{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_17147/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_17147","id":"gutenberg_17147","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/17147","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Free will and determinism","Theism","Theodicy"],"text":"Produced by John Hagerson, Juliet Sutherland, Keith Edkins\nand the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at\nhttps://www.pgdp.net\n\n\n\n\n\nTheodicy\n\nEssays on\nthe Goodness of God\nthe Freedom of Man and\nthe Origin of Evil\n\nG.W. LEIBNIZ\n\nEdited with an Introduction by Austin Farrer, Fellow of Trinity College,\nOxford\n\nTranslated by E.M. Huggard from C.J. Gerhardt's Edition of the Collected\nPhilosophical Works, 1875-90\n\nOpen [Logo] Court\n\nLa Salle, Illinois 61301\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[Logo]\n\nOPEN COURT and the above logo are registered in the U.S. Patent & Trademark\nOffice.\n\n  Published 1985 by Open Court Publishing Company, Peru, Illinois 61354.\n  This edition first published 1951 by Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited,\n      London.\n  Second printing 1988\n  Third printing 1990\n  Fourth printing 1993\n  Fifth printing 1996\n\nPrinted and bound in the United States of America.\n\nLIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA\n\n  Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Freiherr von, 1646-1716.\n    Theodicy: essays on the goodness of God, the\n  freedom of man, and the origin of evil.\n\n    Translation of: Essais de Theodicee.\n    Includes index.\n    1. Theodicy--Early works to 1800. I. Title.\n  B2590.E5 1985 231'.8 85-8833\n  ISBN O-87548-437-9\n\n                                                                        [5]\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nCONTENTS\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nEDITOR'S INTRODUCTION                                                page 7\nPREFACE                                                                  49\nPRELIMINARY DISSERTATION ON THE CONFORMITY OF FAITH WITH                 73\nREASON\nESSAYS ON THE JUSTICE OF GOD AND THE FREEDOM OF MAN IN THE    123, 182, 276\nORIGIN OF EVIL, IN THREE PARTS\n                                APPENDICES\nSUMMARY OF THE CONTROVERSY, REDUCED TO FORMAL ARGUMENTS                 377\nEXCURSUS ON THEODICY, Sec. 392                                             389\nREFLEXIONS ON THE WORK THAT MR. HOBBES PUBLISHED IN                     393\nENGLISH ON 'FREEDOM, NECESSITY AND CHANCE'\nOBSERVATIONS ON THE BOOK CONCERNING 'THE ORIGIN OF EVIL',               405\nPUBLISHED RECENTLY IN LONDON\nCAUSA DEI ASSERTA                                                       443\nINDEX                                                                   445\n\n                                                                        [7]\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nEDITOR'S INTRODUCTION\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nI\n\nLeibniz was above all things a metaphysician. That does not mean that his\nhead was in the clouds, or that the particular sciences lacked interest for\nhim. Not at all--he felt a lively concern for theological debate, he was a\nmathematician of the first rank, he made original contributions to physics,\nhe gave a realistic attention to moral psychology. But he was incapable of\nlooking at the objects of any special enquiry without seeing them as\naspects or parts of one intelligible universe. He strove constantly after\nsystem, and the instrument on which his effort relied was the speculative\nreason. He embodied in an extreme form the spirit of his age. Nothing could\nbe less like the spirit of ours. To many people now alive metaphysics means\na body of wild and meaningless assertions resting on spurious argument. A\nprofessor of metaphysics may nowadays be held to deal handsomely with the\nduties of his chair if he is prepared to handle metaphysical statements at\nall, though it be only for the purpose of getting rid of them, by showing\nthem up as confused forms of something else. A chair in metaphysical\nphilosophy becomes analogous to a chair in tropical diseases: what is\ntaught from it is not the propagation but the cure.\n\nConfidence in metaphysical construction has ebbed and flowed through\nphilosophical history; periods of speculation have been followed by periods\nof criticism. The tide will flow again, but it has not turned yet, and  [8]\nsuch metaphysicians as survive scarcely venture further than to argue a\ncase for the possibility of their art. It would be an embarrassing task to\nopen an approach to Leibnitian metaphysics from the present metaphysical\nposition, if there is a present position. If we want an agreed\nstarting-point, it will have to be historical.\n\nThe historical importance of Leibniz's ideas is anyhow unmistakable. If\nmetaphysical thinking is nonsensical, its empire over the human imagination\nmust still be confessed; if it is as chimerical a science as alchemy, it is\nno less fertile in by-products of importance. And if we are to consider\nLeibniz historically, we cannot do better than take up his _Theodicy_, for\ntwo reasons. It was the only one of his main philosophical works to be\npublished in his lifetime, so that it was a principal means of his direct\ninfluence; the Leibniz his own age knew was the Leibniz of the _Theodicy_.\nThen in the second place, the _Theodicy_ itself is peculiarly rich in\nhistorical material. It reflects the world of men and books which Leibniz\nknew; it expresses the theological setting of metaphysical speculation\nwhich still predominated in the first years of the eighteenth century.\n\nLeibniz is remembered for his philosophy; he was not a professional\nphilosopher. He was offered academic chairs, but he declined them. He was a\ngentleman, a person of means, librarian to a reigning prince, and\nfrequently employed in state affairs of trust and importance. The librarian\nmight at any moment become the political secretary, and offer his own\ncontributions to policy. Leibniz was for the greater part of his active\nlife the learned and confidential servant of the House of Brunswick; when\nthe Duke had nothing better to do with him, he set him to research into\nducal history. If Leibniz had a profession in literature, it was history\nrather than philosophy. He was even more closely bound to the interests of\nhis prince than John Locke was to those of the Prince of Orange. The Houses\nof Orange and of Brunswick were on the same side in the principal contest\nwhich divided Europe, the battle between Louis XIV and his enemies. It was\na turning-point of the struggle when the Prince of Orange supplanted\nLouis's Stuart friends on the English throne. It was a continuation of the\nsame movement, when Leibniz's master, George I, succeeded to the same\nthrone, and frustrated the restoration of the Stuart heir. Locke returned\nto England in the wake of the Prince of Orange, and became the          [9]\nrepresentative thinker of the regime. Leibniz wished to come to the English\ncourt of George I, but was unkindly ordered to attend to the duties of his\nlibrarianship. So he remained in Hanover. He was then an old man, and\nbefore the tide of favour had turned, he died.\n\nPosterity has reckoned Locke and Leibniz the heads of rival sects, but\npolitically they were on the same side. As against Louis's political\nabsolutism and enforced religious uniformity, both championed religious\ntoleration and the freedom of the mind. Their theological liberalism was\npolitical prudence; it was not necessarily for that reason the less\npersonally sincere. They had too much wisdom to meet bigotry with bigotry,\nor set Protestant intolerance against Catholic absolutism. But they had too\nmuch sympathy with the spirit of Europe to react into free thinking or to\nmake a frontal attack on revealed truth. They took their stand on a\nfundamental Christian theism, the common religion of all good men; they\nrepudiated the negative enormities of Hobbes and Spinoza.\n\nThe Christian was to hold a position covered by three lines of defences.\nThe base line was to be the substance of Christian theism and of Christian\nmorals, and it was to be held by the forces of sheer reason, without aid\nfrom scriptural revelation. The middle line was laid down by the general\nsense of Scripture, and the defence of it was this. 'Scriptural doctrine is\nreconcilable with the findings of sheer reason, but it goes beyond them. We\nbelieve the Scriptures, because they are authenticated by marks of\nsupernatural intervention in the circumstances of their origin. We believe\nthem, but reason controls our interpretation of them.' There remained the\nmost forward and the most hazardous line: the special positions which a\nChurch, a sect, or an individual might found upon the scriptural\nrevelation. A prudent man would not hold his advance positions in the same\nforce or defend them with the same obstinacy as either of the lines behind\nthem. He could argue for them, but he could not require assent to them.\n\nOne cannot help feeling, indeed, the readiness of these writers to fall\nback, not only from the front line to the middle line, but from the middle\nline itself to the base line. Leibniz, for example, writes with perfect\nseriousness and decency about the Christian scheme of redemption, but it\nhardly looks like being for him a crucial deliverance from perdition. It is\nnot the intervention of Mercy, by which alone He possesses himself of  [10]\nus: it is one of the ways in which supreme Benevolence carries out a cosmic\npolicy; and God's benevolence is known by pure reason, and apart from\nChristian revelation.\n\nIn one politically important particular the theological attitude of Leibniz\ndiffered from that of Locke. Both stood for toleration and for the\nminimizing of the differences between the sects. This was a serious enough\nmatter in England, but it was an even more serious matter in Germany. For\nGermany was divided between Catholics and Protestants; effective toleration\nmust embrace them both. English toleration might indulge a harmless\nCatholic minority, while rejecting the Catholic regime as the embodiment of\nintolerance. But this was not practical politics on the Continent; you must\ntolerate Catholicism on an equal footing, and come to terms with Catholic\nregimes. Leibniz was not going to damn the Pope with true Protestant\nfervour. It was his consistent aim to show that his theological principles\nwere as serviceable to Catholic thinkers as to the doctors of his own\nchurch. On some points, indeed, he found his most solid support from\nCatholics; in other places there are hints of a joint Catholic-Lutheran\nfront against Calvinism. But on the whole Leibniz's writings suggest that\nthe important decisions cut across all the Churches, and not between them.\n\nLeibniz was impelled to a compromise with 'popery', not only by the\nreligious divisions of Germany, but (at one stage) by the political\nweakness of the German Protestant States. At the point of Louis XIV's\nhighest success, the Protestant princes had no hope but in Catholic\nAustria, and Austria was distracted by Turkish pressure in the rear.\nLeibniz hoped to relieve the situation by preaching a crusade. Could not\nthe Christian princes sink their differences and unite against the infidel?\nAnd could not the Christian alliance be cemented by theological agreement?\nHence Leibniz's famous negotiation with Bossuet for a basis of\nCatholic-Lutheran concord. It was plainly destined to fail; and it was\nbound to recoil upon its author. How could he be a true Protestant who\ntreated the differences with the Catholics as non-essentials? How could he\nhave touched pitch and taken no defilement? Leibniz was generally admired,\nbut he was not widely trusted. As a mere politician, he may be judged to\nhave over-reached himself.\n\nIt has been the object of the preceding paragraphs to show that Leibniz[11]\nthe politician and Leibniz the theologian were one and the same person; not\nat all to suggest that his rational theology was just political expediency.\nWe may apply to him a parody of his own doctrine, the pre-established\nharmony between nature and grace. Everything happens as though Leibniz were\na liberal politician, and his theology expressed his politics. Yes, but\nequally, everything happens as though Leibniz were a philosophical\ntheologian, and his politics expressed his theology. His appreciation of\nCatholic speculation was natural and sincere; his dogmatic ancestry is to\nbe looked for in Thomism and Catholic humanism as much as anywhere. Above\nall, he had himself a liberal and generous mind. It gave him pleasure to\nappreciate good wherever he could see it, and to discover a soul of truth\nin every opinion.\n\nFrom the moment when Leibniz became aware of himself as an independent\nthinker, he was the man of a doctrine. Sometimes he called it 'my\nprinciples', sometimes 'the new system', sometimes 'pre-established\nharmony'. It could be quite briefly expressed; he was always ready to\noblige his friends with a summary statement, either in a letter or an\nenclosed memorandum, and several such have come down to us. The doctrine\nmay have been in Leibniz's view simple, but it was applicable to every\ndepartment of human speculation or enquiry. It provided a new alphabet of\nphilosophical ideas, and everything in heaven and earth could be expressed\nin it; not only could be, but ought to be, and Leibniz showed tireless\nenergy in working out restatements of standing problems.\n\nAs a man with an idea, with a philosophical nostrum, Leibniz may be\ncompared to Bishop Berkeley. There was never any more doubt that Leibniz\nwas a Leibnitian than that Berkeley was a Berkeleian. But there is no\ncomparison between the two men in the width of their range. About many\nthings Berkeley never took the trouble to Berkeleianize. To take the most\nsurprising instance of his neglect--he assured the world that his whole\ndoctrine pointed to, and hung upon, theology. But what sort of a theology?\nHe scarcely took the first steps in the formulation of it. He preferred to\nkeep on defending and explaining his _esse est percipi_. With Leibniz it is\nwholly different; he carries his new torch into every corner, to illuminate\nthe dark questions.\n\nThe wide applicability of pre-established harmony might come home to its\ninventor as a rich surprise. The reflective historian will find it less[12]\nsurprising, for he will suspect that the applications were in view from the\nstart. What was Leibniz thinking of when the new principle flashed upon\nhim? What was he _not_ thinking of? He had a many-sided mind. If the\norigins of the principle were complex, little wonder that its applications\nwere manifold. Every expositor of Leibniz who does not wish to be endlessly\ntedious must concentrate attention on one aspect of Leibniz's principle,\nand one source of its origin. We will here give an account of the matter\nwhich, we trust, will go most directly to the heart of it, but we will make\nno claims to sufficient interpretation of Leibniz's thought-processes.\n\nLeibniz, then, like all the philosophers of the seventeenth century, was\nreforming scholasticism in the light of a new physical science. The science\nwas mathematical in its form, mechanistical in its doctrine, and\nunanswerable in its evidence--it got results. But it was metaphysically\nintractable, and the doctrines of infinite and finite substance which it\ngenerated furnish a gallery of metaphysical grotesques; unless we are to\nexcept Leibniz; his system is, if nothing else, a miracle of ingenuity, and\nthere are moments when we are in danger of believing it.\n\nIt is a natural mistake for the student of seventeenth-century thought to\nunderestimate the tenacity of scholastic Aristotelianism. Descartes, we all\nknow, was reared in it, but then Descartes overthrew it; and he had done\nhis work and died by the time that Leibniz was of an age to philosophize at\nall. We expect to see Leibniz starting on his shoulders and climbing on\nfrom there. We are disappointed. Leibniz himself tells us that he was\nraised in the scholastic teaching. His acquaintance with Descartes's\nopinions was second-hand, and they were retailed to him only that they\nmight be derided. He agreed, like an amiable youth, with his preceptors.\n\nThe next phase of his development gave him a direct knowledge of Cartesian\nwritings, and of other modern books beside, such as those of the atomist\nGassendi. He was delighted with what he read, because of its fertility in\nthe field of physics and mathematics; and for a short time he was an\nenthusiastic modern. But presently he became dissatisfied. The new systems\ndid not go far enough, they were still scientifically inadequate. At the\nsame time they went too far, and carried metaphysical paradox beyond the\nlimits of human credulity.\n\n                                                                       [13]\nThere is no mystery about Leibniz's scientific objections to the new\nphilosophers. If he condemned them here, it was on the basis of scientific\nthought and observation. Descartes's formulation of the laws of motion\ncould, for example, be refuted by physical experiment; and if his general\nview of physical nature was bound up with it, then so much the worse for\nthe Cartesian philosophy. But whence came Leibniz's more strictly\nmetaphysical objections? Where had he learned that standard of metaphysical\nadequacy which showed up the inadequacy of the new metaphysicians? His own\ndisciples might be satisfied to reply, that he learnt it from Reason\nherself; but the answer will not pass with us. Leibniz reasoned, indeed,\nbut he did not reason from nowhere, nor would he have got anywhere if he\nhad. His conception of metaphysical reason was what his early scholastic\ntraining had made it.\n\nThere are certain absurd opinions which we are sure we have been taught,\nalthough, when put to it, we find it hard to name the teacher. Among them\nis something of this sort. 'Leibniz was a scholarly and sympathetic\nthinker. He had more sense of history than his contemporaries, and he was\ninstinctively eclectic. He believed he could learn something from each of\nhis great predecessors. We see him reaching back to cull a notion from\nPlato or from Aristotle; he even found something of use in the scholastics.\nIn particular, he picked out the Aristotelian \"entelechy\" to stop a gap in\nthe philosophy of his own age.' What this form of statement ignores is that\nLeibniz _was_ a scholastic: a scholastic endeavouring, like Descartes\nbefore him, to revolutionize scholasticism. The word 'entelechy' was,\nindeed, a piece of antiquity which Leibniz revived, but the thing for which\nit stood was the most familiar of current scholastic conceptions.\n'Entelechy' means active principle of wholeness or completion in an\nindividual thing. Scholasticism was content to talk about it under the name\nof 'substantial form' or 'formal cause'. But the scholastic interpretation\nof the idea was hopelessly discredited by the new science, and the\nscholastic terms shared the discredit of scholastic doctrine. Leibniz\nwanted a term with a more general sound. 'There is an _X_', he wanted to\nsay, 'which scholasticism has defined as substantial form, but I am going\nto give a new definition of it.' Entelechy was a useful name for _X_, the\nmore so as it had the authority of Aristotle, the master of scholasticism.\n\nUnder the name of entelechy Leibniz was upholding the soul of          [14]\nscholastic doctrine, while retrenching the limbs and outward flourishes.\nThe doctrine of substantial form which he learnt in his youth had had\n_something_ in it; he could not settle down in the principles of Descartes\nor of Gassendi, because both ignored this vital _something_. Since the\nrequirements of a new science would not allow a return to sheer\nscholasticism, it was necessary to find a fresh philosophy, in which\nentelechy and mechanism might be accommodated side by side.\n\nIf one had asked any 'modern' of the seventeenth century to name the\n'ancient' doctrine he most abominated, he would most likely have replied,\n'Substantial form'. Let us recall what was rejected under this name, and\nwhy.\n\nThe medieval account of physical nature had been dominated by what we may\ncall common-sense biology. Biology, indeed, is the science of the living,\nand the medievals were no more inclined than we are to endow all physical\nbodies with life. What they did do was to take living bodies as typical,\nand to treat other bodies as imperfectly analogous to them. Such an\napproach was _a priori_ reasonable enough. For we may be expected to know\nbest the physical being closest to our own; and we, at any rate, are alive.\nWhy not argue from the better known to the less known, from the nearer to\nthe more remote, interpreting other things by the formula of our own being,\nand allowing whatever discount is necessary for their degree of unlikeness\nto us?\n\nCommon-sense biology reasons as follows. In a living body there is a\ncertain pattern of organized parts, a certain rhythm of successive motions,\nand a certain range of characteristic activities. The pattern, the sheer\nanatomy, is basic; but it cannot long continue to exist (outside a\nrefrigerator) without accompanying vital rhythms in heart, respiration and\ndigestion. Nor do these perform their parts without the intermittent\nsupport of variable but still characteristic activities: dogs not only\nbreathe and digest, they run about, hunt their food, look for mates, bark\nat cats, and so on. The anatomical pattern, the vital rhythm, and the\ncharacteristic acts together express dogginess; they reveal the specific\nform of the dog. They _reveal_ it; exactly what the specific form\n_consisted in_ was the subject of much medieval speculation. It need not\nconcern us here.\n\nTaking the form of the species for granted, common-sense biology proceeds\nto ask how it comes to be in a given instance, say in the dog Toby.    [15]\nBefore this dog was born or thought of, his form or species was displayed\nin each of his parents. And now it looks as though the form of dog had\ndetached itself from them through the generative act, and set up anew on\nits own account. How does it do that? By getting hold of some materials in\nwhich to express itself. At first it takes them from the body of the\nmother, afterwards it collects them from a wider environment, and what the\ndog eats becomes the dog.\n\nWhat, then, is the relation of the assimilated materials to the dog-form\nwhich assimilates them? Before assimilation, they have their own form.\nBefore the dog eats the leg of mutton, it has the form given to it by its\nplace in the body of a sheep. What happens to the mutton? Is it without\nremainder transubstantiated from sheep into dog? It loses all its\ndistinctively sheep-like characteristicsm but there may be some more\nbasically material characteristics which it preserves. They underlay the\nstructure of the mutton, and they continue to underlie the structure of the\ndog's flesh which supplants it. Whatever these characteristics may be, let\nus call them common material characteristics, and let us say that they\nbelong to or compose a common material nature.\n\nThe common material nature has its own way of existing, and perhaps its own\nprinciples of physical action. We may suppose that we know much or that we\nknow little about it. This one thing at least we know, that it is capable\nof becoming alternatively either mutton or dog's flesh. It is not essential\nto it to be mutton, or mutton it would always be; nor dog's flesh, or it\nwould always be dog's flesh. It is capable of becoming either, according as\nit is captured by one or other system of formal organization. So the voters\nwho are to go to the polls are, by their common nature, Englishmen; they\nare essentially neither Socialist curs nor Conservative sheep, but\nintrinsically capable of becoming either, if they become captured by either\nsystem of party organization.\n\nAccording to this way of thinking, there is a certain _looseness_ about the\nrelation of the common material nature to the higher forms of organization\ncapable of capturing it. Considered in itself alone, it is perhaps to be\nseen as governed by absolutely determined laws of its own. It is heavy,\nthen it will fall unless obstructed; it is solid, then it will resist\nintrusions. But considered as material for organization by higher forms, it\nis indeterminate. It acts in one sort of way under the persuasion of the\nsheep-form, and in another sort of way under the persuasion of the     [16]\ndog-form, and we cannot tell how it will act until we know which form is\ngoing to capture it. No amount of study bestowed on the common material\nnature will enable us to judge how it will behave under the persuasion of\nthe higher organizing form. The only way to discover that is to examine the\nhigher form itself.\n\nEvery form, then, will really be the object of a distinct science. The form\nof the sheep and the form of the dog have much in common, but that merely\nhappens to be so; we cannot depend upon it, or risk inferences from sheep\nto dog: we must examine each in itself; we shall really need a science of\nprobatology about sheep, and cynology about dogs. Again, the common\nmaterial nature has its own principles of being and action, so it will need\na science of itself, which we may call hylology. Each of these sciences is\nmistress in her own province; but how many there are, and how puzzlingly\nthey overlap! So long as we remain within the province of a single science,\nwe may be able to think rigorously, everything will be 'tight'. But as soon\nas we consider border-issues between one province and another, farewell to\nexactitude: everything will be 'loose'. We can think out hylology till we\nare blue in the face, but we shall never discover anything about the entry\nof material elements into higher organizations, or how they behave when\nthey get there. We may form perfect definitions and descriptions of the\nform of the dog as such, and still derive no rules for telling what\nelements of matter will enter into the body of a given dog or how they will\nbe placed when they do. All we can be sure of is, that the dog-form will\nkeep itself going in, and by means of, the material it embodies--unless the\ndog dies. But what happens to the matter in the body of the dog is\n'accidental' to the nature of the matter; and the use of this matter,\nrather than of some other equally suitable, is accidental to the nature of\nthe dog.\n\nNo account of material events can dispense with accidental relations\naltogether. We must at least recognize that there are accidental relations\nbetween particular things. Accident in the sense of brute fact had to be\nacknowledged even by the tidiest and most dogmatic atomism of the last\ncentury. That atomism must allow it to be accidental, in this sense, that\nthe space surrounding any given atom was occupied by other atoms in a given\nmanner. It belonged neither to the nature of space to be occupied by just\nthose atoms in just those places, nor to the nature of the atoms to be [17]\ndistributed just like that over space; and so in a certain sense the\nenvironment of any atom was an accidental environment. That is, the\nparticular arrangement of the environment was accidental. The nature of the\nenvironment was not accidental at all. It was proper to the nature of the\natom to be in interaction with other atoms over a spatial field, and it\nnever encountered in the fellow-denizens of space any other nature but its\nown. It was not subject to the accident of meeting strange natures, nor of\nbecoming suddenly subject to strange or unequal laws of interaction. All\ninteractions, being with its own kind, were reciprocal and obedient to a\nsingle set of calculable laws.\n\nBut the medieval philosophy had asserted accidental relations between\ndistinct sorts of _natures_, the form of living dog and the form of dead\nmatter, for example. No one could know _a priori_ what effect an accidental\nrelation would produce, and all accidental relations between different\npairs of natures were different: at the most there was analogy between\nthem. Every different nature had to be separately observed, and when you\nhad observed them all, you could still simply write an inventory of them,\nyou could not hope to rationalize your body of knowledge. Let us narrow the\nfield and consider what this doctrine allows us to know about the wood of a\ncertain kind of tree. We shall begin by observing the impressions it makes\non our several senses, and we shall attribute to it a substantial form such\nas naturally to give rise to these impressions, without, perhaps, being so\nrash as to claim a knowledge of what this substantial form is. Still we do\nnot know what its capacities of physical action and passion may be. We\nshall find them out by observing it in relation to different 'natures'. It\nturns out to be combustible by fire, resistant to water, tractable to the\ncarpenter's tools, intractable to his digestive organs, harmless to\nostriches, nourishing to wood-beetles. Each of these capacities of the wood\nis distinct; we cannot relate them intelligibly to one another, nor deduce\nthem from the assumed fundamental 'woodiness'.\n\nWe can now see why 'substantial forms' were the _betes noires_ of the\nseventeenth-century philosophers. It was because they turned nature into an\nunmanageable jungle, in which trees, bushes, and parasites of a thousand\nkinds wildly interlaced. There was nothing for it, if science was to\nproceed, but to clear the ground and replant with spruce in rows: to\npostulate a single uniform nature, of which there should be a single\nscience. Now neither probatology nor cynology could hope to be         [18]\nuniversal--the world is not all sheep nor all dog: it would have to be\nhylology; for the world is, in its spatial aspect, all material. Let us\nsay, then, that there is one uniform material nature of things, and that\neverything else consists in the arrangements of the basic material nature;\nas the show of towers and mountains in the sunset results simply from an\narrangement of vapours. And let us suppose that the interactions of the\nparts of matter are all like those which we can observe in dead manipulable\nbodies--in mechanism, in fact. Such was the postulate of the new\nphilosophers, and it yielded them results.\n\nIt yielded them results, and that was highly gratifying. But what,\nmeanwhile, had happened to those palpable facts of common experience from\nwhich the whole philosophy of substantial forms had taken its rise? Is the\nwholeness of a living thing the mere resultant of the orderly operations of\nits parts? Is a bee no more essentially one than a swarm is? Is the life of\na living animal indistinguishable from the rhythm of a going watch, except\nin degree of complication and subtlety of contrivance? And if an animal's\nbody, say my own, is simply an agglomerate of minute interacting material\nunits, and its wholeness is merely accidental and apparent, how is my\nconscious mind to be adjusted to it? For my consciousness appears to\nidentify itself with that whole vital pattern which used to be called the\nsubstantial form. We are now told that the pattern is nothing real or\nactive, but the mere accidental resultant of distinct interacting forces:\nit does no work, it exercises no influence or control, it _is_ nothing. How\nthen can it be the vehicle and instrument of my conscious soul? It cannot.\nThen is my soul homeless? Or is it to be identified with the activity and\nfortunes of a single atomic constituent of my body, a single cog in the\nanimal clockwork? If so, how irrational! For the soul does not experience\nitself as the soul of one minute part, but as the soul of the body.\n\nSuch questions rose thick and fast in the minds of the seventeenth-century\nphilosophers. It will cause us no great surprise that Leibniz should have\nquickly felt that the Formal Principle of Aristotle and of the Scholastic\nphilosophy must be by hook or by crook reintroduced--not as the detested\n_substantial form_, but under a name by which it might hope to smell more\nsweet, _entelechy_.\n\nNothing so tellingly revealed the difficulties of the new philosophy in[19]\ndealing with living bodies as the insufficiency of the solutions Descartes\nhad proposed. He had boldly declared the unity of animal life to be purely\nmechanical, and denied that brutes had souls at all, or any sensation. He\nhad to admit soul in man, but he still denied the substantial unity of the\nhuman body. It was put together like a watch, it was many things, not one:\nif Descartes had lived in our time, he would have been delighted to compare\nit with a telephone system, the nerves taking the place of the wires, and\nbeing so arranged that all currents of 'animal spirit' flowing in them\nconverged upon a single unit, a gland at the base of the brain. In this\nunit, or in the convergence of all the motions upon it, the 'unity' of the\nbody virtually consisted; and the soul was incarnate, not in the plurality\nof members (for how could it, being one, indwell many things?), but in the\nsingle gland.\n\nEven so, the relation between the soul and the gland was absolutely\nunintelligible, as Descartes disarmingly confessed. Incarnation was all\nvery well in the old philosophy: those who had allowed the interaction of\ndisparate natures throughout the physical world need find no particular\ndifficulty about the special case of it provided by incarnation. Why should\nnot a form of conscious life so interact with what would otherwise be dead\nmatter as to 'indwell' it? But the very principle of the new philosophy\ndisallowed the interaction of disparate natures, because such an\ninteraction did not allow of exact formulation, it was a 'loose' and not a\n'tight' relation.\n\nFrom a purely practical point of view the much derided pineal gland theory\nwould serve. If we could be content to view Descartes as a man who wanted\nto make the world safe for physical science, then there would be a good\ndeal to be said for his doctrine. In the old philosophy exact science had\nbeen frustrated by the hypothesis of loose relations all over the field of\nnature. Descartes had cleared them from as much of the field as science was\nthen in a position to investigate; he allowed only one such relation to\nsubsist, the one which experience appeared unmistakably to force upon\nus--that between our own mind and its bodily vehicle. He had exorcized the\nspirits from the rest of nature; and though there was a spirit here which\ncould not be exorcized, the philosophic conjurer had nevertheless confined\nit and its unaccountable pranks within a minutely narrow magic circle: all\nmind could do was to turn the one tiny switch at the centre of its     [20]\nanimal telephone system. It could create no energy--it could merely\nredirect the currents actually flowing.\n\nPractically this might do, but speculatively it was most disturbing. For if\nthe 'loose relation' had to be admitted in one instance, it was admitted in\nprinciple; and one could not get rid of the suspicion that it would turn up\nelsewhere, and that the banishment of it from every other field represented\na convenient pragmatic postulate rather than a solid metaphysical truth.\nMoreover, the correlation of the unitary soul with the unitary gland might\ndo justice to a mechanistical philosophy, but it did not do justice to the\nsoul's own consciousness of itself. The soul's consciousness is the 'idea'\nor 'representation' of the life of the whole body, certainly not of the\nlife of the pineal gland nor, as the unreflective nowadays would say, of\nthe brain. I am not conscious in, or of, my brain except when I have a\nheadache; consciousness is in my eyes and finger-tips and so on. It is\nphysically true, no doubt, that consciousness in and of my finger-tips is\nnot possible without the functioning of my brain; but that is a poor reason\nfor locating the consciousness in the brain. The filament of the electric\nbulb will not be incandescent apart from the functioning of the dynamo; but\nthat is a poor reason for saying that the incandescence is in the dynamo.\n\nCertainly the area of representation in our mind is not simply equivalent\nto the area of our body. But in so far as the confines of mental\nrepresentation part company with the confines of the body, it is not that\nthey may contract and fall back upon the pineal gland, but that they may\nexpand and advance over the surrounding world. The mind does not represent\nits own body merely, it represents the world in so far as the world affects\nthat body or is physically reproduced in it. The mind has no observable\nnatural relation to the pineal gland. It has only two natural relations: to\nits body as a whole and to its effective environment. What Descartes had\nreally done was to pretend that the soul was related to the pineal gland as\nit is in fact related to its whole body; and then that it was related to\nthe bodily members as in fact it is related to outer environment. The\nmembers became an inner environment, known only in so far as they affected\nthe pineal gland; just as the outer environment in its turn was to be known\nonly in so far as it affected the members.\n\n                                                                       [21]\nThis doctrine of a double environment was wholly artificial. It was forced\non Descartes by the requirements of mechanistical science: if the members\nwere simply a plurality of things, they must really be parts of\nenvironment; the body which the soul indwelt must be _a_ body; presumably,\nthen, the pineal gland. An untenable compromise, surely, between admitting\nand denying the reality of the soul's incarnation.\n\nWhat, then, was to be done? Descartes's rivals and successors attempted\nseveral solutions, which it would be too long to examine here. They\ndissatisfied Leibniz and they have certainly no less dissatisfied\nposterity. It will be enough for us here to consider what Leibniz did. He\nadmitted, to begin with, the psychological fact. The unity of consciousness\nis the representation of a plurality--the plurality of the members, and\nthrough them the plurality of the world. Here, surely, was the very\nprinciple the new philosophy needed for the reconciliation of substantial\nunity with mechanical plurality of parts. For it is directly evident to us\nthat consciousness focuses the plurality of environing things in a unity of\nrepresentation. This is no philosophical theory, it is a simple fact. Our\nbody, then, as a physical system is a mechanical plurality; as focused in\nconsciousness it is a unity of 'idea'.\n\nVery well: but we have not got far yet. For the old difficulty still\nremains--it is purely arbitrary, after all, that a unitary consciousness\nshould be attached to, and represent, a mechanical collection of things\nwhich happen to interact in a sort of pattern. If there is a consciousness\nattached to human bodies, then why not to systems of clockwork? If the body\nis _represented_ as unity, it must surely be because it _is_ unity, as the\nold philosophy had held. But how can we reintroduce unity into the body\nwithout reintroducing substantial form, and destroying the mechanistical\nplurality which the new science demanded?\n\nIt is at this point that Leibniz produces the speculative postulate of his\nsystem. Why not reverse the relation, and make the members represent the\nmind as the mind represents the members? For then the unity of person\nrepresented in the mind will become something actual in the members also.\n\nRepresentation appears to common sense to be a one-way sort of traffic. If\nmy mind represents my bodily members, something happens to my mind, for it\nbecomes a representation of such members in such a state; but nothing\nhappens to the members by their being so represented in the mind. The  [22]\nmental representation obeys the bodily facts; the bodily facts do not obey\nthe mental representation. It seems nonsense to say that my members obey my\nmind _because_ they are mirrored in it. And yet my members do obey my mind,\nor at least common sense supposes so. Sometimes my mind, instead of\nrepresenting the state my members are in, represents a state which it\nintends that they shall be in, for example, that my hand should go through\nthe motion of writing these words. And my hand obeys; its action becomes\nthe moving diagram of my thought, my thought is represented or expressed in\nthe manual act. Here the relation of mind and members appears to be\nreversed: instead of its representing them, they represent it. With this\nrepresentation it is the opposite of what it was with the other. By the\nmembers' being represented in the mind, something happened to the mind, and\nnothing to the members; by the mind's being represented in the members\nsomething happens to the members and nothing to the mind.\n\nWhy should not we take this seriously? Why not allow that there is two-way\ntraffic--by one relation the mind represents the members, by another the\nmembers represent the mind? But then again, how can we take it seriously?\nFor representation, in the required sense, is a mental act; brute matter\ncan represent nothing, only mind can represent. And the members are brute\nmatter. But are they? How do we know that? By brute matter we understand\nextended lumps of stuff, interacting with one another mechanically, as do,\nfor example, two cogs in a piece of clockwork. But this is a large-scale\nview. The cogs are themselves composed of interrelated parts and those\nparts of others, and so on _ad infinitum_. Who knows what the ultimate\nconstituents really are? The 'modern' philosophers, certainly, have\nproposed no hypothesis about them which even looks like making sense. They\nhave supposed that the apparently inert lumps, the cogs, are composed of\nparts themselves equally inert, and that by subdivision we shall still\nreach nothing but the inert. But this supposition is in flat contradiction\nwith what physical theory demands. We have to allow the reality of _force_\nin physics. Now the force which large-scale bodies display may easily be\nthe block-effect of activity in their minute real constituents. If not,\nwhere does it come from? Let it be supposed, then, that these minute real\nconstituents are active because they are alive, because they are minds; for\nindeed we have no notion of activity other than the perception we have [23]\nof our own. We have no notion of it except as something mental. On the\nhypothesis that the constituents of active body are also mental, this\nlimitation in our conception of activity need cause us neither sorrow nor\nsurprise.\n\nThe mind-units which make up body will not of course be developed and fully\nconscious minds like yours or mine, and it is only for want of a better\nword that we call them minds at all. They will be mere unselfconscious\nrepresentations of their physical environment, as it might be seen from the\nphysical point to which they belong by a human mind paying no attention at\nall to its own seeing. How many of these rudimentary 'minds' will there be\nin my body? As many as you like--as many as it is possible there should\nbe--say an infinite number and have done with it.\n\nWe may now observe how this hypothesis introduces real formal unity without\nprejudicing mechanical plurality. Each of the mind-units in my body is\nitself and substantially distinct. But since each, in its own way and\naccording to its own position, represents the superior and more developed\nmind which I call 'me', they will order themselves according to a common\nform. The order is real, not accidental: it is like the order of troops on\na parade-ground. Each man is a distinct active unit, but each is really\nexpressing by his action the mind of the officer in command. He is\nexpressing no less his relation to the other men in the ranks--to obey the\nofficer is to keep in step with them. So the metaphysical units of the\nbody, being all minds, represent one another as well as the dominant mind:\none another co-ordinately, the dominant mind subordinately.\n\nBut if the metaphysically real units of the body are of the nature of mind,\nthen _the_ mind is a mind among minds, a spirit-atom among spirit-atoms.\nWhat then constitutes its superiority or dominance, and makes it a mind\n_par excellence_? Well, what constitutes the officer an officer? Two\nthings: a more developed mentality and the fact of being obeyed. In\nmilitary life these two factors are not always perfectly proportioned to\none another, but in the order of Leibniz's universe they are. A fuller\npower to represent the universe is necessarily combined with dominance over\nan organized troop of members; for the mind knows the universe only in so\nfar as the universe is expressed in its body. That is what the         [24]\n_finitude_ of the mind means. Only an infinite mind appreciates the whole\nplurality of things in themselves; a finite mind perceives them in so far\nas mirrored in the physical being of an organized body of members. The more\nadequate the mirror, the more adequate the representation: the more highly\norganized the body, the more developed the mind.\n\nThe developed mind has an elaborate body; but the least developed mind has\nstill some body, or it would lack any mirror whatever through which to\nrepresent the world. This means, in effect, that Leibniz's system is not an\nunmitigated spiritual atomism. For though the spiritual atoms, or monads,\nare the ultimate constituents out of which nature is composed, they stand\ncomposed together from the beginning in a minimal order which cannot be\nbroken up. Each monad, if it is to be anything at all, must be a continuing\nfinite representation of the universe, and to be that it must have a body,\nthat is to say, it must have other monads in a permanent relation of mutual\ncorrespondence with it. And if you said to Leibniz, 'But surely any\nphysical body can be broken up, and this must mean the dissolution of the\norganic relation between its monadical constituents,' he would take refuge\nin the infinitesimal. The wonders revealed by that new miracle, the\nmicroscope, suggested what the intrinsic divisibility of space itself\nsuggests--whatever organization is broken up, there will still be a minute\norganization within each of the fragments which remains unbroken--and so\n_ad infinitum_. You will never come down to loose monads, monads out of all\norganization. You will never disembody the monads, and so remove their\nrepresentative power; you will only reduce their bodies and so impoverish\ntheir representative power. In this sense no animal dies and no animal is\ngenerated. Death is the reduction and generation the enrichment of some\nexisting monad's body; and, by being that, is the enrichment or the\nreduction of the monad's mental life.\n\n'But,' our common sense protests, 'it is too great a strain on our\ncredulity to make the real nature of things so utterly different from what\nsense and science make of them. If the real universe is what you say it is,\nwhy do our minds represent it to us as they do?' The philosopher's answer\nis, 'Because they _represent_ it. According to the truth of things, each\nmonad is simply its own mental life, its own world-view, its own thoughts\nand desires. To know things as they are would be simultaneously to live\nover, as though from within and by a miracle of sympathy, the          [25]\nbiographies of an infinite number of distinct monads. This is absolutely\nimpossible. Our senses represent the coexistent families of monads _in the\ngross_, and therefore conventionally; what is in fact the mutual\nrepresentation of monads in ordered systems, is represented as the\nmechanical interaction of spatially extended and material parts.' This does\nnot mean that science is overthrown. The physical world-view is in terms of\nthe convention of representation, but it is not, for all that, illusory. It\ncan, ideally, be made as true as it is capable of being. There is no reason\nwhatever for confusing the 'well-grounded seemings' of the apparent\nphysical world with the fantastic seemings of dream and hallucination.\n\nSo far the argument seems to draw whatever cogency it has from the\nsimplicity and naturalness of the notion of representation. The nature of\nidea, it is assumed, is to represent plurality in a unified view. If idea\ndid not represent, it would not be idea. And since there _is_ idea (for our\nminds at least exist and are made up of idea) there is representation. It\nbelongs to idea to represent, and since the whole world has now been\ninterpreted as a system of mutually representing ideations, or ideators, it\nmight seem that all their mutual relations are perfectly natural, a harmony\nof agreement which could not be other than it is. But if so, why does\nLeibniz keep saying that the harmony is _pre-established_, by special and\ninfinitely elaborate divine decrees?\n\nLeibniz himself says that the very nature of representation excludes\ninteraction. By representing environment a mind does not do anything to\nenvironment, that is plain. But it is no less plain that environment does\nnothing to it, either. The act of representing is simply the act of the\nmind; it represents _in view of_ environment, of course, but not under the\ncausal influence of environment. Representation is a business carried on by\nthe mind on its own account, and in virtue of its innate power to\nrepresent.\n\nVery well; but does this consideration really drive us into theology? Is\nnot Leibniz the victim of a familiar fallacy, that of incompletely stated\nalternatives? '_Either_ finite beings interact _or else_ they do not\ndirectly condition one another. Monads do not interact, therefore they do\nnot directly condition one another. How then explain the actual conformity\nof their mutual representation, without recourse to divine fore-ordaining?'\nIt seems sufficient to introduce a further alternative in the first line of\nthe argument, and we are rid of the theology. Things may condition the [26]\naction of a further thing, without acting upon it. It acts of itself, but\nit acts in view of what they are. We are tempted to conclude that Leibniz\nhas introduced the _Deus ex machina_ with the fatal facility of his age.\n'Where a little further meditation on the characters in the play would\nfurnish a natural _denouement_, he swings divine intervention on to the\nscene by wires from the ceiling. It is easy for us to reconstruct for him\nthe end of the piece without recourse to stage-machines.'\n\nIs it? No, I fear it is not. There is really no avoiding the\npre-established harmony. And so we shall discover, if we pursue our train\nof reflexion a little further. It is natural, we were saying, than an idea\nshould represent an environment; indeed, it _is_ the representation of one.\nGiven no environment to represent, it would be empty, a mere capacity for\nrepresentation. Then every idea or ideator, taken merely in itself, _is_ an\nempty capacity. But of what is the environment of each made up? According\nto the Leibnitian theory, of further ideas or ideators: of empty\ncapacities, therefore. Then no idea will either be anything in itself, or\nfind anything in its neighbours to represent. An unhappy predicament, like\nthat of a literary clique in which all the members are adepts at discussing\none another's ideas--only that unfortunately none of them are provided with\nany; or like the shaky economics of the fabled Irish village where they all\nlived by taking in one another's washing.\n\nIt is useless, then, to conceive representations as simply coming into\nexistence in response to environment, and modelling themselves on\nenvironment. They must all mutually reflect environment or they would not\nbe representations; but they must also exist as themselves and in their own\nright or there would be no environment for them mutually to represent.\nSince the world is infinitely various, each representor must have its own\ndistinct character or nature, as our minds have: that is to say, it must\nrepresent in its own individual way; and all these endlessly various\nrepresentations must be so constituted as to form a mutually reflecting\nharmony. Considered as a representation, each monadical existence simply\nreflects the universe after its own manner. But considered as something to\nbe represented by the others, it is a self-existent mental life, or world\nof ideas. Now when we are considering the fact of representation, that\nwhich is to be represented comes first and the representation follows upon\nit. Thus in considering the Leibnitian universe, we must begin with the[27]\nmonads as self-existent mental lives, or worlds of ideas; their\nrepresentation of one another comes second. Nothing surely, then, but\nomnipotent creative wisdom could have pre-established between so many\ndistinct given mental worlds that harmony which constitutes their mutual\nrepresentation.\n\nOur common-sense pluralistic thinking escapes from the need of the\npre-established harmony by distinguishing what we are from what we do. Let\nthe world be made up of a plurality of agents in a 'loose' order, with room\nto manoeuvre and to adjust themselves to one another. Then, by good luck or\ngood management, through friction and disaster, by trial and error, by\naccident or invention, they may work out for themselves a harmony of\n_action_. There is no need for divine preordaining here. But on Leibniz's\nview what the monads do is to represent, and what they are is\nrepresentation; there is no ultimate distinction between what they are and\nwhat they do: all that they do belongs to what they are. The whole system\nof action in each monad, which fits with such infinite complexity the\nsystem of action in each other monad, is precisely the existence of that\nmonad, and apart from it the monad is not. The monads do not _achieve_ a\nharmony, they _are_ a harmony, and therefore they are pre-established in\nharmony.\n\nLeibniz denied that he invoked God to intervene in nature, or that there\nwas anything arbitrary or artificial about his physical theology. He was\nsimply analysing nature and finding it to be a system of mutual\nrepresentation; he was analysing mutual representation and finding it to be\nof its nature intrinsically pre-established, and therefore God-dependent.\nHe was not adding anything to mutual representation, he was just showing\nwhat it necessarily contained or implied. At least he was doing nothing\nworse than recognized scholastic practice. Scholastic Aristotelianism\nexplained all natural causality as response to stimulus, and then had to\npostulate a stimulus which stimulated without being stimulated, and this\nwas God. Apart from this supreme and first stimulus nothing would in fact\nbe moving. The Aristotelians claimed simply to be analysing the nature of\nphysical motion as they perceived it, and to find the necessity of\nperpetually applied divine stimulation implicit in it. No violence was\nthereby done to the system of physical motion nor was anything brought in\nfrom without to patch it up; it was simply found to be of its own      [28]\nnature God-dependent.\n\nIt seems as though the reproachful description _'Deus ex machina'_ should\nbe reserved for more arbitrary expedients than Aristotle's or Leibniz's,\nsay for the occasionalist theory. Occasionalism appeared to introduce God\nthat he might make physical matter do what it had no natural tendency to\ndo, viz. to obey the volitions of finite mind. Ideas, on the other hand,\nhave a natural tendency to represent one another, for to be an idea is to\nbe a representation; God is not introduced by Leibniz to make them\ncorrespond, he is introduced to work a system in which they shall\ncorrespond. This may not be _Deus-ex-machina philosophy_, but it is\n_physical theology_; that is to say, it treats divine action as one factor\namong the factors which together constitute the working of the natural\nsystem. And this appears to be perhaps unscientific, certainly blasphemous:\nGod's action cannot be a factor among factors; the Creator works through\nand in all creaturely action equally; we can never say 'This is the\ncreature, and that is God' of distinguishable causalities in the natural\nworld. The creature is, in its creaturely action, self-sufficient: but\nbecause a creature, insufficient to itself throughout, and sustained by its\nCreator both in existence and in action.\n\nThe only acceptable argument for theism is that which corresponds to the\nreligious consciousness, and builds upon the insufficiency of finite\nexistence throughout, because it is finite. All arguments to God's\nexistence from a particular gap in our account of the world of finites are\nto be rejected. They do not indicate God, they indicate the failure of our\npower to analyse the world-order. When Leibniz discovered that his system\nof mutual representations needed to be pre-established, he ought to have\nseen that he had come up a cul-de-sac and backed out; he ought not to have\nsaid, 'With the help of God I will leap over the wall.'\n\nIf we condemn Leibniz for writing physical theology, we condemn not him but\nhis age. No contemporary practice was any better, and much of it a good\ndeal worse, as Leibniz liked somewhat complacently to point out. And\nbecause he comes to theology through physical theology, that does not mean\nthat all his theology was physical theology and as such to be written off.\nOn the contrary, Leibniz is led to wrestle with many problems which beset\nany philosophical theism of the Christian type. This is particularly so[29]\nin the _Theodicy_, as its many citations of theologians suggest. His\ndiscussions never lack ingenuity, and the system of creation and providence\nin which they result has much of that luminous serenity which colours the\nbest works of the Age of Reason.\n\nEvery theistic philosopher is bound, with whatever cautions, to conceive\nGod by the analogy of the human mind. When Leibniz declares the harmony of\nmonads to be pre-established by God, he is invoking the image of\nintelligent human pre-arrangement. Nor is he content simply to leave it at\nthat: he endeavours as well as he may to conceive the sort of act by which\nGod pre-arranges; and this involves the detailed adaptation for theological\npurposes of Leibnitian doctrine about the human mind.\n\nThe human mind, as we have seen, is the mind predominant in a certain\nsystem of 'minds', viz. in those which constitute the members of the human\nbody. If we call it predominant, we mean that its system of ideas is more\ndeveloped than theirs, so that there are more points in which each of them\nconforms to it than in which it conforms to any one of them. The conception\nof a divine pre-establishing mind will be analogous. It will be the\nconception of a mind _absolutely_ dominant, to whose ideas, that is to say,\nthe whole system simply corresponds, without any reciprocating\ncorrespondence on his side. In a certain sense this is to make God the\n'Mind of the World'; and yet the associations of the phrase are misleading.\nIt suggests that the world is an organism or body in which the divine mind\nis incarnate, and on which he relies for his representations. But that is\nnonsense; the world is not _a_ body, nor is it organic to God. Absolute\ndominance involves absolute transcendence: if everything in the world\nwithout remainder simply obeys the divine thoughts, that is only another\nway of saying that the world is the creature of God; the whole system is\npre-established by him who is absolute Being and perfectly independent of\nthe world.\n\nOf createdness, or pre-establishedness, there is no more to be said: we can\nthink of it as nothing but the pure or absolute case of subjection to\ndominant mind. It is no use asking further _how_ God's thoughts are obeyed\nin the existence and action of things. What we can and must enquire into\nfurther, is the nature of the divine thoughts which are thus obeyed. They\nmust be understood to be volitions or decrees. There are indeed two ways in\nwhich things obey the divine thought, and correspondingly two sorts of\ndivine thoughts that they obey. In so far as created things conform to [30]\nthe mere universal principles of reason, they obey a reasonableness which\nis an inherent characteristic of the divine mind itself. If God wills the\nexistence of any creature, that creature's existence must observe the\nlimits prescribed by eternal reason: it cannot, for example, both have and\nlack a certain characteristic in the same sense and at the same time; nor\ncan it contain two parts and two parts which are not also countable as one\npart and three parts. Finite things, if they exist at all, must thus\nconform to the reasonableness of the divine nature, but what the divine\nreasonableness thus prescribes is highly general: we can deduce from it\nonly certain laws which any finite things must obey, we can never deduce\nfrom it which finite things there are to be, nor indeed that there are to\nbe any. Finite things are particular and individual: each of them might\nhave been other than it is or, to speak more properly, instead of any one\nof them there might have existed something else; it was, according to the\nmere principles of eternal reason, equally possible. But if so, the whole\nuniverse, being made up of things each of which might be otherwise, might\nas a whole be otherwise. Therefore the divine thoughts which it obeys by\nexisting have the nature of _choices_ or _decrees_.\n\nWhat material does the finite mind supply for an analogical picture of the\ninfinite mind making choices or decrees? If we use such language of God, we\nare using language which has its first and natural application to\nourselves. We all of us choose, and those of us who are in authority make\ndecrees. What is to choose? It involves a real freedom in the mind. A\nfinite mind, let us remember, is nothing but a self-operating succession of\nperceptions, ideas, or representations. With regard to some of our ideas we\nhave no freedom, those, for example, which represent to us our body. We\nthink of them as constituting our given substance. They are sheer datum for\nus, and so are those reflexions of our environment which they mediate to\nus. They make up a closely packed and confused mass; they persevere in\ntheir being with an obstinate innate force, the spiritual counterpart of\nthe force which we have to recognize in things as physically interpreted.\nBeing real spiritual force, it is quasi-voluntary, and indeed do we not\nlove our own existence and, in a sense, will it in all its necessary\ncircumstances? But if we can be said to will to be ourselves and to enact\nwith native force what our body and its environment makes us, we are   [31]\nmerely willing to conform to the conditions of our existence; we are making\nno choice. When, however, we think freely or perform deliberate acts, there\nis not only force but choice in our activity. Choice between what? Between\nalternative possibilities arising out of our situation. And choice in\nvirtue of what? In virtue of the appeal exercised by one alternative as\nseemingly better.\n\nCan we adapt our scheme of choice to the description of God's creative\ndecrees? We will take the second point in it first: our choice is in virtue\nof the appeal of the seeming best. Surely the only corrective necessary in\napplying this to God is the omission of the word 'seeming'. His choice is\nin virtue of the appeal of the simply best. The other point causes more\ntrouble. We choose between possibilities which arise for us out of our\nsituation in the system of the existing world. But as the world does not\nexist before God's creative choices, he is in no world-situation, and no\nalternative possibilities can arise out of it, between which he should have\nto choose. But if God does not choose between intrinsic possibilities of\nsome kind, his choice becomes something absolutely meaningless to us--it is\nnot a choice at all, it is an arbitrary and unintelligible _fiat_.\n\nLeibniz's solution is this: what are mere possibilities of thought for us\nare possibilities of action for God. For a human subject, possibilities of\naction are limited to what arises out of his actual situation, but\npossibilities for thought are not so limited. I can conceive a world\ndifferent in many respects from this world, in which, for example,\nvegetables should be gifted with thought and speech; but I can do nothing\ntowards bringing it about. My imaginary world is practically impossible but\nspeculatively possible, in the sense that it contradicts no single\nprinciple of necessary and immutable reason. I, indeed, can explore only a\nvery little way into the region of sheer speculative possibility; God does\nnot explore it, he simply possesses it all: the whole region of the\npossible is but a part of the content of his infinite mind. So among all\npossible creatures he chooses the best and creates it.\n\nBut the whole realm of the possible is an actual infinity of ideas. Out of\nthe consideration of an infinity of ideas, how can God arrive at a choice?\nWhy not? His mind is not, of course, discursive; he does not successively\nturn over the leaves of an infinite book of sample worlds, for then he\nwould never come to the end of it. Embracing infinite possibility in   [32]\nthe single act of his mind, he settles his will with intuitive immediacy\nupon the best. The inferior, the monstrous, the absurd is not a wilderness\nthrough which he painfully threads his way, it is that from which he\nimmediately turns; his wisdom is his elimination of it.\n\nBut in so applying the scheme of choice to God's act, have we not\ninvalidated its application to our own? For if God has chosen the whole\nform and fabric of the world, he has chosen everything in it, including the\nchoices we shall make. And if our choices have already been chosen for us\nby God, it would seem to follow that they are not real open choices on our\npart at all, but are pre-determined. And if they are pre-determined, it\nwould seem that they are not really even choices, for a determined choice\nis not a choice. But if we do not ourselves exercise real choice in any\ndegree, then we have no clue to what any choice would be: and if so, we\nhave no power of conceiving divine choice, either; and so the whole\nargument cuts its own throat.\n\nThere are two possible lines of escape from this predicament. One is to\ndefine human choice in such a sense that it allows of pre-determination\nwithout ceasing to be choice; and this is Leibniz's method, and it can be\nstudied at length in the _Theodicy_. He certainly makes the very best he\ncan of it, and it hardly seems that any of those contemporaries whose views\nhe criticizes was in a position to answer him. The alternative method is to\nmake the most of the negative element involved in all theology. After all,\nwe do not positively or adequately understand the nature of infinite\ncreative will. Perhaps it is precisely the transcendent glory of divine\nfreedom to be able to work infallibly through free instruments. But so\nmystical a paradox is not the sort of thing we can expect to appeal to a\nlate-seventeenth-century philosopher.\n\nOne criticism of Leibniz's argument we cannot refrain from making. He\nallows himself too easy a triumph when he says that the only alternative to\na choice determined by a prevailing inclination towards one proposal is a\nchoice of mere caprice. There is a sort of choice Leibniz never so much as\nconsiders and which appears at least to fall quite outside his categories,\nand that is the sort of choice exercised in artistic creativity. In such\nchoice we freely feel after the shaping of a scheme, we do not arbitrate\nsimply between shaped and given possible schemes. And perhaps some such\nelement enters into all our choices, since our life is to some extent  [33]\nfreely designed by ourselves. If so, our minds are even more akin to the\ndivine mind than Leibniz realized. For the sort of choice we are now\nreferring to seems to be an intuitive turning away from an infinite, or at\nleast indefinite, range of less attractive possibility. And such is the\nnature of the divine creative choice. The consequence of such a line of\nspeculation would be, that the divine mind designs more through us, and\nless simply for us, than Leibniz allowed: the 'harmony' into which we enter\nwould be no longer simply 'pre-established'. Leibniz, in fact, could have\nnothing to do with such a suggestion, and he would have found it easy to be\nironical about it if his contemporaries had proposed it.\n\nII\n\nLeibniz wrote two books; a considerable number of articles in learned\nperiodicals; and an enormous number of unpublished notes, papers and\nletters, preserved in the archives of the Electors of Hanover not because\nof the philosophical significance of some of them, but because of the\npolitical importance of most of them. From among this great mass various\nexcerpts of philosophical interest have been made by successive editors of\nLeibniz's works. It may be that the most profound understanding of his mind\nis to be derived from some of these pieces, but if we wish to consider the\npublic history of Leibniz, we may set them aside.\n\nOf the two books, one was published, and the other never was. The _New\nEssays_ remained in Leibniz's desk, the _Theodicy_ saw the light. And so,\nto his own and the succeeding generation, Leibniz was known as the author\nof the _Theodicy_.\n\nThe articles in journals form the immediate background to the two books. In\n1696 Leibniz heard that a French translation of Locke's _Essay concerning\nHuman Understanding_ was being prepared at Amsterdam. He wrote some polite\ncomments on Locke's great work, and published them. He also sent them to\nLocke, hoping that Locke would write a reply, and that Leibniz's reflexions\nand Locke's reply might be appended to the projected French translation.\nBut Locke set Leibniz's comments aside. Leibniz, not to be defeated, set to\nwork upon the _New Essays_, in which the whole substance of Locke's book is\nsystematically discussed in dialogue. The _New Essays_ were written in\n1703. But meanwhile a painful dispute had broken out between Leibniz   [34]\nand the disciples of Locke and Newton, in which the English, and perhaps\nNewton himself, were much to blame, and Leibniz thought it impolitic to\npublish his book. It was not issued until long after his death, in the\nmiddle of the century.\n\nThe discussion with Locke was a failure: Locke would not play, and the book\nin which the whole controversy was to be systematized never appeared. The\ndiscussion with Bayle, on the other hand, was a model of what a discussion\nshould be. Bayle played up tirelessly, and was never embarrassingly\nprofound; he provided just the sort of objections most useful for drawing\nforth illuminating expositions; he was as good as a fictitious character in\na philosophical dialogue. And the book in which the controversy was\nsystematized duly appeared with great eclat.\n\nHere is the history of the controversy. In 1695 Leibniz was forty-nine\nyears old. He had just emerged from a period of close employment under his\nprince's commands, and he thought fit to try his metaphysical principles\nupon the polite world and see what would come of it. He therefore published\nan article in the _Journal des Savants_ under the title: 'New System of\nNature and of the Communication of Substances, as well as of the Union\nbetween Soul and Body'. In the same year Foucher published an article in\nthe _Journal_ controverting Leibniz; and in the next year Leibniz replied\nwith an 'Explanation'. A second explanation in the same year appeared in\nBasnage's _Histoire des Ouvrages des Savants_, in answer to reflexions by\nthe editor. M. Pierre Bayle had all these articles before him when he\ninserted a note on Leibniz's doctrine in his article on 'Rorarius', in the\nfirst edition of his _Historical and Critical Dictionary_. The point of\nconnexion between Rorarius and Leibniz was no more than this, that both\nheld views about the souls of beasts.\n\nPierre Bayle was the son of a Calvinist pastor, early converted to\nCatholicism, but recovered to his old faith after a short time. He held\nacademic employments in Switzerland and Holland; he promoted and edited the\n_Nouvelles de la Republique des Lettres_, and he produced that\nextraordinary work the _Historical and Critical Dictionary._ The notices it\ncontains of authors and thinkers are little more than pegs upon which Bayle\ncould hang his philosophical reflexions. He could write an intelligent\ndiscussion on any opinion; what he could not do was to reconcile the points\nof view from which he felt impelled to write upon this author and that.[35]\nHis was not a systematic mind. So far as he had a philosophical opinion, he\nwas a Cartesian; in theology he was an orthodox Calvinist. He could not\nreconcile his theology with his Cartesianism and he did not try to. He made\na merit of the oppositions of faith to reason and reason to itself, so that\nhe could throw himself upon a meritorious and voluntary faith.\n\nThere is nothing original in this position. It was characteristic of\ndecadent scholasticism, it squared with Luther's exaggerations about the\nimpotence of reason in fallen man, and Pascal had given his own highly\npersonal twist to it. Bayle has been hailed as a forerunner of Voltairean\nscepticism. It would be truer to say that a Voltairean sceptic could read\nBayle's discussions in his own sense and for his own purposes if he wished.\nBut Bayle was not a sceptic. It is hard to say what he was; his whole\nposition as between faith and reason is hopelessly confused. He was a\nscholar, a wit, and a philosophical sparring-partner of so perfectly\nconvenient a kind that if we had not evidence of his historical reality, we\nmight have suspected Leibniz of inventing him.\n\nIn the first edition of his _Dictionary_, under the article 'Rorarius',\nBayle gave a very fair account of Leibniz's doctrine concerning the souls\nof animals, as it could be collected from his article in the _Journal des\nSavants_, 27 June 1695. He then proceeded to comment upon it in the\nfollowing terms:\n\n'There are some things in Mr. Leibniz's hypothesis that are liable to some\ndifficulties, though they show the great extent of his genius. He will have\nit, for example, that the soul of a dog acts independently of outward\nbodies; that _it stands upon its own bottom, by a perfect _spontaneity_\nwith respect to itself, and yet with a perfect _conformity_ to outward\nthings_.... That _its internal perceptions arise from its original\nconstitution, that is to say, the representative constitution (capable of\nexpressing beings outside itself in relation to its organs) which was\nbestowed upon it from the time of its creation, and makes its individual\ncharacter_ (_Journal des Savants_, 4 July 1695). From whence it results\nthat it would feel hunger and thirst at such and such an hour, though there\nwere not any one body in the universe, and _though nothing should exist but\nGod and that soul_. He has explained (_Histoire des Ouvrages des Savants_,\nFeb. 1696) his thought by the example of two pendulums that should\nperfectly agree: that is, he supposes that according to the particular laws\nwhich put the soul upon action, it must feel hunger at such an hour;   [36]\nand that according to the particular laws which direct the motion of\nmatter, the body which is united to that soul must be modified at that same\nhour as it is modified when the soul is hungry. I will forbear preferring\nthis system to that of occasional causes till the learned author has\nperfected it. I cannot apprehend the connexion of internal and spontaneous\nactions which would have this effect, that the soul of a dog would feel\npain immediately after having felt joy, though it were alone in the\nuniverse. I understand why a dog passes immediately from pleasure to pain\nwhen, being very hungry and eating a piece of bread, he is suddenly struck\nwith a cudgel. But I cannot apprehend that his soul should be so framed\nthat at the very moment of his being beaten he should feel pain though he\nwere not beaten, and though he should continue to eat bread without any\ntrouble or hindrance. Nor do I see how the spontaneity of that soul should\nbe consistent with the sense of pain, and in general with any unpleasing\nperceptions.\n\n'Besides, the reason why this learned man does not like the Cartesian\nsystem seems to me to be a false supposition; for it cannot be said that\nthe system of occasional causes brings in God acting by a miracle (ibid.),\n_Deum ex machina_, in the mutual dependency of the body and soul: for since\nGod does only intervene according to general laws, he cannot be said to act\nin an extraordinary manner. Does the internal and active virtue\ncommunicated to the forms of bodies according to M. Leibniz know the train\nof actions which it is to produce? By no means; for we know by experience\nthat we are ignorant whether we shall have such and such perceptions in an\nhour's time. It were therefore necessary that the forms should be directed\nby some internal principle in the production of their acts. But this would\nbe _Deus ex machina,_ as much as in the system of occasional causes. In\nfine, as he supposes with great reason that all souls are simple and\nindivisible, it cannot be apprehended how they can be compared with a\npendulum, that is, how by their original constitution they can diversify\ntheir operations by using the spontaneous activity bestowed upon them by\ntheir Creator. It may clearly be conceived that a simple being will always\nact in a uniform manner, if no external cause hinders it. If it were\ncomposed of several pieces, as a machine, it would act different ways,\nbecause the peculiar activity of each piece might change every moment the\nprogress of others; but how will you find in a simple substance the    [37]\ncause of a change of operation?'\n\nLeibniz published a reply to Bayle in the _Histoire des Ouvrages des\nSavants_ for July 1698. As in all his references to Bayle, he is studiously\npolite and repays compliment for compliment. The following are perhaps the\nprincipal points of his answer.\n\n1. On the example of the dog:\n\n(_a_) How should it of itself change its sentiment, since everything left\nto itself continues in the state in which it is? Because the state may be a\nstate of _change_, as in a moving body which, unless hindered, continues to\nmove. And such is the nature of simple substances--they continue to evolve\nsteadily.\n\n(_b_) Would it really feel as though beaten if it were not beaten, since\nLeibniz says that the action of every substance takes place as though\nnothing existed but God and itself? Leibniz replies that his remark refers\nto the causality behind an action, not to the reasons for it. The\nspontaneous action of the dog, which leads to the feeling of pain, is only\ndecreed to be what it is, for the reason that the dog is part of a world of\nmutually reflecting substances, a world which also includes the cudgel.\n\n(_c_) Why should the dog ever be displeased _spontaneously_? Leibniz\ndistinguishes the spontaneous from the voluntary: many things occur in the\nmind, of itself, but not chosen by it.\n\n2. On Cartesianism and miracle:\n\nCartesianism in the form of occasionalism _does_ involve miracle, for\nthough God is said by it to act according to laws in conforming body and\nmind to one another, he thereby causes them to act beyond their natural\ncapacities.\n\n3. On the problem, how can the simple act otherwise than uniformly?\n\nLeibniz distinguishes: some uniform action is monotonous, but some is not.\nA point moves uniformly in describing a parabola, for it constantly fulfils\nthe formula of the curve. But it does not move monotonously, for the curve\nconstantly varies. Such is the uniformity of the action of simple\nsubstances.\n\nBayle read this reply, and was pleased but not satisfied with it. In the\nsecond edition of the dictionary, under the same article 'Rorarius', he\nadded the following note:\n\n'I declare first of all that I am very glad I have proposed some small\ndifficulties against the system of that great philosopher, since they  [38]\nhave occasioned some answers whereby that subject has been made clearer to\nme, and which have given me a more distinct notion of what is most to be\nadmired in it. I look now upon that new system as an important conquest,\nwhich enlarges the bounds of philosophy. We had only two hypotheses, that\nof the Schools and that of the Cartesians: the one was a _way of influence_\nof the body upon the soul and of the soul upon the body; the other was a\n_way of assistance_ or occasional causality. But here is a new acquisition,\na new hypothesis, which may be called, as Fr. Lami styles it, a _way of\npre-established harmony_. We are beholden for it to M. Leibniz, and it is\nimpossible to conceive anything that gives us a nobler idea of the power\nand wisdom of the Author of all things. This, together with the advantage\nof setting aside all notions of a miraculous conduct, would engage me to\nprefer this new system to that of the Cartesians, if I could conceive any\npossibility in the _way of pre-established harmony_.\n\n'I desire the reader to take notice that though I confess that this way\nremoves all notions of a miraculous conduct, yet I do not retract what I\nhave said formerly, that the system of occasional causes does not bring in\nGod acting miraculously. (See M. Leibniz's article in _Histoire des\nOuvrages des Savants_, July 1698.) I am as much persuaded as ever I was\nthat an action cannot be said to be miraculous, unless God produces it as\nan exception to the general laws; and that everything of which he is\nimmediately the author according to those laws is distinct from a miracle\nproperly so called. But being willing to cut off from this dispute as many\nthings as I possibly can, I consent it should be said that the surest way\nof removing all notions that include a miracle is to suppose that all\ncreated substances are actively the immediate causes of the effects of\nnature. I will therefore lay aside what I might reply to that part of M.\nLeibniz's answer.\n\n'I will also omit all objections which are not more contrary to his opinion\nthan to that of some other philosophers. I will not therefore propose the\ndifficulties that may be raised against the supposition that a creature can\nreceive from God the power of moving itself. They are strong and almost\nunanswerable, but M. Leibniz's system does not lie more open to them than\nthat of the Aristotelians; nay, I do not know whether the Cartesians would\npresume to say that God cannot communicate to our souls a power of acting.\nIf they say so, how can they own that Adam sinned? And if they dare not[39]\nsay so they weaken the arguments whereby they endeavour to prove that\nmatter is not capable of any activity. Nor do I believe that it is more\ndifficult for M. Leibniz than for the Cartesians or other philosophers, to\nfree himself from the objection of a fatal mechanism which destroys human\nliberty. Wherefore, waiving this, I shall only speak of what is peculiar to\nthe system of the _pre-established harmony_.\n\n'I. My first observation shall be, that it raises the power and wisdom of\nthe divine art above everything that can be conceived. Fancy to yourself a\nship which, without having any sense or knowledge, and without being\ndirected by any created or uncreated being, has the power of moving itself\nso seasonably as to have always the wind favourable, to avoid currents and\nrocks, to cast anchor where it ought to be done, and to retire into a\nharbour precisely when it is necessary. Suppose such a ship sails in that\nmanner for several years successively, being always turned and situated as\nit ought to be, according to the several changes of the air and the\ndifferent situations of seas and lands; you will acknowledge that God,\nnotwithstanding his infinite power, cannot communicate such a faculty to a\nship; or rather you will say that the nature of a ship is not capable of\nreceiving it from God. And yet what M. Leibniz supposes about the machine\nof a human body is more admirable and more surprising than all this. Let us\napply his system concerning the union of the soul with the body to the\nperson of Julius Caesar.\n\n'II. We must say according to this system that the body of Julius Caesar\ndid so exercise its moving faculty that from its birth to its death it went\nthrough continual changes which did most exactly answer the perpetual\nchanges of a certain soul which it did not know and which made no\nimpression on it. We must say that the rule according to which that faculty\nof Caesar's body performed such actions was such, that he would have gone\nto the Senate upon such a day and at such an hour, that he would have\nspoken there such and such words, etc., though God had willed to annihilate\nhis soul the next day after it was created. We must say that this moving\npower did change and modify itself exactly according to the volubility of\nthe thoughts of that ambitious man, and that it was affected precisely in a\ncertain manner rather than in another, because the soul of Caesar passed\nfrom a certain thought to another. Can a blind power modify itself so\nexactly by virtue of an impression communicated thirty or forty years  [40]\nbefore and never renewed since, but left to itself, without ever knowing\nwhat it is to do? Is not this much more incomprehensible than the\nnavigation I spoke of in the foregoing paragraph?\n\n'III. The difficulty will be greater still, if it be considered that the\nhuman machine contains an almost infinite number of organs, and that it is\ncontinually exposed to the shock of the bodies that surround it,[1] and\nwhich by an innumerable variety of shakings produce in it a thousand sorts\nof modifications. How is it possible to conceive that this _pre-established\nharmony_ should never be disordered, but go on still during the longest\nlife of a man, notwithstanding the infinite varieties of the reciprocal\naction of so many organs upon one another, which are surrounded on all\nsides with infinite corpuscles, sometimes hot and sometimes cold, sometimes\ndry and sometimes moist, and always acting, and pricking the nerves a\nthousand different ways? Suppose that the multiplicity of organs and of\nexternal agents be a necessary instrument of the almost infinite variety of\nchanges in a human body: will that variety have the exactness here\nrequired? Will it never disturb the correspondence of those changes with\nthe changes of the soul? This seems to be altogether impossible.\n\n[1] 'According to M. Leibniz what is active in every substance ought to be\nreduced to a true unity. Since therefore the body of every man is composed\nof several substances, each of them ought to have a principle of action\nreally distinct from the principle of each of the others. He will have the\naction of every principle to be spontaneous. Now this must vary the effects\n_ad infinitum_, and confound them. For the impression of the neighbouring\nbodies must needs put some constraint upon the natural spontaneity of every\none of them.'\n\n'IV. It is in vain to have recourse to the power of God, in order to\nmaintain that brutes are mere machines; it is in vain to say that God was\nable to make machines so artfully contrived that the voice of a man, the\nreflected light of an object, etc., will strike them exactly where it is\nnecessary, that they may move in a given manner. This supposition is\nrejected by everybody except some Cartesians; and no Cartesian would admit\nit if it were to be extended to man; that is, if anyone were to assert that\nGod was able to form such bodies as would mechanically do whatever we see\nother men do. By denying this we do not pretend to limit the power and\nknowledge of God: we only mean that the nature of things does not permit\nthat the faculties imparted to a creature should not be necessarily\nconfined within certain bounds. The actions of creatures must be       [41]\nnecessarily proportioned to their essential state, and performed according\nto the character belonging to each machine; for according to the maxim of\nthe philosophers, whatever is received is proportionate to the capacity of\nthe subject that receives it. We may therefore reject M. Leibniz's\nhypothesis as being impossible, since it is liable to greater difficulties\nthan that of the Cartesians, which makes beasts to be mere machines. It\nputs a perpetual harmony between two beings, which do not act one upon\nanother; whereas if servants were mere machines, and should punctually obey\ntheir masters' command, it could not be said that they do it without a real\naction of their masters upon them; for their masters would speak words and\nmake signs which would really shake and move the organs of the servants.\n\n'V. Now let us consider the soul of Julius Caesar, and we shall find the\nthing more impossible still. That soul was in the world without being\nexposed to the influence of any spirit. The power it received from God was\nthe only principle of the actions it produced at every moment: and if those\nactions were different one from another, it was not because some of them\nwere produced by the united influence of some springs which did not\ncontribute to the production of others, for the soul of man is simple,\nindivisible and immaterial. M. Leibniz owns it; and if he did not\nacknowledge it, but if, on the contrary, he should suppose with most\nphilosophers and some of the most excellent metaphysicians of our age (Mr.\nLocke, for instance) that a compound of several material parts placed and\ndisposed in a certain manner, is capable of thinking, his hypothesis would\nappear to be on that very ground absolutely impossible, and I could refute\nit several other ways; which I need not mention since he acknowledges the\nimmateriality of our soul and builds upon it.\n\n'Let us return to the soul of Julius Caesar, and call it an immaterial\nautomaton (M. Leibniz's own phrase), and compare it with an atom of\nEpicurus; I mean an atom surrounded with a vacuum on all sides, and which\nwill never meet any other atom. This is a very just comparison: for this\natom, on the one hand, has a natural power of moving itself and exerts it\nwithout any assistance, and without being retarded or hindered by anything:\nand, on the other hand, the soul of Caesar is a spirit which has received\nthe faculty of producing thoughts, and exerts it without the influence [42]\nof any other spirit or of any body. It is neither assisted nor thwarted by\nanything whatsoever. If you consult the common notions and the ideas of\norder, you will find that this atom can never stop, and that having been in\nmotion in the foregoing moment, it will continue in it at the present\nmoment and in all the moments that shall follow, and that it will always\nmove in the same manner. This is the consequence of an axiom approved by M.\nLeibniz: _since a thing does always remain in the same state wherein it\nhappens to be, unless it receives some alteration from some other thing ...\nwe conclude_, says he, _not only that a body which is at rest will always\nbe at rest, but that a body in motion will always keep that motion or\nchange, that is, the same swiftness and the same direction, unless\nsomething happens to hinder it_. (M. Leibniz, ibid.)\n\n'Everyone clearly sees that this atom, whether it moves by an innate power,\nas Democritus and Epicurus would have it, or by a power received from the\nCreator, will always move in the same line equally and after a uniform\nmanner, without ever turning or going back. Epicurus was laughed at, when\nhe invented the motion of declination; it was a needless supposition, which\nhe wanted in order to get out of the labyrinth of a fatal necessity; and he\ncould give no reason for this new part of his system. It was inconsistent\nwith the clearest notions of our minds: for it is evident that an atom\nwhich describes a straight line for the space of two days cannot turn away\nat the beginning of a third, unless it meets with some obstacle, or has a\nmind all of a sudden to go out of its road, or contains some spring which\nbegins to play at that very moment. The first of these reasons cannot be\nadmitted in a vacuum. The second is impossible, since an atom has not the\nfaculty of thinking. And the third is likewise impossible in a corpuscle\nthat is a perfect unity. I must make some use of all this.\n\n'VI. Caesar's soul is a being to which unity belongs in a strict sense. The\nfaculty of producing thoughts is a property of its nature (so M. Leibniz),\nwhich it has received from God, both as to possession and exercise. If the\nfirst thought it produces is a sense of pleasure, there is no reason why\nthe second should not likewise be a sense of pleasure; for when the total\ncause of an effect remains the same, the effect cannot be altered. Now this\nsoul, at the second moment of its existence, does not receive a new faculty\nof thinking; it only preserves the faculty it had at the first moment, and\nit is as independent of the concourse of any other cause at the second [43]\nmoment as it was at the first. It must therefore produce again at the\nsecond moment the same thought it had produced just before. If it be\nobjected that it ought to be in a state of change, and that it would not be\nin such a state, in the case that I have supposed; I answer that its change\nwill be like the change of the atom; for an atom which continually moves in\nthe same line acquires a new situation at every moment, but it is like the\npreceding situation. A soul may therefore continue in its state of change,\nif it does but produce a new thought like the preceding.\n\n'But suppose it to be not confined within such narrow bounds; it must be\ngranted at least that its going from one thought to another implies some\nreason of affinity. If I suppose that in a certain moment the soul of\nCaesar sees a tree with leaves and blossoms, I can conceive that it does\nimmediately desire to see one that has only leaves, and then one that has\nonly blossoms, and that it will thus successively produce several images\narising from one another; but one cannot conceive the odd change of\nthoughts, which have no affinity with, but are even contrary to, one\nanother, and which are so common in men's souls. One cannot apprehend how\nGod could place in the soul of Julius Caesar the principle of what I am\ngoing to say. He was without doubt pricked with a pin more than once, when\nhe was sucking; and therefore according to M. Leibniz's hypothesis which I\nam here considering, his soul must have produced in itself a sense of pain\nimmediately after the pleasant sensations of the sweetness of the milk,\nwhich it had enjoyed for the space of two or three minutes. By what springs\nwas it determined to interrupt its pleasures and to give itself all of a\nsudden a sense of pain, without receiving any intimation of preparing\nitself to change, and without any new alteration in its substance? If you\nrun over the life of that Roman emperor, every page will afford you matter\nfor a stronger objection than this is.\n\n'VII. The thing would be less incomprehensible if it were supposed that the\nsoul of man is not one spirit but rather a multitude of spirits, each of\nwhich has its functions, that begin and end precisely as the changes made\nin a human body require. By virtue of this supposition it should be said\nthat something analogous to a great number of wheels and springs, or of\nmatters that ferment, disposed according to the changes of our machine,\nawakens or lulls asleep for a certain time the action of each of those\nspirits. But then the soul of man would be no longer a single substance[44]\nbut an _ens per aggregationem_, a collection and heap of substances just\nlike all material beings. We are here in quest of a single being, which\nproduces in itself sometimes joy, sometimes pain, etc., and not of many\nbeings, one of which produces hope, another despair, etc.\n\n'In these observations I have merely cleared and unfolded those which M.\nLeibniz has done me the honour to examine: and now I shall make some\nreflexions upon his answers.\n\n'VIII. He says (ibid., p. 332) that _the law of the change which happens in\nthe substance of the animal transports him from pleasure to pain at the\nvery moment that a solution of continuity is made in his body; because the\nlaw of the indivisible substance of that animal is to represent what is\ndone in his body as we experience it, and even to represent in some manner,\nand with respect to that body, whatever is done in the world_. These words\nare a very good explication of the grounds of this system; they are, as it\nwere, the unfolding and key of it; but at the same time they are the very\nthings at which the objections of those who take this system to be\nimpossible are levelled. The law M. Leibniz speaks of supposes a decree of\nGod, and shows wherein this system agrees with that of occasional causes.\nThose two systems agree in this point, that there are laws according to\nwhich the soul of man is _to represent what is done in the body of man, as\nwe experience it_. But they disagree as to the manner of executing those\nlaws. The Cartesians say that God executes them; M. Leibniz will have it,\nthat the soul itself does it; which appears to me impossible, because the\nsoul has not the necessary instruments for such an execution. Now however\ninfinite the power and knowledge of God be, he cannot perform with a\nmachine deprived of a certain piece, what requires the concourse of such a\npiece. He must supply that defect; but then the effect would be produced by\nhim and not by the machine. I shall show that the soul has not the\ninstruments requisite for the divine law we speak of, and in order to do it\nI shall make use of a comparison.\n\n'Fancy to yourself an animal created by God and designed to sing\ncontinually. It will always sing, that is most certain; but if God designs\nhim a certain tablature, he must necessarily either put it before his eyes\nor imprint it upon his memory or dispose his muscles in such a manner that\naccording to the laws of mechanism one certain note will always come after\nanother, agreeably to the order of the tablature. Without this one cannot\napprehend that the animal can always follow the whole set of the notes [45]\nappointed him by God. Let us apply this to man's soul. M. Leibniz will have\nit that it has received not only the power of producing thoughts\ncontinually, but also the faculty of following always a certain set of\nthoughts, which answers the continual changes that happen in the machine of\nthe body. This set of thoughts is like the tablature prescribed to the\nsinging animal above mentioned. Can the soul change its perceptions or\nmodifications at every moment according to such a set of thoughts, without\nknowing the series of the notes, and actually thinking upon them? But\nexperience teaches us that it knows nothing of it. Were it not at least\nnecessary that in default of such a knowledge, there should be in the soul\na set of particular instruments, each of which would be a necessary cause\nof such and such a thought? Must they not be so placed and disposed as to\noperate precisely one after another, according to the correspondence\n_pre-established_ between the changes of the body and the thoughts of the\nsoul? but it is most certain that an immaterial simple and indivisible\nsubstance cannot be made up of such an innumerable multitude of particular\ninstruments placed one before another, according to the order of the\ntablature in question. It is not therefore possible that a human soul\nshould execute that law.\n\n'M. Leibniz supposes that the soul does not distinctly know its future\nperceptions, _but that it perceives them confusedly_, and that _there are\nin each substance traces of whatever hath happened, or shall happen to it:\nbut that an infinite multitude of perceptions hinders us from\ndistinguishing them. The present state of each substance is a natural\nconsequence of its preceding state. The soul, though never so simple, has\nalways a sentiment composed of several perceptions at one time: which\nanswers our end as well as though it were composed of pieces, like a\nmachine. For each foregoing perception has an influence on those that\nfollow agreeably to a law of order, which is in perceptions as well as in\nmotions...The perceptions that are together in one and the same soul at the\nsame time, including an infinite multitude of little and indistinguishable\nsentiments that are to be unfolded, we need not wonder at the infinite\nvariety of what is to result from it in time. This is only a consequence of\nthe representative nature of the soul, which is, to express what happens\nand what will happen in its body, by the connexion and correspondence of\nall the parts of the world_. I have but little to say in answer to this: I\nshall only observe that this supposition when sufficiently cleared is the\nright way of solving all the difficulties. M. Leibniz, through the     [46]\npenetration of his great genius, has very well conceived the extent and\nstrength of this objection, and what remedy ought to be applied to the main\ninconveniency. I do not doubt but that he will smooth the rough parts of\nhis system, and teach us some excellent things about the nature of spirits.\nNobody can travel more usefully or more safely than he in the intellectual\nworld. I hope that his curious explanations will remove all the\nimpossibilities which I have hitherto found in his system, and that he will\nsolidly remove my difficulties, as well as those of Father Lami. And these\nhopes made me say before, without designing to pass a compliment upon that\nlearned man, that his system ought to be looked upon as an important\nconquest.\n\n'He will not be much embarrassed by this, viz. that whereas according to\nthe supposition of the Cartesians there is but one general law for the\nunion of spirits and bodies, he will have it that God gives a particular\nlaw to each spirit; from whence it seems to result that the primitive\nconstitution of each spirit is specifically different from all others. Do\nnot the Thomists say, that there are as many species as individuals in\nangelic nature?'\n\nLeibniz acknowledged Bayle's note in a further reply, which is written as\nthough for publication. It was communicated to Bayle, but it was not in\nfact published. It is dated 1702. It may be found in the standard\ncollections of Leibniz's philosophical works. It reads almost like a sketch\nfor the _Theodicy_.\n\nThe principal point developed by Leibniz is the richness of content which,\naccording to him, is to be found in each 'simple substance'. Its simplicity\nis more like the infinitely rich simplicity of the divine Being, than like\nthe simplicity of the atom of Epicurus, with which Bayle had chosen to\ncompare it. It contains a condensation in confused idea of the whole\nuniverse: and its essence is from the first defined by the part it is to\nplay in the total harmony.\n\nAs to the musical score ('tablature of notes') which the individual soul\nplays from, in order to perform its ordained part in the universal harmony,\nthis 'score' is to be found in the confused or implicit ideas at any moment\npresent, from which an omniscient observer could always deduce what is to\nhappen next. To the objection 'But the created soul is not an omniscient\nobserver, and if it cannot read the score, the score is useless to it',[47]\nLeibniz replies by affirming that much spontaneous action arises from\nsubjective and yet unperceived reasons, as we are all perfectly aware, once\nwe attend to the relevant facts. All he claims to be doing is to generalize\nthis observation. All events whatsoever arise from the 'interpretation of\nthe score' by monads, but very little of this 'interpretation' is in the\nleast conscious.\n\nLeibniz passes from the remarks about his own doctrine under the article\n'Rorarius' to other articles of Bayle's dictionary, and touches the\nquestion of the origin of evil, and other matters which receive their\nfuller treatment in the _Theodicy_.\n\nIn the same year Leibniz wrote a very friendly letter to Bayle himself,\noffering further explanations of disputed points. He concluded it with a\nparagraph of some personal interest, comparing himself the\nhistorian-philosopher with Bayle the philosophic lexicographer, and\nrevealing by the way his attitude to philosophy, science and history:\n\n'We have good reason to admire, Sir, the way in which your striking\nreflexions on the deepest questions of philosophy remain unhindered by your\nboundless researches into matters of fact. I too am not always able to\nexcuse myself from discussions of the sort, and have even been obliged to\ndescend to questions of genealogy, which would be still more trifling, were\nit not that the interests of States frequently depend upon them. I have\nworked much on the history of Germany in so far as it bears upon these\ncountries, a study which has furnished me with some observations belonging\nto general history. So I have learnt not to neglect the knowledge of sheer\nfacts. But if the choice were open to me, I should prefer natural history\nto political, and the customs and laws God has established in nature, to\nwhat is observed among mankind.'\n\nLeibniz now conceived the idea of putting together all the passages in\nBayle's works which interested him, and writing a systematic answer to\nthem. Before he had leisure to finish the task, Bayle died. The work\nnevertheless appeared in 1710 as the Essays in _Theodicy_.\n\n                                                                       [49]\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nPREFACE\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIt has ever been seen that men in general have resorted to outward forms\nfor the expression of their religion: sound piety, that is to say, light\nand virtue, has never been the portion of the many. One should not wonder\nat this, nothing is so much in accord with human weakness. We are impressed\nby what is outward, while the inner essence of things requires\nconsideration of such a kind as few persons are fitted to give. As true\npiety consists in principles and practice, the outward forms of religion\nimitate these, and are of two kinds: the one kind consists in ceremonial\npractices, and the other in the formularies of belief. Ceremonies resemble\nvirtuous actions, and formularies are like shadows of the truth and\napproach, more or less, the true light. All these outward forms would be\ncommendable if those who invented them had rendered them appropriate to\nmaintain and to express that which they imitate--if religious ceremonies,\necclesiastical discipline, the rules of communities, human laws were always\nlike a hedge round the divine law, to withdraw us from any approach to\nvice, to inure us to the good and to make us familiar with virtue. That was\nthe aim of Moses and of other good lawgivers, of the wise men who founded\nreligious orders, and above all of Jesus Christ, divine founder of the\npurest and most enlightened religion. It is just the same with the\nformularies of belief: they would be valid provided there were nothing [50]\nin them inconsistent with truth unto salvation, even though the full truth\nconcerned were not there. But it happens only too often that religion is\nchoked in ceremonial, and that the divine light is obscured by the opinions\nof men.\n\nThe pagans, who inhabited the earth before Christianity was founded, had\nonly one kind of outward form: they had ceremonies in their worship, but\nthey had no articles of faith and had never dreamed of drawing up\nformularies for their dogmatic theology. They knew not whether their gods\nwere real persons or symbols of the forces of Nature, as the sun, the\nplanets, the elements. Their mysteries consisted not in difficult dogmas\nbut in certain secret observances, whence the profane, namely those who\nwere not initiated, were excluded. These observances were very often\nridiculous and absurd, and it was necessary to conceal them in order to\nguard them against contempt. The pagans had their superstitions: they\nboasted of miracles, everything with them was full of oracles, auguries,\nportents, divinations; the priests invented signs of the anger or of the\ngoodness of the gods, whose interpreters they claimed to be. This tended to\nsway minds through fear and hope concerning human events; but the great\nfuture of another life was scarce envisaged; one did not trouble to impart\nto men true notions of God and of the soul.\n\nOf all ancient peoples, it appears that the Hebrews alone had public dogmas\nfor their religion. Abraham and Moses established the belief in one God,\nsource of all good, author of all things. The Hebrews speak of him in a\nmanner worthy of the Supreme Substance; and one wonders at seeing the\ninhabitants of one small region of the earth more enlightened than the rest\nof the human race. Peradventure the wise men of other nations have\nsometimes said the same, but they have not had the good fortune to find a\nsufficient following and to convert the dogma into law. Nevertheless Moses\nhad not inserted in his laws the doctrine of the immortality of souls: it\nwas consistent with his ideas, it was taught by oral tradition; but it was\nnot proclaimed for popular acceptance until Jesus Christ lifted the veil,\nand, without having force in his hand, taught with all the force of a\nlawgiver that immortal souls pass into another life, wherein they shall\nreceive the wages of their deeds. Moses had already expressed the beautiful\nconceptions of the greatness and the goodness of God, whereto many\ncivilized peoples to-day assent; but Jesus Christ demonstrated fully   [51]\nthe results of these ideas, proclaiming that divine goodness and justice\nare shown forth to perfection in God's designs for the souls of men.\n\nI refrain from considering here the other points of the Christian doctrine,\nand I will show only how Jesus Christ brought about the conversion of\nnatural religion into law, and gained for it the authority of a public\ndogma. He alone did that which so many philosophers had endeavoured in vain\nto do; and Christians having at last gained the upper hand in the Roman\nEmpire, the master of the greater part of the known earth, the religion of\nthe wise men became that of the nations. Later also Mahomet showed no\ndivergence from the great dogmas of natural theology: his followers spread\nthem abroad even among the most remote races of Asia and of Africa, whither\nChristianity had not been carried; and they abolished in many countries\nheathen superstitions which were contrary to the true doctrine of the unity\nof God and the immortality of souls.\n\nIt is clear that Jesus Christ, completing what Moses had begun, wished that\nthe Divinity should be the object not only of our fear and veneration but\nalso of our love and devotion. Thus he made men happy by anticipation, and\ngave them here on earth a foretaste of future felicity. For there is\nnothing so agreeable as loving that which is worthy of love. Love is that\nmental state which makes us take pleasure in the perfections of the object\nof our love, and there is nothing more perfect than God, nor any greater\ndelight than in him. To love him it suffices to contemplate his\nperfections, a thing easy indeed, because we find the ideas of these within\nourselves. The perfections of God are those of our souls, but he possesses\nthem in boundless measure; he is an Ocean, whereof to us only drops have\nbeen granted; there is in us some power, some knowledge, some goodness, but\nin God they are all in their entirety. Order, proportions, harmony delight\nus; painting and music are samples of these: God is all order; he always\nkeeps truth of proportions, he makes universal harmony; all beauty is an\neffusion of his rays.\n\nIt follows manifestly that true piety and even true felicity consist in the\nlove of God, but a love so enlightened that its fervour is attended by\ninsight. This kind of love begets that pleasure in good actions which gives\nrelief to virtue, and, relating all to God as to the centre, transports the\nhuman to the divine. For in doing one's duty, in obeying reason, one   [52]\ncarries out the orders of Supreme Reason. One directs all one's intentions\nto the common good, which is no other than the glory of God. Thus one finds\nthat there is no greater individual interest than to espouse that of the\ncommunity, and one gains satisfaction for oneself by taking pleasure in the\nacquisition of true benefits for men. Whether one succeeds therein or not,\none is content with what comes to pass, being once resigned to the will of\nGod and knowing that what he wills is best. But before he declares his will\nby the event one endeavours to find it out by doing that which appears most\nin accord with his commands. When we are in this state of mind, we are not\ndisheartened by ill success, we regret only our faults; and the ungrateful\nways of men cause no relaxation in the exercise of our kindly disposition.\nOur charity is humble and full of moderation, it presumes not to domineer;\nattentive alike to our own faults and to the talents of others, we are\ninclined to criticize our own actions and to excuse and vindicate those of\nothers. We must work out our own perfection and do wrong to no man. There\nis no piety where there is not charity; and without being kindly and\nbeneficent one cannot show sincere religion.\n\nGood disposition, favourable upbringing, association with pious and\nvirtuous persons may contribute much towards such a propitious condition\nfor our souls; but most securely are they grounded therein by good\nprinciples. I have already said that insight must be joined to fervour,\nthat the perfecting of our understanding must accomplish the perfecting of\nour will. The practices of virtue, as well as those of vice, may be the\neffect of a mere habit, one may acquire a taste for them; but when virtue\nis reasonable, when it is related to God, who is the supreme reason of\nthings, it is founded on knowledge. One cannot love God without knowing his\nperfections, and this knowledge contains the principles of true piety. The\npurpose of religion should be to imprint these principles upon our souls:\nbut in some strange way it has happened all too often that men, that\nteachers of religion have strayed far from this purpose. Contrary to the\nintention of our divine Master, devotion has been reduced to ceremonies and\ndoctrine has been cumbered with formulae. All too often these ceremonies\nhave not been well fitted to maintain the exercise of virtue, and the\nformulae sometimes have not been lucid. Can one believe it? Some Christians\nhave imagined that they could be devout without loving their neighbour,[53]\nand pious without loving God; or else people have thought that they could\nlove their neighbour without serving him and could love God without knowing\nhim. Many centuries have passed without recognition of this defect by the\npeople at large; and there are still great traces of the reign of darkness.\nThere are divers persons who speak much of piety, of devotion, of religion,\nwho are even busied with the teaching of such things, and who yet prove to\nbe by no means versed in the divine perfections. They ill understand the\ngoodness and the justice of the Sovereign of the universe; they imagine a\nGod who deserves neither to be imitated nor to be loved. This indeed seemed\nto me dangerous in its effect, since it is of serious moment that the very\nsource of piety should be preserved from infection. The old errors of those\nwho arraigned the Divinity or who made thereof an evil principle have been\nrenewed sometimes in our own days: people have pleaded the irresistible\npower of God when it was a question rather of presenting his supreme\ngoodness; and they have assumed a despotic power when they should rather\nhave conceived of a power ordered by the most perfect wisdom. I have\nobserved that these opinions, apt to do harm, rested especially on confused\nnotions which had been formed concerning freedom, necessity and destiny;\nand I have taken up my pen more than once on such an occasion to give\nexplanations on these important matters. But finally I have been compelled\nto gather up my thoughts on all these connected questions, and to impart\nthem to the public. It is this that I have undertaken in the Essays which I\noffer here, on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of\nEvil.\n\nThere are two famous labyrinths where our reason very often goes astray:\none concerns the great question of the Free and the Necessary, above all in\nthe production and the origin of Evil; the other consists in the discussion\nof continuity and of the indivisibles which appear to be the elements\nthereof, and where the consideration of the infinite must enter in. The\nfirst perplexes almost all the human race, the other exercises philosophers\nonly. I shall have perchance at another time an opportunity to declare\nmyself on the second, and to point out that, for lack of a true conception\nof the nature of substance and matter, people have taken up false positions\nleading to insurmountable difficulties, difficulties which should properly\nbe applied to the overthrow of these very positions. But if the        [54]\nknowledge of continuity is important for speculative enquiry, that of\nnecessity is none the less so for practical application; and it, together\nwith the questions therewith connected, to wit, the freedom of man and the\njustice of God, forms the object of this treatise.\n\nMen have been perplexed in well-nigh every age by a sophism which the\nancients called the 'Lazy Reason', because it tended towards doing nothing,\nor at least towards being careful for nothing and only following\ninclination for the pleasure of the moment. For, they said, if the future\nis necessary, that which must happen will happen, whatever I may do. Now\nthe future (so they said) is necessary, whether because the Divinity\nforesees everything, and even pre-establishes it by the control of all\nthings in the universe; or because everything happens of necessity, through\nthe concatenation of causes; or finally, through the very nature of truth,\nwhich is determinate in the assertions that can be made on future events,\nas it is in all assertions, since the assertion must always be true or\nfalse in itself, even though we know not always which it is. And all these\nreasons for determination which appear different converge finally like\nlines upon one and the same centre; for there is a truth in the future\nevent which is predetermined by the causes, and God pre-establishes it in\nestablishing the causes.\n\nThe false conception of necessity, being applied in practice, has given\nrise to what I call _Fatum Mahometanum_, fate after the Turkish fashion,\nbecause it is said of the Turks that they do not shun danger or even\nabandon places infected with plague, owing to their use of such reasoning\nas that just recorded. For what is called _Fatum Stoicum_ was not so black\nas it is painted: it did not divert men from the care of their affairs, but\nit tended to give them tranquillity in regard to events, through the\nconsideration of necessity, which renders our anxieties and our vexations\nneedless. In which respect these philosophers were not far removed from the\nteaching of our Lord, who deprecates these anxieties in regard to the\nmorrow, comparing them with the needless trouble a man would give himself\nin labouring to increase his stature.\n\nIt is true that the teachings of the Stoics (and perhaps also of some\nfamous philosophers of our time), confining themselves to this alleged\nnecessity, can only impart a forced patience; whereas our Lord inspires\nthoughts more sublime, and even instructs us in the means of gaining\ncontentment by assuring us that since God, being altogether good and   [55]\nwise, has care for everything, even so far as not to neglect one hair of\nour head, our confidence in him ought to be entire. And thus we should see,\nif we were capable of understanding him, that it is not even possible to\nwish for anything better (as much in general as for ourselves) than what he\ndoes. It is as if one said to men: Do your duty and be content with that\nwhich shall come of it, not only because you cannot resist divine\nprovidence, or the nature of things (which may suffice for tranquillity,\nbut not for contentment), but also because you have to do with a good\nmaster. And that is what may be called _Fatum Christianum_.\n\nNevertheless it happens that most men, and even Christians, introduce into\ntheir dealings some mixture of fate after the Turkish fashion, although\nthey do not sufficiently acknowledge it. It is true that they are not\ninactive or negligent when obvious perils or great and manifest hopes\npresent themselves; for they will not fail to abandon a house that is about\nto fall and to turn aside from a precipice they see in their path; and they\nwill burrow in the earth to dig up a treasure half uncovered, without\nwaiting for fate to finish dislodging it. But when the good or the evil is\nremote and uncertain and the remedy painful or little to our taste, the\nlazy reason seems to us to be valid. For example, when it is a question of\npreserving one's health and even one's life by good diet, people to whom\none gives advice thereupon very often answer that our days are numbered and\nthat it avails nothing to try to struggle against that which God destines\nfor us. But these same persons run to even the most absurd remedies when\nthe evil they had neglected draws near. One reasons in somewhat the same\nway when the question for consideration is somewhat thorny, as for instance\nwhen one asks oneself, _quod vitae sectabor iter_? what profession one must\nchoose; when it is a question of a marriage being arranged, of a war being\nundertaken, of a battle being fought; for in these cases many will be\ninclined to evade the difficulty of consideration and abandon themselves to\nfate or to inclination, as if reason should not be employed except in easy\ncases. One will then all too often reason in the Turkish fashion (although\nthis way is wrongly termed trusting in providence, a thing that in reality\noccurs only when one has done one's duty) and one will employ the lazy\nreason, derived from the idea of inevitable fate, to relieve oneself of the\nneed to reason properly. One will thus overlook the fact that if this  [56]\nargument contrary to the practice of reason were valid, it would always\nhold good, whether the consideration were easy or not. This laziness is to\nsome extent the source of the superstitious practices of fortune-tellers,\nwhich meet with just such credulity as men show towards the philosopher's\nstone, because they would fain have short cuts to the attainment of\nhappiness without trouble.\n\nI do not speak here of those who throw themselves upon fortune because they\nhave been happy before, as if there were something permanent therein. Their\nargument from the past to the future has just as slight a foundation as the\nprinciples of astrology and of other kinds of divination. They overlook the\nfact that there is usually an ebb and flow in fortune, _una marea_, as\nItalians playing basset are wont to call it. With regard to this they make\ntheir own particular observations, which I would, nevertheless, counsel\nnone to trust too much. Yet this confidence that people have in their\nfortune serves often to give courage to men, and above all to soldiers, and\ncauses them to have indeed that good fortune they ascribe to themselves.\nEven so do predictions often cause that to happen which has been foretold,\nas it is supposed that the opinion the Mahometans hold on fate makes them\nresolute. Thus even errors have their use at times, but generally as\nproviding a remedy for other errors: and truth is unquestionably better.\n\nBut it is taking an unfair advantage of this alleged necessity of fate to\nemploy it in excuse for our vices and our libertinism. I have often heard\nit said by smart young persons, who wished to play the freethinker, that it\nis useless to preach virtue, to censure vice, to create hopes of reward and\nfears of punishment, since it may be said of the book of destiny, that what\nis written is written, and that our behaviour can change nothing therein.\nThus, they would say, it were best to follow one's inclination, dwelling\nonly upon such things as may content us in the present. They did not\nreflect upon the strange consequences of this argument, which would prove\ntoo much, since it would prove (for instance) that one should take a\npleasant beverage even though one knows it is poisoned. For the same reason\n(if it were valid) I could say: if it is written in the records of the\nParcae that poison will kill me now or will do me harm, this will happen\neven though I were not to take this beverage; and if this is not written,\nit will not happen even though I should take this same beverage;\nconsequently I shall be able to follow with impunity my inclination to [57]\ntake what is pleasing, however injurious it may be; the result of which\nreasoning is an obvious absurdity. This objection disconcerted them a\nlittle, but they always reverted to their argument, phrased in different\nways, until they were brought to understand where the fault of the sophism\nlies. It is untrue that the event happens whatever one may do: it will\nhappen because one does what leads thereto; and if the event is written\nbeforehand, the cause that will make it happen is written also. Thus the\nconnexion of effects and causes, so far from establishing the doctrine of a\nnecessity detrimental to conduct, serves to overthrow it.\n\nYet, without having evil intentions inclined towards libertinism, one may\nenvisage differently the strange consequences of an inevitable necessity,\nconsidering that it would destroy the freedom of the will, so essential to\nthe morality of action: for justice and injustice, praise and blame,\npunishment and reward cannot attach to necessary actions, and nobody will\nbe under obligation to do the impossible or to abstain from doing what is\nabsolutely necessary. Without any intention of abusing this consideration\nin order to favour irregularity, one will nevertheless not escape\nembarrassment sometimes, when it comes to a question of judging the actions\nof others, or rather of answering objections, amongst which there are some\neven concerned with the actions of God, whereof I will speak presently. And\nas an insuperable necessity would open the door to impiety, whether through\nthe impunity one could thence infer or the hopelessness of any attempt to\nresist a torrent that sweeps everything along with it, it is important to\nnote the different degrees of necessity, and to show that there are some\nwhich cannot do harm, as there are others which cannot be admitted without\ngiving rise to evil consequences.\n\nSome go even further: not content with using the pretext of necessity to\nprove that virtue and vice do neither good nor ill, they have the hardihood\nto make the Divinity accessary to their licentious way of life, and they\nimitate the pagans of old, who ascribed to the gods the cause of their\ncrimes, as if a divinity drove them to do evil. The philosophy of\nChristians, which recognizes better than that of the ancients the\ndependence of things upon the first Author and his co-operation with all\nthe actions of creatures, appears to have increased this difficulty. Some\nable men in our own time have gone so far as to deny all action to     [58]\ncreatures, and M. Bayle, who tended a little towards this extraordinary\nopinion, made use of it to restore the lapsed dogma of the two principles,\nor two gods, the one good, the other evil, as if this dogma were a better\nsolution to the difficulties over the origin of evil. Yet again he\nacknowledges that it is an indefensible opinion and that the oneness of the\nPrinciple is incontestably founded on _a priori_ reasons; but he wishes to\ninfer that our Reason is confounded and cannot meet her own objections, and\nthat one should disregard them and hold fast the revealed dogmas, which\nteach us the existence of one God altogether good, altogether powerful and\naltogether wise. But many readers, convinced of the irrefutable nature of\nhis objections and believing them to be at least as strong as the proofs\nfor the truth of religion, would draw dangerous conclusions.\n\nEven though there were no co-operation by God in evil actions, one could\nnot help finding difficulty in the fact that he foresees them and that,\nbeing able to prevent them through his omnipotence, he yet permits them.\nThis is why some philosophers and even some theologians have rather chosen\nto deny to God any knowledge of the detail of things and, above all, of\nfuture events, than to admit what they believed repellent to his goodness.\nThe Socinians and Conrad Vorstius lean towards that side; and Thomas\nBonartes, an English Jesuit disguised under a pseudonym but exceedingly\nlearned, who wrote a book _De Concordia Scientiae cum Fide_, of which I\nwill speak later, appears to hint at this also.\n\nThey are doubtless much mistaken; but others are not less so who, convinced\nthat nothing comes to pass save by the will and the power of God, ascribe\nto him intentions and actions so unworthy of the greatest and the best of\nall beings that one would say these authors have indeed renounced the dogma\nwhich recognizes God's justice and goodness. They thought that, being\nsupreme Master of the universe, he could without any detriment to his\nholiness cause sins to be committed, simply at his will and pleasure, or in\norder that he might have the pleasure of punishing; and even that he could\ntake pleasure in eternally afflicting innocent people without doing any\ninjustice, because no one has the right or the power to control his\nactions. Some even have gone so far as to say that God acts thus indeed;\nand on the plea that we are as nothing in comparison with him, they liken\nus to earthworms which men crush without heeding as they walk, or in\ngeneral to animals that are not of our species and which we do not     [59]\nscruple to ill-treat.\n\nI believe that many persons otherwise of good intentions are misled by\nthese ideas, because they have not sufficient knowledge of their\nconsequences. They do not see that, properly speaking, God's justice is\nthus overthrown. For what idea shall we form of such a justice as has only\nwill for its rule, that is to say, where the will is not guided by the\nrules of good and even tends directly towards evil? Unless it be the idea\ncontained in that tyrannical definition by Thrasymachus in Plato, which\ndesignated as _just_ that which pleases the stronger. Such indeed is the\nposition taken up, albeit unwittingly, by those who rest all obligation\nupon constraint, and in consequence take power as the gauge of right. But\none will soon abandon maxims so strange and so unfit to make men good and\ncharitable through the imitation of God. For one will reflect that a God\nwho would take pleasure in the misfortune of others cannot be distinguished\nfrom the evil principle of the Manichaeans, assuming that this principle\nhad become sole master of the universe; and that in consequence one must\nattribute to the true God sentiments that render him worthy to be called\nthe good Principle.\n\nHappily these extravagant dogmas scarce obtain any longer among\ntheologians. Nevertheless some astute persons, who are pleased to make\ndifficulties, revive them: they seek to increase our perplexity by uniting\nthe controversies aroused by Christian theology to the disputes of\nphilosophy. Philosophers have considered the questions of necessity, of\nfreedom and of the origin of evil; theologians have added thereto those of\noriginal sin, of grace and of predestination. The original corruption of\nthe human race, coming from the first sin, appears to us to have imposed a\nnatural necessity to sin without the succour of divine grace: but necessity\nbeing incompatible with punishment, it will be inferred that a sufficient\ngrace ought to have been given to all men; which does not seem to be in\nconformity with experience.\n\nBut the difficulty is great, above all, in relation to God's dispositions\nfor the salvation of men. There are few saved or chosen; therefore the\nchoice of many is not God's decreed will. And since it is admitted that\nthose whom he has chosen deserve it no more than the rest, and are not even\nfundamentally less evil, the goodness which they have coming only from the\ngift of God, the difficulty is increased. Where is, then, his justice  [60]\n(people will say), or at the least, where is his goodness? Partiality, or\nrespect of persons, goes against justice, and he who without cause sets\nbounds to his goodness cannot have it in sufficient measure. It is true\nthat those who are not chosen are lost by their own fault: they lack good\nwill or living faith; but it rested with God alone to grant it them. We\nknow that besides inward grace there are usually outward circumstances\nwhich distinguish men, and that training, conversation, example often\ncorrect or corrupt natural disposition. Now that God should call forth\ncircumstances favourable to some and abandon others to experiences which\ncontribute to their misfortune, will not that give us cause for\nastonishment? And it is not enough (so it seems) to say with some that\ninward grace is universal and equal for all. For these same authors are\nobliged to resort to the exclamations of St. Paul, and to say: 'O the\ndepth!' when they consider how men are distinguished by what we may call\noutward graces, that is, by graces appearing in the diversity of\ncircumstances which God calls forth, whereof men are not the masters, and\nwhich have nevertheless so great an influence upon all that concerns their\nsalvation.\n\nNor will it help us to say with St. Augustine that, all men being involved\nin the damnation caused by the sin of Adam, God might have left them all in\ntheir misery; and that thus his goodness alone induces him to deliver some\nof them. For not only is it strange that the sin of another should condemn\nanyone, but there still remains the question why God does not deliver\nall--why he delivers the lesser number and why some in preference to\nothers. He is in truth their master, but he is a good and just master; his\npower is absolute, but his wisdom permits not that he exercise that power\nin an arbitrary and despotic way, which would be tyrannous indeed.\n\nMoreover, the fall of the first man having happened only with God's\npermission, and God having resolved to permit it only when once he had\nconsidered its consequences, which are the corruption of the mass of the\nhuman race and the choice of a small number of elect, with the abandonment\nof all the rest, it is useless to conceal the difficulty by limiting one's\nview to the mass already corrupt. One must, in spite of oneself, go back to\nthe knowledge of the consequences of the first sin, preceding the decree\nwhereby God permitted it, and whereby he permitted simultaneously that [61]\nthe damned should be involved in the mass of perdition and should not be\ndelivered: for God and the sage make no resolve without considering its\nconsequences.\n\nI hope to remove all these difficulties. I will point out that absolute\nnecessity, which is called also logical and metaphysical and sometimes\ngeometrical, and which would alone be formidable in this connexion, does\nnot exist in free actions, and that thus freedom is exempt not only from\nconstraint but also from real necessity. I will show that God himself,\nalthough he always chooses the best, does not act by an absolute necessity,\nand that the laws of nature laid down by God, founded upon the fitness of\nthings, keep the mean between geometrical truths, absolutely necessary, and\narbitrary decrees; which M. Bayle and other modern philosophers have not\nsufficiently understood. Further I will show that there is an indifference\nin freedom, because there is no absolute necessity for one course or the\nother; but yet that there is never an indifference of perfect equipoise.