{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_17158/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_17158","id":"gutenberg_17158","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/17158","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Modern (1750+)","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Politics","Europe -- Politics and government","World War I","World War, 1914-1918 -- Causes"],"text":"Produced by Irma Spehar, Christine D and the Online\nDistributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This\nfile was produced from images generously made available\nby The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries)\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n         ARMAGEDDON--AND AFTER\n\n                  BY\n\n       W.L. COURTNEY, M.A., LL.D.\n\n                LONDON\n\n          CHAPMAN & HALL, LTD.\n\n                 1914\n\n\n\n\n              DEDICATED\n\n   WITH ALL HUMILITY AND ADMIRATION\n\n                 TO\n\n THE YOUNG IDEALISTS OF ALL COUNTRIES\n\nWHO WILL NOT ALLOW THE DREAMS OF THEIR\n\n     YOUTH TO BE TARNISHED BY THE\n\n         EXPERIENCES OF AN\n\n            OUTWORN AGE\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nI dedicate this little book to the young idealists of this and other\ncountries, for several reasons. They must, obviously, be young, because\ntheir older contemporaries, with a large amount of experience of earlier\nconditions, will hardly have the courage to deal with the novel data. I\ntake it that, after the conclusion of the present war, there will come an\nuneasy period of exhaustion and anxiety when we shall be told that those\nwho hold military power in their hands are alone qualified to act as\nsaviours of society. That conclusion, as I understand the matter, young\nidealists will strenuously oppose. They will be quite aware that all the\nconservative elements will be against them; they will appreciate also the\neagerness with which a large number of people will point out that the\nsafest way is to leave matters more or less alone, and to allow the\nsituation to be controlled by soldiers and diplomatists. Of course there\nis obvious truth in the assertion that the immediate settlement of peace\nconditions must, to a large extent, be left in the hands of those who\nbrought the war to a successful conclusion. But the relief from pressing\nanxiety when this horrible strife is over, and the feeling of gratitude to\nthose who have delivered us must not be allowed to gild and consecrate, as\nit were, systems proved effete and policies which intelligent men\nrecognise as bankrupt. The moment of deliverance will be too unique and\ntoo splendid to be left in the hands of men who have grown, if not\ncynical, at all events a little weary of the notorious defects of\nhumanity, and who are, perhaps naturally, tempted to allow European\nprogress to fall back into the old well-worn ruts. It is the young men who\nmust take the matter in hand, with their ardent hopes and their keen\nimagination, and only so far as they believe in the possibility of a great\namelioration will they have any chance of doing yeoman service for\nhumanity.\n\nThe dawn of a new era must be plenarily accepted as a wonderful\nopportunity for reform. If viewed in any other spirit, the splendours of\nthe morning will soon give way before the obstinate clouds hanging on the\nhorizon. In some fashion or other it must be acknowledged that older\nmethods of dealing with international affairs have been tried and found\nwanting. It must be admitted that the ancient principles helped to bring\nabout the tremendous catastrophe in which we are at present involved, and\nthat a thorough re-organisation is required if the new Europe is to start\nunder better auspices. That is why I appeal to the younger idealists,\nbecause they are not likely to be deterred by inveterate prejudices; they\nwill be only too eager to examine things with a fresh intelligence of\ntheir own. Somehow or other we must get rid of the absurd idea that the\nnations of Europe are always on the look out to do each other an injury.\nWe have to establish the doctrines of Right on a proper basis, and\ndethrone that ugly phantom of Might, which is the object of Potsdam\nworship. International law must be built up with its proper sanctions; and\nvirtues, which are Christian and humane, must find their proper place in\nthe ordinary dealings of states with one another. Much clever dialectics\nwill probably be employed in order to prove that idealistic dreams are\nvain. Young men will not be afraid of such arguments; they will not be\ndeterred by purely logical difficulties. Let us remember that this war has\nbeen waged in order to make war for the future impossible. If that be the\npresiding idea of men's minds, they will keep their reforming course\nsteadily directed towards ideal ends, patiently working for the\nreconstruction of Europe and a better lot for humanity at large.\n\nOnce more let me repeat that it is only young idealists who are sufficient\nfor these things. They may call themselves democrats, or socialists, or\nfuturists, or merely reformers. The name is unimportant: the main point is\nthat they must thoroughly examine their creed in the light of their finest\nhopes and aspirations. They will not be the slaves of any formulae, and\nthey will hold out their right hands to every man--whatever may be the\nlabel he puts on his theories--who is striving in single-minded devotion\nfor a millennial peace. The new era will have to be of a spiritual,\nethical type. Coarser forms of materialism, whether in thought or life,\nwill have to be banished, because the scales have at last dropped from our\neyes, and we intend to regard a human being no longer as a thing of\nluxury, or wealth, or greedy passions, but as the possessor of a living\nsoul.\n\nW.L.C.\n\n_November 10, 1914._\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nI wish to acknowledge my obligation to Mr. H.N. Brailsford's _The War of\nSteel and Gold_ (Bell). I do not pretend to agree with all that Mr.\nBrailsford says: but I have found his book always interesting, and\nsometimes inspiring.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n                                                 PAGE\n\nCHAPTER I\nPROBLEMS OF THE FUTURE                             1\n\nCHAPTER II\nLESSONS OF THE PAST                               32\n\nCHAPTER III\nSOME SUGGESTED REFORMS                            63\n\n\n\n\nARMAGEDDON--AND AFTER\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nPROBLEMS OF THE FUTURE\n\n\nThe newspapers have lately been making large quotations from the poems of\nMr. Rudyard Kipling. They might, if they had been so minded, have laid\nunder similar contribution the Revelation of St. John the Divine. There,\ntoo, with all the imagery usual in Apocalyptic literature, is to be found\na description of vague and confused fighting, when most of the Kings of\nthe earth come together to fight a last and desperate battle. The Seven\nAngels go forth, each armed with a vial, the first poisoning the earth,\nthe second the sea, the third the rivers and fountains of waters, the\nfourth the sun. Then out of the mouth of the dragon, of the beast, and of\nthe Antichrist come the lying spirits which persuade the Kings of the\nearth to gather all the people for that great day of God Almighty \"into a\nplace called in the Hebrew tongue Armageddon.\" Translated into our\nlanguage the account might very well serve for the modern assemblage of\ntroops in which nearly all the kingdoms of the earth have to play their\npart, with few, and not very important, exceptions. It is almost absurd to\nspeak of the events of the past three months as though they were merely\nincidents in a great and important campaign. There is nothing in history\nlike them so far as we are aware. In the clash of the two great European\norganisations--the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente--we have all\nthose wild features of universal chaos which the writer of the Apocalypse\nsaw with prophetic eye as ushering in the great day of the Lord, and\npaving the way for a New Heaven and a New Earth.\n\n\nA COLOSSAL UPHEAVAL\n\nIt is a colossal upheaval. But what sort of New Heaven and New Earth is it\nlikely to usher in? This is a question which it is hardly too early to\ndiscuss, for it makes a vast difference, to us English in especial, if,\nfighting for what we deem to be a just cause, we can look forward to an\nissue in the long run beneficial to ourselves and the world. We know the\ncharacter of the desperate conflict which has yet to be accomplished\nbefore our eyes. Everything points to a long stern war, which cannot be\ncompleted in a single campaign. Every one knows that Lord Kitchener is\nsupposed to have prophesied a war of three years, and we can hardly ignore\nthe opinion of so good a judge. If we ask why, the obvious answer is that\nevery nation engaged is not fighting for mere victory in battle, nor yet\nfor extension of territory; but for something more important than these.\nThey fight for the triumph of their respective ideas, and it will make the\ngreatest difference to Europe and the world which of the ideas is\neventually conqueror. Supposing the German invasion of France ends in\nfailure; that, clearly, will not finish the war. Supposing even that\nBerlin is taken by the Russians, we cannot affirm that so great an event\nwill necessarily complete the campaign. The whole of Germany will have to\nbe invaded and subdued, and that is a process which will take a very long\ntime even under the most favourable auspices. Or take the opposite\nhypothesis. Let us suppose that the Germans capture Paris, and manage by\nforced marches to defend their country against the Muscovite incursion.\nEven so, nothing is accomplished of a lasting character. France will go on\nfighting as she did after 1870, and we shall be found at her side. Or,\nassuming the worst hypothesis of all, that France lies prostrate under the\nheel of her German conqueror, does any one suppose that Great Britain\nwill desist from fighting? We know perfectly well that, with the aid of\nour Fleet, we shall still be in a position to defy the German invader and\nmake use of our enormous reserves to wear out even Teutonic obstinacy. The\ngreat sign and seal of this battle to the death is the recent covenant\nentered into by the three members of the Triple Entente.[1] They have\ndeclared in the most formal fashion, over the signatures of their three\nrepresentatives, Sir Edward Grey, M. Paul Cambon, and Count Benckendorff,\nthat they will not make a separate peace, that they will continue to act\nin unison, and fight, not as three nations, but as one. Perhaps one of the\nleast expected results of the present conjuncture is that the Triple\nEntente, which was supposed to possess less cohesive efficiency than the\nrival organisation, has proved, on the contrary, the stronger of the two.\nThe Triple Alliance is not true to its name. Italy, the third and\nunwilling member, still preserves her neutrality, and declares that her\ninterests are not immediately involved.\n\n[1] Subsequently joined by Japan.\n\n\nNEVER AGAIN!\n\nIn order to attempt to discover the vast changes that are likely to come\nas a direct consequence of the present Armageddon, it is necessary to\nrefer in brief retrospect to some of the main causes and features of the\ngreat European war. Meanwhile, I think the general feeling amongst all\nthoughtful men is best expressed in the phrase, \"Never again.\" Never again\nmust we have to face the possibility of such a world-wide catastrophe.\nNever again must it be possible for the pursuit of merely selfish\ninterests to work such colossal havoc. Never again must we have war as the\nonly solution of national differences. Never again must all the arts of\npeace be suspended while Europe rings to the tramp of armed millions.\nNever again must spiritual, moral, artistic culture be submerged under a\nwave of barbarism. Never again must the Ruler of this Universe be\naddressed as the \"God of battles.\" Never again shall a new Wordsworth hail\n\"carnage\" as \"God's daughter.\" The illogicality of it all is too patent.\nThat everything which we respect and revere in the way of science or\nthought, or culture, or music, or poetry, or drama, should be cast into\nthe melting-pot to satisfy dynastic ambition is a thing too puerile as\nwell as too appalling to be even considered. And the horror of it all is\nsomething more than our nerves will stand. The best brains and intellects\nof Europe, the brightest and most promising youths, all the manhood\neverywhere in Europe to be shrivelled and consumed in a holocaust like\nthis--it is such a reign of the Devil and Antichrist on earth that it must\nbe banished in perpetuity if civilisation and progress are to endure.\nNever again!\n\n\nUNEXPECTED WAR\n\nHow did we get into such a stupid and appalling calamity? Let us think for\na moment. I do not suppose it would be wrong to say that no one ever\nexpected war in our days. Take up any of the recent books. With the\nexception of the fiery martial pamphlets of Germany, the work of a von der\nGoltz or a Treitschke, or a Bernhardi, we shall find a general consensus\nof opinion that war on a large scale was impossible because too ruinous,\nthat the very size of the European armaments made war impracticable. Or\nelse, to take the extreme case of Mr. Norman Angell, the entanglements of\nmodern finance were said to have put war out of count as an absurdity. We\nwere a little too hasty in our judgments. It is clear that a single\ndetermined man, if he is powerful enough, may embroil Europe. However\ndestructive modern armaments may be, and however costly a campaign may\nprove, yet there are men who will face the cost and confront the\nwholesale destruction of life that modern warfare entails. How pitiful it\nis, how strange also, to look back upon the solemn asseveration of the\nKaiser and the Tsar, not so many months ago (Port Baltic, July 1912), that\nthe division of Europe into the two great confederations known as the\nTriple Alliance and the Triple Entente provided a safeguard against\nhostilities! We were constantly assured that diplomats were working for a\nBalance of Power, such an equilibrium of rival forces that the total\nresult would be stability and peace. Arbitration, too, was considered by\nmany as the panacea, to say nothing of the Hague Palace of Peace. And now\nwe discover that nations may possibly refer to arbitration points of small\nimportance in their quarrels, but that the greater things which are\nsupposed to touch national honour and the preservation of national life\nare tacitly, if not formally, exempted from the category of arbitrable\ndisputes. Diplomacy, Arbitration, Palaces of Peace seem equally useless.