{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_16729/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_16729","id":"gutenberg_16729","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/16729","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Essays, Letters & Speeches","Category: Science - Biology","Evolution (Biology)","Science","Science -- Philosophy"],"text":"E-text prepared by Clare Boothby, Martin Pettit, and the Project Gutenberg\nOnline Distributed Proofreading Team (https://www.pgdp.net/)\n\n\n\nLAY SERMONS, ADDRESSES, AND REVIEWS\n\nby\n\nTHOMAS HENRY HUXLEY, LL.D., F.R.S.\n\nLondon:\nMacMillan and Co.\nLondon\nR. Clay, Sons, and Taylor, Printers,\nBread Street Hill.\n\n1870\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nA PREFATORY LETTER.\n\n\nMY DEAR TYNDALL,\n\nI should have liked to provide this collection of \"Lay Sermons,\nAddresses, and Reviews,\" with a Dedication and a Preface. In the former,\nI should have asked you to allow me to associate your name with the\nbook, chiefly on the ground that the oldest of the papers in it is a\ngood deal younger than our friendship. In the latter, I intended to\ncomment upon certain criticisms with which some of these Essays have\nbeen met.\n\nBut, on turning the matter over in my mind, I began to fear that a\nformal dedication at the beginning of such a volume would look like a\ngrand lodge in front of a set of cottages; while a complete defence of\nany of my old papers would simply amount to writing a new one--a labour\nfor which I am, at present, by no means fit.\n\nThe book must go forth, therefore, without any better substitute for\neither Dedication, or Preface, than this letter; before concluding which\nit is necessary for me to notify you, and any other reader, of two or\nthree matters.\n\nThe first is, that the oldest Essay of the whole, that \"On the\nEducational Value of the Natural History Sciences,\" contains a view of\nthe nature of the differences between living and not-living bodies out\nof which I have long since grown.\n\nSecondly, in the same paper, there is a statement concerning the method\nof the mathematical sciences, which, repeated and expanded elsewhere,\nbrought upon me, during the meeting of the British Association at\nExeter, the artillery of our eminent friend Professor Sylvester.\n\nNo one knows better than you do, how readily I should defer to the\nopinion of so great a mathematician if the question at issue were\nreally, as he seems to think it is, a mathematical one. But I submit,\nthat the dictum of a mathematical athlete upon a difficult problem which\nmathematics offers to philosophy, has no more special weight, than the\nverdict of that great pedestrian Captain Barclay would have had, in\nsettling a disputed point in the physiology of locomotion.\n\nThe genius which sighs for new worlds to conquer beyond that surprising\nregion in which \"geometry, algebra, and the theory of numbers melt into\none another like sunset tints, or the colours of a dying dolphin,\" may\nbe of comparatively little service in the cold domain (mostly lighted by\nthe moon, some say) of philosophy. And the more I think of it, the more\ndoes our friend seem to me to fall into the position of one of those\n\"verstaendige Leute,\" about whom he makes so apt a quotation from Goethe.\nSurely he has not duly considered two points. The first, that I am in no\nway answerable for the origination of the doctrine he criticises: and\nthe second, that if we are to employ the terms observation, induction,\nand experiment, in the sense in which he uses them, logic is as much an\nobservational, inductive, and experimental science as mathematics; and\nthat, I confess, appears to me to be a _reductio ad absurdum_ of his\nargument.\n\nThirdly, the essay \"On the Physical Basis of Life\" was intended to\ncontain a plain and untechnical statement of one of the great tendencies\nof modern biological thought, accompanied by a protest, from the\nphilosophical side, against what is commonly called Materialism. The\nresult of my well-meant efforts I find to be, that I am generally\ncredited with having invented \"protoplasm\" in the interests of\n\"materialism.\" My unlucky \"Lay Sermon\" has been attacked by\nmicroscopists, ignorant alike of Biology and Philosophy; by\nphilosophers, not very learned in either Biology or Microscopy; by\nclergymen of several denominations; and by some few writers who have\ntaken the trouble to understand the subject. I trust that these last\nwill believe that I leave the essay unaltered from no want of respectful\nattention to all they have said.\n\nFourthly, I wish to refer all who are interested in the topics discussed\nin my address on \"Geological Reform,\" to the reply with which Sir\nWilliam Thomson has honoured me.\n\nAnd, lastly, let me say that I reprint the review of \"The Origin of\nSpecies\" simply because it has been cited as mine by a late President of\nthe Geological Society. If you find its phraseology, in some places, to\nbe more vigorous than seems needful, recollect that it was written in\nthe heat of our first battles over the Novum Organon of biology; that we\nwere all ten years younger in those days; and last, but not least, that\nit was not published until it had been submitted to the revision of a\nfriend for whose judgment I had then, as I have now, the greatest\nrespect.\n\nEver, my dear TYNDALL,\n\nYours very faithfully,\n\nT.H. HUXLEY\n\nLONDON, _June 1870_.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n\nI.\n                                                               PAGE\nON THE ADVISABLENESS OF IMPROVING NATURAL KNOWLEDGE.\n  (A Lay Sermon delivered in St. Martin's Hall, on the evening\n  of Sunday, the 7th of January, 1866, and subsequently published\n  in the _Fortnightly Review_)                                    3\n\nII.\n\nEMANCIPATION--BLACK AND WHITE.\n  (The _Reader_, May 20th, 1865)                                 23\n\nIII.\n\nA LIBERAL EDUCATION: AND WHERE TO FIND IT. (An Address\n  to the South London Working Men's College, delivered on the\n  4th of January, 1868, and subsequently published in _Macmillan's\n  Magazine_)                                                     31\n\nIV.\n\nSCIENTIFIC EDUCATION: NOTES OF AN AFTER-DINNER SPEECH. (Delivered\n  before the Liverpool Philomathic Society in April 1869,\n  and subsequently published in _Macmillan's Magazine_)          60\n\nV.\n\nON THE EDUCATIONAL VALUE OF THE NATURAL HISTORY SCIENCES.\n  (An Address delivered at St. Martin's Hall, on the 22d July,\n  1854, and published as a pamphlet in that year)                80\n\nVI.\n\n\nON THE STUDY OF ZOOLOGY. (A Lecture delivered at the South\n  Kensington Museum, in 1861, and subsequently published by the\n  Department of Science and Art)                                104\n\nVII.\n\nON THE PHYSICAL BASIS OF LIFE. (A Lay Sermon delivered in\n  Edinburgh, on Sunday, the 8th of November, 1868, at the request\n  of the late Rev. James Cranbrook; subsequently published in the\n  _Fortnightly Review_)                                         132\n\nVIII.\n\nTHE SCIENTIFIC ASPECTS OF POSITIVISM. (A Reply to Mr. Congreve's\n  Attack upon the preceding Paper. Published in the _Fortnightly\n  Review._ 1869)                                                162\n\nIX.\n\nON A PIECE OF CHALK. (A Lecture delivered to the Working Men of\n  Norwich, during the Meeting of the British Association, in 1868.\n  Subsequently published in _Macmillan's Magazine_)             192\n\nX.\n\nGEOLOGICAL CONTEMPORANEITY AND PERSISTENT TYPES OF LIFE. (The\n  Anniversary Address to the Geological Society for 1862)       223\n\nXI.\n\nGEOLOGICAL REFORM. (The Anniversary Address to the Geological\n  Society for 1869)                                             251\n\nXII.\n\nTHE ORIGIN OF SPECIES. (The _Westminster Review_, April 1860)   280\n\nXIII.\n\nCRITICISMS ON \"THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES.\" (The _Natural History\n  Review_, 1864)                                                328\n\nXIV.\n\nON DESCARTES' \"DISCOURSE TOUCHING THE METHOD OF USING ONE'S\nREASON RIGHTLY AND OF SEEKING SCIENTIFIC TRUTH.\" (An Address to\n  the Cambridge Young Men's Christian Society, delivered on the\n  24th of March, 1870, and subsequently published in\n  _Macmillan's Magazine_)                                       351\n\n\n\n\nLAY SERMONS, ADDRESSES, AND REVIEWS.\n\n\n\n\nI.\n\nON THE ADVISABLENESS OF IMPROVING NATURAL KNOWLEDGE.\n\n\nThis time two hundred years ago--in the beginning of January,\n1666--those of our forefathers who inhabited this great and ancient\ncity, took breath between the shocks of two fearful calamities, one not\nquite past, although its fury had abated; the other to come.\n\nWithin a few yards of the very spot on which we are assembled, so the\ntradition runs, that painful and deadly malady, the plague, appeared in\nthe latter months of 1664; and, though no new visitor, smote the people\nof England, and especially of her capital, with a violence unknown\nbefore, in the course of the following year. The hand of a master has\npictured what happened in those dismal months; and in that truest of\nfictions, \"The History of the Plague Year,\" Defoe shows death, with\nevery accompaniment of pain and terror, stalking through the narrow\nstreets of old London, and changing their busy hum into a silence broken\nonly by the wailing of the mourners of fifty thousand dead; by the woful\ndenunciations and mad prayers of fanatics; and by the madder yells of\ndespairing profligates.\n\nBut, about this time in 1666, the death-rate had sunk to nearly its\nordinary amount; a case of plague occurred only here and there, and the\nricher citizens who had flown from the pest had returned to their\ndwellings. The remnant of the people began to toil at the accustomed\nround of duty, or of pleasure; and the stream of city life bid fair to\nflow back along its old bed, with renewed and uninterrupted vigour.\n\nThe newly kindled hope was deceitful. The great plague, indeed, returned\nno more; but what it had done for the Londoners, the great fire, which\nbroke out in the autumn of 1666, did for London; and, in September of\nthat year, a heap of ashes and the indestructible energy of the people\nwere all that remained of the glory of five-sixths of the city within\nthe walls.\n\n\nOur forefathers had their own ways of accounting for each of these\ncalamities. They submitted to the plague in humility and in penitence,\nfor they believed it to be the judgment of God. But, towards the fire\nthey were furiously indignant, interpreting it as the effect of the\nmalice of man,--as the work of the Republicans, or of the Papists,\naccording as their prepossessions ran in favour of loyalty or of\nPuritanism.\n\nIt would, I fancy, have fared but ill with one who, standing where I now\nstand, in what was then a thickly peopled and fashionable part of\nLondon, should have broached to our ancestors the doctrine which I now\npropound to you--that all their hypotheses were alike wrong; that the\nplague was no more, in their sense, Divine judgment, than the fire was\nthe work of any political, or of any religious, sect; but that they were\nthemselves the authors of both plague and fire, and that they must look\nto themselves to prevent the recurrence of calamities, to all appearance\nso peculiarly beyond the reach of human control--so evidently the result\nof the wrath of God, or of the craft and subtlety of an enemy.\n\nAnd one may picture to oneself how harmoniously the holy cursing of the\nPuritan of that day would have chimed in with the unholy cursing and the\ncrackling wit of the Rochesters and Sedleys, and with the revilings of\nthe political fanatics, if my imaginary plain dealer had gone on to say\nthat, if the return of such misfortunes were ever rendered impossible,\nit would not be in virtue of the victory of the faith of Laud, or of\nthat of Milton; and, as little, by the triumph of republicanism, as by\nthat of monarchy. But that the one thing needful for compassing this end\nwas, that the people of England should second the efforts of an\ninsignificant corporation, the establishment of which, a few years\nbefore the epoch of the great plague and the great fire, had been as\nlittle noticed, as they were conspicuous.\n\n\nSome twenty years before the outbreak of the plague a few calm and\nthoughtful students banded themselves together for the purpose, as they\nphrased it, of \"improving natural knowledge.\" The ends they proposed to\nattain cannot be stated more clearly than in the words of one of the\nfounders of the organization:--\n\n\"Our business was (precluding matters of theology and state affairs) to\ndiscourse and consider of philosophical enquiries, and such as related\nthereunto:--as Physick, Anatomy, Geometry, Astronomy, Navigation,\nStaticks, Magneticks, Chymicks, Mechanicks, and Natural Experiments;\nwith the state of these studies and their cultivation at home and\nabroad. We then discoursed of the circulation of the blood, the valves\nin the veins, the venae lacteae, the lymphatic vessels, the Copernican\nhypothesis, the nature of comets and new stars, the satellites of\nJupiter, the oval shape (as it then appeared) of Saturn, the spots on\nthe sun and its turning on its own axis, the inequalities and\nselenography of the moon, the several phases of Venus and Mercury, the\nimprovement of telescopes and grinding of glasses for that purpose, the\nweight of air, the possibility or impossibility of vacuities and\nnature's abhorrence thereof, the Torricellian experiment in quicksilver,\nthe descent of heavy bodies and the degree of acceleration therein, with\ndivers other things of like nature, some of which were then but new\ndiscoveries, and others not so generally known and embraced as now they\nare; with other things appertaining to what hath been called the New\nPhilosophy, which, from the times of Galileo at Florence, and Sir\nFrancis Bacon (Lord Verulam) in England, hath been much cultivated in\nItaly, France, Germany, and other parts abroad, as well as with us in\nEngland.\"\n\nThe learned Dr. Wallis, writing in 1696, narrates, in these words, what\nhappened half a century before, or about 1645. The associates met at\nOxford, in the rooms of Dr. Wilkins, who was destined to become a\nbishop; and subsequently coming together in London, they attracted the\nnotice of the king. And it is a strange evidence of the taste for\nknowledge which the most obviously worthless of the Stuarts shared with\nhis father and grandfather, that Charles the Second was not content\nwith saying witty things about his philosophers, but did wise things\nwith regard to them. For he not only bestowed upon them such attention\nas he could spare from his poodles and his mistresses, but, being in his\nusual state of impecuniosity, begged for them of the Duke of Ormond;\nand, that step being without effect, gave them Chelsea College, a\ncharter, and a mace: crowning his favours in the best way they could be\ncrowned, by burdening them no further with royal patronage or state\ninterference.\n\nThus it was that the half-dozen young men, studious of the \"New\nPhilosophy,\" who met in one another's lodgings in Oxford or in London,\nin the middle of the seventeenth century, grew in numerical and in real\nstrength, until, in its latter part, the \"Royal Society for the\nImprovement of Natural Knowledge\" had already become famous, and had\nacquired a claim upon the veneration of Englishmen, which it has ever\nsince retained, as the principal focus of scientific activity in our\nislands, and the chief champion of the cause it was formed to support.\n\nIt was by the aid of the Royal Society that Newton published his\n\"Principia.\" If all the books in the world, except the Philosophical\nTransactions, were destroyed, it is safe to say that the foundations of\nphysical science would remain unshaken, and that the vast intellectual\nprogress of the last two centuries would be largely, though\nincompletely, recorded. Nor have any signs of halting or of decrepitude\nmanifested themselves in our own times. As in Dr. Wallis's days, so in\nthese, \"our business is, precluding theology and state affairs, to\ndiscourse and consider of philosophical enquiries.\" But our\n\"Mathematick\" is one which Newton would have to go to school to learn;\nour \"Staticks, Mechanicks, Magneticks, Chymicks, and Natural\nExperiments\" constitute a mass of physical and chemical knowledge, a\nglimpse at which would compensate Galileo for the doings of a score of\ninquisitorial cardinals; our \"Physick\" and \"Anatomy\" have embraced such\ninfinite varieties of being, have laid open such new worlds in time and\nspace, have grappled, not unsuccessfully, with such complex problems,\nthat the eyes of Vesalius and of Harvey might be dazzled by the sight of\nthe tree that has grown out of their grain of mustard seed.\n\n\nThe fact is perhaps rather too much, than too little, forced upon one's\nnotice, nowadays, that all this marvellous intellectual growth has a no\nless wonderful expression in practical life; and that, in this respect,\nif in no other, the movement symbolized by the progress of the Royal\nSociety stands without a parallel in the history of mankind.\n\nA series of volumes as bulky as the Transactions of the Royal Society\nmight possibly be filled with the subtle speculations of the schoolmen;\nnot improbably, the obtaining a mastery over the products of mediaeval\nthought might necessitate an even greater expenditure of time and of\nenergy than the acquirement of the \"New Philosophy;\" but though such\nwork engrossed the best intellects of Europe for a longer time than has\nelapsed since the great fire, its effects were \"writ in water,\" so far\nas our social state is concerned.\n\nOn the other hand, if the noble first President of the Royal Society\ncould revisit the upper air and once more gladden his eyes with a sight\nof the familiar mace, he would find himself in the midst of a material\ncivilization more different from that of his day, than that of the\nseventeenth, was from that of the first, century. And if Lord\nBrouncker's native sagacity had not deserted his ghost, he would need no\nlong reflection to discover that all these great ships, these railways,\nthese telegraphs, these factories, these printing presses, without which\nthe whole fabric of modern English society would collapse into a mass of\nstagnant and starving pauperism,--that all these pillars of our State\nare but the ripples and the bubbles upon the surface of that great\nspiritual stream, the springs of which, only, he and his fellows were\nprivileged to see; and seeing, to recognise as that which it behoved\nthem above all things to keep pure and undefiled.\n\nIt may not be too great a flight of imagination to conceive our noble\n_revenant_ not forgetful of the great troubles of his own day, and\nanxious to know how often London had been burned down since his time,\nand how often the plague had carried off its thousands. He would have to\nlearn that, although London contains tenfold the inflammable matter that\nit did in 1666; though, not content with filling our rooms with woodwork\nand light draperies, we must needs lead inflammable and explosive gases\ninto every corner of our streets and houses, we never allow even a\nstreet to burn down. And if he asked how this had come about, we should\nhave to explain that the improvement of natural knowledge has furnished\nus with dozens of machines for throwing water upon fires, anyone of\nwhich would have furnished the ingenious Mr. Hooke, the first \"curator\nand experimenter\" of the Royal Society, with ample materials for\ndiscourse before half a dozen meetings of that body; and that, to say\ntruth, except for the progress of natural knowledge, we should not have\nbeen able to make even the tools by which these machines are\nconstructed. And, further, it would be necessary to add, that although\nsevere fires sometimes occur and inflict great damage, the loss is very\ngenerally compensated by societies, the operations of which have been\nrendered possible only by the progress of natural knowledge in the\ndirection of mathematics, and the accumulation of wealth in virtue of\nother natural knowledge.\n\nBut the plague? My Lord Brouncker's observation would not, I fear, lead\nhim to think that Englishmen of the nineteenth century are purer in\nlife, or more fervent in religious faith, than the generation which\ncould produce a Boyle, an Evelyn, and a Milton. He might find the mud of\nsociety at the bottom, instead of at the top, but I fear that the sum\ntotal would be as deserving of swift judgment as at the time of the\nRestoration. And it would be our duty to explain once more, and this\ntime not without shame, that we have no reason to believe that it is the\nimprovement of our faith, nor that of our morals, which keeps the plague\nfrom our city; but, again, that it is the improvement of our natural\nknowledge.\n\nWe have learned that pestilences will only take up their abode among\nthose who have prepared unswept and ungarnished residences for them.\nTheir cities must have narrow, unwatered streets, foul with accumulated\ngarbage. Their houses must be ill-drained, ill-lighted, ill-ventilated.\nTheir subjects must be ill-washed, ill-fed, ill-clothed. The London of\n1665 was such a city. The cities of the East, where plague has an\nenduring dwelling, are such cities. We, in later times, have learned\nsomewhat of Nature, and partly obey her. Because of this partial\nimprovement of our natural knowledge and of that fractional obedience,\nwe have no plague; because that knowledge is still very imperfect and\nthat obedience yet incomplete, typhus is our companion and cholera our\nvisitor. But it is not presumptuous to express the belief that, when our\nknowledge is more complete and our obedience the expression of our\nknowledge, London will count her centuries of freedom from typhus and\ncholera, as she now gratefully reckons her two hundred years of\nignorance of that plague which swooped upon her thrice in the first half\nof the seventeenth century.\n\nSurely, there is nothing in these explanations which is not fully borne\nout by the facts? Surely, the principles involved in them are now\nadmitted among the fixed beliefs of all thinking men? Surely, it is true\nthat our countrymen are less subject to fire, famine, pestilence, and\nall the evils which result from a want of command over and due\nanticipation of the course of Nature, than were the countrymen of\nMilton; and health, wealth, and well-being are more abundant with us\nthan with them? But no less certainly is the difference due to the\nimprovement of our knowledge of Nature, and the extent to which that\nimproved knowledge has been incorporated with the household words of\nmen, and has supplied the springs of their daily actions.\n\nGranting for a moment, then, the truth of that which the depreciators of\nnatural knowledge are so fond of urging, that its improvement can only\nadd to the resources of our material civilization; admitting it to be\npossible that the founders of the Royal Society themselves looked for no\nother reward than this, I cannot confess that I was guilty of\nexaggeration when I hinted, that to him who had the gift of\ndistinguishing between prominent events and important events, the origin\nof a combined effort on the part of mankind to improve natural knowledge\nmight have loomed larger than the Plague and have outshone the glare of\nthe Fire; as a something fraught with a wealth of beneficence to\nmankind, in comparison with which the damage done by those ghastly evils\nwould shrink into insignificance.\n\nIt is very certain that for every victim slain by the plague, hundreds\nof mankind exist and find a fair share of happiness in the world, by the\naid of the spinning jenny. And the great fire, at its worst, could not\nhave burned the supply of coal, the daily working of which, in the\nbowels of the earth, made possible by the steam pump, gives rise to an\namount of wealth to which the millions lost in old London are but as an\nold song.\n\n\nBut spinning jenny and steam pump are, after all, but toys, possessing\nan accidental value; and natural knowledge creates multitudes of more\nsubtle contrivances, the praises of which do not happen to be sung\nbecause they are not directly convertible into instruments for creating\nwealth. When I contemplate natural knowledge squandering such gifts\namong men, the only appropriate comparison I can find for her is, to\nliken her to such a peasant woman as one sees in the Alps, striding ever\nupward, heavily burdened, and with mind bent only on her home; but yet,\nwithout effort and without thought, knitting for her children. Now\nstockings are good and comfortable things, and the children will\nundoubtedly be much the better for them; but surely it would be\nshort-sighted, to say the least of it, to depreciate this toiling mother\nas a mere stocking-machine--a mere provider of physical comforts?\n\nHowever, there are blind leaders of the blind, and not a few of them,\nwho take this view of natural knowledge, and can see nothing in the\nbountiful mother of humanity but a sort of comfort-grinding machine.\nAccording to them, the improvement of natural knowledge always has been,\nand always must be, synonymous with no more than the improvement of the\nmaterial resources and the increase of the gratifications of men.\n\nNatural knowledge is, in their eyes, no real mother of mankind, bringing\nthem up with kindness, and, if need be, with sternness, in the way they\nshould go, and instructing them in all things needful for their welfare;\nbut a sort of fairy godmother, ready to furnish her pets with shoes of\nswiftness, swords of sharpness, and omnipotent Aladdin's lamps, so that\nthey may have telegraphs to Saturn, and see the other side of the moon,\nand thank God they are better than their benighted ancestors.\n\nIf this talk were true, I, for one, should not greatly care to toil in\nthe service of natural knowledge. I think I would just as soon be\nquietly chipping my own flint axe, after the manner of my forefathers a\nfew thousand years back, as be troubled with the endless malady of\nthought which now infests us all, for such reward. But I venture to say\nthat such views are contrary alike to reason and to fact. Those who\ndiscourse in such fashion seem to me to be so intent upon trying to see\nwhat is above Nature, or what is behind her, that they are blind to what\nstares them in the face, in her.\n\nI should not venture to speak thus strongly if my justification were not\nto be found in the simplest and most obvious facts,--if it needed more\nthan an appeal to the most notorious truths to justify my assertion,\nthat the improvement of natural knowledge, whatever direction it has\ntaken, and however low the aims of those who may have commenced it--has\nnot only conferred practical benefits on men, but, in so doing, has\neffected a revolution in their conceptions of the universe and of\nthemselves, and has profoundly altered their modes of thinking and their\nviews of right and wrong. I say that natural knowledge, seeking to\nsatisfy natural wants, has found the ideas which can alone still\nspiritual cravings. I say that natural knowledge, in desiring to\nascertain the laws of comfort, has been driven to discover those of\nconduct; and to lay the foundations of a new morality.\n\n\nLet us take these points separately; and, first, what great ideas has\nnatural knowledge introduced into men's minds?\n\nI cannot but think that the foundations of all natural knowledge were\nlaid when the reason of man first came face to face with the facts of\nNature: when the savage first learned that the fingers of one hand are\nfewer than those of both; that it is shorter to cross a stream than to\nhead it; that a stone stops where it is unless it be moved, and that it\ndrops from the hand which lets it go; that light and heat come and go\nwith the sun; that sticks burn away in a fire; that plants and animals\ngrow and die; that if he struck his fellow-savage a blow he would make\nhim angry, and perhaps get a blow in return, while if he offered him a\nfruit he would please him, and perhaps receive a fish in exchange. When\nmen had acquired this much knowledge, the outlines, rude though they\nwere, of mathematics, of physics, of chemistry, of biology, of moral,\neconomical, and political science, were sketched. Nor did the germ of\nreligion fail when science began to bud. Listen to words which, though\nnew, are yet three thousand years old:--\n\n     \"...When in heaven the stars about the moon\n     Look beautiful, when all the winds are laid,\n     And every height comes out, and jutting peak\n     And valley, and the immeasurable heavens\n     Break open to their highest, and all the stars\n     Shine, and the shepherd gladdens in his heart.\"[1]\n\nIf the half-savage Greek could share our feelings thus far, it is\nirrational to doubt that he went further, to find, as we do, that upon\nthat brief gladness there follows a certain sorrow,--the little light of\nawakened human intelligence shines so mere a spark amidst the abyss of\nthe unknown and unknowable; seems so insufficient to do more than\nilluminate the imperfections that cannot be remedied, the aspirations\nthat cannot be realized, of man's own nature. But in this sadness, this\nconsciousness of the limitation of man, this sense of an open secret\nwhich he cannot penetrate, lies the essence of all religion; and the\nattempt to embody it in the forms furnished by the intellect is the\norigin of the higher theologies.\n\nThus it seems impossible to imagine but that the foundations of all\nknowledge--secular or sacred--were laid when intelligence dawned, though\nthe superstructure remained for long ages so slight and feeble as to be\ncompatible with the existence of almost any general view respecting the\nmode of governance of the universe. No doubt, from the first, there were\ncertain phenomena which, to the rudest mind, presented a constancy of\noccurrence, and suggested that a fixed order ruled, at any rate, among\nthem. I doubt if the grossest of Fetish worshippers ever imagined that a\nstone must have a god within it to make it fall, or that a fruit had a\ngod within it to make it taste sweet. With regard to such matters as\nthese, it is hardly questionable that mankind from the first took\nstrictly positive and scientific views.\n\nBut, with respect to all the less familiar occurrences which present\nthemselves, uncultured man, no doubt, has always taken himself as the\nstandard of comparison, as the centre and measure of the world; nor\ncould he well avoid doing so. And finding that his apparently uncaused\nwill has a powerful effect in giving rise to many occurrences, he\nnaturally enough ascribed other and greater events to other and greater\nvolitions, and came to look upon the world and all that therein is, as\nthe product of the volitions of persons like himself, but stronger, and\ncapable of being appeased or angered, as he himself might be soothed or\nirritated. Through such conceptions of the plan and working of the\nuniverse all mankind have passed, or are passing. And we may now\nconsider, what has been the effect of the improvement of natural\nknowledge on the views of men who have reached this stage, and who have\nbegun to cultivate natural knowledge with no desire but that of\n\"increasing God's honour and bettering man's estate.\"\n\nFor example: what could seem wiser, from a mere material point of view,\nmore innocent, from a theological one, to an ancient people, than that\nthey should learn the exact succession of the seasons, as warnings for\ntheir husbandmen; or the position of the stars, as guides to their rude\nnavigators? But what has grown out of this search for natural knowledge\nof so merely useful a character? You all know the reply.\nAstronomy,--which of all sciences has filled men's minds with general\nideas of a character most foreign to their daily experience, and has,\nmore than any other, rendered it impossible for them to accept the\nbeliefs of their fathers. Astronomy,--which tells them that this so vast\nand seemingly solid earth is but an atom among atoms, whirling, no man\nknows whither, through illimitable space; which demonstrates that what\nwe call the peaceful heaven above us, is but that space, filled by an\ninfinitely subtle matter whose particles are seething and surging, like\nthe waves of an angry sea; which opens up to us infinite regions where\nnothing is known, or ever seems to have been known, but matter and\nforce, operating according to rigid rules; which leads us to contemplate\nphenomena the very nature of which demonstrates that they must have had\na beginning, and that they must have an end, but the very nature of\nwhich also proves that the beginning was, to our conceptions of time,\ninfinitely remote, and that the end is as immeasurably distant.\n\nBut it is not alone those who pursue astronomy who ask for bread and\nreceive ideas. What more harmless than the attempt to lift and\ndistribute water by pumping it; what more absolutely and grossly\nutilitarian? But out of pumps grew the discussions about Nature's\nabhorrence of a vacuum; and then it was discovered that Nature does not\nabhor a vacuum, but that air has weight; and that notion paved the way\nfor the doctrine that all matter has weight, and that the force which\nproduces weight is co-extensive with the universe,--in short, to the\ntheory of universal gravitation and endless force. While learning how to\nhandle gases led to the discovery of oxygen, and to modern chemistry,\nand to the notion of the indestructibility of matter.\n\nAgain, what simpler, or more absolutely practical, than the attempt to\nkeep the axle of a wheel from heating when the wheel turns round very\nfast? How useful for carters and gig drivers to know something about\nthis; and how good were it, if any ingenious person would find out the\ncause of such phenomena, and thence educe a general remedy for them.\nSuch an ingenious person was Count Rumford; and he and his successors\nhave landed us in the theory of the persistence, or indestructibility,\nof force. And in the infinitely minute, as in the infinitely great, the\nseekers after natural knowledge, of the kinds called physical and\nchemical, have everywhere found a definite order and succession of\nevents which seem never to be infringed.\n\nAnd how has it fared with \"Physick\" and Anatomy? Have the anatomist, the\nphysiologist, or the physician, whose business it has been to devote\nthemselves assiduously to that eminently practical and direct end, the\nalleviation of the sufferings of mankind,--have they been able to\nconfine their vision more absolutely to the strictly useful? I fear they\nare worst offenders of all. For if the astronomer has set before us the\ninfinite magnitude of space, and the practical eternity of the duration\nof the universe; if the physical and chemical philosophers have\ndemonstrated the infinite minuteness of its constituent parts, and the\npractical eternity of matter and of force; and if both have alike\nproclaimed the universality of a definite and predicable order and\nsuccession of events, the workers in biology have not only accepted all\nthese, but have added more startling theses of their own. For, as the\nastronomers discover in the earth no centre of the universe, but an\neccentric speck, so the naturalists find man to be no centre of the\nliving world, but one amidst endless modifications of life; and as the\nastronomer observes the mark of practically endless time set upon the\narrangements of the solar system, so the student of life finds the\nrecords of ancient forms of existence peopling the world for ages,\nwhich, in relation to human experience, are infinite.\n\nFurthermore, the physiologist finds life to be as dependent for its\nmanifestation on particular molecular arrangements as any physical or\nchemical phenomenon; and, wherever he extends his researches, fixed\norder and unchanging causation reveal themselves, as plainly as in the\nrest of Nature.\n\nNor can I find that any other fate has awaited the germ of Religion.\nArising, like all other kinds of knowledge, out of the action and\ninteraction of man's mind, with that which is not man's mind, it has\ntaken the intellectual coverings of Fetishism or Polytheism; of Theism\nor Atheism; of Superstition or Rationalism. With these, and their\nrelative merits and demerits, I have nothing to do; but this it is\nneedful for my purpose to say, that if the religion of the present\ndiffers from that of the past, it is because the theology of the present\nhas become more scientific than that of the past; because it has not\nonly renounced idols of wood and idols of stone, but begins to see the\nnecessity of breaking in pieces the idols built up of books and\ntraditions and fine-spun ecclesiastical cobwebs: and of cherishing the\nnoblest and most human of man's emotions, by worship \"for the most part\nof the silent sort\" at the altar of the Unknown and Unknowable.\n\nSuch are a few of the new conceptions implanted in our minds by the\nimprovement of natural knowledge. Men have acquired the ideas of the\npractically infinite extent of the universe and of its practical\neternity; they are familiar with the conception that our earth is but an\ninfinitesimal fragment of that part of the universe which can be seen;\nand that, nevertheless, its duration is, as compared with our standards\nof time, infinite. They have further acquired the idea that man is but\none of innumerable forms of life now existing in the globe, and that the\npresent existences are but the last of an immeasurable series of\npredecessors. Moreover, every step they have made in natural knowledge\nhas tended to extend and rivet in their minds the conception of a\ndefinite order of the universe--which is embodied in what are called, by\nan unhappy metaphor, the laws of Nature--and to narrow the range and\nloosen the force of men's belief in spontaneity, or in changes other\nthan such as arise out of that definite order itself.\n\nWhether these ideas are well or ill founded is not the question. No one\ncan deny that they exist, and have been the inevitable outgrowth of the\nimprovement of natural knowledge. And if so, it cannot be doubted that\nthey are changing the form of men's most cherished and most important\nconvictions.\n\n\nAnd as regards the second point--the extent to which the improvement of\nnatural knowledge has remodelled and altered what may be termed the\nintellectual ethics of men,--what are among the moral convictions most\nfondly held by barbarous and semi-barbarous people?\n\nThey are the convictions that authority is the soundest basis of belief;\nthat merit attaches to a readiness to believe; that the doubting\ndisposition is a bad one, and scepticism a sin; that when good authority\nhas pronounced what is to be believed, and faith has accepted it, reason\nhas no further duty. There are many excellent persons who yet hold by\nthese principles, and it is not my present business, or intention, to\ndiscuss their views. All I wish to bring clearly before your minds is\nthe unquestionable fact, that the improvement of natural knowledge is\neffected by methods which directly give the lie to all these\nconvictions, and assume the exact reverse of each to be true.\n\nThe improver of natural knowledge absolutely refuses to acknowledge\nauthority, as such. For him, scepticism is the highest of duties; blind\nfaith the one unpardonable sin. And it cannot be otherwise, for every\ngreat advance in natural knowledge has involved the absolute rejection\nof authority, the cherishing of the keenest scepticism, the annihilation\nof the spirit of blind faith: and the most ardent votary of science\nholds his firmest convictions, not because the men he most venerates\nhold them; not because their verity is testified by portents and\nwonders; but because his experience teaches him that whenever he chooses\nto bring these convictions into contact with their primary source,\nNature--whenever he thinks fit to test them by appealing to experiment\nand to observation--Nature will confirm them. The man of science has\nlearned to believe in justification, not by faith, but by verification.\n\n\nThus, without for a moment pretending to despise the practical results\nof the improvement of natural knowledge, and its beneficial influence on\nmaterial civilization, it must, I think, be admitted that the great\nideas, some of which I have indicated, and the ethical spirit which I\nhave endeavoured to sketch, in the few moments which remained at my\ndisposal, constitute the real and permanent significance of natural\nknowledge.\n\nIf these ideas be destined, as I believe they are, to be more and more\nfirmly established as the world grows older; if that spirit be fated, as\nI believe it is, to extend itself into all departments of human thought,\nand to become co-extensive with the range of knowledge; if, as our race\napproaches its maturity, it discovers, as I believe it will, that there\nis but one kind of knowledge and but one method of acquiring it; then\nwe, who are still children, may justly feel it our highest duty to\nrecognise the advisableness of improving natural knowledge, and so to\naid ourselves and our successors in their course towards the noble goal\nwhich lies before mankind.\n\nFOOTNOTE:\n\n[1] Need it be said that this is Tennyson's English for Homer's Greek?\n\n\n\n\nII.\n\nEMANCIPATION--BLACK AND WHITE.\n\n\nQuashie's plaintive inquiry, \"Am I not a man and a brother?\" seems at\nlast to have received its final reply--the recent decision of the fierce\ntrial by battle on the other side of the Atlantic fully concurring with\nthat long since delivered here in a more peaceful way.\n\nThe question is settled; but even those who are most thoroughly\nconvinced that the doom is just, must see good grounds for repudiating\nhalf the arguments which have been employed by the winning side; and for\ndoubting whether its ultimate results will embody the hopes of the\nvictors, though they may more than realize the fears of the vanquished.\nIt may be quite true that some negroes are better than some white men;\nbut no rational man, cognizant of the facts, believes that the average\nnegro is the equal, still less the superior, of the average white man.\nAnd, if this be true, it is simply incredible that, when all his\ndisabilities are removed, and our prognathous relative has a fair field\nand no favour, as well as no oppressor, he will be able to compete\nsuccessfully with his bigger-brained and smaller-jawed rival, in a\ncontest which is to be carried on by thoughts and not by bites. The\nhighest places in the hierarchy of civilization will assuredly not be\nwithin the reach of our dusky cousins, though it is by no means\nnecessary that they should be restricted to the lowest. But whatever the\nposition of stable equilibrium into which the laws of social gravitation\nmay bring the negro, all responsibility for the result will henceforward\nlie between Nature and him. The white man may wash his hands of it, and\nthe Caucasian conscience be void of reproach for evermore. And this, if\nwe look to the bottom of the matter, is the real justification for the\nabolition policy.\n\nThe doctrine of equal natural rights may be an illogical delusion;\nemancipation may convert the slave from a well fed animal into a\npauperised man; mankind may even have to do without cotton shirts; but\nall these evils must be faced, if the moral law, that no human being can\narbitrarily dominate over another without grievous damage to his own\nnature, be, as many think, as readily demonstrable by experiment as any\nphysical truth. If this be true, no slavery can be abolished without a\ndouble emancipation, and the master will benefit by freedom more than\nthe freed-man.\n\nThe like considerations apply to all the other questions of emancipation\nwhich are at present stirring the world--the multifarious demands that\nclasses of mankind shall be relieved from restrictions imposed by the\nartifice of man, and not by the necessities of Nature. One of the most\nimportant, if not the most important, of all these, is that which daily\nthreatens to become the \"irrepressible\" woman question. What social and\npolitical rights have women? What ought they to be allowed, or not\nallowed, to do, be, and suffer? And, as involved in, and underlying all\nthese questions, how ought they to be educated?\n\nThere are philogynists as fanatical as any \"misogynists\" who, reversing\nour antiquated notions, bid the man look upon the woman as the higher\ntype of humanity; who ask us to regard the female intellect as the\nclearer and the quicker, if not the stronger; who desire us to look up\nto the feminine moral sense as the purer and the nobler; and bid man\nabdicate his usurped sovereignty over Nature in favour of the female\nline. On the other hand, there are persons not to be outdone in all\nloyalty and just respect for woman-kind, but by nature hard of head and\nhaters of delusion, however charming, who not only repudiate the new\nwoman-worship which so many sentimentalists and some philosophers are\ndesirous of setting up, but, carrying their audacity further, deny even\nthe natural equality of the sexes. They assert, on the contrary, that in\nevery excellent character, whether mental or physical, the average woman\nis inferior to the average man, in the sense of having that character\nless in quantity, and lower in quality. Tell these persons of the rapid\nperceptions and the instinctive intellectual insight of women, and they\nreply that the feminine mental peculiarities, which pass under these\nnames, are merely the outcome of a greater impressibility to the\nsuperficial aspects of things, and of the absence of that restraint upon\nexpression, which, in men, is imposed by reflection and a sense of\nresponsibility. Talk of the passive endurance of the weaker sex, and\nopponents of this kind remind you that Job was a man, and that, until\nquite recent times, patience and long-suffering were not counted among\nthe specially feminine virtues. Claim passionate tenderness as\nespecially feminine, and the inquiry is made whether all the best\nlove-poetry in existence (except, perhaps, the \"Sonnets from the\nPortuguese\") has not been written by men; whether the song which\nembodies the ideal of pure and tender passion--Adelaida--was written by\n_Frau_ Beethoven; whether it was the Fornarina, or Raphael, who painted\nthe Sistine Madonna. Nay, we have known one such heretic go so far as to\nlay his hands upon the ark itself, so to speak, and to defend the\nstartling paradox that, even in physical beauty, man is the superior. He\nadmitted, indeed, that there was a brief period of early youth when it\nmight be hard to say whether the prize should be awarded to the graceful\nundulations of the female figure, or the perfect balance and supple\nvigour of the male frame. But while our new Paris might hesitate between\nthe youthful Bacchus and the Venus emerging from the foam, he averred\nthat, when Venus and Bacchus had reached thirty, the point no longer\nadmitted of a doubt; the male form having then attained its greatest\nnobility, while the female is far gone in decadence; and that, at this\nepoch, womanly beauty, so far as it is independent of grace or\nexpression, is a question of drapery and accessories.\n\nSupposing, however, that all these arguments have a certain foundation;\nadmitting for a moment, that they are comparable to those by which the\ninferiority of the negro to the white man may be demonstrated, are they\nof any value as against woman-emancipation? Do they afford us the\nsmallest ground for refusing to educate women as well as men--to give\nwomen the same civil and political rights as men? No mistake is so\ncommonly made by clever people as that of assuming a cause to be bad\nbecause the arguments of its supporters are, to a great extent,\nnonsensical. And we conceive that those who may laugh at the arguments\nof the extreme philogynists, may yet feel bound to work heart and soul\ntowards the attainment of their practical ends.\n\nAs regards education, for example. Granting the alleged defects of\nwomen, is it not somewhat absurd to sanction and maintain a system of\neducation which would seem to have been specially contrived to\nexaggerate all these defects?\n\nNaturally not so firmly strung, nor so well balanced, as boys, girls are\nin great measure debarred from the sports and physical exercises which\nare justly thought absolutely necessary for the full development of the\nvigour of the more favoured sex. Women are, by nature, more excitable\nthan men--prone to be swept by tides of emotion, proceeding from hidden\nand inward, as well as from obvious and external causes; and female\neducation does its best to weaken every physical counterpoise to this\nnervous mobility--tends in all ways to stimulate the emotional part of\nthe mind and stunt the rest. We find girls naturally timid, inclined to\ndependence, born conservatives; and we teach them that independence is\nunladylike; that blind faith is the right frame of mind; and that\nwhatever we may be permitted, and indeed encouraged, to do to our\nbrother, our sister is to be left to the tyranny of authority and\ntradition. With few insignificant exceptions, girls have been educated\neither to be drudges, or toys, beneath man; or a sort of angels above\nhim; the highest ideal aimed at oscillating between Claerchen and\nBeatrice. The possibility that the ideal of womanhood lies neither in\nthe fair saint, nor in the fair sinner; that the female type of\ncharacter is neither better nor worse than the male, but only weaker;\nthat women are meant neither to be men's guides nor their playthings,\nbut their comrades, their fellows and their equals, so far as Nature\nputs no bar to that equality, does not seem to have entered into the\nminds of those who have had the conduct of the education of girls.\n\nIf the present system of female education stands self-condemned, as\ninherently absurd; and if that which we have just indicated is the true\nposition of woman, what is the first step towards a better state of\nthings? We reply, emancipate girls. Recognise the fact that they share\nthe senses, perceptions, feelings, reasoning powers, emotions, of boys,\nand that the mind of the average girl is less different from that of the\naverage boy, than the mind of one boy is from that of another; so that\nwhatever argument justifies a given education for all boys, justifies\nits application to girls as well. So far from imposing artificial\nrestrictions upon the acquirement of knowledge by women, throw every\nfacility in their way. Let our Faustinas, if they will, toil through the\nwhole round of\n\n     \"Juristerei und Medizin,\n     Und leider! auch Philosophie.\"\n\nLet us have \"sweet girl graduates\" by all means. They will be none the\nless sweet for a little wisdom; and the \"golden hair\" will not curl less\ngracefully outside the head by reason of there being brains within. Nay,\nif obvious practical difficulties can be overcome, let those women who\nfeel inclined to do so descend into the gladiatorial arena of life, not\nmerely in the guise of _retiariae_, as heretofore, but as bold\n_sicariae_, breasting the open fray. Let them, if they so please, become\nmerchants, barristers, politicians. Let them have a fair field, but let\nthem understand, as the necessary correlative, that they are to have no\nfavour. Let Nature alone sit above the lists, \"rain influence and judge\nthe prize.\"\n\nAnd the result? For our parts, though loth to prophesy, we believe it\nwill be that of other emancipations. Women will find their place, and it\nwill neither be that in which they have been held, nor that to which\nsome of them aspire. Nature's old salique law will not be repealed, and\nno change of dynasty will be effected. The big chests, the massive\nbrains, the vigorous muscles and stout frames, of the best men will\ncarry the day, whenever it is worth their while to contest the prizes of\nlife with the best women. And the hardship of it is, that the very\nimprovement of the women will lessen their chances. Better mothers will\nbring forth better sons, and the impetus gained by the one sex will be\ntransmitted, in the next generation, to the other. The most Darwinian of\ntheorists will not venture to propound the doctrine, that the physical\ndisabilities under which women have hitherto laboured, in the struggle\nfor existence with men, are likely to be removed by even the most\nskilfully conducted process of educational selection.\n\nWe are, indeed, fully prepared to believe that the bearing of children\nmay, and ought, to become as free from danger and long disability, to\nthe civilized woman, as it is to the savage; nor is it improbable that,\nas society advances towards its right organization, motherhood will\noccupy a less space of woman's life than it has hitherto done. But\nstill, unless the human species is to come to an end altogether--a\nconsummation which can hardly be desired by even the most ardent\nadvocate of \"women's rights\"--somebody must be good enough to take the\ntrouble and responsibility of annually adding to the world exactly as\nmany people as die out of it. In consequence of some domestic\ndifficulties, Sydney Smith is said to have suggested that it would have\nbeen good for the human race had the model offered by the hive been\nfollowed, and had all the working part of the female community been\nneuters. Failing any thorough-going reform of this kind, we see nothing\nfor it but the old division of humanity into men potentially, or\nactually, fathers, and women potentially, if not actually, mothers. And\nwe fear that so long as this potential motherhood is her lot, woman will\nbe found to be fearfully weighted in the race of life.\n\nThe duty of man is to see that not a grain is piled upon that load\nbeyond what Nature imposes; that injustice is not added to inequality.\n\n\n\n\nIII.\n\nA LIBERAL EDUCATION: AND WHERE TO FIND IT.\n\n\nThe business which the South London Working Men's College has undertaken\nis a great work; indeed, I might say, that Education, with which that\ncollege proposes to grapple, is the greatest work of all those which lie\nready to a man's hand just at present.\n\nAnd, at length, this fact is becoming generally recognised. You cannot\ngo anywhere without hearing a buzz of more or less confused and\ncontradictory talk on this subject--nor can you fail to notice that, in\none point at any rate, there is a very decided advance upon like\ndiscussions in former days. Nobody outside the agricultural interest now\ndares to say that education is a bad thing. If any representative of the\nonce large and powerful party, which, in former days, proclaimed this\nopinion, still exists in a semi-fossil state, he keeps his thoughts to\nhimself. In fact, there is a chorus of voices, almost distressing in\ntheir harmony, raised in favour of the doctrine that education is the\ngreat panacea for human troubles, and that, if the country is not\nshortly to go to the dogs, everybody must be educated.\n\nThe politicians tell us, \"you must educate the masses because they are\ngoing to be masters.\" The clergy join in the cry for education, for they\naffirm that the people are drifting away from church and chapel into the\nbroadest infidelity. The manufacturers and the capitalists swell the\nchorus lustily. They declare that ignorance makes bad workmen; that\nEngland will soon be unable to turn out cotton goods, or steam engines,\ncheaper than other people; and then, Ichabod! Ichabod! the glory will be\ndeparted from us. And a few voices are lifted up in favour of the\ndoctrine that the masses should be educated because they are men and\nwomen with unlimited capacities of being, doing, and suffering, and that\nit is as true now, as ever it was, that the people perish for lack of\nknowledge.\n\nThese members of the minority, with whom I confess I have a good deal of\nsympathy, are doubtful whether any of the other reasons urged in favour\nof the education of the people are of much value--whether, indeed, some\nof them are based upon either wise or noble grounds of action. They\nquestion if it be wise to tell people that you will do for them, out of\nfear of their power, what you have left undone, so long as your only\nmotive was compassion for their weakness and their sorrows. And, if\nignorance of everything which it is needful a ruler should know is\nlikely to do so much harm in the governing classes of the future, why is\nit, they ask reasonably enough, that such ignorance in the governing\nclasses of the past has not been viewed with equal horror?\n\nCompare the average artisan and the average country squire, and it may\nbe doubted if you will find a pin to choose between the two in point of\nignorance, class feeling, or prejudice. It is true that the ignorance\nis of a different sort--that the class feeling is in favour of a\ndifferent class, and that the prejudice has a distinct flavour of\nwrong-headedness in each case--but it is questionable if the one is\neither a bit better, or a bit worse than the other. The old\nprotectionist theory is the doctrine of trades unions as applied by the\nsquires, and the modern trades unionism is the doctrine of the squires\napplied by the artisans. Why should we be worse off under one _regime_\nthan under the other?\n\nAgain, this sceptical minority asks the clergy to think whether it is\nreally want of education which keeps the masses away from their\nministrations--whether the most completely educated men are not as open\nto reproach on this score as the workmen; and whether, perchance, this\nmay not indicate that it is not education which lies at the bottom of\nthe matter?\n\nOnce more, these people, whom there is no pleasing, venture to doubt\nwhether the glory, which rests upon being able to undersell all the rest\nof the world, is a very safe kind of glory--whether we may not purchase\nit too dear; especially if we allow education, which ought to be\ndirected to the making of men, to be diverted into a process of\nmanufacturing human tools, wonderfully adroit in the exercise of some\ntechnical industry, but good for nothing else.\n\nAnd, finally, these people inquire whether it is the masses alone who\nneed a reformed and improved education. They ask whether the richest of\nour public schools might not well be made to supply knowledge, as well\nas gentlemanly habits, a strong class feeling, and eminent proficiency\nin cricket. They seem to think that the noble foundations of our old\nuniversities are hardly fulfilling their functions in their present\nposture of half-clerical seminaries, half racecourses, where men are\ntrained to win a senior wranglership, or a double-first, as horses are\ntrained to win a cup, with as little reference to the needs of\nafter-life in the case of the man as in that of the racer. And, while as\nzealous for education as the rest, they affirm that, if the education of\nthe richer classes were such as to fit them to be the leaders and the\ngovernors of the poorer; and, if the education of the poorer classes\nwere such as to enable them to appreciate really wise guidance and good\ngovernance; the politicians need not fear mob-law, nor the clergy lament\ntheir want of flocks, nor the capitalists prognosticate the annihilation\nof the prosperity of the country.\n\nSuch is the diversity of opinion upon the why and the wherefore of\neducation. And my hearers will be prepared to expect that the practical\nrecommendations which are put forward are not less discordant. There is\na loud cry for compulsory education. We English, in spite of constant\nexperience to the contrary, preserve a touching faith in the efficacy of\nacts of parliament; and I believe we should have compulsory education in\nthe course of next session, if there were the least probability that\nhalf a dozen leading statesmen of different parties would agree what\nthat education should be.\n\nSome hold that education without theology is worse than none. Others\nmaintain, quite as strongly, that education with theology is in the same\npredicament. But this is certain, that those who hold the first opinion\ncan by no means agree what theology should be taught; and that those who\nmaintain the second are in a small minority.\n\nAt any rate \"make people learn to read, write, and cipher,\" say a great\nmany; and the advice is undoubtedly sensible as far as it goes. But, as\nhas happened to me in former days, those who, in despair of getting\nanything better, advocate this measure, are met with the objection that\nit is very like making a child practise the use of a knife, fork, and\nspoon, without giving it a particle of meat. I really don't know what\nreply is to be made to such an objection.\n\nBut it would be unprofitable to spend more time in disentangling, or\nrather in showing up the knots in, the ravelled skeins of our\nneighbours. Much more to the purpose is it to ask if we possess any clue\nof our own which may guide us among these entanglements. And by way of a\nbeginning, let us ask ourselves--What is education? Above all things,\nwhat is our ideal of a thoroughly liberal education?--of that education\nwhich, if we could begin life again, we would give ourselves--of that\neducation which, if we could mould the fates to our own will, we would\ngive our children. Well, I know not what may be your conceptions upon\nthis matter, but I will tell you mine, and I hope I shall find that our\nviews are not very discrepant.\n\n\nSuppose it were perfectly certain that the life and fortune of every one\nof us would, one day or other, depend upon his winning or losing a game\nat chess. Don't you think that we should all consider it to be a primary\nduty to learn at least the names and the moves of the pieces; to have a\nnotion of a gambit, and a keen eye for all the means of giving and\ngetting out of check? Do you not think that we should look with a\ndisapprobation amounting to scorn, upon the father who allowed his son,\nor the state which allowed its members, to grow up without knowing a\npawn from a knight?\n\nYet it is a very plain and elementary truth, that the life, the fortune,\nand the happiness of every one of us, and, more or less, of those who\nare connected with us, do depend upon our knowing something of the rules\nof a game infinitely more difficult and complicated than chess. It is a\ngame which has been played for untold ages, every man and woman of us\nbeing one of the two players in a game of his or her own. The\nchess-board is the world, the pieces are the phenomena of the universe,\nthe rules of the game are what we call the laws of Nature. The player on\nthe other side is hidden from us. We know that his play is always fair,\njust, and patient. But also we know, to our cost, that he never\noverlooks a mistake, or makes the smallest allowance for ignorance. To\nthe man who plays well, the highest stakes are paid, with that sort of\noverflowing generosity with which the strong shows delight in strength.\nAnd one who plays ill is checkmated--without haste, but without remorse.\n\nMy metaphor will remind some of you of the famous picture in which\nRetzsch has depicted Satan playing at chess with man for his soul.\nSubstitute for the mocking fiend in that picture, a calm, strong angel\nwho is playing for love, as we say, and would rather lose than win--and\nI should accept it as an image of human life.\n\nWell, what I mean by Education is learning the rules of this mighty\ngame. In other words, education is the instruction of the intellect in\nthe laws of Nature, under which name I include not merely things and\ntheir forces, but men and their ways; and the fashioning of the\naffections and of the will into an earnest and loving desire to move in\nharmony with those laws. For me, education means neither more nor less\nthan this. Anything which professes to call itself education must be\ntried by this standard, and if it fails to stand the test, I will not\ncall it education, whatever may be the force of authority, or of\nnumbers, upon the other side.\n\nIt is important to remember that, in strictness, there is no such thing\nas an uneducated man. Take an extreme case. Suppose that an adult man,\nin the full vigour of his faculties, could be suddenly placed in the\nworld, as Adam is said to have been, and then left to do as he best\nmight. How long would he be left uneducated? Not five minutes. Nature\nwould begin to teach him, through the eye, the ear, the touch, the\nproperties of objects. Pain and pleasure would be at his elbow telling\nhim to do this and avoid that; and by slow degrees the man would receive\nan education, which, if narrow, would be thorough, real, and adequate to\nhis circumstances, though there would be no extras and very few\naccomplishments.\n\nAnd if to this solitary man entered a second Adam, or, better still, an\nEve, a new and greater world, that of social and moral phenomena, would\nbe revealed. Joys and woes, compared with which all others might seem\nbut faint shadows, would spring from the new relations. Happiness and\nsorrow would take the place of the coarser monitors, pleasure and pain;\nbut conduct would still be shaped by the observation of the natural\nconsequences of actions; or, in other words, by the laws of the nature\nof man.\n\nTo every one of us the world was once as fresh and new as to Adam. And\nthen, long before we were susceptible of any other mode of instruction,\nNature took us in hand, and every minute of waking life brought its\neducational influence, shaping our actions into rough accordance with\nNature's laws, so that we might not be ended untimely by too gross\ndisobedience. Nor should I speak of this process of education as past,\nfor any one, be he as old as he may. For every man, the world is as\nfresh as it was at the first day, and as full of untold novelties for\nhim who has the eyes to see them. And Nature is still continuing her\npatient education of us in that great university, the universe, of which\nwe are all members--Nature having no Test-Acts.\n\nThose who take honours in Nature's university, who learn the laws which\ngovern men and things and obey them, are the really great and successful\nmen in this world. The great mass of mankind are the \"Poll,\" who pick up\njust enough to get through without much discredit. Those who won't learn\nat all are plucked; and then you can't come up again. Nature's pluck\nmeans extermination.\n\nThus the question of compulsory education is settled so far as Nature is\nconcerned. Her bill on that question was framed and passed long ago.\nBut, like all compulsory legislation, that of Nature is harsh and\nwasteful in its operation. Ignorance is visited as sharply as wilful\ndisobedience--incapacity meets with the same punishment as crime.\nNature's discipline is not even a word and a blow, and the blow first;\nbut the blow without the word. It is left to you to find out why your\nears are boxed.\n\nThe object of what we commonly call education--that education in which\nman intervenes and which I shall distinguish as artificial education--is\nto make good these defects in Nature's methods; to prepare the child to\nreceive Nature's education, neither incapably nor ignorantly, nor with\nwilful disobedience; and to understand the preliminary symptoms of her\ndispleasure, without waiting for the box on the ear. In short, all\nartificial education ought to be an anticipation of natural education.\nAnd a liberal education is an artificial education, which has not only\nprepared a man to escape the great evils of disobedience to natural\nlaws, but has trained him to appreciate and to seize upon the rewards,\nwhich Nature scatters with as free a hand as her penalties.\n\nThat man, I think, has had a liberal education, who has been so trained\nin youth that his body is the ready servant of his will, and does with\nease and pleasure all the work that, as a mechanism, it is capable of;\nwhose intellect is a clear, cold, logic engine, with all its parts of\nequal strength, and in smooth working order; ready, like a steam engine,\nto be turned to any kind of work, and spin the gossamers as well as\nforge the anchors of the mind; whose mind is stored with a knowledge of\nthe great and fundamental truths of Nature and of the laws of her\noperations; one who, no stunted ascetic, is full of life and fire, but\nwhose passions are trained to come to heel by a vigorous will, the\nservant of a tender conscience; who has learned to love all beauty,\nwhether of Nature or of art, to hate all vileness, and to respect others\nas himself.\n\nSuch an one and no other, I conceive, has had a liberal education; for\nhe is, as completely as a man can be, in harmony with Nature. He will\nmake the best of her, and she of him. They will get on together rarely;\nshe as his ever beneficent mother; he as her mouth-piece, her conscious\nself, her minister and interpreter.\n\n\nWhere is such an education as this to be had? Where is there any\napproximation to it? Has any one tried to found such an education?\nLooking over the length and breadth of these islands, I am afraid that\nall these questions must receive a negative answer. Consider our primary\nschools, and what is taught in them. A child learns:--\n\n1. To read, write, and cipher, more or less well; but in a very large\nproportion of cases not so well as to take pleasure in reading, or to be\nable to write the commonest letter properly.\n\n2. A quantity of dogmatic theology, of which the child, nine times out\nof ten, understands next to nothing.\n\n3. Mixed up with this, so as to seem to stand or fall with it, a few of\nthe broadest and simplest principles of morality. This, to my mind, is\nmuch as if a man of science should make the story of the fall of the\napple in Newton's garden, an integral part of the doctrine of\ngravitation, and teach it as of equal authority with the law of the\ninverse squares.\n\n4. A good deal of Jewish history and Syrian geography, and, perhaps, a\nlittle something about English history and the geography of the child's\nown country. But I doubt if there is a primary school in England in\nwhich hangs a map of the hundred in which the village lies, so that the\nchildren may be practically taught by it what a map means.\n\n5. A certain amount of regularity, attentive obedience, respect for\nothers: obtained by fear, if the master be incompetent or foolish; by\nlove and reverence, if he be wise.\n\nSo far as this school course embraces a training in the theory and\npractice of obedience to the moral laws of Nature, I gladly admit, not\nonly that it contains a valuable educational element, but that, so far,\nit deals with the most valuable and important part of all education.\nYet, contrast what is done in this direction with what might be done;\nwith the time given to matters of comparatively no importance; with the\nabsence of any attention to things of the highest moment; and one is\ntempted to think of Falstaff's bill and \"the halfpenny worth of bread to\nall that quantity of sack.\"\n\nLet us consider what a child thus \"educated\" knows, and what it does not\nknow. Begin with the most important topic of all--morality, as the guide\nof conduct. The child knows well enough that some acts meet with\napprobation and some with disapprobation. But it has never heard that\nthere lies in the nature of things a reason for every moral law, as\ncogent and as well defined as that which underlies every physical law;\nthat stealing and lying are just as certain to be followed by evil\nconsequences, as putting your hand in the fire, or jumping out of a\ngarret window. Again, though the scholar may have been made acquainted,\nin dogmatic fashion, with the broad laws of morality, he has had no\ntraining in the application of those laws to the difficult problems\nwhich result from the complex conditions of modern civilization. Would\nit not be very hard to expect anyone to solve a problem in conic\nsections who had merely been taught the axioms and definitions of\nmathematical science?\n\nA workman has to bear hard labour, and perhaps privation, while he sees\nothers rolling in wealth, and feeding their dogs with what would keep\nhis children from starvation. Would it not be well to have helped that\nman to calm the natural promptings of discontent by showing him, in his\nyouth, the necessary connexion of the moral law which prohibits stealing\nwith the stability of society--by proving to him, once for all, that it\nis better for his own people, better for himself, better for future\ngenerations, that he should starve than steal? If you have no foundation\nof knowledge, or habit of thought, to work upon, what chance have you of\npersuading a hungry man that a capitalist is not a thief \"with a\ncircumbendibus?\" And if he honestly believes that, of what avail is it\nto quote the commandment against stealing, when he proposes to make the\ncapitalist disgorge?\n\nAgain, the child learns absolutely nothing of the history or the\npolitical organization of his own country. His general impression is,\nthat everything of much importance happened a very long while ago; and\nthat the Queen and the gentlefolks govern the country much after the\nfashion of King David and the elders and nobles of Israel--his sole\nmodels. Will you give a man with this much information a vote? In easy\ntimes he sells it for a pot of beer. Why should he not? It is of about\nas much use to him as a chignon, and he knows as much what to do with\nit, for any other purpose. In bad times, on the contrary, he applies his\nsimple theory of government, and believes that his rulers are the cause\nof his sufferings--a belief which sometimes bears remarkable practical\nfruits.\n\nLeast of all, does the child gather from this primary \"education\" of\nours a conception of the laws of the physical world, or of the relations\nof cause and effect therein. And this is the more to be lamented, as the\npoor are especially exposed to physical evils, and are more interested\nin removing them than any other class of the community. If any one is\nconcerned in knowing the ordinary laws of mechanics one would think it\nis the hand-labourer, whose daily toil lies among levers and pulleys; or\namong the other implements of artisan work. And if any one is interested\nin the laws of health, it is the poor workman, whose strength is wasted\nby ill-prepared food, whose health is sapped by bad ventilation and bad\ndrainage, and half whose children are massacred by disorders which might\nbe prevented. Not only does our present primary education carefully\nabstain from hinting to the workman that some of his greatest evils are\ntraceable to mere physical agencies, which could be removed by energy,\npatience, and frugality; but it does worse--it renders him, so far as it\ncan, deaf to those who could help him, and tries to substitute an\nOriental submission to what is falsely declared to be the will of God,\nfor his natural tendency to strive after a better condition.\n\nWhat wonder then, if very recently, an appeal has been made to\nstatistics for the profoundly foolish purpose of showing that education\nis of no good--that it diminishes neither misery, nor crime, among the\nmasses of mankind? I reply, why should the thing which has been called\neducation do either the one or the other? If I am a knave or a fool,\nteaching me to read and write won't make me less of either one or the\nother--unless somebody shows me how to put my reading and writing to\nwise and good purposes.\n\nSuppose any one were to argue that medicine is of no use, because it\ncould be proved statistically, that the percentage of deaths was just\nthe same, among people who had been taught how to open a medicine chest,\nand among those who did not so much as know the key by sight. The\nargument is absurd; but it is not more preposterous than that against\nwhich I am contending. The only medicine for suffering, crime, and all\nthe other woes of mankind, is wisdom. Teach a man to read and write, and\nyou have put into his hands the great keys of the wisdom box. But it is\nquite another matter whether he ever opens the box or not. And he is as\nlikely to poison as to cure himself, if, without guidance, he swallows\nthe first drug that comes to hand. In these times a man may as well be\npurblind, as unable to read--lame, as unable to write. But I protest\nthat, if I thought the alternative were a necessary one, I would rather\nthat the children of the poor should grow up ignorant of both these\nmighty arts, than that they should remain ignorant of that knowledge to\nwhich these arts are means.\n\n\nIt may be said that all these animadversions may apply to primary\nschools, but that the higher schools, at any rate, must be allowed to\ngive a liberal education. In fact, they professedly sacrifice everything\nelse to this object.\n\nLet us inquire into this matter. What do the higher schools, those to\nwhich the great middle class of the country sends it children, teach,\nover and above the instruction given in the primary schools? There is a\nlittle more reading and writing of English. But, for all that, every\none knows that it is a rare thing to find a boy of the middle or upper\nclasses who can read aloud decently, or who can put his thoughts on\npaper in clear and grammatical (to say nothing of good or elegant)\nlanguage. The \"ciphering\" of the lower schools expands into elementary\nmathematics in the higher; into arithmetic, with a little algebra, a\nlittle Euclid. But I doubt if one boy in five hundred has ever heard the\nexplanation of a rule of arithmetic, or knows his Euclid otherwise than\nby rote.\n\nOf theology, the middle class schoolboy gets rather less than poorer\nchildren, less absolutely and less relatively, because there are so many\nother claims upon his attention. I venture to say that, in the great\nmajority of cases, his ideas on this subject when he leaves school are\nof the most shadowy and vague description, and associated with painful\nimpressions of the weary hours spent in learning collects and catechism\nby heart.\n\nModern geography, modern history, modern literature; the English\nlanguage as a language; the whole circle of the sciences, physical,\nmoral, and social, are even more completely ignored in the higher than\nin the lower schools. Up till within a few years back, a boy might have\npassed through any one of the great public schools with the greatest\ndistinction and credit, and might never so much as have heard of one of\nthe subjects I have just mentioned. He might never have heard that the\nearth goes round the sun; that England underwent a great revolution in\n1688, and France another in 1789; that there once lived certain notable\nmen called Chaucer, Shakspeare, Milton, Voltaire, Goethe, Schiller. The\nfirst might be a German and the last an Englishman for anything he\ncould tell you to the contrary. And as for science, the only idea the\nword would suggest to his mind would be dexterity in boxing.\n\nI have said that this was the state of things a few years back, for the\nsake of the few righteous who are to be found among the educational\ncities of the plain. But I would not have you too sanguine about the\nresult, if you sound the minds of the existing generation of public\nschool-boys, on such topics as those I have mentioned.\n\nNow let us pause to consider this wonderful state of affairs; for the\ntime will come when Englishmen will quote it as the stock example of the\nstolid stupidity of their ancestors in the nineteenth century. The most\nthoroughly commercial people, the greatest voluntary wanderers and\ncolonists the world has ever seen, are precisely the middle classes of\nthis country. If there be a people which has been busy making history on\nthe great scale for the last three hundred years--and the most\nprofoundly interesting history--history which, if it happened to be that\nof Greece or Rome, we should study with avidity--it is the English. If\nthere be a people which, during the same period, has developed a\nremarkable literature, it is our own. If there be a nation whose\nprosperity depends absolutely and wholly upon their mastery over the\nforces of Nature, upon their intelligent apprehension of, and obedience\nto, the laws of the creation and distribution of wealth, and of the\nstable equilibrium of the forces of society, it is precisely this\nnation. And yet this is what these wonderful people tell their\nsons:--\"At the cost of from one to two thousand pounds of our hard\nearned money, we devote twelve of the most precious years of your lives\nto school. There you shall toil, or be supposed to toil; but there you\nshall not learn one single thing of all those you will most want to\nknow, directly you leave school and enter upon the practical business of\nlife. You will in all probability go into business, but you shall not\nknow where, or how, any article of commerce is produced, or the\ndifference between an export or an import, or the meaning of the word\n'capital.' You will very likely settle in a colony, but you shall not\nknow whether Tasmania is part of New South Wales, or _vice versa_.