{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_1672/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_1672","id":"gutenberg_1672","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1672","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Classics of Literature","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Classical literature","Ethics -- Early works to 1800","Political science -- Early works to 1800"],"text":"GORGIAS\n\nby Plato\n\nTranslated by Benjamin Jowett\n\n\nContents\n\n INTRODUCTION\n GORGIAS\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\nIn several of the dialogues of Plato, doubts have arisen among his\ninterpreters as to which of the various subjects discussed in them is\nthe main thesis. The speakers have the freedom of conversation; no\nsevere rules of art restrict them, and sometimes we are inclined to\nthink, with one of the dramatis personae in the Theaetetus, that the\ndigressions have the greater interest. Yet in the most irregular of the\ndialogues there is also a certain natural growth or unity; the\nbeginning is not forgotten at the end, and numerous allusions and\nreferences are interspersed, which form the loose connecting links of\nthe whole. We must not neglect this unity, but neither must we attempt\nto confine the Platonic dialogue on the Procrustean bed of a single\nidea. (Compare Introduction to the Phaedrus.)\n\nTwo tendencies seem to have beset the interpreters of Plato in this\nmatter. First, they have endeavoured to hang the dialogues upon one\nanother by the slightest threads; and have thus been led to opposite\nand contradictory assertions respecting their order and sequence. The\nmantle of Schleiermacher has descended upon his successors, who have\napplied his method with the most various results. The value and use of\nthe method has been hardly, if at all, examined either by him or them.\nSecondly, they have extended almost indefinitely the scope of each\nseparate dialogue; in this way they think that they have escaped all\ndifficulties, not seeing that what they have gained in generality they\nhave lost in truth and distinctness. Metaphysical conceptions easily\npass into one another; and the simpler notions of antiquity, which we\ncan only realize by an effort, imperceptibly blend with the more\nfamiliar theories of modern philosophers. An eye for proportion is\nneeded (his own art of measuring) in the study of Plato, as well as of\nother great artists. We may hardly admit that the moral antithesis of\ngood and pleasure, or the intellectual antithesis of knowledge and\nopinion, being and appearance, are never far off in a Platonic\ndiscussion. But because they are in the background, we should not bring\nthem into the foreground, or expect to discern them equally in all the\ndialogues.\n\nThere may be some advantage in drawing out a little the main outlines\nof the building; but the use of this is limited, and may be easily\nexaggerated. We may give Plato too much system, and alter the natural\nform and connection of his thoughts. Under the idea that his dialogues\nare finished works of art, we may find a reason for everything, and\nlose the highest characteristic of art, which is simplicity. Most great\nworks receive a new light from a new and original mind. But whether\nthese new lights are true or only suggestive, will depend on their\nagreement with the spirit of Plato, and the amount of direct evidence\nwhich can be urged in support of them. When a theory is running away\nwith us, criticism does a friendly office in counselling moderation,\nand recalling us to the indications of the text.\n\nLike the Phaedrus, the Gorgias has puzzled students of Plato by the\nappearance of two or more subjects. Under the cover of rhetoric higher\nthemes are introduced; the argument expands into a general view of the\ngood and evil of man. After making an ineffectual attempt to obtain a\nsound definition of his art from Gorgias, Socrates assumes the\nexistence of a universal art of flattery or simulation having several\nbranches:\u2014this is the genus of which rhetoric is only one, and not the\nhighest species. To flattery is opposed the true and noble art of life\nwhich he who possesses seeks always to impart to others, and which at\nlast triumphs, if not here, at any rate in another world. These two\naspects of life and knowledge appear to be the two leading ideas of the\ndialogue. The true and the false in individuals and states, in the\ntreatment of the soul as well as of the body, are conceived under the\nforms of true and false art. In the development of this opposition\nthere arise various other questions, such as the two famous paradoxes\nof Socrates (paradoxes as they are to the world in general, ideals as\nthey may be more worthily called): (1) that to do is worse than to\nsuffer evil; and (2) that when a man has done evil he had better be\npunished than unpunished; to which may be added (3) a third Socratic\nparadox or ideal, that bad men do what they think best, but not what\nthey desire, for the desire of all is towards the good. That pleasure\nis to be distinguished from good is proved by the simultaneousness of\npleasure and pain, and by the possibility of the bad having in certain\ncases pleasures as great as those of the good, or even greater. Not\nmerely rhetoricians, but poets, musicians, and other artists, the whole\ntribe of statesmen, past as well as present, are included in the class\nof flatterers. The true and false finally appear before the\njudgment-seat of the gods below.\n\nThe dialogue naturally falls into three divisions, to which the three\ncharacters of Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles respectively correspond;\nand the form and manner change with the stages of the argument.\nSocrates is deferential towards Gorgias, playful and yet cutting in\ndealing with the youthful Polus, ironical and sarcastic in his\nencounter with Callicles. In the first division the question is\nasked\u2014What is rhetoric? To this there is no answer given, for Gorgias\nis soon made to contradict himself by Socrates, and the argument is\ntransferred to the hands of his disciple Polus, who rushes to the\ndefence of his master. The answer has at last to be given by Socrates\nhimself, but before he can even explain his meaning to Polus, he must\nenlighten him upon the great subject of shams or flatteries. When Polus\nfinds his favourite art reduced to the level of cookery, he replies\nthat at any rate rhetoricians, like despots, have great power. Socrates\ndenies that they have any real power, and hence arise the three\nparadoxes already mentioned. Although they are strange to him, Polus is\nat last convinced of their truth; at least, they seem to him to follow\nlegitimately from the premises. Thus the second act of the dialogue\ncloses. Then Callicles appears on the scene, at first maintaining that\npleasure is good, and that might is right, and that law is nothing but\nthe combination of the many weak against the few strong. When he is\nconfuted he withdraws from the argument, and leaves Socrates to arrive\nat the conclusion by himself. The conclusion is that there are two\nkinds of statesmanship, a higher and a lower\u2014that which makes the\npeople better, and that which only flatters them, and he exhorts\nCallicles to choose the higher. The dialogue terminates with a mythus\nof a final judgment, in which there will be no more flattery or\ndisguise, and no further use for the teaching of rhetoric.\n\nThe characters of the three interlocutors also correspond to the parts\nwhich are assigned to them. Gorgias is the great rhetorician, now\nadvanced in years, who goes from city to city displaying his talents,\nand is celebrated throughout Greece. Like all the Sophists in the\ndialogues of Plato, he is vain and boastful, yet he has also a certain\ndignity, and is treated by Socrates with considerable respect. But he\nis no match for him in dialectics. Although he has been teaching\nrhetoric all his life, he is still incapable of defining his own art.\nWhen his ideas begin to clear up, he is unwilling to admit that\nrhetoric can be wholly separated from justice and injustice, and this\nlingering sentiment of morality, or regard for public opinion, enables\nSocrates to detect him in a contradiction. Like Protagoras, he is\ndescribed as of a generous nature; he expresses his approbation of\nSocrates\u2019 manner of approaching a question; he is quite \u201cone of\nSocrates\u2019 sort, ready to be refuted as well as to refute,\u201d and very\neager that Callicles and Socrates should have the game out. He knows by\nexperience that rhetoric exercises great influence over other men, but\nhe is unable to explain the puzzle how rhetoric can teach everything\nand know nothing.\n\nPolus is an impetuous youth, a runaway \u201ccolt,\u201d as Socrates describes\nhim, who wanted originally to have taken the place of Gorgias under the\npretext that the old man was tired, and now avails himself of the\nearliest opportunity to enter the lists. He is said to be the author of\na work on rhetoric, and is again mentioned in the Phaedrus, as the\ninventor of balanced or double forms of speech (compare Gorg.; Symp.).\nAt first he is violent and ill-mannered, and is angry at seeing his\nmaster overthrown. But in the judicious hands of Socrates he is soon\nrestored to good-humour, and compelled to assent to the required\nconclusion. Like Gorgias, he is overthrown because he compromises; he\nis unwilling to say that to do is fairer or more honourable than to\nsuffer injustice. Though he is fascinated by the power of rhetoric, and\ndazzled by the splendour of success, he is not insensible to higher\narguments. Plato may have felt that there would be an incongruity in a\nyouth maintaining the cause of injustice against the world. He has\nnever heard the other side of the question, and he listens to the\nparadoxes, as they appear to him, of Socrates with evident\nastonishment. He can hardly understand the meaning of Archelaus being\nmiserable, or of rhetoric being only useful in self-accusation. When\nthe argument with him has fairly run out.\n\nCallicles, in whose house they are assembled, is introduced on the\nstage: he is with difficulty convinced that Socrates is in earnest; for\nif these things are true, then, as he says with real emotion, the\nfoundations of society are upside down. In him another type of\ncharacter is represented; he is neither sophist nor philosopher, but\nman of the world, and an accomplished Athenian gentleman. He might be\ndescribed in modern language as a cynic or materialist, a lover of\npower and also of pleasure, and unscrupulous in his means of attaining\nboth. There is no desire on his part to offer any compromise in the\ninterests of morality; nor is any concession made by him. Like\nThrasymachus in the Republic, though he is not of the same weak and\nvulgar class, he consistently maintains that might is right. His great\nmotive of action is political ambition; in this he is\ncharacteristically Greek. Like Anytus in the Meno, he is the enemy of\nthe Sophists; but favours the new art of rhetoric, which he regards as\nan excellent weapon of attack and defence. He is a despiser of mankind\nas he is of philosophy, and sees in the laws of the state only a\nviolation of the order of nature, which intended that the stronger\nshould govern the weaker (compare Republic). Like other men of the\nworld who are of a speculative turn of mind, he generalizes the bad\nside of human nature, and has easily brought down his principles to his\npractice. Philosophy and poetry alike supply him with distinctions\nsuited to his view of human life. He has a good will to Socrates, whose\ntalents he evidently admires, while he censures the puerile use which\nhe makes of them. He expresses a keen intellectual interest in the\nargument. Like Anytus, again, he has a sympathy with other men of the\nworld; the Athenian statesmen of a former generation, who showed no\nweakness and made no mistakes, such as Miltiades, Themistocles,\nPericles, are his favourites. His ideal of human character is a man of\ngreat passions and great powers, which he has developed to the utmost,\nand which he uses in his own enjoyment and in the government of others.\nHad Critias been the name instead of Callicles, about whom we know\nnothing from other sources, the opinions of the man would have seemed\nto reflect the history of his life.\n\nAnd now the combat deepens. In Callicles, far more than in any sophist\nor rhetorician, is concentrated the spirit of evil against which\nSocrates is contending, the spirit of the world, the spirit of the many\ncontending against the one wise man, of which the Sophists, as he\ndescribes them in the Republic, are the imitators rather than the\nauthors, being themselves carried away by the great tide of public\nopinion. Socrates approaches his antagonist warily from a distance,\nwith a sort of irony which touches with a light hand both his personal\nvices (probably in allusion to some scandal of the day) and his\nservility to the populace. At the same time, he is in most profound\nearnest, as Chaerephon remarks. Callicles soon loses his temper, but\nthe more he is irritated, the more provoking and matter of fact does\nSocrates become. A repartee of his which appears to have been really\nmade to the \u201comniscient\u201d Hippias, according to the testimony of\nXenophon (Mem.), is introduced. He is called by Callicles a popular\ndeclaimer, and certainly shows that he has the power, in the words of\nGorgias, of being \u201cas long as he pleases,\u201d or \u201cas short as he pleases\u201d\n(compare Protag.). Callicles exhibits great ability in defending\nhimself and attacking Socrates, whom he accuses of trifling and\nword-splitting; he is scandalized that the legitimate consequences of\nhis own argument should be stated in plain terms; after the manner of\nmen of the world, he wishes to preserve the decencies of life. But he\ncannot consistently maintain the bad sense of words; and getting\nconfused between the abstract notions of better, superior, stronger, he\nis easily turned round by Socrates, and only induced to continue the\nargument by the authority of Gorgias. Once, when Socrates is describing\nthe manner in which the ambitious citizen has to identify himself with\nthe people, he partially recognizes the truth of his words.\n\nThe Socrates of the Gorgias may be compared with the Socrates of the\nProtagoras and Meno. As in other dialogues, he is the enemy of the\nSophists and rhetoricians; and also of the statesmen, whom he regards\nas another variety of the same species. His behaviour is governed by\nthat of his opponents; the least forwardness or egotism on their part\nis met by a corresponding irony on the part of Socrates. He must speak,\nfor philosophy will not allow him to be silent. He is indeed more\nironical and provoking than in any other of Plato\u2019s writings: for he is\n\u201cfooled to the top of his bent\u201d by the worldliness of Callicles. But he\nis also more deeply in earnest. He rises higher than even in the Phaedo\nand Crito: at first enveloping his moral convictions in a cloud of dust\nand dialectics, he ends by losing his method, his life, himself, in\nthem. As in the Protagoras and Phaedrus, throwing aside the veil of\nirony, he makes a speech, but, true to his character, not until his\nadversary has refused to answer any more questions. The presentiment of\nhis own fate is hanging over him. He is aware that Socrates, the single\nreal teacher of politics, as he ventures to call himself, cannot safely\ngo to war with the whole world, and that in the courts of earth he will\nbe condemned. But he will be justified in the world below. Then the\nposition of Socrates and Callicles will be reversed; all those things\n\u201cunfit for ears polite\u201d which Callicles has prophesied as likely to\nhappen to him in this life, the insulting language, the box on the\nears, will recoil upon his assailant. (Compare Republic, and the\nsimilar reversal of the position of the lawyer and the philosopher in\nthe Theaetetus).\n\nThere is an interesting allusion to his own behaviour at the trial of\nthe generals after the battle of Arginusae, which he ironically\nattributes to his ignorance of the manner in which a vote of the\nassembly should be taken. This is said to have happened \u201clast year\u201d\n(B.C. 406), and therefore the assumed date of the dialogue has been\nfixed at 405 B.C., when Socrates would already have been an old man.\nThe date is clearly marked, but is scarcely reconcilable with another\nindication of time, viz. the \u201crecent\u201d usurpation of Archelaus, which\noccurred in the year 413; and still less with the \u201crecent\u201d death of\nPericles, who really died twenty-four years previously (429 B.C.) and\nis afterwards reckoned among the statesmen of a past age; or with the\nmention of Nicias, who died in 413, and is nevertheless spoken of as a\nliving witness. But we shall hereafter have reason to observe, that\nalthough there is a general consistency of times and persons in the\nDialogues of Plato, a precise dramatic date is an invention of his\ncommentators (Preface to Republic).\n\nThe conclusion of the Dialogue is remarkable, (1) for the truly\ncharacteristic declaration of Socrates that he is ignorant of the true\nnature and bearing of these things, while he affirms at the same time\nthat no one can maintain any other view without being ridiculous. The\nprofession of ignorance reminds us of the earlier and more exclusively\nSocratic Dialogues. But neither in them, nor in the Apology, nor in the\nMemorabilia of Xenophon, does Socrates express any doubt of the\nfundamental truths of morality. He evidently regards this \u201camong the\nmultitude of questions\u201d which agitate human life \u201cas the principle\nwhich alone remains unshaken.\u201d He does not insist here, any more than\nin the Phaedo, on the literal truth of the myth, but only on the\nsoundness of the doctrine which is contained in it, that doing wrong is\nworse than suffering, and that a man should be rather than seem; for\nthe next best thing to a man\u2019s being just is that he should be\ncorrected and become just; also that he should avoid all flattery,\nwhether of himself or of others; and that rhetoric should be employed\nfor the maintenance of the right only. The revelation of another life\nis a recapitulation of the argument in a figure.\n\n(2) Socrates makes the singular remark, that he is himself the only\ntrue politician of his age. In other passages, especially in the\nApology, he disclaims being a politician at all. There he is convinced\nthat he or any other good man who attempted to resist the popular will\nwould be put to death before he had done any good to himself or others.\nHere he anticipates such a fate for himself, from the fact that he is\n\u201cthe only man of the present day who performs his public duties at\nall.\u201d The two points of view are not really inconsistent, but the\ndifference between them is worth noticing: Socrates is and is not a\npublic man. Not in the ordinary sense, like Alcibiades or Pericles, but\nin a higher one; and this will sooner or later entail the same\nconsequences on him. He cannot be a private man if he would; neither\ncan he separate morals from politics. Nor is he unwilling to be a\npolitician, although he foresees the dangers which await him; but he\nmust first become a better and wiser man, for he as well as Callicles\nis in a state of perplexity and uncertainty. And yet there is an\ninconsistency: for should not Socrates too have taught the citizens\nbetter than to put him to death?\n\nAnd now, as he himself says, we will \u201cresume the argument from the\nbeginning.\u201d\n\nSocrates, who is attended by his inseparable disciple, Chaerephon,\nmeets Callicles in the streets of Athens. He is informed that he has\njust missed an exhibition of Gorgias, which he regrets, because he was\ndesirous, not of hearing Gorgias display his rhetoric, but of\ninterrogating him concerning the nature of his art. Callicles proposes\nthat they shall go with him to his own house, where Gorgias is staying.\nThere they find the great rhetorician and his younger friend and\ndisciple Polus.\n\nSOCRATES: Put the question to him, Chaerephon.\n\nCHAEREPHON: What question?\n\nSOCRATES: Who is he?\u2014such a question as would elicit from a man the\nanswer, \u201cI am a cobbler.\u201d\n\nPolus suggests that Gorgias may be tired, and desires to answer for\nhim. \u201cWho is Gorgias?\u201d asks Chaerephon, imitating the manner of his\nmaster Socrates. \u201cOne of the best of men, and a proficient in the best\nand noblest of experimental arts,\u201d etc., replies Polus, in rhetorical\nand balanced phrases. Socrates is dissatisfied at the length and\nunmeaningness of the answer; he tells the disconcerted volunteer that\nhe has mistaken the quality for the nature of the art, and remarks to\nGorgias, that Polus has learnt how to make a speech, but not how to\nanswer a question. He wishes that Gorgias would answer him. Gorgias is\nwilling enough, and replies to the question asked by Chaerephon,\u2014that\nhe is a rhetorician, and in Homeric language, \u201cboasts himself to be a\ngood one.\u201d At the request of Socrates he promises to be brief; for \u201che\ncan be as long as he pleases, and as short as he pleases.\u201d Socrates\nwould have him bestow his length on others, and proceeds to ask him a\nnumber of questions, which are answered by him to his own great\nsatisfaction, and with a brevity which excites the admiration of\nSocrates. The result of the discussion may be summed up as follows:\u2014\n\nRhetoric treats of discourse; but music and medicine, and other\nparticular arts, are also concerned with discourse; in what way then\ndoes rhetoric differ from them? Gorgias draws a distinction between the\narts which deal with words, and the arts which have to do with external\nactions. Socrates extends this distinction further, and divides all\nproductive arts into two classes: (1) arts which may be carried on in\nsilence; and (2) arts which have to do with words, or in which words\nare coextensive with action, such as arithmetic, geometry, rhetoric.\nBut still Gorgias could hardly have meant to say that arithmetic was\nthe same as rhetoric. Even in the arts which are concerned with words\nthere are differences. What then distinguishes rhetoric from the other\narts which have to do with words? \u201cThe words which rhetoric uses relate\nto the best and greatest of human things.\u201d But tell me, Gorgias, what\nare the best? \u201cHealth first, beauty next, wealth third,\u201d in the words\nof the old song, or how would you rank them? The arts will come to you\nin a body, each claiming precedence and saying that her own good is\nsuperior to that of the rest\u2014How will you choose between them? \u201cI\nshould say, Socrates, that the art of persuasion, which gives freedom\nto all men, and to individuals power in the state, is the greatest\ngood.\u201d But what is the exact nature of this persuasion?\u2014is the\npersevering retort: You could not describe Zeuxis as a painter, or even\nas a painter of figures, if there were other painters of figures;\nneither can you define rhetoric simply as an art of persuasion, because\nthere are other arts which persuade, such as arithmetic, which is an\nart of persuasion about odd and even numbers. Gorgias is made to see\nthe necessity of a further limitation, and he now defines rhetoric as\nthe art of persuading in the law courts, and in the assembly, about the\njust and unjust. But still there are two sorts of persuasion: one which\ngives knowledge, and another which gives belief without knowledge; and\nknowledge is always true, but belief may be either true or false,\u2014there\nis therefore a further question: which of the two sorts of persuasion\ndoes rhetoric effect in courts of law and assemblies? Plainly that\nwhich gives belief and not that which gives knowledge; for no one can\nimpart a real knowledge of such matters to a crowd of persons in a few\nminutes. And there is another point to be considered:\u2014when the assembly\nmeets to advise about walls or docks or military expeditions, the\nrhetorician is not taken into counsel, but the architect, or the\ngeneral. How would Gorgias explain this phenomenon? All who intend to\nbecome disciples, of whom there are several in the company, and not\nSocrates only, are eagerly asking:\u2014About what then will rhetoric teach\nus to persuade or advise the state?\n\nGorgias illustrates the nature of rhetoric by adducing the example of\nThemistocles, who persuaded the Athenians to build their docks and\nwalls, and of Pericles, whom Socrates himself has heard speaking about\nthe middle wall of the Piraeus. He adds that he has exercised a similar\npower over the patients of his brother Herodicus. He could be chosen a\nphysician by the assembly if he pleased, for no physician could compete\nwith a rhetorician in popularity and influence. He could persuade the\nmultitude of anything by the power of his rhetoric; not that the\nrhetorician ought to abuse this power any more than a boxer should\nabuse the art of self-defence. Rhetoric is a good thing, but, like all\ngood things, may be unlawfully used. Neither is the teacher of the art\nto be deemed unjust because his pupils are unjust and make a bad use of\nthe lessons which they have learned from him.\n\nSocrates would like to know before he replies, whether Gorgias will\nquarrel with him if he points out a slight inconsistency into which he\nhas fallen, or whether he, like himself, is one who loves to be\nrefuted. Gorgias declares that he is quite one of his sort, but fears\nthat the argument may be tedious to the company. The company cheer, and\nChaerephon and Callicles exhort them to proceed. Socrates gently points\nout the supposed inconsistency into which Gorgias appears to have\nfallen, and which he is inclined to think may arise out of a\nmisapprehension of his own. The rhetorician has been declared by\nGorgias to be more persuasive to the ignorant than the physician, or\nany other expert. And he is said to be ignorant, and this ignorance of\nhis is regarded by Gorgias as a happy condition, for he has escaped the\ntrouble of learning. But is he as ignorant of just and unjust as he is\nof medicine or building? Gorgias is compelled to admit that if he did\nnot know them previously he must learn them from his teacher as a part\nof the art of rhetoric. But he who has learned carpentry is a\ncarpenter, and he who has learned music is a musician, and he who has\nlearned justice is just. The rhetorician then must be a just man, and\nrhetoric is a just thing. But Gorgias has already admitted the opposite\nof this, viz. that rhetoric may be abused, and that the rhetorician may\nact unjustly. How is the inconsistency to be explained?\n\nThe fallacy of this argument is twofold; for in the first place, a man\nmay know justice and not be just\u2014here is the old confusion of the arts\nand the virtues;\u2014nor can any teacher be expected to counteract wholly\nthe bent of natural character; and secondly, a man may have a degree of\njustice, but not sufficient to prevent him from ever doing wrong. Polus\nis naturally exasperated at the sophism, which he is unable to detect;\nof course, he says, the rhetorician, like every one else, will admit\nthat he knows justice (how can he do otherwise when pressed by the\ninterrogations of Socrates?), but he thinks that great want of manners\nis shown in bringing the argument to such a pass. Socrates ironically\nreplies, that when old men trip, the young set them on their legs\nagain; and he is quite willing to retract, if he can be shown to be in\nerror, but upon one condition, which is that Polus studies brevity.\nPolus is in great indignation at not being allowed to use as many words\nas he pleases in the free state of Athens. Socrates retorts, that yet\nharder will be his own case, if he is compelled to stay and listen to\nthem. After some altercation they agree (compare Protag.), that Polus\nshall ask and Socrates answer.\n\n\u201cWhat is the art of Rhetoric?\u201d says Polus. Not an art at all, replies\nSocrates, but a thing which in your book you affirm to have created\nart. Polus asks, \u201cWhat thing?\u201d and Socrates answers, An experience or\nroutine of making a sort of delight or gratification. \u201cBut is not\nrhetoric a fine thing?\u201d I have not yet told you what rhetoric is. Will\nyou ask me another question\u2014What is cookery? \u201cWhat is cookery?\u201d An\nexperience or routine of making a sort of delight or gratification.\nThen they are the same, or rather fall under the same class, and\nrhetoric has still to be distinguished from cookery. \u201cWhat is\nrhetoric?\u201d asks Polus once more. A part of a not very creditable whole,\nwhich may be termed flattery, is the reply. \u201cBut what part?\u201d A shadow\nof a part of politics. This, as might be expected, is wholly\nunintelligible, both to Gorgias and Polus; and, in order to explain his\nmeaning to them, Socrates draws a distinction between shadows or\nappearances and realities; e.g. there is real health of body or soul,\nand the appearance of them; real arts and sciences, and the simulations\nof them. Now the soul and body have two arts waiting upon them, first\nthe art of politics, which attends on the soul, having a legislative\npart and a judicial part; and another art attending on the body, which\nhas no generic name, but may also be described as having two divisions,\none of which is medicine and the other gymnastic. Corresponding with\nthese four arts or sciences there are four shams or simulations of\nthem, mere experiences, as they may be termed, because they give no\nreason of their own existence. The art of dressing up is the sham or\nsimulation of gymnastic, the art of cookery, of medicine; rhetoric is\nthe simulation of justice, and sophistic of legislation. They may be\nsummed up in an arithmetical formula:\u2014\n\nTiring: gymnastic:: cookery: medicine:: sophistic: legislation.\n\nAnd,\n\nCookery: medicine:: rhetoric: the art of justice.\n\nAnd this is the true scheme of them, but when measured only by the\ngratification which they procure, they become jumbled together and\nreturn to their aboriginal chaos. Socrates apologizes for the length of\nhis speech, which was necessary to the explanation of the subject, and\nbegs Polus not unnecessarily to retaliate on him.\n\n\u201cDo you mean to say that the rhetoricians are esteemed flatterers?\u201d\nThey are not esteemed at all. \u201cWhy, have they not great power, and can\nthey not do whatever they desire?\u201d They have no power, and they only do\nwhat they think best, and never what they desire; for they never attain\nthe true object of desire, which is the good. \u201cAs if you, Socrates,\nwould not envy the possessor of despotic power, who can imprison,\nexile, kill any one whom he pleases.\u201d But Socrates replies that he has\nno wish to put any one to death; he who kills another, even justly, is\nnot to be envied, and he who kills him unjustly is to be pitied; it is\nbetter to suffer than to do injustice. He does not consider that going\nabout with a dagger and putting men out of the way, or setting a house\non fire, is real power. To this Polus assents, on the ground that such\nacts would be punished, but he is still of opinion that evil-doers, if\nthey are unpunished, may be happy enough. He instances Archelaus, son\nof Perdiccas, the usurper of Macedonia. Does not Socrates think him\nhappy?\u2014Socrates would like to know more about him; he cannot pronounce\neven the great king to be happy, unless he knows his mental and moral\ncondition. Polus explains that Archelaus was a slave, being the son of\na woman who was the slave of Alcetas, brother of Perdiccas king of\nMacedon\u2014and he, by every species of crime, first murdering his uncle\nand then his cousin and half-brother, obtained the kingdom. This was\nvery wicked, and yet all the world, including Socrates, would like to\nhave his place. Socrates dismisses the appeal to numbers; Polus, if he\nwill, may summon all the rich men of Athens, Nicias and his brothers,\nAristocrates, the house of Pericles, or any other great family\u2014this is\nthe kind of evidence which is adduced in courts of justice, where truth\ndepends upon numbers. But Socrates employs proof of another sort; his\nappeal is to one witness only,\u2014that is to say, the person with whom he\nis speaking; him he will convict out of his own mouth. And he is\nprepared to show, after his manner, that Archelaus cannot be a wicked\nman and yet happy.\n\nThe evil-doer is deemed happy if he escapes, and miserable if he\nsuffers punishment; but Socrates thinks him less miserable if he\nsuffers than if he escapes. Polus is of opinion that such a paradox as\nthis hardly deserves refutation, and is at any rate sufficiently\nrefuted by the fact. Socrates has only to compare the lot of the\nsuccessful tyrant who is the envy of the world, and of the wretch who,\nhaving been detected in a criminal attempt against the state, is\ncrucified or burnt to death. Socrates replies, that if they are both\ncriminal they are both miserable, but that the unpunished is the more\nmiserable of the two. At this Polus laughs outright, which leads\nSocrates to remark that laughter is a new species of refutation. Polus\nreplies, that he is already refuted; for if he will take the votes of\nthe company, he will find that no one agrees with him. To this Socrates\nrejoins, that he is not a public man, and (referring to his own conduct\nat the trial of the generals after the battle of Arginusae) is unable\nto take the suffrages of any company, as he had shown on a recent\noccasion; he can only deal with one witness at a time, and that is the\nperson with whom he is arguing. But he is certain that in the opinion\nof any man to do is worse than to suffer evil.\n\nPolus, though he will not admit this, is ready to acknowledge that to\ndo evil is considered the more foul or dishonourable of the two. But\nwhat is fair and what is foul; whether the terms are applied to bodies,\ncolours, figures, laws, habits, studies, must they not be defined with\nreference to pleasure and utility? Polus assents to this latter\ndoctrine, and is easily persuaded that the fouler of two things must\nexceed either in pain or in hurt. But the doing cannot exceed the\nsuffering of evil in pain, and therefore must exceed in hurt. Thus\ndoing is proved by the testimony of Polus himself to be worse or more\nhurtful than suffering.\n\nThere remains the other question: Is a guilty man better off when he is\npunished or when he is unpunished? Socrates replies, that what is done\njustly is suffered justly: if the act is just, the effect is just; if\nto punish is just, to be punished is just, and therefore fair, and\ntherefore beneficent; and the benefit is that the soul is improved.\nThere are three evils from which a man may suffer, and which affect him\nin estate, body, and soul;\u2014these are, poverty, disease, injustice; and\nthe foulest of these is injustice, the evil of the soul, because that\nbrings the greatest hurt. And there are three arts which heal these\nevils\u2014trading, medicine, justice\u2014and the fairest of these is justice.\nHappy is he who has never committed injustice, and happy in the second\ndegree he who has been healed by punishment. And therefore the criminal\nshould himself go to the judge as he would to the physician, and purge\naway his crime. Rhetoric will enable him to display his guilt in proper\ncolours, and to sustain himself and others in enduring the necessary\npenalty. And similarly if a man has an enemy, he will desire not to\npunish him, but that he shall go unpunished and become worse and worse,\ntaking care only that he does no injury to himself. These are at least\nconceivable uses of the art, and no others have been discovered by us.\n\nHere Callicles, who has been listening in silent amazement, asks\nChaerephon whether Socrates is in earnest, and on receiving the\nassurance that he is, proceeds to ask the same question of Socrates\nhimself. For if such doctrines are true, life must have been turned\nupside down, and all of us are doing the opposite of what we ought to\nbe doing.\n\nSocrates replies in a style of playful irony, that before men can\nunderstand one another they must have some common feeling. And such a\ncommunity of feeling exists between himself and Callicles, for both of\nthem are lovers, and they have both a pair of loves; the beloved of\nCallicles are the Athenian Demos and Demos the son of Pyrilampes; the\nbeloved of Socrates are Alcibiades and philosophy. The peculiarity of\nCallicles is that he can never contradict his loves; he changes as his\nDemos changes in all his opinions; he watches the countenance of both\nhis loves, and repeats their sentiments, and if any one is surprised at\nhis sayings and doings, the explanation of them is, that he is not a\nfree agent, but must always be imitating his two loves. And this is the\nexplanation of Socrates\u2019 peculiarities also. He is always repeating\nwhat his mistress, Philosophy, is saying to him, who unlike his other\nlove, Alcibiades, is ever the same, ever true. Callicles must refute\nher, or he will never be at unity with himself; and discord in life is\nfar worse than the discord of musical sounds.\n\nCallicles answers, that Gorgias was overthrown because, as Polus said,\nin compliance with popular prejudice he had admitted that if his pupil\ndid not know justice the rhetorician must teach him; and Polus has been\nsimilarly entangled, because his modesty led him to admit that to\nsuffer is more honourable than to do injustice. By custom \u201cyes,\u201d but\nnot by nature, says Callicles. And Socrates is always playing between\nthe two points of view, and putting one in the place of the other. In\nthis very argument, what Polus only meant in a conventional sense has\nbeen affirmed by him to be a law of nature. For convention says that\n\u201cinjustice is dishonourable,\u201d but nature says that \u201cmight is right.\u201d\nAnd we are always taming down the nobler spirits among us to the\nconventional level. But sometimes a great man will rise up and reassert\nhis original rights, trampling under foot all our formularies, and then\nthe light of natural justice shines forth. Pindar says, \u201cLaw, the king\nof all, does violence with high hand;\u201d as is indeed proved by the\nexample of Heracles, who drove off the oxen of Geryon and never paid\nfor them.\n\nThis is the truth, Socrates, as you will be convinced, if you leave\nphilosophy and pass on to the real business of life. A little\nphilosophy is an excellent thing; too much is the ruin of a man. He who\nhas not \u201cpassed his metaphysics\u201d before he has grown up to manhood will\nnever know the world. Philosophers are ridiculous when they take to\npolitics, and I dare say that politicians are equally ridiculous when\nthey take to philosophy: \u201cEvery man,\u201d as Euripides says, \u201cis fondest of\nthat in which he is best.\u201d Philosophy is graceful in youth, like the\nlisp of infancy, and should be cultivated as a part of education; but\nwhen a grown-up man lisps or studies philosophy, I should like to beat\nhim. None of those over-refined natures ever come to any good; they\navoid the busy haunts of men, and skulk in corners, whispering to a few\nadmiring youths, and never giving utterance to any noble sentiments.\n\nFor you, Socrates, I have a regard, and therefore I say to you, as\nZethus says to Amphion in the play, that you have \u201ca noble soul\ndisguised in a puerile exterior.\u201d And I would have you consider the\ndanger which you and other philosophers incur. For you would not know\nhow to defend yourself if any one accused you in a law-court,\u2014there you\nwould stand, with gaping mouth and dizzy brain, and might be murdered,\nrobbed, boxed on the ears with impunity. Take my advice, then, and get\na little common sense; leave to others these frivolities; walk in the\nways of the wealthy and be wise.\n\nSocrates professes to have found in Callicles the philosopher\u2019s\ntouchstone; and he is certain that any opinion in which they both agree\nmust be the very truth. Callicles has all the three qualities which are\nneeded in a critic\u2014knowledge, good-will, frankness; Gorgias and Polus,\nalthough learned men, were too modest, and their modesty made them\ncontradict themselves. But Callicles is well-educated; and he is not\ntoo modest to speak out (of this he has already given proof), and his\ngood-will is shown both by his own profession and by his giving the\nsame caution against philosophy to Socrates, which Socrates remembers\nhearing him give long ago to his own clique of friends. He will pledge\nhimself to retract any error into which he may have fallen, and which\nCallicles may point out. But he would like to know first of all what he\nand Pindar mean by natural justice. Do they suppose that the rule of\njustice is the rule of the stronger or of the better?\u201d \u201cThere is no\ndifference.\u201d Then are not the many superior to the one, and the\nopinions of the many better? And their opinion is that justice is\nequality, and that to do is more dishonourable than to suffer wrong.\nAnd as they are the superior or stronger, this opinion of theirs must\nbe in accordance with natural as well as conventional justice. \u201cWhy\nwill you continue splitting words? Have I not told you that the\nsuperior is the better?\u201d But what do you mean by the better? Tell me\nthat, and please to be a little milder in your language, if you do not\nwish to drive me away. \u201cI mean the worthier, the wiser.\u201d You mean to\nsay that one man of sense ought to rule over ten thousand fools? \u201cYes,\nthat is my meaning.\u201d Ought the physician then to have a larger share of\nmeats and drinks? or the weaver to have more coats, or the cobbler\nlarger shoes, or the farmer more seed? \u201cYou are always saying the same\nthings, Socrates.\u201d Yes, and on the same subjects too; but you are never\nsaying the same things. For, first, you defined the superior to be the\nstronger, and then the wiser, and now something else;\u2014what DO you mean?\n\u201cI mean men of political ability, who ought to govern and to have more\nthan the governed.\u201d Than themselves? \u201cWhat do you mean?\u201d I mean to say\nthat every man is his own governor. \u201cI see that you mean those dolts,\nthe temperate. But my doctrine is, that a man should let his desires\ngrow, and take the means of satisfying them. To the many this is\nimpossible, and therefore they combine to prevent him. But if he is a\nking, and has power, how base would he be in submitting to them! To\ninvite the common herd to be lord over him, when he might have the\nenjoyment of all things! For the truth is, Socrates, that luxury and\nself-indulgence are virtue and happiness; all the rest is mere talk.