\n\n\nPROXIMATE AND ULTIMATE CAUSES\n\nIn attempting to understand how Europe has (to use Lord Rosebery's phrase)\n\"rattled into barbarism\" in the uncompromising fashion which we see\nbefore our eyes, we must distinguish between recent operative causes and\nthose more slowly evolving antecedent conditions which play a\nconsiderable, though not necessarily an obvious part in the result. Recent\noperative causes are such things as the murder of the Archduke Franz\nFerdinand at Serajevo, the consequent Austrian ultimatum to Servia, the\nhasty and intemperate action of the Kaiser in forcing war, and--from a\nmore general point of view--the particular form of militarism prevalent in\nGermany. Ulterior antecedent conditions are to be found in the changing\nhistory of European States and their mutual relations in the last quarter\nof a century; the ambition of Germany to create an Imperial fleet; the\nambition of Germany to have \"a place in the sun\" and become a large\ncolonial power; the formation of a Triple Entente following on the\nformation of a Triple Alliance; the rivalry between Teuton and Slav; and\nthe mutations of diplomacy and _Real-politik_. It is not always possible\nto keep the two sets of causes, the recent and the ulterior, separate, for\nthey naturally tend either to overlap or to interpenetrate one another.\nGerman Militarism, for instance, is only a specific form of the general\nambition of Germany, and the Austrian desire to avenge herself on Servia\nis a part of her secular animosity towards Slavdom and its protector,\nRussia. Nor yet, when we are considering the present _debacle_ of\ncivilisation, need we interest ourselves overmuch in the immediate\noccasions and circumstances of the huge quarrel. We want to know not how\nEurope flared into war, but why. Our object is so to understand the\npresent imbroglio as to prevent, if we can, the possibility for the future\nof any similar world-wide catastrophe.\n\n\nEUROPEAN DICTATORS\n\nLet us fix our attention on one or two salient points. Europe has often\nbeen accustomed to watch with anxiety the rise of some potent arbiter of\nher destinies who seems to arrogate to himself a large personal dominion.\nThere was Philip II. There was Louis XIV. There was Napoleon a hundred\nyears ago. Then, a mere shadow of his great ancestor, there was Napoleon\nIII. Then, after the Franco-German war, there was Bismarck. Now it is\nKaiser Wilhelm II. The emergence of some ambitious personality naturally\nmakes Europe suspicious and watchful, and leads to the formation of\nleagues and confederations against him. The only thing, however, which\nseems to have any power of real resistance to the potential tyrant is not\nthe manoeuvring of diplomats, but the steady growth of democracy in\nEurope, which, in virtue of its character and principles, steadily objects\nto the despotism of any given individual, and the arbitrary designs of a\npersonal will. We had hoped that the spread of democracies in all European\nnations would progressively render dynastic wars an impossibility. The\npeoples would cry out, we hoped, against being butchered to make a holiday\nfor any latter-day Caesar. But democracy is a slow growth, and exists in\nvery varying degrees of strength in different parts of our continent.\nEvidently it has not yet discovered its own power. We have sadly to\nrecognise that its range of influence and the new spirit which it seeks to\nintroduce into the world are as yet impotent against the personal\nascendancy of a monarch and the old conceptions of high politics. European\ndemocracy is still too vague, too dispersed, too unorganised, to prevent\nthe breaking out of a bloody international conflict.\n\n\nTHE PERSONAL FACTOR\n\nEurope then has still to reckon with the personal factor--with all its\nvagaries and its desolating ambitions. Let us see how this has worked in\nthe case before us. In 1888 the present German Emperor ascended the\nthrone. Two years afterwards, in March 1890, the Pilot was\ndropped--Bismarck resigned. The change was something more than a mere\nsubstitution of men like Caprivi and Hohenlohe for the Iron Chancellor.\nThere was involved a radical alteration in policy. The Germany which was\nthe ideal of Bismarck's dreams was an exceedingly prosperous\nself-contained country, which should flourish mainly because it developed\nits internal industries as well as paid attention to its agriculture, and\nsecured its somewhat perilous position in the centre of Europe by skilful\ndiplomatic means of sowing dissension amongst its neighbours. Thus\nBismarck discouraged colonial extensions. He thought they might weaken\nGermany. On the other hand, he encouraged French colonial policy, because\nhe thought it would divert the French from their preoccupation with the\nidea of _revanche_. He played, more or less successfully, with England,\nsometimes tempting her with plausible suggestions that she should join the\nTeutonic Empires on the Continent, sometimes thwarting her aims by sowing\ndissensions between her and her nearest neighbour, France. But there was\none empire which, certainly, Bismarck dreaded not so much because she was\nactually of much importance, but because she might be. That empire was\nRussia. The last thing in the world Bismarck desired was precisely that\napproximation between France and Russia which ended in the strange\nphenomenon of an offensive and defensive alliance between a western\nrepublic and a semi-eastern despotic empire.\n\n\nKAISER WILHELM\n\nKaiser Wilhelm II had very different ideals for Germany, and in many\npoints he simply reversed the policy of Bismarck. He began to develop the\nGerman colonial empire, and in order that it might be protected he did all\nin his power to encourage the formation of a large German navy. He even\nallowed himself to say that \"the future of Germany was on the sea.\" It was\npart of that peculiar form of personal autocracy which the Kaiser\nintroduced that he should from time to time invent phrases suggestive of\ndifferent principles of his policy. Side by side with the assertion that\nGermany's future was on the sea, we have the phrases \"Germany wants her\nplace in the sun\" and that the \"drag\" of Teutonic development is \"towards\nthe East.\" The reality and imminence of \"a yellow peril\" was another of\nhis devices for stimulating the efforts of his countrymen. Thus the new\npolicy was expansion, evolution as a world-power, colonisation; and each\nin turn brought him up against the older arrangement of European Powers.\nHis colonial policy, especially in Africa, led to collisions with both\nFrance and Great Britain. The building of the fleet, the Kiel Canal, and\nother details of maritime policy naturally made England very suspicious,\nwhile the steady drag towards the East rendered wholly unavoidable the\nconflict between Teutonism and the Slav races. Germany looked,\nundoubtedly, towards Asia Minor, and for this reason made great advances\nto and many professions of friendship for the Ottoman Empire. Turkey,\nindeed, in several phrases was declared to be \"the natural ally\" of\nGermany in the Near East. And if we ask why, the answer nowadays is\nobvious. Not only was Turkey to lend herself to the encouragement of\nGerman commercial enterprise in Asia Minor, but she was, in the judgment\nof the Emperor, the one power which could in time of trouble make herself\nespecially obnoxious to Great Britain. She could encourage revolt in\nEgypt, and still more, through the influence of Mahommedanism, stir up\ndisaffection in India.[2]\n\n[2] Turkey has now joined Germany.\n\n\nAN AGGRESSIVE POLICY\n\nAnd now let us watch this policy in action in recent events. In 1897\nGermany demanded reparation from China for the recent murder of two German\nmissionaries. Troops were landed at Kiao-chau Bay, a large pecuniary\nindemnity of about L35,000 was refused, and Kiao-chau itself with the\nadjacent territory was ceded to Germany. That was a significant\ndemonstration of the Emperor's determination to make his country a\nworld-power, so that, as was stated afterwards, nothing should occur in\nthe whole world in which Germany would not have her say. Meanwhile, in\nEurope itself event after event occurred to prove the persistent character\nof German aggressiveness. On March 31, 1905, the German Emperor landed at\nTangier, in order to aid the Sultan of Morocco in his demand for a\nConference of the Powers to check the military dispositions of France. M.\nDelcasse, France's Foreign Minister, demurred to this proposal, asserting\nthat a Conference was wholly unnecessary. Thereupon Prince Buelow used\nmenacing language, and Delcasse resigned in June 1905. The Conference of\nAlgeciras was held in January 1906, in which Austria proved herself \"a\nbrilliant second\" to Germany. Two years afterwards, in 1908, came still\nfurther proofs of Germany's ambition. Austria annexed Bosnia and\nHerzegovina. Russia immediately protested; so did most of the other Great\nPowers. But Germany at once took up the Austrian cause, and stood \"in\nshining armour\" side by side with her ally. Inasmuch as Russia was, in\n1908, only just recovering from the effects of her disastrous war with\nJapan, and was therefore in no condition to take the offensive, the Triple\nAlliance gained a distinct victory. Three years later occurred another\nstriking event. In July 1911 the world was startled by the news that the\nGerman gunboat _Panther_, joined shortly afterwards by the cruiser\n_Berlin_, had been sent to Agadir. Clearly Berlin intended to reopen the\nwhole Moroccan question, and the tension between the Powers was for some\ntime acute. Nor did Mr. Lloyd George make it much better by a fiery speech\nat the Mansion House on July 21, which considerably fluttered the\nContinental dovecots. The immediate problem, however, was solved by the\ncession of about one hundred thousand square miles of territory in the\nCongo basin by France to Germany in compensation for German acquiescence\nin the French protectorate over Morocco. I need not, perhaps, refer to\nother more recent events. One point, however, must not be omitted. The\nissue of the Balkan wars in 1912 caused a distinct disappointment to both\nGermany and Austria. Turkey's defeat lessened the importance of the\nOttoman Empire as an ally. Austria had to curb her desires in the\ndirection of Salonica. And the enemies who had prevented the realisation\nof wide Teutonic schemes were Servia and her protector, Russia. From this\ntime onwards Austria waited for an opportunity to avenge herself on\nServia, while Germany, in close union with her ally, began to study the\nsituation in relation to the Great Northern Empire in an eminently\nbellicose spirit.\n\n\nMILITARISM\n\nNow that we have the proper standpoint from which to watch the general\ntendency of events like these, we can form some estimate of the nature of\nGerman ambition and the results of the personal ascendancy of the Kaiser.\nWe speak vaguely of militarism. Fortunately, we have a very valuable\ndocument to enable us to understand what precisely German militarism\nsignifies. General von Bernhardi's _Germany and the Next War_ is one of\nthe most interesting, as well as most suggestive, of books, intended to\nillustrate the spirit of German ambition. Bernhardi writes like a\nsoldier. Such philosophy as he possesses he has taken from Nietzsche. His\napplications of history come from Treitschke. He has persuaded himself\nthat the main object of human life is war, and the higher the nation the\nmore persistently must it pursue preparations for war. Hence the best men\nin the State are the fighting men. Ethics and religion, so far as they\ndeprecate fighting and plead for peace, are absolutely pernicious. Culture\ndoes not mean, as we hoped and thought, the best development of scientific\nand artistic enlightenment, but merely an all-absorbing will-power, an\nall-devouring ambition to be on the top and to crush every one else. The\nassumption throughout is that the German is the highest specimen of\nhumanity. Germany is especially qualified to be the leader, and the only\nway in which it can become the leader is to have such overwhelming\nmilitary power that no one has any chance of resisting. Moreover, all\nmethods are justified in the sacred cause of German culture--duplicity,\nviolence, the deliberate sowing of dissensions between possible rivals,\nincitements of Asiatics to rise against Europeans. All means are to be\nadopted to win the ultimate great victory, and, of course, when the\nstruggle comes there must be no misplaced leniency to any of the inferior\nraces who interpose between Germany and her legitimate place in the\nsun.[3] The ideal is almost too naive and too ferocious to be conceived by\nordinary minds. Yet here it all stands in black and white. According to\nBernhardi's volume German militarism means at least two things. First the\nsuppression of every other nationality except the German; second the\nsuppression of the whole civilian element in the population under the heel\nof the German drill-sergeant. Is it any wonder that the recent war has\nbeen conducted by Berlin with such appalling barbarism and ferocity?\n\n[3] _Germany and the Next War_, by F. von Bernhardi. See especially Chap.\nV, \"World-Power or Downfall.\" Other works which may be consulted are\nProfessor J.A. Cramb's _Germany and England_ (esp. pp. 111-112) and\nProfessor Usher's _Pan-Germanism_.\n\n\nTHE EVILS OF AUTOCRACY\n\nOur inquiry so far has led to two conclusions. We have discovered by\nbitter experience that a personal ascendancy, such as the German Emperor\nwields, is in the highest degree perilous to the interests of peace: and\nthat a militarism such as that which holds in its thrall the German Empire\nis an open menace to intellectual culture and to Christian ethics. But we\nmust not suppose that these conclusions are only true so far as they apply\nto the Teutonic race, and that the same phenomena observed elsewhere are\ncomparatively innocuous. Alas! autocracy in any and every country seems to\nbe inimical to the best and highest of social needs, and militarism,\nwherever found, is the enemy of pacific social development. Let us take a\nfew instances at haphazard of the danger of the personal factor in\nEuropean politics. There is hardly a person to be found nowadays who\ndefends the Crimean war, or indeed thinks that it was in any sense\ninevitable. Yet if there was one man more than another whose personal will\nbrought it about, it was--not Lord Aberdeen who ought to have been\nresponsible--but Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. \"The great Eltchi,\" as he\nwas called, was our Ambassador at Constantinople, a man of uncommon\nstrength of will, which, as is often the case with these powerful natures,\nnot infrequently degenerated into sheer obstinacy. He had made up his mind\nthat England was to support Turkey and fight with Russia, and inasmuch as\nLouis Napoleon, for the sake of personal glory, had similar opinions,\nFrance as well as England was dragged into a costly and quite useless war.