{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_16942/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_16942","id":"gutenberg_16942","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/16942","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Category: Science - Biology","Religion and science"],"text":"Produced by Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe, Martin Pettit and\nthe Online Distributed Proofreading Team at\nhttps://www.pgdp.net\n\n\n\n\n\n\n_Thoughts on Religion_\n\nBY THE LATE\n\nGEORGE JOHN ROMANES\nM.A., LL.D., F.R.S.\n\nEDITED BY\n\nCHARLES GORE, D.D.\nBISHOP OF WORCESTER\n\nTwelfth Impression\n\nLONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.\n39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON\nAND BOMBAY\n\n1904\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n                                                        PAGE\n\nEDITOR'S PREFACE                                           5\n\n\nPART I.\n\nTHE INFLUENCE OF SCIENCE UPON RELIGION.\n\nESSAY I                                                   37\n\nESSAY II                                                  56\n\n\nPART II.\n\nNOTES FOR A WORK ON A CANDID EXAMINATION OF RELIGION.\n\nINTRODUCTORY NOTE BY THE EDITOR                           91\n\nSec. 1. INTRODUCTORY                                         98\n\nSec. 2. DEFINITION OF TERMS AND PURPOSE OF THIS TREATISE    104\n\nSec. 3. CAUSALITY                                           116\n\nSec. 4. FAITH                                               131\n\nSec. 5. FAITH IN CHRISTIANITY                               154\n\nCONCLUDING NOTE BY THE EDITOR                            184\n\n\n\n\nPUBLISHER'S NOTE\n\n\nThe present edition of Romanes' _Thoughts on Religion_ is issued in\nresponse to a request which has been made with some frequency of late\nfor very cheap reprints of standard religious and theological works.\n\n39 PATERNOSTER ROW,\n     LONDON,\n     _January, 1904._\n\n\n\n\nEDITOR'S PREFACE\n\n\nThe late Mr. George John Romanes--the author within the last few years\nof _Darwin and After Darwin_, and of the _Examination of\nWeismannism_--occupied a distinguished place in contemporary biology.\nBut his mind was also continuously and increasingly active on the\nproblems of metaphysics and theology. And at his death in the early\nsummer of this year (1894), he left among his papers some notes, made\nmostly in the previous winter, for a work which he was intending to\nwrite on the fundamental questions of religion. He had desired that\nthese notes should be given to me and that I should do with them as I\nthought best. His literary executors accordingly handed them over to me,\nin company with some unpublished essays, two of which form the first\npart of the present volume.\n\nAfter reading the notes myself, and obtaining the judgement of others in\nwhom I feel confidence upon them, I have no hesitation either in\npublishing by far the greater part of them, or in publishing them with\nthe author's name in spite of the fact that the book as originally\nprojected was to have been anonymous. From the few words which George\nRomanes said to me on the subject, I have no doubt that he realized that\nthe notes if published after his death must be published with his name.\n\nI have said that after reading these notes I feel no doubt that they\nought to be published. They claim it both by their intrinsic value and\nby the light they throw on the religious thought of a scientific man who\nwas not only remarkably able and clear-headed, but also many-sided, as\nfew men are, in his capacities, and singularly candid and open-hearted.\nTo all these qualities the notes which are now offered to the public\nwill bear unmistakeable witness.\n\nWith more hesitation it has been decided to print also the unpublished\nessays already referred to. These, as representing an earlier stage of\nthought than is represented in the notes, naturally appear first.\n\nBoth Essays and Notes however represent the same tendency of a mind from\na position of unbelief in the Christian Revelation toward one of belief\nin it. They represent, I say, a tendency of one 'seeking after God if\nhaply he might feel after Him and find Him,' and not a position of\nsettled orthodoxy. Even the Notes contain in fact many things which\ncould not come from a settled believer. This being so it is natural that\nI should say a word as to the way in which I have understood my function\nas an editor. I have decided the question of publishing each Note solely\nby the consideration whether or no it was sufficiently finished to be\nintelligible. I have rigidly excluded any question of my own agreement\nor disagreement with it. In the case of one Note in particular, I doubt\nwhether I should have published it, had it not been that my decided\ndisagreement with its contents made me fear that I might be prejudiced\nin withholding it.\n\nThe Notes, with the papers which precede them, will, I think, be better\nunderstood if I give some preliminary account of their antecedents, that\nis of Romanes' previous publications on the subject of religion.\n\nIn 1873 an essay of George Romanes gained the Burney Prize at Cambridge,\nthe subject being _Christian Prayer considered in relation to the belief\nthat the Almighty governs the world by general laws_. This was published\nin 1874, with an appendix on _The Physical Efficacy of Prayer_. In this\nessay, written when he was twenty-five years old, Romanes shows the\ncharacteristic qualities of his mind and style already developed. The\nsympathy with the scientific point of view is there, as might be\nexpected perhaps in a Cambridge 'Scholar in Natural Science': the\nlogical acumen and love of exact distinctions is there: there too the\nnatural piety and spiritual appreciation of the nature of Christian\nprayer--a piety and appreciation which later intellectual habits of\nthought could never eradicate. The essay, as judged by the standard of\nprize compositions, is of remarkable ability, and strictly proceeds\nwithin the limits of the thesis. On the one side, for the purpose of the\nargument, the existence of a Personal God is assumed[1], and also the\nreality of the Christian Revelation which assures us that we have reason\nto expect real answers, even though conditionally and within restricted\nlimits, to prayers for _physical_ goods[2]. On the other side, there is\ntaken for granted the belief that general laws pervade the observable\ndomain of physical nature. Then the question is considered--how is the\nphysical efficacy of prayer which the Christian accepts on the authority\nof revelation compatible with the scientifically known fact that God\ngoverns the world by general laws? The answer is mainly found in\nemphasizing the limited sphere within which scientific inquiry can be\nconducted and scientific knowledge can obtain. Special divine acts of\nresponse to prayer, even in the physical sphere, _may_ occur--force\n_may_ be even originated in response to prayer--and still not produce\nany phenomenon such as science must take cognizance of and regard as\nmiraculous or contrary to the known order.\n\nOn one occasion the Notes refer back to this essay[3], and more\nfrequently, as we shall have occasion to notice, they reproduce thoughts\nwhich had already been expressed in the earlier work but had been\nobscured or repudiated in the interval. I have no grounds for knowing\nwhether in the main Romanes remained satisfied with the reasoning and\nconclusion of his earliest essay, granted the theistic hypothesis on\nwhich it rests[4]. But this hypothesis itself, very shortly after\npublishing this essay, he was led to repudiate. In other words, his mind\nmoved rapidly and sharply into a position of reasoned scepticism about\nthe existence of God at all. The Burney Essay was published in 1874.\nAlready in 1876 at least he had written an anonymous work with a wholly\nsceptical conclusion, entitled 'A Candid Examination of Theism' by\n_Physicus_[5]. As the Notes were written with direct reference to this\nwork, some detailed account of its argument seems necessary; and this is\nto be found in the last chapter of the work itself, where the author\nsummarizes his arguments and draws his conclusions. I venture therefore\nto reproduce this chapter at length[6].\n\n\n'Sec. 1. Our analysis is now at an end, and a very few words will here\nsuffice to convey an epitomized recollection of the numerous facts and\nconclusions which we have found it necessary to contemplate. We first\ndisposed of the conspicuously absurd supposition that the origin of\nthings, or the mystery of existence [i.e. the fact that anything exists\nat all], admits of being explained by the theory of Theism in any\nfurther degree than by the theory of Atheism. Next it was shown that the\nargument \"Our heart requires a God\" is invalid, seeing that such a\nsubjective necessity, even if made out, could not be sufficient to\nprove--or even to render probable--an objective existence. And with\nregard to the further argument that the fact of our theistic aspirations\npoints to God as to their explanatory cause, it became necessary to\nobserve that the argument could only be admissible after the possibility\nof the operation of natural causes [in the production of our theistic\naspirations] had been excluded. Similarly the argument from the supposed\nintuitive necessity of individual thought [i.e. the alleged fact that\nmen find it impossible to rid themselves of the persuasion that God\nexists] was found to be untenable, first, because, even if the supposed\nnecessity were a real one, it would only possess an individual\napplicability; and second, that, as a matter of fact, it is extremely\nimprobable that the supposed necessity is a real necessity even for the\nindividual who asserts it, while it is absolutely certain that it is not\nsuch to the vast majority of the race. The argument from the general\nconsent of mankind, being so obviously fallacious both as to facts and\nprinciples, was passed over without comment; while the argument from a\nfirst cause was found to involve a logical suicide. Lastly, the argument\nthat, as human volition is a cause in nature, therefore all causation is\nprobably volitional in character, was shown to consist in a stretch of\ninference so outrageous that the argument had to be pronounced\nworthless.\n\n'Sec. 2. Proceeding next to examine the less superficial arguments in\nfavour of Theism, it was first shown that the syllogism, All known minds\nare caused by an unknown mind; our mind is a known mind; therefore our\nmind is caused by an unknown mind,--is a syllogism that is inadmissible\nfor two reasons. In the first place, it does not account for mind (in\nthe abstract) to refer it to a prior mind for its origin; and therefore,\nalthough the hypothesis, if admitted, would be _an_ explanation of\n_known_ mind, it is useless as an argument for the existence of the\nunknown mind, the assumption of which forms the basis of that\nexplanation. Again, in the next place, if it be said that mind is so far\nan entity _sui generis_ that it must be either self-existing or caused\nby another mind, there is no assignable warrant for the assertion. And\nthis is the second objection to the above syllogism; for anything within\nthe whole range of the possible may, for aught that we can tell, be\ncompetent to produce a self-conscious intelligence. Thus an objector to\nthe above syllogism need not hold any theory of things at all; but even\nas opposed to the definite theory of materialism, the above syllogism\nhas not so valid an argumentative basis to stand upon. We know that what\nwe call matter and force are to all appearance eternal, while we have no\ncorresponding evidence of a mind that is even apparently eternal.\nFurther, within experience mind is invariably associated with highly\ndifferentiated collocations of matter and distributions of force, and\nmany facts go to prove, and none to negative, the conclusion that the\ngrade of intelligence invariably depends upon, or at least is associated\nwith, a corresponding grade of cerebral development. There is thus both\na qualitative and a quantitative relation between intelligence and\ncerebral organisation. And if it is said that matter and motion cannot\nproduce consciousness because it is inconceivable that they should, we\nhave seen at some length that this is no conclusive consideration as\napplied to a subject of a confessedly transcendental nature, and that in\nthe present case it is particularly inconclusive, because, as it is\nspeculatively certain that the substance of mind must be unknowable, it\nseems _a priori_ probable that, whatever is the cause of the unknowable\nreality, this cause should be more difficult to render into thought in\nthat relation than would some other hypothetical substance which is\nimagined as more akin to mind. And if it is said that the _more_\nconceivable cause is the _more_ probable cause, we have seen that it is\nin this case impossible to estimate the validity of the remark. Lastly,\nthe statement that the cause must contain actually all that its effects\ncan contain, was seen to be inadmissible in logic and contradicted by\neveryday experience; while the argument from the supposed freedom of the\nwill and the existence of the moral sense was negatived both deductively\nby the theory of evolution, and inductively by the doctrine of\nutilitarianism.' The theory of the freedom of the will is indeed at this\nstage of thought utterly untenable[7]; the evidence is overwhelming that\nthe moral sense is the result of a purely natural evolution[8], and this\nresult, arrived at on general grounds, is confirmed with irresistible\nforce by the account of our human conscience which is supplied by the\ntheory of utilitarianism, a theory based on the widest and most\nunexceptionable of inductions[9]. 'On the whole, then, with regard to\nthe argument from the existence of the human mind, we were compelled to\ndecide that it is destitute of any assignable weight, there being\nnothing more to lead to the conclusion that our mind has been caused by\nanother mind, than to the conclusion that it has been caused by anything\nelse whatsoever.\n\n'Sec. 3. With regard to the argument from Design, it was observed that\nMill's presentation of it [in his _Essay on Theism_] is merely a\nresuscitation of the argument as presented by Paley, Bell, and Chalmers.\nAnd indeed we saw that the first-named writer treated this whole subject\nwith a feebleness and inaccuracy very surprising in him; for while he\nhas failed to assign anything like due weight to the inductive evidence\nof organic evolution, he did not hesitate to rush into a supernatural\nexplanation of biological phenomena. Moreover, he has failed signally in\nhis _analysis_ of the Design argument, seeing that, in common with all\nprevious writers, he failed to observe that it is utterly impossible for\nus to know the relations in which the supposed Designer stands to the\nDesigned,--much less to argue from the fact that the Supreme Mind, even\nsupposing it to exist, caused the observable products by any particular\nintellectual _process_. In other words, all advocates of the Design\nargument have failed to perceive that, even if we grant nature to be due\nto a creating Mind, still we have no shadow of a right to conclude that\nthis Mind can only have exerted its creative power by means of such and\nsuch cogitative operations. How absurd, therefore, must it be to raise\nthe supposed evidence of such cogitative operations into evidences of\nthe existence of a creating Mind! If a theist retorts that it is, after\nall, of very little importance whether or not we are able to divine the\n_methods_ of creation, so long as the _facts_ are there to attest that,\n_in some way or other_, the observable phenomena of nature must be due\nto Intelligence of some kind as their ultimate cause, then I am the\nfirst to endorse this remark. It has always appeared to me one of the\nmost unaccountable things in the history of speculation that so many\ncompetent writers can have insisted upon _Design_ as an argument for\nTheism, when they must all have known perfectly well that they have no\nmeans of ascertaining the subjective psychology of that Supreme Mind\nwhose existence the argument is adduced to demonstrate. The truth is,\nthat the argument from teleology must, and can only, rest upon the\nobservable _facts_ of nature, without reference to the intellectual\n_processes_ by which these facts may be supposed to have been\naccomplished. But, looking to the \"present state of our knowledge,\" this\nis merely to change the teleological argument in its gross Paleyian\nform, into the argument from the ubiquitous operation of general laws.'\n\n'Sec. 4. This argument was thus[10] stated in contrast with the argument\nfrom design. 'The argument from design says, there must be a God,\nbecause such and such an organic structure must have been due to such\nand such an intellectual _process_. The argument from general laws says,\nThere must be a God, because such and such an organic structure must _in\nsome way or other have been ultimately due to_ intelligence.' Every\nstructure exhibits with more or less of complexity the principle of\norder; it is related to all other things in a universal order. This\nuniversality of order renders irrational the hypothesis of chance in\naccounting for the universe. 'Let us think of the supreme causality as\nwe may, the fact remains that from it there emanates a directive\ninfluence of uninterrupted consistency, on a scale of stupendous\nmagnitude and exact precision worthy of our highest conceptions of\ndeity[11].' The argument was developed in the words of Professor Baden\nPowell. 'That which requires reason and thought to understand must be\nitself thought and reason. That which mind alone can investigate or\nexpress must be itself mind. And if the highest conception attained is\nbut partial, then the mind and reason studied is greater than the mind\nand reason of the student. If the more it is studied the more vast and\ncomplex is the necessary connection in reason disclosed, then the more\nevident is the vast extent and compass of the reason thus partially\nmanifested and its reality _as existing in the immutably connected order\nof objects examined_, independently of the mind of the investigator.'\nThis argument from the universal _Kosmos_ has the advantage of being\nwholly independent of the method by which things came to be what they\nare. It is unaffected by the acceptance of evolution. Till quite\nrecently it seemed irrefutable[12].\n\n'But nevertheless we are constrained to acknowledge that its apparent\npower dwindles to nothing in view of the indisputable fact that, if\nforce and matter have been eternal, all and every natural law must have\nresulted by way of necessary consequence.... It does not admit of one\nmoment's questioning that it is as certainly true that all the exquisite\nbeauty and melodious harmony of nature follows necessarily as inevitably\nfrom the persistence of force and the primary qualities of matter as it\nis certainly true that force is persistent or that matter is extended or\nimpenetrable[13].... It will be remembered that I dwelt at considerable\nlength and with much earnestness upon this truth, not only because of\nits enormous importance in its bearing upon our subject, but also\nbecause no one has hitherto considered it in that relation.' It was also\npointed out that the coherence and correspondence of the macrocosm of\nthe universe with the microcosm of the human mind can be accounted for\nby the fact that the human mind is only one of the products of general\nevolution, its subjective relations necessarily reflecting those\nexternal relations of which they themselves are the product[14].\n\n'Sec. 5. The next step, however, was to mitigate the severity of the\nconclusion that was liable to be formed upon the utter and hopeless\ncollapse of all the possible arguments in favour of Theism. Having fully\ndemonstrated that there is no shadow of a positive argument in support\nof the theistic theory, there arose the danger that some persons might\nerroneously conclude that for this reason the theistic theory must be\nuntrue. It therefore became necessary to point out, that although, as\nfar as we can see, nature does not require an Intelligent Cause to\naccount for any of her phenomena, yet it is possible that, if we could\nsee farther, we should see that nature could not be what she is unless\nshe had owed her existence to an Intelligent Cause. Or, in other words,\nthe probability there is that an Intelligent Cause is unnecessary to\nexplain any of the phenomena of nature, is only equal to the probability\nthere is that the doctrine of the persistence of force is everywhere and\neternally true.\n\n'As a final step in our analysis, therefore, we altogether quitted the\nregion of experience, and ignoring even the very foundations of science,\nand so all the most certain of relative truths, we carried the\ndiscussion into the transcendental region of purely formal\nconsiderations. And here we laid down the canon, \"that the value of any\nprobability, in its last analysis, is determined by the number, the\nimportance, and the definiteness of the relations known, as compared\nwith those of the relations unknown;\" and, consequently, that in cases\nwhere the unknown relations are more numerous, more important, or more\nindefinite than are the known relations, the value of our inference\nvaries inversely as the difference in these respects between the\nrelations compared. From which canon it followed, that as the problem of\nTheism is the most ultimate of all problems, and so contains in its\nunknown relations all that is to man unknown and unknowable, these\nrelations must be pronounced the most indefinite of all relations that\nit is possible for man to contemplate; and, consequently, that although\nwe have here the entire range of experience from which to argue, we are\nunable to estimate the real value of any argument whatsoever. The\nunknown relations in our attempted induction being wholly indefinite,\nboth in respect of their number and importance, as compared with the\nknown relations, it is impossible for us to determine any definite\nprobability either for or against the being of a God. Therefore,\nalthough it is true that, so far as human science can penetrate or human\nthought infer, we can perceive no evidence of God, yet we have no right\non this account to conclude that there is no God. The probability,\ntherefore, that nature is devoid of Deity, while it is of the strongest\nkind if regarded scientifically--amounting, in fact, to a scientific\ndemonstration,--is nevertheless wholly worthless if regarded logically.\nAlthough it is as true as is the fundamental basis of all science and of\nall experience that, if there is a God, His existence, considered as a\ncause of the universe, is superfluous, it may nevertheless be true that,\nif there had never been a God, the universe could never have existed.\n\n'Hence these formal considerations proved conclusively that, no matter\nhow great the probability of Atheism might appear to be in a relative\nsense, we have no means of estimating such probability in an absolute\nsense. From which position there emerged the possibility of another\nargument in favour of Theism--or rather let us say, of a reappearance of\nthe teleological argument in another form. For it may be said, seeing\nthat these formal considerations exclude legitimate reasoning either for\nor against Deity in an absolute sense, while they do not exclude such\nreasoning in a relative sense, if there yet remain any theistic\ndeductions which may properly be drawn from experience, these may now be\nadduced to balance the atheistic deductions from the persistence of\nforce. For although the latter deductions have clearly shown the\nexistence of Deity to be superfluous in a scientific sense, the formal\nconsiderations in question have no less clearly opened up beyond the\nsphere of science a possible _locus_ for the existence of Deity; so that\nif there are any facts supplied by experience for which the atheistic\ndeductions appear insufficient to account, we are still free to account\nfor them in a relative sense by the hypothesis of Theism. And, it may be\nurged, we do find such an unexplained residuum in the correlation of\ngeneral laws in the production of cosmic harmony. It signifies nothing,\nthe argument may run, that we are unable to conceive the methods whereby\nthe supposed Mind operates in producing cosmic harmony; nor does it\nsignify that its operation must now be relegated to a super-scientific\nprovince. What does signify is that, taking a general view of nature,\nwe find it impossible to conceive of the extent and variety of her\nharmonious processes as other than products of intelligent causation.\nNow this sublimated form of the teleological argument, it will be\nremembered, I denoted a metaphysical teleology, in order sharply to\ndistinguish it from all previous forms of that argument, which, in\ncontradistinction I denoted scientific teleologies. And the distinction,\nit will be remembered, consisted in this--that while all previous forms\nof teleology, by resting on a basis which was not beyond the possible\nreach of science, laid themselves open to the possibility of scientific\nrefutation, the metaphysical system of teleology, by resting on a basis\nwhich is clearly beyond the possible reach of science, can never be\nsusceptible of scientific refutation. And that this metaphysical system\nof teleology does rest on such a basis is indisputable; for while it\naccepts the most ultimate truths of which science can ever be\ncognizant--viz. the persistence of force and the consequently necessary\ngenesis of natural law,--it nevertheless maintains that the necessity of\nregarding Mind as the ultimate cause of things is not on this account\nremoved; and, therefore, that if science now requires the operation of a\nSupreme Mind to be posited in a super-scientific sphere, then in a\nsuper-scientific sphere it ought to be posited. No doubt this hypothesis\nat first sight seems gratuitous, seeing that, so far as science can\npenetrate, there is no need of any such hypothesis at all--cosmic\nharmony resulting as a physically necessary consequence from the\ncombined action of natural laws, which in turn result as a physically\nnecessary consequence of the persistence of force and the primary\nqualities of matter. But although it is thus indisputably true that\nmetaphysical teleology is wholly gratuitous if considered\nscientifically, it may not be true that it is wholly gratuitous if\nconsidered psychologically. In other words, if it is more conceivable\nthat Mind should be the ultimate cause of cosmic harmony than that the\npersistence of force should be so, then it is not irrational to accept\nthe more conceivable hypothesis in preference to the less conceivable\none, provided that the choice is made with the diffidence which is\nrequired by the considerations adduced in Chapter V [especially the\n_Canon of probability_ laid down in the second paragraph of this\nsection, Sec. 5].\n\n'I conclude, therefore, that the hypothesis of metaphysical teleology,\nalthough in a physical sense gratuitous, may be in a psychological sense\nlegitimate. But as against the fundamental position on which alone this\nargument can rest--viz. the position that the fundamental postulate of\nAtheism is more _inconceivable_ than is the fundamental postulate of\nTheism--we have seen two important objections to lie.\n\n'For, in the first place, the sense in which the word \"inconceivable\" is\nhere used is that of the impossibility of framing _realizable_ relations\nin the thought; not that of the impossibility of framing _abstract_\nrelations in thought. In the same sense, though in a lower degree, it is\ntrue that the complexity of the human organization and its functions is\ninconceivable; but in this sense the word \"inconceivable\" has much less\nweight in an argument than it has in its true sense. And, without\nwaiting again to dispute (as we did in the case of the speculative\nstanding of Materialism) how far even the genuine test of\ninconceivability ought to be allowed to make against an inference which\nthere is a body of scientific evidence to substantiate, we went on to\nthe second objection against this fundamental position of metaphysical\nteleology. This objection, it will be remembered, was, that it is as\nimpossible to conceive of cosmic harmony as an effect of Mind [i.e. Mind\nbeing what we know it in experience to be], as it is to conceive of it\nas an effect of mindless evolution. The argument from inconceivability,\ntherefore, admits of being turned with quite as terrible an effect on\nTheism, as it can possibly be made to exert on Atheism.\n\n'Hence this more refined form of teleology which we are considering, and\nwhich we saw to be the last of the possible arguments in favour of\nTheism, is met on its own ground by a very crushing opposition: by its\nmetaphysical character it has escaped the opposition of physical\nscience, only to encounter a new opposition in the region of pure\npsychology to which it fled. As a conclusion to our whole inquiry,\ntherefore, it devolved on us to determine the relative magnitudes of\nthese opposing forces. And in doing this we first observed that, if the\nsupporters of metaphysical teleology objected _a priori_ to the method\nwhereby the genesis of natural law was deduced from the datum of the\npersistence of force, in that this method involved an unrestricted use\nof illegitimate symbolic conceptions; then it is no less open to an\natheist to object _a priori_ to the method whereby a directing Mind was\ninferred from the datum of cosmic harmony, in that this method involved\nthe postulation of an unknowable cause,--and this of a character which\nthe whole history of human thought has proved the human mind to exhibit\nan overweening tendency to postulate as the cause of natural phenomena.\nOn these grounds, therefore, I concluded that, so far as their\nrespective standing _a priori_ is concerned, both theories may be\nregarded as about equally suspicious. And similarly with regard to their\nstanding _a posteriori_; for as both theories require to embody at least\none infinite term, they must each alike be pronounced absolutely\ninconceivable. But, finally, if the question were put to me which of the\ntwo theories I regarded as the more rational, I observed that this is a\nquestion which no one man can answer for another. For as the test of\nabsolute inconceivability is equally destructive of both theories, if a\nman wishes to choose between them, his choice can only be determined by\nwhat I have designated relative inconceivability--i.e. in accordance\nwith the verdict given by his individual sense of probability as\ndetermined by his previous habit of thought. And forasmuch as the test\nof relative inconceivability may be held in this matter legitimately to\nvary with the character of the mind which applies it, the strictly\nrational probability of the question to which it is applied varies in\nlike manner. Or otherwise presented, the only alternative for any man in\nthis matter is either to discipline himself into an attitude of pure\nscepticism, and thus to refuse in thought to entertain either a\nprobability or an improbability concerning the existence of a God; or\nelse to incline in thought towards an affirmation or a negation of God,\naccording as his previous habits of thought have rendered such an\ninclination more facile in the one direction than in the other. And\nalthough, under such circumstances, I should consider that man the more\nrational who carefully suspended his judgement, I conclude that if this\ncourse is departed from, neither the metaphysical teleologist nor the\nscientific atheist has any perceptible advantage over the other in\nrespect of rationality. For as the formal conditions of a metaphysical\nteleology are undoubtedly present on the one hand, and the formal\nconditions of a speculative atheism are as undoubtedly present on the\nother, there is thus in both cases a logical vacuum supplied wherein the\npendulum of thought is free to swing in whichever direction it may be\nmade to swing by the momentum of preconceived ideas.\n\n'Sec. 6. Such is the outcome of our investigation, and considering the\nabstract nature of the subject, the immense divergence of opinion which\nat the present time is manifested with regard to it, as well as the\nconfusing amount of good, bad and indifferent literature on both sides\nof the controversy which is extant;--considering these things, I do not\nthink that the result of our inquiry can be justly complained of on the\nscore of its lacking precision. At a time like the present, when\ntraditional beliefs respecting Theism are so generally accepted, and so\ncommonly concluded as a matter of course to have a large and valid basis\nof induction whereon to rest, I cannot but feel that a perusal of this\nshort essay, by showing how very concise the scientific _status_ of the\nsubject really is, will do more to settle the minds of most readers as\nto the exact standing at the present time of all the probabilities of\nthe question, than could a perusal of all the rest of the literature\nupon this subject. And, looking to the present condition of speculative\nphilosophy, I regard it as of the utmost importance to have clearly\nshown that the advance of science has now entitled us to assert, without\nthe least hesitation, that the hypothesis of Mind in nature is as\ncertainly superfluous to account for any of the phenomena of nature, as\nthe scientific doctrine of the persistence of force and the\nindestructibility of matter is certainly true.\n\n'On the other hand, if any one is inclined to complain that the logical\naspect of the question has not proved itself so unequivocally definite\nas has the scientific, I must ask him to consider that, in any matter\nwhich does not admit of actual demonstration, some margin must of\nnecessity be left for variations of individual opinion. And, if he bears\nthis consideration in mind, I feel sure that he cannot properly\ncomplain of my not having done my utmost in this case to define as\nsharply as possible the character and the limits of this margin.