\nAnd I will demonstrate that there is in free actions a perfect spontaneity\nbeyond all that has been conceived hitherto. Finally I will make it plain\nthat the hypothetical and the moral necessity which subsist in free actions\nare open to no objection, and that the 'Lazy Reason' is a pure sophism.\n\nLikewise concerning the origin of evil in its relation to God, I offer a\nvindication of his perfections that shall extol not less his holiness, his\njustice and his goodness than his greatness, his power and his\nindependence. I show how it is possible for everything to depend upon God,\nfor him to co-operate in all the actions of creatures, even, if you will,\nto create these creatures continually, and nevertheless not to be the\nauthor of sin. Here also it is demonstrated how the privative nature of\nevil should be understood. Much more than that, I explain how evil has a\nsource other than the will of God, and that one is right therefore to say\nof moral evil that God wills it not, but simply permits it. Most important\nof all, however, I show that it has been possible for God to permit sin and\nmisery, and even to co-operate therein and promote it, without detriment to\nhis holiness and his supreme goodness: although, generally speaking, he\ncould have avoided all these evils.\n\nConcerning grace and predestination, I justify the most debatable\nassertions, as for instance: that we are converted only through the    [62]\nprevenient grace of God and that we cannot do good except with his aid;\nthat God wills the salvation of all men and that he condemns only those\nwhose will is evil; that he gives to all a sufficient grace provided they\nwish to use it; that, Jesus Christ being the source and the centre of\nelection, God destined the elect for salvation, because he foresaw that\nthey would cling with a lively faith to the doctrine of Jesus Christ. Yet\nit is true that this reason for election is not the final reason, and that\nthis very pre-vision is still a consequence of God's anterior decree. Faith\nlikewise is a gift of God, who has predestinated the faith of the elect,\nfor reasons lying in a superior decree which dispenses grace and\ncircumstance in accordance with God's supreme wisdom.\n\nNow, as one of the most gifted men of our time, whose eloquence was as\ngreat as his acumen and who gave great proofs of his vast erudition, had\napplied himself with a strange predilection to call attention to all the\ndifficulties on this subject which I have just touched in general, I found\na fine field for exercise in considering the question with him in detail. I\nacknowledge that M. Bayle (for it is easy to see that I speak of him) has\non his side all the advantages except that of the root of the matter, but I\nhope that truth (which he acknowledges himself to be on our side) by its\nvery plainness, and provided it be fittingly set forth, will prevail over\nall the ornaments of eloquence and erudition. My hope for success therein\nis all the greater because it is the cause of God I plead, and because one\nof the maxims here upheld states that God's help is never lacking for those\nthat lack not good will. The author of this discourse believes that he has\ngiven proof of this good will in the attention he has brought to bear upon\nthis subject. He has meditated upon it since his youth; he has conferred\nwith some of the foremost men of the time; and he has schooled himself by\nthe reading of good authors. And the success which God has given him\n(according to the opinion of sundry competent judges) in certain other\nprofound meditations, of which some have much influence on this subject,\ngives him peradventure some right to claim the attention of readers who\nlove truth and are fitted to search after it.\n\nThe author had, moreover, particular and weighty reasons inducing him to\ntake pen in hand for discussion of this subject. Conversations which he had\nconcerning the same with literary and court personages, in Germany and in\nFrance, and especially with one of the greatest and most accomplished  [63]\nof princesses, have repeatedly prompted him to this course. He had had the\nhonour of expressing his opinions to this Princess upon divers passages of\nthe admirable _Dictionary_ of M. Bayle, wherein religion and reason appear\nas adversaries, and where M. Bayle wishes to silence reason after having\nmade it speak too loud: which he calls the triumph of faith. The present\nauthor declared there and then that he was of a different opinion, but that\nhe was nevertheless well pleased that a man of such great genius had\nbrought about an occasion for going deeply into these subjects, subjects as\nimportant as they are difficult. He admitted having examined them also for\nsome long time already, and having sometimes been minded to publish upon\nthis matter some reflexions whose chief aim should be such knowledge of God\nas is needed to awaken piety and to foster virtue. This Princess exhorted\nand urged him to carry out his long-cherished intention, and some friends\nadded their persuasions. He was all the more tempted to accede to their\nrequests since he had reason to hope that in the sequel to his\ninvestigation M. Bayle's genius would greatly aid him to give the subject\nsuch illumination as it might receive with his support. But divers\nobstacles intervened, and the death of the incomparable Queen was not the\nleast. It happened, however, that M. Bayle was attacked by excellent men\nwho set themselves to examine the same subject; he answered them fully and\nalways ingeniously. I followed their dispute, and was even on the point of\nbeing involved therein. This is how it came about.\n\nI had published a new system, which seemed well adapted to explain the\nunion of the soul and the body: it met with considerable applause even from\nthose who were not in agreement with it, and certain competent persons\ntestified that they had already been of my opinion, without having reached\nso distinct an explanation, before they saw what I had written on the\nmatter. M. Bayle examined it in his _Historical and Critical Dictionary_,\narticle 'Rorarius'. He thought that my expositions were worthy of further\ndevelopment; he drew attention to their usefulness in various connexions,\nand he laid stress upon what might still cause difficulty. I could not but\nreply in a suitable way to expressions so civil and to reflexions so\ninstructive as his. In order to turn them to greater account, I published\nsome elucidations in the _Histoire des Ouvrages des Savants_, July 1698. M.\nBayle replied to them in the second edition of his _Dictionary_. I sent[64]\nhim a rejoinder which has not yet been published; I know not whether he\never made a further reply.\n\nMeanwhile it happened that M. le Clerc had inserted in his _Select Library_\nan extract from the _Intellectual System_ of the late Mr. Cudworth, and had\nexplained therein certain 'plastic natures' which this admirable author\napplied to the formation of animals. M. Bayle believed (see the\ncontinuation of _Divers Thoughts on the Comet_, ch. 21, art. 11) that,\nthese natures being without cognition, in establishing them one weakened\nthe argument which proves, through the marvellous formation of things, that\nthe universe must have an intelligent Cause. M. le Clerc replied (4th art.\nof the 5th vol. of his _Select Library_) that these natures required to be\ndirected by divine wisdom. M. Bayle insisted (7th article of the _Histoire\ndes Ouvrages des Savants_, August 1704) that direction alone was not\nsufficient for a cause devoid of cognition, unless one took the cause to be\na mere instrument of God, in which case direction would be needless. My\nsystem was touched upon in passing; and that gave me an opportunity to send\na short essay to the illustrious author of the _Histoire des Ouvrages des\nSavants_, which he inserted in the month of May 1705, art. 9. In this I\nendeavoured to make clear that in reality mechanism is sufficient to\nproduce the organic bodies of animals, without any need of other plastic\nnatures, provided there be added thereto the _preformation_ already\ncompletely organic in the seeds of the bodies that come into existence,\ncontained in those of the bodies whence they spring, right back to the\nprimary seeds. This could only proceed from the Author of things,\ninfinitely powerful and infinitely wise, who, creating all in the beginning\nin due order, had _pre-established_ there all order and artifice that was\nto be. There is no chaos in the inward nature of things, and there is\norganism everywhere in a matter whose disposition proceeds from God. More\nand more of it would come to light if we pressed closer our examination of\nthe anatomy of bodies; and we should continue to observe it even if we\ncould go on to infinity, like Nature, and make subdivision as continuous in\nour knowledge as Nature has made it in fact.\n\nIn order to explain this marvel of the formation of animals, I made use of\na Pre-established Harmony, that is to say, of the same means I had used to\nexplain another marvel, namely the correspondence of soul with body,   [65]\nwherein I proved the uniformity and the fecundity of the principles I had\nemployed. It seems that this reminded M. Bayle of my system of accounting\nfor this correspondence, which he had examined formerly. He declared (in\nchapter 180 of his _Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III, p.\n1253) that he did not believe God could give to matter or to any other\ncause the faculty of becoming organic without communicating to it the idea\nand the knowledge of organic nature. Also he was not yet disposed to\nbelieve that God, with all his power over Nature and with all the\nforeknowledge which he has of the contingencies that may arrive, could have\nso disposed things that by the laws of mechanics alone a vessel (for\ninstance) should go to its port of destination without being steered during\nits passage by some intelligent guide. I was surprised to see that limits\nwere placed on the power of God, without the adduction of any proof and\nwithout indication that there was any contradiction to be feared on the\nside of the object or any imperfection on God's side. Whereas I had shown\nbefore in my Rejoinder that even men often produce through automata\nsomething like the movements that come from reason, and that even a finite\nmind (but one far above ours) could accomplish what M. Bayle thinks\nimpossible to the Divinity. Moreover, as God orders all things at once\nbeforehand, the accuracy of the path of this vessel would be no more\nstrange than that of a fuse passing along a cord in fireworks, since the\nwhole disposition of things preserves a perfect harmony between them by\nmeans of their influence one upon the other.\n\nThis declaration of M. Bayle pledged me to an answer. I therefore purposed\nto point out to him, that unless it be said that God forms organic bodies\nhimself by a perpetual miracle, or that he has entrusted this care to\nintelligences whose power and knowledge are almost divine, we must hold the\nopinion that God _preformed_ things in such sort that new organisms are\nonly a mechanical consequence of a preceding organic constitution. Even so\ndo butterflies come out of silkworms, an instance where M. Swammerdam has\nshown that there is nothing but development. And I would have added that\nnothing is better qualified than the preformation of plants and of animals\nto confirm my System of Pre-established Harmony between the soul and the\nbody. For in this the body is prompted by its original constitution to\ncarry out with the help of external things all that it does in accordance\nwith the will of the soul. So the seeds by their original constitution [66]\ncarry out naturally the intentions of God, by an artifice greater still\nthan that which causes our body to perform everything in conformity with\nour will. And since M. Bayle himself deems with reason that there is more\nartifice in the organism of animals than in the most beautiful poem in the\nworld or in the most admirable invention whereof the human mind is capable,\nit follows that my system of the connexion between the body and the soul is\nas intelligible as the general opinion on the formation of animals. For\nthis opinion (which appears to me true) states in effect that the wisdom of\nGod has so made Nature that it is competent in virtue of its laws to form\nanimals; I explain this opinion and throw more light upon the possibility\nof it through the system of preformation. Whereafter there will be no cause\nfor surprise that God has so made the body that by virtue of its own laws\nit can carry out the intentions of the reasoning soul: for all that the\nreasoning soul can demand of the body is less difficult than the\norganization which God has demanded of the seeds. M. Bayle says (_Reply to\nthe Questions of a Provincial_, ch. 182, p. 1294) that it is only very\nrecently there have been people who have understood that the formation of\nliving bodies cannot be a natural process. This he could say also (in\naccordance with his principles) of the communication between the soul and\nthe body, since God effects this whole communication in the system of\noccasional causes to which this author subscribes. But I admit the\nsupernatural here only in the beginning of things, in respect of the first\nformation of animals or in respect of the original constitution of\npre-established harmony between the soul and the body. Once that has come\nto pass, I hold that the formation of animals and the relation between the\nsoul and the body are something as natural now as the other most ordinary\noperations of Nature. A close parallel is afforded by people's ordinary\nthinking about the instinct and the marvellous behaviour of brutes. One\nrecognizes reason there not in the brutes but in him who created them. I\nam, then, of the general opinion in this respect; but I hope that my\nexplanation will have added clearness and lucidity, and even a more ample\nrange, to that opinion.\n\nNow when preparing to justify my system in face of the new difficulties of\nM. Bayle, I purposed at the same time to communicate to him the ideas which\nI had had for some time already, on the difficulties put forward by him[67]\nin opposition to those who endeavour to reconcile reason with faith in\nregard to the existence of evil. Indeed, there are perhaps few persons who\nhave toiled more than I in this matter. Hardly had I gained some tolerable\nunderstanding of Latin writings when I had an opportunity of turning over\nbooks in a library. I flitted from book to book, and since subjects for\nmeditation pleased me as much as histories and fables, I was charmed by the\nwork of Laurentius Valla against Boethius and by that of Luther against\nErasmus, although I was well aware that they had need of some mitigation. I\ndid not omit books of controversy, and amongst other writings of this\nnature the records of the Montbeliard Conversation, which had revived the\ndispute, appeared to me instructive. Nor did I neglect the teachings of our\ntheologians: and the study of their opponents, far from disturbing me,\nserved to strengthen me in the moderate opinions of the Churches of the\nAugsburg Confession. I had opportunity on my journeys to confer with some\nexcellent men of different parties, for instance with Bishop Peter von\nWallenburg, Suffragan of Mainz, with Herr Johann Ludwig Fabricius, premier\ntheologian of Heidelberg, and finally with the celebrated M. Arnauld. To\nhim I even tendered a Latin Dialogue of my own composition upon this\nsubject, about the year 1673, wherein already I laid it down that God,\nhaving chosen the most perfect of all possible worlds, had been prompted by\nhis wisdom to permit the evil which was bound up with it, but which still\ndid not prevent this world from being, all things considered, the best that\ncould be chosen. I have also since read many and various good authors on\nthese subjects, and I have endeavoured to make progress in the knowledge\nthat seems to me proper for banishing all that could have obscured the idea\nof supreme perfection which must be acknowledged in God. I have not\nneglected to examine the most rigorous authors, who have extended furthest\nthe doctrine of the necessity of things, as for instance Hobbes and\nSpinoza, of whom the former advocated this absolute necessity not only in\nhis _Physical Elements_ and elsewhere, but also in a special book against\nBishop Bramhall. And Spinoza insists more or less (like an ancient\nPeripatetic philosopher named Strato) that all has come from the first\ncause or from primitive Nature by a blind and geometrical necessity, with\ncomplete absence of capacity for choice, for goodness and for understanding\nin this first source of things.\n\n                                                                       [68]\nI have found the means, so it seems to me, of demonstrating the contrary in\na way that gives one a clear insight into the inward essence of the matter.\nFor having made new discoveries on the nature of active force and the laws\nof motion, I have shown that they have no geometrical necessity, as Spinoza\nappears to have believed they had. Neither, as I have made plain, are they\npurely arbitrary, even though this be the opinion of M. Bayle and of some\nmodern philosophers: but they are dependent upon the fitness of things as I\nhave already pointed out above, or upon that which I call the 'principle of\nthe best'. Moreover one recognizes therein, as in every other thing, the\nmarks of the first substance, whose productions bear the stamp of a supreme\nwisdom and make the most perfect of harmonies. I have shown also that this\nharmony connects both the future with the past and the present with the\nabsent. The first kind of connexion unites times, and the other places.\nThis second connexion is displayed in the union of the soul with the body,\nand in general in the communication of true substances with one another and\nwith material phenomena. But the first takes place in the preformation of\norganic bodies, or rather of all bodies, since there is organism\neverywhere, although all masses do not compose organic bodies. So a pond\nmay very well be full of fish or of other organic bodies, although it is\nnot itself an animal or organic body, but only a mass that contains them.\nThus I had endeavoured to build upon such foundations, established in a\nconclusive manner, a complete body of the main articles of knowledge that\nreason pure and simple can impart to us, a body whereof all the parts were\nproperly connected and capable of meeting the most important difficulties\nof the ancients and the moderns. I had also in consequence formed for\nmyself a certain system concerning the freedom of man and the cooperation\nof God. This system appeared to me to be such as would in no wise offend\nreason and faith; and I desired to submit it to the scrutiny of M. Bayle,\nas well as of those who are in controversy with him. Now he has departed\nfrom us, and such a loss is no small one, a writer whose learning and\nacumen few have equalled. But since the subject is under consideration and\nmen of talent are still occupied with it, while the public also follows it\nattentively, I take this to be a fitting moment for the publication of\ncertain of my ideas.\n\nIt will perhaps be well to add the observation, before finishing this\npreface, that in denying the physical influence of the soul upon the   [69]\nbody or of the body upon the soul, that is, an influence causing the one to\ndisturb the laws of the other, I by no means deny the union of the one with\nthe other which forms of them a suppositum; but this union is something\nmetaphysical, which changes nothing in the phenomena. This is what I have\nalready said in reply to the objection raised against me, in the _Memoires\nde Trevoux_, by the Reverend Father de Tournemine, whose wit and learning\nare of no ordinary mould. And for this reason one may say also in a\nmetaphysical sense that the soul acts upon the body and the body upon the\nsoul. Moreover, it is true that the soul is the Entelechy or the active\nprinciple, whereas the corporeal alone or the mere material contains only\nthe passive. Consequently the principle of action is in the soul, as I have\nexplained more than once in the _Leipzig Journal_. More especially does\nthis appear in my answer to the late Herr Sturm, philosopher and\nmathematician of Altorf, where I have even demonstrated that, if bodies\ncontained only the passive, their different conditions would be\nindistinguishable. Also I take this opportunity to say that, having heard\nof some objections made by the gifted author of the book on\n_Self-knowledge_, in that same book, to my System of Pre-established\nHarmony, I sent a reply to Paris, showing that he has attributed to me\nopinions I am far from holding. On another matter recently I met with like\ntreatment at the hands of an anonymous Doctor of the Sorbonne. And these\nmisconceptions would have become plain to the reader at the outset if my\nown words, which were being taken in evidence, had been quoted.\n\nThis tendency of men to make mistakes in presenting the opinions of others\nleads me to observe also, that when I said somewhere that man helps himself\nin conversion through the succour of grace, I mean only that he derives\nadvantage from it through the cessation of the resistance overcome, but\nwithout any cooperation on his part: just as there is no co-operation in\nice when it is broken. For conversion is purely the work of God's grace,\nwherein man co-operates only by resisting it; but human resistance is more\nor less great according to the persons and the occasions. Circumstances\nalso contribute more or less to our attention and to the motions that arise\nin the soul; and the co-operation of all these things, together with the\nstrength of the impression and the condition of the will, determines the\noperation of grace, although not rendering it necessary. I have expounded\nsufficiently elsewhere that in relation to matters of salvation        [70]\nunregenerate man is to be considered as dead; and I greatly approve the\nmanner wherein the theologians of the Augsburg Confession declare\nthemselves on this subject. Yet this corruption of unregenerate man is, it\nmust be added, no hindrance to his possession of true moral virtues and his\nperformance of good actions in his civic life, actions which spring from a\ngood principle, without any evil intention and without mixture of actual\nsin. Wherein I hope I shall be forgiven, if I have dared to diverge from\nthe opinion of St. Augustine: he was doubtless a great man, of admirable\nintelligence, but inclined sometimes, as it seems, to exaggerate things,\nabove all in the heat of his controversies. I greatly esteem some persons\nwho profess to be disciples of St. Augustine, amongst others the Reverend\nFather Quenel, a worthy successor of the great Arnauld in the pursuit of\ncontroversies that have embroiled them with the most famous of Societies.\nBut I have found that usually in disputes between people of conspicuous\nmerit (of whom there are doubtless some here in both parties) there is\nright on both sides, although in different points, and it is rather in the\nmatter of defence than attack, although the natural malevolence of the\nhuman heart generally renders attack more agreeable to the reader than\ndefence. I hope that the Reverend Father Ptolemei, who does his Society\ncredit and is occupied in filling the gaps left by the famous Bellarmine,\nwill give us, concerning all of that, some explanations worthy of his\nacumen and his knowledge, and I even dare to add, his moderation. And one\nmust believe that among the theologians of the Augsburg Confession there\nwill arise some new Chemnitz or some new Callixtus; even as one is\njustified in thinking that men like Usserius or Daille will again appear\namong the Reformed, and that all will work more and more to remove the\nmisconceptions wherewith this matter is charged. For the rest I shall be\nwell pleased that those who shall wish to examine it closely read the\nobjections with the answers I have given thereto, formulated in the small\ntreatise I have placed at the end of the work by way of summary. I have\nendeavoured to forestall some new objections. I have explained, for\ninstance, why I have taken the antecedent and consequent will as\npreliminary and final, after the example of Thomas, of Scotus and others;\nhow it is possible that there be incomparably more good in the glory of all\nthe saved than there is evil in the misery of all the damned, despite  [71]\nthat there are more of the latter; how, in saying that evil has been\npermitted as a _conditio sine qua non_ of good, I mean not according to the\nprinciple of necessity, but according to the principle of the fitness of\nthings. Furthermore I show that the predetermination I admit is such as\nalways to predispose, but never to necessitate, and that God will not\nrefuse the requisite new light to those who have made a good use of that\nwhich they had. Other elucidations besides I have endeavoured to give on\nsome difficulties which have been put before me of late. I have, moreover,\nfollowed the advice of some friends who thought it fitting that I should\nadd two appendices: the one treats of the controversy carried on between\nMr. Hobbes and Bishop Bramhall touching Freedom and Necessity, the other of\nthe learned work on _The Origin of Evil_, published a short time ago in\nEngland.\n\nFinally I have endeavoured in all things to consider edification: and if I\nhave conceded something to curiosity, it is because I thought it necessary\nto relieve a subject whose seriousness may cause discouragement. It is with\nthat in view that I have introduced into this dissertation the pleasing\nchimera of a certain astronomical theology, having no ground for\napprehension that it will ensnare anyone and deeming that to tell it and\nrefute it is the same thing. Fiction for fiction, instead of imagining that\nthe planets were suns, one might conceive that they were masses melted in\nthe sun and thrown out, and that would destroy the foundation of this\nhypothetical theology. The ancient error of the two principles, which the\nOrientals distinguished by the names Oromasdes and Arimanius, caused me to\nexplain a conjecture on the primitive history of peoples. It appears indeed\nprobable that these were the names of two great contemporary princes, the\none monarch of a part of upper Asia, where there have since been others of\nthis name, the other king of the Scythian Celts who made incursions into\nthe states of the former, and who was also named amongst the divinities of\nGermania. It seems, indeed, that Zoroaster used the names of these princes\nas symbols of the invisible powers which their exploits made them resemble\nin the ideas of Asiatics. Yet elsewhere, according to the accounts of Arab\nauthors, who in this might well be better informed than the Greeks, it\nappears from detailed records of ancient oriental history, that this\nZerdust or Zoroaster, whom they make contemporary with the great Darius,\ndid not look upon these two principles as completely primitive and     [72]\nindependent, but as dependent upon one supreme and single principle. They\nrelate that he believed, in conformity with the cosmogony of Moses, that\nGod, who is without an equal, created all and separated the light from the\ndarkness; that the light conformed with his original design, but that the\ndarkness came as a consequence, even as the shadow follows the body, and\nthat this is nothing but privation. Such a thesis would clear this ancient\nauthor of the errors the Greeks imputed to him. His great learning caused\nthe Orientals to compare him with the Mercury or Hermes of the Egyptians\nand Greeks; just as the northern peoples compared their Wodan or Odin to\nthis same Mercury. That is why Mercredi (Wednesday), or the day of Mercury,\nwas called Wodansdag by the northern peoples, but day of Zerdust by the\nAsiatics, since it is named Zarschamba or Dsearschambe by the Turks and the\nPersians, Zerda by the Hungarians from the north-east, and Sreda by the\nSlavs from the heart of Great Russia, as far as the Wends of the Luneburg\nregion, the Slavs having learnt the name also from the Orientals. These\nobservations will perhaps not be displeasing to the curious. And I flatter\nmyself that the small dialogue ending the Essays written to oppose M. Bayle\nwill give some satisfaction to those who are well pleased to see difficult\nbut important truths set forth in an easy and familiar way. I have written\nin a foreign language at the risk of making many errors in it, because that\nlanguage has been recently used by others in treating of my subject, and\nbecause it is more generally read by those whom one would wish to benefit\nby this small work. It is to be hoped that the language errors will be\npardoned: they are to be attributed not only to the printer and the\ncopyist, but also to the haste of the author, who has been much distracted\nfrom his task. If, moreover, any error has crept into the ideas expressed,\nthe author will be the first to correct it, once he has been better\ninformed: he has given elsewhere such indications of his love of truth that\nhe hopes this declaration will not be regarded as merely an empty phrase.\n\n                                                                       [73]\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nPRELIMINARY DISSERTATION ON THE CONFORMITY OF FAITH WITH REASON\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n1. I begin with the preliminary question of the _conformity of faith with\nreason_, and the use of philosophy in theology, because it has much\ninfluence on the main subject of my treatise, and because M. Bayle\nintroduces it everywhere. I assume that two truths cannot contradict each\nother; that the object of faith is the truth God has revealed in an\nextraordinary way; and that reason is the linking together of truths, but\nespecially (when it is compared with faith) of those whereto the human mind\ncan attain naturally without being aided by the light of faith. This\ndefinition of reason (that is to say of strict and true reason) has\nsurprised some persons accustomed to inveigh against reason taken in a\nvague sense. They gave me the answer that they had never heard of any such\nexplanation of it: the truth is that they have never conferred with people\nwho expressed themselves clearly on these subjects. They have confessed to\nme, nevertheless, that one could not find fault with reason, understood in\nthe sense which I gave to it. It is in the same sense that sometimes reason\nis contrasted with experience. Reason, since it consists in the linking\ntogether of truths, is entitled to connect also those wherewith experience\nhas furnished it, in order thence to draw mixed conclusions; but reason\npure and simple, as distinct from experience, only has to do with truths\nindependent of the senses. And one may compare faith with experience, since\nfaith (in respect of the motives that give it justification) depends   [74]\nupon the experience of those who have seen the miracles whereon revelation\nis founded, and upon the trustworthy tradition which has handed them down\nto us, whether through the Scriptures or by the account of those who have\npreserved them. It is rather as we rely upon the experience of those who\nhave seen China and on the credibility of their account when we give\ncredence to the wonders that are told us of that distant country. Yet I\nwould also take into account the inward motion of the Holy Spirit, who\ntakes possession of souls and persuades them and prompts them to good, that\nis, to faith and to charity, without always having need of motives.\n\n2. Now the truths of reason are of two kinds: the one kind is of those\ncalled the 'Eternal Verities', which are altogether necessary, so that the\nopposite implies contradiction. Such are the truths whose necessity is\nlogical, metaphysical or geometrical, which one cannot deny without being\nled into absurdities. There are others which may be called _positive_,\nbecause they are the laws which it has pleased God to give to Nature, or\nbecause they depend upon those. We learn them either by experience, that\nis, _a posteriori_, or by reason and _a priori_, that is, by considerations\nof the fitness of things which have caused their choice. This fitness of\nthings has also its rules and reasons, but it is the free choice of God,\nand not a geometrical necessity, which causes preference for what is\nfitting and brings it into existence. Thus one may say that physical\nnecessity is founded on moral necessity, that is, on the wise one's choice\nwhich is worthy of his wisdom; and that both of these ought to be\ndistinguished from geometrical necessity. It is this physical necessity\nthat makes order in Nature and lies in the rules of motion and in some\nother general laws which it pleased God to lay down for things when he gave\nthem being. It is therefore true that God gave such laws not without\nreason, for he chooses nothing from caprice and as though by chance or in\npure indifference; but the general reasons of good and of order, which have\nprompted him to the choice, may be overcome in some cases by stronger\nreasons of a superior order.\n\n3. Thus it is made clear that God can exempt creatures from the laws he has\nprescribed for them, and produce in them that which their nature does not\nbear by performing a miracle. When they have risen to perfections and\nfaculties nobler than those whereto they can by their nature attain, the\nSchoolmen call this faculty an 'Obediential Power', that is to say, a  [75]\npower which the thing acquires by obeying the command of him who can give\nthat which the thing has not. The Schoolmen, however, usually give\ninstances of this power which to me appear impossible: they maintain, for\nexample, that God can give the creature the faculty to create. It may be\nthat there are miracles which God performs through the ministry of angels,\nwhere the laws of Nature are not violated, any more than when men assist\nNature by art, the skill of angels differing from ours only by degree of\nperfection. Nevertheless it still remains true that the laws of Nature are\nsubject to be dispensed from by the Law-giver; whereas the eternal\nverities, as for instance those of geometry, admit no dispensation, and\nfaith cannot contradict them. Thus it is that there cannot be any\ninvincible objection to truth. For if it is a question of proof which is\nfounded upon principles or incontestable facts and formed by a linking\ntogether of eternal verities, the conclusion is certain and essential, and\nthat which is contrary to it must be false; otherwise two contradictories\nmight be true at the same time. If the objection is not conclusive, it can\nonly form a probable argument, which has no force against faith, since it\nis agreed that the Mysteries of religion are contrary to appearances. Now\nM. Bayle declares, in his posthumous Reply to M. le Clerc, that he does not\nclaim that there are demonstrations contrary to the truths of faith: and as\na result all these insuperable difficulties, these so-called wars between\nreason and faith, vanish away.\n\n  _Hi motus animorum atque haec discrimina tanta,_\n  _Pulveris exigui jactu compressa quiescunt._\n\n4. Protestant theologians as well as those of the Roman confession admit\nthe maxims which I have just laid down, when they handle the matter with\nattention; and all that is said against reason has no force save against a\nkind of counterfeit reason, corrupted and deluded by false appearances. It\nis the same with our notions of the justice and the goodness of God, which\nare spoken of sometimes as if we had neither any idea nor any definition of\ntheir nature. But in that case we should have no ground for ascribing these\nattributes to him, or lauding him for them. His goodness and his justice as\nwell as his wisdom differ from ours only because they are infinitely more\nperfect. Thus the simple notions, the necessary truths and the conclusive\nresults of philosophy cannot be contrary to revelation. And when some  [76]\nphilosophical maxims are rejected in theology, the reason is that they are\nconsidered to have only a physical or moral necessity, which speaks only of\nthat which takes place usually, and is consequently founded on appearances,\nbut which may be withheld if God so pleases.\n\n5. It seems, according to what I have just said, that there is often some\nconfusion in the expressions of those who set at variance philosophy and\ntheology, or faith and reason: they confuse the terms 'explain',\n'comprehend', 'prove', 'uphold'. And I find that M. Bayle, shrewd as he is,\nis not always free from this confusion. Mysteries may be _explained_\nsufficiently to justify belief in them; but one cannot _comprehend_ them,\nnor give understanding of how they come to pass. Thus even in natural\nphilosophy we explain up to a certain point sundry perceptible qualities,\nbut in an imperfect manner, for we do not comprehend them. Nor is it\npossible for us, either, to prove Mysteries by reason; for all that which\ncan be proved _a priori_, or by pure reason, can be comprehended. All that\nremains for us then, after having believed in the Mysteries by reason of\nthe proofs of the truth of religion (which are called 'motives of\ncredibility') is to be able to _uphold_ them against objections. Without\nthat our belief in them would have no firm foundation; for all that which\ncan be refuted in a sound and conclusive manner cannot but be false. And\nsuch proofs of the truth of religion as can give only a _moral certainty_\nwould be balanced and even outweighed by such objections as would give an\n_absolute certainty_, provided they were convincing and altogether\nconclusive. This little might suffice me to remove the difficulties\nconcerning the use of reason and philosophy in relation to religion if one\nhad not to deal all too often with prejudiced persons. But as the subject\nis important and it has fallen into a state of confusion, it will be well\nto take it in greater detail.\n\n6. The question of the _conformity of faith with reason_ has always been a\ngreat problem. In the primitive Church the ablest Christian authors adapted\nthemselves to the ideas of the Platonists, which were the most acceptable\nto them, and were at that time most generally in favour. Little by little\nAristotle took the place of Plato, when the taste for systems began to\nprevail, and when theology itself became more systematic, owing to the\ndecisions of the General Councils, which provided precise and positive\nformularies. St. Augustine, Boethius and Cassiodorus in the West, and  [77]\nSt. John of Damascus in the East contributed most towards reducing theology\nto scientific form, not to mention Bede, Alcuin, St. Anselm and some other\ntheologians versed in philosophy. Finally came the Schoolmen. The leisure\nof the cloisters giving full scope for speculation, which was assisted by\nAristotle's philosophy translated from the Arabic, there was formed at last\na compound of theology and philosophy wherein most of the questions arose\nfrom the trouble that was taken to reconcile faith with reason. But this\nhad not met with the full success hoped for, because theology had been much\ncorrupted by the unhappiness of the times, by ignorance and obstinacy.\nMoreover, philosophy, in addition to its own faults, which were very great,\nfound itself burdened with those of theology, which in its turn was\nsuffering from association with a philosophy that was very obscure and very\nimperfect. One must confess, notwithstanding, with the incomparable\nGrotius, that there is sometimes gold hidden under the rubbish of the\nmonks' barbarous Latin. I have therefore oft-times wished that a man of\ntalent, whose office had necessitated his learning the language of the\nSchoolmen, had chosen to extract thence whatever is of worth, and that\nanother Petau or Thomasius had done in respect of the Schoolmen what these\ntwo learned men have done in respect of the Fathers. It would be a very\ncurious work, and very important for ecclesiastical history, and it would\ncontinue the History of Dogmas up to the time of the Revival of Letters\n(owing to which the aspect of things has changed) and even beyond that\npoint. For sundry dogmas, such as those of physical predetermination, of\nmediate knowledge, philosophical sin, objective precisions, and many other\ndogmas in speculative theology and even in the practical theology of cases\nof conscience, came into currency even after the Council of Trent.\n\n7. A little before these changes, and before the great schism in the West\nthat still endures, there was in Italy a sect of philosophers which\ndisputed this conformity of faith with reason which I maintain. They were\ndubbed 'Averroists' because they were adherents of a famous Arab author,\nwho was called the Commentator by pre-eminence, and who appeared to be the\none of all his race that penetrated furthest into Aristotle's meaning. This\nCommentator, extending what Greek expositors had already taught, maintained\nthat according to Aristotle, and even according to reason (and at that time\nthe two were considered almost identical) there was no case for the    [78]\nimmortality of the soul. Here is his reasoning. The human kind is eternal,\naccording to Aristotle, therefore if individual souls die not, one must\nresort to the metempsychosis rejected by that philosopher. Or, if there are\nalways new souls, one must admit the infinity of these souls existing from\nall eternity; but actual infinity is impossible, according to the doctrine\nof the same Aristotle. Therefore it is a necessary conclusion that the\nsouls, that is, the forms of organic bodies, must perish with the bodies,\nor at least this must happen to the passive understanding that belongs to\neach one individually. Thus there will only remain the active understanding\ncommon to all men, which according to Aristotle comes from outside, and\nwhich must work wheresoever the organs are suitably disposed; even as the\nwind produces a kind of music when it is blown into properly adjusted organ\npipes.\n\n8. Nothing could have been weaker than this would-be proof. It is not true\nthat Aristotle refuted metempsychosis, or that he proved the eternity of\nthe human kind; and after all, it is quite untrue that an actual infinity\nis impossible. Yet this proof passed as irresistible amongst Aristotelians,\nand induced in them the belief that there was a certain sublunary\nintelligence and that our active intellect was produced by participation in\nit. But others who adhered less to Aristotle went so far as to advocate a\nuniversal soul forming the ocean of all individual souls, and believed this\nuniversal soul alone capable of subsisting, whilst individual souls are\nborn and die. According to this opinion the souls of animals are born by\nbeing separated like drops from their ocean, when they find a body which\nthey can animate; and they die by being reunited to the ocean of souls when\nthe body is destroyed, as streams are lost in the sea. Many even went so\nfar as to believe that God is that universal soul, although others thought\nthat this soul was subordinate and created. This bad doctrine is very\nancient and apt to dazzle the common herd. It is expressed in these\nbeautiful lines of Vergil (_Aen._, VI, v. 724):\n\n  _Principio coelum ac terram camposque liquentes,_\n  _Lucentemque globum Lunae Titaniaque astra,_\n  _Spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per artus_\n  _Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet._\n  _Inde hominum pecudumque genus vitaeque volantum._\n\n                                                                       [79]\nAnd again elsewhere (_Georg._, IV, v. 221):\n\n      _Deum namque ire per omnes_\n  _Terrasque tractusque maris caelumque profundum:_\n  _Hinc pecudes, armenta, viros, genus omne ferarum,_\n  _Quemque sibi tenues nascentem arcessere vitas._\n  _Scilicet huc reddi deinde ac resoluta referri._\n\n9. Plato's Soul of the World has been taken in this sense by some, but\nthere is more indication that the Stoics succumbed to that universal soul\nwhich swallows all the rest. Those who are of this opinion might be called\n'Monopsychites', since according to them there is in reality only one soul\nthat subsists. M. Bernier observes that this is an opinion almost\nuniversally accepted amongst scholars in Persia and in the States of the\nGrand Mogul; it appears even that it has gained a footing with the\nCabalists and with the mystics. A certain German of Swabian birth,\nconverted to Judaism some years ago, who taught under the name Moses\nGermanus, having adopted the dogmas of Spinoza, believed that Spinoza\nrevived the ancient Cabala of the Hebrews. And a learned man who confuted\nthis proselyte Jew appears to be of the same opinion. It is known that\nSpinoza recognizes only substance in the world, whereof individual souls\nare but transient modifications. Valentin Weigel, Pastor of Zschopau in\nSaxony, a man of wit, even of excessive wit, although people would have it\nthat he was a visionary, was perhaps to some extent of that opinion; as was\nalso a man known as Johann Angelus Silesius, author of certain quite\npleasing little devotional verses in German, in the form of epigrams, which\nhave just been reprinted. In general, the mystics' doctrine of deification\nwas liable to such a sinister interpretation. Gerson already has written\nopposing Ruysbroek, a mystical writer, whose intention was evidently good\nand whose expressions are excusable. But it would be better to write in a\nmanner that has no need of excuses: although I confess that oft-times\nexpressions which are extravagant, and as it were poetical, have greater\nforce to move and to persuade than correct forms of statement.\n\n10. The annihilation of all that belongs to us in our own right, carried to\ngreat lengths by the Quietists, might equally well be veiled irreligion in\ncertain minds, as is related, for example, concerning the Quietism of Foe,\noriginator of a great Chinese sect. After having preached his religion [80]\nfor forty years, when he felt death was approaching, he declared to his\ndisciples that he had hidden the truth from them under the veil of\nmetaphors, and that all reduced itself to Nothingness, which he said was\nthe first source of all things. That was still worse, so it would seem,\nthan the opinion of the Averroists. Both of these doctrines are\nindefensible and even extravagant; nevertheless some moderns have made no\ndifficulty about adopting this one and universal Soul that engulfs the\nrest. It has met with only too much applause amongst the so-called\nfreethinkers, and M. de Preissac, a soldier and man of wit, who dabbled in\nphilosophy, at one time aired it publicly in his discourses. The System of\nPre-established Harmony is the one best qualified to cure this evil. For it\nshows that there are of necessity substances which are simple and without\nextension, scattered throughout all Nature; that these substances must\nsubsist independently of every other except God; and that they are never\nwholly separated from organic body. Those who believe that souls capable of\nfeeling but incapable of reason are mortal, or who maintain that none but\nreasoning souls can have feeling, offer a handle to the Monopsychites. For\nit will ever be difficult to persuade men that beasts feel nothing; and\nonce the admission has been made that that which is capable of feeling can\ndie, it is difficult to found upon reason a proof of the immortality of our\nsouls.\n\n11. I have made this short digression because it appeared to me seasonable\nat a time when there is only too much tendency to overthrow natural\nreligion to its very foundations. I return then to the Averroists, who were\npersuaded that their dogma was proved conclusively in accordance with\nreason. As a result they declared that man's soul is, according to\nphilosophy, mortal, while they protested their acquiescence in Christian\ntheology, which declares the soul's immortality. But this distinction was\nheld suspect, and this divorce between faith and reason was vehemently\nrejected by the prelates and the doctors of that time, and condemned in the\nlast Lateran Council under Leo X. On that occasion also, scholars were\nurged to work for the removal of the difficulties that appeared to set\ntheology and philosophy at variance. The doctrine of their incompatibility\ncontinued to hold its ground _incognito_. Pomponazzi was suspected of it,\nalthough he declared himself otherwise; and that very sect of the\nAverroists survived as a school. It is thought that Caesar Cremoninus, [81]\na philosopher famous in his time, was one of its mainstays. Andreas\nCisalpinus, a physician (and an author of merit who came nearest after\nMichael Servetus to the discovery of the circulation of the blood), was\naccused by Nicolas Taurel (in a book entitled _Alpes Caesae_) of belonging\nto these anti-religious Peripatetics. Traces of this doctrine are found\nalso in the _Circulus Pisanus Claudii Berigardi_, an author of French\nnationality who migrated to Italy and taught philosophy at Pisa: but\nespecially the writings and the letters of Gabriel Naude, as well as the\n_Naudaeana_, show that Averroism still lived on when this learned physician\nwas in Italy. Corpuscular philosophy, introduced shortly after, appears to\nhave extinguished this excessively Peripatetic sect, or perhaps to have\nbeen intermixed with its teaching. It may be indeed that there have been\nAtomists who would be inclined to teach dogmas like those of the\nAverroists, if circumstances so permitted: but this abuse cannot harm such\ngood as there is in Corpuscular philosophy, which can very well be combined\nwith all that is sound in Plato and in Aristotle, and bring them both into\nharmony with true theology.\n\n12. The Reformers, and especially Luther, as I have already observed, spoke\nsometimes as if they rejected philosophy, and deemed it inimical to faith.\nBut, properly speaking, Luther understood by philosophy only that which is\nin conformity with the ordinary course of Nature, or perhaps even\nphilosophy as it was taught in the schools. Thus for example he says that\nit is impossible in philosophy, that is, in the order of Nature, that the\nword be made flesh; and he goes so far as to maintain that what is true in\nnatural philosophy might be false in ethics. Aristotle was the object of\nhis anger; and so far back as the year 1516 he contemplated the purging of\nphilosophy, when he perhaps had as yet no thoughts of reforming the Church.\nBut at last he curbed his vehemence and in the _Apology for the Augsburg\nConfession_ allowed a favourable mention of Aristotle and his _Ethics_.\nMelanchthon, a man of sound and moderate ideas, made little systems from\nthe several parts of philosophy, adapted to the truths of revelation and\nuseful in civic life, which deserve to be read even now. After him, Pierre\nde la Ramee entered the lists. His philosophy was much in favour: the sect\nof the Ramists was powerful in Germany, gaining many adherents among the\nProtestants, and even concerning itself with theology, until the revival of\nCorpuscular philosophy, which caused that of Ramee to fall into        [82]\noblivion and weakened the authority of the Peripatetics.\n\n13. Meanwhile sundry Protestant theologians, deviating as far as they could\nfrom Scholastic philosophy, which prevailed in the opposite party, went so\nfar as to despise philosophy itself, which to them was suspect. The\ncontroversy blazed up finally owing to the rancour of Daniel Hoffmann. He\nwas an able theologian, who had previously gained a reputation at the\nConference of Quedlinburg, when Tilemann Heshusius and he had supported\nDuke Julius of Brunswick in his refusal to accept the Formula of Concord.\nFor some reason or other Dr. Hoffmann flew into a passion with philosophy,\ninstead of being content to find fault with the wrong uses made thereof by\nphilosophers. He was, however, aiming at the famous Caselius, a man\nesteemed by the princes and scholars of his time; and Henry Julius, Duke of\nBrunswick (son of Julius, founder of the University), having taken the\ntrouble himself to investigate the matter, condemned the theologian. There\nhave been some small disputes of the kind since, but it has always been\nfound that they were misunderstandings. Paul Slevogt, a famous Professor at\nJena in Thuringia, whose still extant treatises prove how well versed he\nwas in Scholastic philosophy, as also in Hebrew literature, had published\nin his youth under the title of _Pervigilium_ a little book 'de dissidio\nTheologi et Philosophi in utriusque principiis fundato', bearing on the\nquestion whether God is accidentally the cause of sin. But it was easy to\nsee that his aim was to demonstrate that theologians sometimes misuse\nphilosophical terms.\n\n14. To come now to the events of my own time, I remember that when in 1666\nLouis Meyer, a physician of Amsterdam, published anonymously the book\nentitled _Philosophia Scripturae Interpres_ (by many persons wrongly\nattributed to Spinoza, his friend) the theologians of Holland bestirred\nthemselves, and their written attacks upon this book gave rise to great\ndisputes among them. Divers of them held the opinion that the Cartesians,\nin confuting the anonymous philosopher, had conceded too much to\nphilosophy. Jean de Labadie (before he had seceded from the Reformed\nChurch, his pretext being some abuses which he said had crept into public\nobservance and which he considered intolerable) attacked the book by Herr\nvon Wollzogen, and called it pernicious. On the other hand Herr Vogelsang,\nHerr van der Weye and some other anti-Cocceians also assailed the same [83]\nbook with much acrimony. But the accused won his case in a Synod.\nAfterwards in Holland people spoke of 'rational' and 'non-rational'\ntheologians, a party distinction often mentioned by M. Bayle, who finally\ndeclared himself against the former. But there is no indication that any\nprecise rules have yet been defined which the rival parties accept or\nreject with regard to the use of reason in the interpretation of Holy\nScripture.\n\n15. A like dispute has threatened of late to disturb the peace in the\nChurches of the Augsburg Confession. Some Masters of Arts in the University\nof Leipzig gave private lessons at their homes, to students who sought them\nout in order to learn what is called 'Sacra Philologia', according to the\npractice of this university and of some others where this kind of study is\nnot restricted to the Faculty of Theology. These masters pressed the study\nof the Holy Scriptures and the practice of piety further than their fellows\nhad been wont to do. It is alleged that they had carried certain things to\nexcess, and aroused suspicions of certain doctrinal innovations. This\ncaused them to be dubbed 'Pietists', as though they were a new sect; and\nthis name is one which has since caused a great stir in Germany. It has\nbeen applied somehow or other to those whom one suspected, or pretended to\nsuspect, of fanaticism, or even of hypocrisy, concealed under some\nsemblance of reform. Now some of the students attending these masters had\nbecome conspicuous for behaviour which gave general offence, and amongst\nother things for their scorn of philosophy, even, so it was said, burning\ntheir notebooks. In consequence the belief arose that their masters\nrejected philosophy: but they justified themselves very well; nor could\nthey be convicted either of this error or of the heresies that were being\nimputed to them.\n\n16. The question of the use of philosophy in theology was debated much\namongst Christians, and difficulty was experienced over settling the limits\nof its use when it came to detailed consideration. The Mysteries of the\nTrinity, of the Incarnation and of the Holy Communion gave most occasion\nfor dispute. The new Photinians, disputing the first two Mysteries, made\nuse of certain philosophic maxims which Andreas Kessler, a theologian of\nthe Augsburg Confession, summarized in the various treatises that he\npublished on the parts of the Socinian philosophy. But as to their\nmetaphysics, one might instruct oneself better therein by reading the  [84]\nwork of Christopher Stegmann the Socinian. It is not yet in print; but I\nsaw it in my youth and it has been recently again in my hands.\n\n17. Calovius and Scherzer, authors well versed in Scholastic philosophy,\nand sundry other able theologians answered the Socinians at great length,\nand often with success: for they would not content themselves with the\ngeneral and somewhat cavalier answers that were commonly used against that\nsect. The drift of such answers was: that their maxims were good in\nphilosophy and not in theology; that it was the fault of heterogeneousness\ncalled [Greek: metabasis eis allo genos] to apply those maxims to a matter\ntranscending reason; and that philosophy should be treated as a servant and\nnot a mistress in relation to theology, according to the title of the book\nby a Scot named Robert Baronius, _Philosophia Theologiae ancillans_. In\nfine, philosophy was a Hagar beside Sara and must be driven from the house\nwith her Ishmael when she was refractory. There is something good in these\nanswers: but one might abuse them, and set natural truths and truths of\nrevelation at variance. Scholars therefore applied themselves to\ndistinguishing between what is necessary and indispensable in natural or\nphilosophic truths and that which is not so.\n\n18. The two Protestant parties are tolerably in agreement when it is a\nquestion of making war on the Socinians; and as the philosophy of these\nsectaries is not of the most exact, in most cases the attack succeeded in\nreducing it. But the Protestants themselves had dissensions on the matter\nof the Eucharistic Sacrament. A section of those who are called Reformed\n(namely those who on that point follow rather Zwingli than Calvin) seemed\nto reduce the participation in the body of Jesus Christ in the Holy\nCommunion to a mere figurative representation, employing the maxim of the\nphilosophers which states that a body can only be in one place at a time.\nContrariwise the Evangelicals (who name themselves thus in a particular\nsense to distinguish themselves from the Reformed), being more attached to\nthe literal sense of Scripture, opined with Luther that this participation\nwas real, and that here there lay a supernatural Mystery. They reject, in\ntruth, the dogma of Transubstantiation, which they believe to be without\nfoundation in the Text; neither do they approve that of Consubstantiation\nor of Impanation, which one could only impute to them if one were\nill-informed on their opinion. For they admit no inclusion of the body [85]\nof Jesus Christ in the bread, nor do they even require any union of the one\nwith the other: but they demand at least a concomitance, so that these two\nsubstances be received both at the same time. They believe that the\nordinary sense of the words of Jesus Christ on an occasion so important as\nthat which concerned the expression of his last wishes ought to be\npreserved. Thus in order to show that this sense is free from all absurdity\nwhich could make it repugnant to us, they maintain that the philosophic\nmaxim restricting the existence of, and partaking in, bodies to one place\nalone is simply a consequence of the ordinary course of Nature. They make\nthat no obstacle to the presence, in the ordinary sense of the word, of the\nbody of our Saviour in such form as may be in keeping with the most\nglorified body. They do not resort to a vague diffusion of ubiquity, which\nwould disperse the body and leave it nowhere in particular; nor do they\nadmit the multiple-reduplication theory of some Schoolmen, as if to say one\nand the same body could be at the same time seated here and standing\nelsewhere. In fine, they so express themselves that many consider the\nopinion of Calvin, authorized by sundry confessions of faith from the\nChurches that have accepted his teaching, to be not so far removed from the\nAugsburg Confession as one might think: for he affirmed a partaking in the\nsubstance. The divergence rests perhaps only upon the fact that Calvin\ndemands true faith in addition to the oral reception of the symbols, and\nconsequently excludes the unworthy.\n\n19. Thence we see that the dogma of real and substantial participation can\nbe supported (without resorting to the strange opinions of some Schoolmen)\nby a properly understood analogy between _immediate operation_ and\n_presence_. Many philosophers have deemed that, even in the order of\nNature, a body may operate from a distance immediately on many remote\nbodies at the same time. So do they believe, all the more, that nothing can\nprevent divine Omnipotence from causing one body to be present in many\nbodies together, since the transition from immediate operation to presence\nis but slight, the one perhaps depending upon the other. It is true that\nmodern philosophers for some time now have denied the immediate natural\noperation of one body upon another remote from it, and I confess that I am\nof their opinion. Meanwhile remote operation has just been revived in\nEngland by the admirable Mr. Newton, who maintains that it is the nature of\nbodies to be attracted and gravitate one towards another, in proportion[86]\nto the mass of each one, and the rays of attraction it receives.\nAccordingly the famous Mr. Locke, in his answer to Bishop Stillingfleet,\ndeclares that having seen Mr. Newton's book he retracts what he himself\nsaid, following the opinion of the moderns, in his _Essay concerning Human\nUnderstanding_, to wit, that a body cannot operate immediately upon another\nexcept by touching it upon its surface and driving it by its motion. He\nacknowledges that God can put properties into matter which cause it to\noperate from a distance. Thus the theologians of the Augsburg Confession\nclaim that God may ordain not only that a body operate immediately on\ndivers bodies remote from one another, but that it even exist in their\nneighbourhood and be received by them in a way with which distances of\nplace and dimensions of space have nothing to do. Although this effect\ntranscends the forces of Nature, they do not think it possible to show that\nit surpasses the power of the Author of Nature. For him it is easy to annul\nthe laws that he has given or to dispense with them as seems good to him,\nin the same way as he was able to make iron float upon water and to stay\nthe operation of fire upon the human body.\n\n20. I found in comparing the _Rationale Theologicum_ of Nicolaus Vedelius\nwith the refutation by Johann Musaeus that these two authors, of whom one\ndied while a Professor at Franecker after having taught at Geneva and the\nother finally became the foremost theologian at Jena, are more or less in\nagreement on the principal rules for the use of reason, but that it is in\nthe application of these rules they disagree. For they both agree that\nrevelation cannot be contrary to the truths whose necessity is called by\nphilosophers 'logical' or 'metaphysical', that is to say, whose opposite\nimplies contradiction. They both admit also that revelation will be able to\ncombat maxims whose necessity is called 'physical' and is founded only upon\nthe laws that the will of God has prescribed for Nature. Thus the question\nwhether the presence of one and the same body in divers places is possible\nin the supernatural order only touches the application of the rule; and in\norder to decide this question conclusively by reason, one must needs\nexplain exactly wherein the essence of body consists. Even the Reformed\ndisagree thereon amongst themselves; the Cartesians confine it to\nextension, but their adversaries oppose that; and I think I have even\nobserved that Gisbertus Voetius, a famous theologian of Utrecht,       [87]\ndoubted the alleged impossibility of plurality of locations.\n\n21. Furthermore, although the two Protestant parties agree that one must\ndistinguish these two necessities which I have just indicated, namely\nmetaphysical necessity and physical necessity, and that the first excludes\nexceptions even in the case of Mysteries, they are not yet sufficiently\nagreed upon the rules of interpretation, which serve to determine in what\ncases it is permitted to desert the letter of Scripture when one is not\ncertain that it is contrary to strictly universal truths. It is agreed that\nthere are cases where one must reject a literal interpretation that is not\nabsolutely impossible, when it is otherwise unsuitable. For instance, all\ncommentators agree that when our Lord said that Herod was a fox he meant it\nmetaphorically; and one must accept that, unless one imagine with some\nfanatics that for the time the words of our Lord lasted Herod was actually\nchanged into a fox. But it is not the same with the texts on which\nMysteries are founded, where the theologians of the Augsburg Confession\ndeem that one must keep to the literal sense. Since, moreover, this\ndiscussion belongs to the art of interpretation and not to that which is\nthe proper sphere of logic, we will not here enter thereon, especially as\nit has nothing in common with the disputes that have arisen recently upon\nthe conformity of faith with reason.\n\n22. Theologians of all parties, I believe (fanatics alone excepted), agree\nat least that no article of faith must imply contradiction or contravene\nproofs as exact as those of mathematics, where the opposite of the\nconclusion can be reduced _ad absurdum_, that is, to contradiction. St.\nAthanasius with good reason made sport of the preposterous ideas of some\nwriters of his time, who maintained that God had suffered without any\nsuffering. _'Passus est impassibiliter. O ludicram doctrinam aedificantem\nsimul et demolientem!'_ It follows thence that certain writers have been\ntoo ready to grant that the Holy Trinity is contrary to that great\nprinciple which states that two things which are the same as a third are\nalso the same as each other: that is to say, if A is the same as B, and if\nC is the same as B, then A and C must also be the same as each other. For\nthis principle is a direct consequence of that of contradiction, and forms\nthe basis of all logic; and if it ceases, we can no longer reason with\ncertainty. Thus when one says that the Father is God, that the Son is God\nand that the Holy Spirit is God, and that nevertheless there is only   [88]\none God, although these three Persons differ from one another, one must\nconsider that this word _God_ has not the same sense at the beginning as at\nthe end of this statement. Indeed it signifies now the Divine Substance and\nnow a Person of the Godhead. In general, one must take care never to\nabandon the necessary and eternal truths for the sake of upholding\nMysteries, lest the enemies of religion seize upon such an occasion for\ndecrying both religion and Mysteries.\n\n23. The distinction which is generally drawn between that which is _above_\nreason and that which is _against_ reason is tolerably in accord with the\ndistinction which has just been made between the two kinds of necessity.\nFor what is contrary to reason is contrary to the absolutely certain and\ninevitable truths; and what is above reason is in opposition only to what\none is wont to experience or to understand. That is why I am surprised that\nthere are people of intelligence who dispute this distinction, and that M.\nBayle should be of this number. The distinction is assuredly very well\nfounded. A truth is above reason when our mind (or even every created mind)\ncannot comprehend it. Such is, as it seems to me, the Holy Trinity; such\nare the miracles reserved for God alone, as for instance Creation; such is\nthe choice of the order of the universe, which depends upon universal\nharmony, and upon the clear knowledge of an infinity of things at once. But\na truth can never be contrary to reason, and once a dogma has been disputed\nand refuted by reason, instead of its being incomprehensible, one may say\nthat nothing is easier to understand, nor more obvious, than its absurdity.\nFor I observed at the beginning that by REASON here I do not mean the\nopinions and discourses of men, nor even the habit they have formed of\njudging things according to the usual course of Nature, but rather the\ninviolable linking together of truths.\n\n24. I must come now to the great question which M. Bayle brought up\nrecently, to wit, whether a truth, and especially a truth of faith, can\nprove to be subject to irrefutable objections. This excellent author\nappears to answer with a bold affirmative: he quotes theologians of repute\nin his party, and even in the Church of Rome, who appear to say the same as\nhe affirms; and he cites philosophers who have believed that there are even\nphilosophical truths whose champions cannot answer the objections that are\nbrought up against them. He believes that the theological doctrine of  [89]\npredestination is of this nature, and in philosophy that of the composition\nof the _Continuum_. These are, indeed, the two labyrinths which have ever\nexercised theologians and philosophers. Libertus Fromondus, a theologian of\nLouvain (a great friend of Jansenius, whose posthumous book entitled\n_Augustinus_ he in fact published), who also wrote a book entitled\nexplicitly _Labyrinthus de Compositione Continui_, experienced in full\nmeasure the difficulties inherent in both doctrines; and the renowned\nOchino admirably presented what he calls 'the labyrinths of\npredestination'.\n\n25. But these writers have not denied the possibility of finding thread in\nthe labyrinth; they have recognized the difficulty, but they have surely\nnot turned difficulty into sheer impossibility. As for me, I confess that I\ncannot agree with those who maintain that a truth can admit of irrefutable\nobjections: for is an _objection_ anything but an argument whose conclusion\ncontradicts our thesis? And is not an irrefutable argument a\n_demonstration_? And how can one know the certainty of demonstrations\nexcept by examining the argument in detail, the form and the matter, in\norder to see if the form is good, and then if each premiss is either\nadmitted or proved by another argument of like force, until one is able to\nmake do with admitted premisses alone? Now if there is such an objection\nagainst our thesis we must say that the falsity of this thesis is\ndemonstrated, and that it is impossible for us to have reasons sufficient\nto prove it; otherwise two contradictories would be true at once. One must\nalways yield to proofs, whether they be proposed in positive form or\nadvanced in the shape of objections. And it is wrong and fruitless to try\nto weaken opponents' proofs, under the pretext that they are only\nobjections, since the opponent can play the same game and can reverse the\ndenominations, exalting his arguments by naming them 'proofs' and sinking\nours under the blighting title of 'objections'.\n\n26. It is another question whether we are always obliged to examine the\nobjections we may have to face, and to retain some doubt in respect of our\nown opinion, or what is called _formido oppositi_, until this examination\nhas been made. I would venture to say no, for otherwise one would never\nattain to certainty and our conclusion would be always provisional. I\nbelieve that able geometricians will scarce be troubled by the objections\nof Joseph Scaliger against Archimedes, or by those of Mr. Hobbes       [90]\nagainst Euclid; but that is because they have fully understood and are sure\nof the proofs. Nevertheless it is sometimes well to show oneself ready to\nexamine certain objections. On the one hand it may serve to rescue people\nfrom their error, while on the other we ourselves may profit by it; for\nspecious fallacies often contain some useful solution and bring about the\nremoval of considerable difficulties. That is why I have always liked\ningenious objections made against my own opinions, and I have never\nexamined them without profit: witness those which M. Bayle formerly made\nagainst my System of Pre-established Harmony, not to mention those which M.\nArnauld, M. l'Abbe Foucher and Father Lami, O.S.B., made to me on the same\nsubject. But to return to the principal question, I conclude from reasons I\nhave just set forth that when an objection is put forward against some\ntruth, it is always possible to answer it satisfactorily.\n\n27. It may be also that M. Bayle does not mean 'insoluble objections' in\nthe sense that I have just explained. I observe that he varies, at least in\nhis expressions: for in his posthumous Reply to M. le Clerc he does not\nadmit that one can bring demonstrations against the truths of faith. It\nappears therefore that he takes the objections to be insoluble only in\nrespect of our present degree of enlightenment; and in this Reply, p. 35,\nhe even does not despair of the possibility that one day a solution\nhitherto unknown may be found by someone. Concerning that more will be said\nlater. I hold an opinion, however, that will perchance cause surprise,\nnamely that this solution has been discovered entire, and is not even\nparticularly difficult. Indeed a mediocre intelligence capable of\nsufficient care, and using correctly the rules of common logic, is in a\nposition to answer the most embarrassing objection made against truth, when\nthe objection is only taken from reason, and when it is claimed to be a\n'demonstration'. Whatever scorn the generality of moderns have to-day for\nthe logic of Aristotle, one must acknowledge that it teaches infallible\nways of resisting error in these conjunctures. For one has only to examine\nthe argument according to the rules and it will always be possible to see\nwhether it is lacking in form or whether there are premisses such as are\nnot yet proved by a good argument.\n\n28. It is quite another matter when there is only a question of\n_probabilities_, for the art of judging from probable reasons is not yet\nwell established; so that our logic in this connexion is still very    [91]\nimperfect, and to this very day we have little beyond the art of judging\nfrom demonstrations. But this art is sufficient here: for when it is a\nquestion of opposing reason to an article of our faith, one is not\ndisturbed by objections that only attain probability. Everyone agrees that\nappearances are against Mysteries, and that they are by no means probable\nwhen regarded only from the standpoint of reason; but it suffices that they\nhave in them nothing of absurdity. Thus demonstrations are required if they\nare to be refuted.\n\n29. And doubtless we are so to understand it when Holy Scripture warns us\nthat the wisdom of God is foolishness before men, and when St. Paul\nobserved that the Gospel of Jesus Christ is foolishness unto the Greeks, as\nwell as unto the Jews a stumbling-block. For, after all, one truth cannot\ncontradict another, and the light of reason is no less a gift of God than\nthat of revelation. Also it is a matter of no difficulty among theologians\nwho are expert in their profession, that the motives of credibility\njustify, once for all, the authority of Holy Scripture before the tribunal\nof reason, so that reason in consequence gives way before it, as before a\nnew light, and sacrifices thereto all its probabilities. It is more or less\nas if a new president sent by the prince must show his letters patent in\nthe assembly where he is afterwards to preside. That is the tendency of\nsundry good books that we have on the truth of religion, such as those of\nAugustinus Steuchus, of Du Plessis-Mornay or of Grotius: for the true\nreligion must needs have marks that the false religions have not, else\nwould Zoroaster, Brahma, Somonacodom and Mahomet be as worthy of belief as\nMoses and Jesus Christ. Nevertheless divine faith itself, when it is\nkindled in the soul, is something more than an opinion, and depends not\nupon the occasions or the motives that have given it birth; it advances\nbeyond the intellect, and takes possession of the will and of the heart, to\nmake us act with zeal and joyfully as the law of God commands. Then we have\nno further need to think of reasons or to pause over the difficulties of\nargument which the mind may anticipate.\n\n30. Thus what we have just said of human reason, which is extolled and\ndecried by turns, and often without rule or measure, may show our lack of\nexactitude and how much we are accessary to our own errors. Nothing would\nbe so easy to terminate as these disputes on the rights of faith and of\nreason if men would make use of the commonest rules of logic and reason[92]\nwith even a modicum of attention. Instead of that, they become involved in\noblique and ambiguous phrases, which give them a fine field for\ndeclamation, to make the most of their wit and their learning. It would\nseem, indeed, that they have no wish to see the naked truth, peradventure\nbecause they fear that it may be more disagreeable than error: for they\nknow not the beauty of the Author of all things, who is the source of\ntruth.\n\n31. This negligence is a general defect of humanity, and one not to be laid\nto the charge of any particular person. _Abundamus dulcibus vitiis_, as\nQuintilian said of the style of Seneca, and we take pleasure in going\nastray. Exactitude incommodes us and rules we regard as puerilities. Thus\nit is that common logic (although it is more or less sufficient for the\nexamination of arguments that tend towards certainty) is relegated to\nschoolboys; and there is not even a thought for a kind of logic which\nshould determine the balance between probabilities, and would be so\nnecessary in deliberations of importance. So true is it that our mistakes\nfor the most part come from scorn or lack of the art of thinking: for\nnothing is more imperfect than our logic when we pass beyond necessary\narguments. The most excellent philosophers of our time, such as the authors\nof _The Art of Thinking_, of _The Search for Truth_ and of the _Essay\nconcerning Human Understanding_, have been very far from indicating to us\nthe true means fitted to assist the faculty whose business it is to make us\nweigh the probabilities of the true and the false: not to mention the art\nof discovery, in which success is still more difficult of attainment, and\nwhereof we have nothing beyond very imperfect samples in mathematics.\n\n32. One thing which might have contributed most towards M. Bayle's belief\nthat the difficulties of reason in opposition to faith cannot be obviated\nis that he seems to demand that God be justified in some such manner as\nthat commonly used for pleading the cause of a man accused before his\njudge. But he has not remembered that in the tribunals of men, which cannot\nalways penetrate to the truth, one is often compelled to be guided by signs\nand probabilities, and above all by presumptions or prejudices; whereas it\nis agreed, as we have already observed, that Mysteries are not probable.\nFor instance, M. Bayle will not have it that one can justify the goodness\nof God in the permission of sin, because probability would be against a man\nthat should happen to be in circumstances comparable in our eyes to    [93]\nthis permission. God foresees that Eve will be deceived by the serpent if\nhe places her in the circumstances wherein she later found herself; and\nnevertheless he placed her there. Now if a father or a guardian did the\nsame in regard to his child or his ward, if a friend did so in regard to a\nyoung person whose behaviour was his concern, the judge would not be\nsatisfied by the excuses of an advocate who said that the man only\npermitted the evil, without doing it or willing it: he would rather take\nthis permission as a sign of ill intention, and would regard it as a sin of\nomission, which would render the one convicted thereof accessary in\nanother's sin of commission.\n\n33. But it must be borne in mind that when one has foreseen the evil and\nhas not prevented it although it seems as if one could have done so with\nease, and one has even done things that have facilitated it, it does not\nfollow on that account _necessarily_ that one is accessary thereto. It is\nonly a very strong presumption, such as commonly replaces truth in human\naffairs, but which would be destroyed by an exact consideration of the\nfacts, supposing we were capable of that in relation to God. For amongst\nlawyers that is called 'presumption' which must provisionally pass for\ntruth in case the contrary is not proved; and it says more than\n'conjecture', although the _Dictionary_ of the Academy has not sifted the\ndifference. Now there is every reason to conclude unquestionably that one\nwould find through this consideration, if only it were attainable, that\nreasons most just, and stronger than those which appear contrary to them,\nhave compelled the All-Wise to permit the evil, and even to do things which\nhave facilitated it. Of this some instances will be given later.\n\n34. It is none too easy, I confess, for a father, a guardian, a friend to\nhave such reasons in the case under consideration. Yet the thing is not\nabsolutely impossible, and a skilled writer of fiction might perchance find\nan extraordinary case that would even justify a man in the circumstances I\nhave just indicated. But in reference to God there is no need to suppose or\nto establish particular reasons such as may have induced him to permit the\nevil; general reasons suffice. One knows that he takes care of the whole\nuniverse, whereof all the parts are connected; and one must thence infer\nthat he has had innumerable considerations whose result made him deem it\ninadvisable to prevent certain evils.\n\n35. It should even be concluded that there must have been great or     [94]\nrather invincible reasons which prompted the divine Wisdom to the\npermission of the evil that surprises us, from the mere fact that this\npermission has occurred: for nothing can come from God that is not\naltogether consistent with goodness, justice and holiness. Thus we can\njudge by the event (or _a posteriori_) that the permission was\nindispensable, although it be not possible for us to show this (_a priori_)\nby the detailed reasons that God can have had therefor; as it is not\nnecessary either that we show this to justify him. M. Bayle himself aptly\nsays concerning that (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III,\nch. 165, p. 1067): Sin made its way into the world; God therefore was able\nto permit it without detriment to his perfections; _ab actu ad potentiam\nvalet consequentia._ In God this conclusion holds good: he did this,\ntherefore he did it well. It is not, then, that we have no notion of\njustice in general fit to be applied also to God's justice; nor is it that\nGod's justice has other rules than the justice known of men, but that the\ncase in question is quite different from those which are common among men.\nUniversal right is the same for God and for men; but the question of fact\nis quite different in their case and his.\n\n36. We may even assume or pretend (as I have already observed) that there\nis something similar among men to this circumstance in God's actions. A man\nmight give such great and strong proofs of his virtue and his holiness that\nall the most apparent reasons one could put forward against him to charge\nhim with an alleged crime, for instance a larceny or murder, would deserve\nto be rejected as the calumnies of false witnesses or as an extraordinary\nplay of chance which sometimes throws suspicion on the most innocent. Thus\nin a case where every other would run the risk of being condemned or put to\nthe torture (according to the laws of the country), this man would be\nabsolved by his judges unanimously. Now in this case, which indeed is rare,\nbut which is not impossible, one might say in a sense (_sano sensu_) that\nthere is a conflict between reason and faith, and that the rules of law are\nother in respect of this person than they are in respect of the remainder\nof mankind. But that, when explained, will signify only that appearances of\nreason here give way before the faith that is due to the word and the\nintegrity of this great and holy man, and that he is privileged above other\nmen; not indeed as if there were one law for others and another for him,\nnor as if one had no understanding of what justice is in relation to him.\nIt is rather because the rules of universal justice do not find here   [95]\nthe application that they receive elsewhere, or because they favour him\ninstead of accusing him, since there are in this personage qualities so\nadmirable, that by virtue of a good logic of probabilities one should place\nmore faith in his word than in that of many others.\n\n37. Since it is permitted here to imagine possible cases, may one not\nsuppose this incomparable man to be the Adept or the Possessor of\n\n                  _'that blessed Stone_\n  _Able to enrich all earthly Kings alone'_\n\nand that he spends every day prodigious sums in order to feed and to rescue\nfrom distress countless numbers of poor men? Be there never so many\nwitnesses or appearances of every kind tending to prove that this great\nbenefactor of the human race has just committed some larceny, is it not\ntrue that the whole earth would make mock of the accusation, however\nspecious it might be? Now God is infinitely above the goodness and the\npower of this man, and consequently there are no reasons at all, however\napparent they be, that can hold good against faith, that is, against the\nassurance or the confidence in God wherewith we can and ought to say that\nGod has done all things well. The objections are therefore not insoluble.\nThey only involve prejudices and probabilities, which are, however,\noverthrown by reasons incomparably stronger. One must not say either that\nwhat we call _justice_ is nothing in relation to God, that he is the\nabsolute Master of all things even to the point of being able to condemn\nthe innocent without violating his justice, or finally that justice is\nsomething arbitrary where he is concerned. Those are rash and dangerous\nexpressions, whereunto some have been led astray to the discredit of the\nattributes of God. For if such were the case there would be no reason for\npraising his goodness and his justice: rather would it be as if the most\nwicked spirit, the Prince of evil genii, the evil principle of the\nManichaeans, were the sole master of the universe, just as I observed\nbefore. What means would there be of distinguishing the true God from the\nfalse God of Zoroaster if all things depended upon the caprice of an\narbitrary power and there were neither rule nor consideration for anything\nwhatever?\n\n38. It is therefore more than evident that nothing compels us to commit\nourselves to a doctrine so strange, since it suffices to say that we   [96]\nhave not enough knowledge of the facts when there is a question of\nanswering probabilities which appear to throw doubt upon the justice and\nthe goodness of God, and which would vanish away if the facts were well\nknown to us. We need neither renounce reason in order to listen to faith\nnor blind ourselves in order to see clearly, as Queen Christine used to\nsay: it is enough to reject ordinary appearances when they are contrary to\nMysteries; and this is not contrary to reason, since even in natural things\nwe are very often undeceived about appearances either by experience or by\nsuperior reasons. All that has been set down here in advance, only with the\nobject of showing more plainly wherein the fault of the objections and the\nabuse of reason consists in the present case, where the claim is made that\nreason has greatest force against faith: we shall come afterwards to a more\nexact discussion of that which concerns the origin of evil and the\npermission of sin with its consequences.\n\n39. For now, it will be well to continue our examination of the important\nquestion of the use of reason in theology, and to make reflexions upon what\nM. Bayle has said thereon in divers passages of his works. As he paid\nparticular attention in his _Historical and Critical Dictionary_ to\nexpounding the objections of the Manichaeans and those of the Pyrrhonians,\nand as this procedure had been criticized by some persons zealous for\nreligion, he placed a dissertation at the end of the second edition of this\n_Dictionary_, which aimed at showing, by examples, by authorities and by\nreasons, the innocence and usefulness of his course of action. I am\npersuaded (as I have said above) that the specious objections one can urge\nagainst truth are very useful, and that they serve to confirm and to\nillumine it, giving opportunity to intelligent persons to find new openings\nor to turn the old to better account. But M. Bayle seeks therein a\nusefulness quite the reverse of this: it would be that of displaying the\npower of faith by showing that the truths it teaches cannot sustain the\nattacks of reason and that it nevertheless holds its own in the heart of\nthe faithful. M. Nicole seems to call that 'the triumph of God's authority\nover human reason', in the words of his quoted by M. Bayle in the third\nvolume of his _Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_ (ch. 177, p. 120).\nBut since reason is a gift of God, even as faith is, contention between\nthem would cause God to contend against God; and if the objections of\nreason against any article of faith are insoluble, then it must be said\nthat this alleged article will be false and not revealed: this will be [97]\na chimera of the human mind, and the triumph of this faith will be capable\nof comparison with bonfires lighted after a defeat. Such is the doctrine of\nthe damnation of unbaptized children, which M. Nicole would have us assume\nto be a consequence of original sin; such would be the eternal damnation of\nadults lacking the light that is necessary for the attainment of salvation.\n\n40. Yet everyone need not enter into theological discussions; and persons\nwhose condition allows not of exact researches should be content with\ninstruction on faith, without being disturbed by the objections; and if\nsome exceeding great difficulty should happen to strike them, it is\npermitted to them to avert the mind from it, offering to God a sacrifice of\ntheir curiosity: for when one is assured of a truth one has no need to\nlisten to the objections. As there are many people whose faith is rather\nsmall and shallow to withstand such dangerous tests, I think one must not\npresent them with that which might be poisonous for them; or, if one cannot\nhide from them what is only too public, the antidote must be added to it;\nthat is to say, one must try to add the answer to the objection, certainly\nnot withhold it as unobtainable.\n\n41. The passages from the excellent theologians who speak of this triumph\nof faith can and should receive a meaning appropriate to the principles I\nhave just affirmed. There appear in some objects of faith two great\nqualities capable of making it triumph over reason, the one is\n_incomprehensibility_, the other is _the lack of probability_. But one must\nbeware of adding thereto the third quality whereof M. Bayle speaks, and of\nsaying that what one believes is _indefensible_: for that would be to cause\nreason in its turn to triumph in a manner that would destroy faith.\nIncomprehensibility does not prevent us from believing even natural truths.\nFor instance (as I have already pointed out) we do not comprehend the\nnature of odours and savours, and yet we are persuaded, by a kind of faith\nwhich we owe to the evidence of the senses, that these perceptible\nqualities are founded upon the nature of things and that they are not\nillusions.\n\n42. There are also things contrary to appearances, which we admit when they\nare sufficiently verified. There is a little romance of Spanish origin,\nwhose title states that one must not always believe what one sees. What was\nthere more specious than the lie of the false Martin Guerre, who was\nacknowledged as the true Martin by the true Martin's wife and          [98]\nrelatives, and caused the judges and the relatives to waver for a long time\neven after the arrival of the other? Nevertheless the truth was known in\nthe end. It is the same with faith. I have already observed that all one\ncan oppose to the goodness and the justice of God is nothing but\nappearances, which would be strong against a man, but which are nullified\nwhen they are applied to God and when they are weighed against the proofs\nthat assure us of the infinite perfection of his attributes. Thus faith\ntriumphs over false reasons by means of sound and superior reasons that\nhave made us embrace it; but it would not triumph if the contrary opinion\nhad for it reasons as strong as or even stronger than those which form the\nfoundation of faith, that is, if there were invincible and conclusive\nobjections against faith.\n\n43. It is well also to observe here that what M. Bayle calls a 'triumph of\nfaith' is in part a triumph of demonstrative reason against apparent and\ndeceptive reasons which are improperly set against the demonstrations. For\nit must be taken into consideration that the objections of the Manichaeans\nare hardly less contrary to natural theology than to revealed theology. And\nsupposing one surrendered to them Holy Scripture, original sin, the grace\nof God in Jesus Christ, the pains of hell and the other articles of our\nreligion, one would not even so be delivered from their objections: for one\ncannot deny that there is in the world physical evil (that is, suffering)\nand moral evil (that is, crime) and even that physical evil is not always\ndistributed here on earth according to the proportion of moral evil, as it\nseems that justice demands. There remains, then, this question of natural\ntheology, how a sole Principle, all-good, all-wise and all-powerful, has\nbeen able to admit evil, and especially to permit sin, and how it could\nresolve to make the wicked often happy and the good unhappy?\n\n44. Now we have no need of revealed faith to know that there is such a sole\nPrinciple of all things, entirely good and wise. Reason teaches us this by\ninfallible proofs; and in consequence all the objections taken from the\ncourse of things, in which we observe imperfections, are only based on\nfalse appearances. For, if we were capable of understanding the universal\nharmony, we should see that what we are tempted to find fault with is\nconnected with the plan most worthy of being chosen; in a word, we _should\nsee_, and should not _believe_ only, that what God has done is the best. I\ncall 'seeing' here what one knows _a priori_ by the causes; and        [99]\n'believing' what one only judges by the effects, even though the one be as\ncertainly known as the other. And one can apply here too the saying of St.\nPaul (2 Cor. v. 7), that we walk by _faith_ and not by _sight_. For the\ninfinite wisdom of God being known to us, we conclude that the evils we\nexperience had to be permitted, and this we conclude from the effect or _a\nposteriori_, that is to say, because they exist. It is what M. Bayle\nacknowledges; and he ought to content himself with that, and not claim that\none must put an end to the false appearances which are contrary thereto. It\nis as if one asked that there should be no more dreams or optical\nillusions.\n\n45. And it is not to be doubted that this faith and this confidence in God,\nwho gives us insight into his infinite goodness and prepares us for his\nlove, in spite of the appearances of harshness that may repel us, are an\nadmirable exercise for the virtues of Christian theology, when the divine\ngrace in Jesus Christ arouses these motions within us. That is what Luther\naptly observed in opposition to Erasmus, saying that it is love in the\nhighest degree to love him who to flesh and blood appears so unlovable, so\nharsh toward the unfortunate and so ready to condemn, and to condemn for\nevils in which he appears to be the cause or accessary, at least in the\neyes of those who allow themselves to be dazzled by false reasons. One may\ntherefore say that the triumph of true reason illumined by divine grace is\nat the same time the triumph of faith and love.\n\n46. M. Bayle appears to have taken the matter quite otherwise: he declares\nhimself against reason, when he might have been content to censure its\nabuse. He quotes the words of Cotta in Cicero, where he goes so far as to\nsay that if reason were a gift of the gods providence would be to blame for\nhaving given it, since it tends to our harm. M. Bayle also thinks that\nhuman reason is a source of destruction and not of edification (_Historical\nand Critical Dictionary_, p. 2026, col. 2), that it is a runner who knows\nnot where to stop, and who, like another Penelope, herself destroys her own\nwork.\n\n  _Destruit, aedificat, mutat quadrata rotundis._\n\n(_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III, p. 725). But he takes\npains especially to pile up many authorities one upon the other, in order\nto show that theologians of all parties reject the use of reason just as he\ndoes, and that they call attention to such gleams of reason as oppose\nreligion only that they may sacrifice them to faith by a mere         [100]\nrepudiation, answering nothing but the conclusion of the argument that is\nbrought against them. He begins with the New Testament. Jesus Christ was\ncontent to say: 'Follow Me' (Luke v. 27; ix. 59). The Apostles said:\n'Believe, and thou shalt be saved' (Acts xvi. 3). St. Paul acknowledges\nthat his 'doctrine is obscure' (1 Cor. xiii. 12), that 'one can comprehend\nnothing therein' unless God impart a spiritual discernment, and without\nthat it only passes for foolishness (1 Cor. ii. 14). He exhorts the\nfaithful 'to beware of philosophy' (Col. ii. 8) and to avoid disputations\nin that science, which had caused many persons to lose faith.\n\n47. As for the Fathers of the Church, M. Bayle refers us to the collection\nof passages from them against the use of philosophy and of reason which M.\nde Launoy made (_De Varia Aristotelis Fortuna,_ cap. 2) and especially to\nthe passages from St. Augustine collected by M. Arnauld (against Mallet),\nwhich state: that the judgements of God are inscrutable; that they are not\nany the less just for that they are unknown to us; that it is a deep abyss,\nwhich one cannot fathom without running the risk of falling down the\nprecipice; that one cannot without temerity try to elucidate that which God\nwilled to keep hidden; that his will cannot but be just; that many men,\nhaving tried to explain this incomprehensible depth, have fallen into vain\nimaginations and opinions full of error and bewilderment.\n\n48. The Schoolmen have spoken in like manner. M. Bayle quotes a beautiful\npassage from Cardinal Cajetan (Part I, _Summ._, qu. 22, art. 4) to this\neffect: 'Our mind', he says, 'rests not upon the evidence of known truth\nbut upon the impenetrable depth of hidden truth. And as St. Gregory says:\nHe who believes touching the Divinity only that which he can gauge with his\nmind belittles the idea of God. Yet I do not surmise that it is necessary\nto deny any of the things which we know, or which we see as appertaining to\nthe immutability, the actuality, the certainty, the universality, etc., of\nGod: but I think that there is here some secret, either in regard to the\nrelation which exists between God and the event, or in respect of what\nconnects the event itself with his prevision. Thus, reflecting that the\nunderstanding of our soul is the eye of the owl, I find the soul's repose\nonly in ignorance. For it is better both for the Catholic Faith and for\nPhilosophic Faith to confess our blindness, than to affirm as evident what\ndoes not afford our mind the contentment which self-evidence gives. I do\nnot accuse of presumption, on that account, all the learned men who   [101]\nstammeringly have endeavoured to suggest, as far as in them lay, the\nimmobility and the sovereign and eternal efficacy of the understanding, of\nthe will and of the power of God, through the infallibility of divine\nelection and divine relation to all events. Nothing of all that interferes\nwith my surmise that there is some depth which is hidden from us.' This\npassage of Cajetan is all the more notable since he was an author competent\nto reach the heart of the matter.\n\n49. Luther's book against Erasmus is full of vigorous comments hostile to\nthose who desire to submit revealed truths to the tribunal of our reason.\nCalvin often speaks in the same tone, against the inquisitive daring of\nthose who seek to penetrate into the counsels of God. He declares in his\ntreatise on predestination that God had just causes for damning some men,\nbut causes unknown to us. Finally M. Bayle quotes sundry modern writers who\nhave spoken to the same effect (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_,\nch. 161 et seq.).\n\n50. But all these expressions and innumerable others like them do not prove\nthat the objections opposed to faith are so insoluble as M. Bayle supposes.\nIt is true that the counsels of God are inscrutable, but there is no\ninvincible objection which tends to the conclusion that they are unjust.\nWhat appears injustice on the part of God, and foolishness in our faith,\nonly appears so. The famous passage of Tertullian (_De Carne Christi_),\n'mortuus est Dei filius, credibile est, quia ineptum est; et sepultus\nrevixit, certum est, quia impossibile', is a sally that can only be meant\nto concern appearances of absurdity. There are others like them in Luther's\nbook on _Freewill in Bondage_, as when he says (ch. 174): 'Si placet tibi\nDeus indignos coronans, non debet displicere immeritos damnans.' Which\nbeing reduced to more temperate phrasing, means: If you approve that God\ngive eternal glory to those who are not better than the rest, you should\nnot disapprove that he abandon those who are not worse than the rest. And\nto judge that he speaks only of appearances of injustice, one only has to\nweigh these words of the same author taken from the same book: 'In all the\nrest', he says, 'we recognize in God a supreme majesty; there is only\njustice that we dare to question: and we will not believe provisionally\n[tantisper] that he is just, albeit he has promised us that the time shall\ncome when his glory being revealed all men shall see clearly that he has\nbeen and that he is just.'\n\n                                                                      [102]\n51. It will be found also that when the Fathers entered into a discussion\nthey did not simply reject reason. And, in disputations with the pagans,\nthey endeavour usually to show how paganism is contrary to reason, and how\nthe Christian religion has the better of it on that side also. Origen\nshowed Celsus how reasonable Christianity is and why, notwithstanding, the\nmajority of Christians should believe without examination. Celsus had\njeered at the behaviour of Christians, 'who, willing', he said, 'neither to\nlisten to your reasons nor to give you any for what they believe, are\ncontent to say to you: Examine not, only believe, or: Your faith will save\nyou; and they hold this as a maxim, that the wisdom of the world is an\nevil.'\n\n52. Origen gives the answer of a wise man, and in conformity with the\nprinciples we have established in the matter. For reason, far from being\ncontrary to Christianity, serves as a foundation for this religion, and\nwill bring about its acceptance by those who can achieve the examination of\nit. But, as few people are capable of this, the heavenly gift of plain\nfaith tending towards good suffices for men in general. 'If it were\npossible', he says, 'for all men, neglecting the affairs of life, to apply\nthemselves to study and meditation, one need seek no other way to make them\naccept the Christian religion. For, to say nothing likely to offend anyone'\n(he insinuates that the pagan religion is absurd, but he will not say so\nexplicitly), 'there will be found therein no less exactitude than\nelsewhere, whether in the discussion of its dogmas, or in the elucidation\nof the enigmatical expressions of its prophets, or in the interpretation of\nthe parables of its gospels and of countless other things happening or\nordained symbolically. But since neither the necessities of life nor the\ninfirmities of men permit of this application to study, save for a very\nsmall number of persons, what means could one find more qualified to\nbenefit everyone else in the world than those Jesus Christ wished to be\nused for the conversion of the nations? And I would fain ask with regard to\nthe great number of those who believe, and who thereby have withdrawn\nthemselves from the quagmire of vices wherein before they were plunged,\nwhich would be the better: to have thus changed one's morals and reformed\none's life, believing without examination that there are punishments for\nsin and rewards for good actions; or to have waited for one's conversion\nuntil one not only believed but had examined with care the foundations of\nthese dogmas? It is certain that, were this method to be followed, few[103]\nindeed would reach that point whither they are led by their plain and\nsimple faith, but the majority would remain in their corruption.'\n\n53. M. Bayle (in his explanation concerning the objections of the\nManichaeans, placed at the end of the second edition of the _Dictionary_)\ntakes those words where Origen points out that religion can stand the test\nof having her dogmas discussed, as if it were not meant in relation to\nphilosophy, but only in relation to the accuracy wherewith the authority\nand the true meaning of Holy Scripture is established. But there is nothing\nto indicate this restriction. Origen wrote against a philosopher whom such\na restriction would not have suited. And it appears that this Father wished\nto point out that among Christians there was no less exactitude than among\nthe Stoics and some other philosophers, who established their doctrine as\nmuch by reason as by authorities, as, for example, Chrysippus did, who\nfound his philosophy even in the symbols of pagan antiquity.\n\n54. Celsus brings up still another objection to the Christians, in the same\nplace. 'If they withdraw', he says, 'regularly into their \"Examine not,\nonly believe\", they must tell me at least what are the things they wish me\nto believe.' Therein he is doubtless right, and that tells against those\nwho would say that God is good and just, and who yet would maintain that we\nhave no notion of goodness and of justice when we attribute these\nperfections to him. But one must not always demand what I call 'adequate\nnotions', involving nothing that is not explained, since even perceptible\nqualities, like heat, light, sweetness, cannot give us such notions. Thus\nwe agreed that Mysteries should receive an explanation, but this\nexplanation is imperfect. It suffices for us to have some analogical\nunderstanding of a Mystery such as the Trinity and the Incarnation, to the\nend that in accepting them we pronounce not words altogether devoid of\nmeaning: but it is not necessary that the explanation go as far as we would\nwish, that is, to the extent of comprehension and to the _how_.\n\n55. It appears strange therefore that M. Bayle rejects the tribunal of\n_common notions_ (in the third volume of his _Reply to the Questions of a\nProvincial_, pp. 1062 and 1140) as if one should not consult the idea of\ngoodness in answering the Manichaeans; whereas he had declared himself\nquite differently in his _Dictionary_. Of necessity there must be agreement\nupon the meaning of _good_ and _bad_, amongst those who are in dispute[104]\nover the question whether there is only one principle, altogether good, or\nwhether there are two, the one good and the other bad. We understand\nsomething by union when we are told of the union of one body with another\nor of a substance with its accident, of a subject with its adjunct, of the\nplace with the moving body, of the act with the potency; we also mean\nsomething when we speak of the union of the soul with the body to make\nthereof one single person. For albeit I do not hold that the soul changes\nthe laws of the body, or that the body changes the laws of the soul, and I\nhave introduced the Pre-established Harmony to avoid this derangement, I\nnevertheless admit a true union between the soul and the body, which makes\nthereof a suppositum. This union belongs to the metaphysical, whereas a\nunion of influence would belong to the physical. But when we speak of the\nunion of the Word of God with human nature we should be content with an\nanalogical knowledge, such as the comparison of the union of the soul with\nthe body is capable of giving us. We should, moreover, be content to say\nthat the Incarnation is the closest union that can exist between the\nCreator and the creature; and further we should not want to go.\n\n56. It is the same with the other Mysteries, where moderate minds will ever\nfind an explanation sufficient for belief, but never such as would be\nnecessary for understanding. A certain _what it is_ ([Greek: ti esti]) is\nenough for us, but the _how_ ([Greek: pos]) is beyond us, and is not\nnecessary for us. One may say concerning the explanations of Mysteries\nwhich are given out here and there, what the Queen of Sweden inscribed upon\na medal concerning the crown she had abandoned, 'Non mi bisogna, e non mi\nbasta.' Nor have we any need either (as I have already observed) to prove\nthe Mysteries _a priori_, or to give a reason for them; it suffices us\n_that the thing is thus_ ([Greek: to hoti]) even though we know not the\n_why_ ([Greek: to dioti]), which God has reserved for himself. These lines,\nwritten on that theme by Joseph Scaliger, are beautiful and renowned:\n\n  _Ne curiosus quaere causas omnium,_\n  _Quaecumque libris vis Prophetarum indidit_\n  _Afflata caelo, plena veraci Deo:_\n  _Nec operta sacri supparo silentii_\n  _Irrumpere aude, sed pudenter praeteri._\n  [Page 105]\n  _Nescire velle, quae Magister optimus_\n  _Docere non vult, erudita inscitia est._\n\nM. Bayle, who quotes them (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol.\nIII, p. 1055), holds the likely opinion that Scaliger made them upon the\ndisputes between Arminius and Gomarus. I think M. Bayle repeated them from\nmemory, for he put _sacrata_ instead of _afflata_. But it is apparently the\nprinter's fault that _prudenter_ stands in place of _pudenter_ (that is,\nmodestly) which the metre requires.\n\n57. Nothing can be more judicious than the warning these lines contain; and\nM. Bayle is right in saying (p. 729) that those who claim that the\nbehaviour of God with respect to sin and the consequences of sin contains\nnothing but what they can account for, deliver themselves up to the mercy\nof their adversary. But he is not right in combining here two very\ndifferent things, 'to account for a thing', and 'to uphold it against\nobjections'; as he does when he presently adds: 'They are obliged to follow\nhim [their adversary] everywhere whither he shall wish to lead them, and it\nwould be to retire ignominiously and ask for quarter, if they were to admit\nthat our intelligence is too weak to remove completely all the objections\nadvanced by a philosopher.'\n\n58. It seems here that, according to M. Bayle, 'accounting for' comes short\nof 'answering objections', since he threatens one who should undertake the\nfirst with the resulting obligation to pass on to the second. But it is\nquite the opposite: he who maintains a thesis (the _respondens_) is not\nbound to account for it, but he is bound to meet the objections of an\nopponent. A defendant in law is not bound (as a general rule) to prove his\nright or to produce his title to possession; but he is obliged to reply to\nthe arguments of the plaintiff. I have marvelled many times that a writer\nso precise and so shrewd as M. Bayle so often here confuses things where so\nmuch difference exists as between these three acts of reason: to\ncomprehend, to prove, and to answer objections; as if when it is a question\nof the use of reason in theology one term were as good as another. Thus he\nsays in his posthumous Conversations, p. 73: 'There is no principle which\nM. Bayle has more often inculcated than this, that the incomprehensibility\nof a dogma and the insolubility of the objections that oppose it provide no\nlegitimate reason for rejecting it.' This is true as regards the\nincomprehensibility, but it is not the same with the insolubility. And it\nis indeed just as if one said that an invincible reason against a     [106]\nthesis was not a legitimate reason for rejecting it. For what other\nlegitimate reason for rejecting an opinion can one find, if an invincible\nopposing argument is not such an one? And what means shall one have\nthereafter of demonstrating the falsity, and even the absurdity, of any\nopinion?\n\n59. It is well to observe also that he who proves a thing _a priori_\naccounts for it through the efficient cause; and whosoever can thus account\nfor it in a precise and adequate manner is also in a position to comprehend\nthe thing. Therefore it was that the Scholastic theologians had already\ncensured Raymond Lully for having undertaken to demonstrate the Trinity by\nphilosophy. This so-called demonstration is to be found in his _Works_; and\nBartholomaeus Keckermann, a writer renowned in the Reformed party, having\nmade an attempt of just the same kind upon the same Mystery, has been no\nless censured for it by some modern theologians. Therefore censure will\nfall upon those who shall wish to account for this Mystery and make it\ncomprehensible, but praise will be given to those who shall toil to uphold\nit against the objections of adversaries.\n\n60. I have said already that theologians usually distinguish between what\nis above reason and what is against reason. They place _above_ reason that\nwhich one cannot comprehend and which one cannot account for. But _against_\nreason will be all opinion that is opposed by invincible reasons, or the\ncontrary of which can be proved in a precise and sound manner. They avow,\ntherefore, that the Mysteries are above reason, but they do not admit that\nthey are contrary to it. The English author of a book which is ingenious,\nbut has met with disapproval, entitled _Christianity not Mysterious_,\nwished to combat this distinction; but it does not seem to me that he has\nat all weakened it. M. Bayle also is not quite satisfied with this accepted\ndistinction. This is what he says on the matter (vol. III of the _Reply to\nthe Questions of a Provincial_, ch. 158). Firstly (p. 998) he\ndistinguishes, together with M. Saurin, between these two theses: the one,\n_all the dogmas of Christianity are in conformity with reason_; the other,\n_human reason knows that they are in conformity with reason_. He affirms\nthe first and denies the second. I am of the same opinion, if in saying\n'that a dogma conforms to reason' one means that it is possible to account\nfor it or to explain its _how_ by reason; for God could doubtless do so,\nand we cannot. But I think that one must affirm both theses if by     [107]\n'knowing that a dogma conforms to reason' one means that we can\ndemonstrate, if need be, that there is no contradiction between this dogma\nand reason, repudiating the objections of those who maintain that this\ndogma is an absurdity.\n\n61. M. Bayle explains himself here in a manner not at all convincing. He\nacknowledges fully that our Mysteries are in accordance with the supreme\nand universal reason that is in the divine understanding, or with reason in\ngeneral; yet he denies that they are in accordance with that part of reason\nwhich man employs to judge things. But this portion of reason which we\npossess is a gift of God, and consists in the natural light that has\nremained with us in the midst of corruption; thus it is in accordance with\nthe whole, and it differs from that which is in God only as a drop of water\ndiffers from the ocean or rather as the finite from the infinite. Therefore\nMysteries may transcend it, but they cannot be contrary to it. One cannot\nbe contrary to one part without being contrary to the whole. That which\ncontradicts a proposition of Euclid is contrary to the _Elements_ of\nEuclid. That which in us is contrary to the Mysteries is not reason nor is\nit the natural light or the linking together of truths; it is corruption,\nor error, or prejudice, or darkness.\n\n62. M. Bayle (p. 1002) is not satisfied with the opinion of Josua Stegman\nand of M. Turretin, Protestant theologians who teach that the Mysteries are\ncontrary only to corrupt reason. He asks, mockingly, whether by right\nreason is meant perchance that of an orthodox theologian and by corrupt\nreason that of an heretic; and he urges the objection that the evidence of\nthe Mystery of the Trinity was no greater in the soul of Luther than in the\nsoul of Socinius. But as M. Descartes has well observed, good sense is\ndistributed to all: thus one must believe that both the orthodox and\nheretics are endowed therewith. Right reason is a linking together of\ntruths, corrupt reason is mixed with prejudices and passions. And in order\nto discriminate between the two, one need but proceed in good order, admit\nno thesis without proof, and admit no proof unless it be in proper form,\naccording to the commonest rules of logic. One needs neither any other\ncriterion nor other arbitrator in questions of reason. It is only through\nlack of this consideration that a handle has been given to the sceptics,\nand that even in theology Francois Veron and some others, who         [108]\nexacerbated the dispute with the Protestants, even to the point of\ndishonesty, plunged headlong into scepticism in order to prove the\nnecessity of accepting an infallible external judge. Their course meets\nwith no approval from the most expert, even in their own party: Calixtus\nand Daille derided it as it deserved, and Bellarmine argued quite\notherwise.\n\n63. Now let us come to what M. Bayle says (p. 999) on the distinction we\nare concerned with. 'It seems to me', he says, 'that an ambiguity has crept\ninto the celebrated distinction drawn between things that are above reason\nand things that are against reason. The Mysteries of the Gospel are above\nreason, so it is usually said, but they are not contrary to reason. I think\nthat the same sense is not given to the word reason in the first part of\nthis axiom as in the second: by the first is understood rather the reason\nof man, or reason _in concreto_ and by the second reason in general, or\nreason _in abstracto_. For supposing that it is understood always as reason\nin general or the supreme reason, the universal reason that is in God, it\nis equally true that the Mysteries of the Gospels are not above reason and\nthat they are not against reason. But if in both parts of the axiom human\nreason is meant, I do not clearly see the soundness of the distinction: for\nthe most orthodox confess that we know not how our Mysteries can conform to\nthe maxims of philosophy. It seems to us, therefore, that they are not in\nconformity with our reason. Now that which appears to us not to be in\nconformity with our reason appears contrary to our reason, just as that\nwhich appears to us not in conformity with truth appears contrary to truth.\nThus why should not one say, equally, that the Mysteries are against our\nfeeble reason, and that they are above our feeble reason?' I answer, as I\nhave done already, that 'reason' here is the linking together of the truths\nthat we know by the light of nature, and in this sense the axiom is true\nand without any ambiguity. The Mysteries transcend our reason, since they\ncontain truths that are not comprised in this sequence; but they are not\ncontrary to our reason, and they do not contradict any of the truths\nwhereto this sequence can lead us. Accordingly there is no question here of\nthe universal reason that is in God, but of our reason. As for the question\nwhether we know the Mysteries to conform with our reason, I answer that at\nleast we never know of any non-conformity or any opposition between the\nMysteries and reason. Moreover, we can always abolish such alleged    [109]\nopposition, and so, if this can be called reconciling or harmonizing faith\nwith reason, or recognizing the conformity between them, it must be said\nthat we can recognize this conformity and this harmony. But if the\nconformity consists in a reasonable explanation of the _how_, we cannot\nrecognize it.\n\n64. M. Bayle makes one more ingenious objection, which he draws from the\nexample of the sense of sight. 'When a square tower', he says, 'from a\ndistance appears to us round, our eyes testify very clearly not only that\nthey perceive nothing square in this tower, but also that they discover\nthere a round shape, incompatible with the square shape. One may therefore\nsay that the truth which is the square shape is not only above, but even\nagainst, the witness of our feeble sight.' It must be admitted that this\nobservation is correct, and although it be true that the appearance of\nroundness comes simply from the effacement of the angles, which distance\ncauses to disappear, it is true, notwithstanding, that the round and the\nsquare are opposites. Therefore my answer to this objection is that the\nrepresentation of the senses, even when they do all that in them lies, is\noften contrary to the truth; but it is not the same with the faculty of\nreasoning, when it does its duty, since a strictly reasoned argument is\nnothing but a linking together of truths. And as for the sense of sight in\nparticular, it is well to consider that there are yet other false\nappearances which come not from the 'feebleness of our eyes' nor from the\nloss of visibility brought about by distance, but from the very _nature of\nvision_, however perfect it be. It is thus, for instance, that the circle\nseen sideways is changed into that kind of oval which among geometricians\nis known as an ellipse, and sometimes even into a parabola or a hyperbola,\nor actually into a straight line, witness the ring of Saturn.\n\n65. The _external_ senses, properly speaking, do not deceive us. It is our\ninner sense which often makes us go too fast. That occurs also in brute\nbeasts, as when a dog barks at his reflexion in the mirror: for beasts have\n_consecutions_ of perception which resemble reasoning, and which occur also\nin the inner sense of men, when their actions have only an empirical\nquality. But beasts do nothing which compels us to believe that they have\nwhat deserves to be properly called a _reasoning_ sense, as I have shown\nelsewhere. Now when the understanding uses and follows the false decision\nof the inner sense (as when the famous Galileo thought that Saturn had[110]\ntwo handles) it is deceived by the judgement it makes upon the effect of\nappearances, and it infers from them more than they imply. For the\nappearances of the senses do not promise us absolutely the truth of things,\nany more than dreams do. It is we who deceive ourselves by the use we make\nof them, that is, by our consecutions. Indeed we allow ourselves to be\ndeluded by probable arguments, and we are inclined to think that phenomena\nsuch as we have found linked together often are so always. Thus, as it\nhappens usually that that which appears without angles has none, we readily\nbelieve it to be always thus. Such an error is pardonable, and sometimes\ninevitable, when it is necessary to act promptly and choose that which\nappearances recommend; but when we have the leisure and the time to collect\nour thoughts, we are in fault if we take for certain that which is not so.\nIt is therefore true that appearances are often contrary to truth, but our\nreasoning never is when it proceeds strictly in accordance with the rules\nof the art of reasoning. If by _reason_ one meant generally the faculty of\nreasoning whether well or ill, I confess that it might deceive us, and does\nindeed deceive us, and the appearances of our understanding are often as\ndeceptive as those of the senses: but here it is a question of the linking\ntogether of truths and of objections in due form, and in this sense it is\nimpossible for reason to deceive us.\n\n66. Thus it may be seen from all I have just said that M. Bayle carries too\nfar _the being above reason_, as if it included the insoluble nature of\nobjections: for according to him (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_,\nvol. III, ch. 130, p. 651) 'once a dogma is above reason, philosophy can\nneither explain it nor comprehend it, nor meet the difficulties that are\nurged against it'. I agree with regard to comprehension, but I have already\nshown that the Mysteries receive a necessary verbal explanation, to the end\nthat the terms employed be not _sine mente soni_, words signifying nothing.\nI have shown also that it is necessary for one to be capable of answering\nthe objections, and that otherwise one must needs reject the thesis.\n\n67. He adduces the authority of theologians, who appear to recognize the\ninsoluble nature of the objections against the Mysteries. Luther is one of\nthe chief of these; but I have already replied, in Sec. 12, to the passage\nwhere he seems to say that philosophy contradicts theology. There is\nanother passage (_De Servo Arbitrio_, ch. 246) where he says that the\napparent injustice of God is proved by arguments taken from the       [111]\nadversity of good people and the prosperity of the wicked, an argument\nirresistible both for all reason and for natural intelligence ('Argumentis\ntalibus traducta, quibus nulla ratio aut lumen naturae potest resistere').\nBut soon afterwards he shows that he means it only of those who know\nnothing of the life to come, since he adds that an expression in the Gospel\ndissipates this difficulty, teaching us that there is another life, where\nthat which has not been punished and rewarded in this life shall receive\nits due. The objection is then far from being insuperable, and even without\nthe aid of the Gospel one could bethink oneself of this answer. There is\nalso quoted (_Reply_, vol. III, p. 652) a passage from Martin Chemnitz,\ncriticized by Vedelius and defended by Johann Musaeus, where this famous\ntheologian seems to say clearly that there are truths in the word of God\nwhich are not only above reason but also against reason. But this passage\nmust be taken as referring only to the principles of reason that are in\naccordance with the order of Nature, as Musaeus also interprets it.\n\n68. It is true nevertheless that M. Bayle finds some authorities who are\nmore favourable to him, M. Descartes being one of the chief. This great man\nsays positively (Part I of his _Principles_, art. 41) 'that we shall have\nnot the slightest trouble in ridding ourselves of the difficulty' (which\none may have in harmonizing the freedom of our will with the order of the\neternal providence of God) 'if we observe that our thought is finite, and\nthat the Knowledge and the Omnipotence of God, whereby he has not only\nknown from all eternity all that which is or which can be, but also has\nwilled it, is infinite. We have therefore quite enough intelligence to\nrecognize clearly and distinctly that this knowledge and this power are in\nGod; but we have not enough so to comprehend their scope that we can know\nhow they leave the actions of men entirely free and undetermined. Yet the\nPower and the Knowledge of God must not prevent us from believing that we\nhave a free will; for we should be wrong to doubt of that whereof we are\ninwardly conscious, and which we know by experience to be within us, simply\nbecause we do not comprehend some other thing which we know to be\nincomprehensible in its nature.'\n\n69. This passage from M. Descartes, followed by his adherents (who rarely\nthink of doubting what he asserts), has always appeared strange to me. Not\ncontent with saying that, as for him, he sees no way of reconciling   [112]\nthe two dogmas, he puts the whole human race, and even all rational\ncreatures, in the same case. Yet could he have been unaware that there is\nno possibility of an insuperable objection against truth? For such an\nobjection could only be a necessary linking together of other truths whose\nresult would be contrary to the truth that one maintains; and consequently\nthere would be contradiction between the truths, which would be an utter\nabsurdity. Moreover, albeit our mind is finite and cannot comprehend the\ninfinite, of the infinite nevertheless it has proofs whose strength or\nweakness it comprehends; why then should it not have the same comprehension\nin regard to the objections? And since the power and the wisdom of God are\ninfinite and comprehend everything, there is no pretext for doubting their\nscope. Further, M. Descartes demands a freedom which is not needed, by his\ninsistence that the actions of the will of man are altogether undetermined,\na thing which never happens. Finally, M. Bayle himself maintains that this\nexperience or this inward sense of our independence, upon which M.\nDescartes founds the proof of our freedom, does not prove it: for from the\nfact that we are not conscious of the causes whereon we depend, it does not\nfollow, according to M. Bayle, that we are independent. But that is\nsomething we will speak of in its proper place.\n\n70. It seems that M. Descartes confesses also, in a passage of his\n_Principles_, that it is impossible to find an answer to the difficulties\non the division of matter to infinity, which he nevertheless recognizes as\nactual. Arriaga and other Schoolmen make well-nigh the same confession: but\nif they took the trouble to give to the objections the form these ought to\nhave, they would see that there are faults in the reasoning, and sometimes\nfalse assumptions which cause confusion. Here is an example. A man of parts\none day brought up to me an objection in the following form: Let the\nstraight line BA be cut in two equal parts at the point C, and the part CA\nat the point D, and the part DA at the point E, and so on to infinity; all\nthe halves, BC, CD, DE, etc., together make the whole BA; therefore there\nmust be a last half, since the straight line BA finishes at A. But this\nlast half is absurd: for since it is a line, it will be possible again to\ncut it in two. Therefore division to infinity cannot be admitted. But I\npointed out to him that one is not justified in the inference that there\nmust be a last half, although there be a last point A, for this last point\nbelongs to all the halves of its side. And my friend acknowledged it  [113]\nhimself when he endeavoured to prove this deduction by a formal argument;\non the contrary, just because the division goes on to infinity, there is no\nlast half. And although the straight line AB be finite, it does not follow\nthat the process of dividing it has any final end. The same confusion\narises with the series of numbers going on to infinity. One imagines a\nfinal end, a number that is infinite, or infinitely small; but that is all\nsimple fiction. Every number is finite and specific; every line is so\nlikewise, and the infinite or infinitely small signify only magnitudes that\none may take as great or as small as one wishes, to show that an error is\nsmaller than that which has been specified, that is to say, that there is\nno error; or else by the infinitely small is meant the state of a magnitude\nat its vanishing point or its beginning, conceived after the pattern of\nmagnitudes already actualized.\n\n71. It will, however, be well to consider the argument that M. Bayle puts\nforward to show that one cannot refute the objections which reason opposes\nto the Mysteries. It is in his comment on the Manichaeans (p. 3140 of the\nsecond edition of his _Dictionary_). 'It is enough for me', he says, 'that\nit be unanimously acknowledged that the Mysteries of the Gospel are above\nreason. For thence comes the necessary conclusion that it is impossible to\nsettle the difficulties raised by the philosophers, and in consequence that\na dispute where only the light of Nature is followed will always end\nunfavourably for the theologians, and that they will see themselves forced\nto give way and to take refuge in the canon of the supernatural light.' I\nam surprised that M. Bayle speaks in such general terms, since he has\nacknowledged himself that the light of Nature is against the Manichaeans,\nand for the oneness of the Principle, and that the goodness of God is\nproved incontrovertibly by reason. Yet this is how he continues:\n\n72. 'It is evident that reason can never attain to that which is above it.\nNow if it could supply answers to the objections which are opposed to the\ndogma of the Trinity and that of hypostatic union, it would attain to those\ntwo Mysteries, it would have them in subjection and submit them to the\nstrictest examination by comparison with its first principles, or with the\naphorisms that spring from common notions, and proceed until finally it had\ndrawn the conclusion that they are in accordance with natural light. It\nwould therefore do what exceeds its powers, it would soar above its   [114]\nconfines, and that is a formal contradiction. One must therefore say that\nit cannot provide answers to its own objections, and that thus they remain\nvictorious, so long as one does not have recourse to the authority of God\nand to the necessity of subjugating one's understanding to the obedience of\nfaith.' I do not find that there is any force in this reasoning. We can\nattain to that which is above us not by penetrating it but by maintaining\nit; as we can attain to the sky by sight, and not by touch. Nor is it\nnecessary that, in order to answer the objections which are made against\nthe Mysteries, one should have them in subjection to oneself, and submit\nthem to examination by comparison with the first principles that spring\nfrom common notions. For if he who answers the objections had to go so far,\nhe who proposes the objections needs must do it first. It is the part of\nthe objection to open up the subject, and it is enough for him who answers\nto say Yes or No. He is not obliged to counter with a distinction: it will\ndo, in case of need, if he denies the universality of some proposition in\nthe objection or criticizes its form, and one may do both these things\nwithout penetrating beyond the objection. When someone offers me a proof\nwhich he maintains is invincible, I can keep silence while I compel him\nmerely to prove in due form all the enunciations that he brings forward,\nand such as appear to me in the slightest degree doubtful. For the purpose\nof doubting only, I need not at all probe to the heart of the matter; on\nthe contrary, the more ignorant I am the more shall I be justified in\ndoubting. M. Bayle continues thus:\n\n73. 'Let us endeavour to clarify that. If some doctrines are above reason\nthey are beyond its reach, it cannot attain to them; if it cannot attain to\nthem, it cannot comprehend them.' (He could have begun here with the\n'comprehend', saying that reason cannot comprehend that which is above it.)\n'If it cannot comprehend them, it can find in them no idea' (_Non valet\nconsequentia_: for, to 'comprehend' something, it is not enough that one\nhave some ideas thereof; one must have all the ideas of everything that\ngoes to make it up, and all these ideas must be clear, distinct,\n_adequate_. There are a thousand objects in Nature in which we understand\nsomething, but which we do not therefore necessarily comprehend. We have\nsome ideas on the rays of light, we demonstrate upon them up to a certain\npoint; but there ever remains something which makes us confess that we do\nnot yet comprehend the whole nature of light.) 'nor any principle such[115]\nas may give rise to a solution;' (Why should not evident principles be\nfound mingled with obscure and confused knowledge?) 'and consequently the\nobjections that reason has made will remain unanswered;' (By no means; the\ndifficulty is rather on the side of the opposer. It is for him to seek an\nevident principle such as may give rise to some objection; and the more\nobscure the subject, the more trouble he will have in finding such a\nprinciple. Moreover, when he has found it he will have still more trouble\nin demonstrating an opposition between the principle and the Mystery: for,\nif it happened that the Mystery was evidently contrary to an evident\nprinciple, it would not be an obscure Mystery, it would be a manifest\nabsurdity.) 'or what is the same thing, answer will be made with some\ndistinction as obscure as the very thesis that will have been attacked.'