\nNapoleon III has already figured among those aspiring monarchs who wish\n\"to sit in the chair of Europe.\" It was his personal will once more which\nsent the unhappy Maximilian to his death in Mexico, and his personal\njealousy of Prussia which launched him in the fatal enterprise \"a Berlin\"\nin 1870. In the latter case we find another personal influence, still more\nsinister--that of the Empress Eugenie, whose capricious ambition and\ninterference in military matters directly led to the ruinous disaster of\nSedan. The French people, who had to suffer, discovered it too late.\n\"Quicquid delirant reges plectuntur Achivi.\" Or take another more recent\ninstance. Who was responsible for the Russo-Japanese war? Not Kuropatkin,\nassuredly, nor yet the Russian Prime Minister, but certain of the Grand\nDukes and probably the Tsar himself, who were interested in the forests of\nthe Yalu district and had no mind to lose the money they had invested in a\npurely financial operation. The truth is that modern Europe has no room\nfor \"prancing Pro-consuls,\" and no longer takes stock in autocrats. They\nare, or ought to be, superannuated, out of date. To use an expressive\ncolloquialism they are \"a back number.\" The progress of the world demands\nthe development of peoples; it has no use for mediaeval monarchies like\nthat of Potsdam. One of the things we ought to banish for ever is the\nhorrible idea that whole nations can be massacred and civilisation\nindefinitely postponed to suit the individual caprice of a bragging and\nself-opinionated despot who calls himself God's elect. Now that we know\nthe ruin he can cause, let us fight shy of the Superman, and the whole\nrange of ideas which he connotes.\n\n\nTHE MILITARY CASTE\n\nMilitarism is another of our maladies. Here we must distinguish with some\ncare. A military spirit is one thing: militarism is another. It is\nprobable that no nation is worthy to survive which does not possess a\nmilitary spirit, or, in other words, the instinct to defend itself and its\nliberties against an aggressor. It is a virtue which is closely interfused\nwith high moral qualities--self-respect, a proper pride,\nself-reliance--and is compatible with real modesty and sobriety of mind.\nBut militarism has nothing ethical about it. It is not courage, but sheer\npugnacity and quarrelsomeness, and as exemplified in our modern history it\nmeans the dominion of a clique, the reign of a few self-opinionated\nofficials. That these individuals should possess only a limited\nintelligence is almost inevitable. Existing for the purposes of war, they\nnaturally look at everything from an oblique and perverted point of view.\nThey regard nations, not as peaceful communities of citizens, but as\nmaterial to be worked up into armies. Their assumption is that war, being\nan indelible feature in the history of our common humanity, must be\nceaselessly prepared for by the piling up of huge armaments and weapons of\ndestruction. Their invariable motto is that if you wish for peace you must\nprepare for war--\"si vis pacem, para bellum\"--a notoriously false\napophthegm, because armaments are provocative, not soothing, and the man\nwho is a swash-buckler invites attack. It is needless to say that\nthousands of military men do not belong to this category: no one dreads\nwar so much as the man who knows what it means. I am not speaking of\nindividuals, I am speaking of a particular caste, military officials in\nthe abstract, if you like to put it so, who, because their business is\nwar, have not the slightest idea what the pacific social development of a\npeople really means. Militarism is simply a one-sided, partial point of\nview, and to enforce that upon a nation is as though a man with a\npronounced squint were to be accepted as a man of normal vision. We have\nseen what it involves in Germany. In a less offensive form, however, it\nexists in most states, and its root idea is usually that the civilian as\nsuch belongs to a lower order of humanity, and is not so important to the\nState as the officer who discharges vague and for the most part useless\nfunctions in the War Office.[4] It is a swollen, over-developed militarism\nthat has got us into the present mess, and one of our earliest concerns,\nwhen the storm is over, must be to put it into its proper place. Let him\nwho uses the sword perish by the sword.\n\n[4] Thus it was the Military party in Bulgaria which drove her to the\ndisastrous second Balkan war, and the Military party in Austria which\ninsisted on the ultimatum to Servia.\n\n\nDIPLOMACY\n\nAnd I fear that there is another ancient piece of our international\nstrategy which has been found wanting. I approach with some hesitation the\nsubject of diplomacy, because it contains so many elements of value to a\nstate, and has given so many opportunities for active and original minds.\nIts worst feature is that its operations have to be conducted in secret:\nits best is that it affords a fine exemplification of the way in which the\nhistory and fortunes of states are--to their advantage--dependent upon\nthe initiative of gifted and patriotic individuals. But if we look back\nover the history of recent years, we shall discover that diplomacy has not\nfulfilled its especial mission. According to a well-known cynical dictum a\ndiplomatist is a man who is paid to lie for his country. And, indeed, it\nis one of the least gracious aspects of the diplomatic career that it\nseems necessarily to involve the use of a certain amount of chicanery and\nfalsehood, the object being to jockey opponents by means of skilful ruses\ninto a position in which they find themselves at a disadvantage. Clearly,\nhowever, there are better aims than these for diplomacy--one aim in\nparticular, which is the preservation of peace. A diplomat is supposed to\nhave failed if the result of his work leads to war. It is not his business\nto bring about war. Any king or prime minister or general can do that,\nvery often with conspicuous ease. A diplomat is a skilful statesman\nversed in international politics, who makes the best provision he can for\nthe interests of his country, carefully steering it away from those rocks\nof angry hostility on which possibly his good ship may founder.\n\n\nBALANCE OF POWER\n\nNow what has diplomacy done for us during the last few years? It has\nformed certain understandings and alliances between different states; it\nhas tried to safeguard our position by creating sympathetic bonds with\nthose nations who are allied to us in policy. It has also attempted to\nproduce that kind of \"Balance of Power\" in Europe which on its own showing\nmakes for peace. This Balance of Power, so often and so mysteriously\nalluded to by the diplomatic world, has become a veritable fetish. Perhaps\nits supreme achievement was reached when two autocratic monarchs--the Tsar\nof Russia and the German Emperor--solemnly propounded a statement, as we\nhave seen, at Port Baltic that the Balance of Power, as distributed\nbetween the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, had proved itself\nvaluable in the interests of European peace. That was only two years ago,\nand the thing seems a mockery now. If we examine precisely what is meant\nby a Balance of Power, we shall see that it presupposes certain conditions\nof animosity and attempts to neutralise them by the exhibition of superior\nor, at all events, equivalent forces. A Balance of Power in the\ncontinental system assumes, for all practical purposes, that the nations\nof Europe are ready to fly at each other's throats, and that the only way\nto deter them is to make them realise how extremely perilous to themselves\nwould be any such military enterprise. Can any one doubt that this is the\nreal meaning of the phrase? If we listen to the Delphic oracles of\ndiplomacy on this subject of the Balance of Power, we shall understand\nthat in nine cases out of ten a man invoking this phrase means that he\nwants the Balance of Power to be favourable to himself. It is not so much\nan exact equipoise that he desires, as a certain tendency of the scales to\ndip in his direction. If Germany feels herself weak she not only\nassociates Austria and Italy with herself, but looks eastward to get the\nassistance of Turkey, or, perhaps, attempts--as it so happens without any\nsuccess--to create sympathy for herself in the United States of America.\nIf, on the other hand, France feels herself in danger, she not only forms\nan alliance with Russia, but also an entente with England and, on the\nprinciple that the friends of one's friends ought to be accepted, produces\na further entente between England and Russia. England, on her part, if for\nwhatever reason she feels that she is liable to attack, goes even so far\nas to make an alliance with an Asiatic nation--Japan--in order to\nsafeguard her Asiatic interests in India. Thus, when diplomatists invoke\nthe necessity of a Balance of Power, they are really trying to work for a\npreponderance of power on their side. It is inevitable that this should be\nso. An exact Balance of Power must result in a stalemate.\n\n\nCHANGE OF POLICY\n\nObserve what has happened to Great Britain during recent years. When she\nwas ruled by that extremely clear-headed though obstinate statesman, Lord\nSalisbury, she remained, at his advice, outside the circle of continental\nentanglements and rejoiced in what was known as a policy of \"Splendid\nIsolation.\" It was, of course, a selfish policy. It rested on sound\ngeographical grounds, because, making use of the fortunate accident that\nGreat Britain is an island, it suggested that she could pursue her own\ncommercial career and, thanks to the English Channel, let the whole of the\nrest of the world go hang. Such a position could not possibly last, partly\nbecause Great Britain is not only an island, but also an empire scattered\nover the seven seas; partly because we could not remain alien from those\nsocial and economic interests which necessarily link our career with\ncontinental nations. So we became part of the continental system, and it\nbecame necessary for us to choose friends and partners and mark off other\npeoples as our enemies. It might have been possible a certain number of\nyears ago for us to join the Triple Alliance. At one time Prince Buelow\nseemed anxious that we should do so, and Mr. Chamberlain on our side was\nby no means unwilling. But gradually we discovered that Germany was\nintensely jealous of us as a colonial power and as a great sea-power, and\nfor this reason, as well as for others, we preferred to compose our\nancient differences with France and promote an understanding between\nEnglish and French as the nearest of neighbours and the most convenient of\nallies. Observe, however, that every step in the process was a challenge,\nand a challenge which the rival aimed at could not possibly ignore. The\nconclusion of the French Entente Cordiale in 1904, the launching of the\n_Dreadnought_ in 1906, the formation of the Russian agreement in 1907, and\ncertain changes which we made in our own army were obviously intended as\nwarnings to Germany that we were dangerous people to attack.[5] Germany\nnaturally sought reprisals in her fashion, and gradually Europe was\ntransformed into a huge armed camp, divided into two powerful\norganisations which necessarily watched each other with no friendly gaze.\n\n[5] See _The War of Steel and Gold_, by H.N. Brailsford (Bell)--opening\nchapter on \"The Balance of Power.\"\n\n\nBALANCE OR CONCERT?\n\nI do not say that the course of events could possibly have been altered.\nWhen once we became part of the continental system, it was necessary for\nus to choose between friends and enemies. I only say that if diplomacy\ncalls itself an agency for preventing war, it cannot be said to be\naltogether successful. Its famous doctrine of a Balance of Power is in\nreality a mere phrase. If one combination be represented as X and the\nother as Y, and X increases itself up to X^2, it becomes necessary that Y\nshould similarly increase itself to Y^2, a process which, clearly, does\nnot make for peace. I should imagine that the best of diplomatists are\nquite aware of this. Indeed, there seems reason to suppose that Sir Edward\nGrey, owing to definite experience in the last two years, not only\ndiscovered the uselessness of the principle of a Balance of Power, but did\nhis best to substitute something entirely different--the Concert of\nEurope. All the negotiations he conducted during and after the two Balkan\nwars, his constant effort to summon London Conferences and other things,\nwere intended to create a Concert of European Powers, discussing amongst\nthemselves the best measures to secure the peace of the world. Alas! the\nwhole of the fabric was destroyed, the fair prospects hopelessly clouded\nover, by the intemperate ambition of the Kaiser, who, just because he\nbelieved that the Balance of Power was favourable to himself, that Russia\nwas unready, that France was involved in serious domestic trouble, that\nEngland was on the brink of civil war, set fire to the magazine and\nengineered the present colossal explosion.\n\n\nCONTROL OF FOREIGN POLICY\n\nOne cannot feel sure that diplomacy as hitherto recognised will be able,\nor, indeed, ought to be able, to survive the shock. In this country, as in\nothers, diplomacy has been considered a highly specialised science, which\ncan only be conducted by trained men and by methods of entire secrecy. As\na mere matter of fact, England has far less control over her foreign\npolicy than any of the continental Powers. In Germany foreign affairs come\nbefore the Reichstag, in France they are surveyed by the Senate, in\nAmerica there is a special department of the Senate empowered to deal\nwith foreign concerns. In Great Britain there is nothing of the kind.\nParliament has practically no control whatsoever over foreign affairs, it\nis not even consulted in the formation of treaties and arrangements with\nother nations. Nor yet has the Cabinet any real control, because it must\nact together as a whole, and a determined criticism of a foreign secretary\nmeans the resignation of the Government. Fortunately, our diplomacy has\nbeen left for the most part in very able hands. Nevertheless, it is surely\na paradox that the English people should know so little about foreign\naffairs as to be absolutely incapable of any control in questions that\naffect their life or death. Democracy, though it is supposed to be\nincompetent to manage foreign relations, could hardly have made a worse\nmess of it than the highly-trained Chancelleries. When the new Europe\narises out of the ashes of the old, it is not very hazardous to prophesy\nthat diplomacy, with its secret methods, its belief in phrases and\nabstract principles, and its assumption of a special professional\nknowledge, will find the range of its powers and the sphere of its\nauthority sensibly curtailed.