{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_1681/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_1681","id":"gutenberg_1681","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1681","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Classical literature","Philosophy, Ancient","Virtue","Wealth -- Moral and ethical aspects"],"text":"Produced by Sue Asscher\n\n\n\n\n\nERYXIAS\n\nBy a Platonic Imitator (see Appendix II)\n\n\n\nTranslated by Benjamin Jowett\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX II.\n\nThe two dialogues which are translated in the second appendix are not\nmentioned by Aristotle, or by any early authority, and have no claim\nto be ascribed to Plato. They are examples of Platonic dialogues to be\nassigned probably to the second or third generation after Plato, when\nhis writings were well known at Athens and Alexandria. They exhibit\nconsiderable originality, and are remarkable for containing several\nthoughts of the sort which we suppose to be modern rather than ancient,\nand which therefore have a peculiar interest for us. The Second\nAlcibiades shows that the difficulties about prayer which have perplexed\nChristian theologians were not unknown among the followers of Plato.\nThe Eryxias was doubted by the ancients themselves: yet it may claim the\ndistinction of being, among all Greek or Roman writings, the one which\nanticipates in the most striking manner the modern science of political\neconomy and gives an abstract form to some of its principal doctrines.\n\nFor the translation of these two dialogues I am indebted to my friend\nand secretary, Mr. Knight.\n\nThat the Dialogue which goes by the name of the Second Alcibiades is a\ngenuine writing of Plato will not be maintained by any modern critic,\nand was hardly believed by the ancients themselves. The dialectic is\npoor and weak. There is no power over language, or beauty of style; and\nthere is a certain abruptness and agroikia in the conversation, which\nis very un-Platonic. The best passage is probably that about the\npoets:--the remark that the poet, who is of a reserved disposition, is\nuncommonly difficult to understand, and the ridiculous interpretation of\nHomer, are entirely in the spirit of Plato (compare Protag; Ion; Apol.).\nThe characters are ill-drawn. Socrates assumes the 'superior person' and\npreaches too much, while Alcibiades is stupid and heavy-in-hand. There\nare traces of Stoic influence in the general tone and phraseology of the\nDialogue (compare opos melesei tis...kaka: oti pas aphron mainetai):\nand the writer seems to have been acquainted with the 'Laws' of Plato\n(compare Laws). An incident from the Symposium is rather clumsily\nintroduced, and two somewhat hackneyed quotations (Symp., Gorg.) recur.\nThe reference to the death of Archelaus as having occurred 'quite\nlately' is only a fiction, probably suggested by the Gorgias, where the\nstory of Archelaus is told, and a similar phrase occurs;--ta gar echthes\nkai proen gegonota tauta, k.t.l. There are several passages which\nare either corrupt or extremely ill-expressed. But there is a modern\ninterest in the subject of the dialogue; and it is a good example of\na short spurious work, which may be attributed to the second or third\ncentury before Christ.\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION.\n\nMuch cannot be said in praise of the style or conception of the Eryxias.\nIt is frequently obscure; like the exercise of a student, it is full\nof small imitations of Plato:--Phaeax returning from an expedition to\nSicily (compare Socrates in the Charmides from the army at Potidaea),\nthe figure of the game at draughts, borrowed from the Republic, etc. It\nhas also in many passages the ring of sophistry. On the other hand, the\nrather unhandsome treatment which is exhibited towards Prodicus is quite\nunlike the urbanity of Plato.\n\nYet there are some points in the argument which are deserving of\nattention. (1) That wealth depends upon the need of it or demand for\nit, is the first anticipation in an abstract form of one of the great\nprinciples of modern political economy, and the nearest approach to it\nto be found in an ancient writer. (2) The resolution of wealth into\nits simplest implements going on to infinity is a subtle and refined\nthought. (3) That wealth is relative to circumstances is a sound\nconception. (4) That the arts and sciences which receive payment are\nlikewise to be comprehended under the notion of wealth, also touches a\nquestion of modern political economy. (5) The distinction of post hoc\nand propter hoc, often lost sight of in modern as well as in ancient\ntimes. These metaphysical conceptions and distinctions show considerable\npower of thought in the writer, whatever we may think of his merits as\nan imitator of Plato.\n\n\n\n\nERYXIAS\n\n\nPERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, Eryxias, Erasistratus, Critias.\n\nSCENE: The portico of a temple of Zeus.