\n\n\"Very probably you may become a manufacturer, but you shall not be\nprovided with the means of understanding the working of one of your own\nsteam-engines, or the nature of the raw products you employ; and, when\nyou are asked to buy a patent, you shall not have the slightest means of\njudging whether the inventor is an impostor who is contravening the\nelementary principles of science, or a man who will make you as rich as\nCroesus.\n\n\"You will very likely get into the House of Commons. You will have to\ntake your share in making laws which may prove a blessing or a curse to\nmillions of men. But you shall not hear one word respecting the\npolitical organization of your country; the meaning of the controversy\nbetween freetraders and protectionists shall never have been mentioned\nto you: you shall not so much as know that there are such things as\neconomical laws.\n\n\"The mental power which will be of most importance in your daily life\nwill be the power of seeing things as they are without regard to\nauthority; and of drawing accurate general conclusions from particular\nfacts. But at school and at college you shall know of no source of truth\nbut authority; nor exercise your reasoning faculty upon anything but\ndeduction from that which is laid down by authority.\n\n\"You will have to weary your soul with work, and many a time eat your\nbread in sorrow and in bitterness, and you shall not have learned to\ntake refuge in the great source of pleasure without alloy, the serene\nresting-place for worn human nature,--the world of art.\"\n\nSaid I not rightly that we are a wonderful people? I am quite prepared\nto allow, that education entirely devoted to these omitted subjects\nmight not be a completely liberal education. But is an education which\nignores them all, a liberal education? Nay, is it too much to say that\nthe education which should embrace these subjects and no others, would\nbe a real education, though an incomplete one; while an education which\nomits them is really not an education at all, but a more or less useful\ncourse of intellectual gymnastics?\n\n\nFor what does the middle-class school put in the place of all these\nthings which are left out? It substitutes what is usually comprised\nunder the compendious title of the \"classics\"--that is to say, the\nlanguages, the literature, and the history of the ancient Greeks and\nRomans, and the geography of so much of the world as was known to these\ntwo great nations of antiquity. Now, do not expect me to depreciate the\nearnest and enlightened pursuit of classical learning. I have not the\nleast desire to speak ill of such occupations, nor any sympathy with\nthose who run them down. On the contrary, if my opportunities had lain\nin that direction, there is no investigation into which I could have\nthrown myself with greater delight than that of antiquity.\n\nWhat science can present greater attractions than philology? How can a\nlover of literary excellence fail to rejoice in the ancient\nmasterpieces? And with what consistency could I, whose business lies so\nmuch in the attempt to decipher the past, and to build up intelligible\nforms out of the scattered fragments of long-extinct beings, fail to\ntake a sympathetic, though an unlearned, interest in the labours of a\nNiebuhr, a Gibbon, or a Grote? Classical history is a great section of\nthe palaeontology of man; and I have the same double respect for it as\nfor other kinds of palaeontology--that is to say, a respect for the facts\nwhich it establishes as for all facts, and a still greater respect for\nit as a preparation for the discovery of a law of progress.\n\nBut if the classics were taught as they might be taught--if boys and\ngirls were instructed in Greek and Latin, not merely as languages, but\nas illustrations of philological science; if a vivid picture of life on\nthe shores of the Mediterranean, two thousand years ago, were imprinted\non the minds of scholars; if ancient history were taught, not as a weary\nseries of feuds and fights, but traced to its causes in such men placed\nunder such conditions; if, lastly, the study of the classical books were\nfollowed in such a manner as to impress boys with their beauties, and\nwith the grand simplicity of their statement of the everlasting problems\nof human life, instead of with their verbal and grammatical\npeculiarities; I still think it as little proper that they should form\nthe basis of a liberal education for our contemporaries, as I should\nthink it fitting to make that sort of palaeontology with which I am\nfamiliar, the back-bone of modern education.\n\nIt is wonderful how close a parallel to classical training could be made\nout of that palaeontology to which I refer. In the first place I could\nget up an osteological primer so arid, so pedantic in its terminology,\nso altogether distasteful to the youthful mind, as to beat the recent\nfamous production of the head-masters out of the field in all these\nexcellences. Next, I could exercise my boys upon easy fossils, and bring\nout all their powers of memory and all their ingenuity in the\napplication of my osteo-grammatical rules to the interpretation, or\nconstruing, of those fragments. To those who had reached the higher\nclasses, I might supply odd bones to be built up into animals, giving\ngreat honour and reward to him who succeeded in fabricating monsters\nmost entirely in accordance with the rules. That would answer to\nverse-making and essay-writing in the dead languages.\n\nTo be sure, if a great comparative anatomist were to look at these\nfabrications he might shake his head, or laugh. But what then? Would\nsuch a catastrophe destroy the parallel? What think you would Cicero, or\nHorace, say to the production of the best sixth form going? And would\nnot Terence stop his ears and run out if he could be present at an\nEnglish performance of his own plays? Would Hamlet, in the mouths of a\nset of French actors, who should insist on pronouncing English after the\nfashion of their own tongue, be more hideously ridiculous?\n\nBut it will be said that I am forgetting the beauty, and the human\ninterest, which appertain to classical studies. To this I reply that it\nis only a very strong man who can appreciate the charms of a landscape,\nas he is toiling up a steep hill, along a bad road. What with\nshort-windedness, stones, ruts, and a pervading sense of the wisdom of\nrest and be thankful, most of us have little enough sense of the\nbeautiful under these circumstances. The ordinary school-boy is\nprecisely in this case. He finds Parnassus uncommonly steep, and there\nis no chance of his having much time or inclination to look about him\ntill he gets to the top. And nine times out of ten he does not get to\nthe top.\n\nBut if this be a fair picture of the results of classical teaching at\nits best--and I gather from those who have authority to speak on such\nmatters that it is so--what is to be said of classical teaching at its\nworst, or in other words, of the classics of our ordinary middle-class\nschools[2]? I will tell you. It means getting up endless forms and rules\nby heart. It means turning Latin and Greek into English, for the mere\nsake of being able to do it, and without the smallest regard to the\nworth, or worthlessness, of the author read. It means the learning of\ninnumerable, not always decent, fables in such a shape that the meaning\nthey once had is dried up into utter trash; and the only impression left\nupon a boy's mind is, that the people who believed such things must have\nbeen the greatest idiots the world ever saw. And it means, finally, that\nafter a dozen years spent at this kind of work, the sufferer shall be\nincompetent to interpret a passage in an author he has not already got\nup; that he shall loathe the sight of a Greek or Latin book; and that he\nshall never open, or think of, a classical writer again, until,\nwonderful to relate, he insists upon submitting his sons to the same\nprocess.\n\nThese be your gods, O Israel! For the sake of this net result (and\nrespectability) the British father denies his children all the knowledge\nthey might turn to account in life, not merely for the achievement of\nvulgar success, but for guidance in the great crises of human existence.\nThis is the stone he offers to those whom he is bound by the strongest\nand tenderest ties to feed with bread.\n\n\nIf primary and secondary education are in this unsatisfactory state,\nwhat is to be said to the universities? This is an awful subject, and\none I almost fear to touch with my unhallowed hands; but I can tell you\nwhat those say who have authority to speak.\n\nThe Rector of Lincoln College, in his lately published, valuable\n\"Suggestions for Academical Organization with especial reference to\nOxford,\" tells us (p. 127):--\n\n\"The colleges were, in their origin, endowments, not for the elements of\na general liberal education, but for the prolonged study of special and\nprofessional faculties by men of riper age. The universities embraced\nboth these objects. The colleges, while they incidentally aided in\nelementary education, were specially devoted to the highest learning....\n\n\"This was the theory of the middle-age university and the design of\ncollegiate foundations in their origin. Time and circumstances have\nbrought about a total change. The colleges no longer promote the\nresearches of science, or direct professional study. Here and there\ncollege walls may shelter an occasional student, but not in larger\nproportions than may be found in private life. Elementary teaching of\nyouths under twenty is now the only function performed by the\nuniversity, and almost the only object of college endowments. Colleges\nwere homes for the life-study of the highest and most abstruse parts of\nknowledge. They have become boarding schools in which the elements of\nthe learned languages are taught to youths.\"\n\nIf Mr. Pattison's high position, and his obvious love and respect for\nhis university, be insufficient to convince the outside world that\nlanguage so severe is yet no more than just, the authority of the\nCommissioners who reported on the University of Oxford in 1850 is open\nto no challenge. Yet they write:--\n\n\"It is generally acknowledged that both Oxford and the country at large\nsuffer greatly from the absence of a body of learned men devoting their\nlives to the cultivation of science, and to the direction of academical\neducation.\n\n\"The fact that so few books of profound research emanate from the\nUniversity of Oxford, materially impairs its character as a seat of\nlearning, and consequently its hold on the respect of the nation.\"\n\nCambridge can claim no exemption from the reproaches addressed to\nOxford. And thus there seems no escape from the admission that what we\nfondly call our great seats of learning are simply \"boarding schools\"\nfor bigger boys; that learned men are not more numerous in them than out\nof them; that the advancement of knowledge is not the object of fellows\nof colleges; that, in the philosophic calm and meditative stillness of\ntheir greenswarded courts, philosophy does not thrive, and meditation\nbears few fruits.\n\nIt is my great good fortune to reckon amongst my friends resident\nmembers of both universities, who are men of learning and research,\nzealous cultivators of science, keeping before their minds a noble ideal\nof a university, and doing their best to make that ideal a reality; and,\nto me, they would necessarily typify the universities, did not the\nauthoritative statements I have quoted compel me to believe that they\nare exceptional, and not representative men. Indeed, upon calm\nconsideration, several circumstances lead me to think that the Rector of\nLincoln College and the Commissioners cannot be far wrong.\n\nI believe there can be no doubt that the foreigner who should wish to\nbecome acquainted with the scientific, or the literary, activity of\nmodern England, would simply lose his time and his pains if he visited\nour universities with that object.\n\nAnd, as for works of profound research on any subject, and, above all,\nin that classical lore for which the universities profess to sacrifice\nalmost everything else, why, a third-rate, poverty-stricken German\nuniversity turns out more produce of that kind in one year, than our\nvast and wealthy foundations elaborate in ten.\n\nAsk the man who is investigating any question, profoundly and\nthoroughly--be it historical, philosophical, philological, physical,\nliterary, or theological; who is trying to make himself master of any\nabstract subject (except, perhaps, political economy and geology, both\nof which are intensely Anglican sciences) whether he is not compelled\nto read half a dozen times as many German, as English, books? And\nwhether, of these English books, more than one in ten is the work of a\nfellow of a college, or a professor of an English university?\n\nIs this from any lack of power in the English as compared with the\nGerman mind? The countrymen of Grote and of Mill, of Faraday, of Robert\nBrown, of Lyell, and of Darwin, to go no further back than the\ncontemporaries of men of middle age, can afford to smile at such a\nsuggestion. England can show now, as she has been able to show in every\ngeneration since civilization spread over the West, individual men who\nhold their own against the world, and keep alive the old tradition of\nher intellectual eminence.\n\nBut, in the majority of cases, these men are what they are in virtue of\ntheir native intellectual force, and of a strength of character which\nwill not recognise impediments. They are not trained in the courts of\nthe Temple of Science, but storm the walls of that edifice in all sorts\nof irregular ways, and with much loss of time and power, in order to\nobtain their legitimate positions.\n\nOur universities not only do not encourage such men; do not offer them\npositions, in which it should be their highest duty to do, thoroughly,\nthat which they are most capable of doing; but, as far as possible,\nuniversity training shuts out of the minds of those among them, who are\nsubjected to it, the prospect that there is anything in the world for\nwhich they are specially fitted. Imagine the success of the attempt to\nstill the intellectual hunger any of the men I have mentioned, by\nputting before him, as the object of existence, the successful mimicry\nof the measure of a Greek song, or the roll of Ciceronian prose! Imagine\nhow much success would be likely to attend the attempt to persuade such\nmen, that the education which leads to perfection in such elegancies is\nalone to be called culture; while the facts of history, the process of\nthought, the conditions of moral and social existence, and the laws of\nphysical nature, are left to be dealt with as they may, by outside\nbarbarians!\n\nIt is not thus that the German universities, from being beneath notice a\ncentury ago, have become what they are now--the most intensely\ncultivated and the most productive intellectual corporations the world\nhas ever seen.\n\nThe student who repairs to them sees in the list of classes and of\nprofessors a fair picture of the world of knowledge. Whatever he needs\nto know there is some one ready to teach him, some one competent to\ndiscipline him in the way of learning; whatever his special bent, let\nhim but be able and diligent, and in due time he shall find distinction\nand a career. Among his professors, he sees men whose names are known\nand revered throughout the civilized world; and their living example\ninfects him with a noble ambition, and a love for the spirit of work.\n\nThe Germans dominate the intellectual world by virtue of the same simple\nsecret as that which made Napoleon the master of old Europe. They have\ndeclared _la carriere ouverte aux talents_, and every Bursch marches\nwith a professor's gown in his knapsack. Let him become a great scholar,\nor man of science, and ministers will compete for his services. In\nGermany, they do not leave the chance of his holding the office he\nwould render illustrious to the tender mercies of a hot canvass, and the\nfinal wisdom of a mob of country parsons.\n\nIn short, in Germany, the universities are exactly what the Rector of\nLincoln and the Commissioners tell us the English universities are not;\nthat is to say, corporations \"of learned men devoting their lives to the\ncultivation of science, and the direction of academical education.\" They\nare not \"boarding schools for youths,\" nor clerical seminaries; but\ninstitutions for the higher culture of men, in which the theological\nfaculty is of no more importance, or prominence, than the rest; and\nwhich are truly \"universities,\" since they strive to represent and\nembody the totality of human knowledge, and to find room for all forms\nof intellectual activity.\n\nMay zealous and clear-headed reformers like Mr. Pattison succeed in\ntheir noble endeavours to shape our universities towards some such ideal\nas this, without losing what is valuable and distinctive in their social\ntone! But until they have succeeded, a liberal education will be no more\nobtainable in our Oxford and Cambridge Universities than in our public\nschools.\n\n\nIf I am justified in my conception of the ideal of a liberal education;\nand if what I have said about the existing educational institutions of\nthe country is also true, it is clear that the two have no sort of\nrelation to one another; that the best of our schools and the most\ncomplete of our university trainings give but a narrow, one-sided, and\nessentially illiberal education--while the worst give what is really\nnext to no education at all. The South London Working-Men's College\ncould not copy any of these institutions if it would. I am bold enough\nto express the conviction that it ought not if it could.\n\nFor what is wanted is the reality and not the mere name of a liberal\neducation; and this College must steadily set before itself the ambition\nto be able to give that education sooner or later. At present we are but\nbeginning, sharpening our educational tools, as it were, and, except a\nmodicum of physical science, we are not able to offer much more than is\nto be found in an ordinary school.\n\nMoral and social science--one of the greatest and most fruitful of our\nfuture classes, I hope--at present lacks only one thing in our\nprogramme, and that is a teacher. A considerable want, no doubt; but it\nmust be recollected that it is much better to want a teacher than to\nwant the desire to learn.\n\nFurther, we need what, for want of a better name, I must call Physical\nGeography. What I mean is that which the Germans call \"_Erdkunde_.\" It\nis a description of the earth, of its place and relation to other\nbodies; of its general structure, and of its great features--winds,\ntides, mountains, plains; of the chief forms of the vegetable and animal\nworlds, of the varieties of man. It is the peg upon which the greatest\nquantity of useful and entertaining scientific information can be\nsuspended.\n\nLiterature is not upon the College programme; but I hope some day to see\nit there. For literature is the greatest of all sources of refined\npleasure, and one of the great uses of a liberal education is to enable\nus to enjoy that pleasure. There is scope enough for the purposes of\nliberal education in the study of the rich treasures of our own language\nalone. All that is needed is direction, and the cultivation of a refined\ntaste by attention to sound criticism. But there is no reason why French\nand German should not be mastered sufficiently to read what is worth\nreading in those languages, with pleasure and with profit.\n\nAnd finally, by-and-by, we must have History; treated not as a\nsuccession of battles and dynasties; not as a series of biographies; not\nas evidence that Providence has always been on the side of either Whigs\nor Tories; but as the development of man in times past, and in other\nconditions than our own.\n\nBut, as it is one of the principles of our College to be\nself-supporting, the public must lead, and we must follow, in these\nmatters. If my hearers take to heart what I have said about liberal\neducation, they will desire these things, and I doubt not we shall be\nable to supply them. But we must wait till the demand is made.\n\nFOOTNOTE:\n\n[2] For a justification of what is here said about these schools, see\nthat valuable book, \"Essays on a Liberal Education,\" _passim_.\n\n\n\n\nIV.\n\nSCIENTIFIC EDUCATION: NOTES OF AN AFTER-DINNER SPEECH.\n\n     [MR. THACKERAY, talking of after-dinner speeches, has\n     lamented that \"one never can recollect the fine things one thought\n     of in the cab,\" in going to the place of entertainment. I am not\n     aware that there are any \"fine things\" in the following pages, but\n     such as there are stand to a speech which really did get itself\n     spoken, at the hospitable table of the Liverpool Philomathic\n     Society, more or less in the position of what \"one thought of in\n     the cab.\"]\n\n\nThe introduction of scientific training into the general education of\nthe country is a topic upon which I could not have spoken, without some\nmore or less apologetic introduction, a few years ago. But upon this, as\nupon other matters, public opinion has of late undergone a rapid\nmodification. Committees of both Houses of the Legislature have agreed\nthat something must be done in this direction, and have even thrown out\ntimid and faltering suggestions as to what should be done; while at the\nopposite pole of society, committees of working-men have expressed their\nconviction that scientific training is the one thing needful for their\nadvancement, whether as men, or as workmen. Only the other day, it was\nmy duty to take part in the reception of a deputation of London working\nmen, who desired to learn from Sir Roderick Murchison, the Director of\nthe Royal School of Mines, whether the organization of the Institution\nin Jermyn Street could be made available for the supply of that\nscientific instruction, the need of which could not have been\napprehended, or stated, more clearly than it was by them.\n\nThe heads of colleges in our great Universities (who have not the\nreputation of being the most mobile of persons) have, in several cases,\nthought it well that, out of the great number of honours and rewards at\ntheir disposal, a few should hereafter be given to the cultivators of\nthe physical sciences. Nay, I hear that some colleges have even gone so\nfar as to appoint one, or, may be, two special tutors for the purpose of\nputting the facts and principles of physical science before the\nundergraduate mind. And I say it with gratitude and great respect for\nthose eminent persons, that the head masters of our public schools,\nEton, Harrow, Winchester, have addressed themselves to the problem of\nintroducing instruction in physical science among the studies of those\ngreat educational bodies, with much honesty of purpose and enlightenment\nof understanding; and I live in hope that, before long, important\nchanges in this direction will be carried into effect in those\nstrongholds of ancient prescription. In fact, such changes have already\nbeen made, and physical science, even now, constitutes a recognised\nelement of the school curriculum in Harrow and Rugby, whilst I\nunderstand that ample preparations for such studies are being made at\nEton and elsewhere.\n\nLooking at these facts, I might perhaps spare myself the trouble of\ngiving any reasons for the introduction of physical science into\nelementary education; yet I cannot but think that it may be well, if I\nplace before you some considerations which, perhaps, have hardly\nreceived full attention.\n\nAt other times, and in other places, I have endeavoured to state the\nhigher and more abstract arguments, by which the study of physical\nscience may be shown to be indispensable to the complete training of the\nhuman mind; but I do not wish it to be supposed that, because I happen\nto be devoted to more or less abstract and \"unpractical\" pursuits, I am\ninsensible to the weight which ought to be attached to that which has\nbeen said to be the English conception of Paradise--\"namely, getting\non.\" I look upon it, that \"getting on\" is a very important matter\nindeed. I do not mean merely for the sake of the coarse and tangible\nresults of success, but because humanity is so constituted that a vast\nnumber of us would never be impelled to those stretches of exertion\nwhich make us wiser and more capable men, if it were not for the\nabsolute necessity of putting on our faculties all the strain they will\nbear, for the purpose of \"getting on\" in the most practical sense.\n\nNow the value of a knowledge of physical science as a means of getting\non, is indubitable. There are hardly any of our trades, except the\nmerely huckstering ones, in which some knowledge of science may not be\ndirectly profitable to the pursuer of that occupation. As industry\nattains higher stages of its development, as its processes become more\ncomplicated and refined, and competition more keen, the sciences are\ndragged in, one by one, to take their share in the fray; and he who can\nbest avail himself of their help is the man who will come out uppermost\nin that struggle for existence which goes on as fiercely beneath the\nsmooth surface of modern society, as among the wild inhabitants of the\nwoods.\n\nBut, in addition to the bearing of science on ordinary practical life,\nlet me direct your attention to its immense influence on several of the\nprofessions. I ask any one who has adopted the calling of an engineer,\nhow much time he lost when he left school, because he had to devote\nhimself to pursuits which were absolutely novel and strange, and of\nwhich he had not obtained the remotest conception from his instructors?\nHe had to familiarize himself with ideas of the course and powers of\nNature, to which his attention had never been directed during his\nschool-life, and to learn, for the first time, that a world of facts\nlies outside and beyond the world of words. I appeal to those who know\nwhat Engineering is, to say how far I am right in respect to that\nprofession; but with regard to another, of no less importance, I shall\nventure to speak of my own knowledge. There is no one of who may not at\nany moment be thrown, bound hand and foot by physical incapacity, into the\nhands of a medical practitioner. The chances of life and death for all\nand each of us may, at any moment, depend on the skill with which that\npractitioner is able to make out what is wrong in our bodily frames,\nand on his ability to apply the proper remedy to the defect.\n\nThe necessities of modern life are such, and the class from which the\nmedical profession is chiefly recruited is so situated, that few medical\nmen can hope to spend more than three or four, or it may be five, years\nin the pursuit of those studies which are immediately germane to physic.\nHow is that all too brief period spent at present? I speak as an old\nexaminer, having served some eleven or twelve years in that capacity in\nthe University of London, and therefore having a practical acquaintance\nwith the subject; but I might fortify myself by the authority of the\nPresident of the College of Surgeons, Mr. Quain, whom I heard the other\nday in an admirable address (the Hunterian Oration) deal fully and\nwisely with this very topic[3].\n\nA young man commencing the study of medicine is at once required to\nendeavour to make an acquaintance with a number of sciences, such as\nPhysics, as Chemistry, as Botany, as Physiology, which are absolutely\nand entirely strange to him, however excellent his so-called education\nat school may have been. Not only is he devoid of all apprehension of\nscientific conceptions, not only does he fail to attach any meaning to\nthe words \"matter,\" \"force,\" or \"law\" in their scientific senses, but,\nworse still, he has no notion of what it is to come into contact with\nnature, or to lay his mind alongside of a physical fact, and try to\nconquer it, in the way our great naval hero told his captains to master\ntheir enemies. His whole mind has been given to books, and I am hardly\nexaggerating if I say that they are more real to him than Nature. He\nimagines that all knowledge can be got out of books, and rests upon the\nauthority of some master or other; nor does he entertain any misgiving\nthat the method of learning which led to proficiency in the rules of\ngrammar, will suffice to lead him to a mastery of the laws of Nature.\nThe youngster, thus unprepared for serious study, is turned loose among\nhis medical studies, with the result, in nine cases out of ten, that the\nfirst year of his curriculum is spent in learning how to learn. Indeed,\nhe is lucky, if at the end of the first year, by the exertions of his\nteachers and his own industry, he has acquired even that art of arts.\nAfter which there remain not more than three, or perhaps four, years for\nthe profitable study of such vast sciences as Anatomy, Physiology,\nTherapeutics, Medicine, Surgery, Obstetrics, and the like, upon his\nknowledge or ignorance of which it depends whether the practitioner\nshall diminish, or increase, the bills of mortality. Now what is it but\nthe preposterous condition of ordinary school education which prevents a\nyoung man of seventeen, destined for the practice of medicine, from\nbeing fully prepared for the study of nature; and from coming to the\nmedical school, equipped with that preliminary knowledge of the\nprinciples of Physics, of Chemistry, and of Biology, upon which he has\nnow to waste one of the precious years, every moment of which ought to\nbe given to those studies which bear directly upon the knowledge of his\nprofession?\n\nThere is another profession, to the members of which, I think, a certain\npreliminary knowledge of physical science might be quite as valuable as\nto the medical man. The practitioner of medicine sets before himself the\nnoble object of taking care of man's bodily welfare; but the members of\nthis other profession undertake to \"minister to minds diseased,\" and, so\nfar as may be, to diminish sin and soften sorrow. Like the medical\nprofession, the clerical, of which I now speak, rests its power to heal\nupon its knowledge of the order of the universe--upon certain theories\nof man's relation to that which lies outside him. It is not my business\nto express any opinion about these theories. I merely wish to point out\nthat, like all other theories, they are professedly based upon matter of\nfact. Thus the clerical profession has to deal with the facts of Nature\nfrom a certain point of view; and hence it comes into contact with that\nof the man of science, who has to treat the same facts from another\npoint of view. You know how often that contact is to be described as\ncollision, or violent friction; and how great the heat, how little the\nlight, which commonly results from it.\n\nIn the interests of fair play, to say nothing of those of mankind, I\nask, Why do not the clergy as a body acquire, as a part of their\npreliminary education, some such tincture of physical science as will\nput them in a position to understand the difficulties in the way of\naccepting their theories, which are forced upon the mind of every\nthoughtful and intelligent man, who has taken the trouble to instruct\nhimself in the elements of natural knowledge?\n\nSome time ago I attended a large meeting of the clergy, for the purpose\nof delivering an address which I had been invited to give. I spoke of\nsome of the most elementary facts in physical science, and of the manner\nin which they directly contradict certain of the ordinary teachings of\nthe clergy. The result was, that, after I had finished, one section of\nthe assembled ecclesiastics attacked me with all the intemperance of\npious zeal, for stating facts and conclusions which no competent judge\ndoubts; while, after the first speakers had subsided, amidst the cheers\nof the great majority of their colleagues, the more rational minority\nrose to tell me that I had taken wholly superfluous pains, that they\nalready knew all about what I had told them, and perfectly agreed with\nme. A hard-headed friend of mine, who was present, put the not unnatural\nquestion, \"Then why don't you say so in your pulpits?\" to which inquiry\nI heard no reply.\n\nIn fact the clergy are at present divisible into three sections: an\nimmense body who are ignorant and speak out; a small proportion who know\nand are silent; and a minute minority who know and speak according to\ntheir knowledge. By the clergy, I mean especially the Protestant clergy.\nOur great antagonist--I speak as a man of science--the Roman Catholic\nChurch, the one great spiritual organization which is able to resist,\nand must, as a matter of life and death, resist, the progress of science\nand modern civilization, manages her affairs much better.\n\nIt was my fortune some time ago to pay a visit to one of the most\nimportant of the institutions in which the clergy of the Roman Catholic\nChurch in these islands are trained; and it seemed to me that the\ndifference between these men and the comfortable champions of\nAnglicanism and of Dissent, was comparable to the difference between our\ngallant Volunteers and the trained veterans of Napoleon's Old Guard.\n\nThe Catholic priest is trained to know his business, and do it\neffectually. The professors of the college in question, learned,\nzealous, and determined men, permitted me to speak frankly with them.\nWe talked like outposts of opposed armies during a truce--as friendly\nenemies; and when I ventured to point out the difficulties their\nstudents would have to encounter from scientific thought, they replied:\n\"Our Church has lasted many ages, and has passed safely through many\nstorms. The present is but a new gust of the old tempest, and we do not\nturn out our young men less fitted to weather it, than they have been,\nin former times, to cope with the difficulties of those times. The\nheresies of the day are explained to them by their professors of\nphilosophy and science, and they are taught how those heresies are to be\nmet.\"\n\nI heartily respect an organization which faces its enemies in this way;\nand I wish that all ecclesiastical organizations were in as effective a\ncondition. I think it would be better, not only for them, but for us.\nThe army of liberal thought is, at present, in very loose order; and\nmany a spirited free-thinker makes use of his freedom mainly to vent\nnonsense. We should be the better for a vigorous and watchful enemy to\nhammer us into cohesion and discipline; and I, for one, lament that the\nbench of Bishops cannot show a man of the calibre of Butler of the\n\"Analogy,\" who, if he were alive, would make short work of much of the\ncurrent _a priori_ \"infidelity.\"\n\n\nI hope you will consider that the arguments I have now stated, even if\nthere were no better ones, constitute a sufficient apology for urging\nthe introduction of science into schools. The next question to which I\nhave to address myself is, What sciences ought to be thus taught? And\nthis is one of the most important of questions, because my side (I am\nafraid I am a terribly candid friend) sometimes spoils its cause by\ngoing in for too much. There are other forms of culture beside physical\nscience; and I should be profoundly sorry to see the fact forgotten, or\neven to observe a tendency to starve, or cripple, literary, or aesthetic,\nculture for the sake of science. Such a narrow view of the nature of\neducation has nothing to do with my firm conviction that a complete and\nthorough scientific culture ought to be introduced into all schools. By\nthis, however, I do not mean that every schoolboy should be taught\neverything in science. That would be a very absurd thing to conceive,\nand a very mischievous thing to attempt. What I mean is, that no boy nor\ngirl should leave school without possessing a grasp of the general\ncharacter of science, and without having been disciplined, more or less,\nin the methods of all sciences; so that, when turned into the world to\nmake their own way, they shall be prepared to face scientific problems,\nnot by knowing at once the conditions of every problem, or by being able\nat once to solve it; but by being familiar with the general current of\nscientific thought, and by being able to apply the methods of science in\nthe proper way, when they have acquainted themselves with the conditions\nof the special problem.\n\nThat is what I understand by scientific education. To furnish a boy with\nsuch an education, it is by no means necessary that he should devote his\nwhole school existence to physical science: in fact, no one would lament\nso one-sided a proceeding more than I. Nay more, it is not necessary for\nhim to give up more than a moderate share of his time to such studies,\nif they be properly selected and arranged, and if he be trained in them\nin a fitting manner.\n\nI conceive the proper course to be somewhat as follows. To begin with,\nlet every child be instructed in those general views of the phenomena of\nNature for which we have no exact English name. The nearest\napproximation to a name for what I mean, which we possess, is \"physical\ngeography.\" The Germans have a better, \"Erdkunde,\" (\"earth knowledge\" or\n\"geology\" in its etymological sense,) that is to say, a general\nknowledge of the earth, and what is on it, in it, and about it. If any\none who has had experience of the ways of young children will call to\nmind their questions, he will find that so far as they can be put into\nany scientific category, they come under this head of \"Erdkunde.\" The\nchild asks, \"What is the moon, and why does it shine?\" \"What is this\nwater, and where does it run?\" \"What is the wind?\" \"What makes the waves\nin the sea?\" \"Where does this animal live, and what is the use of that\nplant?\" And if not snubbed and stunted by being told not to ask foolish\nquestions, there is no limit to the intellectual craving of a young\nchild; nor any bounds to the slow, but solid, accretion of knowledge and\ndevelopment of the thinking faculty in this way. To all such questions,\nanswers which are necessarily incomplete, though true as far as they go,\nmay be given by any teacher whose ideas represent real knowledge and not\nmere book learning; and a panoramic view of Nature, accompanied by a\nstrong infusion of the scientific habit of mind, may thus be placed\nwithin the reach of every child of nine or ten.\n\nAfter this preliminary opening of the eyes to the great spectacle of the\ndaily progress of Nature, as the reasoning faculties of the child grow,\nand he becomes familiar with the use of the tools of knowledge--reading,\nwriting, and elementary mathematics--he should pass on to what is, in\nthe more strict sense, physical science. Now there are two kinds of\nphysical science: the one regards form and the relation of forms to one\nanother; the other deals with causes and effects. In many of what we\nterm our sciences, these two kinds are mixed up together; but systematic\nbotany is a pure example of the former kind, and physics of the latter\nkind, of science. Every educational advantage which training in\nphysical science can give is obtainable from the proper study of these\ntwo; and I should be contented, for the present, if they, added to our\n\"Erdkunde,\" furnished the whole of the scientific curriculum of schools.\nIndeed I conceive it would be one of the greatest boons which could be\nconferred upon England, if henceforward every child in the country were\ninstructed in the general knowledge of the things about it, in the\nelements of physics, and of botany. But I should be still better pleased\nif there could be added somewhat of chemistry, and an elementary\nacquaintance with human physiology.\n\nSo far as school education is concerned, I want to go no further just\nnow; and I believe that such instruction would make an excellent\nintroduction to that preparatory scientific training which, as I have\nindicated, is so essential for the successful pursuit of our most\nimportant professions. But this modicum of instruction must be so given\nas to ensure real knowledge and practical discipline. If scientific\neducation is to be dealt with as mere bookwork, it will be better not to\nattempt it, but to stick to the Latin Grammar, which makes no pretence\nto be anything but bookwork.\n\nIf the great benefits of scientific training are sought, it is essential\nthat such training should be real: that is to say, that the mind of the\nscholar should be brought into direct relation with fact, that he should\nnot merely be told a thing, but made to see by the use of his own\nintellect and ability that the thing is _so_ and no otherwise. The great\npeculiarity of scientific training, that in virtue of which it cannot be\nreplaced by any other discipline whatsoever, is this bringing of the\nmind directly into contact with fact, and practising the intellect in\nthe completest form of induction; that is to say, in drawing conclusions\nfrom particular facts made known by immediate observation of Nature.\n\nThe other studies which enter into ordinary education do not discipline\nthe mind in this way. Mathematical training is almost purely deductive.\nThe mathematician starts with a few simple propositions, the proof of\nwhich is so obvious that they are called self-evident, and the rest of\nhis work consists of subtle deductions from them. The teaching of\nlanguages, at any rate as ordinarily practised, is of the same general\nnature,--authority and tradition furnish the data, and the mental\noperations of the scholar are deductive.\n\nAgain: if history be the subject of study, the facts are still taken\nupon the evidence of tradition and authority. You cannot make a boy see\nthe battle of Thermopylae for himself, or know, of his own knowledge,\nthat Cromwell once ruled England. There is no getting into direct\ncontact with natural fact by this road; there is no dispensing with\nauthority, but rather a resting upon it.\n\nIn all these respects, science differs from other educational\ndiscipline, and prepares the scholar for common life. What have we to do\nin every-day life? Most of the business which demands our attention is\nmatter of fact, which needs, in the first place, to be accurately\nobserved or apprehended; in the second, to be interpreted by inductive\nand deductive reasonings, which are altogether similar in their nature\nto those employed in science. In the one case, as in the other, whatever\nis taken for granted is so taken at one's own peril; fact and reason\nare the ultimate arbiters, and patience and honesty are the great\nhelpers out of difficulty.\n\nBut if scientific training is to yield its most eminent results, it\nmust, I repeat, be made practical. That is to say, in explaining to a\nchild the general phenomena of Nature, you must, as far as possible,\ngive reality to your teaching by object-lessons; in teaching him botany,\nhe must handle the plants and dissect the flowers for himself; in\nteaching him physics and chemistry, you must not be solicitous to fill\nhim with information, but you must be careful that what he learns he\nknows of his own knowledge. Don't be satisfied with telling him that a\nmagnet attracts iron. Let him see that it does; let him feel the pull of\nthe one upon the other for himself. And, especially, tell him that it is\nhis duty to doubt until he is compelled, by the absolute authority of\nNature, to believe that which is written in books. Pursue this\ndiscipline carefully and conscientiously, and you may make sure that,\nhowever scanty may be the measure of information which you have poured\ninto the boy's mind, you have created an intellectual habit of priceless\nvalue in practical life.\n\nOne is constantly asked, When should this scientific education be\ncommenced? I should say with the dawn of intelligence. As I have already\nsaid, a child seeks for information about matters of physical science as\nsoon as it begins to talk. The first teaching it wants is an\nobject-lesson of one sort or another; and as soon as it is fit for\nsystematic instruction of any kind, it is fit for a modicum of science.\n\nPeople talk of the difficulty of teaching young children such matters,\nand in the same breath insist upon their learning their Catechism,\nwhich contains propositions far harder to comprehend than anything in\nthe educational course I have proposed. Again, I am incessantly told\nthat we, who advocate the introduction of science into schools, make no\nallowance for the stupidity of the average boy or girl; but, in my\nbelief, that stupidity, in nine cases out of ten, \"_fit, non nascitur_,\"\nand is developed by a long process of parental and pedagogic repression\nof the natural intellectual appetites, accompanied by a persistent\nattempt to create artificial ones for food which is not only tasteless,\nbut essentially indigestible.\n\nThose who urge the difficulty of instructing young people in science are\napt to forget another very important condition of success--important in\nall kinds of teaching, but most essential, I am disposed to think, when\nthe scholars are very young. This condition is, that the teacher should\nhimself really and practically know his subject. If he does, he will be\nable to speak of it in the easy language, and with the completeness of\nconviction, with which he talks of any ordinary every-day matter. If he\ndoes not, he will be afraid to wander beyond the limits of the technical\nphraseology which he has got up; and a dead dogmatism, which oppresses,\nor raises opposition, will take the place of the lively confidence, born\nof personal conviction, which cheers and encourages the eminently\nsympathetic mind of childhood.\n\nI have already hinted that such scientific training as we seek for may\nbe given without making any extravagant claim upon the time now devoted\nto education. We ask only for \"a most favoured nation\" clause in our\ntreaty with the schoolmaster; we demand no more than that science shall\nhave as much time given to it as any other single subject--say four\nhours a week in each class of an ordinary school.\n\nFor the present, I think men of science would be well content with such\nan arrangement as this; but, speaking for myself, I do not pretend to\nbelieve that such an arrangement can be, or will be, permanent. In these\ntimes the educational tree seems to me to have its roots in the air, its\nleaves and flowers in the ground; and, I confess, I should very much\nlike to turn it upside down, so that its roots might be solidly embedded\namong the facts of Nature, and draw thence a sound nutriment for the\nfoliage and fruit of literature and of art. No educational system can\nhave a claim to permanence, unless it recognises the truth that\neducation has two great ends to which everything else must be\nsubordinated. The one of these is to increase knowledge; the other is to\ndevelop the love of right and the hatred of wrong.\n\nWith wisdom and uprightness a nation can make its way worthily, and\nbeauty will follow in the footsteps of the two, even if she be not\nspecially invited; while there is perhaps no sight in the whole world\nmore saddening and revolting than is offered by men sunk in ignorance of\neverything but what other men have written; seemingly devoid of moral\nbelief or guidance; but with the sense of beauty so keen, and the power\nof expression so cultivated, that their sensual caterwauling may be\nalmost mistaken for the music of the spheres.\n\nAt present, education is almost entirely devoted to the cultivation of\nthe power of expression, and of the sense of literary beauty. The matter\nof having anything to say, beyond a hash of other people's opinions, or\nof possessing any criterion of beauty, so that we may distinguish\nbetween the Godlike and the devilish, is left aside as of no moment. I\nthink I do not err in saying that if science were made the foundation of\neducation, instead of being, at most, stuck on as cornice to the\nedifice, this state of things could not exist.\n\nIn advocating the introduction of physical science as a leading element\nin education, I by no means refer only to the higher schools. On the\ncontrary, I believe that such a change is even more imperatively called\nfor in those primary schools, in which the children of the poor are\nexpected to turn to the best account the little time they can devote to\nthe acquisition of knowledge. A great step in this direction has already\nbeen made by the establishment of science-classes under the Department\nof Science and Art,--a measure which came into existence unnoticed, but\nwhich will, I believe, turn out to be of more importance to the welfare\nof the people, than many political changes, over which the noise of\nbattle has rent the air.\n\nUnder the regulations to which I refer, a schoolmaster can set up a\nclass in one or more branches of science; his pupils will be examined,\nand the State will pay him, at a certain rate, for all who succeed in\npassing. I have acted as an examiner under this system from the\nbeginning of its establishment, and this year I expect to have not fewer\nthan a couple of thousand sets of answers to questions in Physiology,\nmainly from young people of the artisan class, who have been taught in\nthe schools which are now scattered all over Great Britain and Ireland.\nSome of my colleagues, who have to deal with subjects such as Geometry,\nfor which the present teaching power is better organized, I understand\nare likely to have three or four times as many papers. So far as my own\nsubjects are concerned, I can undertake to say that a great deal of the\nteaching, the results of which are before me in these examinations, is\nvery sound and good; and I think it is in the power of the examiners,\nnot only to keep up the present standard, but to cause an almost\nunlimited improvement. Now what does this mean? It means that by holding\nout a very moderate inducement, the masters of primary schools in many\nparts of the country have been led to convert them into little foci of\nscientific instruction; and that they and their pupils have contrived to\nfind, or to make, time enough to carry out this object with a very\nconsiderable degree of efficiency. That efficiency will, I doubt not, be\nvery much increased as the system becomes known and perfected, even with\nthe very limited leisure left to masters and teachers on week-days. And\nthis leads me to ask, Why should scientific teaching be limited to\nweek-days?\n\nEcclesiastically-minded persons are in the habit of calling things they\ndo not like by very hard names, and I should not wonder if they brand\nthe proposition I am about to make as blasphemous, and worse. But, not\nminding this, I venture to ask, Would there really be anything wrong in\nusing part of Sunday for the purpose of instructing those who have no\nother leisure, in a knowledge of the phenomena of Nature, and of man's\nrelation to nature?\n\nI should like to see a scientific Sunday-school in every parish, not for\nthe purpose of superseding any existing means of teaching the people\nthe things that are for their good, but side by side with them. I cannot\nbut think that there is room for all of us to work in helping to bridge\nover the great abyss of ignorance which lies at our feet.\n\nAnd if any of the ecclesiastical persons to whom I have referred, object\nthat they find it derogatory to the honour of the God whom they worship,\nto awaken the minds of the young to the infinite wonder and majesty of\nthe works which they proclaim His, and to teach them those laws which\nmust needs be His laws, and therefore of all things needful for man to\nknow--I can only recommend them to be let blood and put on low diet.\nThere must be something very wrong going on in the instrument of logic,\nif it turns out such conclusions from such premisses.\n\nFOOTNOTE:\n\n[3] Mr. Quain's words (_Medical Times and Gazette_, February 20)\nare:--\"A few words as to our special Medical course of instruction and\nthe influence upon it of such changes in the elementary schools as I\nhave mentioned. The student now enters at once upon several\nsciences--physics, chemistry, anatomy, physiology, botany, pharmacy,\ntherapeutics--all these, the facts and the language and the laws of\neach, to be mastered in eighteen months. Up to the beginning of the\nMedical course many have learned little. We cannot claim anything better\nthan the Examiner of the University of London and the Cambridge Lecturer\nhave reported for their Universities. Supposing that at school young\npeople had acquired some exact elementary knowledge in physics,\nchemistry, and a branch of natural history--say botany--with the\nphysiology connected with it, they would then have gained necessary\nknowledge, with some practice in inductive reasoning. The whole studies\nare processes of observation and induction--the best discipline of the\nmind for the purposes of life--for our purposes not less than any. 'By\nsuch study (says Dr. Whewell) of one or more departments of inductive\nscience the mind may escape from the thraldom of mere words.' By that\nplan the burden of the early Medical course would be much lightened, and\nmore time devoted to practical studies, including Sir Thomas Watson's\n'final and supreme stage' of the knowledge of Medicine.\"\n\n\n\n\nV.\n\nON THE EDUCATIONAL VALUE OF THE NATURAL HISTORY SCIENCES.\n\n\nThe subject to which I have to beg your attention during the ensuing\nhour is \"The Relation of Physiological Science to other branches of\nKnowledge.\"\n\nHad circumstances permitted of the delivery, in their strict logical\norder, of that series of discourses of which the present lecture is a\nmember, I should have preceded my friend and colleague Mr. Henfrey, who\naddressed you on Monday last; but while, for the sake of that order, I\nmust beg you to suppose that this discussion of the Educational bearings\nof Biology in general _does_ precede that of Special Zoology and Botany,\nI am rejoiced to be able to take advantage of the light thus already\nthrown upon the tendency and methods of Physiological Science.\n\nRegarding Physiological Science, then, in its widest sense--as the\nequivalent of _Biology_--the Science of Individual Life--we have to\nconsider in succession:\n\n1. Its position and scope as a branch of knowledge.\n\n2. Its value as a means of mental discipline.\n\n3. Its worth as practical information.\n\nAnd lastly,\n\n4. At what period it may best be made a branch of Education.\n\nOur conclusions on the first of these heads must depend, of course, upon\nthe nature of the subject-matter of Biology; and I think a few\npreliminary considerations will place before you in a clear light the\nvast difference which exists between the living bodies with which\nPhysiological science is concerned, and the remainder of the\nuniverse;--between the phaenomena of Number and Space, of Physical and of\nChemical force, on the one hand, and those of Life on the other.\n\nThe mathematician, the physicist, and the chemist contemplate things in\na condition of rest; they look upon a state of equilibrium as that to\nwhich all bodies normally tend.\n\nThe mathematician does not suppose that a quantity will alter, or that a\ngiven point in space will change its direction with regard to another\npoint, spontaneously. And it is the same with the physicist. When Newton\nsaw the apple fall, he concluded at once that the act of falling was not\nthe result of any power inherent in the apple, but that it was the\nresult of the action of something else on the apple. In a similar\nmanner, all physical force is regarded as the disturbance of an\nequilibrium to which things tended before its exertion,--to which they\nwill tend again after its cessation.\n\nThe chemist equally regards chemical change in a as the effect of the\naction of something external to the body changed. A chemical compound\nonce formed would persist for ever, if no alteration took place in\nsurrounding conditions.\n\nBut to the student of Life the aspect of nature is reversed. Here,\nincessant, and, so far as we know, spontaneous change is the rule, rest\nthe exception--the anomaly to be accounted for. Living things have no\ninertia, and tend to no equilibrium.\n\nPermit me, however, to give more force and clearness to these somewhat\nabstract considerations, by an illustration or two.\n\nImagine a vessel full of water, at the ordinary temperature, in an\natmosphere saturated with vapour. The _quantity_ and the _figure_ of\nthat water will not change, so far as we know, for ever.\n\nSuppose a lump of gold be thrown into the vessel--motion and disturbance\nof figure exactly proportional to the momentum of the gold will take\nplace. But after a time the effects of this disturbance will\nsubside--equilibrium will be restored, and the water will return to its\npassive state.\n\nExpose the water to cold--it will solidify--and in so doing its\nparticles will arrange themselves in definite crystalline shapes. But\nonce formed, these crystals change no further.\n\nAgain, substitute for the lump of gold some substance capable of\nentering into chemical relations with the water:--say, a mass of that\nsubstance which is called \"protein\"--the substance of flesh:--a very\nconsiderable disturbance of equilibrium will take place--all sorts of\nchemical compositions and decompositions will occur; but in the end, as\nbefore, the result will be the resumption of a condition of rest.\n\nInstead of such a mass of _dead_ protein, however, take a particle of\n_living_ protein--one of those minute microscopic living things which\nthrong our pools, and are known as Infusoria--such a creature, for\ninstance, as an Euglena, and place it in our vessel of water. It is a\nround mass provided with a long filament, and except in this peculiarity\nof shape, presents no appreciable physical or chemical difference\nwhereby it might be distinguished from the particle of dead protein.\n\nBut the difference in the phaenomena to which it will give rise is\nimmense: in the first place it will develop a vast quantity of physical\nforce--cleaving the water in all directions with considerable rapidity\nby means of the vibrations of the long filament or cilium.\n\nNor is the amount of chemical energy which the little creature possesses\nless striking. It is a perfect laboratory in itself, and it will act and\nreact upon the water and the matters contained therein; converting them\ninto new compounds resembling its own substance, and, at the same time,\ngiving up portions of its own substance which have become effete.\n\nFurthermore, the Euglena will increase in size; but this increase is by\nno means unlimited, as the increase of a crystal might be. After it has\ngrown to a certain extent it divides, and each portion assumes the form\nof the original, and proceeds to repeat the process of growth and\ndivision.\n\nNor is this all. For after a series of such divisions and subdivisions,\nthese minute points assume a totally new form, lose their long\ntails--round themselves, and secrete a sort of envelope or box, in which\nthey remain shut up for a time, eventually to resume, directly or\nindirectly, their primitive mode of existence.\n\nNow, so far as we know, there is no natural limit to the existence of\nthe Euglena, or of any other living germ. A living species once launched\ninto existence tends to live for ever.\n\nConsider how widely different this living particle is from the dead\natoms with which the physicist and chemist have to do!\n\nThe particle of gold falls to the bottom and rests--the particle of dead\nprotein decomposes and disappears--it also rests: but the _living_\nprotein mass neither tends to exhaustion of its forces nor to any\npermanency of form, but is essentially distinguished as a disturber of\nequilibrium so far as force is concerned,--as undergoing continual\nmetamorphosis and change, in point of form.\n\nTendency to equilibrium of force and to permanency of form then, are the\ncharacters of that portion of the universe which does not live--the\ndomain of the chemist and physicist.\n\nTendency to disturb existing equilibrium,--to take on forms which\nsucceed one another in definite cycles, is the character of the living\nworld.\n\nWhat is the cause of this wonderful difference between the dead particle\nand the living particle of matter appearing in other respects identical?\nthat difference to which we give the name of Life?\n\nI, for one, cannot tell you. It may be that, by and by, philosophers\nwill discover some higher laws of which the facts of life are particular\ncases--very possibly they will find out some bond between\nphysico-chemical phaenomena on the one hand, and vital phaenomena on the\nother. At present, however, we assuredly know of none; and I think we\nshall exercise a wise humility in confessing that, for us at least, this\nsuccessive assumption of different states--(external conditions\nremaining the same)--this _spontaneity of action_--if I may use a term\nwhich implies more than I would be answerable for--which constitutes so\nvast and plain a practical distinction between living bodies and those\nwhich do not live, is an ultimate fact; indicating as such, the\nexistence of a broad line of demarcation between the subject-matter of\nBiological and that of all other sciences.\n\nFor I would have it understood that this simple Euglena is the type of\n_all_ living things, so far as the distinction between these and inert\nmatter is concerned. That cycle of changes, which is constituted by\nperhaps not more than two or three steps in the Euglena, is as clearly\nmanifested in the multitudinous stages through which the germ of an oak\nor of a man passes. Whatever forms the Living Being may take on, whether\nsimple or complex, _production_, _growth_, _reproduction_, are the\nphaenomena which distinguish it from that which does not live.\n\nIf this be true, it is clear that the student, in passing from the\nphysico-chemical to the physiological sciences, enters upon a totally\nnew order of facts; and it will next be for us to consider how far these\nnew facts involve _new_ methods, or require a modification of those with\nwhich he is already acquainted. Now a great deal is said about the\npeculiarity of the scientific method in general, and of the different\nmethods which are pursued in the different sciences. The Mathematics\nare said to have one special method; Physics another, Biology a third,\nand so forth. For my own part, I must confess that I do not understand\nthis phraseology.\n\nSo far as I can arrive at any clear comprehension of the matter, Science\nis not, as many would seem to suppose, a modification of the black art,\nsuited to the tastes of the nineteenth century, and flourishing mainly\nin consequence of the decay of the Inquisition.\n\nScience is, I believe, nothing but _trained and organized common sense_,\ndiffering from the latter only as a veteran may differ from a raw\nrecruit: and its methods differ from those of common sense only so far\nas the guardsman's cut and thrust differ from the manner in which a\nsavage wields his club. The primary power is the same in each case, and\nperhaps the untutored savage has the more brawny arm of the two. The\n_real_ advantage lies in the point and polish of the swordsman's weapon;\nin the trained eye quick to spy out the weakness of the adversary; in\nthe ready hand prompt to follow it on the instant. But after all, the\nsword exercise is only the hewing and poking of the clubman developed\nand perfected.\n\nSo, the vast results obtained by Science are won by no mystical\nfaculties, by no mental processes, other than those which are practised\nby every one of us, in the humblest and meanest affairs of life. A\ndetective policeman discovers a burglar from the marks made by his shoe,\nby a mental process identical with that by which Cuvier restored the\nextinct animals of Montmartre from fragments of their bones. Nor does\nthat process of induction and deduction by which a lady, finding a stain\nof a peculiar kind upon her dress, concludes that somebody has upset\nthe inkstand thereon, differ in any way, in kind, from that by which\nAdams and Leverrier discovered a new planet.\n\nThe man of science, in fact, simply uses with scrupulous exactness, the\nmethods which we all, habitually and at every moment, use carelessly;\nand the man of business must as much avail himself of the scientific\nmethod--must be as truly a man of science--as the veriest bookworm of us\nall; though I have no doubt that the man of business will find himself\nout to be a philosopher with as much surprise as M. Jourdain exhibited,\nwhen he discovered that he had been all his life talking prose. If,\nhowever, there be no real difference between the methods of science and\nthose of common life, it would seem, on the face of the matter, highly\nimprobable that there should be any difference between the methods of\nthe different sciences; nevertheless, it is constantly taken for\ngranted, that there is a very wide difference between the Physiological\nand other sciences in point of method.\n\nIn the first place it is said--and I take this point first, because the\nimputation is too frequently admitted by Physiologists themselves--that\nBiology differs from the Physico-chemical and Mathematical sciences in\nbeing \"inexact.\"\n\nNow, this phrase \"inexact\" must refer either to the _methods_ or to the\n_results_ of Physiological science.\n\nIt cannot be correct to apply it to the methods; for, as I hope to show\nyou by and by, these are identical in all sciences, and whatever is true\nof Physiological method is true of Physical and Mathematical method.\n\nIs it then the _results_ of Biological science which are \"inexact\"? I\nthink not. If I say that respiration is performed by the lungs; that\ndigestion is effected in the stomach; that the eye is the organ of\nsight; that the jaws of a vertebrated animal never open sideways, but\nalways up and down; while those of an annulose animal always open\nsideways, and never up and down--I am enumerating propositions which are\nas exact as anything in Euclid. How then has this notion of the\ninexactness of Biological science come about? I believe from two causes:\nfirst, because, in consequence of the great complexity of the science\nand the multitude of interfering conditions, we are very often only\nenabled to predict approximatively what will occur under given\ncircumstances; and secondly, because, on account of the comparative\nyouth of the Physiological sciences, a great many of their laws are\nstill imperfectly worked out. But, in an educational point of view, it\nis most important to distinguish between the essence of a science and\nthe accidents which surround it; and essentially, the methods and\nresults of Physiology are as exact as those of Physics or Mathematics.\n\nIt is said that the Physiological method is especially _comparative_[4];\nand this dictum also finds favour in the eyes of many. I should be\nsorry to suggest that the speculators on scientific classification have\nbeen misled by the accident of the name of one leading branch of\nBiology--_Comparative Anatomy_; but I would ask whether _comparison_,\nand that classification which is the result of comparison, are not the\nessence of every science whatsoever? How is it possible to discover a\nrelation of cause and effect of _any_ kind without comparing a series of\ncases together in which the supposed cause and effect occur singly, or\ncombined? So far from comparison being in any way peculiar to Biological\nscience, it is, I think, the essence of every science.\n\nA speculative philosopher again tells us that the Biological sciences\nare distinguished by being sciences of observation and not of\nexperiment![5]\n\nOf all the strange assertions into which speculation without practical\nacquaintance with a subject may lead even an able man, I think this is\nthe very strangest. Physiology not an experimental science! Why, there\nis not a function of a single organ in the body which has not been\ndetermined wholly and solely by experiment. How did Harvey determine the\nnature of the circulation, except by experiment? How did Sir Charles\nBell determine the functions of the roots of the spinal nerves, save by\nexperiment? How do we know the use of a nerve at all, except by\nexperiment? Nay, how do you know even that your eye is your seeing\napparatus, unless you make the experiment of shutting it; or that your\near is your hearing apparatus, unless you close it up and thereby\ndiscover that you become deaf?\n\nIt would really be much more true to say that Physiology is _the_\nexperimental science _par excellence_ of all sciences; that in which\nthere is least to be learnt by mere observation, and that which affords\nthe greatest field for the exercise of those faculties which\ncharacterise the experimental philosopher. I confess, if any one were to\nask me for a model application of the logic of experiment, I should know\nno better work to put into his hands than Bernard's late Researches on\nthe Functions of the Liver.[6]\n\nNot to give this lecture a too controversial tone, however, I must only\nadvert to one more doctrine, held by a thinker of our own age and\ncountry, whose opinions are worthy of all respect. It is, that the\nBiological sciences differ from all others, inasmuch as in _them_\nclassification takes place by type and not by definition.[7]\n\nIt is said, in short, that a natural-history class is not capable of\nbeing defined--that the class Rosaceae, for instance, or the class of\nFishes, is not accurately and absolutely definable, inasmuch as its\nmembers will present exceptions to every possible definition; and that\nthe members of the class are united together only by the circumstance\nthat they are all more like some imaginary average rose or average fish,\nthan they resemble anything else.\n\nBut here, as before, I think the distinction has arisen entirely from\nconfusing a transitory imperfection with an essential character. So long\nas our information concerning them is imperfect, we class all objects\ntogether according to resemblances which we _feel_, but cannot _define_:\nwe group them round _types_, in short. Thus, if you ask an ordinary\nperson what kinds of animals there are, he will probably say, beasts,\nbirds, reptiles, fishes, insects, &c. Ask him to define a beast from a\nreptile, and he cannot do it; but he says, things like a cow or a horse\nare beasts, and things like a frog or a lizard are reptiles. You see _he\ndoes_ class by type, and not by definition. But how does this\nclassification differ from that of the scientific Zoologist? How does\nthe meaning of the scientific class-name of \"Mammalia\" differ from the\nunscientific of \"Beasts\"?\n\nWhy, exactly because the former depends on a definition, the latter on a\ntype. The class Mammalia is scientifically defined as \"all animals which\nhave a vertebrated skeleton and suckle their young.\" Here is no\nreference to type, but a definition rigorous enough for a geometrician.\nAnd such is the character which every scientific naturalist recognises\nas that to which his classes must aspire--knowing, as he does, that\nclassification by type is simply an acknowledgment of ignorance and a\ntemporary device.\n\nSo much in the way of negative argument as against the reputed\ndifferences, between Biological and other methods. No such differences,\nI believe, really exist. The subject-matter of Biological science is\ndifferent from that of other sciences, but the methods of all are\nidentical; and these methods are--\n\n1. _Observation_ of facts--including under this head that _artificial\nobservation_ which is called _experiment_.\n\n2. That process of tying up similar facts into bundles, ticketed and\nready for use, which is called _Comparison_ and _Classification_,--the\nresults of the process, the ticketed bundles, being named _General\npropositions_.\n\n3. _Deduction_, which takes us from the general proposition to facts\nagain--teaches us, if I may so say, to anticipate from the ticket what\nis inside the bundle. And finally--\n\n4. _Verification_, which is the process of ascertaining whether, in\npoint of fact, our anticipation is a correct one.\n\nSuch are the methods of all science whatsoever; but perhaps you will\npermit me to give you an illustration of their employment in the science\nof Life; and I will take as a special case, the establishment of the\ndoctrine of the _Circulation of the Blood_.\n\nIn this case, _simple observation_ yields us a knowledge of the\nexistence of the blood from some accidental haemorrhage, we will say: we\nmay even grant that it informs us of the localization of this blood in\nparticular vessels, the heart, &c., from some accidental cut or the\nlike. It teaches also the existence of a pulse in various parts of the\nbody, and acquaints us with the structure of the heart and vessels.\n\nHere, however, _simple observation_ stops, and we must have recourse to\n_experiment_.\n\nYou tie a vein, and you find that the blood accumulates on the side of\nthe ligature opposite the heart. You tie an artery, and you find that\nthe blood accumulates on the side near the heart. Open the chest, and\nyou see the heart contracting with great force. Make openings into its\nprincipal cavities, and you will find that all the blood flows out, and\nno more pressure is exerted on either side of the arterial or venous\nligature.\n\nNow all these facts, taken together, constitute the evidence that the\nblood is propelled by the heart through the arteries, and returns by the\nveins--that, in short, the blood circulates.\n\nSuppose our experiments and observations have been made on horses, then\nwe group and ticket them into a general proposition, thus:--_all horses\nhave a circulation of their blood_.\n\nHenceforward a horse is a sort of indication or label, telling us where\nwe shall find a peculiar series of phaenomena called the circulation of\nthe blood.\n\nHere is our _general proposition_ then.\n\nHow and when are we justified in making our next step--a _deduction_\nfrom it?\n\nSuppose our physiologist, whose experience is limited to horses, meets\nwith a zebra for the first time,--will he suppose that this\ngeneralization holds good for zebras also?\n\nThat depends very much on his turn of mind. But we will suppose him to\nbe a bold man. He will say, \"The zebra is certainly not a horse, but it\nis very like one,--so like, that it must be the 'ticket' or mark of a\nblood-circulation also; and, I conclude that the zebra has a\ncirculation.\"\n\nThat is a deduction, a very fair deduction, but by no means to be\nconsidered scientifically secure. This last quality in fact can only be\ngiven by _verification_--that is, by making a zebra the subject of all\nthe experiments performed on the horse. Of course, in the present case,\nthe _deduction_ would be _confirmed_ by this process of verification,\nand the result would be, not merely a positive widening of knowledge,\nbut a fair increase of confidence in the truth of one's generalizations\nin other cases.\n\nThus, having settled the point in the zebra and horse, our philosopher\nwould have great confidence in the existence of a circulation in the\nass. Nay, I fancy most persons would excuse him, if in this case he did\nnot take the trouble to go through the process of verification at all;\nand it would not be without a parallel in the history of the human mind,\nif our imaginary physiologist now maintained that he was acquainted with\nasinine circulation _a priori_.\n\nHowever, if I might impress any caution upon your minds, it is, the\nutterly conditional nature of all our knowledge,--the danger of\nneglecting the process of verification under any circumstances; and the\nfilm upon which we rest, the moment our deductions carry us beyond the\nreach of this great process of verification. There is no better instance\nof this than is afforded by the history of our knowledge of the\ncirculation of the blood in the animal kingdom until the year 1824. In\nevery animal possessing a circulation at all, which had been observed up\nto that time, the current of the blood was known to take one definite\nand invariable direction. Now, there is a class of animals called\n_Ascidians_, which possess a heart and a circulation, and up to the\nperiod of which I speak, no one would have dreamt of questioning the\npropriety of the deduction, that these creatures have a circulation in\none direction; nor would any one have thought it worth while to verify\nthe point. But, in that year, M. von Hasselt happening to examine a\ntransparent animal of this class, found to his infinite surprise, that\nafter the heart had beat a certain number of times, it stopped, and then\nbegan beating the opposite way--so as to reverse the course of the\ncurrent, which returned by and by to its original direction.\n\nI have myself timed the heart of these little animals. I found it as\nregular as possible in its periods of reversal: and I know no spectacle\nin the animal kingdom more wonderful than that which it presents--all\nthe more wonderful that to this day it remains an unique fact, peculiar\nto this class among the whole animated world. At the same time I know of\nno more striking case of the necessity of the _verification_ of even\nthose deductions which seem founded on the widest and safest inductions.\n\nSuch are the methods of Biology--methods which are obviously identical\nwith those of all other sciences, and therefore wholly incompetent to\nform the ground of any distinction between it and them.[8]\n\nBut I shall be asked at once, Do you mean to say that there is no\ndifference between the habit of mind of a mathematician and that of a\nnaturalist? Do you imagine that Laplace might have been put into the\nJardin des Plantes, and Cuvier into the Observatory, with equal\nadvantage to the progress of the sciences they professed?\n\nTo which I would reply, that nothing could be further from my thoughts.\nBut different habits and various special tendencies of two sciences do\nnot imply different methods. The mountaineer and the man of the plains\nhave very different habits of progression, and each would be at a loss\nin the other's place; but the method of progression, by putting one leg\nbefore the other, is the same in each case. Every step of each is a\ncombination of a lift and a push; but the mountaineer lifts more and the\nlowlander pushes more. And I think the case of two sciences resembles\nthis.\n\nI do not question for a moment, that while the Mathematician is busied\nwith deductions _from_ general propositions, the Biologist is more\nespecially occupied with observation, comparison, and those processes\nwhich lead _to_ general propositions. All I wish to insist upon is, that\nthis difference depends not on any fundamental distinction in the\nsciences themselves, but on the accidents of their subject-matter, of\ntheir relative complexity, and consequent relative perfection.\n\nThe Mathematician deals with two properties of objects only, number and\nextension, and all the inductions he wants have been formed and finished\nages ago. He is occupied now with nothing but deduction and\nverification.\n\nThe Biologist deals with a vast number of properties of objects, and\nhis inductions will not be completed, I fear, for ages to come; but when\nthey are, his science will be as deductive and as exact as the\nMathematics themselves.\n\nSuch is the relation of Biology to those sciences which deal with\nobjects having fewer properties than itself. But as the student, in\nreaching Biology, looks back upon sciences of a less complex and\ntherefore more perfect nature; so, on the other hand, does he look\nforward to other more complex and less perfect branches of knowledge.\nBiology deals only with living beings as isolated things--treats only of\nthe life of the individual: but there is a higher division of science\nstill, which considers living beings as aggregates--which deals with the\nrelation of living beings one to another--the science which _observes_\nmen--whose _experiments_ are made by nations one upon another, in\nbattle-fields--whose _general propositions_ are embodied in history,\nmorality, and religion--whose _deductions_ lead to our happiness or our\nmisery,--and whose _verifications_ so often come too late, and serve\nonly\n\n     \"To point a moral or adorn a tale\"--\n\nI mean the science of Society or _Sociology_.