\n(One can do without distinctions, if need be, by denying either some\npremiss or some conclusion; and when one is doubtful of the meaning of some\nterm used by the opposer one may demand of him its definition. Thus the\ndefender has no need to incommode himself when it is a question of\nanswering an adversary who claims that he is offering us an invincible\nproof. But even supposing that the defender, perchance being kindly\ndisposed, or for the sake of brevity, or because he feels himself strong\nenough, should himself vouchsafe to show the ambiguity concealed in the\nobjection, and to remove it by making some distinction, this distinction\nneed not of necessity lead to anything clearer than the first thesis, since\nthe defender is not obliged to elucidate the Mystery itself.)\n\n74. 'Now it is certain', so M. Bayle continues, 'that an objection which is\nfounded on distinct notions remains equally victorious, whether you give to\nit no answer, or you make an answer where none can comprehend anything. Can\nthe contest be equal between a man who alleges in objection to you that\nwhich you and he very clearly conceive, and you, who can only defend\nyourself by answers wherein neither of you understands anything?' (It is\nnot enough that the objection be founded on quite distinct notions, it is\nnecessary also that one apply it in contradiction of the thesis. And when I\nanswer someone by denying some premiss, in order to compel him to prove it,\nor some conclusion, to compel him to put it in good form, it cannot be said\nthat I answer nothing or that I answer nothing intelligible. For as it is\nthe doubtful premiss of the adversary that I deny, my denial will be  [116]\nas intelligible as his affirmation. Finally, when I am so obliging as to\nexplain myself by means of some distinction, it suffices that the terms I\nemploy have some meaning, as in the Mystery itself. Thus something in my\nanswer will be comprehended: but one need not of necessity comprehend all\nthat it involves; otherwise one would comprehend the Mystery also.)\n\n75. M. Bayle continues thus: 'Every philosophical dispute assumes that the\ndisputant parties agree on certain definitions' (This would be desirable,\nbut usually it is only in the dispute itself that one reaches such a point,\nif the necessity arises.) 'and that they admit the rules of Syllogisms, and\nthe signs for the recognition of bad arguments. After that everything lies\nin the investigation as to whether a thesis conforms mediately or\nimmediately to the principles one is agreed upon' (which is done by means\nof the syllogisms of him who makes objections); 'whether the premisses of a\nproof (advanced by the opposer) 'are true; whether the conclusion is\nproperly drawn; whether a four-term Syllogism has been employed; whether\nsome aphorism of the chapter _de oppositis_ or _de sophisticis elenchis_,\netc., has not been violated.' (It is enough, putting it briefly, to deny\nsome premiss or some conclusion, or finally to explain or get explained\nsome ambiguous term.) 'One comes off victorious either by showing that the\nsubject of dispute has no connexion with the principles which had been\nagreed upon' (that is to say, by showing that the objection proves nothing,\nand then the defender wins the case), 'or by reducing the defender to\nabsurdity' (when all the premisses and all the conclusions are well\nproved). 'Now one can reduce him to that point either by showing him that\nthe conclusions of his thesis are \"yes\" and \"no\" at once, or by\nconstraining him to say only intelligible things in answer.' (This last\nembarrassment he can always avoid, because he has no need to advance new\ntheses.) 'The aim in disputes of this kind is to throw light upon\nobscurities and to arrive at self-evidence.' (It is the aim of the opposer,\nfor he wishes to demonstrate that the Mystery is false; but this cannot\nhere be the aim of the defender, for in admitting Mystery he agrees that\none cannot demonstrate it.) 'This leads to the opinion that during the\ncourse of the proceedings victory sides more or less with the defender or\nwith the opposer, according to whether there is more or less clarity in the\npropositions of the one than in the propositions of the other.' (That [117]\nis speaking as if the defender and the opposer were equally unprotected;\nbut the defender is like a besieged commander, covered by his defence\nworks, and it is for the attacker to destroy them. The defender has no need\nhere of self-evidence, and he seeks it not: but it is for the opposer to\nfind it against him, and to break through with his batteries in order that\nthe defender may be no longer protected.)\n\n76. 'Finally, it is judged that victory goes against him whose answers are\nsuch that one comprehends nothing in them,' (It is a very equivocal sign of\nvictory: for then one must needs ask the audience if they comprehend\nanything in what has been said, and often their opinions would be divided.\nThe order of formal disputes is to proceed by arguments in due form and to\nanswer them by denying or making a distinction.) 'and who confesses that\nthey are incomprehensible.' (It is permitted to him who maintains the truth\nof a Mystery to confess that this mystery is incomprehensible; and if this\nconfession were sufficient for declaring him vanquished there would be no\nneed of objection. It will be possible for a truth to be incomprehensible,\nbut never so far as to justify the statement that one comprehends nothing\nat all therein. It would be in that case what the ancient Schools called\n_Scindapsus_ or _Blityri_ (Clem. Alex., _Stromateis_, 8), that is, words\ndevoid of meaning.) 'He is condemned thenceforth by the rules for awarding\nvictory; and even when he cannot be pursued in the mist wherewith he has\ncovered himself, and which forms a kind of abyss between him and his\nantagonists, he is believed to be utterly defeated, and is compared to an\narmy which, having lost the battle, steals away from the pursuit of the\nvictor only under cover of night.' (Matching allegory with allegory, I will\nsay that the defender is not vanquished so long as he remains protected by\nhis entrenchments; and if he risks some sortie beyond his need, it is\npermitted to him to withdraw within his fort, without being open to blame\nfor that.)\n\n77. I was especially at pains to analyse this long passage where M. Bayle\nhas put down his strongest and most skilfully reasoned statements in\nsupport of his opinion: and I hope that I have shown clearly how this\nexcellent man has been misled. That happens all too easily to the ablest\nand shrewdest persons when they give free rein to their wit without\nexercising the patience necessary for delving down to the very foundations\nof their systems. The details we have entered into here will serve as [118]\nanswer to some other arguments upon the subject which are dispersed through\nthe works of M. Bayle, as for instance when he says in his _Reply to the\nQuestions of a Provincial_ (vol. III, ch. 133, p. 685): 'To prove that one\nhas brought reason and religion into harmony one must show not only that\none has philosophic maxims favourable to our faith, but also that the\nparticular maxims cast up against us as not being consistent with our\nCatechism are in reality consistent with it in a clearly conceived way.' I\ndo not see that one has need of all that, unless one aspire to press\nreasoning as far as the _how_ of the Mystery. When one is content to uphold\nits truth, without attempting to render it comprehensible, one has no need\nto resort to philosophic maxims, general or particular, for the proof; and\nwhen another brings up some philosophic maxims against us, it is not for us\nto prove clearly and distinctly that these maxims are consistent with our\ndogma, but it is for our opponent to prove that they are contrary thereto.\n\n78. M. Bayle continues thus in the same passage: 'For this result we need\nan answer as clearly evident as the objection.' I have already shown that\nit is obtained when one denies the premisses, but that for the rest it is\nnot necessary for him who maintains the truth of the Mystery always to\nadvance evident propositions, since the principal thesis concerning the\nMystery itself is not evident. He adds further: 'If we must make reply and\nrejoinder, we must never rest in our positions, nor claim that we have\naccomplished our design, so long as our opponent shall make answer with\nthings as evident as our reasons can be.' But it is not for the defender to\nadduce reasons; it is enough for him to answer those of his opponent.\n\n79. Finally the author draws the conclusion: 'If it were claimed that, on\nmaking an evident objection, a man has to be satisfied with an answer which\nwe can only state as a thing possible though incomprehensible to us, that\nwould be unfair.' He repeats this in the posthumous Dialogues, against M.\nJacquelot, p. 69. I am not of this opinion. If the objection were\ncompletely evident, it would triumph, and the thesis would be overthrown.\nBut when the objection is only founded on appearances or on instances of\nthe most frequent occurrence, and when he who makes it desires to draw from\nit a universal and certain conclusion, he who upholds the Mystery may\nanswer with the instance of a bare possibility. For such an instance  [119]\nsuffices to show that what one wished to infer from the premisses, is\nneither certain nor general; and it suffices for him who upholds the\nMystery to maintain that it is possible, without having to maintain that it\nis probable. For, as I have often said, it is agreed that the Mysteries are\nagainst appearances. He who upholds the Mystery need not even adduce such\nan instance; and should he adduce it, it were indeed a work of\nsupererogation, or else an instrument of greater confusion to the\nadversary.\n\n80. There are passages of M. Bayle in the posthumous reply that he made to\nM. Jacquelot which seem to me still worthy of scrutiny. 'M. Bayle'\n(according to pp. 36, 37) 'constantly asserts in his _Dictionary_, whenever\nthe subject allows, that our reason is more capable of refuting and\ndestroying than of proving and building; that there is scarcely any\nphilosophical or theological matter in respect of which it does not create\ngreat difficulties. Thus', he says, 'if one desired to follow it in a\ndisputatious spirit, as far as it can go, one would often be reduced to a\nstate of troublesome perplexity; and in fine, there are doctrines certainly\ntrue, which it disputes with insoluble objections.' I think that what is\nsaid here in reproach of reason is to its advantage. When it overthrows\nsome thesis, it builds up the opposing thesis. And when it seems to be\noverthrowing the two opposing theses at the same time, it is then that it\npromises us something profound, provided that we follow it _as far as it\ncan go_, not in a disputatious spirit but with an ardent desire to search\nout and discover the truth, which will always be recompensed with a great\nmeasure of success.\n\n81. M. Bayle continues: 'that one must then ridicule these objections,\nrecognizing the narrow bounds of the human mind.' And I think, on the other\nhand, that one must recognize the signs of the force of the human mind,\nwhich causes it to penetrate into the heart of things. These are new\nopenings and, as it were, rays of the dawn which promises us a greater\nlight: I mean in philosophical subjects or those of natural theology. But\nwhen these objections are made against revealed faith it is enough that one\nbe able to repel them, provided that one do so in a submissive and zealous\nspirit, with intent to sustain and exalt the glory of God. And when we\nsucceed in respect of his justice, we shall likewise be impressed by his\ngreatness and charmed by his goodness, which will show themselves through\nthe clouds of a seeming reason that is deceived by outward            [120]\nappearances, in proportion as the mind is elevated by true reason to that\nwhich to us is invisible, but none the less sure.\n\n82. 'Thus' (to continue with M. Bayle) 'reason will be compelled to lay\ndown its arms, and to subjugate itself to the obedience of the faith, which\nit can and ought to do, in virtue of some of its most incontestable maxims.\nThus also in renouncing some of its other maxims it acts nevertheless in\naccordance with that which it is, that is to say, in reason.' But one must\nknow 'that such maxims of reason as must be renounced in this case are only\nthose which make us judge by appearances or according to the ordinary\ncourse of things.' This reason enjoins upon us even in philosophical\nsubjects, when there are invincible proofs to the contrary. It is thus\nthat, being made confident by demonstrations of the goodness and the\njustice of God, we disregard the appearances of harshness and injustice\nwhich we see in this small portion of his Kingdom that is exposed to our\ngaze. Hitherto we have been illumined by the _light of Nature_ and by that\nof _grace_, but not yet by that of _glory_. Here on earth we see apparent\ninjustice, and we believe and even know the truth of the hidden justice of\nGod; but we shall see that justice when at last the Sun of Justice shall\nshow himself as he is.\n\n83. It is certain that M. Bayle can only be understood as meaning those\nostensible maxims which must give way before the eternal verities; for he\nacknowledges that reason is not in reality contrary to faith. In these\nposthumous Dialogues he complains (p. 73, against M. Jacquelot) of being\naccused of the belief that our Mysteries are in reality against reason, and\n(p. 9, against M. le Clerc) of the assertion made that he who acknowledges\nthat a doctrine is exposed to irrefutable objections acknowledges also by a\nnecessary consequence the falsity of this doctrine. Nevertheless one would\nbe justified in the assertion if the irrefutability were more than an\noutward appearance.\n\n84. It may be, therefore, that having long contended thus against M. Bayle\non the matter of the use of reason I shall find after all that his opinions\nwere not fundamentally so remote from mine as his expressions, which have\nprovided matter for our considerations, have led one to believe. It is true\nthat frequently he appears to deny absolutely that one can ever answer the\nobjections of reason against faith, and that he asserts the necessity of\ncomprehending, in order to achieve such an end, how the Mystery comes [121]\nto be or exists. Yet there are passages where he becomes milder, and\ncontents himself with saying that the answers to these objections are\nunknown to him. Here is a very precise passage, taken from the excursus on\nthe Manichaeans, which is found at the end of the second edition of his\n_Dictionary_: 'For the greater satisfaction of the most punctilious\nreaders, I desire to declare here' (he says, p. 3148) 'that wherever the\nstatement is to be met with in my _Dictionary_ that such and such arguments\nare irrefutable I do not wish it to be taken that they are so in actuality.\nI mean naught else than that they appear to me irrefutable. That is of no\nconsequence: each one will be able to imagine, if he pleases, that if I\ndeem thus of a matter it is owing to my lack of acumen.' I do not imagine\nsuch a thing; his great acumen is too well known to me: but I think that,\nafter having applied his whole mind to magnifying the objections, he had\nnot enough attention left over for the purpose of answering them.\n\n85. M. Bayle confesses, moreover, in his posthumous work against M. le\nClerc, that the objections against faith have not the force of proofs. It\nis therefore _ad hominem_ only, or rather _ad homines_, that is, in\nrelation to the existing state of the human race, that he deems these\nobjections irrefutable and the subject unexplainable. There is even a\npassage where he implies that he despairs not of the possibility that the\nanswer or the explanation may be found, and even in our time. For here is\nwhat he says in his posthumous Reply to M. le Clerc (p. 35): 'M. Bayle\ndared to hope that his toil would put on their mettle some of those great\nmen of genius who create new systems, and that they could discover a\nsolution hitherto unknown.' It seems that by this 'solution' he means such\nan explanation of Mystery as would penetrate to the _how_: but that is not\nnecessary for replying to the objections.\n\n86. Many have undertaken to render this _how_ comprehensible, and to prove\nthe possibility of Mysteries. A certain writer named Thomas Bonartes\nNordtanus Anglus, in his _Concordia Scientiae cum Fide,_ claimed to do so.\nThis work seemed to me ingenious and learned, but crabbed and involved, and\nit even contains indefensible opinions. I learned from the _Apologia\nCyriacorum_ of the Dominican Father Vincent Baron that that book was\ncensured in Rome, that the author was a Jesuit, and that he suffered for\nhaving published it. The Reverend Father des Bosses, who now teaches\nTheology in the Jesuit College of Hildesheim, and who has combined    [122]\nrare erudition with great acumen, which he displays in philosophy and\ntheology, has informed me that the real name of Bonartes was Thomas Barton,\nand that after leaving the Society he retired to Ireland, where the manner\nof his death brought about a favourable verdict on his last opinions. I\npity the men of talent who bring trouble upon themselves by their toil and\ntheir zeal. Something of like nature happened in time past to Pierre\nAbelard, to Gilbert de la Porree, to John Wyclif, and in our day to the\nEnglishman Thomas Albius, as well as to some others who plunged too far\ninto the explanation of the Mysteries.\n\n87. St. Augustine, however (as well as M. Bayle), does not despair of the\npossibility that the desired solution may be found upon earth; but this\nFather believes it to be reserved for some holy man illumined by a peculiar\ngrace: 'Est aliqua causa fortassis occultior, quae melioribus\nsanctioribusque reservatur, illius gratia potius quam meritis illorum' (in\n_De Genesi ad Literam_, lib. 11, c. 4). Luther reserves the knowledge of\nthe Mystery of Election for the academy of heaven (lib. _De Servo\nArbitrio_, c. 174): 'Illic [Deus] gratiam et misericordiam spargit in\nindignos, his iram et severitatem spargit in immeritos; utrobique nimius et\niniquus apud homines, sed justus et verax apud se ipsum. Nam quomodo hoc\njustum sit ut indignos coronet, incomprehensibile est modo, videbimus\nautem, cum illuc venerimus, ubi jam non credetur, sed revelata facie\nvidebitur. Ita quomodo hoc justum sit, ut immeritos damnet,\nincomprehensibile est modo, creditur tamen, donec revelabitur filius\nhominis.' It is to be hoped that M. Bayle now finds himself surrounded by\nthat light which is lacking to us here below, since there is reason to\nsuppose that he was not lacking in good will.\n\n  VIRGIL\n    _Candidus insueti miratur limen Olympi,_\n    _Sub pedibusque videt nubes et sidera Daphnis._\n\n  LUCAN\n    _...Illic postquam se lumine vero_\n    _Implevit, stellasque vagas miratur et astra_\n    _Fixa polis, vidit quanta sub nocte jaceret_\n    _Nostra dies._\n\n                                                                      [123]\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nESSAYS ON THE JUSTICE OF GOD AND THE FREEDOM OF MAN IN THE ORIGIN OF EVIL\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nPART ONE\n\n1. Having so settled the rights of faith and of reason as rather to place\nreason at the service of faith than in opposition to it, we shall see how\nthey exercise these rights to support and harmonize what the light of\nnature and the light of revelation teach us of God and of man in relation\nto evil. The _difficulties_ are distinguishable into two classes. The one\nkind springs from man's freedom, which appears incompatible with the divine\nnature; and nevertheless freedom is deemed necessary, in order that man may\nbe deemed guilty and open to punishment. The other kind concerns the\nconduct of God, and seems to make him participate too much in the existence\nof evil, even though man be free and participate also therein. And this\nconduct appears contrary to the goodness, the holiness and the justice of\nGod, since God co-operates in evil as well physical as moral, and\nco-operates in each of them both morally and physically; and since it seems\nthat these evils are manifested in the order of nature as well as in that\nof grace, and in the future and eternal life as well as, nay, more than, in\nthis transitory life.\n\n2. To present these difficulties in brief, it must be observed that freedom\nis opposed, to all appearance, by determination or certainty of any kind\nwhatever; and nevertheless the common dogma of our philosophers states that\nthe truth of contingent futurities is determined. The foreknowledge of[124]\nGod renders all the future certain and determined, but his providence and\nhis foreordinance, whereon foreknowledge itself appears founded, do much\nmore: for God is not as a man, able to look upon events with unconcern and\nto suspend his judgement, since nothing exists save as a result of the\ndecrees of his will and through the action of his power. And even though\none leave out of account the co-operation of God, all is perfectly\nconnected in the order of things, since nothing can come to pass unless\nthere be a cause so disposed as to produce the effect, this taking place no\nless in voluntary than in all other actions. According to which it appears\nthat man is compelled to do the good and evil that he does, and in\nconsequence that he deserves therefor neither recompense nor chastisement:\nthus is the morality of actions destroyed and all justice, divine and\nhuman, shaken.\n\n3. But even though one should grant to man this freedom wherewith he arrays\nhimself to his own hurt, the conduct of God could not but provide matter\nfor a criticism supported by the presumptuous ignorance of men, who would\nwish to exculpate themselves wholly or in part at the expense of God. It is\nobjected that all the reality and what is termed the substance of the act\nin sin itself is a production of God, since all creatures and all their\nactions derive from him that reality they have. Whence one could infer not\nonly that he is the physical cause of sin, but also that he is its moral\ncause, since he acts with perfect freedom and does nothing without a\ncomplete knowledge of the thing and the consequences that it may have. Nor\nis it enough to say that God has made for himself a law to co-operate with\nthe wills or resolutions of man, whether we express ourselves in terms of\nthe common opinion or in terms of the system of occasional causes. Not only\nwill it be found strange that he should have made such a law for himself,\nof whose results he was not ignorant, but the principal difficulty is that\nit seems the evil will itself cannot exist without co-operation, and even\nwithout some predetermination, on his part, which contributes towards\nbegetting this will in man or in some other rational creature. For an\naction is not, for being evil, the less dependent on God. Whence one will\ncome at last to the conclusion that God does all, the good and the evil,\nindifferently; unless one pretend with the Manichaeans that there are two\nprinciples, the one good and the other evil. Moreover, according to the\ngeneral opinion of theologians and philosophers, conservation being a [125]\nperpetual creation, it will be said that man is perpetually created corrupt\nand erring. There are, furthermore, modern Cartesians who claim that God is\nthe sole agent, of whom created beings are only the purely passive organs;\nand M. Bayle builds not a little upon that idea.\n\n4. But even granting that God should co-operate in actions only with a\ngeneral co-operation, or even not at all, at least in those that are bad,\nit suffices, so it is said, to inculpate him and to render him the moral\ncause that nothing comes to pass without his permission. To say nothing of\nthe fall of the angels, he knows all that which will come to pass, if,\nhaving created man, he places him in such and such circumstances; and he\nplaces him there notwithstanding. Man is exposed to a temptation to which\nit is known that he will succumb, thereby causing an infinitude of\nfrightful evils, by which the whole human race will be infected and brought\nas it were into a necessity of sinning, a state which is named 'original\nsin'. Thus the world will be brought into a strange confusion, by this\nmeans death and diseases being introduced, with a thousand other\nmisfortunes and miseries that in general afflict the good and the bad;\nwickedness will even hold sway and virtue will be oppressed on earth, so\nthat it will scarce appear that a providence governs affairs. But it is\nmuch worse when one considers the life to come, since but a small number of\nmen will be saved and since all the rest will perish eternally. Furthermore\nthese men destined for salvation will have been withdrawn from the corrupt\nmass through an unreasoning election, whether it be said that God in\nchoosing them has had regard to their future actions, to their faith or to\ntheir works, or one claim that he has been pleased to give them these good\nqualities and these actions because he has predestined them to salvation.\nFor though it be said in the most lenient system that God wished to save\nall men, and though in the other systems commonly accepted it be granted,\nthat he has made his Son take human nature upon him to expiate their sins,\nso that all they who shall believe in him with a lively and final faith\nshall be saved, it still remains true that this lively faith is a gift of\nGod; that we are dead to all good works; that even our will itself must be\naroused by a prevenient grace, and that God gives us the power to will and\nto do. And whether that be done through a grace efficacious of itself, that\nis to say, through a divine inward motion which wholly determines our [126]\nwill to the good that it does; or whether there be only a sufficient grace,\nbut such as does not fail to attain its end, and to become efficacious in\nthe inward and outward circumstances wherein the man is and has been placed\nby God: one must return to the same conclusion that God is the final reason\nof salvation, of grace, of faith and of election in Jesus Christ. And be\nthe election the cause or the result of God's design to give faith, it\nstill remains true that he gives faith or salvation to whom he pleases,\nwithout any discernible reason for his choice, which falls upon but few\nmen.\n\n5. So it is a terrible judgement that God, giving his only Son for the\nwhole human race and being the sole author and master of the salvation of\nmen, yet saves so few of them and abandons all others to the devil his\nenemy, who torments them eternally and makes them curse their Creator,\nthough they have all been created to diffuse and show forth his goodness,\nhis justice and his other perfections. And this outcome inspires all the\nmore horror, as the sole cause why all these men are wretched to all\neternity is God's having exposed their parents to a temptation that he knew\nthey would not resist; as this sin is inherent and imputed to men before\ntheir will has participated in it; as this hereditary vice impels their\nwill to commit actual sins; and as countless men, in childhood or maturity,\nthat have never heard or have not heard enough of Jesus Christ, Saviour of\nthe human race, die before receiving the necessary succour for their\nwithdrawal from this abyss of sin. These men too are condemned to be for\never rebellious against God and plunged in the most horrible miseries, with\nthe wickedest of all creatures, though in essence they have not been more\nwicked than others, and several among them have perchance been less guilty\nthan some of that little number of elect, who were saved by a grace without\nreason, and who thereby enjoy an eternal felicity which they had not\ndeserved. Such in brief are the difficulties touched upon by sundry\npersons; but M. Bayle was one who insisted on them the most, as will appear\nsubsequently when we examine his passages. I think that now I have recorded\nthe main essence of these difficulties: but I have deemed it fitting to\nrefrain from some expressions and exaggerations which might have caused\noffence, while not rendering the objections any stronger.\n\n6. Let us now turn the medal and let us also point out what can be said in\nanswer to those objections; and here a course of explanation through  [127]\nfuller dissertation will be necessary: for many difficulties can be opened\nup in few words, but for their discussion one must dilate upon them. Our\nend is to banish from men the false ideas that represent God to them as an\nabsolute prince employing a despotic power, unfitted to be loved and\nunworthy of being loved. These notions are the more evil in relation to God\ninasmuch as the essence of piety is not only to fear him but also to love\nhim above all things: and that cannot come about unless there be knowledge\nof his perfections capable of arousing the love which he deserves, and\nwhich makes the felicity of those that love him. Feeling ourselves animated\nby a zeal such as cannot fail to please him, we have cause to hope that he\nwill enlighten us, and that he will himself aid us in the execution of a\nproject undertaken for his glory and for the good of men. A cause so good\ngives confidence: if there are plausible appearances against us there are\nproofs on our side, and I would dare to say to an adversary:\n\n  _Aspice, quam mage sit nostrum penetrabile telum._\n\n7. _God is the first reason of things_: for such things as are bounded, as\nall that which we see and experience, are contingent and have nothing in\nthem to render their existence necessary, it being plain that time, space\nand matter, united and uniform in themselves and indifferent to everything,\nmight have received entirely other motions and shapes, and in another\norder. Therefore one must seek the reason for the existence of the world,\nwhich is the whole assemblage of _contingent_ things, and seek it in the\nsubstance which carries with it the reason for its existence, and which in\nconsequence is _necessary_ and eternal. Moreover, this cause must be\nintelligent: for this existing world being contingent and an infinity of\nother worlds being equally possible, and holding, so to say, equal claim to\nexistence with it, the cause of the world must needs have had regard or\nreference to all these possible worlds in order to fix upon one of them.\nThis regard or relation of an existent substance to simple possibilities\ncan be nothing other than the _understanding_ which has the ideas of them,\nwhile to fix upon one of them can be nothing other than the act of the\n_will_ which chooses. It is the _power_ of this substance that renders its\nwill efficacious. Power relates to _being_, wisdom or understanding to\n_truth_, and will to _good_. And this intelligent cause ought to be\ninfinite in all ways, and absolutely perfect in _power_, in _wisdom_ and in\n_goodness_, since it relates to all that which is possible.           [128]\nFurthermore, since all is connected together, there is no ground for\nadmitting more than _one_. Its understanding is the source of _essences_,\nand its will is the origin of _existences_. There in few words is the proof\nof one only God with his perfections, and through him of the origin of\nthings.\n\n8. Now this supreme wisdom, united to a goodness that is no less infinite,\ncannot but have chosen the best. For as a lesser evil is a kind of good,\neven so a lesser good is a kind of evil if it stands in the way of a\ngreater good; and there would be something to correct in the actions of God\nif it were possible to do better. As in mathematics, when there is no\nmaximum nor minimum, in short nothing distinguished, everything is done\nequally, or when that is not possible nothing at all is done: so it may be\nsaid likewise in respect of perfect wisdom, which is no less orderly than\nmathematics, that if there were not the best (_optimum_) among all possible\nworlds, God would not have produced any. I call 'World' the whole\nsuccession and the whole agglomeration of all existent things, lest it be\nsaid that several worlds could have existed in different times and\ndifferent places. For they must needs be reckoned all together as one world\nor, if you will, as one Universe. And even though one should fill all times\nand all places, it still remains true that one might have filled them in\ninnumerable ways, and that there is an infinitude of possible worlds among\nwhich God must needs have chosen the best, since he does nothing without\nacting in accordance with supreme reason.\n\n9. Some adversary not being able to answer this argument will perchance\nanswer the conclusion by a counter-argument, saying that the world could\nhave been without sin and without sufferings; but I deny that then it would\nhave been _better_. For it must be known that all things are _connected_ in\neach one of the possible worlds: the universe, whatever it may be, is all\nof one piece, like an ocean: the least movement extends its effect there to\nany distance whatsoever, even though this effect become less perceptible in\nproportion to the distance. Therein God has ordered all things beforehand\nonce for all, having foreseen prayers, good and bad actions, and all the\nrest; and each thing _as an idea_ has contributed, before its existence, to\nthe resolution that has been made upon the existence of all things; so that\nnothing can be changed in the universe (any more than in a number) save its\nessence or, if you will, save its _numerical individuality_. Thus, if the\nsmallest evil that comes to pass in the world were missing in it, it  [129]\nwould no longer be this world; which, with nothing omitted and all\nallowance made, was found the best by the Creator who chose it.\n\n10. It is true that one may imagine possible worlds without sin and without\nunhappiness, and one could make some like Utopian or Sevarambian romances:\nbut these same worlds again would be very inferior to ours in goodness. I\ncannot show you this in detail. For can I know and can I present infinities\nto you and compare them together? But you must judge with me _ab effectu_,\nsince God has chosen this world as it is. We know, moreover, that often an\nevil brings forth a good whereto one would not have attained without that\nevil. Often indeed two evils have made one great good:\n\n  _Et si fata volunt, bina venena juvant_.\n\nEven so two liquids sometimes produce a solid, witness the spirit of wine\nand spirit of urine mixed by Van Helmont; or so do two cold and dark bodies\nproduce a great fire, witness an acid solution and an aromatic oil combined\nby Herr Hoffmann. A general makes sometimes a fortunate mistake which\nbrings about the winning of a great battle; and do they not sing on the eve\nof Easter, in the churches of the Roman rite:\n\n  _O certe necessarium Adae peccatum, quod Christi morte deletum est!_\n  _O felix culpa, quae talem ac tantum meruit habere Redemptorem!_\n\n11. The illustrious prelates of the Gallican church who wrote to Pope\nInnocent XII against Cardinal Sfondrati's book on predestination, being of\nthe principles of St. Augustine, have said things well fitted to elucidate\nthis great point. The cardinal appears to prefer even to the Kingdom of\nHeaven the state of children dying without baptism, because sin is the\ngreatest of evils, and they have died innocent of all actual sin. More will\nbe said of that below. The prelates have observed that this opinion is ill\nfounded. The apostle, they say (Rom. iii. 8), is right to disapprove of the\ndoing of evil that good may come, but one cannot disapprove that God,\nthrough his exceeding power, derive from the permitting of sins greater\ngoods than such as occurred before the sins. It is not that we ought to\ntake pleasure in sin, God forbid! but that we believe the same apostle when\nhe says (Rom. v. 20) that where sin abounded, grace did much more     [130]\nabound; and we remember that we have gained Jesus Christ himself by reason\nof sin. Thus we see that the opinion of these prelates tends to maintain\nthat a sequence of things where sin enters in may have been and has been,\nin effect, better than another sequence without sin.\n\n12. Use has ever been made of comparisons taken from the pleasures of the\nsenses when these are mingled with that which borders on pain, to prove\nthat there is something of like nature in intellectual pleasures. A little\nacid, sharpness or bitterness is often more pleasing than sugar; shadows\nenhance colours; and even a dissonance in the right place gives relief to\nharmony. We wish to be terrified by rope-dancers on the point of falling\nand we wish that tragedies shall well-nigh cause us to weep. Do men relish\nhealth enough, or thank God enough for it, without having ever been sick?\nAnd is it not most often necessary that a little evil render the good more\ndiscernible, that is to say, greater?\n\n13. But it will be said that evils are great and many in number in\ncomparison with the good: that is erroneous. It is only want of attention\nthat diminishes our good, and this attention must be given to us through\nsome admixture of evils. If we were usually sick and seldom in good health,\nwe should be wonderfully sensible of that great good and we should be less\nsensible of our evils. But is it not better, notwithstanding, that health\nshould be usual and sickness the exception? Let us then by our reflexion\nsupply what is lacking in our perception, in order to make the good of\nhealth more discernible. Had we not the knowledge of the life to come, I\nbelieve there would be few persons who, being at the point of death, were\nnot content to take up life again, on condition of passing through the same\namount of good and evil, provided always that it were not the same kind:\none would be content with variety, without requiring a better condition\nthan that wherein one had been.\n\n14. When one considers also the fragility of the human body, one looks in\nwonder at the wisdom and the goodness of the Author of Nature, who has made\nthe body so enduring and its condition so tolerable. That has often made me\nsay that I am not astonished men are sometimes sick, but that I am\nastonished they are sick so little and not always. This also ought to make\nus the more esteem the divine contrivance of the mechanism of animals,\nwhose Author has made machines so fragile and so subject to corruption[131]\nand yet so capable of maintaining themselves: for it is Nature which cures\nus rather than medicine. Now this very fragility is a consequence of the\nnature of things, unless we are to will that this kind of creature,\nreasoning and clothed in flesh and bones, be not in the world. But that, to\nall appearance, would be a defect which some philosophers of old would have\ncalled _vacuum formarum_, a gap in the order of species.\n\n15. Those whose humour it is to be well satisfied with Nature and with\nfortune and not to complain about them, even though they should not be the\nbest endowed, appear to me preferable to the other sort; for besides that\nthese complaints are ill founded, it is in effect murmuring against the\norders of providence. One must not readily be among the malcontents in the\nState where one is, and one must not be so at all in the city of God,\nwherein one can only wrongfully be of their number. The books of human\nmisery, such as that of Pope Innocent III, to me seem not of the most\nserviceable: evils are doubled by being given an attention that ought to be\naverted from them, to be turned towards the good which by far\npreponderates. Even less do I approve books such as that of Abbe Esprit,\n_On the Falsity of Human Virtues_, of which we have lately been given a\nsummary: for such a book serves to turn everything wrong side out, and\ncause men to be such as it represents them.\n\n16. It must be confessed, however, that there are disorders in this life,\nwhich appear especially in the prosperity of sundry evil men and in the\nmisfortune of many good people. There is a German proverb which even grants\nthe advantage to the evil ones, as if they were commonly the most\nfortunate:\n\n  _Je kruemmer Holz, je bessre Kruecke:_\n  _Je aerger Schalck, je groesser Gluecke._\n\nAnd it were to be desired that this saying of Horace should be true in our\neyes:\n\n  _Raro antecedentem scelestum_\n  _Deseruit pede poena claudo._\n\nYet it often comes to pass also, though this perchance not the most often,\n\n                                                                      [132]\n  _That in the world's eyes Heaven is justified,_\n\nand that one may say with Claudian:\n\n  _Abstulit hunc tandem Rufini poena tumultum,_\n  _Absolvitque deos..._\n\n17. But even though that should not happen here, the remedy is all prepared\nin the other life: religion and reason itself teach us that, and we must\nnot murmur against a respite which the supreme wisdom has thought fit to\ngrant to men for repentance. Yet there objections multiply on another side,\nwhen one considers salvation and damnation: for it appears strange that,\neven in the great future of eternity, evil should have the advantage over\ngood, under the supreme authority of him who is the sovereign good, since\nthere will be many that are called and few that are chosen or are saved. It\nis true that one sees from some lines of Prudentius (Hymn. ante Somnum),\n\n  _Idem tamen benignus_\n  _Ultor retundit iram,_\n  _Paucosque non piorum_\n  _Patitur perire in aevum,_\n\nthat divers men believed in his time that the number of those wicked enough\nto be damned would be very small. To some indeed it seems that men believed\nat that time in a sphere between Hell and Paradise; that this same\nPrudentius speaks as if he were satisfied with this sphere; that St.\nGregory of Nyssa also inclines in that direction, and that St. Jerome leans\ntowards the opinion according whereunto all Christians would finally be\ntaken into grace. A saying of St. Paul which he himself gives out as\nmysterious, stating that all Israel will be saved, has provided much food\nfor reflexion. Sundry pious persons, learned also, but daring, have revived\nthe opinion of Origen, who maintains that good will predominate in due\ntime, in all and everywhere, and that all rational creatures, even the bad\nangels, will become at last holy and blessed. The book of the eternal\nGospel, published lately in German and supported by a great and learned\nwork entitled [Greek: 'Apokatastasis panton], has caused much stir over\nthis great paradox. M. le Clerc also has ingeniously pleaded the cause of\nthe Origenists, but without declaring himself for them.\n\n                                                                      [133]\n18. There is a man of wit who, pushing my principle of harmony even to\narbitrary suppositions that I in no wise approve, has created for himself a\ntheology well-nigh astronomical. He believes that the present confusion in\nthis world below began when the Presiding Angel of the globe of the earth,\nwhich was still a sun (that is, a star that was fixed and luminous of\nitself) committed a sin with some lesser angels of his department, perhaps\nrising inopportunely against an angel of a greater sun; that\nsimultaneously, by the Pre-established Harmony of the Realms of Nature and\nof Grace, and consequently by natural causes occurring at the appointed\ntime, our globe was covered with stains, rendered opaque and driven from\nits place; which has made it become a wandering star or planet, that is, a\nSatellite of another sun, and even perhaps of that one whose superiority\nits angel refused to recognize; and that therein consists the fall of\nLucifer. Now the chief of the bad angels, who in Holy Scripture is named\nthe prince, and even the god of this world, being, with the angels of his\ntrain, envious of that rational animal which walks on the surface of this\nglobe, and which God has set up there perhaps to compensate himself for\ntheir fall, strives to render it accessary in their crimes and a\nparticipator in their misfortunes. Whereupon Jesus Christ came to save men.\nHe is the eternal Son of God, even as he is his only Son; but (according to\nsome ancient Christians, and according to the author of this hypothesis)\nhaving taken upon him at first, from the beginning of things, the most\nexcellent nature among created beings, to bring them all to perfection, he\nset himself amongst them: and this is the second filiation, whereby he is\nthe first-born of all creatures. This is he whom the Cabalists called Adam\nKadmon. Haply he had planted his tabernacle in that great sun which\nillumines us; but he came at last into this globe where we are, he was born\nof the Virgin, and took human nature upon him to save mankind from the\nhands of their enemy and his. And when the time of judgement shall draw\nnear, when the present face of our globe shall be about to perish, he will\nreturn to it in visible form, thence to withdraw the good, transplanting\nthem, it may be, into the sun, and to punish here the wicked with the\ndemons that have allured them; then the globe of the earth will begin to\nburn and will be perhaps a comet. This fire will last for aeons upon aeons.\nThe tail of the comet is intended by the smoke which will rise incessantly,\naccording to the Apocalypse, and this fire will be hell, or the second[134]\ndeath whereof Holy Scripture speaks. But at last hell will render up its\ndead, death itself will be destroyed; reason and peace will begin to hold\nsway again in the spirits that had been perverted; they will be sensible of\ntheir error, they will adore their Creator, and will even begin to love him\nall the more for seeing the greatness of the abyss whence they emerge.\nSimultaneously (by virtue of the _harmonic parallelism_ of the Realms of\nNature and of Grace) this long and great conflagration will have purged the\nearth's globe of its stains. It will become again a sun; its Presiding\nAngel will resume his place with the angels of his train; humans that were\ndamned shall be with them numbered amongst the good angels; this chief of\nour globe shall render homage to the Messiah, chief of created beings. The\nglory of this angel reconciled shall be greater than it was before his\nfall.\n\n  _Inque Deos iterum factorum lege receptus_\n  _Aureus aeternum noster regnabit Apollo._\n\nThe vision seemed to me pleasing, and worthy of a follower of Origen: but\nwe have no need of such hypothesis or fictions, where Wit plays a greater\npart than Revelation, and which even Reason cannot turn to account. For it\ndoes not appear that there is one principal place in the known universe\ndeserving in preference to the rest to be the seat of the eldest of created\nbeings; and the sun of our system at least is not it.\n\n19. Holding then to the established doctrine that the number of men damned\neternally will be incomparably greater than that of the saved, we must say\nthat the evil could not but seem to be almost as nothing in comparison with\nthe good, when one contemplates the true vastness of the city of God.\nCoelius Secundus Curio wrote a little book, _De Amplitudine Regni\nCoelestis_, which was reprinted not long since; but he is indeed far from\nhaving apprehended the compass of the kingdom of heaven. The ancients had\npuny ideas on the works of God, and St. Augustine, for want of knowing\nmodern discoveries, was at a loss when there was question of explaining the\nprevalence of evil. It seemed to the ancients that there was only one earth\ninhabited, and even of that men held the antipodes in dread: the remainder\nof the world was, according to them, a few shining globes and a few\ncrystalline spheres. To-day, whatever bounds are given or not given to the\nuniverse, it must be acknowledged that there is an infinite number of\nglobes, as great as and greater than ours, which have as much right as[135]\nit to hold rational inhabitants, though it follows not at all that they are\nhuman. It is only one planet, that is to say one of the six principal\nsatellites of our sun; and as all fixed stars are suns also, we see how\nsmall a thing our earth is in relation to visible things, since it is only\nan appendix of one amongst them. It may be that all suns are peopled only\nby blessed creatures, and nothing constrains us to think that many are\ndamned, for few instances or few samples suffice to show the advantage\nwhich good extracts from evil. Moreover, since there is no reason for the\nbelief that there are stars everywhere, is it not possible that there may\nbe a great space beyond the region of the stars? Whether it be the Empyrean\nHeaven, or not, this immense space encircling all this region may in any\ncase be filled with happiness and glory. It can be imagined as like the\nOcean, whither flow the rivers of all blessed creatures, when they shall\nhave reached their perfection in the system of the stars. What will become\nof the consideration of our globe and its inhabitants? Will it not be\nsomething incomparably less than a physical point, since our earth is as a\npoint in comparison with the distance of some fixed stars? Thus since the\nproportion of that part of the universe which we know is almost lost in\nnothingness compared with that which is unknown, and which we yet have\ncause to assume, and since all the evils that may be raised in objection\nbefore us are in this near nothingness, haply it may be that all evils are\nalmost nothingness in comparison with the good things which are in the\nuniverse.\n\n20. But it is necessary also to meet the more speculative and metaphysical\ndifficulties which have been mentioned, and which concern the cause of\nevil. The question is asked first of all, whence does evil come? _Si Deus\nest, unde malum? Si non est, unde bonum?_ The ancients attributed the cause\nof evil to _matter_, which they believed uncreate and independent of God:\nbut we, who derive all being from God, where shall we find the source of\nevil? The answer is, that it must be sought in the ideal nature of the\ncreature, in so far as this nature is contained in the eternal verities\nwhich are in the understanding of God, independently of his will. For we\nmust consider that there is an _original imperfection in the creature_\nbefore sin, because the creature is limited in its essence; whence ensues\nthat it cannot know all, and that it can deceive itself and commit other\nerrors. Plato said in _Timaeus_ that the world originated in          [136]\nUnderstanding united to Necessity. Others have united God and Nature. This\ncan be given a reasonable meaning. God will be the Understanding; and the\nNecessity, that is, the essential nature of things, will be the object of\nthe understanding, in so far as this object consists in the eternal\nverities. But this object is inward and abides in the divine understanding.\nAnd therein is found not only the primitive form of good, but also the\norigin of evil: the Region of the Eternal Verities must be substituted for\nmatter when we are concerned with seeking out the source of things.\n\nThis region is the ideal cause of evil (as it were) as well as of good:\nbut, properly speaking, the formal character of evil has no _efficient_\ncause, for it consists in privation, as we shall see, namely, in that which\nthe efficient cause does not bring about. That is why the Schoolmen are\nwont to call the cause of evil _deficient_.\n\n21. Evil may be taken metaphysically, physically and morally. _Metaphysical\nevil_ consists in mere imperfection, _physical evil_ in suffering, and\n_moral evil_ in sin. Now although physical evil and moral evil be not\nnecessary, it is enough that by virtue of the eternal verities they be\npossible. And as this vast Region of Verities contains all possibilities it\nis necessary that there be an infinitude of possible worlds, that evil\nenter into divers of them, and that even the best of all contain a measure\nthereof. Thus has God been induced to permit evil.\n\n22. But someone will say to me: why speak you to us of 'permitting'? Is it\nnot God that doeth the evil and that willeth it? Here it will be necessary\nto explain what 'permission' is, so that it may be seen how this term is\nnot employed without reason. But before that one must explain the nature of\nwill, which has its own degrees. Taking it in the general sense, one may\nsay that _will_ consists in the inclination to do something in proportion\nto the good it contains. This will is called _antecedent_ when it is\ndetached, and considers each good separately in the capacity of a good. In\nthis sense it may be said that God tends to all good, as good, _ad\nperfectionem simpliciter simplicem_, to speak like the Schoolmen, and that\nby an antecedent will. He is earnestly disposed to sanctify and to save all\nmen, to exclude sin, and to prevent damnation. It may even be said that\nthis will is efficacious _of itself (per se)_, that is, in such sort that\nthe effect would ensue if there were not some stronger reason to prevent\nit: for this will does not pass into final exercise (_ad summum conatum_),\nelse it would never fail to produce its full effect, God being the    [137]\nmaster of all things. Success entire and infallible belongs only to the\n_consequent will_, as it is called. This it is which is complete; and in\nregard to it this rule obtains, that one never fails to do what one wills,\nwhen one has the power. Now this consequent will, final and decisive,\nresults from the conflict of all the antecedent wills, of those which tend\ntowards good, even as of those which repel evil; and from the concurrence\nof all these particular wills comes the total will. So in mechanics\ncompound movement results from all the tendencies that concur in one and\nthe same moving body, and satisfies each one equally, in so far as it is\npossible to do all at one time. It is as if the moving body took equal\naccount of these tendencies, as I once showed in one of the Paris Journals\n(7 Sept. 1693), when giving the general law of the compositions of\nmovement. In this sense also it may be said that the antecedent will is\nefficacious in a sense and even effective with success.\n\n23. Thence it follows that God wills _antecedently_ the good and\n_consequently_ the best. And as for evil, God wills moral evil not at all,\nand physical evil or suffering he does not will absolutely. Thus it is that\nthere is no absolute predestination to damnation; and one may say of\nphysical evil, that God wills it often as a penalty owing to guilt, and\noften also as a means to an end, that is, to prevent greater evils or to\nobtain greater good. The penalty serves also for amendment and example.\nEvil often serves to make us savour good the more; sometimes too it\ncontributes to a greater perfection in him who suffers it, as the seed that\none sows is subject to a kind of corruption before it can germinate: this\nis a beautiful similitude, which Jesus Christ himself used.\n\n24. Concerning sin or moral evil, although it happens very often that it\nmay serve as a means of obtaining good or of preventing another evil, it is\nnot this that renders it a sufficient object of the divine will or a\nlegitimate object of a created will. It must only be admitted or\n_permitted_ in so far as it is considered to be a certain consequence of an\nindispensable duty: as for instance if a man who was determined not to\npermit another's sin were to fail of his own duty, or as if an officer on\nguard at an important post were to leave it, especially in time of danger,\nin order to prevent a quarrel in the town between two soldiers of the\ngarrison who wanted to kill each other.\n\n25. The rule which states, _non esse facienda mala, ut eveniant bona_, and\nwhich even forbids the permission of a moral evil with the end of     [138]\nobtaining a physical good, far from being violated, is here proved, and its\nsource and its reason are demonstrated. One will not approve the action of\na queen who, under the pretext of saving the State, commits or even permits\na crime. The crime is certain and the evil for the State is open to\nquestion. Moreover, this manner of giving sanction to crimes, if it were\naccepted, would be worse than a disruption of some one country, which is\nliable enough to happen in any case, and would perchance happen all the\nmore by reason of such means chosen to prevent it. But in relation to God\nnothing is open to question, nothing can be opposed to _the rule of the\nbest_, which suffers neither exception nor dispensation. It is in this\nsense that God permits sin: for he would fail in what he owes to himself,\nin what he owes to his wisdom, his goodness, his perfection, if he followed\nnot the grand result of all his tendencies to good, and if he chose not\nthat which is absolutely the best, notwithstanding the evil of guilt, which\nis involved therein by the supreme necessity of the eternal verities. Hence\nthe conclusion that God wills all good _in himself antecedently_, that he\nwills the best _consequently_ as an _end_, that he wills what is\nindifferent, and physical evil, sometimes as a _means_, but that he will\nonly permit moral evil as the _sine quo non_ or as a hypothetical necessity\nwhich connects it with the best. Therefore the _consequent will_ of God,\nwhich has sin for its object, is only _permissive_.\n\n26. It is again well to consider that moral evil is an evil so great only\nbecause it is a source of physical evils, a source existing in one of the\nmost powerful of creatures, who is also most capable of causing those\nevils. For an evil will is in its department what the evil principle of the\nManichaeans would be in the universe; and reason, which is an image of the\nDivinity, provides for evil souls great means of causing much evil. One\nsingle Caligula, one Nero, has caused more evil than an earthquake. An evil\nman takes pleasure in causing suffering and destruction, and for that there\nare only too many opportunities. But God being inclined to produce as much\ngood as possible, and having all the knowledge and all the power necessary\nfor that, it is impossible that in him there be fault, or guilt, or sin;\nand when he permits sin, it is wisdom, it is virtue.\n\n27. It is indeed beyond question that we must refrain from preventing the\nsin of others when we cannot prevent their sin without sinning ourselves.\nBut someone will perhaps bring up the objection that it is God himself[139]\nwho acts and who effects all that is real in the sin of the creature. This\nobjection leads us to consider the _physical co-operation_ of God with the\ncreature, after we have examined the _moral co-operation_, which was the\nmore perplexing. Some have believed, with the celebrated Durand de\nSaint-Pourcain and Cardinal Aureolus, the famous Schoolman, that the\nco-operation of God with the creature (I mean the physical cooperation) is\nonly general and mediate, and that God creates substances and gives them\nthe force they need; and that thereafter he leaves them to themselves, and\ndoes naught but conserve them, without aiding them in their actions. This\nopinion has been refuted by the greater number of Scholastic theologians,\nand it appears that in the past it met with disapproval in the writings of\nPelagius. Nevertheless a Capuchin named Louis Pereir of Dole, about the\nyear 1630, wrote a book expressly to revive it, at least in relation to\nfree actions. Some moderns incline thereto, and M. Bernier supports it in a\nlittle book on freedom and freewill. But one cannot say in relation to God\nwhat 'to conserve' is, without reverting to the general opinion. Also it\nmust be taken into account that the action of God in conserving should have\nsome reference to that which is conserved, according to what it is and to\nthe state wherein it is; thus his action cannot be general or\nindeterminate. These generalities are abstractions not to be found in the\ntruth of individual things, and the conservation of a man standing is\ndifferent from the conservation of a man seated. This would not be so if\nconservation consisted only in the act of preventing and warding off some\nforeign cause which could destroy that which one wishes to conserve; as\noften happens when men conserve something. But apart from the fact that we\nare obliged ourselves sometimes to maintain that which we conserve, we must\nbear in mind that conservation by God consists in the perpetual immediate\ninfluence which the dependence of creatures demands. This dependence\nattaches not only to the substance but also to the action, and one can\nperhaps not explain it better than by saying, with theologians and\nphilosophers in general, that it is a continued creation.\n\n28. The objection will be made that God therefore now creates man a sinner,\nhe that in the beginning created him innocent. But here it must be said,\nwith regard to the moral aspect, that God being supremely wise cannot fail\nto observe certain laws, and to act according to the rules, as well   [140]\nphysical as moral, that wisdom has made him choose. And the same reason\nthat has made him create man innocent, but liable to fall, makes him\nre-create man when he falls; for God's knowledge causes the future to be\nfor him as the present, and prevents him from rescinding the resolutions\nmade.\n\n29. As for physical co-operation, here one must consider the truth which\nhas made already so much stir in the Schools since St. Augustine declared\nit, that evil is a privation of being, whereas the action of God tends to\nthe positive. This answer is accounted a quibble, and even something\nchimerical in the minds of many people. But here is an instance somewhat\nsimilar, which will serve to disabuse them.\n\n30. The celebrated Kepler and M. Descartes (in his letters) after him have\nspoken of the 'natural inertia of bodies'; and it is something which may be\nregarded as a perfect image and even as a sample of the original limitation\nof creatures, to show that privation constitutes the formal character of\nthe imperfections and disadvantages that are in substance as well as in its\nactions. Let us suppose that the current of one and the same river carried\nalong with it various boats, which differ among themselves only in the\ncargo, some being laden with wood, others with stone, and some more, the\nothers less. That being so, it will come about that the boats most heavily\nladen will go more slowly than the others, provided it be assumed that the\nwind or the oar, or some other similar means, assist them not at all. It is\nnot, properly speaking, weight which is the cause of this retardation,\nsince the boats are going down and not upwards; but it is the same cause\nwhich also increases the weight in bodies that have greater density, which\nare, that is to say, less porous and more charged with matter that is\nproper to them: for the matter which passes through the pores, not\nreceiving the same movement, must not be taken into account. It is\ntherefore matter itself which originally is inclined to slowness or\nprivation of speed; not indeed of itself to lessen this speed, having once\nreceived it, since that would be action, but to moderate by its receptivity\nthe effect of the impression when it is to receive it. Consequently, since\nmore matter is moved by the same force of the current when the boat is more\nladen, it is necessary that it go more slowly; and experiments on the\nimpact of bodies, as well as reason, show that twice as much force    [141]\nmust be employed to give equal speed to a body of the same matter but of\ntwice the size. But that indeed would not be necessary if the matter were\nabsolutely indifferent to repose and to movement, and if it had not this\nnatural inertia whereof we have just spoken to give it a kind of repugnance\nto being moved. Let us now compare the force which the current exercises on\nboats, and communicates to them, with the action of God, who produces and\nconserves whatever is positive in creatures, and gives them perfection,\nbeing and force: let us compare, I say, the inertia of matter with the\nnatural imperfection of creatures, and the slowness of the laden boat with\nthe defects to be found in the qualities and the action of the creature;\nand we shall find that there is nothing so just as this comparison. The\ncurrent is the cause of the boat's movement, but not of its retardation;\nGod is the cause of perfection in the nature and the actions of the\ncreature, but the limitation of the receptivity of the creature is the\ncause of the defects there are in its action. Thus the Platonists, St.\nAugustine and the Schoolmen were right to say that God is the cause of the\nmaterial element of evil which lies in the positive, and not of the formal\nelement, which lies in privation. Even so one may say that the current is\nthe cause of the material element of the retardation, but not of the\nformal: that is, it is the cause of the boat's speed without being the\ncause of the limits to this speed. And God is no more the cause of sin than\nthe river's current is the cause of the retardation of the boat. Force also\nin relation to matter is as the spirit in relation to the flesh; the spirit\nis willing and the flesh is weak, and spirits act...\n\n  _quantum non noxia corpora tardant._\n\n31. There is, then, a wholly similar relation between such and such an\naction of God, and such and such a passion or reception of the creature,\nwhich in the ordinary course of things is perfected only in proportion to\nits 'receptivity', such is the term used. And when it is said that the\ncreature depends upon God in so far as it exists and in so far as it acts,\nand even that conservation is a continual creation, this is true in that\nGod gives ever to the creature and produces continually all that in it is\npositive, good and perfect, every perfect gift coming from the Father of\nlights. The imperfections, on the other hand, and the defects in operations\nspring from the original limitation that the creature could not but   [142]\nreceive with the first beginning of its being, through the ideal reasons\nwhich restrict it. For God could not give the creature all without making\nof it a God; therefore there must needs be different degrees in the\nperfection of things, and limitations also of every kind.\n\n32. This consideration will serve also to satisfy some modern philosophers\nwho go so far as to say that God is the only agent. It is true that God is\nthe only one whose action is pure and without admixture of what is termed\n'to suffer': but that does not preclude the creature's participation in\nactions, since _the action of the creature_ is a modification of the\nsubstance, flowing naturally from it and containing a variation not only in\nthe perfections that God has communicated to the creature, but also in the\nlimitations that the creature, being what it is, brings with it. Thus we\nsee that there is an actual distinction between the substance and its\nmodification or accidents, contrary to the opinion of some moderns and in\nparticular of the late Duke of Buckingham, who spoke of that in a little\n_Discourse on Religion_ recently reprinted. Evil is therefore like\ndarkness, and not only ignorance but also error and malice consist formally\nin a certain kind of privation. Here is an example of error which we have\nalready employed. I see a tower which from a distance appears round\nalthough it is square. The thought that the tower is what it appears to be\nflows naturally from that which I see; and when I dwell on this thought it\nis an affirmation, it is a false judgement; but if I pursue the\nexamination, if some reflexion causes me to perceive that appearances\ndeceive me, lo and behold, I abandon my error. To abide in a certain place,\nor not to go further, not to espy some landmark, these are privations.\n\n33. It is the same in respect of malice or ill will. The will tends towards\ngood in general, it must strive after the perfection that befits us, and\nthe supreme perfection is in God. All pleasures have within themselves some\nfeeling of perfection. But when one is limited to the pleasures of the\nsenses, or to other pleasures to the detriment of greater good, as of\nhealth, of virtue, of union with God, of felicity, it is in this privation\nof a further aspiration that the defect consists. In general perfection is\npositive, it is an absolute reality; defect is privative, it comes from\nlimitation and tends towards new privations. This saying is therefore as\ntrue as it is ancient: _bonum ex causa integra, malum ex quolibet defectu_;\nas also that which states: _malum causam habet non efficientem, sed   [143]\ndeficientem_. And I hope that the meaning of these axioms will be better\napprehended after what I have just said.\n\n34. The physical co-operation of God and of creatures with the will\ncontributes also to the difficulties existing in regard to freedom. I am of\nopinion that our will is exempt not only from constraint but also from\nnecessity. Aristotle has already observed that there are two things in\nfreedom, to wit, spontaneity and choice, and therein lies our mastery over\nour actions. When we act freely we are not being forced, as would happen if\nwe were pushed on to a precipice and thrown from top to bottom; and we are\nnot prevented from having the mind free when we deliberate, as would happen\nif we were given a draught to deprive us of discernment. There is\n_contingency_ in a thousand actions of Nature; but when there is no\njudgement in him who acts there is no _freedom_. And if we had judgement\nnot accompanied by any inclination to act, our soul would be an\nunderstanding without will.\n\n35. It is not to be imagined, however, that our freedom consists in an\nindetermination or an indifference of equipoise, as if one must needs be\ninclined equally to the side of yes and of no and in the direction of\ndifferent courses, when there are several of them to take. This equipoise\nin all directions is impossible: for if we were equally inclined towards\nthe courses A, B and C, we could not be equally inclined towards A and\ntowards not A. This equipoise is also absolutely contrary to experience,\nand in scrutinizing oneself one will find that there has always been some\ncause or reason inclining us towards the course taken, although very often\nwe be not aware of that which prompts us: just in the same way one is\nhardly aware why, on issuing from a door, one has placed the right foot\nbefore the left or the left before the right.\n\n36. But let us pass to the difficulties. Philosophers agree to-day that the\ntruth of contingent futurities is determinate, that is to say that\ncontingent futurities are future, or that they will be, that they will\nhappen: for it is as sure that the future will be, as it is sure that the\npast has been. It was true already a hundred years ago that I should write\nto-day, as it will be true after a hundred years that I have written. Thus\nthe contingent is not, because it is future, any the less contingent; and\n_determination_, which would be called certainty if it were known, is not\nincompatible with contingency. Often the certain and the determinate are\ntaken as one thing, because a determinate truth is capable of being   [144]\nknown: thus it may be said that determination is an objective certainty.\n\n37. This determination comes from the very nature of truth, and cannot\ninjure freedom: but there are other determinations taken from elsewhere,\nand in the first place from the foreknowledge of God, which many have held\nto be contrary to freedom. They say that what is foreseen cannot fail to\nexist, and they say so truly; but it follows not that what is foreseen is\nnecessary, for _necessary truth_ is that whereof the contrary is impossible\nor implies contradiction. Now this truth which states that I shall write\ntomorrow is not of that nature, it is not necessary. Yet supposing that God\nforesees it, it is necessary that it come to pass; that is, the consequence\nis necessary, namely, that it exist, since it has been foreseen; for God is\ninfallible. This is what is termed a _hypothetical necessity_. But our\nconcern is not this necessity: it is an _absolute necessity_ that is\nrequired, to be able to say that an action is necessary, that it is not\ncontingent, that it is not the effect of a free choice. Besides it is very\neasily seen that foreknowledge in itself adds nothing to the determination\nof the truth of contingent futurities, save that this determination is\nknown: and this does not augment the determination or the 'futurition' (as\nit is termed) of these events, that whereon we agreed at the outset.\n\n38. This answer is doubtless very correct. It is agreed that foreknowledge\nin itself does not make truth more determinate; truth is foreseen because\nit is determinate, because it is true; but it is not true because it is\nforeseen: and therein the knowledge of the future has nothing that is not\nalso in the knowledge of the past or of the present. But here is what an\nopponent will be able to say: I grant you that foreknowledge in itself does\nnot make truth more determinate, but it is the cause of the foreknowledge\nthat makes it so. For it needs must be that the foreknowledge of God have\nits foundation in the nature of things, and this foundation, making the\ntruth _predeterminate_, will prevent it from being contingent and free.\n\n39. It is this difficulty that has caused two parties to spring up, one of\nthe _predeterminators_, the other of the supporters of _mediate knowledge_.\nThe Dominicans and the Augustinians are for predetermination, the\nFranciscans and the modern Jesuits on the other hand are for mediate\nknowledge. These two parties appeared towards the middle of the sixteenth\ncentury and a little later. Molina himself, who is perhaps one of the [145]\nfirst, with Fonseca, to have systematized this point, and from whom the\nothers derived their name of Molinists, says in the book that he wrote on\nthe reconciliation of freewill with grace, about the year 1570, that the\nSpanish doctors (he means principally the Thomists), who had been writing\nthen for twenty years, finding no other way to explain how God could have a\ncertain knowledge of contingent futurities, had introduced predetermination\nas being necessary to free actions.\n\n40. As for himself, he thought to have found another way. He considers that\nthere are three objects of divine knowledge, the possibles, the actual\nevents and the conditional events that would happen in consequence of a\ncertain condition if it were translated into action. The knowledge of\npossibilities is what is called the 'knowledge of mere intelligence'; that\nof events occurring actually in the progress of the universe is called the\n'knowledge of intuition'. And as there is a kind of mean between the merely\npossible and the pure and absolute event, to wit, the conditional event, it\ncan be said also, according to Molina, that there is a mediate knowledge\nbetween that of intuition and that of intelligence. Instance is given of\nthe famous example of David asking the divine oracle whether the\ninhabitants of the town of Keilah, where he designed to shut himself in,\nwould deliver him to Saul, supposing that Saul should besiege the town. God\nanswered yes; whereupon David took a different course. Now some advocates\nof this mediate knowledge are of opinion that God, foreseeing what men\nwould do of their own accord, supposing they were placed in such and such\ncircumstances, and knowing that they would make ill use of their free will,\ndecrees to refuse them grace and favourable circumstances. And he may\njustly so decree, since in any case these circumstances and these aids\nwould not have served them aught. But Molina contents himself with finding\ntherein generally a reason for the decrees of God, founded on what the free\ncreature would do in such and such circumstances.\n\n41. I will not enter into all the detail of this controversy; it will\nsuffice for me to give one instance. Certain older writers, not acceptable\nto St. Augustine and his first disciples, appear to have had ideas somewhat\napproaching those of Molina. The Thomists and those who call themselves\ndisciples of St. Augustine (but whom their opponents call Jansenists)\ncombat this doctrine on philosophical and theological grounds. Some   [146]\nmaintain that mediate knowledge must be included in the knowledge of mere\nintelligence. But the principal objection is aimed at the foundation of\nthis knowledge. For what foundation can God have for seeing what the people\nof Keilah would do? A simple contingent and free act has nothing in itself\nto yield a principle of certainty, unless one look upon it as predetermined\nby the decrees of God, and by the causes that are dependent upon them.\nConsequently the difficulty existing in actual free actions will exist also\nin conditional free actions, that is to say, God will know them only under\nthe condition of their causes and of his decrees, which are the first\ncauses of things: and it will not be possible to separate such actions from\nthose causes so as to know a contingent event in a way that is independent\nof the knowledge of its causes. Therefore all must of necessity be traced\nback to the predetermination of God's decrees, and this mediate knowledge\n(so it will be said) will offer no remedy. The theologians who profess to\nbe adherents of St. Augustine claim also that the system of the Molinists\nwould discover the source of God's grace in the good qualities of man, and\nthis they deem an infringement of God's honour and contrary to St. Paul's\nteaching.\n\n42. It would be long and wearisome to enter here into the replies and\nrejoinders coming from one side and the other, and it will suffice for me\nto explain how I conceive that there is truth on both sides. For this\nresult I resort to my principle of an infinitude of possible worlds,\nrepresented in the region of eternal verities, that is, in the object of\nthe divine intelligence, where all conditional futurities must be\ncomprised. For the case of the siege of Keilah forms part of a possible\nworld, _which differs from ours only in all that is connected with this\nhypothesis_, and the idea of this possible world represents that which\nwould happen in this case. Thus we have a principle for the certain\nknowledge of contingent futurities, whether they happen actually or must\nhappen in a certain case. For in the region of the possibles they are\nrepresented as they are, namely, as free contingencies. Therefore neither\nthe foreknowledge of contingent futurities nor the foundation for the\ncertainty of this foreknowledge should cause us perplexity or seem to\nprejudice freedom. And though it were true and possible that contingent\nfuturities consisting in free actions of reasonable creatures were entirely\nindependent of the decrees of God and of external causes, there would [147]\nstill be means of foreseeing them; for God would see them as they are in\nthe region of the possibles, before he decrees to admit them into\nexistence.\n\n43. But if the foreknowledge of God has nothing to do with the dependence\nor independence of our free actions, it is not so with the foreordinance of\nGod, his decrees, and the sequence of causes which, as I believe, always\ncontribute to the determination of the will. And if I am for the Molinists\nin the first point, I am for the predeterminators in the second, provided\nalways that predetermination be taken as not necessitating. In a word, I am\nof opinion that the will is always more inclined towards the course it\nadopts, but that it is never bound by the necessity to adopt it. That it\nwill adopt this course is certain, but it is not necessary. The case\ncorresponds to that of the famous saying, _Astra inclinant, non\nnecessitant_, although here the similarity is not complete. For the event\ntowards which the stars tend (to speak with the common herd, as if there\nwere some foundation for astrology) does not always come to pass, whereas\nthe course towards which the will is more inclined never fails to be\nadopted. Moreover the stars would form only a part of the inclinations that\nco-operate in the event, but when one speaks of the greater inclination of\nthe will, one speaks of the result of all the inclinations. It is almost as\nwe have spoken above of the consequent will in God, which results from all\nthe antecedent wills.\n\n44. Nevertheless, objective certainty or determination does not bring about\nthe necessity of the determinate truth. All philosophers acknowledge this,\nasserting that the truth of contingent futurities is determinate, and that\nnevertheless they remain contingent. The thing indeed would imply no\ncontradiction in itself if the effect did not follow; and therein lies\ncontingency. The better to understand this point, we must take into account\nthat there are two great principles of our arguments. The one is the\nprinciple of _contradiction_, stating that of two contradictory\npropositions the one is true, the other false; the other principle is that\nof the _determinant reason_: it states that nothing ever comes to pass\nwithout there being a cause or at least a reason determining it, that is,\nsomething to give an _a priori_ reason why it is existent rather than\nnon-existent, and in this wise rather than in any other. This great\nprinciple holds for all events, and a contrary instance will never be\nsupplied: and although more often than not we are insufficiently      [148]\nacquainted with these determinant reasons, we perceive nevertheless that\nthere are such. Were it not for this great principle we could never prove\nthe existence of God, and we should lose an infinitude of very just and\nvery profitable arguments whereof it is the foundation; moreover, it\nsuffers no exception, for otherwise its force would be weakened. Besides,\nnothing is so weak as those systems where all is unsteady and full of\nexceptions. That fault cannot be laid to the charge of the system I\napprove, where everything happens in accordance with general rules that at\nmost are mutually restrictive.\n\n45. We must therefore not imagine with some Schoolmen, whose ideas tend\ntowards the chimerical, that free contingent futurities have the privilege\nof exemption from this general rule of the nature of things. There is\nalways a prevailing reason which prompts the will to its choice, and for\nthe maintenance of freedom for the will it suffices that this reason should\nincline without necessitating. That is also the opinion of all the\nancients, of Plato, of Aristotle, of St. Augustine. The will is never\nprompted to action save by the representation of the good, which prevails\nover the opposite representations. This is admitted even in relation to\nGod, the good angels and the souls in bliss: and it is acknowledged that\nthey are none the less free in consequence of that. God fails not to choose\nthe best, but he is not constrained so to do: nay, more, there is no\nnecessity in the object of God's choice, for another sequence of things is\nequally possible. For that very reason the choice is free and independent\nof necessity, because it is made between several possibles, and the will is\ndetermined only by the preponderating goodness of the object. This is\ntherefore not a defect where God and the saints are concerned: on the\ncontrary, it would be a great defect, or rather a manifest absurdity, were\nit otherwise, even in men here on earth, and if they were capable of acting\nwithout any inclining reason. Of such absurdity no example will ever be\nfound; and even supposing one takes a certain course out of caprice, to\ndemonstrate one's freedom, the pleasure or advantage one thinks to find in\nthis conceit is one of the reasons tending towards it.\n\n46. There is therefore a freedom of contingency or, in a way, of\nindifference, provided that by 'indifference' is understood that nothing\nnecessitates us to one course or the other; but there is never any\n_indifference of equipoise_, that is, where all is completely even on [149]\nboth sides, without any inclination towards either. Innumerable great and\nsmall movements, internal and external, co-operate with us, for the most\npart unperceived by us. And I have already said that when one leaves a room\nthere are such and such reasons determining us to put the one foot first,\nwithout pausing to reflect. For there is not everywhere a slave, as in\nTrimalchio's house in Petronius, to cry to us: the right foot first. All\nthat we have just said agrees entirely also with the maxims of the\nphilosophers, who teach that a cause cannot act without having a\ndisposition towards action. It is this disposition which contains a\npredetermination, whether the doer have received it from without, or have\nhad it in consequence of his own antecedent character.\n\n47. Thus we have no need to resort, in company with some new Thomists, to a\nnew immediate predetermination by God, such as may cause the free creature\nto abandon his indifference, and to a decree of God for predetermining the\ncreature, making it possible for God to know what the creature will do: for\nit suffices that the creature be predetermined by its preceding state,\nwhich inclines it to one course more than to the other. Moreover, all these\nconnexions of the actions of the creature and of all creatures were\nrepresented in the divine understanding, and known to God through the\nknowledge of mere intelligence, before he had decreed to give them\nexistence. Thus we see that, in order to account for the foreknowledge of\nGod, one may dispense with both the mediate knowledge of the Molinists and\nthe predetermination which a Banez or an Alvarez (writers otherwise of\ngreat profundity) have taught.\n\n48. By this false idea of an indifference of equipoise the Molinists were\nmuch embarrassed. They were asked not only how it was possible to know in\nwhat direction a cause absolutely indeterminate would be determined, but\nalso how it was possible that there should finally result therefrom a\ndetermination for which there is no source: to say with Molina that it is\nthe privilege of the free cause is to say nothing, but simply to grant that\ncause the privilege of being chimerical. It is pleasing to see their\nharassed efforts to emerge from a labyrinth whence there is absolutely no\nmeans of egress. Some teach that the will, before it is determined\nformally, must be determined virtually, in order to emerge from its state\nof equipoise; and Father Louis of Dole, in his book on the _Co-operation of\nGod_, quotes Molinists who attempt to take refuge in this expedient:  [150]\nfor they are compelled to acknowledge that the cause must needs be disposed\nto act. But they gain nothing, they only defer the difficulty: for they\nwill still be asked how the free cause comes to be determined virtually.\nThey will therefore never extricate themselves without acknowledging that\nthere is a predetermination in the preceding state of the free creature,\nwhich inclines it to be determined.\n\n49. In consequence of this, the case also of Buridan's ass between two\nmeadows, impelled equally towards both of them, is a fiction that cannot\noccur in the universe, in the order of Nature, although M. Bayle be of\nanother opinion. It is true that, if the case were possible, one must say\nthat the ass would starve himself to death: but fundamentally the question\ndeals in the impossible, unless it be that God bring the thing about\nexpressly. For the universe cannot be halved by a plane drawn through the\nmiddle of the ass, which is cut vertically through its length, so that all\nis equal and alike on both sides, in the manner wherein an ellipse, and\nevery plane figure of the number of those I term 'ambidexter', can be thus\nhalved, by any straight line passing through its centre. Neither the parts\nof the universe nor the viscera of the animal are alike nor are they evenly\nplaced on both sides of this vertical plane. There will therefore always be\nmany things in the ass and outside the ass, although they be not apparent\nto us, which will determine him to go on one side rather than the other.\nAnd although man is free, and the ass is not, nevertheless for the same\nreason it must be true that in man likewise the case of a perfect equipoise\nbetween two courses is impossible. Furthermore it is true that an angel, or\nGod certainly, could always account for the course man has adopted, by\nassigning a cause or a predisposing reason which has actually induced him\nto adopt it: yet this reason would often be complex and incomprehensible to\nourselves, because the concatenation of causes linked together is very\nlong.\n\n50. Hence it is that the reason M. Descartes has advanced to prove the\nindependence of our free actions, by what he terms an intense inward\nsensation, has no force. We cannot properly speaking be sensible of our\nindependence, and we are not aware always of the causes, often\nimperceptible, whereon our resolution depends. It is as though the magnetic\nneedle took pleasure in turning towards the north: for it would think that\nit was turning independently of any other cause, not being aware of the\nimperceptible movements of the magnetic matter. Nevertheless we shall [151]\nsee later in what sense it is quite true that the human soul is altogether\nits own natural principle in relation to its actions, dependent upon itself\nand independent of all other creatures.\n\n51. As for _volition_ itself, to say that it is an object of free will is\nincorrect. We will to act, strictly speaking, and we do not will to will;\nelse we could still say that we will to have the will to will, and that\nwould go on to infinity. Besides, we do not always follow the latest\njudgement of practical understanding when we resolve to will; but we always\nfollow, in our willing, the result of all the inclinations that come from\nthe direction both of reasons and passions, and this often happens without\nan express judgement of the understanding.\n\n52. All is therefore certain and determined beforehand in man, as\neverywhere else, and the human soul is a kind of _spiritual automaton_,\nalthough contingent actions in general and free action in particular are\nnot on that account necessary with an absolute necessity, which would be\ntruly incompatible with contingency. Thus neither futurition in itself,\ncertain as it is, nor the infallible prevision of God, nor the\npredetermination either of causes or of God's decrees destroys this\ncontingency and this freedom. That is acknowledged in respect of futurition\nand prevision, as has already been set forth. Since, moreover, God's decree\nconsists solely in the resolution he forms, after having compared all\npossible worlds, to choose that one which is the best, and bring it into\nexistence together with all that this world contains, by means of the\nall-powerful word _Fiat_, it is plain to see that this decree changes\nnothing in the constitution of things: God leaves them just as they were in\nthe state of mere possibility, that is, changing nothing either in their\nessence or nature, or even in their accidents, which are represented\nperfectly already in the idea of this possible world. Thus that which is\ncontingent and free remains no less so under the decrees of God than under\nhis prevision.\n\n53. But could God himself (it will be said) then change nothing in the\nworld? Assuredly he could not now change it, without derogation to his\nwisdom, since he has foreseen the existence of this world and of what it\ncontains, and since, likewise, he has formed this resolution to bring it\ninto existence: for he cannot be mistaken nor repent, and it did not behove\nhim to from an imperfect resolution applying to one part and not the  [152]\nwhole. Thus, all being ordered from the beginning, it is only because of\nthis hypothetical necessity, recognized by everyone, that after God's\nprevision or after his resolution nothing can be changed: and yet the\nevents in themselves remain contingent. For (setting aside this supposition\nof the futurition of the thing and of the prevision or of the resolution of\nGod, a supposition which already lays it down as a fact that the thing will\nhappen, and in accordance with which one must say, 'Unumquodque, quando\nest, oportet esse, aut unumquodque, siquidem erit, oportet futurum esse'),\nthe event has nothing in it to render it necessary and to suggest that no\nother thing might have happened in its stead. And as for the connexion\nbetween causes and effects, it only inclined, without necessitating, the\nfree agency, as I have just explained; thus it does not produce even a\nhypothetical necessity, save in conjunction with something from outside, to\nwit, this very maxim, that the prevailing inclination always triumphs.\n\n54. It will be said also that, if all is ordered, God cannot then perform\nmiracles. But one must bear in mind that the miracles which happen in the\nworld were also enfolded and represented as possible in this same world\nconsidered in the state of mere possibility; and God, who has since\nperformed them, when he chose this world had even then decreed to perform\nthem. Again the objection will be made that vows and prayers, merits and\ndemerits, good and bad actions avail nothing, since nothing can be changed.\nThis objection causes most perplexity to people in general, and yet it is\npurely a sophism. These prayers, these vows, these good or bad actions that\noccur to-day were already before God when he formed the resolution to order\nthings. Those things which happen in this existing world were represented,\nwith their effects and their consequences, in the idea of this same world,\nwhile it was still possible only; they were represented therein, attracting\nGod's grace whether natural or supernatural, requiring punishments or\nrewards, just as it has happened actually in this world since God chose it.\nThe prayer or the good action were even then an _ideal cause_ or\n_condition_, that is, an inclining reason able to contribute to the grace\nof God, or to the reward, as it now does in reality. Since, moreover, all\nis wisely connected together in the world, it is clear that God, foreseeing\nthat which would happen freely, ordered all other things on that basis\nbeforehand, or (what is the same) he chose that possible world in     [153]\nwhich everything was ordered in this fashion.\n\n55. This consideration demolishes at the same time what the ancients called\nthe 'Lazy Sophism' ([Greek: logos argos]) which ended in a decision to do\nnothing: for (people would say) if what I ask is to happen it will happen\neven though I should do nothing; and if it is not to happen it will never\nhappen, no matter what trouble I take to achieve it. This necessity,\nsupposedly existent in events, and detached from their causes, might be\ntermed _Fatum Mahometanum_, as I have already observed above, because a\nsimilar line of reasoning, so it is said, causes the Turks not to shun\nplaces ravaged by plague. But the answer is quite ready: the effect being\ncertain, the cause that shall produce it is certain also; and if the effect\ncomes about it will be by virtue of a proportionate cause. Thus your\nlaziness perchance will bring it about that you will obtain naught of what\nyou desire, and that you will fall into those misfortunes which you would\nby acting with care have avoided. We see, therefore, that the _connexion of\ncauses with effects_, far from causing an unendurable fatality, provides\nrather a means of obviating it. There is a German proverb which says that\ndeath will ever have a cause; and nothing is so true. You will die on that\nday (let us presume it is so, and that God foresees it): yes, without\ndoubt; but it will be because you will do what shall lead you thither. It\nis likewise with the chastisements of God, which also depend upon their\ncauses. And it will be apposite in this connexion to quote this famous\npassage from St. Ambrose (in cap. I _Lucae_), 'Novit Dominus mutare\nsententiam, si tu noveris mutare delictum', which is not to be understood\nas of reprobation, but of denunciation, such as that which Jonah dealt out\nfor God to the Ninevites. This common saying: 'Si non es praedestinatus,\nfac ut praedestineris', must not be taken literally, its true sense being\nthat he who has doubts of his predestination need only do what is required\nfor him to obtain it by the grace of God. The sophism which ends in a\ndecision to trouble oneself over nothing will haply be useful sometimes to\ninduce certain people to face danger fearlessly. It has been applied in\nparticular to Turkish soldiers: but it seems that hashish is a more\nimportant factor than this sophism, not to mention the fact that this\nresolute spirit in the Turks has greatly belied itself in our days.\n\n56. A learned physician of Holland named Johan van Beverwyck took the\ntrouble to write _De Termino Vitae_ and to collect sundry answers,    [154]\nletters and discourses of some learned men of his time on this subject.\nThis collection has been printed, and it is astonishing to see there how\noften people are misled, and how they have confused a problem which,\nproperly speaking, is the easiest in the world. After that it is no wonder\nthat there are very many doubts which the human race cannot abandon. The\ntruth is that people love to lose themselves, and this is a kind of ramble\nof the mind, which is unwilling to subject itself to attention, to order,\nto rules. It seems as though we are so accustomed to games and jesting that\nwe play the fool even in the most serious occupations, and when we least\nthink to do so.\n\n57. I fear that in the recent dispute between the theologians of the\nAugsburg Confession, _De Termino Paenitentiae Peremptorio_, which has\ncalled forth so many treatises in Germany, some misunderstanding, though of\na different nature, has slipped in. The terms prescribed by the laws are\namongst lawyers known as _fatalia_. It may be said, in a sense, that the\n_peremptory term_, prescribed to man for his repentance and amendment, is\ncertain in the sight of God, with whom all is certain. God knows when a\nsinner will be so hardened that thereafter nothing can be done for him: not\nindeed that it would be impossible for him to do penance or that sufficient\ngrace needs must be refused to him after a certain term, a grace that never\nfails; but because there will be a time whereafter he will no more approach\nthe ways of salvation. But we never have certain marks for recognizing this\nterm, and we are never justified in considering a man utterly abandoned:\nthat would be to pass a rash judgement. It were better always to have room\nfor hope; and this is an occasion, with a thousand others, where our\nignorance is beneficial.\n\n  _Prudens futuri temporis exitum_\n  _Caliginosa nocte premit Deus_.\n\n58. The whole future is doubtless determined: but since we know not what it\nis, nor what is foreseen or resolved, we must do our duty, according to the\nreason that God has given us and according to the rules that he has\nprescribed for us; and thereafter we must have a quiet mind, and leave to\nGod himself the care for the outcome. For he will never fail to do that\nwhich shall be the best, not only in general but also in particular, for\nthose who have true confidence in him, that is, a confidence composed [155]\nof true piety, a lively faith and fervent charity, by virtue of which we\nwill, as far as in us lies, neglect nothing appertaining to our duty and\nhis service. It is true that we cannot 'render service' to him, for he has\nneed of nothing: but it is 'serving him', in our parlance, when we strive\nto carry out his presumptive will, co-operating in the good as it is known\nto us, wherever we can contribute thereto. For we must always presume that\nGod is prompted towards the good we know, until the event shows us that he\nhad stronger reasons, although perhaps unknown to us, which have made him\nsubordinate this good that we sought to some other greater good of his own\ndesigning, which he has not failed or will not fail to effect.\n\n59. I have just shown how the action of the will depends upon its causes;\nthat there is nothing so appropriate to human nature as this dependence of\nour actions; and that otherwise one would slip into a preposterous and\nunendurable fatality, namely into the _Fatum Mahometanum_, which is the\nworst of all because it overthrows foresight and good counsel. It is well\nto show, notwithstanding, how this dependence of voluntary actions does not\nfundamentally preclude the existence within us of a wonderful\n_spontaneity_, which in a certain sense makes the soul in its resolves\nindependent of the physical influence of all other creatures. This\nspontaneity, hitherto little recognized, which exalts our command over our\nactions to the highest pitch, is a consequence of the System of\nPre-established Harmony, of which I must give some explanation here. The\nScholastic philosophers believed that there was a reciprocal physical\ninfluence between body and soul: but since it has been recognized that\nthought and dimensional mass have no mutual connexion, and that they are\ncreatures differing _toto genere_, many moderns have acknowledged that\nthere is no _physical communication_ between soul and body, despite the\n_metaphysical communication_ always subsisting, which causes soul and body\nto compose one and the same _suppositum_, or what is called a person. This\nphysical communication, if there were such, would cause the soul to change\nthe degree of speed and the directional line of some motions that are in\nthe body, and _vice versa_ the body to change the sequence of the thoughts\nthat are in the soul. But this effect cannot be inferred from any notion\nconceived in the body and in the soul; though nothing be better known to us\nthan the soul, since it is inmost to us, that is to say inmost to itself.\n\n                                                                      [156]\n60. M. Descartes wished to compromise and to make a part of the body's\naction dependent upon the soul. He believed in the existence of a rule of\nNature to the effect, according to him, that the same quantity of movement\nis conserved in bodies. He deemed it not possible that the influence of the\nsoul should violate this law of bodies, but he believed that the soul\nnotwithstanding might have power to change the direction of the movements\nthat are made in the body; much as a rider, though giving no force to the\nhorse he mounts, nevertheless controls it by guiding that force in any\ndirection he pleases. But as that is done by means of the bridle, the bit,\nthe spurs and other material aids, it is conceivable how that can be; there\nare, however, no instruments such as the soul may employ for this result,\nnothing indeed either in the soul or in the body, that is, either in\nthought or in the mass, which may serve to explain this change of the one\nby the other. In a word, that the soul should change the quantity of force\nand that it should change the line of direction, both these things are\nequally inexplicable.\n\n61. Moreover, two important truths on this subject have been discovered\nsince M. Descartes' day. The first is that the quantity of absolute force\nwhich is in fact conserved is different from the quantity of movement, as I\nhave demonstrated elsewhere. The second discovery is that the same\ndirection is still conserved in all bodies together that are assumed as\ninteracting, in whatever way they come into collision. If this rule had\nbeen known to M. Descartes, he would have taken the direction of bodies to\nbe as independent of the soul as their force; and I believe that that would\nhave led direct to the Hypothesis of Pre-established Harmony, whither these\nsame rules have led me. For apart from the fact that the physical influence\nof one of these substances on the other is inexplicable, I recognized that\nwithout a complete derangement of the laws of Nature the soul could not act\nphysically upon the body. And I did not believe that one could here listen\nto philosophers, competent in other respects, who produce a God, as it\nwere, _ex machina_, to bring about the final solution of the piece,\nmaintaining that God exerts himself deliberately to move bodies as the soul\npleases, and to give perceptions to the soul as the body requires. For this\nsystem, which is called that of _occasional causes_ (because it teaches\nthat God acts on the body at the instance of the soul, and _vice versa_),\nbesides introducing perpetual miracles to establish communication     [157]\nbetween these two substances, does not obviate the derangement of the\nnatural laws obtaining in each of these same substances, which, in the\ngeneral opinion, their mutual influence would cause.\n\n62. Being on other considerations already convinced of the principle of\nHarmony in general, I was in consequence convinced likewise of the\n_preformation_ and the Pre-established Harmony of all things amongst\nthemselves, of that between nature and grace, between the decrees of God\nand our actions foreseen, between all parts of matter, and even between the\nfuture and the past, the whole in conformity with the sovereign wisdom of\nGod, whose works are the most harmonious it is possible to conceive. Thus I\ncould not fail to arrive at the system which declares that God created the\nsoul in the beginning in such a fashion that it must produce and represent\nto itself successively that which takes place within the body, and the body\nalso in such a fashion that it must do of itself that which the soul\nordains. Consequently the laws that connect the thoughts of the soul in the\norder of final causes and in accordance with the evolution of perceptions\nmust produce pictures that meet and harmonize with the impressions of\nbodies on our organs; and likewise the laws of movements in the body, which\nfollow one another in the order of efficient causes, meet and so harmonize\nwith the thoughts of the soul that the body is induced to act at the time\nwhen the soul wills it.\n\n63. Far from its being prejudicial, nothing can be more favourable to\nfreedom than that system. And M. Jacquelot has demonstrated well in his\nbook on the _Conformity of Faith with Reason_, that it is just as if he who\nknows all that I shall order a servant to do the whole day long on the\nmorrow made an automaton entirely resembling this servant, to carry out\nto-morrow at the right moment all that I should order; and yet that would\nnot prevent me from ordering freely all that I should please, although the\naction of the automaton that would serve me would not be in the least free.\n\n64. Moreover, since all that passes in the soul depends, according to this\nsystem, only upon the soul, and its subsequent state is derived only from\nit and from its present state, how can one give it a greater\n_independence_? It is true that there still remains some imperfection in\nthe constitution of the soul. All that happens to the soul depends upon it,\nbut depends not always upon its will; that were too much. Nor are such[158]\nhappenings even recognized always by its understanding or perceived with\ndistinctness. For there is in the soul not only an order of distinct\nperceptions, forming its dominion, but also a series of confused\nperceptions or passions, forming its bondage: and there is no need for\nastonishment at that; the soul would be a Divinity if it had none but\ndistinct perceptions. It has nevertheless some power over these confused\nperceptions also, even if in an indirect manner. For although it cannot\nchange its passions forthwith, it can work from afar towards that end with\nenough success, and endue itself with new passions and even habits. It even\nhas a like power over the more distinct perceptions, being able to endue\nitself indirectly with opinions and intentions, and to hinder itself from\nhaving this one or that, and stay or hasten its judgement. For we can seek\nmeans beforehand to arrest ourselves, when occasion arises, on the sliding\nstep of a rash judgement; we can find some incident to justify postponement\nof our resolution even at the moment when the matter appears ready to be\njudged. Although our opinion and our act of willing be not directly objects\nof our will (as I have already observed), one sometimes, takes measures\nnevertheless, to will and even to believe in due time, that which one does\nnot will, or believe, now. So great is the profundity of the spirit of man.\n\n65. And now, to bring to a conclusion this question of _spontaneity_, it\nmust be said that, on a rigorous definition, the soul has within it the\nprinciple of all its actions, and even of all its passions, and that the\nsame is true in all the simple substances scattered throughout Nature,\nalthough there be freedom only in those that are intelligent. In the\npopular sense notwithstanding, speaking in accordance with appearances, we\nmust say that the soul depends in some way upon the body and upon the\nimpressions of the senses: much as we speak with Ptolemy and Tycho in\neveryday converse, and think with Copernicus, when it is a question of the\nrising and the setting of the sun.\n\n66. One may however give a true and philosophic sense to this _mutual\ndependence_ which we suppose between the soul and the body. It is that the\none of these two substances depends upon the other ideally, in so far as\nthe reason of that which is done in the one can be furnished by that which\nis in the other. This had already happened when God ordered beforehand the\nharmony that there would be between them. Even so would that          [159]\nautomaton, that should fulfil the servant's function, depend upon me\n_ideally_, in virtue of the knowledge of him who, foreseeing my future\norders, would have rendered it capable of serving me at the right moment\nall through the morrow. The knowledge of my future intentions would have\nactuated this great craftsman, who would accordingly have fashioned the\nautomaton: my influence would be objective, and his physical. For in so far\nas the soul has perfection and distinct thoughts, God has accommodated the\nbody to the soul, and has arranged beforehand that the body is impelled to\nexecute its orders. And in so far as the soul is imperfect and as its\nperceptions are confused, God has accommodated the soul to the body, in\nsuch sort that the soul is swayed by the passions arising out of corporeal\nrepresentations. This produces the same effect and the same appearance as\nif the one depended immediately upon the other, and by the agency of a\nphysical influence. Properly speaking, it is by its confused thoughts that\nthe soul represents the bodies which encompass it. The same thing must\napply to all that we understand by the actions of simple substances one\nupon another. For each one is assumed to act upon the other in proportion\nto its perfection, although this be only ideally, and in the reasons of\nthings, as God in the beginning ordered one substance to accord with\nanother in proportion to the perfection or imperfection that there is in\neach. (Withal action and passion are always reciprocal in creatures,\nbecause one part of the reasons which serve to explain clearly what is\ndone, and which have served to bring it into existence, is in the one of\nthese substances, and another part of these reasons is in the other,\nperfections and imperfections being always mingled and shared.) Thus it is\nwe attribute _action_ to the one, and _passion_ to the other.\n\n67. But after all, whatsoever dependence be conceived in voluntary actions,\nand even though there were an absolute and mathematical necessity (which\nthere is not) it would not follow that there would not be a sufficient\ndegree of freedom to render rewards and punishments just and reasonable. It\nis true that generally we speak as though the necessity of the action put\nan end to all merit and all demerit, all justification for praise and\nblame, for reward and punishment: but it must be admitted that this\nconclusion is not entirely correct. I am very far from sharing the opinions\nof Bradwardine, Wyclif, Hobbes and Spinoza, who advocate, so it seems,[160]\nthis entirely mathematical necessity, which I think I have adequately\nrefuted, and perhaps more clearly than is customary. Yet one must always\nbear testimony to the truth and not impute to a dogma anything that does\nnot result from it. Moreover, these arguments prove too much, since they\nwould prove just as much against hypothetical necessity, and would justify\nthe lazy sophism. For the absolute necessity of the sequence of causes\nwould in this matter add nothing to the infallible certainty of a\nhypothetical necessity.\n\n68. In the first place, therefore, it must be agreed that it is permitted\nto kill a madman when one cannot by other means defend oneself. It will be\ngranted also that it is permitted, and often even necessary, to destroy\nvenomous or very noxious animals, although they be not so by their own\nfault.\n\n69. Secondly, one inflicts punishments upon a beast, despite its lack of\nreason and freedom, when one deems that this may serve to correct it: thus\none punishes dogs and horses, and indeed with much success. Rewards serve\nus no less in the managing of animals: when an animal is hungry, the food\nthat is given to him causes him to do what otherwise would never be\nobtained from him.\n\n70. Thirdly, one would inflict even on beasts capital punishments (where it\nis no longer a question of correcting the beast that is punished) if this\npunishment could serve as an example, or inspire terror in others, to make\nthem cease from evil doing. Rorarius, in his book on reason in beasts, says\nthat in Africa they crucified lions, in order to drive away other lions\nfrom the towns and frequented places, and that he had observed in passing\nthrough the province of Juelich that they hanged wolves there in order to\nensure greater safety for the sheepfolds. There are people in the villages\nalso who nail birds of prey to the doors of houses, with the idea that\nother birds of the same kind will then not so readily appear. These\nmeasures would always be justified if they were of any avail.\n\n71. Then, in the fourth place, since experience proves that the fear of\nchastisements and the hope of rewards serves to make men abstain from evil\nand strive to do good, one would have good reason to avail oneself of such,\neven though men were acting under necessity, whatever the necessity might\nbe. The objection will be raised that if good or evil is necessary it is\nuseless to avail oneself of means to obtain it or to hinder it: but the\nanswer has already been given above in the passage combating the lazy [161]\nsophism. If good or evil were a necessity without these means, then such\nmeans would be unavailing; but it is not so. These goods and evils come\nonly with the aid of these means, and if these results were necessary the\nmeans would be a part of the causes rendering them necessary, since\nexperience teaches us that often fear or hope hinders evil or advances\ngood. This objection, then, differs hardly at all from the lazy sophism,\nwhich we raise against the certainty as well as the necessity of future\nevents. Thus one may say that these objections are directed equally against\nhypothetical necessity and absolute necessity, and that they prove as much\nagainst the one as against the other, that is to say, nothing at all.\n\n72. There was a great dispute between Bishop Bramhall and Mr. Hobbes, which\nbegan when they were both in Paris, and which was continued after their\nreturn to England; all the parts of it are to be found collected in a\nquarto volume published in London in the year 1656. They are all in\nEnglish, and have not been translated as far as I know, nor inserted in the\nCollection of Works in Latin by Mr. Hobbes. I had already read these\nwritings, and have obtained them again since. And I had observed at the\noutset that he had not at all proved the absolute necessity of all things,\nbut had shown sufficiently that necessity would not overthrow all the rules\nof divine or human justice, and would not prevent altogether the exercise\nof this virtue.\n\n73. There is, however, a kind of justice and a certain sort of rewards and\nof punishments which appear not so applicable to those who should act by an\nabsolute necessity, supposing such necessity existed. It is that kind of\njustice which has for its goal neither improvement nor example, nor even\nredress of the evil. This justice has its foundation only in the fitness of\nthings, which demands a certain satisfaction for the expiation of an evil\naction. The Socinians, Hobbes and some others do not admit this punitive\njustice, which properly speaking is avenging justice. God reserves it for\nhimself in many cases; but he does not fail to grant it to those who are\nentitled to govern others, and he exercises it through their agency,\nprovided that they act under the influence of reason and not of passion.\nThe Socinians believe it to be without foundation, but it always has some\nfoundation in that fitness of things which gives satisfaction not only to\nthe injured but also to the wise who see it; even as a beautiful piece of\nmusic, or again a good piece of architecture, satisfies cultivated    [162]\nminds. And the wise lawgiver having threatened, and having, so to speak,\npromised a chastisement, it befits his consistency not to leave the action\ncompletely unpunished, even though the punishment would no longer avail to\ncorrect anyone. But even though he should have promised nothing, it is\nenough that there is a fitness of things which could have prompted him to\nmake this promise, since the wise man likewise promises only that which is\nfitting. And one may even say that there is here a certain compensation of\nthe mind, which would be scandalized by disorder if the chastisement did\nnot contribute towards restoring order. One can also consult what Grotius\nwrote against the Socinians, of the satisfaction of Jesus Christ, and the\nanswer of Crellius thereto.\n\n74. Thus it is that the pains of the damned continue, even when they no\nlonger serve to turn them away from evil, and that likewise the rewards of\nthe blessed continue, even when they no longer serve for strengthening them\nin good. One may say nevertheless that the damned ever bring upon\nthemselves new pains through new sins, and that the blessed ever bring upon\nthemselves new joys by new progress in goodness: for both are founded on\nthe _principle of the fitness of things_, which has seen to it that affairs\nwere so ordered that the evil action must bring upon itself a chastisement.\nThere is good reason to believe, following the parallelism of the two\nrealms, that of final causes and that of efficient causes, that God has\nestablished in the universe a connexion between punishment or reward and\nbad or good action, in accordance wherewith the first should always be\nattracted by the second, and virtue and vice obtain their reward and their\npunishment in consequence of the natural sequence of things, which contains\nstill another kind of pre-established harmony than that which appears in\nthe communication between the soul and the body. For, in a word, all that\nGod does, as I have said already, is harmonious to perfection. Perhaps then\nthis principle of the fitness of things would no longer apply to beings\nacting without true freedom or exemption from absolute necessity; and in\nthat case corrective justice alone would be administered, and not punitive\njustice. That is the opinion of the famous Conringius, in a dissertation he\npublished on what is just. And indeed, the reasons Pomponazzi employed in\nhis book on fate, to prove the usefulness of chastisements and rewards,\neven though all should come about in our actions by a fatal necessity,[163]\nconcern only amendment and not satisfaction, [Greek: kolasin ou timorian].\nMoreover, it is only for the sake of outward appearances that one destroys\nanimals accessary to certain crimes, as one razes the houses of rebels,\nthat is, to inspire terror. Thus it is an act of corrective justice,\nwherein punitive justice has no part at all.\n\n75. But we will not amuse ourselves now by discussing a question more\ncurious than necessary, since we have shown sufficiently that there is no\nsuch necessity in voluntary actions. Nevertheless it was well to show that\n_imperfect freedom_ alone, that is, freedom which is exempt only from\nconstraint, would suffice as foundation for chastisements and rewards of\nthe kind conducive to the avoidance of evil, and to amendment. One sees\nalso from this that some persons of intelligence, who persuade themselves\nthat everything is necessary, are wrong in saying that none must be praised\nor blamed, rewarded or punished. Apparently they say so only to exercise\ntheir wit: the pretext is that all being necessary nothing would be in our\npower. But this pretext is ill founded: necessary actions would be still in\nour power, at least in so far as we could perform them or omit them, when\nthe hope or the fear of praise or blame, of pleasure or pain prompted our\nwill thereto, whether they prompted it of necessity, or in prompting it\nthey left spontaneity, contingency and freedom all alike unimpaired. Thus\npraise and blame, rewards and punishments would preserve always a large\npart of their use, even though there were a true necessity in our actions.\nWe can praise and blame also natural good and bad qualities, where the will\nhas no part--in a horse, in a diamond, in a man; and he who said of Cato of\nUtica that he acted virtuously through the goodness of his nature, and that\nit was impossible for him to behave otherwise, thought to praise him the\nmore.\n\n76. The difficulties which I have endeavoured up to now to remove have been\nalmost all common to natural and revealed theology. Now it will be\nnecessary to come to a question of revealed theology, concerning the\nelection or the reprobation of men, with the dispensation or use of divine\ngrace in connexion with these acts of the mercy or the justice of God. But\nwhen I answered the preceding objections, I opened up a way to meet those\nthat remain. This confirms the observation I made thereon (_Preliminary\nDissertation,_ 43) that there is rather a conflict between the true   [164]\nreasons of natural theology and the false reasons of human appearances,\nthan between revealed faith and reason. For on this subject scarcely any\ndifficulty arises that is new, and not deriving its origin from those which\ncan be placed in the way of the truths discerned by reason.\n\n77. Now as theologians of all parties are divided among themselves on this\nsubject of predestination and grace, and often give different answers to\nthe same objections, according to their various principles, one cannot\navoid touching on the differences which prevail among them. One may say in\ngeneral that some look upon God more metaphysically and others more\nmorally: and it has already been stated on other occasions that the\nCounter-Remonstrants took the first course and the Remonstrants the second.\nBut to act rightly we must affirm alike on one side the independence of God\nand the dependence of creatures, and on the other side the justice and\ngoodness of God, which makes him dependent upon himself, his will upon his\nunderstanding or his wisdom.\n\n78. Some gifted and well-intentioned authors, desiring to show the force of\nthe reasons advocated by the two principal parties, in order to persuade\nthem to a mutual tolerance, deem that the whole controversy is reduced to\nthis essential point, namely: What was God's principal aim in making his\ndecrees with regard to man? Did he make them solely in order to show forth\nhis glory by manifesting his attributes, and forming, to that end, the\ngreat plan of creation and providence? Or has he had regard rather to the\nvoluntary movements of intelligent substances which he designed to create,\nconsidering what they would will and do in the different circumstances and\nsituations wherein he might place them, so as to form a fitting resolve\nthereupon? It appears to me that the two answers to this great question\nthus given as opposites to one another are easy to reconcile, and that in\nconsequence the two parties would be agreed in principle, without any need\nof tolerance, if all were reduced to this point. In truth God, in designing\nto create the world, purposed solely to manifest and communicate his\nperfections in the way that was most efficacious, and most worthy of his\ngreatness, his wisdom and his goodness. But that very purpose pledged him\nto consider all the actions of creatures while still in the state of pure\npossibility, that he might form the most fitting plan. He is like a great\narchitect whose aim in view is the satisfaction or the glory of having[165]\nbuilt a beautiful palace, and who considers all that is to enter into this\nconstruction: the form and the materials, the place, the situation, the\nmeans, the workmen, the expense, before he forms a complete resolve. For a\nwise person in laying his plans cannot separate the end from the means; he\ndoes not contemplate any end without knowing if there are means of\nattaining thereto.\n\n79. I know not whether there are also perchance persons who imagine that,\nGod being the absolute master of all things, one can thence infer that\neverything outside him is indifferent to him, that he considers himself\nalone, without concern for others, and that thus he has made some happy and\nothers unhappy without any cause, without choice, without reason. But to\nteach so about God were to deprive him of wisdom and of goodness. We need\nonly observe that he considers himself and neglects nothing of what he owes\nto himself, to conclude that he considers his creatures also, and that he\nuses them in the manner most consistent with order. For the more a great\nand good prince is mindful of his glory, the more he will think of making\nhis subjects happy, even though he were the most absolute of all monarchs,\nand though his subjects were slaves from birth, bondsmen (in lawyers'\nparlance), people entirely in subjection to arbitrary power. Calvin himself\nand some others of the greatest defenders of the absolute decree rightly\nmaintained that God had _great and just reasons_ for his election and the\ndispensation of his grace, although these reasons be unknown to us in\ndetail: and we must judge charitably that the most rigid predestinators\nhave too much reason and too much piety to depart from this opinion.\n\n80. There will therefore be no argument for debate on that point (as I\nhope) with people who are at all reasonable. But there will always be\nargument among those who are called Universalists and Particularists,\naccording to what they teach of the grace and the will of God. Yet I am\nsomewhat inclined to believe that the heated dispute between them on the\nwill of God to save all men, and on that which depends upon it (when one\nkeeps separate the doctrine _de Auxiliis_, or of the assistance of grace),\nrests rather in expressions than in things. For it is sufficient to\nconsider that God, as well as every wise and beneficent mind, is inclined\ntowards all possible good, and that this inclination is proportionate to\nthe excellence of the good. Moreover, this results (if we take the    [166]\nmatter precisely and in itself) from an 'antecedent will', as it is termed,\nwhich, however, is not always followed by its complete effect, because this\nwise mind must have many other inclinations besides. Thus it is the result\nof all the inclinations together that makes his will complete and\ndecretory, as I have already explained. One may therefore very well say\nwith ancient writers that God wills to save all men according to his\nantecedent will, but not according to his consequent will, which never\nfails to be followed by its effect. And if those who deny this universal\nwill do not allow that the antecedent inclination be called a will, they\nare only troubling themselves about a question of name.\n\n81. But there is a question more serious in regard to predestination to\neternal life and to all other destination by God, to wit, whether this\ndestination is absolute or respective. There is destination to good and\ndestination to evil; and as evil is moral or physical, theologians of all\nparties agree that there is no destination to moral evil, that is to say,\nthat none is destined to sin. As for the greatest physical evil, which is\ndamnation, one can distinguish between destination and predestination: for\npredestination appears to contain within itself an absolute destination,\nwhich is anterior to the consideration of the good or evil actions of those\nwhom it concerns. Thus one may say that the reprobate are _destined_ to be\ncondemned, because they are known to be impenitent. But it cannot so well\nbe said that the reprobate are _predestined_ to damnation: for there is no\n_absolute_ reprobation, its foundation being final foreseen impenitence.\n\n82. It is true that there are writers who maintain that God, wishing to\nmanifest his mercy and his justice in accordance with reasons worthy of\nhim, but unknown to us, chose the elect, and in consequence rejected the\ndamned, prior to all thought of sin, even of Adam, that after this resolve\nhe thought fit to permit sin in order to be able to exercise these two\nvirtues, and that he has bestowed grace in Jesus Christ to some in order to\nsave them, while he has refused it to others in order to be able to punish\nthem. Hence these writers are named 'Supralapsarians', because the decree\nto punish precedes, according to them, the knowledge of the future\nexistence of sin. But the opinion most common to-day amongst those who are\ncalled Reformed, and one that is favoured by the Synod of Dordrecht, is\nthat of the 'Infralapsarians', corresponding somewhat to the conception of\nSt. Augustine. For he asserts that God having resolved to permit the  [167]\nsin of Adam and the corruption of the human race, for reasons just but\nhidden, his mercy made him choose some of the corrupt mass to be freely\nsaved by the merit of Jesus Christ, and his justice made him resolve to\npunish the others by the damnation that they deserved. That is why, with\nthe Schoolmen, only the saved were called _Praedestinati_ and the damned\nwere called _Praesciti_. It must be admitted that some Infralapsarians and\nothers speak sometimes of predestination to damnation, following the\nexample of Fulgentius and of St. Augustine himself: but that signifies the\nsame as destination to them, and it avails nothing to wrangle about words.\nThat pretext, notwithstanding, was in time past used for maltreating that\nGodescalc who caused a stir about the middle of the ninth century, and who\ntook the name of Fulgentius to indicate that he followed that author.\n\n83. As for the destination of the elect to eternal life, the Protestants,\nas well as those of the Roman Church, dispute much among themselves as to\nwhether election is absolute or is founded on the prevision of final living\nfaith. Those who are called Evangelicals, that is, those of the Augsburg\nConfession, hold the latter opinion: they believe that one need not go into\nthe hidden causes of election while one may find a manifest cause of it\nshown in Holy Scripture, which is faith in Jesus Christ; and it appears to\nthem that the prevision of the cause is also the cause of the prevision of\nthe effect. Those who are called Reformed are of a different opinion: they\nadmit that salvation comes from faith in Jesus Christ, but they observe\nthat often the cause anterior to the effect in execution is posterior in\nintention, as when the cause is the means and the effect is the end. Thus\nthe question is, whether faith or salvation is anterior in the intention of\nGod, that is, whether God's design is rather to save man than to make him a\nbeliever.\n\n84. Hence we see that the question between the Supralapsarians and the\nInfralapsarians in part, and again between them and the Evangelicals, comes\nback to a right conception of the order that is in God's decrees. Perhaps\none might put an end to this dispute at once by saying that, properly\nspeaking, all the decrees of God that are here concerned are simultaneous,\nnot only in respect of time, as everyone agrees, but also _in signo\nrationis_, or in the order of nature. And indeed, the Formula of Concord,\nbuilding upon some passages of St. Augustine, comprised in the same   [168]\nDecree of Election salvation and the means that conduce to it. To\ndemonstrate this synchronism of destinations or of decrees with which we\nare concerned, we must revert to the expedient that I have employed more\nthan once, which states that God, before decreeing anything, considered\namong other possible sequences of things that one which he afterwards\napproved. In the idea of this is represented how the first parents sin and\ncorrupt their posterity; how Jesus Christ redeems the human race; how some,\naided by such and such graces, attain to final faith and to salvation; and\nhow others, with or without such or other graces, do not attain thereto,\ncontinue in sin, and are damned. God grants his sanction to this sequence\nonly after having entered into all its detail, and thus pronounces nothing\nfinal as to those who shall be saved or damned without having pondered upon\neverything and compared it with other possible sequences. Thus God's\npronouncement concerns the whole sequence at the same time; he simply\ndecrees its existence. In order to save other men, or in a different way,\nhe must needs choose an altogether different sequence, seeing that all is\nconnected in each sequence. In this conception of the matter, which is that\nmost worthy of the All-wise, all whose actions are connected together to\nthe highest possible degree, there would be only one total decree, which is\nto create such a world. This total decree comprises equally all the\nparticular decrees, without setting one of them before or after another.\nYet one may say also that each particular act of antecedent will entering\ninto the total result has its value and order, in proportion to the good\nwhereto this act inclines. But these acts of antecedent will are not called\ndecrees, since they are not yet inevitable, the outcome depending upon the\ntotal result. According to this conception of things, all the difficulties\nthat can here be made amount to the same as those I have already stated and\nremoved in my inquiry concerning the origin of evil.\n\n85. There remains only one important matter of discussion, which has its\npeculiar difficulties. It is that of the dispensation of the means and\ncircumstances contributing to salvation and to damnation. This comprises\namongst others the subject of the Aids of Grace (_de auxiliis gratiae_), on\nwhich Rome (since the Congregation _de Auxiliis_ under Clement VIII, when a\ndebate took place between the Dominicans and the Jesuits) does not readily\npermit books to be published. Everyone must agree that God is         [169]\naltogether good and just, that his goodness makes him contribute the least\npossible to that which can render men guilty, and the most possible to that\nwhich serves to save them (possible, I say, subject to the general order of\nthings); that his justice prevents him from condemning innocent men, and\nfrom leaving good actions without reward; and that he even keeps an exact\nproportion in punishments and rewards. Nevertheless, this idea that one\nshould have of the goodness and the justice of God does not appear enough\nin what we know of his actions with regard to the salvation and the\ndamnation of men: and it is that which makes difficulties concerning sin\nand its remedies.