{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_17350/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_17350","id":"gutenberg_17350","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/17350","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - European","Category: History - Modern (1750+)","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Politics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Communism -- Soviet Union -- History","Nobel Prizes in Literature","Soviet Union -- Social conditions"],"text":"Produced by Thierry Alberto, Jeannie Howse and the Online\nDistributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n     +---------------------------------------------------------+\n     |                                                         |\n     |   Transcriber's Note:                                   |\n     |   A number of obvious typographical errors have been    |\n     |   corrected in this text. For a complete list, please   |\n     |   see the bottom of this document.                      |\n     |   Corrections listed in the existing Errata at the      |\n     |   end of this book have been applied to the text.       |\n     |                                                         |\n     +---------------------------------------------------------+\n\n\n\n\nThe Practice and Theory\nof Bolshevism\n\n\n\nBertrand Russell\n\n\n\n\n\nLONDON: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD.\nRUSKIN HOUSE, 40 MUSEUM STREET, W.C. 1\n\n\n\n\n_First published November 1920_\n_Reprinted     February 1921_\n\n\n\n(_All rights reserved_)\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nThe Russian Revolution is one of the great heroic events of the\nworld's history. It is natural to compare it to the French Revolution,\nbut it is in fact something of even more importance. It does more to\nchange daily life and the structure of society: it also does more to\nchange men's beliefs. The difference is exemplified by the difference\nbetween Marx and Rousseau: the latter sentimental and soft, appealing\nto emotion, obliterating sharp outlines; the former systematic like\nHegel, full of hard intellectual content, appealing to historic\nnecessity and the technical development of industry, suggesting a view\nof human beings as puppets in the grip of omnipotent material forces.\nBolshevism combines the characteristics of the French Revolution with\nthose of the rise of Islam; and the result is something radically new,\nwhich can only be understood by a patient and passionate effort of\nimagination.\n\nBefore entering upon any detail, I wish to state, as clearly and\nunambiguously as I can, my own attitude towards this new thing.\n\nBy far the most important aspect of the Russian Revolution is as an\nattempt to realize Communism. I believe that Communism is necessary to\nthe world, and I believe that the heroism of Russia has fired men's\nhopes in a way which was essential to the realization of Communism in\nthe future. Regarded as a splendid attempt, without which ultimate\nsuccess would have been very improbable, Bolshevism deserves the\ngratitude and admiration of all the progressive part of mankind.\n\nBut the method by which Moscow aims at establishing Communism is a\npioneer method, rough and dangerous, too heroic to count the cost of\nthe opposition it arouses. I do not believe that by this method a\nstable or desirable form of Communism can be established. Three issues\nseem to me possible from the present situation. The first is the\nultimate defeat of Bolshevism by the forces of capitalism. The second\nis the victory of the Bolshevists accompanied by a complete loss of\ntheir ideals and a regime of Napoleonic imperialism. The third is a\nprolonged world-war, in which civilization will go under, and all its\nmanifestations (including Communism) will be forgotten.\n\nIt is because I do not believe that the methods of the Third\nInternational can lead to the desired goal that I have thought it\nworth while to point out what seem to me undesirable features in the\npresent state of Russia. I think there are lessons to be learnt which\nmust be learnt if the world is ever to achieve what is desired by\nthose in the West who have sympathy with the original aims of the\nBolsheviks. I do not think these lessons can be learnt except by\nfacing frankly and fully whatever elements of failure there are in\nRussia. I think these elements of failure are less attributable to\nfaults of detail than to an impatient philosophy, which aims at\ncreating a new world without sufficient preparation in the opinions\nand feelings of ordinary men and women.\n\nBut although I do not believe that Communism can be realized\nimmediately by the spread of Bolshevism, I do believe that, if\nBolshevism falls, it will have contributed a legend and a heroic\nattempt without which ultimate success might never have come. A\nfundamental economic reconstruction, bringing with it very\nfar-reaching changes in ways of thinking and feeling, in philosophy\nand art and private relations, seems absolutely necessary if\nindustrialism is to become the servant of man instead of his master.\nIn all this, I am at one with the Bolsheviks; politically, I criticize\nthem only when their methods seem to involve a departure from their\nown ideals.\n\nThere is, however, another aspect of Bolshevism from which I differ\nmore fundamentally. Bolshevism is not merely a political doctrine; it\nis also a religion, with elaborate dogmas and inspired scriptures.\nWhen Lenin wishes to prove some proposition, he does so, if possible,\nby quoting texts from Marx and Engels. A full-fledged Communist is not\nmerely a man who believes that land and capital should be held in\ncommon, and their produce distributed as nearly equally as possible.