{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_1735/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_1735","id":"gutenberg_1735","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1735","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Classical literature","Logic, Ancient","Meaning (Philosophy)","Methodology","Ontology","Sophists (Greek philosophy)"],"text":"Produced by Sue Asscher\n\n\n\n\n\nSOPHIST\n\nBy Plato\n\n\nTranslated by Benjamin Jowett\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.\n\nThe dramatic power of the dialogues of Plato appears to diminish as\nthe metaphysical interest of them increases (compare Introd. to the\nPhilebus). There are no descriptions of time, place or persons, in the\nSophist and Statesman, but we are plunged at once into philosophical\ndiscussions; the poetical charm has disappeared, and those who have no\ntaste for abstruse metaphysics will greatly prefer the earlier dialogues\nto the later ones. Plato is conscious of the change, and in the\nStatesman expressly accuses himself of a tediousness in the two\ndialogues, which he ascribes to his desire of developing the dialectical\nmethod. On the other hand, the kindred spirit of Hegel seemed to find in\nthe Sophist the crown and summit of the Platonic philosophy--here is the\nplace at which Plato most nearly approaches to the Hegelian identity of\nBeing and Not-being. Nor will the great importance of the two dialogues\nbe doubted by any one who forms a conception of the state of mind and\nopinion which they are intended to meet. The sophisms of the day were\nundermining philosophy; the denial of the existence of Not-being, and\nof the connexion of ideas, was making truth and falsehood equally\nimpossible. It has been said that Plato would have written differently,\nif he had been acquainted with the Organon of Aristotle. But could\nthe Organon of Aristotle ever have been written unless the Sophist\nand Statesman had preceded? The swarm of fallacies which arose in the\ninfancy of mental science, and which was born and bred in the decay of\nthe pre-Socratic philosophies, was not dispelled by Aristotle, but\nby Socrates and Plato. The summa genera of thought, the nature of\nthe proposition, of definition, of generalization, of synthesis and\nanalysis, of division and cross-division, are clearly described, and\nthe processes of induction and deduction are constantly employed in the\ndialogues of Plato. The 'slippery' nature of comparison, the danger of\nputting words in the place of things, the fallacy of arguing 'a dicto\nsecundum,' and in a circle, are frequently indicated by him. To all\nthese processes of truth and error, Aristotle, in the next generation,\ngave distinctness; he brought them together in a separate science. But\nhe is not to be regarded as the original inventor of any of the great\nlogical forms, with the exception of the syllogism.\n\nThere is little worthy of remark in the characters of the Sophist. The\nmost noticeable point is the final retirement of Socrates from the field\nof argument, and the substitution for him of an Eleatic stranger, who\nis described as a pupil of Parmenides and Zeno, and is supposed to have\ndescended from a higher world in order to convict the Socratic circle of\nerror. As in the Timaeus, Plato seems to intimate by the withdrawal of\nSocrates that he is passing beyond the limits of his teaching; and in\nthe Sophist and Statesman, as well as in the Parmenides, he probably\nmeans to imply that he is making a closer approach to the schools of\nElea and Megara. He had much in common with them, but he must first\nsubmit their ideas to criticism and revision. He had once thought as\nhe says, speaking by the mouth of the Eleatic, that he understood their\ndoctrine of Not-being; but now he does not even comprehend the nature\nof Being. The friends of ideas (Soph.) are alluded to by him as distant\nacquaintances, whom he criticizes ab extra; we do not recognize at\nfirst sight that he is criticizing himself. The character of the Eleatic\nstranger is colourless; he is to a certain extent the reflection of his\nfather and master, Parmenides, who is the protagonist in the dialogue\nwhich is called by his name. Theaetetus himself is not distinguished\nby the remarkable traits which are attributed to him in the preceding\ndialogue. He is no longer under the spell of Socrates, or subject to the\noperation of his midwifery, though the fiction of question and answer is\nstill maintained, and the necessity of taking Theaetetus along with him\nis several times insisted upon by his partner in the discussion. There\nis a reminiscence of the old Theaetetus in his remark that he will not\ntire of the argument, and in his conviction, which the Eleatic thinks\nlikely to be permanent, that the course of events is governed by the\nwill of God. Throughout the two dialogues Socrates continues a silent\nauditor, in the Statesman just reminding us of his presence, at the\ncommencement, by a characteristic jest about the statesman and the\nphilosopher, and by an allusion to his namesake, with whom on that\nground he claims relationship, as he had already claimed an affinity\nwith Theaetetus, grounded on the likeness of his ugly face. But in\nneither dialogue, any more than in the Timaeus, does he offer any\ncriticism on the views which are propounded by another.\n\nThe style, though wanting in dramatic power,--in this respect resembling\nthe Philebus and the Laws,--is very clear and accurate, and has\nseveral touches of humour and satire. The language is less fanciful and\nimaginative than that of the earlier dialogues; and there is more of\nbitterness, as in the Laws, though traces of a similar temper may also\nbe observed in the description of the 'great brute' in the Republic,\nand in the contrast of the lawyer and philosopher in the Theaetetus.\nThe following are characteristic passages: 'The ancient philosophers,\nof whom we may say, without offence, that they went on their way rather\nregardless of whether we understood them or not;' the picture of the\nmaterialists, or earth-born giants, 'who grasped oaks and rocks in their\nhands,' and who must be improved before they can be reasoned with; and\nthe equally humourous delineation of the friends of ideas, who defend\nthemselves from a fastness in the invisible world; or the comparison of\nthe Sophist to a painter or maker (compare Republic), and the hunt after\nhim in the rich meadow-lands of youth and wealth; or, again, the\nlight and graceful touch with which the older philosophies are painted\n('Ionian and Sicilian muses'), the comparison of them to mythological\ntales, and the fear of the Eleatic that he will be counted a parricide\nif he ventures to lay hands on his father Parmenides; or, once more,\nthe likening of the Eleatic stranger to a god from heaven.--All these\npassages, notwithstanding the decline of the style, retain the impress\nof the great master of language. But the equably diffused grace is gone;\ninstead of the endless variety of the early dialogues, traces of the\nrhythmical monotonous cadence of the Laws begin to appear; and already\nan approach is made to the technical language of Aristotle, in the\nfrequent use of the words 'essence,' 'power,' 'generation,' 'motion,'\n'rest,' 'action,' 'passion,' and the like.\n\nThe Sophist, like the Phaedrus, has a double character, and unites two\nenquirers, which are only in a somewhat forced manner connected with\neach other. The first is the search after the Sophist, the second is the\nenquiry into the nature of Not-being, which occupies the middle part of\nthe work. For 'Not-being' is the hole or division of the dialectical\nnet in which the Sophist has hidden himself. He is the imaginary\nimpersonation of false opinion. Yet he denies the possibility of false\nopinion; for falsehood is that which is not, and therefore has no\nexistence. At length the difficulty is solved; the answer, in\nthe language of the Republic, appears 'tumbling out at our feet.'\nAcknowledging that there is a communion of kinds with kinds, and not\nmerely one Being or Good having different names, or several isolated\nideas or classes incapable of communion, we discover 'Not-being' to be\nthe other of 'Being.' Transferring this to language and thought, we have\nno difficulty in apprehending that a proposition may be false as well\nas true. The Sophist, drawn out of the shelter which Cynic and Megarian\nparadoxes have temporarily afforded him, is proved to be a dissembler\nand juggler with words.\n\nThe chief points of interest in the dialogue are: (I) the character\nattributed to the Sophist: (II) the dialectical method: (III) the nature\nof the puzzle about 'Not-being:' (IV) the battle of the philosophers:\n(V) the relation of the Sophist to other dialogues.\n\nI. The Sophist in Plato is the master of the art of illusion; the\ncharlatan, the foreigner, the prince of esprits-faux, the hireling who\nis not a teacher, and who, from whatever point of view he is regarded,\nis the opposite of the true teacher. He is the 'evil one,' the ideal\nrepresentative of all that Plato most disliked in the moral and\nintellectual tendencies of his own age; the adversary of the almost\nequally ideal Socrates. He seems to be always growing in the fancy\nof Plato, now boastful, now eristic, now clothing himself in rags of\nphilosophy, now more akin to the rhetorician or lawyer, now haranguing,\nnow questioning, until the final appearance in the Politicus of his\ndeparting shadow in the disguise of a statesman. We are not to suppose\nthat Plato intended by such a description to depict Protagoras or\nGorgias, or even Thrasymachus, who all turn out to be 'very good sort\nof people when we know them,' and all of them part on good terms with\nSocrates. But he is speaking of a being as imaginary as the wise man\nof the Stoics, and whose character varies in different dialogues. Like\nmythology, Greek philosophy has a tendency to personify ideas. And the\nSophist is not merely a teacher of rhetoric for a fee of one or fifty\ndrachmae (Crat.), but an ideal of Plato's in which the falsehood of all\nmankind is reflected.\n\nA milder tone is adopted towards the Sophists in a well-known passage of\nthe Republic, where they are described as the followers rather than\nthe leaders of the rest of mankind. Plato ridicules the notion that\nany individuals can corrupt youth to a degree worth speaking of in\ncomparison with the greater influence of public opinion. But there is\nno real inconsistency between this and other descriptions of the Sophist\nwhich occur in the Platonic writings. For Plato is not justifying the\nSophists in the passage just quoted, but only representing their power\nto be contemptible; they are to be despised rather than feared, and are\nno worse than the rest of mankind. But a teacher or statesman may be\njustly condemned, who is on a level with mankind when he ought to be\nabove them. There is another point of view in which this passage should\nalso be considered. The great enemy of Plato is the world, not exactly\nin the theological sense, yet in one not wholly different--the world as\nthe hater of truth and lover of appearance, occupied in the pursuit of\ngain and pleasure rather than of knowledge, banded together against the\nfew good and wise men, and devoid of true education. This creature has\nmany heads: rhetoricians, lawyers, statesmen, poets, sophists. But the\nSophist is the Proteus who takes the likeness of all of them; all other\ndeceivers have a piece of him in them. And sometimes he is represented\nas the corrupter of the world; and sometimes the world as the corrupter\nof him and of itself.\n\nOf late years the Sophists have found an enthusiastic defender in the\ndistinguished historian of Greece. He appears to maintain (1) that the\nterm 'Sophist' is not the name of a particular class, and would have\nbeen applied indifferently to Socrates and Plato, as well as to Gorgias\nand Protagoras; (2) that the bad sense was imprinted on the word by the\ngenius of Plato; (3) that the principal Sophists were not the corrupters\nof youth (for the Athenian youth were no more corrupted in the age of\nDemosthenes than in the age of Pericles), but honourable and estimable\npersons, who supplied a training in literature which was generally\nwanted at the time. We will briefly consider how far these statements\nappear to be justified by facts: and, 1, about the meaning of the word\nthere arises an interesting question:--\n\nMany words are used both in a general and a specific sense, and the\ntwo senses are not always clearly distinguished. Sometimes the generic\nmeaning has been narrowed to the specific, while in other cases the\nspecific meaning has been enlarged or altered. Examples of the former\nclass are furnished by some ecclesiastical terms: apostles, prophets,\nbishops, elders, catholics. Examples of the latter class may also be\nfound in a similar field: jesuits, puritans, methodists, and the like.\nSometimes the meaning is both narrowed and enlarged; and a good or bad\nsense will subsist side by side with a neutral one. A curious effect\nis produced on the meaning of a word when the very term which is\nstigmatized by the world (e.g. Methodists) is adopted by the obnoxious\nor derided class; this tends to define the meaning. Or, again, the\nopposite result is produced, when the world refuses to allow some sect\nor body of men the possession of an honourable name which they have\nassumed, or applies it to them only in mockery or irony.\n\nThe term 'Sophist' is one of those words of which the meaning has been\nboth contracted and enlarged. Passages may be quoted from Herodotus\nand the tragedians, in which the word is used in a neutral sense for a\ncontriver or deviser or inventor, without including any ethical idea of\ngoodness or badness. Poets as well as philosophers were called Sophists\nin the fifth century before Christ. In Plato himself the term is applied\nin the sense of a 'master in art,' without any bad meaning attaching to\nit (Symp.; Meno). In the later Greek, again, 'sophist' and 'philosopher'\nbecame almost indistinguishable. There was no reproach conveyed by the\nword; the additional association, if any, was only that of rhetorician\nor teacher. Philosophy had become eclecticism and imitation: in the\ndecline of Greek thought there was no original voice lifted up 'which\nreached to a thousand years because of the god.' Hence the two words,\nlike the characters represented by them, tended to pass into one\nanother. Yet even here some differences appeared; for the term 'Sophist'\nwould hardly have been applied to the greater names, such as Plotinus,\nand would have been more often used of a professor of philosophy in\ngeneral than of a maintainer of particular tenets.\n\nBut the real question is, not whether the word 'Sophist' has all these\nsenses, but whether there is not also a specific bad sense in which\nthe term is applied to certain contemporaries of Socrates. Would an\nAthenian, as Mr. Grote supposes, in the fifth century before Christ,\nhave included Socrates and Plato, as well as Gorgias and Protagoras,\nunder the specific class of Sophists? To this question we must answer,\nNo: if ever the term is applied to Socrates and Plato, either the\napplication is made by an enemy out of mere spite, or the sense in which\nit is used is neutral. Plato, Xenophon, Isocrates, Aristotle, all give\na bad import to the word; and the Sophists are regarded as a separate\nclass in all of them. And in later Greek literature, the distinction\nis quite marked between the succession of philosophers from Thales to\nAristotle, and the Sophists of the age of Socrates, who appeared like\nmeteors for a short time in different parts of Greece. For the purposes\nof comedy, Socrates may have been identified with the Sophists, and\nhe seems to complain of this in the Apology. But there is no reason to\nsuppose that Socrates, differing by so many outward marks, would really\nhave been confounded in the mind of Anytus, or Callicles, or of any\nintelligent Athenian, with the splendid foreigners who from time to time\nvisited Athens, or appeared at the Olympic games. The man of genius, the\ngreat original thinker, the disinterested seeker after truth, the master\nof repartee whom no one ever defeated in an argument, was separated,\neven in the mind of the vulgar Athenian, by an 'interval which no\ngeometry can express,' from the balancer of sentences, the interpreter\nand reciter of the poets, the divider of the meanings of words, the\nteacher of rhetoric, the professor of morals and manners.\n\n2. The use of the term 'Sophist' in the dialogues of Plato also shows\nthat the bad sense was not affixed by his genius, but already current.\nWhen Protagoras says, 'I confess that I am a Sophist,' he implies that\nthe art which he professes has already a bad name; and the words of the\nyoung Hippocrates, when with a blush upon his face which is just seen\nby the light of dawn he admits that he is going to be made 'a Sophist,'\nwould lose their point, unless the term had been discredited. There is\nnothing surprising in the Sophists having an evil name; that, whether\ndeserved or not, was a natural consequence of their vocation. That they\nwere foreigners, that they made fortunes, that they taught novelties,\nthat they excited the minds of youth, are quite sufficient reasons to\naccount for the opprobrium which attached to them. The genius of Plato\ncould not have stamped the word anew, or have imparted the associations\nwhich occur in contemporary writers, such as Xenophon and Isocrates.\nChanges in the meaning of words can only be made with great difficulty,\nand not unless they are supported by a strong current of popular\nfeeling. There is nothing improbable in supposing that Plato may\nhave extended and envenomed the meaning, or that he may have done the\nSophists the same kind of disservice with posterity which Pascal did to\nthe Jesuits. But the bad sense of the word was not and could not have\nbeen invented by him, and is found in his earlier dialogues, e.g. the\nProtagoras, as well as in the later.\n\n3. There is no ground for disbelieving that the principal Sophists,\nGorgias, Protagoras, Prodicus, Hippias, were good and honourable men.\nThe notion that they were corrupters of the Athenian youth has no real\nfoundation, and partly arises out of the use of the term 'Sophist' in\nmodern times. The truth is, that we know little about them; and the\nwitness of Plato in their favour is probably not much more historical\nthan his witness against them. Of that national decline of genius,\nunity, political force, which has been sometimes described as the\ncorruption of youth, the Sophists were one among many signs;--in these\nrespects Athens may have degenerated; but, as Mr. Grote remarks, there\nis no reason to suspect any greater moral corruption in the age of\nDemosthenes than in the age of Pericles. The Athenian youth were not\ncorrupted in this sense, and therefore the Sophists could not have\ncorrupted them. It is remarkable, and may be fairly set down to their\ncredit, that Plato nowhere attributes to them that peculiar Greek\nsympathy with youth, which he ascribes to Parmenides, and which was\nevidently common in the Socratic circle. Plato delights to exhibit\nthem in a ludicrous point of view, and to show them always rather at\na disadvantage in the company of Socrates. But he has no quarrel with\ntheir characters, and does not deny that they are respectable men.\n\nThe Sophist, in the dialogue which is called after him, is exhibited in\nmany different lights, and appears and reappears in a variety of forms.\nThere is some want of the higher Platonic art in the Eleatic Stranger\neliciting his true character by a labourious process of enquiry, when he\nhad already admitted that he knew quite well the difference between\nthe Sophist and the Philosopher, and had often heard the question\ndiscussed;--such an anticipation would hardly have occurred in the\nearlier dialogues. But Plato could not altogether give up his Socratic\nmethod, of which another trace may be thought to be discerned in his\nadoption of a common instance before he proceeds to the greater matter\nin hand. Yet the example is also chosen in order to damage the 'hooker\nof men' as much as possible; each step in the pedigree of the angler\nsuggests some injurious reflection about the Sophist. They are both\nhunters after a living prey, nearly related to tyrants and thieves, and\nthe Sophist is the cousin of the parasite and flatterer. The effect of\nthis is heightened by the accidental manner in which the discovery is\nmade, as the result of a scientific division. His descent in another\nbranch affords the opportunity of more 'unsavoury comparisons.' For he\nis a retail trader, and his wares are either imported or home-made, like\nthose of other retail traders; his art is thus deprived of the character\nof a liberal profession. But the most distinguishing characteristic of\nhim is, that he is a disputant, and higgles over an argument. A feature\nof the Eristic here seems to blend with Plato's usual description of\nthe Sophists, who in the early dialogues, and in the Republic, are\nfrequently depicted as endeavouring to save themselves from disputing\nwith Socrates by making long orations. In this character he parts\ncompany from the vain and impertinent talker in private life, who is a\nloser of money, while he is a maker of it.\n\nBut there is another general division under which his art may be also\nsupposed to fall, and that is purification; and from purification\nis descended education, and the new principle of education is to\ninterrogate men after the manner of Socrates, and make them teach\nthemselves. Here again we catch a glimpse rather of a Socratic or\nEristic than of a Sophist in the ordinary sense of the term. And Plato\ndoes not on this ground reject the claim of the Sophist to be the true\nphilosopher. One more feature of the Eristic rather than of the Sophist\nis the tendency of the troublesome animal to run away into the darkness\nof Not-being. Upon the whole, we detect in him a sort of hybrid or\ndouble nature, of which, except perhaps in the Euthydemus of Plato,\nwe find no other trace in Greek philosophy; he combines the teacher of\nvirtue with the Eristic; while in his omniscience, in his ignorance\nof himself, in his arts of deception, and in his lawyer-like habit of\nwriting and speaking about all things, he is still the antithesis of\nSocrates and of the true teacher.\n\nII. The question has been asked, whether the method of 'abscissio\ninfinti,' by which the Sophist is taken, is a real and valuable logical\nprocess. Modern science feels that this, like other processes of formal\nlogic, presents a very inadequate conception of the actual complex\nprocedure of the mind by which scientific truth is detected and\nverified. Plato himself seems to be aware that mere division is an\nunsafe and uncertain weapon, first, in the Statesman, when he says that\nwe should divide in the middle, for in that way we are more likely to\nattain species; secondly, in the parallel precept of the Philebus,\nthat we should not pass from the most general notions to infinity, but\ninclude all the intervening middle principles, until, as he also says\nin the Statesman, we arrive at the infima species; thirdly, in the\nPhaedrus, when he says that the dialectician will carve the limbs of\ntruth without mangling them; and once more in the Statesman, if we\ncannot bisect species, we must carve them as well as we can. No better\nimage of nature or truth, as an organic whole, can be conceived than\nthis. So far is Plato from supposing that mere division and subdivision\nof general notions will guide men into all truth.\n\nPlato does not really mean to say that the Sophist or the Statesman\ncan be caught in this way. But these divisions and subdivisions were\nfavourite logical exercises of the age in which he lived; and while\nindulging his dialectical fancy, and making a contribution to logical\nmethod, he delights also to transfix the Eristic Sophist with weapons\nborrowed from his own armoury. As we have already seen, the division\ngives him the opportunity of making the most damaging reflections on\nthe Sophist and all his kith and kin, and to exhibit him in the most\ndiscreditable light.\n\nNor need we seriously consider whether Plato was right in assuming that\nan animal so various could not be confined within the limits of a\nsingle definition. In the infancy of logic, men sought only to obtain\na definition of an unknown or uncertain term; the after reflection\nscarcely occurred to them that the word might have several senses, which\nshaded off into one another, and were not capable of being comprehended\nin a single notion. There is no trace of this reflection in Plato.\nBut neither is there any reason to think, even if the reflection had\noccurred to him, that he would have been deterred from carrying on the\nwar with weapons fair or unfair against the outlaw Sophist.\n\nIII. The puzzle about 'Not-being' appears to us to be one of the most\nunreal difficulties of ancient philosophy. We cannot understand the\nattitude of mind which could imagine that falsehood had no existence, if\nreality was denied to Not-being: How could such a question arise at\nall, much less become of serious importance? The answer to this, and to\nnearly all other difficulties of early Greek philosophy, is to be sought\nfor in the history of ideas, and the answer is only unsatisfactory\nbecause our knowledge is defective. In the passage from the world\nof sense and imagination and common language to that of opinion and\nreflection the human mind was exposed to many dangers, and often\n\n     'Found no end in wandering mazes lost.'\n\nOn the other hand, the discovery of abstractions was the great source\nof all mental improvement in after ages. It was the pushing aside of\nthe old, the revelation of the new. But each one of the company of\nabstractions, if we may speak in the metaphorical language of Plato,\nbecame in turn the tyrant of the mind, the dominant idea, which would\nallow no other to have a share in the throne. This is especially true of\nthe Eleatic philosophy: while the absoluteness of Being was asserted\nin every form of language, the sensible world and all the phenomena of\nexperience were comprehended under Not-being. Nor was any difficulty or\nperplexity thus created, so long as the mind, lost in the contemplation\nof Being, asked no more questions, and never thought of applying the\ncategories of Being or Not-being to mind or opinion or practical life.\n\nBut the negative as well as the positive idea had sunk deep into the\nintellect of man. The effect of the paradoxes of Zeno extended far\nbeyond the Eleatic circle. And now an unforeseen consequence began to\narise. If the Many were not, if all things were names of the One, and\nnothing could be predicated of any other thing, how could truth be\ndistinguished from falsehood? The Eleatic philosopher would have\nreplied that Being is alone true. But mankind had got beyond his barren\nabstractions: they were beginning to analyze, to classify, to define,\nto ask what is the nature of knowledge, opinion, sensation. Still less\ncould they be content with the description which Achilles gives in Homer\nof the man whom his soul hates--\n\nos chi eteron men keuthe eni phresin, allo de eipe.\n\nFor their difficulty was not a practical but a metaphysical one; and\ntheir conception of falsehood was really impaired and weakened by a\nmetaphysical illusion.\n\nThe strength of the illusion seems to lie in the alternative: If we once\nadmit the existence of Being and Not-being, as two spheres which exclude\neach other, no Being or reality can be ascribed to Not-being, and\ntherefore not to falsehood, which is the image or expression of\nNot-being. Falsehood is wholly false; and to speak of true falsehood, as\nTheaetetus does (Theaet.), is a contradiction in terms. The fallacy\nto us is ridiculous and transparent,--no better than those which\nPlato satirizes in the Euthydemus. It is a confusion of falsehood and\nnegation, from which Plato himself is not entirely free. Instead of\nsaying, 'This is not in accordance with facts,' 'This is proved by\nexperience to be false,' and from such examples forming a general notion\nof falsehood, the mind of the Greek thinker was lost in the mazes of the\nEleatic philosophy. And the greater importance which Plato attributes\nto this fallacy, compared with others, is due to the influence which\nthe Eleatic philosophy exerted over him. He sees clearly to a certain\nextent; but he has not yet attained a complete mastery over the ideas of\nhis predecessors--they are still ends to him, and not mere instruments\nof thought. They are too rough-hewn to be harmonized in a single\nstructure, and may be compared to rocks which project or overhang in\nsome ancient city's walls. There are many such imperfect syncretisms or\neclecticisms in the history of philosophy. A modern philosopher, though\nemancipated from scholastic notions of essence or substance, might\nstill be seriously affected by the abstract idea of necessity; or though\naccustomed, like Bacon, to criticize abstract notions, might not extend\nhis criticism to the syllogism.\n\nThe saying or thinking the thing that is not, would be the popular\ndefinition of falsehood or error. If we were met by the Sophist's\nobjection, the reply would probably be an appeal to experience. Ten\nthousands, as Homer would say (mala murioi), tell falsehoods and\nfall into errors. And this is Plato's reply, both in the Cratylus\nand Sophist. 'Theaetetus is flying,' is a sentence in form quite as\ngrammatical as 'Theaetetus is sitting'; the difference between the two\nsentences is, that the one is true and the other false. But,\nbefore making this appeal to common sense, Plato propounds for our\nconsideration a theory of the nature of the negative.\n\nThe theory is, that Not-being is relation. Not-being is the other of\nBeing, and has as many kinds as there are differences in Being.\nThis doctrine is the simple converse of the famous proposition of\nSpinoza,--not 'Omnis determinatio est negatio,' but 'Omnis negatio est\ndeterminatio';--not, All distinction is negation, but, All negation is\ndistinction. Not-being is the unfolding or determining of Being, and is\na necessary element in all other things that are. We should be careful\nto observe, first, that Plato does not identify Being with Not-being; he\nhas no idea of progression by antagonism, or of the Hegelian vibration\nof moments: he would not have said with Heracleitus, 'All things are\nand are not, and become and become not.' Secondly, he has lost sight\naltogether of the other sense of Not-being, as the negative of Being;\nalthough he again and again recognizes the validity of the law of\ncontradiction. Thirdly, he seems to confuse falsehood with negation. Nor\nis he quite consistent in regarding Not-being as one class of Being, and\nyet as coextensive with Being in general. Before analyzing further the\ntopics thus suggested, we will endeavour to trace the manner in which\nPlato arrived at his conception of Not-being.\n\nIn all the later dialogues of Plato, the idea of mind or intelligence\nbecomes more and more prominent. That idea which Anaxagoras employed\ninconsistently in the construction of the world, Plato, in the Philebus,\nthe Sophist, and the Laws, extends to all things, attributing to\nProvidence a care, infinitesimal as well as infinite, of all creation.\nThe divine mind is the leading religious thought of the later works of\nPlato. The human mind is a sort of reflection of this, having ideas\nof Being, Sameness, and the like. At times they seem to be parted by a\ngreat gulf (Parmenides); at other times they have a common nature, and\nthe light of a common intelligence.\n\nBut this ever-growing idea of mind is really irreconcilable with the\nabstract Pantheism of the Eleatics. To the passionate language of\nParmenides, Plato replies in a strain equally passionate:--What! has\nnot Being mind? and is not Being capable of being known? and, if this\nis admitted, then capable of being affected or acted upon?--in motion,\nthen, and yet not wholly incapable of rest. Already we have been\ncompelled to attribute opposite determinations to Being. And the\nanswer to the difficulty about Being may be equally the answer to the\ndifficulty about Not-being.\n\nThe answer is, that in these and all other determinations of any notion\nwe are attributing to it 'Not-being.' We went in search of Not-being and\nseemed to lose Being, and now in the hunt after Being we recover both.\nNot-being is a kind of Being, and in a sense co-extensive with Being.\nAnd there are as many divisions of Not-being as of Being. To\nevery positive idea--'just,' 'beautiful,' and the like, there is a\ncorresponding negative idea--'not-just,' 'not-beautiful,' and the like.\n\nA doubt may be raised whether this account of the negative is really\nthe true one. The common logicians would say that the 'not-just,'\n'not-beautiful,' are not really classes at all, but are merged in one\ngreat class of the infinite or negative. The conception of Plato, in\nthe days before logic, seems to be more correct than this. For the word\n'not' does not altogether annihilate the positive meaning of the word\n'just': at least, it does not prevent our looking for the 'not-just'\nin or about the same class in which we might expect to find the 'just.'\n'Not-just is not-honourable' is neither a false nor an unmeaning\nproposition. The reason is that the negative proposition has really\npassed into an undefined positive. To say that 'not-just' has no more\nmeaning than 'not-honourable'--that is to say, that the two cannot in\nany degree be distinguished, is clearly repugnant to the common use of\nlanguage.\n\nThe ordinary logic is also jealous of the explanation of negation as\nrelation, because seeming to take away the principle of contradiction.\nPlato, as far as we know, is the first philosopher who distinctly\nenunciated this principle; and though we need not suppose him to have\nbeen always consistent with himself, there is no real inconsistency\nbetween his explanation of the negative and the principle of\ncontradiction. Neither the Platonic notion of the negative as the\nprinciple of difference, nor the Hegelian identity of Being and\nNot-being, at all touch the principle of contradiction. For what is\nasserted about Being and Not-Being only relates to our most abstract\nnotions, and in no way interferes with the principle of contradiction\nemployed in the concrete. Because Not-being is identified with Other, or\nBeing with Not-being, this does not make the proposition 'Some have not\neaten' any the less a contradiction of 'All have eaten.'