{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_1676/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_1676","id":"gutenberg_1676","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1676","summary":null,"tags":["Alcibiades","Category: Classics of Literature","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Classical literature","Socrates, 470 BC-399 BC","Virtue -- Early works to 1800"],"text":"Produced by Sue Asscher\n\n\n\n\n\nALCIBIADES I\n\nby Plato (may be spurious--see Appendix I)\n\n\n\n\nTranslated by Benjamin Jowett\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX I.\n\nIt seems impossible to separate by any exact line the genuine writings\nof Plato from the spurious. The only external evidence to them which is\nof much value is that of Aristotle; for the Alexandrian catalogues of\na century later include manifest forgeries. Even the value of the\nAristotelian authority is a good deal impaired by the uncertainty\nconcerning the date and authorship of the writings which are ascribed to\nhim. And several of the citations of Aristotle omit the name of Plato,\nand some of them omit the name of the dialogue from which they are\ntaken. Prior, however, to the enquiry about the writings of a particular\nauthor, general considerations which equally affect all evidence to the\ngenuineness of ancient writings are the following: Shorter works are\nmore likely to have been forged, or to have received an erroneous\ndesignation, than longer ones; and some kinds of composition, such as\nepistles or panegyrical orations, are more liable to suspicion than\nothers; those, again, which have a taste of sophistry in them, or the\nring of a later age, or the slighter character of a rhetorical exercise,\nor in which a motive or some affinity to spurious writings can be\ndetected, or which seem to have originated in a name or statement really\noccurring in some classical author, are also of doubtful credit; while\nthere is no instance of any ancient writing proved to be a forgery,\nwhich combines excellence with length. A really great and original\nwriter would have no object in fathering his works on Plato; and to the\nforger or imitator, the 'literary hack' of Alexandria and Athens, the\nGods did not grant originality or genius. Further, in attempting to\nbalance the evidence for and against a Platonic dialogue, we must not\nforget that the form of the Platonic writing was common to several of\nhis contemporaries. Aeschines, Euclid, Phaedo, Antisthenes, and in the\nnext generation Aristotle, are all said to have composed dialogues; and\nmistakes of names are very likely to have occurred. Greek literature in\nthe third century before Christ was almost as voluminous as our own, and\nwithout the safeguards of regular publication, or printing, or binding,\nor even of distinct titles. An unknown writing was naturally attributed\nto a known writer whose works bore the same character; and the name once\nappended easily obtained authority. A tendency may also be observed to\nblend the works and opinions of the master with those of his scholars.\nTo a later Platonist, the difference between Plato and his imitators was\nnot so perceptible as to ourselves. The Memorabilia of Xenophon and the\nDialogues of Plato are but a part of a considerable Socratic literature\nwhich has passed away. And we must consider how we should regard the\nquestion of the genuineness of a particular writing, if this lost\nliterature had been preserved to us.\n\nThese considerations lead us to adopt the following criteria of\ngenuineness: (1) That is most certainly Plato's which Aristotle\nattributes to him by name, which (2) is of considerable length, of (3)\ngreat excellence, and also (4) in harmony with the general spirit of\nthe Platonic writings. But the testimony of Aristotle cannot always\nbe distinguished from that of a later age (see above); and has various\ndegrees of importance. Those writings which he cites without mentioning\nPlato, under their own names, e.g. the Hippias, the Funeral Oration, the\nPhaedo, etc., have an inferior degree of evidence in their favour. They\nmay have been supposed by him to be the writings of another, although in\nthe case of really great works, e.g. the Phaedo, this is not credible;\nthose again which are quoted but not named, are still more defective\nin their external credentials. There may be also a possibility that\nAristotle was mistaken, or may have confused the master and his scholars\nin the case of a short writing; but this is inconceivable about a more\nimportant work, e.g. the Laws, especially when we remember that he was\nliving at Athens, and a frequenter of the groves of the Academy, during\nthe last twenty years of Plato's life. Nor must we forget that in all\nhis numerous citations from the Platonic writings he never attributes\nany passage found in the extant dialogues to any one but Plato. And\nlastly, we may remark that one or two great writings, such as the\nParmenides and the Politicus, which are wholly devoid of Aristotelian\n(1) credentials may be fairly attributed to Plato, on the ground of (2)\nlength, (3) excellence, and (4) accordance with the general spirit\nof his writings. Indeed the greater part of the evidence for the\ngenuineness of ancient Greek authors may be summed up under two heads\nonly: (1) excellence; and (2) uniformity of tradition--a kind of\nevidence, which though in many cases sufficient, is of inferior value.\n\nProceeding upon these principles we appear to arrive at the conclusion\nthat nineteen-twentieths of all the writings which have ever been\nascribed to Plato, are undoubtedly genuine. There is another portion of\nthem, including the Epistles, the Epinomis, the dialogues rejected by\nthe ancients themselves, namely, the Axiochus, De justo, De virtute,\nDemodocus, Sisyphus, Eryxias, which on grounds, both of internal and\nexternal evidence, we are able with equal certainty to reject. But there\nstill remains a small portion of which we are unable to affirm either\nthat they are genuine or spurious. They may have been written in youth,\nor possibly like the works of some painters, may be partly or wholly\nthe compositions of pupils; or they may have been the writings of some\ncontemporary transferred by accident to the more celebrated name of\nPlato, or of some Platonist in the next generation who aspired to\nimitate his master. Not that on grounds either of language or philosophy\nwe should lightly reject them. Some difference of style, or inferiority\nof execution, or inconsistency of thought, can hardly be considered\ndecisive of their spurious character. For who always does justice to\nhimself, or who writes with equal care at all times? Certainly not\nPlato, who exhibits the greatest differences in dramatic power, in the\nformation of sentences, and in the use of words, if his earlier writings\nare compared with his later ones, say the Protagoras or Phaedrus with\nthe Laws. Or who can be expected to think in the same manner during\na period of authorship extending over above fifty years, in an age\nof great intellectual activity, as well as of political and literary\ntransition? Certainly not Plato, whose earlier writings are separated\nfrom his later ones by as wide an interval of philosophical speculation\nas that which separates his later writings from Aristotle.\n\nThe dialogues which have been translated in the first Appendix, and\nwhich appear to have the next claim to genuineness among the Platonic\nwritings, are the Lesser Hippias, the Menexenus or Funeral Oration, the\nFirst Alcibiades. Of these, the Lesser Hippias and the Funeral Oration\nare cited by Aristotle; the first in the Metaphysics, the latter in the\nRhetoric. Neither of them are expressly attributed to Plato, but in his\ncitation of both of them he seems to be referring to passages in the\nextant dialogues. From the mention of 'Hippias' in the singular by\nAristotle, we may perhaps infer that he was unacquainted with a second\ndialogue bearing the same name. Moreover, the mere existence of a\nGreater and Lesser Hippias, and of a First and Second Alcibiades, does\nto a certain extent throw a doubt upon both of them. Though a very\nclever and ingenious work, the Lesser Hippias does not appear to contain\nanything beyond the power of an imitator, who was also a careful student\nof the earlier Platonic writings, to invent. The motive or leading\nthought of the dialogue may be detected in Xen. Mem., and there is\nno similar instance of a 'motive' which is taken from Xenophon in an\nundoubted dialogue of Plato. On the other hand, the upholders of the\ngenuineness of the dialogue will find in the Hippias a true Socratic\nspirit; they will compare the Ion as being akin both in subject and\ntreatment; they will urge the authority of Aristotle; and they will\ndetect in the treatment of the Sophist, in the satirical reasoning\nupon Homer, in the reductio ad absurdum of the doctrine that vice is\nignorance, traces of a Platonic authorship. In reference to the last\npoint we are doubtful, as in some of the other dialogues, whether the\nauthor is asserting or overthrowing the paradox of Socrates, or merely\nfollowing the argument 'whither the wind blows.' That no conclusion\nis arrived at is also in accordance with the character of the earlier\ndialogues. The resemblances or imitations of the Gorgias, Protagoras,\nand Euthydemus, which have been observed in the Hippias, cannot with\ncertainty be adduced on either side of the argument. On the whole, more\nmay be said in favour of the genuineness of the Hippias than against it.\n\nThe Menexenus or Funeral Oration is cited by Aristotle, and is\ninteresting as supplying an example of the manner in which the orators\npraised 'the Athenians among the Athenians,' falsifying persons and\ndates, and casting a veil over the gloomier events of Athenian history.\nIt exhibits an acquaintance with the funeral oration of Thucydides, and\nwas, perhaps, intended to rival that great work. If genuine, the\nproper place of the Menexenus would be at the end of the Phaedrus. The\nsatirical opening and the concluding words bear a great resemblance to\nthe earlier dialogues; the oration itself is professedly a mimetic work,\nlike the speeches in the Phaedrus, and cannot therefore be tested by\na comparison of the other writings of Plato. The funeral oration of\nPericles is expressly mentioned in the Phaedrus, and this may have\nsuggested the subject, in the same manner that the Cleitophon appears to\nbe suggested by the slight mention of Cleitophon and his attachment to\nThrasymachus in the Republic; and the Theages by the mention of Theages\nin the Apology and Republic; or as the Second Alcibiades seems to be\nfounded upon the text of Xenophon, Mem. A similar taste for parody\nappears not only in the Phaedrus, but in the Protagoras, in the\nSymposium, and to a certain extent in the Parmenides.\n\nTo these two doubtful writings of Plato I have added the First\nAlcibiades, which, of all the disputed dialogues of Plato, has the\ngreatest merit, and is somewhat longer than any of them, though not\nverified by the testimony of Aristotle, and in many respects at variance\nwith the Symposium in the description of the relations of Socrates\nand Alcibiades. Like the Lesser Hippias and the Menexenus, it is to be\ncompared to the earlier writings of Plato. The motive of the piece may,\nperhaps, be found in that passage of the Symposium in which Alcibiades\ndescribes himself as self-convicted by the words of Socrates. For the\ndisparaging manner in which Schleiermacher has spoken of this dialogue\nthere seems to be no sufficient foundation. At the same time, the lesson\nimparted is simple, and the irony more transparent than in the undoubted\ndialogues of Plato. We know, too, that Alcibiades was a favourite\nthesis, and that at least five or six dialogues bearing this name passed\ncurrent in antiquity, and are attributed to contemporaries of Socrates\nand Plato. (1) In the entire absence of real external evidence (for\nthe catalogues of the Alexandrian librarians cannot be regarded as\ntrustworthy); and (2) in the absence of the highest marks either of\npoetical or philosophical excellence; and (3) considering that we have\nexpress testimony to the existence of contemporary writings bearing\nthe name of Alcibiades, we are compelled to suspend our judgment on the\ngenuineness of the extant dialogue.\n\nNeither at this point, nor at any other, do we propose to draw an\nabsolute line of demarcation between genuine and spurious writings of\nPlato. They fade off imperceptibly from one class to another. There may\nhave been degrees of genuineness in the dialogues themselves, as there\nare certainly degrees of evidence by which they are supported. The\ntraditions of the oral discourses both of Socrates and Plato may have\nformed the basis of semi-Platonic writings; some of them may be of the\nsame mixed character which is apparent in Aristotle and Hippocrates,\nalthough the form of them is different. But the writings of Plato,\nunlike the writings of Aristotle, seem never to have been confused with\nthe writings of his disciples: this was probably due to their definite\nform, and to their inimitable excellence. The three dialogues which\nwe have offered in the Appendix to the criticism of the reader may\nbe partly spurious and partly genuine; they may be altogether\nspurious;--that is an alternative which must be frankly admitted. Nor\ncan we maintain of some other dialogues, such as the Parmenides, and\nthe Sophist, and Politicus, that no considerable objection can be urged\nagainst them, though greatly overbalanced by the weight (chiefly)\nof internal evidence in their favour. Nor, on the other hand, can\nwe exclude a bare possibility that some dialogues which are usually\nrejected, such as the Greater Hippias and the Cleitophon, may be\ngenuine. The nature and object of these semi-Platonic writings require\nmore careful study and more comparison of them with one another, and\nwith forged writings in general, than they have yet received, before we\ncan finally decide on their character. We do not consider them all as\ngenuine until they can be proved to be spurious, as is often maintained\nand still more often implied in this and similar discussions; but\nshould say of some of them, that their genuineness is neither proven nor\ndisproven until further evidence about them can be adduced. And we are\nas confident that the Epistles are spurious, as that the Republic, the\nTimaeus, and the Laws are genuine.