\n\n'Sec. 7. And now, in conclusion, I feel it is desirable to state that any\nantecedent bias with regard to Theism which I individually possess is\nunquestionably on the side of traditional beliefs. It is therefore with\nthe utmost sorrow that I find myself compelled to accept the conclusions\nhere worked out; and nothing would have induced me to publish them, save\nthe strength of my conviction that it is the duty of every member of\nsociety to give his fellows the benefit of his labours for whatever they\nmay be worth. Just as I am confident that truth must in the end be the\nmost profitable for the race, so I am persuaded that every individual\nendeavour to attain it, provided only that such endeavour is unbiassed\nand sincere, ought without hesitation to be made the common property of\nall men, no matter in what direction the results of its promulgation may\nappear to tend. And so far as the ruination of individual happiness is\nconcerned, no one can have a more lively perception than myself of the\npossibly disastrous tendency of my work. So far as I am individually\nconcerned, the result of this analysis has been to show that, whether I\nregard the problem of Theism on the lower plane of strictly relative\nprobability, or on the higher plane of purely formal considerations, it\nequally becomes my obvious duty to stifle all belief of the kind which I\nconceive to be the noblest, and to discipline my intellect with regard\nto this matter into an attitude of the purest scepticism. And forasmuch\nas I am far from being able to agree with those who affirm that the\ntwilight doctrine of the \"new faith\" is a desirable substitute for the\nwaning splendour of \"the old,\" I am not ashamed to confess that with\nthis virtual negation of God the universe to me has lost its soul of\nloveliness; and although from henceforth the precept to \"work while it\nis day\" will doubtless but gain an intensified force from the terribly\nintensified meaning of the words that \"the night cometh when no man can\nwork,\" yet when at times I think, as think at times I must, of the\nappalling contrast between the hallowed glory of that creed which once\nwas mine, and the lonely mystery of existence as now I find it,--at such\ntimes I shall ever feel it impossible to avoid the sharpest pang of\nwhich my nature is susceptible. For whether it be due to my intelligence\nnot being sufficiently advanced to meet the requirements of the age, or\nwhether it be due to the memory of those sacred associations which to me\nat least were the sweetest that life has given, I cannot but feel that\nfor me, and for others who think as I do, there is a dreadful truth in\nthose words of Hamilton,--Philosophy having become a meditation, not\nmerely of death, but of annihilation, the precept _know thyself_ has\nbecome transformed into the terrific oracle to OEdipus--\n\n     \"Mayest thou ne'er know the truth of what thou art.\"'\n\nThis analysis will have been at least sufficient to give a clear idea\nof the general argument of the _Candid Examination_ and of its\nmelancholy conclusions. What will most strike a somewhat critical reader\nis perhaps (1) the tone of certainty, and (2) the belief in the almost\nexclusive right of the scientific method in the court of reason.\n\nAs evidence of (1) I would adduce the following brief quotations:--\n\n     P. xi. 'Possible errors in reasoning apart, the rational position\n     of Theism as here defined must remain without material modification\n     as long as our intelligence remains human.'\n\n     P. 24. 'I am quite unable to understand how any one at the present\n     day, and with the most moderate powers of abstract thinking, can\n     possibly bring himself to embrace the theory of Free-will.'\n\n     P. 64. 'Undoubtedly we have no alternative but to conclude that the\n     hypothesis of mind in nature is now logically proved to be as\n     certainly superfluous as the very basis of all science is certainly\n     true. There can no longer be any more doubt that the existence of a\n     God is wholly unnecessary to explain any of the phenomena of the\n     universe, than there is doubt that if I leave go of my pen it will\n     fall upon the table.'\n\nAs evidence of (2) I would adduce from the preface--\n\n     'To my mind, therefore, it is impossible to resist the conclusion\n     that, looking to this undoubted pre-eminence of the scientific\n     methods as ways to truth, whether or not there is a God, the\n     question as to his existence is both more morally and more\n     reverently contemplated if we regard it purely as a problem for\n     methodical analysis to solve, than if we regard it in any other\n     light.'\n\nIt is in respect both of (1) and (2) that the change in Romanes' thought\nas exhibited in his later Notes is most conspicuous[15].\n\nAt what date George Romanes' mind began to react from the conclusions of\nthe _Candid Examination_ I cannot say. But after a period of ten\nyears--in his Rede lecture of 1885[16]--we find his frame of mind very\nmuch changed. This lecture, on _Mind and Motion_, consists of a severe\ncriticism of the materialistic account of mind. On the other hand\n'spiritualism'--or the theory which would suppose that mind is the cause\nof motion--is pronounced from the point of view of science not\nimpossible indeed but 'unsatisfactory,' and the more probable conclusion\nis found in a 'monism' like Bruno's--according to which mind and motion\nare co-ordinate and probably co-extensive aspects of the same universal\nfact--a monism which may be called Pantheism, but may also be regarded\nas an extension of contracted views of Theism[17]. The position\nrepresented by this lecture may be seen sufficiently from its\nconclusion:--\n\n\n'If the advance of natural science is now steadily leading us to the\nconclusion that there is no motion without mind, must we not see how the\nindependent conclusion of mental science is thus independently\nconfirmed--the conclusion, I mean, that there is no being without\nknowing? To me, at least, it does appear that the time has come when we\nmay begin, as it were in a dawning light, to see that the study of\nNature and the study of Mind are meeting upon this greatest of possible\ntruths. And if this is the case--if there is no motion without mind, no\nbeing without knowing--shall we infer, with Clifford, that universal\nbeing is mindless, or answer with a dogmatic negative that most\nstupendous of questions,--Is there knowledge with the Most High? If\nthere is no motion without mind, no being without knowing, may we not\nrather infer, with Bruno, that it is in the medium of mind, and in the\nmedium of knowledge, we live, and move, and have our being?\n\n'This, I think, is the direction in which the inference points, if we\nare careful to set out the logical conditions with complete\nimpartiality. But the ulterior question remains, whether, so far as\nscience is concerned, it is here possible to point any inference at all:\nthe whole orbit of human knowledge may be too narrow to afford a\nparallax for measurements so vast. Yet even here, if it be true that the\nvoice of science must thus of necessity speak the language of\nagnosticism, at least let us see to it that the language is pure[18];\nlet us not tolerate any barbarisms introduced from the side of\naggressive dogma. So shall we find that this new grammar of thought does\nnot admit of any constructions radically opposed to more venerable ways\nof thinking; even if we do not find that the often-quoted words of its\nearliest formulator apply with special force to its latest\ndialects--that if a little knowledge of physiology and a little\nknowledge of psychology dispose men to atheism, a deeper knowledge of\nboth, and, still more, a deeper thought upon their relations to one\nanother, will lead men back to some form of religion, which if it be\nmore vague, may also be more worthy than that of earlier days.'\n\n\nSome time before 1889 three articles were written for the _Nineteenth\nCentury_ on the _Influence of Science upon Religion_. They were never\npublished, for what reason I am not able to ascertain. But I have\nthought it worth while to print the first two of them as a 'first part'\nof this volume, both because they contain--written in George Romanes'\nown name--an important criticism upon the _Candid Examination_ which he\nhad published anonymously, and also because, with their entirely\nsceptical result, they exhibit very clearly a stage in the mental\nhistory of their author. The antecedents of these papers those who have\nread this Introduction will now be in a position to understand. What\nremains to be said by way of further introduction to the Notes had\nbetter be reserved till later.\n\n                                                                   C.G.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[1] p. 7.\n\n[2] p. 173.\n\n[3] See p. 110.\n\n[4] But see an interesting note in Romanes' _Mind and Motion and Monism_\n(Longmans, 1895) p. 111.\n\n[5] Published in Truebner's _English and Foreign Philosophical Library_\nin 1878, but written 'several years ago' (preface). 'I have refrained\nfrom publishing it,' the author explains, 'lest, after having done so, I\nshould find that more mature thought had modified the conclusions which\nthe author sets forth.'\n\n[6] At times I have sought to make the argument of the chapter more\nintelligible by introducing references to earlier parts of the book or\nexplanations in my own words. These latter I have inserted in square\nbrackets.\n\n[7] p. 24.\n\n[8] p. 28.\n\n[9] p. 28.\n\n[10] p. 45.\n\n[11] p. 47.\n\n[12] p. 50.\n\n[13] p. 63.\n\n[14] pp. 58 ff.\n\n[15] With reference to the views and arguments of the _Candid\nExamination_, it may be interesting to notice here in detail that George\nRomanes (1) came to attach much more importance to the subjective\nreligious needs and intuitions of the human spirit (pp. 131 ff.); (2)\nperceived that the subjective religious consciousness can be regarded\nobjectively as a broad human phenomenon (pp. 147 f.); (3) criticized his\nearlier theory of causation and returned _towards_ the theory that all\ncausation is volitional (pp. 102, 118); (4) definitely repudiated the\nmaterialistic account of the origin of mind (pp. 30, 31); (5) returned\nto the use of the expression 'the argument from design,' and therefore\npresumably abandoned his strong objection to it; (6) 'saw through'\nHerbert Spencer's refutation of the wider teleology expressed by Baden\nPowell, and felt the force of the teleology again (p. 72); (7)\nrecognized that the scientific objections to the doctrine of the freedom\nof the will are not finally valid (p. 128).\n\n[16] See _Mind and Motion and Monism_, pp. 36 ff.\n\n[17] In some 'Notes' of the Summer of 1893 I find the statement, 'The\nresult (of philosophical inquiry) has been that in his millennial\ncontemplation and experience man has attained certainty with regard to\ncertain aspects of the world problem, no less secure than that which he\nhas gained in the domain of physical science, e.g.\n\nLogical priority of mind over matter.\n\nConsequent untenability of materialism.\n\nRelativity of knowledge.\n\nThe order of nature, conservation of energy and indestructibility of\nmatter within human experience, the principle of evolution and survival\nof the fittest.'\n\n[18] For the meaning of 'pure' agnosticism see below, pp. 107 ff.\n\n\n\n\nPART I.\n\nTHE INFLUENCE OF SCIENCE UPON RELIGION.\n\n\n\n\nI.\n\n\nI propose to consider, in a series of three papers, the influence of\nScience upon Religion. In doing this I shall seek to confine myself to\nthe strictly rational aspect of the subject, without travelling into any\nmatters of sentiment. Moreover, I shall aim at estimating in the first\ninstance the kind and degree of influence which has been exerted by\nScience upon Religion in the past, and then go on to estimate the\nprobable extent of this influence in the future. The first two papers\nwill be devoted to the past and prospective influence of Science upon\nNatural Religion, while the third will be devoted to the past and\nprospective influence of Science upon Revealed Religion[19].\n\nFew subjects have excited so much interest of late years as that which I\nthus mark out for discussion. This can scarcely be considered a matter\nof surprise, seeing that the influence in question is not only very\ndirect, but also extremely important from every point of view. For\ngenerations and for centuries in succession Religion maintained an\nundisputed sway over men's minds--if not always as a practical guide in\nmatters of conduct, at least as a regulator of belief. Even among the\ncomparatively few who in previous centuries professedly rejected\nChristianity, there can be no doubt that their intellectual conceptions\nwere largely determined by it: for Christianity being then the only\ncourt of appeal with reference to all these conceptions, even the few\nminds which were professedly without its jurisdiction could scarcely\nescape its indirect influence through the minds of others. But as side\nby side with the venerable institution a new court of appeal was\ngradually formed, we cannot wonder that it should have come to be\nregarded in the light of a rival to the old--more especially as the\nsearching methods of its inquiry and the certain character of its\njudgements were much more in consonance with the requirements of an age\ndisposed to scepticism. And this spirit of rivalry is still further\nfostered by the fact that Science has unquestionably exerted upon\nReligion what Mr. Fiske terms a 'purifying influence.' That is to say,\nnot only are the scientific methods of inquiry after truth more\ncongenial to sceptical minds than are the religious methods (which may\nbroadly be defined as accepting truth on authority), but the results of\nthe former have more than once directly contradicted those of the\nlatter: science has in several cases incontestably demonstrated that\nreligious teaching has been wrong as to matters of fact. Further still,\nthe great advance of natural knowledge which has characterized the\npresent century, has caused our ideas upon many subjects connected with\nphilosophy to undergo a complete metamorphosis. A well-educated man of\nthe present day is absolutely precluded from regarding some of the\nChristian dogmas from the same intellectual standpoint as his\nforefathers, even though he may still continue to accept them in some\nother sense. In short, our whole key of thinking or tone of thought\nhaving been in certain respects changed, we can no longer anticipate\nthat in these respects it should continue to harmonize with the\nunalterable system of theology.\n\nSuch I conceive to be the ways in which Science has exerted her\ninfluence upon Religion, and it is needless to dwell upon the potency of\ntheir united effect. No one can read even a newspaper without perceiving\nhow great this effect has been. On the one hand, sceptics are\ntriumphantly confident that the light of dawning knowledge has begun\nfinally to dispel the darkness of superstition, while religious persons,\non the other hand, tremble to think what the future, if judged by the\npast, is likely to bring forth. On both sides we have free discussion,\nstrong language, and earnest canvassing. Year by year stock is taken,\nand year by year the balance is found to preponderate in favour of\nScience.\n\nThis being the state of things of the present time, I think that with\nthe experience of the kind and degree of influence which Science has\nexerted upon Religion in the past, we have material enough whereby to\nestimate the probable extent of such influence in the future. This,\ntherefore, I shall endeavour to do by seeking to define, on general\nprinciples, the limits within which it is antecedently possible that the\ninfluence in question can be exercised. But in order to do this, it is\nnecessary to begin by estimating the kind and degree of the influence\nwhich has been exerted by Science upon Religion in the past.\n\nThus much premised, we have in the first place to define the essential\nnature both of Science and of Religion: for this is clearly the first\nstep in an analysis which has for its object an estimation of the actual\nand possible effects of one of these departments of thought upon the\nother.\n\nScience, then, is essentially a department of thought having exclusive\nreference to the Proximate. More particularly, it is a department of\nthought having for its object the explanation of natural phenomena by\nthe discovery of natural (or proximate) causes. In so far as Science\nventures to trespass beyond this her only legitimate domain, and seeks\nto interpret natural phenomena by the immediate agency of supernatural\nor ultimate causes, in that degree has she ceased to be physical\nscience, and become ontological speculation. The truth of this statement\nhas now been practically recognized by all scientific workers; and terms\ndescribing final causes have been banished from their vocabulary in\nastronomy, chemistry, geology, biology, and even in psychology.\n\nReligion, on the other hand, is a department of thought having no less\nexclusive reference to the Ultimate. More particularly, it is a\ndepartment of thought having for its object a self-conscious and\nintelligent Being, which it regards as a Personal God, and the\nfountain-head of all causation. I am, of course, aware that the term\nReligion has been of late years frequently used in senses which this\ndefinition would not cover; but I conceive that this only shows how\nfrequently the term in question has been abused. To call any theory of\nthings a Religion which does not present any belief in any form of\nDeity, is to apply the word to the very opposite of that which it has\nhitherto been used to denote. To speak of the Religion of the\nUnknowable, the Religion of Cosmism, the Religion of Humanity, and so\nforth, where the personality of the First Cause is not recognized, is as\nunmeaning as it would be to speak of the love of a triangle, or the\nrationality of the equator. That is to say, if any meaning is to be\nextracted from the terms at all, it is only to be so by using them in\nsome metaphorical sense. We may, for instance, say that there is such a\nthing as a Religion of Humanity, because we may begin by deifying\nHumanity in our own estimation, and then go on to worship our ideal. But\nby thus giving Humanity the name of Deity we are not really creating a\nnew religion: we are merely using a metaphor, which may or may not be\nsuccessful as a matter of poetic diction, but which most assuredly\npresents no shred of value as a matter of philosophical statement.\nIndeed, in this relation it is worse than valueless: it is misleading.\nVariations or reversals in the meanings of words are not of uncommon\noccurrence in the ordinary growth of languages; but it is not often that\nwe find, as in this case, the whole meaning of a term intentionally and\ngratuitously changed by the leaders of philosophical thought. Humanity,\nfor example, is an abstract idea of our own making: it is not an object\nany more than the equator is an object. Therefore, if it were possible\nto construct a religion by this curious device of metaphorically\nascribing to Humanity the attributes of Deity, it ought to be as\nlogically possible to construct, let us say, a theory of brotherly\nregard towards the equator, by metaphorically ascribing to it the\nattributes of man. The distinguishing features of any theory which can\nproperly be termed a Religion, is that it should refer to the ultimate\nsource, or sources, of things: and that it should suppose this source to\nbe of an objective, intelligent, and personal nature. To apply the term\nReligion to any other theory is merely to abuse it.\n\nFrom these definitions, then, it appears that the aims and methods of\nScience are exclusively concerned with the ascertaining and the proof of\nthe proximate How of things and processes physical: her problem is, as\nMill states it, to discover what are the fewest number of (phenomenal)\ndata which, being granted, will explain the phenomena of experience. On\nthe other hand, Religion is not in any way concerned with causation,\nfurther than to assume that all things and all processes are ultimately\ndue to intelligent personality. Religion is thus, as Mr. Spencer says,\n'an _a priori_ theory of the universe'--to which, however, we must add,\n'and a theory which assumes intelligent personality as the originating\nsource of the universe.' Without this needful addition, a religion would\nbe in no way logically distinguished from a philosophy.\n\nFrom these definitions, then, it clearly follows that in their purest\nforms, Science and Religion really have no point of logical contact.\nOnly if Science could transcend the conditions of space and time, of\nphenomenal relativity, and of all human limitations, only then could\nScience be in a position to touch the supernatural theory of Religion.\nBut obviously, if Science could do this, she would cease to be Science.\nIn soaring above the region of phenomena and entering the tenuous aether\nof noumena, her present wings, which we call her methods, would in such\nan atmosphere be no longer of any service for movement. Out of time, out\nof place, and out of phenomenal relation, Science could no longer exist\nas such.\n\nOn the other hand, Religion in its purest form is equally incompetent to\naffect Science. For, as we have already seen, Religion as such is not\nconcerned with the phenomenal sphere: her theory of ontology cannot have\nany reference to the How of phenomenal causation. Hence it is evident\nthat, as in their purest or most ideal forms they move in different\nmental planes, Science and Religion cannot exhibit interference.\n\nThus far the remarks which I have made apply equally to all forms of\nReligion, as such, whether actual or possible, and in so far as the\nReligion is _pure_. But it is notorious that until quite recently\nReligion did exercise upon Science, not only an influence, but an\noverpowering influence. Belief in divine agency being all but universal,\nwhile the methods of scientific research had not as yet been distinctly\nformulated, it was in previous generations the usual habit of mind to\nrefer any natural phenomenon, the physical causation of which had not\nbeen ascertained, to the more or less immediate causal action of the\nDeity. But we now see that this habit of mind arose from a failure to\ndistinguish between the essentially distinct characters of Science and\nReligion as departments of thought, and therefore that it was only so\nfar as the Religion of former times was impure--or mixed with the\ningredients of thought which belong to Science--that the baleful\ninfluence in question was exerted. The gradual, successive, and now all\nbut total abolition of final causes from the thoughts of scientific men,\nto which allusion has already been made, is merely an expression of the\nfact that scientific men as a body have come fully to recognize the\nfundamental distinction between Science and Religion which I have\nstated.\n\nOr, to put the matter in another way, scientific men as a body--and,\nindeed, all persons whose ideas on such matters are abreast of the\ntimes--perceive plainly enough that a religious explanation of any\nnatural phenomenon is, from a scientific point of view, no explanation\nat all. For a religious explanation consists in referring the observed\nphenomenon to the First Cause--i.e. to merge that particular phenomenon\nin the general or final mystery of things. A scientific explanation, on\nthe other hand, consists in referring the observed phenomenon to its\nphysical causes, and in no case can such an explanation entertain the\nhypothesis of a final cause without abandoning its character as a\nscientific explanation. For example, if a child brings me a flower and\nasks why it has such a curious form, bright colour, sweet perfume, and\nso on, and if I answer, Because God made it so, I am not really\nanswering the child's question: I am merely concealing my ignorance of\nNature under a guise of piety, and excusing my indolence in the study of\nbotany. It was the appreciation of this fact that led Mr. Darwin to\nobserve in his _Origin of Species_ that the theory of creation does not\nserve to explain any of the facts with which it is concerned, but merely\nre-states these facts as they are observed to occur. That is to say, by\nthus merging the facts as observed into the final mystery of things, we\nare not even attempting to explain them in any scientific sense: for it\nwould be obviously possible to get rid of the necessity of thus\nexplaining any natural phenomenon whatsoever by referring it to the\nimmediate causal action of the Deity. If any phenomenon were actually\nto occur which did proceed from the immediate causal action of the\nDeity, then _ex hypothesi_, there would be no physical causes to\ninvestigate, and the occupation of Othello, in the person of a man of\nscience, would be gone. Such a phenomenon would be miraculous, and\ntherefore from its very nature beyond the reach of scientific\ninvestigation.\n\nProperly speaking, then, the religious theory of final causes does not\nexplain any of the phenomena of Nature: it merely re-states the\nphenomena as observed--or, if we prefer so to say, it is itself an\nultimate and universal explanation of all possible phenomena taken\ncollectively. For it must be admitted that behind all possible\nexplanations of a scientific kind, there lies a great inexplicable,\nwhich just because of its ultimate character, cannot be merged into\nanything further--that is to say, cannot be explained. 'It is what it\nis,' is all that we can say of it: 'I am that I am' is all that it could\nsay of itself. And it is in referring phenomena to this inexplicable\nsource of physical causation that the theory of Religion essentially\nconsists. The theory of Science, on the other hand, consists in the\nassumption that there is always a practically endless chain of physical\ncausation to investigate--i.e. an endless series of phenomena to be\nexplained. So that, if we define the process of explanation as the\nprocess of referring observed phenomena to their adequate causes, we may\nsay that Religion, by the aid of a general theory of things in the\npostulation of an intelligent First Cause, furnishes to her own\nsatisfaction an ultimate explanation of the universe as a whole, and\ntherefore is not concerned with any of those proximate explanations or\ndiscovery of second causes, which form the exclusive subject-matter of\nScience. In other words, we recur to the definitions already stated, to\nthe effect that Religion is a department of thought having, as such,\nexclusive reference to the Ultimate, while Science is a department of\nthought having, as such, no less exclusive reference to the Proximate.\nWhen these two departments of thought overlap, interference results, and\nwe find confusion. Therefore it was that when the religious theory of\nfinal causes intruded upon the field of scientific inquiry, it was\npassing beyond its logical domain; and seeking to arrogate the function\nof explaining this or that phenomenon _in detail_, it ceased to be a\npurely religious theory, while at the same time and for the same reason\nit blocked the way of scientific progress[20].\n\nThis remark serves to introduce one of the chief topics with which I\nhave to deal--viz. the doctrine of Design in Nature, and thus the whole\nquestion of Natural Religion in its relation to Natural Science. In\nhandling this topic I shall endeavour to take as broad and deep a view\nas I can of the present standing of Natural Religion, without waiting to\nshow step by step the ways and means by which it has been brought into\nthis position, by the influence of Science.\n\nIn the earliest dawn of recorded thought, teleology in some form or\nanother has been the most generally accepted theory whereby the order of\nNature is explained. It is not, however, my object in this paper to\ntrace the history of this theory from its first rude beginnings in\nFetishism to its final development in Theism. I intend to devote myself\nexclusively to the question as to the present standing of this theory,\nand I allude to its past history only in order to examine the statement\nwhich is frequently made, to the effect that its general prevalence in\nall ages and among all peoples of the world lends to it a certain degree\nof 'antecedent credibility.' With reference to this point, I should say,\nthat, whether or not the order of Nature is due to a disposing Mind, the\nhypothesis of mental agency in Nature--or, as the Duke of Argyll terms\nit, the hypothesis of 'anthropopsychism'--must necessarily have been the\nearliest hypothesis. What we find in Nature is the universal prevalence\nof causation, and long before the no less universal equivalency between\ncauses and effects--i.e. the universal prevalence of natural law--became\na matter of even the [vaguest] appreciation, the general fact that\nnothing happens without a cause of some kind was fully recognized.\nIndeed, the recognition of this fact is not only presented by the\nlowest races of the present day, but, as I have myself given evidence to\nshow, likewise by animals and infants[21]. And therefore, it appears to\nme probable that those psychologists are right who argue that the idea\nof cause is intuitive, in the same sense that the ideas of space and\ntime are intuitive--i.e. the instinctive or [inherited] effect of\nancestral experience.\n\nNow if it is thus a matter of certainty that the recognition of\ncausality in Nature is co-extensive with, and even anterior to, the\nhuman mind, it appears to me no less certain that the first attempt at\nassigning a cause of this or that observed event in Nature--i.e. the\nfirst attempts at a rational explanation of the phenomena of\nNature--must have been of an anthropopsychic kind. No other explanation\nwas, as it were, so ready to hand as that of projecting into external\nNature the agency of volition, which was known to each individual as the\napparent fountain-head of causal activity so far as he and his\nneighbours were concerned. To reach this most obvious explanation of\ncausality in Nature, it did not require that primitive man should know,\nas we know, that the very conception of causality arises out of our\nsense of effort in voluntary action; it only required that this should\nbe the fact, and then it must needs follow that when any natural\nphenomenon was thought about at all with reference to its causality, the\ncause inferred should be one of a psychical kind. I need not wait to\ntrace the gradual integration of this anthropopsychic hypothesis from\nits earliest and most diffused form of what we may term polypsychism\n(wherein the causes inferred were almost as personally numerous as the\neffects contemplated), through polytheism (wherein many effects of a\nlike kind were referred to one deity, who, as it were, took special\ncharge over that class), up to monotheism (wherein all causation is\ngathered up into the monopsychism of a single personality): it is enough\nthus briefly to show that from first to last the hypothesis of\nanthropopsychism is a necessary phase of mental evolution under existing\nconditions, and this whether or not the hypothesis is true.\n\nThus viewed, I do not think that 'the general consent of mankind' is a\nfact of any argumentative weight in favour of the anthropopsychic\ntheory--so far, I mean, as the matter of causation is concerned--whether\nthis be in fetishism or in the teleology of our own day: the general\nconsent of mankind in the larger question of theism (where sundry other\nmatters besides causation fail to be considered) does not here concern\nus. Indeed, it appears to me that if we are to go back to the savages\nfor any guarantee of our anthropopsychic theory, the pledge which we\nreceive is of worse than no value. As well might we conclude that a\nmatch is a living organism, because this is to the mind of a savage the\nmost obvious explanation of its movements, as conclude on precisely\nsimilar grounds that our belief in teleology derives any real support\nfrom any of the more primitive phases of anthropopsychism.\n\nIt seems to me, therefore, that in seeking to estimate the evidence of\ndesign in Nature, we must as it were start _de novo_, without reference\nto anterior beliefs upon the subject. The question is essentially one to\nbe considered in the light of all the latest knowledge that we possess,\nand by the best faculties of thinking that we (the heirs of all the\nages) are able to bring to bear upon it. I shall, therefore, only allude\nto the history of anthropopsychism in so far as I may find it necessary\nto do so for the sake of elucidating my argument.\n\nAnd here it is needful to consider first what Paley called 'the state of\nthe argument' before the Darwinian epoch. This is clearly and tersely\npresented by Paley in his classical illustration of finding a watch upon\na heath--an illustration so well known that I need not here re-state it.\nI will merely observe, therefore, that it conveys, as it were in one's\nwatch-pocket, the whole of the argument from design; and that it is not\nin my opinion open to the stricture which was passed upon it by Mill\nwhere he says,--'The inference would not be from marks of design, but\nbecause I already know by direct experience that watches are made by\nmen.' This appears to me to miss the whole point of Paley's meaning, for\nthere would be obviously no argument at all unless he be understood to\nmean that the evidence of design which is supposed to be afforded by\nexamination of the watch, is supposed to be afforded by this examination\nonly, and not from any of the direct knowledge alluded to by Mill. For\nthe purposes of the illustration, it must clearly be assumed that the\nfinder of the watch has no previous or direct knowledge touching the\nmanufacture of watches. Apart from this curious misunderstanding, Mill\nwas at one with Paley upon the whole subject.\n\nAgain, it is no real objection to the argument or illustration to say,\nas we often have said, that it does not account for the watchmaker. The\nobject of the argument from design is to _prove_ the existence of a\ndesigner: not to _explain_ that existence. Indeed, it would be suicidal\nto the whole argument in its relation to Theism, if the possibility of\nany such explanation were entertained; for such a possibility could only\nbe entertained on the supposition that the being of the Deity admits of\nbeing explained--i.e. that the Deity is not ultimate.