\n\nThe explanation of the negative given by Plato in the Sophist is a true\nbut partial one; for the word 'not,' besides the meaning of 'other,'\nmay also imply 'opposition.' And difference or opposition may be either\ntotal or partial: the not-beautiful may be other than the beautiful, or\nin no relation to the beautiful, or a specific class in various degrees\nopposed to the beautiful. And the negative may be a negation of fact\nor of thought (ou and me). Lastly, there are certain ideas, such as\n'beginning,' 'becoming,' 'the finite,' 'the abstract,' in which\nthe negative cannot be separated from the positive, and 'Being' and\n'Not-being' are inextricably blended.\n\nPlato restricts the conception of Not-being to difference. Man is a\nrational animal, and is not--as many other things as are not included\nunder this definition. He is and is not, and is because he is not.\nBesides the positive class to which he belongs, there are endless\nnegative classes to which he may be referred. This is certainly\nintelligible, but useless. To refer a subject to a negative class is\nunmeaning, unless the 'not' is a mere modification of the positive, as\nin the example of 'not honourable' and 'dishonourable'; or unless the\nclass is characterized by the absence rather than the presence of a\nparticular quality.\n\nNor is it easy to see how Not-being any more than Sameness or Otherness\nis one of the classes of Being. They are aspects rather than classes of\nBeing. Not-being can only be included in Being, as the denial of some\nparticular class of Being. If we attempt to pursue such airy phantoms\nat all, the Hegelian identity of Being and Not-being is a more apt and\nintelligible expression of the same mental phenomenon. For Plato has\nnot distinguished between the Being which is prior to Not-being, and the\nBeing which is the negation of Not-being (compare Parm.).\n\nBut he is not thinking of this when he says that Being comprehends\nNot-being. Again, we should probably go back for the true explanation\nto the influence which the Eleatic philosophy exercised over him. Under\n'Not-being' the Eleatic had included all the realities of the sensible\nworld. Led by this association and by the common use of language, which\nhas been already noticed, we cannot be much surprised that Plato should\nhave made classes of Not-being. It is observable that he does not\nabsolutely deny that there is an opposite of Being. He is inclined to\nleave the question, merely remarking that the opposition, if admissible\nat all, is not expressed by the term 'Not-being.'\n\nOn the whole, we must allow that the great service rendered by Plato\nto metaphysics in the Sophist, is not his explanation of 'Not-being' as\ndifference. With this he certainly laid the ghost of 'Not-being'; and we\nmay attribute to him in a measure the credit of anticipating Spinoza\nand Hegel. But his conception is not clear or consistent; he does not\nrecognize the different senses of the negative, and he confuses\nthe different classes of Not-being with the abstract notion. As the\nPre-Socratic philosopher failed to distinguish between the universal and\nthe true, while he placed the particulars of sense under the false and\napparent, so Plato appears to identify negation with falsehood, or is\nunable to distinguish them. The greatest service rendered by him to\nmental science is the recognition of the communion of classes, which,\nalthough based by him on his account of 'Not-being,' is independent\nof it. He clearly saw that the isolation of ideas or classes is the\nannihilation of reasoning. Thus, after wandering in many diverging\npaths, we return to common sense. And for this reason we may be inclined\nto do less than justice to Plato,--because the truth which he attains\nby a real effort of thought is to us a familiar and unconscious truism,\nwhich no one would any longer think either of doubting or examining.\n\nIV. The later dialogues of Plato contain many references to contemporary\nphilosophy. Both in the Theaetetus and in the Sophist he recognizes\nthat he is in the midst of a fray; a huge irregular battle everywhere\nsurrounds him (Theaet.). First, there are the two great philosophies\ngoing back into cosmogony and poetry: the philosophy of Heracleitus,\nsupposed to have a poetical origin in Homer, and that of the Eleatics,\nwhich in a similar spirit he conceives to be even older than Xenophanes\n(compare Protag.). Still older were theories of two and three\nprinciples, hot and cold, moist and dry, which were ever marrying and\nbeing given in marriage: in speaking of these, he is probably referring\nto Pherecydes and the early Ionians. In the philosophy of motion there\nwere different accounts of the relation of plurality and unity,\nwhich were supposed to be joined and severed by love and hate,\nsome maintaining that this process was perpetually going on (e.g.\nHeracleitus); others (e.g. Empedocles) that there was an alternation of\nthem. Of the Pythagoreans or of Anaxagoras he makes no distinct mention.\nHis chief opponents are, first, Eristics or Megarians; secondly, the\nMaterialists.\n\nThe picture which he gives of both these latter schools is indistinct;\nand he appears reluctant to mention the names of their teachers. Nor can\nwe easily determine how much is to be assigned to the Cynics, how much\nto the Megarians, or whether the 'repellent Materialists' (Theaet.)\nare Cynics or Atomists, or represent some unknown phase of opinion at\nAthens. To the Cynics and Antisthenes is commonly attributed, on the\nauthority of Aristotle, the denial of predication, while the Megarians\nare said to have been Nominalists, asserting the One Good under many\nnames to be the true Being of Zeno and the Eleatics, and, like Zeno,\nemploying their negative dialectic in the refutation of opponents. But\nthe later Megarians also denied predication; and this tenet, which is\nattributed to all of them by Simplicius, is certainly in accordance with\ntheir over-refining philosophy. The 'tyros young and old,' of whom\nPlato speaks, probably include both. At any rate, we shall be safer in\naccepting the general description of them which he has given, and in not\nattempting to draw a precise line between them.\n\nOf these Eristics, whether Cynics or Megarians, several characteristics\nare found in Plato:--\n\n1. They pursue verbal oppositions; 2. they make reasoning impossible by\ntheir over-accuracy in the use of language; 3. they deny predication;\n4. they go from unity to plurality, without passing through the\nintermediate stages; 5. they refuse to attribute motion or power to\nBeing; 6. they are the enemies of sense;--whether they are the 'friends\nof ideas,' who carry on the polemic against sense, is uncertain;\nprobably under this remarkable expression Plato designates those who\nmore nearly approached himself, and may be criticizing an earlier form\nof his own doctrines. We may observe (1) that he professes only to give\nus a few opinions out of many which were at that time current in\nGreece; (2) that he nowhere alludes to the ethical teaching of the\nCynics--unless the argument in the Protagoras, that the virtues are one\nand not many, may be supposed to contain a reference to their views, as\nwell as to those of Socrates; and unless they are the school alluded to\nin the Philebus, which is described as 'being very skilful in physics,\nand as maintaining pleasure to be the absence of pain.' That Antisthenes\nwrote a book called 'Physicus,' is hardly a sufficient reason for\ndescribing them as skilful in physics, which appear to have been very\nalien to the tendency of the Cynics.\n\nThe Idealism of the fourth century before Christ in Greece, as in\nother ages and countries, seems to have provoked a reaction towards\nMaterialism. The maintainers of this doctrine are described in the\nTheaetetus as obstinate persons who will believe in nothing which they\ncannot hold in their hands, and in the Sophist as incapable of argument.\nThey are probably the same who are said in the Tenth Book of the Laws\nto attribute the course of events to nature, art, and chance. Who they\nwere, we have no means of determining except from Plato's description of\nthem. His silence respecting the Atomists might lead us to suppose that\nhere we have a trace of them. But the Atomists were not Materialists in\nthe grosser sense of the term, nor were they incapable of reasoning; and\nPlato would hardly have described a great genius like Democritus in the\ndisdainful terms which he uses of the Materialists. Upon the whole, we\nmust infer that the persons here spoken of are unknown to us, like the\nmany other writers and talkers at Athens and elsewhere, of whose endless\nactivity of mind Aristotle in his Metaphysics has preserved an anonymous\nmemorial.\n\nV. The Sophist is the sequel of the Theaetetus, and is connected with\nthe Parmenides by a direct allusion (compare Introductions to Theaetetus\nand Parmenides). In the Theaetetus we sought to discover the nature\nof knowledge and false opinion. But the nature of false opinion seemed\nimpenetrable; for we were unable to understand how there could be any\nreality in Not-being. In the Sophist the question is taken up again; the\nnature of Not-being is detected, and there is no longer any metaphysical\nimpediment in the way of admitting the possibility of falsehood. To\nthe Parmenides, the Sophist stands in a less defined and more remote\nrelation. There human thought is in process of disorganization; no\nabsurdity or inconsistency is too great to be elicited from the\nanalysis of the simple ideas of Unity or Being. In the Sophist the same\ncontradictions are pursued to a certain extent, but only with a view\nto their resolution. The aim of the dialogue is to show how the few\nelemental conceptions of the human mind admit of a natural connexion in\nthought and speech, which Megarian or other sophistry vainly attempts to\ndeny.\n\n...\n\nTrue to the appointment of the previous day, Theodorus and Theaetetus\nmeet Socrates at the same spot, bringing with them an Eleatic Stranger,\nwhom Theodorus introduces as a true philosopher. Socrates, half in jest,\nhalf in earnest, declares that he must be a god in disguise, who, as\nHomer would say, has come to earth that he may visit the good and evil\namong men, and detect the foolishness of Athenian wisdom. At any rate he\nis a divine person, one of a class who are hardly recognized on earth;\nwho appear in divers forms--now as statesmen, now as sophists, and are\noften deemed madmen. 'Philosopher, statesman, sophist,' says Socrates,\nrepeating the words--'I should like to ask our Eleatic friend what his\ncountrymen think of them; do they regard them as one, or three?'\n\nThe Stranger has been already asked the same question by Theodorus and\nTheaetetus; and he at once replies that they are thought to be three;\nbut to explain the difference fully would take time. He is pressed\nto give this fuller explanation, either in the form of a speech or\nof question and answer. He prefers the latter, and chooses as his\nrespondent Theaetetus, whom he already knows, and who is recommended to\nhim by Socrates.\n\nWe are agreed, he says, about the name Sophist, but we may not be\nequally agreed about his nature. Great subjects should be approached\nthrough familiar examples, and, considering that he is a creature not\neasily caught, I think that, before approaching him, we should try\nour hand upon some more obvious animal, who may be made the subject of\nlogical experiment; shall we say an angler? 'Very good.'\n\nIn the first place, the angler is an artist; and there are two kinds\nof art,--productive art, which includes husbandry, manufactures,\nimitations; and acquisitive art, which includes learning, trading,\nfighting, hunting. The angler's is an acquisitive art, and acquisition\nmay be effected either by exchange or by conquest; in the latter case,\neither by force or craft. Conquest by craft is called hunting, and of\nhunting there is one kind which pursues inanimate, and another which\npursues animate objects; and animate objects may be either land animals\nor water animals, and water animals either fly over the water or live\nin the water. The hunting of the last is called fishing; and of fishing,\none kind uses enclosures, catching the fish in nets and baskets, and\nanother kind strikes them either with spears by night or with barbed\nspears or barbed hooks by day; the barbed spears are impelled from\nabove, the barbed hooks are jerked into the head and lips of the fish,\nwhich are then drawn from below upwards. Thus, by a series of divisions,\nwe have arrived at the definition of the angler's art.\n\nAnd now by the help of this example we may proceed to bring to light\nthe nature of the Sophist. Like the angler, he is an artist, and the\nresemblance does not end here. For they are both hunters, and hunters\nof animals; the one of water, and the other of land animals. But at this\npoint they diverge, the one going to the sea and the rivers, and the\nother to the rivers of wealth and rich meadow-lands, in which generous\nyouth abide. On land you may hunt tame animals, or you may hunt wild\nanimals. And man is a tame animal, and he may be hunted either by force\nor persuasion;--either by the pirate, man-stealer, soldier, or by the\nlawyer, orator, talker. The latter use persuasion, and persuasion is\neither private or public. Of the private practitioners of the art, some\nbring gifts to those whom they hunt: these are lovers. And others take\nhire; and some of these flatter, and in return are fed; others profess\nto teach virtue and receive a round sum. And who are these last? Tell me\nwho? Have we not unearthed the Sophist?\n\nBut he is a many-sided creature, and may still be traced in another line\nof descent. The acquisitive art had a branch of exchange as well as of\nhunting, and exchange is either giving or selling; and the seller is\neither a manufacturer or a merchant; and the merchant either retails or\nexports; and the exporter may export either food for the body or food\nfor the mind. And of this trading in food for the mind, one kind may be\ntermed the art of display, and another the art of selling learning; and\nlearning may be a learning of the arts or of virtue. The seller of the\narts may be called an art-seller; the seller of virtue, a Sophist.\n\nAgain, there is a third line, in which a Sophist may be traced. For\nis he less a Sophist when, instead of exporting his wares to another\ncountry, he stays at home, and retails goods, which he not only buys of\nothers, but manufactures himself?\n\nOr he may be descended from the acquisitive art in the combative line,\nthrough the pugnacious, the controversial, the disputatious arts; and he\nwill be found at last in the eristic section of the latter, and in that\ndivision of it which disputes in private for gain about the general\nprinciples of right and wrong.\n\nAnd still there is a track of him which has not yet been followed out by\nus. Do not our household servants talk of sifting, straining, winnowing?\nAnd they also speak of carding, spinning, and the like. All these are\nprocesses of division; and of division there are two kinds,--one in\nwhich like is divided from like, and another in which the good is\nseparated from the bad. The latter of the two is termed purification;\nand again, of purification, there are two sorts,--of animate bodies\n(which may be internal or external), and of inanimate. Medicine and\ngymnastic are the internal purifications of the animate, and bathing the\nexternal; and of the inanimate, fulling and cleaning and other humble\nprocesses, some of which have ludicrous names. Not that dialectic is a\nrespecter of names or persons, or a despiser of humble occupations; nor\ndoes she think much of the greater or less benefits conferred by them.\nFor her aim is knowledge; she wants to know how the arts are related to\none another, and would quite as soon learn the nature of hunting from\nthe vermin-destroyer as from the general. And she only desires to have\na general name, which shall distinguish purifications of the soul from\npurifications of the body.\n\nNow purification is the taking away of evil; and there are two kinds\nof evil in the soul,--the one answering to disease in the body, and the\nother to deformity. Disease is the discord or war of opposite principles\nin the soul; and deformity is the want of symmetry, or failure in the\nattainment of a mark or measure. The latter arises from ignorance, and\nno one is voluntarily ignorant; ignorance is only the aberration of the\nsoul moving towards knowledge. And as medicine cures the diseases and\ngymnastic the deformity of the body, so correction cures the injustice,\nand education (which differs among the Hellenes from mere instruction in\nthe arts) cures the ignorance of the soul. Again, ignorance is twofold,\nsimple ignorance, and ignorance having the conceit of knowledge. And\neducation is also twofold: there is the old-fashioned moral training of\nour forefathers, which was very troublesome and not very successful; and\nanother, of a more subtle nature, which proceeds upon a notion that\nall ignorance is involuntary. The latter convicts a man out of his own\nmouth, by pointing out to him his inconsistencies and contradictions;\nand the consequence is that he quarrels with himself, instead of\nquarrelling with his neighbours, and is cured of prejudices and\nobstructions by a mode of treatment which is equally entertaining and\neffectual. The physician of the soul is aware that his patient will\nreceive no nourishment unless he has been cleaned out; and the soul of\nthe Great King himself, if he has not undergone this purification, is\nunclean and impure.\n\nAnd who are the ministers of the purification? Sophists I may not call\nthem. Yet they bear about the same likeness to Sophists as the dog,\nwho is the gentlest of animals, does to the wolf, who is the fiercest.\nComparisons are slippery things; but for the present let us assume the\nresemblance of the two, which may probably be disallowed hereafter.\nAnd so, from division comes purification; and from this, mental\npurification; and from mental purification, instruction; and from\ninstruction, education; and from education, the nobly-descended art\nof Sophistry, which is engaged in the detection of conceit. I do not\nhowever think that we have yet found the Sophist, or that his will\nultimately prove to be the desired art of education; but neither do I\nthink that he can long escape me, for every way is blocked. Before we\nmake the final assault, let us take breath, and reckon up the many forms\nwhich he has assumed: (1) he was the paid hunter of wealth and birth;\n(2) he was the trader in the goods of the soul; (3) he was the retailer\nof them; (4) he was the manufacturer of his own learned wares; (5)\nhe was the disputant; and (6) he was the purger away of\nprejudices--although this latter point is admitted to be doubtful.\n\nNow, there must surely be something wrong in the professor of any art\nhaving so many names and kinds of knowledge. Does not the very number of\nthem imply that the nature of his art is not understood? And that we\nmay not be involved in the misunderstanding, let us observe which of\nhis characteristics is the most prominent. Above all things he is a\ndisputant. He will dispute and teach others to dispute about things\nvisible and invisible--about man, about the gods, about politics, about\nlaw, about wrestling, about all things. But can he know all things? 'He\ncannot.' How then can he dispute satisfactorily with any one who knows?\n'Impossible.' Then what is the trick of his art, and why does he receive\nmoney from his admirers? 'Because he is believed by them to know all\nthings.' You mean to say that he seems to have a knowledge of them?\n'Yes.'\n\nSuppose a person were to say, not that he would dispute about all\nthings, but that he would make all things, you and me, and all other\ncreatures, the earth and the heavens and the gods, and would sell them\nall for a few pence--this would be a great jest; but not greater than if\nhe said that he knew all things, and could teach them in a short time,\nand at a small cost. For all imitation is a jest, and the most graceful\nform of jest. Now the painter is a man who professes to make all things,\nand children, who see his pictures at a distance, sometimes take them\nfor realities: and the Sophist pretends to know all things, and he, too,\ncan deceive young men, who are still at a distance from the truth, not\nthrough their eyes, but through their ears, by the mummery of words,\nand induce them to believe him. But as they grow older, and come into\ncontact with realities, they learn by experience the futility of his\npretensions. The Sophist, then, has not real knowledge; he is only an\nimitator, or image-maker.\n\nAnd now, having got him in a corner of the dialectical net, let us\ndivide and subdivide until we catch him. Of image-making there are two\nkinds,--the art of making likenesses, and the art of making appearances.\nThe latter may be illustrated by sculpture and painting, which often use\nillusions, and alter the proportions of figures, in order to adapt\ntheir works to the eye. And the Sophist also uses illusions, and\nhis imitations are apparent and not real. But how can anything be an\nappearance only? Here arises a difficulty which has always beset the\nsubject of appearances. For the argument is asserting the existence\nof not-being. And this is what the great Parmenides was all his life\ndenying in prose and also in verse. 'You will never find,' he says,\n'that not-being is.' And the words prove themselves! Not-being cannot be\nattributed to any being; for how can any being be wholly abstracted from\nbeing? Again, in every predication there is an attribution of singular\nor plural. But number is the most real of all things, and cannot be\nattributed to not-being. Therefore not-being cannot be predicated or\nexpressed; for how can we say 'is,' 'are not,' without number?\n\nAnd now arises the greatest difficulty of all. If not-being is\ninconceivable, how can not-being be refuted? And am I not contradicting\nmyself at this moment, in speaking either in the singular or the plural\nof that to which I deny both plurality and unity? You, Theaetetus, have\nthe might of youth, and I conjure you to exert yourself, and, if you\ncan, to find an expression for not-being which does not imply being and\nnumber. 'But I cannot.' Then the Sophist must be left in his hole. We\nmay call him an image-maker if we please, but he will only say, 'And\npray, what is an image?' And we shall reply, 'A reflection in the water,\nor in a mirror'; and he will say, 'Let us shut our eyes and open our\nminds; what is the common notion of all images?' 'I should answer, Such\nanother, made in the likeness of the true.' Real or not real? 'Not real;\nat least, not in a true sense.' And the real 'is,' and the not-real 'is\nnot'? 'Yes.' Then a likeness is really unreal, and essentially not.\nHere is a pretty complication of being and not-being, in which the\nmany-headed Sophist has entangled us. He will at once point out that\nhe is compelling us to contradict ourselves, by affirming being of\nnot-being. I think that we must cease to look for him in the class of\nimitators.\n\nBut ought we to give him up? 'I should say, certainly not.' Then I fear\nthat I must lay hands on my father Parmenides; but do not call me a\nparricide; for there is no way out of the difficulty except to show\nthat in some sense not-being is; and if this is not admitted, no one can\nspeak of falsehood, or false opinion, or imitation, without falling into\na contradiction. You observe how unwilling I am to undertake the task;\nfor I know that I am exposing myself to the charge of inconsistency in\nasserting the being of not-being. But if I am to make the attempt, I\nthink that I had better begin at the beginning.\n\nLightly in the days of our youth, Parmenides and others told us tales\nabout the origin of the universe: one spoke of three principles warring\nand at peace again, marrying and begetting children; another of\ntwo principles, hot and cold, dry and moist, which also formed\nrelationships. There were the Eleatics in our part of the world, saying\nthat all things are one; whose doctrine begins with Xenophanes, and is\neven older. Ionian, and, more recently, Sicilian muses speak of a one\nand many which are held together by enmity and friendship, ever parting,\never meeting. Some of them do not insist on the perpetual strife, but\nadopt a gentler strain, and speak of alternation only. Whether they are\nright or not, who can say? But one thing we can say--that they went on\ntheir way without much caring whether we understood them or not. For\ntell me, Theaetetus, do you understand what they mean by their assertion\nof unity, or by their combinations and separations of two or more\nprinciples? I used to think, when I was young, that I knew all about\nnot-being, and now I am in great difficulties even about being.\n\nLet us proceed first to the examination of being. Turning to the dualist\nphilosophers, we say to them: Is being a third element besides hot and\ncold? or do you identify one or both of the two elements with being?\nAt any rate, you can hardly avoid resolving them into one. Let us next\ninterrogate the patrons of the one. To them we say: Are being and one\ntwo different names for the same thing? But how can there be two names\nwhen there is nothing but one? Or you may identify them; but then the\nname will be either the name of nothing or of itself, i.e. of a name.\nAgain, the notion of being is conceived of as a whole--in the words\nof Parmenides, 'like every way unto a rounded sphere.' And a whole has\nparts; but that which has parts is not one, for unity has no parts. Is\nbeing, then, one, because the parts of being are one, or shall we say\nthat being is not a whole? In the former case, one is made up of parts;\nand in the latter there is still plurality, viz. being, and a whole\nwhich is apart from being. And being, if not all things, lacks something\nof the nature of being, and becomes not-being. Nor can being ever have\ncome into existence, for nothing comes into existence except as a whole;\nnor can being have number, for that which has number is a whole or sum\nof number. These are a few of the difficulties which are accumulating\none upon another in the consideration of being.\n\nWe may proceed now to the less exact sort of philosophers. Some of\nthem drag down everything to earth, and carry on a war like that of the\ngiants, grasping rocks and oaks in their hands. Their adversaries defend\nthemselves warily from an invisible world, and reduce the substances\nof their opponents to the minutest fractions, until they are lost in\ngeneration and flux. The latter sort are civil people enough; but the\nmaterialists are rude and ignorant of dialectics; they must be taught\nhow to argue before they can answer. Yet, for the sake of the argument,\nwe may assume them to be better than they are, and able to give an\naccount of themselves. They admit the existence of a mortal living\ncreature, which is a body containing a soul, and to this they would not\nrefuse to attribute qualities--wisdom, folly, justice and injustice. The\nsoul, as they say, has a kind of body, but they do not like to assert\nof these qualities of the soul, either that they are corporeal, or that\nthey have no existence; at this point they begin to make distinctions.\n'Sons of earth,' we say to them, 'if both visible and invisible\nqualities exist, what is the common nature which is attributed to them\nby the term \"being\" or \"existence\"?' And, as they are incapable of\nanswering this question, we may as well reply for them, that being is\nthe power of doing or suffering. Then we turn to the friends of ideas:\nto them we say, 'You distinguish becoming from being?' 'Yes,' they will\nreply. 'And in becoming you participate through the bodily senses, and\nin being, by thought and the mind?' 'Yes.' And you mean by the word\n'participation' a power of doing or suffering? To this they answer--I\nam acquainted with them, Theaetetus, and know their ways better than you\ndo--that being can neither do nor suffer, though becoming may. And we\nrejoin: Does not the soul know? And is not 'being' known? And are not\n'knowing' and 'being known' active and passive? That which is known is\naffected by knowledge, and therefore is in motion. And, indeed, how\ncan we imagine that perfect being is a mere everlasting form, devoid of\nmotion and soul? for there can be no thought without soul, nor can soul\nbe devoid of motion. But neither can thought or mind be devoid of some\nprinciple of rest or stability. And as children say entreatingly,\n'Give us both,' so the philosopher must include both the moveable and\nimmoveable in his idea of being. And yet, alas! he and we are in the\nsame difficulty with which we reproached the dualists; for motion and\nrest are contradictions--how then can they both exist? Does he who\naffirms this mean to say that motion is rest, or rest motion? 'No; he\nmeans to assert the existence of some third thing, different from them\nboth, which neither rests nor moves.' But how can there be anything\nwhich neither rests nor moves? Here is a second difficulty about being,\nquite as great as that about not-being. And we may hope that any light\nwhich is thrown upon the one may extend to the other.\n\nLeaving them for the present, let us enquire what we mean by giving many\nnames to the same thing, e.g. white, good, tall, to man; out of which\ntyros old and young derive such a feast of amusement. Their meagre minds\nrefuse to predicate anything of anything; they say that good is good,\nand man is man; and that to affirm one of the other would be making\nthe many one and the one many. Let us place them in a class with our\nprevious opponents, and interrogate both of them at once. Shall we\nassume (1) that being and rest and motion, and all other things,\nare incommunicable with one another? or (2) that they all have\nindiscriminate communion? or (3) that there is communion of some and not\nof others? And we will consider the first hypothesis first of all.\n\n(1) If we suppose the universal separation of kinds, all theories alike\nare swept away; the patrons of a single principle of rest or of motion,\nor of a plurality of immutable ideas--all alike have the ground cut from\nunder them; and all creators of the universe by theories of composition\nand division, whether out of or into a finite or infinite number of\nelemental forms, in alternation or continuance, share the same fate.\nMost ridiculous is the discomfiture which attends the opponents of\npredication, who, like the ventriloquist Eurycles, have the voice that\nanswers them in their own breast. For they cannot help using the words\n'is,' 'apart,' 'from others,' and the like; and their adversaries are\nthus saved the trouble of refuting them. But (2) if all things have\ncommunion with all things, motion will rest, and rest will move; here is\na reductio ad absurdum. Two out of the three hypotheses are thus seen to\nbe false. The third (3) remains, which affirms that only certain things\ncommunicate with certain other things. In the alphabet and the scale\nthere are some letters and notes which combine with others, and some\nwhich do not; and the laws according to which they combine or are\nseparated are known to the grammarian and musician. And there is a\nscience which teaches not only what notes and letters, but what classes\nadmit of combination with one another, and what not. This is a noble\nscience, on which we have stumbled unawares; in seeking after the\nSophist we have found the philosopher. He is the master who discerns\none whole or form pervading a scattered multitude, and many such wholes\ncombined under a higher one, and many entirely apart--he is the true\ndialectician. Like the Sophist, he is hard to recognize, though for the\nopposite reasons; the Sophist runs away into the obscurity of not-being,\nthe philosopher is dark from excess of light. And now, leaving him, we\nwill return to our pursuit of the Sophist.\n\nAgreeing in the truth of the third hypothesis, that some things have\ncommunion and others not, and that some may have communion with all, let\nus examine the most important kinds which are capable of admixture; and\nin this way we may perhaps find out a sense in which not-being may be\naffirmed to have being. Now the highest kinds are being, rest, motion;\nand of these, rest and motion exclude each other, but both of them are\nincluded in being; and again, they are the same with themselves and\nthe other of each other. What is the meaning of these words, 'same' and\n'other'? Are there two more kinds to be added to the three others? For\nsameness cannot be either rest or motion, because predicated both of\nrest and motion; nor yet being; because if being were attributed to both\nof them we should attribute sameness to both of them. Nor can other be\nidentified with being; for then other, which is relative, would have the\nabsoluteness of being. Therefore we must assume a fifth principle, which\nis universal, and runs through all things, for each thing is other than\nall other things. Thus there are five principles: (1) being, (2) motion,\nwhich is not (3) rest, and because participating both in the same and\nother, is and is not (4) the same with itself, and is and is not (5)\nother than the other. And motion is not being, but partakes of being,\nand therefore is and is not in the most absolute sense. Thus we have\ndiscovered that not-being is the principle of the other which runs\nthrough all things, being not excepted. And 'being' is one thing, and\n'not-being' includes and is all other things. And not-being is not the\nopposite of being, but only the other. Knowledge has many branches,\nand the other or difference has as many, each of which is described by\nprefixing the word 'not' to some kind of knowledge. The not-beautiful is\nas real as the beautiful, the not-just as the just. And the essence of\nthe not-beautiful is to be separated from and opposed to a certain kind\nof existence which is termed beautiful. And this opposition and negation\nis the not-being of which we are in search, and is one kind of being.