skill, the strongest army\nin Europe--an army which within six years had been used successfully\nagainst Denmark, Austria, and France. Germany became \"Queen\" by virtue\nof her military power.\n\nIn the same paper Carlyle said of the French Revolution, of which he was\nhimself the great portrayer: \"I often call that a celestial infernal\nphenomenon, the most memorable in our world for a thousand years; on the\nwhole, a transcendent revolt against the devil and his works, (since\nshams are all and sundry of the devil, and poisonous and unendurable to\nman.)\" Now, the French Revolution was an extraordinary outbreak of\npassionate feeling and physical violence on the part of the French\nNation, both at home and abroad; and it led on to the Napoleonic wars,\nwhich were tremendous physical struggles for mastery in Europe.\n\nIn a recent public statement two leading philosophical writers of modern\nGermany, Profs. Eucken and Haeckel, denounce the \"brutal national\negoism\" of England, which they say \"recognizes no rights on the part of\nothers, and, unconcerned about morality or unmorality, pursues only its\nown advantage\"; and they attribute to England the purpose to hinder at\nany cost the further growth of German greatness. But what are the\nelements of that German greatness which England is determined to arrest\nby joining France and Russia in war against Germany and Austria-Hungary?\nThe three elements of recent German greatness are the extension of her\nterritory; contiguous territories in Europe and in other continents\ncolonial possessions; the enlargement of German commerce and wealth, and\nto these ends the firm establishment of her military supremacy in\nEurope. These are the ideas on the true greatness of nations which have\nprevailed in the ruling oligarchy of Germany for at least sixty years,\nand now seem to have been accepted, or acquiesced in, by the whole\nGerman people. In this view, the foundation of national greatness is\nfighting power.\n\nThis conception of national greatness has prevailed at many different\nepochs--Macedonian, Roman, Saracen, Spanish, English, and French--and,\nindeed, has appeared from time to time in almost all the nations and\ntribes of the earth; but the civilized world is now looking for better\nfoundations of national greatness than force and fighting.\n\nThe partial successes of democracy in Europe have much increased the\nevils of war. Sir Francis Bacon looked for a fighting class; under the\nfeudal system when a Baron went to war he took with him his vassals, or\nthat portion of them that could be spared from the fields at home.\nUniversal conscription is a modern invention, the horrors of which, as\nnow exhibited in Germany, Austria-Hungary, and France, much exceed those\nof earlier martial methods. There has never been such an interruption of\nagricultural and industrial production, or such a rending of family ties\nin consequence of war as is now taking place in the greater part of\nEurope. Moreover, mankind has never before had the use of such\ndestructive implements as the machine gun, the torpedo, and the dynamite\nbomb. The progress of science has much increased the potential\ndestructiveness of warfare.\n\nThinking people in all the civilized countries are asking themselves\nwhat the fundamental trouble with civilization is, and where to look for\nmeans of escape from the present intolerable conditions. Christianity in\nnineteen centuries has afforded no relief. The so-called mitigations of\nwar are comparatively trivial. The recent Balkan wars were as ferocious\nas those of Alexander. The German aviators drop aimless bombs at night\ninto cities occupied chiefly by non-combatants. The North Sea is strewn\nwith floating mines which may destroy fishing, freight, or passenger\nvessels of any nation, neutral or belligerent, which have business on\nthat sea. The ruthless destruction of the Louvain Library by German\nsoldiers reminds people who have read history that the destroyers of the\nAlexandria Library have ever since been called fanatics and barbarians.\nThe German Army tries to compel unfortified Belgian cities and towns to\npay huge ransoms to save themselves from destruction--a method which the\nBarbary States, indeed, were accustomed to use against their Christian\nneighbors, but which has long been held to be a method appropriate only\nfor brigands and pirates--Greek, Sicilian, Syrian, or Chinese.\n\n\nWhat Is Wrong with Civilization?\n\nHow can it be that the Government of a civilized State commits, or\npermits in its agents, such barbarities? The fundamental reason seems to\nbe that most of the European nations still believe that national\ngreatness depends on the possession and brutal use of force, and is to\nbe maintained and magnified only by military and naval power.\n\nIn North America there are two large communities--heretofore inspired\nchiefly by ideals of English origin--which have never maintained\nconscripted armies, and have never fortified against each other their\nlong frontier--Canada and the United States. Both may fairly be called\ngreat peoples even now; and both give ample promise for the future.\nNeither of these peoples lacks the \"stout and warlike\" quality of which\nSir Francis Bacon spoke; both have often exhibited it. The United States\nsuffered for four years from a civil war, characterized by determined\nfighting, in indecisive battles, in which the losses, in proportion to\nthe number of men engaged, were often much heavier than any thus far\nreported from the present battlefields in Belgium and France. There\nbeing then no lack of martial spirit in these two peoples, it is an\ninstructive phenomenon that power to conquer is not their ideal of\nnational greatness. Much the same thing may be said of some other\nself-governing constituents of the British Empire, such as Australia,\nNew Zealand, and South Africa. They, too, have a better ideal of\nnational greatness than that of military supremacy.\n\nWhat are the real ambitions and hopes of the people of the United States\nand the people of Canada in regard to their own future? Their\nexpectations of greatness certainly are not based on any conception of\ninvincible military force, or desire for the physical means of enforcing\ntheir own will on their neighbors. They both believe in the free\ncommonwealth, administered justly, and with the purpose of securing for\neach individual all the freedom he can exercise without injury to his\nneighbors and the collective well-being. They desire for themselves,\neach for itself, a strong Government, equipped to perform its functions\nwith dignity, certainty, and efficiency; but they wish to have that\nGovernment under the control of the deliberate public opinion of free\ncitizens, and not under the control of any Praetorian Guard, Oligarchic\nCouncil, or General Staff, and they insist that the civil authority\nshould always control such military and police forces as it may be\nnecessary to maintain for protective purposes.\n\n\nTrue National Greatness.\n\nThey believe that the chief object of government should be the promotion\nof the public welfare by legislative and administrative means; that the\nprocesses of government should be open and visible, and their results be\nincessantly published for approval or disapproval. They believe that a\nnation becomes great through industrial productiveness and the resulting\ninternal and external commerce, through the gradual increase of comfort\nand general well-being in the population, and through the advancement of\nscience, letters, and art. They believe that education, free intercourse\nwith other nations, and religious enthusiasm and toleration are means of\nnational greatness, and that in the development and use of these means\nforce has no place. They attribute national greatness in others, as well\nas in themselves, not to the possession of military force, but to the\nadvance of the people in freedom, industry, righteousness, and\ngood-will.\n\nThey believe that the ideals of fighting power and domination should be\nreplaced by the ideals of peaceful competition in production and trade,\nof generous rivalry in education, scientific discovery, and the fine\narts, of co-operation for mutual benefit among nations different in\nsize, natural abilities, and material resources, and of federation among\nnations associated geographically or historically, or united in the\npursuit of some common ends and in the cherishing of like hopes and\naspirations. They think that the peace of the world can be best promoted\nby solemn public compacts between peoples--not Princes or\nCabinets--compacts made to be kept, strengthened by mutual services and\ngood offices, and watched over by a permanent International Judicial\nTribunal authorized to call on the affiliated nations for whatever force\nmay be necessary to induce obedience to its decrees.\n\nWill not the civilized world learn from this horrible European war--the\nlegitimate result of the policies of Bismarck and his associates and\ndisciples--that these democratic ideals constitute the rational\nsubstitute for the imperialistic ideal of fighting force as the\nfoundation of national greatness? The new ideals will still need the\nprotection and support, both within and without each nation, of a\nrestrained public force, acting under law, national and international,\njust as a sane mind needs as its agent a sound and strong body. Health\nand vigor will continue to be the safeguards of morality, justice, and\nmercy.\n\nCHARLES W. ELIOT.\n\nAsticou, Me., Sept. 14, 1914.\n\n\n\n\nDR. ELIOT'S THIRD LETTER.\n\nWhy Is America Anti-German?\n\n\n_To the Editor of The New York Times:_\n\nThe numerous pamphlets which German writers are now distributing in the\nUnited States, and the many letters about the European war which\nAmericans are now receiving from German and German-American friends, are\nconvincing thoughtful people in this country that American public\nopinion has some weight with the German Government and people, or, at\nleast, some interest for them; but that the reasons which determine\nAmerican sympathy with the Allies, rather than with Germany and\nAustria-Hungary, are not understood in Germany, and are not always\nappreciated by persons of German birth who have lived long in the United\nStates.\n\nIt would be a serious mistake to suppose that Americans feel any\nhostility or jealousy toward Germany, or fail to recognize the immense\nobligations under which she has placed all the rest of the world,\nalthough they now feel that the German Nation has been going wrong in\ntheoretical and practical politics for more than a hundred years, and is\ntoday reaping the consequences of her own wrong-thinking and\nwrong-doing.\n\nThere are many important matters concerning which American sympathy is\nstrongly with Germany: (1) The unification of Germany, which Bismarck\nand his co-workers accomplished, naturally commended itself to\nAmericans, whose own country is a firm federation of many more or less\ndifferent States, containing more or less different peoples; while most\nAmericans did not approve Bismarck's methods and means, they cordially\napproved his accomplishment of German unification; (2) Americans have\nfelt unqualified admiration for the commercial and financial growth of\nGermany during the past forty years, believing it to be primarily the\nfruit of well-directed industry and enterprise; (3) all educated\nAmericans feel strong gratitude to the German Nation for its\nextraordinary achievements in letters, science, and education within the\nlast hundred years. Jealousy of Germany in these matters is absolutely\nforeign to American thought, and that any external power or influence\nshould undertake to restrict or impair German progress in these respects\nwould seem to all Americans intolerable, and, indeed incredible; (4) all\nAmericans who have had any experience in Governmental or educational\nadministration recognize the fact, that German administration--both in\npeace and in war--is the most efficient in the world, and for that\nefficiency they feel nothing but respect and admiration, unless the\nefficiency requires an inexpedient suppression or restriction of\nindividual liberty; (5) Americans sympathize with a unanimous popular\nsentiment in favor of a war which the people believe to be essential to\nthe greatness, and even the safety, of their country--a sentiment which\nprompts to family and property sacrifices very distressing at the\nmoment, and irremediable in the future; and they believe that the German\npeople today are inspired by just such an overwhelming sentiment.\n\nHow is it, then, that, with all these strong American feelings tending\nto make them sympathize with the German people in good times or bad, in\npeace or in war, the whole weight of American opinion is on the side of\nthe Allies in the present war? The reasons are to be found, of course,\nin the political and social history of the American people, and in its\nGovernmental philosophy and practice today. These reasons have come out\nof the past, and are intrenched in all the present ideals and practices\nof the American Commonwealth. They inevitably lead Americans to object\nstrongly and irrevocably to certain German national practices of great\nmoment, practices which are outgrowths of Prussian theories, and\nexperiences that have come to prevail in Germany during the past hundred\nyears. In the hope that American public opinion about the European war\nmay be a little better understood abroad it seems worth while to\nenumerate those German practices which do not conform to American\nstandards in the conduct of public affairs:\n\n(a) Americans object to the committal of a nation to grave measures of\nforeign policy by a permanent Executive--Czar, Kaiser, or King--advised\nin secret by professional diplomatists who consider themselves the\npersonal representatives of their respective sovereigns. The American\npeople have no permanent Executive, and the profession of diplomacy\nhardly exists among them. In the conduct of their national affairs they\nutterly distrust secrecy, and are accustomed to demand and secure the\nutmost publicity.\n\n(b) They object to placing in any ruler's hands the power to order\nmobilization or declare war in advance of deliberate consultation with a\nrepresentative assembly, and of co-operative action thereby. The fact\nthat German mobilization was ordered three days in advance of the\nmeeting of the Reichstag confounds all American ideas and practices\nabout the rights of the people and the proper limits of Executive\nauthority.\n\n(c) The secrecy of European diplomatic intercourse and of international\nunderstandings and terms of alliance in Europe is in the view of\nordinary Americans not only inexpedient, but dangerous and\nunjustifiable. Under the Constitution of the United States no treaty\nnegotiated by the President and his Cabinet is valid until it has been\npublicly discussed and ratified by the Senate. During this discussion\nthe people can make their voice heard through the press, the telegraph,\nand the telephone.\n\n(d) The reliance on military force as the foundation of true national\ngreatness seems to thinking Americans erroneous, and in the long run\ndegrading to a Christian nation. They conceive that the United States\nmay fairly be called a great nation; but that its greatness is due to\nintellectual and moral forces acting through adequate material forces\nand expressed in education, public health and order, agriculture,\nmanufacturing, and commerce, and the resulting general well-being of the\npeople. It has never in all its history organized what could be called a\nstanding or a conscripted army; and, until twenty years ago, its navy\nwas very small, considering the length of its sea coasts. There is\nnothing in the history of the American people to make them believe that\nthe true greatness of nations depends on military power.\n\n\nObject to Extension by Force.\n\n(e) They object to the extension of national territory by force,\ncontrary to the wishes of the population concerned. This objection is\nthe inevitable result of democratic institutions; and the American\npeople have been faithful to this democratic opinion under circumstances\nof considerable difficulty--as, for example, in withdrawing from Cuba,\nthe rich island which had been occupied by American troops during the\nshort war with Spain, (1898,) and in the refusing to intervene by force\nin Mexico for the protection of American investors, when that contiguous\ncountry was distracted by factional fighting. This objection applies to\nlong-past acts of the German Government an well as to its proceedings in\nthe present war--as, for example, to the taking of Schleswig-Holstein\nand Alsace-Lorraine, as well as to the projected occupation of Belgium.\n\n(f) Americans object strenuously to the violation of treaties between\nnations on the allegation of military necessity or for any other reason\nwhatever. They believe that the progress of civilization will depend in\nfuture on the general acceptance of the sanctity of contracts or solemn\nagreements between nations and on the development by common consent of\ninternational law. The neutralization treaties, the arbitration\ntreaties, The Hague Conferences, and some of the serious attempts at\nmediation, although none of them go far enough, and many of them have\nbeen rudely violated on occasion, illustrate a strong tendency in the\ncivilized parts of the world to prevent international wars by means of\nagreements deliberately made in time of peace. The United States has\nproposed and made more of these agreements than any other power, has\nadhered to them, and profited by them. Under one such agreement, made\nnearly a hundred years ago, Canada and the United States have avoided\nforts and armaments against each other, although they have had serious\ndifferences of opinion and clashes of interests, and the frontier is\n3,000 miles long and for the most part without natural barriers.\nCherishing the hope that the peace of Europe and the rights of its\npeoples may be secured through solemn compacts, (which should include\nthe establishment of a permanent international judicial tribunal,\nsupported by an international force,) Americans see, in the treatment by\nthe German Government of the Belgian neutralization treaty as nothing\nbut a piece of paper which might be torn up on the ground of military\nnecessity, evidence of the adoption by Germany of a retrograde policy of\nthe most alarming sort. That single act on the part of Germany--the\nviolation of the neutral territory of Belgium--would have determined\nAmerican opinion in favor of the Allies, if it had stood alone by\nitself--the reason being that American hopes for the peace and order of\nthe world are based on the sanctity of treaties.\n\n(g) American public opinion, however, has been greatly shocked in other\nways by the German conduct of the war. The American common people see no\njustification for the dropping of bombs, to which no specific aim can be\ngiven, into cities and towns chiefly inhabited by non-combatants, the\nburning or blowing up of large portions of unfortified towns and cities,\nthe destruction of precious monuments and treasuries of art, the\nstrewing of floating mines through the North Sea, the exacting of\nransoms from cities and towns under threat of destroying them, and the\nholding of unarmed citizens as hostages for the peaceable behavior of a\nlarge population under threat of summary execution of the hostages in\ncase of any disorder. All these seem to Americans unnecessary,\ninexpedient, and unjustifiable methods of warfare, sure to breed hatred\nand contempt toward the nation that uses them, and therefore to make it\ndifficult for future generations to maintain peace and order in Europe.\nThey cannot help imagining the losses civilization would suffer if the\nRussians should ever carry into Western Europe the kind of war which the\nGermans are now waging in Belgium and France. They have supposed that\nwar was to be waged in this century only against public, armed forces\nand their supplies and shelters.\n\nThese opinions and prepossessions on the part of the American people\nhave obviously grown out of the ideals which the early English colonists\ncarried with them to the American wilderness in the seventeenth century,\nout of the long fighting and public discussion which preceded the\nadoption of the Constitution of the United States in the eighteenth\ncentury, and out of the peculiar experiences of the free Commonwealths\nwhich make up the United States, as they have spread across the almost\nuninhabited continent during the past 125 years.\n\nThe experience and the situation of modern Germany have been utterly\ndifferent. Germany was divided for centuries into discordant parts, had\nambitious and martial neighbors, and often felt the weight of their\nattacks. Out of war came accessions of territory for Prussia, and at\nlast German unity. The reliance of intelligent and patriotic Germany on\nmilitary force as the basis of national greatness is a natural result of\nits experiences. Americans, however, believe that this reliance is\nunsound both theoretically and practically. The wars in Europe since\n1870-71, the many threatenings of war, and the present catastrophe seem\nto Americans to demonstrate that no amount of military preparedness on\nthe part of the nations of Europe can possibly keep the peace of the\nContinent, or indeed prevent frequent explosions of destructive warfare.\nThey think, too, that preparation for war on the part of Germany better\nthan any of her neighbors can make will not keep her at peace or protect\nher from invasion, even if this better preparation include advantages of\ndetail which have been successfully kept secret. All the nations which\nsurround Germany are capable of developing a strong fighting spirit; and\nall the countries of Europe, except England and Russia, possess the\nmeans of quickly assembling and getting into action great bodies of men.\nIn other words, all the European States are capable of developing a\npassionate patriotism, and all possess the railroads, roads,\nconveyances, telegraphs, and telephones which make rapid mobilization\npossible. No perfection of military forces, and no amount of previous\nstudy of feasible campaigns against neighbors, can give peaceful\nsecurity to Germany in the present condition of the great European\nStates. In the actual development of weapons and munitions, and of the\nart of quick intrenching, the attacking force in battle on land is at a\ngreat disadvantage in comparison with the force on the defensive. That\nmeans indecisive battles and ultimately an indecisive war, unless each\nparty is resolved to push the war to the utter exhaustion and\nhumiliation of the other--a long process which involves incalculable\nlosses and wastes and endless miseries. Americans have always before\nthem the memory of their four years' civil war, which, although\nresolutely prosecuted on both sides, could not be brought to a close\nuntil the resources of the Southern States in men and material were\nexhausted. In that dreadful process the whole capital of the Southern\nStates was wiped out.\n\n\nBut One Possible Issue.\n\nNow that the sudden attack on Paris has failed, and adequate time has\nbeen secured to summon the slower-moving forces of Russia and England,\nand these two resolute and persistent peoples have decided to use all\ntheir spiritual and material forces in co-operation with France against\nGermany, thoughtful Americans can see but one possible issue of the\nstruggle, whether it be long or short, namely, the defeat of Germany and\nAustria-Hungary in their present undertakings, and the abandonment by\nboth peoples of the doctrine that their salvation depends on militarism\nand the maintenance of autocratic Executives intrusted with the power\nand the means to make sudden war. They believe that no human being\nshould ever be trusted with such power. The alternative is, of course,\ngenuine constitutional government, with the military power subject to\nthe civil power.\n\nThe American people grieve over the fruitless sacrifices of life,\nproperty, and the natural human joys which the German people are making\nto a wrong and impossible ideal of national power and welfare. The\nsacrifices which Germany is imposing on the Allies are fearfully heavy,\nbut there is reason to hope that these will not be fruitless, for out of\nthem may come great gains for liberty and peace in Europe.\n\nAll experienced readers on this side of the Atlantic are well aware that\nnine-tenths of all the reports they get about the war come from English\nand French sources, and this knowledge makes them careful not to form\njudgments about details until the events and deeds tell their own story.\nThey cannot even tell to which side victory inclines in a long,\nfar-extended battle until recognizable changes in the positions of the\ncombatants show what the successes or failures must have been. The\nEnglish and French win some advantage so far as the formation of public\nopinion in this country is concerned, because those two Governments send\nhither official reports on current events more frequently than the\nGerman Government does, and with more corroborative details. The amount\nof secrecy with which the campaign is surrounded on both sides is,\nhowever, a new and unwelcome experience for both the English and the\nAmerican public.\n\n\nGerman Ignorance of Events.\n\nThe pamphlets by German publicists and men of letters which are now\ncoming to this country, and the various similar publications written\nhere, seem to indicate that the German public is still kept by its\nGovernment in ignorance about the real antecedents of the war and about\nmany of the incidents and aspects of the portentous combat. These\ndocuments seem to Americans to contain a large amount of misinformation\nabout the attack of Austria-Hungary on Servia, the diplomatic\nnegotiations and the correspondence between the sovereigns which\nimmediately preceded the war, and the state of mind of the Belgian and\nEnglish peoples. American believers in the good sense and good feeling\nof the common people naturally imagine, when an awful calamity befalls a\nnation, that the people cannot have been warned of its approach, else\nthey would have avoided it. In this case they fear that the Emperor, the\nChancellery, and the General Staff have themselves been misinformed in\nimportant respects, have made serious miscalculations which they are\nproposing to conceal as long as possible, and are not taking the common\npeople into their confidence. American sympathies are with the German\npeople in their sufferings and losses, but not with their rulers, or\nwith the military class, or with the professors and men of letters who\nhave been teaching for more than a generation that might makes right.\nThat short phrase contains the fundamental fallacy which for fifty years\nhas been poisoning the springs of German thought and German policy on\npublic affairs.\n\nDread of the Muscovite does not seem to Americans a reasonable\nexplanation of the present actions of Germany and Austria-Hungary,\nexcept so far as irrational panic can be said to be an explanation.\nAgainst possible, though not probable, Russian aggression, a firm\ndefensive alliance of all Western Europe would be a much better\nprotection than the single might of Germany. It were easy to imagine\nalso two new \"buffer\" States--a reconstructed Poland and a Balkan\nConfederation. As to French \"revenge,\" it is the inevitable and\npraiseworthy consequence of Germany's treatment of France in 1870-71.\nThe great success of Germany in expanding her commerce during the last\nthirty years makes it hard for Americans to understand the hot\nindignation of the Germans against the British because of whatever\nineffective opposition Great Britain may have offered to that expansion.\nNo amount of commercial selfishness on the part of insular England can\njustify Germany in attempting to seize supreme power in Europe and\nthence, perhaps, in the world.\n\nFinally, Americans hope and expect that there will be no such fatal\nissue of the present struggle as the destruction or ruin of the German\nNation. On the contrary, they believe that Germany will be freer,\nhappier, and greater than ever when once she has got rid of the\nmonstrous Bismarck policies and the Emperor's archaic conception of his\nfunction, and has enjoyed twenty years of real peace. Your obedient\nservant,\n\nCHARLES W. ELIOT.\n\nAsticou, Me., Sept. 28, 1914.\n\n\n\n\nDr. Dernburg's Reply to the Third Letter\n\n     Late German Secretary of State for the Colonies; lived for\n     several years in the United States as member of the banking\n     firm of Ladenburg, Thalmann & Co., New York.\n\n\n_To the Editor of The New York Times:_\n\nProf. Eliot is conferring a great favor on the exponents of the German\nside in the present struggle in explaining to them what he thinks of the\nso-called anti-German feeling in the United States. I am sure his views\nwill be read also in Germany with a great deal of attention, although he\nwill certainly not remain unchallenged in nearly all essential points.\nThe compliment that Prof. Eliot pays to the German people as a whole\nmust be specially appreciated, the more so as it comes from a scientist\nwhose great authority is equally recognized on both sides of the\nAtlantic.\n\nThe anti-German feeling, according to Prof. Eliot, takes its source from\nthe American objection to the committal of a nation to grave mistakes by\na permanent Executive. But then, with the exception of France, all the\nwarring nations have permanent Executives, professional diplomatists;\nall their affairs are conducted in secret, and all their rulers have the\npower, including the President of France, to embroil their nations in\nwar. The German Emperor is in this respect certainly more restricted\nthan the other heads of State, and I have not read that the declaration\nof war has been expressly sanctioned by the English Parliament, and\ncertainly the mobilization of the English fleet that took place in July,\nand the mobilization of the Russian Army that took place at the same\ntime, have not even been brought to the knowledge of the respective\nParliaments. When, therefore, the same conditions prevail in all the\nwarring States, how can they be made the reason for such an anti-German\nfeeling?\n\nThe same objection holds good with the American antipathy against the\npower of rulers to order mobilization or declare war in advance without\nconsultation of Parliament, to which I have only to say that the English\nfleet was mobilized without consulting the English Parliament, while in\nGermany the Bundesrat, the representatives of the Federal States, as\nwell as of the Federal Diets, has been duly consulted. I may add that\nalso the party leaders of the Reichstag, which could not be convoked\nearlier than two days after the declaration of the war, have been\ncontinuously informed and consulted.\n\nAgainst the next paragraph, where Prof. Eliot complains of the secrecy\nof European diplomacy and of international treaties and understandings,\nthe same objection must be made. The state described here as particular\nto Germany prevails in all European countries, and neither the treaty of\nthe Russian-French alliance, nor the arrangements of the Triple Entente\nhave ever been submitted to the French or British Parliaments. As\nregards the American attitude toward armaments, I purposely refrain from\nadducing the American example into my argument, much as I could show\nthat with a very large part of the American Nation the idea of defending\nthe American coast against any invader and the maintenance of a strong\nPan-American policy, if need be by arms, is just as fixed a tenet as the\nGerman idea that the Fatherland should be held safe from invasion or\ndestruction by the will and the strength of its people. England has\nalways held the same, if not through her army so through her navy, and\nso did the rest of Europe; and there is no argument to be gotten from\nthat for an anti-German feeling.\n\n\nNo Seizure of Schleswig-Holstein.\n\nAmericans object to the extension of territory by force. Germany has\nnever done that, even if one goes back as far as Prof. Eliot wishes to\ngo. Mr. Eliot is absolutely mistaken as to the history of the\nincorporation of Schleswig-Holstein into Prussia. Schleswig-Holstein was\na Dual-Dukedom that never belonged to Denmark, but having as its Duke\nthe King of Denmark as long as he belonged to the elder line of the\nHouse of Oldenburg. This elder line was extinct when King Christian\nVIII. died without male issue. His successor wanted to incorporate the\ntwo German Dukedoms into Denmark. Then the people stood up and expressed\nthe desire to remain with the German Federation, to which it had always\nbelonged, and there it is now, of its own free will. The natural\ndividing line between Denmark and Germany, however, is the River Eider.\nThere are about 30,000 Danes south of the Eider, who have been absorbed\nagainst their will, a thing that can never be avoided, and that has\nsometimes given Prussia a little trouble.\n\n\nAlsace-Lorraine Originally German.\n\nAs to Alsace-Lorraine, the facts are known to be that it had belonged to\nGermany until it had been taken, against the will of the people, by\nFrance under Louis XIV., and it was returned to Germany as a matter of\nright, more than three-quarters of the population being of German\ndescent and speaking the German language.\n\nBut let me ask in return, Mr. Eliot, when did ever in her political\ncareer England consult the will of the people when she took a country?\nCan he say that, when England tore the treaty of Majuba Hill, like a\n\"scrap of paper,\" and made war on the Boers? Did she consult the people\nof Cyprus in 1878? Does he know of any plebiscite in India? Has she\nconsulted the Persians, or has France consulted the people of Morocco,\nor of Indo-China, Italy the people of Tripoli? Since Germany has not\nacted here in any other way forty years ago than all the other nations,\nwhy does Dr. Eliot consider the American people justified in taking\nanti-German views for reasons of such an old date, while he forgives the\nnations of the party he favors for much more recent infringement of his\nrule?\n\n\"Americans object to the violation of treaties.\" So do the Germans. We\nhave always kept our treaties, and mean to do so in the future. The fact\nwith Belgium is that her neutrality was very one-sided; that, as can be\nproved, as early as the 25th of June, Liege was full of French soldiers,\nthat Belgian fortifications were all directed against Germany, and that\nfor years past it was the Belgian press that outdid the French press in\nattacks against Germany. But I can give Mr. Eliot here some authority\nthat he has so far not challenged. When Sir Edward Grey presented the\nEnglish case in the House of Commons on the 3d of August he declared\nthat the British attitude was laid down by the British Government in\n1870, and he verbally cited Mr. Gladstone's speech, in which he said he\ncould not subscribe to the assertion that the simple fact of the\nexistence of a guarantee was binding on every party, irrespective\naltogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the\ntime when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises. He called\nthat assertion a \"stringent and impracticable\" view of the guarantee and\nthe whole treaty a \"complicated question.\" So Mr. Gladstone, and with\nhim Sir Edward Grey, has held the Belgian neutrality treaty not binding\non every party, when it was against the interest which the particular\nsituation dictated, when the war broke out. It was the interest of Great\nBritain to maintain the treaty, and that is why she acted. It was\nagainst German interest to maintain the treaty, and that is why she\nbroke it. That is the British and not the German theory, and I could\nvery well rest my case here. My theory is with the German Chancellor,\nthat I greatly regret the necessity of violating the Belgian neutrality,\nafter Belgium had chosen to repel the German overtures for a free\npassage.\n\nIt is quite certain that the breach of the Belgian neutrality by Germany\nwas used in Great Britain as a powerful instrument to influence the\npublic sentiment. Every war must be borne by national unity, and it is\nthe duty of the nation's leaders to secure such unity by all practicable\nmeans. But has it been forgotten that the attitude of Sir Edward Grey\ncaused such excellent men as Lord Morley, John Burns, and Sir John\nTrevelyan to leave the Cabinet, where they were looked upon as the best\nand most liberal members of the ruling combination? Bernard Shaw says of\nGreat Britain that she has never been at a loss for an effective moral\nattitude. Such an attitude is a powerful weapon in diplomatical and\nactual warfare, and it must be resorted to, if the necessity arises. But\nthat cannot blind us to the fact that the British Government allowed the\npolitical interest to be the paramount consideration in this Belgian\nneutrality matter. The German interest for not acting on the guarantee\nwas just as strong as the English to act for it.\n\nThe proof is found in the English \"White Paper.\" I cite the famous\nreprint of THE TIMES, (Dispatch No. 148 of Aug. 2 to Paris.) Here Sir\nEdward Grey says: \"We were considering ... whether we should declare\nviolation of Belgian neutrality to be a casus belli.\"\n\n\n\"Treaties Must Not Be Overrated.\"\n\nI am an ardent believer in all international arrangements to prevent\ndifficulties and wars between nations, and I rejoice with the American\npeople in the signal success this policy is now having in this country.\nBut international treaties must not be overrated. There are questions\nwhich cannot be settled by them. It is too difficult to explain just the\nnature of such situations as arose in Europe, so I may be permitted for\nonce to ask this question: Does Prof. Eliot believe that the majority of\nthe American people think that the unwritten Monroe Doctrine could be\nmade the subject of arbitration, whether it had a right to exist or to\nbe enforced? I must emphatically say, No, it could not. It can be as\nlittle arbitrated upon as a matter of religion or of personal morals.\n\nMr. Eliot thinks a happy result of the war would be that American\ninstitutions should prevail in Germany thereafter. Why should Germany\nonly become a representative republic? Does he not demand the same\nregarding Russia, England, Italy, Austria, and Japan? And if not, why\nnot?\n\nFrom all this I fail to see the point in the reasons given by Prof.\nEliot why fair-minded Americans should side with the Allies because the\nobjections made against German procedure, down to the breach of the\nBelgian neutrality, must be made against all other European States.\nBritish history is just teeming with examples of broken treaties and\ntorn \"scraps of paper.\" The chasing of German diplomatic representatives\nout of neutral Egypt is a case in point.\n\nI must insist that whatever anti-German feeling there is is not fully\nexplained by Prof. Eliot, and his article cannot be made a code by which\nGerman behavior could be regulated in the future. Prof. Eliot is a\nscholar; business interests do not come very near him. So he is\nespecially concerned with the ethical aspect of the matter. He believes\nthe Germans think that \"might is right.\" This is very unjust. Our\nhistory proves that we have never acted on this principle. We have never\ngot or attempted to get a world empire such as England has won, all of\nwhich, with a very few exceptions, by might, by war, and by conquest.\nThe German writers who have expounded this doctrine have only shown how\nthe large world empires of England and France were welded together, what\nmeans have been adopted for that purpose, and against what sort of\npolitical doctrines we must beware.\n\n\nOur Sympathy for the Under Dog.\n\nAs Dr. Eliot makes his remarks for the benefit of his German confreres,\nmay I be permitted to say to them what I consider the reason for the\nAmerican attitude? There is, in the first place, the ethical side.\nAmericans have a very strong sense of generosity, and are, as a rule,\nvery good sports. They think Belgium a small nation, brutally attacked\nby a much bigger fellow; they feel that the little man stands up bravely\nand gamely, and fights for all he is worth. Such a situation will always\ncommand American sympathy and antagonism against the stronger. Then\nthere is the business side. Americans feel that this war is endangering\ntheir political and commercial interests, so they are naturally angry\nagainst the people who, they believe, have brought the war about.\n\nAs Germany has not had an opportunity to make herself heard as amply as\nher adversaries, they think that it was Germany which set the world\nafire, and that is what they resent, and in which they were justified,\nif it were true. But the question of the hour is not the question of the\npast, but of the present and of the future, and the people on this side\nwho will give Germany fair play because it is just in them will examine\nthe situation in the light of their interests. Then they will find that\nBelgium had been in league with the Allies long before the conflagration\nbroke out, only to be left to its own resources when the critical hour\narose. They will further find that it is not Germany but England and her\nallies that are throttling commerce, maiming cables, stopping mails,\nand breaking neutrality and other treaties to further their aims; that,\nfinally, today England has established a world rule on the sea to which\neven America must submit. They will then soon come to the conclusion\nthat, no matter what happened in the past, the peace of the world can\nonly be assured by a good understanding between Germany and the United\nStates as a sort of counterbalance against the unmeasured aggrandizement\nof English sea power. Then the feeling toward Germany will be\nconsiderably better, and I may add that even now it is not so very bad\nafter all.\n\nI make these remarks with due respect to Prof. Eliot and his views, and\nwith great reluctance for being compelled to enter the field against a\npersonality whose undoubted superiority I wish to be the first to\nacknowledge.\n\nBERNHARD DERNBURG.\n\nNew York, Oct. 4, 1914.\n\n\n\n\nDr. Jordan's Reply to Dr. Dernburg\n\n     Daniel Jordan is Assistant Professor of Roman Languages and\n     Literature at Columbia University.\n\n\n_To the Editor of The New York Times:_\n\nPresident Eliot is as fair a judge of the present European situation as\ncan be found anywhere, and is well qualified to explain the almost\nunanimous attitude of thoughtful Americans in regard to Germany. Dr.\nDernburg, on the other hand, has been officially sent from Germany to\nexpound the German official version; both his point of view and his\ntreatment of facts are essentially un-American.\n\nHe says: \"Americans object to the extension of territory by force.\nGermany has never done that.\" Apparently he believes that the Poles\nasked Prussia to become her subjects. The facts are that they have\nfought and begged for autonomy for nearly 150 years, and that at the\npresent time high German officials are members of the Anti-Polish\nLeague.\n\nDr. Dernburg, when he comes to Schleswig-Holstein, states that 30,000\nDanes south of the Eider River (this is in Holstein) have been absorbed\nagainst their will, \"a thing that can never be avoided, and that has\nsometimes given Prussia a little trouble.\" But what about the Danes\nnorth of the Eider River? Schleswig and Holstein are really two\nprovinces. Holstein is German, but the northern part of Schleswig, north\nof Fiensburg, is inhabited by Danes who are longing to join Denmark and\nwho number about 200,000. Article 5 of the Treaty of Prague, signed on\nAug. 23, 1866, after Sadowa, between Prussia and Austria, states that\nthe inhabitants of Northern Schleswig shall be given a chance to join\nDenmark, \"if they should so express the desire by a free vote.\" Prussia\nhas not respected this solemn promise any more than former promises\nconcerning Schleswig. The frequently renewed protests of the annexed\nDanes have remained unanswered. The best proof that Prussia's title to\nDanish Schleswig was not considered as very substantial is that in\nOctober, 1878, Prussia finally obtained from Austria the annulment of\nArticle 5 of the Treaty of Prague, which dealt with the taking of a\nplebiscite in Danish Schleswig.\n\nTo decide the fate of a province without consulting the inhabitants\nseems perfectly natural to German Kultur, but to Americans it is not;\nthe days of slavery have gone, and wherever slavery still exists it is\ntime to make a change.\n\nAs to Alsace-Lorraine, says Dr. Dernburg, \"the facts are known that it\nhad belonged to Germany until it was taken by Louis XIV., against the\nwill of the people, and that it was returned to Germany as a matter of\nright.\" Such an argument is mediaeval, and it might just as well be\nargued that Germany should now belong to France, because Germany was\nonce conquered, civilized, and organized by inhabitants of France, led\nby their Frankish King. And it is not sure that in 1648 Alsace was not\nglad to become French, because Louis XIV., by the Treaty of Westphalia,\nthen granted perfect religious freedom to the Alsatians, who unlike\ntheir neighbors, lived ever since without fear of religious\npersecutions. Lorraine itself was not annexed by Louis XIV., nor by\nforce, as it was peacefully united to France at the death of Stanislas,\nfather of the Queen of France, Marie-Lesinzka. As for the inhabitants of\nMetz, they were considered long ago as French. Metz was annexed to\nFrance in 1552, with the full consent of the then allies of the French\nKing, Henri II., the German Princes, who recognized by the Treaty of\nCateau-Cambresis, (1559,) that Metz, Toul, and Verdun were French\ncities, and could not be considered as a part of the German\nConfederation. So there were at one time German Princes who accepted\nthe dogma of the consent of the governed!\n\nAttacking the record of England in order to defend the record of\nGermany, as Dr. Dernburg does, is no justification for the necessary\nGerman aggression of today. Even granting that the English record is\npoor, which is a matter open to discussion, two wrongs would not make\nthings right.\n\nDr. Dernburg also compares the policy of aggrandizement of Germany in\nSchleswig, Alsace, &c., with that of other countries in Morocco,\nTripoli, &c. Even school children know that two things which are\nentirely unlike must not be compared. Northern Africa had too long been\na den of pirates and brigands, and Latin Europe has rendered an immense\nservice to the world in establishing order there. Algeria has been\nconquered in the same way as Morocco is now being conquered, and her\nnatives enjoy more genuine liberty than they ever did before; they are\neven willing to fight as volunteers for the country they consider now as\ntheir own. Neither Danish Schleswig nor Alsace-Lorraine, which were as\ncivilized as any other European country when they were last annexed, can\nbe compared to Morocco any more than to the Philippines. So this\ncomparison made by Dr. Dernburg also falls to pieces.\n\nThe case of the German point of view is not entirely without hope. In\nTHE TIMES of Oct. 5 Dr. Dernburg approves the annexation of Holstein\nbecause the Germans of Holstein wanted to belong to Germany. This is a\nsound conclusion, and Dr. Dernburg will doubtless acknowledge\nlater--better late than never--that the Alsatians and the Danish of\nSchleswig should have had their say, just like the Germans of Holstein.\nIt cannot be possible that to him the wish of the inhabitants of a\nprovince is the voice of God when it suits Germany and the voice of the\ndevil when it suits somebody else.\n\nDANIEL JORDAN.\n\nColumbia University, Nov. 6, 1914.\n\n\n\n\nDr. Irene Sargent's Reply to Dr. Dernburg\n\n     Professor of the History of Fine Arts, Syracuse University.\n\n\n_To the Editor of The New York Times:_\n\nContradicting Dr. Eliot, Dr. Bernhard Dernburg says:\n\n     Schleswig-Holstein was a dual Dukedom that never belonged to\n     Denmark; but, having as its Duke the King of Denmark, as long\n     as he belonged to the elder line of the house of Oldenburg ...\n     Frederick VII. wanted to incorporate the two German Dukedoms\n     into Denmark.... Then the people stood up and expressed the\n     desire to remain with the German Federation.\n\nSuch an assertion is a summary, inaccurate, and unfair manner of dealing\nwith perhaps the most complex series of diplomatic, legal, and racial\nquestions that arose in the nineteenth century. It would appear from the\nbest evidence that Schleswig was indissolubly united with the Crown of\nDenmark. To maintain this principle Christian VIII. in 1846 issued\nletters patent declaring that the royal line of succession (female) was\nin full force, as far as Schleswig was concerned. As to Holstein, the\nKing stated that he was prevented from giving an equally clear decision,\nand the reason of his hesitation lay in the assumption that the law of\nthe Salic Saxons excluding women from the throne would naturally prevail\nin Holstein, where the Germans, their customs, and their language were\ndominant. Two years later, Prussia sought to restore her prestige, lost\nin the Revolution of 1848, by sending troops into the Duchies in order\nto enforce the principle that this territory constituted two independent\nand indivisible States, the government of which was hereditary in the\nmale line alone. The Prussian troops were afterward withdrawn by the\nhesitating Frederic William, and there followed a succession of\nprotocols, constitutions, and compacts until the time of Bismarck, who,\nin his \"Reflections,\" Volume II., Page 10, in writing of the Duchies,\nacknowledges:\n\n\"From the beginning I kept annexation steadily before my eyes.\"\n\nThe master of statecraft conquered. But did the people \"stand up and\nexpress their desire to remain with the German Federation,\" as Dr.\nDernburg asserts?\n\nIf his assertion be true, why were the Danish \"optants\" subjected to\ndomiciliary visits, perquisitions, arrest, and expulsion? And why--only\nto mention one instance of espionage--did the Prussian police confiscate\nthe issue of a Danish newspaper published in Schleswig because it\ncontained a reference to that Duchy under its historic name of South\nJutland?\n\nThe truth stands that the whole Schleswig-Holstein question is one that\ninvolves the modern principle of \"nationality,\" and, as such, enters of\nnecessity into the present European crisis. It is broadly understood by\nDr. Eliot and willfully misapprehended by his critic.\n\nPassing on to consider Alsace-Lorraine, Dr. Dernburg declares that \"it\nhad belonged to Germany until it was taken, against the will of the\npeople, under Louis XIV.\"\n\nIn this statement, as in the treatment of the previous question, facts\nare mutilated and wrong impressions are given. Alsace, it is well known,\nwas included within the confines of ancient Gaul, its original\npopulation was Celtic, and it passed, late in the fifth Christian\ncentury, under the rule of the Franks, one of whose chieftains, Clovis,\nbecame the founder of the first French monarchy. In dealing with its\nlater history Dr. Dernburg confuses the Holy Roman (Germanic) Empire\nwith Germany, considered in its modern sense. He appears to forget that\nthe reign of Louis XIV. was an age of absolutism and not of plebiscites.\n\nHe also ignores that the most strenuous efforts on the part of Germany\nto strangle the French nationality and language in the imperial\nterritory (Alsace-Lorraine) have proved useless, although they have been\nexerted constantly for almost a half century.\n\nIRENE SARGENT.\n\nProfessor of the History of Fine Arts.\n\nSyracuse University, Nov. 3, 1914.\n\n\n\n\nDR. ELIOT'S FOURTH LETTER.\n\nGermany and World Empire\n\n\n_To the Editor of The New York Times:_\n\nEach one of the principal combatants in Europe seems to be anxious to\nprove that it is not responsible for this cruelest, most extensive, and\nmost destructive of all wars. Each Government involved has published the\ncorrespondence between its Chief Executive and other Chief Executives,\nand between its Chancellery or Foreign Office and the equivalent bodies\nin the other nations that have gone to war, and has been at pains to\ngive a wide circulation to these documents. To be sure, none of these\nGovernment publications seems to be absolutely complete. There seems to\nbe in all of them suppressions or omissions which only the future\nhistorian will be able to report--perhaps after many years. They reveal,\nhowever, the dilapidated state of the Concert of Europe in July, 1914,\nand the flurry in the European Chancelleries which the ultimatum sent by\nAustria-Hungary to Servia produced. They also testify to the existence\nof a new and influential public opinion, about war and peace, to which\nnations that go to war think it desirable to appeal for justification or\nmoral support.\n\nThese publications have been read with intense interest by impartial\nobservers in all parts of the world, and have in many cases determined\nthe direction of the readers' sympathy and good will; and yet none of\nthem discloses or deals with the real sources of the unprecedented\ncalamity. They relate chiefly to the question who struck the match, and\nnot to the questions who provided the magazine that exploded, and why\ndid he provide it. Grave responsibility, of course, attaches to the\nperson who gives the order to mobilize a national army or to invade a\nneighbor's territory; but the real source of the resulting horrors is\nnot in such an order, but in the Governmental institutions, political\nphilosophy, and long-nurtured passions and purposes of the nation or\nnations concerned.\n\n\nGerman Desire for World Empire.\n\nThe prime source of the present immense disaster in Europe is the desire\non the part of Germany for world empire, a desire which one European\nnation after another has made its supreme motive, and none that has once\nadopted it has ever completely eradicated. Germany arrived late at this\ndesire, being prevented until 1870 from indulging it, because of her\nlack of unity, or rather because of being divided since the Thirty\nYears' War into a large number of separate, more or less independent,\nStates. When this disease, which has attacked one nation after another\nthrough all historic times, struck Germany it exhibited in her case a\nremarkable malignity, moving her to expansion in Europe by force of\narms, and to the seizure of areas for colonization in many parts of the\nworld. Prussia, indeed, had long believed in making her way in Europe by\nfighting, and had repeatedly acted on that belief. Shortly before the\nachievement of German unity by Bismarck she had obtained by war in 1864\nand 1866 important accessions of territory and leadership in all\nGermany.\n\nWith this desire for world empire went the belief that it was only to\nbe obtained by force of arms. Therefore, united Germany has labored with\nutmost intelligence and energy to prepare the most powerful army in the\nworld, and to equip it for instant action in the most perfect manner\nwhich science and eager invasion could contrive. To develop this supreme\nmilitary machine universal conscription--an outgrowth of the conception\nof the citizens' army of France during the Revolution--was necessary; so\nthat every young man in Germany physically competent to bear arms might\nreceive the training of a soldier, whether he wished it or not, and\nremain at the call of the Government for military duty during all his\nyears of competency, even if he were the only son of a widow, or a\nwidower with little children, or the sole support of a family or other\ndependents. In order to the completeness of this military ideal the army\nbecame the nation and the nation became the army to a degree which had\nnever before been realized in either the savage or the civilized world.\nThis army could be summoned and put in play by the Chief Executive of\nthe German Nation with no preliminaries except the consent of the\nhereditary heads of the several States which united to form the empire\nin 1870-71 under the domination of Prussia, the Prussian King, become\nGerman Emperor, being Commander in Chief of the German Army. At the word\nof the Emperor this army can be summoned, collected, clothed, equipped\nand armed, and set in motion toward any frontier in a day. The German\nArmy was thus made the largest in proportion to population, the best\nequipped, and the most mobile in the world. The German General Staff\nstudied incessantly and thoroughly plans for campaigns against all the\nother principal States of Europe, and promptly utilized--secretly,\nwhenever secrecy was possible--all promising inventions in explosives,\nordnance, munitions, transportation, and sanitation. At the opening of\n1914 the General Staff believed that the German Army was ready for war\non the instant, and that it possessed some significant advantages in\nfighting--such as better implements and better discipline--over the\narmies of the neighboring nations. The army could do its part toward the\nattainment of world empire. It would prove invincible.\n\n\nA Great German Navy.\n\nThe intense desire for colonies, and for the spread of German commerce\nthroughout the world, instigated the creation of a great German navy,\nand started the race with England in navy building. The increase of\nGerman wealth, and the rapid development of manufactures and commercial\nsea power after 1870-71, made it possible for the empire to devote\nimmense sums of money to the quick construction of a powerful navy, in\nwhich the experience and skill of all other shipbuilding nations would\nbe appropriated and improved on. In thus pushing her colonization and\nsea-power policy Germany encountered the wide domination of Great\nBritain on the oceans; and this encounter bred jealousy, suspicion, and\ndistrust on both sides. That Germany should have been belated in the\nquest for foreign possessions was annoying; but that England and France\nshould have acquired early ample and rich territories on other\ncontinents, and then should resist or obstruct Germany when she aspired\nto make up for lost time, was intensely exasperating. Hence chronic\nresentments, and--when the day came--probably war. In respect to its\nnavy, however, Germany was not ready for war at the opening of 1914;\nand, therefore, she did not mean to get into war with Great Britain in\nthat year. Indeed, she believed--on incorrect information--that England\ncould not go to war in the Summer of 1914. Neither the Government nor\nthe educated class in Germany comprehends the peculiar features of party\ngovernment as it exists in England, France, and the United States; and,\ntherefore, the German leaders were surprised and grievously disappointed\nat the sudden popular determination of Great Britain and Ireland to lay\naside party strife and take strenuous part in the general European\nconflict.\n\nThe complete preparation of the German Army for sudden war, the\nauthority to make war always ready in the hands of the German Emperor,\nand the thorough studies of the German Staff into the most advantageous\nplans of campaign against every neighbor, conspired to develop a new\ndoctrine of \"military necessity\" as the all-sufficient excuse for\ndisregarding and violating the contracts or agreements into which\nPrussia or the new Germany had entered with other nations. To gain\nquickly a military advantage in attacking a neighbor came to be regarded\nas proper ground for violating any or all international treaties and\nagreements, no matter how solemn and comprehensive, how old or how new.\nThe demonstration of the insignificance or worthlessness of\ninternational agreements in German thought and practice was given in the\nfirst days of the war by the invasion of Belgium, and has been continued\never since by violation on the part of Germany of numerous agreements\nconcerning the conduct of war into which Germany entered with many other\nnations at the Second Hague Conference.\n\n\nSanctity of National Contracts.\n\nThis German view of the worthlessness of international agreements was\nnot a cause of the present war, because it was not fully evident to\nEurope, although familiar and of long standing in Germany; but it is a\npotent reason for the continuance of the war by the Allies until Germany\nis defeated; because it is plain to all the nations of the world, except\nGermany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey at the moment, that the hopes of\nmankind for the gradual development of international order and peace\nrest on the sanctity of contracts between nations, and on the\ndevelopment of adequate sanctions in the administration of international\nlaw. The new doctrine of military necessity affronts all law and is\ncompletely and hopelessly barbarous.\n\nWorld empire now, as always, is to be won by force--that is, by conquest\nand holding possession. So Assyria, Israel, Macedonia, Athens, Rome,\nIslam, England, and France have successively believed and tried to\naccomplish in practice. United Germany has for forty years been putting\ninto practice, at home and abroad, the doctrine of force as the source\nof all personal and national greatness and all worthy human\nachievements. In the support of this doctrine, educated Germany has\ndeveloped and accepted the religion of valor and the dogma that might\nmakes right. In so doing it has rejected with scorn the Christian\nteachings concerning humility and meekness, justice and mercy,\nbrotherhood and love. The objects of its adoration have become Strength,\nCourage, and ruthless Will-power; let the weak perish and help them to\nperish; let the gentle, meek, and humble submit to the harsh and proud;\nlet the shiftless and incapable die; the world is for the strong, and\nthe strongest shall be ruler. This is a religion capable of inspiring\nits followers with zeal and sustained enthusiasm in promoting the\nnational welfare at whatever cost to the individual of life, liberty, or\nhappiness, and also of lending a religious sanction to the extremes of\ncruelty, greed, and hate. It were incredible that educated people who\nhave been brought up within earshot of Christian ethics and within sight\nof gentle men and women should all be content with the religion-of-valor\nplan. Accordingly, the finer German spirits have invented a supplement\nto that Stone Age religion. They have set up for worship a mystical\nconception of the State as a majestic and beneficent entity which\nembraces all the noble activities of the nation and guides it to its\nbest achievements. To this ideal State every German owes duty,\nobedience, and complete devotion. The trouble with this supplement to\nthe religion of valor is that it dwells too much on submission,\nself-sacrifice, and discipline, and not enough on individual liberty and\nself-control in liberty. Accordingly, when the valiant men got control\nof the Government and carried the nation into a ferocious war, they\nswept away with them all the devotees of this romantic and spiritual\nState. The modern German is always a controlled, directed, and drilled\nperson, who aspires to control and discipline his inferiors; and in his\nview pretty much all mankind are his inferiors. He is not a freeman in\nthe French, English, or American sense; and he prefers not to be.\n\n\nWhat German Domination Would Mean.\n\nThe present war is the inevitable result of lust of empire, autocratic\ngovernment, sudden wealth, and the religion of valor. What German\ndomination would mean to any that should resist it the experience of\nBelgium and Northern France during the past three months aptly\ndemonstrates. The civilized world can now see where the new German\nmorality--be efficient, be virile, be hard, be bloody, be rulers--would\nland it. To maintain that the power which has adopted in practice that\nnew morality, and in accordance with its precepts promised Austria its\nsupport against Servia and invaded Belgium and France in hot haste, is\nnot the responsible author of the European war, is to throw away memory,\nreason, and common sense in judging the human agencies in current\nevents.\n\nThe real cause of the war is this gradually developed barbaric state of\nthe German mind and will. All other causes--such as the assassination of\nthe heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, the sympathy of Russia with\nthe Balkan States, the French desire for the recovery of\nAlsace-Lorraine, and Great Britain's jealousy of German\naggrandizement--are secondary and incidental causes, contributory,\nindeed, but not primary and fundamental. If any one ask who brought the\nruling class in Germany to this barbaric frame of mind, the answer must\nbe Bismarck, Moltke, Treitschke, Nietzsche, Bernhardi, the German\nEmperor, their like, their disciples, and the military caste.\n\n\nGermany Never Dreaded Russia.\n\nMany German apologists for the war attribute it to German fear of\nRussia. They say that, although Germany committed the first actual\naggression by invading Belgium and Luxemburg on the way to attack France\nwith the utmost speed and fierceness, the war is really a war of\ndefense against Russia, which might desirably pass over, after France\nhas been crushed, into a war against Great Britain, that perfidious and\ninsolent obstacle to Germany's world empire. The answer to this\nexplanation is that, as a matter of fact, Germany has never dreaded, or\neven respected, the military strength of Russia, and that the recent\nwars and threatenings of war by Germany have not been directed against\nRussia, but against Denmark, Austria, France, and England. In her\ncolonization enterprises it is not Russia that Germany has encountered,\nbut England, France, and the United States. The friendly advances made\nwithin the last twenty years by Germany to Turkey were not intended\nprimarily to strengthen Germany against Russia, but Germany against\nGreat Britain through access by land to British India. In short,\nGermany's policies, at home and abroad, during the last forty years have\nbeen inspired not by fear of Russia, or of any other invader, but by its\nown aggressive ambition for world empire. In the present war it thinks\nit has staked its all on \"empire or downfall.