\nHe is a man who entertains a number of elaborate and dogmatic\nbeliefs--such as philosophic materialism, for example--which may be\ntrue, but are not, to a scientific temper, capable of being known to\nbe true with any certainty. This habit, of militant certainty about\nobjectively doubtful matters, is one from which, since the\nRenaissance, the world has been gradually emerging, into that temper\nof constructive and fruitful scepticism which constitutes the\nscientific outlook. I believe the scientific outlook to be\nimmeasurably important to the human race. If a more just economic\nsystem were only attainable by closing men's minds against free\ninquiry, and plunging them back into the intellectual prison of the\nmiddle ages, I should consider the price too high. It cannot be denied\nthat, over any short period of time, dogmatic belief is a help in\nfighting. If all Communists become religious fanatics, while\nsupporters of capitalism retain a sceptical temper, it may be assumed\nthat the Communists will win, while in the contrary case the\ncapitalists would win. It seems evident, from the attitude of the\ncapitalist world to Soviet Russia, of the Entente to the Central\nEmpires, and of England to Ireland and India, that there is no depth\nof cruelty, perfidy or brutality from which the present holders of\npower will shrink when they feel themselves threatened. If, in order\nto oust them, nothing short of religious fanaticism will serve, it is\nthey who are the prime sources of the resultant evil. And it is\npermissible to hope that, when they have been dispossessed, fanaticism\nwill fade, as other fanaticisms have faded in the past.\n\nThe present holders of power are evil men, and the present manner of\nlife is doomed. To make the transition with a minimum of bloodshed,\nwith a maximum of preservation of whatever has value in our existing\ncivilization, is a difficult problem. It is this problem which has\nchiefly occupied my mind in writing the following pages. I wish I\ncould think that its solution would be facilitated by some slight\ndegree of moderation and humane feeling on the part of those who enjoy\nunjust privileges in the world as it is.\n\nThe present work is the outcome of a visit to Russia, supplemented by\nmuch reading and discussion both before and after. I have thought it\nbest to record what I saw separately from theoretical considerations,\nand I have endeavoured to state my impressions without any bias for or\nagainst the Bolsheviks. I received at their hands the greatest\nkindness and courtesy, and I owe them a debt of gratitude for the\nperfect freedom which they allowed me in my investigations. I am\nconscious that I was too short a time in Russia to be able to form\nreally reliable judgments; however, I share this drawback with most\nother westerners who have written on Russia since the October\nRevolution. I feel that Bolshevism is a matter of such importance that\nit is necessary, for almost every political question, to define one's\nattitude in regard to it; and I have hopes that I may help others to\ndefine their attitude, even if only by way of opposition to what I\nhave written.\n\nI have received invaluable assistance from my secretary, Miss D.W.\nBlack, who was in Russia shortly after I had left. The chapter on Art\nand Education is written by her throughout. Neither is responsible for\nthe other's opinions.\n\n  BERTRAND RUSSELL\n\n  _September, 1920._\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n                                                        PAGE\nPREFACE                                                    5\n\n\nPART I\nTHE PRESENT CONDITION OF RUSSIA\n\n   I. WHAT IS HOPED FROM BOLSHEVISM                       15\n\n  II. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS                             24\n\n III. LENIN, TROTSKY AND GORKY                            36\n\n  IV. ART AND EDUCATION                                   45\n\n   V. COMMUNISM AND THE SOVIET CONSTITUTION               72\n\n  VI. THE FAILURE OF RUSSIAN INDUSTRY                     81\n\n VII. DAILY LIFE IN MOSCOW                                92\n\nVIII. TOWN AND COUNTRY                                    99\n\n  IX. INTERNATIONAL POLICY                               106\n\n\nPART II\nBOLSHEVIK THEORY\n\n   I. THE MATERIALISTIC THEORY OF HISTORY                119\n\n  II. DECIDING FORCES IN POLITICS                        128\n\n III. BOLSHEVIK CRITICISM OF DEMOCRACY                   134\n\n  IV. REVOLUTION AND DICTATORSHIP                        146\n\n   V. MECHANISM AND THE INDIVIDUAL                       157\n\n  VI. WHY RUSSIAN COMMUNISM HAS FAILED                   165\n\n VII. CONDITIONS FOR THE SUCCESS OF COMMUNISM            178\n\n\n\n\nPART I\n\nTHE PRESENT CONDITION OF RUSSIA\n\n\n\n\nI\n\nWHAT IS HOPED FROM BOLSHEVISM\n\n\nTo understand Bolshevism it is not sufficient to know facts; it is\nnecessary also to enter with sympathy or imagination into a new\nspirit. The chief thing that the Bolsheviks have done is to create a\nhope, or at any rate to make strong and widespread a hope which was\nformerly confined to a few. This aspect of the movement is as easy to\ngrasp at a distance as it is in Russia--perhaps even easier, because\nin Russia present circumstances tend to obscure the view of the\ndistant future. But the actual situation in Russia can only be\nunderstood superficially if we forget the hope which is the motive\npower of the whole. One might as well describe the Thebaid without\nmentioning that the hermits expected eternal bliss as the reward of\ntheir sacrifices here on earth.\n\nI cannot share the hopes of the Bolsheviks any more than those of the\nEgyptian anchorites; I regard both as tragic delusions, destined to\nbring upon the world centuries of darkness and futile violence. The\nprinciples of the Sermon on the Mount are admirable, but their effect\nupon average human nature was very different from what was intended.