\nThus, in spite of Parmenides, we have not only discovered the existence,\nbut also the nature of not-being--that nature we have found to be\nrelation. In the communion of different kinds, being and other mutually\ninterpenetrate; other is, but is other than being, and other than each\nand all of the remaining kinds, and therefore in an infinity of ways 'is\nnot.' And the argument has shown that the pursuit of contradictions is\nchildish and useless, and the very opposite of that higher spirit which\ncriticizes the words of another according to the natural meaning\nof them. Nothing can be more unphilosophical than the denial of all\ncommunion of kinds. And we are fortunate in having established such a\ncommunion for another reason, because in continuing the hunt after the\nSophist we have to examine the nature of discourse, and there could be\nno discourse if there were no communion. For the Sophist, although he\ncan no longer deny the existence of not-being, may still affirm that\nnot-being cannot enter into discourse, and as he was arguing before that\nthere could be no such thing as falsehood, because there was no such\nthing as not-being, he may continue to argue that there is no such thing\nas the art of image-making and phantastic, because not-being has no\nplace in language. Hence arises the necessity of examining speech,\nopinion, and imagination.\n\nAnd first concerning speech; let us ask the same question about words\nwhich we have already answered about the kinds of being and the letters\nof the alphabet: To what extent do they admit of combination? Some words\nhave a meaning when combined, and others have no meaning. One class of\nwords describes action, another class agents: 'walks,' 'runs,' 'sleeps'\nare examples of the first; 'stag,' 'horse,' 'lion' of the second. But\nno combination of words can be formed without a verb and a noun, e.g. 'A\nman learns'; the simplest sentence is composed of two words, and one\nof these must be a subject. For example, in the sentence, 'Theaetetus\nsits,' which is not very long, 'Theaetetus' is the subject, and in the\nsentence 'Theaetetus flies,' 'Theaetetus' is again the subject. But the\ntwo sentences differ in quality, for the first says of you that which\nis true, and the second says of you that which is not true, or, in other\nwords, attributes to you things which are not as though they were. Here\nis false discourse in the shortest form. And thus not only speech,\nbut thought and opinion and imagination are proved to be both true and\nfalse. For thought is only the process of silent speech, and opinion is\nonly the silent assent or denial which follows this, and imagination is\nonly the expression of this in some form of sense. All of them are akin\nto speech, and therefore, like speech, admit of true and false. And\nwe have discovered false opinion, which is an encouraging sign of our\nprobable success in the rest of the enquiry.\n\nThen now let us return to our old division of likeness-making and\nphantastic. When we were going to place the Sophist in one of them,\na doubt arose whether there could be such a thing as an appearance,\nbecause there was no such thing as falsehood. At length falsehood\nhas been discovered by us to exist, and we have acknowledged that the\nSophist is to be found in the class of imitators. All art was divided\noriginally by us into two branches--productive and acquisitive. And\nnow we may divide both on a different principle into the creations or\nimitations which are of human, and those which are of divine, origin.\nFor we must admit that the world and ourselves and the animals did not\ncome into existence by chance, or the spontaneous working of nature, but\nby divine reason and knowledge. And there are not only divine creations\nbut divine imitations, such as apparitions and shadows and reflections,\nwhich are equally the work of a divine mind. And there are human\ncreations and human imitations too,--there is the actual house and the\ndrawing of it. Nor must we forget that image-making may be an imitation\nof realities or an imitation of appearances, which last has been\ncalled by us phantastic. And this phantastic may be again divided into\nimitation by the help of instruments and impersonations. And the\nlatter may be either dissembling or unconscious, either with or without\nknowledge. A man cannot imitate you, Theaetetus, without knowing you,\nbut he can imitate the form of justice or virtue if he have a sentiment\nor opinion about them. Not being well provided with names, the former\nI will venture to call the imitation of science, and the latter the\nimitation of opinion.\n\nThe latter is our present concern, for the Sophist has no claims to\nscience or knowledge. Now the imitator, who has only opinion, may be\neither the simple imitator, who thinks that he knows, or the dissembler,\nwho is conscious that he does not know, but disguises his ignorance. And\nthe last may be either a maker of long speeches, or of shorter speeches\nwhich compel the person conversing to contradict himself. The maker of\nlonger speeches is the popular orator; the maker of the shorter is\nthe Sophist, whose art may be traced as being the\n\n     / contradictious\n     / dissembling\n     / without knowledge\n     / human and not divine\n     / juggling with words\n     / phantastic or unreal\n     / art of image-making.\n\n...\n\nIn commenting on the dialogue in which Plato most nearly approaches the\ngreat modern master of metaphysics there are several points which\nit will be useful to consider, such as the unity of opposites, the\nconception of the ideas as causes, and the relation of the Platonic and\nHegelian dialectic.\n\nThe unity of opposites was the crux of ancient thinkers in the age of\nPlato: How could one thing be or become another? That substances have\nattributes was implied in common language; that heat and cold, day and\nnight, pass into one another was a matter of experience 'on a level with\nthe cobbler's understanding' (Theat.). But how could philosophy explain\nthe connexion of ideas, how justify the passing of them into one\nanother? The abstractions of one, other, being, not-being, rest, motion,\nindividual, universal, which successive generations of philosophers had\nrecently discovered, seemed to be beyond the reach of human thought,\nlike stars shining in a distant heaven. They were the symbols of\ndifferent schools of philosophy: but in what relation did they stand to\none another and to the world of sense? It was hardly conceivable\nthat one could be other, or the same different. Yet without some\nreconciliation of these elementary ideas thought was impossible. There\nwas no distinction between truth and falsehood, between the Sophist\nand the philosopher. Everything could be predicated of everything,\nor nothing of anything. To these difficulties Plato finds what to us\nappears to be the answer of common sense--that Not-being is the relative\nor other of Being, the defining and distinguishing principle, and that\nsome ideas combine with others, but not all with all. It is remarkable\nhowever that he offers this obvious reply only as the result of a long\nand tedious enquiry; by a great effort he is able to look down as 'from\na height' on the 'friends of the ideas' as well as on the pre-Socratic\nphilosophies. Yet he is merely asserting principles which no one who\ncould be made to understand them would deny.\n\nThe Platonic unity of differences or opposites is the beginning of the\nmodern view that all knowledge is of relations; it also anticipates the\ndoctrine of Spinoza that all determination is negation. Plato takes or\ngives so much of either of these theories as was necessary or possible\nin the age in which he lived. In the Sophist, as in the Cratylus, he is\nopposed to the Heracleitean flux and equally to the Megarian and\nCynic denial of predication, because he regards both of them as making\nknowledge impossible. He does not assert that everything is and is not,\nor that the same thing can be affected in the same and in opposite ways\nat the same time and in respect of the same part of itself. The law\nof contradiction is as clearly laid down by him in the Republic, as by\nAristotle in his Organon. Yet he is aware that in the negative there is\nalso a positive element, and that oppositions may be only differences.\nAnd in the Parmenides he deduces the many from the one and Not-being\nfrom Being, and yet shows that the many are included in the one, and\nthat Not-being returns to Being.\n\nIn several of the later dialogues Plato is occupied with the connexion\nof the sciences, which in the Philebus he divides into two classes of\npure and applied, adding to them there as elsewhere (Phaedr., Crat.,\nRepublic, States.) a superintending science of dialectic. This is the\norigin of Aristotle's Architectonic, which seems, however, to have\npassed into an imaginary science of essence, and no longer to retain\nany relation to other branches of knowledge. Of such a science, whether\ndescribed as 'philosophia prima,' the science of ousia, logic or\nmetaphysics, philosophers have often dreamed. But even now the time has\nnot arrived when the anticipation of Plato can be realized. Though many\na thinker has framed a 'hierarchy of the sciences,' no one has as yet\nfound the higher science which arrays them in harmonious order,\ngiving to the organic and inorganic, to the physical and moral, their\nrespective limits, and showing how they all work together in the world\nand in man.\n\nPlato arranges in order the stages of knowledge and of existence. They\nare the steps or grades by which he rises from sense and the shadows of\nsense to the idea of beauty and good. Mind is in motion as well as\nat rest (Soph.); and may be described as a dialectical progress which\npasses from one limit or determination of thought to another and back\nagain to the first. This is the account of dialectic given by Plato in\nthe Sixth Book of the Republic, which regarded under another aspect\nis the mysticism of the Symposium. He does not deny the existence of\nobjects of sense, but according to him they only receive their true\nmeaning when they are incorporated in a principle which is above them\n(Republic). In modern language they might be said to come first in the\norder of experience, last in the order of nature and reason. They are\nassumed, as he is fond of repeating, upon the condition that they shall\ngive an account of themselves and that the truth of their existence\nshall be hereafter proved. For philosophy must begin somewhere and may\nbegin anywhere,--with outward objects, with statements of opinion, with\nabstract principles. But objects of sense must lead us onward to the\nideas or universals which are contained in them; the statements of\nopinion must be verified; the abstract principles must be filled up and\nconnected with one another. In Plato we find, as we might expect, the\ngerms of many thoughts which have been further developed by the genius\nof Spinoza and Hegel. But there is a difficulty in separating the germ\nfrom the flower, or in drawing the line which divides ancient\nfrom modern philosophy. Many coincidences which occur in them are\nunconscious, seeming to show a natural tendency in the human mind\ntowards certain ideas and forms of thought. And there are many\nspeculations of Plato which would have passed away unheeded, and\ntheir meaning, like that of some hieroglyphic, would have remained\nundeciphered, unless two thousand years and more afterwards an\ninterpreter had arisen of a kindred spirit and of the same intellectual\nfamily. For example, in the Sophist Plato begins with the abstract and\ngoes on to the concrete, not in the lower sense of returning to outward\nobjects, but to the Hegelian concrete or unity of abstractions. In the\nintervening period hardly any importance would have been attached to the\nquestion which is so full of meaning to Plato and Hegel.\n\nThey differ however in their manner of regarding the question. For Plato\nis answering a difficulty; he is seeking to justify the use of common\nlanguage and of ordinary thought into which philosophy had introduced\na principle of doubt and dissolution. Whereas Hegel tries to go beyond\ncommon thought, and to combine abstractions in a higher unity: the\nordinary mechanism of language and logic is carried by him into another\nregion in which all oppositions are absorbed and all contradictions\naffirmed, only that they may be done away with. But Plato, unlike Hegel,\nnowhere bases his system on the unity of opposites, although in the\nParmenides he shows an Hegelian subtlety in the analysis of one and\nBeing.\n\nIt is difficult within the compass of a few pages to give even a\nfaint outline of the Hegelian dialectic. No philosophy which is worth\nunderstanding can be understood in a moment; common sense will not teach\nus metaphysics any more than mathematics. If all sciences demand of us\nprotracted study and attention, the highest of all can hardly be matter\nof immediate intuition. Neither can we appreciate a great system without\nyielding a half assent to it--like flies we are caught in the spider's\nweb; and we can only judge of it truly when we place ourselves at a\ndistance from it. Of all philosophies Hegelianism is the most obscure:\nand the difficulty inherent in the subject is increased by the use of\na technical language. The saying of Socrates respecting the writings of\nHeracleitus--'Noble is that which I understand, and that which I do not\nunderstand may be as noble; but the strength of a Delian diver is needed\nto swim through it'--expresses the feeling with which the reader rises\nfrom the perusal of Hegel. We may truly apply to him the words in which\nPlato describes the Pre-Socratic philosophers: 'He went on his way\nrather regardless of whether we understood him or not'; or, as he is\nreported himself to have said of his own pupils: 'There is only one of\nyou who understands me, and he does NOT understand me.'\n\nNevertheless the consideration of a few general aspects of the Hegelian\nphilosophy may help to dispel some errors and to awaken an interest\nabout it. (i) It is an ideal philosophy which, in popular phraseology,\nmaintains not matter but mind to be the truth of things, and this not by\na mere crude substitution of one word for another, but by showing\neither of them to be the complement of the other. Both are creations of\nthought, and the difference in kind which seems to divide them may also\nbe regarded as a difference of degree. One is to the other as the real\nto the ideal, and both may be conceived together under the higher form\nof the notion. (ii) Under another aspect it views all the forms of sense\nand knowledge as stages of thought which have always existed implicitly\nand unconsciously, and to which the mind of the world, gradually\ndisengaged from sense, has become awakened. The present has been the\npast. The succession in time of human ideas is also the eternal 'now';\nit is historical and also a divine ideal. The history of philosophy\nstripped of personality and of the other accidents of time and place\nis gathered up into philosophy, and again philosophy clothed in\ncircumstance expands into history. (iii) Whether regarded as present or\npast, under the form of time or of eternity, the spirit of dialectic\nis always moving onwards from one determination of thought to another,\nreceiving each successive system of philosophy and subordinating it to\nthat which follows--impelled by an irresistible necessity from one idea\nto another until the cycle of human thought and existence is complete.\nIt follows from this that all previous philosophies which are worthy of\nthe name are not mere opinions or speculations, but stages or moments of\nthought which have a necessary place in the world of mind. They are\nno longer the last word of philosophy, for another and another has\nsucceeded them, but they still live and are mighty; in the language of\nthe Greek poet, 'There is a great God in them, and he grows not old.'\n(iv) This vast ideal system is supposed to be based upon experience. At\neach step it professes to carry with it the 'witness of eyes and\nears' and of common sense, as well as the internal evidence of its\nown consistency; it has a place for every science, and affirms that\nno philosophy of a narrower type is capable of comprehending all true\nfacts.\n\nThe Hegelian dialectic may be also described as a movement from the\nsimple to the complex. Beginning with the generalizations of sense, (1)\npassing through ideas of quality, quantity, measure, number, and the\nlike, (2) ascending from presentations, that is pictorial forms of\nsense, to representations in which the picture vanishes and the essence\nis detached in thought from the outward form, (3) combining the I and\nthe not-I, or the subject and object, the natural order of thought is at\nlast found to include the leading ideas of the sciences and to arrange\nthem in relation to one another. Abstractions grow together and\nagain become concrete in a new and higher sense. They also admit\nof development from within their own spheres. Everywhere there is\na movement of attraction and repulsion going on--an attraction or\nrepulsion of ideas of which the physical phenomenon described under a\nsimilar name is a figure. Freedom and necessity, mind and matter, the\ncontinuous and the discrete, cause and effect, are perpetually being\nsevered from one another in thought, only to be perpetually reunited.\nThe finite and infinite, the absolute and relative are not really\nopposed; the finite and the negation of the finite are alike lost in a\nhigher or positive infinity, and the absolute is the sum or correlation\nof all relatives. When this reconciliation of opposites is finally\ncompleted in all its stages, the mind may come back again and review the\nthings of sense, the opinions of philosophers, the strife of theology\nand politics, without being disturbed by them. Whatever is, if not\nthe very best--and what is the best, who can tell?--is, at any rate,\nhistorical and rational, suitable to its own age, unsuitable to any\nother. Nor can any efforts of speculative thinkers or of soldiers and\nstatesmen materially quicken the 'process of the suns.'\n\nHegel was quite sensible how great would be the difficulty of presenting\nphilosophy to mankind under the form of opposites. Most of us live\nin the one-sided truth which the understanding offers to us, and\nif occasionally we come across difficulties like the time-honoured\ncontroversy of necessity and free-will, or the Eleatic puzzle of\nAchilles and the tortoise, we relegate some of them to the sphere of\nmystery, others to the book of riddles, and go on our way rejoicing.\nMost men (like Aristotle) have been accustomed to regard a contradiction\nin terms as the end of strife; to be told that contradiction is the life\nand mainspring of the intellectual world is indeed a paradox to them.\nEvery abstraction is at first the enemy of every other, yet they are\nlinked together, each with all, in the chain of Being. The struggle for\nexistence is not confined to the animals, but appears in the kingdom of\nthought. The divisions which arise in thought between the physical and\nmoral and between the moral and intellectual, and the like, are deepened\nand widened by the formal logic which elevates the defects of the human\nfaculties into Laws of Thought; they become a part of the mind which\nmakes them and is also made up of them. Such distinctions become so\nfamiliar to us that we regard the thing signified by them as absolutely\nfixed and defined. These are some of the illusions from which Hegel\ndelivers us by placing us above ourselves, by teaching us to analyze\nthe growth of 'what we are pleased to call our minds,' by reverting to\na time when our present distinctions of thought and language had no\nexistence.\n\nOf the great dislike and childish impatience of his system which would\nbe aroused among his opponents, he was fully aware, and would often\nanticipate the jests which the rest of the world, 'in the superfluity\nof their wits,' were likely to make upon him. Men are annoyed at what\npuzzles them; they think what they cannot easily understand to be full\nof danger. Many a sceptic has stood, as he supposed, firmly rooted in\nthe categories of the understanding which Hegel resolves into their\noriginal nothingness. For, like Plato, he 'leaves no stone unturned'\nin the intellectual world. Nor can we deny that he is unnecessarily\ndifficult, or that his own mind, like that of all metaphysicians, was\ntoo much under the dominion of his system and unable to see beyond:\nor that the study of philosophy, if made a serious business (compare\nRepublic), involves grave results to the mind and life of the student.\nFor it may encumber him without enlightening his path; and it may weaken\nhis natural faculties of thought and expression without increasing\nhis philosophical power. The mind easily becomes entangled among\nabstractions, and loses hold of facts. The glass which is adapted to\ndistant objects takes away the vision of what is near and present to us.\n\nTo Hegel, as to the ancient Greek thinkers, philosophy was a religion, a\nprinciple of life as well as of knowledge, like the idea of good in the\nSixth Book of the Republic, a cause as well as an effect, the source of\ngrowth as well as of light. In forms of thought which by most of us are\nregarded as mere categories, he saw or thought that he saw a gradual\nrevelation of the Divine Being. He would have been said by his opponents\nto have confused God with the history of philosophy, and to have been\nincapable of distinguishing ideas from facts. And certainly we can\nscarcely understand how a deep thinker like Hegel could have hoped\nto revive or supplant the old traditional faith by an unintelligible\nabstraction: or how he could have imagined that philosophy consisted\nonly or chiefly in the categories of logic. For abstractions, though\ncombined by him in the notion, seem to be never really concrete; they\nare a metaphysical anatomy, not a living and thinking substance. Though\nwe are reminded by him again and again that we are gathering up the\nworld in ideas, we feel after all that we have not really spanned the\ngulf which separates phainomena from onta.\n\nHaving in view some of these difficulties, he seeks--and we may follow\nhis example--to make the understanding of his system easier (a)\nby illustrations, and (b) by pointing out the coincidence of the\nspeculative idea and the historical order of thought.\n\n(a) If we ask how opposites can coexist, we are told that many different\nqualities inhere in a flower or a tree or in any other concrete object,\nand that any conception of space or matter or time involves the two\ncontradictory attributes of divisibility and continuousness. We may\nponder over the thought of number, reminding ourselves that every unit\nboth implies and denies the existence of every other, and that the one\nis many--a sum of fractions, and the many one--a sum of units. We may be\nreminded that in nature there is a centripetal as well as a centrifugal\nforce, a regulator as well as a spring, a law of attraction as well as\nof repulsion. The way to the West is the way also to the East; the north\npole of the magnet cannot be divided from the south pole; two minus\nsigns make a plus in Arithmetic and Algebra. Again, we may liken the\nsuccessive layers of thought to the deposits of geological strata which\nwere once fluid and are now solid, which were at one time uppermost in\nthe series and are now hidden in the earth; or to the successive rinds\nor barks of trees which year by year pass inward; or to the ripple of\nwater which appears and reappears in an ever-widening circle. Or our\nattention may be drawn to ideas which the moment we analyze them involve\na contradiction, such as 'beginning' or 'becoming,' or to the opposite\npoles, as they are sometimes termed, of necessity and freedom, of idea\nand fact. We may be told to observe that every negative is a positive,\nthat differences of kind are resolvable into differences of degree, and\nthat differences of degree may be heightened into differences of kind.\nWe may remember the common remark that there is much to be said on both\nsides of a question. We may be recommended to look within and to explain\nhow opposite ideas can coexist in our own minds; and we may be told to\nimagine the minds of all mankind as one mind in which the true ideas of\nall ages and countries inhere. In our conception of God in his relation\nto man or of any union of the divine and human nature, a contradiction\nappears to be unavoidable. Is not the reconciliation of mind and body\na necessity, not only of speculation but of practical life? Reflections\nsuch as these will furnish the best preparation and give the right\nattitude of mind for understanding the Hegelian philosophy.\n\n(b) Hegel's treatment of the early Greek thinkers affords the readiest\nillustration of his meaning in conceiving all philosophy under the form\nof opposites. The first abstraction is to him the beginning of thought.\nHitherto there had only existed a tumultuous chaos of mythological\nfancy, but when Thales said 'All is water' a new era began to dawn upon\nthe world. Man was seeking to grasp the universe under a single form\nwhich was at first simply a material element, the most equable and\ncolourless and universal which could be found. But soon the human mind\nbecame dissatisfied with the emblem, and after ringing the changes\non one element after another, demanded a more abstract and perfect\nconception, such as one or Being, which was absolutely at rest. But the\npositive had its negative, the conception of Being involved Not-being,\nthe conception of one, many, the conception of a whole, parts. Then the\npendulum swung to the other side, from rest to motion, from Xenophanes\nto Heracleitus. The opposition of Being and Not-being projected into\nspace became the atoms and void of Leucippus and Democritus. Until\nthe Atomists, the abstraction of the individual did not exist; in the\nphilosophy of Anaxagoras the idea of mind, whether human or divine,\nwas beginning to be realized. The pendulum gave another swing, from the\nindividual to the universal, from the object to the subject. The\nSophist first uttered the word 'Man is the measure of all things,' which\nSocrates presented in a new form as the study of ethics. Once more we\nreturn from mind to the object of mind, which is knowledge, and out\nof knowledge the various degrees or kinds of knowledge more or less\nabstract were gradually developed. The threefold division of logic,\nphysic, and ethics, foreshadowed in Plato, was finally established by\nAristotle and the Stoics. Thus, according to Hegel, in the course of\nabout two centuries by a process of antagonism and negation the leading\nthoughts of philosophy were evolved.\n\nThere is nothing like this progress of opposites in Plato, who in the\nSymposium denies the possibility of reconciliation until the opposition\nhas passed away. In his own words, there is an absurdity in supposing\nthat 'harmony is discord; for in reality harmony consists of notes of a\nhigher and lower pitch which disagreed once, but are now reconciled by\nthe art of music' (Symp.). He does indeed describe objects of sense\nas regarded by us sometimes from one point of view and sometimes from\nanother. As he says at the end of the Fifth Book of the Republic, 'There\nis nothing light which is not heavy, or great which is not small.' And\nhe extends this relativity to the conceptions of just and good, as well\nas to great and small. In like manner he acknowledges that the same\nnumber may be more or less in relation to other numbers without any\nincrease or diminution (Theat.). But the perplexity only arises out of\nthe confusion of the human faculties; the art of measuring shows us what\nis truly great and truly small. Though the just and good in particular\ninstances may vary, the IDEA of good is eternal and unchangeable. And\nthe IDEA of good is the source of knowledge and also of Being, in which\nall the stages of sense and knowledge are gathered up and from being\nhypotheses become realities.\n\nLeaving the comparison with Plato we may now consider the value of\nthis invention of Hegel. There can be no question of the importance of\nshowing that two contraries or contradictories may in certain cases be\nboth true. The silliness of the so-called laws of thought ('All A = A,'\nor, in the negative form, 'Nothing can at the same time be both A, and\nnot A') has been well exposed by Hegel himself (Wallace's Hegel), who\nremarks that 'the form of the maxim is virtually self-contradictory,\nfor a proposition implies a distinction between subject and predicate,\nwhereas the maxim of identity, as it is called, A = A, does not fulfil\nwhat its form requires. Nor does any mind ever think or form conceptions\nin accordance with this law, nor does any existence conform to it.'\nWisdom of this sort is well parodied in Shakespeare (Twelfth Night,\n'Clown: For as the old hermit of Prague, that never saw pen and ink,\nvery wittily said to a niece of King Gorboduc, \"That that is is\"...for\nwhat is \"that\" but \"that,\" and \"is\" but \"is\"?'). Unless we are willing\nto admit that two contradictories may be true, many questions which lie\nat the threshold of mathematics and of morals will be insoluble puzzles\nto us.\n\nThe influence of opposites is felt in practical life. The understanding\nsees one side of a question only--the common sense of mankind joins\none of two parties in politics, in religion, in philosophy. Yet, as\neverybody knows, truth is not wholly the possession of either. But the\ncharacters of men are one-sided and accept this or that aspect of the\ntruth. The understanding is strong in a single abstract principle and\nwith this lever moves mankind. Few attain to a balance of principles\nor recognize truly how in all human things there is a thesis and\nantithesis, a law of action and of reaction. In politics we require\norder as well as liberty, and have to consider the proportions in which\nunder given circumstances they may be safely combined. In religion there\nis a tendency to lose sight of morality, to separate goodness from\nthe love of truth, to worship God without attempting to know him.\nIn philosophy again there are two opposite principles, of immediate\nexperience and of those general or a priori truths which are supposed to\ntranscend experience. But the common sense or common opinion of mankind\nis incapable of apprehending these opposite sides or views--men are\ndetermined by their natural bent to one or other of them; they go\nstraight on for a time in a single line, and may be many things by turns\nbut not at once.\n\nHence the importance of familiarizing the mind with forms which will\nassist us in conceiving or expressing the complex or contrary aspects\nof life and nature. The danger is that they may be too much for us, and\nobscure our appreciation of facts. As the complexity of mechanics cannot\nbe understood without mathematics, so neither can the many-sidedness of\nthe mental and moral world be truly apprehended without the assistance\nof new forms of thought. One of these forms is the unity of opposites.\nAbstractions have a great power over us, but they are apt to be partial\nand one-sided, and only when modified by other abstractions do they make\nan approach to the truth. Many a man has become a fatalist because he\nhas fallen under the dominion of a single idea. He says to himself, for\nexample, that he must be either free or necessary--he cannot be both.\nThus in the ancient world whole schools of philosophy passed away in the\nvain attempt to solve the problem of the continuity or divisibility of\nmatter. And in comparatively modern times, though in the spirit of an\nancient philosopher, Bishop Berkeley, feeling a similar perplexity,\nis inclined to deny the truth of infinitesimals in mathematics. Many\ndifficulties arise in practical religion from the impossibility of\nconceiving body and mind at once and in adjusting their movements to one\nanother. There is a border ground between them which seems to belong to\nboth; and there is as much difficulty in conceiving the body without the\nsoul as the soul without the body. To the 'either' and 'or' philosophy\n('Everything is either A or not A') should at least be added the clause\n'or neither,' 'or both.' The double form makes reflection easier and\nmore conformable to experience, and also more comprehensive. But\nin order to avoid paradox and the danger of giving offence to the\nunmetaphysical part of mankind, we may speak of it as due to the\nimperfection of language or the limitation of human faculties. It is\nnevertheless a discovery which, in Platonic language, may be termed a\n'most gracious aid to thought.'\n\nThe doctrine of opposite moments of thought or of progression by\nantagonism, further assists us in framing a scheme or system of the\nsciences. The negation of one gives birth to another of them. The double\nnotions are the joints which hold them together. The simple is developed\ninto the complex, the complex returns again into the simple. Beginning\nwith the highest notion of mind or thought, we may descend by a series\nof negations to the first generalizations of sense. Or again we may\nbegin with the simplest elements of sense and proceed upwards to the\nhighest being or thought. Metaphysic is the negation or absorption of\nphysiology--physiology of chemistry--chemistry of mechanical philosophy.\nSimilarly in mechanics, when we can no further go we arrive at\nchemistry--when chemistry becomes organic we arrive at physiology:\nwhen we pass from the outward and animal to the inward nature of man we\narrive at moral and metaphysical philosophy. These sciences have each of\nthem their own methods and are pursued independently of one another.\nBut to the mind of the thinker they are all one--latent in one\nanother--developed out of one another.\n\nThis method of opposites has supplied new instruments of thought for the\nsolution of metaphysical problems, and has thrown down many of the walls\nwithin which the human mind was confined. Formerly when philosophers\narrived at the infinite and absolute, they seemed to be lost in a region\nbeyond human comprehension. But Hegel has shown that the absolute and\ninfinite are no more true than the relative and finite, and that they\nmust alike be negatived before we arrive at a true absolute or a true\ninfinite. The conceptions of the infinite and absolute as ordinarily\nunderstood are tiresome because they are unmeaning, but there is\nno peculiar sanctity or mystery in them. We might as well make an\ninfinitesimal series of fractions or a perpetually recurring decimal\nthe object of our worship. They are the widest and also the thinnest of\nhuman ideas, or, in the language of logicians, they have the greatest\nextension and the least comprehension. Of all words they may be truly\nsaid to be the most inflated with a false meaning. They have been\nhanded down from one philosopher to another until they have acquired a\nreligious character. They seem also to derive a sacredness from their\nassociation with the Divine Being. Yet they are the poorest of the\npredicates under which we describe him--signifying no more than this,\nthat he is not finite, that he is not relative, and tending to obscure\nhis higher attributes of wisdom, goodness, truth.