\n\nOn the whole, not a twentieth part of the writings which pass under\nthe name of Plato, if we exclude the works rejected by the ancients\nthemselves and two or three other plausible inventions, can be fairly\ndoubted by those who are willing to allow that a considerable change\nand growth may have taken place in his philosophy (see above). That\ntwentieth debatable portion scarcely in any degree affects our judgment\nof Plato, either as a thinker or a writer, and though suggesting some\ninteresting questions to the scholar and critic, is of little importance\nto the general reader.\n\n\nALCIBIADES I\n\nby\n\nPlato (see Appendix I above)\n\nTranslated by Benjamin Jowett\n\n\nINTRODUCTION.\n\nThe First Alcibiades is a conversation between Socrates and Alcibiades.\nSocrates is represented in the character which he attributes to himself\nin the Apology of a know-nothing who detects the conceit of knowledge in\nothers. The two have met already in the Protagoras and in the Symposium;\nin the latter dialogue, as in this, the relation between them is that\nof a lover and his beloved. But the narrative of their loves is told\ndifferently in different places; for in the Symposium Alcibiades\nis depicted as the impassioned but rejected lover; here, as coldly\nreceiving the advances of Socrates, who, for the best of purposes, lies\nin wait for the aspiring and ambitious youth.\n\nAlcibiades, who is described as a very young man, is about to enter on\npublic life, having an inordinate opinion of himself, and an extravagant\nambition. Socrates, 'who knows what is in man,' astonishes him by a\nrevelation of his designs. But has he the knowledge which is necessary\nfor carrying them out? He is going to persuade the Athenians--about\nwhat? Not about any particular art, but about politics--when to fight\nand when to make peace. Now, men should fight and make peace on just\ngrounds, and therefore the question of justice and injustice must enter\ninto peace and war; and he who advises the Athenians must know the\ndifference between them. Does Alcibiades know? If he does, he must\neither have been taught by some master, or he must have discovered the\nnature of them himself. If he has had a master, Socrates would like to\nbe informed who he is, that he may go and learn of him also. Alcibiades\nadmits that he has never learned. Then has he enquired for himself? He\nmay have, if he was ever aware of a time when he was ignorant. But\nhe never was ignorant; for when he played with other boys at dice, he\ncharged them with cheating, and this implied a knowledge of just\nand unjust. According to his own explanation, he had learned of the\nmultitude. Why, he asks, should he not learn of them the nature of\njustice, as he has learned the Greek language of them? To this Socrates\nanswers, that they can teach Greek, but they cannot teach justice; for\nthey are agreed about the one, but they are not agreed about the other:\nand therefore Alcibiades, who has admitted that if he knows he must\neither have learned from a master or have discovered for himself the\nnature of justice, is convicted out of his own mouth.\n\nAlcibiades rejoins, that the Athenians debate not about what is just,\nbut about what is expedient; and he asserts that the two principles of\njustice and expediency are opposed. Socrates, by a series of questions,\ncompels him to admit that the just and the expedient coincide.\nAlcibiades is thus reduced to the humiliating conclusion that he knows\nnothing of politics, even if, as he says, they are concerned with the\nexpedient.\n\nHowever, he is no worse than other Athenian statesmen; and he will not\nneed training, for others are as ignorant as he is. He is reminded that\nhe has to contend, not only with his own countrymen, but with their\nenemies--with the Spartan kings and with the great king of Persia; and\nhe can only attain this higher aim of ambition by the assistance of\nSocrates. Not that Socrates himself professes to have attained the\ntruth, but the questions which he asks bring others to a knowledge of\nthemselves, and this is the first step in the practice of virtue.\n\nThe dialogue continues:--We wish to become as good as possible. But to\nbe good in what? Alcibiades replies--'Good in transacting business.' But\nwhat business? 'The business of the most intelligent men at Athens.' The\ncobbler is intelligent in shoemaking, and is therefore good in that; he\nis not intelligent, and therefore not good, in weaving. Is he good in\nthe sense which Alcibiades means, who is also bad? 'I mean,' replies\nAlcibiades, 'the man who is able to command in the city.' But to command\nwhat--horses or men? and if men, under what circumstances? 'I mean\nto say, that he is able to command men living in social and political\nrelations.' And what is their aim? 'The better preservation of the\ncity.' But when is a city better? 'When there is unanimity, such as\nexists between husband and wife.' Then, when husbands and wives perform\ntheir own special duties, there can be no unanimity between them; nor\ncan a city be well ordered when each citizen does his own work only.\nAlcibiades, having stated first that goodness consists in the unanimity\nof the citizens, and then in each of them doing his own separate work,\nis brought to the required point of self-contradiction, leading him to\nconfess his own ignorance.\n\nBut he is not too old to learn, and may still arrive at the truth, if he\nis willing to be cross-examined by Socrates. He must know himself; that\nis to say, not his body, or the things of the body, but his mind, or\ntruer self. The physician knows the body, and the tradesman knows\nhis own business, but they do not necessarily know themselves.\nSelf-knowledge can be obtained only by looking into the mind and virtue\nof the soul, which is the diviner part of a man, as we see our own image\nin another's eye. And if we do not know ourselves, we cannot know what\nbelongs to ourselves or belongs to others, and are unfit to take a part\nin political affairs. Both for the sake of the individual and of the\nstate, we ought to aim at justice and temperance, not at wealth or\npower. The evil and unjust should have no power,--they should be\nthe slaves of better men than themselves. None but the virtuous are\ndeserving of freedom.\n\nAnd are you, Alcibiades, a freeman? 'I feel that I am not; but I hope,\nSocrates, that by your aid I may become free, and from this day forward\nI will never leave you.'\n\nThe Alcibiades has several points of resemblance to the undoubted\ndialogues of Plato. The process of interrogation is of the same kind\nwith that which Socrates practises upon the youthful Cleinias in the\nEuthydemus; and he characteristically attributes to Alcibiades the\nanswers which he has elicited from him. The definition of good is\nnarrowed by successive questions, and virtue is shown to be identical\nwith knowledge. Here, as elsewhere, Socrates awakens the consciousness\nnot of sin but of ignorance. Self-humiliation is the first step to\nknowledge, even of the commonest things. No man knows how ignorant he\nis, and no man can arrive at virtue and wisdom who has not once in his\nlife, at least, been convicted of error. The process by which the soul\nis elevated is not unlike that which religious writers describe under\nthe name of 'conversion,' if we substitute the sense of ignorance for\nthe consciousness of sin.\n\nIn some respects the dialogue differs from any other Platonic\ncomposition. The aim is more directly ethical and hortatory; the process\nby which the antagonist is undermined is simpler than in other Platonic\nwritings, and the conclusion more decided. There is a good deal of\nhumour in the manner in which the pride of Alcibiades, and of the Greeks\ngenerally, is supposed to be taken down by the Spartan and Persian\nqueens; and the dialogue has considerable dialectical merit. But we\nhave a difficulty in supposing that the same writer, who has given so\nprofound and complex a notion of the characters both of Alcibiades\nand Socrates in the Symposium, should have treated them in so thin and\nsuperficial a manner in the Alcibiades, or that he would have ascribed\nto the ironical Socrates the rather unmeaning boast that Alcibiades\ncould not attain the objects of his ambition without his help; or that\nhe should have imagined that a mighty nature like his could have\nbeen reformed by a few not very conclusive words of Socrates. For the\narguments by which Alcibiades is reformed are not convincing; the writer\nof the dialogue, whoever he was, arrives at his idealism by crooked and\ntortuous paths, in which many pitfalls are concealed. The anachronism of\nmaking Alcibiades about twenty years old during the life of his uncle,\nPericles, may be noted; and the repetition of the favourite observation,\nwhich occurs also in the Laches and Protagoras, that great Athenian\nstatesmen, like Pericles, failed in the education of their sons. There\nis none of the undoubted dialogues of Plato in which there is so little\ndramatic verisimilitude.\n\n\nALCIBIADES I\n\nby\n\nPlato (see Appendix I above)\n\nTranslated by Benjamin Jowett\n\n\nPERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Alcibiades, Socrates.\n\n\nSOCRATES: I dare say that you may be surprised to find, O son of\nCleinias, that I, who am your first lover, not having spoken to you\nfor many years, when the rest of the world were wearying you with their\nattentions, am the last of your lovers who still speaks to you. The\ncause of my silence has been that I was hindered by a power more\nthan human, of which I will some day explain to you the nature; this\nimpediment has now been removed; I therefore here present myself before\nyou, and I greatly hope that no similar hindrance will again occur.\nMeanwhile, I have observed that your pride has been too much for the\npride of your admirers; they were numerous and high-spirited, but they\nhave all run away, overpowered by your superior force of character; not\none of them remains. And I want you to understand the reason why you\nhave been too much for them. You think that you have no need of them\nor of any other man, for you have great possessions and lack nothing,\nbeginning with the body, and ending with the soul. In the first\nplace, you say to yourself that you are the fairest and tallest of the\ncitizens, and this every one who has eyes may see to be true; in the\nsecond place, that you are among the noblest of them, highly connected\nboth on the father's and the mother's side, and sprung from one of the\nmost distinguished families in your own state, which is the greatest in\nHellas, and having many friends and kinsmen of the best sort, who can\nassist you when in need; and there is one potent relative, who is more\nto you than all the rest, Pericles the son of Xanthippus, whom your\nfather left guardian of you, and of your brother, and who can do as he\npleases not only in this city, but in all Hellas, and among many and\nmighty barbarous nations. Moreover, you are rich; but I must say that\nyou value yourself least of all upon your possessions. And all these\nthings have lifted you up; you have overcome your lovers, and they have\nacknowledged that you were too much for them. Have you not remarked\ntheir absence? And now I know that you wonder why I, unlike the rest of\nthem, have not gone away, and what can be my motive in remaining.\n\nALCIBIADES: Perhaps, Socrates, you are not aware that I was just going\nto ask you the very same question--What do you want? And what is your\nmotive in annoying me, and always, wherever I am, making a point of\ncoming? (Compare Symp.) I do really wonder what you mean, and should\ngreatly like to know.\n\nSOCRATES: Then if, as you say, you desire to know, I suppose that you\nwill be willing to hear, and I may consider myself to be speaking to an\nauditor who will remain, and will not run away?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly, let me hear.\n\nSOCRATES: You had better be careful, for I may very likely be as\nunwilling to end as I have hitherto been to begin.\n\nALCIBIADES: Proceed, my good man, and I will listen.\n\nSOCRATES: I will proceed; and, although no lover likes to speak with\none who has no feeling of love in him (compare Symp.), I will make an\neffort, and tell you what I meant: My love, Alcibiades, which I hardly\nlike to confess, would long ago have passed away, as I flatter myself,\nif I saw you loving your good things, or thinking that you ought to\npass life in the enjoyment of them. But I shall reveal other thoughts\nof yours, which you keep to yourself; whereby you will know that I have\nalways had my eye on you. Suppose that at this moment some God came to\nyou and said: Alcibiades, will you live as you are, or die in an instant\nif you are forbidden to make any further acquisition?--I verily believe\nthat you would choose death. And I will tell you the hope in which you\nare at present living: Before many days have elapsed, you think that you\nwill come before the Athenian assembly, and will prove to them that\nyou are more worthy of honour than Pericles, or any other man that ever\nlived, and having proved this, you will have the greatest power in the\nstate. When you have gained the greatest power among us, you will go\non to other Hellenic states, and not only to Hellenes, but to all the\nbarbarians who inhabit the same continent with us. And if the God were\nthen to say to you again: Here in Europe is to be your seat of empire,\nand you must not cross over into Asia or meddle with Asiatic affairs, I\ndo not believe that you would choose to live upon these terms; but the\nworld, as I may say, must be filled with your power and name--no man\nless than Cyrus and Xerxes is of any account with you. Such I know to be\nyour hopes--I am not guessing only--and very likely you, who know that\nI am speaking the truth, will reply, Well, Socrates, but what have\nmy hopes to do with the explanation which you promised of your\nunwillingness to leave me? And that is what I am now going to tell you,\nsweet son of Cleinias and Dinomache. The explanation is, that all these\ndesigns of yours cannot be accomplished by you without my help; so great\nis the power which I believe myself to have over you and your concerns;\nand this I conceive to be the reason why the God has hitherto forbidden\nme to converse with you, and I have been long expecting his permission.