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nLESSONS OF THE PAST\n\n\nThe problems that lie before us in the reconstitution of Europe are so\nmany and so various that we can only hope to take a few separately,\nespecially those which seem to throw most light on a possible future. I\nhave used the phrase \"reconstitution of Europe,\" because I do not know how\notherwise to characterise the general trend of the ideas germinating in\nmany men's minds as they survey the present crisis and its probable\noutcome. Europe will have to be reconstituted in more respects than one.\nAt the present moment, or rather before the present war broke out, it was\ngoverned by phrases and conceptions which had become superannuated. An\nuneasy equipoise between the Great Powers represented the highest\nculmination of our diplomatic efforts. Something must clearly be\nsubstituted for this uneasy equipoise. It is not enough that after\ntremendous efforts the relative balance of forces between great states\nshould, on the whole, dissuade them from war. As a matter of fact, it has\nnot done so. The underlying conception has been that nations are so\nardently bellicose that they require to be restrained from headlong\nconflicts by the doubtful and dangerous character of such military efforts\nas might be practicable. Hence Europe, as divided into armed camps,\nrepresents one of the old-fashioned ideas that we want to abolish. We wish\nto put in its stead something like a Concert of Europe. We have before our\neyes a vague, but inspiring vision not of tremendous and rival armaments,\nbut of a United States of Europe, each component element striving for the\npublic weal, and for further advances in general cultivation and welfare\nrather than commercial prosperity. The last is a vital point, for it does\nnot require much knowledge of modern history to discover that the race for\ncommercial advantage is exactly one of the reasons why Europe is at war at\nthe present moment. A vast increase in the commercial prosperity of any\none state means a frantic effort on the part of its rivals to pull down\nthis advantage. In some fashion, therefore, we have to substitute for\nendless competition the principle of co-operation, national welfare being\nconstrued at the same time not in terms of overwhelming wealth, but of\nthorough sanity and health in the body corporate.\n\n\nNAKED STRENGTH\n\nAll this sounds shadowy and abstruse until it is translated into something\nconcrete and definite. What is it we want to dispossess and banish from\nthe Europe of to-day? We have to find something to take the place of what\nis called militarism. I dealt with the general features of militarism in\nmy last essay; I will therefore content myself with saying that militarism\nin Europe has meant two things above all. First, the worship of might, as\nexpressed in formidable armaments; next, the corresponding worship of\nwealth to enable the burden of armaments to be borne with comparative\nease. The worship of naked strength involves several deductions. Right\ndisappears, or rather is translated in terms of might. International\nmorality equally disappears. Individuals, it is true, seek to be governed\nby the consciousness of universal moral laws. But a nation, as such, has\nno conscience, and is not bound to recognise the supremacy of anything\nhigher than itself. Morality, though it may bind the individual, does not\nbind the State, or, as General von Bernhardi has expressed it, \"political\nmorality differs from individual morality because there is no power above\nthe State.\" In similar fashion the worship of wealth carries numerous\nconsequences with it, which are well worthy of consideration. But the main\npoint, so far as it affects my present argument, is that it substitutes\nmaterialistic objects of endeavour for ethical and spiritual aims. Once\nmore morality is defeated. The ideal is not the supremacy of good, but the\nsupremacy of that range and sphere of material efficiency that is\nprocurable by wealth.\n\n\nPUBLIC RIGHT\n\nLet us try to be more concrete still, and in this context let us turn to\nsuch definite statements as are available of the views entertained by our\nchief statesmen, politicians, and leaders of public opinion. I turn to the\nspeech which Mr. Asquith delivered on Friday evening, September 25, in\nDublin, as part of the crusade which he and others are undertaking for the\ngeneral enlightenment of the country. \"I should like,\" said Mr. Asquith,\n\"to ask your attention and that of my fellow-countrymen to the end which,\nin this war, we ought to keep in view. Forty-four years ago, at the time\nof the war of 1870, Mr. Gladstone used these words. He said: 'The greatest\ntriumph of our time will be the enthronement of the idea of public right\nas the governing idea of European politics.' Nearly fifty years have\npassed. Little progress, it seems, has as yet been made towards that good\nand beneficent change, but it seems to me to be now at this moment as good\na definition as we can have of our European policy--the idea of public\nright. What does it mean when translated into concrete terms? It means,\nfirst and foremost, the clearing of the ground by the definite repudiation\nof militarism as the governing factor in the relation of states and of the\nfuture moulding of the European world. It means next that room must be\nfound and kept for the independent existence and the free development of\nthe smaller nationalities, each with a corporate consciousness of its\nown.... And it means, finally, or it ought to mean, perhaps, by a slow and\ngradual process, the substitution for force, for the clash of competing\nambition, for groupings and alliances, of a real European partnership\nbased on the recognition of equal right and established and enforced by a\ncommon will.\"[6]\n\nMuch the same language has been used by Sir Edward Grey and by Mr. Winston\nChurchill.\n\n[6] _The Times_, September 26.\n\n\nA COMMON WILL\n\nObserve that there are three points here. In the first place--if I do not\nmisapprehend Mr. Asquith's drift--in working for the abolition of\nmilitarism, we are working for a great diminution in those armaments which\nhave become a nightmare to the modern world. The second point is that we\nhave to help in every fashion small nationalities, or, in other words,\nthat we have to see that countries like Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, the\nScandinavian countries, Greece and the Balkan States, and, perhaps, more\nspecially, the Slav nationalities shall have a free chance in Europe,\nshall \"have their place in the sun,\" and not be browbeaten and raided and\noverwhelmed by their powerful neighbours. And the third point, perhaps\nmore important than all, is the creation of what Mr. Asquith calls a\n\"European partnership based on the recognition of equal right and\nestablished and enforced by a common will.\" We have to recognise that\nthere is such a thing as public right; that there is such a thing as\ninternational morality, and that the United States of Europe have to keep\nas their ideal the affirmation of this public right, and to enforce it by\na common will. That creation of a common will is at once the most\ndifficult and the most imperative thing of all. Every one must be aware\nhow difficult it is. We know, for instance, how the common law is enforced\nin any specified state, because it has a \"sanction,\" or, in other words,\nbecause those who break it can be punished. But the weakness for a long\ntime past of international law, from the time of Grotius onwards, is that\nit apparently has no real sanction. How are we to punish an offending\nstate? It can only be done by the gradual development of a public\nconscience in Europe, and by means of definite agreements so that the rest\nof the civilised world shall compel a recalcitrant member to abide by the\ncommon decrees. If only this common will of Europe ever came into\nexistence, we should have solved most, if not all, our troubles. But the\nquestion is: How?\n\n\nA HUNDRED YEARS AGO\n\nIt may be depressing, but it certainly is an instructive lesson to go back\njust a hundred years ago, when the condition of Europe was in many\nrespects similar to that which prevails now. The problems that unrolled\nthemselves before the nations afford useful points of comparison. The\ngreat enemy was then Napoleon and France. Napoleon's views of empire were\nprecisely of that universal predatory type which we have learnt to\nassociate with the Kaiser and the German Empire. The autocratic rule of\nthe single personal will was weighing heavily on nearly every quarter of\nthe globe. Then came a time when the principle of nationality, which\nNapoleon had everywhere defied, gradually grew in strength until it was\nable to shake off the yoke of the conqueror. In Germany, and Spain, and\nItaly the principle of nationality steadily grew, while in England there\nhad always been a steady opposition to the tyranny of Napoleon on the\nprecise ground that it interfered with the independent existence of\nnations. The defeat of Napoleon, therefore, was hailed by our forefathers\na hundred years ago as the dawn of a new era. Four great Powers--Great\nBritain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia--had before them as their task the\nsettlement of Europe, one of the noblest tasks that could possibly be\nassigned to those who, having suffered under the old regime, were desirous\nto secure peace and base it on just and equitable foundations. There is\nthus an obvious parallelism between the conditions of affairs in 1815 and\nthose which will, as we hope, obtain if and when the German tyrant is\ndefeated and the nations of Europe commence their solemn task of\nreconstituting Europe. Of course, we must not press the analogy too far.\nThe dawn of a new era might have been welcomed in 1815, but the proviso\nwas always kept in the background that most of the older traditions should\nbe preserved. Diplomacy was still inspired by its traditional watchwords.\nAbove all, the transformation so keenly and so vaguely desired was in the\nhands of sovereigns who were more anxious about their own interests than\nperhaps was consistent with the common weal.\n\n\nEQUILIBRIUM\n\nAt first the four Great Powers proceeded very tentatively. They wished to\nconfine France--the dangerous element in Europe--within her legitimate\nboundaries. Next, they desired to arrange an equilibrium of Powers\n(observe, in passing, the old doctrine of the Balance of Power) so that no\nindividual state should for the future be in a position to upset the\ngeneral tranquillity. Revolutionary France was to be held under by the\nre-establishment of its ancient dynasty. Hence Louis XVIII was to be\nrestored. The other object was to be obtained by a careful parcelling out\nof the various territories of Europe, on the basis, so far as possible, of\nold rights consecrated by treaties. It is unnecessary to go into detail in\nthis matter. We may say summarily that Germany was reconstituted as a\nConfederation of Sovereign States; Austria received the Presidency of the\nFederal Diet; in Italy Lombardo-Venetia was erected into a kingdom under\nAustrian hegemony, while the Low Countries were annexed to the crown of\nHolland so as to form, under the title of the United Netherlands, an\nefficient barrier against French aggression northwards. It was troublesome\nto satisfy Alexander I of Russia because of his ambition to secure for\nhimself the kingdom of Poland. Indeed, as we shall see presently, the\npersonality of Alexander was a permanent stumbling-block to most of the\nprojects of European statesmen. As a whole, it cannot be denied that this\nparticular period of history, between Napoleon's abdication in 1814 and\nthe meeting of the European Congress at Verona in 1882, presented a\nprofoundly distressing picture of international egotism. The ruin of their\ncommon enemy, relieving the members of the European family from the\nnecessity of maintaining concord, also released their individual\nselfishnesses and their long-suppressed mutual jealousies.[7]\n\n[7] See _The Confederation of Europe_, by Walter Alison Phillips\n(Longmans), esp. Chapters V and VI. Cf. also _Political and Literary\nEssays_, by the Earl of Cromer, 2nd series (Macmillan), on _The\nConfederation of Europe_.\n\n\nTHE HOLY ALLIANCE\n\nThe figure of Alexander I dominates this epoch. His character exhibits a\nvery curious mixture of autocratic ambition and a mystical vein of sheer\nundiluted idealism. Probably it would be true to say that he began by\nbeing an idealist, and was forced by the pressure of events to adopt\nreactionary tactics. Perhaps also, deeply embedded in the Russian nature\nwe generally find a certain unpracticalness and a tendency to mystical\ndreams, far remote from the ordinary necessities of every day. It was\nAlexander's dream to found a Union of Europe, and to consecrate its\npolitical by its spiritual aims. He retained various nebulous thinkers\naround his throne; he also derived much of his crusade from the\ninspiration of a woman--Baroness von Kruedener, who is supposed to have\nowed her own conversion to the teaching of a pious cobbler. Even if we\nhave to describe Alexander's dream as futile, we cannot afford to dismiss\nit as wholly inoperative. For it had as its fruit the so-called Holy\nAlliance, which was in a sense the direct ancestor of the peace programmes\nof the Hague, and, through a different chain of ideas, the Monroe Doctrine\nof the United States. We are apt sometimes to confuse the Holy Alliance\nwith the Grand Alliance. The second, however, was a union of the four\nGreat Powers, to which France was ultimately admitted. The first was not\nan alliance at all, hardly, perhaps, even a treaty. It was in its original\nconception a single-hearted attempt to arrange Europe on the principles of\nthe Christian religion, the various nations being regarded as brothers who\nought to have proper brotherly affection for one another. We know that,\neventually, the Holy Alliance became an instrument of something like\nautocratic despotism, but in its essence it was so far from being\nreactionary that, according to the Emperor Alexander, it involved the\ngrant of liberal constitutions by princes to their subjects.\n\n\nDIPLOMATIC CRITICISM\n\nBut just because it bound its signatories to act on certain vague\nprinciples for no well-defined ends, it was bound to become the mockery\nof diplomatists trained in an older school. Metternich, for instance,\ncalled it a \"loud sounding nothing\"; Castlereagh \"a piece of sublime\nmysticism and nonsense,\" while Canning declared that for his part he\nwanted no more of \"Areopagus and the like of that.