\n\nThe system of Hegel frees the mind from the dominion of abstract ideas.\nWe acknowledge his originality, and some of us delight to wander in the\nmazes of thought which he has opened to us. For Hegel has found admirers\nin England and Scotland when his popularity in Germany has departed, and\nhe, like the philosophers whom he criticizes, is of the past. No other\nthinker has ever dissected the human mind with equal patience and\nminuteness. He has lightened the burden of thought because he has shown\nus that the chains which we wear are of our own forging. To be able to\nplace ourselves not only above the opinions of men but above their\nmodes of thinking, is a great height of philosophy. This dearly obtained\nfreedom, however, we are not disposed to part with, or to allow him to\nbuild up in a new form the 'beggarly elements' of scholastic logic\nwhich he has thrown down. So far as they are aids to reflection and\nexpression, forms of thought are useful, but no further:--we may easily\nhave too many of them.\n\nAnd when we are asked to believe the Hegelian to be the sole or\nuniversal logic, we naturally reply that there are other ways in which\nour ideas may be connected. The triplets of Hegel, the division into\nbeing, essence, and notion, are not the only or necessary modes in which\nthe world of thought can be conceived. There may be an evolution by\ndegrees as well as by opposites. The word 'continuity' suggests the\npossibility of resolving all differences into differences of quantity.\nAgain, the opposites themselves may vary from the least degree of\ndiversity up to contradictory opposition. They are not like numbers\nand figures, always and everywhere of the same value. And therefore\nthe edifice which is constructed out of them has merely an imaginary\nsymmetry, and is really irregular and out of proportion. The spirit of\nHegelian criticism should be applied to his own system, and the terms\nBeing, Not-being, existence, essence, notion, and the like challenged\nand defined. For if Hegel introduces a great many distinctions, he\nobliterates a great many others by the help of the universal solvent 'is\nnot,' which appears to be the simplest of negations, and yet admits\nof several meanings. Neither are we able to follow him in the play of\nmetaphysical fancy which conducts him from one determination of thought\nto another. But we begin to suspect that this vast system is not God\nwithin us, or God immanent in the world, and may be only the invention\nof an individual brain. The 'beyond' is always coming back upon us\nhowever often we expel it. We do not easily believe that we have within\nthe compass of the mind the form of universal knowledge. We rather\nincline to think that the method of knowledge is inseparable from actual\nknowledge, and wait to see what new forms may be developed out of\nour increasing experience and observation of man and nature. We are\nconscious of a Being who is without us as well as within us. Even\nif inclined to Pantheism we are unwilling to imagine that the meagre\ncategories of the understanding, however ingeniously arranged or\ndisplayed, are the image of God;--that what all religions were seeking\nafter from the beginning was the Hegelian philosophy which has been\nrevealed in the latter days. The great metaphysician, like a prophet of\nold, was naturally inclined to believe that his own thoughts were divine\nrealities. We may almost say that whatever came into his head seemed\nto him to be a necessary truth. He never appears to have criticized\nhimself, or to have subjected his own ideas to the process of analysis\nwhich he applies to every other philosopher.\n\nHegel would have insisted that his philosophy should be accepted as a\nwhole or not at all. He would have urged that the parts derived their\nmeaning from one another and from the whole. He thought that he had\nsupplied an outline large enough to contain all future knowledge, and a\nmethod to which all future philosophies must conform. His metaphysical\ngenius is especially shown in the construction of the categories--a work\nwhich was only begun by Kant, and elaborated to the utmost by himself.\nBut is it really true that the part has no meaning when separated from\nthe whole, or that knowledge to be knowledge at all must be universal?\nDo all abstractions shine only by the reflected light of other\nabstractions? May they not also find a nearer explanation in their\nrelation to phenomena? If many of them are correlatives they are not\nall so, and the relations which subsist between them vary from a mere\nassociation up to a necessary connexion. Nor is it easy to determine\nhow far the unknown element affects the known, whether, for example, new\ndiscoveries may not one day supersede our most elementary notions about\nnature. To a certain extent all our knowledge is conditional upon\nwhat may be known in future ages of the world. We must admit this\nhypothetical element, which we cannot get rid of by an assumption that\nwe have already discovered the method to which all philosophy must\nconform. Hegel is right in preferring the concrete to the abstract,\nin setting actuality before possibility, in excluding from the\nphilosopher's vocabulary the word 'inconceivable.' But he is too well\nsatisfied with his own system ever to consider the effect of what is\nunknown on the element which is known. To the Hegelian all things are\nplain and clear, while he who is outside the charmed circle is in\nthe mire of ignorance and 'logical impurity': he who is within is\nomniscient, or at least has all the elements of knowledge under his\nhand.\n\nHegelianism may be said to be a transcendental defence of the world\nas it is. There is no room for aspiration and no need of any: 'What is\nactual is rational, what is rational is actual.' But a good man will not\nreadily acquiesce in this aphorism. He knows of course that all things\nproceed according to law whether for good or evil. But when he sees\nthe misery and ignorance of mankind he is convinced that without any\ninterruption of the uniformity of nature the condition of the world may\nbe indefinitely improved by human effort. There is also an adaptation\nof persons to times and countries, but this is very far from being the\nfulfilment of their higher natures. The man of the seventeenth century\nis unfitted for the eighteenth, and the man of the eighteenth for the\nnineteenth, and most of us would be out of place in the world of a\nhundred years hence. But all higher minds are much more akin than\nthey are different: genius is of all ages, and there is perhaps more\nuniformity in excellence than in mediocrity. The sublimer intelligences\nof mankind--Plato, Dante, Sir Thomas More--meet in a higher sphere\nabove the ordinary ways of men; they understand one another from\nafar, notwithstanding the interval which separates them. They are 'the\nspectators of all time and of all existence;' their works live for\never; and there is nothing to prevent the force of their individuality\nbreaking through the uniformity which surrounds them. But such\ndisturbers of the order of thought Hegel is reluctant to acknowledge.\n\nThe doctrine of Hegel will to many seem the expression of an indolent\nconservatism, and will at any rate be made an excuse for it. The mind of\nthe patriot rebels when he is told that the worst tyranny and oppression\nhas a natural fitness: he cannot be persuaded, for example, that the\nconquest of Prussia by Napoleon I. was either natural or necessary,\nor that any similar calamity befalling a nation should be a matter of\nindifference to the poet or philosopher. We may need such a philosophy\nor religion to console us under evils which are irremediable, but we see\nthat it is fatal to the higher life of man. It seems to say to us, 'The\nworld is a vast system or machine which can be conceived under the forms\nof logic, but in which no single man can do any great good or any great\nharm. Even if it were a thousand times worse than it is, it could be\narranged in categories and explained by philosophers. And what more do\nwe want?'\n\nThe philosophy of Hegel appeals to an historical criterion: the ideas\nof men have a succession in time as well as an order of thought. But\nthe assumption that there is a correspondence between the succession of\nideas in history and the natural order of philosophy is hardly true even\nof the beginnings of thought. And in later systems forms of thought\nare too numerous and complex to admit of our tracing in them a regular\nsuccession. They seem also to be in part reflections of the past, and it\nis difficult to separate in them what is original and what is borrowed.\nDoubtless they have a relation to one another--the transition from\nDescartes to Spinoza or from Locke to Berkeley is not a matter of\nchance, but it can hardly be described as an alternation of opposites or\nfigured to the mind by the vibrations of a pendulum. Even in Aristotle\nand Plato, rightly understood, we cannot trace this law of action and\nreaction. They are both idealists, although to the one the idea is\nactual and immanent,--to the other only potential and transcendent, as\nHegel himself has pointed out (Wallace's Hegel). The true meaning of\nAristotle has been disguised from us by his own appeal to fact and the\nopinions of mankind in his more popular works, and by the use made of\nhis writings in the Middle Ages. No book, except the Scriptures,\nhas been so much read, and so little understood. The Pre-Socratic\nphilosophies are simpler, and we may observe a progress in them; but is\nthere any regular succession? The ideas of Being, change, number, seem\nto have sprung up contemporaneously in different parts of Greece and we\nhave no difficulty in constructing them out of one another--we can see\nthat the union of Being and Not-being gave birth to the idea of change\nor Becoming and that one might be another aspect of Being. Again,\nthe Eleatics may be regarded as developing in one direction into\nthe Megarian school, in the other into the Atomists, but there is no\nnecessary connexion between them. Nor is there any indication that the\ndeficiency which was felt in one school was supplemented or compensated\nby another. They were all efforts to supply the want which the Greeks\nbegan to feel at the beginning of the sixth century before Christ,--the\nwant of abstract ideas. Nor must we forget the uncertainty of\nchronology;--if, as Aristotle says, there were Atomists before\nLeucippus, Eleatics before Xenophanes, and perhaps 'patrons of the\nflux' before Heracleitus, Hegel's order of thought in the history\nof philosophy would be as much disarranged as his order of religious\nthought by recent discoveries in the history of religion.\n\nHegel is fond of repeating that all philosophies still live and that the\nearlier are preserved in the later; they are refuted, and they are not\nrefuted, by those who succeed them. Once they reigned supreme, now they\nare subordinated to a power or idea greater or more comprehensive\nthan their own. The thoughts of Socrates and Plato and Aristotle have\ncertainly sunk deep into the mind of the world, and have exercised an\ninfluence which will never pass away; but can we say that they have\nthe same meaning in modern and ancient philosophy? Some of them, as\nfor example the words 'Being,' 'essence,' 'matter,' 'form,' either\nhave become obsolete, or are used in new senses, whereas 'individual,'\n'cause,' 'motive,' have acquired an exaggerated importance. Is the\nmanner in which the logical determinations of thought, or 'categories'\nas they may be termed, have been handed down to us, really different\nfrom that in which other words have come down to us? Have they not\nbeen equally subject to accident, and are they not often used by Hegel\nhimself in senses which would have been quite unintelligible to their\noriginal inventors--as for example, when he speaks of the 'ground' of\nLeibnitz ('Everything has a sufficient ground') as identical with\nhis own doctrine of the 'notion' (Wallace's Hegel), or the 'Being and\nNot-being' of Heracleitus as the same with his own 'Becoming'?\n\nAs the historical order of thought has been adapted to the logical, so\nwe have reason for suspecting that the Hegelian logic has been in\nsome degree adapted to the order of thought in history. There is\nunfortunately no criterion to which either of them can be subjected, and\nnot much forcing was required to bring either into near relations with\nthe other. We may fairly doubt whether the division of the first and\nsecond parts of logic in the Hegelian system has not really arisen from\na desire to make them accord with the first and second stages of the\nearly Greek philosophy. Is there any reason why the conception of\nmeasure in the first part, which is formed by the union of quality and\nquantity, should not have been equally placed in the second division of\nmediate or reflected ideas? The more we analyze them the less exact does\nthe coincidence of philosophy and the history of philosophy appear. Many\nterms which were used absolutely in the beginning of philosophy, such\nas 'Being,' 'matter,' 'cause,' and the like, became relative in\nthe subsequent history of thought. But Hegel employs some of them\nabsolutely, some relatively, seemingly without any principle and without\nany regard to their original significance.\n\nThe divisions of the Hegelian logic bear a superficial resemblance to\nthe divisions of the scholastic logic. The first part answers to the\nterm, the second to the proposition, the third to the syllogism. These\nare the grades of thought under which we conceive the world, first, in\nthe general terms of quality, quantity, measure; secondly, under the\nrelative forms of 'ground' and existence, substance and accidents, and\nthe like; thirdly in syllogistic forms of the individual mediated with\nthe universal by the help of the particular. Of syllogisms there are\nvarious kinds,--qualitative, quantitative, inductive, mechanical,\nteleological,--which are developed out of one another. But is there any\nmeaning in reintroducing the forms of the old logic? Who ever thinks\nof the world as a syllogism? What connexion is there between the\nproposition and our ideas of reciprocity, cause and effect, and similar\nrelations? It is difficult enough to conceive all the powers of nature\nand mind gathered up in one. The difficulty is greatly increased\nwhen the new is confused with the old, and the common logic is the\nProcrustes' bed into which they are forced.\n\nThe Hegelian philosophy claims, as we have seen, to be based upon\nexperience: it abrogates the distinction of a priori and a posteriori\ntruth. It also acknowledges that many differences of kind are resolvable\ninto differences of degree. It is familiar with the terms 'evolution,'\n'development,' and the like. Yet it can hardly be said to have\nconsidered the forms of thought which are best adapted for the\nexpression of facts. It has never applied the categories to experience;\nit has not defined the differences in our ideas of opposition, or\ndevelopment, or cause and effect, in the different sciences which make\nuse of these terms. It rests on a knowledge which is not the result of\nexact or serious enquiry, but is floating in the air; the mind has been\nimperceptibly informed of some of the methods required in the sciences.\nHegel boasts that the movement of dialectic is at once necessary and\nspontaneous: in reality it goes beyond experience and is unverified\nby it. Further, the Hegelian philosophy, while giving us the power of\nthinking a great deal more than we are able to fill up, seems to be\nwanting in some determinations of thought which we require. We cannot\nsay that physical science, which at present occupies so large a share\nof popular attention, has been made easier or more intelligible by the\ndistinctions of Hegel. Nor can we deny that he has sometimes interpreted\nphysics by metaphysics, and confused his own philosophical fancies with\nthe laws of nature. The very freedom of the movement is not without\nsuspicion, seeming to imply a state of the human mind which has entirely\nlost sight of facts. Nor can the necessity which is attributed to it be\nvery stringent, seeing that the successive categories or determinations\nof thought in different parts of his writings are arranged by the\nphilosopher in different ways. What is termed necessary evolution seems\nto be only the order in which a succession of ideas presented themselves\nto the mind of Hegel at a particular time.\n\nThe nomenclature of Hegel has been made by himself out of the language\nof common life. He uses a few words only which are borrowed from his\npredecessors, or from the Greek philosophy, and these generally in a\nsense peculiar to himself. The first stage of his philosophy answers to\nthe word 'is,' the second to the word 'has been,' the third to the\nwords 'has been' and 'is' combined. In other words, the first sphere\nis immediate, the second mediated by reflection, the third or highest\nreturns into the first, and is both mediate and immediate. As Luther's\nBible was written in the language of the common people, so Hegel seems\nto have thought that he gave his philosophy a truly German character\nby the use of idiomatic German words. But it may be doubted whether the\nattempt has been successful. First because such words as 'in sich seyn,'\n'an sich seyn,' 'an und fur sich seyn,' though the simplest combinations\nof nouns and verbs, require a difficult and elaborate explanation. The\nsimplicity of the words contrasts with the hardness of their meaning.\nSecondly, the use of technical phraseology necessarily separates\nphilosophy from general literature; the student has to learn a new\nlanguage of uncertain meaning which he with difficulty remembers. No\nformer philosopher had ever carried the use of technical terms to the\nsame extent as Hegel. The language of Plato or even of Aristotle is but\nslightly removed from that of common life, and was introduced naturally\nby a series of thinkers: the language of the scholastic logic has become\ntechnical to us, but in the Middle Ages was the vernacular Latin of\npriests and students. The higher spirit of philosophy, the spirit of\nPlato and Socrates, rebels against the Hegelian use of language as\nmechanical and technical.\n\nHegel is fond of etymologies and often seems to trifle with words. He\ngives etymologies which are bad, and never considers that the meaning of\na word may have nothing to do with its derivation. He lived before the\ndays of Comparative Philology or of Comparative Mythology and Religion,\nwhich would have opened a new world to him. He makes no allowance for\nthe element of chance either in language or thought; and perhaps there\nis no greater defect in his system than the want of a sound theory\nof language. He speaks as if thought, instead of being identical with\nlanguage, was wholly independent of it. It is not the actual growth\nof the mind, but the imaginary growth of the Hegelian system, which is\nattractive to him.\n\nNeither are we able to say why of the common forms of thought some are\nrejected by him, while others have an undue prominence given to them.\nSome of them, such as 'ground' and 'existence,' have hardly any basis\neither in language or philosophy, while others, such as 'cause' and\n'effect,' are but slightly considered. All abstractions are supposed by\nHegel to derive their meaning from one another. This is true of some,\nbut not of all, and in different degrees. There is an explanation of\nabstractions by the phenomena which they represent, as well as by their\nrelation to other abstractions. If the knowledge of all were necessary\nto the knowledge of any one of them, the mind would sink under the load\nof thought. Again, in every process of reflection we seem to require\na standing ground, and in the attempt to obtain a complete analysis we\nlose all fixedness. If, for example, the mind is viewed as the complex\nof ideas, or the difference between things and persons denied, such an\nanalysis may be justified from the point of view of Hegel: but we shall\nfind that in the attempt to criticize thought we have lost the power of\nthinking, and, like the Heracliteans of old, have no words in which\nour meaning can be expressed. Such an analysis may be of value as a\ncorrective of popular language or thought, but should still allow us to\nretain the fundamental distinctions of philosophy.\n\nIn the Hegelian system ideas supersede persons. The world of thought,\nthough sometimes described as Spirit or 'Geist,' is really impersonal.\nThe minds of men are to be regarded as one mind, or more correctly as\na succession of ideas. Any comprehensive view of the world must\nnecessarily be general, and there may be a use with a view to\ncomprehensiveness in dropping individuals and their lives and actions.\nIn all things, if we leave out details, a certain degree of order\nbegins to appear; at any rate we can make an order which, with a little\nexaggeration or disproportion in some of the parts, will cover the whole\nfield of philosophy. But are we therefore justified in saying that\nideas are the causes of the great movement of the world rather than the\npersonalities which conceived them? The great man is the expression of\nhis time, and there may be peculiar difficulties in his age which he\ncannot overcome. He may be out of harmony with his circumstances, too\nearly or too late, and then all his thoughts perish; his genius passes\naway unknown. But not therefore is he to be regarded as a mere waif\nor stray in human history, any more than he is the mere creature or\nexpression of the age in which he lives. His ideas are inseparable from\nhimself, and would have been nothing without him. Through a thousand\npersonal influences they have been brought home to the minds of\nothers. He starts from antecedents, but he is great in proportion as he\ndisengages himself from them or absorbs himself in them. Moreover\nthe types of greatness differ; while one man is the expression of the\ninfluences of his age, another is in antagonism to them. One man is\nborne on the surface of the water; another is carried forward by the\ncurrent which flows beneath. The character of an individual, whether he\nbe independent of circumstances or not, inspires others quite as much\nas his words. What is the teaching of Socrates apart from his personal\nhistory, or the doctrines of Christ apart from the Divine life in which\nthey are embodied? Has not Hegel himself delineated the greatness of\nthe life of Christ as consisting in his 'Schicksalslosigkeit' or\nindependence of the destiny of his race? Do not persons become ideas,\nand is there any distinction between them? Take away the five greatest\nlegislators, the five greatest warriors, the five greatest poets, the\nfive greatest founders or teachers of a religion, the five greatest\nphilosophers, the five greatest inventors,--where would have been all\nthat we most value in knowledge or in life? And can that be a true\ntheory of the history of philosophy which, in Hegel's own language,\n'does not allow the individual to have his right'?\n\nOnce more, while we readily admit that the world is relative to the\nmind, and the mind to the world, and that we must suppose a common or\ncorrelative growth in them, we shrink from saying that this complex\nnature can contain, even in outline, all the endless forms of Being and\nknowledge. Are we not 'seeking the living among the dead' and dignifying\na mere logical skeleton with the name of philosophy and almost of God?\nWhen we look far away into the primeval sources of thought and belief,\ndo we suppose that the mere accident of our being the heirs of the Greek\nphilosophers can give us a right to set ourselves up as having the true\nand only standard of reason in the world? Or when we contemplate the\ninfinite worlds in the expanse of heaven can we imagine that a few\nmeagre categories derived from language and invented by the genius of\none or two great thinkers contain the secret of the universe? Or, having\nregard to the ages during which the human race may yet endure, do we\nsuppose that we can anticipate the proportions human knowledge may\nattain even within the short space of one or two thousand years?\n\nAgain, we have a difficulty in understanding how ideas can be causes,\nwhich to us seems to be as much a figure of speech as the old notion\nof a creator artist, 'who makes the world by the help of the demigods'\n(Plato, Tim.), or with 'a golden pair of compasses' measures out the\ncircumference of the universe (Milton, P.L.). We can understand how\nthe idea in the mind of an inventor is the cause of the work which is\nproduced by it; and we can dimly imagine how this universal frame may\nbe animated by a divine intelligence. But we cannot conceive how all the\nthoughts of men that ever were, which are themselves subject to so many\nexternal conditions of climate, country, and the like, even if regarded\nas the single thought of a Divine Being, can be supposed to have\nmade the world. We appear to be only wrapping up ourselves in our own\nconceits--to be confusing cause and effect--to be losing the distinction\nbetween reflection and action, between the human and divine.\n\nThese are some of the doubts and suspicions which arise in the mind of\na student of Hegel, when, after living for a time within the charmed\ncircle, he removes to a little distance and looks back upon what he\nhas learnt, from the vantage-ground of history and experience. The\nenthusiasm of his youth has passed away, the authority of the master no\nlonger retains a hold upon him. But he does not regret the time spent\nin the study of him. He finds that he has received from him a real\nenlargement of mind, and much of the true spirit of philosophy, even\nwhen he has ceased to believe in him. He returns again and again to his\nwritings as to the recollections of a first love, not undeserving of\nhis admiration still. Perhaps if he were asked how he can admire\nwithout believing, or what value he can attribute to what he knows to be\nerroneous, he might answer in some such manner as the following:--\n\n1. That in Hegel he finds glimpses of the genius of the poet and of the\ncommon sense of the man of the world. His system is not cast in a poetic\nform, but neither has all this load of logic extinguished in him the\nfeeling of poetry. He is the true countryman of his contemporaries\nGoethe and Schiller. Many fine expressions are scattered up and down\nin his writings, as when he tells us that 'the Crusaders went to the\nSepulchre but found it empty.' He delights to find vestiges of his own\nphilosophy in the older German mystics. And though he can be scarcely\nsaid to have mixed much in the affairs of men, for, as his biographer\ntells us, 'he lived for thirty years in a single room,' yet he is far\nfrom being ignorant of the world. No one can read his writings without\nacquiring an insight into life. He loves to touch with the spear of\nlogic the follies and self-deceptions of mankind, and make them appear\nin their natural form, stripped of the disguises of language and custom.\nHe will not allow men to defend themselves by an appeal to one-sided or\nabstract principles. In this age of reason any one can too easily find\na reason for doing what he likes (Wallace). He is suspicious of a\ndistinction which is often made between a person's character and his\nconduct. His spirit is the opposite of that of Jesuitism or casuistry\n(Wallace). He affords an example of a remark which has been often made,\nthat in order to know the world it is not necessary to have had a great\nexperience of it.\n\n2. Hegel, if not the greatest philosopher, is certainly the greatest\ncritic of philosophy who ever lived. No one else has equally mastered\nthe opinions of his predecessors or traced the connexion of them in\nthe same manner. No one has equally raised the human mind above the\ntrivialities of the common logic and the unmeaningness of 'mere'\nabstractions, and above imaginary possibilities, which, as he truly\nsays, have no place in philosophy. No one has won so much for the\nkingdom of ideas. Whatever may be thought of his own system it will\nhardly be denied that he has overthrown Locke, Kant, Hume, and the\nso-called philosophy of common sense. He shows us that only by the study\nof metaphysics can we get rid of metaphysics, and that those who are\nin theory most opposed to them are in fact most entirely and hopelessly\nenslaved by them: 'Die reinen Physiker sind nur die Thiere.'\nThe disciple of Hegel will hardly become the slave of any other\nsystem-maker. What Bacon seems to promise him he will find realized\nin the great German thinker, an emancipation nearly complete from the\ninfluences of the scholastic logic.\n\n3. Many of those who are least disposed to become the votaries of\nHegelianism nevertheless recognize in his system a new logic supplying\na variety of instruments and methods hitherto unemployed. We may not\nbe able to agree with him in assimilating the natural order of human\nthought with the history of philosophy, and still less in identifying\nboth with the divine idea or nature. But we may acknowledge that the\ngreat thinker has thrown a light on many parts of human knowledge,\nand has solved many difficulties. We cannot receive his doctrine of\nopposites as the last word of philosophy, but still we may regard it as\na very important contribution to logic. We cannot affirm that words have\nno meaning when taken out of their connexion in the history of thought.\nBut we recognize that their meaning is to a great extent due to\nassociation, and to their correlation with one another. We see the\nadvantage of viewing in the concrete what mankind regard only in the\nabstract. There is much to be said for his faith or conviction, that God\nis immanent in the world,--within the sphere of the human mind, and not\nbeyond it. It was natural that he himself, like a prophet of old, should\nregard the philosophy which he had invented as the voice of God in man.\nBut this by no means implies that he conceived himself as creating God\nin thought. He was the servant of his own ideas and not the master of\nthem. The philosophy of history and the history of philosophy may be\nalmost said to have been discovered by him. He has done more to explain\nGreek thought than all other writers put together. Many ideas of\ndevelopment, evolution, reciprocity, which have become the symbols of\nanother school of thinkers may be traced to his speculations. In the\ntheology and philosophy of England as well as of Germany, and also in\nthe lighter literature of both countries, there are always appearing\n'fragments of the great banquet' of Hegel.\n\n\n\n\nSOPHIST\n\n\nPERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Theodorus, Theaetetus, Socrates. An Eleatic\nStranger, whom Theodorus and Theaetetus bring with them. The younger\nSocrates, who is a silent auditor.\n\n\nTHEODORUS: Here we are, Socrates, true to our agreement of yesterday;\nand we bring with us a stranger from Elea, who is a disciple of\nParmenides and Zeno, and a true philosopher.\n\nSOCRATES: Is he not rather a god, Theodorus, who comes to us in the\ndisguise of a stranger? For Homer says that all the gods, and especially\nthe god of strangers, are companions of the meek and just, and visit\nthe good and evil among men. And may not your companion be one of those\nhigher powers, a cross-examining deity, who has come to spy out our\nweakness in argument, and to cross-examine us?\n\nTHEODORUS: Nay, Socrates, he is not one of the disputatious sort--he\nis too good for that. And, in my opinion, he is not a god at all; but\ndivine he certainly is, for this is a title which I should give to all\nphilosophers.\n\nSOCRATES: Capital, my friend! and I may add that they are almost as hard\nto be discerned as the gods. For the true philosophers, and such as\nare not merely made up for the occasion, appear in various forms\nunrecognized by the ignorance of men, and they 'hover about cities,'\nas Homer declares, looking from above upon human life; and some think\nnothing of them, and others can never think enough; and sometimes they\nappear as statesmen, and sometimes as sophists; and then, again, to many\nthey seem to be no better than madmen. I should like to ask our Eleatic\nfriend, if he would tell us, what is thought about them in Italy, and to\nwhom the terms are applied.\n\nTHEODORUS: What terms?\n\nSOCRATES: Sophist, statesman, philosopher.\n\nTHEODORUS: What is your difficulty about them, and what made you ask?\n\nSOCRATES: I want to know whether by his countrymen they are regarded as\none or two; or do they, as the names are three, distinguish also three\nkinds, and assign one to each name?\n\nTHEODORUS: I dare say that the Stranger will not object to discuss the\nquestion. What do you say, Stranger?\n\nSTRANGER: I am far from objecting, Theodorus, nor have I any difficulty\nin replying that by us they are regarded as three. But to define\nprecisely the nature of each of them is by no means a slight or easy\ntask.\n\nTHEODORUS: You have happened to light, Socrates, almost on the very\nquestion which we were asking our friend before we came hither, and he\nexcused himself to us, as he does now to you; although he admitted that\nthe matter had been fully discussed, and that he remembered the answer.\n\nSOCRATES: Then do not, Stranger, deny us the first favour which we ask\nof you: I am sure that you will not, and therefore I shall only beg of\nyou to say whether you like and are accustomed to make a long oration\non a subject which you want to explain to another, or to proceed by\nthe method of question and answer. I remember hearing a very noble\ndiscussion in which Parmenides employed the latter of the two methods,\nwhen I was a young man, and he was far advanced in years. (Compare\nParm.)