\u201d\n\nSocrates compliments Callicles on his frankness in saying what other\nmen only think. According to his view, those who want nothing are not\nhappy. \u201cWhy,\u201d says Callicles, \u201cif they were, stones and the dead would\nbe happy.\u201d Socrates in reply is led into a half-serious, half-comic\nvein of reflection. \u201cWho knows,\u201d as Euripides says, \u201cwhether life may\nnot be death, and death life?\u201d Nay, there are philosophers who maintain\nthat even in life we are dead, and that the body (soma) is the tomb\n(sema) of the soul. And some ingenious Sicilian has made an allegory,\nin which he represents fools as the uninitiated, who are supposed to be\ncarrying water to a vessel, which is full of holes, in a similarly\nholey sieve, and this sieve is their own soul. The idea is fanciful,\nbut nevertheless is a figure of a truth which I want to make you\nacknowledge, viz. that the life of contentment is better than the life\nof indulgence. Are you disposed to admit that? \u201cFar otherwise.\u201d Then\nhear another parable. The life of self-contentment and self-indulgence\nmay be represented respectively by two men, who are filling jars with\nstreams of wine, honey, milk,\u2014the jars of the one are sound, and the\njars of the other leaky; the first fills his jars, and has no more\ntrouble with them; the second is always filling them, and would suffer\nextreme misery if he desisted. Are you of the same opinion still? \u201cYes,\nSocrates, and the figure expresses what I mean. For true pleasure is a\nperpetual stream, flowing in and flowing out. To be hungry and always\neating, to be thirsty and always drinking, and to have all the other\ndesires and to satisfy them, that, as I admit, is my idea of\nhappiness.\u201d And to be itching and always scratching? \u201cI do not deny\nthat there may be happiness even in that.\u201d And to indulge unnatural\ndesires, if they are abundantly satisfied? Callicles is indignant at\nthe introduction of such topics. But he is reminded by Socrates that\nthey are introduced, not by him, but by the maintainer of the identity\nof pleasure and good. Will Callicles still maintain this? \u201cYes, for the\nsake of consistency, he will.\u201d The answer does not satisfy Socrates,\nwho fears that he is losing his touchstone. A profession of seriousness\non the part of Callicles reassures him, and they proceed with the\nargument. Pleasure and good are the same, but knowledge and courage are\nnot the same either with pleasure or good, or with one another.\nSocrates disproves the first of these statements by showing that two\nopposites cannot coexist, but must alternate with one another\u2014to be\nwell and ill together is impossible. But pleasure and pain are\nsimultaneous, and the cessation of them is simultaneous; e.g. in the\ncase of drinking and thirsting, whereas good and evil are not\nsimultaneous, and do not cease simultaneously, and therefore pleasure\ncannot be the same as good.\n\nCallicles has already lost his temper, and can only be persuaded to go\non by the interposition of Gorgias. Socrates, having already guarded\nagainst objections by distinguishing courage and knowledge from\npleasure and good, proceeds:\u2014The good are good by the presence of good,\nand the bad are bad by the presence of evil. And the brave and wise are\ngood, and the cowardly and foolish are bad. And he who feels pleasure\nis good, and he who feels pain is bad, and both feel pleasure and pain\nin nearly the same degree, and sometimes the bad man or coward in a\ngreater degree. Therefore the bad man or coward is as good as the brave\nor may be even better.\n\nCallicles endeavours now to avert the inevitable absurdity by affirming\nthat he and all mankind admitted some pleasures to be good and others\nbad. The good are the beneficial, and the bad are the hurtful, and we\nshould choose the one and avoid the other. But this, as Socrates\nobserves, is a return to the old doctrine of himself and Polus, that\nall things should be done for the sake of the good.\n\nCallicles assents to this, and Socrates, finding that they are agreed\nin distinguishing pleasure from good, returns to his old division of\nempirical habits, or shams, or flatteries, which study pleasure only,\nand the arts which are concerned with the higher interests of soul and\nbody. Does Callicles agree to this division? Callicles will agree to\nanything, in order that he may get through the argument. Which of the\narts then are flatteries? Flute-playing, harp-playing, choral\nexhibitions, the dithyrambics of Cinesias are all equally condemned on\nthe ground that they give pleasure only; and Meles the harp-player, who\nwas the father of Cinesias, failed even in that. The stately muse of\nTragedy is bent upon pleasure, and not upon improvement. Poetry in\ngeneral is only a rhetorical address to a mixed audience of men, women,\nand children. And the orators are very far from speaking with a view to\nwhat is best; their way is to humour the assembly as if they were\nchildren.\n\nCallicles replies, that this is only true of some of them; others have\na real regard for their fellow-citizens. Granted; then there are two\nspecies of oratory; the one a flattery, another which has a real regard\nfor the citizens. But where are the orators among whom you find the\nlatter? Callicles admits that there are none remaining, but there were\nsuch in the days when Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades, and the great\nPericles were still alive. Socrates replies that none of these were\ntrue artists, setting before themselves the duty of bringing order out\nof disorder. The good man and true orator has a settled design, running\nthrough his life, to which he conforms all his words and actions; he\ndesires to implant justice and eradicate injustice, to implant all\nvirtue and eradicate all vice in the minds of his citizens. He is the\nphysician who will not allow the sick man to indulge his appetites with\na variety of meats and drinks, but insists on his exercising\nself-restraint. And this is good for the soul, and better than the\nunrestrained indulgence which Callicles was recently approving.\n\nHere Callicles, who had been with difficulty brought to this point,\nturns restive, and suggests that Socrates shall answer his own\nquestions. \u201cThen,\u201d says Socrates, \u201cone man must do for two;\u201d and though\nhe had hoped to have given Callicles an \u201cAmphion\u201d in return for his\n\u201cZethus,\u201d he is willing to proceed; at the same time, he hopes that\nCallicles will correct him, if he falls into error. He recapitulates\nthe advantages which he has already won:\u2014\n\nThe pleasant is not the same as the good\u2014Callicles and I are agreed\nabout that,\u2014but pleasure is to be pursued for the sake of the good, and\nthe good is that of which the presence makes us good; we and all things\ngood have acquired some virtue or other. And virtue, whether of body or\nsoul, of things or persons, is not attained by accident, but is due to\norder and harmonious arrangement. And the soul which has order is\nbetter than the soul which is without order, and is therefore temperate\nand is therefore good, and the intemperate is bad. And he who is\ntemperate is also just and brave and pious, and has attained the\nperfection of goodness and therefore of happiness, and the intemperate\nwhom you approve is the opposite of all this and is wretched. He\ntherefore who would be happy must pursue temperance and avoid\nintemperance, and if possible escape the necessity of punishment, but\nif he have done wrong he must endure punishment. In this way states and\nindividuals should seek to attain harmony, which, as the wise tell us,\nis the bond of heaven and earth, of gods and men. Callicles has never\ndiscovered the power of geometrical proportion in both worlds; he would\nhave men aim at disproportion and excess. But if he be wrong in this,\nand if self-control is the true secret of happiness, then the paradox\nis true that the only use of rhetoric is in self-accusation, and Polus\nwas right in saying that to do wrong is worse than to suffer wrong, and\nGorgias was right in saying that the rhetorician must be a just man.\nAnd you were wrong in taunting me with my defenceless condition, and in\nsaying that I might be accused or put to death or boxed on the ears\nwith impunity. For I may repeat once more, that to strike is worse than\nto be stricken\u2014to do than to suffer. What I said then is now made fast\nin adamantine bonds. I myself know not the true nature of these things,\nbut I know that no one can deny my words and not be ridiculous. To do\nwrong is the greatest of evils, and to suffer wrong is the next\ngreatest evil. He who would avoid the last must be a ruler, or the\nfriend of a ruler; and to be the friend he must be the equal of the\nruler, and must also resemble him. Under his protection he will suffer\nno evil, but will he also do no evil? Nay, will he not rather do all\nthe evil which he can and escape? And in this way the greatest of all\nevils will befall him. \u201cBut this imitator of the tyrant,\u201d rejoins\nCallicles, \u201cwill kill any one who does not similarly imitate him.\u201d\nSocrates replies that he is not deaf, and that he has heard that\nrepeated many times, and can only reply, that a bad man will kill a\ngood one. \u201cYes, and that is the provoking thing.\u201d Not provoking to a\nman of sense who is not studying the arts which will preserve him from\ndanger; and this, as you say, is the use of rhetoric in courts of\njustice. But how many other arts are there which also save men from\ndeath, and are yet quite humble in their pretensions\u2014such as the art of\nswimming, or the art of the pilot? Does not the pilot do men at least\nas much service as the rhetorician, and yet for the voyage from Aegina\nto Athens he does not charge more than two obols, and when he\ndisembarks is quite unassuming in his demeanour? The reason is that he\nis not certain whether he has done his passengers any good in saving\nthem from death, if one of them is diseased in body, and still more if\nhe is diseased in mind\u2014who can say? The engineer too will often save\nwhole cities, and yet you despise him, and would not allow your son to\nmarry his daughter, or his son to marry yours. But what reason is there\nin this? For if virtue only means the saving of life, whether your own\nor another\u2019s, you have no right to despise him or any practiser of\nsaving arts. But is not virtue something different from saving and\nbeing saved? I would have you rather consider whether you ought not to\ndisregard length of life, and think only how you can live best, leaving\nall besides to the will of Heaven. For you must not expect to have\ninfluence either with the Athenian Demos or with Demos the son of\nPyrilampes, unless you become like them. What do you say to this?\n\n\u201cThere is some truth in what you are saying, but I do not entirely\nbelieve you.\u201d\n\nThat is because you are in love with Demos. But let us have a little\nmore conversation. You remember the two processes\u2014one which was\ndirected to pleasure, the other which was directed to making men as\ngood as possible. And those who have the care of the city should make\nthe citizens as good as possible. But who would undertake a public\nbuilding, if he had never had a teacher of the art of building, and had\nnever constructed a building before? or who would undertake the duty of\nstate-physician, if he had never cured either himself or any one else?\nShould we not examine him before we entrusted him with the office? And\nas Callicles is about to enter public life, should we not examine him?\nWhom has he made better? For we have already admitted that this is the\nstatesman\u2019s proper business. And we must ask the same question about\nPericles, and Cimon, and Miltiades, and Themistocles. Whom did they\nmake better? Nay, did not Pericles make the citizens worse? For he gave\nthem pay, and at first he was very popular with them, but at last they\ncondemned him to death. Yet surely he would be a bad tamer of animals\nwho, having received them gentle, taught them to kick and butt, and man\nis an animal; and Pericles who had the charge of man only made him\nwilder, and more savage and unjust, and therefore he could not have\nbeen a good statesman. The same tale might be repeated about Cimon,\nThemistocles, Miltiades. But the charioteer who keeps his seat at first\nis not thrown out when he gains greater experience and skill. The\ninference is, that the statesman of a past age were no better than\nthose of our own. They may have been cleverer constructors of docks and\nharbours, but they did not improve the character of the citizens. I\nhave told you again and again (and I purposely use the same images)\nthat the soul, like the body, may be treated in two ways\u2014there is the\nmeaner and the higher art. You seemed to understand what I said at the\ntime, but when I ask you who were the really good statesmen, you\nanswer\u2014as if I asked you who were the good trainers, and you answered,\nThearion, the baker, Mithoecus, the author of the Sicilian\ncookery-book, Sarambus, the vintner. And you would be affronted if I\ntold you that these are a parcel of cooks who make men fat only to make\nthem thin. And those whom they have fattened applaud them, instead of\nfinding fault with them, and lay the blame of their subsequent\ndisorders on their physicians. In this respect, Callicles, you are like\nthem; you applaud the statesmen of old, who pandered to the vices of\nthe citizens, and filled the city with docks and harbours, but\nneglected virtue and justice. And when the fit of illness comes, the\ncitizens who in like manner applauded Themistocles, Pericles, and\nothers, will lay hold of you and my friend Alcibiades, and you will\nsuffer for the misdeeds of your predecessors. The old story is always\nbeing repeated\u2014\u201cafter all his services, the ungrateful city banished\nhim, or condemned him to death.\u201d As if the statesman should not have\ntaught the city better! He surely cannot blame the state for having\nunjustly used him, any more than the sophist or teacher can find fault\nwith his pupils if they cheat him. And the sophist and orator are in\nthe same case; although you admire rhetoric and despise sophistic,\nwhereas sophistic is really the higher of the two. The teacher of the\narts takes money, but the teacher of virtue or politics takes no money,\nbecause this is the only kind of service which makes the disciple\ndesirous of requiting his teacher.\n\nSocrates concludes by finally asking, to which of the two modes of\nserving the state Callicles invites him:\u2014\u201cto the inferior and\nministerial one,\u201d is the ingenuous reply. That is the only way of\navoiding death, replies Socrates; and he has heard often enough, and\nwould rather not hear again, that the bad man will kill the good. But\nhe thinks that such a fate is very likely reserved for him, because he\nremarks that he is the only person who teaches the true art of\npolitics. And very probably, as in the case which he described to\nPolus, he may be the physician who is tried by a jury of children. He\ncannot say that he has procured the citizens any pleasure, and if any\none charges him with perplexing them, or with reviling their elders, he\nwill not be able to make them understand that he has only been actuated\nby a desire for their good. And therefore there is no saying what his\nfate may be. \u201cAnd do you think that a man who is unable to help himself\nis in a good condition?\u201d Yes, Callicles, if he have the true self-help,\nwhich is never to have said or done any wrong to himself or others. If\nI had not this kind of self-help, I should be ashamed; but if I die for\nwant of your flattering rhetoric, I shall die in peace. For death is no\nevil, but to go to the world below laden with offences is the worst of\nevils. In proof of which I will tell you a tale:\u2014\n\nUnder the rule of Cronos, men were judged on the day of their death,\nand when judgment had been given upon them they departed\u2014the good to\nthe islands of the blest, the bad to the house of vengeance. But as\nthey were still living, and had their clothes on at the time when they\nwere being judged, there was favouritism, and Zeus, when he came to the\nthrone, was obliged to alter the mode of procedure, and try them after\ndeath, having first sent down Prometheus to take away from them the\nforeknowledge of death. Minos, Rhadamanthus, and Aeacus were appointed\nto be the judges; Rhadamanthus for Asia, Aeacus for Europe, and Minos\nwas to hold the court of appeal. Now death is the separation of soul\nand body, but after death soul and body alike retain their\ncharacteristics; the fat man, the dandy, the branded slave, are all\ndistinguishable. Some prince or potentate, perhaps even the great king\nhimself, appears before Rhadamanthus, and he instantly detects him,\nthough he knows not who he is; he sees the scars of perjury and\niniquity, and sends him away to the house of torment.\n\nFor there are two classes of souls who undergo punishment\u2014the curable\nand the incurable. The curable are those who are benefited by their\npunishment; the incurable are such as Archelaus, who benefit others by\nbecoming a warning to them. The latter class are generally kings and\npotentates; meaner persons, happily for themselves, have not the same\npower of doing injustice. Sisyphus and Tityus, not Thersites, are\nsupposed by Homer to be undergoing everlasting punishment. Not that\nthere is anything to prevent a great man from being a good one, as is\nshown by the famous example of Aristeides, the son of Lysimachus. But\nto Rhadamanthus the souls are only known as good or bad; they are\nstripped of their dignities and preferments; he despatches the bad to\nTartarus, labelled either as curable or incurable, and looks with love\nand admiration on the soul of some just one, whom he sends to the\nislands of the blest. Similar is the practice of Aeacus; and Minos\noverlooks them, holding a golden sceptre, as Odysseus in Homer saw him\n\n\u201cWielding a sceptre of gold, and giving laws to the dead.\u201d\n\n\nMy wish for myself and my fellow-men is, that we may present our souls\nundefiled to the judge in that day; my desire in life is to be able to\nmeet death. And I exhort you, and retort upon you the reproach which\nyou cast upon me,\u2014that you will stand before the judge, gaping, and\nwith dizzy brain, and any one may box you on the ear, and do you all\nmanner of evil.\n\nPerhaps you think that this is an old wives\u2019 fable. But you, who are\nthe three wisest men in Hellas, have nothing better to say, and no one\nwill ever show that to do is better than to suffer evil. A man should\nstudy to be, and not merely to seem. If he is bad, he should become\ngood, and avoid all flattery, whether of the many or of the few.\n\nFollow me, then; and if you are looked down upon, that will do you no\nharm. And when we have practised virtue, we will betake ourselves to\npolitics, but not until we are delivered from the shameful state of\nignorance and uncertainty in which we are at present. Let us follow in\nthe way of virtue and justice, and not in the way to which you,\nCallicles, invite us; for that way is nothing worth.\n\nWe will now consider in order some of the principal points of the\ndialogue. Having regard (1) to the age of Plato and the ironical\ncharacter of his writings, we may compare him with himself, and with\nother great teachers, and we may note in passing the objections of his\ncritics. And then (2) casting one eye upon him, we may cast another\nupon ourselves, and endeavour to draw out the great lessons which he\nteaches for all time, stripped of the accidental form in which they are\nenveloped.\n\n(1) In the Gorgias, as in nearly all the other dialogues of Plato, we\nare made aware that formal logic has as yet no existence. The old\ndifficulty of framing a definition recurs. The illusive analogy of the\narts and the virtues also continues. The ambiguity of several words,\nsuch as nature, custom, the honourable, the good, is not cleared up.\nThe Sophists are still floundering about the distinction of the real\nand seeming. Figures of speech are made the basis of arguments. The\npossibility of conceiving a universal art or science, which admits of\napplication to a particular subject-matter, is a difficulty which\nremains unsolved, and has not altogether ceased to haunt the world at\nthe present day (compare Charmides). The defect of clearness is also\napparent in Socrates himself, unless we suppose him to be practising on\nthe simplicity of his opponent, or rather perhaps trying an experiment\nin dialectics. Nothing can be more fallacious than the contradiction\nwhich he pretends to have discovered in the answers of Gorgias (see\nabove). The advantages which he gains over Polus are also due to a\nfalse antithesis of pleasure and good, and to an erroneous assertion\nthat an agent and a patient may be described by similar predicates;\u2014a\nmistake which Aristotle partly shares and partly corrects in the\nNicomachean Ethics. Traces of a \u201crobust sophistry\u201d are likewise\ndiscernible in his argument with Callicles.\n\n(2) Although Socrates professes to be convinced by reason only, yet the\nargument is often a sort of dialectical fiction, by which he conducts\nhimself and others to his own ideal of life and action. And we may\nsometimes wish that we could have suggested answers to his antagonists,\nor pointed out to them the rocks which lay concealed under the\nambiguous terms good, pleasure, and the like. But it would be as\nuseless to examine his arguments by the requirements of modern logic,\nas to criticise this ideal from a merely utilitarian point of view. If\nwe say that the ideal is generally regarded as unattainable, and that\nmankind will by no means agree in thinking that the criminal is happier\nwhen punished than when unpunished, any more than they would agree to\nthe stoical paradox that a man may be happy on the rack, Plato has\nalready admitted that the world is against him. Neither does he mean to\nsay that Archelaus is tormented by the stings of conscience; or that\nthe sensations of the impaled criminal are more agreeable than those of\nthe tyrant drowned in luxurious enjoyment. Neither is he speaking, as\nin the Protagoras, of virtue as a calculation of pleasure, an opinion\nwhich he afterwards repudiates in the Phaedo. What then is his meaning?\nHis meaning we shall be able to illustrate best by parallel notions,\nwhich, whether justifiable by logic or not, have always existed among\nmankind. We must remind the reader that Socrates himself implies that\nhe will be understood or appreciated by very few.\n\nHe is speaking not of the consciousness of happiness, but of the idea\nof happiness. When a martyr dies in a good cause, when a soldier falls\nin battle, we do not suppose that death or wounds are without pain, or\nthat their physical suffering is always compensated by a mental\nsatisfaction. Still we regard them as happy, and we would a thousand\ntimes rather have their death than a shameful life. Nor is this only\nbecause we believe that they will obtain an immortality of fame, or\nthat they will have crowns of glory in another world, when their\nenemies and persecutors will be proportionably tormented. Men are found\nin a few instances to do what is right, without reference to public\nopinion or to consequences. And we regard them as happy on this ground\nonly, much as Socrates\u2019 friends in the opening of the Phaedo are\ndescribed as regarding him; or as was said of another, \u201cthey looked\nupon his face as upon the face of an angel.\u201d We are not concerned to\njustify this idealism by the standard of utility or public opinion, but\nmerely to point out the existence of such a sentiment in the better\npart of human nature.\n\nThe idealism of Plato is founded upon this sentiment. He would maintain\nthat in some sense or other truth and right are alone to be sought, and\nthat all other goods are only desirable as means towards these. He is\nthought to have erred in \u201cconsidering the agent only, and making no\nreference to the happiness of others, as affected by him.\u201d But the\nhappiness of others or of mankind, if regarded as an end, is really\nquite as ideal and almost as paradoxical to the common understanding as\nPlato\u2019s conception of happiness. For the greatest happiness of the\ngreatest number may mean also the greatest pain of the individual which\nwill procure the greatest pleasure of the greatest number. Ideas of\nutility, like those of duty and right, may be pushed to unpleasant\nconsequences. Nor can Plato in the Gorgias be deemed purely\nself-regarding, considering that Socrates expressly mentions the duty\nof imparting the truth when discovered to others. Nor must we forget\nthat the side of ethics which regards others is by the ancients merged\nin politics. Both in Plato and Aristotle, as well as in the Stoics, the\nsocial principle, though taking another form, is really far more\nprominent than in most modern treatises on ethics.\n\nThe idealizing of suffering is one of the conceptions which have\nexercised the greatest influence on mankind. Into the theological\nimport of this, or into the consideration of the errors to which the\nidea may have given rise, we need not now enter. All will agree that\nthe ideal of the Divine Sufferer, whose words the world would not\nreceive, the man of sorrows of whom the Hebrew prophets spoke, has sunk\ndeep into the heart of the human race. It is a similar picture of\nsuffering goodness which Plato desires to pourtray, not without an\nallusion to the fate of his master Socrates. He is convinced that,\nsomehow or other, such an one must be happy in life or after death. In\nthe Republic, he endeavours to show that his happiness would be assured\nhere in a well-ordered state. But in the actual condition of human\nthings the wise and good are weak and miserable; such an one is like a\nman fallen among wild beasts, exposed to every sort of wrong and\nobloquy.\n\nPlato, like other philosophers, is thus led on to the conclusion, that\nif \u201cthe ways of God\u201d to man are to be \u201cjustified,\u201d the hopes of another\nlife must be included. If the question could have been put to him,\nwhether a man dying in torments was happy still, even if, as he\nsuggests in the Apology, \u201cdeath be only a long sleep,\u201d we can hardly\ntell what would have been his answer. There have been a few, who, quite\nindependently of rewards and punishments or of posthumous reputation,\nor any other influence of public opinion, have been willing to\nsacrifice their lives for the good of others. It is difficult to say\nhow far in such cases an unconscious hope of a future life, or a\ngeneral faith in the victory of good in the world, may have supported\nthe sufferers. But this extreme idealism is not in accordance with the\nspirit of Plato. He supposes a day of retribution, in which the good\nare to be rewarded and the wicked punished. Though, as he says in the\nPhaedo, no man of sense will maintain that the details of the stories\nabout another world are true, he will insist that something of the kind\nis true, and will frame his life with a view to this unknown future.\nEven in the Republic he introduces a future life as an afterthought,\nwhen the superior happiness of the just has been established on what is\nthought to be an immutable foundation. At the same time he makes a\npoint of determining his main thesis independently of remoter\nconsequences.\n\n(3) Plato\u2019s theory of punishment is partly vindictive, partly\ncorrective. In the Gorgias, as well as in the Phaedo and Republic, a\nfew great criminals, chiefly tyrants, are reserved as examples. But\nmost men have never had the opportunity of attaining this pre-eminence\nof evil. They are not incurable, and their punishment is intended for\ntheir improvement. They are to suffer because they have sinned; like\nsick men, they must go to the physician and be healed. On this\nrepresentation of Plato\u2019s the criticism has been made, that the analogy\nof disease and injustice is partial only, and that suffering, instead\nof improving men, may have just the opposite effect.\n\nLike the general analogy of the arts and the virtues, the analogy of\ndisease and injustice, or of medicine and justice, is certainly\nimperfect. But ideas must be given through something; the nature of the\nmind which is unseen can only be represented under figures derived from\nvisible objects. If these figures are suggestive of some new aspect\nunder which the mind may be considered, we cannot find fault with them\nfor not exactly coinciding with the ideas represented. They partake of\nthe imperfect nature of language, and must not be construed in too\nstrict a manner. That Plato sometimes reasons from them as if they were\nnot figures but realities, is due to the defective logical analysis of\nhis age.\n\nNor does he distinguish between the suffering which improves and the\nsuffering which only punishes and deters. He applies to the sphere of\nethics a conception of punishment which is really derived from criminal\nlaw. He does not see that such punishment is only negative, and\nsupplies no principle of moral growth or development. He is not far off\nthe higher notion of an education of man to be begun in this world, and\nto be continued in other stages of existence, which is further\ndeveloped in the Republic. And Christian thinkers, who have ventured\nout of the beaten track in their meditations on the \u201clast things,\u201d have\nfound a ray of light in his writings. But he has not explained how or\nin what way punishment is to contribute to the improvement of mankind.\nHe has not followed out the principle which he affirms in the Republic,\nthat \u201cGod is the author of evil only with a view to good,\u201d and that\n\u201cthey were the better for being punished.\u201d Still his doctrine of a\nfuture state of rewards and punishments may be compared favourably with\nthat perversion of Christian doctrine which makes the everlasting\npunishment of human beings depend on a brief moment of time, or even on\nthe accident of an accident. And he has escaped the difficulty which\nhas often beset divines, respecting the future destiny of the meaner\nsort of men (Thersites and the like), who are neither very good nor\nvery bad, by not counting them worthy of eternal damnation.\n\nWe do Plato violence in pressing his figures of speech or chains of\nargument; and not less so in asking questions which were beyond the\nhorizon of his vision, or did not come within the scope of his design.\nThe main purpose of the Gorgias is not to answer questions about a\nfuture world, but to place in antagonism the true and false life, and\nto contrast the judgments and opinions of men with judgment according\nto the truth. Plato may be accused of representing a superhuman or\ntranscendental virtue in the description of the just man in the\nGorgias, or in the companion portrait of the philosopher in the\nTheaetetus; and at the same time may be thought to be condemning a\nstate of the world which always has existed and always will exist among\nmen. But such ideals act powerfully on the imagination of mankind. And\nsuch condemnations are not mere paradoxes of philosophers, but the\nnatural rebellion of the higher sense of right in man against the\nordinary conditions of human life. The greatest statesmen have fallen\nvery far short of the political ideal, and are therefore justly\ninvolved in the general condemnation.\n\nSubordinate to the main purpose of the dialogue are some other\nquestions, which may be briefly considered:\u2014\n\na. The antithesis of good and pleasure, which as in other dialogues is\nsupposed to consist in the permanent nature of the one compared with\nthe transient and relative nature of the other. Good and pleasure,\nknowledge and sense, truth and opinion, essence and generation, virtue\nand pleasure, the real and the apparent, the infinite and finite,\nharmony or beauty and discord, dialectic and rhetoric or poetry, are so\nmany pairs of opposites, which in Plato easily pass into one another,\nand are seldom kept perfectly distinct. And we must not forget that\nPlato\u2019s conception of pleasure is the Heracleitean flux transferred to\nthe sphere of human conduct. There is some degree of unfairness in\nopposing the principle of good, which is objective, to the principle of\npleasure, which is subjective. For the assertion of the permanence of\ngood is only based on the assumption of its objective character. Had\nPlato fixed his mind, not on the ideal nature of good, but on the\nsubjective consciousness of happiness, that would have been found to be\nas transient and precarious as pleasure.\n\nb. The arts or sciences, when pursued without any view to truth, or the\nimprovement of human life, are called flatteries. They are all alike\ndependent upon the opinion of mankind, from which they are derived. To\nPlato the whole world appears to be sunk in error, based on\nself-interest. To this is opposed the one wise man hardly professing to\nhave found truth, yet strong in the conviction that a virtuous life is\nthe only good, whether regarded with reference to this world or to\nanother. Statesmen, Sophists, rhetoricians, poets, are alike brought up\nfor judgment. They are the parodies of wise men, and their arts are the\nparodies of true arts and sciences. All that they call science is\nmerely the result of that study of the tempers of the Great Beast,\nwhich he describes in the Republic.\n\nc. Various other points of contact naturally suggest themselves between\nthe Gorgias and other dialogues, especially the Republic, the Philebus,\nand the Protagoras. There are closer resemblances both of spirit and\nlanguage in the Republic than in any other dialogue, the verbal\nsimilarity tending to show that they were written at the same period of\nPlato\u2019s life. For the Republic supplies that education and training of\nwhich the Gorgias suggests the necessity. The theory of the many weak\ncombining against the few strong in the formation of society (which is\nindeed a partial truth), is similar in both of them, and is expressed\nin nearly the same language. The sufferings and fate of the just man,\nthe powerlessness of evil, and the reversal of the situation in another\nlife, are also points of similarity. The poets, like the rhetoricians,\nare condemned because they aim at pleasure only, as in the Republic\nthey are expelled by the State, because they are imitators, and\nminister to the weaker side of human nature. That poetry is akin to\nrhetoric may be compared with the analogous notion, which occurs in the\nProtagoras, that the ancient poets were the Sophists of their day. In\nsome other respects the Protagoras rather offers a contrast than a\nparallel. The character of Protagoras may be compared with that of\nGorgias, but the conception of happiness is different in the two\ndialogues; being described in the former, according to the old Socratic\nnotion, as deferred or accumulated pleasure, while in the Gorgias, and\nin the Phaedo, pleasure and good are distinctly opposed.\n\nThis opposition is carried out from a speculative point of view in the\nPhilebus. There neither pleasure nor wisdom are allowed to be the chief\ngood, but pleasure and good are not so completely opposed as in the\nGorgias. For innocent pleasures, and such as have no antecedent pains,\nare allowed to rank in the class of goods. The allusion to Gorgias\u2019\ndefinition of rhetoric (Philebus; compare Gorg.), as the art of\npersuasion, of all arts the best, for to it all things submit, not by\ncompulsion, but of their own free will\u2014marks a close and perhaps\ndesigned connection between the two dialogues. In both the ideas of\nmeasure, order, harmony, are the connecting links between the beautiful\nand the good.\n\nIn general spirit and character, that is, in irony and antagonism to\npublic opinion, the Gorgias most nearly resembles the Apology, Crito,\nand portions of the Republic, and like the Philebus, though from\nanother point of view, may be thought to stand in the same relation to\nPlato\u2019s theory of morals which the Theaetetus bears to his theory of\nknowledge.\n\nd. A few minor points still remain to be summed up: (1) The extravagant\nirony in the reason which is assigned for the pilot\u2019s modest charge;\nand in the proposed use of rhetoric as an instrument of\nself-condemnation; and in the mighty power of geometrical equality in\nboth worlds. (2) The reference of the mythus to the previous discussion\nshould not be overlooked: the fate reserved for incurable criminals\nsuch as Archelaus; the retaliation of the box on the ears; the\nnakedness of the souls and of the judges who are stript of the clothes\nor disguises which rhetoric and public opinion have hitherto provided\nfor them (compare Swift\u2019s notion that the universe is a suit of\nclothes, Tale of a Tub). The fiction seems to have involved Plato in\nthe necessity of supposing that the soul retained a sort of corporeal\nlikeness after death. (3) The appeal of the authority of Homer, who\nsays that Odysseus saw Minos in his court \u201cholding a golden sceptre,\u201d\nwhich gives verisimilitude to the tale.\n\nIt is scarcely necessary to repeat that Plato is playing \u201cboth sides of\nthe game,\u201d and that in criticising the characters of Gorgias and Polus,\nwe are not passing any judgment on historical individuals, but only\nattempting to analyze the \u201cdramatis personae\u2019 as they were conceived by\nhim. Neither is it necessary to enlarge upon the obvious fact that\nPlato is a dramatic writer, whose real opinions cannot always be\nassumed to be those which he puts into the mouth of Socrates, or any\nother speaker who appears to have the best of the argument; or to\nrepeat the observation that he is a poet as well as a philosopher; or\nto remark that he is not to be tried by a modern standard, but\ninterpreted with reference to his place in the history of thought and\nthe opinion of his time.\n\nIt has been said that the most characteristic feature of the Gorgias is\nthe assertion of the right of dissent, or private judgment. But this\nmode of stating the question is really opposed both to the spirit of\nPlato and of ancient philosophy generally. For Plato is not asserting\nany abstract right or duty of toleration, or advantage to be derived\nfrom freedom of thought; indeed, in some other parts of his writings\n(e.g. Laws), he has fairly laid himself open to the charge of\nintolerance. No speculations had as yet arisen respecting the \u201cliberty\nof prophesying;\u2019 and Plato is not affirming any abstract right of this\nnature: but he is asserting the duty and right of the one wise and true\nman to dissent from the folly and falsehood of the many. At the same\ntime he acknowledges the natural result, which he hardly seeks to\navert, that he who speaks the truth to a multitude, regardless of\nconsequences, will probably share the fate of Socrates.\n\n\nThe irony of Plato sometimes veils from us the height of idealism to\nwhich he soars. When declaring truths which the many will not receive,\nhe puts on an armour which cannot be pierced by them. The weapons of\nridicule are taken out of their hands and the laugh is turned against\nthemselves. The disguises which Socrates assumes are like the parables\nof the New Testament, or the oracles of the Delphian God; they half\nconceal, half reveal, his meaning. The more he is in earnest, the more\nironical he becomes; and he is never more in earnest or more ironical\nthan in the Gorgias. He hardly troubles himself to answer seriously the\nobjections of Gorgias and Polus, and therefore he sometimes appears to\nbe careless of the ordinary requirements of logic. Yet in the highest\nsense he is always logical and consistent with himself. The form of the\nargument may be paradoxical; the substance is an appeal to the higher\nreason. He is uttering truths before they can be understood, as in all\nages the words of philosophers, when they are first uttered, have found\nthe world unprepared for them. A further misunderstanding arises out of\nthe wildness of his humour; he is supposed not only by Callicles, but\nby the rest of mankind, to be jesting when he is profoundly serious. At\nlength he makes even Polus in earnest. Finally, he drops the argument,\nand heedless any longer of the forms of dialectic, he loses himself in\na sort of triumph, while at the same time he retaliates upon his\nadversaries. From this confusion of jest and earnest, we may now return\nto the ideal truth, and draw out in a simple form the main theses of\nthe dialogue.\n\nFirst Thesis:\u2014\n\nIt is a greater evil to do than to suffer injustice.\n\nCompare the New Testament\u2014\n\n\u201cIt is better to suffer for well doing than for evil doing.\u201d\u20141 Pet.\n\nAnd the Sermon on the Mount\u2014\n\n\u201cBlessed are they that are persecuted for righteousness\u2019 sake.\u201d\u2014Matt.\n\nThe words of Socrates are more abstract than the words of Christ, but\nthey equally imply that the only real evil is moral evil. The righteous\nmay suffer or die, but they have their reward; and even if they had no\nreward, would be happier than the wicked. The world, represented by\nPolus, is ready, when they are asked, to acknowledge that injustice is\ndishonourable, and for their own sakes men are willing to punish the\noffender (compare Republic). But they are not equally willing to\nacknowledge that injustice, even if successful, is essentially evil,\nand has the nature of disease and death. Especially when crimes are\ncommitted on the great scale\u2014the crimes of tyrants, ancient or\nmodern\u2014after a while, seeing that they cannot be undone, and have\nbecome a part of history, mankind are disposed to forgive them, not\nfrom any magnanimity or charity, but because their feelings are blunted\nby time, and \u201cto forgive is convenient to them.\u201d The tangle of good and\nevil can no longer be unravelled; and although they know that the end\ncannot justify the means, they feel also that good has often come out\nof evil. But Socrates would have us pass the same judgment on the\ntyrant now and always; though he is surrounded by his satellites, and\nhas the applauses of Europe and Asia ringing in his ears; though he is\nthe civilizer or liberator of half a continent, he is, and always will\nbe, the most miserable of men. The greatest consequences for good or\nfor evil cannot alter a hair\u2019s breadth the morality of actions which\nare right or wrong in themselves. This is the standard which Socrates\nholds up to us. Because politics, and perhaps human life generally, are\nof a mixed nature we must not allow our principles to sink to the level\nof our practice.