\n\nI think it is one of the grandest features of Biology, that it occupies\nthis central position in human knowledge. There is no side of the human\nmind which physiological study leaves uncultivated. Connected by\ninnumerable ties with abstract science, Physiology is yet in the most\nintimate relation with humanity; and by teaching us that law and order,\nand a definite scheme of development, regulate even the strangest and\nwildest manifestations of individual life, she prepares the student to\nlook for a goal even amidst the erratic wanderings of mankind, and to\nbelieve that history offers something more than an entertaining chaos--a\njournal of a toilsome, tragi-comic march nowhither.\n\nThe preceding considerations have, I hope, served to indicate the\nreplies which befit the two first of the questions which I set before\nyou at starting, viz. what is the range and position of Physiological\nScience as a branch of knowledge, and what is its value as a means of\nmental discipline.\n\nIts _subject-matter_ is a large moiety of the universe--its _position_\nis midway between the physico-chemical and the social sciences. Its\n_value_ as a branch of discipline is partly that which it has in common\nwith all sciences--the training and strengthening of common sense;\npartly that which is more peculiar to itself--the great exercise which\nit affords to the faculties of observation and comparison; and I may\nadd, the _exactness_ of knowledge which it requires on the part of those\namong its votaries who desire to extend its boundaries.\n\nIf what has been said as to the position and scope of Biology be\ncorrect, our third question--What is the practical value of\nphysiological instruction?--might, one would think, be left to answer\nitself.\n\nOn other grounds even, were mankind deserving of the title \"rational,\"\nwhich they arrogate to themselves, there can be no question that they\nwould consider, as the most necessary of all branches of instruction for\nthemselves and for their children, that which professes to acquaint them\nwith the conditions of the existence they prize so highly--which teaches\nthem how to avoid disease and to cherish health, in themselves and\nthose who are dear to them.\n\nI am addressing, I imagine, an audience of educated persons; and yet I\ndare venture to assert that, with the exception of those of my hearers\nwho may chance to have received a medical education, there is not one\nwho could tell me what is the meaning and use of an act which he\nperforms a score of times every minute, and whose suspension would\ninvolve his immediate death;--I mean the act of breathing--or who could\nstate in precise terms why it is that a confined atmosphere is injurious\nto health.\n\nThe _practical value_ of Physiological knowledge! Why is it that\neducated men can be found to maintain that a slaughter-house in the\nmidst of a great city is rather a good thing than otherwise?--that\nmothers persist in exposing the largest possible amount of surface of\ntheir children to the cold, by the absurd style of dress they adopt, and\nthen marvel at the peculiar dispensation of Providence, which removes\ntheir infants by bronchitis and gastric fever? Why is it that quackery\nrides rampant over the land; and that not long ago, one of the largest\npublic rooms in this great city could be filled by an audience gravely\nlistening to the reverend expositor of the doctrine--that the simple\nphysiological phenomena known as spirit-rapping, table-turning,\nphreno-magnetism, and by I know not what other absurd and inappropriate\nnames, are due to the direct and personal agency of Satan?\n\nWhy is all this, except from the utter ignorance as to the simplest laws\nof their own animal life, which prevails among even the most highly\neducated persons in this country?\n\nBut there are other branches of Biological Science, besides Physiology\nproper, whose practical influence, though less obvious, is not, as I\nbelieve, less certain. I have heard educated men speak with an\nill-disguised contempt of the studies of the naturalist, and ask, not\nwithout a shrug, \"What is the use of knowing all about these miserable\nanimals--what bearing has it on human life?\"\n\nI will endeavour to answer that question. I take it that all will admit\nthere is definite Government of this universe--that its pleasures and\npains are not scattered at random, but are distributed in accordance\nwith orderly and fixed laws, and that it is only in accordance with all\nwe know of the rest of the world, that there should be an agreement\nbetween one portion of the sensitive creation and another in these\nmatters.\n\nSurely then it interests us to know the lot of other animal\ncreatures--however far below us, they are still the sole created things\nwhich share with us the capability of pleasure and the susceptibility to\npain.\n\nI cannot but think that he who finds a certain proportion of pain and\nevil inseparably woven up in the life of the very worms, will bear his\nown share with more courage and submission; and will, at any rate, view\nwith suspicion those weakly amiable theories of the Divine government,\nwhich would have us believe pain to be an oversight and a mistake,--to\nbe corrected by and by. On the other hand, the predominance of happiness\namong living things--their lavish beauty--the secret and wonderful\nharmony which pervades them all, from the highest to the lowest, are\nequally striking refutations of that modern Manichean doctrine, which\nexhibits the world as a slave-mill, worked with many tears, for mere\nutilitarian ends.\n\nThere is yet another way in which natural history may, I am convinced,\ntake a profound hold upon practical life,--and that is, by its influence\nover our finer feelings, as the greatest of all sources of that pleasure\nwhich is derivable from beauty. I do not pretend that natural-history\nknowledge, as such, can increase our sense of the beautiful in natural\nobjects. I do not suppose that the dead soul of Peter Bell, of whom the\ngreat poet of nature says,--\n\n     A primrose by the river's brim,\n     A yellow primrose was to him,--\n     And it was nothing more,--\n\nwould have been a whit roused from its apathy, by the information that\nthe primrose is a Dicotyledonous Exogen, with a monopetalous corolla and\ncentral placentation. But I advocate natural-history knowledge from this\npoint of view, because it would lead us to _seek_ the beauties of\nnatural objects, instead of trusting to chance to force them on our\nattention. To a person uninstructed in natural history, his country, or\nsea-side, stroll is a walk through a gallery filled with wonderful works\nof art, nine-tenths of which have their faces turned to the wall. Teach\nhim something of natural history, and you place in his hands a catalogue\nof those which are worth turning round. Surely our innocent pleasures\nare not so abundant in this life, that we can afford to despise this or\nany other source of them. We should fear being banished for our neglect\nto that limbo, where the great Florentine tells us are those who, during\nthis life, \"wept when they might be joyful.\"\n\nBut I shall be trespassing unwarrantably on your kindness, if I do not\nproceed at once to my last point--the time at which Physiological\nScience should first form a part of the Curriculum of Education.\n\nThe distinction between the teaching of the facts of a science as\ninstruction, and the teaching it systematically as knowledge, has\nalready been placed before you in a previous lecture: and it appears to\nme, that, as with other sciences, the _common facts_ of Biology--the\nuses of parts of the body--the names and habits of the living creatures\nwhich surround us--may be taught with advantage to the youngest child.\nIndeed, the avidity of children for this kind of knowledge, and the\ncomparative ease with which they retain it, is something quite\nmarvellous. I doubt whether any toy would be so acceptable to young\nchildren as a vivarium, of the same kind as, but of course on a smaller\nscale than, those admirable devices in the Zoological Gardens.\n\nOn the other hand, systematic teaching in Biology cannot be attempted\nwith success until the student has attained to a certain knowledge of\nphysics and chemistry: for though the phaenomena of life are dependent\nneither on physical nor on chemical, but on vital forces, yet they\nresult in all sorts of physical and chemical changes, which can only be\njudged by their own laws.\n\nAnd now to sum up in a few words the conclusions to which I hope you see\nreason to follow me.\n\nBiology needs no apologist when she demands a place--and a prominent\nplace--in any scheme of education worthy of the name. Leave out the\nPhysiological sciences from your curriculum, and you launch the student\ninto the world, undisciplined in that science whose subject-matter\nwould best develop his powers of observation; ignorant of facts of the\ndeepest importance for his own and others' welfare; blind to the richest\nsources of beauty in God's creation; and unprovided with that belief in\na living law, and an order manifesting itself in and through endless\nchange and variety, which might serve to check and moderate that phase\nof despair through which, if he take an earnest interest in social\nproblems, he will assuredly sooner or later pass.\n\nFinally, one word for myself. I have not hesitated to speak strongly\nwhere I have felt strongly; and I am but too conscious that the\nindicative and imperative moods have too often taken the place of the\nmore becoming subjunctive and conditional. I feel, therefore, how\nnecessary it is to beg you to forget the personality of him who has thus\nventured to address you, and to consider only the truth or error in what\nhas been said.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[4] \"In the third place, we have to review the method of Comparison,\nwhich is so specially adapted to the study of living bodies, and by\nwhich, above all others, that study must be advanced. In Astronomy, this\nmethod is necessarily inapplicable; and it is not till we arrive at\nChemistry that this third means of investigation can be used, and then\nonly in subordination to the two others. It is in the study, both\nstatical and dynamical, of living bodies that it first acquires its full\ndevelopment; and its use elsewhere can be only through its application\nhere.\"--COMTE'S _Positive Philosophy_, translated by Miss Martineau.\nVol. i. p. 372.\n\nBy what method does M. Comte suppose that the equality or inequality of\nforces and quantities and the dissimilarity or similarity of\nforms--points of some slight importance not only in Astronomy and\nPhysics, but even in Mathematics--are ascertained, if not by Comparison?\n\n[5] \"Proceeding to the second class of means,--Experiment cannot but be\nless and less decisive, in proportion to the complexity of the phaenomena\nto be explored; and therefore we saw this resource to be less effectual\nin chemistry than in physics: and we now find that it is eminently\nuseful in chemistry in comparison with physiology. _In fact, the nature\nof the phaenomena seems to offer almost insurmountable impediments to any\nextensive and prolific application of such a procedure in\nbiology._\"--Comte, vol i. p. 367.\n\nM. Comte, as his manner is, contradicts himself two pages further on,\nbut that will hardly relieve him from the responsibility of such a\nparagraph as the above.\n\n[6] \"Nouvelle Fonction du Foie considere comme organe producteur de\nmatiere sucree chez l'Homme et les Animaux,\" par M. Claude Bernard.\n\n[7] \"_Natural Groups given by Type, not by Definition...._ The class is\nsteadily fixed, though not precisely limited; it is given, though not\ncircumscribed; it is determined, not by a boundary-line without, but by\na central point within; not by what it strictly excludes, but what it\neminently includes; by an example, not by a precept; in short, instead\nof Definition we have a _Type_ for our director. A type is an example of\nany class, for instance, a species of a genus, which is considered as\neminently possessing the characters of the class. All the species which\nhave a greater affinity with this type-species than with any others,\nform the genus, and are ranged about it, deviating from it in various\ndirections and different degrees.\"--WHEWELL, _The Philosophy of the\nInductive Sciences_, vol. i. pp. 476, 477.\n\n[8] Save for the pleasure of doing so, I need hardly point out my\nobligations to Mr. J.S. Mill's \"System of Logic,\" in this view of\nscientific method.\n\n\n\n\nVI.\n\nON THE STUDY OF ZOOLOGY.\n\n\nNatural history is the name familiarly applied to the study of the\nproperties of such natural bodies as minerals, plants, and animals; the\nsciences which embody the knowledge man has acquired upon these subjects\nare commonly termed Natural Sciences, in contradistinction to other,\nso-called \"physical,\" sciences; and those who devote themselves\nespecially to the pursuit of such sciences have been, and are, commonly\ntermed \"Naturalists.\"\n\nLinnaeus was a naturalist in this wide sense, and his \"Systema Naturae\"\nwas a work upon natural history, in the broadest acceptation of the\nterm; in it, that great methodizing spirit embodied all that was known\nin his time of the distinctive characters of minerals, animals, and\nplants. But the enormous stimulus which Linnaeus gave to the\ninvestigation of nature soon rendered it impossible that any one man\nshould write another \"Systema Naturae,\" and extremely difficult for any\none to become a naturalist such as Linnaeus was.\n\nGreat as have been the advances made by all the three branches of\nscience, of old included under the title of natural history, there can\nbe no doubt that zoology and botany have grown in an enormously greater\nratio than mineralogy; and hence, as I suppose, the name of \"natural\nhistory\" has gradually become more and more definitely attached to these\nprominent divisions of the subject, and by \"naturalist\" people have\nmeant more and more distinctly to imply a student of the structure and\nfunctions of living beings.\n\nHowever this may be, it is certain that the advance of knowledge has\ngradually widened the distance between mineralogy and its old\nassociates, while it has drawn zoology and botany closer together; so\nthat of late years it has been found convenient (and indeed necessary)\nto associate the sciences which deal with vitality and all its phenomena\nunder the common head of \"biology;\" and the biologists have come to\nrepudiate any blood-relationship with their foster-brothers, the\nmineralogists.\n\nCertain broad laws have a general application throughout both the animal\nand the vegetable worlds, but the ground common to these kingdoms of\nnature is not of very wide extent, and the multiplicity of details is so\ngreat, that the student of living beings finds himself obliged to devote\nhis attention exclusively either to the one or the other. If he elects\nto study plants, under any aspect, we know at once what to call him; he\nis a botanist, and his science is botany. But if the investigation of\nanimal life be his choice, the name generally applied to him will vary,\naccording to the kind of animals he studies, or the particular phenomena\nof animal life to which he confines his attention. If the study of man\nis his object, he is called an anatomist, or a physiologist, or an\nethnologist; but if he dissects animals, or examines into the mode in\nwhich their functions are performed, he is a comparative anatomist or\ncomparative physiologist. If he turns his attention to fossil animals,\nhe is a palaeontologist. If his mind is more particularly directed to the\ndescription, specific discrimination, classification, and distribution\nof animals, he is termed a zoologist.\n\nFor the purposes of the present discourse, however, I shall recognise\nnone of these titles save the last, which I shall employ as the\nequivalent of botanist, and I shall use the term zoology as denoting the\nwhole doctrine of animal life, in contradistinction to botany, which\nsignifies the whole doctrine of vegetable life.\n\nEmployed in this sense, zoology, like botany, is divisible into three\ngreat but subordinate sciences, morphology, physiology, and\ndistribution, each of which may, to a very great extent, be studied\nindependently of the other.\n\nZoological morphology is the doctrine of animal form or structure.\nAnatomy is one of its branches, development is another; while\nclassification is the expression of the relations which different\nanimals bear to one another, in respect of their anatomy and their\ndevelopment.\n\nZoological distribution is the study of animals in relation to the\nterrestrial conditions which obtain now, or have obtained at any\nprevious epoch of the earth's history.\n\nZoological physiology, lastly, is the doctrine of the functions or\nactions of animals. It regards animal bodies as machines impelled by\ncertain forces, and performing an amount of work, which can be\nexpressed in terms of the ordinary forces of nature. The final object of\nphysiology is to deduce the facts of morphology, on the one hand, and\nthose of distribution on the other, from the laws of the molecular\nforces of matter.\n\nSuch is the scope of zoology. But if I were to content myself with the\nenunciation of these dry definitions, I should ill exemplify that method\nof teaching this branch of physical science, which it is my chief\nbusiness to-night to recommend. Let us turn away then from abstract\ndefinitions. Let us take some concrete living thing, some animal, the\ncommoner the better, and let us see how the application of common sense\nand common logic to the obvious facts it presents, inevitably leads us\ninto all these branches of zoological science.\n\nI have before me a lobster. When I examine it, what appears to be the\nmost striking character it presents? Why, I observe that this part which\nwe call the tail of the lobster, is made up of six distinct hard rings\nand a seventh terminal piece. If I separate one of the middle rings, say\nthe third, I find it carries upon its under surface a pair of limbs or\nappendages, each of which consists of a stalk and two terminal pieces.\nSo that I can represent a transverse section of the ring and its\nappendages upon the diagram board in this way.\n\nIf I now take the fourth ring I find it has the same structure, and so\nhave the fifth and the second; so that, in each of these divisions of\nthe tail, I find parts which correspond with one another, a ring and two\nappendages; and in each appendage a stalk and two end pieces. These\ncorresponding parts are called, in the technical language of anatomy,\n\"homologous parts.\" The ring of the third division is the \"homologue\"\nof the ring of the fifth, the appendage of the former is the homologue\nof the appendage of the latter. And, as each division exhibits\ncorresponding parts in corresponding places, we say that all the\ndivisions are constructed upon the same plan. But now let us consider\nthe sixth division. It is similar to, and yet different from, the\nothers. The ring is essentially the same as in the other divisions; but\nthe appendages look at first as if they were very different; and yet\nwhen we regard them closely, what do we find? A stalk and two terminal\ndivisions, exactly as in the others, but the stalk is very short and\nvery thick, the terminal divisions are very broad and flat, and one of\nthem is divided into two pieces.\n\nI may say, therefore, that the sixth segment is like the others in plan,\nbut that it is modified in its details.\n\nThe first segment is like the others, so far as its ring is concerned,\nand though its appendages differ from any of those yet examined in the\nsimplicity of their structure, parts corresponding with the stem and one\nof the divisions of the appendages of the other segments can be readily\ndiscerned in them.\n\nThus it appears that the lobster's tail is composed of a series of\nsegments which are fundamentally similar, though each presents peculiar\nmodifications of the plan common to all. But when I turn to the fore\npart of the body I see, at first, nothing but a great shield-like shell,\ncalled technically the \"carapace,\" ending in front in a sharp spine, on\neither side of which are the curious compound eyes, set upon the ends of\nstout moveable stalks. Behind these, on the under side of the body, are\ntwo pairs of long feelers, or antennae, followed by six pairs of jaws,\nfolded against one another over the mouth, and five pairs of legs, the\nforemost of these being the great pinchers, or claws, of the lobster.\n\nIt looks, at first, a little hopeless to attempt to find in this complex\nmass a series of rings, each with its pair of appendages, such as I have\nshown you in the abdomen, and yet it is not difficult to demonstrate\ntheir existence. Strip off the legs, and you will find that each pair is\nattached to a very definite segment of the under wall of the body; but\nthese segments, instead of being the lower parts of free rings, as in\nthe tail, are such parts of rings which are all solidly united and bound\ntogether; and the like is true of the jaws, the feelers, and the\neye-stalks, every pair of which is borne upon its own special segment.\nThus the conclusion is gradually forced upon us, that the body of the\nlobster is composed of as many rings as there are pairs of appendages,\nnamely, twenty in all, but that the six hindmost rings remain free and\nmoveable, while the fourteen front rings become firmly soldered\ntogether, their backs forming one continuous shield--the carapace.\n\nUnity of plan, diversity in execution, is the lesson taught by the study\nof the rings of the body, and the same instruction is given still more\nemphatically by the appendages. If I examine the outermost jaw I find it\nconsists of three distinct portions, an inner, a middle, and an outer,\nmounted upon a common stem; and if I compare this jaw with the legs\nbehind it, or the jaws in front of it, I find it quite easy to see,\nthat, in the legs, it is the part of the appendage which corresponds\nwith the inner division, which becomes modified into what we know\nfamiliarly as the \"leg,\" while the middle division, disappears, and the\nouter division is hidden under the carapace. Nor is it more difficult to\ndiscern that, in the appendages of the tail, the middle division appears\nagain and the outer vanishes; while, on the other hand, in the foremost\njaw, the so-called mandible, the inner division only is left; and, in\nthe same way, the parts of the feelers and of the eye-stalks can be\nidentified with those of the legs and jaws.\n\nBut whither does all this tend? To the very remarkable conclusion that a\nunity of plan, of the same kind as that discoverable in the tail or\nabdomen of the lobster, pervades the whole organization of its skeleton,\nso that I can return to the diagram representing any one of the rings of\nthe tail, which I drew upon the board, and by adding a third division to\neach appendage, I can use it as a sort of scheme or plan of any ring of\nthe body. I can give names to all the parts of that figure, and then if\nI take any segment of the body of the lobster, I can point out to you\nexactly, what modification the general plan has undergone in that\nparticular segment; what part has remained moveable, and what has become\nfixed to another; what has been excessively developed and metamorphosed,\nand what has been suppressed.\n\nBut I imagine I hear the question, How is all this to be tested? No\ndoubt it is a pretty and ingenious way of looking at the structure of\nany animal, but is it anything more? Does Nature acknowledge, in any\ndeeper way, this unity of plan we seem to trace?\n\nThe objection suggested by these questions is a very valid and important\none, and morphology was in an unsound state, so long as it rested upon\nthe mere perception of the analogies which obtain between fully formed\nparts. The unchecked ingenuity of speculative anatomists proved itself\nfully competent to spin any number of contradictory hypotheses out of\nthe same facts, and endless morphological dreams threatened to supplant\nscientific theory.\n\nHappily, however, there is a criterion of morphological truth, and a\nsure test of all homologies. Our lobster has not always been what we see\nit; it was once an egg, a semifluid mass of yolk, not so big as a pin's\nhead, contained in a transparent membrane, and exhibiting not the least\ntrace of any one of those organs, whose multiplicity and complexity, in\nthe adult, are so surprising. After a time a delicate patch of cellular\nmembrane appeared upon one face of this yolk, and that patch was the\nfoundation of the whole creature, the clay out of which it would be\nmoulded. Gradually investing the yolk, it became subdivided by\ntransverse constrictions into segments, the forerunners of the rings of\nthe body. Upon the ventral surface of each of the rings thus sketched\nout, a pair of bud-like prominences made their appearance--the rudiments\nof the appendages of the ring. At first, all the appendages were alike,\nbut, as they grew, most of them became distinguished into a stem and two\nterminal divisions, to which, in the middle part of the body, was added\na third outer division; and it was only at a later period, that by the\nmodification, or absorption, of certain of these primitive constituents,\nthe limbs acquired their perfect form.\n\nThus the study of development proves that the doctrine of unity of plan\nis not merely a fancy, that it is not merely one way of looking at the\nmatter, but that it is the expression of deep-seated natural facts. The\nlegs and jaws of the lobster may not merely be regarded as modifications\nof a common type,--in fact and in nature they are so,--the leg and the\njaw of the young animal being, at first, indistinguishable.\n\nThese are wonderful truths, the more so because the zoologist finds them\nto be of universal application. The investigation of a polype, of a\nsnail, of a fish, of a horse, or of a man, would have led us, though by\na less easy path, perhaps, to exactly the same point. Unity of plan\neverywhere lies hidden under the mask of diversity of structure--the\ncomplex is everywhere evolved out of the simple. Every animal has at\nfirst the form of an egg, and every animal and every organic part, in\nreaching its adult state, passes through conditions common to other\nanimals and other adult parts; and this leads me to another point. I\nhave hitherto spoken as if the lobster were alone in the world, but, as\nI need hardly remind you, there are myriads of other animal organisms.\nOf these, some, such as men, horses, birds, fishes, snails, slugs,\noysters, corals, and sponges, are not in the least like the lobster. But\nother animals, though they may differ a good deal from the lobster, are\nyet either very like it, or are like something that is like it. The cray\nfish, the rock lobster, and the prawn, and the shrimp, for example,\nhowever different, are yet so like lobsters, that a child would group\nthem as of the lobster kind, in contradistinction to snails and slugs;\nand these last again would form a kind by themselves, in\ncontradistinction to cows, horses, and sheep, the cattle kind.\n\nBut this spontaneous grouping into \"kinds\" is the first essay of the\nhuman mind at classification, or the calling by a common name of those\nthings that are alike, and the arranging them in such a manner as best\nto suggest the sum of their likenesses and unlikenesses to other things.\n\nThose kinds which include no other subdivisions than the sexes, or\nvarious breeds, are called, in technical language, species. The English\nlobster is a species, our cray fish is another, our prawn is another. In\nother countries, however, there are lobsters, cray fish, and prawns,\nvery like ours, and yet presenting sufficient differences to deserve\ndistinction. Naturalists, therefore, express this resemblance and this\ndiversity by grouping them as distinct species of the same \"genus.\" But\nthe lobster and the cray fish, though belonging to distinct genera, have\nmany features in common, and hence are grouped together in an assemblage\nwhich is called a family. More distant resemblances connect the lobster\nwith the prawn and the crab, which are expressed by putting all these\ninto the same order. Again, more remote, but still very definite,\nresemblances unite the lobster with the woodlouse, the king crab, the\nwater-flea, and the barnacle, and separate them from all other animals;\nwhence they collectively constitute the larger group, or class,\n_Crustacea_. But the _Crustacea_ exhibit many peculiar features in\ncommon with insects, spiders, and centipedes, so that these are grouped\ninto the still larger assemblage or \"province\" _Articulata_; and,\nfinally, the relations which these have to worms and other lower\nanimals, are expressed by combining the whole vast aggregate into the\nsub-kingdom of _Annulosa_.\n\nIf I had worked my way from a sponge instead of a lobster, I should have\nfound it associated, by like ties, with a great number of other animals\ninto the sub-kingdom _Protozoa_; if I had selected a fresh-water polype\nor a coral, the members of what naturalists term the sub-kingdom\n_C\u00falenterata_ would have grouped themselves around my type; had a snail\nbeen chosen, the inhabitants of all univalve and bivalve, land and\nwater, shells, the lamp shells, the squids, and the sea-mat would have\ngradually linked themselves on to it as members of the same sub-kingdom\nof _Mollusca_; and finally, starting from man, I should have been\ncompelled to admit first, the ape, the rat, the horse, the dog, into the\nsame class; and then the bird, the crocodile, the turtle, the frog, and\nthe fish, into the same sub-kingdom of _Vertebrata_.\n\nAnd if I had followed out all these various lines of classification\nfully, I should discover in the end that there was no animal, either\nrecent or fossil, which did not at once fall into one or other of these\nsub-kingdoms. In other words, every animal is organized upon one or\nother of the five, or more, plans, whose existence renders our\nclassification possible. And so definitely and precisely marked is the\nstructure of each animal, that, in the present state of our knowledge,\nthere is not the least evidence to prove that a form, in the slightest\ndegree transitional between any of the two groups _Vertebrata, Annulosa,\nMollusca_, and _C\u00falenterata_, either exists, or has existed, during that\nperiod of the earth's history which is recorded by the geologist.\nNevertheless, you must not for a moment suppose, because no such\ntransitional forms are known, that the members of the sub-kingdoms are\ndisconnected from, or independent of, one another. On the contrary, in\ntheir earliest condition they are all alike, and the primordial germs\nof a man, a dog, a bird, a fish, a beetle, a snail, and a polype are, in\nno essential structural respects, distinguishable.\n\nIn this broad sense, it may with truth be said, that all living animals,\nand all those dead creations which geology reveals, are bound together\nby an all-pervading unity of organization, of the same character, though\nnot equal in degree, to that which enables us to discern one and the\nsame plan amidst the twenty different segments of a lobster's body.\nTruly it has been said, that to a clear eye the smallest fact is a\nwindow through which the Infinite may be seen.\n\nTurning from these purely morphological considerations, let us now\nexamine into the manner in which the attentive study of the lobster\nimpels us into other lines of research.\n\nLobsters are found in all the European seas; but on the opposite shores\nof the Atlantic and in the seas of the southern hemisphere they do not\nexist. They are, however, represented in these regions by very closely\nallied, but distinct forms--the _Homarus Americanus_ and the _Homarus\nCapensis_: so that we may say that the European has one species of\n_Homarus_; the American, another; the African, another; and thus the\nremarkable facts of geographical distribution begin to dawn upon us.\n\nAgain, if we examine the contents of the earth's crust, we shall find in\nthe latter of those deposits, which have served as the great burying\ngrounds of past ages, numberless lobster-like animals, but none so\nsimilar to our living lobster as to make zoologists sure that they\nbelonged even to the same genus. If we go still further back in time,\nwe discover, in the oldest rocks of all, the remains of animals,\nconstructed on the same general plan as the lobster, and belonging to\nthe same great group of _Crustacea_; but for the most part totally\ndifferent from the lobster, and indeed from any other living form of\ncrustacean; and thus we gain a notion of that successive change of the\nanimal population of the globe, in past ages, which is the most striking\nfact revealed by geology.\n\nConsider, now, where our inquiries have led us. We studied our type\nmorphologically, when we determined its anatomy and its development, and\nwhen comparing it, in these respects, with other animals, we made out\nits place in a system of classification. If we were to examine every\nanimal in a similar manner, we should establish a complete body of\nzoological morphology.\n\nAgain, we investigated the distribution of our type in space and in\ntime, and, if the like had been done with every animal, the sciences of\ngeographical and geological distribution would have attained their\nlimit.\n\nBut you will observe one remarkable circumstance, that, up to this\npoint, the question of the life of these organisms has not come under\nconsideration. Morphology and distribution might be studied almost as\nwell, if animals and plants were a peculiar kind of crystals, and\npossessed none of those functions which distinguish living beings so\nremarkably. But the facts of morphology and distribution have to be\naccounted for, and the science, whose aim it is to account for them, is\nPhysiology.\n\nLet us return to our lobster once more. If we watched the creature in\nits native element, we should see it climbing actively the submerged\nrocks, among which it delights to live, by means of its strong legs; or\nswimming by powerful strokes of its great tail, the appendages of whose\nsixth joint are spread out into a broad fan-like propeller: seize it,\nand it will show you that its great claws are no mean weapons of\noffence; suspend a piece of carrion among its haunts, and it will\ngreedily devour it, tearing and crushing the flesh by means of its\nmultitudinous jaws.\n\nSuppose that we had known nothing of the lobster but as an inert mass,\nan organic crystal, if I may use the phrase, and that we could suddenly\nsee it exerting all these powers, what wonderful new ideas and new\nquestions would arise in our minds! The great new question would be,\n\"How does all this take place?\" the chief new idea would be, the idea of\nadaptation to purpose,--the notion, that the constituents of animal\nbodies are not mere unconnected parts, but organs working together to an\nend. Let us consider the tail of the lobster again from this point of\nview. Morphology has taught us that it is a series of segments composed\nof homologous parts, which undergo various modifications--beneath and\nthrough which a common plan of formation is discernible. But if I look\nat the same part physiologically, I see that it is a most beautifully\nconstructed organ of locomotion, by means of which the animal can\nswiftly propel itself either backwards or forwards.\n\nBut how is this remarkable propulsive machine made to perform its\nfunctions? If I were suddenly to kill one of these animals and to take\nout all the soft parts, I should find the shell to be perfectly inert,\nto have no more power of moving itself than is possessed by the\nmachinery of a mill, when disconnected from its steam-engine or\nwater-wheel. But if I were to open it, and take out the viscera only,\nleaving the white flesh, I should perceive that the lobster could bend\nand extend its tail as well as before. If I were to cut off the tail, I\nshould cease to find any spontaneous motion in it; but on pinching any\nportion of the flesh, I should observe that it underwent a very curious\nchange--each fibre becoming shorter and thicker. By this act of\ncontraction, as it is termed, the parts to which the ends of the fibre\nare attached are, of course, approximated; and according to the\nrelations of their points of attachment to the centres of motion of the\ndifferent rings, the bending or the extension of the tail results. Close\nobservation of the newly opened lobster would soon show that all its\nmovements are due to the same cause--the shortening and thickening of\nthese fleshy fibres, which are technically called muscles.\n\nHere, then, is a capital fact. The movements of the lobster are due to\nmuscular contractility. But why does a muscle contract at one time and\nnot at another? Why does one whole group of muscles contract when the\nlobster wishes to extend his tail, and another group, when he desires to\nbend it? What is it originates, directs, and controls the motive power?\n\nExperiment, the great instrument for the ascertainment of truth in\nphysical science, answers this question for us. In the head of the\nlobster there lies a small mass of that peculiar tissue which is known\nas nervous substance. Cords of similar matter connect this brain of the\nlobster, directly or indirectly, with the muscles. Now, if these\ncommunicating cords are cut, the brain remaining entire, the power of\nexerting what we call voluntary motion in the parts below the section is\ndestroyed; and on the other hand, if, the cords remaining entire, the\nbrain mass be destroyed, the same voluntary mobility is equally lost.\nWhence the inevitable conclusion is, that the power of originating these\nmotions resides in the brain, and is propagated along the nervous cords.\n\nIn the higher animals the phaenomena which attend this transmission have\nbeen investigated, and the exertion of the peculiar energy which resides\nin the nerves has been found to be accompanied by a disturbance of the\nelectrical state of their molecules.\n\nIf we could exactly estimate the signification of this disturbance; if\nwe could obtain the value of a given exertion of nerve force by\ndetermining the quantity of electricity, or of heat, of which it is the\nequivalent; if we could ascertain upon what arrangement, or other\ncondition of the molecules of matter, the manifestation of the nervous\nand muscular energies depends, (and doubtless science will some day or\nother ascertain these points,) physiologists would have attained their\nultimate goal in this direction; they would have determined the relation\nof the motive force of animals to the other forms of force found in\nnature; and if the same process had been successfully performed for all\nthe operations which are carried on in, and by, the animal frame,\nphysiology would be perfect, and the facts of morphology and\ndistribution would be deducible from the laws which physiologists had\nestablished, combined with those determining the condition of the\nsurrounding universe.\n\nThere is not a fragment of the organism of this humble animal, whose\nstudy would not lead us into regions of thought as large as those which\nI have briefly opened up to you; but what I have been saying, I trust,\nhas not only enabled you to form a conception of the scope and purport\nof zoology, but has given you an imperfect example of the manner in\nwhich, in my opinion, that science, or indeed any physical science, may\nbe best taught. The great matter is, to make teaching real and\npractical, by fixing the attention of the student on particular facts;\nbut at the same time it should be rendered broad and comprehensive, by\nconstant reference to the generalizations of which all particular facts\nare illustrations. The lobster has served as a type of the whole animal\nkingdom, and its anatomy and physiology have illustrated for us some of\nthe greatest truths of biology. The student who has once seen for\nhimself the facts which I have described, has had their relations\nexplained to him, and has clearly comprehended them, has, so far, a\nknowledge of zoology, which is real and genuine, however limited it may\nbe, and which is worth more than all the mere reading knowledge of the\nscience he could ever acquire. His zoological information is, so far,\nknowledge and not mere hearsay.\n\nAnd if it were my business to fit you for the certificate in zoological\nscience granted by this department, I should pursue a course precisely\nsimilar in principle to that which I have taken to-night. I should\nselect a fresh-water sponge, a fresh-water polype or a _Cyanaea_, a\nfresh-water mussel, a lobster, a fowl, as types of the five primary\ndivisions of the animal kingdom. I should explain their structure very\nfully, and show how each illustrated the great principles of zoology.\nHaving gone very carefully and fully over this ground, I should feel\nthat you had a safe foundation, and I should then take you in the same\nway, but less minutely, over similarly selected illustrative types of\nthe classes; and then I should direct your attention to the special\nforms enumerated under the head of types, in this syllabus, and to the\nother facts there mentioned.\n\nThat would, speaking generally, be my plan. But I have undertaken to\nexplain to you the best mode of acquiring and communicating a knowledge\nof zoology, and you may therefore fairly ask me for a more detailed and\nprecise account of the manner in which I should propose to furnish you\nwith the information I refer to.\n\nMy own impression is, that the best model for all kinds of training in\nphysical science is that afforded by the method of teaching anatomy, in\nuse in the medical schools. This method consists of three\nelements--lectures, demonstrations, and examinations.\n\nThe object of lectures is, in the first place, to awaken the attention\nand excite the enthusiasm of the student; and this, I am sure, may be\neffected to a far greater extent by the oral discourse and by the\npersonal influence of a respected teacher than in any other way.\nSecondly, lectures have the double use of guiding the student to the\nsalient points of a subject, and at the same time forcing him to attend\nto the whole of it, and not merely to that part which takes his fancy.\nAnd lastly, lectures afford the student the opportunity of seeking\nexplanations of those difficulties which will; and indeed ought to,\narise in the course of his studies.\n\nBut for a student to derive the utmost possible value from lectures,\nseveral precautions are needful.\n\nI have a strong impression that the better a discourse is, as an\noration, the worse it is as a lecture. The flow of the discourse carries\nyou on without proper attention to its sense; you drop a word or a\nphrase, you lose the exact meaning for a moment, and while you strive to\nrecover yourself, the speaker has passed on to something else.\n\nThe practice I have adopted of late years, in lecturing to students, is\nto condense the substance of the hour's discourse into a few dry\npropositions, which are read slowly and taken down from dictation; the\nreading of each being followed by a free commentary, expanding and\nillustrating the proposition, explaining terms, and removing any\ndifficulties that may be attackable in that way, by diagrams made\nroughly, and seen to grow under the lecturer's hand. In this manner you,\nat any rate, insure the co-operation of the student to a certain extent.\nHe cannot leave the lecture-room entirely empty if the taking of notes\nis enforced; and a student must be preternaturally dull and mechanical,\nif he can take notes and hear them properly explained, and yet learn\nnothing.\n\nWhat books shall I read? is a question constantly put by the student to\nthe teacher. My reply usually is, \"None: write your notes out carefully\nand fully; strive to understand them thoroughly; come to me for the\nexplanation of anything you cannot understand; and I would rather you\ndid not distract your mind by reading.\" A properly composed course of\nlectures ought to contain fully as much matter as a student can\nassimilate in the time occupied by its delivery; and the teacher should\nalways recollect that his business is to feed, and not to cram the\nintellect. Indeed, I believe that a student who gains from a course of\nlectures the simple habit of concentrating his attention upon a\ndefinitely limited series of facts, until they are thoroughly mastered,\nhas made a step of immeasurable importance.\n\nBut, however good lectures may be, and however extensive the course of\nreading by which they are followed up, they are but accessories to the\ngreat instrument of scientific teaching--demonstration. If I insist\nunweariedly, nay fanatically, upon the importance of physical science as\nan educational agent, it is because the study of any branch of science,\nif properly conducted, appears to me to fill up a void left by all other\nmeans of education. I have the greatest respect and love for literature;\nnothing would grieve me more than to see literary training other than a\nvery prominent branch of education: indeed, I wish that real literary\ndiscipline were far more attended to than it is; but I cannot shut my\neyes to the fact, that there is a vast difference between men who have\nhad a purely literary, and those who have had a sound scientific,\ntraining.\n\nSeeking for the cause of this difference, I imagine I can find it in the\nfact, that, in the world of letters, learning and knowledge are one, and\nbooks are the source of both; whereas in science, as in life, learning\nand knowledge are distinct, and the study of things, and not of books,\nis the source of the latter.\n\nAll that literature has to bestow may be obtained by reading and by\npractical exercise in writing, and in speaking; but I do not exaggerate\nwhen I say, that none of the best gifts of science are to be won by\nthese means. On the contrary, the great benefit which a scientific\neducation bestows, whether as training or as knowledge, is dependent\nupon the extent to which the mind of the student is brought into\nimmediate contact with facts--upon the degree to which he learns the\nhabit of appealing directly to Nature, and of acquiring through his\nsenses concrete images of those properties of things, which are, and\nalways will be, but approximatively expressed in human language. Our way\nof looking at Nature, and of speaking about her, varies from year to\nyear; but a fact once seen, a relation of cause and effect, once\ndemonstratively apprehended, are possessions which neither change nor\npass away, but, on the contrary, form fixed centres, about which other\ntruths aggregate by natural affinity.\n\nTherefore, the great business of the scientific teacher is, to imprint\nthe fundamental, irrefragable facts of his science, not only by words\nupon the mind, but by sensible impressions upon the eye, and ear, and\ntouch of the student, in so complete a manner, that every term used, or\nlaw enunciated, should afterwards call up vivid images of the particular\nstructural, or other, facts which furnished the demonstration of the\nlaw, or the illustration of the term.\n\nNow this important operation can only be achieved by constant\ndemonstration, which may take place to a certain imperfect extent during\na lecture, but which ought also to be carried on independently, and\nwhich should be addressed to each individual student, the teacher\nendeavouring, not so much to show a thing to the learner, as to make him\nsee it for himself.\n\nI am well aware that there are great practical difficulties in the way\nof effectual zoological demonstrations. The dissection of animals is\nnot altogether pleasant, and requires much time; nor is it easy to\nsecure an adequate supply of the needful specimens. The botanist has\nhere a great advantage; his specimens are easily obtained, are clean and\nwholesome, and can be dissected in a private house as well as anywhere\nelse; and hence, I believe, the fact, that botany is so much more\nreadily and better taught than its sister science. But, be it difficult\nor be it easy, if zoological science is to be properly studied,\ndemonstration, and, consequently, dissection, must be had. Without it,\nno man can have a really sound knowledge of animal organization.\n\nA good deal may be done, however, without actual dissection on the\nstudent's part, by demonstration upon specimens and preparations; and in\nall probability it would not be very difficult, were the demand\nsufficient, to organize collections of such objects, sufficient for all\nthe purposes of elementary teaching, at a comparatively cheap rate. Even\nwithout these, much might be effected, if the zoological collections,\nwhich are open to the public, were arranged according to what has been\ntermed the \"typical principle;\" that is to say, if the specimens exposed\nto public view were so selected, that the public could learn something\nfrom them, instead of being, as at present, merely confused by their\nmultiplicity. For example, the grand ornithological gallery at the\nBritish Museum contains between two and three thousand species of birds,\nand sometimes five or six specimens of a species. They are very pretty\nto look at, and some of the cases are, indeed, splendid; but undertake\nto say, that no man but a professed ornithologist has ever gathered\nmuch information from the collection. Certainly, no one of the tens of\nthousands of the general public who have walked through that gallery\never knew more about the essential peculiarities of birds when he left\nthe gallery, than when he entered it. But if, somewhere in that vast\nhall, there were a few preparations, exemplifying the leading structural\npeculiarities and the mode of development of a common fowl; if the types\nof the genera, the leading modifications in the skeleton, in the plumage\nat various ages, in the mode of nidification, and the like, among birds,\nwere displayed; and if the other specimens were put away in a place\nwhere the men of science, to whom they are alone useful, could have free\naccess to them, I can conceive that this collection might become a great\ninstrument of scientific education.\n\nThe last implement of the teacher to which I have adverted is\nexamination--a means of education now so thoroughly understood that I\nneed hardly enlarge upon it. I hold that both written and oral\nexaminations are indispensable, and, by requiring the description of\nspecimens, they may be made to supplement demonstration.\n\nSuch is the fullest reply the time at my disposal will allow me to give\nto the question--how may a knowledge of zoology be best acquired and\ncommunicated?\n\nBut there is a previous question which may be moved, and which, in fact,\nI know many are inclined to move. It is the question, why should\ntraining masters be encouraged to acquire a knowledge of this, or any\nother branch of physical science? What is the use, it is said, of\nattempting to make physical science a branch of primary education? It\nis not probable that teachers, in pursuing such studies, will be led\nastray from the acquirement of more important but less attractive\nknowledge? And, even if they can learn something of science without\nprejudice to their usefulness, what is the good of their attempting to\ninstil that knowledge into boys whose real business is the acquisition\nof reading, writing, and arithmetic?\n\nThese questions are, and will be, very commonly asked, for they arise\nfrom that profound ignorance of the value and true position of physical\nscience, which infests the minds of the most highly educated and\nintelligent classes of the community. But if I did not feel well assured\nthat they are capable of being easily and satisfactorily answered; that\nthey have been answered over and over again; and that the time will come\nwhen men of liberal education will blush to raise such questions,--I\nshould be ashamed of my position here to-night. Without doubt, it is\nyour great and very important function to carry out elementary\neducation; without question, anything that should interfere with the\nfaithful fulfilment of that duty on your part would be a great evil; and\nif I thought that your acquirement of the elements of physical science,\nand your communication of those elements to your pupils, involved any\nsort of interference with your proper duties, I should be the first\nperson to protest against your being encouraged to do anything of the\nkind.\n\nBut is it true that the acquisition of such a knowledge of science as is\nproposed, and the communication of that knowledge, are calculated to\nweaken your usefulness? Or may I not rather ask, is it possible for you\nto discharge your functions properly without these aids?\n\nWhat is the purpose of primary intellectual education? I apprehend that\nits first object is to train the young in the use of those tools\nwherewith men extract knowledge from the ever-shifting succession of\nphenomena which pass before their eyes; and that its second object is to\ninform them of the fundamental laws which have been found by experience\nto govern the course of things, so that they may not be turned out into\nthe world naked, defenceless, and a prey to the events they might\ncontrol.\n\nA boy is taught to read his own and other languages, in order that he\nmay have access to infinitely wider stores of knowledge than could ever\nbe opened to him by oral intercourse with his fellow men; he learns to\nwrite, that his means of communication with the rest of mankind may be\nindefinitely enlarged, and that he may record and store up the knowledge\nhe acquires. He is taught elementary mathematics, that he may understand\nall those relations of number and form, upon which the transactions of\nmen, associated in complicated societies, are built, and that he may\nhave some practice in deductive reasoning.\n\nAll these operations of reading, writing, and ciphering, are\nintellectual tools, whose use should, before all things, be learned, and\nlearned thoroughly; so that the youth may be enabled to make his life\nthat which it ought to be, a continual progress in learning and in\nwisdom.\n\nBut, in addition, primary education endeavours to fit a boy out with a\ncertain equipment of positive knowledge. He is taught the great laws of\nmorality; the religion of his sect; so much history and geography as\nwill tell him where the great countries of the world are, what they are,\nand how they have become what they are.\n\nWithout doubt all these are most fitting and excellent things to teach a\nboy; I should be very sorry to omit any of them from any scheme of\nprimary intellectual education. The system is excellent, so far as it\ngoes.\n\nBut if I regard it closely, a curious reflection arises. I suppose that,\nfifteen hundred years ago, the child of any well-to-do Roman citizen was\ntaught just these same things; reading and writing in his own, and,\nperhaps, the Greek tongue; the elements of mathematics; and the\nreligion, morality, history, and geography current in his time.\nFurthermore, I do not think I err in affirming, that, if such a\nChristian Roman boy, who had finished his education, could be\ntransplanted into one of our public schools, and pass through its course\nof instruction, he would not meet with a single unfamiliar line of\nthought; amidst all the new facts he would have to learn, not one would\nsuggest a different mode of regarding the universe from that current in\nhis own time.\n\nAnd yet surely there is some great difference between the civilization\nof the fourth century and that of the nineteenth, and still more between\nthe intellectual habits and tone of thought of that day and this?\n\nAnd what has made this difference? I answer fearlessly,--The prodigious\ndevelopment of physical science within the last two centuries.\n\nModern civilization rests upon physical science; take away her gifts to\nour own country, and our position among the leading nations of the world\nis gone to-morrow; for it is physical science only, that makes\nintelligence and moral energy stronger than brute force.\n\nThe whole of modern thought is steeped in science; it has made its way\ninto the works of our best poets, and even the mere man of letters, who\naffects to ignore and despise science, is unconsciously impregnated with\nher spirit, and indebted for his best products to her methods. I believe\nthat the greatest intellectual revolution mankind has yet seen is now\nslowly taking place by her agency. She is teaching the world that the\nultimate court of appeal is observation and experiment, and not\nauthority; she is teaching it to estimate the value of evidence; she is\ncreating a firm and living faith in the existence of immutable moral and\nphysical laws, perfect obedience to which is the highest possible aim of\nan intelligent being.\n\nBut of all this your old stereotyped system of education takes no note.\nPhysical science, its methods, its problems, and its difficulties, will\nmeet the poorest boy at every turn, and yet we educate him in such a\nmanner that he shall enter the world as ignorant of the existence of the\nmethods and facts of science as the day he was born. The modern world is\nfull of artillery; and we turn out our children to do battle in it,\nequipped with the shield and sword of an ancient gladiator.\n\nPosterity will cry shame on us if we do not remedy this deplorable state\nof things. Nay, if we live twenty years longer, our own consciences will\ncry shame on us.\n\nIt is my firm conviction that the only way to remedy it is, to make the\nelements of physical science an integral part of primary education. I\nhave endeavoured to show you how that may be done for that branch of\nscience which it is my business to pursue; and I can but add, that I\nshould look upon the day when every schoolmaster throughout this land\nwas a centre of genuine, however rudimentary, scientific knowledge, as\nan epoch in the history of the country.\n\nBut let me entreat you to remember my last words. Addressing myself to\nyou, as teachers, I would say, mere book learning in physical science is\na sham and a delusion--what you teach, unless you wish to be impostors,\nthat you must first know; and real knowledge in science means personal\nacquaintance with the facts, be they few or many.[9]\n\nFOOTNOTE:\n\n[9] It has been suggested to me that these words may be taken to imply a\ndiscouragement on my part of any sort of scientific instruction which\ndoes not give an acquaintance with the facts at first hand. But this is\nnot my meaning. The ideal of scientific teaching is, no doubt, a system\nby which the scholar sees every fact for himself, and the teacher\nsupplies only the explanations. Circumstances, however, do not often\nallow of the attainment of that ideal, and we must put up with the next\nbest system--one in which the scholar takes a good deal on trust from a\nteacher, who, knowing the facts by his own knowledge, can describe them\nwith so much vividness as to enable his audience to form competent ideas\nconcerning them. The system which I repudiate is that which allows\nteachers who have not come into direct contact with the leading facts of\na science to pass their second-hand information on. The scientific\nvirus, like vaccine lymph, if passed through too long a succession of\norganisms, will lose all its effect in protecting the young against the\nintellectual epidemics to which they are exposed.\n\n\n\n\nVII.\n\nON THE PHYSICAL BASIS OF LIFE.[10]\n\n\nIn order to make the title of this discourse generally intelligible, I\nhave translated the term \"Protoplasm,\" which is the scientific name of\nthe substance of which I am about to speak, by the words \"the physical\nbasis of life.\" I suppose that, to many, the idea that there is such a\nthing as a physical basis, or matter, of life may be novel--so widely\nspread is the conception of life as a something which works through\nmatter, but is independent of it; and even those who are aware that\nmatter and life are inseparably connected, may not be prepared for the\nconclusion plainly suggested by the phrase, \"_the_ physical basis or\nmatter of life,\" that there is some one kind of matter which is common\nto all living beings, and that their endless diversities are bound\ntogether by a physical, as well as an ideal, unity. In fact, when first\napprehended, such a doctrine as this appears almost shocking to common\nsense.\n\nWhat, truly, can seem to be more obviously different from one another in\nfaculty, in form, and in substance, than the various kinds of living\nbeings? What community of faculty can there be between the\nbrightly-coloured lichen, which so nearly resembles a mere mineral\nincrustation of the bare rock on which it grows, and the painter, to\nwhom it is instinct with beauty, or the botanist, whom it feeds with\nknowledge?\n\nAgain, think of the microscopic fungus--a mere infinitesimal ovoid\nparticle, which finds space and duration enough to multiply into\ncountless millions in the body of a living fly; and then of the wealth\nof foliage, the luxuriance of flower and fruit, which lies between this\nbald sketch of a plant and the giant pine of California, towering to the\ndimensions of a cathedral spire, or the Indian fig, which covers acres\nwith its profound shadow, and endures while nations and empires come and\ngo around its vast circumference? Or, turning to the other half of the\nworld of life, picture to yourselves the great Finner whale, hugest of\nbeasts that live, or have lived, disporting his eighty or ninety feet of\nbone, muscle, and blubber, with easy roll, among waves in which the\nstoutest ship that ever left dockyard would founder hopelessly; and\ncontrast him with the invisible animalcules--mere gelatinous specks,\nmultitudes of which could, in fact, dance upon the point of a needle\nwith the same ease as the angels of the Schoolmen could, in imagination.\nWith these images before your minds, you may well ask, what community\nof form, or structure, is there between the animalcule and the whale; or\nbetween the fungus and the fig-tree? And, _a fortiori_, between all\nfour?\n\nFinally, if we regard substance, or material composition, what hidden\nbond can connect the flower which a girl wears in her hair and the blood\nwhich courses through her youthful veins; or, what is there in common\nbetween the dense and resisting mass of the oak, or the strong fabric of\nthe tortoise, and those broad disks of glassy jelly which may be seen\npulsating through the waters of a calm sea, but which drain away to mere\nfilms in the hand which raises them out of their element?\n\nSuch objections as these must, I think, arise in the mind of every one\nwho ponders, for the first time, upon the conception of a single\nphysical basis of life underlying all the diversities of vital\nexistence; but I propose to demonstrate to you that, notwithstanding\nthese apparent difficulties, a threefold unity--namely, a unity of\npower, or faculty, a unity of form, and a unity of substantial\ncomposition--does pervade the whole living world.\n\n\nNo very abstruse argumentation is needed, in the first place, to prove\nthat the powers, or faculties, of all kinds of living matter, diverse as\nthey may be in degree, are substantially similar in kind.\n\nGoethe has condensed a survey of all the powers of mankind into the\nwell-known epigram:--\n\n     \"Warum treibt sich das Volk so und schreit? Es will sich ernaehren\n         Kinder zeugen, und die naehren so gut es vermag.\n\n            *       *       *       *       *\n\n     Weiter bringt es kein Mensch, stell' er sich wie er auch will.\"\n\nIn physiological language this means, that all the multifarious and\ncomplicated activities of man are comprehensible under three categories.\nEither they are immediately directed towards the maintenance and\ndevelopment of the body, or they effect transitory changes in the\nrelative positions of parts of the body, or they tend towards the\ncontinuance of the species. Even those manifestations of intellect, of\nfeeling, and of will, which we rightly name the higher faculties, are\nnot excluded from this classification, inasmuch as to every one but the\nsubject of them, they are known only as transitory changes in the\nrelative positions of parts of the body. Speech, gesture, and every\nother form of human action are, in the long run, resolvable into\nmuscular contraction, and muscular contraction is but a transitory\nchange in the relative positions of the parts of a muscle. But the\nscheme which is large enough to embrace the activities of the highest\nform of life, covers all those of the lower creatures. The lowest plant,\nor animalcule, feeds, grows, and reproduces its kind. In addition, all\nanimals manifest those transitory changes of form which we class under\nirritability and contractility; and, it is more than probable, that when\nthe vegetable world is thoroughly explored, we shall find all plants in\npossession of the same powers, at one time or other of their existence.\n\nI am not now alluding to such phaenomena, at once rare and conspicuous,\nas those exhibited by the leaflets of the sensitive plant, or the\nstamens of the barberry, but to much more widely-spread, and, at the\nsame time, more subtle and hidden, manifestations of vegetable\ncontractility. You are doubtless aware that the common nettle owes its\nstinging property to the innumerable stiff and needle-like, though\nexquisitely delicate, hairs which cover its surface. Each\nstinging-needle tapers from a broad base to a slender summit, which,\nthough rounded at the end, is of such microscopic fineness that it\nreadily penetrates, and breaks off in, the skin. The whole hair consists\nof a very delicate outer case of wood, closely applied to the inner\nsurface of which is a layer of semifluid matter, full of innumerable\ngranules of extreme minuteness. This semi-fluid lining is protoplasm,\nwhich thus constitutes a kind of bag, full of a limpid liquid, and\nroughly corresponding in form with the interior of the hair which it\nfills. When viewed with a sufficiently high magnifying power, the\nprotoplasmic layer of the nettle hair is seen to be in a condition of\nunceasing activity. Local contractions of the whole thickness of its\nsubstance pass slowly and gradually from point to point, and give rise\nto the appearance of progressive waves, just as the bending of\nsuccessive stalks of corn by a breeze produces the apparent billows of a\ncorn-field.\n\nBut, in addition to these movements, and independently of them, the\ngranules are driven, in relatively rapid streams, through channels in\nthe protoplasm which seem to have a considerable amount of persistence.\nMost commonly, the currents in adjacent parts of the protoplasm take\nsimilar directions; and, thus, there is a general stream up one side of\nthe hair and down the other. But this does not prevent the existence of\npartial currents which take different routes; and, sometimes, trains of\ngranules may be seen coursing swiftly in opposite directions, within a\ntwenty-thousandth of an inch of one another; while, occasionally,\nopposite streams come into direct collision, and, after a longer or\nshorter struggle, one predominates. The cause of these currents seems\nto lie in contractions of the protoplasm which bounds the channels in\nwhich they flow, but which are so minute that the best microscopes show\nonly their effects, and not themselves.\n\nThe spectacle afforded by the wonderful energies prisoned within the\ncompass of the microscopic hair of a plant, which we commonly regard as\na merely passive organism, is not easily forgotten by one who has\nwatched its display, continued hour after hour, without pause or sign of\nweakening. The possible complexity of many other organic forms,\nseemingly as simple as the protoplasm of the nettle, dawns upon one; and\nthe comparison of such a protoplasm to a body with an internal\ncirculation, which has been put forward by an eminent physiologist,\nloses much of its startling character. Currents similar to those of the\nhairs of the nettle have been observed in a great multitude of very\ndifferent plants, and weighty authorities have suggested that they\nprobably occur, in more or less perfection, in all young vegetable\ncells. If such be the case, the wonderful noonday silence of a tropical\nforest is, after all, due only to the dulness of our hearing; and could\nour ears catch the murmur of these tiny Maelstroms, as they whirl in the\ninnumerable myriads of living cells which constitute each tree, we\nshould be stunned, as with the roar of a great city.\n\nAmong the lower plants, it is the rule rather than the exception, that\ncontractility should be still more openly manifested at some periods of\ntheir existence. The protoplasm of _Algae_ and _Fungi_ becomes, under\nmany circumstances, partially, or completely, freed from its woody\ncase, and exhibits movements of its whole mass, or is propelled by the\ncontractility of one, or more, hair-like prolongations of its body,\nwhich are called vibratile cilia. And, so far as the conditions of the\nmanifestation of the phaenomena of contractility have yet been studied,\nthey are the same for the plant as for the animal. Heat and electric\nshocks influence both, and in the same way, though it may be in\ndifferent degrees. It is by no means my intention to suggest that there\nis no difference in faculty between the lowest plant and the highest, or\nbetween plants and animals. But the difference between the powers of the\nlowest plant, or animal, and those of the highest, is one of degree, not\nof kind, and depends, as Milne-Edwards long ago so well pointed out,\nupon the extent to which the principle of the division of labour is\ncarried out in the living economy. In the lowest organism all parts are\ncompetent to perform all functions, and one and the same portion of\nprotoplasm may successively take on the function of feeding, moving, or\nreproducing apparatus. In the highest, on the contrary, a great number\nof parts combine to perform each function, each part doing its allotted\nshare of the work with great accuracy and efficiency, but being useless\nfor any other purpose.\n\nOn the other hand, notwithstanding all the fundamental resemblances\nwhich exist between the powers of the protoplasm in plants and in\nanimals, they present a striking difference (to which I shall advert\nmore at length presently), in the fact that plants can manufacture fresh\nprotoplasm out of mineral compounds, whereas animals are obliged to\nprocure it ready made, and hence, in the long run, depend upon plants.\nUpon what condition this difference in the powers of the two great\ndivisions of the world of life depends, nothing is at present known.\n\nWith such qualification as arises out of the last-mentioned fact, it may\nbe truly said that the acts of all living things are fundamentally one.\nIs any such unity predicable of their forms? Let us seek in easily\nverified facts for a reply to this question. If a drop of blood be drawn\nby pricking one's finger, and viewed with proper precautions and under a\nsufficiently high microscopic power, there will be seen, among the\ninnumerable multitude of little, circular, discoidal bodies, or\ncorpuscles, which float in it and give it its colour, a comparatively\nsmall number of colourless corpuscles, of somewhat larger size and very\nirregular shape. If the drop of blood be kept at the temperature of the\nbody, these colourless corpuscles will be seen to exhibit a marvellous\nactivity, changing their forms with great rapidity, drawing in and\nthrusting out prolongations of their substance, and creeping about as if\nthey were independent organisms.\n\nThe substance which is thus active is a mass of protoplasm, and its\nactivity differs in detail, rather than in principle, from that of the\nprotoplasm of the nettle. Under sundry circumstances the corpuscle dies\nand becomes distended into a round mass, in the midst of which is seen a\nsmaller spherical body, which existed, but was more or less hidden, in\nthe living corpuscle, and is called its _nucleus_. Corpuscles of\nessentially similar structure are to be found in the skin, in the lining\nof the mouth, and scattered through the whole framework of the body.\nNay, more; in the earliest condition of the human organism, in that\nstate in which it has but just become distinguishable from the egg in\nwhich it arises, it is nothing but an aggregation of such corpuscles,\nand every organ of the body was, once, no more than such an aggregation.\n\nThus a nucleated mass of protoplasm turns out to be what may be termed\nthe structural unit of the human body. As a matter of fact, the body, in\nits earliest state, is a mere multiple of such units; and, in its\nperfect condition, it is a multiple of such units, variously modified.\n\nBut does the formula which expresses the essential structural character\nof the highest animal cover all the rest, as the statement of its powers\nand faculties covered that of all others? Very nearly. Beast and fowl,\nreptile and fish, mollusk, worm, and polype, are all composed of\nstructural units of the same character, namely, masses of protoplasm\nwith a nucleus. There are sundry very low animals, each of which,\nstructurally, is a mere colourless blood-corpuscle, leading an\nindependent life. But, at the very bottom of the animal scale, even this\nsimplicity becomes simplified, and all the phaenomena of life are\nmanifested by a particle of protoplasm without a nucleus. Nor are such\norganisms insignificant by reason of their want of complexity. It is a\nfair question whether the protoplasm of those simplest forms of life,\nwhich people an immense extent of the bottom of the sea, would not\noutweigh that of all the higher living beings which inhabit the land put\ntogether. And in ancient times, no less than at the present day, such\nliving beings as these have been the greatest of rock builders.\n\nWhat has been said of the animal world is no less true of plants.\nImbedded in the protoplasm at the broad, or attached, end of the nettle\nhair, there lies a spheroidal nucleus. Careful examination further\nproves that the whole substance of the nettle is made up of a repetition\nof such masses of nucleated protoplasm, each contained in a wooden case,\nwhich is modified in form, sometimes into a woody fibre, sometimes into\na duct or spiral vessel, sometimes into a pollen grain, or an ovule.\nTraced back to its earliest state, the nettle arises as the man does, in\na particle of nucleated protoplasm. And in the lowest plants, as in the\nlowest animals, a single mass of such protoplasm may constitute the\nwhole plant, or the protoplasm may exist without a nucleus.\n\nUnder these circumstances it may well be asked, how is one mass of\nnon-nucleated protoplasm to be distinguished from another? why call one\n\"plant\" and the other \"animal\"?\n\nThe only reply is that, so far as form is concerned, plants and animals\nare not separable, and that, in many cases, it is a mere matter of\nconvention whether we call a given organism an animal or a plant. There\nis a living body called _AEthalium septicum_, which appears upon decaying\nvegetable substances, and, in one of its forms, is common upon the\nsurfaces of tan-pits. In this condition it is, to all intents and\npurposes, a fungus, and formerly was always regarded as such; but the\nremarkable investigations of De Bary have shown that, in another\ncondition, the _AEthalium_ is an actively locomotive creature, and takes\nin solid matters, upon which, apparently, it feeds, thus exhibiting the\nmost characteristic feature of animality. Is this a plant; or is it an\nanimal? Is it both; or is it neither? Some decide in favour of the last\nsupposition, and establish an intermediate kingdom, a sort of biological\nNo Man's Land for all these questionable forms. But, as it is admittedly\nimpossible to draw any distinct boundary line between this no man's land\nand the vegetable world on the one hand, or the animal, on the other, it\nappears to me that this proceeding merely doubles the difficulty which,\nbefore, was single.\n\nProtoplasm, simple or nucleated, is the formal basis of all life. It is\nthe clay of the potter: which, bake it and paint it as he will, remains\nclay, separated by artifice, and not by nature, from the commonest brick\nor sun-dried clod.\n\nThus it becomes clear that all living powers are cognate, and that all\nliving forms are fundamentally of one character. The researches of the\nchemist have revealed a no less striking uniformity of material\ncomposition in living matter.\n\nIn perfect strictness, it is true that chemical investigation can tell\nus little or nothing, directly, of the composition of living matter,\ninasmuch as such matter must needs die in the act of analysis,--and upon\nthis very obvious ground, objections, which I confess seem to me to be\nsomewhat frivolous, have been raised to the drawing of any conclusions\nwhatever respecting the composition of actually living matter, from that\nof the dead matter of life, which alone is accessible to us. But\nobjectors of this class do not seem to reflect that it is also, in\nstrictness, true that we know nothing about the composition of any body\nwhatever, as it is. The statement that a crystal of calc-spar consists\nof carbonate of lime, is quite true, if we only mean that, by\nappropriate processes, it may be resolved into carbonic acid and\nquicklime. If you pass the same carbonic acid over the very quicklime\nthus obtained, you will obtain carbonate of lime again; but it will not\nbe calc-spar, nor anything like it. Can it, therefore, be said that\nchemical analysis teaches nothing about the chemical composition of\ncalc-spar? Such a statement would be absurd; but it is hardly more so\nthan the talk one occasionally hears about the uselessness of applying\nthe results of chemical analysis to the living bodies which have yielded\nthem.\n\nOne fact, at any rate, is out of reach of such refinements, and this is,\nthat all the forms of protoplasm which have yet been examined contain\nthe four elements, carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen, in very\ncomplex union, and that they behave similarly towards several reagents.\nTo this complex combination, the nature of which has never been\ndetermined with exactness, the name of Protein has been applied. And if\nwe use this term with such caution as may properly arise out of our\ncomparative ignorance of the things for which it stands, it may be truly\nsaid, that all protoplasm is proteinaceous; or, as the white, or\nalbumen, of an egg is one of the commonest examples of a nearly pure\nprotein matter, we may say that all living matter is more or less\nalbuminoid.\n\nPerhaps it would not yet be safe to say that all forms of protoplasm are\naffected by the direct action of electric shocks; and yet the number of\ncases in which the contraction of protoplasm is shown to be effected by\nthis agency increases every day.\n\nNor can it be affirmed with perfect confidence, that all forms of\nprotoplasm are liable to undergo that peculiar coagulation at a\ntemperature of 40 deg.--50 deg. centigrade, which has been called\n\"heat-stiffening,\" though Kuehne's beautiful researches have proved this\noccurrence to take place in so many and such diverse living beings, that\nit is hardly rash to expect that the law holds good for all.\n\n\nEnough has, perhaps, been said to prove the existence of a general\nuniformity in the character of the protoplasm, or physical basis, of\nlife, in whatever group of living beings it may be studied. But it will\nbe understood that this general uniformity by no means excludes any\namount of special modifications of the fundamental substance. The\nmineral, carbonate of lime, assumes an immense diversity of characters,\nthough no one doubts that, under all these Protean changes, it is one\nand the same thing.\n\nAnd now, what is the ultimate fate, and what the origin, of the matter\nof life?\n\nIs it, as some of the older naturalists supposed, diffused throughout\nthe universe in molecules, which are indestructible and unchangeable in\nthemselves; but, in endless transmigration, unite in innumerable\npermutations, into the diversified forms of life we know? Or, is the\nmatter of life composed of ordinary matter, differing from it only in\nthe manner in which its atoms are aggregated? Is it built up of ordinary\nmatter, and again resolved into ordinary matter when its work is done?