\n\n86. The first difficulty is how the soul could be infected with original\nsin, which is the root of actual sins, without injustice on God's part in\nexposing the soul thereto. This difficulty has given rise to three opinions\non the origin of the soul itself. The first is that of the _pre-existence\nof human souls_ in another world or in another life, where they had sinned\nand on that account had been condemned to this prison of the human body, an\nopinion of the Platonists which is attributed to Origen and which even\nto-day finds adherents. Henry More, an English scholar, advocated something\nlike this dogma in a book written with that express purpose. Some of those\nwho affirm this pre-existence have gone as far as metempsychosis. The\nyounger van Helmont held this opinion, and the ingenious author of some\nmetaphysical _Meditations_, published in 1678 under the name of William\nWander, appears to have some leaning towards it. The second opinion is that\nof _Traduction_, as if the soul of children were engendered (_per\ntraducem_) from the soul or souls of those from whom the body is\nengendered. St. Augustine inclined to this judgement the better to explain\noriginal sin. This doctrine is taught also by most of the theologians of\nthe Augsburg Confession. Nevertheless it is not completely established\namong them, since the Universities of Jena and Helmstedt, and others\nbesides, have long been opposed to it. The third opinion, and that most\nwidely accepted to-day, is that of _Creation_: it is taught in the majority\nof the Christian Schools, but it is fraught with the greatest difficulty in\nrespect of original sin.\n\n87. Into this controversy of theologians on the origin of the human soul\nhas entered the philosophic dispute on _the origin of forms._ Aristotle and\nscholastic philosophy after him called _Form_ that which is a         [170]\nprinciple of action and is found in that which acts. This inward principle\nis either substantial, being then termed 'Soul', when it is in an organic\nbody, or accidental, and customarily termed 'Quality'. The same philosopher\ngave to the soul the generic name of 'Entelechy' or _Act_. This word\n'Entelechy' apparently takes its origin from the Greek word signifying\n'perfect', and hence the celebrated Ermolao Barbaro expressed it literally\nin Latin by _perfectihabia_: for Act is a realization of potency. And he\nhad no need to consult the Devil, as men say he did, in order to learn\nthat. Now the Philosopher of Stagira supposes that there are two kinds of\nAct, the permanent act and the successive act. The permanent or lasting act\nis nothing but the Substantial or Accidental Form: the substantial form (as\nfor example the soul) is altogether permanent, at least according to my\njudgement, and the accidental is only so for a time. But the altogether\nmomentary act, whose nature is transitory, consists in action itself. I\nhave shown elsewhere that the notion of Entelechy is not altogether to be\nscorned, and that, being permanent, it carries with it not only a mere\nfaculty for action, but also that which is called 'force', 'effort',\n'conatus', from which action itself must follow if nothing prevents it.\nFaculty is only an _attribute_, or rather sometimes a mode; but force, when\nit is not an ingredient of substance itself (that is, force which is not\nprimitive but derivative), is a _quality_, which is distinct and separable\nfrom substance. I have shown also how one may suppose that the soul is a\nprimitive force which is modified and varied by derivative forces or\nqualities, and exercised in actions.\n\n88. Now philosophers have troubled themselves exceedingly on the question\nof the origin of substantial forms. For to say that the compound of form\nand matter is produced and that the form is only _comproduced_ means\nnothing. The common opinion was that forms were derived from the potency of\nmatter, this being called _Eduction_. That also meant in fact nothing, but\nit was explained in a sense by a comparison with shapes: for that of a\nstatue is produced only by removal of the superfluous marble. This\ncomparison might be valid if form consisted in a mere limitation, as in the\ncase of shape. Some have thought that forms were sent from heaven, and even\ncreated expressly, when bodies were produced. Julius Scaliger hinted that\nit was possible that forms were rather derived from the active potency of\nthe efficient cause (that is to say, either from that of God in the   [171]\ncase of Creation or from that of other forms in the case of generation),\nthan from the passive potency of matter. And that, in the case of\ngeneration, meant a return to traduction. Daniel Sennert, a famous doctor\nand physicist at Wittenberg, cherished this opinion, particularly in\nrelation to animate bodies which are multiplied through seed. A certain\nJulius Caesar della Galla, an Italian living in the Low Countries, and a\ndoctor of Groningen named Johan Freitag wrote with much vehemence in\nopposition to Sennert. Johann Sperling, a professor at Wittenberg, made a\ndefence of his master, and finally came into conflict with Johann Zeisold,\na professor at Jena, who upheld the belief that the human soul is created.\n\n89. But traduction and eduction are equally inexplicable when it is a\nquestion of finding the origin of the soul. It is not the same with\naccidental forms, since they are only modifications of the substance, and\ntheir origin may be explained by eduction, that is, by variation of\nlimitations, in the same way as the origin of shapes. But it is quite\nanother matter when we are concerned with the origin of a substance, whose\nbeginning and destruction are equally difficult to explain. Sennert and\nSperling did not venture to admit the subsistence and the indestructibility\nof the souls of beasts or of other primitive forms, although they allowed\nthat they were indivisible and immaterial. But the fact is that they\nconfused indestructibility with immortality, whereby is understood in the\ncase of man that not only the soul but also the personality subsists. In\nsaying that the soul of man is immortal one implies the subsistence of what\nmakes the identity of the person, something which retains its moral\nqualities, conserving the _consciousness_, or the reflective inward\nfeeling, of what it is: thus it is rendered susceptible to chastisement or\nreward. But this conservation of personality does not occur in the souls of\nbeasts: that is why I prefer to say that they are imperishable rather than\nto call them immortal. Yet this misapprehension appears to have been the\ncause of a great inconsistency in the doctrine of the Thomists and of other\ngood philosophers: they recognized the immateriality or indivisibility of\nall souls, without being willing to admit their indestructibility, greatly\nto the prejudice of the immortality of the human soul. John Scot, that is,\nthe Scotsman (which formerly signified Hibernian or Erigena), a famous\nwriter of the time of Louis the Debonair and of his sons, was for the\nconservation of all souls: and I see not why there should be less     [172]\nobjection to making the atoms of Epicurus or of Gassendi endure, than to\naffirming the subsistence of all truly simple and indivisible substances,\nwhich are the sole and true atoms of Nature. And Pythagoras was right in\nsaying generally, as Ovid makes him say:\n\n  _Morte carent animae_.\n\n90. Now as I like maxims which hold good and admit of the fewest exceptions\npossible, here is what has appeared to me most reasonable in every sense on\nthis important question. I consider that souls and simple substances\naltogether cannot begin except by creation, or end except by annihilation.\nMoreover, as the formation of organic animate bodies appears explicable in\nthe order of nature only when one assumes a _preformation_ already organic,\nI have thence inferred that what we call generation of an animal is only a\ntransformation and augmentation. Thus, since the same body was already\nfurnished with organs, it is to be supposed that it was already animate,\nand that it had the same soul: so I assume _vice versa_, from the\nconservation of the soul when once it is created, that the animal is also\nconserved, and that apparent death is only an envelopment, there being no\nlikelihood that in the order of nature souls exist entirely separated from\nall body, or that what does not begin naturally can cease through natural\nforces.\n\n91. Considering that so admirable an order and rules so general are\nestablished in regard to animals, it does not appear reasonable that man\nshould be completely excluded from that order, and that everything in\nrelation to his soul should come about in him by miracle. Besides I have\npointed out repeatedly that it is of the essence of God's wisdom that all\nshould be harmonious in his works, and that nature should be parallel with\ngrace. It is thus my belief that those souls which one day shall be human\nsouls, like those of other species, have been in the seed, and in the\nprogenitors as far back as Adam, and have consequently existed since the\nbeginning of things, always in a kind of organic body. On this point it\nseems that M. Swammerdam, Father Malebranche, M. Bayle, Mr. Pitcairne, M.\nHartsoeker and numerous other very able persons share my opinion. This\ndoctrine is also sufficiently confirmed by the microscope observations of\nM. Leeuwenhoek and other good observers. But it also for divers reasons\nappears likely to me that they existed then as sentient or animal     [173]\nsouls only, endowed with perception and feeling, and devoid of reason.\nFurther I believe that they remained in this state up to the time of the\ngeneration of the man to whom they were to belong, but that then they\nreceived reason, whether there be a natural means of raising a sentient\nsoul to the degree of a reasoning soul (a thing I find it difficult to\nimagine) or whether God may have given reason to this soul through some\nspecial operation, or (if you will) by a kind of _transcreation_. This\nlatter is easier to admit, inasmuch as revelation teaches much about other\nforms of immediate operation by God upon our souls. This explanation\nappears to remove the obstacles that beset this matter in philosophy or\ntheology. For the difficulty of the origin of forms thus disappears\ncompletely; and besides it is much more appropriate to divine justice to\ngive the soul, already corrupted _physically_ or on the animal side by the\nsin of Adam, a new perfection which is reason, than to put a reasoning\nsoul, by creation or otherwise, in a body wherein it is to be corrupted\n_morally_.\n\n92. Now the soul being once under the domination of sin, and ready to\ncommit sin in actual fact as soon as the man is fit to exercise reason, a\nnew question arises, to wit: whether this tendency in a man who has not\nbeen regenerated by baptism suffices to damn him, even though he should\nnever come to commit sin, as may happen, and happens often, whether he die\nbefore reaching years of discretion or he become dull of sense before he\nhas made use of his reason. St. Gregory of Nazianzos is supposed to have\ndenied this (_Orat. de Baptismo_); but St. Augustine is for the\naffirmative, and maintains that original sin of itself is sufficient to\nearn the flames of hell, although this opinion is, to say the least, very\nharsh. When I speak here of damnation or of hell, I mean pains, and not\nmere deprivation of supreme felicity; I mean _poenam sensus, non damni_.\nGregory of Rimini, General of the Augustinians, with a few others followed\nSt. Augustine in opposition to the accepted opinion of the Schools of his\ntime, and for that reason he was called the torturer of children, _tortor\ninfantum_. The Schoolmen, instead of sending them into the flames of hell,\nhave assigned to them a special Limbo, where they do not suffer, and are\nonly punished by privation of the beatific vision. The Revelations of St.\nBirgitta (as they are called), much esteemed in Rome, also uphold this\ndogma. Salmeron and Molina, and before them Ambrose Catharin and      [174]\nothers, grant them a certain natural bliss; and Cardinal Sfondrati, a man\nof learning and piety, who approves this, latterly went so far as to prefer\nin a sense their state, which is the state of happy innocence, to that of a\nsinner saved, as we may see in his _Nodus Praedestinationis Solutus_. That,\nhowever, seems to go too far. Certainly a soul truly enlightened would not\nwish to sin, even though it could by this means obtain all imaginable\npleasures. But the case of choosing between sin and true bliss is simply\nchimerical, and it is better to obtain bliss (even after repentance) than\nto be deprived of it for ever.\n\n93. Many prelates and theologians of France who are well pleased to differ\nfrom Molina, and to join with St. Augustine, seem to incline towards the\nopinion of this great doctor, who condemns to eternal flames children that\ndie in the age of innocence before having received baptism. This is what\nappears from the letter mentioned above, written by five distinguished\nprelates of France to Pope Innocent XII, against that posthumous book by\nCardinal Sfondrati. But therein they did not venture to condemn the\ndoctrine of the purely privative punishment of children dying without\nbaptism, seeing it approved by the venerable Thomas Aquinas, and by other\ngreat men. I do not speak of those who are called on one side Jansenists\nand on the other disciples of St. Augustine, for they declare themselves\nentirely and firmly for the opinion of this Father. But it must be\nconfessed that this opinion has not sufficient foundation either in reason\nor in Scripture, and that it is outrageously harsh. M. Nicole makes rather\na poor apology for it in his book on the _Unity of the Church_, written to\noppose M. Jurieu, although M. Bayle takes his side in chapter 178 of the\n_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III. M. Nicole makes use of\nthis pretext, that there are also other dogmas in the Christian religion\nwhich appear harsh. On the one hand, however, that does not lead to the\nconclusion that these instances of harshness may be multiplied without\nproof; and on the other we must take into account that the other dogmas\nmentioned by M. Nicole, namely original sin and eternity of punishment, are\nonly harsh and unjust to outward appearance, while the damnation of\nchildren dying without actual sin and without regeneration would in truth\nbe harsh, since it would be in effect the damning of innocents. For that\nreason I believe that the party which advocates this opinion will never\naltogether have the upper hand in the Roman Church itself. Evangelical[175]\ntheologians are accustomed to speak with fair moderation on this question,\nand to surrender these souls to the judgement and the clemency of their\nCreator. Nor do we know all the wonderful ways that God may choose to\nemploy for the illumination of souls.\n\n94. One may say that those who condemn for original sin alone, and who\nconsequently condemn children dying unbaptized or outside the Covenant,\nfall, in a sense, without being aware of it, into a certain attitude to\nman's inclination and God's foreknowledge which they disapprove in others.\nThey will not have it that God should refuse his grace to those whose\nresistance to it he foresees, nor that this expectation and this tendency\nshould cause the damnation of these persons: and yet they claim that the\ntendency which constitutes original sin, and in which God foresees that the\nchild will sin as soon as he shall reach years of discretion, suffices to\ndamn this child beforehand. Those who maintain the one and reject the other\ndo not preserve enough uniformity and connexion in their dogmas.\n\n95. There is scarcely less difficulty in the matter of those who reach\nyears of discretion and plunge into sin, following the inclination of\ncorrupt nature, if they receive not the succour of the grace necessary for\nthem to stop on the edge of the precipice, or to drag themselves from the\nabyss wherein they have fallen. For it seems hard to damn them eternally\nfor having done that which they had no power to prevent themselves from\ndoing. Those that damn even children, who are without discretion, trouble\nthemselves even less about adults, and one would say that they have become\ncallous through the very expectation of seeing people suffer. But it is not\nthe same with other theologians, and I would be rather on the side of those\nwho grant to all men a grace sufficient to draw them away from evil,\nprovided they have a sufficient tendency to profit by this succour, and not\nto reject it voluntarily. The objection is made that there has been and\nstill is a countless multitude of men, among civilized peoples and among\nbarbarians, who have never had this knowledge of God and of Jesus Christ\nwhich is necessary for those who would tread the wonted paths to salvation.\nBut without excusing them on the plea of a sin purely philosophical, and\nwithout stopping at a mere penalty of privation, things for which there is\nno opportunity of discussion here, one may doubt the fact: for how do we\nknow whether they do not receive ordinary or extraordinary succour of [176]\nkinds unknown to us? This maxim, _Quod facienti, quod in se est, non\ndenegatur gratia necessaria_, appears to me to have eternal truth. Thomas\nAquinas, Archbishop Bradwardine and others have hinted that, in regard to\nthis, something comes to pass of which we are not aware. (Thom. quest. XIV,\n_De Veritate_, artic. XI, ad I et alibi. Bradwardine, _De Causa Dei_, non\nprocul ab initio.) And sundry theologians of great authority in the Roman\nChurch itself have taught that a sincere act of the love of God above all\nthings, when the grace of Jesus Christ arouses it, suffices for salvation.\nFather Francis Xavier answered the Japanese that if their ancestors had\nused well their natural light God would have given them the grace necessary\nfor salvation; and the Bishop of Geneva, Francis of Sales, gives full\napproval to this answer (Book 4, _On the Love of God,_ ch. 5).\n\n96. This I pointed out some time ago to the excellent M Pelisson, to show\nhim that the Roman Church, going further than the Protestants, does not\ndamn utterly those who are outside its communion, and even outside\nChristianity, by using as its only criterion explicit faith. Nor did he\nrefute it, properly speaking, in the very kind answer he gave me, and which\nhe published in the fourth part of his _Reflexions_, also doing me the\nhonour of adding to it my letter. I offered him then for consideration what\na famous Portuguese theologian, by name Jacques Payva Andradius, envoy to\nthe Council of Trent, wrote concerning this, in opposition to Chemnitz,\nduring this same Council. And now, without citing many other authors of\neminence, I will content myself with naming Father Friedrich Spee, the\nJesuit, one of the most excellent in his Society, who also held this common\nopinion upon the efficacy of the love of God, as is apparent in the preface\nto the admirable book which he wrote in Germany on the Christian virtues.\nHe speaks of this observation as of a highly important secret of piety, and\nexpatiates with great clearness upon the power of divine love to blot out\nsin, even without the intervention of the Sacraments of the Catholic\nChurch, provided one scorn them not, for that would not at all be\ncompatible with this love. And a very great personage, whose character was\none of the most lofty to be found in the Roman Church, was the first to\nmake me acquainted with it. Father Spee was of a noble family of Westphalia\n(it may be said in passing) and he died in the odour of sanctity, according\nto the testimony of him who published this book in Cologne with the   [177]\napproval of the Superiors.\n\n97. The memory of this excellent man ought to be still precious to persons\nof knowledge and good sense, because he is the author of the book entitled:\n_Cautio Criminalis circa Processus contra Sagas_, which has caused much\nstir, and has been translated into several languages. I learnt from the\nGrand Elector of Mainz, Johann Philipp von Schonborn, uncle of His Highness\nthe present Elector, who walks gloriously in the footsteps of that worthy\npredecessor, the story that follows. That Father was in Franconia when\nthere was a frenzy there for burning alleged sorcerers. He accompanied even\nto the pyre many of them, all of whom he recognized as being innocent, from\ntheir confessions and the researches that he had made thereon. Therefore in\nspite of the danger incurred at that time by one telling the truth in this\nmatter, he resolved to compile this work, without however naming himself.\nIt bore great fruit and on this matter converted that Elector, at that time\nstill a simple canon and afterwards Bishop of Wuerzburg, finally also\nArchbishop of Mainz, who, as soon as he came to power, put an end to these\nburnings. Therein he was followed by the Dukes of Brunswick, and finally by\nthe majority of the other princes and states of Germany.\n\n98. This digression appeared to me to be seasonable, because that writer\ndeserves to be more widely known. Returning now to the subject I make a\nfurther observation. Supposing that to-day a knowledge of Jesus Christ\naccording to the flesh is absolutely necessary to salvation, as indeed it\nis safest to teach, it will be possible to say that God will give that\nknowledge to all those who do, humanly speaking, that which in them lies,\neven though God must needs give it by a miracle. Moreover, we cannot know\nwhat passes in souls at the point of death; and if sundry learned and\nserious theologians claim that children receive in baptism a kind of faith,\nalthough they do not remember it afterwards when they are questioned about\nit, why should one maintain that nothing of a like nature, or even more\ndefinite, could come about in the dying, whom we cannot interrogate after\ntheir death? Thus there are countless paths open to God, giving him means\nof satisfying his justice and his goodness: and the only thing one may\nallege against this is that we know not what way he employs; which is far\nfrom being a valid objection.\n\n                                                                      [178]\n99. Let us pass on to those who lack not power to amend, but good will.\nThey are doubtless not to be excused; but there always remains a great\ndifficulty concerning God, since it rested with him to give them this same\ngood will. He is the master of wills, the hearts of kings and those of all\nother men are in his hand. Holy Scripture goes so far as to say that God at\ntimes hardened the wicked in order to display his power by punishing them.\nThis hardening is not to be taken as meaning that God inspires men with a\nkind of anti-grace, that is, a kind of repugnance to good, or even an\ninclination towards evil, just as the grace that he gives is an inclination\ntowards good. It is rather that God, having considered the sequence of\nthings that he established, found it fitting, for superior reasons, to\npermit that Pharaoh, for example, should be in such _circumstances_ as\nshould increase his wickedness, and divine wisdom willed to derive a good\nfrom this evil.\n\n100. Thus it all often comes down to _circumstances_, which form a part of\nthe combination of things. There are countless examples of small\ncircumstances serving to convert or to pervert. Nothing is more widely\nknown than the _Tolle, lege_ (Take and read) cry which St. Augustine heard\nin a neighbouring house, when he was pondering on what side he should take\namong the Christians divided into sects, and saying to himself,\n\n  _Quod vitae sectabor iter?_\n\nThis brought him to open at random the book of the Holy Scriptures which he\nhad before him, and to read what came before his eyes: and these were words\nwhich finally induced him to give up Manichaeism. The good Steno, a Dane,\nwho was titular Bishop of Titianopolis, Vicar Apostolic (as they say) of\nHanover and the region around, when there was a Duke Regent of his\nreligion, told us that something of that kind had happened to him. He was a\ngreat anatomist and deeply versed in natural science; but he unfortunately\ngave up research therein, and from being a great physicist he became a\nmediocre theologian. He would almost listen to nothing more about the\nmarvels of Nature, and an express order from the Pope _in virtute sanctae\nobedientiae_ was needed to extract from him the observations M. Thevenot\nasked of him. He told us then that what had greatly helped towards inducing\nhim to place himself on the side of the Roman Church had been the voice of\na lady in Florence, who had cried out to him from a window: 'Go not on[179]\nthe side where you are about to go, sir, go on the other side.' 'That voice\nstruck me,' he told us, 'because I was just meditating upon religion.' This\nlady knew that he was seeking a man in the house where she was, and, when\nshe saw him making his way to the other house, wished to point out where\nhis friend's room was.\n\n101. Father John Davidius, the Jesuit, wrote a book entitled _Veridicus\nChristianus_, which is like a kind of _Bibliomancy_, where one takes\npassages at random, after the pattern of the _Tolle, lege_ of St.\nAugustine, and it is like a devotional game. But the chances to which, in\nspite of ourselves, we are subject, play only too large a part in what\nbrings salvation to men, or removes it from them. Let us imagine twin\nPolish children, the one taken by the Tartars, sold to the Turks, brought\nto apostasy, plunged in impiety, dying in despair; the other saved by some\nchance, falling then into good hands to be educated properly, permeated by\nthe soundest truths of religion, exercised in the virtues that it commends\nto us, dying with all the feelings of a good Christian. One will lament the\nmisfortune of the former, prevented perhaps by a slight circumstance from\nbeing saved like his brother, and one will marvel that this slight chance\nshould have decided his fate for eternity.\n\n102. Someone will perchance say that God foresaw by mediate knowledge that\nthe former would have been wicked and damned even if he had remained in\nPoland. There are perhaps conjunctures wherein something of the kind takes\nplace. But will it therefore be said that this is a general rule, and that\nnot one of those who were damned amongst the pagans would have been saved\nif he had been amongst Christians? Would that not be to contradict our\nLord, who said that Tyre and Sidon would have profited better by his\npreaching, if they had had the good fortune to hear it, than Capernaum?\n\n103. But were one to admit even here this use of mediate knowledge against\nall appearances, this knowledge still implies that God considers what a man\nwould do in such and such circumstances; and it always remains true that\nGod could have placed him in other circumstances more favourable, and given\nhim inward or outward succour capable of vanquishing the most abysmal\nwickedness existing in any soul. I shall be told that God is not bound to\ndo so, but that is not enough; it must be added that greater reasons\nprevent him from making all his goodness felt by all. Thus there must [180]\nneeds be choice; but I do not think one must seek the reason altogether in\nthe good or bad nature of men. For if with some people one assume that God,\nchoosing the plan which produces the most good, but which involves sin and\ndamnation, has been prompted by his wisdom to choose the best natures in\norder to make them objects of his grace, this grace would not sufficiently\nappear to be a free gift. Accordingly man will be distinguishable by a kind\nof inborn merit, and this assumption seems remote from the principles of\nSt. Paul, and even from those of Supreme Reason.\n\n104. It is true that there are reasons for God's choice, and the\nconsideration of the object, that is, the nature of man, must needs enter\ntherein; but it does not seem that this choice can be subjected to a rule\nsuch as we are capable of conceiving, and such as may flatter the pride of\nmen. Some famous theologians believe that God offers more grace, and in a\nmore favourable way, to those whose resistance he foresees will be less,\nand that he abandons the rest to their self-will. We may readily suppose\nthat this is often the case, and this expedient, among those which make man\ndistinguishable by anything favourable in his nature, is the farthest\nremoved from Pelagianism. But I would not venture, notwithstanding, to make\nof it a universal rule. Moreover, that we may not have cause to vaunt\nourselves, it is necessary that we be ignorant of the reasons for God's\nchoice. Those reasons are too diverse to become known to us; and it may be\nthat God at times shows the power of his grace by overcoming the most\nobstinate resistance, to the end that none may have cause either to despair\nor to be puffed up. St. Paul, as it would seem, had this in mind when he\noffered himself as an example. God, he said, has had mercy upon me, to give\na great example of his patience.\n\n105. It may be that fundamentally all men are equally bad, and consequently\nincapable of being distinguished the one from the other through their good\nor less bad natural qualities; but they are not bad all in the same way:\nfor there is an inherent individual difference between souls, as the\nPre-established Harmony proves. Some are more or less inclined towards a\nparticular good or a particular evil, or towards their opposites, all in\naccordance with their natural dispositions. But since the general plan of\nthe universe, chosen by God for superior reasons, causes men to be in\ndifferent circumstances, those who meet with such as are more         [181]\nfavourable to their nature will become more readily the least wicked, the\nmost virtuous, the most happy; yet it will be always by aid of the\ninfluence of that inward grace which God unites with the circumstances.\nSometimes it even comes to pass, in the progress of human life, that a more\nexcellent nature succeeds less, for lack of cultivation or opportunities.\nOne may say that men are chosen and ranged not so much according to their\nexcellence as according to their conformity with God's plan. Even so it may\noccur that a stone of lesser quality is made use of in a building or in a\ngroup because it proves to be the particular one for filling a certain gap.\n\n106. But, in fine, all these attempts to find reasons, where there is no\nneed to adhere altogether to certain hypotheses, serve only to make clear\nto us that there are a thousand ways of justifying the conduct of God. All\nthe disadvantages we see, all the obstacles we meet with, all the\ndifficulties one may raise for oneself, are no hindrance to a belief\nfounded on reason, even when it cannot stand on conclusive proof, as has\nbeen shown and will later become more apparent, that there is nothing so\nexalted as the wisdom of God, nothing so just as his judgements, nothing so\npure as his holiness, and nothing more vast than his goodness.\n\n                                                                      [182]\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nESSAYS ON THE JUSTICE OF GOD AND THE FREEDOM OF MAN IN THE ORIGIN OF EVIL\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nPART TWO\n\n107. Hitherto I have devoted myself to giving a full and clear exposition\nof this whole subject: and although I have not yet spoken of M. Bayle's\nobjections in particular, I have endeavoured to anticipate them, and to\nsuggest ways of answering them. But as I have taken upon myself the task of\nmeeting them in detail, not only because there will perhaps still be\npassages calling for elucidation, but also because his arguments are\nusually full of wit and erudition, and serve to throw greater light on this\ncontroversy, it will be well to give an account of the chief objections\nthat are dispersed through his works, and to add my answers. At the\nbeginning I observed 'that God co-operates in moral evil, and in physical\nevil, and in each of them both morally and physically; and that man\nco-operates therein also morally and physically in a free and active way,\nbecoming in consequence subject to blame and punishment'. I have shown also\nthat each point has its own difficulty; but the greatest of these lies in\nmaintaining that God co-operates morally in moral evil, that is, in sin,\nwithout being the originator of the sin, and even without being accessary\nthereto.\n\n108. He does this by _permitting_ it justly, and by _directing_ it wisely\ntowards the good, as I have shown in a manner that appears tolerably\nintelligible. But as it is here principally that M. Bayle undertakes  [183]\nto discomfit those who maintain that there is nothing in faith which cannot\nbe harmonized with reason, it is also here especially I must show that my\ndogmas are fortified (to make use of his own allegory) with a rampart, even\nof reasons, which is able to resist the fire of his strongest batteries. He\nhas ranged them against me in chapter 144 of his _Reply to the Questions of\na Provincial_ (vol. III, p. 812), where he includes the theological\ndoctrine in seven propositions and opposes thereto nineteen philosophic\nmaxims, like so many large cannon capable of breaching my rampart. Let us\nbegin with the theological propositions.\n\n109. I. 'God,' he says, 'the Being eternal and necessary, infinitely good,\nholy, wise and powerful, possesses from all eternity a glory and a bliss\nthat can never either increase or diminish.' This proposition of M. Bayle's\nis no less philosophical than theological. To say that God possesses a\n'glory' when he is alone, that depends upon the meaning of the term. One\nmay say, with some, that glory is the satisfaction one finds in being aware\nof one's own perfections; and in this sense God possesses it always. But\nwhen glory signifies that others become aware of these perfections, one may\nsay that God acquires it only when he reveals himself to intelligent\ncreatures; even though it be true that God thereby gains no new good, and\nit is rather the rational creatures who thence derive advantage, when they\napprehend aright the glory of God.\n\n110. II. 'He resolved freely upon the production of creatures, and he chose\nfrom among an infinite number of possible beings those whom it pleased him\nto choose, to give them existence, and to compose the universe of them,\nwhile he left all the rest in nothingness.' This proposition is also, just\nlike the preceding one, in close conformity with that part of philosophy\nwhich is called natural theology. One must dwell a little on what is said\nhere, that he chose the possible beings 'whom it pleased him to choose'.\nFor it must be borne in mind that when I say, 'that pleases me', it is as\nthough I were saying, 'I find it good'. Thus it is the ideal goodness of\nthe object which pleases, and which makes me choose it among many others\nwhich do not please or which please less, that is to say, which contain\nless of that goodness which moves me. Now it is only the genuinely good\nthat is capable of pleasing God: and consequently that which pleases God\nmost, and which meets his choice, is the best.\n\n                                                                      [184]\n111. III. 'Human nature having been among the Beings that he willed to\nproduce, he created a man and a woman, and granted them amongst other\nfavours free will, so that they had the power to obey him; but he\nthreatened them with death if they should disobey the order that he gave\nthem to abstain from a certain fruit.' This proposition is in part\nrevealed, and should be admitted without difficulty, provided that _free\nwill_ be understood properly, according to the explanation I have given.\n\n112. IV. 'They ate thereof nevertheless, and thenceforth they were\ncondemned, they and all their posterity, to the miseries of this life, to\ntemporal death and eternal damnation, and made subject to such a tendency\nto sin that they abandoned themselves thereto endlessly and without\nceasing.' There is reason to suppose that the forbidden action by itself\nentailed these evil results in accordance with a natural effect, and that\nit was for that very reason, and not by a purely arbitrary decree, that God\nhad forbidden it: much as one forbids knives to children. The famous Fludde\nor de Fluctibus, an Englishman, once wrote a book _De Vita, Morte et\nResurrectione_ under the name of R. Otreb, wherein he maintained that the\nfruit of the forbidden tree was a poison: but we cannot enter into this\ndetail. It suffices that God forbade a harmful thing; one must not\ntherefore suppose that God acted here simply in the character of a\nlegislator who enacts a purely positive law, or of a judge who imposes and\ninflicts a punishment by an order of his will, without any connexion\nbetween the evil of guilt and the evil of punishment. And it is not\nnecessary to suppose that God in justifiable annoyance deliberately put a\ncorruption in the soul and the body of man, by an extraordinary action, in\norder to punish him: much as the Athenians gave hemlock-juice to their\ncriminals. M. Bayle takes the matter thus: he speaks as if the original\ncorruption had been put in the soul of the first man by an order and\noperation of God. It is that which calls forth his objection (_Reply to the\nQuestions of a Provincial_, vol. III, ch. 178, p. 1218) 'that reason would\nnot commend the monarch who, in order to chastise a rebel, condemned him\nand his descendants to have a tendency towards rebellion'. But this\nchastisement happens naturally to the wicked, without any ordinance of a\nlegislator, and they become addicted to evil. If drunkards begot children\ninclined to the same vice, by a natural consequence of what takes place in\nbodies, that would be a punishment of their progenitors, but it would [185]\nnot be a penalty of law. There is something comparable to this in the\nconsequences of the first man's sin. For the contemplation of divine wisdom\nleads us to believe that the realm of nature serves that of grace; and that\nGod as an Architect has done all in a manner befitting God considered as a\nMonarch. We do not sufficiently know the nature of the forbidden fruit, or\nthat of the action, or its effects, to judge of the details of this matter:\nnevertheless we must do God justice so far as to believe that it comprised\nsomething other than what painters depict for us.\n\n113. V. 'It has pleased him by his infinite mercy to deliver a very few men\nfrom this condemnation; and, leaving them exposed during this life to the\ncorruption of sin and misery, he has given them aids which enable them to\nobtain the never-ending bliss of paradise.' Many in the past have doubted,\nas I have already observed, whether the number of the damned is so great as\nis generally supposed; and it appears that they believed in the existence\nof some intermediate state between eternal damnation and perfect bliss. But\nwe have no need of these opinions, and it is enough to keep to the ideas\naccepted in the Church. In this connexion it is well to observe that this\nproposition of M. Bayle's is conceived in accordance with the principles of\nsufficient grace, given to all men, and sufficing them provided that they\nhave good will. Although M. Bayle holds the opposite opinion, he wished (as\nhe states in the margin) to avoid the terms that would not agree with a\nsystem of decrees subsequent to the prevision of contingent events.\n\n114. VI. 'He foresaw from eternity all that which should happen, he ordered\nall things and placed them each one in its own place, and he guides and\ncontrols them continually, according to his pleasure. Thus nothing is done\nwithout his permission or against his will, and he can prevent, as seems\ngood to him, as much and as often as seems good to him, all that does not\nplease him, and in consequence sin, which is the thing in the world that\nmost offends him and that he most detests; and he can produce in each human\nsoul all the thoughts that he approves.' This thesis is also purely\nphilosophic, that is, recognizable by the light of natural reason. It is\nopportune also, as one has dwelt in thesis II on _that which pleases_, to\ndwell here upon _that which seems good_, that is, upon that which God finds\ngood to do. He can avoid or put away as 'seems good to him' all 'that does\nnot please him'. Nevertheless it must be borne in mind that some objects of\nhis aversion, such as certain evils, and especially sin, which his    [186]\nantecedent will repelled, could only have been rejected by his consequent\nor decretory will, in so far as it was prompted by the rule of the best,\nwhich the All-wise must choose after having taken all into account. When\none says 'that sin offends God most, and that he detests it most', these\nare human ways of speaking. God cannot, properly speaking, be _offended_,\nthat is, injured, disturbed, disquieted or angered; and he _detests_\nnothing of that which exists, in the sense that to detest something is to\nlook upon it with abomination and in a way that causes us disgust, that\ngreatly pains and distresses us; for God cannot suffer either vexation, or\ngrief or discomfort; he is always altogether content and at ease. Yet these\nexpressions in their true sense are justified. The supreme goodness of God\ncauses his antecedent will to repel all evil, but moral evil more than any\nother: it only admits evil at all for irresistible superior reasons, and\nwith great correctives which repair its ill effects to good advantage. It\nis true also that God could produce in each human soul all the thoughts\nthat he approves: but this would be to act by miracles, more than his most\nperfectly conceived plan admits.\n\n115. VII. 'He offers grace to people that he knows are destined not to\naccept it, and so destined by this refusal to make themselves more criminal\nthan they would be if he had not offered them that grace; he assures them\nthat it is his ardent wish that they accept it, and he does not give them\nthe grace which he knows they would accept.' It is true that these people\nbecome more criminal through their refusal than if one had offered them\nnothing, and that God knows this. Yet it is better to permit their crime\nthan to act in a way which would render God himself blameworthy, and\nprovide the criminals with some justification for the complaint that it was\nnot possible for them to do better, even though they had or might have\nwished it. God desires that they receive such grace from him as they are\nfit to receive, and that they accept it; and he desires to give them in\nparticular that grace whose acceptance by them he foresees: but it is\nalways by a will antecedent, detached or particular, which cannot always be\ncarried out in the general plan of things. This thesis also is among the\nnumber of those which philosophy establishes no less than revelation, like\nthree others of the seven that we have just stated here, the third, fourth\nand fifth being the only ones where revelation is necessary.\n\n                                                                      [187]\n116. Here now are the nineteen philosophic maxims which M. Bayle opposes to\nthe seven theological propositions.\n\nI. 'As the infinitely perfect Being finds in himself a glory and a bliss\nthat can never either diminish or increase, his goodness alone has\ndetermined him to create this universe: neither the ambition to be praised,\nnor any interested motive of preserving or augmenting his bliss and his\nglory, has had any part therein.' This maxim is very good: praises of God\ndo him no service, but they are of service to the men who praise him, and\nhe desired their good. Nevertheless, when one says that _goodness_ alone\ndetermined God to create this universe, it is well to add that his GOODNESS\nprompted him _antecedently_ to create and to produce all possible good; but\nthat his WISDOM made the choice and caused him to select the best\n_consequently_; and finally that his POWER gave him the means to carry out\n_actually_ the great design which he had formed.\n\n117. II. 'The goodness of the infinitely perfect Being is infinite, and\nwould not be infinite if one could conceive of a goodness greater than\nthis. This characteristic of infinity is proper also to all his other\nperfections, to love of virtue, hatred of vice, etc., they must be the\ngreatest one can imagine. (See M. Jurieu in the first three sections of the\n_Judgement on Methods_, where he argues constantly upon this principle, as\nupon a primary notion. See also in Wittich, _De Providentia Dei_, n. 12,\nthese words of St. Augustine, lib. I, _De Doctrina Christiana_, c. 7: \"Cum\ncogitatur Deus, ita cogitatur, ut aliquid, quo nihil melius sit atque\nsublimius. Et paulo post: Nec quisquam inveniri potest, qui hoc Deum credat\nesse, quo melius aliquid est.\")'\n\nThis maxim is altogether to my liking, and I draw from it this conclusion,\nthat God does the very best possible: otherwise the exercise of his\ngoodness would be restricted, and that would be restricting his _goodness_\nitself, if it did not prompt him to the best, if he were lacking in good\nwill. Or again it would be restricting his _wisdom_ and his _power_, if he\nlacked the knowledge necessary for discerning the best and for finding the\nmeans to obtain it, or if he lacked the strength necessary for employing\nthese means. There is, however, ambiguity in the assertion that love of\nvirtue and hatred of vice are infinite in God: if that were absolutely and\nunreservedly true, in practice there would be no vice in the world. But\nalthough each one of God's perfections is infinite in itself, it is\nexercised only in proportion to the object and as the nature of things\nprompts it. Thus love of the best in the whole carries the day over   [188]\nall other individual inclinations or hatreds; it is the only impulse whose\nvery exercise is absolutely infinite, nothing having power to prevent God\nfrom declaring himself for the best; and some vice being combined with the\nbest possible plan, God permits it.\n\n118. III. 'An infinite goodness having guided the Creator in the production\nof the world, all the characteristics of knowledge, skill, power and\ngreatness that are displayed in his work are destined for the happiness of\nintelligent creatures. He wished to show forth his perfections only to the\nend that creatures of this kind should find their felicity in the\nknowledge, the admiration and the love of the Supreme Being.'\n\nThis maxim appears to me not sufficiently exact. I grant that the happiness\nof intelligent creatures is the principal part of God's design, for they\nare most like him; but nevertheless I do not see how one can prove that to\nbe his sole aim. It is true that the realm of nature must serve the realm\nof grace: but, since all is connected in God's great design, we must\nbelieve that the realm of grace is also in some way adapted to that of\nnature, so that nature preserves the utmost order and beauty, to render the\ncombination of the two the most perfect that can be. And there is no reason\nto suppose that God, for the sake of some lessening of moral evil, would\nreverse the whole order of nature. Each perfection or imperfection in the\ncreature has its value, but there is none that has an infinite value. Thus\nthe moral or physical good and evil of rational creatures does not\ninfinitely exceed the good and evil which is simply metaphysical, namely\nthat which lies in the perfection of the other creatures; and yet one would\nbe bound to say this if the present maxim were strictly true. When God\njustified to the Prophet Jonah the pardon that he had granted to the\ninhabitants of Nineveh, he even touched upon the interest of the beasts who\nwould have been involved in the ruin of this great city. No substance is\nabsolutely contemptible or absolutely precious before God. And the abuse or\nthe exaggerated extension of the present maxim appears to be in part the\nsource of the difficulties that M. Bayle puts forward. It is certain that\nGod sets greater store by a man than a lion; nevertheless it can hardly be\nsaid with certainty that God prefers a single man in all respects to the\nwhole of lion-kind. Even should that be so, it would by no means follow\nthat the interest of a certain number of men would prevail over the   [189]\nconsideration of a general disorder diffused through an infinite number of\ncreatures. This opinion would be a remnant of the old and somewhat\ndiscredited maxim, that all is made solely for man.\n\n119. IV. 'The benefits he imparts to the creatures that are capable of\nfelicity tend only to their happiness. He therefore does not permit that\nthese should serve to make them unhappy, and, if the wrong use that they\nmade of them were capable of destroying them, he would give them sure means\nof always using them well. Otherwise they would not be true benefits, and\nhis goodness would be smaller than that we can conceive of in another\nbenefactor. (I mean, in a Cause that united with its gifts the sure skill\nto make good use of them.)'\n\nThere already is the abuse or the ill effect of the preceding maxim. It is\nnot strictly true (though it appear plausible) that the benefits God\nimparts to the creatures who are capable of felicity tend solely to their\nhappiness. All is connected in Nature; and if a skilled artisan, an\nengineer, an architect, a wise politician often makes one and the same\nthing serve several ends, if he makes a double hit with a single throw,\nwhen that can be done conveniently, one may say that God, whose wisdom and\npower are perfect, does so always. That is husbanding the ground, the time,\nthe place, the material, which make up as it were his outlay. Thus God has\nmore than one purpose in his projects. The felicity of all rational\ncreatures is one of the aims he has in view; but it is not his whole aim,\nnor even his final aim. Therefore it happens that the unhappiness of some\nof these creatures may come about _by concomitance_, and as a result of\nother greater goods: this I have already explained, and M. Bayle has to\nsome extent acknowledged it. The goods as such, considered in themselves,\nare the object of the antecedent will of God. God will produce as much\nreason and knowledge in the universe as his plan can admit. One can\nconceive of a mean between an antecedent will altogether pure and\nprimitive, and a consequent and final will. The _primitive antecedent will_\nhas as its object each good and each evil in itself, detached from all\ncombination, and tends to advance the good and prevent the evil. The\n_mediate will_ relates to combinations, as when one attaches a good to an\nevil: then the will will have some tendency towards this combination when\nthe good exceeds the evil therein. But the _final and decisive will_\nresults from consideration of all the goods and all the evils that enter\ninto our deliberation, it results from a total combination. This shows[190]\nthat a mediate will, although it may in a sense pass as consequent in\nrelation to a pure and primitive antecedent will, must be considered\nantecedent in relation to the final and decretory will. God gives reason to\nthe human race; misfortunes arise thence by concomitance. His pure\nantecedent will tends towards giving reason, as a great good, and\npreventing the evils in question. But when it is a question of the evils\nthat accompany this gift which God has made to us of reason, the compound,\nmade up of the combination of reason and of these evils, will be the object\nof a mediate will of God, which will tend towards producing or preventing\nthis compound, according as the good or the evil prevails therein. But even\nthough it should prove that reason did more harm than good to men (which,\nhowever, I do not admit), whereupon the mediate will of God would discard\nit with all its concomitants, it might still be the case that it was more\nin accordance with the perfection of the universe to give reason to men,\nnotwithstanding all the evil consequences which it might have with\nreference to them. Consequently, the final will or the decree of God,\nresulting from all the considerations he can have, would be to give it to\nthem. And, far from being subject to blame for this, he would be\nblameworthy if he did not so. Thus the evil, or the mixture of goods and\nevils wherein the evil prevails, happens only _by concomitance_, because it\nis connected with greater goods that are outside this mixture. This\nmixture, therefore, or this compound, is not to be conceived as a grace or\nas a gift from God to us; but the good that is found mingled therein will\nnevertheless be good. Such is God's gift of reason to those who make ill\nuse thereof. It is always a good in itself; but the combination of this\ngood with the evils that proceed from its abuse is not a good with regard\nto those who in consequence thereof become unhappy. Yet it comes to be by\nconcomitance, because it serves a greater good in relation to the universe.\nAnd it is doubtless that which prompted God to give reason to those who\nhave made it an instrument of their unhappiness. Or, to put it more\nprecisely, in accordance with my system God, having found among the\npossible beings some rational creatures who misuse their reason, gave\nexistence to those who are included in the best possible plan of the\nuniverse. Thus nothing prevents us from admitting that God grants goods\nwhich turn into evil by the fault of men, this often happening to men in\njust punishment of the misuse they had made of God's grace. Aloysius  [191]\nNovarinus wrote a book _De Occultis Dei Beneficiis_: one could write one\n_De Occultis Dei Poenis_. This saying of Claudian would be in place here\nwith regard to some persons:\n\n      _Tolluntur in altum,_ _Ut lapsu graviore ruant_.\n\nBut to say that God should not give a good which he knows an evil will will\nabuse, when the general plan of things demands that he give it; or again to\nsay that he should give certain means for preventing it, contrary to this\nsame general order: that is to wish (as I have observed already) that God\nhimself become blameworthy in order to prevent man from being so. To\nobject, as people do here, that the goodness of God would be smaller than\nthat of another benefactor who would give a more useful gift, is to\noverlook the fact that the goodness of a benefactor is not measured by a\nsingle benefit. It may well be that a gift from a private person is greater\nthan one from a prince, but the gifts of this private person all taken\ntogether will be much inferior to the prince's gifts all together. Thus one\ncan esteem fittingly the good things done by God only when one considers\ntheir whole extent by relating them to the entire universe. Moreover, one\nmay say that the gifts given in the expectation that they will harm are the\ngifts of an enemy, [Greek: hechthron dora adora],\n\n    _Hostibus eveniant talia dona meis._\n\nBut that applies to when there is malice or guilt in him who gives them, as\nthere was in that Eutrapelus of whom Horace speaks, who did good to people\nin order to give them the means of destroying themselves. His design was\nevil, but God's design cannot be better than it is. Must God spoil his\nsystem, must there be less beauty, perfection and reason in the universe,\nbecause there are people who misuse reason? The common sayings are in place\nhere: _Abusus non tollit usum_; there is _scandalum datum et scandalum\nacceptum_.\n\n120. V. 'A maleficent being is very capable of heaping magnificent gifts\nupon his enemies, when he knows that they will make thereof a use that will\ndestroy them. It therefore does not beseem the infinitely good Being to\ngive to creatures a free will, whereof, as he knows for certain, they would\nmake a use that would render them unhappy. Therefore if he gives them free\nwill he combines with it the art of using it always opportunely, and\npermits not that they neglect the practice of this art in any         [192]\nconjuncture; and if there were no sure means of determining the good use of\nthis free will, he would rather take from them this faculty, than allow it\nto be the cause of their unhappiness. That is the more manifest, as free\nwill is a grace which he has given them of his own choice and without their\nasking for it; so that he would be more answerable for the unhappiness it\nwould bring upon them than if he had only granted it in response to their\nimportunate prayers.'\n\nWhat was said at the end of the remark on the preceding maxim ought to be\nrepeated here, and is sufficient to counter the present maxim. Moreover,\nthe author is still presupposing that false maxim advanced as the third,\nstating that the happiness of rational creatures is the sole aim of God. If\nthat were so, perhaps neither sin nor unhappiness would ever occur, even by\nconcomitance. God would have chosen a sequence of possibles where all these\nevils would be excluded. But God would fail in what is due to the universe,\nthat is, in what he owes to himself. If there were only spirits they would\nbe without the required connexion, without the order of time and place.\nThis order demands matter, movement and its laws; to adjust these to\nspirits in the best possible way means to return to our world. When one\nlooks at things only in the mass, one imagines to be practicable a thousand\nthings that cannot properly take place. To wish that God should not give\nfree will to rational creatures is to wish that there be none of these\ncreatures; and to wish that God should prevent them from misusing it is to\nwish that there be none but these creatures alone, together with what was\nmade for them only. If God had none but these creatures in view, he would\ndoubtless prevent them from destroying themselves. One may say in a sense,\nhowever, that God has given to these creatures the art of always making\ngood use of their free will, for the natural light of reason is this art.\nBut it would be necessary always to have the will to do good, and often\ncreatures lack the means of giving themselves the will they ought to have;\noften they even lack the will to use those means which indirectly give a\ngood will. Of this I have already spoken more than once. This fault must be\nadmitted, and one must even acknowledge that God would perhaps have been\nable to exempt creatures from that fault, since there is nothing to\nprevent, so it seems, the existence of some whose nature it would be always\nto have good will. But I reply that it is not necessary, and that it was\nnot feasible for all rational creatures to have so great a perfection,[193]\nand such as would bring them so close to the Divinity. It may even be that\nthat can only be made possible by a special divine grace. But in this case,\nwould it be proper for God to grant it to all, that is, always to act\nmiraculously in respect of all rational creatures? Nothing would be less\nrational than these perpetual miracles. There are degrees among creatures:\nthe general order requires it. And it appears quite consistent with the\norder of divine government that the great privilege of strengthening in the\ngood should be granted more easily to those who had a good will when they\nwere in a more imperfect state, in the state of struggle and of pilgrimage,\n_in Ecclesia militante, in statu viatorum_. The good angels themselves were\nnot created incapable of sin. Nevertheless I would not dare to assert that\nthere are no blessed creatures born, or such as are sinless and holy by\ntheir nature. There are perhaps people who give this privilege to the\nBlessed Virgin, since, moreover, the Roman Church to-day places her above\nthe angels. But it suffices us that the universe is very great and very\nvaried: to wish to limit it is to have little knowledge thereof. 'But', M.\nBayle goes on, 'God has given free will to creatures capable of sinning,\nwithout their having asked him for this grace. And he who gave such a gift\nwould be more answerable for the unhappiness that it brought upon those who\nmade use of it, than if he had granted it only in response to their\nimportunate prayers.' But importunity in prayers makes no difference to\nGod; he knows better than we what we need, and he only grants what serves\nthe interest of the whole. It seems that M. Bayle here makes free will\nconsist in the faculty for sinning; yet he acknowledges elsewhere that God\nand the Saints are free, without having this faculty. However that may be,\nI have already shown fully that God, doing what his wisdom and his goodness\ncombined ordain, is not answerable for the evil that he permits. Even men,\nwhen they do their duty, are not answerable for consequences, whether they\nforesee them or not.\n\n121. VI. 'It is as sure a means of taking a man's life to give him a silk\ncord that one knows certainly he will make use of freely to strangle\nhimself, as to plant a few dagger thrusts in his body. One desires his\ndeath not less when one makes use of the first way, than when one employs\nthe second: it even seems as though one desires it with a more malicious\nintention, since one tends to leave to him the whole trouble and the whole\nblame of his destruction.'\n\n                                                                      [194]\nThose who write treatises on Duties (De Officiis) as, for instance, Cicero,\nSt. Ambrose, Grotius, Opalenius, Sharrok, Rachelius, Pufendorf, as well as\nthe Casuists, teach that there are cases where one is not obliged to return\nto its owner a thing deposited: for example, one will not give back a\ndagger when one knows that he who has deposited it is about to stab\nsomeone. Let us pretend that I have in my hands the fatal draught that\nMeleager's mother will make use of to kill him; the magic javelin that\nCephalus will unwittingly employ to kill his Procris; the horses of Theseus\nthat will tear to pieces Hippolytus, his son: these things are demanded\nback from me, and I am right in refusing them, knowing the use that will be\nmade of them. But how will it be if a competent judge orders me to restore\nthem, when I cannot prove to him what I know of the evil consequences that\nrestitution will have, Apollo perchance having given to me, as to\nCassandra, the gift of prophecy under the condition that I shall not be\nbelieved? I should then be compelled to make restitution, having no\nalternative other than my own destruction: thus I cannot escape from\ncontributing towards the evil. Another comparison: Jupiter promises Semele,\nthe Sun Phaeton, Cupid Psyche to grant whatever favour the other shall ask.\nThey swear by the Styx,\n\n  _Di cujus jurare timent et fallere Numen_.\n\nOne would gladly stop, but too late, the request half heard,\n\n              _Voluit Deus ora loquentis_\n  _Opprimere; exierat jam vox properata sub auras_.\n\nOne would gladly draw back after the request was made, making vain\nremonstrances; but they press you, they say to you: 'Do you make oaths that\nyou will not keep?' The law of the Styx is inviolable, one must needs\nsubmit to it; if one has erred in making the oath, one would err more in\nnot keeping it; the promise must be fulfilled, however harmful it may be to\nhim who exacts it. It would be ruinous to you if you did not fulfil it. It\nseems as though the moral of these fables implies that a supreme necessity\nmay constrain one to comply with evil. God, in truth, knows no other judge\nthat can compel him to give what may turn to evil, he is not like Jupiter\nwho fears the Styx. But his own wisdom is the greatest judge that he can\nfind, there is no appeal from its judgements: they are the decrees of\ndestiny. The eternal verities, objects of his wisdom, are more        [195]\ninviolable than the Styx. These laws and this judge do not constrain: they\nare stronger, for they persuade. Wisdom only shows God the best possible\nexercise of his goodness: after that, the evil that occurs is an inevitable\nresult of the best. I will add something stronger: To permit the evil, as\nGod permits it, is the greatest goodness.\n\n  _Si mala sustulerat, non erat ille bonus._\n\nOne would need to have a bent towards perversity to say after this that it\nis more malicious to leave to someone the whole trouble and the whole blame\nof his destruction. When God does leave it to a man, it has belonged to him\nsince before his existence; it was already in the idea of him as still\nmerely possible, before the decree of God which makes him to exist. Can\none, then, leave it or give it to another? There is the whole matter.\n\n122. VII. 'A true benefactor gives promptly, and does not wait to give\nuntil those he loves have suffered long miseries from the privation of what\nhe could have imparted to them at first very easily, and without causing\nany inconvenience to himself. If the limitation of his forces does not\npermit him to do good without inflicting pain or some other inconvenience,\nhe acquiesces in this, but only regretfully, and he never employs this way\nof rendering service when he can render it without mingling any kind of\nevil in his favours. If the profit one could derive from the evils he\ninflicted could spring as easily from an unalloyed good as from those\nevils, he would take the straight road of unalloyed good, and not the\nindirect road that would lead from the evil to the good. If he showers\nriches and honours, it is not to the end that those who have enjoyed them,\nwhen they come to lose them, should be all the more deeply afflicted in\nproportion to their previous experience of pleasure, and that thus they\nshould become more unhappy than the persons who have always been deprived\nof these advantages. A malicious being would shower good things at such a\nprice upon the people for whom he had the most hatred.'\n\n(Compare this passage of Aristotle, _Rhetor._, 1. 2, c. 23, p. m. 446:\n[Greek: hoion ei doie an tis tini hina aphelomenos leipesei; hothen kai\ntout' eiretai,]\n\n  [Greek: pollois ho daimon ou kat' eunoian pheron]\n  [Greek: Megala didosin eutychemat', all' hina]\n  [Greek: tas symphoras labosin epiphanesteras.]\n\n                                                                      [196]\nId est: Veluti si quis alicui aliquid det, ut (postea) hoc (ipsi) erepto\n(ipsum) afficiat dolore. Unde etiam illud est dictum:\n\n  _Bona magna multis non amicus dat Deus,_\n  _Insigniore ut rursus his privet malo._)\n\nAll these objections depend almost on the same sophism; they change and\nmutilate the fact, they only half record things: God has care for men, he\nloves the human race, he wishes it well, nothing so true. Yet he allows men\nto fall, he often allows them to perish, he gives them goods that tend\ntowards their destruction; and when he makes someone happy, it is after\nmany sufferings: where is his affection, where is his goodness or again\nwhere is his power? Vain objections, which suppress the main point, which\nignore the fact that it is of God one speaks. It is as though one were\nspeaking of a mother, a guardian, a tutor, whose well-nigh only care is\nconcerned with the upbringing, the preservation, the happiness of the\nperson in question, and who neglect their duty. God takes care of the\nuniverse, he neglects nothing, he chooses what is best on the whole. If in\nspite of all that someone is wicked and unhappy, it behoved him to be so.\nGod (so they say) could have given happiness to all, he could have given it\npromptly and easily, and without causing himself any inconvenience, for he\ncan do all. But should he? Since he does not so, it is a sign that he had\nto act altogether differently. If we infer from this either that God only\nregretfully, and owing to lack of power, fails to make men happy and to\ngive the good first of all and without admixture of evil, or else that he\nlacks the good will to give it unreservedly and for good and all, then we\nare comparing our true God with the God of Herodotus, full of envy, or with\nthe demon of the poet whose iambics Aristotle quotes, and I have just\ntranslated into Latin, who gives good things in order that he may cause\nmore affliction by taking them away. That would be trifling with God in\nperpetual anthropomorphisms, representing him as a man who must give\nhimself up completely to one particular business, whose goodness must be\nchiefly exercised upon those objects alone which are known to us, and who\nlacks either aptitude or good will. God is not lacking therein, he could do\nthe good that we would desire; he even wishes it, taking it separately, but\nhe must not do it in preference to other greater goods which are opposed to\nit. Moreover, one has no cause to complain of the fact that usually   [197]\none attains salvation only through many sufferings, and by bearing the\ncross of Jesus Christ. These evils serve to make the elect imitators of\ntheir master, and to increase their happiness.\n\n123. VIII. 'The greatest and the most substantial glory that he who is the\nmaster of others can gain is to maintain amongst them virtue, order, peace,\ncontentment of mind. The glory that he would derive from their unhappiness\ncan be nothing but a false glory.'\n\nIf we knew the city of God just as it is, we should see that it is the most\nperfect state which can be devised; that virtue and happiness reign there,\nas far as is possible, in accordance with the laws of the best; that sin\nand unhappiness (whose entire exclusion from the nature of things reasons\nof the supreme order did not permit), are well-nigh nothing there in\ncomparison with the good, and even are of service for greater good. Now\nsince these evils were to exist, there must needs be some appointed to be\nsubject to them, and we are those people. If it were others, would there\nnot be the same appearance of evil? Or rather, would not these others be\nthose known as We? When God derives some glory from the evil through having\nmade it serve a greater good, it was proper that he should derive that\nglory. It is not therefore a false glory, as would be that of a prince who\noverthrew his state in order to have the honour of setting it up again.\n\n124. IX. 'The way whereby that master can give proof of greatest love for\nvirtue is to cause it, if he can, to be always practised without any\nmixture of vice. If it is easy for him to procure for his subjects this\nadvantage, and nevertheless he permits vice to raise its head, save that he\npunishes it finally after having long tolerated it, his affection for\nvirtue is not the greatest one can conceive; it is therefore not infinite.'\n\nI am not yet half way through the nineteen maxims, and already I am weary\nof refuting, and making the same answer always. M. Bayle multiplies\nunnecessarily his so-called maxims in opposition to my dogmas. If things\nconnected together may be separated, the parts from their whole, the human\nkind from the universe, God's attributes the one from the other, power from\nwisdom, it may be said that God _can cause_ virtue to be in the world\nwithout any mixture of vice, and even that he can do so _easily_. But,\nsince he has permitted vice, it must be that that order of the universe\nwhich was found preferable to every other plan required it. One must\nbelieve that it is not permitted to do otherwise, since it is not     [198]\npossible to do better. It is a hypothetical necessity, a moral necessity,\nwhich, far from being contrary to freedom, is the effect of its choice.\n_Quae rationi contraria sunt, ea nec fieri a Sapiente posse credendum est_.\nThe objection is made here, that God's affection for virtue is therefore\nnot the greatest which can be conceived, that it is not _infinite_. To that\nan answer has already been given on the second maxim, in the assertion that\nGod's affection for any created thing whatsoever is proportionate to the\nvalue of the thing. Virtue is the noblest quality of created things, but it\nis not the only good quality of creatures. There are innumerable others\nwhich attract the inclination of God: from all these inclinations there\nresults the most possible good, and it turns out that if there were only\nvirtue, if there were only rational creatures, there would be less good.\nMidas proved to be less rich when he had only gold. And besides, wisdom\nmust vary. To multiply one and the same thing only would be superfluity,\nand poverty too. To have a thousand well-bound Vergils in one's library,\nalways to sing the airs from the opera of Cadmus and Hermione, to break all\nthe china in order only to have cups of gold, to have only diamond buttons,\nto eat nothing but partridges, to drink only Hungarian or Shiraz\nwine--would one call that reason? Nature had need of animals, plants,\ninanimate bodies; there are in these creatures, devoid of reason, marvels\nwhich serve for exercise of the reason. What would an intelligent creature\ndo if there were no unintelligent things? What would it think of, if there\nwere neither movement, nor matter, nor sense? If it had only distinct\nthoughts it would be a God, its wisdom would be without bounds: that is one\nof the results of my meditations. As soon as there is a mixture of confused\nthoughts, there is sense, there is matter. For these confused thoughts come\nfrom the relation of all things one to the other by way of duration and\nextent. Thus it is that in my philosophy there is no rational creature\nwithout some organic body, and there is no created spirit entirely detached\nfrom matter. But these organic bodies vary no less in perfection than the\nspirits to which they belong. Therefore, since God's wisdom must have a\nworld of bodies, a world of substances capable of perception and incapable\nof reason; since, in short, it was necessary to choose from all the things\npossible what produced the best effect together, and since vice entered in\nby this door, God would not have been altogether good, altogether wise if\nhe had excluded it.\n\n                                                                      [199]\n125. X. 'The way to evince the greatest hatred for vice is not indeed to\nallow it to prevail for a long time and then chastise it, but to crush it\nbefore its birth, that is, prevent it from showing itself anywhere. A king,\nfor example, who put his finances in such good order that no malversation\nwas ever committed, would thus display more hatred for the wrong done by\nfactionaries than if, after having suffered them to batten on the blood of\nthe people, he had them hanged.'\n\nIt is always the same song, it is anthropomorphism pure and simple. A king\nshould generally have nothing so much at heart as to keep his subjects free\nfrom oppression. One of his greatest interests is to bring good order into\nhis finances. Nevertheless there are times when he is obliged to tolerate\nvice and disorders. He has a great war on his hands, he is in a state of\nexhaustion, he has no choice of generals, it is necessary to humour those\nhe has, those possessed of great authority with the soldiers: a Braccio, a\nSforza, a Wallenstein. He lacks money for the most pressing needs, it is\nnecessary to turn to great financiers, who have an established credit, and\nhe must at the same time connive at their malversations. It is true that\nthis unfortunate necessity arises most often from previous errors. It is\nnot the same with God: he has need of no man, he commits no error, he\nalways does the best. One cannot even wish that things may go better, when\none understands them: and it would be a vice in the Author of things if he\nwished to change anything whatsoever in them, if he wished to exclude the\nvice that was found there. Is this State with perfect government, where\ngood is willed and performed as far as it is possible, where evil even\nserves the greatest good, comparable with the State of a prince whose\naffairs are in ruin and who escapes as best he can? Or with that of a\nprince who encourages oppression in order to punish it, and who delights to\nsee the little men with begging bowls and the great on scaffolds?\n\n126. XI. 'A ruler devoted to the interests of virtue, and to the good of\nhis subjects, takes the utmost care to ensure that they never disobey his\nlaws; and if he must needs chastise them for their disobedience, he sees to\nit that the penalty cures them of the inclination to evil, and restores in\ntheir soul a strong and constant tendency towards good: so far is he from\nany desire that the penalty for the error should incline them more and more\ntowards evil.'\n\n                                                                      [200]\nTo make men better, God does all that is due, and even all that can be done\non his side without detriment to what is due. The most usual aim of\npunishment is amendment; but it is not the sole aim, nor that which God\nalways intends. I have said a word on that above. Original sin, which\ndisposes men towards evil, is not merely a penalty for the first sin; it is\na natural consequence thereof. On that too a word has been said, in the\ncourse of an observation on the fourth theological proposition. It is like\ndrunkenness, which is a penalty for excess in drinking and is at the same\ntime a natural consequence that easily leads to new sins.\n\n127. XII. 'To permit the evil that one could prevent is not to care whether\nit be committed or not, or is even to wish that it be committed.'\n\nBy no means. How many times do men permit evils which they could prevent if\nthey turned all their efforts in that direction? But other more important\ncares prevent them from doing so. One will rarely resolve upon adjusting\nirregularities in the coinage while one is involved in a great war. And the\naction of an English Parliament in this direction a little before the Peace\nof Ryswyck will be rather praised than imitated. Can one conclude from this\nthat the State has no anxiety about this irregularity, or even that it\ndesires it? God has a far stronger reason, and one far more worthy of him,\nfor tolerating evils. Not only does he derive from them greater goods, but\nhe finds them connected with the greatest goods of all those that are\npossible: so that it would be a fault not to permit them.\n\n128. XIII. 'It is a very great fault in those who govern, if they do not\ncare whether there be disorder in their States or not. The fault is still\ngreater if they wish and even desire disorder there. If by hidden and\nindirect, but infallible, ways they stirred up a sedition in their States\nto bring them to the brink of ruin, in order to gain for themselves the\nglory of showing that they have the courage and the prudence necessary for\nsaving a great kingdom on the point of perishing, they would be most\ndeserving of condemnation. But if they stirred up this sedition because\nthere were no other means than that, of averting the total ruin of their\nsubjects and of strengthening on new foundations, and for several\ncenturies, the happiness of nations, one must needs lament the unfortunate\nnecessity (see above, pp. 146, 147, what has been said of the force of[201]\nnecessity) to which they were reduced, and praise them for the use that\nthey made thereof.'\n\nThis maxim, with divers others set forth here, is not applicable to the\ngovernment of God. Not to mention the fact that it is only the disorders of\na very small part of his kingdom which are brought up in objection, it is\nuntrue that he has no anxiety about evils, that he desires them, that he\nbrings them into being, to have the glory of allaying them. God wills order\nand good; but it happens sometimes that what is disorder in the part is\norder in the whole. I have already stated this legal axiom: _Incivile est\nnisi tota lege inspecta judicare_. The permission of evils comes from a\nkind of moral necessity: God is constrained to this by his wisdom and by\nhis goodness; _this necessity is happy_, whereas that of the prince spoken\nof in the maxim is _unhappy_. His State is one of the most corrupt; and the\ngovernment of God is the best State possible.\n\n129. XIV. 'The permission of a certain evil is only excusable when one\ncannot remedy it without introducing a greater evil; but it cannot be\nexcusable in those who have in hand a remedy more efficacious against this\nevil, and against all the other evils that could spring from the\nsuppression of this one.'\n\nThe maxim is true, but it cannot be brought forward against the government\nof God. Supreme reason constrains him to permit the evil. If God chose what\nwould not be the best absolutely and in all, that would be a greater evil\nthan all the individual evils which he could prevent by this means. This\nwrong choice would destroy his wisdom and his goodness.\n\n130. XV. 'The Being infinitely powerful, Creator of matter and of spirits,\nmakes whatever he wills of this matter and these spirits. There is no\nsituation or shape that he cannot communicate to spirits. If he then\npermitted a physical or a moral evil, this would not be for the reason that\notherwise some other still greater physical or moral evil would be\naltogether inevitable. None of those reasons for the mixture of good and\nevil which are founded on the limitation of the forces of benefactors can\napply to him.'\n\nIt is true that God makes of matter and of spirits whatever he wills; but\nhe is like a good sculptor, who will make from his block of marble only\nthat which he judges to be the best, and who judges well. God makes of\nmatter the most excellent of all possible machines; he makes of spirits the\nmost excellent of all governments conceivable; and over and above all that,\nhe establishes for their union the most perfect of all harmonies,     [202]\naccording to the system I have proposed. Now since physical evil and moral\nevil occur in this perfect work, one must conclude (contrary to M. Bayle's\nassurance here) that _otherwise a still greater evil would have been\naltogether inevitable_. This great evil would be that God would have chosen\nill if he had chosen otherwise than he has chosen. It is true that God is\ninfinitely powerful; but his power is indeterminate, goodness and wisdom\ncombined determine him to produce the best. M. Bayle makes elsewhere an\nobjection which is peculiar to him, which he derives from the opinions of\nthe modern Cartesians. They say that God could have given to souls what\nthoughts he would, without making them depend upon any relation to the\nbody: by this means souls would be spared a great number of evils which\nonly spring from derangement of the body. More will be said of this later;\nnow it is sufficient to bear in mind that God cannot establish a system\nill-connected and full of dissonances. It is to some extent the nature of\nsouls to represent bodies.\n\n131. XVI. 'One is just as much the cause of an event when one brings it\nabout in moral ways, as when one brings it about in physical ways. A\nMinister of State, who, without going out of his study, and simply by\nutilizing the passions of the leaders of a faction, overthrew all their\nplots, would thus be bringing about the ruin of this faction, no less than\nif he destroyed it by a surprise attack.'\n\nI have nothing to say against this maxim. Evil is always attributed to\nmoral causes, and not always to physical causes. Here I observe simply that\nif I could not prevent the sin of others except by committing a sin myself,\nI should be justified in permitting it, and I should not be accessary\nthereto, or its moral cause. In God, every fault would represent a sin; it\nwould be even more than sin, for it would destroy Divinity. And it would be\na great fault in him not to choose the best. I have said so many times. He\nwould then prevent sin by something worse than all sins.\n\n132. XVII. 'It is all the same whether one employ a necessary cause, or\nemploy a free cause while choosing the moments when one knows it to be\ndetermined. If I imagine that gunpowder has the power to ignite or not to\nignite when fire touches it, and if I know for certain that it will be\ndisposed to ignite at eight o'clock in the morning, I shall be just as much\nthe cause of its effects if I apply the fire to it at that hour, as I\nshould be in assuming, as is the case, that it is a necessary cause.  [203]\nFor where I am concerned it would no longer be a free cause. I should be\ncatching it at the moment when I knew it to be necessitated by its own\nchoice. It is impossible for a being to be free or indifferent with regard\nto that to which it is already determined, and at the time when it is\ndetermined thereto. All that which exists exists of necessity while it\nexists. [Greek: To einai to on hotan ei, kai to me einai hotan me ei,\nananke.] \"Necesse est id quod est, quando est, esse; et id quod non est,\nquando non est, non esse\": Arist., _De Interpret._, cap. 9. The Nominalists\nhave adopted this maxim of Aristotle. Scotus and sundry other Schoolmen\nappear to reject it, but fundamentally their distinctions come to the same\nthing. See the Jesuits of Coimbra on this passage from Aristotle, p. 380\n_et seq._)'\n\nThis maxim may pass also; I would wish only to change something in the\nphraseology. I would not take 'free' and 'indifferent' for one and the same\nthing, and would not place 'free' and 'determined' in antithesis. One is\nnever altogether indifferent with an indifference of equipoise; one is\nalways more inclined and consequently more determined on one side than on\nanother: but one is never necessitated to the choice that one makes. I mean\nhere a _necessity_ absolute and metaphysical; for it must be admitted that\nGod, that wisdom, is prompted to the best by a _moral_ necessity. It must\nbe admitted also that one is necessitated to the choice by a hypothetical\nnecessity, when one actually makes the choice; and even before one is\nnecessitated thereto by the very truth of the futurition, since one will do\nit. These hypothetical necessities do no harm. I have spoken sufficiently\non this point already.\n\n133. XVIII. 'When a whole great people has become guilty of rebellion, it\nis not showing clemency to pardon the hundred thousandth part, and to kill\nall the rest, not excepting even babes and sucklings.'\n\nIt seems to be assumed here that there are a hundred thousand times more\ndamned than saved, and that children dying unbaptized are included among\nthe former. Both these points are disputed, and especially the damnation of\nthese children. I have spoken of this above. M. Bayle urges the same\nobjection elsewhere (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III,\nch. 178, p. 1223): 'We see clearly', he says, 'that the Sovereign who\nwishes to exercise both justice and clemency when a city has revolted must\nbe content with the punishment of a small number of mutineers, and    [204]\npardon all the rest. For if the number of those who are chastised is as a\nthousand to one, in comparison with those whom he freely pardons, he cannot\nbe accounted mild, but, on the contrary, cruel. He would assuredly be\naccounted an abominable tyrant if he chose punishments of long duration,\nand if he eschewed bloodshed only because he was convinced that men would\nprefer death to a miserable life; and if, finally, the desire to take\nrevenge were more responsible for his severities than the desire to turn to\nthe service of the common weal the penalty that he would inflict on almost\nall the rebels. Criminals who are executed are considered to expiate their\ncrimes so completely by the loss of their life, that the public requires\nnothing more, and is indignant when executioners are clumsy. These would be\nstoned if they were known deliberately to give repeated strokes of the axe;\nand the judges who are present at the execution would not be immune from\ndanger if they were thought to take pleasure in this evil sport of the\nexecutioners, and to have surreptitiously urged them to practise it.' (Note\nthat this is not to be understood as strictly universal. There are cases\nwhere the people approve of the slow killing of certain criminals, as when\nFrancis I thus put to death some persons accused of heresy after the\nnotorious Placards of 1534. No pity was shown to Ravaillac, who was\ntortured in divers horrible ways. See the _French Mercury_, vol. I, fol.\nm., 455 _et seq._ See also Pierre Matthieu in his _History of the Death of\nHenry IV_; and do not forget what he says on page m. 99 concerning the\ndiscussion by the judges with regard to the torture of this parricide.)\n'Finally it is an exceptionally notorious fact that Rulers who should be\nguided by St. Paul, I mean who should condemn to the extreme penalty all\nthose whom he condemns to eternal death, would be accounted enemies of the\nhuman kind and destroyers of their communities. It is incontestable that\ntheir laws, far from being fitted, in accordance with the aim of\nlegislators, to uphold society, would be its complete ruin. (Apply here\nthese words of Pliny the Younger, _Epist._, 22, lib. 8: Mandemus memoriae\nquod vir mitissimus, et ob hoc quoque maximus, Thrasea crebro dicere\nsolebat, Qui vitia odit, homines odit.)' He adds that it was said of the\nlaws of Draco, an Athenian lawgiver, that they had not been written with\nink, but with blood, because they punished all sins with the extreme\npenalty, and because damnation is a penalty even worse than death. But it\nmust be borne in mind that damnation is a consequence of sin. Thus I  [205]\nonce answered a friend, who raised as an objection the disproportion\nexisting between an eternal punishment and a limited crime, that there is\nno injustice when the continuation of the punishment is only a result of\nthe continuation of the sin. I will speak further on this point later. As\nfor the number of the damned, even though it should be incomparably greater\namong men than the number of the saved, that would not preclude the\npossibility that in the universe the happy creatures infinitely outnumber\nthose who are unhappy. Such examples as that of a prince who punishes only\nthe leaders of rebels or of a general who has a regiment decimated, are of\nno importance here. Self-interest compels the prince and the general to\npardon the guilty, even though they should remain wicked. God only pardons\nthose who become better: he can distinguish them; and this severity is more\nconsistent with perfect justice. But if anyone asks why God gives not to\nall the grace of conversion, the question is of a different nature, having\nno relation to the present maxim. I have already answered it in a sense,\nnot in order to find God's reasons, but to show that he cannot lack such,\nand that there are no opposing reasons of any validity. Moreover, we know\nthat sometimes whole cities are destroyed and the inhabitants put to the\nsword, to inspire terror in the rest. That may serve to shorten a great war\nor a rebellion, and would mean a saving of blood through the shedding of\nit: there is no decimation there. We cannot assert, indeed, that the wicked\nof our globe are punished so severely in order to intimidate the\ninhabitants of the other globes and to make them better. Yet an abundance\nof reasons in the universal harmony which are unknown to us, because we\nknow not sufficiently the extent of the city of God, nor the form of the\ngeneral republic of spirits, nor even the whole architecture of bodies, may\nproduce the same effect.\n\n134. XIX. 'Those physicians who chose, among many remedies capable of\ncuring a sick man, whereof divers were such as they well knew he would take\nwith enjoyment, precisely that one which they knew he would refuse to take,\nwould vainly urge and pray him not to refuse it; we should still have just\ncause for thinking that they had no desire to cure him: for if they wished\nto do so, they would choose for him among those good medicines one which\nthey knew he would willingly swallow. If, moreover, they knew that\nrejection of the remedy they offered him would augment his sickness to[206]\nthe point of making it fatal, one could not help saying that, despite all\ntheir exhortations, they must certainly be desirous of the sick man's\ndeath.'\n\nGod wishes to save all men: that means that he would save them if men\nthemselves did not prevent it, and did not refuse to receive his grace; and\nhe is not bound or prompted by reason always to overcome their evil will.\nHe does so sometimes nevertheless, when superior reasons allow of it, and\nwhen his consequent and decretory will, which results from all his reasons,\nmakes him resolve upon the election of a certain number of men. He gives\naids to all for their conversion and for perseverance, and these aids\nsuffice in those who have good will, but they do not always suffice to give\ngood will. Men obtain this good will either through particular aids or\nthrough circumstances which cause the success of the general aids. God\ncannot refrain from offering other remedies which he knows men will reject,\nbringing upon themselves all the greater guilt: but shall one wish that God\nbe unjust in order that man may be less criminal? Moreover, the grace that\ndoes not serve the one may serve the other, and indeed always serves the\ntotality of God's plan, which is the best possible in conception. Shall God\nnot give the rain, because there are low-lying places which will be thereby\nincommoded? Shall the sun not shine as much as it should for the world in\ngeneral, because there are places which will be too much dried up in\nconsequence? In short, all these comparisons, spoken of in these maxims\nthat M. Bayle has just given, of a physician, a benefactor, a minister of\nState, a prince, are exceedingly lame, because it is well known what their\nduties are and what can and ought to be the object of their cares: they\nhave scarce more than the one affair, and they often fail therein through\nnegligence or malice. God's object has in it something infinite, his cares\nembrace the universe: what we know thereof is almost nothing, and we desire\nto gauge his wisdom and his goodness by our knowledge. What temerity, or\nrather what absurdity! The objections are on false assumptions; it is\nsenseless to pass judgement on the point of law when one does not know the\nmatter of fact. To say with St. Paul, _O altitudo divitiarum et\nsapientiae,_ is not renouncing reason, it is rather employing the reasons\nthat we know, for they teach us that immensity of God whereof the Apostle\nspeaks. But therein we confess our ignorance of the facts, and we\nacknowledge, moreover, before we see it, that God does all the best   [207]\npossible, in accordance with the infinite wisdom which guides his actions.\nIt is true that we have already before our eyes proofs and tests of this,\nwhen we see something entire, some whole complete in itself, and isolated,\nso to speak, among the works of God. Such a whole, shaped as it were by the\nhand of God, is a plant, an animal, a man. We cannot wonder enough at the\nbeauty and the contrivance of its structure. But when we see some broken\nbone, some piece of animal's flesh, some sprig of a plant, there appears to\nbe nothing but confusion, unless an excellent anatomist observe it: and\neven he would recognize nothing therein if he had not before seen like\npieces attached to their whole. It is the same with the government of God:\nthat which we have been able to see hitherto is not a large enough piece\nfor recognition of the beauty and the order of the whole. Thus the very\nnature of things implies that this order in the Divine City, which we see\nnot yet here on earth, should be an object of our faith, of our hope, of\nour confidence in God. If there are any who think otherwise, so much the\nworse for them, they are malcontents in the State of the greatest and the\nbest of all monarchs; and they are wrong not to take advantage of the\nexamples he has given them of his wisdom and his infinite goodness, whereby\nhe reveals himself as being not only wonderful, but also worthy of love\nbeyond all things.\n\n135. I hope it will be found that nothing of what is comprised in the\nnineteen maxims of M. Bayle, which we have just considered, has been left\nwithout a necessary answer. It is likely that, having often before\nmeditated on this subject, he will have put there all his strongest\nconvictions touching the moral cause of moral evil. There are, however,\nstill sundry passages here and there in his works which it will be well not\nto pass over in silence. Very often he exaggerates the difficulty which he\nassumes with regard to freeing God from the imputation of sin. He observes\n_(Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, ch. 161, p. 1024) that Molina,\nif he reconciled free will with foreknowledge, did not reconcile the\ngoodness and the holiness of God with sin. He praises the sincerity of\nthose who bluntly declare (as he claims Piscator did) that everything is to\nbe traced back to the will of God, and who maintain that God could not but\nbe just, even though he were the author of sin, even though he condemned\ninnocence. And on the other side, or in other passages, he seems to show\nmore approval of the opinions of those who preserve God's goodness at [208]\nthe expense of his greatness, as Plutarch does in his book against the\nStoics. 'It was more reasonable', he says, 'to say' (with the Epicureans)\n'that innumerable parts' (or atoms flying about at haphazard through an\ninfinite space) 'by their force prevailed over the weakness of Jupiter and,\nin spite of him and against his nature and will, did many bad and\nirrational things, than to agree that there is neither confusion nor\nwickedness but he is the author thereof.' What may be said for both these\nparties, Stoics and Epicureans, appears to have led M. Bayle to the [Greek:\nepechein] of the Pyrrhonians, the suspension of his judgement in respect of\nreason, so long as faith is set apart; and to that he professes sincere\nsubmission.\n\n136. Pursuing his arguments, however, he has gone as far as attempting\nalmost to revive and reinforce those of the disciples of Manes, a Persian\nheretic of the third century after Christ, or of a certain Paul, chief of\nthe Manichaeans in Armenia in the seventh century, from whom they were\nnamed Paulicians. All these heretics renewed what an ancient philosopher of\nUpper Asia, known under the name of Zoroaster, had taught, so it is said,\nof two intelligent principles of all things, the one good, the other bad, a\ndogma that had perhaps come from the Indians. Among them numbers of people\nstill cling to their error, one that is exceedingly prone to overtake human\nignorance and superstition, since very many barbarous peoples, even in\nAmerica, have been deluded by it, without having had need of philosophy.\nThe Slavs (according to Helmold) had their Zernebog or black God. The\nGreeks and Romans, wise as they seem to be, had a Vejovis or Anti-Jupiter,\notherwise called Pluto, and numerous other maleficent divinities. The\nGoddess Nemesis took pleasure in abasing those who were too fortunate; and\nHerodotus in some passages hints at his belief that all Divinity is\nenvious; which, however, is not in harmony with the doctrine of the two\nprinciples.\n\n137. Plutarch, in his treatise _On Isis and Osiris_, knows of no writer\nmore ancient than Zoroaster the magician, as he calls him, that is likely\nto have taught the two principles. Trogus or Justin makes him a King of the\nBactrians, who was conquered by Ninus or Semiramis; he attributes to him\nthe knowledge of astronomy and the invention of magic. But this magic was\napparently the religion of the fire-worshippers: and it appears that he\nlooked upon light and heat as the good principle, while he added the  [209]\nevil, that is to say, opacity, darkness, cold. Pliny cites the testimony of\na certain Hermippus, an interpreter of Zoroaster's books, according to whom\nZoroaster was a disciple in the art of magic to one named Azonacus; unless\nindeed this be a corruption of Oromases, of whom I shall speak presently,\nand whom Plato in the _Alcibiades_ names as the father of Zoroaster. Modern\nOrientals give the name Zerdust to him whom the Greeks named Zoroaster; he\nis regarded as corresponding to Mercury, because with some nations\nWednesday _(mercredi)_ takes its name from him. It is difficult to\ndisentangle the story of Zoroaster and know exactly when he lived. Suidas\nputs him five hundred years before the taking of Troy. Some Ancients cited\nby Pliny and Plutarch took it to be ten times as far back. But Xanthus the\nLydian (in the preface to Diogenes Laertius) put him only six hundred years\nbefore the expedition of Xerxes. Plato declares in the same passage, as M.\nBayle observes, that the magic of Zoroaster was nothing but the study of\nreligion. Mr. Hyde in his book on the religion of the ancient Persians\ntries to justify this magic, and to clear it not only of the crime of\nimpiety but also of idolatry. Fire-worship prevailed among the Persians and\nthe Chaldaeans also; it is thought that Abraham left it when he departed\nfrom Ur of the Chaldees. Mithras was the sun and he was also the God of the\nPersians; and according to Ovid's account horses were offered in sacrifice\nto him,\n\n  _Placat equo Persis radiis Hyperiona cinctum,_\n  _Ne detur celeri victima tarda Deo._\n\nBut Mr. Hyde believes that they only made use of the sun and fire in their\nworship as symbols of the Divinity. It may be necessary to distinguish, as\nelsewhere, between the Wise and the Multitude. There are in the splendid\nruins of Persepolis or of Tschelminaar (which means forty columns)\nsculptured representations of their ceremonies. An ambassador of Holland\nhad had them sketched at very great cost by a painter, who had devoted a\nconsiderable time to the task: but by some chance or other these sketches\nfell into the hands of a well-known traveller, M. Chardin, according to\nwhat he tells us himself. It would be a pity if they were lost. These ruins\nare one of the most ancient and most beautiful monuments of the earth; and\nin this respect I wonder at such lack of curiosity in a century so curious\nas ours.\n\n                                                                      [210]\n138. The ancient Greeks and the modern Orientals agree in saying that\nZoroaster called the good God Oromazes, or rather Oromasdes, and the evil\nGod Arimanius. When I pondered on the fact that great princes of Upper Asia\nhad the name of Hormisdas and that Irminius or Herminius was the name of a\ngod or ancient hero of the Scythian Celts, that is, of the Germani, it\noccurred to me that this Arimanius or Irminius might have been a great\nconqueror of very ancient time coming from the west, just as Genghis Khan\nand Tamburlaine were later, coming from the east. Arimanius would therefore\nhave come from the north-west, that is, from Germania and Sarmatia, through\nthe territory of the Alani and Massagetae, to raid the dominions of one\nOrmisdas, a great king in Upper Asia, just as other Scythians did in the\ndays of Cyaxares, King of the Medes, according to the account given by\nHerodotus. The monarch governing civilized peoples, and working to defend\nthem against the barbarians, would have gone down to posterity, amongst the\nsame peoples, as the good god; but the chief of these devastators will have\nbecome the symbol of the evil principle: that is altogether reasonable. It\nappears from this same mythology that these two princes contended for long,\nbut that neither of them was victorious. Thus they both held their own,\njust as the two principles shared the empire of the world according to the\nhypothesis attributed to Zoroaster.\n\n139. It remains to be proved that an ancient god or hero of the Germani was\ncalled Herman, Arimanius or Irminius. Tacitus relates that the three tribes\nwhich composed Germania, the Ingaevones, the Istaevones and the Herminones\nor Hermiones, were thus named from the three sons of Mannus. Whether that\nbe true or not, he wished in any case to indicate that there was a hero\nnamed Herminius, from whom he was told the Herminones were named.\nHerminones, Hermenner, Hermunduri all mean the same, that is, Soldiers.\nEven in the Dark Ages Arimanni were _viri militares,_ and there is _feudum\nArimandiae_ in Lombard law.\n\n140. I have shown elsewhere that apparently the name of one part of\nGermania was given to the whole, and that from these Herminones or\nHermunduri all the Teutonic peoples were named _Hermanni_ or _Germani_. The\ndifference between these two words is only in the force of the aspiration:\nthere is the same difference of initial letter between the _Germani_ of the\nLatins and _Hermanos_ of the Spaniards, or in the _Gammarus_ of the Latins\nand the _Hummer_ (that is, marine crayfish) of the Low Germans.       [211]\nBesides it is very usual for one part of a nation to give the name to the\nwhole: so all the Germani were called Alemanni by the French, and yet this,\naccording to the old nomenclature, only applied to the Suabians and the\nSwiss. Although Tacitus did not actually know the origin of the name of the\nGermani, he said something which supports my opinion, when he observed that\nit was a name which inspired terror, taken or given _ob metum_. In fact it\nsignifies a warrior: _Heer_, _Hari_ is army, whence comes _Hariban_, or\n'call to Haro', that is, a general order to be with the army, since\ncorrupted into _Arriereban_. Thus Hariman or Ariman, German _Guerre-man_,\nis a soldier. For as _Hari_, _Heer_ means army, so _Wehr_ signifies arms,\n_Wehren_ to fight, to make war, the word _Guerre_, _Guerra_ coming\ndoubtless from the same source. I have already spoken of the _feudum\nArimandiae_: not only did Herminones or Germani signify the same, but also\nthat ancient Herman, so-called son of Mannus, appears to have been given\nthis name as being pre-eminently a warrior.\n\n141. Now it is not the passage in Tacitus only which indicates for us this\ngod or hero: we cannot doubt the existence of one of this name among these\npeoples, since Charlemagne found and destroyed near the Weser the column\ncalled _Irminsaeule_, erected in honour of this god. And that combined with\nthe passage in Tacitus leaves us with the conclusion that it was not that\nfamous Arminius who was an enemy of the Romans, but a much greater and more\nancient hero, that this cult concerned. Arminius bore the same name as\nthose who are called Hermann to-day. Arminius was not great enough, nor\nfortunate enough, nor well enough known throughout Germania to attain to\nthe honour of a public cult, even at the hands of remote tribes, like the\nSaxons, who came long after him into the country of the Cherusci. And our\nArminius, taken by the Asiatics for the evil God, provides ample\nconfirmation of my opinion. For in these matters conjectures confirm one\nanother without any logical circle, when their foundations tend towards one\nand the same end.\n\n142. It is not beyond belief that the Hermes (that is, Mercury) of the\nGreeks is the same Herminius or Arimanius. He may have been an inventor or\npromoter of the arts and of a slightly more civilized life among his own\npeople and in the countries where he held supremacy, while amongst his\nenemies he was looked upon as the author of confusion. Who knows but that\nhe may have penetrated even into Egypt, like the Scythians who in     [212]\npursuit of Sesostris came nearly so far. Theut, Menes and Hermes were known\nand revered in Egypt. They might have been Tuiscon, his son Mannus and\nHerman, son of Mannus, according to the genealogy of Tacitus. Menes is held\nto be the most ancient king of the Egyptians; 'Theut' was with them a name\nfor Mercury. At least Theut or Tuiscon, from whom Tacitus derives the\ndescent of the Germani, and from whom the Teutons, _Tuitsche_ (that is,\nGermani) even to-day have their name, is the same as that _Teutates_ who\naccording to Lucan was worshipped by the Gauls, and whom Caesar took _pro\nDite Patre_, for Pluto, because of the resemblance between his Latin name\nand that of _Teut_ or _Thiet_, _Titan_, _Theodon_; this in ancient times\nsignified men, people, and also an excellent man (like the word 'baron'),\nin short, a prince. There are authorities for all these significations: but\none must not delay over this point. Herr Otto Sperling, who is well known\nfor various learned writings, but has many more in readiness to appear, in\na special dissertation has treated the question of this Teutates, God of\nthe Celts. Some observations which I imparted to him on that subject have\nbeen published, with his reply, in the _Literary News of the Baltic Sea_.\nHe interprets this passage from Lucan somewhat otherwise than I do:\n\n  _Teutates, pollensque feris altaribus Hesus,_\n  _Et Tamaris Scythicae non mitior ara Dianae._\n\nHesus was, it appears, the God of War, who was called Ares by the Greeks\nand Erich by the ancient Germani, whence still remains _Erichtag_, Tuesday.\nThe letters R and S, which are produced by the same organ, are easily\ninterchanged, for instance: _Moor_ and _Moos_, _Geren_ and _Gesen_, _Er\nwar_ and _Er was_, _Fer_, _Hierro_, _Eiron_, _Eisen_. Likewise _Papisius_,\n_Valesius_, _Fusius_, instead of _Papirius_, _Valerius_, _Furius_, with the\nancient Romans. As for Taramis or perhaps Taranis, one knows that _Taran_\nwas the thunder, or the God of Thunder, with the ancient Celts, called\n_Thor_ by the Germani of the north; whence the English have preserved the\nname 'Thursday', _jeudi_, _diem Jovis_. And the passage from Lucan means\nthat the altar of Taran, God of the Celts, was not less cruel than that of\nDiana in Tauris: _Taranis aram non mitiorem ara Dianae Scythicae fuisse_.\n\n143. It is also not impossible that there was a time when the western [213]\nor Celtic princes made themselves masters of Greece, of Egypt and a good\npart of Asia, and that their cult remained in those countries. When one\nconsiders with what rapidity the Huns, the Saracens and the Tartars gained\npossession of a great part of our continent one will be the less surprised\nat this; and it is confirmed by the great number of words in the Greek and\nGerman tongues which correspond so closely. Callimachus, in a hymn in\nhonour of Apollo, seems to imply that the Celts who attacked the Temple at\nDelphi, under their Brennus, or chief, were descendants of the ancient\nTitans and Giants who made war on Jupiter and the other gods, that is to\nsay, on the Princes of Asia and of Greece. It may be that Jupiter is\nhimself descended from the Titans or Theodons, that is, from the earlier\nCelto-Scythian princes; and the material collected by the late Abbe de la\nCharmoye in his _Celtic Origins_ conforms to that possibility. Yet there\nare opinions on other matters in this work by this learned writer which to\nme do not appear probable, especially when he excludes the Germani from the\nnumber of the Celts, not having recalled sufficiently the facts given by\nancient writers and not being sufficiently aware of the relation between\nthe ancient Gallic and Germanic tongues. Now the so-called Giants, who\nwished to scale the heavens, were new Celts who followed the path of their\nancestors; and Jupiter, although of their kindred, as it were, was\nconstrained to resist them. Just so did the Visigoths established in Gallic\nterritory resist, together with the Romans, other peoples of Germania and\nScythia, who succeeded them under Attila their leader, he being at that\ntime in control of the Scythian, Sarmatic and Germanic tribes from the\nfrontiers of Persia up to the Rhine. But the pleasure one feels when one\nthinks to find in the mythologies of the gods some trace of the old history\nof fabulous times has perhaps carried me too far, and I know not whether I\nshall have been any more successful than Goropius Becanus, Schrieckius,\nHerr Rudbeck and the Abbe de la Charmoye.\n\n144. Let us return to Zoroaster, who led us to Oromasdes and Arimanius, the\nsources of good and evil, and let us assume that he looked upon them as two\neternal principles opposed to each other, although there is reason to doubt\nthis assumption. It is thought that Marcion, disciple of Cerdon, was of\nthis opinion before Manes. M. Bayle acknowledges that these men used\nlamentable arguments; but he thinks that they did not sufficiently    [214]\nrecognize their advantages or know how to apply their principal instrument,\nwhich was the difficulty over the origin of evil. He believes that an able\nman on their side would have thoroughly embarrassed the orthodox, and it\nseems as though he himself, failing any other, wished to undertake a task\nso unnecessary in the opinion of many people. 'All the hypotheses' (he\nsays, _Dictionary_, v., 'Marcion', p. 2039) 'that Christians have\nestablished parry but poorly the blows aimed at them: they all triumph when\nthey act on the offensive; but they lose their whole advantage when they\nhave to sustain the attack.' He confesses that the 'Dualists' (as with Mr.\nHyde he calls them), that is, the champions of two principles, would soon\nhave been routed by _a priori_ reasons, taken from the nature of God; but\nhe thinks that they triumph in their turn when one comes to the _a\nposteriori_ reasons, which are taken from the existence of evil.\n\n145. He treats of the matter with abundant detail in his _Dictionary_,\narticle 'Manichaeans', p. 2025, which we must examine a little, in order to\nthrow greater light upon this subject: 'The surest and clearest ideas of\norder teach us', he says, 'that a Being who exists through himself, who is\nnecessary, who is eternal, must be single, infinite, all powerful, and\nendowed with all kinds of perfections.' This argument deserves to have been\ndeveloped more completely. 'Now it is necessary to see', he goes on, 'if\nthe phenomena of nature can be conveniently explained by the hypothesis of\none single principle.' I have explained it sufficiently by showing that\nthere are cases where some disorder in the part is necessary for producing\nthe greatest order in the whole. But it appears that M. Bayle asks a little\ntoo much: he wishes for a detailed exposition of how evil is connected with\nthe best possible scheme for the universe. That would be a complete\nexplanation of the phenomena: but I do not undertake to give it; nor am I\nbound to do so, for there is no obligation to do that which is impossible\nfor us in our existing state. It is sufficient for me to point out that\nthere is nothing to prevent the connexion of a certain individual evil with\nwhat is the best on the whole. This incomplete explanation, leaving\nsomething to be discovered in the life to come, is sufficient for answering\nthe objections, though not for a comprehension of the matter.\n\n146. 'The heavens and all the rest of the universe', adds M. Bayle, 'preach\nthe glory, the power, the oneness of God.' Thence the conclusion      [215]\nshould have been drawn that this is the case (as I have already observed\nabove) because there is seen in these objects something entire and\nisolated, so to speak. Every time we see such a work of God, we find it so\nperfect that we must wonder at the contrivance and the beauty thereof: but\nwhen we do not see an entire work, when we only look upon scraps and\nfragments, it is no wonder if the good order is not evident there. Our\nplanetary system composes such an isolated work, which is complete also\nwhen it is taken by itself; each plant, each animal, each man furnishes one\nsuch work, to a certain point of perfection: one recognizes therein the\nwonderful contrivance of the author. But the human kind, so far as it is\nknown to us, is only a fragment, only a small portion of the City of God or\nof the republic of Spirits, which has an extent too great for us, and\nwhereof we know too little, to be able to observe the wonderful order\ntherein. 'Man alone,' says M. Bayle, 'that masterpiece of his Creator among\nthings visible, man alone, I say, gives rise to great objections with\nregard to the oneness of God.' Claudian made the same observation,\nunburdening his heart in these well-known lines:\n\n  _Saepe mihi dubiam traxit sententia mentem_, etc.\n\nBut the harmony existing in all the rest allows of a strong presumption\nthat it would exist also in the government of men, and generally in that of\nSpirits, if the whole were known to us. One must judge the works of God as\nwisely as Socrates judged those of Heraclitus in these words: What I have\nunderstood thereof pleases me; I think that the rest would please me no\nless if I understood it.\n\n147. Here is another particular reason for the disorder apparent in that\nwhich concerns man. It is that God, in giving him intelligence, has\npresented him with an image of the Divinity. He leaves him to himself, in a\nsense, in his small department, _ut Spartam quam nactus est ornet_. He\nenters there only in a secret way, for he supplies being, force, life,\nreason, without showing himself. It is there that free will plays its game:\nand God makes game (so to speak) of these little Gods that he has thought\ngood to produce, as we make game of children who follow pursuits which we\nsecretly encourage or hinder according as it pleases us. Thus man is there\nlike a little god in his own world or _Microcosm_, which he governs   [216]\nafter his own fashion: he sometimes performs wonders therein, and his art\noften imitates nature.\n\n  _Jupiter in parvo cum cerneret aethera vitro,_\n    _Risit et ad Superos talia dicta dedit:_\n  _Huccine mortalis progressa potentia, Divi?_\n    _Jam meus in fragili luditur orbe labor._\n  _Jura poli rerumque fidem legesque Deorum_\n    _Cuncta Syracusius transtulit arte Senex._\n  _Quid falso insontem tonitru Salmonea miror?_\n    _Aemula Naturae est parva reperta manus._\n\nBut he also commits great errors, because he abandons himself to the\npassions, and because God abandons him to his own way. God punishes him\nalso for such errors, now like a father or tutor, training or chastising\nchildren, now like a just judge, punishing those who forsake him: and evil\ncomes to pass most frequently when these intelligences or their small\nworlds come into collision. Man finds himself the worse for this, in\nproportion to his fault; but God, by a wonderful art, turns all the errors\nof these little worlds to the greater adornment of his great world. It is\nas in those devices of perspective, where certain beautiful designs look\nlike mere confusion until one restores them to the right angle of vision or\none views them by means of a certain glass or mirror. It is by placing and\nusing them properly that one makes them serve as adornment for a room. Thus\nthe apparent deformities of our little worlds combine to become beauties in\nthe great world, and have nothing in them which is opposed to the oneness\nof an infinitely perfect universal principle: on the contrary, they\nincrease our wonder at the wisdom of him who makes evil serve the greater\ngood.\n\n148. M. Bayle continues: 'that man is wicked and miserable; that there are\neverywhere prisons and hospitals; that history is simply a collection of\nthe crimes and calamities of the human race.' I think that there is\nexaggeration in that: there is incomparably more good than evil in the life\nof men, as there are incomparably more houses than prisons. With regard to\nvirtue and vice, a certain mediocrity prevails. Machiavelli has already\nobserved that there are few very wicked and very good men, and that this\ncauses the failure of many great enterprises. I find it a great fault in\nhistorians that they keep their mind on the evil more than on the     [217]\ngood. The chief end of history, as also of poetry, should be to teach\nprudence and virtue by examples, and then to display vice in such a way as\nto create aversion to it and to prompt men to avoid it, or serve towards\nthat end.\n\n149. M. Bayle avows: 'that one finds everywhere both moral good and\nphysical good, some examples of virtue, some examples of happiness, and\nthat this is what makes the difficulty. For if there were only wicked and\nunhappy people', he says, 'there would be no need to resort to the\nhypothesis of the two principles.' I wonder that this admirable man could\nhave evinced so great an inclination towards this opinion of the two\nprinciples; and I am surprised at his not having taken into account that\nthis romance of human life, which makes the universal history of the human\nrace, lay fully devised in the divine understanding, with innumerable\nothers, and that the will of God only decreed its existence because this\nsequence of events was to be most in keeping with the rest of things, to\nbring forth the best result. And these apparent faults in the whole world,\nthese spots on a Sun whereof ours is but a ray, rather enhance its beauty\nthan diminish it, contributing towards that end by obtaining a greater\ngood. There are in truth two principles, but they are both in God, to wit,\nhis understanding and his will. The understanding furnishes the principle\nof evil, without being sullied by it, without being evil; it represents\nnatures as they exist in the eternal verities; it contains within it the\nreason wherefore evil is permitted: but the will tends only towards good.\nLet us add a third principle, namely power; it precedes even understanding\nand will, but it operates as the one displays it and as the other requires\nit.\n\n150. Some (like Campanella) have called these three perfections of God the\nthree primordialities. Many have even believed that there was therein a\nsecret connexion with the Holy Trinity: that power relates to the Father,\nthat is, to the source of Divinity, wisdom to the Eternal Word, which is\ncalled _logos_ by the most sublime of the Evangelists, and will or Love to\nthe Holy Spirit. Well-nigh all the expressions or comparisons derived from\nthe nature of the intelligent substance tend that way.\n\n151. It seems to me that if M. Bayle had taken into account what I have\njust said of the principles of things, he would have answered his own\nquestions, or at the least he would not have continued to ask, as he does\nin these which follow: 'If man is the work of a single principle      [218]\nsupremely good, supremely holy, supremely powerful, can he be subject to\ndiseases, to cold, heat, hunger, thirst, pain, grief? Can he have so many\nevil tendencies? Can he commit so many crimes? Can supreme goodness produce\nan unhappy creature? Shall not supreme power, united to an infinite\ngoodness, shower blessings upon its work, and shall it not banish all that\nmight offend or grieve?' Prudentius in his _Hamartigenia_ presented the\nsame difficulty:\n\n  _Si non vult Deus esse malum, cur non vetat? inquit._\n  _Non refert auctor fuerit, factorve malorum._\n  _Anne opera in vitium sceleris pulcherrima verti,_\n  _Cum possit prohibere, sinat; quod si velit omnes_\n  _Innocuos agere Omnipotens, ne sancta voluntas_\n  _Degeneret, facto nec se manus inquinet ullo?_\n  _Condidit ergo malum Dominus, quod spectat ab alto,_\n  _Et patitur fierique probat, tanquam ipse crearit._\n  _Ipse creavit enim, quod si discludere possit,_\n  _Non abolet, longoque sinit grassarier usu._\n\nBut I have already answered that sufficiently. Man is himself the source of\nhis evils: just as he is, he was in the divine idea. God, prompted by\nessential reasons of wisdom, decreed that he should pass into existence\njust as he is. M. Bayle would perchance have perceived this origin of evil\nin the form in which I demonstrate it here, if he had herein combined the\nwisdom of God with his power, his goodness and his holiness. I will add, in\npassing, that his _holiness_ is nothing other than the highest degree of\ngoodness, just as the crime which is its opposite is the worst of all evil.\n\n152. M. Bayle places the Greek philosopher Melissus, champion of the\noneness of the first principle (and perhaps even of the oneness of\nsubstance) in conflict with Zoroaster, as with the first originator of\nduality. Zoroaster admits that the hypothesis of Melissus is more\nconsistent with order and _a priori_ reasons, but he denies its conformity\nwith experience and _a posteriori_ reasons. 'I surpass you', he said, 'in\nthe explanation of phenomena, which is the principal mark of a good\nsystem.' But, in my opinion, it is not a very good explanation of a\nphenomenon to assign to it an _ad hoc_ principle: to evil, a _principium\nmaleficum_, to cold, a _primum frigidum_; there is nothing so easy and\nnothing so dull. It is well-nigh as if someone were to say that the   [219]\nPeripatetics surpass the new mathematicians in the explanation of the\nphenomena of the stars, by giving them _ad hoc_ intelligences to guide\nthem. According to that, it is quite easy to conceive why the planets make\ntheir way with such precision; whereas there is need of much geometry and\nreflexion to understand how from the gravity of the planets, which bears\nthem towards the sun, combined with some whirlwind which carries them\nalong, or with their own motive force, can spring the elliptic movement of\nKepler, which satisfies appearances so well. A man incapable of relishing\ndeep speculations will at first applaud the Peripatetics and will treat our\nmathematicians as dreamers. Some old Galenist will do the same with regard\nto the faculties of the Schoolmen: he will admit a chylific, a chymific and\na sanguific, and he will assign one of these _ad hoc_ to each operation; he\nwill think he has worked wonders, and will laugh at what he will call the\nchimeras of the moderns, who claim to explain through mechanical structure\nwhat passes in the body of an animal.\n\n153. The explanation of the cause of evil by a particular principle, _per\nprincipium maleficum_, is of the same nature. Evil needs no such\nexplanation, any more than do cold and darkness: there is neither _primum\nfrigidum_ nor principle of darkness. Evil itself comes only from privation;\nthe positive enters therein only by concomitance, as the active enters by\nconcomitance into cold. We see that water in freezing is capable of\nbreaking a gun-barrel wherein it is confined; and yet cold is a certain\nprivation of force, it only comes from the diminution of a movement which\nseparates the particles of fluids. When this separating motion becomes\nweakened in the water by the cold, the particles of compressed air\nconcealed in the water collect; and, becoming larger, they become more\ncapable of acting outwards through their buoyancy. The resistance which the\nsurfaces of the proportions of air meet in the water, and which opposes the\nforce exerted by these portions towards dilation, is far less, and\nconsequently the effect of the air greater, in large air-bubbles than in\nsmall, even though these small bubbles combined should form as great a mass\nas the large. For the resistances, that is, the surfaces, increase by the\n_square_, and the forces, that is, the contents or the volumes of the\nspheres of compressed air, increase by the _cube_, of their diameters. Thus\nit is _by accident_ that privation involves action and force. I have\nalready shown how privation is enough to cause error and malice, and  [220]\nhow God is prompted to permit them, despite that there be no malignity in\nhim. Evil comes from privation; the positive and action spring from it by\naccident, as force springs from cold.\n\n154. The statement that M. Bayle attributes to the Paulicians, p. 2323, is\nnot conclusive, to wit, that free will must come from two principles, to\nthe end that it may have power to turn towards good and towards evil: for,\nbeing simple in itself, it should rather have come from a neutral principle\nif this argument held good. But free will tends towards good, and if it\nmeets with evil it is by accident, for the reason that this evil is\nconcealed beneath the good, and masked, as it were. These words which Ovid\nascribes to Medea,\n\n      _Video meliora proboque,_\n  _Deteriora sequor_,\n\nimply that the morally good is mastered by the agreeably good, which makes\nmore impression on souls when they are disturbed by the passions.\n\n155. Furthermore, M. Bayle himself supplies Melissus with a good answer;\nbut a little later he disputes it. Here are his words, p. 2025: 'If\nMelissus consults the notions of order, he will answer that man was not\nwicked when God made him; he will say that man received from God a happy\nstate, but that not having followed the light of conscience, which in\naccordance with the intention of its author should have guided him along\nthe path of virtue, he has become wicked, and has deserved that God the\nsupremely good should make him feel the effects of his anger. It is\ntherefore not God who is the cause of moral evil: but he is the cause of\nphysical evil, that is, of the punishment of moral evil. And this\npunishment, far from being incompatible with the supremely good principle,\nof necessity emanates from that one of its attributes, I mean its justice,\nwhich is not less essential to it than its goodness. This answer, the most\nreasonable that Melissus can give, is fundamentally good and sound, but it\nmay be disputed by something more specious and more dazzling. For indeed\nZoroaster objects that the infinitely good principle ought to have created\nman not only without actual evil, but also without the inclination towards\nevil; that God, having foreseen sin with all its consequences, ought to\nhave prevented it; that he ought to have impelled man to moral good, and\nnot to have allowed him any force for tending towards crime.' That is quite\neasy to say, but it is not practicable if one follows the principles  [221]\nof order: it could not have been accomplished without perpetual miracles.\nIgnorance, error and malice follow one another naturally in animals made as\nwe are: should this species, then, have been missing in the universe? I\nhave no doubt but that it is too important there, despite all its\nweaknesses, for God to have consented to its abolition.\n\n156. M. Bayle, in the article entitled 'Paulicians' inserted by him in his\n_Dictionary_, follows up the pronouncements he made in the article on the\nManichaeans. According to him (p. 2330, lit. H) the orthodox seem to admit\ntwo first principles, in making the devil the originator of sin. M. Becker,\na former minister of Amsterdam, author of the book entitled _The World\nBewitched_, has made use of this idea in order to demonstrate that one\nshould not assign such power and authority to the Devil as would allow of\nhis comparison with God. Therein he is right: but he pushes the conclusions\ntoo far. And the author of the book entitled [Greek: Apokatastasis Panton]\nbelieves that if the Devil had never been vanquished and despoiled, if he\nhad always kept his prey, if the title of invincible had belonged to him,\nthat would have done injury to the glory of God. But it is a poor advantage\nto keep those whom one has led astray in order to share their punishment\nfor ever. And as for the cause of evil, it is true that the Devil is the\nauthor of sin. But the origin of sin comes from farther away, its source is\nin the original imperfection of creatures: that renders them capable of\nsinning, and there are circumstances in the sequence of things which cause\nthis power to evince itself in action.\n\n157. The devils were angels like the rest before their fall, and it is\nthought that their leader was one of the chief among angels; but Scripture\nis not explicit enough on that point. The passage of the Apocalypse that\nspeaks of the struggle with the Dragon, as of a vision, leaves much in\ndoubt, and does not sufficiently develop a subject which by the other\nsacred writers is hardly mentioned. It is not in place here to enter into\nthis discussion, and one must still admit that the common opinion agrees\nbest with the sacred text. M. Bayle examines some replies of St. Basil, of\nLactantius and others on the origin of evil. As, however, they are\nconcerned with physical evil, I postpone discussion thereof, and I will\nproceed with the examination of the difficulties over the moral cause of\nmoral evil, which arise in several passages of the works of our gifted\nauthor.\n\n                                                                      [222]\n158. He disputes the _permission_ of this evil, he would wish one to admit\nthat God _wills_ it. He quotes these words of Calvin (on Genesis, ch. 3):\n'The ears of some are offended when one says that God willed it. But I ask\nyou, what else is the permission of him who is entitled to forbid, or\nrather who has the thing in his own hands, but an act of will?' M. Bayle\nexplains these words of Calvin, and those which precede them, as if he\nadmitted that God willed the fall of Adam, not in so far as it was a crime,\nbut under some other conception that is unknown to us. He quotes casuists\nwho are somewhat lax, who say that a son can desire the death of his\nfather, not in so far as it is an evil for himself but in so far as it is a\ngood for his heirs _(Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, ch. 147, p.\n850). It seems to me that Calvin only says that God willed man's fall for\nsome reason unknown to us. In the main, when it is a question of a decisive\nwill, that is, of a decree, these distinctions are useless: one wills the\naction with all its qualities, if it is true that one wills it. But when it\nis a crime, God can only will the permission of it: the crime is neither an\nend nor a means, it is only a _conditio sine qua non_; thus it is not the\nobject of a direct will, as I have already demonstrated above. God cannot\nprevent it without acting against what he owes to himself, without doing\nsomething that would be worse than the crime of man, without violating the\nrule of the best; and that would be to destroy divinity, as I have already\nobserved. God is therefore bound by a moral necessity, which is in himself,\nto permit moral evil in creatures. There is precisely the case wherein the\nwill of a wise mind is only permissive. I have already said this: he is\nbound to permit the crime of others when he cannot prevent it without\nhimself failing in that which he owes to himself.\n\n159. 'But among all these infinite combinations', says M. Bayle (p. 853),\n'it pleased God to choose one wherein Adam was to sin, and by his decree he\nmade it, in preference to all the others, the plan that should come to\npass.' Very good; that is speaking my language; so long as one applies it\nto the combinations which compose the whole universe. 'You will therefore\nnever make us understand', he adds, 'how God did not will that Eve and Adam\nshould sin, since he rejected all the combinations wherein they would not\nhave sinned.' But the thing is in general very easy to understand, from all\nthat I have just said. This combination that makes the whole universe is\nthe best; God therefore could not refrain from choosing it without    [223]\nincurring a lapse, and rather than incur such, a thing altogether\ninappropriate to him, he permits the lapse or the sin of man which is\ninvolved in this combination.\n\n160. M. Jacquelot, with other able men, does not differ in opinion from me,\nwhen for example he says, p. 186 of his treatise on the _Conformity of\nFaith with Reason_: 'Those who are puzzled by these difficulties seem to be\ntoo limited in their outlook, and to wish to reduce all God's designs to\ntheir own interests. When God formed the universe, his whole prospect was\nhimself and his own glory, so that if we had knowledge of all creatures, of\ntheir diverse combinations and of their different relations, we should\nunderstand without difficulty that the universe corresponds perfectly to\nthe infinite wisdom of the Almighty.' He says elsewhere (p. 232):\n'Supposing the impossible, that God could not prevent the wrong use of free\nwill without destroying it, it will be agreed that since his wisdom and his\nglory determined him to form free creatures this powerful reason must have\nprevailed over the grievous consequences which their freedom might have.' I\nhave endeavoured to develop this still further through _the reason of the\nbest and the moral necessity_ which led God to make this choice, despite\nthe sin of some creatures which is involved therein. I think that I have\ncut down to the root of the difficulty; nevertheless I am well pleased, for\nthe sake of throwing more light on the matter, to apply my principle of\nsolution to the peculiar difficulties of M. Bayle.\n\n161. Here is one, set forth in these terms (ch. 148, p. 856): 'Would it in\na prince be a mark of his kindness: 1. To give to a hundred messengers as\nmuch money as is needed for a journey of two hundred leagues? 2. To promise\na recompense to all those who should finish the journey without having\nborrowed anything, and to threaten with imprisonment all those whom their\nmoney should not have sufficed? 3. To make choice of a hundred persons, of\nwhom he would know for certain that there were but two who should earn the\nrecompense, the ninety-eight others being destined to find on the way\neither a mistress or a gamester or some other thing which would make them\nincur expenses, and which he would himself have been at pains to dispose in\ncertain places along their path? 4. To imprison actually ninety-eight of\nthese messengers on the moment of their return? Is it not abundantly\nevident that he would have no kindness for them, and that on the contrary\nhe would intend for them, not the proposed recompense, but prison?    [224]\nThey would deserve it, certainly; but he who had wished them to deserve it\nand placed them in the sure way towards deserving it, should he be worthy\nof being called kind, on the pretext that he had recompensed the two\nothers?' It would doubtless not be on that account that he earned the title\nof 'kind'. Yet other circumstances may contribute, which would avail to\nrender him worthy of praise for having employed this artifice in order to\nknow those people, and to make trial of them; just as Gideon made use of\nsome extraordinary means of choosing the most valiant and the least\nsqueamish among his soldiers. And even if the prince were to know already\nthe disposition of all these messengers, may he not put them to this test\nin order to make them known also to the others? Even though these reasons\nbe not applicable to God, they make it clear, nevertheless, that an action\nlike that of this prince may appear preposterous when it is detached from\nthe circumstances indicating its cause. All the more must one deem that God\nhas acted well, and that we should see this if we fully knew of all that he\nhas done.\n\n162. M. Descartes, in a letter to the Princess Elizabeth (vol. 1, letter\n10) has made use of another comparison to reconcile human freedom with the\nomnipotence of God. 'He imagines a monarch who has forbidden duels, and\nwho, knowing for certain that two noblemen, if they meet, will fight, takes\nsure steps to bring about their meeting. They meet indeed, they fight:\ntheir disobedience of the law is an effect of their free will, they are\npunishable. What a king can do in such a case (he adds) concerning some\nfree actions of his subjects, God, who has infinite foreknowledge and\npower, certainly does concerning all those of men. Before he sent us into\nthis world he knew exactly what all the tendencies of our will would be: he\nhas endued us therewith, he also has disposed all other things that are\noutside us, to cause such and such objects to present themselves to our\nsenses at such and such a time. He knew that as a result of this our free\nwill would determine us toward some particular thing, and he has willed it\nthus; but he has not for that willed to constrain our free will thereto. In\nthis king one may distinguish two different degrees of will, the one\nwhereby he willed that these noblemen should fight, since he brought about\ntheir meeting, and the other whereby he did not will it, since he forbade\nduels. Even so theologians distinguish in God an absolute and independent\nwill, whereby he wills that all things be done just as they are done, [225]\nand another which is relative, and which concerns the merit or demerit of\nmen, whereby he wills that his Laws be obeyed' (Descartes, letter 10 of\nvol. 1, pp. 51, 52. Compare with that the quotation made by M. Arnauld,\nvol. 2, p. 288 _et seqq_. of his _Reflexions on the System of Malebranche_,\nfrom Thomas Aquinas, on the antecedent and consequent will of God).\n\n163. Here is M. Bayle's reply to that (_Reply to the Questions of a\nProvincial_, ch. 154, p. 943): 'This great philosopher is much mistaken, it\nseems to me. There would not be in this monarch any degree of will, either\nsmall or great, that these two noblemen should obey the law, and not fight.\nHe would will entirely and solely that they should fight. That would not\nexculpate them, they would only follow their passion, they would be unaware\nthat they conformed to the will of their sovereign: but he would be in\ntruth the moral cause of their encounter, and he would not more entirely\nwish it supposing he were to inspire them with the desire or to give them\nthe order for it. Imagine to yourself two princes each of whom wishes his\neldest son to poison himself. One employs constraint, the other contents\nhimself with secretly causing a grief that he knows will be sufficient to\ninduce his son to poison himself. Will you be doubtful whether the will of\nthe latter is less complete than the will of the former? M. Descartes is\ntherefore assuming an unreal fact and does not at all solve the\ndifficulty.'\n\n164. One must confess that M. Descartes speaks somewhat crudely of the will\nof God in regard to evil in saying not only that God knew that our free\nwill would determine us toward some particular thing, but also _that he\nalso wished it_, albeit he did not will to constrain the will thereto. He\nspeaks no less harshly in the eighth letter of the same volume, saying that\nnot the slightest thought enters into the mind of a man which God does not\n_will_, and has not willed from all eternity, to enter there. Calvin never\nsaid anything harsher; and all that can only be excused if it is to be\nunderstood of a permissive will. M. Descartes' solution amounts to the\ndistinction between the will expressed in the sign and the will expressive\nof the good pleasure (_inter voluntatem signi et beneplaciti_) which the\nmoderns have taken from the Schoolmen as regards the terms, but to which\nthey have given a meaning not usual among the ancients. It is true that God\nmay command something and yet not will that it be done, as when he\ncommanded Abraham to sacrifice his son: he willed the obedience, and he did\nnot will the action. But when God commands the virtuous action and    [226]\nforbids the sin, he wills indeed that which he ordains, but it is only by\nan antecedent will, as I have explained more than once.\n\n165. M. Descartes' comparison is therefore not satisfactory; but it may be\nmade so. One must make some change in the facts, inventing some reason to\noblige the prince to cause or permit the two enemies to meet. They must,\nfor instance, be together in the army or in other obligatory functions, a\ncircumstance the prince himself cannot hinder without endangering his\nState. For example, the absence of either of them might be responsible for\nthe disappearance of innumerable persons of his party from the army or\ncause grumbling among the soldiers and give rise to some great disturbance.\nIn this case, therefore, one may say that the prince does not will the\nduel: he knows of it, but he permits it notwithstanding, for he prefers\npermitting the sin of others to committing one himself. Thus this corrected\ncomparison may serve, provided that one observe the difference between God\nand the prince. The prince is forced into this permission by his\npowerlessness; a more powerful monarch would have no need of all these\nconsiderations; but God, who has power to do all that is possible, only\npermits sin because it is absolutely impossible to anyone at all to do\nbetter. The prince's action is peradventure not free from sorrow and\nregret. This regret is due to his imperfection, of which he is sensible;\ntherein lies displeasure. God is incapable of such a feeling and finds,\nmoreover, no cause therefor; he is infinitely conscious of his own\nperfection, and it may even be said that the imperfection in creatures\ntaken individually changes for him into perfection in relation to the\nwhole, and that it is an added glory for the Creator. What more can one\nwish, when one possesses a boundless wisdom and when one is as powerful as\none is wise; when one can do all and when one has the best?\n\n166. Having once understood these things, we are hardened sufficiently, so\nit seems to me, against the strongest and most spirited objections. I have\nnot concealed them: but there are some we shall merely touch upon, because\nthey are too odious. The Remonstrants and M. Bayle (_Reply to the Questions\nof a Provincial_, vol. III, ch. 152, end page 919) quote St. Augustine,\nsaying, '_crudelem esse misericordiam velle aliquem miserum esse ut eius\nmiserearis_': in the same sense is cited Seneca _De Benef._, L. 6, c. 36,\n37. I confess that one would have some reason to urge that against those\nwho believed that God has no other cause for permitting sin than the  [227]\ndesign to have something wherewith to exercise punitive justice against the\nmajority of men, and his mercy towards a small number of elect. But it must\nbe considered that God had reasons for his permission of sin, more worthy\nof him and more profound in relation to us. Someone has dared to compare\nGod's course of action with that of a Caligula, who has his edicts written\nin so small a hand and has them placarded in so high a place that it is not\npossible to read them; with that of a mother who neglects her daughter's\nhonour in order to attain her own selfish ends; with that of Queen\nCatherine de Medicis, who is said to have abetted the love-affairs of her\nladies in order to learn of the intrigues of the great; and even with that\nof Tiberius, who arranged, through the extraordinary services of the\nexecutioner, that the law forbidding the subjection of a virgin to capital\npunishment should no longer apply to the case of Sejanus's daughter. This\nlast comparison was proposed by Peter Bertius, then an Armenian, but\nfinally a member of the Roman communion. And a scandalous comparison has\nbeen made between God and Tiberius, which is related at length by Andreas\nCaroli in his _Memorabilia Ecclesiastica_ of the last century, as M. Bayle\nobserves. Bertius used it against the Gomarists. I think that arguments of\nthis kind are only valid against those who maintain that justice is an\narbitrary thing in relation to God; or that he has a despotic power which\ncan go so far as being able to condemn innocents; or, in short, that good\nis not the motive of his actions.\n\n167. At that same time an ingenious satire was composed against the\nGomarists, entitled _Fur praedestinatus, de gepredestineerdedief_, wherein\nthere is introduced a thief condemned to be hanged, who attributes to God\nall the evil he has done; who believes himself predestined to salvation\nnotwithstanding his wicked actions; who imagines that this belief is\nsufficient for him, and who defeats by arguments _ad hominem_ a\nCounter-remonstrant minister called to prepare him for death: but this\nthief is finally converted by an old pastor who had been dismissed for his\nArminianism, whom the gaoler, in pity for the criminal and for the weakness\nof the minister, had brought to him secretly. Replies were made to this\nlampoon, but replies to satires never please as much as the satires\nthemselves. M. Bayle (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III,\nch. 154, p. 938) says that this book was printed in England in the    [228]\ntime of Cromwell, and he appears not to have been informed that it was only\na translation of the much older original Flemish. He adds that Dr. George\nKendal wrote a confutation of it at Oxford in the year 1657, under the\ntitle of _Fur pro Tribunali_, and that the dialogue is there inserted. This\ndialogue presupposes, contrary to the truth, that the Counter-remonstrants\nmake God the cause of evil, and teach a kind of predestination in the\nMahometan manner according to which it does not matter whether one does\ngood or evil, and the assumption that one is predestined assures the fact.\nThey by no means go so far. Nevertheless it is true that there are among\nthem some Supralapsarians and others who find it hard to declare themselves\nin clear terms upon the justice of God and the principles of piety and\nmorals in man. For they imagine despotism in God, and demand that man be\nconvinced, without reason, of the absolute certainty of his election, a\ncourse that is liable to have dangerous consequences. But all those who\nacknowledge that God produces the best plan, having chosen it from among\nall possible ideas of the universe; that he there finds man inclined by the\noriginal imperfection of creatures to misuse his free will and to plunge\ninto misery; that God prevents the sin and the misery in so far as the\nperfection of the universe, which is an emanation from his, may permit it:\nthose, I say, show forth more clearly that God's intention is the one most\nright and holy in the world; that the creature alone is guilty, that his\noriginal limitation or imperfection is the source of his wickedness, that\nhis evil will is the sole cause of his misery; that one cannot be destined\nto salvation without also being destined to the holiness of the children of\nGod, and that all hope of election one can have can only be founded upon\nthe good will infused into one's heart by the grace of God.\n\n168. _Metaphysical considerations_ also are brought up against my\nexplanation of the moral cause of moral evil; but they will trouble me less\nsince I have dismissed the objections derived from moral reasons, which\nwere more impressive. These metaphysical considerations concern the nature\nof the _possible_ and of the _necessary_; they go against my fundamental\nassumption that God has chosen the best of all possible worlds. There are\nphilosophers who have maintained that there is nothing possible except that\nwhich actually happens. These are those same people who thought or could\nhave thought that all is necessary unconditionally. Some were of this [229]\nopinion because they admitted a brute and blind necessity in the cause of\nthe existence of things: and it is these I have most reason for opposing.\nBut there are others who are mistaken only because they misuse terms. They\nconfuse moral necessity with metaphysical necessity: they imagine that\nsince God cannot help acting for the best he is thus deprived of freedom,\nand things are endued with that necessity which philosophers and\ntheologians endeavour to avoid. With these writers my dispute is only one\nof words, provided they admit in very deed that God chooses and does the\nbest. But there are others who go further, they think that God could have\ndone better. This is an opinion which must be rejected: for although it\ndoes not altogether deprive God of wisdom and goodness, as do the advocates\nof blind necessity, it sets bounds thereto, thus derogating from God's\nsupreme perfection.\n\n169. The question of the _possibility of things that do not happen_ has\nalready been examined by the ancients. It appears that Epicurus, to\npreserve freedom and to avoid an absolute necessity, maintained, after\nAristotle, that contingent futurities were not susceptible of determinate\ntruth. For if it was true yesterday that I should write to-day, it could\ntherefore not fail to happen, it was already necessary; and, for the same\nreason, it was from all eternity. Thus all that which happens is necessary,\nand it is impossible for anything different to come to pass. But since that\nis not so it would follow, according to him, that contingent futurities\nhave no determinate truth. To uphold this opinion, Epicurus went so far as\nto deny the first and the greatest principle of the truths of reason, he\ndenied that every assertion was either true or false. Here is the way they\nconfounded him: 'You deny that it was true yesterday that I should write\nto-day; it was therefore false.' The good man, not being able to admit this\nconclusion, was obliged to say that it was neither true nor false. After\nthat, he needs no refutation, and Chrysippus might have spared himself the\ntrouble he took to prove the great principle of contradictories, following\nthe account by Cicero in his book _De Fato_: 'Contendit omnes nervos\nChrysippus ut persuadeat omne [Greek: Axioma] aut verum esse aut falsum. Ut\nenim Epicurus veretur ne si hoc concesserit, concedendum sit, fato fieri\nquaecunque fiant; si enim alterum ex aeternitate verum sit, esse id etiam\ncertum; si certum, etiam necessarium; ita et necessitatem et fatum\nconfirmari putat; sic Chrysippus metuit ne non, si non obtinuerit omne[230]\nquod enuncietur aut verum esse aut falsum, omnia fato fieri possint ex\ncausis aeternis rerum futurarum.' M. Bayle observes (_Dictionary_, article\n'Epicurus', let. T, p. 1141) 'that neither of these two great philosophers\n[Epicurus and Chrysippus] understood that the truth of this maxim, every\nproposition is true or false, is independent of what is called _fatum_: it\ncould not therefore serve as proof of the existence of the _fatum_, as\nChrysippus maintained and as Epicurus feared. Chrysippus could not have\nconceded, without damaging his own position, that there are propositions\nwhich are neither true nor false. But he gained nothing by asserting the\ncontrary: for, whether there be free causes or not, it is equally true that\nthis proposition, The Grand Mogul will go hunting to-morrow, is true or\nfalse. Men rightly regarded as ridiculous this speech of Tiresias: All that\nI shall say will happen or not, for great Apollo confers on me the faculty\nof prophesying. If, assuming the impossible, there were no God, it would\nyet be certain that everything the greatest fool in the world should\npredict would happen or would not happen. That is what neither Chrysippus\nnor Epicurus has taken into consideration.' Cicero, lib. I, _De Nat.\nDeorum_, with regard to the evasions of the Epicureans expressed the sound\nopinion (as M. Bayle observes towards the end of the same page) that it\nwould be much less shameful to admit that one cannot answer one's opponent,\nthan to have recourse to such answers. Yet we shall see that M. Bayle\nhimself confused the certain with the necessary, when he maintained that\nthe choice of the best rendered things necessary.\n\n170. Let us come now to the possibility of things that do not happen, and I\nwill give the very words of M. Bayle, albeit they are somewhat discursive.\nThis is what he says on the matter in his _Dictionary_ (article\n'Chrysippus', let. S, p. 929): 'The celebrated dispute on things possible\nand things impossible owed its origin to the doctrine of the Stoics\nconcerning fate. The question was to know whether, among the things which\nhave never been and never will be, there are some possible; or whether all\nthat is not, all that has never been, all that will never be, was\nimpossible. A famous dialectician of the Megaric Sect, named Diodorus, gave\na negative answer to the first of these two questions and an affirmative to\nthe second; but Chrysippus vehemently opposed him. Here are two passages of\nCicero (epist. 4, lib. 9, _Ad Familiar._): \"[Greek: peri dynaton] me scito\n[Greek: kata Diodoron krinein]. Quapropter si venturus es, scito      [231]\nnecesse esse te venire. Sin autem non es, [Greek: ton adynaton] est te\nvenire. Nunc vide utra te [Greek: krisis] magis delectet, [Greek:\nChrysippeia] ne, an haec; quam noster Diodorus [a Stoic who for a long time\nhad lived in Cicero's house] non concoquebat.\" This is quoted from a letter\nthat Cicero wrote to Varro. He sets forth more comprehensively the whole\nstate of the question, in the little book _De Fato_. I am going to quote a\nfew pieces (Cic., _De Fato_, p. m. 65): \"Vigila, Chrysippe, ne tuam causam,\nin qua tibi cum Diodoro valente Dialectico magna luctatio est, deseras ...\nomne ergo quod falsum dicitur in futuro, id fieri non potest. At hoc,\nChrysippe, minime vis, maximeque tibi de hoc ipso cum Diodoro certamen est.\nIlle enim id solum fieri posse dicit, quod aut sit verum, aut futurum sit\nverum; et quicquid futurum sit, id dicit fieri necesse esse; et quicquid\nnon sit futurum, id negat fieri posse. Tu etiam quae non sint futura, posse\nfieri dicis, ut frangi hanc gemmam, etiamsi id nunquam futurum sit: neque\nnecesse fuisse Cypselum regnare Corinthi, quamquam id millesimo ante anno\nApollinis Oraculo editum esset.... Placet Diodoro, id solum fieri posse,\nquod aut verum sit, aut verum futurum sit: qui locus attingit hanc\nquaestionem, nihil fieri, quod non necesse fuerit; et quicquid fieri\npossit, id aut esse jam, aut futurum esse: nec magis commutari ex veris in\nfalsa ea posse quae futura sunt, quam ea quae facta sunt: sed in factis\nimmutabilitatem apparere; in futuris quibusdam, quia non apparent, ne\ninesse quidem videri: ut in eo qui mortifero morbo urgeatur, verum sit, hic\nmorietur hoc morbo: at hoc idem si vere dicatur in eo, in quo tanta vis\nmorbi non appareat, nihilominus futurum sit. Ita fit ut commutatio ex vero\nin falsum, ne in futuro quidem ulla fieri possit.\" Cicero makes it clear\nenough that Chrysippus often found himself in difficulties in this dispute,\nand that is no matter for astonishment: for the course he had chosen was\nnot bound up with his dogma of fate, and, if he had known how, or had\ndared, to reason consistently, he would readily have adopted the whole\nhypothesis of Diodorus. We have seen already that the freedom he assigned\nto the soul, and his comparison of the cylinder, did not preclude the\npossibility that in reality all the acts of the human will were unavoidable\nconsequences of fate. Hence it follows that everything which does not\nhappen is impossible, and that there is nothing possible but that which\nactually comes to pass. Plutarch (_De Stoicor. Repugn._, pp. 1053, 1054)\ndiscomfits him completely, on that point as well as on the dispute    [232]\nwith Diodorus, and maintains that his opinion on possibility is altogether\ncontrary to the doctrine of _fatum_. Observe that the most eminent Stoics\nhad written on this matter without following the same path. Arrian (in\n_Epict._, lib. 2, c. 29, p. m. 166) named four of them, who are Chrysippus,\nCleanthes, Archidemus and Antipater. He evinces great scorn for this\ndispute; and M. Menage need not have cited him as a writer who had spoken\nin commendation of the work of Chrysippus [Greek: peri dynaton] (\"citatur\nhonorifice apud Arrianum\", Menag. in _Laert._, I, 7, 341) for assuredly\nthese words, \"[Greek: gegraphe de kai Chrysippos thaumastos], etc., de his\nrebus mira scripsit Chrysippus\", etc., are not in that connexion a eulogy.\nThat is shown by the passages immediately before and after it. Dionysius of\nHalicarnassus (_De Collocat. Verbor._, c. 17, p. m. 11) mentions two\ntreatises by Chrysippus, wherein, under a title that promised something\ndifferent, much of the logicians' territory had been explored. The work was\nentitled \"[Greek: peri tes syntaxeos ton tou logou meron], de partium\norationis collocatione\", and treated only of propositions true and false,\npossible and impossible, contingent and equivocal, etc., matter that our\nSchoolmen have pounded down and reduced to its essence. Take note that\nChrysippus recognized that past things were necessarily true, which\nCleanthes had not been willing to admit. (Arrian, _ubi supra_, p. m. 165.)\n\"[Greek: Ou pan de parelelythos alethes anankaion esti, kathaper hoi peri\nKleanthen pheresthai dokousi]. Non omne praeteritum ex necessitate verum\nest, ut illi qui Cleanthem sequuntur sentiunt.\" We have already seen (p.\n562, col. 2) that Abelard is alleged to have taught a doctrine which\nresembles that of Diodorus. I think that the Stoics pledged themselves to\ngive a wider range to possible things than to future things, for the\npurpose of mitigating the odious and frightful conclusions which were drawn\nfrom their dogma of fatality.'\n\nIt is sufficiently evident that Cicero when writing to Varro the words that\nhave just been quoted (lib. 9, Ep. 4, _Ad Familiar._) had not enough\ncomprehension of the effect of Diodorus's opinion, since he found it\npreferable. He presents tolerably well in his book _De Fato_ the opinions\nof those writers, but it is a pity that he has not always added the reasons\nwhich they employed. Plutarch in his treatise on the contradictions of the\nStoics and M. Bayle are both surprised that Chrysippus was not of the same\nopinion as Diodorus, since he favours fatality. But Chrysippus and even his\nmaster Cleanthes were on that point more reasonable than is supposed. [233]\nThat will be seen as we proceed. It is open to question whether the past is\nmore necessary than the future. Cleanthes held the opinion that it is. The\nobjection is raised that it is necessary _ex hypothesi_ for the future to\nhappen, as it is necessary _ex hypothesi_ for the past to have happened.\nBut there is this difference, that it is not possible to act on the past\nstate, that would be a contradiction; but it is possible to produce some\neffect on the future. Yet the hypothetical necessity of both is the same:\nthe one cannot be changed, the other will not be; and once that is past, it\nwill not be possible for it to be changed either.\n\n171. The famous Pierre Abelard expressed an opinion resembling that of\nDiodorus in the statement that God can do only that which he does. It was\nthe third of the fourteen propositions taken from his works which were\ncensured at the Council of Sens. It had been taken from the third book of\nhis _Introduction to Theology_, where he treats especially of the power of\nGod. The reason he gave for his statement was that God can do only that\nwhich he wills. Now God cannot will to do anything other than that which he\ndoes, because, of necessity, he must will whatever is fitting. Hence it\nfollows that all that which he does not, is not fitting, that he cannot\nwill to do it, and consequently that he cannot do it. Abelard admits\nhimself that this opinion is peculiar to him, that hardly anyone shares in\nit, that it seems contrary to the doctrine of the saints and to reason and\nderogatory to the greatness of God. It appears that this author was a\nlittle too much inclined to speak and to think differently from others: for\nin reality this was only a dispute about words: he was changing the use of\nterms. Power and will are different faculties, whose objects also are\ndifferent; it is confusing them to say that God can do only that which he\nwills. On the contrary, among various possibles, he wills only that which\nhe finds the best. For all possibles are regarded as objects of power, but\nactual and existing things are regarded as the objects of his decretory\nwill. Abelard himself acknowledged it. He raises this objection for\nhimself: a reprobate can be saved; but he can only be saved if God saves\nhim. God can therefore save him, and consequently do something that he does\nnot. Abelard answers that it may indeed be said that this man can be saved\nin respect of the possibility of human nature, which is capable of\nsalvation: but that it may not be said that God can save him in respect of\nGod himself, because it is impossible that God should do that which he[234]\nmust not do. But Abelard admits that it may very well be said in a sense,\nspeaking absolutely and setting aside the assumption of reprobation, that\nsuch an one who is reprobate can be saved, and that thus often that which\nGod does not can be done. He could therefore have spoken like the rest, who\nmean nothing different when they say that God can save this man, and that\nhe can do that which he does not.\n\n172. The so-called necessity of Wyclif, which was condemned by the Council\nof Constance, seems to arise simply from this same misunderstanding. I\nthink that men of talent do wrong to truth and to themselves when, without\nreason, they bring into use new and displeasing expressions. In our own\ntime the celebrated Mr. Hobbes supported this same opinion, that what does\nnot happen is impossible. He proves it by the statement that all the\nconditions requisite for a thing that shall not exist (_omnia rei non\nfuturae requisita_) are never found together, and that the thing cannot\nexist otherwise. But who does not see that that only proves a hypothetical\nimpossibility? It is true that a thing cannot exist when a requisite\ncondition for it is lacking. But as we claim to be able to say that the\nthing can exist although it does not exist, we claim in the same way to be\nable to say that the requisite conditions can exist although they do not\nexist. Thus Mr. Hobbes's argument leaves the matter where it is. The\nopinion which was held concerning Mr. Hobbes, that he taught an absolute\nnecessity of all things, brought upon him much discredit, and would have\ndone him harm even had it been his only error.\n\n173. Spinoza went further: he appears to have explicitly taught a blind\nnecessity, having denied to the Author of Things understanding and will,\nand assuming that good and perfection relate to us only, and not to him. It\nis true that Spinoza's opinion on this subject is somewhat obscure: for he\ngrants God thought, after having divested him of understanding,\n_cogitationem, non intellectum concedit Deo_. There are even passages where\nhe relents on the question of necessity. Nevertheless, as far as one can\nunderstand him, he acknowledges no goodness in God, properly speaking, and\nhe teaches that all things exist through the necessity of the divine\nnature, without any act of choice by God. We will not waste time here in\nrefuting an opinion so bad, and indeed so inexplicable. My own opinion is\nfounded on the nature of the possibles, that is, of things that imply [235]\nno contradiction. I do not think that a Spinozist will say that all the\nromances one can imagine exist actually now, or have existed, or will still\nexist in some place in the universe. Yet one cannot deny that romances such\nas those of Mademoiselle de Scudery, or as _Octavia_, are possible. Let us\ntherefore bring up against him these words of M. Bayle, which please me\nwell, on page 390, 'It is to-day', he says, 'a great embarrassment for the\nSpinozists to see that, according to their hypothesis, it was as impossible\nfrom all eternity that Spinoza, for instance, should not die at The Hague,\nas it is impossible for two and two to make six. They are well aware that\nit is a necessary conclusion from their doctrine, and a conclusion which\ndisheartens, affrights, and stirs the mind to revolt, because of the\nabsurdity it involves, diametrically opposed to common sense. They are not\nwell pleased that one should know they are subverting a maxim so universal\nand so evident as this one: All that which implies contradiction is\nimpossible, and all that which implies no contradiction is possible.'\n\n174. One may say of M. Bayle, 'ubi bene, nemo melius', although one cannot\nsay of him what was said of Origen, 'ubi male, nemo pejus'. I will only add\nthat what has just been indicated as a maxim is in fact the definition of\nthe _possible_ and the _impossible_. M. Bayle, however, adds here towards\nthe end a remark which somewhat spoils his eminently reasonable statement.\n'Now what contradiction would there be if Spinoza had died in Leyden? Would\nNature then have been less perfect, less wise, less powerful?' He confuses\nhere what is impossible because it implies contradiction with what cannot\nhappen because it is not meet to be chosen. It is true that there would\nhave been no contradiction in the supposition that Spinoza died in Leyden\nand not at The Hague; there would have been nothing so possible: the matter\nwas therefore indifferent in respect of the power of God. But one must not\nsuppose that any event, however small it be, can be regarded as indifferent\nin respect of his wisdom and his goodness. Jesus Christ has said divinely\nwell that everything is numbered, even to the hairs of our head. Thus the\nwisdom of God did not permit that this event whereof M. Bayle speaks should\nhappen otherwise than it happened, not as if by itself it would have been\nmore deserving of choice, but on account of its connexion with that entire\nsequence of the universe which deserved to be given preference. To say that\nwhat has already happened was of no interest to the wisdom of God, and[236]\nthence to infer that it is therefore not necessary, is to make a false\nassumption and argue incorrectly to a true conclusion. It is confusing what\nis necessary by moral necessity, that is, according to the principle of\nWisdom and Goodness, with what is so by metaphysical and brute necessity,\nwhich occurs when the contrary implies contradiction. Spinoza, moreover,\nsought a metaphysical necessity in events. He did not think that God was\ndetermined by his goodness and by his perfection (which this author treated\nas chimeras in relation to the universe), but by the necessity of his\nnature; just as the semicircle is bound to enclose only right angles,\nwithout either knowing or willing this. For Euclid demonstrated that all\nangles enclosed between two straight lines drawn from the extremities of\nthe diameter towards a point on the circumference of the circle are of\nnecessity right angles, and that the contrary implies contradiction.\n\n175. There are people who have gone to the other extreme: under the pretext\nof freeing the divine nature from the yoke of necessity they wished to\nregard it as altogether indifferent, with an indifference of equipoise.\nThey did not take into account that just as metaphysical necessity is\npreposterous in relation to God's actions _ad extra_, so moral necessity is\nworthy of him. It is a happy necessity which obliges wisdom to do good,\nwhereas indifference with regard to good and evil would indicate a lack of\ngoodness or of wisdom. And besides, the indifference which would keep the\nwill in a perfect equipoise would itself be a chimera, as has been already\nshown: it would offend against the great principle of the determinant\nreason.\n\n176. Those who believe that God established good and evil by an arbitrary\ndecree are adopting that strange idea of mere indifference, and other\nabsurdities still stranger. They deprive God of the designation _good_: for\nwhat cause could one have to praise him for what he does, if in doing\nsomething quite different he would have done equally well? And I have very\noften been surprised that divers Supralapsarian theologians, as for\ninstance Samuel Rutherford, a Professor of Theology in Scotland, who wrote\nwhen the controversies with the Remonstrants were at their height, could\nhave been deluded by so strange an idea. Rutherford (in his _Exercitationes\nApologeticae pro Gratia_) says positively that nothing is unjust or morally\nbad in God's eyes before he has forbidden it: thus without this prohibition\nit would be a matter of indifference whether one murdered or saved a  [237]\nman, loved God or hated him, praised or blasphemed him. Nothing is so\nunreasonable as that. One may teach that God established good and evil by a\npositive law, or one may assert that there was something good and just\nbefore his decree, but that he is not required to conform to it, and that\nnothing prevents him from acting unjustly and from perhaps condemning\ninnocence: but it all comes to the same thing, offering almost equal\ndishonour to God. For if justice was established arbitrarily and without\nany cause, if God came upon it by a kind of hazard, as when one draws lots,\nhis goodness and his wisdom are not manifested in it, and there is nothing\nat all to attach him to it. If it is by a purely arbitrary decree, without\nany reason, that he has established or created what we call justice and\ngoodness, then he can annul them or change their nature. Thus one would\nhave no reason to assume that he will observe them always, as it would be\npossible to say he will observe them on the assumption that they are\nfounded on reasons. The same would hold good more or less if his justice\nwere different from ours, if (for example) it were written in his code that\nit is just to make the innocent eternally unhappy. According to these\nprinciples also, nothing would compel God to keep his word or would assure\nus of its fulfilment. For why should the law of justice, which states that\nreasonable promises must be kept, be more inviolable for him than any other\nlaws?\n\n177. All these three dogmas, albeit a little different from one another,\nnamely, (1) that the nature of justice is arbitrary, (2) that it is fixed,\nbut it is not certain that God will observe it, and finally (3) that the\njustice we know is not that which he observes, destroy the confidence in\nGod that gives us tranquillity, and the love of God that makes our\nhappiness. There is nothing to prevent such a God from behaving as a tyrant\nand an enemy of honest folk, and from taking pleasure in that which we call\nevil. Why should he not, then, just as well be the evil principle of the\nManichaeans as the single good principle of the orthodox? At least he would\nbe neutral and, as it were, suspended between the two, or even sometimes\nthe one and sometimes the other. That would be as if someone were to say\nthat Oromasdes and Arimanius reign in turns, according to which of the two\nis the stronger or the more adroit. It is like the saying of a certain\nMoghul woman. She, so it seems, having heard it said that formerly under\nGenghis Khan and his successors her nation had had dominion over most [238]\nof the North and East, told the Muscovites recently, when M. Isbrand went\nto China on behalf of the Czar, through the country of those Tartars, that\nthe god of the Moghuls had been driven from Heaven, but that one day he\nwould take his own place again. The true God is always the same: natural\nreligion itself demands that he be essentially as good and wise as he is\npowerful. It is scarcely more contrary to reason and piety to say that God\nacts without cognition, than to maintain that he has cognition which does\nnot find the eternal rules of goodness and of justice among its objects, or\nagain to say that he has a will such as heeds not these rules.\n\n178. Some theologians who have written of God's right over creatures appear\nto have conceded to him an unrestricted right, an arbitrary and despotic\npower. They thought that would be placing divinity on the most exalted\nlevel that may be imagined for it, and that it would abase the creature\nbefore the Creator to such an extent that the Creator is bound by no laws\nof any kind with respect to the creature. There are passages from Twiss,\nRutherford and some other Supralapsarians which imply that God cannot sin\nwhatever he may do, because he is subject to no law. M. Bayle himself\nconsiders that this doctrine is monstrous and contrary to the holiness of\nGod (_Dictionary_, v. 'Paulicians', p. 2332 _in initio_); but I suppose\nthat the intention of some of these writers was less bad than it seems to\nbe. Apparently they meant by the term right, [Greek: anypeuthynian], a\nstate wherein one is responsible to none for one's actions. But they will\nnot have denied that God owes to himself what goodness and justice demand\nof him. On that matter one may see M. Amyraut's _Apology for Calvin_: it is\ntrue that Calvin appears orthodox on this subject, and that he is by no\nmeans one of the extreme Supralapsarians.\n\n179. Thus, when M. Bayle says somewhere that St. Paul extricates himself\nfrom predestination only through the consideration of God's absolute right,\nand the incomprehensibility of his ways, it is implied that, if one\nunderstood them, one would find them consistent with justice, God not being\nable to use his power otherwise. St. Paul himself says that it is a\n_depth_, but a depth of wisdom (_altitudo sapientiae_), and _justice_ is\nincluded in _the goodness of the All-wise_. I find that M. Bayle speaks\nvery well elsewhere on the application of our notions of goodness to the\nactions of God (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, ch. 81, p. 139):\n'One must not assert here', he says, 'that the goodness of the        [239]\ninfinite Being is not subject to the same rules as the goodness of the\ncreature. For if there is in God an attribute that can be called goodness,\nthe marks of goodness in general must apply to him. Now when we reduce\ngoodness to the most general abstraction, we find therein the will to do\ngood. Divide and subdivide into as many kinds as you shall please this\ngeneral goodness, into infinite goodness, finite goodness, kingly goodness,\ngoodness of a father, goodness of a husband, goodness of a master, you will\nfind in each, as an inseparable attribute, the will to do good.'\n\n180. I find also that M. Bayle combats admirably the opinion of those who\nassert that goodness and justice depend solely upon the arbitrary choice of\nGod; who suppose, moreover, that if God had been determined by the goodness\nof things themselves to act, he would be entirely subjected to necessity in\nhis actions, a state incompatible with freedom. That is confusing\nmetaphysical necessity with moral necessity. Here is what M. Bayle says in\nobjection to this error (_Reply_, ch. 89, p. 203): 'The consequence of this\ndoctrine will be, that before God resolved upon creating the world he saw\nnothing better in virtue than in vice, and that his ideas did not show him\nthat virtue was more worthy of his love than vice. That leaves no\ndistinction between natural right and positive right; there will no longer\nbe anything unalterable or inevitable in morals; it will have been just as\npossible for God to command people to be vicious as to command them to be\nvirtuous; and one will have no certainty that the moral laws will not one\nday be abrogated, as the ceremonial laws of the Jews were. This, in a word,\nleads us straight to the belief that God was the free author, not only of\ngoodness and of virtue, but also of truth and of the essence of things.\nThat is what certain of the Cartesians assert, and I confess that their\nopinion (see the Continuation of _Divers Thoughts on the Comet_, p. 554)\nmight be of some avail in certain circumstances. Yet it is open to dispute\nfor so many reasons, and subject to consequences so troublesome (see\nchapter 152 of the same Continuation) that there are scarcely any extremes\nit were not better to suffer rather than plunge into that one. It opens the\ndoor to the most exaggerated Pyrrhonism: for it leads to the assertion that\nthis proposition, three and three make six, is only true where and during\nthe time when it pleases God; that it is perhaps false in some parts of the\nuniverse; and that perhaps it will be so among men in the coming year.[240]\nAll that depends on the free will of God could have been limited to certain\nplaces and certain times, like the Judaic ceremonies. This conclusion will\nbe extended to all the laws of the Decalogue, if the actions they command\nare in their nature divested of all goodness to the same degree as the\nactions they forbid.'\n\n181. To say that God, having resolved to create man just as he is, could\nnot but have required of him piety, sobriety, justice and chastity, because\nit is impossible that the disorders capable of overthrowing or disturbing\nhis work can please him, that is to revert in effect to the common opinion.\nVirtues are virtues only because they serve perfection or prevent the\nimperfection of those who are virtuous, or even of those who have to do\nwith them. And they have that power by their nature and by the nature of\nrational creatures, before God decrees to create them. To hold a different\nopinion would be as if someone were to say that the rules of proportion and\nharmony are arbitrary with regard to musicians because they occur in music\nonly when one has resolved to sing or to play some instrument. But that is\nexactly what is meant by being essential to good music: for those rules\nbelong to it already in the ideal state, even when none yet thinks of\nsinging, since it is known that they must of necessity belong to it as soon\nas one shall sing. In the same way virtues belong to the ideal state of the\nrational creature before God decrees to create it; and it is for that very\nreason we maintain that virtues are good by their nature.\n\n182. M. Bayle has inserted a special chapter in his Continuation of _Divers\nThoughts on the Comet_ (it is chapter 152) where he shows 'that the\nChristian Doctors teach that there are things which are just antecedently\nto God's decrees'. Some theologians of the Augsburg Confession censured\nsome of the Reformed who appeared to be of a different opinion; and this\nerror was regarded as if it were a consequence of the absolute decree,\nwhich doctrine seems to exempt the will of God from any kind of reason,\n_ubi stat pro ratione voluntas_. But, as I have observed already on various\noccasions, Calvin himself acknowledged that the decrees of God are in\nconformity with justice and wisdom, although the reasons that might prove\nthis conformity in detail are unknown to us. Thus, according to him, the\nrules of goodness and of justice are anterior to the decrees of God. M.\nBayle, in the same place, quotes a passage from the celebrated M. Turretin\nwhich draws a distinction between natural divine laws and positive    [241]\ndivine laws. Moral laws are of the first kind and ceremonial of the second.\nSamuel Desmarests, a celebrated theologian formerly at Groningen, and Herr\nStrinesius, who is still at Frankfort on the Oder, advocated this same\ndistinction; and I think that it is the opinion most widely accepted even\namong the Reformed. Thomas Aquinas and all the Thomists were of the same\nopinion, with the bulk of the Schoolmen and the theologians of the Roman\nChurch. The Casuists also held to that idea: I count Grotius among the most\neminent of them, and he was followed in this point by his commentators.\nHerr Pufendorf appeared to be of a different opinion, which he insisted on\nmaintaining in the face of censure from some theologians; but he need not\nbe taken into account, not having advanced far enough in subjects of this\nkind. He makes a vigorous protest against the absolute decree, in his\n_Fecialis divinus_, and yet he approves what is worst in the opinions of\nthe champions of this decree, and without which this decree (as others of\nthe Reformed explain) becomes endurable. Aristotle was very orthodox on\nthis matter of justice, and the Schoolmen followed him: they distinguish,\njust as Cicero and the Jurists do, between perpetual right, which is\nbinding on all and everywhere, and positive right, which is only for\ncertain times and certain peoples. I once read with enjoyment the\n_Euthyphro_ of Plato, who makes Socrates uphold the truth on that point,\nand M. Bayle has called attention to the same passage.\n\n183. M. Bayle himself upholds this truth with considerable force in a\ncertain passage, which it will be well to quote here in its entirety, long\nas it is (vol. II of the Continuation of _Divers Thoughts on the Comet_,\nch. 152, p. 771 _seqq._): 'According to the teaching of countless writers\nof importance', he says, 'there is in nature and in the essence of certain\nthings a moral good or evil that precedes the divine decree. They prove\nthis doctrine principally through the frightful consequences that attend\nthe opposite dogma. Thus from the proposition that to do wrong to no man\nwould be a good action, not in itself but by an arbitrary dispensation of\nGod's will, it would follow that God could have given to man a law directly\nopposed at all points to the commandments of the Decalogue. That is\nhorrifying. But here is a more direct proof, one derived from metaphysics.\nOne thing is certain, that the existence of God is not an effect of his\nwill. He exists not because he wills his existence, but through the   [242]\nnecessity of his infinite nature. His power and his knowledge exist through\nthe same necessity. He is all-powerful, he knows all things, not because he\nwills it thus, but because these are attributes necessarily identified with\nhim. The dominion of his will relates only to the exercise of his power, he\ngives effect outside himself only to that which he wills, and he leaves all\nthe rest in the state of mere possibility. Thence it comes that this\ndominion extends only over the existence of creatures, and not over their\nessential being. God was able to create matter, a man, a circle, or leave\nthem in nothingness, but he was not able to produce them without giving\nthem their essential properties. He had of necessity to make man a rational\nanimal and to give the round shape to a circle, since, according to his\neternal ideas, independent of the free decrees of his will, the essence of\nman lay in the properties of being animal and rational, and since the\nessence of the circle lay in having a circumference equally distant from\nthe centre as to all its parts. This is what has caused the Christian\nphilosophers to acknowledge that the essences of things are eternal, and\nthat there are propositions of eternal truth; consequently that the\nessences of things and the truth of the first principles are immutable.\nThat is to be understood not only of theoretical but also of practical\nfirst principles, and of all the propositions that contain the true\ndefinition of creatures. These essences and these truths emanate from the\nsame necessity of nature as the knowledge of God. Since therefore it is by\nthe nature of things that God exists, that he is all-powerful, and that he\nhas perfect knowledge of all things, it is also by the nature of things\nthat matter, the triangle, man and certain actions of man, etc., have such\nand such properties essentially. God saw from all eternity and in all\nnecessity the essential relations of numbers, and the identity of the\nsubject and predicate in the propositions that contain the essence of each\nthing. He saw likewise that the term just is included in these\npropositions: to esteem what is estimable, be grateful to one's benefactor,\nfulfil the conditions of a contract, and so on, with many others relating\nto morals. One is therefore justified in saying that the precepts of\nnatural law assume the reasonableness and justice of that which is\nenjoined, and that it would be man's duty to practise what they contain\neven though God should have been so indulgent as to ordain nothing in that\nrespect. Pray observe that in going back with our visionary thoughts to\nthat ideal moment when God has yet decreed nothing, we find in the    [243]\nideas of God the principles of morals under terms that imply an obligation.\nWe understand these maxims as certain, and derived from the eternal and\nimmutable order: it beseems the rational creature to conform to reason; a\nrational creature conforming to reason is to be commended, but not\nconforming thereto is blameworthy. You would not dare to deny that these\ntruths impose upon man a duty in relation to all acts which are in\nconformity with strict reason, such as these: one must esteem all that is\nestimable; render good for good; do wrong to no man; honour one's father;\nrender to every man that which is his due, etc. Now since by the very\nnature of things, and before the divine laws, the truths of morality impose\nupon man certain duties, Thomas Aquinas and Grotius were justified in\nsaying that if there were no God we should nevertheless be obliged to\nconform to natural law. Others have said that even supposing all rational\nbeings in existence were to perish, true propositions would remain true.\nCajetan maintained that if he remained alone in the universe, all other\nthings without any exception having been destroyed, the knowledge that he\nhad of the nature of a rose would nevertheless subsist.'\n\n184. The late Jacob Thomasius, a celebrated Professor at Leipzig, made the\napt observation in his elucidations of the philosophic rules of Daniel\nStahl, a Jena professor, that it is not advisable to go altogether beyond\nGod, and that one must not say, with some Scotists, that the eternal\nverities would exist even though there were no understanding, not even that\nof God. For it is, in my judgement, the divine understanding which gives\nreality to the eternal verities, albeit God's will have no part therein.\nAll reality must be founded on something existent. It is true that an\natheist may be a geometrician: but if there were no God, geometry would\nhave no object. And without God, not only would there be nothing existent,\nbut there would be nothing possible. That, however, does not hinder those\nwho do not see the connexion of all things one with another and with God\nfrom being able to understand certain sciences, without knowing their first\nsource, which is in God. Aristotle, although he also scarcely knew that\nsource, nevertheless said something of the same kind which was very\napposite. He acknowledged that the principles of individual forms of\nknowledge depend on a superior knowledge which gives the reason for them;\nand this superior knowledge must have being, and consequently God, the[244]\nsource of being, for its object. Herr Dreier of Koenigsberg has aptly\nobserved that the true metaphysics which Aristotle sought, and which he\ncalled [Greek: ten zetoumenen], his _desideratum_, was theology.\n\n185. Yet the same M. Bayle, who says so much that is admirable in order to\nprove that the rules of goodness and justice, and the eternal verities in\ngeneral, exist by their nature, and not by an arbitrary choice of God, has\nspoken very hesitatingly about them in another passage (Continuation of\n_Divers Thoughts on the Comet_, vol. II, ch. 114, towards the end). After\nhaving given an account of the opinion of M. Descartes and a section of his\nfollowers, who maintain that God is the free cause of truths and of\nessences, he adds (p. 554): 'I have done all that I could to gain true\nunderstanding of this dogma and to find the solution of the difficulties\nsurrounding it. I confess to you quite simply that I still cannot properly\nfathom it. That does not discourage me; I suppose, as other philosophers in\nother cases have supposed, that time will unfold the meaning of this noble\nparadox. I wish that Father Malebranche had thought fit to defend it, but\nhe took other measures.' Is it possible that the enjoyment of doubt can\nhave such influence upon a gifted man as to make him wish and hope for the\npower to believe that two contradictories never exist together for the sole\nreason that God forbade them to, and, moreover, that God could have issued\nthem an order to ensure that they always walked together? There is indeed a\nnoble paradox! Father Malebranche showed great wisdom in taking other\nmeasures.\n\n186. I cannot even imagine that M. Descartes can have been quite seriously\nof this opinion, although he had adherents who found this easy to believe,\nand would in all simplicity follow him where he only made pretence to go.\nIt was apparently one of his tricks, one of his philosophic feints: he\nprepared for himself some loophole, as when for instance he discovered a\ntrick for denying the movement of the earth, while he was a Copernican in\nthe strictest sense. I suspect that he had in mind here another\nextraordinary manner of speaking, of his own invention, which was to say\nthat affirmations and negations, and acts of inner judgement in general,\nare operations of the will. Through this artifice the eternal verities,\nwhich until the time of Descartes had been named an object of the divine\nunderstanding, suddenly became an object of God's will. Now the acts of his\nwill are free, therefore God is the free cause of the verities. That  [245]\nis the outcome of the matter. _Spectatum admissi._ A slight change in the\nmeaning of terms has caused all this commotion. But if the affirmations of\nnecessary truths were actions of the will of the most perfect mind, these\nactions would be anything but free, for there is nothing to choose. It\nseems that M. Descartes did not declare himself sufficiently on the nature\nof freedom, and that his conception of it was somewhat unusual: for he\nextended it so far that he even held the affirmations of necessary truths\nto be free in God. That was preserving only the name of freedom.\n\n187. M. Bayle, who with others conceives this to be a freedom of\nindifference, that God had had to establish (for instance) the truths of\nnumbers, and to ordain that three times three made nine, whereas he could\nhave commanded them to make ten, imagines in this strange opinion,\nsupposing it were possible to defend it, some kind of advantage gained\nagainst the Stratonists. Strato was one of the leaders of the School of\nAristotle, and the successor of Theophrastus; he maintained (according to\nCicero's account) that this world had been formed such as it is by Nature\nor by a necessary cause devoid of cognition. I admit that that might be so,\nif God had so preformed matter as to cause such an effect by the laws of\nmotion alone. But without God there would not even have been any reason for\nexistence, and still less for any particular existence of things: thus\nStrato's system is not to be feared.\n\n188. Nevertheless M. Bayle is in difficulties over this: he will not admit\nplastic natures devoid of cognition, which Mr. Cudworth and others had\nintroduced, for fear that the modern Stratonists, that is, the Spinozists,\ntake advantage of it. This has involved him in disputes with M. le Clerc.\nUnder the influence of this error, that a non-intelligent cause can produce\nnothing where contrivance appears, he is far from conceding to me that\n_preformation_ which produces naturally the organs of animals, and _the\nsystem of a harmony pre-established by God_ in bodies, to make them respond\nin accordance with their own laws to the thoughts and the wills of souls.\nBut it ought to have been taken into account that this non-intelligent\ncause, which produces such beautiful things in the grains and seeds of\nplants and animals, and effects the actions of bodies as the will ordains\nthem, was formed by the hand of God: and God is infinitely more skilful\nthan a watchmaker, who himself makes machines and automata that are   [246]\ncapable of producing as wonderful effects as if they possessed\nintelligence.\n\n189. Now to come to M. Bayle's apprehensions concerning the Stratonists, in\ncase one should admit truths that are not dependent upon the will of God:\nhe seems to fear lest they may take advantage against us of the perfect\nregularity of the eternal verities. Since this regularity springs only from\nthe nature and necessity of things, without being directed by any\ncognition, M. Bayle fears that one might with Strato thence infer that the\nworld also could have become regular through a blind necessity. But it is\neasy to answer that. In the region of the eternal verities are found all\nthe possibles, and consequently the regular as well as the irregular: there\nmust be a reason accounting for the preference for order and regularity,\nand this reason can only be found in understanding. Moreover these very\ntruths can have no existence without an understanding to take cognizance of\nthem; for they would not exist if there were no divine understanding\nwherein they are realized, so to speak. Hence Strato does not attain his\nend, which is to exclude cognition from that which enters into the origin\nof things.\n\n190. The difficulty that M. Bayle has imagined in connexion with Strato\nseems a little too subtle and far-fetched. That is termed: _timere, ubi non\nest timor_. He makes another difficulty, which has just as slight a\nfoundation, namely, that God would be subjected to a kind of _fatum_. Here\nare his words (p. 555): 'If they are propositions of eternal truth, which\nare such by their nature and not by God's institution, if they are not true\nby a free decree of his will, but if on the contrary he has recognized them\nas true of necessity, because such was their nature, there is a kind of\n_fatum_ to which he is subjected; there is an absolutely insurmountable\nnatural necessity. Thence comes also the result that the divine\nunderstanding in the infinity of its ideas has always and at the outset hit\nupon their perfect conformity with their objects, without the guidance of\nany cognition; for it would be a contradiction to say that any exemplary\ncause had served as a plan for the acts of God's understanding. One would\nnever that way find eternal ideas or any first intelligence. One must say,\nthen, that a nature which exists of necessity always finds its way, without\nany need for it to be shown. How then shall we overcome the obstinacy of a\nStratonist?'\n\n191. But again it is easy to answer. This so-called _fatum_, which    [247]\nbinds even the Divinity, is nothing but God's own nature, his own\nunderstanding, which furnishes the rules for his wisdom and his goodness;\nit is a happy necessity, without which he would be neither good nor wise.\nIs it to be desired that God should not be bound to be perfect and happy?\nIs our condition, which renders us liable to fail, worth envying? And\nshould we not be well pleased to exchange it for sinlessness, if that\ndepended upon us? One must be indeed weary of life to desire the freedom to\ndestroy oneself and to pity the Divinity for not having that freedom. M.\nBayle himself reasons thus elsewhere against those who laud to the skies an\nextravagant freedom which they assume in the will, when they would make the\nwill independent of reason.\n\n192. Moreover, M. Bayle wonders 'that the divine understanding in the\ninfinity of its ideas always and at the outset hits upon their perfect\nconformity with their objects, without the guidance of any cognition'. This\nobjection is null and void. Every distinct idea is, through its\ndistinctness, in conformity with its object, and in God there are distinct\nideas only. At first, moreover, the object exists nowhere; but when it\ncomes into existence, it will be formed according to this idea. Besides, M.\nBayle knows very well that the divine understanding has no need of time for\nseeing the connexion of things. All trains of reasoning are in God in a\ntranscendent form, and they preserve an order amongst them in his\nunderstanding, as well as in ours: but with him it is only an order and a\n_priority of nature_, whereas with us there is a _priority of time_. It is\ntherefore not to be wondered at that he who penetrates all things at one\nstroke should always strike true at the outset; and it must not be said\nthat he succeeds without the guidance of any cognition. On the contrary, it\nis because his knowledge is perfect that his voluntary actions are also\nperfect.\n\n193. Up to now I have shown that the Will of God is not independent of the\nrules of Wisdom, although indeed it is a matter for surprise that one\nshould have been constrained to argue about it, and to do battle for a\ntruth so great and so well established. But it is hardly less surprising\nthat there should be people who believe that God only half observes these\nrules, and does not choose the best, although his wisdom causes him to\nrecognize it; and, in a word, that there should be writers who hold that\nGod could have done better. That is more or less the error of the famous\nAlfonso, King of Castile, who was elected King of the Romans by       [248]\ncertain Electors, and originated the astronomical tables that bear his\nname. This prince is reported to have said that if God in making the world\nhad consulted him he would have given God good advice. Apparently the\nPtolemaic system, which prevailed at that time, was displeasing to him. He\nbelieved therefore that something better planned could have been made, and\nhe was right. But if he had known the system of Copernicus, with the\ndiscoveries of Kepler, now extended by knowledge of the gravity of the\nplanets, he would indeed have confessed that the contrivance of the true\nsystem is marvellous. We see, therefore, that here the question concerned\nthe more or less only; Alfonso maintained that better could have been done,\nand his opinion was censured by everyone.\n\n194. Yet philosophers and theologians dare to support dogmatically such a\nbelief; and I have many times wondered that gifted and pious persons should\nhave been capable of setting bounds to the goodness and the perfection of\nGod. For to assert that he knows what is best, that he can do it and that\nhe does it not, is to avow that it rested with his will only to make the\nworld better than it is; but that is what one calls lacking goodness. It is\nacting against that axiom already quoted: _Minus bonum habet rationem\nmali_. If some adduce experience to prove that God could have done better,\nthey set themselves up as ridiculous critics of his works. To such will be\ngiven the answer given to all those who criticize God's course of action,\nand who from this same assumption, that is, the alleged defects of the\nworld, would infer that there is an evil God, or at least a God neutral\nbetween good and evil. And if we hold the same opinion as King Alfonso, we\nshall, I say, receive this answer: You have known the world only since the\nday before yesterday, you see scarce farther than your nose, and you carp\nat the world. Wait until you know more of the world and consider therein\nespecially the parts which present a complete whole (as do organic bodies);\nand you will find there a contrivance and a beauty transcending all\nimagination. Let us thence draw conclusions as to the wisdom and the\ngoodness of the author of things, even in things that we know not. We find\nin the universe some things which are not pleasing to us; but let us be\naware that it is not made for us alone. It is nevertheless made for us if\nwe are wise: it will serve us if we use it for our service; we shall be\nhappy in it if we wish to be.\n\n                                                                      [249]\n195. Someone will say that it is impossible to produce the best, because\nthere is no perfect creature, and that it is always possible to produce one\nwhich would be more perfect. I answer that what can be said of a creature\nor of a particular substance, which can always be surpassed by another, is\nnot to be applied to the universe, which, since it must extend through all\nfuture eternity, is an infinity. Moreover, there is an infinite number of\ncreatures in the smallest particle of matter, because of the actual\ndivision of the _continuum_ to infinity. And infinity, that is to say, the\naccumulation of an infinite number of substances, is, properly speaking,\nnot a whole any more than the infinite number itself, whereof one cannot\nsay whether it is even or uneven. That is just what serves to confute those\nwho make of the world a God, or who think of God as the Soul of the world;\nfor the world or the universe cannot be regarded as an animal or as a\nsubstance.\n\n196. It is therefore not a question of a creature, but of the universe; and\nthe adversary will be obliged to maintain that one possible universe may be\nbetter than the other, to infinity; but there he would be mistaken, and it\nis that which he cannot prove. If this opinion were true, it would follow\nthat God had not produced any universe at all: for he is incapable of\nacting without reason, and that would be even acting against reason. It is\nas if one were to suppose that God had decreed to make a material sphere,\nwith no reason for making it of any particular size. This decree would be\nuseless, it would carry with it that which would prevent its effect. It\nwould be quite another matter if God decreed to draw from a given point one\nstraight line to another given straight line, without any determination of\nthe angle, either in the decree or in its circumstances. For in this case\nthe determination would spring from the nature of the thing, the line would\nbe perpendicular, and the angle would be right, since that is all that is\ndetermined and distinguishable. It is thus one must think of the creation\nof the best of all possible universes, all the more since God not only\ndecrees to create a universe, but decrees also to create the best of all.\nFor God decrees nothing without knowledge, and he makes no separate\ndecrees, which would be nothing but antecedent acts of will: and these we\nhave sufficiently explained, distinguishing them from genuine decrees.\n\n197. M. Diroys, whom I knew in Rome, theologian to Cardinal d'Estrees,\nwrote a book entitled _Proofs and Assumptions in Favour of_ _the      [250]\nChristian Religion_, published in Paris in the year 1683. M. Bayle (_Reply\nto the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III, ch. 165, p. 1058) recounts\nthis objection brought up by M. Diroys: 'There is one more difficulty', he\nsays, 'which it is no less important to meet than those given earlier,\nsince it causes more trouble to those who judge goods and evils by\nconsiderations founded on the purest and most lofty maxims. This is that\nGod being the supreme wisdom and goodness, it seems to them that he ought\nto do all things as wise and virtuous persons would wish them to be done,\nfollowing the rules of wisdom and of goodness which God has imprinted in\nthem, and as they would be obliged themselves to do these things if they\ndepended upon them. Thus, seeing that the affairs of the world do not go so\nwell as, in their opinion, they might go, and as they would go if they\ninterfered themselves, they conclude that God, who is infinitely better and\nwiser than they, or rather wisdom and goodness itself, does not concern\nhimself with these affairs.'\n\n198. M. Diroys makes some apt remarks concerning this, which I will not\nrepeat, since I have sufficiently answered the objection in more than one\npassage, and that has been the chief end of all my discourse. But he makes\none assertion with which I cannot agree. He claims that the objection\nproves too much. One must again quote his own words with M. Bayle, p. 1059:\n'If it does not behove the supreme Wisdom and Goodness to fail to do what\nis best and most perfect, it follows that all Beings are eternally,\nimmutably and essentially as perfect and as good as they can be, since\nnothing can change except by passing either from a state less good to a\nbetter, or from a better to a less good. Now that cannot happen if it does\nnot behove God to fail to do that which is best and most perfect, when he\ncan do it. It will therefore be necessary that all beings be eternally and\nessentially filled with a knowledge and a virtue as perfect as God can give\nthem. Now all that which is eternally and essentially as perfect as God can\nmake it proceeds essentially from him; in a word, is eternally and\nessentially good as he is, and consequently it is God, as he is. That is\nthe bearing of this maxim, that it is repugnant to supreme justice and\ngoodness not to make things as good and perfect as they can be. For it is\nessential to essential wisdom and goodness to banish all that is repugnant\nto it altogether. One must therefore assert as a primary truth concerning\nthe conduct of God in relation to creatures that there is nothing repugnant\nto this goodness and this wisdom in making things less perfect than   [251]\nthey could be, or in permitting the goods that it has produced either\ncompletely to cease to be or to change and deteriorate. For it causes no\noffence to God that there should be other Beings than he, that is beings\nwho can be not what they are, and do not what they do or do what they do\nnot.'\n\n199. M. Bayle calls this answer paltry, but I find his counter-objection\ninvolved. M. Bayle will have those who are for the two principles to take\ntheir stand chiefly on the assumption of the supreme freedom of God: for if\nhe were compelled to produce all that which he can, he would produce also\nsins and sorrows. Thus the Dualists could from the existence of evil\nconclude nothing contrary to the oneness of the principle, if this\nprinciple were as much inclined to evil as to good. There M. Bayle carries\nthe notion of freedom too far: for even though God be supremely free, it\ndoes not follow that he maintains an indifference of equipoise: and even\nthough he be inclined to act, it does not follow that he is compelled by\nthis inclination to produce all that which he can. He will produce only\nthat which he wills, for his inclination prompts him to good. I admit the\nsupreme freedom of God, but I do not confuse it with indifference of\nequipoise, as if he could act without reason. M. Diroys therefore imagines\nthat the Dualists, in their insistence that the single good principle\nproduce no evil, ask too much; for by the same reason, according to M.\nDiroys, they ought also to ask that he should produce the greatest good,\nthe less good being a kind of evil. I hold that the Dualists are wrong in\nrespect of the first point, and that they would be right in respect of the\nsecond, where M. Diroys blames them without cause; or rather that one can\nreconcile the evil, or the less good, in some parts with the best in the\nwhole. If the Dualists demanded that God should do the best, they would not\nbe demanding too much. They are mistaken rather in claiming that the best\nin the whole should be free from evil in the parts, and that therefore what\nGod has made is not the best.\n\n200. But M. Diroys maintains that if God always produces the best he will\nproduce other Gods; otherwise each substance that he produced would not be\nthe best nor the most perfect. But he is mistaken, through not taking into\naccount the order and connexion of things. If each substance taken\nseparately were perfect, all would be alike; which is neither fitting nor\npossible. If they were Gods, it would not have been possible to       [252]\nproduce them. The best system of things will therefore not contain Gods; it\nwill always be a system of bodies (that is, things arranged according to\ntime and place) and of souls which represent and are aware of bodies, and\nin accordance with which bodies are in great measure directed. So, as the\ndesign of a building may be the best of all in respect of its purpose, of\nexpense and of circumstances; and as an arrangement of some figured\nrepresentations of bodies which is given to you may be the best that one\ncan find, it is easy to imagine likewise that a structure of the universe\nmay be the best of all, without becoming a god. The connexion and order of\nthings brings it about that the body of every animal and of every plant is\ncomposed of other animals and of other plants, or of other living and\norganic beings; consequently there is subordination, and one body, one\nsubstance serves the other: thus their perfection cannot be equal.\n\n201. M. Bayle thinks (p. 1063) that M. Diroys has confused two different\npropositions. According to the one, God must do all things as wise and\nvirtuous persons would wish that they should be done, by the rules of\nwisdom and of goodness that God has imprinted in them, and as they would be\nobliged themselves to do them if those things depended upon them. The other\nis that it is not consistent with supreme wisdom and goodness to fail to do\nwhat is best and most perfect. M. Diroys (in M. Bayle's opinion) sets up\nthe first proposition as an objection for himself, and replies to the\nsecond. But therein he is justified, as it seems to me. For these two\npropositions are connected, the second is a result of the first: to do less\ngood than one could is to be lacking in wisdom or in goodness. To be the\nbest, and to be desired by those who are most virtuous and wise, comes to\nthe same thing. And it may be said that, if we could understand the\nstructure and the economy of the universe, we should find that it is made\nand directed as the wisest and most virtuous could wish it, since God\ncannot fail to do thus. This necessity nevertheless is only of a moral\nnature: and I admit that if God were forced by a metaphysical necessity to\nproduce that which he makes, he would produce all the possibles, or\nnothing; and in this sense M. Bayle's conclusion would be fully correct.\nBut as all the possibles are not compatible together in one and the same\nworld-sequence, for that very reason all the possibles cannot be produced,\nand it must be said that God is not forced, metaphysically speaking,  [253]\ninto the creation of this world. One may say that as soon as God has\ndecreed to create something there is a struggle between all the possibles,\nall of them laying claim to existence, and that those which, being united,\nproduce most reality, most perfection, most significance carry the day. It\nis true that all this struggle can only be ideal, that is to say, it can\nonly be a conflict of reasons in the most perfect understanding, which\ncannot fail to act in the most perfect way, and consequently to choose the\nbest. Yet God is bound by a moral necessity, to make things in such a\nmanner that there can be nothing better: otherwise not only would others\nhave cause to criticize what he makes, but, more than that, he would not\nhimself be satisfied with his work, he would blame himself for its\nimperfection; and that conflicts with the supreme felicity of the divine\nnature. This perpetual sense of his own fault or imperfection would be to\nhim an inevitable source of grief, as M. Bayle says on another occasion\n(p.953).\n\n202. M. Diroys' argument contains a false assumption, in his statement that\nnothing can change except by passing from a state less good to a better or\nfrom a better to a less good; and that thus, if God makes the best, what he\nhas produced cannot be changed: it would be an eternal substance, a god.\nBut I do not see why a thing cannot change its kind in relation to good or\nevil, without changing its degree. In the transition from enjoyment of\nmusic to enjoyment of painting, or _vice versa_ from the pleasure of the\neyes to that of the ears, the degree of enjoyment may remain the same, the\nlatter gaining no advantage over the former save that of novelty. If the\nquadrature of the circle should come to pass or (what is the same thing)\nthe circulature of the square, that is, if the circle were changed into a\nsquare of the same size, or the square into a circle, it would be difficult\nto say, on the whole, without having regard to some special use, whether\none would have gained or lost. Thus the best may be changed into another\nwhich neither yields to it nor surpasses it: but there will always be an\norder among them, and that the best order possible. Taking the whole\nsequence of things, the best has no equal; but one part of the sequence may\nbe equalled by another part of the same sequence. Besides it might be said\nthat the whole sequence of things to infinity may be the best possible,\nalthough what exists all through the universe in each portion of time be\nnot the best. It might be therefore that the universe became even     [254]\nbetter and better, if the nature of things were such that it was not\npermitted to attain to the best all at once. But these are problems of\nwhich it is hard for us to judge.\n\n203. M. Bayle says (p. 1064) that the question whether God could have made\nthings more perfect than he made them is also very difficult, and that the\nreasons for and against are very strong. But it is, so it seems to me, as\nif one were to question whether God's actions are consistent with the most\nperfect wisdom and the greatest goodness. It is a very strange thing, that\nby changing the terms a little one throws doubt upon what is, if properly\nunderstood, as clear as anything can be. The reasons to the contrary have\nno force, being founded only on the semblance of defects; and M. Bayle's\nobjection, which tends to prove that the law of the best would impose upon\nGod a true metaphysical necessity, is only an illusion that springs from\nthe misuse of terms. M. Bayle formerly held a different opinion, when he\ncommended that of Father Malebranche, which was akin to mine on this\nsubject. But M. Arnauld having written in opposition to Father Malebranche,\nM. Bayle altered his opinion; and I suppose that his tendency towards\ndoubt, which increased in him with the years, was conducive to that result.\nM. Arnauld was doubtless a great man, and his authority has great weight:\nhe made sundry good observations in his writings against Father\nMalebranche, but he was not justified in contesting those of his statements\nthat were akin to mine on the rule of the best.\n\n204. The excellent author of _The Search for Truth_, having passed from\nphilosophy to theology, published finally an admirable treatise on Nature\nand Grace. Here he showed in his way (as M. Bayle explained in his _Divers\nThoughts on the Comet_, ch. 234) that the events which spring from the\nenforcement of general laws are not the object of a particular will of God.\nIt is true that when one wills a thing one wills also in a sense everything\nthat is necessarily attached to it, and in consequence God cannot will\ngeneral laws without also willing in a sense all the particular effects\nthat must of necessity be derived from them. But it is always true that\nthese particular events are not willed for their own sake, and that is what\nis meant by the expression that they are not willed by a _particular_ and\ndirect _will_. There is no doubt that when God resolved to act outside\nhimself, he made choice of a manner of action which should be worthy  [255]\nof the supremely perfect Being, that is, which should be infinitely simple\nand uniform, but yet of an infinite productivity. One may even suppose that\nthis manner of action by _general acts of will_ appeared to him\npreferable--although there must thence result some superfluous events (and\neven bad if they are taken separately, that is my own addition)--to another\nmanner more composed and more regular; such is Father Malebranche's\nopinion. Nothing is more appropriate than this assumption (according to the\nopinion of M. Bayle, when he wrote his _Divers Thoughts on the Comet_) to\nsolve a thousand difficulties which are brought up against divine\nprovidence: 'To ask God', he says, 'why he has made things which serve to\nrender men more wicked, that would be to ask why God has carried out his\nplan (which can only be of infinite beauty) by the simplest and most\nuniform methods, and why, by a complexity of decrees that would unceasingly\ncut across one another, he has not prevented the wrong use of man's free\nwill.' He adds 'that miracles being particular acts of will must have an\nend worthy of God'.\n\n205. On these foundations he makes some good reflexions (ch. 231)\nconcerning the injustice of those who complain of the prosperity of the\nwicked. 'I shall have no scruples', he says, 'about saying that all those\nwho are surprised at the prosperity of the wicked have pondered very little\nupon the nature of God, and that they have reduced the obligations of a\ncause which directs all things, to the scope of a providence altogether\nsubordinate; and that is small-minded. What then! Should God, after having\nmade free causes and necessary causes, in a mixture infinitely well fitted\nto show forth the wonders of his infinite wisdom, have established laws\nconsistent with the nature of free causes, but so lacking in firmness that\nthe slightest trouble that came upon a man would overthrow them entirely,\nto the ruin of human freedom? A mere city governor will become an object of\nridicule if he changes his regulations and orders as often as someone is\npleased to murmur against him. And shall God, whose laws concern a good so\nuniversal that all of the world that is visible to us perchance enters into\nit as no more than a trifling accessary, be bound to depart from his laws,\nbecause they to-day displease the one and to-morrow the other? Or again\nbecause a superstitious person, deeming wrongly that a monstrosity presages\nsomething deadly, proceeds from his error to a criminal sacrifice? Or\nbecause a good soul, who yet does not value virtue highly enough to   [256]\nbelieve that to have none is punishment enough in itself, is shocked that a\nwicked man should become rich and enjoy vigorous health? Can one form any\nfalser notions of a universal providence? Everyone agrees that this law of\nnature, the strong prevails over the weak, has been very wisely laid down,\nand that it would be absurd to maintain that when a stone falls on a\nfragile vase which is the delight of its owner, God should depart from this\nlaw in order to spare that owner vexation. Should one then not confess that\nit is just as absurd to maintain that God must depart from the same law to\nprevent a wicked man from growing rich at the expense of a good man? The\nmore the wicked man sets himself above the promptings of conscience and of\nhonour, the more does he exceed the good man in strength, so that if he\ncomes to grips with the good man he must, according to the course of\nnature, ruin him. If, moreover, they are both engaged in the business of\nfinance, the wicked man must, according to the same course of nature, grow\nricher than the good man, just as a fierce fire consumes more wood than a\nfire of straw. Those who would wish sickness for a wicked man are sometimes\nas unfair as those who would wish that a stone falling on a glass should\nnot break it: for his organs being arranged as they are, neither the food\nthat he takes nor the air that he breathes can, according to natural laws,\nbe detrimental to his health. Therefore those who complain about his health\ncomplain of God's failure to violate the laws which he has established. And\nin this they are all the more unfair because, through combinations and\nconcatenations which were in the power of God alone, it happens often\nenough that the course of nature brings about the punishment of sin.'\n\n206. It is a thousand pities that M. Bayle so soon quitted the way he had\nso auspiciously begun, of reasoning on behalf of providence: for his work\nwould have been fruitful, and in saying fine things he would have said good\nthings as well. I agree with Father Malebranche that God does things in the\nway most worthy of him. But I go a little further than he, with regard to\n'general and particular acts of will'. As God can do nothing without\nreasons, even when he acts miraculously, it follows that he has no will\nabout individual events but what results from some general truth or will.\nThus I would say that God never has a _particular will_ such as this Father\nimplies, that is to say, _a particular primitive will_.\n\n                                                                      [257]\n207. I think even that miracles have nothing to distinguish them from other\nevents in this regard: for reasons of an order superior to that of Nature\nprompt God to perform them. Thus I would not say, with this Father, that\nGod departs from general laws whenever order requires it: he departs from\none law only for another law more applicable, and what order requires\ncannot fail to be in conformity with the rule of order, which is one of the\ngeneral laws. The distinguishing mark of miracles (taken in the strictest\nsense) is that they cannot be accounted for by the natures of created\nthings. That is why, should God make a general law causing bodies to be\nattracted the one to the other, he could only achieve its operation by\nperpetual miracles. And likewise, if God willed that the organs of human\nbodies should conform to the will of the soul, according to the _system of\noccasional causes_, this law also would come into operation only through\nperpetual miracles.\n\n208. Thus one must suppose that, among the general rules which are not\nabsolutely necessary, God chooses those which are the most natural, which\nit is easiest to explain, and which also are of greatest service for the\nexplanation of other things. That is doubtless the conclusion most\nexcellent and most pleasing; and even though the System of Pre-established\nHarmony were not necessary otherwise, because it banishes superfluous\nmiracles, God would have chosen it as being the most harmonious. The ways\nof God are those most simple and uniform: for he chooses rules that least\nrestrict one another. They are also the most _productive_ in proportion to\nthe _simplicity of ways and means_. It is as if one said that a certain\nhouse was the best that could have been constructed at a certain cost. One\nmay, indeed, reduce these two conditions, simplicity and productivity, to a\nsingle advantage, which is to produce as much perfection as is possible:\nthus Father Malebranche's system in this point amounts to the same as mine.\nEven if the effect were assumed to be greater, but the process less simple,\nI think one might say that, when all is said and done, the effect itself\nwould be less great, taking into account not only the final effect but also\nthe mediate effect. For the wisest mind so acts, as far as it is possible,\nthat the _means_ are also in a sense _ends_, that is, they are desirable\nnot only on account of what they do, but on account of what they are. The\nmore intricate processes take up too much ground, too much space, too much\nplace, too much time that might have been better employed.\n\n                                                                      [258]\n209. Now since everything resolves itself into this greatest perfection, we\nreturn to my law of the best. For perfection includes not only the _moral\ngood_ and the _physical good_ of intelligent creatures, but also the good\nwhich is purely _metaphysical_, and concerns also creatures devoid of\nreason. It follows that the evil that is in rational creatures happens only\nby concomitance, not by antecedent will but by a consequent will, as being\ninvolved in the best possible plan; and the metaphysical good which\nincludes everything makes it necessary sometimes to admit physical evil and\nmoral evil, as I have already explained more than once. It so happens that\nthe ancient Stoics were not far removed from this system. M. Bayle remarked\nupon this himself in his _Dictionary_ in the article on 'Chrysippus', rem.\nT. It is of importance to give his own words, in order sometimes to face\nhim with his own objections and to bring him back to the fine sentiments\nthat he had formerly pronounced: 'Chrysippus', he says (p. 930), 'in his\nwork on Providence examined amongst other questions this one: Did the\nnature of things, or the providence that made the world and the human kind,\nmake also the diseases to which men are subject? He answers that the chief\ndesign of Nature was not to make them sickly, that would not be in keeping\nwith the cause of all good; but Nature, in preparing and producing many\ngreat things excellently ordered and of great usefulness, found that some\ndrawbacks came as a result, and thus these were not in conformity with the\noriginal design and purpose; they came about as a sequel to the work, they\nexisted only as consequences. For the formation of the human body,\nChrysippus said, the finest idea as well as the very utility of the work\ndemanded that the head should be composed of a tissue of thin, fine bones;\nbut because of that it was bound to have the disadvantage of not being able\nto resist blows. Nature made health, and at the same time it was necessary\nby a kind of concomitance that the source of diseases should be opened up.\nThe same thing applies with regard to virtue; the direct action of Nature,\nwhich brought it forth, produced by a counter stroke the brood of vices. I\nhave not translated literally, for which reason I give here the actual\nLatin of Aulus Gellius, for the benefit of those who understand that\nlanguage (Aul. Gellius, lib. 6, cap. 1): \"Idem Chrysippus in eod. lib.\n(quarto, [Greek: peri pronoias]) tractat consideratque, dignumque esse id\nquaeri putat, [Greek: ei hai ton anthropon nosoi kata physin gignontai]. Id\nest, naturane ipsa rerum, vel providentia quae compagem hanc mundi et [259]\ngenus hominum fecit, morbos quoque et debilitates et aegritudines corporum,\nquas patiuntur homines, fecerit. Existimat autem non fuisse hoc principale\nnaturae consilium, ut faceret homines morbis obnoxios. Nunquam enim hoc\nconvenisse naturae auctori parentique rerum omnium bonarum. Sed quum multa,\ninquit, atque magna gigneret, pareretque aptissima et utilissima, alia\nquoque simul agnata sunt incommoda iis ipsis, quae faciebat, cohaerentia:\neaque non per naturam, sed per sequelas quasdam necessarias facta dicit,\nquod ipse appellat [Greek: kata parakolouthesin]. Sicut, inquit, quum\ncorpora hominum natura fingeret, ratio subtilior et utilitas ipsa operis\npostulavit ut tenuissimis minutisque ossiculis caput compingeret. Sed hanc\nutilitatem rei majoris alia quaedam incommoditas extrinsecus consecuta est,\nut fieret caput tenuiter munitum et ictibus offensionibusque parvis\nfragile. Proinde morbi quoque et aegritudines partae sunt, dum salus\nparitur. Sic Hercle, inquit, dum virtus hominibus per consilium naturae\ngignitur, vitia ibidem per affinitatem contrariam nata sunt.\" I do not\nthink that a pagan could have said anything more reasonable, considering\nhis ignorance of the first man's fall, the knowledge of which has only\nreached us through revelation, and which indeed is the true cause of our\nmiseries. If we had sundry like extracts from the works of Chrysippus, or\nrather if we had his works, we should have a more favourable idea than we\nhave of the beauty of his genius.'\n\n210. Let us now see the reverse of the medal in the altered M. Bayle. After\nhaving quoted in his _Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_ (vol. III,\nch. 155, p. 962) these words of M. Jacquelot, which are much to my liking:\n'To change the order of the universe is something of infinitely greater\nconsequence than the prosperity of a good man,' he adds: 'This thought has\nsomething dazzling about it: Father Malebranche has placed it in the best\npossible light; and he has persuaded some of his readers that a system\nwhich is simple and very productive is more consistent with God's wisdom\nthan a system more composite and less productive in proportion, but more\ncapable of averting irregularities. M. Bayle was one of those who believed\nthat Father Malebranche in that way gave a wonderful solution.' (It is M.\nBayle himself speaking.) 'But it is almost impossible to be satisfied with\nit after having read M. Arnauld's books against this system, and after\nhaving contemplated the vast and boundless idea of the supremely      [260]\nperfect Being. This idea shows us that nothing is easier for God than to\nfollow a plan which is simple, productive, regular and opportune for all\ncreatures simultaneously.'\n\n211. While I was in France I showed to M. Arnauld a dialogue I had composed\nin Latin on the cause of evil and the justice of God; it was not only\nbefore his disputes with Father Malebranche, but even before the book on\n_The Search for Truth_ appeared. That principle which I uphold here, namely\nthat sin had been permitted because it had been involved in the best plan\nfor the universe, was already applied there; and M. Arnauld did not seem to\nbe startled by it. But the slight contentions which he has since had with\nFather Malebranche have given him cause to examine this subject with closer\nattention, and to be more severe in his judgement thereof. Yet I am not\naltogether pleased with M. Bayle's manner of expression here on this\nsubject, and I am not of the opinion 'that a more composite and less\nproductive plan might be more capable of averting irregularities'. Rules\nare the expression of general will: the more one observes rules, the more\nregularity there is; simplicity and productivity are the aim of rules. I\nshall be met with the objection that a uniform system will be free from\nirregularities. I answer that it would be an irregularity to be too\nuniform, that would offend against the rules of harmony. _Et citharoedus\nRidetur chorda qui semper oberrat eadem_. I believe therefore that God can\nfollow a simple, productive, regular plan; but I do not believe that the\nbest and the most regular is always opportune for all creatures\nsimultaneously; and I judge _a posteriori_, for the plan chosen by God is\nnot so. I have, however, also shown this _a priori_ in examples taken from\nmathematics, and I will presently give another here. An Origenist who\nmaintains that all rational creatures become happy in the end will be still\neasier to satisfy. He will say, in imitation of St. Paul's saying about the\nsufferings of this life, that those which are finite are not worthy to be\ncompared with eternal bliss.\n\n212. What is deceptive in this subject, as I have already observed, is that\none feels an inclination to believe that what is the best in the whole is\nalso the best possible in each part. One reasons thus in geometry, when it\nis a question _de maximis et minimis_. If the road from A to B that one\nproposes to take is the shortest possible, and if this road passes by C,\nthen the road from A to C, part of the first, must also be the shortest\npossible. But the inference from _quantity_ to _quality_ is not always[261]\nright, any more than that which is drawn from equals to similars. For\n_equals_ are those whose quantity is the same, and _similars_ are those not\ndiffering according to qualities. The late Herr Sturm, a famous\nmathematician in Altorf, while in Holland in his youth published there a\nsmall book under the title of _Euclides Catholicus_. Here he endeavoured to\ngive exact and general rules in subjects not mathematical, being encouraged\nin the task by the late Herr Erhard Weigel, who had been his tutor. In this\nbook he transfers to similars what Euclid had said of equals, and he\nformulates this axiom: _Si similibus addas similia, tota sunt similia_. But\nso many limitations were necessary to justify this new rule, that it would\nhave been better, in my opinion, to enounce it at the outset with a\nreservation, by saying, _Si similibus similia addas similiter, tota sunt\nsimilia_. Moreover, geometricians often require _non tantum similia, sed et\nsimiliter posita_.\n\n213. This difference between quantity and quality appears also in our case.\nThe part of the shortest way between two extreme points is also the\nshortest way between the extreme points of this part; but the part of the\nbest Whole is not of necessity the best that one could have made of this\npart. For the part of a beautiful thing is not always beautiful, since it\ncan be extracted from the whole, or marked out within the whole, in an\nirregular manner. If goodness and beauty always lay in something absolute\nand uniform, such as extension, matter, gold, water, and other bodies\nassumed to be homogeneous or similar, one must say that the part of the\ngood and the beautiful would be beautiful and good like the whole, since it\nwould always have resemblance to the whole: but this is not the case in\nthings that have mutual relations. An example taken from geometry will be\nappropriate to explain my idea.\n\n214. There is a kind of geometry which Herr Jung of Hamburg, one of the\nmost admirable men of his time, called 'empiric'. It makes use of\nconclusive experiments and proves various propositions of Euclid, but\nespecially those which concern the equality of two figures, by cutting the\none in pieces, and putting the pieces together again to make the other. In\nthis manner, by cutting carefully in parts the squares on the two sides of\nthe right-angled triangle, and arranging these parts carefully, one makes\nfrom them the square on the hypotenuse; that is demonstrating empirically\nthe 47th proposition of the first book of Euclid. Now supposing that some\nof these pieces taken from the two smaller squares are lost, something[262]\nwill be lacking in the large square that is to be formed from them; and\nthis defective combination, far from pleasing, will be disagreeably ugly.\nIf then the pieces that remained, composing the faulty combination, were\ntaken separately without any regard to the large square to whose formation\nthey ought to contribute, one would group them together quite differently\nto make a tolerably good combination. But as soon as the lost pieces are\nretrieved and the gap in the faulty combination is filled, there will ensue\na beautiful and regular thing, the complete large square: this perfect\ncombination will be far more beautiful than the tolerably good combination\nwhich had been made from the pieces one had not mislaid alone. The perfect\ncombination corresponds to the universe in its entirety, and the faulty\ncombination that is a part of the perfect one corresponds to some part of\nthe universe, where we find defects which the Author of things has allowed,\nbecause otherwise, if he had wished to re-shape this faulty part and make\nthereof a tolerably good combination, the whole would not then have been so\nbeautiful. For the parts of the faulty combination, grouped better to make\na tolerably good combination, could not have been used properly to form the\nwhole and perfect combination. Thomas Aquinas had an inkling of these\nthings when he said: _ad prudentem gubernatorem pertinet, negligere aliquem\ndefectum bonitatis in parte, ut faciat augmentum bonitatis in toto_ (Thom.,\n_Contra Gentiles_, lib. 2, c. 71). Thomas Gatacre, in his Notes on the book\nof Marcus Aurelius (lib. 5, cap. 8, with M. Bayle), cites also passages\nfrom authors who say that the evil of the parts is often the good of the\nwhole.\n\n215. Let us return to M. Bayle's illustrations. He imagines a prince (p.\n963) who is having a city built, and who, in bad taste, aims rather at airs\nof magnificence therein, and a bold and unusual style of architecture, than\nat the provision of conveniences of all kinds for the inhabitants. But if\nthis prince has true magnanimity he will prefer the convenient to the\nmagnificent architecture. That is M. Bayle's judgement. I consider,\nhowever, that there are cases where one will justifiably prefer beauty of\nconstruction in a palace to the convenience of a few domestics. But I admit\nthat the construction would be bad, however beautiful it might be, if it\nwere a cause of diseases to the inhabitants; provided it was possible to\nmake one that would be better, taking into account beauty, convenience and\nhealth all together. It may be, indeed, that one cannot have all these[263]\nadvantages at once. Thus, supposing one wished to build on the northern and\nmore bracing side of the mountain, if the castle were then bound to be of\nan unendurable construction, one would prefer to make it face southward.\n\n216. M. Bayle raises the further objection, that it is true that our\nlegislators can never invent regulations such as are convenient for all\nindividuals, 'Nulla lex satis commoda omnibus est; id modo quaeritur, si\nmajori parti et in summam prodest. (Cato apud Livium, L. 34, circa init.)'\nBut the reason is that the limited condition of their knowledge compels\nthem to cling to laws which, when all is taken into account, are more\nadvantageous than harmful. Nothing of all that can apply to God, who is as\ninfinite in power and understanding as in goodness and true greatness. I\nanswer that since God chooses the best possible, one cannot tax him with\nany limitation of his perfections; and in the universe not only does the\ngood exceed the evil, but also the evil serves to augment the good.\n\n217. He observes also that the Stoics derived a blasphemy from this\nprinciple, saying that evils must be endured with patience, or that they\nwere necessary, not only to the well-being and completeness of the\nuniverse, but also to the felicity, perfection and conservation of God, who\ndirects it. The Emperor Marcus Aurelius gave expression to that in the\neighth chapter of the fifth book of his _Meditations_. 'Duplici ratione',\nhe says, 'diligas oportet, quidquid evenerit tibi; altera quod tibi natum\net tibi coordinatum et ad te quodammodo affectum est; altera quod universi\ngubernatori prosperitatis et consummationis atque adeo permansionis ipsius\nprocurandae ([Greek: tes euodias kai tes synteleias kai tes symmones\nautes]) ex parte causa est.' This precept is not the most reasonable of\nthose stated by that great emperor. A _diligas oportet_ ([Greek: stergein\nchre]) is of no avail; a thing does not become pleasing just because it is\nnecessary, and because it is destined for or attached to someone: and what\nfor me would be an evil would not cease to be such because it would be my\nmaster's good, unless this good reflected back on me. One good thing among\nothers in the universe is that the general good becomes in reality the\nindividual good of those who love the Author of all good. But the principal\nerror of this emperor and of the Stoics was their assumption that the good\nof the universe must please God himself, because they imagined God as the\nsoul of the world. This error has nothing in common with my dogma,    [264]\naccording to which God is _Intelligentia extramundana_, as Martianus\nCapella calls him, or rather _supramundana_. Further, he acts to do good,\nand not to receive it. _Melius est dare quam accipere_; his bliss is ever\nperfect and can receive no increase, either from within or from without.\n\n218. I come now to the principal objection M. Bayle, after M. Arnauld,\nbrings up against me. It is complicated: they maintain that God would be\nunder compulsion, that he would act of necessity, if he were bound to\ncreate the best; or at least that he would have been lacking in power if he\ncould not have found a better expedient for excluding sins and other evils.\nThat is in effect denying that this universe is the best, and that God is\nbound to insist upon the best. I have met this objection adequately in more\nthan one passage: I have proved that God cannot fail to produce the best;\nand from that assumption it follows that the evils we experience could not\nhave been reasonably excluded from the universe, since they are there. Let\nus see, however, what these two excellent men bring up, or rather let us\nsee what M. Bayle's objection is, for he professes to have profited by the\narguments of M. Arnauld.\n\n219. 'Would it be possible', he says, _Reply to the Questions of a\nProvincial_, vol. III, ch. 158, p. 890, 'that a nature whose goodness,\nholiness, wisdom, knowledge and power are infinite, who loves virtue\nsupremely, and hates vice supremely, as our clear and distinct idea of him\nshows us, and as well-nigh every page of Scripture assures us, could have\nfound in virtue no means fitting and suited for his ends? Would it be\npossible that vice alone had offered him this means? One would have thought\non the contrary that nothing beseemed this nature more than to establish\nvirtue in his work to the exclusion of all vice.' M. Bayle here exaggerates\nthings. I agree that some vice was connected with the best plan of the\nuniverse, but I do not agree with him that God could not find in virtue any\nmeans suited for his ends. This objection would have been valid if there\nwere no virtue, if vice took its place everywhere. He will say it suffices\nthat vice prevails and that virtue is trifling in comparison. But I am far\nfrom agreeing with him there, and I think that in reality, properly\nspeaking, there is incomparably more moral good than moral evil in rational\ncreatures; and of these we have knowledge of but few.\n\n220. This evil is not even so great in men as it is declared to be. It[265]\nis only people of a malicious disposition or those who have become somewhat\nmisanthropic through misfortunes, like Lucian's Timon, who find wickedness\neverywhere, and who poison the best actions by the interpretations they\ngive to them. I speak of those who do it in all seriousness, to draw thence\nevil conclusions, by which their conduct is tainted; for there are some who\nonly do it to show off their own acumen. People have found that fault in\nTacitus, and that again is the criticism M. Descartes (in one of his\nletters) makes of Mr. Hobbes's book _De Cive_, of which only a few copies\nhad at that time been printed for distribution among friends, but to which\nsome notes by the author were added in the second edition which we have.\nFor although M. Descartes acknowledges that this book is by a man of\ntalent, he observes therein some very dangerous principles and maxims, in\nthe assumption there made that all men are wicked, or the provision of them\nwith motives for being so. The late Herr Jacob Thomasius said in his\nadmirable _Tables of Practical Philosophy_ that the [Greek: proton\npseudos], the primary cause of errors in this book by Mr. Hobbes, was that\nhe took _statum legalem pro naturali_, that is to say that the corrupt\nstate served him as a gauge and rule, whereas it is the state most\nbefitting human nature which Aristotle had had in view. For according to\nAristotle, that is termed _natural_ which conforms most closely to the\nperfection of the nature of the thing; but Mr. Hobbes applies the term\n_natural state_ to that which has least art, perhaps not taking into\naccount that human nature in its perfection carries art with it. But the\nquestion of name, that is to say, of what may be called natural, would not\nbe of great importance were it not that Aristotle and Hobbes fastened upon\nit the notion of natural right, each one following his own signification. I\nhave said here already that I found in the book on the Falsity of human\nVirtues the same defect as M. Descartes found in Mr. Hobbes's _De Cive_.\n\n221. But even if we assume that vice exceeds virtue in the human kind, as\nit is assumed the number of the damned exceeds that of the elect, it by no\nmeans follows that vice and misery exceed virtue and happiness in the\nuniverse: one should rather believe the opposite, because the City of God\nmust be the most perfect of all possible states, since it was formed and is\nperpetually governed by the greatest and best of all Monarchs. This answer\nconfirms the observation I made earlier, when speaking of the conformity of\nfaith with reason, namely, that one of the greatest sources of fallacy[266]\nin the objections is the confusion of the apparent with the real. And here\nby the apparent I mean not simply such as would result from an exact\ndiscussion of facts, but that which has been derived from the small extent\nof our experiences. It would be senseless to try to bring up appearances so\nimperfect, and having such slight foundation, in opposition to the proofs\nof reason and the revelations of faith.\n\n222. Finally, I have already observed that love of virtue and hatred of\nvice, which tend in an undefined way to bring virtue into existence and to\nprevent the existence of vice, are only antecedent acts of will, such as is\nthe will to bring about the happiness of all men and to save them from\nmisery. These acts of antecedent will make up only a portion of all the\nantecedent will of God taken together, whose result forms the consequent\nwill, or the decree to create the best. Through this decree it is that love\nfor virtue and for the happiness of rational creatures, which is undefined\nin itself and goes as far as is possible, receives some slight limitations,\non account of the heed that must be paid to good in general. Thus one must\nunderstand that God loves virtue supremely and hates vice supremely, and\nthat nevertheless some vice is to be permitted.\n\n223. M. Arnauld and M. Bayle appear to maintain that this method of\nexplaining things and of establishing a best among all the plans for the\nuniverse, one such as may not be surpassed by any other, sets a limit to\nGod's power. 'Have you considered', says M. Arnauld to Father Malebranche\n(in his _Reflexions on the New System of Nature and Grace_, vol. II, p.\n385), 'that in making such assumptions you take it upon yourself to subvert\nthe first article of the creed, whereby we make profession of believing in\nGod the Father Almighty?' He had said already (p. 362): 'Can one maintain,\nwithout trying to blind oneself, that a course of action which could not\nfail to have this grievous result, namely, that the majority of men perish,\nbears the stamp of God's goodness more than a different course of action,\nwhich would have caused, if God had followed it, the salvation of all men?'\nAnd, as M. Jacquelot does not differ from the principles I have just laid\ndown, M. Bayle raises like objections in his case (_Reply to the Questions\nof a Provincial_, vol. III, ch. 151, p. 900): 'If one adopts such\nexplanations', he says, 'one sees oneself constrained to renounce the most\nobvious notions on the nature of the supremely perfect Being. These teach\nus that all things not implying contradiction are possible for him,   [267]\nthat consequently it is possible for him to save people whom he does not\nsave: for what contradiction would result supposing the number of the elect\nwere greater than it is? They teach us besides that, since he is supremely\nhappy, he has no will which he cannot carry out. How, then, shall we\nunderstand that he wills to save all men and that he cannot do so? We\nsought some light to help us out of the perplexities we feel in comparing\nthe idea of God with the state of the human kind, and lo! we are given\nelucidations that cast us into darkness more dense.'\n\n224. All these obstacles vanish before the exposition I have just given. I\nagree with M. Bayle's principle, and it is also mine, that everything\nimplying no contradiction is possible. But as for me, holding as I do that\nGod did the best that was possible, or that he could not have done better\nthan he has done, deeming also that to pass any other judgement upon his\nwork in its entirety would be to wrong his goodness or his wisdom, I must\nsay that to make something which surpasses in goodness the best itself,\nthat indeed would imply contradiction. That would be as if someone\nmaintained that God could draw from one point to another a line shorter\nthan the straight line, and accused those who deny this of subverting the\narticle of faith whereby we believe in God the Father Almighty.\n\n225. The infinity of possibles, however great it may be, is no greater than\nthat of the wisdom of God, who knows all possibles. One may even say that\nif this wisdom does not exceed the possibles extensively, since the objects\nof the understanding cannot go beyond the possible, which in a sense is\nalone intelligible, it exceeds them intensively, by reason of the\ninfinitely infinite combinations it makes thereof, and its many\ndeliberations concerning them. The wisdom of God, not content with\nembracing all the possibles, penetrates them, compares them, weighs them\none against the other, to estimate their degrees of perfection or\nimperfection, the strong and the weak, the good and the evil. It goes even\nbeyond the finite combinations, it makes of them an infinity of infinites,\nthat is to say, an infinity of possible sequences of the universe, each of\nwhich contains an infinity of creatures. By this means the divine Wisdom\ndistributes all the possibles it had already contemplated separately, into\nso many universal systems which it further compares the one with the other.\nThe result of all these comparisons and deliberations is the choice of the\nbest from among all these possible systems, which wisdom makes in     [268]\norder to satisfy goodness completely; and such is precisely the plan of the\nuniverse as it is. Moreover, all these operations of the divine\nunderstanding, although they have among them an order and a priority of\nnature, always take place together, no priority of time existing among\nthem.\n\n226. The careful consideration of these things will, I hope, induce a\ndifferent idea of the greatness of the divine perfections, and especially\nof the wisdom and goodness of God, from any that can exist in the minds of\nthose who make God act at random, without cause or reason. And I do not see\nhow they could avoid falling into an opinion so strange, unless they\nacknowledged that there are reasons for God's choice, and that these\nreasons are derived from his goodness: whence it follows of necessity that\nwhat was chosen had the advantage of goodness over what was not chosen, and\nconsequently that it is the best of all the possibles. The best cannot be\nsurpassed in goodness, and it is no restriction of the power of God to say\nthat he cannot do the impossible. Is it possible, said M. Bayle, that there\nis no better plan than that one which God carried out? One answers that it\nis very possible and indeed necessary, namely that there is none: otherwise\nGod would have preferred it.\n\n227. It seems to me that I have proved sufficiently that among all the\npossible plans of the universe there is one better than all the rest, and\nthat God has not failed to choose it. But M. Bayle claims to infer thence\nthat God is therefore not free. This is how he speaks on that question\n(_ubi supra_, ch. 151, p. 899): 'I thought to argue with a man who assumed\nas I do that the goodness and the power of God are infinite, as well as his\nwisdom; and now I see that in reality this man assumes that God's goodness\nand power are enclosed within rather narrow bounds.' As to that, the\nobjection has already been met: I set no bounds to God's power, since I\nrecognize that it extends _ad maximum, ad omnia_, to all that implies no\ncontradiction; and I set none to his goodness, since it attains to the\nbest, _ad optimum_. But M. Bayle goes on: 'There is therefore no freedom in\nGod; he is compelled by his wisdom to create, and then to create precisely\nsuch a work, and finally to create it precisely in such ways. These are\nthree servitudes which form a more than Stoic _fatum_, and which render\nimpossible all that is not within their sphere. It seems that, according to\nthis system, God could have said, even before shaping his decrees: I  [269]\ncannot save such and such a man, nor condemn such and such another, _quippe\nvetor fatis_, my wisdom permits it not.'\n\n228. I answer that it is goodness which prompts God to create with the\npurpose of communicating himself; and this same goodness combined with\nwisdom prompts him to create the best: a best that includes the whole\nsequence, the effect and the process. It prompts him thereto without\ncompelling him, for it does not render impossible that which it does not\ncause him to choose. To call that _fatum_ is taking it in a good sense,\nwhich is not contrary to freedom: _fatum_ comes from _fari_, to speak, to\npronounce; it signifies a judgement, a decree of God, the award of his\nwisdom. To say that one cannot do a thing, simply because one does not will\nit, is to misuse terms. The wise mind wills only the good: is it then a\nservitude when the will acts in accordance with wisdom? And can one be less\na slave than to act by one's own choice in accordance with the most perfect\nreason? Aristotle used to say that that man is in a natural servitude\n(_natura servus_) who lacks guidance, who has need of being directed.\nSlavery comes from without, it leads to that which offends, and especially\nto that which offends with reason: the force of others and our own passions\nenslave us. God is never moved by anything outside himself, nor is he\nsubject to inward passions, and he is never led to that which can cause him\noffence. It appears, therefore, that M. Bayle gives odious names to the\nbest things in the world, and turns our ideas upside-down, applying the\nterm slavery to the state of the greatest and most perfect freedom.\n\n229. He had also said not long before (ch. 151, p. 891): 'If virtue, or any\nother good at all, had been as appropriate as vice for the Creator's ends,\nvice would not have been given preference; it must therefore have been the\nonly means that the Creator could have used; it was therefore employed\npurely of necessity. As therefore he loves his glory, not with a freedom of\nindifference, but by necessity, he must by necessity love all the means\nwithout which he could not manifest his glory. Now if vice, as vice, was\nthe only means of attaining to this end, it will follow that God of\nnecessity loves vice as vice, a thought which can only inspire us with\nhorror; and he has revealed quite the contrary to us.' He observes at the\nsame time that certain doctors among the Supralapsarians (like Rutherford,\nfor example) denied that God wills sin as sin, whilst they admitted   [270]\nthat he wills sin permissively in so far as it is punishable and\npardonable. But he urges in objection, that an action is only punishable\nand pardonable in so far as it is vicious.\n\n230. M. Bayle makes a false assumption in these words that we have just\nread, and draws from them false conclusions. It is not true that God loves\nhis glory by necessity, if thereby it is understood that he is led by\nnecessity to acquire his glory through his creatures. For if that were so,\nhe would acquire his glory always and everywhere. The decree to create is\nfree: God is prompted to all good; the good, and even the best, inclines\nhim to act; but it does not compel him, for his choice creates no\nimpossibility in that which is distinct from the best; it causes no\nimplication of contradiction in that which God refrains from doing. There\nis therefore in God a freedom that is exempt not only from constraint but\nalso from necessity. I mean this in respect of metaphysical necessity; for\nit is a moral necessity that the wisest should be bound to choose the best.\nIt is the same with the means which God chooses to attain his glory. And as\nfor vice, it has been shown in preceding pages that it is not an object of\nGod's decree as _means_, but as _conditio sine qua non_, and that for that\nreason alone it is permitted. One is even less justified in saying that\nvice is _the only means_; it would be at most one of the means, but one of\nthe least among innumerable others.\n\n231. 'Another frightful consequence,' M. Bayle goes on, 'the fatality of\nall things, ensues: God will not have been free to arrange events in a\ndifferent way, since the means he chose to show forth his glory was the\nonly means befitting his wisdom.' This so-called fatality or necessity is\nonly moral, as I have just shown: it does not affect freedom; on the\ncontrary, it assumes the best use thereof; it does not render impossible\nthe objects set aside by God's choice. 'What, then, will become', he adds,\n'of man's free will? Will there not have been necessity and fatality for\nAdam to sin? For if he had not sinned, he would have overthrown the sole\nplan that God had of necessity created.' That is again a misuse of terms.\nAdam sinning freely was seen of God among the ideas of the possibles, and\nGod decreed to admit him into existence as he saw him. This decree does not\nchange the nature of the objects: it does not render necessary that which\nwas contingent in itself, or impossible that which was possible.\n\n                                                                      [271]\n232. M. Bayle goes on (p. 892): 'The subtle Scotus asserts with much\ndiscernment that if God had no freedom of indifference no creature could\nhave this kind of freedom.' I agree provided it is not meant as an\nindifference of equipoise, where there is no reason inclining more to one\nside than the other. M. Bayle acknowledges (farther on in chapter 168, p.\n1111) that what is termed indifference does not exclude prevenient\ninclinations and pleasures. It suffices therefore that there be no\nmetaphysical necessity in the action which is termed free, that is to say,\nit suffices that a choice be made between several courses possible.\n\n233. He goes on again in the said chapter 157, p. 893: 'If God is not\ndetermined to create the world by a free motion of his goodness, but by the\ninterests of his glory, which he loves by necessity, and which is the only\nthing he loves, for it is not different from his substance; and if the love\nthat he has for himself has compelled him to show forth his glory through\nthe most fitting means, and if the fall of man was this same means, it is\nevident that this fall happened entirely by necessity and that the\nobedience of Eve and Adam to God's commands was impossible.' Still the same\nerror. The love that God bears to himself is essential to him, but the love\nfor his glory, or the will to acquire his glory, is not so by any means:\nthe love he has for himself did not impel him by necessity to actions\nwithout; they were free; and since there were possible plans whereby the\nfirst parents should not sin, their sin was therefore not necessary.\nFinally, I say in effect what M. Bayle acknowledges here, 'that God\nresolved to create the world by a free motion of his goodness'; and I add\nthat this same motion prompted him to the best.\n\n234. The same answer holds good against this statement of M. Bayle's (ch.\n165, p. 1071): 'The means most appropriate for attaining an end is of\nnecessity one alone' (that is very well said, at least for the cases where\nGod has chosen). 'Therefore if God was prompted irresistibly to employ this\nmeans, he employed it by necessity.' (He was certainly prompted thereto, he\nwas determined, or rather he determined himself thereto: but that which is\ncertain is not always necessary, or altogether irresistible; the thing\nmight have gone otherwise, but that did not happen, and with good reason.\nGod chose between different courses all possible: thus, metaphysically\nspeaking, he could have chosen or done what was not the best; but he could\nnot morally speaking have done so. Let us make use of a comparison    [272]\nfrom geometry. The best way from one point to another (leaving out of\naccount obstacles and other considerations accidental to the medium) is one\nalone: it is that one which passes by the shortest line, which is the\nstraight line. Yet there are innumerable ways from one point to another.\nThere is therefore no necessity which binds me to go by the straight line;\nbut as soon as I choose the best, I am determined to go that way, although\nthis is only a moral necessity in the wise. That is why the following\nconclusions fail.) 'Therefore he could only do that which he did. Therefore\nthat which has not happened or will never happen is absolutely impossible.'\n(These conclusions fail, I say: for since there are many things which have\nnever happened and never will happen, and which nevertheless are clearly\nconceivable, and imply no contradiction, how can one say they are\naltogether impossible? M. Bayle has refuted that himself in a passage\nopposing the Spinozists, which I have already quoted here, and he has\nfrequently acknowledged that there is nothing impossible except that which\nimplies contradiction: now he changes style and terminology.) 'Therefore\nAdam's perseverance in innocence was always impossible; therefore his fall\nwas altogether inevitable, and even antecedently to God's decree, for it\nimplied contradiction that God should be able to will a thing opposed to\nhis wisdom: it is, after all, the same thing to say, that it is impossible\nfor God, as to say, God could do it, if he so willed, but he cannot will\nit.' (It is misusing terms in a sense to say here: one can will, one will\nwill; 'can' here concerns the actions that one does will. Nevertheless it\nimplies no contradiction that God should will--directly or permissively--a\nthing not implying contradiction, and in this sense it is permitted to say\nthat God can will it.)\n\n235. In a word, when one speaks of the _possibility_ of a thing it is not a\nquestion of the causes that can bring about or prevent its actual\nexistence: otherwise one would change the nature of the terms, and render\nuseless the distinction between the possible and the actual. This Abelard\ndid, and Wyclif appears to have done after him, in consequence of which\nthey fell needlessly into unsuitable and disagreeable expressions. That is\nwhy, when one asks if a thing is possible or necessary, and brings in the\nconsideration of what God wills or chooses, one alters the issue. For God\nchooses among the possibles, and for that very reason he chooses      [273]\nfreely, and is not compelled; there would be neither choice nor freedom if\nthere were but one course possible.\n\n236. One must also answer M. Bayle's syllogisms, so as to neglect none of\nthe objections of a man so gifted: they occur in Chapter 151 of his _Reply\nto the Questions of a Provincial_ (vol. III, pp. 900, 901).\n\nFIRST SYLLOGISM\n\n'God can will nothing that is opposed to the necessary love which he has\nfor his wisdom.\n\n'Now the salvation of all men is opposed to the necessary love which God\nhas for his wisdom.\n\n'Therefore God cannot will the salvation of all men.'\n\nThe major is self-evident, for one can do nothing whereof the opposite is\nnecessary. But the minor cannot be accepted, for, albeit God loves his\nwisdom of necessity, the actions whereto his wisdom prompts him cannot but\nbe free, and the objects whereto his wisdom does not prompt him do not\ncease to be possible. Moreover, his wisdom has prompted him to will the\nsalvation of all men, but not by a consequent and decretory will. Yet this\nconsequent will, being only a result of free antecedent acts of will,\ncannot fail to be free also.\n\nSECOND SYLLOGISM\n\n'The work most worthy of God's wisdom involves amongst other things the sin\nof all men and the eternal damnation of the majority of men.\n\n'Now God wills of necessity the work most worthy of his wisdom.\n\n'He wills therefore of necessity the work that involves amongst other\nthings the sin of all men and the eternal damnation of the majority of\nmen.'\n\nThe major holds good, but the minor I deny. The decrees of God are always\nfree, even though God be always prompted thereto by reasons which lie in\nthe intention towards good: for to be morally compelled by wisdom, to be\nbound by the consideration of good, is to be free; it is not compulsion in\nthe metaphysical sense. And metaphysical necessity alone, as I have\nobserved so many times, is opposed to freedom.\n\n238. I shall not examine the syllogisms that M. Bayle urges in objection in\nthe following chapter (Ch. 152), against the system of the Supralapsarians,\nand particularly against the oration made by Theodore de Beze at the  [274]\nConference of Montbeliard in the year 1586. This conference also only\nserved to increase the acrimony of the parties. 'God created the World to\nhis glory: his glory is not known (according to Beze), if his mercy and his\njustice are not declared; for this cause simply by his grace he decreed for\nsome men life eternal, and for others by a just judgement eternal\ndamnation. Mercy presupposes misery, justice presupposes guilt.' (He might\nhave added that misery also supposes guilt.) 'Nevertheless God being good,\nindeed goodness itself, he created man good and righteous, but unstable,\nand capable of sinning of his own free will. Man did not fall at random or\nrashly, or through causes ordained by some other God, as the Manichaeans\nhold, but by the providence of God; in such a way notwithstanding, that God\nwas not involved in the fault, inasmuch as man was not constrained to sin.'\n\n239. This system is not of the best conceived: it is not well fitted to\nshow forth the wisdom, the goodness and the justice of God; and happily it\nis almost abandoned to-day. If there were not other more profound reasons\ncapable of inducing God to permit guilt, the source of misery, there would\nbe neither guilt nor misery in the world, for the reasons alleged here do\nnot suffice. He would declare his mercy better in preventing misery, and he\nwould declare his justice better in preventing guilt, in advancing virtue,\nin recompensing it. Besides, one does not see how he who not only causes a\nman to be capable of falling, but who so disposes circumstances that they\ncontribute towards causing his fall, is not culpable, if there are no other\nreasons compelling him thereto. But when one considers that God, altogether\ngood and wise, must have produced all the virtue, goodness, happiness\nwhereof the best plan of the universe is capable, and that often an evil in\nsome parts may serve the greater good of the whole, one readily concludes\nthat God may have given room for unhappiness, and even permitted guilt, as\nhe has done, without deserving to be blamed. It is the only remedy that\nsupplies what all systems lack, however they arrange the decrees. These\nthoughts have already been favoured by St. Augustine, and one may say of\nEve what the poet said of the hand of Mucius Scaevola:\n\n  _Si non errasset, fecerat illa minus_.\n\n240. I find that the famous English prelate who wrote an ingenious book on\nthe origin of evil, some passages of which were disputed by M. Bayle  [275]\nin the second volume of his _Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, while\ndisagreeing with some of the opinions that I have upheld here and appearing\nto resort sometimes to a despotic power, as if the will of God did not\nfollow the rules of wisdom in relation to good or evil, but decreed\narbitrarily that such and such a thing must be considered good or evil; and\nas if even the will of the creature, in so far as it is free, did not\nchoose because the object appears good to him, but by a purely arbitrary\ndetermination, independent of the representation of the object; this\nbishop, I say, in other passages nevertheless says things which seem more\nin favour of my doctrine than of what appears contrary thereto in his own.\nHe says that what an infinitely wise and free cause has chosen is better\nthan what it has not chosen. Is not that recognizing that goodness is the\nobject and the reason of his choice? In this sense one will here aptly say:\n\n  _Sic placuit superis; quaerere plura, nefas_.\n\n                                                                      [276]\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nESSAYS ON THE JUSTICE OF GOD AND THE FREEDOM OF MAN IN THE ORIGIN OF EVIL\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nPART THREE\n\n241. Now at last I have disposed of the cause of moral evil; _physical\nevil_, that is, sorrows, sufferings, miseries, will be less troublesome to\nexplain, since these are results of moral evil. _Poena est malum passionis,\nquod infligitur ob malum actionis_, according to Grotius. One suffers\nbecause one has acted; one suffers evil because one does evil.\n\n    _Nostrorum causa malorum_\n  _Nos sumus_.\n\nIt is true that one often suffers through the evil actions of others; but\nwhen one has no part in the offence one must look upon it as a certainty\nthat these sufferings prepare for us a greater happiness. The question of\n_physical evil_, that is, of the origin of sufferings, has difficulties in\ncommon with that of the origin of _metaphysical evil_, examples whereof are\nfurnished by the monstrosities and other apparent irregularities of the\nuniverse. But one must believe that even sufferings and monstrosities are\npart of order; and it is well to bear in mind not only that it was better\nto admit these defects and these monstrosities than to violate general\nlaws, as Father Malebranche sometimes argues, but also that these very\nmonstrosities are in the rules, and are in conformity with general acts of\nwill, though we be not capable of discerning this conformity. It is   [277]\njust as sometimes there are appearances of irregularity in mathematics\nwhich issue finally in a great order when one has finally got to the bottom\nof them: that is why I have already in this work observed that according to\nmy principles all individual events, without exception, are consequences of\ngeneral acts of will.\n\n242. It should be no cause for astonishment that I endeavour to elucidate\nthese things by comparisons taken from pure mathematics, where everything\nproceeds in order, and where it is possible to fathom them by a close\ncontemplation which grants us an enjoyment, so to speak, of the vision of\nthe ideas of God. One may propose a succession or series of numbers\nperfectly irregular to all appearance, where the numbers increase and\ndiminish variably without the emergence of any order; and yet he who knows\nthe key to the formula, and who understands the origin and the structure of\nthis succession of numbers, will be able to give a rule which, being\nproperly understood, will show that the series is perfectly regular, and\nthat it even has excellent properties. One may make this still more evident\nin lines. A line may have twists and turns, ups and downs, points of\nreflexion and points of inflexion, interruptions and other variations, so\nthat one sees neither rhyme nor reason therein, especially when taking into\naccount only a portion of the line; and yet it may be that one can give its\nequation and construction, wherein a geometrician would find the reason and\nthe fittingness of all these so-called irregularities. That is how we must\nlook upon the irregularities constituted by monstrosities and other\nso-called defects in the universe.\n\n243. In this sense one may apply that fine adage of St. Bernard (Ep. 276,\nAd Eugen., III): 'Ordinatissimum est, minus interdum ordinate fieri\naliquid.' It belongs to the great order that there should be some small\ndisorder. One may even say that this small disorder is apparent only in the\nwhole, and it is not even apparent when one considers the happiness of\nthose who walk in the ways of order.\n\n244. When I mention monstrosities I include numerous other apparent defects\nbesides. We are acquainted with hardly anything but the surface of our\nglobe; we scarce penetrate into its interior beyond a few hundred fathoms.