\n\nSTRANGER: I prefer to talk with another when he responds pleasantly, and\nis light in hand; if not, I would rather have my own say.\n\nSOCRATES: Any one of the present company will respond kindly to you, and\nyou can choose whom you like of them; I should recommend you to take a\nyoung person--Theaetetus, for example--unless you have a preference for\nsome one else.\n\nSTRANGER: I feel ashamed, Socrates, being a new-comer into your society,\ninstead of talking a little and hearing others talk, to be spinning out\na long soliloquy or address, as if I wanted to show off. For the true\nanswer will certainly be a very long one, a great deal longer than might\nbe expected from such a short and simple question. At the same time,\nI fear that I may seem rude and ungracious if I refuse your courteous\nrequest, especially after what you have said. For I certainly cannot\nobject to your proposal, that Theaetetus should respond, having already\nconversed with him myself, and being recommended by you to take him.\n\nTHEAETETUS: But are you sure, Stranger, that this will be quite so\nacceptable to the rest of the company as Socrates imagines?\n\nSTRANGER: You hear them applauding, Theaetetus; after that, there is\nnothing more to be said. Well then, I am to argue with you, and if you\ntire of the argument, you may complain of your friends and not of me.\n\nTHEAETETUS: I do not think that I shall tire, and if I do, I shall get\nmy friend here, young Socrates, the namesake of the elder Socrates, to\nhelp; he is about my own age, and my partner at the gymnasium, and is\nconstantly accustomed to work with me.\n\nSTRANGER: Very good; you can decide about that for yourself as we\nproceed. Meanwhile you and I will begin together and enquire into the\nnature of the Sophist, first of the three: I should like you to make out\nwhat he is and bring him to light in a discussion; for at present we are\nonly agreed about the name, but of the thing to which we both apply the\nname possibly you have one notion and I another; whereas we ought\nalways to come to an understanding about the thing itself in terms of a\ndefinition, and not merely about the name minus the definition. Now the\ntribe of Sophists which we are investigating is not easily caught or\ndefined; and the world has long ago agreed, that if great subjects are\nto be adequately treated, they must be studied in the lesser and easier\ninstances of them before we proceed to the greatest of all. And as I\nknow that the tribe of Sophists is troublesome and hard to be caught, I\nshould recommend that we practise beforehand the method which is to be\napplied to him on some simple and smaller thing, unless you can suggest\na better way.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Indeed I cannot.\n\nSTRANGER: Then suppose that we work out some lesser example which will\nbe a pattern of the greater?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Good.\n\nSTRANGER: What is there which is well known and not great, and is yet as\nsusceptible of definition as any larger thing? Shall I say an angler?\nHe is familiar to all of us, and not a very interesting or important\nperson.\n\nTHEAETETUS: He is not.\n\nSTRANGER: Yet I suspect that he will furnish us with the sort of\ndefinition and line of enquiry which we want.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Very good.\n\nSTRANGER: Let us begin by asking whether he is a man having art or not\nhaving art, but some other power.\n\nTHEAETETUS: He is clearly a man of art.\n\nSTRANGER: And of arts there are two kinds?\n\nTHEAETETUS: What are they?\n\nSTRANGER: There is agriculture, and the tending of mortal creatures,\nand the art of constructing or moulding vessels, and there is the art of\nimitation--all these may be appropriately called by a single name.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What do you mean? And what is the name?\n\nSTRANGER: He who brings into existence something that did not exist\nbefore is said to be a producer, and that which is brought into\nexistence is said to be produced.\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And all the arts which were just now mentioned are\ncharacterized by this power of producing?\n\nTHEAETETUS: They are.\n\nSTRANGER: Then let us sum them up under the name of productive or\ncreative art.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Very good.\n\nSTRANGER: Next follows the whole class of learning and cognition;\nthen comes trade, fighting, hunting. And since none of these produces\nanything, but is only engaged in conquering by word or deed, or in\npreventing others from conquering, things which exist and have been\nalready produced--in each and all of these branches there appears to be\nan art which may be called acquisitive.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes, that is the proper name.\n\nSTRANGER: Seeing, then, that all arts are either acquisitive or\ncreative, in which class shall we place the art of the angler?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Clearly in the acquisitive class.\n\nSTRANGER: And the acquisitive may be subdivided into two parts: there is\nexchange, which is voluntary and is effected by gifts, hire, purchase;\nand the other part of acquisitive, which takes by force of word or deed,\nmay be termed conquest?\n\nTHEAETETUS: That is implied in what has been said.\n\nSTRANGER: And may not conquest be again subdivided?\n\nTHEAETETUS: How?\n\nSTRANGER: Open force may be called fighting, and secret force may have\nthe general name of hunting?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: And there is no reason why the art of hunting should not be\nfurther divided.\n\nTHEAETETUS: How would you make the division?\n\nSTRANGER: Into the hunting of living and of lifeless prey.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes, if both kinds exist.\n\nSTRANGER: Of course they exist; but the hunting after lifeless things\nhaving no special name, except some sorts of diving, and other small\nmatters, may be omitted; the hunting after living things may be called\nanimal hunting.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: And animal hunting may be truly said to have two divisions,\nland-animal hunting, which has many kinds and names, and water-animal\nhunting, or the hunting after animals who swim?\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And of swimming animals, one class lives on the wing and the\nother in the water?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: Fowling is the general term under which the hunting of all\nbirds is included.\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: The hunting of animals who live in the water has the general\nname of fishing.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: And this sort of hunting may be further divided also into two\nprincipal kinds?\n\nTHEAETETUS: What are they?\n\nSTRANGER: There is one kind which takes them in nets, another which\ntakes them by a blow.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What do you mean, and how do you distinguish them?\n\nSTRANGER: As to the first kind--all that surrounds and encloses anything\nto prevent egress, may be rightly called an enclosure.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Very true.\n\nSTRANGER: For which reason twig baskets, casting-nets, nooses, creels,\nand the like may all be termed 'enclosures'?\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And therefore this first kind of capture may be called by us\ncapture with enclosures, or something of that sort?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: The other kind, which is practised by a blow with hooks and\nthree-pronged spears, when summed up under one name, may be called\nstriking, unless you, Theaetetus, can find some better name?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Never mind the name--what you suggest will do very well.\n\nSTRANGER: There is one mode of striking, which is done at night, and by\nthe light of a fire, and is by the hunters themselves called firing, or\nspearing by firelight.\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And the fishing by day is called by the general name of\nbarbing, because the spears, too, are barbed at the point.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes, that is the term.\n\nSTRANGER: Of this barb-fishing, that which strikes the fish who is below\nfrom above is called spearing, because this is the way in which the\nthree-pronged spears are mostly used.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes, it is often called so.\n\nSTRANGER: Then now there is only one kind remaining.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What is that?\n\nSTRANGER: When a hook is used, and the fish is not struck in any chance\npart of his body, as he is with the spear, but only about the head\nand mouth, and is then drawn out from below upwards with reeds and\nrods:--What is the right name of that mode of fishing, Theaetetus?\n\nTHEAETETUS: I suspect that we have now discovered the object of our\nsearch.\n\nSTRANGER: Then now you and I have come to an understanding not only\nabout the name of the angler's art, but about the definition of\nthe thing itself. One half of all art was acquisitive--half of the\nacquisitive art was conquest or taking by force, half of this was\nhunting, and half of hunting was hunting animals, half of this was\nhunting water animals--of this again, the under half was fishing, half\nof fishing was striking; a part of striking was fishing with a barb,\nand one half of this again, being the kind which strikes with a hook\nand draws the fish from below upwards, is the art which we have been\nseeking, and which from the nature of the operation is denoted angling\nor drawing up (aspalieutike, anaspasthai).\n\nTHEAETETUS: The result has been quite satisfactorily brought out.\n\nSTRANGER: And now, following this pattern, let us endeavour to find out\nwhat a Sophist is.\n\nTHEAETETUS: By all means.\n\nSTRANGER: The first question about the angler was, whether he was a\nskilled artist or unskilled?\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And shall we call our new friend unskilled, or a thorough\nmaster of his craft?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly not unskilled, for his name, as, indeed, you\nimply, must surely express his nature.\n\nSTRANGER: Then he must be supposed to have some art.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What art?\n\nSTRANGER: By heaven, they are cousins! it never occurred to us.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Who are cousins?\n\nSTRANGER: The angler and the Sophist.\n\nTHEAETETUS: In what way are they related?\n\nSTRANGER: They both appear to me to be hunters.\n\nTHEAETETUS: How the Sophist? Of the other we have spoken.\n\nSTRANGER: You remember our division of hunting, into hunting after\nswimming animals and land animals?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: And you remember that we subdivided the swimming and left the\nland animals, saying that there were many kinds of them?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: Thus far, then, the Sophist and the angler, starting from the\nart of acquiring, take the same road?\n\nTHEAETETUS: So it would appear.\n\nSTRANGER: Their paths diverge when they reach the art of animal hunting;\nthe one going to the sea-shore, and to the rivers and to the lakes, and\nangling for the animals which are in them.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Very true.\n\nSTRANGER: While the other goes to land and water of another sort--rivers\nof wealth and broad meadow-lands of generous youth; and he also is\nintending to take the animals which are in them.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What do you mean?\n\nSTRANGER: Of hunting on land there are two principal divisions.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What are they?\n\nSTRANGER: One is the hunting of tame, and the other of wild animals.\n\nTHEAETETUS: But are tame animals ever hunted?\n\nSTRANGER: Yes, if you include man under tame animals. But if you like\nyou may say that there are no tame animals, or that, if there are, man\nis not among them; or you may say that man is a tame animal but is not\nhunted--you shall decide which of these alternatives you prefer.\n\nTHEAETETUS: I should say, Stranger, that man is a tame animal, and I\nadmit that he is hunted.\n\nSTRANGER: Then let us divide the hunting of tame animals into two parts.\n\nTHEAETETUS: How shall we make the division?\n\nSTRANGER: Let us define piracy, man-stealing, tyranny, the whole\nmilitary art, by one name, as hunting with violence.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Very good.\n\nSTRANGER: But the art of the lawyer, of the popular orator, and the art\nof conversation may be called in one word the art of persuasion.\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And of persuasion, there may be said to be two kinds?\n\nTHEAETETUS: What are they?\n\nSTRANGER: One is private, and the other public.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes; each of them forms a class.\n\nSTRANGER: And of private hunting, one sort receives hire, and the other\nbrings gifts.\n\nTHEAETETUS: I do not understand you.\n\nSTRANGER: You seem never to have observed the manner in which lovers\nhunt.\n\nTHEAETETUS: To what do you refer?\n\nSTRANGER: I mean that they lavish gifts on those whom they hunt in\naddition to other inducements.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Most true.\n\nSTRANGER: Let us admit this, then, to be the amatory art.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: But that sort of hireling whose conversation is pleasing\nand who baits his hook only with pleasure and exacts nothing but his\nmaintenance in return, we should all, if I am not mistaken, describe as\npossessing flattery or an art of making things pleasant.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: And that sort, which professes to form acquaintances only for\nthe sake of virtue, and demands a reward in the shape of money, may be\nfairly called by another name?\n\nTHEAETETUS: To be sure.\n\nSTRANGER: And what is the name? Will you tell me?\n\nTHEAETETUS: It is obvious enough; for I believe that we have discovered\nthe Sophist: which is, as I conceive, the proper name for the class\ndescribed.\n\nSTRANGER: Then now, Theaetetus, his art may be traced as a branch of the\nappropriative, acquisitive family--which hunts animals,--living--land--\ntame animals; which hunts man,--privately--for hire,--taking money in\nexchange--having the semblance of education; and this is termed\nSophistry, and is a hunt after young men of wealth and rank--such is the\nconclusion.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Just so.\n\nSTRANGER: Let us take another branch of his genealogy; for he is a\nprofessor of a great and many-sided art; and if we look back at what has\npreceded we see that he presents another aspect, besides that of which\nwe are speaking.\n\nTHEAETETUS: In what respect?\n\nSTRANGER: There were two sorts of acquisitive art; the one concerned\nwith hunting, the other with exchange.\n\nTHEAETETUS: There were.\n\nSTRANGER: And of the art of exchange there are two divisions, the one of\ngiving, and the other of selling.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Let us assume that.\n\nSTRANGER: Next, we will suppose the art of selling to be divided into\ntwo parts.\n\nTHEAETETUS: How?\n\nSTRANGER: There is one part which is distinguished as the sale of a\nman's own productions; another, which is the exchange of the works of\nothers.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: And is not that part of exchange which takes place in the\ncity, being about half of the whole, termed retailing?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: And that which exchanges the goods of one city for those of\nanother by selling and buying is the exchange of the merchant?\n\nTHEAETETUS: To be sure.\n\nSTRANGER: And you are aware that this exchange of the merchant is of\ntwo kinds: it is partly concerned with food for the use of the body,\nand partly with the food of the soul which is bartered and received in\nexchange for money.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What do you mean?\n\nSTRANGER: You want to know what is the meaning of food for the soul; the\nother kind you surely understand.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: Take music in general and painting and marionette playing and\nmany other things, which are purchased in one city, and carried away and\nsold in another--wares of the soul which are hawked about either for the\nsake of instruction or amusement;--may not he who takes them about and\nsells them be quite as truly called a merchant as he who sells meats and\ndrinks?\n\nTHEAETETUS: To be sure he may.\n\nSTRANGER: And would you not call by the same name him who buys up\nknowledge and goes about from city to city exchanging his wares for\nmoney?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly I should.\n\nSTRANGER: Of this merchandise of the soul, may not one part be fairly\ntermed the art of display? And there is another part which is certainly\nnot less ridiculous, but being a trade in learning must be called by\nsome name germane to the matter?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: The latter should have two names,--one descriptive of the sale\nof the knowledge of virtue, and the other of the sale of other kinds of\nknowledge.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Of course.\n\nSTRANGER: The name of art-seller corresponds well enough to the latter;\nbut you must try and tell me the name of the other.\n\nTHEAETETUS: He must be the Sophist, whom we are seeking; no other name\ncan possibly be right.\n\nSTRANGER: No other; and so this trader in virtue again turns out to\nbe our friend the Sophist, whose art may now be traced from the art of\nacquisition through exchange, trade, merchandise, to a merchandise of\nthe soul which is concerned with speech and the knowledge of virtue.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Quite true.\n\nSTRANGER: And there may be a third reappearance of him;--for he may\nhave settled down in a city, and may fabricate as well as buy these same\nwares, intending to live by selling them, and he would still be called a\nSophist?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: Then that part of the acquisitive art which exchanges, and of\nexchange which either sells a man's own productions or retails those\nof others, as the case may be, and in either way sells the knowledge of\nvirtue, you would again term Sophistry?\n\nTHEAETETUS: I must, if I am to keep pace with the argument.\n\nSTRANGER: Let us consider once more whether there may not be yet another\naspect of sophistry.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What is it?\n\nSTRANGER: In the acquisitive there was a subdivision of the combative or\nfighting art.\n\nTHEAETETUS: There was.\n\nSTRANGER: Perhaps we had better divide it.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What shall be the divisions?\n\nSTRANGER: There shall be one division of the competitive, and another of\nthe pugnacious.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Very good.\n\nSTRANGER: That part of the pugnacious which is a contest of bodily\nstrength may be properly called by some such name as violent.\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And when the war is one of words, it may be termed\ncontroversy?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: And controversy may be of two kinds.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What are they?\n\nSTRANGER: When long speeches are answered by long speeches, and there\nis public discussion about the just and unjust, that is forensic\ncontroversy.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: And there is a private sort of controversy, which is cut up\ninto questions and answers, and this is commonly called disputation?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes, that is the name.\n\nSTRANGER: And of disputation, that sort which is only a discussion about\ncontracts, and is carried on at random, and without rules of art, is\nrecognized by the reasoning faculty to be a distinct class, but has\nhitherto had no distinctive name, and does not deserve to receive one\nfrom us.\n\nTHEAETETUS: No; for the different sorts of it are too minute and\nheterogeneous.\n\nSTRANGER: But that which proceeds by rules of art to dispute about\njustice and injustice in their own nature, and about things in general,\nwe have been accustomed to call argumentation (Eristic)?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: And of argumentation, one sort wastes money, and the other\nmakes money.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Very true.\n\nSTRANGER: Suppose we try and give to each of these two classes a name.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Let us do so.\n\nSTRANGER: I should say that the habit which leads a man to neglect his\nown affairs for the pleasure of conversation, of which the style is\nfar from being agreeable to the majority of his hearers, may be fairly\ntermed loquacity: such is my opinion.\n\nTHEAETETUS: That is the common name for it.\n\nSTRANGER: But now who the other is, who makes money out of private\ndisputation, it is your turn to say.\n\nTHEAETETUS: There is only one true answer: he is the wonderful Sophist,\nof whom we are in pursuit, and who reappears again for the fourth time.\n\nSTRANGER: Yes, and with a fresh pedigree, for he is the money-making\nspecies of the Eristic, disputatious, controversial, pugnacious,\ncombative, acquisitive family, as the argument has already proven.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: How true was the observation that he was a many-sided animal,\nand not to be caught with one hand, as they say!\n\nTHEAETETUS: Then you must catch him with two.\n\nSTRANGER: Yes, we must, if we can. And therefore let us try another\ntrack in our pursuit of him: You are aware that there are certain menial\noccupations which have names among servants?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes, there are many such; which of them do you mean?\n\nSTRANGER: I mean such as sifting, straining, winnowing, threshing.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: And besides these there are a great many more, such as\ncarding, spinning, adjusting the warp and the woof; and thousands of\nsimilar expressions are used in the arts.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Of what are they to be patterns, and what are we going to do\nwith them all?\n\nSTRANGER: I think that in all of these there is implied a notion of\ndivision.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: Then if, as I was saying, there is one art which includes all\nof them, ought not that art to have one name?\n\nTHEAETETUS: And what is the name of the art?\n\nSTRANGER: The art of discerning or discriminating.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Very good.\n\nSTRANGER: Think whether you cannot divide this.\n\nTHEAETETUS: I should have to think a long while.\n\nSTRANGER: In all the previously named processes either like has been\nseparated from like or the better from the worse.\n\nTHEAETETUS: I see now what you mean.\n\nSTRANGER: There is no name for the first kind of separation; of the\nsecond, which throws away the worse and preserves the better, I do know\na name.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What is it?\n\nSTRANGER: Every discernment or discrimination of that kind, as I have\nobserved, is called a purification.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes, that is the usual expression.\n\nSTRANGER: And any one may see that purification is of two kinds.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Perhaps so, if he were allowed time to think; but I do not\nsee at this moment.\n\nSTRANGER: There are many purifications of bodies which may with\npropriety be comprehended under a single name.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What are they, and what is their name?\n\nSTRANGER: There is the purification of living bodies in their inward and\nin their outward parts, of which the former is duly effected by medicine\nand gymnastic, the latter by the not very dignified art of the bath-man;\nand there is the purification of inanimate substances--to this the arts\nof fulling and of furbishing in general attend in a number of minute\nparticulars, having a variety of names which are thought ridiculous.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Very true.\n\nSTRANGER: There can be no doubt that they are thought ridiculous,\nTheaetetus; but then the dialectical art never considers whether the\nbenefit to be derived from the purge is greater or less than that to be\nderived from the sponge, and has not more interest in the one than in\nthe other; her endeavour is to know what is and is not kindred in all\narts, with a view to the acquisition of intelligence; and having this\nin view, she honours them all alike, and when she makes comparisons, she\ncounts one of them not a whit more ridiculous than another; nor does she\nesteem him who adduces as his example of hunting, the general's art, at\nall more decorous than another who cites that of the vermin-destroyer,\nbut only as the greater pretender of the two. And as to your question\nconcerning the name which was to comprehend all these arts of\npurification, whether of animate or inanimate bodies, the art of\ndialectic is in no wise particular about fine words, if she may be only\nallowed to have a general name for all other purifications, binding them\nup together and separating them off from the purification of the soul\nor intellect. For this is the purification at which she wants to arrive,\nand this we should understand to be her aim.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes, I understand; and I agree that there are two sorts of\npurification, and that one of them is concerned with the soul, and that\nthere is another which is concerned with the body.\n\nSTRANGER: Excellent; and now listen to what I am going to say, and try\nto divide further the first of the two.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Whatever line of division you suggest, I will endeavour to\nassist you.\n\nSTRANGER: Do we admit that virtue is distinct from vice in the soul?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: And purification was to leave the good and to cast out\nwhatever is bad?\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: Then any taking away of evil from the soul may be properly\ncalled purification?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: And in the soul there are two kinds of evil.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What are they?\n\nSTRANGER: The one may be compared to disease in the body, the other to\ndeformity.\n\nTHEAETETUS: I do not understand.\n\nSTRANGER: Perhaps you have never reflected that disease and discord are\nthe same.\n\nTHEAETETUS: To this, again, I know not what I should reply.\n\nSTRANGER: Do you not conceive discord to be a dissolution of kindred\nelements, originating in some disagreement?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Just that.\n\nSTRANGER: And is deformity anything but the want of measure, which is\nalways unsightly?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Exactly.\n\nSTRANGER: And do we not see that opinion is opposed to desire, pleasure\nto anger, reason to pain, and that all these elements are opposed to one\nanother in the souls of bad men?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: And yet they must all be akin?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Of course.\n\nSTRANGER: Then we shall be right in calling vice a discord and disease\nof the soul?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Most true.\n\nSTRANGER: And when things having motion, and aiming at an appointed\nmark, continually miss their aim and glance aside, shall we say that\nthis is the effect of symmetry among them, or of the want of symmetry?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Clearly of the want of symmetry.\n\nSTRANGER: But surely we know that no soul is voluntarily ignorant of\nanything?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly not.\n\nSTRANGER: And what is ignorance but the aberration of a mind which is\nbent on truth, and in which the process of understanding is perverted?\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: Then we are to regard an unintelligent soul as deformed and\ndevoid of symmetry?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Very true.\n\nSTRANGER: Then there are these two kinds of evil in the soul--the\none which is generally called vice, and is obviously a disease of the\nsoul...\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: And there is the other, which they call ignorance, and which,\nbecause existing only in the soul, they will not allow to be vice.\n\nTHEAETETUS: I certainly admit what I at first disputed--that there are\ntwo kinds of vice in the soul, and that we ought to consider cowardice,\nintemperance, and injustice to be alike forms of disease in the\nsoul, and ignorance, of which there are all sorts of varieties, to be\ndeformity.\n\nSTRANGER: And in the case of the body are there not two arts which have\nto do with the two bodily states?\n\nTHEAETETUS: What are they?\n\nSTRANGER: There is gymnastic, which has to do with deformity, and\nmedicine, which has to do with disease.\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And where there is insolence and injustice and cowardice, is\nnot chastisement the art which is most required?\n\nTHEAETETUS: That certainly appears to be the opinion of mankind.\n\nSTRANGER: Again, of the various kinds of ignorance, may not instruction\nbe rightly said to be the remedy?\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And of the art of instruction, shall we say that there is one\nor many kinds? At any rate there are two principal ones. Think.\n\nTHEAETETUS: I will.\n\nSTRANGER: I believe that I can see how we shall soonest arrive at the\nanswer to this question.\n\nTHEAETETUS: How?\n\nSTRANGER: If we can discover a line which divides ignorance into two\nhalves. For a division of ignorance into two parts will certainly\nimply that the art of instruction is also twofold, answering to the two\ndivisions of ignorance.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Well, and do you see what you are looking for?\n\nSTRANGER: I do seem to myself to see one very large and bad sort of\nignorance which is quite separate, and may be weighed in the scale\nagainst all other sorts of ignorance put together.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What is it?\n\nSTRANGER: When a person supposes that he knows, and does not know; this\nappears to be the great source of all the errors of the intellect.\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And this, if I am not mistaken, is the kind of ignorance which\nspecially earns the title of stupidity.\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: What name, then, shall be given to the sort of instruction\nwhich gets rid of this?\n\nTHEAETETUS: The instruction which you mean, Stranger, is, I should\nimagine, not the teaching of handicraft arts, but what, thanks to us,\nhas been termed education in this part the world.\n\nSTRANGER: Yes, Theaetetus, and by nearly all Hellenes. But we have still\nto consider whether education admits of any further division.\n\nTHEAETETUS: We have.\n\nSTRANGER: I think that there is a point at which such a division is\npossible.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Where?\n\nSTRANGER: Of education, one method appears to be rougher, and another\nsmoother.\n\nTHEAETETUS: How are we to distinguish the two?\n\nSTRANGER: There is the time-honoured mode which our fathers commonly\npractised towards their sons, and which is still adopted by many--either\nof roughly reproving their errors, or of gently advising them;\nwhich varieties may be correctly included under the general term of\nadmonition.\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: But whereas some appear to have arrived at the conclusion that\nall ignorance is involuntary, and that no one who thinks himself wise is\nwilling to learn any of those things in which he is conscious of his\nown cleverness, and that the admonitory sort of instruction gives much\ntrouble and does little good--\n\nTHEAETETUS: There they are quite right.\n\nSTRANGER: Accordingly, they set to work to eradicate the spirit of\nconceit in another way.\n\nTHEAETETUS: In what way?\n\nSTRANGER: They cross-examine a man's words, when he thinks that he is\nsaying something and is really saying nothing, and easily convict him\nof inconsistencies in his opinions; these they then collect by the\ndialectical process, and placing them side by side, show that they\ncontradict one another about the same things, in relation to the same\nthings, and in the same respect. He, seeing this, is angry with himself,\nand grows gentle towards others, and thus is entirely delivered from\ngreat prejudices and harsh notions, in a way which is most amusing to\nthe hearer, and produces the most lasting good effect on the person who\nis the subject of the operation. For as the physician considers that\nthe body will receive no benefit from taking food until the internal\nobstacles have been removed, so the purifier of the soul is conscious\nthat his patient will receive no benefit from the application of\nknowledge until he is refuted, and from refutation learns modesty; he\nmust be purged of his prejudices first and made to think that he knows\nonly what he knows, and no more.\n\nTHEAETETUS: That is certainly the best and wisest state of mind.\n\nSTRANGER: For all these reasons, Theaetetus, we must admit that\nrefutation is the greatest and chiefest of purifications, and he who has\nnot been refuted, though he be the Great King himself, is in an awful\nstate of impurity; he is uninstructed and deformed in those things in\nwhich he who would be truly blessed ought to be fairest and purest.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Very true.\n\nSTRANGER: And who are the ministers of this art? I am afraid to say the\nSophists.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Why?\n\nSTRANGER: Lest we should assign to them too high a prerogative.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yet the Sophist has a certain likeness to our minister of\npurification.