\nThose who followed Christ did not learn to love their enemies or to\nturn the other cheek. They learned instead to use the Inquisition and\nthe stake, to subject the human intellect to the yoke of an ignorant\nand intolerant priesthood, to degrade art and extinguish science for a\nthousand years. These were the inevitable results, not of the\nteaching, but of fanatical belief in the teaching. The hopes which\ninspire Communism are, in the main, as admirable as those instilled by\nthe Sermon on the Mount, but they are held as fanatically, and are\nlikely to do as much harm. Cruelty lurks in our instincts, and\nfanaticism is a camouflage for cruelty. Fanatics are seldom genuinely\nhumane, and those who sincerely dread cruelty will be slow to adopt a\nfanatical creed. I do not know whether Bolshevism can be prevented\nfrom acquiring universal power. But even if it cannot, I am persuaded\nthat those who stand out against it, not from love of ancient\ninjustice, but in the name of the free spirit of Man, will be the\nbearers of the seeds of progress, from which, when the world's\ngestation is accomplished, new life will be born.\n\nThe war has left throughout Europe a mood of disillusionment and\ndespair which calls aloud for a new religion, as the only force\ncapable of giving men the energy to live vigorously. Bolshevism has\nsupplied the new religion. It promises glorious things: an end of the\ninjustice of rich and poor, an end of economic slavery, an end of war.\nIt promises an end of the disunion of classes which poisons political\nlife and threatens our industrial system with destruction. It promises\nan end to commercialism, that subtle falsehood that leads men to\nappraise everything by its money value, and to determine money value\noften merely by the caprices of idle plutocrats. It promises a world\nwhere all men and women shall be kept sane by work, and where all work\nshall be of value to the community, not only to a few wealthy\nvampires. It is to sweep away listlessness and pessimism and weariness\nand all the complicated miseries of those whose circumstances allow\nidleness and whose energies are not sufficient to force activity. In\nplace of palaces and hovels, futile vice and useless misery, there is\nto be wholesome work, enough but not too much, all of it useful,\nperformed by men and women who have no time for pessimism and no\noccasion for despair.\n\nThe existing capitalist system is doomed. Its injustice is so glaring\nthat only ignorance and tradition could lead wage-earners to tolerate\nit. As ignorance diminishes, tradition becomes weakened, and the war\ndestroyed the hold upon men's minds of everything merely traditional.\nIt may be that, through the influence of America, the capitalist\nsystem will linger for another fifty years; but it will grow\ncontinually weaker, and can never recover the position of easy\ndominance which it held in the nineteenth century. To attempt to\nbolster it up is a useless diversion of energies which might be\nexpended upon building something new. Whether the new thing will be\nBolshevism or something else, I do not know; whether it will be better\nor worse than capitalism, I do not know. But that a radically new\norder of society will emerge, I feel no doubt. And I also feel no\ndoubt that the new order will be either some form of Socialism or a\nreversion to barbarism and petty war such as occurred during the\nbarbarian invasion. If Bolshevism remains the only vigorous and\neffective competitor of capitalism, I believe that no form of\nSocialism will be realized, but only chaos and destruction. This\nbelief, for which I shall give reasons later, is one of the grounds\nupon which I oppose Bolshevism. But to oppose it from the point of\nview of a supporter of capitalism would be, to my mind, utterly\nfutile and against the movement of history in the present age.\n\nThe effect of Bolshevism as a revolutionary hope is greater outside\nRussia than within the Soviet Republic. Grim realities have done much\nto kill hope among those who are subject to the dictatorship of\nMoscow. Yet even within Russia, the Communist party, in whose hands\nall political power is concentrated, still lives by hope, though the\npressure of events has made the hope severe and stern and somewhat\nremote. It is this hope that leads to concentration upon the rising\ngeneration. Russian Communists often avow that there is little hope\nfor those who are already adult, and that happiness can only come to\nthe children who have grown up under the new regime and been moulded\nfrom the first to the group-mentality that Communism requires. It is\nonly after the lapse of a generation that they hope to create a Russia\nthat shall realize their vision.\n\nIn the Western World, the hope inspired by Bolshevism is more\nimmediate, less shot through with tragedy. Western Socialists who have\nvisited Russia have seen fit to suppress the harsher features of the\npresent regime, and have disseminated a belief among their followers\nthat the millennium would be quickly realized there if there were no\nwar and no blockade. Even those Socialists who are not Bolsheviks for\ntheir own country have mostly done very little to help men in\nappraising the merits or demerits of Bolshevik methods. By this lack\nof courage they have exposed Western Socialism to the danger of\nbecoming Bolshevik through ignorance of the price that has to be paid\nand of the uncertainty as to whether the desired goal will be reached\nin the end. I believe that the West is capable of adopting less\npainful and more certain methods of reaching Socialism than those that\nhave seemed necessary in Russia. And I believe that while some forms\nof Socialism are immeasurably better than capitalism, others are even\nworse. Among those that are worse I reckon the form which is being\nachieved in Russia, not only in itself, but as a more insuperable\nbarrier to further progress.