\nFor, as you hope to prove your own great value to the state, and having\nproved it, to attain at once to absolute power, so do I indulge a hope\nthat I shall be the supreme power over you, if I am able to prove my own\ngreat value to you, and to show you that neither guardian, nor kinsman,\nnor any one is able to deliver into your hands the power which you\ndesire, but I only, God being my helper. When you were young (compare\nSymp.) and your hopes were not yet matured, I should have wasted my\ntime, and therefore, as I conceive, the God forbade me to converse with\nyou; but now, having his permission, I will speak, for now you will\nlisten to me.\n\nALCIBIADES: Your silence, Socrates, was always a surprise to me. I never\ncould understand why you followed me about, and now that you have begun\nto speak again, I am still more amazed. Whether I think all this or not,\nis a matter about which you seem to have already made up your mind, and\ntherefore my denial will have no effect upon you. But granting, if\nI must, that you have perfectly divined my purposes, why is your\nassistance necessary to the attainment of them? Can you tell me why?\n\nSOCRATES: You want to know whether I can make a long speech, such as you\nare in the habit of hearing; but that is not my way. I think, however,\nthat I can prove to you the truth of what I am saying, if you will grant\nme one little favour.\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes, if the favour which you mean be not a troublesome one.\n\nSOCRATES: Will you be troubled at having questions to answer?\n\nALCIBIADES: Not at all.\n\nSOCRATES: Then please to answer.\n\nALCIBIADES: Ask me.\n\nSOCRATES: Have you not the intention which I attribute to you?\n\nALCIBIADES: I will grant anything you like, in the hope of hearing what\nmore you have to say.\n\nSOCRATES: You do, then, mean, as I was saying, to come forward in\na little while in the character of an adviser of the Athenians? And\nsuppose that when you are ascending the bema, I pull you by the sleeve\nand say, Alcibiades, you are getting up to advise the Athenians--do you\nknow the matter about which they are going to deliberate, better than\nthey?--How would you answer?\n\nALCIBIADES: I should reply, that I was going to advise them about a\nmatter which I do know better than they.\n\nSOCRATES: Then you are a good adviser about the things which you know?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And do you know anything but what you have learned of others,\nor found out yourself?\n\nALCIBIADES: That is all.\n\nSOCRATES: And would you have ever learned or discovered anything, if you\nhad not been willing either to learn of others or to examine yourself?\n\nALCIBIADES: I should not.\n\nSOCRATES: And would you have been willing to learn or to examine what\nyou supposed that you knew?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: Then there was a time when you thought that you did not know\nwhat you are now supposed to know?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: I think that I know tolerably well the extent of your\nacquirements; and you must tell me if I forget any of them: according\nto my recollection, you learned the arts of writing, of playing on the\nlyre, and of wrestling; the flute you never would learn; this is the sum\nof your accomplishments, unless there were some which you acquired in\nsecret; and I think that secrecy was hardly possible, as you could not\nhave come out of your door, either by day or night, without my seeing\nyou.\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes, that was the whole of my schooling.\n\nSOCRATES: And are you going to get up in the Athenian assembly, and give\nthem advice about writing?\n\nALCIBIADES: No, indeed.\n\nSOCRATES: Or about the touch of the lyre?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: And they are not in the habit of deliberating about wrestling,\nin the assembly?\n\nALCIBIADES: Hardly.\n\nSOCRATES: Then what are the deliberations in which you propose to advise\nthem? Surely not about building?\n\nALCIBIADES: No.\n\nSOCRATES: For the builder will advise better than you will about that?\n\nALCIBIADES: He will.\n\nSOCRATES: Nor about divination?\n\nALCIBIADES: No.\n\nSOCRATES: About that again the diviner will advise better than you will?\n\nALCIBIADES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: Whether he be little or great, good or ill-looking, noble or\nignoble--makes no difference.\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: A man is a good adviser about anything, not because he has\nriches, but because he has knowledge?\n\nALCIBIADES: Assuredly.\n\nSOCRATES: Whether their counsellor is rich or poor, is not a matter\nwhich will make any difference to the Athenians when they are\ndeliberating about the health of the citizens; they only require that he\nshould be a physician.\n\nALCIBIADES: Of course.\n\nSOCRATES: Then what will be the subject of deliberation about which you\nwill be justified in getting up and advising them?\n\nALCIBIADES: About their own concerns, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: You mean about shipbuilding, for example, when the question is\nwhat sort of ships they ought to build?\n\nALCIBIADES: No, I should not advise them about that.\n\nSOCRATES: I suppose, because you do not understand shipbuilding:--is\nthat the reason?\n\nALCIBIADES: It is.\n\nSOCRATES: Then about what concerns of theirs will you advise them?\n\nALCIBIADES: About war, Socrates, or about peace, or about any other\nconcerns of the state.\n\nSOCRATES: You mean, when they deliberate with whom they ought to make\npeace, and with whom they ought to go to war, and in what manner?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And they ought to go to war with those against whom it is\nbetter to go to war?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And when it is better?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And for as long a time as is better?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: But suppose the Athenians to deliberate with whom they ought\nto close in wrestling, and whom they should grasp by the hand, would\nyou, or the master of gymnastics, be a better adviser of them?\n\nALCIBIADES: Clearly, the master of gymnastics.\n\nSOCRATES: And can you tell me on what grounds the master of gymnastics\nwould decide, with whom they ought or ought not to close, and when and\nhow? To take an instance: Would he not say that they should wrestle with\nthose against whom it is best to wrestle?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And as much as is best?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And at such times as are best?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Again; you sometimes accompany the lyre with the song and\ndance?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: When it is well to do so?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And as much as is well?\n\nALCIBIADES: Just so.\n\nSOCRATES: And as you speak of an excellence or art of the best in\nwrestling, and of an excellence in playing the lyre, I wish you would\ntell me what this latter is;--the excellence of wrestling I call\ngymnastic, and I want to know what you call the other.\n\nALCIBIADES: I do not understand you.\n\nSOCRATES: Then try to do as I do; for the answer which I gave is\nuniversally right, and when I say right, I mean according to rule.\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And was not the art of which I spoke gymnastic?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And I called the excellence in wrestling gymnastic?\n\nALCIBIADES: You did.\n\nSOCRATES: And I was right?\n\nALCIBIADES: I think that you were.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, now,--for you should learn to argue prettily--let me ask\nyou in return to tell me, first, what is that art of which playing and\nsinging, and stepping properly in the dance, are parts,--what is the\nname of the whole? I think that by this time you must be able to tell.\n\nALCIBIADES: Indeed I cannot.\n\nSOCRATES: Then let me put the matter in another way: what do you call\nthe Goddesses who are the patronesses of art?\n\nALCIBIADES: The Muses do you mean, Socrates?\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, I do; and what is the name of the art which is called\nafter them?\n\nALCIBIADES: I suppose that you mean music.\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, that is my meaning; and what is the excellence of the\nart of music, as I told you truly that the excellence of wrestling was\ngymnastic--what is the excellence of music--to be what?\n\nALCIBIADES: To be musical, I suppose.\n\nSOCRATES: Very good; and now please to tell me what is the excellence of\nwar and peace; as the more musical was the more excellent, or the more\ngymnastical was the more excellent, tell me, what name do you give to\nthe more excellent in war and peace?\n\nALCIBIADES: But I really cannot tell you.\n\nSOCRATES: But if you were offering advice to another and said to\nhim--This food is better than that, at this time and in this quantity,\nand he said to you--What do you mean, Alcibiades, by the word\n'better'? you would have no difficulty in replying that you meant 'more\nwholesome,' although you do not profess to be a physician: and when the\nsubject is one of which you profess to have knowledge, and about which\nyou are ready to get up and advise as if you knew, are you not ashamed,\nwhen you are asked, not to be able to answer the question? Is it not\ndisgraceful?\n\nALCIBIADES: Very.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, then, consider and try to explain what is the meaning\nof 'better,' in the matter of making peace and going to war with those\nagainst whom you ought to go to war? To what does the word refer?\n\nALCIBIADES: I am thinking, and I cannot tell.\n\nSOCRATES: But you surely know what are the charges which we bring\nagainst one another, when we arrive at the point of making war, and what\nname we give them?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes, certainly; we say that deceit or violence has been\nemployed, or that we have been defrauded.\n\nSOCRATES: And how does this happen? Will you tell me how? For there may\nbe a difference in the manner.\n\nALCIBIADES: Do you mean by 'how,' Socrates, whether we suffered these\nthings justly or unjustly?\n\nSOCRATES: Exactly.\n\nALCIBIADES: There can be no greater difference than between just and\nunjust.\n\nSOCRATES: And would you advise the Athenians to go to war with the just\nor with the unjust?\n\nALCIBIADES: That is an awkward question; for certainly, even if a person\ndid intend to go to war with the just, he would not admit that they were\njust.\n\nSOCRATES: He would not go to war, because it would be unlawful?\n\nALCIBIADES: Neither lawful nor honourable.\n\nSOCRATES: Then you, too, would address them on principles of justice?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: What, then, is justice but that better, of which I spoke, in\ngoing to war or not going to war with those against whom we ought or\nought not, and when we ought or ought not to go to war?\n\nALCIBIADES: Clearly.\n\nSOCRATES: But how is this, friend Alcibiades? Have you forgotten that\nyou do not know this, or have you been to the schoolmaster without my\nknowledge, and has he taught you to discern the just from the unjust?\nWho is he? I wish you would tell me, that I may go and learn of him--you\nshall introduce me.\n\nALCIBIADES: You are mocking, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: No, indeed; I most solemnly declare to you by Zeus, who is the\nGod of our common friendship, and whom I never will forswear, that I am\nnot; tell me, then, who this instructor is, if he exists.\n\nALCIBIADES: But, perhaps, he does not exist; may I not have acquired the\nknowledge of just and unjust in some other way?\n\nSOCRATES: Yes; if you have discovered them.\n\nALCIBIADES: But do you not think that I could discover them?\n\nSOCRATES: I am sure that you might, if you enquired about them.\n\nALCIBIADES: And do you not think that I would enquire?\n\nSOCRATES: Yes; if you thought that you did not know them.\n\nALCIBIADES: And was there not a time when I did so think?\n\nSOCRATES: Very good; and can you tell me how long it is since you\nthought that you did not know the nature of the just and the unjust?\nWhat do you say to a year ago? Were you then in a state of conscious\nignorance and enquiry? Or did you think that you knew? And please to\nanswer truly, that our discussion may not be in vain.\n\nALCIBIADES: Well, I thought that I knew.\n\nSOCRATES: And two years ago, and three years ago, and four years ago,\nyou knew all the same?\n\nALCIBIADES: I did.\n\nSOCRATES: And more than four years ago you were a child--were you not?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And then I am quite sure that you thought you knew.\n\nALCIBIADES: Why are you so sure?\n\nSOCRATES: Because I often heard you when a child, in your teacher's\nhouse, or elsewhere, playing at dice or some other game with the boys,\nnot hesitating at all about the nature of the just and unjust; but very\nconfident--crying and shouting that one of the boys was a rogue and a\ncheat, and had been cheating. Is it not true?\n\nALCIBIADES: But what was I to do, Socrates, when anybody cheated me?\n\nSOCRATES: And how can you say, 'What was I to do'? if at the time you\ndid not know whether you were wronged or not?\n\nALCIBIADES: To be sure I knew; I was quite aware that I was being\ncheated.\n\nSOCRATES: Then you suppose yourself even when a child to have known the\nnature of just and unjust?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly; and I did know then.\n\nSOCRATES: And when did you discover them--not, surely, at the time when\nyou thought that you knew them?