{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_1673/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_1673","id":"gutenberg_1673","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1673","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Classics of Literature","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Classical literature","Philosophy, Ancient"],"text":"Produced by Sue Asscher\n\n\n\n\n\nLESSER HIPPIAS\n\nby Plato\n\n(see Appendix I)\n\n\nTranslated by Benjamin Jowett\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX I.\n\nIt seems impossible to separate by any exact line the genuine writings\nof Plato from the spurious. The only external evidence to them which is\nof much value is that of Aristotle; for the Alexandrian catalogues of\na century later include manifest forgeries. Even the value of the\nAristotelian authority is a good deal impaired by the uncertainty\nconcerning the date and authorship of the writings which are ascribed to\nhim. And several of the citations of Aristotle omit the name of Plato,\nand some of them omit the name of the dialogue from which they are\ntaken. Prior, however, to the enquiry about the writings of a particular\nauthor, general considerations which equally affect all evidence to the\ngenuineness of ancient writings are the following: Shorter works are\nmore likely to have been forged, or to have received an erroneous\ndesignation, than longer ones; and some kinds of composition, such as\nepistles or panegyrical orations, are more liable to suspicion than\nothers; those, again, which have a taste of sophistry in them, or the\nring of a later age, or the slighter character of a rhetorical exercise,\nor in which a motive or some affinity to spurious writings can be\ndetected, or which seem to have originated in a name or statement really\noccurring in some classical author, are also of doubtful credit; while\nthere is no instance of any ancient writing proved to be a forgery,\nwhich combines excellence with length. A really great and original\nwriter would have no object in fathering his works on Plato; and to the\nforger or imitator, the 'literary hack' of Alexandria and Athens, the\nGods did not grant originality or genius. Further, in attempting to\nbalance the evidence for and against a Platonic dialogue, we must not\nforget that the form of the Platonic writing was common to several of\nhis contemporaries. Aeschines, Euclid, Phaedo, Antisthenes, and in the\nnext generation Aristotle, are all said to have composed dialogues; and\nmistakes of names are very likely to have occurred. Greek literature in\nthe third century before Christ was almost as voluminous as our own, and\nwithout the safeguards of regular publication, or printing, or binding,\nor even of distinct titles. An unknown writing was naturally attributed\nto a known writer whose works bore the same character; and the name once\nappended easily obtained authority. A tendency may also be observed to\nblend the works and opinions of the master with those of his scholars.\nTo a later Platonist, the difference between Plato and his imitators was\nnot so perceptible as to ourselves. The Memorabilia of Xenophon and the\nDialogues of Plato are but a part of a considerable Socratic literature\nwhich has passed away. And we must consider how we should regard the\nquestion of the genuineness of a particular writing, if this lost\nliterature had been preserved to us.\n\nThese considerations lead us to adopt the following criteria of\ngenuineness: (1) That is most certainly Plato's which Aristotle\nattributes to him by name, which (2) is of considerable length, of (3)\ngreat excellence, and also (4) in harmony with the general spirit of\nthe Platonic writings. But the testimony of Aristotle cannot always\nbe distinguished from that of a later age (see above); and has various\ndegrees of importance. Those writings which he cites without mentioning\nPlato, under their own names, e.g. the Hippias, the Funeral Oration, the\nPhaedo, etc., have an inferior degree of evidence in their favour. They\nmay have been supposed by him to be the writings of another, although in\nthe case of really great works, e.g. the Phaedo, this is not credible;\nthose again which are quoted but not named, are still more defective\nin their external credentials. There may be also a possibility that\nAristotle was mistaken, or may have confused the master and his scholars\nin the case of a short writing; but this is inconceivable about a more\nimportant work, e.g. the Laws, especially when we remember that he was\nliving at Athens, and a frequenter of the groves of the Academy, during\nthe last twenty years of Plato's life. Nor must we forget that in all\nhis numerous citations from the Platonic writings he never attributes\nany passage found in the extant dialogues to any one but Plato. And\nlastly, we may remark that one or two great writings, such as the\nParmenides and the Politicus, which are wholly devoid of Aristotelian\n(1) credentials may be fairly attributed to Plato, on the ground of (2)\nlength, (3) excellence, and (4) accordance with the general spirit\nof his writings. Indeed the greater part of the evidence for the\ngenuineness of ancient Greek authors may be summed up under two heads\nonly: (1) excellence; and (2) uniformity of tradition--a kind of\nevidence, which though in many cases sufficient, is of inferior value.\n\nProceeding upon these principles we appear to arrive at the conclusion\nthat nineteen-twentieths of all the writings which have ever been\nascribed to Plato, are undoubtedly genuine. There is another portion of\nthem, including the Epistles, the Epinomis, the dialogues rejected by\nthe ancients themselves, namely, the Axiochus, De justo, De virtute,\nDemodocus, Sisyphus, Eryxias, which on grounds, both of internal and\nexternal evidence, we are able with equal certainty to reject. But there\nstill remains a small portion of which we are unable to affirm either\nthat they are genuine or spurious. They may have been written in youth,\nor possibly like the works of some painters, may be partly or wholly\nthe compositions of pupils; or they may have been the writings of some\ncontemporary transferred by accident to the more celebrated name of\nPlato, or of some Platonist in the next generation who aspired to\nimitate his master. Not that on grounds either of language or philosophy\nwe should lightly reject them. Some difference of style, or inferiority\nof execution, or inconsistency of thought, can hardly be considered\ndecisive of their spurious character. For who always does justice to\nhimself, or who writes with equal care at all times? Certainly not\nPlato, who exhibits the greatest differences in dramatic power, in the\nformation of sentences, and in the use of words, if his earlier writings\nare compared with his later ones, say the Protagoras or Phaedrus with\nthe Laws. Or who can be expected to think in the same manner during\na period of authorship extending over above fifty years, in an age\nof great intellectual activity, as well as of political and literary\ntransition? Certainly not Plato, whose earlier writings are separated\nfrom his later ones by as wide an interval of philosophical speculation\nas that which separates his later writings from Aristotle.