\n\n\nIt happened by chance that Eryxias the Steirian was walking with me in\nthe Portico of Zeus the Deliverer, when there came up to us Critias\nand Erasistratus, the latter the son of Phaeax, who was the nephew of\nErasistratus. Now Erasistratus had just arrived from Sicily and that\npart of the world. As they approached, he said, Hail, Socrates!\n\nSOCRATES: The same to you, I said; have you any good news from Sicily to\ntell us?\n\nERASISTRATUS: Most excellent. But, if you please, let us first sit down;\nfor I am tired with my yesterday's journey from Megara.\n\nSOCRATES: Gladly, if that is your desire.\n\nERASISTRATUS: What would you wish to hear first? he said. What the\nSicilians are doing, or how they are disposed towards our city? To my\nmind, they are very like wasps: so long as you only cause them a little\nannoyance they are quite unmanageable; you must destroy their nests\nif you wish to get the better of them. And in a similar way, the\nSyracusans, unless we set to work in earnest, and go against them with\na great expedition, will never submit to our rule. The petty injuries\nwhich we at present inflict merely irritate them enough to make them\nutterly intractable. And now they have sent ambassadors to Athens, and\nintend, I suspect, to play us some trick.--While we were talking, the\nSyracusan envoys chanced to go by, and Erasistratus, pointing to one of\nthem, said to me, That, Socrates, is the richest man in all Italy and\nSicily. For who has larger estates or more land at his disposal to\ncultivate if he please? And they are of a quality, too, finer than any\nother land in Hellas. Moreover, he has all the things which go to make\nup wealth, slaves and horses innumerable, gold and silver without end.\n\nI saw that he was inclined to expatiate on the riches of the man; so I\nasked him, Well, Erasistratus, and what sort of character does he bear\nin Sicily?\n\nERASISTRATUS: He is esteemed to be, and really is, the wickedest of\nall the Sicilians and Italians, and even more wicked than he is rich;\nindeed, if you were to ask any Sicilian whom he thought to be the worst\nand the richest of mankind, you would never hear any one else named.\n\nI reflected that we were speaking, not of trivial matters, but about\nwealth and virtue, which are deemed to be of the greatest moment, and\nI asked Erasistratus whom he considered the wealthier,--he who was the\npossessor of a talent of silver or he who had a field worth two talents?\n\nERASISTRATUS: The owner of the field.\n\nSOCRATES: And on the same principle he who had robes and bedding and\nsuch things which are of greater value to him than to a stranger would\nbe richer than the stranger?\n\nERASISTRATUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And if any one gave you a choice, which of these would you\nprefer?\n\nERASISTRATUS: That which was most valuable.\n\nSOCRATES: In which way do you think you would be the richer?\n\nERASISTRATUS: By choosing as I said.\n\nSOCRATES: And he appears to you to be the richest who has goods of the\ngreatest value?\n\nERASISTRATUS: He does.\n\nSOCRATES: And are not the healthy richer than the sick, since health is\na possession more valuable than riches to the sick? Surely there is no\none who would not prefer to be poor and well, rather than to have all\nthe King of Persia's wealth and to be ill. And this proves that men set\nhealth above wealth, else they would never choose the one in preference\nto the other.\n\nERASISTRATUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And if anything appeared to be more valuable than health, he\nwould be the richest who possessed it?\n\nERASISTRATUS: He would.\n\nSOCRATES: Suppose that some one came to us at this moment and were to\nask, Well, Socrates and Eryxias and Erasistratus, can you tell me what\nis of the greatest value to men? Is it not that of which the possession\nwill best enable a man to advise how his own and his friend's affairs\nshould be administered?--What will be our reply?\n\nERASISTRATUS: I should say, Socrates, that happiness was the most\nprecious of human possessions.\n\nSOCRATES: Not a bad answer. But do we not deem those men who are most\nprosperous to be the happiest?\n\nERASISTRATUS: That is my opinion.\n\nSOCRATES: And are they not most prosperous who commit the fewest errors\nin respect either of themselves or of other men?\n\nERASISTRATUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And they who know what is evil and what is good; what should\nbe done and what should be left undone;--these behave the most wisely\nand make the fewest mistakes?\n\nErasistratus agreed to this.\n\nSOCRATES: Then the wisest and those who do best and the most fortunate\nand the richest would appear to be all one and the same, if wisdom is\nreally the most valuable of our possessions?\n\nYes, said Eryxias, interposing, but what use would it be if a man had\nthe wisdom of Nestor and wanted the necessaries of life, food and drink\nand clothes and the like? Where would be the advantage of wisdom then?\nOr how could he be the richest of men who might even have to go begging,\nbecause he had not wherewithal to live?