\n\nAnd so of private individuals\u2014to them, too, the world occasionally\nspeaks of the consequences of their actions:\u2014if they are lovers of\npleasure, they will ruin their health; if they are false or dishonest,\nthey will lose their character. But Socrates would speak to them, not\nof what will be, but of what is\u2014of the present consequence of lowering\nand degrading the soul. And all higher natures, or perhaps all men\neverywhere, if they were not tempted by interest or passion, would\nagree with him\u2014they would rather be the victims than the perpetrators\nof an act of treachery or of tyranny. Reason tells them that death\ncomes sooner or later to all, and is not so great an evil as an\nunworthy life, or rather, if rightly regarded, not an evil at all, but\nto a good man the greatest good. For in all of us there are slumbering\nideals of truth and right, which may at any time awaken and develop a\nnew life in us.\n\nSecond Thesis:\u2014\n\nIt is better to suffer for wrong doing than not to suffer.\n\nThere might have been a condition of human life in which the penalty\nfollowed at once, and was proportioned to the offence. Moral evil would\nthen be scarcely distinguishable from physical; mankind would avoid\nvice as they avoid pain or death. But nature, with a view of deepening\nand enlarging our characters, has for the most part hidden from us the\nconsequences of our actions, and we can only foresee them by an effort\nof reflection. To awaken in us this habit of reflection is the business\nof early education, which is continued in maturer years by observation\nand experience. The spoilt child is in later life said to be\nunfortunate\u2014he had better have suffered when he was young, and been\nsaved from suffering afterwards. But is not the sovereign equally\nunfortunate whose education and manner of life are always concealing\nfrom him the consequences of his own actions, until at length they are\nrevealed to him in some terrible downfall, which may, perhaps, have\nbeen caused not by his own fault? Another illustration is afforded by\nthe pauper and criminal classes, who scarcely reflect at all, except on\nthe means by which they can compass their immediate ends. We pity them,\nand make allowances for them; but we do not consider that the same\nprinciple applies to human actions generally. Not to have been found\nout in some dishonesty or folly, regarded from a moral or religious\npoint of view, is the greatest of misfortunes. The success of our evil\ndoings is a proof that the gods have ceased to strive with us, and have\ngiven us over to ourselves. There is nothing to remind us of our sins,\nand therefore nothing to correct them. Like our sorrows, they are\nhealed by time;\n\n\u201cWhile rank corruption, mining all within,\nInfects unseen.\u201d\n\n\nThe \u201caccustomed irony\u201d of Socrates adds a corollary to the\nargument:\u2014\u201cWould you punish your enemy, you should allow him to escape\nunpunished\u201d\u2014this is the true retaliation. (Compare the obscure verse of\nProverbs, \u201cTherefore if thine enemy hunger, feed him,\u201d etc., quoted in\nRomans.)\n\nMen are not in the habit of dwelling upon the dark side of their own\nlives: they do not easily see themselves as others see them. They are\nvery kind and very blind to their own faults; the rhetoric of self-love\nis always pleading with them on their own behalf. Adopting a similar\nfigure of speech, Socrates would have them use rhetoric, not in defence\nbut in accusation of themselves. As they are guided by feeling rather\nthan by reason, to their feelings the appeal must be made. They must\nspeak to themselves; they must argue with themselves; they must paint\nin eloquent words the character of their own evil deeds. To any\nsuffering which they have deserved, they must persuade themselves to\nsubmit. Under the figure there lurks a real thought, which, expressed\nin another form, admits of an easy application to ourselves. For do not\nwe too accuse as well as excuse ourselves? And we call to our aid the\nrhetoric of prayer and preaching, which the mind silently employs while\nthe struggle between the better and the worse is going on within us.\nAnd sometimes we are too hard upon ourselves, because we want to\nrestore the balance which self-love has overthrown or disturbed; and\nthen again we may hear a voice as of a parent consoling us. In\nreligious diaries a sort of drama is often enacted by the consciences\nof men \u201caccusing or else excusing them.\u201d For all our life long we are\ntalking with ourselves:\u2014What is thought but speech? What is feeling but\nrhetoric? And if rhetoric is used on one side only we shall be always\nin danger of being deceived. And so the words of Socrates, which at\nfirst sounded paradoxical, come home to the experience of all of us.\n\nThird Thesis:\u2014\n\nWe do not what we will, but what we wish.\n\nSocrates would teach us a lesson which we are slow to learn\u2014that good\nintentions, and even benevolent actions, when they are not prompted by\nwisdom, are of no value. We believe something to be for our good which\nwe afterwards find out not to be for our good. The consequences may be\ninevitable, for they may follow an invariable law, yet they may often\nbe the very opposite of what is expected by us. When we increase\npauperism by almsgiving; when we tie up property without regard to\nchanges of circumstances; when we say hastily what we deliberately\ndisapprove; when we do in a moment of passion what upon reflection we\nregret; when from any want of self-control we give another an advantage\nover us\u2014we are doing not what we will, but what we wish. All actions of\nwhich the consequences are not weighed and foreseen, are of this\nimpotent and paralytic sort; and the author of them has \u201cthe least\npossible power\u201d while seeming to have the greatest. For he is actually\nbringing about the reverse of what he intended. And yet the book of\nnature is open to him, in which he who runs may read if he will\nexercise ordinary attention; every day offers him experiences of his\nown and of other men\u2019s characters, and he passes them unheeded by. The\ncontemplation of the consequences of actions, and the ignorance of men\nin regard to them, seems to have led Socrates to his famous\nthesis:\u2014\u201cVirtue is knowledge;\u201d which is not so much an error or paradox\nas a half truth, seen first in the twilight of ethical philosophy, but\nalso the half of the truth which is especially needed in the present\nage. For as the world has grown older men have been too apt to imagine\na right and wrong apart from consequences; while a few, on the other\nhand, have sought to resolve them wholly into their consequences. But\nSocrates, or Plato for him, neither divides nor identifies them; though\nthe time has not yet arrived either for utilitarian or transcendental\nsystems of moral philosophy, he recognizes the two elements which seem\nto lie at the basis of morality. (Compare the following: \u201cNow, and for\nus, it is a time to Hellenize and to praise knowing; for we have\nHebraized too much and have overvalued doing. But the habits and\ndiscipline received from Hebraism remain for our race an eternal\npossession. And as humanity is constituted, one must never assign the\nsecond rank to-day without being ready to restore them to the first\nto-morrow.\u201d Sir William W. Hunter, Preface to Orissa.)\n\nFourth Thesis:\u2014\n\nTo be and not to seem is the end of life.\n\nThe Greek in the age of Plato admitted praise to be one of the chief\nincentives to moral virtue, and to most men the opinion of their\nfellows is a leading principle of action. Hence a certain element of\nseeming enters into all things; all or almost all desire to appear\nbetter than they are, that they may win the esteem or admiration of\nothers. A man of ability can easily feign the language of piety or\nvirtue; and there is an unconscious as well as a conscious hypocrisy\nwhich, according to Socrates, is the worst of the two. Again, there is\nthe sophistry of classes and professions. There are the different\nopinions about themselves and one another which prevail in different\nranks of society. There is the bias given to the mind by the study of\none department of human knowledge to the exclusion of the rest; and\nstronger far the prejudice engendered by a pecuniary or party interest\nin certain tenets. There is the sophistry of law, the sophistry of\nmedicine, the sophistry of politics, the sophistry of theology. All of\nthese disguises wear the appearance of the truth; some of them are very\nancient, and we do not easily disengage ourselves from them; for we\nhave inherited them, and they have become a part of us. The sophistry\nof an ancient Greek sophist is nothing compared with the sophistry of a\nreligious order, or of a church in which during many ages falsehood has\nbeen accumulating, and everything has been said on one side, and\nnothing on the other. The conventions and customs which we observe in\nconversation, and the opposition of our interests when we have dealings\nwith one another (\u201cthe buyer saith, it is nought\u2014it is nought,\u201d etc.),\nare always obscuring our sense of truth and right. The sophistry of\nhuman nature is far more subtle than the deceit of any one man. Few\npersons speak freely from their own natures, and scarcely any one dares\nto think for himself: most of us imperceptibly fall into the opinions\nof those around us, which we partly help to make. A man who would shake\nhimself loose from them, requires great force of mind; he hardly knows\nwhere to begin in the search after truth. On every side he is met by\nthe world, which is not an abstraction of theologians, but the most\nreal of all things, being another name for ourselves when regarded\ncollectively and subjected to the influences of society.\n\nThen comes Socrates, impressed as no other man ever was, with the\nunreality and untruthfulness of popular opinion, and tells mankind that\nthey must be and not seem. How are they to be? At any rate they must\nhave the spirit and desire to be. If they are ignorant, they must\nacknowledge their ignorance to themselves; if they are conscious of\ndoing evil, they must learn to do well; if they are weak, and have\nnothing in them which they can call themselves, they must acquire\nfirmness and consistency; if they are indifferent, they must begin to\ntake an interest in the great questions which surround them. They must\ntry to be what they would fain appear in the eyes of their fellow-men.\nA single individual cannot easily change public opinion; but he can be\ntrue and innocent, simple and independent; he can know what he does,\nand what he does not know; and though not without an effort, he can\nform a judgment of his own, at least in common matters. In his most\nsecret actions he can show the same high principle (compare Republic)\nwhich he shows when supported and watched by public opinion. And on\nsome fitting occasion, on some question of humanity or truth or right,\neven an ordinary man, from the natural rectitude of his disposition,\nmay be found to take up arms against a whole tribe of politicians and\nlawyers, and be too much for them.\n\nWho is the true and who the false statesman?\u2014\n\nThe true statesman is he who brings order out of disorder; who first\norganizes and then administers the government of his own country; and\nhaving made a nation, seeks to reconcile the national interests with\nthose of Europe and of mankind. He is not a mere theorist, nor yet a\ndealer in expedients; the whole and the parts grow together in his\nmind; while the head is conceiving, the hand is executing. Although\nobliged to descend to the world, he is not of the world. His thoughts\nare fixed not on power or riches or extension of territory, but on an\nideal state, in which all the citizens have an equal chance of health\nand life, and the highest education is within the reach of all, and the\nmoral and intellectual qualities of every individual are freely\ndeveloped, and \u201cthe idea of good\u201d is the animating principle of the\nwhole. Not the attainment of freedom alone, or of order alone, but how\nto unite freedom with order is the problem which he has to solve.\n\nThe statesman who places before himself these lofty aims has undertaken\na task which will call forth all his powers. He must control himself\nbefore he can control others; he must know mankind before he can manage\nthem. He has no private likes or dislikes; he does not conceal personal\nenmity under the disguise of moral or political principle: such\nmeannesses, into which men too often fall unintentionally, are absorbed\nin the consciousness of his mission, and in his love for his country\nand for mankind. He will sometimes ask himself what the next generation\nwill say of him; not because he is careful of posthumous fame, but\nbecause he knows that the result of his life as a whole will then be\nmore fairly judged. He will take time for the execution of his plans;\nnot hurrying them on when the mind of a nation is unprepared for them;\nbut like the Ruler of the Universe Himself, working in the appointed\ntime, for he knows that human life, \u201cif not long in comparison with\neternity\u201d (Republic), is sufficient for the fulfilment of many great\npurposes. He knows, too, that the work will be still going on when he\nis no longer here; and he will sometimes, especially when his powers\nare failing, think of that other \u201ccity of which the pattern is in\nheaven\u201d (Republic).\n\nThe false politician is the serving-man of the state. In order to\ngovern men he becomes like them; their \u201cminds are married in\nconjunction;\u201d they \u201cbear themselves\u201d like vulgar and tyrannical\nmasters, and he is their obedient servant. The true politician, if he\nwould rule men, must make them like himself; he must \u201ceducate his\nparty\u201d until they cease to be a party; he must breathe into them the\nspirit which will hereafter give form to their institutions. Politics\nwith him are not a mechanism for seeming what he is not, or for\ncarrying out the will of the majority. Himself a representative man, he\nis the representative not of the lower but of the higher elements of\nthe nation. There is a better (as well as a worse) public opinion of\nwhich he seeks to lay hold; as there is also a deeper current of human\naffairs in which he is borne up when the waves nearer the shore are\nthreatening him. He acknowledges that he cannot take the world by\nforce\u2014two or three moves on the political chess board are all that he\ncan fore see\u2014two or three weeks moves on the political chessboard are\nall that he can foresee\u2014two or three weeks or months are granted to him\nin which he can provide against a coming struggle. But he knows also\nthat there are permanent principles of politics which are always\ntending to the well-being of states\u2014better administration, better\neducation, the reconciliation of conflicting elements, increased\nsecurity against external enemies. These are not \u201cof to-day or\nyesterday,\u201d but are the same in all times, and under all forms of\ngovernment. Then when the storm descends and the winds blow, though he\nknows not beforehand the hour of danger, the pilot, not like Plato\u2019s\ncaptain in the Republic, half-blind and deaf, but with penetrating eye\nand quick ear, is ready to take command of the ship and guide her into\nport.\n\nThe false politician asks not what is true, but what is the opinion of\nthe world\u2014not what is right, but what is expedient. The only measures\nof which he approves are the measures which will pass. He has no\nintention of fighting an uphill battle; he keeps the roadway of\npolitics. He is unwilling to incur the persecution and enmity which\npolitical convictions would entail upon him. He begins with popularity,\nand in fair weather sails gallantly along. But unpopularity soon\nfollows him. For men expect their leaders to be better and wiser than\nthemselves: to be their guides in danger, their saviours in extremity;\nthey do not really desire them to obey all the ignorant impulses of the\npopular mind; and if they fail them in a crisis they are disappointed.\nThen, as Socrates says, the cry of ingratitude is heard, which is most\nunreasonable; for the people, who have been taught no better, have done\nwhat might be expected of them, and their statesmen have received\njustice at their hands.\n\nThe true statesman is aware that he must adapt himself to times and\ncircumstances. He must have allies if he is to fight against the world;\nhe must enlighten public opinion; he must accustom his followers to act\ntogether. Although he is not the mere executor of the will of the\nmajority, he must win over the majority to himself. He is their leader\nand not their follower, but in order to lead he must also follow. He\nwill neither exaggerate nor undervalue the power of a statesman,\nneither adopting the \u201claissez faire\u201d nor the \u201cpaternal government\u201d\nprinciple; but he will, whether he is dealing with children in\npolitics, or with full-grown men, seek to do for the people what the\ngovernment can do for them, and what, from imperfect education or\ndeficient powers of combination, they cannot do for themselves. He\nknows that if he does too much for them they will do nothing; and that\nif he does nothing for them they will in some states of society be\nutterly helpless. For the many cannot exist without the few, if the\nmaterial force of a country is from below, wisdom and experience are\nfrom above. It is not a small part of human evils which kings and\ngovernments make or cure. The statesman is well aware that a great\npurpose carried out consistently during many years will at last be\nexecuted. He is playing for a stake which may be partly determined by\nsome accident, and therefore he will allow largely for the unknown\nelement of politics. But the game being one in which chance and skill\nare combined, if he plays long enough he is certain of victory. He will\nnot be always consistent, for the world is changing; and though he\ndepends upon the support of a party, he will remember that he is the\nminister of the whole. He lives not for the present, but for the\nfuture, and he is not at all sure that he will be appreciated either\nnow or then. For he may have the existing order of society against him,\nand may not be remembered by a distant posterity.\n\nThere are always discontented idealists in politics who, like Socrates\nin the Gorgias, find fault with all statesmen past as well as present,\nnot excepting the greatest names of history. Mankind have an uneasy\nfeeling that they ought to be better governed than they are. Just as\nthe actual philosopher falls short of the one wise man, so does the\nactual statesman fall short of the ideal. And so partly from vanity and\negotism, but partly also from a true sense of the faults of eminent\nmen, a temper of dissatisfaction and criticism springs up among those\nwho are ready enough to acknowledge the inferiority of their own\npowers. No matter whether a statesman makes high professions or none at\nall\u2014they are reduced sooner or later to the same level. And sometimes\nthe more unscrupulous man is better esteemed than the more\nconscientious, because he has not equally deceived expectations. Such\nsentiments may be unjust, but they are widely spread; we constantly\nfind them recurring in reviews and newspapers, and still oftener in\nprivate conversation.\n\nWe may further observe that the art of government, while in some\nrespects tending to improve, has in others a tendency to degenerate, as\ninstitutions become more popular. Governing for the people cannot\neasily be combined with governing by the people: the interests of\nclasses are too strong for the ideas of the statesman who takes a\ncomprehensive view of the whole. According to Socrates the true\ngovernor will find ruin or death staring him in the face, and will only\nbe induced to govern from the fear of being governed by a worse man\nthan himself (Republic). And in modern times, though the world has\ngrown milder, and the terrible consequences which Plato foretells no\nlonger await an English statesman, any one who is not actuated by a\nblind ambition will only undertake from a sense of duty a work in which\nhe is most likely to fail; and even if he succeed, will rarely be\nrewarded by the gratitude of his own generation.\n\nSocrates, who is not a politician at all, tells us that he is the only\nreal politician of his time. Let us illustrate the meaning of his words\nby applying them to the history of our own country. He would have said\nthat not Pitt or Fox, or Canning or Sir R. Peel, are the real\npoliticians of their time, but Locke, Hume, Adam Smith, Bentham,\nRicardo. These during the greater part of their lives occupied an\ninconsiderable space in the eyes of the public. They were private\npersons; nevertheless they sowed in the minds of men seeds which in the\nnext generation have become an irresistible power. \u201cHerein is that\nsaying true, One soweth and another reapeth.\u201d We may imagine with Plato\nan ideal statesman in whom practice and speculation are perfectly\nharmonized; for there is no necessary opposition between them. But\nexperience shows that they are commonly divorced\u2014the ordinary\npolitician is the interpreter or executor of the thoughts of others,\nand hardly ever brings to the birth a new political conception. One or\ntwo only in modern times, like the Italian statesman Cavour, have\ncreated the world in which they moved. The philosopher is naturally\nunfitted for political life; his great ideas are not understood by the\nmany; he is a thousand miles away from the questions of the day. Yet\nperhaps the lives of thinkers, as they are stiller and deeper, are also\nhappier than the lives of those who are more in the public eye. They\nhave the promise of the future, though they are regarded as dreamers\nand visionaries by their own contemporaries. And when they are no\nlonger here, those who would have been ashamed of them during their\nlives claim kindred with them, and are proud to be called by their\nnames. (Compare Thucyd.)\n\nWho is the true poet?\n\nPlato expels the poets from his Republic because they are allied to\nsense; because they stimulate the emotions; because they are thrice\nremoved from the ideal truth. And in a similar spirit he declares in\nthe Gorgias that the stately muse of tragedy is a votary of pleasure\nand not of truth. In modern times we almost ridicule the idea of poetry\nadmitting of a moral. The poet and the prophet, or preacher, in\nprimitive antiquity are one and the same; but in later ages they seem\nto fall apart. The great art of novel writing, that peculiar creation\nof our own and the last century, which, together with the sister art of\nreview writing, threatens to absorb all literature, has even less of\nseriousness in her composition. Do we not often hear the novel writer\ncensured for attempting to convey a lesson to the minds of his readers?\n\nYet the true office of a poet or writer of fiction is not merely to\ngive amusement, or to be the expression of the feelings of mankind,\ngood or bad, or even to increase our knowledge of human nature. There\nhave been poets in modern times, such as Goethe or Wordsworth, who have\nnot forgotten their high vocation of teachers; and the two greatest of\nthe Greek dramatists owe their sublimity to their ethical character.\nThe noblest truths, sung of in the purest and sweetest language, are\nstill the proper material of poetry. The poet clothes them with beauty,\nand has a power of making them enter into the hearts and memories of\nmen. He has not only to speak of themes above the level of ordinary\nlife, but to speak of them in a deeper and tenderer way than they are\nordinarily felt, so as to awaken the feeling of them in others. The old\nhe makes young again; the familiar principle he invests with a new\ndignity; he finds a noble expression for the common-places of morality\nand politics. He uses the things of sense so as to indicate what is\nbeyond; he raises us through earth to heaven. He expresses what the\nbetter part of us would fain say, and the half-conscious feeling is\nstrengthened by the expression. He is his own critic, for the spirit of\npoetry and of criticism are not divided in him. His mission is not to\ndisguise men from themselves, but to reveal to them their own nature,\nand make them better acquainted with the world around them. True poetry\nis the remembrance of youth, of love, the embodiment in words of the\nhappiest and holiest moments of life, of the noblest thoughts of man,\nof the greatest deeds of the past. The poet of the future may return to\nhis greater calling of the prophet or teacher; indeed, we hardly know\nwhat may not be effected for the human race by a better use of the\npoetical and imaginative faculty. The reconciliation of poetry, as of\nreligion, with truth, may still be possible. Neither is the element of\npleasure to be excluded. For when we substitute a higher pleasure for a\nlower we raise men in the scale of existence. Might not the novelist,\ntoo, make an ideal, or rather many ideals of social life, better than a\nthousand sermons? Plato, like the Puritans, is too much afraid of\npoetic and artistic influences. But he is not without a true sense of\nthe noble purposes to which art may be applied (Republic).\n\nModern poetry is often a sort of plaything, or, in Plato\u2019s language, a\nflattery, a sophistry, or sham, in which, without any serious purpose,\nthe poet lends wings to his fancy and exhibits his gifts of language\nand metre. Such an one seeks to gratify the taste of his readers; he\nhas the \u201csavoir faire,\u201d or trick of writing, but he has not the higher\nspirit of poetry. He has no conception that true art should bring order\nout of disorder; that it should make provision for the soul\u2019s highest\ninterest; that it should be pursued only with a view to \u201cthe\nimprovement of the citizens.\u201d He ministers to the weaker side of human\nnature (Republic); he idealizes the sensual; he sings the strain of\nlove in the latest fashion; instead of raising men above themselves he\nbrings them back to the \u201ctyranny of the many masters,\u201d from which all\nhis life long a good man has been praying to be delivered. And often,\nforgetful of measure and order, he will express not that which is\ntruest, but that which is strongest. Instead of a great and\nnobly-executed subject, perfect in every part, some fancy of a heated\nbrain is worked out with the strangest incongruity. He is not the\nmaster of his words, but his words\u2014perhaps borrowed from another\u2014the\nfaded reflection of some French or German or Italian writer, have the\nbetter of him. Though we are not going to banish the poets, how can we\nsuppose that such utterances have any healing or life-giving influence\non the minds of men?\n\n\u201cLet us hear the conclusion of the whole matter:\u201d Art then must be\ntrue, and politics must be true, and the life of man must be true and\nnot a seeming or sham. In all of them order has to be brought out of\ndisorder, truth out of error and falsehood. This is what we mean by the\ngreatest improvement of man. And so, having considered in what way \u201cwe\ncan best spend the appointed time, we leave the result with God.\u201d Plato\ndoes not say that God will order all things for the best (compare\nPhaedo), but he indirectly implies that the evils of this life will be\ncorrected in another. And as we are very far from the best imaginable\nworld at present, Plato here, as in the Phaedo and Republic, supposes a\npurgatory or place of education for mankind in general, and for a very\nfew a Tartarus or hell. The myth which terminates the dialogue is not\nthe revelation, but rather, like all similar descriptions, whether in\nthe Bible or Plato, the veil of another life. For no visible thing can\nreveal the invisible. Of this Plato, unlike some commentators on\nScripture, is fully aware. Neither will he dogmatize about the manner\nin which we are \u201cborn again\u201d (Republic). Only he is prepared to\nmaintain the ultimate triumph of truth and right, and declares that no\none, not even the wisest of the Greeks, can affirm any other doctrine\nwithout being ridiculous.\n\nThere is a further paradox of ethics, in which pleasure and pain are\nheld to be indifferent, and virtue at the time of action and without\nregard to consequences is happiness. From this elevation or\nexaggeration of feeling Plato seems to shrink: he leaves it to the\nStoics in a later generation to maintain that when impaled or on the\nrack the philosopher may be happy (compare Republic). It is observable\nthat in the Republic he raises this question, but it is not really\ndiscussed; the veil of the ideal state, the shadow of another life, are\nallowed to descend upon it and it passes out of sight. The martyr or\nsufferer in the cause of right or truth is often supposed to die in\nraptures, having his eye fixed on a city which is in heaven. But if\nthere were no future, might he not still be happy in the performance of\nan action which was attended only by a painful death? He himself may be\nready to thank God that he was thought worthy to do Him the least\nservice, without looking for a reward; the joys of another life may not\nhave been present to his mind at all. Do we suppose that the mediaeval\nsaint, St. Bernard, St. Francis, St. Catharine of Sienna, or the\nCatholic priest who lately devoted himself to death by a lingering\ndisease that he might solace and help others, was thinking of the\n\u201csweets\u201d of heaven? No; the work was already heaven to him and enough.\nMuch less will the dying patriot be dreaming of the praises of man or\nof an immortality of fame: the sense of duty, of right, and trust in\nGod will be sufficient, and as far as the mind can reach, in that hour.\nIf he were certain that there were no life to come, he would not have\nwished to speak or act otherwise than he did in the cause of truth or\nof humanity. Neither, on the other hand, will he suppose that God has\nforsaken him or that the future is to be a mere blank to him. The\ngreatest act of faith, the only faith which cannot pass away, is his\nwho has not known, but yet has believed. A very few among the sons of\nmen have made themselves independent of circumstances, past, present,\nor to come. He who has attained to such a temper of mind has already\npresent with him eternal life; he needs no arguments to convince him of\nimmortality; he has in him already a principle stronger than death. He\nwho serves man without the thought of reward is deemed to be a more\nfaithful servant than he who works for hire. May not the service of\nGod, which is the more disinterested, be in like manner the higher? And\nalthough only a very few in the course of the world\u2019s history\u2014Christ\nhimself being one of them\u2014have attained to such a noble conception of\nGod and of the human soul, yet the ideal of them may be present to us,\nand the remembrance of them be an example to us, and their lives may\nshed a light on many dark places both of philosophy and theology.\n\nTHE MYTHS OF PLATO.\n\nThe myths of Plato are a phenomenon unique in literature. There are\nfour longer ones: these occur in the Phaedrus, Phaedo, Gorgias, and\nRepublic. That in the Republic is the most elaborate and finished of\nthem. Three of these greater myths, namely those contained in the\nPhaedo, the Gorgias and the Republic, relate to the destiny of human\nsouls in a future life. The magnificent myth in the Phaedrus treats of\nthe immortality, or rather the eternity of the soul, in which is\nincluded a former as well as a future state of existence. To these may\nbe added, (1) the myth, or rather fable, occurring in the Statesman, in\nwhich the life of innocence is contrasted with the ordinary life of man\nand the consciousness of evil: (2) the legend of the Island of\nAtlantis, an imaginary history, which is a fragment only, commenced in\nthe Timaeus and continued in the Critias: (3) the much less artistic\nfiction of the foundation of the Cretan colony which is introduced in\nthe preface to the Laws, but soon falls into the background: (4) the\nbeautiful but rather artificial tale of Prometheus and Epimetheus\nnarrated in his rhetorical manner by Protagoras in the dialogue called\nafter him: (5) the speech at the beginning of the Phaedrus, which is a\nparody of the orator Lysias; the rival speech of Socrates and the\nrecantation of it. To these may be added (6) the tale of the\ngrasshoppers, and (7) the tale of Thamus and of Theuth, both in the\nPhaedrus: (8) the parable of the Cave (Republic), in which the previous\nargument is recapitulated, and the nature and degrees of knowledge\nhaving been previously set forth in the abstract are represented in a\npicture: (9) the fiction of the earth-born men (Republic; compare\nLaws), in which by the adaptation of an old tradition Plato makes a new\nbeginning for his society: (10) the myth of Aristophanes respecting the\ndivision of the sexes, Sym.: (11) the parable of the noble captain, the\npilot, and the mutinous sailors (Republic), in which is represented the\nrelation of the better part of the world, and of the philosopher, to\nthe mob of politicians: (12) the ironical tale of the pilot who plies\nbetween Athens and Aegina charging only a small payment for saving men\nfrom death, the reason being that he is uncertain whether to live or\ndie is better for them (Gor.): (13) the treatment of freemen and\ncitizens by physicians and of slaves by their apprentices,\u2014a somewhat\nlaboured figure of speech intended to illustrate the two different ways\nin which the laws speak to men (Laws). There also occur in Plato\ncontinuous images; some of them extend over several pages, appearing\nand reappearing at intervals: such as the bees stinging and stingless\n(paupers and thieves) in the Eighth Book of the Republic, who are\ngenerated in the transition from timocracy to oligarchy: the sun, which\nis to the visible world what the idea of good is to the intellectual,\nin the Sixth Book of the Republic: the composite animal, having the\nform of a man, but containing under a human skin a lion and a\nmany-headed monster (Republic): the great beast, i.e. the populace: and\nthe wild beast within us, meaning the passions which are always liable\nto break out: the animated comparisons of the degradation of philosophy\nby the arts to the dishonoured maiden, and of the tyrant to the\nparricide, who \u201cbeats his father, having first taken away his arms\u201d:\nthe dog, who is your only philosopher: the grotesque and rather paltry\nimage of the argument wandering about without a head (Laws), which is\nrepeated, not improved, from the Gorgias: the argument personified as\nveiling her face (Republic), as engaged in a chase, as breaking upon us\nin a first, second and third wave:\u2014on these figures of speech the\nchanges are rung many times over. It is observable that nearly all\nthese parables or continuous images are found in the Republic; that\nwhich occurs in the Theaetetus, of the midwifery of Socrates, is\nperhaps the only exception. To make the list complete, the mathematical\nfigure of the number of the state (Republic), or the numerical interval\nwhich separates king from tyrant, should not be forgotten.\n\nThe myth in the Gorgias is one of those descriptions of another life\nwhich, like the Sixth Aeneid of Virgil, appear to contain reminiscences\nof the mysteries. It is a vision of the rewards and punishments which\nawait good and bad men after death. It supposes the body to continue\nand to be in another world what it has become in this. It includes a\nParadiso, Purgatorio, and Inferno, like the sister myths of the Phaedo\nand the Republic. The Inferno is reserved for great criminals only. The\nargument of the dialogue is frequently referred to, and the meaning\nbreaks through so as rather to destroy the liveliness and consistency\nof the picture. The structure of the fiction is very slight, the chief\npoint or moral being that in the judgments of another world there is no\npossibility of concealment: Zeus has taken from men the power of\nforeseeing death, and brings together the souls both of them and their\njudges naked and undisguised at the judgment-seat. Both are exposed to\nview, stripped of the veils and clothes which might prevent them from\nseeing into or being seen by one another.\n\nThe myth of the Phaedo is of the same type, but it is more\ncosmological, and also more poetical. The beautiful and ingenious fancy\noccurs to Plato that the upper atmosphere is an earth and heaven in\none, a glorified earth, fairer and purer than that in which we dwell.\nAs the fishes live in the ocean, mankind are living in a lower sphere,\nout of which they put their heads for a moment or two and behold a\nworld beyond. The earth which we inhabit is a sediment of the coarser\nparticles which drop from the world above, and is to that heavenly\nearth what the desert and the shores of the ocean are to us. A part of\nthe myth consists of description of the interior of the earth, which\ngives the opportunity of introducing several mythological names and of\nproviding places of torment for the wicked. There is no clear\ndistinction of soul and body; the spirits beneath the earth are spoken\nof as souls only, yet they retain a sort of shadowy form when they cry\nfor mercy on the shores of the lake; and the philosopher alone is said\nto have got rid of the body. All the three myths in Plato which relate\nto the world below have a place for repentant sinners, as well as other\nhomes or places for the very good and very bad. It is a natural\nreflection which is made by Plato elsewhere, that the two extremes of\nhuman character are rarely met with, and that the generality of mankind\nare between them. Hence a place must be found for them. In the myth of\nthe Phaedo they are carried down the river Acheron to the Acherusian\nlake, where they dwell, and are purified of their evil deeds, and\nreceive the rewards of their good. There are also incurable sinners,\nwho are cast into Tartarus, there to remain as the penalty of atrocious\ncrimes; these suffer everlastingly. And there is another class of\nhardly-curable sinners who are allowed from time to time to approach\nthe shores of the Acherusian lake, where they cry to their victims for\nmercy; which if they obtain they come out into the lake and cease from\ntheir torments.\n\nNeither this, nor any of the three greater myths of Plato, nor perhaps\nany allegory or parable relating to the unseen world, is consistent\nwith itself. The language of philosophy mingles with that of mythology;\nabstract ideas are transformed into persons, figures of speech into\nrealities. These myths may be compared with the Pilgrim\u2019s Progress of\nBunyan, in which discussions of theology are mixed up with the\nincidents of travel, and mythological personages are associated with\nhuman beings: they are also garnished with names and phrases taken out\nof Homer, and with other fragments of Greek tradition.\n\nThe myth of the Republic is more subtle and also more consistent than\neither of the two others. It has a greater verisimilitude than they\nhave, and is full of touches which recall the experiences of human\nlife. It will be noticed by an attentive reader that the twelve days\nduring which Er lay in a trance after he was slain coincide with the\ntime passed by the spirits in their pilgrimage. It is a curious\nobservation, not often made, that good men who have lived in a\nwell-governed city (shall we say in a religious and respectable\nsociety?) are more likely to make mistakes in their choice of life than\nthose who have had more experience of the world and of evil. It is a\nmore familiar remark that we constantly blame others when we have only\nourselves to blame; and the philosopher must acknowledge, however\nreluctantly, that there is an element of chance in human life with\nwhich it is sometimes impossible for man to cope. That men drink more\nof the waters of forgetfulness than is good for them is a poetical\ndescription of a familiar truth. We have many of us known men who, like\nOdysseus, have wearied of ambition and have only desired rest. We\nshould like to know what became of the infants \u201cdying almost as soon as\nthey were born,\u201d but Plato only raises, without satisfying, our\ncuriosity. The two companies of souls, ascending and descending at\neither chasm of heaven and earth, and conversing when they come out\ninto the meadow, the majestic figures of the judges sitting in heaven,\nthe voice heard by Ardiaeus, are features of the great allegory which\nhave an indescribable grandeur and power. The remark already made\nrespecting the inconsistency of the two other myths must be extended\nalso to this: it is at once an orrery, or model of the heavens, and a\npicture of the Day of Judgment.\n\nThe three myths are unlike anything else in Plato. There is an\nOriental, or rather an Egyptian element in them, and they have an\naffinity to the mysteries and to the Orphic modes of worship. To a\ncertain extent they are un-Greek; at any rate there is hardly anything\nlike them in other Greek writings which have a serious purpose; in\nspirit they are mediaeval. They are akin to what may be termed the\nunderground religion in all ages and countries. They are presented in\nthe most lively and graphic manner, but they are never insisted on as\ntrue; it is only affirmed that nothing better can be said about a\nfuture life. Plato seems to make use of them when he has reached the\nlimits of human knowledge; or, to borrow an expression of his own, when\nhe is standing on the outside of the intellectual world. They are very\nsimple in style; a few touches bring the picture home to the mind, and\nmake it present to us. They have also a kind of authority gained by the\nemployment of sacred and familiar names, just as mere fragments of the\nwords of Scripture, put together in any form and applied to any\nsubject, have a power of their own. They are a substitute for poetry\nand mythology; and they are also a reform of mythology. The moral of\nthem may be summed up in a word or two: After death the Judgment; and\n\u201cthere is some better thing remaining for the good than for the evil.