\n\nThe dialogues which have been translated in the first Appendix, and\nwhich appear to have the next claim to genuineness among the Platonic\nwritings, are the Lesser Hippias, the Menexenus or Funeral Oration, the\nFirst Alcibiades. Of these, the Lesser Hippias and the Funeral Oration\nare cited by Aristotle; the first in the Metaphysics, the latter in the\nRhetoric. Neither of them are expressly attributed to Plato, but in his\ncitation of both of them he seems to be referring to passages in the\nextant dialogues. From the mention of 'Hippias' in the singular by\nAristotle, we may perhaps infer that he was unacquainted with a second\ndialogue bearing the same name. Moreover, the mere existence of a\nGreater and Lesser Hippias, and of a First and Second Alcibiades, does\nto a certain extent throw a doubt upon both of them. Though a very\nclever and ingenious work, the Lesser Hippias does not appear to contain\nanything beyond the power of an imitator, who was also a careful student\nof the earlier Platonic writings, to invent. The motive or leading\nthought of the dialogue may be detected in Xen. Mem., and there is\nno similar instance of a 'motive' which is taken from Xenophon in an\nundoubted dialogue of Plato. On the other hand, the upholders of the\ngenuineness of the dialogue will find in the Hippias a true Socratic\nspirit; they will compare the Ion as being akin both in subject and\ntreatment; they will urge the authority of Aristotle; and they will\ndetect in the treatment of the Sophist, in the satirical reasoning\nupon Homer, in the reductio ad absurdum of the doctrine that vice is\nignorance, traces of a Platonic authorship. In reference to the last\npoint we are doubtful, as in some of the other dialogues, whether the\nauthor is asserting or overthrowing the paradox of Socrates, or merely\nfollowing the argument 'whither the wind blows.' That no conclusion\nis arrived at is also in accordance with the character of the earlier\ndialogues. The resemblances or imitations of the Gorgias, Protagoras,\nand Euthydemus, which have been observed in the Hippias, cannot with\ncertainty be adduced on either side of the argument. On the whole, more\nmay be said in favour of the genuineness of the Hippias than against it.\n\nThe Menexenus or Funeral Oration is cited by Aristotle, and is\ninteresting as supplying an example of the manner in which the orators\npraised 'the Athenians among the Athenians,' falsifying persons and\ndates, and casting a veil over the gloomier events of Athenian history.\nIt exhibits an acquaintance with the funeral oration of Thucydides, and\nwas, perhaps, intended to rival that great work. If genuine, the\nproper place of the Menexenus would be at the end of the Phaedrus. The\nsatirical opening and the concluding words bear a great resemblance to\nthe earlier dialogues; the oration itself is professedly a mimetic work,\nlike the speeches in the Phaedrus, and cannot therefore be tested by\na comparison of the other writings of Plato. The funeral oration of\nPericles is expressly mentioned in the Phaedrus, and this may have\nsuggested the subject, in the same manner that the Cleitophon appears to\nbe suggested by the slight mention of Cleitophon and his attachment to\nThrasymachus in the Republic; and the Theages by the mention of Theages\nin the Apology and Republic; or as the Second Alcibiades seems to be\nfounded upon the text of Xenophon, Mem. A similar taste for parody\nappears not only in the Phaedrus, but in the Protagoras, in the\nSymposium, and to a certain extent in the Parmenides.\n\nTo these two doubtful writings of Plato I have added the First\nAlcibiades, which, of all the disputed dialogues of Plato, has the\ngreatest merit, and is somewhat longer than any of them, though not\nverified by the testimony of Aristotle, and in many respects at variance\nwith the Symposium in the description of the relations of Socrates\nand Alcibiades. Like the Lesser Hippias and the Menexenus, it is to be\ncompared to the earlier writings of Plato. The motive of the piece may,\nperhaps, be found in that passage of the Symposium in which Alcibiades\ndescribes himself as self-convicted by the words of Socrates. For the\ndisparaging manner in which Schleiermacher has spoken of this dialogue\nthere seems to be no sufficient foundation. At the same time, the lesson\nimparted is simple, and the irony more transparent than in the undoubted\ndialogues of Plato. We know, too, that Alcibiades was a favourite\nthesis, and that at least five or six dialogues bearing this name passed\ncurrent in antiquity, and are attributed to contemporaries of Socrates\nand Plato. (1) In the entire absence of real external evidence (for\nthe catalogues of the Alexandrian librarians cannot be regarded as\ntrustworthy); and (2) in the absence of the highest marks either of\npoetical or philosophical excellence; and (3) considering that we have\nexpress testimony to the existence of contemporary writings bearing\nthe name of Alcibiades, we are compelled to suspend our judgment on the\ngenuineness of the extant dialogue.\n\nNeither at this point, nor at any other, do we propose to draw an\nabsolute line of demarcation between genuine and spurious writings of\nPlato. They fade off imperceptibly from one class to another. There may\nhave been degrees of genuineness in the dialogues themselves, as there\nare certainly degrees of evidence by which they are supported. The\ntraditions of the oral discourses both of Socrates and Plato may have\nformed the basis of semi-Platonic writings; some of them may be of the\nsame mixed character which is apparent in Aristotle and Hippocrates,\nalthough the form of them is different. But the writings of Plato,\nunlike the writings of Aristotle, seem never to have been confused with\nthe writings of his disciples: this was probably due to their definite\nform, and to their inimitable excellence. The three dialogues which\nwe have offered in the Appendix to the criticism of the reader may\nbe partly spurious and partly genuine; they may be altogether\nspurious;--that is an alternative which must be frankly admitted. Nor\ncan we maintain of some other dialogues, such as the Parmenides, and\nthe Sophist, and Politicus, that no considerable objection can be urged\nagainst them, though greatly overbalanced by the weight (chiefly)\nof internal evidence in their favour. Nor, on the other hand, can\nwe exclude a bare possibility that some dialogues which are usually\nrejected, such as the Greater Hippias and the Cleitophon, may be\ngenuine. The nature and object of these semi-Platonic writings require\nmore careful study and more comparison of them with one another, and\nwith forged writings in general, than they have yet received, before we\ncan finally decide on their character. We do not consider them all as\ngenuine until they can be proved to be spurious, as is often maintained\nand still more often implied in this and similar discussions; but\nshould say of some of them, that their genuineness is neither proven nor\ndisproven until further evidence about them can be adduced. And we are\nas confident that the Epistles are spurious, as that the Republic, the\nTimaeus, and the Laws are genuine.