\n\nLastly, the argument is precisely the same as that which occurs in\nnumerous passages of Scripture and in theological writings all over the\nworld down to the present time. That is to say, everywhere in organic\nnature we meet with innumerable adaptations of means to ends, which in\nvery many cases present a degree of refinement and complexity in\ncomparison with which the adaptations of means to ends in a watch are\nbut miserable and rudimentary attempts at mechanism. No one can know so\nwell as the modern biologist in what an immeasurable degree the\nmechanisms which occur in such profusion in nature surpass, in every\nform of excellence, the highest triumphs of human invention. Hence at\nfirst sight it does unquestionably appear that we could have no stronger\nor better evidence of purpose than is thus afforded. In the words of\nPaley: 'arrangement, disposition of parts, subserviency of means to an\nend, relation of instruments to a use, imply the presence of\nintelligence and mind.'\n\nBut next the question arises, Although such things certainly [may][22]\nimply the presence of mind as their explanatory cause, are we entitled\nto assume that there can be in nature no other cause competent to\nproduce these effects? This is a question which never seems to have\noccurred to Paley, Bell, Chalmers, or indeed to any of the natural\ntheologians up to the time of Darwin. This, I think, is a remarkable\nfact, because the question is one which, as a mere matter of logical\nform, appears to lie so much upon the surface. But nevertheless the fact\nremains that natural theologians, so far as I know without exception,\nwere satisfied to assume as an axiom that mechanism could have no cause\nother than that of a designing mind; and therefore their work was\nrestricted to tracing out in detail the number and the excellency of the\nmechanisms which were to be met with in nature. It is, however, obvious\nthat the mere accumulation of such cases can have no real, or logical,\neffect upon the argument. The mechanisms which we encounter in nature\nare so amazing in their perfections, that the attentive study of any one\nof them would (as Paley in his illustration virtually, though not\nexpressly, contends) be sufficient to carry the whole position, if the\nassumption be conceded that mechanism can only be due to mind. Therefore\nthe argument is not really, or logically, strengthened by the mere\naccumulation of any number of special cases of mechanism in nature, all\nas mechanisms similar in kind. Let us now consider this argument.\n\nIf we are disposed to wonder why natural theologians prior to the days\nof Darwin were content to assume that mind is the only possible cause of\nmechanism, I think we have a ready answer in the universal prevalence of\ntheir belief in special creation. For I think it is unquestionable that,\nupon the basis of this belief, the assumption is legitimate. That is to\nsay, if we start with the belief that all species of plants and animals\nwere originally introduced to the complex conditions of their several\nenvironments suddenly and ready made (in some such manner as watches are\nturned out from a manufactory), then I think we are reasonably entitled\nto assume that no conceivable cause, other than that of intelligent\npurpose, could possibly be assigned in explanation of the effects. It\nis, of course, needless to observe that in so far as this previous\nbelief in special creation was thus allowed to affect the argument from\ndesign, that argument became an instance of circular reasoning. And it\nis, perhaps, equally needless to observe that the mere fact of\nevolution, as distinguished from special creation--or of the gradual\ndevelopment of living mechanisms, as distinguished from their sudden\nand ready-made apparition--would not in any way affect the argument from\ndesign, unless it could be shown that the process of evolution admits\nthe possibility of some other cause which is not admitted by the\nhypothesis of special creation. But this is precisely what is shown by\nthe theory of evolution as propounded by Darwin. That is to say, the\ntheory of the gradual development of living mechanisms propounded by\nDarwin, is something more than a theory of gradual development as\ndistinguished from sudden creation. It is this, but it is also a theory\nof a purely scientific kind which seeks to explain the purely physical\ncauses of that development. And this is the point where natural science\nbegins to exert her influence upon natural theology--or the point where\nthe theory of evolution begins to affect the theory of design. As this\nis a most important part of our subject, and one upon which an\nextraordinary amount of confusion at the present time prevails, I shall\nin my next paper carefully consider it in all its bearings.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[19] [The third paper is not published because Romanes' views on the\nrelation between science and faith in Revealed Religion are better and\nmore maturely expressed in the Notes.--ED.]\n\n[20] To avoid misunderstanding I may observe that in the above\ndefinitions I am considering Religion and Science under the conditions\nin which they actually exist. It is conceivable that under other\nconditions these two departments of thought might not be so sharply\nseparated. Thus, for instance, if a Religion were to appear carrying a\nrevelation to Science upon matters of physical causation, such a\nReligion (supposing the revelation were found by experiment to be true)\nought to be held to exercise upon Science a strictly legitimate\ninfluence.\n\n[21] _Mental Evolution in Animals_, pp. 155-8.\n\n[22] [I have put 'may' in place of 'do' for the sake of argument.--ED.]\n\n\n\n\nII.\n\n\nSuppose the man who found the watch upon a heath to continue his walk\ntill he comes down to the sea-shore, and suppose further that he is as\nignorant of physical geography as he is of watch-making. He soon begins\nto observe a number of adaptations of means to ends, which, if less\nrefined and delicate than those that formed the object of his study in\nthe watch, are on the other hand much more impressive from the greatly\nlarger scale on which they are displayed. First, he observes that there\nis a beautiful basin hollowed out in the land for the reception of a\nbay; that the sides of this basin, which from being near its opening are\nmost exposed to the action of large rolling billows, are composed of\nrocky cliffs, evidently in order to prevent the further encroachment of\nthe sea, and the consequent destruction of the entire bay; that the\nsides of the basin, which from being successively situated more inland\nare successively less and less exposed to the action of large waves, are\nconstituted successively of smaller rocks, passing into shingle, and\neventually into the finest sand: that as the tides rise and fall with as\ngreat a regularity as was exhibited by the movements of the watch, the\nstones are carefully separated out from the sand to be arranged in\nsloping layers by themselves, and this always with a most beautiful\nreference to the places round the margin of the basin which are most in\ndanger of being damaged by the action of the waves. He would further\nobserve, upon closer inspection, that this process of selective\narrangement goes into matters of the most minute detail. Here, for\ninstance, he would observe a mile or two of a particular kind of seaweed\nartistically arranged in one long sinuous line upon the beach; there he\nwould see a wonderful deposit of shells; in another place a lovely\nlittle purple heap of garnet sand, the minute particles of which have\nall been carefully picked out from the surrounding acres of yellow sand.\nAgain, he would notice that the streams which come down to the bay are\nall flowing in channels admirably dug out for the purpose; and, being\nled by curiosity to investigate the teleology of these various streams,\nhe would find that they serve to supply the water which the sea loses by\nevaporation, and also, by a wonderful piece of adjustment, to furnish\nfresh water to those animals and plants which thrive best in fresh\nwater, and yet by their combined action to carry down sufficient mineral\nconstituents to give that precise degree of saltness to the sea as a\nwhole which is required for the maintenance of pelagic life. Lastly,\ncontinuing his investigations along this line of inquiry, he would find\nthat a thousand different habitats were all thoughtfully adapted to the\nneeds of a hundred thousand different forms of life, none of which\ncould survive if these habitats were reversed. Now, I think that our\nimaginary inquirer would be a dull man if, as the result of all this\nstudy, he failed to conclude that the evidence of Design furnished by\nthe marine bay was at least as cogent as that which he had previously\nfound in his study of the watch.\n\nBut there is this great difference between the two cases. Whereas by\nsubsequent inquiry he could ascertain as a matter of fact that the watch\nwas due to intelligent contrivance, he could make no such discovery with\nreference to the marine bay: in the one case intelligent contrivance as\na cause is independently demonstrable, while in the other case it can\nonly be inferred. What, then, is the value of the inference?\n\nIf, after the studies of our imaginary teleologist had been completed,\nhe were introduced to the library of the Royal Society, and if he were\nthen to spend a year or two in making himself acquainted with the\nleading results of modern science, I fancy that he would end by being\nboth a wiser and a sadder man. At least I am certain that in learning\nmore he would feel that he is understanding less--that the archaic\nsimplicity of his earlier explanations must give place to a matured\nperplexity upon the whole subject. To begin with, he would now find that\nevery one of the adjustments of means to ends which excited his\nadmiration on the sea-coast were due to physical causes which are\nperfectly well understood. The cliffs stood at the opening of the bay\nbecause the sea in past ages had encroached upon the coast-line until\nit met with these cliffs, which then opposed its further progress; the\nbay was a depression in the land which happened to be there when the sea\narrived, and into which the sea consequently flowed; the successive\noccurrence of rocks, shingle, and sand was due to the actions of the\nwaves themselves; the segregation of sea-weeds, shells, pebbles, and\ndifferent kinds of sand, was due to their different degrees of specific\ngravity; the fresh-water streams ran in channels because they had\nthemselves been the means of excavating them; and the multitudinous\nforms of life were all adapted to their several habitats simply because\nthe unsuited forms were not able to live in them. In all these cases,\ntherefore, our teleologist in the light of fuller knowledge would be\ncompelled to conclude at least this much--that the adaptations which he\nhad so greatly admired when he supposed that they were all due to\ncontrivance in anticipation of the existing phenomena, cease to furnish\nthe same evidence of intelligent design when it is found that no one of\nthem was prepared beforehand by any independent or external cause.\n\nHe would therefore be led to conclude that if the teleological\ninterpretation of the facts were to be saved at all, it could only be so\nby taking a much wider view of the subject than was afforded by the\nparticular cases of apparent design which at first appeared so cogent.\nThat is to say, he would feel that he must abandon the supposition of\nany _special_ design in the construction of that particular bay, and\nfall back upon the theory of a much more _general_ design in the\nconstruction of one great scheme of Nature as a whole. In short he would\nrequire to dislodge his argument from the special adjustments which in\nthe first instance appeared to him so suggestive, to those general laws\nof Nature which by their united operation give rise to a cosmos as\ndistinguished from a chaos.\n\nNow I have been careful thus to present in all its more important\ndetails an imaginary argument drawn from inorganic nature, because it\nfurnishes a complete analogy to the actual argument which is drawn from\norganic nature. Without any question, the instances of apparent design,\nor of the apparently intentional adaptation of means to ends, which we\nmeet with in organic nature, are incomparably more numerous and\nsuggestive than anything with which we meet in inorganic nature. But if\nonce we find good reason to conclude that the former, like the latter,\nare all due, not to the immediate, special and prospective action of a\ncontriving intelligence (as in watch-making or creation), but to the\nagency of secondary or physical causes acting under the influence of\nwhat we call general laws, then it seems to me that no matter how\nnumerous or how wonderful the adaptations of means to ends in organic\nnature may be, they furnish one no other or better evidence of design\nthan is furnished by any of the facts of inorganic nature.\n\nFor the sake of clearness let us take any special case. Paley says, 'I\nknow of no better method of introducing so large a subject than that of\ncomparing a single thing with a single thing; an eye, for example, with\na telescope.' He then goes on to point out the analogies between these\ntwo pieces of apparatus, and ends by asking, 'How is it possible, under\ncircumstances of such close affinity, and under the operation of equal\nevidence, to exclude contrivance in the case of the eye, yet to\nacknowledge the proof of contrivance having been employed, as the\nplainest and clearest of all propositions in the case of the telescope?'\n\nWell, the answer to be made is that only upon the hypothesis of special\ncreation can this analogy hold: on the hypothesis of evolution by\nphysical causes the evidence in the two cases is _not_ equal. For, upon\nthis hypothesis we have the eye beginning, not as a ready-made structure\nprepared beforehand for the purposes of seeing, but as a mere\ndifferentiation of the ends of nerves in the skin, probably in the first\ninstance to enable them better to discriminate changes of temperature.\nPigment having been laid down in these places the better to secure this\npurpose (I use teleological terms for the sake of brevity), the\nnerve-ending begins to distinguish between light and darkness. The\nbetter to secure this further purpose, the simplest conceivable form of\nlens begins to appear in the shape of small refractive bodies. Behind\nthese sensory cells are developed, forming the earliest indication of a\nretina presenting a single layer. And so on, step by step, till we\nreach the eye of an eagle.\n\nOf course the teleologist will here answer--'The fact of such a gradual\nbuilding up is no argument against design: whether the structure\nappeared on a sudden or was the result of a slow elaboration, the marks\nof design in either case occur in the structure as it stands.' All of\nwhich is very true; but I am not maintaining that the fact of a gradual\ndevelopment _in itself_ does affect the argument from design. I am\nmaintaining that it only does so because it reveals the possibility\n(excluded by the hypothesis of sudden or special creation) of the\nstructure having been proximately due to the operation of physical\ncauses. Thus, for the value of argument, let us assume that natural\nselection has been satisfactorily established as a cause adequate to\naccount for all these effects. Given the facts of heredity, variation,\nstruggle for existence, and the consequent survival of the fittest, what\nfollows? Why that each step in the prolonged and gradual development of\nthe eye was brought about by the elimination of all the less adapted\nstructures in any given generation, i.e. the selection of all the better\nadapted to perpetuate the improvement by heredity. Will the teleologist\nmaintain that this selective process is itself indicative of special\ndesign? If so, it appears to me that he is logically bound to maintain\nthat the long line of seaweed, the shells, the stones and the little\nheap of garnet sand upon the sea-coast are all equally indicative of\nspecial design. The general laws relating to specific gravity are at\nleast of as much importance in the economy of nature as are the general\nlaws relating to specific differentiation; and in each illustration\nalike we find the result of the operation of known physical causes to be\nthat of selection. If it should be argued in reply that the selection in\nthe one case is obviously purposeless, while in the other it is as\nobviously purposive, I answer that this is pure assumption. It is\nperhaps not too much to say that every geological formation on the face\nof the globe is either wholly or in part due to the selective influence\nof specific gravity, and who shall say that the construction of the\nearth's crust is a less important matter in the general scheme of things\n(if there is such a scheme) than is the evolution of an eye? Or who\nshall say that because we see an apparently intentional adaptation of\nmeans to ends as the result of selection in the case of the eye, there\nis no intention served by the result of selection in the case of the\nsea-weeds, stones, sand, mud? For anything that we can know to the\ncontrary, the supposed intelligence may take a greater delight in the\nlatter than in the former process.\n\nFor the sake of clearness I have assumed that the physical causes with\nwhich we are already acquainted are sufficient to explain the observed\nphenomena of organic nature. But it clearly makes no difference whether\nor not this assumption is conceded, provided we allow that the observed\nphenomena are all due to physical causes of some kind, be they known or\nunknown. That is to say, in whatever measure we exclude the hypothesis\nof the direct or immediate intervention of the Deity in organic nature\n(miracle), in that measure we are reducing the evidence of design in\norganic nature to precisely the same logical position as that which is\noccupied by the evidence of design in inorganic nature. Hence I conceive\nthat Mill has shown a singular want of penetration where, after\nobserving with reference to natural selection, 'creative forethought is\nnot absolutely the only link by which the origin of the wonderful\nmechanism of the eye may be connected with the fact of sight,' he goes\non to say, 'leaving this remarkable speculation (i.e. that of natural\nselection) to whatever fate the progress of discovery may have in store\nfor it, in the present state of knowledge the adaptations in nature\nafford a large balance of probability in favour of creation by\nintelligence.' I say this passage seems to me to show a singular want of\npenetration, and I say so because it appears to argue that the issue\nlies between the hypothesis of special design and the hypothesis of\nnatural selection. But it does not do so. The issue really lies between\nspecial design and natural causes. Survival of the fittest is one of\nthese causes which has been suggested, and shown by a large accumulation\nof evidence to be probably a true cause. But even if it were to be\ndisproved as a cause, the real argumentative position of teleology would\nnot thereby be effected, unless we were to conclude that there can be no\nother causes of a secondary or physical kind concerned in the\nproduction of the observed adaptations.\n\nI trust that I have now made it sufficiently clear why I hold that if we\nbelieve the reign of natural law, or the operation of physical causes,\nto extend throughout organic nature in the same universal manner as we\nbelieve this in the case of inorganic nature, then we can find no better\nevidence of design in the one province than in the other. The mere fact\nthat we meet with more numerous and apparently more complete instances\nof design in the one province than in the other is, _ex hypothesi_,\nmerely due to our ignorance of the natural causation in the more\nintricate province. In studying biological phenomena we are all at\npresent in the intellectual position of our imaginary teleologist when\nstudying the marine bay: we do not know the natural causes which have\nproduced the observed results. But if, after having obtained a partial\nkey in the theory of natural selection, we trust to the large analogy\nwhich is afforded by the simpler provinces of Nature, and conclude that\nphysical causes are everywhere concerned in the production of organic\nstructures, then we have concluded that any evidence of design which\nthese structures present is of just the same logical value as that which\nwe may attach to the evidence of design in inorganic nature. If it\nshould still be urged that the adaptations met with in organic nature\nare from their number and unity much more suggestive of design than\nanything met with in inorganic nature, I must protest that this is to\nchange the ground of argument and to evade the only point in dispute.\nNo one denies the obvious fact stated: the only question is whether any\nnumber and any quantity of adaptations in any one department of nature\nafford other or better evidence of design than is afforded by\nadaptations in other departments, when all departments alike are\nsupposed to be equally the outcome of physical causation. And this\nquestion I answer in the negative, because we have no means of\nascertaining the extent to which the process of natural selection, or\nany other physical cause, is competent to produce adaptations of the\nkind observed.\n\nThus, to take another instance of apparent design from inorganic nature,\nit has been argued that the constitution of the atmosphere is clearly\ndesigned for the support of vegetable and animal life. But before this\nconclusion can be established upon the facts, it must be shown that life\ncould exist under no other material conditions than those which are\nfurnished to it by the elementary constituents of the atmosphere. This,\nhowever, it is clearly impossible to show. For anything that we can know\nto the contrary, life may actually be existing upon some of the other\nheavenly bodies under totally different conditions as to atmosphere; and\nthe fact that on this planet all life has come to be dependent upon the\ngases which occur in our atmosphere, may be due simply to the fact that\nit was only the forms of life which were able to adapt themselves\n(through natural selection or other physical causes) to these particular\ngases which could possibly be expected to occur--just as in matters of\nstill smaller detail, it was only those forms of life that were suited\nto their several habitats in the marine bay, which could possibly be\nexpected to be found in these several situations. Now, if a set of\nadjustments so numerous and so delicate as those on which the relations\nof every known form of life to the constituent gases of the atmosphere\nare seen to depend, can thus be shown not necessarily to imply the\naction of any disposing intelligence, how is it possible to conclude\nthat any less general exhibitions of adjustment imply this, so long as\nevery case of adjustment, whether or not ultimately due to design, is\nregarded as proximately due to physical causes?\n\nIn view of these considerations, therefore, I think it is perfectly\nclear that if the argument from teleology is to be saved at all, it can\nonly be so by shifting it from the narrow basis of special adaptations,\nto the broad area of Nature as a whole. And here I confess that to my\nmind the argument does acquire a weight which, if long and attentively\nconsidered, deserves to be regarded as enormous. For, although this and\nthat particular adjustment in Nature may be seen to be proximately due\nto physical causes, and although we are prepared on the grounds of the\nlargest possible analogy to infer that all other such particular cases\nare likewise due to physical causes, the more ultimate question arises,\nHow is it that all physical causes conspire, by their united action, to\nthe production of a general order of Nature? It is against all analogy\nto suppose that such an end as this can be accomplished by such means\nas those, in the way of mere chance or 'the fortuitous concourse of\natoms.' We are led by the most fundamental dictates of our reason to\nconclude that there must be some cause for this co-operation of causes.\nI know that from Lucretius' time this has been denied; but it has been\ndenied only on grounds of _feeling_. No possible _reason_ can be given\nfor the denial which does not run counter to the law of causation\nitself. I am therefore perfectly clear that the only question which,\nfrom a purely rational point of view, here stands to be answered is\nthis--Of what nature are we to suppose the _causa causarum_ to be?\n\nOn this point only two hypotheses have ever been advanced, and I think\nit is impossible to conceive that any third one is open. Of these two\nhypotheses the earliest, and of course the most obvious, is that of\nmental purpose. The other hypothesis is one which we owe to the\nfar-reaching thought of Mr. Herbert Spencer. In Chapter VII of his\n_First Principles_ he argues that all causation arises immediately out\nof existence as such, or, as he states it, that 'uniformity of law\ninevitably follows from the persistence of force.' For 'if in any two\ncases there is exact likeness not only between those most conspicuous\nantecedents which we distinguish as the causes, but also between those\naccompanying antecedents which we call the conditions, we cannot affirm\nthat the effects will differ, without affirming either that some force\nhas come into existence or that some force has ceased to exist. If the\nco-operative forces in the one case are equal to those in the other,\neach to each, in distribution and amount; then it is impossible to\nconceive the product of their joint action in the one case as unlike\nthat in the other, without conceiving one or more of the forces to have\nincreased or diminished in quantity; and this is conceiving that force\nis not persistent.'\n\nNow this interpretation of causality as the immediate outcome of\nexistence must be considered first as a theory of causation, and next as\na theory in relation to Theism. As a theory of causation it has not met\nwith the approval of mathematicians, physicists, or logicians, leading\nrepresentatives of all these departments of thought having expressly\nopposed it, while, so far as I am aware, no representative of any one of\nthem has spoken in its favour[23]. But with this point I am not at\npresent concerned, for even if the theory were admitted to furnish a\nfull and complete explanation of causality, it would still fail to\naccount for the harmonious relation of causes, or the fact with which we\nare now alone concerned. This distinction is not perceived by the\nanonymous author 'Physicus,' who, in his _Candid Examination of Theism_,\nlays great stress upon Mr. Spencer's theory of causation as subversive\nof Theism, or at least as superseding the necessity of theistic\nhypothesis by furnishing a full explanation of the order of Nature on\npurely physical grounds. But he fails to perceive that even if Mr.\nSpencer's theory were conceded fully to explain all the facts of\ncausality, it would in no wise tend to explain the cosmos in which these\nfacts occur. It may be true that causation depends upon the 'persistence\nof force': it does not follow that all manifestations of force should on\nthis account have been directed to occur as they do occur. For, if we\nfollow back any sequence of physical causation, we soon find that it\nspreads out on all sides into a network of physical relations which are\nliterally infinite both in space (conditions) and in time (antecedent\ncauses). Now, even if we suppose that the persistence of force is a\nsufficient explanation of the occurrence of the particular sequence\ncontemplated so far as the exhibition of force is there concerned, we\nare thus as far as ever from explaining the _determination_ of this\nforce into the particular channel through which it flows. It may be\nquite true that the resultant is determined as to magnitude and\ndirection by the components; but what about the magnitude and direction\nof the components? If it is said that they in turn were determined by\nthe outcome of previous systems, how about these systems? And so on till\nwe spread away into the infinite network already mentioned. Only if we\nknew the origin of all series of all such systems could we be in a\nposition to say that an adequate intelligence might determine beforehand\nby calculation the state of any one part of the universe at any given\ninstant of time. But, as the series are infinite both in number and\nextent, this knowledge is clearly out of the question. Moreover, even if\nit could be imagined as possible, it could only be so imagined at the\nexpense of supposing an origin of physical causation in time; and this\namounts to supposing a state of things prior to such causation, and out\nof which it arose. But to suppose this is to suppose some extra-physical\nsource of physical causation; and whether this supposition is made with\nreference to a physical event occurring under immediate observation\n(miracle), or to a physical event in past time, or to the origin of all\nphysical events, it is alike incompatible with any theory that seeks to\ngive a purely physical explanation of the physical universe as a whole.\nIt is, in short, the old story about a stream not being able to rise\nabove its source. Physical causation cannot be made to supply its own\nexplanation, and the mere persistence of force, even if it were conceded\nto account for particular cases of physical sequence, can give no\naccount of the ubiquitous and eternal direction of force in the\nconstruction and maintenance of universal order.\n\nWe are thus, as it were, driven upon the theory of Theism as furnishing\nthe only nameable explanation of this universal order. That is to say,\nby no logical artifice can we escape from the conclusion that, as far\nas we can see, this universal order must be regarded as due to some one\nintegrating principle; and that this, so far as we can see, is most\nprobably of the nature of mind. At least it must be allowed that we can\nconceive of it under no other aspect; and that if any particular\nadaptation in organic nature is held to be suggestive of such an agency,\nthe sum total of all adaptations in the universe must be held to be\nincomparably more so. I shall not, however, dwell upon this theme since\nit has been well treated by several modern writers, and with special\ncogency by the Rev. Baden Powell. I will merely observe that I do not\nconsider it necessary to the display of this argument in favour of\nTheism that we should speak of 'natural laws.' It is enough to take our\nstand upon the [broadest] general fact that Nature is a system, and that\nthe order observable in this system is absolutely universal, eternally\nenduring, and infinitely exact; while only upon the supposition of its\nbeing such is our experience conceived as possible, or our knowledge\nconceived as attainable.\n\nHaving thus stated as emphatically as I can that in my opinion no\nexplanation of natural order can be either conceived or named other than\nthat of intelligence as the supreme directing cause, I shall proceed to\ntwo other questions which arise immediately out of this conclusion. The\nfirst of these questions is as to the presumable character of this\nsupreme Intelligence so far as any data of inference upon this point are\nsupplied by our observation of Nature; and the other question is as to\nthe strictly formal cogency of any conclusions either with reference to\nthe existence or the character of such an intelligence[24]. I shall\nconsider these two points separately.\n\nNo sooner have we reached the conclusion that the only hypothesis\nwhereby the general order of Nature admits of being in any degree\naccounted for is that it is due to a cause of a mental kind, than we\nconfront the fact that this cause must be widely different from anything\nthat we know of Mind in ourselves. And we soon discover that this\ndifference must be conceived as not merely of degree, however great, but\nof kind. In other words, although we may conclude that the nearest\nanalogue of the _causa causarum_ given in experience is the human mind,\nwe are bound to acknowledge that in all fundamental points the analogy\nis so remote that it becomes a question whether we are really very much\nnearer the truth by entertaining it. Thus, for instance, as Mr. Spencer\nhas pointed out, our only conception of that which we know as Mind in\nourselves is the conception of a series of states of consciousness. But,\nhe continues, 'Put a series of states of consciousness as cause and the\nevolving universe as effect, and then endeavour to see the last as\nflowing from the first. I find it possible to imagine in some dim way a\nseries of states of consciousness serving as antecedent to any one of\nthe movements I see going on; for my own states of consciousness are\noften indirectly the antecedents to such movements. But how if I attempt\nto think of such a series as antecedent to _all_ actions throughout the\nuniverse ...? If to account for this infinitude of physical changes\neverywhere going on, \"Mind must be conceived as there,\" \"under the guise\nof simple-dynamics,\" then the reply is, that, to be so conceived, Mind\nmust be divested of all attributes by which it is distinguished; and\nthat, when thus divested of its distinguishing attributes the conception\ndisappears--the word Mind stands for a blank.'\n\nMoreover, 'How is the \"originating Mind\" to be thought of as having\nstates produced by things objective to it, as discriminating among these\nstates, and classing them as like and unlike; and as preferring one\nobjective result to another?'