\nThat which we find in this crust of the globe appears to be the effect of\nsome great upheavals. It seems that this globe was once on fire, and that\nthe rocks forming the base of this crust of the earth are scoria remaining\nfrom a great fusion. In their entrails are found metal and mineral    [278]\nproducts, which closely resemble those emanating from our furnaces: and the\nentire sea may be a kind of _oleum per deliquium_, just as tartaric oil\nforms in a damp place. For when the earth's surface cooled after the great\nconflagration the moisture that the fire had driven into the air fell back\nupon the earth, washed its surface and dissolved and absorbed the solid\nsalt that was left in the cinders, finally filling up this great cavity in\nthe surface of our globe, to form the ocean filled with salt water.\n\n245. But, after the fire, one must conclude that earth and water made\nravages no less. It may be that the crust formed by the cooling, having\nbelow it great cavities, fell in, so that we live only on ruins, as among\nothers Thomas Burnet, Chaplain to the late King of Great Britain, aptly\nobserved. Sundry deluges and inundations have left deposits, whereof traces\nand remains are found which show that the sea was in places that to-day are\nmost remote from it. But these upheavals ceased at last, and the globe\nassumed the shape that we see. Moses hints at these changes in few words:\nthe separation of light from darkness indicates the melting caused by the\nfire; and the separation of the moist from the dry marks the effects of\ninundations. But who does not see that these disorders have served to bring\nthings to the point where they now are, that we owe to them our riches and\nour comforts, and that through their agency this globe became fit for\ncultivation by us. These disorders passed into order. The disorders, real\nor apparent, that we see from afar are sunspots and comets; but we do not\nknow what uses they supply, nor the rules prevailing therein. Time was when\nthe planets were held to be wandering stars: now their motion is found to\nbe regular. Peradventure it is the same with the comets: posterity will\nknow.\n\n246. One does not include among the disorders inequality of conditions, and\nM. Jacquelot is justified in asking those who would have everything equally\nperfect, why rocks are not crowned with leaves and flowers? why ants are\nnot peacocks? And if there must needs be equality everywhere, the poor man\nwould serve notice of appeal against the rich, the servant against the\nmaster. The pipes of an organ must not be of equal size. M. Bayle will say\nthat there is a difference between a privation of good and a disorder;\nbetween a disorder in inanimate things, which is purely metaphysical, and a\ndisorder in rational creatures, which is composed of crime and        [279]\nsufferings. He is right in making a distinction between them, and I am\nright in combining them. God does not neglect inanimate things: they do not\nfeel, but God feels for them. He does not neglect animals: they have not\nintelligence, but God has it for them. He would reproach himself for the\nslightest actual defect there were in the universe, even though it were\nperceived of none.\n\n247. It seems M. Bayle does not approve any comparison between the\ndisorders which may exist in inanimate things and those which trouble the\npeace and happiness of rational creatures; nor would he agree to our\njustifying the permission of vice on the pretext of the care that must be\ntaken to avoid disturbing the laws of motion. One might thence conclude,\naccording to him (posthumous Reply to M. Jacquelot, p. 183), 'that God\ncreated the world only to display his infinite skill in architecture and\nmechanics, whilst his property of goodness and love of virtue took no part\nin the construction of this great work. This God would pride himself only\non skill; he would prefer to let the whole human kind perish rather than\nsuffer some atoms to go faster or more slowly than general laws require.'\nM. Bayle would not have made this antithesis if he had been informed on the\nsystem of general harmony which I assume, which states that the realm of\nefficient causes and that of final causes are parallel to each other; that\nGod has no less the quality of the best monarch than that of the greatest\narchitect; that matter is so disposed that the laws of motion serve as the\nbest guidance for spirits; and that consequently it will prove that he has\nattained the utmost good possible, provided one reckon the metaphysical,\nphysical and moral goods together.\n\n248. But (M. Bayle will say) God having power to avert innumerable evils by\none small miracle, why did he not employ it? He gives so much extraordinary\nhelp to fallen men; but slight help of such a kind given to Eve would have\nprevented her fall and rendered the temptation of the serpent ineffective.\nI have sufficiently met objections of this sort with this general answer,\nthat God ought not to make choice of another universe since he has chosen\nthe best, and has only made use of the miracles necessary thereto. I had\nanswered M. Bayle that miracles change the natural order of the universe.\nHe replies, that that is an illusion, and that the miracle of the wedding\nat Cana (for instance) made no change in the air of the room, except that\ninstead of receiving into its pores some corpuscles of water, it      [280]\nreceived corpuscles of wine. But one must bear in mind that once the best\nplan of things has been chosen nothing can be changed therein.\n\n249. As for miracles (concerning which I have already said something in\nthis work), they are perhaps not all of one and the same kind: there are\nmany, to all appearances, which God brings about through the ministry of\ninvisible substances, such as the angels, as Father Malebranche also\nbelieves. These angels or these substances act according to the ordinary\nlaws of their nature, being combined with bodies more rarefied and more\nvigorous than those we have at our command. And such miracles are only so\nby comparison, and in relation to us; just as our works would be considered\nmiraculous amongst animals if they were capable of remarking upon them. The\nchanging of water into wine might be a miracle of this kind. But the\nCreation, the Incarnation and some other actions of God exceed all the\npower of creatures and are truly miracles, or indeed Mysteries. If,\nnevertheless, the changing of water into wine at Cana was a miracle of the\nhighest kind, God would have thereby changed the whole course of the\nuniverse, because of the connexion of bodies; or else he would have been\nbound to prevent this connexion miraculously also, and cause the bodies not\nconcerned in the miracle to act as if no miracle had happened. After the\nmiracle was over, it would have been necessary to restore all things in\nthose very bodies concerned to the state they would have reached without\nthe miracle: whereafter all would have returned to its original course.\nThus this miracle demanded more than at first appears.\n\n250. As for physical evil in creatures, to wit their sufferings, M. Bayle\ncontends vigorously against those who endeavour to justify by means of\nparticular reasons the course of action pursued by God in regard to this.\nHere I set aside the sufferings of animals, and I see that M. Bayle insists\nchiefly on those of men, perhaps because he thinks that brute beasts have\nno feeling. It is on account of the injustice there would be in the\nsufferings of beasts that divers Cartesians wished to prove that they are\nonly machines, _quoniam sub Deo justo nemo innocens miser est_: it is\nimpossible that an innocent creature should be unhappy under such a master\nas God. The principle is good, but I do not think it warrants the inference\nthat beasts have no feeling, because I think that, properly speaking,\nperception is not sufficient to cause misery if it is not accompanied [281]\nby reflexion. It is the same with happiness: without reflexion there is\nnone.\n\n  _O fortunatos nimium, sua qui bona norint!_\n\nOne cannot reasonably doubt the existence of pain among animals; but it\nseems as if their pleasures and their pains are not so keen as they are in\nman: for animals, since they do not reflect, are susceptible neither to the\ngrief that accompanies pain, nor to the joy that accompanies pleasure. Men\nare sometimes in a state approaching that of the beasts, when they act\nalmost on instinct alone and simply on the impressions made by the\nexperience of the senses: and, in this state, their pleasures and their\npains are very slight.\n\n251. But let us pass from the beasts and return to rational creatures. It\nis with regard to them that M. Bayle discusses this question: whether there\nis more physical evil than physical good in the world? (_Reply to the\nQuestions of a Provincial_, vol. II, ch. 75.) To settle it aright, one must\nexplain wherein these goods and evils lie. We are agreed that physical evil\nis simply displeasure and under that heading I include pain, grief, and\nevery other kind of discomfort. But does physical good lie solely in\npleasure? M. Bayle appears to be of this opinion; but I consider that it\nlies also in a middle state, such as that of health. One is well enough\nwhen one has no ill; it is a degree of wisdom to have no folly:\n\n      _Sapientia prima est,_\n  _Stultitia caruisse_.\n\nIn the same way one is worthy of praise when one cannot with justice be\nblamed:\n\n  _Si non culpabor, sat mihi laudis erit_.\n\nThat being the case, all the sensations not unpleasing to us, all the\nexercises of our powers that do not incommode us, and whose prevention\nwould incommode us, are physical goods, even when they cause us no\npleasure; for privation of them is a physical evil. Besides we only\nperceive the good of health, and other like goods, when we are deprived of\nthem. On those terms I would dare to maintain that even in this life goods\nexceed evils, that our comforts exceed our discomforts, and that M.\nDescartes was justified in writing (vol. I, Letter 9) 'that natural reason\nteaches us that we have more goods than evils in this life'.\n\n                                                                      [282]\n252. It must be added that pleasures enjoyed too often and to excess would\nbe a very great evil. There are some which Hippocrates compared to the\nfalling sickness, and Scioppius doubtless only made pretence of envying the\nsparrows in order to be agreeably playful in a learned and far from playful\nwork. Highly seasoned foods are injurious to health and impair the niceness\nof a delicate sense; and in general bodily pleasures are a kind of\nexpenditure of the spirit, though they be made good in some better than in\nothers.\n\n253. As proof, however, that the evil exceeds the good is quoted the\ninstance of M. de la Motte le Vayer (Letter 134), who would not have been\nwilling to return to the world, supposing he had had to play the same part\nas providence had already assigned to him. But I have already said that I\nthink one would accept the proposal of him who could re-knot the thread of\nFate if a new part were promised to us, even though it should not be better\nthan the first. Thus from M. de la Motte le Vayer's saying it does not\nfollow that he would not have wished for the part he had already played,\nprovided it had been new, as M. Bayle seems to take it.\n\n254. The pleasures of the mind are the purest, and of greatest service in\nmaking joy endure. Cardan, when already an old man, was so content with his\nstate that he protested solemnly that he would not exchange it for the\nstate of the richest of young men who at the same time was ignorant. M. de\nla Motte le Vayer quotes the saying himself without criticizing it.\nKnowledge has doubtless charms which cannot be conceived by those who have\nnot tasted them. I do not mean a mere knowledge of facts without that of\nreasons, but knowledge like that of Cardan, who with all his faults was a\ngreat man, and would have been incomparable without those faults.\n\n  _Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas!_\n  _Ille metus omnes et inexorabile fatum_\n  _Subjecit pedibus._\n\nIt is no small thing to be content with God and with the universe, not to\nfear what destiny has in store for us, nor to complain of what befalls us.\nAcquaintance with true principles gives us this advantage, quite other than\nthat the Stoics and the Epicureans derived from their philosophy. There is\nas much difference between true morality and theirs as there is       [283]\nbetween joy and patience: for their tranquillity was founded only on\nnecessity, while ours must rest upon the perfection and beauty of things,\nupon our own happiness.\n\n255. What, then, shall we say of bodily sufferings? May they not be\nsufficiently acute to disturb the sage's tranquillity? Aristotle assents;\nthe Stoics were of a different opinion, and even the Epicureans likewise.\nM. Descartes revived the doctrine of these philosophers; he says in the\nletter just quoted: 'that even amid the worst misfortunes and the most\noverwhelming sufferings one may always be content, if only one knows how to\nexercise reason'. M. Bayle says concerning this (_Reply to the Questions of\na Provincial_, vol. III, ch. 157, p. 991) 'that it is saying nothing, that\nit is prescribing for us a remedy whose preparation hardly anyone\nunderstands'. I hold that the thing is not impossible, and that men could\nattain it by dint of meditation and practice. For apart from the true\nmartyrs and those who have been aided in wonderful wise from on high, there\nhave been counterfeits who imitated them. That Spanish slave who killed the\nCarthaginian governor in order to avenge his master and who evinced great\njoy in his deed, even in the greatest tortures, may shame the philosophers.\nWhy should not one go as far as he? One may say of an advantage, as of a\ndisadvantage:\n\n  _Cuivis potest accidere, quod cuiquam potest_.\n\n256. But even to-day entire tribes, such as the Hurons, the Iroquois, the\nGalibis and other peoples of America teach us a great lesson on this\nmatter: one cannot read without astonishment of the intrepidity and\nwell-nigh insensibility wherewith they brave their enemies, who roast them\nover a slow fire and eat them by slices. If such people could retain their\nphysical superiority and their courage, and combine them with our\nacquirements, they would surpass us in every way,\n\n  _Extat ut in mediis turris aprica casis_.\n\nThey would be, in comparison with us, as a giant to a dwarf, a mountain to\na hill:\n\n  _Quantus Eryx, et quantus Athos, gaudetque nivali_\n  _Vertice se attollens pater Apenninus ad auras._\n\n                                                                      [284]\n257. All that which is effected by a wonderful vigour of body and mind in\nthese savages, who persist obstinately in the strangest point of honour,\nmight be acquired in our case by training, by well-seasoned mortifications,\nby an overmastering joy founded on reason, by great practice in preserving\na certain presence of mind in the midst of the distractions and impressions\nmost liable to disturb it. Something of this kind is related of the ancient\nAssassins, subjects and pupils of the Old Man or rather the Seigneur\n(_Senior_) of the Mountain. Such a school (for a better purpose) would be\ngood for missionaries who would wish to return to Japan. The Gymnosophists\nof the ancient Indians had perhaps something resembling this, and that\nCalanus, who provided for Alexander the Great the spectacle of his burning\nalive, had doubtless been encouraged by the great examples of his masters\nand trained by great sufferings not to fear pain. The wives of these same\nIndians, who even to-day ask to be burned with the bodies of their\nhusbands, seem still to keep something of the courage of those ancient\nphilosophers of their country. I do not expect that there should\nstraightway be founded a religious order whose purpose would be to exalt\nman to that high pitch of perfection: such people would be too much above\nthe rest, and too formidable for the authorities. As it rarely happens that\npeople are exposed to extremes where such great strength of mind would be\nneeded, one will scarce think of providing for it at the expense of our\nusual comforts, albeit incomparably more would be gained than lost thereby.\n\n258. Nevertheless the very fact that one has no need of that great remedy\nis a proof that the good already exceeds the evil. Euripides also said:\n\n  [Greek: pleio ta chresta ton kakon einai brotois].\n  _Mala nostra longe judico vinci a bonis._\n\nHomer and divers other poets were of another mind, and men in general agree\nwith them. The reason for this is that the evil arouses our attention\nrather than the good: but this same reason proves that the evil is more\nrare. One must therefore not credit the petulant expressions of Pliny, who\nwould have it that Nature is a stepmother, and who maintains that man is\nthe most unhappy and most vain of all creatures. These two epithets do not\nagree: one is not so very unhappy, when one is full of oneself. It is [285]\ntrue that men hold human nature only too much in contempt, apparently\nbecause they see no other creatures capable of arousing their emulation;\nbut they have all too much self-esteem, and individually are but too easily\nsatisfied. I therefore agree with Meric Casaubon, who in his notes on the\nXenophanes of Diogenes Laertius praises exceedingly the admirable\nsentiments of Euripides, going so far as to credit him with having said\nthings _quae spirant_ [Greek: theopneuston] _pectus_. Seneca (Lib. 4, c. 5,\n_De Benefic._) speaks eloquently of the blessings Nature has heaped upon\nus. M. Bayle in his _Dictionary_, article 'Xenophanes', brings up sundry\nauthorities against this, and among others that of the poet Diphilus in the\nCollections of Stobaeus, whose Greek might be thus expressed in Latin:\n\n  _Fortuna cyathis bibere nos datis jubens,_\n  _Infundit uno terna pro bono mala._\n\n259. M. Bayle believes that if it were a question only of the evil of\nguilt, or of moral evil among men, the case would soon be terminated to the\nadvantage of Pliny, and Euripides would lose his action. To that I am not\nopposed; our vices doubtless exceed our virtues, and this is the effect of\noriginal sin. It is nevertheless true that also on that point men in\ngeneral exaggerate things, and that even some theologians disparage man so\nmuch that they wrong the providence of the Author of mankind. That is why I\nam not in favour of those who thought to do great honour to our religion by\nsaying that the virtues of the pagans were only _splendida peccata_,\nsplendid vices. It is a sally of St. Augustine's which has no foundation in\nholy Scripture, and which offends reason. But here we are only discussing a\nphysical good and evil, and one must compare in detail the prosperities and\nthe adversities of this life. M. Bayle would wish almost to set aside the\nconsideration of health; he likens it to the rarefied bodies, which are\nscarcely felt, like air, for example; but he likens pain to the bodies that\nhave much density and much weight in slight volume. But pain itself makes\nus aware of the importance of health when we are bereft of it. I have\nalready observed that excess of physical pleasures would be a real evil,\nand the matter ought not to be otherwise; it is too important for the\nspirit to be free. Lactantius (_Divin. Instit._, lib. 3, cap. 18) had said\nthat men are so squeamish that they complain of the slightest ill, as if it\nswallowed up all the goods they have enjoyed. M. Bayle says, concerning\nthis, that the very fact that men have this feeling warrants the      [286]\njudgement that they are in evil case, since it is feeling which measures\nthe extent of good or evil. But I answer that present feeling is anything\nrather than the true measure of good and evil past and future. I grant that\none is in evil case while one makes these peevish reflexions; but that does\nnot exclude a previous state of well-being, nor imply that, everything\nreckoned in and all allowance made, the good does not exceed the evil.\n\n260. I do not wonder that the pagans, dissatisfied with their gods, made\ncomplaints against Prometheus and Epimetheus for having forged so weak an\nanimal as man. Nor do I wonder that they acclaimed the fable of old\nSilenus, foster-father of Bacchus, who was seized by King Midas, and as the\nprice of his deliverance taught him that ostensibly fine maxim that the\nfirst and the greatest of goods was not to be born, and the second, to\ndepart from this life with dispatch (Cic., _Tuscul._, lib. 1). Plato\nbelieved that souls had been in a happier state, and many of the ancients,\namongst others Cicero in his Consolation (according to the account of\nLactantius), believed that for their sins they were confined in bodies as\nin a prison. They rendered thus a reason for our ills, and asserted their\nprejudices against human life: for there is no such thing as a beautiful\nprison. But quite apart from the consideration that, even according to\nthese same pagans, the evils of this life would be counterbalanced and\nexceeded by the goods of past and future lives, I make bold to say that we\nshall find, upon unbiassed scrutiny of the facts, that taking all in all\nhuman life is in general tolerable. And adding thereto the motives of\nreligion, we shall be content with the order God has set therein. Moreover,\nfor a better judgement of our goods and our evils, it will be well to read\nCardan, _De Utilitate ex Adversis Capienda_, and Novarini, _De Occultis Dei\nBeneficiis_.\n\n261. M. Bayle dilates upon the misfortunes of the great, who are thought to\nbe the most fortunate: the constant experience of the fair aspect of their\ncondition renders them unaware of good, but greatly aware of evil. Someone\nwill say: so much the worse for them; if they know not how to enjoy the\nadvantages of nature and fortune, is that the fault of either? There are\nnevertheless great men possessed of more wisdom, who know how to profit by\nthe favours God has shown them, who are easily consoled for their\nmisfortunes, and who even turn their own faults to account. M. Bayle  [287]\npays no heed to that: he prefers to listen to Pliny, who thinks that\nAugustus, one of the princes most favoured by fortune, experienced at least\nas much evil as good. I admit that he found great causes of trouble in his\nfamily and that remorse for having crushed the Republic may have tormented\nhim; but I think that he was too wise to grieve over the former, and that\nMaecenas apparently made him understand that Rome had need of a master. Had\nnot Augustus been converted on this point, Vergil would never have said of\na lost soul:\n\n  _Vendidit hic auro patriam Dominumque potentem_\n  _Imposuit, fixit leges pretio atque refixit._\n\nAugustus would have thought that he and Caesar were alluded to in these\nlines, which speak of a master given to a free state. But there is every\nindication that he applied it just as little to his dominion, which he\nregarded as compatible with liberty and as a necessary remedy for public\nevils, as the princes of to-day apply to themselves the words used of the\nkings censured in M. de Cambray's _Telemachus_. Each one considers himself\nwithin his rights. Tacitus, an unbiassed writer, justifies Augustus in two\nwords, at the beginning of his _Annals_. But Augustus was better able than\nanyone to judge of his good fortune. He appears to have died content, as\nmay be inferred from a proof he gave of contentedness with his life: for in\ndying he repeated to his friends a line in Greek, which has the\nsignification of that _Plaudite_ that was wont to be spoken at the\nconclusion of a well-acted play. Suetonius quotes it:\n\n  [Greek: Dote kroton kai pantes hymeis meta charas ktypesate.]\n\n262. But even though there should have fallen to the lot of the human kind\nmore evil than good, it is enough where God is concerned that there is\nincomparably more good than evil in the universe. Rabbi Maimonides (whose\nmerit is not sufficiently recognized in the statement that he is the first\nof the Rabbis to have ceased talking nonsense) also gave wise judgement on\nthis question of the predominance of good over evil in the world. Here is\nwhat he says in his _Doctor Perplexorum_ (cap. 12, p. 3): 'There arise\noften in the hearts of ill-instructed persons thoughts which persuade them\nthere is more evil than good in the world: and one often finds in the poems\nand songs of the pagans that it is as it were a miracle when something good\ncomes to pass, whereas evils are usual and constant. This error has   [288]\ntaken hold not of the common herd only, those very persons who wish to be\nconsidered wise have been beguiled thereby. A celebrated writer named\nAlrasi, in his _Sepher Elohuth_, or Theosophy, amongst other absurdities\nhas stated that there are more evils than goods, and that upon comparison\nof the recreations and the pleasures man enjoys in times of tranquillity\nwith the pains, the torments, the troubles, faults, cares, griefs and\nafflictions whereby he is overwhelmed our life would prove to be a great\nevil, and an actual penalty inflicted upon us to punish us.' Maimonides\nadds that the cause of their extravagant error is their supposition that\nNature was made for them only, and that they hold of no account what is\nseparate from their person; whence they infer that when something\nunpleasing to them occurs all goes ill in the universe.\n\n263. M. Bayle says that this observation of Maimonides is not to the point,\nbecause the question is whether among men evil exceeds good. But, upon\nconsideration of the Rabbi's words, I find that the question he formulates\nis general, and that he wished to refute those who decide it on one\nparticular motive derived from the evils of the human race, as if all had\nbeen made for man; and it seems as though the author whom he refutes spoke\nalso of good and evil in general. Maimonides is right in saying that if one\ntook into account the littleness of man in relation to the universe one\nwould comprehend clearly that the predominance of evil, even though it\nprevailed among men, need not on that account occur among the angels, nor\namong the heavenly bodies, nor among the elements and inanimate compounds,\nnor among many kinds of animals. I have shown elsewhere that in supposing\nthat the number of the damned exceeds that of the saved (a supposition\nwhich is nevertheless not altogether certain) one might admit that there is\nmore evil than good in respect of the human kind known to us. But I pointed\nout that that neither precludes the existence of incomparably more good\nthan evil, both moral and physical, in rational creatures in general, nor\nprevents the city of God, which contains all creatures, from being the most\nperfect state. So also on consideration of the metaphysical good and evil\nwhich is in all substances, whether endowed with or devoid of intelligence,\nand which taken in such scope would include physical good and moral good,\none must say that the universe, such as it actually is, must be the best of\nall systems.\n\n                                                                      [289]\n264. Moreover, M. Bayle will not have it that our transgression should have\nanything to do with the consideration of our sufferings. He is right when\nit is simply a matter of appraising these sufferings; but the case is not\nthe same when one asks whether they should be ascribed to God, this indeed\nbeing the principal cause of M. Bayle's difficulties when he places reason\nor experience in opposition to religion. I know that he is wont to say that\nit is of no avail to resort to our free will, since his objections tend\nalso to prove that the misuse of free will must no less be laid to the\naccount of God, who has permitted it and who has co-operated therein. He\nstates it as a maxim that for one difficulty more or less one must not\nabandon a system. This he advances especially in favour of the methods of\nthe strict and the dogma of the Supralapsarians. For he supposes that one\ncan subscribe to their opinion, although he leaves all the difficulties in\ntheir entirety, because the other systems, albeit they put an end to some\nof the difficulties, cannot meet them all. I hold that the true system I\nhave expounded satisfies all. Nevertheless, even were that not so, I\nconfess that I cannot relish this maxim of M. Bayle's, and I should prefer\na system which would remove a great portion of the difficulties, to one\nwhich would meet none of them. And the consideration of the wickedness of\nmen, which brings upon them well-nigh all their misfortunes, shows at least\nthat they have no right to complain. No justice need trouble itself over\nthe origin of a scoundrel's wickedness when it is only a question of\npunishing him: it is quite another matter when it is a question of\nprevention. One knows well that disposition, upbringing, conversation, and\noften chance itself, have much share in that origin: is the man any the\nless deserving of punishment?\n\n265. I confess that there still remains another difficulty. If God is not\nbound to account to the wicked for their wickedness, it seems as if he owes\nto himself, and to those who honour him and love him, justification for his\ncourse of action with regard to the permission of vice and crime. But God\nhas already given that satisfaction, as far as it is needed here on earth:\nby granting us the light of reason he has bestowed upon us the means\nwhereby we may meet all difficulties. I hope that I have made it plain in\nthis discourse, and have elucidated the matter in the preceding portion of\nthese Essays, almost as far as it can be done through general arguments.\nThereafter, the permission of sin being justified, the other evils    [290]\nthat are a consequence thereof present no further difficulty. Thus also I\nam justified in restricting myself here to the evil of guilt to account for\nthe evil of punishment, as Holy Scripture does, and likewise well-nigh all\nthe Fathers of the Church and the Preachers. And, to the end that none may\nsay that is only good _per la predica_, it is enough to consider that,\nafter the solutions I have given, nothing must seem more right or more\nexact than this method. For God, having found already among things\npossible, before his actual decrees, man misusing his freedom and bringing\nupon himself his misfortune, yet could not avoid admitting him into\nexistence, because the general plan required this. Wherefore it will no\nlonger be necessary to say with M. Jurieu that one must dogmatize like St.\nAugustine and preach like Pelagius.\n\n266. This method, deriving the evil of punishment from the evil of guilt,\ncannot be open to censure, and serves especially to account for the\ngreatest physical evil, which is damnation. Ernst Sonner, sometime\nProfessor of Philosophy at Altorf (a university established in the\nterritory of the free city of Nuremberg), who was considered an excellent\nAristotelian, but was finally recognized as being secretly a Socinian, had\ncomposed a little discourse entitled: _Demonstration against the Eternity\nof Punishment_. It was founded on this somewhat trite principle, that there\nis no proportion between an infinite punishment and a finite guilt. It was\nconveyed to me, printed (so it seemed) in Holland; and I replied that there\nwas one thing to be considered which had escaped the late Herr Sonner:\nnamely that it was enough to say that the duration of the guilt caused the\nduration of the penalty. Since the damned remained wicked they could not be\nwithdrawn from their misery; and thus one need not, in order to justify the\ncontinuation of their sufferings, assume that sin has become of infinite\nweight through the infinite nature of the object offended, who is God. This\nthesis I had not explored enough to pass judgement thereon. I know that the\ngeneral opinion of the Schoolmen, according to the Master of the Sentences,\nis that in the other life there is neither merit nor demerit; but I do not\nthink that, taken literally, it can pass for an article of faith. Herr\nFecht, a famous theologian at Rostock, well refuted that in his book on\n_The State of the Damned_. It is quite wrong, he says (Sec. 59); God cannot\nchange his nature; justice is essential to him; death has closed the door\nof grace, but not that of justice.\n\n                                                                      [291]\n267. I have observed that sundry able theologians have accounted for the\nduration of the pains of the damned as I have just done. Johann Gerhard, a\nfamous theologian of the Augsburg Confession (in _Locis Theol._, loco de\nInferno, Sec. 60), brings forward amongst other arguments that the damned have\nstill an evil will and lack the grace that could render it good. Zacharias\nUrsinus, a theologian of Heidelberg, who follows Calvin, having formulated\nthis question (in his treatise _De Fide_) why sin merits an eternal\npunishment, advances first the common reason, that the person offended is\ninfinite, and then also this second reason, _quod non cessante peccato non\npotest cessare poena_. And the Jesuit Father Drexler says in his book\nentitled _Nicetas, or Incontinence Overcome_ (book 2, ch. 11, Sec. 9): 'Nec\nmirum damnatos semper torqueri, continue blasphemant, et sic quasi semper\npeccant, semper ergo plectuntur.' He declares and approves the same reason\nin his work on _Eternity_ (book 2, ch. 15) saying: 'Sunt qui dicant, nec\ndisplicet responsum: scelerati in locis infernis semper peccant, ideo\nsemper puniuntur.' And he indicates thereby that this opinion is very\ncommon among learned men in the Roman Church. He alleges, it is true,\nanother more subtle reason, derived from Pope Gregory the Great (lib. 4,\nDial. c. 44), that the damned are punished eternally because God foresaw by\na kind of _mediate knowledge_ that they would always have sinned if they\nhad always lived upon earth. But it is a hypothesis very much open to\nquestion. Herr Fecht quotes also various eminent Protestant theologians for\nHerr Gerhard's opinion, although he mentions also some who think\ndifferently.\n\n268. M. Bayle himself in various places has supplied me with passages from\ntwo able theologians of his party, which have some reference to these\nstatements of mine. M. Jurieu in his book on the _Unity of the Church_, in\nopposition to that written by M. Nicole on the same subject, gives the\nopinion (p. 379) 'that reason tells us that a creature which cannot cease\nto be criminal can also not cease to be miserable'. M. Jacquelot in his\nbook on _The Conformity of Faith with Reason_ (p. 220) is of opinion 'that\nthe damned must remain eternally deprived of the glory of the blessed, and\nthat this deprivation might well be the origin and the cause of all their\npains, through the reflexions these unhappy creatures make upon their\ncrimes which have deprived them of an eternal bliss. One knows what burning\nregrets, what pain envy causes to those who see themselves deprived of a\ngood, of a notable honour which had been offered to them, and which   [292]\nthey rejected, especially when they see others invested with it.' This\nposition is a little different from that of M. Jurieu, but both agree in\nthis sentiment, that the damned are themselves the cause of the\ncontinuation of their torments. M. le Clerc's Origenist does not entirely\ndiffer from this opinion when he says in the _Select Library_ (vol. 7, p.\n341): 'God, who foresaw that man would fall, does not condemn him on that\naccount, but only because, although he has the power to recover himself, he\nyet does not do so, that is, he freely retains his evil ways to the end of\nhis life.' If he carries this reasoning on beyond this life, he will\nascribe the continuation of the pains of the wicked to the continuation of\ntheir guilt.\n\n269. M. Bayle says (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, ch. 175, p.\n1188) 'that this dogma of the Origenist is heretical, in that it teaches\nthat damnation is not founded simply on sin, but on voluntary impenitence':\nbut is not this voluntary impenitence a continuation of sin? I would not\nsimply say, however, that it is because man, having the power to recover\nhimself, does not; and would wish to add that it is because man does not\ntake advantage of the succour of grace to aid him to recover himself. But\nafter this life, though one assume that the succour ceases, there is always\nin the man who sins, even when he is damned, a freedom which renders him\nculpable, and a power, albeit remote, of recovering himself, even though it\nshould never pass into action. And there is no reason why one may not say\nthat this degree of freedom, exempt from necessity, but not exempt from\ncertainty, remains in the damned as well as in the blessed. Moreover, the\ndamned have no need of a succour that is needed in this life, for they know\nonly too well what one must believe here.\n\n270. The illustrious prelate of the Anglican Church who published recently\na book on the origin of evil, concerning which M. Bayle made some\nobservations in the second volume of his _Reply_, speaks with much subtlety\nabout the pains of the damned. This prelate's opinion is presented\n(according to the author of the _Nouvelles de la Republique des Lettres_,\nJune 1703) as if he made 'of the damned just so many madmen who will feel\ntheir miseries acutely, but who will nevertheless congratulate themselves\non their own behaviour, and who will rather choose to be, and to be that\nwhich they are, than not to be at all. They will love their state, unhappy\nas it will be, even as angry people, lovers, the ambitious, the       [293]\nenvious take pleasure in the very things that only augment their misery.\nFurthermore the ungodly will have so accustomed their mind to wrong\njudgements that they will henceforth never make any other kind, and will\nperpetually pass from one error into another. They will not be able to\nrefrain from desiring perpetually things whose enjoyment will be denied\nthem, and, being deprived of which, they will fall into inconceivable\ndespair, while experience can never make them wiser for the future. For by\ntheir own fault they will have altogether corrupted their understanding,\nand will have rendered it incapable of passing a sound judgement on any\nmatter.'\n\n271. The ancients already imagined that the Devil dwells remote from God\nvoluntarily, in the midst of his torments, and that he is unwilling to\nredeem himself by an act of submission. They invented a tale that an\nanchorite in a vision received a promise from God that he would receive\ninto grace the Prince of the bad angels if he would acknowledge his fault;\nbut that the devil rebuffed this mediator in a strange manner. At the\nleast, the theologians usually agree that the devils and the damned hate\nGod and blaspheme him; and such a state cannot but be followed by\ncontinuation of misery. Concerning that, one may read the learned treatise\nof Herr Fecht on the _State of the Damned_.\n\n272. There were times when the belief was held that it was not impossible\nfor a lost soul to be delivered. The story told of Pope Gregory the Great\nis well known, how by his prayers he had withdrawn from hell the soul of\nthe Emperor Trajan, whose goodness was so renowned that to new emperors the\nwish was offered that they should surpass Augustus in good fortune and\nTrajan in goodness. It was this that won for the latter the pity of the\nHoly Father. God acceded to his prayers (it is said), but he forbade him to\nmake the like prayers in future. According to this fable, the prayers of\nSt. Gregory had the force of the remedies of Aesculapius, who recalled\nHippolytus from Hades; and, if he had continued to make such prayers, God\nwould have waxed wroth, like Jupiter in Vergil:\n\n  _At pater omnipotens aliquem indignatus ab umbris_\n  _Mortalem infernis ad lumina surgere vitae,_\n  _Ipse repertorem medicinae talis et artis_\n  _Fulmine Phoebigenam Stygias detrusit ad undas._\n\n                                                                      [294]\nGodescalc, a monk of the ninth century, who set at variance the theologians\nof his day, and even those of our day, maintained that the reprobate should\npray God to render their pains more bearable; but one is never justified in\nbelieving oneself reprobate so long as one is alive. The passage in the\nMass for the dead is more reasonable: it asks for the abatement of the\ntorments of the damned, and, according to the hypothesis that I have just\nstated, one must wish for them _meliorem mentem_. Origen having applied the\npassage from Psalm lxxvii, verse 10: God will not forget to be gracious,\nneither will he shut up his loving-kindness in displeasure, St. Augustine\nreplies _(Enchirid._, c. 112) that it is possible that the pains of the\ndamned last eternally, and that they may nevertheless be mitigated. If the\ntext implied that, the abatement would, as regards its duration, go on to\ninfinity; and yet that abatement would, as regards its extent, have a _non\nplus ultra_. Even so there are asymptote figures in geometry where an\ninfinite length makes only a finite progress in breadth. If the parable of\nthe wicked rich man represented the state of a definitely lost soul, the\nhypothesis which makes these souls so mad and so wicked would be\ngroundless. But the charity towards his brothers attributed to him in the\nparable does not seem to be consistent with that degree of wickedness which\nis ascribed to the damned. St. Gregory the Great (IX _Mor._, 39) thinks\nthat the rich man was afraid lest their damnation should increase his: but\nit seems as though this fear is not sufficiently consistent with the\ndisposition of a perfectly wicked will. Bonaventura, on the Master of the\nSentences, says that the wicked rich man would have desired to see everyone\ndamned; but since that was not to be, he desired the salvation of his\nbrothers rather than that of the rest. This reply is by no means sound. On\nthe contrary, the mission of Lazarus that he desired would have served to\nsave many people; and he who takes so much pleasure in the damnation of\nothers that he desires it for everyone will perhaps desire that damnation\nfor some more than others; but, generally speaking, he will have no\ninclination to gain salvation for anyone. However that may be, one must\nadmit that all this detail is problematical, God having revealed to us all\nthat is needed to put us in fear of the greatest of misfortunes, and not\nwhat is needed for our understanding thereof.\n\n273. Now since it is henceforth permitted to have recourse to the misuse of\nfree will, and to evil will, in order to account for other evils,     [295]\nsince the divine permission of this misuse is plainly enough justified, the\nordinary system of the theologians meets with justification at the same\ntime. Now we can seek with confidence _the origin of evil in the freedom of\ncreatures_. The first wickedness is well known to us, it is that of the\nDevil and his angels: the Devil sinneth from the beginning, and for this\npurpose the Son of God was manifested, that he might destroy the works of\nthe Devil (1 John iii. 8). The Devil is the father of wickedness, he was a\nmurderer from the beginning, and abode not in the truth (John viii. 44).\nAnd therefore God spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down to\nHell, and delivered them into chains of darkness, to be reserved unto\njudgement (2 Pet. ii. 4). And the angels which kept not their own\nhabitation, he hath reserved in _eternal_ (that is to say everlasting)\nchains under darkness unto the judgement of the great day (Jude i. 6).\nWhence it is easy to observe that one of these two letters must have been\nseen by the author of the other.\n\n274. It seems as if the author of the Apocalypse wished to throw light upon\nwhat the other canonical writers had left obscure: he gives us an account\nof a battle that took place in Heaven. Michael and his angels fought\nagainst the Dragon, and the Dragon fought and his angels. 'But they\nprevailed not, neither was their place found any more in heaven. And the\ngreat Dragon was cast out, that old serpent, called the Devil, and Satan,\nwhich deceiveth the whole world: and he was cast out into the earth, and\nhis angels were cast out with him' (Rev. xii. 7, 8, 9). For although this\naccount is placed after the flight of the woman into the wilderness, and it\nmay have been intended to indicate thereby some revulsion favourable to the\nChurch, it appears as though the author's design was to show simultaneously\nthe old fall of the first enemy and a new fall of a new enemy.\n\n275. Lying or wickedness springs from the Devil's own nature, [Greek: ek\nton idion] from his will, because it was written in the book of the eternal\nverities, which contains the things possible before any decree of God, that\nthis creature would freely turn toward evil if it were created. It is the\nsame with Eve and Adam; they sinned freely, albeit the Devil tempted them.\nGod gives the wicked over to a reprobate mind (Rom. i. 28), abandoning them\nto themselves and denying them a grace which he owes them not, and indeed\nought to deny to them.\n\n276. It is said in the Scriptures that God hardeneth (Exod. iv. 21 and[296]\nvii. 3; Isa. lxiii. 17); that God sendeth a lying spirit (1 Kings xxii.\n23); strong delusion that they should believe a lie (2 Thess. ii. 11); that\nhe deceived the prophet (Ezek. xiv. 9); that he commanded Shimei to curse\n(2 Sam xvi. 10); that the children of Eli hearkened not unto the voice of\ntheir father, because the Lord would slay them (1 Sam. ii. 25); that the\nLord took away Job's substance, even although that was done through the\nmalice of brigands (Job i. 21); that he raised up Pharaoh, to show his\npower in him (Exod. ix. 19; Rom. ix. 17) that he is like a potter who\nmaketh a vessel unto dishonour (Rom. ix. 21); that he hideth the truth from\nthe wise and prudent (Matt. xi. 25); that he speaketh in parables unto them\nthat are without, that seeing they may see and not perceive, and hearing\nthey may hear and not understand, lest at any time they might be converted,\nand their sins might be forgiven them (Mark iv. 12; Luke viii. 10); that\nJesus was delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God\n(Acts ii. 23); that Pontius Pilate and Herod with the Gentiles and the\npeople of Israel did that which the hand and the counsel of God had\ndetermined before to be done (Acts iv. 27, 28); that it was of the Lord to\nharden the hearts of the enemy, that they should come against Israel in\nbattle, that he might destroy them utterly, and that they might have no\nfavour (Joshua xi. 20); that the Lord mingled a perverse spirit in the\nmidst of Egypt, and caused it to err in all its works, like a drunken man\n(Isa. xix. 14); that Rehoboam hearkened not unto the word of the people,\nfor the cause was from the Lord (1 Kings xii. 15); that he turned the\nhearts of the Egyptians to hate his people (Ps. cv. 25). But all these and\nother like expressions suggest only that the things God has done are used\nas occasion for ignorance, error, malice and evil deeds, and contribute\nthereto, God indeed foreseeing this, and intending to use it for his ends,\nsince superior reasons of perfect wisdom have determined him to permit\nthese evils, and even to co-operate therein. 'Sed non sineret bonus fieri\nmale, nisi omnipotens etiam de malo posset facere bene', in St. Augustine's\nwords. But this has been expounded more fully in the preceding part.\n\n277. God made man in his image (Gen. i. 26); he made him upright (Eccles.\nvii. 29). But also he made him free. Man has behaved badly, he has fallen;\nbut there remains still a certain freedom after the fall. Moses said as\nfrom God: 'I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I\nhave set before you life and death, blessing and cursing; therefore   [297]\nchoose life' (Deut. xxx. 19). 'Thus saith the Lord: Behold, I set before\nyou the way of life, and the way of death' (Jer. xxi. 8). He has left man\nin the power of his counsel, giving him his ordinances and his\ncommandments. 'If thou wilt, thou shalt keep the commandments' (or they\nshall keep thee). 'He hath set before thee fire and water, to stretch forth\nthine hand to whichever thou wilt' (Sirach xv. 14, 15, 16). Fallen and\nunregenerate man is under the domination of sin and of Satan, because it\npleases him so to be; he is a voluntary slave through his evil lust. Thus\nit is that free will and will in bondage are one and the same thing.\n\n278. 'Let no man say, I am tempted of God'; 'but every man is tempted, when\nhe is drawn away of his own lust and enticed' (Jas. i. 13, 14). And Satan\ncontributes thereto. He 'blindeth the minds of them which believe not' (2\nCor. iv. 4). But man is delivered up to the Devil by his covetous desire:\nthe pleasure he finds in evil is the bait that hooks him. Plato has said so\nalready, and Cicero repeats it: 'Plato voluptatem dicebat escam malorum.'\nGrace sets over against it a greater pleasure, as St. Augustine observed.\nAll _pleasure_ is a feeling of some perfection; one _loves_ an object in\nproportion as one feels its perfections; nothing surpasses the divine\nperfections. Whence it follows that charity and love of God give the\ngreatest pleasure that can be conceived, in that proportion in which one is\npenetrated by these feelings, which are not common among men, busied and\ntaken up as men are with the objects that are concerned with their\npassions.\n\n279. Now as our corruption is not altogether invincible and as we do not\nnecessarily sin even when we are under the bondage of sin, it must likewise\nbe said that we are not aided invincibly; and, however efficacious divine\ngrace may be, there is justification for saying that one can resist it. But\nwhen it indeed proves victorious, it is certain and infallible beforehand\nthat one will yield to its allurements, whether it have its strength of\nitself or whether it find a way to triumph through the congruity of\ncircumstances. Thus one must always distinguish between the infallible and\nthe necessary.\n\n280. The system of those who call themselves Disciples of St. Augustine is\nnot far removed from this, provided one exclude certain obnoxious things,\nwhether in the expressions or in the dogmas themselves. In the\n_expressions_ I find that it is principally the use of terms like     [298]\n'necessary' or 'contingent', 'possible' or 'impossible', which sometimes\ngives a handle and causes much ado. That is why, as Herr Loescher the\nyounger aptly observed in a learned dissertation on the _Paroxysms of the\nAbsolute Decree_, Luther desired, in his book _On the Will in Bondage_, to\nfind a word more fitting for that which he wished to express than the word\nnecessity. Speaking generally, it appears more reasonable and more fitting\nto say that obedience to God's precepts is always _possible_, even for the\nunregenerate; that the grace of God is always _resistible_, even in those\nmost holy, and that _freedom_ is exempt not only from _constraint_ but also\nfrom _necessity_, although it be never without infallible _certainty_ or\nwithout inclining _determination_.\n\n281. Nevertheless there is on the other hand a sense wherein it would be\npermitted to say, in certain conjunctures, that the _power_ to do good is\noften lacking, even in the just; that sins are often _necessary_, even in\nthe regenerate; that it is _impossible_ sometimes for one not to sin; that\ngrace is _irresistible_; that freedom is not exempt from _necessity_. But\nthese expressions are less exact and less pleasing in the circumstances\nthat prevail about us to-day. They are also in general more open to misuse;\nand moreover they savour somewhat of the speech of the people, where terms\nare employed with great latitude. There are, however, circumstances which\nrender them acceptable and even serviceable. It is the case that sacred and\northodox writers, and even the holy Scriptures, have made use of\nexpressions on both sides, and no real contradiction has arisen, any more\nthan between St. Paul and St. James, or any error on either side that might\nbe attributable to the ambiguity of the terms. One is so well accustomed to\nthese various ways of speaking that often one is put to it to say precisely\nwhich sense is the more ordinary and the more natural, and even that more\nintended by the author (_quis sensus magis naturalis, obvius, intentus_).\nFor the same writer has different aims in different passages, and the same\nways of speaking are more or less accepted or acceptable before or after\nthe decision of some great man or of some authority that one respects and\nfollows. As a result of this one may well authorize or ban, as opportunity\narises and at certain times, certain expressions; but it makes no\ndifference to the sense, or to the content of faith, if sufficient\nexplanations of the terms are not added.\n\n282. It is therefore only necessary to understand fully some distinctions,\nsuch as that I have very often urged between the necessary and the    [299]\ncertain, and between metaphysical necessity and moral necessity. It is the\nsame with possibility and impossibility, since the event whose opposite is\npossible is contingent, even as that whose opposite is impossible is\nnecessary. A distinction is rightly drawn also between a proximate potency\nand a remote potency; and, according to these different senses, one says\nnow that a thing may be and now that it may not be. It may be said in a\ncertain sense that it is necessary that the blessed should not sin; that\nthe devils and the damned should sin; that God himself should choose the\nbest; that man should follow the course which after all attracts him most.\nBut this necessity is not opposed to contingency; it is not of the kind\ncalled logical, geometrical or metaphysical, whose opposite implies\ncontradiction. M. Nicole has made use somewhere of a comparison which is\nnot amiss. It is considered impossible that a wise and serious magistrate,\nwho has not taken leave of his senses, should publicly commit some\noutrageous action, as it would be, for instance, to run about the streets\nnaked in order to make people laugh. It is the same, in a sense, with the\nblessed; they are still less capable of sinning, and the necessity that\nforbids them to sin is of the same kind. Finally I also hold that 'will' is\na term as equivocal as potency and necessity. For I have already observed\nthat those who employ this axiom, that one does not fail to do what one\nwills when one can, and who thence infer that God therefore does not will\nthe salvation of all, imply a _decretory will_. Only in that sense can one\nsupport this proposition, that wisdom never wills what it knows to be among\nthe things that shall not happen. On the other hand, one may say, taking\nwill in a sense more general and more in conformity with customary use,\nthat the wise will is _inclined_ antecedently to all good, although it\n_decrees_ finally to do that which is most fitting. Thus one would be very\nwrong to deny to God the serious and strong inclination to save all men,\nwhich Holy Scripture attributes to him; or even to attribute to him an\noriginal distaste which diverts him from the salvation of a number of\npersons, _odium antecedaneum_. One should rather maintain that the wise\nmind tends towards all good, as good, in proportion to his knowledge and\nhis power, but that he only produces the best that can be achieved. Those\nwho admit that, and yet deny to God the antecedent will to save all men,\nare wrong only in their misuse of the term, provided that they acknowledge,\nbesides, that God gives to all help sufficient to enable them to win  [300]\nsalvation if only they have the will to avail themselves thereof.\n\n283. In the _dogmas_ themselves held by the Disciples of St. Augustine I\ncannot approve the damnation of unregenerate children, nor in general\ndamnation resulting from original sin alone. Nor can I believe that God\ncondemns those who are without the necessary light. One may believe, with\nmany theologians, that men receive more aid than we are aware of, were it\nonly when they are at the point of death. It does not appear necessary\neither that all those who are saved should always be saved through a grace\nefficacious of itself, independently of circumstances. Also I consider it\nunnecessary to say that all the virtues of the pagans were false or that\nall their actions were sins; though it be true that what does not spring\nfrom faith, or from the uprightness of the soul before God, is infected\nwith sin, at least virtually. Finally I hold that God cannot act as if at\nrandom by an absolutely absolute decree, or by a will independent of\nreasonable motives. And I am persuaded that he is always actuated, in the\ndispensation of his grace, by reasons wherein the nature of the objects\nparticipates. Otherwise he would not act in accordance with wisdom. I grant\nnevertheless that these reasons are not of necessity bound up with the good\nor the less evil natural qualities of men, as if God gave his grace only\naccording to these good qualities. Yet I hold, as I have explained already\nhere, that these qualities are taken into consideration like all the other\ncircumstances, since nothing can be neglected in the designs of supreme\nwisdom.\n\n284. Save for these points, and some few others, where St. Augustine\nappears obscure or even repellent, it seems as though one can conform to\nhis system. He states that from the substance of God only a God can\nproceed, and that thus the creature is derived from nothingness (Augustine\n_De Lib. Arb._, lib. 1, c. 2). That is what makes the creature imperfect,\nfaulty and corruptible (_De Genesi ad Lit._, c. 15, _Contra Epistolam\nManichaei_, c. 36). Evil comes not from nature, but from evil will\n(Augustine, in the whole book _On the Nature of Good_). God can command\nnothing that would be impossible. 'Firmissime creditur Deum justum et bonum\nimpossibilia non potuisse praecipere' (_Lib. de Nat. et Grat._, c. 43, p.\n69). Nemo peccat in eo, quod caveri non potest (lib. 3, _De Lib. Arb._, c.\n16, 17, _lib._ 1 _Retract._ c. 11, 13, 15). Under a just God, none can be\nunhappy who deserves not so to be, 'neque sub Deo justo miser esse    [301]\nquisquam, nisi mereatur, potest' (lib. 1, c. 39). Free will cannot carry\nout God's commands without the aid of grace (_Ep. ad Hilar.\nCaesaraugustan._). We know that grace is not given according to deserts\n(Ep. 106, 107, 120). Man in the state of innocence had the aid necessary to\nenable him to do good if he wished; but the wish depended on free will,\n'habebat adjutorium, per quod posset, et sine quo non vellet, sed non\nadjutorium quo vellet' (_Lib. de Corrept._, c. 11 et c. 10, 12). God let\nangels and men try what they could do by their free will, and after that\nwhat his grace and his justice could achieve (ibid., c. 10, 11, 12). Sin\nturned man away from God, to turn him towards creatures (lib. 1, qu. 2, _Ad\nSimplicium_). To take pleasure in sinning is the freedom of a slave\n(_Enchirid._, c. 103). 'Liberum arbitrium usque adeo in peccatore non\nperiit, ut per illud peccent maxime omnes, qui cum delectatione peccant'\n(lib. 1, _Ad Bonifac._, c. 2, 3).\n\n285. God said to Moses: 'I will be gracious to whom I will be gracious, and\nwill shew mercy on whom I will shew mercy' (Exod. xxxiii. 19). 'So then it\nis not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that\nsheweth mercy' (Rom. ix. 15, 16). That does not prevent all those who have\ngood will, and who persevere therein, from being saved. But God gives them\nthe willing and the doing. 'Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have\nmercy, and whom he will he hardeneth' (Rom. ix. 18). And yet the same\nApostle says that God willeth that all men should be saved, and come to the\nknowledge of the truth; which I would not interpret in accordance with some\npassages of St. Augustine, as if it signified that no men are saved except\nthose whose salvation he wills, or as if he would save _non singulos\ngenerum, sed genera singulorum_. But I would rather say that there is none\nwhose salvation he willeth not, in so far as this is permitted by greater\nreasons. For these bring it about that God only saves those who accept the\nfaith he has offered to them and who surrender themselves thereto by the\ngrace he has given them, in accordance with what was consistent with the\nplan of his works in its entirety, than which none can be better conceived.\n\n286. As for predestination to salvation, it includes also, according to St.\nAugustine, the ordinance of the means that shall lead to salvation.\n'Praedestinatio sanctorum nihil aliud est, quam praescientia et praeparatio\nbeneficiorum Dei, quibus certissime liberantur quicunque liberantur' (_Lib.\nde Persev._, c. 14). He does not then understand it there as an       [302]\nabsolute decree; he maintains that there is a grace which is not rejected\nby any hardened heart, because it is given in order to remove especially\nthe hardness of hearts (_Lib. de Praedest._, c. 8; _Lib. de Grat._, c. 13,\n14). I do not find, however, that St. Augustine conveys sufficiently that\nthis grace, which subdues the heart, is always efficacious of itself. And\none might perhaps have asserted without offence to him that the same degree\nof inward grace is victorious in the one, where it is aided by outward\ncircumstances, but not in the other.\n\n287. Will is proportionate to the sense we have of the good, and follows\nthe sense which prevails. 'Si utrumque tantundem diligimus, nihil horum\ndabimus. Item: Quod amplius nos delectat, secundum id operemur necesse est'\n(in c. 5, _Ad Gal._). I have explained already how, despite all that, we\nhave indeed a great power over our will. St. Augustine takes it somewhat\ndifferently, and in a way that does not go far, when he says that nothing\nis so much within our power as the action of our will. And he gives a\nreason which is almost tautological: for (he says) this action is ready at\nthe moment when we will. 'Nihil tam in nostra potestate est, quam ipsa\nvoluntas, ea enim mox ut volumus praesto est' (lib. 3, _De Lib. Arb._, c.\n3; lib. 5, _De Civ. Dei_, c. 10). But that only means that we will when we\nwill, and not that we will that which we wish to will. There is more reason\nfor saying with him: '_aut voluntas non est, aut libera dicenda est_' (d.\n1, 3, c. 3); and that what inclines the will towards good infallibly, or\ncertainly, does not prevent it from being free. 'Perquam absurdum est, ut\nideo dicamus non pertinere ad voluntatem [libertatem] nostram, quod beati\nesse volumus, quia id omnino nolle non possumus, nescio qua bona\nconstrictione naturae. Nec dicere audemus ideo Deum non voluntatem\n[libertatem], sed necessitatem habere justitiae, quia non potest velle\npeccare. Certe Deus ipse numquid quia peccare non potest, ideo liberum\narbitrium habere negandus est?' (_De Nat. et Grat._, c. 46, 47, 48, 49). He\nalso says aptly, that God gives the first good impulse, but that afterwards\nman acts also. 'Aguntur ut agant, non ut ipsi nihil agant' (_De Corrept._,\nc. 2).\n\n288. I have proved that free will is the proximate cause of the evil of\nguilt, and consequently of the evil of punishment; although it is true that\nthe original imperfection of creatures, which is already presented in the\neternal ideas, is the first and most remote cause. M. Bayle           [303]\nnevertheless always disputes this use of the notion of free will; he will\nnot have the cause of evil ascribed to it. One must listen to his\nobjections, but first it will be well to throw further light on the nature\nof freedom. I have shown that freedom, according to the definition required\nin the schools of theology, consists in intelligence, which involves a\nclear knowledge of the object of deliberation, in spontaneity, whereby we\ndetermine, and in contingency, that is, in the exclusion of logical or\nmetaphysical necessity. Intelligence is, as it were, the soul of freedom,\nand the rest is as its body and foundation. The free substance is\nself-determining and that according to the motive of good perceived by the\nunderstanding, which inclines it without compelling it: and all the\nconditions of freedom are comprised in these few words. It is nevertheless\nwell to point out that the imperfection present in our knowledge and our\nspontaneity, and the infallible determination that is involved in our\ncontingency, destroy neither freedom nor contingency.\n\n289. Our knowledge is of two kinds, distinct or confused. Distinct\nknowledge, or _intelligence_, occurs in the actual use of reason; but the\nsenses supply us with confused thoughts. And we may say that we are immune\nfrom bondage in so far as we act with a distinct knowledge, but that we are\nthe slaves of passion in so far as our perceptions are confused. In this\nsense we have not all the freedom of spirit that were to be desired, and we\nmay say with St. Augustine that being subject to sin we have the freedom of\na slave. Yet a slave, slave as he is, nevertheless has freedom to choose\naccording to the state wherein he is, although more often than not he is\nunder the stern necessity of choosing between two evils, because a superior\nforce prevents him from attaining the goods whereto he aspires. That which\nin a slave is effected by bonds and constraint in us is effected by\npassions, whose violence is sweet, but none the less pernicious. In truth\nwe will only that which pleases us: but unhappily what pleases us now is\noften a real evil, which would displease us if we had the eyes of the\nunderstanding open. Nevertheless that evil state of the slave, which is\nalso our own, does not prevent us, any more than him, from making a free\nchoice of that which pleases us most, in the state to which we are reduced,\nin proportion to our present strength and knowledge.\n\n290. As for spontaneity, it belongs to us in so far as we have within us\nthe source of our actions, as Aristotle rightly conceived. The        [304]\nimpressions of external things often, indeed, divert us from our path, and\nit was commonly believed that, at least in this respect, some of the\nsources of our actions were outside ourselves. I admit that one is bound to\nspeak thus, adapting oneself to the popular mode of expression, as one may,\nin a certain sense, without doing violence to truth. But when it is a\nquestion of expressing oneself accurately I maintain that our spontaneity\nsuffers no exception and that external things have no physical influence\nupon us, I mean in the strictly philosophical sense.\n\n291. For better understanding of this point, one must know that true\nspontaneity is common to us and all simple substances, and that in the\nintelligent or free substance this becomes a mastery over its actions. That\ncannot be better explained than by the System of Pre-established Harmony,\nwhich I indeed propounded some years ago. There I pointed out that by\nnature every simple substance has perception, and that its individuality\nconsists in the perpetual law which brings about the sequence of\nperceptions that are assigned to it, springing naturally from one another,\nto represent the body that is allotted to it, and through its\ninstrumentality the entire universe, in accordance with the point of view\nproper to this simple substance and without its needing to receive any\nphysical influence from the body. Even so the body also for its part adapts\nitself to the wishes of the soul by its own laws, and consequently only\nobeys it according to the promptings of these laws. Whence it follows that\nthe soul has in itself a perfect spontaneity, so that it depends only upon\nGod and upon itself in its actions.\n\n292. As this system was not known formerly, other ways were sought for\nemerging from this labyrinth, and the Cartesians themselves were in\ndifficulties over the subject of free will. They were no longer satisfied\nby the 'faculties' of the Schoolmen, and they considered that all the\nactions of the soul appear to be determined by what comes from without,\naccording to the impressions of the senses, and that, ultimately, all is\ncontrolled in the universe by the providence of God. Thence arose naturally\nthe objection that there is therefore no freedom. To that M. Descartes\nreplied that we are assured of God's providence by reason; but that we are\nlikewise assured of our freedom by experience thereof within ourselves; and\nthat we must believe in both, even though we see not how it is possible to\nreconcile them.\n\n                                                                      [305]\n293. That was cutting the Gordian knot, and answering the conclusion of an\nargument not by refuting it but by opposing thereto a contrary argument.\nWhich procedure does not conform to the laws for philosophical disputes.\nNotwithstanding, most of the Cartesians contented themselves with this,\nalbeit the inward experience they adduce does not prove their assertion, as\nM. Bayle has clearly shown. M. Regis (_Philos._, vol. 1, Metaph., book 2,\npart 2, c. 22) thus paraphrases M. Descartes' doctrine: 'Most\nphilosophers', he says, 'have fallen into error. Some, not being able to\nunderstand the relation existing between free actions and the providence of\nGod, have denied that God was the first efficient cause of free will: but\nthat is sacrilegious. The others, not being able to apprehend the relation\nbetween God's efficacy and free actions, have denied that man was endowed\nwith freedom: and that is a blasphemy. The mean to be found between these\ntwo extremes is to say' (id. ibid., p. 485) 'that, even though we were not\nable to understand all the relations existing between freedom and God's\nprovidence, we should nevertheless be bound to acknowledge that we are free\nand dependent upon God. For both these truths are equally known, the one\nthrough experience, and the other through reason; and prudence forbids one\nto abandon truths whereof one is assured, under the pretext that one cannot\napprehend all the relations existing between them and other truths well\nknown.'\n\n294. M. Bayle here remarks pertinently in the margin, 'that these\nexpressions of M. Regis fail to point out that we are aware of relations\nbetween man's actions and God's providence, such as appear to us to be\nincompatible with our freedom.' He adds that these expressions are\nover-circumspect, weakening the statement of the problem. 'Authors assume',\nhe says, 'that the difficulty arises solely from our lack of enlightenment;\nwhereas they ought to say that it arises in the main from the enlightenment\nwhich we have, and cannot reconcile' (in M. Bayle's opinion) 'with our\nMysteries.' That is exactly what I said at the beginning of this work, that\nif the Mysteries were irreconcilable with reason, and if there were\nunanswerable objections, far from finding the mystery incomprehensible, we\nshould comprehend that it was false. It is true that here there is no\nquestion of a mystery, but only of natural religion.\n\n295. This is how M. Bayle combats those inward experiences, whereon   [306]\nthe Cartesians make freedom rest: but he begins by reflexions with which I\ncannot agree. 'Those who do not make profound examination', he says\n(_Dictionary_, art. 'Helen.', lit. [Greek: TD]), 'of that which passes\nwithin them easily persuade themselves that they are free, and that, if\ntheir will prompts them to evil, it is their fault, it is through a choice\nwhereof they are the masters. Those who judge otherwise are persons who\nhave studied with care the springs and the circumstances of their actions,\nand who have thought over the progress of their soul's impulses. Those\npersons usually have doubts about their free will, and even come to\npersuade themselves that their reason and mind are slaves, without power to\nresist the force that carries them along where they would not go. It was\nprincipally persons of this kind who ascribed to the gods the cause of\ntheir evil deeds.'\n\n296. These words remind me of those of Chancellor Bacon, who says that a\nlittle philosophy inclineth us away from God, but that depth in philosophy\nbringeth men's minds about to him. It is the same with those who reflect\nupon their actions: it appears to them at first that all we do is only\nimpulsion from others, and that all we apprehend comes from without through\nthe senses, and is traced upon the void of our mind _tanquam in tabula\nrasa_. But more profound meditation shows us that all (even perceptions and\npassions) comes to us from our own inner being, with complete spontaneity.\n\n297. Yet M. Bayle cites poets who pretend to exonerate men by laying the\nblame upon the gods. Medea in Ovid speaks thus:\n\n      _Frustra, Medea, repugnas,_\n  _Nescio quid Deus obstat, ait._\n\nAnd a little later Ovid makes her add:\n\n  _Sed trahit invitam nova vis, aliudque Cupido,_\n  _Mens aliud suadet; video meliora proboque,_\n  _Deteriora sequor_.\n\nBut one could set against that a passage from Vergil, who makes Nisus say\nwith far more reason:\n\n  _Di ne hunc ardorem mentibus addunt,_\n  _Euryale, an sua cuique Deus fit dira cupido?_\n\n298. Herr Wittich seems to have thought that in reality our independence is\nonly apparent. For in his _Diss. de providentia Dei actuali_ (n. 61)  [307]\nhe makes free will consist in our being inclined towards the objects that\npresent themselves to our soul for affirmation or denial, love or hate, in\nsuch a way that we _do not feel_ we are being determined by any outward\nforce. He adds that it is when God himself causes our volitions that we act\nwith most freedom; and that the more efficacious and powerful God's action\nis upon us, the more we are masters of our actions. 'Quia enim Deus\noperatur ipsum velle, quo efficacius operatur, eo magis volumus; quod\nautem, cum volumus, facimus, id maxime habemus in nostra potestate.' It is\ntrue that when God causes a volition in us he causes a free action. But it\nseems to me that the question here is not of the universal cause or of that\nproduction of our will which is proper to it in so far as it is a created\neffect, whose positive elements are actually created continually through\nGod's co-operation, like all other absolute reality of things. We are\nconcerned here with the reasons for willing, and the means God uses when he\ngives us a good will or permits us to have an evil will. It is always we\nwho produce it, good or evil, for it is our action: but there are always\nreasons that make us act, without impairing either our spontaneity or our\nfreedom. Grace does no more than give impressions which are conducive to\nmaking will operate through fitting motives, such as would be an attention,\n_a dic cur hic_, a prevenient pleasure. And it is quite evident that that\ndoes not interfere with freedom, any more than could a friend who gives\ncounsel and furnishes motives. Thus Herr Wittich has not supplied an answer\nto the question, any more than M. Bayle, and recourse to God is of no avail\nhere.\n\n299. But let me give another much more reasonable passage from the same M.\nBayle, where he disputes with greater force the so-called lively sense of\nfreedom, which according to the Cartesians is a proof of freedom. His words\nare indeed full of wit, and worthy of consideration, and occur in the\n_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_ (vol. III, ch. 140, p. 761\n_seqq._). Here they are: 'By the clear and distinct sense we have of our\nexistence we do not discern whether we exist through ourselves or derive\nour being from another. We discern that only by reflexion, that is, through\nmeditation upon our powerlessness in the matter of conserving ourselves as\nmuch as we would, and of freeing ourselves from dependence upon the beings\nthat surround us, etc. It is indeed certain that the pagans (the same must\nbe said of the Socinians, since they deny the creation) never attained[308]\nto the knowledge of that true dogma that we were created from nothing, and\nthat we are derived from nothingness at every moment of our continuance.\nThey therefore thought erroneously that all substances in the universe\nexist of themselves and can never be reduced to nothing, and that thus they\ndepend upon no other thing save in respect of their modifications, which\nare liable to be destroyed by the action of an external cause. Does not\nthis error spring from the fact that we are unconscious of the creative\naction which conserves us, and that we are only conscious of our existence?\nThat we are conscious of it, I say, in such a way that we should for ever\nremain ignorant of the cause of our being if other knowledge did not aid\nus? Let us say also, that the clear and distinct sense we have of the acts\nof our will cannot make us discern whether we give them ourselves to\nourselves or receive them from that same cause which gives us existence. We\nmust have recourse to reflexion or to meditation in order to effect this\ndiscrimination. Now I assert that one can never by purely philosophical\nmeditations arrive at an established certainty that we are the efficient\ncause of our volitions: for every person who makes due investigation will\nrecognize clearly, that if we were only passive subjects with regard to\nwill we should have the same sensations of experience as we have when we\nthink that we are free. Assume, for the sake of argument, that God so\nordered the laws of the union between soul and body that all the modalities\nof the soul, without a single exception, are of necessity linked together\nwith the interposition of the modalities of the brain. You will then\nunderstand that nothing will happen to us except that of which we are\nconscious: there will be in our soul the same sequence of thoughts from the\nperception of objects of the senses, which is its first step, up to the\nmost definite volitions, which are its final step. There will be in this\nsequence the consciousness of ideas, that of affirmations, that of\nirresolutions, that of velleities and that of volitions. For whether the\nact of willing be impressed upon us by an external cause or we bring it\nabout ourselves, it will be equally true that we will, and that we feel\nthat we will. Moreover, as this external cause can blend as much pleasure\nas it will with the volition which it impresses upon us, we shall be able\nto feel at times that the acts of our will please us infinitely, and that\nthey lead us according to the bent of our strongest inclinations. We shall\nfeel no constraint; you know the maxim: _voluntas non potest cogi_. Do[309]\nyou not clearly understand that a weather-vane, always having communicated\nto it simultaneously (in such a way, however, that priority of nature or,\nif one will, a real momentary priority, should attach to the desire for\nmotion) movement towards a certain point on the horizon, and the wish to\nturn in that direction, would be persuaded that it moved of itself to\nfulfil the desires which it conceived? I assume that it would not know that\nthere were winds, or that an external cause changed everything\nsimultaneously, both its situation and its desires. That is the state we\nare in by our nature: we know not whether an invisible cause makes us pass\nsufficiently from one thought to another. It is therefore natural that men\nare persuaded that they determine their own acts. But it remains to be\ndiscovered whether they are mistaken in that, as in countless other things\nthey affirm by a kind of instinct and without having made use of\nphilosophic meditation. Since therefore there are two hypotheses as to what\ntakes place in man: the one that he is only a passive subject, the other\nthat he has active virtues, one cannot in reason prefer the second to the\nfirst, so long as one can only adduce proofs of feeling. For we should feel\nwith an equal force that we wish this or that, whether all our volitions\nwere imprinted upon our soul by an exterior and invisible cause, or we\nformed them ourselves.'\n\n300. There are here excellent arguments, which are valid against the usual\nsystems; but they fail in respect of the System of Pre-established Harmony,\nwhich takes us further than we were able to go formerly. M. Bayle asserts,\nfor instance, 'that by purely philosophical meditations one can never\nattain to an established certainty that we are the efficient cause of our\nvolitions'. But this is a point which I do not concede to him: for the\nestablishment of this system demonstrates beyond a doubt that in the course\nof nature each substance is the sole cause of all its actions, and that it\nis free of all physical influence from every other substance, save the\ncustomary co-operation of God. And this system shows that our spontaneity\nis real, and not only apparent, as Herr Wittich believed it to be. M. Bayle\nasserts also on the same reasons (ch. 170, p. 1132) that if there were a\n_fatum Astrologicum_ this would not destroy freedom; and I would concede\nthat to him, if freedom consisted only in an apparent spontaneity.\n\n301. The spontaneity of our actions can therefore no longer be questioned;\nand Aristotle has defined it well, saying that an action is           [310]\n_spontaneous_ when its source is in him who acts. 'Spontaneum est, cujus\nprincipium est in agente.' Thus it is that our actions and our wills depend\nentirely upon us. It is true that we are not directly the masters of our\nwill, although we be its cause; for we do not choose volitions, as we\nchoose our actions by our volitions. Yet we have a certain power also over\nour will, because we can contribute indirectly towards willing another time\nthat which we would fain will now, as I have here already shown: that,\nhowever, is no _velleity_, properly speaking. There also we have a mastery,\nindividual and even perceptible, over our actions and our wills, resulting\nfrom a combination of spontaneity with intelligence.\n\n302. Up to this point I have expounded the two conditions of freedom\nmentioned by Aristotle, that is, _spontaneity_ and _intelligence_, which\nare found united in us in deliberation, whereas beasts lack the second\ncondition. But the Schoolmen demand yet a third, which they call\n_indifference_. And indeed one must admit it, if indifference signifies as\nmuch as 'contingency'; for I have already said here that freedom must\nexclude an absolute and metaphysical or logical necessity. But, as I have\ndeclared more than once, this indifference, this contingency, this\nnon-necessity, if I may venture so to speak, which is a characteristic\nattribute of freedom, does not prevent one from having stronger\ninclinations towards the course one chooses; nor does it by any means\nrequire that one be absolutely and equally indifferent towards the two\nopposing courses.\n\n303. I therefore admit indifference only in the one sense, implying the\nsame as contingency, or non-necessity. But, as I have declared more than\nonce, I do not admit an indifference of equipoise, and I do not think that\none ever chooses when one is absolutely indifferent. Such a choice would\nbe, as it were, mere chance, without determining reason, whether apparent\nor hidden. But such a chance, such an absolute and actual fortuity, is a\nchimera which never occurs in nature. All wise men are agreed that chance\nis only an apparent thing, like fortune: only ignorance of causes gives\nrise to it. But if there were such a vague indifference, or rather if we\nwere to choose without having anything to prompt us to the choice, chance\nwould then be something actual, resembling what, according to Epicurus,\ntook place in that little deviation of the atoms, occurring without cause\nor reason. Epicurus had introduced it in order to evade necessity, and[311]\nCicero with good reason ridiculed it.\n\n304. This deviation had a final cause in the mind of Epicurus, his aim\nbeing to free us from fate; but it can have no efficient cause in the\nnature of things, it is one of the most impossible of chimeras. M. Bayle\nhimself refutes it admirably, as we shall see presently. And yet it is\nsurprising that he appears to admit elsewhere himself something of like\nnature with this supposed deviation: here is what he says, when speaking of\nBuridan's ass (_Dictionary_, art. 'Buridan', lit. 13): 'Those who advocate\nfree will properly so called admit in man a power of determining, either to\nthe right hand or the left, even when the motives are perfectly uniform on\nthe side of each of the two opposing objects. For they maintain that our\nsoul can say, without having any reason other than that of using its\nfreedom: \"I prefer this to that, although I see nothing more worthy of my\nchoice in the one than the other\".'\n\n305. All those who admit a free will properly so called will not for that\nreason concede to M. Bayle this determination springing from an\nindeterminate cause. St. Augustine and the Thomists believe that all is\ndetermined. And one sees that their opponents resort also to the\ncircumstances which contribute to our choice. Experience by no means\napproves the chimera of an indifference of equipoise; and one can employ\nhere the argument that M. Bayle himself employed against the Cartesians'\nmanner of proving freedom by the lively sense of our independence. For\nalthough I do not always see the reason for an inclination which makes me\nchoose between two apparently uniform courses, there will always be some\nimpression, however imperceptible, that determines us. The mere desire to\nmake use of one's freedom has no effect of specifying, or determining us to\nthe choice of one course or the other.\n\n306. M. Bayle goes on: 'There are at the very least two ways whereby man\ncan extricate himself from the snares of equipoise. One, which I have\nalready mentioned, is for a man to flatter himself with the pleasing fancy\nthat he is master in his own house, and that he does not depend upon\nobjects.' This way is blocked: for all that one might wish to play master\nin one's own house, that has no determining effect, nor does it favour one\ncourse more than the other. M. Bayle goes on: 'He would make this Act: I\nwill prefer this to that, because it pleases me to behave thus.' But  [312]\nthese words, 'because it pleases me', 'because such is my pleasure', imply\nalready a leaning towards 'the object that pleases'.\n\n307. There is therefore no justification for continuing thus: 'And so that\nwhich determined him would not be taken from the object; the motive would\nbe derived only from the ideas men have of their own perfections, or of\ntheir natural faculties. The other way is that of the lot or chance: the\nshort straw would decide.' This way has an outlet, but it does not reach\nthe goal: it would alter the issue, for in such a case it is not man who\ndecides. Or again if one maintains that it is still the man who decides by\nlot, man himself is no longer in equipoise, because the lot is not, and the\nman has attached himself to it. There are always reasons in Nature which\ncause that which happens by chance or through the lot. I am somewhat\nsurprised that a mind so shrewd as M. Bayle's could have allowed itself to\nbe so misled on this point. I have set out elsewhere the true rejoinder to\nthe Buridan sophism: it is that the case of perfect equipoise is\nimpossible, since the universe can never be halved, so as to make all\nimpressions equivalent on both sides.\n\n308. Let us see what M. Bayle himself says elsewhere against the chimerical\nor absolutely undefined indifference. Cicero had said (in his book _De\nFato_) that Carneades had found something more subtle than the deviation of\natoms, attributing the cause of a so-called absolutely undefined\nindifference to the voluntary motions of souls, because these motions have\nno need of an external cause, coming as they do from our nature. But M.\nBayle (_Dictionary_, art. 'Epicurus', p. 1143) aptly replies that all that\nwhich springs from the nature of a thing is determined: thus determination\nalways remains, and Carneades' evasion is of no avail.\n\n309. He shows elsewhere (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, ch. 90,\nl. 2, p. 229) 'that a freedom far removed from this so-called equipoise is\nincomparably more beneficial. I mean', he says, 'a freedom such as may\nalways follow the judgements of the mind, and such as cannot resist objects\nclearly recognized as good. I know of no people who do not agree that truth\nclearly recognized necessitates' (determines rather, unless one speak of a\nmoral necessity) 'the assent of the soul; experience teaches us that. In\nthe schools they teach constantly that as the true is the object of   [313]\nthe understanding, so the good is the object of the will. So likewise they\nteach that as the understanding can never affirm anything save that which\nis shown to it under the semblance of truth, the will can never love\nanything which to it does not appear to be good. One never believes the\nfalse as such, and one never loves evil as evil. There is in the\nunderstanding a natural determination towards the true in general, and\ntowards each individual truth clearly recognized. There is in the will a\nnatural determination towards good in general; whence many philosophers\nconclude that from the moment when individual goods are clearly recognized\nby us we are of necessity compelled to love them. The understanding\nsuspends its actions only when its objects show themselves obscurely, so\nthat there is cause for doubt as to whether they are false or true. That\nleads many persons to the conclusion that the will remains in equipoise\nonly when the soul is uncertain whether the object presented to it is a\ngood with regard to it; but that also, the moment the soul decides in the\naffirmative, it of necessity clings to that object until other judgements\nof the mind determine it otherwise. Those who expound freedom in this\nfashion think to find therein plentiful enough material for merit or\ndemerit. For they assume that these judgements of the mind proceed from a\nfree attention of the soul in examining the objects, comparing them\ntogether, and discriminating between them. I must not forget that there are\nvery learned men' (such as Bellarmine, lib. 3, _De Gratia et Libero\nArbitrio_, c. 8, et 9, and Cameron, in _Responsione ad Epistolam Viri\nDocti, id est Episcopii_) 'who maintain with very cogent reasons that the\nwill always of necessity follows the last practical act of the\nunderstanding.'\n\n310. One must make some observations on this discourse. A very clear\nrecognition of the best _determines_ the will; but it does not necessitate\nit, properly speaking. One must always distinguish between the necessary\nand the certain or infallible, as I have already observed more than once,\nand distinguish metaphysical necessity from moral necessity. I think also\nthat it is only God's will which always follows the judgements of the\nunderstanding: all intelligent creatures are subject to some passions, or\nto perceptions at least, that are not composed entirely of what I call\n_adequate ideas_. And although in the blessed these passions always tend\ntowards the true good, by virtue of the laws of Nature and the system of\nthings pre-established in relation to them, yet this does not always  [314]\nhappen in such a way that they have a perfect knowledge of that good. It is\nthe same with them as with us, who do not always understand the reason for\nour instincts. The angels and the blessed are created beings, even as we\nare, in whom there is always some confused perception mingled with distinct\nknowledge. Suarez said something similar concerning them. He thinks\n(_Treatise on Prayer_, book I, ch. 11) that God has so ordered things\nbeforehand that their prayers, when they are made with a full will, always\nsucceed: that is an example of a pre-established harmony. As for us, in\naddition to the judgement of the understanding, of which we have an express\nknowledge, there are mingled therewith confused perceptions of the senses,\nand these beget passions and even imperceptible inclinations, of which we\nare not always aware. These movements often thwart the judgement of the\npractical understanding.\n\n311. As for the parallel between the relation of the understanding to the\ntrue and that of the will to the good, one must know that a clear and\ndistinct perception of a truth contains within it actually the affirmation\nof this truth: thus the understanding is necessitated in that direction.\nBut whatever perception one may have of the good, the effort to act in\naccordance with the judgement, which in my opinion forms the essence of the\nwill, is distinct from it. Thus, since there is need of time to raise this\neffort to its climax, it may be suspended, and even changed, by a new\nperception or inclination which passes athwart it, which diverts the mind\nfrom it, and which even causes it sometimes to make a contrary judgement.\nHence it comes that our soul has so many means of resisting the truth which\nit knows, and that the passage from mind to heart is so long. Especially is\nthis so when the understanding to a great extent proceeds only by faint\n_thoughts_, which have only slight power to affect, as I have explained\nelsewhere. Thus the connexion between judgement and will is not so\nnecessary as one might think.\n\n312. M. Bayle goes on to say, with truth (p. 221): 'Indeed, it cannot be a\nfault in man's soul that it has no freedom of indifference as regards good\nin general. It would be rather a disorder, an inordinate imperfection, if\none could say truthfully: It is all one to me whether I am happy or\nunhappy; I have no more determination to love the good than to hate it; I\ncan do both equally. Now if it is a praiseworthy and advantageous quality\nto be determinate as regards good in general, it cannot be a fault if [315]\none is necessitated as regards each individual good recognized plainly as\nfor our good. It seems even as though it were a necessary conclusion, that\nif the soul has no freedom of indifference as regards good in general, it\nalso has none in respect of particular goods which after due examination it\njudges to be goods in relation to it. What should we think of a soul which,\nhaving formed that judgement, had, and prided itself on having, the power\nnot to love these goods, and even to hate them, and which said: I recognize\nclearly that these are goods for me, I have all the enlightenment necessary\non that point; nevertheless I will not love them, I will hate them; my\ndecision is made, I act upon it; it is not that any reason' (that is, any\nother reason than that which is founded upon 'Such is my good pleasure')\n'urges me thereto, but it pleases me so to behave: what should we think, I\nsay, of such a soul? Should we not find it more imperfect and more unhappy\nthan if it had not this freedom of indifference?\n\n313. 'Not only does the doctrine that subjects the will to the final acts\nof the understanding give a more favourable idea of the state of the soul,\nbut it shows also that it is easier to lead man to happiness along that\nroad than along the road of indifference. It will suffice to enlighten his\nmind upon his true interests, and straightway his will will comply with the\njudgements that reason shall have pronounced. But if he has a freedom\nindependent of reason and of the quality of objects clearly recognized, he\nwill be the most intractable of all animals, and it will never be possible\nto rely upon making him choose the right course. All the counsels, all the\narguments in the world may prove unavailing; you will give him\nexplanations, you will convince his mind, and yet his will will play the\nhaughty madam and remain motionless as a rock. Vergil, _Aen_., lib. 6, v.\n470:\n\n  _Non magis incepto vultum sermone movetur,_\n  _Quam si dura silex, aut stet Marpesia cautes_.\n\nA caprice, an empty whim will make her stiffen against reasons of all\nkinds; it will not please her to love her clearly recognized good, it will\nplease her to hate it. Do you consider such a faculty, sir, to be the\nrichest present God can have made to man, and the sole instrument of our\nhappiness? Is it not rather an obstacle to our felicity? Is there cause for\nboasting in being able to say: \"I have scorned all the judgements of  [316]\nmy reason, and I have followed an altogether different path, simply from\nconsiderations of my own good pleasure?\" With what regrets would one not be\ntorn, in that case, if the determination made had an ill result? Such a\nfreedom would therefore be more harmful than profitable to men, because the\nunderstanding would not present all the goodness of the objects clearly\nenough to deprive the will of the power of rejection. It would be therefore\ninfinitely better for man to be always of necessity determined by the\njudgement of the understanding, than to permit the will to suspend its\naction. For by this means it would achieve its aim with greater ease and\ncertainty.'\n\n314. Upon this discourse I make the further observation, that it is very\ntrue that a freedom of indifference, undefined and without any determining\nreason, would be as harmful, and even objectionable, as it is impracticable\nand chimerical. The man who wished to behave thus, or at the least appear\nto be acting without due cause, would most certainly be looked upon as\nirrational. But it is very true also that the thing is impossible, when it\nis taken strictly in accordance with the assumption. As soon as one tries\nto give an example of it one misses one's aim and stumbles upon the case of\na man who, while he does not come to a decision without cause, does so\nrather under the influence of inclination or passion than of judgement. As\nsoon as one says: 'I scorn the judgements of my reason simply from\nconsiderations of my own good pleasure, it pleases me to behave thus', it\nis as if one were to say: I prefer my inclination to my interest, my\npleasure to my profit.\n\n315. Even so some capricious man, fancying that it is ignominious for him\nto follow the advice of his friends or his servants, might prefer the\nsatisfaction of contradicting them to the profit he could derive from their\ncounsel. It may happen, however, that in a matter of small moment a wise\nman acts irregularly and against his own interest in order to thwart\nanother who tries to restrain him or direct him, or that he may disconcert\nthose who watch his steps. It is even well at times to imitate Brutus by\nconcealing one's wit, and even to feign madness, as David did before the\nKing of the Philistines.\n\n316. M. Bayle admirably supplements his remarks with the object of showing\nthat to act against the judgement of the understanding would be a great\nimperfection. He observes (p. 225) that, even according to the        [317]\nMolinists, 'the understanding which does its DUTY well indicates that which\nis THE BEST'. He introduces God (ch. 91, p. 227) saying to our first\nparents in the Garden of Eden: 'I have given you my knowledge, the faculty\nof judging things, and full power to dispose your wills. I shall give you\ninstructions and orders; but the free will that I have bestowed upon you is\nof such a nature that you have equal power (according to circumstances) to\nobey me and to disobey me. You will be tempted: if you make a good use of\nyour freedom you will be happy; and if you use it ill you will be unhappy.\nIt is for you to see if you wish to ask of me, as a new grace, either that\nI permit you to abuse your freedom when you shall make resolve to do so, or\nthat I prevent you from doing so. Consider carefully, I give you four and\ntwenty hours. Do you not clearly understand' (adds M. Bayle) 'that their\nreason, which had not yet been obscured by sin, would have made them\nconclude that they must ask God, as the crowning point of the favours\nwherewith he had honoured them, not to permit them to destroy themselves by\nan ill use of their powers? And must one not admit that if Adam, through\nwrongly making it a point of honour to order his own goings, had refused a\ndivine direction that would have safeguarded his happiness, he would have\nbeen the prototype of all such as Phaeton and Icarus? He would have been\nwell-nigh as ungodly as the Ajax of Sophocles, who wished to conquer\nwithout the aid of the gods, and who said that the most craven would put\ntheir enemies to flight with such aid.'\n\n317. M. Bayle also shows (ch. 80) that one congratulates oneself no less,\nor even takes more credit to oneself, for having been aided from above,\nthan for owing one's happiness to one's own choice. And if one does well\nthrough having preferred a tumultuous instinct, which arose suddenly, to\nreasons maturely considered, one feels an extraordinary joy in this; for\none assumes that either God, or our Guardian Angel, or something or other\nwhich one pictures to oneself under the vague name of _good luck_ has\nimpelled us thereto. Indeed, Sulla and Caesar boasted more of their good\nluck than of their prudence. The pagans, and particularly the poets (Homer\nespecially), determined their heroes' acts by divine promptings. The hero\nof the _Aeneid_ proceeds only under the direction of a God. It was very\ngreat praise offered to the Emperors if one said that they were victorious\nboth through their troops and through their gods whom they lent to    [318]\ntheir generals: 'Te copias, te consilium et tuos praebente Divos,' said\nHorace. The generals fought under the auspices of the Emperors, as if\ntrusting to the Emperor's good luck, for subordinate officers had no rights\nregarding the auspices. One takes credit to oneself for being a favourite\nof heaven, one rates oneself more highly for the possession of good fortune\nthan of talent. There are no people that think themselves more fortunate\nthan the mystics, who imagine that they keep still while God acts within\nthem.\n\n318. 'On the other hand', M. Bayle adds (ch. 83), 'a Stoic philosopher, who\nattaches to everything an inevitable necessity, is as susceptible as\nanother man to the pleasure of having chosen well. And every man of sense\nwill find that, far from taking pleasure in the thought of having\ndeliberated long and finally chosen the most honourable course, one feels\nincredible satisfaction in persuading oneself that one is so firmly rooted\nin the love of virtue that without the slightest resistance one would repel\na temptation. A man to whom is suggested the doing of a deed contrary to\nhis duty, his honour and his conscience, who answers forthwith that he is\nincapable of such a crime, and who is certainly not capable of it, is far\nmore contented with himself than if he asked for time to consider it, and\nwere for some hours in a state of indecision as to which course to take.\nOne is on many occasions regretful over not being able to make up one's\nmind between two courses, and one would be well pleased that the counsel of\na good friend, or some succour from above, should impel us to make a good\nchoice.' All that demonstrates for us the advantage a determinate judgement\nhas over that vague indifference which leaves us in uncertainty. But indeed\nI have proved sufficiently that only ignorance or passion has power to keep\nus in doubt, and have thus given the reason why God is never in doubt. The\nnearer one comes to him, the more perfect is freedom, and the more it is\ndetermined by the good and by reason. The character of Cato, of whom\nVelleius said that it was impossible for him to perform a dishonourable\naction, will always be preferred to that of a man who is capable of\nwavering.\n\n319. I have been well pleased to present and to support these arguments of\nM. Bayle against vague indifference, as much for the elucidation of the\nsubject as to confront him with himself, and to demonstrate that he ought\ntherefore not to complain of the alleged necessity imposed upon God,  [319]\nof choosing the best way that is possible. For either God will act through\na vague indifference and at random, or again he will act on caprice or\nthrough some other passion, or finally he must act through a prevailing\ninclination of reason which prompts him to the best. But passions, which\ncome from the confused perception of an apparent good, cannot occur in God;\nand vague indifference is something chimerical. It is therefore only the\nstrongest reason that can regulate God's choice. It is an imperfection in\nour freedom that makes us capable of choosing evil instead of good, a\ngreater evil instead of the lesser evil, the lesser good instead of the\ngreater good. That arises from the appearances of good and evil, which\ndeceive us; whereas God is always prompted to the true and the greatest\ngood, that is, to the absolutely true good, which he cannot fail to know.\n\n320. This false idea of freedom, conceived by those who, not content with\nexempting it, I do not say from constraint, but from necessity itself,\nwould also exempt it from certainty and determination, that is, from reason\nand perfection, nevertheless pleased some Schoolmen, people who often\nbecome entangled in their own subtleties, and take the straw of terms for\nthe grain of things. They assume some chimerical notion, whence they think\nto derive some use, and which they endeavour to maintain by quibblings.\nComplete indifference is of this nature: to concede it to the will is to\ngrant it a privilege of the kind that some Cartesians and some mystics find\nin the divine nature, of being able to do the impossible, to produce\nabsurdities, to cause two contradictory propositions to be true\nsimultaneously. To claim that a determination comes from a complete\nindifference absolutely indeterminate is to claim that it comes naturally\nfrom nothing. Let it be assumed that God does not give this determination:\nit has accordingly no fountainhead in the soul, nor in the body, nor in\ncircumstances, since all is assumed to be indeterminate; and yet there it\nis, appearing and existing without preparation, nothing making ready for\nit, no angel, not even God himself, being able to see or to show how it\nexists. That would be not only the emergence of something from nothing, but\nits emergence thence _of itself_. This doctrine introduces something as\npreposterous as the theory already mentioned, of the deviation of atoms,\nwhereby Epicurus asserted that one of these small bodies, going in a\nstraight line, would turn aside all at once from its path, without any[320]\nreason, simply because the will so commands. Take note moreover that he\nresorted to that only to justify this alleged freedom of complete\nindifference, a chimerical notion which appears to be of very ancient\norigin; and one may with good reason say: _Chimaera Chimaeram parit_.\n\n321. This is the way Signor Marchetti has expressed it in his admirable\ntranslation of Lucretius into Italian verse, which has not yet been\npublished (Book 2):\n\n  _Ma ch'i principii poi non corran punto_\n  _Della lor dritta via, chi veder puote?_\n  _Si finalmente ogni lor moto sempre_\n  _Insieme s'aggruppa, e dall' antico_\n  _Sempre con ordin certo il nuovo nasce;_\n  _Ne tracciando i primi semi, fanno_\n  _Di moto un tal principio, il qual poi rompa_\n  _I decreti del fato, accio non segua_\n  _L'una causa dell' altra in infinito;_\n  _Onde han questa, dich' io_, del fato sciolta\n  Libera volunta, _per cui ciascuno_\n  _Va dove piu l'agrada? I moti ancora_\n  _Si declinan sovente, e non in tempo_\n  _Certo, ne certa region, ma solo_\n  _Quando e dove commanda il nostro arbitrio;_\n  _Poiche senz' alcun dubbio a queste cose_\n  _Da sol principio il voler proprio, e quindi_\n  _Van poi scorrendo per le membra i moti._\n\nIt is comical that a man like Epicurus, after having discarded the gods and\nall incorporeal substances, could have supposed that the will, which he\nhimself takes as composed of atoms, could have had control over the atoms,\nand diverted them from their path, without its being possible for one to\nsay how.\n\n322. Carneades, not going so far back as to the atoms, claimed to find at\nonce in the soul of man the reason for the so-called vague indifference,\nassuming as reason for the thing just that for which Epicurus sought a\nreason. Carneades gained nothing thereby, except that he more easily\ndeceived careless people, in transferring the absurdity from one subject,\nwhere it is somewhat too evident, to another subject where it is easier to\nconfuse matters, that is to say, from the body to the soul. For most\nphilosophers had not very distinct notions of the nature of the soul. [321]\nEpicurus, who composed it of atoms, was at least right in seeking the\norigin of its determination in that which he believed to be the origin of\nthe soul itself. That is why Cicero and M. Bayle were wrong to find so much\nfault with him, and to be indulgent towards, and even praise, Carneades,\nwho is no less irrational. I do not understand how M. Bayle, who was so\nclear-sighted, was thus satisfied by a disguised absurdity, even to the\nextent of calling it the greatest effort the human mind can make on this\nmatter. It is as if the soul, which is the seat of reason, were more\ncapable than the body of acting without being determined by some reason or\ncause, internal or external; or as if the great principle which states that\nnothing comes to pass without cause only related to the body.\n\n323. It is true that the Form or the Soul has this advantage over matter,\nthat it is the source of action, having within itself the principle of\nmotion or of change, in a word, [Greek: to autokineton], as Plato calls it;\nwhereas matter is simply passive, and has need of being impelled to act,\n_agitur, ut agat_. But if the soul is active of itself (as it indeed is),\nfor that very reason it is not of itself absolutely indifferent to the\naction, like matter, and it must find in itself a ground of determination.\nAccording to the System of Pre-established Harmony the soul finds in\nitself, and in its ideal nature anterior to existence, the reasons for its\ndeterminations, adjusted to all that shall surround it. That way it was\ndetermined from all eternity in its state of mere possibility to act\nfreely, as it does, when it attains to existence.\n\n324. M. Bayle himself remarks aptly that freedom of indifference (such as\nmust be admitted) does not exclude inclinations and does not demand\nequipoise. He demonstrates amply enough (_Reply to the Questions of a\nProvincial_, ch. 139, p. 748 _seqq_.) that the soul may be compared to a\nbalance, where reasons and inclinations take the place of weights.\nAccording to him, one can explain what passes in our resolutions by the\nhypothesis that the will of man is like a balance which is at rest when the\nweights of its two pans are equal, and which always inclines either to one\nside or the other according to which of the pans is the more heavily laden.\nA new reason makes a heavier weight, a new idea shines more brightly than\nthe old; the fear of a heavy penalty prevails over some pleasure; when two\npassions dispute the ground, it is always the stronger which gains the\nmastery, unless the other be assisted by reason or by some other      [322]\ncontributing passion. When one flings away merchandise in order to save\noneself, the action, which the Schoolmen call mixed, is voluntary and free;\nand yet love of life indubitably prevails over love of possessions. Grief\narises from remembrance of lost possessions, and one has all the greater\ndifficulty in making one's resolve, the nearer the approach to even weight\nin the opposing reasons, as also we see that the balance is determined more\npromptly when there is a great difference between the weights.\n\n325. Nevertheless, as very often there are divers courses to choose from,\none might, instead of the balance, compare the soul with a force which puts\nforth effort on various sides simultaneously, but which acts only at the\nspot where action is easiest or there is least resistance. For instance,\nair if it is compressed too firmly in a glass vessel will break it in order\nto escape. It puts forth effort at every part, but finally flings itself\nupon the weakest. Thus do the inclinations of the soul extend over all the\ngoods that present themselves: they are antecedent acts of will; but the\nconsequent will, which is their result, is determined in the direction of\nthat which touches most closely.\n\n326. This ascendancy of inclinations, however, does not prevent man from\nbeing master in his own domain, provided that he knows how to make use of\nhis power. His dominion is that of reason: he has only to prepare himself\nin good time to resist the passions, and he will be capable of checking the\nvehemence of the most furious. Let us assume that Augustus, about to give\norders for putting to death Fabius Maximus, acts, as is his wont, upon the\nadvice a philosopher had given him, to recite the Greek alphabet before\ndoing anything in the first heat of his anger: this reflexion will be\ncapable of saving the life of Fabius and the glory of Augustus. But without\nsome fortunate reflexion, which one owes sometimes to a special divine\nmercy, or without some skill acquired beforehand, like that of Augustus,\ncalculated to make us reflect fittingly as to time and place, passion will\nprevail over reason. The driver is master over the horses if he controls\nthem as he should, and as he can; but there are occasions when he becomes\nnegligent, and then for a time he will have to let go the reins:\n\n  _Fertur equis auriga, nec audit currus habenas_.\n\n327. One must admit that there is always within us enough power over  [323]\nour will, but we do not always bethink ourselves of employing it. That\nshows, as I have observed more than once, that the power of the soul over\nits inclinations is a control which can only be exercised in an _indirect_\nmanner, almost as Bellarmine would have had the Popes exercise rights over\nthe temporal power of kings. In truth, the external actions that do not\nexceed our powers depend absolutely upon our will; but our volitions depend\nupon our will only through certain artful twists which give us means of\nsuspending our resolutions, or of changing them. We are masters in our own\nhouse, not as God is in the world, he having but to speak, but as a wise\nprince is in his dominions or as a good father of a family is in his home.\nM. Bayle sometimes takes the matter differently, as though we must have, in\norder to boast of a free will, an absolute power over ourselves,\nindependent of reasons and of means. But even God has not such a power, and\nmust not have in this sense, in relation to his will: he cannot change his\nnature, nor act otherwise than according to method; and how could man\ntransform himself all of a sudden? I have already said God's dominion, the\ndominion of wisdom, is that of reason. It is only God, however, who always\nwills what is most to be desired, and consequently he has no need of the\npower to change his will. 328. If the soul is mistress in its own house\n(says M. Bayle, p. 753) it has only to will, and straightway that vexation\nand pain which is attendant upon victory over the passions will vanish\naway. For this effect it would suffice, in his opinion, to give oneself\nindifference to the objects of the passions (p. 758). Why, then, do men not\ngive themselves this indifference (he says), if they are masters in their\nown house? But this objection is exactly as if I were to ask why a father\nof a family does not give himself gold when he has need thereof? He can\nacquire some, but through skill, and not, as in the age of the fairies, or\nof King Midas, through a mere command of the will or by his touch. It would\nnot suffice to be master in one's own house; one must be master of all\nthings in order to give oneself all that one wishes; for one does not find\neverything in one's own house. Working thus upon oneself, one must do as in\nworking upon something else; one must have knowledge of the constitution\nand the qualities of one's object, and adapt one's operations thereto. It\nis therefore not in a moment and by a mere act of the will that one\ncorrects oneself, and that one acquires a better will.\n\n                                                                      [324]\n329. Nevertheless it is well to observe that the vexations and pains\nattendant upon victory over the passions in some people turn into pleasure,\nthrough the great satisfaction they find in the lively sense of the force\nof their mind, and of the divine grace. Ascetics and true mystics can speak\nof this from experience; and even a true philosopher can say something\nthereof. One can attain to that happy state, and it is one of the principal\nmeans the soul can use to strengthen its dominion.\n\n330. If the Scotists and the Molinists appear to favour vague indifference\n(appear, I say, for I doubt whether they do so in reality, once they have\nlearnt to know it), the Thomists and the disciples of Augustine are for\npredetermination. For one must have either the one or the other. Thomas\nAquinas is a writer who is accustomed to reason on sound principles, and\nthe subtle Scotus, seeking to contradict him, often obscures matters\ninstead of throwing light upon them. The Thomists as a general rule follow\ntheir master, and do not admit that the soul makes its resolve without the\nexistence of some predetermination which contributes thereto. But the\npredetermination of the new Thomists is not perhaps exactly that which one\nneeds. Durand de Saint-Pourcain, who often enough formed a party of his\nown, and who opposed the idea of the special co-operation of God, was\nnevertheless in favour of a certain predetermination. He believed that God\nsaw in the state of the soul, and of its surroundings, the reason for his\ndeterminations.\n\n331. The ancient Stoics were in that almost of the same opinion as the\nThomists. They were at the same time in favour of determination and against\nnecessity, although they have been accused of attaching necessity to\neverything. Cicero says in his book _De Fato_ that Democritus, Heraclitus,\nEmpedocles and Aristotle believed that fate implied necessity; that others\nwere opposed to that (he means perhaps Epicurus and the Academicians); and\nthat Chrysippus sought a middle course. I think that Cicero is mistaken as\nregards Aristotle, who fully recognized contingency and freedom, and went\neven too far, saying (inadvertently, as I think) that propositions on\ncontingent futurities had no determinate truth; on which point he was\njustifiably abandoned by most of the Schoolmen. Even Cleanthes, the teacher\nof Chrysippus, although he upheld the determinate truth of future events,\ndenied their necessity. Had the Schoolmen, so fully convinced of this [325]\ndetermination of contingent futurities (as were for instance the Fathers of\nCoimbra, authors of a famous Course of Philosophy), seen the connexion\nbetween things in the form wherein the System of General Harmony proclaims\nit, they would have judged that one cannot admit preliminary certainty, or\ndetermination of futurition, without admitting a predetermination of the\nthing in its causes and in its reasons.\n\n332. Cicero has endeavoured to expound for us the middle course taken by\nChrysippus; but Justus Lipsius observed, in his _Stoic Philosophy_, that\nthe passage from Cicero was mutilated, and that Aulus Gellius has preserved\nfor us the whole argument of the Stoic philosopher (_Noct. Att._, lib. 6,\nc. 2). Here it is in epitome. Fate is the inevitable and eternal connexion\nof all events. Against this is urged in objection, that it follows that the\nacts of the will would be necessary, and that criminals, being coerced into\nevil, should not be punished. Chrysippus answers that evil springs from the\noriginal constitution of souls, which forms part of the destined sequence;\nthat souls which are of a good natural disposition offer stronger\nresistance to the impressions of external causes; but that those whose\nnatural defects had not been corrected by discipline allowed themselves to\nbe perverted. Next he distinguishes (according to Cicero) between principal\ncauses and accessary causes, and uses the comparison of a cylinder, whose\nrotatory force and speed or ease in motion comes chiefly from its shape,\nwhereas it would be retarded by any roughness in formation. Nevertheless it\nhas need of impulsion, even as the soul needs to be acted upon by the\nobjects of the senses, and receives this impression according to its own\nconstitution.\n\n333. Cicero considers that Chrysippus becomes so confused that, whether he\nwill or no, he confirms the necessity of fate. M. Bayle is almost of the\nsame opinion (_Dictionary_, art. 'Chrysippus', lit. H). He says that this\nphilosopher does not get out of the bog, since the cylinder is regular or\nuneven according to what the craftsman has made it; and thus God,\nprovidence, fate will be the causes of evil in such a way as to render it\nnecessary. Justus Lipsius answers that, according to the Stoics, evil came\nfrom matter. That is (to my mind) as if he had said that the stone on which\nthe craftsman worked was sometimes too rough and too irregular to produce a\ngood cylinder. M. Bayle cites against Chrysippus the fragments of Onomaus\nand Diogenianus that Eusebius has preserved for us in the _Praeparatio[326]\nEvangelica_ (lib. 6, c. 7, 8); and above all he relies upon Plutarch's\nrefutation in his book against the Stoics, quoted art. 'Paulicians', lit.\nG. But this refutation does not amount to very much. Plutarch maintains\nthat it would be better to deny power to God than to impute to him the\npermission of evils; and he will not admit that evil may serve a greater\ngood. I have already shown, on the contrary, that God cannot but be\nall-powerful, even though he can do no better than produce the best, which\nincludes the permission of evil. Moreover, I have pointed out repeatedly\nthat what is to the disadvantage of a part taken separately may serve the\nperfection of the whole.\n\n334. Chrysippus had already made an observation to this effect, not only in\nhis fourth book on Providence, as given by Aulus Gellius (lib. 6, c. 1)\nwhere he asserts that evil serves to bring the good to notice (a reason\nwhich is not sufficient here), but still better when he applies the\ncomparison of a stage play, in his second book on Nature (as Plutarch\nquotes it himself). There he says that there are sometimes portions in a\ncomedy which are of no worth in themselves and which nevertheless lend\ngrace to the whole poem. He calls these portions epigrams or inscriptions.\nWe have not enough acquaintance with the nature of the ancient comedy for\nfull understanding of this passage from Chrysippus; but since Plutarch\nassents to the fact, there is reason to believe that this comparison was\nnot a poor one. Plutarch replies in the first place that the world is not\nlike a play to provide entertainment. But that is a poor answer: the\ncomparison lies in this point alone, that one bad part may make the whole\nbetter. He replies secondly that this bad passage is only a small part of\nthe comedy, whereas human life swarms with evils. This reply is of no value\neither: for he ought to have taken into account that what we know is also a\nvery small part of the universe.\n\n335. But let us return to the cylinder of Chrysippus. He is right in saying\nthat vice springs from the original constitution of some minds. He was met\nwith the objection that God formed them, and he could only reply by\npointing to the imperfection of matter, which did not permit God to do\nbetter. This reply is of no value, for matter in itself is indifferent to\nall forms, and God made it. Evil springs rather from the _Forms_ themselves\nin their detached state, that is, from the ideas that God has not produced\nby an act of his will, any more than he thus produced numbers and     [327]\nfigures, and all possible essences which one must regard as eternal and\nnecessary; for they are in the ideal region of the possibles, that is, in\nthe divine understanding. God is therefore not the author of essences in so\nfar as they are only possibilities. But there is nothing actual to which he\nhas not decreed and given existence; and he has permitted evil because it\nis involved in the best plan existing in the region of possibles, a plan\nwhich supreme wisdom could not fail to choose. This notion satisfies at\nonce the wisdom, the power and the goodness of God, and yet leaves a way\nopen for the entrance of evil. God gives perfection to creatures in so far\nas it is possible in the universe. One gives a turn to the cylinder, but\nany roughness in its shape restricts the swiftness of its motion. This\ncomparison made by Chrysippus does not greatly differ from mine, which was\ntaken from a laden boat that is carried along by the river current, its\npace becoming slower as the load grows heavier. These comparisons tend\ntowards the same end; and that shows that if we were sufficiently informed\nconcerning the opinions of ancient philosophers, we should find therein\nmore reason than is supposed.\n\n336. M. Bayle himself commends the passage from Chrysippus (art.\n'Chrysippus', lit. T) that Aulus Gellius quotes in the same place, where\nthis philosopher maintains that evil has come _by concomitance._ That also\nis made clear by my system. For I have demonstrated that the evil which God\npermitted was not an object of his will, as an end or a means, but simply\nas a condition, since it had to be involved in the best. Yet one must\nconfess that the cylinder of Chrysippus does not answer the objection of\nnecessity. He ought to have added, in the first place, that it is by the\nfree choice of God that some of the possibles exist; secondly, that\nrational creatures act freely also, in accordance with their original\nnature, which existed already in the eternal ideas; and lastly, that the\nmotive power of good inclines the will without compelling it.\n\n337. The advantage of freedom which is in the creature without doubt exists\nto an eminent degree in God. That must be understood in so far as it is\ngenuinely an advantage and in so far as it presupposes no imperfection. For\nto be able to make a mistake and go astray is a disadvantage, and to have\ncontrol over the passions is in truth an advantage, but one that\npresupposes an imperfection, namely passion itself, of which God is   [328]\nincapable. Scotus was justified in saying that if God were not free and\nexempt from necessity, no creature would be so. But God is incapable of\nbeing indeterminate in anything whatsoever: he cannot be ignorant, he\ncannot doubt, he cannot suspend his judgement; his will is always decided,\nand it can only be decided by the best. God can never have a primitive\nparticular will, that is, independent of laws or general acts of will; such\na thing would be unreasonable. He cannot determine upon Adam, Peter, Judas\nor any individual without the existence of a reason for this determination;\nand this reason leads of necessity to some general enunciation. The wise\nmind always acts _according to principles_; always _according to rules_,\nand never _according to exceptions_, save when the rules come into\ncollision through opposing tendencies, where the strongest carries the day:\nor else, either they will stop one another or some third course will emerge\nas a result. In all these cases one rule serves as an exception to the\nother, and there are never any _original exceptions_ with one who always\nacts in a regular way.\n\n338. If there are people who believe that election and reprobation are\naccomplished on God's part by a despotic absolute power, not only without\nany apparent reason but actually without any reason, even a concealed one,\nthey maintain an opinion that destroys alike the nature of things and the\ndivine perfections. Such an _absolutely absolute decree_ (so to speak)\nwould be without doubt insupportable. But Luther and Calvin were far from\nsuch a belief: the former hopes that the life to come will make us\ncomprehend the just reasons of God's choice; and the latter protests\nexplicitly that these reasons are just and holy, although they be unknown\nto us. I have already in that connexion quoted Calvin's treatise on\npredestination, and here are the actual words: 'God before the fall of Adam\nhad reflected upon what he had to do, and that for causes concealed from\nus.... It is evident therefore that he had just causes for the reprobation\nof some of mankind, but causes to us UNKNOWN.'\n\n339. This truth, that all God does is reasonable and cannot be better done,\nstrikes at the outset every man of good sense, and extorts, so to speak,\nhis approbation. And yet the most subtle of philosophers have a fatal\npropensity for offending sometimes without observing it, during the course\nand in the heat of disputes, against the first principles of good sense,\nwhen these are shrouded in terms that disguise them. We have here     [329]\nalready seen how the excellent M. Bayle, with all his shrewdness, has\nnevertheless combated this principle which I have just indicated, and which\nis a sure consequence of the supreme perfection of God. He thought to\ndefend in that way the cause of God and to exempt him from an imaginary\nnecessity, by leaving him the freedom to choose from among various goods\nthe least. I have already spoken of M. Diroys and others who have also been\ndeluded by this strange opinion, one that is far too commonly accepted.\nThose who uphold it do not observe that it implies a wish to preserve for,\nor rather bestow upon, God a false freedom, which is the freedom to act\nunreasonably. That is rendering his works subject to correction, and making\nit impossible for us to say or even to hope that anything reasonable can be\nsaid upon the permission of evil.\n\n340. This error has much impaired M. Bayle's arguments, and has barred his\nway of escape from many perplexities. That appears again in relation to the\nlaws of the realm of Nature: he believes them to be arbitrary and\nindifferent, and he objects that God could better have attained his end in\nthe realm of grace if he had not clung to these laws, if he had more often\ndispensed with their observance, or even if he had made others. He believed\nthis especially with regard to the law of the union between the soul and\nthe body. For he is persuaded, with the modern Cartesians, that the ideas\nof the perceptible qualities that God gives (according to them) to the\nsoul, occasioned by movements of the body, have nothing representing these\nmovements or resembling them. Accordingly it was a purely arbitrary act on\nGod's part to give us the ideas of heat, cold, light and other qualities\nwhich we experience, rather than to give us quite different ideas\noccasioned in the same way. I have often wondered that people so talented\nshould have been capable of relishing notions so unphilosophic and so\ncontrary to the fundamental maxims of reason. For nothing gives clearer\nindication of the imperfection of a philosophy than the necessity\nexperienced by the philosopher to confess that something comes to pass, in\naccordance with his system, for which there is no reason. That applies to\nthe idea of Epicurus on the deviation of atoms. Whether it be God or Nature\nthat operates, the operation will always have its reasons. In the\noperations of Nature, these reasons will depend either upon necessary\ntruths or upon the laws that God has found the most reasonable; and in the\noperations of God, they will depend upon the choice of the supreme    [330]\nreason which causes them to act.\n\n341. M. Regis, a famous Cartesian, had asserted in his 'Metaphysics' (part\n2, book 2, c. 29) that the faculties God has given to men are the most\nexcellent that they were capable of in conformity with the general order of\nnature. 'Considering only', he says, 'the power of God and the nature of\nman by themselves, it is very easy to conceive that God could have made man\nmore perfect: but if one will consider man, not in himself and separately\nfrom all other creatures, but as a member of the universe and a portion\nwhich is subject to the general laws of motions, one will be bound to\nacknowledge that man is as perfect as he could have been.' He adds 'that we\ncannot conceive that God could have employed any other means more\nappropriate than pain for the conservation of our bodies'. M. Regis is\nright in a general way in saying that God cannot do better than he has done\nin relation to all. And although there be apparently in some places in the\nuniverse rational animals more perfect than man, one may say that God was\nright to create every kind of species, some more perfect than others. It is\nperhaps not impossible that there be somewhere a species of animals much\nresembling man and more perfect than we are. It may be even that the human\nrace will attain in time to a greater perfection than that which we can now\nenvisage. Thus the laws of motions do not prevent man from being more\nperfect: but the place God has assigned to man in space and in time limits\nthe perfections he was able to receive.\n\n342. I also doubt, with M. Bayle, whether pain be necessary in order to\nwarn men of peril. But this writer goes too far (_Reply to the Questions of\na Provincial_, vol. II, ch. 77, p. 104): he seems to think that a feeling\nof pleasure could have the same effect, and that, in order to prevent a\nchild from going too near the fire, God could give him ideas of pleasure in\nproportion to the distance he kept from it. This expedient does not appear\nvery practicable with regard to all evils, unless a miracle were involved.\nIt is more natural that what if it were too near would cause an evil should\ncause some foreboding of evil when it is a little less near. Yet I admit\nthat it is possible such a foreboding will be something less than pain, and\nusually this is the case. Thus it indeed appears that pain is not necessary\nfor causing one to shun present peril; it is wont rather to serve as a\npenalty for having actually plunged into evil, and a warning against  [331]\nfurther lapse. There are also many painful evils the avoidance whereof\nrests not with us. As a dissolution of the continuity of our body is a\nconsequence of many accidents that may happen to us, it was natural that\nthis imperfection of the body should be represented by some sense of\nimperfection in the soul. Nevertheless I would not guarantee that there\nwere no animals in the universe whose structure was cunning enough to cause\na sense of indifference as accompaniment to this dissolution of continuity,\nas for instance when a gangrenous limb is cut off; or even a sense of\npleasure, as if one were only scratching oneself. For the imperfection that\nattends the dissolution of the body might lead to the sense of a greater\nperfection, which was suspended or checked by the continuity which is now\nbroken: and in this respect the body would be as it were a prison.\n\n343. There is also nothing to preclude the existence in the universe of\nanimals resembling that one which Cyrano de Bergerac encountered in the\nsun. The body of this animal being a sort of fluid composed of innumerable\nsmall animals, that were capable of ranging themselves in accordance with\nthe desires of the great animal, by this means it transformed itself in a\nmoment, just as it pleased; and the dissolution of continuity caused it no\nmore hurt than the stroke of an oar can cause to the sea. But, after all,\nthese animals are not men, they are not in our globe or in our present\ncentury; and God's plan ensured that there should not be lacking here on\nearth a rational animal clothed in flesh and bones, whose structure\ninvolves susceptibility to pain.\n\n344. But M. Bayle further opposes this on another principle, one which I\nhave already mentioned. It seems that he thinks the ideas which the soul\nconceives in relation to the feelings of the body are arbitrary. Thus God\nmight have caused the dissolution of continuity to give us pleasure. He\neven maintains that the laws of motion are entirely arbitrary. 'I would\nwish to know', he says (vol. III, ch. 166, p. 1080), 'whether God\nestablished by an act of his freedom of indifference general laws on the\ncommunication of movements, and the particular laws on the union of the\nhuman soul with an organic body? In this case, he could have established\nquite different laws, and adopted a system whose results involved neither\nmoral evil nor physical evil. But if the answer is given that God was\nconstrained by supreme wisdom to establish the laws that he has\nestablished, there we have neither more nor less than the _Fatum_ of  [332]\nthe Stoics. Wisdom will have marked out a way for God, the abandonment\nwhereof will have been as impossible to him as his own self-destruction.'