\n\nOn the whole, not a twentieth part of the writings which pass under\nthe name of Plato, if we exclude the works rejected by the ancients\nthemselves and two or three other plausible inventions, can be fairly\ndoubted by those who are willing to allow that a considerable change\nand growth may have taken place in his philosophy (see above). That\ntwentieth debatable portion scarcely in any degree affects our judgment\nof Plato, either as a thinker or a writer, and though suggesting some\ninteresting questions to the scholar and critic, is of little importance\nto the general reader.\n\n\n\n\nLESSER HIPPIAS\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION.\n\nThe Lesser Hippias may be compared with the earlier dialogues of Plato,\nin which the contrast of Socrates and the Sophists is most strongly\nexhibited. Hippias, like Protagoras and Gorgias, though civil, is vain\nand boastful: he knows all things; he can make anything, including his\nown clothes; he is a manufacturer of poems and declamations, and also of\nseal-rings, shoes, strigils; his girdle, which he has woven himself, is\nof a finer than Persian quality. He is a vainer, lighter nature than\nthe two great Sophists (compare Protag.), but of the same character\nwith them, and equally impatient of the short cut-and-thrust method of\nSocrates, whom he endeavours to draw into a long oration. At last, he\ngets tired of being defeated at every point by Socrates, and is with\ndifficulty induced to proceed (compare Thrasymachus, Protagoras,\nCallicles, and others, to whom the same reluctance is ascribed).\n\nHippias like Protagoras has common sense on his side, when he argues,\nciting passages of the Iliad in support of his view, that Homer intended\nAchilles to be the bravest, Odysseus the wisest of the Greeks. But he is\neasily overthrown by the superior dialectics of Socrates, who pretends\nto show that Achilles is not true to his word, and that no similar\ninconsistency is to be found in Odysseus. Hippias replies that Achilles\nunintentionally, but Odysseus intentionally, speaks falsehood. But is it\nbetter to do wrong intentionally or unintentionally? Socrates, relying\non the analogy of the arts, maintains the former, Hippias the latter\nof the two alternatives...All this is quite conceived in the spirit of\nPlato, who is very far from making Socrates always argue on the side\nof truth. The over-reasoning on Homer, which is of course satirical, is\nalso in the spirit of Plato. Poetry turned logic is even more ridiculous\nthan 'rhetoric turned logic,' and equally fallacious. There were\nreasoners in ancient as well as in modern times, who could never receive\nthe natural impression of Homer, or of any other book which they\nread. The argument of Socrates, in which he picks out the apparent\ninconsistencies and discrepancies in the speech and actions of Achilles,\nand the final paradox, 'that he who is true is also false,' remind us\nof the interpretation by Socrates of Simonides in the Protagoras, and of\nsimilar reasonings in the first book of the Republic. The discrepancies\nwhich Socrates discovers in the words of Achilles are perhaps as great\nas those discovered by some of the modern separatists of the Homeric\npoems...\n\nAt last, Socrates having caught Hippias in the toils of the voluntary\nand involuntary, is obliged to confess that he is wandering about in the\nsame labyrinth; he makes the reflection on himself which others would\nmake upon him (compare Protagoras). He does not wonder that he should be\nin a difficulty, but he wonders at Hippias, and he becomes sensible\nof the gravity of the situation, when ordinary men like himself can no\nlonger go to the wise and be taught by them.\n\nIt may be remarked as bearing on the genuineness of this dialogue: (1)\nthat the manners of the speakers are less subtle and refined than in\nthe other dialogues of Plato; (2) that the sophistry of Socrates is more\npalpable and unblushing, and also more unmeaning; (3) that many turns\nof thought and style are found in it which appear also in the other\ndialogues:--whether resemblances of this kind tell in favour of or\nagainst the genuineness of an ancient writing, is an important question\nwhich will have to be answered differently in different cases. For that\na writer may repeat himself is as true as that a forger may imitate; and\nPlato elsewhere, either of set purpose or from forgetfulness, is full\nof repetitions. The parallelisms of the Lesser Hippias, as already\nremarked, are not of the kind which necessarily imply that the dialogue\nis the work of a forger. The parallelisms of the Greater Hippias with\nthe other dialogues, and the allusion to the Lesser (where Hippias\nsketches the programme of his next lecture, and invites Socrates to\nattend and bring any friends with him who may be competent judges), are\nmore than suspicious:--they are of a very poor sort, such as we cannot\nsuppose to have been due to Plato himself. The Greater Hippias more\nresembles the Euthydemus than any other dialogue; but is immeasurably\ninferior to it. The Lesser Hippias seems to have more merit than the\nGreater, and to be more Platonic in spirit. The character of Hippias is\nthe same in both dialogues, but his vanity and boasting are even more\nexaggerated in the Greater Hippias. His art of memory is specially\nmentioned in both. He is an inferior type of the same species as\nHippodamus of Miletus (Arist. Pol.). Some passages in which the Lesser\nHippias may be advantageously compared with the undoubtedly genuine\ndialogues of Plato are the following:--Less. Hipp.: compare Republic\n(Socrates' cunning in argument): compare Laches (Socrates' feeling about\narguments): compare Republic (Socrates not unthankful): compare Republic\n(Socrates dishonest in argument).\n\nThe Lesser Hippias, though inferior to the other dialogues, may be\nreasonably believed to have been written by Plato, on the ground (1)\nof considerable excellence; (2) of uniform tradition beginning with\nAristotle and his school. That the dialogue falls below the standard of\nPlato's other works, or that he has attributed to Socrates an unmeaning\nparadox (perhaps with the view of showing that he could beat the\nSophists at their own weapons; or that he could 'make the worse appear\nthe better cause'; or merely as a dialectical experiment)--are not\nsufficient reasons for doubting the genuineness of the work.\n\n\n\n\nPERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Eudicus, Socrates, Hippias.