\n\nI thought that what Eryxias was saying had some weight, and I\nreplied, Would the wise man really suffer in this way, if he were so\nill-provided; whereas if he had the house of Polytion, and the house\nwere full of gold and silver, he would lack nothing?\n\nERYXIAS: Yes; for then he might dispose of his property and obtain in\nexchange what he needed, or he might sell it for money with which he\ncould supply his wants and in a moment procure abundance of everything.\n\nSOCRATES: True, if he could find some one who preferred such a house to\nthe wisdom of Nestor. But if there are persons who set great store by\nwisdom like Nestor's and the advantages accruing from it, to sell these,\nif he were so disposed, would be easier still. Or is a house a most\nuseful and necessary possession, and does it make a great difference in\nthe comfort of life to have a mansion like Polytion's instead of living\nin a shabby little cottage, whereas wisdom is of small use and it is\nof no importance whether a man is wise or ignorant about the highest\nmatters? Or is wisdom despised of men and can find no buyers, although\ncypress wood and marble of Pentelicus are eagerly bought by numerous\npurchasers? Surely the prudent pilot or the skilful physician, or the\nartist of any kind who is proficient in his art, is more worth than the\nthings which are especially reckoned among riches; and he who can advise\nwell and prudently for himself and others is able also to sell the\nproduct of his art, if he so desire.\n\nEryxias looked askance, as if he had received some unfair treatment, and\nsaid, I believe, Socrates, that if you were forced to speak the\ntruth, you would declare that you were richer than Callias the son of\nHipponicus. And yet, although you claimed to be wiser about things of\nreal importance, you would not any the more be richer than he.\n\nI dare say, Eryxias, I said, that you may regard these arguments of ours\nas a kind of game; you think that they have no relation to facts, but\nare like the pieces in the game of draughts which the player can move\nin such a way that his opponents are unable to make any countermove.\n(Compare Republic.) And perhaps, too, as regards riches you are of\nopinion that while facts remain the same, there are arguments, no matter\nwhether true or false, which enable the user of them to prove that the\nwisest and the richest are one and the same, although he is in the wrong\nand his opponents are in the right. There would be nothing strange in\nthis; it would be as if two persons were to dispute about letters, one\ndeclaring that the word Socrates began with an S, the other that it\nbegan with an A, and the latter could gain the victory over the former.\n\nEryxias glanced at the audience, laughing and blushing at once, as if\nhe had had nothing to do with what had just been said, and replied,--No,\nindeed, Socrates, I never supposed that our arguments should be of a\nkind which would never convince any one of those here present or be of\nadvantage to them. For what man of sense could ever be persuaded that\nthe wisest and the richest are the same? The truth is that we are\ndiscussing the subject of riches, and my notion is that we should\nargue respecting the honest and dishonest means of acquiring them, and,\ngenerally, whether they are a good thing or a bad.\n\nVery good, I said, and I am obliged to you for the hint: in future we\nwill be more careful. But why do not you yourself, as you introduced the\nargument, and do not think that the former discussion touched the point\nat issue, tell us whether you consider riches to be a good or an evil?\n\nI am of opinion, he said, that they are a good. He was about to add\nsomething more, when Critias interrupted him:--Do you really suppose so,\nEryxias?\n\nCertainly, replied Eryxias; I should be mad if I did not: and I do not\nfancy that you would find any one else of a contrary opinion.\n\nAnd I, retorted Critias, should say that there is no one whom I could\nnot compel to admit that riches are bad for some men. But surely, if\nthey were a good, they could not appear bad for any one?\n\nHere I interposed and said to them: If you two were having an argument\nabout equitation and what was the best way of riding, supposing that I\nknew the art myself, I should try to bring you to an agreement. For\nI should be ashamed if I were present and did not do what I could\nto prevent your difference. And I should do the same if you were\nquarrelling about any other art and were likely, unless you agreed on\nthe point in dispute, to part as enemies instead of as friends. But now,\nwhen we are contending about a thing of which the usefulness continues\nduring the whole of life, and it makes an enormous difference whether we\nare to regard it as beneficial or not,--a thing, too, which is esteemed\nof the highest importance by the Hellenes:--(for parents, as soon as\ntheir children are, as they think, come to years of discretion, urge\nthem to consider how wealth may be acquired, since by riches the value\nof a man is judged):--When, I say, we are thus in earnest, and you,\nwho agree in other respects, fall to disputing about a matter of such\nmoment, that is, about wealth, and not merely whether it is black or\nwhite, light or heavy, but whether it is a good or an evil, whereby,\nalthough you are now the dearest of friends and kinsmen, the most bitter\nhatred may arise betwixt you, I must hinder your dissension to the best\nof my power. If I could, I would tell you the truth, and so put an end\nto the dispute; but as I cannot do this, and each of you supposes that\nyou can bring the other to an agreement, I am prepared, as far as my\ncapacity admits, to help you in solving the question. Please, therefore,\nCritias, try to make us accept the doctrines which you yourself\nentertain.