\" What happened on this\noccasion is what ordinarily happens with well-intentioned idealists who\nhappen also to be amateur statesmen. Trying to regulate practical\npolitics, the Holy Alliance was deflected from its original purpose\nbecause its chief author, Alexander I, came under the influence of\nMetternich and was frightened by revolutionary movements in Italy and\nwithin his own dominions. Thus the instrument originally intended to\npreserve nationalities and secure the constitutional rights of people was\nconverted into a weapon for the use of autocrats only anxious to preserve\ntheir own thrones. Nevertheless, though it may have been a failure, the\nHoly Alliance did not leave itself without witness in the modern world. It\ntried to regulate ordinary diplomacy in accordance with ethical and\nspiritual principles; and the dreaming mind of its first founder was\nreproduced in that later descendant of his who initiated the Hague\npropaganda of peace.\n\n\nFAILURE\n\n\"These things were written for our ensamples,\" and we should be foolish\nindeed if we did not take stock of them with an anxious eye to the future.\nThe main and startling fact is that with every apparent desire for the\nre-establishment of Europe on better lines, Europe, as a matter of fact,\ndrifted back into the old welter of conflicting nationalities, while the\nvery instrument of peace--the Holy Alliance--was used by autocratic\ngovernments for the subjection of smaller nationalities and the\ndestruction of popular freedom. It is accordingly very necessary that we\nshould study the conditions under which so startling a transformation took\nplace. Even in England herself it cannot be said that the people were in\nany sense benefited by the conclusions of the war. They had borne its\nburdens, but at its end found themselves hampered as before in the free\ndevelopment of a democracy. Meanwhile, Europe at large presented a\nspectacle of despotism tempered by occasional popular outbreaks, while in\nthe majority of cases the old fetters were riveted anew by cunning and by\nno means disinterested hands.\n\n\nA DECEPTIVE PARALLEL\n\nWhat we have to ask ourselves is whether the conditions a hundred years\nago have any real similarity with those likely to obtain when Europe\nbegins anew to set its house in order. To this, fortunately, we can return\na decided negative. We have already shown that the general outlines\npresent a certain similarity, but the parallelism is at most superficial,\nand in many respects deceptive. A despot has to be overthrown, an end has\nto be put to a particular form of autocratic regime, and smaller states\nhave to be protected against the exactions of their stronger\nneighbours--that is the extent of the analogy. But it is to be hoped that\nwe shall commence our labours under much better auspices. The personal\nforces involved, for instance, are wholly different. Amongst those who\ntook upon themselves to solve the problems of the time is to be found the\nwidest possible divergence in character and aims. On the one side we have\na sheer mystic and idealist in the person of Alexander I, with all kinds\nof visionary characters at his side--La Harpe, who was his tutor, a\nJacobin pure and simple, and a fervent apostle of the teachings of Jean\nJacques Rousseau; Czartoryski, a Pole, sincerely anxious for the\nregeneration of his kingdom; and Capo d'Istria, a champion of Greek\nnationality. To these we have to add the curious figure of the Baroness\nvon Kruedener, an admirable representative of the religious sickliness of\nthe age. \"I have immense things to say to him,\" she said, referring to the\nEmperor, \"the Lord alone can prepare his heart to receive them.\" She had,\nindeed, many things to say to him, but her influence was evanescent and\nhis Imperial heart was hardened eventually to quite different issues.\n\n\nMETTERNICH\n\nAbsolutely at the other extreme was a man like Metternich, trained in the\nold school of politics, wily with the wiliness of a practised diplomatic\ntraining, naturally impatient of speculative dreamers, thoroughly\npractical in the only sense in which he understood the term, that is to\nsay, determined to preserve Austrian supremacy. To a reactionary of this\nkind the Holy Alliance represented nothing but words. He knew, with the\ncynicism bred of long experience of mankind, that the rivalries and\njealousies between different states would prevent their union in any\ncommon purpose, and in the long run the intensity with which he pursued\nhis objects, narrow and limited as it was, prevailed over the large and\nvague generosity of Alexander's nature. To the same type belonged both\nTalleyrand and Richelieu, who concentrated themselves on the single task\nof winning back for France her older position in the European\ncommonwealth--a laudable aim for patriots to espouse, but one which was\nnot likely to help the cause of the Holy Alliance.\n\n\nCASTLEREAGH AND CANNING\n\nHalf-way between these two extremes of unpractical idealists and extremely\npractical but narrow-minded reactionaries come the English statesmen,\nCastlereagh, Wellington, and Canning. Much injustice has been done to the\nfirst of these. For many critics have been misled by Byron's denunciation\nof Castlereagh, just as others have spoken lightly of the stubborn\nconservatism of Wellington, or the easy and half-cynical insouciance of\nthe author of the _Anti-Jacobin_. As a matter of fact, Castlereagh was by\nno means an opponent of the principles of the Holy Alliance. He joined\nwith Russia, Austria, and Prussia as a not unwilling member of the\nsuccessive Congresses, but both he and Wellington, true to their national\ninstincts, sought to subordinate all proposals to the interests of Great\nBritain, and to confine discussions to immediate objects, such as the\nlimitation of French power and the suppression of dangerous revolutionary\nideas. They were not, it is true, idealists in the sense in which\nAlexander I understood the term. And yet, on the whole, both Castlereagh\nand Canning did more for the principle of nationality than any of the\nother diplomatists of the time. The reason why Canning broke with the Holy\nAlliance, after Troppau, Laibach, and Verona, was because he discerned\nsomething more than a tendency on the part of Continental States to crush\nthe free development of peoples, especially in reference to the\nLatin-American States of South America. It is true that in these matters\nhe and his successor were guided by a shrewd notion of British interest,\nbut it would be hardly just to blame them on this account. \"You know my\npolitics well enough,\" wrote Canning in 1822 to the British Ambassador in\nSt. Petersburg, \"to know what I mean when I say that for Europe I should\nbe desirous now and then to read England.\" Castlereagh was, no doubt, more\nconciliatory than Canning, but he saw the fundamental difficulty of\norganising an international system and yet holding the balance between\nconflicting nations. And thus we get to a result such as seems to have\nrejoiced the heart of Canning, when he said in 1823 that \"the issue of\nVerona has split the one and indivisible alliance into three parts as\ndistinct as the constitutions of England, France, and Muscovy.\" \"Things\nare getting back,\" he added, \"to a wholesome state again. Every nation for\nitself and God for us all. Only bid your Emperor (Alexander I) be quiet,\nfor the time for Areopagus and the like of that is gone by.\"[8]\n\n[8] _The Confederation of Europe_, by W.A. Phillips, p. 280.\n\n\nEARTHEN VESSELS\n\nIf, then, the ardent hopes of a regenerated Europe in the early years of\nthe nineteenth century failed, the result was due in large measure to the\nfact that the business was committed to wrong hands. The organs for\nworking the change were for the most part autocratic monarchs and\nold-world diplomatists--the last people in the world likely to bring about\na workable millennium. A great crisis demands very careful manipulation.\nCynicism must not be allowed to play any part in it. Traditional\nwatchwords are not of much use. Theoretical idealism itself may turn out\nto be a most formidable stumbling-block. Yet no one can doubt that a\nsolution of the problem, whenever it is arrived at, must come along the\npath of idealism. Long ago a man of the world was defined as a man who in\nevery serious crisis is invariably wrong. He is wrong because he applies\nold-fashioned experience to a novel situation--old wine in new\nbottles--and because he has no faith in generous aspirations, having noted\ntheir continuous failure in the past. Yet, after all, it is only faith\nwhich can move mountains, and the Holy Alliance itself was not so much\nwrong in the principles to which it appealed as it was in the personages\nwho signed it. We have noticed already that, like all other great ideas,\nit did not wholly die. The propaganda of peace, however futile may be some\nof the discussions of pacifists, is the heritage which even so\nwrong-headed a man as Alexander I has left to the world. The idea of\narbitration between nations, the solution of difficulties by arguments\nrather than by swords, the power which democracies hold in their hands for\nguiding the future destinies of the world--all these in their various\nforms remain with us as legacies of that splendid, though ineffective,\nidealism which lay at the root of the Holy Alliance.\n\n\nSMALL NATIONALITIES\n\nAnd now after this digression, which has been necessary to clear the\nground, and also to suggest apt parallels, let us return to what Mr.\nAsquith said in Dublin on the ultimate objects of the present war. He\nborrowed from Mr. Gladstone the phrase \"the enthronement of the idea of\npublic right as the governing idea of European politics,\" and in\ndeveloping it as applicable to the present situation he pointed out that\nfor us three definite objects are involved. The first, assented to by\nevery publicist of the day, apart from those educated in Germany, is the\nwholesale obliteration of the notion that states exist simply for the sake\nof going to war. This kind of militarism, in all its different aspects,\nwill have to be abolished. The next point brings us at once to the heart\nof some of the controversies raised in 1815 and onwards. \"Room,\" said Mr.\nAsquith--agreeing in this matter with Mr. Winston Churchill--\"room must be\nfound, and kept, for the independent existence and the free development of\nthe smaller nationalities, each with a corporate consciousness of its\nown.\" Now this is a plain issue which every one can understand. Not only\ndid we go to war in order to help a small nationality--Belgium--but the\nvery principle of nationality is one of the familiar phrases which have\ncharacterised British policy through the greater part of the nineteenth\ncentury. Our principle is to live and let live, to allow smaller states to\nexist and thrive by the side of their large neighbours without undue\ninterference on the part of the latter. Each distinct nationality is to\nhave its voice, at all events, in the free direction of its own future.\nAnd, above all, its present and future position must be determined not by\nthe interests of the big Powers, but by a sort of plebiscite of the whole\nnationality.\n\n\nSOME PLAIN ISSUES\n\nApplying such principles to Europe as it exists to-day, and as it is\nlikely to exist to-morrow, we arrive at certain very definite conclusions.\nThe independence of Belgium must be secured, so also must the independence\nof Holland and Denmark. Alsace and Lorraine must, if the inhabitants so\nwish, be restored to France, and there can be little doubt that Alsace at\nall events will be only too glad to resume her old allegiance to the\nFrench nation. The Duchies of Schleswig-Holstein must also decide whether\nthey would like to be reunited to Denmark. And we are already aware that\nthe Tsar has promised to give independence to the country of Poland--a\npoint which forms a curious analogy with the same offer originally\nproposed by the Tsar's ancestor, Alexander I. Of course, these do not\nexhaust by any means the changes that must be forthcoming. Finland will\nhave to be liberated; those portions of Transylvania which are akin to\nRoumania must be allowed to gravitate towards their own stock. Italy must\narrogate to herself--if she is wise enough to join her forces with those\nof the Triple Entente--those territories which come under the general\ntitle of \"unredeemed Italy\"--the Trentino and Trieste, to say nothing of\nwhat Italy claims on the Adriatic littoral. Possibly the greatest changes\nof all will take place in reference to the Slavs. Servia and Montenegro\nwill clearly wish to incorporate in a great Slav kingdom a great many of\ntheir kinsmen who at present are held in uneasy subjection by Austria.[9]\nNor must we forget how these same principles apply to the Teutonic States.\nIf the principle of nationality is to guide us, we must preserve the\nGerman nation, even though we desire to reduce its dangerous elements to\nimpotence. Prussia must remain the home of all those Germans who accept\nthe hegemony of Berlin, but it does not follow that the southern states of\nthe German Empire--who have not been particularly fond of their northern\nneighbours--should have to endure any longer the Prussian yoke. Lastly,\nthe German colonies can hardly be permitted to remain under the dominion\nof the Kaiser.[10] Here are only a few of the changes which may\nmetamorphose the face of Europe as a direct result of enforcing the\nprinciple of nationalities.\n\n[9] The entrance of Turkey into the quarrel of course brings new factors\ninto the ultimate settlement.\n\n[10] Cf. _Who is Responsible?_ by Cloudesley Brereton (Harrap), Chapter\nIV, \"The Settlement.\"\n\n\nEUROPEAN PARTNERSHIP\n\nBut there is a further point to which Mr. Asquith referred, one which is\nmore important than anything else, because it represents the far-off ideal\nof European peace and the peace of the world. \"We have got to substitute\nby a slow and gradual process,\" said Mr. Asquith, \"instead of force,\ninstead of the clash of compelling ambition, instead of groupings and\nalliances, a real European partnership, based on the recognition of equal\nright and established and enforced by a common will.\" There we have the\nwhole crux of the situation, and, unfortunately, we are forced to add, its\nmain difficulty. For if we desire to summarise in a single sentence the\nrock on which European negotiations from 1815 to 1829 ultimately split, it\nwas the union of two such contradictory things as independent\nnationalities and an international committee or system of public law.