\n\nSTRANGER: Yes, the same sort of likeness which a wolf, who is the\nfiercest of animals, has to a dog, who is the gentlest. But he who\nwould not be found tripping, ought to be very careful in this matter\nof comparisons, for they are most slippery things. Nevertheless, let us\nassume that the Sophists are the men. I say this provisionally, for I\nthink that the line which divides them will be marked enough if proper\ncare is taken.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Likely enough.\n\nSTRANGER: Let us grant, then, that from the discerning art comes\npurification, and from purification let there be separated off a\npart which is concerned with the soul; of this mental purification\ninstruction is a portion, and of instruction education, and of\neducation, that refutation of vain conceit which has been discovered\nin the present argument; and let this be called by you and me the\nnobly-descended art of Sophistry.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Very well; and yet, considering the number of forms in which\nhe has presented himself, I begin to doubt how I can with any truth or\nconfidence describe the real nature of the Sophist.\n\nSTRANGER: You naturally feel perplexed; and yet I think that he must\nbe still more perplexed in his attempt to escape us, for as the proverb\nsays, when every way is blocked, there is no escape; now, then, is the\ntime of all others to set upon him.\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: First let us wait a moment and recover breath, and while we\nare resting, we may reckon up in how many forms he has appeared. In\nthe first place, he was discovered to be a paid hunter after wealth and\nyouth.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: In the second place, he was a merchant in the goods of the\nsoul.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: In the third place, he has turned out to be a retailer of the\nsame sort of wares.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes; and in the fourth place, he himself manufactured the\nlearned wares which he sold.\n\nSTRANGER: Quite right; I will try and remember the fifth myself. He\nbelonged to the fighting class, and was further distinguished as a hero\nof debate, who professed the eristic art.\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: The sixth point was doubtful, and yet we at last agreed\nthat he was a purger of souls, who cleared away notions obstructive to\nknowledge.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Very true.\n\nSTRANGER: Do you not see that when the professor of any art has one\nname and many kinds of knowledge, there must be something wrong? The\nmultiplicity of names which is applied to him shows that the common\nprinciple to which all these branches of knowledge are tending, is not\nunderstood.\n\nTHEAETETUS: I should imagine this to be the case.\n\nSTRANGER: At any rate we will understand him, and no indolence shall\nprevent us. Let us begin again, then, and re-examine some of our\nstatements concerning the Sophist; there was one thing which appeared to\nme especially characteristic of him.\n\nTHEAETETUS: To what are you referring?\n\nSTRANGER: We were saying of him, if I am not mistaken, that he was a\ndisputer?\n\nTHEAETETUS: We were.\n\nSTRANGER: And does he not also teach others the art of disputation?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly he does.\n\nSTRANGER: And about what does he profess that he teaches men to dispute?\nTo begin at the beginning--Does he make them able to dispute about\ndivine things, which are invisible to men in general?\n\nTHEAETETUS: At any rate, he is said to do so.\n\nSTRANGER: And what do you say of the visible things in heaven and earth,\nand the like?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly he disputes, and teaches to dispute about them.\n\nSTRANGER: Then, again, in private conversation, when any universal\nassertion is made about generation and essence, we know that such\npersons are tremendous argufiers, and are able to impart their own skill\nto others.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Undoubtedly.\n\nSTRANGER: And do they not profess to make men able to dispute about law\nand about politics in general?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Why, no one would have anything to say to them, if they did\nnot make these professions.\n\nSTRANGER: In all and every art, what the craftsman ought to say in\nanswer to any question is written down in a popular form, and he who\nlikes may learn.\n\nTHEAETETUS: I suppose that you are referring to the precepts of\nProtagoras about wrestling and the other arts?\n\nSTRANGER: Yes, my friend, and about a good many other things. In a word,\nis not the art of disputation a power of disputing about all things?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly; there does not seem to be much which is left out.\n\nSTRANGER: But oh! my dear youth, do you suppose this possible? for\nperhaps your young eyes may see things which to our duller sight do not\nappear.\n\nTHEAETETUS: To what are you alluding? I do not think that I understand\nyour present question.\n\nSTRANGER: I ask whether anybody can understand all things.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Happy would mankind be if such a thing were possible!\n\nSOCRATES: But how can any one who is ignorant dispute in a rational\nmanner against him who knows?\n\nTHEAETETUS: He cannot.\n\nSTRANGER: Then why has the sophistical art such a mysterious power?\n\nTHEAETETUS: To what do you refer?\n\nSTRANGER: How do the Sophists make young men believe in their supreme\nand universal wisdom? For if they neither disputed nor were thought\nto dispute rightly, or being thought to do so were deemed no wiser for\ntheir controversial skill, then, to quote your own observation, no one\nwould give them money or be willing to learn their art.\n\nTHEAETETUS: They certainly would not.\n\nSTRANGER: But they are willing.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes, they are.\n\nSTRANGER: Yes, and the reason, as I should imagine, is that they are\nsupposed to have knowledge of those things about which they dispute?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: And they dispute about all things?\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And therefore, to their disciples, they appear to be all-wise?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: But they are not; for that was shown to be impossible.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Impossible, of course.\n\nSTRANGER: Then the Sophist has been shown to have a sort of conjectural\nor apparent knowledge only of all things, which is not the truth?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Exactly; no better description of him could be given.\n\nSTRANGER: Let us now take an illustration, which will still more clearly\nexplain his nature.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What is it?\n\nSTRANGER: I will tell you, and you shall answer me, giving your very\nclosest attention. Suppose that a person were to profess, not that he\ncould speak or dispute, but that he knew how to make and do all things,\nby a single art.\n\nTHEAETETUS: All things?\n\nSTRANGER: I see that you do not understand the first word that I utter,\nfor you do not understand the meaning of 'all.'\n\nTHEAETETUS: No, I do not.\n\nSTRANGER: Under all things, I include you and me, and also animals and\ntrees.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What do you mean?\n\nSTRANGER: Suppose a person to say that he will make you and me, and all\ncreatures.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What would he mean by 'making'? He cannot be a\nhusbandman;--for you said that he is a maker of animals.\n\nSTRANGER: Yes; and I say that he is also the maker of the sea, and the\nearth, and the heavens, and the gods, and of all other things; and,\nfurther, that he can make them in no time, and sell them for a few\npence.\n\nTHEAETETUS: That must be a jest.\n\nSTRANGER: And when a man says that he knows all things, and can teach\nthem to another at a small cost, and in a short time, is not that a\njest?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: And is there any more artistic or graceful form of jest than\nimitation?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly not; and imitation is a very comprehensive term,\nwhich includes under one class the most diverse sorts of things.\n\nSTRANGER: We know, of course, that he who professes by one art to\nmake all things is really a painter, and by the painter's art makes\nresemblances of real things which have the same name with them; and\nhe can deceive the less intelligent sort of young children, to whom\nhe shows his pictures at a distance, into the belief that he has the\nabsolute power of making whatever he likes.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: And may there not be supposed to be an imitative art of\nreasoning? Is it not possible to enchant the hearts of young men by\nwords poured through their ears, when they are still at a distance from\nthe truth of facts, by exhibiting to them fictitious arguments, and\nmaking them think that they are true, and that the speaker is the wisest\nof men in all things?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes; why should there not be another such art?\n\nSTRANGER: But as time goes on, and their hearers advance in years,\nand come into closer contact with realities, and have learnt by sad\nexperience to see and feel the truth of things, are not the greater\npart of them compelled to change many opinions which they formerly\nentertained, so that the great appears small to them, and the easy\ndifficult, and all their dreamy speculations are overturned by the facts\nof life?\n\nTHEAETETUS: That is my view, as far as I can judge, although, at my age,\nI may be one of those who see things at a distance only.\n\nSTRANGER: And the wish of all of us, who are your friends, is and always\nwill be to bring you as near to the truth as we can without the sad\nreality. And now I should like you to tell me, whether the Sophist\nis not visibly a magician and imitator of true being; or are we still\ndisposed to think that he may have a true knowledge of the various\nmatters about which he disputes?\n\nTHEAETETUS: But how can he, Stranger? Is there any doubt, after what\nhas been said, that he is to be located in one of the divisions of\nchildren's play?\n\nSTRANGER: Then we must place him in the class of magicians and mimics.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly we must.\n\nSTRANGER: And now our business is not to let the animal out, for we have\ngot him in a sort of dialectical net, and there is one thing which he\ndecidedly will not escape.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What is that?\n\nSTRANGER: The inference that he is a juggler.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Precisely my own opinion of him.\n\nSTRANGER: Then, clearly, we ought as soon as possible to divide the\nimage-making art, and go down into the net, and, if the Sophist does not\nrun away from us, to seize him according to orders and deliver him over\nto reason, who is the lord of the hunt, and proclaim the capture of him;\nand if he creeps into the recesses of the imitative art, and secretes\nhimself in one of them, to divide again and follow him up until in some\nsub-section of imitation he is caught. For our method of tackling each\nand all is one which neither he nor any other creature will ever escape\nin triumph.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Well said; and let us do as you propose.\n\nSTRANGER: Well, then, pursuing the same analytic method as before, I\nthink that I can discern two divisions of the imitative art, but I am\nnot as yet able to see in which of them the desired form is to be found.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Will you tell me first what are the two divisions of which\nyou are speaking?\n\nSTRANGER: One is the art of likeness-making;--generally a likeness of\nanything is made by producing a copy which is executed according to the\nproportions of the original, similar in length and breadth and depth,\neach thing receiving also its appropriate colour.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Is not this always the aim of imitation?\n\nSTRANGER: Not always; in works either of sculpture or of painting,\nwhich are of any magnitude, there is a certain degree of deception; for\nartists were to give the true proportions of their fair works, the upper\npart, which is farther off, would appear to be out of proportion in\ncomparison with the lower, which is nearer; and so they give up the\ntruth in their images and make only the proportions which appear to be\nbeautiful, disregarding the real ones.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Quite true.\n\nSTRANGER: And that which being other is also like, may we not fairly\ncall a likeness or image?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: And may we not, as I did just now, call that part of the\nimitative art which is concerned with making such images the art of\nlikeness-making?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Let that be the name.\n\nSTRANGER: And what shall we call those resemblances of the beautiful,\nwhich appear such owing to the unfavourable position of the spectator,\nwhereas if a person had the power of getting a correct view of works\nof such magnitude, they would appear not even like that to which they\nprofess to be like? May we not call these 'appearances,' since they\nappear only and are not really like?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: There is a great deal of this kind of thing in painting, and\nin all imitation.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Of course.\n\nSTRANGER: And may we not fairly call the sort of art, which produces an\nappearance and not an image, phantastic art?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Most fairly.\n\nSTRANGER: These then are the two kinds of image-making--the art of\nmaking likenesses, and phantastic or the art of making appearances?\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: I was doubtful before in which of them I should place the\nSophist, nor am I even now able to see clearly; verily he is a wonderful\nand inscrutable creature. And now in the cleverest manner he has got\ninto an impossible place.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes, he has.\n\nSTRANGER: Do you speak advisedly, or are you carried away at the moment\nby the habit of assenting into giving a hasty answer?\n\nTHEAETETUS: May I ask to what you are referring?\n\nSTRANGER: My dear friend, we are engaged in a very difficult\nspeculation--there can be no doubt of that; for how a thing can appear\nand seem, and not be, or how a man can say a thing which is not true,\nhas always been and still remains a very perplexing question. Can any\none say or think that falsehood really exists, and avoid being caught in\na contradiction? Indeed, Theaetetus, the task is a difficult one.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Why?\n\nSTRANGER: He who says that falsehood exists has the audacity to assert\nthe being of not-being; for this is implied in the possibility of\nfalsehood. But, my boy, in the days when I was a boy, the great\nParmenides protested against this doctrine, and to the end of his life\nhe continued to inculcate the same lesson--always repeating both in\nverse and out of verse:\n\n'Keep your mind from this way of enquiry, for never will you show that\nnot-being is.'\n\nSuch is his testimony, which is confirmed by the very expression when\nsifted a little. Would you object to begin with the consideration of the\nwords themselves?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Never mind about me; I am only desirous that you should\ncarry on the argument in the best way, and that you should take me with\nyou.\n\nSTRANGER: Very good; and now say, do we venture to utter the forbidden\nword 'not-being'?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly we do.\n\nSTRANGER: Let us be serious then, and consider the question neither\nin strife nor play: suppose that one of the hearers of Parmenides was\nasked, 'To what is the term \"not-being\" to be applied?'--do you know\nwhat sort of object he would single out in reply, and what answer he\nwould make to the enquirer?\n\nTHEAETETUS: That is a difficult question, and one not to be answered at\nall by a person like myself.\n\nSTRANGER: There is at any rate no difficulty in seeing that the\npredicate 'not-being' is not applicable to any being.\n\nTHEAETETUS: None, certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: And if not to being, then not to something.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Of course not.\n\nSTRANGER: It is also plain, that in speaking of something we speak of\nbeing, for to speak of an abstract something naked and isolated from all\nbeing is impossible.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Impossible.\n\nSTRANGER: You mean by assenting to imply that he who says something must\nsay some one thing?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: Some in the singular (ti) you would say is the sign of one,\nsome in the dual (tine) of two, some in the plural (tines) of many?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Exactly.\n\nSTRANGER: Then he who says 'not something' must say absolutely nothing.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Most assuredly.\n\nSTRANGER: And as we cannot admit that a man speaks and says nothing, he\nwho says 'not-being' does not speak at all.\n\nTHEAETETUS: The difficulty of the argument can no further go.\n\nSTRANGER: Not yet, my friend, is the time for such a word; for there\nstill remains of all perplexities the first and greatest, touching the\nvery foundation of the matter.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What do you mean? Do not be afraid to speak.\n\nSTRANGER: To that which is, may be attributed some other thing which is?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: But can anything which is, be attributed to that which is not?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Impossible.\n\nSTRANGER: And all number is to be reckoned among things which are?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes, surely number, if anything, has a real existence.\n\nSTRANGER: Then we must not attempt to attribute to not-being number\neither in the singular or plural?\n\nTHEAETETUS: The argument implies that we should be wrong in doing so.\n\nSTRANGER: But how can a man either express in words or even conceive in\nthought things which are not or a thing which is not without number?\n\nTHEAETETUS: How indeed?\n\nSTRANGER: When we speak of things which are not, are we not attributing\nplurality to not-being?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: But, on the other hand, when we say 'what is not,' do we not\nattribute unity?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Manifestly.\n\nSTRANGER: Nevertheless, we maintain that you may not and ought not to\nattribute being to not-being?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Most true.\n\nSTRANGER: Do you see, then, that not-being in itself can neither be\nspoken, uttered, or thought, but that it is unthinkable, unutterable,\nunspeakable, indescribable?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Quite true.\n\nSTRANGER: But, if so, I was wrong in telling you just now that the\ndifficulty which was coming is the greatest of all.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What! is there a greater still behind?\n\nSTRANGER: Well, I am surprised, after what has been said already, that\nyou do not see the difficulty in which he who would refute the notion of\nnot-being is involved. For he is compelled to contradict himself as soon\nas he makes the attempt.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What do you mean? Speak more clearly.\n\nSTRANGER: Do not expect clearness from me. For I, who maintain that\nnot-being has no part either in the one or many, just now spoke and\nam still speaking of not-being as one; for I say 'not-being.' Do you\nunderstand?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: And a little while ago I said that not-being is unutterable,\nunspeakable, indescribable: do you follow?\n\nTHEAETETUS: I do after a fashion.\n\nSTRANGER: When I introduced the word 'is,' did I not contradict what I\nsaid before?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Clearly.\n\nSTRANGER: And in using the singular verb, did I not speak of not-being\nas one?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: And when I spoke of not-being as indescribable and unspeakable\nand unutterable, in using each of these words in the singular, did I not\nrefer to not-being as one?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: And yet we say that, strictly speaking, it should not be\ndefined as one or many, and should not even be called 'it,' for the use\nof the word 'it' would imply a form of unity.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Quite true.\n\nSTRANGER: How, then, can any one put any faith in me? For now, as\nalways, I am unequal to the refutation of not-being. And therefore, as\nI was saying, do not look to me for the right way of speaking about\nnot-being; but come, let us try the experiment with you.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What do you mean?\n\nSTRANGER: Make a noble effort, as becomes youth, and endeavour with all\nyour might to speak of not-being in a right manner, without introducing\ninto it either existence or unity or plurality.\n\nTHEAETETUS: It would be a strange boldness in me which would attempt the\ntask when I see you thus discomfited.\n\nSTRANGER: Say no more of ourselves; but until we find some one or other\nwho can speak of not-being without number, we must acknowledge that the\nSophist is a clever rogue who will not be got out of his hole.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Most true.\n\nSTRANGER: And if we say to him that he professes an art of making\nappearances, he will grapple with us and retort our argument upon\nourselves; and when we call him an image-maker he will say, 'Pray what\ndo you mean at all by an image?'--and I should like to know, Theaetetus,\nhow we can possibly answer the younker's question?\n\nTHEAETETUS: We shall doubtless tell him of the images which are\nreflected in water or in mirrors; also of sculptures, pictures, and\nother duplicates.\n\nSTRANGER: I see, Theaetetus, that you have never made the acquaintance\nof the Sophist.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Why do you think so?\n\nSTRANGER: He will make believe to have his eyes shut, or to have none.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What do you mean?\n\nSTRANGER: When you tell him of something existing in a mirror, or in\nsculpture, and address him as though he had eyes, he will laugh you to\nscorn, and will pretend that he knows nothing of mirrors and streams, or\nof sight at all; he will say that he is asking about an idea.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What can he mean?\n\nSTRANGER: The common notion pervading all these objects, which you speak\nof as many, and yet call by the single name of image, as though it were\nthe unity under which they were all included. How will you maintain your\nground against him?\n\nTHEAETETUS: How, Stranger, can I describe an image except as something\nfashioned in the likeness of the true?\n\nSTRANGER: And do you mean this something to be some other true thing, or\nwhat do you mean?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly not another true thing, but only a resemblance.\n\nSTRANGER: And you mean by true that which really is?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: And the not true is that which is the opposite of the true?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Exactly.\n\nSTRANGER: A resemblance, then, is not really real, if, as you say, not\ntrue?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Nay, but it is in a certain sense.\n\nSTRANGER: You mean to say, not in a true sense?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes; it is in reality only an image.\n\nSTRANGER: Then what we call an image is in reality really unreal.\n\nTHEAETETUS: In what a strange complication of being and not-being we are\ninvolved!\n\nSTRANGER: Strange! I should think so. See how, by his reciprocation of\nopposites, the many-headed Sophist has compelled us, quite against our\nwill, to admit the existence of not-being.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes, indeed, I see.\n\nSTRANGER: The difficulty is how to define his art without falling into a\ncontradiction.\n\nTHEAETETUS: How do you mean? And where does the danger lie?\n\nSTRANGER: When we say that he deceives us with an illusion, and that\nhis art is illusory, do we mean that our soul is led by his art to think\nfalsely, or what do we mean?\n\nTHEAETETUS: There is nothing else to be said.\n\nSTRANGER: Again, false opinion is that form of opinion which thinks the\nopposite of the truth:--You would assent?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: You mean to say that false opinion thinks what is not?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Of course.\n\nSTRANGER: Does false opinion think that things which are not are not, or\nthat in a certain sense they are?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Things that are not must be imagined to exist in a certain\nsense, if any degree of falsehood is to be possible.\n\nSTRANGER: And does not false opinion also think that things which most\ncertainly exist do not exist at all?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: And here, again, is falsehood?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Falsehood--yes.\n\nSTRANGER: And in like manner, a false proposition will be deemed to\nbe one which asserts the non-existence of things which are, and the\nexistence of things which are not.\n\nTHEAETETUS: There is no other way in which a false proposition can\narise.\n\nSTRANGER: There is not; but the Sophist will deny these statements.\nAnd indeed how can any rational man assent to them, when the very\nexpressions which we have just used were before acknowledged by us to\nbe unutterable, unspeakable, indescribable, unthinkable? Do you see his\npoint, Theaetetus?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Of course he will say that we are contradicting ourselves\nwhen we hazard the assertion, that falsehood exists in opinion and in\nwords; for in maintaining this, we are compelled over and over again\nto assert being of not-being, which we admitted just now to be an utter\nimpossibility.\n\nSTRANGER: How well you remember! And now it is high time to hold a\nconsultation as to what we ought to do about the Sophist; for if we\npersist in looking for him in the class of false workers and magicians,\nyou see that the handles for objection and the difficulties which will\narise are very numerous and obvious.\n\nTHEAETETUS: They are indeed.\n\nSTRANGER: We have gone through but a very small portion of them, and\nthey are really infinite.\n\nTHEAETETUS: If that is the case, we cannot possibly catch the Sophist.\n\nSTRANGER: Shall we then be so faint-hearted as to give him up?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly not, I should say, if we can get the slightest\nhold upon him.\n\nSTRANGER: Will you then forgive me, and, as your words imply, not be\naltogether displeased if I flinch a little from the grasp of such a\nsturdy argument?\n\nTHEAETETUS: To be sure I will.\n\nSTRANGER: I have a yet more urgent request to make.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Which is--?\n\nSTRANGER: That you will promise not to regard me as a parricide.\n\nTHEAETETUS: And why?\n\nSTRANGER: Because, in self-defence, I must test the philosophy of my\nfather Parmenides, and try to prove by main force that in a certain\nsense not-being is, and that being, on the other hand, is not.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Some attempt of the kind is clearly needed.\n\nSTRANGER: Yes, a blind man, as they say, might see that, and, unless\nthese questions are decided in one way or another, no one when he speaks\nof false words, or false opinion, or idols, or images, or imitations, or\nappearances, or about the arts which are concerned with them; can avoid\nfalling into ridiculous contradictions.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Most true.\n\nSTRANGER: And therefore I must venture to lay hands on my father's\nargument; for if I am to be over-scrupulous, I shall have to give the\nmatter up.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Nothing in the world should ever induce us to do so.\n\nSTRANGER: I have a third little request which I wish to make.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What is it?\n\nSTRANGER: You heard me say what I have always felt and still feel--that\nI have no heart for this argument?\n\nTHEAETETUS: I did.\n\nSTRANGER: I tremble at the thought of what I have said, and expect that\nyou will deem me mad, when you hear of my sudden changes and shiftings;\nlet me therefore observe, that I am examining the question entirely out\nof regard for you.\n\nTHEAETETUS: There is no reason for you to fear that I shall impute\nany impropriety to you, if you attempt this refutation and proof; take\nheart, therefore, and proceed.\n\nSTRANGER: And where shall I begin the perilous enterprise? I think that\nthe road which I must take is--\n\nTHEAETETUS: Which?--Let me hear.\n\nSTRANGER: I think that we had better, first of all, consider the points\nwhich at present are regarded as self-evident, lest we may have fallen\ninto some confusion, and be too ready to assent to one another, fancying\nthat we are quite clear about them.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Say more distinctly what you mean.\n\nSTRANGER: I think that Parmenides, and all ever yet undertook to\ndetermine the number and nature of existences, talked to us in rather a\nlight and easy strain.\n\nTHEAETETUS: How?\n\nSTRANGER: As if we had been children, to whom they repeated each his own\nmythus or story;--one said that there were three principles, and that at\none time there was war between certain of them; and then again there was\npeace, and they were married and begat children, and brought them up;\nand another spoke of two principles,--a moist and a dry, or a hot and\na cold, and made them marry and cohabit. The Eleatics, however, in our\npart of the world, say that all things are many in name, but in nature\none; this is their mythus, which goes back to Xenophanes, and is even\nolder. Then there are Ionian, and in more recent times Sicilian muses,\nwho have arrived at the conclusion that to unite the two principles is\nsafer, and to say that being is one and many, and that these are held\ntogether by enmity and friendship, ever parting, ever meeting, as\nthe severer Muses assert, while the gentler ones do not insist on the\nperpetual strife and peace, but admit a relaxation and alternation of\nthem; peace and unity sometimes prevailing under the sway of Aphrodite,\nand then again plurality and war, by reason of a principle of strife.\nWhether any of them spoke the truth in all this is hard to determine;\nbesides, antiquity and famous men should have reverence, and not be\nliable to accusations so serious. Yet one thing may be said of them\nwithout offence--\n\nTHEAETETUS: What thing?\n\nSTRANGER: That they went on their several ways disdaining to notice\npeople like ourselves; they did not care whether they took us with them,\nor left us behind them.\n\nTHEAETETUS: How do you mean?\n\nSTRANGER: I mean to say, that when they talk of one, two, or more\nelements, which are or have become or are becoming, or again of\nheat mingling with cold, assuming in some other part of their works\nseparations and mixtures,--tell me, Theaetetus, do you understand what\nthey mean by these expressions? When I was a younger man, I used\nto fancy that I understood quite well what was meant by the term\n'not-being,' which is our present subject of dispute; and now you see in\nwhat a fix we are about it.\n\nTHEAETETUS: I see.\n\nSTRANGER: And very likely we have been getting into the same perplexity\nabout 'being,' and yet may fancy that when anybody utters the word, we\nunderstand him quite easily, although we do not know about not-being.\nBut we may be; equally ignorant of both.\n\nTHEAETETUS: I dare say.\n\nSTRANGER: And the same may be said of all the terms just mentioned.\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: The consideration of most of them may be deferred; but we had\nbetter now discuss the chief captain and leader of them.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Of what are you speaking? You clearly think that we must\nfirst investigate what people mean by the word 'being.'\n\nSTRANGER: You follow close at my heels, Theaetetus. For the right\nmethod, I conceive, will be to call into our presence the dualistic\nphilosophers and to interrogate them. 'Come,' we will say, 'Ye, who\naffirm that hot and cold or any other two principles are the universe,\nwhat is this term which you apply to both of them, and what do you mean\nwhen you say that both and each of them \"are\"? How are we to understand\nthe word \"are\"? Upon your view, are we to suppose that there is a third\nprinciple over and above the other two,--three in all, and not two? For\nclearly you cannot say that one of the two principles is being, and yet\nattribute being equally to both of them; for, if you did, whichever of\nthe two is identified with being, will comprehend the other; and so they\nwill be one and not two.'\n\nTHEAETETUS: Very true.\n\nSTRANGER: But perhaps you mean to give the name of 'being' to both of\nthem together?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Quite likely.\n\nSTRANGER: 'Then, friends,' we shall reply to them, 'the answer is\nplainly that the two will still be resolved into one.'\n\nTHEAETETUS: Most true.\n\nSTRANGER: 'Since, then, we are in a difficulty, please to tell us what\nyou mean, when you speak of being; for there can be no doubt that you\nalways from the first understood your own meaning, whereas we once\nthought that we understood you, but now we are in a great strait. Please\nto begin by explaining this matter to us, and let us no longer fancy\nthat we understand you, when we entirely misunderstand you.' There will\nbe no impropriety in our demanding an answer to this question, either of\nthe dualists or of the pluralists?