\n\nModern science does not hesitate a moment between these alternatives.\nPhysiology writes over the portals of life--\n\n     \"Debemur morti nos nostraque,\"\n\nwith a profounder meaning than the Roman poet attached to that\nmelancholy line. Under whatever disguise it takes refuge, whether fungus\nor oak, worm or man, the living protoplasm not only ultimately dies and\nis resolved into its mineral and lifeless constituents, but is always\ndying, and, strange as the paradox may sound, could not live unless it\ndied.\n\nIn the wonderful story of the \"Peau de Chagrin,\" the hero becomes\npossessed of a magical wild ass' skin, which yields him the means of\ngratifying all his wishes. But its surface represents the duration of\nthe proprietor's life; and for every satisfied desire the skin shrinks\nin proportion to the intensity of fruition, until at length life and the\nlast handbreadth of the _peau de chagrin_ disappear with the\ngratification of a last wish.\n\nBalzac's studies had led him over a wide range of thought and\nspeculation, and his shadowing forth of physiological truth in this\nstrange story may have been intentional. At any rate, the matter of life\nis a veritable _peau de chagrin_, and for every vital act it is somewhat\nthe smaller. All work implies waste, and the work of life results,\ndirectly or indirectly, in the waste of protoplasm.\n\nEvery word uttered by a speaker costs him some physical loss; and, in\nthe strictest sense, he burns that others may have light--so much\neloquence, so much of his body resolved into carbonic acid, water, and\nurea. It is clear that this process of expenditure cannot go on for\never. But happily, the protoplasmic _peau de chagrin_ differs from\nBalzac's in its capacity of being repaired, and brought back to its full\nsize, after every exertion.\n\nFor example, this present lecture, whatever its intellectual worth to\nyou, has a certain physical value to me, which is, conceivably,\nexpressible by the number of grains of protoplasm and other bodily\nsubstance wasted in maintaining my vital processes during its delivery.\nMy _peau de chagrin_ will be distinctly smaller at the end of the\ndiscourse than it was at the beginning. By and by, I shall probably have\nrecourse to the substance commonly called mutton, for the purpose of\nstretching it back to its original size. Now this mutton was once the\nliving protoplasm, more or less modified, of another animal--a sheep. As\nI shall eat it, it is the same matter altered, not only by death, but by\nexposure to sundry artificial operations in the process of cooking.\n\nBut these changes, whatever be their extent, have not rendered it\nincompetent to resume its old functions as matter of life. A singular\ninward laboratory, which I possess, will dissolve a certain portion of\nthe modified protoplasm; the solution so formed will pass into my veins;\nand the subtle influences to which it will then be subjected will\nconvert the dead protoplasm into living protoplasm, and transubstantiate\nsheep into man.\n\nNor is this all. If digestion were a thing to be trifled with, I might\nsup upon lobster, and the matter of life of the crustacean would undergo\nthe same wonderful metamorphosis into humanity. And were I to return to\nmy own place by sea, and undergo shipwreck, the crustacea might, and\nprobably would, return the compliment, and demonstrate our common nature\nby turning my protoplasm into living lobster. Or, if nothing better were\nto be had, I might supply my wants with mere bread, and I should find\nthe protoplasm of the wheat-plant to be convertible into man, with no\nmore trouble than that of the sheep, and with far less, I fancy, than\nthat of the lobster.\n\nHence it appears to be a matter of no great moment what animal, or what\nplant, I lay under contribution for protoplasm, and the fact speaks\nvolumes for the general identity of that substance in all living beings.\nI share this catholicity of assimilation with other animals, all of\nwhich, so far as we know, could thrive equally well on the protoplasm of\nany of their fellows, or of any plant; but here the assimilative powers\nof the animal world cease. A solution of smelling-salts in water, with\nan infinitesimal proportion of some other saline matters, contains all\nthe elementary bodies which enter into the composition of protoplasm;\nbut, as I need hardly say, a hogshead of that fluid would not keep a\nhungry man from starving, nor would it save any animal whatever from a\nlike fate. An animal cannot make protoplasm, but must take it ready-made\nfrom some other animal, or some plant--the animal's highest feat of\nconstructive chemistry being to convert dead protoplasm into that living\nmatter of life which is appropriate to itself.\n\nTherefore, in seeking for the origin of protoplasm, we must eventually\nturn to the vegetable world. The fluid containing carbonic acid, water,\nand ammonia, which offers such a Barmecide feast to the animal, is a\ntable richly spread to multitudes of plants; and, with a due supply of\nonly such materials, many a plant will not only maintain itself in\nvigour, but grow and multiply, until it has increased a million-fold, or\na million million-fold, the quantity of protoplasm which it originally\npossessed; in this way building up the matter of life, to an indefinite\nextent, from the common matter of the universe.\n\nThus, the animal can only raise the complex substance of dead\nprotoplasm to the higher power, as one may say, of living protoplasm;\nwhile the plant can raise the less complex substances--carbonic acid,\nwater, and ammonia--to the same stage of living protoplasm, if not to\nthe same level. But the plant also has its limitations. Some of the\nfungi, for example, appear to need higher compounds to start with; and\nno known plant can live upon the uncompounded elements of protoplasm. A\nplant supplied with pure carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen,\nphosphorus, sulphur, and the like, would as infallibly die as the animal\nin his bath of smelling-salts, though it would be surrounded by all the\nconstituents of protoplasm. Nor, indeed, need the process of\nsimplification of vegetable food be carried so far as this, in order to\narrive at the limit of the plant's thaumaturgy. Let water, carbonic\nacid, and all the other needful constituents be supplied with ammonia,\nand an ordinary plant will still be unable to manufacture protoplasm.\n\nThus the matter of life, so far as we know it (and we have no right to\nspeculate on any other), breaks up, in consequence of that continual\ndeath which is the condition of its manifesting vitality, into carbonic\nacid, water, and ammonia, which certainly possess no properties but\nthose of ordinary matter. And out of these same forms of ordinary\nmatter, and from none which are simpler, the vegetable world builds up\nall the protoplasm which keeps the animal world a going. Plants are the\naccumulators of the power which animals distribute and disperse.\n\nBut it will be observed, that the existence of the matter of life\ndepends on the pre-existence of certain compounds; namely, carbonic\nacid, water, and ammonia. Withdraw any one of these three from the\nworld and all vital phaenomena come to an end. They are related to the\nprotoplasm of the plant, as the protoplasm of the plant is to that of\nthe animal. Carbon, hydrogen, oxygen and nitrogen are all lifeless\nbodies. Of these, carbon and oxygen unite, in certain proportions and\nunder certain conditions, to give rise to carbonic acid; hydrogen and\noxygen produce water; nitrogen and hydrogen give rise to ammonia. These\nnew compounds like the elementary bodies of which they are composed, are\nlifeless. But when they are brought together, under certain conditions\nthey give rise to the still more complex body, protoplasm, and this\nprotoplasm exhibits the phenomena of life.\n\nI see no break in this series of steps in molecular complication, and I\nam unable to understand why the language which is applicable to any one\nterm of the series may not be used to any of the others. We think fit to\ncall different kinds of matter carbon, oxygen, hydrogen, and nitrogen,\nand to speak of the various powers and activities of these substances as\nthe properties of the matter of which they are composed.\n\nWhen hydrogen and oxygen are mixed in a certain proportion, and an\nelectric spark is passed through them, they disappear, and a quantity of\nwater, equal in weight to the sum of their weights, appears in their\nplace. There is not the slightest parity between the passive and active\npowers of the water and those of the oxygen and hydrogen which have\ngiven rise to it. At 32 deg. Fahrenheit, and far below that temperature,\noxygen and hydrogen are elastic gaseous bodies, whose particles tend to\nrush away from one another with great force. Water, at the same\ntemperature, is a strong though brittle solid, whose particles tend to\ncohere into definite geometrical shapes, and sometimes build up frosty\nimitations of the most complex forms of vegetable foliage.\n\nNevertheless we call these, and many other strange phaenomena, the\nproperties of the water, and we do not hesitate to believe that, in some\nway or another, they result from the properties of the component\nelements of the water. We do not assume that a something called\n\"aquosity\" entered into and took possession of the oxide of hydrogen as\nsoon as it was formed, and then guided the aqueous particles to their\nplaces in the facets of the crystal, or amongst the leaflets of the\nhoar-frost. On the contrary, we live in the hope and in the faith that,\nby the advance of molecular physics, we shall by and by be able to see\nour way as clearly from the constituents of water to the properties of\nwater, as we are now able to deduce the operations of a watch from the\nform of its parts and the manner in which they are put together.\n\nIs the case in any way changed when carbonic acid, water, and ammonia\ndisappear, and in their place, under the influence of pre-existing\nliving protoplasm, an equivalent weight of the matter of life makes its\nappearance?\n\nIt is true that there is no sort of parity between the properties of the\ncomponents and the properties of the resultant, but neither was there in\nthe case of the water. It is also true that what I have spoken of as the\ninfluence of pre-existing living matter is something quite\nunintelligible; but does anybody quite comprehend the _modus operandi_\nof an electric spark, which traverses a mixture of oxygen and hydrogen?\n\nWhat justification is there, then, for the assumption of the existence\nin the living matter of a something which has no representative, or\ncorrelative, in the not living matter which gave rise to it? What better\nphilosophical status has \"vitality\" than \"aquosity\"? And why should\n\"vitality\" hope for a better fate than the other \"itys\" which have\ndisappeared since Martinus Scriblerus accounted for the operation of the\nmeat-jack by its inherent \"meat roasting quality,\" and scorned the\n\"materialism\" of those who explained the turning of the spit by a\ncertain mechanism worked by the draught of the chimney?\n\nIf scientific language is to possess a definite and constant\nsignification whenever it is employed, it seems to me that we are\nlogically bound to apply to the protoplasm, or physical basis of life,\nthe same conceptions as those which are held to be legitimate elsewhere.\nIf the phaenomena exhibited by water are its properties, so are those\npresented by protoplasm, living or dead, its properties.\n\nIf the properties of water may be properly said to result from the\nnature and disposition of its component molecules, I can find no\nintelligible ground for refusing to say that the properties of\nprotoplasm result from the nature and disposition of its molecules.\n\nBut I bid you beware that, in accepting these conclusions, you are\nplacing your feet on the first rung of a ladder which, in most people's\nestimation, is the reverse of Jacob's, and leads to the antipodes of\nheaven. It may seem a small thing to admit that the dull vital actions\nof a fungus, or a foraminifer, are the properties of their protoplasm,\nand are the direct results of the nature of the matter of which they\nare composed. But if, as I have endeavoured to prove to you, their\nprotoplasm is essentially identical with, and most readily converted\ninto, that of any animal, I can discover no logical halting-place\nbetween the admission that such is the case, and the further concession\nthat all vital action may, with equal propriety, be said to be the\nresult of the molecular forces of the protoplasm which displays it. And\nif so, it must be true, in the same sense and to the same extent, that\nthe thoughts to which I am now giving utterance, and your thoughts\nregarding them, are the expression of molecular changes in that matter\nof life which is the source of our other vital phaenomena.\n\n\nPast experience leads me to be tolerably certain that, when the\npropositions I have just placed before you are accessible to public\ncomment and criticism, they will be condemned by many zealous persons,\nand perhaps by some few of the wise and thoughtful. I should not wonder\nif \"gross and brutal materialism\" were the mildest phrase applied to\nthem in certain quarters. And, most undoubtedly, the terms of the\npropositions are distinctly materialistic. Nevertheless two things are\ncertain: the one, that I hold the statements to be substantially true;\nthe other, that I, individually, am no materialist, but, on the\ncontrary, believe materialism to involve grave philosophical error.\n\nThis union of materialistic terminology with the repudiation of\nmaterialistic philosophy, I share with some of the most thoughtful men\nwith whom I am acquainted. And, when I first undertook to deliver the\npresent discourse, it appeared to me to be a fitting opportunity to\nexplain how such a union is not only consistent with, but necessitated\nby, sound logic. I purposed to lead you through the territory of vital\nphenomena to the materialistic slough in which you find yourselves now\nplunged, and then to point out to you the sole path by which, in my\njudgment, extrication is possible.\n\nAn occurrence of which I was unaware until my arrival here last night,\nrenders this line of argument singularly opportune. I found in your\npapers the eloquent address \"On the Limits of Philosophical Inquiry,\"\nwhich a distinguished prelate of the English Church delivered before the\nmembers of the Philosophical Institution on the previous day. My\nargument, also, turns upon this very point of the limits of\nphilosophical inquiry; and I cannot bring out my own views better than\nby contrasting them with those so plainly, and, in the main, fairly,\nstated by the Archbishop of York.\n\nBut I may be permitted to make a preliminary comment upon an occurrence\nthat greatly astonished me. Applying the name of \"the New Philosophy\" to\nthat estimate of the limits of philosophical inquiry which I, in common\nwith many other men of science, hold to be just, the Archbishop opens\nhis address by identifying this \"New Philosophy\" with the Positive\nPhilosophy of M. Comte (of whom he speaks as its \"founder\"); and then\nproceeds to attack that philosopher and his doctrines vigorously.\n\nNow, so far as I am concerned, the most reverend prelate might\ndialectically hew M. Comte in pieces, as a modern Agag, and I should not\nattempt to stay his hand. In so far as my study of what specially\ncharacterises the Positive Philosophy has led me, I find therein little\nor nothing of any scientific value, and a great deal which is as\nthoroughly antagonistic to the very essence of science as anything in\nultramontane Catholicism. In fact, M. Comte's philosophy in practice\nmight be compendiously described as Catholicism _minus_ Christianity.\n\nBut what has Comtism to do with the \"New Philosophy,\" as the Archbishop\ndefines it in the following passage?\n\n     \"Let me briefly remind you of the leading principles of this new\n     philosophy.\n\n     \"All knowledge is experience of facts acquired by the senses. The\n     traditions of older philosophies have obscured our experience by\n     mixing with it much that the senses cannot observe, and until these\n     additions are discarded our knowledge is impure. Thus metaphysics\n     tell us that one fact which we observe is a cause, and another is\n     the effect of that cause; but upon a rigid analysis, we find that\n     our senses observe nothing of cause or effect: they observe, first,\n     that one fact succeeds another, and, after some opportunity, that\n     this fact has never failed to follow--that for cause and effect we\n     should substitute invariable succession. An older philosophy\n     teaches us to define an object by distinguishing its essential from\n     its accidental qualities: but experience knows nothing of essential\n     and accidental; she sees only that certain marks attach to an\n     object, and, after many observations, that some of them attach\n     invariably, whilst others may at times be absent.... As all\n     knowledge is relative, the notion of anything being necessary must\n     be banished with other traditions.\"[11]\n\nThere is much here that expresses the spirit of the \"New Philosophy,\" if\nby that term be meant the spirit of modern science; but I cannot but\nmarvel that the assembled wisdom and learning of Edinburgh should have\nuttered no sign of dissent, when Comte was declared to be the founder of\nthese doctrines. No one will accuse Scotchmen of habitually forgetting\ntheir great countrymen; but it was enough to make David Hume turn in\nhis grave, that here, almost within earshot of his house, an instructed\naudience should have listened, without a murmur, while his most\ncharacteristic doctrines were attributed to a French writer of fifty\nyears later date, in whose dreary and verbose pages we miss alike the\nvigour of thought and the exquisite clearness of style of the man whom I\nmake bold to term the most acute thinker of the eighteenth century--even\nthough that century produced Kant.\n\nBut I did not come to Scotland to vindicate the honour of one of the\ngreatest men she has ever produced. My business is to point out to you\nthat the only way of escape out of the crass materialism in which we\njust now landed, is the adoption and strict working-out of the very\nprinciples which the Archbishop holds up to reprobation.\n\nLet us suppose that knowledge is absolute, and not relative, and\ntherefore, that our conception of matter represents that which it really\nis. Let us suppose, further, that we do know more of cause and effect\nthan a certain definite order of succession among facts, and that we\nhave a knowledge of the necessity of that succession--and hence, of\nnecessary laws--and I, for my part, do not see what escape there is from\nutter materialism and necessarianism. For it is obvious that our\nknowledge of what we call the material world, is, to begin with, at\nleast as certain and definite as that of the spiritual world, and that\nour acquaintance with law is of as old a date as our knowledge of\nspontaneity. Further, I take it to be demonstrable that it is utterly\nimpossible to prove that anything whatever may not be the effect of a\nmaterial and necessary cause, and that human logic is equally\nincompetent to prove that any act is really spontaneous. A really\nspontaneous act is one which, by the assumption, has no cause; and the\nattempt to prove such a negative as this is, on the face of the matter,\nabsurd. And while it is thus a philosophical impossibility to\ndemonstrate that any given phaenomenon is not the effect of a material\ncause, any one who is acquainted with the history of science will admit,\nthat its progress has, in all ages, meant, and now, more than ever,\nmeans, the extension of the province of what we call matter and\ncausation, and the concomitant gradual banishment from all regions of\nhuman thought of what we call spirit and spontaneity.\n\nI have endeavoured, in the first part of this discourse, to give you a\nconception of the direction towards which modern physiology is tending;\nand I ask you, what is the difference between the conception of life as\nthe product of a certain disposition of material molecules, and the old\nnotion of an Archaeus governing and directing blind matter within each\nliving body, except this--that here, as elsewhere, matter and law have\ndevoured spirit and spontaneity? And as surely as every future grows out\nof past and present, so will the physiology of the future gradually\nextend the realm of matter and law until it is co-extensive with\nknowledge, with feeling, and with action.\n\nThe consciousness of this great truth weighs like a nightmare, I\nbelieve, upon many of the best minds of these days. They watch what they\nconceive to be the progress of materialism, in such fear and powerless\nanger as a savage feels, when, during an eclipse, the great shadow\ncreeps over the face of the sun. The advancing tide of matter threatens\nto drown their souls; the tightening grasp of law impedes their freedom;\nthey are alarmed lest man's moral nature be debased by the increase of\nhis wisdom.\n\nIf the \"New Philosophy\" be worthy of the reprobation with which it is\nvisited, I confess their fears seem to me, to be well founded. While, on\nthe contrary, could David Hume be consulted, I think he would smile at\ntheir perplexities, and chide them for doing even as the heathen, and\nfalling down in terror before the hideous idols their own hands have\nraised.\n\nFor, after all, what do we know of this terrible \"matter,\" except as a\nname for the unknown and hypothetical cause of states of our own\nconsciousness? And what do we know of that \"spirit\" over whose\nthreatened extinction by matter a great lamentation is arising, like\nthat which was heard at the death of Pan, except that it is also a name\nfor an unknown and hypothetical cause, or condition, of states of\nconsciousness? In other words, matter and spirit are but names for the\nimaginary substrata of groups of natural phaenomena.\n\nAnd what is the dire necessity and \"iron\" law under which men groan?\nTruly, most gratuitously invented bugbears. I suppose if there be an\n\"iron\" law, it is that of gravitation; and if there be a physical\nnecessity, it is that a stone, unsupported, must fall to the ground. But\nwhat is all we really know and can know about the latter phaenomenon?\nSimply, that, in all human experience, stones have fallen to the ground\nunder these conditions; that we have not the smallest reason for\nbelieving that any stone so circumstanced will not fall to the ground;\nand that we have, on the contrary, every reason to believe that it will\nso fall. It is very convenient to indicate that all the conditions of\nbelief have been fulfilled in this case, by calling the statement that\nunsupported stones will fall to the ground, \"a law of nature.\" But when,\nas commonly happens, we change _will_ into _must_, we introduce an idea\nof necessity which most assuredly does not lie in the observed facts,\nand has no warranty that I can discover elsewhere. For my part, I\nutterly repudiate and anathematize the intruder. Fact I know; and Law I\nknow; but what is this Necessity, save an empty shadow of my own mind's\nthrowing?\n\nBut, if it is certain that we can have no knowledge of the nature of\neither matter or spirit, and that the notion of necessity is something\nillegitimately thrust into the perfectly legitimate conception of law,\nthe materialistic position that there is nothing in the world but\nmatter, force, and necessity, is as utterly devoid of justification as\nthe most baseless of theological dogmas. The fundamental doctrines of\nmaterialism, like those of spiritualism, and most other \"isms,\" lie\noutside \"the limits of philosophical inquiry,\" and David Hume's great\nservice to humanity is his irrefragable demonstration of what these\nlimits are. Hume called himself a sceptic, and therefore others cannot\nbe blamed if they apply the same title to him; but that does not alter\nthe fact that the name, with its existing implications, does him gross\ninjustice.\n\nIf a man asks me what the politics of the inhabitants of the moon are,\nand I reply that I do not know; that neither I, nor any one else, have\nany means of knowing; and that, under these circumstances, I decline to\ntrouble myself about the subject at all, I do not think he has any\nright to call me a sceptic. On the contrary, in replying thus, I\nconceive that I am simply honest and truthful, and show a proper regard\nfor the economy of time. So Hume's strong and subtle intellect takes up\na great many problems about which we are naturally curious, and shows us\nthat they are essentially questions of lunar politics, in their essence\nincapable of being answered, and therefore not worth the attention of\nmen who have work to do in the world. And he thus ends one of his\nessays:--\n\n     \"If we take in hand any volume of Divinity, or school metaphysics,\n     for instance, let us ask, _Does it contain any abstract reasoning\n     concerning quantity or number_? No. _Does it contain any\n     experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence_?\n     No. Commit it then to the flames; for it can contain nothing but\n     sophistry and illusion.\"[12]\n\nPermit me to enforce this most wise advice. Why trouble ourselves about\nmatters of which, however important they may be, we do know nothing, and\ncan know nothing? We live in a world which is full of misery and\nignorance, and the plain duty of each and all of us is to try to make\nthe little corner he can influence somewhat less miserable and somewhat\nless ignorant than it was before he entered it. To do this effectually\nit is necessary to be fully possessed of only two beliefs: the first,\nthat the order of nature is ascertainable by our faculties to an extent\nwhich is practically unlimited; the second, that our volition counts for\nsomething as a condition of the course of events.\n\nEach of these beliefs can be verified experimentally, as often as we\nlike to try. Each, therefore, stands upon the strongest foundation upon\nwhich any belief can rest, and forms one of our highest truths. If we\nfind that the ascertainment of the order of nature is facilitated by\nusing one terminology, or one set of symbols, rather than another, it is\nour clear duty to use the former; and no harm can accrue, so long as we\nbear in mind, that we are dealing merely with terms and symbols.\n\nIn itself it is of little moment whether we express the phaenomena of\nmatter in terms of spirit; or the phaenomena of spirit, in terms of\nmatter: matter may be regarded as a form of thought, thought may be\nregarded as a property of matter--each statement has a certain relative\ntruth. But with a view to the progress of science, the materialistic\nterminology is in every way to be preferred. For it connects thought\nwith the other phaenomena of the universe, and suggests inquiry into the\nnature of those physical conditions, or concomitants of thought, which\nare more or less accessible to us, and a knowledge of which may, in\nfuture, help us to exercise the same kind of control over the world of\nthought, as we already possess in respect of the material world;\nwhereas, the alternative, or spiritualistic, terminology is utterly\nbarren, and leads to nothing but obscurity and confusion of ideas.\n\nThus there can be little doubt, that the further science advances, the\nmore extensively and consistently will all the phaenomena of nature be\nrepresented by materialistic formulae and symbols.\n\nBut the man of science, who, forgetting the limits of philosophical\ninquiry, slides from these formulae and symbols into what is commonly\nunderstood by materialism, seems to me to place himself on a level with\nthe mathematician, who should mistake the _x_'s and _y_'s, with which he\nworks his problems, for real entities--and with this further\ndisadvantage, as compared with the mathematician, that the blunders of\nthe latter are of no practical consequence, while the errors of\nsystematic materialism may paralyse the energies and destroy the beauty\nof a life.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[10] The substance of this paper was contained in a discourse which was\ndelivered in Edinburgh on the evening of Sunday, the 8th of November,\n1868--being the first of a series of Sunday evening addresses upon\nnon-theological topics, instituted by the Rev. J. Cranbrook. Some\nphrases, which could possess only a transitory and local interest, have\nbeen omitted; instead of the newspaper report of the Archbishop of\nYork's address, his Grace's subsequently-published pamphlet \"On the\nLimits of Philosophical Inquiry\" is quoted; and I have, here and there,\nendeavoured to express my meaning more fully and clearly than I seem to\nhave done in speaking--if I may judge by sundry criticisms upon what I\nam supposed to have said, which have appeared. But in substance, and, so\nfar as my recollection serves, in form, what is here written corresponds\nwith what was there said.\n\n[11] \"The Limits of Philosophical Inquiry,\" pp. 4 and 5.\n\n[12] Hume's Essay \"Of the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy,\" in the\n\"Inquiry concerning the Human Understanding.\"\n\n\n\n\nVIII.\n\nTHE SCIENTIFIC ASPECTS OF POSITIVISM.\n\n\nIt is now some sixteen or seventeen years since I became acquainted with\nthe \"Philosophic Positive,\" the \"Discours sur l'Ensemble du\nPositivisme,\" and the \"Politique Positive\" of Auguste Comte. I was led\nto study these works partly by the allusions to them in Mr. Mill's\n\"Logic,\" partly by the recommendation of a distinguished theologian, and\npartly by the urgency of a valued friend, the late Professor Henfrey,\nwho looked upon M. Comte's bulky volumes as a mine of wisdom, and lent\nthem to me that I might dig and be rich. After due perusal, I found\nmyself in a position to echo my friend's words, though I may have laid\nmore stress on the \"mine\" than on the \"wisdom.\" For I found the veins of\nore few and far between, and the rock so apt to run to mud, that one\nincurred the risk of being intellectually smothered in the working.\nStill, as I was glad to acknowledge, I did come to a nugget here and\nthere; though not, so far as my experience went, in the discussions on\nthe philosophy of the physical sciences, but in the chapters on\nspeculative and practical sociology. In these there was indeed much to\narouse the liveliest interest in one whose boat had broken away from\nthe old moorings, and who had been content \"to lay out an anchor by the\nstern\" until daylight should break and the fog clear. Nothing could be\nmore interesting to a student of biology than to see the study of the\nbiological sciences laid down, as an essential part of the prolegomena\nof a new view of social phenomena. Nothing could be more satisfactory to\na worshipper of the severe truthfulness of science than the attempt to\ndispense with all beliefs, save such as could brave the light, and seek,\nrather than fear, criticism; while, to a lover of courage and\noutspokenness, nothing could be more touching than the placid\nannouncement on the title-page of the \"Discours sur l'Ensemble du\nPositivisme,\" that its author proposed\n\n     \"Reorganiser, sans Dieu ni roi,\n     Par le culte systematique de l'Humanite,\"\n\nthe shattered frame of modern society.\n\nIn those days I knew my \"Faust\" pretty well, and, after reading this\nword of might, I was minded to chant the well-known stanzas of the\n\"Geisterchor\"--\n\n     \"Weh! Weh!\n     Die schoene welt.\n     Sie stuerzt, sie zerfaellt\n     Wir tragen\n     Die Truemmern ins Nichts hinueber.\n     Maechtiger\n     Der Erdensoehne,\n     Praechtiger,\n     Baue sie wieder\n     In deinem Busen baue sie auf.\"\n\nGreat, however, was my perplexity, not to say disappointment, as I\nfollowed the progress of this \"mighty son of earth\" in his work of\nreconstruction. Undoubtedly \"Dieu\" disappeared, but the \"Nouveau\nGrand-Etre Supreme,\" a gigantic fetish, turned out bran-new by M.\nComte's own hands, reigned in his stead. \"Roi\" also was not heard of;\nbut, in his place, I found a minutely-defined social organization,\nwhich, if it ever came into practice, would exert a despotic authority\nsuch as no sultan has rivalled, and no Puritan presbytery, in its\npalmiest days, could hope to excel. While, as for the \"culte\nsystematique de l'Humanite,\" I, in my blindness, could not distinguish\nit from sheer Popery, with M. Comte in the chair of St. Peter, and the\nnames of most of the saints changed. To quote \"Faust\" again, I found\nmyself saying with Gretchen,--\n\n     \"Ungefaehr sagt das der Pfarrer auch\n     Nur mit ein bischen andern Worten.\"\n\nRightly or wrongly, this was the impression which, all those years ago,\nthe study of M. Comte's works left on my mind, combined with the\nconviction, which I shall always be thankful to him for awakening in me,\nthat the organization of society upon a new and purely scientific basis\nis not only practicable, but is the only political object much worth\nfighting for.\n\nAs I have said, that part of M. Comte's writings which deals with the\nphilosophy of physical science appeared to me to possess singularly\nlittle value, and to show that he had but the most superficial, and\nmerely second-hand, knowledge of most branches of what is usually\nunderstood by science. I do not mean by this merely to say that Comte\nwas behind our present knowledge, or that he was unacquainted with the\ndetails of the science of his own day. No one could justly make such\ndefects cause of complaint in a philosophical writer of the past\ngeneration. What struck me was his want of apprehension of the great\nfeatures of science; his strange mistakes as to the merits of his\nscientific contemporaries; and his ludicrously erroneous notions about\nthe part which some of the scientific doctrines current in his time were\ndestined to play in the future. With these impressions in my mind, no\none will be surprised if I acknowledge that, for these sixteen years, it\nhas been a periodical source of irritation to me to find M. Comte put\nforward as a representative of scientific thought; and to observe that\nwriters whose philosophy had its legitimate parent in Hume, or in\nthemselves, were labelled \"Comtists\" or \"Positivists\" by public writers,\neven in spite of vehement protests to the contrary. It has cost Mr. Mill\nhard rubbings to get that label off; and I watch Mr. Spencer, as one\nregards a good man struggling with adversity, still engaged in eluding\nits adhesiveness, and ready to tear away skin and all, rather than let\nit stick. My own turn might come next; and, therefore, when an eminent\nprelate the other day gave currency and authority to the popular\nconfusion, I took an opportunity of incidentally revindicating Hume's\nproperty in the so-called \"New Philosophy,\" and, at the same time, of\nrepudiating Comtism on my own behalf.[13]\n\nThe few lines devoted to Comtism in my paper on the \"Physical Basis of\nLife\" were, in intention, strictly limited to these two purposes. But\nthey seem to have given more umbrage than I intended they should, to the\nfollowers of M. Comte in this country, for some of whom, let me observe\nin passing, I entertain a most unfeigned respect; and Mr. Congreve's\nrecent article gives expression to the displeasure which I have excited\namong the members of the Comtian body.\n\nMr. Congreve, in a peroration which seems especially intended to catch\nthe attention of his readers, indignantly challenges me to admire M.\nComte's life, \"to deny that it has a marked character of grandeur about\nit;\" and he uses some very strong language because I show no sign of\nveneration for his idol. I confess I do not care to occupy myself with\nthe denigration of a man who, on the whole, deserves to be spoken of\nwith respect. Therefore, I shall enter into no statement of the reasons\nwhich lead me unhesitatingly to accept Mr. Congreve's challenge, and to\nrefuse to recognise anything which deserves the name of grandeur of\ncharacter in M. Comte, unless it be his arrogance, which is undoubtedly\nsublime. All I have to observe is, that if Mr. Congreve is justified in\nsaying that I speak with a tinge of contempt for his spiritual father,\nthe reason for such colouring of my language is to be found in the fact,\nthat, when I wrote, I had but just arisen from the perusal of a work\nwith which he is doubtless well acquainted, M. Littre's \"Auguste Comte\net la Philosophic Positive.\"\n\nThough there are tolerably fixed standards of right and wrong, and even\nof generosity and meanness, it may be said that the beauty, or grandeur,\nof a life is more or less a matter of taste; and Mr. Congreve's notions\nof literary excellence are so different from mine that, it may be, we\nshould diverge as widely in our judgment of moral beauty or ugliness.\nTherefore, while retaining my own notions, I do not presume to quarrel\nwith his. But when Mr. Congreve devotes a great deal of laboriously\nguarded insinuation to the endeavour to lead the public to believe that\nI have been guilty of the dishonesty of having criticised Comte without\nhaving read him, I must be permitted to remind him that he has neglected\nthe well-known maxim of a diplomatic sage, \"If you want to damage a man,\nyou should say what is probable, as well as what is true.\"\n\nAnd when Mr. Congreve speaks of my having an advantage over him in my\nintroduction of \"Christianity\" into the phrase that \"M. Comte's\nphilosophy, in practice, might be described as Catholicism _minus_\nChristianity;\" intending thereby to suggest that I have, by so doing,\ndesired to profit by an appeal to the _odium theologicum_,--he lays\nhimself open to a very unpleasant retort.\n\nWhat if I were to suggest that Mr. Congreve had not read Comte's works;\nand that the phrase \"the context shows that the view of the writer\nranges--however superficially--over the whole works. This is obvious\nfrom the mention of Catholicism,\" demonstrates that Mr. Congreve has no\nacquaintance with the \"Philosophie Positive\"? I think the suggestion\nwould be very unjust and unmannerly, and I shall not make it. But the\nfact remains, that this little epigram of mine, which has so greatly\nprovoked Mr. Congreve, is neither more nor less than a condensed\nparaphrase of the following passage, which is to be found at page 344 of\nthe fifth volume of the \"Philosophie Positive:\"[14]--\n\n     \"La seule solution possible de ce grand probleme historique, qui\n     n'a jamais pu etre philosophiquement pose jusqu'ici, consiste a\n     concevoir, en sens radicalement inverse des notions habituelles,\n     _que ce qui devait necessairement perir ainsi, dans le\n     catholicisme, c'etait la doctrine, et non l'organisation_, qui n'a\n     ete passagerement ruinee que par suite de son inevitable adherence\n     elementaire a la philosophie theologique, destinee a succomber\n     graduellement sous l'irresistible emancipation de la raison\n     humaine; _tandis qu'une telle constitution, convenablement\n     reconstruite sur des bases intellectuelles a la fois plus etendues\n     et plus stables, devra finalement presider a l'indispensable\n     reorganisation spirituelle des societes modernes, sauf les\n     differences essentielles spontanement correspondantes a l'extreme\n     diversite des doctrines fondamentales_; a moins de supposer, ce qui\n     serait certainement contradictoire a l'ensemble des lois de notre\n     nature, que les immenses efforts de tant de grands hommes, secondes\n     par la perseverante sollicitude des nations civilisees, dans la\n     fondation seculaire de ce chef-d'oeuvre politique de la sagesse\n     humaine, doivent etre enfin irrevocablement perdus pour l'elite de\n     l'humanite sauf les resultats, capitaux mais provisoires, qui s'y\n     rapportaient immediatement. Cette explication generale, deja\n     evidemment motivee par la suite des considerations propres a ce\n     chapitre, sera de plus en plus confirmee par tout le reste de\n     notre operation historique, _dont elle constituera spontanement la\n     principale conclusion politique.\"_\n\nNothing can be clearer. Comte's ideal, as stated by himself, is Catholic\norganization without Catholic doctrine, or, in other words, Catholicism\n_minus_ Christianity. Surely it is utterly unjustifiable to ascribe to\nme base motives for stating a man's doctrines, as nearly as may be, in\nhis own words!\n\nMy readers would hardly be interested were I to follow Mr. Congreve any\nfurther, or I might point out that the fact of his not having heard me\nlecture is hardly a safe ground for his speculations as to what I do not\nteach. Nor do I feel called upon to give any opinion as to M. Comte's\nmerits or demerits as regards sociology. Mr. Mill (whose competence to\nspeak on these matters I suppose will not be questioned, even by Mr.\nCongreve) has dealt with M. Comte's philosophy from this point of view,\nwith a vigour and authority to which I cannot for a moment aspire; and\nwith a severity, not unfrequently amounting to contempt, which I have\nnot the wish, if I had the power, to surpass. I, as a mere student in\nthese questions, am content to abide by Mr. Mill's judgment until some\none shows cause for its reversal, and I decline to enter into a\ndiscussion which I have not provoked.\n\nThe sole obligation which lies upon me is to justify so much as still\nremains without justification of what I have written respecting\nPositivism--namely, the opinion expressed in the following paragraph:--\n\n     \"In so far as my study of what specially characterises the Positive\n     Philosophy has led me, I find therein little or nothing of any\n     scientific value, and a great deal which is as thoroughly\n     antagonistic to the very essence of science as any thing in\n     ultramontane Catholicism.\"\n\nHere are two propositions: the first, that the \"Philosophie Positive\"\ncontains little or nothing of any scientific value; the second, that\nComtism is, in spirit, anti-scientific. I shall endeavour to bring\nforward ample evidence in support of both.\n\nI. No one who possesses even a superficial acquaintance with physical\nscience can read Comte's \"Lecons\" without becoming aware that he was at\nonce singularly devoid of real knowledge on these subjects, and\nsingularly unlucky. What is to be thought of the contemporary of Young\nand of Fresnel, who never misses an opportunity of casting scorn upon\nthe hypothesis of an ether--the fundamental basis not only of the\nundulatory theory of light, but of so much else in modern physics--and\nwhose contempt for the intellects of some of the strongest men of his\ngeneration was such, that he puts forward the mere existence of night as\na refutation of the undulatory theory?[15] What a wonderful gauge of his\nown value as a scientific critic does he afford, by whom we are informed\nthat phrenology is a great science, and psychology a chimaera; that Gall\nwas one of the great men of his age, and that Cuvier was \"brilliant but\nsuperficial\"![16] How unlucky must one consider the bold speculator who,\njust before the dawn of modern histology--which is simply the\napplication of the microscope to anatomy--reproves what he calls \"the\nabuse of microscopic investigations,\" and \"the exaggerated credit\"\nattached to them; who, when the morphological uniformity of the tissues\nof the great majority of plants and animals was on the eve of being\ndemonstrated, treated with ridicule those who attempt to refer all\ntissues to a \"tissu generateur,\" formed by \"le chimerique et\ninintelligible assemblage d'une sorte de monades organiques, qui\nseraient des lors les vrais elements primordiaux de tout corps\nvivant;\"[17] and who finally tells us, that all the objections against a\nlinear arrangement of the species of living beings are in their essence\nfoolish, and that the order of the animal series is \"necessarily\nlinear,\"[18] when the exact contrary is one of the best-established and\nthe most important truths of zoology. Appeal to mathematicians,\nastronomers, physicists,[19] chemists, biologists, about the\n\"Philosophie Positive,\" and they all, with one consent, begin to make\nprotestation that, whatever M. Comte's other merits, he has shed no\nlight upon the philosophy of their particular studies.\n\nTo be just, however, it must be admitted that even M. Comte's most\nardent disciples are content to be judiciously silent about his\nknowledge or appreciation of the sciences themselves, and prefer to base\ntheir master's claims to scientific authority upon his \"law of the three\nstates,\" and his \"classification of the sciences.\" But here, also, I\nmust join issue with them as completely as others--notably Mr. Herbert\nSpencer--have done before me. A critical examination of what M. Comte\nhas to say about the \"law of the three states\" brings out nothing but a\nseries of more or less contradictory statements of an imperfectly\napprehended truth; and his \"classification of the sciences,\" whether\nregarded historically or logically, is, in my judgment, absolutely\nworthless.\n\nLet us consider the law of \"the three states\" as it is put before us in\nthe opening of the first Lecon of the \"Philosophie Positive:\"--\n\n     \"En etudiant ainsi le developpement total de l'intelligence humaine\n     dans ses diverses spheres d'activite, depuis son premier essor le\n     plus simple jusqu'a nos jours, je crois avoir decouvert une grande\n     loi fondamentale, a laquelle il est assujetti par une necessite\n     invariable, et qui me semble pouvoir etre solidement etablie, soit\n     sur les preuves rationelles fournies par la connaissance de notre\n     organisation, soit sur les verifications historiques resultant d'un\n     examen attentif du passe. Cette loi consiste en ce que chacune de\n     nos conceptions principales, chaque branche de nos connaissances,\n     passe successivement par trois etats theoriques differents; l'etat\n     theologique, ou fictif; l'etat metaphysique, ou abstrait; l'etat\n     scientifique, ou positif. En d'autres termes, l'esprit humain, par\n     sa nature, emploie successivement dans chacune de ses recherches\n     trois methodes de philosopher, dont _le caractere est\n     essentiellement different et meme radicalement oppose_; d'abord la\n     methode theologique, ensuite la methode metaphysique, et enfin la\n     methode positive. De la, trois sortes de philosophie, ou de\n     systemes generaux de conceptions sur l'ensemble des phenomenes _qui\n     s'excluent mutuellement_; la premiere est le point de depart\n     necessaire de l'intelligence humaine; la troisieme, son etat fixe\n     et definitif; la seconde est uniquement destinee a servir de\n     transition.\"[20]\n\nNothing can be more precise than these statements, which may be put into\nthe following propositions:--\n\n(a) The human intellect is subjected to the law by an invariable\nnecessity, which is demonstrable, _a priori_, from the nature and\nconstitution of the intellect; while, as a matter of historical fact,\nthe human intellect has been subjected to the law.\n\n(b) Every branch of human knowledge passes through the three states,\nnecessarily beginning with the first stage.\n\n(c) The three states mutually exclude one another, being essentially\ndifferent, and even radically opposed.\n\nTwo questions present themselves. Is M. Comte consistent with himself in\nmaking these assertions? And is he consistent with fact? I reply to both\nquestions in the negative; and, as regards the first, I bring forward as\nmy witness a remarkable passage which is to be found in the fourth\nvolume of the \"Philosophic Positive\" (p. 491), when M. Comte had had\ntime to think out, a little more fully, the notions crudely stated in\nthe first volume:--\n\n     \"A proprement parler, la philosophie theologique, meme dans notre\n     premiere enfance, individuelle ou sociale, n'a jamais pu etre\n     rigoureusement universelle, c'est-a-dire que, pour les ordres\n     quelconques de phenomenes, _les faits les plus simples et les plus\n     communs ont toujours ete regardes comme essentiellement assujettis\n     a des lois naturelles, au lieu d'etre attribues a l'arbitraire\n     volonte des agents surnaturels_. L'illustre Adam Smith a, par\n     example, tres-heureusement remarque dans ses essais philosophiques,\n     qu'on ne trouvait, en aucun temps ni en aucun pays, un dieu pour la\n     pesanteur. _Il en est ainsi, en general, meme a l'egard des sujets\n     les plus compliques, envers tous les phenomenes assez elementaires\n     et assez familiers pour que la parfaite invariabilite de leurs\n     relations effectives ait toujours du frapper spontanement\n     l'observateur le moins prepare_. Dans l'ordre moral et social,\n     qu'une vaine opposition voudrait aujourd'hui systematiquement\n     interdire a la philosophie positive, il y a eu necessairement, en\n     tout temps, la pensee des lois naturelles, relativement aux plus\n     simples phenomenes de la vie journaliere, comme l'exige evidemment\n     la conduite generale de notre existence reelle, individuelle ou\n     sociale, qui n'aurait pu jamais comporter aucune prevoyance\n     quelconque, si tous les phenomenes humains avaient ete\n     rigoureusement attribues a des agents surnaturels, puisque des lors\n     la priere aurait logiquement constitue la seule ressource\n     imaginable pour influer sur le cours habituel des actions humaines.\n     _On doit meme remarquer, a ce sujet, que c'est, au contraire,\n     l'ebauche spontanee des premieres lois naturelles propres aux\n     actes individuels ou sociaux qui, fictivement transportee a tous\n     les phenomenes du monde exterieur, a d'abord fourni, d'apres nos\n     explications precedentes, le vrai principe fondamental de la\n     philosophie theologique. Ainsi, le germe elementaire de la\n     philosophie positive est certainement tout aussi primitif au fond\n     que celui de la philosophie theologique elle-meme, quoi qu'il n'ait\n     pu se developper que beaucoup plus tard._ Une telle notion importe\n     extremement a la parfaite rationalite de notre theorie\n     sociologique, puisque la vie humaine ne pouvant jamais offrir\n     aucune veritable creation quelconque, mais toujours une simple\n     evolution graduelle, l'essor final de l'esprit positif deviendrait\n     scientifiquement incomprehensible, si, des l'origine, on n'en\n     concevait, a tous egards, les premiers rudiments necessaires.\n     Depuis cette situation primitive, a mesure que nos observations se\n     sont spontanement etendues et generalisees, cet essor, d'abord a\n     peine appreciable, a constamment suivi, sans cesser longtemps\n     d'etre subalterne, une progression tres-lente, mais continue, la\n     philosophie theologique restant toujours reservee pour les\n     phenomenes, de moins en moins nombreux, dont les lois naturelles ne\n     pouvaient encore etre aucunement connues.\"\n\nCompare the propositions implicitly laid down here with those contained\nin the earlier volume. (a) As a matter of fact, the human intellect\nhas _not_ been invariably subjected to the law of the three states, and\ntherefore the necessity of the law _cannot_ be demonstrable _a priori_.\n(b) Much of our knowledge of all kinds has _not_ passed through the\nthree states, and more particularly, as M. Comte is careful to point\nout, not through the first, (c) The positive state has more or less\nco-existed with the theological, from the dawn of human intelligence.\nAnd, by way of completing the series of contradictions, the assertion\nthat the three states are \"essentially different and even radically\nopposed,\" is met a little lower on the same page by the declaration that\n\"the metaphysical state is, at bottom, nothing but a simple general\nmodification of the first;\" while, in the fortieth Lecon, as also in the\ninteresting early essay entitled \"Considerations philosophiques sur les\nSciences et les Savants (1825),\" the three states are practically\nreduced to two. \"Le veritable esprit general de toute philosophie\ntheologique ou metaphysique consiste a prendre pour principe, dans\nl'explication des phenomenes du monde exterieur, notre sentiment\nimmediat des phenomenes humains; tandis que au contraire, la philosophie\npositive est toujours caracterisee, non moins profondement, par la\nsubordination necessaire et rationnelle de la conception de l'homme a\ncelle du monde.\"[21]\n\nI leave M. Cointe's disciples to settle which of these contradictory\nstatements expresses their master's real meaning. All I beg leave to\nremark is, that men of science are not in the habit of paying much\nattention to \"laws\" stated in this fashion.\n\nThe second statement is undoubtedly far more rational and consistent\nwith fact than the first; but I cannot think it is a just or adequate\naccount of the growth of intelligence, either in the individual man, or\nin the human species. Any one who will carefully watch the development\nof the intellect of a child will perceive that, from the first, its mind\nis mirroring nature in two different ways. On the one hand, it is merely\ndrinking in sensations and building up associations, while it forms\nconceptions of things and their relations which are more thoroughly\n\"positive,\" or devoid of entanglement with hypotheses of any kind, than\nthey will ever be in after-life. No child has recourse to imaginary\npersonifications in order to account for the ordinary properties of\nobjects which are not alive, or do not represent living things. It does\nnot imagine that the taste of sugar is brought about by a god of\nsweetness, or that a spirit of jumping causes a ball to bound. Such\nphaenomena, which form the basis of a very large part of its ideas, are\ntaken as matters of course--as ultimate facts which suggest no\ndifficulty and need no explanation. So far as all these common, though\nimportant, phaenomena are concerned, the child's mind is in what M. Comte\nwould call the \"positive\" state.\n\nBut, side by side with this mental condition, there rises another. The\nchild becomes aware of itself as a source of action and a subject of\npassion and of thought. The acts which follow upon its own desires are\namong the most interesting and prominent of surrounding occurrences; and\nthese acts, again, plainly arise either out of affections caused by\nsurrounding things, or of other changes in itself. Among these\nsurrounding things, the most interesting and important are mother and\nfather, brethren and nurses. The hypothesis that these wonderful\ncreatures are of like nature to itself is speedily forced upon the\nchild's mind; and this primitive piece of anthropomorphism turns out to\nbe a highly successful speculation, which finds its justification at\nevery turn. No wonder, then, that it is extended to other similarly\ninteresting objects which are not too unlike these--to the dog, the cat,\nand the canary, the doll, the toy, and the picture-book--that these are\nendowed with wills and affections, and with capacities for being \"good\"\nand \"naughty.\" But surely it would be a mere perversion of language to\ncall this a \"theological\" state of mind, either in the proper sense of\nthe word \"theological,\" or as contrasted with \"scientific\" or\n\"positive.\" The child does not worship either father or mother, dog or\ndoll. On the contrary, nothing is more curious than the absolute\nirreverence, if I may so say, of a kindly-treated young child; its\ntendency to believe in itself as the centre of the universe, and its\ndisposition to exercise despotic tyranny over those who could crush it\nwith a finger.\n\nStill less is there anything unscientific, or anti-scientific, in this\ninfantile anthropomorphism. The child observes that many phaenomena are\nthe consequences of affections of itself; it soon has excellent reasons\nfor the belief that many other phaenomena are consequences of the\naffections of other beings, more or less like itself. And having thus\ngood evidence for believing that many of the most interesting\noccurrences about it are explicable on the hypothesis that they are the\nwork of intelligences like itself--having discovered a _vera causa_ for\nmany phaenomena--why should the child limit the application of so\nfruitful an hypothesis? The dog has a sort of intelligence, so has the\ncat; why should not the doll and the picture-book also have a share,\nproportioned to their likeness to intelligent things?\n\nThe only limit which does arise is exactly that which, as a matter of\nscience, should arise; that is to say, the anthropomorphic\ninterpretation is applied only to those phaenomena which, in their\ngeneral nature, or their apparent capriciousness, resemble those which\nthe child observes to be caused by itself, or by beings like itself. All\nthe rest are regarded as things which explain themselves, or are\ninexplicable.\n\nIt is only at a later stage of intellectual development that the\nintelligence of man awakes to the apparent conflict between the\nanthropomorphic, and what I may call the physical,[22] aspect of\nnature, and either endeavours to extend the anthropomorphic view over\nthe whole of nature--which is the tendency of theology; or to give the\nsame exclusive predominance to the physical view--which is the tendency\nof science; or adopts a middle course, and taking from the\nanthropomorphic view its tendency to personify, and from the physical\nview its tendency to exclude volition and affection, ends in what M.\nComte calls the \"metaphysical\" state--\"metaphysical,\" in M. Comte's\nwritings, being a general term of abuse for anything he does not like.\n\nWhat is true of the individual is, _mutatis mutandis_, true of the\nintellectual development of the species. It is absurd to say of men in a\nstate of primitive savagery, that all their conceptions are in a\ntheological state. Nine-tenths of them are eminently realistic, and as\n\"positive\" as ignorance and narrowness can make them. It no more occurs\nto a savage than it does to a child, to ask the why of the daily and\nordinary occurrences which form the greater part of his mental life. But\nin regard to the more striking, or out-of-the-way, events, which force\nhim to speculate, he is highly anthropomorphic; and, as compared with a\nchild, his anthropomorphism is complicated by the intense impression\nwhich the death of his own kind makes upon him, as indeed it well may.\nThe warrior, full of ferocious energy, perhaps the despotic chief of\nhis tribe, is suddenly struck down. A child may insult the man a moment\nbefore so awful; a fly rests, undisturbed, on the lips from which\nundisputed command issued. And yet the bodily aspect of the man seems\nhardly more altered than when he slept, and, sleeping, seemed to himself\nto leave his body and wander through dreamland. What then if that\nsomething, which is the essence of the man, has really been made to\nwander by the violence done to it, and is unable, or has forgotten, to\ncome back to its shell? Will it not retain somewhat of the powers it\npossessed during life? May it not help us if it be pleased, or (as seems\nto be by far the more general impression) hurt us if it be angered? Will\nit not be well to do towards it those things which would have soothed\nthe man and put him in good humour during his life? It is impossible to\nstudy trustworthy accounts of savage thought without seeing, that some\nsuch train of ideas as this, lies at the bottom of their speculative\nbeliefs.\n\nThere are savages without God, in any proper sense of the word, but none\nwithout ghosts. And the Fetishism, Ancestor-worship, Hero-worship, and\nDemonology of primitive savages, are all, I believe, different manners\nof expression of their belief in ghosts, and of the anthropomorphic\ninterpretation of out-of-the-way events, which is its concomitant.\nWitchcraft and sorcery are the practical expressions of these beliefs;\nand they stand in the same relation to religious worship as the simple\nanthropomorphism of children, or savages, does to theology.\n\nIn the progress of the species from savagery to advanced civilization,\nanthropomorphism grows into theology, while physicism (if I may so call\nit) develops into science; but the development of the two is\ncontemporaneous, not successive. For each, there long exists an assured\nprovince which is not invaded by the other; while, between the two, lies\na debateable land, ruled by a sort of bastards, who owe their complexion\nto physicism and their substance to anthropomorphism, and are M. Comte's\nparticular aversions--metaphysical entities.\n\nBut, as the ages lengthen, the borders of Physicism increase. The\nterritories of the bastards are all annexed to science; and even\nTheology, in her purer forms, has ceased to be anthropomorphic, however\nshe may talk. Anthropomorphism has taken stand in its last fortress--man\nhimself. But science closely invests the walls; and Philosophers gird\nthemselves for battle upon the last and greatest of all speculative\nproblems--Does human nature possess any free, volitional, or truly\nanthropomorphic element, or is it only the cunningest of all Nature's\nclocks? Some, among whom I count myself, think that the battle will for\never remain a drawn one, and that, for all practical purposes, this\nresult is as good as anthropomorphism winning the day.\n\nThe classification of the sciences, which, in the eyes of M. Comte's\nadherents, constitutes his second great claim to the dignity of a\nscientific philosopher, appears to me to be open to just the same\nobjections as the law of the three states. It is inconsistent in itself,\nand it is inconsistent with fact. Let us consider the main points of\nthis classification successively:--\n\n     \"Il faut distinguer par rapport a tous les ordres des phenomenes,\n     deux genres de sciences naturelles; les unes abstraites,\n     generales, ont pour objet la decouverte des lois qui regissent les\n     diverses classes de phenomenes, en considerant tous les cas qu'on\n     peut concevoir; les autres concretes, particulieres, descriptives,\n     et qu'on designe quelquefois sous le nom des sciences naturelles\n     proprement dites, consistent dans l'application de ces lois a\n     l'histoire effective des differents etres existants.\"[23]\n\nThe \"abstract\" sciences are subsequently said to be mathematics,\nastronomy, physics, chemistry, physiology, and social physics--the\ntitles of the two latter being subsequently changed to biology and\nsociology. M. Comte exemplifies the distinction between his abstract and\nhis concrete sciences as follows:--\n\n     \"On pourra d'abord l'apercevoir tres-nettement en comparant, d'une\n     part, la physiologie generale, et d'une autre part la zoologie et\n     la botanique proprement dites. Ce sont evidemment, en effet, deux\n     travaux d'un caractere fort distinct, que d'etudier, en general,\n     les lois de la vie, ou de determiner le mode d'existence de chaque\n     corps vivant, en particulier. _Cette seconde etude, en outre, est\n     necessairememt fondee sur la premiere._\"--P. 57.\n\nAll the unreality and mere bookishness of M. Comte's knowledge of\nphysical science comes out in the passage I have italicised. \"The\nspecial study of living beings is based upon a general study of the laws\nof life!\" What little I know about the matter leads me to think, that,\nif M. Comte had possessed the slightest practical acquaintance with\nbiological science, he would have turned his phraseology upside down,\nand have perceived that we can have no knowledge of the general laws of\nlife, except that which is based upon the study of particular living\nbeings.\n\nThe illustration is surely unluckily chosen; but the language in which\nthese so-called abstract sciences are defined seems to me to be still\nmore open to criticism. With what propriety can astronomy, or physics,\nor chemistry, or biology, be said to occupy themselves with the\nconsideration of \"all conceivable cases\" which fall within their\nrespective provinces? Does the astronomer occupy himself with any other\nsystem of the universe than that which is visible to him? Does he\nspeculate upon the possible movements of bodies which may attract one\nanother in the inverse proportion of the cube of their distances, say?\nDoes biology, whether \"abstract\" or \"concrete,\" occupy itself with any\nother form of life than those which exist, or have existed? And, if the\nabstract sciences embrace all conceivable cases of the operation of the\nlaws with which they are concerned, would not they, necessarily, embrace\nthe subjects of the concrete sciences, which, inasmuch as they exist,\nmust needs be conceivable? In fact, no such distinction as that which M.\nComte draws is tenable. The first stage of his classification breaks by\nits own weight.\n\nBut granting M. Comte his six abstract sciences, he proceeds to arrange\nthem according to what he calls their natural order or hierarchy, their\nplaces in this hierarchy being determined by the degree of generality\nand simplicity of the conceptions with which they deal. Mathematics\noccupies the first, astronomy the second, physics the third, chemistry\nthe fourth, biology the fifth, and sociology the sixth and last place in\nthe series. M. Comte's arguments in favour of this classification are\nfirst--\n\n     \"Sa conformite essentielle avec la co-ordination, en quelque sorte\n     spontanee, qui se trouve en effet implicitement admise par les\n     savants livres a l'etude des diverse branches de la philosophie\n     naturelle.\"\n\nBut I absolutely deny the existence of this conformity. If there is one\nthing clear about the progress of modern science, it is the tendency to\nreduce all scientific problems, except those which are purely\nmathematical, to questions of molecular physics--that is to, say, to the\nattractions, repulsions, motions, and co-ordination of the ultimate\nparticles of matter. Social phaenomena are the result of the interaction\nof the components of society, or men, with one another and the\nsurrounding universe. But, in the language of physical science, which,\nby the nature of the case, is materialistic, the actions of men, so far\nas they are recognisable by science, are the results of molecular\nchanges in the matter of which they are composed; and, in the long run,\nthese must come into the hands of the physicist. _A fortiori_, the\nphaenomena of biology and of chemistry are, in their ultimate analysis,\nquestions of molecular physics. Indeed, the fact is acknowledged by all\nchemists and biologists who look beyond their immediate occupations. And\nit is to be observed, that the phaenomena of biology are as directly and\nimmediately connected with molecular physics as are those of chemistry.\nMolar physics, chemistry, and biology are not three successive steps in\nthe ladder of knowledge, as M. Comte would have us believe, but three\nbranches springing from the common stem of molecular physics.\n\nAs to astronomy, I am at a loss to understand how any one who will give\na moment's attention to the nature of the science can fail to see that\nit consists of two parts: first, of a description of the phaenomena,\nwhich is as much entitled as descriptive zoology, or botany, is, to the\nname of natural history; and, secondly, of an explanation of the\nphaenomena, furnished by the laws of a force--gravitation--the study of\nwhich is as much a part of physics, as is that of heat, or electricity.\nIt would be just as reasonable to make the study of the heat of the sun\na science preliminary to the rest of thermotics, as to place the study\nof the attraction of the bodies, which compose the universe in general,\nbefore that of the particular terrestrial bodies, which alone we can\nexperimentally know. Astronomy, in fact, owes its perfection to the\ncircumstance that it is the only branch of natural history, the\nphaenomena of which are largely expressible by mathematical conceptions,\nand which can be, to a great extent, explained by the application of\nvery simple physical laws.\n\nWith regard to mathematics, it is to be observed, in the first place,\nthat M. Comte mixes up under that head the pure relations of space and\nof quantity, which are properly included under the name, with rational\nmechanics and statics, which are mathematical developments of the most\ngeneral conceptions of physics, namely, the notions of force and of\nmotion. Relegating these to their proper place in physics, we have left\npure mathematics, which can stand neither at the head, nor at the tail,\nof any hierarchy of the sciences, since, like logic, it is equally\nrelated to all; though the enormous practical difficulty of applying\nmathematics to the more complex phaenomena of nature removes them, for\nthe present, out of its sphere.\n\nOn this subject of mathematics, again, M. Comte indulges in assertions\nwhich can only be accounted for by his total ignorance of physical\nscience practically. As for example:--\n\n     \"C'est donc par l'etude des mathematiques, _et seulement par elle_,\n     que l'on peut se faire une idee juste et approfondie de ce que\n     c'est qu'une _science_. C'est la _uniquement_ qu'on doit chercher a\n     connaitre avec precision _la methode generale que l'esprit humain\n     emploie constamment dans toutes ses recherches positives_, parce\n     que nulle part ailleurs les questions ne sont resolues d'une\n     maniere aussi complete et les deductions prolongees aussi loin avec\n     une severite rigoureuse. C'est la egalement que notre entendement a\n     donne les plus grandes preuves de sa force, parce que les idees\n     qu'il y considere sont du plus haut degre d'abstraction possible\n     dans l'ordre positif. _Toute education scientifique qui ne commence\n     point par une telle etude peche donc necessairement par sa\n     base._\"[24]\n\nThat is to say, the only study which can confer \"a just and\ncomprehensive idea of what is meant by science,\" and, at the same time,\nfurnish an exact conception of the general method of scientific\ninvestigation, is that which knows nothing of observation, nothing of\nexperiment, nothing of induction, nothing of causation! And education,\nthe whole secret of which consists in proceeding from the easy to the\ndifficult, the concrete to the abstract, ought to be turned the other\nway, and pass from the abstract to the concrete.\n\nM. Comte puts a second argument in favour of his hierarchy of the\nsciences thus:--\n\n     \"Un second caractere tres-essentiel de notre classification, c'est\n     d'etre necessairement conforme a l'ordre effectif du developpement\n     de la philosophie naturelle. C'est ce que verifie tout ce qu'on\n     sait de l'histoire des sciences.\"[25]\n\nBut Mr. Spencer has so thoroughly and completely demonstrated the\nabsence of any correspondence between the historical development of the\nsciences, and their position in the Comtean hierarchy, in his essay on\nthe \"Genesis of Science,\" that I shall not waste time in repeating his\nrefutation.\n\nA third proposition in support of the Comtean classification of the\nsciences stands as follows:--\n\n     \"En troisieme lieu cette classification presente la propriete\n     tres-remarquable de marquer exactement la perfection relative des\n     differentes sciences, laquelle consiste essentiellement dans le\n     degre de precision des connaissances et dans leur co-ordination\n     plus ou moins intime.\"[26]\n\nI am quite unable to understand the distinction which M. Comte\nendeavours to draw in this passage in spite of his amplifications\nfurther on. Every science must consist of precise knowledge, and that\nknowledge must be co-ordinated into general proportions, or it is not\nscience. When M. Comte, in exemplification of the statement I have\ncited, says that \"les phenomenes organiques ne comportent qu'une etude a\nla fois moins exacte et moins systematique que les phenomenes des corps\nbruts,\" I am at a loss to comprehend what he means. If I affirm that\n\"when a motor nerve is irritated, the muscle connected with it becomes\nsimultaneously shorter and thicker, without changing its volume,\" it\nappears to me that the statement is as precise or exact (and not merely\nas true) as that of the physicist who should say, that \"when a piece of\niron is heated, it becomes simultaneously longer and thicker and\nincreases in volume;\" nor can I discover any difference, in point of\nprecision, between the statement of the morphological law that \"animals\nwhich suckle their young have two occipital condyles,\" and the\nenunciation of the physical law that \"water subjected to electrolysis\nis replaced by an equal weight of the gases, oxygen and hydrogen.\" As\nfor anatomical or physiological investigation being less \"systematic\"\nthan that of the physicist or chemist, the assertion is simply\nunaccountable. The methods of physical science are everywhere the same\nin principle, and the physiological investigator who was not\n\"systematic\" would, on the whole, break down rather sooner than the\ninquirer into simpler subjects.\n\nThus M. Comte's classification of the sciences, under all its aspects,\nappears to me to be a complete failure. It is impossible, in an article\nwhich is already too long, to inquire how it may be replaced by a\nbetter; and it is the less necessary to do so, as a second edition of\nMr. Spencer's remarkable essay on this subject has just been published.\nAfter wading through pages of the long-winded confusion and second-hand\ninformation of the \"Philosophic Positive,\" at the risk of a _crise\ncerebrale_--it is as good as a shower-bath to turn to the\n\"Classification of the Sciences,\" and refresh oneself with Mr. Spencer's\nprofound thought, precise knowledge, and clear language.\n\nII. The second proposition to which I have committed myself, in the\npaper to which I have been obliged to refer so often, is, that the\n\"Positive Philosophy\" contains \"a great deal which is as thoroughly\nantagonistic to the very essence of science as is anything in\nultramontane Catholicism.\"\n\nWhat I refer to in these words, is, on the one hand, the dogmatism and\nnarrowness which so often mark M. Comte's discussion of doctrines which\nhe does not like, and reduce his expressions of opinion to mere\npassionate puerilities; as, for example, when he is arguing against the\nassumption of an ether, or when he is talking (I cannot call it arguing)\nagainst psychology, or political economy. On the other hand, I allude to\nthe spirit of meddling systematization and regulation which animates\neven the \"Philosophic Positive,\" and breaks out, in the latter volumes\nof that work, into no uncertain foreshadowing of the anti-scientific\nmonstrosities of Comte's later writings.\n\nThose who try to draw a line of demarcation between the spirit of the\n\"Philosophic Positive,\" and that of the \"Politique\" and its successors,\n(if I may express an opinion from fragmentary knowledge of these last,)\nmust have overlooked, or forgotten, what Comte himself labours to show,\nand indeed succeeds in proving, in the \"Appendice General\" of the\n\"Politique Positive.\" \"Des mon debut,\" he writes, \"je tentai de fonder\nle nouveau pouvoir spirituel que j'institue aujourd'hui.\" \"Ma politique,\nloin d'etre aucunement opposee a ma philosophie, en constitue tellement\nla suite naturelle que celle-ci fut directement instituee pour servir de\nbase a celle-la, comme le prouve cet appendice.\"[27]\n\nThis is quite true. In the remarkable essay entitled \"Considerations sur\nle Pouvoir spirituel,\" published in March 1826, Comte advocates the\nestablishment of a \"modern spiritual power,\" which, he anticipates, may\nexercise an even greater influence over temporal affairs, than did the\nCatholic clergy, at the height of their vigour and independence, in the\ntwelfth century. This spiritual power is, in fact, to govern opinion,\nand to have the supreme control over education, in each nation of the\nWest; and the spiritual powers of the several European peoples are to be\nassociated together and placed under a common direction or \"souverainete\nspirituelle.\"\n\nA system of \"Catholicism _minus_ Christianity\" was therefore completely\norganized in Comte's mind, four years before the first volume of the\n\"Philosophie Positive\" was written; and, naturally, the papal spirit\nshows itself in that work, not only in the ways I have already\nmentioned, but, notably, in the attack on liberty of conscience which\nbreaks out in the fourth volume:--\n\n     \"Il n'y a point de liberte de conscience en astronomie, en\n     physique, en chimie, en physiologie meme, en ce sens que chacun\n     trouverait absurde de ne pas croire de confiance aux principes\n     etablis dans les sciences par les hommes competents.\"\n\n\"Nothing in ultramontane Catholicism\" can, in my judgment, be more\ncompletely sacerdotal, more entirely anti-scientific, than this dictum.\nAll the great steps in the advancement of science have been made by just\nthose men who have not hesitated to doubt the \"principles established in\nthe sciences by competent persons;\" and the great teaching of\nscience--the great use of it as an instrument of mental discipline--is\nits constant inculcation of the maxim, that the sole ground on which any\nstatement has a right to be believed is the impossibility of refuting\nit.\n\nThus, without travelling beyond the limits of the \"Philosophie\nPositive,\" we find its author contemplating the establishment of a\nsystem of society, in which an organized spiritual power shall over-ride\nand direct the temporal power, as completely as the Innocents and\nGregorys tried to govern Europe in the middle ages; and repudiating the\nexercise of liberty of conscience against the \"_hommes competents_\", of\nwhom, by the assumption, the new priesthood would be composed. Was Mr.\nCongreve as forgetful of this, as he seems to have been of some other\nparts of the \"Philosophie Positive,\" when he wrote, that \"in any\nlimited, careful use of the term, no candid man could say that the\nPositive Philosophy contained a great deal as thoroughly antagonistic to\n[the very essence of[28]] science as Catholicism\"?\n\nM. Comte, it will have been observed, desires to retain the whole of\nCatholic organization; and the logical practical result of this part of\nhis doctrine would be the establishment of something corresponding with\nthat eminently Catholic, but admittedly anti-scientific,\ninstitution--the Holy Office.\n\nI hope I have said enough to show that I wrote the few lines I devoted\nto M. Comte and his philosophy, neither unguardedly, nor ignorantly,\nstill less maliciously. I shall be sorry if what I have now added, in my\nown justification, should lead any to suppose that I think M. Comte's\nworks worthless; or that I do not heartily respect, and sympathise with,\nthose who have been impelled by him to think deeply upon social\nproblems, and to strive nobly for social regeneration. It is the virtue\nof that impulse, I believe, which will save the name and fame of Auguste\nComte from oblivion. As for his philosophy, I part with it by quoting\nhis own words, reported to me by a quondam Comtist, now an eminent\nmember of the Institute of France, M. Charles Robin:--\n\n     \"La Philosophie est une tentative incessante de l'esprit humain\n     pour arriver au repos: mais elle se trouve incessamment aussi\n     derangee par les progres continus de la science. De la vient pour\n     le philosophe l'obligation de refaire chaque soir la synthese de\n     ses conceptions; et un jour viendra ou l'homme raisonnable ne fera\n     plus d'autre priere du soir.