\n\n\nEUDICUS: Why are you silent, Socrates, after the magnificent display\nwhich Hippias has been making? Why do you not either refute his words,\nif he seems to you to have been wrong in any point, or join with us in\ncommending him? There is the more reason why you should speak, because\nwe are now alone, and the audience is confined to those who may fairly\nclaim to take part in a philosophical discussion.\n\nSOCRATES: I should greatly like, Eudicus, to ask Hippias the meaning\nof what he was saying just now about Homer. I have heard your father,\nApemantus, declare that the Iliad of Homer is a finer poem than the\nOdyssey in the same degree that Achilles was a better man than Odysseus;\nOdysseus, he would say, is the central figure of the one poem and\nAchilles of the other. Now, I should like to know, if Hippias has no\nobjection to tell me, what he thinks about these two heroes, and which\nof them he maintains to be the better; he has already told us in the\ncourse of his exhibition many things of various kinds about Homer and\ndivers other poets.\n\nEUDICUS: I am sure that Hippias will be delighted to answer anything\nwhich you would like to ask; tell me, Hippias, if Socrates asks you a\nquestion, will you answer him?\n\nHIPPIAS: Indeed, Eudicus, I should be strangely inconsistent if I\nrefused to answer Socrates, when at each Olympic festival, as I went up\nfrom my house at Elis to the temple of Olympia, where all the Hellenes\nwere assembled, I continually professed my willingness to perform any of\nthe exhibitions which I had prepared, and to answer any questions which\nany one had to ask.\n\nSOCRATES: Truly, Hippias, you are to be congratulated, if at every\nOlympic festival you have such an encouraging opinion of your own wisdom\nwhen you go up to the temple. I doubt whether any muscular hero would be\nso fearless and confident in offering his body to the combat at Olympia,\nas you are in offering your mind.\n\nHIPPIAS: And with good reason, Socrates; for since the day when I first\nentered the lists at Olympia I have never found any man who was my\nsuperior in anything. (Compare Gorgias.)\n\nSOCRATES: What an ornament, Hippias, will the reputation of your wisdom\nbe to the city of Elis and to your parents! But to return: what say you\nof Odysseus and Achilles? Which is the better of the two? and in what\nparticular does either surpass the other? For when you were exhibiting\nand there was company in the room, though I could not follow you, I did\nnot like to ask what you meant, because a crowd of people were present,\nand I was afraid that the question might interrupt your exhibition. But\nnow that there are not so many of us, and my friend Eudicus bids me ask,\nI wish you would tell me what you were saying about these two heroes, so\nthat I may clearly understand; how did you distinguish them?\n\nHIPPIAS: I shall have much pleasure, Socrates, in explaining to you more\nclearly than I could in public my views about these and also about other\nheroes. I say that Homer intended Achilles to be the bravest of the men\nwho went to Troy, Nestor the wisest, and Odysseus the wiliest.\n\nSOCRATES: O rare Hippias, will you be so good as not to laugh, if I find\na difficulty in following you, and repeat my questions several times\nover? Please to answer me kindly and gently.\n\nHIPPIAS: I should be greatly ashamed of myself, Socrates, if I, who\nteach others and take money of them, could not, when I was asked by you,\nanswer in a civil and agreeable manner.\n\nSOCRATES: Thank you: the fact is, that I seemed to understand what you\nmeant when you said that the poet intended Achilles to be the bravest\nof men, and also that he intended Nestor to be the wisest; but when you\nsaid that he meant Odysseus to be the wiliest, I must confess that I\ncould not understand what you were saying. Will you tell me, and then I\nshall perhaps understand you better; has not Homer made Achilles wily?\n\nHIPPIAS: Certainly not, Socrates; he is the most straight-forward of\nmankind, and when Homer introduces them talking with one another in the\npassage called the Prayers, Achilles is supposed by the poet to say to\nOdysseus:--\n\n'Son of Laertes, sprung from heaven, crafty Odysseus, I will speak out\nplainly the word which I intend to carry out in act, and which will,\nI believe, be accomplished. For I hate him like the gates of death who\nthinks one thing and says another. But I will speak that which shall be\naccomplished.'\n\nNow, in these verses he clearly indicates the character of the two men;\nhe shows Achilles to be true and simple, and Odysseus to be wily and\nfalse; for he supposes Achilles to be addressing Odysseus in these\nlines.\n\nSOCRATES: Now, Hippias, I think that I understand your meaning; when you\nsay that Odysseus is wily, you clearly mean that he is false?\n\nHIPPIAS: Exactly so, Socrates; it is the character of Odysseus, as he is\nrepresented by Homer in many passages both of the Iliad and Odyssey.\n\nSOCRATES: And Homer must be presumed to have meant that the true man is\nnot the same as the false?\n\nHIPPIAS: Of course, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: And is that your own opinion, Hippias?\n\nHIPPIAS: Certainly; how can I have any other?\n\nSOCRATES: Well, then, as there is no possibility of asking Homer what\nhe meant in these verses of his, let us leave him; but as you show a\nwillingness to take up his cause, and your opinion agrees with what you\ndeclare to be his, will you answer on behalf of yourself and him?\n\nHIPPIAS: I will; ask shortly anything which you like.\n\nSOCRATES: Do you say that the false, like the sick, have no power to do\nthings, or that they have the power to do things?\n\nHIPPIAS: I should say that they have power to do many things, and in\nparticular to deceive mankind.\n\nSOCRATES: Then, according to you, they are both powerful and wily, are\nthey not?\n\nHIPPIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And are they wily, and do they deceive by reason of their\nsimplicity and folly, or by reason of their cunning and a certain sort\nof prudence?\n\nHIPPIAS: By reason of their cunning and prudence, most certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Then they are prudent, I suppose?\n\nHIPPIAS: So they are--very.\n\nSOCRATES: And if they are prudent, do they know or do they not know what\nthey do?\n\nHIPPIAS: Of course, they know very well; and that is why they do\nmischief to others.\n\nSOCRATES: And having this knowledge, are they ignorant, or are they\nwise?\n\nHIPPIAS: Wise, certainly; at least, in so far as they can deceive.\n\nSOCRATES: Stop, and let us recall to mind what you are saying; are you\nnot saying that the false are powerful and prudent and knowing and wise\nin those things about which they are false?\n\nHIPPIAS: To be sure.\n\nSOCRATES: And the true differ from the false--the true and the false are\nthe very opposite of each other?\n\nHIPPIAS: That is my view.\n\nSOCRATES: Then, according to your view, it would seem that the false are\nto be ranked in the class of the powerful and wise?\n\nHIPPIAS: Assuredly.