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: And when did you think that you were ignorant--if you\nconsider, you will find that there never was such a time?\n\nALCIBIADES: Really, Socrates, I cannot say.\n\nSOCRATES: Then you did not learn them by discovering them?\n\nALCIBIADES: Clearly not.\n\nSOCRATES: But just before you said that you did not know them by\nlearning; now, if you have neither discovered nor learned them, how and\nwhence do you come to know them?\n\nALCIBIADES: I suppose that I was mistaken in saying that I knew them\nthrough my own discovery of them; whereas, in truth, I learned them in\nthe same way that other people learn.\n\nSOCRATES: So you said before, and I must again ask, of whom? Do tell me.\n\nALCIBIADES: Of the many.\n\nSOCRATES: Do you take refuge in them? I cannot say much for your\nteachers.\n\nALCIBIADES: Why, are they not able to teach?\n\nSOCRATES: They could not teach you how to play at draughts, which you\nwould acknowledge (would you not) to be a much smaller matter than\njustice?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And can they teach the better who are unable to teach the\nworse?\n\nALCIBIADES: I think that they can; at any rate, they can teach many far\nbetter things than to play at draughts.\n\nSOCRATES: What things?\n\nALCIBIADES: Why, for example, I learned to speak Greek of them, and I\ncannot say who was my teacher, or to whom I am to attribute my knowledge\nof Greek, if not to those good-for-nothing teachers, as you call them.\n\nSOCRATES: Why, yes, my friend; and the many are good enough teachers\nof Greek, and some of their instructions in that line may be justly\npraised.\n\nALCIBIADES: Why is that?\n\nSOCRATES: Why, because they have the qualities which good teachers ought\nto have.\n\nALCIBIADES: What qualities?\n\nSOCRATES: Why, you know that knowledge is the first qualification of any\nteacher?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And if they know, they must agree together and not differ?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And would you say that they knew the things about which they\ndiffer?\n\nALCIBIADES: No.\n\nSOCRATES: Then how can they teach them?\n\nALCIBIADES: They cannot.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, but do you imagine that the many would differ about the\nnature of wood and stone? are they not agreed if you ask them what they\nare? and do they not run to fetch the same thing, when they want a\npiece of wood or a stone? And so in similar cases, which I suspect to be\npretty nearly all that you mean by speaking Greek.\n\nALCIBIADES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: These, as we were saying, are matters about which they are\nagreed with one another and with themselves; both individuals and states\nuse the same words about them; they do not use some one word and some\nanother.\n\nALCIBIADES: They do not.\n\nSOCRATES: Then they may be expected to be good teachers of these things?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And if we want to instruct any one in them, we shall be right\nin sending him to be taught by our friends the many?\n\nALCIBIADES: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: But if we wanted further to know not only which are men and\nwhich are horses, but which men or horses have powers of running, would\nthe many still be able to inform us?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: And you have a sufficient proof that they do not know these\nthings and are not the best teachers of them, inasmuch as they are never\nagreed about them?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And suppose that we wanted to know not only what men are like,\nbut what healthy or diseased men are like--would the many be able to\nteach us?\n\nALCIBIADES: They would not.\n\nSOCRATES: And you would have a proof that they were bad teachers of\nthese matters, if you saw them at variance?\n\nALCIBIADES: I should.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, but are the many agreed with themselves, or with one\nanother, about the justice or injustice of men and things?\n\nALCIBIADES: Assuredly not, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: There is no subject about which they are more at variance?\n\nALCIBIADES: None.\n\nSOCRATES: I do not suppose that you ever saw or heard of men quarrelling\nover the principles of health and disease to such an extent as to go to\nwar and kill one another for the sake of them?\n\nALCIBIADES: No indeed.\n\nSOCRATES: But of the quarrels about justice and injustice, even if\nyou have never seen them, you have certainly heard from many people,\nincluding Homer; for you have heard of the Iliad and Odyssey?\n\nALCIBIADES: To be sure, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: A difference of just and unjust is the argument of those\npoems?\n\nALCIBIADES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: Which difference caused all the wars and deaths of Trojans\nand Achaeans, and the deaths of the suitors of Penelope in their quarrel\nwith Odysseus.\n\nALCIBIADES: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: And when the Athenians and Lacedaemonians and Boeotians fell\nat Tanagra, and afterwards in the battle of Coronea, at which your\nfather Cleinias met his end, the question was one of justice--this was\nthe sole cause of the battles, and of their deaths.\n\nALCIBIADES: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: But can they be said to understand that about which they are\nquarrelling to the death?\n\nALCIBIADES: Clearly not.\n\nSOCRATES: And yet those whom you thus allow to be ignorant are the\nteachers to whom you are appealing.\n\nALCIBIADES: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: But how are you ever likely to know the nature of justice and\ninjustice, about which you are so perplexed, if you have neither learned\nthem of others nor discovered them yourself?\n\nALCIBIADES: From what you say, I suppose not.\n\nSOCRATES: See, again, how inaccurately you speak, Alcibiades!\n\nALCIBIADES: In what respect?\n\nSOCRATES: In saying that I say so.\n\nALCIBIADES: Why, did you not say that I know nothing of the just and\nunjust?\n\nSOCRATES: No; I did not.\n\nALCIBIADES: Did I, then?\n\nSOCRATES: Yes.\n\nALCIBIADES: How was that?\n\nSOCRATES: Let me explain. Suppose I were to ask you which is the greater\nnumber, two or one; you would reply 'two'?\n\nALCIBIADES: I should.\n\nSOCRATES: And by how much greater?\n\nALCIBIADES: By one.\n\nSOCRATES: Which of us now says that two is more than one?\n\nALCIBIADES: I do.\n\nSOCRATES: Did not I ask, and you answer the question?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then who is speaking? I who put the question, or you who\nanswer me?\n\nALCIBIADES: I am.\n\nSOCRATES: Or suppose that I ask and you tell me the letters which make\nup the name Socrates, which of us is the speaker?\n\nALCIBIADES: I am.\n\nSOCRATES: Now let us put the case generally: whenever there is a\nquestion and answer, who is the speaker,--the questioner or the\nanswerer?\n\nALCIBIADES: I should say, Socrates, that the answerer was the speaker.\n\nSOCRATES: And have I not been the questioner all through?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And you the answerer?\n\nALCIBIADES: Just so.\n\nSOCRATES: Which of us, then, was the speaker?\n\nALCIBIADES: The inference is, Socrates, that I was the speaker.\n\nSOCRATES: Did not some one say that Alcibiades, the fair son of\nCleinias, not understanding about just and unjust, but thinking that he\ndid understand, was going to the assembly to advise the Athenians about\nwhat he did not know? Was not that said?\n\nALCIBIADES: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: Then, Alcibiades, the result may be expressed in the language\nof Euripides. I think that you have heard all this 'from yourself, and\nnot from me'; nor did I say this, which you erroneously attribute to me,\nbut you yourself, and what you said was very true. For indeed, my dear\nfellow, the design which you meditate of teaching what you do not know,\nand have not taken any pains to learn, is downright insanity.\n\nALCIBIADES: But, Socrates, I think that the Athenians and the rest of\nthe Hellenes do not often advise as to the more just or unjust; for they\nsee no difficulty in them, and therefore they leave them, and consider\nwhich course of action will be most expedient; for there is a difference\nbetween justice and expediency. Many persons have done great wrong and\nprofited by their injustice; others have done rightly and come to no\ngood.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, but granting that the just and the expedient are ever so\nmuch opposed, you surely do not imagine that you know what is expedient\nfor mankind, or why a thing is expedient?\n\nALCIBIADES: Why not, Socrates?--But I am not going to be asked again\nfrom whom I learned, or when I made the discovery.\n\nSOCRATES: What a way you have! When you make a mistake which might be\nrefuted by a previous argument, you insist on having a new and different\nrefutation; the old argument is a worn-our garment which you will no\nlonger put on, but some one must produce another which is clean and\nnew. Now I shall disregard this move of yours, and shall ask over\nagain,--Where did you learn and how do you know the nature of the\nexpedient, and who is your teacher? All this I comprehend in a single\nquestion, and now you will manifestly be in the old difficulty, and\nwill not be able to show that you know the expedient, either because you\nlearned or because you discovered it yourself. But, as I perceive\nthat you are dainty, and dislike the taste of a stale argument, I will\nenquire no further into your knowledge of what is expedient or what is\nnot expedient for the Athenian people, and simply request you to say\nwhy you do not explain whether justice and expediency are the same or\ndifferent? And if you like you may examine me as I have examined you,\nor, if you would rather, you may carry on the discussion by yourself.\n\nALCIBIADES: But I am not certain, Socrates, whether I shall be able to\ndiscuss the matter with you.\n\nSOCRATES: Then imagine, my dear fellow, that I am the demus and the\necclesia; for in the ecclesia, too, you will have to persuade men\nindividually.\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And is not the same person able to persuade one individual\nsingly and many individuals of the things which he knows? The\ngrammarian, for example, can persuade one and he can persuade many about\nletters.\n\nALCIBIADES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And about number, will not the same person persuade one and\npersuade many?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And this will be he who knows number, or the arithmetician?\n\nALCIBIADES: Quite true.\n\nSOCRATES: And cannot you persuade one man about that of which you can\npersuade many?\n\nALCIBIADES: I suppose so.\n\nSOCRATES: And that of which you can persuade either is clearly what you\nknow?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And the only difference between one who argues as we are\ndoing, and the orator who is addressing an assembly, is that the one\nseeks to persuade a number, and the other an individual, of the same\nthings.\n\nALCIBIADES: I suppose so.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, then, since the same person who can persuade a multitude\ncan persuade individuals, try conclusions upon me, and prove to me that\nthe just is not always expedient.\n\nALCIBIADES: You take liberties, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: I shall take the liberty of proving to you the opposite of\nthat which you will not prove to me.\n\nALCIBIADES: Proceed.\n\nSOCRATES: Answer my questions--that is all.\n\nALCIBIADES: Nay, I should like you to be the speaker.\n\nSOCRATES: What, do you not wish to be persuaded?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly I do.\n\nSOCRATES: And can you be persuaded better than out of your own mouth?\n\nALCIBIADES: I think not.\n\nSOCRATES: Then you shall answer; and if you do not hear the words, that\nthe just is the expedient, coming from your own lips, never believe\nanother man again.\n\nALCIBIADES: I won't; but answer I will, for I do not see how I can come\nto any harm.\n\nSOCRATES: A true prophecy! Let me begin then by enquiring of you whether\nyou allow that the just is sometimes expedient and sometimes not?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And sometimes honourable and sometimes not?\n\nALCIBIADES: What do you mean?\n\nSOCRATES: I am asking if you ever knew any one who did what was\ndishonourable and yet just?\n\nALCIBIADES: Never.\n\nSOCRATES: All just things are honourable?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And are honourable things sometimes good and sometimes not\ngood, or are they always good?\n\nALCIBIADES: I rather think, Socrates, that some honourable things are\nevil.\n\nSOCRATES: And are some dishonourable things good?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: You mean in such a case as the following:--In time of war, men\nhave been wounded or have died in rescuing a companion or kinsman, when\nothers who have neglected the duty of rescuing them have escaped in\nsafety?\n\nALCIBIADES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And to rescue another under such circumstances is honourable,\nin respect of the attempt to save those whom we ought to save; and this\nis courage?\n\nALCIBIADES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: But evil in respect of death and wounds?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And the courage which is shown in the rescue is one thing, and\nthe death another?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Then the rescue of one's friends is honourable in one point of\nview, but evil in another?\n\nALCIBIADES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And if honourable, then also good: Will you consider now\nwhether I may not be right, for you were acknowledging that the courage\nwhich is shown in the rescue is honourable? Now is this courage good or\nevil? Look at the matter thus: which would you rather choose, good or\nevil?\n\nALCIBIADES: Good.\n\nSOCRATES: And the greatest goods you would be most ready to choose, and\nwould least like to be deprived of them?