\"\n\n\nGermany Should Be Defeated.\n\nThose nations which value public liberty and believe that the primary\nobject of Government is to promote the general welfare by measures and\npolicies founded on justice, good-will, and respect for the freedom of\nthe individual cannot but hope that Germany will be completely defeated\nin its present undertakings; but they do not believe that Germany is\ncompelled to choose between a life of domination in Europe and the world\nand national death. They wish that all her humane culture and her genius\nfor patient and exact research may survive this hideous war and guide\nanother Germany to great achievements for humanity.\n\nIf the causes of the present immense catastrophe have been have\ncorrectly stated, the desirable outcomes of the war are, no world empire\nfor any race or nation, no more \"subjects,\" no Executives, either\npermanent or temporary, with power to throw their fellow-countrymen\ninto war, no secret diplomacy justifying the use for a profit of all the\nlies, concealments, deceptions, and ambuscades which are an inevitable\npart of war and assuming to commit nations on international questions,\nand no conscription armies that can be launched in war by Executives\nwithout consulting independent representative assemblies. There should\ncome out from this supreme convulsion, a federated Europe, or a league\nof the freer nations, which should secure the smaller States against\nattack, prevent the larger from attempting domination, make sure that\ntreaties and other international contracts shall be public and be\nrespected until modified by mutual consent, and provide a safe basis for\nthe limitation and reduction of armaments on land and sea, no basis to\nbe considered safe which could fail to secure the liberties of each and\nall the federated States against the attacks of any outsider or\nfaithless member. No one can see at present how such a consummation is\nto be brought about, but any one can see already that this consummation\nis the only one which can satisfy the lovers of liberty under law, and\nthe believers in the progress of mankind through loving service each to\nall and all to each.\n\nExtreme pacificists shrink from fighting evil with evil, hell with\nhell, and advise submission to outrage, or at least taking the risk of\nbeing forced into resigned submission. The believers in the religion of\nvalor, on the other hand, proclaim that war is a good thing in itself,\nthat it develops the best human virtues, invigorates a nation become\nflaccid through ease and luxury, and puts in command the strong,\ndominating spirit of a valid nation or race. What is the just mean\nbetween these two extremes? Is it not that war is always a hideous and\nhateful evil, but that a nation may sometimes find it to be the least of\ntwo evils between which it has to choose? The justifiable and indeed\nnecessary war is the war against the ravager and destroyer, the enemy of\nliberty, the claimant of world empire. More and more the thinkers of the\nworld see, and the common people more and more believe instinctively,\nthat the cause of righteous liberty is the cause of civilization. In the\nconference which will one day meet to settle the terms of peace, and\ntherefore the future conditions of life in Europe, the example of the\nAmerican Republic in regard to armaments and war, the publicity of\ntreaties, and public liberty, security and prosperity may reasonably\nhave some influence.\n\nCHARLES W. ELIOT.\n\nCambridge, Mass., Nov. 14, 1914.\n\n\n\n\nDR. ELIOT'S FIFTH LETTER.\n\nA Hopeful Road to Lasting Peace\n\n\n_To the Editor of The New York Times:_\n\nThe great war has now been going on long enough to enable mankind to\nform approximately correct views about its vast extent and scale of\noperations, its sudden interference with commerce and all other helpful\ninternational intercourse, its unprecedented wrecking of family\nhappiness and continuity, its wiping out, as it proceeds, of the\naccumulated savings of many former generations in structures, objects of\nart, and industrial capital, and the huge burdens it is likely to impose\non twentieth century Europe. From all these points of view, it is\nevidently the most horrible calamity that has ever befallen the human\nrace and the most crucial trial to which civilization has been exposed.\nIt is, and is to be, the gigantic struggle of these times between the\nforces which make for liberty and righteousness and those which make\nfor the subjection of the individual man, the exaltation of the State,\nand the enthronement of physical force directed by a ruthless collective\nwill. It threatens a sweeping betrayal of the best hopes of mankind.\n\nEach of the nations involved, horrified at the immensity of the\ndisaster, maintains that it is not responsible for the war; and each\nGovernment has issued a statement to prove that some other Government is\nresponsible for the outbreak. This discussion, however, relates almost\nentirely to actions by monarchs and Cabinets between July 23 and Aug.\n4--a short period of hurried messages between the Chancelleries of\nEurope--actions which only prove that the monarchs and Ministers for\nForeign Affairs could not, or at least did not, prevent the\nlong-prepared general war from breaking out. The assassination of the\nArchduke and Duchess of Hohenberg on the 28th of June was in no proper\nsense a cause of the war, except as it was one of the consequences of\nthe persistent aggressions of Austria-Hungary against her southeastern\nneighbors. Neither was Russian mobilization in four military districts\non July 29 a cause of the war; for that was only an external\nmanifestation of the Russian state of mind toward the Balkan peoples, a\nstate of mind well known to all publicists ever since the Treaty of\nBerlin in 1878. No more was the invasion of Belgium by the German Army\non Aug. 4 a true cause of the war, or even the cause, as distinguished\nfrom the occasion, of Great Britain's becoming involved in it. By that\naction Germany was only taking the first step in carrying out a\nlong-cherished purpose and in executing a judicious plan of campaign\nprepared for many years in advance. The artificial panic in Germany\nabout its exposed position between two powerful enemies, France and\nRussia, was not a genuine cause of the war; for the General Staff knew\nthey had crushed France once, and were confident they could do it again\nin a month. As to Russia, it was, in their view, a huge nation, but\nvery clumsy and dull in war.\n\nThe real causes of the war are all of many years' standing; and all the\nnations now involved in the fearful catastrophe have contributed to the\ndevelopment of one or more of these effective causes. The fundamental\ncauses are: (1) The maintenance of monarchical Governments, each\nsanctioned and supported by the national religion, and each furnished\nwith a Cabinet selected by the monarch--Governments which can make war\nwithout any previous consultation of the peoples through their elected\nrepresentatives; (2) the constant maintenance of conscript armies,\nthrough which the entire able-bodied male population is trained in youth\nfor service in the army or navy, and remains subject to the instant call\nof the Government till late in life, the officering of these permanent\narmies involving the creation of a large military class likely to become\npowerful in political, industrial, and social administration; (3) the\ncreation of a strong, permanent bureaucracy within each nation for the\nmanagement of both foreign and domestic affairs, much of whose work is\nkept secret from the public at large; and, finally, (4) the habitual use\nof military and naval forces to acquire new territories, contiguous or\ndetached, without regard to the wishes of the people annexed or\ncontrolled. This last cause of the war is the most potent of the four,\nsince it is strong in itself, and is apt to include one or more of the\nother three. It is the gratification of the lust for world empire.\n\nOf all the nations taking part in the present war, Great Britain is the\nonly one which does not maintain a conscript army; but, on the other\nhand, Great Britain is the earliest modern claimant of world empire by\nforce, with the single exception of Spain, which long since abandoned\nthat quest. Every one of these nations except little Servia has yielded\nto the lust for empire. Every one has permitted its monarch or its\nCabinet to carry on secret negotiations liable at any time to commit the\nnation to war, or to fail in maintaining the peace of Europe or of the\nNear East. In the crowded diplomatic events of last July, no phenomenon\nis more striking than the exhibition of the power which the British\npeople confide to the hands of their Foreign Secretary. In the interests\nof public liberty and public welfare no official should possess such\npowers as Sir Edward Grey used admirably--though in vain--last July. In\nall three of the empires engaged in the war there has long existed a\nlarge military caste which exerts a strong influence on the Government\nand its policies, and on the daily life of the people.\n\nThese being the real causes of the terrific convulsion now going on in\nEurope, it cannot be questioned that the nation in which these complex\ncauses have taken strongest and most complete effect during the last\nfifty years is Germany. Her form of government has been imperialistic\nand autocratic in the highest degree. She has developed with great\nintelligence and assiduity the most formidable conscript army in the\nworld, and the most influential and insolent military caste. Three times\nsince 1864 she has waged war in Europe, and each time she has added to\nher territory without regard to the wishes of the annexed population.\nFor twenty-five years she has exhibited a keen desire to obtain colonial\npossessions; and since 1896 she has been aggressive in this field. In\nher schools and universities the children and youth have been taught for\ngenerations that Germany is surrounded by hostile peoples, that her\nexpansion in Europe and in other continents is resisted by jealous\npowers which started earlier in the race for foreign possessions, and\nthat the salvation of Germany has depended from the first, and will\ndepend till the last, on the efficiency of her army and navy and the\nwarlike spirit of her people. This instruction, given year after year by\nteachers, publicists, and rulers, was first generally accepted in\nPrussia, but now seems to be accepted by the entire empire as unified in\n1871.\n\nThe attention of the civilized world was first called to this state of\nthe German mind and will by the triumphant policies of Bismarck; but\nduring the reign of the present Emperor the external aggressiveness of\nGermany and her passion for world empire have grown to much more\nformidable proportions. Although the German Emperor has sometimes played\nthe part of a peacemaker, he has habitually acted the war lord in both\nspeech and bearing, and has supported the military caste whenever it has\nbeen assailed. He is by inheritance, conviction, and practice a\nDivine-right sovereign whose throne rests on an \"invincible\" army, an\narmy conterminous with the nation. In the present tremendous struggle he\ncarries his subjects with him in a rushing torrent of self-sacrificing\npatriotism. Mass fanaticism and infectious enthusiasm seem to have\ndeprived the leading class in Germany, for the moment, of all power to\nsee, reason, and judge correctly--no new phenomenon in the world, but\ninstructive in this case because it points to the grave defect in German\neducation--the lack of liberty and, therefore, practice in self-control.\n\nThe twentieth century educated German is, however, by no means given\nover completely to material and physical aggrandizement and the worship\nof might. He cherishes a partly new conception of the State as a\ncollective entity whose function is to develop and multiply, not the\nfree, healthy, and happy individual man and woman, but higher and more\neffective types of humanity, made superior by a strenuous discipline\nwhich takes much account of the strong and ambitious, and little of the\nweak or meek. He rejects the ethics of the Beatitudes as unsound, but\naccepts the religion of valor, which exalts strength, courage,\nendurance, and the ready sacrifice by the individual of liberty,\nhappiness, and life itself for Germany's honor and greatness. A nation\nof 60,000,000 holding these philosophical and religious views, and\nproposing to act on them in winning by force the empire of the world,\nthreatens civilization with more formidable irruptions of a destroying\nhost than any that history has recorded. The rush of the German Army\ninto Belgium, France, and Russia and its consequences to those lands\nhave taught the rest of Europe to dread German domination, and--it is to\nbe hoped--to make it impossible.\n\nThe real cause of the present convulsion is, then, the state of mind or\ntemper of Germany, including her conception of national greatness, her\ntheory of the State, and her intelligent and skillful use of all the\nforces of nineteenth century applied science for the destructive\npurposes of war. It is, therefore, apparent that Europe can escape from\nthe domination of Germany only by defeating her in her present\nundertakings; and that this defeat can be brought about only by using\nagainst her the same effective agencies of destruction and the same\nmartial spirit on which Germany itself relies. Horrible as are the\nmurderous and devastating effects of this war, there can be no lasting\npeace until Europe as a whole is ready to make some serious and\nfar-reaching decisions in regard to Governmental structures and powers.\nIn all probability the sufferings and losses of this widespread war must\ngo further and cut deeper before Europe can be brought to the decisions\nwhich alone can give securities for lasting peace against Germany on the\none hand and Russia on the other, or to either of these nations, or can\ngive security for the future to any of the smaller nations of\nContinental Europe. There can, indeed, be no security for future peace\nin Europe until every European nation recognizes the fact that there is\nto be no such thing in the world as one dominating nation--no such thing\nas world empire for any single nation--Great Britain, Germany, Russia,\nJapan, or China. There can be no sense of security against sudden\ninvasion in Europe so long as all the able-bodied men are trained to be\nsoldiers and the best possible armies are kept constantly ready for\ninstant use. There can be no secure peace in Europe until a federation\nof the European States is established, capable of making public\ncontracts intended to be kept, and backed by an overwhelming\ninternational force subject to the orders of an international tribunal.\nThe present convulsion demonstrates the impotence toward permanent\npeace of secret negotiations, of unpublished agreements, of treaties and\ncovenants that can be broken on grounds of military necessity, of\ninternational law if without sanctions, of pious wishes, of economic and\nbiological predictions, and of public opinion unless expressed through a\nfirm international agreement, behind which stands an international\nforce. When that international force has been firmly established it will\nbe time to consider what proportionate reductions in national armaments\ncan be prudently recommended. Until that glorious day dawns, no patriot\nand no lover of his kind can wisely advocate either peace in Europe or\nany reduction of armaments.\n\nThe hate-breeding and worse than brutal cruelties and devastations of\nthe war, with their inevitable moral and physical degradations, ought to\nshock mankind into attempting a great step forward. Europe and America\nshould undertake to exterminate the real causes of the catastrophe. In\nstudying that problem the coming European conference can profit by the\nexperience of the three prosperous and valid countries in which public\nliberty and the principle of federation have been most successfully\ndeveloped--Switzerland, Great Britain, and the United States.\nSwitzerland is a democratic federation which unites in a firm federal\nbond three different racial stocks speaking three unlike languages, and\ndivided locally and irregularly between the Catholic Church and the\nProtestant. The so-called British Empire tends strongly to become a\nfederation; and the methods of Government both in Great Britain itself\nand in its affiliated Commonwealths are becoming more and more\ndemocratic in substance. The war has brought this fact out in high\nrelief. As to the United States, it is a strong federation of\nforty-eight heterogeneous States which has been proving for a hundred\nyears that freedom and democracy are safer and happier for mankind than\nsubjection to any sort of autocracy, and affords far the best training\nfor national character and national efficiency. Republican France has\nnot yet had time to give this demonstration, being incumbered with many\nsurvivals of the Bourbon and Napoleonic regimes, and being forced to\nmaintain a conscript army.\n\nIt is an encouraging fact that every one of the political or\nGovernmental changes needed is already illustrated in the practice of\none or more of the civilized nations. To exaggerate the necessary\nchanges is to postpone or prevent a satisfactory outcome from the\npresent calculated destructions and wrongs and the accompanying moral\nand religious chaos. Ardent proposals to remake the map of Europe,\nreconstruct European society, substitute republics for empires, and\nabolish armaments are in fact obstructing the road toward peace and\ngood-will among men. That road is hard at best.\n\nThe immediate duty of the United States is presumably to prepare, on the\nbasis of its present army and navy, to furnish an effective quota of the\ninternational force, servant of an international tribunal, which will\nmake the ultimate issue of this most abominable of wars not a truce, but\na durable peace.\n\nIn the meantime the American peoples cry with one voice to the German\npeople, like Ezekiel to the House of Israel: \"Turn ye, turn ye from your\nevil ways; for why will ye die?\"\n\nCHARLES W. ELIOT.\n\nCambridge, Mass., Dec. 8, 1914.\n\n\n\n\nTHE LORD OF HOSTS.\n\nBy JOSEPH B. GILDER.\n\n\n\"He that sitteth in the heavens shall laugh.\"\n\n    The warring hosts that gather\n      To ravage, burn, and slay,\n    Turn first to that dread Father\n      To whom the nations pray:\n\n    \"O God, our hearts Thou knowest,\n      Our minds Thou readest clear;\n    Where we go, there Thou goest--\n      With Thee we have no fear.\n\n    \"The folk that harm and hate us--\n      Thy enemies, O Lord--\n    Thou knowest how they bait us:\n      Make brittle their strong sword!\n\n    \"Against the foe that goaded\n      We heed Thy call to fight:\n    Our guns are primed and loaded,\n      Our swords, how keen and bright!\n\n    \"Make strong our hearts to serve Thee,\n      Uphold our lifted hands;\n    Let no petition swerve Thee\n      To succor alien bands.\n\n    \"So shall we burn and slaughter,\n      Spread desolation wide,\n    If still, by land and water,\n      Thou fightest on our side.\"\n\n    The Lord of Hosts had listened--\n      Had heard the rivals' prayer,\n    Upraised where bayonets glistened\n      And banners dyed the air;\n\n    And as His people waited\n      An answer to their cry,\n    Two bolts with lightning freighted\n      Flashed from the angry sky.\n\n    To left, to right they darted,\n      Impartially they fell:\n    The hosts in terror started\n      As they envisaged hell.\n\n    For wide their ranks were riven,\n      Night blotted out the sky,\n    As prostrate, dazed or driven,\n      They caught their God's reply.\n\n    Then, as the blinding levin's\n      Twin bolts were buried deep,\n    Who dwelleth in the heavens\n      Was heard to laugh--and weep!\n\n\n\n\nA War of Dishonor\n\nBy David Starr Jordan.\n\n     Late President of Leland Stanford Junior University, now its\n     Chancellor; Chief Director of the World Peace Foundation since\n     1910.\n\n\n_To the Editor of The New York Times:_\n\nIn this war what of right and what of wrong? Not much of right, perhaps,\nand very much of wrong. But there are degrees in wrong, and sometimes,\nby comparison, wrong becomes almost right.\n\nThe armed peace, the peace of guns and dreadnoughts and sabre rattlers,\nhas come to its predestined end. Its armaments were made for war. Its\nwar makers and war traders, the Pan-Germanists in the lead, have done\ntheir worst for the last nine years. They have been foiled time after\ntime, but they have their way at last. Their last and most fatal weapon\nwas the ultimatum. If Servia had not given them their chance they would\nhave found their pretext somewhere else. When a nation or a continent\nprepares for war it will get it soon or later. To prepare for war is to\nbreed a host of men who have no other business, and another host who\nfind their profits in blood.\n\nWhen the war began it had very little meaning. It was the third Balkan\nwar, brought on, as the others were, by intrigues of rival despotisms.\nThe peoples of Europe do not hate each other. The springs of war come\nfrom a few men impelled by greed and glory. Diplomacy in Europe has been\nfor years the cover for robbery in Asia or Africa. Of all the nations\nconcerned not one had any wish to fight, and Belgium alone could fight\nwith clean hands.\n\nAnd this fact gave the war its meaning. The invasion of Belgium changed\nthe whole face of affairs. As by a lightning flash the issue was made\nplain: the issue of the sacredness of law; the rule of the soldier or\nthe rule of the citizen; the rule of fear or the rule of law. Germany\nstands for army rule. This was made clear when, a year ago, she passed\nunder the yoke at Zabern. However devious her diplomacy in the past,\nBritain stands today for the rule of law. The British soldier is the\nservant of the British people, not their master.\n\nThe highest conception of human relations is embodied in the word law.\nLaw is the framework of civilization. Law is the condition of security,\nhappiness, and progress. War is the denial of all law. It makes scrap\npaper of all the solemn agreements men and nations have established for\ntheir mutual good.\n\nThe rape of Belgium made scrap paper of international law. The sowing of\nmines in the fairways of commerce made scrap paper of the rights of\nneutral nations. The torture of the Belgian people made scrap paper of\nthe rights of non-combatants.\n\nWar may be never righteous, but it is sometimes honorable. In honorable\nwar armies fight against armies, never against private citizens. If\narmies give no needless provocation, they will receive none. The sacking\nof Malines, Aerschot, Dinant--these are not acts of honorable war. The\nwreck of Louvain, historic Louvain, the venerable centre for 500 years\nof Catholic erudition, at the hands of blood-drunk soldiers was an act\nof dishonorable war. It marks a stain on the record of Germany which the\nages will not efface.\n\n\"A needed example,\" say the apologists for this crime. The Duke of Alva\ngave the same \"needed example\" to these same people in his day. For\ncenturies the words \"Spanish blood\" struck terror into peoples' hearts\nthroughout the Netherlands. For centuries to come the word Prussian will\ntake its hated place.\n\nThe good people of Germany do not burn universities. Neither do they\nmake war for war's sake. They are helpless in the hands of a monster of\ntheir own creation. The affair at Zabern a year ago testifies to their\ncomplete subjugation. All the virtues are left to them, save only the\nlove of freedom. This the mailed fist has taken away.\n\nThe Germany of today is an anachronism. Her scientific ideals are of the\ntwentieth century. Her political ideals hark back to the sixteenth. Her\nrulers have made her the most superb fighting machine in a world which\nis soul-weary of fighting. For a nation in shining armor the civilized\nWorld has no place. It will not worship them, it will not obey them. It\nwill not respect those who either worship or obey. It finds no people\ngood enough to rule other people against their will.\n\nA great nation which its own people do not control is a nation without a\nGovernment. It is a derelict on the international sea. It is a danger to\nits neighbors, a greater danger to itself. Of all the many issues, good\nor bad, which may come from this war, none is more important than this,\nthat the German people should take possession of Germany.\n\nDAVID STARR JORDAN.\n\nBerkeley, Cal., Sept. 19, 1914.\n\n\n\n\nMight or Right\n\nBy John Grier Hibben.\n\n     President of Princeton University; author of works on logic\n     and philosophy.\n\n\n_The address printed below was delivered by President Hibben at the\nopening of the Laymen's Efficiency Convention in New York City, Oct. 16,\n1914._\n\nWe are all of us sadly conscious of our failure to realize in any\nadequate measure the standards of right conduct which we set for\nourselves. Attainment falls far short of purpose and desire. Through\nwant of courage, or it may be of inclination, or of sheer inertia, we\nfail to obey perfectly the law of duty which we recognize as\nimperatively binding upon us. There is, however, a more subtle kind of\nfailure as regards our moral endeavor and achievement which is due to\nthe unconscious shifting of these standards of right and wrong\nthemselves. It is not merely that we fail to do that which we know to be\nright, but at times the very idea of right itself is strangely altered.\nThe good insensibly assimilates to itself certain elements of evil which\nwe allow and accept without full realization of the significance of this\nmoral alchemy to which the most fundamental of our ideas are often times\nsubjected. The idea of right no longer stands in its integrity, but is\ncompromised and even neutralized by conflicting thoughts and sentiments.\nThe things which at one time held first place in our estimate of life\nbecome secondary. Our attitude toward men, and manners, and affairs\nexperiences a radical change. This in most cases takes place\nunconsciously, or if conscious of it, we refrain from confessing it even\nto ourselves.\n\nThere are some, however, who are both frank enough and bold enough to\nannounce their belief in the radical doctrine which demands a complete\ntransformation of essential values. For them, good is evil and evil\ngood, and they seem not ashamed to avow it. The conspicuous German\nphilosopher of later years, Nietzsche, with a naive simplicity insists\nthat the great need of our modern civilization is that which he\ndesignates as \"the transvaluation of all values.\" By this he means the\ncomplete transformation of certain ideas of supreme value into their\ndirect opposites. He declares, for instance, that the central virtues of\nChristianity, such as those of self-sacrifice, pity, mercy, indicate an\ninherent weakness of the human race, and that the strong man dissipates\nhis energies through the offices of kindness and helpfulness. Thus the\nlaw which commands us to bear one another's burdens must be regarded as\nobsolete. Every man should be strong enough to bear his own burdens. If\nnot, he is a drag to the onward progress of humanity, and to assist him\nis to do evil and not good. If you help the weak, you so far forth\nassist in perpetuating an inferior type of manhood.\n\n\nNietzsche's \"Moralic Acid.\"\n\nFrom this point of view, the definition of religion given in the Old\nTestament should be revised, \"Do justice, love mercy, and walk humbly\nbefore thy God.\" In doing justice we must first be just to self; in\nloving mercy it must not be at the expense of our own interests and\nadvantage, and we must not walk so humbly before our God as to give to\nthe world the appearance of weakness or lack of independence. As\nNietzsche insists, \"The man who loves his neighbor as himself must have\nan exceedingly poor opinion of himself.\" If the race is to be perfected,\neverything and every person must be sacrificed in order to produce and\npreserve the strong man at all hazards. There is a kind of \"moralic\nacid,\" as Nietzsche styles it, which is corroding the strength of\nhumanity in our modern day. We have discoursed too much of character,\ntoo little of power; too much of self-sacrifice and too little of\nself-assertion; too much of right, too little of might. Conscience not\nonly interferes with success, but also prevents the evolution of a\nsuperior type of man, that superman who is not constrained by duty nor\nlimited by law, living his life \"beyond good and evil.\"\n\nThe serious question which presents itself to our minds at this time is\nwhether our modern world has not been unconsciously incorporating these\nideas into its living beliefs--that is, those beliefs which reveal\nthemselves in actual living and doing, in daily purpose, in the\nadaptation of means to ends, in the deeds which the world honors, and in\nthe achievements which it crowns with glory. There are many persons who\nwould not have the frankness of Nietzsche to say that might makes right,\nand that a moral sense is the great obstacle to progress, and that in\n\"vigorous eras noble civilizations see something contemptible in\nsympathy, in brotherly love, in the lack of self-assertion and\nself-reliance.\" Our modern world may not explicitly subscribe to such\ndoctrines in their extreme and exaggerated expression, but nevertheless\nmay be unconsciously influenced by them. Our real opinions, however, are\nto be tested by our sense of values as revealed by the things which we\ncrave, which we set our hearts upon, which we strive early and late to\ngain, and sacrifice all else in order to secure. Have we not offered our\nprayers to the God of might rather than the God of righteousness, to the\nGod of power rather than the God of justice, the God of mercy and of\nlove?\n\nThe time has come, in my opinion, for us to take account of the things\nwhich we really believe, and of the God Whom we really worship. If we\nhave been following false gods, let us honestly endeavor to re-establish\nfundamental and essential values, to discover anew what is of supreme\nworth and set our faces resolutely toward its realization. The need of\nour modern world today is the same as that of the ancient world at the\ntime of the coming of Christ. His message to the world as indicated by\nHis teaching, and His life was an arraignment of the ancient regime as\nregards three crucial points.\n\n\nThe Brotherhood of Man.\n\nFirst, the religious and moral beliefs of that age had become purely\nformal. There was the letter of conviction, but not the spirit of it.\nThe creed, the ritual, the ceremony were there, but the life had\ndeparted. And so today our beliefs have lost vitality to a large extent\nbecause we have been content to indulge in formulas oft repeated, which\nhave ceased to have significance for our thoughts or for our feelings.\nWe have allowed ourselves to be betrayed by words which are mere sounds\nwithout substance. We have verbalized our beliefs, and have\ndepotentialed them of vital significance. Take, for instance, the\nphrases, \"The fatherhood of God\" and \"The brotherhood of man.\" They have\nbeen so often upon our lips as to become trite; their real meaning has\ndisappeared. It is easy to repeat the words, and to be satisfied with\nthe repetition, and nevertheless remain wholly insensible to their\nprofound import, and under no compulsion whatsoever to obey their\nsublime command. We assent to the formula: but it does not become a\ndetermining factor in our purposes and plans. There is perhaps no age in\nthe history of the world which has so emphasized the idea of the\nbrotherhood of man as our own, and never in all history has there been\nsuch a denial of this idea as by the present European war. If the\nbrotherhood of man had been the living, dominant idea of our\ncivilization, could this present tragedy of the nations have occurred?\nIf the world had believed profoundly in the idea of God, would we now be\ndaily reading of the ghastly scenes where human life is no longer\nsacred, where love gives place to hate, where the constructive forces of\nthe world are superseded by the destructive, and all the passions of\nman's brute inheritance are given full play and scope?\n\nSecond--In the teachings of Christ there was a remarkable expansion of\nthe idea of God. Instead of the tribal God worshipped as the God of\nAbraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, He substituted the idea of God, as the\nGod of all peoples and all races, the God of the Jew and Gentile, of the\nGreek and barbarian, of the bond and the free. It was the great apostle\nof the Gentiles who at the centre of Greek civilization announced this\nfundamental conception of Christianity to the old world:\n\n     God hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on\n     all the face of the earth.\n\nThis was the sublime idea of the God of a united humanity. The God of\nthe tribe had given place to the God of the whole world. That conception\nwas very foreign to the popular religious notions current at the time\nof Christ, and it seems still further away from our ideas of the present\nday. It is a very narrow and circumscribed view of God to regard Him as\nconcerned merely for our little insular affairs, to regard Him simply as\na God of the individual or of the home, or even one's nation. He\ntranscends all these limitations of particular interests and particular\nneeds. He is not merely our God but the God of all mankind. The children\nof Israel called Him the God of battle, the God of hosts, that is, the\none who would give victory to them in their battles, and who would prove\nthe leader of their hosts. But Christ came to the world in God's name to\nuniversalize this narrow tribal idea of God, proclaiming peace on earth\nand good will to men. It was the dawn of a new era, the Christian era.\nThat light which shone upon the old world is darkened by the cloud\nhanging low over Europe at the present time. We cannot think, however,\nthat it is permanently extinguished. To that light the nations of the\nearth must again return.\n\n\nThe Area of Moral Obligation.\n\nThird--Christ gave to the world of His day an enlarged idea of the area\nof moral obligation. He insisted most stoutly upon the expansion of the\nscope of individual responsibility. This freeing of the idea of duty\nfrom the limitations of race prejudice is a natural corollary to the\nidea of the universality of God's relation to the world. Corresponding\nto the tribal view of God there is always an accompanying idea of the\nrestricted obligation of the individual. To care for one's own family or\none's own clan or tribe and present a hostile front to the rest of\nmankind has always been the characteristic feature of primitive\nmorality. It was peculiarly the teaching of Christ which brought to the\nworld the idea that the area of moral obligation is co-extensive with\nthe world itself. There are no racial or national lines which can limit\nthe extent of our responsibility. The world today needs to learn this\nlesson anew, and it is evident that it must acquire this knowledge\nthrough bitter and desperate experiences. We must interpret in this\nlarge sense the great moral dictum of the German philosopher, Kant, that\nevery one in a particular circumstance should act as he would wish all\nmen to act if similarly circumstanced and conditioned. This is the\ncomplete universalizing of our moral obligations--stripping our sense of\nduty of everything that is particular and local and isolated. The\nnatural tendency of human nature is to particularize our relations to\nGod and bound our relations to our fellow-men; to narrow our relations\nto God so as to embrace only our direst needs, and to circumscribe our\nrelations to man so as to include in the field of responsibility only\nthose who are our kin or our own kind. The time has certainly come for\nus to take larger views of the world, of man, and of God.\n\nAfter the great calamity of this present war is passed there must\nnecessarily follow a period of reconstruction. It will not be merely the\nreconstruction of national resources and international relations, but\nit must be also a reconstruction of our fundamental conceptions of man\nand of the relation of man to man the world over, and of the relation\nalso of man to God. We must ask anew the question, Who is our neighbor?\nIn this great moral enterprise you will naturally play a large and\nsignificant part, for you belong to the class of men who are expected to\nhave strong and decided opinions in the face of a great world crisis,\nand are capable of leading others toward the goal of a regenerated\nhumanity. To know the right and to maintain it, to fight against the\nwrong, to impart courage to the timid, strength to the weak, and hope to\nthe faint-hearted; to forget self in the service of others and extend a\nhuman sympathy to the ends of the earth, this is your vocation. It is\nthe call of the world, it is the voice of one calling to you out of a\ndistant past across the nineteen Christian centuries; it is the \"spirit\nof the years to come,\" summoning you to establish the Kingdom of God\nupon earth.\n\n\n\n\nJEANNE D'ARC--1914.\n\nBy ALMA DURANT NICOLSON.\n\n\n    Rise from the buried ages, O thou Maid,\n    Rise from thy glorious ashes, unafraid,\n    And wheresoe'er thy Brothers need thee most,\n    Arise again, to lead thy tireless host.\n    France calls thee as she called in days gone by!\n    She calls thy spirit where her soldiers die;\n    She knows thy courage and thy sacrifice,\n    And wills today to pay the selfsame price,\n    All-confident that when the work is done,\n    She shall behold her Honor saved and Victory won.\n\n    God calls thee, Maid, from out the Past--\n    The Past of France where thy strange lot was cast--\n    And bid'st thee fling about this fearful hour\n    Thy dauntless Faith, that was thy magic Power.\n    And Freedom calls, with all-impelling voice,\n    She calls the Sons of France, and leaves no choice,\n    No waver and no alternating will;\n    Where Freedom calls, all other calls are still,\n    All-confident that when her work is done\n    Ye shall behold your Country saved and Victory won.\n\n\n\n\nThe Kaiser and Belgium\n\nBy John W. Burgess.\n\n     Dean of the Faculties of Political Science, Philosophy, Pure\n     Science, and the fine Arts at Columbia University; Roosevelt\n     Professor of American History and Institutions at Friedrich\n     Wilhelms University, Berlin, 1906-7; Visiting American\n     Professor to Austrian Universities, 1914-15; Decorated, Order\n     of Prussian Crown by the German Emperor and Order of the\n     Albrechts by the King of Saxony.\n\n\nFIRST ARTICLE.\n\nIt is often said by historians that no truly great man is every really\nunderstood by the generation, and in the age, for which he labors. Many\ninstances of the truth of this statement can be easily cited. Two of the\nmost flagrant have come within the range of my own personal experience.\nThe first was the character of Abraham Lincoln as depicted by the\nBritish press of 1860-64 and as conceived by the British public opinion\nof that era. Mr. Henry Adams, son and private secretary of Mr. Charles\nFrancis Adams, our Minister Plenipotentiary to Great Britain during that\ncritical era in our history, writes, in that fascinating book of his\nentitled \"The Education of Henry Adams,\"\n\n     that \"London was altogether beside itself on one point, in\n     especial; it created a nightmare of its own, and gave it the\n     shape of Abraham Lincoln. Behind this it placed another demon,\n     if possible more devilish, and called it Mr. Seward. In regard\n     to these two men English society seemed demented. Defense was\n     useless: explanation was vain. One could only let the passion\n     exhaust itself. One's best friends were as unreasonable as\n     enemies, for the belief in poor Mr. Lincoln's brutality and\n     Seward's ferocity became a dogma of popular faith.\"\n\nAdams relates further that the last time he saw Thackeray at Christmas\nof 1863 they spoke of their mutual friend Mrs. Frank Hampton of South\nCarolina, whom Thackeray had portrayed as Ethel Newcome, and who had\nrecently passed away from life. Thackeray had read in the British papers\nthat her parents had been prevented by the Federal soldiers from passing\nthrough the lines to see her on her deathbed. Adams writes that\n\n     in speaking of it Thackeray's voice trembled and his eyes\n     filled with tears. The coarse cruelty of Lincoln and his\n     hirelings was notorious. He never doubted that the Federals\n     made a business of harrowing the tenderest feelings of\n     women--particularly of women--in order to punish their\n     opponents. On quite insufficient evidence he burst into\n     reproach. Had he (Adams) carried in his pocket the proofs that\n     the reproach was unjust he would have gained nothing by\n     showing them. At that moment Thackeray, and all London society\n     with him, needed the nervous relief of expressing emotions;\n     for if Mr. Lincoln was not what they said he was, what were\n     they?\n\nMr. Lincoln sent over our most skillful politician, Thurlow Weed, and\nour most able constitutional lawyer, William M. Evarts, and later our\nmost brilliant orator, Henry Ward Beecher, followed, for the purpose of\nbringing the British people to their senses and correcting British\nopinion, but all to little purpose. Gettysburg and Vicksburg did far\nmore toward modifying that opinion than the persuasiveness of Weed, the\nlogic of Evarts, or the eloquence of Beecher, and it took Chattanooga,\nthe March to the Sea, and Appomattox to dispel the illusion entirely.\n\nToday we are laboring under a no less singular illusion than were the\nEnglish in 1862. The conception prevailing in England and in this\ncountry concerning the physical, mental, and moral make-up of the German\nEmperor is the monumental caricature of biographical literature. I have\nhad the privilege of his personal acquaintance now for nearly ten years.\nI have been brought into contact with him in many different ways and\nunder many varying conditions, at Court and State functions, at\nuniversity ceremonies and celebrations, at his table, and by his\nfireside surrounded by his family, when in the midst of his officials,\nhis men of science, and his personal friends, and, more instructive than\nall, alone in the imperial home in Berlin and at Potsdam and in the\ncastle and forest at Wilhelmshoehe. With all this experience, with all\nthis opportunity for observation at close range, I am hardly able to\nrecognize a single characteristic usually attributed to him by the\nBritish and American press of today.\n\nIn the first place, the Emperor is an impressive man physically. He is\nnot a giant in stature, but a man of medium size, great strength and\nendurance, and of agile and graceful movement. He looks every inch a\nleader of men. His fine gray-blue eyes are peculiarly fascinating. I saw\nhim once seated beside his uncle, King Edward VII., and the contrast was\nvery striking, and greatly in his favor.\n\nIn the second place, the Emperor is an exceedingly intelligent and\nhighly cultivated man. His mental processes are swift, but they go also\nvery deep. He is a searching inquirer, and questions and listens more\nthan he talks. His fund of knowledge is immense and sometimes\nastonishing. He manifests interest in everything, even to the smallest\ndetail, which can have any bearing upon human improvement. I remember a\nhalf hour's conversation with him once over a cupping glass, which he\nhad gotten from an excavation in the Roman ruin called the Saalburg,\nnear Homburg. He always appeared to me most deeply concerned with the\narts of peace. I have never heard him speak much of war, and then always\nwith abhorrence, nor much of military matters, but improved agriculture,\ninvention, and manufacture, and especially commerce and education in all\ntheir ramifications, were the chief subjects of his thought and\nconversation. I have had the privilege of association with many highly\nintelligent and profoundly learned men, but I have never acquired as\nmuch knowledge, in the same time, from any man whom I have ever met, as\nfrom the German Emperor. And yet, with all this real superiority of mind\nand education, his deference to the opinions of others is remarkable.\nArrogance is one of the qualities most often attributed to him, but he\nis the only ruler I ever saw in whom there appeared to be absolutely no\narrogance. He meets you as man meets man and makes you feel that you are\nrequired to yield to nothing but the better reason.\n\n\nA Man of Warm Affections.\n\nIn the third place, the Emperor impressed me as a man of heart, of warm\naffections, and of great consideration for the feelings and well-being\nof others. He can not, at least does not, conceal his reverence for, and\ndevotion to, the Empress, or his love for his children, or his\nattachment to his friends. He always speaks of Queen Victoria and of the\nEmpress Friedrich with the greatest veneration, and once when speaking\nto me of an old American friend who had turned upon him he said that it\nwas difficult for him to give up an old friend, right or wrong, and\nimpossible when he believed him to be in the right. His manifest respect\nand affection for his old and tried officials, such as Lucanus and zu\nEulenburg and von Studt and Beseler and Althoff, give strong evidence of\nthe warmth and depth of his nature. His consideration for Americans,\nespecially, has always been remarkable. It was at his suggestion that\nthe exchange of educators between the universities of Germany and of the\nUnited States was established, and it has been his custom to be present\nat the opening lecture of each new incumbent of these positions at\nthe University of Berlin, and to greet him and welcome him to his work.\nHe is also the first to extend to these foreign educators hospitality\nand social attention. To any one who has experienced his hearty welcome\nto his land and his home the assertion that he is arrogant and\nautocratic is so far away from truth as to be ludicrous. Again I must\nsay that I have never met a ruler, in monarchy or republic, in whom\ngenuine democratic geniality was a so predominant characteristic.\n\n[Illustration: FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS\n\n_(Photo by the Misses Selby.)_\n\n_See Page 526_]\n\n[Illustration: RUDOLF EUCKEN\n\n_See Page 534_]\n\nBut the characteristic of the Emperor which struck me most forcibly is\nhis profound sense of duty and his readiness for self-sacrifice for the\nwelfare of his country. This is a general German trait. It is the most\nadmirable side of German nature. And the Emperor is, in this respect\nespecially, their Princeps. I remember sitting beside him one day, when\none of the ladies of his household asked me if I were acquainted with a\ncertain wealthy ultra-fashionable New York social leader. I replied, by\nname only. She pressed me to know why not more nearly, why not\npersonally. And to this, I replied that I was not of her class; that I\ncould not amuse her, and that I did not approve of the frivolous and\ndemoralizing example and influence of one so favorably circumstanced for\ndoing good. The Emperor had heard the conversation, and he promptly\nsaid: \"You know in Germany we do not rate and classify people by their\nmaterial possessions, but by the importance of the service they render\nto country, culture, and civilization.\" One of his sons once told me\nthat from his earliest childhood his father had instilled into his mind\nthe lesson that devotion to duty and readiness for sacrifice were the\ncardinal virtues of a German, especially of a Hohenzollern. His days are\nperiods of constant labor and severe discipline. He rises early, lives\nabstemiously and works until far into the night. There is no day laborer\nin his entire empire who gives so many hours per diem to his work. His\nnature is manifestly deeply religious and, in every sentence he speaks,\nevidence of his consciousness that the policeman's club cannot take the\nplace of religious and moral principle is revealed. His frequent appeal\nfor Divine aid in the discharge of his duties is prompted by the\nconviction that the heavier the duty the more need there is of that aid.\n\n\nHis Passion for German Greatness.\n\nHe undoubtedly has an intense desire, almost a passion, for the\nprosperity and greatness of his country, but his conception of that\nprosperity and greatness is more spiritual and cultural than material\nand commercial. More than once have I heard him say that he desired to\nsee Germany a wealthy country, but only as the result of honest and\nproperly requited toil, and that wealth acquired by force or fraud was\nmore a curse than a blessing, and was destined to go as it had come. His\nconception of the greatness of Germany is as a great intellectual and\nmoral power rather than anything else. Its physical power he values\nchiefly as the creator and maintainer of the conditions necessary to the\nproduction and influence of this higher power. I have often heard him\nexpress this thought.\n\nAnd in spite of this terrible war, the responsibility for which is by so\nmany erroneously laid at his door, I firmly believe him to be a man of\npeace. I am absolutely sure that he has entered upon this war only under\nthe firm conviction that Great Britain, France, and Russia have\nconspired to destroy Germany as a world power, and that he is simply\ndefending, as he said in his memorable speech to the Reichstag, the\nplace which God had given the Germans to dwell on. For seven years I\nmyself have witnessed the growth of this conviction in his mind and that\nof the whole German Nation as the evidences of it have multiplied from\nyear to year until at last the fatal hour at Serajevo struck. I firmly\nbelieve that there is no soul in this wide world upon whom the burden\nand grief of this great catastrophe so heavily rest as upon the German\nEmperor. I have heard him declare with the greatest earnestness and\nsolemnity that he considered war a dire calamity; that Germany would\nnever during his reign wage an offensive war, and that he hoped God\nwould spare him from the necessity of ever having to conduct a defensive\nwar. For years he has been conscious that British diplomacy was seeking\nto isolate and crush Germany by an alliance of Latin, Slav, and Mongol\nunder British direction, and he sought in every way to avert it. He\nvisited England himself frequently. He sent his Ministers of State over\nto cultivate the acquaintance and friendship of the British Ministers,\nbut rarely would the British King go himself to Germany or send his\nMinisters to return these visits. More than once have I heard him say\nthat he was most earnestly desirous of close friendship between Germany,\nGreat Britain, and the United States, and had done, was doing, and would\ncontinue to do, all in his power to promote it; but that while the\nAmericans were cordially meeting Germany half way, the British were\ncold, suspicious, and repellent.\n\nI know that the two things which are giving him the deepest pain in this\nworld catastrophe, excepting only the sufferings of his own kindred and\npeople, are the enmity of Great Britain and the misunderstanding of his\ncharacter, feelings, and purposes in America. To remedy the first we\nhere can do nothing, but to dispel the second is our bounden duty; and I\ndevoutly hope that other evidence may prove sufficient to do this to the\nsatisfaction of the minds of my countrymen than was necessary to\nconvince the British Nation that the great-hearted Abraham Lincoln was\nnot a brute nor the urbane William H. Seward a demon of ferocity.\n\n\n\n\nReply to Prof. Burgess\n\n\n_To the Editor of The New York Times:_\n\nThe Burgess Kaiser is a truly admirable person. Every right-minded man\nwill be only too glad to believe all that Prof. Burgess affirms of him.\nTo be sure, there is a lurking sense that the professor \"doth protest\ntoo much.\" But let that go. In the present topsy-turvy state of the\nworld it is refreshing to hear of a man who loves his wife and children\nin the good, old way. But just now the world is not interested in the\nprivate, personal, peculiarly German characteristics of the Kaiser. We\noutsiders must take him as he is known to the international world. We of\ncourse trust that he is an able, cultivated, attractive gentleman. There\nare many such in the world. But this gentleman happens to be the head of\none of the great nations. Our interest in him centres in his relations\nto his neighbor nations.\n\nAn English friend of mine was appointed to duty in a tribe of savages in\nAfrica. I dislike to call them savages after the testimony of my friend.\nBut they were just plain, naked folk, living in primitive simplicity in\ntheir native land. The chief of this little tribe was, as my friend\nasserts, a superior man, and, in spite of his undress, a good deal of a\ngentleman. In physique he was superb. A sculptor's heart would have\nleaped for joy at sight of him. My friend said to see him teaching his\nyoung son to throw a spear was a sort of physical music. He himself\ncould throw a spear to an incredible distance with the precision of a\nrifle shot. He ruled his little kingdom with surprising wisdom and\nfairness. He was welcomed everywhere among his people as the friend and\ncounselor. His family relations were unimpeachable. The same was true\nthroughout the tribe. He was devoutly pious. In short, he was a Burgess\nKaiser in the small. But he was the war lord of all that region. He was\nfiercely jealous of all the neighboring tribes. He kept his own people\narmed and drilled to the top of efficiency, ready for attack or\ndefense. He was noted for his hatred and contempt for his people except\nhis own. His forays were marked by savage cruelty. His military\nnecessities stopped at nothing.\n\nNeed it be said that the surrounding tribes were in nowise interested in\nthis chief's physique or domestic virtues, or in his fidelity to his own\npeople? It is safe to affirm that the British Government did not ask\nwhether he had the body of a Michael Angelo's David or of a baboon from\nthe jungle. It did not ask whether he was good to his wife and children.\nMost animals are. It did not care how devoted he was to his fetich. The\nsole question was, What sort of public citizen is he? How does he stand\nrelated to surrounding peoples? On what terms does he propose to live\nwith them? That precisely is what we want to know about the Kaiser.\n\nFortunately, we do not have to ask Prof. Burgess, or any group of\nsavants, or the German people. The Kaiser's record is known and read of\nall men.\n\nJAMES H. ECOB,\n\nAmerican Institute of Social Service.\n\nNew York, Oct. 21, 1914.\n\n\n\n\nPROF. BURGESS'S SECOND ARTICLE.\n\nThe Guarantee of Belgian Neutrality\n\n\nSo much has been said about Belgian neutrality, so much assumed, and it\nhas been such a stumbling block in the way of any real and comprehensive\nunderstanding of the causes and purposes of the great European\ncatastrophe, that it may be well to examine the basis of it and endeavor\nto get an exact idea of the scope and obligation.\n\nOf course, we are considering here the question of guaranteed\nneutrality, not the ordinary neutrality enjoyed by all States not at\nwar, when some States are at war; the difference between ordinary\nneutrality and guaranteed neutrality being that no State is under any\nobligation to defend the ordinary neutrality of any other State against\ninfringement by a belligerent, and no belligerent is under any special\nobligation to observe it. Guaranteed neutrality is, therefore, purely a\nquestion of specific agreement between States.\n\nOn the 19th day of April, 1839, Belgium and Holland, which from 1815 to\n1830 had formed the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, signed a treaty\nof separation from, and independence of, each other. It is in this\ntreaty that the original pledge of Belgian neutrality is to be found.\nThe clause of the treaty reads: \"Belgium in the limits above described\nshall form an independent neutral State and shall be bound to observe\nthe same neutrality toward all other States.\" On the same day and at the\nsame place, (London,) a treaty, known in the history of diplomacy as the\nQuintuple Treaty, was signed by Great Britain, France, Prussia, Austria,\nand Russia, approving and adopting the treaty between Belgium and\nHolland. A little later, May 11, the German Confederation, of which both\nAustria and Prussia were members, also ratified this treaty.\n\nIn the year 1866 the German Confederation was dissolved by the war\nbetween Austria and Prussia, occasioned by the Schleswig-Holstein\nquestion. In 1867 the North German Union was formed, of which Prussia\nwas the leading State, while Austria and the German States south of the\nRiver Main were left out of it altogether. Did these changes render the\nguarantees of the Treaty of 1839 obsolete and thereby abrogate them, or\nat least weaken them and make them an uncertain reliance? The test of\nthis came in the year 1870, at the beginning of hostilities between\nFrance and the North German Union. Great Britain, the power most\ninterested in the maintenance of Belgian neutrality, seems to have had\nconsiderable apprehension about it. Mr. Gladstone, then Prime Minister,\nsaid in the House of Commons: \"I am not able to subscribe to the\ndoctrine of those who have held in this House what plainly amounts to an\nassertion that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is\nbinding on every party to it, irrespective altogether of the particular\nposition in which it may find itself when the occasion for acting on the\nguarantee arises.\"\n\n\nA One-Year Treaty.\n\nProceeding upon this view, the British Government then sought and\nprocured from the French Government and from the Government of the North\nGerman Union separate but identical treaties guaranteeing with the\nBritish Government the neutrality of Belgium during the period of the\nwar between France and the North German Union, the so-called\nFranco-Prussian war, which had just broken out, and for one year from\nthe date of its termination. In these treaties it is also to be remarked\nthat Great Britain limited the possible operation of her military force\nin maintaining the neutrality of Belgium to the territory of the State\nof Belgium.\n\nThese treaties expired in the year 1872, and the present German Empire\nhas never signed any treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium.\nMoreover, between 1872 and 1914 Belgium became what is now termed a\nworld power; that is, it reached a population of nearly 9,000,000\npeople, it had a well-organized, well-equipped army of over 200,000 men\nand powerful fortifications for its own defense; it had acquired and was\nholding colonies covering 1,000,000 square miles of territory, inhabited\nby 15,000,000 men, and it had active commerce, mediated by its own\nmarine, with many, if not all, parts of the world. Now, these things are\nnot at all compatible in principle with a specially guaranteed\nneutrality of the State which possesses them. The State which possesses\nthem has grown out of its swaddling clothes, has arrived at the age and\ncondition of maturity and self-protection, and has passed the age when\nspecially guaranteed neutrality is natural.\n\nFrom all these considerations, I think it extremely doubtful whether, on\nthe first day of August, 1914, Belgium should have been considered as\npossessing any other kind of neutrality than the ordinary neutrality\nenjoyed by all States not at war, when some States are at war. In fact,\nit remains to be seen whether Belgium itself had not forfeited the\nprivilege of this ordinary neutrality before a single German soldier had\nplaced foot on Belgian soil. A few days ago I received a letter from one\nof the most prominent professors in the University of Berlin, who is\nalso in close contact with the Prussian Ministry of Education, a man in\nwhose veracity I place perfect confidence, having known him well for ten\nyears. He writes: \"Our violation of the neutrality of Belgium was\nprompted in part by the fact that we had convincing proof that there\nwere French soldiers already in Belgium and that Belgium had agreed to\nallow the French Army to pass over its soil in case of a war between\nFrance and us.\" Moreover, in the British \"White Paper\" itself, No. 122,\nis to be found a dispatch from the British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir E.\nGoschen, to Sir Edward Grey, containing these words: \"It appears from\nwhat he [the German Secretary of Foreign Affairs] said that the German\nGovernment consider that certain hostile acts have already been\ncommitted by Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a\nconsignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo\nalready.\" The date of this dispatch is July 31, days before the Germans\nentered Belgium.\n\nBut placing these two things entirely aside, as well as the new\nevidence, said to have just been found in the archives at Brussels, that\nBelgium had by her agreements with Great Britain forfeited every claim\nto even ordinary neutrality in case of a war between Germany and Great\nBritain, I find in the British \"White Paper\" itself, No. 123, not only\nample justification, but absolute necessity, from a military point of\nview, for a German army advancing against France, not only to pass\nthrough Belgium, but to occupy Belgium. This number of the \"White Paper\"\nis a communication dated Aug. 1 from Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen,\nBritish Ambassador in Berlin. In it Sir Edward Grey informed Sir E.\nGoschen that the German Ambassador in London asked him \"whether, if\nGermany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality, we, Great\nBritain, would remain neutral,\" and that he [Grey] replied that he\n\"could not say that,\" that he did not think Great Britain \"could give a\npromise of neutrality on that condition alone\"; further, Sir Edward Grey\nsays: \"The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate\nconditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the\nintegrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed. I said that I\nfelt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on\nsimilar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free.\"\n\n\nThe Necessary Invasions.\n\nAfter this Sir Edward Grey declared in Parliament, according to\nnewspaper reports, that Great Britain stood, as to Belgian neutrality,\non the same ground as in 1870. With all due respect, I cannot so\nunderstand it. In 1870 Great Britain remained neutral in a war between\nthe North German Union and France, and, with the North German Union,\nguaranteed Belgium against invasion by France, and, with France,\nguaranteed Belgium against invasion by the North German Union. On Aug.\n1, 1914, the German Empire asked Great Britain to do virtually the same\nthing, and Great Britain refused. It is, therefore, Germany who stood in\n1914 on the same ground, with regard to Belgium neutrality, as she did\nin 1870, and it is Great Britain who shifted her position and virtually\ngave notice that she herself would become a belligerent. It was this\nnotice served by Sir Edward Grey on the German Ambassador in London on\nAug. 1, 1914, which made the occupation of Belgium an absolute military\nnecessity to the safety of the German armies advancing against France.\nOtherwise they would, so far as the wit of man could divine, have left\ntheir right flank exposed to the advance of a British army through\nBelgium, and there certainly was no German commander so absolutely\nbereft of all military knowledge or instinct as to have committed so\npatent an error.\n\nBelgium has Great Britain to thank for every drop of blood shed by her\npeople, and every franc of damage inflicted within her territory during\nthis war. With a million of German soldiers on her eastern border\ndemanding unhindered passage through one end of her territory, under the\npledge of guarding her independence and integrity and reimbursing every\nfranc of damage, and no British force nearer than Dover, across the\nChannel, it was one of the most inconsiderate, reckless, and selfish\nacts ever committed by a great power when Sir Edward Grey directed, as\nis stated in No. 155 of the British \"White Paper,\" the British Envoy in\nBrussels to inform the \"Belgian Government that if pressure is applied\nto them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, his\nMajesty's Government expects that they will resist by any means in their\npower.\"\n\nIt is plain enough that Great Britain was not thinking so much of\nprotecting Belgium as of Belgium protecting her, until she could prepare\nto attack Germany in concert with Russia and France. She was willing to\nlet Belgium, yea almost to command Belgium, to take the fearful risk of\ncomplete destruction in order that she might gain a little time in\nperfecting the co-operation of Russia and France with herself for the\ncrushing of Germany, and in order to hold the public opinion of neutral\npowers, especially of the United States of America, in leash under the\nchivalrous issue of protecting a weaker country, which she has done\nlittle or nothing to protect, but which she could have effectively\nprotected by simply remaining neutral herself.