[25]\n\nHence, without continuing this line of argument, which it would not be\ndifficult to trace through every constituent branch of human psychology,\nwe may take it as unquestionable that, if there is a Divine Mind, it\nmust differ so essentially from the human mind, that it becomes\nillogical to designate the two by the same name: the attributes of\neternity and ubiquity are in themselves enough to place such a Mind in a\ncategory _sui generis_, wholly different from anything which the analogy\nfurnished by our own mind enables us even dimly to conceive. And this,\nof course, is no more than theologians admit. God's thoughts are above\nour thoughts, and a God who would be comprehensible to our intelligence\nwould be no God at all, they say. Which may be true enough, only we must\nremember that in whatever measure we are thus precluded from\nunderstanding the Divine Mind, in that measure are we precluded from\nfounding any conclusions as to its nature upon analogies furnished by\nthe human mind. The theory ceases to be anthropomorphic: it ceases to be\neven 'anthropopsychic': it is affiliated with the conception of mind\nonly in virtue of the one fact that it serves to give the best\nprovisional account of the order of Nature, by supposing an infinite\nextension of some of the faculties of the human mind, with a concurrent\nobliteration of all the essential conditions under which alone these\nfaculties are known to exist. Obviously of such a Mind as this no\npredication is logically possible. If such a Mind exists, it is not\nconceivable as existing, and we are precluded from assigning to it any\nattributes.\n\nThus much on general grounds. Descending now to matters of more detail,\nlet us assume with the natural theologians that such a Mind does exist,\nthat it so far resembles the human mind as to be a conscious, personal\nintelligence, and that the care of such a Mind is over all its works.\nEven upon the grounds of this supposition we meet with a number of large\nand general facts which indicate that this Mind ought still to be\nregarded as apparently very unlike its 'image' in the mind of man. I\nwill not here dwell upon the argument of seeming waste and purposeless\naction in Nature, because I think that this may be fairly met by the\nulterior argument already drawn from Nature as a whole--viz. that as a\nwhole, Nature is a cosmos, and therefore that what to us appears\nwasteful and purposeless in matters of detail may not be so in relation\nto the scheme of things as a whole. But I am doubtful whether this\nulterior argument can fairly be adduced to meet the apparent absence in\nNature of that which in man we term morality. For in the human mind the\nsense of right and wrong--with all its accompanying or constituting\nemotions of love, sympathy, justice, &c.--is so important a factor, that\nhowever greatly we may imagine the intellectual side of the human mind\nto be extended, we can scarcely imagine that the moral side could ever\nbecome so apparently eclipsed as to end in the authorship of such a work\nas we find in terrestrial nature. It is useless to hide our eyes to the\nstate of matters which meets us here. Most of the instances of special\ndesign which are relied upon by the natural theologian to prove the\nintelligent nature of the First Cause, have as their end or object the\ninfliction of painful death or the escape from remorseless enemies; and\nso far the argument in favour of the intelligent nature of the First\nCause is an argument against its morality. Again, even if we quit the\nnarrower basis on which teleological argument has rested in the past,\nand stand that argument upon the broader ground of Nature as a whole, it\nscarcely becomes less incompatible with any inference to the morality\nof that Cause, seeing that the facts to which I have alluded are not\nmerely occasional and, as it were, outweighed by contrary facts of a\nmore general kind, but manifestly constitute the leading feature of the\nscheme of organic nature as a whole: or, if this were held to be\nquestionable, it could only follow that we are not entitled to infer\nthat there is any such scheme at all.\n\nNature, as red in tooth and claw with ravin, is thus without question a\nlarge and general fact that must be considered by any theory of\nteleology which can be propounded. I do not think that this aspect of\nthe matter could be conveyed in stronger terms than it is by\n'Physicus[26],' whom I shall therefore quote:--\n\n'Supposing the Deity to be, what Professor Flint maintains that he\nis--viz. omnipotent, and there can be no inference more transparent than\nthat such wholesale suffering, for whatever ends designed, exhibits an\nincalculably greater deficiency of beneficence in the divine character\nthan that which we know in any, the very worst, of human characters. For\nlet us pause for one moment to think of what suffering in Nature means.\nSome hundreds of millions of years ago some millions of millions of\nanimals must be supposed to have become sentient. Since that time till\nthe present, there must have been millions and millions of generations\nof millions and millions of individuals. And throughout all this period\nof incalculable duration, this inconceivable host of sentient organisms\nhave been in a state of unceasing battle, dread, ravin, pain. Looking to\nthe outcome, we find that more than one half of the species which have\nsurvived the ceaseless struggle are parasitic in their habits, lower and\ninsentient forms of life feasting on higher and sentient forms; we find\nteeth and talons whetted for slaughter, hooks and suckers moulded for\ntorment--everywhere a reign of terror, hunger, sickness, with oozing\nblood and quivering limbs, with gasping breath and eyes of innocence\nthat dimly close in deaths of cruel torture! Is it said that there are\ncompensating enjoyments? I care not to strike the balance; the\nenjoyments I plainly perceive to be as physically necessary as the\npains, and this whether or not evolution is due to design.... Am I told\nthat I am not competent to judge the purposes of the Almighty? I answer\nthat if there are _purposes_, I _am_ able to judge of them so far as I\ncan see; and if I am expected to judge of His purposes when they appear\nto be beneficent, I am in consistency obliged also to judge of them when\nthey appear to be malevolent. And it can be no possible extenuation of\nthe latter to point to the \"final result\" as \"order and beauty,\" so long\nas the means adopted by the \"_Omnipotent Designer_\" are known to have\nbeen so [terrible]. All that we could legitimately assert in this case\nwould be that, so far as observation can extend, \"He cares for animal\nperfection\" _to the exclusion of_ \"animal enjoyment,\" and even to the\n_total disregard_ of animal suffering. But to assert this would merely\nbe to deny beneficence as an attribute of God[27].'\n\nThe reasoning here appears as unassailable as it is obvious. If, as the\nwriter goes on to say, we see a rabbit panting in the iron jaws of a\nspring trap, and in consequence abhor the devilish nature of the being\nwho, with full powers of realizing what pain means, can deliberately\nemploy his whole faculties of invention in contriving a thing so\nhideously cruel; what are we to think of a Being who, with yet higher\nfaculties of thought and knowledge, and with an unlimited choice of\nmeans to secure His ends, has contrived untold thousands of mechanisms\nno less diabolical? In short, so far as Nature can teach us, or\n'observation can extend,' it does appear that the scheme, if it is a\nscheme, is the product of a Mind which differs from the more highly\nevolved type of human mind in that it is immensely more intellectual\nwithout being nearly so moral. And the same thing is indicated by the\nrough and indiscriminate manner in which justice is allotted--even if it\ncan be said to be allotted at all. When we contrast the certainty and\nrigour with which any offence against 'physical law' is punished by\nNature (no matter though the sin be but one of ignorance), with the\nextreme uncertainty and laxity with which she meets any offence against\n'moral law,' we are constrained to feel that the system of legislation\n(if we may so term it) is conspicuously different from that which would\nhave been devised by any intelligence which in any sense could be called\n'anthropopsychic.'\n\nThe only answer to these difficulties open to the natural theologian is\nthat which is drawn from the constitution of the human mind. It is\nargued that the fact of this mind having so large an ingredient of\nmorality in its constitution may be taken as proof that its originating\nsource is likewise of a moral character. This argument, however, appears\nto me of a questionable character, seeing that, for anything we can tell\nto the contrary, the moral sense may have been given to, or developed\nin, man simply on account of its utility to the species--just in the\nsame way as teeth in the shark or poison in the snake. If so, the\noccurrence of the moral sense in man would merely furnish one other\ninstance of the intellectual, as distinguished from the moral, nature of\nGod; and there seems to be in itself no reason why we should take any\nother view. The mere fact that to _us_ the moral sense seems such a\ngreat and holy thing, is doubtless (under any view) owing to its\nimportance to the well-being of our species. In itself, or as it appears\nto other possible beings intellectual like ourselves, but existing under\nunlike conditions, the moral sense of man may be regarded as of no more\nsignificance than the social instincts of bees. More particularly may\nthis consideration apply to the case of a Mind existing, according to\nthe theological theory of things, wholly beyond the pale of anything\nanalogous to those social relations out of which, according to the\nscientific theory of evolution, the moral sense has been developed in\nourselves[28].\n\nThe truth is that in this matter natural theologians begin by assuming\nthat the First Cause, if intelligent, _must_ be moral; and then they are\nblinded to the strictly logical weakness of the argument whereby they\nendeavour to sustain their assumption. For aught that we can tell to the\ncontrary, it may be quite as 'anthropomorphic' a notion to attribute\nmorality to God as it would be to attribute those capacities for\nsensuous enjoyment with which the Greeks endowed their divinities. The\nDeity may be as high above the one as the other--or rather perhaps we\nmay say as much external to the one as to the other. Without being\nsupra-moral, and still less immoral, He may be un-moral: our ideas of\nmorality may have no meaning as applied to Him.\n\nBut if we go thus far in one direction, I think, _per contra_, it must\nin consistency be allowed that the argument from the constitution of the\nhuman mind acquires more weight when it is shifted from the moral sense\nto the religious instincts. For, on the one hand, these instincts are\nnot of such obvious use to the species as are those of morality; and,\non the other hand, while they are unquestionably very general, very\npersistent, and very powerful, they do not appear to serve any 'end' or\n'purpose' in the scheme of things, unless we accept the theory which is\ngiven of them by those in whom they are most strongly developed. Here I\nthink we have an argument of legitimate force, although it does not\nappear that such was the opinion entertained of it by Mill. I think the\nargument is of legitimate force, because if the religious instincts of\nthe human race point to no reality as their object, they are out of\nanalogy with all other instinctive endowments. Elsewhere in the animal\nkingdom we never meet with such a thing as an instinct pointing\naimlessly, and therefore the fact of man being, as it is said, 'a\nreligious animal'--i.e. presenting a class of feelings of a peculiar\nnature directed to particular ends, and most akin to, if not identical\nwith, true instinct--is so far, in my opinion, a legitimate argument in\nfavour of the reality of some object towards which the religious side of\nthis animal's nature is directed. And I do not think that this argument\nis invalidated by such facts as that widely different intellectual\nconceptions touching the character of this object are entertained by\ndifferent races of mankind; that the force of the religious instincts\ndiffers greatly in different individuals even of the same race; that\nthese instincts admit of being greatly modified by education; that they\nwould probably fail to be developed in any individual without at least\nso much education as is required to furnish the needful intellectual\nconceptions on which they are founded; or that we may not improbably\ntrace their origin, as Mr. Spencer traces it, to a primitive mode of\ninterpreting dreams. For even in view of all these considerations the\nfact remains that these instincts _exist_, and therefore, like all other\ninstincts, may be supposed to have a _definite_ meaning, even though,\nlike all other instincts, they may be supposed to have had a _natural\ncause_, which both in the individual and in the race requires, as in the\nnatural development of all other instincts, the natural conditions for\nits occurrence to be supplied. In a word, if animal instincts generally,\nlike organic structures or inorganic systems, are held to betoken\npurpose, the religious nature of man would stand out as an anomaly in\nthe general scheme of things if it alone were purposeless. Hence we have\nhere what seems to me a valid inference, so far as it goes, to the\neffect that, if the general order of Nature is due to Mind, the\ncharacter of that Mind is such as it is conceived to be by the most\nhighly developed form of religion. A conclusion which is no doubt the\nopposite of that which we reached by contemplating the phenomena of\nbiology; and a contradiction which can only be overcome by supposing,\neither that Nature conceals God, while man reveals Him, or that Nature\nreveals God while man misrepresents Him.\n\nThere is still one other fact of a very wide and general kind presented\nby Nature, which, if the order of Nature is taken to be the expression\nof intelligent purpose, ought in my opinion to be regarded as of great\nweight in furnishing evidence upon the ethical quality of that purpose.\nIt is a fact which, so far as I know, has not been considered by any\nother writer; but from its being one of the most general of all the\nfacts relating to the sentient creation, and from its admitting of no\none single exception, I feel that I am not able too strongly to\nemphasize its argumentative importance. This fact is, as I have stated\nit on a former occasion, 'that amid all the millions of mechanisms and\ninstincts in the animal kingdom, there is no one instance of a mechanism\nor instinct occurring in one species for the exclusive benefit of\nanother species, although there are a few cases in which a mechanism or\ninstinct that is of benefit to its possessor has come also to be\nutilized by other species. Now, on the beneficent design theory it is\nimpossible to explain why, when all the mechanisms in the same species\nare invariably correlated for the benefit of that species, there should\nnever be any such correlation between mechanisms in different species,\nor why the same remark should apply to instincts. For how magnificent a\ndisplay of Divine beneficence would organic nature have afforded, if\nall, or even some, species had been so inter-related as to minister to\neach other's necessities. Organic species might then have been likened\nto a countless multitude of voices all singing in one harmonious psalm\nof praise. But, as it is, we see no vestige of such co-ordination; every\nspecies is for itself, and for itself alone--an outcome of the always\nand everywhere fiercely raging struggle for life[29].'\n\nThe large and general fact thus stated constitutes, in my opinion, the\nstrongest of all arguments in favour of Mr. Darwin's theory of natural\nselection, and therefore we can see the probable reason why it is what\nit is, so far as the question of its physical causation is concerned.\nBut where the question is, Supposing the physical causation ultimately\ndue to Mind, what are we to infer concerning the character of the Mind\nwhich has adopted this method of causation?--then we again reach the\nanswer that, so far as we can judge from a conscientious examination of\nthese facts, this Mind does not show that it is of a nature which in man\nwe should call moral. Of course behind the physical appearances there\nmay be a moral justification, so that from these appearances we are not\nentitled to say more than that from the fact of its having chosen a\nmethod of physical causation leading to these results, it has presented\nto us the appearance, as before observed, of caring for animal\nperfection to the exclusion of animal enjoyment, and even to the total\ndisregard of animal suffering.\n\nIn conclusion, it is of importance to insist upon a truth which in\ndiscussions of this kind is too often disregarded--viz. that all our\nreasonings being of a character relative to our knowledge, our\ninferences are uncertain in a degree proportionate to the extent of our\nignorance; and that as with reference to the topics which we have been\nconsidering our ignorance is of immeasurable extent, any conclusions\nthat we may have formed are, as Bishop Butler would say, 'infinitely\nprecarious.' Or, as I have previously presented this formal aspect of\nthe matter while discussing the teleological argument with Professor Asa\nGray,--'I suppose it will be admitted that the validity of an inference\ndepends upon the number, the importance, and the definiteness of the\nthings or ratios known, as compared with the number, importance, and\ndefiniteness of the things or ratios unknown, but inferred. If so, we\nshould be logically cautious in drawing inferences from the natural to\nthe supernatural: for although we have the entire sphere of experience\nfrom which to draw an inference, we are unable to gauge the probability\nof the inference when drawn--the unknown ratios being confessedly of\nunknown number, importance, and degree of definiteness: the whole orbit\nof human knowledge is insufficient to obtain a parallax whereby to\ninstitute the required measurements or to determine the proportion\nbetween the terms known and the terms unknown. Otherwise phrased, we may\nsay--as our knowledge of a part is to our knowledge of a whole, so is\nour inference from that part to the reality of that whole. Who,\ntherefore, can say, even upon the hypothesis of Theism, that our\ninferences or \"idea of design\" would have any meaning if applied to the\n\"All-Upholder,\" whose thoughts are not as our thoughts?'[30] And of\ncourse, _mutatis mutandis_, the same remarks apply to all inferences\nhaving a negative tendency.\n\nAs an outcome of the whole of this discussion, then, I think it appears\nthat the influence of Science upon Natural Religion has been uniformly\nof a destructive character. Step by step it has driven back the apparent\nevidence of direct or special design in Nature, until now this evidence\nresides exclusively in the one great and general fact that Nature as a\nwhole is a Cosmos. Further than this it is obviously impossible that the\ndestructive influence of Science can extend, because Science can only\nexist upon the basis of this fact. But when we allow that this great and\nuniversal fact--which but for the effects of unremitting familiarity\ncould scarcely fail to be intellectually overwhelming--does betoken\nmental agency in Nature, we immediately find it impossible to determine\nthe probable character of such a mind, even supposing that it exists. We\ncannot conceive of it as presenting any one of the qualities which\nessentially characterize what we know as mind in ourselves; and\ntherefore the word Mind, as applied to the supposed agency, stands for a\nblank. Further, even if we disregard this difficulty, and assume that in\nsome way or other incomprehensible to us a Mind does exist as far\ntranscending the human mind as the human mind transcends mechanical\nmotion; still we are met by some very large and general facts in Nature\nwhich seem strongly to indicate that this Mind, if it exists, is either\ndeficient in, or wholly destitute of, that class of feelings which in\nman we term moral; while, on the other hand, the religious aspirations\nof man himself may be taken to indicate the opposite conclusion. And,\nlastly, with reference to the whole course of such reasonings, we have\nseen that any degree of measurable probability, as attaching to the\nconclusions, is unattainable. From all which it appears that Natural\nReligion at the present time can only be regarded as a system full of\nintellectual contradictions and moral perplexities; so that if we go to\nher with these greatest of all questions: 'Is there knowledge with the\nMost High?' 'Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?' the only\nclear answer which we receive is the one that comes back to us from the\ndepths of our own heart--'When I thought upon this it was too painful\nfor me.'\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[23] A note (of 1893) contains the following: 'Being, considered in the\nabstract, is logically equivalent to Not-Being or Nothing. For if by\nsuccessive stages of abstraction, we divest the conception of Being of\nattribute and relation we reach the conception of that which cannot be,\ni.e. a logical contradiction, or the logical correlative of Being which\nis Nothing. (All this is well expressed in Caird's _Evolution of\nReligion_.) The failure to perceive this fact constitutes a ground\nfallacy in my _Candid Examination of Theism_, where I represent Being as\nbeing a sufficient explanation of the Order of Nature or the law of\nCausation.'\n\n[24] This promise is only partially fulfilled in the penultimate\nparagraph of the essay.--ED.\n\n[25] _Essays_, vol. iii. p. 246 et seq. The whole passage ought to be\nconsulted, being too long to quote here.\n\n[26] In an essay on Prof. Flint's _Theism_, appended to the _Candid\nExamination_.\n\n[27] _A Candid Examination of Theism_, pp. 171-2.\n\n[28] [I have, as Editor, resisted a temptation to intervene in the above\nargument. But I think I may intervene on a matter of fact, and point out\nthat 'according to the theological theory of things,' i.e. according to\nthe Trinitarian doctrine, God's Nature consists in what is strictly\n'analogous to social relations,' and He not merely exhibits in His\ncreation, but Himself _is_ Love. See, on the subject, especially, R.H.\nHutton's essay on the Incarnation, in his _Theological Essays_\n(Macmillan).--ED.]\n\n[29] _Scientific Evidences of Organic Evolution_, pp. 76-7.\n\n[30] _Nature_, April 5, 1883.\n\n\n\n\nPART II.\n\n\n\n\n+Introductory Note by the Editor+.\n\n\nLittle more requires to be said by way of introduction to the Notes\nwhich are all that George Romanes was able to write of a work that was\nto have been entitled _A Candid Examination of Religion_. What little\ndoes require to be said must be by way of bridging the interval of\nthought which exists between the Essays which have just preceded and the\nNotes which represent more nearly his final phase of mind.\n\nThe most anti-theistic feature in the Essays is the stress laid in them\non the evidence which Nature supplies, or is supposed to supply,\nantagonistic to the belief in the goodness of God.\n\nOn this mysterious and perplexing subject George Romanes appears to have\nhad more to say but did not live to say it[31]. We may notice however\nthat in 1889, in a paper read before the Aristotelian Society, on 'the\nEvidence of Design in Nature[32],' he appears to allow more weight than\nbefore to the argument that the method of physical development must be\njudged in the light of its result. This paper was part of a _Symposium_.\nMr. S. Alexander has argued in a previous paper against the hypothesis\nof 'design' in Nature on the ground that 'the fair order of Nature is\nonly acquired by a wholesale waste and sacrifice.' This argument was\ndeveloped by pointing to the obvious 'mal-adjustments,' 'aimless\ndestructions,' &c., which characterize the processes of Nature. But\nthese, Romanes replies, necessarily belong to the process considered as\none of 'natural selection.' The question is only: Is such a process _per\nse_ incompatible with the hypothesis of design? And he replies in the\nnegative.\n\n\n'\"The fair order of Nature is only acquired by a wholesale waste and\nsacrifice.\" Granted. But if the \"wholesale waste and sacrifice,\" as\nantecedent, leads to a \"fair order of Nature\" as its consequent, how can\nit be said that the \"wholesale waste and sacrifice\" has been a failure?\nOr how can it be said that, in point of fact, there _has_ been a waste,\nor _has_ been a sacrifice? Clearly such things can only be said when\nour point of view is restricted to the means (i.e. the wholesale\ndestruction of the less fit); not when we extend our view to what, even\nwithin the limits of human observation, is unquestionably the _end_\n(i.e. the causal result in an ever improving world of types). A\ncandidate who is plucked in a Civil Service examination because he\nhappens to be one of the less fitted to pass, is no doubt an instance of\nfailure so far as his own career is concerned; but it does not therefore\nfollow that the system of examination is a failure in its final end of\nsecuring the best men for the Civil Service. And the fact that the\ngeneral outcome of all the individual failures in Nature is that of\nsecuring what Mr. Alexander calls \"the fair order of Nature,\" is\nassuredly evidence that the _modus operandi_ has not been a failure in\nrelation to what, if there be any Design in Nature at all, must be\nregarded as the higher purpose of such Design. Therefore, cases of\nindividual or otherwise relative failure cannot be quoted as evidence\nagainst the hypothesis of there being such Design. The fact that the\ngeneral system of natural causation has for its eventual result \"a fair\norder of Nature,\" cannot of itself be a fact inimical to the hypothesis\nof Design in Nature, even though it be true that such causation entails\nthe continual elimination of the less efficient types.\n\n'To the best of my judgement, then, this argument from failure, random\ntrial, blind blundering, or in whatever other terminology the argument\nmay be presented, is only valid as against the theory of what Mr.\nAlexander alludes to as a \"Carpenter-God,\" i.e. that if there be Design\nin Nature at all, it must everywhere be _special_ Design; so that the\nevidence of it may as well be tested by any given minute fragment of\nNature--such as one individual organism or class of organisms--as by\nhaving regard to the whole Cosmos. The evidence of Design in this sense\nI fully allow has been totally destroyed by the proof of natural\nselection. But such destruction has only brought into clearer relief the\nmuch larger question that rises behind, viz. as before phrased, Is there\nanything about the method of natural causation, considered as a whole,\nthat is inimical to the theory of Design in Nature, considered as a\nwhole?'\n\n\nIt is true that this argument does not bear directly upon the\n_character_ of the God whose 'design' Nature exhibits: but indirectly it\ndoes[33]. For instance, such an argument as that found above (on p. 79:\n'we see a rabbit, &c.') seems to be only valid on the postulate here\ndescribed as that of the 'Carpenter-God.'\n\nIt is also probable that Romanes felt the difficulty arising from the\ncruelty of nature less, as he was led to dwell more on humanity as the\nmost important part of nature, and perceived the function of suffering\nin the economy of human life (pp. 142, 154): and also as he became more\nimpressed with the positive evidences for Christianity as at once the\nreligion of sorrow and the revelation of God as Love (pp. 163, ff.). The\nChristian Faith supplies believers not only with an argument against\npessimism from general results, but also with such an insight into the\nDivine character and method as enables them at least to bear hopefully\nthe awful perplexities which arise from the spectacle of individuals\nsuffering.\n\nIn the last year or two of his life he read very attentively a great\nnumber of books on 'Christian Evidences,' from Pascal's _Pensees_\ndownwards, and studied carefully the appearance of 'plan' in the\nBiblical Revelation considered as a whole. The _fact_ of this study\nappears in fragmentary remarks, indices and references, which George\nRomanes left behind him in note-books. The _results_ of it will not be\nunapparent in the following Notes, which, I need to remind my readers,\nare, in spite of their small bulk, the sole reason for the existence of\nthis volume.\n\nIn reading these I can hardly conceive any one not being possessed with\na profound regret that the author was not allowed to complete his work.\nAnd it is only fair to ask every reader of the following pages to\nremember that he is reading, in the main, incomplete notes and not\nfinished work. This will account for a great deal that may seem sketchy\nand unsatisfactory in the treatment of different points, and also for\nrepetitions and traces of inconsistency. But I can hardly think any one\ncan read these notes to the end without agreeing with me that if I had\nwithheld them from publication, the world would have lost the witness of\na mind, both able and profoundly sincere, feeling after God and finding\nHim.\n\n                                                                    C.G.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[31] See below p. 142, and note. I find also the following note of a\ndate subsequent to 1889. 'It is a fact that pessimism is illogical,\nsimply because we are inadequate judges of the world, and pessimism\nwould therefore be opposed to agnosticism. We may know that there is\nsomething out of joint between the world and ourselves; but we cannot\nknow how far this is the fault of the world or of ourselves.'\n\n[32] _Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society_ (Williams & Norgate),\nvol. i. no. 3, pp. 72, 73.\n\n[33] I ought also to mention that Romanes on the Sunday before his death\nexpressed to me verbally his entire agreement with the argument of\nProfessor Knight's _Aspects of Theism_ (Macmillan, 1893); in which on\nthis subject see pp. 184-186, 'A larger good is evolved through the\nwinnowing process by which physical nature casts its weaker products\naside,' &c.\n\n\n\n\nNOTES FOR A WORK ON A CANDID EXAMINATION OF RELIGION.\n\nBY METAPHYSICUS.\n\n\n_Proposed Mottoes_.\n\n     'I quite admit the difficulty of believing that in every man there\n     is an eye of the soul which, when by other pursuits lost and\n     dimmed, is by this purified and re-illumined; and is more precious\n     far than ten thousand bodily eyes, for by this alone is truth seen.\n     Now there are two classes of persons, one class who will agree with\n     you and will take your words as a revelation; another class who\n     have no understanding of them and to whom they will naturally be as\n     idle tales.\n\n     'And you had better decide at once with which of the two you are\n     arguing; or, perhaps, you will say with neither, and that your\n     chief aim in carrying on the argument is your own improvement; at\n     the same time not grudging to either any benefit which they may\n     derive.'--PLATO.\n\n     'If we would reprove with success, and show another his mistake, we\n     must see from what side he views the matter, for on that side it is\n     generally true: and, admitting this truth, show him the side on\n     which it is false.'--PASCAL.\n\n\n\n\nSec. 1. INTRODUCTORY.\n\n\nMany years ago I published in Messrs. Truebner's 'Philosophical Series,'\na short treatise entitled _A Candid Examination of Theism_ by\n'Physicus.' Although the book made some stir at the time, and has since\nexhibited a vitality never anticipated by its author, the secret of its\nauthorship has been well preserved[34]. This secret it is my intention,\nif possible, still to preserve; but as it is desirable (on several\naccounts which will become apparent in the following pages) to avow\nidentity of authorship, the present essay appears under the same\npseudonym[35] as its predecessor. The reason why the first essay\nappeared anonymously is truthfully stated in the preface thereof, viz.\nin order that the reasoning should be judged on its own merits, without\nthe bias which is apt to arise on the part of a reader from a knowledge\nof the authority--or absence of authority--on the part of a writer. This\nreason, in my opinion, still holds good as regards _A Candid Examination\nof Theism_, and applies in equal measure to the present sequel in _A\nCandid Examination of Religion_.\n\nIt will be shown that in many respects the negative conclusions reached\nin the former essay have been greatly modified by the results of maturer\nthought as now presented in the second. Therefore it seems desirable to\nstate at the outset that, as far as I am capable of judging, the\nmodifications in question have not been due in any measure to influence\nfrom without. They appear to have been due exclusively to the results of\nmy own further thought, as briefly set out in the following pages, with\nno indebtedness to private friends and but little to published\nutterances in the form of books, &c. Nevertheless, no very original\nideas are here presented. Indeed, I suppose it would nowadays be\nimpossible to present any idea touching religion, which has not at some\ntime or another been presented previously. Still much may be done in the\nfurthering of one's thought by changing points of view, selecting and\narranging ideas already more or less familiar, so that they may be built\ninto new combinations; and this, I think, I have in no small degree\naccomplished as regards the microcosm of my own mind. But I state this\nmuch only for the sake of adding a confession that, as far as\nintrospection can carry one, it does not appear to me that the\nmodifications which my views have undergone since the publication of my\nprevious _Candid Examination_ are due so much to purely logical\nprocesses of the intellect, as to the sub-conscious (and therefore more\nor less unanalyzable) influences due to the ripening experience of life.\nThe extent to which this is true [i.e. the extent to which experience\nmodifies logic][36] is seldom, if ever, realized, although it is\npractically exemplified every day by the sobering caution which\nadvancing age exercises upon the mind. Not so much by any above-board\nplay of syllogism as by some underhand cheating of consciousness, do the\naccumulating experiences of life and of thought slowly enrich the\njudgement. And this, one need hardly say, is especially true in such\nregions of thought as present the most tenuous media for the progress of\nthought by the comparatively clumsy means of syllogistic locomotion. For\nthe further we ascend from the solid ground of verification, the less\nconfidence should we place in our wings of speculation, while the more\ndo we find the practical wisdom of such intellectual caution, or\ndistrust of ratiocination, as can be given only by experience.