\u201d\n\nAll literature gathers into itself many elements of the past: for\nexample, the tale of the earth-born men in the Republic appears at\nfirst sight to be an extravagant fancy, but it is restored to propriety\nwhen we remember that it is based on a legendary belief. The art of\nmaking stories of ghosts and apparitions credible is said to consist in\nthe manner of telling them. The effect is gained by many literary and\nconversational devices, such as the previous raising of curiosity, the\nmention of little circumstances, simplicity, picturesqueness, the\nnaturalness of the occasion, and the like. This art is possessed by\nPlato in a degree which has never been equalled.\n\nThe myth in the Phaedrus is even greater than the myths which have been\nalready described, but is of a different character. It treats of a\nformer rather than of a future life. It represents the conflict of\nreason aided by passion or righteous indignation on the one hand, and\nof the animal lusts and instincts on the other. The soul of man has\nfollowed the company of some god, and seen truth in the form of the\nuniversal before it was born in this world. Our present life is the\nresult of the struggle which was then carried on. This world is\nrelative to a former world, as it is often projected into a future. We\nask the question, Where were men before birth? As we likewise enquire,\nWhat will become of them after death? The first question is unfamiliar\nto us, and therefore seems to be unnatural; but if we survey the whole\nhuman race, it has been as influential and as widely spread as the\nother. In the Phaedrus it is really a figure of speech in which the\n\u201cspiritual combat\u201d of this life is represented. The majesty and power\nof the whole passage\u2014especially of what may be called the theme or\nproem (beginning \u201cThe mind through all her being is immortal\u201d)\u2014can only\nbe rendered very inadequately in another language.\n\nThe myth in the Statesman relates to a former cycle of existence, in\nwhich men were born of the earth, and by the reversal of the earth\u2019s\nmotion had their lives reversed and were restored to youth and beauty:\nthe dead came to life, the old grew middle-aged, and the middle-aged\nyoung; the youth became a child, the child an infant, the infant\nvanished into the earth. The connection between the reversal of the\nearth\u2019s motion and the reversal of human life is of course verbal only,\nyet Plato, like theologians in other ages, argues from the consistency\nof the tale to its truth. The new order of the world was immediately\nunder the government of God; it was a state of innocence in which men\nhad neither wants nor cares, in which the earth brought forth all\nthings spontaneously, and God was to man what man now is to the\nanimals. There were no great estates, or families, or private\npossessions, nor any traditions of the past, because men were all born\nout of the earth. This is what Plato calls the \u201creign of Cronos;\u201d and\nin like manner he connects the reversal of the earth\u2019s motion with some\nlegend of which he himself was probably the inventor.\n\nThe question is then asked, under which of these two cycles of\nexistence was man the happier,\u2014under that of Cronos, which was a state\nof innocence, or that of Zeus, which is our ordinary life? For a while\nPlato balances the two sides of the serious controversy, which he has\nsuggested in a figure. The answer depends on another question: What use\ndid the children of Cronos make of their time? They had boundless\nleisure and the faculty of discoursing, not only with one another, but\nwith the animals. Did they employ these advantages with a view to\nphilosophy, gathering from every nature some addition to their store of\nknowledge? or, Did they pass their time in eating and drinking and\ntelling stories to one another and to the beasts?\u2014in either case there\nwould be no difficulty in answering. But then, as Plato rather\nmischievously adds, \u201cNobody knows what they did,\u201d and therefore the\ndoubt must remain undetermined.\n\nTo the first there succeeds a second epoch. After another natural\nconvulsion, in which the order of the world and of human life is once\nmore reversed, God withdraws his guiding hand, and man is left to the\ngovernment of himself. The world begins again, and arts and laws are\nslowly and painfully invented. A secular age succeeds to a\ntheocratical. In this fanciful tale Plato has dropped, or almost\ndropped, the garb of mythology. He suggests several curious and\nimportant thoughts, such as the possibility of a state of innocence,\nthe existence of a world without traditions, and the difference between\nhuman and divine government. He has also carried a step further his\nspeculations concerning the abolition of the family and of property,\nwhich he supposes to have no place among the children of Cronos any\nmore than in the ideal state.\n\nIt is characteristic of Plato and of his age to pass from the abstract\nto the concrete, from poetry to reality. Language is the expression of\nthe seen, and also of the unseen, and moves in a region between them. A\ngreat writer knows how to strike both these chords, sometimes remaining\nwithin the sphere of the visible, and then again comprehending a wider\nrange and soaring to the abstract and universal. Even in the same\nsentence he may employ both modes of speech not improperly or\ninharmoniously. It is useless to criticise the broken metaphors of\nPlato, if the effect of the whole is to create a picture not such as\ncan be painted on canvas, but which is full of life and meaning to the\nreader. A poem may be contained in a word or two, which may call up not\none but many latent images; or half reveal to us by a sudden flash the\nthoughts of many hearts. Often the rapid transition from one image to\nanother is pleasing to us: on the other hand, any single figure of\nspeech if too often repeated, or worked out too much at length, becomes\nprosy and monotonous. In theology and philosophy we necessarily include\nboth \u201cthe moral law within and the starry heaven above,\u201d and pass from\none to the other (compare for examples Psalms xviii. and xix.). Whether\nsuch a use of language is puerile or noble depends upon the genius of\nthe writer or speaker, and the familiarity of the associations\nemployed.\n\nIn the myths and parables of Plato the ease and grace of conversation\nis not forgotten: they are spoken, not written words, stories which are\ntold to a living audience, and so well told that we are more than\nhalf-inclined to believe them (compare Phaedrus). As in conversation\ntoo, the striking image or figure of speech is not forgotten, but is\nquickly caught up, and alluded to again and again; as it would still be\nin our own day in a genial and sympathetic society. The descriptions of\nPlato have a greater life and reality than is to be found in any modern\nwriting. This is due to their homeliness and simplicity. Plato can do\nwith words just as he pleases; to him they are indeed \u201cmore plastic\nthan wax\u201d (Republic). We are in the habit of opposing speech and\nwriting, poetry and prose. But he has discovered a use of language in\nwhich they are united; which gives a fitting expression to the highest\ntruths; and in which the trifles of courtesy and the familiarities of\ndaily life are not overlooked.\n\n\n\n\n\nGORGIAS\n\nBy Plato\n\nTranslated by Benjamin Jowett\n\nPERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Callicles, Socrates, Chaerephon, Gorgias,\nPolus.\n\nSCENE: The house of Callicles.\n\nCALLICLES: The wise man, as the proverb says, is late for a fray, but\nnot for a feast.\n\nSOCRATES: And are we late for a feast?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes, and a delightful feast; for Gorgias has just been\nexhibiting to us many fine things.\n\nSOCRATES: It is not my fault, Callicles; our friend Chaerephon is to\nblame; for he would keep us loitering in the Agora.\n\nCHAEREPHON: Never mind, Socrates; the misfortune of which I have been\nthe cause I will also repair; for Gorgias is a friend of mine, and I\nwill make him give the exhibition again either now, or, if you prefer,\nat some other time.\n\nCALLICLES: What is the matter, Chaerephon\u2014does Socrates want to hear\nGorgias?\n\nCHAEREPHON: Yes, that was our intention in coming.\n\nCALLICLES: Come into my house, then; for Gorgias is staying with me,\nand he shall exhibit to you.\n\nSOCRATES: Very good, Callicles; but will he answer our questions? for I\nwant to hear from him what is the nature of his art, and what it is\nwhich he professes and teaches; he may, as you (Chaerephon) suggest,\ndefer the exhibition to some other time.\n\nCALLICLES: There is nothing like asking him, Socrates; and indeed to\nanswer questions is a part of his exhibition, for he was saying only\njust now, that any one in my house might put any question to him, and\nthat he would answer.\n\nSOCRATES: How fortunate! will you ask him, Chaerephon\u2014?\n\nCHAEREPHON: What shall I ask him?\n\nSOCRATES: Ask him who he is.\n\nCHAEREPHON: What do you mean?\n\nSOCRATES: I mean such a question as would elicit from him, if he had\nbeen a maker of shoes, the answer that he is a cobbler. Do you\nunderstand?\n\nCHAEREPHON: I understand, and will ask him: Tell me, Gorgias, is our\nfriend Callicles right in saying that you undertake to answer any\nquestions which you are asked?\n\nGORGIAS: Quite right, Chaerephon: I was saying as much only just now;\nand I may add, that many years have elapsed since any one has asked me\na new one.\n\nCHAEREPHON: Then you must be very ready, Gorgias.\n\nGORGIAS: Of that, Chaerephon, you can make trial.\n\nPOLUS: Yes, indeed, and if you like, Chaerephon, you may make trial of\nme too, for I think that Gorgias, who has been talking a long time, is\ntired.\n\nCHAEREPHON: And do you, Polus, think that you can answer better than\nGorgias?\n\nPOLUS: What does that matter if I answer well enough for you?\n\nCHAEREPHON: Not at all:\u2014and you shall answer if you like.\n\nPOLUS: Ask:\u2014\n\nCHAEREPHON: My question is this: If Gorgias had the skill of his\nbrother Herodicus, what ought we to call him? Ought he not to have the\nname which is given to his brother?\n\nPOLUS: Certainly.\n\nCHAEREPHON: Then we should be right in calling him a physician?\n\nPOLUS: Yes.\n\nCHAEREPHON: And if he had the skill of Aristophon the son of Aglaophon,\nor of his brother Polygnotus, what ought we to call him?\n\nPOLUS: Clearly, a painter.\n\nCHAEREPHON: But now what shall we call him\u2014what is the art in which he\nis skilled.\n\nPOLUS: O Chaerephon, there are many arts among mankind which are\nexperimental, and have their origin in experience, for experience makes\nthe days of men to proceed according to art, and inexperience according\nto chance, and different persons in different ways are proficient in\ndifferent arts, and the best persons in the best arts. And our friend\nGorgias is one of the best, and the art in which he is a proficient is\nthe noblest.\n\nSOCRATES: Polus has been taught how to make a capital speech, Gorgias;\nbut he is not fulfilling the promise which he made to Chaerephon.\n\nGORGIAS: What do you mean, Socrates?\n\nSOCRATES: I mean that he has not exactly answered the question which he\nwas asked.\n\nGORGIAS: Then why not ask him yourself?\n\nSOCRATES: But I would much rather ask you, if you are disposed to\nanswer: for I see, from the few words which Polus has uttered, that he\nhas attended more to the art which is called rhetoric than to\ndialectic.\n\nPOLUS: What makes you say so, Socrates?\n\nSOCRATES: Because, Polus, when Chaerephon asked you what was the art\nwhich Gorgias knows, you praised it as if you were answering some one\nwho found fault with it, but you never said what the art was.\n\nPOLUS: Why, did I not say that it was the noblest of arts?\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, indeed, but that was no answer to the question: nobody\nasked what was the quality, but what was the nature, of the art, and by\nwhat name we were to describe Gorgias. And I would still beg you\nbriefly and clearly, as you answered Chaerephon when he asked you at\nfirst, to say what this art is, and what we ought to call Gorgias: Or\nrather, Gorgias, let me turn to you, and ask the same question,\u2014what\nare we to call you, and what is the art which you profess?\n\nGORGIAS: Rhetoric, Socrates, is my art.\n\nSOCRATES: Then I am to call you a rhetorician?\n\nGORGIAS: Yes, Socrates, and a good one too, if you would call me that\nwhich, in Homeric language, \u201cI boast myself to be.\u201d\n\nSOCRATES: I should wish to do so.\n\nGORGIAS: Then pray do.\n\nSOCRATES: And are we to say that you are able to make other men\nrhetoricians?\n\nGORGIAS: Yes, that is exactly what I profess to make them, not only at\nAthens, but in all places.\n\nSOCRATES: And will you continue to ask and answer questions, Gorgias,\nas we are at present doing, and reserve for another occasion the longer\nmode of speech which Polus was attempting? Will you keep your promise,\nand answer shortly the questions which are asked of you?\n\nGORGIAS: Some answers, Socrates, are of necessity longer; but I will do\nmy best to make them as short as possible; for a part of my profession\nis that I can be as short as any one.\n\nSOCRATES: That is what is wanted, Gorgias; exhibit the shorter method\nnow, and the longer one at some other time.\n\nGORGIAS: Well, I will; and you will certainly say, that you never heard\na man use fewer words.\n\nSOCRATES: Very good then; as you profess to be a rhetorician, and a\nmaker of rhetoricians, let me ask you, with what is rhetoric concerned:\nI might ask with what is weaving concerned, and you would reply (would\nyou not?), with the making of garments?\n\nGORGIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And music is concerned with the composition of melodies?\n\nGORGIAS: It is.\n\nSOCRATES: By Here, Gorgias, I admire the surpassing brevity of your\nanswers.\n\nGORGIAS: Yes, Socrates, I do think myself good at that.\n\nSOCRATES: I am glad to hear it; answer me in like manner about\nrhetoric: with what is rhetoric concerned?\n\nGORGIAS: With discourse.\n\nSOCRATES: What sort of discourse, Gorgias?\u2014such discourse as would\nteach the sick under what treatment they might get well?\n\nGORGIAS: No.\n\nSOCRATES: Then rhetoric does not treat of all kinds of discourse?\n\nGORGIAS: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: And yet rhetoric makes men able to speak?\n\nGORGIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And to understand that about which they speak?\n\nGORGIAS: Of course.\n\nSOCRATES: But does not the art of medicine, which we were just now\nmentioning, also make men able to understand and speak about the sick?\n\nGORGIAS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Then medicine also treats of discourse?\n\nGORGIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Of discourse concerning diseases?\n\nGORGIAS: Just so.\n\nSOCRATES: And does not gymnastic also treat of discourse concerning the\ngood or evil condition of the body?\n\nGORGIAS: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: And the same, Gorgias, is true of the other arts:\u2014all of them\ntreat of discourse concerning the subjects with which they severally\nhave to do.\n\nGORGIAS: Clearly.\n\nSOCRATES: Then why, if you call rhetoric the art which treats of\ndiscourse, and all the other arts treat of discourse, do you not call\nthem arts of rhetoric?\n\nGORGIAS: Because, Socrates, the knowledge of the other arts has only to\ndo with some sort of external action, as of the hand; but there is no\nsuch action of the hand in rhetoric which works and takes effect only\nthrough the medium of discourse. And therefore I am justified in saying\nthat rhetoric treats of discourse.\n\nSOCRATES: I am not sure whether I entirely understand you, but I dare\nsay I shall soon know better; please to answer me a question:\u2014you would\nallow that there are arts?\n\nGORGIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: As to the arts generally, they are for the most part\nconcerned with doing, and require little or no speaking; in painting,\nand statuary, and many other arts, the work may proceed in silence; and\nof such arts I suppose you would say that they do not come within the\nprovince of rhetoric.\n\nGORGIAS: You perfectly conceive my meaning, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: But there are other arts which work wholly through the medium\nof language, and require either no action or very little, as, for\nexample, the arts of arithmetic, of calculation, of geometry, and of\nplaying draughts; in some of these speech is pretty nearly co-extensive\nwith action, but in most of them the verbal element is greater\u2014they\ndepend wholly on words for their efficacy and power: and I take your\nmeaning to be that rhetoric is an art of this latter sort?\n\nGORGIAS: Exactly.\n\nSOCRATES: And yet I do not believe that you really mean to call any of\nthese arts rhetoric; although the precise expression which you used\nwas, that rhetoric is an art which works and takes effect only through\nthe medium of discourse; and an adversary who wished to be captious\nmight say, \u201cAnd so, Gorgias, you call arithmetic rhetoric.\u201d But I do\nnot think that you really call arithmetic rhetoric any more than\ngeometry would be so called by you.\n\nGORGIAS: You are quite right, Socrates, in your apprehension of my\nmeaning.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, then, let me now have the rest of my answer:\u2014seeing\nthat rhetoric is one of those arts which works mainly by the use of\nwords, and there are other arts which also use words, tell me what is\nthat quality in words with which rhetoric is concerned:\u2014Suppose that a\nperson asks me about some of the arts which I was mentioning just now;\nhe might say, \u201cSocrates, what is arithmetic?\u201d and I should reply to\nhim, as you replied to me, that arithmetic is one of those arts which\ntake effect through words. And then he would proceed to ask: \u201cWords\nabout what?\u201d and I should reply, Words about odd and even numbers, and\nhow many there are of each. And if he asked again: \u201cWhat is the art of\ncalculation?\u201d I should say, That also is one of the arts which is\nconcerned wholly with words. And if he further said, \u201cConcerned with\nwhat?\u201d I should say, like the clerks in the assembly, \u201cas aforesaid\u201d of\narithmetic, but with a difference, the difference being that the art of\ncalculation considers not only the quantities of odd and even numbers,\nbut also their numerical relations to themselves and to one another.\nAnd suppose, again, I were to say that astronomy is only words\u2014he would\nask, \u201cWords about what, Socrates?\u201d and I should answer, that astronomy\ntells us about the motions of the stars and sun and moon, and their\nrelative swiftness.\n\nGORGIAS: You would be quite right, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: And now let us have from you, Gorgias, the truth about\nrhetoric: which you would admit (would you not?) to be one of those\narts which act always and fulfil all their ends through the medium of\nwords?\n\nGORGIAS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: Words which do what? I should ask. To what class of things do\nthe words which rhetoric uses relate?\n\nGORGIAS: To the greatest, Socrates, and the best of human things.\n\nSOCRATES: That again, Gorgias is ambiguous; I am still in the dark: for\nwhich are the greatest and best of human things? I dare say that you\nhave heard men singing at feasts the old drinking song, in which the\nsingers enumerate the goods of life, first health, beauty next,\nthirdly, as the writer of the song says, wealth honestly obtained.\n\nGORGIAS: Yes, I know the song; but what is your drift?\n\nSOCRATES: I mean to say, that the producers of those things which the\nauthor of the song praises, that is to say, the physician, the trainer,\nthe money-maker, will at once come to you, and first the physician will\nsay: \u201cO Socrates, Gorgias is deceiving you, for my art is concerned\nwith the greatest good of men and not his.\u201d And when I ask, Who are\nyou? he will reply, \u201cI am a physician.\u201d What do you mean? I shall say.\nDo you mean that your art produces the greatest good? \u201cCertainly,\u201d he\nwill answer, \u201cfor is not health the greatest good? What greater good\ncan men have, Socrates?\u201d And after him the trainer will come and say,\n\u201cI too, Socrates, shall be greatly surprised if Gorgias can show more\ngood of his art than I can show of mine.\u201d To him again I shall say, Who\nare you, honest friend, and what is your business? \u201cI am a trainer,\u201d he\nwill reply, \u201cand my business is to make men beautiful and strong in\nbody.\u201d When I have done with the trainer, there arrives the\nmoney-maker, and he, as I expect, will utterly despise them all.\n\u201cConsider Socrates,\u201d he will say, \u201cwhether Gorgias or any one else can\nproduce any greater good than wealth.\u201d Well, you and I say to him, and\nare you a creator of wealth? \u201cYes,\u201d he replies. And who are you? \u201cA\nmoney-maker.\u201d And do you consider wealth to be the greatest good of\nman? \u201cOf course,\u201d will be his reply. And we shall rejoin: Yes; but our\nfriend Gorgias contends that his art produces a greater good than\nyours. And then he will be sure to go on and ask, \u201cWhat good? Let\nGorgias answer.\u201d Now I want you, Gorgias, to imagine that this question\nis asked of you by them and by me; What is that which, as you say, is\nthe greatest good of man, and of which you are the creator? Answer us.\n\nGORGIAS: That good, Socrates, which is truly the greatest, being that\nwhich gives to men freedom in their own persons, and to individuals the\npower of ruling over others in their several states.\n\nSOCRATES: And what would you consider this to be?\n\nGORGIAS: What is there greater than the word which persuades the judges\nin the courts, or the senators in the council, or the citizens in the\nassembly, or at any other political meeting?\u2014if you have the power of\nuttering this word, you will have the physician your slave, and the\ntrainer your slave, and the money-maker of whom you talk will be found\nto gather treasures, not for himself, but for you who are able to speak\nand to persuade the multitude.\n\nSOCRATES: Now I think, Gorgias, that you have very accurately explained\nwhat you conceive to be the art of rhetoric; and you mean to say, if I\nam not mistaken, that rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion, having\nthis and no other business, and that this is her crown and end. Do you\nknow any other effect of rhetoric over and above that of producing\npersuasion?\n\nGORGIAS: No: the definition seems to me very fair, Socrates; for\npersuasion is the chief end of rhetoric.\n\nSOCRATES: Then hear me, Gorgias, for I am quite sure that if there ever\nwas a man who entered on the discussion of a matter from a pure love of\nknowing the truth, I am such a one, and I should say the same of you.\n\nGORGIAS: What is coming, Socrates?\n\nSOCRATES: I will tell you: I am very well aware that I do not know\nwhat, according to you, is the exact nature, or what are the topics of\nthat persuasion of which you speak, and which is given by rhetoric;\nalthough I have a suspicion about both the one and the other. And I am\ngoing to ask\u2014what is this power of persuasion which is given by\nrhetoric, and about what? But why, if I have a suspicion, do I ask\ninstead of telling you? Not for your sake, but in order that the\nargument may proceed in such a manner as is most likely to set forth\nthe truth. And I would have you observe, that I am right in asking this\nfurther question: If I asked, \u201cWhat sort of a painter is Zeuxis?\u201d and\nyou said, \u201cThe painter of figures,\u201d should I not be right in asking,\n\u201cWhat kind of figures, and where do you find them?\u201d\n\nGORGIAS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And the reason for asking this second question would be, that\nthere are other painters besides, who paint many other figures?\n\nGORGIAS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: But if there had been no one but Zeuxis who painted them,\nthen you would have answered very well?\n\nGORGIAS: Quite so.\n\nSOCRATES: Now I want to know about rhetoric in the same way;\u2014is\nrhetoric the only art which brings persuasion, or do other arts have\nthe same effect? I mean to say\u2014Does he who teaches anything persuade\nmen of that which he teaches or not?\n\nGORGIAS: He persuades, Socrates,\u2014there can be no mistake about that.\n\nSOCRATES: Again, if we take the arts of which we were just now\nspeaking:\u2014do not arithmetic and the arithmeticians teach us the\nproperties of number?\n\nGORGIAS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And therefore persuade us of them?\n\nGORGIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then arithmetic as well as rhetoric is an artificer of\npersuasion?\n\nGORGIAS: Clearly.\n\nSOCRATES: And if any one asks us what sort of persuasion, and about\nwhat,\u2014we shall answer, persuasion which teaches the quantity of odd and\neven; and we shall be able to show that all the other arts of which we\nwere just now speaking are artificers of persuasion, and of what sort,\nand about what.\n\nGORGIAS: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: Then rhetoric is not the only artificer of persuasion?\n\nGORGIAS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: Seeing, then, that not only rhetoric works by persuasion, but\nthat other arts do the same, as in the case of the painter, a question\nhas arisen which is a very fair one: Of what persuasion is rhetoric the\nartificer, and about what?\u2014is not that a fair way of putting the\nquestion?\n\nGORGIAS: I think so.\n\nSOCRATES: Then, if you approve the question, Gorgias, what is the\nanswer?\n\nGORGIAS: I answer, Socrates, that rhetoric is the art of persuasion in\ncourts of law and other assemblies, as I was just now saying, and about\nthe just and unjust.\n\nSOCRATES: And that, Gorgias, was what I was suspecting to be your\nnotion; yet I would not have you wonder if by-and-by I am found\nrepeating a seemingly plain question; for I ask not in order to confute\nyou, but as I was saying that the argument may proceed consecutively,\nand that we may not get the habit of anticipating and suspecting the\nmeaning of one another\u2019s words; I would have you develope your own\nviews in your own way, whatever may be your hypothesis.\n\nGORGIAS: I think that you are quite right, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: Then let me raise another question; there is such a thing as\n\u201chaving learned\u201d?\n\nGORGIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And there is also \u201chaving believed\u201d?\n\nGORGIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And is the \u201chaving learned\u201d the same as \u201chaving believed,\u201d\nand are learning and belief the same things?\n\nGORGIAS: In my judgment, Socrates, they are not the same.\n\nSOCRATES: And your judgment is right, as you may ascertain in this\nway:\u2014If a person were to say to you, \u201cIs there, Gorgias, a false belief\nas well as a true?\u201d\u2014you would reply, if I am not mistaken, that there\nis.\n\nGORGIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, but is there a false knowledge as well as a true?\n\nGORGIAS: No.\n\nSOCRATES: No, indeed; and this again proves that knowledge and belief\ndiffer.\n\nGORGIAS: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: And yet those who have learned as well as those who have\nbelieved are persuaded?\n\nGORGIAS: Just so.\n\nSOCRATES: Shall we then assume two sorts of persuasion,\u2014one which is\nthe source of belief without knowledge, as the other is of knowledge?\n\nGORGIAS: By all means.\n\nSOCRATES: And which sort of persuasion does rhetoric create in courts\nof law and other assemblies about the just and unjust, the sort of\npersuasion which gives belief without knowledge, or that which gives\nknowledge?\n\nGORGIAS: Clearly, Socrates, that which only gives belief.\n\nSOCRATES: Then rhetoric, as would appear, is the artificer of a\npersuasion which creates belief about the just and unjust, but gives no\ninstruction about them?\n\nGORGIAS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And the rhetorician does not instruct the courts of law or\nother assemblies about things just and unjust, but he creates belief\nabout them; for no one can be supposed to instruct such a vast\nmultitude about such high matters in a short time?\n\nGORGIAS: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: Come, then, and let us see what we really mean about\nrhetoric; for I do not know what my own meaning is as yet. When the\nassembly meets to elect a physician or a shipwright or any other\ncraftsman, will the rhetorician be taken into counsel? Surely not. For\nat every election he ought to be chosen who is most skilled; and,\nagain, when walls have to be built or harbours or docks to be\nconstructed, not the rhetorician but the master workman will advise; or\nwhen generals have to be chosen and an order of battle arranged, or a\nposition taken, then the military will advise and not the rhetoricians:\nwhat do you say, Gorgias? Since you profess to be a rhetorician and a\nmaker of rhetoricians, I cannot do better than learn the nature of your\nart from you. And here let me assure you that I have your interest in\nview as well as my own. For likely enough some one or other of the\nyoung men present might desire to become your pupil, and in fact I see\nsome, and a good many too, who have this wish, but they would be too\nmodest to question you. And therefore when you are interrogated by me,\nI would have you imagine that you are interrogated by them. \u201cWhat is\nthe use of coming to you, Gorgias?\u201d they will say\u2014\u201cabout what will you\nteach us to advise the state?\u2014about the just and unjust only, or about\nthose other things also which Socrates has just mentioned?\u201d How will\nyou answer them?\n\nGORGIAS: I like your way of leading us on, Socrates, and I will\nendeavour to reveal to you the whole nature of rhetoric. You must have\nheard, I think, that the docks and the walls of the Athenians and the\nplan of the harbour were devised in accordance with the counsels,\npartly of Themistocles, and partly of Pericles, and not at the\nsuggestion of the builders.\n\nSOCRATES: Such is the tradition, Gorgias, about Themistocles; and I\nmyself heard the speech of Pericles when he advised us about the middle\nwall.\n\nGORGIAS: And you will observe, Socrates, that when a decision has to be\ngiven in such matters the rhetoricians are the advisers; they are the\nmen who win their point.\n\nSOCRATES: I had that in my admiring mind, Gorgias, when I asked what is\nthe nature of rhetoric, which always appears to me, when I look at the\nmatter in this way, to be a marvel of greatness.\n\nGORGIAS: A marvel, indeed, Socrates, if you only knew how rhetoric\ncomprehends and holds under her sway all the inferior arts. Let me\noffer you a striking example of this. On several occasions I have been\nwith my brother Herodicus or some other physician to see one of his\npatients, who would not allow the physician to give him medicine, or\napply the knife or hot iron to him; and I have persuaded him to do for\nme what he would not do for the physician just by the use of rhetoric.\nAnd I say that if a rhetorician and a physician were to go to any city,\nand had there to argue in the Ecclesia or any other assembly as to\nwhich of them should be elected state-physician, the physician would\nhave no chance; but he who could speak would be chosen if he wished;\nand in a contest with a man of any other profession the rhetorician\nmore than any one would have the power of getting himself chosen, for\nhe can speak more persuasively to the multitude than any of them, and\non any subject. Such is the nature and power of the art of rhetoric!\nAnd yet, Socrates, rhetoric should be used like any other competitive\nart, not against everybody,\u2014the rhetorician ought not to abuse his\nstrength any more than a pugilist or pancratiast or other master of\nfence;\u2014because he has powers which are more than a match either for\nfriend or enemy, he ought not therefore to strike, stab, or slay his\nfriends. Suppose a man to have been trained in the palestra and to be a\nskilful boxer,\u2014he in the fulness of his strength goes and strikes his\nfather or mother or one of his familiars or friends; but that is no\nreason why the trainers or fencing-masters should be held in\ndetestation or banished from the city;\u2014surely not. For they taught\ntheir art for a good purpose, to be used against enemies and\nevil-doers, in self-defence not in aggression, and others have\nperverted their instructions, and turned to a bad use their own\nstrength and skill. But not on this account are the teachers bad,\nneither is the art in fault, or bad in itself; I should rather say that\nthose who make a bad use of the art are to blame. And the same argument\nholds good of rhetoric; for the rhetorician can speak against all men\nand upon any subject,\u2014in short, he can persuade the multitude better\nthan any other man of anything which he pleases, but he should not\ntherefore seek to defraud the physician or any other artist of his\nreputation merely because he has the power; he ought to use rhetoric\nfairly, as he would also use his athletic powers. And if after having\nbecome a rhetorician he makes a bad use of his strength and skill, his\ninstructor surely ought not on that account to be held in detestation\nor banished. For he was intended by his teacher to make a good use of\nhis instructions, but he abuses them. And therefore he is the person\nwho ought to be held in detestation, banished, and put to death, and\nnot his instructor.\n\nSOCRATES: You, Gorgias, like myself, have had great experience of\ndisputations, and you must have observed, I think, that they do not\nalways terminate in mutual edification, or in the definition by either\nparty of the subjects which they are discussing; but disagreements are\napt to arise\u2014somebody says that another has not spoken truly or\nclearly; and then they get into a passion and begin to quarrel, both\nparties conceiving that their opponents are arguing from personal\nfeeling only and jealousy of themselves, not from any interest in the\nquestion at issue. And sometimes they will go on abusing one another\nuntil the company at last are quite vexed at themselves for ever\nlistening to such fellows. Why do I say this? Why, because I cannot\nhelp feeling that you are now saying what is not quite consistent or\naccordant with what you were saying at first about rhetoric. And I am\nafraid to point this out to you, lest you should think that I have some\nanimosity against you, and that I speak, not for the sake of\ndiscovering the truth, but from jealousy of you. Now if you are one of\nmy sort, I should like to cross-examine you, but if not I will let you\nalone. And what is my sort? you will ask. I am one of those who are\nvery willing to be refuted if I say anything which is not true, and\nvery willing to refute any one else who says what is not true, and\nquite as ready to be refuted as to refute; for I hold that this is the\ngreater gain of the two, just as the gain is greater of being cured of\na very great evil than of curing another. For I imagine that there is\nno evil which a man can endure so great as an erroneous opinion about\nthe matters of which we are speaking; and if you claim to be one of my\nsort, let us have the discussion out, but if you would rather have\ndone, no matter;\u2014let us make an end of it.\n\nGORGIAS: I should say, Socrates, that I am quite the man whom you\nindicate; but, perhaps, we ought to consider the audience, for, before\nyou came, I had already given a long exhibition, and if we proceed the\nargument may run on to a great length. And therefore I think that we\nshould consider whether we may not be detaining some part of the\ncompany when they are wanting to do something else.\n\nCHAEREPHON: You hear the audience cheering, Gorgias and Socrates, which\nshows their desire to listen to you; and for myself, Heaven forbid that\nI should have any business on hand which would take me away from a\ndiscussion so interesting and so ably maintained.\n\nCALLICLES: By the gods, Chaerephon, although I have been present at\nmany discussions, I doubt whether I was ever so much delighted before,\nand therefore if you go on discoursing all day I shall be the better\npleased.\n\nSOCRATES: I may truly say, Callicles, that I am willing, if Gorgias is.\n\nGORGIAS: After all this, Socrates, I should be disgraced if I refused,\nespecially as I have promised to answer all comers; in accordance with\nthe wishes of the company, then, do you begin, and ask of me any\nquestion which you like.\n\nSOCRATES: Let me tell you then, Gorgias, what surprises me in your\nwords; though I dare say that you may be right, and I may have\nmisunderstood your meaning. You say that you can make any man, who will\nlearn of you, a rhetorician?\n\nGORGIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Do you mean that you will teach him to gain the ears of the\nmultitude on any subject, and this not by instruction but by\npersuasion?\n\nGORGIAS: Quite so.\n\nSOCRATES: You were saying, in fact, that the rhetorician will have\ngreater powers of persuasion than the physician even in a matter of\nhealth?\n\nGORGIAS: Yes, with the multitude,\u2014that is.\n\nSOCRATES: You mean to say, with the ignorant; for with those who know\nhe cannot be supposed to have greater powers of persuasion.\n\nGORGIAS: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: But if he is to have more power of persuasion than the\nphysician, he will have greater power than he who knows?\n\nGORGIAS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Although he is not a physician:\u2014is he?\n\nGORGIAS: No.\n\nSOCRATES: And he who is not a physician must, obviously, be ignorant of\nwhat the physician knows.\n\nGORGIAS: Clearly.\n\nSOCRATES: Then, when the rhetorician is more persuasive than the\nphysician, the ignorant is more persuasive with the ignorant than he\nwho has knowledge?\u2014is not that the inference?\n\nGORGIAS: In the case supposed:\u2014yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And the same holds of the relation of rhetoric to all the\nother arts; the rhetorician need not know the truth about things; he\nhas only to discover some way of persuading the ignorant that he has\nmore knowledge than those who know?\n\nGORGIAS: Yes, Socrates, and is not this a great comfort?\u2014not to have\nlearned the other arts, but the art of rhetoric only, and yet to be in\nno way inferior to the professors of them?\n\nSOCRATES: Whether the rhetorician is or not inferior on this account is\na question which we will hereafter examine if the enquiry is likely to\nbe of any service to us; but I would rather begin by asking, whether he\nis or is not as ignorant of the just and unjust, base and honourable,\ngood and evil, as he is of medicine and the other arts; I mean to say,\ndoes he really know anything of what is good and evil, base or\nhonourable, just or unjust in them; or has he only a way with the\nignorant of persuading them that he not knowing is to be esteemed to\nknow more about these things than some one else who knows? Or must the\npupil know these things and come to you knowing them before he can\nacquire the art of rhetoric? If he is ignorant, you who are the teacher\nof rhetoric will not teach him\u2014it is not your business; but you will\nmake him seem to the multitude to know them, when he does not know\nthem; and seem to be a good man, when he is not. Or will you be unable\nto teach him rhetoric at all, unless he knows the truth of these things\nfirst? What is to be said about all this? By heavens, Gorgias, I wish\nthat you would reveal to me the power of rhetoric, as you were saying\nthat you would.\n\nGORGIAS: Well, Socrates, I suppose that if the pupil does chance not to\nknow them, he will have to learn of me these things as well.\n\nSOCRATES: Say no more, for there you are right; and so he whom you make\na rhetorician must either know the nature of the just and unjust\nalready, or he must be taught by you.\n\nGORGIAS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, and is not he who has learned carpentering a carpenter?\n\nGORGIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And he who has learned music a musician?\n\nGORGIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And he who has learned medicine is a physician, in like\nmanner? He who has learned anything whatever is that which his\nknowledge makes him.\n\nGORGIAS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And in the same way, he who has learned what is just is just?\n\nGORGIAS: To be sure.\n\nSOCRATES: And he who is just may be supposed to do what is just?\n\nGORGIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And must not the just man always desire to do what is just?\n\nGORGIAS: That is clearly the inference.\n\nSOCRATES: Surely, then, the just man will never consent to do\ninjustice?\n\nGORGIAS: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: And according to the argument the rhetorician must be a just\nman?\n\nGORGIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And will therefore never be willing to do injustice?\n\nGORGIAS: Clearly not.\n\nSOCRATES: But do you remember saying just now that the trainer is not\nto be accused or banished if the pugilist makes a wrong use of his\npugilistic art; and in like manner, if the rhetorician makes a bad and\nunjust use of his rhetoric, that is not to be laid to the charge of his\nteacher, who is not to be banished, but the wrong-doer himself who made\na bad use of his rhetoric\u2014he is to be banished\u2014was not that said?\n\nGORGIAS: Yes, it was.\n\nSOCRATES: But now we are affirming that the aforesaid rhetorician will\nnever have done injustice at all?\n\nGORGIAS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And at the very outset, Gorgias, it was said that rhetoric\ntreated of discourse, not (like arithmetic) about odd and even, but\nabout just and unjust? Was not this said?