\"\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[13] I am glad to observe that Mr. Congreve, in the criticism with which\nhe has favoured me in the number of the _Fortnightly Review_ for April\n1869, does not venture to challenge the justice of the claim I make for\nHume. He merely suggests that I have been wanting in candour in not\nmentioning Comte's high opinion of Hume. After mature reflection I am\nunable to discern my fault. If I had suggested that Comte had borrowed\nfrom Hume without acknowledgment; or if, instead of trying to express my\nown sense of Hume's merits with the modesty which becomes a writer who\nhas no authority in matters of philosophy, I had affirmed that no one\nhad properly appreciated him, Mr. Congreve's remarks would apply: but as\nI did neither of these things, they appear to me to be irrelevant, if\nnot unjustifiable. And even had it occurred to me to quote M. Comte's\nexpressions about Hume, I do not know that I should have cited them,\ninasmuch as, on his own showing, M. Comte occasionally speaks very\ndecidedly touching writers of whose works he has not read a line. Thus,\nin Tome VI. of the \"Philosophie Positive,\" p. 619, M. Comte writes: \"Le\nplus grand des metaphysiciens modernes, l'illustre Kant, a noblement\nmerite une eternelle admiration en tentant, le premier, d'echapper\ndirectement a l'absolu philosophique par sa celebre conception de la\ndouble realite, a la fois objective et subjective, qui indique un si\njuste sentiment de la saine philosophie.\"\n\nBut in the \"Preface Personnelle\" in the same volume, p. 35, M. Comte\ntells us:--\"Je n'ai jamais lu, en aucune langue, ni Vico, _ni Kant_, ni\nHerder, ni Hegel, &c.; je ne connais leurs divers ouvrages que d'apres\nquelques relations indirectes et certains extraits fort insuffisants.\"\n\nWho knows but that the \"&c.\" may include Hume? And in that case what is\nthe value of M. Comte's praise of him?\n\n[14] Now and always I quote the second edition, by Littre.\n\n[15] \"Philosophie Positive,\" ii. p. 440.\n\n[16] \"Le brillant mais superficiel Cuvier.\"--_Philosophie Positive_, vi.\np. 383.\n\n[17] \"Philosophie Positive,\" iii. p. 369.\n\n[18] Ibid. p. 387.\n\n[19] Hear the late Dr. Whewell, who calls Comte \"a shallow pretender,\"\nso far as all the modern sciences, except astronomy, are concerned; and\ntells us that \"his pretensions to discoveries are, as Sir John Herschel\nhas shown, absurdly fallacious.\"--\"Comte and Positivism,\" _Macmillan's\nMagazine_, March 1866.\n\n[20] \"Philosophie Positive,\" i. pp. 8, 9.\n\n[21] \"Philosophie Positive,\" iii. p. 188.\n\n[22] The word \"positive\" is in every way objectionable. In one sense it\nsuggests that mental quality which was undoubtedly largely developed in\nM. Comte, but can best be dispensed with in a philosopher; in another,\nit is unfortunate in its application to a system which starts with\nenormous negations; in its third, and specially philosophical sense, as\nimplying a system of thought which assumes nothing beyond the content of\nobserved facts, it implies that which never did exist, and never will.\n\n[23] \"Philosophie Positive,\" i. p. 56.\n\n[24] \"Philosophie Positive,\" i. p. 99.\n\n[25] Ibid., i. p. 77.\n\n[26] \"Philosophie Positive,\" i. p. 78.\n\n[27] Loc. cit., Preface Speciale, pp. i. ii.\n\n[28] Mr. Congreve leaves out these important words, which show that I\nrefer to the spirit, and not to the details of science.\n\n\n\n\nIX.\n\nON A PIECE OF CHALK.\n\nA LECTURE TO WORKING MEN.\n\n\nIf a well were to be sunk at our feet in the midst of the city of\nNorwich, the diggers would very soon find themselves at work in that\nwhite substance almost too soft to be called rock, with which we are all\nfamiliar as \"chalk.\"\n\nNot only here, but over the whole county of Norfolk, the well-sinker\nmight carry his shaft down many hundred feet without coming to the end\nof the chalk; and, on the sea-coast, where the waves have pared away the\nface of the land which breasts them, the scarped faces of the high\ncliffs are often wholly formed of the same material. Northward, the\nchalk may be followed as far as Yorkshire; on the south coast it appears\nabruptly in the picturesque western bays of Dorset, and breaks into the\nNeedles of the Isle of Wight; while on the shores of Kent it supplies\nthat long line of white cliffs to which England owes her name of Albion.\n\nWere the thin soil which covers it all washed away, a curved band of\nwhite chalk, here broader, and there narrower, might be followed\ndiagonally across England from Lulworth in Dorset, to Flamborough Head\nin Yorkshire--a distance of over 280 miles as the crow flies.\n\nFrom this band to the North Sea, on the east, and the Channel, on the\nsouth, the chalk is largely hidden by other deposits; but, except in the\nWeald of Kent and Sussex, it enters into the very foundation of all the\nsouth-eastern counties.\n\nAttaining, as it does in some places, a thickness of more than a\nthousand feet, the English chalk must be admitted to be a mass of\nconsiderable magnitude. Nevertheless, it covers but an insignificant\nportion of the whole area occupied by the chalk formation of the globe,\nwhich has precisely the same general characters as ours, and is found in\ndetached patches, some less, and others more extensive, than the\nEnglish.\n\nChalk occurs in north-west Ireland; it stretches over a large part of\nFrance,--the chalk which underlies Paris being, in fact, a continuation\nof that of the London basin; it runs through Denmark and Central Europe,\nand extends southward to North Africa; while, eastward, it appears in\nthe Crimea and in Syria, and may be traced as far as the shores of the\nSea of Aral, in Central Asia.\n\nIf all the points at which true chalk occurs were circumscribed, they\nwould lie within an irregular oval about 3,000 miles in long\ndiameter--the area of which would be as great as that of Europe, and\nwould many times exceed that of the largest existing inland sea--the\nMediterranean.\n\nThus the chalk is no unimportant element in the masonry of the earth's\ncrust, and it impresses a peculiar stamp, varying with the conditions\nto which it is exposed, on the scenery of the districts in which it\noccurs. The undulating downs and rounded coombs, covered with\nsweet-grassed turf, of our inland chalk country, have a peacefully\ndomestic and mutton-suggesting prettiness, but can hardly be called\neither grand or beautiful. But, on our southern coasts, the wall-sided\ncliffs, many hundred feet high, with vast needles and pinnacles standing\nout in the sea, sharp and solitary enough to serve as perches for the\nwary cormorant, confer a wonderful beauty and grandeur upon the chalk\nheadlands. And, in the East, chalk has its share in the formation of\nsome of the most venerable of mountain ranges, such as the Lebanon.\n\n\nWhat is this wide-spread component of the surface of the earth? and\nwhence did it come?\n\nYou may think this no very hopeful inquiry. You may not unnaturally\nsuppose that the attempt to solve such problems as these can lead to no\nresult, save that of entangling the inquirer in vague speculations,\nincapable of refutation and of verification.\n\nIf such were really the case, I should have selected some other subject\nthan a \"piece of chalk\" for my discourse. But, in truth, after much\ndeliberation, I have been unable to think of any topic which would so\nwell enable me to lead you to see how solid is the foundation upon which\nsome of the most startling conclusions of physical science rest.\n\nA great chapter of the history of the world is written in the chalk. Few\npassages in the history of man can be supported by such an overwhelming\nmass of direct and indirect evidence as that which testifies to the\ntruth of the fragment of the history of the globe, which I hope to\nenable you to read, with your own eyes, to-night.\n\nLet me add, that few chapters of human history have a more profound\nsignificance for ourselves. I weigh my words well when I assert, that\nthe man who should know the true history of the bit of chalk which every\ncarpenter carries about in his breeches-pocket, though ignorant of all\nother history, is likely, if he will think his knowledge out to its\nultimate results, to have a truer, and therefore a better, conception of\nthis wonderful universe, and of man's relation to it, than the most\nlearned student who is deep-read in the records of humanity and ignorant\nof those of Nature.\n\nThe language of the chalk is not hard to learn, not nearly so hard as\nLatin, if you only want to get at the broad features of the story it has\nto tell; and I propose that we now set to work to spell that story out\ntogether.\n\nWe all know that if we \"burn\" chalk the result is quicklime. Chalk, in\nfact, is a compound of carbonic acid gas and lime, and when you make it\nvery hot the carbonic acid flies away and the lime is left.\n\nBy this method of procedure we see the lime, but we do not see the\ncarbonic acid. If, on the other hand, you were to powder a little chalk,\nand drop it into a good deal of strong vinegar, there would be a great\nbubbling and fizzing, and, finally, a clear liquid, in which no sign of\nchalk would appear. Here you see the carbonic acid in the bubbles; the\nlime, dissolved in the vinegar, vanishes from sight. There are a great\nmany other ways of showing that chalk is essentially nothing but\ncarbonic acid and quicklime. Chemists enunciate the result of all the\nexperiments which prove this, by stating that chalk is almost wholly\ncomposed of \"carbonate of lime.\"\n\nIt is desirable for us to start from the knowledge of this fact, though\nit may not seem to help us very far towards what we seek. For carbonate\nof lime is a widely-spread substance, and is met with under very various\nconditions. All sorts of limestones are composed of more or less pure\ncarbonate of lime. The crust which is often deposited by waters which\nhave drained through limestone rocks, in the form of what are called\nstalagmites and stalactites, is carbonate of lime. Or, to take a more\nfamiliar example, the fur on the inside of a tea-kettle is carbonate of\nlime; and, for anything chemistry tells us to the contrary, the chalk\nmight be a kind of gigantic fur upon the bottom of the earth-kettle,\nwhich is kept pretty hot below.\n\nLet us try another method of making the chalk tell us its own history.\nTo the unassisted eye chalk looks simply like a very loose and open kind\nof stone. But it is possible to grind a slice of chalk down so thin that\nyou can see through it--until it is thin enough, in fact, to be examined\nwith any magnifying power that may be thought desirable. A thin slice of\nthe fur of a kettle might be made in the same way. If it were examined\nmicroscopically, it would show itself to be a more or less distinctly\nlaminated mineral substance, and nothing more.\n\nBut the slice of chalk presents a totally different appearance when\nplaced under the microscope. The general mass of it is made up of very\nminute granules; but imbedded in this matrix, are innumerable bodies,\nsome smaller and some larger, but, on a rough average, not more than a\nhundredth of an inch in diameter, having a well-defined shape and\nstructure. A cubic inch of some specimens of chalk may contain hundreds\nof thousands of these bodies, compacted together with incalculable\nmillions of the granules.\n\nThe examination of a transparent slice gives a good notion of the manner\nin which the components of the chalk are arranged, and of their relative\nproportions. But, by rubbing up some chalk with a brush in water and\nthen pouring off the milky fluid, so as to obtain sediments of different\ndegrees of fineness, the granules and the minute rounded bodies may be\npretty well separated from one another, and submitted to microscopic\nexamination, either as opaque or as transparent objects. By combining\nthe views obtained in these various methods, each of the rounded bodies\nmay be proved to be a beautifully-constructed calcareous fabric, made up\nof a number of chambers, communicating freely with one another. The\nchambered bodies are of various forms. One of the commonest is something\nlike a badly-grown raspberry, being formed of a number of nearly\nglobular chambers of different sizes congregated together. It is called\n_Globigerina_, and some specimens of chalk consist of little else than\n_Globigerinae_ and granules.\n\nLet us fix our attention upon the _Globigerina_. It is the spoor of the\ngame we are tracking. If we can learn what it is and what are the\nconditions of its existence, we shall see our way to the origin and past\nhistory of the chalk.\n\nA suggestion which may naturally enough present itself is, that these\ncurious bodies are the result of some process of aggregation which has\ntaken place in the carbonate of lime; that, just as in winter, the rime\non our windows simulates the most delicate and elegantly arborescent\nfoliage--proving that the mere mineral water may, under certain\nconditions, assume the outward form of organic bodies--so this mineral\nsubstance, carbonate of lime, hidden away in the bowels of the earth,\nhas taken the shape of these chambered bodies. I am not raising a merely\nfanciful and unreal objection. Very learned men, in former days, have\neven entertained the notion that all the formed things found in rocks\nare of this nature; and if no such conception is at present held to be\nadmissible, it is because long and varied experience has now shown that\nmineral matter never does assume the form and structure we find in\nfossils. If any one were to try to persuade you that an oyster-shell\n(which is also chiefly composed of carbonate of lime) had crystallized\nout of sea-water, I suppose you would laugh at the absurdity. Your\nlaughter would be justified by the fact that all experience tends to\nshow that oyster-shells are formed by the agency of oysters, and in no\nother way. And if there were no better reasons, we should be justified,\non like grounds, in believing that _Globigerina_ is not the product of\nanything but vital activity.\n\nHappily, however, better evidence in proof of the organic nature of the\n_Globigerinae_ than that of analogy is forthcoming. It so happens that\ncalcareous skeletons, exactly similar to the _Globigerinae_ of the chalk,\nare being formed, at the present moment, by minute living creatures,\nwhich flourish in multitudes, literally more numerous than the sands of\nthe sea-shore, over a large extent of that part of the earth's surface\nwhich is covered by the ocean.\n\nThe history of the discovery of these living _Globigerinae_, and of the\npart which they play in rock-building, is singular enough. It is a\ndiscovery which, like others of no less scientific importance, has\narisen, incidentally, out of work devoted to very different and\nexceedingly practical interests.\n\nWhen men first took to the sea, they speedily learned to look out for\nshoals and rocks; and the more the burthen of their ships increased, the\nmore imperatively necessary it became for sailors to ascertain with\nprecision the depth of the waters they traversed. Out of this necessity\ngrew the use of the lead and sounding-line; and, ultimately,\nmarine-surveying, which is the recording of the form of coasts and of\nthe depth of the sea, as ascertained by the sounding-lead, upon charts.\n\nAt the same time, it became desirable to ascertain and to indicate the\nnature of the sea-bottom, since this circumstance greatly affects its\ngoodness as holding ground for anchors. Some ingenious tar, whose name\ndeserves a better fate than the oblivion into which it has fallen,\nattained this object by \"arming\" the bottom of the lead with a lump of\ngrease, to which more or less of the sand or mud, or broken shells, as\nthe case might be, adhered, and was brought to the surface. But, however\nwell adapted such an apparatus might be for rough nautical purposes,\nscientific accuracy could not be expected from the armed lead, and to\nremedy its defects (especially when applied to sounding in great depths)\nLieut. Brooke, of the American Navy, some years ago invented a most\ningenious machine, by which a considerable portion of the superficial\nlayer of the sea-bottom can be scooped out and brought up, from any\ndepth to which the lead descends.\n\nIn 1853, Lieut. Brooke obtained mud from the bottom of the North\nAtlantic, between Newfoundland and the Azores, at a depth of more than\n10,000 feet, or two miles, by the help of this sounding apparatus. The\nspecimens were sent for examination to Ehrenberg of Berlin, and to\nBailey of West Point, and those able microscopists found that this\ndeep-sea mud was almost entirely composed of the skeletons of living\norganisms--the greater proportion of these being just like the\n_Globigerinae_ already known to occur in the chalk.\n\nThus far, the work had been carried on simply in the interests of\nscience, but Lieut. Brooke's method of sounding acquired a high\ncommercial value, when the enterprise of laying down the telegraph-cable\nbetween this country and the United States was undertaken. For it became\na matter of immense importance to know, not only the depth of the sea\nover the whole line along which the cable was to be laid, but the exact\nnature of the bottom, so as to guard against chances of cutting or\nfraying the strands of that costly rope. The Admiralty consequently\nordered Captain Dayman, an old friend and shipmate of mine, to ascertain\nthe depth over the whole line of the cable, and to bring back specimens\nof the bottom. In former days, such a command as this might have sounded\nvery much like one of the impossible things which the young prince in\nthe Fairy Tales is ordered to do before he can obtain the hand of the\nPrincess. However, in the months of June and July 1857, my friend\nperformed the task assigned to him with great expedition and precision,\nwithout, so far as I know, having met with any reward of that kind. The\nspecimens of Atlantic mud which he procured were sent to me to be\nexamined and reported upon.[29]\n\nThe result of all these operations is, that we know the contours and the\nnature of the surface-soil covered by the North Atlantic, for a distance\nof 1,700 miles from east to west, as well as we know that of any part of\nthe dry land.\n\nIt is a prodigious plain--one of the widest and most even plains in the\nworld. If the sea were drained off, you might drive a wagon all the way\nfrom Valentia, on the west coast of Ireland, to Trinity Bay, in\nNewfoundland. And, except upon one sharp incline about 200 miles from\nValentia, I am not quite sure that it would even be necessary to put the\nskid on, so gentle are the ascents and descents upon that long route.\nFrom Valentia the road would lie down hill for about 200 miles to the\npoint at which the bottom is now covered by 1,700 fathoms of sea-water.\nThen would come the central plain, more than a thousand miles wide, the\ninequalities of the surface of which would be hardly perceptible, though\nthe depth of water upon it now varies from 10,000 to 15,000 feet; and\nthere are places in which Mont Blanc might be sunk without showing its\npeak above water. Beyond this, the ascent on the American side\ncommences, and gradually leads, for about 300 miles, to the Newfoundland\nshore.\n\nAlmost the whole of the bottom of this central plain (which extends for\nmany hundred miles in a north and south direction) is covered by a fine\nmud, which, when brought to the surface, dries into a greyish-white\nfriable substance. You can write with this on a blackboard, if you are\nso inclined; and, to the eye, it is quite like very soft, greyish chalk.\nExamined chemically, it proves to be composed almost wholly of carbonate\nof lime; and if you make a section of it, in the same way as that of the\npiece of chalk was made, and view it with the microscope, it presents\ninnumerable _Globigerinae_, embedded in a granular matrix.\n\nThus this deep-sea mud is substantially chalk. I say substantially,\nbecause there are a good many minor differences: but as these have no\nbearing on the question immediately before us,--which is the nature of\nthe _Globigerinae_ of the chalk,--it is unnecessary to speak of them.\n\n_Globigerinae_ of every size, from the smallest to the largest, are\nassociated together in the Atlantic mud, and the chambers of many are\nfilled by a soft animal matter. This soft substance is, in fact, the\nremains of the creature to which the _Globigerina_ shell, or rather\nskeleton, owes its existence--and which is an animal of the simplest\nimaginable description. It is, in fact, a mere particle of living jelly,\nwithout defined parts of any kind--without a mouth, nerves, muscles, or\ndistinct organs, and only manifesting its vitality to ordinary\nobservation by thrusting out and retracting from all parts of its\nsurface, long filamentous processes, which serve for arms and legs. Yet\nthis amorphous particle, devoid of everything which, in the higher\nanimals, we call organs, is capable of feeding, growing, and\nmultiplying; of separating from the ocean the small proportion of\ncarbonate of lime which is dissolved in sea-water; and of building up\nthat substance into a skeleton for itself, according to a pattern which\ncan be imitated by no other known agency.\n\nThe notion that animals can live and flourish in the sea, at the vast\ndepths from which apparently living _Globigerinae_ have been brought up,\ndoes not agree very well with our usual conceptions respecting the\nconditions of animal life; and it is not so absolutely impossible as it\nmight at first sight appear to be, that the _Globigerinae_ of the\nAtlantic sea-bottom do not live and die where they are found.\n\nAs I have mentioned, the soundings from the great Atlantic plain are\nalmost entirely made up of _Globigerinae_, with the granules which have\nbeen mentioned, and some few other calcareous shells; but a small\npercentage of the chalky mud--perhaps at most some five per cent. of\nit--is of a different nature, and consists of shells and skeletons\ncomposed of silex, or pure flint. These silicious bodies belong partly\nto the lowly vegetable organisms which are called _Diatomaceae_, and\npartly to the minute, and extremely simple, animals, termed\n_Radiolaria_. It is quite certain that these creatures do not live at\nthe bottom of the ocean, but at its surface--where they may be obtained\nin prodigious numbers by the use of a properly constructed net. Hence\nit follows that these silicious organisms, though they are not heavier\nthan the lightest dust, must have fallen, in some cases, through fifteen\nthousand feet of water, before they reached their final resting-place on\nthe ocean floor. And, considering how large a surface these bodies\nexpose in proportion to their weight, it is probable that they occupy a\ngreat length of time in making their burial journey from the surface of\nthe Atlantic to the bottom.\n\nBut if the _Radiolaria_ and Diatoms are thus rained upon the bottom of\nthe sea, from the superficial layer of its waters in which they pass\ntheir lives, it is obviously possible that the _Globigerinae_ may be\nsimilarly derived; and if they were so, it would be much more easy to\nunderstand how they obtain their supply of food than it is at present.\nNevertheless, the positive and negative evidence all points the other\nway. The skeletons of the full-grown, deep-sea _Globigerinae_ are so\nremarkably solid and heavy in proportion to their surface as to seem\nlittle fitted for floating; and, as a matter of fact, they are not to be\nfound along with the Diatoms and _Radiolaria_, in the uppermost stratum\nof the open ocean.\n\nIt has been observed, again, that the abundance of _Globigerinae_, in\nproportion to other organisms of like kind, increases with the depth of\nthe sea; and that deep-water _Globigerinae_ are larger than those which\nlive in shallower parts of the sea; and such facts negative the\nsupposition that these organisms have been swept by currents from the\nshallows into the deeps of the Atlantic.\n\nIt therefore seems to be hardly doubtful that these wonderful creatures\nlive and die at the depths in which they are found.[30]\n\nHowever, the important points for us are, that the living _Globigerinae_\nare exclusively marine animals, the skeletons of which abound at the\nbottom of deep seas; and that there is not a shadow of reason for\nbelieving that the habits of the _Globigerinae_ of the chalk differed\nfrom those of the existing species. But if this be true, there is no\nescaping the conclusion that the chalk itself is the dried mud of an\nancient deep sea.\n\nIn working over the soundings collected by Captain Dayman, I was\nsurprised to find that many of what I have called the \"granules\" of that\nmud, were not, as one might have been tempted to think at first, the\nmere powder and waste of _Globigerinae_, but that they had a definite\nform and size, I termed these bodies \"_coccoliths_,\" and doubted their\norganic nature. Dr. Wallich verified my observation, and added the\ninteresting discovery that, not unfrequently, bodies similar to these\n\"coccoliths\" were aggregated together into spheroids, which he termed\n\"_coccospheres_.\" So far as we knew, these bodies, the nature of which\nis extremely puzzling and problematical, were peculiar to the Atlantic\nsoundings.\n\nBut, a few years ago, Mr. Sorby, in making a careful examination of the\nchalk by means of thin sections and otherwise, observed, as Ehrenberg\nhad done before him, that much of its granular basis possesses a\ndefinite form. Comparing these formed particles with those in the\nAtlantic soundings, he found the two to be identical; and thus proved\nthat the chalk, like the soundings, contains these mysterious coccoliths\nand coccospheres. Here was a further and a most interesting\nconfirmation, from internal evidence, of the essential identity of the\nchalk with modern deep-sea mud. _Globigerinae_, coccoliths, and\ncoccospheres are found as the chief constituents of both, and testify to\nthe general similarity of the conditions under which both have been\nformed.[31]\n\nThe evidence furnished by the hewing, facing, and superposition of the\nstones of the Pyramids, that these structures were built by men, has no\ngreater weight than the evidence that the chalk was built by\n_Globigerinae_; and the belief that those ancient pyramid-builders were\nterrestrial and air-breathing creatures like ourselves, is not better\nbased than the conviction that the chalk-makers lived in the sea.\n\nBut as our belief in the building of the Pyramids by men is not only\ngrounded on the internal evidence afforded by these structures, but\ngathers strength from multitudinous collateral proofs, and is clinched\nby the total absence of any reason for a contrary belief; so the\nevidence drawn from the _Globigerinae_ that the chalk is an ancient\nsea-bottom, is fortified by innumerable independent lines of evidence;\nand our belief in the truth of the conclusion to which all positive\ntestimony tends, receives the like negative justification from the fact\nthat no other hypothesis has a shadow of foundation.\n\nIt may be worth while briefly to consider a few of these collateral\nproofs that the chalk was deposited at the bottom of the sea.\n\nThe great mass of the chalk is composed, as we have seen, of the\nskeletons of _Globigerinae_, and other simple organisms, imbedded in\ngranular matter. Here and there, however, this hardened mud of the\nancient sea reveals the remains of higher animals which have lived and\ndied, and left their hard parts in the mud, just as the oysters die and\nleave their shells behind them, in the mud of the present seas.\n\nThere are, at the present day, certain groups of animals which are never\nfound in fresh waters, being unable to live anywhere but in the sea.\nSuch are the corals; those corallines which are called _Polyzoa_; those\ncreatures which fabricate the lamp-shells, and are called _Brachiopoda_;\nthe pearly _Nautilus_, and all animals allied to it; and all the forms\nof sea-urchins and star-fishes.\n\nNot only are all these creatures confined to salt water at the present\nday; but, so far as our records of the past go, the conditions of their\nexistence have been the same: hence, their occurrence in any deposit is\nas strong evidence as can be obtained, that that deposit was formed in\nthe sea. Now the remains of animals of all the kinds which have been\nenumerated, occur in the chalk, in greater or less abundance; while not\none of those forms of shell-fish which are characteristic of fresh water\nhas yet been observed in it.\n\nWhen we consider that the remains of more than three thousand distinct\nspecies of aquatic animals have been discovered among the fossils of the\nchalk, that the great majority of them are of such forms as are now met\nwith only in the sea, and that there is no reason to believe that any\none of them inhabited fresh water--the collateral evidence that the\nchalk represents an ancient sea-bottom acquires as great force as the\nproof derived from the nature of the chalk itself. I think you will now\nallow that I did not overstate my case when I asserted that we have as\nstrong grounds for believing that all the vast area of dry land, at\npresent occupied by the chalk, was once at the bottom of the sea, as we\nhave for any matter of history whatever; while there is no justification\nfor any other belief.\n\nNo less certain is it that the time during which the countries we now\ncall south-east England, France, Germany, Poland, Russia, Egypt, Arabia,\nSyria, were more or less completely covered by a deep sea, was of\nconsiderable duration.\n\nWe have already seen that the chalk is, in places, more than a thousand\nfeet thick. I think you will agree with me, that it must have taken some\ntime for the skeletons of animalcules of a hundredth of an inch in\ndiameter to heap up such a mass as that. I have said that throughout the\nthickness of the chalk the remains of other animals are scattered. These\nremains are often in the most exquisite state of preservation. The\nvalves of the shell-fishes are commonly adherent; the long spines of\nsome of the sea-urchins, which would be detached by the smallest jar,\noften remain in their places. In a word, it is certain that these\nanimals have lived and died when the place which they now occupy was\nthe surface of as much of the chalk as had then been deposited; and that\neach has been covered up by the layer of _Globigerinae_ mud, upon which\nthe creatures imbedded a little higher up have, in like manner, lived\nand died. But some of these remains prove the existence of reptiles of\nvast size in the chalk sea. These lived their time, and had their\nancestors and descendants, which assuredly implies time, reptiles being\nof slow growth.\n\nThere is more curious evidence, again, that the process of covering up,\nor, in other words, the deposit of _Globigerinae_ skeletons, did not go\non very fast. It is demonstrable that an animal of the cretaceous sea\nmight die, that its skeleton might lie uncovered upon the sea-bottom\nlong enough to lose all its outward coverings and appendages by\nputrefaction; and that, after this had happened, another animal might\nattach itself to the dead and naked skeleton, might grow to maturity,\nand might itself die before the calcareous mud had buried the whole.\n\nCases of this kind are admirably described by Sir Charles Lyell. He\nspeaks of the frequency with which geologists find in the chalk a\nfossilized sea-urchin, to which is attached the lower valve of a\n_Crania_. This is a kind of shell-fish, with a shell composed of two\npieces, of which, as in the oyster, one is fixed and the other free.\n\n\"The upper valve is almost invariably wanting, though occasionally found\nin a perfect state of preservation in the white chalk at some distance.\nIn this case, we see clearly that the sea-urchin first lived from youth\nto age, then died and lost its spines, which were carried away. Then\nthe young _Crania_ adhered to the bared shell, grew and perished in its\nturn; after which, the upper valve was separated from the lower, before\nthe Echinus became enveloped in chalky mud.\"[32]\n\nA specimen in the Museum of Practical Geology, in London, still further\nprolongs the period which must have elapsed between the death of the\nsea-urchin, and its burial by the _Globigerinae_. For the outward face of\nthe valve of a _Crania_, which is attached to a sea-urchin\n(_Micraster_), is itself overrun by an incrusting coralline, which\nspreads thence over more or less of the surface of the sea-urchin. It\nfollows that, after the upper valve of the _Crania_ fell off, the\nsurface of the attached valve must have remained exposed long enough to\nallow of the growth of the whole coralline, since corallines do not live\nimbedded in mud.\n\nThe progress of knowledge may, one day, enable us to deduce from such\nfacts as these the maximum rate at which the chalk can have accumulated,\nand thus to arrive at the minimum duration of the chalk period. Suppose\nthat the valve of the _Crania_ upon which a coralline has fixed itself\nin the way just described, is so attached to the sea-urchin that no part\nof it is more than an inch above the face upon which the sea-urchin\nrests. Then, as the coralline could not have fixed itself, if the\n_Crania_ had been covered up with chalk mud, and could not have lived\nhad itself been so covered, it follows, that an inch of chalk mud could\nnot have accumulated within the time between the death and decay of the\nsoft parts of the sea-urchin and the growth of the coralline to the full\nsize which it has attained. If the decay of the soft parts of the\nsea-urchin; the attachment, growth to maturity, and decay of the\n_Crania_; and the subsequent attachment and growth of the coralline,\ntook a year (which is a low estimate enough), the accumulation of the\ninch of chalk must have taken more than a year: and the deposit of a\nthousand feet of chalk must, consequently, have taken more than twelve\nthousand years.\n\nThe foundation of all this calculation is, of course, a knowledge of the\nlength of time the _Crania_ and the coralline needed to attain their\nfull size; and, on this head, precise knowledge is at present wanting.\nBut there are circumstances which tend to show, that nothing like an\ninch of chalk has accumulated during the life of a _Crania_; and, on any\nprobable estimate of the length of that life, the chalk period must have\nhad a much longer duration than that thus roughly assigned to it.\n\n\nThus, not only is it certain that the chalk is the mud of an ancient\nsea-bottom; but it is no less certain, that the chalk sea existed during\nan extremely long period, though we may not be prepared to give a\nprecise estimate of the length of that period in years. The relative\nduration is clear, though the absolute duration may not be definable.\nThe attempt to affix any precise date to the period at which the chalk\nsea began, or ended, its existence, is baffled by difficulties of the\nsame kind. But the relative age of the cretaceous epoch may be\ndetermined with as great ease and certainty as the long duration of that\nepoch.\n\nYou will have heard of the interesting discoveries recently made, in\nvarious parts of Western Europe, of flint implements, obviously worked\ninto shape by human hands, under circumstances which show conclusively\nthat man is a very ancient denizen of these regions.\n\nIt has been proved that the old populations of Europe, whose existence\nhas been revealed to us in this way, consisted of savages, such as the\nEsquimaux are now; that, in the country which is now France, they hunted\nthe reindeer, and were familiar with the ways of the mammoth and the\nbison. The physical geography of France was in those days different from\nwhat it is now--the river Somme, for instance, having cut its bed a\nhundred feet deeper between that time and this; and, it is probable,\nthat the climate was more like that of Canada or Siberia, than that of\nWestern Europe.\n\nThe existence of these people is forgotten even in the traditions of the\noldest historical nations. The name and fame of them had utterly\nvanished until a few years back; and the amount of physical change which\nhas been effected since their day, renders it more than probable that,\nvenerable as are some of the historical nations, the workers of the\nchipped flints of Hoxne or of Amiens are to them, as they are to us, in\npoint of antiquity.\n\nBut, if we assign to these hoar relics of long vanished generations of\nmen the greatest age that can possibly be claimed for them, they are not\nolder than the drift, or boulder clay, which, in comparison with the\nchalk, is but a very juvenile deposit. You need go no further than your\nown sea-board for evidence of this fact. At one of the most charming\nspots on the coast of Norfolk, Cromer, you will see the boulder clay\nforming a vast mass, which lies upon the chalk, and must consequently\nhave come into existence after it. Huge boulders of chalk are, in fact,\nincluded in the clay, and have evidently been brought to the position\nthey now occupy, by the same agency as that which has planted blocks of\nsyenite from Norway side by side with them.\n\nThe chalk, then, is certainly older than the boulder clay. If you ask\nhow much, I will again take you no further than the same spot upon your\nown coasts for evidence. I have spoken of the boulder clay and drift as\nresting upon the chalk. That is not strictly true. Interposed between\nthe chalk and the drift is a comparatively insignificant layer,\ncontaining vegetable matter. But that layer tells a wonderful history.\nIt is full of stumps of trees standing as they grew. Fir-trees are there\nwith their cones, and hazel-bushes with their nuts; there stand the\nstools of oak and yew trees, beeches and alders. Hence this stratum is\nappropriately called the \"forest-bed.\"\n\nIt is obvious that the chalk must have been upheaved and converted into\ndry land, before the timber trees could grow upon it. As the bolls of\nsome of these trees are from two to three feet in diameter, it is no\nless clear that the dry land thus formed remained in the same condition\nfor long ages. And not only do the remains of stately oaks and\nwell-grown firs testify to the duration of this condition of things, but\nadditional evidence to the same effect is afforded by the abundant\nremains of elephants, rhinoceroses, hippopotamuses, and other great wild\nbeasts, which it has yielded to the zealous search of such men as the\nRev. Mr. Gunn.\n\nWhen you look at such a collection as he has formed, and bethink you\nthat these elephantine bones did veritably carry their owners about,\nand these great grinders crunch, in the dark woods of which the\nforest-bed is now the only trace, it is impossible not to feel that they\nare as good evidence of the lapse of time as the annual rings of the\ntree-stumps.\n\nThus there is a writing upon the wall of cliffs at Cromer, and whoso\nruns may read it. It tells us, with an authority which cannot be\nimpeached, that the ancient sea-bed of the chalk sea was raised up, and\nremained dry land, until it was covered with forest, stocked with the\ngreat game whose spoils have rejoiced your geologists. How long it\nremained in that condition cannot be said; but \"the whirligig of time\nbrought its revenges\" in those days as in these. That dry land, with the\nbones and teeth of generations of long-lived elephants, hidden away\namong the gnarled roots and dry leaves of its ancient trees, sank\ngradually to the bottom of the icy sea, which covered it with huge\nmasses of drift and boulder clay. Sea-beasts, such as the walrus, now\nrestricted to the extreme north, paddled about where birds had twittered\namong the topmost twigs of the fir-trees. How long this state of things\nendured we know not, but at length it came to an end. The upheaved\nglacial mud hardened into the soil of modern Norfolk. Forests grew once\nmore, the wolf and the beaver replaced the reindeer and the elephant;\nand at length what we call the history of England dawned.\n\nThus you have, within the limits of your own county, proof that the\nchalk can justly claim a very much greater antiquity than even the\noldest physical traces of mankind. But we may go further and\ndemonstrate, by evidence of the same authority as that which testifies\nto the existence of the father of men, that the chalk is vastly older\nthan Adam himself.\n\nThe Book of Genesis informs us that Adam, immediately upon his creation,\nand before the appearance of Eve, was placed in the Garden of Eden. The\nproblem of the geographical position of Eden has greatly vexed the\nspirits of the learned in such matters, but there is one point\nrespecting which, so far as I know, no commentator has ever raised a\ndoubt. This is, that of the four rivers which are said to run out of it,\nEuphrates and Hiddekel are identical with the rivers now known by the\nnames of Euphrates and Tigris.\n\nBut the whole country in which these mighty rivers take their origin,\nand through which they run, is composed of rocks which are either of the\nsame age as the chalk, or of later date. So that the chalk must not only\nhave been formed, but, after its formation, the time required for the\ndeposit of these later rocks, and for their upheaval into dry land, must\nhave elapsed, before the smallest brook which feeds the swift stream of\n\"the great river, the river of Babylon,\" began to flow.\n\n\nThus, evidence which cannot be rebutted, and which need not be\nstrengthened, though if time permitted I might indefinitely increase its\nquantity, compels you to believe that the earth, from the time of the\nchalk to the present day, has been the theatre of a series of changes as\nvast in their amount, as they were slow in their progress. The area on\nwhich we stand has been first sea and then land, for at least four\nalternations; and has remained in each of these conditions for a period\nof great length.\n\nNor have these wonderful metamorphoses of sea into land, and of land\ninto sea, been confined to one corner of England. During the chalk\nperiod, or \"cretaceous epoch,\" not one of the present great physical\nfeatures of the globe was in existence. Our great mountain ranges,\nPyrenees, Alps, Himalayas, Andes, have all been upheaved since the chalk\nwas deposited, and the cretaceous sea flowed over the sites of Sinai and\nArarat.\n\nAll this is certain, because rocks of cretaceous, or still later, date\nhave shared in the elevatory movements which gave rise to these mountain\nchains; and may be found perched up, in some cases, many thousand feet\nhigh upon their flanks. And evidence of equal cogency demonstrates that,\nthough, in Norfolk, the forest-bed rests directly upon the chalk, yet it\ndoes so, not because the period at which the forest grew immediately\nfollowed that at which the chalk was formed, but because an immense\nlapse of time, represented elsewhere by thousands of feet of rock, is\nnot indicated at Cromer.\n\nI must ask you to believe that there is no less conclusive proof that a\nstill more prolonged succession of similar changes occurred, before the\nchalk was deposited. Nor have we any reason to think that the first term\nin the series of these changes is known. The oldest sea-beds preserved\nto us are sands, and mud, and pebbles, the wear and tear of rocks which\nwere formed in still older oceans.\n\nBut, great as is the magnitude of these physical changes of the world,\nthey have been accompanied by a no less striking series of modifications\nin its living inhabitants.\n\nAll the great classes of animals, beasts of the field, fowls of the\nair, creeping things, and things which dwell in the waters, flourished\nupon the globe long ages before the chalk was deposited. Very few,\nhowever, if any, of these ancient forms of animal life were identical\nwith those which now live. Certainly not one of the higher animals was\nof the same species as any of those now in existence. The beasts of the\nfield, in the days before the chalk, were not our beasts of the field,\nnor the fowls of the air such as those which the eye of men has seen\nflying, unless his antiquity dates infinitely further back than we at\npresent surmise. If we could be carried back into those times, we should\nbe as one suddenly set down in Australia before it was colonized. We\nshould see mammals, birds, reptiles, fishes, insects, snails, and the\nlike, clearly recognisable as such, and yet not one of them would be\njust the same as those with which we are familiar, and many would be\nextremely different.\n\nFrom that time to the present, the population of the world has undergone\nslow and gradual, but incessant, changes. There has been no grand\ncatastrophe--no destroyer has swept away the forms of life of one\nperiod, and replaced them by a totally new creation; but one species has\nvanished and another has taken its place; creatures of one type of\nstructure have diminished, those of another have increased, as time has\npassed on. And thus, while the differences between the living creatures\nof the time before the chalk and those of the present day appear\nstartling, if placed side by side, we are led from one to the other by\nthe most gradual progress, if we follow the course of Nature through\nthe whole series of those relics of her operations which she has left\nbehind.\n\nAnd it is by the population of the chalk sea that the ancient and the\nmodern inhabitants of the world are most completely connected. The\ngroups which are dying out flourish, side by side, with the groups which\nare now the dominant forms of life.\n\nThus the chalk contains remains of those strange flying and swimming\nreptiles, the pterodactyl, the ichthyosaurus, and the plesiosaurus,\nwhich are found in no later deposits, but abounded in preceding ages.\nThe chambered shells called ammonites and belemnites, which are so\ncharacteristic of the period preceding the cretaceous, in like manner\ndie with it.\n\nBut, amongst these fading remainders of a previous state of things, are\nsome very modern forms of life, looking like Yankee pedlars among a\ntribe of Red Indians. Crocodiles of modern type appear; bony fishes,\nmany of them very similar to existing species, almost supplant the forms\nof fish which predominate in more ancient seas; and many kinds of living\nshell-fish first become known to us in the chalk. The vegetation\nacquires a modern aspect. A few living animals are not even\ndistinguishable as species, from those which existed at that remote\nepoch. The _Globigerina_ of the present day, for example, is not\ndifferent specifically from that of the chalk; and the same may be said\nof many other _Foraminifera_. I think it probable that critical and\nunprejudiced examination will show that more than one species of much\nhigher animals have had a similar longevity; but the only example which\nI can at present give confidently is the snake's-head lamp-shell\n(_Terebratulina caput serpentis_), which lives in our English seas and\nabounded (as _Terebratulina striata_ of authors) in the chalk.\n\nThe longest line of human ancestry must hide its diminished head before\nthe pedigree of this insignificant shell-fish. We Englishmen are proud\nto have an ancestor who was present at the Battle of Hastings. The\nancestors of _Terebratulina caput serpentis_ may have been present at a\nbattle of _Ichthyosauria_ in that part of the sea which, when the chalk\nwas forming, flowed over the site of Hastings. While all around has\nchanged, this _Terebratulina_ has peacefully propagated its species from\ngeneration to generation, and stands to this day, as a living testimony\nto the continuity of the present with the past history of the globe.\n\n\nUp to this moment I have stated, so far as I know, nothing but\nwell-authenticated facts, and the immediate conclusions which they force\nupon the mind.\n\nBut the mind is so constituted that it does not willingly rest in facts\nand immediate causes, but seeks always after a knowledge of the remoter\nlinks in the chain of causation.\n\nTaking the many changes of any given spot of the earth's surface, from\nsea to land and from land to sea, as an established fact, we cannot\nrefrain from asking ourselves how these changes have occurred. And when\nwe have explained them--as they must be explained--by the alternate slow\nmovements of elevation and depression which have affected the crust of\nthe earth, we go still further back, and ask, Why these movements?\n\nI am not certain that any one can give you a satisfactory answer to\nthat question. Assuredly I cannot. All that can be said, for certain,\nis, that such movements are part of the ordinary course of nature,\ninasmuch as they are going on at the present time. Direct proof may be\ngiven, that some parts of the land of the northern hemisphere are at\nthis moment insensibly rising and others insensibly sinking; and there\nis indirect, but perfectly satisfactory, proof, that an enormous area\nnow covered by the Pacific has been deepened thousands of feet, since\nthe present inhabitants of that sea came into existence.\n\nThus there is not a shadow of a reason for believing that the physical\nchanges of the globe, in past times, have been effected by other than\nnatural causes.\n\nIs there any more reason for believing that the concomitant\nmodifications in the forms of the living inhabitants of the globe have\nbeen brought about in other ways?\n\nBefore attempting to answer this question, let us try to form a distinct\nmental picture of what has happened in some special case.\n\nThe crocodiles are animals which, as a group, have a very vast\nantiquity. They abounded ages before the chalk was deposited; they\nthrong the rivers in warm climates, at the present day. There is a\ndifference in the form of the joints of the back-bone, and in some minor\nparticulars, between the crocodiles of the present epoch and those which\nlived before the chalk; but, in the cretaceous epoch, as I have already\nmentioned, the crocodiles had assumed the modern type of structure.\nNotwithstanding this, the crocodiles of the chalk are not identically\nthe same as those which lived in the times called \"older tertiary,\"\nwhich succeeded the cretaceous epoch; and the crocodiles of the older\ntertiaries are not identical with those of the newer tertiaries, nor are\nthese identical with existing forms. I leave open the question whether\nparticular species may have lived on from epoch to epoch. But each epoch\nhas had its peculiar crocodiles; though all, since the chalk, have\nbelonged to the modern type, and differ simply in their proportions, and\nin such structural particulars as are discernible only to trained eyes.\n\nHow is the existence of this long succession of different species of\ncrocodiles to be accounted for?\n\nOnly two suppositions seem to be open to us--Either each species of\ncrocodile has been specially created, or it has arisen out of some\npre-existing form by the operation of natural causes.\n\nChoose your hypothesis; I have chosen mine. I can find no warranty for\nbelieving in the distinct creation of a score of successive species of\ncrocodiles in the course of countless ages of time. Science gives no\ncountenance to such a wild fancy; nor can even the perverse ingenuity of\na commentator pretend to discover this sense, in the simple words in\nwhich the writer of Genesis records the proceedings of the fifth and\nsixth days of the Creation.\n\nOn the other hand, I see no good reason for doubting the necessary\nalternative, that all these varied species have been evolved from\npre-existing crocodilian forms, by the operation of causes as completely\na part of the common order of nature, as those which have effected the\nchanges of the inorganic world.\n\nFew will venture to affirm that the reasoning which applies to\ncrocodiles loses its force among other animals, or among plants. If one\nseries of species has come into existence by the operation of natural\ncauses, it seems folly to deny that all may have arisen in the same way.\n\n\nA small beginning has led us to a great ending. If I were to put the bit\nof chalk with which we started into the hot but obscure flame of burning\nhydrogen, it would presently shine like the sun. It seems to me that\nthis physical metamorphosis is no false image of what has been the\nresult of our subjecting it to a jet of fervent, though nowise\nbrilliant, thought to-night. It has become luminous, and its clear rays,\npenetrating the abyss of the remote past, have brought within our ken\nsome stages of the evolution of the earth. And in the shifting \"without\nhaste, but without rest\" of the land and sea, as in the endless\nvariation of the forms assumed by living beings, we have observed\nnothing but the natural product of the forces originally possessed by\nthe substance of the universe.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[29] See Appendix to Captain Dayman's \"Deep Sea Soundings in the North\nAtlantic Ocean, between Ireland and Newfoundland, made in H.M.S.\n_Cyclops_. Published by order of the Lords Commissioners of the\nAdmiralty, 1858.\" They have since formed the subject of an elaborate\nMemoir by Messrs. Parker and Jones, published in the _Philosophical\nTransactions_ for 1865.\n\n[30] During the cruise of H.M.S. _Bull-dog_, commanded by Sir Leopold\nM'Clintock, in 1860, living star-fish were brought up, clinging to the\nlowest part of the sounding-line, from a depth of 1,260 fathoms, midway\nbetween Cape Farewell, in Greenland, and the Rockall banks. Dr. Wallich\nascertained that the sea-bottom at this point consisted of the ordinary\n_Globigerina_ ooze, and that the stomachs of the star-fishes were full\nof _Globigerinae_. This discovery removes all objections to the existence\nof living _Globigerinae_ at great depths, which are based upon the\nsupposed difficulty of maintaining animal life under such conditions;\nand it throws the burden of proof upon those who object to the\nsupposition that the _Globigerinae_ live and die where they are found.\n\n[31] I have recently traced out the development of the \"coccoliths\" from\na diameter of 1/7000th of an inch up to their largest size (which is\nabout 1/1600th), and no longer doubt that they are produced by\nindependent organisms, which, like the _Globigerinae_, live and die at\nthe bottom of the sea.\n\n[32] \"Elements of Geology,\" by Sir Charles Lyell, Bart. F.R.S., p. 23.\n\n\n\n\nX.\n\nGEOLOGICAL CONTEMPORANEITY AND PERSISTENT TYPES OF LIFE.\n\n\nMerchants occasionally go through a wholesome, though troublesome and\nnot always satisfactory, process which they term \"taking stock.\" After\nall the excitement of speculation, the pleasure of gain, and the pain of\nloss, the trader makes up his mind to face facts and to learn the exact\nquantity and quality of his solid and reliable possessions.\n\nThe man of science does well sometimes to imitate this procedure; and,\nforgetting for the time the importance of his own small winnings, to\nre-examine the common stock in trade, so that he may make sure how far\nthe stock of bullion in the cellar--on the faith of whose existence so\nmuch paper has been circulating--is really the solid gold of truth.\n\nThe Anniversary Meeting of the Geological Society seems to be an\noccasion well suited for an undertaking of this kind--for an inquiry, in\nfact, into the nature and value of the present results of\npalaeontological investigation; and the more so, as all those who have\npaid close attention to the late multitudinous discussions in which\npalaeontology is implicated, must have felt the urgent necessity of some\nsuch scrutiny.\n\n\nFirst in order, as the most definite and unquestionable of all the\nresults of palaeontology, must be mentioned the immense extension and\nimpulse given to botany, zoology, and comparative anatomy, by the\ninvestigation of fossil remains. Indeed, the mass of biological facts\nhas been so greatly increased, and the range of biological speculation\nhas been so vastly widened, by the researches of the geologist and\npalaeontologist, that it is to be feared there are naturalists in\nexistence who look upon geology as Brindley regarded rivers. \"Rivers,\"\nsaid the great engineer, \"were made to feed canals;\" and geology, some\nseem to think, was solely created to advance comparative anatomy.\n\nWere such a thought justifiable, it could hardly expect to be received\nwith favour by this assembly. But it is not justifiable. Your favourite\nscience has her own great aims independent of all others; and if,\nnotwithstanding her steady devotion to her own progress, she can scatter\nsuch rich alms among her sisters, it should be remembered that her\ncharity is of the sort that does not impoverish, but \"blesseth him that\ngives and him that takes.\"\n\nRegard the matter as we will, however, the facts remain. Nearly 40,000\nspecies of animals and plants have been added to the Systema Naturae by\npalaeontological research. This is a living population equivalent to that\nof a new continent in mere number; equivalent to that of a new\nhemisphere, if we take into account the small population of insects as\nyet found fossil, and the large proportion and peculiar organization of\nmany of the Vertebrata.\n\nBut, beyond this, it is perhaps not too much to say that, except for the\nnecessity of interpreting palaeontological facts, the laws of\ndistribution would have received less careful study; while few\ncomparative anatomists (and those not of the first order) would have\nbeen induced by mere love of detail, as such, to study the minutiae of\nosteology, were it not that in such minutiae lie the only keys to the\nmost interesting riddles offered by the extinct animal world.\n\nThese assuredly are great and solid gains. Surely it is matter for no\nsmall congratulation that in half a century (for palaeontology, though it\ndawned earlier, came into full day only with Cuvier) a subordinate\nbranch of biology should have doubled the value and the interest of the\nwhole group of sciences to which it belongs.\n\nBut this is not all. Allied with geology, palaeontology has established\ntwo laws of inestimable importance: the first, that one and the same\narea of the earth's surface has been successively occupied by very\ndifferent kinds of living beings; the second, that the order of\nsuccession established in one locality holds good, approximately, in\nall.\n\nThe first of these laws is universal and irreversible; the second is an\ninduction from a vast number of observations, though it may possibly,\nand even probably, have to admit of exceptions. As a consequence of the\nsecond law, it follows that a peculiar relation frequently subsists\nbetween series of strata, containing organic remains, in different\nlocalities. The series resemble one another, not only in virtue of a\ngeneral resemblance of the organic remains in the two, but also in\nvirtue of a resemblance in the order and character of the serial\nsuccession in each. There is a resemblance of arrangement; so that the\nseparate terms of each series, as well as the whole series, exhibit a\ncorrespondence.\n\nSuccession implies time; the lower members of a series of sedimentary\nrocks are certainly older than the upper; and when the notion of age was\nonce introduced as the equivalent of succession, it was no wonder that\ncorrespondence in succession came to be looked upon as correspondence in\nage, or \"contemporaneity.\" And, indeed, so long as relative age only is\nspoken of, correspondence in succession _is_ correspondence in age; it\nis _relative_ contemporaneity.\n\n\nBut it would have been very much better for geology if so loose and\nambiguous a word as \"contemporaneous\" had been excluded from her\nterminology, and if, in its stead, some term expressing similarity of\nserial relation, and excluding the notion of time altogether, had been\nemployed to denote correspondence in position in two or more series of\nstrata.\n\nIn anatomy, where such correspondence of position has constantly to be\nspoken of, it is denoted by the word \"homology\" and its derivatives; and\nfor Geology (which after all is only the anatomy and physiology of the\nearth) it might be well to invent some single word, such as \"homotaxis\"\n(similarity of order), in order to express an essentially similar idea.\nThis, however, has not been done, and most probably the inquiry will at\nonce be made--To what end burden science with a new and strange term in\nplace of one old, familiar, and part of our common language?\n\nThe reply to this question will become obvious as the inquiry into the\nresults of palaeontology is pushed further.\n\nThose whose business it is to acquaint themselves specially with the\nworks of palaeontologists, in fact, will be fully aware that very few, if\nany, would rest satisfied with such a statement of the conclusions of\ntheir branch of biology as that which has just been given.\n\nOur standard repertories of palaeontology profess to teach us far higher\nthings--to disclose the entire succession of living forms upon the\nsurface of the globe; to tell us of a wholly different distribution of\nclimatic conditions in ancient times; to reveal the character of the\nfirst of all living existences; and to trace out the law of progress\nfrom them to us.\n\nIt may not be unprofitable to bestow on these professions a somewhat\nmore critical examination than they have hitherto received, in order to\nascertain how far they rest on an irrefragable basis; or whether, after\nall, it might not be well for palaeontologists to learn a little more\ncarefully that scientific \"ars artium,\" the art of saying \"I don't\nknow.\" And to this end let us define somewhat more exactly the extent of\nthese pretensions of palaeontology.\n\nEvery one is aware that Professor Bronn's \"Untersuchungen\" and Professor\nPictet's \"Traite de Paleontologie\" are works of standard authority,\nfamiliarly consulted by every working palaeontologist. It is desirable to\nspeak of these excellent books, and of their distinguished authors,\nwith the utmost respect, and in a tone as far as possible removed from\ncarping criticism; indeed, if they are specially cited in this place, it\nis merely in justification of the assertion that the following\npropositions, which may be found implicitly, or explicitly, in the works\nin question, are regarded by the mass of palaeontologists and geologists,\nnot only on the Continent but in this country, as expressing some of the\nbest-established results of palaeontology. Thus:--\n\nAnimals and plants began their existence together, not long after the\ncommencement of the deposition of the sedimentary rocks; and then\nsucceeded one another, in such a manner, that totally distinct faunas\nand florae occupied the whole surface of the earth, one after the other,\nand during distinct epochs of time.\n\nA geological formation is the sum of all the strata deposited over the\nwhole surface of the earth during one of these epochs: a geological\nfauna or flora is the sum of all the species of animals or plants which\noccupied the whole surface of the globe, during one of these epochs.\n\nThe population of the earth's surface was at first very similar in all\nparts, and only from the middle of the Tertiary epoch onwards, began to\nshow a distinct distribution in zones.\n\nThe constitution of the original population, as well as the numerical\nproportions of its members, indicates a warmer and, on the whole,\nsomewhat tropical climate, which remained tolerably equable throughout\nthe year. The subsequent distribution of living beings in zones is the\nresult of a gradual lowering of the general temperature, which first\nbegan to be felt at the poles.\n\n\nIt is not now proposed to inquire whether these doctrines are true or\nfalse; but to direct your attention to a much simpler though very\nessential preliminary question--What is their logical basis? what are\nthe fundamental assumptions upon which they all logically depend? and\nwhat is the evidence on which those fundamental propositions demand our\nassent?\n\nThese assumptions are two: the first, that the commencement of the\ngeological record is coeval with the commencement of life on the globe;\nthe second, that geological contemporaneity is the same thing as\nchronological synchrony. Without the first of these assumptions there\nwould of course be no ground for any statement respecting the\ncommencement of life; without the second, all the other statements\ncited, every one of which implies a knowledge of the state of different\nparts of the earth at one and the same time, will be no less devoid of\ndemonstration.\n\nThe first assumption obviously rests entirely on negative evidence. This\nis, of course, the only evidence that ever can be available to prove the\ncommencement of any series of phaenomena; but, at the same time, it must\nbe recollected that the value of negative evidence depends entirely on\nthe amount of positive corroboration it receives. If A.B. wishes to\nprove an _alibi_, it is of no use for him to get a thousand witnesses\nsimply to swear that they did not see him in such and such a place,\nunless the witnesses are prepared to prove that they must have seen him\nhad he been there. But the evidence that animal life commenced with the\nLingula-flags, _e.g._, would seem to be exactly of this unsatisfactory\nuncorroborated sort. The Cambrian witnesses simply swear they \"haven't\nseen anybody their way;\" upon which the counsel for the other side\nimmediately puts in ten or twelve thousand feet of Devonian sandstones\nto make oath they never saw a fish or a mollusk, though all the world\nknows there were plenty in their time.\n\nBut then it is urged that, though the Devonian rocks in one part of the\nworld exhibit no fossils, in another they do, while the lower Cambrian\nrocks nowhere exhibit fossils, and hence no living being could have\nexisted in their epoch.\n\nTo this there are two replies: the first, that the observational basis\nof the assertion that the lowest rocks are nowhere fossiliferous is an\namazingly small one, seeing how very small an area, in comparison to\nthat of the whole world, has yet been fully searched; the second, that\nthe argument is good for nothing unless the unfossiliferous rocks in\nquestion were not only _contemporaneous_ in the geological sense, but\n_synchronous_ in the chronological sense. To use the _alibi_\nillustration again. If a man wishes to prove he was in neither of two\nplaces, A and B, on a given day, his witnesses for each place must be\nprepared to answer for the whole day. If they can only prove that he was\nnot at A in the morning, and not at B in the afternoon, the evidence of\nhis absence from both is _nil_, because he might have been at B in the\nmorning and at A in the afternoon.\n\nThus everything depends upon the validity of the second assumption. And\nwe must proceed to inquire what is the real meaning of the word\n\"contemporaneous\" as employed by geologists. To this end a concrete\nexample may be taken.\n\nThe Lias of England and the Lias of Germany, the Cretaceous rocks of\nBritain and the Cretaceous rocks of Southern India, are termed by\ngeologists \"contemporaneous\" formations; but whenever any thoughtful\ngeologist is asked whether he means to say that they were deposited\nsynchronously, he says, \"No,--only within the same great epoch.\" And if,\nin pursuing the inquiry, he is asked what may be the approximate value\nin time of a \"great epoch\"--whether it means a hundred years, or a\nthousand, or a million, or ten million years--his reply is, \"I cannot\ntell.\"\n\nIf the further question be put, whether physical geology is in\npossession of any method by which the actual synchrony (or the reverse)\nof any two distant deposits can be ascertained, no such method can be\nheard of; it being admitted by all the best authorities that neither\nsimilarity of mineral composition, nor of physical character, nor even\ndirect continuity of stratum, are _absolute_ proofs of the synchronism\nof even approximated sedimentary strata: while, for distant deposits,\nthere seems to be no kind of physical evidence attainable of a nature\ncompetent to decide whether such deposits were formed simultaneously, or\nwhether they possess any given difference of antiquity. To return to an\nexample already given. All competent authorities will probably assent to\nthe proposition that physical geology does not enable us in any way to\nreply to this question--Were the British Cretaceous rocks deposited at\nthe same time as those of India, or are they a million of years younger\nor a million of years older?\n\nIs palaeontology able to succeed where physical geology fails? Standard\nwriters on palaeontology, as has been seen, assume that she can. They\ntake it for granted, that deposits containing similar organic remains\nare synchronous--at any rate in a broad sense; and yet, those who will\nstudy the eleventh and twelfth chapters of Sir Henry De la Beche's\nremarkable \"Researches in Theoretical Geology,\" published now nearly\nthirty years ago, and will carry out the arguments there most luminously\nstated, to their logical consequences, may very easily convince\nthemselves that even absolute identity of organic contents is no proof\nof the synchrony of deposits, while absolute diversity is no proof of\ndifference of date. Sir Henry De la Beche goes even further, and adduces\nconclusive evidence to show that the different parts of one and the same\nstratum, having a similar composition throughout, containing the same\norganic remains, and having similar beds above and below it, may yet\ndiffer to any conceivable extent in age.\n\nEdward Forbes was in the habit of asserting that the similarity of the\norganic contents of distant formations was _prima facie_ evidence, not\nof their similarity, but of their difference of age; and holding as he\ndid the doctrine of single specific centres, the conclusion was as\nlegitimate as any other; for the two districts must have been occupied\nby migration from one of the two, or from an intermediate spot, and the\nchances against exact coincidence of migration and of imbedding are\ninfinite.\n\nIn point of fact, however, whether the hypothesis of single or of\nmultiple specific centres be adopted, similarity of organic contents\ncannot possibly afford any proof of the synchrony of the deposits which\ncontain them; on the contrary, it is demonstrably compatible with the\nlapse of the most prodigious intervals of time, and with interposition\nof vast changes in the organic and inorganic worlds, between the epochs\nin which such deposits were formed.\n\nOn what amount of similarity of their faunae is the doctrine of the\ncontemporaneity of the European and of the North American Silurians\nbased? In the last edition of Sir Charles Lyell's \"Elementary Geology\"\nit is stated, on the authority of a former President of this Society,\nthe late Daniel Sharpe, that between 30 and 40 per cent. of the species\nof Silurian Mollusca are common to both sides of the Atlantic. By way of\ndue allowance for further discovery, let us double the lesser number and\nsuppose that 60 per cent. of the species are common to the North\nAmerican and the British Silurians. Sixty per cent. of species in common\nis, then, proof of contemporaneity.\n\nNow suppose that, a million or two of years hence, when Britain has made\nanother dip beneath the sea and has come up again, some geologist\napplies this doctrine, in comparing the strata laid bare by the upheaval\nof the bottom, say, of St. George's Channel with what may then remain of\nthe Suffolk Crag. Reasoning in the same way, he will at once decide the\nSuffolk Crag and the St. George's Channel beds to be contemporaneous;\nalthough we happen to know that a vast period (even in the geological\nsense) of time, and physical changes of almost unprecedented extent,\nseparate the two.\n\nBut if it be a demonstrable fact that strata containing more than 60 or\n70 per cent. of species of Mollusca in common, and comparatively close\ntogether, may yet be separated by an amount of geological time\nsufficient to allow of some of the greatest physical changes the world\nhas seen, what becomes of that sort of contemporaneity the sole evidence\nof which is a similarity of facies, or the identity of half a dozen\nspecies, or of a good many genera?\n\nAnd yet there is no better evidence for the contemporaneity assumed by\nall who adopt the hypotheses of universal faunae and florae, of a\nuniversally uniform climate, and of a sensible cooling of the globe\nduring geological time.\n\nThere seems, then, no escape from the admission that neither physical\ngeology, nor palaeontology, possesses any method by which the absolute\nsynchronism of two strata can be demonstrated. All that geology can\nprove is local order of succession. It is mathematically certain that,\nin any given vertical linear section of an undisturbed series of\nsedimentary deposits, the bed which lies lowest is the oldest. In any\nother vertical linear section of the same series, of course,\ncorresponding beds will occur in a similar order; but, however great may\nbe the probability, no man can say with absolute certainty that the beds\nin the two sections were synchronously deposited. For areas of moderate\nextent, it is doubtless true that no practical evil is likely to result\nfrom assuming the corresponding beds to be synchronous or strictly\ncontemporaneous; and there are multitudes of accessory circumstances\nwhich may fully justify the assumption of such synchrony. But the moment\nthe geologist has to deal with large areas, or with completely separated\ndeposits, the mischief of confounding that \"homotaxis\" or \"similarity of\narrangement,\" which _can_ be demonstrated, with \"synchrony\" or \"identity\nof date,\" for which there is not a shadow of proof, under the one common\nterm of \"contemporaneity\" becomes incalculable, and proves the constant\nsource of gratuitous speculations.\n\nFor anything that geology or palaeontology are able to show to the\ncontrary, a Devonian fauna and flora in the British Islands may have\nbeen contemporaneous with Silurian life in North America, and with a\nCarboniferous fauna and flora in Africa. Geographical provinces and\nzones may have been as distinctly marked in the Palaeozoic epoch as at\npresent, and those seemingly sudden appearances of new genera and\nspecies, which we ascribe to new creation, may be simple results of\nmigration.\n\nIt may be so; it may be otherwise. In the present condition of our\nknowledge and of our methods, one verdict--\"not proven, and not\nproveable\"--must be recorded against all the grand hypotheses of the\npalaeontologist respecting the general succession of life on the globe.\nThe order and nature of terrestrial life, as a whole, are open\nquestions. Geology at present provides us with most valuable\ntopographical records, but she has not the means of working them up into\na universal history. Is such a universal history, then, to be regarded\nas unattainable? Are all the grandest and most interesting problems\nwhich offer themselves to the geological student essentially insoluble?\nIs he in the position of a scientific Tantalus--doomed always to thirst\nfor a knowledge which he cannot obtain? The reverse is to be hoped; nay,\nit may not be impossible to indicate the source whence help will come.\n\nIn commencing these remarks, mention was made of the great obligations\nunder which the naturalist lies to the geologist and palaeontologist.\nAssuredly the time will come when these obligations will be repaid\ntenfold, and when the maze of the world's past history, through which\nthe pure geologist and the pure palaeontologist find no guidance, will be\nsecurely threaded by the clue furnished by the naturalist.\n\nAll who are competent to express an opinion on the subject are, at\npresent, agreed that the manifold varieties of animal and vegetable form\nhave not either come into existence by chance, nor result from\ncapricious exertions of creative power; but that they have taken place\nin a definite order, the statement of which order is what men of science\nterm a natural law. Whether such a law is to be regarded as an\nexpression of the mode of operation of natural forces, or whether it is\nsimply a statement of the manner in which a supernatural power has\nthought fit to act, is a secondary question, so long as the existence of\nthe law and the possibility of its discovery by the human intellect are\ngranted. But he must be a half-hearted philosopher who, believing in\nthat possibility, and having watched the gigantic strides of the\nbiological sciences during the last twenty years, doubts that science\nwill sooner or later make this further step, so as to become possessed\nof the law of evolution of organic forms--of the unvarying order of that\ngreat chain of causes and effects of which all organic forms, ancient\nand modern, are the links. And then, if ever, we shall be able to begin\nto discuss, with profit, the questions respecting the commencement of\nlife, and the nature of the successive populations of the globe, which\nso many seem to think are already answered.\n\n\nThe preceding arguments make no particular claim to novelty; indeed they\nhave been floating more or less distinctly before the minds of\ngeologists for the last thirty years; and if, at the present time, it\nhas seemed desirable to give them more definite and systematic\nexpression, it is because palaeontology is every day assuming a greater\nimportance, and now requires to rest on a basis the firmness of which is\nthoroughly well assured. Among its fundamental conceptions, there must\nbe no confusion between what is certain and what is more or less\nprobable.[33] But, pending the construction of a surer foundation than\npalaeontology now possesses, it may be instructive, assuming for the\nnonce the general correctness of the ordinary hypothesis of geological\ncontemporaneity, to consider whether the deductions which are ordinarily\ndrawn from the whole body of palaeontological facts are justifiable.\n\nThe evidence on which such conclusions are based is of two kinds,\nnegative and positive. The value of negative evidence, in connexion with\nthis inquiry, has been so fully and clearly discussed in an address from\nthe chair of this Society,[34] which none of us have forgotten, that\nnothing need at present be said about it; the more, as the\nconsiderations which have been laid before you have certainly not tended\nto increase your estimation of such evidence. It will be preferable to\nturn to the positive facts of palaeontology, and to inquire what they\ntell us.\n\nWe are all accustomed to speak of the number and the extent of the\nchanges in the living population of the globe during geological time as\nsomething enormous; and indeed they are so, if we regard only the\nnegative differences which separate the older rocks from the more\nmodern, and if we look upon specific and generic changes as great\nchanges, which from one point of view they truly are. But leaving the\nnegative differences out of consideration, and looking only at the\npositive data furnished by the fossil world from a broader point of\nview--from that of the comparative anatomist who has made the study of\nthe greater modifications of animal form his chief business--a surprise\nof another kind dawns upon the mind; and under _this_ aspect the\nsmallness of the total change becomes as astonishing as was its\ngreatness under the other.\n\nThere are two hundred known orders of plants; of these not one is\ncertainly known to exist exclusively in the fossil state. The whole\nlapse of geological time has as yet yielded not a single new ordinal\ntype of vegetable structure.[35]\n\nThe positive change in passing from the recent to the ancient animal\nworld is greater, but still singularly small. No fossil animal is so\ndistinct from those now living as to require to be arranged even in a\nseparate class from those which, contain existing forms. It is only\nwhen we come to the orders, which may be roughly estimated at about a\nhundred and thirty, that we meet with fossil animals so distinct from\nthose now living as to require orders for themselves; and these do not\namount, on the most liberal estimate, to more than about 10 per cent, of\nthe whole.\n\nThere is no certainly known extinct order of Protozoa; there is but one\namong the C\u00falenterata--that of the rugose corals; there is none among\nthe Mollusca; there are three, the Cystidea, Blastoidea, and\nEdrioasterida, among the Echinoderms; and two, the Trilobita and\nEurypterida, among the Crustacea; making altogether five for the great\nsub-kingdom of Annulosa. Among Vertebrates there is no ordinally\ndistinct fossil fish: there is only one extinct order of Amphibia--the\nLabyrinthodonts; but there are at least four distinct orders of\nReptilia, viz. the Ichthyosauria, Plesiosauria, Pterosauria, Dinosauria,\nand perhaps another or two. There is no known extinct order of Birds,\nand no certainly known extinct order of Mammals, the ordinal\ndistinctness of the \"Toxodontia\" being doubtful.