\n\nWe Americans have been greatly confused in mind in regard to the issues\nof this war. We have confounded causes and occasions and purposes and\nincidents until it has become almost impossible for any considerable\nnumber of us to form a sound and correct judgment in regard to it. But\nwe shall emerge from that nebulous condition. We are beginning to see\nmore clearly now, and it would not surprise me greatly if the means used\nfor producing our confusion would some day come back, if not to plague\nthe consciences, at least to foil the purposes of their inventors.\n\n\n\n\nReply to Prof. Burgess\n\n\n_To the Editor of The New York Times:_\n\nProf. Burgess's amazing communication on Belgian neutrality omits an\nessential piece of evidence. Granting, for the sake of argument, that\nthe German Empire might repudiate all treaty obligations of the earlier\nGerman confederations, (very odd law, this;) granting also the still\nmore novel plea that Belgium had outgrown the need, and the privilege of\nneutralization, Germany had agreed to treat all neutral powers under the\nfollowing provisions of The Hague Conventions of 1907 concerning the\nrights and duties of neutral powers:\n\n     1. The territory of neutral powers is inviolable.\n\n     2. Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or either\n     munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral\n     power.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n     5. A neutral power must not allow any of the acts referred to\n     in Articles 2 to 4 to occur on its territory.\n\nThis pledge the German Empire had solemnly made only seven years ago. It\nwould seem that Prof. Burgess may accept the distinction ably made by\nProf. Muensterberg between \"pledges of national honor\" and mere \"routine\nagreements,\" placing Hague treaties in the latter category.\n\nThe allegation that France and England secretly did unneutral acts in\nBelgium is as yet without proof of any sort, and must be interpreted by\nthe commonsense consideration that a neutral Belgium was a defensive\nbulwark for France and England. To have tampered with her neutrality\nwould have been motiveless folly. How much more decent and moral than\nProf. Burgess's meticulous weighing of national reincorporation as a\nmeans of evading national obligations is Chancellor Hollweg's robust\nplea of national necessity! Prof. Burgess's whole moral and mental\nattitude in this case seems to be that of a corporation lawyer getting a\ntrust out of a hole under the Statute of Limitations or by some\nreorganizing dodge.\n\nFRANK JEWETT MATHER, Jr.\n\nPrinceton, N.J., Nov. 4, 1914.\n\n\n\n\nAmerica's Peril in Judging Germany\n\nBy William M. Sloane.\n\n     Late Seth Low Professor of History at Columbia University;\n     ex-President National Institute of Arts and Letters and of the\n     American Historical Association; was secretary of George\n     Bancroft, the historian, in Berlin, 1873-5; author of works on\n     French History.\n\n\nThe American public has been carefully trained to avoid entanglement\nwith foreign affairs. This European war was so unexpected, so entirely\nunforeseen, that we were at first bewildered, and then exasperated, by\nour unreadiness to meet our own emergencies.\n\nIn our effort to fix responsibility we then became partisan to the verge\nof moral participation and had to be called to our senses by the wise\nproclamation and warning of our Chief Magistrate.\n\nWestern Europe is a nearer neighbor than either Central or Eastern, and\nwhat stern censors permit us to know is nicely calculated to arouse our\nprejudice on one side or the other. Believing that, owing to cable\ncutting and neutrality restrictions of wireless, as yet the plain truth\nis not available, we ask for a suspension of judgment on both sides in\norder that our Government may enjoy the undivided support of all\nAmerican citizens in its desire to secure a minimum of disturbance to\nthe normal course of our commercial, industrial, and agricultural life\nby convulsions that are not of our making.\n\nFairness to ourselves means justice in the formation and expression of\nopinion about not one or two but all the participants in a struggle for\nEuropean ascendency, with which we have nothing to do except as\noverwhelming victory for either side might bring on a struggle for world\nascendency, with which, unhappily, we might have much to do. To\ncontemplate such a terrible event should sober us; the best preparation\nfor it is absolute neutrality in thought, speech, and conduct.\n\nOur own history since independence is an unbroken record of expansion\nand imperialism. Our contiguous territories have been acquired by\ncompulsion, whether of war, of purchase, of occupation, or of exchange.\nWe have taken advantage of others' dire necessity in the case of Great\nBritain, France, Spain, Russia, and Mexico.\n\nTo rectify our frontier we compelled the Gladsden Purchase within the\nwriter's lifetime. As to our non-contiguous possessions, we hold them by\nthe right of conquest or revolution, salving our consciences with such\ncash indemnity as we ourselves have chosen to pay, and even now we are\nconsidering what we choose to pay, not what a disinterested court might\nconsider adequate, for the good-will of the United States of Colombia, a\ngood-will desired solely and entirely for an additional safeguard to the\nPanama Canal and a prop to the policy or doctrine substituted by the\npresent Administration for the moribund Monroe Doctrine.\n\nIn no single instance of virtual annexation or protectorate have we\nconsulted by popular vote either the desires of those inhabiting the\nrespective territories annexed or The Hague Tribunal. In every case we\nhave had one single plea and one only--self-interest.\n\nThe entire American continent south of our frontier we have closed to\nall European settlement, thereby maintaining for more than a century in\na magnificent territory an imperfect civilization which makes a sorry\nuse of natural resources which could vastly improve the condition of all\nmankind if properly used.\n\nThis is the light in which European nations see us; our identity in\nthis policy from the dawn of our national existence onward they consider\na proof of our national character. It differs in no respect from their\nown policies except in one.\n\nBut for them this exception is basic. We are a composite folk and they\nare homogeneous, their blend being approximately complete. They have one\nlanguage, one tradition, one set of institutions and laws; a unity of\nliterature, habits, and method in life. Some European States are\ncomposite, but each component part claims and cultivates its own style\nand its own principles; each announces itself as a nationality with a\nlife to be maintained and a destiny to be wrought out somehow, either in\npeace or in conflict.\n\nWith perhaps a single exception, they have an overflow of population,\ndue to natural generation, for the comfort and happiness of which they\nseek either an expansion of territory or an improvement in the\nproductivity of their home lands; for those who must emigrate they\npassionately desire the perpetuation of their nationality, with all it\nimplies.\n\nIn these respects they do not differ from us, except that perhaps we are\nmore determined and imperious. We cannot think politically in any other\nterms than those of democratic government, either direct or\nrepresentative.\n\nAt the present hour we are engaged in the very dubious experiment of\ndirect popular legislation and administration. We are trying to change\nour Government radically, discarding its representative form for that of\ndelegation. The remotest cause of this is the desire to amalgamate all\nour elements into homogeneity. So far this policy has resulted in a\ndemand, not for equality of political and civil rights, but for its\noverthrow, substituting laws intended to create social and economic\nequality by means of class legislation.\n\nThese facts are not to the edification of other civilized States, and\nsubject us to harsh and contemptuous criticism.\n\nIt is likewise very interesting that apparently the American people\nbelieve in a monarchical democracy. One of our typical first citizens\nhas recently expressed his antipathy to the phrases \"My monarchy,\" \"My\nloyal people,\" \"My loyal subjects,\" used by one of the German monarchs\nin summoning the nation to war, as implying a dynastic or personal\nownership of men.\n\n\nAverse from Militarism.\n\nThe American masses dislike the sound of supreme war lord, but gladly\nadmit their own Chief Magistrate to be Commander in Chief of the army\nand navy. To our ears the three German words are offensive, and well\nthey may be, for in the treacherous literal translation they are willful\nperversion; but the much stronger English words are a delight to our\ndemocracy.\n\nThe phrases of monarchy are constantly used in Great Britain by its King\nand its Emperor, but give no offense to his \"loyal subjects,\" even the\nmost radical, who delight in them, as apparently do our people of\nBritish origin. Why do they give such deep offense when employed by the\nGerman Government through its King and Emperor? The social\nstratification of Germany is not as marked as that of Great Britain; its\naristocracy is far less powerful; and Edward VII. proved that an adroit\nand willful English monarch could involve his \"loyal people\" deeper in\nharmful, secret alliances than William II., whose alliances and policies\nwere and are unconcealed.\n\nOne of our greatest historians has earned a brilliant reputation in the\nconclusive proof that oceans are the world's highways, while its\ncontinents are its barriers. To the term \"militarism\" we attach an\nopprobrious meaning; militarism is the more infamous in exact proportion\nto its efficiency. We have been at little pains to define it, and as to\ncertain of its aspects are curiously complacent.\n\nThe basic principle of our own nationality has long been the very vague\nMonroe Doctrine, by the assertion of which we have prevented the\nestablishment on our nearest and remotest frontiers of strong military\npowers, which might in certain events compel us to maintain a powerful\nand numerous standing army, or even introduce the compulsory military\nservice of all voters, (women, of course, excepted.)\n\nYet we propose to fight if necessary in order to prevent fighting, and\nto this end maintain the second strongest and, for its size, the most\nefficient fleet in the world. This is our militarism; that of Great\nBritain has been to maintain a fleet double our own or any other in\nsize, for it is her basic principle to maintain an unquestioned\nsupremacy on the highways of commerce. To this we have meekly assented,\nwhile other nations absorb our carrying trade and our flag waves over a\nfleet of perhaps a dozen respectable oceangoing trading and passenger\nships. It is under her rather patronizing protection that we fight our\nforeign wars and by pressure from her that we manage the Panama Canal\nwith nice and honorable attention to her interpretation of a treaty\ncapable of quite a different one. Whether or not this be \"militarism\" of\nthe utmost efficiency by sea is not difficult to decide. But we have\nnever styled it infamous.\n\nWhile I am writing, Germans, whose basic principle is the most efficient\n\"militarism\" by land, are publishing all abroad that the \"militarism\" of\nFrance must be forever stamped out, so that they may dwell at peace in\nthe lands which are their home.\n\nWithin a generation France has accumulated a colonial empire second only\nto that of Great Britain, while she has incessantly demanded the\nreintegration of German lands, and especially a German city which she\narbitrarily annexed and held by \"militarism\" for about five generations.\nThe \"militarism\" of a republic and a democracy which retains the\nessential features of Napoleonic administration has been quite as\nefficient as that of a monarchical democracy like Great Britain, and may\neasily prove more efficient than that of a monarchy like Germany.\n\nWhy should it be more infamous or barbarous in one case than the other?\nAnd with what is this efficient military democracy allied in the\nclosest ties?\n\nWith Russia, an Oriental despotism which by the aid of French money has\ndeveloped a \"militarism\" by land so portentous in numbers, dimension,\nand efficiency that its movements are comparable to those of Attila's\nHuns. Escaped Russians in Western lands are denouncing German\n\"militarism\" as the incubus of the world.\n\nWhich of the two should Americans regard as the greater danger?\n\n\nMenaces to Our Neutrality.\n\nIt has wrung our hearts to consider the violation of Belgian neutrality,\nfor which both France and eventually even Great Britain have long been\nprepared, but the latter has with little or no protest arranged with the\n\"bear that walks like a man\" to disregard contemptuously the neutrality\nof Persia in arranging spheres of influence, exactly as Japan, another\nally, is contemptuously disregarding the neutrality of China, the new\n\"republic\" we were in such haste to recognize that we had to use the\ncable. And what about Korea? It is a Japanese province in contravention\nof the most solemn guarantees of its integrity.\n\nLeaving aside for the moment certain considerations like these, and they\nmight easily be indefinitely amplified, which should compel Americans to\nunbiased consideration for others and preclude a dangerous partiality,\nlet us ask ourselves how in the event of mediation we could be an\nimpartial pacificator, behaving as we have hitherto done. The attitude\nof our Government has been strictly neutral, neutral to the verge of\nutter self-abnegation; and, as some regard it, timidity.\n\nBut rock-fast as any democratic magistrate may be, public opinion must\nand does influence him. Rightly or wrongly his agents would be even more\ncompletely dominated, and rightly or wrongly they would be suspect in\nview of our terrific partisanship on both sides since the commencement\nof hostilities.\n\nThe efficiency of Government organs in \"producing the goods,\" the\nterrific power of organization on one side and mass on the other, have\nbeen considered a menace to world equilibrium.\n\nWhichever way the decision falls, the scrutiny of Europe will be turned\nto us. Unless observation and instinct be utterly at fault, we have for\nmore than a decade been, after Germany, the worst-hated nation of all\nthat are foremost.\n\nIt is pre-eminently our affair to mind our own business, as others have\nminded theirs. Without cessation of noise and fury in America this is\nimpossible.\n\nIndeed, our emotional storms have already furnished proof of how we are\nincapacitated from either enforcing our rights as neutrals or seizing by\nthe forelock the opportunity afforded to us as neutrals and from\nenjoying the unquestioned privileges of neutrality.\n\nIt is not altogether edifying to think that the close of the European\nstruggle, be it long or short, will probably find our ocean commerce\nsubstantially where it was at the beginning, and that conflicts which\nwere not of our making will have been fought out before we are able to\nsecure our share of the world markets. Apparently the leaders in\ncommerce, industry, and trade, like the lawmakers and administrators,\nare paralyzed by the imperative necessity of aiding panicstricken\ntourists and panicstricken stay-at-homes. Apparently, too, our people\nare suffering more in purse and general comfort than the actual\ncombatant nations.\n\nClamorous for American sympathy and cash, we have on our shores\nembassies from the belligerents, pleading their respective virtues and\nsorrows.\n\nWhy, after all, should our chiefest concern be with them? Surely we may\nbe good Samaritans without a total disregard of our own interests and a\nblindness to opportunity verging on impotency. There is no immorality in\nthe proper play of self-interest. It is the conflict of interests which\ncreates morality. But the spectators, even the maddest baseball \"fans,\"\ndo not play the game nor train for it. It is high time we ceased wasting\nour energies in emotions and vain babble.\n\nAt this writing the first line of defense against the Oriental deluge is\nendangered. The Slav individually and in his primitive culture is\naltogether charming. He is a son of the soil, picturesque in life and\ncreative; he is minstrel and poet, seer. But so far he is the carrier of\na low civilization, the prophet, priest, and king of autocracy and\nabsolutism. Never has there been a time in history when the higher\ncivilization was not in a savage struggle for existence. It is almost\nthe first time in three centuries that the highest civilizations were in\nalliance with the lowest; not since the pugnacious Western powers of\nEurope sued for favor at the Sublime Porte.\n\n\nIn Peril of the Whirlwind.\n\nThis ought to be a very sobering spectacle, but it seems to arouse the\ndelighted enthusiasm of an American majority. For such an aberration\nthere is but a single and efficient remedy: absorption in our own\naffairs, the discriminating study of efficient methods to prevent our\nbeing caught up by a whirlwind, even the outer edges of which may snatch\nus into the vortex.\n\nTo change the metaphor, we revel in the pleasant propulsion of the\nmaelstrom's rim, unaware that every instant brings us closer to dangers,\nescape from which would demand herculean effort. Irresponsible emotions\nare, like those of the novel and the stage, when intensified to excess\nutterly incompatible with action. And just such a paralysis seems for\nsix long weeks to have lamed the highest powers of America.\n\nThe proportionate increase in population among the European powers is\noverwhelmingly in favor of the Slavs. Their rate of increase by natural\ngeneration is nearly three times that of even the Germans, with the\nresult that by the introduction of enforced military service into\nEastern Europe, (excepting Hungary and perhaps Rumania,) the military\nbalance of power has been completely changed.\n\nThe wars among the Balkan States, including Turkey, have put on foot\narmies of a dimension hitherto undreamed of among the South Slavs, and\nthe army of Russia is probably two and a half times larger than it\ncould have been thirty-five years ago.\n\nThe method by which Eastern Europe has succeeded in financing itself is\nrather mysterious. We know, of course, that the original Franco-Russian\nAlliance was based on reciprocal interests, and that large sums of\nFrench money flowed into Russia, which partly developed the natural\nresources of Russia and were partly in the shape of loans that in all\nlikelihood were used for war material.\n\n\nSlavs in Germany.\n\nThe conflict between the Slavs and the Teutons all along the line on\nwhich they border has therefore been in two ways intensified. In the\nfirst place, just in proportion as Germany has become an industrial\nState, the field work has been intrusted to immigrant Slavs, some of\nwhom come only for the season and return, but a very large number of\nthem--estimated at the present moment at close to a million--have\nsubstantially settled within the borders of the German Empire. That is\nto say, there is a constant injection of 1-1/2 per cent. of Slavic blood\ninto the territories of the German Empire.\n\nSuppose now that Russia should succeed in establishing the protectorate\nover all Slavs which she desires, and at the same time should press back\nthe Germans on that border line, something very closely approximating a\nnew migration of peoples in Europe will take place.\n\nAs far as I know the German feeling, expressed both privately and\npublicly, officially and unofficially, they have hoped to maintain their\ncomplete consanguinity, if not homogeneity, within the lands they regard\nas their home; and their preparations for war, their increase of their\nmilitary strength, have been made, professedly at least, solely in the\ninterest of defense. Americans can simply not realize--it is impossible\nfor them to realize--the difference in the degree of civilization and\nculture on either side of a purely artificial boundary line.\n\nVery fortunately it has entered the minds of several people lately to\nwrite to the newspapers about the unhappy confusion that comes from the\nuse of words in a meaning which at home they do not connote at all.\nTake, for example, the whole question of militarism. As we see it, it is\na matter altogether of degree. For defense against what the German\nconsiders the most terrible danger that he personally has to confront,\nit has been necessary from time to time to change both the size and the\ncomposition of his forces, whether offensive or defensive, and they\ntherefore have introduced compulsory military service, an idea which has\nalways been very offensive to Anglo-Saxons, but which in cases of dire\nnecessity they have been compelled to utilize themselves, as, for\nexample, during our own civil war, the abandonment of voluntary\nenlistment and the introduction of the draft.\n\nNow, the compulsory military service of the German means that every man\nis for a period of his life drafted and trained as a soldier. Forty\nyears ago there were a great many men who escaped by reason of one or\nanother provision of the law. That number was steadily diminished until\nwithin eighteen months, when finally it was proclaimed that every German\nwho could endure the severity of that training must undergo it, and that\nwas due to the fact that the military balance of power of which I spoke\nhad been so completely changed by the re-armament of Russia and by the\nformation of the South Slav armies in the Balkan Peninsula.\n\nAs a parallel we might imagine, not one troublesome neighbor, but four.\nWe might imagine a tremendous military power developed in Canada, and we\nmight imagine a hostile military power on the Atlantic side and another\none on the Pacific side, in which case we would beyond a question have\nto expand our inchoate militarism, just in proportion as we came to feel\nthe necessity for a strong physical defensive or offensive in the way of\na great standing army, and we probably would do it without any\nhesitation.\n\nNow, Germany has not any really bitter foe on the north, although there\nis no love lost between the Germans and the Scandinavians; but it has an\nembittered foe on the east, and another one on the west, and what has\nproved to be an embittered foe upon the water and a very lukewarm\nneutral State on the south, a State which had joined in alliance with\nher.\n\nItaly had joined what Italy considered a defensive alliance, but not an\noffensive alliance, and chose to regard the outbreak of this war as an\noffensive movement on the part of Germany, and for that reason has\nrefused to participate in the struggle.\n\nI say for that reason because, having been accustomed to reading, all my\nlife, long diplomatic documents, really having been trained, you might\nsay, almost in the school of Ranke, who was the inaugurator of an\nentirely new school of historical writing based on the criticism of\nhistorical papers, I have come to realize that the dispatches of trained\ndiplomats are for the most part purely formal, and that while these\nrespective publications of Great Britain and of Germany have a certain\nvalue, yet nevertheless the most important plans are laid in the\nembrasures of windows, where important men stand and talk so that no one\ncan hear, or they are arranged and often times amplified in private\ncorrespondence which does not see the light until years afterward, and\nthat the most important historical documents are found in the archives\nof families, members of which have been the guiding spirits of European\npolicy and politics.\n\nSo that what the secret diplomacy of the last years may have been is as\nyet utterly unknown, and certainly will not be known for the generation\nyet to come and perhaps for several generations. The student in almost\nany European capital is given complete access to everything on file in\nthe archives, including secret documents, only down to a certain date.\nThat date differs in various of these storehouses, but I think in no\ncase is it later than 1830.\n\nIf you ask why, there are the sensibilities of families to be\nconsidered, there is the question of hidden policies which they do not\ncare to reveal, and then there is the whole matter of who the examining\nstudent is. For instance, certain very important papers were absolutely\ndenied to me, as an American, in Great Britain--or at least excuses were\nmade if they were not absolutely denied--which were opened to an\nEnglishman who was working upon the same subject at about the same time.\n\nThe reason for such observations at the present hour is plain enough.\nPublic opinion is formed upon what the public is permitted to know, and\nis not formed upon the actual facts which the public is not permitted to\nknow. And for that reason Americans, remote as we are from the sources\nof information, and especially remote from that most delicate of all\nindications, the pulse of public opinion in foreign countries, ought to\nbe extremely slow to commit themselves to anything.\n\n\nAttack on Sir Edward Grey.\n\nNow, we have just had a very interesting incident. THE NEW YORK TIMES\nprinted recently what the British call their \"White Paper,\" as well as\nthe German \"White Paper.\" The editors of our most important journals\nannounced that they had read and studied those papers with care, and\nthat on the face of those papers, beyond any peradventure, Germany was\nthe aggressor. German militarism had flaunted itself as an insult in the\nface of Europe. Germany had violated neutrality, Germany had committed\nalmost every sin known to international law, and therefore the whole\nGerman procedure was to be reprobated.\n\nWithin a very short time a Labor member of Parliament, J. Ramsay\nMacdonald, rises in his place, able and fearless, and, on the basis of\nthe \"White Paper,\" as published and put in the hands of the British\npublic, attacks Sir Edward Grey for having so committed Great Britain in\nadvance to both Russia and France that, in spite of the representations\nof the German Ambassador, he dared not discuss the question of\nneutrality. This member of Parliament manifestly belongs to the powerful\nanti-war party of Great Britain, a party two of whose members, John\nBurns and Lord Morley, resigned from the Cabinet rather than condone\niniquity; a party which before the outbreak of the war made itself\nheard and felt, and protested against the participation of Great\nBritain, desiring localization of the struggle.\n\nMr. Macdonald says that in his opinion this talk about the violation of\nBelgian neutrality, from the point of view of British statesmen, is\nabsurd, because as long ago as 1870 the plans for the use of Belgium,\nboth by France and by Germany--in other words, the violation of its\nneutrality--were in the British War Office, and that Mr. Gladstone rose\nin his place and said he was not one of those whose opinion was that a\nformal guarantee should stand so far in thwarting the natural course of\nevents as to commit Great Britain to war; and that has been the\nannounced and avowed policy of Great Britain all the way down since\n1870, and that therefore talk about the violation of Belgian neutrality\nis a mere pretext.\n\nThat is another instance of this secret agreement that goes on, which so\ncommits a man like Sir Edward Grey that in the pinch, when the German\nAmbassador substantially proposed to yield everything to him and asked\nhim for his proposition, he cannot make any.\n\nThese facts are in the \"White Paper.\" As far as I know, no editor in the\nUnited States who claims to have studied thoroughly that \"White Paper\"\nhas ever brought this out, and they had not been published in that paper\nat the time when Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith made their respective\nspeeches and committed the British Nation to the war.\n\nAnother unhappy use of language which has been noted in the public press\nis due to the literal translation of words. Americans simply do not know\nwhat the word Emperor means. To most of them it connotes the later Roman\nEmperors, or the autocratic Czar of Russia, or the short-lived but\nautocratic quality of Napoleon III., so that when we use the word\nEmperor we are thinking of an absolutely non-existing personage, unless\nit be the Czar of Russia.\n\nWe like very much to make sport of phrases from languages unfamiliar to\nus, and we enjoy the jokes of ludicrous translations, and so we take\nthe term \"Oberster Kriegsherr\" and we translate it \"Supreme War Lord.\"\nWhat conception the average American forms of that is manifest. Whereas,\nas a matter of fact--and this has already been pointed out both in\nconversation and in public prints--the term means nothing in the world\nbut Commander in Chief of the German Empire, has not any different\nrelation whatsoever in the substance of its meaning than that which\nPresidents of the United States have been in time of supreme danger to\nthe country. Mr. Lincoln was just as much an \"Oberster Kriegsherr\" at\none period of his term as the German Emperor could ever be; in fact,\nrather more.\n\n\nSherman's March to the Sea.\n\nIn truth, the sense of outrage which Americans feel over the horrors of\nwar, while most creditable to them, is very often based upon an\nignorance of the rules and regulations of so-called civilized warfare,\nand upon a sentimentality, which, though also very creditable, is\nunfortunately not one of the factors in the world's work. It would not\nhurt Americans occasionally to recall Sherman's march to the sea, during\nwhich every known kind of devastation occurred, or to recall Gen.\nHunter's boast that he had made the Valley of Virginia such a desert\nthat a crow could not find sustenance enough in it to fly from one side\nto the other, and yet at that time, in what we considered the supreme\ndanger to our country, the conduct of those men was approved, and they\nthemselves were almost deified for their actions.\n\nWhile parallels are dangerous and the existence of one wrong does not\nmake another action right, yet at the same time a very considerable\namount of open-mindedness must be exercised in a neutral country when\nregarding the passionate devotions of combatant nations to their\nculture, to their safety, to their interest; and it should be recalled\nthat in the heats and horrors of war it is extremely difficult, however\ntrained or disciplined troops may be, to prevent outrages, and that so\nfar as we have gone in accurate information the least that can be said\nis that it is slowly dawning upon us that horror for horror and outrage\nfor outrage there has been no overwhelming balance on either side.\n\nThe Allies (this interview was received Tuesday morning) firmly believe\nthat the struggle on the west is so indecisive up to this time that what\nwill count for them is the duration of the war. Lloyd George has just\nsaid, not in the exact language, but virtually, what Disraeli said in\n1878: \"We don't want to fight; but, by jingo, if we do we have got the\nships, we have got the men, we have got the money, too.\" Those are the\nwords that brought into use the expression \"jingoists.\"\n\nNow, Lloyd George said the other day that it was the money which in the\nlong run would count and that Great Britain had that; and the meetings\nthat are held to induce Englishmen to enlist are addressed by speakers\nwho meet with lots of applause when they say: \"We may not be able to put\nthe same number of men into the field immediately that Germany was able\nto put or Russia was able to put, but in the long run, considering the\nattitude of all the different parts of our empire, we will be able to\nput just as many men, and therefore time is on our side both as regards\nforce in the field and money to sustain it.\" (The London Times confesses\nthat enlistment in Ireland is a failure.)\n\nLloyd George says that for a comparatively short time England's enemies\ncan finance themselves and be very efficient, but that as time passes\nthey unquestionably will exhaust not only their pecuniary means but\ntheir resources of men as well. That is his position at this time.\nTherefore, it does appear as if the long duration of the war was a thing\ndesired, at least in Great Britain, as being their hope of victory. Both\nGreat Britain and France are wealthy countries. Just how wealthy Germany\nis I do not think they realize, nor do we know, nor what its ultimate\nresources can be.\n\nNow, looking at the allied line as a whole, we will suppose that the\nGerman forces were overwhelmingly triumphant in France, and suppose,\nlikewise, which is by no means as strong a hypothesis, that Russia is\noverwhelmingly victorious against Austria and the Eastern German Army;\nthen, of course, you have the situation in which that one of the Allies\nwhich is triumphant will assert its leadership in the terms of peace\nthat will be reached, and would have the hegemony, as we call it, of all\nEurope.\n\n\nRussia's Position.\n\nSo that the defeat of the Allies in the west and their overwhelming\nsuccess in the east would compel the acceptance, in any peace that might\nbe made, of such terms as Russia chose to dictate. She would have to be\nsatisfied, otherwise there would only be one outcome of it; that is, of\ncourse, if Great Britain and France could not accept those terms, there\nwould be a rupture, and stranger things have been seen than Germany,\nFrance, and Great Britain fighting against Russia.\n\nStranger things than that have been seen; such changes in the alliances\nbetween States have occurred at intervals from the seventeenth century\nonward in Europe, a phase of the subject that is too lengthy to discuss\nhere, but which every student of history knows all about. And it is\nthinkable that they might occur again.\n\nSuppose, on the other hand, that the Germans should imitate Frederick\nthe Great, which is not so preposterous as appears on the face of it,\nbecause of comparatively easy means of transportation, and should be\nable to make successive victorious dashes, first in the east and then in\nthe west, backward and forward; leadership would be hers, and France\nwould be a minor power for years to come.\n\nProbably peace might come more quickly if neither side should be\nabsolutely victorious than otherwise. But for the moment I think that\nthe agreement among the Allies is a very portentous thing, as far as the\nduration of the war is concerned.\n\n\"Do you think that any secret agreement may exist; that France even now\nmay have made an agreement with Germany?\" Mr. Sloane was asked.\n\nI cannot think so. I think it very evident there is no such secret\nagreement. If one existed it would be much more likely to be between\nRussia and Germany. You remember the development of Prussia, which is,\nof course, the commanding State in the German Empire, occurred by its\ncareful conservation of the policy which was laid down in the political\nwill of Frederick the Great, that of keeping friends with Russia.\n\nThe fact of the matter is, Prussia was saved in the Napoleonic wars by\nthe act of Gen. Yorck at Tauroggen, when he suddenly abandoned the\nFrench and went over to the Prussians, and while Russia has within half\na generation become intensely bitter against Germany, yet it is true\nthat the Baltic Provinces, in which the gentry and the burghers are\nGermans, have furnished most important administrators to the Russian\nEmpire, a fact that causes much of the jealousy in Russia on the part of\nthe native-born Russians against the Germans of the Baltic Provinces.\nNevertheless, self-interest is a very important thing, and if Russia\nthought for a moment that France was going to abandon her I think she\nwould turn to Germany right away.\n\nAs time has developed the nations of today, it has come to be understood\nby hard-headed statesmen that those who conduct their respective affairs\ncan have no other guiding principle than the interest of their own\nState, no other.\n\nThere is a persistent feeling throughout the world that there is an\nanalogy between the individual man and organized society. There are\nbooks written to show that States must and do pass through the various\nstages through which an individual passes, namely, infancy, childhood,\nyouth, middle age, old age, decay. By a perfectly natural parallel the\nmajority of men apply the same morality to the State which they apply to\nthe individual, and they insist upon it that a State must be moral in\nevery respect; that it must have a conscience; that it must have virtue;\nthat it must practice self-denial; that it must not lay its hands on\nwhat does not belong to it. In short, that it must as a State or as a\nnation be \"good,\" in exactly the same sense in which a person is \"good.\"\nIn other words, they personify the State.\n\nI have never heard of any speaker or writer who would not approve of\nthat as an ideal, and who would not desire that the millennium should\ncome upon earth now, and that exactly the same virtues that are held up\nfor personal ideals should be held up for national ideals.\n\nI think we all believe that, but, as a matter of fact, in a world\nconstituted as ours is, the one test of a good Government, applied by\nevery individual, is the material prosperity of the people who live\nunder it, and for that reason if the people do not at first put in power\nmen who can give them material prosperity they will put such failures\nout and try another set of rulers, and they will go on and on that way\nuntil necessarily the policies of statesmen must be based upon the\ninterest of that State whose destinies are in their hands. So that the\nonly hope of relations between nations similar to those that exist\nbetween good men and good women is that the individuals of that nation,\nits population, its inhabitants, should consent to exercise the\nself-denying virtues; and until that point is reached there can be no\ngood State in the sense in which there can be a good man. We ought all\nto work for it, but it is not here now, and there are no signs on the\nhorizon of its approach.\n\nIn a war, therefore, every statesman studies the resources of his\nnation, and when the time comes that it is manifestly his duty to put an\nend to warfare, it is only by the public approval that he dares do it,\nby showing that it is to their advantage to give up the things for which\nthey went to war, in greater or less degree.\n\n\nArmed Peace Not Disarmament.\n\nAnd the man of shrewd insight, who knows when that point is reached, is\nthe leader who saves the face, so to speak, of these nations and steps\nin and says:\n\n\"Now, the whole moral force of the civilized world must be brought to\nbear upon you to make a peace, the terms of which, if possible, shall\nnot discredit any of you, but at the same time shall be as elastic and\nas proportionate to your respective gains and losses as will insure at\nleast a considerable period of peace, not an armistice, not an armed\narmistice, though it may be an armed peace.\"\n\nWe see no signs anywhere in Europe that disarmament has any substantial\nbody of advocates in any nation. The basic principle hitherto of the\nGerman people has been to have, not the largest, but the strongest army;\nthe basic principle of Great Britain, which sneers at militarism, has\nbeen not only to have the most powerful fleet, but twice the most\npowerful fleet.\n\nAnd what is the basic principle of the United States? The Monroe\nDoctrine, to have no armed neighbor which shall compel us to violate by\nits presence our dislike for compulsory military service or to expend\ngreat sums for armament.\n\nThese are basic principles in each of us. Now, we have been able to\nmaintain the Monroe Doctrine by simply showing our teeth, but whether we\ncould maintain it in the future without an armed force sufficient to\ngive it sanction I think is doubtful, and for that reason the Monroe\nDoctrine has undergone quite a number of modifications which I do not\nneed to explain here.\n\nBut this basic principle of ours that from Patagonia to the Mexican\nfrontier we will suffer no armed nation of Europe to make permanent\nsettlement and endanger our peace is exactly the same sort of principle\nthat the German holds when he says, \"We must have the strongest army,\"\nand the same which the Englishman holds when he says, \"We must have the\nstrongest fleet.\"\n\nI want it distinctly understood that I am not a partisan. I am not pro\nthis or pro that or pro anything except pro-American, and the principal\nimpulse I have in trying to clarify my mind is my hope that there may be\nan end to these hysterical exhibitions of partisanship, in which\n(throughout this neutral nation) men indulge who still hold too\nstrongly, as I think, to the glory, honor, dignity, and traditions of\nthe lands of their origin.\n\n\n\n\nAn Answer by Prof. Ladd\n\n     Emeritus Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy at Yale\n     University; Lecturer on Philosophy in India and Japan; has\n     received numerous decorations in Japan, where he was guest and\n     unofficial adviser of Prince Ito; ex-President of American\n     Psychological Association.\n\n\n_To the Editor of The New York Times:_\n\nIt seems strange to me that a student of history with the training and\nacumen of Prof. Sloane should overlook or minimize the important\ndistinction that must hold the chief place in enabling us to understand\nthe issues and appreciate the merits of the war now raging in Europe.\nThis distinction is that between the German people and Germanic\ncivilization, on the one hand, and, on the other, the present\nConstitution and cherished ambitions of the German Empire under the\ndominance of Prussia. The German people, by genuine processes of\nself-development, have worked out for themselves a veritable spiritual\nunity which manifests itself in language, laws, customs, and a large\nmeasure of substantial uniformity in moral and religious ideals.\nGermanic civilization, with its love of order, its high estimate of\neducation, its notable additions to science, philosophy, and art,\nconstitutes one of the most noble and beneficent contributions to the\nwelfare of mankind.\n\nBut the case is not at all the same with the German Empire as at present\nconstituted. It is not a historical development, a truly national\naffair, as are the Empire of Great Britain, the Republics of France and\nthe United States, or the Empires of Russia and Japan. It is a modern\ncombination of politically divergent unities, forced by the ruthless but\ninfinitely shrewd policy of Bismarck and his coadjutors, misdirected and\nperhaps driven to ruin by the man and his entourage, who, even if he is\nKing of Prussia \"by the grace of God,\" is only Emperor of Germany \"by\nthe will of the Princes.\"\n\nWe are diligently given to understand that all these \"Princes\" and all\nthe German people have entered heart and soul into this war, and without\nthe slightest doubt as to its righteousness and as to the destiny of the\nempire, this modern military autocracy, ultimately to be completely\nvictorious. This is hard to believe, although it must be admitted that\nthe cowardice of the Socialists and the obsession of the professors are\nremarkable phenomena. As to the latter, however, we must remember their\ndependence on the Government, not only for their information and their\n\"call\" to speak, but also for their positions in the Government system\nof education.\n\nAs to the significance of the two names most prominently quoted in this\nconnection, I am not at all impressed, as so many of my colleagues\nappear to be. An intimate friend of mine some twenty years ago was\nseveral weeks en pension in the same house where Haeckel had his\napartment, and even then he was notorious for his hatred of foreigners\nand of women. Those of us who have followed closely his career know how\noften he has written with more than German professorial virulence\nagainst those who differed from his theory of evolution, and that he is\nat present scarcely more abusive of England than he has several times\nbeen of his own Government and of the State Church because his system\nwas not made a matter of compulsory teaching. As to Eucken, the reasons\nfor his obsession are quite different. In his case the feeling and the\nutterance are due to intellectual weakness rather than to virulence of\npassion.\n\nAfter all, however, the temper of military and imperial Germany under\nthe dominance of Prussia has been essentially the same from the\nbeginning. In illustration of this, let me quote for your readers from a\npoem of Heine, written as long ago as 1842. I do this the more readily\nbecause I have recently seen, to my astonishment, Heine placed beside\nGoethe as representing the better temper of the Germanic civilization as\nopposed to the blinded judgment and immoral hatred of the modern German\nEmpire:\n\n    Germany's still a little child,\n      But he's nursed by the sun, though tender;\n    He is not suckled on soothing milk,\n      But on flames of burning splendor.\n\n    One grows apace on such a diet;\n      It fires the blood from languor;\n    Ye neighbor's children, have a care,\n      This urchin how ye anger!\n\n    He is an awkward infant giant,\n      The oak by the roots uptearing;\n    He'll beat you till your backs are sore,\n      And crack your crowns for daring.\n\n    He is like Siegfried, the noble child,\n      That song-and-saga wonder,\n    Who, when his fabled sword was forged,\n      His anvil cleft in sunder!\n\n    To you, who will our Dragon slay,\n      Shall Siegfried's strength be given;\n    Hurrah! how joyfully your nurse\n      Will laugh on you from heaven!\n\n    The Dragon's hoard of royal gems\n      You'll win, with none to share it;\n    Hurrah! how bright the golden crown\n      Will sparkle when you wear it!\n\nBut it would not be stranger than many other things which have happened\nin human history if the defeat of German military imperialism should\nresult in restoring to Europe and spreading more widely over the world\nthe beneficent influence of Germanic civilization. Certainly they are\nnot the same thing, and they do not stand or fall together.\n\nGEORGE TRUMBULL LADD.\n\nYale University, Oct. 20, 1914.\n\n\n\n\nPossible Profits From War\n\nINTERVIEW WITH FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS.\n\n     Dr. Giddings is Professor of Sociology and the History of\n     Civilization at Columbia University; author of many works on\n     sociology and political economy; President of Institut\n     Internationale de Sociologie, 1913.\n\nBy Edward Marshall.\n\n\nNo man in the United States is better entitled to estimate the probable\nsocial and economic outcome of the present European debacle than Prof.\nFranklin H. Giddings of Columbia, one of the most distinguished\nsociologists and political economists in the United States.\n\n\"Today all Europe fights,\" he said to me, \"but, also, today all Europe\nthinks.\"\n\nThat is an impressive sentence, with which he concluded our long talk,\nand with which I begin my record of it.\n\nHe believes that this thinking of the men who crouch low in the drenched\ntrenches and of the women who tragically wait for news of them will\nfashion a new Europe.\n\nHe agrees with the remarkable opinions of President Butler, that that\nnew Europe will be marked by the rise of democracy.\n\nHe sees the probability of broadened individual opportunity in it,\naccompanied by the breaking down of international suspicions; and he\nthinks that all these processes, which surely make for peace, will\nsurely bring a lasting peace.\n\nIn the following interview, which Prof. Giddings has carefully reread,\nwill be found one of the most interesting speculative utterances born of\nthe war.\n\n\"The immediate economic cause of the war,\" said Prof. Giddings, \"lay in\nthe affairs of Servia and Austria. Servia had been shut in. She had been\nable to get practically nothing from, and sell practically nothing to,\nthe outside world, save by Austria's permission, while Austria, with\nGermany professing fear of Slavic development, for years had been taking\nevery care to prevent the Balkan peoples from having free access to the\nAdriatic.\n\n\"Some financial profit arose from this interning of the little States,\nbut it is probable that the desire for this was all along entirely\nsecondary to the fear of Balkan, especially Servian, political and\neconomic development.\n\n\"In the larger economic question Germany felt especial interest.\n\n\"In a comparatively few years she had made the greatest progress ever\nmade by any nation in an equal time, with the possible exception of that\nmade by the United States in a similar period after our civil war, and\nit is probable that not even our own advance has equaled hers in\nrapidity or extent, if all could be tabbed up.\n\n\"She had worked out a great manufacturing scheme, she had developed an\nimmense internal commerce by means of her railroads and her Rhine and\nother waterways, she had built up an enormous trade with Eastern Europe,\nWestern Asia, South America, and the United States.\n\n\"She had highly specialized in and become somewhat dependent on the\nproduction of articles like dyestuffs and the commodities of the\npharmacopoeia.\n\n\"Her shipping had advanced until it closely crowded England's; her\nfinances, on the whole, were well handled and her credit was excellent,\nwhile her wonderful system of co-operation between the Government and\nmanufacturing producers and commercial distributers of all kinds had\nbecome the admiration of all nations. The extent to which her Government\nfacilitated foreign trade through obtaining and distributing costly\ninformation might well be taken as the world's model.\n\n\"Whatever claims be made or contested about her contributions to culture\nand theoretical science, there can be no argument about her material\nachievements.\"\n\n\nGerman Achievements.\n\n\"Along every line her social organization of co-operation between the\nGovernment and the people successfully handled problems feared by all\nthe outside world. While, as a result of the development of humane\nfeeling, England and the United States have been saying that ignorance,\nvagabondage, and misery ought to be abolished, Germany has said, 'They\nshall be!' And, saying it, she had actually commenced to abolish them.\n\n\"She had cut down enormous wastes of human energy and, for the first\ntime in the history of the world, had established an economic minimum\nbelow which men and families were not permitted to sink.\n\n\"The cost of this was large; for insurance, colonies for tramps and\nvagabonds, employment agencies, and the like; but Germany made it pay in\nthe creation of a nation built of loyal and efficient people. Both their\nloyalty and their efficiency have been proved and reproved in the course\nof the present struggle. They had accomplished marvels, they were ready\nfor amazing sacrifices.\n\n\"Now, one of the principal reasons why Germany was able to do these\nthings, although, she probably ignored it and possibly would deny it, is\nto be found in the free-trade policy of England.\n\n\"At any time during the past twenty years England could have checked\nGerman progress effectively by the establishment of a protective tariff\nsystem designed to encourage her own colonies and other nations with\nwhom she had long been on friendly and influential terms, to the utmost\ndevelopment of exclusive trade privileges designed to shut out Germany.\nExcept for the long-established English policy of commercial freedom\nGermany could not have accomplished for herself what she has.\n\n\"Germany has been growing rapidly. Her birth rate has been high, but of\nlate it has been falling, and when the war began there were indications\nthat she soon would approach the low ratio of population increase\nalready characteristic of France, of New England and the Middle West in\nthe United States, and lately of England. But Germany's population was\nstill a growing one and, in a sense, a restive one.\n\n\"The Malthusian theory has not worked out in the civilized world as\nMalthus supposed it would, for the application of science to\nmanufacturing, agriculture, &c., has prevented increasing populations\nfrom pressing upon the means of subsistence; but in all parts of the\nWestern World the standards of living have been raised, the ambitions of\nthe average man and woman have expanded. They have lived better than\ntheir parents lived, and they have wished their children to live better\nstill.\n\n\"However, we can place no limit upon the probable expansion of human\ndesires, and it is true that a population unchecked by the intelligent\naction of the human will tends to increase at a rate more rapid than\nthat at which it is possible to raise the actual plane of human living.\n\n\"The speed of the working of the two rules is different, perhaps, but\nboth are dynamic, and the population of Germany tended to grow more\nrapidly than betterment of conditions could be provided, even under the\nnation's splendid governmental and commercial efficiency.\n\n\"The natural yearning of the nation, therefore, was toward colonial\nexpansion, and, although note that I make no charges against either the\nGerman Government or German people, the nation probably has wished\nsovereignty over Western Europe, through Belgium and Holland to the sea.\nIts narrow outlet through Hamburg and Bremen was insufficient for its\nneeds.\n\n\"Of course, its trade and economic advance has sometimes conflicted\nwith that of other nations. It is natural for Germany to suppose that\nEngland tried to block it. However, I think that all the evidence which\nGermany has brought forward in proof of this is weak and improbable,\nbecause England's great source of revenue has been her foreign trade,\nand, above all, her carrying trade, and I am not partisan but stating\nthe obvious when I say that England prospers when the rest of the world\nprospers, and that she has profited mightily through Germany's\ncommercial advance.\n\n\"These facts point to the conclusion that Germany really had everything\nto gain by avoiding war and continuing her prosperous expansion along\ncommercial lines, increasing the strength of her grip in foreign\ncountries, as, for example, in South America.\"\n\n\nGermany's Prosperous Commerce.\n\n\"In South America we Americans were not really competing with her. She\nhad studied the market and adopted the methods necessary to its\nsatisfaction; we had not. England was relatively losing her hold there.\nIn another twenty years Germany surely would have been one of the\ngreatest commercial and manufacturing nations which the world has ever\nknown. So it was not economic necessity, nor pressure approaching\neconomic necessity, which precipitated this war.\n\n\"I think the German people, as they professed to do, did become greatly\nalarmed over a possibility, magnified into a probability, that Russia,\ntaking up the cause of the Balkan peoples, would obtain Constantinople,\nthat Servia would make her way to the Adriatic, and that all possibility\nof the expansion of Germany to the southeast would be blocked, and\nGermany probably became alarmed over England's intentions--there were\nmany indications of something close to panic in Germany after it was\ngenerally understood that King Edward figured in the pact with France.\n\n\"I, for one, do not believe that the German fears of England were well\ngrounded; I do not believe that in the excitement the German mind worked\ndiscriminatingly or that it is working with discrimination today. I\nthink that Germany has presented an extraordinary example of nation-wide\nmobmindedness in a situation which offered nothing but ruin through war\nand boundless advantages if she sat tight and waited for some one else\nto strike the first blow, which, then, probably never would have been\nstruck.\n\n\"So, although I have outlined what I think may fairly be regarded as\nsome of the economic conditions contributing to the war, I do not think\nthat it is entirely to be explained by economic causes.\n\n\"They fail to account for the actual precipitation of the conflict. I\nthink that there is no explanation of that, short of recognition of an\nabnormal reaction of the German mind to a situation the nature of which\nwas mistaken, or, at least, exaggerated.\n\n\"And, of course, there were other factors concerning which we shall not\nknow the truth for years, such as the personal influence of individual\nminds in the German and other Governments. It will be long before the\ncomplete history of the acts and negligence of diplomats and other\nresponsible Ministers will be written.\"\n\nI asked Prof. Giddings if, in his opinion, the struggle is likely to\nresult in any wide and profound change in the economic life of the\nworld.\n\n\"Yes,\" he replied, \"I think it is sure to. In the first place, for at\nleast half a generation, and perhaps longer, the producing capital of\nthe world will be much smaller than it was before the war.\n\n\"But in this speculation we must be cautious, because, so far, the\ncostly war material which has been consumed, such as fortresses\ndestroyed, guns worn out, ammunition consumed, soldiers' clothing, and\nin general food, were principally accumulated and paid for long ago.\nThey have come out of the world's past production, and their cost\nalready has been written off.\n\n\"The real loss, the new waste, over and above the devastation of Belgium\nand other lands, has been of labor, productive activity which would have\nbeen carried on during the period of the war had the struggle been\navoided, the destruction of the lives of men in their economic prime,\nthe maiming of others to the depletion of their future usefulness and\nthe loss to European fatherhood.\n\n\"But if the war lasts a long time, necessitating the general renewal of\nships, fortresses, weapons, and stores, the waste will be enormous, for\nthe actual money expenditure will then come out of funds newly\naccumulated or charged against the future, and not out of those set\naside in the past for war purposes.\"\n\n\nOne Great Change Occurring.\n\n\"Thus one great economic change already is occurring--the devastation\nwrought, the destruction of hoarded funds and supplies and of useful\nhuman life.\n\n\"There are others which are probable, but also problematical, although I\nthink we fairly may take them into account.\n\n\"Will the European nations, in settlement of their differences through\nfinal terms of peace, simply endeavor to restore the old order, drawing\ntheir lines of demarkation very strictly, enacting, for example, higher\ntariffs, thinking that along that line will lie the easiest way of\nre-establishing national finances?\n\n\"If so, the old contentions will be perpetuated. It will be the old\norder of things over again.\n\n\"We shall again have the spirit of exclusiveness fostered and the old\nsuspicions bred. The old intense competition of nation with nation for\ntrade to the exclusion of other nations from the markets of the world\nwill return with its attendant inefficiency.\n\n\"But, on the other hand, the world will be an immense gainer through the\nwar if it is followed by a broad and rational review of the whole\nsituation and an adjustment of the map of Europe with due regard to the\nambitions and legitimate economic opportunities and capabilities of the\nvarious peoples.\n\n\"This war may be the greatest good the world has ever known if it leaves\nEurope in a mental state disposed to Broaden opportunity, to break down\nsuspicions, to eliminate barriers, and make commerce much freer than it\nhas been.\n\n\"Then Europe's economic recovery will be rapid, animosities will die\nquickly away, and every nation which is now involved will progress with\na new speed, seeing that opportunity is created only through superiority\nin fair competition.\n\n\"The next possibility, one far more nearly a probability, I think, than\nthe somewhat Utopian speculation in which I have just indulged, is that\nafter the war the world will have been deeply impressed by the\ntremendous activity of Germany, whether she be victor or vanquished.\n\n\"What is the secret of her efficiency as manifested in the mobilization\nof her vast army, in her use of science in new military devices, in her\nholding of the elements of her national life together during the\nstruggle, in her keeping her industries going in the face of\nunprecedented difficulties--all to a degree never before dreamed of?\nwill be a general query.\n\n\"Other nations will study the German plan, asking whether it is true, as\nhas been taught in America, that that Government is best which governs\nleast.\n\n\"It may be that this war will result, entirely apart from the urgency of\nthe labor problem which it will magnify, and wholly on the grounds of\ngeneral efficiency, in a general inquiry as to whether or not the time\nhas come for quasi-socialistic national developments.\n\n\"I think it unlikely that the war will give impetus to that proletarian\nsocialism which is founded on class consciousness and class struggle;\nbut it may urge forward a socialistic movement based upon the large and\nfruitful idea that the best hope for the future is offered by the most\ncomplete and highly organized co-operation of all elements, all\ninterests, all agencies which in their combination make up national\nstructures.\n\n\"As a matter of fact, I am an optimist, and I believe that this is about\nwhat will come after this war ends.\n\n\"To put my theory in slightly different terms, I believe that the\nconflict will greatly further the development of what perhaps may be\ncalled 'public socialism,' and I mean by that the highest attainable\norganization of whole peoples for the production of commodities, the\nfurtherance of enterprise, and the promotion of the general well-being.\n\n\"I think that when the world sobers up it will ask: 'How did Germany do\nit?'\n\n\"Whether she wins or loses that must be the universal query, for whether\nshe wins or loses her achievement has been in many ways unprecedented.\n\n\"There can be but one answer to this query: She did it by an\norganization which brought together in efficient co-operation the\nindividual, the quasi-private corporation, the public corporation, and\nthe Government upon a scale never before seen.\n\n\"The world is bound to take notice of this.\"\n\n\nWill Fear Loss of Liberty.\n\nI asked Prof. Giddings to go beyond economics and to consider the war's\nprobable results in their broader sociological aspects.\n\n\"If what I have predicted happens,\" he replied, \"the democratic elements\nof society in all nations will become apprehensive of the loss of\nliberty.\n\n\"They will fear that in the interests of efficiency the perfected social\norder will impose minute and unwelcome regulations upon individual life\nand effort, and that a degree of coercive control will be established\nwhich will end by making individuals mere cogs in the machine,\ndiminishing their importance, curtailing their usefulness and initiative\nfar more than is done by the great industrial corporations against which\nthe working classes already are protesting so loudly.\n\n\"And not only the working people but a large proportion of all other\nclasses will develop these fears, especially in those nations which,\nduring the last century, have built up popular sovereignty and\ndemocratic freedom, as the terms are understood in England and America.\n\n\"We shall hear the argument that the loss of individual initiative and\npersonal self-reliance is too great a price to pay even for supreme\nefficiency and the maximum production of material comforts.\n\n\"The problem which such a conflict of interests and opinions will\npresent may be speculatively defined as that of trying to find a way to\nreconcile a maximum of efficiency organization with a maximum of\nindividual freedom.\n\n\"So stating it, we have to recognize that this has been the biggest\nproblem, in fact the comprehensive problem, that man, has faced\nthroughout human history, and the one which, really, he has been trying\nto solve by the trial and error method in all his social experiments.\n\n\"It is the sociological as distinguished from the merely economic\nproblem.\n\n\"Human society exists because early in his career man discovered that\nmutual aid, or team work, is, on the whole, in the struggle for\nexistence and the pursuit of happiness, a more effective factor than\nphysical strength or individual cleverness.\n\n\"Natural selection has acted not only upon individuals, but, in the\nlarge sense, upon groups and aggregates of groups. The restrictions upon\nindividual life have developed in the interests of groups, or collective\nefficiency.\n\n\"On the other hand, collective efficiency has no meaning, it serves no\npurpose apart from the amelioration of individual life and the\ndevelopment of individual personality.\n\n\"So long as groups fear one another and fight with one another the\nrestrictions upon individual liberty must be extreme in the interests of\nthe collective fighting efficiency of each group as a whole.\n\n\"All the possibilities of personal development, of individual freedom,\nare involved in the larger possibilities of friendly relations between\nnation and nation.\n\n\"Already the co-operative instinct has so grown that if war and the fear\nof war could be eliminated, mankind would have relatively little\ndifficulty in working out ways and means of combining Governmental\naction with individual initiative for purposes of economic production,\neducation, the promotion of the public health, and the administration\nof justice.\n\n\"All those principles and rules which we call Morality are, in fact,\nmere rules of the game of life. We play the game or do not play it; we\nare fair or unfair.\n\n\"On the whole, most of us try to be fair because it has been found that\nplaying the game with a sense of fairness is the only way in which we\ncan succeed in working together for common ends without the necessity of\nimposing upon ourselves coercive rules to hold our organization together\nfor possible mass attack upon the end in view.