\nTherefore, most of all is this the case in those departments of thought\nwhich are furthest from the region of our sensuous life--viz.\nmetaphysics and religion. And, as a matter of fact, it is just in these\ndepartments of thought that we find the rashness of youth most amenable\nto the discipline in question by the experience of age.\n\nHowever, in spite of this confession, I have no doubt that even in the\nmatter of pure and conscious reason further thought has enabled me to\ndetect serious errors, or rather oversights, in the very foundations of\nmy _Candid Examination of Theism_. I still think, indeed, that from the\npremises there laid down the conclusions result in due logical sequence,\nso that, as a matter of mere ratiocination, I am not likely ever to\ndetect any serious flaws, especially as this has not been done by\nanybody else during the many years of its existence. But I now clearly\nperceive two wellnigh fatal oversights which I then committed. The first\nwas undue confidence in merely syllogistic conclusions, even when\nderived from sound premises, in regions of such high abstraction. The\nsecond was, in not being sufficiently careful in examining the\nfoundations of my criticism, i.e. the validity of its premises. I will\nhere briefly consider these two points separately.\n\nAs regards the first point, never was any one more arrogant in his\nclaims for pure reason than I was--more arrogant in spirit though not in\nletter, this being due to contact with science; without ever considering\nhow opposed to reason itself is the unexpressed assumption of my earlier\nargument as to God Himself, as if His existence were a merely physical\nproblem to be solved by man's reason alone, without reference to his\nother and higher faculties[37].\n\nThe second point is of still more importance, because so seldom, if\never, recognized.\n\nAt the time of writing the _Candid Examination_ I perceived clearly how\nthe whole question of Theism from the side of reason turned on the\nquestion as to the nature of natural causation. My theory of natural\ncausation obeyed the Law of Parsimony, resolving all into Being as such;\nbut, on the other hand, it erred in not considering whether 'higher\ncauses' are not 'necessary' to account for spiritual facts--i.e. whether\nthe ultimate Being must not be at least as high as the intellectual and\nspiritual nature of man, i.e. higher than anything merely physical or\nmechanical. The supposition that it must does not violate the Law of\nParsimony.\n\nPure agnostics ought to investigate the religious consciousness of\nChristians as a phenomenon which may possibly be what Christians\nthemselves believe it to be, i.e. of Divine origin. And this may be done\nwithout entering into any question as to the objective validity of\nChristian dogmas. The metaphysics of Christianity may be all false in\nfact, and yet the spirit of Christianity may be true in substance--i.e.\nit may be the highest 'good gift from above' as yet given to man.\n\nMy present object, then, like that of Socrates, is not to impart any\nphilosophical system, or even positive knowledge, but a frame of mind,\nwhat I may term, pure agnosticism, as distinguished from what is\ncommonly so called.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[34] The first edition, which was published in 1878, was rapidly\nexhausted, but, as my object in publishing was solely that of soliciting\ncriticism for my own benefit, I arranged with the publishers not to\nissue any further edition. The work has therefore been out of print for\nmany years.\n\n[This 'arrangement' was however not actually made, or at least was\nunknown to the present publishing firm of Kegan Paul, Trench, Truebner &\nCo. Thus a new edition of the book was published in 1892, to the\nauthor's surprise.--ED.]\n\n[35] [Or rather it was intended that it should appear under the\npseudonym of 'Metaphysicus.'--ED.]\n\n[36] [Words in square brackets have been added by me. But I have not\nintroduced the brackets when I have simply inserted single unimportant\nwords obviously necessary for the sense.--ED.]\n\n[37] [See p. 29, quotation from Preface of 'Physicus.' The state of mind\nexpressed in the above Note is a return to the earlier frame of mind of\nthe Burney Essay, e.g. p. 20. That essay was full of the thought that\nChristian evidences are very manifold and largely\n'extra-scientific.'--ED.]\n\n\n\n\nSec. 2. DEFINITION OF TERMS AND PURPOSE OF THIS TREATISE.\n\n\n[To understand George Romanes' mind close attention must be paid to the\nfollowing section. Also to the fact, not explicitly noticed by him, that\nhe uses the word 'reason' (see p. 112) in a sense closely resembling\nthat in which Mr. Kidd has recently used it in his _Social Evolution_.\nHe uses it, that is, in a restricted sense as equivalent to _the process\nof scientific ratiocination_. His main position is therefore this:\nScientific ratiocination cannot find adequate grounds for belief in God.\nBut the pure agnostic must recognize that God may have revealed Himself\nby other means than that of scientific ratiocination. As religion is for\nthe whole man, so all human faculties may be required to seek after God\nand find Him--emotions and experiences of an extra-'rational' kind. The\n'pure agnostic' must be prepared to welcome evidence of all\nsorts.--ED.]\n\nIt is desirable to be clear at the outset as to the meaning which I\nshall throughout attach to certain terms and phrases.\n\n\n_Theism._\n\nIt will frequently be said, 'on the theory of Theism,' 'supposing Theism\ntrue,' &c. By such phrase my meaning will always be equivalent\nto--'supposing, for the sake of argument, that the nearest approach\nwhich the human mind can make to a true notion of the _ens realissimum_,\nis that of an inconceivably magnified image of itself at its best.'\n\n\n_Christianity._\n\nSimilarly, when it is said, 'supposing Christianity true,' what will be\nmeant is--'supposing for the sake of argument, that the Christian system\nas a whole, from its earliest dawn in Judaism, to the phase of its\ndevelopment at the present time, is the highest revelation of Himself\nwhich a personal Deity has vouchsafed to mankind.' This I intend to\nsignify an attitude of pure agnosticism as regards any particular dogma\nof Christianity--even that of the Incarnation.\n\nShould it be said that by holding in suspense any distinctive dogma of\nChristianity, I am not considering Christianity at all, I reply, Not so;\nI am not writing a theological, but a philosophical treatise, and shall\nconsider Christianity merely as one of many religions, though, of\ncourse, the latest, &c. Thus considered, Christianity takes its place as\nthe highest manifestation of evolution in this department of the human\nmind; but I am not concerned even with so important an ecclesiastical\ndogma as that of the Incarnation of God in Christ. As far as this\ntreatise has to go, that dogma may or may not be true. The important\nquestion for us is, Has God spoken through the medium of our religious\ninstincts? And although this will necessarily involve the question\nwhether or how far in the case of Christianity there is objective\nevidence of His having spoken by the mouth of holy men [of the Old\nTestament] which have been since the world began, such will be the case\nonly because it is a question of objective evidence whether or how far\nthe religious instincts of these men, or this race of men, have been so\nmuch superior to those of other men, or races of men, as to have enabled\nthem to predict future events of a religious character. And whether or\nnot in these latter days God has spoken by His own Son is not a question\nfor us, further than to investigate the higher class of religious\nphenomena which unquestionably have been present in the advent and\nperson of Jesus. The question whether Jesus was the Son of God, is,\nlogically speaking, a question of ontology, which, _qua_ pure agnostics,\nwe are logically forbidden to touch.\n\nBut elsewhere I ought to show that, from my point of view as to the\nfundamental question being whether God has spoken at all through the\nreligious instincts of mankind, it may very well be that Christ was not\nGod, and yet that He gave the highest revelation of God. If the 'first\nMan' was allegorical, why not the 'second'? It is, indeed, an historical\nfact that the 'second Man' existed, but so likewise may the 'first.'\nAnd, as regards the 'personal claims' of Christ, all that He said is not\nincompatible with His having been Gabriel, and His Holy Ghost,\nMichael[38]. Or He may have been a man deceived as to His own\npersonality, and yet the vehicle of highest inspiration.\n\n\n_Religion._\n\nBy the term 'religion,' I shall mean any theory of personal agency in\nthe universe, belief in which is strong enough in any degree to\ninfluence conduct. No term has been used more loosely of late years, or\nin a greater variety of meanings. Of course anybody may use it in any\nsense he pleases, provided he defines exactly in what sense he does so.\nThe above seems to be most in accordance with traditional usage.\n\n\n_Agnosticism 'pure' and 'impure'._\n\nThe modern and highly convenient term 'Agnosticism,' is used in two very\ndifferent senses. By its originator, Professor Huxley, it was coined to\nsignify an attitude of reasoned ignorance touching everything that lies\nbeyond the sphere of sense-perception--a professed inability to found\nvalid belief on any other basis. It is in this its original sense--and\nalso, in my opinion, its only philosophically justifiable sense--that I\nshall understand the term. But the other, and perhaps more popular sense\nin which the word is now employed, is as the correlative of Mr. H.\nSpencer's doctrine of the Unknowable.\n\nThis latter term is philosophically erroneous, implying important\nnegative knowledge that if there be a God we know this much about\nHim--that He _cannot_ reveal Himself to man[39]. _Pure_ agnosticism is\nas defined by Huxley.\n\nOf all the many scientific men whom I have known, the most pure in his\nagnosticism--not only in profession but in spirit and conduct--was\nDarwin. (What he says in his autobiography about Christianity[40] shows\nno profundity of thought in the direction of philosophy or religion. His\nmind was too purely inductive for this. But, on this very account, it is\nthe more remarkable that his rejection of Christianity was due, not to\nany _a priori_ bias against the creed on grounds of reason as absurd,\nbut solely on the ground of an apparent moral objection _a\nposteriori_[41].) Faraday and many other first-rate originators in\nscience were like Darwin.\n\nAs an illustration of impure agnosticism take Hume's _a priori_ argument\nagainst miracles, leading on to the analogous case of the attitude of\nscientific men towards modern spiritualism. Notwithstanding that they\nhave the close analogy of mesmerism as an object-lesson to warn them,\nscientific men as a class are here quite as dogmatic as the straightest\nsect of theologians. I may give examples which can cause no offence,\ninasmuch as the men in question have themselves made the facts public,\nviz. ---- refusing to go to [a famous spiritualist]; ---- refusing to\ntry ---- in thought-reading[42]. These men all _professed_ to be\nagnostics at the very time when thus so egregiously violating their\nphilosophy by their conduct.\n\nOf course I do not mean to say that, even to a pure agnostic, reason\nshould not be guided in part by antecedent presumption--e.g. in ordinary\nlife, the _prima facie_ case, motive, &c., counts for evidence in a\ncourt of law--and where there is a strong antecedent improbability a\nproportionately greater weight of evidence _a posteriori_ is needed to\ncounterbalance it: so that, e.g. better evidence would be needed to\nconvict the Archbishop of Canterbury than a vagabond of pocket-picking.\nAnd so it is with speculative philosophy. But in both cases our only\nguide is known analogy; therefore, the further we are removed from\npossible experience--i.e. the more remote from experience the sphere\ncontemplated--the less value attaches to antecedent presumptions[43].\n_Maximum_ remoteness from possible experience is reached in the sphere\nof the final mystery of things with which religion has to do; so that\nhere all presumption has faded away into a vanishing point, and pure\nagnosticism is our only rational attitude. In other words, here we\nshould all alike be pure agnostics as far as reason is concerned; and,\nif any of us are to attain to any information, it can only be by means\nof some super-added faculty of our minds. The questions as to whether\nthere are any such super-added faculties; if so, whether they ever\nappear to have been acted upon from without; if they have, in what\nmanner they have; what is their report; how far they are trustworthy in\nthat report, and so on--these are the questions with which this treatise\nis to be mainly concerned.\n\nMy own attitude may be here stated. I do not claim any [religious]\ncertainty of an intuitive kind myself; but am nevertheless able to\ninvestigate the abstract logic of the matter. And, although this may\nseem but barren dialectic, it may, I hope, be of practical service if it\nsecures a fair hearing to the reports given by the vast majority of\nmankind who unquestionably believe them to emanate from some such\nsuper-added faculties--numerous and diverse though their religions be.\nBesides, in my youth I published an essay (the _Candid Examination_)\nwhich excited a good deal of interest at the time, and has been long out\nof print. In that treatise I have since come to see that I was wrong\ntouching what I constituted the basal argument for my negative\nconclusion. Therefore I now feel it obligatory on me to publish the\nfollowing results of my maturer thought, from the same stand-point of\npure reason. Even though I have obtained no further light from the side\nof intuition, I have from that of intellect. So that, if there be in\ntruth any such intuition, I occupy with regard to the organ of it the\nsame position as that of the blind lecturer on optics. But on this very\naccount I cannot be accused of partiality towards it.\n\nIt is generally assumed that when a man has clearly perceived\nagnosticism to be the only legitimate attitude of reason to rest in with\nregard to religion (as I will subsequently show that it is), he has\nthereby finished with the matter; he can go no further. The main object\nof this treatise is to show that such is by no means the case. He has\nthen only begun his enquiry into the grounds and justification of\nreligious belief. For reason is not the only attribute of man, nor is it\nthe only faculty which he habitually employs for the ascertainment of\ntruth. Moral and spiritual faculties are of no less importance in their\nrespective spheres even of everyday life; faith, trust, taste, &c., are\nas needful in ascertaining truth as to character, beauty, &c., as is\nreason. Indeed we may take it that reason is concerned in ascertaining\ntruth only where _causation_ is concerned; the appropriate organs for\nits ascertainment where anything else is concerned belong to the moral\nand spiritual region.\n\n\nAs Herbert Spencer says, 'men of science may be divided into two\nclasses, of which the one, well exemplified by Faraday, keeping their\nreligion and their science absolutely separate, are unperplexed by any\nincongruities between them, and the other of which, occupying themselves\nexclusively with the facts of science, never ask what implications they\nhave. Be it trilobite or be it double star, their thought about it is\nmuch like the thought of Peter Bell about the primrose[44].' Now, both\nthese classes are logical, since both, as to their religion, adopt an\nattitude of pure agnosticism, not only in theory, but also in practice.\nWhat, however, have we to say of the third class, which Spencer does\nnot mention, although it is, I think, the largest, viz. of those\nscientific men who expressly abstain from drawing a line of division\nbetween science and religion [and then judge of religion purely on the\nprinciples and by the method of science[45]]?\n\n\nThere are two opposite casts of mind--the mechanical (scientific, &c.)\nand the spiritual (artistic, religious, &c.). These may alternate even\nin the same individual. An 'agnostic' has no hesitation--even though he\nhimself keenly experience the latter--that the former only is worthy of\ntrust. But a _pure_ agnostic must know better, as he will perceive that\nthere is nothing to choose between the two in point of trustworthiness.\nIndeed, if choice has to be made the mystic might claim higher authority\nfor his direct intuitions.\n\n\nMr. Herbert Spencer has well said, in the opening section of his\nSynthetic Philosophy, that wherever human thought appears to be\nradically divided, [there must be truth on both sides and that the]\n'reconciliation' of opposing views is to be found by emphasizing that\nultimate element of truth which on each side underlies manifold\ndifferences. More than is generally supposed depends on points of view,\nespecially where first principles of a subject are in dispute. Opposite\nsides of the same shield may present wholly different aspects[46].\nSpencer alludes to this with special reference to the conflict between\nscience and religion; and it is in this same connexion that I also\nallude to it. For it seems to me, after many years of thought upon the\nsubject, that the 'reconciliation' admits of being carried much further\nthan it has been by him. For he effects this reconciliation only to the\nextent of showing that religion arises from the recognition of\nfundamental mystery--which it may be proved that science also recognizes\nin all her fundamental ideas. This, however, is after all little more\nthan a platitude. That our ultimate scientific ideas (i.e. ultimate\ngrounds of experience) are inexplicable, is a proposition which is\nself-evident since the dawn of human thought. My aim is to carry the\n'reconciliation' into much more detail and yet without quitting the\ngrounds of pure reason. I intend to take science and religion in their\npresent highly developed states as such, and show that on a systematic\nexamination of the latter by the methods of the former, the 'conflict'\nbetween the two may be not merely 'reconciled' as regards the highest\ngeneralities of each, but entirely abolished in all matters of detail\nwhich can be regarded as of any great importance.\n\n\nIn any methodical enquiry the first object should be to ascertain the\nfundamental principles with which the enquiry is concerned. In actual\nresearch, however, it is by no means always the case that the enquirer\nknows, or is able at first to ascertain what those principles are. In\nfact, it is often only at the end of a research, that they are\ndiscovered to be the fundamental principles. Such has been my own\nexperience with regard to the subject of the present enquiry. Although\nall my thinking life has been concerned, off and on, in contemplating\nthe problem of our religious instincts, the sundry attempts which have\nbeen made by mankind for securing their gratification, and the important\nquestion as to their objective justification, it is only in advanced\nyears that I have clearly perceived wherein the first principles of such\na research must consist. And I doubt whether any one has hitherto\nclearly defined this point. The principles in question are the nature of\ncausation and the nature of faith.\n\n\nMy objects then in this treatise are, mainly, three: 1st, to purify\nagnosticism; 2nd, to consider more fully than heretofore, and from the\nstand-point of pure agnosticism, the nature of natural causation, or,\nmore correctly, the relation of what we know on the subject of such\ncausation to the question of Theism; and, 3rd, again starting from the\nsame stand-point, to consider the religious consciousnesses of men as\nphenomena of experience (i.e. as regarded by us from without), and\nespecially in their highest phase of development as exhibited in\nChristianity.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[38] [I.e. supernatural but not strictly Divine Persons. Surely,\nhowever, the proposition is not maintainable.--ED.]\n\n[39] [This is another instance of recurrence to an earlier thought; see\nBurney Essay, p. 25, and cf. _Mind and Motion and Monism_, p. 117, note\n1.--ED.]\n\n[40] _Life and Letters of Charles Darwin_, i. 308.\n\n[41] [See further, p. 182.--ED.]\n\n[42] [On the whole I have thought it best to omit the names.--ED.]\n\n[43] [The MS. note here continues: 'Here introduce all that I say on the\nsubject in my Burney Prize.' I have not, however, introduced any\nquotation into the text because (1) I think Romanes makes his meaning\nplain in the text as it stands; (2) I cannot find in the essay in\nquestion any exactly appropriate passage of reasonable length to quote.\nThe greater part of the essay is, however, directed to meet the\nscientific objection to the doctrine that prayer is answered in the\nphysical region, by showing that this objection consists in an argument\nfrom the known to the unknown, i.e. from the known sphere of invariable\nphysical laws to the unknown sphere of God's relation to all such laws;\nand is, therefore, weak in proportion as the unknown sphere is remote\nfrom possible experience of a scientific kind, and admits of an\nindefinite number of possibilities, more or less conceivable to our\nimagination, which would or might prevent the scientific argument from\nhaving legitimate application to the question in hand.--ED.]\n\n[44] _Fortnightly Review_, Feb. 1894.\n\n[45] [Some such phrase is necessary to complete the sentence.--ED.]\n\n[46] _First Principles_, Part I, ch. 1.\n\n\n\n\nSec. 3. CAUSALITY.\n\n\nOnly because we are so familiar with the great phenomenon of causality\ndo we take it for granted, and think that we reach an ultimate\nexplanation of anything when we have succeeded in finding the 'cause'\nthereof: when, in point of fact, we have only succeeded in merging it in\nthe mystery of mysteries. I often wish we could have come into the\nworld, like the young of some other mammals, with all the powers of\nintellect that we shall ever subsequently attain already developed, but\nwithout any individual experience, and so without any of the blunting\neffects of custom. Could we have done so, surely nothing in the world\nwould more acutely excite our intelligent astonishment than the one\nuniversal fact of causation. That everything which happens should have a\ncause, that this should invariably be proportioned to its effect, so\nthat, no matter how complex the interaction of causes, the same\ninteraction should always produce the same result; that this rigidly\nexact system of energizing should be found to present all the\nappearances of universality and of eternity, so that, e.g., the motion\nof the solar system in space is being determined by some causes beyond\nhuman ken, and that we are indebted to billions of cellular unions, each\ninvolving billions of separate causes, for our hereditary passage from\nan invertebrate ancestry,--that such things should be, would surely\nstrike us as the most wonderful fact in this wonderful universe.\n\nNow, although familiarity with this fact has made us forget its wonder\nto the extent of virtually assuming that we know all about it,\nphilosophical enquiry shows that, besides empirically knowing it to be a\nfact, we only know one other thing about it, viz.--that our knowledge of\nit is derived from our own activity when we ourselves are causes. No\nresult of psychological analysis seems to me more certain than this[47].\nIf it were not for our own volitions, we should be ignorant of what we\ncan now not doubt, on pain of suicidal scepticism, to be the most\ngeneral fact of nature. Such, at least, seems to me by far the most\nreasonable theory of our idea of causality, and is the one now most\ngenerally entertained by philosophers of every school.\n\nNow, to the plain man it will always seem that if our very notion of\ncausality is derived from our own volition--as our very notion of energy\nis derived from our sense of effort in overcoming resistance by our\nvolition--presumably the truest notion we can form of that in which\ncausation objectively consists is the notion derived from that known\nmode of existence which alone gives us the notion of causality at all.\nHence the plain man will always infer that all energy is of the nature\nof will-energy, and all objective causation of the nature of subjective.\nNor is this inference confined to the plain man; the deepest\nphilosophical thinkers have arrived at substantially the same opinion,\ne.g. Hegel, Schopenhauer. So that the direct and most natural\ninterpretation of causality in external nature which is drawn by\nprimitive thought in savages and young children, seems destined to\nbecome also the ultimate deliverance of human thought in the highest\nlevels of its culture[48].\n\nBut, be this as it may, we are not concerned with any such questions of\nabstract philosophical speculation. As pure agnostics they lie beyond\nour sphere. Therefore, I allude to them only for the sake of showing\nthat there is nothing either in the science or philosophy of mankind\ninimical to the theory of natural causation being the energizing of a\nwill objective to us. And we can plainly see that if such be the case,\nand if that will be self-consistent, its operations, as revealed in\nnatural causation, must appear to us when considered _en bloc_ (or not\npiece-meal as by savages), non-volitional, or mechanical.\n\nOf all philosophical theories of causality the most repugnant to reason\nmust be those of Hume, Kant and Mill, which while differing from one\nanother agree in this--that they attribute the principle of causality to\na creation of our own minds, or in other words deny that there is\nanything objective in the relation of cause and effect--i.e. in the very\nthing which all physical science is engaged in discovering in particular\ncases of it.\n\n\nThe conflict of Science and Religion has always arisen from one common\nground of agreement, or fundamental postulate of both parties--without\nwhich, indeed, it would plainly have been impossible that any conflict\ncould have arisen, inasmuch as there would then have been no field for\nbattle. Every thesis must rest on some hypothesis; therefore, in cases\nwhere two or more rival theses rest on a common hypothesis, the disputes\nmust needs collapse so soon as the common hypothesis is proved\nerroneous. And proportionably, in whatever degree the previously common\nhypothesis is shown to be dubious, in that degree are the disputations\nshown to be possibly unreal. Now, it is one of the main objects of this\ntreatise to show that the common hypothesis on which all the disputes\nbetween Science and Religion have arisen, is highly dubious. And not\nonly so, but that quite apart from modern science all the difficulties\non the side of intellect (or reason) which religious belief has ever\nencountered in the past, or can ever encounter in the future, whether\nin the individual or the race, arise, and arise exclusively, from the\nself-same ground of this highly dubious hypothesis.\n\nThe hypothesis, or fundamental postulate, in question is, _If there be a\npersonal God, He is not immediately concerned with natural causation_.\nIt is assumed that _qua_ 'first cause,' He can in no way be concerned\nwith 'second causes,' further than by having started them in the first\ninstance as a great machinery of 'natural causation,' working under\n'general laws.' True the theory of Deism, which entertains more or less\nexpressly this hypothesis of 'Deus ex machina,' has during the present\ncentury been more and more superseded by that of Theism, which\nentertains also in some indefinable measure the doctrine of 'immanence';\nas well as by that of Pantheism, which expressly holds this doctrine to\nthe exclusion _in toto_ of its rival. But Theism has never yet\nentertained it sufficiently or up to the degree required by the pure\nlogic of the case, while Pantheism has but rarely considered the rival\ndoctrine of personality--or the possible union of immanence with\npersonality.[49]\n\nNow it is the object of this book to go much further than any one has\nhitherto gone in proving the possibility of this union. For I purpose to\nshow that, provided only we lay aside all prejudice, sentiment, &c.,\nand follow to its logical termination the guidance of pure reason, there\nare no other conclusions to be reached than these. Namely, (_A_) That if\nthere be a personal God, no reason can be assigned why He should not be\nimmanent in nature, or why all causation should not be the immediate\nexpression of His will. (_B_) That every available reason points to the\ninference that He probably is so. (_C_) That if He is so, and if His\nwill is self-consistent, all natural causation must needs appear to us\n'mechanical.' Therefore (_D_) that it is no argument against the divine\norigin of a thing, event, &c., to prove it due to natural causation.\n\nAfter having dealt briefly with (_A_), (_B_) and (_C_), I would show\nthat (_D_) is the most practically important of these four conclusions.\nFor the fundamental hypothesis which I began by mentioning is just the\nopposite of this. Whether tacitly or expressly, it has always been\nassumed by both sides in the controversy between Science and Religion,\nthat as soon as this that and the other phenomenon has been explained by\nmeans of natural causation, it has thereupon ceased to be ascribable\n[directly] to God. The distinction between the natural and the\nsupernatural has always been regarded by both sides as indisputably\nsound, and this fundamental agreement as to ground of battle has\nfurnished the only possible condition to fighting. It has also furnished\nthe condition of all the past, and may possibly furnish the condition of\nall the future, discomfitures of religion. True religion is indeed\nlearning her lesson that something is wrong in her method of fighting,\nand many of her soldiers are now waking up to the fact that it is here\nthat her error lies--as in past times they woke up to see the error of\ndenying the movement of the earth, the antiquity of the earth, the\norigin of species by evolution, &c. But no one, even of her captains and\ngenerals, has so far followed up their advantage to its ultimate\nconsequences. And this is what I want to do. The logical advantage is\nclearly on their side; and it is their own fault if they do not gain the\nultimate victory,--not only as against science, but as against\nintellectual dogmatism in every form. This can be routed all along the\nline. For science is only the organized study of natural causation, and\nthe experience of every human being, in so far as it leads to dogmatism\non purely intellectual grounds, does so on account of entertaining the\nfundamental postulate in question. The influence of custom and want of\nimagination is here very great. But the answer always should be to move\nthe ulterior question--what is the nature of natural causation?\n\nNow I propose to push to its full logical conclusion the consequence of\nthis answer. For no one, even the most orthodox, has as yet learnt this\nlesson of religion to anything like fullness. God is still grudged His\nown universe, so to speak, as far and as often as He can possibly be. As\nexamples we may take the natural growth of Christianity out of previous\nreligions; the natural spread of it; the natural conversion of St. Paul,\nor of anybody else. It is still assumed on both sides that there must\nbe something inexplicable or miraculous about a phenomenon in order to\nits being divine.\n\nWhat else have science and religion ever had to fight about save on the\nbasis of this common hypothesis, and hence as to whether the causation\nof such and such a phenomenon has been 'natural' or 'super-natural.' For\neven the disputes as to science contradicting scripture, ultimately turn\non the assumption of inspiration (supposing it genuine) being\n'super-natural' as to its causation. Once grant that it is 'natural' and\nall possible ground of dispute is removed.\n\nI can well understand why infidelity should make the basal assumption in\nquestion, because its whole case must rest thereon. But surely it is\ntime for theists to abandon this assumption.\n\nThe assumed distinction between causation as natural and super-natural\nno doubt began in superstition in prehistoric time, and throughout the\nhistorical period has continued from a vague feeling that the action of\nGod must be mysterious, and hence that the province of religion must be\nwithin the super-sensuous. Now, it is true enough that the finite cannot\ncomprehend the infinite, and hence the feeling in question is logically\nsound. But under the influence of this feeling, men have always\ncommitted the fallacy of concluding that if a phenomenon has been\nexplained in terms of natural causation, it has thereby been explained\n_in toto_--forgetting that it has only been explained up to the point\nwhere such causation is concerned, and that the real question of\nultimate causation has merely been thus postponed. And assuredly beyond\nthis point there is an infinitude of mystery sufficient to satisfy the\nmost exacting mystic. For even Herbert Spencer allows that in ultimate\nanalysis all natural causation is inexplicable.\n\nLogically regarded the advance of science, far from having weakened\nreligion, has immeasurably strengthened it. For it has proved the\nuniformity of natural causation. The so-called natural sphere has\nincreased at the expense of the 'super-natural.' Unquestionably. But\nalthough to lower grades of culture this always seems a fact inimical to\nreligion, we may now perceive it is quite the reverse, since it merely\ngoes to abolish the primitive or uncultured distinction in question.