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: What would you say of courage? At what price would you be\nwilling to be deprived of courage?\n\nALCIBIADES: I would rather die than be a coward.\n\nSOCRATES: Then you think that cowardice is the worst of evils?\n\nALCIBIADES: I do.\n\nSOCRATES: As bad as death, I suppose?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And life and courage are the extreme opposites of death and\ncowardice?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And they are what you would most desire to have, and their\nopposites you would least desire?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Is this because you think life and courage the best, and death\nand cowardice the worst?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And you would term the rescue of a friend in battle\nhonourable, in as much as courage does a good work?\n\nALCIBIADES: I should.\n\nSOCRATES: But evil because of the death which ensues?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Might we not describe their different effects as follows:--You\nmay call either of them evil in respect of the evil which is the result,\nand good in respect of the good which is the result of either of them?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And they are honourable in so far as they are good, and\ndishonourable in so far as they are evil?\n\nALCIBIADES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: Then when you say that the rescue of a friend in battle is\nhonourable and yet evil, that is equivalent to saying that the rescue is\ngood and yet evil?\n\nALCIBIADES: I believe that you are right, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: Nothing honourable, regarded as honourable, is evil; nor\nanything base, regarded as base, good.\n\nALCIBIADES: Clearly not.\n\nSOCRATES: Look at the matter yet once more in a further light: he who\nacts honourably acts well?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And he who acts well is happy?\n\nALCIBIADES: Of course.\n\nSOCRATES: And the happy are those who obtain good?\n\nALCIBIADES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And they obtain good by acting well and honourably?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then acting well is a good?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And happiness is a good?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then the good and the honourable are again identified.\n\nALCIBIADES: Manifestly.\n\nSOCRATES: Then, if the argument holds, what we find to be honourable we\nshall also find to be good?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And is the good expedient or not?\n\nALCIBIADES: Expedient.\n\nSOCRATES: Do you remember our admissions about the just?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes; if I am not mistaken, we said that those who acted\njustly must also act honourably.\n\nSOCRATES: And the honourable is the good?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And the good is expedient?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then, Alcibiades, the just is expedient?\n\nALCIBIADES: I should infer so.\n\nSOCRATES: And all this I prove out of your own mouth, for I ask and you\nanswer?\n\nALCIBIADES: I must acknowledge it to be true.\n\nSOCRATES: And having acknowledged that the just is the same as the\nexpedient, are you not (let me ask) prepared to ridicule any one who,\npretending to understand the principles of justice and injustice, gets\nup to advise the noble Athenians or the ignoble Peparethians, that the\njust may be the evil?\n\nALCIBIADES: I solemnly declare, Socrates, that I do not know what I am\nsaying. Verily, I am in a strange state, for when you put questions to\nme I am of different minds in successive instants.\n\nSOCRATES: And are you not aware of the nature of this perplexity, my\nfriend?\n\nALCIBIADES: Indeed I am not.\n\nSOCRATES: Do you suppose that if some one were to ask you whether you\nhave two eyes or three, or two hands or four, or anything of that sort,\nyou would then be of different minds in successive instants?\n\nALCIBIADES: I begin to distrust myself, but still I do not suppose that\nI should.\n\nSOCRATES: You would feel no doubt; and for this reason--because you\nwould know?\n\nALCIBIADES: I suppose so.\n\nSOCRATES: And the reason why you involuntarily contradict yourself is\nclearly that you are ignorant?\n\nALCIBIADES: Very likely.\n\nSOCRATES: And if you are perplexed in answering about just and unjust,\nhonourable and dishonourable, good and evil, expedient and inexpedient,\nthe reason is that you are ignorant of them, and therefore in\nperplexity. Is not that clear?\n\nALCIBIADES: I agree.\n\nSOCRATES: But is this always the case, and is a man necessarily\nperplexed about that of which he has no knowledge?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly he is.\n\nSOCRATES: And do you know how to ascend into heaven?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: And in this case, too, is your judgment perplexed?\n\nALCIBIADES: No.\n\nSOCRATES: Do you see the reason why, or shall I tell you?\n\nALCIBIADES: Tell me.\n\nSOCRATES: The reason is, that you not only do not know, my friend, but\nyou do not think that you know.\n\nALCIBIADES: There again; what do you mean?\n\nSOCRATES: Ask yourself; are you in any perplexity about things of which\nyou are ignorant? You know, for example, that you know nothing about the\npreparation of food.\n\nALCIBIADES: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: And do you think and perplex yourself about the preparation of\nfood: or do you leave that to some one who understands the art?\n\nALCIBIADES: The latter.\n\nSOCRATES: Or if you were on a voyage, would you bewilder yourself by\nconsidering whether the rudder is to be drawn inwards or outwards, or do\nyou leave that to the pilot, and do nothing?\n\nALCIBIADES: It would be the concern of the pilot.\n\nSOCRATES: Then you are not perplexed about what you do not know, if you\nknow that you do not know it?\n\nALCIBIADES: I imagine not.\n\nSOCRATES: Do you not see, then, that mistakes in life and practice\nare likewise to be attributed to the ignorance which has conceit of\nknowledge?\n\nALCIBIADES: Once more, what do you mean?\n\nSOCRATES: I suppose that we begin to act when we think that we know what\nwe are doing?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: But when people think that they do not know, they entrust\ntheir business to others?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And so there is a class of ignorant persons who do not make\nmistakes in life, because they trust others about things of which they\nare ignorant?\n\nALCIBIADES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: Who, then, are the persons who make mistakes? They cannot, of\ncourse, be those who know?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: But if neither those who know, nor those who know that they\ndo not know, make mistakes, there remain those only who do not know and\nthink that they know.\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes, only those.\n\nSOCRATES: Then this is ignorance of the disgraceful sort which is\nmischievous?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And most mischievous and most disgraceful when having to do\nwith the greatest matters?\n\nALCIBIADES: By far.\n\nSOCRATES: And can there be any matters greater than the just, the\nhonourable, the good, and the expedient?\n\nALCIBIADES: There cannot be.\n\nSOCRATES: And these, as you were saying, are what perplex you?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: But if you are perplexed, then, as the previous argument has\nshown, you are not only ignorant of the greatest matters, but being\nignorant you fancy that you know them?\n\nALCIBIADES: I fear that you are right.\n\nSOCRATES: And now see what has happened to you, Alcibiades! I hardly\nlike to speak of your evil case, but as we are alone I will: My good\nfriend, you are wedded to ignorance of the most disgraceful kind, and of\nthis you are convicted, not by me, but out of your own mouth and by\nyour own argument; wherefore also you rush into politics before you are\neducated. Neither is your case to be deemed singular. For I might say\nthe same of almost all our statesmen, with the exception, perhaps of\nyour guardian, Pericles.\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes, Socrates; and Pericles is said not to have got his\nwisdom by the light of nature, but to have associated with several of\nthe philosophers; with Pythocleides, for example, and with Anaxagoras,\nand now in advanced life with Damon, in the hope of gaining wisdom.\n\nSOCRATES: Very good; but did you ever know a man wise in anything who\nwas unable to impart his particular wisdom? For example, he who taught\nyou letters was not only wise, but he made you and any others whom he\nliked wise.\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And you, whom he taught, can do the same?\n\nALCIBIADES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And in like manner the harper and gymnastic-master?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: When a person is enabled to impart knowledge to another, he\nthereby gives an excellent proof of his own understanding of any matter.\n\nALCIBIADES: I agree.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, and did Pericles make any one wise; did he begin by\nmaking his sons wise?\n\nALCIBIADES: But, Socrates, if the two sons of Pericles were simpletons,\nwhat has that to do with the matter?\n\nSOCRATES: Well, but did he make your brother, Cleinias, wise?\n\nALCIBIADES: Cleinias is a madman; there is no use in talking of him.\n\nSOCRATES: But if Cleinias is a madman and the two sons of Pericles were\nsimpletons, what reason can be given why he neglects you, and lets you\nbe as you are?\n\nALCIBIADES: I believe that I am to blame for not listening to him.\n\nSOCRATES: But did you ever hear of any other Athenian or foreigner,\nbond or free, who was deemed to have grown wiser in the society of\nPericles,--as I might cite Pythodorus, the son of Isolochus, and\nCallias, the son of Calliades, who have grown wiser in the society of\nZeno, for which privilege they have each of them paid him the sum of\na hundred minae (about 406 pounds sterling) to the increase of their\nwisdom and fame.\n\nALCIBIADES: I certainly never did hear of any one.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, and in reference to your own case, do you mean to remain\nas you are, or will you take some pains about yourself?\n\nALCIBIADES: With your aid, Socrates, I will. And indeed, when I hear you\nspeak, the truth of what you are saying strikes home to me, and I\nagree with you, for our statesmen, all but a few, do appear to be quite\nuneducated.\n\nSOCRATES: What is the inference?\n\nALCIBIADES: Why, that if they were educated they would be trained\nathletes, and he who means to rival them ought to have knowledge\nand experience when he attacks them; but now, as they have become\npoliticians without any special training, why should I have the trouble\nof learning and practising? For I know well that by the light of nature\nI shall get the better of them.\n\nSOCRATES: My dear friend, what a sentiment! And how unworthy of your\nnoble form and your high estate!\n\nALCIBIADES: What do you mean, Socrates; why do you say so?\n\nSOCRATES: I am grieved when I think of our mutual love.\n\nALCIBIADES: At what?\n\nSOCRATES: At your fancying that the contest on which you are entering is\nwith people here.\n\nALCIBIADES: Why, what others are there?\n\nSOCRATES: Is that a question which a magnanimous soul should ask?\n\nALCIBIADES: Do you mean to say that the contest is not with these?\n\nSOCRATES: And suppose that you were going to steer a ship into action,\nwould you only aim at being the best pilot on board? Would you not,\nwhile acknowledging that you must possess this degree of excellence,\nrather look to your antagonists, and not, as you are now doing, to your\nfellow combatants? You ought to be so far above these latter, that they\nwill not even dare to be your rivals; and, being regarded by you as\ninferiors, will do battle for you against the enemy; this is the kind\nof superiority which you must establish over them, if you mean to\naccomplish any noble action really worthy of yourself and of the state.\n\nALCIBIADES: That would certainly be my aim.\n\nSOCRATES: Verily, then, you have good reason to be satisfied, if you are\nbetter than the soldiers; and you need not, when you are their superior\nand have your thoughts and actions fixed upon them, look away to the\ngenerals of the enemy.\n\nALCIBIADES: Of whom are you speaking, Socrates?\n\nSOCRATES: Why, you surely know that our city goes to war now and then\nwith the Lacedaemonians and with the great king?\n\nALCIBIADES: True enough.\n\nSOCRATES: And if you meant to be the ruler of this city, would you not\nbe right in considering that the Lacedaemonian and Persian king were\nyour true rivals?\n\nALCIBIADES: I believe that you are right.\n\nSOCRATES: Oh no, my friend, I am quite wrong, and I think that you ought\nrather to turn your attention to Midias the quail-breeder and others\nlike him, who manage our politics; in whom, as the women would remark,\nyou may still see the slaves' cut of hair, cropping out in their minds\nas well as on their pates; and they come with their barbarous lingo to\nflatter us and not to rule us. To these, I say, you should look, and\nthen you need not trouble yourself about your own fitness to contend in\nsuch a noble arena: there is no reason why you should either learn what\nhas to be learned, or practise what has to be practised, and only when\nthoroughly prepared enter on a political career.\n\nALCIBIADES: There, I think, Socrates, that you are right; I do not\nsuppose, however, that the Spartan generals or the great king are really\ndifferent from anybody else.\n\nSOCRATES: But, my dear friend, do consider what you are saying.\n\nALCIBIADES: What am I to consider?\n\nSOCRATES: In the first place, will you be more likely to take care of\nyourself, if you are in a wholesome fear and dread of them, or if you\nare not?\n\nALCIBIADES: Clearly, if I have such a fear of them.