\n\nSOCRATES: And when you say that the false are powerful and wise in so\nfar as they are false, do you mean that they have or have not the power\nof uttering their falsehoods if they like?\n\nHIPPIAS: I mean to say that they have the power.\n\nSOCRATES: In a word, then, the false are they who are wise and have the\npower to speak falsely?\n\nHIPPIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then a man who has not the power of speaking falsely and is\nignorant cannot be false?\n\nHIPPIAS: You are right.\n\nSOCRATES: And every man has power who does that which he wishes at the\ntime when he wishes. I am not speaking of any special case in which he\nis prevented by disease or something of that sort, but I am speaking\ngenerally, as I might say of you, that you are able to write my name\nwhen you like. Would you not call a man able who could do that?\n\nHIPPIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And tell me, Hippias, are you not a skilful calculator and\narithmetician?\n\nHIPPIAS: Yes, Socrates, assuredly I am.\n\nSOCRATES: And if some one were to ask you what is the sum of 3\nmultiplied by 700, you would tell him the true answer in a moment, if\nyou pleased?\n\nHIPPIAS: certainly I should.\n\nSOCRATES: Is not that because you are the wisest and ablest of men in\nthese matters?\n\nHIPPIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And being as you are the wisest and ablest of men in these\nmatters of calculation, are you not also the best?\n\nHIPPIAS: To be sure, Socrates, I am the best.\n\nSOCRATES: And therefore you would be the most able to tell the truth\nabout these matters, would you not?\n\nHIPPIAS: Yes, I should.\n\nSOCRATES: And could you speak falsehoods about them equally well? I\nmust beg, Hippias, that you will answer me with the same frankness and\nmagnanimity which has hitherto characterized you. If a person were to\nask you what is the sum of 3 multiplied by 700, would not you be the\nbest and most consistent teller of a falsehood, having always the power\nof speaking falsely as you have of speaking truly, about these same\nmatters, if you wanted to tell a falsehood, and not to answer truly?\nWould the ignorant man be better able to tell a falsehood in matters\nof calculation than you would be, if you chose? Might he not sometimes\nstumble upon the truth, when he wanted to tell a lie, because he did\nnot know, whereas you who are the wise man, if you wanted to tell a lie\nwould always and consistently lie?\n\nHIPPIAS: Yes, there you are quite right.\n\nSOCRATES: Does the false man tell lies about other things, but not about\nnumber, or when he is making a calculation?\n\nHIPPIAS: To be sure; he would tell as many lies about number as about\nother things.\n\nSOCRATES: Then may we further assume, Hippias, that there are men who\nare false about calculation and number?\n\nHIPPIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Who can they be? For you have already admitted that he who is\nfalse must have the ability to be false: you said, as you will remember,\nthat he who is unable to be false will not be false?\n\nHIPPIAS: Yes, I remember; it was so said.\n\nSOCRATES: And were you not yourself just now shown to be best able to\nspeak falsely about calculation?\n\nHIPPIAS: Yes; that was another thing which was said.\n\nSOCRATES: And are you not likewise said to speak truly about\ncalculation?\n\nHIPPIAS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Then the same person is able to speak both falsely and truly\nabout calculation? And that person is he who is good at calculation--the\narithmetician?\n\nHIPPIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Who, then, Hippias, is discovered to be false at calculation?\nIs he not the good man? For the good man is the able man, and he is the\ntrue man.\n\nHIPPIAS: That is evident.\n\nSOCRATES: Do you not see, then, that the same man is false and also true\nabout the same matters? And the true man is not a whit better than the\nfalse; for indeed he is the same with him and not the very opposite, as\nyou were just now imagining.\n\nHIPPIAS: Not in that instance, clearly.\n\nSOCRATES: Shall we examine other instances?\n\nHIPPIAS: Certainly, if you are disposed.\n\nSOCRATES: Are you not also skilled in geometry?\n\nHIPPIAS: I am.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, and does not the same hold in that science also? Is\nnot the same person best able to speak falsely or to speak truly about\ndiagrams; and he is--the geometrician?\n\nHIPPIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: He and no one else is good at it?\n\nHIPPIAS: Yes, he and no one else.\n\nSOCRATES: Then the good and wise geometer has this double power in the\nhighest degree; and if there be a man who is false about diagrams the\ngood man will be he, for he is able to be false; whereas the bad is\nunable, and for this reason is not false, as has been admitted.\n\nHIPPIAS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: Once more--let us examine a third case; that of the\nastronomer, in whose art, again, you, Hippias, profess to be a still\ngreater proficient than in the preceding--do you not?\n\nHIPPIAS: Yes, I am.\n\nSOCRATES: And does not the same hold of astronomy?\n\nHIPPIAS: True, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: And in astronomy, too, if any man be able to speak falsely\nhe will be the good astronomer, but he who is not able will not speak\nfalsely, for he has no knowledge.\n\nHIPPIAS: Clearly not.\n\nSOCRATES: Then in astronomy also, the same man will be true and false?\n\nHIPPIAS: It would seem so.\n\nSOCRATES: And now, Hippias, consider the question at large about all\nthe sciences, and see whether the same principle does not always hold.\nI know that in most arts you are the wisest of men, as I have heard you\nboasting in the agora at the tables of the money-changers, when you were\nsetting forth the great and enviable stores of your wisdom; and you said\nthat upon one occasion, when you went to the Olympic games, all that you\nhad on your person was made by yourself. You began with your ring, which\nwas of your own workmanship, and you said that you could engrave rings;\nand you had another seal which was also of your own workmanship, and\na strigil and an oil flask, which you had made yourself; you said also\nthat you had made the shoes which you had on your feet, and the cloak\nand the short tunic; but what appeared to us all most extraordinary and\na proof of singular art, was the girdle of your tunic, which, you said,\nwas as fine as the most costly Persian fabric, and of your own weaving;\nmoreover, you told us that you had brought with you poems, epic, tragic,\nand dithyrambic, as well as prose writings of the most various kinds;\nand you said that your skill was also pre-eminent in the arts which\nI was just now mentioning, and in the true principles of rhythm and\nharmony and of orthography; and if I remember rightly, there were a\ngreat many other accomplishments in which you excelled. I have forgotten\nto mention your art of memory, which you regard as your special glory,\nand I dare say that I have forgotten many other things; but, as I was\nsaying, only look to your own arts--and there are plenty of them--and to\nthose of others; and tell me, having regard to the admissions which\nyou and I have made, whether you discover any department of art or any\ndescription of wisdom or cunning, whichever name you use, in which the\ntrue and false are different and not the same: tell me, if you can, of\nany. But you cannot.