\n\nThe objection that broad statements of this kind, after all, rest\nlargely on negative evidence is obvious, but it has less force than may\nat first be supposed; for, as might be expected from the circumstances\nof the case, we possess more abundant positive evidence regarding Fishes\nand marine Mollusks than respecting any other forms of animal life; and\nyet these offer us, through the whole range of geological time, no\nspecies ordinarily distinct from those now living; while the far less\nnumerous class of Echinoderms presents three, and the Crustacea two,\nsuch orders, though none of these come down later than the Palaeozoic\nage. Lastly, the Reptilia present the extraordinary and exceptional\nphaenomenon of as many extinct as existing orders, if not more; the four\nmentioned maintaining their existence from the Lias to the Chalk\ninclusive.\n\nSome years ago one of your Secretaries pointed out another kind of\npositive palaeontological evidence tending towards the same\nconclusion--afforded by the existence of what he termed \"persistent\ntypes\" of vegetable and of animal life.[36] He stated, on the authority\nof Dr. Hooker, that there are Carboniferous plants which appear to be\ngenerically identical with some now living; that the cone of the Oolitic\n_Araucaria_ is hardly distinguishable from that of an existing species;\nthat a true _Pinus_ appears in the Purbecks and a _Juglans_ in the\nChalk; while, from the Bagshot Sands, a _Banksia_, the wood of which is\nnot distinguishable from that of species now living in Australia, had\nbeen obtained.\n\nTurning to the animal kingdom, he affirmed the tabulate corals of the\nSilurian rocks to be wonderfully like those which now exist; while even\nthe families of the Aporosa were all represented in the older Mesozoic\nrocks.\n\nAmong the Mollusca similar facts were adduced. Let it be borne in mind\nthat _Avicula_, _Mytilus_, _Chiton_, _Natica_, _Patella_, _Trochus_,\n_Discina_, _Orbicula_, _Lingula_, _Rhynchonella_, and _Nautilus_, all of\nwhich are existing _genera_, are given without a doubt as Silurian in\nthe last edition of \"Siluria;\" while the highest forms of the highest\nCephalopods are represented in the Lias by a genus, _Belemnoteuthis_,\nwhich presents the closest relation to the existing _Loligo_.\n\nThe two highest groups of the Annulosa, the Insecta and the Arachnida,\nare represented in the Coal, either by existing genera, or by forms\ndiffering from existing genera in quite minor peculiarities.\n\nTurning to the Vertebrata, the only palaeozoic Elasmobranch Fish of which\nwe have any complete knowledge is the Devonian and Carboniferous\n_Pleuracanthus_, which differs no more from existing Sharks than these\ndo from one another.\n\nAgain, vast as is the number of undoubtedly Ganoid fossil Fishes, and\ngreat as is their range in time, a large mass of evidence has recently\nbeen adduced to show that almost all those respecting which we possess\nsufficient information, are referable to the same sub-ordinal groups as\nthe existing _Lepidosteus_, _Polypterus_, and Sturgeon; and that a\nsingular relation obtains between the older and the younger Fishes; the\nformer, the Devonian Ganoids, being almost all members of the same\nsub-order as _Polypterus_, while the Mesozoic Ganoids are almost all\nsimilarly allied to _Lepidosteus_.[37]\n\nAgain, what can be more remarkable than the singular constancy of\nstructure preserved throughout a vast period of time by the family of\nthe Pycnodonts and by that of the true Coelacanths: the former\npersisting, with but insignificant modifications, from the Carboniferous\nto the Tertiary rocks, inclusive; the latter existing, with still less\nchange, from the Carboniferous rocks to the Chalk, inclusive?\n\nAmong Reptiles, the highest living group, that of the Crocodilia, is\nrepresented, at the early part of the Mesozoic epoch, by species\nidentical in the essential characters of their organization with those\nnow living, and differing from the latter only in such matters as the\nform of the articular facets of the vertebral centra, in the extent to\nwhich the nasal passages are separated from the cavity of the mouth by\nbone, and in the proportions of the limbs.\n\nAnd even as regards the Mammalia, the scanty remains of Triassic and\nOolitic species afford no foundation for the supposition that the\norganization of the oldest forms differed nearly so much from some of\nthose which now live as these differ from one another.\n\nIt is needless to multiply these instances; enough has been said to\njustify the statement that, in view of the immense diversity of known\nanimal and vegetable forms, and the enormous lapse of time indicated by\nthe accumulation of fossiliferous strata, the only circumstance to be\nwondered at is, not that the changes of life, as exhibited by positive\nevidence, have been so great, but that they have been so small.\n\n\nBe they great or small, however, it is desirable to attempt to estimate\nthem. Let us, therefore, take each great division of the animal world in\nsuccession, and, whenever an order or a family can be shown to have had\na prolonged existence, let us endeavour to ascertain how far the later\nmembers of the group differ from the earlier ones. If these later\nmembers, in all or in many cases, exhibit a certain amount of\nmodification, the fact is so far, evidence in favour of a general law of\nchange; and, in a rough way, the rapidity of that change will be\nmeasured by the demonstrable amount of modification. On the other hand,\nit must be recollected that the absence of any modification, while it\nmay leave the doctrine of the existence of a law of change without\npositive support, cannot possibly disprove all forms of that doctrine,\nthough it may afford a sufficient refutation of many of them.\n\nThe PROTOZOA.--The Protozoa are represented throughout the\nwhole range of geological series, from the Lower Silurian formation to\nthe present day. The most ancient forms recently made known by Ehrenberg\nare exceedingly like those which now exist: no one has ever pretended\nthat the difference between any ancient and any modern Foraminifera is\nof more than generic value; nor are the oldest Foraminifera either\nsimpler, more embryonic, or less differentiated, than the existing\nforms.\n\nThe C\u0106LENTERATA.--The Tabulate Corals have existed from the\nSilurian epoch to the present day, but I am not aware that the ancient\n_Heliolites_ possesses a single mark of a more embryonic or less\ndifferentiated character, or less high organization, than the existing\n_Heliopora_. As for the Aporose Corals, in what respect is the Silurian\n_Paloeocydus_ less highly organized or more embryonic than the modern\n_Fungia_, or the Liassic Aporosa than the existing members of the same\nfamilies?\n\nThe _Mollusca_.--In what sense is the living _Waldheimia_ less\nembryonic, or more specialized, than the palaeozoic _Spirifer_; or the\nexisting _Rhynchonellae_, _Craniae_, _Discinae_, _Lingulae_, than the\nSilurian species of the same genera? In what sense can _Loligo_ or\n_Spirula_ be said to be more specialized, or less embryonic, than\n_Belemnites_; or the modern species of Lamellibranch and Gasteropod\ngenera, than the Silurian species of the same genera?\n\nThe ANNULOSA.--The Carboniferous Insecta and Arachnida are\nneither less specialized, nor more embryonic, than those that now live,\nnor are the Liassic Cirripedia and Macrura; while several of the\nBrachyura, which appear in the Chalk, belong to existing genera; and\nnone exhibit either an intermediate, or an embryonic, character.\n\nThe VERTEBRATA.--Among fishes I have referred to the\nCoelacanthini (comprising the genera _Coelacanthus_, _Holophagus_,\n_Undina_, and _Macropoma_) as affording an example of a persistent type;\nand it is most remarkable to note the smallness of the differences\nbetween any of these fishes (affecting at most the proportions of the\nbody and fins, and the character and sculpture of the scales),\nnotwithstanding their enormous range in time. In all the essentials of\nits very peculiar structure, the _Macropoma_ of the Chalk is identical\nwith the _Coelacanthus_ of the Coal. Look at the genus _Lepidotus_,\nagain, persisting without a modification of importance from the Liassic\nto the Eocene formations, inclusive.\n\nOr among the Teleostei--in what respect is the _Beryx_ of the Chalk more\nembryonic, or less differentiated, than _Beryx lineatus_ of King\nGeorge's Sound?\n\nOr to turn to the higher Vertebrata--in what sense are the Liassic\nChelonia inferior to those which now exist? How are the Cretaceous\nIchthyosauria, Plesiosauria, or Pterosauria less embryonic, or more\ndifferentiated, species than those of the Lias?\n\nOr lastly, in what circumstance is the _Phascolotherium_ more embryonic,\nor of a more generalized type, than the modern Opossum; or a\n_Lophiodon_, or a _Palaeotherium_, than a modern _Tapirus_ or _Hyrax_?\n\nThese examples might be almost indefinitely multiplied, but surely they\nare sufficient to prove that the only safe and unquestionable testimony\nwe can procure--positive evidence--fails to demonstrate any sort of\nprogressive modification towards a less embryonic, or less generalized,\ntype in a great many groups of animals of long-continued geological\nexistence. In these groups there is abundant evidence of variation--none\nof what is ordinarily understood as progression; and, if the known\ngeological record is to be regarded as even any considerable fragment of\nthe whole, it is inconceivable that any theory of a necessarily\nprogressive development can stand, for the numerous orders and families\ncited afford no trace of such a process.\n\nBut it is a most remarkable fact, that, while the groups which have been\nmentioned, and many besides, exhibit no sign of progressive\nmodification, there are others, coexisting with them, under the same\nconditions, in which more or less distinct indications of such a process\nseem to be traceable. Among such indications I may remind you of the\npredominance of Holostome Gasteropoda in the older rocks as compared\nwith that of Siphonostome Gasteropoda in the later. A case less open to\nthe objection of negative evidence, however, is that afforded by the\nTetrabranchiate Cephalopoda, the forms of the shells and of the septal\nsutures exhibiting a certain increase of complexity in the newer genera.\nHere, however, one is met at once with the occurrence of _Orthoceras_\nand _Baculites_ at the two ends of the series, and of the fact that one\nof the simplest genera, _Nautilus_, is that which now exists.\n\nThe Crinoidea, in the abundance of stalked forms in the ancient\nformations as compared with their present rarity, seem to present us\nwith a fair case of modification from a more embryonic towards a less\nembryonic condition. But then, on careful consideration of the facts,\nthe objection arises that the stalk, calyx, and arms of the palaeozoic\nCrinoid are exceedingly different from the corresponding organs of a\nlarval _Comatula_; and it might with perfect justice be argued that\n_Actinocrinus_ and _Eucalyptocrinus_, for example, depart to the full as\nwidely, in one direction, from the stalked embryo of _Comatula_, as\n_Comatula_ itself does in the other.\n\nThe Echinidea, again, are frequently quoted as exhibiting a gradual\npassage from a more generalized to a more specialized type, seeing that\nthe elongated, or oval, Spatangoids appear after the spheroidal\nEchinoids. But here it might be argued, on the other hand, that the\nspheroidal Echinoids, in reality, depart further from the general plan\nand from the embryonic form than the elongated Spatangoids do; and that\nthe peculiar dental apparatus and the pedicellariae of the former are\nmarks of at least as great differentiation as the petaloid ambulacra and\nsemitae of the latter.\n\nOnce more, the prevalence of Macrurous before Brachyurous Podophthalmia\nis, apparently, a fair piece of evidence in favour of progressive\nmodification in the same order of Crustacea; and yet the case will not\nstand much sifting, seeing that the Macrurous Podophthalmia depart as\nfar in one direction from the common type of Podophthalmia, or from any\nembryonic condition of the Brachyura, as the Brachyura do in the other;\nand that the middle terms between Macrura and Brachyura--the\nAnomura--are little better represented in the older Mesozoic rocks than\nthe Brachyura are.\n\nNone of the cases of progressive modification which are cited from among\nthe Invertebrata appear to me to have a foundation less open to\ncriticism than these; and if this be so, no careful reasoner would, I\nthink, be inclined to lay very great stress upon them. Among the\nVertebrata, however, there are a few examples which appear to be far\nless open to objection.\n\nIt is, in fact, true of several groups of Vertebrata which have lived\nthrough a considerable range of time, that the endoskeleton (more\nparticularly the spinal column) of the older genera presents a less\nossified, and, so far, less differentiated, condition than that of the\nyounger genera. Thus the Devonian Ganoids, though almost all members of\nthe same sub-order as _Polypterus,_ and presenting numerous important\nresemblances to the existing genus, which possesses biconcave vertebrae,\nare, for the most part, wholly devoid of ossified vertebral centra. The\nMesozoic Lepidosteidae, again, have, at most, biconcave vertebrae, while\nthe existing _Lepidosteus_ has Salamandroid, opisthocoelous, vertebrae.\nSo, none of the Palaeozoic Sharks have shown themselves to be possessed\nof ossified vertebrae, while the majority of modern Sharks possess such\nvertebrae. Again, the more ancient Crocodilia and Lacertilia have\nvertebrae with the articular facets of their centra flattened or\nbiconcave, while the modern members of the same group have them\nprocoelous. But the most remarkable examples of progressive\nmodification of the vertebral column, in correspondence with geological\nage, are those afforded by the Pycnodonts among fish, and the\nLabyrinthodonts among Amphibia.\n\nThe late able ichthyologist Heckel pointed out the fact, that, while the\nPycnodonts never possess true vertebral centra, they differ in the\ndegree of expansion and extension of the ends of the bony arches of the\nvertebrae upon the sheath of the notochord; the Carboniferous forms\nexhibiting hardly any such expansion, while the Mesozoic genera present\na greater and greater development, until, in the Tertiary forms, the\nexpanded ends become suturally united so as to form a sort of false\nvertebra. Hermann von Meyer, again, to whose luminous researches we are\nindebted for our present large knowledge of the organization of the\nolder Labyrinthodonts, has proved that the Carboniferous _Archegosaurus_\nhad very imperfectly developed vertebral centra, while the Triassic\n_Mastodonsaurus_ had the same parts completely ossified.[38]\n\nThe regularity and evenness of the dentition of the _Anoplotherium_, as\ncontrasted with that of existing Artiodactyles, and the assumed nearer\napproach of the dentition of certain ancient Carnivores to the typical\narrangement, have also been cited as exemplifications of a law of\nprogressive development, but I know of no other cases based on positive\nevidence which are worthy of particular notice.\n\nWhat then does an impartial survey of the positively ascertained truths\nof palaeontology testify in relation to the common doctrines of\nprogressive modification, which suppose that modification to have taken\nplace by a necessary progress from more to less embryonic forms, or from\nmore to less generalized types, within the limits of the period\nrepresented by the fossiliferous rocks?\n\nIt negatives those doctrines; for it either shows us no evidence of any\nsuch modification, or demonstrates it to have been very slight; and as\nto the nature of that modification, it yields no evidence whatsoever\nthat the earlier members of any long-continued group were more\ngeneralized in structure than the later ones. To a certain extent,\nindeed, it may be said that imperfect ossification of the vertebral\ncolumn is an embryonic character; but, on the other hand, it would be\nextremely incorrect to suppose that the vertebral columns of the older\nVertebrata are in any sense embryonic in their whole structure.\n\nObviously, if the earliest fossiliferous rocks now known are coeval with\nthe commencement of life, and if their contents give us any just\nconception of the nature and the extent of the earliest fauna and flora,\nthe insignificant amount of modification which can be demonstrated to\nhave taken place in any one group of animals, or plants, is quite\nincompatible with the hypothesis that all living forms are the results\nof a necessary process of progressive development, entirely comprised\nwithin the time represented by the fossiliferous rocks.\n\nContrariwise, any admissible hypothesis of progressive modification\nmust be compatible with persistence without progression, through\nindefinite periods. And should such an hypothesis eventually be proved\nto be true, in the only way in which it can be demonstrated, viz. by\nobservation and experiment upon the existing forms of life, the\nconclusion will inevitably present itself, that the Palaeozoic, Mesozoic,\nand Cainozoic faunae and florae, taken together, bear somewhat the same\nproportion to the whole series of living beings which have occupied this\nglobe, as the existing fauna and flora do to them.\n\nSuch are the results of palaeontology as they appear, and have for some\nyears appeared, to the mind of an inquirer who regards that study simply\nas one of the applications of the great biological sciences, and who\ndesires to see it placed upon the same sound basis as other branches of\nphysical inquiry. If the arguments which have been brought forward are\nvalid, probably no one, in view of the present state of opinion, will be\ninclined to think the time wasted which has been spent upon their\nelaboration.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[33] \"Le plus grand service qu'on puisse rendre a la science est d'y\nfaire place nette avant d'y rien construire.\"--CUVIER.\n\n[34] Anniversary Address for 1851, Quart. Journ. Geol. Soc. vol. vii.\n\n[35] See Hooker's \"Introductory Essay to the Flora of Tasmania,\" p.\nxxiii.\n\n[36] See the abstract of a Lecture \"On the Persistent Types of Animal\nLife\" in the \"Notices of the Meetings of the Royal Institution of Great\nBritain,\" June 3, 1859, vol. iii. p. 151.\n\n[37] \"Memoirs of the Geological Survey of the United Kingdom.--Decade x.\nPreliminary Essay upon the Systematic Arrangement of the Fishes of the\nDevonian Epoch.\"\n\n[38] As this Address is passing through the press (March 7, 1862),\nevidence lies before me of the existence of a new Labyrinthodont\n(_Pholidogaster_), from the Edinburgh coal-field, with well-ossified\nvertebral centra.\n\n\n\n\nXI.\n\nGEOLOGICAL REFORM.\n\n     \"A great reform in geological speculation seems now to have become\n     necessary.\"\n\n     \"It is quite certain that a great mistake has been made,--that\n     British popular geology at the present time is in direct opposition\n     to the principles of Natural Philosophy.\"[39]\n\n\nIn reviewing the course of geological thought during the past year, for\nthe purpose of discovering those matters to which I might most fitly\ndirect your attention in the Address which it now becomes my duty to\ndeliver from the Presidential Chair, the two somewhat alarming sentences\nwhich I have just read, and which occur in an able and interesting essay\nby an eminent natural philosopher, rose into such prominence before my\nmind that they eclipsed everything else.\n\nIt surely is a matter of paramount importance for the British geologists\n(some of them very popular geologists too) here in solemn annual session\nassembled, to inquire whether the severe judgment thus passed upon them,\nby so high an authority as Sir William Thomson is one to which they\nmust plead guilty _sans phrase_, or whether they are prepared to say\n\"not guilty,\" and appeal for a reversal of the sentence to that higher\ncourt of educated scientific opinion to which we are all amenable.\n\nAs your attorney-general for the time being, I thought I could not do\nbetter than get up the case with a view of advising you. It is true that\nthe charges brought forward by the other side involve the consideration\nof matters quite foreign to the pursuits with which I am ordinarily\noccupied; but, in that respect, I am only in the position which is, nine\ntimes out of ten, occupied by counsel, who nevertheless contrive to gain\ntheir causes, mainly by force of mother-wit and common sense, aided by\nsome training in other intellectual exercises.\n\nNerved by such precedents, I proceed to put my pleading before you.\n\nAnd the first question with which I propose to deal is, What is it to\nwhich Sir W. Thomson refers when he speaks of \"geological speculation\"\nand \"British popular geology\"?\n\nI find three, more or less contradictory, systems of geological thought,\neach of which might fairly enough claim these appellations, standing\nside by side in Britain. I shall call one of them CATASTROPHISM, another\nUNIFORMITARIANISM, the third EVOLUTIONISM; and I shall try briefly to\nsketch the characters of each, that you may say whether the\nclassification is, or is not, exhaustive.\n\nBy CATASTROPHISM, I mean any form of geological speculation\nwhich, in order to account for the phaenomena of geology, supposes the\noperation of forces different in their nature, or immeasurably different\nin power, from those which we at present see in action in the universe.\n\nThe Mosaic cosmogony is, in this sense, catastrophic, because it\nassumes the operation of extra-natural power. The doctrine of violent\nupheavals, _debacles_, and cataclysms in general, is catastrophic, so\nfar as it assumes that these were brought about by causes which have now\nno parallel. There was a time when catastrophism might, pre-eminently,\nhave claimed the title of \"British popular geology;\" and assuredly it\nhas yet many adherents, and reckons among its supporters some of the\nmost honoured members of this Society.\n\nBy UNIFORMITARIANISM, I mean especially, the teaching of Hutton\nand of Lyell.\n\nThat great, though incomplete work, \"The Theory of the Earth,\" seems to\nme to be one of the most remarkable contributions to geology which is\nrecorded in the annals of the science. So far as the not-living world is\nconcerned, uniformitarianism lies there, not only in germ, but in\nblossom and fruit.\n\nIf one asks how it is that Hutton was led to entertain views so far in\nadvance of those prevalent in his time, in some respects; while, in\nothers, they seem almost curiously limited, the answer appears to me to\nbe plain.\n\nHutton was in advance of the geological speculation of his time,\nbecause, in the first place, he had amassed a vast store of knowledge of\nthe facts of geology, gathered by personal observation in travels of\nconsiderable extent; and because, in the second place, he was thoroughly\ntrained in the physical and chemical science of his day, and thus\npossessed, as much as any one in his time could possess it, the\nknowledge which is requisite for the just interpretation of geological\nphaenomena, and the habit of thought which fits a man for scientific\ninquiry.\n\nIt is to this thorough scientific training, that I ascribe Hutton's\nsteady and persistent refusal to look to other causes than those now in\noperation, for the explanation of geological phaenomena.\n\nThus he writes:--\"I do not pretend, as he [M. de Luc] does in his\ntheory, to describe the beginning of things. I take things such as I\nfind them at present; and from these I reason with regard to that which\nmust have been.\"[40]\n\nAnd again:--\"A theory of the earth, which has for object truth, can have\nno retrospect to that which had preceded the present order of the world;\nfor this order alone is what we have to reason upon; and to reason\nwithout data is nothing but delusion. A theory, therefore, which is\nlimited to the actual constitution of this earth cannot be allowed to\nproceed one step beyond the present order of things.\"[41]\n\nAnd so clear is he, that no causes beside such as are now in operation\nare needed to account for the character and disposition of the\ncomponents of the crust of the earth, that he says, broadly and\nboldly:-- \"... There is no part of the earth which has not had the same\norigin, so far as this consists in that earth being collected at the\nbottom of the sea, and afterwards produced, as land, along with masses\nof melted substances, by the operation of mineral causes.\"[42]\n\nBut other influences were at work upon Hutton beside those of a mind\nlogical by Nature, and scientific by sound training; and the peculiar\nturn which his speculations took seems to me to be unintelligible,\nunless these be taken into account. The arguments of the French\nastronomers and mathematicians, which, at the end of the last century,\nwere held to demonstrate the existence of a compensating arrangement\namong the celestial bodies, whereby all perturbations eventually reduced\nthemselves to oscillations on each side of a mean position, and the\nstability of the solar system was secured, had evidently taken strong\nhold of Hutton's mind.\n\nIn those oddly constructed periods which seem to have prejudiced many\npersons against reading his works, but which are full of that peculiar,\nif unattractive, eloquence which flows from mastery of the subject,\nHutton says:--\n\n\"We have now got to the end of our reasoning; we have no data further to\nconclude immediately from that which actually is. But we have got\nenough; we have the satisfaction to find, that in Nature there is\nwisdom, system, and consistency. For having, in the natural history of\nthis earth, seen a succession of worlds, we may from this conclude that\nthere is a system in Nature; in like manner as, from seeing revolutions\nof the planets, it is concluded, that there is a system by which they\nare intended to continue those revolutions. But if the succession of\nworlds is established in the system of Nature, it is in vain to look for\nanything higher in the origin of the earth. The result, therefore, of\nthis physical inquiry is, that we find no vestige of a beginning,--no\nprospect of an end.\"[43]\n\nYet another influence worked strongly upon Hutton. Like most\nphilosophers of his age, he coquetted with those final causes which have\nbeen named barren virgins, but which might be more fitly termed the\n_hetairae_ of philosophy, so constantly have they led men astray. The\nfinal cause of the existence of the world is, for Hutton, the production\nof life and intelligence.\n\n\"We have now considered the globe of this earth as a machine,\nconstructed upon chemical as well as mechanical principles, by which its\ndifferent parts are all adapted, in form, in quality, and in quantity,\nto a certain end; an end attained with certainty or success; and an end\nfrom which we may perceive wisdom, in contemplating the means employed.\n\n\"But is this world to be considered thus merely as a machine, to last no\nlonger than its parts retain their present position, their proper forms\nand qualities? Or may it not be also considered as an organized body?\nsuch as has a constitution in which the necessary decay of the machine\nis naturally repaired, in the exertion of those productive powers by\nwhich it had been formed.\n\n\"This is the view in which we are now to examine the globe; to see if\nthere be, in the constitution of this world, a reproductive operation,\nby which a ruined constitution may be again repaired, and a duration or\nstability thus procured to the machine, considered as a world sustaining\nplants and animals.\"[44]\n\nKirwan, and the other Philistines of the day, accused Hutton of\ndeclaring that his theory implied that the world never had a beginning,\nand never differed in condition from its present state. Nothing could be\nmore grossly unjust, as he expressly guards himself against any such\nconclusion in the following terms:--\n\n\"But in thus tracing back the natural operations which have succeeded\neach other, and mark to us the course of time past, we come to a period\nin which we cannot see any farther. This, however, is not the beginning\nof the operations which proceed in time and according to the wise\neconomy of this world; nor is it the establishing of that which, in the\ncourse of time, had no beginning; it is only the limit of our\nretrospective view of those operations which have come to pass in time,\nand have been conducted by supreme intelligence.\"[45]\n\nI have spoken of Uniformitarianism as the doctrine of Hutton and of\nLyell. If I have quoted the older writer rather than the newer, it is\nbecause his works are little known, and his claims on our veneration too\nfrequently forgotten, not because I desire to dim the fame of his\neminent successor. Few of the present generation of geologists have read\nPlayfair's \"Illustrations,\" fewer still the original \"Theory of the\nEarth;\" the more is the pity; but which of us has not thumbed every page\nof the \"Principles of Geology?\" I think that he who writes fairly the\nhistory of his own progress in geological thought, will not be able to\nseparate his debt to Hutton from his obligations to Lyell; and the\nhistory of the progress of individual geologists is the history of\ngeology.\n\nNo one can doubt that the influence of uniformitarian views has been\nenormous, and, in the main, most beneficial and favourable to the\nprogress of sound geology.\n\nNor can it be questioned that Uniformitarianism has even a stronger\ntitle than Catastrophism to call itself the geological speculation of\nBritain, or, if you will, British popular geology. For it is eminently a\nBritish doctrine, and has even now made comparatively little progress\non the continent of Europe. Nevertheless it seems to me to be open to\nserious criticism upon one of its aspects.\n\nI have shown how unjust was the insinuation that Hutton denied a\nbeginning to the world. But it would not be unjust to say that he\npersistently, in practice, shut his eyes to the existence of that prior\nand different state of things which, in theory, he admitted; and, in\nthis aversion to look beyond the veil of stratified rocks, Lyell follows\nhim.\n\nHutton and Lyell alike agree in their indisposition to carry their\nspeculations a step beyond the period recorded in the most ancient\nstrata now open to observation in the crust of the earth. This is, for\nHutton, \"the point in which we cannot see any farther;\" while Lyell\ntells us,--\n\n\"The astronomer may find good reasons for ascribing the earth's form to\nthe original fluidity of the mass, in times long antecedent to the first\nintroduction of living beings into the planet; but the geologist must be\ncontent to regard the earliest monuments which it is his task to\ninterpret, as belonging to a period when the crust had already acquired\ngreat solidity and thickness, probably as great as it now possesses, and\nwhen volcanic rocks, not essentially differing from those now produced,\nwere formed from time to time, the intensity of volcanic heat being\nneither greater nor less than it is now.\"[46]\n\nAnd again, \"As geologists, we learn that it is not only the present\ncondition of the globe which has been suited to the accommodation of\nmyriads of living creatures, but that many former states also have been\nadapted to the organization and habits of prior races of beings. The\ndisposition of the seas, continents and islands, and the climates, have\nvaried; the species likewise have been changed; and yet they have all\nbeen so modelled, on types analogous to those of existing plants and\nanimals, as to indicate, throughout, a perfect harmony of design and\nunity of purpose. To assume that the evidence of the beginning, or end,\nof so vast a scheme lies within the reach of our philosophical\ninquiries, or even of our speculations, appears to be inconsistent with\na just estimate of the relations which subsist between the finite powers\nof man and the attributes of an infinite and eternal Being.\"[47]\n\nThe limitations implied in these passages appear to me to constitute the\nweakness and the logical defect of uniformitarianism. No one will impute\nblame to Hutton that, in face of the imperfect condition, in his day, of\nthose physical sciences which furnish the keys to the riddles of\ngeology, he should have thought it practical wisdom to limit his theory\nto an attempt to account for \"the present order of things;\" but I am at\na loss to comprehend why, for all time, the geologist must be content to\nregard the oldest fossiliferous rocks as the _ultima Thule_ of his\nscience; or what there is inconsistent with the relations between the\nfinite and the infinite mind, in the assumption, that we may discern\nsomewhat of the beginning, or of the end, of this speck in space we call\nour earth. The finite mind is certainly competent to trace out the\ndevelopment of the fowl within the egg; and I know not on what ground it\nshould find more difficulty in unravelling the complexities of the\ndevelopment of the earth. In fact, as Kant has well remarked,[48] the\ncosmical process is really simpler than the biological.\n\nThis attempt to limit, at a particular point, the progress of inductive\nand deductive reasoning from the things which are, to those which\nwere--this faithlessness to its own logic, seems to me to have cost\nUniformitarianism the place, as the permanent form of geological\nspeculation, which it might otherwise have held.\n\nIt remains that I should put before you what I understand to be the\nthird phase of geological speculation--namely, EVOLUTIONISM.\n\nI shall not make what I have to say on this head clear, unless I\ndiverge, or seem to diverge, for a while, from the direct path of my\ndiscourse, so far as to explain what I take to be the scope of geology\nitself. I conceive geology to be the history of the earth, in precisely\nthe same sense as biology is the history of living beings; and I trust\nyou will not think that I am overpowered by the influence of a dominant\npursuit if I say that I trace a close analogy between these two\nhistories.\n\nIf I study a living being, under what heads does the knowledge I obtain\nfall? I can learn its structure, or what we call its ANATOMY;\nand its DEVELOPMENT, or the series of changes which it passes\nthrough to acquire its complete structure. Then I find that the living\nbeing has certain powers resulting from its own activities, and the\ninteraction of these with the activities of other things--the knowledge\nof which is PHYSIOLOGY. Beyond this the living being has a\nposition in space and time, which is its DISTRIBUTION. All\nthese form the body of ascertainable facts which constitute the _status\nquo_ of the living creature. But these facts have their causes; and the\nascertainment of these causes is the doctrine of AETIOLOGY.\n\nIf we consider what is knowable about the earth, we shall find that such\nearth-knowledge--if I may so translate the word geology--falls into the\nsame categories.\n\nWhat is termed stratigraphical geology is neither more nor less than the\nanatomy of the earth; and the history of the succession of the\nformations is the history of a succession of such anatomies, or\ncorresponds with development, as distinct from generation.\n\nThe internal heat of the earth, the elevation and depression of its\ncrust, its belchings forth of vapours, ashes, and lava, are its\nactivities, in as strict a sense, as are warmth and the movements and\nproducts of respiration the activities of an animal. The phaenomena of\nthe seasons, of the trade winds, of the Gulf-stream, are as much the\nresults of the reaction between these inner activities and outward\nforces, as are the budding of the leaves in spring and their falling in\nautumn the effects of the interaction between the organization of a\nplant and the solar light and heat. And, as the study of the activities\nof the living being is called its physiology, so are these phaenomena the\nsubject-matter of an analogous telluric physiology, to which we\nsometimes give the name of meteorology, sometimes that of physical\ngeography, sometimes that of geology. Again, the earth has a place in\nspace and in time, and relations to other bodies in both these\nrespects, which constitute its distribution. This subject is usually\nleft to the astronomer; but a knowledge of its broad outlines seems to\nme to be an essential constituent of the stock of geological ideas.\n\nAll that can be ascertained concerning the structure, succession of\nconditions, actions, and position in space of the earth, is the matter\nof fact of its natural history. But, as in biology, there remains the\nmatter of reasoning from these facts to their causes, which is just as\nmuch science as the other, and indeed more; and this constitutes\ngeological aetiology.\n\nHaving regard to this general scheme of geological knowledge and\nthought, it is obvious that geological speculation may be, so to speak,\nanatomical and developmental speculation, so far as it relates to points\nof stratigraphical arrangement which are out of reach of direct\nobservation; or, it may be physiological speculation, so far as it\nrelates to undetermined problems relative to the activities of the\nearth; or, it may be distributional speculation, if it deals with\nmodifications of the earth's place in space; or, finally, it will be\naetiological speculation, if it attempts to deduce the history of the\nworld, as a whole, from the known properties of the matter of the earth,\nin the conditions in which the earth has been placed.\n\nFor the purposes of the present discourse I may take this last to be\nwhat is meant by \"geological speculation.\"\n\nNow uniformitarianism, as we have seen, tends to ignore geological\nspeculation in this sense altogether.\n\nThe one point the catastrophists and the uniformitarians agreed upon,\nwhen this Society was founded, was to ignore it. And you will find, if\nyou look back into our records, that our revered fathers in geology\nplumed themselves a good deal upon the practical sense and wisdom of\nthis proceeding. As a temporary measure, I do not presume to challenge\nits wisdom; but in all organized bodies temporary changes are apt to\nproduce permanent effects; and as time has slipped by, altering all the\nconditions which may have made such mortification of the scientific\nflesh desirable, I think the effect of the stream of cold water which\nhas steadily flowed over geological speculation within these walls, has\nbeen of doubtful beneficence.\n\nThe sort of geological speculation to which I am now referring\n(geological aetiology, in short) was created, as a science, by that\nfamous philosopher Immanuel Kant, when, in 1755, he wrote his \"General\nNatural History and Theory of the Celestial Bodies; or an Attempt to\naccount for the Constitution and the mechanical Origin of the Universe\nupon Newtonian principles.\"[49]\n\nIn this very remarkable, but seemingly little-known treatise,[50] Kant\nexpounds a complete cosmogony, in the shape of a theory of the causes\nwhich have led to the development of the universe from diffused atoms of\nmatter endowed with simple attractive and repulsive forces.\n\n\"Give me matter,\" says Kant, \"and I will build the world;\" and he\nproceeds to deduce from the simple data from which he starts, a doctrine\nin all essential respects similar to the well-known \"Nebular Hypothesis\"\nof Laplace.[51] He accounts for the relation of the masses and the\ndensities of the planets to their distances from the sun, for the\neccentricities of their orbits, for their rotations, for their\nsatellites, for the general agreement in the direction of rotation among\nthe celestial bodies, for Saturn's ring, and for the zodiacal light. He\nfinds, in each system of worlds, indications that the attractive force\nof the central mass will eventually destroy its organization, by\nconcentrating upon itself the matter of the whole system; but, as the\nresult of this concentration, he argues for the development of an amount\nof heat which will dissipate the mass once more into a molecular chaos\nsuch as that in which it began.\n\nKant pictures to himself the universe as once an infinite expansion of\nformless and diffused matter. At one point of this he supposes a single\ncentre of attraction set up; and, by strict deductions from admitted\ndynamical principles, shows how this must result in the development of a\nprodigious central body, surrounded by systems of solar and planetary\nworlds in all stages of development. In vivid language he depicts the\ngreat world-maelstrom, widening the margins of its prodigious eddy in the\nslow progress of millions of ages, gradually reclaiming more and more of\nthe molecular waste, and converting chaos into cosmos. But what is\ngained at the margin is lost in the centre; the attractions of the\ncentral systems bring their constituents together, which then, by the\nheat evolved, are converted once more into molecular chaos. Thus the\nworlds that are, lie between the ruins of the worlds that have been and\nthe chaotic materials of the worlds that shall be; and, in spite of all\nwaste and destruction, Cosmos is extending his borders at the expense of\nChaos.\n\nKant's further application of his views to the earth itself is to be\nfound in his \"Treatise on Physical Geography\"[52] (a term under which\nthe then unknown science of geology was included), a subject which he\nhad studied with very great care and on which he lectured for many\nyears. The fourth section of the first part of this Treatise is called\n\"History of the great Changes which the Earth has formerly undergone and\nis still undergoing,\" and is, in fact, a brief and pregnant essay upon\nthe principles of geology. Kant gives an account first \"of the gradual\nchanges which are now taking place\" under the heads of such as are\ncaused by earthquakes, such as are brought about by rain and rivers,\nsuch as are effected by the sea, such as are produced by winds and\nfrost; and, finally, such as result from the operations of man.\n\nThe second part is devoted to the \"Memorials of the Changes which the\nEarth has undergone in remote antiquity.\" These are enumerated as:--A.\nProofs that the sea formerly covered the whole earth. B. Proofs that the\nsea has often been changed into dry land and then again into sea. C. A\ndiscussion of the various-theories of the earth put forward by\nScheuchzer, Moro, Bonnet, Woodward, White, Leibnitz, Linnaeus, and\nBuffon.\n\nThe third part contains an \"Attempt to give a sound explanation of the\nancient history of the earth.\"\n\nI suppose that it would be very easy to pick holes in the details of\nKant's speculations, whether cosmological, or specially telluric, in\ntheir application. But, for all that, he seems to me to have been the\nfirst person to frame a complete system of geological speculation by\nfounding the doctrine of evolution.\n\nWith as much truth as Hutton, Kant could say, \"I take things just as I\nfind them at present, and, from these, I reason with regard to that\nwhich must have been.\" Like Hutton, he is never tired of pointing out\nthat \"in Nature there is wisdom, system, and consistency.\" And, as in\nthese great principles, so in believing that the cosmos has a\nreproductive operation \"by which a ruined constitution may be repaired,\"\nhe forestalls Hutton; while, on the other hand, Kant is true to science.\nHe knows no bounds to geological speculation but those of the intellect.\nHe reasons back to a beginning of the present state of things; he admits\nthe possibility of an end.\n\nI have said that the three schools of geological speculation which I\nhave termed Catastrophism, Uniformitarianism, and Evolutionism are\ncommonly supposed to be antagonistic to one another; and I presume it\nwill have become obvious that, in my belief, the last is destined to\nswallow up the other two. But it is proper to remark that each of the\nlatter has kept alive the tradition of precious truths.\n\nCATASTROPHISM has insisted upon the existence of a practically\nunlimited bank of force, on which the theorist might draw; and it has\ncherished the idea of the development of the earth from a state in which\nits form, and the forces which it exerted, were very different from\nthose we now know. That such difference of form and power once existed\nis a necessary part of the doctrine of evolution.\n\nUNIFORMITARIANISM, on the other hand, has with equal justice\ninsisted upon a practically unlimited bank of time, ready to discount\nany quantity of hypothetical paper. It has kept before our eyes the\npower of the infinitely little, time being granted, and has compelled us\nto exhaust known causes, before flying to the unknown.\n\nTo my mind there appears to be no sort of necessary theoretical\nantagonism between Catastrophism and Uniformitarianism. On the contrary,\nit is very conceivable that catastrophes may be part and parcel of\nuniformity. Let me illustrate my case by analogy. The working of a clock\nis a model of uniform action; good time-keeping means uniformity of\naction. But the striking of the clock is essentially a catastrophe; the\nhammer might be made to blow up a barrel of gunpowder, or turn on a\ndeluge of water; and, by proper arrangement, the clock, instead of\nmarking the hours, might strike at all sorts of irregular periods, never\ntwice alike, in the intervals, force, or number of its blows.\nNevertheless, all these irregular, and apparently lawless, catastrophes\nwould be the result of an absolutely uniformitarian action; and we might\nhave two schools of clock-theorists, one studying the hammer and the\nother the pendulum.\n\nStill less is there any necessary antagonism between either of these\ndoctrines and that of Evolution, which embraces all that is sound in\nboth Catastrophism and Uniformitarianism, while it rejects the arbitrary\nassumptions of the one and the, as arbitrary, limitations of the other.\nNor is the value of the doctrine of Evolution to the philosophic thinker\ndiminished by the fact that it applies the same method to the living and\nthe not-living world; and embraces, in one stupendous analogy, the\ngrowth of a solar system from molecular chaos, the shaping of the earth\nfrom the nebulous cubhood of its youth, through innumerable changes and\nimmeasurable ages, to its present form; and the development of a living\nbeing from the shapeless mass of protoplasm we term a germ.\n\nI do not know whether Evolutionism can claim that amount of currency\nwhich would entitle it to be called British popular geology; but, more\nor less vaguely, it is assuredly present in the minds of most\ngeologists.\n\n\nSuch being the three phases of geological speculation, we are now in a\nposition to inquire which of these it is that Sir William Thomson calls\nupon us to reform in the passages which I have cited.\n\nIt is obviously Uniformitarianism which the distinguished physicist\ntakes to be the representative of geological speculation in general. And\nthus a first issue is raised, inasmuch as many persons (and those not\nthe least thoughtful among the younger geologists) do not accept strict\nUniformitarianism as the final form of geological speculation. We should\nsay, if Hutton and Playfair declare the course of the world to have been\nalways the same, point out the fallacy by all means; but, in so doing,\ndo not imagine that you are proving modern geology to be in opposition\nto natural philosophy. I do not suppose that, at the present day, any\ngeologist would be found to maintain absolute Uniformitarianism, to deny\nthat the rapidity of the rotation of the earth _may_ be diminishing,\nthat the sun _may_ be waxing dim, or that the earth itself _may_ be\ncooling. Most of us, I suspect, are Gallios, \"who care for none of these\nthings,\" being of opinion that, true or fictitious, they have made no\npractical difference to the earth, during the period of which, a record\nis preserved in stratified deposits.\n\nThe accusation that we have been running counter to the _principles_ of\nnatural philosophy, therefore, is devoid of foundation. The only\nquestion which can arise is whether we have, or have not, been tacitly\nmaking assumptions which are in opposition to certain conclusions which\nmay be drawn from those principles. And this question subdivides itself\ninto two:--the first, are we really contravening such conclusions? the\nsecond, if we are, are those conclusions so firmly based that we may not\ncontravene them? I reply in the negative to both these questions, and I\nwill give you my reasons for so doing. Sir William Thomson believes that\nhe is able to prove, by physical reasonings, \"that the existing state of\nthings on the earth, life on the earth--all geological history showing\ncontinuity of life--must be limited within some such period of time as\none hundred million years\" (loc. cit. p. 25).\n\nThe first inquiry which arises plainly is, has it ever been denied that\nthis period _may_ be enough for the purposes of geology?\n\nThe discussion of this question is greatly embarrassed by the vagueness\nwith which the assumed limit is, I will not say defined, but\nindicated,--\"some such period of past time as one hundred million\nyears.\" Now does this mean that it may have been two, or three, or four\nhundred million years? Because this really makes all the difference.[53]\n\nI presume that 100,000 feet may be taken as a full allowance for the\ntotal thickness of stratified rocks containing traces of life; 100,000\ndivided by 100,000,000 = 0.001. Consequently, the deposit of 100,000\nfeet of stratified rock in 100,000,000 years means that the deposit has\ntaken place at the rate of 1/1000 of a foot, or, say, 1/83 of an inch,\nper annum.\n\nWell, I do not know that any one is prepared to maintain that, even\nmaking all needful allowances, the stratified rocks may not have been\nformed, on the average, at the rate of 1/83 of an inch per annum. I\nsuppose that if such could be shown to be the limit of world-growth, we\ncould put up with the allowance without feeling that our speculations\nhad undergone any revolution. And perhaps, after all, the qualifying\nphrase \"some such period\" may not necessitate the assumption of more\nthan 1/166, or 1/249, or 1/332 of an inch of deposit per year, which, of\ncourse, would give us still more ease and comfort.\n\nBut, it may be said, that it is biology, and not geology, which asks for\nso much time--that the succession of life demands vast intervals; but\nthis appears to me to be reasoning in a circle. Biology takes her time\nfrom geology. The only reason we have for believing in the slow rate of\nthe change in living forms is the fact that they persist through a\nseries of deposits which, geology informs us, have taken a long while to\nmake. If the geological clock is wrong, all the naturalist will have to\ndo is to modify his notions of the rapidity of change accordingly. And I\nventure to point out that, when we are told that the limitation of the\nperiod during which living beings have inhabited this planet to one,\ntwo, or three hundred million years requires a complete revolution in\ngeological speculation, the _onus probandi_ rests on the maker of the\nassertion, who brings forward not a shadow of evidence in its support.\n\nThus, if we accept the limitation of time placed before us by Sir W.\nThomson, it is not obvious, on the face of the matter, that we shall\nhave to alter, or reform, our ways in any appreciable degree; and we may\ntherefore proceed with much calmness, and indeed much indifference, as\nto the result, to inquire whether that limitation is justified by the\narguments employed in its support.\n\nThese arguments are three in number:--\n\nI. The first is based upon the undoubted fact that the tides tend to\nretard the rate of the earth's rotation upon its axis. That this must be\nso is obvious, if one considers, roughly, that the tides result from the\npull which the sun and the moon exert upon the sea, causing it to act as\na sort of break upon the rotating solid earth.\n\nKant, who was by no means a mere \"abstract philosopher,\" but a good\nmathematician and well versed in the physical science of his time, not\nonly proved this in an essay of exquisite clearness and intelligibility,\nnow more than a century old,[54] but deduced from it some of its more\nimportant consequences, such as the constant turning of one face of the\nmoon towards the earth.\n\nBut there is a long step from the demonstration of a tendency to the\nestimation of the practical value of that tendency, which is all with\nwhich we are at present concerned. The facts bearing on this point\nappear to stand as follow:--\n\nIt is a matter of observation that the moon's mean motion is (and has\nfor the last 3,000 years been) undergoing an acceleration, relatively to\nthe rotation of the earth. Of course this may result from one of two\ncauses: the moon may really have been moving more swiftly in its orbit;\nor the earth may have been rotating more slowly on its axis.\n\nLaplace believed he had accounted for this phaenomenon by the fact that\nthe eccentricity of the earth's orbit has been diminishing throughout\nthese 3,000 years. This would produce a diminution of the mean\nattraction of the sun on the moon; or, in other words, an increase in\nthe attraction of the earth on the moon: and, consequently, an increase\nin the rapidity of the orbital motion of the latter body. Laplace,\ntherefore, laid the responsibility of the acceleration upon the moon;\nand if his views were correct, the tidal retardation must either be\ninsignificant in amount, or be counteracted by some other agency.\n\nOur great astronomer, Adams, however, appears to have found a flaw in\nLaplace's calculation, and to have shown that only half the observed\nretardation could be accounted for in the way he had suggested. There\nremains, therefore, the other half to be accounted for; and here, in the\nabsence of all positive knowledge, three sets of hypotheses have been\nsuggested.\n\n(a) M. Delaunay suggests that the earth is at fault, in consequence\nof the tidal retardation. Messrs. Adams, Thomson, and Tait work out this\nsuggestion, and, \"on a certain assumption as to the proportion of\nretardations due to the sun and the moon,\" find the earth may lose\ntwenty-two seconds of time in a century from this cause.[55]\n\n(b) But M. Dufour suggests that the retardation of the earth (which\nis hypothetically assumed to exist) may be due in part, or wholly, to\nthe increase of the moment of inertia of the earth by meteors falling\nupon its surface. This suggestion also meets with the entire approval of\nSir W. Thomson, who shows that meteor-dust, accumulating at the rate of\none foot in 4,000 years, would account for the remainder of\nretardation.[56]\n\n(c) Thirdly, Sir W. Thomson brings forward an hypothesis of his own\nwith respect to the cause of the hypothetical retardation of the earth's\nrotation:--\n\n\"Let us suppose ice to melt from the polar regions (20 deg. round each\npole, we may say) to the extent of something more than a foot thick, enough\nto give 1.1 foot of water over those areas, or 0.006 of a foot of water if\nspread over the whole globe, which would, in reality, raise the\nsea-level by only some such undiscoverable difference as three-fourths\nof an inch or an inch. This, or the reverse, which we believe might\nhappen any year, and could certainly not be detected without far more\naccurate observations and calculations for the mean sea-level than any\nhitherto made, would slacken or quicken the earth's rate as a timekeeper\nby one-tenth of a second per year.\"[57]\n\nI do not presume to throw the slightest doubt upon the accuracy of any\nof the calculations made by such distinguished mathematicians as those\nwho have made the suggestions I have cited. On the contrary, it is\nnecessary to my argument to assume that they are all correct. But I\ndesire to point out that this seems to be one of the many cases in which\nthe admitted accuracy of mathematical processes is allowed to throw a\nwholly inadmissible appearance of authority over the results obtained by\nthem. Mathematics may be compared to a mill of exquisite workmanship,\nwhich grinds you stuff of any degree of fineness; but, nevertheless,\nwhat you get out depends on what you put in; and as the grandest mill in\nthe world will not extract wheat-flour from peascods, so pages of\nformulae will not get a definite result out of loose data.\n\nIn the present instance it appears to be admitted:--\n\n1. That it is not absolutely certain, after all, whether the moon's mean\nmotion is undergoing acceleration, or the earth's rotation\nretardation.[58] And yet this is the key of the whole position.\n\n2. If the rapidity of the earth's rotation is diminishing, it is not\ncertain how much of that retardation is due to tidal friction,--how much\nto meteors,--how much to possible excess of melting over accumulation of\npolar ice, during the period covered by observation, which amounts, at\nthe outside, to not more than 2,600 years.\n\n3. The effect of a different distribution of land and water in modifying\nthe retardation caused by tidal friction, and of reducing it, under some\ncircumstances, to a minimum, does not appear to be taken into account.\n\n4. During the Miocene epoch the polar ice was certainly many feet\nthinner than it has been during, or since, the Glacial epoch. Sir W.\nThomson tells us that the accumulation of something more than a foot of\nice around the poles (which implies the withdrawal of, say, an inch of\nwater from the general surface of the sea) will cause the earth to\nrotate quicker by one-tenth of a second per annum. It would appear,\ntherefore, that the earth may have been rotating, throughout the whole\nperiod which has elapsed from the commencement of the Glacial epoch down\nto the present time, one, or more, seconds per annum quicker than it\nrotated during the Miocene epoch.\n\nBut, according to Sir W. Thomson's calculation, tidal retardation will\nonly account for a retardation of 22\" in a century, or 22/100 (say 1/5)\nof a second per annum.\n\nThus, assuming that the accumulation of polar ice since the Miocene\nepoch has only been sufficient to produce ten times the effect of a coat\nof ice one foot thick, we shall have an accelerating cause which covers\nall the loss from tidal action, and leaves a balance of 4/5 a second per\nannum in the way of acceleration.\n\nIf tidal retardation can be thus checked and overthrown by other\ntemporary conditions, what becomes of the confident assertion, based\nupon the assumed uniformity of tidal retardation, that ten thousand\nmillion years ago the earth must have been rotating more than twice as\nfast as at present, and, therefore, that we geologists are \"in direct\nopposition to the principles of Natural Philosophy\" if we spread\ngeological history over that time?\n\nII. The second argument is thus stated by Sir W. Thomson:--\"An article,\nby myself, published in 'Macmillan's Magazine' for March 1862, on the\nage of the sun's heat, explains results of investigation into various\nquestions as to possibilities regarding the amount of heat that the sun\ncould have, dealing with it as you would with a stone, or a piece of\nmatter, only taking into account the sun's dimensions, which showed it\nto be possible that the sun may have already illuminated the earth for\nas many as one hundred million years, but at the same time rendered it\nalmost certain that he had not illuminated the earth for five hundred\nmillions of years. The estimates here are necessarily very vague; but\nyet, vague as they are, I do not know that it is possible, upon any\nreasonable estimate founded on known properties of matter, to say that\nwe can believe the sun has really illuminated the earth for five hundred\nmillion years.\"[59]\n\nI do not wish to \"Hansardize\" Sir William Thomson by laying much stress\non the fact that, only fifteen years ago, he entertained a totally\ndifferent view of the origin of the sun's heat, and believed that the\nenergy radiated from year to year was supplied from year to year--a\ndoctrine which would have suited Hutton perfectly. But the fact that so\neminent a physical philosopher has, thus recently, held views opposite\nto those which he now entertains, and that he confesses his own\nestimates to be \"very vague,\" justly entitles us to disregard those\nestimates, if any distinct facts on our side go against them. However, I\nam not aware that such facts exist. As I have already said, for anything\nI know, one, two, or three hundred millions of years may serve the needs\nof geologists perfectly well.\n\nIII. The third line of argument is based upon the temperature of the\ninterior of the earth. Sir W. Thomson refers to certain investigations\nwhich prove that the present thermal condition of the interior of the\nearth implies either a heating of the earth within the last 20,000 years\nof as much as 100 deg. F., or a greater heating all over the surface at\nsome time further back than 20,000 years, and then proceeds thus:--\n\n\"Now, are geologists prepared to admit that, at some time within the\nlast 20,000 years, there has been all over the earth so high a\ntemperature as that? I presume not; no geologist--no _modern_\ngeologist--would for a moment admit the hypothesis that the present\nstate of underground heat is due to a heating of the surface at so late\na period as 20,000 years ago. If that is not admitted, we are driven to\na greater heat at some time more than 20,000 years ago. A greater\nheating all over the surface than 100 deg. Fahrenheit would kill nearly all\nexisting plants and animals, I may safely say. Are modern geologists\nprepared to say that all life was killed off the earth 50,000, 100,000,\nor 200,000 years ago? For the uniformity theory, the further back the\ntime of high surface-temperature is put the better; but the further back\nthe time of heating, the hotter it must have been. The best for those\nwho draw most largely on time is that which puts it furthest back; and\nthat is the theory that the heating was enough to melt the whole. But\neven if it was enough to melt the whole, we must still admit some limit,\nsuch as fifty million years, one hundred million years, or two or three\nhundred million years ago. Beyond that we cannot go.\"[60]\n\nIt will be observed that the \"limit\" is once again of the vaguest,\nranging from 50,000,000 years to 300,000,000. And the reply is, once\nmore, that, for anything that can be proved to the contrary, one or two\nhundred million years might serve the purpose, even of a thorough-going\nHuttonian uniformitarian, very well.\n\nBut if, on the other hand, the 100,000,000 or 200,000,000 years appear\nto be insufficient for geological purposes, we must closely criticise\nthe method by which the limit is reached. The argument is simple enough.\n_Assuming_ the earth to be nothing but a cooling mass, the quantity of\nheat lost per year, _supposing_ the rate of cooling to have been\nuniform, multiplied by any given number of years, will be given the\nminimum temperature that number of years ago.\n\nBut is the earth nothing but a cooling mass, \"like a hot-water jar such\nas is used in carriages,\" or \"a globe of sandstone?\" and has its cooling\nbeen uniform? An affirmative answer to both these questions seems to be\nnecessary to the validity of the calculations on which Sir W. Thomson\nlays so much stress.\n\nNevertheless it surely may be urged that such affirmative answers are\npurely hypothetical, and that other suppositions have an equal right to\nconsideration.\n\nFor example, is it not possible that, at the prodigious temperature\nwhich would seem to exist at 100 miles below the surface, all the\nmetallic bases may behave as mercury does at a red heat, when it refuses\nto combine with oxygen; while, nearer the surface, and therefore at a\nlower temperature, they may enter into combination (as mercury does with\noxygen a few degrees below its boiling-point) and so give rise to a\nheat totally distinct from that which they possess as cooling bodies?\nAnd has it not also been proved by recent researches that the quality of\nthe atmosphere may immensely affect its permeability to heat; and,\nconsequently, profoundly modify the rate of cooling the globe as a\nwhole?\n\nI do not think it can be denied that such conditions may exist, and may\nso greatly affect the supply, and the loss, of terrestrial heat as to\ndestroy the value of any calculations which leave them out of sight.\n\n\nMy functions as your advocate are at an end. I speak with more than the\nsincerity of a mere advocate when I express the belief that the case\nagainst us has entirely broken down. The cry for reform which has been\nraised without, is superfluous, inasmuch as we have long been reforming\nfrom within, with all needful speed. And the critical examination of the\ngrounds upon which the very grave charge of opposition to the principles\nof Natural Philosophy has been brought against us, rather shows that we\nhave exercised a wise discrimination in declining, for the present, to\nmeddle with our foundations.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[39] On Geological Time. By Sir W. Thomson, LL.D. Transactions of the\nGeological Society of Glasgow, vol. iii.\n\n[40] The Theory of the Earth, vol. i. p. 173, note.\n\n[41] Ibid. p. 281.\n\n[42] Ibid. p. 371.\n\n[43] The Theory of the Earth, vol. i. p. 200.\n\n[44] The Theory of the Earth, vol. i. pp. 16, 17.\n\n[45] The Theory of the Earth, vol. i. p. 223.\n\n[46] Principles of Geology, vol. ii. p. 211.\n\n[47] Principles of Geology, vol. ii. p. 613.\n\n[48] \"Man darf es sich also nicht befremden lassen, wenn ich mich\nunterstehe zu sagen, dass eher die Bildung aller Himmelskoerper, die\nUrsache ihrer Bewegungen, kurz der Ursprung der ganzen gegenwaertigen\nVerfassung des Weltbaues werden koennen eingesehen werden, ehe die\nErzeugung eines einzigen Krautes oder einer Raupe aus mechanischen\nGruenden, deutlich und vollstaendig kund werden wird.\"--KANT'S _Saemmtliche\nWerke_, Bd. I. p. 220.\n\n[49] Grant (\"History of Physical Astronomy,\" p. 574) makes but the\nbriefest reference to Kant.\n\n[50] \"Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels; oder Versuch\nvon der Verfassung und dem mechanischen Ursprunge des ganzen\nWeltgebaeudes nach Newton'schen Grundsatzen abgehandelt.\"--KANT'S\n_Saemmtliche Werke_, Bd. i. p. 207.\n\n[51] Systeme du Monde, tome ii. chap. 6\n\n[52] Kant's \"Saemmtliche Werke,\" Bd. viii. p. 145.\n\n[53] Sir William Thomson implies (loc. cit. p. 16), that the precise\ntime is of no consequence: \"the principle is the same;\" but, as the\nprinciple is admitted, the whole discussion turns on its practical\nresults.\n\n[54] \"Untersuchung der Frage ob die Erde in ihrer Umdrehung um die\nAchse, wodurch sie die Abwechselung des Tages und der Nacht\nhervorbringt, einige Veraenderung seit den ersten Zeiten ihres Ursprunges\nerlitten habe, &c.\"--KANT'S _Saemmtliche Werke_, Bd. i. p. 178.\n\n[55] Sir W. Thomson, loc. cit., p. 14.\n\n[56] Loc. cit., p. 27\n\n[57] Ibid.\n\n[58] It will be understood that I do not wish to deny that the earth's\nrotation _may be_ undergoing retardation.\n\n[59] Loc. cit., p. 20.\n\n[60] Loc. cit., p. 24.\n\n\n\n\nXII.\n\nTHE ORIGIN OF SPECIES.\n\n\nMr. Darwin's long-standing and well-earned scientific eminence probably\nrenders him indifferent to that social notoriety which passes by the\nname of success; but if the calm spirit of the philosopher have not yet\nwholly superseded the ambition and the vanity of the carnal man within\nhim, he must be well satisfied with the results of his venture in\npublishing the \"Origin of Species.\" Overflowing the narrow bounds of\npurely scientific circles, the \"species question\" divides with Italy and\nthe Volunteers the attention of general society. Everybody has read Mr.\nDarwin's book, or, at least, has given an opinion upon its merits or\ndemerits; pietists, whether lay or ecclesiastic, decry it with the mild\nrailing which sounds so charitable; bigots denounce it with ignorant\ninvective; old ladies, of both sexes, consider it a decidedly dangerous\nbook, and even savans, who have no better mud to throw, quote antiquated\nwriters to show that its author is no better than an ape himself; while\nevery philosophical thinker hails it as a veritable Whitworth gun in the\narmory of liberalism; and all competent naturalists and physiologists,\nwhatever their opinions as to the ultimate fate of the doctrines put\nforth, acknowledge that the work in which they are embodied is a solid\ncontribution to knowledge and inaugurates a new epoch in natural\nhistory.\n\nNor has the discussion of the subject been restrained within the limits\nof conversation. When the public is eager and interested, reviewers must\nminister to its wants; and the genuine _litterateur_ is too much in the\nhabit of acquiring his knowledge from the book he judges--as the\nAbyssinian is said to provide himself with steaks from the ox which\ncarries him--to be withheld from criticism of a profound scientific work\nby the mere want of the requisite preliminary scientific acquirement;\nwhile, on the other hand, the men of science who wish well to the new\nviews, no less than those who dispute their validity, have naturally\nsought opportunities of expressing their opinions. Hence it is not\nsurprising that almost all the critical journals have noticed Mr.\nDarwin's work at greater or less length; and so many disquisitions, of\nevery degree of excellence, from the poor product of ignorance, too\noften stimulated by prejudice, to the fair and thoughtful essay of the\ncandid student of Nature, have appeared, that it seems an almost\nhopeless task to attempt to say anything new upon the question.\n\nBut it may be doubted if the knowledge and acumen of prejudged\nscientific opponents, or the subtlety of orthodox special pleaders, have\nyet exerted their full force in mystifying the real issues of the great\ncontroversy which has been set afoot, and whose end is hardly likely to\nbe seen by this generation; so that, at this eleventh hour, and even\nfailing anything new, it may be useful to state afresh that which is\ntrue, and to put the fundamental positions advocated by Mr. Darwin in\nsuch a form that they may be grasped by those whose special studies lie\nin other directions. And the adoption of this course may be the more\nadvisable, because notwithstanding its great deserts, and indeed partly\non account of them, the \"Origin of Species\" is by no means an easy book\nto read--if by reading is implied the full comprehension of an author's\nmeaning.\n\nWe do not speak jestingly in saying that it is Mr. Darwin's misfortune\nto know more about the question he has taken up than any man living.\nPersonally and practically exercised in zoology, in minute anatomy, in\ngeology; a student of geographical distribution, not on maps and in\nmuseums only, but by long voyages and laborious collection; having\nlargely advanced each of these branches of science, and having spent\nmany years in gathering and sifting materials for his present work, the\nstore of accurately registered facts upon which the author of the\n\"Origin of Species\" is able to draw at will is prodigious.\n\nBut this very superabundance of matter must have been embarrassing to a\nwriter who, for the present, can only put forward an abstract of his\nviews; and thence it arises, perhaps, that notwithstanding the clearness\nof the style, those who attempt fairly to digest the book find much of\nit a sort of intellectual pemmican--a mass of facts crushed and pounded\ninto shape, rather than held together by the ordinary medium of an\nobvious logical bond: due attention will, without doubt, discover this\nbond, but it is often hard to find.\n\nAgain, from sheer want of room, much has to be taken for granted which\nmight readily enough be proved; and hence, while the adept, who can\nsupply the missing links in the evidence from his own knowledge,\ndiscovers fresh proof of the singular thoroughness with which all\ndifficulties have been considered and all unjustifiable suppositions\navoided, at every reperusal of Mr. Darwin's pregnant paragraphs, the\nnovice in biology is apt to complain of the frequency of what he fancies\nis gratuitous assumption.\n\nThus while it may be doubted if, for some years, any one is likely to be\ncompetent to pronounce judgment on all the issues raised by Mr. Darwin,\nthere is assuredly abundant room for him, who, assuming the humbler,\nthough perhaps as useful, office of an interpreter between the \"Origin\nof Species\" and the public, contents himself with endeavouring to point\nout the nature of the problems which it discusses; to distinguish\nbetween the ascertained facts and the theoretical views which it\ncontains; and finally, to show the extent to which the explanation it\noffers satisfies the requirements of scientific logic. At any rate, it\nis this office which we propose to undertake in the following pages.\n\nIt may be safely assumed that our readers have a general conception of\nthe nature of the objects to which the word \"species\" is applied; but it\nhas, perhaps, occurred to few, even of those who are naturalists _ex\nprofesso_, to reflect, that, as commonly employed, the term has a double\nsense and denotes two very different orders of relations. When we call a\ngroup of animals, or of plants, a species, we may imply thereby either,\nthat all these animals or plants have some common peculiarity of form\nor structure; or, we may mean that they possess some common functional\ncharacter. That part of biological science which deals with form and\nstructure is called Morphology--that which concerns itself with\nfunction, Physiology--so that we may conveniently speak of these two\nsenses, or aspects, of \"species\"--the one as morphological, the other as\nphysiological. Regarded from the former point of view, a species is\nnothing more than a kind of animal or plant, which is distinctly\ndefinable from all others, by certain constant, and not merely sexual,\nmorphological peculiarities. Thus horses form a species, because the\ngroup of animals to which that name is applied is distinguished from all\nothers in the world by the following constantly associated characters.\nThey have 1. A vertebral column; 2. Mammae; 3. A placental embryo; 4.\nFour legs; 5. A single well-developed toe in each foot provided with a\nhoof; 6. A bushy tail; and 7. Callosities on the inner sides of both the\nfore and the hind legs. The asses, again, form a distinct species,\nbecause, with the same characters, as far as the fifth in the above\nlist, all asses have tufted tails, and have callosities only on the\ninner side of the fore legs. If animals were discovered having the\ngeneral characters of the horse, but sometimes with callosities only on\nthe fore legs, and more or less tufted tails; or animals having the\ngeneral characters of the ass, but with more or less bushy tails, and\nsometimes with callosities on both pairs of legs, besides being\nintermediate in other respects--the two species would have to be merged\ninto one. They could no longer be regarded as morphologically distinct\nspecies, for they would not be distinctly definable one from the other.\n\nHowever bare and simple this definition of species may appear to be, we\nconfidently appeal to all practical naturalists, whether zoologists,\nbotanists, or palaeontologists, to say if, in the vast majority of cases,\nthey know, or mean to affirm, anything more of the group of animals or\nplants they so denominate than what has just been stated. Even the most\ndecided advocates of the received doctrines respecting species admit\nthis.\n\n     \"I apprehend,\" says Professor Owen,[61] \"that few naturalists\n     now-a-days, in describing and proposing a name for what they call\n     'a new _species_,' use that term to signify what was meant by it\n     twenty or thirty years ago; that is, an originally distinct\n     creation, maintaining its primitive distinction by obstructive\n     generative peculiarities. The proposer of the new species now\n     intends to state no more than he actually knows; as, for example,\n     that the differences on which he founds the specific character are\n     constant in individuals of both sexes, so far as observation has\n     reached; and that they are not due to domestication or to\n     artificially superinduced external circumstances, or to any outward\n     influence within his cognizance; that the species is wild, or is\n     such as it appears by Nature.\"\n\nIf we consider, in fact, that by far the largest proportion of recorded\nexisting species are known only by the study of their skins, or bones,\nor other lifeless exuvia; that we are acquainted with none, or next to\nnone, of their physiological peculiarities, beyond those which can be\ndeduced from their structure, or are open to cursory observation; and\nthat we cannot hope to learn more of any of those extinct forms of life\nwhich now constitute no inconsiderable proportion of the known Flora and\nFauna of the world: it is obvious that the definitions of these species\ncan be only of a purely structural or morphological character. It is\nprobable that naturalists would have avoided much confusion of ideas if\nthey had more frequently borne these necessary limitations of our\nknowledge in mind. But while it may safely be admitted that we are\nacquainted with only the morphological characters of the vast majority\nof species--the functional, or physiological, peculiarities of a few\nhave been carefully investigated, and the result of that study forms a\nlarge and most interesting portion of the physiology of reproduction.\n\nThe student of Nature wonders the more and is astonished the less, the\nmore conversant he becomes with her operations; but of all the perennial\nmiracles she offers to his inspection, perhaps the most worthy of\nadmiration is the development of a plant or of an animal from its\nembryo. Examine the recently laid egg of some common animal, such as a\nsalamander or a newt. It is a minute spheroid in which the best\nmicroscope will reveal nothing but a structureless sac, enclosing a\nglairy fluid, holding granules in suspension. But strange possibilities\nlie dormant in that semi-fluid globule. Let a moderate supply of warmth\nreach its watery cradle, and the plastic matter undergoes changes so\nrapid and yet so steady and purposelike in their succession, that one\ncan only compare them to those operated by a skilled modeller upon a\nformless lump of clay. As with an invisible trowel, the mass is divided\nand subdivided into smaller and smaller portions, until it is reduced to\nan aggregation of granules not too large to build withal the finest\nfabrics of the nascent organism. And, then, it is as if a delicate\nfinger traced out the line to be occupied by the spinal column, and\nmoulded the contour of the body; pinching up the head at one end, the\ntail at the other, and fashioning flank and limb into due salamandrine\nproportions, in so artistic a way, that, after watching the process hour\nby hour, one is almost involuntarily possessed by the notion, that some\nmore subtle aid to vision than an achromatic, would show the hidden\nartist, with his plan before him, striving with skilful manipulation to\nperfect his work.\n\nAs life advances, and the young amphibian ranges the waters, the terror\nof his insect contemporaries, not only are the nutritious particles\nsupplied by its prey, by the addition of which to its frame growth takes\nplace, laid down, each in its proper spot, and in such due proportion to\nthe rest, as to reproduce the form, the colour and the size,\ncharacteristic of the parental stock; but even the wonderful powers of\nreproducing lost parts possessed by these animals are controlled by the\nsame governing tendency. Cut off the legs, the tail, the jaws,\nseparately or all together, and, as Spallanzani showed long ago, these\nparts not only grow again, but the redintegrated limb is formed on the\nsame type as those which were lost. The new jaw, or leg, is a newt's,\nand never by any accident more like that of a frog. What is true of the\nnewt is true of every animal and of every plant; the acorn tends to\nbuild itself up again into a woodland giant such as that from whose twig\nit fell; the spore of the humblest lichen reproduces the green or brown\nincrustation which gave it birth; and at the other end of the scale of\nlife, the child that resembled neither the paternal nor the maternal\nside of the house would be regarded as a kind of monster.