\n\nCRITIAS: I should like to follow up the argument, and will ask Eryxias\nwhether he thinks that there are just and unjust men?\n\nERYXIAS: Most decidedly.\n\nCRITIAS: And does injustice seem to you an evil or a good?\n\nERYXIAS: An evil.\n\nCRITIAS: Do you consider that he who bribes his neighbour's wife and\ncommits adultery with her, acts justly or unjustly, and this although\nboth the state and the laws forbid?\n\nERYXIAS: Unjustly.\n\nCRITIAS: And if the wicked man has wealth and is willing to spend it,\nhe will carry out his evil purposes? whereas he who is short of means\ncannot do what he fain would, and therefore does not sin? In such a\ncase, surely, it is better that a person should not be wealthy, if his\npoverty prevents the accomplishment of his desires, and his desires are\nevil? Or, again, should you call sickness a good or an evil?\n\nERYXIAS: An evil.\n\nCRITIAS: Well, and do you think that some men are intemperate?\n\nERYXIAS: Yes.\n\nCRITIAS: Then, if it is better for his health that the intemperate man\nshould refrain from meat and drink and other pleasant things, but he\ncannot owing to his intemperance, will it not also be better that he\nshould be too poor to gratify his lust rather than that he should have\na superabundance of means? For thus he will not be able to sin, although\nhe desire never so much.\n\nCritias appeared to be arguing so admirably that Eryxias, if he had not\nbeen ashamed of the bystanders, would probably have got up and struck\nhim. For he thought that he had been robbed of a great possession when\nit became obvious to him that he had been wrong in his former opinion\nabout wealth. I observed his vexation, and feared that they would\nproceed to abuse and quarrelling: so I said,--I heard that very argument\nused in the Lyceum yesterday by a wise man, Prodicus of Ceos; but the\naudience thought that he was talking mere nonsense, and no one could\nbe persuaded that he was speaking the truth. And when at last a certain\ntalkative young gentleman came in, and, taking his seat, began to laugh\nand jeer at Prodicus, tormenting him and demanding an explanation of his\nargument, he gained the ear of the audience far more than Prodicus.\n\nCan you repeat the discourse to us? Said Erasistratus.\n\nSOCRATES: If I can only remember it, I will. The youth began by asking\nProdicus, In what way did he think that riches were a good and in what\nan evil? Prodicus answered, as you did just now, that they were a good\nto good men and to those who knew in what way they should be employed,\nwhile to the bad and the ignorant they were an evil. The same is true,\nhe went on to say, of all other things; men make them to be what they\nare themselves. The saying of Archilochus is true:--\n\n'Men's thoughts correspond to the things which they meet with.'\n\nWell, then, replied the youth, if any one makes me wise in that wisdom\nwhereby good men become wise, he must also make everything else good to\nme. Not that he concerns himself at all with these other things, but he\nhas converted my ignorance into wisdom. If, for example, a person teach\nme grammar or music, he will at the same time teach me all that relates\nto grammar or music, and so when he makes me good, he makes things good\nto me.\n\nProdicus did not altogether agree: still he consented to what was said.\n\nAnd do you think, said the youth, that doing good things is like\nbuilding a house,--the work of human agency; or do things remain what\nthey were at first, good or bad, for all time?\n\nProdicus began to suspect, I fancy, the direction which the argument\nwas likely to take, and did not wish to be put down by a mere stripling\nbefore all those present:--(if they two had been alone, he would not\nhave minded):--so he answered, cleverly enough: I think that doing good\nthings is a work of human agency.\n\nAnd is virtue in your opinion, Prodicus, innate or acquired by\ninstruction?\n\nThe latter, said Prodicus.\n\nThen you would consider him a simpleton who supposed that he could\nobtain by praying to the Gods the knowledge of grammar or music or\nany other art, which he must either learn from another or find out for\nhimself?\n\nProdicus agreed to this also.\n\nAnd when you pray to the Gods that you may do well and receive good, you\nmean by your prayer nothing else than that you desire to become good and\nwise:--if, at least, things are good to the good and wise and evil to\nthe evil. But in that case, if virtue is acquired by instruction, it\nwould appear that you only pray to be taught what you do not know.