\n\n\"Social life, in this sense of playing the game fairly, has made man the\nsuperior of the brutes he sprang from. There is nothing mysterious or\nrecondite about it.\n\n\"In order to work together men must understand one another. Therefore,\nnatural selection has picked out the intelligent for survival in the\nsocial world; and in order to work together intelligent men must depend\non one another, abiding by their covenants.\n\n\"Therefore, again, natural selection has picked out what we call\nMorality for survival in the social world. The whole further progress of\nmankind would seem to hang upon the possibility that we can find a way\nto limit and, if possible, to terminate wars between nations, for only\nin that contingency can we hope to develop a social system in which a\nsupreme efficiency with a maximum of individual liberty can be combined\nupon a working basis.\"\n\n\nApplication of the Facts.\n\n\"These are incontrovertible facts, and they find their application to\nthe existing European situation in various ways, the most important of\nwhich will appear in the discovery that, valuable as conventions and\ncovenants of nation with nation may be, and intolerable as any violation\nof them surely is, we cannot hope for general and unfailing observance\nof them until the feeling of mankind and the whole attitude of the world\nin respect to international as well as private conduct shall be that the\ncovenants and conventions shall become, in a degree, unnecessary.\n\n\"Already it is apparent that the entire world, including the peoples of\nthe nations at war as well as the peoples of the nations remaining\nhappily at peace, have, begun to think these thoughts and reflect upon\ntheir momentous importance.\n\n\"Shocked and stunned as never before by a calamity for which we find no\nmeasure in past human experience, mankind is bound to take at this\nmoment a more sober view, a broader and more rational view, of the\nproblems of responsibility and collective conduct than it hitherto has\nbeen able even to attempt.\n\n\"The world is sure to ask what things make for sobriety of judgment and\nintegrity of purpose. It is sure in future more carefully to weigh\nrelative values, and will be disposed to count as unimportant many\nthings for which hitherto the armed men of nations have rushed into war.\n\n\"In a word, this war has made the whole world think as no one thing ever\nhas made it think before, and, after all, it is upon the habit of\nthought that we must depend for all rational progress.\n\n\"Other wars and other great events have fostered sentiment, much of\nwhich has been hopeful and useful; they have accomplished far-reaching\neconomic changes, many of them necessary.\n\n\"But the reactions of this war will surely go beyond all previous\nexperience. They already are and must be, in a far greater measure,\nprofoundly intellectual, and one of the consequences of this fact\ninevitably will be the broadening and deepening of the democratic\ncurrent.\n\n\"When peace returns it will be seen that democracy has received a\nhitherto unimagined impetus. Then it will be understood that democracy,\nin one of its most important aspects, is popular thinking, that it is\nthe widest possible extension of the sense of responsibility.\n\n\"A democratic world will be, all in all, a peace-loving world.\n\n\"We may confidently expect far-reaching changes in the internal\npolitical organization of the nations now involved. In every nation of\nEurope the people are asking: What, after all, is this conflict all\nabout?\n\n\"They will ask this many times, and however they may answer it they\nwill, by consequence, follow the question with another: Shall we go on\nfighting wars about the necessity, expedience, and righteousness of\nwhich we have not been consulted?\n\n\"And to this query they will find only one answer--an emphatic negative.\n\n\"Sooner or later there will be a comprehensive political reorganization\nof Europe, and when its day comes the rearrangement will be along the\nlines of a republic rather than along the lines of any monarchy, however\nliberal.\n\n\"Then international agreements will be unnecessary and there will be no\ntreaties to be broken--no 'scraps of paper' to be disregarded.\n\n\"Apparently Germany has been as successful in training her people to\nthink accurately along economic lines as she has been in training them\nto work efficiently along such lines; and that accurate thought\nundoubtedly is bearing startling fruit among the men today crouched in\nthe trenches on the firing lines.\"\n\n\nEra of Individual Thought.\n\n\"England, on the other hand, and France have encouraged the free and\nspontaneous life of democratic peoples. France and England, like the\nUnited States, have been training their peoples to think efficiently of\nand to appreciate and use liberty and initiative. And the men of these\ntwo nations are, in turn, exercising that ability as they crouch in\ntheir trenches.\n\n\"In other words, this war has precipitated an era of sober individual\nthought about the individual's rights and responsibilities. It will\neverywhere bring about a wider political organization of mankind, a\ngreater freedom of trade and opportunity, a more serious and thorough\neducation, a more earnest attention and devotion to the higher interests\nof life, giving such thought preference above that overemphasis of\nmaterial comforts which has been so marked a feature of recent human\nhistory.\n\n\"All these things will make for peace; and another and potent influence\nwill be the exhaustion of the weakened nations which will follow the\nconflict. Because of that very weakness Europe will turn its unanimous\nattention to the things of peace rather than to the things of war.\n\n\"The new Europe is being fashioned by those questioning men who now are\nlying in the trenches.\n\n\"They are searching in the universe for answers to such inquiries as\nthey never dreamed about before, and the women, worrying at home--they,\ntoo, are busy with a search for answers to hitherto undreamed-of\nquestions.\n\n\"They all are pondering great things for the first time. Their pondering\nwill be fruitful.\n\n\"Today all Europe fights, but, also, today all Europe thinks. And,\nthinking, perhaps it may devise a better order, so that it may not ever\nfight again.\"\n\n[Illustration]\n\n\n\n\n\"To Americans Leaving Germany\"\n\nA FAREWELL WORD.\n\n\nAMERICANS!\n\nCitizens of the United States!\n\nIn this earnest moment in which you are leaving the soil of Germany and\nBerlin, take with you from German citizens, from representatives of\ntrade and industry, who are proud to entertain friendly commercial\nrelations with the United States, a hearty farewell coupled with the\ndesire of a speedy return.\n\nTogether with this farewell we beg you to do us a favor. As our guests,\nwhom we have always honored and protected, we ask you to take this paper\nwith you as a memorial and to circulate the same among your authorities,\npress, friends, and acquaintances.\n\nFor, we are well aware that the enemies of Germany are at work to make\nyou the instruments to lower Germany's people and army in the face of\nthe whole world in order to deceive foreign nations as to Germany's\npolicy and economical power. We ask you, as free citizens face to face\nwith free citizens, to circulate the real truth about Germany among your\npeople as compared to the lies of our enemies.\n\nWe beg you to take the following main points to heart:\n\n     1. The German Emperor and the German Nation wanted peace. The\n     cunning and breach of faith of our opponents have forced the\n     sword into the hands of Germany.\n\n     2. After war has been forced on us the German Nation, Emperor,\n     and Reichstag have granted everything in the most brilliant\n     unanimity for the war. No difference prevails in Germany any\n     longer, no difference between party, confession, rank or\n     position, but we are a united nation and army.\n\n     3. Our military organization and our mobilization has\n     proceeded with splendid precision. The mobilization was\n     accomplished during the course of a few days. In addition to\n     those who are compelled to serve, more than 1,200,000\n     volunteers have offered their services. All civil\n     organizations, from the head of industry and finance to the\n     smallest man downward, vie with each other in works of\n     voluntary aid and welfare.\n\n     4. In the field German arms have had splendid successes in the\n     first days of mobilization.\n\nIn the east the Russian enemy has been driven from the German frontier,\nin numerous small fights by our troops in conjunction with those of the\nAustro-Hungarian monarchy. By successful coup de mains our navy has been\nsuccessful in damaging and alarming our Russian opponent in her Baltic\nnaval ports. The Russian port of Libau has been burned down and in\nRussian Poland revolution has already begun. Russian mobilization is a\nlong way from being accomplished, the troops are badly, poorly\nnourished, and many deserters sell their weapons and horses.\n\nIn the west the German Army has gained imposing victories over Belgium\nand France.\n\nIn Belgium, where the population unfortunately committed the most\nbarbarous atrocities against peaceful Germans before the war broke out,\ncomparatively weak German forces conquered the strong fortress of Liege\na few days after the mobilization, inflicting severe damage on the enemy\nand opening up the way via Belgium to France.\n\nValuable victories have been obtained over France on the Alsatian\nfrontier toward the strong French fortress of Belfort as well as in the\ndirection of the fortress Luneville. At Muelhausen one and a half French\nArmy divisions were overthrown and driven back over the frontier with\nheavy losses.\n\nThe strong and effective German fleet is on the watch against the\nEnglish fleet.\n\nEngland's risk is great in staking her reputation as the strongest\nnaval power on one throw against the German fleet. Further, England runs\nthe danger that her large colonies, such as India and Egypt, will seize\na moment that has been long desired to revolt.\n\nIt is for the United States to utilize the present moment to frustrate\nby powerful initiative England's endeavors to keep down all nations,\nincluding America, in the trade and traffic of the world.\n\nCitizens of the United States! Take the conviction with you to your\nhomes that Germany will stake her last man and her last penny for\nvictory. Germany must conquer and will conquer.\n\nRemember! That after a successful victory Germany will make new\npolitical and economical progress, and that America, as a shrewd\nbusinesslike State and as a friend of Germany, will participate in such\nprogress.\n\nToday we beg you earnestly to convey to your fellow-citizens that the\nGerman Nation, as the safe refuge of civilization and culture, has\nalways protected the loyal citizens of its enemies in every manner in\ncontrast to Russia, France, and Belgium. By circulating this short\nmemorial among your fellow-citizens you are likewise insuring that also\nin the future the United States will learn the truth about Germany's\nbattles and victories. Your friends here will always do the best in\ntheir power to supply you with genuine news. We wish you a happy voyage\ntoward your home, so appreciated by all Germans, and hope to see you\nagain in a victorious and prosperous Germany.\n\nREPRESENTATIVES OF GERMAN INDUSTRY.\n\nBerlin, Aug. 13, 1914.\n\n\n\n\nGerman Declarations\n\nBy Rudolf Eucken and Ernst Haeckel.\n\n     Dr. Eucken is Privy Councilor and Professor of Philosophy in\n     the University of Jena; won the Nobel Prize for Literature in\n     1908; has received many foreign honorary degrees and his\n     philosophy has been expounded in English.\n\n     Ernst Haeckel is Privy Councilor and late Professor of Zoology\n     at the University of Jena; has written many works on evolution\n     which have been translated into English.\n\n\nThe whole German world of letters is today filled with deep indignation\nand strong moral resentment at the present behavior of England. Both of\nus, for many years bound to England by numerous scientific and personal\nties, believe ourselves prepared to give open expression to this inward\nrevulsion. In close co-operation with like-minded English investigators\nwe have zealously exerted ourselves to bring the two great peoples\ncloser together in spirit and to promote a mutual understanding. A\nfruitful reciprocal interchange of English and German culture seemed to\nus worth while, indeed necessary, for the spiritual advance of mankind,\nwhich today confronts such great problems. Gratefully we recall in this\nconnection the friendly reception which our efforts received in England.\nSo great and noble were the traits of English character which revealed\nthemselves to us that we were permitted to hope that in their sure\ngrowth they would come to be superior to the pitfalls and seamy sides of\nthis character. And now they have proved inferior, inferior to the old\nevil of a brutal national egotism which recognizes no rights on the\npart of others, which, unconcerned about morality or unmorality, pursues\nonly its own advantage.\n\nHistory furnishes in abundance examples of such an unscrupulous egotism;\nwe need recall here only the destruction of the Danish fleet (1807) and\nthe theft of the Dutch colonies in the Napoleonic wars. But what is\ntaking place today is the worst of all; it will be forever pointed at in\nthe annals of world history as England's indelible shame. England fights\nin behalf of a Slavic, half-Asiatic power against Germanism; she fights\non the side not only of barbarism but also of moral injustice, for it is\nindeed not forgotten that Russia began the war because she would permit\nno radical reparation for a shameful murder.\n\nIt is England whose fault has extended the present war into a world war,\nand has thereby endangered our joint culture. And all this for what\nreason? Because she was jealous of Germany's greatness, because she\nwanted to hinder at any price a further growth of this greatness. For\nthere cannot be the least doubt on this point that England was\ndetermined in advance to cast as many obstacles as possible in the way\nof Germany's great struggle for national existence, and to hinder her as\nmuch as possible in the full development of her powers. She (England)\nwas watching only for a favorable opportunity when she could break out\nsuddenly against Germany, and she therefore promptly seized on the\nnecessary German invasion of Belgium in order that she might cover with\na small cloak of decency her brutal national egotism. Or is there in the\nwhole wide world any one so simple as to believe that England would have\ndeclared war on France also if the latter had invaded Belgium? In that\nevent she would have wept hypocritical tears over the unavoidable\nviolation of international law; but as for the rest she would have\nlaughed in her sleeve with great satisfaction. This hypocritical\nPharisaism is the most repugnant feature of the whole matter; it\ndeserves nothing but contempt.\n\nThe history of the world shows that such sentiments lead the nations not\nupward but downward. For the present, however, we trust firmly in our\njust cause, in the superior strength and the unyielding victorious\nspirit of the German people. Yet we must at the same time lament deeply\nthat the boundless egotism we have referred to has disturbed for an\nimmeasurable period of time the spiritual co-operation of the two\npeoples which promised so much good for the development of mankind. But\nthey wished it so on their side--on England alone falls the monstrous\nguilt and the historical responsibility.\n\nRUDOLF EUCKEN.\n\nERNST HAECKEL.\n\nJena, Aug. 18, 1914.\n\n\n\n\nA Second Appeal\n\n\n_To the Universities of America:_\n\nIn a time when half of the world falls upon Germany full of hatred and\nenvy, we Germans derive great benefit from the idea of our being sure of\nthe friendly feeling of the American universities. If from any quarter\nin the world, it must be from them that we expect the right\ncomprehension of the present situation and present attitude of Germany.\nNumerous American scholars who received their scientific training at our\nuniversities have convinced themselves of the quality and the peaceful\ntendency of German work, the exchange of scientists has proved of\ndeepening influence on the mutual understanding, the lasting intercourse\nof scholarly research gives us the feeling of being members of one great\ncommunity. This is why we entertain the hope that the scientific\ncircles of America will not give credit to the libels our enemies\npropagate against us.\n\nThese libels, above all, accuse Germany of having brought about the\npresent war, she being responsible for the monstrous struggle which is\nextending more and more over the whole world. The truth points to the\ncontrary. Our foes have disturbed us in our peaceful work, forcing the\nwar upon us very much against our desire. We are at a righteous war for\nthe preservation of our existence and at the same time of sacred goods\nof humanity. The murder of Serajevo was not our work; it was the outcome\nof a widely extending conspiracy pointing back to Servia, where for many\nyears already a passionate agitation against Austria had been carried\non, supported by Russia. It was Russia, therefore, that took the\nassassins under her wings, and some weeks already before the war broke\nout she promised her assistance to that blood-stained State. Nobody but\nRussia has given the dangerous turn to the conflict; nobody but Russia\nis to blame for the outbreak of the war. The German Emperor, who has\nproved his love of peace by a peaceful reign of more than twenty-five\nyears, in face of the imminent danger, tried to intermediate between\nAustria and Russia with the greatest zeal, but while he was negotiating\nwith the Czar Russia was busy with the mobilization of a large army\ntoward the German frontier. This necessitated an open and decisive\ninquiry that led to the war. This only happened because Russia wanted it\nso, because she wanted to raise the Muscovites against the Germans and\nthe Western Slavs and to lead Asia into the field against Europe.\n\nFrance, too, might have kept the peace, the decision resting solely with\nher. The security of Germany demanded that she should inquire what\nFrance would do in the impending war; the answer of France unmistakably\nbetrayed her intention to join in the war. As a matter of fact, it was\nnot Germany but France who commenced the war.\n\nEngland already before the war stood in close relations to France. From\nthe very beginning she has clearly shown that she by no means wanted to\nkeep absolutely neutral. From the very beginning she made endeavors to\nprotect France against Germany. Undoubtedly the German invasion in\nBelgium served England as a welcome pretext to openly declare her\nhostility. In reality, before the German invasion, already the\nneutrality of Belgium had been given up in favor of the French. It has\nbeen officially stated, e.g., that not only before but also after the\noutbreak of the war French officers have been at Liege in order to\ninstruct the Belgian soldiers as to the fortification service. England's\ncomplaints of the violation of international law, however, are the most\natrocious hypocrisy and the vilest Pharisaism. At all times English\npolitics have unscrupulously disregarded all forms of law as soon as\ntheir own interest was touched. During the last few weeks the same\nmethod has been quite sufficiently manifested in the unlawful capture of\nthe Turkish warships, and still more so in the instigation of the\nJapanese to undertake the detestable raid upon the German territory in\nChina, which needs must end in strengthening the power of that Mongolian\nnation at the costs of Europeans and Americans.\n\nHow it is possible for a nation that in such a way has betrayed precious\ninterests of Western culture as soon as it seems to benefit them, how is\nit possible for these accomplices of the Japanese robbery to put on the\nair of being the guardians of morality?\n\nWe Germans did not want this war, but as it has been forced upon us we\nshall carry it on bravely and vigorously. In the face of all envy and\nhatred, all brutality and hypocrisy, Germany feels unshakably conscious\nof serving a righteous cause and of standing up for the preservation of\nher national self as well as for sacred goods of humanity; indeed, for\nthe very progress of true culture. It is from this conviction that she\ndraws her unrelenting force and the absolute certainty that she will\nbeat back the assault of all her enemies. This conviction does not stand\nin need of any encouragement from abroad; our country absolutely relies\nupon itself and confides in the strength of its right.\n\nNevertheless, the idea of our American friends' thoughts and sympathies\nbeing with us gives us a strong feeling of comfort in this gigantic\nstruggle. We both of us feel especially justified in pronouncing this as\nbeing the conviction of all German scientists, as so many scientific and\npersonal relations connect us both with the universities of America.\nThese universities know what German culture means to the world, so we\ntrust they will stand by Germany.\n\nRUDOLF EUCKEN.\n\nERNST HAECKEL.\n\nJena, Aug. 31, 1914.\n\n\n\n\nThe Eucken and Haeckel Charges\n\nBy John Warbeke.\n\n     Professor of Philosophy and Psychology at Mount Holyoke\n     College.\n\n_A Letter to the Springfield Republican._\n\n\n_To the Editor of The Springfield Republican:_\n\nThe approval of President Wilson for neutrality of language can hardly\nbe construed into complacency in the face of monstrous evil. If a\njudicial attitude of mind be not jeopardized a discussion of the issues\nraised by Profs. Eucken and Haeckel ought to help us in the attainment\nof impartial judgment. A long acquaintance with both these men makes it\nhard for the present writer to give expression to such negative\ncriticism as he is constrained to do. But his plea can be only this: Not\ntruth but only passion can separate, and truth is greater even than\nfriendship.\n\nThe charge of \"brutal national egoism\" is laid at England's door. She is\ndeclared to be the instigator of the present world war. \"Upon her alone\nfalls the monstrous guilt and the judgment of history.\" Such language\nfrom two benevolent philosophers, one of them a winner of the Nobel\nPeace Prize for Idealistic Literature, seems to suggest a lack of\ninformation among the German people, including its most enlightened\nexponents, of not only their own published \"White Paper\" dispatches, but\nalso of the events of the last two months. It seems hardly possible that\nin the case of these two gentlemen a deliberate campaign of vituperation\ncould have been inaugurated with determination to blind themselves to\nfacts clearly stated in the reports of both contending parties--\n\nFirst--That Servia, in reply to ten urgent demands on the part of\nAustria, acquiesced in nine and proposed to submit the tenth, as\nconcerning her national integrity, to The Hague Tribunal. Austria,\nnevertheless, declared war, with Germany's self-confessed assurances of\nsupport.\n\nSecondly--Germany was the second to declare war, the mobilization of\nRussia being assigned as the reason for this step. The objection of\nGermany's initial campaign, as shown by events, was not defense against\nthe confessedly slowly mobilizing Russians, however, but the humiliation\nand subjugation of France. And the means employed to that end included\nthe treaty-breaking invasion, and more than invasion, of Belgium, who is\nsuffering because of this step \"so necessary for Germany.\"\n\nThirdly--England, as is repeatedly demonstrated by the official\ndocuments, of both sides, strained every means to bring about a common\nunderstanding. The appeals of Sir Edward Grey for more time in the\nServian ultimatum and for a council of Ambassadors were met by the\nAustrian and German Governments respectively with evasion. And England\nwas the last of the great powers to enter the conflict, her plea being\nthe moral obligation of supporting treaties in which she guaranteed the\nintegrity of a weak neighbor and undertook to defend her ally, France,\nwhen attacked.\n\n\nThe Case of England.\n\nWe may justifiably ask, then, What basis is there for the charge that\nEngland's \"brutal, national egoism\" provoked the world war? The answer\nis a two-fold one. Historically, England has exhibited aggression in the\nextension of her interests; morally, England supports the Russian\naggressor, who declined \"to allow Austria the thoroughgoing punishment\nof an ignominious murder,\" cloaking her real intentions behind the\nmantle of a \"contemptible sanctimoniousness\" and \"hypocrisy\" concerning\ntreaty obligations.\n\nThe first charge against England is unfortunately true. History records\ninstances of British aggression in the extension of her interests and\nthe cases cited (destruction of the Danish fleet and the taking of Dutch\ncolonies) are good examples. The implication, however, involved in the\nstatement is that such aggression is not to be found in the history of\nPrussia. This is clearly an error.\n\nFrom the time of the Markgrafen even unto the Agadir incident it has\nbeen characteristic of Prussia to extend her boundaries and interests\nunder the plea of military necessity. Aggression is the only word to\ncharacterize Frederick's seizure of Silesia and part of Poland. South\nand East Prussia were added by the same forcible means (1793-1795). In\nthe Napoleonic wars Swedish Pomerania fell as the booty of military\nnecessity. Schleswig-Holstein was filched from Denmark (1866) by the\nsame \"extension of her greatness.\" Once more it was the plea in\nAlsace-Lorraine--\"so necessary for Germany.\"\n\nNor are we here urging immunity of criticism for ourselves. It is sadly\ntrue that the history of many nominally Christian States, including that\nof the United States, and not excluding the Papacy, includes chapters of\naggression. But the point involved, namely, the charge of England's\naggression in the present instance, is clearly an a priori one, based on\na presupposition of monopoly which lacks material support. No evidence\nis presented to justify the statement, nor do the facts seem to allow of\nany such construction.\n\nThe second argument, England's support of Russia's unwillingness to\npermit the expiation of an ignominious murder, is a strange and\nunfortunate commentary on how even in philosophic minds a preconceived\nidea will distort the most unmistakable evidence. For Servia in her\nreply to the Austrian demands agreed to have just punishment inflicted\nupon the murderers, even going so far as to cause the arrest of those\nperhaps unjustly suspected by the Austrian committee and to suggest an\ninternational court. How, then, did Russia stand in the way of the\npunishment? Austria declared war, with the self-confessed assurances of\nGerman support, all too obviously for reasons other than the ones\nmentioned in the ultimatum to which Servia acquiesced. The charge of\nRussian mobilization in view of such a situation suggests the temper of\nthe man who, when caught in his own bear trap, tries to find his\nneighbor at fault. Suppose Germany had remained on the defensive, would\nwar have been likely? Suppose Germany had not backed up the entirely\nunjustifiable military movement of Austria, would the general war have\nbeen probable?\n\n\nWhere Nietzsche Comes In.\n\nIt seems more likely when one passes in review the extant data that at\nleast one and a crucial cause for the present situation is the\n\"overwhelming power and unbending will to victory in the German people\"\nwhen confronted with an opportunity for the \"further expansion of their\ngreatness.\" That such phrases should be in the mouths of our apologists\nfor the war is significant. And that the invasion of Belgium \"so\nnecessary for the Germans\" is treated by the spokesmen of morality\nsolely and confessedly from the standpoint of military expediency seems\nto indicate the permeation of the Nietzsche superman into the very\nstronghold of idealistic philosophy.\n\nIt would, of course, be as absurd to suppose Nietzsche a direct cause of\nthis war as it would be to regard the Serajevo murderers as the sole\ncause. Nietzsche was and is an exponent of his time, as well as one\nreciprocally fostering such movements as Bernhardi militarism and the\nCrown Prince's war book. Perhaps it will not be inappropriate here to\ncite from \"War and the People of War,\" in \"Also Sprach Zarathustra,\"\n(Pages 67-68,) the magnum opus of Nietzsche:\n\n     You should love peace as a means to new war and brief peace\n     more than a long one. Do you say, \"It is a good cause by which\n     a war is hallowed\"? I say unto you, It is a good war which\n     hallows every cause. War and courage have done greater things\n     than the love of one's neighbor. \"What, then, is good?\" you\n     ask. To be brave is good. Let young maidens say, \"Good is to\n     be pretty and touching.\" But you are hateful? Well, so be it,\n     my brethren! Cast about you a mantle of the sublimely hateful.\n     And when your soul has become great it will become wanton; in\n     your greatness there will be malice, I know, and in malice the\n     proud heart will meet the weakling.\n\nThis, we are told, is not to be taken literally--all is symbolism and\nhas a meaning other than the more direct one. But the fact remains, as\ncan be testified by the present writer from three years' residence as a\nuniversity student in Germany, that the rank and file as well as the\naristocracy--from laborers and small shopkeepers, petty officials, and\nstudents to Judges of the Supreme Court and university professors who\nhave become \"secret councilors\" (Geheimrat)--not only in Berlin and Bonn\nbut in Munich and Heidelberg, all have become ominously full of the\ndoctrine of the survival of the fittest and the consequent expediency of\npower, not only in intellectual rivalry but in Krupps and high\nexplosives.\n\nThe Nietzsche fire may, perhaps, serve a purpose on the hearthstone of\nour inmost life if it be to rescue us from complacency and secure\ninanity, but in the form of electrically connected lyddite stores and\ngasoline bombs it drives those who believe in a supernation to a\nliteral interpretation of the above widely popular philosophy. And, as\ndemonstrated at Louvain and Rheims, it goes far to obliterate the\nmemorials of a past which Nietzsche thought so contemptible a check upon\nthe prowess of the \"blonde Bestie\" as he progressed toward--toward the\nsuperman.\n\nIt was wide of the mark, therefore, to attribute that which bears the\nstamp \"made in Germany\" to England. Bernhardi and the Crown Prince with\ntheir thousands of officers and the multitudes in the ranks to whom\nNietzsche has become an inspiring motive are not to be construed as\nEnglish surely. Nor does the English \"culture,\" so far as the present\nwriter is informed, contain a superman, unless it be Bernard Shaw!\nEnglish people have to import \"beyond good and evil\" philosophy, and as\nhistorians of thought Profs. Eucken and Haeckel must know that it has\nnever had a foothold there. Had it been \"brutal national egoism, knowing\nno rights of others,\" which motivated Britain, she would not now have\ngone to war--in order that she might profit finally by the inevitable\nexhaustion of the Continent. And having taken the clear stand she has,\nwhat but good-will and the consciousness of a just cause brought support\nand sacrifice from the hands and lives of her grateful peoples all over\nthe earth? Would brutality have done it? The same question might be\nasked concerning France's empire from which she derives chiefly the\nconsciousness of an extending civilization.\n\n\nThe Claims of German Culture.\n\nA word more should be added concerning the condescending tone generally\nof the exponents of German culture and more specifically that of the\ndistinguished writers of the circular letter. They had up to the present\ncontinued to hope for growth in English literary and scientific\ndevelopment. Before this dismal egoism got the upper hand the English\npeople really and truly possessed some noble traits and so forth. As for\nRussian culture, supposedly including its science and literature, music,\narchitecture and the rest, it is all effaced by a single \"barbarism\"!\nThe implication of such an attitude and such words is that the Kremlin\nor Rheims, Shakespeare and Rembrandt, Michaelangelo, Darwin, Spinoza and\nthe treasures of Louvain might be easily paralleled or surpassed by\nGerman cathedrals, German sculpture, German paintings, German literature\nand so forth. It is not our present purpose to dispute the claim, but\nonly to remind the Teutons that in France and Belgium they have declared\nwar, not indeed upon supermen, but upon many gentlemen and some worthy\nfruits of their spirits, and that they have destroyed much which\nformerly enriched the life of the world.\n\nIt is the claim of some objective German writers that a modicum of\nmodesty would prove the most substantial contribution to Teutonic\ncivilization. Defeat of German arms might, therefore, prove a blessing\nto the self-lauded culture as well as call a halt to the brutal science\nof Krupps. As instances of authors mentioned above, a passage from the\nlamented Friedrich Paulsen's \"System der Ethic\" (Page 582) may, justly,\nbe cited: \"Insolence still continues to impress the average German. The\nspirit of English scientific intercourse forms a highly pleasing\ncontrast to the German habit. Take such writers as Mill and Darwin; they\nspeak to the reader as though he did them a favor by listening to them,\nand whenever they enter upon a controversy, they do it in a manner\nwhich expresses respect and a desire for mutual understanding. The\nGerman scholar believes that it will detract from the respect due him if\nhe does not assume a tone of condescension or overbearing censure.\nExamine the first scientific journal you may happen to pick up; even the\nsmallest anonymous announcement breathes the air of infinite\nsuperiority.\"\n\nA second passage is quoted from the great work of Wilhelm Scherer,\n\"Geschichte der Deutschen Litteratur\" (Pages 20-21): \"Recklessness seems\nto be the curse of our spiritual development ... obstinacy in good and\nin evil. Beauty we have not often served, nor long at a time.\" These\nare, of course, not the judgments of the present writer.\n\nConviction does not flow from the argument concerning England's brutal\negoism and reckless immorality under the cloak of sanctimoniousness; nor\nis there strength in the appeal for Teuton culture. All has the tone of\nspecial pleading and makes doubly significant a sentence from Nietzsche\nwhen he pleads for an overcoming of our ideals of veracity: \"'I have\ndone this thing,' says my memory, 'I could not have done this thing,'\nsays my pride and remains inexorable. Finally memory yields.\" (\"Beyond\nGood and Evil,\" Page 94.)\n\nJOHN WARBEKE.\n\nMount Holyoke College, South Hadley, Sept. 23, 1914.\n\n[Illustration: BRANDER MATTHEWS\n\n_(Photo by Brown Bros.)_\n\n_See Page 541_]\n\n[Illustration: NEWELL DWIGHT HILL\n\n_See Page 573_]\n\n\n\n\nConcerning German Culture\n\nBy Brander Matthews.\n\n     Professor of Dramatic Literature at Columbia University;\n     author of many works on literature and the development of the\n     drama.\n\n\n_To the Editor of The New York Times:_\n\nIn the earnest and sincere appeals of various distinguished Germans,\nProf. Eucken, Prof. Haeckel, and the several authors of \"The Truth About\nGermany,\" we find frequent references to \"German culture\" as though it\nwas of a superior quality to the culture of every other nationality; and\nwe seem to perceive also a sustaining belief that Germany is not only\nthe defender of civilization, but its foremost exponent. We have no\nright to question the good faith of scholars of the high character of\nEucken and Haeckel; and we cannot doubt their being honestly possessed\nof the conviction that Germany is the supreme example of a highly\ncivilized State and the undisputed leader in the arts and sciences which\nrepresent culture. It is plain that these German writers take this for\ngranted and that they would be indignantly surprised if it should be\nquestioned.\n\nTo an American who feels himself a sharer of the noble heritage of\nEnglish literature, and who has sat for more than forty years at the\nfeet of the masters of French literature, this claim cannot but come as\na startling surprise.\n\nThe most obvious characteristic of a highly civilized man is his\nwillingness to keep his word, at whatever cost to himself. For reasons\nsatisfactory to itself, Germany broke its pledge to respect the\nneutrality of Luxemburg and of Belgium. It is another characteristic of\ncivilization to cherish the works of art which have been bequeathed to\nus by the past. For reasons satisfactory to itself Germany destroyed\nLouvain, more or less completely. It is a final characteristic of\ncivilized man to be humane and to refrain from ill-treating the\nblameless. For reasons satisfactory to itself Germany dropped bombs in\nthe unbesieged City of Antwerp and caused the death of innocent women\nand children. Here are three instances where German culture has been\ntested and found wanting.\n\n\nThe Standard Bearer of Culture.\n\nBut it may be urged that war has its own exigencies and that these three\ninstances of uncivilized conduct partook of the nature of military\nnecessities. Turning from the outrages of war to the triumphs of peace,\nlet us make a disinterested attempt to find out just what foundation\nthere may be for the implicit assertion that Germany is the standard\nbearer of civilization.\n\nPerhaps it is too petty to point out that manners are the outward and\nvisible sign of civilization, and that in this respect the Germans have\nnot yet attained to the standard set by the French and the English. But\nit is not insignificant to record that the Germans alone retain a\nbarbaric mediaeval alphabet, while the rest of Western Europe has\nadopted the more legible and more graceful Roman letter; and it is not\nunimportant to note that German press style is cumbrous and uncouth.\nTaken collectively, these things seem to show German culture is a little\nlacking in the social instinct, the desire to make things easy and\npleasant for others. It is this social instinct which is the dominating\ninfluence in French civilization and which has given to French\ncivilization its incomparable urbanity and amenity. It is to the absence\nof this social instinct, to the inability to understand the attitude of\nother parties to a discussion, to the unwillingness to appreciate their\npoint of view, that we may ascribe the failure of German diplomacy, a\nfailure which has left her almost without a friend in her hour of need.\nAnd success in diplomacy is one of the supreme tests of civilization.\n\nThe claim asserted explicity or implicitly in behalf of German culture\nseems to be based on the belief that the Germans are leaders in the arts\nand in the sciences. So far as the art of war is concerned there is no\nneed today to dispute the German claim. It is to the preparation for war\nthat Prussia has devoted its utmost energy for half a century--in fact,\never since Bismarck began to make ready for the seizing of unwilling\nSchleswig-Holstein. And so far as the art of music is concerned there is\nalso no need to cavil.\n\nBut what about the other and more purely intellectual arts? How many are\nthe contemporary painters and sculptors and architects of Germany who\nhave succeeded in winning the cosmopolitan reputation which has been the\nreward of a score of the artists of France and of half a dozen of the\nartists of America?\n\n\nSince Goethe, Who?\n\nWhen we consider the art of letters we find a similar condition. Germany\nhas had philosophers and historians of high rank; but in pure\nliterature, in what used to be called \"belles-lettres,\" from the death\nof Goethe in 1832 to the advent of the younger generation of dramatists,\nSudermann and Hauptmann and the rest, in the final decade of the\nnineteenth century--that is to say, for a period of nearly sixty\nyears--only one German author succeeded in winning a worldwide\ncelebrity--and Heine was a Hebrew, who died in Paris, out of favor with\nhis countrymen, perhaps because he had been unceasing in calling\nattention to the deficiencies of German culture. There were in Germany\nmany writers who appealed strongly to their fellow-countrymen, but\nexcept only the solitary Heine no German writer attained to the\ninternational fame achieved by Cooper and by Poe, by Walt Whitman and by\nMark Twain. And it was during these threescore years of literary aridity\nin Germany that there was a superb literary fecundity in Great Britain\nand in France, and that each of these countries produced at least a\nscore of authors whose names are known throughout the world. Even\nsparsely settled Scandinavia brought forth a triumvirate, Bjoernsen,\nIbsen, and Brandes, without compeers in Germany. And from Russia the\nfame of Turgenef and of Tolstoy spread abroad a knowledge of the heart\nand mind of a great people who are denounced by Germans as barbarous.\n\nIt is probably in the field of science, pure and applied, that the\ndefenders of the supremacy of German culture would take their last\nstand. That the German contribution to science has been important is\nindisputable; yet it is equally indisputable that the two dominating\nscientific leaders of the second half of the nineteenth century are\nDarwin and Pasteur. It is in chemistry that the Germans have been\npioneers; yet the greatest of modern chemists is Mendeleef. It was Hertz\nwho made the discovery which is the foundation of Marconi's invention;\nbut although not a few valuable discoveries are to be credited to the\nGermans, perhaps almost as many as to either the French or the British,\nthe German contribution in the field of invention, in the practical\napplication of scientific discovery, has been less than that of France,\nless than that of Great Britain, and less than that of the United\nStates. The Germans contributed little or nothing to the development of\nthe railroad, the steamboat, the automobile, the aeroplane, the\ntelegraph, the telephone, the phonograph, the photograph, the moving\npicture, the electric light, the sewing machine, and the reaper and\nbinder. Even those dread instruments of war, the revolver and the\nmachine gun, the turreted ship, the torpedo, and the submarine, are not\ndue to the military ardor of the Germans. It would seem as though the\nGermans had been lacking in the inventiveness which is so marked a\nfeature of our modern civilization.\n\nIn this inquiry there has been no desire to deny the value of the German\ncontributions to the arts and to the sciences. These contributions are\nknown to all; they speak for themselves; they redound to the honor of\nGerman culture; and for them, whatever may be their number, the other\nnations of the world are eternally indebted to Germany. But these German\ncontributions are neither important enough nor numerous enough to\njustify the assumption that German culture is superior or that Germany\nis entitled to think herself the supreme leader of the arts and of the\nsciences. No one nation can claim this lofty position, although few\nwould be so bold as to deny the superior achievement of the French in\nthe fine arts and of the English in pure science.\n\nNations are never accepted by other nations at their own valuation; and\nthe Germans need not be surprised that we are now astonished to find\nthem asserting their natural self-appreciation, with the apparent\nexpectation that it will pass unchallenged. The world owes a debt to\nmodern Germany beyond all question, but this is far less than the debt\nowed to England and to France. It would be interesting if some German,\nspeaking with authority, should now be moved to explain to us Americans\nthe reasons which underlie the insistent assertion of the superiority of\nGerman civilization. Within the past few weeks we have been forced to\ngaze at certain of the less pleasant aspects of the German character;\nand we have been made to see that the militarism of the Germans is in\nabsolute contradiction to the preaching and to the practice of the great\nGoethe, to whom they proudly point as the ultimate representative of\nGerman culture.\n\nBRANDER MATTHEWS.\n\nColumbia University in the City of New York, Sept. 18, 1914.\n\n\n\n\nCulture vs. Kultur\n\nBy Frank Jewett Mather, Jr.\n\n\n_To the Editor of The New York Times:_\n\nCurrent discussion of the worth of German culture has been almost\nhopelessly clouded by the fact that when a German speaks of Kultur he\nmeans an entirely different thing from what a Latin or Briton means by\nculture. Kultur means the organized efficiency of a nation in the\nbroadest sense--its successful achievement in civil and military\nadministration, industry, commerce, finance, and in a quite secondary\nway in scholarship, letters, and art. Kultur applies to a nation as a\nwhole, implying an enlightened Government to which the individual is\nstrictly subordinated. Thus Kultur is an attribute not of\nindividuals--whose particular interests, on the contrary, must often be\nsacrificed to it--but of nations.\n\nCulture, for which nearest German equivalent is Bildung, is the opposite\nof all this. It is an attribute not of nations as a whole but of\naccomplished individuals. It acquires national import only through the\napproval and admiration of these individuals by the rest, who share but\nslightly in the culture they applaud. The aim of culture is the\nenlightened and humane individual, conversant with the best values of\nthe past and sensitive to the best values of the present. The\nopen-mindedness and imagination implied in culture are potentially\ndestructive to a highly organized national Kultur. A cultured leader is\ngenerally too much alive to the point of view of his rival to be a\nwholly convinced partisan. Hence he lacks the intensity, drive, and\nnarrowness that make for competitive success. He keeps his place in the\nsun not by masterfully overriding others, but by a series of delicate\ncompromises which reconcile the apparently conflicting claims. Moreover,\nhe has too great a respect for the differences between men's gifts to\nformulate any rigid plan which, requires for its execution a strictly\nregimented humanity. He will sacrifice a little efficiency that life may\nbe more various, rich, and delightful.\n\nHence nations with cultured leaders have generally been beaten by those\nwhose leaders had merely Kultur. The Spartans and Macedonians had\nabundant Kultur; they generally beat the Athenians, who had merely very\nhigh culture. The Romans had Kultur, and the Hellenistic world wore\ntheir yoke. Germany unquestionably has admirable Kultur, and none of the\nmere cultured nations who are leagued against her could hope to beat her\nsingly.\n\n\nShe Does Not Desire Culture.\n\nOn the other hand, Germany has singularly little culture, has less than\nshe had a hundred years ago, does not apparently desire it. She has\nwillingly sacrificed the culture of a few leading individuals to the\nKultur of the empire as a whole. Thus it is not surprising that Germany,\nas measured by the production of cultured individuals, takes a very low\nplace today. Not only France and England, Italy and Spain, but also\nRussia and America, may fairly claim a higher degree of culture. Here\nthe fetich of German scholarship should not deceive us. Culture--a\nbalanced and humanized state of mind--is only remotely connected with\nscholarship or even with education. A Spanish peasant or an Italian\nwaiter may have finer culture than a German university professor. And in\nthe field of scholarship, Germany is in the main chiefly laborious,\naccurate, and small-minded. Her scholarship is related not to culture,\nbut is a minor expression of Kultur. Such scholarly men of letters as\nDarwin, Huxley, Renan, Taine, Boissier, Gaston Paris, Menendez y Pelayo,\nFrancis J. Child, Germany used to produce in the days of the Grimms and\nSchlegels. She rarely does so now. Her culture has been swallowed up in\nher Kultur.\n\nThe claim of Germany to realize her Kultur at the expense of her\nneighbors is at first sight plausible. Her Kultur is unquestionably\nhigher than theirs. She has a sharply realized idea of the State, and\nshe has justified it largely in practice. In a certain patience,\nthoroughness, and perfection of political organization her pre-eminence\nis unquestionable. The tone of her apologists shows amazement and\nindignation over the fact that the world, so far from welcoming the\nextension of German Kultur, is actively hostile to that ambition. Yet,\neven if it be conceded that Germany's Kultur is wholly good for\nherself--surely a debatable proposition--it does not follow that it is\nor would be a universal benefit. Nations may deliberately and\nlegitimately prefer their culture, with its admitted disadvantages, to\nthe Kultur which pleases Germany. England is often mocked for the way in\nwhich she \"muddles through\" successive perils, yet she may feel that the\nstereotyping of her people in a rigid administrative frame might be too\nhigh a price to pay for constant preparedness. As for us Americans, we\nhave made a virtue, perhaps overdone it, of avoiding a mechanical\nKultur. We prefer the greatest freedom for the individual to the\nperfectly regimented state. We will move toward culture and cheerfully\nassume the necessary risks of the process.\n\n\nUnlovely and Impressive.\n\nIn a broader view, the war may be regarded as a contest between the\nmetallic, half-mechanical Kultur of Prussianized Germany and the more\nflexible civilizations of States that have inherited culture or aspire\nto it. Germany herself has rejected the humane and somewhat hazardous\nideal of culture, so she cannot wonder or complain when she sees that\nthe culture of the world is almost unanimously hostile to her. There is\nno quarrel with German Kultur itself; merely a feeling that it has its\ndrawbacks, that it is, on the whole, as unlovely as it is impressive,\nthat there is quite enough of it in the world already, and that its\nbroad extension would be disastrous.\n\nMeanwhile the nations of culture have much to learn from Germany's\nKultur. Flexibility may mean weakness. The United States, for example,\ncould well have a standing army and an army reserve commensurate with\nits history and prospects without incurring any danger of militarism.\nThere is, finally, some disadvantage in being merely a culture nation,\nfor such a nation can add a large measure of Kultur without belying\nitself. On the contrary, so highly developed a Kultur nation as the\nGerman Empire puts itself in a position where it is almost impossible to\nacquire any considerable degree of culture. Culture is the enemy of such\na state--it must remain in the Spartan or Macedonian stage. Rome began\nto decline as soon as Hellenistic culture got the ascendency over the\nold Latin Kultur. Kultur, in short, galvanizes; culture liberates. A\nsurvey of modern Germany hardly warrants a desire for her world\ndominion.\n\nIf any reader is still unclear about the distinction between culture and\nKultur, let him examine his most-gifted friends as to their sympathies\nin the present war, choosing, of course, persons who have no racial\nreasons for taking sides. Almost without exception he will find they\nfall into two sharply defined classes. The mental characteristics of his\npro-German friends will pretty certainly illustrate Kultur quite\nconcretely, while he may read the meaning of culture in his more-gifted\nfriends who favor the Allies.\n\nFRANK JEWETT MATHER, Jr.\n\nPrinceton, Nov. 6, 1914.\n\n\n\n\nThe Trespass in Belgium\n\nBy John Grier Hibben.\n\n\n_To the Editor of The New York Times:_\n\nSome time ago I received with many others an appeal \"To the Civilized\nWorld!\" from certain distinguished representatives of German science and\nart. I at once wrote to Prof. Eucken, whom I know, and who is one of the\nsigners of this document. I wished to draw his attention particularly to\nthe second statement of this appeal, which is as follows:\n\n     It is not true that we trespassed in neutral Belgium. It has\n     been proved that France and England had resolved on such a\n     trespass, and it has likewise been proved that Belgium had\n     agreed to their doing so,\n\nand I stated to him that \"It is naturally to be expected of a group of\nscholars that where reference is made to proof, some citation should be\ngiven both of the sources of the proof and of its nature. I am sure you\nwill agree with me that it is of the very essence of scholarly method in\nthe treatment of any subject whatsoever that one should cite his\nauthority as regards every important and significant statement that is\nmade. No one of the distinguished group of scholars signing their names\nto this letter would think of writing an article in his own specialty\nand not add in the text or in a footnote the complete list of\nauthorities for his several assertions.\n\n\"In your appeal, however, the most important statement by far which you\nmake, and the one bearing most intimately upon the honor and integrity\nof your nation, is left without even the attempt to support it, save the\nbare assertion by you and your colleagues. In the interests of a fair\nunderstanding of Germany's position, I feel that it is incumbent upon\nyou to give us who are under such a deep debt of gratitude to German\nscholarship in our own lives the opportunity of a full knowledge of all\nthe facts which definitely bear upon this present situation.\"\n\nAt the time of writing Prof. Eucken, I also wrote to a friend of mine,\nDr. A.E. Shipley, the Master of Christ's College, Cambridge, England,\nasking him if he could get for me some authoritative statement from the\nBritish Foreign Office concerning the assertion that \"it has been proved\nthat France and England had resolved on such a trespass, and it has\nlikewise been proved that Belgium had agreed to their doing so.\" I have\njust received a letter from Mr. Shipley, stating that Lord Haldane had\nprepared a statement in answer to this question. Thinking that your\nreaders would be interested in seeing this, I am sending it to you.\nFaithfully yours,\n\nJOHN GRIER HIBBEN.\n\nPrinceton, N.J., Nov. 24, 1914.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n     _(Inclosure from Lord Haldane to the Master of Christ's\n     College, Cambridge.)_\n\n     10 Downing St., Whitehall, S.W., Nov. 14.\n\n     Dear Master of Christ's: The inclosed memoranda have been\n     specially prepared for me by the Foreign Office in answer to\n     your question. Yours truly,\n\n     HALDANE.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n     (MEMORANDUM.)\n\n     It is quite untrue that the British Government had ever\n     arranged with Belgium to trespass on her country in case of\n     war, or that Belgium had agreed to this. The strategic\n     dispositions of Germany, especially as regards railways, have\n     for some years given rise to the apprehension that Germany\n     would attack France through Belgium. Whatever military\n     discussions have taken place before this war have been limited\n     entirely to the suggestion of what could be done to defend\n     France if Germany attacked her through Belgium.\n\n     The Germans have stated that we contemplated sending troops to\n     Belgium. We had never committed ourselves at all to the\n     sending of troops to the Continent, and we had never\n     contemplated the possibility of sending troops to Belgium to\n     attack Germany.\n\n     The Germans have stated that British military stores had been\n     placed at Maubeuge, a French fortress near the Belgian\n     frontier, before the outbreak of the war, and that this is\n     evidence of an intention to attack Germany through Belgium. No\n     British soldiers and no British stores were landed on the\n     Continent till after Germany had invaded Belgium and Belgium\n     had appealed to France and England for assistance. It was only\n     after this appeal that British troops were sent to France;\n     and, if the Germans found British munitions of war in\n     Maubeuge, these munitions were sent with our expedition to\n     France after the outbreak of the war. The idea of violating\n     the neutrality of Belgium was never discussed or contemplated\n     by the British Government.\n\n     The extract inclosed, which is taken from an official\n     publication of the Belgian Government, and the extract from an\n     official statement by the Belgian Minister of War, prove that\n     the Belgian Government had never connived, or been willing to\n     connive, at the breach of the treaty that made the maintenance\n     of Belgian neutrality an international obligation. The moment\n     that there appeared to be danger that this treaty might be\n     violated the British Government made an appeal for an\n     assurance from both France and Germany, as had been done in\n     1870 by Mr. Gladstone, that neither of those countries would\n     violate the neutrality of Belgium if the other country\n     respected it. The French agreed, the Germans declined to\n     agree. The appeal made by the British Government is to be\n     found in our first \"White Paper\" after the outbreak of the\n     war.\n\n     The reason why Germany would not agree was stated very frankly\n     by Herr von Jagow, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, to\n     Sir Edward Goschen, our Ambassador in Berlin; and it is\n     recorded in the second \"White Paper\" that we published. The\n     attitude of the British Government throughout has been to\n     endeavor to preserve the neutrality of Belgium, and we never\n     thought of sending troops to Belgium until Germany had invaded\n     it and Belgium had appealed for assistance to maintain the\n     international treaty.\n\n     We have known for some years past that in Holland, in Denmark,\n     and in Norway the Germans have inspired the apprehension that,\n     if England was at war with Germany, England would violate the\n     neutrality of those countries and seize some of their harbors.\n     This allegation is as baseless as the allegation about our\n     intention to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and events\n     have shown it to be so. But it seems to be a rule with Germany\n     to attribute to others the designs that she herself\n     entertains; as it is clear now that, for some long time past,\n     it has been a settled part of her strategic plans to attack\n     France through Belgium. A statement is inclosed, which was\n     issued by us on Oct. 14 last, dealing with this point.\n\n     This memorandum and its inclosures should provide ample\n     material for a reply to the German statements.\n\n     Foreign Office, Nov. 9, 1914.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nBelgian Official Denials.\n\nHere is inclosed a copy of the note of Aug. 3 sent by M. Davignon,\nBelgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, the\nGerman Minister at Brussels, included in the Belgian \"Gray Paper,\" and\nprinted in full in THE NEW YORK TIMES of Oct. 18 and reprinted in THE\nTIMES'S pamphlet of the war's diplomatic papers. This is the note\nexpressing the \"profound and painful surprise\" caused to King Albert's\nGovernment by the German invitation to it to abandon Belgian neutrality\nand denying that France had, as alleged by Germany, manifested any such\nintention.\n\nA second inclosure gives this clipping from The London Times of Sept.\n30:\n\n     OFFICIAL STATEMENT.\n\n     The German press has been attempting to persuade the public\n     that if Germany herself had not violated Belgian neutrality,\n     France or Great Britain would have done so. It has declared\n     that French and British troops had marched into Belgium before\n     the outbreak of war. We have received from the Belgian\n     Minister of War an official statement which denies absolutely\n     these allegations. It declares, on the one hand, that \"before\n     Aug. 3 not a single French soldier had set foot on Belgian\n     territory,\" and, again, \"it is untrue that on Aug. 4 there was\n     a single English soldier in Belgium.\" It adds:\n\n     \"For long past Great Britain knew that the Belgian Army would\n     oppose by force a 'preventive' disembarkation of British\n     troops in Belgium. The Belgian Government did not hesitate at\n     the time of the Agadir crisis to warn foreign Ambassadors, in\n     terms which could not be misunderstood, of its formal\n     intention to compel respect for the neutrality of Belgium by\n     every means at its disposal, and against attempts upon it from\n     any and every quarter.\"\n\n\nThe \"Agreement\" of 1903.\n\nThe third inclosure is this British official communique:\n\n     14 October, 1914.\n\n     The story of an alleged Anglo-Belgian agreement of 1906\n     published in the German press, and based on documents said to\n     have been found at Brussels, is only a fresh edition of a\n     story which has been reproduced in various forms and denied\n     on several occasions. No such agreement has ever existed.\n\n     As the Germans well know, Gen. Grierson is dead and Col. (now\n     Gen.) Barnardiston is commanding the British forces before\n     Tsing-tau. In 1906 Gen. Grierson was on the General Staff at\n     the War Office, and Col. Barnardiston was Military Attache at\n     Brussels. In view of the solemn guarantee given by Great\n     Britain to protect the neutrality of Belgium against violation\n     from any side, some academic discussions may, through the\n     instrumentality of Col. Barnardiston, have taken place between\n     Gen. Grierson and the Belgian military authorities as to what\n     assistance the British Army might be able to afford to Belgium\n     should one of her neighbors violate that neutrality. Some\n     notes with reference to the subject may exist in the archives\n     at Brussels.\n\n     It should be noted that the date mentioned, namely, 1906, was\n     the year following that in which Germany had, as in 1911,\n     adopted a threatening attitude toward France with regard to\n     Morocco, and, in view of the apprehensions existing of an\n     attack on France through Belgium, it was natural that possible\n     eventualities should be discussed.\n\n     The impossibility of Belgium having been a party to any\n     agreement of the nature indicated or to any design for the\n     violation of Belgian neutrality is clearly shown by the\n     reiterated declarations that she has made for many years past\n     that she would resist to the utmost any violation of her\n     neutrality from whatever quarter and in whatever form such\n     violation might come.\n\n     It is worthy of attention that these charges of aggressive\n     designs on the part of other powers are made by Germany, who,\n     since 1906, has established an elaborate network of\n     strategical railways leading from the Rhine to the Belgian\n     frontier through a barren, thinly populated tract,\n     deliberately constructed to permit of the sudden attack upon\n     Belgium, which was carried out two months ago.\n\n\n\n\nApportioning the Blame\n\nBy Arthur v. Briesen.\n\n     Of the law firm of Briesen & Knauth; Doctor of Laws, New York\n     University; philanthropist; has served the American public as\n     head of important civic bodies and Governmental commissions.\n\n\n_To the Editor of The New York Times:_\n\nHaving been requested by you to express my views with reference to the\nwar which is now lacerating Europe, I take pleasure to comply with your\ndesire.\n\nAs an American citizen I am, of course, under obligations to be neutral\nand to send no ammunition to either belligerent. At the same time the\nGerman blood in my veins naturally causes me to sympathize with Germany\nin this conflict. But even if we leave out of consideration any matter\nof sympathy, if we look upon the situation in an entirely unbiased\nspirit, the conclusion which I propose to lay before you appears to be\nirresistible.\n\nThe questions that seem to have agitated the American public mostly in\nconnection with this awful conflict have been:\n\n     _First_--Who is to blame for bringing about this war, and,\n\n     _Second_--Assuming that Germany was not to blame for beginning\n     the war, is she to blame for violating the neutrality of\n     Belgium?\n\nIf we should find the fault regarding the first question to lie\nprimarily with England and secondarily with Russia, we should at once\nclear the German people and their Government from the charge that has\nheretofore been brought against them for having incited the war. And if\nwe should find that the neutrality of Belgium was not binding upon any\ncountry whose existence or whose interests were threatened by other\ncountries, that fact would then absolve either country from a charge\nwhich thus far seems to have been brought against one of them.\n\n_How was the war brought about?_ As far back as 1906 it is known, and\ncan be proved by the files of New York papers, to say nothing of\nofficial correspondence now found in Brussels and elsewhere, that\nmeasures were started by England to circumscribe or isolate the German\nEmpire, and treaties were entered between England, France, and Russia\n(the Triple Entente) to insure joint action against Germany when\nnecessary.\n\nGermany herself has been peaceful, progressive, and anxious to retain\nher position as a nation undisturbed by others, as a nation that should\nadvance in art, in science, in population, and in all things that make\nhappiness through peace. What was the situation in other countries?