\n\nIt is indeed most extraordinary how long this distinction has held sway,\nor how it is the ablest men of all generations have quietly assumed that\nwhen once we know the natural causation of any phenomenon, we therefore\nknow all about it--or, as it were, have removed it from the sphere of\nmystery altogether, when, in point of fact, we have only merged it in a\nmuch greater mystery than ever.\n\nBut the answer to our astonishment how this distinction has managed to\nsurvive so long lies in the extraordinary effect of custom, which here\nseems to slay reason altogether; and the more a man busies himself with\nnatural causes (e.g. in scientific research) the greater does this\nslavery to custom become, till at last he seems positively unable to\nperceive the real state of the case--regarding any rational thinking\nthereon as chimerical, so that the term 'meta-physical,' even in its\netymological sense as super-sensuous or beyond physical causation,\nbecomes a term of rational reproach. Obviously such a man has written\nhimself down, if not an ass, at all events a creature wholly incapable\nof rationally treating any of the highest problems presented either by\nnature or by man.\n\nOn any logical theory of Theism there can be no such distinction between\n'natural' and 'supernatural' as is usually drawn, since on that theory\nall causation is but the action of the Divine Will. And if we draw any\ndistinction between such action as 'immediate' or 'mediate,' we can only\nmean this as valid in relation to mankind--i.e. in relation to our\nexperience. For, obviously, it would be wholly incompatible with pure\nagnosticism to suppose that we are capable of drawing any such\ndistinction in relation to the Divine activity itself. Even apart from\nthe theory of Theism, pure agnosticism must take it that the real\ndistinction is not between natural and supernatural, but between the\nexplicable and the inexplicable--meaning by those terms that which is\nand that which is not accountable by such causes as fall within the\nrange of human observation. Or, in other words, the distinction is\nreally between the observable and the unobservable causal processes of\nthe universe.\n\nAlthough science is essentially engaged in explaining, her work is\nnecessarily confined to the sphere of natural causation; beyond that\nsphere (i.e. the sensuous) she can explain nothing. In other words,\neven if she were able to explain the natural causation of everything,\nshe would be unable to assign the ultimate _raison d'etre_ of anything.\n\n\nIt is not my intention to write an essay on the nature of causality, or\neven to attempt a survey of the sundry theories which have been\npropounded on this subject by philosophers. Indeed, to attempt this\nwould be little less than to write a history of philosophy itself.\nNevertheless it is necessary for my purpose to make a few remarks\ntouching the main branches of thought upon the matter[50].\n\n_The remarkable nature of the facts._ These are remarkable, since they\nare common to all human experience. Everything that _happens_ has a\ncause. The same happening has always the same cause--or the same\nconsequent the same antecedent. It is only familiarity with this great\nfact that prevents universal wonder at it, for, notwithstanding all the\ntheories upon it, no one has ever really shown why it is so. That the\nsame causes always produce the same effects is a proposition which\nexpresses a fundamental fact of our knowledge, but the knowledge of this\nfact is purely empirical; we can show no reason why it should be a fact.\nDoubtless, if it were not a fact, there could be no so-called 'Order of\nNature,' and consequently no science, no philosophy, or perhaps (if the\nirregularity were sufficiently frequent) no possibility of human\nexperience. But although this is easy enough to show, it in no wise\ntends to show why the same causes should always produce the same\neffects.\n\nSo manifest is it that our knowledge of the fact in question is only\nempirical, that some of our ablest thinkers, such as Hume and Mill, have\nfailed to perceive even so much as the intellectual necessity of looking\nbeyond our empirical knowledge of the fact to gain any explanation of\nthe fact itself. Therefore they give to the world the wholly vacuous, or\nmerely tautological theory of causation--viz. that of constancy of\nsequence within human observation[51].\n\n\nIf it be said of my argument touching causality, that it is naturalizing\nor materializing the super-natural or spiritual (as most orthodox\npersons will feel), my reply is that deeper thought will show it to be\nat least as susceptible of the opposite view--viz. that it is subsuming\nthe natural into the super-natural, or spiritualizing the material: and\na pure agnostic, least of all, should have anything to say as against\neither of these alternative points of view. Or we may state the matter\nthus: in as far as pure reason can have anything to say in the matter,\nshe ought to incline towards the view of my doctrine spiritualizing the\nmaterial, because it is pretty certain that we could know nothing about\nnatural causation--even so much as its existence--but for our own\nvolitions.\n\n\n_Free Will_[52].\n\nHaving read all that is said to be worth reading on the Free Will\ncontroversy, it appears to me that the main issues and their logical\nconclusions admit of being summed up in a very few words, thus:--\n\n1. A writer, before he undertakes to deal with this subject at all,\nshould be conscious of fully perceiving the fundamental distinction\nbetween responsibility as merely legal and as also moral; otherwise he\ncannot but miss the very essence of the question in debate. No one\nquestions the patent fact of responsibility as legal; the only question\nis touching responsibility as moral. Yet the principal bulk of\nliterature on Free Will and Necessity arises from disputants on both\nsides failing to perceive this basal distinction. Even such able writers\nas Spencer, Huxley and Clifford are in this position.\n\n2. The root question is as to whether the will is caused or un-caused.\nFor however much this root-question may be obscured by its own abundant\nfoliage, the latter can have no existence but that which it derives\nfrom the former.\n\n3. Consequently, if libertarians grant causality as appertaining to the\nwill, however much they may beat about the bush, they are surrendering\ntheir position all along the line, unless they fall back upon the more\nultimate question as to the nature of natural causation. Now it can be\nproved that this more ultimate question is [scientifically]\nunanswerable. Therefore both sides may denominate natural causation\n_x_--an unknown quantity.\n\n4. Hence the whole controversy ought to be seen by both sides to resolve\nitself into this--is or is not the will determined by _x_? And, if this\nseems but a barren question to debate, I do not undertake to deny the\nfact. At the same time there is clearly this real issue remaining--viz.\nIs the will self-determining, or is it determined--i.e. _from without_?\n\n5. If determined from without, is there any room for freedom, in the\nsense required for saving the doctrine of moral responsibility? And I\nthink the answer to this must be an unconditional negative.\n\n6. But, observe, it is not one and the same thing to ask, Is the will\nentirely determined from without? and Is the will entirely determined by\nnatural causation (_x_)? For the unknown quantity _x_ may very well\ninclude _x'_, if by _x'_ we understand all the unknown ingredients of\npersonality.\n\n7. Hence, determinists gain no advantage over their adversaries by any\npossible proof (at present impossible) that all acts of will are due to\nnatural causation, unless they can show the nature of the latter, and\nthat it is of such a nature as supports their conclusion. For aught we\nat present know, the will may very well be free in the sense required,\neven though all its acts are due to _x_.\n\n8. In particular, for aught we know to the contrary, all may be due to\n_x'_, i.e. all causation may be of the nature of will (as, indeed, many\nsystems of philosophy maintain), with the result that every human will\nis of the nature of a First Cause. In support of which possibility it\nmay be remarked that most philosophies are led to the theory of a _causa\ncausarum_ as regards _x_.\n\n9. To the obvious objection that with a plurality of first causes--each\nthe _fons et origo_ of a new and never-ending stream of causality--the\ncosmos must sooner or later become a chaos by cumulative intersection of\nthe streams, the answer is to be found in the theory of monism[53].\n\n10. Nevertheless, the ultimate difficulty remains which is depicted in\nmy essay on the 'World as an Eject[54].' But this, again, is merged in\nthe mystery of Personality, which is only known as an inexplicable, and\nseemingly ultimate, fact.\n\n11. So that the general conclusion of the whole matter must be--pure\nagnosticism.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[47] [Here it was intended to insert further explanation 'showing that\nmere observation of causality in external nature would not have yielded\nidea of anything further than time and space relations.'--ED.]\n\n[48] [This theory was suggested in the Burney Essay, p. 136, and\nridiculed in the _Candid Examination_; see above, p. 11. Romanes\nintended at this point to consider at greater length his old views 'on\ncausation as due to being _qua_ being.'--ED.]\n\n[49] See, however, Aubrey Moore in _Lux Mundi_, pp. 94-96, and Le Conte,\n_Evolution in its Relation to Religious Thought_, pp. 335, ff. [N.B. The\nreferences not enclosed in brackets are the author's, not mine.--ED.]\n\n[50] [Nothing more however was written than what follows\nimmediately.--ED.]\n\n[51] [The author intended further to show the vacuity of this theory and\npoint out how Mill himself appears to perceive it by his introduction\nafter the term 'invariably' of the term 'unconditionally'; he refers\nalso to Martineau, _Study of Religion_, i. pp. 152, 3.--ED.]\n\n[52] [Romanes' thoughts about Free Will are more lucidly expressed in an\nessay published subsequently to these Notes in _Mind and Motion and\nMonism_, pp. 129 ff.--ED.]\n\n[53] [See above, p. 31.--ED.]\n\n[54] _Contemporary Review_, July 1886. [But the 'ultimate difficulty'\nreferred to above would seem to be the relation of manifold dependent\nhuman wills to the One Ultimate and All-embracing Will.--ED.]\n\n\n\n\nSec. 4. FAITH.\n\n\nFaith in its religious sense is distinguished not only from opinion (or\nbelief founded on reason alone), in that it contains a spiritual\nelement: it is further distinguished from belief founded on the\naffections, by needing an active co-operation of the will. Thus all\nparts of the human mind have to be involved in faith--intellect,\nemotions, will. We 'believe' in the theory of evolution on grounds of\nreason alone; we 'believe' in the affection of our parents, children,\n&c., almost (or it may be exclusively) on what I have called spiritual\ngrounds--i.e. on grounds of spiritual experience; for this we need no\nexercise either of reason or of will. But no one can 'believe' in God,\nor _a fortiori_ in Christ, without also a severe effort of will. This I\nhold to be a matter of fact, whether or not there be a God or a Christ.\n\nObserve will is to be distinguished from desire. It matters not what\npsychologists may have to say upon this subject. Whether desire differs\nfrom will in kind or only in degree--whether will is desire in action,\nso to speak, and desire but incipient will--are questions with which we\nneed not trouble ourselves. For it is certain that there are agnostics\nwho would greatly prefer being theists, and theists who would give all\nthey possess to be Christians, if they could thus secure promotion by\npurchase--i.e. by one single act of will. But yet the desire is not\nstrong enough to sustain the will in perpetual action, so as to make the\ncontinual sacrifices which Christianity entails. Perhaps the hardest of\nthese sacrifices to an intelligent man is that of his own intellect. At\nleast I am certain that this is so in my own case. I have been so long\naccustomed to constitute my reason my sole judge of truth, that even\nwhile reason itself tells me it is not unreasonable to expect that the\nheart and the will should be required to join with reason in seeking God\n(for religion is for the _whole_ man), I am too jealous of my reason to\nexercise my will in the direction of my most heart-felt desires. For\nassuredly the strongest desire of my nature is to find that that nature\nis not deceived in its highest aspirations. Yet I cannot bring myself so\nmuch as to make a venture in the direction of faith. For instance,\nregarded from one point of view it seems reasonable enough that\nChristianity should have enjoined the _doing_ of the doctrine as a\nnecessary condition to ascertaining (i.e. 'believing') its truth. But\nfrom another, and my more habitual point of view, it seems almost an\naffront to reason to make any such 'fool's experiment'--just as to some\nscientific men it seems absurd and childish to expect them to\ninvestigate the 'superstitious' follies of modern spiritualism. Even the\nsimplest act of will in regard to religion--that of prayer--has not been\nperformed by me for at least a quarter of a century, simply because it\nhas seemed so impossible to pray, as it were, hypothetically, that much\nas I have always desired to be able to pray, I cannot will the attempt.\nTo justify myself for what my better judgement has often seen to be\nessentially irrational, I have ever made sundry excuses. The chief of\nthem has run thus. Even supposing Christianity true, and even supposing\nthat after having so far sacrificed my reason to my desire as to have\nsatisfied the supposed conditions to obtaining 'grace,' or direct\nillumination from God,--even then would not my reason turn round and\nrevenge herself upon me? For surely even then my habitual scepticism\nwould make me say to myself--'this is all very sublime and very\ncomforting; but what evidence have you to give me that the whole\nbusiness is anything more than self-delusion? The wish was probably\nfather to the thought, and you might much better have performed your\n\"act of will\" by going in for a course of Indian hemp.' Of course a\nChristian would answer to this that the internal light would not admit\nof such doubt, any more than seeing the sun does--that God knows us well\nenough to prevent that, &c., and also that it is unreasonable not to try\nan experiment lest the result should prove too good to be credible, and\nso on. And I do not dispute that the Christian would be justified in so\nanswering, but I only adduce the matter as an illustration of the\ndifficulty which is experienced in conforming to all the conditions of\nattaining to Christian faith--even supposing it to be sound. Others have\ndoubtless other difficulties, but mine is chiefly, I think, that of an\nundue regard to reason, as against heart and will--undue, I mean, if so\nit be that Christianity is true, and the conditions to faith in it have\nbeen of divine ordination.\n\nThis influence of will on belief, even in matters secular, is the more\npronounced the further removed these matters may be from demonstration\n(as already remarked); but this is most of all the case where our\npersonal interests are affected--whether these be material or\nintellectual, such as credit for consistency, &c. See, for example, how\nclosely, in the respects we are considering, political beliefs resemble\nreligious. Unless the points of difference are such that truth is\nvirtually demonstrable on one side, so that adhesion to the opposite is\ndue to _conscious_ sacrifice of integrity to expediency, we always find\nthat party-spectacles so colour the view as to leave reason at the mercy\nof will, custom, interest, and all the other circumstances which\nsimilarly operate on religious beliefs. It seems to make but little\ndifference in either case what level of general education, mental power,\nspecial training, &c., is brought to bear upon the question under\njudgement. From the Premier to the peasant we find the same difference\nof opinion in politics as we do in religion. And in each case the\nexplanation is the same. Beliefs are so little dependent on reason alone\nthat in such regions of thought--i.e. where personal interests are\naffected and the evidences of truth are not in their nature\ndemonstrable--it really seems as if reason ceases to be a judge of\nevidence or guide to truth, and becomes a mere advocate of opinion\nalready formed on quite other grounds. Now these other grounds are, as\nwe have seen, mainly the accidents of habit or custom, wish being father\nto the thought, &c.\n\nNow this may be all deplorable enough in politics, and in all other\nbeliefs secular; but who shall say it is not exactly as it ought to be\nin the matter of beliefs religious? For, unless we beg the question of a\nfuture life in the negative, we must entertain at least the possibility\nof our being in a state of probation in respect of an honest use not\nonly of our reason, but probably still more of those other ingredients\nof human nature which go to determine our beliefs touching this most\nimportant of all matters.\n\nIt is remarkable how even in politics it is the moral and spiritual\nelements of character which lead to success in the long run, even more\nthan intellectual ability--supposing, of course, that the latter is not\nbelow the somewhat high level of our Parliamentary assemblies.\n\nAs regards the part that is played by will in the determining of belief,\none can show how unconsciously large this is even in matters of secular\ninterest. Reason is very far indeed from being the sole guide of\njudgement that it is usually taken to be--so far, indeed, that, save in\nmatters approaching down-right demonstration (where of course there is\nno room for any other ingredient) it is usually hampered by custom,\nprejudice, dislike, &c., to a degree that would astonish the most sober\nphilosopher could he lay bare to himself all the mental processes\nwhereby the complex act of assent or dissent is eventually\ndetermined[55].\n\nAs showing how little reason alone has to do with the determining of\nreligious belief, let us take the case of mathematicians. This I think\nis the fairest case we can take, seeing that of all intellectual\npursuits that of mathematical research is the most exact, as well as the\nmost exclusive in its demand upon the powers of reason, and hence that,\nas a class, the men who have achieved highest eminence in that pursuit\nmay be fairly taken as the fittest representatives of our species in\nrespect of the faculty of pure reason. Yet whenever they have turned\ntheir exceptional powers in this respect upon the problems of religion,\nhow suggestively well balanced are their opposite conclusions--so much\nso indeed that we can only conclude that reason counts for very little\nin the complex of mental processes which here determine judgement.\n\nThus, if we look to the greatest mathematicians in the world's history,\nwe find Kepler and Newton as Christians; La Place, on the other hand, an\ninfidel. Or, coming to our own times, and confining our attention to the\nprincipal seat of mathematical study:--when I was at Cambridge, there\nwas a galaxy of genius in that department emanating from that place such\nas had never before been equalled. And the curious thing in our present\nconnexion is that all the most illustrious names were ranged on the side\nof orthodoxy. Sir W. Thomson, Sir George Stokes, Professors Tait, Adams,\nClerk-Maxwell, and Cayley--not to mention a number of lesser lights,\nsuch as Routh, Todhunter, Ferrers, &c.--were all avowed Christians.\nClifford had only just moved at a bound from the extreme of asceticism\nto that of infidelity--an individual instance which I deem of particular\ninterest in the present connexion, as showing the dominating influence\nof a forcedly emotional character even on so powerful an intellectual\none, for the _rationality_ of the whole structure of Christian belief\ncannot have so reversed its poles within a few months.\n\nNow it would doubtless be easy to find elsewhere than in Cambridge\nmathematicians of the first order who in our own generation are, or have\nbeen, professedly anti-Christian in their beliefs,--although certainly\nnot so great an array of such extraordinary powers. But, be this as it\nmay, the case of Cambridge in my own time seems to me of itself enough\nto prove that Christian belief is neither made nor marred by the highest\npowers of reasoning, apart from other and still more potent factors.\n\n\n_Faith and Superstition._\n\nWhether or not Christianity is true, there is a great distinction\nbetween these two things. For while the main ingredient of Christian\nfaith is the moral element, this has no part in superstition. In point\nof fact, the only point of resemblance is that both present the mental\nstate called _belief_. It is on this account they are so often\nconfounded by anti-Christians, and even by non-Christians; the much more\nimportant point of difference is not noted, viz. that belief in the one\ncase is purely intellectual, while in the other it is chiefly moral.\n_Qua_ purely intellectual, belief may indicate nothing but sheer\ncredulity in absence of evidence; but where a moral basis is added, the\ncase is clearly different; for even if it appears to be sheer credulity\nto an outsider, that may be because he does not take into account the\nadditional evidence supplied by the moral facts.\n\n\nFaith and superstition are often confounded, or even identified. And,\nunquestionably, they are identical up to a certain point--viz. they both\npresent the mental state of _belief_. All people can see this; but not\nall people can see further, or define the _differentiae_. These are as\nfollows: First, supposing Christianity true, there is the spiritual\nverification. Second, supposing Christianity false, there is still the\nmoral ingredient, which _ex hypothesi_ is absent in superstition. In\nother words, both faith and superstition rest on an intellectual basis\n(which may be pure credulity); but faith rests also on a moral, even if\nnot likewise on a spiritual. Even in human relations there is a wide\ndifference between 'belief' in a scientific theory and 'faith' in a\npersonal character. And the difference is in the latter comprising a\nmoral element.\n\n'Faith-healing,' therefore, has no real point of resemblance with 'thy\nfaith hath saved thee' of the New Testament, unless we sink the personal\ndifferences between a modern faith-healer and Jesus Christ as objects of\nfaith.\n\nBelief is not exclusively founded on objective evidence appealing to\nreason (opinion), but mainly on subjective evidence appealing to some\naltogether different faculty (faith). Now, whether Christians are right\nor wrong in what they believe, I hold it as certain as anything can be\nthat the distinction which I have just drawn, and which they all\nimplicitly draw for themselves, is logically valid. For no one is\nentitled to deny the possibility of what may be termed an organ of\nspiritual discernment. In fact to do so would be to vacate the position\nof pure agnosticism _in toto_--and this even if there were no objective,\nor strictly scientific, evidences in favour of such an organ, such as we\nhave in the lives of the saints, and, in a lower degree, in the\nuniversality of the religious sentiment. Now, if there be such an organ,\nit follows from preceding paragraphs, that not only will the main\nevidences for Christianity be subjective, but that they ought to be so:\nthey ought to be so, I mean, on the Christian supposition of the object\nof Christianity being moral probation, and 'faith' both the test and the\nreward.\n\nFrom this many practical considerations ensue. E.g. the duty of parents\nto educate their children in what they _believe_ as distinguished from\nwhat they _know_. This would be unjustifiable if faith were the same as\nopinion. But it is fully justifiable if a man not only knows that he\nbelieves (opinion) but believes that he knows (faith). Whether or not\nthe Christian differs from the 'natural man' in having a spiritual organ\nof cognition, provided he honestly believes such is the case, it would\nbe immoral in him not to proceed in accordance with what he thus\nbelieves to be his knowledge. This obligation is recognized in education\nin every other case. He is morally right even if mentally deluded.\n\n\nHuxley, in _Lay Sermons_, says that faith has been proved a 'cardinal\nsin' by science. Now, this is true enough of credulity, superstition,\n&c., and science has done no end of good in developing our ideas of\nmethod, evidence, &c. But this is all on the side of intellect. 'Faith'\nis not touched by such facts or considerations. And what a terrible hell\nscience would have made of the world, if she had abolished the 'spirit\nof faith' even in human relations. The fact is, Huxley falls into the\ncommon error of identifying 'faith' with opinion.\n\n\nSupposing Christianity true, it is very reasonable that faith in the\nsense already explained should be constituted the test of divine\nacceptance. If there be such a thing as Christ's winnowing fan, the\nquality of sterling weight for the discovery of which it is adapted\ncannot be conceived as anything other than this moral quality. No one\ncould suppose a revelation appealing to the mere intellect of man, since\nacceptance would thus become a mere matter of prudence in subscribing to\na demonstration made by higher intellects.\n\nIt is also a matter of fact that if Christianity is truthful in\nrepresenting this world as a school of moral probation, we cannot\nconceive a system better adapted to this end than is the world, or a\nbetter schoolmaster than Christianity. This is proved not only by\ngeneral reasoning, but also by the work of Christianity in the world,\nits adaptation to individual needs, &c. Consider also the extraordinary\ndiversity of human characters in respect both of morality and\nspirituality though all are living in the same world. Out of the same\nexternal material or environment such astonishingly diverse products\narise according to the use made of it. Even human suffering in its worst\nforms can be welcome if justified by faith in such an object. 'Ills have\nno weight, and tears no bitterness,' but are rather to be 'gloried\nin[56].'\n\nIt is a further fact that only by means of this theory of probation is\nit possible to give any meaning to the world, i.e. any _raison d'etre_\nof human existence.\n\nSupposing Christianity true, every man must stand or fall by the results\nof his own conduct, as developed through his own moral character. (This\ncould not be so if the test were intellectual ability.) Yet this does\nnot hinder that the exercise of will in the direction of religion should\nneed help in order to attain belief. Nor does it hinder that some men\nshould need more help and others less. Indeed, it may well be that some\nmen are intentionally precluded from receiving any help, so as not to\nincrease their responsibility, or receive but little, so as to\nconstitute intellectual difficulties a moral trial. But clearly, if such\nthings are so, we are inadequate judges.\n\n\nIt is a fact that we all feel the intellectual part of man to be\n'higher' than the animal, whatever our theory of his origin. It is a\nfact that we all feel the moral part of man to be 'higher' than the\nintellectual, whatever our theory of either may be. It is also a fact\nthat we all similarly feel the spiritual to be 'higher' than the moral,\nwhatever our theory of religion may be. It is what we understand by\nman's moral, and still more his spiritual, qualities that go to\nconstitute 'character.' And it is astonishing how in all walks of life\nit is character that tells in the long run.\n\nIt is a fact that these distinctions are all well marked and universally\nrecognized--viz.\n\n           {Animality.\n           {Intellectuality.\n     Human {Morality.\n           {Spirituality.\n\nMorality and spirituality are to be distinguished as two very different\nthings. A man may be highly moral in his conduct without being in any\ndegree spiritual in his nature, and, though to a lesser extent, vice\nversa. And, objectively, we see the same distinction between morals and\nreligion. By spirituality I mean the religious temperament, whether or\nnot associated with any particular creed or dogma.\n\nThere is no doubt that intellectual pleasures are more satisfying and\nenduring than sensual--or even sensuous. And, to those who have\nexperienced them, so it is with spiritual over intellectual, artistic,\n&c. This is an objective fact, abundantly testified to by every one who\nhas had experience: and it seems to indicate that the spiritual nature\nof man is the highest part of man--the [culminating] point of his being.\n\n\nIt is probably true, as Renan says in his posthumous work, that there\nwill always be materialists and spiritualists, inasmuch as it will\nalways be observable on the one hand that there is no thought without\nbrain, while, on the other hand, instincts of man will always aspire to\nhigher beliefs. But this is just what ought to be if religion is true,\nand we are in a state of probation. And is it not probable that the\nmaterialistic position (discredited even by philosophy) is due simply to\ncustom and want of imagination? Else why the inextinguishable instincts?\n\n\nIt is much more easy to disbelieve than to believe. This is obvious on\nthe side of reason, but it is also true on that of spirit, for to\ndisbelieve is in accordance with environment or custom, while to believe\nnecessitates a spiritual use of the imagination. For both these\nreasons, very few unbelievers have any justification, either\nintellectual or spiritual, for their own unbelief.\n\nUnbelief is usually due to indolence, often to prejudice, and never a\nthing to be proud of.\n\n\n'Why should it be thought a thing incredible with you that God should\nraise the dead?' Clearly no answer can be given by the pure agnostic.\nBut he will naturally say in reply, 'the question rather is, why should\nit be thought credible with you that there is a God, or, if there is,\nthat he should raise the dead?' And I think the wise Christian will\nanswer, 'I believe in the resurrection of the dead, partly on grounds of\nreason, partly on those of intuition, but chiefly on both combined; so\nto speak, it is my whole character which accepts the whole system of\nwhich the doctrine of personal immortality forms an essential part.' And\nto this it may be fairly added that the Christian doctrine of the\nresurrection of our bodily form cannot have been arrived at for the\npurpose of meeting modern materialistic objections to the doctrine of\npersonal immortality; hence it is certainly a strange doctrine to have\nbeen propounded at that time, together with its companion, and scarcely\nless distinctive, doctrine of the vileness of the body. Why was it not\nsaid that the 'soul' alone should survive as a disembodied 'spirit'? Or\nif form were supposed necessary for man as distinguished from God, that\nhe was to be an angel? But, be this as it may, the doctrine of the\nresurrection seems to have fully met beforehand the materialistic\nobjection to a future life, and so to have raised the ulterior question\nwith which this paragraph opens.\n\n\nWe have seen in the Introduction that all first principles even of\nscientific facts are known by intuition and not by reason. No one can\ndeny this. Now, if there be a God, the fact is certainly of the nature\nof a first principle; for it must be the first of all first principles.\nNo one can dispute this. No one can therefore dispute the necessary\nconclusion, that, if there be a God, He is knowable, (if knowable at\nall) by intuition and not by reason.\n\nIndeed a little thought is enough to show that from its very nature as\nsuch, reason must be incapable of adjudicating on the subject, for it is\na process of inferring from the known to the unknown.\n\nOr thus. It would be against reason itself to suppose that God, even if\nHe exists, can be known by reason; He must be known, if knowable at all,\nby intuition[57].\n\n\nObserve, although God might give an objective revelation of Himself,\ne.g. as Christians believe He has, even this would not give knowledge\nof Him save to those who believe the revelations genuine; and I doubt\nwhether it is logically possible for any form of objective revelation of\nitself to compel belief in it. Assuredly one rising from the dead to\ntestify thereto would not, nor would letters of fire across the sky do\nso. But, even if it were logically possible, we need not consider the\nabstract possibility, seeing that, as a matter of fact, no such\ndemonstrative revelation has been given.\n\nHence, the only legitimate attitude of pure reason is pure agnosticism.\nNo one can deny this. But, it will be said, there is this vast\ndifference between our intuitive knowledge of all other first principles\nand that alleged of the 'first of all first principles,' viz. that the\nlatter is confessedly _not_ known to all men. Now, assuredly, there is\nhere a vast difference. But so there ought to be, if we are here in a\nstate of probation, as before explained. And that we are in such a state\nis not only the hypothesis of religion, but the sole rational\nexplanation as well as moral justification of our existence as rational\nbeings and moral agents[58].\n\n\nIt is not necessarily true, as J.S. Mill and all other agnostics think,\nthat even if internal intuition be of divine origin, the illumination\nthus furnished can only be of evidential value to the individual subject\nthereof. On the contrary, it may be studied objectively, even if not\nexperienced subjectively; and ought to be so studied by a pure agnostic\ndesirous of light from any quarter. Even if he does not know it as a\nnoumenon he can investigate it as a phenomenon. And, supposing it to be\nof divine origin, as its subjects believe and he has no reason to doubt,\nhe may gain much evidence against its being a mere psychological\nillusion from identical reports of it in all ages. Thus, if any large\nsection of the race were to see flames issuing from magnets, there would\nbe no doubt as to their objective reality.\n\n\nThe testimony given by Socrates to the occurrence in himself of an\ninternal Voice, having all the definiteness of an auditory\nhallucination, has given rise to much speculation by subsequent\nphilosophers.