\nThis objection has been sufficiently overthrown: it is only a moral\nnecessity; and it is always a happy necessity to be bound to act in\naccordance with the rules of perfect wisdom.\n\n345. Moreover, it appears to me that the reason for the belief held by many\nthat the laws of motion are arbitrary comes from the fact that few people\nhave properly examined them. It is known now that M. Descartes was much\nmistaken in his statement of them. I have proved conclusively that\nconservation of the same quantity of motion cannot occur, but I consider\nthat the same quantity of force is conserved, whether absolute or directive\nand respective, whether total or partial. My principles, which carry this\nsubject as far as it can go, have not yet been published in full; but I\nhave communicated them to friends competent to judge of them, who have\napproved them, and have converted some other persons of acknowledged\nerudition and ability. I discovered at the same time that the laws of\nmotion actually existing in Nature, and confirmed by experiments, are not\nin reality absolutely demonstrable, as a geometrical proposition would be;\nbut neither is it necessary that they be so. They do not spring entirely\nfrom the principle of necessity, but rather from the principle of\nperfection and order; they are an effect of the choice and the wisdom of\nGod. I can demonstrate these laws in divers ways, but must always assume\nsomething that is not of an absolutely geometrical necessity. Thus these\nadmirable laws are wonderful evidence of an intelligent and free being, as\nopposed to the system of absolute and brute necessity, advocated by Strato\nor Spinoza.\n\n346. I have found that one may account for these laws by assuming that the\neffect is always equal in force to its cause, or, which amounts to the same\nthing, that the same force is conserved always: but this axiom of higher\nphilosophy cannot be demonstrated geometrically. One may again apply other\nprinciples of like nature, for instance the principle that action is always\nequal to reaction, one which assumes in things a distaste for external\nchange, and cannot be derived either from extension or impenetrability; and\nthat other principle, that a simple movement has the same properties as\nthose which might belong to a compound movement such as would produce [333]\nthe same phenomena of locomotion. These assumptions are very plausible, and\nare successful as an explanation of the laws of motion: nothing is so\nappropriate, all the more since they are in accord with each other. But\nthere is to be found in them no absolute necessity, such as may compel us\nto admit them, in the way one is compelled to admit the rules of logic, of\narithmetic and geometry.\n\n347. It seems, when one considers the indifference of matter to motion and\nto rest, that the largest body at rest could be carried along without any\nresistance by the smallest body in motion, in which case there would be\naction without reaction and an effect greater than its cause. There is also\nno necessity to say of the motion of a ball which runs freely on an even,\nhorizontal plane, with a certain degree of speed, termed A, that this\nmotion must have the properties of that motion which it would have if it\nwere going with lesser speed in a boat, itself moving in the same direction\nwith the residue of the speed, to ensure that the ball, seen from the bank,\nadvance with the same degree A. For, although the same appearance of speed\nand of direction results through this medium of the boat, it is not because\nit is the same thing. Nevertheless it happens that the effects of the\ncollision of the balls in the boat, the motion in each one separately\ncombined with that of the boat giving the appearance of that which goes on\noutside the boat, also give the appearance of the effects that these same\nballs colliding would have outside the boat. All that is admirable, but one\ndoes not see its absolute necessity. A movement on the two sides of the\nright-angled triangle composes a movement on the hypotenuse; but it does\nnot follow that a ball moving on the hypotenuse must produce the effect of\ntwo balls of its own size moving on the two sides: yet that is true.\nNothing is so appropriate as this result, and God has chosen the laws that\nproduce it: but one sees no geometrical necessity therein. Yet it is this\nvery lack of necessity which enhances the beauty of the laws that God has\nchosen, wherein divers admirable axioms exist in conjunction, and it is\nimpossible for one to say which of them is the primary.\n\n348. I have also shown that therein is observed that excellent law of\ncontinuity, which I have perhaps been the first to state, and which is a\nkind of touchstone whose test the rules of M. Descartes, of Father Fabry,\nFather Pardies, Father de Malebranche and others cannot pass. In virtue of\nthis law, one must be able to regard rest as a movement vanishing     [334]\nafter having continually diminished, and likewise equality as an inequality\nthat vanishes also, as would happen through the continual diminution of the\ngreater of two unequal bodies, while the smaller retains its size. As a\nconsequence of this consideration, the general rule for unequal bodies, or\nbodies in motion, must apply also to equal bodies or to bodies one of which\nis at rest, as to a particular case of the rule. This does result in the\ntrue laws of motion, and does not result in certain laws invented by M.\nDescartes and by some other men of talent, which already on that score\nalone prove to be ill-concerted, so that one may predict that experiment\nwill not favour them.\n\n349. These considerations make it plain that the laws of Nature regulating\nmovements are neither entirely necessary nor entirely arbitrary. The middle\ncourse to be taken is that they are a choice of the most perfect wisdom.\nAnd this great example of the laws of motion shows with the utmost clarity\nhow much difference there is between these three cases, to wit, firstly _an\nabsolute necessity_, metaphysical or geometrical, which may be called\nblind, and which does not depend upon any but efficient causes; in the\nsecond place, _a moral necessity_, which comes from the free choice of\nwisdom in relation to final causes; and finally in the third place,\n_something absolutely arbitrary_, depending upon an indifference of\nequipoise, which is imagined, but which cannot exist, where there is no\nsufficient reason either in the efficient or in the final cause.\nConsequently one must conclude how mistaken it is to confuse either that\nwhich is absolutely necessary with that which is determined by the reason\nof the best, or the freedom that is determined by reason with a vague\nindifference.\n\n350. This also settles M. Bayle's difficulty, for he fears that, if God is\nalways determinate, Nature could dispense with him and bring about that\nsame effect which is attributed to him, through the necessity of the order\nof things. That would be true if the laws of motion for instance, and all\nthe rest, had their source in a geometrical necessity of efficient causes;\nbut in the last analysis one is obliged to resort to something depending\nupon final causes and upon what is fitting. This also utterly destroys the\nmost plausible reasoning of the Naturalists. Dr. Johann Joachim Becher, a\nGerman physician, well known for his books on chemistry, had composed a\nprayer which looked like getting him into trouble. It began: 'O sancta[335]\nmater natura, aeterne rerum ordo'. And it ended by saying that this Nature\nmust forgive him his errors, since she herself was their cause. But the\nnature of things, if taken as without intelligence and without choice, has\nin it nothing sufficiently determinant. Herr Becher did not sufficiently\ntake into account that the Author of things (_natura naturans_) must be\ngood and wise, and that we can be evil without complicity on his part in\nour acts of wickedness. When a wicked man exists, God must have found in\nthe region of possibles the idea of such a man forming part of that\nsequence of things, the choice of which was demanded by the greatest\nperfection of the universe, and in which errors and sins are not only\npunished but even repaired to greater advantage, so that they contribute to\nthe greatest good.\n\n351. M. Bayle, however, has extended the free choice of God a little too\nfar. Speaking of the Peripatetic Strato (_Reply to the Questions of a\nProvincial_, vol. III, ch. 180, p. 1239), who asserted that everything had\nbeen brought forth by the necessity of a nature devoid of intelligence, he\nmaintains that this philosopher, on being asked why a tree has not the\npower to form bones and veins, might have asked in his turn: Why has matter\nprecisely three dimensions? why should not two have sufficed for it? why\nhas it not four? 'If one had answered that there can be neither more nor\nless than three dimensions he would have demanded the cause of this\nimpossibility.' These words lead one to believe that M. Bayle suspected\nthat the number of the dimensions of matter depended upon God's choice,\neven as it depended upon him to cause or not to cause trees to produce\nanimals. Indeed, how do we know whether there are not planetary globes or\nearths situated in some more remote place in the universe where the fable\nof the Barnacle-geese of Scotland (birds that were said to be born of\ntrees) proves true, and even whether there are not countries where one\ncould say:\n\n  _... populos umbrosa creavit_\n  _Fraxinus, et foeta viridis puer excidit alno?_\n\nBut with the dimensions of matter it is not thus: the ternary number is\ndetermined for it not by the reason of the best, but by a geometrical\nnecessity, because the geometricians have been able to prove that there are\nonly three straight lines perpendicular to one another which can intersect\nat one and the same point. Nothing more appropriate could have been   [336]\nchosen to show the difference there is between the moral necessity that\naccounts for the choice of wisdom and the brute necessity of Strato and the\nadherents of Spinoza, who deny to God understanding and will, than a\nconsideration of the difference existing between the reason for the laws of\nmotion and the reason for the ternary number of the dimensions: for the\nfirst lies in the choice of the best and the second in a geometrical and\nblind necessity.\n\n352. Having spoken of the laws of bodies, that is, of the rules of motion,\nlet us come to the laws of the union between body and soul, where M. Bayle\nbelieves that he finds again some vague indifference, something absolutely\narbitrary. Here is the way he speaks of it in his _Reply_ (vol. II, ch. 84,\np. 163): 'It is a puzzling question whether bodies have some natural\nproperty of doing harm or good to man's soul. If one answers yes, one\nplunges into an insane labyrinth: for, as man's soul is an immaterial\nsubstance, one will be bound to say that the local movement of certain\nbodies is an efficient cause of the thoughts in a mind, a statement\ncontrary to the most obvious notions that philosophy imparts to us. If one\nanswers no, one will be constrained to admit that the influence of our\norgans upon our thoughts depends neither upon the internal qualities of\nmatter, nor upon the laws of motion, but upon an _arbitrary institution_ of\nthe creator. One must then admit that it depended altogether upon God's\nfreedom to combine particular thoughts of our soul with particular\nmodifications of our body, even when he had once established all the laws\nfor the action of bodies one upon another. Whence it results that there is\nin the universe no portion of matter which by its proximity can harm us,\nsave when God wills it; and consequently, that the earth is as capable as\nany other place of being the abode of the happy man.... In short it is\nevident that there is no need, in order to prevent the wrong choices of\nfreedom, to transport man outside the earth. God could do on earth with\nregard to all the acts of the will what he does in respect of the good\nworks of the predestined when he settles their outcome, whether by\nefficacious or by sufficient grace: and that grace, without in any way\nimpairing freedom, is always followed by the assent of the soul. It would\nbe as easy for him on earth as in heaven to bring about the determination\nof our souls to a good choice.'\n\n353. I agree with M. Bayle that God could have so ordered bodies and  [337]\nsouls on this globe of earth, whether by ways of nature or by extraordinary\ngraces, that it would have been a perpetual paradise and a foretaste of the\ncelestial state of the blessed. There is no reason why there should not be\nworlds happier than ours; but God had good reasons for willing that ours\nshould be such as it is. Nevertheless, in order to prove that a better\nstate would have been possible here, M. Bayle had no need to resort to the\nsystem of occasional causes: it abounds in miracles and in hypotheses for\nwhich their very originators confess there is no justification; and these\nare two defects such as will most of all estrange a system from true\nphilosophy. It is a cause for surprise, in the first place, that M. Bayle\ndid not bethink himself of the System of Pre-established Harmony which he\nhad examined before, and which for this matter was so opportune. But as in\nthis system all is connected and harmonious, all following from reasons and\nnothing being left incomplete or exposed to the rash discretion of perfect\nindifference, it seems that it was not pleasing to M. Bayle: for he was\nhere somewhat biassed in favour of such indifference, which,\nnotwithstanding, he contested so strongly on other occasions. He was much\ngiven to passing from one extreme to the other, not with an ill intention\nor against his own conviction, but because there was as yet nothing settled\nin his mind on the question concerned. He contented himself with whatever\nsuited him for frustrating the opponent he had in mind, his aim being only\nto perplex philosophers, and show the weakness of our reason; and never, in\nmy opinion, did either Arcesilaus or Carneades argue for and against with\nmore eloquence and more wit. But, after all, one must not doubt for the\nsake of doubting: doubts must serve us as a gangway to the truth. That is\nwhat I often said to the late Abbe Foucher, a few specimens of whose work\nprove that he designed to do with regard to the Academicians what Lipsius\nand Scioppius had done for the Stoics, and M. Gassendi for Epicurus, and\nwhat M. Dacier has so well begun for Plato. It must not be possible for us\nto offer true philosophers such a reproach as that implied in the\ncelebrated Casaubon's answer to those who, in showing him the hall of the\nSorbonne, told him that debate had been carried on there for some\ncenturies. What conclusions have been reached? he said to them.\n\n354. M. Bayle goes on (p. 166): 'It is true that since the laws of motion\nwere instituted in such forms as we see now in the world, it is an\ninevitable necessity that a hammer striking a nut should break it, and[338]\nthat a stone falling on a man's foot should cause some bruise or some\nderangement of its parts. But that is all that can follow the action of\nthis stone upon the human body. If you want it in addition to cause a\nfeeling of pain, then one must assume the institution of a code other than\nthat one which regulates the action and reaction of bodies one upon\nanother; one must, I say, have recourse to the particular system of the\nlaws of union between the soul and certain bodies. Now as this system is\nnot of necessity connected with the other, the indifference of God does not\ncease in relation to the one immediately upon his choice of the other. He\ntherefore combined these two systems with a complete freedom, like two\nthings which did not follow naturally the one from the other. Thus it is by\nan arbitrary institution he has ordained that wounds in the body should\ncause pain in the soul which is united to this body. It therefore only\nrested with him to have chosen another system of union between soul and\nbody: he was therefore able to choose one in accordance wherewith wounds\nonly evoke the idea of the remedy and an intense but agreeable desire to\napply it. He was able to arrange that all bodies which were on the point of\nbreaking a man's head or piercing his heart should evoke a lively sense of\ndanger, and that this sense should cause the body to remove itself promptly\nout of reach of the blow. All that would have come to pass without\nmiracles, since there would have been general laws on this subject. The\nsystem which we know by experience teaches us that the determination of the\nmovement of certain bodies changes in pursuance of our desires. It was\ntherefore possible for a combination to be effected between our desires and\nthe movement of certain bodies, whereby the nutritive juices were so\nmodified that the good arrangement of our organs was never affected.'\n\n355. It is evident that M. Bayle believes that everything accomplished\nthrough general laws is accomplished without miracles. But I have shown\nsufficiently that if the law is not founded on reasons and does not serve\nto explain the event through the nature of things, it can only be put into\nexecution by a miracle. If, for example, God had ordained that bodies must\nhave a circular motion, he would have needed perpetual miracles, or the\nministry of angels, to put this order into execution: for that is contrary\nto the nature of motion, whereby the body naturally abandons the circular\nline to continue in the tangent straight line if nothing holds it     [339]\nback. Therefore it is not enough for God to ordain simply that a wound\nshould excite an agreeable sensation: natural means must be found for that\npurpose. The real means whereby God causes the soul to be conscious of what\nhappens in the body have their origin in the nature of the soul, which\nrepresents the bodies, and is so made beforehand that the representations\nwhich are to spring up one from another within it, by a natural sequence of\nthoughts, correspond to the changes in the body.\n\n356. The representation has a natural relation to that which is to be\nrepresented. If God should have the round shape of a body represented by\nthe idea of a square, that would be an unsuitable representation: for there\nwould be angles or projections in the representation, while all would be\neven and smooth in the original. The representation often suppresses\nsomething in the objects when it is imperfect; but it can add nothing: that\nwould render it, not more than perfect, but false. Moreover, the\nsuppression is never complete in our perceptions, and there is in the\nrepresentation, confused as it is, more than we see there. Thus there is\nreason for supposing that the ideas of heat, cold, colours, etc., also only\nrepresent the small movements carried out in the organs, when one is\nconscious of these qualities, although the multiplicity and the diminutive\ncharacter of these movements prevents their clear representation. Almost in\nthe same way it happens that we do not distinguish the blue and the yellow\nwhich play their part in the representation as well as in the composition\nof the green, when the microscope shows that what appears to be green is\ncomposed of yellow and blue parts.\n\n357. It is true that the same thing may be represented in different ways;\nbut there must always be an exact relation between the representation and\nthe thing, and consequently between the different representations of one\nand the same thing. The projections in perspective of the conic sections of\nthe circle show that one and the same circle may be represented by an\nellipse, a parabola and a hyperbola, and even by another circle, a straight\nline and a point. Nothing appears so different nor so dissimilar as these\nfigures; and yet there is an exact relation between each point and every\nother point. Thus one must allow that each soul represents the universe to\nitself according to its point of view, and through a relation which is\npeculiar to it; but a perfect harmony always subsists therein. God, if he\nwished to effect representation of the dissolution of continuity of   [340]\nthe body by an agreeable sensation in the soul, would not have neglected to\nensure that this very dissolution should serve some perfection in the body,\nby giving it some new relief, as when one is freed of some burden or loosed\nfrom some bond. But organic bodies of such kinds, although possible, do not\nexist upon our globe, which doubtless lacks innumerable inventions that God\nmay have put to use elsewhere. Nevertheless it is enough that, due\nallowance being made for the place our world holds in the universe, nothing\ncan be done for it better than what God does. He makes the best possible\nuse of the laws of nature which he has established and (as M. Regis also\nacknowledged in the same passage) 'the laws that God has established in\nnature are the most excellent it is possible to conceive'.\n\n358. I will add to that the remark from the _Journal des Savants_ of the\n16th March 1705, which M. Bayle has inserted in chapter 162 of the _Reply\nto the Questions of a Provincial_ (vol. III, p. 1030). The matter in\nquestion is the extract from a very ingenious modern book on the Origin of\nEvil, to which I have already referred here. It is stated: 'that the\ngeneral solution in respect of physical evil which this book gives is that\nthe universe must be regarded as a work composed of various pieces which\nform a whole; that, according to the laws established in nature, some parts\ncannot be better unless others become worse, whence would result a system\nless perfect as a whole. This principle', the writer goes on, 'is good; but\nif nothing is added to it, it does not appear sufficient. Why has God\nestablished laws that give rise to so many difficulties? philosophers who\nare somewhat precise will say. Could he not have established others of a\nkind not subject to any defects? And to cut the matter short, how comes it\nthat he has prescribed laws for himself? Why does he not act without\ngeneral laws, in accordance with all his power and all his goodness? The\nwriter has not carried the difficulty as far as that. By disentangling his\nideas one might indeed possibly find means of solving the difficulty, but\nthere is no development of the subject in his work.'\n\n359. I suppose that the gifted author of this extract, when he thought the\ndifficulty could be solved, had in mind something akin to my principles on\nthis matter. If he had vouchsafed to declare himself in this passage, he\nwould to all appearance have replied, like M. Regis, that the laws God\nestablished were the most excellent that could be established. He would\nhave acknowledged, at the same time, that God could not have refrained[341]\nfrom establishing laws and following rules, because laws and rules are what\nmakes order and beauty; that to act without rules would be to act without\nreason; and that because God _called into action all his goodness_ the\nexercise of his omnipotence was consistent with the laws of wisdom, to\nsecure as much good as was possible of attainment. Finally, he would have\nsaid, the existence of certain particular disadvantages which strike us is\na sure indication that the best plan did not permit of their avoidance, and\nthat they assist in the achievement of the total good, an argument\nwherewith M. Bayle in more than one place expresses agreement.\n\n360. Now that I have proved sufficiently that everything comes to pass\naccording to determinate reasons, there cannot be any more difficulty over\nthese principles of God's foreknowledge. Although these determinations do\nnot compel, they cannot but be certain, and they foreshadow what shall\nhappen. It is true that God sees all at once the whole sequence of this\nuniverse, when he chooses it, and that thus he has no need of the connexion\nof effects and causes in order to foresee these effects. But since his\nwisdom causes him to choose a sequence in perfect connexion, he cannot but\nsee one part of the sequence in the other. It is one of the rules of my\nsystem of general harmony, _that the present is big with the future_, and\nthat he who sees all sees in that which is that which shall be. What is\nmore, I have proved conclusively that God sees in each portion of the\nuniverse the whole universe, owing to the perfect connexion of things. He\nis infinitely more discerning than Pythagoras, who judged the height of\nHercules by the size of his footprint. There must therefore be no doubt\nthat effects follow their causes determinately, in spite of contingency and\neven of freedom, which nevertheless exist together with certainty or\ndetermination.\n\n361. Durand de Saint-Pourcain, among others, has indicated this clearly in\nsaying that contingent futurities are seen determinately in their causes,\nand that God, who knows all, seeing all that shall have power to tempt or\nrepel the will, will see therein the course it shall take. I could cite\nmany other authors who have said the same thing, and reason does not allow\nthe possibility of thinking otherwise. M. Jacquelot implies also\n(_Conformity of Faith with Reason_, p. 318 _et seqq._), as M. Bayle\nobserves (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III, ch. 142, p.\n796), that the dispositions of the human heart and those of circumstances\nacquaint God unerringly with the choice that man shall make. M. Bayle [342]\nadds that some Molinists say the same, and refers us to those who are\nquoted in the _Suavis Concordia_ of Pierre de S. Joseph, the Feuillant (pp.\n579, 580).\n\n362. Those who have confused this determination with necessity have\nfabricated monsters in order to fight them. To avoid a reasonable thing\nwhich they had disguised under a hideous shape, they have fallen into great\nabsurdities. For fear of being obliged to admit an imaginary necessity, or\nat least one different from that in question, they have admitted something\nwhich happens without the existence of any cause or reason for it. This\namounts to the same as the absurd deviation of atoms, which according to\nEpicurus happened without any cause. Cicero, in his book on Divination, saw\nclearly that if the cause could produce an effect towards which it was\nentirely indifferent there would be a true chance, a genuine luck, an\nactual fortuitous case, that is, one which would be so not merely in\nrelation to us and our ignorance, according to which one may say:\n\n                                _Sed Te_\n  _Nos facimus, Fortuna, Deam, caeloque locamus,_\n\nbut even in relation to God and to the nature of things. Consequently it\nwould be impossible to foresee events by judging of the future by the past.\nHe adds fittingly in the same passage: 'Qui potest provideri, quicquam\nfuturum esse, quod neque causam habet ullam, neque notam cur futurum sit?'\nand soon after: 'Nihil est tam contrarium rationi et constantiae, quam\nfortuna; ut mihi ne in Deum quidem cadere videatur, ut sciat quid casu et\nfortuito futurum sit. Si enim scit, certe illud eveniet: sin certe eveniet,\nnulla fortuna est.' If the future is certain, there is no such thing as\nluck. But he wrongly adds: 'Est autum fortuna; rerum igitur fortuitarum\nnulla praesensio est.' There is luck, therefore future events cannot be\nforeseen. He ought rather to have concluded that, events being\npredetermined and foreseen, there is no luck. But he was then speaking\nagainst the Stoics, in the character of an Academician.\n\n363. The Stoics already derived from the decrees of God the prevision of\nevents. For, as Cicero says in the same book: 'Sequitur porro nihil Deos\nignorare, quod omnia ab iis sint constituta.' And, according to my system,\nGod, having seen the possible world that he desired to create, foresaw[343]\neverything therein. Thus one may say that the _divine knowledge of vision\ndiffers from the knowledge of simple intelligence_ only in that it adds to\nthe latter the acquaintance with the actual decree to choose this sequence\nof things which simple intelligence had already presented, but only as\npossible; and this decree now makes the present universe.\n\n364. Thus the Socinians cannot be excused for denying to God the certain\nknowledge of future events, and above all of the future resolves of a free\ncreature. For even though they had supposed that there is a freedom of\ncomplete indifference, so that the will can choose without cause, and that\nthus this effect could not be seen in its cause (which is a great\nabsurdity), they ought always to take into account that God was able to\nforesee this event in the idea of the possible world that he resolved to\ncreate. But the idea which they have of God is unworthy of the Author of\nthings, and is not commensurate with the skill and wit which the writers of\nthis party often display in certain particular discussions. The author of\nthe _Reflexion on the Picture of Socinianism_ was not altogether mistaken\nin saying that the God of the Socinians would be ignorant and powerless,\nlike the God of Epicurus, every day confounded by events and living from\none day to the next, if he only knows by conjecture what the will of men is\nto be.\n\n365. The whole difficulty here has therefore only come from a wrong idea of\ncontingency and of freedom, which was thought to have need of a complete\nindifference or equipoise, an imaginary thing, of which neither a notion\nnor an example exists, nor ever can exist. Apparently M. Descartes had been\nimbued with the idea in his youth, at the College of la Fleche. That caused\nhim to say (part I of his _Principles_, art. 41): 'Our thought is finite,\nand the knowledge and omnipotence of God, whereby he has not only known\nfrom all eternity everything that is, or that can be, but also has willed\nit, is infinite. Thus we have enough intelligence to recognize clearly and\ndistinctly that this power and this knowledge are in God; but we have not\nenough so to comprehend their extent that we can know how they leave the\nactions of men entirely free and indeterminate.' The continuation has\nalready been quoted above. 'Entirely free', that is right; but one spoils\neverything by adding 'entirely indeterminate'. One has no need of infinite\nknowledge in order to see that the foreknowledge and the providence of God\nallow freedom to our actions, since God has foreseen those actions in [344]\nhis ideas, just as they are, that is, free. Laurentius Valla indeed, in his\n_Dialogue against Boethius_ (which I will presently quote in epitome) ably\nundertakes to reconcile freedom with foreknowledge, but does not venture to\nhope that he can reconcile it with providence. Yet there is no more\ndifficulty in the one than the other, because the decree to give existence\nto this action no more changes its nature than does one's mere\nconsciousness thereof. But there is no knowledge, however infinite it be,\nwhich can reconcile the knowledge and providence of God with actions of an\nindeterminate cause, that is to say, with a chimerical and impossible\nbeing. The actions of the will are determined in two ways, by the\nforeknowledge or providence of God, and also by the dispositions of the\nparticular immediate cause, which lie in the inclinations of the soul. M.\nDescartes followed the Thomists on this point; but he wrote with his usual\ncircumspection, so as not to come into conflict with some other\ntheologians.\n\n366. M. Bayle relates (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III,\nch. 142, p. 804) that Father Gibieuf of the Oratory published a Latin\ntreatise on the freedom of God and of the creature, in the year 1639; that\nhe was met with protests, and was shown a collection of seventy\ncontradictions taken from the first book of his work; and that, twenty\nyears after, Father Annat, Confessor to the King of France, reproached him\nin his book _De Incoacta Libertate_ (ed. Rome, 1654, in 4to.), for the\nsilence he still maintained. Who would not think (adds M. Bayle), after the\nuproar of the _de Auxiliis_ Congregations, that the Thomists taught things\ntouching the nature of free will which were entirely opposed to the opinion\nof the Jesuits? When, however, one considers the passages that Father Annat\nquoted from the works of the Thomists (in a pamphlet entitled: _Jansenius a\nThomistis, gratiae per se ipsam efficacis defensoribus, condemnatus_,\nprinted in Paris in the year 1654 in 4to.) one can in reality only see\nverbal controversies between the two sects. The grace efficacious of\nitself, according to the one side, leaves to free will quite as much power\nof resistance as the congruent grace of the others. M. Bayle thinks one can\nsay almost as much of Jansenius himself. He was (so he says) an able man,\nof a methodical mind and of great assiduity. He worked for twenty-two years\nat his _Augustinus_. One of his aims was to refute the Jesuits on the dogma\nof free will; yet no decision has yet been reached as to whether he rejects\nor adopts freedom of indifference. From his work innumerable passages [345]\nare quoted for and against this opinion, as Father Annat has himself shown\nin the work that has just been mentioned, _De Incoacta Libertate_. So easy\nis it to render this subject obscure, as M. Bayle says at the conclusion of\nthis discourse. As for Father Gibieuf, it must be admitted that he often\nalters the meaning of his terms, and that consequently he does not answer\nthe question in the main, albeit he often writes with good sense.\n\n367. Indeed, confusion springs, more often than not, from ambiguity in\nterms, and from one's failure to take trouble over gaining clear ideas\nabout them. That gives rise to these eternal, and usually mistaken,\ncontentions on necessity and contingency, on the possible and the\nimpossible. But provided that it is understood that necessity and\npossibility, taken metaphysically and strictly, depend solely upon this\nquestion, whether the object in itself or that which is opposed to it\nimplies contradiction or not; and that one takes into account that\ncontingency is consistent with the inclinations, or reasons which\ncontribute towards causing determination by the will; provided also that\none knows how to distinguish clearly between necessity and determination or\ncertainty, between metaphysical necessity, which admits of no choice,\npresenting only one single object as possible, and moral necessity, which\nconstrains the wisest to choose the best; finally, provided that one is rid\nof the chimera of complete indifference, which can only be found in the\nbooks of philosophers, and on paper (for they cannot even conceive the\nnotion in their heads, or prove its reality by an example in things) one\nwill easily escape from a labyrinth whose unhappy Daedalus was the human\nmind. That labyrinth has caused infinite confusion, as much with the\nancients as with those of later times, even so far as to lead men into the\nabsurd error of the Lazy Sophism, which closely resembles fate after the\nTurkish fashion. I do not wonder if in reality the Thomists and the\nJesuits, and even the Molinists and the Jansenists, agree together on this\nmatter more than is supposed. A Thomist and even a wise Jansenist will\ncontent himself with certain determination, without going on to necessity:\nand if someone goes so far, the error mayhap will lie only in the word. A\nwise Molinist will be content with an indifference opposed to necessity,\nbut such as shall not exclude prevalent inclinations.\n\n368. These difficulties, however, have greatly impressed M. Bayle, who[346]\nwas more inclined to dwell on them than to solve them, although he might\nperhaps have had better success than anyone if he had thought fit to turn\nhis mind in that direction. Here is what he says of them in his\n_Dictionary_, art. 'Jansenius', lit. G, p. 1626: 'Someone has said that the\nsubject of Grace is an ocean which has neither shore nor bottom. Perhaps he\nwould have spoken more correctly if he had compared it to the Strait of\nMessina, where one is always in danger of striking one reef while\nendeavouring to avoid another.\n\n  _Dextrum Scylla latus, laevum implacata Charybdis_\n  _Obsidet._\n\nEverything comes back in the end to this: Did Adam sin freely? If you\nanswer yes, then you will be told, his fall was not foreseen. If you answer\nno, then you will be told, he is not guilty. You may write a hundred\nvolumes against the one or the other of these conclusions, and yet you will\nconfess, either that the infallible prevision of a contingent event is a\nmystery impossible to conceive, or that the way in which a creature which\nacts without freedom sins nevertheless is altogether incomprehensible.'\n\n369. Either I am greatly mistaken or these two alleged\nincomprehensibilities are ended altogether by my solutions. Would to God it\nwere as easy to answer the question how to cure fevers, and how to avoid\nthe perils of two chronic sicknesses that may originate, the one from not\ncuring the fever, the other from curing it wrongly. When one asserts that a\nfree event cannot be foreseen, one is confusing freedom with\nindetermination, or with indifference that is complete and in equipoise;\nand when one maintains that the lack of freedom would prevent man from\nbeing guilty, one means a freedom exempt, not from determination or from\ncertainty, but from necessity and from constraint. This shows that the\ndilemma is not well expressed, and that there is a wide passage between the\ntwo perilous reefs. One will reply, therefore, that Adam sinned freely, and\nthat God saw him sinning in the possible state of Adam, which became actual\nin accordance with the decree of the divine permission. It is true that\nAdam was determined to sin in consequence of certain prevailing\ninclinations: but this determination destroys neither contingency nor\nfreedom. Moreover, the certain determination to sin which exists in man\ndoes not deprive him of the power to avoid sinning (speaking generally) or,\nsince he does sin, prevent him from being guilty and deserving        [347]\npunishment. This is more especially so since the punishment may be of\nservice to him or others, to contribute towards determining them another\ntime not to sin. There is besides punitive justice, which goes beyond\ncompensation and amendment, and wherein also there is nothing liable to be\nshaken by the certain determination of the contingent resolutions of the\nwill. It may be said, on the contrary, that the penalties and rewards would\nbe to some extent unavailing, and would fail in one of their aims, that of\namendment, if they could not contribute towards determining the will to do\nbetter another time.\n\n370. M. Bayle continues: 'Where freedom is concerned there are only two\ncourses to take: one is to say that all the causes distinct from the soul,\nand co-operating with it, leave it the power to act or not to act; the\nother is to say that they so determine it to act that it cannot forbear to\ndo so. The first course is that taken by the Molinists, the other is that\nof the Thomists and Jansenists and the Protestants of the Geneva\nConfession. Yet the Thomists have clamorously maintained that they were not\nJansenists; and the latter have maintained with equal warmth that where\nfreedom was concerned they were not Calvinists. On the other hand, the\nMolinists have maintained that St. Augustine did not teach Jansenism. Thus\nthe one side not wishing to admit that they were in conformity with people\nwho were considered heretics, and the other side not wishing to admit that\nthey were in opposition to a learned saint whose opinions were always\nconsidered orthodox, have both performed a hundred feats of contortion,\netc.'\n\n371. The two courses which M. Bayle distinguishes here do not exclude a\nthird course, according to which the determination of the soul does not\ncome solely from the co-operation of all the causes distinct from the soul,\nbut also from the state of the soul itself and its inclinations which\nmingle with the impressions of the senses, strengthening or weakening them.\nNow all the internal and external causes taken together bring it about that\nthe soul is determined certainly, but not of necessity: for no\ncontradiction would be implied if the soul were to be determined\ndifferently, it being possible for the will to be inclined, but not\npossible for it to be compelled by necessity. I will not venture upon a\ndiscussion of the difference existing between the Jansenists and the\nReformed on this matter. They are not perhaps always fully in accord  [348]\nwith themselves as regards things, or as regards expressions, on a matter\nwhere one often loses one's way in bewildering subtleties. Father Theophile\nRaynaud, in his book entitled _Calvinismus Religio Bestiarum_, wished to\nstrike at the Dominicans, without naming them. On the other hand, those who\nprofessed to be followers of St. Augustine reproached the Molinists with\nPelagianism or at the least semi-Pelagianism. Things were carried to excess\nat times by both sides, whether in their defence of a vague indifference\nand the granting of too much to man, or in their teaching _determinationem\nad unum secundum qualitatem actus licet non quoad ejus substantiam_, that\nis to say, a determination to evil in the non-regenerate, as if they did\nnothing but sin. After all, I think one must not reproach any but the\nadherents of Hobbes and Spinoza with destroying freedom and contingency;\nfor they think that that which happens is alone possible, and must happen\nby a brute geometrical necessity. Hobbes made everything material and\nsubjected it to mathematical laws alone; Spinoza also divested God of\nintelligence and choice, leaving him a blind power, whence all emanates of\nnecessity. The theologians of the two Protestant parties are equally\nzealous in refuting an unendurable necessity. Although those who follow the\nSynod of Dordrecht teach sometimes that it suffices for freedom to be\nexempt from constraint, it seems that the necessity they leave in it is\nonly hypothetical, or rather that which is more appropriately termed\ncertainty and infallibility. Thus it results that very often the\ndifficulties only lie in the terms. I say as much with regard to the\nJansenists, although I do not wish to make excuse for those people in\neverything.\n\n372. With the Hebrew Cabalists, _Malcuth_ or the Kingdom, the last of the\nSephiroth, signified that God controls everything irresistibly, but gently\nand without violence, so that man thinks he is following his own will while\nhe carries out God's. They said that Adam's sin had been _truncatio Malcuth\na caeteris plantis_, that is to say, that Adam had cut back the last of the\nSephiroth, by making a dominion for himself within God's dominion, and by\nassuming for himself a freedom independent of God, but that his fall had\ntaught him that he could not subsist of himself, and that men must needs be\nredeemed by the Messiah. This doctrine may receive a good interpretation.\nBut Spinoza, who was versed in the Cabala of the writers of his race, and\nwho says (_Tractatus Politicus_, c. 2, n. 6) that men, conceiving of\nfreedom as they do, establish a dominion within God's dominion, has   [349]\ngone too far. The dominion of God is with Spinoza nothing but the dominion\nof necessity, and of a blind necessity (as with Strato), whereby everything\nemanates from the divine nature, while no choice is left to God, and man's\nchoice does not exempt him from necessity. He adds that men, in order to\nestablish what is termed _Imperium in Imperio_, supposed that their soul\nwas a direct creation of God, something which could not be produced by\nnatural causes, furthermore that it had an absolute power of determination,\na state of things contrary to experience. Spinoza is right in opposing an\nabsolute power of determination, that is, one without any grounds; it does\nnot belong even to God. But he is wrong in thinking that a soul, that a\nsimple substance, can be produced naturally. It seems, indeed, that the\nsoul to him was only a transient modification; and when he pretends to make\nit lasting, and even perpetual, he substitutes for it the idea of the body,\nwhich is purely a notion and not a real and actual thing.\n\n373. The story M. Bayle relates of Johan Bredenburg, a citizen of Rotterdam\n(_Dictionary_, art. 'Spinoza', lit. H, p. 2774) is curious. He published a\nbook against Spinoza, entitled: _Enervatio Tractatus Theologico-politici,\nuna cum demonstratione geometrico ordine disposita, Naturam non esse Deum,\ncujus effati contrario praedictus Tractatus unice innititur_. One was\nsurprised to see that a man who did not follow the profession of letters,\nand who had but slight education (having written his book in Flemish, and\nhad it translated into Latin), had been able to penetrate with such\nsubtlety all the principles of Spinoza, and succeed in overthrowing them,\nafter having reduced them by a candid analysis to a state wherein they\ncould appear in their full force. I have been told (adds M. Bayle) that\nthis writer after copious reflexion upon his answer, and upon the principle\nof his opponent, finally found that this principle could be reduced to the\nform of a demonstration. He undertook therefore to prove that there is no\ncause of all things other than a nature which exists necessarily, and which\nacts according to an immutable, inevitable and irrevocable necessity. He\nexamined the whole system of the geometricians, and after having\nconstructed his demonstration he scrutinized it from every imaginable\nangle, he endeavoured to find its weak spot and was never able to discover\nany means of destroying it, or even of weakening it. That caused him real\ndistress: he groaned over it and begged the most talented of his      [350]\nfriends to help him in searching out the defects of this demonstration. For\nall that, he was not well pleased that copies of the book were made. Franz\nCuper, a Socinian (who had written _Arcana Atheismi Revelata_ against\nSpinoza, Rotterdam, 1676, in 4to.), having obtained a copy, published it\njust as it was, that is, in Flemish, with some reflexions, and accused the\nauthor of being an atheist. The accused made his defence in the same\ntongue. Orobio, a very able Jewish physician (that one who was refuted by\nM. Limbourg, and who replied, so I have heard say, in a work posthumously\ncirculated, but unpublished), brought out a book opposing Bredenburg's\ndemonstration, entitled: _Certamen Philosophicum Propugnatae Veritatis\nDivinae ac Naturalis, adversus J.B. principia, Amsterdam_, 1684. M. Aubert\nde Verse also wrote in opposition to him the same year under the name of\nLatinus Serbattus Sartensis. Bredenburg protested that he was convinced of\nfree will and of religion, and that he wished he might be shown a\npossibility of refuting his own demonstration.\n\n374. I would desire to see this alleged demonstration, and to know whether\nit tended to prove that primitive Nature, which produces all, acts without\nchoice and without knowledge. In this case, I admit that his proof was\nSpinozistic and dangerous. But if he meant perhaps that the divine nature\nis determined toward that which it produces, by its choice and through the\nmotive of the best, there was no need for him to grieve about this\nso-called immutable, inevitable, irrevocable necessity. It is only moral,\nit is a happy necessity; and instead of destroying religion it shows divine\nperfection to the best advantage.\n\n375. I take this opportunity to add that M. Bayle quotes (p. 2773) the\nopinion of those who believe that the book entitled _Lucii Antistii\nConstantis de Jure Ecclesiasticorum Liber Singularis_, published in 1665,\nis by Spinoza. But I have reason for doubting this, despite that M.\nColerus, who has passed on to me an account he wrote of the life of that\nfamous Jew, is also of that opinion. The initial letters L.A.C. lead me to\nbelieve that the author of this book was M. de la Cour or Van den Hoof,\nfamous for works on the _Interest of Holland, Political Equipoise_, and\nnumerous other books that he published (some of them under the signature\nV.D.H.) attacking the power of the Governor of Holland, which was at that\ntime considered a danger to the Republic; for the memory of Prince William\nthe Second's attempt upon the city of Amsterdam was still quite fresh.[351]\nMost of the ecclesiastics of Holland were on the side of this prince's son,\nwho was then a minor, and they suspected M. de Witt and what was called the\nLowenstein faction of favouring the Arminians, the Cartesians, and other\nsects that were feared still more, endeavouring to rouse the populace\nagainst them, and not without success, as the event proved. It was thus\nvery natural that M. de la Cour should publish this book. It is true that\npeople seldom keep to the happy mean in works published to further party\ninterests. I will say in passing that a French version of the _Interest of\nHolland_ by M. de la Cour has just been published, under the deceptive\ntitle of _Memoires de M. le Grand-Pensionnaire de Witt_; as if the thoughts\nof a private individual, who was, to be sure, of de Witt's party, and a man\nof talent, but who had not enough acquaintance with public affairs or\nenough ability to write as that great Minister of State might have written,\ncould pass for the production of one of the first men of his time.\n\n376. I saw M. de la Cour as well as Spinoza on my return from France by way\nof England and Holland, and I learnt from them a few good anecdotes on the\naffairs of that time. M. Bayle says, p. 2770, that Spinoza studied Latin\nunder a physician named Franz van den Ende. He tells at the same time, on\nthe authority of Sebastian Kortholt (who refers to it in the preface to the\nsecond edition of the book by his late father, _De Tribus Impostoribus,\nHerberto L. B. de Cherbury, Hobbio et Spinoza_) that a girl instructed\nSpinoza in Latin, and that she afterwards married M. Kerkering, who was her\npupil at the same time as Spinoza. In connexion with that I note that this\nyoung lady was a daughter of M. van den Ende, and that she assisted her\nfather in the work of teaching. Van den Ende, who was also called A.\nFinibus, later went to Paris, and there kept a boarding-school in the\nFaubourg St. Antoine. He was considered excellent as an instructor, and he\ntold me, when I called upon him there, that he would wager that his\naudiences would always pay attention to his words. He had with him as well\nat that time a young girl who also spoke Latin, and worked upon geometrical\ndemonstrations. He had insinuated himself into M. Arnauld's good graces,\nand the Jesuits began to be jealous of his reputation. But he disappeared\nshortly afterwards, having been mixed up in the Chevalier de Rohan's\nconspiracy.\n\n377. I think I have sufficiently proved that neither the foreknowledge nor\nthe providence of God can impair either his justice or his goodness,  [352]\nor our freedom. There remains only the difficulty arising from God's\nco-operation with the actions of the creature, which seems to concern more\nclosely both his goodness, in relation to our evil actions, and our\nfreedom, in relation to good actions as well as to others. M. Bayle has\nbrought out this also with his usual acuteness. I will endeavour to throw\nlight upon the difficulties he puts forward, and then I shall be in a\nposition to conclude this work. I have already proved that the co-operation\nof God consists in giving us continually all that is real in us and in our\nactions, in so far as it involves perfection; but that all that is limited\nand imperfect therein is a consequence of the previous limitations which\nare originally in the creature. Since, moreover, every action of the\ncreature is a change of its modifications, it is obvious that action arises\nin the creature in relation to the limitations or negations which it has\nwithin itself, and which are diversified by this change.\n\n378. I have already pointed out more than once in this work that evil is a\nconsequence of privation, and I think that I have explained that\nintelligibly enough. St. Augustine has already put forward this idea, and\nSt. Basil said something of the same kind in his _Hexaemeron_, Homil. 2,\n'that vice is not a living and animate substance, but an affection of the\nsoul contrary to virtue, which arises from one's abandoning the good; and\nthere is therefore no need to look for an original evil'. M. Bayle, quoting\nthis passage in his _Dictionary_ (art. 'Paulicians', lit. D, p. 2325)\ncommends a remark by Herr Pfanner (whom he calls a German theologian, but\nhe is a jurist by profession, Counsellor to the Dukes of Saxony), who\ncensures St. Basil for not being willing to admit that God is the author of\nphysical evil. Doubtless God is its author, when the moral evil is assumed\nto be already in existence; but speaking generally, one might assert that\nGod permitted physical evil by implication, in permitting moral evil which\nis its source. It appears that the Stoics knew also how slender is the\nentity of evil. These words of Epictetus are an indication: 'Sicut\naberrandi causa meta non ponitur, sic nec natura mali in mundo existit.'\n\n379. There was therefore no need to have recourse to a principle of evil,\nas St. Basil aptly observes. Nor is it necessary either to seek the origin\nof evil in matter. Those who believed that there was a chaos before God\nlaid his hand upon it sought therein the source of disorder. It was an\nopinion which Plato introduced into his _Timaeus_. Aristotle found fault\nwith him for that (in his third book on Heaven, ch. 2) because,       [353]\naccording to this doctrine, disorder would be original and natural, and\norder would have been introduced against nature. This Anaxagoras avoided by\nmaking matter remain at rest until it was stirred by God; and Aristotle in\nthe same passage commends him for it. According to Plutarch (_De Iside et\nOsiride_, and _Tr. de Animae Procreatione ex Timaeo_) Plato recognized in\nmatter a certain maleficent soul or force, rebellious against God: it was\nan actual blemish, an obstacle to God's plans. The Stoics also believed\nthat matter was the source of defects, as Justus Lipsius showed in the\nfirst book of the Physiology of the Stoics.\n\n380. Aristotle was right in rejecting chaos: but it is not always easy to\ndisentangle the conceptions of Plato, and such a task would be still less\neasy in respect of some ancient authors whose works are lost. Kepler, one\nof the most excellent of modern mathematicians, recognized a species of\nimperfection in matter, even when there is no irregular motion: he calls it\nits 'natural inertia', which gives it a resistance to motion, whereby a\ngreater mass receives less speed from one and the same force. There is\nsoundness in this observation, and I have used it to advantage in this\nwork, in order to have a comparison such as should illustrate how the\noriginal imperfection of the creatures sets bounds to the action of the\nCreator, which tends towards good. But as matter is itself of God's\ncreation, it only furnishes a comparison and an example, and cannot be the\nvery source of evil and of imperfection. I have already shown that this\nsource lies in the forms or ideas of the possibles, for it must be eternal,\nand matter is not so. Now since God made all positive reality that is not\neternal, he would have made the source of evil, if that did not rather lie\nin the possibility of things or forms, that which alone God did not make,\nsince he is not the author of his own understanding.\n\n381. Yet even though the source of evil lies in the possible forms,\nanterior to the acts of God's will, it is nevertheless true that God\nco-operates in evil in the actual performance of introducing these forms\ninto matter: and this is what causes the difficulty in question here.\nDurand de Saint-Pourcain, Cardinal Aureolus, Nicolas Taurel, Father Louis\nde Dole, M. Bernier and some others, speaking of this co-operation, would\nhave it only general, for fear of impairing the freedom of man and the\nholiness of God. They seem to maintain that God, having given to creatures\nthe power to act, contents himself with conserving this power. On the [354]\nother hand, M. Bayle, according to some modern writers, carries the\ncooperation of God too far: he seems to fear lest the creature be not\nsufficiently dependent upon God. He goes so far as to deny action to\ncreatures; he does not even acknowledge any real distinction between\naccident and substance.\n\n382. He places great reliance especially on that doctrine accepted of the\nSchoolmen, that conservation is a continued creation. The conclusion to be\ndrawn from this doctrine would seem to be that the creature never exists,\nthat it is ever newborn and ever dying, like time, movement and other\ntransient beings. Plato believed this of material and tangible things,\nsaying that they are in a perpetual flux, _semper fluunt, nunquam sunt_.\nBut of immaterial substances he judged quite differently, regarding them\nalone as real: nor was he in that altogether mistaken. Yet continued\ncreation applies to all creatures without distinction. Sundry good\nphilosophers have been opposed to this dogma, and M. Bayle tells that David\nde Rodon, a philosopher renowned among those of the French who have adhered\nto Geneva, deliberately refuted it. The Arminians also do not approve of\nit; they are not much in favour of these metaphysical subtleties. I will\nsay nothing of the Socinians, who relish them even less.\n\n383. For a proper enquiry as to _whether conservation is a continued\ncreation,_ it would be necessary to consider the reasons whereon this dogma\nis founded. The Cartesians, after the example of their master, employ in\norder to prove it a principle which is not conclusive enough. They say that\n'the moments of time having no necessary connexion with one another, it\ndoes not follow that because I am at this moment I shall exist at the\nmoment which shall follow, if the same cause which gives me being for this\nmoment does not also give it to me for the instant following.' The author\nof the _Reflexion on the Picture of Socinianism_ has made use of this\nargument, and M. Bayle (perhaps the author of this same _Reflexion_) quotes\nit (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III, ch. 141, p. 771).\nOne may answer that in fact it does not follow _of necessity_ that, because\nI am, I shall be; but this follows _naturally_, nevertheless, that is, of\nitself, _per se_, if nothing prevents it. It is the distinction that can be\ndrawn between the essential and the natural. For the same movement endures\nnaturally unless some new cause prevents it or changes it, because the\nreason which makes it cease at this instant, if it is no new reason,  [355]\nwould have already made it cease sooner.\n\n384. The late Herr Erhard Weigel, a celebrated mathematician and\nphilosopher at Jena, well known for his _Analysis Euclidea_, his\nmathematical philosophy, some neat mechanical inventions, and finally the\ntrouble he took to induce the Protestant princes of the Empire to undertake\nthe last reform of the Almanac, whose success, notwithstanding, he did not\nwitness; Herr Weigel, I say, communicated to his friends a certain\ndemonstration of the existence of God, which indeed amounted to this idea\nof continued creation. As he was wont to draw parallels between reckoning\nand reasoning--witness his Arithmetical Ethics (_rechenschaftliche\nSittenlehre_)--he said that the foundation of the demonstration was this\nbeginning of the Pythagorean Table, _once one is one_. These repeated\nunities were the moments of the existence of things, each one of them\ndepending upon God, who resuscitates, as it were, all things outside\nhimself at each moment: falling away as they do at each moment, they must\never have one who shall resuscitate them, and that cannot be any other than\nGod. But there would be need of a more exact proof if that is to be called\na demonstration. It would be necessary to prove that the creature always\nemerges from nothingness and relapses thither forthwith. In particular it\nmust be shown that the privilege of enduring more than a moment by its\nnature belongs to the necessary being alone. The difficulties on the\ncomposition of the _continuum_ enter also into this matter. This dogma\nappears to resolve time into moments, whereas others regard moments and\npoints as mere modalities of the _continuum_, that is, as extremities of\nthe parts that can be assigned to it, and not as constituent parts. But\nthis is not the place for entering into that labyrinth.\n\n385. What can be said for certain on the present subject is that the\ncreature depends continually upon divine operation, and that it depends\nupon that no less after the time of its beginning than when it first\nbegins. This dependence implies that it would not continue to exist if God\ndid not continue to act; in short, that this action of God is free. For if\nit were a necessary emanation, like that of the properties of the circle,\nwhich issue from its essence, it must then be said that God in the\nbeginning produced the creature by necessity; or else it must be shown how,\nin creating it once, he imposed upon himself the necessity of conserving\nit. Now there is no reason why this conserving action should not be   [356]\ncalled production, and even creation, if one will: for the dependence being\nas great afterwards as at the beginning, the extrinsic designation of being\nnew or not does not change the nature of that action.\n\n386. Let us then admit in such a sense that conservation is a continued\ncreation, and let us see what M. Bayle seems to infer thence (p. 771) after\nthe author of the _Reflexion on the Picture of Socinianism_, in opposition\nto M. Jurieu. 'It seems to me', this writer says, 'that one must conclude\nthat God does all, and that in all creation there are no first or second or\neven occasional causes, as can be easily proved. At this moment when I\nspeak, I am such as I am, with all my circumstances, with such thought,\nsuch action, whether I sit or stand, that if God creates me in this moment\nsuch as I am, as one must of necessity say in this system, he creates me\nwith such thought, such action, such movement and such determination. One\ncannot say that God creates me in the first place, and that once I am\ncreated he produces with me my movements and my determinations. That is\nindefensible for two reasons. The first is, that when God creates me or\nconserves me at this instant, he does not conserve me as a being without\nform, like a species, or another of the Universals of Logic. I am an\nindividual; he creates me and conserves me as such, and as being all that I\nam in this instant, with all my attendant circumstances. The second reason\nis that if God creates me in this instant, and one says that afterwards he\nproduces with me my actions, it will be necessary to imagine another\ninstant for action: for before acting one must exist. Now that would be two\ninstants where we only assume one. It is therefore certain in this\nhypothesis that creatures have neither more connexion nor more relation\nwith their actions than they had with their production at the first moment\nof the first creation.' The author of this _Reflexion_ draws thence very\nharsh conclusions which one can picture to oneself; and he testifies at the\nend that one would be deeply indebted to any man that should teach those\nwho approve this system how to extricate themselves from these frightful\nabsurdities.\n\n387. M. Bayle carries this still further. 'You know', he says (p. 775),\n'that it is demonstrated in the Scholastic writings' (he cites Arriaga,\n_Disp_. 9, Phys., sect. 6 et praesertim, sub-sect. 3) 'that the creature\ncannot be either the total cause or the partial cause of its conservation:\nfor if it were, it would exist before existing, which is              [357]\ncontradictory. You know that the argument proceeds like this: that which\nconserves itself acts; now that which acts exists, and nothing can act\nbefore it has attained complete existence; therefore, if a creature\nconserved itself, it would act before being. This argument is not founded\nupon probabilities, but upon the first principles of Metaphysics, _non\nentis nulla sunt accidentia, operari sequitur esse_, axioms as clear as\ndaylight. Let us go further. If creatures co-operated with God (here is\nmeant an active cooperation, and not co-operation by a passive instrument)\nto conserve themselves they would act before being: that has been\ndemonstrated. Now if they co-operated with God for the production of any\nother thing, they would also act before being; it is therefore as\nimpossible for them to co-operate with God for the production of any other\nthing (such as local movement, an affirmation, volition, entities actually\ndistinct from their substance, so it is asserted) as for their own\nconservation. Since their conservation is a continued creation, and since\nall human creatures in the world must confess that they cannot co-operate\nwith God at the first moment of their existence, either to produce\nthemselves or to give themselves any modality, since that would be to act\nbefore being (observe that Thomas Aquinas and sundry other Schoolmen teach\nthat if the angels had sinned at the first moment of their creation God\nwould be the author of the sin: see the Feuillant Pierre de St. Joseph, p.\n318, _et seqq_., of the _Suavis Concordia Humanae Libertatis_; it is a sign\nthat they acknowledge that at the first instant the creature cannot act in\nanything whatsoever), it follows manifestly that they cannot co-operate\nwith God in any one of the subsequent moments, either to produce themselves\nor to produce any other thing. If they could co-operate therein at the\nsecond moment of their existence, nothing would prevent their being able to\ncooperate at the first moment.'\n\n388. This is the way it will be necessary to answer these arguments. Let us\nassume that the creature is produced anew at each instant; let us grant\nalso that the instant excludes all priority of time, being indivisible; but\nlet us point out that it does not exclude priority of nature, or what is\ncalled anteriority _in signo rationis,_ and that this is sufficient. The\nproduction, or action whereby God produces, is anterior by nature to the\nexistence of the creature that is produced; the creature taken in itself,\nwith its nature and its necessary properties, is anterior to its accidental\naffections and to its actions; and yet all these things are in being  [358]\nin the same moment. God produces the creature in conformity with the\nexigency of the preceding instants, according to the laws of his wisdom;\nand the creature operates in conformity with that nature which God conveys\nto it in creating it always. The limitations and imperfections arise\ntherein through the nature of the subject, which sets bounds to God's\nproduction; this is the consequence of the original imperfection of\ncreatures. Vice and crime, on the other hand, arise there through the free\ninward operation of the creature, in so far as this can occur within the\ninstant, repetition afterwards rendering it discernible.\n\n389. This anteriority of nature is a commonplace in philosophy: thus one\nsays that the decrees of God have an order among themselves. When one\nascribes to God (and rightly so) understanding of the arguments and\nconclusions of creatures, in such sort that all their demonstrations and\nsyllogisms are known to him, and are found in him in a transcendent way,\none sees that there is in the propositions or truths a natural order; but\nthere is no order of time or interval, to cause him to advance in knowledge\nand pass from the premisses to the conclusion.\n\n390. I find in the arguments that have just been quoted nothing which these\nreflexions fail to satisfy. When God produces the thing he produces it as\nan individual and not as a universal of logic (I admit); but he produces\nits essence before its accidents, its nature before its operations,\nfollowing the priority of their nature, and _in signo anteriore rationis_.\nThus one sees how the creature can be the true cause of the sin, while\nconservation by God does not prevent the sin; God disposes in accordance\nwith the preceding state of the same creature, in order to follow the laws\nof his wisdom notwithstanding the sin, which in the first place will be\nproduced by the creature. But it is true that God would not in the\nbeginning have created the soul in a state wherein it would have sinned\nfrom the first moment, as the Schoolmen have justly observed: for there is\nnothing in the laws of his wisdom that could have induced him so to do.\n\n391. This law of wisdom brings it about also that God reproduces the same\nsubstance, the same soul. Such was the answer that could have been given by\nthe Abbe whom M. Bayle introduces in his _Dictionary_ (art. 'Pyrrhon.' lit.\nB, p. 2432). This wisdom effects the connexion of things. I concede\ntherefore that the creature does not co-operate with God to conserve  [359]\nhimself (in the sense in which I have just explained conservation). But I\nsee nothing to prevent the creature's co-operation with God for the\nproduction of any other thing: and especially might this concern its inward\noperation, as in the case of a thought or a volition, things really\ndistinct from the substance.\n\n392. But there I am once more at grips with M. Bayle. He maintains that\nthere are no such accidents distinct from the substance. 'The reasons', he\nsays, 'which our modern philosophers have employed to demonstrate that the\naccidents are not beings in reality distinct from the substance are not\nmere difficulties; they are arguments which overwhelm one, and which cannot\nbe refuted. Take the trouble', he adds, 'to look for them in the writings\nof Father Maignan, or Father Malebranche or M. Calli' (Professor of\nPhilosophy at Caen) 'or in the _Accidentia profligata_ of Father Saguens,\ndisciple of Father Maignan, the extract from which is to be found in the\n_Nouvelles de la Republique des Lettres_, June 1702. Or if you wish one\nauthor only to suffice you, choose Dom Francois Lami, a Benedictine monk,\nand one of the strongest Cartesians to be found in France. You will find\namong his _Philosophical Letters_, printed at Trevoux in 1703, that one\nwherein by the geometricians' method he demonstrates \"that God is the sole\ntrue cause of all that which is real.\" I would wish to see all these books;\nand as for this last proposition, it may be true in a very good sense: God\nis the one principal cause of pure and absolute realities, or of\nperfections. _Causae secundae agunt in virtute primae._ But when one\ncomprises limitations and privations under the term realities one may say\nthat the second causes co-operate in the production of that which is\nlimited; otherwise God would be the cause of sin, and even the sole cause.\n\n393. It is well to beware, moreover, lest in confusing substances with\naccidents, in depriving created substances of action, one fall into\nSpinozism, which is an exaggerated Cartesianism. That which does not act\ndoes not merit the name of substance. If the accidents are not distinct\nfrom the substances; if the created substance is a successive being, like\nmovement; if it does not endure beyond a moment, and does not remain the\nsame (during some stated portion of time) any more than its accidents; if\nit does not operate any more than a mathematical figure or a number: why\nshall one not say, with Spinoza, that God is the only substance, and  [360]\nthat creatures are only accidents or modifications? Hitherto it has been\nsupposed that the substance remains, and that the accidents change; and I\nthink one ought still to abide by this ancient doctrine, for the arguments\nI remember having read do not prove the contrary, and prove more than is\nneeded.\n\n394. 'One of the absurdities', says M. Bayle (p. 779), 'that arise from the\nso-called distinction which is alleged to exist between substances and\ntheir accidents is that creatures, if they produce the accidents, would\npossess a power of creation and annihilation. Accordingly one could not\nperform the slightest action without creating an innumerable number of real\nbeings, and without reducing to nothingness an endless multitude of them.\nMerely by moving the tongue to cry out or to eat, one creates as many\naccidents as there are movements of the parts of the tongue, and one\ndestroys as many accidents as there are parts of that which one eats, which\nlose their form, which become chyle, blood, etc.' This argument is only a\nkind of bugbear. What harm would be done, supposing that an infinity of\nmovements, an infinity of figures spring up and disappear at every moment\nin the universe, and even in each part of the universe? It can be\ndemonstrated, moreover, that that must be so.\n\n395. As for the so-called creation of the accidents, who does not see that\none needs no creative power in order to change place or shape, to form a\nsquare or a column, or some other parade-ground figure, by the movement of\nthe soldiers who are drilling; or again to fashion a statue by removing a\nfew pieces from a block of marble; or to make some figure in relief, by\nchanging, decreasing or increasing a piece of wax? The production of\nmodifications has never been called _creation_, and it is an abuse of terms\nto scare the world thus. God produces substances from nothing, and the\nsubstances produce accidents by the changes of their limits.\n\n396. As for the souls or substantial forms, M. Bayle is right in adding:\n'that there is nothing more inconvenient for those who admit substantial\nforms than the objection which is made that they could not be produced save\nby an actual creation, and that the Schoolmen are pitiable in their\nendeavours to answer this.' But there is nothing more convenient for me and\nfor my system than this same objection. For I maintain that all the Souls,\nEntelechies or primitive forces, substantial forms, simple substances, or\nMonads, whatever name one may apply to them, can neither spring up    [361]\nnaturally nor perish. And the qualities or derivative forces, or what are\ncalled accidental forms, I take to be modifications of the primitive\nEntelechy, even as shapes are modifications of matter. That is why these\nmodifications are perpetually changing, while the simple substance remains.\n\n397. I have shown already (part I, 86 _seqq._) that souls cannot spring up\nnaturally, or be derived from one another, and that it is necessary that\nours either be created or be pre-existent. I have even pointed out a\ncertain middle way between a creation and an entire pre-existence. I find\nit appropriate to say that the soul preexisting in the seeds from the\nbeginning of things was only sentient, but that it was elevated to the\nsuperior degree, which is that of reason, when the man to whom this soul\nshould belong was conceived, and when the organic body, always accompanying\nthis soul from the beginning, but under many changes, was determined for\nforming the human body. I considered also that one might attribute this\nelevation of the sentient soul (which makes it reach a more sublime degree\nof being, namely reason) to the extraordinary operation of God.\nNevertheless it will be well to add that I would dispense with miracles in\nthe generating of man, as in that of the other animals. It will be possible\nto explain that, if one imagines that in this great number of souls and of\nanimals, or at least of living organic bodies which are in the seeds, those\nsouls alone which are destined to attain one day to human nature contain\nthe reason that shall appear therein one day, and the organic bodies of\nthese souls alone are preformed and predisposed to assume one day the human\nshape, while the other small animals or seminal living beings, in which no\nsuch thing is pre-established, are essentially different from them and\npossessed only of an inferior nature. This production is a kind of\n_traduction_, but more manageable than that kind which is commonly taught:\nit does not derive the soul from a soul, but only the animate from an\nanimate, and it avoids the repeated miracles of a new creation, which would\ncause a new and pure soul to enter a body that must corrupt it.\n\n398. I am, however, of the same opinion as Father Malebranche, that, in\ngeneral, creation properly understood is not so difficult to admit as might\nbe supposed, and that it is in a sense involved in the notion of the\ndependence of creatures. 'How stupid and ridiculous are the Philosophers!'\n(he exclaims, in his _Christian Meditations_, 9, No. 3). 'They assume that\nCreation is impossible, because they cannot conceive how God's power  [362]\nis great enough to make something from nothing. But can they any better\nconceive how the power of God is capable of stirring a straw?' He adds,\nagain with great truth (No. 5), 'If matter were uncreate, God could not\nmove it or form anything from it. For God cannot move matter, or arrange it\nwisely, if he does not know it. Now God cannot know it, if he does not give\nit being: he can derive his knowledge only from himself. Nothing can act on\nhim or enlighten him.'\n\n399. M. Bayle, not content with saying that we are created continually,\ninsists also on this other doctrine which he would fain derive thence: that\nour soul cannot act. This is the way he speaks on that matter (ch. 141, p.\n765): 'He has too much acquaintance with Cartesianism' (it is of an able\nopponent he is speaking) 'not to know with what force it has been\nmaintained in our day that there is no creature capable of producing\nmotion, and that our soul is a purely passive subject in relation to\nsensations and ideas, and feelings of pain and of pleasure, etc. If this\nhas not been carried as far as the volitions, that is on account of the\nexistence of revealed truths; otherwise the acts of the will would have\nbeen found as passive as those of the understanding. The same reasons which\nprove that our soul does not form our ideas, and does not stir our organs,\nwould prove also that it cannot form our acts of love and our volitions,\netc' He might add: our vicious actions, our crimes.\n\n400. The force of these proofs, which he praises, must not be so great as\nhe thinks, for if it were they would prove too much. They would make God\nthe author of sin. I admit that the soul cannot stir the organs by a\nphysical influence; for I think that the body must have been so formed\nbeforehand that it would do in time and place that which responds to the\nvolitions of the soul, although it be true nevertheless that the soul is\nthe principle of the operation. But if it be said that the soul does not\nproduce its thoughts, its sensations, its feelings of pain and of pleasure,\nthat is something for which I see no reason. In my system every simple\nsubstance (that is, every true substance) must be the true immediate cause\nof all its actions and inward passions; and, speaking strictly in a\nmetaphysical sense, it has none other than those which it produces. Those\nwho hold a different opinion, and who make God the sole agent, are\nneedlessly becoming involved in expressions whence they will only with\ndifficulty extricate themselves without offence against religion;     [363]\nmoreover, they unquestionably offend against reason.\n\n401. Here is, however, the foundation of M. Bayle's argument. He says that\nwe do not do that of which we know not the way it is done. But it is a\nprinciple which I do not concede to him. Let us listen to his dissertation\n(p. 767 seqq.): 'It is an astonishing thing that almost all philosophers\n(with the exception of those who expounded Aristotle, and who admitted a\nuniversal intelligence distinct from our soul, and cause of our\nperceptions: see in the _Historical and Critical Dictionary_, Note E of the\narticle \"Averroes\") have shared the popular belief that we form our ideas\nactively. Yet where is the man who knows not on the one hand that he is in\nabsolute ignorance as to how ideas are made, and on the other hand, that he\ncould not sew two stitches if he were ignorant of how to sew? Is the sewing\nof two stitches in itself a work more difficult than the painting in one's\nmind of a rose, the very first time one's eyes rest upon it, and although\none has never learnt this kind of painting? Does it not appear on the\ncontrary that this mental portrait is in itself a work more difficult than\ntracing on canvas the shape of a flower, a thing we cannot do without\nhaving learnt it? We are all convinced that a key would be of no use to us\nfor opening a chest if we were ignorant as to how to use the key, and yet\nwe imagine that our soul is the efficient cause of the movement of our\narms, despite that it knows neither where the nerves are which must be used\nfor this movement, nor whence to obtain the animal spirits that are to flow\ninto these nerves. We have the experience every day that the ideas we would\nfain recall do not come, and that they appear of themselves when we are no\nlonger thinking of them. If that does not prevent us from thinking that we\nare their efficient cause, what reliance shall one place on the proof of\nfeeling, which to M. Jacquelot appears so conclusive? Does our authority\nover our ideas more often fall short than our authority over our volitions?\nIf we were to count up carefully, we should find in the course of our life\nmore velleities than volitions, that is, more evidences of the servitude of\nour will than of its dominion. How many times does one and the same man not\nexperience an inability to do a certain act of will (for example, an act of\nlove for a man who had just injured him; an act of scorn for a fine sonnet\nthat he had composed; an act of hatred for a mistress; an act of approval\nof an absurd epigram. Take note that I speak only of inward acts,     [364]\nexpressed by an \"I will\", such as \"I will scorn\", \"approve\", etc.) even if\nthere were a hundred pistoles to be gained forthwith, and he ardently\ndesired to gain these hundred pistoles, and he were fired with the ambition\nto convince himself by an experimental proof that he is master in his own\ndomain?\n\n402. 'To put together in few words the whole force of what I have just said\nto you, I will observe that it is evident to all those who go deeply into\nthings, that the true efficient cause of an effect must know the effect,\nand be aware also of the way in which it must be produced. That is not\nnecessary when one is only the instrument of the cause, or only the passive\nsubject of its action; but one cannot conceive of it as not necessary to a\ntrue agent. Now if we examine ourselves well we shall be strongly\nconvinced, (1) that, independently of experience, our soul is just as\nlittle aware of what a volition is as of what an idea is; (2) that after a\nlong experience it is no more fully aware of how volitions are formed than\nit was before having willed anything. What is one to conclude from that,\nsave that the soul cannot be the efficient cause of its volitions, any more\nthan of its ideas, and of the motion of the spirits which cause our arms to\nmove? (Take note that no pretence is made of deciding the point here\nabsolutely, it is only being considered in relation to the principles of\nthe objection.)'\n\n403. That is indeed a strange way of reasoning! What necessity is there for\none always to be aware how that which is done is done? Are salts, metals,\nplants, animals and a thousand other animate or inanimate bodies aware how\nthat which they do is done, and need they be aware? Must a drop of oil or\nof fat understand geometry in order to become round on the surface of\nwater? Sewing stitches is another matter: one acts for an end, one must be\naware of the means. But we do not form our ideas because we will to do so,\nthey form themselves within us, they form themselves through us, not in\nconsequence of our will, but in accordance with our nature and that of\nthings. The foetus forms itself in the animal, and a thousand other wonders\nof nature are produced by a certain _instinct_ that God has placed there,\nthat is by virtue of _divine preformation_, which has made these admirable\nautomata, adapted to produce mechanically such beautiful effects. Even so\nit is easy to believe that the soul is a spiritual automaton still more\nadmirable, and that it is through divine preformation that it produces\nthese beautiful ideas, wherein our will has no part and to which our  [365]\nart cannot attain. The operation of spiritual automata, that is of souls,\nis not mechanical, but it contains in the highest degree all that is\nbeautiful in mechanism. The movements which are developed in bodies are\nconcentrated in the soul by representation as in an ideal world, which\nexpresses the laws of the actual world and their consequences, but with\nthis difference from the perfect ideal world which is in God, that most of\nthe perceptions in the other substances are only confused. For it is plain\nthat every simple substance embraces the whole universe in its confused\nperceptions or sensations, and that the succession of these perceptions is\nregulated by the particular nature of this substance, but in a manner which\nalways expresses all the nature in the universe; and every present\nperception leads to a new perception, just as every movement that it\nrepresents leads to another movement. But it is impossible that the soul\ncan know clearly its whole nature, and perceive how this innumerable number\nof small perceptions, piled up or rather concentrated together, shapes\nitself there: to that end it must needs know completely the whole universe\nwhich is embraced by them, that is, it must needs be a God.\n\n404. As regards _velleities_, they are only a very imperfect kind of\nconditional will. I would, if I could: _liberet si liceret_; and in the\ncase of a velleity, we do not will, properly speaking, to will, but to be\nable. That explains why there are none in God; and they must not be\nconfused with antecedent will. I have explained sufficiently elsewhere that\nour control over volitions can be exercised only indirectly, and that one\nwould be unhappy if one were sufficiently master in one's own domain to be\nable to will without cause, without rhyme or reason. To complain of not\nhaving such a control would be to argue like Pliny, who carps at the power\nof God because God cannot destroy himself.\n\n405. I intended to finish here after having met (as it seems to me) all the\nobjections of M. Bayle on this matter that I could find in his works. But\nremembering Laurentius Valla's _Dialogue on Free Will,_ in opposition to\nBoethius, which I have already mentioned, I thought it would be opportune\nto quote it in abstract, retaining the dialogue form, and then to continue\nfrom where it ends, keeping up the fiction it initiated; and that less with\nthe purpose of enlivening the subject, than in order to explain myself\ntowards the end of my dissertation as clearly as I can, and in a way  [366]\nmost likely to be generally understood. This Dialogue of Valla and his\nbooks on Pleasure and the True Good make it plain that he was no less a\nphilosopher than a humanist. These four books were opposed to the four\nbooks on the _Consolation of Philosophy_ by Boethius, and the Dialogue to\nthe fifth book. A certain Spaniard named Antonio Glarea requests of him\nelucidation on the difficulty of free will, whereof little is known as it\nis worthy to be known, for upon it depend justice and injustice, punishment\nand reward in this life and in the life to come. Laurentius Valla answers\nhim that we must console ourselves for an ignorance which we share with the\nwhole world, just as one consoles oneself for not having the wings of\nbirds.\n\n406. ANTONIO--I know that you can give me those wings, like another\nDaedalus, so that I may emerge from the prison of ignorance, and rise to\nthe very region of truth, which is the homeland of souls. The books that I\nhave seen have not satisfied me, not even the famous Boethius, who meets\nwith general approval. I know not whether he fully understood himself what\nhe says of God's understanding, and of eternity superior to time; and I ask\nfor your opinion on his way of reconciling foreknowledge with freedom.\nLAURENT--I am fearful of giving offence to many people, if I confute this\ngreat man; yet I will give preference over this fear to the consideration I\nhave for the entreaties of a friend, provided that you make me a promise.\nANT.--What? LAUR.--It is, that when you have dined with me you do not ask\nme to give you supper, that is to say, I desire that you be content with\nthe answer to the question you have put to me, and do not put a further\nquestion.\n\n407. ANT.--I promise you. Here is the heart of the difficulty. If God\nforesaw the treason of Judas, it was necessary that he should betray, it\nwas impossible for him not to betray. There is no obligation to do the\nimpossible. He therefore did not sin, he did not deserve to be punished.\nThat destroys justice and religion, and the fear of God. LAUR.--God foresaw\nsin; but he did not compel man to commit it; sin is voluntary. ANT.--That\nwill was necessary, since it was foreseen. LAUR.--If my knowledge does not\ncause things past or present to exist, neither will my foreknowledge cause\nfuture things to exist.\n\n408. ANT.--That comparison is deceptive: neither the present nor the past\ncan be changed, they are already necessary; but the future, movable in\nitself, becomes fixed and necessary through foreknowledge. Let us     [367]\npretend that a god of the heathen boasts of knowing the future: I will ask\nhim if he knows which foot I shall put foremost, then I will do the\nopposite of that which he shall have foretold. LAUR.--This God knows what\nyou are about to do. ANT.--How does he know it, since I will do the\nopposite of what he shall have said, and I suppose that he will say what he\nthinks? LAUR.--Your supposition is false: God will not answer you; or\nagain, if he were to answer you, the veneration you would have for him\nwould make you hasten to do what he had said; his prediction would be to\nyou an order. But we have changed the question. We are not concerned with\nwhat God will foretell but with what he foresees. Let us therefore return\nto foreknowledge, and distinguish between the necessary and the certain. It\nis not impossible for what is foreseen not to happen; but it is infallibly\nsure that it will happen. I can become a Soldier or Priest, but I shall not\nbecome one.\n\n409. ANT.--Here I have you firmly held. The philosophers' rule maintains\nthat all that which is possible can be considered as existing. But if that\nwhich you affirm to be possible, namely an event different from what has\nbeen foreseen, actually happened, God would have been mistaken. LAUR.--The\nrules of the philosophers are not oracles for me. This one in particular is\nnot correct. Two contradictories are often both possible. Can they also\nboth exist? But, for your further enlightenment, let us pretend that Sextus\nTarquinius, coming to Delphi to consult the Oracle of Apollo, receives the\nanswer:\n\n  _Exul inopsque cades irata pulsus ab urbe._\n  A beggared outcast of the city's rage,\n  Beside a foreign shore cut short thy age.\n\nThe young man will complain: I have brought you a royal gift, O Apollo, and\nyou proclaim for me a lot so unhappy? Apollo will say to him: Your gift is\npleasing to me, and I will do that which you ask of me, I will tell you\nwhat will happen. I know the future, but I do not bring it about. Go make\nyour complaint to Jupiter and the Parcae. Sextus would be ridiculous if he\ncontinued thereafter to complain about Apollo. Is not that true? ANT.--He\nwill say: I thank you, O holy Apollo, for not having repaid me with\nsilence, for having revealed to me the Truth. But whence comes it that\nJupiter is so cruel towards me, that he prepares so hard a fate for an[368]\ninnocent man, for a devout worshipper of the Gods? LAUR.--You innocent?\nApollo will say. Know that you will be proud, that you will commit\nadulteries, that you will be a traitor to your country. Could Sextus reply:\nIt is you who are the cause, O Apollo; you compel me to do it, by\nforeseeing it? ANT.--I admit that he would have taken leave of his senses\nif he were to make this reply. LAUR.--Therefore neither can the traitor\nJudas complain of God's foreknowledge. And there is the answer to your\nquestion.\n\n410. ANT.--You have satisfied me beyond my hopes, you have done what\nBoethius was not able to do: I shall be beholden to you all my life long.\nLAUR.--Yet let us carry our tale a little further. Sextus will say: No,\nApollo, I will not do what you say. ANT.--What! the God will say, do you\nmean then that I am a liar? I repeat to you once more, you will do all that\nI have just said. LAUR.--Sextus, mayhap, would pray the Gods to alter fate,\nto give him a better heart. ANT.--He would receive the answer:\n\n  _Desine fata Deum flecti sperare precando_.\n\nHe cannot cause divine foreknowledge to lie. But what then will Sextus say?\nWill he not break forth into complaints against the Gods? Will he not say?\nWhat? I am then not free? It is not in my power to follow virtue?\nLAUR.--Apollo will say to him perhaps: Know, my poor Sextus, that the Gods\nmake each one as he is. Jupiter made the wolf ravening, the hare timid, the\nass stupid, and the lion courageous. He gave you a soul that is wicked and\nirreclaimable; you will act in conformity with your natural disposition,\nand Jupiter will treat you as your actions shall deserve; he has sworn it\nby the Styx.\n\n411. ANT.--I confess to you, it seems to me that Apollo in excusing himself\naccuses Jupiter more than he accuses Sextus, and Sextus would answer him:\nJupiter therefore condemns in me his own crime; it is he who is the only\nguilty one. He could have made me altogether different: but, made as I am,\nI must act as he has willed. Why then does he punish me? Could I have\nresisted his will? LAUR.--I confess that I am brought to a pause here as\nyou are. I have made the Gods appear on the scene, Apollo and Jupiter, to\nmake you distinguish between divine foreknowledge and providence. I have\nshown that Apollo and foreknowledge do not impair freedom; but I cannot\nsatisfy you on the decrees of Jupiter's will, that is to say, on the orders\nof providence. ANT.--You have dragged me out of one abyss, and you    [369]\nplunge me back into another and greater abyss. LAUR.--Remember our\ncontract: I have given you dinner, and you ask me to give you supper also.\n\n412. ANT.--Now I discover your cunning: You have caught me, this is not an\nhonest contract. LAUR.--What would you have me do? I have given you wine\nand meats from my home produce, such as my small estate can provide; as for\nnectar and ambrosia, you will ask the Gods for them: that divine nurture is\nnot found among men. Let us hearken to St. Paul, that chosen vessel who was\ncarried even to the third heaven, who heard there unutterable words: he\nwill answer you with the comparison of the potter, with the\nincomprehensibility of the ways of God, and wonder at the depth of his\nwisdom. Nevertheless it is well to observe that one does not ask why God\nforesees the thing, for that is understood, it is because it will be: but\none asks why he ordains thus, why he hardens such an one, why he has\ncompassion on another. We do not know the reasons which he may have for\nthis; but _since he is very good and very wise that is enough to make us\ndeem that his reasons are good_. As he is just also, it follows that his\ndecrees and his operation do not destroy our freedom. Some men have sought\nsome reason therein. They have said that we are made from a corrupt and\nimpure mass, indeed of mud. But Adam and the Angels were made of silver and\ngold, and they sinned notwithstanding. One sometimes becomes hardened again\nafter regeneration. We must therefore seek another cause for evil, and I\ndoubt whether even the Angels are aware of it; yet they cease not to be\nhappy and to praise God. Boethius hearkened more to the answer of\nphilosophy than to that of St. Paul; that was the cause of his failure. Let\nus believe in Jesus Christ, he is the virtue and the wisdom of God: he\nteaches us that God willeth the salvation of all, that he willeth not the\ndeath of the sinner. Let us therefore put our trust in the divine mercy,\nand let us not by our vanity and our malice disqualify ourselves to receive\nit.\n\n413. This dialogue of Valla's is excellent, even though one must take\nexception to some points in it: but its chief defect is that it cuts the\nknot and that it seems to condemn providence under the name of Jupiter,\nmaking him almost the author of sin. Let us therefore carry the little\nfable still further. Sextus, quitting Apollo and Delphi, seeks out Jupiter\nat Dodona. He makes sacrifices and then he exhibits his complaints. Why\nhave you condemned me, O great God, to be wicked and unhappy? Change  [370]\nmy lot and my heart, or acknowledge your error. Jupiter answers him: If you\nwill renounce Rome, the Parcae shall spin for you different fates, you\nshall become wise, you shall be happy. SEXTUS--Why must I renounce the hope\nof a crown? Can I not come to be a good king? JUPITER--No, Sextus; I know\nbetter what is needful for you. If you go to Rome, you are lost. Sextus,\nnot being able to resolve upon so great a sacrifice, went forth from the\ntemple, and abandoned himself to his fate. Theodorus, the High Priest, who\nhad been present at the dialogue between God and Sextus, addressed these\nwords to Jupiter: Your wisdom is to be revered, O great Ruler of the Gods.\nYou have convinced this man of his error; he must henceforth impute his\nunhappiness to his evil will; he has not a word to say. But your faithful\nworshippers are astonished; they would fain wonder at your goodness as well\nas at your greatness: it rested with you to give him a different will.\nJUPITER--Go to my daughter Pallas, she will inform you what I was bound to\ndo.\n\n414. Theodorus journeyed to Athens: he was bidden to lie down to sleep in\nthe temple of the Goddess. Dreaming, he found himself transported into an\nunknown country. There stood a palace of unimaginable splendour and\nprodigious size. The Goddess Pallas appeared at the gate, surrounded by\nrays of dazzling majesty.\n\n          _Qualisque videri_\n  _Coelicolis et quanta solet._\n\nShe touched the face of Theodorus with an olive-branch, which she was\nholding in her hand. And lo! he had become able to confront the divine\nradiancy of the daughter of Jupiter, and of all that she should show him.\nJupiter who loves you (she said to him) has commended you to me to be\ninstructed. You see here the palace of the fates, where I keep watch and\nward. Here are representations not only of that which happens but also of\nall that which is possible. Jupiter, having surveyed them before the\nbeginning of the existing world, classified the possibilities into worlds,\nand chose the best of all. He comes sometimes to visit these places, to\nenjoy the pleasure of recapitulating things and of renewing his own choice,\nwhich cannot fail to please him. I have only to speak, and we shall see a\nwhole world that my father might have produced, wherein will be represented\nanything that can be asked of him; and in this way one may know also what\nwould happen if any particular possibility should attain unto         [371]\nexistence. And whenever the conditions are not determinate enough, there\nwill be as many such worlds differing from one another as one shall wish,\nwhich will answer differently the same question, in as many ways as\npossible. You learnt geometry in your youth, like all well-instructed\nGreeks. You know therefore that when the conditions of a required point do\nnot sufficiently determine it, and there is an infinite number of them,\nthey all fall into what the geometricians call a locus, and this locus at\nleast (which is often a line) will be determinate. Thus you can picture to\nyourself an ordered succession of worlds, which shall contain each and\nevery one the case that is in question, and shall vary its circumstances\nand its consequences. But if you put a case that differs from the actual\nworld only in one single definite thing and in its results, a certain one\nof those determinate worlds will answer you. These worlds are all here,\nthat is, in ideas. I will show you some, wherein shall be found, not\nabsolutely the same Sextus as you have seen (that is not possible, he\ncarries with him always that which he shall be) but several Sextuses\nresembling him, possessing all that you know already of the true Sextus,\nbut not all that is already in him imperceptibly, nor in consequence all\nthat shall yet happen to him. You will find in one world a very happy and\nnoble Sextus, in another a Sextus content with a mediocre state, a Sextus,\nindeed, of every kind and endless diversity of forms.\n\n415. Thereupon the Goddess led Theodorus into one of the halls of the\npalace: when he was within, it was no longer a hall, it was a world,\n\n  _Solemque suum, sua sidera norat_.\n\nAt the command of Pallas there came within view Dodona with the temple of\nJupiter, and Sextus issuing thence; he could be heard saying that he would\nobey the God. And lo! he goes to a city lying between two seas, resembling\nCorinth. He buys there a small garden; cultivating it, he finds a treasure;\nhe becomes a rich man, enjoying affection and esteem; he dies at a great\nage, beloved of the whole city. Theodorus saw the whole life of Sextus as\nat one glance, and as in a stage presentation. There was a great volume of\nwritings in this hall: Theodorus could not refrain from asking what that\nmeant. It is the history of this world which we are now visiting, the\nGoddess told him; it is the book of its fates. You have seen a number [372]\non the forehead of Sextus. Look in this book for the place which it\nindicates. Theodorus looked for it, and found there the history of Sextus\nin a form more ample than the outline he had seen. Put your finger on any\nline you please, Pallas said to him, and you will see represented actually\nin all its detail that which the line broadly indicates. He obeyed, and he\nsaw coming into view all the characteristics of a portion of the life of\nthat Sextus. They passed into another hall, and lo! another world, another\nSextus. who, issuing from the temple, and having resolved to obey Jupiter,\ngoes to Thrace. There he marries the daughter of the king, who had no other\nchildren; he succeeds him, and he is adored by his subjects. They went into\nother rooms, and always they saw new scenes.\n\n416. The halls rose in a pyramid, becoming even more beautiful as one\nmounted towards the apex, and representing more beautiful worlds. Finally\nthey reached the highest one which completed the pyramid, and which was the\nmost beautiful of all: for the pyramid had a beginning, but one could not\nsee its end; it had an apex, but no base; it went on increasing to\ninfinity. That is (as the Goddess explained) because amongst an endless\nnumber of possible worlds there is the best of all, else would God not have\ndetermined to create any; but there is not any one which has not also less\nperfect worlds below it: that is why the pyramid goes on descending to\ninfinity. Theodorus, entering this highest hall, became entranced in\necstasy; he had to receive succour from the Goddess, a drop of a divine\nliquid placed on his tongue restored him; he was beside himself for joy. We\nare in the real true world (said the Goddess) and you are at the source of\nhappiness. Behold what Jupiter makes ready for you, if you continue to\nserve him faithfully. Here is Sextus as he is, and as he will be in\nreality. He issues from the temple in a rage, he scorns the counsel of the\nGods. You see him going to Rome, bringing confusion everywhere, violating\nthe wife of his friend. There he is driven out with his father, beaten,\nunhappy. If Jupiter had placed here a Sextus happy at Corinth or King in\nThrace, it would be no longer this world. And nevertheless he could not\nhave failed to choose this world, which surpasses in perfection all the\nothers, and which forms the apex of the pyramid. Else would Jupiter have\nrenounced his wisdom, he would have banished me, me his daughter. You see\nthat my father did not make Sextus wicked; he was so from all         [373]\neternity, he was so always and freely. My father only granted him the\nexistence which his wisdom could not refuse to the world where he is\nincluded: he made him pass from the region of the possible to that of the\nactual beings. The crime of Sextus serves for great things: it renders Rome\nfree; thence will arise a great empire, which will show noble examples to\nmankind. But that is nothing in comparison with the worth of this whole\nworld, at whose beauty you will marvel, when, after a happy passage from\nthis mortal state to another and better one, the Gods shall have fitted you\nto know it.\n\n417. At this moment Theodorus wakes up, he gives thanks to the Goddess, he\nowns the justice of Jupiter. His spirit pervaded by what he has seen and\nheard, he carries on the office of High Priest, with all the zeal of a true\nservant of his God, and with all the joy whereof a mortal is capable. It\nseems to me that this continuation of the tale may elucidate the difficulty\nwhich Valla did not wish to treat. If Apollo has represented aright God's\nknowledge of vision (that which concerns beings in existence), I hope that\nPallas will have not discreditably filled the role of what is called\nknowledge of simple intelligence (that which embraces all that is\npossible), wherein at last the source of things must be sought.\n\n                                                                      [377]\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nAPPENDICES\n\nSUMMARY OF THE CONTROVERSY REDUCED TO FORMAL ARGUMENTS\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nSome persons of discernment have wished me to make this addition. I have\nthe more readily deferred to their opinion, because of the opportunity\nthereby gained for meeting certain difficulties, and for making\nobservations on certain matters which were not treated in sufficient detail\nin the work itself.\n\nOBJECTION I\n\nWhoever does not choose the best course is lacking either in power, or\nknowledge, or goodness.\n\nGod did not choose the best course in creating this world.\n\nTherefore God was lacking in power, or knowledge, or goodness.\n\nANSWER\n\nI deny the minor, that is to say, the second premiss of this syllogism, and\nthe opponent proves it by this\n\nPROSYLLOGISM\n\nWhoever makes things in which there is evil, and which could have been made\nwithout any evil, or need not have been made at all, does not choose the\nbest course.\n\nGod made a world wherein there is evil; a world, I say, which could have\nbeen made without any evil or which need not have been made at all.\n\n                                                                      [378]\nTherefore God did not choose the best course.\n\nANSWER\n\nI admit the minor of this prosyllogism: for one must confess that there is\nevil in this world which God has made, and that it would have been possible\nto make a world without evil or even not to create any world, since its\ncreation depended upon the free will of God. But I deny the major, that is,\nthe first of the two premisses of the prosyllogism, and I might content\nmyself with asking for its proof. In order, however, to give a clearer\nexposition of the matter, I would justify this denial by pointing out that\nthe best course is not always that one which tends towards avoiding evil,\nsince it is possible that the evil may be accompanied by a greater good.\nFor example, the general of an army will prefer a great victory with a\nslight wound to a state of affairs without wound and without victory. I\nhave proved this in further detail in this work by pointing out, through\ninstances taken from mathematics and elsewhere, that an imperfection in the\npart may be required for a greater perfection in the whole. I have followed\ntherein the opinion of St. Augustine, who said a hundred times that God\npermitted evil in order to derive from it a good, that is to say, a greater\ngood; and Thomas Aquinas says (in libr. 2, _Sent. Dist._ 32, qu. 1, art. 1)\nthat the permission of evil tends towards the good of the universe. I have\nshown that among older writers the fall of Adam was termed _felix culpa_, a\nfortunate sin, because it had been expiated with immense benefit by the\nincarnation of the Son of God: for he gave to the universe something more\nnoble than anything there would otherwise have been amongst created beings.\nFor the better understanding of the matter I added, following the example\nof many good authors, that it was consistent with order and the general\ngood for God to grant to certain of his creatures the opportunity to\nexercise their freedom, even when he foresaw that they would turn to evil:\nfor God could easily correct the evil, and it was not fitting that in order\nto prevent sin he should always act in an extraordinary way. It will\ntherefore sufficiently refute the objection to show that a world with evil\nmay be better than a world without evil. But I have gone still further in\nthe work, and have even shown that this universe must be indeed better than\nevery other possible universe.\n\n                                                                      [379]\nOBJECTION II\n\nIf there is more evil than good in intelligent creatures, there is more\nevil than good in all God's work.\n\nNow there is more evil than good in intelligent creatures.\n\nTherefore there is more evil than good in all God's work.\n\nANSWER\n\nI deny the major and the minor of this conditional syllogism. As for the\nmajor, I do not admit it because this supposed inference from the part to\nthe whole, from intelligent creatures to all creatures, assumes tacitly and\nwithout proof that creatures devoid of reason cannot be compared or taken\ninto account with those that have reason. But why might not the surplus of\ngood in the non-intelligent creatures that fill the world compensate for\nand even exceed incomparably the surplus of evil in rational creatures? It\nis true that the value of the latter is greater; but by way of compensation\nthe others are incomparably greater in number; and it may be that the\nproportion of number and quantity surpasses that of value and quality.\n\nThe minor also I cannot admit, namely, that there is more evil than good in\nintelligent creatures. One need not even agree that there is more evil than\ngood in the human kind. For it is possible, and even a very reasonable\nthing, that the glory and the perfection of the blessed may be incomparably\ngreater than the misery and imperfection of the damned, and that here the\nexcellence of the total good in the smaller number may exceed the total\nevil which is in the greater number. The blessed draw near to divinity\nthrough a divine Mediator, so far as can belong to these created beings,\nand make such progress in good as is impossible for the damned to make in\nevil, even though they should approach as nearly as may be the nature of\ndemons. God is infinite, and the Devil is finite; good can and does go on\n_ad infinitum_, whereas evil has its bounds. It may be therefore, and it is\nprobable, that there happens in the comparison between the blessed and the\ndamned the opposite of what I said could happen in the comparison between\nthe happy and the unhappy, namely that in the latter the proportion of\ndegrees surpasses that of numbers, while in the comparison between\nintelligent and non-intelligent the proportion of numbers is greater than\nthat of values. One is justified in assuming that a thing may be so as long\nas one does not prove that it is impossible, and indeed what is here  [380]\nput forward goes beyond assumption.\n\nBut secondly, even should one admit that there is more evil than good in\nthe human kind, one still has every reason for not admitting that there is\nmore evil than good in all intelligent creatures. For there is an\ninconceivable number of Spirits, and perhaps of other rational creatures\nbesides: and an opponent cannot prove that in the whole City of God,\ncomposed as much of Spirits as of rational animals without number and of\nendless different kinds, the evil exceeds the good. Although one need not,\nin order to answer an objection, prove that a thing is, when its mere\npossibility suffices, I have nevertheless shown in this present work that\nit is a result of the supreme perfection of the Sovereign of the Universe\nthat the kingdom of God should be the most perfect of all states or\ngovernments possible, and that in consequence what little evil there is\nshould be required to provide the full measure of the vast good existing\nthere.\n\nOBJECTION III\n\nIf it is always impossible not to sin, it is always unjust to punish.\n\nNow it is always impossible not to sin, or rather all sin is necessary.\n\nTherefore it is always unjust to punish.\n\nThe minor of this is proved as follows.\n\nFIRST PROSYLLOGISM\n\nEverything predetermined is necessary.\n\nEvery event is predetermined.\n\nTherefore every event (and consequently sin also) is necessary.\n\nAgain this second minor is proved thus.\n\nSECOND PROSYLLOGISM\n\nThat which is future, that which is foreseen, that which is involved in\ncauses is predetermined.\n\nEvery event is of this kind.\n\nTherefore every event is predetermined.\n\nANSWER\n\nI admit in a certain sense the conclusion of the second prosyllogism, which\nis the minor of the first; but I shall deny the major of the first    [381]\nprosyllogism, namely that everything predetermined is necessary; taking\n'necessity', say the necessity to sin, or the impossibility of not sinning,\nor of not doing some action, in the sense relevant to the argument, that\nis, as a necessity essential and absolute, which destroys the morality of\naction and the justice of punishment. If anyone meant a different necessity\nor impossibility (that is, a necessity only moral or hypothetical, which\nwill be explained presently) it is plain that we would deny him the major\nstated in the objection. We might content ourselves with this answer, and\ndemand the proof of the proposition denied: but I am well pleased to\njustify my manner of procedure in the present work, in order to make the\nmatter clear and to throw more light on this whole subject, by explaining\nthe necessity that must be rejected and the determination that must be\nallowed. The truth is that the necessity contrary to morality, which must\nbe avoided and which would render punishment unjust, is an insuperable\nnecessity, which would render all opposition unavailing, even though one\nshould wish with all one's heart to avoid the necessary action, and though\none should make all possible efforts to that end. Now it is plain that this\nis not applicable to voluntary actions, since one would not do them if one\ndid not so desire. Thus their prevision and predetermination is not\nabsolute, but it presupposes will: if it is certain that one will do them,\nit is no less certain that one will will to do them. These voluntary\nactions and their results will not happen whatever one may do and whether\none will them or not; but they will happen because one will do, and because\none will will to do, that which leads to them. That is involved in\nprevision and predetermination, and forms the reason thereof. The necessity\nof such events is called conditional or hypothetical, or again necessity of\nconsequence, because it presupposes the will and the other requisites. But\nthe necessity which destroys morality, and renders punishment unjust and\nreward unavailing, is found in the things that will be whatever one may do\nand whatever one may will to do: in a word, it exists in that which is\nessential. This it is which is called an absolute necessity. Thus it avails\nnothing with regard to what is necessary absolutely to ordain interdicts or\ncommandments, to propose penalties or prizes, to blame or to praise; it\nwill come to pass no more and no less. In voluntary actions, on the\ncontrary, and in what depends upon them, precepts, armed with power to[382]\npunish and to reward, very often serve, and are included in the order of\ncauses that make action exist. Thus it comes about that not only pains and\neffort but also prayers are effective, God having had even these prayers in\nmind before he ordered things, and having made due allowance for them. That\nis why the precept _Ora et labora_ (Pray and work) remains intact. Thus not\nonly those who (under the empty pretext of the necessity of events)\nmaintain that one can spare oneself the pains demanded by affairs, but also\nthose who argue against prayers, fall into that which the ancients even in\ntheir time called 'the Lazy Sophism'. So the predetermination of events by\ntheir causes is precisely what contributes to morality instead of\ndestroying it, and the causes incline the will without necessitating it.\nFor this reason the determination we are concerned with is not a\nnecessitation. It is certain (to him who knows all) that the effect will\nfollow this inclination; but this effect does not follow thence by a\nconsequence which is necessary, that is, whose contrary implies\ncontradiction; and it is also by such an inward inclination that the will\nis determined, without the presence of necessity. Suppose that one has the\ngreatest possible passion (for example, a great thirst), you will admit\nthat the soul can find some reason for resisting it, even if it were only\nthat of displaying its power. Thus though one may never have complete\nindifference of equipoise, and there is always a predominance of\ninclination for the course adopted, that predominance does not render\nabsolutely necessary the resolution taken.\n\nOBJECTION IV\n\nWhoever can prevent the sin of others and does not so, but rather\ncontributes to it, although he be fully apprised of it, is accessary\nthereto.\n\nGod can prevent the sin of intelligent creatures; but he does not so, and\nhe rather contributes to it by his co-operation and by the opportunities he\ncauses, although he is fully cognizant of it.\n\nTherefore, etc.\n\nANSWER\n\nI deny the major of this syllogism. It may be that one can prevent the sin,\nbut that one ought not to do so, because one could not do so without\ncommitting a sin oneself, or (when God is concerned) without acting\nunreasonably. I have given instances of that, and have applied them to[383]\nGod himself. It may be also that one contributes to the evil, and that one\neven opens the way to it sometimes, in doing things one is bound to do. And\nwhen one does one's duty, or (speaking of God) when, after full\nconsideration, one does that which reason demands, one is not responsible\nfor events, even when one foresees them. One does not will these evils; but\none is willing to permit them for a greater good, which one cannot in\nreason help preferring to other considerations. This is a _consequent_\nwill, resulting from acts of _antecedent_ will, in which one wills the\ngood. I know that some persons, in speaking of the antecedent and\nconsequent will of God, have meant by the antecedent that which wills that\nall men be saved, and by the consequent that which wills, in consequence of\npersistent sin, that there be some damned, damnation being a result of sin.\nBut these are only examples of a more general notion, and one may say with\nthe same reason, that God wills by his antecedent will that men sin not,\nand that by his consequent or final and decretory will (which is always\nfollowed by its effect) he wills to permit that they sin, this permission\nbeing a result of superior reasons. One has indeed justification for\nsaying, in general, that the antecedent will of God tends towards the\nproduction of good and the prevention of evil, each taken in itself, and as\nit were detached (_particulariter et secundum quid_: Thom., I, qu. 19, art.\n6) according to the measure of the degree of each good or of each evil.\nLikewise one may say that the consequent, or final and total, divine will\ntends towards the production of as many goods as can be put together, whose\ncombination thereby becomes determined, and involves also the permission of\nsome evils and the exclusion of some goods, as the best possible plan of\nthe universe demands. Arminius, in his _Antiperkinsus,_ explained very well\nthat the will of God can be called consequent not only in relation to the\naction of the creature considered beforehand in the divine understanding,\nbut also in relation to other anterior acts of divine will. But it is\nenough to consider the passage cited from Thomas Aquinas, and that from\nScotus (I, dist. 46, qu. 11), to see that they make this distinction as I\nhave made it here. Nevertheless if anyone will not suffer this use of the\nterms, let him put 'previous' in place of 'antecedent' will, and 'final' or\n'decretory' in place of 'consequent' will. For I do not wish to wrangle\nabout words.\n\n                                                                      [384]\nOBJECTION V\n\nWhoever produces all that is real in a thing is its cause.\n\nGod produces all that is real in sin.\n\nTherefore God is the cause of sin.\n\nANSWER\n\nI might content myself with denying the major or the minor, because the\nterm 'real' admits of interpretations capable of rendering these\npropositions false. But in order to give a better explanation I will make a\ndistinction. 'Real' either signifies that which is positive only, or else\nit includes also privative beings: in the first case, I deny the major and\nI admit the minor; in the second case, I do the opposite. I might have\nconfined myself to that; but I was willing to go further, in order to\naccount for this distinction. I have therefore been well pleased to point\nout that every purely positive or absolute reality is a perfection, and\nthat every imperfection comes from limitation, that is, from the privative:\nfor to limit is to withhold extension, or the more beyond. Now God is the\ncause of all perfections, and consequently of all realities, when they are\nregarded as purely positive. But limitations or privations result from the\noriginal imperfection of creatures which restricts their receptivity. It is\nas with a laden boat, which the river carries along more slowly or less\nslowly in proportion to the weight that it bears: thus the speed comes from\nthe river, but the retardation which restricts this speed comes from the\nload. Also I have shown in the present work how the creature, in causing\nsin, is a deficient cause; how errors and evil inclinations spring from\nprivation; and how privation is efficacious accidentally. And I have\njustified the opinion of St. Augustine (lib. I, _Ad. Simpl._, qu. 2) who\nexplains (for example) how God hardens the soul, not in giving it something\nevil, but because the effect of the good he imprints is restricted by the\nresistance of the soul, and by the circumstances contributing to this\nresistance, so that he does not give it all the good that would overcome\nits evil. 'Nec _(inquit)_ ab illo erogatur aliquid quo homo fit deterior,\nsed tantum quo fit melior non erogatur.' But if God had willed to do more\nhere he must needs have produced either fresh natures in his creatures or\nfresh miracles to change their natures, and this the best plan did not\nallow. It is just as if the current of the river must needs be more rapid\nthan its slope permits or the boats themselves be less laden, if they [385]\nhad to be impelled at a greater speed. So the limitation or original\nimperfection of creatures brings it about that even the best plan of the\nuniverse cannot admit more good, and cannot be exempted from certain evils,\nthese, however, being only of such a kind as may tend towards a greater\ngood. There are some disorders in the parts which wonderfully enhance the\nbeauty of the whole, just as certain dissonances, appropriately used,\nrender harmony more beautiful. But that depends upon the answer which I\nhave already given to the first objection.\n\nOBJECTION VI\n\nWhoever punishes those who have done as well as it was in their power to do\nis unjust.\n\nGod does so.\n\nTherefore, etc.\n\nANSWER\n\nI deny the minor of this argument. And I believe that God always gives\nsufficient aid and grace to those who have good will, that is to say, who\ndo not reject this grace by a fresh sin. Thus I do not admit the damnation\nof children dying unbaptized or outside the Church, or the damnation of\nadult persons who have acted according to the light that God has given\nthem. And I believe that, _if anyone has followed the light he had_, he\nwill undoubtedly receive thereof in greater measure as he has need, even as\nthe late Herr Hulsemann, who was celebrated as a profound theologian at\nLeipzig, has somewhere observed; and if such a man had failed to receive\nlight during his life, he would receive it at least in the hour of death.\n\nOBJECTION VII\n\nWhoever gives only to some, and not to all, the means of producing\neffectively in them good will and final saving faith has not enough\ngoodness.\n\nGod does so.\n\nTherefore, etc.\n\nANSWER\n\nI deny the major. It is true that God could overcome the greatest\nresistance of the human heart, and indeed he sometimes does so,       [386]\nwhether by an inward grace or by the outward circumstances that can greatly\ninfluence souls; but he does not always do so. Whence comes this\ndistinction, someone will say, and wherefore does his goodness appear to be\nrestricted? The truth is that it would not have been in order always to act\nin an extraordinary way and to derange the connexion of things, as I have\nobserved already in answering the first objection. The reasons for this\nconnexion, whereby the one is placed in more favourable circumstances than\nthe other, are hidden in the depths of God's wisdom: they depend upon the\nuniversal harmony. The best plan of the universe, which God could not fail\nto choose, required this. One concludes thus from the event itself; since\nGod made the universe, it was not possible to do better. Such management,\nfar from being contrary to goodness, has rather been prompted by supreme\ngoodness itself. This objection with its solution might have been inferred\nfrom what was said with regard to the first objection; but it seemed\nadvisable to touch upon it separately.\n\nOBJECTION VIII\n\nWhoever cannot fail to choose the best is not free.\n\nGod cannot fail to choose the best.\n\nTherefore God is not free.\n\nANSWER\n\nI deny the major of this argument. Rather is it true freedom, and the most\nperfect, to be able to make the best use of one's free will, and always to\nexercise this power, without being turned aside either by outward force or\nby inward passions, whereof the one enslaves our bodies and the other our\nsouls. There is nothing less servile and more befitting the highest degree\nof freedom than to be always led towards the good, and always by one's own\ninclination, without any constraint and without any displeasure. And to\nobject that God therefore had need of external things is only a sophism. He\ncreates them freely: but when he had set before him an end, that of\nexercising his goodness, his wisdom determined him to choose the means most\nappropriate for obtaining this end. To call that a _need_ is to take the\nterm in a sense not usual, which clears it of all imperfection, somewhat as\none does when speaking of the wrath of God.\n\nSeneca says somewhere, that God commanded only once, but that he obeys[387]\nalways, because he obeys the laws that he willed to ordain for himself:\n_semel jussit, semper paret_. But he had better have said, that God always\ncommands and that he is always obeyed: for in willing he always follows the\ntendency of his own nature, and all other things always follow his will.\nAnd as this will is always the same one cannot say that he obeys that will\nonly which he formerly had. Nevertheless, although his will is always\nindefectible and always tends towards the best, the evil or the lesser good\nwhich he rejects will still be possible in itself. Otherwise the necessity\nof good would be geometrical (so to speak) or metaphysical, and altogether\nabsolute; the contingency of things would be destroyed, and there would be\nno choice. But necessity of this kind, which does not destroy the\npossibility of the contrary, has the name by analogy only: it becomes\neffective not through the mere essence of things, but through that which is\noutside them and above them, that is, through the will of God. This\nnecessity is called moral, because for the wise what is necessary and what\nis owing are equivalent things; and when it is always followed by its\neffect, as it indeed is in the perfectly wise, that is, in God, one can say\nthat it is a happy necessity. The more nearly creatures approach this, the\ncloser do they come to perfect felicity. Moreover, necessity of this kind\nis not the necessity one endeavours to avoid, and which destroys morality,\nreward and commendation. For that which it brings to pass does not happen\nwhatever one may do and whatever one may will, but because one desires it.\nA will to which it is natural to choose well deserves most to be commended;\nand it carries with it its own reward, which is supreme happiness. And as\nthis constitution of the divine nature gives an entire satisfaction to him\nwho possesses it, it is also the best and the most desirable from the point\nof view of the creatures who are all dependent upon God. If the will of God\nhad not as its rule the principle of the best, it would tend towards evil,\nwhich would be worst of all; or else it would be indifferent somehow to\ngood and to evil, and guided by chance. But a will that would always drift\nalong at random would scarcely be any better for the government of the\nuniverse than the fortuitous concourse of corpuscles, without the existence\nof divinity. And even though God should abandon himself to chance only in\nsome cases, and in a certain way (as he would if he did not always tend\nentirely towards the best, and if he were capable of preferring a lesser\ngood to a greater good, that is, an evil to a good, since that which  [388]\nprevents a greater good is an evil) he would be no less imperfect than the\nobject of his choice. Then he would not deserve absolute trust; he would\nact without reason in such a case, and the government of the universe would\nbe like certain games equally divided between reason and luck. This all\nproves that this objection which is made against the choice of the best\nperverts the notions of free and necessary, and represents the best to us\nactually as evil: but that is either malicious or absurd.\n\n                                                                      [389]\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nEXCURSUS ON THEODICY\n\n 392\n\npublished by the author in Memoires de Trevoux\n\nJuly 1712\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n_February_ 1712\n\nI said in my essays, 392, that I wished to see the demonstrations mentioned\nby M. Bayle and contained in the sixth letter printed at Trevoux in 1703.\nFather des Bosses has shown me this letter, in which the writer essays to\ndemonstrate by the geometrical method that God is the sole true cause of\nall that is real. My perusal of it has confirmed me in the opinion which I\nindicated in the same passage, namely, that this proposition can be true in\na very good sense, God being the only cause of pure and absolute realities,\nor perfections; but when one includes limitations or privations under the\nname of realities one can say that second causes co-operate in the\nproduction of what is limited, and that otherwise God would be the cause of\nsin, and even its sole cause. And I am somewhat inclined to think that the\ngifted author of the letter does not greatly differ in opinion from me,\nalthough he seems to include all modalities among the realities of which he\ndeclares God to be the sole cause. For in actual fact I think he will not\nadmit that God is the cause and the author of sin. Indeed, he explains\nhimself in a manner which seems to overthrow his thesis and to grant real\naction to creatures. For in the proof of the eighth corollary of his second\nproposition these words occur: 'The natural motion of the soul, although\ndeterminate in itself, is indeterminate in respect of its objects. For it\nis love of good in general. It is through the ideas of good appearing [390]\nin individual objects that this motion becomes individual and determinate\nin relation to those objects. And thus as the mind has the power of varying\nits own ideas it can also change the determinations of its love. And for\nthat purpose it is not necessary that it overcome the power of God or\noppose his action. These determinations of motion towards individual\nobjects are not invincible. It is this noninvincibility which causes the\nmind to be free and capable of changing them; but after all the mind makes\nthese changes only through the motion which God gives to it and conserves\nfor it.' In my own style I would have said that the perfection which is in\nthe action of the creature comes from God, but that the limitations to be\nfound there are a consequence of the original limitation and the preceding\nlimitations that occurred in the creature. Further, this is so not only in\nminds but also in all other substances, which thereby are causes\nco-operating in the change which comes to pass in themselves; for this\ndetermination of which the author speaks is nothing but a limitation.\n\nNow if after that one reviews all the demonstrations or corollaries of the\nletter, one will be able to admit or reject the majority of its assertions,\nin accordance with the interpretation one may make of them. If by 'reality'\none means only perfections or positive realities, God is the only true\ncause; but if that which involves limitations is included under the\nrealities, one will deny a considerable portion of the theses, and the\nauthor himself will have shown us the example. It is in order to render the\nmatter more comprehensible that I used in the Essays the example of a laden\nboat, which, the more laden it is, is the more slowly carried along by the\nstream. There one sees clearly that the stream is the cause of what is\npositive in this motion, of the perfection, the force, the speed of the\nboat, but that the load is the cause of the restriction of this force, and\nthat it brings about the retardation.\n\nIt is praiseworthy in anyone to attempt to apply the geometrical method to\nmetaphysical matters. But it must be admitted that hitherto success has\nseldom been attained: and M. Descartes himself, with all that very great\nskill which one cannot deny in him, never perhaps had less success than\nwhen he essayed to do this in one of his answers to objections. For in\nmathematics it is easier to succeed, because numbers, figures and\ncalculations make good the defects concealed in words; but in metaphysics,\nwhere one is deprived of this aid (at least in ordinary               [391]\nargumentation), the strictness employed in the form of the argument and in\nthe exact definitions of the terms must needs supply this lack. But in\nneither argument nor definition is that strictness here to be seen.\n\nThe author of the letter, who undoubtedly displays much ardour and\npenetration, sometimes goes a little too far, as when he claims to prove\nthat there is as much reality and force in rest as in motion, according to\nthe fifth corollary of the second proposition. He asserts that the will of\nGod is no less positive in rest than in motion, and that it is not less\ninvincible. Be it so, but does it follow that there is as much reality and\nforce in each of the two? I do not see this conclusion, and with the same\nargument one would prove that there is as much force in a strong motion as\nin a weak motion. God in willing rest wills that the body be at the place\nA, where it was immediately before, and for that it suffices that there be\nno reason to prompt God to the change. But when God wills that afterwards\nthe body be at the place B, there must needs be a new reason, of such a\nkind as to determine God to will that it be in B and not in C or in any\nother place, and that it be there more or less promptly. It is upon these\nreasons, the volitions of God, that we must assess the force and the\nreality existent in things. The author speaks much of the will of God, but\nhe does not speak much in this letter of the reasons which prompt God to\nwill, and upon which all depends. And these reasons are taken from the\nobjects.