\n\nHereupon I said to Prodicus that it was no misfortune to him if he\nhad been proved to be in error in supposing that the Gods immediately\ngranted to us whatever we asked:--if, I added, whenever you go up to\nthe Acropolis you earnestly entreat the Gods to grant you good things,\nalthough you know not whether they can yield your request, it is as\nthough you went to the doors of the grammarian and begged him, although\nyou had never made a study of the art, to give you a knowledge of\ngrammar which would enable you forthwith to do the business of a\ngrammarian.\n\nWhile I was speaking, Prodicus was preparing to retaliate upon his\nyouthful assailant, intending to employ the argument of which you have\njust made use; for he was annoyed to have it supposed that he offered a\nvain prayer to the Gods. But the master of the gymnasium came to him and\nbegged him to leave because he was teaching the youths doctrines which\nwere unsuited to them, and therefore bad for them.\n\nI have told you this because I want you to understand how men are\ncircumstanced in regard to philosophy. Had Prodicus been present and\nsaid what you have said, the audience would have thought him raving, and\nhe would have been ejected from the gymnasium. But you have argued so\nexcellently well that you have not only persuaded your hearers, but have\nbrought your opponent to an agreement. For just as in the law courts,\nif two witnesses testify to the same fact, one of whom seems to be an\nhonest fellow and the other a rogue, the testimony of the rogue often\nhas the contrary effect on the judges' minds to what he intended, while\nthe same evidence if given by the honest man at once strikes them as\nperfectly true. And probably the audience have something of the same\nfeeling about yourself and Prodicus; they think him a Sophist and a\nbraggart, and regard you as a gentleman of courtesy and worth. For they\ndo not pay attention to the argument so much as to the character of the\nspeaker.\n\nBut truly, Socrates, said Erasistratus, though you may be joking,\nCritias does seem to me to be saying something which is of weight.\n\nSOCRATES: I am in profound earnest, I assure you. But why, as you have\nbegun your argument so prettily, do you not go on with the rest? There\nis still something lacking, now you have agreed that (wealth) is a good\nto some and an evil to others. It remains to enquire what constitutes\nwealth; for unless you know this, you cannot possibly come to an\nunderstanding as to whether it is a good or an evil. I am ready to\nassist you in the enquiry to the utmost of my power: but first let him\nwho affirms that riches are a good, tell us what, in his opinion, is\nwealth.\n\nERASISTRATUS: Indeed, Socrates, I have no notion about wealth beyond\nthat which men commonly have. I suppose that wealth is a quantity of\nmoney (compare Arist. Pol.); and this, I imagine, would also be Critias'\ndefinition.\n\nSOCRATES: Then now we have to consider, What is money? Or else later\non we shall be found to differ about the question. For instance, the\nCarthaginians use money of this sort. Something which is about the size\nof a stater is tied up in a small piece of leather: what it is, no one\nknows but the makers. A seal is next set upon the leather, which then\npasses into circulation, and he who has the largest number of such\npieces is esteemed the richest and best off. And yet if any one among us\nhad a mass of such coins he would be no wealthier than if he had so many\npebbles from the mountain. At Lacedaemon, again, they use iron by weight\nwhich has been rendered useless: and he who has the greatest mass of\nsuch iron is thought to be the richest, although elsewhere it has\nno value. In Ethiopia engraved stones are employed, of which a\nLacedaemonian could make no use. Once more, among the Nomad Scythians a\nman who owned the house of Polytion would not be thought richer than one\nwho possessed Mount Lycabettus among ourselves. And clearly those things\ncannot all be regarded as possessions; for in some cases the possessors\nwould appear none the richer thereby: but, as I was saying, some one of\nthem is thought in one place to be money, and the possessors of it\nare the wealthy, whereas in some other place it is not money, and the\nownership of it does not confer wealth; just as the standard of morals\nvaries, and what is honourable to some men is dishonourable to others.\nAnd if we wish to enquire why a house is valuable to us but not to the\nScythians, or why the Carthaginians value leather which is worthless to\nus, or the Lacedaemonians find wealth in iron and we do not, can we not\nget an answer in some such way as this: Would an Athenian, who had a\nthousand talents weight of the stones which lie about in the Agora and\nwhich we do not employ for any purpose, be thought to be any the richer?\n\nERASISTRATUS: He certainly would not appear so to me.\n\nSOCRATES: But if he possessed a thousand talents weight of some precious\nstone, we should say that he was very rich?