\n\nSince 1870 _France_ had cried for revenge (_revanche_). Its school\nbooks, newspapers, public speakers, and political leaders were all\ncharged with the one great idea of seeking revenge against Germany for\nhaving retaken Alsace and Lorraine in 1870, which France had wrongfully\noccupied since the time of Louis XIV. Alsace and Lorraine had been\nGerman for centuries before; they were wrested from Germany without even\na semblance of an excuse at the close of the seventeenth century, and\nwere largely German in language and in spirit in 1870. Goethe's studies\nin Strassburg and his visits to Frederica von Sesenheim in the\neighteenth century show that he was living in a German country whenever\nhe was in Alsace. A _united_ Germany did not exist prior to 1870.\nHowever, the cry for revenge was there, and France distinctly declared\nit to be her policy to take her revenge as soon as opportunity offered.\nFrance was, therefore, a pronounced enemy of Germany ever since 1870,\nand when asked by the German Government on July 31, 1914, whether she\nwould remain neutral in a Russian-German war (Annex 25, German \"White\nPaper\") she answered: \"France would do that which might be required of\nher _by her interests_.\" This answer was given on Aug. 1, 1914, (Annex\n27, German \"White Paper.\") Today we may well ask France whether, since\nAug. 1, 1914, she has done that which was required by her interests.\n\n_Russia_ may next be looked at. How did Russia become involved in this\ncontest? The little kingdom of Servia, which had familiarized itself\nwith the fine art of disposing of crowned heads by throwing its King and\nQueen, Alexandra and Draga, out of the window of their castle, caused\nthrough its officials and its followers to have the heir to the Austrian\nthrone and his wife cruelly assassinated on June 28, 1914. This\nassassination was an act of enmity toward Austria and a step toward the\nenlargement of Servia. Deeming her existence threatened and her national\ndignity offended, Austria sent a rather sharp demand under date of July\n23, 1914, to Servia, requiring prompt and thorough satisfaction for the\ngross attack made upon her and her reigning family through Servia's\nofficial directions.\n\nStrange to say, however, the British \"White Book\" shows that three days\nbefore, on July 20, 1914, Sir Edward Grey, (Paper 1, British \"White\nBook,\") wrote to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, a letter\nin which he states:\n\n     In fact, the more Austria could keep her demand within\n     reasonable limits, and the stronger the justification she\n     could produce for making any demand, the more chance there\n     would be of smoothing things over. _I hated the idea of a war\n     between any of the great powers_, and that any of them should\n     be dragged into a war by Servia would be detestable.\n\nOn July 24, 1914, the Austrian message to Servia became known to all\ncountries, and on the same day Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador\nat St. Petersburg, wrote that he had been asked by Mr. Sazonof, Russian\nMinister of Foreign Affairs, to meet him at the French Embassy to\ndiscuss matters, as Austria's step clearly meant that war was imminent.\nHe wrote that Mr. Sazonof expressed himself as follows (British Paper\n6):\n\n     He hoped that his Majesty's Government would not fail to\n     _proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France_. The French\n     Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfill all\n     the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia, if\n     necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in any\n     diplomatic negotiations.\n\nLater, on July 29, 1914, Sir George Buchanan wrote to Sir Edward Grey\n(Paper 72, English \"White Book\") as follows:\n\n     I made it clear to his Excellency that, _Russia being\n     thoroughly in earnest, a general war could not be averted_ if\n     Servia were attacked by Austria.\n\nSir George Buchanan would not have said that if he had not been\nauthorized to do so. He would not have said a \"general war could not be\naverted if Servia were attacked by Austria\"; and by \"general war\" he\nmeant, and we all understand he meant, a war between England, France,\nand Russia on one side and Germany and Austria on the other.\n\nServia's reply to the demand of Austria, which was dated July 25, 1914,\nnot being deemed satisfactory, Austria proceeded to a punitive\nexpedition against Servia, and she repeatedly asserted and assured all\nthe other powers that the expedition was merely punitive and that\nneither the independence nor the territorial integrity of Servia were at\nall involved or in any danger.\n\nBut all this had no effect upon Russia. In fact, when Russia was first\ninformed of the Austrian demand (Annex 4, German \"White Book\") Minister\nof Foreign Affairs Sazonof made wild complaints on _July_ 24, 1914,\nagainst Austria-Hungary. What he said most definitely was this:\n\n     _That Russia could not possibly permit the Servian-Austrian\n     dispute to be confined to the parties concerned._\n\nThis was the keynote of the Russian situation and of the Russian\nintention. Russia wanted, of course, to expand its realm as far\nwestward as possible, and it wanted to take advantage of the opportunity\noffered by the necessary consequences of the dreadful insult and cruelty\npracticed by Servia on Austria, not only to prevent the punishment of\nServia, but also to proceed against Germany, for, as Paper 4 says:\n\"Russia could not possibly permit the Servian-Austrian dispute to be\n_confined_ to the parties concerned.\"\n\nWho, then, was to blame for not allowing the war to be confined, for not\npermitting Austria to punish the murderers of her King, but utilizing\nthis opportunity for the purpose of bringing about the great war which\nRussia and France had carefully prepared long ago? The great war which\nshould involve all the civilized nations in a conflict, and threaten to\nextinguish Austria and to carry barbarism into the heart of Europe! She\n_did_ not permit the Servian-Austrian dispute to be confined to the\nparties concerned.\n\nAgain, in Paper 56, (English \"White Book,\") we find the English\nAmbassador to Austria writing to Sir Edward Grey on July 27, 1914, the\nfollowing:\n\n     If actual war broke out with Servia it would be _impossible_\n     to localize it, for _Russia_ was not prepared to give way\n     again.\n\nAgain, in Paper 72, (English \"White Book,\") dated July 28, 1914, from\nthe English Ambassador in Russia to Sir Edward Grey:\n\n     I made it clear to his Excellency (German Ambassador) that,\n     _Russia being thoroughly in earnest_, a general war could not\n     be averted if Servia were attacked by Austria.\n\nPaper 121, (English \"White Book,\") British Ambassador in Berlin to Sir\nEdward Grey under date of July 31, 1914:\n\n     He (the German Secretary of State) again assured me that both\n     the Emperor William, at the request of the Emperor of Russia,\n     and the German Foreign Office had even up till last night been\n     urging Austria to show willingness to continue\n     discussions--and telegraphic and telephonic communications\n     from Vienna had been of a promising nature--_but Russia's\n     mobilization had spoiled everything_.\n\nI could repeat, _ad infinitum_, quotations from these books to show\nthat Russia not only wanted this war if Austria wanted to punish Servia\nfor her misdeeds, but started it against the protest of Germany, and\nstarted it, I sincerely believe, largely because encouraged by Great\nBritain.\n\n_England_: The letter written by the Belgian Charge at St. Petersburg to\nhis Government on July 30, 1914, which letter was published in THE NEW\nYORK TIMES on Oct. 7, 1914, and which letter, nearly a month before, had\nbeen published abroad and never disavowed by the Belgian Government,\nstates distinctly on the part of Belgium:\n\n     _What is incontestable is that Germany has striven here, as\n     well as at Vienna, to find some means of avoiding a general\n     conflict...._ M. Sazonof, Russian Foreign Minister, has\n     declared that it would be impossible for Russia not to hold\n     herself ready and to mobilize, but that these preparations\n     were not directed against Germany. This morning an official\n     communique to the newspapers announces that \"the reserves have\n     been called under arms in a certain number of Governments.\"\n     Knowing the discreet nature of the official communique one can\n     without fear assert that _mobilization is going on\n     everywhere_.\n\n     ... One can truly ask one's self whether the whole world does\n     not desire war and is trying merely to retard its declaration\n     a little in order to gain time. England began by allowing it\n     to be understood that she did not want to be drawn into a\n     conflict. Sir George Buchanan (British Ambassador) said that\n     openly. Today one is firmly convinced at St. Petersburg--one\n     has even the assurance of it--that England will support\n     France. This support is of enormous weight, and _has\n     contributed not a little to give the upper hand to the war\n     party_.\n\nThe German Emperor during these times believed England to be really and\nhonestly striving to avoid the war; he went so far as to announce in one\nof his letters published in the \"White Book\" that \"he had shoulder to\nshoulder with England tried to bring about a peaceful solution.\" It\ncertainly now appears that all this while England had made her\narrangements with France and with Russia, and had strengthened the war\nparty in Russia to such an extent that Russia's desire to set Europe\nafire was rendered possible.\n\n_Belgian neutrality._ It is charged that Germany violated an alleged\ntreaty with Belgium, which treaty is supposed to have guaranteed the\nintegrity of Belgium. When Germany found her efforts to maintain peace\nfrustrated, Russian troops having crossed the German frontier on the\nafternoon of Aug. 1, while France opened hostilities on Aug. 2, she\nannounced to Belgium on Aug. 2, 1914, that she found herself under\nobligation, to prevent a French attack through Belgium, to pass through\nBelgian territory; she expressed her readiness to guarantee the\nintegrity of the kingdom and its possessions and to pay any damage\ncaused if Belgium would, in a friendly way, permit such a passage of\ntroops through it.\n\nThe English \"White Book\" contains, Paper 151, dated Aug. 3, 1914, which\npaper we repeat in full:\n\n(British Minister to Belgium to Sir Edward Grey.)\n\n     French Government have offered through their Military Attache\n     the support of five French Army corps to the Belgian\n     Government. Following reply has been received today: We are\n     sincerely grateful to the French Government for offering\n     eventual support. In the actual circumstances, however, _we do\n     not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the powers_. Belgian\n     Government will decide later on the action which they may\n     think it necessary to take.\n\nIn short, Belgium says in the foregoing notice to France, that she does\nnot propose to appeal to the guarantee of the powers.\n\nWas Germany justified in disregarding any previous treaty which related\nto Belgium if her interests required her so to do?\n\n_United States Supreme Court:_ In its unanimous opinion in the Chinese\nexclusion cases, reported on Pages 581 to 611 of Vol. 130 of United\nStates Reports, the Supreme Court of the United States had this very\nquestion before it. A treaty had been entered into by the United States\nand China, allowing Chinese subjects the right to visit and reside in\nthe United States and to there enjoy the same privileges that are\nenjoyed by citizens of the United States. After that treaty an act of\nCongress was passed in violation of the treaty, providing it to be\nunlawful thereafter for Chinese laborers to enter the United States. The\nquestion was, whether we had the right to violate a treaty solemnly\nentered into with another country? On this subject the court said (Page\n600):\n\n     The effect of legislation upon conflicting treaty stipulations\n     was elaborately considered in THE HEAD MONEY CASES, and it was\n     there adjudged: \"that so far as a treaty made by the United\n     States with any foreign nation can become the subject of\n     judicial cognizance in the courts of this country, it is\n     subject to such acts as Congress may pass for its enforcement,\n     modification, or repeal,\" 112 U.S. 580, 599. This doctrine was\n     affirmed and followed in WHITNEY v. ROBERTSON, 124 U.S. 190,\n     195. It will not be presumed that the legislative department\n     of the Government will lightly pass laws which are in conflict\n     with the treaties of the country; _but that circumstances may\n     arise which would not only justify the Government in\n     disregarding their stipulations, but demand in the interests\n     of the country that it should do so, there can be no question.\n     Unexpected events may call for a change in the policy of the\n     country._\n\nIn the same opinion the Supreme Court calls attention to an act passed\nin 1798, declaring that the United States were freed and exonerated from\nthe stipulations of previous treaties with France. This subject was\nfully considered by Justice Curtis, who held, as the Supreme Court says\n(Page 602): \"That whilst it would always be a matter of the utmost\ngravity and delicacy to refuse to execute a treaty, the power to do so\nwas a prerogative of which no nation could be deprived without deeply\naffecting its independence.\"\n\nWe observe, therefore, that under our own ideas of international law the\nUnited States claims the right to disregard its stipulations if the\ninterests of the country should require it. And the same right we should\nconcede to other nations. Particularly to Germany in the present\ninstance, when we find her battling for her very existence against\nenemies that seek to destroy her, against enemies that surround her on\nall sides, against enemies that do not hesitate to bring troops into the\nconflict from the wilds of Africa and Asia, and who do not hesitate to\ndrag Japan into this war, causing her to disregard Chinese neutrality in\nher effort to capture a small settlement, lawfully occupied in China by\na handful of German soldiers.\n\nIn this connection I quote the British sentiment, as expressed by\nGladstone regarding Belgium neutrality in the year 1870:\n\n     But I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who\n     have held in this House, what plainly amounts to the assertion\n     that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is\n     binding to every party to it, irrespective altogether of the\n     particular position in which it may find itself at the time\n     when the occasion for _acting on the question arises_.\n\nThis shows that England herself reserved the right, whenever her\ninterests required her to do so, to act in violation of the treaty with\nBelgium. That, at least, is my understanding of Gladstone's language.\nEngland did not respect Danish neutrality a hundred years ago, when she\ndestroyed the Danish fleet at Copenhagen because her interests required,\nand England does not now, through its Asiatic ally, and directly,\nrespect Chinese neutrality, claiming the right primarily to consult her\nown interests. Should this right, asserted by our own Supreme Court, and\nactually assumed by England and Japan, be denied to Germany? Finally, I\nunderstand that The Hague Conference of 1907 drafted a convention which\nreads:\n\n     The territory of neutral powers is inviolable. Belligerents\n     are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either munitions of\n     war or supplies across the territory of a neutral power. Great\n     Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy refused to sign\n     it and did not sign it. Russia was not represented.\n\nMILITARISM. There is one more subject which many people in this country\nhave failed to understand, and that is the matter of militarism. German\nmilitarism is supposed to be something dreadful, and many good people\nbelieve that it would be a great advance toward eternal peace if that\nmilitarism could be wiped out. Well, now, let us see.\n\nIf Germany did not require every one of her sons to spend a year, or at\nmost two years, in the army, and if she had not provided for all these\nmen sufficient arms and accoutrements for immediate use in case of war,\nwhat would have happened when Russia entered her territory, or when\nFrance came on a like errand?\n\nAny one who lives among enemies is expected to be sufficiently prepared\nto defend himself should they attack him, be he ever so peaceful.\n\nAt the time the United States of America was born there was no such\nthing as Germany. Every country around it had a slice of it. Napoleon\ntook the larger western part of Germany as his property, England held\nHanover, the former Kingdom of Poland held Saxony, Austria held Silesia,\nand so there was no Germany. The Teutonic races had no home in which\nthey could develop and live without interference by others. To prevent\nsuch interference Germany of all nations needed an army; to prevent\nsimilar interference at sea England of all nations needed a navy. That\ngreat British Navy bears precisely the same relation to the protection\nof Great Britain at sea which the German Army bears to the protection of\nGermany on land.\n\nTo sum up, what are the countries fighting for? Russia for her\nenlargement; she has no grudge whatever against Germany except that it\nexists. France for revenge; she has no grudge whatever against Germany\nexcept that she wants revenge for 1870. What grudge has England against\nGermany, except that Germany has grown commercially, financially, and\nindustrially to a position which threatens to crowd England into a\nsecond rank? Jealousy appears to control the English attitude.\n\nThe position apparently assumed by England is best expressed by the King\nof England in his telegram to Prince Henry of Prussia, dated July 30,\n1914:\n\n     My Government is doing its utmost, suggesting to Russia and\n     France to _suspend further military preparations_ if Austria\n     will consent to be satisfied with occupation of Belgrade and\n     neighboring Servian territory as a hostage for satisfactory\n     settlement of her demands, other countries meanwhile\n     suspending their war preparations. Trust William will use his\n     great influence to induce Austria to accept this proposal,\n     thus proving that Germany and England are working together to\n     prevent what would be an international catastrophe.\n\nOn July 31, the very next day, Sir Edward Grey wrote the telegram, No.\n111, (English \"White Book,\") to the British Ambassador at Berlin, in\nwhich we find the following:\n\n     I would undertake to sound St. Petersburg, whether it would be\n     possible for the four disinterested powers to offer to Austria\n     that they would undertake to see that she obtained full\n     satisfaction of her demands on Servia, provided that they did\n     not impair Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian\n     territory. _As your Excellency is aware, Austria has already\n     declared her willingness to respect them._ (Established by\n     Paper 3, July 24, and Paper 5, July 26, German \"White Book.\")\n\nHence, we find that all King George said he wanted had been granted, and\nyet England entered into the war. Why? Probably because she thought, as\nFrance had expressed it, that she acted in pursuance of her interests.\n\nAnd what is Germany fighting for? Does she want anything from anybody?\nShe wants to be left alone; she always wanted to be left alone; she\nprospered while she was left alone; she grew while she was left alone.\nNot being left alone she has to defend herself. Hence, I bespeak for\nGermany and for her side fair play, just judgment on behalf of the\nAmerican people.\n\nARTHUR v. BRIESEN.\n\nNew York, Oct. 17, 1914.\n\n\n\n\nPARTING.\n\nBy LOUISE VON WETTER.\n\n\n    Sodger lad, O sodger lad,\n      The dawn will see ye marchin'--\n    The nicht drag's on--its dark is out\n      Wi' searchlichts, shiftin', archin'.\n\n    Sodger lad, O sodger lad,\n      D'ye mind our Summer meetin'?\n    And noo, ye'll gang. The heather's dead ...\n      I canna keep frae greetin'.\n\n    Sodger lad, my sodger lad--\n      D'ye mind, my time is nearin'?\n    Alone--alone--wi'out yer hand!\n      How shall I keep frae fearin'?\n\n    Sodger lad, O sodger lad,\n      Far, far awa' ye're goin'--\n    I'll not dare count the leagues an' days--\n      _Gude God! The cocks are crowin'!_\n\n    Sodger lad, my luve, my dear,\n      Awake! The morn is grayin'!\n    E'en tho' my heart drags, sick wi' dread,\n      I wouldna have ye stayin'.\n\n\n\n\nFrench Hate and English Jealousy\n\nBy Kuno Francke.\n\n\nIt is easy to see why American public opinion should have condemned by\nan overwhelming majority the diplomatic acts of Austria and Hungary\nwhich have been the immediate occasion of the terrific explosion which\nnow shakes the foundations of the whole civilized world. Austria's break\nwith Servia and Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality--the one\nleading to war between Russia and Germany, the other bringing England\ninto the fray--must appear to the uninitiated as reckless and\nindefensible provocations and as wanton attacks upon the laws of\nnations.\n\nThe thoughtful observer, however, should look beyond the immediate\noccasion of this world conflict and try to understand its underlying\ncauses. By doing so he will, I believe, come to the conclusion that\nfundamental justice is to be found on the German side, and that Germany\nhas been forced to fight for her life.\n\nIt is an unquestionable fact that the unification of Germany and the\nestablishment of a strong German Empire, half a century ago, were\nbrought about against the bitter opposition of France, and that the\ndefeat incurred by France in 1870, in her attempt to prevent German\nunification, is at the bottom of the constant irritation that has\nagitated Europe during the last forty-three years. Germany's policy\ntoward France during these forty-three years has been one of utmost\nrestraint and forbearance, and has been dictated by the one desire of\nmaking her forget the loss of the two provinces, German until the\nseventeenth century and inhabited by German stock, which were won back\nfrom France in 1870. Whether the acquisition of these provinces was a\nfortunate thing for Germany may be doubted. The possession of\nAlsace-Lorraine has certainly robbed Germany of the undivided sympathy\nof the world, which she otherwise would have had. But it is probably\ntrue that from the military point of view Alsace-Lorraine was needed by\nGermany as a bulwark against the repetition of the many wanton French\ninvasions from which Germany has had to suffer since the time of the\nThirty Years' War and the age of Louis XIV.\n\n\nSought to Heal the Breach.\n\nHowever this may be, Germany has done her best during the last four\ndecades to heal the wounds struck by her to French national pride. She\nabetted French colonial expansion in Cochin-China, Madagascar, Tunis.\nShe yielded to France her own well-founded claims to political influence\nin Morocco. In Alsace-Lorraine itself she introduced an amount of local\nself-government and home rule such as England has not accorded even now\nto Ireland. While Ireland still is waiting for a Parliament at Dublin,\nStrassburg has been for years the seat of the Alsace-Lorraine Diet, a\nprovincial Parliament based on universal suffrage. And even in spite of\nthe incessant and inflammatory French propaganda which last year led to\nsuch unhappy counter-strokes as the deplorable Zabern affair, there can\nbe no reasonable doubt that the people of Alsace-Lorraine have been\ngradually settling down to willing co-operation with the German\nadministration--an administration which insures them order, justice, and\nprosperity. Nothing is a clearer indication of the peaceable trend which\naffairs have lately taken in Alsace-Lorraine than the fact that the\nNationalists, i.e., French party, in the Strassburg Diet has never been\nable to rise above insignificance, and that, on the other hand, a\nconsiderable number of responsible officers in the civil administration,\nincluding the highest Governmental positions, have been occupied by\nnative Alsatians.\n\nWhile Germany has thus repeatedly shown her willingness and desire to\nend the ancient feud, France has remained irreconcilable; and\nparticularly the intellectual class of France cannot escape the charge\nthat they have persistently and willfully kept alive the flame of\ndiscord.\n\nIt surely cannot be said that the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine is a\nvital necessity to France. Without Alsace-Lorraine France has recovered\nher prosperity and her prestige in a manner that has been the admiration\nof the world. It is a mere illusion to think that the reconquest of\nAlsace-Lorraine would add to her glory. It would have been a demand of\npatriotism for the intellectual class to combat this illusion. Instead\nof this, every French writer, every French scholar, every French orator,\nexcept the Socialists, year in and year out, has been dinning into the\npopular ear the one word revenge.\n\n\nFrance to Blame.\n\nThere can be little doubt that Prof. Gustave Lanson, the distinguished\nliterary historian, voiced the sentiments of the vast majority of his\ncountrymen when in a lecture, delivered some years ago at Harvard, he\nstated that France could not and would not reorganize the peace of\nFrankfurt as a final settlement, and that the one aim of the French\npolicy of the last forty years had been to force Germany to reopen the\nAlsace-Lorraine question.\n\nIf there were people in Germany inclined to overlook or to minimize this\nconstantly growing menace from France, their eyes must have been opened\nwhen in 1912 the French Government, having previously abolished the\none-year volunteers, raised the duration of active military service for\nevery Frenchman from two years to three, and, in addition to this,\ncalled out in the Autumn of 1913 the recruits not only of the year whose\nturn had come, namely, the recruits born in 1892, but also those born\nin 1893. This was a measure nearly identical with mobilization; it was a\nmeasure which clearly showed that France would not delay much longer\nstriking the deadly blow. For no nation could possibly stand for any\nlength of time this terrific strain of holding under the colors its\nentire male population from the twentieth to the twenty-fourth year. No\nwonder that the Paris papers were speaking as long ago as the Summer of\n1912 of the regiments stationed in the Eastern Departments as the\n\"vanguard of our glorious army,\" and were advocating double pay for\nthem, as being practically in contact with the enemy.\n\nThe second foe now threatening the destruction of Germany is England.\nCan it truly be said that England's hostility has been brought about by\nGerman aggression? True, Germany has built a powerful navy; but so have\nJapan, the United States, France, and even Italy. Has England felt any\nmenace from these? Why, then, is the German Navy singled out as a\nspecially sinister threat to England? Has German diplomacy during the\nlast generation been particularly menacing to England? Germany has\nacquired some colonies in Africa and in the Far East. But what are\nKamerun and Dar-es-Salaam and Kiao-Chau compared with the colonial\npossessions of the other great powers? Where has Germany pursued a\ncolonial aggressiveness that could in any way be compared with the\nBritish subjugation of the South African republics or the Italian\nconquest of Tripoli or the French expansion in Algiers, Tunis, and\nMorocco, or the American acquisition of the Philippines?\n\n\nHer Open-Door Policy.\n\nWherever Germany has made her influence felt on the globe she has stood\nfor the principle of the open door. Wherever she has engaged in colonial\nenterprises, she has been willing to make compromises with other nations\nand to accept their co-operation, notably so in the Bagdad railway\nundertaking. And yet, the colonial expansion of every other nation is\nhailed by England as \"beneficial to mankind,\" as \"work for\ncivilization\"; the slightest attempt of Germany to take part in this\nexpansion is denounced as \"intolerable aggression,\" as evidence of the\n\"bullying tendencies of the War Lord.\"\n\nWhat is the reason for this singular unfairness of England toward\nGermany, of this incessant attempt to check her and hem her in? Not so\nmuch the existence of a large German Navy as the encroachment upon\nEnglish commerce by the rapidly growing commerce of Germany has made\nGermany hateful to England. The navy has simply added to this hate of\nGermany the dread of Germany. But if there had been no German Navy, and\nconsequently no dread of Germany, this hate of Germany might have come\nto an explosion before now. For the history of the last 300 years proves\nthat England has habitually considered as her mortal enemy any nation\nwhich dared to contest her commercial and industrial supremacy--first\nSpain, then Holland, then France, and now Germany. As long as German\nfirms, by the manufacture of artificial indigo, keep on ruining the\nEnglish importation of indigo from India, and as long as the German\nsteamship lines keep on outstripping the prestige of the English boats,\nthere can be no real friendship between England and Germany. Although\nEngland has repeatedly proposed to Germany naval agreements, these\nagreements were avowedly meant to perpetuate the overwhelming\npreponderance of England's fighting power, so that she would at any\nmoment be in a position to crush German commercial rivalry for all time.\nShe apparently thinks that this moment has now come.\n\nThat Germany's third implacable enemy, Russia, is clearly the aggressor,\nand not the defender of her own national existence, need hardly be\ndemonstrated. She poses as the guardian of the Balkan States. But is\nthere any case on record where Russia has really protected the\nindependence of smaller neighboring countries? Has she not crushed out\nprovincial and racial individuality wherever she has extended her power?\nIs it not the sole aim of her national policy to Russianize forcibly\nevery nationality under her sway?\n\nIn Finland she has gone back on her solemnly pledged word to maintain\nthe Finnish Constitution, and is ruthlessly reducing one of her most\nhighly developed provinces to the dead level of autocratic rule. In her\nBaltic provinces she is trying to destroy, root and branch, whatever\nthere is left of German culture. Wherever the Russian Church holds\ndominion intellectual blight is sure to follow.\n\nTo think, therefore, that Russia would promote the free development of a\nnumber of independent Balkan States under her protectorate is to shut\none's eyes to the whole history of Russian expansion. No, Russian\nexpansion in the Balkans means nothing less than the extinction of all\nlocal independence and the establishment of Russian despotism from the\nBlack Sea to the Adriatic.\n\n\nWhy Germany Supports Austria.\n\nNot Russia, but Austria, is the natural protector of the equilibrium\nbetween the existing States on the Balkan Peninsula and their natural\nguardian against Russian domination. Austria is their nearest neighbor;\nindeed, the possession of Bosnia and Herzegovina makes her a Balkan\nState herself.\n\nBeing herself more than half of Slavic stock, she has every reason for\nliving on good terms with the various Slav kingdoms south of her. Being\nherself forced, through the conglomerateness of her population, to\nconstant compromises in her internal affairs between conflicting\nnationalities within her borders, she could not possibly absorb a large\nadditional amount of foreign territory. She is bound to respect the\nexisting lines of political demarkation in the Balkans, and her sole\nobject can be through commercial treaties and tariff legislation to open\nup what used to be European Turkey to her trade and her civilizing\ninfluence.\n\nIn this she must clearly be supported by Germany. For only if Austria is\nleft free to exercise her natural protectorate over the Balkan States\ncan the passage between Germany and the Near Orient, one of the most\nimportant routes of German commerce, be kept open.\n\nRussia's unwillingness, then, to allow Austria a free hand in her\ndealings with Servia was an open menace to Germany, a challenge which\nhad to be accepted unless Germany was prepared to abdicate all her\ninfluence in the Near Orient and to allow Russia to override the\nlegitimate claims and aspirations of her only firm and faithful ally.\n\nThis formidable coalition of the three greatest European powers,\nthreatening the very existence of Germany, has now been joined by Japan,\nopenly and boldly for the purpose of snatching from Germany her one\nAsiatic possession.\n\nIf any additional proof had been needed to make it clear that, if\nGermany wanted to retain the slightest chance of extricating herself\nfrom this worldwide conspiracy against her, she had to strike the first\nblow, even at the risk of offending against international good manners,\nthis stab in the back by Japan would furnish such proof.\n\n\n\n\nDr. Sanderson Replies\n\n\n_To the Editor of The New York Times:_\n\nAlthough I hate to enter into a controversy with Prof. Kuno Francke, who\nwas once my excellent friend, I cannot refrain from answering his\narticle which appeared in last Sunday's NEW YORK TIMES.\n\nHow can any one say, in all fairness, that Germany's policy toward\nFrance during the last forty-three years has been one of the utmost\nrestraint and forbearance, and has been dictated by the one desire to\nmake her forget the loss of the two provinces? What are the facts? We\nknow that not once, but again and again, since 1878, Germany has tried\nto provoke France into war. We know that on one occasion Queen Victoria\nherself threatened the Kaiser with Great Britain's intervention if he\ndid not desist from his intended attack on France. And to cite only the\ntwo most recent instances, the Agadir affair and the enforced\nresignation of the French Premier, Delcasse! Would Germany have\nswallowed such insults?\n\nThis may be the German conception of \"utmost restraint and forbearance,\"\nbut it appeared to the French, as it did to the rest of the world, that\nit required their utmost restraint and forbearance to remain calm under\nthe affronts.\n\nThe fact that Alsace-Lorraine was German up to the seventeenth century,\nand inhabited by German stock, cannot be brought forward today, after\nmore than 200 years, to justify the retaking of those provinces by the\nGermans. The whole world would be in a state of continual warfare if\nnations claimed provinces or States that belonged to them once upon a\ntime. Richelieu's idea was that the Rhine was the natural and\ngeographical frontier between France and Germany, and the war was\nundertaken to carry out that plan. Since then the inhabitants have\nbecome French, and the attempts to re-Germanize them have proved futile.\nProf. Francke may well doubt if the acquisition of these provinces was a\nfortunate thing for Germany. It was undoubtedly the most unfortunate\nthing not only for Germany but for France and the rest of Europe, for it\nkept open a wound which might have been healed either by a return of the\nlost provinces, with or without compensation, or by granting them\nautonomy, or, better still, by leaving it to the inhabitants to choose\nfor themselves, as France did with Nice and Savoy.\n\nThe ruthless methods of a Bismarck are no longer of this age. They are\ntoo odious, and the human conscience revolts at them. What a\npreposterous idea, in this twentieth century, to compel by force\nmillions of people to renounce their traditions and even their\nlanguage! If Great Britain had followed the same method in dealing with\nthe French Canadians, instead of loyal subjects she would have made\nrebels of them all.\n\nIt is neither right nor just nor truthful to say that Germany has done\nher best during the last four decades to heal the wounds struck by her\nto French national pride. On the contrary, Germany's attitude has been\nall along one of studied provocation; and if the instances already\nmentioned are not sufficient, many others could be added.\n\nGermany abetted French colonial expansion. Well, by what right should\nshe have opposed it? And if she yielded to France in Morocco, it was\nonly after France had given Germany part of her African possessions\nrather than go to war with her.\n\nIt will be news to the world to be informed that there can be no\nreasonable doubt that the people of Alsace-Lorraine have been gradually\nsettling down to willing co-operation with the German administration.\nCertainly such a statement is in violent contradiction with all we hear\nand read and know of the state of mind, the feelings, and aspirations of\nthe inhabitants of those two provinces.\n\nTo argue that the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine is not a vital\nnecessity to France; that without these provinces she has recovered her\nprosperity and her prestige, and that it is mere illusion to think that\nthe reconquest of Alsace-Lorraine would add to her glory is pure\nsophistry. It is just as if you said to a man whom you had robbed of\nsome valuable property: \"What does it matter? You are just as well off\nwithout it.\" Yes, Prof. Larson did voice the sentiment of the vast\nmajority of his countrymen when he stated that France could not and\nwould not recognize the treaty of Frankfurt. If I have an enemy who\ntakes me by surprise and with revolver leveled at my head compels me to\nsign a paper by which I despoil myself to his advantage, what is the\nvalidity of such a document?\n\nThat is the way that all Frenchmen of all classes look upon the treaty\nof Frankfurt, wrung from them under duress.\n\nThe term \"revanche\" is a slogan. It simply typifies in one word the\nreconquest of Alsace-Lorraine; but it does not carry with it the idea of\nwillfully laying waste the enemy's country, burning and pillaging,\nshooting inoffensive non-combatants, and cleaning banks of all the gold\nthey contain.\n\nAnother statement which is misleading in Prof. Francke's article is the\none which refers to the \"growing menace from France,\" in which he speaks\nof the increasing armament that has been going on in that country since\n1912. But what is called in Germany \"the menace from France\" is called\nin the latter country \"the menace from Germany.\" Who started these\nenormous armaments? Each time Germany increased her army France was\nforced to do the same; and when France recently increased from two to\nthree years the duration of military service, it was her only way of\nmeeting Germany's increase of 500,000 men.\n\nThe attempt to change the roles and present France to the world as the\naggressor, or even as premeditating an attack upon Germany, is futile.\nIt is a strange and yet not uncommon psychological fact that the hate of\nthe conqueror is often greater than that of the conquered; and it is\nGerman, not French, hate which has forced Germany into this savage war.\nFrance had recovered too rapidly from her disasters; she was too rich;\nher colonies were too vast and too prosperous; she must be crushed. What\nright had she to have large colonies when Germany, the superior nation,\nhad none worth mentioning? There you have the key to the Kaiser's\nrepeated provocations and to his final attack.\n\nIn regard to England and Russia, the writer will simply confine himself\nto the statement that if the German Imperial Government can produce as\nclean a bill of health as the \"White Paper\" of the British Foreign\nOffice, just published, it will do more to convince American public\nopinion of the justice of its cause than anything that has yet been\nwritten in the press by Germans and their sympathizers.\n\nR.L. SANDERSON.\n\nYale University, New Haven, Conn., Sept. 5, 1914.\n\n\n\n\nIn Defense of Austria\n\nBy Baron L. Hengelmuller.\n\n     Late Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to the United States.\n\n\n_The following letter was written by Baron Hengelmuller to Col. Theodore\nRoosevelt._\n\nABBAZIA, Sept. 25, 1914.\n\nMy Dear Mr. Roosevelt:\n\nOur correspondence has suffered a long interruption. Your last letter\nwas from July of last year. I do not know whether you ever received my\nanswer, by which I thanked you for your preface to my book. You were in\nArizona when I wrote it, and soon after your return you started for\nBrazil. At the occasion of your son's wedding I sent him a telegram to\nMadrid, but I had no chance to write to you because I had no information\nwith regard to the length of your stay and your whereabouts in Europe.\n\nNow I write to you at the time of a most momentous crisis in the world's\nhistory, and I do so impelled by the desire to talk with you about my\ncountry's cause and to win your just and fair appreciation for the same.\nI wish I could address my appeal to the American people, but having no\nstanding and no opportunity to do so, I address it to you as to one of\nAmerica's most illustrious citizens with whom it has been my privilege\nto entertain during many years the most friendly relations.\n\nSince the outbreak of the war our communications with America are slow\nand irregular. In the beginning they were nil. From the end of July to\nthe middle of August we received neither letters, telegrams, nor papers.\nI suppose it was the same with you concerning direct news from us. Our\nadversaries had the field all for themselves and they seem to have made\nthe most of it. To judge from what I have learned since and from what I\ncould glean in our papers, the New York press seem to have written about\nus and Germany very much in the same tone and spirit as they did about\nyou during your last Presidential campaign. I have seen it stated that\nThe Outlook published an article in which Austro-Hungary was accused of\nhaving brought about the war through her greed of conquest and the\noverbearing arrogance of her behavior toward Servia. I do not know\nwhether I cite correctly, as I have not seen the article, and I am aware\nthat you have severed your connection with The Outlook after your return\nfrom Brazil. I only mention the statement as an illustration of what I\nhave said above, for if a review of the standing of The Outlook opens\nits columns to such a glaringly false accusation the daily papers have\ncertainly not lagged behind.\n\nIt is natural that our adversaries should be anxious to win the\nsympathies of the American people. So are we. But it is not for this\npurpose that I now write to you. Sympathy is a sentiment and, as a rule,\nnot to be won by argument. What I want to discuss with you are the\ncauses of this war and the issues at stake.\n\n\nThe Cause of the War.\n\nUndoubtedly the war broke out over our conflict with Servia, but this\nconflict was not of our seeking. We had no wish of aggrandizement or\nextension of power at the expense of Servia, but Servia covets territory\nwhich belongs to us, and for years has pursued her ends by the most\nnefarious and criminal means. The assassination of our heir to the crown\nand his consort was not an isolated fact, but only the most glaring\nlink in a long chain of plotting and agitating against us. This\nattitude of Servia toward us dates back to the day when the gang of\nofficers who murdered their own King came to power, and when it became\ntheir policy to keep a hold over their own people by exciting their\nambitions against us. This policy reached its first climax when we\ndeclared the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which we had occupied\nand developed for thirty years. You were in office then, and the events\nof the time are familiar to you. The crisis ended then by Servia's\nformal acknowledgment that our annexation violated none of her rights,\nand by her promise to cultivate henceforth correct and friendly\nrelations with us. This promise was not kept. The plotting continued,\nlies were disseminated about a pretended oppression of our South Slav\npopulation, and associations were formed for the purpose of stirring\nthem to discontent and if possible to treason.\n\nThings came to a second climax with the murder of Archduke Francis\nFerdinand. The plot for this crime was hatched in Servia, the bombs and\nrevolvers for its execution were furnished there, and Servian officers\ninstructed the murder candidates in their use. At last we could stand it\nno longer. What we wanted from Servia was the punishment of the plotters\nand accomplices and a guarantee for normal relations in the future. This\nwas the object of our ultimatum. Servia made a show of complying with\nsome of our demands, but in reality her answer was evasive.\n\nThese facts are exposed and authenticated in the note which we sent to\nthe powers after having presented our ultimatum in Belgrade and in the\nmemorandum which accompanied it. I do not know whether the American\npapers published these documents at the time. Today they are outstripped\nby greater events, but for the just appreciation of our proceedings in\nregard to Servia they are indispensable.\n\nIn reality, however, our conflict with Servia was not the cause of the\ngreat war now raging, but only the spark which brought the overloaded\npowder barrel to explosion. Who talks of Servia today, and who believes\nthat France, England, and Japan are making war on Germany and on us\nbecause of Servia? The war broke out because Russia decided to shield\nServia against the consequences of her provocations and because, owing\nto preconcerted arrangements, the situation in Europe was such that the\naction of one great power was bound to bring all or nearly all the\nothers into the field. And again those preconcerted arrangements were\nthe outcome of a mass of pent-up passions, of hatred, envy, and\njealousy, the like of which--all Hague conferences and pacific unions\nnotwithstanding--the world has never seen before.\n\nWe are fully aware of the danger which threatened us from Russia when we\nformulated our demands in Belgrade. Russia's population is three times\nas large as ours and it was not with a light heart that our Emperor-King\ntook his final resolution. But our national honor and our very existence\nas a self-respecting power were at stake. We could not hesitate. Now we\nare in a struggle for life or death and we mean to carry it through with\nfull confidence in the rightfulness of our cause and in the force of our\narms. In one respect events have already belied the calculations of our\nenemies, who counted on internal dissensions within our own borders. I\nam happy to say that Croatians, Slovenes, and a large majority of our\nown Servians are fighting in our ranks with the same valor and\nenthusiasm as Czechs, Rumanians, Poles, Magyars, and Germans.\n\nBut why did Russia decide to assail us? During the whole nineteenth\ncentury she has shown herself a very shifty and unreliable protectress\nof Servia. She made use of the smaller country when it suited her own\naggressive purposes against others, and she dropped it whenever it\nserved her ends. It was so at the time of the Turkish war of 1877 and of\nthe Berlin Congress, and it remained so until with the advent of the\npresent dynasty Servia offered a sure prospect of becoming and remaining\na permanent tool in Russia's hands and a thorn in our flesh.\n\nRussia is an aggressive power. For 200 years she has extended her\ndominions at the cost of Sweden first, of Poland and Turkey afterward.\nNow she thinks our turn has come. Finding us to be in the way of her\nultimate aims in the Balkan Peninsula, she began to regard us as her\nenemy. For years the propaganda for undermining the bases of our empire\nhas been carried on in the name of Pan-Slavism. It seems that she judged\nthat now the time had come to draw the consequences and to bring things\nto a final issue. With what result remains to be seen.\n\n\nGermany Bound to Aid Austria.\n\nBy the terms of our treaty of alliance Germany was bound to come to our\nassistance if we were attacked by Russia. There was no secrecy about\nthat treaty. Its text had been made public long ago and its purely\ndefensive character brought to the knowledge of the world. No more than\nwe did Germany entertain hostile intentions or nourish hostile feelings\nagainst Russia. There were no clashing interests to excite the first, no\nhistorical reminiscences to justify the second. If it is otherwise in\nRussia, it is because her present leaders find German power in the way\nof their conquering aspirations against us. Germany, true to her\nobligations, hastened to our side when she saw us menaced, and when she\ndeclared war she did it because she had positive information that in\nspite of formal and solemn assurances to the contrary Russia\nmobilization was proceeding.\n\nThe terms of the Franco-Russian alliance have never been made public.\nWhether it was concluded merely for defensive or also for offensive\npurposes, and whether France was obliged by her treaty to draw the sword\nin the present case, remains therefore a matter of surmise. But there is\nno mystery about the feelings of France with regard to Germany, and no\ndoubt about the greed for revenge which during the last forty-four years\nhas swayed the overwhelming majority of her people and been the\ndominant factor of her foreign policy. It was for this object that she\nentered into her alliances and agreements, and it is for this cause that\nshe is fighting now.\n\nIt is simple hypocrisy to talk about German aggressiveness against\nFrance. France stood in no danger of being attacked by Germany if she\nhad chosen to remain neutral in the latter's war with Russia. Asked\nwhether she would do so, she replied that her actions would be guided by\nher interests. The meaning of this reply was clear, and left Germany no\nchoice. The formal declaration of war became then a mere matter of\npolitical and military convenience, and has no bearing on the moral\nissue of the case.\n\nBut why has England plunged into this war? Officially and to the world\nat large she has explained her resolution by Germany's violation of\nBelgian neutrality, and in the royal message to Parliament it was\nsolemnly declared that England could not stand by and passively tolerate\nsuch a breach of international law and obligations.\n\nNo Austrian can read this declaration otherwise than with a mournful\nsmile. Its futility has been exposed by the question which Englishmen of\nstanding and renown have put to their Government, viz., whether they\nwould equally have declared war on France if that violation of\nneutrality had first come from her side. In face of this question having\nremained unanswered, and in face of what has come to light since about\nFrench preparations in Belgium, there is no need to expiate on this\nsubject. All that there is to be said about it has been said by the\nGerman Chancellor in open session of the Reichstag, and all that may be\nadded is the remark that, considering England's history and what she did\nbefore Copenhagen in 1807, she of all nations should be the last to put\non airs of moral indignation over the application of the principle that\nin time of war \"salus reipublicae suprema lex est.\"\n\nThe existence of a convention binding England to France in case of war\nhas--as far as I know--never been admitted officially by England. As I\nsee now from manifestations of Englishmen disapproving of their\ncountry's participation in the war, the belief exists nevertheless that\nsuch a convention had been concluded. But whether England's declaration\nof war was the consequence of previously entered obligations or the\noutcome of present free initiative, the main fact remains that in the\nlast resort it sprang from jealousy of Germany's growing sea power and\ncommercial prosperity. This feeling was the dominant factor in English\nforeign policy, just as greed for revenge was in France. It was the\npropelling power for the agreements which England has made and for\nothers which she endeavored but did not succeed in bringing about.\n\nEngland claims the dominion over the seas as her native right, and, what\nis more, she holds it. Her title is no better and no worse than that of\nthe Romans when they conquered the world, or of the Turkish Sultans in\nthe days of their power. Like them, she has succeeded in making good her\nclaim. For three centuries the nations of Continental Europe have been\nhating, fighting, and devastating each other for the sake of strips of\nfrontier land and a shadowy balance of power. These centuries were\nEngland's opportunity, and she has made the most of it. That she should\nmean to keep what she has and hold to her maritime supremacy as to the\napple of her eye is natural. Whether it is for the benefit of mankind\nthat it should be so, and whether the world in general would not be\nbetter off if there existed a balance of power on sea as well as on\nland, does not enter into the present discussion. What is more to the\npurpose is that in reality England's sea power stood in no danger at\nall. To any thinking and fair-minded observer it must be clear that\nGermany, hemmed in by hostile neighbors in the east and west, and\nobliged, therefore, to keep up her armaments on land, would not have\nbeen able to threaten England's maritime superiority for generations to\ncome. If the issue has been thrown into the balance, it has been done so\nby England's own doing.\n\nBut it is not only the nascent German Navy that excited the distrust\nand envy of England. German colonies and every trading German vessel\nseem equally to have become thorns in English eyes. The wish to sweep\nthose vessels from off the seas, to destroy all German ports, in one\nword, to down Germany, has long been nourished and lately openly avowed\nin England. Norman Angell's theories about the great illusion of the\nprofitability of modern warfare seem to have made mighty small\nimpression on his countrymen.\n\nRussian lust of conquest, French greed of revenge, and English envy were\nthe forces at work in the European powder magazine. The Servian spark\nignited it, but the explosion was bound to come sooner or later. What\nalone could have stopped it would have been England's stepping out of\nthe conspiracy. That she did not do so, in fact became its really\ndirecting power, will forever remain a blot on her history.\n\nAbout Japan's motives and methods I do not think it necessary to write.\nAmerican public opinion will hardly need any enlightenment on this\nsubject. America forced Japan out of the isolation in which she had\nlived during centuries. I hope the day may not come when she will wish\nthat she had not done so.\n\nThe issues of the war stand in relation to its causes and the same\nattempts have been made to distort and falsify them in the eyes of the\nAmerican public. I have seen it stated in a New York paper that this war\nis a fight between civilization and barbarism, and I have seen a member\nof the present English Cabinet quoted as having said that the issue was\none between militarism and freedom, civilization and freedom standing,\nof course, in both cases on the side of our enemies.\n\n\nNot a War for Civilization.\n\nMore idiotic rot--excuse the expression--I have never read in my life.\nWhat has civilization to do with Servia's murderous plotting against\nus? What with Russia's desire to shield her from the consequences\nof her aggressions and to demonstrate to the world that we are of\nno account in the Balkans and to establish her own--more or less\nveiled--protectorate there? And if the case of civilization is advanced\nby Japan's ousting Germany from Kiao-Chau, why should it not be equally\nfurthered if Japan did the same to England in Hongkong, Singapore, or,\nif the opportunity offered, in India itself? And a person must be indeed\nat his wits' end for arguments to proclaim Russia as a standard bearer\nof freedom in her war against us. Compare her treatment of Poles, Finns,\nUkrainanians (small Russians) and Hebrews with the freedom which the\ndifferent nationalities enjoy in our empire! And England herself. Is it\nfor freedom's sake that she holds Gibraltar and that she subjugated the\nBoers?\n\nNo! Civilization and freedom have nothing to do with the issues at stake\nnow, least of all in the sense that our enemies have drawn the sword for\ntheir cause. It is a war for conquest and supremacy stirred up by all\nthe hateful passions in human nature, fully as much as any war that has\never been waged before. But we did not stir it up. We are fighting for\nour existence, right and justice are on our side, and so we trust will\nvictory be.\n\nThe causes of the war are clear. To make its issues still clearer,\nimagine for a moment and merely for argument's sake the consequences of\nour adversaries being successful. Russia, England, and Japan would\nremain masters of the field. Is this a consummation any thinking\nAmerican can wish for?\n\nThese are the considerations I wished to lay before you, and I ask your\nassistance to bring them before the American people. I ask for no reply,\nno manifestation of feelings or opinion from you. What I ask you is to\npublish this letter as an open letter addressed by me to you, signed\nwith my full name. How to do this I leave entirely to you. It goes\nwithout saying that your private reply, if you favor me with one, will\nbe treated as such.\n\nHoping to meet you in better times, and sending our kindest regards to\nMrs. Roosevelt, believe me, yours most sincerely,\n\nBARON L. HENGELMULLER.\n\nAbbazia, Sept. 25, 1914.\n\n\n\n\nRussian Atrocities\n\nBy George Haven Putnam.\n\n     Publisher, Director of the Knickerbocker Press, Secretary\n     American Copyright League; decorated with the Cross of the\n     Legion of Honor, France.\n\n\n_To the Editor of The New York Times:_\n\nIt is possible that the letter presented herewith from a German neighbor\n(who is a stranger to me) may be of interest to your readers as an\nexample of a curious confusion of thought into which have fallen Germans\non both sides of the Atlantic in regard to the issues of the present\nstruggle and the conduct and the actions of the German Army. I am\ninclosing a copy of my reply to Mr. Thienes.\n\nGEORGE HAVEN PUTNAM.\n\nNew York, Nov. 4, 1914.\n\n\nTHE LETTER.\n\nNEW YORK, Oct. 28, 1914.\n\nMr. George Haven Putnam.\n\nDEAR SIR: Now that you have shown your \"true\" spirit of neutrality\ntoward Germany, would you not be kind enough to give us a similar piece\nof your wisdom and describe in detail the way the Russians acted in East\nPrussia during their short stay there, and how they murdered, tortured,\nand assaulted women and girls, and cut children and infants to pieces\nwithout even the provocation of \"sniping\"?\n\nThis, your new article in THE TIMES, I anticipate with the greatest\ninterest.\n\nRUDOLF F. THIENES.\n\n\nTHE REPLY.\n\nRudolf F. Thienes, Esq.\n\nMY DEAR SIR: Your letter of the 28th inst., intended as a rejoinder to a\nletter recently printed by me in THE TIMES, is written under a\nmisapprehension in regard to one important matter.\n\nThe Americans, who are in a position to judge impartially in regard to\nthe issues of the war, have criticised the official acts which have\nattended the devastation of Belgium, not because these acts were\ncommitted by Germans, but because they were in themselves abominable and\ncontrary to precedents and to civilized standards.\n\nIf the Russians had, under official order, burned Lemburg, including the\nuniversity and the library, and executed the Burgomaster, they would\nhave come under the same condemnation from Americans that has been given\nto Germans for the burning of Louvain and Aerschot and the shooting of\nthe Aerschot Burgomaster. I am myself familiar with Germany. I am an\nold-time German student, and I have German friends on both sides of the\nAtlantic, and I am in a position to sympathize with legitimate\naspirations and ideals of these German friends.\n\nI am convinced, however, that no nation can secure in this twentieth\ncentury its rightful development unless its national conduct is\nregulated with a \"decent respect to the opinions of mankind.\" The\nreferences made in my TIMES letters were restricted to official actions;\nthings done under the direction of the military commanders acting in\naccord with the instructions or the general policy of the Imperial\nGovernment.\n\nThe misdeeds of individual soldiers are difficult to verify. While these\nare always exaggerated, it remains the sad truth that every big army\ncontains a certain percentage of ruffians, and that when these ruffians\nare let loose in a community, with weapons and with military power\nbehind them, bad things are done. It is my own belief that the material\nin the German Army (which is the best fighting machine that the world\nhas ever seen) will compare favorably with that of any army in the\nworld, and that the percentage of wrongful acts on the part of the\nGerman soldiers has been small. Such misdeeds, sometimes to be\ncharacterized as atrocities, are the inevitable result of war, and they\nbring a grave responsibility upon a Government which (to accept as well\nfounded the frank utterances of the leaders of opinion in Germany) has\ninitiated this war for the purpose of \"crushing France and of breaking\nup the British Empire.\"\n\nYou appear to think that it is in order for Germany to visit upon\nunoffending Belgians reprisal for the misdeeds (as far as such misdeeds\nmay be in evidence) committed by Russians in East Prussia. I cannot see\nthat this contention is in accord with justice or with common sense.\n\nGEORGE HAVEN PUTNAM.\n\nNew York, Oct. 28, 1914.\n\n\n\n\n\"The United States of Europe\"\n\nINTERVIEW WITH NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER.\n\n     Dr. Butler is President of Columbia University; received\n     Republican electoral vote for Vice President of the United\n     States, 1913; President of American Branch of Conciliation\n     Internationale; President American Historical Association;\n     Trustee Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Commander\n     Order of the Red Eagle (with Star) of Prussia; Commandeur de\n     Legion d'Honneur of France.\n\nBy Edward Marshall.\n\n\nThe United States of Europe.\n\nDr. Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia University, firmly\nbelieves that the organization of such a federation will be the outcome,\nsoon or late, of a situation built up through years of European failure\nto adjust government to the growth of civilization.\n\nHe thinks it possible that the ending of the present war may see the\nrising of the new sun of democracy to light a day of freedom for our\ntransatlantic neighbors.\n\nHe tells me that thinking men in all the contending nations are\nbeginning vividly to consider such a contingency, to argue for it or\nagainst it; in other words, to regard it as an undoubted possibility.\n\nDr. Butler's acquaintance among those thinking men of all shades of\npolitical belief is probably wider than that of any other American, and\nit is significant of the startling importance of what he says that by\nfar the greater number of his European friends, the men upon whose views\nhe has largely, directly or indirectly, based his conclusions, are not\nof the socialistic or of any other revolutionary or semi-revolutionary\ngroups, but are among the most conservative and most important figures\nin European political, literary, and educational fields.\n\nThis being unquestionably true, it is by no means improbable that in the\ninterview which follows, fruit of two evenings in Dr. Butler's library,\nmay be found the most important speculative utterance yet to appear in\nrelation to the general European war.\n\nDr. Butler's estimate of the place which the United States now holds\nupon the stage of the theatre of world progress and his forecast of the\ntremendously momentous role which she is destined to play there must\nmake every American's heart first swell with pride and then thrill with\na realization of responsibility.\n\nThe United States of Europe, modeled after and instructed by the United\nStates of America! The thought is stimulating.\n\nSaid Dr. Butler:\n\n\"The European cataclysm puts the people of the United States in a unique\nand tremendously important position. As neutrals we are able to observe\nevents and to learn the lesson that they teach. If we learn rightly we\nshall gain for ourselves and be able to confer upon others benefits far\nmore important than any of the material advantages which may come to us\nthrough a shrewd handling of the new possibilities in international\ntrade.\n\n\"I hesitate to discuss any phase of the great conflict now raging in\nEurope. By today's mail, for example, I received long, personal letters\nfrom Lord Haldane, from Lord Morley, from Lord Weardale, and from Lord\nBryce. Another has just come from Prof. Schiemann of Berlin, perhaps the\nEmperor's most intimate adviser; another from Prof. Lamasch of Austria,\nwho was the Presiding Judge of the British-American arbitration in\nrelation to the Newfoundland fisheries a few years ago, and is a member\nof the Austrian House of Peers. Still others are from M. Ribot, Minister\nof Finance in France, and M. d'Estournelles de Constant. These\nconfidential letters give a wealth of information as to the intellectual\nand political forces that are behind the conflict.\n\n\"You will understand, then, that without disloyalty to my many friends\nin Europe, I could not discuss with freedom the causes or the progress\nof the war, or speculate in detail about the future of the European\nproblem. My friends in Germany, France, and England all write to me with\nthe utmost freedom and not for the public eye; so you see that my great\ndifficulty, when you ask me to talk about the meaning of the struggle,\narises from the obligation that I am under to preserve a proper personal\nreserve regarding the great figures behind the vast intellectual and\npolitical changes which really are in the background of the war.