\n\nIn judging of Bolshevism from what is to be seen in Russia at present,\nit is necessary to disentangle various factors which contribute to a\nsingle result. To begin with, Russia is one of the nations that were\ndefeated in the war; this has produced a set of circumstances\nresembling those found in Germany and Austria. The food problem, for\nexample, appears to be essentially similar in all three countries. In\norder to arrive at what is specifically Bolshevik, we must first\neliminate what is merely characteristic of a country which has\nsuffered military disaster. Next we come to factors which are Russian,\nwhich Russian Communists share with other Russians, but not with other\nCommunists. There is, for example, a great deal of disorder and chaos\nand waste, which shocks Westerners (especially Germans) even when they\nare in close political sympathy with the Bolsheviks. My own belief is\nthat, although, with the exception of a few very able men, the Russian\nGovernment is less efficient in organization than the Germans or the\nAmericans would be in similar circumstances, yet it represents what is\nmost efficient in Russia, and does more to prevent chaos than any\npossible alternative government would do. Again, the intolerance and\nlack of liberty which has been inherited from the Tsarist regime is\nprobably to be regarded as Russian rather than Communist. If a\nCommunist Party were to acquire power in England, it would probably be\nmet by a less irresponsible opposition, and would be able to show\nitself far more tolerant than any government can hope to be in Russia\nif it is to escape assassination. This, however, is a matter of\ndegree. A great part of the despotism which characterizes the\nBolsheviks belongs to the essence of their social philosophy, and\nwould have to be reproduced, even if in a milder form, wherever that\nphilosophy became dominant.\n\nIt is customary among the apologists of Bolshevism in the West to\nexcuse its harshness on the ground that it has been produced by the\nnecessity of fighting the Entente and its mercenaries. Undoubtedly it\nis true that this necessity has produced many of the worst elements in\nthe present state of affairs. Undoubtedly, also, the Entente has\nincurred a heavy load of guilt by its peevish and futile opposition.\nBut the expectation of such opposition was always part of Bolshevik\ntheory. A general hostility to the first Communist State was both\nforeseen and provoked by the doctrine of the class war. Those who\nadopt the Bolshevik standpoint must reckon with the embittered\nhostility of capitalist States; it is not worth while to adopt\nBolshevik methods unless they can lead to good in spite of this\nhostility. To say that capitalists are wicked and we have no\nresponsibility for their acts is unscientific; it is, in particular,\ncontrary to the Marxian doctrine of economic determinism. The evils\nproduced in Russia by the enmity of the Entente are therefore to be\nreckoned as essential in the Bolshevik method of transition to\nCommunism, not as specially Russian. I am not sure that we cannot even\ngo a step further. The exhaustion and misery caused by unsuccessful\nwar were necessary to the success of the Bolsheviks; a prosperous\npopulation will not embark by such methods upon a fundamental economic\nreconstruction. One can imagine England becoming Bolshevik after an\nunsuccessful war involving the loss of India--no improbable\ncontingency in the next few years. But at present the average\nwage-earner in England will not risk what he has for the doubtful gain\nof a revolution. A condition of widespread misery may, therefore, be\ntaken as indispensable to the inauguration of Communism, unless,\nindeed, it were possible to establish Communism more or less\npeacefully, by methods which would not, even temporarily, destroy the\neconomic life of the country. If the hopes which inspired Communism at\nthe start, and which still inspire its Western advocates, are ever to\nbe realized, the problem of minimizing violence in the transition must\nbe faced. Unfortunately, violence is in itself delightful to most\nreally vigorous revolutionaries, and they feel no interest in the\nproblem of avoiding it as far as possible. Hatred of enemies is easier\nand more intense than love of friends. But from men who are more\nanxious to injure opponents than to benefit the world at large no\ngreat good is to be expected.\n\n\n\n\nII\n\nGENERAL CHARACTERISTICS\n\n\nI entered Soviet Russia on May 11th and recrossed the frontier on June\n16th. The Russian authorities only admitted me on the express\ncondition that I should travel with the British Labour Delegation, a\ncondition with which I was naturally very willing to comply, and which\nthat Delegation kindly allowed me to fulfil. We were conveyed from the\nfrontier to Petrograd, as well as on subsequent journeys, in a special\n_train de luxe_; covered with mottoes about the Social Revolution and\nthe Proletariat of all countries; we were received everywhere by\nregiments of soldiers, with the Internationale being played on the\nregimental band while civilians stood bare-headed and soldiers at the\nsalute; congratulatory orations were made by local leaders and\nanswered by prominent Communists who accompanied us; the entrances to\nthe carriages were guarded by magnificent Bashkir cavalry-men in\nresplendent uniforms; in short, everything was done to make us feel\nlike the Prince of Wales. Innumerable functions were arranged for us:\nbanquets, public meetings, military reviews, etc.