\n\nMany explanations are suggested, but if we remember the critical nature\nof Socrates' own mind, the literal nature of his mode of teaching, and\nthe high authority which attaches to Plato's opinion on the subject, the\nprobability seems to incline towards the 'Demon' having been, in\nSocrates' own consciousness, an actual auditory sensation. Be this\nhowever as it may, I suppose there is no question that we may adopt this\nview of the matter at least to the extent of classifying Socrates with\nLuther, Pascal, &c., not to mention all the line of Hebrew and other\nprophets, who agree in speaking of a Divine Voice.\n\nIf so, the further question arises whether we are to classify all these\nwith lunatics in whom the phenomena of auditory hallucination are\nhabitual.\n\nWithout doubt this hypothesis is most in accordance with the temper of\nour age, partly because it obeys the law of parsimony, and partly\nbecause it [negatives] _a priori_ the possibility of revelation.\n\nBut if we look at the matter from the point of view of pure agnosticism,\nwe are not entitled to adopt so rough and ready an interpretation.\n\nSuppose then that not only Socrates and all great religious reformers\nand founders of religious systems both before and after him were\nsimilarly stricken with mental disease, but that similar phenomena had\noccurred in the case of all scientific discoverers such as Galileo,\nNewton, Darwin, &c.--supposing all these men to have declared that their\nmain ideas had been communicated by subjective sensations as of spoken\nlanguage, so that all the progress of the world's scientific thought had\nresembled that of the world's religious thought, and had been attributed\nby the promoters thereof to direct inspirations of this kind--would it\nbe possible to deny that the testimony thus afforded to the fact of\nsubjective revelation would have been overwhelming? Or could it any\nlonger have been maintained that supposing a revelation to be\ncommunicated subjectively the fact thereof could only be of any\nevidential value to the recipient himself? To this it will no doubt be\nanswered, 'No, but in the case supposed the evidence arises not from the\nfact of their subjective intuition but from that of its objective\nverification in the results of science.' Quite so; but this is exactly\nthe test appealed to by the Hebrew prophets--the test of true and lying\nprophets being in the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of their prophecies\nand 'By their fruits ye shall know them.'\n\nTherefore it is as absurd to say that the religious consciousness of\nminds other than our own can be barred antecedently as evidence, as it\nis to say that testimony to the miraculous is similarly barred. The pure\nagnostic must always carefully avoid the 'high _priori_ road.' But, on\nthe other hand, he must be all the more assiduous in estimating fairly\nthe character, both as to quantity and quality, of evidence _a\nposteriori_. Now this evidence in the present case is twofold, positive\nand negative. It will be convenient to consider the negative first.\n\nThe negative evidence is furnished by the nature of man without God. It\nis thoroughly miserable, as is well shown by Pascal, who has devoted the\nwhole of the first part of his treatise to this subject. I need not go\nover the ground which he has already so well traversed.\n\nSome men are not conscious of the cause of this misery: this, however,\ndoes not prevent the fact of their being miserable. For the most part\nthey conceal the fact as well as possible from themselves, by occupying\ntheir minds with society, sport, frivolity of all kinds, or, if\nintellectually disposed, with science, art, literature, business, &c.\nThis however is but to fill the starving belly with husks. I know from\nexperience the intellectual distractions of scientific research,\nphilosophical speculation, and artistic pleasures; but am also well\naware that even when all are taken together and well sweetened to taste,\nin respect of consequent reputation, means, social position, &c., the\nwhole concoction is but as high confectionery to a starving man. He may\ncheat himself for a time--especially if he be a strong man--into the\nbelief that he is nourishing himself by denying his natural appetite;\nbut soon finds he was made for some altogether different kind of food,\neven though of much less tastefulness as far as the palate is concerned.\n\nSome men indeed never acknowledge this articulately or distinctly even\nto themselves, yet always show it plainly enough to others. Take, e.g.,\n'that last infirmity of noble minds.' I suppose the most exalted and\nleast 'carnal' of worldly joys consists in the adequate recognition by\nthe world of high achievement by ourselves. Yet it is notorious that--\n\n               \"It is by God decreed\n     Fame shall not satisfy the highest need.\"\n\nIt has been my lot to know not a few of the famous men of our\ngeneration, and I have always observed that this is profoundly true.\nLike all other 'moral' satisfactions, this soon palls by custom, and as\nsoon as one end of distinction is reached, another is pined for. There\nis no finality to rest in, while disease and death are always standing\nin the background. Custom may even blind men to their own misery, so far\nas not to make them realize what is wanting; yet the want is there.\n\nI take it then as unquestionably true that this whole negative side of\nthe subject proves a vacuum in the soul of man which nothing can fill\nsave faith in God.\n\nNow take the positive side. Consider the happiness of religious--and\nchiefly of the highest religious, i.e. Christian--belief. It is a matter\nof fact that besides being most intense, it is most enduring, growing,\nand never staled by custom. In short, according to the universal\ntestimony of those who have it, it differs from all other happiness not\nonly in degree but in kind. Those who have it can usually testify to\nwhat they used to be without it. It has no relation to intellectual\nstatus. It is a thing by itself and supreme.\n\nSo much for the individual. But positive evidence does not end here.\nLook at the effects of Christian belief as exercised on human\nsociety--1st, by individual Christians on the family, &c.; and, 2nd, by\nthe Christian Church on the world.\n\nAll this may lead on to an argument from the adaptation of Christianity\nto human higher needs. All men must feel these needs more or less in\nproportion as their higher natures, moral and spiritual, are developed.\nNow Christianity is the only religion which is adapted to meet them,\nand, according to those who are alone able to testify, does so most\nabundantly. All these men, of every sect, nationality, &c., agree in\ntheir account of their subjective experience; so as to this there can be\nno question. The only question is as to whether they are all deceived.\n\nPEU DE CHOSE.\n\n     'La vie est vaine:\n       Un peu d'amour,\n     Un peu de haine ...\n       Et puis--bon jour!\n\n     La vie est breve:\n       Un peu d'espoir,\n     Un peu de reve ...\n       Et puis--bon soir!'\n\nThe above is a terse and true criticism of this life without hope of a\nfuture one. Is it satisfactory? But Christian faith, as a matter of\nfact, changes it entirely.\n\n     'The night has a thousand eyes,\n       And the day but one;\n     Yet the light of a whole world dies\n       With the setting sun.\n\n     The mind has a thousand eyes,\n       And the heart but one;\n     Yet the light of a whole life dies\n       When love is done.'\n\nLove is known to be all this. How great, then, is Christianity, as being\nthe religion of love, and causing men to believe both in the cause of\nlove's supremacy and the infinity of God's love to man.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[55] Cf. Pascal, _Pensees_. 'For we must not mistake ourselves, we have\nas much that is automatic in us as intellectual, and hence it comes that\nthe instrument by which persuasion is brought about is not demonstration\nalone. How few things are demonstrated! Proofs can only convince the\nmind; custom makes our strongest proofs and those which we hold most\nfirmly, it sways the automaton, which draws the unconscious intellect\nafter it.... It is then custom that makes so many men Christians, custom\nthat makes them Turks, heathen, artisans, soldiers, &c. Lastly, we must\nresort to custom when once the mind has seen where truth is, in order to\nslake our thirst and steep ourselves in that belief which escapes us at\nevery hour, for to have proofs always at hand were too onerous. We must\nacquire a more easy belief, that of custom, which without violence,\nwithout art, without argument, causes our assent and inclines all our\npowers to this belief, so that our soul naturally falls into it....\n\n'It is not enough to believe only by force of conviction if the\nautomaton is inclined to believe the contrary. Both parts of us then\nmust be obliged to believe, the intellect by arguments which it is\nenough to have admitted once in our lives, the automaton by custom, and\nby not allowing it to incline in the contrary direction. _Inclina cor\nmeum Deus_.' See also Newman's _Grammar of Assent_, chap. vi. and\nChurch's _Human Life and its Conditions_, pp. 67-9.\n\n[56] [The author has added, \"For suffering in brutes see further on,\"\nbut nothing further on the subject appears to have been written.--ED.]\n\n[57] [In this connexion I may again notice that two days before his\ndeath George Romanes expressed his cordial approval of Professor\nKnight's _Aspects of Theism_--a work in which great stress is laid on\nthe argument from intuition in different forms.--ED.]\n\n[58] On this subject see Pascal, _Pensees_ (Kegan Paul's trans.) p. 103.\n\n\n\n\nSec. 5. FAITH IN CHRISTIANITY.\n\nChristianity comes up for serious investigation in the present treatise,\nbecause this _Examination of Religion_ [i.e. of the validity of the\nreligious consciousness] has to do with the evidences of Theism\npresented by man, and not only by nature _minus_ man. Now of the\nreligious consciousness Christianity is unquestionably the highest\nproduct.\n\nWhen I wrote the preceding treatise [the _Candid Examination_], I did\nnot sufficiently appreciate the immense importance of _human_ nature, as\ndistinguished from physical nature, in any enquiry touching Theism. But\nsince then I have seriously studied anthropology (including the science\nof comparative religions), psychology and metaphysics, with the result\nof clearly seeing that human nature is the most important part of nature\nas a whole whereby to investigate the theory of Theism. This I ought to\nhave anticipated on merely _a priori_ grounds, and no doubt should have\nperceived, had I not been too much immersed in merely physical research.\n\nMoreover, in those days, I took it for granted that Christianity was\nplayed out, and never considered it at all as having any rational\nbearing on the question of Theism. And, though this was doubtless\ninexcusable, I still think that the rational standing of Christianity\nhas materially improved since then. For then it seemed that Christianity\nwas destined to succumb as a rational system before the double assault\nof Darwin from without and the negative school of criticism from within.\nNot only the book of organic nature, but likewise its own sacred\ndocuments, seemed to be declaring against it. But now all this has been\nvery materially changed. We have all more or less grown to see that\nDarwinism is like Copernicanism, &c., in this respect[59]; while the\noutcome of the great textual battle[60] is impartially considered a\nsignal victory for Christianity. Prior to the new [Biblical] science,\nthere was really no rational basis in thoughtful minds, either for the\ndate of any one of the New Testament books, or, consequently, for the\nhistorical truth of any one of the events narrated in them. Gospels,\nActs and Epistles were all alike shrouded in this uncertainty. Hence the\nvalidity of the eighteenth-century scepticism. But now all this kind of\nscepticism has been rendered obsolete, and for ever impossible; while\nthe certainty of enough of St. Paul's writings for the practical purpose\nof displaying the belief of the apostles has been established, as well\nas the certainty of the publication of the Synoptics within the first\ncentury. An enormous gain has thus accrued to the objective evidences\nof Christianity. It is most important that the expert investigator\nshould be exact, and, as in any other science, the lay public must take\non authority as trustworthy only what both sides are agreed upon. But,\nas in any other science, experts are apt to lose sight of the importance\nof the main results agreed upon, in their fighting over lesser points\nstill in dispute. Now it is enough for us that the Epistles to the\nRomans, Galatians, and Corinthians, have been agreed upon as genuine,\nand that the same is true of the Synoptics so far as concerns the main\ndoctrine of Christ Himself.\n\n\nThe extraordinary candour of Christ's biographers must not be\nforgotten[61]. Notice also such sentences as 'but some doubted,' and (in\nthe account of Pentecost) 'these men are full of new wine[62].' Such\nobservations are wonderfully true to human nature; but no less\nwonderfully opposed to any 'accretion' theory.\n\nObserve, when we become honestly pure agnostics the whole scene changes\nby the change in our point of view. We may then read the records\nimpartially, or on their own merits, without any antecedent conviction\nthat they must be false. It is then an open question whether they are\nnot true as history.\n\nThere is so much to be said in objective evidence for Christianity that\nwere the central doctrines thus testified to anything short of\nmiraculous, no one would doubt. But we are not competent judges _a\npriori_ of what a revelation should be. If our agnosticism be _pure_, we\nhave no right to pre-judge the case on _prima facie_ grounds.\n\n\nOne of the strongest pieces of objective evidence in favour of\nChristianity is not sufficiently enforced by apologists. Indeed, I am\nnot aware that I have ever seen it mentioned. It is the absence from the\nbiography of Christ of any doctrines which the subsequent growth of\nhuman knowledge--whether in natural science, ethics, political economy,\nor elsewhere--has had to discount. This negative argument is really\nalmost as strong as is the positive one from what Christ did teach. For\nwhen we consider what a large number of sayings are recorded of--or at\nleast attributed to--Him, it becomes most remarkable that in literal\ntruth there is no reason why any of His words should ever pass away in\nthe sense of becoming obsolete. 'Not even now could it be easy,' says\nJohn Stuart Mill, 'even for an unbeliever, to find a better translation\nof the rule of virtue from the abstract into the concrete, than to\nendeavour so to live that Christ would approve our life[63].' Contrast\nJesus Christ in this respect with other thinkers of like antiquity. Even\nPlato, who, though some 400 years B.C. in point of time, was greatly in\nadvance of Him in respect of philosophic thought--not only because\nAthens then presented the extraordinary phenomenon which it did of\ngenius in all directions never since equalled, but also because he,\nfollowing Socrates, was, so to speak, the greatest representative of\nhuman reason in the direction of spirituality--even Plato, I say, is\nnowhere in this respect as compared with Christ. Read the dialogues, and\nsee how enormous is the contrast with the Gospels in respect of errors\nof all kinds--reaching even to absurdity in respect of reason, and to\nsayings shocking to the moral sense. Yet this is confessedly the highest\nlevel of human reason on the lines of spirituality, when unaided by\nalleged revelation.\n\nTwo things may be said in reply. First, that the Jews (Rabbis) of\nChrist's period had enunciated most of Christ's ethical sayings. But,\neven so far as this is true, the sayings were confessedly extracted or\ndeduced from the Old Testament, and so _ex hypothesi_ due to original\ninspiration. Again, it is not very far true, because, as _Ecce Homo_\nsays, the ethical sayings of Christ, even when anticipated by Rabbis and\nthe Old Testament, were _selected_ by Him.\n\n\nIt is a general, if not a universal, rule that those who reject\nChristianity with contempt are those who care not for religion of any\nkind. 'Depart from us' has always been the sentiment of such. On the\nother hand, those in whom the religious sentiment is intact, but who\nhave rejected Christianity on intellectual grounds, still almost deify\nChrist. These facts are remarkable.\n\nIf we estimate the greatness of a man by the influence which he has\nexerted on mankind, there can be no question, even from the secular\npoint of view, that Christ is much the greatest man who has ever lived.\n\nIt is on all sides worth considering (blatant ignorance or base\nvulgarity alone excepted) that the revolution effected by Christianity\nin human life is immeasurable and unparalleled by any other movement in\nhistory; though most nearly approached by that of the Jewish religion,\nof which, however, it is a development, so that it may be regarded as of\na piece with it. If thus regarded, this whole system of religion is so\nimmeasurably in advance of all others, that it may fairly be said, if it\nhad not been for the Jews, the human race would not have had any\nreligion worth our serious attention as such. The whole of that side of\nhuman nature would never have been developed in civilized life. And\nalthough there are numberless individuals who are not conscious of its\ndevelopment in themselves, yet even these have been influenced to an\nenormous extent by the atmosphere of religion around them.\n\nBut not only is Christianity thus so immeasurably in advance of all\nother religions. It is no less so of every other system of thought that\nhas ever been promulgated in regard to all that is moral and spiritual.\nWhether it be true or false, it is certain that neither philosophy,\nscience, nor poetry has ever produced results in thought, conduct, or\nbeauty in any degree to be compared with it. This I think will be on all\nhands allowed as regards conduct. As regards thought and beauty it may\nbe disputed. But, consider, what has all the science or all the\nphilosophy of the world done for the thought of mankind to be compared\nwith the one doctrine, 'God is love'? Whether or not true, conceive what\nbelief in it has been to thousands of millions of our race--i.e. its\ninfluence on human thought, and thence on human conduct. Thus to admit\nits incomparable influence in conduct is indirectly to admit it as\nregards thought. Again, as regards beauty, the man who fails to see its\nincomparable excellence in this respect merely shows his own deficiency\nin the appreciation of all that is noblest in man. True or not true, the\nentire Story of the Cross, from its commencement in prophetic aspiration\nto its culmination in the Gospel, is by far the most magnificent\n[presentation] in literature. And surely the fact of its having all been\nlived does not detract from its poetic value. Nor does the fact of its\nbeing capable of appropriation by the individual Christian of to-day as\nstill a vital religion detract from its sublimity. Only to a man wholly\ndestitute of spiritual perception can it be that Christianity should\nfail to appear the greatest exhibition of the beautiful, the sublime,\nand of all else that appeals to our spiritual nature, which has ever\nbeen known upon our earth.\n\nYet this side of its adaptation is turned only towards men of highest\nculture. The most remarkable thing about Christianity is its adaptation\nto all sorts and conditions of men. Are you highly intellectual? There\nis in its problems, historical and philosophical, such worlds of\nmaterial as you may spend your life upon with the same interminable\ninterest as is open to the students of natural science. Or are you but a\npeasant in your parish church, with knowledge of little else than your\nBible? Still are you ...[64]\n\n\n_Regeneration_.\n\nHow remarkable is the doctrine of Regeneration _per se_, as it is stated\nin the New Testament[65], and how completely it fits in with the\nnon-demonstrative character of Revelation to reason alone, with the\nhypothesis of moral probation, &c. Now this doctrine is one of the\ndistinctive notes of Christianity. That is, Christ foretold repeatedly\nand distinctly--as did also His apostles after Him--that while those who\nreceived the Holy Ghost, who came to the Father through faith in the\nSon, who were born again of the Spirit, (and many other synonymous\nphrases,) would be absolutely certain of Christian truth as it were by\ndirect vision or intuition, the carnally minded on the other hand would\nnot be affected by any amount of direct evidence, even though one rose\nfrom the dead--as indeed Christ shortly afterwards did, with fulfilment\nof this prediction. Thus scepticism may be taken by Christians as\ncorroborating Christianity.\n\nBy all means let us retain our independence of judgement; but this is\npre-eminently a matter in which pure agnostics must abstain from\narrogance and consider the facts impartially as unquestionable phenomena\nof experience.\n\nShortly after the death of Christ, this phenomenon which had been\nforetold by Him occurred, and appears to have done so for the first\ntime. It has certainly continued to manifest itself ever since, and has\nbeen attributed by professed historians to that particular moment in\ntime called Pentecost, producing much popular excitement and a large\nnumber of Christian believers.\n\nBut, whether or not we accept this account, it is unquestionable that\nthe apostles were filled with faith in the person and office of their\nMaster, which is enough to justify His doctrine of regeneration.\n\n\n_Conversions._\n\nSt. Augustine after thirty years of age, and other Fathers, bear\ntestimony to a sudden, enduring and extraordinary change in themselves,\ncalled _conversion_[66].\n\nNow this experience has been repeated and testified to by countless\nmillions of civilized men and women in all nations and all degrees of\nculture. It signifies not whether the conversion be sudden or gradual,\nthough, as a psychological phenomenon, it is more remarkable when sudden\nand there is no symptom of mental aberration otherwise. But even as a\ngradual growth in mature age, its evidential value is not less. (Cf.\nBunyan, &c.)\n\nIn all cases it is not a mere change of belief or opinion; this is by no\nmeans the point; the point is that it is a modification of character,\nmore or less profound.\n\nSeeing what a complex thing is character, this change therefore cannot\nbe simple. That it may all be due to so-called natural causes is no\nevidence against its so-called supernatural source, unless we beg the\nwhole question of the Divine in Nature. To pure agnostics the evidence\nfrom conversions and regeneration lies in the bulk of these\npsychological phenomena, shortly after the death of Christ, with their\ncontinuance ever since, their general similarity all over the world,\n&c., &c.\n\n\n_Christianity and Pain_.\n\nChristianity, from its foundation in Judaism, has throughout been a\nreligion of sacrifice and sorrow. It has been a religion of blood and\ntears, and yet of profoundest happiness to its votaries. The apparent\nparadox is due to its depth, and to the union of these seemingly diverse\nroots in Love. It has been throughout and growingly a religion--or\nrather let us say _the_ religion--of Love, with these apparently\nopposite qualities. Probably it is only those whose characters have been\ndeepened by experiences gained in this religion itself who are so much\nas capable of intelligently resolving this paradox.\n\nFakirs hang on hooks, Pagans cut themselves and even their children,\nsacrifice captives, &c., for the sake of propitiating diabolical\ndeities. The Jewish and Christian idea of sacrifice is doubtless a\nsurvival of this idea of God by way of natural causation, yet this is no\nevidence against the completed idea of the Godhead being [such as the\nChristian belief represents it], for supposing the completed idea to be\ntrue, the earlier ideals would have been due to the earlier\ninspirations, in accordance with the developmental method of Revelation\nhereafter to be discussed[67].\n\nBut Christianity, with its roots in Judaism, is, as I have said, _par\nexcellence_ the religion of sorrow, because it reaches to truer and\ndeeper levels of our spiritual nature, and therefore has capabilities\nboth of sorrow and joy which are presumably non-existent except in\ncivilized man. I mean the sorrows and the joys of a fully evolved\nspiritual life--such as were attained wonderfully early, historically\nspeaking, in the case of the Jews, and are now universally diffused\nthroughout Christendom. In short, the sorrows and the joys in question\nare those which arise from the fully developed consciousness of sin\nagainst a God of Love, as distinguished from propitiation of malignant\nspirits. These joys and sorrows are wholly spiritual, not merely\nphysical, and culminate in the cry,'Thou desirest no sacrifice.... The\nsacrifice of God is a troubled spirit[68].'\n\n\nI agree with Pascal[69] that there is virtually nothing to be gained by\nbeing a theist as distinguished from a Christian. Unitarianism is only\nan affair of the reason--a merely abstract theory of the mind, having\nnothing to do with the heart, or the real needs of mankind. It is only\nwhen it takes the New Testament, tears out a few of its leaves relating\nto the divinity of Christ, and appropriates all the rest, that its\nsystem becomes in any degree possible as a basis for personal religion.\n\nIf there is a Deity it seems to be in some indefinite degree more\nprobable that He should impart a Revelation than that He should not.\n\n\nWomen, as a class, are in all countries much more disposed to\nChristianity than men. I think the scientific explanation of this is to\nbe found in the causes assigned in my essay on _Mental differences\nbetween Men and Women_[70]. But, if Christianity be supposed true, there\nwould, of course, be a more ultimate explanation of a religious\nkind--as in all other cases where causation is concerned. And, in that\ncase I have no doubt that the largest part of the explanation would\nconsist in the passions of women being less ardent than those of men,\nand also much more kept under restraint by social conditions of life.\nThis applies not only to purity, but likewise to most of the other\npsychological _differentiae_ between the sexes, such as ambition,\nselfishness, pride of power, and so forth. In short, the whole ideal of\nChristian ethics is of a feminine as distinguished from a masculine\ntype[71]. Now nothing is so inimical to Christian belief as un-Christian\nconduct. This is especially the case as regards impurity; for whether\nthe fact be explained on religious or non-religious grounds, it has more\nto do with unbelief than has the speculative reason. Consequently, woman\nis, for all these reasons, the 'fitter' type for receiving and retaining\nChristian belief.\n\n\nModern agnosticism is performing this great service to Christian faith;\nit is silencing all rational scepticism of the _a priori_ kind. And this\nit is bound to do more and more the purer it becomes. In every\ngeneration it must henceforth become more and more recognized by\nlogical thinking, that all antecedent objections to Christianity founded\non reason alone are _ipso facto_ nugatory. Now, all the strongest\nobjections to Christianity have ever been those of the antecedent kind;\nhence the effect of modern thinking is that of more and more diminishing\nthe purely speculative difficulties, such as that of the Incarnation,\n&c. In other words the force of Butler's argument about our being\nincompetent judges[72] is being more and more increased.\n\nAnd the logical development of this lies in the view already stated\nabout natural causation. For, just as pure agnosticism must allow that\nreason is incompetent to adjudicate _a priori_ for or against Christian\nmiracles, including the Incarnation, so it must further allow that, if\nthey ever took place, reason can have nothing to say against their being\nall of one piece with causation in general. Hence, so far as reason is\nconcerned, pure agnosticism must allow that it is only the event which\ncan ultimately prove whether Christianity is true or false. 'If it be of\nGod we cannot overthrow it, lest haply we be found even to fight against\nGod.' But the individual cannot wait for this empirical determination.\nWhat then is he to do? The unbiassed answer of pure agnosticism ought\nreasonably to be, in the words of John Hunter, 'Do not think; try.' That\nis, in this case, try the only experiment available--the experiment of\nfaith. Do the doctrine, and if Christianity be true, the verification\nwill come, not indeed mediately through any course of speculative\nreason, but immediately by spiritual intuition. Only if a man has faith\nenough to make this venture honestly, will he be in a just position for\ndeciding the issue. Thus viewed it would seem that the experiment of\nfaith is not a 'fool's experiment'; but, on the contrary, so that there\nis enough _prima facie_ evidence to arrest serious attention, such an\nexperimental trial would seem to be the rational duty of a pure\nagnostic.\n\nIt is a fact that Christian belief is much more due to doing than to\nthinking, as prognosticated by the New Testament. 'If any man will do\nHis will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God' (St. John\nvii. 17). And surely, even on grounds of reason itself, it should be\nallowed that, supposing Christianity to be 'of God,' it _ought_ to\nappeal to the spiritual rather than to the rational side of our nature.\n\n\nEven within the region of pure reason (or the '_prima facie_ case')\nmodern science, as directed on the New Testament criticism, has surely\ndone more for Christianity than against it. For, after half a century of\nbattle over the text by the best scholars, the dates of the Gospels have\nbeen fixed within the first century, and at least four of St. Paul's\nepistles have had their authenticity proved beyond doubt. Now this is\nenough to destroy all eighteenth-century criticism as to the\ndoubtfulness of the historical existence of Christ and His apostles,\n'inventions of priests,' &c., which was the most formidable kind of\ncriticism of all. There is no longer any question as to historical\nfacts, save the miraculous, which, however, are ruled out by negative\ncriticism on merely _a priori_ grounds. This remaining--and, _ex\nhypothesi_, necessary--doubt is of very different importance from the\nother.\n\nAgain, the Pauline epistles of proved authenticity are enough for all\nthat is wanted to show the belief of Christ's contemporaries.\n\nThese are facts of the first order of importance to have proved. Old\nTestament criticism is as yet too immature to consider.\n\n\n_Plan in Revelation_.\n\nThe views which I entertained on this subject when an undergraduate\n[i.e. the ordinary orthodox views] were abandoned in presence of the\ntheory of Evolution--i.e. the theory of natural causation as probably\nfurnishing a scientific explanation [of the religious phenomena of\nJudaism] or, which is the same thing, an explanation in terms of\nascertainable causes up to some certain point; which however in this\nparticular case cannot be determined within wide limits, so that the\nhistory of Israel will always embody an element of 'mystery' much more\nthan any other history.\n\nIt was not until twenty-five years later that I saw clearly the full\nimplications of my present views on natural causation. As applied to\nthis particular case these views show that to a theist, at all events\n(i.e. to any one who on independent grounds has accepted the theory of\nTheism), it ought not to make much difference to the evidential value of\nthe Divine Plan of Revelation as exhibited in the Old and New\nTestaments, even if it be granted that the whole has been due to\nso-called natural causes only. I say, 'not much difference,' for that it\nought to make some difference I do not deny. Take a precisely analogous\ncase. The theory of evolution by natural causes is often said to make no\nlogical difference in the evidence of plan or design manifested in\norganic nature--it being only a question of _modus operandi_ whether all\npieces of organic machinery were produced suddenly or by degrees; the\nevidence of design is equally there in either case. Now I have shown\nelsewhere that this is wrong[73]. It may not make much difference to a\nman who is already a theist, for then it is but a question of _modus_,\nbut it makes a great difference to the evidence of Theism.\n\nSo it is in evidence of plan in proof of a revelation. If there had been\nno alleged revelation up to the present time, and if Christ were now to\nappear suddenly in His first advent in all the power and glory which\nChristians expect for His second, the proof of His revelation would be\ndemonstrative. So that, as a mere matter of evidence, a sudden\nrevelation might be much more convincing than a gradual one. But it\nwould be quite out of analogy with causation in nature[74]. Besides,\neven a gradual revelation might be given easily, which would be of\ndemonstrative value--as by making prophecies of historical events,\nscientific discoveries, &c., so clear as to be unmistakeable. But, as\nbefore shown, a demonstrative revelation has not been made, and there\nmay well be good reasons why it should not. Now, if there are such\nreasons (e.g. our state of probation), we can well see that the gradual\nunfolding of a plan of revelation, from earliest dawn of history to the\nend of the world ('I speak as a fool') is much preferable to a sudden\nmanifestation sufficiently late in the world's history to be\nhistorically attested for all subsequent time. For\n\n     1st. Gradual evolution is in analogy with God's other work.\n\n     2nd. It does not leave Him without witness at any time during the\n     historical period.\n\n     3rd. It gives ample scope for persevering research at all\n     times--i.e. a moral test, and not merely an intellectual assent to\n     some one _(ex hypothesi)_ unequivocally attested event in history.