\n\nSo that the one end to which, in all living beings, the formative\nimpulse is tending--the one scheme which the Archaeus of the old\nspeculators strives to carry out, seems to be to mould the offspring\ninto the likeness of the parent. It is the first great law of\nreproduction, that the offspring tends to resemble its parent or\nparents, more closely than anything else.\n\nScience will some day show us how this law is a necessary consequence of\nthe more general laws which govern matter; but for the present, more can\nhardly be said than that it appears to be in harmony with them. We know\nthat the phaenomena of vitality are not something apart from other\nphysical phaenomena, but one with them; and matter and force are the two\nnames of the one artist who fashions the living as well as the lifeless.\nHence living bodies should obey the same great laws as other\nmatter--nor, throughout Nature, is there a law of wider application than\nthis, that a body impelled by two forces takes the direction of their\nresultant. But living bodies may be regarded as nothing but extremely\ncomplex bundles of forces held in a mass of matter, as the complex\nforces of a magnet are held in the steel by its coercive force; and,\nsince the differences of sex are comparatively slight, or, in other\nwords, the sum of the forces in each has a very similar tendency, their\nresultant, the offspring, may reasonably be expected to deviate but\nlittle from a course parallel to either, or to both.\n\nRepresent the reason of the law to ourselves by what physical metaphor\nor analogy we will, however, the great matter is to apprehend its\nexistence and the importance of the consequences deducible from it. For\nthings which are like to the same are like to one another, and if, in a\ngreat series of generations, every offspring is like its parent, it\nfollows that all the offspring and all the parents must be like one\nanother; and that, given an original parental stock, with the\nopportunity of undisturbed multiplication, the law in question\nnecessitates the production, in course of time, of an indefinitely large\ngroup, the whole of whose members are at once very similar and are blood\nrelations, having descended from the same parent, or pair of parents.\nThe proof that all the members of any given group of animals, or plants,\nhad thus descended, would be ordinarily considered sufficient to entitle\nthem to the rank of physiological species, for most physiologists\nconsider species to be definable as \"the offspring of a single primitive\nstock.\"\n\nBut though it is quite true that all those groups we call species _may_,\naccording to the known laws of reproduction, have descended from a\nsingle stock, and though it is very likely they really have done so, yet\nthis conclusion rests on deduction and can hardly hope to establish\nitself upon a basis of observation. And the primitiveness of the\nsupposed single stock, which, after all, is the essential part of the\nmatter, is not only a hypothesis, but one which has not a shadow of\nfoundation, if by \"primitive\" be meant \"independent of any other living\nbeing.\" A scientific definition, of which an unwarrantable hypothesis\nforms an essential part, carries its condemnation within itself; but\neven supposing such a definition were, in form, tenable, the\nphysiologist who should attempt to apply it in Nature would soon find\nhimself involved in great, if not inextricable difficulties. As we have\nsaid, it is indubitable that offspring _tend_ to resemble the parental\norganism, but it is equally true that the similarity attained never\namounts to identity, either in form or in structure. There is always a\ncertain amount of deviation, not only from the precise characters of a\nsingle parent, but when, as in most animals and many plants, the sexes\nare lodged in distinct individuals, from an exact mean between the two\nparents. And indeed, on general principles, this slight deviation seems\nas intelligible as the general similarity, if we reflect how complex the\nco-operating \"bundles of forces\" are, and how improbable it is that, in\nany case, their true resultant shall coincide with any mean between the\nmore obvious characters of the two parents. Whatever be its cause,\nhowever, the co-existence of this tendency to minor variation with the\ntendency to general similarity, is of vast importance in its bearing on\nthe question of the origin of species.\n\nAs a general rule, the extent to which an offspring differs from its\nparent is slight enough; but, occasionally, the amount of difference is\nmuch more strongly marked, and then the divergent offspring receives the\nname of a Variety. Multitudes, of what there is every reason to believe\nare such varieties, are known, but the origin of very few has been\naccurately recorded, and of these we will select two as more especially\nillustrative of the main features of variation. The first of them is\nthat of the \"Ancon,\" or \"Otter\" sheep, of which a careful account is\ngiven by Colonel David Humphreys, F.R.S., in a letter to Sir Joseph\nBanks, published in the Philosophical Transactions for 1813. It appears\nthat one Seth Wright, the proprietor of a farm on the banks of the\nCharles River, in Massachusetts, possessed a flock of fifteen ewes and a\nram of the ordinary kind. In the year 1791, one of the ewes presented\nher owner with a male lamb, differing, for no assignable reason, from\nits parents by a proportionally long body and short bandy legs, whence\nit was unable to emulate its relatives in those sportive leaps over the\nneighbours' fences, in which they were in the habit of indulging, much\nto the good farmer's vexation.\n\nThe second case is that detailed by a no less unexceptionable authority\nthan Reaumur in his \"Art de faire eclore les Poulets.\" A Maltese couple,\nnamed Kelleia, whose hands and feet were constructed upon the ordinary\nhuman model, had born to them a son, Gratio, who possessed six perfectly\nmoveable fingers on each hand and six toes, not quite so well formed, on\neach foot. No cause could be assigned for the appearance of this unusual\nvariety of the human species.\n\nTwo circumstances are well worthy of remark in both these cases. In\neach, the variety appears to have arisen in full force, and, as it were,\n_per saltum_; a wide and definite difference appearing, at once, between\nthe Ancon ram and the ordinary sheep; between the six-fingered and\nsix-toed Gratio Kelleia and ordinary men. In neither case is it possible\nto point out any obvious reason for the appearance of the variety.\nDoubtless there were determining causes for these as for all other\nphaenomena; but they do not appear, and we can be tolerably certain that\nwhat are ordinarily understood as changes in physical conditions, as in\nclimate, in food, or the like, did not take place and had nothing to do\nwith the matter. It was no case of what is commonly called adaptation to\ncircumstances; but, to use a conveniently erroneous phrase, the\nvariations arose spontaneously. The fruitless search after final causes\nleads their pursuers a long way; but even those hardy teleologists, who\nare ready to break through all the laws of physics in chase of their\nfavourite will-o'-the-wisp, may be puzzled to discover what purpose\ncould be attained by the stunted legs of Seth Wright's ram or the\nhexadactyle members of Gratio Kelleia.\n\nVarieties then arise we know not why; and it is more than probable that\nthe majority of varieties have arisen in this \"spontaneous\" manner,\nthough we are, of course, far from denying that they may be traced, in\nsome cases, to distinct external influences; which are assuredly\ncompetent to alter the character of the tegumentary covering, to change\ncolour, to increase or diminish the size of muscles, to modify\nconstitution, and, among plants, to give rise to the metamorphosis of\nstamens into petals, and so forth. But however they may have arisen,\nwhat especially interests us at present is, to remark that, once in\nexistence, varieties obey the fundamental law of reproduction that like\ntends to produce like, and their offspring exemplify it by tending to\nexhibit the same deviation from the parental stock as themselves.\nIndeed, there seems to be, in many instances, a pre-potent influence\nabout a newly-arisen variety which gives it what one may call an unfair\nadvantage over the normal descendants from the same stock. This is\nstrikingly exemplified by the case of Gratio Kelleia, who married a\nwoman with the ordinary pentadactyle extremities, and had by her four\nchildren, Salvator, George, Andre, and Marie. Of these children\nSalvator, the eldest boy, had six fingers and six toes, like his father;\nthe second and third, also boys, had five fingers and five toes, like\ntheir mother, though the hands and feet of George were slightly\ndeformed; the last, a girl, had five fingers and five toes, but the\nthumbs were slightly deformed. The variety thus reproduced itself purely\nin the eldest, while the normal type reproduced itself purely in the\nthird, and almost purely in the second and last: so that it would seem,\nat first, as if the normal type were more powerful than the variety. But\nall these children grew up and intermarried with normal wives and\nhusband, and then, note what took place: Salvator had four children,\nthree of whom exhibited the hexadactyle members of their grandfather and\nfather, while the youngest had the pentadactyle limbs of the mother and\ngrandmother; so that here, notwithstanding a double pentadactyle\ndilution of the blood, the hexadactyle variety had the best of it. The\nsame pre-potency of the variety was still more markedly exemplified in\nthe progeny of two of the other children, Marie and George. Marie (whose\nthumbs only were deformed) gave birth to a boy with six toes, and three\nother normally formed children; but George, who was not quite so pure a\npentadactyle, begot, first, two girls, each of whom had six fingers and\ntoes; then a girl with six fingers on each hand and six toes on the\nright foot, but only five toes on the left; and lastly, a boy with only\nfive fingers and toes. In these instances, therefore, the variety, as it\nwere, leaped over one generation to reproduce itself in full force in\nthe next. Finally, the purely pentadactyle Andre was the father of many\nchildren, not one of whom departed from the normal parental type.\n\nIf a variation which approaches the nature of a monstrosity can strive\nthus forcibly to reproduce itself, it is not wonderful that less\naberrant modifications should tend to be preserved even more strongly;\nand the history of the Ancon sheep is, in this respect, particularly\ninstructive. With the \"'cuteness\" characteristic of their nation, the\nneighbours of the Massachusetts farmer imagined it would be an excellent\nthing if all his sheep were imbued with the stay-at-home tendencies\nenforced by Nature upon the newly-arrived ram; and they advised Wright\nto kill the old patriarch of his fold, and install the Ancon ram in his\nplace. The result justified their sagacious anticipations, and coincided\nvery nearly with what occurred to the progeny of Gratio Kelleia. The\nyoung lambs were almost always either pure Ancons, or pure ordinary\nsheep.[62] But when sufficient Ancon sheep were obtained to interbreed\nwith one another, it was found that the offspring was always pure Ancon.\nColonel Humphreys, in fact, states that he was acquainted with only \"one\nquestionable case of a contrary nature.\" Here, then, is a remarkable and\nwell-established instance, not only of a very distinct race being\nestablished _per saltum_, but of that race breeding \"true\" at once, and\nshowing no mixed forms, even when crossed with another breed.\n\nBy taking care to select Ancons of both sexes, for breeding from, it\nthus became easy to establish an extremely well-marked race; so peculiar\nthat, even when herded with other sheep, it was noted that the Ancons\nkept together. And there is every reason to believe that the existence\nof this breed might have been indefinitely protracted; but the\nintroduction of the Merino sheep, which were not only very superior to\nthe Ancons in wool and meat, but quite as quiet and orderly, led to the\ncomplete neglect of the new breed, so that, in 1813, Colonel Humphreys\nfound it difficult to obtain the specimen, whose skeleton was presented\nto Sir Joseph Banks. We believe that, for many years, no remnant of it\nhas existed in the United States.\n\nGratio Kelleia was not the progenitor of a race of six-fingered men, as\nSeth Wright's ram became a nation of Ancon sheep, though the tendency of\nthe variety to perpetuate itself appears to have been fully as strong,\nin the one case as in the other. And the reason of the difference is not\nfar to seek. Seth Wright took care not to weaken the Ancon blood by\nmatching his Ancon ewes with any but males of the same variety, while\nGratio Kelleia's sons were too far removed from the patriarchal times to\nintermarry with their sisters; and his grandchildren seem not to have\nbeen attracted by their six-fingered cousins. In other words, in the one\nexample a race was produced, because, for several generations, care was\ntaken to _select_ both parents of the breeding stock, from animals\nexhibiting a tendency to vary in the same direction; while, in the\nother, no race was evolved, because no such selection was exercised. A\nrace is a propagated variety; and as, by the laws of reproduction,\noffspring tend to assume the parental form, they will be more likely to\npropagate a variation exhibited by both parents than that possessed by\nonly one.\n\nThere is no organ of the body of an animal which may not, and does not,\noccasionally, vary more or less from the normal type; and there is no\nvariation which may not be transmitted, and which, if selectively\ntransmitted, may not become the foundation of a race. This great truth,\nsometimes forgotten by philosophers, has long been familiar to practical\nagriculturists and breeders: and upon it rest all the methods of\nimproving the breeds of domestic animals, which, for the last century,\nhave been followed with so much success in England. Colour, form, size,\ntexture of hair or wool, proportions of various parts, strength or\nweakness of constitution, tendency to fatten or to remain lean, to give\nmuch or little milk, speed, strength, temper, intelligence, special\ninstincts; there is not one of these characters whose transmission is\nnot an every-day occurrence within the experience of cattle-breeders,\nstock-farmers, horse-dealers, and dog and poultry fanciers. Nay, it is\nonly the other day that an eminent physiologist, Dr. Brown-Sequard,\ncommunicated to the Royal Society his discovery that epilepsy,\nartificially produced in guinea-pigs, by a means which he has\ndiscovered, is transmitted to their offspring.\n\nBut a race, once produced, is no more a fixed and immutable entity than\nthe stock whence it sprang; variations arise among its members, and as\nthese variations are transmitted like any others, new races may be\ndeveloped out of the pre-existing ones _ad infinitum_, or, at least,\nwithin any limit at present determined. Given sufficient time and\nsufficiently careful selection, and the multitude of races which may\narise from a common stock is as astonishing as are the extreme\nstructural differences which they may present. A remarkable example of\nthis is to be found in the rock-pigeon, which Mr. Darwin has, in our\nopinion, satisfactorily demonstrated to be the progenitor of all our\ndomestic pigeons, of which there are certainly more than a hundred\nwell-marked races. The most noteworthy of these races are, the four\ngreat stocks known to the \"fancy\" as tumblers, pouters, carriers, and\nfantails; birds which not only differ most singularly in size, colour,\nand habits, but in the form of the beak and of the skull: in the\nproportions of the beak to the skull; in the number of tail-feathers; in\nthe absolute and relative size of the feet; in the presence or absence\nof the uropygial gland; in the number of vertebrae in the back; in short,\nin precisely those characters in which the genera and species of birds\ndiffer from one another.\n\nAnd it is most remarkable and instructive to observe, that none of these\nraces can be shown to have been originated by the action of changes in\nwhat are commonly called external circumstances, upon the wild\nrock-pigeon. On the contrary, from time immemorial, pigeon fanciers have\nhad essentially similar methods of treating their pets, which have been\nhoused, fed, protected and cared for in much the same way in all\npigeonries. In fact, there is no case better adapted than that of the\npigeons, to refute the doctrine which one sees put forth on high\nauthority, that \"no other characters than those founded on the\ndevelopment of bone for the attachment of muscles\" are capable of\nvariation. In precise contradiction of this hasty assertion, Mr.\nDarwin's researches prove that the skeleton of the wings in domestic\npigeons has hardly varied at all from that of the wild type; while, on\nthe other hand, it is in exactly those respects, such as the relative\nlength of the beak and skull, the number of the vertebrae, and the number\nof the tail-feathers, in which muscular exertion can have no important\ninfluence, that the utmost amount of variation has taken place.\n\n\nWe have said that the following out of the properties exhibited by\nphysiological species would lead us into difficulties, and at this point\nthey begin to be obvious; for, if, as a result of spontaneous variation\nand of selective breeding, the progeny of a common stock may become\nseparated into groups distinguished from one another by constant, not\nsexual, morphological characters, it is clear that the physiological\ndefinition of species is likely to clash with the morphological\ndefinition. No one would hesitate to describe the pouter and the tumbler\nas distinct species, if they were found fossil, or if their skins and\nskeletons were imported, as those of exotic wild birds commonly\nare--and, without doubt, if considered alone, they are good and distinct\nmorphological species. On the other hand, they are not physiological\nspecies, for they are descended from a common stock, the rock-pigeon.\n\nUnder these circumstances, as it is admitted on all sides that races\noccur in Nature, how are we to know whether any apparently distinct\nanimals are really of different physiological species, or not, seeing\nthat the amount of morphological difference is no safe guide? Is there\nany test of a physiological species? The usual answer of physiologists\nis in the affirmative. It is said that such a test is to be found in the\nphaenomena of hybridization--in the results of crossing races, as\ncompared with the results of crossing species.\n\nSo far as the evidence goes at present, individuals, of what are\ncertainly known to be mere races produced by selection, however distinct\nthey may appear to be, not only breed freely together, but the offspring\nof such crossed races are only perfectly fertile with one another. Thus,\nthe spaniel and the greyhound, the dray-horse and the Arab, the pouter\nand the tumbler, breed together with perfect freedom, and their\nmongrels, if matched with other mongrels of the same kind, are equally\nfertile.\n\nOn the other hand, there can be no doubt that the individuals of many\nnatural species are either absolutely infertile, if crossed with\nindividuals of other species, or, if they give rise to hybrid offspring,\nthe hybrids so produced are infertile when paired together. The horse\nand the ass, for instance, if so crossed, give rise to the mule, and\nthere is no certain evidence of offspring ever having been produced by a\nmale and female mule. The unions of the rock-pigeon and the ring-pigeon\nappear to be equally barren of result. Here, then, says the\nphysiologist, we have a means of distinguishing any two true species\nfrom any two varieties. If a male and a female, selected from each\ngroup, produce offspring, and that offspring is fertile with others\nproduced in the same way, the groups are races and not species. If, on\nthe other hand, no result ensues, or if the offspring are infertile with\nothers produced in the same way, they are true physiological species.\nThe test would be an admirable one, if, in the first place, it were\nalways practicable to apply it, and if, in the second, it always\nyielded results susceptible of a definite interpretation. Unfortunately,\nin the great majority of cases, this touchstone for species is wholly\ninapplicable.\n\nThe constitution of many wild animals is so altered by confinement that\nthey will not breed even with their own females, so that the negative\nresults obtained from crosses are of no value; and the antipathy of wild\nanimals of different species for one another, or even of wild and tame\nmembers of the same species, is ordinarily so great, that it is hopeless\nto look for such unions in Nature. The hermaphrodism of most plants, the\ndifficulty in the way of ensuring the absence of their own, or the\nproper working of other pollen, are obstacles of no less magnitude in\napplying the test to them. And in both, animals and plants is superadded\nthe further difficulty, that experiments must be continued over a long\ntime for the purpose of ascertaining the fertility of the mongrel or\nhybrid progeny, as well as of the first crosses from which they spring.\n\nNot only do these great practical difficulties lie in the way of\napplying the hybridization test, but even when this oracle can be\nquestioned, its replies are sometimes as doubtful as those of Delphi.\nFor example, cases are cited by Mr. Darwin, of plants which are more\nfertile with the pollen of another species than with their own; and\nthere are others, such as certain _fuci_, whose male element will\nfertilize the ovule of a plant of distinct species, while the males of\nthe latter species are ineffective with the females of the first. So\nthat, in the last-named instance, a physiologist, who should cross the\ntwo species in one way, would decide that they were true species; while\nanother, who should cross them in the reverse way, would, with equal\njustice, according to the rule, pronounce them to be mere races. Several\nplants, which there is great reason to believe are mere varieties, are\nalmost sterile when crossed; while both animals and plants, which have\nalways been regarded by naturalists as of distinct species, turn out,\nwhen the test is applied, to be perfectly fertile. Again, the sterility\nor fertility of crosses seems to bear no relation to the structural\nresemblances or differences of the members of any two groups.\n\nMr. Darwin has discussed this question with singular ability and\ncircumspection, and his conclusions are summed up as follow, at page 276\nof his work:--\n\n     \"First crosses between forms sufficiently distinct to be ranked as\n     species, and their hybrids, are very generally, but not\n     universally, sterile. The sterility is of all degrees, and is often\n     so slight that the two most careful experimentalists who have ever\n     lived have come to diametrically opposite conclusions in ranking\n     forms by this test. The sterility is innately variable in\n     individuals of the same species, and is eminently susceptible of\n     favourable and unfavourable conditions. The degree of sterility\n     does not strictly follow systematic affinity, but is governed by\n     several curious and complex laws. It is generally different, and\n     sometimes widely different, in reciprocal crosses between the same\n     two species. It is not always equal in degree in a first cross, and\n     in the hybrid produced from this cross.\n\n     \"In the same manner as in grafting trees, the capacity of one\n     species or variety to take on another is incidental on generally\n     unknown differences in their vegetative systems; so in crossing,\n     the greater or less facility of one species to unite with another\n     is incidental on unknown differences in their reproductive systems.\n     There is no more reason to think that species have been specially\n     endowed with various degrees of sterility to prevent them crossing\n     and breeding in Nature, than to think that trees have been\n     specially endowed with various and somewhat analogous degrees of\n     difficulty in being grafted together, in order to prevent them\n     becoming inarched in our forests.\n\n     \"The sterility of first crosses between pure species, which have\n     their reproductive systems perfect, seems to depend on several\n     circumstances; in some cases largely on the early death of the\n     embryo. The sterility of hybrids which have their reproductive\n     systems imperfect, and which have had this system and their whole\n     organization disturbed by being compounded of two distinct species,\n     seems closely allied to that sterility which so frequently affects\n     pure species when their natural conditions of life have been\n     disturbed. This view is supported by a parallelism of another kind;\n     namely, that the crossing of forms, only slightly different, is\n     favourable to the vigour and fertility of the offspring; and that\n     slight changes in the conditions of life are apparently favourable\n     to the vigour and fertility of all organic beings. It is not\n     surprising that the degree of difficulty in uniting two species,\n     and the degree of sterility of their hybrid offspring, should\n     generally correspond, though due to distinct causes; for both\n     depend on the amount of difference of some kind between the species\n     which are crossed. Nor is it surprising that the facility of\n     effecting a first cross, the fertility of hybrids produced from it,\n     and the capacity of being grafted together--though this latter\n     capacity evidently depends on widely different\n     circumstances--should all run to a certain extent parallel with the\n     systematic affinity of the forms which are subjected to experiment;\n     for systematic affinity attempts to express all kinds of\n     resemblance between all species.\n\n     \"First crosses between forms known to be varieties, or sufficiently\n     alike to be considered as varieties, and their mongrel offspring,\n     are very generally, but not quite universally, fertile. Nor is this\n     nearly general and perfect fertility surprising, when we remember\n     how liable we are to argue in a circle with respect to varieties in\n     a state of Nature; and when we remember that the greater number of\n     varieties have been produced under domestication by the selection\n     of mere external differences, and not of differences in the\n     reproductive system. In all other respects, excluding fertility,\n     there is a close general resemblance between hybrids and\n     mongrels.\"--Pp. 276-8.\n\nWe fully agree with the general tenor of this weighty passage; but\nforcible as are these arguments, and little as the value of fertility or\ninfertility as a test of species may be, it must not be forgotten that\nthe really important fact, so far as the inquiry into the origin of\nspecies goes, is, that there are such things in Nature as groups of\nanimals and of plants, whose members are incapable of fertile union with\nthose of other groups; and that there are such things as hybrids, which\nare absolutely sterile when crossed with other hybrids. For if such\nphaenomena as these were exhibited by only two of those assemblages of\nliving objects, to which the name of species (whether it be used in its\nphysiological or in its morphological sense) is given, it would have to\nbe accounted for by any theory of the origin of species, and every\ntheory which could not account for it would be, so far, imperfect.\n\nUp to this point we have been dealing with matters of fact, and the\nstatements which we have laid before the reader would, to the best of\nour knowledge, be admitted to contain a fair exposition of what is at\npresent known respecting the essential properties of species, by all who\nhave studied the question. And whatever may be his theoretical views, no\nnaturalist will probably be disposed to demur to the following summary\nof that exposition:--\n\nLiving beings, whether animals or plants, are divisible into multitudes\nof distinctly definable kinds, which are morphological species. They are\nalso divisible into groups of individuals, which breed freely together,\ntending to reproduce their like, and are physiological species. Normally\nresembling their parents, the offspring of members of these species are\nstill liable to vary, and the variation may be perpetuated by selection,\nas a race, which race, in many cases, presents all the characteristics\nof a morphological species. But it is not as yet proved that a race ever\nexhibits, when crossed with another race of the same species, those\nphaenomena of hybridization which are exhibited by many species when\ncrossed with other species. On the other hand, not only is it not\nproved that all species give rise to hybrids infertile _inter se_, but\nthere is much reason to believe that, in crossing, species exhibit every\ngradation from perfect sterility to perfect fertility.\n\n\nSuch are the most essential characteristics of species. Even were man\nnot one of them--a member of the same system and subject to the same\nlaws--the question of their origin, their causal connexion, that is,\nwith the other phaenomena of the universe, must have attracted his\nattention, as soon as his intelligence had raised itself above the level\nof his daily wants.\n\nIndeed history relates that such was the case, and has embalmed for us\nthe speculations upon the origin of living beings, which were among the\nearliest products of the dawning intellectual activity of man. In those\nearly days positive knowledge was not to be had, but the craving after\nit needed, at all hazards, to be satisfied, and according to the\ncountry, or the turn of thought of the speculator, the suggestion that\nall living things arose from the mud of the Nile, from a primeval egg,\nor from some more anthropomorphic agency, afforded a sufficient\nresting-place for his curiosity. The myths of Paganism are as dead as\nOsiris or Zeus, and the man who should revive them, in opposition to the\nknowledge of our time, would be justly laughed to scorn; but the coeval\nimaginations current among the rude inhabitants of Palestine, recorded\nby writers whose very name and age are admitted by every scholar to be\nunknown, have unfortunately not yet shared their fate, but, even at this\nday, are regarded by nine-tenths of the civilized world as the\nauthoritative standard of fact and the criterion of the justice of\nscientific conclusions, in all that relates to the origin of things,\nand, among them, of species. In this nineteenth century, as at the dawn\nof modern physical science, the cosmogony of the semi-barbarous Hebrew\nis the incubus of the philosopher and the opprobrium of the orthodox.\nWho shall number the patient and earnest seekers after truth, from the\ndays of Galileo until now, whose lives have been embittered and their\ngood name blasted by the mistaken zeal of Bibliolaters? Who shall count\nthe host of weaker men whose sense of truth has been destroyed in the\neffort to harmonize impossibilities--whose life has been wasted in the\nattempt to force the generous new wine of Science into the old bottles\nof Judaism, compelled by the outcry of the same strong party?\n\nIt is true that if philosophers have suffered, their cause has been\namply avenged. Extinguished theologians lie about the cradle of every\nscience as the strangled snakes beside that of Hercules; and history\nrecords that whenever science and orthodoxy have been fairly opposed,\nthe latter has been forced to retire from the lists, bleeding and\ncrushed, if not annihilated; scotched, if not slain. But orthodoxy is\nthe Bourbon of the world of thought. It learns not, neither can it\nforget; and though, at present, bewildered and afraid to move, it is as\nwilling as ever to insist that the first chapter of Genesis contains the\nbeginning and the end of sound science; and to visit, with such petty\nthunderbolts as its half-paralysed hands can hurl, those who refuse to\ndegrade Nature to the level of primitive Judaism.\n\nPhilosophers, on the other hand, have no such aggressive tendencies.\nWith eyes fixed on the noble goal to which \"per aspera et ardua\" they\ntend, they may, now and then, be stirred to momentary wrath by the\nunnecessary obstacles with which the ignorant, or the malicious,\nencumber, if they cannot bar, the difficult path; but why should their\nsouls be deeply vexed? The majesty of Fact is on their side, and the\nelemental forces of Nature are working for them. Not a star comes to the\nmeridian at its calculated time but testifies to the justice of their\nmethods--their beliefs are \"one with the falling rain and with the\ngrowing corn.\" By doubt they are established, and open inquiry is their\nbosom friend. Such men have no fear of traditions however venerable, and\nno respect for them when they become mischievous and obstructive; but\nthey have better than mere antiquarian business in hand, and if dogmas,\nwhich ought to be fossil but are not, are not forced upon their notice,\nthey are too happy to treat them as non-existent.\n\n\nThe hypotheses respecting the origin of species which profess to stand\nupon a scientific basis, and, as such, alone demand serious attention,\nare of two kinds. The one, the \"special creation\" hypothesis, presumes\nevery species to have originated from one or more stocks, these not\nbeing the result of the modification of any other form of living\nmatter--or arising by natural agencies--but being produced, as such, by\na supernatural creative act.\n\nThe other, the so-called \"transmutation\" hypothesis, considers that all\nexisting species are the result of the modification of pre-existing\nspecies, and those of their predecessors, by agencies similar to those\nwhich at the present day produce varieties and races, and therefore in\nan altogether natural way; and it is a probable, though not a necessary\nconsequence of this hypothesis, that all living beings have arisen from\na single stock. With respect to the origin of this primitive stock, or\nstocks, the doctrine of the origin of species is obviously not\nnecessarily concerned. The transmutation hypothesis, for example, is\nperfectly consistent either with the conception of a special creation of\nthe primitive germ, or with the supposition of its having arisen, as a\nmodification of inorganic matter, by natural causes.\n\nThe doctrine of special creation owes its existence very largely to the\nsupposed necessity of making science accord with the Hebrew cosmogony;\nbut it is curious to observe that, as the doctrine is at present\nmaintained by men of science, it is as hopelessly inconsistent with the\nHebrew view as any other hypothesis.\n\nIf there be any result which has come more clearly out of geological\ninvestigation than another, it is, that the vast series of extinct\nanimals and plants is not divisible, as it was once supposed to be, into\ndistinct groups, separated by sharply marked boundaries. There are no\ngreat gulfs between epochs and formations--no successive periods marked\nby the appearance of plants, of water animals, and of land animals, _en\nmasse_. Every year adds to the list of links between what the older\ngeologists supposed to be widely separated epochs: witness the crags\nlinking the drift with the older tertiaries; the Maestricht beds linking\nthe tertiaries with the chalk; the St. Cassian beds exhibiting an\nabundant fauna of mixed mesozoic and palaeozoic types, in rocks of an\nepoch once supposed to be eminently poor in life; witness, lastly, the\nincessant disputes as to whether a given stratum shall be reckoned\ndevonian or carboniferous, silurian or devonian, cambrian or silurian.\n\nThis truth is further illustrated in a most interesting manner by the\nimpartial and highly competent testimony of M. Pictet, from whose\ncalculations of what percentage of the genera of animals, existing in\nany formation, lived during the preceding formation, it results that in\nno case is the proportion less than _one-third_, or 33 per cent. It is\nthe triassic formation, or the commencement of the mesozoic epoch, which\nhas received this smallest inheritance from preceding ages. The other\nformations not uncommonly exhibit 60, 80, or even 94 per cent. of genera\nin common with those whose remains are imbedded in their predecessor.\nNot only is this true, but the subdivisions of each formation exhibit\nnew species characteristic of, and found only in, them; and, in many\ncases, as in the lias for example, the separate beds of these\nsubdivisions are distinguished by well-marked and peculiar forms of\nlife. A section, a hundred feet thick, will exhibit, at different\nheights, a dozen species of ammonite, none of which passes beyond its\nparticular zone of limestone, or clay, into the zone below it or into\nthat above it; so that those who adopt the doctrine of special creation\nmust be prepared to admit that at intervals of time, corresponding with\nthe thickness of these beds, the Creator thought fit to interfere with\nthe natural course of events for the purpose of making a new ammonite.\nIt is not easy to transplant oneself into the frame of mind of those who\ncan accept such a conclusion as this, on any evidence short of absolute\ndemonstration; and it is difficult to see what is to be gained by so\ndoing, since, as we have said, it is obvious that such a view of the\norigin of living beings is utterly opposed to the Hebrew cosmogony.\nDeserving no aid from the powerful arm of bibliolatry, then, does the\nreceived form of the hypothesis of special creation derive any support\nfrom science or sound logic? Assuredly not much. The arguments brought\nforward in its favour all take one form: If species were not\nsupernaturally created, we cannot understand the facts _x_, or _y_, or\n_z_; we cannot understand the structure of animals or plants, unless we\nsuppose they were contrived for special ends; we cannot understand the\nstructure of the eye, except by supposing it to have been made to see\nwith; we cannot understand instincts, unless we suppose animals to have\nbeen miraculously endowed with them.\n\nAs a question of dialectics, it must be admitted that this sort of\nreasoning is not very formidable to those who are not to be frightened\nby consequences. It is an _argumentum ad ignorantiam_--take this\nexplanation or be ignorant. But suppose we prefer to admit our ignorance\nrather than adopt a hypothesis at variance with all the teachings of\nNature? Or, suppose for a moment we admit the explanation, and then\nseriously ask ourselves how much the wiser are we; what does the\nexplanation explain? Is it any more than a grandiloquent way of\nannouncing the fact, that we really know nothing about the matter? A\nphenomenon is explained when it is shown to be a case of some general\nlaw of Nature; but the supernatural interposition of the Creator can, by\nthe nature of the case, exemplify no law, and if species have really\narisen in this way, it is absurd to attempt to discuss their origin.\n\nOr, lastly, let us ask ourselves whether any amount of evidence which\nthe nature of our faculties permits us to attain, can justify us in\nasserting that any phaenomenon is out of the reach of natural causation.\nTo this end it is obviously necessary that we should know all the\nconsequences to which all possible combinations, continued through\nunlimited time, can give rise. If we knew these, and found none\ncompetent to originate species, we should have good ground for denying\ntheir origin by natural causation. Till we know them, any hypothesis is\nbetter than one which involves us in such miserable presumption.\n\nBut the hypothesis of special creation is not only a mere specious mask\nfor our ignorance; its existence in Biology marks the youth and\nimperfection of the science. For what is the history of every science\nbut the history of the elimination of the notion of creative, or other\ninterferences, with the natural order of the phaenomena which are the\nsubject-matter of that science? When Astronomy was young \"the morning\nstars sang together for joy,\" and the planets were guided in their\ncourses by celestial hands. Now, the harmony of the stars has resolved\nitself into gravitation according to the inverse squares of the\ndistances, and the orbits of the planets are deducible from the laws of\nthe forces which allow a schoolboy's stone to break a window. The\nlightning was the angel of the Lord; but it has pleased Providence, in\nthese modern times, that science should make it the humble messenger of\nman, and we know that every flash that shimmers about the horizon on a\nsummer's evening is determined by ascertainable conditions, and that its\ndirection and brightness might, if our knowledge of these were great\nenough, have been calculated.\n\nThe solvency of great mercantile companies rests on the validity of the\nlaws which have been ascertained to govern the seeming irregularity of\nthat human life which the moralist bewails as the most uncertain of\nthings; plague, pestilence, and famine are admitted, by all but fools,\nto be the natural result of causes for the most part fully within human\ncontrol, and not the unavoidable tortures inflicted by wrathful\nOmnipotence upon his helpless handiwork.\n\nHarmonious order governing eternally continuous progress--the web and\nwoof of matter and force interweaving by slow degrees, without a broken\nthread, that veil which lies between us and the Infinite--that universe\nwhich alone we know or can know; such is the picture which science draws\nof the world, and in proportion as any part of that picture is in unison\nwith the rest, so may we feel sure that it is rightly painted. Shall\nBiology alone remain out of harmony with her sister sciences?\n\nSuch arguments against the hypothesis of the direct creation of species\nas these are plainly enough deducible from general considerations; but\nthere are, in addition, phaenomena exhibited by species themselves, and\nyet not so much a part of their very essence as to have required earlier\nmention, which are in the highest degree perplexing, if we adopt the\npopularly accepted hypothesis. Such are the facts of distribution in\nspace and in time; the singular phaenomena brought to light by the study\nof development; the structural relations of species upon which our\nsystems of classification are founded; the great doctrines of\nphilosophical anatomy, such as that of homology, or of the community of\nstructural plan exhibited by large groups of species differing very\nwidely in their habits and functions.\n\nThe species of animals which inhabit the sea on opposite sides of the\nisthmus of Panama are wholly distinct;[63] the animals and plants which\ninhabit islands are commonly distinct from those of the neighbouring\nmainlands, and yet have a similarity of aspect. The mammals of the\nlatest tertiary epoch in the Old and New Worlds belong to the same\ngenera, or family groups, as those which now inhabit the same great\ngeographical area. The crocodilian reptiles which existed in the\nearliest secondary epoch were similar in general structure to those now\nliving, but exhibit slight differences in their vertebrae, nasal\npassages, and one or two other points. The guinea-pig has teeth which\nare shed before it is born, and hence can never subserve the masticatory\npurpose for which they seem contrived, and, in like manner, the female\ndugong has tusks which never cut the gum. All the members of the same\ngreat group run through similar conditions in their development, and all\ntheir parts, in the adult state, are arranged according to the same\nplan. Man is more like a gorilla than a gorilla is like a lemur. Such\nare a few, taken at random, among the multitudes of similar facts which\nmodern research has established; but when the student seeks for an\nexplanation of them from the supporters of the received hypothesis of\nthe origin of species, the reply he receives is, in substance, of\nOriental simplicity and brevity--\"Mashallah! it so pleases God!\" There\nare different species on opposite sides of the isthmus of Panama,\nbecause they were created different on the two sides. The pliocene\nmammals are like the existing ones, because such was the plan of\ncreation; and we find rudimental organs and similarity of plan, because\nit has pleased the Creator to set before himself a \"divine exemplar or\narchetype,\" and to copy it in his works; and somewhat ill, those who\nhold this view imply, in some of them. That such verbal hocus-pocus\nshould be received as science will one day be regarded as evidence of\nthe low state of intelligence in the nineteenth century, just as we\namuse ourselves with the phraseology about Nature's abhorrence of a\nvacuum, wherewith Torricelli's compatriots were satisfied to explain the\nrise of water in a pump. And be it recollected that this sort of\nsatisfaction works not only negative but positive ill, by discouraging\ninquiry, and so depriving man of the usufruct of one of the most fertile\nfields of his great patrimony, Nature.\n\nThe objections to the doctrine of the origin of species by special\ncreation which have been detailed, must have occurred, with more or less\nforce, to the mind of every one who has seriously and independently\nconsidered the subject. It is therefore no wonder that, from time to\ntime, this hypothesis should have been met by counter hypotheses, all as\nwell, and some better, founded than itself; and it is curious to remark\nthat the inventors of the opposing views seem to have been led into them\nas much by their knowledge of geology, as by their acquaintance with\nbiology. In fact, when the mind has once admitted the conception of the\ngradual production of the present physical state of our globe, by\nnatural causes operating through long ages of time, it will be little\ndisposed to allow that living beings have made their appearance in\nanother way, and the speculations of De Maillet and his successors are\nthe natural complement of Scilla's demonstration of the true nature of\nfossils.\n\nA contemporary of Newton and of Leibnitz, sharing therefore in the\nintellectual activity of the remarkable age which witnessed the birth of\nmodern physical science, Benoit de Maillet spent a long life as a\nconsular agent of the French Government in various Mediterranean ports.\nFor sixteen years, in fact, he held the office of Consul-General in\nEgypt, and the wonderful phaenomena offered by the valley of the Nile\nappear to have strongly impressed his mind, to have directed his\nattention to all facts of a similar order which came within his\nobservation, and to have led him to speculate on the origin of the\npresent condition of our globe and of its inhabitants. But, with all his\nardour for science, De Maillet seems to have hesitated to publish views\nwhich, notwithstanding the ingenious attempts to reconcile them with the\nHebrew hypothesis contained in the preface to \"Telliamed,\" were hardly\nlikely to be received with favour by his contemporaries.\n\nBut a short time had elapsed since more than one of the great anatomists\nand physicists of the Italian school had paid dearly for their\nendeavours to dissipate some of the prevalent errors; and their\nillustrious pupil, Harvey, the founder of modern physiology, had not\nfared so well, in a country less oppressed by the benumbing influences\nof theology, as to tempt any man to follow his example. Probably not\nuninfluenced by these considerations, his Catholic majesty's\nConsul-General for Egypt kept his theories to himself throughout a long\nlife, for \"Telliamed,\" the only scientific work which is known to have\nproceeded from his pen, was not printed till 1735, when its author had\nreached the ripe age of seventy-nine; and though De Maillet lived three\nyears longer, his book was not given to the world before 1748. Even then\nit was anonymous to those who were not in the secret of the anagramatic\ncharacter of its title; and the preface and dedication are so worded as,\nin case of necessity, to give the printer a fair chance of falling back\non the excuse that the work was intended for a mere _jeu d'esprit_.\n\nThe speculations of the supposititious Indian sage, though quite as\nsound as those of many a \"Mosaic Geology,\" which sells exceedingly well,\nhave no great value if we consider them by the light of modern science.\nThe waters are supposed to have originally covered the whole globe; to\nhave deposited the rocky masses which compose its mountains by processes\ncomparable to those which are now forming mud, sand, and shingle; and\nthen to have gradually lowered their level, leaving the spoils of their\nanimal and vegetable inhabitants embedded in the strata. As the dry land\nappeared, certain of the aquatic animals are supposed to have taken to\nit, and to have become gradually adapted to terrestrial and aerial modes\nof existence. But if we regard the general tenor and style of the\nreasoning in relation to the state of knowledge of the day, two\ncircumstances appear very well worthy of remark. The first, that De\nMaillet had a notion of the modifiability of living forms (though\nwithout any precise information on the subject), and how such\nmodifiability might account for the origin of species; the second, that\nhe very clearly apprehended the great modern geological doctrine, so\nstrongly insisted upon by Hutton, and so ably and comprehensively\nexpounded by Lyell, that we must look to existing causes for the\nexplanation of past geological events. Indeed, the following passage of\nthe preface, in which De Maillet is supposed to speak of the Indian\nphilosopher Telliamed, his _alter ego_, might have been written by the\nmost philosophical uniformitarian of the present day:--\n\n     \"Ce qu'il y a d'etonnant, est que pour arriver a ces connoissances\n     il semble avoir perverti l'ordre naturel, pui-qu'au lieu de\n     s'attacher d'abord a rechercher l'origine de notre globe il a\n     commence par travailler a s'instruire de la nature. Mais a\n     l'entendre, ce renversement de l'ordre a ete pour lui l'effet d'un\n     genie favorable qui l'a conduit pas a pas et comme par la main aux\n     decouvertes les plus sublimes. C'est en decomposant la substance de\n     ce globe par une anatomie exacte de toutes ses parties qu'il a\n     premierement appris de quelles matieres il etait compose et quels\n     arrangemens ces memes matieres observaient entre elles. Ces\n     lumieres jointes a l'esprit de comparaison toujours necessaire a\n     quiconque entreprend de percer les voiles dont la nature aime a se\n     cacher, ont servi de guide a notre philosophe pour parvenir a des\n     connoissances plus interessantes. Par la matiere et l'arrangement\n     de ces compositions il pretend avoir reconnu quelle est la\n     veritable origine de ce globe que nous habitons, comment et par qui\n     il a ete forme.\"--Pp. xix. xx.\n\nBut De Maillet was before his age, and as could hardly fail to happen to\none who speculated on a zoological and botanical question before\nLinnaeus, and on a physiological problem before Haller, he fell into\ngreat errors here and there; and hence, perhaps, the general neglect of\nhis work. Robinet's speculations are rather behind, than in advance of,\nthose of De Maillet; and though Linnaeus may have played with the\nhypothesis of transmutation, it obtained no serious support until\nLamarck adopted it, and advocated it with great ability in his\n\"Philosophie Zoologique.\"\n\nImpelled towards the hypothesis of the transmutation of species, partly\nby his general cosmological and geological views; partly by the\nconception of a graduated, though irregularly branching, scale of being,\nwhich had arisen out of his profound study of plants and of the lower\nforms of animal life, Lamarck, whose general line of thought often\nclosely resembles that of De Maillet, made a great advance upon the\ncrude and merely speculative manner in which that writer deals with the\nquestion of the origin of living beings, by endeavouring to find\nphysical causes competent to effect that change of one species into\nanother, which De Maillet had only supposed to occur. And Lamarck\nconceived that he had found in Nature such causes, amply sufficient for\nthe purpose in view. It is a physiological fact, he says, that organs\nare increased in size by action, atrophied by inaction; it is another\nphysiological fact that modifications produced are transmissible to\noffspring. Change the actions of an animal, therefore, and you will\nchange its structure, by increasing the development of the parts newly\nbrought into use and by the diminution of those less used; but by\naltering the circumstances which surround it you will alter its actions,\nand hence, in the long run, change of circumstance must produce change\nof organization. All the species of animals, therefore, are, in\nLamarck's view, the result of the indirect action of changes of\ncircumstance upon those primitive germs which he considered to have\noriginally arisen, by spontaneous generation, within the waters of the\nglobe. It is curious, however, that Lamarck should insist so\nstrongly[64] as he has done, that circumstances never in any degree\ndirectly modify the form or the organization of animals, but only\noperate by changing their wants and consequently their actions; for he\nthereby brings upon himself the obvious question, how, then, do plants,\nwhich cannot be said to have wants or actions, become modified? To this\nhe replies, that they are modified by the changes in their nutritive\nprocesses, which are effected by changing circumstances; and it does not\nseem to have occurred to him that such changes might be as well supposed\nto take place among animals.\n\nWhen we have said that Lamarck felt that mere speculation was not the\nway to arrive at the origin of species, but that it was necessary, in\norder to the establishment of any sound theory on the subject, to\ndiscover by observation or otherwise, some _vera causa_, competent to\ngive rise to them; that he affirmed the true order of classification to\ncoincide with the order of their development one from another; that he\ninsisted on the necessity of allowing sufficient time, very strongly;\nand that all the varieties of instinct and reason were traced back by\nhim to the same cause as that which has given rise to species, we have\nenumerated his chief contributions to the advance of the question. On\nthe other hand, from his ignorance of any power in Nature competent to\nmodify the structure of animals, except the development of parts, or\natrophy of them, in consequence of a change of needs, Lamarck was led to\nattach infinitely greater weight than it deserves to this agency, and\nthe absurdities into which he was led have met with deserved\ncondemnation. Of the struggle for existence, on which, as, we shall\nsee, Mr. Darwin lays such great stress, he had no conception; indeed, he\ndoubts whether there really are such things as extinct species, unless\nthey be such large animals as may have met their death at the hands of\nman; and so little does he dream of there being any other destructive\ncauses at work, that, in discussing the possible existence of fossil\nshells, he asks, \"Pourquoi d'ailleurs seroient-ils perdues des que\nl'homme n'a pu operer leur destruction?\" (Phil. Zool., vol. i. p. 77.)\nOf the influence of selection Lamarck has as little notion, and he makes\nno use of the wonderful phaenomena which are exhibited by domesticated\nanimals, and illustrate its powers. The vast influence of Cuvier was\nemployed against the Lamarckian views, and, as the untenability of some\nof his conclusions was easily shown, his doctrines sank under the\nopprobium of scientific, as well as of theological, heterodoxy. Nor have\nthe efforts made of late years to revive them tended to re-establish\ntheir credit in the minds of sound thinkers acquainted with the facts of\nthe case; indeed it may be doubted whether Lamarck has not suffered more\nfrom his friends than from his foes.\n\nTwo years ago, in fact, though we venture to question if even the\nstrongest supporters of the special creation hypothesis had not, now and\nthen, an uneasy consciousness that all was not right, their position\nseemed more impregnable than ever, if not by its own inherent strength,\nat any rate by the obvious failure of all the attempts which had been\nmade to carry it. On the other hand, however much the few, who thought\ndeeply on the question of species, might be repelled by the generally\nreceived dogmas, they saw no way of escaping from them, save by the\nadoption of suppositions, so little justified by experiment or by\nobservation, as to be at least equally distasteful.\n\nThe choice lay between two absurdities and a middle condition of uneasy\nscepticism; which last, however unpleasant and unsatisfactory, was\nobviously the only justifiable state of mind under the circumstances.\n\nSuch being the general ferment in the minds of naturalists, it is no\nwonder that they mustered strong in the rooms of the Linnaean Society, on\nthe 1st of July of the year 1858, to hear two papers by authors living\non opposite sides of the globe, working out their results independently,\nand yet professing to have discovered one and the same solution of all\nthe problems connected with species. The one of these authors was an\nable naturalist, Mr. Wallace, who had been employed for some years in\nstudying the productions of the islands of the Indian Archipelago, and\nwho had forwarded a memoir embodying his views to Mr. Darwin, for\ncommunication to the Linnaean Society. On perusing the essay, Mr. Darwin\nwas not a little surprised to find that it embodied some of the leading\nideas of a great work which he had been preparing for twenty years, and\nparts of which, containing a development of the very same views, had\nbeen perused by his private friends fifteen or sixteen years before.\nPerplexed in what manner to do full justice both to his friend and to\nhimself, Mr. Darwin placed the matter in the hands of Dr. Hooker and Sir\nCharles Lyell, by whose advice he communicated a brief abstract of his\nown views to the Linnaean Society, at the same time that Mr. Wallace's\npaper was read. Of that abstract, the work on the \"Origin of Species\" is\nan enlargement; but a complete statement of Mr. Darwin's doctrine is\nlooked for in the large and well-illustrated work which he is said to be\npreparing for publication.\n\n\nThe Darwinian hypothesis has the merit of being eminently simple and\ncomprehensible in principle, and its essential positions may be stated\nin a very few words: all species have been produced by the development\nof varieties from common stocks by the conversion of these first into\npermanent races and then into new species, by the process of _natural\nselection_, which process is essentially identical with that artificial\nselection by which man has originated the races of domestic animals--the\n_struggle for existence_ taking the place of man, and exerting, in the\ncase of natural selection, that selective action which he performs in\nartificial selection.\n\nThe evidence brought forward by Mr. Darwin in support of his hypothesis\nis of three kinds. First, he endeavours to prove that species may be\noriginated by selection; secondly, he attempts to show that natural\ncauses are competent to exert selection; and thirdly, he tries to prove\nthat the most remarkable and apparently anomalous phaenomena exhibited by\nthe distribution, development, and mutual relations of species, can be\nshown to be deducible from the general doctrine of their origin, which\nhe propounds, combined with the known facts of geological change; and\nthat, even if all these phaenomena are not at present explicable by it,\nnone are necessarily inconsistent with it.\n\nThere cannot be a doubt that the method of inquiry which Mr. Darwin has\nadopted is not only rigorously in accordance with the canons of\nscientific logic, but that it is the only adequate method. Critics\nexclusively trained in classics or in mathematics, who have never\ndetermined a scientific fact in their lives by induction from experiment\nor observation, prate learnedly about Mr. Darwin's method, which is not\ninductive enough, not Baconian enough, forsooth, for them. But even if\npractical acquaintance with the process of scientific investigation is\ndenied them, they may learn, by the perusal of Mr. Mill's admirable\nchapter \"On the Deductive Method,\" that there are multitudes of\nscientific inquiries, in which the method of pure induction helps the\ninvestigator but a very little way.\n\n     \"The mode of investigation,\" says Mr. Mill, \"which, from the proved\n     inapplicability of direct methods of observation and experiment,\n     remains to us as the main source of the knowledge we possess, or\n     can acquire, respecting the conditions and laws of recurrence of\n     the more complex phaenomena, is called, in its most general\n     expression, the deductive method, and consists of three operations:\n     the first, one of direct induction; the second, of ratiocination;\n     and the third, of verification.\"\n\nNow, the conditions which have determined the existence of species are\nnot only exceedingly complex, but, so far as the great majority of them\nare concerned, are necessarily beyond our cognizance. But what Mr.\nDarwin has attempted to do is in exact accordance with the rule laid\ndown by Mr. Mill; he has endeavoured to determine certain great facts\ninductively, by observation and experiment; he has then reasoned from\nthe data thus furnished; and lastly, he has tested the validity of his\nratiocination by comparing his deductions with the observed facts of\nNature. Inductively, Mr. Darwin endeavours to prove that species arise\nin a given way. Deductively, he desires to show that, if they arise in\nthat way, the facts of distribution, development, classification, &c.,\nmay be accounted for, _i.e._ may be deduced from their mode of origin,\ncombined with admitted changes in physical geography and climate, during\nan indefinite period. And this explanation, or coincidence of observed\nwith deduced facts, is, so far as it extends, a verification of the\nDarwinian view.\n\nThere is no fault to be found with Mr. Darwin's method, then; but it is\nanother question whether he has fulfilled all the conditions imposed by\nthat method. Is it satisfactorily proved, in fact, that species may be\noriginated by selection? that there is such a thing as natural\nselection? that none of the phaenomena exhibited by species are\ninconsistent with the origin of species in this way? If these questions\ncan be answered in the affirmative, Mr. Darwin's view steps out of the\nranks of hypotheses into those of proved theories; but, so long as the\nevidence at present adduced falls short of enforcing that affirmation,\nso long, to our minds, must the new doctrine be content to remain among\nthe former--an extremely valuable, and in the highest degree probable,\ndoctrine, indeed the only extant hypothesis which is worth anything in a\nscientific point of view; but still a hypothesis, and not yet the theory\nof species.\n\nAfter much consideration, and with assuredly no bias against Mr.\nDarwin's views, it is our clear conviction that, as the evidence stands,\nit is not absolutely proven that a group of animals, having all the\ncharacters exhibited by species in Nature, has ever been originated by\nselection, whether artificial or natural. Groups having the\nmorphological character of species, distinct and permanent races in\nfact, have been so produced over and over again; but there is no\npositive evidence, at present, that any group of animals has, by\nvariation and selective breeding, given rise to another group which was\neven in the least degree infertile with the first. Mr. Darwin is\nperfectly aware of this weak point, and brings forward a multitude of\ningenious and important arguments to diminish the force of the\nobjection. We admit the value of these arguments to their fullest\nextent; nay, we will go so far as to express our belief that\nexperiments, conducted by a skilful physiologist, would very probably\nobtain the desired production of mutually more or less infertile breeds\nfrom a common stock, in a comparatively few years; but still, as the\ncase stands at present, this \"little rift within the lute\" is not to be\ndisguised nor overlooked.\n\nIn the remainder of Mr. Darwin's argument our own private ingenuity has\nnot hitherto enabled us to pick holes of any great importance; and\njudging by what we hear and read, other adventurers in the same field do\nnot seem to have been much more fortunate. It has been urged, for\ninstance, that in his chapters on the struggle for existence and on\nnatural selection, Mr. Darwin does not so much prove that natural\nselection does occur, as that it must occur; but, in fact, no other sort\nof demonstration is attainable. A race does not attract our attention in\nNature until it has, in all probability, existed for a considerable\ntime, and then it is too late to inquire into the conditions of its\norigin. Again, it is said that there is no real analogy between the\nselection which takes place under domestication, by human influence, and\nany operation which can be effected by Nature, for man interferes\nintelligently. Reduced to its elements, this argument implies that an\neffect produced with trouble by an intelligent agent must, _a fortiori_,\nbe more troublesome, if not impossible, to an unintelligent agent. Even\nputting aside the question whether Nature, acting as she does according\nto definite and invariable laws, can be rightly called an unintelligent\nagent, such a position as this is wholly untenable. Mix salt and sand,\nand it shall puzzle the wisest of men, with his mere natural appliances,\nto separate all the grains of sand from all the grains of salt; but a\nshower of rain will effect the same object in ten minutes. And so, while\nman may find it tax all his intelligence to separate any variety which\narises, and to breed selectively from it, the destructive agencies\nincessantly at work in Nature, if they find one variety to be more\nsoluble in circumstances than the other, will inevitably, in the long\nrun, eliminate it.\n\nA frequent and a just objection to the Lamarckian hypothesis of the\ntransmutation of species is based upon the absence of transitional forms\nbetween many species. But against the Darwinian hypothesis this argument\nhas no force. Indeed, one of the most valuable and suggestive parts of\nMr. Darwin's work is that in which he proves, that the frequent absence\nof transitions is a necessary consequence of his doctrine, and that the\nstock whence two or more species have sprung, need in no respect be\nintermediate between these species. If any two species have arisen from\na common stock in the same way as the carrier and the pouter, say, have\narisen from the rock-pigeon, then the common stock of these two species\nneed be no more intermediate between the two than the rock-pigeon is\nbetween the carrier and pouter. Clearly appreciate the force of this\nanalogy, and all the arguments against the origin of species by\nselection, based on the absence of transitional forms, fall to the\nground. And Mr. Darwin's position might, we think, have been even\nstronger than it is if he had not embarrassed himself with the aphorism,\n\"_Natura non facit saltum_,\" which turns up so often in his pages. We\nbelieve, as we have said above, that Nature does make jumps now and\nthen, and a recognition of the fact is of no small importance in\ndisposing of many minor objections to the doctrine of transmutation.\n\nBut we must pause. The discussion of Mr. Darwin's arguments in detail\nwould lead us far beyond the limits within which we proposed, at\nstarting, to confine this article. Our object has been attained if we\nhave given an intelligible, however brief, account of the established\nfacts connected with species, and of the relation of the explanation of\nthose facts offered by Mr. Darwin to the theoretical views held by his\npredecessors and his contemporaries, and, above all, to the requirements\nof scientific logic. We have ventured to point out that it does not, as\nyet, satisfy all those requirements; but we do not hesitate to assert\nthat it is as superior to any preceding or contemporary hypothesis, in\nthe extent of observational and experimental basis on which it rests, in\nits rigorously scientific method, and in its power of explaining\nbiological phaenomena, as was the hypothesis of Copernicus to the\nspeculations of Ptolemy. But the planetary orbits turned out to be not\nquite circular after all, and, grand as was the service Copernicus\nrendered to science, Kepler and Newton had to come after him. What if\nthe orbit of Darwinism should be a little too circular? What if species\nshould offer residual phaenomena, here and there, not explicable by\nnatural selection? Twenty years hence naturalists may be in a position\nto say whether this is, or is not, the case; but in either event they\nwill owe the author of \"The Origin of Species\" an immense debt of\ngratitude. We should leave a very wrong impression on the reader's mind\nif we permitted him to suppose that the value of that work depends\nwholly on the ultimate justification of the theoretical views which it\ncontains. On the contrary, if they were disproved to-morrow, the book\nwould still be the best of its kind--the most compendious statement of\nwell-sifted facts bearing on the doctrine of species that has ever\nappeared. The chapters on Variation, on the Struggle for Existence, on\nInstinct, on Hybridism, on the Imperfection of the Geological Record, on\nGeographical Distribution, have not only no equals, but, so far as our\nknowledge goes, no competitors, within the range of biological\nliterature. And viewed as a whole, we do not believe that, since the\npublication of Von Baer's Researches on Development, thirty years ago,\nany work has appeared calculated to exert so large an influence, not\nonly on the future of Biology, but in extending the domination of\nScience over regions of thought into which she has, as yet, hardly\npenetrated.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[61] On the Osteology of the Chimpanzees and Orangs: Transactions of the\nZoological Society, 1858.\n\n[62] Colonel Humphreys' statements are exceedingly explicit on this\npoint:--\"When an Ancon ewe is impregnated by a common ram, the increase\nresembles wholly either the ewe or the ram. The increase of the common\newe impregnated by an Ancon ram follows entirely the one or the other,\nwithout blending any of the distinguishing and essential peculiarities\nof both. Frequent instances have happened where common ewes have had\ntwins by Ancon rams, when one exhibited the complete marks and features\nof the ewe, the other of the ram. The contrast has been rendered\nsingularly striking, when one short-legged and one long-legged lamb,\nproduced at a birth, have been seen sucking the dam at the same\ntime.\"--_Philosophical Transactions_, 1813, Pt. I., pp. 89, 90.\n\n[63] Recent investigations tend to show that this statement is not\nstrictly accurate.--1870.\n\n[64] See Phil. Zoologique, vol. i. p. 222, et seq.\n\n\n\n\nXIII.\n\nCRITICISMS ON \"THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES.\"\n\n     1. UEBER DIE DARWIN'SCHE SCHOePFUNGSTHEORIE; EIN VORTAG, VON A.\n     KOeLLIKER. Leipzig, 1864.\n\n     2. EXAMINATION DU LIVRE DE M. DARWIN SUR L'ORIGINE DES ESPECES.\n     PAR P. FLOURENS. Paris, 1864.\n\n\nIn the course of the present year [1864] several foreign commentaries\nupon Mr. Darwin's great work have made their appearance. Those who have\nperused that remarkable chapter of the \"Antiquity of Man,\" in which Sir\nCharles Lyell draws a parallel between the development of species and\nthat of languages, will be glad to hear that one of the most eminent\nphilologers of Germany, Professor Schleicher, has, independently,\npublished a most instructive and philosophical pamphlet (an excellent\nnotice of which is to be found in the _Reader_, for February 27th of\nthis year) supporting similar views with all the weight of his special\nknowledge and established authority as a linguist. Professor Haeckel, to\nwhom Schleicher addresses himself, previously took occasion, in his\nsplendid monograph on the _Radiolaria_,[65] to express his high\nappreciation of, and general concordance with, Mr. Darwin's views.\n\nBut the most elaborate criticisms of the \"Origin of Species\" which have\nappeared are two works of very widely different merit, the one by\nProfessor Koelliker, the well-known anatomist and histologist of\nWuerzburg; the other by M. Flourens, Perpetual Secretary of the French\nAcademy of Sciences.\n\nProfessor Koelliker's critical essay \"Upon the Darwinian Theory\" is, like\nall that proceeds from the pen of that thoughtful and accomplished\nwriter, worthy of the most careful consideration. It comprises a brief\nbut clear sketch of Darwin's views, followed by an enumeration of the\nleading difficulties in the way of their acceptance; difficulties which\nwould appear to be insurmountable to Professor Koelliker, inasmuch as he\nproposes to replace Mr. Darwin's Theory by one which he terms the\n\"Theory of Heterogeneous Generation.\" We shall proceed to consider first\nthe destructive, and secondly, the constructive portion of the essay.\n\nWe regret to find ourselves compelled to dissent very widely from many\nof Professor Koelliker's remarks; and from none more thoroughly than from\nthose in which he seeks to define what we may term the philosophical\nposition of Darwinism.\n\n     \"Darwin,\" says Professor Koelliker, \"is, in the fullest sense of the\n     Word, a Teleologist. He says quite distinctly (First Edition, pp.\n     199, 200) that every particular in the structure of an animal has\n     been created for its benefit, and he regards the whole series of\n     animal forms only from this point of view.\"\n\nAnd again:\n\n     \"7. The teleological general conception adopted by Darwin is a\n     mistaken one.\n\n     \"Varieties arise irrespectively of the notion of purpose, or of\n     utility, according to general laws of Nature, and may be either\n     useful, or hurtful, or indifferent.\n\n     \"The assumption that an organism exists only on account of some\n     definite end in view, and represents something more than the\n     incorporation of a general idea, or law, implies a one-sided\n     conception of the universe. Assuredly, every organ has, and every\n     organism fulfils, its end, but its purpose is not the condition of\n     its existence. Every organism is also sufficiently perfect for the\n     purpose it serves, and in that, at least, it is useless to seek for\n     a cause of its improvement.\"\n\nIt is singular how differently one and the same book will impress\ndifferent minds. That which struck the present writer most forcibly on\nhis first perusal of the \"Origin of Species\" was the conviction that\nTeleology, as commonly understood, had received its deathblow at Mr.\nDarwin's hands. For the teleological argument runs thus: an organ or\norganism (A) is precisely fitted to perform a function or purpose (B);\ntherefore it was specially constructed to perform that function. In\nPaley's famous illustration, the adaptation of all the parts of the\nwatch to the function, or purpose, of showing the time, is held to be\nevidence that the watch was specially contrived to that end; on the\nground, that the only cause we know of, competent to produce such an\neffect as a watch which shall keep time, is a contriving intelligence\nadapting the means directly to that end.\n\nSuppose, however, that any one had been able to show that the watch had\nnot been made directly by any person, but that it was the result of the\nmodification of another watch which kept time but poorly; and that this\nagain had proceeded from a structure which could hardly be called a\nwatch at all--seeing that it had no figures on the dial and the hands\nwere rudimentary; and that going back and back in time we came at last\nto a revolving barrel as the earliest traceable rudiment of the whole\nfabric. And imagine that it had been possible to show that all these\nchanges had resulted, first, from a tendency of the structure to vary\nindefinitely; and secondly, from something in the surrounding world\nwhich helped all variations in the direction of an accurate time-keeper,\nand checked all those in other directions; then it is obvious that the\nforce of Paley's argument would be gone. For it would be demonstrated\nthat an apparatus thoroughly well adapted to a particular purpose might\nbe the result of a method of trial and error worked by unintelligent\nagents, as well as of the direct application of the means appropriate to\nthat end, by an intelligent agent.\n\nNow it appears to us that what we have here, for illustration's sake,\nsupposed to be done with the watch, is exactly what the establishment of\nDarwin's Theory will do for the organic world. For the notion that every\norganism has been created as it is and launched straight at a purpose,\nMr. Darwin substitutes the conception of something which may fairly be\ntermed a method of trial and error. Organisms vary incessantly; of these\nvariations the few meet with surrounding conditions which suit them and\nthrive; the many are unsuited and become extinguished.\n\nAccording to Teleology, each organism is like a rifle bullet fired\nstraight at a mark; according to Darwin, organisms are like grapeshot of\nwhich one hits something and the rest fall wide.\n\nFor the teleologist an organism exists because it was made for the\nconditions in which it is found; for the Darwinian an organism exists\nbecause, out of many of its kind, it is the only one which has been\nable to persist in the conditions in which it is found.\n\nTeleology implies that the organs of every organism are perfect and\ncannot be improved; the Darwinian theory simply affirms that they work\nwell enough to enable the organism to hold its own against such\ncompetitors as it has met with, but admits the possibility of indefinite\nimprovement. But an example may bring into clearer light the profound\nopposition between the ordinary teleological, and the Darwinian,\nconception.\n\nCats catch mice, small birds and the like, very well. Teleology tells us\nthat they do so because they were expressly constructed for so\ndoing--that they are perfect mousing apparatuses, so perfect and so\ndelicately adjusted that no one of their organs could be altered,\nwithout the change involving the alteration of all the rest. Darwinism\naffirms, on the contrary, that there was no express construction\nconcerned in the matter; but that among the multitudinous variations of\nthe Feline stock, many of which died out from want of power to resist\nopposing influences, some, the cats, were better fitted to catch mice\nthan others, whence they throve and persisted, in proportion to the\nadvantage over their fellows thus offered to them.\n\nFar from imagining that cats exist _in order_ to catch mice well,\nDarwinism supposes that cats exist _because_ they catch mice\nwell--mousing being not the end, but the condition, of their existence.\nAnd if the cat-type has long persisted as we know it, the interpretation\nof the fact upon Darwinian principles would be, not that the cats have\nremained invariable, but that such varieties as have incessantly\noccurred have been, on the whole, less fitted to get on in the world\nthan the existing stock.\n\nIf we apprehend the spirit of the \"Origin of Species\" rightly, then,\nnothing can be more entirely and absolutely opposed to Teleology, as it\nis commonly understood, than the Darwinian Theory. So far from being a\n\"Teleologist in the fullest sense of the word,\" we should deny that he\nis a Teleologist in the ordinary sense at all; and we should say that,\napart from his merits as a naturalist, he has rendered a most remarkable\nservice to philosophical thought by enabling the student of Nature to\nrecognise, to their fullest extent, those adaptations to purpose which\nare so striking in the organic world, and which Teleology has done good\nservice in keeping before our minds, without being false to the\nfundamental principles of a scientific conception of the universe. The\napparently diverging teachings of the Teleologist and of the\nMorphologist are reconciled by the Darwinian hypothesis.