\nIntrinsically the two ideas are opposed, for one suggests absolute\nfreedom, and the other suggests control, superintendence, interference. If\nthe one recognises the entire independence of a nationality within its own\nlimits, the other seeks to enforce something of the nature of a European\npolice to see that every nation does its duty. It is true, of course, that\nthis public will of Europe must be incorporated in a kind of parliament,\nto which the separate nations must send their representatives, and that\nthus in a fashion each nation will have its proper say in any of the\nconclusions arrived at. But here the difficulty starts anew owing to the\nrelative size, and therefore the relative importance of the different\nstates constituting the union. If all alike are given an equivalent vote,\nit is rather hard on the big states, which represent larger numbers and\ntherefore control larger destinies. If, on the other hand, we adopt the\nprinciple of proportional representation, we may be pretty certain that\nthe larger states will press somewhat heavily on the smaller. For\ninstance, suppose that some state violates, or threatens to violate, the\npublic law of the world. In that case the Universal Union must, of course,\ntry to bring it to reason by peaceful means first, but if that should\nfail, the only other alternative is by force of arms. If once we admit the\nright of the world-organisation to coerce its recalcitrant members, what\nbecomes of the sovereign independence of nations? That, as we have said,\nwas the main difficulty confronting the European peace-maker of a hundred\nyears ago, and, however we may choose to regard it, it remains a\ndifficulty, we will not say insuperable, but at all events exceedingly\nformidable, for the European peace-makers of the twentieth century. The\nantithesis is the old antithesis between order and progress; between\ncoercion and independence; between the public voice, or, if we like to\nphrase it so, the public conscience, and the arbitrariness and\nirresponsibility of individual units. Or we might put the problem in a\nstill wider form. A patriot is a man who believes intensely in the rights\nof his own nationality. But if we have to form a United States of Europe\nwe shall have gradually to soften, diminish, or perhaps even destroy the\nnarrower conceptions of patriotism. The ultimate evolution of democracy in\nthe various peoples means the mutual recognition of their common\ninterests, as against despotism and autocracy. It is clear that such a\nprocess must gradually wipe out the distinction between the different\npeoples, and substitute for particularism something of universal import.\nIn such a process what, we ask once more, becomes of the principle of\nnationality, which is one of our immediate aims? In point of fact, it is\nobvious that, from a strictly logical standpoint, the will of Europe, or\nthe public right of Europe, and the free independence of nationalities are\nantithetical terms, and will continue to remain so, however cunningly, by\na series of compromises, we may conceal their essential divergence. That\nis the real problem which confronts us quite as obstinately as it did our\nforefathers after the destruction of the Napoleonic power. And it will\nhave to be faced by all reformers, whether they are pacifists or\nidealists, on ethical or political grounds.\n\n\nA MORAL FOR PACIFISTS\n\nWhat is the outcome of the foregoing considerations? The only moral at\npresent which I am disposed to draw is one which may be addressed to\npacifists in general, and to all those who avail themselves of large and\ngenerous phrases, such as \"the public will of Europe,\" or \"the common\nconsciousness of civilised states.\" The solution of the problem before us\nis not to be gained by the use of abstract terms, but by very definite and\nconcrete experience used in the most practical way to secure immediate\nreforms. We demand, for instance, the creation of what is to all intents\nand purposes an international federal system applied to Europe at large.\nNow it is obvious that a federal system can be created amongst nations\nmore or less at the same level of civilisation, inspired by much the same\nideals, acknowledging the same end of their political and social activity.\nBut in what sense is this true of Europe as we know it? There is every\nkind of diversity between the constituent elements of the suggested\nfederation. There is no real uniformity of political institutions and\nideals. But in order that our object may be realised it is precisely this\nuniformity of political institutions and ideals amongst the nations which\nwe require. How is a public opinion formed in any given state? It comes\ninto being owing to a certain community of sentiments, opinions, and\nprejudices, and without such community it cannot develop. The same thing\nholds true of international affairs. If we desiderate the public voice of\nEurope, or the public conscience of Europe, Europe must grow to be far\nmore concordant than it is at present, both in actual political\ninstitutions and in those inspiring ideals which form the life-blood of\ninstitutions. How many states, for instance, recognise or put into\npractice a really representative system of government?\n\n\nCOMPULSORY ARBITRATION\n\nIf we turn to the programme of the pacifists, we shall be confronted by\nsimilar difficulties. Pacifism, as such, involves an appeal to all the\ndemocracies, asking them to come into line, as it were, for the execution\nof certain definite projects intended to seek peace and ensure it. The\nfirst stage of the peace movement is the general recognition of the\nprinciple of arbitration between states. That first period has, we may\ntake it, been already realised. The second stage is the recognition of\ncompulsory arbitration. When, in 1907, the second Hague Conference was\nheld, this principle was supported by thirty-two different states,\nrepresenting more than a thousand million human beings. Something like\nthree or four hundred millions remained not yet prepared to admit the\nprinciple in its entirety. I may remark in passing that the verbal\nacceptance of a general principle is one thing, the application, as we\nhave lately had much reason to discover, is quite another. We may\nrecognise, however, that this second stage of the pacifist programme has,\nundoubtedly, made large advances. But of course it must necessarily be\nfollowed by its consequence, a third stage which shall ensure respect for,\nand obedience to arbitration verdicts. Recalcitrant states will have to be\ncoerced, and the one thing that can coerce them is an international police\nadministered by an international executive power. That is to say, we must\nhave a parliament of parliaments, a universal parliament, the\nrepresentatives of which must be selected by the different constituent\nmembers of the United States of Europe. When this has been done, and only\nwhen this has been done, can we arrive at a fourth stage, that of a\ngeneral disarmament. In the millennium that is to be it is only the\ninternational police which shall be allowed to use weapons of war in order\nto execute the decrees of the central parliament representing the common\nEuropean will.\n\n\nDEMOCRATIC UNANIMITY\n\nHere we have all the old difficulties starting anew, and especially the\nmain one--democratic unanimity. How far the democracies of the European\nCommonwealth can work in unison is one of the problems which the future\nwill have to solve. At present they, obviously, do not do so. The Social\nDemocrats of Germany agreed to make war on the democrats of other\ncountries. Old instincts were too strong for them. For it must always be\nremembered that only so far as a cosmopolitan spirit takes the place of\nnarrow national prejudices can we hope to reach the level of a common\nconscience, or a common will of Europe. And are we prepared to say that\nnational prejudices _ought_ to be obliterated and ignored? The very\nprinciple of nationality forbids it.\n\nI do not wish, however, to end on a note of pessimism. The mistake of the\npacifist has all along been the assumption that bellicose impulses have\ndied away. They have done nothing of the kind, and are not likely to do\nso. But, happily, all past experience in the world's history shows us that\nideas in a real sense govern the world, and that a logical difficulty is\nnot necessarily a practical impossibility. In this case, as in others, a\nnoble and generous idea of European peace will gradually work its own\nfulfilment, if we are not in too much of a hurry to force the pace, or\nimagine that the ideal has been reached even before the preliminary\nfoundations have been laid.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nSOME SUGGESTED REFORMS\n\n\nIt is an obvious criticism on the considerations which have been occupying\nus in the preceding chapters that they are too purely theoretical to be of\nany value. They are indeed speculative, and, perhaps, from one point of\nview come under the edge of the usual condemnation of prophecy. Prophecy\nis, of course, if one of the most interesting, also one of the most\ndangerous of human ingenuities, and the usual fate of prophets is, in nine\ncases out of ten, to be proved wrong. Moreover, it is possible that there\nmay come an issue to the present war which would be by far the worst which\nthe human mind can conceive. It may end in a deadlock, a stalemate, an\nimpasse, because the two opposing forces are so equal that neither side\ncan get the better of the other. If peace has to be made because of such a\nbalance between the opposing forces as this, it would be a calamity almost\nworse than the original war. German militarism would still be unsubdued,\nthe Kaiser's pretensions to universal sovereignty, although clipped, would\nnot be wiped out, and we should find remaining in all the nations of the\nearth a sort of sullen resentment which could not possibly lead to\nanything else than a purely temporary truce. The only logical object of\nwar is to make war impossible, and if merely an indecisive result were\nachieved in the present war, it would be as certain as anything human can\nbe that a fresh war would soon arise. At the present moment we confess\nthat there is an ugly possibility of this kind, and that it is one of the\nmost formidable perils of future civilisation.\n\n\nAN IGNOBLE PACIFICATION\n\nIt is so immensely important, however, that the cause of the Allies should\nprevail not for their own sakes alone, but for the sake of the world, that\nit is difficult to imagine their consenting to an ignoble pacification.\nThe Allies have signed an important document, in order to prove their\nsolidarity, that no one of them will sign peace without the sanction of\nthe other partners. Let us suppose that the rival armies have fought each\nother to a standstill; let us suppose that France is exhausted; let us\nfurther suppose that the German troops, by their mobility and their\ntactical skill, are able to hold the Russians in the eastern sphere of\nwar. We can suppose all these things, but what we cannot imagine even for\na moment is that Great Britain--to confine ourselves only to our own\ncase--will ever consent to stop until she has achieved her object. America\nmay strive to make the combatants desist from hostilities, partly because\nshe is a great pacific power herself, and partly because it is a practical\nobject with her as a commercial nation to secure tranquil conditions. Yet,\neven so, there would be no answer to the question which most thoughtful\nminds would propound: Why did we go to war, and what have we gained by the\nwar? If we went to war for large cosmic purposes, then we cannot consent\nto a peace which leaves those ultimate purposes unfulfilled. I think,\ntherefore, we can put aside this extremely uncomfortable suggestion that\nthe war may possibly end in a deadlock, because, in the last resort, Great\nBritain, with her fleet, her sister dominions over the seas, her colonies,\nand her eastern ally Japan, will always, to use the familiar phrase, have\n\"something up her sleeve,\" even though continental nations should reach a\npitch of absolute exhaustion.\n\n\nA NEW EUROPE\n\nIt follows then that, even if we admit the purely speculative character of\nour argument, it is not only right and proper, but absolutely necessary\nthat we should prepare ourselves for something which we can really\ndescribe as a new Europe. Thoughtful minds ought imaginatively to put\nthemselves in the position of a spectator of a reconstituted world, or\nrather of a world that waits to be reconstituted. It is necessary that\nthis should be done, because so many older prejudices have to be swept\naway, so many novel conceptions have to be entertained. Let us take only a\nsingle example. If we look back over history, we shall see that all the\ngreat nations have made themselves great by war. There is a possible\nexception in the case of Italy, whose present greatness has flowed from\nloyal help rendered her by other kindred nations, and by realising for\nherself certain large patriotic ideals entertained by great minds. But for\nthe majority of nations it is certainly true that they have fought their\nway into the ranks of supreme powers. From this the deduction is easy that\ngreatness depends on the possession of formidable military power. Indeed,\nall the arguments of those who are very anxious that we should not reduce\nour armaments is entirely based on this supposition. The strong man armed\nkeepeth his goods in peace; his only fear is that a stronger man may come\nwith better arms and take away his possessions. Now if the new Europe\ndawns not indeed for those who are past middle age--for they will have\ndied before its realisation--but for the younger generation for whose sake\nwe are bearing the toil and burden of the day, the one thing which is\nabsolutely necessary is that the index of greatness must no longer be\nfound in armies and navies. Clearly it will take a long time for men to\nget used to this novel conception. Inveterate prejudices will stand in the\nway. We shall be told over and over again that peace-lovers are no\npatriots; that imperialism demands the possible sacrifice of our manhood\nto the exigencies of war; and that the only class of men who are ever\nrespected in this world are those who can fight. And so, even though we\nhave had ocular demonstration of the appalling ruin which militarism can\nproduce, we may yet, if we are not careful, forget all our experience and\ndrift back into notions which are not really separable from precisely\nthose ideas which we are at present reprobating in the German nation. The\nreal test is this: Is, or is not, war a supreme evil? It is no answer to\nthis question to suggest that war educes many splendid qualities. Of\ncourse it does. And so, too, does exploration of Polar solitudes, or even\nclimbing Alpine or Himalayan heights. Either war is a detestable solution\nof our difficulties, or it is not. If it is not, then we have no right\nwhatsoever to object to the Prussian ideal. But if it is, let us call it\nby its proper name. Let us say that it is devil's work, and have done with\nit.