\n\nThe _appearance_ of plan in revelation is, in fact, certainly remarkable\nenough to arrest serious attention.\n\nIf revelation has been of a progressive character, then it follows that\nit must have been so, not only historically, but likewise\nintellectually, morally, and spiritually. For thus only could it be\nalways adapted to the advancing conditions of the human race. This\nreflection destroys all those numerous objections against Scripture on\naccount of the absurdity or immorality of its statements or precepts,\nunless it can be shown that the modifications suggested by criticism as\nrequisite to bring the statements or precepts into harmony with modern\nadvancement would have been as well adapted to the requirements of the\nworld at the date in question, as were the actual statements or precepts\nbefore us.\n\n\nSupposing Christianity true, it is certain that the revelation which it\nconveys has been predetermined at least since the dawn of the historical\nperiod. This is certain because the objective evidences of Christianity\nas a revelation have their origin in that dawn. And these objective\nevidences are throughout [evidence] of a scheme, in which the end can be\nseen from the beginning. And the very methods whereby this scheme is\nitself revealed are such (still supposing that it is a scheme) as\npresent remarkable evidences of design. These methods are, broadly\nspeaking, miracles, prophecy and the results of the teaching, &c., upon\nmankind. Now one may show that no better methods could conceivably have\nbeen designed for the purpose of latter-day evidence, combined with\nmoral and religious teaching throughout. The mere fact of it being so\nlargely incorporated with secular history renders the Christian religion\nunique: so to speak, the world, throughout its entire historical period,\nhas been constituted the canvas on which this divine revelation has been\npainted--and painted so gradually that not until the process had been\ngoing on for a couple of thousand years was it possible to perceive the\nsubject thereof.\n\n\n_Christian Dogmas_.\n\nWhether or not Christ was Himself divine would make no difference so far\nas the consideration of Christianity as the highest phase of evolution\nis concerned, or from the purely secular [scientific] point of view.\nFrom the religious point of view, or that touching the relation of God\nto man, it would of course make a great difference; but the difference\nbelongs to the same region of thought as that which applies to all the\nprevious moments of evolution. Thus the passage from the non-moral to\nthe moral appears, from the secular or scientific point of view, to be\ndue, as far as we can see, to mechanical causes in natural selection or\nwhat not. But, just as in the case of the passage from the non-mental to\nthe mental, &c., this passage may have been _ultimately_ due to divine\nvolition, and _must have been so due_ on the theory of Theism.\nTherefore, I say, it makes no difference from a secular or scientific\npoint of view whether or not Christ was Himself divine; since, in either\ncase, the movement which He inaugurated was the proximate or phenomenal\ncause of the observable results.\n\nThus, even the question of the divinity of Christ ultimately resolves\nitself into the question of all questions--viz. is or is not mechanical\ncausation 'the outward and visible form of an inward and spiritual\ngrace'? Is it phenomenal or ontological; ultimate or derivative?\n\nSimilarly as regards the redemption. Whether or not Christ was really\ndivine, in as far as a belief in His divinity has been a necessary cause\nof the moral and religious evolution which has resulted from His life on\nearth, it has equally and so far 'saved His people from their sins';\nthat is, of course, it has saved them from their own sense of sin as an\nabiding curse. Whether or not He has effected any corresponding change\nof an objective character in the ontological sphere, again depends on\nthe 'question of questions' just stated.\n\n\n_Reasonableness of the Doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity._\n\nPure agnostics and those who search for God in Christianity should have\nnothing to do with metaphysical theology. _That_ is a department of\nenquiry which, _ex hypothesi_, is transcendental, and is only to be\nconsidered after Christianity has been accepted. The doctrines of the\nIncarnation and the Trinity seemed to me most absurd in my agnostic\ndays. But now, as a _pure_ agnostic, I see in them no rational\ndifficulty at all. As to the Trinity, the plurality of persons is\nnecessarily implied in the companion doctrine of the Incarnation. So\nthat at best there is here but one difficulty, since, duality being\npostulated in the doctrine of the Incarnation, there is no further\ndifficulty for pure agnosticism in the doctrine of plurality. Now at one\ntime it seemed to me impossible that any proposition, verbally\nintelligible as such, could be more violently absurd than that of the\ndoctrine [of the Incarnation]. Now I see that this standpoint is wholly\nirrational, due only to the blindness of reason itself promoted by\n[purely] scientific habits of thought. 'But it is opposed to common\nsense.' No doubt, utterly so; but so it _ought_ to be if true. Common\nsense is merely a [rough] register of common experience; but the\nIncarnation, if it ever took place, whatever else it may have been, at\nall events cannot have been a common event. 'But it is derogatory to God\nto become man.' How do you know? Besides, Christ was not an ordinary\nman. Both negative criticism and the historical effects of His life\nprove this; while, if we for a moment adopt the Christian point of view\nfor the sake of argument, the whole _raison d'etre_ of mankind is bound\nup in Him. Lastly, there are considerations _per contra_, rendering an\nincarnation antecedently probable[75]. On antecedent grounds there\n_must_ be mysteries unintelligible to reason as to the nature of God,\n&c., supposing a revelation to be made at all. Therefore their\noccurrence in Christianity _is_ no proper objection to Christianity.\nWhy, again, stumble _a priori_ over the doctrine of the\nTrinity--especially as man himself is a triune being, of body, mind\n(i.e. reason), and spirit (i.e. moral, aesthetic, religious faculties)?\nThe unquestionable union of these no less unquestionably distinct orders\nof being in man is known immediately as a fact of experience, but is as\nunintelligible by any process of logic or reason as is the alleged\ntriunity of God.\n\n\n_Adam, the Fall, the Origin of Evil_.\n\nThese, all taken together as Christian dogmas, are undoubtedly hard hit\nby the scientific proof of evolution (but are the _only_ dogmas which\ncan fairly be said to be so), and, as constituting the logical basis of\nthe whole plan, they certainly do appear at first sight necessarily to\ninvolve in their destruction that of the entire superstructure. But the\nquestion is whether, after all, they have been destroyed for a pure\nagnostic. In other words, whether my principles are not as applicable in\nturning the flank of infidelity here as everywhere else.\n\nFirst, as regards Adam and Eve, observe, to begin with, that long before\nDarwin the story of man in Paradise was recognized by thoughtful\ntheologians as allegorical. Indeed, read with unprejudiced eyes, the\nfirst chapters of Genesis ought always to have been seen to be a poem as\ndistinguished from a history: nor could it ever have been mistaken for\na history, but for preconceived ideas on the matter of inspiration. But\nto pure agnostics there should be no such preconceived ideas; so that\nnowadays no presumption should be raised against it as inspired, merely\nbecause it has been proved not to be a history--and this even though we\ncannot see of what it is allegorical. For, supposing it inspired, it has\ncertainly done good service in the past and can do so likewise in the\npresent, by giving an allegorical, though not a literal, starting-point\nfor the Divine Plan of Redemption.\n\n\n_The evidence of Natural and Revealed Religion compared_.\n\nIt is often said that evolution of organic forms gives as good evidence\nof design as would their special creation, inasmuch as all the facts of\nadaptation, in which the evidence consists, are there in either case.\nBut here it is overlooked that the very question at issue is thus\nbegged. The question is, Are these facts of adaptation _per se_\nsufficient evidence of design as their cause? But if it be allowed, as\nit must be, that under hypothesis of evolution by natural causes the\nfacts of adaptation belong to the same category as all the other facts\nof nature, no more special argument for design can be founded on these\nfacts than on any others in nature. So that the facts of adaptation,\nlike all other facts, are only available as arguments for design when\nit is assumed that all natural causation is of a mental character: which\nassumption merely begs the question of design anywhere. Or, in other\nwords, on the supposition of their having been due to natural causes,\nthe facts of adaptation are only then available as _per se_ good\nevidence of design, when it has already been assumed that, _qua_ due to\nnatural causes, they are due to design.\n\nNatural religion resembles Revealed religion in this. Supposing both\ndivine, both have been arranged so that, as far as reason can lead us,\nthere is only enough evidence of design to arouse serious attention to\nthe question of it. In other words, as regards both, the attitude of\npure reason ought to be that of pure agnosticism. (Observe that the\ninadequacy of teleology, or design in nature, to prove Theism has been\nexpressly recognized by all the more intellectual Christians of all\nages, although such recognition has become more general since Darwin. On\nthis point I may refer to Pascal especially[76], and many other\nauthors.) This is another striking analogy between Nature and\nRevelation, supposing both to have emanated from the same author--i.e.\nquite as much so as identity of developmental method in both.\n\n_Supposing the hypothesis of design in both to be true_, it follows that\nin both this hypothesis can be alike verified only by the organ of\nimmediate intuition--i.e. that other mode of human apprehension which is\nsupplementary to the rational. Here again we note the analogy. And if a\nman has this supplementary mode of apprehending the highest truth (by\nhypothesis such), it will be his duty to exercise his spiritual eyesight\nin searching for God in nature as in revelation, when (still on our\npresent hypothesis that 'God is, and is the rewarder of them who seek\nHim diligently') he will find that his subjective evidence of God in\nNature and in Revelation will mutually corroborate one another--so\nyielding additional evidence to his reason.\n\nThe teleology of Revelation supplements that of Nature, and so, to the\nspiritually minded man, they logically and mutually corroborate one\nanother.\n\nPaley's writings form an excellent illustration of the identity of the\nteleological argument from Nature and from Revelation; though a very\nimperfect illustration of the latter taken by itself, inasmuch as he\ntreats only of the New Testament, and even of that very\npartially--ignoring all that went before Christ, and much of what\nhappened after the apostles. Yet Paley himself does not seem to have\nobserved the similarity of the argument, as developed in his _Natural\nTheology_ and _Evidences of Christianity_ respectively. But no one has\ndeveloped the argument better in both cases. His great defect was in not\nperceiving that this teleological argument, _per se_, is not in either\ncase enough to convince, but only to arouse serious attention. Paley\neverywhere represents that such an appeal to reason alone ought to be\nsufficient. He fails to see that if it were, there could be no room for\nfaith. In other words, he fails to recognize the spiritual organ in\nman, and its complementary object, grace in God. So far he fails to be a\nChristian. And, whether Theism and Christianity be true or false, it is\ncertain that the teleological argument alone _ought_ to result, not in\nconviction, but in agnosticism.\n\n\nThe antecedent improbability against a miracle being wrought by a man\nwithout a moral object is apt to be confused with that of its being done\nby God with an adequate moral object. The former is immeasurably great;\nthe latter is only equal to that of the theory of Theism--i.e. _nil_.\n\n\n_Christian Demonology_[77].\n\nIt will be said, 'However you may seek to explain away _a priori_\nobjections to miracles on _a priori_ grounds, there remains the fact\nthat Christ accepted the current superstition in regard to diabolic\npossession. Now the devils damn the doctrine. For you must choose the\nhorn of your dilemma, either the current theory was true or it was not.\nIf you say true, you must allow that the same theory is true for all\nsimilar stages of culture, [but not for the later stages,] and therefore\nthat the most successful exorcist is Science, albeit Science works not\nby faith in the theory, but by rejection of it. Observe, the diseases\nare so well described by the record, that there is no possibility of\nmistaking them. Hence you must suppose that they were due to devils in\nA.D. 30, and to nervous disorders in A.D. 1894. On the other hand, if\nyou choose the other horn, you must accept either the hypothesis of the\nignorance or that of the mendacity of Christ.'\n\nThe answer is, that either hypothesis may be accepted by Christianity.\nFor the sake of argument we may exclude the question whether the\nacceptance of the devil theory by Christ was really historical, or\nmerely attributed to Him by His biographers after His death. If Christ\nknew that the facts were not due to devils, He may also have known it\nwas best to fall in with current theory, rather than to puzzle the\npeople with a lecture on pathology. If He did not know, why should He,\nif He had previously 'emptied Himself' of omniscience? In either case,\nif He had denied the current theory, He would have been giving evidence\nof scientific knowledge or of scientific intuition beyond the culture of\nHis time, and this, as in countless other cases, was not in accordance\nwith His method, which, whether we suppose it divine or human, has\nnowhere proved His divine mission by foreknowledge of natural science.\n\nThe particular question of Christ and demonology is but part of a much\nlarger one.\n\n\n_Darwin's Difficulty_[78].\n\nThe answer to Darwin's objection about so small a proportion of mankind\nhaving ever heard of Christ, is manifold:--\n\n1. Supposing Christianity true, it is the highest and final revelation;\ni.e. the scheme of revelation has been developmental. Therefore, it\nfollows from the very method that the larger proportion of mankind\nshould never hear of Christ, i.e. all who live before His advent.\n\n2. But these were not left 'without witness.' They all had their\nreligion and their moral sense, each at its appropriate stage of\ndevelopment. Therefore 'the times of ignorance God winked at' (Acts\nxvii. 30).\n\n3. Moreover these men were not devoid of benefit from Christ, because it\nis represented that He died for all men--i.e. but for Him [i.e. apart\nfrom the knowledge of what was to come] God would not have 'winked at\nthe times of ignorance.' The efficacy of atonement is represented as\ntranscendental, and not dependent on the accident of hearing about the\nAtoner.\n\n4. It is remarkable that of all men Darwin should have been worsted by\nthis fallacious argument. For it has received its death-blow from the\ntheory of evolution: i.e. if it be true that evolution has been the\nmethod of natural causation, and if it be true that the method of\nnatural causation is due to a Divinity, then it follows that the\nlateness of Christ's appearance on earth must have been designed. For it\nis certain that He could not have appeared at any earlier date without\nhaving violated the method of evolution. Therefore, on the theory of\nTheism, He _ought_ to have appeared when He did--i.e. at the earliest\npossible moment in history.\n\nSo as to the suitability of the moment of Christ's appearance in other\nrespects. Even secular historians are agreed as to the suitability of\nthe combinations, and deduce the success of His system of morals and\nreligion from this fact. So with students of comparative religions.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[59] [I.e. a theory which comes at first as a shock to the current\nteaching of Christianity, but is finally seen to be in no antagonism to\nits necessary principles.--ED.]\n\n[60] [I.e. the battle in regard to the Christian texts or\ndocuments.--ED.]\n\n[61] See Gore's _Bampton Lectures_, pp. 74 ff.\n\n[62] Matt, xxviii. 17; Acts ii. 13.\n\n[63] _Three Essays on Theism_, p. 255.\n\n[64] [Note unfinished.--ED.]\n\n[65] [George Romanes began to make a collection of N.T. texts bearing on\nthe subject.--ED.]\n\n[66] See Pascal, _Pensees_, p. 245.\n\n[67] [The notes on this subject were often too fragmentary for\npublication.--ED.]\n\n[68] Ps. li.\n\n[69] _Pensees_, pp. 91-93.\n\n[70] See _Nineteenth Century_, May 1887.\n\n[71] [The essay mentioned above should be read in explanation of this\nexpression. George Romanes' meaning would be more accurately expressed,\nI think, had he said: 'The ideal of Christian character holds in\nprominence the elements which we regard as characteristically feminine,\ne.g. development of affections, readiness of trust, love of service,\nreadiness to suffer, &c.'--ED.]\n\n[72] See _Analogy_, part i. ch. 7; part ii. ch. 3, 4, &c.\n\n[73] See Conclusion of _Darwin and After Darwin_, part I.\n\n[74] I should somewhere show how much better a treatise Butler might\nhave written had he known about evolution as the general law of nature.\n\n[75] See Gore's _Bampton Lectures_, lect. ii.\n\n[76] _Pensees_, pp. 205 ff.\n\n[77] [Romanes' line of argument in this note seems to me impossible to\nmaintain. The emphasis which Jesus Christ lays on diabolic agency is so\ngreat that, if it is not a reality, He must be regarded either as\nseriously misled about realities which concern the spiritual life, or\nelse as seriously misleading others. And in neither case could He be\neven the perfect Prophet. I think I am justified in explaining my\ndisagreement with Romanes' argument at this point particularly.--ED.]\n\n[78] [There is nothing in Darwin's _writings_ which seems to me to\njustify Romanes in attributing this difficulty to him specially. But he\nknew Darwin so intimately and reverenced him so profoundly that he is\nnot likely to have been in error on the subject.--ED.]\n\n\n\n\n+Concluding Note by the Editor:--+\n\nThe intellectual attitude towards Christianity expressed in these notes\nmay be described as--(1) 'pure agnosticism' in the region of the\nscientific 'reason,' coupled with (2) a vivid recognition of the\nspiritual necessity of faith and of the legitimacy and value of its\nintuitions; (3) a perception of the positive strength of the historical\nand spiritual evidences of Christianity.\n\nGeorge Romanes came to recognize, as in these written notes so also in\nconversation, that it was 'reasonable to be a Christian believer' before\nthe activity or habit of faith had been recovered. His life was cut\nshort very soon after this point was reached; but it will surprise no\none to learn that the writer of these 'Thoughts' returned before his\ndeath to that full, deliberate communion with the Church of Jesus Christ\nwhich he had for so many years been conscientiously compelled to forego.\nIn his case the 'pure in heart' was after a long period of darkness\nallowed, in a measure before his death, to 'see God.'\n\n    _Fecisti nos ad te, Domine; et inquietum est cor nostrum donec\n    requiescat in te_.\n\n\nOXFORD: HORACE HART\nPRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY\n\n\nADVERTISEMENTS\n\n\nThe Oxford Library of Practical Theology\n\n     Edited by the Rev. W.C.E. NEWBOLT, M.A., Canon and\n     Chancellor of St. Paul's; and the Rev. DARWELL STONE,\n     M.A., Librarian of the Pusey House, Oxford.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n_Price 5s. each volume_.\n\n+RELIGION+. By the Rev. W.C.E. NEWBOLT, M.A., Canon and Chancellor of\nSt. Paul's.                                         [_Fifth Impression_.\n\n     '_The Oxford Library of Practical Theology_ makes a good beginning\n     with Canon Newbolt's volume on religion.... The publishers have\n     spared no pains in making the appearance of the volumes as\n     attractive as possible. The binding, type, and general \"get up\" of\n     the volume just issued leave nothing to be desired.'--_Guardian_.\n\n+HOLY BAPTISM+. By the Rev. DARWELL STONE, M.A., Librarian of the Pusey\nHouse, Oxford.                                         [_Third Edition_.\n\n     'Few books on Baptism contain more thoughtful and useful\n     instruction on the rite, and we give Mr. Stone's effort our highest\n     approval. It might well be made a text-book for candidates for the\n     diaconate, or at least in theological colleges. As a book for\n     thoughtful laymen it is also certain to find a place.'--_Church\n     Times_.\n\n+CONFIRMATION+. By the Right Rev. A.C.A. HALL, D.D., Bishop of Vermont.\n                                                    [_Third Impression_.\n\n     'To the parochial clergy this volume may be warmly commended. They\n     will find it to be a storehouse of material for their instruction,\n     and quite the best treatise that we have on the subject it treats.\n     It is thoroughly practical, and gives exactly the kind of teaching\n     that is wanted.'--_Guardian_.\n\n+THE HISTORY OF THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER+. By the Rev. LEIGHTON PULLAN,\nM.A., Fellow of St. John Baptist's College, Oxford,    [_Third Edition_.\n\n     'Mr. Pullan's book will no doubt have, as it deserves to have, a\n     large number of readers, and they will gain a great deal from the\n     perusal of it. It may be certainly recommended to the ordinary\n     layman as by far the best book on the subject available.'--_Pilot_.\n\n+HOLY MATRIMONY+. By the Rev. W.J. KNOX LITTLE, M.A., Canon of\nWorcester.                                            [_Second Edition_.\n\n     'Canon Knox Little has given us a most exhaustive treatise on Holy\n     Matrimony written in his best and happiest style, and giving ample\n     proofs of wide research and deep study of the various aspects, and\n     the essential characteristics of Christian marriage.... We would\n     strongly advise the clergy to place this work upon their shelves as\n     a book of reference, while it forms a complete manual of\n     instruction to aid them in the preparation of addresses on the\n     subject.'--_Church Bells_.\n\n+THE INCARNATION+. By the Rev. H.V.S. ECK, M.A., Rector of Bethnal\nGreen.                                                [_Second Edition_.\n\n     'The teaching is sound, and the book may be placed with confidence\n     in the hands of candidates for Orders or of intelligent and\n     educated lay people who desire fuller instruction on the central\n     doctrines of the Faith than can be provided in sermons.'\n     --_Guardian_.\n\n+FOREIGN MISSIONS+. By the Right Rev. E.T. CHURTON, D.D., formerly\nBishop of Nassau.\n\n     'We welcome Bishop Churton's book as an authoritative exposition of\n     the modern High Church view of Missions, It is good for us all to\n     understand it, thereby we shall be saved alike from uninstructed\n     admiration and indiscriminate denunciation.'--_Church Missionary\n     Intelligencer_.\n\n+PRAYER+. By the Rev. ARTHUR JOHN WORLLEDGE, M.A., Canon and Chancellor\nof Truro.                                             [_Second Edition_.\n\n     'We do not know of any book about prayer which is equally useful;\n     and we anticipate that it will be a standard work for, at any rate,\n     a considerable time.'--_Pilot_.\n\n+SUNDAY+. By the Rev. W.B. TREVELYAN, M.A., Vicar of St. Matthew's,\nWestminster.                                          [_Second Edition_.\n\n     'An extremely useful contribution to a difficult and important\n     subject, and we are confident it will rank high in the series to\n     which it belongs.'--_Guardian_.\n\n+THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION+. By the Rev. LEIGHTON PULLAN, M.A., Fellow of\nSt. John Baptist's College, Oxford.\n\n     'Mr. Pullan affirms that the critics of orthodox Christianity are\n     now destroying one another's theories much more than they are\n     destroying the Catholic Faith. However that may be, his book should\n     render some assistance in determining what is and what is not \"The\n     Faith once delivered to the Saints.\" It is a worthy addition to the\n     series to which it belongs.'--_Westminster Gazette_.\n\n+BOOKS OF DEVOTION+. By the Rev. CHARLES BODINGTON, Canon and Precentor\nof Lichfield.\n\n     'Extremely valuable for its high tone, fidelity to Catholic\n     standards, and powerful advocacy of reality in private devotion. To\n     those who have never studied the subject, it should reveal a mine\n     of devotional wealth, yet to be worked with profit to man and glory\n     to God.'--_Church Times_.\n\n+HOLY ORDERS+. By the Rev. A.R. WHITHAM, M.A., Principal of Culham\nCollege, Abingdon.\n\n     'For the educated layman who wishes to know what the Church is\n     teaching about the ministry, and what the relation of the laity to\n     it really is, this is the best book with which we have met. Young\n     men who are considering whether they will seek ordination will find\n     in it excellent statements on the position and work and\n     responsibilities of the ordained.'--_Pilot_.\n\n+THE CHURCH CATECHISM THE CHRISTIAN'S MANUAL+. By the Rev. W.C.E.\nNEWBOLT, M.A., Canon and Chancellor of St. Paul's.\n\n     'We think the book should be in the possession of every teacher who\n     can afford it, and in every Church Library for the benefit of those\n     who cannot.'--_The Reader and Layworker_.\n\n+THE HOLY COMMUNION+. By the Rev. DARWELL STONE, M.A., Librarian of the\nPusey House, Oxford.\n\n+RELIGIOUS CEREMONIAL+. By the Rev. WALTER HOWARD FRERE, M.A., of the\nCommunity of the Resurrection, Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of\nRochester.                                            [_In preparation_.\n\n+THE BIBLE+. By the Rev. DARWELL STONE, M.A., Librarian of the\nPusey House, Oxford.                                  [_In preparation_.\n\n+OLD TESTAMENT CRITICISM+. By the Very Rev. HENRY WACE, D.D., Dean of\nCanterbury.                                           [_In preparation_.\n\n+NEW TESTAMENT CRITICISM+. By the Rev. R.J. KNOWLING, D.D., Professor of\nNew Testament Exegesis at King's College, London.     [_In preparation_.\n\n+THE HOLY TRINITY+. By the Right Rev. L.G. MYLNE, D.D., late Bishop of\nBombay.                                               [_In preparation_.\n\n+THE ANGLICAN CHURCH+. By the Rev. ARTHUR JOHN WORLLEDGE, M.A., Canon\nand Chancellor of Truro.                              [_In preparation_.\n\n+THE ATONEMENT+. By the Rev. LEIGHTON PULLAN, M.A., Fellow of St. John\nBaptist's College, Oxford.                            [_In preparation_.\n\n+CHURCH HISTORY+. By the Rev. H.N. BATE, M.A., Fellow of Magdalen\nCollege, Oxford. 2 vols.                              [_In preparation_.\n\n+CHURCH WORK+. By the Rev. BERNARD REYNOLDS, M.A., Prebendary of St.\nPaul's.                                               [_In preparation_.\n\n+VISITATION OF THE SICK+. By the Rev. E.F. RUSSELL, M.A., of St.\nAlban's, Holborn.                                     [_In preparation_.\n\n\n+HANDBOOKS FOR THE CLERGY+\n\nEDITED BY THE REV. ARTHUR W. ROBINSON, B.D.\n\nVICAR OF ALLHALLOWS BARKING BY THE TOWER\n\n\n_Crown 8vo, price 2s. 6d. net each volume_.\n\n     The purpose of the writers of this Series is to present in a clear\n     and attractive way the responsibilities and opportunities of the\n     Clergy of to-day, and to offer such practical guidance, in regard\n     both to aims and to methods, as experience may have shown to be\n     valuable. It is hoped that the Series, while primarily intended for\n     those who are already face to face with the duties and problems of\n     the ministerial office, may be of interest and assistance also to\n     others who are considering the question of entering into Holy\n     Orders.\n\nTHIRD IMPRESSION.\n\n+THE PERSONAL LIFE OF THE CLERGY+. By the EDITOR.\n\n     'It is a short book, but it covers a wide, field. Every line of it\n     tells, and it is excellent reading. Not the least valuable part of\n     the book are the extremely apt and striking quotations from various\n     writers of eminence, which are placed in the form of notes at the\n     end of the chapters. It is emphatically a book for both clergy and\n     laity to buy and study.'--_Church Times_.\n\n     'We are grateful for a little book which will be of service to many\n     priests, young and old. We need more priests, and such a book may\n     well increase their number by explaining the nature of the life to\n     which a vocation to Holy Orders calls men; but we need still more\n     that priests should realise the life to which they are called and\n     pledged; and this they can hardly fail to do if they listen to Mr.\n     Robinson's prudent and tender counsels.'--_Church Quarterly\n     Review_.\n\nSECOND EDITION.\n\n+PATRISTIC STUDY+. By the Rev. H.B. SWETE, D.D., Regius Professor of\nDivinity in the University of Cambridge.\n\n     'The whole of the work which this little volume contains is most\n     admirably done. Sufficient is told about the personal history of\n     the Fathers to make the study of their writings profitable.'\n     --_Church Quarterly Review_.\n\n     'This is an admirable little guide-book to wide study by one who\n     well knows how to guide. It is sound and learned, and crammed full\n     of information, yet pleasant in style and easy to understand.'\n     --_Pall Mall Gazette_.\n\nSECOND IMPRESSION.\n\n+THE MINISTRY OF CONVERSION+. By the Rev. A.J. MASON, D.D., Master of\nPembroke College, Cambridge, and Canon of Canterbury.\n\n     'It will be found most valuable and interesting.'--_Guardian_.\n\n     'Canon Mason has given a manual that should be carefully studied by\n     all, whether clergy or laity, who have in any way to share in the\n     \"Ministry of Conversion\" by preaching, by parochial organisation,\n     or by personal influence.'--_Scottish Guardian._\n\nTHIRD IMPRESSION.\n\n+FOREIGN MISSIONS+. By the Right Rev. H.H. MONTGOMERY, D.D., formerly\nBishop of Tasmania, Secretary of the Society for the Propagation of the\nGospel in Foreign Parts.\n\n     'Bishop Montgomery's admirable little book.... Into a limited\n     compass he has compressed the very kind of information which gives\n     one an adequate impression of the spirit which pervades a religion,\n     of what is its strength and weakness, what its relation to\n     Christianity, what, the side upon which it must be approached.'\n     _Church Quarterly Review_.\n\nTHIRD IMPRESSION.\n\n+THE STUDY OF THE GOSPELS+. By the Very Rev. J. ARMITAGE ROBINSON, D.D.,\nDean of Westminster.\n\n     'Nothing could be more desirable than that the Anglican clergy\n     should be equipped with knowledge of the kind to which this little\n     volume will introduce them, and should regard the questions with\n     which Biblical study abounds in the candid spirit, and with the\n     breadth of view which they see here exemplified.'--_Spectator_.\n\n     'The little book on the Gospels, which the new Dean of Westminster\n     has recently published, is one to be warmly commended alike to\n     clergy and laity. Any intelligent person who takes the trouble to\n     work through this little volume of 150 pages will be rewarded by\n     gaining from it as clear a view of the synoptic problem as is\n     possible without prolonged and independent study of the\n     sources.'--_The Pilot_.\n\n+A CHRISTIAN APOLOGETIC+. By the Very Rev. WILFORD L. ROBBINS, Dean of\nthe General Theological Seminary, New York; Author of _An Essay toward\nFaith_.\n\n     'We commend this handbook with confidence as a helpful guide to\n     those clergy and teachers who have thoughtful doubters to deal with,\n     and who wish to build safely if they build at all.'--_Church of\n     Ireland Gazette._\n\n+PASTORAL VISITATION+. By the Rev. H.E. SAVAGE, M.A., Vicar of South\nShields, and Hon. Canon of Durham.\n\n     'This is an excellent book.'--_Spectator_.\n\n+AUTHORITY IN THE CHURCH+. By the Very Rev. T.B. STRONG, D.D., Dean of\nChrist Church.\n\n     'This is a valuable and timely book, small in bulk, but weighty\n     both in style and substance.... The Dean's essay is an admirable\n     one, and is well calculated to clear men's minds in regard to\n     questions of very far-reaching importance. Its calm tone, and its\n     clear and penetrating thought, are alike characteristic of the\n     author, and give a peculiar distinction to everything he\n     writes.'--_Guardian_.\n\n+THE STUDY OF ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY+. By the Right Rev. W.E. COLLINS,\nD.D., Bishop of Gibraltar.\n\n     'A book which displays the master-mind on every page, and has what\n     many master-minds lack, a sober, practical, common-sense strain\n     about it, which is hardly ever found in those who set out to\n     instruct us in Church History, or Canon Law, or Catholic use.'\n     --_Church Bells_.\n\n+LAY WORK AND THE OFFICE OF READER+. By the Right Rev. HUYSHE\nYEATMAN-BIGGS, D.D., Lord Bishop of Southwark.\n\n+RELIGION AND SCIENCE+. By the Rev. P.N. WAGGETT, M.A., of the Society\nof St. John the Evangelist, Cowley.\n\n+CHURCH MUSIC+. By A. MADELEY RICHARDSON, Mus. Doc., Organist of St.\nSaviour's Collegiate Church, Southwark.\n\n+INTEMPERANCE+. By the Right Rev. H.H. PEREIRA, D.D., Bishop of Croydon.\n                                                      [_In preparation_.\n\n+SCHOOLS+. By the Rev. W. FOXLEY NORRIS, M.A., Rector of Barnsley, and\nHon. Canon of Wakefield.                              [_In preparation_.\n\n\nLONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.\nLONDON, NEW YORK, AND BOMBAY","title":"Thoughts on Religion","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":45713}