\n\nGORGIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: I was thinking at the time, when I heard you saying so, that\nrhetoric, which is always discoursing about justice, could not possibly\nbe an unjust thing. But when you added, shortly afterwards, that the\nrhetorician might make a bad use of rhetoric I noted with surprise the\ninconsistency into which you had fallen; and I said, that if you\nthought, as I did, that there was a gain in being refuted, there would\nbe an advantage in going on with the question, but if not, I would\nleave off. And in the course of our investigations, as you will see\nyourself, the rhetorician has been acknowledged to be incapable of\nmaking an unjust use of rhetoric, or of willingness to do injustice. By\nthe dog, Gorgias, there will be a great deal of discussion, before we\nget at the truth of all this.\n\nPOLUS: And do even you, Socrates, seriously believe what you are now\nsaying about rhetoric? What! because Gorgias was ashamed to deny that\nthe rhetorician knew the just and the honourable and the good, and\nadmitted that to any one who came to him ignorant of them he could\nteach them, and then out of this admission there arose a\ncontradiction\u2014the thing which you dearly love, and to which not he, but\nyou, brought the argument by your captious questions\u2014(do you seriously\nbelieve that there is any truth in all this?) For will any one ever\nacknowledge that he does not know, or cannot teach, the nature of\njustice? The truth is, that there is great want of manners in bringing\nthe argument to such a pass.\n\nSOCRATES: Illustrious Polus, the reason why we provide ourselves with\nfriends and children is, that when we get old and stumble, a younger\ngeneration may be at hand to set us on our legs again in our words and\nin our actions: and now, if I and Gorgias are stumbling, here are you\nwho should raise us up; and I for my part engage to retract any error\ninto which you may think that I have fallen-upon one condition:\n\nPOLUS: What condition?\n\nSOCRATES: That you contract, Polus, the prolixity of speech in which\nyou indulged at first.\n\nPOLUS: What! do you mean that I may not use as many words as I please?\n\nSOCRATES: Only to think, my friend, that having come on a visit to\nAthens, which is the most free-spoken state in Hellas, you when you got\nthere, and you alone, should be deprived of the power of speech\u2014that\nwould be hard indeed. But then consider my case:\u2014shall not I be very\nhardly used, if, when you are making a long oration, and refusing to\nanswer what you are asked, I am compelled to stay and listen to you,\nand may not go away? I say rather, if you have a real interest in the\nargument, or, to repeat my former expression, have any desire to set it\non its legs, take back any statement which you please; and in your turn\nask and answer, like myself and Gorgias\u2014refute and be refuted: for I\nsuppose that you would claim to know what Gorgias knows\u2014would you not?\n\nPOLUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And you, like him, invite any one to ask you about anything\nwhich he pleases, and you will know how to answer him?\n\nPOLUS: To be sure.\n\nSOCRATES: And now, which will you do, ask or answer?\n\nPOLUS: I will ask; and do you answer me, Socrates, the same question\nwhich Gorgias, as you suppose, is unable to answer: What is rhetoric?\n\nSOCRATES: Do you mean what sort of an art?\n\nPOLUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: To say the truth, Polus, it is not an art at all, in my\nopinion.\n\nPOLUS: Then what, in your opinion, is rhetoric?\n\nSOCRATES: A thing which, as I was lately reading in a book of yours,\nyou say that you have made an art.\n\nPOLUS: What thing?\n\nSOCRATES: I should say a sort of experience.\n\nPOLUS: Does rhetoric seem to you to be an experience?\n\nSOCRATES: That is my view, but you may be of another mind.\n\nPOLUS: An experience in what?\n\nSOCRATES: An experience in producing a sort of delight and\ngratification.\n\nPOLUS: And if able to gratify others, must not rhetoric be a fine\nthing?\n\nSOCRATES: What are you saying, Polus? Why do you ask me whether\nrhetoric is a fine thing or not, when I have not as yet told you what\nrhetoric is?\n\nPOLUS: Did I not hear you say that rhetoric was a sort of experience?\n\nSOCRATES: Will you, who are so desirous to gratify others, afford a\nslight gratification to me?\n\nPOLUS: I will.\n\nSOCRATES: Will you ask me, what sort of an art is cookery?\n\nPOLUS: What sort of an art is cookery?\n\nSOCRATES: Not an art at all, Polus.\n\nPOLUS: What then?\n\nSOCRATES: I should say an experience.\n\nPOLUS: In what? I wish that you would explain to me.\n\nSOCRATES: An experience in producing a sort of delight and\ngratification, Polus.\n\nPOLUS: Then are cookery and rhetoric the same?\n\nSOCRATES: No, they are only different parts of the same profession.\n\nPOLUS: Of what profession?\n\nSOCRATES: I am afraid that the truth may seem discourteous; and I\nhesitate to answer, lest Gorgias should imagine that I am making fun of\nhis own profession. For whether or not this is that art of rhetoric\nwhich Gorgias practises I really cannot tell:\u2014from what he was just now\nsaying, nothing appeared of what he thought of his art, but the\nrhetoric which I mean is a part of a not very creditable whole.\n\nGORGIAS: A part of what, Socrates? Say what you mean, and never mind\nme.\n\nSOCRATES: In my opinion then, Gorgias, the whole of which rhetoric is a\npart is not an art at all, but the habit of a bold and ready wit, which\nknows how to manage mankind: this habit I sum up under the word\n\u201cflattery\u201d; and it appears to me to have many other parts, one of which\nis cookery, which may seem to be an art, but, as I maintain, is only an\nexperience or routine and not an art:\u2014another part is rhetoric, and the\nart of attiring and sophistry are two others: thus there are four\nbranches, and four different things answering to them. And Polus may\nask, if he likes, for he has not as yet been informed, what part of\nflattery is rhetoric: he did not see that I had not yet answered him\nwhen he proceeded to ask a further question: Whether I do not think\nrhetoric a fine thing? But I shall not tell him whether rhetoric is a\nfine thing or not, until I have first answered, \u201cWhat is rhetoric?\u201d For\nthat would not be right, Polus; but I shall be happy to answer, if you\nwill ask me, What part of flattery is rhetoric?\n\nPOLUS: I will ask and do you answer? What part of flattery is rhetoric?\n\nSOCRATES: Will you understand my answer? Rhetoric, according to my\nview, is the ghost or counterfeit of a part of politics.\n\nPOLUS: And noble or ignoble?\n\nSOCRATES: Ignoble, I should say, if I am compelled to answer, for I\ncall what is bad ignoble: though I doubt whether you understand what I\nwas saying before.\n\nGORGIAS: Indeed, Socrates, I cannot say that I understand myself.\n\nSOCRATES: I do not wonder, Gorgias; for I have not as yet explained\nmyself, and our friend Polus, colt by name and colt by nature, is apt\nto run away. (This is an untranslatable play on the name \u201cPolus,\u201d which\nmeans \u201ca colt.\u201d)\n\nGORGIAS: Never mind him, but explain to me what you mean by saying that\nrhetoric is the counterfeit of a part of politics.\n\nSOCRATES: I will try, then, to explain my notion of rhetoric, and if I\nam mistaken, my friend Polus shall refute me. We may assume the\nexistence of bodies and of souls?\n\nGORGIAS: Of course.\n\nSOCRATES: You would further admit that there is a good condition of\neither of them?\n\nGORGIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Which condition may not be really good, but good only in\nappearance? I mean to say, that there are many persons who appear to be\nin good health, and whom only a physician or trainer will discern at\nfirst sight not to be in good health.\n\nGORGIAS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And this applies not only to the body, but also to the soul:\nin either there may be that which gives the appearance of health and\nnot the reality?\n\nGORGIAS: Yes, certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And now I will endeavour to explain to you more clearly what\nI mean: The soul and body being two, have two arts corresponding to\nthem: there is the art of politics attending on the soul; and another\nart attending on the body, of which I know no single name, but which\nmay be described as having two divisions, one of them gymnastic, and\nthe other medicine. And in politics there is a legislative part, which\nanswers to gymnastic, as justice does to medicine; and the two parts\nrun into one another, justice having to do with the same subject as\nlegislation, and medicine with the same subject as gymnastic, but with\na difference. Now, seeing that there are these four arts, two attending\non the body and two on the soul for their highest good; flattery\nknowing, or rather guessing their natures, has distributed herself into\nfour shams or simulations of them; she puts on the likeness of some one\nor other of them, and pretends to be that which she simulates, and\nhaving no regard for men\u2019s highest interests, is ever making pleasure\nthe bait of the unwary, and deceiving them into the belief that she is\nof the highest value to them. Cookery simulates the disguise of\nmedicine, and pretends to know what food is the best for the body; and\nif the physician and the cook had to enter into a competition in which\nchildren were the judges, or men who had no more sense than children,\nas to which of them best understands the goodness or badness of food,\nthe physician would be starved to death. A flattery I deem this to be\nand of an ignoble sort, Polus, for to you I am now addressing myself,\nbecause it aims at pleasure without any thought of the best. An art I\ndo not call it, but only an experience, because it is unable to explain\nor to give a reason of the nature of its own applications. And I do not\ncall any irrational thing an art; but if you dispute my words, I am\nprepared to argue in defence of them.\n\nCookery, then, I maintain to be a flattery which takes the form of\nmedicine; and tiring, in like manner, is a flattery which takes the\nform of gymnastic, and is knavish, false, ignoble, illiberal, working\ndeceitfully by the help of lines, and colours, and enamels, and\ngarments, and making men affect a spurious beauty to the neglect of the\ntrue beauty which is given by gymnastic.\n\nI would rather not be tedious, and therefore I will only say, after the\nmanner of the geometricians (for I think that by this time you will be\nable to follow)\n\nas tiring: gymnastic:: cookery: medicine;\n\nor rather,\n\nas tiring: gymnastic:: sophistry: legislation;\n\nand\n\nas cookery: medicine:: rhetoric: justice.\n\nAnd this, I say, is the natural difference between the rhetorician and\nthe sophist, but by reason of their near connection, they are apt to be\njumbled up together; neither do they know what to make of themselves,\nnor do other men know what to make of them. For if the body presided\nover itself, and were not under the guidance of the soul, and the soul\ndid not discern and discriminate between cookery and medicine, but the\nbody was made the judge of them, and the rule of judgment was the\nbodily delight which was given by them, then the word of Anaxagoras,\nthat word with which you, friend Polus, are so well acquainted, would\nprevail far and wide: \u201cChaos\u201d would come again, and cookery, health,\nand medicine would mingle in an indiscriminate mass. And now I have\ntold you my notion of rhetoric, which is, in relation to the soul, what\ncookery is to the body. I may have been inconsistent in making a long\nspeech, when I would not allow you to discourse at length. But I think\nthat I may be excused, because you did not understand me, and could\nmake no use of my answer when I spoke shortly, and therefore I had to\nenter into an explanation. And if I show an equal inability to make use\nof yours, I hope that you will speak at equal length; but if I am able\nto understand you, let me have the benefit of your brevity, as is only\nfair: And now you may do what you please with my answer.\n\nPOLUS: What do you mean? do you think that rhetoric is flattery?\n\nSOCRATES: Nay, I said a part of flattery; if at your age, Polus, you\ncannot remember, what will you do by-and-by, when you get older?\n\nPOLUS: And are the good rhetoricians meanly regarded in states, under\nthe idea that they are flatterers?\n\nSOCRATES: Is that a question or the beginning of a speech?\n\nPOLUS: I am asking a question.\n\nSOCRATES: Then my answer is, that they are not regarded at all.\n\nPOLUS: How not regarded? Have they not very great power in states?\n\nSOCRATES: Not if you mean to say that power is a good to the possessor.\n\nPOLUS: And that is what I do mean to say.\n\nSOCRATES: Then, if so, I think that they have the least power of all\nthe citizens.\n\nPOLUS: What! are they not like tyrants? They kill and despoil and exile\nany one whom they please.\n\nSOCRATES: By the dog, Polus, I cannot make out at each deliverance of\nyours, whether you are giving an opinion of your own, or asking a\nquestion of me.\n\nPOLUS: I am asking a question of you.\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, my friend, but you ask two questions at once.\n\nPOLUS: How two questions?\n\nSOCRATES: Why, did you not say just now that the rhetoricians are like\ntyrants, and that they kill and despoil or exile any one whom they\nplease?\n\nPOLUS: I did.\n\nSOCRATES: Well then, I say to you that here are two questions in one,\nand I will answer both of them. And I tell you, Polus, that\nrhetoricians and tyrants have the least possible power in states, as I\nwas just now saying; for they do literally nothing which they will, but\nonly what they think best.\n\nPOLUS: And is not that a great power?\n\nSOCRATES: Polus has already said the reverse.\n\nPOLUS: Said the reverse! nay, that is what I assert.\n\nSOCRATES: No, by the great\u2014what do you call him?\u2014not you, for you say\nthat power is a good to him who has the power.\n\nPOLUS: I do.\n\nSOCRATES: And would you maintain that if a fool does what he thinks\nbest, this is a good, and would you call this great power?\n\nPOLUS: I should not.\n\nSOCRATES: Then you must prove that the rhetorician is not a fool, and\nthat rhetoric is an art and not a flattery\u2014and so you will have refuted\nme; but if you leave me unrefuted, why, the rhetoricians who do what\nthey think best in states, and the tyrants, will have nothing upon\nwhich to congratulate themselves, if as you say, power be indeed a\ngood, admitting at the same time that what is done without sense is an\nevil.\n\nPOLUS: Yes; I admit that.\n\nSOCRATES: How then can the rhetoricians or the tyrants have great power\nin states, unless Polus can refute Socrates, and prove to him that they\ndo as they will?\n\nPOLUS: This fellow\u2014\n\nSOCRATES: I say that they do not do as they will;\u2014now refute me.\n\nPOLUS: Why, have you not already said that they do as they think best?\n\nSOCRATES: And I say so still.\n\nPOLUS: Then surely they do as they will?\n\nSOCRATES: I deny it.\n\nPOLUS: But they do what they think best?\n\nSOCRATES: Aye.\n\nPOLUS: That, Socrates, is monstrous and absurd.\n\nSOCRATES: Good words, good Polus, as I may say in your own peculiar\nstyle; but if you have any questions to ask of me, either prove that I\nam in error or give the answer yourself.\n\nPOLUS: Very well, I am willing to answer that I may know what you mean.\n\nSOCRATES: Do men appear to you to will that which they do, or to will\nthat further end for the sake of which they do a thing? when they take\nmedicine, for example, at the bidding of a physician, do they will the\ndrinking of the medicine which is painful, or the health for the sake\nof which they drink?\n\nPOLUS: Clearly, the health.\n\nSOCRATES: And when men go on a voyage or engage in business, they do\nnot will that which they are doing at the time; for who would desire to\ntake the risk of a voyage or the trouble of business?\u2014But they will, to\nhave the wealth for the sake of which they go on a voyage.\n\nPOLUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And is not this universally true? If a man does something for\nthe sake of something else, he wills not that which he does, but that\nfor the sake of which he does it.\n\nPOLUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And are not all things either good or evil, or intermediate\nand indifferent?\n\nPOLUS: To be sure, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: Wisdom and health and wealth and the like you would call\ngoods, and their opposites evils?\n\nPOLUS: I should.\n\nSOCRATES: And the things which are neither good nor evil, and which\npartake sometimes of the nature of good and at other times of evil, or\nof neither, are such as sitting, walking, running, sailing; or, again,\nwood, stones, and the like:\u2014these are the things which you call neither\ngood nor evil?\n\nPOLUS: Exactly so.\n\nSOCRATES: Are these indifferent things done for the sake of the good,\nor the good for the sake of the indifferent?\n\nPOLUS: Clearly, the indifferent for the sake of the good.\n\nSOCRATES: When we walk we walk for the sake of the good, and under the\nidea that it is better to walk, and when we stand we stand equally for\nthe sake of the good?\n\nPOLUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And when we kill a man we kill him or exile him or despoil\nhim of his goods, because, as we think, it will conduce to our good?\n\nPOLUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Men who do any of these things do them for the sake of the\ngood?\n\nPOLUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And did we not admit that in doing something for the sake of\nsomething else, we do not will those things which we do, but that other\nthing for the sake of which we do them?\n\nPOLUS: Most true.\n\nSOCRATES: Then we do not will simply to kill a man or to exile him or\nto despoil him of his goods, but we will to do that which conduces to\nour good, and if the act is not conducive to our good we do not will\nit; for we will, as you say, that which is our good, but that which is\nneither good nor evil, or simply evil, we do not will. Why are you\nsilent, Polus? Am I not right?\n\nPOLUS: You are right.\n\nSOCRATES: Hence we may infer, that if any one, whether he be a tyrant\nor a rhetorician, kills another or exiles another or deprives him of\nhis property, under the idea that the act is for his own interests when\nreally not for his own interests, he may be said to do what seems best\nto him?\n\nPOLUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: But does he do what he wills if he does what is evil? Why do\nyou not answer?\n\nPOLUS: Well, I suppose not.\n\nSOCRATES: Then if great power is a good as you allow, will such a one\nhave great power in a state?\n\nPOLUS: He will not.\n\nSOCRATES: Then I was right in saying that a man may do what seems good\nto him in a state, and not have great power, and not do what he wills?\n\nPOLUS: As though you, Socrates, would not like to have the power of\ndoing what seemed good to you in the state, rather than not; you would\nnot be jealous when you saw any one killing or despoiling or\nimprisoning whom he pleased, Oh, no!\n\nSOCRATES: Justly or unjustly, do you mean?\n\nPOLUS: In either case is he not equally to be envied?\n\nSOCRATES: Forbear, Polus!\n\nPOLUS: Why \u201cforbear\u201d?\n\nSOCRATES: Because you ought not to envy wretches who are not to be\nenvied, but only to pity them.\n\nPOLUS: And are those of whom I spoke wretches?\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, certainly they are.\n\nPOLUS: And so you think that he who slays any one whom he pleases, and\njustly slays him, is pitiable and wretched?\n\nSOCRATES: No, I do not say that of him: but neither do I think that he\nis to be envied.\n\nPOLUS: Were you not saying just now that he is wretched?\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, my friend, if he killed another unjustly, in which case\nhe is also to be pitied; and he is not to be envied if he killed him\njustly.\n\nPOLUS: At any rate you will allow that he who is unjustly put to death\nis wretched, and to be pitied?\n\nSOCRATES: Not so much, Polus, as he who kills him, and not so much as\nhe who is justly killed.\n\nPOLUS: How can that be, Socrates?\n\nSOCRATES: That may very well be, inasmuch as doing injustice is the\ngreatest of evils.\n\nPOLUS: But is it the greatest? Is not suffering injustice a greater\nevil?\n\nSOCRATES: Certainly not.\n\nPOLUS: Then would you rather suffer than do injustice?\n\nSOCRATES: I should not like either, but if I must choose between them,\nI would rather suffer than do.\n\nPOLUS: Then you would not wish to be a tyrant?\n\nSOCRATES: Not if you mean by tyranny what I mean.\n\nPOLUS: I mean, as I said before, the power of doing whatever seems good\nto you in a state, killing, banishing, doing in all things as you like.\n\nSOCRATES: Well then, illustrious friend, when I have said my say, do\nyou reply to me. Suppose that I go into a crowded Agora, and take a\ndagger under my arm. Polus, I say to you, I have just acquired rare\npower, and become a tyrant; for if I think that any of these men whom\nyou see ought to be put to death, the man whom I have a mind to kill is\nas good as dead; and if I am disposed to break his head or tear his\ngarment, he will have his head broken or his garment torn in an\ninstant. Such is my great power in this city. And if you do not believe\nme, and I show you the dagger, you would probably reply: Socrates, in\nthat sort of way any one may have great power\u2014he may burn any house\nwhich he pleases, and the docks and triremes of the Athenians, and all\ntheir other vessels, whether public or private\u2014but can you believe that\nthis mere doing as you think best is great power?\n\nPOLUS: Certainly not such doing as this.\n\nSOCRATES: But can you tell me why you disapprove of such a power?\n\nPOLUS: I can.\n\nSOCRATES: Why then?\n\nPOLUS: Why, because he who did as you say would be certain to be\npunished.\n\nSOCRATES: And punishment is an evil?\n\nPOLUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And you would admit once more, my good sir, that great power\nis a benefit to a man if his actions turn out to his advantage, and\nthat this is the meaning of great power; and if not, then his power is\nan evil and is no power. But let us look at the matter in another\nway:\u2014do we not acknowledge that the things of which we were speaking,\nthe infliction of death, and exile, and the deprivation of property are\nsometimes a good and sometimes not a good?\n\nPOLUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: About that you and I may be supposed to agree?\n\nPOLUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Tell me, then, when do you say that they are good and when\nthat they are evil\u2014what principle do you lay down?\n\nPOLUS: I would rather, Socrates, that you should answer as well as ask\nthat question.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, Polus, since you would rather have the answer from me,\nI say that they are good when they are just, and evil when they are\nunjust.\n\nPOLUS: You are hard of refutation, Socrates, but might not a child\nrefute that statement?\n\nSOCRATES: Then I shall be very grateful to the child, and equally\ngrateful to you if you will refute me and deliver me from my\nfoolishness. And I hope that refute me you will, and not weary of doing\ngood to a friend.\n\nPOLUS: Yes, Socrates, and I need not go far or appeal to antiquity;\nevents which happened only a few days ago are enough to refute you, and\nto prove that many men who do wrong are happy.\n\nSOCRATES: What events?\n\nPOLUS: You see, I presume, that Archelaus the son of Perdiccas is now\nthe ruler of Macedonia?\n\nSOCRATES: At any rate I hear that he is.\n\nPOLUS: And do you think that he is happy or miserable?\n\nSOCRATES: I cannot say, Polus, for I have never had any acquaintance\nwith him.\n\nPOLUS: And cannot you tell at once, and without having an acquaintance\nwith him, whether a man is happy?\n\nSOCRATES: Most certainly not.\n\nPOLUS: Then clearly, Socrates, you would say that you did not even know\nwhether the great king was a happy man?\n\nSOCRATES: And I should speak the truth; for I do not know how he stands\nin the matter of education and justice.\n\nPOLUS: What! and does all happiness consist in this?\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, indeed, Polus, that is my doctrine; the men and women\nwho are gentle and good are also happy, as I maintain, and the unjust\nand evil are miserable.\n\nPOLUS: Then, according to your doctrine, the said Archelaus is\nmiserable?\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, my friend, if he is wicked.\n\nPOLUS: That he is wicked I cannot deny; for he had no title at all to\nthe throne which he now occupies, he being only the son of a woman who\nwas the slave of Alcetas the brother of Perdiccas; he himself therefore\nin strict right was the slave of Alcetas; and if he had meant to do\nrightly he would have remained his slave, and then, according to your\ndoctrine, he would have been happy. But now he is unspeakably\nmiserable, for he has been guilty of the greatest crimes: in the first\nplace he invited his uncle and master, Alcetas, to come to him, under\nthe pretence that he would restore to him the throne which Perdiccas\nhas usurped, and after entertaining him and his son Alexander, who was\nhis own cousin, and nearly of an age with him, and making them drunk,\nhe threw them into a waggon and carried them off by night, and slew\nthem, and got both of them out of the way; and when he had done all\nthis wickedness he never discovered that he was the most miserable of\nall men, and was very far from repenting: shall I tell you how he\nshowed his remorse? he had a younger brother, a child of seven years\nold, who was the legitimate son of Perdiccas, and to him of right the\nkingdom belonged; Archelaus, however, had no mind to bring him up as he\nought and restore the kingdom to him; that was not his notion of\nhappiness; but not long afterwards he threw him into a well and drowned\nhim, and declared to his mother Cleopatra that he had fallen in while\nrunning after a goose, and had been killed. And now as he is the\ngreatest criminal of all the Macedonians, he may be supposed to be the\nmost miserable and not the happiest of them, and I dare say that there\nare many Athenians, and you would be at the head of them, who would\nrather be any other Macedonian than Archelaus!\n\nSOCRATES: I praised you at first, Polus, for being a rhetorician rather\nthan a reasoner. And this, as I suppose, is the sort of argument with\nwhich you fancy that a child might refute me, and by which I stand\nrefuted when I say that the unjust man is not happy. But, my good\nfriend, where is the refutation? I cannot admit a word which you have\nbeen saying.\n\nPOLUS: That is because you will not; for you surely must think as I do.\n\nSOCRATES: Not so, my simple friend, but because you will refute me\nafter the manner which rhetoricians practise in courts of law. For\nthere the one party think that they refute the other when they bring\nforward a number of witnesses of good repute in proof of their\nallegations, and their adversary has only a single one or none at all.\nBut this kind of proof is of no value where truth is the aim; a man may\noften be sworn down by a multitude of false witnesses who have a great\nair of respectability. And in this argument nearly every one, Athenian\nand stranger alike, would be on your side, if you should bring\nwitnesses in disproof of my statement;\u2014you may, if you will, summon\nNicias the son of Niceratus, and let his brothers, who gave the row of\ntripods which stand in the precincts of Dionysus, come with him; or you\nmay summon Aristocrates, the son of Scellius, who is the giver of that\nfamous offering which is at Delphi; summon, if you will, the whole\nhouse of Pericles, or any other great Athenian family whom you\nchoose;\u2014they will all agree with you: I only am left alone and cannot\nagree, for you do not convince me; although you produce many false\nwitnesses against me, in the hope of depriving me of my inheritance,\nwhich is the truth. But I consider that nothing worth speaking of will\nhave been effected by me unless I make you the one witness of my words;\nnor by you, unless you make me the one witness of yours; no matter\nabout the rest of the world. For there are two ways of refutation, one\nwhich is yours and that of the world in general; but mine is of another\nsort\u2014let us compare them, and see in what they differ. For, indeed, we\nare at issue about matters which to know is honourable and not to know\ndisgraceful; to know or not to know happiness and misery\u2014that is the\nchief of them. And what knowledge can be nobler? or what ignorance more\ndisgraceful than this? And therefore I will begin by asking you whether\nyou do not think that a man who is unjust and doing injustice can be\nhappy, seeing that you think Archelaus unjust, and yet happy? May I\nassume this to be your opinion?\n\nPOLUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: But I say that this is an impossibility\u2014here is one point\nabout which we are at issue:\u2014very good. And do you mean to say also\nthat if he meets with retribution and punishment he will still be\nhappy?\n\nPOLUS: Certainly not; in that case he will be most miserable.\n\nSOCRATES: On the other hand, if the unjust be not punished, then,\naccording to you, he will be happy?\n\nPOLUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: But in my opinion, Polus, the unjust or doer of unjust\nactions is miserable in any case,\u2014more miserable, however, if he be not\npunished and does not meet with retribution, and less miserable if he\nbe punished and meets with retribution at the hands of gods and men.\n\nPOLUS: You are maintaining a strange doctrine, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: I shall try to make you agree with me, O my friend, for as a\nfriend I regard you. Then these are the points at issue between us\u2014are\nthey not? I was saying that to do is worse than to suffer injustice?\n\nPOLUS: Exactly so.\n\nSOCRATES: And you said the opposite?\n\nPOLUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: I said also that the wicked are miserable, and you refuted\nme?\n\nPOLUS: By Zeus, I did.\n\nSOCRATES: In your own opinion, Polus.\n\nPOLUS: Yes, and I rather suspect that I was in the right.\n\nSOCRATES: You further said that the wrong-doer is happy if he be\nunpunished?\n\nPOLUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And I affirm that he is most miserable, and that those who\nare punished are less miserable\u2014are you going to refute this\nproposition also?\n\nPOLUS: A proposition which is harder of refutation than the other,\nSocrates.\n\nSOCRATES: Say rather, Polus, impossible; for who can refute the truth?\n\nPOLUS: What do you mean? If a man is detected in an unjust attempt to\nmake himself a tyrant, and when detected is racked, mutilated, has his\neyes burned out, and after having had all sorts of great injuries\ninflicted on him, and having seen his wife and children suffer the\nlike, is at last impaled or tarred and burned alive, will he be happier\nthan if he escape and become a tyrant, and continue all through life\ndoing what he likes and holding the reins of government, the envy and\nadmiration both of citizens and strangers? Is that the paradox which,\nas you say, cannot be refuted?\n\nSOCRATES: There again, noble Polus, you are raising hobgoblins instead\nof refuting me; just now you were calling witnesses against me. But\nplease to refresh my memory a little; did you say\u2014\u201cin an unjust attempt\nto make himself a tyrant\u201d?\n\nPOLUS: Yes, I did.\n\nSOCRATES: Then I say that neither of them will be happier than the\nother,\u2014neither he who unjustly acquires a tyranny, nor he who suffers\nin the attempt, for of two miserables one cannot be the happier, but\nthat he who escapes and becomes a tyrant is the more miserable of the\ntwo. Do you laugh, Polus? Well, this is a new kind of refutation,\u2014when\nany one says anything, instead of refuting him to laugh at him.\n\nPOLUS: But do you not think, Socrates, that you have been sufficiently\nrefuted, when you say that which no human being will allow? Ask the\ncompany.\n\nSOCRATES: O Polus, I am not a public man, and only last year, when my\ntribe were serving as Prytanes, and it became my duty as their\npresident to take the votes, there was a laugh at me, because I was\nunable to take them. And as I failed then, you must not ask me to count\nthe suffrages of the company now; but if, as I was saying, you have no\nbetter argument than numbers, let me have a turn, and do you make trial\nof the sort of proof which, as I think, is required; for I shall\nproduce one witness only of the truth of my words, and he is the person\nwith whom I am arguing; his suffrage I know how to take; but with the\nmany I have nothing to do, and do not even address myself to them. May\nI ask then whether you will answer in turn and have your words put to\nthe proof? For I certainly think that I and you and every man do really\nbelieve, that to do is a greater evil than to suffer injustice: and not\nto be punished than to be punished.\n\nPOLUS: And I should say neither I, nor any man: would you yourself, for\nexample, suffer rather than do injustice?\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, and you, too; I or any man would.\n\nPOLUS: Quite the reverse; neither you, nor I, nor any man.\n\nSOCRATES: But will you answer?\n\nPOLUS: To be sure, I will; for I am curious to hear what you can have\nto say.\n\nSOCRATES: Tell me, then, and you will know, and let us suppose that I\nam beginning at the beginning: which of the two, Polus, in your\nopinion, is the worst?\u2014to do injustice or to suffer?\n\nPOLUS: I should say that suffering was worst.\n\nSOCRATES: And which is the greater disgrace?\u2014Answer.\n\nPOLUS: To do.\n\nSOCRATES: And the greater disgrace is the greater evil?\n\nPOLUS: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: I understand you to say, if I am not mistaken, that the\nhonourable is not the same as the good, or the disgraceful as the evil?\n\nPOLUS: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: Let me ask a question of you: When you speak of beautiful\nthings, such as bodies, colours, figures, sounds, institutions, do you\nnot call them beautiful in reference to some standard: bodies, for\nexample, are beautiful in proportion as they are useful, or as the\nsight of them gives pleasure to the spectators; can you give any other\naccount of personal beauty?\n\nPOLUS: I cannot.\n\nSOCRATES: And you would say of figures or colours generally that they\nwere beautiful, either by reason of the pleasure which they give, or of\ntheir use, or of both?\n\nPOLUS: Yes, I should.\n\nSOCRATES: And you would call sounds and music beautiful for the same\nreason?\n\nPOLUS: I should.\n\nSOCRATES: Laws and institutions also have no beauty in them except in\nso far as they are useful or pleasant or both?\n\nPOLUS: I think not.\n\nSOCRATES: And may not the same be said of the beauty of knowledge?\n\nPOLUS: To be sure, Socrates; and I very much approve of your measuring\nbeauty by the standard of pleasure and utility.\n\nSOCRATES: And deformity or disgrace may be equally measured by the\nopposite standard of pain and evil?\n\nPOLUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Then when of two beautiful things one exceeds in beauty, the\nmeasure of the excess is to be taken in one or both of these; that is\nto say, in pleasure or utility or both?\n\nPOLUS: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: And of two deformed things, that which exceeds in deformity\nor disgrace, exceeds either in pain or evil\u2014must it not be so?\n\nPOLUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: But then again, what was the observation which you just now\nmade, about doing and suffering wrong? Did you not say, that suffering\nwrong was more evil, and doing wrong more disgraceful?\n\nPOLUS: I did.\n\nSOCRATES: Then, if doing wrong is more disgraceful than suffering, the\nmore disgraceful must be more painful and must exceed in pain or in\nevil or both: does not that also follow?\n\nPOLUS: Of course.\n\nSOCRATES: First, then, let us consider whether the doing of injustice\nexceeds the suffering in the consequent pain: Do the injurers suffer\nmore than the injured?\n\nPOLUS: No, Socrates; certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: Then they do not exceed in pain?\n\nPOLUS: No.\n\nSOCRATES: But if not in pain, then not in both?\n\nPOLUS: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: Then they can only exceed in the other?\n\nPOLUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: That is to say, in evil?\n\nPOLUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: Then doing injustice will have an excess of evil, and will\ntherefore be a greater evil than suffering injustice?\n\nPOLUS: Clearly.\n\nSOCRATES: But have not you and the world already agreed that to do\ninjustice is more disgraceful than to suffer?\n\nPOLUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And that is now discovered to be more evil?\n\nPOLUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And would you prefer a greater evil or a greater dishonour to\na less one? Answer, Polus, and fear not; for you will come to no harm\nif you nobly resign yourself into the healing hand of the argument as\nto a physician without shrinking, and either say \u201cYes\u201d or \u201cNo\u201d to me.\n\nPOLUS: I should say \u201cNo.\u201d\n\nSOCRATES: Would any other man prefer a greater to a less evil?\n\nPOLUS: No, not according to this way of putting the case, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: Then I said truly, Polus, that neither you, nor I, nor any\nman, would rather do than suffer injustice; for to do injustice is the\ngreater evil of the two.\n\nPOLUS: That is the conclusion.\n\nSOCRATES: You see, Polus, when you compare the two kinds of\nrefutations, how unlike they are. All men, with the exception of\nmyself, are of your way of thinking; but your single assent and witness\nare enough for me,\u2014I have no need of any other, I take your suffrage,\nand am regardless of the rest. Enough of this, and now let us proceed\nto the next question; which is, Whether the greatest of evils to a\nguilty man is to suffer punishment, as you supposed, or whether to\nescape punishment is not a greater evil, as I supposed. Consider:\u2014You\nwould say that to suffer punishment is another name for being justly\ncorrected when you do wrong?\n\nPOLUS: I should.\n\nSOCRATES: And would you not allow that all just things are honourable\nin so far as they are just? Please to reflect, and tell me your\nopinion.\n\nPOLUS: Yes, Socrates, I think that they are.\n\nSOCRATES: Consider again:\u2014Where there is an agent, must there not also\nbe a patient?\n\nPOLUS: I should say so.\n\nSOCRATES: And will not the patient suffer that which the agent does,\nand will not the suffering have the quality of the action? I mean, for\nexample, that if a man strikes, there must be something which is\nstricken?\n\nPOLUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And if the striker strikes violently or quickly, that which\nis struck will be struck violently or quickly?\n\nPOLUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And the suffering to him who is stricken is of the same\nnature as the act of him who strikes?\n\nPOLUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And if a man burns, there is something which is burned?\n\nPOLUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And if he burns in excess or so as to cause pain, the thing\nburned will be burned in the same way?\n\nPOLUS: Truly.\n\nSOCRATES: And if he cuts, the same argument holds\u2014there will be\nsomething cut?\n\nPOLUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And if the cutting be great or deep or such as will cause\npain, the cut will be of the same nature?\n\nPOLUS: That is evident.\n\nSOCRATES: Then you would agree generally to the universal proposition\nwhich I was just now asserting: that the affection of the patient\nanswers to the affection of the agent?\n\nPOLUS: I agree.\n\nSOCRATES: Then, as this is admitted, let me ask whether being punished\nis suffering or acting?\n\nPOLUS: Suffering, Socrates; there can be no doubt of that.\n\nSOCRATES: And suffering implies an agent?\n\nPOLUS: Certainly, Socrates; and he is the punisher.\n\nSOCRATES: And he who punishes rightly, punishes justly?\n\nPOLUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And therefore he acts justly?\n\nPOLUS: Justly.\n\nSOCRATES: Then he who is punished and suffers retribution, suffers\njustly?\n\nPOLUS: That is evident.\n\nSOCRATES: And that which is just has been admitted to be honourable?\n\nPOLUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Then the punisher does what is honourable, and the punished\nsuffers what is honourable?\n\nPOLUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And if what is honourable, then what is good, for the\nhonourable is either pleasant or useful?\n\nPOLUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Then he who is punished suffers what is good?\n\nPOLUS: That is true.\n\nSOCRATES: Then he is benefited?\n\nPOLUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Do I understand you to mean what I mean by the term\n\u201cbenefited\u201d? I mean, that if he be justly punished his soul is\nimproved.\n\nPOLUS: Surely.\n\nSOCRATES: Then he who is punished is delivered from the evil of his\nsoul?\n\nPOLUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And is he not then delivered from the greatest evil? Look at\nthe matter in this way:\u2014In respect of a man\u2019s estate, do you see any\ngreater evil than poverty?\n\nPOLUS: There is no greater evil.\n\nSOCRATES: Again, in a man\u2019s bodily frame, you would say that the evil\nis weakness and disease and deformity?\n\nPOLUS: I should.\n\nSOCRATES: And do you not imagine that the soul likewise has some evil\nof her own?\n\nPOLUS: Of course.\n\nSOCRATES: And this you would call injustice and ignorance and\ncowardice, and the like?\n\nPOLUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: So then, in mind, body, and estate, which are three, you have\npointed out three corresponding evils\u2014injustice, disease, poverty?\n\nPOLUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And which of the evils is the most disgraceful?\u2014Is not the\nmost disgraceful of them injustice, and in general the evil of the\nsoul?\n\nPOLUS: By far the most.\n\nSOCRATES: And if the most disgraceful, then also the worst?\n\nPOLUS: What do you mean, Socrates?\n\nSOCRATES: I mean to say, that is most disgraceful has been already\nadmitted to be most painful or hurtful, or both.