\n\nHIPPIAS: Not without consideration, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: Nor will consideration help you, Hippias, as I believe; but\nthen if I am right, remember what the consequence will be.\n\nHIPPIAS: I do not know what you mean, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: I suppose that you are not using your art of memory, doubtless\nbecause you think that such an accomplishment is not needed on the\npresent occasion. I will therefore remind you of what you were saying:\nwere you not saying that Achilles was a true man, and Odysseus false and\nwily?\n\nHIPPIAS: I was.\n\nSOCRATES: And now do you perceive that the same person has turned out to\nbe false as well as true? If Odysseus is false he is also true, and if\nAchilles is true he is also false, and so the two men are not opposed to\none another, but they are alike.\n\nHIPPIAS: O Socrates, you are always weaving the meshes of an argument,\nselecting the most difficult point, and fastening upon details instead\nof grappling with the matter in hand as a whole. Come now, and I will\ndemonstrate to you, if you will allow me, by many satisfactory proofs,\nthat Homer has made Achilles a better man than Odysseus, and a truthful\nman too; and that he has made the other crafty, and a teller of many\nuntruths, and inferior to Achilles. And then, if you please, you shall\nmake a speech on the other side, in order to prove that Odysseus is the\nbetter man; and this may be compared to mine, and then the company will\nknow which of us is the better speaker.\n\nSOCRATES: O Hippias, I do not doubt that you are wiser than I am. But I\nhave a way, when anybody else says anything, of giving close attention\nto him, especially if the speaker appears to me to be a wise man. Having\na desire to understand, I question him, and I examine and analyse and\nput together what he says, in order that I may understand; but if the\nspeaker appears to me to be a poor hand, I do not interrogate him, or\ntrouble myself about him, and you may know by this who they are whom I\ndeem to be wise men, for you will see that when I am talking with a wise\nman, I am very attentive to what he says; and I ask questions of him,\nin order that I may learn, and be improved by him. And I could not help\nremarking while you were speaking, that when you recited the verses in\nwhich Achilles, as you argued, attacks Odysseus as a deceiver, that you\nmust be strangely mistaken, because Odysseus, the man of wiles, is\nnever found to tell a lie; but Achilles is found to be wily on your own\nshowing. At any rate he speaks falsely; for first he utters these words,\nwhich you just now repeated,--\n\n'He is hateful to me even as the gates of death who thinks one thing and\nsays another:'--\n\nAnd then he says, a little while afterwards, he will not be persuaded by\nOdysseus and Agamemnon, neither will he remain at Troy; but, says he,--\n\n'To-morrow, when I have offered sacrifices to Zeus and all the Gods,\nhaving loaded my ships well, I will drag them down into the deep; and\nthen you shall see, if you have a mind, and if such things are a care\nto you, early in the morning my ships sailing over the fishy Hellespont,\nand my men eagerly plying the oar; and, if the illustrious shaker of the\nearth gives me a good voyage, on the third day I shall reach the fertile\nPhthia.'\n\nAnd before that, when he was reviling Agamemnon, he said,--\n\n'And now to Phthia I will go, since to return home in the beaked ships\nis far better, nor am I inclined to stay here in dishonour and amass\nwealth and riches for you.'\n\nBut although on that occasion, in the presence of the whole army, he\nspoke after this fashion, and on the other occasion to his companions,\nhe appears never to have made any preparation or attempt to draw down\nthe ships, as if he had the least intention of sailing home; so nobly\nregardless was he of the truth. Now I, Hippias, originally asked you\nthe question, because I was in doubt as to which of the two heroes was\nintended by the poet to be the best, and because I thought that both of\nthem were the best, and that it would be difficult to decide which was\nthe better of them, not only in respect of truth and falsehood, but of\nvirtue generally, for even in this matter of speaking the truth they are\nmuch upon a par.\n\nHIPPIAS: There you are wrong, Socrates; for in so far as Achilles speaks\nfalsely, the falsehood is obviously unintentional. He is compelled\nagainst his will to remain and rescue the army in their misfortune. But\nwhen Odysseus speaks falsely he is voluntarily and intentionally false.\n\nSOCRATES: You, sweet Hippias, like Odysseus, are a deceiver yourself.\n\nHIPPIAS: Certainly not, Socrates; what makes you say so?\n\nSOCRATES: Because you say that Achilles does not speak falsely from\ndesign, when he is not only a deceiver, but besides being a braggart,\nin Homer's description of him is so cunning, and so far superior to\nOdysseus in lying and pretending, that he dares to contradict himself,\nand Odysseus does not find him out; at any rate he does not appear to\nsay anything to him which would imply that he perceived his falsehood.\n\nHIPPIAS: What do you mean, Socrates?\n\nSOCRATES: Did you not observe that afterwards, when he is speaking to\nOdysseus, he says that he will sail away with the early dawn; but to\nAjax he tells quite a different story?\n\nHIPPIAS: Where is that?\n\nSOCRATES: Where he says,--\n\n'I will not think about bloody war until the son of warlike Priam,\nillustrious Hector, comes to the tents and ships of the Myrmidons,\nslaughtering the Argives, and burning the ships with fire; and about\nmy tent and dark ship, I suspect that Hector, although eager for the\nbattle, will nevertheless stay his hand.'\n\nNow, do you really think, Hippias, that the son of Thetis, who had been\nthe pupil of the sage Cheiron, had such a bad memory, or would have\ncarried the art of lying to such an extent (when he had been assailing\nliars in the most violent terms only the instant before) as to say to\nOdysseus that he would sail away, and to Ajax that he would remain, and\nthat he was not rather practising upon the simplicity of Odysseus, whom\nhe regarded as an ancient, and thinking that he would get the better of\nhim by his own cunning and falsehood?\n\nHIPPIAS: No, I do not agree with you, Socrates; but I believe that\nAchilles is induced to say one thing to Ajax, and another to Odysseus in\nthe innocence of his heart, whereas Odysseus, whether he speaks falsely\nor truly, speaks always with a purpose.