\n\nThe assumption was that we had come to testify to the solidarity of\nBritish Labour with Russian Communism, and on that assumption the\nutmost possible use was made of us for Bolshevik propaganda. We, on\nthe other hand, desired to ascertain what we could of Russian\nconditions and Russian methods of government, which was impossible in\nthe atmosphere of a royal progress. Hence arose an amicable contest,\ndegenerating at times into a game of hide and seek: while they assured\nus how splendid the banquet or parade was going to be, we tried to\nexplain how much we should prefer a quiet walk in the streets. I, not\nbeing a member of the Delegation, felt less obligation than my\ncompanions did to attend at propaganda meetings where one knew the\nspeeches by heart beforehand. In this way, I was able, by the help of\nneutral interpreters, mostly English or American, to have many\nconversations with casual people whom I met in the streets or on\nvillage greens, and to find out how the whole system appears to the\nordinary non-political man and woman. The first five days we spent in\nPetrograd, the next eleven in Moscow. During this time we were living\nin daily contact with important men in the Government, so that we\nlearned the official point of view without difficulty. I saw also what\nI could of the intellectuals in both places. We were all allowed\ncomplete freedom to see politicians of opposition parties, and we\nnaturally made full use of this freedom. We saw Mensheviks, Social\nRevolutionaries of different groups, and Anarchists; we saw them\nwithout the presence of any Bolsheviks, and they spoke freely after\nthey had overcome their initial fears. I had an hour's talk with\nLenin, virtually _tete-a-tete_; I met Trotsky, though only in company;\nI spent a night in the country with Kamenev; and I saw a great deal of\nother men who, though less known outside Russia, are of considerable\nimportance in the Government.\n\nAt the end of our time in Moscow we all felt a desire to see something\nof the country, and to get in touch with the peasants, since they form\nabout 85 per cent, of the population. The Government showed the\ngreatest kindness in meeting our wishes, and it was decided that we\nshould travel down the Volga from Nijni Novgorod to Saratov, stopping\nat many places, large and small, and talking freely with the\ninhabitants. I found this part of the time extraordinarily\ninstructive. I learned to know more than I should have thought\npossible of the life and outlook of peasants, village schoolmasters,\nsmall Jew traders, and all kinds of people. Unfortunately, my friend,\nClifford Allen, fell ill, and my time was much taken up with him. This\nhad, however, one good result, namely, that I was able to go on with\nthe boat to Astrakhan, as he was too ill to be moved off it. This not\nonly gave me further knowledge of the country, but made me acquainted\nwith Sverdlov, Acting Minister of Transport, who was travelling on the\nboat to organize the movement of oil from Baku up the Volga, and who\nwas one of the ablest as well as kindest people whom I met in Russia.\n\nOne of the first things that I discovered after passing the Red Flag\nwhich marks the frontier of Soviet Russia, amid a desolate region of\nmarsh, pine wood, and barbed wire entanglements, was the profound\ndifference between the theories of actual Bolsheviks and the version\nof those theories current among advanced Socialists in this country.\nFriends of Russia here think of the dictatorship of the proletariat as\nmerely a new form of representative government, in which only working\nmen and women have votes, and the constituencies are partly\noccupational, not geographical. They think that \"proletariat\" means\n\"proletariat,\" but \"dictatorship\" does not quite mean \"dictatorship.\"\nThis is the opposite of the truth. When a Russian Communist speaks of\ndictatorship, he means the word literally, but when he speaks of the\nproletariat, he means the word in a Pickwickian sense. He means the\n\"class-conscious\" part of the proletariat, _i.e._, the Communist\nParty.[1] He includes people by no means proletarian (such as Lenin\nand Tchicherin) who have the right opinions, and he excludes such\nwage-earners as have not the right opinions, whom he classifies as\nlackeys of the _bourgeoisie_. The Communist who sincerely believes the\nparty creed is convinced that private property is the root of all\nevil; he is so certain of this that he shrinks from no measures,\nhowever harsh, which seem necessary for constructing and preserving\nthe Communist State. He spares himself as little as he spares others.\nHe works sixteen hours a day, and foregoes his Saturday half-holiday.\nHe volunteers for any difficult or dangerous work which needs to be\ndone, such as clearing away piles of infected corpses left by Kolchak\nor Denikin. In spite of his position of power and his control of\nsupplies, he lives an austere life. He is not pursuing personal ends,\nbut aiming at the creation of a new social order. The same motives,\nhowever, which make him austere make him also ruthless. Marx has\ntaught that Communism is fatally predestined to come about; this fits\nin with the Oriental traits in the Russian character, and produces a\nstate of mind not unlike that of the early successors of Mahomet.\nOpposition is crushed without mercy, and without shrinking from the\nmethods of the Tsarist police, many of whom are still employed at\ntheir old work. Since all evils are due to private property, the evils\nof the Bolshevik regime while it has to fight private property will\nautomatically cease as soon as it has succeeded.\n\nThese views are the familiar consequences of fanatical belief. To an\nEnglish mind they reinforce the conviction upon which English life has\nbeen based ever since 1688, that kindliness and tolerance are worth\nall the creeds in the world--a view which, it is true, we do not apply\nto other nations or to subject races.\n\nIn a very novel society it is natural to seek for historical\nparallels. The baser side of the present Russian Government is most\nnearly paralleled by the Directoire in France, but on its better side\nit is closely analogous to the rule of Cromwell. The sincere\nCommunists (and all the older members of the party have proved their\nsincerity by years of persecution) are not unlike the Puritan\nsoldiers in their stern politico-moral purpose. Cromwell's dealings\nwith Parliament are not unlike Lenin's with the Constituent Assembly.