\n\n\"If such reserve is necessary in my case, it seems to me that it also is\nnecessary for the country as a whole. The attitude of the President has\nbeen impeccable. That of the whole American press and people should be\nthe same.\n\n\"Especially is it true that all Americans who hope to have influence, as\nindividuals, in shaping the events which will follow the war, must avoid\nany expression which even might be tortured into an avowal of\npartisanship or final judgment.\n\n\"Even the free expression of views criticising particular details of the\nwar, which might, in fact, deserve criticism, might destroy one's chance\nof future possible usefulness. A statement which might be unquestionably\ntrue might also be remembered to the damage of some important cause\nlater on.\n\n\"There are reasons why my position is, perhaps, more difficult than that\nof some others. Talking is often a hazardous practice, and never more so\nthan now.\n\n\"The World is at crossroads, and everything may depend upon the United\nStates, which has been thrust by events into a unique position of moral\nleadership. Whether the march of the future is to be to the right or to\nthe left, uphill or down, after the war is over, may well depend upon\nthe course this nation shall then take, and upon the influence which it\nshall exercise.\n\n\"If we keep our heads clear there are two things that we can bring\ninsistently to the attention of Europe--each of vast import at such a\ntime as that which will follow the ending of this war.\n\n\"The first of these is the fact that race antagonisms die away and\ndisappear under the influence of liberal and enlightened political\ninstitutions. This has been proved in the United States.\n\n\"We have huge Celtic, Latin, Teutonic and Slavic populations all living\nhere at peace and in harmony; and, as years pass, they tend to merge,\ncreating new and homogeneous types. The Old World antagonisms have\nbecome memories. This proves that such antagonisms are not mysterious\nattributes of geography or climate, but that they are the outgrowth\nprincipally of social and political conditions. Here a man can do about\nwhat he likes, so long as he does not violate the law; he may pray as he\npleases or not at all, and he may speak any language that he chooses.\n\n\"The United States is itself proof that most of the contentions of\nEuropeans as to race antagonisms are ill-founded. We have demonstrated\nthat racial antagonisms need not necessarily become the basis of\npermanent hatreds and an excuse for war.\"\n\n\nHyphens Are Going.\n\n\"If human beings are given the chance they will make the most of\nthemselves, and, by living happily--which means by living at peace--they\nwill avoid conflict. The hyphen tends to disappear from American\nterminology. The German-American, the Italio-American, the\nIrish-American all become Americans.\n\n\"So, by and large, our institutions have proved their capacity to\namalgamate and to set free every type of human being which thus far has\ncome under our flag. There is in this a lesson which may well be taken\nseriously to heart by the leaders of opinion in Europe when this war\nends.\n\n\"The second thing which we may press, with propriety, upon the attention\nof the people of Europe after peace comes to them is the fact that we\nare not only the great exponents but the great example of the success of\nthe principle of federation in its application to unity of political\nlife regardless of local, economic, and racial differences.\n\n\"If our fathers had attempted to organize this country upon the basis of\na single, closely unified State, it would have gone to smash almost at\nthe outset, wrecked by clashing economic and personal interests. Indeed,\nthis nearly happened in the civil war, which was more economic than\npolitical in its origin.\n\n\"But, though we had our difficulties, we did find a way to make a\nunified nation of a hundred million people and forty-eight\nCommonwealths, all bound together in unity and in loyalty to a common\npolitical ideal and a common political purpose.\n\n\"Just as certainly as we sit here this must and will be the future of\nEurope. There will be a federation into the United States of Europe.\n\n\"When one nation sets out to assert itself by force against the will, or\neven the wish, of its neighbors, disaster must inevitably come. Disaster\nwould have come here if, in 1789, New York had endeavored to assert\nitself against New England or Pennsylvania.\n\n\"As a matter of fact, certain inhabitants of Rhode Island and\nPennsylvania did try something of the sort after the Federal Government\nhad been formed, but, fortunately, their effort was a failure.\n\n\"The leaders of our national life had established such a flexible and\nadmirable plan of government that it was soon apparent that each State\ncould retain its identity, forming its own ideals and shaping its own\nprogress, and still remain a loyal part of the whole; that each State\ncould make a place for itself in the new federated nation and not be\ndestroyed thereby.\n\n\"There is no reason why each nation in Europe should not make a place\nfor itself in the sun of unity which I am sure is rising there behind\nthe war clouds. Europe's stupendous economic loss, which already has\nbeen appalling and will soon be incalculable, will give us an\nopportunity to press this argument home.\n\n\"True internationalism is not the enemy of the nationalistic principle.\n\n\"On the contrary, it helps true nationalism to thrive. The Vermonter is\nmore a Vermonter because he is an American, and there is no reason why\nHungary, for example, should not be more than ever before Hungarian\nafter she becomes a member of the United States of Europe.\n\n\"Europe, of course, is not without examples of the successful\napplication of the principle of federation within itself. It so happens\nthat the federated State next greatest to our own is the German Empire.\nIt is only forty-three years old, but their federation has been notably\nsuccessful. So the idea of federation is familiar to German publicists.\n\n\"It is familiar, also, to the English, and has lately been pressed there\nas the probable final solution of the Irish question.\n\n\"It has insistently suggested itself as the solution of the Balkan\nproblem.\n\n\"In a lesser way it already is represented in the structure of\nAustria-Hungary.\"\n\n\nAmerica's Great Work.\n\n\"This principle of nation building, of international building through\nfederation, certainly has in it the seeds of the world's next great\ndevelopment--and we Americans are in a position both to expand the\ntheory and to illustrate the practice. It seems to me that this is the\ngreatest work which America will have to do at the end of this war.\n\n\"These are the things which I am writing to my European correspondents\nin the several belligerent countries by every mail.\n\n\"The cataclysm is so awful that it is quite within the bounds of truth\nto say that on July 31 the curtain went down upon a world which never\nwill be seen again.\n\n\"This conflict is the birth-throe of a new European order of things. The\nman who attempts to judge the future by the old standards or to force\nthe future back to them will be found to be hopelessly out of date. The\nworld will have no use for him. The world has left behind forever the\ninternational policies of Palmerston and of Beaconsfield and even those\nof Bismarck, which were far more powerful.\n\n\"When the war ends conditions will be such that a new kind of\nimagination and a new kind of statesmanship will be required. This war\nwill prove to be the most effective education of 500,000,000 people\nwhich possibly could have been thought of, although it is the most\ncostly and most terrible means which could have been chosen. The results\nof this education will be shown, I think, in the process of general\nreconstruction which will follow.\n\n\"All the talk of which we hear so much about, the peril from the Slav or\nfrom the Teuton or from the Celt, is unworthy of serious attention. It\nwould be quite as reasonable to discuss seriously the red-headed peril\nor the six-footer peril.\n\n\"There is no peril to the world in the Slav, the Teuton, the Celt, or\nany other race, provided the people of that race have an opportunity to\ndevelop as social and economic units, and are not bottled up so that an\nexplosion must come.\n\n\"It is my firm belief that nowhere in the world, from this time on, will\nany form of government be tolerated which does not set men free to\ndevelop in this fashion.\"\n\nI asked Dr. Butler to make some prognostication of what the United\nStates of Europe, which he so confidently expects, will be. He answered:\n\n\nHas Advanced Much.\n\n\"I can say only this: The international organization of the world\nalready has progressed much further than is ordinarily understood. Ever\nsince the Franco-Prussian war and the Geneva Arbitration, both\nlandmarks in modern history, this has advanced inconspicuously, but by\nleaps and bounds.\n\n\"The postal service of the world has been internationalized in its\ncontrol for years. The several Postal Conventions have been evidences of\nan international organization of the highest order.\n\n\"Europe abounds in illustrations of the international administration of\nlarge things. The very laws of war, which are at present the subject of\nso much and such bitter discussion, are the result of international\norganization.\n\n\"They were not adopted by a Congress, a Parliament, or a Reichstag. They\nwere agreed to by many and divergent peoples, who sent representatives\nto meet for their discussion and determination.\"\n\n\nOne of the Examples.\n\n\"In the admiralty law we have a most striking example of uniformity of\npractice in all parts of the world. If a ship is captured or harmed in\nthe Far East and taken into Yokohama or Nagasaki, damages will be\nassessed and collected precisely as they would be in New York or\nLiverpool.\n\n\"The world is gradually developing a code for international legal\nprocedure. Special arbitral tribunals have tended to merge and grow into\nthe international court at The Hague, and that, in turn, will develop\nuntil it becomes a real supreme judicial tribunal.\n\n\"Of course the analogy with the federated State fails at some points,\nbut I believe the time will come when each nation will deposit in a\nworld federation some portion of its sovereignty.\n\n\"When this occurs we shall be able to establish an international\nexecutive and an international police, both devised for the especial\npurpose of enforcing the decisions of the international court.\n\n\"Here, again, we offer a perfect object lesson. Our Central Government\nis one of limited and defined powers. Our history can show Europe how\nsuch limitations and definitions can be established and interpreted, and\nhow they can be modified and amended when necessary to meet new\nconditions.\n\n\"My colleague, Prof. John Bassett Moore, is now preparing and publishing\na series of annotated reports of the international arbitration\ntribunals, in order that the Governments and jurists of the world may\nhave at hand, as they have in the United States Supreme Court, reports,\na record of decided cases which, when the time comes, may be referred to\nas precedents.\n\n\"It will be through graded processes such as this that the great end\nwill be accomplished. Beginning with such annotated reports as a basis\nfor precedents, each new case tried before this tribunal will add a\nfurther precedent, and presently a complete international code will be\nin existence. It was in this way that the English common law was built,\nand such has been the admirable history of the work done by our own\njudicial system.\n\n\"The study of such problems is at this time infinitely more important\nthan the consideration of how large a fine shall be inflicted by the\nvictors upon the vanquished.\"\n\n\nThe Chief Result.\n\n\"There is the probability of some dislocation of territory and some\nshiftings of sovereignty after the war ends, but these will be of\ncomparatively minor importance. The important result of this great war\nwill be the stimulation of international organization along some such\nlines as I have suggested.\n\n\"Dislocation of territory and the shifting of sovereigns as the result\nof international disagreements are mediaeval practices. After this war\nthe world will want to solve its problems in terms of the future, not in\nthose of the outgrown past.\n\n\"Conventional diplomacy and conventional statesmanship have very\nevidently broken down in Europe. They have made a disastrous failure of\nthe work with which they were intrusted. They did not and could not\nprevent the war because they knew and used only the old formulas. They\nhad no tools for a job like this.\n\n\"A new type of international statesman is certain to arise, who will\nhave a grasp of new tendencies, a new outlook upon life. Bismarck used\nto say that it would pay any nation to wear the clean linen of a\ncivilized State. The truth of this must be taught to those nations of\nthe world which are weakest in morale, and it can only be done, I\nsuppose, as similar work is accomplished with individuals. Courts, not\nkillings, have accomplished it with individuals.\n\n\"One more point ought to be remembered. We sometimes hear it said that\nnationalism, the desire for national expression by each individual\nnation, makes the permanent peace and good order of the world\nimpossible.\n\n\"To me it seems absurd to believe that this is any truer of nations than\nit is of individuals. It is not each nation's desire for national\noppression which makes peace impossible; it is the fact that thus far in\nthe world's history such desire has been bound up with militarism.\n\n\"The nation whose frontier bristles with bayonets and with forts is like\nthe individual with a magazine pistol in his pocket. Both make for\nmurder. Both in their hearts really mean murder.\n\n\"The world will be better when the nations invite the judgment of their\nneighbors and are influenced by it.\n\n\"When John Hay said that the Golden Rule and the open door should guide\nour new diplomacy he said something which should be applicable to the\nnew diplomacy of the whole world. The Golden Rule and a free chance are\nall that any man ought to want or ought to have, and they are all that\nany nation ought to want or ought to have.\n\n\"One of the controlling principles of a democratic State is that its\nmilitary and naval establishments must be completely subservient to the\ncivil power. They should form the police, and not be the dominant factor\nof any national life.\n\n\"As soon as they go beyond this simple function in any nation, then that\nnation is afflicted with militarism.\n\n\"It is difficult to make predictions of the war's effect on us. As I see\nit, our position will depend a good deal upon the outcome of the\nconflict, and what that will be no one at present knows.\n\n\"If a new map of Europe follows the war, its permanence will depend upon\nwhether or not the changes are such as will permit nationalities to\norganize as nations.\n\n\"The world should have learned through the lessons of the past that it\nis impossible permanently and peacefully to submerge large bodies of\naliens if they are treated as aliens. That is the opposite of the mixing\nprocess which is so successfully building a nation out of varied\nnationalities in the United States.\n\n\"The old Romans understood this. They permitted their outlying vassal\nnations to speak any language they chose and to worship whatever god\nthey chose, so long as they recognized the sovereignty of Rome. When a\nconquering nation goes beyond that, and begins to suppress religions,\nlanguages, and customs, it begins at that very moment to sow the seeds\nof insurrection and revolution.\n\n\"My old teacher and colleague, Prof. Burgess, once defined a nation as\nan ethnographic unit inhabiting a geographic unit. That is an\nilluminating definition. If a nation is not an ethnographic unit, it\ntries to become one by oppressing or amalgamating the weaker portions of\nits people. If it is not a geographic unit, it tries to become one by\nreaching out to a mountain chain or to the sea--to something which will\nserve as a real dividing line between it and its next neighbors.\n\n\"The accuracy of this definition can hardly be denied, and we all know\nwhat the violations of this principle have been in Europe. It is\nunnecessary for me to point them out.\n\n\"Races rarely have been successfully mixed by conquest. The military\nwinner of a war is not always the real conqueror in the long run. The\nNormans conquered Saxon England, but Saxon law and Saxon institutions\nworked up through the new power and have dominated England's later\nhistory. The Teutonic tribes conquered Rome, but Roman civilization, by\na sort of capillary attraction, went up into the mass above and\npresently dominated the Teutons.\n\n\"The persistency of a civilization may well be superior in tenacity to\nmere military conquest and control.\n\n\"The smallness of the number of instances in which conquering nations\nhave been able successfully to deal with alien peoples is extraordinary.\nThe Romans were unusually successful, and England has been successful\nwith all but the Irish, but perhaps no other peoples have been\nsuccessful in high degree in an effort to hold alien populations as\nvassals and to make them really happy and comfortable as such.\n\n\"One of the war's chief effects on us will be to change our point of\nview. Europe will be more vivid to us from now on. There are many public\nmen who have never thought much about Europe, and who have been far from\na realization of its actual importance to us. It has been a place to\nwhich to go for a Summer holiday.\n\n\"But, suddenly, they find they cannot sell their cotton there or their\ncopper, that they cannot market their stocks and bonds there, that they\ncannot send money to their families who are traveling there, because\nthere is a war. To such men the war must have made it apparent that\ninterdependence among nations is more than a mere phrase.\n\n\"All our trade and all our economic and social policies must recognize\nthis. The world has discovered that cash without credit means little.\nOne cannot use cash if one cannot use one's credit to draw it whenever\nand wherever needed. Credit is intangible and volatile, and may be\ndestroyed over night.\n\n\"I saw this in Venice.\n\n\"On July 31 I could have drawn every cent that my letter of credit\ncalled for up to the time the banks closed. At 10 in the morning on the\n1st of August I could not draw the value of a postage stamp.\n\n\"Yet the banker in New York who issued my letter of credit had not\nfailed. His standing was as good as ever it had been. But the world's\nsystem of international exchange of credit had suffered a stroke of\nparalysis over night.\n\n\"This realization of international interdependence, I hope, will\nelevate and refine our patriotism by teaching men a wider sympathy and a\ndeeper understanding of other peoples, nations, and languages. I\nsincerely hope it will educate us up to what I have called 'The\nInternational Mind.'\n\n\"When Joseph Chamberlain began his campaign after returning from South\nAfrica his keynote was, 'Learn to think imperially.' I think ours should\nbe, 'Learn to think internationally,' to see ourselves not in\ncompetition with the other peoples of the world, but working with them\ntoward a common end, the advance of civilization.\"\n\n\nA Note of Optimism.\n\n\"There are hopeful signs, even in the midst of the gloom that hangs over\nus. Think what it has meant for the great nations of Europe to have come\nto us, as they have done, asking our favorable public opinion. We have\nno army and navy worthy of their fears. They can have been induced by\nnothing save their conviction that we are the possessors of sound\npolitical ideals and a great moral force.\n\n\"In other words, they do not want us to fight for them, but they do want\nus to approve of them. They want us to pass judgment upon the humanity\nand the legality of their acts, because they feel that our judgment\nwill be the judgment of history. There is a lesson in this.\n\n\"If we had not repealed the Panama Canal Tolls Exemption act last June\nthey would not have come to us as they are doing now. Who would have\ncared for our opinion in the matter of a treaty violation if, for mere\nfinancial interest or from sheer vanity, we ourselves had violated a\nsolemn treaty?\n\n\"When Congress repealed the Panama Canal Tolls Exemption act it marked\nan epoch in the history of the United States. This did more than the\nSpanish war, than the building of the Panama Canal, or than anything\nelse I think of, to make us a true world power.\n\n\"As a nation we have kept our word when sorely tempted to break it. We\nmade Cuba independent, we have not exploited the Philippines, we have\nstood by our word as to Panama Canal tolls.\n\n\"In consequence we are the first moral power in the world today. Others\nmay be first with armies, still others first with navies. But we have\nmade good our right to be appealed to on questions of national and\ninternational morality. That Europe is seeking our favor is the tribute\nof the European nations to this fact.\"\n\n\n\n\nA New World Map\n\nBy Wilhelm Ostwald.\n\n     Late Visiting Professor to Harvard and Columbia Universities\n     from the University of Leipsic.\n\n\n_The following article is extracted from a letter written by Prof.\nOstwald to Edwin D. Mead, Director of the World Peace Foundation._\n\nThe war is the result of a deliberate onslaught upon Germany and Austria\nby the powers of the Triple Entente--Russia, France, and England. Its\nobject is on the part of Russia an extension of Russian supremacy over\nthe Balkans, on the side of France revenge, and on the side of England\nannihilation of the German Navy and German commerce. In England\nespecially it has been for several centuries a constant policy to\ndestroy upon favoring occasion every navy of every other country which\nthreatened to become equal to the English Navy.\n\nGermany has proved its love of peace for forty-four years under the most\ntrying circumstances. While all other States have expanded themselves\nby conquest, Russia in Manchuria, England in the Transvaal, France in\nMorocco, Italy in Tripoli, Austria in Bosnia, Japan in Korea, Germany\nalone has contented itself with the borders fixed in 1871. It is purely\na war of defense which is now forced upon us.\n\nIn the face of these attacks Germany has until now (the end of August)\nproved its military superiority, which rests upon the fact that the\nentire German military force is scientifically organized and honestly\nadministered.\n\nThe violation of Belgian neutrality was an act of military necessity,\nsince it is now proved that Belgian neutrality was to be violated by\nFrance and England. A proof of this is the accumulation of English\nmunitions in Maubeuge, aside from many other facts.\n\nAccording to the course of the war up to the present time, European\npeace seems to me nearer than ever before. We pacificists must only\nunderstand that unhappily the time was not yet sufficiently developed to\nestablish peace by the peaceful way. If Germany, as everything now seems\nto make probable, is victorious in the struggle not only with Russia and\nFrance but attains the further end of destroying the source from which\nfor two or three centuries all European strifes have been nourished and\nintensified, namely, the English policy of world dominion, then will\nGermany, fortified on one side by its military superiority, on the other\nside by the eminently peaceful sentiment of the greatest part of its\npeople, and especially of the German Emperor, dictate peace to the rest\nof Europe, I hope especially that the future treaty of peace will in\nthe first place provide effectually that a European war such as the\npresent can never again break out.\n\nI hope, moreover, that the Russian people, after the conquest of their\narmies, will free themselves from Czarism through an internal movement\nby which the present political Russia will be resolved into its natural\nunits, namely, Great Russia, the Caucasus, Little Russia, Poland,\nSiberia, and Finland, to which probably the Baltic provinces would join\nthemselves. These, I trust, would unite themselves with Finland and\nSweden, and perhaps with Norway and Denmark, into a Baltic federation,\nwhich in close connection with Germany would insure European peace, and\nespecially form a bulwark against any disposition to war which might\nremain in Great Britain.\n\nFor the other side of the earth I predict a similar development under\nthe leadership of the United States. I assume that the English dominion\nwill suffer a downfall similar to that which I have predicted for\nRussia, and that under these circumstances Canada would join the United\nStates, the expanded republic assuming a certain leadership with\nreference to the South American republics.\n\nThe principle of the absolute sovereignty of the individual nations,\nwhich in the present European tumult has proved itself so inadequate and\nbaneful, must be given up and replaced by a system conforming to the\nworld's actual conditions and especially to those political and economic\nrelations which determine industrial and cultural progress and the\ncommon welfare.\n\n[Illustration: NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER\n\n_See Page 565_]\n\n[Illustration: ARTHUR VON BRIESEN\n\n_See Page 548_]\n\n\n\n\nThe Verdict of the American People\n\nBy Newell Dwight Hillis.\n\n     _Dr. Hillis, who occupies the pulpit of Plymouth Church,\n     Brooklyn, made famous by the pastorate of the late Henry Ward\n     Beecher, delivered the following remarkable sermon on the\n     European War on Sunday, Dec. 20, 1914, choosing as his text\n     the words: \"From whence come wars? Come they not from your own\n     lusts?\"_\n\n\nNearly five months have now passed by since the German Army invaded\nBelgium and France. These 140 days have been packed with thrilling and\nmomentous events. While from their safe vantage ground the American\npeople have surveyed the scene, an old regime has literally crumbled\nunder our very eyes. Europe is a loom on whose earthen framework\ndemiurgic forces like Frederick the Great, Bismarck, and Napoleon once\nwove the texture of European civilization. Now the demon of war has,\nwith hot knife, shorn away the texture, and a modern Czar and Kaiser,\nKing and President, with Generals and Admirals, are weaving the warp and\nwoof of a new world. One hundred years ago the forces that bred wars\nwere political forces; today the collision between nations is born of\neconomic interests. The twentieth century influences are chiefly the\nforce of wealth and the force of public opinion. These are the giant\nsteeds, though the reins of the horses may be in the hands of Kings and\nKaisers. In Napoleon's day antagonism grew out of the natural hatred of\nautocracy for democracy, of German imperialism for French radicalism.\nToday Germany is not even interested in France's republican form of\nGovernment, nor is France concerned with Germany's imperial autocrat.\nBut all Europe is intensely concerned with the question of economic\nsupremacy or financial subordination.\n\nEver since Oliver Cromwell's day England has been the mistress of the\nseas, and Germany is envious and believes that she has a right to\nsupplant England in this naval leadership. France has long been the\nbanker of Europe, and Germany covets financial leadership. From whence\ncome wars? Come they not from men's lusts? Now that long time has\npassed, it is quite certain that neither Napoleon nor Bismarck nor\nWilliam II. understood the future. It is a proverb that yesterday is a\nseed, today the stalk, and tomorrow is the full corn in the ear.\nNapoleon was a practical man, but he could not see the shock in the\nseed. When Napoleon said, \"One hundred years from now Europe will be all\nrepublican or all Cossack\"--Napoleon was quite wrong. Forty years ago\nBismarck said that he had reduced France to the level of a fourth-class\nnation, and that henceforth France did not count; while as for the\nBalkan States, \"the whole Eastern question is not worth the bones of a\nPomeranian grenadier\"--Bismarck was quite wrong. The present Kaiser has\nno imagination. A man of any prevision of the future might have foreseen\nthat any attack upon England would settle the Irish question; that any\ntreaty with Turkey would force Italy, as Turkey's enemy in the late\nItalian-Turkish war, to break with Germany; any man with the least\ninstinct for diplomacy might have known that the twentieth century man\nis so incensed by an enemy's trespass upon his property, that Belgium\nwould have resisted encroachment, and so cost Germany the best three\nweeks of the entire war. If the history of great wars tells us anything,\nit tells us that the first qualification of the statesman and diplomat\nis an intuitive knowledge of a future that is the certain outcome of the\npresent. There has been no foresight on the part of the makers and\nadvisers of this war. Years ago, when the Austrian Emperor visited\nInnsbruck, the Burgomaster ordered foresters to go up on the mountain\nsides and cut certain swaths of brush. At the moment the man with his\naxe did not know what he was doing, but when the night fell, and the\ntorch was lifted on the boughs, the people in the city below read these\nwords written in letters of fire, \"Welcome to our Emperor.\" Today the\ndemon of war has been writing with blazing letters certain lessons upon\nthe hills and valleys of Europe, and fortunate is that youth who can\nread the writing and interpret aright the lessons of the times.\n\nThe people of the republic now realize for the first time what are the\ninevitable fruits of imperialism and militarism. One of the perils of\nAmerica's distance from the scenes of autocracy is that our people have\ncome to think that the forms of government are of little importance. We\nhear it said that climate determines government and that one nation\nlikes autocracy and another limited monarchy, that we like democracy\nself-government, and that the people are about as happy under one form\nof control as another. This misconception is based upon a failure to\nunderstand foreign imperialism. Superficially, the fruits of autocracy\nare efficiency, industrial wealth, and military power. But now, after\nnearly five months of constant discussion, our people understand\nthoroughly the other side of imperialism. The 6,000,000 of\nGerman-Americans living in this country, with their high type of\ncharacter, millions who have left their native land to escape service in\nthe army, the burdens of taxation involved in militarism, and the law of\nlese majeste, should have opened our eyes long ago. During the last five\nyears I have lectured in more than one hundred cities on the New Germany\nand the lessons derived from her industrial efficiency, with the\napplication of science to the production of wealth, but I did not\nappreciate fully the far-off harvest of militarism. And, lest an\nAmerican overstate the meaning of militarism, let me condense\nTreitschke's view. He holds that the nation should be looked upon as a\nvast military engine; that its ruler should be the commander of the\narmy; that his Cabinet should be under Generals; that the whole nation\nshould march with the force of an armed regiment; that the real \"sin\nagainst the Holy Ghost was the sin of military impotence; that such an\narmy should take all it wants and the territory it needs and explain\nafterward.\" Manufacturers are essentially inventors of cannons and guns\nand dreadnoughts, incidentally self-supporting men. Bankers are here to\nfinance the army and incidentally to make money. Physicians are here to\nheal the wounded soldiers. Gymnasiums are founded to train soldiers.\nWomen are here to breed soldiers, and militarism is the path that will\nbring Germany to her place in the sun. The youth is first of all to be a\nsoldier and incidentally to be a man. No one has indicted Germany's\nmilitarism in stronger language than the distinguished German-American,\nCarl Schurz. In words that burn the great statesman expressed his hatred\nof the imperialism and militarism against which he helped to organize a\nrevolution that led to his flight to this country. Of late Americans\nhave been asking themselves certain questions.\n\n\nThe American Ideal vs. the German.\n\nWhat will be the result if Germany is allowed to seize any smaller State\nwhose territory and property she covets? Is all Europe to become an\narmed camp? What is the meaning of this German professor's article in\nThe North American Review, written two or three years ago, in which he\nsays that once she is victorious the Monroe Doctrine will go and the\nUnited States will receive the \"thrashing she so richly deserves\"? Must\nwe then go over to the military ideal? If Germany supports 8,000,000\nsoldiers out of 66,000,000, must we withdraw from productive industry\n12,000,000 men for at least two or three of the best years of their\nyoung life? Must we start in on a programme of ten dreadnoughts a year\ninstead of building ten colleges and universities for the same sum of\nmoney? Of late Americans who love their country have been searching\ntheir own hearts. Merchants hitherto busied with commerce are asking\nthemselves whither this country is drifting. Is Germany to compel us to\nbecome a vast military machine? This military question is a subject of\ndiscussion on the street cars and in the stores, at the dining room\ntable. No articles in paper and magazine are so eagerly read and\nanalyzed. The American ideal is not a military machine, but a high\nquality of manhood. To make men free, with the gift of self-expression;\nto make men wise through the public school and the free press; to make\nmen self-sufficing and happy in their homes, through freedom of\nindustrial contracts; to make men sound in their manhood through\nreligious liberty for Jew and Gentile and Catholic and Protestant--these\nare our national ideals. America stands at the other pole of the\nuniverse from imperialism and militarism. So far from being willing to\ndesert the political faith of the fathers, this war has confirmed our\nconfidence in self-government. Liberty to grow, freedom to climb as high\nas industry and ability will permit, liberty to analyze and discuss the\nviews of President, Congress, Governor--these are our rights. In a\nmilitary autocracy there can be no liberty of the printing press. If a\nman criticises the Kaiser, he goes to jail; in this republic, if Horace\nGreeley criticises Abraham Lincoln, Abraham Lincoln does not send the\ngreat editor to jail, but writes the latter, \"My paramount object is to\nsave the Union,\" and vindicates himself at the bar of the nation. An\nAmerican editor or citizen would choke to death in Germany. He could not\nbreathe because of the mephitic gases of imperialism and militarism. For\na long time some of us did not realize what was involved, but now we do\nrealize the difference between the fruits of democratic self-government\nand the fruits of military imperialism.\n\nThe last five months have brought a new realization to American citizens\nas to the rights and liberties of small States. In the republic the sin\nof trespass is one of the blackest of sins. Here we hold to the\nsanctity of property. A man's home is his castle, a citadel that cannot\nbe invaded even by the power of the State. So deep is the American\nhatred of trespass against property rights that imperialism finds it\nimpossible to understand this. Here the individual is a king of kings in\nhis native right, and takes out an injunction against the city that\nwishes to trespass upon his property. This antagonism manifests itself\nin the laws that safeguard the small shopkeeper against the big firm,\nand the small manufacturer against any company with its billion dollars\nof capital. This antagonism to the sin of trespass has lent a peculiar\nsanctity to treaties between Canada and the United States. We have one\nhundred millions of people, and Canada nine millions. We need many\nthings that Canada has, but it is intellectually unthinkable that \"we\nshould take what we want and explain afterward,\" or that we should\nviolate our treaty guaranteeing neutrality to Canada. Our frontier line\nis three thousand miles long. There is not a fort from Maine to\nVictoria. If we adopted Germany's position we would have to build one\nthousand forts, withdraw two million young men from the farm, factory,\nstore and bank, and load the working people with taxes to support them.\nIn a free land, and in God's world, there should be a place for the poor\nman and for the small nation. In the olden time there was a king who had\nherds and flocks, and a poor man who had one pet lamb. It came to pass\nthat a stranger claimed the right of hospitality at the rich man's\npalace, and the king sent out and took the poor man's one lamb and gave\nit for food to the stranger. And, soon or late, the time will come when\nhistory will tell the story of Germany's taking little Belgium, and\nconscience, like a prophet, will indict the militarism that seized the\none lamb that belonged to the poor man. This episode is not closed. The\nGerman representative who says that Belgium is a part of Germany may be\nright in terms of future government and war, but the incident has just\nbegun in the memory of the soldiers who never can forget that they first\nbroke their sacred treaty, and then, when the Belgian defended his home\nas his castle, butchered the man, who died with a sacred treaty in his\nhand. Why, all over this land, teachers, fathers, editors, authors, have\nfound it necessary to say to the young men and women of the republic,\n\"Do not sign your name to an obligation unless you intend to keep it.\"\nKeep your faith. Remember that your word given should be as good as your\nbond. \"Swear to your own hurt, and change not.\" All this is inevitable,\nas the result of Germany's trespass upon the property and the homes of\nBelgium. In some European lands the State is everything and the\nindividual nothing. In this republic the individual is first, and the\nState is here to safeguard his rights and see to it that no one\ntrespasses upon his property. The time will come when the nation that\nbreaks its treaties and sows to the wind shall of that wind reap the\nwhirlwind. It is an awful thing for a nation to make it inevitable that\nhereafter when other people sign a treaty with that country, that our\nrepresentatives shall say: \"Before we sign this treaty with you, we wish\nto ask one question. Later, if it is to your interest to break this\ntreaty, is this document to be sneered at as a scrap of paper? Or does\nthis treaty mean the faith of a nation that will die rather than break\nits word, given before the tribunal of civilized States?\"\n\n\nThe Death of the Tribal God Idea.\n\nThis great war and one or two of the leaders thereof have killed the old\ntribal idea of God. In the twentieth century it seems almost ludicrous\nto find that the conception of the ancient Hebrews is still held by some\nrulers. Be the reasons what they may, of late there has been a strange\nrecrudescence of the tribal God idea. This is the twentieth century, not\nthe tenth! Think of a man sending his soldiers into Belgium, saying,\n\"Make yourselves as terrible as the Huns of Attila, and the Lord our God\nwill give you victory.\" Just as if God were not the God of the whole\nearth, a disinterested God, a God who makes His sun to shine and His\nrain to fall upon all His children, without regard to race or clime or\ncolor. Why, it is as artless as the way the old Hebrew peasant called on\nGod to blast his enemy's field, and drown his children with floods, and\nsmite his herds with the plague. The tribal idea of God belongs with the\nox cart, the medicine man, the cave dweller. This is an era of science.\nWhatever is true is universal, not racial. If the heart beats and the\nblood circulates in a German soldier's veins, the blood flows in the\nveins of the people of England and France. If the earth goes around the\nsun in Berlin, the earth goes around the sun in Petrograd and Edinburgh.\nIf there are seven rays in the sunbeam, why, the discussion is closed,\nand it is a universal fact. And if Jesus was right when He said, \"God is\nour Father, and all the races are our brothers, and the world has been\nfitted up by God as an Eden garden for His children,\" then no man or\nruler should ever adopt the view of the peasant and the cave man, and\ntry to make the Eternal God a tribal God. The unconscious humor in the\nstatements of one or two men as to their tribal God idea has added to\nthe gayety of nations. But when any view is laughed at, it is doomed.\nFrom the very moment that the doctrine of election, that made God love a\nfew aristocrats and pass the non-elect by, became a matter of joke in\nthe comic papers, that theory was dead. Not otherwise is it with this\nidea of a tribal God. When Barry Paine begins to say,\n\n    Led by William, as you tell,\n    God has done extremely well,\n\nthe tribal idea has been relegated to the theological scrap-heap. The\npeasant's view must go. In this age men must be citizens of all\ncountries and of the universe. God is a sun Who shines for the poor\nman's hut as truly as for the rich man's palace. The Judge of all the\nearth is also the Father of all the races, and He will do men good and\nnot evil.\n\nIn view of the events of the last few months, all Americans now realize\nas never before the futility of war as a means of settling disputes.\nIndeed, it may be doubted whether any war has ever settled any question.\nDefeat did not convince the South that they were wrong in their idea of\nState rights or slavery. If the South has given up both ideas today it\nis because time, events, and social progress have changed their view,\nnot because the sword convinced them. Bismarck's victory at Versailles\nand von Moltke's at Sedan did not settle the dispute with France. To\nkeep one billion dollars of indemnity Germany must have spent five\nbillions on forts and armies in the government of Alsace and Lorraine.\nGermany's apparent victory simply put Germany's trouble with France out\nat compound interest, and left the next generation of Germans to pay\nseveral billions of dollars of accrued debt through hatred. Plainly it\nis folly not to reconstitute the map of Europe. The frontier lines of\nthe geographer should exactly coincide with the racial lines. The German\nrace, with their peculiar ideals, ought not to try to govern the French\nrace. It is an expensive experiment. It is an impossible experiment. The\nplan is doomed to failure in advance. And when the day of payment comes\nit is quite certain that the questions at issue will not have been\nsettled by regiments of soldiers. They must finally be settled by an\nappeal to some court of arbitration that will do justice and love mercy;\nthat will insist upon the rights of the smaller States, and make it\nimpossible for the great ones of the earth to trespass upon the property\nand the liberties of brave little peoples.\n\n\nImperialism Confuses Men's Judgments.\n\nOut of the smoke of battle another lesson is written for all who have\neyes to read. In view of the mistakes made by men who have absolute\npower it is now certain that exemption from criticism is a bad thing for\nany man, and that endless adoration destroys the ruler's power to think\nin straight lines. There never lived a man who was not injured by\nperpetual compliments. Strong men are willing to pay cash for criticism.\nFlattery will conceal the weakness, and they know that pitiless\ncriticism will expose the danger and perhaps save them. No man is so\nunfortunate as the man who is put on a throne lifted up beyond the\nreach of plain truth telling. It is doubtful if so many blunders were\never made by statesmen and diplomats as were made at the beginning of\nthis war. Just think of one Government being wrong in all these\nparticulars at the same time! Lincoln said, \"You can't fool all of the\npeople all of the time.\" Yes, that may be true in a republic, but you\ncertainly can fool all the diplomats and Generals and do it all the\ntime--during July and August, in any event. Call the roll of the\ndiplomatic blunders, and the list is long. First, England will be\nneutral and Ireland will keep her from going to war; second, Italy will\nbe our ally; third, Belgium will be neutral and allow us to trespass\nupon her property and her homes; fourth, France is unprepared and Paris\nwill fall within three weeks; fifth, an alliance with Turkey, despite\nher polygamy and butcheries in Armenia and the civilized world's hatred\nfor her cruelties, will help us; sixth, Japan will hold Russia in check;\nseventh, the Czar will be attacked by Bulgaria, Italy, and China. It\nseems incredible that any ruler and group of diplomats could be so\nentirely wrong, all the time, on every question, for a whole Summer! Was\nthere no man as diplomat who had the wisdom to see that an attack upon\nEngland would end the disputes in Ireland? And bind together Canada,\nAustralia, New Zealand, South Africa, India into a new United States of\nGreat Britain? Was there no statesman with enough prevision of the\nfuture, and with courage to tell the people in Wilhelmstrasse that the\ncertain result would be the United States of Balkany, to stand\nhenceforth as a barrier between Germany and the Bosphorus? Was there no\none to remind Berlin that Italy had just completed a war with Turkey and\nthat any treaty with Turkey meant inevitably the breaking of friendship\nwith Italy? Alas! for the man who is elevated to a throne, in whose\npresence men burn incense, pour forth flattery that he may breathe its\nperfume, sing songs of praise that he may slumber!\n\nIn concluding our survey of the nations and the stake of each country\nin the war, there is one reflection that must be obvious to all thinking\nmen. This little fire of last August has become a world conflagration.\nThe nation that first sent out her armies was Germany. There is a\nhigh-water mark of battle in every war, and after that, the invading\nwaves begin their retreat. The high-water mark of Napoleon's was\nAusterlitz and the waves ebbed away at Waterloo. The high-water mark of\nthe civil war was Gettysburg, and the tide ebbed out at Appomattox.\nBelgium's defense cost Germany the three most important weeks of the\nwar, and her high-water mark was when she was within twenty miles of\nParis. Occasional eddies and returns of the tide there may be, but\nnothing is more certain than that there are ten nations and six hundred\nmillions of men that had rather die than have militarism imposed upon\nthemselves and their children. Americans who admire German efficiency,\nthe German people, and want to see German science preserved, and feel an\nimmeasurable debt to Martin Luther, do not want Germany destroyed. But\nGermany will not listen to England, nor France, nor America. There is\nonly one voice that can reach Germany--it is the voice of the\nGerman-Americans in this country. They are six million strong. They are\namong the most honored and esteemed folk in American life. Their\nachievements are beyond all praise. The Germans have built Milwaukee and\nhave done much for St. Louis. The Germans have been great forces in\nCincinnati and Chicago and New York. What wealth among their bankers!\nWhat prosperity among German manufacturers! What solidity of manhood in\nthese German Lutherans! Was there ever a finer body of farming folk than\nthe German landowners of the Middle West? The republic owes the\nGerman-American a great debt as to liberty through men like Carl Schurz.\nTake Martin Luther and German liberty of thought out of the republic and\nthis land would suffer an immeasurable loss. Many of these\nGerman-Americans own great estates and have investments in the\nFatherland. Today these six million German-Americans have the centre of\nthe world's stage. This war is a conflagration that will probably burn\nitself out. But if the six million German-Americans organize themselves\nand hold great meetings of protest in New York and Brooklyn and Chicago\nand Milwaukee, in St. Louis and Cincinnati; if German-American editors\nand bankers and business men united their voice, they would be heard.\n\n\nGerman-American Man of the Hour.\n\nAnd do they not owe something to this republic? Having come to the\nkingdom for such a crisis as this, should they not use their influence\nwith the Fatherland? Having escaped conscription and years of military\nservice, with heavy taxation and enjoyed the liberty of the press;\nhaving become convinced that militarism does not promote the prosperity\nand manhood of the people, why should they not as one man ask the\nFatherland now to present their cause to arbitrators? To no body of\nAmerican citizens has there ever come a more strategic opportunity, or a\nresponsibility so heavy. Some of the most thoughtful men in this land\nbelieve that the destiny of Germany rests now largely with the leaders\nof the 6,000,000 German-Americans in our country. But no matter what the\noutcome, let no man think that God and justice are not fully equal to\nthis emergency. The great vine of Liberty was planted by Divine hands in\nthe Eden garden. Just now men are feeding the blossoms of the tree of\nlife to their war horses and splitting the boughs of that tree into\nshafts for their spears. The storm roars through the branches, but the\nstorm will die out. Better days are coming. It may be that the\nconvulsion of war will do for Europe what the earthquake did for the\nrude folk of Greece--cracked the solid rock and exposed the silver veins\nthat gave the wealth with which rude men built Athens, with its art, its\nliterature, its law and its liberty. Take no counsel of crouching fear,\nGod is abroad in the world. With Him a thousand years are as one day.\nWhen a long time has passed let us believe that self-government will be\nfound to be the most stable form of government, and that these golden\nwords, Liberty, Opportunity, Intelligence, and Integrity, will be the\nwatch-words not only of the republic, but of all the nations of the\nearth.\n\n\n\n\nInterview With Dr. Hillis\n\n_From the Brooklyn Eagle._\n\n\nA frank declaration that he was opposed to Germany in the present great\nwar was the answer returned today [Dec. 21, 1914] by the Rev. Dr. Newell\nDwight Hillis to the protests against his sermon at Plymouth Church last\nnight, in which he scored militarism and the Kaiser.\n\nNot only did Dr. Hillis come out with the statement that he had said and\nmeant all to which exception was taken in his sermon, but, in an\ninterview today in his study, in the Arbuckle Institute, he asserted as\nwell that he had told but little of what he had come to believe about\nGermany. This position, he said, was that America and all the world must\nhope for German defeat, and must see that Germany was in the wrong.\n\n\"I was for Germany five months ago,\" said Dr. Hillis. \"I have been\nlecturing for five years about the lessons we might learn from Germany.\nFive months ago, it may be remembered, I gave an interview, in which I\npraised Germany and in which I took the part of the German people in the\ndreadful war that had come.\n\n\"But I have changed my mind. I have seen that I was mistaken. Several\nmonths ago I gave instructions to my lecture bureau to withdraw my\nlecture, 'The New Germany,' from my list. That was about the middle of\nSeptember, and it was only then that I realized what a German success\nwould mean to the world--how there could be nothing else but a world of\narmed camps, how we in this country, too, would have to adopt militarism\nin order to live.\n\n\"Just prior to that time, in the first of my Sunday evening sermons in\nthis course, I had praised the Kaiser. I believed in the German ideals,\nI believed in German progress, German inventions, German principles. But\nI was wrong. I have now become convinced of what I never imagined\nbefore--that in the German viewpoint the only sin against the Holy Ghost\nis military impotency, and, to use Treitschke's words again, the only\nvirtue is militarism.\"\n\nThe pastor of Plymouth uttered this attack upon Germany with a\nscornfulness which the printed word can hardly indicate. He was as\nstrongly against Germany--more strongly against Germany now than he had\nbefore been in favor of Germany, he said. It was a position, he said, to\nwhich everybody in the United States was turning, and it was inevitable\nthat Germany should find the world against her.\n\nIn his frank avowal of his position regarding Germany and the Kaiser,\nDr. Hillis admitted, too, that his sermon last night had contained more\nthan appeared on the surface. When he stated in the sermon that no man\nor ruler should ever adopt the view of the peasant and the cave man, and\ntry to make the Eternal God a tribal God, he had the Kaiser in mind,\nsaid Dr. Hillis. The sermon is published in full in today's sermon pages\nof The Eagle.\n\nIn addition, Dr. Hillis said that while he believed that his sermon\ncould not be considered in any way a violation of President Wilson's\nappeal for neutrality, yet, indirectly, the passages to which exception\nhad been taken could be rightly construed as an attack upon Germany and\nthe Kaiser.\n\n\"You believe that it is right for a minister to use the pulpit to\nexpress his own views upon a subject like this?\" was asked.\n\n\"I do not believe that it is right for a minister to air his peculiar\npolitical views upon any subject--personal, social, or economic,\"\nanswered Dr. Hillis, emphatically. \"The church is a conservatory where a\nwarm, genial atmosphere should be created. My conception of the work of\na minister is that he is to create an atmosphere in the church on Sunday\nso that the Republican with the tariff, the Democrat who believes in\nfree trade, and the Single Taxer can all grow and express their judgment\nduring the week.\n\n\"The sun and the Summer shine for all kinds of seeds and roots, and the\nminister and the church should create an atmosphere in which all\ntemperaments and races and faiths can grow. It is quite true that there\nwere some of my German friends and members who rather protested against\nmy view last night. But they had the same right and liberty to protest\nthat I have. A German physician told me plainly that he thought that\nwithin six months I would change my view, and with the new light go over\nto the position of his native land, and even thought that I might\nretract all my studies, that are apparently prejudiced in favor of the\nrepublic and self-government and the liberty of the press. Well, if I do\nchange my views and am converted to his viewpoint, I certainly will\nretract my statements. But I think this improbable. The task of\nconverting me should be let out as a Government contract--in piecemeal.\"\n\nDr. Hillis was reminded here that a number of people were said to have\nleft the church last night in the course of his sermon as a sign of\nprotest against the expression of his views. Asked if it were true, Dr.\nHillis answered:\n\n\"I did not see many leave,\" and then declared that it was impossible to\nimagine that war should not be discussed in the churches as it was being\ndiscussed everywhere else. He continued with the assertion that he\nbelieved it was his duty as the minister of Plymouth Church to say what\nhe had, and then made this assertion with a vehemence that was almost\nstartling:\n\n\"Whenever the time comes that I have to add God and the devil together\nand divide by two in the name of neutrality, I'll withdraw. I'm not\ngoing to sacrifice my manhood for what some people call neutrality.\"\n\nIt was on this score that Dr. Hillis came out with his unequivocal\ndeclaration that he was against Germany and against the Kaiser. He\nasserted that the viewpoint of the German people would have to be\nchanged if they were to take the place in the world he had thought their\ndue, five months ago, and he stated there could be no doubt but that the\nwar was occasioned by Germany's lust for power--political, industrial,\neconomic.\n\n\"I believe that the real issue of this war is largely industrial,\"\ncontinued Dr. Hillis. \"It is an industrial war and not a political war.\nSome days ago I said that the real fight between Germany and the nations\nopposed to her was a fight for the possession of the iron fields\nrecently discovered in Northern France. That statement regarding\nGermany's iron deposits and the whole economic situation has been\nchallenged.\n\n\"Instead of modifying my position, I wish to reaffirm it. This is an age\nof steel. Without hematite iron deposits Germany cannot build her\nsteamships, her cannon, her railways, her factories. German engineers\nhave been saying for five years that another five years will exhaust her\npresent iron supply. On Page 221 of the volume 'Problems of Power,' the\nauthor says that within a generation 20,000,000 of Germany's people will\nhave to leave their native land. The pressure of iron and the call of\nsteel led to Germany's development of the Morocco situation, where there\nare valuable iron mines. A short time ago French engineers discovered\nthe largest and richest body of iron ore in Europe. Fullerton, in his\nbook on the subject, expresses the judgment that one province has enough\nhematite iron ore to last Europe for the next 150 years.\n\n\"This diplomat and author said plainly two years ago, in one of his\nreview articles, that Germany would go to war to obtain the iron\ndeposits in Northern France, and that if she loses the war, she will\nfall behind in the manufacturing race, and that the French bankers and\nFrench engineers will make France the great manufacturing force and the\nrichest people in Europe. The Napoleonic wars were wars between\npolitical ideas. The collision was between autocracy and bureaucracy and\nFrench democracy and radicalism. The new antagonism grows out of\neconomic conditions. Germany wants to supersede England upon the seas,\nand Germany wants the iron mines of France, and this is the whole\nsituation in a nutshell.\n\n\"No, I am not sinning against the law of neutrality. I am trying to\nfreshen the old American ideals of self-government for the young men and\nwomen in Plymouth Church. If the whole-hearted support of America's free\ninstitutions involves indirectly a dissent from imperialism and\nmilitarism, I am not responsible. I admit there is a necessary\ncondemnation of autocracy involved in the mere publication of the\nDeclaration of Independence. Ours is a Government of laws and not of\nmen, and I have been discussing the principles of self-government and\nnot rulers who represent imperialism.\n\n\"Neutrality does not mean the wiping out of conviction. There are some\nmen who think that neutrality means adding God and the devil together\nand dividing by two. And there are some statesmen who seem to think that\nneutrality means adding together autocracy and democracy, and halving\nthe result. I do not share that view. I believe it is the first duty of\nthe German-American and the native-born American to uphold the\nfundamental principles of self-government, and of an industrial\ncivilization as opposed to a military machine, and if this means protest\nand criticism, then that protest must be accepted.\"\n\n\n\n\nTIPPERARY.\n\nBy JOHN B. KENNEDY.\n\n\n     (At the other end of the long, long road.)\n\n    Who is it stands at the full o' the door?\n      Mary O'Fay, Mother O'Fay.\n    An' what is she watching an' waiting for?\n      Och, none but her soul can say.\n\n    There's a list in the Post Office long an' black,\n      With tidings bad, and woeful sad;\n    The names of the boys who'll ne'er come back,\n      An' one is her darling lad.\n\n    We showed her the list; but she cannot read,\n      So we told her true, yes, we told her true.\n    Her old eyes stared till they'd almost bleed,\n      An' she swore that none of us knew.\n\n    She's waiting now for Father O'Toole,\n      Till he goes her way at the noon of day.\n    She's simperin' white--the poor old fool,\n      For she knows what the priest'll say.\n\n           *       *       *       *       *\n\n    Who is it sprawls upon the sod\n      At the break o' day? It's Mickey O'Fay;\n    His eyes glare up to the walls of God,\n      And half of his head is blown away.\n\n    What is he doing in that strange place,\n      Torn and shred, and murdered dead?\n    He's singin' the psalm of the fighting race\n      As his soul soars wide o'erhead.\n\n    He killed three foemen before he fell\n      (Och, the toll he'd take and the skulls he'd break!)\n    And he shrieked like a soul escaped from Hell\n      As he died for the Sassenach's sake.\n\n    Who shall we blame for the awful thing--\n      For the blood that flows and the heart-wrung throes?\n    Kaiser or Czar; statesman or King?\n      Och, leave it to Him Who Knows!\n\n\n\n\nAs America Sees the War\n\nBy Harold Begbie.\n\n\nI.\n\n     _In order to determine how American public opinion concerning\n     the war is running, The London Daily Chronicle sent Mr. Begbie\n     to this country. The two articles printed below appeared in\n     The Chronicle_.\n\nEvery day of my sojourn in this country deepens the desire in my mind to\nsee an increasing unity of understanding between America and England. I\nfeel that the audacity of America, its passion for the Right Thing, and\nits impatience with the spirit of muddling through are the finest\nincentives for modern England, England at this dawn of her political\nrenascence. I feel, too, as Americans themselves most willingly\nacknowledge, that Great Britain has something to give to America out of\nthe ancient treasury of her domestic experience. Finally, I like\nAmericans so heartily that I want to be the best of friends with them.\n\nBut it was only last night in this old and mighty city of Philadelphia\nthat the greatest of reasons for an alliance was brought sharply home to\nmy mind. I had thought, loosely enough, that since we speak the same\nlanguage, share many of the same traditions, and equally desire peace\nfor the prosperity of our trade, surely some alliance between us was\nnatural, and with a little effort might be made inevitable. The deeper,\nmore political, and far grander reason for this comradeship between the\ntwo nations had never definitely shaped itself to my consciousness.\n\nEnlightenment came to me in the course of conversation with two\nthoughtful Philadelphians whose minds are centred on something which\ntranscends patriotism and who work with fine courage and remarkable\nability for the triumph of their idea.\n\nOne of these men said to me: \"You speak of an alliance between England\nand America; do you mind telling us what you mean by that term\nalliance?\"\n\nI explained that I had no thought in my mind of treaties and tariffs;\nthat the word \"alliance\" meant nothing more to me than conscious\nfriendship, and that such a disposition between two nations thinking in\nthe same language, speaking and writing the same language, must result,\nI thought, in an ever-multiplying volume of trade, to the great\nadvantage of both parties.\n\n\nThinks Little of Blood Ties.\n\nOut of this explanation came the following statement, made by the second\nPhiladelphian: \"I am as desirous as you are for such an understanding. I\ndesire it so greatly that I venture to offer you a warning on the\nsubject. It would be a mistake on your part, I am convinced, to advocate\nany such friendship, any such understanding, any such alliance, if you\nprefer that word, on the score of blood ties or a common speech. Believe\nme, the American, to speak generally, thinks very little of such\nmatters. When America was far more English in its population than it is\nnow scarcely any country was more unpopular with us than your country.\n\n\"I can remember when hatred for England was a kind of gospel with\nAmericans. The Irish fanned that hatred. Your country had behaved badly\ntoward us, war had left its scar on our memories, we rejoiced that we\nhad thrown off a yoke which we felt to be definitely tyrannous. What,\nthen, has produced the change in America--America, whose population is\nnow made up from nearly all the nations of the earth? Have your people\nthought why we are on their side in this present war? Have they asked\nthemselves that question? If so, and they have answered it with such a\nphrase as 'blood is thicker than water,' I can assure you they give not\nonly a false answer but an answer which betrays amazing ignorance, if\nyou will forgive the word, of this country's population. Blood thicker\nthan water! Why, look at our names; our blood is world's blood.\n\n\"We're a nation of all the nations. The English element is only one\nelement. Our ancestors were French, Dutch, German, Spanish, Norwegian,\nRussian, Danish, Irish, Greek, and Italian. The modern American citizen\nis no more English than the Boers of South Africa are English. And yet\nin overwhelming figures the American population is on the side of the\nAllies, and particularly on the side of England. Why?\"\n\n\nEngland Stands for Democracy.