\n\nSOCRATES: Then Odysseus would appear after all to be better than\nAchilles?\n\nHIPPIAS: Certainly not, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: Why, were not the voluntary liars only just now shown to be\nbetter than the involuntary?\n\nHIPPIAS: And how, Socrates, can those who intentionally err, and\nvoluntarily and designedly commit iniquities, be better than those who\nerr and do wrong involuntarily? Surely there is a great excuse to be\nmade for a man telling a falsehood, or doing an injury or any sort of\nharm to another in ignorance. And the laws are obviously far more severe\non those who lie or do evil, voluntarily, than on those who do evil\ninvoluntarily.\n\nSOCRATES: You see, Hippias, as I have already told you, how pertinacious\nI am in asking questions of wise men. And I think that this is the only\ngood point about me, for I am full of defects, and always getting wrong\nin some way or other. My deficiency is proved to me by the fact that\nwhen I meet one of you who are famous for wisdom, and to whose wisdom\nall the Hellenes are witnesses, I am found out to know nothing. For\nspeaking generally, I hardly ever have the same opinion about anything\nwhich you have, and what proof of ignorance can be greater than to\ndiffer from wise men? But I have one singular good quality, which is my\nsalvation; I am not ashamed to learn, and I ask and enquire, and am very\ngrateful to those who answer me, and never fail to give them my grateful\nthanks; and when I learn a thing I never deny my teacher, or pretend\nthat the lesson is a discovery of my own; but I praise his wisdom, and\nproclaim what I have learned from him. And now I cannot agree in what\nyou are saying, but I strongly disagree. Well, I know that this is my\nown fault, and is a defect in my character, but I will not pretend to\nbe more than I am; and my opinion, Hippias, is the very contrary of what\nyou are saying. For I maintain that those who hurt or injure mankind,\nand speak falsely and deceive, and err voluntarily, are better far\nthan those who do wrong involuntarily. Sometimes, however, I am of the\nopposite opinion; for I am all abroad in my ideas about this matter, a\ncondition obviously occasioned by ignorance. And just now I happen to be\nin a crisis of my disorder at which those who err voluntarily appear to\nme better than those who err involuntarily. My present state of mind\nis due to our previous argument, which inclines me to believe that in\ngeneral those who do wrong involuntarily are worse than those who do\nwrong voluntarily, and therefore I hope that you will be good to me, and\nnot refuse to heal me; for you will do me a much greater benefit if you\ncure my soul of ignorance, than you would if you were to cure my body of\ndisease. I must, however, tell you beforehand, that if you make a long\noration to me you will not cure me, for I shall not be able to follow\nyou; but if you will answer me, as you did just now, you will do me a\ngreat deal of good, and I do not think that you will be any the worse\nyourself. And I have some claim upon you also, O son of Apemantus, for\nyou incited me to converse with Hippias; and now, if Hippias will not\nanswer me, you must entreat him on my behalf.\n\nEUDICUS: But I do not think, Socrates, that Hippias will require any\nentreaty of mine; for he has already said that he will refuse to answer\nno man.--Did you not say so, Hippias?\n\nHIPPIAS: Yes, I did; but then, Eudicus, Socrates is always troublesome\nin an argument, and appears to be dishonest. (Compare Gorgias;\nRepublic.)\n\nSOCRATES: Excellent Hippias, I do not do so intentionally (if I did,\nit would show me to be a wise man and a master of wiles, as you would\nargue), but unintentionally, and therefore you must pardon me; for, as\nyou say, he who is unintentionally dishonest should be pardoned.\n\nEUDICUS: Yes, Hippias, do as he says; and for our sake, and also that\nyou may not belie your profession, answer whatever Socrates asks you.\n\nHIPPIAS: I will answer, as you request me; and do you ask whatever you\nlike.\n\nSOCRATES: I am very desirous, Hippias, of examining this question, as to\nwhich are the better--those who err voluntarily or involuntarily? And if\nyou will answer me, I think that I can put you in the way of approaching\nthe subject: You would admit, would you not, that there are good\nrunners?\n\nHIPPIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And there are bad runners?\n\nHIPPIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And he who runs well is a good runner, and he who runs ill is\na bad runner?\n\nHIPPIAS: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: And he who runs slowly runs ill, and he who runs quickly runs\nwell?\n\nHIPPIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then in a race, and in running, swiftness is a good, and\nslowness is an evil quality?\n\nHIPPIAS: To be sure.\n\nSOCRATES: Which of the two then is a better runner? He who runs slowly\nvoluntarily, or he who runs slowly involuntarily?\n\nHIPPIAS: He who runs slowly voluntarily.\n\nSOCRATES: And is not running a species of doing?\n\nHIPPIAS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And if a species of doing, a species of action?\n\nHIPPIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then he who runs badly does a bad and dishonourable action in\na race?\n\nHIPPIAS: Yes; a bad action, certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And he who runs slowly runs badly?\n\nHIPPIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then the good runner does this bad and disgraceful action\nvoluntarily, and the bad involuntarily?\n\nHIPPIAS: That is to be inferred.\n\nSOCRATES: Then he who involuntarily does evil actions, is worse in a\nrace than he who does them voluntarily?\n\nHIPPIAS: Yes, in a race.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, but at a wrestling match--which is the better wrestler,\nhe who falls voluntarily or involuntarily?\n\nHIPPIAS: He who falls voluntarily, doubtless.\n\nSOCRATES: And is it worse or more dishonourable at a wrestling match, to\nfall, or to throw another?\n\nHIPPIAS: To fall.\n\nSOCRATES: Then, at a wrestling match, he who voluntarily does base\nand dishonourable actions is a better wrestler than he who does them\ninvoluntarily?\n\nHIPPIAS: That appears to be the truth.\n\nSOCRATES: And what would you say of any other bodily exercise--is not he\nwho is better made able to do both that which is strong and that which\nis weak--that which is fair and that which is foul?--so that when\nhe does bad actions with the body, he who is better made does them\nvoluntarily, and he who is worse made does them involuntarily.\n\nHIPPIAS: Yes, that appears to be true about strength.\n\nSOCRATES: And what do you say about grace, Hippias? Is not he who is\nbetter made able to assume evil and disgraceful figures and postures\nvoluntarily, as he who is worse made assumes them involuntarily?