\nBoth, starting from a combination of democracy and religious faith,\nwere driven to sacrifice democracy to religion enforced by military\ndictatorship. Both tried to compel their countries to live at a higher\nlevel of morality and effort than the population found tolerable. Life\nin modern Russia, as in Puritan England, is in many ways contrary to\ninstinct. And if the Bolsheviks ultimately fall, it will be for the\nreason for which the Puritans fell: because there comes a point at\nwhich men feel that amusement and ease are worth more than all other\ngoods put together.\n\nFar closer than any actual historical parallel is the parallel of\nPlato's Republic. The Communist Party corresponds to the guardians;\nthe soldiers have about the same status in both; there is in Russia an\nattempt to deal with family life more or less as Plato suggested. I\nsuppose it may be assumed that every teacher of Plato throughout the\nworld abhors Bolshevism, and that every Bolshevik regards Plato as an\nantiquated _bourgeois_. Nevertheless, the parallel is extraordinarily\nexact between Plato's Republic and the regime which the better\nBolsheviks are endeavouring to create.\n\nBolshevism is internally aristocratic and externally militant. The\nCommunists in many ways resemble the British public-school type: they\nhave all the good and bad traits of an aristocracy which is young and\nvital. They are courageous, energetic, capable of command, always\nready to serve the State; on the other hand, they are dictatorial,\nlacking in ordinary consideration for the plebs. They are practically\nthe sole possessors of power, and they enjoy innumerable advantages in\nconsequence. Most of them, though far from luxurious, have better food\nthan other people. Only people of some political importance can obtain\nmotor-cars or telephones. Permits for railway journeys, for making\npurchases at the Soviet stores (where prices are about one-fiftieth of\nwhat they are in the market), for going to the theatre, and so on,\nare, of course, easier to obtain for the friends of those in power\nthan for ordinary mortals. In a thousand ways, the Communists have a\nlife which is happier than that of the rest of the community. Above\nall, they are less exposed to the unwelcome attentions of the police\nand the extraordinary commission.\n\nThe Communist theory of international affairs is exceedingly simple.\nThe revolution foretold by Marx, which is to abolish capitalism\nthroughout the world, happened to begin in Russia, though Marxian\ntheory would seem to demand that it should begin in America. In\ncountries where the revolution has not yet broken out, the sole duty\nof a Communist is to hasten its advent. Agreements with capitalist\nStates can only be make-shifts, and can never amount on either side to\na sincere peace. No real good can come to any country without a bloody\nrevolution: English Labour men may fancy that a peaceful evolution is\npossible, but they will find their mistake. Lenin told me that he\nhopes to see a Labour Government in England, and would wish his\nsupporters to work for it, but solely in order that the futility of\nParliamentarism may be conclusively demonstrated to the British\nworking man. Nothing will do any real good except the arming of the\nproletariat and the disarming of the _bourgeoisie_. Those who preach\nanything else are social traitors or deluded fools.\n\nFor my part, after weighing this theory carefully, and after admitting\nthe whole of its indictment of _bourgeois_ capitalism, I find myself\ndefinitely and strongly opposed to it. The Third International is an\norganization which exists to promote the class-war and to hasten the\nadvent of revolution everywhere. My objection is not that capitalism\nis less bad than the Bolsheviks believe, but that Socialism is less\ngood, not in its best form, but in the only form which is likely to be\nbrought about by war. The evils of war, especially of civil war, are\ncertain and very great; the gains to be achieved by victory are\nproblematical. In the course of a desperate struggle, the heritage of\ncivilization is likely to be lost, while hatred, suspicion, and\ncruelty become normal in the relations of human beings. In order to\nsucceed in war, a concentration of power is necessary, and from\nconcentration of power the very same evils flow as from the capitalist\nconcentration of wealth. For these reasons chiefly, I cannot support\nany movement which aims at world revolution. The damage to\ncivilization done by revolution in one country may be repaired by the\ninfluence of another in which there has been no revolution; but in a\nuniversal cataclysm civilization might go under for a thousand years.\nBut while I cannot advocate world revolution, I cannot escape from the\nconclusion that the Governments of the leading capitalist countries\nare doing everything to bring it about. Abuse of our power against\nGermany, Russia, and India (to say nothing of any other countries) may\nwell bring about our downfall, and produce those very evils which the\nenemies of Bolshevism most dread.\n\nThe true Communist is thoroughly international. Lenin, for example, so\nfar as I could judge, is not more concerned with the interests of\nRussia than with those of other countries; Russia is, at the moment,\nthe protagonist of the social revolution, and, as such, valuable to\nthe world, but Lenin would sacrifice Russia rather than the\nrevolution, if the alternative should ever arise. This is the orthodox\nattitude, and is no doubt genuine in many of the leaders. But\nnationalism is natural and instinctive; through pride in the\nrevolution, it grows again even in the breasts of Communists. Through\nthe Polish war, the Bolsheviks have acquired the support of national\nfeeling, and their position in the country has been immensely\nstrengthened.