\n\nPOLUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And now injustice and all evil in the soul has been admitted\nby us to be most disgraceful?\n\nPOLUS: It has been admitted.\n\nSOCRATES: And most disgraceful either because most painful and causing\nexcessive pain, or most hurtful, or both?\n\nPOLUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And therefore to be unjust and intemperate, and cowardly and\nignorant, is more painful than to be poor and sick?\n\nPOLUS: Nay, Socrates; the painfulness does not appear to me to follow\nfrom your premises.\n\nSOCRATES: Then, if, as you would argue, not more painful, the evil of\nthe soul is of all evils the most disgraceful; and the excess of\ndisgrace must be caused by some preternatural greatness, or\nextraordinary hurtfulness of the evil.\n\nPOLUS: Clearly.\n\nSOCRATES: And that which exceeds most in hurtfulness will be the\ngreatest of evils?\n\nPOLUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then injustice and intemperance, and in general the depravity\nof the soul, are the greatest of evils?\n\nPOLUS: That is evident.\n\nSOCRATES: Now, what art is there which delivers us from poverty? Does\nnot the art of making money?\n\nPOLUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And what art frees us from disease? Does not the art of\nmedicine?\n\nPOLUS: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: And what from vice and injustice? If you are not able to\nanswer at once, ask yourself whither we go with the sick, and to whom\nwe take them.\n\nPOLUS: To the physicians, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: And to whom do we go with the unjust and intemperate?\n\nPOLUS: To the judges, you mean.\n\nSOCRATES: \u2014Who are to punish them?\n\nPOLUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And do not those who rightly punish others, punish them in\naccordance with a certain rule of justice?\n\nPOLUS: Clearly.\n\nSOCRATES: Then the art of money-making frees a man from poverty;\nmedicine from disease; and justice from intemperance and injustice?\n\nPOLUS: That is evident.\n\nSOCRATES: Which, then, is the best of these three?\n\nPOLUS: Will you enumerate them?\n\nSOCRATES: Money-making, medicine, and justice.\n\nPOLUS: Justice, Socrates, far excels the two others.\n\nSOCRATES: And justice, if the best, gives the greatest pleasure or\nadvantage or both?\n\nPOLUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: But is the being healed a pleasant thing, and are those who\nare being healed pleased?\n\nPOLUS: I think not.\n\nSOCRATES: A useful thing, then?\n\nPOLUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, because the patient is delivered from a great evil; and\nthis is the advantage of enduring the pain\u2014that you get well?\n\nPOLUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And would he be the happier man in his bodily condition, who\nis healed, or who never was out of health?\n\nPOLUS: Clearly he who was never out of health.\n\nSOCRATES: Yes; for happiness surely does not consist in being delivered\nfrom evils, but in never having had them.\n\nPOLUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And suppose the case of two persons who have some evil in\ntheir bodies, and that one of them is healed and delivered from evil,\nand another is not healed, but retains the evil\u2014which of them is the\nmost miserable?\n\nPOLUS: Clearly he who is not healed.\n\nSOCRATES: And was not punishment said by us to be a deliverance from\nthe greatest of evils, which is vice?\n\nPOLUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And justice punishes us, and makes us more just, and is the\nmedicine of our vice?\n\nPOLUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: He, then, has the first place in the scale of happiness who\nhas never had vice in his soul; for this has been shown to be the\ngreatest of evils.\n\nPOLUS: Clearly.\n\nSOCRATES: And he has the second place, who is delivered from vice?\n\nPOLUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: That is to say, he who receives admonition and rebuke and\npunishment?\n\nPOLUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then he lives worst, who, having been unjust, has no\ndeliverance from injustice?\n\nPOLUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: That is, he lives worst who commits the greatest crimes, and\nwho, being the most unjust of men, succeeds in escaping rebuke or\ncorrection or punishment; and this, as you say, has been accomplished\nby Archelaus and other tyrants and rhetoricians and potentates?\n(Compare Republic.)\n\nPOLUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: May not their way of proceeding, my friend, be compared to\nthe conduct of a person who is afflicted with the worst of diseases and\nyet contrives not to pay the penalty to the physician for his sins\nagainst his constitution, and will not be cured, because, like a child,\nhe is afraid of the pain of being burned or cut:\u2014Is not that a parallel\ncase?\n\nPOLUS: Yes, truly.\n\nSOCRATES: He would seem as if he did not know the nature of health and\nbodily vigour; and if we are right, Polus, in our previous conclusions,\nthey are in a like case who strive to evade justice, which they see to\nbe painful, but are blind to the advantage which ensues from it, not\nknowing how far more miserable a companion a diseased soul is than a\ndiseased body; a soul, I say, which is corrupt and unrighteous and\nunholy. And hence they do all that they can to avoid punishment and to\navoid being released from the greatest of evils; they provide\nthemselves with money and friends, and cultivate to the utmost their\npowers of persuasion. But if we, Polus, are right, do you see what\nfollows, or shall we draw out the consequences in form?\n\nPOLUS: If you please.\n\nSOCRATES: Is it not a fact that injustice, and the doing of injustice,\nis the greatest of evils?\n\nPOLUS: That is quite clear.\n\nSOCRATES: And further, that to suffer punishment is the way to be\nreleased from this evil?\n\nPOLUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And not to suffer, is to perpetuate the evil?\n\nPOLUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: To do wrong, then, is second only in the scale of evils; but\nto do wrong and not to be punished, is first and greatest of all?\n\nPOLUS: That is true.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, and was not this the point in dispute, my friend? You\ndeemed Archelaus happy, because he was a very great criminal and\nunpunished: I, on the other hand, maintained that he or any other who\nlike him has done wrong and has not been punished, is, and ought to be,\nthe most miserable of all men; and that the doer of injustice is more\nmiserable than the sufferer; and he who escapes punishment, more\nmiserable than he who suffers.\u2014Was not that what I said?\n\nPOLUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And it has been proved to be true?\n\nPOLUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, Polus, but if this is true, where is the great use of\nrhetoric? If we admit what has been just now said, every man ought in\nevery way to guard himself against doing wrong, for he will thereby\nsuffer great evil?\n\nPOLUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And if he, or any one about whom he cares, does wrong, he\nought of his own accord to go where he will be immediately punished; he\nwill run to the judge, as he would to the physician, in order that the\ndisease of injustice may not be rendered chronic and become the\nincurable cancer of the soul; must we not allow this consequence,\nPolus, if our former admissions are to stand:\u2014is any other inference\nconsistent with them?\n\nPOLUS: To that, Socrates, there can be but one answer.\n\nSOCRATES: Then rhetoric is of no use to us, Polus, in helping a man to\nexcuse his own injustice, that of his parents or friends, or children\nor country; but may be of use to any one who holds that instead of\nexcusing he ought to accuse\u2014himself above all, and in the next degree\nhis family or any of his friends who may be doing wrong; he should\nbring to light the iniquity and not conceal it, that so the wrong-doer\nmay suffer and be made whole; and he should even force himself and\nothers not to shrink, but with closed eyes like brave men to let the\nphysician operate with knife or searing iron, not regarding the pain,\nin the hope of attaining the good and the honourable; let him who has\ndone things worthy of stripes, allow himself to be scourged, if of\nbonds, to be bound, if of a fine, to be fined, if of exile, to be\nexiled, if of death, to die, himself being the first to accuse himself\nand his own relations, and using rhetoric to this end, that his and\ntheir unjust actions may be made manifest, and that they themselves may\nbe delivered from injustice, which is the greatest evil. Then, Polus,\nrhetoric would indeed be useful. Do you say \u201cYes\u201d or \u201cNo\u201d to that?\n\nPOLUS: To me, Socrates, what you are saying appears very strange,\nthough probably in agreement with your premises.\n\nSOCRATES: Is not this the conclusion, if the premises are not\ndisproven?\n\nPOLUS: Yes; it certainly is.\n\nSOCRATES: And from the opposite point of view, if indeed it be our duty\nto harm another, whether an enemy or not\u2014I except the case of\nself-defence\u2014then I have to be upon my guard\u2014but if my enemy injures a\nthird person, then in every sort of way, by word as well as deed, I\nshould try to prevent his being punished, or appearing before the\njudge; and if he appears, I should contrive that he should escape, and\nnot suffer punishment: if he has stolen a sum of money, let him keep\nwhat he has stolen and spend it on him and his, regardless of religion\nand justice; and if he have done things worthy of death, let him not\ndie, but rather be immortal in his wickedness; or, if this is not\npossible, let him at any rate be allowed to live as long as he can. For\nsuch purposes, Polus, rhetoric may be useful, but is of small if of any\nuse to him who is not intending to commit injustice; at least, there\nwas no such use discovered by us in the previous discussion.\n\nCALLICLES: Tell me, Chaerephon, is Socrates in earnest, or is he\njoking?\n\nCHAEREPHON: I should say, Callicles, that he is in most profound\nearnest; but you may well ask him.\n\nCALLICLES: By the gods, and I will. Tell me, Socrates, are you in\nearnest, or only in jest? For if you are in earnest, and what you say\nis true, is not the whole of human life turned upside down; and are we\nnot doing, as would appear, in everything the opposite of what we ought\nto be doing?\n\nSOCRATES: O Callicles, if there were not some community of feelings\namong mankind, however varying in different persons\u2014I mean to say, if\nevery man\u2019s feelings were peculiar to himself and were not shared by\nthe rest of his species\u2014I do not see how we could ever communicate our\nimpressions to one another. I make this remark because I perceive that\nyou and I have a common feeling. For we are lovers both, and both of us\nhave two loves apiece:\u2014I am the lover of Alcibiades, the son of\nCleinias, and of philosophy; and you of the Athenian Demus, and of\nDemus the son of Pyrilampes. Now, I observe that you, with all your\ncleverness, do not venture to contradict your favourite in any word or\nopinion of his; but as he changes you change, backwards and forwards.\nWhen the Athenian Demus denies anything that you are saying in the\nassembly, you go over to his opinion; and you do the same with Demus,\nthe fair young son of Pyrilampes. For you have not the power to resist\nthe words and ideas of your loves; and if a person were to express\nsurprise at the strangeness of what you say from time to time when\nunder their influence, you would probably reply to him, if you were\nhonest, that you cannot help saying what your loves say unless they are\nprevented; and that you can only be silent when they are. Now you must\nunderstand that my words are an echo too, and therefore you need not\nwonder at me; but if you want to silence me, silence philosophy, who is\nmy love, for she is always telling me what I am now telling you, my\nfriend; neither is she capricious like my other love, for the son of\nCleinias says one thing to-day and another thing to-morrow, but\nphilosophy is always true. She is the teacher at whose words you are\nnow wondering, and you have heard her yourself. Her you must refute,\nand either show, as I was saying, that to do injustice and to escape\npunishment is not the worst of all evils; or, if you leave her word\nunrefuted, by the dog the god of Egypt, I declare, O Callicles, that\nCallicles will never be at one with himself, but that his whole life\nwill be a discord. And yet, my friend, I would rather that my lyre\nshould be inharmonious, and that there should be no music in the chorus\nwhich I provided; aye, or that the whole world should be at odds with\nme, and oppose me, rather than that I myself should be at odds with\nmyself, and contradict myself.\n\nCALLICLES: O Socrates, you are a regular declaimer, and seem to be\nrunning riot in the argument. And now you are declaiming in this way\nbecause Polus has fallen into the same error himself of which he\naccused Gorgias:\u2014for he said that when Gorgias was asked by you,\nwhether, if some one came to him who wanted to learn rhetoric, and did\nnot know justice, he would teach him justice, Gorgias in his modesty\nreplied that he would, because he thought that mankind in general would\nbe displeased if he answered \u201cNo\u201d; and then in consequence of this\nadmission, Gorgias was compelled to contradict himself, that being just\nthe sort of thing in which you delight. Whereupon Polus laughed at you\ndeservedly, as I think; but now he has himself fallen into the same\ntrap. I cannot say very much for his wit when he conceded to you that\nto do is more dishonourable than to suffer injustice, for this was the\nadmission which led to his being entangled by you; and because he was\ntoo modest to say what he thought, he had his mouth stopped. For the\ntruth is, Socrates, that you, who pretend to be engaged in the pursuit\nof truth, are appealing now to the popular and vulgar notions of right,\nwhich are not natural, but only conventional. Convention and nature are\ngenerally at variance with one another: and hence, if a person is too\nmodest to say what he thinks, he is compelled to contradict himself;\nand you, in your ingenuity perceiving the advantage to be thereby\ngained, slyly ask of him who is arguing conventionally a question which\nis to be determined by the rule of nature; and if he is talking of the\nrule of nature, you slip away to custom: as, for instance, you did in\nthis very discussion about doing and suffering injustice. When Polus\nwas speaking of the conventionally dishonourable, you assailed him from\nthe point of view of nature; for by the rule of nature, to suffer\ninjustice is the greater disgrace because the greater evil; but\nconventionally, to do evil is the more disgraceful. For the suffering\nof injustice is not the part of a man, but of a slave, who indeed had\nbetter die than live; since when he is wronged and trampled upon, he is\nunable to help himself, or any other about whom he cares. The reason,\nas I conceive, is that the makers of laws are the majority who are\nweak; and they make laws and distribute praises and censures with a\nview to themselves and to their own interests; and they terrify the\nstronger sort of men, and those who are able to get the better of them,\nin order that they may not get the better of them; and they say, that\ndishonesty is shameful and unjust; meaning, by the word injustice, the\ndesire of a man to have more than his neighbours; for knowing their own\ninferiority, I suspect that they are too glad of equality. And\ntherefore the endeavour to have more than the many, is conventionally\nsaid to be shameful and unjust, and is called injustice (compare\nRepublic), whereas nature herself intimates that it is just for the\nbetter to have more than the worse, the more powerful than the weaker;\nand in many ways she shows, among men as well as among animals, and\nindeed among whole cities and races, that justice consists in the\nsuperior ruling over and having more than the inferior. For on what\nprinciple of justice did Xerxes invade Hellas, or his father the\nScythians? (not to speak of numberless other examples). Nay, but these\nare the men who act according to nature; yes, by Heaven, and according\nto the law of nature: not, perhaps, according to that artificial law,\nwhich we invent and impose upon our fellows, of whom we take the best\nand strongest from their youth upwards, and tame them like young\nlions,\u2014charming them with the sound of the voice, and saying to them,\nthat with equality they must be content, and that the equal is the\nhonourable and the just. But if there were a man who had sufficient\nforce, he would shake off and break through, and escape from all this;\nhe would trample under foot all our formulas and spells and charms, and\nall our laws which are against nature: the slave would rise in\nrebellion and be lord over us, and the light of natural justice would\nshine forth. And this I take to be the sentiment of Pindar, when he\nsays in his poem, that\n\n\u201cLaw is the king of all, of mortals as well as of immortals;\u201d\n\nthis, as he says,\n\n\u201cMakes might to be right, doing violence with highest hand; as I infer\nfrom the deeds of Heracles, for without buying them\u2014\u201d (Fragm. Incert.\n151 (Bockh).) \u2014I do not remember the exact words, but the meaning is,\nthat without buying them, and without their being given to him, he\ncarried off the oxen of Geryon, according to the law of natural right,\nand that the oxen and other possessions of the weaker and inferior\nproperly belong to the stronger and superior. And this is true, as you\nmay ascertain, if you will leave philosophy and go on to higher things:\nfor philosophy, Socrates, if pursued in moderation and at the proper\nage, is an elegant accomplishment, but too much philosophy is the ruin\nof human life. Even if a man has good parts, still, if he carries\nphilosophy into later life, he is necessarily ignorant of all those\nthings which a gentleman and a person of honour ought to know; he is\ninexperienced in the laws of the State, and in the language which ought\nto be used in the dealings of man with man, whether private or public,\nand utterly ignorant of the pleasures and desires of mankind and of\nhuman character in general. And people of this sort, when they betake\nthemselves to politics or business, are as ridiculous as I imagine the\npoliticians to be, when they make their appearance in the arena of\nphilosophy. For, as Euripides says,\n\n\u201cEvery man shines in that and pursues that, and devotes the greatest\nportion of the day to that in which he most excels,\u201d (Antiope, fragm.\n20 (Dindorf).)\n\nbut anything in which he is inferior, he avoids and depreciates, and\npraises the opposite from partiality to himself, and because he thinks\nthat he will thus praise himself. The true principle is to unite them.\nPhilosophy, as a part of education, is an excellent thing, and there is\nno disgrace to a man while he is young in pursuing such a study; but\nwhen he is more advanced in years, the thing becomes ridiculous, and I\nfeel towards philosophers as I do towards those who lisp and imitate\nchildren. For I love to see a little child, who is not of an age to\nspeak plainly, lisping at his play; there is an appearance of grace and\nfreedom in his utterance, which is natural to his childish years. But\nwhen I hear some small creature carefully articulating its words, I am\noffended; the sound is disagreeable, and has to my ears the twang of\nslavery. So when I hear a man lisping, or see him playing like a child,\nhis behaviour appears to me ridiculous and unmanly and worthy of\nstripes. And I have the same feeling about students of philosophy; when\nI see a youth thus engaged,\u2014the study appears to me to be in character,\nand becoming a man of liberal education, and him who neglects\nphilosophy I regard as an inferior man, who will never aspire to\nanything great or noble. But if I see him continuing the study in later\nlife, and not leaving off, I should like to beat him, Socrates; for, as\nI was saying, such a one, even though he have good natural parts,\nbecomes effeminate. He flies from the busy centre and the market-place,\nin which, as the poet says, men become distinguished; he creeps into a\ncorner for the rest of his life, and talks in a whisper with three or\nfour admiring youths, but never speaks out like a freeman in a\nsatisfactory manner. Now I, Socrates, am very well inclined towards\nyou, and my feeling may be compared with that of Zethus towards\nAmphion, in the play of Euripides, whom I was mentioning just now: for\nI am disposed to say to you much what Zethus said to his brother, that\nyou, Socrates, are careless about the things of which you ought to be\ncareful; and that you\n\n\u201cWho have a soul so noble, are remarkable for a puerile exterior;\nNeither in a court of justice could you state a case, or give any\nreason or proof, Or offer valiant counsel on another\u2019s behalf.\u201d\n\nAnd you must not be offended, my dear Socrates, for I am speaking out\nof good-will towards you, if I ask whether you are not ashamed of being\nthus defenceless; which I affirm to be the condition not of you only\nbut of all those who will carry the study of philosophy too far. For\nsuppose that some one were to take you, or any one of your sort, off to\nprison, declaring that you had done wrong when you had done no wrong,\nyou must allow that you would not know what to do:\u2014there you would\nstand giddy and gaping, and not having a word to say; and when you went\nup before the Court, even if the accuser were a poor creature and not\ngood for much, you would die if he were disposed to claim the penalty\nof death. And yet, Socrates, what is the value of\n\n\u201cAn art which converts a man of sense into a fool,\u201d\n\n\nwho is helpless, and has no power to save either himself or others,\nwhen he is in the greatest danger and is going to be despoiled by his\nenemies of all his goods, and has to live, simply deprived of his\nrights of citizenship?\u2014he being a man who, if I may use the expression,\nmay be boxed on the ears with impunity. Then, my good friend, take my\nadvice, and refute no more:\n\n\u201cLearn the philosophy of business, and acquire the reputation of\nwisdom. But leave to others these niceties,\u201d\n\nwhether they are to be described as follies or absurdities:\n\n\u201cFor they will only Give you poverty for the inmate of your dwelling.\u201d\n\nCease, then, emulating these paltry splitters of words, and emulate\nonly the man of substance and honour, who is well to do.\n\nSOCRATES: If my soul, Callicles, were made of gold, should I not\nrejoice to discover one of those stones with which they test gold, and\nthe very best possible one to which I might bring my soul; and if the\nstone and I agreed in approving of her training, then I should know\nthat I was in a satisfactory state, and that no other test was needed\nby me.\n\nCALLICLES: What is your meaning, Socrates?\n\nSOCRATES: I will tell you; I think that I have found in you the desired\ntouchstone.\n\nCALLICLES: Why?\n\nSOCRATES: Because I am sure that if you agree with me in any of the\nopinions which my soul forms, I have at last found the truth indeed.\nFor I consider that if a man is to make a complete trial of the good or\nevil of the soul, he ought to have three qualities\u2014knowledge,\ngood-will, outspokenness, which are all possessed by you. Many whom I\nmeet are unable to make trial of me, because they are not wise as you\nare; others are wise, but they will not tell me the truth, because they\nhave not the same interest in me which you have; and these two\nstrangers, Gorgias and Polus, are undoubtedly wise men and my very good\nfriends, but they are not outspoken enough, and they are too modest.\nWhy, their modesty is so great that they are driven to contradict\nthemselves, first one and then the other of them, in the face of a\nlarge company, on matters of the highest moment. But you have all the\nqualities in which these others are deficient, having received an\nexcellent education; to this many Athenians can testify. And you are my\nfriend. Shall I tell you why I think so? I know that you, Callicles,\nand Tisander of Aphidnae, and Andron the son of Androtion, and\nNausicydes of the deme of Cholarges, studied together: there were four\nof you, and I once heard you advising with one another as to the extent\nto which the pursuit of philosophy should be carried, and, as I know,\nyou came to the conclusion that the study should not be pushed too much\ninto detail. You were cautioning one another not to be overwise; you\nwere afraid that too much wisdom might unconsciously to yourselves be\nthe ruin of you. And now when I hear you giving the same advice to me\nwhich you then gave to your most intimate friends, I have a sufficient\nevidence of your real good-will to me. And of the frankness of your\nnature and freedom from modesty I am assured by yourself, and the\nassurance is confirmed by your last speech. Well then, the inference in\nthe present case clearly is, that if you agree with me in an argument\nabout any point, that point will have been sufficiently tested by us,\nand will not require to be submitted to any further test. For you could\nnot have agreed with me, either from lack of knowledge or from\nsuperfluity of modesty, nor yet from a desire to deceive me, for you\nare my friend, as you tell me yourself. And therefore when you and I\nare agreed, the result will be the attainment of perfect truth. Now\nthere is no nobler enquiry, Callicles, than that which you censure me\nfor making,\u2014What ought the character of a man to be, and what his\npursuits, and how far is he to go, both in maturer years and in youth?\nFor be assured that if I err in my own conduct I do not err\nintentionally, but from ignorance. Do not then desist from advising me,\nnow that you have begun, until I have learned clearly what this is\nwhich I am to practise, and how I may acquire it. And if you find me\nassenting to your words, and hereafter not doing that to which I\nassented, call me \u201cdolt,\u201d and deem me unworthy of receiving further\ninstruction. Once more, then, tell me what you and Pindar mean by\nnatural justice: Do you not mean that the superior should take the\nproperty of the inferior by force; that the better should rule the\nworse, the noble have more than the mean? Am I not right in my\nrecollection?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes; that is what I was saying, and so I still aver.\n\nSOCRATES: And do you mean by the better the same as the superior? for I\ncould not make out what you were saying at the time\u2014whether you meant\nby the superior the stronger, and that the weaker must obey the\nstronger, as you seemed to imply when you said that great cities attack\nsmall ones in accordance with natural right, because they are superior\nand stronger, as though the superior and stronger and better were the\nsame; or whether the better may be also the inferior and weaker, and\nthe superior the worse, or whether better is to be defined in the same\nway as superior:\u2014this is the point which I want to have cleared up. Are\nthe superior and better and stronger the same or different?\n\nCALLICLES: I say unequivocally that they are the same.\n\nSOCRATES: Then the many are by nature superior to the one, against\nwhom, as you were saying, they make the laws?\n\nCALLICLES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Then the laws of the many are the laws of the superior?\n\nCALLICLES: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: Then they are the laws of the better; for the superior class\nare far better, as you were saying?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And since they are superior, the laws which are made by them\nare by nature good?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And are not the many of opinion, as you were lately saying,\nthat justice is equality, and that to do is more disgraceful than to\nsuffer injustice?\u2014is that so or not? Answer, Callicles, and let no\nmodesty be found to come in the way; do the many think, or do they not\nthink thus?\u2014I must beg of you to answer, in order that if you agree\nwith me I may fortify myself by the assent of so competent an\nauthority.\n\nCALLICLES: Yes; the opinion of the many is what you say.\n\nSOCRATES: Then not only custom but nature also affirms that to do is\nmore disgraceful than to suffer injustice, and that justice is\nequality; so that you seem to have been wrong in your former assertion,\nwhen accusing me you said that nature and custom are opposed, and that\nI, knowing this, was dishonestly playing between them, appealing to\ncustom when the argument is about nature, and to nature when the\nargument is about custom?\n\nCALLICLES: This man will never cease talking nonsense. At your age,\nSocrates, are you not ashamed to be catching at words and chuckling\nover some verbal slip? do you not see\u2014have I not told you already, that\nby superior I mean better: do you imagine me to say, that if a rabble\nof slaves and nondescripts, who are of no use except perhaps for their\nphysical strength, get together, their ipsissima verba are laws?\n\nSOCRATES: Ho! my philosopher, is that your line?\n\nCALLICLES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: I was thinking, Callicles, that something of the kind must\nhave been in your mind, and that is why I repeated the question,\u2014What\nis the superior? I wanted to know clearly what you meant; for you\nsurely do not think that two men are better than one, or that your\nslaves are better than you because they are stronger? Then please to\nbegin again, and tell me who the better are, if they are not the\nstronger; and I will ask you, great Sir, to be a little milder in your\ninstructions, or I shall have to run away from you.\n\nCALLICLES: You are ironical.\n\nSOCRATES: No, by the hero Zethus, Callicles, by whose aid you were just\nnow saying many ironical things against me, I am not:\u2014tell me, then,\nwhom you mean, by the better?\n\nCALLICLES: I mean the more excellent.\n\nSOCRATES: Do you not see that you are yourself using words which have\nno meaning and that you are explaining nothing?\u2014will you tell me\nwhether you mean by the better and superior the wiser, or if not, whom?\n\nCALLICLES: Most assuredly, I do mean the wiser.\n\nSOCRATES: Then according to you, one wise man may often be superior to\nten thousand fools, and he ought to rule them, and they ought to be his\nsubjects, and he ought to have more than they should. This is what I\nbelieve that you mean (and you must not suppose that I am\nword-catching), if you allow that the one is superior to the ten\nthousand?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes; that is what I mean, and that is what I conceive to be\nnatural justice\u2014that the better and wiser should rule and have more\nthan the inferior.\n\nSOCRATES: Stop there, and let me ask you what you would say in this\ncase: Let us suppose that we are all together as we are now; there are\nseveral of us, and we have a large common store of meats and drinks,\nand there are all sorts of persons in our company having various\ndegrees of strength and weakness, and one of us, being a physician, is\nwiser in the matter of food than all the rest, and he is probably\nstronger than some and not so strong as others of us\u2014will he not, being\nwiser, be also better than we are, and our superior in this matter of\nfood?\n\nCALLICLES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Either, then, he will have a larger share of the meats and\ndrinks, because he is better, or he will have the distribution of all\nof them by reason of his authority, but he will not expend or make use\nof a larger share of them on his own person, or if he does, he will be\npunished;\u2014his share will exceed that of some, and be less than that of\nothers, and if he be the weakest of all, he being the best of all will\nhave the smallest share of all, Callicles:\u2014am I not right, my friend?\n\nCALLICLES: You talk about meats and drinks and physicians and other\nnonsense; I am not speaking of them.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, but do you admit that the wiser is the better? Answer\n\u201cYes\u201d or \u201cNo.\u201d\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And ought not the better to have a larger share?\n\nCALLICLES: Not of meats and drinks.\n\nSOCRATES: I understand: then, perhaps, of coats\u2014the skilfullest weaver\nought to have the largest coat, and the greatest number of them, and go\nabout clothed in the best and finest of them?\n\nCALLICLES: Fudge about coats!\n\nSOCRATES: Then the skilfullest and best in making shoes ought to have\nthe advantage in shoes; the shoemaker, clearly, should walk about in\nthe largest shoes, and have the greatest number of them?\n\nCALLICLES: Fudge about shoes! What nonsense are you talking?\n\nSOCRATES: Or, if this is not your meaning, perhaps you would say that\nthe wise and good and true husbandman should actually have a larger\nshare of seeds, and have as much seed as possible for his own land?\n\nCALLICLES: How you go on, always talking in the same way, Socrates!\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, Callicles, and also about the same things.\n\nCALLICLES: Yes, by the Gods, you are literally always talking of\ncobblers and fullers and cooks and doctors, as if this had to do with\nour argument.\n\nSOCRATES: But why will you not tell me in what a man must be superior\nand wiser in order to claim a larger share; will you neither accept a\nsuggestion, nor offer one?\n\nCALLICLES: I have already told you. In the first place, I mean by\nsuperiors not cobblers or cooks, but wise politicians who understand\nthe administration of a state, and who are not only wise, but also\nvaliant and able to carry out their designs, and not the men to faint\nfrom want of soul.\n\nSOCRATES: See now, most excellent Callicles, how different my charge\nagainst you is from that which you bring against me, for you reproach\nme with always saying the same; but I reproach you with never saying\nthe same about the same things, for at one time you were defining the\nbetter and the superior to be the stronger, then again as the wiser,\nand now you bring forward a new notion; the superior and the better are\nnow declared by you to be the more courageous: I wish, my good friend,\nthat you would tell me, once for all, whom you affirm to be the better\nand superior, and in what they are better?\n\nCALLICLES: I have already told you that I mean those who are wise and\ncourageous in the administration of a state\u2014they ought to be the rulers\nof their states, and justice consists in their having more than their\nsubjects.\n\nSOCRATES: But whether rulers or subjects will they or will they not\nhave more than themselves, my friend?\n\nCALLICLES: What do you mean?\n\nSOCRATES: I mean that every man is his own ruler; but perhaps you think\nthat there is no necessity for him to rule himself; he is only required\nto rule others?\n\nCALLICLES: What do you mean by his \u201cruling over himself\u201d?\n\nSOCRATES: A simple thing enough; just what is commonly said, that a man\nshould be temperate and master of himself, and ruler of his own\npleasures and passions.\n\nCALLICLES: What innocence! you mean those fools,\u2014the temperate?\n\nSOCRATES: Certainly:\u2014any one may know that to be my meaning.\n\nCALLICLES: Quite so, Socrates; and they are really fools, for how can a\nman be happy who is the servant of anything? On the contrary, I plainly\nassert, that he who would truly live ought to allow his desires to wax\nto the uttermost, and not to chastise them; but when they have grown to\ntheir greatest he should have courage and intelligence to minister to\nthem and to satisfy all his longings. And this I affirm to be natural\njustice and nobility. To this however the many cannot attain; and they\nblame the strong man because they are ashamed of their own weakness,\nwhich they desire to conceal, and hence they say that intemperance is\nbase. As I have remarked already, they enslave the nobler natures, and\nbeing unable to satisfy their pleasures, they praise temperance and\njustice out of their own cowardice. For if a man had been originally\nthe son of a king, or had a nature capable of acquiring an empire or a\ntyranny or sovereignty, what could be more truly base or evil than\ntemperance\u2014to a man like him, I say, who might freely be enjoying every\ngood, and has no one to stand in his way, and yet has admitted custom\nand reason and the opinion of other men to be lords over him?\u2014must not\nhe be in a miserable plight whom the reputation of justice and\ntemperance hinders from giving more to his friends than to his enemies,\neven though he be a ruler in his city? Nay, Socrates, for you profess\nto be a votary of the truth, and the truth is this:\u2014that luxury and\nintemperance and licence, if they be provided with means, are virtue\nand happiness\u2014all the rest is a mere bauble, agreements contrary to\nnature, foolish talk of men, nothing worth. (Compare Republic.)\n\nSOCRATES: There is a noble freedom, Callicles, in your way of\napproaching the argument; for what you say is what the rest of the\nworld think, but do not like to say. And I must beg of you to\npersevere, that the true rule of human life may become manifest. Tell\nme, then:\u2014you say, do you not, that in the rightly-developed man the\npassions ought not to be controlled, but that we should let them grow\nto the utmost and somehow or other satisfy them, and that this is\nvirtue?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes; I do.\n\nSOCRATES: Then those who want nothing are not truly said to be happy?\n\nCALLICLES: No indeed, for then stones and dead men would be the\nhappiest of all.\n\nSOCRATES: But surely life according to your view is an awful thing; and\nindeed I think that Euripides may have been right in saying,\n\n\u201cWho knows if life be not death and death life;\u201d\n\nand that we are very likely dead; I have heard a philosopher say that\nat this moment we are actually dead, and that the body (soma) is our\ntomb (sema (compare Phaedr.)), and that the part of the soul which is\nthe seat of the desires is liable to be tossed about by words and blown\nup and down; and some ingenious person, probably a Sicilian or an\nItalian, playing with the word, invented a tale in which he called the\nsoul\u2014because of its believing and make-believe nature\u2014a vessel (An\nuntranslatable pun,\u2014dia to pithanon te kai pistikon onomase pithon.),\nand the ignorant he called the uninitiated or leaky, and the place in\nthe souls of the uninitiated in which the desires are seated, being the\nintemperate and incontinent part, he compared to a vessel full of\nholes, because it can never be satisfied. He is not of your way of\nthinking, Callicles, for he declares, that of all the souls in Hades,\nmeaning the invisible world (aeides), these uninitiated or leaky\npersons are the most miserable, and that they pour water into a vessel\nwhich is full of holes out of a colander which is similarly perforated.\nThe colander, as my informer assures me, is the soul, and the soul\nwhich he compares to a colander is the soul of the ignorant, which is\nlikewise full of holes, and therefore incontinent, owing to a bad\nmemory and want of faith. These notions are strange enough, but they\nshow the principle which, if I can, I would fain prove to you; that you\nshould change your mind, and, instead of the intemperate and insatiate\nlife, choose that which is orderly and sufficient and has a due\nprovision for daily needs. Do I make any impression on you, and are you\ncoming over to the opinion that the orderly are happier than the\nintemperate? Or do I fail to persuade you, and, however many tales I\nrehearse to you, do you continue of the same opinion still?\n\nCALLICLES: The latter, Socrates, is more like the truth.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, I will tell you another image, which comes out of the\nsame school:\u2014Let me request you to consider how far you would accept\nthis as an account of the two lives of the temperate and intemperate in\na figure:\u2014There are two men, both of whom have a number of casks; the\none man has his casks sound and full, one of wine, another of honey,\nand a third of milk, besides others filled with other liquids, and the\nstreams which fill them are few and scanty, and he can only obtain them\nwith a great deal of toil and difficulty; but when his casks are once\nfilled he has no need to feed them any more, and has no further trouble\nwith them or care about them. The other, in like manner, can procure\nstreams, though not without difficulty; but his vessels are leaky and\nunsound, and night and day he is compelled to be filling them, and if\nhe pauses for a moment, he is in an agony of pain. Such are their\nrespective lives:\u2014And now would you say that the life of the\nintemperate is happier than that of the temperate? Do I not convince\nyou that the opposite is the truth?\n\nCALLICLES: You do not convince me, Socrates, for the one who has filled\nhimself has no longer any pleasure left; and this, as I was just now\nsaying, is the life of a stone: he has neither joy nor sorrow after he\nis once filled; but the pleasure depends on the superabundance of the\ninflux.\n\nSOCRATES: But the more you pour in, the greater the waste; and the\nholes must be large for the liquid to escape.\n\nCALLICLES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: The life which you are now depicting is not that of a dead\nman, or of a stone, but of a cormorant; you mean that he is to be\nhungering and eating?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And he is to be thirsting and drinking?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes, that is what I mean; he is to have all his desires\nabout him, and to be able to live happily in the gratification of them.\n\nSOCRATES: Capital, excellent; go on as you have begun, and have no\nshame; I, too, must disencumber myself of shame: and first, will you\ntell me whether you include itching and scratching, provided you have\nenough of them and pass your life in scratching, in your notion of\nhappiness?\n\nCALLICLES: What a strange being you are, Socrates! a regular\nmob-orator.