\n\nHIPPIAS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: Then voluntary ungracefulness comes from excellence of the\nbodily frame, and involuntary from the defect of the bodily frame?\n\nHIPPIAS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And what would you say of an unmusical voice; would you prefer\nthe voice which is voluntarily or involuntarily out of tune?\n\nHIPPIAS: That which is voluntarily out of tune.\n\nSOCRATES: The involuntary is the worse of the two?\n\nHIPPIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And would you choose to possess goods or evils?\n\nHIPPIAS: Goods.\n\nSOCRATES: And would you rather have feet which are voluntarily or\ninvoluntarily lame?\n\nHIPPIAS: Feet which are voluntarily lame.\n\nSOCRATES: But is not lameness a defect or deformity?\n\nHIPPIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And is not blinking a defect in the eyes?\n\nHIPPIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And would you rather always have eyes with which you might\nvoluntarily blink and not see, or with which you might involuntarily\nblink?\n\nHIPPIAS: I would rather have eyes which voluntarily blink.\n\nSOCRATES: Then in your own case you deem that which voluntarily acts\nill, better than that which involuntarily acts ill?\n\nHIPPIAS: Yes, certainly, in cases such as you mention.\n\nSOCRATES: And does not the same hold of ears, nostrils, mouth, and of\nall the senses--those which involuntarily act ill are not to be desired,\nas being defective; and those which voluntarily act ill are to be\ndesired as being good?\n\nHIPPIAS: I agree.\n\nSOCRATES: And what would you say of instruments;--which are the better\nsort of instruments to have to do with?--those with which a man acts\nill voluntarily or involuntarily? For example, had a man better have a\nrudder with which he will steer ill, voluntarily or involuntarily?\n\nHIPPIAS: He had better have a rudder with which he will steer ill\nvoluntarily.\n\nSOCRATES: And does not the same hold of the bow and the lyre, the flute\nand all other things?\n\nHIPPIAS: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: And would you rather have a horse of such a temper that you\nmay ride him ill voluntarily or involuntarily?\n\nHIPPIAS: I would rather have a horse which I could ride ill voluntarily.\n\nSOCRATES: That would be the better horse?\n\nHIPPIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then with a horse of better temper, vicious actions would be\nproduced voluntarily; and with a horse of bad temper involuntarily?\n\nHIPPIAS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And that would be true of a dog, or of any other animal?\n\nHIPPIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And is it better to possess the mind of an archer who\nvoluntarily or involuntarily misses the mark?\n\nHIPPIAS: Of him who voluntarily misses.\n\nSOCRATES: This would be the better mind for the purposes of archery?\n\nHIPPIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then the mind which involuntarily errs is worse than the mind\nwhich errs voluntarily?\n\nHIPPIAS: Yes, certainly, in the use of the bow.\n\nSOCRATES: And what would you say of the art of medicine;--has not the\nmind which voluntarily works harm to the body, more of the healing art?\n\nHIPPIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then in the art of medicine the voluntary is better than the\ninvoluntary?\n\nHIPPIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, and in lute-playing and in flute-playing, and in all\narts and sciences, is not that mind the better which voluntarily does\nwhat is evil and dishonourable, and goes wrong, and is not the worse\nthat which does so involuntarily?\n\nHIPPIAS: That is evident.\n\nSOCRATES: And what would you say of the characters of slaves? Should we\nnot prefer to have those who voluntarily do wrong and make mistakes,\nand are they not better in their mistakes than those who commit them\ninvoluntarily?\n\nHIPPIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And should we not desire to have our own minds in the best\nstate possible?\n\nHIPPIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And will our minds be better if they do wrong and make\nmistakes voluntarily or involuntarily?\n\nHIPPIAS: O, Socrates, it would be a monstrous thing to say that\nthose who do wrong voluntarily are better than those who do wrong\ninvoluntarily!\n\nSOCRATES: And yet that appears to be the only inference.\n\nHIPPIAS: I do not think so.\n\nSOCRATES: But I imagined, Hippias, that you did. Please to answer once\nmore: Is not justice a power, or knowledge, or both? Must not justice,\nat all events, be one of these?\n\nHIPPIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: But if justice is a power of the soul, then the soul which has\nthe greater power is also the more just; for that which has the greater\npower, my good friend, has been proved by us to be the better.\n\nHIPPIAS: Yes, that has been proved.\n\nSOCRATES: And if justice is knowledge, then the wiser will be the juster\nsoul, and the more ignorant the more unjust?\n\nHIPPIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: But if justice be power as well as knowledge--then will not\nthe soul which has both knowledge and power be the more just, and that\nwhich is the more ignorant be the more unjust? Must it not be so?\n\nHIPPIAS: Clearly.\n\nSOCRATES: And is not the soul which has the greater power and wisdom\nalso better, and better able to do both good and evil in every action?\n\nHIPPIAS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: The soul, then, which acts ill, acts voluntarily by power and\nart--and these either one or both of them are elements of justice?\n\nHIPPIAS: That seems to be true.\n\nSOCRATES: And to do injustice is to do ill, and not to do injustice is\nto do well?\n\nHIPPIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And will not the better and abler soul when it does wrong, do\nwrong voluntarily, and the bad soul involuntarily?\n\nHIPPIAS: Clearly.\n\nSOCRATES: And the good man is he who has the good soul, and the bad man\nis he who has the bad?\n\nHIPPIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then the good man will voluntarily do wrong, and the bad man\ninvoluntarily, if the good man is he who has the good soul?\n\nHIPPIAS: Which he certainly has.\n\nSOCRATES: Then, Hippias, he who voluntarily does wrong and disgraceful\nthings, if there be such a man, will be the good man?\n\nHIPPIAS: There I cannot agree with you.\n\nSOCRATES: Nor can I agree with myself, Hippias; and yet that seems to be\nthe conclusion which, as far as we can see at present, must follow from\nour argument. As I was saying before, I am all abroad, and being in\nperplexity am always changing my opinion. Now, that I or any ordinary\nman should wander in perplexity is not surprising; but if you wise men\nalso wander, and we cannot come to you and rest from our wandering, the\nmatter begins to be serious both to us and to you.","title":"Lesser Hippias","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":9399}