\n\nThe only time I saw Trotsky was at the Opera in Moscow. The British\nLabour Delegation were occupying what had been the Tsar's box. After\nspeaking with us in the ante-chamber, he stepped to the front of the\nbox and stood with folded arms while the house cheered itself hoarse.\nThen he spoke a few sentences, short and sharp, with military\nprecision, winding up by calling for \"three cheers for our brave\nfellows at the front,\" to which the audience responded as a London\naudience would have responded in the autumn of 1914. Trotsky and the\nRed Army undoubtedly now have behind them a great body of nationalist\nsentiment. The reconquest of Asiatic Russia has even revived what is\nessentially an imperialist way of feeling, though this would be\nindignantly repudiated by many of those in whom I seemed to detect it.\nExperience of power is inevitably altering Communist theories, and men\nwho control a vast governmental machine can hardly have quite the same\noutlook on life as they had when they were hunted fugitives. If the\nBolsheviks remain in power, it is much to be feared that their\nCommunism will fade, and that they will increasingly resemble any\nother Asiatic Government--for example, our own Government in India.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[1] See the article \"On the role of the Communist Party in the\nProletarian Revolution,\" in _Theses presented to the Second Congress\nof the Communist International, Petrograd-Moscow, 18 July, 1920_--a\nvaluable work which I possess only in French.\n\n\n\n\nIII\n\nLENIN, TROTSKY AND GORKY\n\n\nSoon after my arrival in Moscow I had an hour's conversation with\nLenin in English, which he speaks fairly well. An interpreter was\npresent, but his services were scarcely required. Lenin's room is very\nbare; it contains a big desk, some maps on the walls, two book-cases,\nand one comfortable chair for visitors in addition to two or three\nhard chairs. It is obvious that he has no love of luxury or even\ncomfort. He is very friendly, and apparently simple, entirely without\na trace of _hauteur_. If one met him without knowing who he was, one\nwould not guess that he is possessed of great power or even that he is\nin any way eminent. I have never met a personage so destitute of\nself-importance. He looks at his visitors very closely, and screws up\none eye, which seems to increase alarmingly the penetrating power of\nthe other. He laughs a great deal; at first his laugh seems merely\nfriendly and jolly, but gradually I came to feel it rather grim. He\nis dictatorial, calm, incapable of fear, extraordinarily devoid of\nself-seeking, an embodied theory. The materialist conception of\nhistory, one feels, is his life-blood. He resembles a professor in his\ndesire to have the theory understood and in his fury with those who\nmisunderstand or disagree, as also in his love of expounding, I got\nthe impression that he despises a great many people and is an\nintellectual aristocrat.\n\nThe first question I asked him was as to how far he recognized the\npeculiarity of English economic and political conditions? I was\nanxious to know whether advocacy of violent revolution is an\nindispensable condition of joining the Third International, although I\ndid not put this question directly because others were asking it\nofficially. His answer was unsatisfactory to me. He admitted that\nthere is little chance of revolution in England now, and that the\nworking man is not yet disgusted with Parliamentary government. But he\nhopes that this result may be brought about by a Labour Ministry. He\nthinks that, if Mr. Henderson, for instance, were to become Prime\nMinister, nothing of importance would be done; organized Labour would\nthen, so he hopes and believes, turn to revolution. On this ground, he\nwishes his supporters in this country to do everything in their power\nto secure a Labour majority in Parliament; he does not advocate\nabstention from Parliamentary contests, but participation with a view\nto making Parliament obviously contemptible. The reasons which make\nattempts at violent revolution seem to most of us both improbable and\nundesirable in this country carry no weight with him, and seem to him\nmere _bourgeois_ prejudices. When I suggested that whatever is\npossible in England can be achieved without bloodshed, he waved aside\nthe suggestion as fantastic. I got little impression of knowledge or\npsychological imagination as regards Great Britain. Indeed the whole\ntendency of Marxianism is against psychological imagination, since it\nattributes everything in politics to purely material causes.\n\nI asked him next whether he thought it possible to establish Communism\nfirmly and fully in a country containing such a large majority of\npeasants. He admitted that it was difficult, and laughed over the\nexchange the peasant is compelled to make, of food for paper; the\nworthlessness of Russian paper struck him as comic. But he said--what\nis no doubt true--that things will right themselves when there are\ngoods to offer to the peasant. For this he looks partly to\nelectrification in industry, which, he says, is a technical necessity\nin Russia, but will take ten years to complete.[2] He spoke with\nenthusiasm, as they all do, of the great scheme for generating\nelectrical power by means of peat. Of course he looks to the raising\nof the blockade as the only radical cure; but he was not very hopeful\nof this being achieved thoroughly or permanently except through\nrevolutions in other countries. Peace between Bolshevik Russia and\ncapitalist countries, he said, must always be insecure; the Entente\nmight be led by weariness and mutual dissensions to conclude peace,\nbut he felt convinced that the peace would be of brief duration. I\nfound in him, as in almost all leading Communists, much less eagerness\nthan existed in our delegation for peace and the raising of the\nblockade. He believes that nothing of real value can be achieved\nexcept through world revolution and the abolition of capitalism; I\nfelt that he regarded the resumption of trade with capitalist\ncountries as a mere palliative of doubtful value.