\n\nSOCRATES: That was the reason, Callicles, why I scared Polus and\nGorgias, until they were too modest to say what they thought; but you\nwill not be too modest and will not be scared, for you are a brave man.\nAnd now, answer my question.\n\nCALLICLES: I answer, that even the scratcher would live pleasantly.\n\nSOCRATES: And if pleasantly, then also happily?\n\nCALLICLES: To be sure.\n\nSOCRATES: But what if the itching is not confined to the head? Shall I\npursue the question? And here, Callicles, I would have you consider how\nyou would reply if consequences are pressed upon you, especially if in\nthe last resort you are asked, whether the life of a catamite is not\nterrible, foul, miserable? Or would you venture to say, that they too\nare happy, if they only get enough of what they want?\n\nCALLICLES: Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of introducing such topics\ninto the argument?\n\nSOCRATES: Well, my fine friend, but am I the introducer of these\ntopics, or he who says without any qualification that all who feel\npleasure in whatever manner are happy, and who admits of no distinction\nbetween good and bad pleasures? And I would still ask, whether you say\nthat pleasure and good are the same, or whether there is some pleasure\nwhich is not a good?\n\nCALLICLES: Well, then, for the sake of consistency, I will say that\nthey are the same.\n\nSOCRATES: You are breaking the original agreement, Callicles, and will\nno longer be a satisfactory companion in the search after truth, if you\nsay what is contrary to your real opinion.\n\nCALLICLES: Why, that is what you are doing too, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: Then we are both doing wrong. Still, my dear friend, I would\nask you to consider whether pleasure, from whatever source derived, is\nthe good; for, if this be true, then the disagreeable consequences\nwhich have been darkly intimated must follow, and many others.\n\nCALLICLES: That, Socrates, is only your opinion.\n\nSOCRATES: And do you, Callicles, seriously maintain what you are\nsaying?\n\nCALLICLES: Indeed I do.\n\nSOCRATES: Then, as you are in earnest, shall we proceed with the\nargument?\n\nCALLICLES: By all means. (Or, \u201cI am in profound earnest.\u201d)\n\nSOCRATES: Well, if you are willing to proceed, determine this question\nfor me:\u2014There is something, I presume, which you would call knowledge?\n\nCALLICLES: There is.\n\nSOCRATES: And were you not saying just now, that some courage implied\nknowledge?\n\nCALLICLES: I was.\n\nSOCRATES: And you were speaking of courage and knowledge as two things\ndifferent from one another?\n\nCALLICLES: Certainly I was.\n\nSOCRATES: And would you say that pleasure and knowledge are the same,\nor not the same?\n\nCALLICLES: Not the same, O man of wisdom.\n\nSOCRATES: And would you say that courage differed from pleasure?\n\nCALLICLES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, then, let us remember that Callicles, the Acharnian,\nsays that pleasure and good are the same; but that knowledge and\ncourage are not the same, either with one another, or with the good.\n\nCALLICLES: And what does our friend Socrates, of Foxton, say\u2014does he\nassent to this, or not?\n\nSOCRATES: He does not assent; neither will Callicles, when he sees\nhimself truly. You will admit, I suppose, that good and evil fortune\nare opposed to each other?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And if they are opposed to each other, then, like health and\ndisease, they exclude one another; a man cannot have them both, or be\nwithout them both, at the same time?\n\nCALLICLES: What do you mean?\n\nSOCRATES: Take the case of any bodily affection:\u2014a man may have the\ncomplaint in his eyes which is called ophthalmia?\n\nCALLICLES: To be sure.\n\nSOCRATES: But he surely cannot have the same eyes well and sound at the\nsame time?\n\nCALLICLES: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: And when he has got rid of his ophthalmia, has he got rid of\nthe health of his eyes too? Is the final result, that he gets rid of\nthem both together?\n\nCALLICLES: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: That would surely be marvellous and absurd?\n\nCALLICLES: Very.\n\nSOCRATES: I suppose that he is affected by them, and gets rid of them\nin turns?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And he may have strength and weakness in the same way, by\nfits?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Or swiftness and slowness?\n\nCALLICLES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And does he have and not have good and happiness, and their\nopposites, evil and misery, in a similar alternation? (Compare\nRepublic.)\n\nCALLICLES: Certainly he has.\n\nSOCRATES: If then there be anything which a man has and has not at the\nsame time, clearly that cannot be good and evil\u2014do we agree? Please not\nto answer without consideration.\n\nCALLICLES: I entirely agree.\n\nSOCRATES: Go back now to our former admissions.\u2014Did you say that to\nhunger, I mean the mere state of hunger, was pleasant or painful?\n\nCALLICLES: I said painful, but that to eat when you are hungry is\npleasant.\n\nSOCRATES: I know; but still the actual hunger is painful: am I not\nright?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And thirst, too, is painful?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes, very.\n\nSOCRATES: Need I adduce any more instances, or would you agree that all\nwants or desires are painful?\n\nCALLICLES: I agree, and therefore you need not adduce any more\ninstances.\n\nSOCRATES: Very good. And you would admit that to drink, when you are\nthirsty, is pleasant?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And in the sentence which you have just uttered, the word\n\u201cthirsty\u201d implies pain?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And the word \u201cdrinking\u201d is expressive of pleasure, and of the\nsatisfaction of the want?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: There is pleasure in drinking?\n\nCALLICLES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: When you are thirsty?\n\nSOCRATES: And in pain?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Do you see the inference:\u2014that pleasure and pain are\nsimultaneous, when you say that being thirsty, you drink? For are they\nnot simultaneous, and do they not affect at the same time the same\npart, whether of the soul or the body?\u2014which of them is affected cannot\nbe supposed to be of any consequence: Is not this true?\n\nCALLICLES: It is.\n\nSOCRATES: You said also, that no man could have good and evil fortune\nat the same time?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes, I did.\n\nSOCRATES: But you admitted, that when in pain a man might also have\npleasure?\n\nCALLICLES: Clearly.\n\nSOCRATES: Then pleasure is not the same as good fortune, or pain the\nsame as evil fortune, and therefore the good is not the same as the\npleasant?\n\nCALLICLES: I wish I knew, Socrates, what your quibbling means.\n\nSOCRATES: You know, Callicles, but you affect not to know.\n\nCALLICLES: Well, get on, and don\u2019t keep fooling: then you will know\nwhat a wiseacre you are in your admonition of me.\n\nSOCRATES: Does not a man cease from his thirst and from his pleasure in\ndrinking at the same time?\n\nCALLICLES: I do not understand what you are saying.\n\nGORGIAS: Nay, Callicles, answer, if only for our sakes;\u2014we should like\nto hear the argument out.\n\nCALLICLES: Yes, Gorgias, but I must complain of the habitual trifling\nof Socrates; he is always arguing about little and unworthy questions.\n\nGORGIAS: What matter? Your reputation, Callicles, is not at stake. Let\nSocrates argue in his own fashion.\n\nCALLICLES: Well, then, Socrates, you shall ask these little peddling\nquestions, since Gorgias wishes to have them.\n\nSOCRATES: I envy you, Callicles, for having been initiated into the\ngreat mysteries before you were initiated into the lesser. I thought\nthat this was not allowable. But to return to our argument:\u2014Does not a\nman cease from thirsting and from the pleasure of drinking at the same\nmoment?\n\nCALLICLES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And if he is hungry, or has any other desire, does he not\ncease from the desire and the pleasure at the same moment?\n\nCALLICLES: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: Then he ceases from pain and pleasure at the same moment?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: But he does not cease from good and evil at the same moment,\nas you have admitted: do you still adhere to what you said?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes, I do; but what is the inference?\n\nSOCRATES: Why, my friend, the inference is that the good is not the\nsame as the pleasant, or the evil the same as the painful; there is a\ncessation of pleasure and pain at the same moment; but not of good and\nevil, for they are different. How then can pleasure be the same as\ngood, or pain as evil? And I would have you look at the matter in\nanother light, which could hardly, I think, have been considered by you\nwhen you identified them: Are not the good good because they have good\npresent with them, as the beautiful are those who have beauty present\nwith them?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And do you call the fools and cowards good men? For you were\nsaying just now that the courageous and the wise are the good\u2014would you\nnot say so?\n\nCALLICLES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And did you never see a foolish child rejoicing?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes, I have.\n\nSOCRATES: And a foolish man too?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes, certainly; but what is your drift?\n\nSOCRATES: Nothing particular, if you will only answer.\n\nCALLICLES: Yes, I have.\n\nSOCRATES: And did you ever see a sensible man rejoicing or sorrowing?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Which rejoice and sorrow most\u2014the wise or the foolish?\n\nCALLICLES: They are much upon a par, I think, in that respect.\n\nSOCRATES: Enough: And did you ever see a coward in battle?\n\nCALLICLES: To be sure.\n\nSOCRATES: And which rejoiced most at the departure of the enemy, the\ncoward or the brave?\n\nCALLICLES: I should say \u201cmost\u201d of both; or at any rate, they rejoiced\nabout equally.\n\nSOCRATES: No matter; then the cowards, and not only the brave, rejoice?\n\nCALLICLES: Greatly.\n\nSOCRATES: And the foolish; so it would seem?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And are only the cowards pained at the approach of their\nenemies, or are the brave also pained?\n\nCALLICLES: Both are pained.\n\nSOCRATES: And are they equally pained?\n\nCALLICLES: I should imagine that the cowards are more pained.\n\nSOCRATES: And are they not better pleased at the enemy\u2019s departure?\n\nCALLICLES: I dare say.\n\nSOCRATES: Then are the foolish and the wise and the cowards and the\nbrave all pleased and pained, as you were saying, in nearly equal\ndegree; but are the cowards more pleased and pained than the brave?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: But surely the wise and brave are the good, and the foolish\nand the cowardly are the bad?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then the good and the bad are pleased and pained in a nearly\nequal degree?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then are the good and bad good and bad in a nearly equal\ndegree, or have the bad the advantage both in good and evil? (i.e. in\nhaving more pleasure and more pain.)\n\nCALLICLES: I really do not know what you mean.\n\nSOCRATES: Why, do you not remember saying that the good were good\nbecause good was present with them, and the evil because evil; and that\npleasures were goods and pains evils?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes, I remember.\n\nSOCRATES: And are not these pleasures or goods present to those who\nrejoice\u2014if they do rejoice?\n\nCALLICLES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Then those who rejoice are good when goods are present with\nthem?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And those who are in pain have evil or sorrow present with\nthem?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And would you still say that the evil are evil by reason of\nthe presence of evil?\n\nCALLICLES: I should.\n\nSOCRATES: Then those who rejoice are good, and those who are in pain\nevil?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: The degrees of good and evil vary with the degrees of\npleasure and of pain?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Have the wise man and the fool, the brave and the coward, joy\nand pain in nearly equal degrees? or would you say that the coward has\nmore?\n\nCALLICLES: I should say that he has.\n\nSOCRATES: Help me then to draw out the conclusion which follows from\nour admissions; for it is good to repeat and review what is good twice\nand thrice over, as they say. Both the wise man and the brave man we\nallow to be good?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And the foolish man and the coward to be evil?\n\nCALLICLES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And he who has joy is good?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And he who is in pain is evil?\n\nCALLICLES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: The good and evil both have joy and pain, but, perhaps, the\nevil has more of them?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then must we not infer, that the bad man is as good and bad\nas the good, or, perhaps, even better?\u2014is not this a further inference\nwhich follows equally with the preceding from the assertion that the\ngood and the pleasant are the same:\u2014can this be denied, Callicles?\n\nCALLICLES: I have been listening and making admissions to you,\nSocrates; and I remark that if a person grants you anything in play,\nyou, like a child, want to keep hold and will not give it back. But do\nyou really suppose that I or any other human being denies that some\npleasures are good and others bad?\n\nSOCRATES: Alas, Callicles, how unfair you are! you certainly treat me\nas if I were a child, sometimes saying one thing, and then another, as\nif you were meaning to deceive me. And yet I thought at first that you\nwere my friend, and would not have deceived me if you could have\nhelped. But I see that I was mistaken; and now I suppose that I must\nmake the best of a bad business, as they said of old, and take what I\ncan get out of you.\u2014Well, then, as I understand you to say, I may\nassume that some pleasures are good and others evil?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: The beneficial are good, and the hurtful are evil?\n\nCALLICLES: To be sure.\n\nSOCRATES: And the beneficial are those which do some good, and the\nhurtful are those which do some evil?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Take, for example, the bodily pleasures of eating and\ndrinking, which we were just now mentioning\u2014you mean to say that those\nwhich promote health, or any other bodily excellence, are good, and\ntheir opposites evil?\n\nCALLICLES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And in the same way there are good pains and there are evil\npains?\n\nCALLICLES: To be sure.\n\nSOCRATES: And ought we not to choose and use the good pleasures and\npains?\n\nCALLICLES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: But not the evil?\n\nCALLICLES: Clearly.\n\nSOCRATES: Because, if you remember, Polus and I have agreed that all\nour actions are to be done for the sake of the good;\u2014and will you agree\nwith us in saying, that the good is the end of all our actions, and\nthat all our actions are to be done for the sake of the good, and not\nthe good for the sake of them?\u2014will you add a third vote to our two?\n\nCALLICLES: I will.\n\nSOCRATES: Then pleasure, like everything else, is to be sought for the\nsake of that which is good, and not that which is good for the sake of\npleasure?\n\nCALLICLES: To be sure.\n\nSOCRATES: But can every man choose what pleasures are good and what are\nevil, or must he have art or knowledge of them in detail?\n\nCALLICLES: He must have art.\n\nSOCRATES: Let me now remind you of what I was saying to Gorgias and\nPolus; I was saying, as you will not have forgotten, that there were\nsome processes which aim only at pleasure, and know nothing of a better\nand worse, and there are other processes which know good and evil. And\nI considered that cookery, which I do not call an art, but only an\nexperience, was of the former class, which is concerned with pleasure,\nand that the art of medicine was of the class which is concerned with\nthe good. And now, by the god of friendship, I must beg you, Callicles,\nnot to jest, or to imagine that I am jesting with you; do not answer at\nrandom and contrary to your real opinion\u2014for you will observe that we\nare arguing about the way of human life; and to a man who has any sense\nat all, what question can be more serious than this?\u2014whether he should\nfollow after that way of life to which you exhort me, and act what you\ncall the manly part of speaking in the assembly, and cultivating\nrhetoric, and engaging in public affairs, according to the principles\nnow in vogue; or whether he should pursue the life of philosophy;\u2014and\nin what the latter way differs from the former. But perhaps we had\nbetter first try to distinguish them, as I did before, and when we have\ncome to an agreement that they are distinct, we may proceed to consider\nin what they differ from one another, and which of them we should\nchoose. Perhaps, however, you do not even now understand what I mean?\n\nCALLICLES: No, I do not.\n\nSOCRATES: Then I will explain myself more clearly: seeing that you and\nI have agreed that there is such a thing as good, and that there is\nsuch a thing as pleasure, and that pleasure is not the same as good,\nand that the pursuit and process of acquisition of the one, that is\npleasure, is different from the pursuit and process of acquisition of\nthe other, which is good\u2014I wish that you would tell me whether you\nagree with me thus far or not\u2014do you agree?\n\nCALLICLES: I do.\n\nSOCRATES: Then I will proceed, and ask whether you also agree with me,\nand whether you think that I spoke the truth when I further said to\nGorgias and Polus that cookery in my opinion is only an experience, and\nnot an art at all; and that whereas medicine is an art, and attends to\nthe nature and constitution of the patient, and has principles of\naction and reason in each case, cookery in attending upon pleasure\nnever regards either the nature or reason of that pleasure to which she\ndevotes herself, but goes straight to her end, nor ever considers or\ncalculates anything, but works by experience and routine, and just\npreserves the recollection of what she has usually done when producing\npleasure. And first, I would have you consider whether I have proved\nwhat I was saying, and then whether there are not other similar\nprocesses which have to do with the soul\u2014some of them processes of art,\nmaking a provision for the soul\u2019s highest interest\u2014others despising the\ninterest, and, as in the previous case, considering only the pleasure\nof the soul, and how this may be acquired, but not considering what\npleasures are good or bad, and having no other aim but to afford\ngratification, whether good or bad. In my opinion, Callicles, there are\nsuch processes, and this is the sort of thing which I term flattery,\nwhether concerned with the body or the soul, or whenever employed with\na view to pleasure and without any consideration of good and evil. And\nnow I wish that you would tell me whether you agree with us in this\nnotion, or whether you differ.\n\nCALLICLES: I do not differ; on the contrary, I agree; for in that way I\nshall soonest bring the argument to an end, and shall oblige my friend\nGorgias.\n\nSOCRATES: And is this notion true of one soul, or of two or more?\n\nCALLICLES: Equally true of two or more.\n\nSOCRATES: Then a man may delight a whole assembly, and yet have no\nregard for their true interests?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Can you tell me the pursuits which delight mankind\u2014or rather,\nif you would prefer, let me ask, and do you answer, which of them\nbelong to the pleasurable class, and which of them not? In the first\nplace, what say you of flute-playing? Does not that appear to be an art\nwhich seeks only pleasure, Callicles, and thinks of nothing else?\n\nCALLICLES: I assent.\n\nSOCRATES: And is not the same true of all similar arts, as, for\nexample, the art of playing the lyre at festivals?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And what do you say of the choral art and of dithyrambic\npoetry?\u2014are not they of the same nature? Do you imagine that Cinesias\nthe son of Meles cares about what will tend to the moral improvement of\nhis hearers, or about what will give pleasure to the multitude?\n\nCALLICLES: There can be no mistake about Cinesias, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: And what do you say of his father, Meles the harp-player? Did\nhe perform with any view to the good of his hearers? Could he be said\nto regard even their pleasure? For his singing was an infliction to his\naudience. And of harp-playing and dithyrambic poetry in general, what\nwould you say? Have they not been invented wholly for the sake of\npleasure?\n\nCALLICLES: That is my notion of them.\n\nSOCRATES: And as for the Muse of Tragedy, that solemn and august\npersonage\u2014what are her aspirations? Is all her aim and desire only to\ngive pleasure to the spectators, or does she fight against them and\nrefuse to speak of their pleasant vices, and willingly proclaim in word\nand song truths welcome and unwelcome?\u2014which in your judgment is her\ncharacter?\n\nCALLICLES: There can be no doubt, Socrates, that Tragedy has her face\nturned towards pleasure and the gratification of the audience.\n\nSOCRATES: And is not that the sort of thing, Callicles, which we were\njust now describing as flattery?\n\nCALLICLES: Quite true.\n\nSOCRATES: Well now, suppose that we strip all poetry of song and rhythm\nand metre, there will remain speech? (Compare Republic.)\n\nCALLICLES: To be sure.\n\nSOCRATES: And this speech is addressed to a crowd of people?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then poetry is a sort of rhetoric?\n\nCALLICLES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And do not the poets in the theatres seem to you to be\nrhetoricians?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then now we have discovered a sort of rhetoric which is\naddressed to a crowd of men, women, and children, freemen and slaves.\nAnd this is not much to our taste, for we have described it as having\nthe nature of flattery.\n\nCALLICLES: Quite true.\n\nSOCRATES: Very good. And what do you say of that other rhetoric which\naddresses the Athenian assembly and the assemblies of freemen in other\nstates? Do the rhetoricians appear to you always to aim at what is\nbest, and do they seek to improve the citizens by their speeches, or\nare they too, like the rest of mankind, bent upon giving them pleasure,\nforgetting the public good in the thought of their own interest,\nplaying with the people as with children, and trying to amuse them, but\nnever considering whether they are better or worse for this?\n\nCALLICLES: I must distinguish. There are some who have a real care of\nthe public in what they say, while others are such as you describe.\n\nSOCRATES: I am contented with the admission that rhetoric is of two\nsorts; one, which is mere flattery and disgraceful declamation; the\nother, which is noble and aims at the training and improvement of the\nsouls of the citizens, and strives to say what is best, whether welcome\nor unwelcome, to the audience; but have you ever known such a rhetoric;\nor if you have, and can point out any rhetorician who is of this stamp,\nwho is he?\n\nCALLICLES: But, indeed, I am afraid that I cannot tell you of any such\namong the orators who are at present living.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, then, can you mention any one of a former generation,\nwho may be said to have improved the Athenians, who found them worse\nand made them better, from the day that he began to make speeches? for,\nindeed, I do not know of such a man.\n\nCALLICLES: What! did you never hear that Themistocles was a good man,\nand Cimon and Miltiades and Pericles, who is just lately dead, and whom\nyou heard yourself?\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, Callicles, they were good men, if, as you said at first,\ntrue virtue consists only in the satisfaction of our own desires and\nthose of others; but if not, and if, as we were afterwards compelled to\nacknowledge, the satisfaction of some desires makes us better, and of\nothers, worse, and we ought to gratify the one and not the other, and\nthere is an art in distinguishing them,\u2014can you tell me of any of these\nstatesmen who did distinguish them?\n\nCALLICLES: No, indeed, I cannot.\n\nSOCRATES: Yet, surely, Callicles, if you look you will find such a one.\nSuppose that we just calmly consider whether any of these was such as I\nhave described. Will not the good man, who says whatever he says with a\nview to the best, speak with a reference to some standard and not at\nrandom; just as all other artists, whether the painter, the builder,\nthe shipwright, or any other look all of them to their own work, and do\nnot select and apply at random what they apply, but strive to give a\ndefinite form to it? The artist disposes all things in order, and\ncompels the one part to harmonize and accord with the other part, until\nhe has constructed a regular and systematic whole; and this is true of\nall artists, and in the same way the trainers and physicians, of whom\nwe spoke before, give order and regularity to the body: do you deny\nthis?\n\nCALLICLES: No; I am ready to admit it.\n\nSOCRATES: Then the house in which order and regularity prevail is good;\nthat in which there is disorder, evil?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And the same is true of a ship?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And the same may be said of the human body?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And what would you say of the soul? Will the good soul be\nthat in which disorder is prevalent, or that in which there is harmony\nand order?\n\nCALLICLES: The latter follows from our previous admissions.\n\nSOCRATES: What is the name which is given to the effect of harmony and\norder in the body?\n\nCALLICLES: I suppose that you mean health and strength?\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, I do; and what is the name which you would give to the\neffect of harmony and order in the soul? Try and discover a name for\nthis as well as for the other.\n\nCALLICLES: Why not give the name yourself, Socrates?\n\nSOCRATES: Well, if you had rather that I should, I will; and you shall\nsay whether you agree with me, and if not, you shall refute and answer\nme. \u201cHealthy,\u201d as I conceive, is the name which is given to the regular\norder of the body, whence comes health and every other bodily\nexcellence: is that true or not?\n\nCALLICLES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And \u201clawful\u201d and \u201claw\u201d are the names which are given to the\nregular order and action of the soul, and these make men lawful and\norderly:\u2014and so we have temperance and justice: have we not?\n\nCALLICLES: Granted.\n\nSOCRATES: And will not the true rhetorician who is honest and\nunderstands his art have his eye fixed upon these, in all the words\nwhich he addresses to the souls of men, and in all his actions, both in\nwhat he gives and in what he takes away? Will not his aim be to implant\njustice in the souls of his citizens and take away injustice, to\nimplant temperance and take away intemperance, to implant every virtue\nand take away every vice? Do you not agree?\n\nCALLICLES: I agree.\n\nSOCRATES: For what use is there, Callicles, in giving to the body of a\nsick man who is in a bad state of health a quantity of the most\ndelightful food or drink or any other pleasant thing, which may be\nreally as bad for him as if you gave him nothing, or even worse if\nrightly estimated. Is not that true?\n\nCALLICLES: I will not say No to it.\n\nSOCRATES: For in my opinion there is no profit in a man\u2019s life if his\nbody is in an evil plight\u2014in that case his life also is evil: am I not\nright?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: When a man is in health the physicians will generally allow\nhim to eat when he is hungry and drink when he is thirsty, and to\nsatisfy his desires as he likes, but when he is sick they hardly suffer\nhim to satisfy his desires at all: even you will admit that?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And does not the same argument hold of the soul, my good sir?\nWhile she is in a bad state and is senseless and intemperate and unjust\nand unholy, her desires ought to be controlled, and she ought to be\nprevented from doing anything which does not tend to her own\nimprovement.\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Such treatment will be better for the soul herself?\n\nCALLICLES: To be sure.\n\nSOCRATES: And to restrain her from her appetites is to chastise her?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then restraint or chastisement is better for the soul than\nintemperance or the absence of control, which you were just now\npreferring?\n\nCALLICLES: I do not understand you, Socrates, and I wish that you would\nask some one who does.\n\nSOCRATES: Here is a gentleman who cannot endure to be improved or to\nsubject himself to that very chastisement of which the argument speaks!\n\nCALLICLES: I do not heed a word of what you are saying, and have only\nanswered hitherto out of civility to Gorgias.\n\nSOCRATES: What are we to do, then? Shall we break off in the middle?\n\nCALLICLES: You shall judge for yourself.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, but people say that \u201ca tale should have a head and not\nbreak off in the middle,\u201d and I should not like to have the argument\ngoing about without a head (compare Laws); please then to go on a\nlittle longer, and put the head on.\n\nCALLICLES: How tyrannical you are, Socrates! I wish that you and your\nargument would rest, or that you would get some one else to argue with\nyou.\n\nSOCRATES: But who else is willing?\u2014I want to finish the argument.\n\nCALLICLES: Cannot you finish without my help, either talking straight\non, or questioning and answering yourself?\n\nSOCRATES: Must I then say with Epicharmus, \u201cTwo men spoke before, but\nnow one shall be enough\u201d? I suppose that there is absolutely no help.\nAnd if I am to carry on the enquiry by myself, I will first of all\nremark that not only I but all of us should have an ambition to know\nwhat is true and what is false in this matter, for the discovery of the\ntruth is a common good. And now I will proceed to argue according to my\nown notion. But if any of you think that I arrive at conclusions which\nare untrue you must interpose and refute me, for I do not speak from\nany knowledge of what I am saying; I am an enquirer like yourselves,\nand therefore, if my opponent says anything which is of force, I shall\nbe the first to agree with him. I am speaking on the supposition that\nthe argument ought to be completed; but if you think otherwise let us\nleave off and go our ways.\n\nGORGIAS: I think, Socrates, that we should not go our ways until you\nhave completed the argument; and this appears to me to be the wish of\nthe rest of the company; I myself should very much like to hear what\nmore you have to say.\n\nSOCRATES: I too, Gorgias, should have liked to continue the argument\nwith Callicles, and then I might have given him an \u201cAmphion\u201d in return\nfor his \u201cZethus\u201d; but since you, Callicles, are unwilling to continue,\nI hope that you will listen, and interrupt me if I seem to you to be in\nerror. And if you refute me, I shall not be angry with you as you are\nwith me, but I shall inscribe you as the greatest of benefactors on the\ntablets of my soul.\n\nCALLICLES: My good fellow, never mind me, but get on.\n\nSOCRATES: Listen to me, then, while I recapitulate the argument:\u2014Is the\npleasant the same as the good? Not the same. Callicles and I are agreed\nabout that. And is the pleasant to be pursued for the sake of the good?\nor the good for the sake of the pleasant? The pleasant is to be pursued\nfor the sake of the good. And that is pleasant at the presence of which\nwe are pleased, and that is good at the presence of which we are good?\nTo be sure. And we are good, and all good things whatever are good when\nsome virtue is present in us or them? That, Callicles, is my\nconviction. But the virtue of each thing, whether body or soul,\ninstrument or creature, when given to them in the best way comes to\nthem not by chance but as the result of the order and truth and art\nwhich are imparted to them: Am I not right? I maintain that I am. And\nis not the virtue of each thing dependent on order or arrangement? Yes,\nI say. And that which makes a thing good is the proper order inhering\nin each thing? Such is my view. And is not the soul which has an order\nof her own better than that which has no order? Certainly. And the soul\nwhich has order is orderly? Of course. And that which is orderly is\ntemperate? Assuredly. And the temperate soul is good? No other answer\ncan I give, Callicles dear; have you any?\n\nCALLICLES: Go on, my good fellow.\n\nSOCRATES: Then I shall proceed to add, that if the temperate soul is\nthe good soul, the soul which is in the opposite condition, that is,\nthe foolish and intemperate, is the bad soul. Very true.\n\nAnd will not the temperate man do what is proper, both in relation to\nthe gods and to men;\u2014for he would not be temperate if he did not?\nCertainly he will do what is proper. In his relation to other men he\nwill do what is just; and in his relation to the gods he will do what\nis holy; and he who does what is just and holy must be just and holy?\nVery true. And must he not be courageous? for the duty of a temperate\nman is not to follow or to avoid what he ought not, but what he ought,\nwhether things or men or pleasures or pains, and patiently to endure\nwhen he ought; and therefore, Callicles, the temperate man, being, as\nwe have described, also just and courageous and holy, cannot be other\nthan a perfectly good man, nor can the good man do otherwise than well\nand perfectly whatever he does; and he who does well must of necessity\nbe happy and blessed, and the evil man who does evil, miserable: now\nthis latter is he whom you were applauding\u2014the intemperate who is the\nopposite of the temperate. Such is my position, and these things I\naffirm to be true. And if they are true, then I further affirm that he\nwho desires to be happy must pursue and practise temperance and run\naway from intemperance as fast as his legs will carry him: he had\nbetter order his life so as not to need punishment; but if either he or\nany of his friends, whether private individual or city, are in need of\npunishment, then justice must be done and he must suffer punishment, if\nhe would be happy. This appears to me to be the aim which a man ought\nto have, and towards which he ought to direct all the energies both of\nhimself and of the state, acting so that he may have temperance and\njustice present with him and be happy, not suffering his lusts to be\nunrestrained, and in the never-ending desire satisfy them leading a\nrobber\u2019s life. Such a one is the friend neither of God nor man, for he\nis incapable of communion, and he who is incapable of communion is also\nincapable of friendship. And philosophers tell us, Callicles, that\ncommunion and friendship and orderliness and temperance and justice\nbind together heaven and earth and gods and men, and that this universe\nis therefore called Cosmos or order, not disorder or misrule, my\nfriend. But although you are a philosopher you seem to me never to have\nobserved that geometrical equality is mighty, both among gods and men;\nyou think that you ought to cultivate inequality or excess, and do not\ncare about geometry.\u2014Well, then, either the principle that the happy\nare made happy by the possession of justice and temperance, and the\nmiserable miserable by the possession of vice, must be refuted, or, if\nit is granted, what will be the consequences? All the consequences\nwhich I drew before, Callicles, and about which you asked me whether I\nwas in earnest when I said that a man ought to accuse himself and his\nson and his friend if he did anything wrong, and that to this end he\nshould use his rhetoric\u2014all those consequences are true. And that which\nyou thought that Polus was led to admit out of modesty is true, viz.,\nthat, to do injustice, if more disgraceful than to suffer, is in that\ndegree worse; and the other position, which, according to Polus,\nGorgias admitted out of modesty, that he who would truly be a\nrhetorician ought to be just and have a knowledge of justice, has also\nturned out to be true.\n\nAnd now, these things being as we have said, let us proceed in the next\nplace to consider whether you are right in throwing in my teeth that I\nam unable to help myself or any of my friends or kinsmen, or to save\nthem in the extremity of danger, and that I am in the power of another\nlike an outlaw to whom any one may do what he likes,\u2014he may box my\nears, which was a brave saying of yours; or take away my goods or\nbanish me, or even do his worst and kill me; a condition which, as you\nsay, is the height of disgrace. My answer to you is one which has been\nalready often repeated, but may as well be repeated once more. I tell\nyou, Callicles, that to be boxed on the ears wrongfully is not the\nworst evil which can befall a man, nor to have my purse or my body cut\nopen, but that to smite and slay me and mine wrongfully is far more\ndisgraceful and more evil; aye, and to despoil and enslave and pillage,\nor in any way at all to wrong me and mine, is far more disgraceful and\nevil to the doer of the wrong than to me who am the sufferer. These\ntruths, which have been already set forth as I state them in the\nprevious discussion, would seem now to have been fixed and riveted by\nus, if I may use an expression which is certainly bold, in words which\nare like bonds of iron and adamant; and unless you or some other still\nmore enterprising hero shall break them, there is no possibility of\ndenying what I say. For my position has always been, that I myself am\nignorant how these things are, but that I have never met any one who\ncould say otherwise, any more than you can, and not appear ridiculous.\nThis is my position still, and if what I am saying is true, and\ninjustice is the greatest of evils to the doer of injustice, and yet\nthere is if possible a greater than this greatest of evils (compare\nRepublic), in an unjust man not suffering retribution, what is that\ndefence of which the want will make a man truly ridiculous? Must not\nthe defence be one which will avert the greatest of human evils? And\nwill not the worst of all defences be that with which a man is unable\nto defend himself or his family or his friends?\u2014and next will come that\nwhich is unable to avert the next greatest evil; thirdly that which is\nunable to avert the third greatest evil; and so of other evils. As is\nthe greatness of evil so is the honour of being able to avert them in\ntheir several degrees, and the disgrace of not being able to avert\nthem. Am I not right Callicles?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes, quite right.\n\nSOCRATES: Seeing then that there are these two evils, the doing\ninjustice and the suffering injustice\u2014and we affirm that to do\ninjustice is a greater, and to suffer injustice a lesser evil\u2014by what\ndevices can a man succeed in obtaining the two advantages, the one of\nnot doing and the other of not suffering injustice? must he have the\npower, or only the will to obtain them? I mean to ask whether a man\nwill escape injustice if he has only the will to escape, or must he\nhave provided himself with the power?\n\nCALLICLES: He must have provided himself with the power; that is clear.\n\nSOCRATES: And what do you say of doing injustice? Is the will only\nsufficient, and will that prevent him from doing injustice, or must he\nhave provided himself with power and art; and if he have not studied\nand practised, will he be unjust still? Surely you might say,\nCallicles, whether you think that Polus and I were right in admitting\nthe conclusion that no one does wrong voluntarily, but that all do\nwrong against their will?\n\nCALLICLES: Granted, Socrates, if you will only have done.\n\nSOCRATES: Then, as would appear, power and art have to be provided in\norder that we may do no injustice?\n\nCALLICLES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And what art will protect us from suffering injustice, if not\nwholly, yet as far as possible? I want to know whether you agree with\nme; for I think that such an art is the art of one who is either a\nruler or even tyrant himself, or the equal and companion of the ruling\npower.\n\nCALLICLES: Well said, Socrates; and please to observe how ready I am to\npraise you when you talk sense.\n\nSOCRATES: Think and tell me whether you would approve of another view\nof mine: To me every man appears to be most the friend of him who is\nmost like to him\u2014like to like, as ancient sages say: Would you not\nagree to this?\n\nCALLICLES: I should.\n\nSOCRATES: But when the tyrant is rude and uneducated, he may be\nexpected to fear any one who is his superior in virtue, and will never\nbe able to be perfectly friendly with him.\n\nCALLICLES: That is true.\n\nSOCRATES: Neither will he be the friend of any one who is greatly his\ninferior, for the tyrant will despise him, and will never seriously\nregard him as a friend.\n\nCALLICLES: That again is true.\n\nSOCRATES: Then the only friend worth mentioning, whom the tyrant can\nhave, will be one who is of the same character, and has the same likes\nand dislikes, and is at the same time willing to be subject and\nsubservient to him; he is the man who will have power in the state, and\nno one will injure him with impunity:\u2014is not that so?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And if a young man begins to ask how he may become great and\nformidable, this would seem to be the way\u2014he will accustom himself,\nfrom his youth upward, to feel sorrow and joy on the same occasions as\nhis master, and will contrive to be as like him as possible?