\n\nERASISTRATUS: Of course.\n\nSOCRATES: The reason is that the one is useless and the other useful?\n\nERASISTRATUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And in the same way among the Scythians a house has no value\nbecause they have no use for a house, nor would a Scythian set so much\nstore on the finest house in the world as on a leather coat, because he\ncould use the one and not the other. Or again, the Carthaginian coinage\nis not wealth in our eyes, for we could not employ it, as we can silver,\nto procure what we need, and therefore it is of no use to us.\n\nERASISTRATUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: What is useful to us, then, is wealth, and what is useless to\nus is not wealth?\n\nBut how do you mean, Socrates? said Eryxias, interrupting. Do we not\nemploy in our intercourse with one another speech and violence (?) and\nvarious other things? These are useful and yet they are not wealth.\n\nSOCRATES: Clearly we have not yet answered the question, What is\nwealth? That wealth must be useful, to be wealth at all,--thus much is\nacknowledged by every one. But what particular thing is wealth, if not\nall things? Let us pursue the argument in another way; and then we may\nperhaps find what we are seeking. What is the use of wealth, and for\nwhat purpose has the possession of riches been invented,--in the sense,\nI mean, in which drugs have been discovered for the cure of disease?\nPerhaps in this way we may throw some light on the question. It appears\nto be clear that whatever constitutes wealth must be useful, and that\nwealth is one class of useful things; and now we have to enquire, What\nis the use of those useful things which constitute wealth? For all\nthings probably may be said to be useful which we use in production,\njust as all things which have life are animals, but there is a special\nkind of animal which we call 'man.' Now if any one were to ask us, What\nis that of which, if we were rid, we should not want medicine and the\ninstruments of medicine, we might reply that this would be the case if\ndisease were absent from our bodies and either never came to them at all\nor went away again as soon as it appeared; and we may therefore conclude\nthat medicine is the science which is useful for getting rid of disease.\nBut if we are further asked, What is that from which, if we were free,\nwe should have no need of wealth? can we give an answer? If we have\nnone, suppose that we restate the question thus:--If a man could live\nwithout food or drink, and yet suffer neither hunger nor thirst, would\nhe want either money or anything else in order to supply his needs?\n\nERYXIAS: He would not.\n\nSOCRATES: And does not this apply in other cases? If we did not want for\nthe service of the body the things of which we now stand in need, and\nheat and cold and the other bodily sensations were unperceived by us,\nthere would be no use in this so-called wealth, if no one, that is,\nhad any necessity for those things which now make us wish for wealth in\norder that we may satisfy the desires and needs of the body in respect\nof our various wants. And therefore if the possession of wealth is\nuseful in ministering to our bodily wants, and bodily wants were unknown\nto us, we should not need wealth, and possibly there would be no such\nthing as wealth.\n\nERYXIAS: Clearly not.\n\nSOCRATES: Then our conclusion is, as would appear, that wealth is what\nis useful to this end?\n\nEryxias once more gave his assent, but the small argument considerably\ntroubled him.\n\nSOCRATES: And what is your opinion about another question:--Would you\nsay that the same thing can be at one time useful and at another useless\nfor the production of the same result?\n\nERYXIAS: I cannot say more than that if we require the same thing to\nproduce the same result, then it seems to me to be useful; if not, not.\n\nSOCRATES: Then if without the aid of fire we could make a brazen statue,\nwe should not want fire for that purpose; and if we did not want it, it\nwould be useless to us? And the argument applies equally in other cases.\n\nERYXIAS: Clearly.\n\nSOCRATES: And therefore conditions which are not required for the\nexistence of a thing are not useful for the production of it?\n\nERYXIAS: Of course not.\n\nSOCRATES: And if without gold or silver or anything else which we do\nnot use directly for the body in the way that we do food and drink and\nbedding and houses,--if without these we could satisfy the wants of the\nbody, they would be of no use to us for that purpose?\n\nERYXIAS: They would not.\n\nSOCRATES: They would no longer be regarded as wealth, because they are\nuseless, whereas that would be wealth which enabled us to obtain what\nwas useful to us?\n\nERYXIAS: O Socrates, you will never be able to persuade me that gold\nand silver and similar things are not wealth. But I am very strongly of\nopinion that things which are useless to us are not wealth, and that the\nmoney which is useful for this purpose is of the greatest use; not that\nthese things are not useful towards life, if by them we can procure\nwealth.