\n\nSOCRATES: And do you think that you will sustain any injury if you take\ncare of yourself?\n\nALCIBIADES: No, I shall be greatly benefited.\n\nSOCRATES: And this is one very important respect in which that notion of\nyours is bad.\n\nALCIBIADES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: In the next place, consider that what you say is probably\nfalse.\n\nALCIBIADES: How so?\n\nSOCRATES: Let me ask you whether better natures are likely to be found\nin noble races or not in noble races?\n\nALCIBIADES: Clearly in noble races.\n\nSOCRATES: Are not those who are well born and well bred most likely to\nbe perfect in virtue?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Then let us compare our antecedents with those of the\nLacedaemonian and Persian kings; are they inferior to us in descent?\nHave we not heard that the former are sprung from Heracles, and the\nlatter from Achaemenes, and that the race of Heracles and the race of\nAchaemenes go back to Perseus, son of Zeus?\n\nALCIBIADES: Why, so does mine go back to Eurysaces, and he to Zeus!\n\nSOCRATES: And mine, noble Alcibiades, to Daedalus, and he to Hephaestus,\nson of Zeus. But, for all that, we are far inferior to them. For they\nare descended 'from Zeus,' through a line of kings--either kings\nof Argos and Lacedaemon, or kings of Persia, a country which the\ndescendants of Achaemenes have always possessed, besides being at\nvarious times sovereigns of Asia, as they now are; whereas, we and our\nfathers were but private persons. How ridiculous would you be thought if\nyou were to make a display of your ancestors and of Salamis the island\nof Eurysaces, or of Aegina, the habitation of the still more ancient\nAeacus, before Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes. You should consider how\ninferior we are to them both in the derivation of our birth and in other\nparticulars. Did you never observe how great is the property of the\nSpartan kings? And their wives are under the guardianship of the Ephori,\nwho are public officers and watch over them, in order to preserve as\nfar as possible the purity of the Heracleid blood. Still greater is the\ndifference among the Persians; for no one entertains a suspicion that\nthe father of a prince of Persia can be any one but the king. Such is\nthe awe which invests the person of the queen, that any other guard is\nneedless. And when the heir of the kingdom is born, all the subjects of\nthe king feast; and the day of his birth is for ever afterwards kept\nas a holiday and time of sacrifice by all Asia; whereas, when you and\nI were born, Alcibiades, as the comic poet says, the neighbours hardly\nknew of the important event. After the birth of the royal child, he is\ntended, not by a good-for-nothing woman-nurse, but by the best of the\nroyal eunuchs, who are charged with the care of him, and especially with\nthe fashioning and right formation of his limbs, in order that he may\nbe as shapely as possible; which being their calling, they are held in\ngreat honour. And when the young prince is seven years old he is put\nupon a horse and taken to the riding-masters, and begins to go out\nhunting. And at fourteen years of age he is handed over to the royal\nschoolmasters, as they are termed: these are four chosen men, reputed to\nbe the best among the Persians of a certain age; and one of them is the\nwisest, another the justest, a third the most temperate, and a fourth\nthe most valiant. The first instructs him in the magianism of Zoroaster,\nthe son of Oromasus, which is the worship of the Gods, and teaches him\nalso the duties of his royal office; the second, who is the justest,\nteaches him always to speak the truth; the third, or most temperate,\nforbids him to allow any pleasure to be lord over him, that he may be\naccustomed to be a freeman and king indeed,--lord of himself first,\nand not a slave; the most valiant trains him to be bold and fearless,\ntelling him that if he fears he is to deem himself a slave; whereas\nPericles gave you, Alcibiades, for a tutor Zopyrus the Thracian, a slave\nof his who was past all other work. I might enlarge on the nurture and\neducation of your rivals, but that would be tedious; and what I have\nsaid is a sufficient sample of what remains to be said. I have only\nto remark, by way of contrast, that no one cares about your birth or\nnurture or education, or, I may say, about that of any other Athenian,\nunless he has a lover who looks after him. And if you cast an eye on\nthe wealth, the luxury, the garments with their flowing trains, the\nanointings with myrrh, the multitudes of attendants, and all the other\nbravery of the Persians, you will be ashamed when you discern your own\ninferiority; or if you look at the temperance and orderliness and ease\nand grace and magnanimity and courage and endurance and love of toil\nand desire of glory and ambition of the Lacedaemonians--in all these\nrespects you will see that you are but a child in comparison of them.\nEven in the matter of wealth, if you value yourself upon that, I must\nreveal to you how you stand; for if you form an estimate of the wealth\nof the Lacedaemonians, you will see that our possessions fall far short\nof theirs. For no one here can compete with them either in the extent\nand fertility of their own and the Messenian territory, or in the number\nof their slaves, and especially of the Helots, or of their horses, or of\nthe animals which feed on the Messenian pastures. But I have said enough\nof this: and as to gold and silver, there is more of them in Lacedaemon\nthan in all the rest of Hellas, for during many generations gold has\nbeen always flowing in to them from the whole Hellenic world, and often\nfrom the barbarian also, and never going out, as in the fable of Aesop\nthe fox said to the lion, 'The prints of the feet of those going in\nare distinct enough;' but who ever saw the trace of money going out of\nLacedaemon? And therefore you may safely infer that the inhabitants are\nthe richest of the Hellenes in gold and silver, and that their kings are\nthe richest of them, for they have a larger share of these things, and\nthey have also a tribute paid to them which is very considerable. Yet\nthe Spartan wealth, though great in comparison of the wealth of the\nother Hellenes, is as nothing in comparison of that of the Persians and\ntheir kings. Why, I have been informed by a credible person who went up\nto the king (at Susa), that he passed through a large tract of excellent\nland, extending for nearly a day's journey, which the people of the\ncountry called the queen's girdle, and another, which they called her\nveil; and several other fair and fertile districts, which were reserved\nfor the adornment of the queen, and are named after her several\nhabiliments. Now, I cannot help thinking to myself, What if some one\nwere to go to Amestris, the wife of Xerxes and mother of Artaxerxes, and\nsay to her, There is a certain Dinomache, whose whole wardrobe is not\nworth fifty minae--and that will be more than the value--and she has a\nson who is possessed of a three-hundred acre patch at Erchiae, and he\nhas a mind to go to war with your son--would she not wonder to what this\nAlcibiades trusts for success in the conflict? 'He must rely,' she would\nsay to herself, 'upon his training and wisdom--these are the things\nwhich Hellenes value.' And if she heard that this Alcibiades who\nis making the attempt is not as yet twenty years old, and is wholly\nuneducated, and when his lover tells him that he ought to get education\nand training first, and then go and fight the king, he refuses, and says\nthat he is well enough as he is, would she not be amazed, and ask 'On\nwhat, then, does the youth rely?' And if we replied: He relies on his\nbeauty, and stature, and birth, and mental endowments, she would think\nthat we were mad, Alcibiades, when she compared the advantages which you\npossess with those of her own people. And I believe that even Lampido,\nthe daughter of Leotychides, the wife of Archidamus and mother of Agis,\nall of whom were kings, would have the same feeling; if, in your present\nuneducated state, you were to turn your thoughts against her son, she\ntoo would be equally astonished. But how disgraceful, that we should not\nhave as high a notion of what is required in us as our enemies'\nwives and mothers have of the qualities which are required in their\nassailants! O my friend, be persuaded by me, and hear the Delphian\ninscription, 'Know thyself'--not the men whom you think, but these kings\nare our rivals, and we can only overcome them by pains and skill. And\nif you fail in the required qualities, you will fail also in becoming\nrenowned among Hellenes and Barbarians, which you seem to desire more\nthan any other man ever desired anything.\n\nALCIBIADES: I entirely believe you; but what are the sort of pains which\nare required, Socrates,--can you tell me?\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, I can; but we must take counsel together concerning the\nmanner in which both of us may be most improved. For what I am telling\nyou of the necessity of education applies to myself as well as to you;\nand there is only one point in which I have an advantage over you.\n\nALCIBIADES: What is that?\n\nSOCRATES: I have a guardian who is better and wiser than your guardian,\nPericles.\n\nALCIBIADES: Who is he, Socrates?\n\nSOCRATES: God, Alcibiades, who up to this day has not allowed me to\nconverse with you; and he inspires in me the faith that I am especially\ndesigned to bring you to honour.\n\nALCIBIADES: You are jesting, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: Perhaps, at any rate, I am right in saying that all men\ngreatly need pains and care, and you and I above all men.\n\nALCIBIADES: You are not far wrong about me.\n\nSOCRATES: And certainly not about myself.\n\nALCIBIADES: But what can we do?\n\nSOCRATES: There must be no hesitation or cowardice, my friend.\n\nALCIBIADES: That would not become us, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: No, indeed, and we ought to take counsel together: for do we\nnot wish to be as good as possible?\n\nALCIBIADES: We do.\n\nSOCRATES: In what sort of virtue?\n\nALCIBIADES: Plainly, in the virtue of good men.\n\nSOCRATES: Who are good in what?\n\nALCIBIADES: Those, clearly, who are good in the management of affairs.\n\nSOCRATES: What sort of affairs? Equestrian affairs?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: You mean that about them we should have recourse to horsemen?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, naval affairs?\n\nALCIBIADES: No.\n\nSOCRATES: You mean that we should have recourse to sailors about them?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then what affairs? And who do them?\n\nALCIBIADES: The affairs which occupy Athenian gentlemen.\n\nSOCRATES: And when you speak of gentlemen, do you mean the wise or the\nunwise?\n\nALCIBIADES: The wise.\n\nSOCRATES: And a man is good in respect of that in which he is wise?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And evil in respect of that in which he is unwise?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: The shoemaker, for example, is wise in respect of the making\nof shoes?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then he is good in that?\n\nALCIBIADES: He is.\n\nSOCRATES: But in respect of the making of garments he is unwise?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then in that he is bad?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then upon this view of the matter the same man is good and\nalso bad?\n\nALCIBIADES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: But would you say that the good are the same as the bad?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: Then whom do you call the good?\n\nALCIBIADES: I mean by the good those who are able to rule in the city.\n\nSOCRATES: Not, surely, over horses?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: But over men?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: When they are sick?\n\nALCIBIADES: No.\n\nSOCRATES: Or on a voyage?\n\nALCIBIADES: No.\n\nSOCRATES: Or reaping the harvest?\n\nALCIBIADES: No.\n\nSOCRATES: When they are doing something or nothing?\n\nALCIBIADES: When they are doing something, I should say.\n\nSOCRATES: I wish that you would explain to me what this something is.\n\nALCIBIADES: When they are having dealings with one another, and using\none another's services, as we citizens do in our daily life.\n\nSOCRATES: Those of whom you speak are ruling over men who are using the\nservices of other men?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Are they ruling over the signal-men who give the time to the\nrowers?\n\nALCIBIADES: No; they are not.\n\nSOCRATES: That would be the office of the pilot?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: But, perhaps you mean that they rule over flute-players, who\nlead the singers and use the services of the dancers?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: That would be the business of the teacher of the chorus?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then what is the meaning of being able to rule over men who\nuse other men?\n\nALCIBIADES: I mean that they rule over men who have common rights of\ncitizenship, and dealings with one another.\n\nSOCRATES: And what sort of an art is this? Suppose that I ask you\nagain, as I did just now, What art makes men know how to rule over their\nfellow-sailors,--how would you answer?\n\nALCIBIADES: The art of the pilot.\n\nSOCRATES: And, if I may recur to another old instance, what art enables\nthem to rule over their fellow-singers?\n\nALCIBIADES: The art of the teacher of the chorus, which you were just\nnow mentioning.\n\nSOCRATES: And what do you call the art of fellow-citizens?\n\nALCIBIADES: I should say, good counsel, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: And is the art of the pilot evil counsel?\n\nALCIBIADES: No.\n\nSOCRATES: But good counsel?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes, that is what I should say,--good counsel, of which the\naim is the preservation of the voyagers.\n\nSOCRATES: True. And what is the aim of that other good counsel of which\nyou speak?\n\nALCIBIADES: The aim is the better order and preservation of the city.