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly not.\n\nSTRANGER: And what about the assertors of the oneness of the all--must\nwe not endeavour to ascertain from them what they mean by 'being'?\n\nTHEAETETUS: By all means.\n\nSTRANGER: Then let them answer this question: One, you say, alone is?\n'Yes,' they will reply.\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And there is something which you call 'being'?\n\nTHEAETETUS: 'Yes.'\n\nSTRANGER: And is being the same as one, and do you apply two names to\nthe same thing?\n\nTHEAETETUS: What will be their answer, Stranger?\n\nSTRANGER: It is clear, Theaetetus, that he who asserts the unity of\nbeing will find a difficulty in answering this or any other question.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Why so?\n\nSTRANGER: To admit of two names, and to affirm that there is nothing but\nunity, is surely ridiculous?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: And equally irrational to admit that a name is anything?\n\nTHEAETETUS: How so?\n\nSTRANGER: To distinguish the name from the thing, implies duality.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: And yet he who identifies the name with the thing will be\ncompelled to say that it is the name of nothing, or if he says that it\nis the name of something, even then the name will only be the name of a\nname, and of nothing else.\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And the one will turn out to be only one of one, and being\nabsolute unity, will represent a mere name.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: And would they say that the whole is other than the one that\nis, or the same with it?\n\nTHEAETETUS: To be sure they would, and they actually say so.\n\nSTRANGER: If being is a whole, as Parmenides sings,--\n\n'Every way like unto the fullness of a well-rounded sphere, Evenly\nbalanced from the centre on every side, And must needs be neither\ngreater nor less in any way, Neither on this side nor on that--'\n\nthen being has a centre and extremes, and, having these, must also\nhave parts.\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: Yet that which has parts may have the attribute of unity in\nall the parts, and in this way being all and a whole, may be one?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: But that of which this is the condition cannot be absolute\nunity?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Why not?\n\nSTRANGER: Because, according to right reason, that which is truly one\nmust be affirmed to be absolutely indivisible.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: But this indivisible, if made up of many parts, will\ncontradict reason.\n\nTHEAETETUS: I understand.\n\nSTRANGER: Shall we say that being is one and a whole, because it has the\nattribute of unity? Or shall we say that being is not a whole at all?\n\nTHEAETETUS: That is a hard alternative to offer.\n\nSTRANGER: Most true; for being, having in a certain sense the attribute\nof one, is yet proved not to be the same as one, and the all is\ntherefore more than one.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: And yet if being be not a whole, through having the attribute\nof unity, and there be such a thing as an absolute whole, being lacks\nsomething of its own nature?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: Upon this view, again, being, having a defect of being, will\nbecome not-being?\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And, again, the all becomes more than one, for being and the\nwhole will each have their separate nature.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: But if the whole does not exist at all, all the previous\ndifficulties remain the same, and there will be the further difficulty,\nthat besides having no being, being can never have come into being.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Why so?\n\nSTRANGER: Because that which comes into being always comes into being as\na whole, so that he who does not give whole a place among beings, cannot\nspeak either of essence or generation as existing.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes, that certainly appears to be true.\n\nSTRANGER: Again; how can that which is not a whole have any quantity?\nFor that which is of a certain quantity must necessarily be the whole of\nthat quantity.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Exactly.\n\nSTRANGER: And there will be innumerable other points, each of them\ncausing infinite trouble to him who says that being is either one or\ntwo.\n\nTHEAETETUS: The difficulties which are dawning upon us prove this; for\none objection connects with another, and they are always involving what\nhas preceded in a greater and worse perplexity.\n\nSTRANGER: We are far from having exhausted the more exact thinkers who\ntreat of being and not-being. But let us be content to leave them, and\nproceed to view those who speak less precisely; and we shall find as\nthe result of all, that the nature of being is quite as difficult to\ncomprehend as that of not-being.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Then now we will go to the others.\n\nSTRANGER: There appears to be a sort of war of Giants and Gods going\non amongst them; they are fighting with one another about the nature of\nessence.\n\nTHEAETETUS: How is that?\n\nSTRANGER: Some of them are dragging down all things from heaven and from\nthe unseen to earth, and they literally grasp in their hands rocks and\noaks; of these they lay hold, and obstinately maintain, that the things\nonly which can be touched or handled have being or essence, because they\ndefine being and body as one, and if any one else says that what is not\na body exists they altogether despise him, and will hear of nothing but\nbody.\n\nTHEAETETUS: I have often met with such men, and terrible fellows they\nare.\n\nSTRANGER: And that is the reason why their opponents cautiously defend\nthemselves from above, out of an unseen world, mightily contending that\ntrue essence consists of certain intelligible and incorporeal ideas; the\nbodies of the materialists, which by them are maintained to be the very\ntruth, they break up into little bits by their arguments, and affirm\nthem to be, not essence, but generation and motion. Between the\ntwo armies, Theaetetus, there is always an endless conflict raging\nconcerning these matters.\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: Let us ask each party in turn, to give an account of that\nwhich they call essence.\n\nTHEAETETUS: How shall we get it out of them?\n\nSTRANGER: With those who make being to consist in ideas, there will be\nless difficulty, for they are civil people enough; but there will be\nvery great difficulty, or rather an absolute impossibility, in getting\nan opinion out of those who drag everything down to matter. Shall I tell\nyou what we must do?\n\nTHEAETETUS: What?\n\nSTRANGER: Let us, if we can, really improve them; but if this is not\npossible, let us imagine them to be better than they are, and more\nwilling to answer in accordance with the rules of argument, and then\ntheir opinion will be more worth having; for that which better men\nacknowledge has more weight than that which is acknowledged by inferior\nmen. Moreover we are no respecters of persons, but seekers after truth.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Very good.\n\nSTRANGER: Then now, on the supposition that they are improved, let us\nask them to state their views, and do you interpret them.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Agreed.\n\nSTRANGER: Let them say whether they would admit that there is such a\nthing as a mortal animal.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Of course they would.\n\nSTRANGER: And do they not acknowledge this to be a body having a soul?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly they do.\n\nSTRANGER: Meaning to say that the soul is something which exists?\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And do they not say that one soul is just, and another unjust,\nand that one soul is wise, and another foolish?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: And that the just and wise soul becomes just and wise by\nthe possession of justice and wisdom, and the opposite under opposite\ncircumstances?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes, they do.\n\nSTRANGER: But surely that which may be present or may be absent will be\nadmitted by them to exist?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: And, allowing that justice, wisdom, the other virtues, and\ntheir opposites exist, as well as a soul in which they inhere, do\nthey affirm any of them to be visible and tangible, or are they all\ninvisible?\n\nTHEAETETUS: They would say that hardly any of them are visible.\n\nSTRANGER: And would they say that they are corporeal?\n\nTHEAETETUS: They would distinguish: the soul would be said by them to\nhave a body; but as to the other qualities of justice, wisdom, and the\nlike, about which you asked, they would not venture either to deny their\nexistence, or to maintain that they were all corporeal.\n\nSTRANGER: Verily, Theaetetus, I perceive a great improvement in them;\nthe real aborigines, children of the dragon's teeth, would have been\ndeterred by no shame at all, but would have obstinately asserted that\nnothing is which they are not able to squeeze in their hands.\n\nTHEAETETUS: That is pretty much their notion.\n\nSTRANGER: Let us push the question; for if they will admit that any,\neven the smallest particle of being, is incorporeal, it is enough; they\nmust then say what that nature is which is common to both the corporeal\nand incorporeal, and which they have in their mind's eye when they say\nof both of them that they 'are.' Perhaps they may be in a difficulty;\nand if this is the case, there is a possibility that they may accept a\nnotion of ours respecting the nature of being, having nothing of their\nown to offer.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What is the notion? Tell me, and we shall soon see.\n\nSTRANGER: My notion would be, that anything which possesses any sort\nof power to affect another, or to be affected by another, if only for a\nsingle moment, however trifling the cause and however slight the effect,\nhas real existence; and I hold that the definition of being is simply\npower.\n\nTHEAETETUS: They accept your suggestion, having nothing better of their\nown to offer.\n\nSTRANGER: Very good; perhaps we, as well as they, may one day change our\nminds; but, for the present, this may be regarded as the understanding\nwhich is established with them.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Agreed.\n\nSTRANGER: Let us now go to the friends of ideas; of their opinions, too,\nyou shall be the interpreter.\n\nTHEAETETUS: I will.\n\nSTRANGER: To them we say--You would distinguish essence from generation?\n\nTHEAETETUS: 'Yes,' they reply.\n\nSTRANGER: And you would allow that we participate in generation with the\nbody, and through perception, but we participate with the soul through\nthought in true essence; and essence you would affirm to be always the\nsame and immutable, whereas generation or becoming varies?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes; that is what we should affirm.\n\nSTRANGER: Well, fair sirs, we say to them, what is this participation,\nwhich you assert of both? Do you agree with our recent definition?\n\nTHEAETETUS: What definition?\n\nSTRANGER: We said that being was an active or passive energy, arising\nout of a certain power which proceeds from elements meeting with one\nanother. Perhaps your ears, Theaetetus, may fail to catch their answer,\nwhich I recognize because I have been accustomed to hear it.\n\nTHEAETETUS: And what is their answer?\n\nSTRANGER: They deny the truth of what we were just now saying to the\naborigines about existence.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What was that?\n\nSTRANGER: Any power of doing or suffering in a degree however slight was\nheld by us to be a sufficient definition of being?\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: They deny this, and say that the power of doing or suffering\nis confined to becoming, and that neither power is applicable to being.\n\nTHEAETETUS: And is there not some truth in what they say?\n\nSTRANGER: Yes; but our reply will be, that we want to ascertain from\nthem more distinctly, whether they further admit that the soul knows,\nand that being or essence is known.\n\nTHEAETETUS: There can be no doubt that they say so.\n\nSTRANGER: And is knowing and being known doing or suffering, or both,\nor is the one doing and the other suffering, or has neither any share in\neither?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Clearly, neither has any share in either; for if they say\nanything else, they will contradict themselves.\n\nSTRANGER: I understand; but they will allow that if to know is active,\nthen, of course, to be known is passive. And on this view being, in\nso far as it is known, is acted upon by knowledge, and is therefore in\nmotion; for that which is in a state of rest cannot be acted upon, as we\naffirm.\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And, O heavens, can we ever be made to believe that motion\nand life and soul and mind are not present with perfect being? Can\nwe imagine that being is devoid of life and mind, and exists in awful\nunmeaningness an everlasting fixture?\n\nTHEAETETUS: That would be a dreadful thing to admit, Stranger.\n\nSTRANGER: But shall we say that has mind and not life?\n\nTHEAETETUS: How is that possible?\n\nSTRANGER: Or shall we say that both inhere in perfect being, but that it\nhas no soul which contains them?\n\nTHEAETETUS: And in what other way can it contain them?\n\nSTRANGER: Or that being has mind and life and soul, but although endowed\nwith soul remains absolutely unmoved?\n\nTHEAETETUS: All three suppositions appear to me to be irrational.\n\nSTRANGER: Under being, then, we must include motion, and that which is\nmoved.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: Then, Theaetetus, our inference is, that if there is no\nmotion, neither is there any mind anywhere, or about anything or\nbelonging to any one.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Quite true.\n\nSTRANGER: And yet this equally follows, if we grant that all things are\nin motion--upon this view too mind has no existence.\n\nTHEAETETUS: How so?\n\nSTRANGER: Do you think that sameness of condition and mode and subject\ncould ever exist without a principle of rest?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly not.\n\nSTRANGER: Can you see how without them mind could exist, or come into\nexistence anywhere?\n\nTHEAETETUS: No.\n\nSTRANGER: And surely contend we must in every possible way against him\nwho would annihilate knowledge and reason and mind, and yet ventures to\nspeak confidently about anything.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes, with all our might.\n\nSTRANGER: Then the philosopher, who has the truest reverence for these\nqualities, cannot possibly accept the notion of those who say that\nthe whole is at rest, either as unity or in many forms: and he will\nbe utterly deaf to those who assert universal motion. As children say\nentreatingly 'Give us both,' so he will include both the moveable and\nimmoveable in his definition of being and all.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Most true.\n\nSTRANGER: And now, do we seem to have gained a fair notion of being?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes truly.\n\nSTRANGER: Alas, Theaetetus, methinks that we are now only beginning to\nsee the real difficulty of the enquiry into the nature of it.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What do you mean?\n\nSTRANGER: O my friend, do you not see that nothing can exceed our\nignorance, and yet we fancy that we are saying something good?\n\nTHEAETETUS: I certainly thought that we were; and I do not at all\nunderstand how we never found out our desperate case.\n\nSTRANGER: Reflect: after having made these admissions, may we not be\njustly asked the same questions which we ourselves were asking of those\nwho said that all was hot and cold?\n\nTHEAETETUS: What were they? Will you recall them to my mind?\n\nSTRANGER: To be sure I will, and I will remind you of them, by putting\nthe same questions to you which I did to them, and then we shall get on.\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: Would you not say that rest and motion are in the most entire\nopposition to one another?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Of course.\n\nSTRANGER: And yet you would say that both and either of them equally\nare?\n\nTHEAETETUS: I should.\n\nSTRANGER: And when you admit that both or either of them are, do you\nmean to say that both or either of them are in motion?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly not.\n\nSTRANGER: Or do you wish to imply that they are both at rest, when you\nsay that they are?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Of course not.\n\nSTRANGER: Then you conceive of being as some third and distinct nature,\nunder which rest and motion are alike included; and, observing that they\nboth participate in being, you declare that they are.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Truly we seem to have an intimation that being is some third\nthing, when we say that rest and motion are.\n\nSTRANGER: Then being is not the combination of rest and motion, but\nsomething different from them.\n\nTHEAETETUS: So it would appear.\n\nSTRANGER: Being, then, according to its own nature, is neither in motion\nnor at rest.\n\nTHEAETETUS: That is very much the truth.\n\nSTRANGER: Where, then, is a man to look for help who would have any\nclear or fixed notion of being in his mind?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Where, indeed?\n\nSTRANGER: I scarcely think that he can look anywhere; for that which is\nnot in motion must be at rest, and again, that which is not at rest must\nbe in motion; but being is placed outside of both these classes. Is this\npossible?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Utterly impossible.\n\nSTRANGER: Here, then, is another thing which we ought to bear in mind.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What?\n\nSTRANGER: When we were asked to what we were to assign the appellation\nof not-being, we were in the greatest difficulty:--do you remember?\n\nTHEAETETUS: To be sure.\n\nSTRANGER: And are we not now in as great a difficulty about being?\n\nTHEAETETUS: I should say, Stranger, that we are in one which is, if\npossible, even greater.\n\nSTRANGER: Then let us acknowledge the difficulty; and as being and\nnot-being are involved in the same perplexity, there is hope that when\nthe one appears more or less distinctly, the other will equally appear;\nand if we are able to see neither, there may still be a chance of\nsteering our way in between them, without any great discredit.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Very good.\n\nSTRANGER: Let us enquire, then, how we come to predicate many names of\nthe same thing.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Give an example.\n\nSTRANGER: I mean that we speak of man, for example, under many\nnames--that we attribute to him colours and forms and magnitudes and\nvirtues and vices, in all of which instances and in ten thousand\nothers we not only speak of him as a man, but also as good, and having\nnumberless other attributes, and in the same way anything else which we\noriginally supposed to be one is described by us as many, and under many\nnames.\n\nTHEAETETUS: That is true.\n\nSTRANGER: And thus we provide a rich feast for tyros, whether young or\nold; for there is nothing easier than to argue that the one cannot be\nmany, or the many one; and great is their delight in denying that a man\nis good; for man, they insist, is man and good is good. I dare say that\nyou have met with persons who take an interest in such matters--they are\noften elderly men, whose meagre sense is thrown into amazement by these\ndiscoveries of theirs, which they believe to be the height of wisdom.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly, I have.\n\nSTRANGER: Then, not to exclude any one who has ever speculated at all\nupon the nature of being, let us put our questions to them as well as to\nour former friends.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What questions?\n\nSTRANGER: Shall we refuse to attribute being to motion and rest, or\nanything to anything, and assume that they do not mingle, and are\nincapable of participating in one another? Or shall we gather all into\none class of things communicable with one another? Or are some things\ncommunicable and others not?--Which of these alternatives, Theaetetus,\nwill they prefer?\n\nTHEAETETUS: I have nothing to answer on their behalf. Suppose that you\ntake all these hypotheses in turn, and see what are the consequences\nwhich follow from each of them.\n\nSTRANGER: Very good, and first let us assume them to say that nothing is\ncapable of participating in anything else in any respect; in that case\nrest and motion cannot participate in being at all.\n\nTHEAETETUS: They cannot.\n\nSTRANGER: But would either of them be if not participating in being?\n\nTHEAETETUS: No.\n\nSTRANGER: Then by this admission everything is instantly overturned, as\nwell the doctrine of universal motion as of universal rest, and also the\ndoctrine of those who distribute being into immutable and everlasting\nkinds; for all these add on a notion of being, some affirming that\nthings 'are' truly in motion, and others that they 'are' truly at rest.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Just so.\n\nSTRANGER: Again, those who would at one time compound, and at another\nresolve all things, whether making them into one and out of one creating\ninfinity, or dividing them into finite elements, and forming compounds\nout of these; whether they suppose the processes of creation to be\nsuccessive or continuous, would be talking nonsense in all this if there\nwere no admixture.\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: Most ridiculous of all will the men themselves be who want\nto carry out the argument and yet forbid us to call anything, because\nparticipating in some affection from another, by the name of that other.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Why so?\n\nSTRANGER: Why, because they are compelled to use the words 'to be,'\n'apart,' 'from others,' 'in itself,' and ten thousand more, which they\ncannot give up, but must make the connecting links of discourse; and\ntherefore they do not require to be refuted by others, but their enemy,\nas the saying is, inhabits the same house with them; they are always\ncarrying about with them an adversary, like the wonderful ventriloquist,\nEurycles, who out of their own bellies audibly contradicts them.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Precisely so; a very true and exact illustration.\n\nSTRANGER: And now, if we suppose that all things have the power of\ncommunion with one another--what will follow?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Even I can solve that riddle.\n\nSTRANGER: How?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Why, because motion itself would be at rest, and rest again\nin motion, if they could be attributed to one another.\n\nSTRANGER: But this is utterly impossible.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Of course.\n\nSTRANGER: Then only the third hypothesis remains.\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: For, surely, either all things have communion with all; or\nnothing with any other thing; or some things communicate with some\nthings and others not.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: And two out of these three suppositions have been found to be\nimpossible.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: Every one then, who desires to answer truly, will adopt the\nthird and remaining hypothesis of the communion of some with some.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Quite true.\n\nSTRANGER: This communion of some with some may be illustrated by the\ncase of letters; for some letters do not fit each other, while others\ndo.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Of course.\n\nSTRANGER: And the vowels, especially, are a sort of bond which pervades\nall the other letters, so that without a vowel one consonant cannot be\njoined to another.\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: But does every one know what letters will unite with what? Or\nis art required in order to do so?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Art is required.\n\nSTRANGER: What art?\n\nTHEAETETUS: The art of grammar.\n\nSTRANGER: And is not this also true of sounds high and low?--Is not he\nwho has the art to know what sounds mingle, a musician, and he who is\nignorant, not a musician?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: And we shall find this to be generally true of art or the\nabsence of art.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Of course.\n\nSTRANGER: And as classes are admitted by us in like manner to be some of\nthem capable and others incapable of intermixture, must not he who would\nrightly show what kinds will unite and what will not, proceed by the\nhelp of science in the path of argument? And will he not ask if the\nconnecting links are universal, and so capable of intermixture with all\nthings; and again, in divisions, whether there are not other universal\nclasses, which make them possible?\n\nTHEAETETUS: To be sure he will require science, and, if I am not\nmistaken, the very greatest of all sciences.\n\nSTRANGER: How are we to call it? By Zeus, have we not lighted\nunwittingly upon our free and noble science, and in looking for the\nSophist have we not entertained the philosopher unawares?\n\nTHEAETETUS: What do you mean?\n\nSTRANGER: Should we not say that the division according to classes,\nwhich neither makes the same other, nor makes other the same, is the\nbusiness of the dialectical science?\n\nTHEAETETUS: That is what we should say.\n\nSTRANGER: Then, surely, he who can divide rightly is able to see clearly\none form pervading a scattered multitude, and many different forms\ncontained under one higher form; and again, one form knit together into\na single whole and pervading many such wholes, and many forms, existing\nonly in separation and isolation. This is the knowledge of classes which\ndetermines where they can have communion with one another and where not.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Quite true.\n\nSTRANGER: And the art of dialectic would be attributed by you only to\nthe philosopher pure and true?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Who but he can be worthy?\n\nSTRANGER: In this region we shall always discover the philosopher, if we\nlook for him; like the Sophist, he is not easily discovered, but for a\ndifferent reason.\n\nTHEAETETUS: For what reason?\n\nSTRANGER: Because the Sophist runs away into the darkness of not-being,\nin which he has learned by habit to feel about, and cannot be discovered\nbecause of the darkness of the place. Is not that true?\n\nTHEAETETUS: It seems to be so.\n\nSTRANGER: And the philosopher, always holding converse through reason\nwith the idea of being, is also dark from excess of light; for the souls\nof the many have no eye which can endure the vision of the divine.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes; that seems to be quite as true as the other.\n\nSTRANGER: Well, the philosopher may hereafter be more fully considered\nby us, if we are disposed; but the Sophist must clearly not be allowed\nto escape until we have had a good look at him.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Very good.\n\nSTRANGER: Since, then, we are agreed that some classes have a communion\nwith one another, and others not, and some have communion with a few and\nothers with many, and that there is no reason why some should not have\nuniversal communion with all, let us now pursue the enquiry, as the\nargument suggests, not in relation to all ideas, lest the multitude\nof them should confuse us, but let us select a few of those which are\nreckoned to be the principal ones, and consider their several natures\nand their capacity of communion with one another, in order that if we\nare not able to apprehend with perfect clearness the notions of being\nand not-being, we may at least not fall short in the consideration of\nthem, so far as they come within the scope of the present enquiry, if\nperadventure we may be allowed to assert the reality of not-being, and\nyet escape unscathed.\n\nTHEAETETUS: We must do so.\n\nSTRANGER: The most important of all the genera are those which we were\njust now mentioning--being and rest and motion.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes, by far.\n\nSTRANGER: And two of these are, as we affirm, incapable of communion\nwith one another.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Quite incapable.\n\nSTRANGER: Whereas being surely has communion with both of them, for both\nof them are?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Of course.\n\nSTRANGER: That makes up three of them.\n\nTHEAETETUS: To be sure.\n\nSTRANGER: And each of them is other than the remaining two, but the same\nwith itself.\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: But then, what is the meaning of these two words, 'same' and\n'other'? Are they two new kinds other than the three, and yet always of\nnecessity intermingling with them, and are we to have five kinds instead\nof three; or when we speak of the same and other, are we unconsciously\nspeaking of one of the three first kinds?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Very likely we are.\n\nSTRANGER: But, surely, motion and rest are neither the other nor the\nsame.\n\nTHEAETETUS: How is that?\n\nSTRANGER: Whatever we attribute to motion and rest in common, cannot be\neither of them.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Why not?\n\nSTRANGER: Because motion would be at rest and rest in motion, for either\nof them, being predicated of both, will compel the other to change into\nthe opposite of its own nature, because partaking of its opposite.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Quite true.\n\nSTRANGER: Yet they surely both partake of the same and of the other?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: Then we must not assert that motion, any more than rest, is\neither the same or the other.\n\nTHEAETETUS: No; we must not.\n\nSTRANGER: But are we to conceive that being and the same are identical?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Possibly.\n\nSTRANGER: But if they are identical, then again in saying that motion\nand rest have being, we should also be saying that they are the same.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Which surely cannot be.\n\nSTRANGER: Then being and the same cannot be one.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Scarcely.\n\nSTRANGER: Then we may suppose the same to be a fourth class, which is\nnow to be added to the three others.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Quite true.\n\nSTRANGER: And shall we call the other a fifth class? Or should we\nconsider being and other to be two names of the same class?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Very likely.\n\nSTRANGER: But you would agree, if I am not mistaken, that existences are\nrelative as well as absolute?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: And the other is always relative to other?\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: But this would not be the case unless being and the other\nentirely differed; for, if the other, like being, were absolute as well\nas relative, then there would have been a kind of other which was not\nother than other. And now we find that what is other must of necessity\nbe what it is in relation to some other.\n\nTHEAETETUS: That is the true state of the case.\n\nSTRANGER: Then we must admit the other as the fifth of our selected\nclasses.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: And the fifth class pervades all classes, for they all differ\nfrom one another, not by reason of their own nature, but because they\npartake of the idea of the other.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Quite true.\n\nSTRANGER: Then let us now put the case with reference to each of the\nfive.\n\nTHEAETETUS: How?\n\nSTRANGER: First there is motion, which we affirm to be absolutely\n'other' than rest: what else can we say?\n\nTHEAETETUS: It is so.\n\nSTRANGER: And therefore is not rest.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly not.\n\nSTRANGER: And yet is, because partaking of being.\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: Again, motion is other than the same?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Just so.\n\nSTRANGER: And is therefore not the same.\n\nTHEAETETUS: It is not.\n\nSTRANGER: Yet, surely, motion is the same, because all things partake of\nthe same.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Very true.\n\nSTRANGER: Then we must admit, and not object to say, that motion is the\nsame and is not the same, for we do not apply the terms 'same' and 'not\nthe same,' in the same sense; but we call it the 'same,' in relation to\nitself, because partaking of the same; and not the same, because having\ncommunion with the other, it is thereby severed from the same, and has\nbecome not that but other, and is therefore rightly spoken of as 'not\nthe same.'\n\nTHEAETETUS: To be sure.\n\nSTRANGER: And if absolute motion in any point of view partook of rest,\nthere would be no absurdity in calling motion stationary.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Quite right,--that is, on the supposition that some classes\nmingle with one another, and others not.\n\nSTRANGER: That such a communion of kinds is according to nature, we had\nalready proved before we arrived at this part of our discussion.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: Let us proceed, then. May we not say that motion is other than\nthe other, having been also proved by us to be other than the same and\nother than rest?\n\nTHEAETETUS: That is certain.\n\nSTRANGER: Then, according to this view, motion is other and also not\nother?\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: What is the next step? Shall we say that motion is other than\nthe three and not other than the fourth,--for we agreed that there\nare five classes about and in the sphere of which we proposed to make\nenquiry?