\n\nBut leaving our own impressions of the \"Origin of Species,\" and turning\nto those passages specially cited by Professor Koelliker, we cannot admit\nthat they bear the interpretation he puts upon them. Darwin, if we read\nhim rightly, does _not_ affirm that every detail in the structure of an\nanimal has been created for its benefit. His words are (p. 199):--\n\n     \"The foregoing remarks lead me to say a few words on the protest\n     lately made by some naturalists against the utilitarian doctrine\n     that every detail of structure has been produced for the good of\n     its possessor. They believe that very many structures have been\n     created for beauty in the eyes of man, or for mere variety. This\n     doctrine, if true, would be absolutely fatal to my theory--yet I\n     fully admit that many structures are of no direct use to their\n     possessor.\"\n\nAnd after sundry illustrations and qualifications, he concludes (p.\n200):--\n\n     \"Hence every detail of structure in every living creature (making\n     some little allowance for the direct action of physical conditions)\n     may be viewed either as having been of special use to some\n     ancestral form, or as being now of special use to the descendants\n     of this form--either directly, or indirectly, through the complex\n     laws of growth.\"\n\nBut it is one thing to say, Darwinically, that every detail observed in\nan animal's structure is of use to it, or has been of use to its\nancestors; and quite another to affirm, teleologically, that every\ndetail of an animal's structure has been created for its benefit. On the\nformer hypothesis, for example, the teeth of the foetal _Balaena_ have\na meaning; on the latter, none. So far as we are aware, there is not a\nphrase in the \"Origin of Species,\" inconsistent with Professor\nKoelliker's position, that \"varieties arise irrespectively of the notion\nof purpose, or of utility, according to general laws of Nature, and may\nbe either useful, or hurtful, or indifferent.\"\n\nOn the contrary, Mr. Darwin writes (Summary of Chap. V.):--\n\n     \"Our ignorance of the laws of variation is profound. Not in one\n     case out of a hundred can we pretend to assign any reason why this\n     or that part varies more or less from the same part in the\n     parents.... The external conditions of life, as climate and food,\n     &c. seem to have induced some slight modifications. Habit, in\n     producing constitutional differences, and use, in strengthening,\n     and disuse, in weakening and diminishing organs, seem to have been\n     more potent in their effects.\"\n\nAnd finally, as if to prevent all possible misconception, Mr. Darwin\nconcludes his Chapter on Variation with these pregnant words:--\n\n     \"Whatever the cause may be of each slight difference in the\n     offspring from their parents--and a cause for each must exist--it\n     is the steady accumulation, through natural selection of such\n     differences, when beneficial to the individual, that gives rise to\n     all the more important modifications of structure, by which the\n     innumerable beings on the face of the earth are enabled to struggle\n     with each other, and the best adapted to survive.\"\n\nWe have dwelt at length upon this subject, because of its great general\nimportance, and because we believe that Professor Koelliker's criticisms\non this head are based upon a misapprehension of Mr. Darwin's\nviews--substantially they appear to us to coincide with his own. The\nother objections which Professor Koelliker enumerates and discusses are\nthe following:[66]--\n\n     \"1. No transitional forms between existing species are known; and\n     known varieties, whether selected or spontaneous, never go so far\n     as to establish new species.\"\n\nTo this Professor Koelliker appears to attach some weight. He makes the\nsuggestion that the short-faced tumbler pigeon may be a pathological\nproduct.\n\n     \"2. No transitional forms of animals are met with among the organic\n     remains of earlier epochs.\"\n\nUpon this, Professor Koelliker remarks that the absence of transitional\nforms in the fossil world, though not necessarily fatal to Darwin's\nviews, weakens his case.\n\n     \"3. The struggle for existence does not take place.\"\n\nTo this objection, urged by Pelzeln, Koelliker, very justly, attaches no\nweight.\n\n     \"4. A tendency of organisms to give rise to useful varieties, and a\n     natural selection, do not exist.\n\n     \"The varieties which are found arise in consequence of manifold\n     external influences, and it is not obvious why they all, or\n     partially, should be particularly useful. Each animal suffices for\n     its own ends, is perfect of its kind, and needs no further\n     development. Should, however, a variety be useful and even maintain\n     itself, there is no obvious reason why it should change any\n     further. The whole conception of the imperfection of organisms and\n     the necessity of their becoming perfected is plainly the weakest\n     side of Darwin's Theory, and a _pis aller_ (Nothbehelf) because\n     Darwin could think of no other principle by which to explain the\n     metamorphoses which, as I also believe, have occurred.\"\n\n\nHere again we must venture to dissent completely from Professor\nKoelliker's conception of Mr. Darwin's hypothesis. It appears to us to be\none of the many peculiar merits of that hypothesis that it involves no\nbelief in a necessary and continual progress of organisms.\n\nAgain, Mr. Darwin, if we read him aright, assumes no special tendency of\norganisms to give rise to useful varieties, and knows nothing of needs\nof development, or necessity of perfection. What he says is, in\nsubstance: All organisms vary. It is in the highest degree improbable\nthat any given variety should have exactly the same relations to\nsurrounding conditions as the parent stock. In that case it is either\nbetter fitted (when the variation may be called useful), or worse\nfitted, to cope with them. If better, it will tend to supplant the\nparent stock; if worse, it will tend to be extinguished by the parent\nstock.\n\nIf (as is hardly conceivable) the new variety is so perfectly adapted to\nthe conditions that no improvement upon it is possible,--it will\npersist, because, though it does not cease to vary, the varieties will\nbe inferior to itself.\n\nIf, as is more probable, the new variety is by no means perfectly\nadapted to its conditions, but only fairly well adapted to them, it will\npersist, so long as none of the varieties which it throws off are\nbetter adapted than itself.\n\nOn the other hand, as soon as it varies in a useful way, _i.e._ when the\nvariation is such as to adapt it more perfectly to its conditions, the\nfresh variety will tend to supplant the former.\n\nSo far from a gradual progress towards perfection forming any necessary\npart of the Darwinian creed, it appears to us that it is perfectly\nconsistent with indefinite persistence in one state, or with a gradual\nretrogression. Suppose, for example, a return of the glacial epoch and a\nspread of polar climatal conditions over the whole globe. The operation\nof natural selection under these circumstances would tend, on the whole,\nto the weeding out of the higher organisms and the cherishing of the\nlower forms of life. Cryptogamic vegetation would have the advantage\nover Phanerogamic; _Hydrozoa_ over Corals; _Crustacea_ over _Insecta_,\nand _Amphipoda_ and _Isopoda_ over the higher _Crustacea_; Cetaceans and\nSeals over the _Primates_; the civilization of the Esquimaux over that\nof the European.\n\n     \"5. Pelzeln has also objected that if the later organisms have\n     proceeded from the earlier, the whole developmental series, from\n     the simplest to the highest, could not now exist; in such a case\n     the simpler organisms must have disappeared.\"\n\nTo this Professor Koelliker replies, with perfect justice, that the\nconclusion drawn by Pelzeln does not really follow from Darwin's\npremises, and that, if we take the facts of Palaeontology as they stand,\nthey rather support than oppose Darwin's theory.\n\n     \"6. Great weight must be attached to the objection brought forward\n     by Huxley, otherwise a warm supporter of Darwin's hypothesis, that\n     we know of no varieties which are sterile with one another, as is\n     the rule among sharply distinguished animal forms.\n\n     \"If Darwin is right, it must be demonstrated that forms may be\n     produced by selection, which, like the present sharply\n     distinguished animal forms, are infertile when coupled with one\n     another, and this has not been done.\"\n\nThe weight of this objection is obvious; but our ignorance of the\nconditions of fertility and sterility, the want of carefully conducted\nexperiments extending over long series of years, and the strange\nanomalies presented by the results of the cross-fertilization of many\nplants, should all, as Mr. Darwin has urged, be taken into account in\nconsidering it.\n\nThe seventh objection is that we have already discussed (_supra_, p.\n329).\n\nThe eighth and last stands as follows:--\n\n     \"8. The developmental theory of Darwin is not needed to enable us\n     to understand the regular harmonious progress of the complete\n     series of organic forms from the simpler to the more perfect.\n\n     \"The existence of general laws of Nature explains this harmony,\n     even if we assume that all beings have arisen separately and\n     independent of one another. Darwin forgets that inorganic nature,\n     in which there can be no thought of a genetic connexion of forms,\n     exhibits the same regular plan, the same harmony, as the organic\n     world; and that, to cite only one example, there is as much a\n     natural system of minerals as of plants and animals.\"\n\nWe do not feel quite sure that we seize Professor Koelliker's meaning\nhere, but he appears to suggest that the observation of the general\norder and harmony which pervade inorganic nature, would lead us to\nanticipate a similar order and harmony in the organic world. And this is\nno doubt true, but it by no means follows that the particular order and\nharmony observed among them should be that which we see. Surely the\nstripes of dun horses, and the teeth of the foetal _Balaena_, are not\nexplained by the \"existence of general laws of Nature.\" Mr. Darwin\nendeavours to explain the exact order of organic nature which exists;\nnot the mere fact that there is some order.\n\nAnd with regard to the existence of a natural system of minerals; the\nobvious reply is that there may be a natural classification of any\nobjects--of stones on a sea-beach, or of works of art; a natural\nclassification being simply an assemblage of objects in groups, so as to\nexpress their most important and fundamental resemblances and\ndifferences. No doubt Mr. Darwin believes that those resemblances and\ndifferences upon which our natural systems or classifications of animals\nand plants are based, are resemblances and differences which have been\nproduced genetically, but we can discover no reason for supposing that\nhe denies the existence of natural classifications of other kinds.\n\nAnd, after all, is it quite so certain that a genetic relation may not\nunderlie the classification of minerals? The inorganic world has not\nalways been what we see it. It has certainly had its metamorphoses, and,\nvery probably, a long \"Entwickelungsgeschichte\" out of a nebular\nblastema. Who knows how far that amount of likeness among sets of\nminerals, in virtue of which they are now grouped into families and\norders, may not be the expression of the common conditions to which that\nparticular patch of nebulous fog, which may have been constituted by\ntheir atoms, and of which they may be, in the strictest sense, the\ndescendants, was subjected?\n\nIt will be obvious from what has preceded, that we do not agree with\nProfessor Koelliker in thinking the objections which he brings forward\nso weighty as to be fatal to Darwin's view. But even if the case were\notherwise, we should be unable to accept the \"Theory of Heterogeneous\nGeneration\" which is offered as a substitute. That theory is thus\nstated:--\n\n     \"The fundamental conception of this hypothesis is, that, under the\n     influence of a general law of development, the germs of organisms\n     produce others different from themselves. This might happen (1) by\n     the fecundated ova passing, in the course of their development,\n     under particular circumstances, into higher forms; (2) by the\n     primitive and later organisms producing other organisms without\n     fecundation, out of germs or eggs (Parthenogenesis).\"\n\nIn favour of this hypothesis, Professor Koelliker adduces the well-known\nfacts of Agamogenesis, or \"alternate generation;\" the extreme\ndissimilarity of the males and females of many animals; and of the\nmales, females, and neuters of those insects which live in colonies: and\nhe defines its relations to the Darwinian theory as follows:--\n\n     \"It is obvious that my hypothesis is apparently very similar to\n     Darwin's, inasmuch as I also consider that the various forms of\n     animals have proceeded directly from one another. My hypothesis of\n     the creation of organisms by heterogeneous generation, however, is\n     distinguished very essentially from Darwin's by the entire absence\n     of the principle of useful variations and their natural selection;\n     and my fundamental conception is this, that a great plan of\n     development lies at the foundation of the origin of the whole\n     organic world, impelling the simpler forms to more and more complex\n     developments. How this law operates, what influences determine the\n     development of the eggs and germs, and impel them to assume\n     constantly new forms, I naturally cannot pretend to say; but I can\n     at least adduce the great analogy of the alternation of\n     generations. If a _Bipinnaria_, a _Brachialaria_, a _Pluteus_, is\n     competent to produce the Echinoderm, which is so widely different\n     from it; if a hydroid polype can produce the higher Medusa; if the\n     vermiform Trematode 'nurse' can develop within itself the very\n     unlike _Cercaria_, it will not appear impossible that the egg, or\n     ciliated embryo, of a sponge, for once, under special conditions,\n     might become a hydroid polype, or the embryo of a Medusa, an\n     Echinoderm.\"\n\nIt is obvious, from these extracts, that Professor Koelliker's hypothesis\nis based upon the supposed existence of a close analogy between the\nphaenomena of Agamogenesis and the production of new species from\npre-existing ones. But is the analogy a real one? We think that it is\nnot, and, by the hypothesis, cannot be.\n\nFor what are the phaenomena of Agamogenesis, stated generally? An\nimpregnated egg develops into an asexual form, A; this gives rise,\nasexually, to a second form or forms, B, more or less different from A.\nB may multiply asexually again; in the simpler cases, however, it does\nnot, but, acquiring sexual characters, produces impregnated eggs from\nwhence A once more arises.\n\nNo case of Agamogenesis is known in which, _when A differs widely from\nB_, it is itself capable of sexual propagation. No case whatever is\nknown in which the progeny of B, by sexual generation, is other than a\nreproduction of A.\n\nBut if this be a true statement of the nature of the process of\nAgamogenesis, how can it enable us to comprehend the production of new\nspecies from already existing ones? Let us suppose Hyaenas to have\npreceded Dogs, and to have produced the latter in this way. Then the\nHyaena will represent A, and the Dog, B. The first difficulty that\npresents itself is that the Hyaena must be asexual, or the process will\nbe wholly without analogy in the world of Agamogenesis. But passing over\nthis difficulty, and supposing a male and female Dog to be produced at\nthe same time from the Hyaena stock, the progeny of the pair, if the\nanalogy of the simpler kinds of Agamogenesis[67] is to be followed,\nshould be a litter, not of puppies, but of young Hyaenas. For the\nAgamogenetic series is always, as we have seen, A: B: A: B, &c.;\nwhereas, for the production of a new species, the series must be A: B:\nB: B, &c. The production of new species, or genera, is the extreme\npermanent divergence from the primitive stock. All known Agamogenetic\nprocesses, on the other hand, end in a complete return to the primitive\nstock. How then is the production of new species to be rendered\nintelligible by the analogy of Agamogenesis?\n\nThe other alternative put by Professor Koelliker--the passage of\nfecundated ova in the course of their development into higher\nforms--would, if it occurred, be merely an extreme case of variation in\nthe Darwinian sense, greater in degree than, but perfectly similar in\nkind to, that which occurred when the well-known Ancon Ram was developed\nfrom an ordinary Ewe's ovum. Indeed we have always thought that Mr.\nDarwin has unnecessarily hampered himself by adhering so strictly to his\nfavourite \"Natura non facit saltum.\" We greatly suspect that she does\nmake considerable jumps in the way of variation now and then, and that\nthese saltations give rise to some of the gaps which appear to exist in\nthe series of known forms.\n\n\nStrongly and freely as we have ventured to disagree with Professor\nKoelliker, we have always done so with regret, and we trust without\nviolating that respect which is due, not only to his scientific eminence\nand to the careful study which he has devoted to the subject, but to the\nperfect fairness of his argumentation, and the generous appreciation of\nthe worth of Mr. Darwin's labours which he always displays. It would be\nsatisfactory to be able to say as much for M. Flourens.\n\nBut the Perpetual Secretary of the French Academy of Sciences deals with\nMr. Darwin as the first Napoleon would have treated an \"ideologue;\" and\nwhile displaying a painful weakness of logic and shallowness of\ninformation, assumes a tone of authority, which always touches upon the\nludicrous, and sometimes passes the limits of good breeding.\n\nFor example (p. 56):--\n\n     \"M. Darwin continue: 'Aucune distinction absolue n'a ete et ne peut\n     etre etablie entre les especes et les varietes.' Je vous ai deja\n     dit que vous vous trompiez; une distinction absolue separe les\n     varietes d'avec les especes.\"\n\n\"_Je vous ai deja dit_; moi, M. le Secretaire perpetuel de l'Academie\ndes Sciences: et vous\n\n     'Qui n'etes rien,\n     Pas meme Academicien;'\n\nwhat do you mean by asserting the contrary?\" Being devoid of the\nblessings of an Academy in England, we are unaccustomed to see our\nablest men treated in this fashion even by a \"Perpetual Secretary.\"\n\nOr again, considering that if there is any one quality of Mr. Darwin's\nwork to which friends and foes have alike borne witness, it is his\ncandour and fairness in admitting and discussing objections, what is to\nbe thought of M. Flourens' assertion, that\n\n     \"M. Darwin ne cite que les auteurs qui partagent ses opinions.\" (P.\n     40.)\n\nOnce more (p. 65):\n\n     \"Enfin l'ouvrage de M. Darwin a paru. On ne peut qu'etre frappe du\n     talent de l'auteur. Mais que d'idees obscures, que d'idees fausses!\n     Quel jargon metaphysique jete mal a propos dans l'histoire\n     naturelle, qui tombe dans le galimatias des qu'elle sort des idees\n     claires, des idees justes! Quel langage pretentieux et vide!\n     Quelles personifications pueriles et surannees! O lucidite! O\n     solidite de l'esprit Francais, que devenez-vous?\"\n\n\"Obscure ideas,\" \"metaphysical jargon,\" \"pretentious and empty\nlanguage,\" \"puerile and superannuated personifications.\" Mr. Darwin has\nmany and hot opponents on this side of the Channel and in Germany, but\nwe do not recollect to have found precisely these sins in the long\ncatalogue of those hitherto laid to his charge. It is worth while,\ntherefore, to examine into these discoveries effected solely by the aid\nof the \"lucidity and solidity\" of the mind of M. Flourens.\n\nAccording to M. Flourens, Mr. Darwin's great error is that he has\npersonified Nature (p. 10), and further that he has\n\n     \"imagined a natural selection: he imagines afterwards that this\n     power of selecting (_pouvoir d'elire_) which he gives to Nature is\n     similar to the power of man. These two suppositions admitted,\n     nothing stops him: he plays with Nature as he likes, and makes her\n     do all he pleases.\" (P. 6.)\n\nAnd this is the way M. Flourens extinguishes natural selection:\n\n     \"Voyons donc encore une fois, ce qu'il peut y avoir de fonde dans\n     ce qu'on nomme _election naturelle_.\n\n     \"_L'election naturelle_ n'est sous un autre nom que la nature. Pour\n     un etre organise, la nature n'est que l'organisation, ni plus ni\n     moins.\n\n     \"Il faudra donc aussi personnifier _l'organisation_, et dire que\n     _l'organisation_ choisit _l'organisation_. _L'election naturelle_\n     est cette _forme substantielle_ dont on jonait autrefois avec tant\n     de facilite. Aristote disait que 'Si l'art de batir etait dans le\n     bois, cet art agirait comme la nature.' A la place de _l'art de\n     batir_ M. Darwin met _l'election naturelle_, et c'est tout un: l'un\n     n'est pas plus chimerique que l'autre.\" (P. 31.)\n\nAnd this is really all that M. Flourens can make of Natural Selection.\nWe have given the original, in fear lest a translation should be\nregarded as a travesty; but with the original before the reader, we may\ntry to analyse the passage. \"For an organized being, Nature is only\norganization, neither more nor less.\"\n\nOrganized beings then have absolutely no relation to inorganic nature: a\nplant does not depend on soil or sunshine, climate, depth in the ocean,\nheight above it; the quantity of saline matters in water have no\ninfluence upon animal life; the substitution of carbonic acid for oxygen\nin our atmosphere would hurt nobody! That these are absurdities no one\nshould know better than M. Flourens; but they are logical deductions\nfrom the assertion just quoted, and from the further statement that\nnatural selection means only that \"organization chooses and selects\norganization.\"\n\nFor if it be once admitted (what no sane man denies) that the chances of\nlife of any given organism are increased by certain conditions (A) and\ndiminished by their opposites (B), then it is mathematically certain\nthat any change of conditions in the direction of (A) will exercise a\nselective influence in favour of that organism, tending to its increase\nand multiplication, while any change in the direction of (B) will\nexercise a selective influence against that organism, tending to its\ndecrease and extinction.\n\nOr, on the other hand, conditions remaining the same, let a given\norganism vary (and no one doubts that they do vary) in two directions:\ninto one form (a) better fitted to cope with these conditions than the\noriginal stock, and a second (b) less well adapted to them. Then it is\nno less certain that the conditions in question must exercise a\nselective influence in favour of (a) and against (b), so that (a)\nwill tend to predominance, and (b) to extirpation.\n\nThat M. Flourens should be unable to perceive the logical necessity of\nthese simple arguments, which lie at the foundation of all Mr. Darwin's\nreasoning; that he should confound an irrefragable deduction from the\nobserved relations of organisms to the conditions which lie around them,\nwith a metaphysical \"forme substantielle,\" or a chimerical\npersonification of the powers of Nature, would be incredible, were it\nnot that other passages of his work leave no room for doubt upon the\nsubject.\n\n     \"On imagine une _election naturelle_ que, pour plus de menagement,\n     on me dit etre _inconsciente_, sans s'apercevoir que le contre-sens\n     litteral est precisement la: _election inconsciente_.\" (P. 52.)\n\n     \"J'ai deja dit ce qu'il faut penser de _l'election naturelle_. Ou\n     _l'election naturelle_ n'est rien, ou c'est la nature: mais la\n     nature douee _d'election_, mais la nature personnifiee: derniere\n     erreur du dernier siecle: Le xix^e ne fait plus de\n     personnifications.\" (P. 53.)\n\nM. Flourens cannot imagine an unconscious selection--it is for him a\ncontradiction in terms. Did M. Flourens ever visit one of the prettiest\nwatering-places of \"la belle France,\" the Baie d'Arcachon? If so, he\nwill probably have passed through the district of the Landes, and will\nhave had an opportunity of observing the formation of \"dunes\" on a grand\nscale. What are these \"dunes?\" The winds and waves of the Bay of Biscay\nhave not much consciousness, and yet they have with great care\n\"selected,\" from among an infinity of masses of silex of all shapes and\nsizes, which have been submitted to their action, all the grains of sand\nbelow a certain size, and have heaped them by themselves over a great\narea. This sand has been \"unconsciously selected\" from amidst the gravel\nin which it first lay with as much precision as if man had \"consciously\nselected\" it by the aid of a sieve. Physical Geology is full of such\nselections--of the picking out of the soft from the hard, of the soluble\nfrom the insoluble, of the fusible from the infusible, by natural\nagencies to which we are certainly not in the habit of ascribing\nconsciousness.\n\nBut that which wind and sea are to a sandy beach, the sum of influences,\nwhich we term the \"conditions of existence,\" is to living organisms. The\nweak are sifted out from the strong. A frosty night \"selects\" the hardy\nplants in a plantation from among the tender ones as effectually as if\nit were the wind, and they, the sand and pebbles, of our illustration;\nor, on the other hand, as if the intelligence of a gardener had been\noperative in cutting the weaker organisms down. The thistle, which has\nspread over the Pampas, to the destruction of native plants, has been\nmore effectually \"selected\" by the unconscious operation of natural\nconditions than if a thousand agriculturists had spent their time in\nsowing it.\n\nIt is one of Mr. Darwin's many great services to Biological science that\nhe has demonstrated the significance of these facts. He has shown\nthat--given variation and given change of conditions--the inevitable\nresult is the exercise of such an influence upon organisms that one is\nhelped and another is impeded; one tends to predominate, another to\ndisappear; and thus the living world bears within itself, and is\nsurrounded by, impulses towards incessant change.\n\nBut the truths just stated are as certain as any other physical laws,\nquite independently of the truth, or falsehood, of the hypothesis which\nMr. Darwin has based upon them; and that M. Flourens, missing the\nsubstance and grasping at a shadow, should be blind to the admirable\nexposition of them, which Mr. Darwin has given, and see nothing there\nbut a \"derniere erreur du dernier siecle\"--a personification of\nNature--leads us indeed to cry with him: \"O lucidite! O solidite de\nl'esprit Francais, que devenez-vous?\"\n\nM. Flourens has, in fact, utterly failed to comprehend the first\nprinciples of the doctrine which he assails so rudely. His objections to\ndetails are of the old sort, so battered and hackneyed on this side of\nthe Channel, that not even a Quarterly Reviewer could be induced to pick\nthem up for the purpose of pelting Mr. Darwin over again. We have Cuvier\nand the mummies; M. Roulin and the domesticated animals of America; the\ndifficulties presented by hybridism and by Palaeontology; Darwinism a\n_rifacciamento_ of De Maillet and Lamarck; Darwinism a system without a\ncommencement, and its author bound to believe in M. Pouchet, &c. &c. How\none knows it all by heart, and with what relief one reads at p. 65--\n\n     \"Je laisse M. Darwin!\"\n\nBut we cannot leave M. Flourens without calling our readers' attention\nto his wonderful tenth chapter, \"De la Preexistence des Germes et de\nl'Epigenese,\" which opens thus:--\n\n     \"Spontaneous generation is only a chimaera. This point established,\n     two hypotheses remain: that of _pre-existence_ and that of\n     _epigenesis_. The one of these hypotheses has as little foundation\n     as the other.\" (P. 163.)\n\n     \"The doctrine of _epigenesis_ is derived from Harvey: following by\n     ocular inspection the development of the new being in the Windsor\n     does, he saw each part appear successively, and taking the moment\n     of _appearance_ for the moment of _formation_ he imagined\n     _epigenesis_.\" (P. 165.)\n\nOn the contrary, says M. Flourens (p. 167),\n\n     \"The new being is formed at a stroke (_tout d'un coup_), as a\n     whole, instantaneously; it is not formed part by part, and at\n     different times. It is formed at once; it is formed at the single\n     _individual_ moment at which the conjunction of the male and female\n     elements takes place.\"\n\nIt will be observed that M. Flourens uses language which cannot be\nmistaken. For him, the labours of Von Baer, of Rathke, of Coste, and\ntheir contemporaries and successors in Germany, France, and England, are\nnon-existent; and, as Darwin \"_imagina_\" natural selection, so Harvey\n\"_imagina_\" that doctrine which gives him an even greater claim to the\nveneration of posterity than his better known discovery of the\ncirculation of the blood.\n\nLanguage such as that we have quoted is, in fact, so preposterous, so\nutterly incompatible with anything but absolute ignorance of some of the\nbest established facts, that we should have passed it over in silence\nhad it not appeared to afford some clue to M. Flourens' unhesitating, _a\npriori_, repudiation of all forms of the doctrine of the progressive\nmodification of living beings. He whose mind remains uninfluenced by an\nacquaintance with the phaenomena of development, must indeed lack one of\nthe chief motives towards the endeavour to trace a genetic relation\nbetween the different existing forms of life. Those who are ignorant of\nGeology, find no difficulty in believing that the world was made as it\nis; and the shepherd, untutored in history, sees no reason to regard the\ngreen mounds which indicate the site of a Roman camp, as aught but part\nand parcel of the primaeval hill-side. So M. Flourens, who believes that\nembryos are formed \"tout d'un coup,\" naturally finds no difficulty in\nconceiving that species came into existence in the same way.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[65] \"Die Radiolarien: eine Monographie,\" p. 231.\n\n[66] Space will not allow us to give Professor Koelliker's arguments in\ndetail; our readers will find a full and accurate version of them in the\n_Reader_ for August 13th and 20th, 1864.\n\n[67] If, on the contrary, we follow the analogy of the more complex\nforms of Agamogenesis, such as that exhibited by some _Trematoda_ and by\nthe _Aphides_, the Hyaena must produce, asexually, a brood of asexual\nDogs, from which other sexless Dogs must proceed. At the end of a\ncertain number of terms of the series, the Dogs would acquire sexes and\ngenerate young; but these young would be, not Dogs, but Hyaenas. In fact,\nwe have _demonstrated_, in Agamogenetic phaenomena, that inevitable\nrecurrence to the original type, which is _asserted_ to be true of\nvariations in general, by Mr. Darwin's opponents; and which, if the\nassertion could be changed into a demonstration, would, in fact, be\nfatal to his hypothesis.\n\n\n\n\nXIV.\n\nON DESCARTES' \"DISCOURSE TOUCHING THE METHOD OF USING ONE'S REASON\nRIGHTLY AND OF SEEKING SCIENTIFIC TRUTH.\"\n\n\nIt has been well said that \"all the thoughts of men, from the beginning\nof the world until now, are linked together into one great chain;\" but\nthe conception of the intellectual filiation of mankind which is\nexpressed in these words may, perhaps, be more fitly shadowed forth by a\ndifferent metaphor. The thoughts of men seem rather to be comparable to\nthe leaves, flowers, and fruit upon the innumerable branches of a few\ngreat stems, fed by commingled and hidden roots. These stems bear the\nnames of the half-a-dozen men, endowed with intellects of heroic force\nand clearness, to whom we are led, at whatever point of the world of\nthought the attempt to trace its history commences; just as certainly as\nthe following up the small twigs of a tree to the branchlets which bear\nthem, and tracing the branchlets to their supporting branches, brings\nus, sooner or later, to the bole.\n\nIt seems to me that the thinker who, more than any other, stands in the\nrelation of such a stem towards the philosophy and the science of the\nmodern world is Rene Descartes. I mean, that if you lay hold of any\ncharacteristic product of modern ways of thinking, either in the region\nof philosophy, or in that of science, you find the spirit of that\nthought, if not its form, to have been present in the mind of the great\nFrenchman.\n\nThere are some men who are counted great because they represent the\nactuality of their own age, and mirror it as it is. Such an one was\nVoltaire, of whom it was epigrammatically said, \"he expressed\neverybody's thoughts better than anybody.\"[68] But there are other men\nwho attain greatness because they embody the potentiality of their own\nday, and magically reflect the future. They express the thoughts which\nwill be everybody's two or three centuries after them. Such an one was\nDescartes.\n\nBorn, in 1596, nearly three hundred years ago, of a noble family in\nTouraine, Rene Descartes grew up into a sickly and diminutive child,\nwhose keen wit soon gained him that title of \"the Philosopher,\" which,\nin the mouths of his noble kinsmen, was more than, half a reproach. The\nbest schoolmasters of the day, the Jesuits, educated him as well as a\nFrench boy of the seventeenth century could be educated. And they must\nhave done their work honestly and well, for, before his schoolboy days\nwere over, he had discovered that the most of what he had learned,\nexcept in mathematics, was devoid of solid and real value.\n\n     \"Therefore,\" says he, in that \"Discourse\"[69] which I have taken\n     for my text, \"as soon as I was old enough to be set free from the\n     government of my teachers, I entirely forsook the study of letters;\n     and determining to seek no other knowledge than that which I could\n     discover within myself, or in the great book of the world, I spent\n     the remainder of my youth in travelling; in seeing courts and\n     armies; in the society of people of different humours and\n     conditions; in gathering varied experience; in testing myself by\n     the chances of fortune; and in always trying to profit by my\n     reflections on what happened.... And I always had an intense desire\n     to learn how to distinguish truth from falsehood, in order to be\n     clear about my actions, and to walk surefootedly in this life.\"\n\nBut \"learn what is true, in order to do what is right,\" is the summing\nup of the whole duty of man, for all who are unable to satisfy their\nmental hunger with the east wind of authority; and to those of us\nmoderns who are in this position, it is one of Descartes' great claims\nto our reverence as a spiritual ancestor, that, at three-and-twenty, he\nsaw clearly that this was his duty, and acted up to his conviction. At\ntwo-and-thirty, in fact, finding all other occupations incompatible with\nthe search after the knowledge which leads to action, and being\npossessed of a modest competence, he withdrew into Holland; where he\nspent nine years in learning and thinking, in such retirement that only\none or two trusted friends knew of his whereabouts.\n\nIn 1637 the firstfruits of these long meditations were given to the\nworld in the famous \"Discourse touching the Method of using Reason\nrightly and of seeking scientific Truth,\" which, at once an\nautobiography and a philosophy, clothes the deepest thought in language\nof exquisite harmony, simplicity, and clearness.\n\nThe central propositions of the whole \"Discourse\" are these. There is a\npath that leads to truth so surely, that if any one who will follow it\nmust needs reach the goal, whether his capacity be great or small. And\nthere is one guiding rule by which a man may always find this path, and\nkeep himself from straying when he has found it. This golden rule\nis--give unqualified assent to no propositions but those the truth of\nwhich is so clear and distinct that they cannot be doubted.\n\nThe enunciation of this great first commandment of science consecrated\nDoubt. It removed Doubt from the seat of penance among the grievous sins\nto which it had long been condemned, and enthroned it in that high place\namong the primary duties, which is assigned to it by the scientific\nconscience of these latter days. Descartes was the first among the\nmoderns to obey this commandment deliberately; and, as a matter of\nreligious duty, to strip off all his beliefs and reduce himself to a\nstate of intellectual nakedness, until such time as he could satisfy\nhimself which were fit to be worn. He thought a bare skin healthier than\nthe most respectable and well-cut clothing of what might, possibly, be\nmere shoddy.\n\nWhen I say that Descartes consecrated doubt, you must remember that it\nwas that sort of doubt which Goethe has called \"the active scepticism,\nwhose whole aim is to conquer itself;\"[70] and not that other sort which\nis born of flippancy and ignorance, and whose aim is only to perpetuate\nitself, as an excuse for idleness and indifference. But it is impossible\nto define what is meant by scientific doubt better than in Descartes'\nown words. After describing the gradual progress of his negative\ncriticism, he tells us:--\n\n     \"For all that, I did not imitate the sceptics, who doubt only for\n     doubting's sake, and pretend to be always undecided; on the\n     contrary, my whole intention was to arrive at certainty, and to dig\n     away the drift and the sand until I reached the rock or the clay\n     beneath.\"\n\nAnd further, since no man of common sense, when he pulls down his house\nfor the purpose of rebuilding it, fails to provide himself with some\nshelter while the work is in progress; so, before demolishing the\nspacious, if not commodious, mansion of his old beliefs, Descartes\nthought it wise to equip himself with what he calls \"_une morale par\nprovision_,\" by which he resolved to govern his practical life until\nsuch time as he should be better instructed. The laws of this\n\"provisional self-government\" are embodied in four maxims, of which one\nbinds our philosopher to submit himself to the laws and religion in\nwhich he was brought up; another, to act, on all those occasions which\ncall for action, promptly and according to the best of his judgment, and\nto abide, without repining, by the result: a third rule is to seek\nhappiness in limiting his desires, rather than in attempting to satisfy\nthem; while the last is to make the search after truth the business of\nhis life.\n\nThus prepared to go on living while he doubted, Descartes proceeded to\nface his doubts like a man. One thing was clear to him, he would not lie\nto himself--would, under no penalties, say, \"I am sure\" of that of which\nhe was not sure; but would go on digging and delving until he came to\nthe solid adamant; or, at worst, made sure there was no adamant. As the\nrecord of his progress tells us, he was obliged to confess that life is\nfull of delusions; that authority may err; that testimony may be false\nor mistaken; that reason lands us in endless fallacies; that memory is\noften as little trustworthy as hope; that the evidence of the very\nsenses may be misunderstood; that dreams are real as long as they last,\nand that what we call reality may be a long and restless dream. Nay, it\nis conceivable that some powerful and malicious being may find his\npleasure in deluding us, and in making us believe the thing which is\nnot, every moment of our lives. What, then, is certain? What even, if\nsuch a being exists, is beyond the reach of his powers of delusion? Why,\nthe fact that the thought, the present consciousness, exists. Our\nthoughts may be delusive, but they cannot be fictitious. As thoughts,\nthey are real and existent, and the cleverest deceiver cannot make them\notherwise.\n\nThus, thought is existence. More than that, so far as we are concerned,\nexistence is thought, all our conceptions of existence being some kind\nor other of thought. Do not for a moment suppose that these are mere\nparadoxes or subtleties. A little reflection upon the commonest facts\nproves them to be irrefragable truths. For example, I take up a marble,\nand I find it to be a red, round, hard, single body. We call the\nredness, the roundness, the hardness, and the singleness, \"qualities\" of\nthe marble; and it sounds, at first, the height of absurdity to say that\nall these qualities are modes of our own consciousness, which cannot\neven be conceived to exist in the marble. But consider the redness, to\nbegin with. How does the sensation of redness arise? The waves of a\ncertain very attenuated matter, the particles of which are vibrating\nwith vast rapidity, but with very different velocities, strike upon the\nmarble, and those which vibrate with one particular velocity are thrown\noff from its surface in all directions. The optical apparatus of the eye\ngathers some of these together, and gives them such a course that they\nimpinge upon the surface of the retina, which is a singularly delicate\napparatus, connected with the termination of the fibres of the optic\nnerve. The impulses of the attenuated matter, or ether, affect this\napparatus and the fibres of the optic nerve in a certain way; and the\nchange in the fibres of the optic nerve produces yet other changes in\nthe brain; and these, in some fashion unknown to us, give rise to the\nfeeling, or consciousness, of redness. If the marble could remain\nunchanged, and either the rate of vibration of the ether, or the nature\nof the retina, could be altered, the marble would seem not red, but some\nother colour. There are many people who are what are called colourblind,\nbeing unable to distinguish one colour from another. Such an one might\ndeclare our marble to be green; and he would be quite as right in saying\nthat it is green, as we are in declaring it to be red. But then, as the\nmarble cannot, in itself, be both green and red, at the same time, this\nshows that the quality \"redness\" must be in our consciousness and not in\nthe marble.\n\nIn like manner, it is easy to see that the roundness and the hardness\nare forms of our consciousness, belonging to the groups which we call\nsensations of sight and touch. If the surface of the cornea were\ncylindrical, we should have a very different notion of a round body from\nthat which we possess now; and if the strength of the fabric, and the\nforce of the muscles, of the body were increased a hundredfold, our\nmarble would seem to be as soft as a pellet of bread crumbs.\n\nNot only is it obvious that all these qualities are in us, but, if you\nwill make the attempt, you will find it quite impossible to conceive of\n\"blueness,\" \"roundness,\" and \"hardness\" as existing without reference to\nsome such consciousness as our own. It may seem strange to say that even\nthe \"singleness\" of the marble is relative to us; but extremely simple\nexperiments will show that such is veritably the case, and that our two\nmost trustworthy senses may be made to contradict one another on this\nvery point. Hold the marble between the finger and thumb, and look at it\nin the ordinary way. Sight and touch agree that it is single. Now\nsquint, and sight tells you that there are two marbles, while touch\nasserts that there is only one. Next, return the eyes to their natural\nposition, and, having crossed the forefinger and the middle finger, put\nthe marble between their tips. Then touch will declare that there are\ntwo marbles, while sight says that there is only one; and touch claims\nour belief, when we attend to it, just as imperatively as sight does.\n\nBut it may be said, the marble takes up a certain space which could not\nbe occupied, at the same time, by anything else. In other words, the\nmarble has the primary quality of matter, extension. Surely this quality\nmust be in the thing, and not in our minds? But the reply must still be;\nwhatever may, or may not, exist in the thing, all that we can know of\nthese qualities is a state of consciousness. What we call extension is a\nconsciousness of a relation between two, or more, affections of the\nsense of sight, or of touch. And it is wholly inconceivable that what\nwe call extension should exist independently of such consciousness as\nour own. Whether, notwithstanding this inconceivability, it does so\nexist, or not, is a point on which I offer no opinion.\n\nThus, whatever our marble may be in itself, all that we can know of it\nis under the shape of a bundle of our own consciousnesses.\n\nNor is our knowledge of anything we know or feel more, or less, than a\nknowledge of states of consciousness. And our whole life is made up of\nsuch states. Some of these states we refer to a cause we call \"self;\"\nothers to a cause or causes which may be comprehended under the title of\n\"not-self.\" But neither of the existence of \"self,\" nor of that of\n\"not-self,\" have we, or can we by any possibility have, any such\nunquestionable and immediate certainty as we have of the states of\nconsciousness which we consider to be their effects. They are not\nimmediately observed facts, but results of the application of the law of\ncausation to those facts. Strictly speaking, the existence of a \"self\"\nand of a \"not-self\" are hypotheses by which we account for the facts of\nconsciousness. They stand upon the same footing as the belief in the\ngeneral trustworthiness of memory, and in the general constancy of the\norder of nature--as hypothetical assumptions which cannot be proved, or\nknown with that highest degree of certainty which is given by immediate\nconsciousness; but which, nevertheless, are of the highest practical\nvalue, inasmuch as the conclusions logically drawn from them are always\nverified by experience.\n\nThis, in my judgment, is the ultimate issue of Descartes' argument; but\nit is proper for me to point out that we have left Descartes himself\nsome way behind us. He stopped at the famous formula, \"I think,\ntherefore I am.\" But a little consideration will show this formula to be\nfull of snares and verbal entanglements. In the first place, the\n\"therefore\" has no business there. The \"I am\" is assumed in the \"I\nthink,\" which is simply another way of saying \"I am thinking.\" And, in\nthe second place, \"I think\" is not one simple proposition, but three\ndistinct assertions rolled into one. The first of these is, \"something\ncalled I exists;\" the second is, \"something called thought exists;\" and\nthe third is, \"the thought is the result of the action of the I.\"\n\nNow, it will be obvious to you, that the only one of these three\npropositions which can stand the Cartesian test of certainty is the\nsecond. It cannot be doubted, for the very doubt is an existent thought.\nBut the first and third, whether true or not, may be doubted, and have\nbeen doubted. For the assertor may be asked, How do you know that\nthought is not self-existent; or that a given thought is not the effect\nof its antecedent thought, or of some external power? And a diversity of\nother questions, much more easily put than answered. Descartes,\ndetermined as he was to strip off all the garments which the intellect\nweaves for itself, forgot this gossamer shirt of the \"self;\" to the\ngreat detriment, and indeed ruin, of his toilet when he began to clothe\nhimself again.\n\nBut it is beside my purpose to dwell upon the minor peculiarities of the\nCartesian philosophy. All I wish to put clearly before your minds thus\nfar, is that Descartes, having commenced by declaring doubt to be a\nduty, found certainty in consciousness alone; and that the necessary\noutcome of his views is what may properly be termed Idealism; namely,\nthe doctrine that, whatever the universe may be, all we can know of it\nis the picture presented to us by consciousness. This picture may be a\ntrue likeness--though how this can be is inconceivable; or it may have\nno more resemblance to its cause than one of Bach's fugues has to the\nperson who is playing it; or than a piece of poetry has to the mouth and\nlips of a reciter. It is enough for all the practical purposes of human\nexistence if we find that our trust in the representations of\nconsciousness is verified by results; and that, by their help, we are\nenabled \"to walk surefootedly in this life.\"\n\nThus the method, or path which leads to truth, indicated by Descartes,\ntakes us straight to the Critical Idealism of his great successor Kant.\nIt is that Idealism which declares the ultimate fact of all knowledge to\nbe a consciousness, or, in other words, a mental phenomenon; and\ntherefore affirms the highest of all certainties, and indeed the only\nabsolute certainty, to be the existence of mind. But it is also that\nIdealism which refuses to make any assertions, either positive or\nnegative, as to what lies beyond consciousness. It accuses the subtle\nBerkeley of stepping beyond the limits of knowledge when he declared\nthat a substance of matter does not exist; and of illogicality, for not\nseeing that the arguments which he supposed demolished the existence of\nmatter were equally destructive to the existence of soul. And it refuses\nto listen to the jargon of more recent days about the \"Absolute,\" and\nall the other hypostatized adjectives, the initial letters of the names\nof which are generally printed in capital letters; just as you give a\nGrenadier a bearskin cap, to make him look more formidable than he is by\nnature.\n\nI repeat, the path indicated and followed by Descartes which we have\nhitherto been treading, leads through doubt to that critical Idealism\nwhich lies at the heart of modern metaphysical thought. But the\n\"Discourse\" shows us another, and apparently very different, path, which\nleads, quite as definitely, to that correlation of all the phaenomena of\nthe universe with matter and motion, which lies at the heart of modern\nphysical thought, and which most people call Materialism.\n\nThe early part of the seventeenth century, when Descartes reached\nmanhood, is one of the great epochs of the intellectual life of mankind.\nAt that time, physical science suddenly strode into the arena of public\nand familiar thought, and openly challenged, not only Philosophy and the\nChurch, but that common ignorance which passes by the name of Common\nSense. The assertion of the motion of the earth was a defiance to all\nthree, and Physical Science threw down her glove by the hand of Galileo.\n\nIt is not pleasant to think of the immediate result of the combat; to\nsee the champion of science, old, worn, and on his knees before the\nCardinal Inquisitor, signing his name to what he knew to be a lie. And,\nno doubt, the Cardinals rubbed their hands as they thought how well they\nhad silenced and discredited their adversary. But two hundred years have\npassed, and however feeble or faulty her soldiers, Physical Science sits\ncrowned and enthroned as one of the legitimate rulers of the world of\nthought. Charity children would be ashamed not to know that the earth\nmoves; while the Schoolmen are forgotten; and the Cardinals--well, the\nCardinals are at the oecumenical Council, still at their old business\nof trying to stop the movement of the world.\n\nAs a ship, which having lain becalmed with every stitch of canvas set,\nbounds away before the breeze which springs up astern, so the mind of\nDescartes, poised in equilibrium of doubt, not only yielded to the full\nforce of the impulse towards physical science and physical ways of\nthought, given by his great contemporaries, Galileo and Harvey, but shot\nbeyond them; and anticipated, by bold speculation, the conclusions,\nwhich could only be placed upon a secure foundation by the labours of\ngenerations of workers.\n\nDescartes saw that the discoveries of Galileo meant that the remotest\nparts of the universe were governed by mechanical laws; while those of\nHarvey meant that the same laws presided over the operations of that\nportion of the world which is nearest to us, namely, our own bodily\nframe. And crossing the interval between the centre and its vast\ncircumference by one of the great strides of genius, Descartes sought to\nresolve all the phaenomena of the universe into matter and motion, or\nforces operating according to law.[71] This grand conception, which is\nsketched in the \"Discours,\" and more fully developed in the \"Principes\"\nand in the \"Traite de l'Homme,\" he worked out with extraordinary power\nand knowledge; and with the effect of arriving, in the last-named essay,\nat that purely mechanical view of vital phaenomena towards which modern\nphysiology is striving.\n\nLet us try to understand how Descartes got into this path, and why it\nled him where it did. The mechanism of the circulation of the blood had\nevidently taken a great hold of his mind, as he describes it several\ntimes, at much length. After giving a full account of it in the\n\"Discourse,\" and erroneously describing the motion of the blood, not to\nthe contraction of the walls of the heart, but to the heat which he\nsupposes to be generated there, he adds:--\n\n     \"This motion, which I have just explained, is as much the necessary\n     result of the structure of the parts which one can see in the\n     heart, and of the heat which one may feel there with one's fingers,\n     and of the nature of the blood, which may be experimentally\n     ascertained; as is that of a clock of the force, the situation, and\n     the figure, of its weight and of its wheels.\"\n\nBut if this apparently vital operation were explicable as a simple\nmechanism, might not other vital operations be reducible to the same\ncategory? Descartes replies without hesitation in the affirmative.\n\n     \"The animal spirits,\" says he, \"resemble a very subtle fluid, or a\n     very pure and vivid flame, and are continually generated in the\n     heart, and ascend to the brain as to a sort of reservoir. Hence\n     they pass into the nerves and are distributed to the muscles,\n     causing contraction, or relaxation, according to their quantity.\"\n\nThus, according to Descartes, the animal body is an automaton, which is\ncompetent to perform all the animal functions in exactly the same way as\na clock or any other piece of mechanism. As he puts the case himself:--\n\n     \"In proportion as these spirits [the animal spirits] enter the\n     cavities of the brain, they pass thence into the pores of its\n     substance, and from these pores into the nerves; where, according\n     as they enter, or even only tend to enter, more or less, into one\n     than into another, they have the power of altering the figure of\n     the muscles into which the nerves are inserted, and by this means\n     of causing all the limbs to move. Thus, as you may have seen in the\n     grottoes and the fountains in royal gardens, the force with which\n     the water issues from its reservoir is sufficient to move various\n     machines, and even to make them play instruments, or pronounce\n     words according to the different disposition of the pipes which\n     lead the water.\n\n     \"And, in truth, the nerves of the machine which I am describing may\n     very well be compared to the pipes of these waterworks; its muscles\n     and its tendons to the other various engines and springs which seem\n     to move them; its animal spirits to the water which impels them, of\n     which the heart is the fountain; while the cavities of the brain\n     are the central office. Moreover, respiration and other such\n     actions as are natural and usual in the body, and which depend on\n     the course of the spirits, are like the movements of a clock, or of\n     a mill, which may be kept up by the ordinary flow of the water.\n\n     \"The external objects which, by their mere presence, act upon the\n     organs of the senses; and which, by this means, determine the\n     corporal machine to move in many different ways, according as the\n     parts of the brain are arranged, are like the strangers who,\n     entering into some of the grottoes of these waterworks,\n     unconsciously cause the movements which take place in their\n     presence. For they cannot enter without treading upon certain\n     planks so arranged that, for example, if they approach a bathing\n     Diana, they cause her to hide among the reeds; and if they attempt\n     to follow her, they see approaching a Neptune, who threatens them\n     with his trident; or if they try some other way, they cause some\n     monster who vomits water into their faces, to dart out; or like\n     contrivances, according to the fancy of the engineers who have made\n     them. And lastly, when the _rational soul_ is lodged in this\n     machine, it will have its principal seat in the brain, and will\n     take the place of the engineer, who ought to be in that part of the\n     works with which all the pipes are connected, when he wishes to\n     increase, or to slacken, or in some way to alter, their\n     movements.\"[72]\n\nAnd again still more strongly:--\n\n     \"All the functions which I have attributed to this machine (the\n     body), as the digestion of food, the pulsation of the heart and of\n     the arteries; the nutrition and the growth of the limbs;\n     respiration, wakefulness, and sleep; the reception of light,\n     sounds, odours, flavours, heat, and such like qualities, in the\n     organs of the external senses; the impression of the ideas of these\n     in the organ of common sense and in the imagination; the retention,\n     or the impression, of these ideas on the memory; the internal\n     movements of the appetites and the passions; and lastly, the\n     external movements of all the limbs, which follow so aptly, as well\n     the action of the objects which are presented to the senses, as the\n     impressions which meet in the memory, that they imitate as nearly\n     as possible those of a real man:[73] I desire, I say, that you\n     should consider that these functions in the machine naturally\n     proceed from the mere arrangement of its organs, neither more nor\n     less than do the movements of a clock, or other automaton, from\n     that of its weights and its wheels; so that, so far as these are\n     concerned, it is not necessary to conceive any other vegetative or\n     sensitive soul, nor any other principle of motion, or of life, than\n     the blood and the spirits agitated by the fire which burns\n     continually in the heart, and which is no wise essentially\n     different from all the fires which exist in inanimate bodies.\"[74]\n\nThe spirit of these passages is exactly that of the most advanced\nphysiology of the present day; all that is necessary to make them\ncoincide with our present physiology in form, is to represent the\ndetails of the working of the animal machinery in modern language, and\nby the aid of modern conceptions.\n\nMost undoubtedly, the digestion of food in the human body is a purely\nchemical process; and the passage of the nutritive parts of that food\ninto the blood, a physical operation. Beyond all question, the\ncirculation of the blood is simply a matter of mechanism, and results\nfrom the structure and arrangement of the parts of the heart and\nvessels, from the contractility of those organs, and from the\nregulation of that contractility by an automatically acting nervous\napparatus. The progress of physiology has further shown, that the\ncontractility of the muscles and the irritability of the nerves are\npurely the results of the molecular mechanism of those organs; and that\nthe regular movements of the respiratory, alimentary, and other internal\norgans are governed and guided, as mechanically, by their appropriate\nnervous centres. The even rhythm of the breathing of every one of us\ndepends upon the structural integrity of a particular region of the\nmedulla oblongata, as much as the ticking of a clock depends upon the\nintegrity of the escapement. You may take away the hands of a clock and\nbreak up its striking machinery, but it will still tick; and a man may\nbe unable to feel, speak, or move, and yet he will breathe.\n\nAgain, in entire accordance with Descartes' affirmation, it is certain\nthat the modes of motion which constitute the physical basis of light,\nsound, and heat, are transmuted into affections of nervous matter by the\nsensory organs. These affections are, so to speak, a kind of physical\nideas, which are retained in the central organs, constituting what might\nbe called physical memory, and may be combined in a manner which answers\nto association and imagination, or may give rise to muscular\ncontractions, in those \"reflex actions\" which are the mechanical\nrepresentatives of volitions.\n\nConsider what happens when a blow is aimed at the eye.[75] Instantly,\nand without our knowledge or will, and even against the will, the\neyelids close. What is it that happens? A picture of the rapidly\nadvancing fist is made upon the retina at the back of the eye. The\nretina changes this picture into an affection of a number of the fibres\nof the optic nerve; the fibres of the optic nerve affect certain parts\nof the brain; the brain, in consequence, affects those particular fibres\nof the seventh nerve which go to the orbicular muscle of the eyelids;\nthe change in these nerve-fibres causes the muscular fibres to change\ntheir dimensions, so as to become shorter and broader; and the result is\nthe closing of the slit between the two lids, round which these fibres\nare disposed. Here is a pure mechanism, giving rise to a purposive\naction, and strictly comparable to that by which Descartes supposes his\nwaterwork Diana to be moved. But we may go further, and inquire whether\nour volition, in what we term voluntary action, ever plays any other\npart than that of Descartes' engineer, sitting in his office, and\nturning this tap or the other, as he wishes to set one or another\nmachine in motion, but exercising no direct influence upon the movements\nof the whole.\n\nOur voluntary acts consist of two parts: firstly, we desire to perform a\ncertain action; and, secondly, we somehow set a-going a machinery which\ndoes what we desire. But so little do we directly influence that\nmachinery, that nine-tenths of us do not even know its existence.\n\nSuppose one wills to raise one's arm and whirl it round. Nothing is\neasier. But the majority of us do not know that nerves and muscles are\nconcerned in this process; and the best anatomist among us would be\namazingly perplexed, if he were called upon to direct the succession,\nand the relative strength, of the multitudinous nerve-changes, which are\nthe actual causes of this very simple operation.\n\nSo again in speaking. How many of us know that the voice is produced in\nthe larynx, and modified by the mouth? How many among these instructed\npersons understand how the voice is produced and modified? And what\nliving man, if he had unlimited control over all the nerves supplying\nthe mouth and larynx of another person, could make him pronounce a\nsentence? Yet, if one has anything to say, what is easier than to say\nit? We desire the utterance of certain words: we touch the spring of the\nword-machine, and they are spoken. Just as Descartes' engineer, when he\nwanted a particular hydraulic machine to play, had only to turn a tap,\nand what he wished was done. It is because the body is a machine that\neducation is possible. Education is the formation of habits, a\nsuperinducing of an artificial organization upon the natural\norganization of the body; so that acts, which at first required a\nconscious effort, eventually became unconscious and mechanical. If the\nact which primarily requires a distinct consciousness and volition of\nits details, always needed the same effort, education would be an\nimpossibility.\n\nAccording to Descartes, then, all the functions which are common to man\nand animals are performed by the body as a mere mechanism, and he looks\nupon consciousness as the peculiar distinction of the \"_chose\npensante_,\" of the \"rational soul,\" which in man (and in man only, in\nDescartes' opinion) is superadded to the body. This rational soul he\nconceived to be lodged in the pineal gland, as in a sort of central\noffice; and, here, by the intermediation of the animal spirits, it\nbecame aware of what was going on in the body, or influenced the\noperations of the body. Modern physiologists do not ascribe so exalted\na function to the little pineal gland, but, in a vague sort of way, they\nadopt Descartes' principle, and suppose that the soul is lodged in the\ncortical part of the brain--at least this is commonly regarded as the\nseat and instrument of consciousness.\n\nDescartes has clearly stated what he conceived to be the difference\nbetween spirit and matter. Matter is substance which has extension, but\ndoes not think; spirit is substance which thinks, but has no extension.\nIt is very hard to form a definite notion of what this phraseology\nmeans, when it is taken in connexion with the location of the soul in\nthe pineal gland; and I can only represent it to myself as signifying\nthat the soul is a mathematical point, having place but not extension,\nwithin the limits of the pineal gland. Not only has it place, but it\nmust exert force; for, according to the hypothesis, it is competent,\nwhen it wills, to change the course of the animal spirits, which consist\nof matter in motion. Thus the soul becomes a centre of force. But, at\nthe same time, the distinction between spirit and matter vanishes;\ninasmuch as matter, according to a tenable hypothesis, may be nothing\nbut a multitude of centres of force. The case is worse if we adopt the\nmodern vague notion that consciousness is seated in the grey matter of\nthe cerebrum, generally; for, as the grey matter has extension, that\nwhich is lodged in it must also have extension. And thus we are led, in\nanother way, to lose spirit in matter.\n\nIn truth, Descartes' physiology, like the modern physiology of which it\nanticipates the spirit, leads straight to Materialism, so far as that\ntitle is rightly applicable to the doctrine that we have no knowledge\nof any thinking substance, apart from extended substance; and that\nthought is as much a function of matter as motion is. Thus we arrive at\nthe singular result that, of the two paths opened up to us in the\n\"Discourse upon Method,\" the one leads, by way of Berkeley and Hume, to\nKant and Idealism; while the other leads, by way of De La Mettrie and\nPriestley, to modern physiology and Materialism.[76] Our stem divides\ninto two main branches, which grow in opposite ways, and bear flowers\nwhich look as different as they can well be. But each branch is sound\nand healthy, and has as much life and vigour as the other.\n\nIf a botanist found this state of things in a new plant, I imagine that\nhe might be inclined to think that his tree was monoecious--that the\nflowers were of different sexes, and that, so far from setting up a\nbarrier between the two branches of the tree, the only hope of fertility\nlay in bringing them together. I may be taking too much of a\nnaturalist's view of the case, but I must confess that this is exactly\nmy notion of what is to be done with metaphysics and physics. Their\ndifferences are complementary, not antagonistic; and thought will never\nbe completely fruitful until the one unites with the other. Let me try\nto explain what I mean. I hold, with the Materialist, that the human\nbody, like all living bodies, is a machine, all the operations of which\nwill, sooner or later, be explained on physical principles. I believe\nthat we shall, sooner or later, arrive at a mechanical equivalent of\nconsciousness, just as we have arrived at a mechanical equivalent of\nheat. If a pound weight falling through a distance of a foot gives rise\nto a definite amount of heat, which may properly be said to be its\nequivalent; the same pound weight falling through a foot on a man's hand\ngives rise to a definite amount of feeling, which might with equal\npropriety be said to be its equivalent in consciousness.[77] And as we\nalready know that there is a certain parity between the intensity of a\npain and the strength of one's desire to get rid of that pain; and\nsecondly, that there is a certain correspondence between the intensity\nof the heat, or mechanical violence, which gives rise to the pain, and\nthe pain itself; the possibility of the establishment of a correlation\nbetween mechanical force and volition becomes apparent. And the same\nconclusion is suggested by the fact that, within certain limits, the\nintensity of the mechanical force we exert is proportioned to the\nintensity of our desire to exert it.\n\nThus I am prepared to go with the Materialists wherever the true pursuit\nof the path of Descartes may lead them; and I am glad, on all occasions,\nto declare my belief that their fearless development of the\nmaterialistic aspect of these matters has had an immense, and a most\nbeneficial, influence upon physiology and psychology. Nay more, when\nthey go farther than I think they are entitled to do--when they\nintroduce Calvinism into science and declare that man is nothing but a\nmachine, I do not see any particular harm in their doctrines, so long as\nthey admit that which is a matter of experimental fact--namely, that it\nis a machine capable of adjusting itself within certain limits.\n\nI protest that if some great Power would agree to make me always think\nwhat is true and do what is right, on condition of being turned into a\nsort of clock and wound up every morning before I got out of bed, I\nshould instantly close with the offer. The only freedom I care about is\nthe freedom to do right; the freedom to do wrong I am ready to part with\non the cheapest terms to any one who will take it of me. But when the\nMaterialists stray beyond the borders of their path and begin to talk\nabout there being nothing else in the universe but Matter and Force and\nNecessary Laws, and all the rest of _their_ \"grenadiers,\" I decline to\nfollow them. I go back to the point from which we started, and to the\nother path of Descartes. I remind you that we have already seen clearly\nand distinctly, and in a manner which admits of no doubt, that all our\nknowledge is a knowledge of states of consciousness. \"Matter\" and\n\"Force\" are, so far as we can know, mere names for certain forms of\nconsciousness. \"Necessary\" means that of which we cannot conceive the\ncontrary. \"Law\" means a rule which we have always found to hold good,\nand which we expect always will hold good. Thus it is an indisputable\ntruth that what we call the material world is only known to us under the\nforms of the ideal world; and, as Descartes tells us, our knowledge of\nthe soul is more intimate and certain than our knowledge of the body.\nIf I say that impenetrability is a property of matter, all that I can\nreally mean is that the consciousness I call extension, and the\nconsciousness I call resistance, constantly accompany one another. Why\nand how they are thus related is a mystery. And if I say that thought is\na property of matter, all that I can mean is that, actually or possibly,\nthe consciousness of extension and that of resistance accompany all\nother sorts of consciousness. But, as in the former case, why they are\nthus associated is an insoluble mystery.\n\nFrom all this it follows that what I may term legitimate materialism,\nthat is, the extension of the conceptions and of the methods of physical\nscience to the highest as well as the lowest phenomena of vitality, is\nneither more nor less than a sort of shorthand Idealism; and Descartes'\ntwo paths meet at the summit of the mountain, though they set out on\nopposite sides of it.\n\nThe reconciliation of physics and metaphysics lies in the acknowledgment\nof faults upon both sides; in the confession by physics that all the\nphaenomena of nature are, in their ultimate analysis, known to us only as\nfacts of consciousness; in the admission by metaphysics, that the facts\nof consciousness are, practically, interpretable only by the methods and\nthe formulae of physics: and, finally, in the observance by both\nmetaphysical and physical thinkers of Descartes' maxim--assent to no\nproposition the matter of which is not so clear and distinct that it\ncannot be doubted.\n\n\nWhen you did me the honour to ask me to deliver this address, I confess\nI was perplexed what topic to select. For you are emphatically and\ndistinctly a _Christian_ body; while science and philosophy, within the\nrange of which lie all the topics on which I could venture to speak, are\nneither Christian, nor Unchristian, but are Extrachristian, and have a\nworld of their own, which, to use language which will be very familiar\nto your ears just now, is not only \"unsectarian,\" but is altogether\n\"secular.\" The arguments which I have put before you to-night, for\nexample, are not inconsistent, so far as I know, with any form of\ntheology.\n\nAfter much consideration, I thought that I might be most useful to you,\nif I attempted to give you some vision of this Extrachristian world, as\nit appears to a person who lives a good deal in it; and if I tried to\nshow you by what methods the dwellers therein try to distinguish truth\nfrom falsehood, in regard to some of the deepest and most difficult\nproblems that beset humanity, \"in order to be clear about their actions,\nand to walk surefootedly in this life,\" as Descartes says.\n\nIt struck me that if the execution of my project came anywhere near the\nconception of it, you would become aware that the philosophers and the\nmen of science are not exactly what they are sometimes represented to\nyou to be; and that their methods and paths do not lead so\nperpendicularly downwards as you are occasionally told they do. And I\nmust admit, also, that a particular and personal motive weighed with\nme,--namely, the desire to show that a certain discourse, which brought\na great storm about my head some time ago, contained nothing but the\nultimate development of the views of the father of modern philosophy. I\ndo not know if I have been quite wise in allowing this last motive to\nweigh with me. They say that the most dangerous thing one can do in a\nthunderstorm is to shelter oneself under a great tree, and the history\nof Descartes' life shows how narrowly he escaped being riven by the\nlightnings, which were more destructive in his time than in ours.\n\nDescartes lived and died a good Catholic, and prided himself upon having\ndemonstrated the existence of God and of the soul of man. As a reward\nfor his exertions, his old friends the Jesuits put his works upon the\n\"Index,\" and called him an Atheist; while the Protestant divines of\nHolland declared him to be both a Jesuit and an Atheist. His books\nnarrowly escaped being burned by the hangman; the fate of Vanini was\ndangled before his eyes; and the misfortunes of Galileo so alarmed him,\nthat he well-nigh renounced the pursuits by which the world has so\ngreatly benefited, and was driven into subterfuges and evasions which\nwere not worthy of him.\n\n\"Very cowardly,\" you may say; and so it was. But you must make allowance\nfor the fact that, in the seventeenth century, not only did heresy mean\npossible burning, or imprisonment, but the very suspicion of it\ndestroyed a man's peace, and rendered the calm pursuit of truth\ndifficult or impossible. I fancy that Descartes was a man to care more\nabout being worried and disturbed, than about being burned outright;\nand, like many other men, sacrificed for the sake of peace and\nquietness, what he would have stubbornly maintained against downright\nviolence.\n\nHowever this may be, let those who are sure they would have done better\nthrow stones at him. I have no feelings but those of gratitude and\nreverence for the man who did what he did, when he did; and a sort of\nshame that any one should repine against taking a fair share of such\ntreatment as the world thought good enough for him.\n\nFinally, it occurs to me that, such being my feeling about the matter,\nit may be useful to all of us if I ask you, \"What is yours? Do you think\nthat the Christianity of the seventeenth century looks nobler and more\nattractive for such treatment of such a man?\" You will hardly reply that\nit does. But if it does not, may it not be well if all of you do what\nlies within your power to prevent the Christianity of the nineteenth\ncentury from repeating the scandal?\n\nThere are one or two living men, who, a couple of centuries hence, will\nbe remembered as Descartes is now, because they have produced great\nthoughts which will live and grow as long as mankind lasts.\n\nIf the twenty-first century studies their history, it will find that the\nChristianity of the middle of the nineteenth century recognised them\nonly as objects of vilification. It is for you and such as you,\nChristian young men, to say whether this shall be as true of the\nChristianity of the future as it is of that of the present. I appeal to\nyou to say \"No,\" in your own interest, and in that of the Christianity\nyou profess.\n\nIn the interest of Science, no appeal is needful; as Dante sings of\nFortune--\n\n     \"Quest' e colei, ch'e tanto posta in croce\n       Pur da color, che le dovrian dar lode\n     Dandole biasmo a torto e mala voce.\n       Ma ella s' e beata, e cio non ode:\n     Con l' altre prime creature lieta\n       Volve sua spera, e beata si gode:\"[78]\n\nso, whatever evil voices may rage, Science, secure among the powers that\nare eternal, will do her work and be blessed.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[68] I forget who it was said of him: \"Il a plus que personne l'esprit\nque tout le monde a.\"\n\n[69] \"Discours de la Methode pour bien conduire sa Raison et chercher la\nVerite dans les Sciences.\"\n\n[70] \"Eine thaetige Skepsis ist die, welche unablaessig bemueht ist sich\nselbst zu ueberwinden, und durch geregelte Erfahrung zu einer Art von\nbedingtrer Zuverlaessigkeit zu gelangen.\"--_Maximen und Reflexionen_, 7\nAbtheilung.\n\n[71] \"Au milieu de toutes ses erreurs, il ne faut pas meconnaitre une\ngrande idee, qui consiste a avoir tente pour la premiere fois de ramener\ntous les phenomenes naturels a n'etre qu'un simple develloppement des\nlois de la mecanique,\" is the weighty judgment of Biot, cited by\nBouillier (_Histoire de la Philosophie Cartesienne_, t. i. p. 196).\n\n[72] \"Traite de l'Homme\" (Cousin's Edition), p. 347.\n\n[73] Descartes pretends that he does not apply his views to the human\nbody, but only to an imaginary machine which, if it could be\nconstructed, would do all that the human body does; throwing a sop to\nCerberus unworthily; and uselessly, because Cerberus was by no means\nstupid enough to swallow it.\n\n[74] \"Traite de l'Homme,\" p. 427.\n\n[75] Compare \"Traite des Passions,\" Art. XIII. and XVI.\n\n[76] Bouillier, into whose excellent \"History of the Cartesian\nPhilosophy\" I had not looked when this passage was written, says, very\njustly, that Descartes \"a merite le titre de pere de la physique, aussi\nbien que celui de pere de la metaphysique moderne\" (t. i. p. 197). See\nalso Kuno Fischer's \"Geschichte der neuen Philosophie,\" Bd. i.; and the\nvery remarkable work of Lange, \"Geschichte des Materialismus.\"--A good\ntranslation of the latter would be a great service to philosophy in\nEngland.\n\n[77] For all the qualifications which need to be made here, I refer the\nreader to the thorough discussion of the nature of the relation between\nnerve-action and consciousness in Mr. Herbert Spencer's \"Principles of\nPsychology,\" p. 115 _et seq._\n\n[78]\n         \"And this is she who's put on cross so much,\n         Even by them who ought to give her praise,\n         Giving her wrongly ill repute and blame.\n         But she is blessed, and she hears not this:\n         She, with the other primal creatures, glad\n         Revolves her sphere, and blessed joys herself.\"\n\n         _Inferno_, vii. 90-95 (W.M. Rossetti's Translation).","title":"Lay Sermons, Addresses and Reviews","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":107790}