\n\nSOCRATES: And what is that of which the absence or presence improves\nand preserves the order of the city? Suppose you were to ask me, what is\nthat of which the presence or absence improves or preserves the order\nof the body? I should reply, the presence of health and the absence of\ndisease. You would say the same?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And if you were to ask me the same question about the eyes, I\nshould reply in the same way, 'the presence of sight and the absence of\nblindness;' or about the ears, I should reply, that they were improved\nand were in better case, when deafness was absent, and hearing was\npresent in them.\n\nALCIBIADES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And what would you say of a state? What is that by the\npresence or absence of which the state is improved and better managed\nand ordered?\n\nALCIBIADES: I should say, Socrates:--the presence of friendship and the\nabsence of hatred and division.\n\nSOCRATES: And do you mean by friendship agreement or disagreement?\n\nALCIBIADES: Agreement.\n\nSOCRATES: What art makes cities agree about numbers?\n\nALCIBIADES: Arithmetic.\n\nSOCRATES: And private individuals?\n\nALCIBIADES: The same.\n\nSOCRATES: And what art makes each individual agree with himself?\n\nALCIBIADES: The same.\n\nSOCRATES: And what art makes each of us agree with himself about the\ncomparative length of the span and of the cubit? Does not the art of\nmeasure?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Individuals are agreed with one another about this; and\nstates, equally?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And the same holds of the balance?\n\nALCIBIADES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: But what is the other agreement of which you speak, and about\nwhat? what art can give that agreement? And does that which gives it to\nthe state give it also to the individual, so as to make him consistent\nwith himself and with another?\n\nALCIBIADES: I should suppose so.\n\nSOCRATES: But what is the nature of the agreement?--answer, and faint\nnot.\n\nALCIBIADES: I mean to say that there should be such friendship and\nagreement as exists between an affectionate father and mother and their\nson, or between brothers, or between husband and wife.\n\nSOCRATES: But can a man, Alcibiades, agree with a woman about the\nspinning of wool, which she understands and he does not?\n\nALCIBIADES: No, truly.\n\nSOCRATES: Nor has he any need, for spinning is a female accomplishment.\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And would a woman agree with a man about the science of arms,\nwhich she has never learned?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: I suppose that the use of arms would be regarded by you as a\nmale accomplishment?\n\nALCIBIADES: It would.\n\nSOCRATES: Then, upon your view, women and men have two sorts of\nknowledge?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Then in their knowledge there is no agreement of women and\nmen?\n\nALCIBIADES: There is not.\n\nSOCRATES: Nor can there be friendship, if friendship is agreement?\n\nALCIBIADES: Plainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: Then women are not loved by men when they do their own work?\n\nALCIBIADES: I suppose not.\n\nSOCRATES: Nor men by women when they do their own work?\n\nALCIBIADES: No.\n\nSOCRATES: Nor are states well administered, when individuals do their\nown work?\n\nALCIBIADES: I should rather think, Socrates, that the reverse is the\ntruth. (Compare Republic.)\n\nSOCRATES: What! do you mean to say that states are well administered\nwhen friendship is absent, the presence of which, as we were saying,\nalone secures their good order?\n\nALCIBIADES: But I should say that there is friendship among them, for\nthis very reason, that the two parties respectively do their own work.\n\nSOCRATES: That was not what you were saying before; and what do you mean\nnow by affirming that friendship exists when there is no agreement? How\ncan there be agreement about matters which the one party knows, and of\nwhich the other is in ignorance?\n\nALCIBIADES: Impossible.\n\nSOCRATES: And when individuals are doing their own work, are they doing\nwhat is just or unjust?\n\nALCIBIADES: What is just, certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And when individuals do what is just in the state, is there no\nfriendship among them?\n\nALCIBIADES: I suppose that there must be, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: Then what do you mean by this friendship or agreement about\nwhich we must be wise and discreet in order that we may be good men?\nI cannot make out where it exists or among whom; according to you, the\nsame persons may sometimes have it, and sometimes not.\n\nALCIBIADES: But, indeed, Socrates, I do not know what I am saying; and I\nhave long been, unconsciously to myself, in a most disgraceful state.\n\nSOCRATES: Nevertheless, cheer up; at fifty, if you had discovered your\ndeficiency, you would have been too old, and the time for taking care of\nyourself would have passed away, but yours is just the age at which the\ndiscovery should be made.\n\nALCIBIADES: And what should he do, Socrates, who would make the\ndiscovery?\n\nSOCRATES: Answer questions, Alcibiades; and that is a process which,\nby the grace of God, if I may put any faith in my oracle, will be very\nimproving to both of us.\n\nALCIBIADES: If I can be improved by answering, I will answer.\n\nSOCRATES: And first of all, that we may not peradventure be deceived\nby appearances, fancying, perhaps, that we are taking care of ourselves\nwhen we are not, what is the meaning of a man taking care of himself?\nand when does he take care? Does he take care of himself when he takes\ncare of what belongs to him?\n\nALCIBIADES: I should think so.\n\nSOCRATES: When does a man take care of his feet? Does he not take care\nof them when he takes care of that which belongs to his feet?\n\nALCIBIADES: I do not understand.\n\nSOCRATES: Let me take the hand as an illustration; does not a ring\nbelong to the finger, and to the finger only?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And the shoe in like manner to the foot?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And when we take care of our shoes, do we not take care of our\nfeet?\n\nALCIBIADES: I do not comprehend, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: But you would admit, Alcibiades, that to take proper care of a\nthing is a correct expression?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And taking proper care means improving?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And what is the art which improves our shoes?\n\nALCIBIADES: Shoemaking.\n\nSOCRATES: Then by shoemaking we take care of our shoes?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And do we by shoemaking take care of our feet, or by some\nother art which improves the feet?\n\nALCIBIADES: By some other art.\n\nSOCRATES: And the same art improves the feet which improves the rest of\nthe body?\n\nALCIBIADES: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: Which is gymnastic?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Then by gymnastic we take care of our feet, and by shoemaking\nof that which belongs to our feet?\n\nALCIBIADES: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: And by gymnastic we take care of our hands, and by the art of\ngraving rings of that which belongs to our hands?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And by gymnastic we take care of the body, and by the art of\nweaving and the other arts we take care of the things of the body?\n\nALCIBIADES: Clearly.\n\nSOCRATES: Then the art which takes care of each thing is different from\nthat which takes care of the belongings of each thing?\n\nALCIBIADES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: Then in taking care of what belongs to you, you do not take\ncare of yourself?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: For the art which takes care of our belongings appears not to\nbe the same as that which takes care of ourselves?\n\nALCIBIADES: Clearly not.\n\nSOCRATES: And now let me ask you what is the art with which we take care\nof ourselves?\n\nALCIBIADES: I cannot say.\n\nSOCRATES: At any rate, thus much has been admitted, that the art is\nnot one which makes any of our possessions, but which makes ourselves\nbetter?\n\nALCIBIADES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: But should we ever have known what art makes a shoe better, if\nwe did not know a shoe?\n\nALCIBIADES: Impossible.\n\nSOCRATES: Nor should we know what art makes a ring better, if we did not\nknow a ring?\n\nALCIBIADES: That is true.\n\nSOCRATES: And can we ever know what art makes a man better, if we do not\nknow what we are ourselves?\n\nALCIBIADES: Impossible.\n\nSOCRATES: And is self-knowledge such an easy thing, and was he to be\nlightly esteemed who inscribed the text on the temple at Delphi? Or is\nself-knowledge a difficult thing, which few are able to attain?\n\nALCIBIADES: At times I fancy, Socrates, that anybody can know himself;\nat other times the task appears to be very difficult.\n\nSOCRATES: But whether easy or difficult, Alcibiades, still there is\nno other way; knowing what we are, we shall know how to take care of\nourselves, and if we are ignorant we shall not know.\n\nALCIBIADES: That is true.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, then, let us see in what way the self-existent can be\ndiscovered by us; that will give us a chance of discovering our own\nexistence, which otherwise we can never know.\n\nALCIBIADES: You say truly.\n\nSOCRATES: Come, now, I beseech you, tell me with whom you are\nconversing?--with whom but with me?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: As I am, with you?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: That is to say, I, Socrates, am talking?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And Alcibiades is my hearer?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And I in talking use words?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And talking and using words have, I suppose, the same meaning?\n\nALCIBIADES: To be sure.\n\nSOCRATES: And the user is not the same as the thing which he uses?\n\nALCIBIADES: What do you mean?\n\nSOCRATES: I will explain; the shoemaker, for example, uses a square\ntool, and a circular tool, and other tools for cutting?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: But the tool is not the same as the cutter and user of the\ntool?\n\nALCIBIADES: Of course not.\n\nSOCRATES: And in the same way the instrument of the harper is to be\ndistinguished from the harper himself?\n\nALCIBIADES: It is.\n\nSOCRATES: Now the question which I asked was whether you conceive the\nuser to be always different from that which he uses?\n\nALCIBIADES: I do.\n\nSOCRATES: Then what shall we say of the shoemaker? Does he cut with his\ntools only or with his hands?\n\nALCIBIADES: With his hands as well.\n\nSOCRATES: He uses his hands too?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And does he use his eyes in cutting leather?\n\nALCIBIADES: He does.\n\nSOCRATES: And we admit that the user is not the same with the things\nwhich he uses?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then the shoemaker and the harper are to be distinguished from\nthe hands and feet which they use?\n\nALCIBIADES: Clearly.\n\nSOCRATES: And does not a man use the whole body?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And that which uses is different from that which is used?\n\nALCIBIADES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: Then a man is not the same as his own body?\n\nALCIBIADES: That is the inference.\n\nSOCRATES: What is he, then?\n\nALCIBIADES: I cannot say.\n\nSOCRATES: Nay, you can say that he is the user of the body.\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And the user of the body is the soul?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes, the soul.\n\nSOCRATES: And the soul rules?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Let me make an assertion which will, I think, be universally\nadmitted.\n\nALCIBIADES: What is it?\n\nSOCRATES: That man is one of three things.\n\nALCIBIADES: What are they?\n\nSOCRATES: Soul, body, or both together forming a whole.\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: But did we not say that the actual ruling principle of the\nbody is man?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes, we did.\n\nSOCRATES: And does the body rule over itself?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: It is subject, as we were saying?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then that is not the principle which we are seeking?\n\nALCIBIADES: It would seem not.\n\nSOCRATES: But may we say that the union of the two rules over the body,\nand consequently that this is man?\n\nALCIBIADES: Very likely.\n\nSOCRATES: The most unlikely of all things; for if one of the members is\nsubject, the two united cannot possibly rule.\n\nALCIBIADES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: But since neither the body, nor the union of the two, is man,\neither man has no real existence, or the soul is man?\n\nALCIBIADES: Just so.\n\nSOCRATES: Is anything more required to prove that the soul is man?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly not; the proof is, I think, quite sufficient.\n\nSOCRATES: And if the proof, although not perfect, be sufficient, we\nshall be satisfied;--more precise proof will be supplied when we have\ndiscovered that which we were led to omit, from a fear that the enquiry\nwould be too much protracted.\n\nALCIBIADES: What was that?\n\nSOCRATES: What I meant, when I said that absolute existence must be\nfirst considered; but now, instead of absolute existence, we have been\nconsidering the nature of individual existence, and this may, perhaps,\nbe sufficient; for surely there is nothing which may be called more\nproperly ourselves than the soul?\n\nALCIBIADES: There is nothing.\n\nSOCRATES: Then we may truly conceive that you and I are conversing with\none another, soul to soul?