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Surely we cannot admit that the number is less than it\nappeared to be just now.\n\nSTRANGER: Then we may without fear contend that motion is other than\nbeing?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Without the least fear.\n\nSTRANGER: The plain result is that motion, since it partakes of being,\nreally is and also is not?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Nothing can be plainer.\n\nSTRANGER: Then not-being necessarily exists in the case of motion and of\nevery class; for the nature of the other entering into them all, makes\neach of them other than being, and so non-existent; and therefore of all\nof them, in like manner, we may truly say that they are not; and again,\ninasmuch as they partake of being, that they are and are existent.\n\nTHEAETETUS: So we may assume.\n\nSTRANGER: Every class, then, has plurality of being and infinity of\nnot-being.\n\nTHEAETETUS: So we must infer.\n\nSTRANGER: And being itself may be said to be other than the other kinds.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: Then we may infer that being is not, in respect of as many\nother things as there are; for not-being these it is itself one, and is\nnot the other things, which are infinite in number.\n\nTHEAETETUS: That is not far from the truth.\n\nSTRANGER: And we must not quarrel with this result, since it is of the\nnature of classes to have communion with one another; and if any one\ndenies our present statement [viz., that being is not, etc.], let him\nfirst argue with our former conclusion [i.e., respecting the communion\nof ideas], and then he may proceed to argue with what follows.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Nothing can be fairer.\n\nSTRANGER: Let me ask you to consider a further question.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What question?\n\nSTRANGER: When we speak of not-being, we speak, I suppose, not of\nsomething opposed to being, but only different.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What do you mean?\n\nSTRANGER: When we speak of something as not great, does the expression\nseem to you to imply what is little any more than what is equal?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly not.\n\nSTRANGER: The negative particles, ou and me, when prefixed to words,\ndo not imply opposition, but only difference from the words, or more\ncorrectly from the things represented by the words, which follow them.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Quite true.\n\nSTRANGER: There is another point to be considered, if you do not object.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What is it?\n\nSTRANGER: The nature of the other appears to me to be divided into\nfractions like knowledge.\n\nTHEAETETUS: How so?\n\nSTRANGER: Knowledge, like the other, is one; and yet the various parts\nof knowledge have each of them their own particular name, and hence\nthere are many arts and kinds of knowledge.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Quite true.\n\nSTRANGER: And is not the case the same with the parts of the other,\nwhich is also one?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Very likely; but will you tell me how?\n\nSTRANGER: There is some part of the other which is opposed to the\nbeautiful?\n\nTHEAETETUS: There is.\n\nSTRANGER: Shall we say that this has or has not a name?\n\nTHEAETETUS: It has; for whatever we call not-beautiful is other than the\nbeautiful, not than something else.\n\nSTRANGER: And now tell me another thing.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What?\n\nSTRANGER: Is the not-beautiful anything but this--an existence parted\noff from a certain kind of existence, and again from another point of\nview opposed to an existing something?\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: Then the not-beautiful turns out to be the opposition of being\nto being?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Very true.\n\nSTRANGER: But upon this view, is the beautiful a more real and the\nnot-beautiful a less real existence?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Not at all.\n\nSTRANGER: And the not-great may be said to exist, equally with the\ngreat?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: And, in the same way, the just must be placed in the same\ncategory with the not-just--the one cannot be said to have any more\nexistence than the other.\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: The same may be said of other things; seeing that the nature\nof the other has a real existence, the parts of this nature must equally\nbe supposed to exist.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Of course.\n\nSTRANGER: Then, as would appear, the opposition of a part of the other,\nand of a part of being, to one another, is, if I may venture to say so,\nas truly essence as being itself, and implies not the opposite of being,\nbut only what is other than being.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Beyond question.\n\nSTRANGER: What then shall we call it?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Clearly, not-being; and this is the very nature for which\nthe Sophist compelled us to search.\n\nSTRANGER: And has not this, as you were saying, as real an existence\nas any other class? May I not say with confidence that not-being has an\nassured existence, and a nature of its own? Just as the great was found\nto be great and the beautiful beautiful, and the not-great not-great,\nand the not-beautiful not-beautiful, in the same manner not-being has\nbeen found to be and is not-being, and is to be reckoned one among the\nmany classes of being. Do you, Theaetetus, still feel any doubt of this?\n\nTHEAETETUS: None whatever.\n\nSTRANGER: Do you observe that our scepticism has carried us beyond the\nrange of Parmenides' prohibition?\n\nTHEAETETUS: In what?\n\nSTRANGER: We have advanced to a further point, and shown him more than\nhe forbad us to investigate.\n\nTHEAETETUS: How is that?\n\nSTRANGER: Why, because he says--\n\n'Not-being never is, and do thou keep thy thoughts from this way of\nenquiry.'\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes, he says so.\n\nSTRANGER: Whereas, we have not only proved that things which are not\nare, but we have shown what form of being not-being is; for we have\nshown that the nature of the other is, and is distributed over all\nthings in their relations to one another, and whatever part of the other\nis contrasted with being, this is precisely what we have ventured to\ncall not-being.\n\nTHEAETETUS: And surely, Stranger, we were quite right.\n\nSTRANGER: Let not any one say, then, that while affirming the opposition\nof not-being to being, we still assert the being of not-being; for as to\nwhether there is an opposite of being, to that enquiry we have long\nsaid good-bye--it may or may not be, and may or may not be capable of\ndefinition. But as touching our present account of not-being, let a man\neither convince us of error, or, so long as he cannot, he too must say,\nas we are saying, that there is a communion of classes, and that\nbeing, and difference or other, traverse all things and mutually\ninterpenetrate, so that the other partakes of being, and by reason of\nthis participation is, and yet is not that of which it partakes, but\nother, and being other than being, it is clearly a necessity that\nnot-being should be. And again, being, through partaking of the other,\nbecomes a class other than the remaining classes, and being other than\nall of them, is not each one of them, and is not all the rest, so that\nundoubtedly there are thousands upon thousands of cases in which\nbeing is not, and all other things, whether regarded individually or\ncollectively, in many respects are, and in many respects are not.\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And he who is sceptical of this contradiction, must think how\nhe can find something better to say; or if he sees a puzzle, and his\npleasure is to drag words this way and that, the argument will prove to\nhim, that he is not making a worthy use of his faculties; for there is\nno charm in such puzzles, and there is no difficulty in detecting them;\nbut we can tell him of something else the pursuit of which is noble and\nalso difficult.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What is it?\n\nSTRANGER: A thing of which I have already spoken;--letting alone these\npuzzles as involving no difficulty, he should be able to follow and\ncriticize in detail every argument, and when a man says that the same is\nin a manner other, or that other is the same, to understand and refute\nhim from his own point of view, and in the same respect in which he\nasserts either of these affections. But to show that somehow and in some\nsense the same is other, or the other same, or the great small, or\nthe like unlike; and to delight in always bringing forward such\ncontradictions, is no real refutation, but is clearly the new-born babe\nof some one who is only beginning to approach the problem of being.\n\nTHEAETETUS: To be sure.\n\nSTRANGER: For certainly, my friend, the attempt to separate all\nexistences from one another is a barbarism and utterly unworthy of an\neducated or philosophical mind.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Why so?\n\nSTRANGER: The attempt at universal separation is the final annihilation\nof all reasoning; for only by the union of conceptions with one another\ndo we attain to discourse of reason.\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And, observe that we were only just in time in making a\nresistance to such separatists, and compelling them to admit that one\nthing mingles with another.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Why so?\n\nSTRANGER: Why, that we might be able to assert discourse to be a kind of\nbeing; for if we could not, the worst of all consequences would follow;\nwe should have no philosophy. Moreover, the necessity for determining\nthe nature of discourse presses upon us at this moment; if utterly\ndeprived of it, we could no more hold discourse; and deprived of it we\nshould be if we admitted that there was no admixture of natures at all.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Very true. But I do not understand why at this moment we\nmust determine the nature of discourse.\n\nSTRANGER: Perhaps you will see more clearly by the help of the following\nexplanation.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What explanation?\n\nSTRANGER: Not-being has been acknowledged by us to be one among many\nclasses diffused over all being.\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And thence arises the question, whether not-being mingles with\nopinion and language.\n\nTHEAETETUS: How so?\n\nSTRANGER: If not-being has no part in the proposition, then all things\nmust be true; but if not-being has a part, then false opinion and false\nspeech are possible, for to think or to say what is not--is falsehood,\nwhich thus arises in the region of thought and in speech.\n\nTHEAETETUS: That is quite true.\n\nSTRANGER: And where there is falsehood surely there must be deceit.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: And if there is deceit, then all things must be full of idols\nand images and fancies.\n\nTHEAETETUS: To be sure.\n\nSTRANGER: Into that region the Sophist, as we said, made his escape,\nand, when he had got there, denied the very possibility of falsehood;\nno one, he argued, either conceived or uttered falsehood, inasmuch as\nnot-being did not in any way partake of being.\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And now, not-being has been shown to partake of being, and\ntherefore he will not continue fighting in this direction, but he will\nprobably say that some ideas partake of not-being, and some not, and\nthat language and opinion are of the non-partaking class; and he will\nstill fight to the death against the existence of the image-making and\nphantastic art, in which we have placed him, because, as he will say,\nopinion and language do not partake of not-being, and unless this\nparticipation exists, there can be no such thing as falsehood. And, with\nthe view of meeting this evasion, we must begin by enquiring into the\nnature of language, opinion, and imagination, in order that when we\nfind them we may find also that they have communion with not-being, and,\nhaving made out the connexion of them, may thus prove that falsehood\nexists; and therein we will imprison the Sophist, if he deserves it, or,\nif not, we will let him go again and look for him in another class.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly, Stranger, there appears to be truth in what\nwas said about the Sophist at first, that he was of a class not easily\ncaught, for he seems to have abundance of defences, which he throws up,\nand which must every one of them be stormed before we can reach the man\nhimself. And even now, we have with difficulty got through his first\ndefence, which is the not-being of not-being, and lo! here is another;\nfor we have still to show that falsehood exists in the sphere of\nlanguage and opinion, and there will be another and another line of\ndefence without end.\n\nSTRANGER: Any one, Theaetetus, who is able to advance even a little\nought to be of good cheer, for what would he who is dispirited at a\nlittle progress do, if he were making none at all, or even undergoing\na repulse? Such a faint heart, as the proverb says, will never take a\ncity: but now that we have succeeded thus far, the citadel is ours, and\nwhat remains is easier.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Very true.\n\nSTRANGER: Then, as I was saying, let us first of all obtain a conception\nof language and opinion, in order that we may have clearer grounds for\ndetermining, whether not-being has any concern with them, or whether\nthey are both always true, and neither of them ever false.\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: Then, now, let us speak of names, as before we were speaking\nof ideas and letters; for that is the direction in which the answer may\nbe expected.\n\nTHEAETETUS: And what is the question at issue about names?\n\nSTRANGER: The question at issue is whether all names may be connected\nwith one another, or none, or only some of them.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Clearly the last is true.\n\nSTRANGER: I understand you to say that words which have a meaning when\nin sequence may be connected, but that words which have no meaning when\nin sequence cannot be connected?\n\nTHEAETETUS: What are you saying?\n\nSTRANGER: What I thought that you intended when you gave your assent;\nfor there are two sorts of intimation of being which are given by the\nvoice.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What are they?\n\nSTRANGER: One of them is called nouns, and the other verbs.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Describe them.\n\nSTRANGER: That which denotes action we call a verb.\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And the other, which is an articulate mark set on those who do\nthe actions, we call a noun.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Quite true.\n\nSTRANGER: A succession of nouns only is not a sentence, any more than of\nverbs without nouns.\n\nTHEAETETUS: I do not understand you.\n\nSTRANGER: I see that when you gave your assent you had something else\nin your mind. But what I intended to say was, that a mere succession of\nnouns or of verbs is not discourse.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What do you mean?\n\nSTRANGER: I mean that words like 'walks,' 'runs,' 'sleeps,' or any other\nwords which denote action, however many of them you string together, do\nnot make discourse.\n\nTHEAETETUS: How can they?\n\nSTRANGER: Or, again, when you say 'lion,' 'stag,' 'horse,' or any\nother words which denote agents--neither in this way of stringing words\ntogether do you attain to discourse; for there is no expression of\naction or inaction, or of the existence of existence or non-existence\nindicated by the sounds, until verbs are mingled with nouns; then the\nwords fit, and the smallest combination of them forms language, and is\nthe simplest and least form of discourse.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Again I ask, What do you mean?\n\nSTRANGER: When any one says 'A man learns,' should you not call this the\nsimplest and least of sentences?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: Yes, for he now arrives at the point of giving an intimation\nabout something which is, or is becoming, or has become, or will be.\nAnd he not only names, but he does something, by connecting verbs with\nnouns; and therefore we say that he discourses, and to this connexion of\nwords we give the name of discourse.\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And as there are some things which fit one another, and other\nthings which do not fit, so there are some vocal signs which do, and\nothers which do not, combine and form discourse.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Quite true.\n\nSTRANGER: There is another small matter.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What is it?\n\nSTRANGER: A sentence must and cannot help having a subject.\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And must be of a certain quality.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: And now let us mind what we are about.\n\nTHEAETETUS: We must do so.\n\nSTRANGER: I will repeat a sentence to you in which a thing and an action\nare combined, by the help of a noun and a verb; and you shall tell me of\nwhom the sentence speaks.\n\nTHEAETETUS: I will, to the best of my power.\n\nSTRANGER: 'Theaetetus sits'--not a very long sentence.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Not very.\n\nSTRANGER: Of whom does the sentence speak, and who is the subject? that\nis what you have to tell.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Of me; I am the subject.\n\nSTRANGER: Or this sentence, again--\n\nTHEAETETUS: What sentence?\n\nSTRANGER: 'Theaetetus, with whom I am now speaking, is flying.'\n\nTHEAETETUS: That also is a sentence which will be admitted by every one\nto speak of me, and to apply to me.\n\nSTRANGER: We agreed that every sentence must necessarily have a certain\nquality.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: And what is the quality of each of these two sentences?\n\nTHEAETETUS: The one, as I imagine, is false, and the other true.\n\nSTRANGER: The true says what is true about you?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: And the false says what is other than true?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: And therefore speaks of things which are not as if they were?\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And say that things are real of you which are not; for, as we\nwere saying, in regard to each thing or person, there is much that is\nand much that is not.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Quite true.\n\nSTRANGER: The second of the two sentences which related to you was first\nof all an example of the shortest form consistent with our definition.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes, this was implied in recent admission.\n\nSTRANGER: And, in the second place, it related to a subject?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: Who must be you, and can be nobody else?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Unquestionably.\n\nSTRANGER: And it would be no sentence at all if there were no subject,\nfor, as we proved, a sentence which has no subject is impossible.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Quite true.\n\nSTRANGER: When other, then, is asserted of you as the same, and\nnot-being as being, such a combination of nouns and verbs is really and\ntruly false discourse.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Most true.\n\nSTRANGER: And therefore thought, opinion, and imagination are now proved\nto exist in our minds both as true and false.\n\nTHEAETETUS: How so?\n\nSTRANGER: You will know better if you first gain a knowledge of what\nthey are, and in what they severally differ from one another.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Give me the knowledge which you would wish me to gain.\n\nSTRANGER: Are not thought and speech the same, with this exception, that\nwhat is called thought is the unuttered conversation of the soul with\nherself?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Quite true.\n\nSTRANGER: But the stream of thought which flows through the lips and is\naudible is called speech?\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And we know that there exists in speech...\n\nTHEAETETUS: What exists?\n\nSTRANGER: Affirmation.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes, we know it.\n\nSTRANGER: When the affirmation or denial takes Place in silence and in\nthe mind only, have you any other name by which to call it but opinion?\n\nTHEAETETUS: There can be no other name.\n\nSTRANGER: And when opinion is presented, not simply, but in some form of\nsense, would you not call it imagination?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: And seeing that language is true and false, and that thought\nis the conversation of the soul with herself, and opinion is the end of\nthinking, and imagination or phantasy is the union of sense and opinion,\nthe inference is that some of them, since they are akin to language,\nshould have an element of falsehood as well as of truth?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: Do you perceive, then, that false opinion and speech have\nbeen discovered sooner than we expected?--For just now we seemed to be\nundertaking a task which would never be accomplished.\n\nTHEAETETUS: I perceive.\n\nSTRANGER: Then let us not be discouraged about the future; but\nnow having made this discovery, let us go back to our previous\nclassification.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What classification?\n\nSTRANGER: We divided image-making into two sorts; the one\nlikeness-making, the other imaginative or phantastic.\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And we said that we were uncertain in which we should place\nthe Sophist.\n\nTHEAETETUS: We did say so.\n\nSTRANGER: And our heads began to go round more and more when it was\nasserted that there is no such thing as an image or idol or appearance,\nbecause in no manner or time or place can there ever be such a thing as\nfalsehood.\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And now, since there has been shown to be false speech and\nfalse opinion, there may be imitations of real existences, and out of\nthis condition of the mind an art of deception may arise.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Quite possible.\n\nSTRANGER: And we have already admitted, in what preceded, that the\nSophist was lurking in one of the divisions of the likeness-making art?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: Let us, then, renew the attempt, and in dividing any class,\nalways take the part to the right, holding fast to that which holds the\nSophist, until we have stripped him of all his common properties, and\nreached his difference or peculiar. Then we may exhibit him in his true\nnature, first to ourselves and then to kindred dialectical spirits.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Very good.\n\nSTRANGER: You may remember that all art was originally divided by us\ninto creative and acquisitive.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: And the Sophist was flitting before us in the acquisitive\nclass, in the subdivisions of hunting, contests, merchandize, and the\nlike.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Very true.\n\nSTRANGER: But now that the imitative art has enclosed him, it is clear\nthat we must begin by dividing the art of creation; for imitation is\na kind of creation--of images, however, as we affirm, and not of real\nthings.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Quite true.\n\nSTRANGER: In the first place, there are two kinds of creation.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What are they?\n\nSTRANGER: One of them is human and the other divine.\n\nTHEAETETUS: I do not follow.\n\nSTRANGER: Every power, as you may remember our saying originally, which\ncauses things to exist, not previously existing, was defined by us as\ncreative.\n\nTHEAETETUS: I remember.\n\nSTRANGER: Looking, now, at the world and all the animals and plants,\nat things which grow upon the earth from seeds and roots, as well as\nat inanimate substances which are formed within the earth, fusile or\nnon-fusile, shall we say that they come into existence--not having\nexisted previously--by the creation of God, or shall we agree with\nvulgar opinion about them?\n\nTHEAETETUS: What is it?\n\nSTRANGER: The opinion that nature brings them into being from some\nspontaneous and unintelligent cause. Or shall we say that they are\ncreated by a divine reason and a knowledge which comes from God?\n\nTHEAETETUS: I dare say that, owing to my youth, I may often waver in my\nview, but now when I look at you and see that you incline to refer them\nto God, I defer to your authority.\n\nSTRANGER: Nobly said, Theaetetus, and if I thought that you were one of\nthose who would hereafter change your mind, I would have gently argued\nwith you, and forced you to assent; but as I perceive that you will come\nof yourself and without any argument of mine, to that belief which, as\nyou say, attracts you, I will not forestall the work of time. Let me\nsuppose, then, that things which are said to be made by nature are the\nwork of divine art, and that things which are made by man out of\nthese are works of human art. And so there are two kinds of making and\nproduction, the one human and the other divine.\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: Then, now, subdivide each of the two sections which we have\nalready.\n\nTHEAETETUS: How do you mean?\n\nSTRANGER: I mean to say that you should make a vertical division of\nproduction or invention, as you have already made a lateral one.\n\nTHEAETETUS: I have done so.\n\nSTRANGER: Then, now, there are in all four parts or segments--two of\nthem have reference to us and are human, and two of them have reference\nto the gods and are divine.\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And, again, in the division which was supposed to be made in\nthe other way, one part in each subdivision is the making of the things\nthemselves, but the two remaining parts may be called the making of\nlikenesses; and so the productive art is again divided into two parts.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Tell me the divisions once more.\n\nSTRANGER: I suppose that we, and the other animals, and the elements out\nof which things are made--fire, water, and the like--are known by us to\nbe each and all the creation and work of God.\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And there are images of them, which are not them, but which\ncorrespond to them; and these are also the creation of a wonderful\nskill.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What are they?\n\nSTRANGER: The appearances which spring up of themselves in sleep or by\nday, such as a shadow when darkness arises in a fire, or the reflection\nwhich is produced when the light in bright and smooth objects meets\non their surface with an external light, and creates a perception the\nopposite of our ordinary sight.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes; and the images as well as the creation are equally the\nwork of a divine hand.\n\nSTRANGER: And what shall we say of human art? Do we not make one house\nby the art of building, and another by the art of drawing, which is a\nsort of dream created by man for those who are awake?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Quite true.\n\nSTRANGER: And other products of human creation are also twofold and go\nin pairs; there is the thing, with which the art of making the thing is\nconcerned, and the image, with which imitation is concerned.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Now I begin to understand, and am ready to acknowledge that\nthere are two kinds of production, and each of them twofold; in the\nlateral division there is both a divine and a human production; in the\nvertical there are realities and a creation of a kind of similitudes.\n\nSTRANGER: And let us not forget that of the imitative class the one part\nwas to have been likeness-making, and the other phantastic, if it could\nbe shown that falsehood is a reality and belongs to the class of real\nbeing.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: And this appeared to be the case; and therefore now, without\nhesitation, we shall number the different kinds as two.\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: Then, now, let us again divide the phantastic art.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Where shall we make the division?\n\nSTRANGER: There is one kind which is produced by an instrument,\nand another in which the creator of the appearance is himself the\ninstrument.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What do you mean?\n\nSTRANGER: When any one makes himself appear like another in his figure\nor his voice, imitation is the name for this part of the phantastic art.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: Let this, then, be named the art of mimicry, and this the\nprovince assigned to it; as for the other division, we are weary and\nwill give that up, leaving to some one else the duty of making the class\nand giving it a suitable name.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Let us do as you say--assign a sphere to the one and leave\nthe other.\n\nSTRANGER: There is a further distinction, Theaetetus, which is worthy of\nour consideration, and for a reason which I will tell you.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Let me hear.\n\nSTRANGER: There are some who imitate, knowing what they imitate, and\nsome who do not know. And what line of distinction can there possibly be\ngreater than that which divides ignorance from knowledge?\n\nTHEAETETUS: There can be no greater.\n\nSTRANGER: Was not the sort of imitation of which we spoke just now the\nimitation of those who know? For he who would imitate you would surely\nknow you and your figure?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Naturally.\n\nSTRANGER: And what would you say of the figure or form of justice or of\nvirtue in general? Are we not well aware that many, having no knowledge\nof either, but only a sort of opinion, do their best to show that this\nopinion is really entertained by them, by expressing it, as far as they\ncan, in word and deed?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Yes, that is very common.\n\nSTRANGER: And do they always fail in their attempt to be thought just,\nwhen they are not? Or is not the very opposite true?\n\nTHEAETETUS: The very opposite.\n\nSTRANGER: Such a one, then, should be described as an imitator--to be\ndistinguished from the other, as he who is ignorant is distinguished\nfrom him who knows?\n\nTHEAETETUS: True.\n\nSTRANGER: Can we find a suitable name for each of them? This is clearly\nnot an easy task; for among the ancients there was some confusion\nof ideas, which prevented them from attempting to divide genera into\nspecies; wherefore there is no great abundance of names. Yet, for the\nsake of distinctness, I will make bold to call the imitation which\ncoexists with opinion, the imitation of appearance--that which coexists\nwith science, a scientific or learned imitation.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Granted.\n\nSTRANGER: The former is our present concern, for the Sophist was classed\nwith imitators indeed, but not among those who have knowledge.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Very true.\n\nSTRANGER: Let us, then, examine our imitator of appearance, and see\nwhether he is sound, like a piece of iron, or whether there is still\nsome crack in him.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Let us examine him.\n\nSTRANGER: Indeed there is a very considerable crack; for if you look,\nyou find that one of the two classes of imitators is a simple creature,\nwho thinks that he knows that which he only fancies; the other sort has\nknocked about among arguments, until he suspects and fears that he is\nignorant of that which to the many he pretends to know.\n\nTHEAETETUS: There are certainly the two kinds which you describe.\n\nSTRANGER: Shall we regard one as the simple imitator--the other as the\ndissembling or ironical imitator?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Very good.\n\nSTRANGER: And shall we further speak of this latter class as having one\nor two divisions?\n\nTHEAETETUS: Answer yourself.\n\nSTRANGER: Upon consideration, then, there appear to me to be two; there\nis the dissembler, who harangues a multitude in public in a long speech,\nand the dissembler, who in private and in short speeches compels the\nperson who is conversing with him to contradict himself.\n\nTHEAETETUS: What you say is most true.\n\nSTRANGER: And who is the maker of the longer speeches? Is he the\nstatesman or the popular orator?\n\nTHEAETETUS: The latter.\n\nSTRANGER: And what shall we call the other? Is he the philosopher or the\nSophist?\n\nTHEAETETUS: The philosopher he cannot be, for upon our view he is\nignorant; but since he is an imitator of the wise he will have a name\nwhich is formed by an adaptation of the word sophos. What shall we name\nhim? I am pretty sure that I cannot be mistaken in terming him the true\nand very Sophist.\n\nSTRANGER: Shall we bind up his name as we did before, making a chain\nfrom one end of his genealogy to the other?\n\nTHEAETETUS: By all means.\n\nSTRANGER: He, then, who traces the pedigree of his art as follows--who,\nbelonging to the conscious or dissembling section of the art of causing\nself-contradiction, is an imitator of appearance, and is separated from\nthe class of phantastic which is a branch of image-making into that\nfurther division of creation, the juggling of words, a creation human,\nand not divine--any one who affirms the real Sophist to be of this blood\nand lineage will say the very truth.\n\nTHEAETETUS: Undoubtedly.","title":"Sophist","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":45254}