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And in this way he will have accomplished, as you and your\nfriends would say, the end of becoming a great man and not suffering\ninjury?\n\nCALLICLES: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: But will he also escape from doing injury? Must not the very\nopposite be true,\u2014if he is to be like the tyrant in his injustice, and\nto have influence with him? Will he not rather contrive to do as much\nwrong as possible, and not be punished?\n\nCALLICLES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And by the imitation of his master and by the power which he\nthus acquires will not his soul become bad and corrupted, and will not\nthis be the greatest evil to him?\n\nCALLICLES: You always contrive somehow or other, Socrates, to invert\neverything: do you not know that he who imitates the tyrant will, if he\nhas a mind, kill him who does not imitate him and take away his goods?\n\nSOCRATES: Excellent Callicles, I am not deaf, and I have heard that a\ngreat many times from you and from Polus and from nearly every man in\nthe city, but I wish that you would hear me too. I dare say that he\nwill kill him if he has a mind\u2014the bad man will kill the good and true.\n\nCALLICLES: And is not that just the provoking thing?\n\nSOCRATES: Nay, not to a man of sense, as the argument shows: do you\nthink that all our cares should be directed to prolonging life to the\nuttermost, and to the study of those arts which secure us from danger\nalways; like that art of rhetoric which saves men in courts of law, and\nwhich you advise me to cultivate?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes, truly, and very good advice too.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, my friend, but what do you think of swimming; is that\nan art of any great pretensions?\n\nCALLICLES: No, indeed.\n\nSOCRATES: And yet surely swimming saves a man from death, and there are\noccasions on which he must know how to swim. And if you despise the\nswimmers, I will tell you of another and greater art, the art of the\npilot, who not only saves the souls of men, but also their bodies and\nproperties from the extremity of danger, just like rhetoric. Yet his\nart is modest and unpresuming: it has no airs or pretences of doing\nanything extraordinary, and, in return for the same salvation which is\ngiven by the pleader, demands only two obols, if he brings us from\nAegina to Athens, or for the longer voyage from Pontus or Egypt, at the\nutmost two drachmae, when he has saved, as I was just now saying, the\npassenger and his wife and children and goods, and safely disembarked\nthem at the Piraeus,\u2014this is the payment which he asks in return for so\ngreat a boon; and he who is the master of the art, and has done all\nthis, gets out and walks about on the sea-shore by his ship in an\nunassuming way. For he is able to reflect and is aware that he cannot\ntell which of his fellow-passengers he has benefited, and which of them\nhe has injured in not allowing them to be drowned. He knows that they\nare just the same when he has disembarked them as when they embarked,\nand not a whit better either in their bodies or in their souls; and he\nconsiders that if a man who is afflicted by great and incurable bodily\ndiseases is only to be pitied for having escaped, and is in no way\nbenefited by him in having been saved from drowning, much less he who\nhas great and incurable diseases, not of the body, but of the soul,\nwhich is the more valuable part of him; neither is life worth having\nnor of any profit to the bad man, whether he be delivered from the sea,\nor the law-courts, or any other devourer;\u2014and so he reflects that such\na one had better not live, for he cannot live well. (Compare Republic.)\n\nAnd this is the reason why the pilot, although he is our saviour, is\nnot usually conceited, any more than the engineer, who is not at all\nbehind either the general, or the pilot, or any one else, in his saving\npower, for he sometimes saves whole cities. Is there any comparison\nbetween him and the pleader? And if he were to talk, Callicles, in your\ngrandiose style, he would bury you under a mountain of words, declaring\nand insisting that we ought all of us to be engine-makers, and that no\nother profession is worth thinking about; he would have plenty to say.\nNevertheless you despise him and his art, and sneeringly call him an\nengine-maker, and you will not allow your daughters to marry his son,\nor marry your son to his daughters. And yet, on your principle, what\njustice or reason is there in your refusal? What right have you to\ndespise the engine-maker, and the others whom I was just now\nmentioning? I know that you will say, \u201cI am better, and better born.\u201d\nBut if the better is not what I say, and virtue consists only in a man\nsaving himself and his, whatever may be his character, then your\ncensure of the engine-maker, and of the physician, and of the other\narts of salvation, is ridiculous. O my friend! I want you to see that\nthe noble and the good may possibly be something different from saving\nand being saved:\u2014May not he who is truly a man cease to care about\nliving a certain time?\u2014he knows, as women say, that no man can escape\nfate, and therefore he is not fond of life; he leaves all that with\nGod, and considers in what way he can best spend his appointed\nterm;\u2014whether by assimilating himself to the constitution under which\nhe lives, as you at this moment have to consider how you may become as\nlike as possible to the Athenian people, if you mean to be in their\ngood graces, and to have power in the state; whereas I want you to\nthink and see whether this is for the interest of either of us;\u2014I would\nnot have us risk that which is dearest on the acquisition of this\npower, like the Thessalian enchantresses, who, as they say, bring down\nthe moon from heaven at the risk of their own perdition. But if you\nsuppose that any man will show you the art of becoming great in the\ncity, and yet not conforming yourself to the ways of the city, whether\nfor better or worse, then I can only say that you are mistaken,\nCallides; for he who would deserve to be the true natural friend of the\nAthenian Demus, aye, or of Pyrilampes\u2019 darling who is called after\nthem, must be by nature like them, and not an imitator only. He, then,\nwho will make you most like them, will make you as you desire, a\nstatesman and orator: for every man is pleased when he is spoken to in\nhis own language and spirit, and dislikes any other. But perhaps you,\nsweet Callicles, may be of another mind. What do you say?\n\nCALLICLES: Somehow or other your words, Socrates, always appear to me\nto be good words; and yet, like the rest of the world, I am not quite\nconvinced by them. (Compare Symp.: 1 Alcib.)\n\nSOCRATES: The reason is, Callicles, that the love of Demus which abides\nin your soul is an adversary to me; but I dare say that if we recur to\nthese same matters, and consider them more thoroughly, you may be\nconvinced for all that. Please, then, to remember that there are two\nprocesses of training all things, including body and soul; in the one,\nas we said, we treat them with a view to pleasure, and in the other\nwith a view to the highest good, and then we do not indulge but resist\nthem: was not that the distinction which we drew?\n\nCALLICLES: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: And the one which had pleasure in view was just a vulgar\nflattery:\u2014was not that another of our conclusions?\n\nCALLICLES: Be it so, if you will have it.\n\nSOCRATES: And the other had in view the greatest improvement of that\nwhich was ministered to, whether body or soul?\n\nCALLICLES: Quite true.\n\nSOCRATES: And must we not have the same end in view in the treatment of\nour city and citizens? Must we not try and make them as good as\npossible? For we have already discovered that there is no use in\nimparting to them any other good, unless the mind of those who are to\nhave the good, whether money, or office, or any other sort of power, be\ngentle and good. Shall we say that?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes, certainly, if you like.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, then, if you and I, Callicles, were intending to set\nabout some public business, and were advising one another to undertake\nbuildings, such as walls, docks or temples of the largest size, ought\nwe not to examine ourselves, first, as to whether we know or do not\nknow the art of building, and who taught us?\u2014would not that be\nnecessary, Callicles?\n\nCALLICLES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: In the second place, we should have to consider whether we\nhad ever constructed any private house, either of our own or for our\nfriends, and whether this building of ours was a success or not; and if\nupon consideration we found that we had had good and eminent masters,\nand had been successful in constructing many fine buildings, not only\nwith their assistance, but without them, by our own unaided skill\u2014in\nthat case prudence would not dissuade us from proceeding to the\nconstruction of public works. But if we had no master to show, and only\na number of worthless buildings or none at all, then, surely, it would\nbe ridiculous in us to attempt public works, or to advise one another\nto undertake them. Is not this true?\n\nCALLICLES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And does not the same hold in all other cases? If you and I\nwere physicians, and were advising one another that we were competent\nto practise as state-physicians, should I not ask about you, and would\nyou not ask about me, Well, but how about Socrates himself, has he good\nhealth? and was any one else ever known to be cured by him, whether\nslave or freeman? And I should make the same enquiries about you. And\nif we arrived at the conclusion that no one, whether citizen or\nstranger, man or woman, had ever been any the better for the medical\nskill of either of us, then, by Heaven, Callicles, what an absurdity to\nthink that we or any human being should be so silly as to set up as\nstate-physicians and advise others like ourselves to do the same,\nwithout having first practised in private, whether successfully or not,\nand acquired experience of the art! Is not this, as they say, to begin\nwith the big jar when you are learning the potter\u2019s art; which is a\nfoolish thing?\n\nCALLICLES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And now, my friend, as you are already beginning to be a\npublic character, and are admonishing and reproaching me for not being\none, suppose that we ask a few questions of one another. Tell me, then,\nCallicles, how about making any of the citizens better? Was there ever\na man who was once vicious, or unjust, or intemperate, or foolish, and\nbecame by the help of Callicles good and noble? Was there ever such a\nman, whether citizen or stranger, slave or freeman? Tell me, Callicles,\nif a person were to ask these questions of you, what would you answer?\nWhom would you say that you had improved by your conversation? There\nmay have been good deeds of this sort which were done by you as a\nprivate person, before you came forward in public. Why will you not\nanswer?\n\nCALLICLES: You are contentious, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: Nay, I ask you, not from a love of contention, but because I\nreally want to know in what way you think that affairs should be\nadministered among us\u2014whether, when you come to the administration of\nthem, you have any other aim but the improvement of the citizens? Have\nwe not already admitted many times over that such is the duty of a\npublic man? Nay, we have surely said so; for if you will not answer for\nyourself I must answer for you. But if this is what the good man ought\nto effect for the benefit of his own state, allow me to recall to you\nthe names of those whom you were just now mentioning, Pericles, and\nCimon, and Miltiades, and Themistocles, and ask whether you still think\nthat they were good citizens.\n\nCALLICLES: I do.\n\nSOCRATES: But if they were good, then clearly each of them must have\nmade the citizens better instead of worse?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And, therefore, when Pericles first began to speak in the\nassembly, the Athenians were not so good as when he spoke last?\n\nCALLICLES: Very likely.\n\nSOCRATES: Nay, my friend, \u201clikely\u201d is not the word; for if he was a\ngood citizen, the inference is certain.\n\nCALLICLES: And what difference does that make?\n\nSOCRATES: None; only I should like further to know whether the\nAthenians are supposed to have been made better by Pericles, or, on the\ncontrary, to have been corrupted by him; for I hear that he was the\nfirst who gave the people pay, and made them idle and cowardly, and\nencouraged them in the love of talk and money.\n\nCALLICLES: You heard that, Socrates, from the laconising set who bruise\ntheir ears.\n\nSOCRATES: But what I am going to tell you now is not mere hearsay, but\nwell known both to you and me: that at first, Pericles was glorious and\nhis character unimpeached by any verdict of the Athenians\u2014this was\nduring the time when they were not so good\u2014yet afterwards, when they\nhad been made good and gentle by him, at the very end of his life they\nconvicted him of theft, and almost put him to death, clearly under the\nnotion that he was a malefactor.\n\nCALLICLES: Well, but how does that prove Pericles\u2019 badness?\n\nSOCRATES: Why, surely you would say that he was a bad manager of asses\nor horses or oxen, who had received them originally neither kicking nor\nbutting nor biting him, and implanted in them all these savage tricks?\nWould he not be a bad manager of any animals who received them gentle,\nand made them fiercer than they were when he received them? What do you\nsay?\n\nCALLICLES: I will do you the favour of saying \u201cyes.\u201d\n\nSOCRATES: And will you also do me the favour of saying whether man is\nan animal?\n\nCALLICLES: Certainly he is.\n\nSOCRATES: And was not Pericles a shepherd of men?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And if he was a good political shepherd, ought not the\nanimals who were his subjects, as we were just now acknowledging, to\nhave become more just, and not more unjust?\n\nCALLICLES: Quite true.\n\nSOCRATES: And are not just men gentle, as Homer says?\u2014or are you of\nanother mind?\n\nCALLICLES: I agree.\n\nSOCRATES: And yet he really did make them more savage than he received\nthem, and their savageness was shown towards himself; which he must\nhave been very far from desiring.\n\nCALLICLES: Do you want me to agree with you?\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, if I seem to you to speak the truth.\n\nCALLICLES: Granted then.\n\nSOCRATES: And if they were more savage, must they not have been more\nunjust and inferior?\n\nCALLICLES: Granted again.\n\nSOCRATES: Then upon this view, Pericles was not a good statesman?\n\nCALLICLES: That is, upon your view.\n\nSOCRATES: Nay, the view is yours, after what you have admitted. Take\nthe case of Cimon again. Did not the very persons whom he was serving\nostracize him, in order that they might not hear his voice for ten\nyears? and they did just the same to Themistocles, adding the penalty\nof exile; and they voted that Miltiades, the hero of Marathon, should\nbe thrown into the pit of death, and he was only saved by the Prytanis.\nAnd yet, if they had been really good men, as you say, these things\nwould never have happened to them. For the good charioteers are not\nthose who at first keep their place, and then, when they have broken-in\ntheir horses, and themselves become better charioteers, are thrown\nout\u2014that is not the way either in charioteering or in any\nprofession.\u2014What do you think?\n\nCALLICLES: I should think not.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, but if so, the truth is as I have said already, that in\nthe Athenian State no one has ever shown himself to be a good\nstatesman\u2014you admitted that this was true of our present statesmen, but\nnot true of former ones, and you preferred them to the others; yet they\nhave turned out to be no better than our present ones; and therefore,\nif they were rhetoricians, they did not use the true art of rhetoric or\nof flattery, or they would not have fallen out of favour.\n\nCALLICLES: But surely, Socrates, no living man ever came near any one\nof them in his performances.\n\nSOCRATES: O, my dear friend, I say nothing against them regarded as the\nserving-men of the State; and I do think that they were certainly more\nserviceable than those who are living now, and better able to gratify\nthe wishes of the State; but as to transforming those desires and not\nallowing them to have their way, and using the powers which they had,\nwhether of persuasion or of force, in the improvement of their fellow\ncitizens, which is the prime object of the truly good citizen, I do not\nsee that in these respects they were a whit superior to our present\nstatesmen, although I do admit that they were more clever at providing\nships and walls and docks, and all that. You and I have a ridiculous\nway, for during the whole time that we are arguing, we are always going\nround and round to the same point, and constantly misunderstanding one\nanother. If I am not mistaken, you have admitted and acknowledged more\nthan once, that there are two kinds of operations which have to do with\nthe body, and two which have to do with the soul: one of the two is\nministerial, and if our bodies are hungry provides food for them, and\nif they are thirsty gives them drink, or if they are cold supplies them\nwith garments, blankets, shoes, and all that they crave. I use the same\nimages as before intentionally, in order that you may understand me the\nbetter. The purveyor of the articles may provide them either wholesale\nor retail, or he may be the maker of any of them,\u2014the baker, or the\ncook, or the weaver, or the shoemaker, or the currier; and in so doing,\nbeing such as he is, he is naturally supposed by himself and every one\nto minister to the body. For none of them know that there is another\nart\u2014an art of gymnastic and medicine which is the true minister of the\nbody, and ought to be the mistress of all the rest, and to use their\nresults according to the knowledge which she has and they have not, of\nthe real good or bad effects of meats and drinks on the body. All other\narts which have to do with the body are servile and menial and\nilliberal; and gymnastic and medicine are, as they ought to be, their\nmistresses. Now, when I say that all this is equally true of the soul,\nyou seem at first to know and understand and assent to my words, and\nthen a little while afterwards you come repeating, Has not the State\nhad good and noble citizens? and when I ask you who they are, you\nreply, seemingly quite in earnest, as if I had asked, Who are or have\nbeen good trainers?\u2014and you had replied, Thearion, the baker,\nMithoecus, who wrote the Sicilian cookery-book, Sarambus, the vintner:\nthese are ministers of the body, first-rate in their art; for the first\nmakes admirable loaves, the second excellent dishes, and the third\ncapital wine;\u2014to me these appear to be the exact parallel of the\nstatesmen whom you mention. Now you would not be altogether pleased if\nI said to you, My friend, you know nothing of gymnastics; those of whom\nyou are speaking to me are only the ministers and purveyors of luxury,\nwho have no good or noble notions of their art, and may very likely be\nfilling and fattening men\u2019s bodies and gaining their approval, although\nthe result is that they lose their original flesh in the long run, and\nbecome thinner than they were before; and yet they, in their\nsimplicity, will not attribute their diseases and loss of flesh to\ntheir entertainers; but when in after years the unhealthy surfeit\nbrings the attendant penalty of disease, he who happens to be near them\nat the time, and offers them advice, is accused and blamed by them, and\nif they could they would do him some harm; while they proceed to\neulogize the men who have been the real authors of the mischief. And\nthat, Callicles, is just what you are now doing. You praise the men who\nfeasted the citizens and satisfied their desires, and people say that\nthey have made the city great, not seeing that the swollen and\nulcerated condition of the State is to be attributed to these elder\nstatesmen; for they have filled the city full of harbours and docks and\nwalls and revenues and all that, and have left no room for justice and\ntemperance. And when the crisis of the disorder comes, the people will\nblame the advisers of the hour, and applaud Themistocles and Cimon and\nPericles, who are the real authors of their calamities; and if you are\nnot careful they may assail you and my friend Alcibiades, when they are\nlosing not only their new acquisitions, but also their original\npossessions; not that you are the authors of these misfortunes of\ntheirs, although you may perhaps be accessories to them. A great piece\nof work is always being made, as I see and am told, now as of old;\nabout our statesmen. When the State treats any of them as malefactors,\nI observe that there is a great uproar and indignation at the supposed\nwrong which is done to them; \u201cafter all their many services to the\nState, that they should unjustly perish,\u201d\u2014so the tale runs. But the cry\nis all a lie; for no statesman ever could be unjustly put to death by\nthe city of which he is the head. The case of the professed statesman\nis, I believe, very much like that of the professed sophist; for the\nsophists, although they are wise men, are nevertheless guilty of a\nstrange piece of folly; professing to be teachers of virtue, they will\noften accuse their disciples of wronging them, and defrauding them of\ntheir pay, and showing no gratitude for their services. Yet what can be\nmore absurd than that men who have become just and good, and whose\ninjustice has been taken away from them, and who have had justice\nimplanted in them by their teachers, should act unjustly by reason of\nthe injustice which is not in them? Can anything be more irrational, my\nfriends, than this? You, Callicles, compel me to be a mob-orator,\nbecause you will not answer.\n\nCALLICLES: And you are the man who cannot speak unless there is some\none to answer?\n\nSOCRATES: I suppose that I can; just now, at any rate, the speeches\nwhich I am making are long enough because you refuse to answer me. But\nI adjure you by the god of friendship, my good sir, do tell me whether\nthere does not appear to you to be a great inconsistency in saying that\nyou have made a man good, and then blaming him for being bad?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes, it appears so to me.\n\nSOCRATES: Do you never hear our professors of education speaking in\nthis inconsistent manner?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes, but why talk of men who are good for nothing?\n\nSOCRATES: I would rather say, why talk of men who profess to be rulers,\nand declare that they are devoted to the improvement of the city, and\nnevertheless upon occasion declaim against the utter vileness of the\ncity:\u2014do you think that there is any difference between one and the\nother? My good friend, the sophist and the rhetorician, as I was saying\nto Polus, are the same, or nearly the same; but you ignorantly fancy\nthat rhetoric is a perfect thing, and sophistry a thing to be despised;\nwhereas the truth is, that sophistry is as much superior to rhetoric as\nlegislation is to the practice of law, or gymnastic to medicine. The\norators and sophists, as I am inclined to think, are the only class who\ncannot complain of the mischief ensuing to themselves from that which\nthey teach others, without in the same breath accusing themselves of\nhaving done no good to those whom they profess to benefit. Is not this\na fact?\n\nCALLICLES: Certainly it is.\n\nSOCRATES: If they were right in saying that they make men better, then\nthey are the only class who can afford to leave their remuneration to\nthose who have been benefited by them. Whereas if a man has been\nbenefited in any other way, if, for example, he has been taught to run\nby a trainer, he might possibly defraud him of his pay, if the trainer\nleft the matter to him, and made no agreement with him that he should\nreceive money as soon as he had given him the utmost speed; for not\nbecause of any deficiency of speed do men act unjustly, but by reason\nof injustice.\n\nCALLICLES: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: And he who removes injustice can be in no danger of being\ntreated unjustly: he alone can safely leave the honorarium to his\npupils, if he be really able to make them good\u2014am I not right? (Compare\nProtag.)\n\nCALLICLES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then we have found the reason why there is no dishonour in a\nman receiving pay who is called in to advise about building or any\nother art?\n\nCALLICLES: Yes, we have found the reason.\n\nSOCRATES: But when the point is, how a man may become best himself, and\nbest govern his family and state, then to say that you will give no\nadvice gratis is held to be dishonourable?\n\nCALLICLES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And why? Because only such benefits call forth a desire to\nrequite them, and there is evidence that a benefit has been conferred\nwhen the benefactor receives a return; otherwise not. Is this true?\n\nCALLICLES: It is.\n\nSOCRATES: Then to which service of the State do you invite me?\ndetermine for me. Am I to be the physician of the State who will strive\nand struggle to make the Athenians as good as possible; or am I to be\nthe servant and flatterer of the State? Speak out, my good friend,\nfreely and fairly as you did at first and ought to do again, and tell\nme your entire mind.\n\nCALLICLES: I say then that you should be the servant of the State.\n\nSOCRATES: The flatterer? well, sir, that is a noble invitation.\n\nCALLICLES: The Mysian, Socrates, or what you please. For if you refuse,\nthe consequences will be\u2014\n\nSOCRATES: Do not repeat the old story\u2014that he who likes will kill me\nand get my money; for then I shall have to repeat the old answer, that\nhe will be a bad man and will kill the good, and that the money will be\nof no use to him, but that he will wrongly use that which he wrongly\ntook, and if wrongly, basely, and if basely, hurtfully.\n\nCALLICLES: How confident you are, Socrates, that you will never come to\nharm! you seem to think that you are living in another country, and can\nnever be brought into a court of justice, as you very likely may be\nbrought by some miserable and mean person.\n\nSOCRATES: Then I must indeed be a fool, Callicles, if I do not know\nthat in the Athenian State any man may suffer anything. And if I am\nbrought to trial and incur the dangers of which you speak, he will be a\nvillain who brings me to trial\u2014of that I am very sure, for no good man\nwould accuse the innocent. Nor shall I be surprised if I am put to\ndeath. Shall I tell you why I anticipate this?\n\nCALLICLES: By all means.\n\nSOCRATES: I think that I am the only or almost the only Athenian living\nwho practises the true art of politics; I am the only politician of my\ntime. Now, seeing that when I speak my words are not uttered with any\nview of gaining favour, and that I look to what is best and not to what\nis most pleasant, having no mind to use those arts and graces which you\nrecommend, I shall have nothing to say in the justice court. And you\nmight argue with me, as I was arguing with Polus:\u2014I shall be tried just\nas a physician would be tried in a court of little boys at the\nindictment of the cook. What would he reply under such circumstances,\nif some one were to accuse him, saying, \u201cO my boys, many evil things\nhas this man done to you: he is the death of you, especially of the\nyounger ones among you, cutting and burning and starving and\nsuffocating you, until you know not what to do; he gives you the\nbitterest potions, and compels you to hunger and thirst. How unlike the\nvariety of meats and sweets on which I feasted you!\u201d What do you\nsuppose that the physician would be able to reply when he found himself\nin such a predicament? If he told the truth he could only say, \u201cAll\nthese evil things, my boys, I did for your health,\u201d and then would\nthere not just be a clamour among a jury like that? How they would cry\nout!\n\nCALLICLES: I dare say.\n\nSOCRATES: Would he not be utterly at a loss for a reply?\n\nCALLICLES: He certainly would.\n\nSOCRATES: And I too shall be treated in the same way, as I well know,\nif I am brought before the court. For I shall not be able to rehearse\nto the people the pleasures which I have procured for them, and which,\nalthough I am not disposed to envy either the procurers or enjoyers of\nthem, are deemed by them to be benefits and advantages. And if any one\nsays that I corrupt young men, and perplex their minds, or that I speak\nevil of old men, and use bitter words towards them, whether in private\nor public, it is useless for me to reply, as I truly might:\u2014\u201cAll this I\ndo for the sake of justice, and with a view to your interest, my\njudges, and to nothing else.\u201d And therefore there is no saying what may\nhappen to me.\n\nCALLICLES: And do you think, Socrates, that a man who is thus\ndefenceless is in a good position?\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, Callicles, if he have that defence, which as you have\noften acknowledged he should have\u2014if he be his own defence, and have\nnever said or done anything wrong, either in respect of gods or men;\nand this has been repeatedly acknowledged by us to be the best sort of\ndefence. And if any one could convict me of inability to defend myself\nor others after this sort, I should blush for shame, whether I was\nconvicted before many, or before a few, or by myself alone; and if I\ndied from want of ability to do so, that would indeed grieve me. But if\nI died because I have no powers of flattery or rhetoric, I am very sure\nthat you would not find me repining at death. For no man who is not an\nutter fool and coward is afraid of death itself, but he is afraid of\ndoing wrong. For to go to the world below having one\u2019s soul full of\ninjustice is the last and worst of all evils. And in proof of what I\nsay, if you have no objection, I should like to tell you a story.\n\nCALLICLES: Very well, proceed; and then we shall have done.\n\nSOCRATES: Listen, then, as story-tellers say, to a very pretty tale,\nwhich I dare say that you may be disposed to regard as a fable only,\nbut which, as I believe, is a true tale, for I mean to speak the truth.\nHomer tells us (Il.), how Zeus and Poseidon and Pluto divided the\nempire which they inherited from their father. Now in the days of\nCronos there existed a law respecting the destiny of man, which has\nalways been, and still continues to be in Heaven,\u2014that he who has lived\nall his life in justice and holiness shall go, when he is dead, to the\nIslands of the Blessed, and dwell there in perfect happiness out of the\nreach of evil; but that he who has lived unjustly and impiously shall\ngo to the house of vengeance and punishment, which is called Tartarus.\nAnd in the time of Cronos, and even quite lately in the reign of Zeus,\nthe judgment was given on the very day on which the men were to die;\nthe judges were alive, and the men were alive; and the consequence was\nthat the judgments were not well given. Then Pluto and the authorities\nfrom the Islands of the Blessed came to Zeus, and said that the souls\nfound their way to the wrong places. Zeus said: \u201cI shall put a stop to\nthis; the judgments are not well given, because the persons who are\njudged have their clothes on, for they are alive; and there are many\nwho, having evil souls, are apparelled in fair bodies, or encased in\nwealth or rank, and, when the day of judgment arrives, numerous\nwitnesses come forward and testify on their behalf that they have lived\nrighteously. The judges are awed by them, and they themselves too have\ntheir clothes on when judging; their eyes and ears and their whole\nbodies are interposed as a veil before their own souls. All this is a\nhindrance to them; there are the clothes of the judges and the clothes\nof the judged.\u2014What is to be done? I will tell you:\u2014In the first place,\nI will deprive men of the foreknowledge of death, which they possess at\npresent: this power which they have Prometheus has already received my\norders to take from them: in the second place, they shall be entirely\nstripped before they are judged, for they shall be judged when they are\ndead; and the judge too shall be naked, that is to say, dead\u2014he with\nhis naked soul shall pierce into the other naked souls; and they shall\ndie suddenly and be deprived of all their kindred, and leave their\nbrave attire strewn upon the earth\u2014conducted in this manner, the\njudgment will be just. I knew all about the matter before any of you,\nand therefore I have made my sons judges; two from Asia, Minos and\nRhadamanthus, and one from Europe, Aeacus. And these, when they are\ndead, shall give judgment in the meadow at the parting of the ways,\nwhence the two roads lead, one to the Islands of the Blessed, and the\nother to Tartarus. Rhadamanthus shall judge those who come from Asia,\nand Aeacus those who come from Europe. And to Minos I shall give the\nprimacy, and he shall hold a court of appeal, in case either of the two\nothers are in any doubt:\u2014then the judgment respecting the last journey\nof men will be as just as possible.\u201d\n\nFrom this tale, Callicles, which I have heard and believe, I draw the\nfollowing inferences:\u2014Death, if I am right, is in the first place the\nseparation from one another of two things, soul and body; nothing else.\nAnd after they are separated they retain their several natures, as in\nlife; the body keeps the same habit, and the results of treatment or\naccident are distinctly visible in it: for example, he who by nature or\ntraining or both, was a tall man while he was alive, will remain as he\nwas, after he is dead; and the fat man will remain fat; and so on; and\nthe dead man, who in life had a fancy to have flowing hair, will have\nflowing hair. And if he was marked with the whip and had the prints of\nthe scourge, or of wounds in him when he was alive, you might see the\nsame in the dead body; and if his limbs were broken or misshapen when\nhe was alive, the same appearance would be visible in the dead. And in\na word, whatever was the habit of the body during life would be\ndistinguishable after death, either perfectly, or in a great measure\nand for a certain time. And I should imagine that this is equally true\nof the soul, Callicles; when a man is stripped of the body, all the\nnatural or acquired affections of the soul are laid open to view.\u2014And\nwhen they come to the judge, as those from Asia come to Rhadamanthus,\nhe places them near him and inspects them quite impartially, not\nknowing whose the soul is: perhaps he may lay hands on the soul of the\ngreat king, or of some other king or potentate, who has no soundness in\nhim, but his soul is marked with the whip, and is full of the prints\nand scars of perjuries and crimes with which each action has stained\nhim, and he is all crooked with falsehood and imposture, and has no\nstraightness, because he has lived without truth. Him Rhadamanthus\nbeholds, full of all deformity and disproportion, which is caused by\nlicence and luxury and insolence and incontinence, and despatches him\nignominiously to his prison, and there he undergoes the punishment\nwhich he deserves.\n\nNow the proper office of punishment is twofold: he who is rightly\npunished ought either to become better and profit by it, or he ought to\nbe made an example to his fellows, that they may see what he suffers,\nand fear and become better. Those who are improved when they are\npunished by gods and men, are those whose sins are curable; and they\nare improved, as in this world so also in another, by pain and\nsuffering; for there is no other way in which they can be delivered\nfrom their evil. But they who have been guilty of the worst crimes, and\nare incurable by reason of their crimes, are made examples; for, as\nthey are incurable, the time has passed at which they can receive any\nbenefit. They get no good themselves, but others get good when they\nbehold them enduring for ever the most terrible and painful and fearful\nsufferings as the penalty of their sins\u2014there they are, hanging up as\nexamples, in the prison-house of the world below, a spectacle and a\nwarning to all unrighteous men who come thither. And among them, as I\nconfidently affirm, will be found Archelaus, if Polus truly reports of\nhim, and any other tyrant who is like him. Of these fearful examples,\nmost, as I believe, are taken from the class of tyrants and kings and\npotentates and public men, for they are the authors of the greatest and\nmost impious crimes, because they have the power. And Homer witnesses\nto the truth of this; for they are always kings and potentates whom he\nhas described as suffering everlasting punishment in the world below:\nsuch were Tantalus and Sisyphus and Tityus. But no one ever described\nThersites, or any private person who was a villain, as suffering\neverlasting punishment, or as incurable. For to commit the worst\ncrimes, as I am inclined to think, was not in his power, and he was\nhappier than those who had the power. No, Callicles, the very bad men\ncome from the class of those who have power (compare Republic). And yet\nin that very class there may arise good men, and worthy of all\nadmiration they are, for where there is great power to do wrong, to\nlive and to die justly is a hard thing, and greatly to be praised, and\nfew there are who attain to this. Such good and true men, however,\nthere have been, and will be again, at Athens and in other states, who\nhave fulfilled their trust righteously; and there is one who is quite\nfamous all over Hellas, Aristeides, the son of Lysimachus. But, in\ngeneral, great men are also bad, my friend.\n\nAs I was saying, Rhadamanthus, when he gets a soul of the bad kind,\nknows nothing about him, neither who he is, nor who his parents are; he\nknows only that he has got hold of a villain; and seeing this, he\nstamps him as curable or incurable, and sends him away to Tartarus,\nwhither he goes and receives his proper recompense. Or, again, he looks\nwith admiration on the soul of some just one who has lived in holiness\nand truth; he may have been a private man or not; and I should say,\nCallicles, that he is most likely to have been a philosopher who has\ndone his own work, and not troubled himself with the doings of other\nmen in his lifetime; him Rhadamanthus sends to the Islands of the\nBlessed. Aeacus does the same; and they both have sceptres, and judge;\nbut Minos alone has a golden sceptre and is seated looking on, as\nOdysseus in Homer declares that he saw him:\n\n\u201cHolding a sceptre of gold, and giving laws to the dead.\u201d\n\nNow I, Callicles, am persuaded of the truth of these things, and I\nconsider how I shall present my soul whole and undefiled before the\njudge in that day. Renouncing the honours at which the world aims, I\ndesire only to know the truth, and to live as well as I can, and, when\nI die, to die as well as I can. And, to the utmost of my power, I\nexhort all other men to do the same. And, in return for your\nexhortation of me, I exhort you also to take part in the great combat,\nwhich is the combat of life, and greater than every other earthly\nconflict. And I retort your reproach of me, and say, that you will not\nbe able to help yourself when the day of trial and judgment, of which I\nwas speaking, comes upon you; you will go before the judge, the son of\nAegina, and, when he has got you in his grip and is carrying you off,\nyou will gape and your head will swim round, just as mine would in the\ncourts of this world, and very likely some one will shamefully box you\non the ears, and put upon you any sort of insult.\n\nPerhaps this may appear to you to be only an old wife\u2019s tale, which you\nwill contemn. And there might be reason in your contemning such tales,\nif by searching we could find out anything better or truer: but now you\nsee that you and Polus and Gorgias, who are the three wisest of the\nGreeks of our day, are not able to show that we ought to live any life\nwhich does not profit in another world as well as in this. And of all\nthat has been said, nothing remains unshaken but the saying, that to do\ninjustice is more to be avoided than to suffer injustice, and that the\nreality and not the appearance of virtue is to be followed above all\nthings, as well in public as in private life; and that when any one has\nbeen wrong in anything, he is to be chastised, and that the next best\nthing to a man being just is that he should become just, and be\nchastised and punished; also that he should avoid all flattery of\nhimself as well as of others, of the few or of the many: and rhetoric\nand any other art should be used by him, and all his actions should be\ndone always, with a view to justice.\n\nFollow me then, and I will lead you where you will be happy in life and\nafter death, as the argument shows. And never mind if some one despises\nyou as a fool, and insults you, if he has a mind; let him strike you,\nby Zeus, and do you be of good cheer, and do not mind the insulting\nblow, for you will never come to any harm in the practice of virtue, if\nyou are a really good and true man. When we have practised virtue\ntogether, we will apply ourselves to politics, if that seems desirable,\nor we will advise about whatever else may seem good to us, for we shall\nbe better able to judge then. In our present condition we ought not to\ngive ourselves airs, for even on the most important subjects we are\nalways changing our minds; so utterly stupid are we! Let us, then, take\nthe argument as our guide, which has revealed to us that the best way\nof life is to practise justice and every virtue in life and death. This\nway let us go; and in this exhort all men to follow, not in the way to\nwhich you trust and in which you exhort me to follow you; for that way,\nCallicles, is nothing worth.","title":"Gorgias","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":59291}