\n\nALCIBIADES: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: And that is just what I was saying before--that I, Socrates,\nam not arguing or talking with the face of Alcibiades, but with the real\nAlcibiades; or in other words, with his soul.\n\nALCIBIADES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: Then he who bids a man know himself, would have him know his\nsoul?\n\nALCIBIADES: That appears to be true.\n\nSOCRATES: He whose knowledge only extends to the body, knows the things\nof a man, and not the man himself?\n\nALCIBIADES: That is true.\n\nSOCRATES: Then neither the physician regarded as a physician, nor the\ntrainer regarded as a trainer, knows himself?\n\nALCIBIADES: He does not.\n\nSOCRATES: The husbandmen and the other craftsmen are very far from\nknowing themselves, for they would seem not even to know their own\nbelongings? When regarded in relation to the arts which they practise\nthey are even further removed from self-knowledge, for they only know\nthe belongings of the body, which minister to the body.\n\nALCIBIADES: That is true.\n\nSOCRATES: Then if temperance is the knowledge of self, in respect of his\nart none of them is temperate?\n\nALCIBIADES: I agree.\n\nSOCRATES: And this is the reason why their arts are accounted vulgar,\nand are not such as a good man would practise?\n\nALCIBIADES: Quite true.\n\nSOCRATES: Again, he who cherishes his body cherishes not himself, but\nwhat belongs to him?\n\nALCIBIADES: That is true.\n\nSOCRATES: But he who cherishes his money, cherishes neither himself nor\nhis belongings, but is in a stage yet further removed from himself?\n\nALCIBIADES: I agree.\n\nSOCRATES: Then the money-maker has really ceased to be occupied with his\nown concerns?\n\nALCIBIADES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And if any one has fallen in love with the person of\nAlcibiades, he loves not Alcibiades, but the belongings of Alcibiades?\n\nALCIBIADES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: But he who loves your soul is the true lover?\n\nALCIBIADES: That is the necessary inference.\n\nSOCRATES: The lover of the body goes away when the flower of youth\nfades?\n\nALCIBIADES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: But he who loves the soul goes not away, as long as the soul\nfollows after virtue?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And I am the lover who goes not away, but remains with you,\nwhen you are no longer young and the rest are gone?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes, Socrates; and therein you do well, and I hope that you\nwill remain.\n\nSOCRATES: Then you must try to look your best.\n\nALCIBIADES: I will.\n\nSOCRATES: The fact is, that there is only one lover of Alcibiades the\nson of Cleinias; there neither is nor ever has been seemingly any\nother; and he is his darling,--Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus and\nPhaenarete.\n\nALCIBIADES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And did you not say, that if I had not spoken first, you were\non the point of coming to me, and enquiring why I only remained?\n\nALCIBIADES: That is true.\n\nSOCRATES: The reason was that I loved you for your own sake, whereas\nother men love what belongs to you; and your beauty, which is not you,\nis fading away, just as your true self is beginning to bloom. And I will\nnever desert you, if you are not spoiled and deformed by the Athenian\npeople; for the danger which I most fear is that you will become a lover\nof the people and will be spoiled by them. Many a noble Athenian has\nbeen ruined in this way. For the demus of the great-hearted Erechteus is\nof a fair countenance, but you should see him naked; wherefore observe\nthe caution which I give you.\n\nALCIBIADES: What caution?\n\nSOCRATES: Practise yourself, sweet friend, in learning what you ought to\nknow, before you enter on politics; and then you will have an antidote\nwhich will keep you out of harm's way.\n\nALCIBIADES: Good advice, Socrates, but I wish that you would explain to\nme in what way I am to take care of myself.\n\nSOCRATES: Have we not made an advance? for we are at any rate tolerably\nwell agreed as to what we are, and there is no longer any danger, as\nwe once feared, that we might be taking care not of ourselves, but of\nsomething which is not ourselves.\n\nALCIBIADES: That is true.\n\nSOCRATES: And the next step will be to take care of the soul, and look\nto that?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Leaving the care of our bodies and of our properties to\nothers?\n\nALCIBIADES: Very good.\n\nSOCRATES: But how can we have a perfect knowledge of the things of the\nsoul?--For if we know them, then I suppose we shall know ourselves.\nCan we really be ignorant of the excellent meaning of the Delphian\ninscription, of which we were just now speaking?\n\nALCIBIADES: What have you in your thoughts, Socrates?\n\nSOCRATES: I will tell you what I suspect to be the meaning and lesson\nof that inscription. Let me take an illustration from sight, which I\nimagine to be the only one suitable to my purpose.\n\nALCIBIADES: What do you mean?\n\nSOCRATES: Consider; if some one were to say to the eye, 'See thyself,'\nas you might say to a man, 'Know thyself,' what is the nature and\nmeaning of this precept? Would not his meaning be:--That the eye should\nlook at that in which it would see itself?\n\nALCIBIADES: Clearly.\n\nSOCRATES: And what are the objects in looking at which we see ourselves?\n\nALCIBIADES: Clearly, Socrates, in looking at mirrors and the like.\n\nSOCRATES: Very true; and is there not something of the nature of a\nmirror in our own eyes?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Did you ever observe that the face of the person looking into\nthe eye of another is reflected as in a mirror; and in the visual organ\nwhich is over against him, and which is called the pupil, there is a\nsort of image of the person looking?\n\nALCIBIADES: That is quite true.\n\nSOCRATES: Then the eye, looking at another eye, and at that in the eye\nwhich is most perfect, and which is the instrument of vision, will there\nsee itself?\n\nALCIBIADES: That is evident.\n\nSOCRATES: But looking at anything else either in man or in the world,\nand not to what resembles this, it will not see itself?\n\nALCIBIADES: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: Then if the eye is to see itself, it must look at the eye,\nand at that part of the eye where sight which is the virtue of the eye\nresides?\n\nALCIBIADES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And if the soul, my dear Alcibiades, is ever to know herself,\nmust she not look at the soul; and especially at that part of the soul\nin which her virtue resides, and to any other which is like this?\n\nALCIBIADES: I agree, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: And do we know of any part of our souls more divine than that\nwhich has to do with wisdom and knowledge?\n\nALCIBIADES: There is none.\n\nSOCRATES: Then this is that part of the soul which resembles the divine;\nand he who looks at this and at the whole class of things divine, will\nbe most likely to know himself?\n\nALCIBIADES: Clearly.\n\nSOCRATES: And self-knowledge we agree to be wisdom?\n\nALCIBIADES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: But if we have no self-knowledge and no wisdom, can we ever\nknow our own good and evil?\n\nALCIBIADES: How can we, Socrates?\n\nSOCRATES: You mean, that if you did not know Alcibiades, there would\nbe no possibility of your knowing that what belonged to Alcibiades was\nreally his?\n\nALCIBIADES: It would be quite impossible.\n\nSOCRATES: Nor should we know that we were the persons to whom anything\nbelonged, if we did not know ourselves?\n\nALCIBIADES: How could we?\n\nSOCRATES: And if we did not know our own belongings, neither should we\nknow the belongings of our belongings?\n\nALCIBIADES: Clearly not.\n\nSOCRATES: Then we were not altogether right in acknowledging just now\nthat a man may know what belongs to him and yet not know himself; nay,\nrather he cannot even know the belongings of his belongings; for the\ndiscernment of the things of self, and of the things which belong to the\nthings of self, appear all to be the business of the same man, and of\nthe same art.\n\nALCIBIADES: So much may be supposed.\n\nSOCRATES: And he who knows not the things which belong to himself, will\nin like manner be ignorant of the things which belong to others?\n\nALCIBIADES: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: And if he knows not the affairs of others, he will not know\nthe affairs of states?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: Then such a man can never be a statesman?\n\nALCIBIADES: He cannot.\n\nSOCRATES: Nor an economist?\n\nALCIBIADES: He cannot.\n\nSOCRATES: He will not know what he is doing?\n\nALCIBIADES: He will not.\n\nSOCRATES: And will not he who is ignorant fall into error?\n\nALCIBIADES: Assuredly.\n\nSOCRATES: And if he falls into error will he not fail both in his public\nand private capacity?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes, indeed.\n\nSOCRATES: And failing, will he not be miserable?\n\nALCIBIADES: Very.\n\nSOCRATES: And what will become of those for whom he is acting?\n\nALCIBIADES: They will be miserable also.\n\nSOCRATES: Then he who is not wise and good cannot be happy?\n\nALCIBIADES: He cannot.\n\nSOCRATES: The bad, then, are miserable?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes, very.\n\nSOCRATES: And if so, not he who has riches, but he who has wisdom, is\ndelivered from his misery?\n\nALCIBIADES: Clearly.\n\nSOCRATES: Cities, then, if they are to be happy, do not want walls, or\ntriremes, or docks, or numbers, or size, Alcibiades, without virtue?\n(Compare Arist. Pol.)\n\nALCIBIADES: Indeed they do not.\n\nSOCRATES: And you must give the citizens virtue, if you mean to\nadminister their affairs rightly or nobly?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: But can a man give that which he has not?\n\nALCIBIADES: Impossible.\n\nSOCRATES: Then you or any one who means to govern and superintend, not\nonly himself and the things of himself, but the state and the things of\nthe state, must in the first place acquire virtue.\n\nALCIBIADES: That is true.\n\nSOCRATES: You have not therefore to obtain power or authority, in\norder to enable you to do what you wish for yourself and the state, but\njustice and wisdom.\n\nALCIBIADES: Clearly.\n\nSOCRATES: You and the state, if you act wisely and justly, will act\naccording to the will of God?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: As I was saying before, you will look only at what is bright\nand divine, and act with a view to them?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: In that mirror you will see and know yourselves and your own\ngood?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And so you will act rightly and well?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: In which case, I will be security for your happiness.\n\nALCIBIADES: I accept the security.\n\nSOCRATES: But if you act unrighteously, your eye will turn to the dark\nand godless, and being in darkness and ignorance of yourselves, you will\nprobably do deeds of darkness.\n\nALCIBIADES: Very possibly.\n\nSOCRATES: For if a man, my dear Alcibiades, has the power to do what he\nlikes, but has no understanding, what is likely to be the result, either\nto him as an individual or to the state--for example, if he be sick and\nis able to do what he likes, not having the mind of a physician--having\nmoreover tyrannical power, and no one daring to reprove him, what will\nhappen to him? Will he not be likely to have his constitution ruined?\n\nALCIBIADES: That is true.\n\nSOCRATES: Or again, in a ship, if a man having the power to do what he\nlikes, has no intelligence or skill in navigation, do you see what will\nhappen to him and to his fellow-sailors?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes; I see that they will all perish.\n\nSOCRATES: And in like manner, in a state, and where there is any power\nand authority which is wanting in virtue, will not misfortune, in like\nmanner, ensue?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Not tyrannical power, then, my good Alcibiades, should be the\naim either of individuals or states, if they would be happy, but virtue.\n\nALCIBIADES: That is true.\n\nSOCRATES: And before they have virtue, to be commanded by a superior is\nbetter for men as well as for children? (Compare Arist. Pol.)\n\nALCIBIADES: That is evident.\n\nSOCRATES: And that which is better is also nobler?\n\nALCIBIADES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And what is nobler is more becoming?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Then to the bad man slavery is more becoming, because better?\n\nALCIBIADES: True.\n\nSOCRATES: Then vice is only suited to a slave?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And virtue to a freeman?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And, O my friend, is not the condition of a slave to be\navoided?\n\nALCIBIADES: Certainly, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: And are you now conscious of your own state? And do you know\nwhether you are a freeman or not?\n\nALCIBIADES: I think that I am very conscious indeed of my own state.\n\nSOCRATES: And do you know how to escape out of a state which I do not\neven like to name to my beauty?\n\nALCIBIADES: Yes, I do.\n\nSOCRATES: How?\n\nALCIBIADES: By your help, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: That is not well said, Alcibiades.\n\nALCIBIADES: What ought I to have said?\n\nSOCRATES: By the help of God.\n\nALCIBIADES: I agree; and I further say, that our relations are likely\nto be reversed. From this day forward, I must and will follow you as you\nhave followed me; I will be the disciple, and you shall be my master.\n\nSOCRATES: O that is rare! My love breeds another love: and so like the\nstork I shall be cherished by the bird whom I have hatched.\n\nALCIBIADES: Strange, but true; and henceforward I shall begin to think\nabout justice.\n\nSOCRATES: And I hope that you will persist; although I have fears, not\nbecause I doubt you; but I see the power of the state, which may be too\nmuch for both of us.","title":"Alcibiades I","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":18628}