\n\nI observe first, indeed, with regard to the second corollary of the first\nproposition, that it is very true, but that it is not very well proven. The\nwriter affirms that if God only ceased to will the existence of a being,\nthat being would no longer exist; and here is the proof given word for\nword:\n\n'Demonstration. That which exists only by the will of God no longer exists\nonce that will has ceased.' (But that is what must be proved. The writer\nendeavours to prove it by adding:) 'Remove the cause, you remove the\neffect.' (This maxim ought to have been placed among the axioms which are\nstated at the beginning. But unhappily this axiom may be reckoned among\nthose rules of philosophy which are subject to many exceptions.) 'Now by\nthe preceding proposition and by its first corollary no being exists save\nby the will of God. Therefore, etc.' There is ambiguity in this expression,\nthat nothing exists save by the will of God. If one means that things [392]\nbegin to exist only through this will, one is justified in referring to the\npreceding propositions; but if one means that the existence of things is at\nall times a consequence of the will of God, one assumes more or less what\nis in question. Therefore it was necessary to prove first that the\nexistence of things depends upon the will of God, and that it is not only a\nmere effect of that will, but a dependence, in proportion to the perfection\nwhich things contain; and once that is assumed, they will depend upon God's\nwill no less afterwards than at the beginning. That is the way I have taken\nthe matter in my Essays.\n\nNevertheless I recognize that the letter upon which I have just made\nobservations is admirable and well deserving of perusal, and that it\ncontains noble and true sentiments, provided it be taken in the sense I\nhave just indicated. And arguments in this form may serve as an\nintroduction to meditations somewhat more advanced.\n\n                                                                      [393]\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nREFLEXIONS ON THE WORK THAT MR. HOBBES PUBLISHED IN ENGLISH ON 'FREEDOM,\nNECESSITY AND CHANCE'\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n1. As the question of Necessity and Freedom, with other questions depending\nthereon, was at one time debated between the famous Mr. Hobbes and Dr. John\nBramhall, Bishop of Derry, in books published by each of them, I have\ndeemed it appropriate to give a clear account of them (although I have\nalready mentioned them more than once); and this all the more since these\nwritings of Mr. Hobbes have hitherto only appeared in English, and since\nthe works of this author usually contain something good and ingenious. The\nBishop of Derry and Mr. Hobbes, having met in Paris at the house of the\nMarquis, afterwards Duke, of Newcastle in the year 1646, entered into a\ndiscussion on this subject. The dispute was conducted with extreme\nrestraint; but the bishop shortly afterwards sent a note to My Lord\nNewcastle, desiring him to induce Mr. Hobbes to answer it. He answered; but\nat the same time he expressed a wish that his answer should not be\npublished, because he believed it possible for ill-instructed persons to\nabuse dogmas such as his, however true they might be. It so happened,\nhowever, that Mr. Hobbes himself passed it to a French friend, and allowed\na young Englishman to translate it into French for the benefit of this\nfriend. This young man kept a copy of the English original, and published\nit later in England without the author's knowledge. Thus the bishop was\nobliged to reply to it, and Mr. Hobbes to make a rejoinder, and to    [394]\npublish all the pieces together in a book of 348 pages printed in London in\nthe year 1656, in 4to., entitled, _Questions concerning Freedom, Necessity\nand Chance, elucidated and discussed between Doctor Bramhall, Bishop of\nDerry, and Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury_. There is a later edition, of the\nyear 1684, in a work entitled _Hobbes's Tripos_, where are to be found his\nbook on human nature, his treatise on the body politic and his treatise on\nfreedom and necessity; but the latter does not contain the bishop's reply,\nnor the author's rejoinder. Mr. Hobbes argues on this subject with his\nusual wit and subtlety; but it is a pity that in both the one and the other\nwe stumble upon petty tricks, such as arise in excitement over the game.\nThe bishop speaks with much vehemence and behaves somewhat arrogantly. Mr.\nHobbes for his part is not disposed to spare the other, and manifests\nrather too much scorn for theology, and for the terminology of the\nSchoolmen, which is apparently favoured by the bishop.\n\n2. One must confess that there is something strange and indefensible in the\nopinions of Mr. Hobbes. He maintains that doctrines touching the divinity\ndepend entirely upon the determination of the sovereign, and that God is no\nmore the cause of the good than of the bad actions of creatures. He\nmaintains that all that which God does is just, because there is none above\nhim with power to punish and constrain him. Yet he speaks sometimes as if\nwhat is said about God were only compliments, that is to say expressions\nproper for paying him honour, but not for knowing him. He testifies also\nthat it seems to him that the pains of the wicked must end in their\ndestruction: this opinion closely approaches that of the Socinians, but it\nseems that Mr. Hobbes goes much further. His philosophy, which asserts that\nbodies alone are substances, hardly appears favourable to the providence of\nGod and the immortality of the soul. On other subjects nevertheless he says\nvery reasonable things. He shows clearly that nothing comes about by\nchance, or rather that chance only signifies the ignorance of causes that\nproduce the effect, and that for each effect there must be a concurrence of\nall the sufficient conditions anterior to the event, not one of which,\nmanifestly, can be lacking when the event is to follow, because they are\nconditions: the event, moreover, does not fail to follow when these\nconditions exist all together, because they are sufficient conditions. All\nwhich amounts to the same as I have said so many times, that everything\ncomes to pass as a result of determining reasons, the knowledge       [395]\nwhereof, if we had it, would make us know at the same time why the thing\nhas happened and why it did not go otherwise.\n\n3. But this author's humour, which prompts him to paradoxes and makes him\nseek to contradict others, has made him draw out exaggerated and odious\nconclusions and expressions, as if everything happened through an absolute\nnecessity. The Bishop of Derry, on the other hand, has aptly observed in\nthe answer to article 35, page 327, that there results only a hypothetical\nnecessity, such as we all grant to events in relation to the foreknowledge\nof God, while Mr. Hobbes maintains that even divine foreknowledge alone\nwould be sufficient to establish an absolute necessity of events. This was\nalso the opinion of Wyclif, and even of Luther, when he wrote _De Servo\nArbitrio_; or at least they spoke so. But it is sufficiently acknowledged\nto-day that this kind of necessity which is termed hypothetical, and\nsprings from foreknowledge or from other anterior reasons, has nothing in\nit to arouse one's alarm: whereas it would be quite otherwise if the thing\nwere necessary of itself, in such a way that the contrary implied\ncontradiction. Mr. Hobbes refuses to listen to anything about a moral\nnecessity either, on the ground that everything really happens through\nphysical causes. But one is nevertheless justified in making a great\ndifference between the necessity which constrains the wise to do good, and\nwhich is termed moral, existing even in relation to God, and that blind\nnecessity whereby according to Epicurus, Strato, Spinoza, and perhaps Mr.\nHobbes, things exist without intelligence and without choice, and\nconsequently without God. Indeed, there would according to them be no need\nof God, since in consequence of this necessity all would have existence\nthrough its own essence, just as necessarily as two and three make five.\nAnd this necessity is absolute, because everything it carries with it must\nhappen, whatever one may do; whereas what happens by a hypothetical\nnecessity happens as a result of the supposition that this or that has been\nforeseen or resolved, or done beforehand; and moral necessity contains an\nobligation imposed by reason, which is always followed by its effect in the\nwise. This kind of necessity is happy and desirable, when one is prompted\nby good reasons to act as one does; but necessity blind and absolute would\nsubvert piety and morality.\n\n4. There is more reason in Mr. Hobbes's discourse when he admits that [396]\nour actions are in our power, so that we do that which we will when we have\nthe power to do it, and when there is no hindrance. He asserts\nnotwithstanding that our volitions themselves are not so within our power\nthat we can give ourselves, without difficulty and according to our good\npleasure, inclinations and wills which we might desire. The bishop does not\nappear to have taken notice of this reflexion, which Mr. Hobbes also does\nnot develop enough. The truth is that we have some power also over our\nvolitions, but obliquely, and not absolutely and indifferently. This has\nbeen explained in some passages of this work. Finally Mr. Hobbes shows,\nlike others before him, that the certainty of events, and necessity itself,\nif there were any in the way our actions depend upon causes, would not\nprevent us from employing deliberations, exhortations, blame and praise,\npunishments and rewards: for these are of service and prompt men to produce\nactions or to refrain from them. Thus, if human actions were necessary,\nthey would be so through these means. But the truth is, that since these\nactions are not necessary absolutely whatever one may do, these means\ncontribute only to render the actions determinate and certain, as they are\nindeed; for their nature shows that they are not subject to an absolute\nnecessity. He gives also a good enough notion of _freedom_, in so far as it\nis taken in a general sense, common to intelligent and non-intelligent\nsubstances: he states that a thing is deemed free when the power which it\nhas is not impeded by an external thing. Thus the water that is dammed by a\ndyke has the power to spread, but not the freedom. On the other hand, it\nhas not the power to rise above the dyke, although nothing would prevent it\nthen from spreading, and although nothing from outside prevents it from\nrising so high. To that end it would be necessary that the water itself\nshould come from a higher point or that the water-level should be raised by\nan increased flow. Thus a prisoner lacks the freedom, while a sick man\nlacks the power, to go his way.\n\n5. There is in Mr. Hobbes's preface an abstract of the disputed points,\nwhich I will give here, adding some expression of opinion. _On one side_\n(he says) the assertion is made, (1) 'that it is not in the present power\nof man to choose for himself the will that he should have'. That is _well_\nsaid, especially in relation to present will: men choose the objects\nthrough will, but they do not choose their present wills, which spring from\nreasons and dispositions. It is true, however, that one can seek new  [397]\nreasons for oneself, and with time give oneself new dispositions; and by\nthis means one can also obtain for oneself a will which one had not and\ncould not have given oneself forthwith. It is (to use the comparison Mr.\nHobbes himself uses) as with hunger or with thirst. At the present it does\nnot rest with my will to be hungry or not; but it rests with my will to eat\nor not to eat; yet, for the time to come, it rests with me to be hungry, or\nto prevent myself from being so at such and such an hour of day, by eating\nbeforehand. In this way it is possible often to avoid an evil will. Even\nthough Mr. Hobbes states in his reply (No. 14, p. 138) that it is the\nmanner of laws to say, you must do or you must not do this, but that there\nis no law saying, you must will, or you must not will it, yet it is clear\nthat he is mistaken in regard to the Law of God, which says _non\nconcupisces_, thou shalt not covet; it is true that this prohibition does\nnot concern the first motions, which are involuntary. It is asserted (2)\n'That hazard' (_chance_ in English, _casus_ in Latin) 'produces nothing',\nthat is, that nothing is produced without cause or reason. Very _right_, I\nadmit it, if one thereby intends a real hazard. For fortune and hazard are\nonly appearances, which spring from ignorance of causes or from disregard\nof them. (3) 'That all events have their necessary causes.' _Wrong_: they\nhave their determining causes, whereby one can account for them; but these\nare not necessary causes. The contrary might have happened, without\nimplying contradiction. (4) 'That the will of God makes the necessity of\nall things.' _Wrong_: the will of God produces only contingent things,\nwhich could have gone differently, since time, space and matter are\nindifferent with regard to all kinds of shape and movement.\n\n6. _On the other side_ (according to Mr. Hobbes) it is asserted, (1) 'That\nman is free' (absolutely) not only 'to choose what he wills to do, but also\nto choose what he wills to will.' That is _ill_ said: one is not absolute\nmaster of one's will, to change it forthwith, without making use of some\nmeans or skill for that purpose. (2) 'When man wills a good action, the\nwill of God co-operates with his, otherwise not.' That is _well_ said,\nprovided one means that God does not will evil actions, although he wills\nto permit them, to prevent the occurrence of something which would be worse\nthan these sins. (3) 'That the will can choose whether it wills to will or\nnot.' _Wrong_, with regard to present volition. (4) 'That things happen\nwithout necessity by chance.' _Wrong_: what happens without necessity [398]\ndoes not because of that happen by chance, that is to say, without causes\nand reasons. (5) 'Notwithstanding that God may foresee that an event will\nhappen, it is not necessary that it happen, since God foresees things, not\nas futurities and as in their causes, but as present.' That begins _well_,\nand finishes _ill_. One is justified in admitting the necessity of the\nconsequence, but one has no reason to resort to the question how the future\nis present to God: for the necessity of the consequence does not prevent\nthe event or consequent from being contingent in itself.\n\n7. Our author thinks that since the doctrine revived by Arminius had been\nfavoured in England by Archbishop Laud and by the Court, and important\necclesiastical promotions had been only for those of that party, this\ncontributed to the revolt which caused the bishop and him to meet in their\nexile in Paris at the house of Lord Newcastle, and to enter into a\ndiscussion. I would not approve all the measures of Archbishop Laud, who\nhad merit and perhaps also good will, but who appears to have goaded the\nPresbyterians excessively. Nevertheless one may say that the revolutions,\nas much in the Low Countries as in Great Britain, in part arose from the\nextreme intolerance of the strict party. One may say also that the\ndefenders of the absolute decree were at least as strict as the others,\nhaving oppressed their opponents in Holland with the authority of Prince\nMaurice and having fomented the revolts in England against King Charles I.\nBut these are the faults of men, and not of dogmas. Their opponents do not\nspare them either, witness the severity used in Saxony against Nicolas\nKrell and the proceedings of the Jesuits against the Bishop of Ypres's\nparty.\n\n8. Mr. Hobbes observes, after Aristotle, that there are two sources for\nproofs: reason and authority. As for reason, he says that he admits the\nreasons derived from the attributes of God, which he calls argumentative,\nand the notions whereof are conceivable; but he maintains that there are\nothers wherein one conceives nothing, and which are only expressions by\nwhich we aspire to honour God. But I do not see how one can honour God by\nexpressions that have no meaning. It may be that with Mr. Hobbes, as with\nSpinoza, wisdom, goodness, justice are only fictions in relation to God and\nthe universe, since the prime cause, according to them, acts through the\nnecessity of its power, and not by the choice of its wisdom. That is  [399]\nan opinion whose falsity I have sufficiently proved. It appears that Mr.\nHobbes did not wish to declare himself enough, for fear of causing offence\nto people; on which point he is to be commended. It was also on that\naccount, as he says himself, that he had desired that what had passed\nbetween the bishop and him in Paris should not be published. He adds that\nit is not good to say that an action which God does not will happens, since\nthat is to say in effect that God is lacking in power. But he adds also at\nthe same time that it is not good either to say the opposite, and to\nattribute to God that he wills the evil; because that is not seemly, and\nwould appear to accuse God of lack of goodness. He believes, therefore,\nthat in these matters telling the truth is not advisable. He would be right\nif the truth were in the paradoxical opinions that he maintains. For indeed\nit appears that according to the opinion of this writer God has no\ngoodness, or rather that that which he calls God is nothing but the blind\nnature of the mass of material things, which acts according to mathematical\nlaws, following an absolute necessity, as the atoms do in the system of\nEpicurus. If God were as the great are sometimes here on earth, it would\nnot be fitting to utter all the truths concerning him. But God is not as a\nman, whose designs and actions often must be concealed; rather it is always\npermissible and reasonable to publish the counsels and the actions of God,\nbecause they are always glorious and worthy of praise. Thus it is always\nright to utter truths concerning the divinity; one need not anyhow refrain\nfrom fear of giving offence. And I have explained, so it seems to me, in a\nway which satisfies reason, and does not wound piety, how it is to be\nunderstood that God's will takes effect, and concurs with sin, without\ncompromising his wisdom and his goodness.\n\n9. As to the authorities derived from Holy Scripture, Mr. Hobbes divides\nthem into three kinds; some, he says, are for me, the second kind are\nneutral, and the third seem to be for my opponent. The passages which he\nthinks favourable to his opinion are those which ascribe to God the cause\nof our will. Thus Gen. xlv. 5, where Joseph says to his brethren, 'Be not\ngrieved, nor angry with yourselves, that you sold me hither: for God did\nsend me before you to preserve life'; and verse 8, 'it was not you that\nsent me hither, but God.' And God said (Exod. vii. 3), 'I will harden\nPharaoh's heart.' And Moses said (Deut. ii. 30), 'But Sihon King of   [400]\nHeshbon would not let us pass by him: for the Lord thy God hardened his\nspirit, and made his heart obstinate, that he might deliver him into thy\nhand.' And David said of Shimei (2 Sam. xvi. 10), 'Let him curse, because\nthe Lord hath said unto him: Curse David. Who shall then say, wherefore\nhast thou done so?' And (1 Kings xii. 15), 'The King [Rehoboam] hearkened\nnot unto the people; for the cause was from the Lord.' Job xii. 16: 'The\ndeceived and the deceiver are his.' v. 17: 'He maketh the judges fools'; v.\n24: 'He taketh away the heart of the chief of the people of the earth, and\ncauseth them to wander in a wilderness'; v. 25: 'He maketh them to stagger\nlike a drunken man.' God said of the King of Assyria (Isa. x. 6), 'Against\nthe people will I give him a charge, to take the spoil, and to take the\nprey, and to tread them down like the mire of the streets.' And Jeremiah\nsaid (Jer. x. 23), 'O Lord, I know that the way of man is not in himself:\nit is not in man that walketh to direct his steps.' And God said (Ezek.\niii. 20), 'When a righteous man doth turn from his righteousness, and\ncommit iniquity, and I lay a stumbling-block before him, he shall die.' And\nthe Saviour said (John vi. 44), 'No man can come to me, except the Father\nwhich hath sent me draw him.' And St. Peter (Acts ii. 23), 'Jesus having\nbeen delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have\ntaken.' And Acts iv. 27, 28, 'Both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the\nGentiles and the people of Israel, were gathered together, for to do\nwhatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done.' And St.\nPaul (Rom. ix. 16), 'It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that\nrunneth, but of God that showeth mercy.' And v. 18: 'Therefore hath he\nmercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth'; v. 19:\n'Thou wilt say then unto me, why doth he yet find fault? For who hath\nresisted his will?'; v. 20: 'Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest\nagainst God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, why hast\nthou made me thus?' And 1 Cor. iv. 7: 'For who maketh thee to differ from\nanother? and what hast thou that thou didst not receive?' And 1 Cor. xii.\n6: 'There are diversities of operations, but it is the same God which\nworketh all in all.' And Eph. ii. 10: 'We are his workmanship, created in\nChrist Jesus unto good works, which God hath before ordained that we should\nwalk in them.' And Phil. ii. 13: 'It is God which worketh in you both to\nwill and to do of his good pleasure.' One may add to these passages all\nthose which make God the author of all grace and of all good          [401]\ninclinations, and all those which say that we are as dead in sin.\n\n10. Here now are the neutral passages, according to Mr. Hobbes. These are\nthose where Holy Scripture says that man has the choice to act if he wills,\nor not to act if he wills not. For example Deut. xxx. 19: 'I call heaven\nand earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life\nand death, blessing and cursing: therefore choose life, that both thou and\nthy seed may live.' And Joshua xxiv. 15: 'Choose you this day whom ye will\nserve.' And God said to Gad the prophet (2 Sam. xxiv. 12), 'Go and say unto\nDavid: Thus saith the Lord, I offer thee three things; choose thee one of\nthem, that I may do it unto thee.' And Isa. vii. 16: 'Until the child shall\nknow to refuse the evil and choose the good.' Finally the passages which\nMr. Hobbes acknowledges to be apparently contrary to his opinion are all\nthose where it is indicated that the will of man is not in conformity with\nthat of God. Thus Isa. v. 4: 'What could have been done more to my\nvineyard, that I have not done in it? Wherefore, when I looked that it\nshould bring forth grapes, brought it forth wild grapes?' And Jer. xix. 5:\n'They have built also the high places of Baal, to burn their sons with fire\nfor burnt offerings unto Baal; which I commanded not, nor spake it, neither\ncame it into my mind.' And Hos. xiii. 9: 'O Israel, thou hast destroyed\nthyself; but in me is thine help.' And I Tim. ii. 4: 'God will have all men\nto be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth.' He avows that he\ncould quote very many other passages, such as those which indicate that God\nwilleth not iniquity, that he willeth the salvation of the sinner, and\ngenerally all those which declare that God commands good and forbids evil.\n\n11. Mr. Hobbes makes answer to these passages that God does not always will\nthat which he commands, as for example when he commanded Abraham to\nsacrifice his son, and that God's revealed will is not always his full will\nor his decree, as when he revealed to Jonah that Nineveh would perish in\nforty days. He adds also, that when it is said that God wills the salvation\nof all, that means simply that God commands that all do that which is\nnecessary for salvation; when, moreover, the Scripture says that God wills\nnot sin, that means that he wills to punish it. And as for the rest, Mr.\nHobbes ascribes it to the forms of expression used among men. But one will\nanswer him that it would be to God's discredit that his revealed will [402]\nshould be opposed to his real will: that what he bade Jonah say to the\nNinevites was rather a threat than a prediction, and that thus the\ncondition of impenitence was implied therein; moreover the Ninevites took\nit in this sense. One will say also, that it is quite true that God in\ncommanding Abraham to sacrifice his son willed obedience, but did not will\naction, which he prevented after having obtained obedience; for that was\nnot an action deserving in itself to be willed. And it is not the same in\nthe case of actions where he exerts his will positively, and which are in\nfact worthy to be the object of his will. Of such are piety, charity and\nevery virtuous action that God commands; of such is omission of sin, a\nthing more alien to divine perfection than any other. It is therefore\nincomparably better to explain the will of God as I have explained it in\nthis work. Thus I shall say that God, by virtue of his supreme goodness,\nhas in the beginning a serious inclination to produce, or to see and cause\nto be produced, all good and every laudable action, and to prevent, or to\nsee and cause to fail, all evil and every bad action. But he is determined\nby this same goodness, united to an infinite wisdom, and by the very\nconcourse of all the previous and particular inclinations towards each\ngood, and towards the preventing of each evil, to produce the best possible\ndesign of things. This is his final and decretory will. And this design of\nthe best being of such a nature that the good must be enhanced therein, as\nlight is enhanced by shade, by some evil which is incomparably less than\nthis good, God could not have excluded this evil, nor introduced certain\ngoods that were excluded from this plan, without wronging his supreme\nperfection. So for that reason one must say that he permitted the sins of\nothers, because otherwise he would have himself performed an action worse\nthan all the sin of creatures.\n\n12. I find that the Bishop of Derry is at least justified in saying,\narticle XV, in his Reply, p. 153, that the opinion of his opponents is\ncontrary to piety, when they ascribe all to God's power only, and that Mr.\nHobbes ought not to have said that honour or worship is only a sign of the\npower of him whom one honours: for one may also, and one must, acknowledge\nand honour wisdom, goodness, justice and other perfections. _Magnos facile\nlaudamus, bonos libenter._ This opinion, which despoils God of all goodness\nand of all true justice, which represents him as a Tyrant, wielding an\nabsolute power, independent of all right and of all equity, and       [403]\ncreating millions of creatures to be eternally unhappy, and this without\nany other aim than that of displaying his power, this opinion, I say, is\ncapable of rendering men very evil; and if it were accepted no other Devil\nwould be needed in the world to set men at variance among themselves and\nwith God; as the Serpent did in making Eve believe that God, when he\nforbade her the fruit of the tree, did not will her good. Mr. Hobbes\nendeavours to parry this thrust in his Rejoinder (p. 160) by saying that\ngoodness is a part of the power of God, that is to say, the power of making\nhimself worthy of love. But that is an abuse of terms by an evasion, and\nconfounds things that must be kept distinct. After all, if God does not\nintend the good of intelligent creatures, if he has no other principles of\njustice than his power alone, which makes him produce either arbitrarily\nthat which chance presents to him, or by necessity all that which is\npossible, without the intervention of choice founded on good, how can he\nmake himself worthy of love? It is therefore the doctrine either of blind\npower or of arbitrary power, which destroys piety: for the one destroys the\nintelligent principle or the providence of God, the other attributes to him\nactions which are appropriate to the evil principle. Justice in God, says\nMr. Hobbes (p. 161), is nothing but the power he has, which he exercises in\ndistributing blessings and afflictions. This definition surprises me: it is\nnot the power to distribute them, but the will to distribute them\nreasonably, that is, goodness guided by wisdom, which makes the justice of\nGod. But, says he, justice is not in God as in a man, who is only just\nthrough the observance of laws made by his superior. Mr. Hobbes is mistaken\nalso in that, as well as Herr Pufendorf, who followed him. Justice does not\ndepend upon arbitrary laws of superiors, but on the eternal rules of wisdom\nand of goodness, in men as well as in God. Mr. Hobbes asserts in the same\npassage that the wisdom which is attributed to God does not lie in a\nlogical consideration of the relation of means to ends, but in an\nincomprehensible attribute, attributed to an incomprehensible nature to\nhonour it. It seems as if he means that it is an indescribable something\nattributed to an indescribable something, and even a chimerical quality\ngiven to a chimerical substance, to intimidate and to deceive the nations\nthrough the worship which they render to it. After all, it is difficult for\nMr. Hobbes to have a different opinion of God and of wisdom, since he\nadmits only material substances. If Mr. Hobbes were still alive, I would\nbeware of ascribing to him opinions which might do him injury; but it [404]\nis difficult to exempt him from this. He may have changed his mind\nsubsequently, for he attained to a great age; thus I hope that his errors\nmay not have been deleterious to him. But as they might be so to others, it\nis expedient to give warnings to those who shall read the writings of one\nwho otherwise is of great merit, and from whom one may profit in many ways.\nIt is true that God does not reason, properly speaking, using time as we\ndo, to pass from one truth to the other: but as he understands at one and\nthe same time all the truths and all their connexions, he knows all the\nconclusions, and he contains in the highest degree within himself all the\nreasonings that we can develop. And just because of that his wisdom is\nperfect.\n\n                                                                      [405]\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nOBSERVATIONS ON THE BOOK CONCERNING 'THE ORIGIN OF EVIL' PUBLISHED RECENTLY\nIN LONDON\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n1. It is a pity that M. Bayle should have seen only the reviews of this\nadmirable work, which are to be found in the journals. If he had read it\nhimself and examined it properly, he would have provided us with a good\nopportunity of throwing light on many difficulties, which spring again and\nagain like the head of the hydra, in a matter where it is easy to become\nconfused when one has not seen the whole system or does not take the\ntrouble to reason according to a strict plan. For strictness of reasoning\nperforms in subjects that transcend imagination the same function as\nfigures do in geometry: there must always be something capable of fixing\nour attention and forming a connexion between our thoughts. That is why\nwhen this Latin book, so learned and so elegant of style, printed\noriginally in London and then reprinted in Bremen, fell into my hands, I\njudged that the seriousness of the matter and the author's merit required\nan attention which readers might fairly expect of me, since we are agreed\nonly in regard to half of the subject. Indeed, as the work contains five\nchapters, and the fifth with the appendix equals the rest in size, I have\nobserved that the first four, where it is a question of evil in general and\nof physical evil in particular, are in harmony with my principles (save for\na few individual passages), and that they sometimes even develop with force\nand eloquence some points I had treated but slightly because M. Bayle [406]\nhad not placed emphasis upon them. But the fifth chapter, with its sections\n(of which some are equal to entire chapters) speaking of freedom and of the\nmoral evil dependent upon it, is constructed upon principles opposed to\nmine, and often, indeed, to those of M. Bayle; that is, if it were possible\nto credit him with any fixed principles. For this fifth chapter tends to\nshow (if that were possible) that true freedom depends upon an indifference\nof equipoise, vague, complete and absolute; so that, until the will has\ndetermined itself, there would be no reason for its determination, either\nin him who chooses or in the object; and one would not choose what pleases,\nbut in choosing without reason one would cause what one chooses to be\npleasing.\n\n2. This principle of choice without cause or reason, of a choice, I say,\ndivested of the aim of wisdom and goodness, is regarded by many as the\ngreat privilege of God and of intelligent substances, and as the source of\ntheir freedom, their satisfaction, their morality and their good or evil.\nThe fantasy of a power to declare one's independence, not only of\ninclination, but of reason itself within and of good and evil without, is\nsometimes painted in such fine colours that one might take it to be the\nmost excellent thing in the world. Nevertheless it is only a hollow\nfantasy, a suppression of the reasons for the caprice of which one boasts.\nWhat is asserted is impossible, but if it came to pass it would be harmful.\nThis fantastic character might be attributed to some Don Juan in a St.\nPeter's Feast, and a man of romantic disposition might even affect the\noutward appearances of it and persuade himself that he has it in reality.\nBut in Nature there will never be any choice to which one is not prompted\nby the previous representation of good or evil, by inclinations or by\nreasons: and I have always challenged the supporters of this absolute\nindifference to show an example thereof. Nevertheless if I call fantastic\nthis choice whereto one is determined by nothing, I am far from calling\nvisionaries the supporters of that hypothesis, especially our gifted\nauthor. The Peripatetics teach some beliefs of this nature; but it would be\nthe greatest injustice in the world to be ready to despise on that account\nan Occam, a Suisset, a Cesalpino, a Conringius, men who still advocated\ncertain scholastic opinions which have been improved upon to-day.\n\n3. One of these opinions, revived, however, and introduced by         [407]\ndegenerate scholasticism, and in the Age of Chimeras, is vague indifference\nof choice, or real chance, assumed in our souls; as if nothing gave us any\ninclination unless we perceived it distinctly, and as if an effect could be\nwithout causes, when these causes are imperceptible. It is much as some\nhave denied the existence of insensible corpuscles because they do not see\nthem. Modern philosophers have improved upon the opinions of the Schoolmen\nby showing that, according to the laws of corporeal nature, a body can only\nbe set in motion by the movement of another body propelling it. Even so we\nmust believe that our souls (by virtue of the laws of spiritual nature) can\nonly be moved by some reason of good or evil: and this even when no\ndistinct knowledge can be extracted from our mental state, on account of a\nconcourse of innumerable little perceptions which make us now joyful and\nnow sad, or again of some other humour, and cause us to like one thing more\nthan another without its being possible to say why. Plato, Aristotle and\neven Thomas Aquinas, Durand and other Schoolmen of the sounder sort reason\non that question like the generality of men, and as unprejudiced people\nalways have reasoned. They assume that freedom lies in the use of reason\nand the inclinations, which cause the choice or rejection of objects. But\nfinally some rather too subtle philosophers have extracted from their\nalembic an inexplicable notion of choice independent of anything\nwhatsoever, which is said to do wonders in solving all difficulties. But\nthe notion is caught up at the outset in one of the greatest difficulties,\nby offending against the grand principle of reasoning which makes us always\nassume that nothing is done without some sufficient cause or reason. As the\nSchoolmen often forgot to apply this great principle, admitting certain\nprime occult qualities, one need not wonder if this fiction of vague\nindifference met with applause amongst them, and if even most worthy men\nhave been imbued therewith. Our author, who is otherwise rid of many of the\nerrors of the ordinary Schoolmen, is still deluded by this fiction: but he\nis without doubt one of the most skilful of those who have supported it.\n\n              _Si Pergama dextra_\n  _Defendi possent, etiam hac defensa fuissent._\n\nHe gives it the best possible turn, and only shows it on its good side. He\nknows how to strip spontaneity and reason of their advantages,        [408]\ntransferring all these to vague indifference: only through this\nindifference is one active, resisting the passions, taking pleasure in\none's choice, or being happy; it appears indeed that one would be miserable\nif some happy necessity should oblige us to choose aright. Our author had\nsaid admirable things on the origin and reasons of natural evils: he only\nhad to apply the same principles to moral evil; indeed, he believes himself\nthat moral evil becomes an evil through the physical evils that it causes\nor tends to cause. But somehow or other he thinks that it would be a\ndegradation of God and men if they were to be made subject to reason; that\nthus they would all be rendered passive to it and would no longer be\nsatisfied with themselves; in short that men would have nothing wherewith\nto oppose the misfortunes that come to them from without, if they had not\nwithin them this admirable privilege of rendering things good or tolerable\nby choosing them, and of changing all into gold by the touch of this\nwondrous faculty.\n\n4. We will examine it in closer detail presently; but it will be well to\nprofit beforehand by the excellent ideas of our author on the nature of\nthings and on natural evils, particularly since there are some points in\nwhich we shall be able to go a little further: by this means also we shall\ngain a better understanding of the whole arrangement of his system. The\nfirst chapter contains the principles. The writer calls substance a being\nthe idea of which does not involve the existence of another. I do not know\nif there are any such among created beings, by reason of the connexion\nexisting between all things; and the example of a wax torch is not the\nexample of a substance, any more than that of a swarm of bees would be. But\none may take the terms in an extended sense. He observes aptly that after\nall the changes of matter and after all the qualities of which it may be\ndivested, there remain extension, mobility, divisibility and resistance. He\nexplains also the nature of notions, and leaves it to be understood that\n_universals_ indicate only the resemblances which exist between\n_individuals_; that we understand by _ideas_ only that which is known\nthrough an immediate sensation, and that the rest is known to us only\nthrough relations with these ideas. But when he admits that we have no idea\nof God, of spirit, of substance, he does not appear to have observed\nsufficiently that we have immediate apperception of substance and of spirit\nin our apperception of ourselves, and that the idea of God is found in[409]\nthe idea of ourselves through a suppression of the limits of our\nperfections, as extension taken in an absolute sense is comprised in the\nidea of a globe. He is right also in asserting that our simple ideas at\nleast are innate, and in rejecting the _Tabula rasa_ of Aristotle and of\nMr. Locke. But I cannot agree with him that our ideas have scarce any more\nrelation to things than words uttered into the air or writings traced upon\npaper have to our ideas, and that the bearing of our sensations is\narbitrary and _ex instituto_, like the signification of words. I have\nalready indicated elsewhere why I am not in agreement with our Cartesians\non that point.\n\n5. For the purpose of advancing to the first Cause, the author seeks a\ncriterion, a distinguishing mark of truth; and he finds it in the force\nwhereby our inward assertions, when they are evident, compel the\nunderstanding to give them its consent. It is by such a process, he says,\nthat we credit the senses. He points out that the distinguishing mark in\nthe Cartesian scheme, to wit, a clear and distinct perception, has need of\na new mark to indicate what is clear and distinct, and that the congruity\nor non-congruity of ideas (or rather of terms, as one spoke formerly) may\nstill be deceptive, because there are congruities real and apparent. He\nappears to recognize even that the inward force which constrains us to give\nour assent is still a matter for caution, and may come from deep-rooted\nprejudices. That is why he confesses that he who should furnish another\ncriterion would have found something very advantageous to the human race. I\nhave endeavoured to explain this criterion in a little _Discourse on Truth\nand Ideas_, published in 1684; and although I do not boast of having given\ntherein a new discovery I hope that I have expounded things which were only\nconfusedly recognized. I distinguish between truths of fact and truths of\nreason. Truths of fact can only be verified by confronting them with truths\nof reason, and by tracing them back to immediate perceptions within us,\nsuch as St. Augustine and M. Descartes very promptly acknowledged to be\nindubitable; that is to say, we cannot doubt that we think, nor indeed that\nwe think this thing or that. But in order to judge whether our inward\nnotions have any reality in things, and to pass from thoughts to objects,\nmy opinion is that it is necessary to consider whether our perceptions are\nfirmly connected among themselves and with others that we have had, in such\nfashion as to manifest the rules of mathematics and other truths of   [410]\nreason. In this case one must regard them as real; and I think that it is\nthe only means of distinguishing them from imaginations, dreams and\nvisions. Thus the truth of things outside us can be recognized only through\nthe connexion of phenomena. The criterion of the truths of reason, or those\nwhich spring from conceptions, is found in an exact use of the rules of\nlogic. As for ideas or notions, I call _real_ all those the possibility of\nwhich is certain; and the _definitions_ which do not mark this possibility\nare only _nominal_. Geometricians well versed in analysis are aware what\ndifference there is in this respect between several properties by which\nsome line or figure might be defined. Our gifted author has not gone so\nfar, perhaps; one may see, however, from the account I have given of him\nalready, and from what follows, that he is by no means lacking in\nprofundity or reflexion.\n\n6. Thereafter he proceeds to examine whether motion, matter and space\nspring from themselves; and to that end he considers whether it is possible\nto conceive that they do not exist. He remarks upon this privilege of God,\nthat as soon as it is assumed that he exists it must be admitted that he\nexists of necessity. This is a corollary to a remark which I made in the\nlittle discourse mentioned above, namely that as soon as one admits that\nGod is possible, one must admit that he exists of necessity. Now, as soon\nas one admits that God exists, one admits that he is possible. Therefore as\nsoon as one admits that God exists, one must admit that he exists of\nnecessity. Now this privilege does not belong to the three things of which\nwe have just spoken. The author believes also especially concerning motion,\nthat it is not sufficient to say, with Mr. Hobbes, that the present\nmovement comes from an anterior movement, and this one again from another,\nand so on to infinity. For, however far back you may go, you will not be\none whit nearer to finding the reason which causes the presence of motion\nin matter. Therefore this reason must be outside the sequence; and even if\nthere were an eternal motion, it would require an eternal motive power. So\nthe rays of the sun, even though they were eternal with the sun, would\nnevertheless have their eternal cause in the sun. I am well pleased to\nrecount these arguments of our gifted author, that it may be seen how\nimportant, according to him, is the principle of sufficient reason. For, if\nit is permitted to admit something for which it is acknowledged there is no\nreason, it will be easy for an atheist to overthrow this argument, by [411]\nsaying that it is not necessary that there be a sufficient reason for the\nexistence of motion. I will not enter into the discussion of the reality\nand the eternity of space, for fear of straying too far from our subject.\nIt is enough to state that the author believes that space can be\nannihilated by the divine power, but in entirety and not in portions, and\nthat we could exist alone with God even if there were neither space nor\nmatter, since we do not contain within ourselves the notion of the\nexistence of external things. He also puts forward the consideration that\nin the sensations of sounds, of odours and of savours the idea of space is\nnot included. But whatever the opinion formed as to space, it suffices that\nthere is a God, the cause of matter and of motion, and in short of all\nthings. The author believes that we can reason about God, as one born blind\nwould reason about light. But I hold that there is something more in us,\nfor our light is a ray from God's light. After having spoken of some\nattributes of God, the author acknowledges that God acts for an end, which\nis the communication of his goodness, and that his works are ordered\naright. Finally he concludes this chapter very properly, by saying that God\nin creating the world was at pains to give it the greatest harmony amongst\nthings, the greatest comfort of beings endowed with reason, and the\ngreatest compatibility in desires that an infinite power, wisdom and\ngoodness combined could produce. He adds that, if some evil has remained\nnotwithstanding, one must believe that these infinite divine perfections\ncould not have (I would rather say ought not to have) taken it away.\n\n7. Chapter II anatomizes evil, dividing it as we do into metaphysical,\nphysical and moral. Metaphysical evil consists in imperfections, physical\nevil in suffering and other like troubles, and moral evil in sin. All these\nevils exist in God's work; Lucretius thence inferred that there is no\nprovidence, and he denied that the world can be an effect of divinity:\n\n  _Naturam rerum divinitus esse creatam;_\n\nbecause there are so many faults in the nature of things,\n\n  _quoniam tanta stat praedita culpa._\n\nOthers have admitted two principles, the one good, the other evil. There\nhave also been people who thought the difficulty insurmountable, and among\nthese our author appears to have had M. Bayle in mind. He hopes to    [412]\nshow in his work that it is not a Gordian knot, which needs to be cut; and\nhe says rightly that the power, the wisdom and the goodness of God would\nnot be infinite and perfect in their exercise if these evils had been\nbanished. He begins with the evil of imperfection in Chapter III and\nobserves, as St. Augustine does, that creatures are imperfect, since they\nare derived from nothingness, whereas God producing a perfect substance\nfrom his own essence would have made thereof a God. This gives him occasion\nfor making a little digression against the Socinians. But someone will say,\nwhy did not God refrain from producing things, rather than make imperfect\nthings? The author answers appositely that the abundance of the goodness of\nGod is the cause. He wished to communicate himself at the expense of a\ncertain fastidiousness which we assume in God, imagining that imperfections\noffend him. Thus he preferred that there should be the imperfect rather\nthan nothing. But one might have added that God has produced indeed the\nmost perfect whole that was possible, one wherewith he had full cause for\nsatisfaction, the imperfections of the parts serving a greater perfection\nin the whole. Also the observation is made soon afterwards, that certain\nthings might have been made better, but not without other new and _perhaps_\ngreater disadvantages. This _perhaps_ could have been omitted: for the\nauthor also states as a certainty, and rightly so, at the end of the\nchapter, _that it appertains to infinite goodness to choose the best_; and\nthus he was able to draw this conclusion a little earlier, that imperfect\nthings will be added to those more perfect, so long as they do not preclude\nthe existence of the more perfect in as great a number as possible. Thus\nbodies were created as well as spirits, since the one does not offer any\nobstacle to the other; and the creation of matter was not unworthy of the\ngreat God, as some heretics of old believed, attributing this work to a\ncertain Demogorgon.\n\n8. Let us now proceed to physical evil, which is treated of in Chapter IV.\nOur famous author, having observed that metaphysical evil, or imperfection,\nsprings from nothingness, concludes that physical evil, or discomfort,\nsprings from matter, or rather from its movement; for without movement\nmatter would be useless. Moreover there must be contrariety in these\nmovements; otherwise, if all went together in the same direction, there\nwould be neither variety nor generation. But the movements that cause [413]\ngenerations cause also corruptions, since from the variety of movements\ncomes concussion between bodies, by which they are often dissipated and\ndestroyed. The Author of Nature however, in order to render bodies more\nenduring, distributed them into _systems_, those which we know being\ncomposed of luminous and opaque balls, in a manner so excellent and so\nfitting for the display of that which they contain, and for arousing wonder\nthereat, that we can conceive of nothing more beautiful. But the crowning\npoint of the work was the construction of animals, to the end that\neverywhere there should be creatures capable of cognition,\n\n  _Ne regio foret ulla suis animalibus orba._\n\nOur sagacious author believes that the air and even the purest aether have\ntheir denizens as well as the water and the earth. But supposing that there\nwere places without animals, these places might have uses necessary for\nother places which are inhabited. So for example the mountains, which\nrender the surface of our globe unequal and sometimes desert and barren,\nare of use for the production of rivers and of winds; and we have no cause\nto complain of sands and marshes, since there are so many places still\nremaining to be cultivated. Moreover, it must not be supposed that all is\nmade for man alone: and the author is persuaded that there are not only\npure spirits but also immortal animals of a nature akin to these spirits,\nthat is, animals whose souls are united to an ethereal and incorruptible\nmatter. But it is not the same with animals whose body is terrestrial,\ncomposed of tubes and fluids which circulate therein, and whose motion is\nterminated by the breaking of the vessels. Thence the author is led to\nbelieve that the immortality granted to Adam, if he had been obedient,\nwould not have been an effect of his nature, but of the grace of God.\n\n9. Now it was necessary for the conservation of corruptible animals that\nthey should have indications causing them to recognize a present danger,\nand giving them the inclination to avoid it. That is why what is about to\ncause a great injury must beforehand cause pain such as may force the\nanimal to efforts capable of repulsing or shunning the cause of this\ndiscomfort, and of forestalling a greater evil. The dread of death helps\nalso to cause its avoidance: for it if were not so ugly and if the\ndissolution of continuity were not so painful, very often animals would\ntake no precautions against perishing, or allowing the parts of their [414]\nbody to perish, and the strongest would have difficulty in subsisting for a\nwhole day.\n\nGod has also given hunger and thirst to animals, to compel them to feed and\nmaintain themselves by replacing that which is used up and which disappears\nimperceptibly. These appetites are of use also to prompt them to work, in\norder to procure a nourishment meet for their constitution, and which may\navail to invigorate them. It was even found necessary by the Author of\nthings that one animal very often should serve as food for another. This\nhardly renders the victim more unhappy, since death caused by diseases is\ngenerally just as painful as a violent death, if not more so; and animals\nsubject to being preyed upon by others, having neither foresight nor\nanxiety for the future, have a life no less tranquil when they are not in\ndanger. It is the same with inundations, earthquakes, thunderbolts and\nother disorders, which brute beasts do not fear, and which men have\nordinarily no cause to fear, since there are few that suffer thereby.\n\n10. The Author of Nature has compensated for these evils and others, which\nhappen only seldom, with a thousand advantages that are ordinary and\nconstant. Hunger and thirst augment the pleasure experienced in the taking\nof nourishment. Moderate work is an agreeable exercise of the animal's\npowers; and sleep is also agreeable in an altogether opposite way,\nrestoring the forces through repose. But one of the pleasures most intense\nis that which prompts animals to propagation. God, having taken care to\nensure that the species should be immortal, since the individual cannot be\nso here on earth, also willed that animals should have a great tenderness\nfor their little ones, even to the point of endangering themselves for\ntheir preservation. From pain and from sensual pleasure spring fear,\ncupidity and the other passions that are ordinarily serviceable, although\nit may accidentally happen that they sometimes turn towards ill: one must\nsay as much of poisons, epidemic diseases and other hurtful things, namely\nthat these are indispensable consequences of a well-conceived system. As\nfor ignorance and errors, it must be taken into account that the most\nperfect creatures are doubtless ignorant of much, and that knowledge is\nwont to be proportionate to needs. Nevertheless it is necessary that one be\nexposed to hazards which cannot be foreseen, and accidents of such kinds\nare inevitable. One must often be mistaken in one's judgement, because it\nis not always permitted to suspend it long enough for exact           [415]\nconsideration. These disadvantages are inseparable from the system of\nthings: for things must very often resemble one another in a certain\nsituation, the one being taken for the other. But the inevitable errors are\nnot the most usual, nor the most pernicious. Those which cause us the most\nharm are wont to arise through our fault; and consequently one would be\nwrong to make natural evils a pretext for taking one's own life, since one\nfinds that those who have done so have generally been prompted to such\naction by voluntary evils.\n\n11. After all, one finds that all these evils of which we have spoken come\naccidentally from good causes; and there is reason to infer concerning all\nwe do not know, from all we do know, that one could not have done away with\nthem without falling into greater troubles. For the better understanding of\nthis the author counsels us to picture the world as a great building. There\nmust be not only apartments, halls, galleries, gardens, grottoes, but also\nthe kitchen, the cellar, the poultry-yard, stables, drainage. Thus it would\nnot have been proper to make only suns in the world, or to make an earth\nall of gold and of diamonds, but not habitable. If man had been all eye or\nall ear, he would not have been fitted for feeding himself. If God had made\nhim without passions, he would have made him stupid; and if he had wished\nto make man free from error he would have had to deprive him of senses, or\ngive him powers of sensation through some other means than organs, that is\nto say, there would not have been any man. Our learned author remarks here\nupon an idea which histories both sacred and profane appear to inculcate,\nnamely that wild beasts, poisonous plants and other natures that are\ninjurious to us have been armed against us by sin. But as he argues here\nonly in accordance with the principles of reason he sets aside what\nRevelation can teach. He believes, however, that Adam would have been\nexempted from natural evils (if he had been obedient) only by virtue of\ndivine grace and of a covenant made with God, and that Moses expressly\nindicates only about seven effects of the first sin. These effects are:\n\n1. The revocation of the gracious gift of immortality.\n\n2. The sterility of the earth, which was no longer to be fertile of itself,\nsave in evil or useless herbs.\n\n3. The rude toil one must exercise in order to gain sustenance.\n\n4. The subjection of the woman to the will of the husband.\n\n                                                                      [416]\n5. The pains of childbirth.\n\n6. The enmity between man and the serpent.\n\n7. The banishment of man from the place of delight wherein God had placed\nhim.\n\nBut our author thinks that many of our evils spring from the necessity of\nmatter, especially since the withdrawal of grace. Moreover, it seems to him\nthat after our banishment immortality would be only a burden to us, and\nthat it is perhaps more for our good than to punish us that the tree of\nlife has become inaccessible to us. On one point or another one might have\nsomething to say in objection, but the body of the discourse by our author\non the origin of evils is full of good and sound reflexions, which I have\njudged it advisable to turn to advantage. Now I must pass on to the subject\nof our controversy, that is, the explanation of the nature of freedom.\n\n12. The learned author of this work on the origin of evil, proposing to\nexplain the origin of moral evil in the fifth chapter, which makes up half\nof the whole book, considers that it is altogether different from that of\nphysical evil, which lies in the inevitable imperfection of creatures. For,\nas we shall see presently, it appears to him that moral evil comes rather\nfrom that which he calls a perfection, which the creature has in common,\naccording to him, with the Creator, that is to say, in the power of\nchoosing without any motive and without any final or impelling cause. It is\na very great paradox to assert that the greatest imperfection, namely sin,\nsprings from perfection itself. But it is no less a paradox to present as a\nperfection the thing which is the least reasonable in the world, the\nadvantage whereof would consist in being privileged against reason. And\nthat, after all, rather than pointing out the source of the evil, would be\nto contend that it has none. For if the will makes its resolve without the\nexistence of anything, either in the person who chooses or in the object\nwhich is chosen, to prompt it to the choice, there will be neither cause\nnor reason for this election; and as moral evil consists in the wrong\nchoice, that is admitting that moral evil has no source at all. Thus in the\nrules of good metaphysics there would have to be no moral evil in Nature;\nand also for the same reason there would be no moral good either, and all\nmorality would be destroyed. But we must listen to our gifted author, from\nwhom the subtlety of an opinion maintained by famous philosophers among the\nSchoolmen, and the adornments that he has added thereto himself by his[417]\nwit and his eloquence, have hidden the great disadvantages contained\ntherein. In setting forth the position reached in the controversy, he\ndivides the writers into two parties. The one sort, he says, are content to\nsay that the freedom of the will is exempt from outward constraint; and the\nother sort maintain that it is also exempt from inward necessity. But this\nexposition does not suffice, unless one distinguish the necessity that is\nabsolute and contrary to morality from hypothetical necessity and moral\nnecessity, as I have already explained in many places.\n\n13. The first section of this chapter is to indicate the nature of choice.\nThe author sets forth in the first place the opinion of those who believe\nthat the will is prompted by the judgement of the understanding, or by\nanterior inclinations of the desires, to resolve upon the course that it\nadopts. But he confuses these authors with those who assert that the will\nis prompted to its resolution by an absolute necessity, and who maintain\nthat the person who wills has no power over his volitions: that is, he\nconfuses a Thomist with a Spinozist. He makes use of the admissions and the\nodious declarations of Mr. Hobbes and his like, to lay them to the charge\nof those who are infinitely far removed from them, and who take great care\nto refute them. He lays these things to their charge because they believe,\nas Mr. Hobbes believes, like everyone else (save for some doctors who are\nenveloped in their own subtleties), that the will is moved by the\nrepresentation of good and evil. Thence he imputes to them the opinion that\nthere is therefore no such thing as contingency, and that all is connected\nby an absolute necessity. That is a very speedy manner of reasoning; yet he\nadds also, that properly speaking there will be no evil will, since if\nthere were, all one could object to therein would be the evil which it can\ncause. That, he says, is different from the common notion, since the world\ncensures the wicked not because they do harm, but because they do harm\nwithout necessity. He holds also that the wicked would be only unfortunate\nand by no means culpable; that there would be no difference between\nphysical evil and moral evil, since man himself would not be the true cause\nof an action which he could not avoid; that evil-doers would not be either\nblamed or maltreated because they deserve it, but because that action may\nserve to turn people away from evil; again, for this reason only one would\nfind fault with a rogue, but not with a sick man, that reproaches and [418]\nthreats can correct the one, and cannot cure the other. And further,\naccording to this doctrine, chastisements would have no object save the\nprevention of future evil, without which the mere consideration of the evil\nalready done would not be sufficient for punishment. Likewise gratitude\nwould have as its sole aim that of procuring a fresh benefit, without which\nthe mere consideration of the past benefit would not furnish a sufficient\nreason. Finally the author thinks that if this doctrine, which derives the\nresolution of the will from the representation of good and evil, were true,\none must despair of human felicity, since it would not be in our power, and\nwould depend upon things which are outside us. Now as there is no ground\nfor hoping that things from outside will order themselves and agree\ntogether in accordance with our wishes, there will always lack something to\nus, and there will always be something too much. All these conclusions\nhold, according to him, against those also who think that the will makes\nits resolve in accordance with the final judgement of the understanding, an\nopinion which, as he considers, strips the will of its right and renders\nthe soul quite passive. This accusation is also directed against countless\nserious writers, of accepted authority, who are here placed in the same\nclass with Mr. Hobbes and Spinoza, and with some other discredited authors,\nwhose doctrine is considered odious and insupportable. As for me, I do not\nrequire the will always to follow the judgement of the understanding,\nbecause I distinguish this judgement from the motives that spring from\ninsensible perceptions and inclinations. But I hold that the will always\nfollows the most advantageous representation, whether distinct or confused,\nof the good or the evil resulting from reasons, passions and inclinations,\nalthough it may also find motives for suspending its judgement. But it is\nalways upon motives that it acts.\n\n14. It will be necessary to answer these objections to my opinion before\nproceeding to establish that of our author. The misapprehension of my\nopponents originates in their confusing a consequence which is necessary\nabsolutely, whose contrary implies contradiction, with a consequence which\nis founded only upon truths of fitness, and nevertheless has its effect. To\nput it otherwise, there is a confusion between what depends upon the\nprinciple of contradiction, which makes necessary and indispensable truths,\nand what depends upon the principle of the sufficient reason, which   [419]\napplies also to contingent truths. I have already elsewhere stated this\nproposition, which is one of the most important in philosophy, pointing out\nthat there are two great principles, namely, _that of identicals or of\ncontradiction_, which states that of two contradictory enunciations the one\nis true and the other false, and _that of the sufficient reason_, which\nstates that there is no true enunciation whose reason could not be seen by\none possessing all the knowledge necessary for its complete understanding.\nBoth principles must hold not only in necessary but also in contingent\ntruths; and it is even necessary that that which has no sufficient reason\nshould not exist. For one may say in a sense that these two principles are\ncontained in the definition of the true and the false. Nevertheless, when\nin making the analysis of the truth submitted one sees it depending upon\ntruths whose contrary implies contradiction, one may say that it is\nabsolutely necessary. But when, while pressing the analysis to the furthest\nextent, one can never attain to such elements of the given truth, one must\nsay that it is contingent, and that it originates from a prevailing reason\nwhich inclines without necessitating. Once that is granted, it is seen how\nwe can say with sundry famous philosophers and theologians, that the\nthinking substance is prompted to its resolution by the prevailing\nrepresentation of good or of evil, and this certainly and infallibly, but\nnot necessarily, that is, by reasons which incline it without necessitating\nit. That is why contingent futurities, foreseen both in themselves and\nthrough their reasons, remain contingent. God was led infallibly by his\nwisdom and by his goodness to create the world through his power, and to\ngive it the best possible form; but he was not led thereto of necessity,\nand the whole took place without any diminution of his perfect and supreme\nwisdom. And I do not know if it would be easy, apart from the reflexions we\nhave just entertained, to untie the Gordian knot of contingency and\nfreedom.\n\n15. This explanation dismisses all the objections of our gifted opponent.\nIn the first place, it is seen that contingency exists together with\nfreedom. Secondly, evil wills are evil not only because they do harm, but\nalso because they are a source of harmful things, or of physical evils, a\nwicked spirit being, in the sphere of its activity, what the evil principle\nof the Manichaeans would be in the universe. Moreover, the author has\nobserved (ch. 4, sect. 4, Sec. 8) that divine wisdom has usually forbidden\nactions which would cause discomforts, that is to say, physical evils.[420]\nIt is agreed that he who causes evil by necessity is not culpable. But\nthere is neither legislator nor lawyer who by this necessity means the\nforce of the considerations of good or evil, real or apparent, that have\nprompted man to do ill: else anyone stealing a great sum of money or\nkilling a powerful man in order to attain to high office would be less\ndeserving of punishment than one who should steal a few halfpence for a mug\nof beer or wantonly kill his neighbour's dog, since these latter were\ntempted less. But it is quite the opposite in the administration of justice\nwhich is authorized in the world: for the greater is the temptation to sin,\nthe more does it need to be repressed by the fear of a great chastisement.\nBesides, the greater the calculation evident in the design of an evil-doer,\nthe more will it be found that the wickedness has been deliberate, and the\nmore readily will one decide that it is great and deserving of punishment.\nThus a too artful fraud causes the aggravating crime called _stellionate_,\nand a cheat becomes a forger when he has the cunning to sap the very\nfoundations of our security in written documents. But one will have greater\nindulgence for a great passion, because it is nearer to madness. The Romans\npunished with the utmost severity the priests of the God Apis, when these\nhad prostituted the chastity of a noble lady to a knight who loved her to\ndistraction, making him pass as their god; while it was found enough to\nsend the lover into exile. But if someone had done evil deeds without\napparent reason and without appearance of passion the judge would be\ntempted to take him for a madman, especially if it proved that he was given\nto committing such extravagances often: this might tend towards reduction\nof the penalty, rather than supplying the true grounds of wickedness and\npunishment. So far removed are the principles of our opponents from the\npractice of the tribunals and from the general opinion of men.\n\n16. Thirdly, the distinction between physical evil and moral evil will\nstill remain, although there be this in common between them, that they have\ntheir reasons and causes. And why manufacture new difficulties for oneself\nconcerning the origin of moral evil, since the principle followed in the\nsolution of those which natural evils have raised suffices also to account\nfor voluntary evils? That is to say, it suffices to show that one could not\nhave prevented men from being prone to errors, without changing the   [421]\nconstitution of the best of systems or without employing miracles at every\nturn. It is true that sin makes up a large portion of human wretchedness,\nand even the largest; but that does not prevent one from being able to say\nthat men are wicked and deserving of punishment: else one must needs say\nthat the actual sins of the non-regenerate are excusable, because they\nspring from the first cause of our wretchedness, which is original sin.\nFourthly, to say that the soul becomes passive and that man is not the true\ncause of sin, if he is prompted to his voluntary actions by their objects,\nas our author asserts in many passages, and particularly ch. 5, sect. 1,\nsub-sect. 3, Sec. 18, is to create for oneself new senses for terms. When the\nancients spoke of that which is [Greek: eph' hemin], or when we speak of\nthat which depends upon us, of spontaneity, of the inward principle of our\nactions, we do not exclude the representation of external things; for these\nrepresentations are in our souls, they are a portion of the modifications\nof this active principle which is within us. No agent is capable of acting\nwithout being _predisposed_ to what the action demands; and the reasons or\ninclinations derived from good or evil are the dispositions that enable the\nsoul to decide between various courses. One will have it that the will is\nalone active and supreme, and one is wont to imagine it to be like a queen\nseated on her throne, whose minister of state is the understanding, while\nthe passions are her courtiers or favourite ladies, who by their influence\noften prevail over the counsel of her ministers. One will have it that the\nunderstanding speaks only at this queen's order; that she can vacillate\nbetween the arguments of the minister and the suggestions of the\nfavourites, even rejecting both, making them keep silence or speak, and\ngiving them audience or not as seems good to her. But it is a\npersonification or mythology somewhat ill-conceived. If the will is to\njudge, or take cognizance of the reasons and inclinations which the\nunderstanding or the senses offer it, it will need another understanding in\nitself, to understand what it is offered. The truth is that the soul, or\nthe thinking substance, understands the reasons and feels the inclinations,\nand decides according to the predominance of the representations modifying\nits active force, in order to shape the action. I have no need here to\napply my system of Pre-established Harmony, which shows our independence to\nthe best advantage and frees us from the physical influence of objects. For\nwhat I have just said is sufficient to answer the objection. Our      [422]\nauthor, even though he admits with people in general this physical\ninfluence of objects upon us, observes nevertheless with much perspicacity\nthat the body or the objects of the senses do not even give us our ideas,\nmuch less the active force of our soul, and that they serve only to draw\nout that which is within us. This is much in the spirit of M. Descartes'\nbelief that the soul, not being able to give force to the body, gives it at\nleast some direction. It is a mean between one side and the other, between\nphysical influence and Pre-established Harmony.\n\n17. Fifthly, the objection is made that, according to my opinion, sin would\nneither be censured nor punished because of its deserts, but because the\ncensure and the chastisement serve to prevent it another time; whereas men\ndemand something more, namely, satisfaction for the crime, even though it\nshould serve neither for amendment nor for example. So do men with reason\ndemand that true gratitude should come from a true recognition of the past\nbenefit, and not from the interested aim of extorting a fresh benefit. This\nobjection contains noble and sound considerations, but it does not strike\nat me. I require a man to be virtuous, grateful, just, not only from the\nmotive of interest, of hope or of fear, but also of the pleasure that he\nshould find in good actions: else one has not yet reached the degree of\nvirtue that one must endeavour to attain. That is what one means by saying\nthat justice and virtue must be loved for their own sake; and it is also\nwhat I explained in justifying 'disinterested love', shortly before the\nopening of the controversy which caused so much stir. Likewise I consider\nthat wickedness is all the greater when its practice becomes a pleasure, as\nwhen a highwayman, after having killed men because they resist, or because\nhe fears their vengeance, finally grows cruel and takes pleasure in killing\nthem, and even in making them suffer beforehand. Such a degree of\nwickedness is taken to be diabolical, even though the man affected with it\nfinds in this execrable indulgence a stronger reason for his homicides than\nhe had when he killed simply under the influence of hope or of fear. I have\nalso observed in answering the difficulties of M. Bayle that, according to\nthe celebrated Conringius, justice which punishes by means of _medicinal_\npenalties, so to speak, that is, in order to correct the criminal or at\nleast to provide an example for others, might exist in the opinion of those\nwho do away with the freedom that is exempt from necessity. True      [423]\nretributive justice, on the other hand, going beyond the medicinal, assumes\nsomething more, namely, intelligence and freedom in him who sins, because\nthe harmony of things demands a satisfaction, or evil in the form of\nsuffering, to make the mind feel its error after the voluntary active evil\nwhereto it has consented. Mr. Hobbes also, who does away with freedom, has\nrejected retributive justice, as do the Socinians, drawing on themselves\nthe condemnation of our theologians; although the writers of the Socinian\nparty are wont to exaggerate the idea of freedom.\n\n18. Sixthly, the objection is finally made that men cannot hope for\nfelicity if the will can only be actuated by the representation of good and\nevil. But this objection seems to me completely null and void, and I think\nit would be hard to guess how any tolerable interpretation was ever put\nupon it. Moreover, the line of reasoning adopted to prove it is of a most\nastounding nature: it is that our felicity depends upon external things, if\nit is true that it depends upon the representation of good or evil. It is\ntherefore not in our own power, so it is said, for we have no ground for\nhoping that outward things will arrange themselves for our pleasure. This\nargument is halting from every aspect. _There is no force in the inference:\none might grant the conclusion: the argument may be retorted upon the\nauthor_. Let us begin with the retort, which is easy. For are men any\nhappier or more independent of the accidents of fortune upon this argument,\nor because they are credited with the advantage of choosing without reason?\nHave they less bodily suffering? Have they less tendency toward true or\napparent goods, less fear of true or imaginary evils? Are they any less\nenslaved by sensual pleasure, by ambition, by avarice? less apprehensive?\nless envious? Yes, our gifted author will say; I will prove it by a method\nof counting or assessment. I would rather he had proved it by experience;\nbut let us see this proof by counting. Suppose that by my choice, which\nenables me to give goodness-for-me to that which I choose, I give to the\nobject chosen six degrees of goodness, when previously there were two\ndegrees of evil in my condition; I shall become happy all at once, and with\nperfect ease, for I should have four degrees surplus, or net good.\nDoubtless that is all very well; but unfortunately it is impossible. For\nwhat possibility is there of giving these six degrees of goodness to the\nobject? To that end we must needs have the power to change our taste, or\nthe things, as we please. That would be almost as if I could say to   [424]\nlead, Thou shalt be gold, and make it so; to the pebble, Thou shalt be\ndiamond; or at the least, Thou shalt look like it. Or it would be like the\ncommon explanation of the Mosaical passage which seems to say that the\ndesert manna assumed any taste the Israelites desired to give to it. They\nonly had to say to their homerful, Thou shalt be a capon, thou shalt be a\npartridge. But if I am free to give these six degrees of goodness to the\nobject, am I not permitted to give it more goodness? I think that I am. But\nif that is so, why shall we not give to the object all the goodness\nconceivable? Why shall we not even go as far as twenty-four carats of\ngoodness? By this means behold us completely happy, despite the accidents\nof fortune; it may blow, hail or snow, and we shall not mind: by means of\nthis splendid secret we shall be always shielded against fortuitous events.\nThe author agrees (in this first section of the fifth chapter, sub-sect. 3,\nSec. 12) that this power overcomes all the natural appetites and cannot be\novercome by any of them; and he regards it (Sec.Sec. 20, 21, 22) as the soundest\nfoundation for happiness. Indeed, since there is nothing capable of\nlimiting a power so indeterminate as that of choosing without any reason,\nand of giving goodness to the object through the choice, either this\ngoodness must exceed infinitely that which the natural appetites seek in\nobjects, these appetites and objects being limited while this power is\nindependent or at the least this goodness, given by the will to the chosen\nobject, must be arbitrary and of such a kind as the will desires. For\nwhence would one derive the reason for limits if the object is possible, if\nit is within reach of him who wills, and if the will can give it the\ngoodness it desires to give, independently of reality and of appearances?\nIt seems to me that may suffice to overthrow a hypothesis so precarious,\nwhich contains something of a fairy-tale kind, _optantis ista sunt, non\ninvenientis_. It therefore remains only too true that this handsome fiction\ncannot render us more immune from evils. And we shall see presently that\nwhen men place themselves above certain desires or certain aversions they\ndo so through other desires, which always have their foundation in the\nrepresentation of good and evil. I said also 'that one might grant the\nconclusion of the argument', which states that our happiness does not\ndepend absolutely upon ourselves, at least in the present state of human\nlife: for who would question the fact that we are liable to meet a thousand\naccidents which human prudence cannot evade? How, for example, can I  [425]\navoid being swallowed up, together with a town where I take up my abode, by\nan earthquake, if such is the order of things? But finally I can also deny\nthe inference in the argument, which states that if the will is only\nactuated by the representation of good and evil our happiness does not\ndepend upon ourselves. The inference would be valid if there were no God,\nif everything were ruled by brute causes; but God's ordinance is that for\nthe attainment of happiness it suffices that one be virtuous. Thus, if the\nsoul follows reason and the orders that God has given it, it is assured of\nits happiness, even though one may not find a sufficiency thereof in this\nlife.\n\n19. Having thus endeavoured to point out the disadvantages of my\nhypothesis, our gifted author sets forth the advantages of his own. He\nbelieves that it alone is capable of saving our freedom, that all our\nfelicity rests therein, that it increases our goods and lessens our evils,\nand that an agent possessing this power is so much the more complete. These\nadvantages have almost all been already disproved. We have shown that for\nthe securing of our freedom it is enough that the representations of goods\nand of evils, and other inward or outward dispositions, should incline us\nwithout constraining us. Moreover one does not see how pure indifference\ncan contribute to felicity; on the contrary, the more indifferent one is,\nthe more insensitive and the less capable of enjoying what is good will one\nprove to be. Besides the hypothesis proves too much. For if an indifferent\npower could give itself the consciousness of good it could also give itself\nthe most perfect happiness, as has been already shown. And it is manifest\nthat there is nothing which would set limits to that power, since limits\nwould withdraw it from its pure indifference, whence, so our author\nalleges, it only emerges of itself, or rather wherein it has never been.\nFinally one does not see wherein the perfection of pure indifference lies:\non the contrary, there is nothing more imperfect; it would render knowledge\nand goodness futile, and would reduce everything to chance, with no rules,\nand no measures that could be taken. There are, however, still some\nadvantages adduced by our author which have not been discussed. He\nconsiders then that by this power alone are we the true cause to which our\nactions can be imputed, since otherwise we should be under the compulsion\nof external objects; likewise that by this power alone can one ascribe to\noneself the merit of one's own felicity, and feel pleased with        [426]\noneself. But the exact opposite is the case: for when one happens upon the\naction through an absolutely indifferent movement, and not as a result of\none's good or bad qualities, is it not just as though one were to happen\nupon it blindly by chance or hazard? Why then should one boast of a good\naction, or why should one be censured for an evil one, if the thanks or\nblame redounds to fortune or hazard? I think that one is more worthy of\npraise when one owes the action to one's good qualities, and the more\nculpable in proportion as one has been impelled to it by one's evil\nqualities. To attempt to assess actions without weighing the qualities\nwhence they spring is to talk at random and to put an imaginary indefinable\nsomething in the place of causes. Thus, if this chance or this indefinable\nsomething were the cause of our actions, to the exclusion of our natural or\nacquired qualities, of our inclinations, of our habits, it would not be\npossible to set one's hopes upon anything depending upon the resolve of\nothers, since it would not be possible to fix something indefinite, or to\nconjecture into what roadstead the uncertain weather of an extravagant\nindifference will drive the vessel of the will.\n\n20. But setting aside advantages and disadvantages, let us see how our\nlearned author will justify the hypothesis from which he promises us so\nmuch good. He imagines that it is only God and the free creatures who are\nactive in the true sense, and that in order to be active one must be\ndetermined by oneself only. Now that which is determined by itself must not\nbe determined by objects, and consequently the free substance, in so far as\nit is free, must be indifferent with regard to objects, and emerge from\nthis indifference only by its own choice, which shall render the object\npleasing to it. But almost all the stages of this argument have their\nstumbling-blocks. Not only the free creatures, but also all the other\nsubstances and natures composed of substances, are active. Beasts are not\nfree, and yet all the same they have active souls, unless one assume, with\nthe Cartesians, that they are mere machines. Moreover, it is not necessary\nthat in order to be active one should be determined only by oneself, since\na thing may receive direction without receiving force. So it is that the\nhorse is controlled by the rider and the vessel is steered by the helm; and\nM. Descartes' belief was that our body, having force in itself, receives\nonly some direction from the soul. Thus an active thing may receive from\noutside some determination or direction, capable of changing that     [427]\ndirection which it would take of itself. Finally, even though an active\nsubstance is determined only by itself, it does not follow that it is not\nmoved by objects: for it is the representation of the object within it\nwhich contributes towards the determination. Now the representation does\nnot come from without, and consequently there is complete spontaneity.\nObjects do not act upon intelligent substances as efficient and physical\ncauses, but as final and moral causes. When God acts in accordance with his\nwisdom, he is guided by the ideas of the possibles which are his objects,\nbut which have no reality outside him before their actual creation. Thus\nthis kind of spiritual and moral motion is not contrary to the activity of\nthe substance, nor to the spontaneity of its action. Finally, even though\nfree power were not determined by the objects, it can never be indifferent\nto the action when it is on the point of acting, since the action must have\nits origin in a disposition to act: otherwise one will do anything from\nanything, _quidvis ex quovis_, and there will be nothing too absurd for us\nto imagine. But this disposition will have already broken the charm of mere\nindifference, and if the soul gives itself this disposition there must\nneeds be another predisposition for this act of giving it. Consequently,\nhowever far back one may go, one will never meet with a mere indifference\nin the soul towards the actions which it is to perform. It is true that\nthese dispositions incline it without constraining it. They relate usually\nto the objects; but there are some, notwithstanding, which arise variously\n_a subjecto_ or from the soul itself, and which bring it about that one\nobject is more acceptable than the other, or that the same is more\nacceptable at one time than at another.\n\n21. Our author continually assures us that his hypothesis is true, and he\nundertakes to show that this indifferent power is indeed found in God, and\neven that it must be attributed to him of necessity. For (he says) nothing\nis to God either good or bad in creatures. He has no natural appetite, to\nbe satisfied by the enjoyment of anything outside him. He is therefore\nabsolutely indifferent to all external things, since by them he can neither\nbe helped nor hindered; and he must determine himself and create as it were\nan appetite in making his choice. And having once chosen, he will wish to\nabide by his choice, just as if he had been prompted thereto by a natural\ninclination. Thus will the divine will be the cause of goodness in beings.\nThat is to say, there will be goodness in the objects, not by their   [428]\nnature, but by the will of God: whereas if that will be excluded neither\ngood nor evil can exist in things. It is difficult to imagine how writers\nof merit could have been misled by so strange an opinion, for the reason\nwhich appears to be advanced here has not the slightest force. It seems to\nme as though an attempt is being made to justify this opinion by the\nconsideration that all creatures have their whole being from God, so that\nthey cannot act upon him or determine him. But this is clearly an instance\nof self-deception. When we say that an intelligent substance is actuated by\nthe goodness of its object, we do not assert that this object is\nnecessarily a being existing outside the substance, and it is enough for us\nthat it be conceivable: for its representation acts in the substance, or\nrather the substance acts upon itself, in so far as it is disposed and\ninfluenced by this representation. With God, it is plain that his\nunderstanding contains the ideas of all possible things, and that is how\neverything is in him in a transcendent manner. These ideas represent to him\nthe good and evil, the perfection and imperfection, the order and disorder,\nthe congruity and incongruity of possibles; and his superabundant goodness\nmakes him choose the most advantageous. God therefore determines himself by\nhimself; his will acts by virtue of his goodness, but it is particularized\nand directed in action by understanding filled with wisdom. And since his\nunderstanding is perfect, since his thoughts are always clear, his\ninclinations always good, he never fails to do the best; whereas we may be\ndeceived by the mere semblances of truth and goodness. But how is it\npossible for it to be said that there is no good or evil in the ideas\nbefore the operation of God's will? Does the will of God form the ideas\nwhich are in his understanding? I dare not ascribe to our learned author so\nstrange a sentiment, which would confuse understanding and will, and would\nsubvert the current use of our notions. Now if ideas are independent of\nwill, the perfection or imperfection which is represented in them will be\nindependent also. Indeed, is it by the will of God, for example, or is it\nnot rather by the nature of numbers, that certain numbers allow more than\nothers of various exact divisions? that some are more fitted than others\nfor forming battalions, composing polygons and other regular figures? that\nthe number six has the advantage of being the least of all the numbers that\nare called perfect? that in a plane six equal circles may touch a seventh?\nthat of all equal bodies, the sphere has the least surface? that      [429]\ncertain lines are incommensurable, and consequently ill-adapted for\nharmony? Do we not see that all these advantages or disadvantages spring\nfrom the idea of the thing, and that the contrary would imply\ncontradiction? Can it be thought that the pain and discomfort of sentient\ncreatures, and above all the happiness and unhappiness of intelligent\nsubstances, are a matter of indifference to God? And what shall be said of\nhis justice? Is it also something arbitrary, and would he have acted wisely\nand justly if he had resolved to condemn the innocent? I know that there\nhave been writers so ill-advised as to maintain an opinion so dangerous and\nso liable to overthrow religion. But I am assured that our illustrious\nauthor is far from holding it. Nevertheless, it seems as though this\nhypothesis tends in that direction, if there is nothing in objects save\nwhat is indifferent to the divine will before its choice. It is true that\nGod has need of nothing; but the author has himself shown clearly that\nGod's goodness, and not his need, prompted him to produce creatures. There\nwas therefore in him a reason anterior to the resolution; and, as I have\nsaid so many times, it was neither by chance nor without cause, nor even by\nnecessity, that God created this world, but rather as a result of his\ninclination, which always prompts him to the best. Thus it is surprising\nthat our author should assert here (ch. 5, sect. 1, sub-sect. 4, Sec. 5) that\nthere is no reason which could have induced God, absolutely perfect and\nhappy in himself, to create anything outside him, although, according to\nthe author's previous declarations (ch. 1, sect. 3, Sec.Sec. 8, 9), God acts for\nan end, and his aim is to communicate his goodness. It was therefore not\naltogether a matter of indifference to him whether he should create or not\ncreate, and creation is notwithstanding a free act. Nor was it a matter of\nindifference to him either, whether he should create one world rather than\nanother; a perpetual chaos, or a completely ordered system. Thus the\nqualities of objects, included in their ideas, formed the reason for God's\nchoice.\n\n22. Our author, having already spoken so admirably about the beauty and\nfittingness of the works of God, has tried to search out phrases that would\nreconcile them with his hypothesis, which appears to deprive God of all\nconsideration for the good or the advantage of creatures. The indifference\nof God prevails (he says) only in his first elections, but as soon as God\nhas chosen something he has virtually chosen, at the same time, all   [430]\nthat which is of necessity connected therewith. There were innumerable\npossible men equally perfect: the election of some from among them is\npurely arbitrary (in the judgement of our author). But God, once having\nchosen them, could not have willed in them anything contrary to human\nnature. Up to this point the author's words are consistent with his\nhypothesis; but those that follow go further. He advances the proposition\nthat when God resolved to produce certain creatures he resolved at the same\ntime, by virtue of his infinite goodness, to give them every possible\nadvantage. Nothing, indeed, could be so reasonable, but also nothing could\nbe so contrary to the hypothesis he has put forward, and he does right to\noverthrow it, rather than prolong the existence of anything so charged with\nincongruities incompatible with the goodness and wisdom of God. Here is the\nway to see plainly that this hypothesis cannot harmonize with what has just\nbeen said. The first question will be: Will God create something or not,\nand wherefore? The author has answered that he will create something in\norder to communicate his goodness. It is therefore no matter of\nindifference to him whether he shall create or not. Next the question is\nasked: Will God create such and such a thing, and wherefore? One must needs\nanswer (to speak consistently) that the same goodness makes him choose the\nbest, and indeed the author falls back on that subsequently. But, following\nhis own hypothesis, he answers that God will create such a thing, but that\nthere is no _wherefore_, because God is absolutely indifferent towards\ncreatures, who have their goodness only from his choice. It is true that\nour author varies somewhat on this point, for he says here (ch. 5, sect. 5,\nsub-sect. 4, Sec. 12) that God is indifferent to the choice between men of\nequal perfection, or between equally perfect kinds of rational creatures.\nThus, according to this form of expression, he would choose rather the more\nperfect kind: and as kinds that are of equal perfection harmonize more or\nless with others, God will choose those that agree best together; there\nwill therefore be no pure and absolute indifference, and the author thus\ncomes back to my principles. But let us speak, as he speaks, in accordance\nwith his hypothesis, and let us assume with him that God chooses certain\ncreatures even though he be absolutely indifferent towards them. He will\nthen just as soon choose creatures that are irregular, ill-shapen,\nmischievous, unhappy, chaos everlasting, monsters everywhere,         [431]\nscoundrels as sole inhabitants of the earth, devils filling the whole\nuniverse, all this rather than excellent systems, shapely forms, upright\npersons, good angels! No, the author will say, God, when once he had\nresolved to create men, resolved at the same time to give them all the\nadvantages possible in the world, and it is the same with regard to\ncreatures of other kinds. I answer, that if this advantage were connected\nof necessity with their nature, the author would be speaking in accordance\nwith his hypothesis. That not being so, however, he must admit that God's\nresolve to give every possible advantage to men arises from a new election\nindependent of that one which prompted God to make men. But whence comes\nthis new election? Does it also come from mere indifference? If such is the\ncase, nothing prompts God to seek the good of men, and if he sometimes\ncomes to do it, it will be merely by accident. But the author maintains\nthat God was prompted to the choice by his goodness; therefore the good and\nill of creatures is no matter of indifference to him, and there are in him\nprimary choices to which the goodness of the object prompts him. He chooses\nnot only to create men, but also to create men as happy as it is possible\nto be in this system. After that not the least vestige of mere indifference\nwill be left, for we can reason concerning the entire world just as we have\nreasoned concerning the human race. God resolved to create a world, but he\nwas bound by his goodness at the same time to make choice of such a world\nas should contain the greatest possible amount of order, regularity,\nvirtue, happiness. For I can see no excuse for saying that whereas God was\nprompted by his goodness to make the men he has resolved to create as\nperfect as is possible within this system, he had not the same good\nintention towards the whole universe. There we have come back again to the\ngoodness of the objects; and pure indifference, where God would act without\ncause, is altogether destroyed by the very procedure of our gifted author,\nwith whom the force of truth, once the heart of the matter was reached,\nprevailed over a speculative hypothesis, which cannot admit of any\napplication to the reality of things.\n\n23. Since, therefore, nothing is altogether indifferent to God, who knows\nall degrees, all effects, all relations of things, and who penetrates at\none and the same time all their possible connexions, let us see whether at\nleast the ignorance and insensibility of man can make him absolutely\nindifferent in his choice. The author regales us with this pure       [432]\nindifference as with a handsome present. Here are the proofs of it which he\ngives: (1) We feel it within us. (2) We have experience within ourselves of\nits marks and its properties. (3) We can show that other causes which might\ndetermine our will are insufficient. As for the first point, he asserts\nthat in feeling freedom within us we feel within us at the same time pure\nindifference. But I do not agree that we feel such indifference, or that\nthis alleged feeling follows upon that of freedom. We feel usually within\nus something which inclines us to our choice. At times it happens, however,\nthat we cannot account for all our dispositions. If we give our mind to the\nquestion, we shall recognize that the constitution of our body and of\nbodies in our environment, the present or previous temper of our soul,\ntogether with countless small things included under these comprehensive\nheadings, may contribute towards our greater or lesser predilection for\ncertain objects, and the variation of our opinions from one time to\nanother. At the same time we shall recognize that none would attribute this\nto mere indifference, or to some indefinable force of the soul which has\nthe same effect upon objects as colours are said to have upon the\nchameleon. Thus the author has no cause here to appeal to the judgement of\nthe people: he does so, saying that in many things the people reason better\nthan the philosophers. It is true that certain philosophers have been\nmisled by chimeras, and it would seem that mere indifference is numbered\namong chimerical notions. But when someone maintains that a thing does not\nexist because the common herd does not perceive it, here the populace\ncannot be regarded as a good judge, being, as it is, only guided by the\nsenses. Many people think that air is nothing when it is not stirred by the\nwind. The majority do not know of imperceptible bodies, the fluid which\ncauses weight or elasticity, magnetic matter, to say nothing of atoms and\nother indivisible substances. Do we say then that these things are not\nbecause the common herd does not know of them? If so, we shall be able to\nsay also that the soul acts sometimes without any disposition or\ninclination contributing towards the production of its act, because there\nare many dispositions and inclinations which are not sufficiently perceived\nby the common herd, for lack of attention and thought. Secondly, as to the\nmarks of the power in question, I have already refuted the claim advanced\nfor it, that it possesses the advantage of making one active, the real\ncause of one's action, and subject to responsibility and morality:    [433]\nthese are not genuine marks of its existence. Here is one the author\nadduces, which is not genuine either, namely, that we have within us a\npower of resisting natural appetites, that is to say of resisting not only\nthe senses, but also the reason. But I have already stated this fact: one\nresists natural appetites through other natural appetites. One sometimes\nendures inconveniences, and is happy to do so; but that is on account of\nsome hope or of some satisfaction which is combined with the ill and\nexceeds it: either one anticipates good from it, or one finds good in it.\nThe author asserts that it is through that power to transform appearances\nwhich he has introduced on the scene, that we render agreeable what at\nfirst displeased us. But who cannot see that the true reason is, that\napplication and attention to the object and custom change our disposition\nand consequently our natural appetites? Once we become used to a rather\nhigh degree of cold or heat, it no longer incommodes us as it formerly did,\nand yet no one would ascribe this effect to our power of choice. Time is\nneeded, for instance, to bring about that hardening, or rather that\ncallosity, which enables the hands of certain workmen to resist a degree of\nheat that would burn our hands. The populace, whom the author invokes,\nguess correctly the cause of this effect, although they sometimes apply it\nin a laughable manner. Two serving-maids being close to the fire in the\nkitchen, one who has burnt herself says to the other: Oh, my dear, who will\nbe able to endure the fire of purgatory? The other answers: Don't be\nabsurd, my good woman, one grows used to everything.\n\n24. But (the author will say) this wonderful power which causes us to be\nindifferent to everything, or inclined towards everything, simply at our\nown free will, prevails over reason itself. And this is his third proof,\nnamely, that one cannot sufficiently explain our actions without having\nrecourse to this power. One sees numbers of people despising the entreaties\nof their friends, the counsels of their neighbours, the reproaches of their\nconscience, discomforts, tortures, death, the wrath of God, hell itself,\nfor the sake of running after follies which have no claim to be good or\ntolerable, save as being freely chosen by such people. All is well in this\nargument, with the exception of the last words only. For when one takes an\nactual instance one will find that there were reasons or causes which led\nthe man to his choice, and that there are very strong bonds to fasten [434]\nhim thereto. A love-affair, for example, will never have arisen from mere\nindifference: inclination or passion will have played its part; but habit\nand stubbornness will cause certain natures to face ruin rather than\nseparation from the beloved. Here is another example cited by the author:\nan atheist, a man like Lucilio Vanini (that is what many people call him,\nwhereas he himself adopts the magnificent name of Giulio Cesare Vanini in\nhis works), will suffer a preposterous martyrdom for his chimera rather\nthan renounce his impiety. The author does not name Vanini; and the truth\nis that this man repudiated his wrong opinions, until he was convicted of\nhaving published atheistical dogmas and acted as an apostle of atheism.\nWhen he was asked whether there was a God, he plucked some grass, saying:\n\n  _Et levis est cespes qui probet esse Deum._\n\nBut since the Attorney General to the Parliament of Toulouse desired to\ncause annoyance to the First President (so it is said), to whom Vanini was\ngranted considerable access, teaching his children philosophy, if indeed he\nwas not altogether in the service of that magistrate, the inquisition was\ncarried through rigorously. Vanini, seeing that there was no chance of\npardon, declared himself, when at the point of death, for what he was, an\natheist; and there was nothing very extraordinary in that. But supposing\nthere were an atheist who gave himself up for torture, vanity might be in\nhis case a strong enough motive, as in that of the Gymnosophist, Calanus,\nand of the Sophist who, according to Lucian's account, was burnt to death\nof his own will. But the author thinks that that very vanity, that\nstubbornness, those other wild intentions of persons who otherwise seem to\nhave quite good sense, cannot be explained by the appetites that arise from\nthe representation of good and evil, and that they compel us to have\nrecourse to that transcendent power which transforms good into evil, and\nevil into good, and the indifferent into good or into evil. But we do not\nneed to go so far, and the causes of our errors are only too visible.\nIndeed, we can make these transformations, but it is not as with the\nFairies, by a mere act of this magic power, but by obscuring and\nsuppressing in one's mind the representations of good or bad qualities\nwhich are naturally attached to certain objects, and by contemplating only\nsuch representations as conform to our taste or our prejudices; or    [435]\nagain, because one attaches to the objects, by dint of thinking of them,\ncertain qualities which are connected with them only accidentally or\nthrough our habitual contemplation of them. For example, all my life long I\ndetest a certain kind of good food, because in my childhood I found in it\nsomething distasteful, which made a strong impression upon me. On the other\nhand, a certain natural defect will be pleasing to me, because it will\nrevive within me to some extent the thought of a person I used to esteem or\nlove. A young man will have been delighted by the applause which has been\nshowered upon him after some successful public action; the impression of\nthis great pleasure will have made him remarkably sensitive to reputation;\nhe will think day and night of nothing save what nourishes this passion,\nand that will cause him to scorn death itself in order to attain his end.\nFor although he may know very well that he will not feel what is said of\nhim after his death, the representation he makes of it for himself\nbeforehand creates a strong impression on his mind. And there are always\nmotives of the same kind in actions which appear most useless and absurd to\nthose who do not enter into these motives. In a word, a strong or\noft-repeated impression may alter considerably our organs, our imagination,\nour memory, and even our reasoning. It happens that a man, by dint of\nhaving often related something untrue, which he has perhaps invented,\nfinally comes to believe in it himself. And as one often represents to\noneself something pleasing, one makes it easy to imagine, and one thinks it\nalso easy to put into effect, whence it comes that one persuades oneself\neasily of what one wishes.\n\n  _Et qui amant ipsi sibi somnia fingunt._\n\n25. Errors are therefore, absolutely speaking, never voluntary, although\nthe will very often contributes towards them indirectly, owing to the\npleasure one takes in giving oneself up to certain thoughts, or owing to\nthe aversion one feels for others. Beautiful print in a book will help\ntowards making it persuasive to the reader. The air and manner of a speaker\nwill win the audience for him. One will be inclined to despise doctrines\ncoming from a man one despises or hates, or from another who resembles him\nin some point that strikes us. I have already said why one is readily\ndisposed to believe what is advantageous or agreeable, and I have known\npeople who at first had changed their religion for worldly            [436]\nconsiderations, but who have been persuaded (and well persuaded) afterwards\nthat they had taken the right course. One sees also that stubbornness is\nnot simply wrong choice persevering, but also a disposition to persevere\ntherein, which is due to some good supposed to be inherent in the choice,\nor some evil imagined as arising from a change. The first choice has\nperchance been made in mere levity, but the intention to abide by it\nsprings from certain stronger reasons or impressions. There are even some\nwriters on ethics who lay it down that one ought to abide by one's choice\nso as not to be inconstant or appear so. Yet perseverance is wrong when one\ndespises the warnings of reason, especially when the subject is important\nenough to be examined carefully; but when the thought of change is\nunpleasant, one readily averts one's attention from it, and that is the way\nwhich most frequently leads one to stubbornness. The author wished to\nconnect stubbornness with his so-called pure indifference. He might then\nhave taken into account that to make us cling to a choice there would be\nneed of more than the mere choice itself or a pure indifference, especially\nif this choice has been made lightly, and all the more lightly in\nproportion to the indifference shown. In such a case we shall be readily\ninclined to reverse the choice, unless vanity, habit, interest or some\nother motive makes us persevere therein. It must not be supposed either\nthat vengeance pleases without cause. Persons of intense feeling ponder\nupon it day and night, and it is hard for them to efface the impression of\nthe wrong or the affront they have sustained. They picture for themselves a\nvery great pleasure in being freed from the thought of scorn which comes\nupon them every moment, and which causes some to find vengeance sweeter\nthan life itself.\n\n  _Quis vindicta bonum vita jucundius ipsa._\n\nThe author would wish to persuade us that usually, when our desire or our\naversion is for some object which does not sufficiently deserve it, we have\ngiven to it the surplus of good or evil which has affected us, through the\nalleged power of choice which makes things appear good or evil as we wish.\nOne has had two degrees of natural evil, one gives oneself six degrees of\nartificial good through the power that can choose without cause. Thus one\nwill have four degrees of net good (ch. 5, sect. 2, Sec. 7). If that could be\ncarried out it would take us far, as I have already said here. The    [437]\nauthor even thinks that ambition, avarice, the gambling mania and other\nfrivolous passions derive all their force from this power (ch. 5, sect. 5,\nsub-sect. 6). But there are besides so many false appearances in things, so\nmany imaginations capable of enlarging or diminishing objects, so many\nunjustified connexions in our arguments, that there is no need of this\nlittle Fairy, that is, of this inward power operating as it were by\nenchantment, to whom the author attributes all these disorders. Indeed, I\nhave already said repeatedly that when we resolve upon some course contrary\nto acknowledged reason, we are prompted to it by another reason stronger to\noutward appearance, such as, for instance, is the pleasure of appearing\nindependent and of performing an extraordinary action. There was in days\npast at the Court of Osnabrueck a tutor to the pages, who, like a second\nMucius Scaevola, held out his arm into the flame and looked like getting a\ngangrene, in order to show that the strength of his mind was greater than a\nvery acute pain. Few people will follow his example; and I do not even know\nif a writer could easily be found who, having once affirmed the existence\nof a power capable of choosing without cause, or even contrary to reason,\nwould be willing to prove his case by his own example, in renouncing some\ngood benefice or some high office, simply in order to display this\nsuperiority of will over reason. But I am sure at the least that an\nintelligent man would not do so. He would be presently aware that someone\nwould nullify his sacrifice by pointing out to him that he had simply\nimitated Heliodorus, Bishop of Larissa. That man (so it is said) held his\nbook on Theagenes and Chariclea dearer than his bishopric; and such a thing\nmay easily happen when a man has resources enabling him to dispense with\nhis office and when he is sensitive to reputation. Thus every day people\nare found ready to sacrifice their advantages to their caprices, that is to\nsay, actual goods to the mere semblance of them.\n\n26. If I wished to follow step by step the arguments of our gifted author,\nwhich often come back to matters previously considered in our inquiry,\nusually however with some elegant and well-phrased addition, I should be\nobliged to proceed too far; but I hope that I shall be able to avoid doing\nso, having, as I think, sufficiently met all his reasons. The best thing is\nthat with him practice usually corrects and amends theory. After having\nadvanced the hypothesis, in the second section of this fifth chapter, [438]\nthat we approach God through the capacity to choose without reason, and\nthat this power being of the noblest kind its exercise is the most capable\nof making one happy, things in the highest degree paradoxical, since it is\nreason which leads us to imitate God and our happiness lies in following\nreason: after that, I say, the author provides an excellent corrective, for\nhe says rightly (Sec. 5) that in order to be happy we must adapt our choice to\nthings, since things are scarcely prone to adapt themselves to us, and that\nthis is in effect adapting oneself to the divine will. Doubtless that is\nwell said, but it implies besides that our will must be guided as far as\npossible by the reality of the objects, and by true representations of good\nand evil. Consequently also the motives of good and evil are not opposed to\nfreedom, and the power of choosing without cause, far from ministering to\nour happiness, will be useless and even highly prejudicial. Thus it is\nhappily the case that this power nowhere exists, and that it is 'a being of\nreasoning reason', as some Schoolmen call the fictions that are not even\npossible. As for me, I should have preferred to call them 'beings of\nnon-reasoning reason'. Also I think that the third section (on wrong\nelections) may pass, since it says that one must not choose things that are\nimpossible, inconsistent, harmful, contrary to the divine will, or already\ntaken by others. Moreover, the author remarks appositely that by\nprejudicing the happiness of others needlessly one offends the divine will,\nwhich desires that all be happy as far as it is possible. I will say as\nmuch of the fourth section, where there is mention of the source of wrong\nelections, which are error or ignorance, negligence, fickleness in changing\ntoo readily, stubbornness in not changing in time, and bad habits; finally\nthere is the importunity of the appetites, which often drive us\ninopportunely towards external things. The fifth section is designed to\nreconcile evil elections or sins with the power and goodness of God; and\nthis section, as it is diffuse, is divided into sub-sections. The author\nhas cumbered himself needlessly with a great objection: for he asserts that\nwithout a power to choose that is altogether indifferent in the choice\nthere would be no sin. Now it was very easy for God to refuse to creatures\na power so irrational. It was sufficient for them to be actuated by the\nrepresentations of goods and evils; it was therefore easy, according to the\nauthor's hypothesis, for God to prevent sin. To extricate himself from this\ndifficulty, he has no other resource than to state that if this power [439]\nwere removed from things the world would be nothing but a purely passive\nmachine. But that is the very thing which I have disproved. If this power\nwere missing in the world (as in fact it is), one would hardly complain of\nthe fact. Souls will be well content with the representations of goods and\nevils for the making of their choice, and the world will remain as\nbeautiful as it is. The author comes back to what he had already put\nforward here, that without this power there would be no happiness. But I\nhave given a sufficient answer to that, and there is not the slightest\nprobability in this assertion and in certain other paradoxes he puts\nforward here to support his principal paradox.\n\n27. He makes a small digression on prayer (sub-sect. 4), saying that those\nwho pray to God hope for some change in the order of nature; but it seems\nas though, according to his opinion, they are mistaken. In reality, men\nwill be content if their prayers are heard, without troubling themselves as\nto whether the course of nature is changed in their favour, or not. Indeed,\nif they receive succour from good angels there will be no change in the\ngeneral order of things. Also this opinion of our author is a very\nreasonable one, that there is a system of spiritual substances, just as\nthere is of corporeal substances, and that the spiritual have communication\nwith one another, even as bodies do. God employs the ministry of angels in\nhis rule of mankind, without any detriment to the order of nature.\nNevertheless, it is easier to put forward theories on these matters than to\nexplain them, unless one have recourse to my system of Harmony. But the\nauthor goes somewhat further. He believes that the mission of the Holy\nSpirit was a great miracle in the beginning, but that now his operations\nwithin us are natural. I leave it to him to explain his opinion, and to\nsettle the matter with other theologians. Yet I observe that he finds the\nnatural efficacy of prayer in the power it has of making the soul better,\nof overcoming the passions, and of winning for oneself a certain degree of\nnew grace. I can say almost the same things on my hypothesis, which\nrepresents the will as acting only in accordance with motives; and I am\nimmune from the difficulties in which the author has become involved over\nhis power of choosing without cause. He is in great embarrassment also with\nregard to the foreknowledge of God. For if the soul is perfectly\nindifferent in its choice how is it possible to foresee this choice? and\nwhat sufficient reason will one be able to find for the knowledge of a[440]\nthing, if there is no reason for its existence? The author puts off to some\nother occasion the solution of this difficulty, which would require\n(according to him) an entire work. For the rest, he sometimes speaks\npertinently, and in conformity with my principles, on the subject of moral\nevil. He says, for example (sub-sect. 6), that vices and crimes do not\ndetract from the beauty of the universe, but rather add to it, just as\ncertain dissonances would offend the ear by their harshness if they were\nheard quite alone, and yet in combination they render the harmony more\npleasing. He also points out divers goods involved in evils, for instance,\nthe usefulness of prodigality in the rich and avarice in the poor; indeed\nit serves to make the arts flourish. We must also bear in mind that we are\nnot to judge the universe by the small size of our globe and of all that is\nknown to us. For the stains and defects in it may be found as useful for\nenhancing the beauty of the rest as patches, which have nothing beautiful\nin themselves, are by the fair sex found adapted to embellish the whole\nface, although they disfigure the part they cover. Cotta, in Cicero's book,\nhad compared providence, in its granting of reason to men, to a physician\nwho allows wine to a patient, notwithstanding that he foresees the misuse\nwhich will be made thereof by the patient, at the expense of his life. The\nauthor replies that providence does what wisdom and goodness require, and\nthat the good which accrues is greater than the evil. If God had not given\nreason to man there would have been no man at all, and God would be like a\nphysician who killed someone in order to prevent his falling ill. One may\nadd that it is not reason which is harmful in itself, but the absence of\nreason; and when reason is ill employed we reason well about means, but not\nadequately about an end, or about that bad end we have proposed to\nourselves. Thus it is always for lack of reason that one does an evil deed.\nThe author also puts forward the objection made by Epicurus in the book by\nLactantius on the wrath of God. The terms of the objection are more or less\nas follows. Either God wishes to banish evils and cannot contrive to do so,\nin which case he would be weak; or he can abolish them, and will not, which\nwould be a sign of malignity in him; or again he lacks power and also will,\nwhich would make him appear both weak and jealous; or finally he can and\nwill, but in this case it will be asked why he then does not banish evil,\nif he exists? The author replies that God cannot banish evil, that he does\nnot wish to either, and that notwithstanding he is neither malicious  [441]\nnor weak. I should have preferred to say that he can banish evil, but that\nhe does not wish to do so absolutely, and rightly so, because he would then\nbanish good at the same time, and he would banish more good than evil.\nFinally our author, having finished his learned work, adds an Appendix, in\nwhich he speaks of the Divine Laws. He fittingly divides these laws into\nnatural and positive. He observes that the particular laws of the nature of\nanimals must give way to the general laws of bodies, that God is not in\nreality angered when his laws are violated, but that order demanded that he\nwho sins should bring an evil upon himself, and that he who does violence\nto others should suffer violence in his turn. But he believes that the\npositive laws of God rather indicate and forecast the evil than cause its\ninfliction. And that gives him occasion to speak of the eternal damnation\nof the wicked, which no longer serves either for correction or example, and\nwhich nevertheless satisfies the retributive justice of God, although the\nwicked bring their unhappiness upon themselves. He suspects, however, that\nthese punishments of the wicked bring some advantage to virtuous people. He\nis doubtful also whether it is not better to be damned than to be nothing:\nfor it might be that the damned are fools, capable of clinging to their\nstate of misery owing to a certain perversity of mind which, he maintains,\nmakes them congratulate themselves on their false judgements in the midst\nof their misery, and take pleasure in finding fault with the will of God.\nFor every day one sees peevish, malicious, envious people who enjoy the\nthought of their ills, and seek to bring affliction upon themselves. These\nideas are not worthy of contempt, and I have sometimes had the like myself,\nbut I am far from passing final judgement on them. I related, in 271 of the\nessays written to oppose M. Bayle, the fable of the Devil's refusal of the\npardon a hermit offers him on God's behalf. Baron Andre Taifel, an Austrian\nnobleman, Knight of the Court of Ferdinand Archduke of Austria who became\nthe second emperor of that name, alluding to his name (which appears to\nmean Devil in German) assumed as his emblem a devil or satyr, with this\nSpanish motto, _Mas perdido, y menos arrepentido_, the more lost, the less\nrepentant, which indicates a hopeless passion from which one cannot free\noneself. This motto was afterwards repeated by the Spanish Count of\nVillamediana when he was said to be in love with the Queen. Coming to the\nquestion why evil often happens to the good and good to the wicked,   [442]\nour illustrious author thinks that it has been sufficiently answered, and\nthat hardly any doubt remains on that point. He observes nevertheless that\none may often doubt whether good people who endure affliction have not been\nmade good by their very misfortune, and whether the fortunate wicked have\nnot perhaps been spoilt by prosperity. He adds that we are often bad\njudges, when it is a question of recognizing not only a virtuous man, but\nalso a happy man. One often honours a hypocrite, and one despises another\nwhose solid virtue is without pretence. We are poor judges of happiness\nalso, and often felicity is hidden from sight under the rags of a contented\npoor man, while it is sought in vain in the palaces of certain of the\ngreat. Finally the author observes, that the greatest felicity here on\nearth lies in the hope of future happiness, and thus it may be said that to\nthe wicked nothing happens save what is of service for correction or\nchastisement, and to the good nothing save what ministers to their greater\ngood. These conclusions entirely correspond to my opinion, and one can say\nnothing more appropriate for the conclusion of this work.\n\n                                                                      [443]\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nCAUSA DEI ASSERTA\nPER JUSTITIAM EJUS\n\n_cum caeteris ejus perfectionibus cunctisque actionibus conciliatam._\n\nThe original edition of the Theodicy contained a fourth appendix under this\ntitle. It presented in scholastic Latin a formal summary of the positive\ndoctrine expressed by the French treatise. It satisfied the academic\nrequirements of its day, but would not, presumably, be of interest to many\nmodern readers, and is consequently omitted here.\n\n                                                                      [445]\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nINDEX\n\n  Abelard, 122, 232-4, 272\n  Abraham, 209\n  Adam, 222, 270-2, 346-7\n  Adam Kadmon, 133\n  Albius, Thomas, 122\n  Alcuin, 77\n  Alfonso, King of Castile, 247-8\n  Aloysius Novarinus, 191\n  Alrasi, 288\n  Alvarez, 149\n  Ambrose, St., 153, 194\n  Amyraut, 238\n  Anaxagoras, 353\n  Andradius, Jacques Payva, 176\n  Andreas Cisalpinus, 81\n  Angelus Silesius, Johann, 79\n  Annat, 344-5\n  Anselm, St., 77\n  Antipater, 232\n  Aquinas, Thomas, _see_ Thomas\n  Arcesilaus, 337\n  Archidemus, 232\n  Aristotelians, 27-8\n  Aristotle, 13, 76-8, 81, 148, 170, 195, 203, 229, 241, 243-4, 265, 269,\n      283, 304, 309-10, 324, 352, 353, 409\n  Arminius, _see_ Irminius\n  Arminius (Jacob Harmensen), 383, 398\n  Arnauld, 67, 89, 225, 254, 260, 264-6, 351\n  Arriaga, 112, 356\n  Arrian, 232\n  Assassins, 284\n  Athanasius, St., 87\n  Augustine (of Hippo), St., 60, 100, 122, 134, 148, 166, 173, 187, 226,\n      274, 285, 294, 296-7, 300-3, 347, 352-3, 378, 384, 409, 412\n  ----, his disciples, 145, 297, 300, 324, 330, 348\n  Augustus (Emperor), 287\n  Aulus Gellius, 258-9, 325, 327\n  Aureolus, Cardinal, 139, 353\n  Averroes, Averroists, 77 ff.\n\n  Bacon, Francis, 306\n  Banez, 149\n  Barbaro, Ermolao, 170\n  Baron, Vincent, 121\n  Baronius, Robert, 84\n  Barton, Thomas, 122\n  Basil, St., 221, 352\n  Bayle, P., 34 ff. _et passim_\n  Becher, Johann Joachim, 334-5\n  Becker, 221\n  Bede, 77\n  Bellarmine, St. Robert, 107, 313, 323\n  Berigardus, Claudius, 81\n  Berkeley, Bp., 11\n  Bernard, St., 277\n  Bernier, 139, 353\n  Bertius, 227\n  de Beze, Theodore, 274\n  _Birgitta, Revelations of St._, 173\n  Boethius, 76, 365-6\n  Bonartes, Thomas, 58, 121-2\n  Bonaventura, St., 294\n  des Bosses, Fr., 121, 389\n  Bossuet, 10\n  Bradwardine, Abp., 159, 176\n  Bramhall, Bp. John, 161, 393\n  Bredenburg, Johan, 349-50\n  Brunswick, Duke of, 8, 82\n  Buckingham, Duke of, 142\n  Buridan's ass, 150, 311, 312\n  Burnet, Thomas, 278\n\n  Cabalists, 79, 133, 347\n  Caesar Cremoninus, 81\n  Cajetan, Cardinal, 100, 243\n  Calanus, 284, 434\n  Caligula, 227\n  Calixtus, 108\n  Calli, 359\n  Callimachus, 213\n  Calovius, 84\n  Calvin, 84-5, 101, 165, 222, 238, 240, 328\n  Cameron, 313\n  Campanella, 217\n  Capella, Martianus, 264\n  Cardan, Jerome, 282, 286\n  Carneades, 312, 320-1, 337\n  Caroli, Andreas, 227\n  Casaubon, Meric, 285\n  Caselius, 82\n  Cassiodorus, 76\n  [Page 446]\n  Casuists, 194, 222, 241\n  Catharin, Ambrose, 173\n  Catherine de Medicis, 227\n  Cato, 263, 318\n  Celsus, 102-3\n  Chardin, 209\n  de la Charmoye, Abbe, 213\n  Chemnitz, Martin, 111, 176\n  Christine, Queen of Sweden, 96, 104\n  Chrysippus, 229-32, 258-9, 324-7\n  Cicero, 99, 194, 229-32, 241, 286, 297, 312, 321, 324-5, 342\n  Claudian, 132, 191, 215\n  Cleanthes, 233, 324\n  Coelius Secundus Curio, 134\n  Coimbra, Fathers of, 325\n  Colerus, 350\n  Conringius, 161, 422\n  Constance, Council of, 234\n  de la Cour, 350-1\n  Crellius, 161\n  Cudworth, Ralph, 64, 245\n  Cuper, Franz, 350\n  Cyrano de Bergerac, 331\n\n  Dacier, 337\n  Daille, 70, 107\n  Davidius, John, 179\n  _De Auxiliis_, 168\n  Democritus, 324\n  Descartes, 12-13, 19-21, 107, 111-12, 140, 150, 156, 224 ff., 239, 244,\n      265, 281, 304, 331, 333, 334, 343, 390, 409, 426\n  Desmarests, Samuel, 241\n  Diodorus, 230-2\n  Diogenianus, 325\n  Dionysius of Halicarnassus, 232\n  Diphilus, 285\n  Diroys, 249-53, 329\n  Dominicans, 348\n  Dreier, 244\n  Drexler, 291\n  Dualists, 251\n  du Plessis-Mornay, 91\n  Durand de Saint-Pourcain, 139, 324, 341, 353\n\n  Empedocles, 324\n  Epictetus, 352\n  Epicureans, 282-3\n  Epicurus, 229-30, 310-11, 319, 320, 324, 395\n  Esprit, Abbe, 131\n  Euclid, 261\n  Euripides, 284, 285\n  Eusebius, 326\n  Eutrapelus, 191\n\n  Fabricius, Johann Ludwig, 67\n  Fabry, 333\n  Fecht, 290, 291, 293\n  Fenelon, 287\n  Fludde, 184\n  Fonseca, 145\n  Foucher, 34, 89, 337\n  Francis I of France, 204\n  Francis of Sales, St., 176\n  Francis Xavier, St., 176\n  Freitag, Johann, 171\n  Fromondus, Libertus, 89\n  Fulgentius, 167\n  _Fur praedestinatus_, 227\n\n  della Galla, Julius Caesar, 171\n  Gassendi, 12, 337\n  Gatacre, Thomas, 262\n  Gerhard, Johann, 291\n  Gerson, 79\n  Gibieuf, 344-5\n  Glarea, Antonio, 366\n  Godescalc, 167, 294\n  Gomarists, 227\n  Gregory, St., the Great, 100, 291, 293, 294\n  Gregory, St., of Nazianzus, 173\n  Gregory, St., of Nyssa, 132\n  Gregory of Rimini, 173\n  Grotius, 77, 91, 161, 194, 241, 243, 276\n  Guerre, Martin, 97-8\n  Gymnosophists, 284\n\n  Hartsoeker, 172\n  Heliodorus of Larissa, 437\n  Heraclitus, 324\n  Herminius, _see_ Irminius\n  Hermippus, 209\n  Herodotus, 196, 208, 210\n  Heshusius, Tilemann, 82\n  Hobbes, Thomas, 67, 89, 159, 161, 234, 265, 348, 393 ff., 410\n  Hoffmann, Daniel, 82\n  Horace, 131, 318\n  Homer, 284\n  Hyde, 209\n\n  Innocent III, Pope, 131\n  Irminius, 209\n  Isbrand, 238\n\n  Jansenists, 145, 346-7\n  Jansenius, 344\n  Jacquelot, 157, 223, 259, 265, 278, 341\n  Jerome, St., 132\n  John of Damascus, St., 77\n  [Page 447]\n  John Scot, 171\n  Jung, 261\n  Jupiter, 213\n  Jurieu, 174, 187, 290-2, 356\n  Justin, 208\n\n  Keckermann, Bartholomaeus, 106\n  Keilah, siege of, 145-6\n  Kendal, George, 228\n  Kepler, 140, 353\n  Kerkering, 351\n  Kessler, Andreas, 83\n  Kortholt, Sebastian, 351\n  Krell, Nicolas, 398\n\n  de Labadie, Jean, 82\n  Lactantius, 221, 285, 286, 440\n  Lami, Francois, 89, 359\n  Lateran Council, 80\n  Laud, Abp., 398\n  de Launoy, 100\n  Lazarus, 294\n  le Clerc, 64, 121, 132, 245, 292\n  Leeuwenhoek, 172\n  Limbourg, 350\n  Lipsius, Justus, 325, 337, 353\n  Livy, 263\n  Locke, John, 8, 9, 33-4, 86, 409\n  Loescher, 298\n  Louis of Dole, 149, 353\n  Lucan, 122, 212\n  Lucian, 265, 434\n  Lucretius, 320\n  Lully, Raymond, 106\n  Luther, 67, 81, 99, 101, 110-11, 122, 298, 328, 395\n\n  Machiavelli, 216\n  Maignan, 359\n  Maimonides, 287-8\n  Malebranche, 172, 244, 254 ff., 276, 280, 333, 359, 361\n  Manichaeans, 59, 98, 113, 124, 208, 274, 419\n  Marchetti, 320\n  Marcion, 213\n  Marcus Aurelius, 263\n  Mary, Blessed Virgin, 193\n  Matthieu, Pierre, 204\n  Maurice, Prince, 398\n  Melanchthon, 81\n  Melissus, 218, 220\n  Menage, 232\n  Meyer, Louis, 82\n  Mithras, 209\n  Molina, 145, 173, 207\n  Molinists, 145, 317, 324, 342\n  More, Henry, 169\n  Moses Germanus, 79\n  de la Motte le Vayer, 282\n  Musaeus, Johann, 86, 111\n\n  Naude, Gabriel, 81\n  Newcastle, Duke of, 393 ff.\n  Newton, Isaac, 34, 85-6\n  Nicole, 96-7, 174, 291, 299\n  Nominalists, 203\n  Novarini, 286\n\n  Ochino, Bernardino, 89\n  Onomaus, 325\n  Opalenius, 194\n  Origen, 102-3, 132, 235, 294\n  Origenists, 260, 292\n  Orobio, 350\n  Ovid, 209, 220, 306\n\n  Pardies, 333\n  Pascal, 35\n  Paul, St., 129-30, 238, 260\n  Paulicians, _see_ Manichaeans\n  Pelagius, 139\n  Pelisson, 176\n  Pereir, Louis, 139\n  Peter Lombard, 290\n  Pfanner, 352\n  Pierre de Saint-Joseph, 342, 357\n  Pietists, Leipzig, 83\n  Piscator, 207\n  Pitcairne, 172\n  Plato, 59, 76, 135, 148, 209, 241, 286, 297, 321, 352-4\n  Pliny the Younger, 204, 209, 284, 287, 365\n  Plutarch, 208, 231, 326, 353\n  Pomponazzi, 80, 161\n  de la Porree, Gilbert, 122\n  de Preissac, 80\n  Prudentius, 132, 218\n  Ptolomei, Fr., 70\n  Pufendorf, 194, 241, 403\n  Pythagoras, 172\n\n  Quenel, Fr., 70\n  Quietists, 79\n\n  Rachelius, 194\n  de la Ramee, Pierre, 81\n  Ravaillac, 204\n  Regis, 305, 330, 340\n  Remonstrants, 226\n  Reynaud, Theophile, 348\n  [Page 448]\n  Rodon, David de, 354\n  Rorarius, 160\n  Rutherford, Samuel, 236, 238, 269\n  Ruysbroek, 79\n\n  Saguens, 359\n  Salmeron, 173\n  Saurin, 106\n  Scaliger, Joseph, 89, 104-5\n  Scaliger, Julius, 170\n  Scherzer, 84\n  Schoolmen, 75, 77, 100, 241, 290, 310, 354, 407\n  Scioppius, 337\n  Scotists, 243, 324\n  Scotus, Duns, 203, 271, 328, 383\n  Seneca, 226, 285\n  Sennert, Daniel, 171\n  Sentences, Master of the, _see_ Peter Lombard\n  Servetus, Michael, 81\n  Sfondrati, Cardinal, 129, 173\n  Sharrok, 194\n  Silenus, 286\n  Slevogt, Paul, 82\n  Socinians, 58, 83-4, 161-2, 307, 343, 394, 412, 423\n  Sonner, Ernst, 290\n  Spee, Friedrich, 176-7\n  Sperling, Johann, 171\n  Sperling, Otto, 212\n  Spinoza, 67, 68, 79, 82, 159, 234-6, 331, 348-51, 359, 418\n  Stahl, Daniel, 243\n  Stegman, Josua, 107\n  Stegmann, Christopher, 84\n  Steno, 178\n  Steuchus, Augustinus, 91\n  Stoics, 79, 232, 263, 282-3, 324 ff., 342\n  Strato, 67, 245-6, 331, 335, 336, 349, 395\n  Strinesius, 241\n  Sturm, 69, 261\n  Suarez, 314\n  Suetonius, 287\n  Supralapsarians, 166, 228, 236, 238, 269, 273-4, 289\n  Swammerdam, 172\n\n  Tacitus, 210, 211, 265, 287\n  Taifel, Baron Andre, 441\n  Taurel, Nicolas, 81, 353\n  Tertullian, 101\n  Thomas Aquinas, St., 174, 176, 241, 243, 262, 324, 357, 378, 383\n  Thomasius, Jacob, 243, 265\n  Thomists, 145, 149, 241, 311, 324, 344, 347\n  Tiberius, 227\n  Timon, 265\n  Tiresias, 230\n  Toland, John, 106\n  de Tournemine, Fr., 69\n  Trajan, 293\n  Trogus, 208\n  Turretin, 240\n  Twiss, 238\n\n  Ursinus, Zacharias, 291\n  Usserius, 70\n\n  Valla, Laurentius, 67, 344, 365 ff.\n  van Beverwyck, Johan, 153-4\n  van den Ende, Franz, 351\n  van den Hoof, 350\n  van der Weye, 82\n  van Helmont, 169\n  Vanini, Lucilio, 434\n  Vedelius, Nicolaus, 86, 111\n  Velleius Paterculus, 318\n  Vergil, 78-9, 122, 287, 293, 306, 315\n  Veron, Francois, 107\n  Verse, Aubert de, 350\n  Voetius, Gisbertus, 86\n  Vorstius, Conrad, 58\n  Vogelsang, 82\n\n  von Wallenberg, Bp. Peter, 67\n  Wander, William, 169\n  Weigel, Erhard, 261, 355\n  Weigel, Valentine, 79\n  de Witt, 351\n  Wittich, 187, 306-7, 309\n  von Wollzogen, 82\n  Wyclif, John, 122, 159, 234, 272, 395\n\n  Xanthus, 209\n\n  Zeisold, Johann, 171\n  Zoroaster, 71, 208-10, 218","title":"Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man and the Origin of Evil","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":189217}