\n\n\nEVIL OF ARMAMENTS\n\nWe are trying not only to understand what Europe will be like if, as we\nhope, this war ends successfully for the Allies, but what sort of new\nEurope it will be in the hands of the conquerors to frame. Those who come\nafter us are to find in that new Europe real possibilities of advance in\nall the higher kinds of civilisation. Not only are the various states to\ncontain sane and healthy people who desire to live in peace with their\nneighbours, but people who will desire to realise themselves in science,\nin philosophic thought, in art, in literature. What is an indispensable\ncondition for an evolution of this sort? It must be the absence of all\nuneasiness, the growth of a serene confidence and trust, the obliteration\nof envy, jealousy, and every kind of unreasonableness. The cause, above\nall others, which has produced an opposite condition of things, which has\ncreated the unfortunate Europe in which we have hitherto had to live, is\nthe growth and extension of armaments. The main factor, then, in our\nproblem is the existence of such swollen armaments as have wasted the\nresources of every nation and embittered the minds of rival peoples. How\nare we to meet this intolerable evil of armaments?\n\n\nABSENCE OF PROVOCATION\n\nIn the first place, let us remark that on our supposition--the eventual\nvictory of the Allies--one of the great disturbing elements will have been\nput out of the field. Europe has hitherto been lulled into an uneasy and\nfractious sleep by the balance of two great organisations. Under the\nhappiest hypothesis the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente will have\ndisappeared into the deep backward and abysm of time. For all practical\npurposes there will be no Triple Alliance, and therefore no Triple Entente\nto confront it. With Austria wiped out of the map for all purposes of\noffence, and Germany restricted within modest dimensions, the three powers\nof the Triple Entente--Great Britain, France, and Russia--can do what they\nlike, and as they are sworn friends and allies they can take their own\nsteps undisturbed by fears of hostile combinations. Why should these\nthree allies consent any further to keep up bloated armaments? It is\nagainst their own interests and against the interests of the world. So\nlong as Germany existed as a power and developed her own ambitions, we\nwere always on the edge of a catastrophe. With the conquest of Germany\nthat nightmare will have gone. And observe some of the consequences which\nmust inevitably follow. It was against the menace of Germany that France\nhad to pass her three years' law of military service: in the absence of\nthe German army France can reduce as she pleases her military\nestablishment. It was against the menace of a German fleet that we had to\nincur an outlay of millions of pounds: in the absence of the German fleet\nwe, too, can do what we please. It is certain also that Russia, so long as\nthe deep-seated antagonism between Teuton and Slav remained, was under\nstrong compulsion to reform and reinforce her army.\n\n\nFEAR OF RUSSIA\n\nThere may, it is true, remain in some minds a certain fear about Russia,\nbecause it is difficult to dispel the old conception of a great despotic\nRussian autocracy, or, if we like to say so, a semi-eastern and\nhalf-barbarous power biding her time to push her conquests both towards\nthe rising and the setting sun. But many happy signs of quite a new spirit\nin Russia have helped to allay our fears. It looks as if a reformed Russia\nmight arise, with ideas of constitutionalism and liberty and a much truer\nconception of what the evolution of a state means. At the very beginning\nof the war the Tsar issued a striking proclamation to the Poles, promising\nthem a restoration of the national freedom which they had lost a century\nand a half previously. This doubtless was a good stroke of policy, but\nalso it seemed something more--a proof of that benevolent idealism which\nbelongs to the Russian nature, and of which the Tsar himself has given\nmany signs. Of the three nations who control the Poles, the Austrians have\ndone most for their subjects: at all events, the Poles under Austrian\ncontrol are supposed to be the most happy and contented. Then come the\nRussian Poles. But the Poles under German government are the most\nmiserable of all, mainly because all German administration is so\nmechanical, so hard, in a real sense so inhuman. But this determination of\nthe Tsar to do some justice to the Polish subjects is not the only sign of\na newer spirit we have to deal with. There was also a proclamation\npromising liberty to the Jews--a very necessary piece of reform--and\ngiving, as an earnest of the good intentions of the Government,\ncommissions to Jews in the army. Better than all other evidence is the\nextraordinary outburst of patriotic feeling in all sections of the Russian\npeople. It looks as if this war has really united Russia in a sense in\nwhich it has never been united before. When we see voluntary service\noffered on the part of those who hitherto have felt themselves the victims\nof Russian autocracy, we may be pretty certain that even the reformers in\nthe great northern kingdom have satisfied themselves that their\nlong-deferred hopes may at length gain fulfilment. Nor ought we to forget\nthat splendid act of reform which has abolished the Imperial monopoly of\nthe sale of vodka. If by one stroke of the pen the Tsar can sacrifice\nninety-three millions of revenue in order that Russia may be sober, it is\nnot very extravagant to hope that in virtue of the same kind of benevolent\ndespotism Russia may secure a liberal constitution and the Russian people\nbe set free.[11]\n\n[11] See _Our Russian Ally_, by Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace (Macmillan).\n\n\nMILITARY AUTOCRACY\n\nThe end of a great war, however, has one inevitable result, that it leaves\na military autocracy in supreme control of affairs. The armies which have\nwon the various campaigns, the generals who have led them, the\nCommanders-in-Chief who have carried out the successful strategy, these\nare naturally left with almost complete authority in their hands.\nWellington, for instance, a hundred years ago, held an extraordinarily\nstrong position in deciding the fate of Europe. And so, too, did the\nRussian Tsar, whose armies had done so much to destroy the legend of\nNapoleonic invincibility. Similar conditions must be expected on the\npresent occasion. And, perhaps, the real use of diplomats, if they are\nprudent and level-headed men, is to control the ambitions of the military\nelement, to adopt a wider outlook, to consider the ultimate consequences\nrather than the immediate effects of things. It would indeed be a\nlamentable result if a war which was intended to destroy militarism in\nEurope should end by setting up militarism in high places.\n\n\nLIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS\n\nThus we seem to see still more clearly than before that the size of\narmaments in Europe constitutes a fundamental problem with which we have\nto grapple. Every soldier, as a matter of course, believes in military\narmaments, and is inclined to exaggerate their social and not merely their\noffensive value. Those of us who are not soldiers, but who are interested\nin the social and economic development of the nation, know, on the\ncontrary, that the most destructive and wasteful form of expenditure is\nthat which is occupied with armaments grown so bloated that they go far to\nrender the most pressing domestic reforms absolutely impossible. How,\nthen, can we limit the size of armaments? What provision can we make to\nkeep in check that desire to fortify itself, to entrench itself in an\nabsolutely commanding position, which inherently belongs to the military\nmind? In the case of both navies and armies something depends on\ngeographical conditions, and something on financial possibilities. The\nfirst represents, as it were, the minimum required for safety; the second\nthe maximum burden which a state can endure without going into\nbankruptcy.[12] Our own country, we should say, requires fleets, so far as\ngeographical conditions are concerned, for the protection of her shores,\nand, inasmuch as she is a scattered empire, we must have our warships in\nall the Seven Seas. France, in her turn, requires a navy which shall\nprotect her in the Mediterranean, and especially render access easy to\nher North African possessions. On the supposition that she is good friends\nwith England, she does not require ships in the North Sea or in the\nEnglish Channel, while, vice versa, England, so long as France is strong\nin the Mediterranean, need only keep quite small detachments at Gibraltar,\nMalta, and elsewhere. Russia must have a fleet for the Baltic, and also a\nfleet in the Black Sea. Beyond that her requirements assuredly do not go.\nItaly's activities are mainly in the Mediterranean. Under the supposition\nthat she is conquered, Germany stands in some danger of losing her navy\naltogether.\n\n[12] Brailsford's _War of Steel and Gold_: Chap. IX.\n\n\nPROTECTION OF COMMERCE\n\nIt is obvious, therefore, that if we confine ourselves purely to\ngeographical conditions, and adhere to the principle that navies are\nrequired for the protection of coasts, we can at once reduce, within\nrelatively small limits, the building of armoured ships. The reason why\nlarge navies have hitherto been necessary is because it has been assumed\nthat they do not merely protect coasts, but protect lines of commerce. We\nhave been told, for instance, that inasmuch as we cannot feed our own\npopulation, and our national food comes to us from Canada, America, the\nArgentine, Russia, and elsewhere, we must possess a very large amount of\ncruisers to safeguard the ships that are conveying to us our daily bread.\nIf we ask why our ships must not only protect our shores, but our\nmerchandise--the latter being for the most part a commercial enterprise\nworked by individual companies--the answer turns on that much-discussed\nprinciple, the Right of Capture at Sea, which was debated at the last\nHague Conference, and as a matter of fact stoutly defended both by Germany\nand ourselves. If we look at this doctrine--the supposed right that a\npower possesses to capture the merchandise of private individuals who\nbelong to an enemy country in times of war--we shall perhaps feel some\nsurprise that a principle which is not admitted in land warfare should\nstill prevail at sea. According to the more benevolent notions of\nconducting a campaign suggested, and indeed enforced by Hague Conventions\nand such like, an army has no right to steal the food of a country which\nit has invaded. It must pay for what it takes. Well-conducted armies, as a\nmatter of fact, behave in this fashion: the necessity of paying for what\nthey take is very strictly enforced by responsible officers. Why,\ntherefore, at sea an opposite state of affairs should prevail is really\nnot easy to understand. Most of the enemy's merchant ships which have been\ncaptured in the recent war belong to private individuals, or private\ncompanies. But they are taken, subject to the decision of Prize Courts, as\npart of the spoils of a successful maritime power. I am aware that the\nquestion is an exceedingly controversial one, and that Great Britain has\nhitherto been very firm, or, perhaps, I might be allowed to say, obstinate\nin upholding the law of capture at sea. But I also know that a great many\ncompetent lawyers and politicians do not believe in the validity of such a\nprinciple, and would not be sorry to have it abolished.[13] At all events,\nit is clear enough that if it were abolished one of the main arguments for\nkeeping up a strong navy would fall to the ground. We should then require\nno patrol of cruisers in the Atlantic, in the Pacific, and in the\nMediterranean. One thing at least is certain, that if we can ever arrive\nat a time when a real Concert of Europe prevails, one of the first things\nwhich it must take in hand is a thorough examination of the extent of\ndefensive force which a nation requires as a minimum for the preservation\nof its independence and liberty.\n\n[13] Notably Lord Loreburn, in his _Capture at Sea_ (Methuen).\n\n\nTRADE IN ARMAMENTS\n\nCertainly one crying evil exists which ought to be dealt with promptly and\neffectively in accordance with the dictates of common sense as well as\ncommon morality. I refer to the trade in armaments carried on by private\ncompanies, whose only interest it is to foment, or perhaps actually to\nproduce, war scares in order that munitions of war may be greedily\npurchased. A notorious example is furnished by the great works at Essen\nowned by Krupp. In the same position are the great French works at\nCreusot, owned by Schneider, and those of our own English firms,\nArmstrongs, Vickers, John Brown, and Cammell Laird. These are all\nsuccessful concerns, and the shareholders have reaped large profits. I\nbelieve that at Creusot the dividends have reached twenty per cent., and\nArmstrongs yield rarely less than ten per cent. It is necessary to speak\nvery plainly about industries of this kind, because, however we like to\nphrase it, they represent the realisation of private profit through the\ninstruments of death and slaughter. It would be bad enough if they\nremained purely private companies, but they really represent the most\nsolid public organisations in the world. We know the intimate relations\nbetween Krupp and the German Government, and doubtless also between\nMessrs. Schneider and the French Government. This sordid manufacture of\nthe instruments of death constitutes a vast business, with all kinds of\nramifications, and the main and deadly stigma on it is that it is bound to\nencourage and promote war. Let me quote some energetic sentences from Mr.\nH.G. Wells on this point: \"Kings and Kaisers must cease to be commercial\ntravellers of monstrous armament concerns.... I do not need to argue, what\nis manifest, what every German knows, what every intelligent educated man\nin the world knows. The Krupp concern and the tawdry Imperialism of Berlin\nare linked like thief and receiver; the hands of the German princes are\ndirty with the trade. All over the world statecraft and royalty have been\napproached and touched and tainted by these vast firms, but it is in\nBerlin that the corruption is centred, it is from Berlin that the\nintolerable pressure to arm and still to arm has come.\"[14]\n\nWhat is the obvious cure for this state of things? It stares us in the\nface. Governments alone should be allowed to manufacture weapons. This\nought not to be an industry left in private hands. If a nation, through\nits accredited representatives, thinks it is necessary to arm itself, it\nmust keep in its own hands this lethal industry. Beyond the Government\nfactories there clearly ought to be no making of weapons all over Europe\nand the world.