\n\nSOCRATES: And how would you answer another question? There are persons,\nare there not, who teach music and grammar and other arts for pay, and\nthus procure those things of which they stand in need?\n\nERYXIAS: There are.\n\nSOCRATES: And these men by the arts which they profess, and in exchange\nfor them, obtain the necessities of life just as we do by means of gold\nand silver?\n\nERYXIAS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: Then if they procure by this means what they want for the\npurposes of life, that art will be useful towards life? For do we not\nsay that silver is useful because it enables us to supply our bodily\nneeds?\n\nERYXIAS: We do.\n\nSOCRATES: Then if these arts are reckoned among things useful, the arts\nare wealth for the same reason as gold and silver are, for, clearly,\nthe possession of them gives wealth. Yet a little while ago we found it\ndifficult to accept the argument which proved that the wisest are the\nwealthiest. But now there seems no escape from this conclusion. Suppose\nthat we are asked, 'Is a horse useful to everybody?' will not our reply\nbe, 'No, but only to those who know how to use a horse?'\n\nERYXIAS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And so, too, physic is not useful to every one, but only to\nhim who knows how to use it?\n\nERYXIAS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And the same is the case with everything else?\n\nERYXIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then gold and silver and all the other elements which are\nsupposed to make up wealth are only useful to the person who knows how\nto use them?\n\nERYXIAS: Exactly.\n\nSOCRATES: And were we not saying before that it was the business of a\ngood man and a gentleman to know where and how anything should be used?\n\nERYXIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: The good and gentle, therefore will alone have profit from\nthese things, supposing at least that they know how to use them. But if\nso, to them only will they seem to be wealth. It appears, however, that\nwhere a person is ignorant of riding, and has horses which are useless\nto him, if some one teaches him that art, he makes him also richer, for\nwhat was before useless has now become useful to him, and in giving him\nknowledge he has also conferred riches upon him.\n\nERYXIAS: That is the case.\n\nSOCRATES: Yet I dare be sworn that Critias will not be moved a whit by\nthe argument.\n\nCRITIAS: No, by heaven, I should be a madman if I were. But why do you\nnot finish the argument which proves that gold and silver and other\nthings which seem to be wealth are not real wealth? For I have been\nexceedingly delighted to hear the discourses which you have just been\nholding.\n\nSOCRATES: My argument, Critias (I said), appears to have given you the\nsame kind of pleasure which you might have derived from some rhapsode's\nrecitation of Homer; for you do not believe a word of what has been\nsaid. But come now, give me an answer to this question. Are not certain\nthings useful to the builder when he is building a house?\n\nCRITIAS: They are.\n\nSOCRATES: And would you say that those things are useful which are\nemployed in house building,--stones and bricks and beams and the like,\nand also the instruments with which the builder built the house, the\nbeams and stones which they provided, and again the instruments by which\nthese were obtained?\n\nCRITIAS: It seems to me that they are all useful for building.\n\nSOCRATES: And is it not true of every art, that not only the materials\nbut the instruments by which we procure them and without which the work\ncould not go on, are useful for that art?\n\nCRITIAS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And further, the instruments by which the instruments are\nprocured, and so on, going back from stage to stage ad infinitum,--are\nnot all these, in your opinion, necessary in order to carry out the\nwork?\n\nCRITIAS: We may fairly suppose such to be the case.\n\nSOCRATES: And if a man has food and drink and clothes and the other\nthings which are useful to the body, would he need gold or silver or any\nother means by which he could procure that which he now has?\n\nCRITIAS: I do not think so.\n\nSOCRATES: Then you consider that a man never wants any of these things\nfor the use of the body?\n\nCRITIAS: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: And if they appear useless to this end, ought they not always\nto appear useless? For we have already laid down the principle that\nthings cannot be at one time useful and at another time not, in the same\nprocess.\n\nCRITIAS: But in that respect your argument and mine are the same. For\nyou maintain if they are useful to a certain end, they can never become\nuseless; whereas I say that in order to accomplish some results bad\nthings are needed, and good for others.\n\nSOCRATES: But can a bad thing be used to carry out a good purpose?\n\nCRITIAS: I should say not.\n\nSOCRATES: And we call those actions good which a man does for the sake\nof virtue?