\n\n\"It is,\" he continued, \"because England of all the nations on the earth\nstands for the democratic ideals which are the very breath of life to\nAmerica. Modern England is for us the greatest of democracies. You lead\nthe way to the rest of the world, if not in science and art, at any rate\nhere in the great business of humanity's social existence. We see that\nthe old England of privilege and obstinate prerogatives and bull-headed\nconservatism is dead. All your best qualities, straight dealing,\nhonesty, fearless justice, and faith in the goodness of human nature are\ndevoted now to the only ideals which can save progress from rot and\ndecay. Your democracy is master. It has no overlords. And, from what we\ncan gather since this war broke out, it would seem that your aristocracy\nis coming more and more into line with the democracy, making great\nsacrifices, showing a deeper appreciation of the democracy and shedding\nthe worst of its prejudices in the common love of liberty and right.\n\n\"We hope that your aristocracy may render as great a service to the\nextravagant plutocracy of this country as your democracy has rendered to\nour democracy. To make life better, that's the work of all intelligent\npeople. That's what our democracy is after, and, because your democracy\nis after the same thing, that's why we are on your side in this war.\nUnder all the sentiment on the subject this is the bedrock fact. We're\nfor England because we're for the ideals of democracy. That we speak the\nsame language is only an accident. It's your spirit we desire to share,\nthe spirit which desires to make life kinder, sweeter, better, more\nbeautiful, and more righteous. America believes in civilization. It\ndoesn't want culture in bearskin and top boots. It wants civilization,\nand civilization means a culture that takes in the whole of a man's\nbeing--his body, his mind, his spirit. Well, we think you're after the\nsame ideal; we believe that you're as conscious of humanity as we are,\nand we begin to realize pretty acutely that in a world rather barbarous\non the whole, come to think of it, we can't afford to lose England.\"\n\nThe other man added: \"Germany stands for nearly everything we Americans\nare opposed to, tooth and nail. We just loathe militarism.\nConscription's a thing we abominate. And feudalism is more dead over\nhere than in any country in the world.\"\n\n\"But bear in mind,\" said the first, \"we have few people in America\nbetter than the Germans. The Germans are almost the most efficient of\nour immigrants. They've taught us a lot. We owe them a mighty big debt.\nBefore their coming we were prodigals. We used up our natural resources\nwith a ruthless disregard for the future. We leveled our forests for\ntimber, and just scratched the top soil of the land for corn. Now we're\nlearning to farm scientifically and to conserve our wealth. And this is\ndue in no small degree to the Germans. The German, emancipated from\nfeudalism and kaiserism, is a pretty good citizen. In fact, among the\nmen who have most helped modern America we reckon Germans and Irishmen.\"\n\nI told them this story: A man in New York was speaking the other day to\nCount von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador. Count von Bernstorff was\nendeavoring to prove to this important personage that England had forced\nthe war upon Germany out of jealousy of her trade competition. \"Sir,\"\nsaid the American, \"you really must not tell me that, and I advise you\nnot to tell such a tale to other Americans. For we know very well that\nwe are greater trade rivals of England than you are, and that, in spite\nof that fact, here on this continent of America we have got 3,000 miles\nof British frontier without a fort or a gun.\" He then said to the\nAmbassador: \"No, Sir; your mistake all through has been in making an\nenemy of England when your best interest was to make friends with her.\nIf you had made friends with England, you would have got all you\nwanted.\" To this accusation, I understand, the Ambassador made answer\nthat Germany had endeavored to make friends with England, but had been\nrepulsed. We have a different record in England. The American quietly\nreminded the Ambassador of the fact that England admits German goods\nfree of tariff charges.\n\n\nGermany Represents Autocracy.\n\nThe two Philadelphians perfectly agreed with the justice of this\naccusation, and declared again that it was because Germany represented\nall the perils and slavishness of autocracy, and because England\nrepresented the freedom, the justice, and the passion for social welfare\nwhich inspire all living democracies, that America was so absolutely on\nthe English side.\n\nThey spoke of Ireland, and expressed the hope that the Conservative\nParty would do nothing to hinder that great settlement which has done so\nmuch to increase American respect for England.\n\n\"We recognize over here,\" said one, \"that the Liberal Party, in going to\nthe rescue of Belgium, sacrificed some of its greatest ideals on the\naltar of national righteousness. War must have been a bitter draught for\nLloyd George. Your social programme will be checked for many years. But\nif the Conservatives attempt to spoil the Irish settlement, that will be\nworse than anything else. It will mean confusion for you at home and\nloss of reputation abroad.\"\n\nI spoke of what I had heard on this subject from Irish-Americans, and\nthey confirmed everything recorded in my former article. The three great\nthings, outside of increasing opportunities for intercourse, which have\ndrawn modern America toward England, they told me, are the social\nlegislation of the Liberal Party, the triumph of home rule, and\nEngland's keeping her word to Belgium. By these three things, I was\nassured, the old animosities against England have been destroyed, and a\nspirit of enthusiasm for English ideals has been born among Americans.\n\nI should like to say that, while many American women love England for\nthe beauty and repose of her social life, and most eloquently base their\naffection on the assertion that blood is thicker than water, the men of\nAmerica are sometimes inclined, and not unnaturally, to disapprove of\nthis pleasing sentimentalism. I now begin to perceive that the men of\nAmerica are not jealous of England's social life, but anxious to put\ntheir friendship on a more substantial foundation.\n\nLiberalism not only uplifts democracy; it establishes England in the\naffection of all vital democracies. If the Conservatives, so liberal and\ncharming in their private lives, combine with the Liberals after this\nhideous war to reconstruct our national life and to consolidate the\nempire, how great will be the harvest reaped by our children!\n\nIt is in the high and lofty name of civilization that the American\npeople are anxious to make friends with the people of Great Britain. We\nhave both got something to live for greater than patriotism and\nimperialism, greater because it includes them both.\n\n\nII.\n\nIrish-American Feeling\n\nUntil I came to America I had not the least idea of the depth of hatred\nwhich has existed among Irish-Americans toward England. Nothing that I\never encountered in Ireland itself is comparable with this transatlantic\nfury of unforgiving hate.\n\nAn Irishman who had held very high office in America, a well-educated, a\nkindly, and a judicious man, told me that when war with Germany was in\nthe air he could not prevent himself from hailing this opportunity for\ndeclaring his hatred, his undying hatred, of England. His father had\nsuffered frightfully in the great famine; every story he ever heard at\nhis mother's knee was a story of English tyranny, English brutality,\nEnglish rapacity; England, for him, stood at the rack centre, the\nlustful and bestial slave driver, the cruel and merciless extortioner.\n\nThis man's good judgment, however, would not suffer him to approve of\nGerman militarism, and as events moved forward he gave his support more\nand more to the cause of the Allies.\n\n\"But I want you to know,\" he told me, striking the table with his hand\nand watching me carefully, \"that I was dead against John Redmond for\nsaying that Ireland must go to the aid of England. Ireland's call was to\ngo to the aid of civilization. If Germany had stood for civilization, I\nshould have been on Germany's side and dead against England.\n\n\"I tell you, at the beginning of this business I longed to see England\ndefeated, humiliated, broken to the dust. But civilization is of such\nenormous consequence that I put my natural hatred of England on one\nside. The violation of Belgium made me an anti-German. And with the vast\nmajority of Irishmen in America it was the same thing. The menace of\nGerman militarism forced us into your camp.\n\n\"I am perfectly certain that but for the violation of Belgium there\nwould have been in this country among Irish-Americans an open movement\npublicly proclaimed in favor of Germany. That is my fixed opinion. And I\nhappen to know what I am talking about.\"\n\n\nNo Hatred of England.\n\nI gathered in the course of his conversation that Irish friendliness\ntoward England is a final manifestation of a change in the feeling of\nall America toward England. It was not very long ago that President\nCleveland wanted war with England. Hatred of England was at one time as\nfiercely handed down from generation to generation by Americans as by\nIrish-Americans. We have to thank our English stars that America has\noutgrown this historic hate and that Irish-Americans now show the new\nand happier feeling of their compatriots.\n\nI asked this Irishman, no one better able throughout America to express\na just opinion on the subject, what difference had been made in the\nfeeling toward England by the passing of the Home Rule bill.\n\n\"It was the passing of that bill,\" he replied, \"which finished the work\nbegun by German militarism. Home rule has softened our feelings toward\nEngland, particularly among the thousands of Irish-Americans who are\nborn over here and whose fathers have become too Americanized to\nremember the sufferings of their ancestors.\n\n\"There is still some hatred of England, but not very much. It is a\nsentimental, a poetic hatred, not a political hatred. One finds it among\na few individuals. What agitation is now going on is secret and\nunderground, a sure proof that it is unrepresentative. We ignore it. It\nmeans nothing. No; the passing of the Home Rule bill has given balance\nto the Irish mind.\n\n\"It has helped Irish-Americans to realize that the dreadful sins of\nEngland are sins of a dead and gone England, and it has helped them to\nsee that the present England, so far as its democracy is concerned,\nsincerely desires to make reparation for the past. In fact, the war and\nthe Home Rule bill together have produced such a transformation in the\nIrish-American nature as I, for one, never expected and never hoped to\nsee.\"\n\nHe then warned me that this great change might suffer a dangerous\nreaction if England allows the religious bigotry of Ulster to split\nIreland into two camps. To the Irish-American Ireland is a country, a\nhome, and a shrine, one and indivisible.\n\n\"Such a surrender,\" said my friend, \"would not only be fatal to Ireland\nbut fatal to something even greater than Ireland, and that is the cause\nof religion in an age of increasing paganism. For the world can only be\nsaved from the ruin of paganism, as we are beginning to see very clearly\nin America, by a union of religious forces.\n\n\"I am a Catholic, but I say that any man who says 'Only through my door\ncan you enter into heaven' is a bad Christian. There are many doors into\nheaven. What we have all got to do, Catholics and non-Catholics, is to\ninsist together that there is a heaven, that there is a life after\ndeath, that there is a God. The more doors the better. No one has a\nmonopoly of heaven.\n\n\"And to Ireland is offered the opportunity, greater than politicians\nappear to perceive, of presenting to the world an example of tolerance\nand compromise in the supreme interests of religion which may have\nincalculable results for the whole world. But what will happen if\nEngland bows before the worst and the stupidest bigotry the modern world\ncan show? Not only will you strike a blow at Ireland and a blow at\nIrish-American sympathy, but a blow at the vitals of religion.\n\n\"For it is only by sinking religious differences and making a common\nadvance against this universal paganism that religion can save the soul\nof civilization. If you do not see the truth of that fact in England I\nthink you must be blind. The fullness of civilization hangs upon\nreligious union; religious dissension is the enemy.\"\n\n\nChange in Ulster.\n\nAnother Irish-American who was present on this occasion, an accomplished\nman of letters and a traveler, asked me what England felt about Ulster's\nshare in the responsibility for the present war.\n\n\"I myself have seen two letters from Ulster,\" he said, \"in which the\nphrase occurs, 'Rather the Kaiser than the Pope.' These letters were\nwritten before the war. Ulster, no doubt, has now changed her tune. But\nit was that spirit, surely, and the reports sent to Berlin by German\nofficers who visited Ulster and inquired into the military character of\nCarsonism which persuaded Germany that England would not fight.\"\n\nIrish-Americans are persuaded that Sir Edward Carson is in very great\nmeasure responsible for all the ruin and death and bitter suffering of\nthe enormous catastrophe. He boasted that he would make civil war, and\nsuch were his preparations that in any other country in the world civil\nwar would have been inevitable.\n\nGermany counted on that civil war. The British Army was said to be\ncompletely under the influence of Carsonism. The real catastrophe for\nthe diplomacy of Berlin was not India's loyalty and the vigorous\nuprising of the young dominions, but the dying down of Ulster mutiny.\n\nThese Irish-Americans have hated the ruling classes in England, not only\nfor sins of the past but for the unworthy and most cruel opposition\noffered by those ruling classes, in the name of religious intolerance,\nto the ideals of the Irish Nation.\n\nWhen Unionist politicians sneer at the subscriptions sent by Irish\nservant girls in America to help the cause of Ireland they should\nreflect that not only do they fail to make a good joke, not only do they\nexhibit a horribly bad taste, but they spread hatred of England through\nthe thousands and thousands of people. For it is the loyalty of the\npoorest of these Irish-Americans, the sacrifices perpetually made by\nthe humblest of them, which should move us to see, as it has certainly\nmoved the American people to see, that the cause of Irish liberty is\nnoble and undying.\n\n\nReligious Education.\n\nWith all my heart I would beg Unionists in England to reflect\nconscientiously upon this very significant state of affairs in America:\n\nA non-Catholic Bible used to be read in the public schools of America\ndown to the year 1888. A Catholic agitation against this Bible reading\nwas begun in 1885, and in 1888 the custom was finally abolished. From\nthat date to this there has been no religious instruction of any kind in\nthe public schools of America.\n\nBigotry and intolerance won that victory. The Catholic Church, in its\nfolly, destroyed religious teaching in the schools of the country.\nCatholics themselves are now looking back on that agitation with\nreligious repentance and political regret.\n\nThe result of this abolition is that Catholics and non-Catholics who\nbelieve in the importance of religious instruction, and who see the\npagan effect of purely secular instruction, do not send their children\nto the public schools.\n\n\"These schools, for which Christians are heavily taxed, are in the\npossession of the Hebrews. If nothing is done to alter the existing\nstate of things Americans themselves assure me that in five-and-twenty\nyears America will be a pagan country. But a fight is to be made to\navert this disaster at the Constitutional Convention to be held next\nmonth.\n\n\"What we have to do,\" my Irish friend told me, \"Catholics and\nnon-Catholics alike, is to appeal for schools representing Catholic and\nnon-Catholic teaching. Instead of the various churches fighting against\neach other they must fight together, helping one another to get the\nschools they demand. Only in this way can we save civilization.\"\n\nThis is how the Irishman, breathing the free air of America, and in\nAmerica rising to positions of extraordinary power and responsibility,\nviews the foundational question of religion; while England allows\nherself to be dragged at the heels of the frothing fanatic who has\nactually dared to raise the unholy battle cry of \"Rather the Kaiser than\nthe Pope.\"\n\nLet the Unionist Party hesitate before it seeks to revive this hideous,\nutterly irrational and most unchristianlike spirit at the very heart of\nthe British Empire. The sower of hate is the reaper of death.\n\n\n\n\nTO MELOS, POMEGRANATE ISLE.\n\nBy GRACE HARRIET MACURDY.\n\n     (Destroyed by Athens, 416 B.C., because of her refusal to\n     break neutrality.--Thucydides V., 84-116; Euripides, \"Trojan\n     Women.\")\n\n\n    O thou Pomegranate of the Sea,\n      Sweet Melian isle, across the years\n    Thy Belgian sister calls to thee\n      In anguished sweat of blood and tears.\n\n    Her fate like thine--a ruthless band\n      Hath ravaged all her loveliness.\n    How Athens spoiled thy prosperous land\n      Athenian lips with shame confess.\n\n    Thou, too, a land of lovely arts,\n      Of potter's and of sculptor's skill--\n    Thy folk of high undaunted hearts\n      As those that throb in Belgium still.\n\n    Within thy harbor's circling rim\n      The warships long, with banners bright,\n    Sailed bearing Athens' message grim--\n      \"God hates the weak. Respect our Might.\"\n\n    The flame within thy fanes grew cold,\n      Stilled by the foeman's swarming hordes.\n    Thy sons were slain, thy daughters sold\n      To serve the lusts of stranger lords.\n\n    For Attic might thou didst defy\n      Thy folk the foeman slew as sheep,\n    Across the years hear Belgium's cry--\n      \"O Sister, of the Wine-Dark Deep,\n\n    \"Whose cliffs gleam seaward roseate.\n      Not one of all my martyr roll\n    But keeps his faith inviolate,\n      Man kills our body, not our soul.\"\n\n\n\n\nWhat America Can Do\n\nBy Lord Channing of Wellingborough.\n\n     Lord Channing, who makes the following suggestion to American\n     statesmen, was born in the United States of the well-known\n     Channings of Boston. His father was the Rev. W.H. Channing,\n     Chaplain of the House of Representatives during the civil war\n     and a close friend of President Lincoln. Lord Channing has\n     been for twenty-five years a member of the British Parliament,\n     and for the last three years a member of the House of Lords,\n     having been created first Baron of Wellingborough in 1912. He\n     is President of the British National Peace Congress.\n\n\nTo the Editor of The New York Times:\n\nAs a member of the British Legislature for a generation, and a lifelong\nLiberal, and having also the closest ties of blood with America, and a\nproud reverence for her ideals, I would wish, with the utmost respect,\nto offer some comments on one specific aspect of present affairs, as\nthey affect America, which does not seem to have been marked off with\nthe distinctness its importance calls for.\n\nThis is the greatest crisis in the history of the world, and attention\nconcentrates itself on the attitude of the greatest neutral State.\n\nIt is unthinkable that America can divest herself of responsibility for\nthe final outcome. This seems as clearly recognized in America as in\nEurope.\n\nTo us in England this war is a life or death struggle between two\nprinciples--Pan-Germanism on the one side, with its avowed purpose to\nimpose its hegemony and its rigid system of ideas and organization on\nthe rest of the world, not by consent, but by irresistible military\nforce; on the other side the claim of the other nations, large and\nsmall, to maintain inviolate their freedom and individuality, and to\nthink and work out for themselves their own political and economic\nfuture in their own way.\n\nThe one principle would seem the flat contradiction of all that America\nstands for, the other principle would seem to be precisely the essential\nidea of free self-government and democratic evolution, in which are\nrooted the very life and being of America.\n\nFor this reason there is instinctive and profound sympathy on the part\nof the great majority of native Americans with the cause of England and\nher allies.\n\nThis sympathy is not merely the tie of blood or the unity of ideals.\nReason has convinced Americans that the supreme principles and highest\ninterests of America will be best safeguarded if the Allies win.\n\nThey dread instinctively what might happen if Pan-Germanism absorbed the\nsmaller nationalities, crushed the great free countries like France and\nEngland, and dominated the whole world with the \"mailed fist,\" not only\nEurope and the Far East, but South America and the Pacific. Perhaps the\nhint of Count Bernstorff that Canada may be treated like Belgium, and\nthe Monroe Doctrine like other \"scraps of paper,\" may also have thrown\nsome light for Americans on a \"Germanized\" future! And a cast-iron\nsystem of commercial and industrial monopoly dictated by German needs\ncannot attract.\n\n\nAmerica Can't Stand Apart.\n\nThat is one side that American statesmen have to consider. There is, of\ncourse, another.\n\nThe United States visibly form the greatest force the world has yet seen\nto bring together, to unite, to assimilate, in the development of their\nvast territories, measureless resources, and complicated industries, all\nthat is best from all the other great nations, welding slowly but\nsurely, through free institutions, these new elements into instruments\nfor the fuller realization of the generous and noble ideals for which\nAmerica stands. Perhaps an eighteenth or even fifteenth part of the\npopulation is of German origin, a percentage not far from equal to that\ncontributed by the United Kingdom and Canada.\n\nThere is thus not only the broad question of avoiding war with Germany,\nwhose people have so large a share in the life of America, a war doubly\nunwelcome at all times because of the innumerable links of science,\ninvention, professional training, of commerce, and of personal\nfriendship; but there is also the local question of peace and good-will\nin the daily work of America as between huge sections of her population.\nThese visible facts not unnaturally give great weight to the argument\nfor neutrality. No wise man on this side of the Atlantic will try to\nignore them, or take exception to the dignity and correctness with which\nthe American Executive has dealt with the grave problem before it.\n\nNeutrality has, of course, its limits and conditions, logical and moral.\nThose limits and conditions, the possibility of their infringement in\nsuch a way as to make some change of policy imperative, are matters\nsolely for the United States.\n\nThe point the present writer wishes to press is on a different plane,\nand is precisely this:\n\nAmerica does not and can not stand wholly apart from supreme European\ndecisions.\n\nAmerica is as responsible as Europe for the great extensions,\ndefinitions, the strengthening and modification of international law.\nAmerica stands forth as the apostle of arbitration, to widen the area\nwithin which disputed points may be determined amicably. America stands\nalso as the chief signatory of the great world conventions which have\nsettled new rules for the conduct of war, to mitigate its horrors,\nespecially for non-combatants.\n\nAmerica has taken a noble part in framing machinery for securing peace\nand justice, and in moving forward the landmarks of civilization as\nagainst savagery, and of human mercy as against cruel terrorism.\n\nCan America safely or wisely divest herself of the duty thus placed upon\nher, logically and morally, by her participation in this, the noblest\nwork of our age?\n\nAnd is it wise or is it safe to indefinitely postpone the discharge of\nthis duty?\n\nBy the events of the last three months the whole of this new charter of\nhumanity has been challenged and is at stake.\n\nIs it not sound policy as well as an imperative duty to take some step\nhere and now to \"stop the rot\" and to make good here and now as much as\nwe can of what we have won and wish to keep?\n\n\nBelgium's Wrongs.\n\nAdmittedly a \"guiltless and unoffending nation,\"[1] whose neutrality and\nindependence had been solemnly guaranteed by treaty, to which the powers\nconcerned in the war were parties, has had her treaty rights violated by\none of these powers on the cynical plea that there is no right or wrong\nas against national interest, that necessity obeys no law, and treaties\nare \"scraps of paper.\" This is not matter for inquiry or judicial\ndecision at some later date. It has been frankly avowed by the German\nGovernment from the outset of this war.\n\n[Footnote 1: Theodore Roosevelt.]\n\nAgain, this admitted wrong is not the sudden and unavoidable outcome of\nevents unforeseen and uncontrollable. It has been deliberately planned\nyears ahead, with elaborate preparation of railway and other facilities,\nand with every invention and contrivance, to rush in irresistible\nforces; to subvert and destroy the independent State that Germany was\nherself pledged to defend.\n\nThirdly, this policy of absolute annihilation of Belgium, of its right\nto live its own life, its right even to preserve those monuments of its\nnoble and beautiful history which had become treasured heirlooms of the\nwhole world, has been carried out with a ruthless barbarity to the\npeople, and especially the non-combatants, for which it is hard to find\na parallel in the worst incidents of the Thirty Years' War or of the\ndevastation of the Palatinate. To bring the actual guilt home to those\nwho actually did or ordered these deeds to be done in individual cases\nis one thing. The broad fact that these barbarous deeds were done stands\nmanifest and insistent, and demands such instant action as can be taken\nby a great and responsible people.\n\nAnd, lastly, there is the undisguised adoption of the policy of\nterrorizing non-combatants to submission by such acts as forcing women\nand children to walk before the advancing enemy, the wholesale burning\nof houses, shooting of hostages and other non-combatants, and the\ndropping of bombs from aeroplanes not on forts or troops, but on places\nwhere women and children can be killed or injured.\n\nAnd all this tragic sweeping away of such good things as had been won\nwith worldwide consent, at the instance of the Czar in initiating The\nHague policy, has gone on, so far as it could go on, with equal horror,\nthroughout Northern France. Rheims and Senlis have suffered the fate of\nLouvain and Termonde and Malines, and Paris has had her quota of women\nand children wantonly slain by bombs, exactly like Antwerp.\n\n\nThe Threat to England.\n\nAnd America knows, as we here in England know, from the open menace of\nthe German press, writing of England as the _one supreme enemy_, that it\nis the full intention of Germans, if they can, to carry through England,\ntoo, even more ruthlessly, the same policy.\n\nWe are fighting here, and are confident that we shall fight with\nsuccess, not only to protect our English homes and to guard the historic\nbuildings of this land but to make an end of this Prussian terrorism of\nthe world; to secure no national aggrandizement, but to secure a\npermanent and solid peace, based on guaranteed liberties, and a rational\nsettlement of the question of armaments.\n\nThese questions touch us all the more because many of us have been the\nmost persistent friends of international peace and have specially\nlabored to promote happy and friendly relations with the German people.\nThe present writer, who was honored by election as President of this\nyear's National Peace Congress, has been associated with the work of men\nlike Lord Brassey, Sir John Lubbock, (later Lord Avebury,) as a member\nof the Anglo-German Friendship League, and has repeatedly in Parliament\nargued against any hostile or provocative attitude toward Germany. This\nwar is our answer and our reward!\n\n\nAmerica in the Settlement.\n\nSo far as can be judged from authoritative words of President Wilson and\nex-President Roosevelt, America does and will claim a right to share in\nthe final settlement of the terms of a permanent and stable peace.\n\nIf that claim is sound, if the efforts of America to create better\nmachinery for securing peace and for generously and humanely vindicating\nthe liberties and happiness of nations and of the individuals who make\nthem up do entitle America to a voice, and a potent voice, in the work\nof mending and remaking the world after this terrific catastrophe, then\nI would submit with all respect that it is really idle to wait till all\nthe recognized principles of what has been held to be right or wrong as\nbetween nations, and what has been held to be right or wrong in the\nmethods of conducting war have gone overboard, without one word of\nprotest; we must save the world first, if we are to have a real chance\nof remaking it on lines which are worth having.\n\nNothing but good could come from immediate action by the American\nExecutive to assert as they, best of all nations, could assert, now and\nat once in terms uncompromising, unanswerable, that the ground taken up\nby international consent in the past generation must be held now and\nhereafter, and accepted as an essential basis of the final settlement.\n\nSuch a pronouncement now by America would make a landmark in\nhistory--would render a measureless service to the whole world in\nemancipation from the persistent degradation of the twin doctrines that\nmight makes right, and that necessity knows no law, and would bring to\nAmerica herself imperishable honor and glory in the fearless assertion\nand eternal consecration of her own noblest ideals.\n\nI would submit further that such a national declaration by America\ninvolves no violation of neutrality, and is in no sense inconsistent\nwith the spirit of official utterances already made.\n\nTo take the latter first--we have had notable utterances from the\nPresident and from the ex-President.\n\nPresident Wilson seems to have given a sympathetic hearing to the\nmission which laid the case of Belgium before him, both as to the\nviolation of Belgium's neutrality and as to the cruel treatment of the\nnon-combatant population and the wanton destruction of towns and\nvillages and of precious historical monuments. He is understood to have\npromised an investigation, and it is gathered from the Independance\nBelge this week that this investigation has been, and is being, carried\nout by American Military Attaches in Belgium, and also at the London\nEmbassy of the United States.\n\nAgain, President Wilson's recent letter to the Kaiser, while confirming\nneutrality in precise terms, went on to intimate that there must be a\n\"day of settlement\" and that \"where injustices have found a place\nresults are sure to follow, and all those who have been found at fault\nwill have to answer for them.\" If the \"general settlement\" does not\nsufficiently determine this, there is the ultimate sanction of \"the\nopinion of mankind\" which will \"in such cases interfere.\" He would\napparently reserve judgment until the end of the war, but in no way\ndisclaims or surrenders American responsibility.\n\nMr. Roosevelt is not tied by official responsibility, and can speak with\nless restraint and more freedom. In The Outlook he has substantially\naccepted and indorsed all that is material in the Belgian case.\n\nAmerica should help in securing a peace which will not mean the\n\"crushing the liberty and life of just and inoffending peoples or\nconsecrate the rule of militarism,\" but which \"will, by international\nagreement, minimize the chances of the recurrence of such worldwide\ndisaster,\" and \"will, in the interests of civilization, create\nconditions which will make such action\" as the violation of Belgian\ntreaty rights \"impossible in the future.\"\n\nLike President Wilson, he seems to think that the time for judicial\npronouncement on acts presumably guilty and wrongful will come at the\nconclusion of the war. At the same time he surrenders no part of\nAmerica's responsibility, but reaffirms it with all the force of his\ntrenchant style.\n\nBut elsewhere, and later, he has insisted on the \"helplessness\"--the\n\"humiliating impotence created by the fact that our neutrality can only\nbe preserved by failure to help to right what is wrong.\"\n\n\nMr. Roosevelt's Remedy.\n\nAnd he has gone on to adumbrate his practical remedy--\"a world league\"\nwith \"an amplified Hague Court,\" made strong by joint agreement of the\npowers, to secure \"peace and righteousness,\" and to vindicate the just\ndecisions of such a court by \"a union of forces to enforce the decree.\"\nHe adds that this might help to obtain a \"limitation of armaments that\nwould be real and effective.\"\n\nThat so happy a plan may be capable of realization would be the hope of\nall wise men.\n\nBut where I take exception with Col. Roosevelt is as to America's\npresent \"impotence\"--that nothing effectual can be done by America\nwithout breaking her own neutrality.\n\nThat view I wholly traverse. It might conceivably be felt by America,\nunder certain grave eventualities, that neutrality must be broken.\n\nBut it is clear that the articles of The Hague Convention of 1907 amply\nprovide for the type of action here and now by the United States which\nI have ventured to lay before American statesmen in this paper. And, in\nmy opinion, it is conceivable that more good might be achieved by\nAmerica taking that action, while maintaining her neutrality.\n\nIt goes without saying, it really needs no demonstration, that nearly\nevery international agreement embodied in The Hague Convention has been\nbroken, wholly or in part, in the letter and in the spirit, in the\nproceedings of this unhappy year.\n\nThe violation of the territory of a neutral State by the transit of\nbelligerent troops and other acts of war is forbidden, (Articles 1, 2,\n3, 4, &c.) It is the duty of the neutral State not to tolerate, (Article\n5,) but to resist such acts, and her forcible resistance is not to be\nregarded as an act of war, (Article 10.)\n\n\nInterference with Neutrals.\n\nThat, of course, covers the case of Belgium completely and establishes\nabsolutely that there is, and need be, no breach of neutrality in\nresistance thus legally sanctioned to illegal interference with neutral\nrights.\n\nIt is hardly necessary to recapitulate the articles that have been torn\nup. To refer to the most striking, there is the repeated bombardment of\nundefended towns, pillage incessant throughout Belgium and Northern\nFrance, (Articles 28 and 47;) the levying of illegal contributions,\n(Articles 49 and 52;) the seizure of cash and securities belonging to\nprivate persons, banks, and local authorities, (Articles 52 and 56;)\ncollective penalties for individual acts for which the community as a\nwhole are not responsible, (Article 50.) Articles 50 and 43 should have\nmade impossible the punitive destruction of Vise, Aerschot, Dinant, and\nLouvain, and numberless villages; Article 56 should have preserved from\ndestruction institutions and buildings dedicated to religion, education,\ncharity, hospitals, &c. All these wrongful acts, committed everywhere,\nhave been prohibited by these articles.\n\nThe gradual introduction of the policy of terrorism has been ably traced\nby perhaps the highest French authority on international law, Prof.\nEdouard Clunet, formerly President of the Institute of International\nLaw, in a recent address.\n\n\"Bombardment par intimidation\" was adopted by the Germans in 1870 and\nused at Strassburg, Paris, Peronne, &c., shells being directed and\nconflagrations spread in the inhabited parts of towns apart from the\nfortifications. Germany herself assented to serious mitigations of this\npractice at the Conference of Brussels in 1874 and at The Hague in 1907.\n\nThe worst evolution of the policy of terrorism has been in the throwing\nfrom aeroplanes of bombs, explosive or incendiary. M. Clunet lays down\nthat, by the most recent decision of the institute, bomb throwing from\naeroplanes must follow the rules of bombardment by artillery. This would\nprohibit such bombs without formal notice. But in Antwerp bombs were\ndropped without notice over the Royal Palace, to the peril of the Queen\nand her young children, and the number of peaceable inhabitants killed\nor injured was thirty-eight, three children being mutilated in their\nbeds. In Paris, besides the bombs dropped on Notre Dame, bombs were\ndeliberately dropped in the public streets and a number of peaceable\nvictims killed or wounded. The dropping of bombs as an act of war on\nfortresses, ammunition depots, Zeppelin sheds, &c., is, of course,\nlegal. But the bomb dropping adopted in Belgium and France, and\nthreatened in England, if the opportunity arises, is undisguised\nterrorism, and not war.\n\nIt is important to note also that at Brussels in 1874 Antwerp addressed\na petition to the conference praying that any bombardment should be\nlimited to fortifications only. The commission of the conference, which\nincluded three well-known German Generals and two professors, recognized\nthe justice of this plea and recommended Generals to conform to it.\n\nBut the one point that should appeal most strongly to the patriotism as\nwell as the idealism of America is the fact that the instructions of\n1863 for armies in campaign, drawn up by the United States Government\nin the height of the civil war, first codified the laws for the conduct\nof war, and have been the source and starting point of all these later\ninternational agreements.\n\nAnd it should be remembered that both Germany and America signed the\nFourth Convention of The Hague with its annexed regulations as to sieges\nand bombardments (Articles 22 to 28) and the further provision which may\neven yet be applied punitively to the proceedings of the present war.\n\"The belligerent who shall have violated the provisions of the said\nregulation shall be held liable for an indemnity.\"\n\nAnd if it be thought that America can render no help in such a position\nas the present without violating her neutrality, the answer is that by\nArticle 3 of Convention 1 of The Hague, 1907, neutral powers have the\nright to offer their suggestions (bons offices) or their mediation, even\nduring the course of hostilities. And further: \"The exercise of this\nright must never be considered by one or the other of the parties to\nthe conflict as an unfriendly act.\"\n\nWith all submission, I earnestly urge on the leaders of American thought\nto support this attempted interpretation of the supreme duty and the\nnoble opportunity the present position places before their country.\n\nOne more word. I referred to the possible benefit of neutrality being\nmaintained while this protest against wrong and appeal for right is at\nthe same time advanced.\n\nIs it not more than probable that there is an immense section of\nmoderate though patriotic opinion in the great German people which at\nheart deprecates the extreme doctrines of conquest and world supremacy\nin pursuit of which the great, the wonderful achievements of the German\nrace in science, in industry, in the extension of commerce, are being\nrashly risked?\n\nCHANNING OF WELLINGBOROUGH.\n\n40 Eaton Place, London S.W., Oct. 29, 1914.\n\n\n\n\nTO A COUSIN GERMAN.\n\nBy Adeline Adams.\n\n\n    My Hans, you say, with self-applausive jest,\n      \"When Albert gave his Belgians Caesar's name--\n      'Bravest of all the Gauls'--surely 'twere shame\n    The King, unthorough man, forgot the rest:\n\n    \"'Bravest because most far from all the best\n      Provincial culture.'\"[2] Friend, if now your aim\n      Be that fine thoroughness your people claim,\n    Read on: \"Such culture's wares, it stands confest,\n\n    \"Oft weaken minds.\" And Caesar's word was just.\n      If men, bedeviled under culture's star,\n      Have left Louvain a void where flames still hiss,\n    Speared babes, and stamped the world's own Rose to dust,\n      God grant that Belgium's soul may dwell afar\n    Forever, from a culture such as this!\n\n[Footnote 2: \"Propterea quod a cultu atque humanitute provinciae\nlongissime absunt.\"]\n\n\n\n\nWhat the Economic Effects May Be\n\nBy Irving Fisher.\n\n     Professor of Political Economy at Yale University; member of\n     many scientific societies.\n\n\nWhen the future historian chronicles the facts of the present great\nworld struggle and attempts to analyze its causes and effects the\neconomic losses, gains, shiftings, and dislocations will form an\nimportant part of the story. It is, of course, quite impossible at this\ntime to know, in any detail, what all the economic results will be. Much\nwill depend on how long the war lasts, how many people and how much\nproperty are destroyed, what financial devices are resorted to in order\nto finance it, and which side is finally victorious.\n\nThe most palpable and the most fundamental effects will be a partial\nstoppage of earnings in the nations directly concerned, i.e., a\nreduction in the \"real income,\" which consists of enjoyable goods. All\nthe other important results follow from this.\n\nThe cost, however reckoned, is sure to be stupendous. Prof. Richet is\nquoted as reckoning it at $50,000,000 a day. This is probably more than\nhalf the total income of all the inhabitants of the warring countries.\nThe highest estimates of the total income of the United Kingdom, France,\nand Germany, estimates of Bowley, Laverge, and Buchel, respectively,\ntotal up less than $70,000,000 a day. Russia and Austria are poor\ncountries per capita, and would scarcely bring the grand total to\n$100,000,000 a day. Moreover, the loss of real income to Europe is, I\nimagine, in reality much greater than Richet's estimate, chiefly because\nhe takes little account of the indirect costs, which may well be the\ngreatest of all. The cost to the fiscal departments of Government is\nprobably only a small part of the total cost which the people will have\nto bear. The killing and disabling of the men engaged will cut off the\nfinancial support of European families to the tune of hundreds of\nmillions of dollars per year. The physical destruction of capital\nthrough the devastation of crops, the burning and demolishing of\nmerchant ships and buildings, the crippling of industry through the\nsudden withdrawal of labor and raw materials, the introduction of new\ntrade risks, and the cutting off of transportation, both internal and\nforeign, make up a sum of items which cannot be measured, but which may\nexceed those which can. Last, but not least, is the impairment of that\nsubtle but vital basis of business, commercial credit.\n\nIn short, the central effect is a vast impairment of Europe's current\nincome and of the capital from which her future income will flow. It\nmeans a veritable impoverishment of vast populations. The great burden\nwill bear heaviest, of course, on the poor. It will impinge very\nunequally and will cause a great redistribution of wealth. As always\nhappens, some people, mostly lucky speculators, will come out of the\nmelee wealthier than before. This fact will not serve to lessen the\ndiscontent of the masses, which their impoverishment is sure to create.\nFood prices will be high, the earnings of labor will be low, and after\nthe war unemployment will be great, due to the impossibility of quick\nabsorption into the industrial system of returned soldiers, as well as\nother maladjustments which the war is sure to bring.\n\nThe victor may secure indemnity for part of the loss, but not for all;\nhe will, in spite of himself, be a net loser. Taxes will be a crushing\nburden, merely to secure funds with which to pay high interest on vast\nnew war debts, to say nothing of funds with which to purchase new\narmaments--if again the nations are forced, by lack of international\ncontrol, to resume the stupendous folly of racing each other in military\nequipments.\n\n\nBankruptcy and Revolution.\n\nIt may well be that among the economic consequences of the war there\nwill be some national bankruptcies, and that among the political\nconsequences will be revolutions. High prices, high taxes, low wages,\nand unemployment make an ominous combination. We may be sure that\ndiscontent will be profound and widespread. This discontent is pretty\nsure to lead, especially in the defeated nations where there is no\ncompensating \"glory,\" to strong revolutionary movements just as was the\ncase in Russia after her defeat by Japan. Whether or to what extent\nthese movements, in which \"Socialism\" in the various meanings of that\nword is sure to play a part, will succeed, depends on the relative\nstrength of opposing tendencies which cannot yet be measured. One\npossible if not probable result may be, as I suggested in THE TIMES two\nweeks ago, some international device to secure disarmament and to\nsafeguard peace.\n\nThough part of the losses to Europe will be permanent, her chief loss\nwill be coterminous with the war. She will, therefore, seek ways and\nmeans to fill in this immediate hole in her income in order to \"get by.\"\nTo do this she must borrow; that is, she must secure her present bread\nand butter from us and other nations and arrange to repay later out of\nthe fruits of peace. She can stint herself, but not enough to meet the\nsituation. She must borrow. And in one way and another she will satisfy\nthis necessity by borrowing in the United States.\n\nMost of the strange and unprecedented phenomena which we have witnessed\nin the last month, in rapid succession, are due to this pressing\nnecessity of the belligerent peoples to cash in now and trust to good\nfortune to pay later. As soon as the war became even probable Europe\ntried to cash in on our securities. The pressure for our gold pushed it\ntoward Europe faster than it could move. Exchange jumped to the\ngold-shipping point of $4.89 per pound sterling, and did not stop. In\nsome cases it reached $7. This was partly due to the desire to get our\ngold and bolster up a credit structure, tottering before the deadly blow\nof war; but it was also partly due to the need of ready money for\nsupplies of all kinds. This need applies not only to the Governments,\nbut to the individual people. To obtain this ready money they threw back\non us the securities they had purchased of us in former years. They\nwanted us to take back these titles to future income and give them\ninstead titles to present income. Had they secured our gold their next\nstep would have been to spend part of it for supplies, and this would\nhave caused any foreign dealers to whom they applied to place orders\nwith us. The gold then might have turned the exchanges and have been\nbrought back to us in return for our wheat and other products.\n\nThis double transaction is in essence one--a barter of present income in\nthe form of our wheat to Europe for future income in the form of\ninvestment securities. It was interfered with by the refusal of the\ninsurance companies to insure the gold and by the closing of Stock\nExchanges against the inundating flood of securities. The first\ndifficulty, as to transporting gold, has been largely removed by\narranging for drafts against stocks of it kept on both sides of the\nAtlantic. This will save the need of sending it on risky voyages back\nand forth, and any final net balances can be liquidated after the war.\nThe second obstacle, the closure of the Stock Exchanges, is more\nformidable, but cannot completely or permanently prevent the\ntransactions which so many people on both sides are anxious to\nconsummate. Curb markets and limited cash sales on the Exchanges\nthemselves are doing some of this business, and, sooner or later, much\nmore will be done, whether the Exchanges are open or not. Europe needs\nour wheat and cannot pay for it except with securities, partly because\nher own industry is paralyzed, partly because ocean transportation is\ndifficult.\n\n\nWhat Dumping Securities Means.\n\nFew people seem to realize that the dumping of securities on our shores\nand the efforts of foreign Governments, such as France and Switzerland,\nto borrow money in our markets are at the bottom very much the same\nthing. They are simply two forms of securing present supplies from\nAmerica in return for future supplies, the dividends and interest on\nsecurities from Europe.\n\nIt does not much matter whether we buy Government bonds or other\nsecurities. If we buy of French capitalists their holdings in American\nrailway securities we simply provide them with the wherewithal to take\nthe French Government loans themselves. They virtually become, without\nour knowledge, the go-between through which we lend, as it were, to the\nFrench Government, in spite of ourselves. It is doubtless well, as a\nmatter of policy, to refuse to loan directly to France, but we must not\nfor a moment conclude that France or any other nation will have to\nfinance the war without our aid. We shall not be consciously helping any\nparticular nation, but we shall be actually helping any nation which can\ntrade with us. Evidently England will get more of our help than any\nother nation because her shores are more accessible. Germany is more\nisolated. Unless she possesses a larger food stock than commercial\nstatistics indicate she will be pressing for our food supplies, which\nmay reach her indirectly, we selling to Holland and Holland to Germany;\nalso reversely, via Holland or via Austria and Italy, Germany may sell a\nstream of securities the other end of which we receive. Whether directly\nor by devious routes there will inevitably be, so far as I can see, a\nvast exchange of commodities passing to Europe for securities coming\nfrom Europe. In this interchange will be found the dominant economic\neffect of the war on the United States.\n\nForeign nations will get their much-needed loans on better terms, even\nif less promptly, by the circuitous process mentioned than if they\ncould borrow directly in our markets; for their own citizens will pay\nhigher prices than we would, even if, to get the money, they have to\nsell their other investment securities to us at a considerable\nsacrifice. England has sold Treasury bills for seventy-five millions of\ndollars on as low a \"basis\" as 3-3/4 per cent.\n\nIn this virtual trade of this year's crops for titles to future years'\ncrops we shall get a high price for the former and pay a low price (in\npresent valuation) for the latter. Investment securities are, and will\nbe, a drug on the market. In other words, the rate of return to the\ninvestor will be high; the rate of interest on long-time loans will be\nhigh and stay high, that on short-time loans may fluctuate greatly. The\nrise in the rate of interest on long-time investments is one of the most\nvital and far-reaching effects of the war. At bottom, interest always\narises from the exchange of present and future goods. The rate of\ninterest, as I have tried to show in my book of that title, is simply\nthe crystallization, in a market rate, of the impatience of the human\nrace for its bread and butter. War has now produced such impatience in\npopulations of hundreds of millions. It is this impatience which dumps\nthe securities upon us, sends down their price, and sends up the rate of\ninterest. As Byron W. Holt has said, there is no moratorium for hunger.\nThe fall of securities in Europe produces the like fall in this and\nother countries.\n\nOne of the consequences to America of being forced to play the role of\nmoney lender and one of the consequences of the rise in the rate of\ninterest here, or what amounts to the same thing, the fall in the prices\nof bonds, will be an increased difficulty of financing our own\nenterprises. Only the most promising enterprises will be able to sell\ntheir securities. This means that we shall be neglecting, to some\nextent, our own enterprises, to finance the European war instead.\n\nThis general depreciation of investment securities will doubtless lead\nto many bankruptcies, if not to a genuine crisis. It will also give\ntempting opportunities to investors. The likelihood of a genuine panic\nis lessened by the fact that every one recognizes the real cause of the\ndisturbance and that insolvency is not suspected. According to the best\ncommercial observers, the previous liquidation had been fairly well\ncompleted. Unless they are mistaken, disaster will not be likely to\nfollow.\n\nWe repeat that since the necessities of Europe have forced her to buy\nour food in return for her investments, it is evident that during the\nwar food prices will be high and security prices, especially bonds, will\nbe low. These are the two facts of greatest economic significance to us.\nTo the country as a whole they defer some of our pleasures till after\nthe war. Uncle Sam will cut down for the present on his eating and\ndrinking, his clothes, shelter, and amusements in order to share his\nrations with Europe. Instead of the pleasures foregone he will\ninvest--not in new enterprises at home, but in old ones--American and\npossibly European also--purchased of Europe. We can never have our cake\nand eat it too. In this case we shall let Europe eat some of it on\ncondition that she in turn shares hers with us after the war. Moreover,\nwe shall trade off a relatively small piece of our present cake for a\nrelatively large piece of Europe's future cake. In other words, Europe\nwill fill up the great breach in her income now impending by inducing us\nto make a small breach in ours. The result will be that the course of\nour real income, that is, economic satisfaction or enjoyable\nconsumption, will imitate in some degree that of Europe. This is,\nreduced to its lowest terms, the chief economic result of the war.\n\nBut to many the question is, do we gain or lose, as compared with what\nmight have been the case if there had been no war? I do not think any\none can answer that question with certainty. Europe is willing to\nmortgage its future to us on terms very advantageous to us; but when the\nfuture comes, the purchasing power of money will probably be so much\nlessened as to have absorbed all our advantage. Probably we shall lose\nslightly on the whole. But it is not economically impossible that there\nwill be a net gain. In either case the net effect will, I believe, be\nsmall.\n\nOf more importance will be the various effects on various classes.\nCertain people will be greatly benefited by the rise in food prices and\nthe fall in security prices. The farming classes will profit by the\nformer; the investing classes by the latter. Those who have the good\nfortune to belong to both classes will grow rich. The farmer who is in a\nposition to save money will both make more money to save and be able to\ninvest it more advantageously after he has saved it. If he lends to his\nneighbors he will find the market rate of interest high. Even if he buys\nmore land the purchase price will be restrained from the great rise we\nmight expect from the prosperity of farming by the fact that the \"number\nof years purchase,\" as the phrase is in England, will be small, or, in\nother words, that the interest basis, which enters into every land\nprice, will be high.\n\n\nLabor Will Not Suffer Much.\n\nOn the other hand the general consumer of farm products will suffer from\nanother advance in that part of his cost of living, while the debtor\nclasses will suffer from the fall in bonds or rise in interest. Many\nspeculators on the Stock Exchange, those who have speculated for a rise,\nare in effect undoubtedly ruined already, and many borrowers at banks on\ncollateral security will feel the pinch from the depreciation of their\nproperty and the hard terms of renewing their loans.\n\nAnd the laboring man, who forms the majority, what of him? It seems\nimprobable that he will be greatly affected, that is, on the average. He\nwill have to pay more for his food, and food constitutes more than a\nthird of his budget. But some articles he buys will probably fall and he\nmay secure higher wages because of the withdrawal of competing laborers.\nSome labor may rise, especially in the industries benefited by the war,\nsuch as, for instance, farming and other food industries, canning, flour\nmills, sugar, &c., the automobile industry and perhaps ammunition and\nsteel. In other industries thrown out of gear for lack of foreign\nmarkets or for lack of foreign raw material, the wage earner may lose in\nwages and employment. In other words, labor will be dislocated in spots,\nlike the other parts of our industrial machinery.\n\nImportant dislocations will be felt in the fields of shipping and\nbanking. One consequence is that American enterprise has now the golden\nopportunity to capture a good share of each. The outbreak of the war and\nthe simultaneous opening of the Panama Canal will tend to divert the\ncourse of trade from Europe to South America. Probably our merchant\nmarine can be developed more successfully for this South American trade\nthan it could for the European trade. New York can largely take the\nplace of London as the world's exchange centre for Pan-American trade.\nThis opportunity is increased by the possibilities in the new Banking\nact for the establishment of branch banks abroad.\n\nWith these opportunities and the rise of interest in Europe, the United\nStates will change to a great degree from a debtor to a creditor nation.\n\nOne of the dislocations of the war in the United States will be the\ncutting off of imports of a large part of our dutiable commodities, and\ntherefore the loss of national revenue. There is an urgent need to\ncompensate for this loss by some other form of tax.\n\nBut it is well not to lose perspective, to remember that dislocations\nare not necessarily losses, that, however loudly they are proclaimed in\nnews columns, they are small in extent, when considered in relation to\nour whole trade, that this country of ours is a vast one, and that the\nrank and file of Americans will be but slightly affected by the\nwar--especially by contrast with our friends, now fighting each other,\nacross the sea.\n\nWe are too nearly self-supporting to be prostrated. Our foreign trade is\nand always has been a trifling matter compared with our internal\ncommerce. The internal commerce paid for by money and checks annually\nin the United States amounts to nearly five hundred billions of dollars,\nwhich is more than a hundred times as much as our combined exports and\nimports.\n\nAlmost all of what has been said so far had grown out of the prospect\nthat the prices of foods and other materials needed in Europe will be\nhigh, while the prices of securities which Europe does not need and\ncannot afford will be low. Other prices will rise or fall according to\nspecial circumstances. Like a bomb-shell, the effect of the war will be\nto disperse or scatter prices at all angles of rises and falls. The\nprices of luxuries will be lowered. The prices of chemicals will be\nraised. The same article will fall in price in one country and rise in\nanother if the transportation from the former to the latter is\ninterfered with. This is true today of cotton.\n\nThere has already been a speculative movement to anticipate these\nchanges and arbitrarily to mark some prices up and some prices down. But\nas this is guesswork, and will be subject to frequent revision, one of\nthe striking phenomena will doubtless be an increase in the variability\nof prices. The general level of prices will tend to rise. The rise will\nprobably be greatest in little countries like Belgium, which are in the\nwar zone and largely dependent on foreign trade. The rise will be less\nin England and in the United States than on the Continent. In fact, it\nis conceivable that in England the hoarding of money and the shock to\ncredit, which is as predominant there as it is here, may actually lower\nthe general level of prices during the war, especially if we could\ninclude in the index number the prices of securities, luxuries, and\narticles of English internal trade. If any nation tries the old\nexperiment of paying its bills in irredeemable paper money, that\ndesperate expedient will have the same result that it did with us during\nthe civil war. Inflation of the currency will expel gold from that\ncountry and raise its price level higher than elsewhere.\n\nAfter the war is over prices will probably not retreat, but will move\nupward even faster than before. There may then come the familiar \"boom\"\nperiod, which may culminate in a commercial crisis in a few years after\nthe close of the war, as was true after the Crimean war, the American\ncivil war, and the Franco-Prussian war. The rebound will probably be\nfastest in England. Statistical price curves of many nations usually\nshow an upward turn when war begins and another when it ends. The war\nwill thus aggravate a rise of prices already in prospect.\n\nIt would take considerable space to give, completely, the reasons for\nthese prognostications, but I have tried to justify them in a brief\naddendum to a book to be issued this week on \"Why Is the Dollar\nShrinking?\"\n\nThe sudden lightning bolt of war produced as one of its first economic\neffects a general dislocation of credit machinery in Europe and to some\nextent in this country. We heard at once that letters of credit of\ntravelers in Europe were uncashable. Gold was hoarded everywhere. It is\nestimated that about $30,000,000 in gold was hoarded in New York in the\nfirst week in August. Runs on banks were frequent. Bank reserves were\ndepleted.\n\nThe moratorium was resorted to to avoid a general cataclysm of\nbankruptcies which might have occurred--not from actual insolvency but\nfrom mere insufficiency of cash.\n\nTo me one of the most striking phenomena was the promptness and\neffectiveness of the co-operative actions by which, so far, any business\ncataclysm has been avoided. The closure of Stock Exchanges perhaps saved\nus from general financial panic. Most striking of all is the manner in\nwhich the Governments of the world have come to the rescue of business.\nThose of us who were brought up in the old laissez-faire school have to\nrub our eyes. Had the world been guided by laissez-faire ideas, in this\nemergency we should in all probability have witnessed by this time the\ngreatest collapse of credit the world has ever seen. Almost all the\nlarge and effective measures to meet the many emergencies arising were\ntaken by Governments. The moratorium must be counted among the\nGovernmental acts which, so far at least, have saved the day for\nbusiness credits. In England the Government permitted suspension of the\nBank act, (not of the Bank, as many Americans seem to imagine.)\n\n\nImprovised Accounting Methods.\n\nThe Bank of England has been enabled to rediscount a great mass of\nacceptances by the guarantee of the British Government against loss in\nso doing. These in the end will amount to several hundred millions of\ndollars. Emergency notes were issued by Governmental authority on both\nsides of the Atlantic, and in the arrangements made for special gold\nfunds in Canada and in France the Governments of England and France\nplayed the important parts. Thus have been improvised methods of\ninternational accounting by which the transportation of gold balances\nmay be deferred and largely dispensed with. Our own Government has\nco-operated in the currency exchange and credit situation in many ways.\nIt made provision for sending gold to Europe for our stranded\ncountrymen. It promptly revised the banking and shipping laws.\n\nWhether further instability will be found to need such bolstering we\ncannot be sure. The present outlook is that business conditions are\nfairly sound and stable. In which direction across the Atlantic the\ntitle to gold will tend to change cannot as yet be foreseen. It will\ndepend largely on how much Europe wants our products and how large a\nsacrifice she is willing to make in selling us her securities. It will\nalso depend on possible issues of paper money. Fortunately, we are the\nhappy possessors of over $1,500,000,000 in gold, and it is inconceivable\nthat any large part of this should flow out--unless we should be so\ninsensate as to inflate the currency.\n\nIf we keep our heads, we shall at the end of the war be in the proud\nposition of being the only great nation whose economic resources have\nnot even been strained.\n\n\n\n\nEffects of War on America\n\nBy Roland G. Usher.\n\n     Head of Department of History at Washington University; author\n     of \"Pan-Germanism,\" \"The Rise of the American People,\" &c.\n\n     _From The Boston Transcript, Sept. 2, 1914._\n\n\nThe events of the last few days of July, 1914, showed the Americans the\nfar-reaching effects of a state of war. There are now few who would say,\nas used to be so common, that a European war would make no difference to\nus. The closing of the New York Stock Exchange, the great shipments of\ngold and its consequent scarcity in the United States, the closing of\nthe New England cotton mills, the cessation of export to Europe and of\ntransatlantic communication with the Continent were instantaneous\neffects of a war 3,000 miles away obvious even to the apathetic and the\nheedless. With these we have not here to do; such are already past\nhistory. There is, however, a legitimate field for speculation as to the\nprobable effects on the United States of the continuation of the state\nof war in Europe for months or years. The permanent results of a war\nnaturally cannot be predicted in advance, but in the light of the\nhistory of the past, certain changes and developments in the United\nStates appear so probable if the war continues as to reach almost the\nrealm of certainty.