\n\n[14] There are one or two pamphlets on this subject which are worth\nconsulting, especially _The War Traders_, by G.H. Perris (National Peace\nCouncil, St. Stephen's House, Westminster), and _The War Trust Exposed_,\nby J.F. Walton Newbold (the National Leader Press, Manchester). See also\n_The War of Steel and Gold_, by H.N. Brailsford, Chapter II, \"Real\nPolitics,\" p. 89. The sentences quoted from Mr. Wells come from _The War\nthat will end War_ (F. and C. Palmer), p. 39.\n\n\nFINANCIAL INTERESTS\n\nIt has already been remarked that the conditions which limit and control\nthe size of armaments are partly geographical and partly financial, and\nthat while the former represent the minimum, the latter stand for the\nmaximum of protective force. I need say nothing further about the\ngeographical conditions. Every one who studies a map can see for himself\nwhat is required by a country anxious to protect its shores or its\nboundaries. If we suppose that armaments are strictly limited to the needs\nof self-defence, and if we further assume that in the new Europe countries\nare not animated by the strongest dislikes against one another, but are\nprepared to live and let live (a tolerably large assumption, I am aware),\nwe can readily imagine a steady process of curtailment in the absolutely\nnecessary armament. Further, if Great Britain gave up its doctrine of the\nRight of Capture at Sea (and if Great Britain surrendered it, we may be\npretty sure that, after Germany has been made powerless, no other country\nwould wish to retain it), the supposed necessity of protecting lines of\ncommerce would disappear and a further reduction in cruisers would take\nplace. I cannot imagine that either America or Japan would wish to revive\nthe Right of Capture theory if we ourselves had given it up. And they are\nthe most important maritime and commercial nations after ourselves.[15]\n\nThe financial conditions, however, deserve study because they lead\nstraight to the very heart of the modern bellicose tendencies. In an\nobvious and superficial sense, financial conditions represent the maximum\nin the provision of armaments, because ultimately it becomes a question of\nhow much a nation can afford to spend without going bankrupt or being\nfatally hampered in its expenditure on necessary social reforms. This,\nhowever, is not perhaps the most significant point. Financial conditions\nact much more subtly than this. Why has it grown so imperative on states\nto have large armies or large navies, or both? Because--so we have been\ntold over and over again--diplomacy cannot speak with effect unless it is\nbacked by power. And what are the main occasions on which diplomacy has to\nspeak effectively? We should be inclined to answer off-hand that it must\npossess this stentorian power when there is any question about national\nhonour--when the country for whom it speaks is insulted or bullied, or\ndefrauded of its just rights; when treaties are torn up and disregarded;\nwhen its plighted word has been given and another nation acts as though no\nsuch pledge had been made; when its territory is menaced with invasion and\nso forth.\n\n[15] As a matter of fact, the United States are opposed to the Capture at\nSea principle.\n\n\nPROTECTION OF FINANCIERS\n\nBut these justifiable occasions do not exhaust the whole field. Sometimes\ndiplomacy is brought to bear on much more doubtful issues. It is used to\nsupport the concession-hunter, and to coerce a relatively powerless nation\nto grant concessions. It backs up a bank which has financed a company to\nbuild railroads or develop the internal resources of a country; or to\nexploit mines or oil-fields, or to do those thousand-and-one things which\nconstitute what is called \"peaceful penetration.\" Think of the recent\ndealings with Turkey,[16] and the international rivalry, always suspicious\nand inflammatory, which has practically divided up her Asiatic dominions\nbetween European States--so that Armenia is to belong to Russia, Syria to\nFrance, Arabia to Great Britain, and Anatolia and I know not what besides\nto Germany! Think of the competition for the carrying out of railways in\nAsia Minor and the constant friction as to which power has obtained, by\nfair means or foul, the greatest influence! Or let us remember the recent\ndisputes as to the proper floating of a loan to China and the bickering\nabout the Five-Power Group and the determination on the part of the last\nnamed that no one else should share the spoil! Or shall we transfer our\nattention to Mexico, where the severe struggle between the two rival Oil\nCompanies--the Cowdray group and the American group--threw into the shade\nthe quarrel between Huerta and Carranza? These are only a few instances\ntaken at random to illustrate the dealings of modern finance. Relatively\nsmall harm would be done if financiers were allowed to fight out their own\nquarrels. Unfortunately, however, diplomacy is brought in to support this\nside or that: and ambassadors have to speak in severe terms if a Chinese\nmandarin does not favour our so-called \"nationals,\" or if corrupt Turkish\nofficials are not sufficiently squeezable to suit our \"patriotic\"\npurposes. Our armaments are big not merely to protect the nation's honour,\nbut to provide large dividends for speculative concerns held in private\nhands.\n\n[16] Turkey has now thrown in her lot with Germany.\n\n\nINVESTING MONEY ABROAD\n\nThe truth is, of course, that the honourable name of commerce is now used\nto cover very different kinds of enterprise. We used to export goods; now\nwe export cash. Wealthy men, not being content with the sound, but not\nmagnificent interest on home securities, take their money abroad and\ninvest in extremely remunerative--though of course speculative--businesses\nin South Africa, or South America, concerned with rubber, petroleum, or\nwhatnot. Often they subscribe to a foreign loan--in itself a perfectly\nlegitimate and harmless operation, but not harmless or legitimate if one\nof the conditions of the loan is that the country to which it is lent\nshould purchase its artillery from Essen or Creusot, or its battleships\nfrom our yards. For that is precisely one of the ways in which the traffic\nin munitions of war goes on increasing and itself helps to bring about a\nconflagration. Financial enterprise is, of course, the life-blood of\nmodern states. But why should our army and navy be brought in to protect\nfinanciers? Let them take their own risks, like every other man who\npursues a hazardous path for his own private gain. Private investment in\nforeign securities does not increase the volume of a nation's commerce.\nThe individual may make a colossal fortune, but the nation pays much too\ndearly for the enrichment of financiers if it allows itself to be dragged\ninto war on account of their \"_beaux yeux_.\"\n\n\nIDEAL AIMS\n\nIt is time to gather together in a summary fashion some of the\nconsiderations which have been presented to us in the course of our\ninquiry. We have gone to war partly for direct, partly for indirect\nobjects. The direct objects are the protection of small nationalities, the\ndestruction of a particularly offensive kind of militarism in Germany, the\nsecuring of respect for treaties, and the preservation of our own and\nEuropean liberty. But there are also indirect objects at which we have to\naim, and it is here, of course, that the speculative character of our\ninquiry is most clearly revealed. Apart from the preservation of the\nsmaller nationalities, Mr. Asquith has himself told us that we should aim\nat the organisation of a Public Will of Europe, a sort of Collective\nConscience which should act as a corrective of national defects and as a\nsupport of international morality. Nothing could well be more speculative\nor vague than this, and we have already seen the kind of difficulties\nwhich surround the conception, especially the conflict between a\ncollective European constraint and an eager and energetic patriotism. We\nmust not, however, be deterred by the nebulous character of some of the\nideals which are floating through our minds. Ideals are always nebulous,\nand always resisted by the narrow sort of practical men who suggest that\nwe are metaphysical dreamers unaware of the stern facts of life.\nNevertheless, the actual progress of the world depends on the visions of\nidealists, and when the time comes for the reconstitution of Europe on a\nnew basis we must already have imaginatively thought out some of the ends\ntowards which we are striving. We must also be careful not to narrow our\nconceptions to the level of immediate needs--that is not the right way of\nany reform. Our conceptions must be as large and as wide and as\nphilanthropical as imagination can make them; otherwise Europe will miss\none of the greatest opportunities that it has ever had to deal with, and\nwe shall incur the bitterest of all disappointments--not to be awake when\nthe dawn appears.\n\n\nGREATNESS OF STATES\n\nWhat, then, are some of those nebulous visions which come before the minds\nof eager idealists? We have got to envisage for ourselves a new idea of\nwhat constitutes greatness in a state. Hitherto we have measured national\ngreatness by military strength, because most of the European nations have\nattained their present position through successful war. So long as we\ncherish a notion like this, so long shall we be under the heel of a\ngrinding militarism. We have set out as crusaders to destroy Prussian\nmilitarism, and in pursuit of this quest we have invoked, as a matter of\nnecessity, the aid of our militarists. But when their work is done, all\npeoples who value freedom and independence will refuse to be under the\nheel of any military party. To be great is not, necessarily, to be strong\nfor war. There are other qualities which ought to enter into the\ndefinition, a high standard of civilisation and culture--not culture in\nthe Prussian sense, but that which we understand by the term--the great\ndevelopment and extension of knowledge, room for the discoveries of\nscience, quick susceptibility in the domain of art, the organisation of\nliterature--all these things are part and parcel of greatness, as we want\nto understand it in the future. It is precisely these things that\nmilitarism, as such, cares nothing for. Therefore, if we are out for war\nagainst militarism, the whole end and object of our endeavour must be by\nmeans of war to make war impossible. Hence it follows, as a matter of\ncourse, that the new Europe must take very serious and energetic steps to\ndiminish military establishments and to limit the size of armaments. If\nonce the new masters of Europe understand the immense importance of\nreducing their military equipment, they have it in their power to relieve\nnations of one of the greatest burdens which have ever checked the social\nand economic development of the world. Suggestions have already been made\nas to the reduction of armaments, and, although such schemes as have been\nset forward are, in the truest sense, speculative, it does not follow that\nthey, or something like them, cannot hereafter be realised. Nor yet in\nour conception of greatness must we include another false idea of the\npast. If a nation is not necessarily great because it is strong for war,\nneither is it necessarily great because it contains a number of\ncosmopolitan financiers trying to exploit for their own purposes various\nundeveloped tracts of the world's surface. These financiers are certainly\nnot patriots because, amongst other things, they take particular care to\ninvest in foreign securities, the interest of home investments not being\nsufficient for their financial greed. It will not be the least of the many\nbenefits which may accrue to us after the end of this disastrous war if a\nvulgar and crude materialism, based on the notion of wealth, is dethroned\nfrom its present sovereignty over men's minds. The more we study the\ncourses of this world's history, the more certainly do we discover that a\nlove of money is the root of most of the evils which beset humanity.\n\n\nAPOSTLES OF THE NEW ERA\n\nAs we survey the possible reforms which are to set up a new and better\nEurope on the ruin of the old, we naturally ask ourselves with some\ndisquietude: Who are the personalities, and what are the forces required\nfor so tremendous a change? Who are sufficient for these things? Are kings\nlikely to be saviours of society? Past experience hardly favours this\nsuggestion. Will soldiers and great generals help us? Here, again, we may\nbe pardoned for a very natural suspicion. Every one knows that a\nbenevolent despotism has much to recommend it. But, unfortunately, the\nbenevolent are not usually despotic, nor are despots as a rule benevolent.\nCan diplomatists help us? Not so far as they continue to mumble the\nwatchwords of their ancient mystery: they will have to learn a new set of\nformulae, or more likely, perhaps, they will find that ordinary people, who\nhave seen to what a pass diplomacy has brought us, may work out for\nthemselves some better system. Clearly the tasks of the future will depend\non the co-operation of intelligent, far-sighted philanthropic reformers in\nthe various states of the world, who will recognise that at critical\nperiods of the world's history they must set to work with a new ardour to\nthink out problems from the very beginning. We want fresh and intelligent\nminds, specially of the younger idealists, keen, ardent, and energetic\nsouls, touched with the sacred fire, erecting the fabric of humanity on a\nnovel basis. Democracy will have a great deal to do in the new Europe.\nIt, too, had better refurbish its old watchwords. It has got to set itself\npatiently to the business of preventing future wars by the extension of\nits sympathies and its clear discernment of all that imperils its future\ndevelopment and progress. Above all, it has got to solve that most\ndifficult problem of creating a Public Will and a Common Conscience in\nEurope, a conscience sensitive to the demands of a higher ethics, and a\nwill to enforce its decrees against obstructives and recalcitrants. We do\nnot see our way clear as yet, it is true. But we have a dim idea of the\nfar-seen peaks towards which we must lift up our eyes. It is the greatest\nenterprise which humanity has ever been called upon to face, and, however\ndifficult, it is also the most splendid.\n\n\nPRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY RICHARD CLAY & SONS, LIMITED, BRUNSWICK ST.,\nSTAMFORD ST., S.E., AND BUNGAY, SUFFOLK.","title":"Armageddon\u2014And After","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":19696}