\n\nCRITIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: But can a man learn any kind of knowledge which is imparted by\nword of mouth if he is wholly deprived of the sense of hearing?\n\nCRITIAS: Certainly not, I think.\n\nSOCRATES: And will not hearing be useful for virtue, if virtue is taught\nby hearing and we use the sense of hearing in giving instruction?\n\nCRITIAS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And since medicine frees the sick man from his disease, that\nart too may sometimes appear useful in the acquisition of virtue, e.g.\nwhen hearing is procured by the aid of medicine.\n\nCRITIAS: Very likely.\n\nSOCRATES: But if, again, we obtain by wealth the aid of medicine, shall\nwe not regard wealth as useful for virtue?\n\nCRITIAS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And also the instruments by which wealth is procured?\n\nCRITIAS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Then you think that a man may gain wealth by bad and\ndisgraceful means, and, having obtained the aid of medicine which\nenables him to acquire the power of hearing, may use that very faculty\nfor the acquisition of virtue?\n\nCRITIAS: Yes, I do.\n\nSOCRATES: But can that which is evil be useful for virtue?\n\nCRITIAS: No.\n\nSOCRATES: It is not therefore necessary that the means by which we\nobtain what is useful for a certain object should always be useful for\nthe same object: for it seems that bad actions may sometimes serve good\npurposes? The matter will be still plainer if we look at it in this\nway:--If things are useful towards the several ends for which they\nexist, which ends would not come into existence without them, how would\nyou regard them? Can ignorance, for instance, be useful for knowledge,\nor disease for health, or vice for virtue?\n\nCRITIAS: Never.\n\nSOCRATES: And yet we have already agreed--have we not?--that there\ncan be no knowledge where there has not previously been ignorance, nor\nhealth where there has not been disease, nor virtue where there has not\nbeen vice?\n\nCRITIAS: I think that we have.\n\nSOCRATES: But then it would seem that the antecedents without which a\nthing cannot exist are not necessarily useful to it. Otherwise ignorance\nwould appear useful for knowledge, disease for health, and vice for\nvirtue.\n\nCritias still showed great reluctance to accept any argument which\nwent to prove that all these things were useless. I saw that it was as\ndifficult to persuade him as (according to the proverb) it is to boil\na stone, so I said: Let us bid 'good-bye' to the discussion, since we\ncannot agree whether these things are useful and a part of wealth or\nnot. But what shall we say to another question: Which is the happier and\nbetter man,--he who requires the greatest quantity of necessaries for\nbody and diet, or he who requires only the fewest and least? The answer\nwill perhaps become more obvious if we suppose some one, comparing the\nman himself at different times, to consider whether his condition is\nbetter when he is sick or when he is well?\n\nCRITIAS: That is not a question which needs much consideration.\n\nSOCRATES: Probably, I said, every one can understand that health is a\nbetter condition than disease. But when have we the greatest and the\nmost various needs, when we are sick or when we are well?\n\nCRITIAS: When we are sick.\n\nSOCRATES: And when we are in the worst state we have the greatest and\nmost especial need and desire of bodily pleasures?\n\nCRITIAS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And seeing that a man is best off when he is least in need of\nsuch things, does not the same reasoning apply to the case of any two\npersons, of whom one has many and great wants and desires, and the other\nfew and moderate? For instance, some men are gamblers, some drunkards,\nand some gluttons: and gambling and the love of drink and greediness are\nall desires?\n\nCRITIAS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: But desires are only the lack of something: and those who have\nthe greatest desires are in a worse condition than those who have none\nor very slight ones?\n\nCRITIAS: Certainly I consider that those who have such wants are bad,\nand that the greater their wants the worse they are.\n\nSOCRATES: And do we think it possible that a thing should be useful for\na purpose unless we have need of it for that purpose?\n\nCRITIAS: No.\n\nSOCRATES: Then if these things are useful for supplying the needs of the\nbody, we must want them for that purpose?\n\nCRITIAS: That is my opinion.\n\nSOCRATES: And he to whom the greatest number of things are useful\nfor his purpose, will also want the greatest number of means of\naccomplishing it, supposing that we necessarily feel the want of all\nuseful things?\n\nCRITIAS: It seems so.\n\nSOCRATES: The argument proves then that he who has great riches has\nlikewise need of many things for the supply of the wants of the body;\nfor wealth appears useful towards that end. And the richest must be in\nthe worst condition, since they seem to be most in want of such things.","title":"Eryxias","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":7098}