\n\nNeedless to say, the European war will not involve the United States in\nactual hostilities. It is highly improbable that either our army or our\nnavy will see service. We are too distant from the seat of war; too\nentirely devoid of interests the combatants might seriously injure which\na resort to war could remedy; too completely incapable of aiding or\nabetting one or the other in arms to cause them to assail us. Even were\nwe not as a nation of a peaceable disposition, even had we not a\nPresident blessed with a singularly clear head and able to keep his\ntemper, we should still stand little chance of going to war. One\neventuality alone might affect us--Japan might attempt some measures of\naggression in the Far East which would interest us as possessors of the\nPhilippines, but that is practically foreclosed by her official\nannouncement that she will side with England. The effects of the war\nupon the United States will be indirect effects; they will be economic\nin character, though far-reaching and significant for every man, woman,\nand child in the country.\n\nThe economic structure of the United States rests today upon the\nassumption of the interdependence of international trade, upon an\ninternational division of labor, where England makes some things,\nGermany others, and we still more, all of which are exchanged. In a\nsense each country manufactures and produces for the whole world, and in\nturn expects the rest of the world to buy its products and to\nmanufacture and produce things for its consumption. While something of\nthis sort has always been true in international trade, the process\nreached during the nineteenth century an unprecedented development which\nactually made countries interdependent, or, if you will, actually\ndependent for the necessities of life upon each other's prosperity and\ncontinued activity. Hand in hand went the expansion of the international\ncredit structure, based upon public confidence in the mutual honesty of\nmerchants, until finally personal checks have begun to be exchanged\n(between the United States and England at least) at par and without\ninvestigation or previous indorsement by the banks on which they were\ndrawn.\n\nWith the outbreak of war a striking and artificial change, a totally\nuneconomic and unnatural factor, came to transform the situation and\nleave the United States for all practical purposes in contact with only\ntwo of her really large customers. We have no merchant marine and cannot\ntherefore avail ourselves of our neutral status to trade with the\nbelligerents. We shall be compelled (for a time at least) to ship in\nEnglish bottoms to such ports as English ships can make--which will\npractically be limited to England, France, Portugal, Spain, and the\nMediterranean ports. The ordinary commercial roads to Russia through the\nBaltic are automatically closed by the location of the German fleet, and\nprobably England and France, deprived of other outlets for their own\ntrade, will nearly monopolize the trade with Russia through the\nMediterranean and the Black Sea.\n\nOn the other hand, the mobilization of armies and fleets in Europe will\ndraw millions of men from the field and factories where they have been\naccustomed to make what we have usually bought. The war will vastly\ndiminish and in many cases stop altogether the stream of imports to the\nUnited States. These millions of men in the field and on the sea will\nnot possess most of the economic wants they had in time of peace and\nwill become conscious of many which they usually did not feel. The war\nwill diminish and in many cases entirely stop the stream of ordinary\nAmerican exports to Europe. Because of the stoppage of the European\nsupply of things we have usually bought of them, and the cessation of a\nEuropean demand for things we have usually sold to them, the conditions\nof the home market, both in regard to what we must buy in it, and to\nwhat we must sell in it, will be vitally changed. When our present\nsupplies of European importations are exhausted, we shall be obliged to\nmake for each other and buy from each other the things which we happen\nto be no longer able to import or export. A great readjustment of the\neconomic fabric in the United States will take place if the war lasts\nlonger than a comparatively short time.\n\nHow long a time that must be will depend entirely upon the sharpness of\nthe break in the economic life of Europe, and the amount of supplies\nthey have on hand, which, as they will not now need them at home, they\nwill be anxious to sell in the United States. Indeed, it would not be\nsurprising if there was for a short time a glut of English and French\nmanufactured goods in the United States market.\n\n\nEurope May Depend On Us.\n\nOf late years the commercial relationship between the United States and\nEurope has changed very greatly. For centuries we were a debtor\ncommunity, buying largely from Europe, possessed only of crude staple\nproducts for export, and scarcely able by a series of expedients and\nexchanges to pay for what we bought. Tobacco for many decades, then\ncotton, were the only commodities of which much was exported direct to\nEurope. Then came, during the European famines of 1846, 1861, and 1862,\nan enormous demand for American grain. Yet only during the last few\ndecades have we been able to export largely manufactured products or\nbeen able to deal with Europe on an equality of terms. We are no longer\na debtor nation; we are no longer dependent upon Europe; the United\nStates is an integral and essential part of the interdependent\ninternational economic fabric. Indeed, if the war continues ten years,\nEurope may be dependent upon us.\n\nIn a sense we are not ready to meet the crisis. During the last ten or\nfifteen years the exports of foodstuffs have fallen off greatly, and the\nsupply in this country has actually declined in proportion to\npopulation. There has been also a most marked increase in the exports of\nmanufactured goods and a decided increase in the importation of raw\nmaterials, including foodstuffs. Now will come an enormous demand from\nEurope for the very things of which we have not produced so much and\nexported little or nothing--bacon, eggs, butter, beef. The demand will\nalso be greatly increased for woolen cloth, raw leather, shoes, steel\nin all its forms, railroad equipment of all sorts, automobiles and\nmachinery, and, in particular, coal and gasoline. To supply this demand\nold industries will be expanded and new ones created, and a shift of\ncapital and labor will inevitably take place to the industries for which\na demand becomes clear in Europe, as soon as it seems reasonably certain\nthat the war will last, beyond the present year.\n\n\nAn American Merchant Marine.\n\nAbove all, an American merchant marine is likely to be seen again upon\nthe seas. There will be German ships in plenty for sale, in all\nprobability, unless Germany wins an immediate victory on the sea, and\nthe advantage of an unquestioned neutral status, easily obtained by a\nbona-fide purchase, will be so great that American capital will probably\ninvest largely in freight steamers and ocean liners. It seems entirely\nunlikely that England, while she remains mistress of the seas, should\nrecognize as valid the registration in the United States of vessels\nactually owned by belligerents or regard as anything more than\nmasquerading their appearance under the American flag. England has never\nrecognized any one's \"right\" to do anything at sea in time of war which\ndid not accrue directly to her own benefit. It is scarcely necessary to\nsay that she will not allow trade with Germany or Austria while she can\nprevent it. The only refuge will be the sale of the ship by the foreign\nowner to Americans who will trade with England, her allies, and strictly\nneutral nations. As always in time of war, privateering and smuggling\nwill be profitable, and trade with Germany, unless she is immediately\nvictorious at sea, will offer to the adventurous plenty of risk and the\ncertainty of huge profits. During the Napoleonic wars the flats and bars\nof the German coast along the North Sea offered light vessels a great\nopportunity and the pursuing warships great obstacles. A modern\nmotor-driven light craft will now have an enormous advantage over\ndestroyers or cruisers. Here, as a century ago, many an American will\nfind an opportunity to make a fortune.\n\nThe preoccupation of Europe with the war and the opening of the Panama\nCanal will afford the United States an unrivaled opportunity to develop\ntrade with Canada, South America, Australia, New Zealand, India, China,\nand the Far East in general. We have never bulked large in the eyes of\nthese countries and there has been much speculation as to the reasons\nwhy the German succeeded so well in South America and why the Englishman\ndid so much business in China. Whether from sentiment or from a national\nhabit that prefers English goods, the English colonies have bought more\nlargely of the mother country than they have of us. But now that the war\nhas closed the German factories, called German commercial agents home,\nand sent German ships racing to neutral harbors; now that the Panama\nCanal brings us some thousands of miles nearer to Australia and New\nZealand than they are to London via Suez; now that England will be busy\nmanufacturing for Europe and will have less to sell her colonies, these\nparticular parts of the world will probably be compelled to look for\ntheir manufactured goods to the United States. Indeed, if one were not\nafraid of being accused of gross exaggeration, he might take heart and\nproclaim his conviction that a long and really inclusive European war\nwould give the United States a practical monopoly of the South American\nand Pacific trade, provided always that the United States acquire by\npurchase a merchant marine and that the Panama Canal becomes feasible in\nJanuary for large ships.\n\n\nForeigners Leaving America\n\nOne other effect of the war has already begun to reveal itself in the\nemigration from America of thousands of Servians, Austrians, Russians,\nGermans, Frenchmen, going home to take their places in the ranks. While\nmany of these men are brave and honorable citizens, the fact that they\nrespond to such a call proves them not yet Americans. The war will tend\nto remove a goodly part of the distinctly foreign element in the\ncountry, the part not yet amalgamated, and therefore the part most alien\nto our institutions and the most difficult to place in our social\nstructure. If the war continues, Europe will draw every able-bodied man\nwho can be influenced to go. Far more important, immigration will\nprobably become negligible not only during the war, but for some time\nafter it. Usually the reason for leaving home lies in the crowded\npopulation of European States and the lack of opportunity for\nadvancement, plus the glib tongue of some agent of a contractor or of a\nsteamship company. In recent years those who have come have not been\ndesirable additions to our population because they came from nations\nalien in blood, language, religion and institutions, and were not\ntherefore easily knit into our national structure and absorbed. There\nwill be little, if any, further immigration. The men are wanted for the\narmy and will not be allowed to leave during the war. After peace is\nrestored, they will be imperatively needed in the fields and factories\nand every effort will be made to retain them. In fact, it does not take\nany wild stretch of the imagination for one acquainted with the results\nof the Thirty Years' War and of the Napoleonic wars to conceive that,\nfrom the view of economic opportunity and rewards, Europe might become a\nmore favorable scene for the truly capable and ambitious than America is\ntoday. The tendency of a war is to absorb the best of a nation and to\nleave the dregs. For the power of organization and the fire of\ninitiative Europe will at no distant date be ready to pay well.\n\n\nThe Effect of Economic Readjustment.\n\nUnquestionably the economic readjustment which the war will force upon\nthe United States will have an immediate and serious effect on\nindividuals. Some will profit largely and promptly. All who at present\npossess large stocks of food, leather, oil, woolen cloth will be able to\ndispose of them at enormous profits. From the greater volume of freight\nthe railroads will benefit directly. But while the farmers and\ncattle-men, the steel and oil kings are rejoicing in the opportunity,\nall industries which depend chiefly upon exportation or which\nmanufacture an amount beyond the normal American demand, will be closing\nthe factories or curtailing the output. For a time certain individuals,\nperhaps a relatively large number of individuals, will suffer\ninconvenience, loss, anxiety, and even privation. But the vast demand\nfor labor in other industries, and the almost certain extensive demand\nfor relatively unskilled labor ought not to make the period of\ntransition long or the amount of suffering considerable. After all, the\nvast majority of the people of the United States are connected with\nfarming, with the manufacture or production of the very things for which\nthere will most likely be a great demand, or with the transportation and\ndistribution of both imports and exports to the rest of the community.\nIn certain industries, like the manufacture of cotton cloth, which is\nlocalized in New England to such an extent that whole districts are\ndependent upon it for a livelihood, the distress will be great, for the\nfactories closed upon the declaration of war and the workers are a long\ndistance from the Western fields, where laborers are only too scarce.\nThe cheapening of transportation, the rapidity of communication, the\nsuperior mobility of the population today over ten years ago, make it\nprobable that these people will soon find new places.\n\nConcomitant with the war came a rise of prices. Foodstuffs especially\nadvanced sharply and will certainly continue to rise until some material\nincrease of the supply is assured beyond a peradventure. The tendency in\nEngland and above all on the Continent for the cities to buy great\nsupplies to guard against possible want will increase this tendency.\nBut, without question, should the war last, a rise in the whole level of\nprices of everything, including labor, will take place in the United\nStates. It will affect some individuals adversely, but for most will be\nin the long run almost negligible. For those who actually produce or\nhandle goods which advance in price the result will be a profit, because\nthe price of the commodity they have to sell will almost certainly\nadvance sooner and faster than the prices of the commodities they\nthemselves are compelled to buy. In time the two will equalize and they\nwill be precisely where they were before the war; they will pay out with\none hand what they take in with the other. In nearly all cases where the\nindividual produces or shares in the production of an actual commodity a\ngeneral rise in prices, even to the extent which this war threatens to\nproduce, will be to him only a temporary advantage or disadvantage.\nTrue, wages and salaries in industrial pursuits will not quite keep pace\nwith the rise in foodstuffs, and factory workers and clerks will not\nbenefit to the same extent nor as soon as the farmers will. People whose\nincomes are derived from stocks in the businesses which prosper will\nprobably receive much more than they pay by reason of the increased\nprices of other commodities, and certainly cannot be worse off than\nbefore.\n\n\nAmerica's Real Sufferers.\n\nThe real sufferers in America will be those who hold stock in the\nenterprises which fail or cease to operate, and that far larger class\nwho are dependent on a fixed salary. Professors and teachers of all\nsorts and grades; people living on annuities or small incomes derived\nfrom bonds or real estate; those dependent on the rent derived from\nleases for a term of years of dwelling houses, office buildings and the\nlike, these will lose a material amount, exactly in proportion to the\nrise in prices. To that extent, the purchasing power of the stated\nnumber of dollars they receive will depreciate and that much they will\nlose beyond a peradventure. In time, some relief will be afforded by a\ntardy rise in salaries, by the expiration of leases and the payment of\nbonds, but the actual losses of the intervening years have never been in\nany way refunded in like cases in the past.\n\nFor some individuals, then, the European war will spell strict economy;\nfor a comparatively few, let us hope, ruin. For the country as a whole,\nconsidered as a social and economic unit, a long war will introduce an\nera of astounding prosperity. Never before has the country had, and\ncertainly it will never again have, almost a monopoly of the world's\ntrade thrust into its hands. The United States will have only one real\ncompetitor, England, and, should the English Navy prove itself less\ncapable than is expected, or should England and her colonies be forced\nto order a general mobilization of their armies, the United States might\nconceivably remain the only great mercantile community to which the\nworld could look for supplies. No such eventuality need be predicated to\nprove that the continuation of this war or a series of wars will create\na demand for manufactured goods such as our merchants have never dreamed\nof. And they will command war prices. It means employment with rich\nreward for capital and labor alike--a vastly increased foreign market, a\nmuch greater domestic market, high prices, and a steadily voracious\ndemand for the entire output. The result will be the rapid\ndiversification of industry in the United States, the creation of\nindustries never before possible because of European competition, the\ninvention of machines to meet new needs. The normal economic development\nwill be accelerated decades.\n\nAfter the close of the European war, when manufacturing and production\nare resumed, America will find herself overproducing and face to face\nwith another economic readjustment necessary to meet the new situation.\nThen will ensue a commercial crisis with all its attendant suffering and\ntrouble such as the United States has probably never seen and which will\nbe violent and serious in proportion to the length of the war.\n\n\n\n\nGermany of the Future\n\nAN INTERVIEW WITH M. DE LAPREDELLE.\n\nExchange Professor from the University of Paris at Columbia University.\n\nBy Edward Marshall.\n\n\nIn the American press French views of the great war's significance have\nbeen less common than British views and far less frequent than German\nviews. Therefore, this talk with M. de Lapredelle, Exchange Professor\nfrom the University of Paris at Columbia, will have especial interest.\n\nThis very distinguished Frenchman, although but 43 years old, has won\nhigh eminence in his native land, especially in the domain of\ninternational law, which is his branch at the University of Paris. Also\nhe is Directeur de Recuel des Arbitrages Internacioneaux, he is the\neditor of The International Law Review in Paris, he is a member of the\nCommittee on International Law for the French Department of Justice, he\nis a member of the French Committee on Aerial Navigation, he is General\nSecretary of the French Society of International Law, and he occupies\nother important posts and bears other important scholastic honors.\n\nHe is a cautious conversationist, as might be expected of one who has so\ndeeply delved into the most cautious of all professions, but in the mind\nof the thoughtful reader this should add to the value of his utterances,\nwhich, as expressed in the following columns, were carefully revised by\nhim before going into type.\n\nI asked M. de Lapredelle to estimate the great war's probable effect\nupon education.\n\n\"Of course it is too early to guess intelligently,\" he replied, \"for the\neffect of the war will be dependent entirely upon the results of the\nwar, and, while we of the Allies have no doubt of our ultimate victory,\nit is the fact that victory has not been won as yet by either side.\n\n\"In talking with you my impulse is to assume what I feel in my\nheart--the certainty of German defeat, but I must not do that, although\nall the letters which I get from the front and from Paris express a\ngrowing confidence in the victory of the Allies.\n\n\"But it is too early to attempt intelligent detailed prophecy as to the\neffect of the great struggle upon the world's philosophy, or upon any\nother phase of its intellectual development.\n\n\"Almost certainly, however, a reaction against certain Germanic\ninfluences will be apparent after the war ends, for the world will not\nwant ever to risk repetition of the horrors of this struggle, and it\nwill be plain that they were the inevitable fruit of Germany's attempt\nat intellectual domination.\n\n\"This German assumption was due, largely, to their victory in 1870, but\nit went far beyond the bounds of reason, far beyond the fields in which\nGerman achievement really had established legitimate supremacy.\n\n\"The momentum of victory often has led humanity into excess. It led\nGermany into excessive claims of social superiority and into an\nexcessive assumption of intellectual supremacy. Even in the eyes of\nothers it gave Germany an unwarranted intellectual prestige.\n\n\"Really, the German is not a big thinker; he is an immensely careful\nthinker.\n\n\"Above everything, the German is an observer--a very diligent\nobserver--and his mental eyes are likely to be so close to the wall\nthat he sees only a single brick in it, wholly failing to get a\ncomprehensive view of the whole structure.\n\n\"Germans are very careful students. They attach a vast importance to\ndetail. I think it is not unfair to say that, with the German, the\nsmaller, the more minute the detail, the more it interests him. The\nGerman loves to write a big book on a small subject, and, loving it, he\ndoes it well.\n\n\"But there are more exalted tasks, as, for example, the writing of big\nbooks upon big subjects, giving the world fresh visions of new and\nfar-flung vistas. The German loves to catalogue and catalogues almost\nwith genius; he loves to deliver long lectures upon microcosms.\n\n\"Cataloguing and the near-sightedness which may arise from intense study\nof the atom, to the exclusion of the collective organism, whether that\ncollective organism be the human individual or the social mass, may\nrender immense service to the world, but it never will be the only\nservice necessary, and, if pursued to the exclusion of all other\ninvestigations, such study is likely to produce an aggravated narrowness\nof vision. Narrow vision is certain to eventuate in selfishness.\n\n\"The Germans became selfish after this fashion. The present struggle is\nthe war of selfishness against world advance.\n\n\"Innumerable, or at least many, individuals have furnished smaller\nparallels to the course which Germany has taken as a nation. The\nindividual with the truly and exclusively scientific mind is likely to\ngo too far into abstractions, built from a possible misinterpretation of\nminutiae.\n\n\"The ideal national intellectual development will combine both fact and\ntheory, will join rationalism to idealism, and will be far more like\nthat of certain nations which I shall not name than it will be like that\nof Germany. These nations which I shall not name have both.\n\n\"In other words, it seems to be the fixed idea of the German that the\nGerman civilization is the only civilization; but it is not the thought\nof France or England that their civilizations are the only ones.\n\n\"This very lack of what may be defined as national egotism in France and\nEngland enables these nations to work, as Germany does not, for world\nscience and world development--the growth of civilization as a whole.\n\n\"Germany's scientific work is for German science, she thinks\nof civilization only as German civilization. The world's other\ngreat nations--and may I say the world's great Latin nations\nespecially?--internationalize their science and their civilization.\"\n\n\nWhy the Philosopher Is Important.\n\n\"One must be struck by the fact that Germany's critical philosophy\nformed the basis of her educational system and, therefore, the basis of\nher social system, and that it had in it the basis of the war.\n\n\"It cannot be denied, I think, that her education, as well as her\npolitics and militarism, directly pointed to this great conflict.\nIndeed, the industrialism, the politics, the philosophy of Germany all\nfind their logical expression in present events.\n\n\"Hegel was the first, in the beginning of the last century, to insist\nupon the ideas which, already being paramount in him, quickly became\nparamount in his followers, serving as the basis for the development of\nPrussia. To him this represented all and everything; to him divinity on\nearth was incarcerated in the State, and, therefore, the development of\nthe State, not justice, was, in his mind, the object of all law.\n\n\"Since this beginning that has been the consistent German viewpoint, and\nincreasingly so. The glorification of the State has included, of\nnecessity, the sacrifice of the individual, and this has been conducted\nruthlessly in Germany itself.\n\n\"Of course the State which considers it right to sacrifice the\nindividuals of its own citizenship will be sure to consider it right to\nsacrifice the individuals of other nations' citizenships.\n\n\"That explains why international law never has been considered binding\nby the German; it explains why international law was not considered\nbinding when Belgium stood in the path of Germany's march toward Paris.\n\n\"International law never has bound the German; it never will bind him\nuntil he changes his national psychology.\n\n\"Ihering, one of Germany's greatest theoretical jurists and a scholar in\nthe matter of Roman law, declared, 'Right is the child of might.' He did\nnot say exactly that right is might, but he defined it as 'the child of\nmight.'\n\n\"That may be taken as the German keynote, for this man is of such great\ninfluence in Germany that his utterances must have an enormous effect.\n\n\"Treitschke, the historian, in his teaching in Berlin, naturally drew\nsome of his inspiration from these two men. For him the State need\nconsider no law save that which will promote its own expansion.\n\n\"Moral law, he holds, need not and must not stand in the way of the\nprosperity and growth of States, as it frequently must obstruct the\nprosperity and growth of individuals.\n\n\"Under this theory the State has two functions--these are, inside the\ncountry, to make law; outside the country, to make war. Germany denies\nthe right of an extraneous law to decide upon the details of right and\nwrong within a country, and that is why Germany defies and even denies\ninternational law.\n\n\"If it happens that a treaty which the State has entered into later\nproves to be obstructive to some expansion which is thought to be a\nnecessity of the State's destiny, that treaty may be disregarded with\nthe full approval of Germany's national morality, although similar\nconduct on the part of an individual in Germany would be considered\nhighly reprehensible.\n\n\"The State may bind itself to secure advantage, but, also, it may unbind\nitself to secure advantage, and this without consultation with, or the\napproval of, the other party or parties to the contract.\n\n\"This theory becomes confusing to the student reared in other nations\nunder different educational influences. It indicates beyond\ncontradiction that Germany feels no sense of duty toward other nations,\nbut only an obligation to further her own interests.\n\n\"Germany has immense patriotism but no humanitarianism. Her only duty is\nto herself. Her national egotism can be characterized by no other word\nthan selfishness.\n\n\"It is a curious phenomenon that at a time when humanitarianism in its\nbroadest sense has become the keynote of all other of the great nations\nit has not become at all the keynote of German civilization.\"\n\n\nTeutonic Superexcitation.\n\n\"It is impossible that such pride, such a sense of arrogant national\nsuperiority as that which marks Germany, should maintain among a\ndemocratic people; it is possible only to a very aristocratic country.\nWhat has happened is its logical outgrowth in the country which it has\ninfected.\n\n\"In Germany this sense of national pride, of intolerance of others, even\nof contempt for others, has been developed until it amounts to\nsuperexcitation. It not only affects Germany's relations to other\npeoples, but it affects the relations of Germans to one another.\n\n\"Different classes of the German population continually exhibit it in\ntheir dealings with one another.\n\n\"It is continually illustrated in those events which have been the\nwonder of visiting foreigners--episodes of the contemptuous\nill-treatment of subordinate German soldiers by their superiors. It goes\nbeyond that, manifesting itself in the treatment of all civilians by the\nlowest soldier, and, further still, in the attitude even of the lowest\ncivilian to all foreigners, even the highest.\n\n\"The German individual may not consider himself superior to all\nindividuals of other nationalities, but he will be sure to consider his\nnation so far superior to every other that there can be no comparison\nbetween it and them. His is a peculiar arrogance. It is not at all\npersonal; it is purely national; but none the less it is arrogance, and\nall arrogance is dangerous.\n\n\"A hierarchy always exists in aristocratic countries; the hierarchical\nidea has been developed further in Germany than elsewhere.\n\n\"This has given Germany an unfortunate impulse. If to this impulse we\nadd that other born of all her various victories since 1866, especially\nthose which were won while Germany was realizing Bismarck's dream of\ntriumph 'through fire and blood'--her industrial victories, her\nscientific advance, her social progress--and consider the Germanic\ntendency toward egotism, we do not find ourselves surprised when we\nfind, examine, and appraise exactly what we have today in Germany.\n\n\"The perversion of national sentiment into national arrogance has been\nthe definite, although, perhaps, unrealized and unintended, aim of every\neducational influence which has been at work in Germany since 1870. It\nhas amounted to an unparalleled perversion of a nation's sentiment\ntoward all the outside world.\n\n\"This war marks the crisis of this German pride.\n\n\"Germany's course throughout has borne all the earmarks of a national\nego-mania. The whole German people, as a nation, not always, perhaps, as\nindividuals, have fallen victim to the most colossal attack of ego-mania\nwhich the world ever has known.\n\n\"Combine this ego-mania with another delusion--the entirely unjustified\nconclusion that Germany was the object of a worldwide persecution--and\nit is unnecessary to search further for the causes of the war, just as\nit is unnecessary to search further for reasons for the combination of\npractically all other Europe against Germany.\n\n\"What would German victory mean to the world, if German victory came,\nsave the worldwide dominance of German egotism, imposed at the expense\nof every other people? France would not escape, England would not\nescape, and, I assure you, you, America, would not escape. German\nvictory would be far more than a European disaster--it would be a world\ndisaster.\n\n\"Of all the nations in the world perhaps the United States and France\nhave stood most notably for the ideas of international justice. This\nreally makes your interest in the outcome of the present war indirectly\nas great as ours.\n\n\"I cannot see how the people of the United States can feel otherwise\nthan that not only their hearts but their reason demands victory for the\nAllies, not because of any wish for the destruction of Germany, but\nbecause of the wish for the preservation of the world.\n\n\"Indeed, it is inconceivable that victory for the Allies can mean\ndestruction for Germany. It can mean only the destruction of German\nmilitarism, which has brought about the perversion of the German mind.\n\n\"No abler mind exists. Its release from the thralldom which has fettered\nit would be a vast world service, would, indeed, be a vast benefit to\nGermany herself. It is curious, but true, that I believe Germany's own\nsalvation depends upon her absolute defeat in this great war.\n\n\"A few weeks before the war began Prof. Schucking expressed regret that\nGermany--that is, the German Government--should be so antagonistic to\ninternational spirit. The fact that he made this expression shows that,\nin spite of and beyond military Germany, the intellectual elite, the\ncream of the elite in Germany, has remained faithful to the traditions\nof the great philosopher, Kant.\n\n\"The intellectual elite--the cream of the elite--therefore may be\nabsolved from all responsibility. Loyalty to the teachings of Kant will\nmake it possible for the friends of humanity in all nations to join with\nGermany for human advancement on the basis of universal justice.\n\n\"After the victory of the Allies a new Germany will appear; it will be a\nliberal Germany, willing to renounce the narrow Prussian ideals, finding\nagain the old German ideal in its disinterested form, a Germany which\nwill be able to join hands with other nations, to help them in taking up\nagain the works of international civilization, which Prussian Germany\nherself brutally brought to an end, with insolent scorn of right--an act\nfor which she is now paying and must pay the penalty.\"\n\n\n\n\nGermany the Aggressor\n\nBy Albert Sauveur.\n\nProfessor of Metallurgy at Harvard University.\n\n\n_To the Editor of The New York Times:_\n\nGerman professors and editors and other German sympathizers in the\npresent struggle of nations have attempted the difficult task of\nconvincing the American public, first, that Germany was not the\naggressor, and, second, that she is conducting a war of civilization\ndirected primarily against Russia, that Europe may not fall under\nMuscovite domination. The German Chancellor has made similar claims,\nwhile in the German \"White Paper,\" published in full in THE NEW YORK\nTIMES of Aug. 24, it is likewise attempted to fasten the responsibility\nfor this war on Germany's opponents.\n\nA close and impartial study of both the English and German \"White\nPapers\" must suffice to convince the reader that Germany clearly was the\naggressor and that England made every possible effort first to prevent a\nwar between Austria and Servia and later to localize the conflict.\nGermany, on the contrary, by insisting from the start that there should\nbe no intervention in the settlement of the dispute between Servia and\nher ally, Austria, made a European war inevitable. The sophistry,\ninaccuracies, and unwarranted conclusions of the German professors and\neditors have not helped their cause. The irrefutable facts remain,\nfirst, that Austria with the knowledge and approval of Germany presented\nto Servia an ultimatum so worded that she knew that the conditions\nimposed could not be complied with by any nation retaining a spark of\nself-respect; second, that after Servia had accepted Austria's ultimatum\nwith the single exception of the most offensive clause, which she\nproposed to submit to arbitration, Austria, with Germany's consent,\nproclaimed herself unsatisfied and immediately declared war on Servia;\nthird, that Germany and Austria knew that a war with Servia meant a war\nwith Russia, and that a war with Russia meant a general European\nconflagration; fourth, that Germany declared war on Russia, started the\ninvasion of France before declaring war, and, by refusing to respect the\nneutrality of Belgium, to which she was solemnly pledged, forced both\nBelgium and England into the war. In the face of so flagrant a violation\nof all sentiments making for peace no sophistry will avail in attempting\nto protect Germany from the odium of being responsible for the greatest\ncalamity the civilized world has ever seen.\n\nWe are told that Germany is conducting this war in the interest of\ncivilization, that her chief purpose is to protect Europe from the\ndomination of the Slav. And to ward off this Muscovite danger Germany is\nat present making desperate efforts to crush England and France, the\nstandard bearers of democracy in Europe! In her war for civilization she\nis employing the methods of barbarian tribes, methods condemned by\ncivilized nations and which have already horrified the world. It is\nhardly conceivable that Russia, which the German Chancellor describes as\na semi-Asiatic, slightly cultured barbaric nation, could have committed\nin Belgium the atrocities imputed to the Germans had she conquered that\ncountry in similar circumstances.\n\nIt is manifest that Germany's supreme desire is to fasten Teutonic rule\non Europe, to crush Russia, to be sure, but also to crush France and\nFrench civilization and to reduce England to the rank of a second-class\nnation. It is obvious that this is a struggle between militarism and its\nevils as represented by the Hohenzollern dynasty and democracy as\nrepresented by England and France.\n\nALBERT SAUVEUR.\n\nHarvard University, Cambridge, Mass., Sept. 5, 1914.\n\n\n\n\nMilitarism and Christianity\n\nBy Lyman Abbott.\n\n_A Letter to The New York Sun._\n\n     Editor in Chief of The Outlook; author of numerous works on\n     theology, religion, and democracy.\n\n\n_To the Editor of The New York Sun:_\n\nIn answer to your request for a statement of the causes and meaning of\nthe European war I write with necessary brevity, both because of the\nlimits on my time and the limits on your crowded columns.\n\nWhat is the cause of the explosion of a powder magazine? The gases\nstored in the powder. The lighted match is the occasion, not the cause\nof the explosion. The cause of the European war is the spirit of envy,\njealousy, selfishness and suspicion in the so-called Christian nations.\nThe assassination by a Servian of the Crown Prince of Austria was only\nthe lighted match which set the European combustibles in flame.\n\nIn the United States we recognize the truth that the interests of each\nState are identical with the interests of the Union, and that no State\ncan permanently prosper by reason of the misfortune of its neighbor. In\nthe German Empire since its unification each principality similarly\nrecognizes that the interests of the German Empire and the interests of\nthe several principalities are essentially identical. But there is no\nsuch recognition of the common interest binding the warring nations of\nEurope together.\n\nEach nation looks with envy on the prosperity of its neighbor and acts\nupon the assumption that its neighbor is a rival, and that its own\ncommerce and wealth can be built up only at the expense of its rival.\nNew York is quite willing that the harbor of Boston should be improved.\nBremen is quite willing that the harbor of Hamburg should be improved.\nThe west coast of England does not object to harbor facilities on the\neast coast of England. But Germany envies England's harbor facilities,\nand England and Germany are both resolved to prevent if possible Russia\nfrom getting harbor facilities on the Mediterranean Sea. Not every\nindividual German, Austrian, Frenchman, and Englishman holds this\nopinion, but the policies of these nations are governed by this spirit\nof international rivalry.\n\nA striking illustration of this spirit, perhaps the most striking\nillustration in modern international life, is furnished by the military\nparty in Prussia. Gen. Bernhardi, in a volume entitled \"Germany and the\nNext War,\" has given what may be regarded as a semi-official\ninterpretation of German militarism. He holds that life is a struggle\nfor existence, with a survival of the fittest, and the strongest is the\nfittest; that a military organization constitutes the true strength of a\nnation; that there is no higher power in human life, certainly none in\ninternational life, than the power of physical force; that only the\nstrong nation has a right to exist, and he objects to international\narbitration because it recognizes the right to life of a small nation.\nIn this volume he calls on Germany to establish a \"world sovereignty\" by\nforce of arms, and he indicates what should be the twofold purpose of\nGermany in the next war, namely, to crush France and to establish such\nworld sovereignty of Germany.\n\n\nMilitarism to Blame.\n\nIt was this spirit which led Germany into the present war; this spirit\nwhich denied that Belgium had any rights which Germany was bound to\nrespect; this spirit which inspired the military party in Germany to\nregard its treaty with France and England guaranteeing the neutrality of\nBelgium as only a \"scrap of paper,\" and this spirit which could not and\napparently still does not comprehend why Belgium should be bound in\nhonor to defend her neutrality, or why England, with no very direct and\nimmediate interests to protect, should feel herself bound to come to the\ndefense of her weaker neighbor.\n\nThe delay of the German Army, which is likely to prove disastrous to her\ndesigns, has demonstrated in her own chosen field that there is a force\nin national honor and national conscience which can put up a very\nefficient resistance to Krupp guns.\n\nIt is a great mistake to suppose that all Germany is actuated by this\nspirit of militarism. Frederick William Wile, for over seven years the\nchief German correspondent of The London Daily Mail, in an article in\nThe Outlook recently said: \"There are 66,000,000 Germans; 65,000,000 of\nthem did not want war; the other million are the war party.\" But he adds\nthat now Germany is absolutely united and that the Germans will not\nstack arms \"till the last among them capable of shouldering a rifle is\nincapacitated, till the last copper pfennig capable of purchasing\nammunition of war has vanished from their impoverished grasp.\"\n\nThere is in this nothing extraordinary. Whoever is responsible for\nbringing on the war, the interests, the welfare, and in some sense the\nhonor of Germany are apparently involved in it. And yet it may be true,\nand I believe it is true, that the defeat of Germany will be its\nsalvation, for it will be the overthrow of the spirit of militarism\ninherited from Frederick the Great, and this has been the bane of the\nGerman Empire.\n\nIn our civil war there was at first only a minority in most of the\nSouthern States in favor of secession, but when the national troops\ninvaded Virginia the South was as united for State independence as the\nNorth was for national union, and yet today it will be difficult to find\nanywhere in the South an intelligent man who does not recognize the\ntruth that the defeat of secession and the emancipation of the slave\nhave been of inestimable benefit to the Southern States.\n\nI make no attempt here to apportion the responsibility for this war\nbetween the several powers engaged in it. However this responsibility\nmust be shared among them I can see but one meaning in the awful\ncampaign. The victory of Germany would mean the victory of Prussian\nmilitarism. The defeat of Germany will mean the defeat of Prussian\nmilitarism, the rehabilitation of Germany as a great industrial and\neducational power in the world, and probably the practical overthrow of\nmilitary autocracy in all Western Europe.\n\n\nDivine Right of Kings Obsolete.\n\nThe campaigns of Napoleon ended for Western Europe the Divine right of\nKings. The campaigns of the Allies will end for Western Europe the\nDivine right of the armed man. The Russo-Japanese war gave to Russia its\nfirst representative assembly, the Duma. It is not unreasonable to hope\nthat the present European war will result in greatly enlarging the\npowers of the Duma and establishing true constitutional government in\nGermany, a government in which the Ministry will be responsible not to\nthe Emperor but to the Reichstag; and the power both of the purse and\nthe sword will not be in the hands of an aristocratic oligarchy but in\nthe hands of the common people.\n\nIt is not strange that men should point to this, perhaps the greatest\nwar of history, as an evidence that Christianity is a failure. If\nChristianity professed to be able by a miracle to transform human nature\nat once, such a war would be fatal to its claim. But no such claim can\nbe made for Christianity. It is a great human movement, a phase of the\ngradual evolution of man, governed by conscience and reason, out of the\nbrute, governed by appetite and passion.\n\nMan as he is seen in the world to day is an unfinished product. He is in\nthe making. The best that can be said of a Christian is that he is\nfurther along toward the goal of humanity than the barbarian.\nTheological doctrines such as the Trinity, the Atonement, and the like\nare not the essential doctrines of Christianity. The essential doctrine\nis that life is a struggle for others as well as for self; that in this\nstruggle every one owes a duty to his neighbor, and the stronger he is\nand the greater the need of his neighbor the more imperative is his\nduty; that as the father and the mother care for, educate and govern\ntheir child until he grows able to care for, educate and govern himself,\nso always the strong men and women owe the duty of protection,\neducation, and, in some measure, government to the weaker of the human\nrace until they have outgrown the need for it.\n\nIn so far as autocracy is the rule of the few for the benefit of the few\nit is paganism. In so far as democracy is the rule of the many for the\nbenefit of the many it is Christianity. He who believes this will\nperhaps believe with me that in a true sense this is a religious war,\nthe war of conscience, honor, the moral sense against the rule of the\nbayonet and the bullet.\n\nThe cynic who thinks this war demonstrates the failure of Christianity\nshould not forget such facts as the heroic struggle of Belgium to\nmaintain her neutrality, the resolve of England at every cost to\nmaintain her pledges to Belgium, the Red Cross following the armies in\nthe field and ministering to the sick, the wounded and the suffering,\nregardless of their nationality, the general kind treatment to\nprisoners, accentuated by some very horrible exceptions, and all this\ncontrasted with the enslaving, torturing, the crucifying, the flaying\nalive of prisoners captured in war by barbaric nations before the dawn\nof Christianity.\n\nLYMAN ABBOTT.\n\nCornwall-on-Hudson, Sept. 17, 1914.\n\n\n\n\nVIGIL\n\nBy HORTENSE FLEXNER.\n\n\nI have waited with my mothers down the dim, uncertain ages,\nI have waited in the cave and hut and tower,\n  From the first dawn's nameless fear\n  To the death-list posted here\nI have slain my soul in waiting, hour by hour.\n\nUnder pelt of beast, trap-taken, or the leaves by chance winds blow,\nUnder tunic, peasant hemp, or cloth of gold,\n  By the fire, in low flame burning,\n  I have crouched in silence, yearning,\nAnd as now, my helpless heart has waited cold.\n\nAncient is the part I play--like a cloak of heavy mourning,\nI take it, bending, from a million women's hands.\n  They have worn it, they have torn it,\n  Agonizing, they have borne it,\nAnd its folds are dark with heart-break of all lands.\n\nOh, the woman figure standing, with the face toward the horizon,\nOh, the hand above the eyes to ease the strain!\n  Gaunt and barren, stricken, lonely,\n  With the empty memories only,\nWe have stood, the dry-eyed sentries of our pain.\n\nNothing we can do to stop them, nothing we can say to hold them;\nTaking sunlight, laughter, youth, they swing away,\n  And the things they leave grow strange,\n  House and street and voices change,\nBut the women and the burdened hours stay.\n\nI have waited with my mothers down the dim, uncertain ages,\nWhile my children die, I pray the centuries through,\n  And I wonder in my fear\n  At the death-list posted here\nIf God has left the women waiting, too!\n\n\n\n\nNietzsche and German Culture\n\nBy Abraham Solomon.\n\n_A Letter to The New York Evening Post._\n\n\nSir: Those who trace the German militaristic doctrines to Nietzsche's\ninfluence commit Pastor Mander's sin when he told Mrs. Alving to bar\nfrom her library a book which he had never read. Nietzsche was an\ninveterate enemy of efficiency, astigmatic with regard to practical\nlife, and he never worked out a philosophy in the accepted sense of the\nterm. He was a lyric poet who wrote psychology when he failed to sustain\nthe poetic mood. In the Engadine and at Sils-Maria, brooding in a rocky\nvoid wherein he touched the sharp edge of infinity, he sang a Dionysian\nhymn to life against the melancholy products of German learning and\nagainst those Nihilistic snares which he thought lurked in Christian\ndoctrine. There he worked out the mystic idea of \"Eternal Recurrence\"\nand his song of Zarathustra with the bell strokes of noon.\n\nWhat he knew of history he used for an analysis of values, and not for\nState polity. He shrank from the irritations of reality, and he had\nlittle patience with the national mania cultivated after Sedan, warning\nhis country that their victory was not one of a superior culture, that\nGermany had no style but a barbaric mixture of many styles; and he\npointed out the essential difference between culture and erudition.\n\nHis unfinished work, \"The Will to Power,\" was an attempt to house his\nlyric passions in an architectural frame. The facade of the structure,\nas posthumously revealed to us, is an indication that he was really\nengaged in building a Tower of Babel. Power, Affirmation, Yea-Saying he\nconsidered the attributes of life, and he found in them recompense for\nhis weakness and his lack of capacity for happiness. He was a master of\nthe exquisite nuances of vision, but since he touched real life at the\ncircumference, and not at the centre, his philosophical valuations are\nbizarre, and have only a literary value.\n\nIt is superficial to make Treitschke and Bernhardi his disciples, as\nsome American writers have made Roosevelt his disciple. Treitschke is a\nheavy-footed historian who raised the axiom of self-preservation into a\nphilosophy of force. Von Bernhardi's book, though extreme in its\nexpression, is based on the fundamental truth that if Germany desired a\njust proportion of oversea territories (a proportion denied her by\nEngland) she would have to gain it by force of arms. In the development\nof this idea he makes many generalizations calculated to dazzle the\nmultitude and to imbue it with the courage to expansion. Treitschke\nwould have rested in obscurity but for the war; Bernhardi does not\npretend to talents as a philosopher.\n\nThe real origin of Germany's policy in the last forty years may be\nderived from the eminently practical and direct mind of Bismarck. From\nreading of history he learned that chicane and force had been utilized\nas the roads to power, of which fact he found ample demonstration in the\nhistories of England and Russia. He proved himself a true adept by using\nchicane and force to achieve German unity, after the theorists had\nfailed.\n\nThose who glibly condemn a lyric philosopher in order to make out a case\nagainst Germany reveal the weakness of their position. It is strange\nthat these lantern-eyed critics haven't cited Heine as an enemy of\ndemocracy because he adored Napoleon. Was it because Heine lived for\nyears in Paris on the adulation of advanced feminines?\n\nABRAHAM SOLOMON.\n\nNew York, Oct. 13, 1914.\n\n\n\n\nBelgium's Bitter Need\n\nBy Sir Gilbert Parker.\n\n\n_Sir Gilbert Parker, M.P., went to Holland at the request of the\nAmerican Committee for the Relief of Belgium a week ago to inquire into\nthe work of the committee and the needs of the Belgians._\n\n_Sir Gilbert visited frontier towns and the camps of the refugees for\nthe purpose of making a personal investigation into the conditions. That\nhe is deeply impressed by the desperate need of the Belgians may be\ngathered from the following graphic statement and appeal, dated Dec. 5,\n1914, to the American people:_\n\nSince the beginning of the war the hearts of all humane people have been\ntortured by the sufferings of Belgium. For myself the martyrdom of\nBelgium had been a nightmare since the fall of Liege. Whoever or\nwhatever country is to blame for this war, Belgium is innocent. Her\nhands are free from stain. She has kept the faith. She saw it with the\neyes of duty and honor. Her Government is carried on in another land.\nHer King is in the trenches. Her army is decimated, but the last\ndecimals fight on.\n\nHer people wander in foreign lands, the highest and lowest looking for\nwork and bread; they cannot look for homes. Those left behind huddle\nnear the ruins of their shattered villages or take refuge in towns which\ncannot feed their own citizens.\n\n\nAbyss of Want and Woe.\n\nMany cities and towns have been completely destroyed; others, reduced or\nshattered, struggle in vain to feed their poor and broken populations.\nStones and ashes mark the places where small communities lived their\npeaceful lives before the invasion. The Belgian people live now in the\nabyss of want and woe.\n\nAll this I knew in England, but knew it from the reports of others. I\ndid not, could not, know what the destitution, the desolation of Belgium\nwas, what were the imperative needs of this people, until I got to\nHolland and to the borders of Belgian territory. Inside that territory I\ncould not pass because I was a Britisher, but there I could see German\nsoldiers, the Landwehr, keeping guard over what they call their new\nGerman province. Belgium a German province!\n\nThere at Maastricht I saw fugitives crossing the frontier into Holland\nwith all their worldly goods on their shoulders or in their hands, or\nwith nothing at all, seeking hospitality of a little land which itself\nfeels, though it is neutral, the painful stress and cost of the war.\nThere, on the frontier, I was standing between Dutch soldiers and German\nsoldiers, so near the Germans that I could almost have touched them, so\nnear three German officers that their conversation as they saluted me\nreached my ears.\n\nI begin to understand what the sufferings and needs of Belgium are. They\nare such that the horror of it almost paralyzes expression. I met at\nMaastricht Belgians, representatives of municipalities, who said that\nthey had food for only a fortnight longer. And what was the food they\nhad? No meat, no vegetables, but only one-third of a soldier's rations\nof bread for each person per day. At Liege, as I write, there is food\nfor only three days.\n\nWhat is it the people of Belgium ask for? They ask for bread and salt,\nno more, and it is not forthcoming. They do not ask for meat; they\ncannot get it. They have no fires for cooking, and they do not beg for\npetrol. Money is of little use to them, because there is no food to be\nbought with money.\n\nBelgium under ordinary circumstances imports five-sixths of the food she\neats. The ordinary channels of sale and purchase are closed. They\ncannot buy and sell if they would. Representatives of Belgian\ncommunities told me at Maastricht yesterday that the crops were taken\nfrom their fields--the wheat and potatoes--and were sent into Germany.\n\n\nNo Work, but Taxes Continue.\n\nThere is no work. The factories are closed because they have not raw\nmaterial, coal, or petrol, because they have no markets.\n\nAnd yet war taxes are falling with hideous pressure upon a people whose\nhands are empty, whose workshops are closed, whose fields are idle,\nwhose cattle have been taken, or compulsorily purchased without value\nreceived.\n\nIn Belgium itself the misery of the populace is greater than the misery\nof the Belgian fugitives in other countries, such as Holland, where\nthere have come since the fall of Liege one and a half million of\nfugitives. To gauge what that misery in Belgium is, think of what even\nthe fugitives suffer. I have seen in a room without fire, the walls\ndamp, the floor without covering, not even straw, a family of nine women\nand eight children, one on an improvised bunk seriously ill. Their home\nin Belgium was leveled with the ground, the father killed in battle.\n\nTheir food is coffee and bread for breakfast, potatoes for dinner, with\nsalt--and in having the salt they were lucky--bread and coffee for\nsupper. Insufficiently clothed, there by the North Sea, they watched the\nbleak hours pass, with nothing to do except cling together in a vain\nattempt to keep warm.\n\nMultiply this case by hundreds of thousands and you will have some hint\nof the people's sufferings.\n\nIn a lighter on the River Maas at Rotterdam, without windows, without\ndoors, with only an open hatchway from which a ladder descends, several\nhundred fugitives spend their nights and the best parts of their days in\nthe iron hold, forever covered with moisture, leaky when rain comes,\nwith the floor never dry, and pervasive with a perpetual smell like the\nsmell of a cave which never gets the light of day. Here men, women, and\nchildren were huddled together in a promiscuous communion of misery,\nmade infinitely more pathetic and heartrending because none complained.\n\nAt Rosendaal, at Scheveningen, Eysden, and Flushing, at a dozen other\nplaces, these ghastly things are repeated in one form or another.\nHolland has sheltered hundreds of thousands, but she could not in a\nmoment organize even adequate shelter, much less comforts.\n\nIn Bergen-op-Zoom, where I write these words, there have come since the\nfall of Antwerp 300,000 hungry marchers, with no resources except what\nthey carry with them. This little town of 15,000 people did its best to\nmeet the terrible pressure, and its citizens went without bread\nthemselves to feed the refugees. How can a small municipality suddenly\ndeal with so vast a catastrophe? Yet slowly some sort of order was\norganized out of chaos, and when the Government was able to establish\nrefugee camps through the military the worst conditions were moderated,\nand now, in tents and in vans on a fortunately situated piece of land,\nover 3,000 people live, so far as comforts are concerned, like Kaffirs\nin Karoo or aborigines in a camp in the back blocks of Australia. The\ntents are crammed with people, and life is reduced to its barest\nelements. Straw, boards, and a few blankets and dishes for rations--that\nconstitutes the menage.\n\nChildren are born in the hugger mugger of such conditions, but the good\nHolland citizens see that the children are cared for and that the babies\nhave milk. Devoted priests teach the children, and the value of military\norganization illuminates the whole panoply of misery. Yet the best of\nthe refugee camps would seem to American citizens like the dark and\ndreadful life of an underworld, in which is neither work, purpose, nor\nopportunity. It is a sight repugnant to civilization.\n\nThe saddest, most heartrending thing I have ever seen has been the\npatience of every Belgian, whatever his state, I have met. Among the\nthousands of refugees I have seen in Holland, in the long stream that\ncrossed the frontier at Maastricht and besieged the doors of the\nBelgian Consul while I was there, no man, no woman railed or declaimed\nagainst the horror of their situation. The pathos of lonely, staring,\napathetic endurance is tragic beyond words. So grateful, so simply\ngrateful, are they, every one, for whatever is done for them.\n\n\nNone of the Refugees Begs.\n\nNone begs, none asks for money, and yet on the faces of these frontier\nrefugees I saw stark hunger, the weakness come of long weeks of famine.\nOne man, one fortunate man from Verviers, told me he could purchase as\nmuch as 2s. 8d. worth of food for himself, his wife, and child for a\nweek.\n\nThink of it, American citizens! Sixty-six cents' worth of food for a\nman, his wife, and child for a whole week, if he were permitted to\npurchase that much! Sixty-six cents! That is what an average American\ncitizen pays for his dinner in his own home. He cannot get breakfast, he\ncan only get half a breakfast, for that at the Waldorf or the Plaza in\nNew York.\n\nThis man was only allowed to purchase that much food if he could,\nbecause if he purchased more he would be taking from some one else, and\nthey were living on rations for the week which would represent the food\nof an ordinary man for a day. A rich man can have no more than a poor\nman. It is a democracy of famine.\n\nThere is enough food wasted in the average American household in one day\nto keep a Belgian for a fortnight in health and strength. They want in\nBelgium 300,000 tons of food a month. That is their normal requirement.\nThe American Relief Committee is asking for 8,000 tons a month,\none-quarter of the normal requirements, one-half of a soldier's rations\nfor each Belgian. The American Committee needs $5,000,000 a month until\nnext harvest. It is a huge sum, but it must be forthcoming.\n\nOf all the great powers of the world the United States is the only one\nnot at war or in peril of war. Of all the foremost nations of the world\nthe United States is the only one that can save Belgium from starvation\nif she will. She was the only nation that Germany would allow a foothold\nfor humanity's and for Christ's sake in Belgium. Such an opportunity,\nsuch responsibility, no nation ever had before in the history of the\nworld. Spain and Italy join with her, but the initiative and resources\nand organization are hers.\n\nAround Belgium is a ring of steel. Within that ring of steel are a\ndisappearing and for ever disappearing population. Towns like\nDendermonde, that were of 10,000 people, have now 4,000, and in\nDendermonde 1,200 houses have fallen under the iron and fire of war.\nInto that vast graveyard and camp of the desolate only the United States\nenters with an adequate and responsible organization upon the mission of\nhumanity.\n\nNo such opportunity was ever given to a people, no such test ever came\nto a Christian people in all the records of time. Will the American\nNation rise to the chance given to it to prove that its civilization is\na real thing and that its acts measure up with its inherent and\nprofessed Christianity?\n\nI am a profound believer in the great-heartedness of the United States,\nand there is not an American of German origin who ought not gladly and\nfreely give to the relief of people who, unless the world feeds them,\nmust be the remnant of a nation; and the world in this case is the\nUnited States. She can give most.\n\nThe price of one good meal a week for a family in an American home will\nkeep a Belgian alive for a fortnight.\n\nProbably the United States has 18,000,000 homes. How many of them will\ndeny themselves a meal for martyred Belgium? The mass of the American\npeople do not need to deny themselves anything to give to Belgium. The\nwhole standard of living on the American Continent, in the United States\nand Canada, is so much higher than the European standard that if they\nlowered the scale by one-tenth just for one six months the Belgium\nproblem would be solved.\n\nI say to the American people that they cannot conceive what this strain\nupon the populations of Europe is at this moment, and, in the cruel\ngrip of Winter, hundreds of thousands will agonize till death or relief\ncomes. In Australia in drought times vast flocks of sheep go traveling\nwith shepherds looking for food and water, and no flock ever comes back\nas it went forth. Not in flocks guided by shepherds, but lonely,\nhopeless units, the Belgian people take flight, looking for food and\nshelter, or remain paralyzed by the tragedy fallen upon them in their\nown land.\n\nTheir sufferings are majestic in simple heroism and uncomplaining\nendurance. So majestic in proportion ought the relief to be. The Belgian\npeople are wards of the world. In the circumstances the Belgian people\nare special wards of the one great country that is secure in its peace\nand that by its natural instincts of human sympathy and love of freedom\nis best suited to do the work that should be done for Belgium. If every\nmillionaire would give a thousand, if every man with $100 a month would\ngive $10, the American Committee for the Relief of Belgium, with its\nsplendid organization, its unrivaled efficiency, through which flows a\ntide of human sympathy, would be able to report at the end of the war\nthat a small nation in misfortune had been saved from famine and despair\nby a great people far away, who had responded to the call, \"Come over\nand help us!\"\n\nGILBERT PARKER.\n\n\n\n\nA CORRECTION.\n\n\nUnder the head of \"Russia's 'Little Brother,'\" on Page 364 of this\nmagazine history, in its issue of Dec. 26, 1914, appeared a statement\ntaken from The New York Sun of Oct. 12, 1914, and attributed to George\nBakhmeteff, Russian Ambassador at Washington. Our attention has been\ncalled to the following editorial paragraph printed by The Sun on Oct.\n14, embodying the Russian Ambassador's denial of its authenticity:\n\n     The Sun on Monday printed in good faith what it believed to be\n     an authorized statement of the views and sentiments of Mr.\n     George Bakhmeteff, Russian Ambassador to the United States.\n     Ambassador Bakhmeteff telegraphs to us from Washington as\n     follows:\n\n     \"I most emphatically deny having spoken one single word to the\n     reporter who published an interview with me in your paper. I\n     have not even seen one, and must insist on your publishing\n     this very categorical and direct statement.\"\n\n     Of course, we publish the Ambassador's denial not less in\n     justice to our readers and to ourselves than to him, at the\n     same time expressing our extreme regret that The Sun should\n     have been led to believe that it was presenting the Russian\n     case as viewed by Mr. Bakhmeteff with his full acquiescence.\n\nWe add our cordial regret to that of The Sun that this repudiated\nstatement should have gained further circulation.--Editor.\n\n\n\n\n[English Cartoon]\n\nCertainly Not!\n\n\n[Illustration: _--From The Sketch, London._\n\nTURKEY, THE OFFICE BOY (to his master): Please, Sir, can I have a day\noff?]","title":"The New York Times Current History of the European War, Vol. 1, January 9, 1915: What Americans Say to Europe","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":130292}