\n\nHe described the division between rich and poor peasants, and the\nGovernment propaganda among the latter against the former, leading to\nacts of violence which he seemed to find amusing. He spoke as though\nthe dictatorship over the peasant would have to continue a long time,\nbecause of the peasant's desire for free trade. He said he knew from\nstatistics (what I can well believe) that the peasants have had more\nto eat these last two years than they ever had before, \"and yet they\nare against us,\" he added a little wistfully. I asked him what to\nreply to critics who say that in the country he has merely created\npeasant proprietorship, not Communism; he replied that that is not\nquite the truth, but he did not say what the truth is.[3]\n\nThe last question I asked him was whether resumption of trade with\ncapitalist countries, if it took place, would not create centres of\ncapitalist influence, and make the preservation of Communism more\ndifficult? It had seemed to me that the more ardent Communists might\nwell dread commercial intercourse with the outer world, as leading to\nan infiltration of heresy, and making the rigidity of the present\nsystem almost impossible. I wished to know whether he had such a\nfeeling. He admitted that trade would create difficulties, but said\nthey would be less than those of the war. He said that two years ago\nneither he nor his colleagues thought they could survive against the\nhostility of the world. He attributes their survival to the jealousies\nand divergent interests of the different capitalist nations; also to\nthe power of Bolshevik propaganda. He said the Germans had laughed\nwhen the Bolsheviks proposed to combat guns with leaflets, but that\nthe event had proved the leaflets quite as powerful. I do not think he\nrecognizes that the Labour and Socialist parties have had any part in\nthe matter. He does not seem to know that the attitude of British\nLabour has done a great deal to make a first-class war against Russia\nimpossible, since it has confined the Government to what could be done\nin a hole-and-corner way, and denied without a too blatant mendacity.\n\nHe thoroughly enjoys the attacks of Lord Northcliffe, to whom he\nwishes to send a medal for Bolshevik propaganda. Accusations of\nspoliation, he remarked, may shock the _bourgeois_, but have an\nopposite effect upon the proletarian.\n\nI think if I had met him without knowing who he was, I should not have\nguessed that he was a great man; he struck me as too opinionated and\nnarrowly orthodox. His strength comes, I imagine, from his honesty,\ncourage, and unwavering faith--religious faith in the Marxian gospel,\nwhich takes the place of the Christian martyr's hopes of Paradise,\nexcept that it is less egotistical. He has as little love of liberty\nas the Christians who suffered under Diocletian, and retaliated when\nthey acquired power. Perhaps love of liberty is incompatible with\nwhole-hearted belief in a panacea for all human ills. If so, I cannot\nbut rejoice in the sceptical temper of the Western world. I went to\nRussia a Communist; but contact with those who have no doubts has\nintensified a thousandfold my own doubts, not as to Communism in\nitself, but as to the wisdom of holding a creed so firmly that for its\nsake men are willing to inflict widespread misery.\n\nTrotsky, whom the Communists do not by any means regard as Lenin's\nequal, made more impression upon me from the point of view of\nintelligence and personality, though not of character. I saw too\nlittle of him, however, to have more than a very superficial\nimpression. He has bright eyes, military bearing, lightning\nintelligence and magnetic personality. He is very good-looking, with\nadmirable wavy hair; one feels he would be irresistible to women. I\nfelt in him a vein of gay good humour, so long as he was not crossed\nin any way. I thought, perhaps wrongly, that his vanity was even\ngreater than his love of power--the sort of vanity that one associates\nwith an artist or actor. The comparison with Napoleon was forced upon\none. But I had no means of estimating the strength of his Communist\nconviction, which may be very sincere and profound.\n\nAn extraordinary contrast to both these men was Gorky, with whom I had\na brief interview in Petrograd. He was in bed, apparently very ill and\nobviously heart-broken. He begged me, in anything I might say about\nRussia, always to emphasize what Russia has suffered. He supports the\nGovernment--as I should do, if I were a Russian--not because he thinks\nit faultless, but because the possible alternatives are worse. One\nfelt in him a love of the Russian people which makes their present\nmartyrdom almost unbearable, and prevents the fanatical faith by which\nthe pure Marxians are upheld. I felt him the most lovable, and to me\nthe most sympathetic, of all the Russians I saw. I wished for more\nknowledge of his outlook, but he spoke with difficulty and was\nconstantly interrupted by terrible fits of coughing, so that I could\nnot stay. All the intellectuals whom I met--a class who have suffered\nterribly--expressed their gratitude to him for what he has done on\ntheir behalf. The materialistic conception of history is all very\nwell, but some care for the higher things of civilization is a relief.\nThe Bolsheviks are sometimes said to have done great things for art,\nbut I could not discover that they had done more than preserve\nsomething of what existed before. When I questioned one of them on the\nsubject, he grew impatient, and said: \"We haven't time for a new art,\nany more than for a new religion.\" Unavoidably, although the\nGovernment favours art as much as it can, the atmosphere is one in\nwhich art cannot flourish, because art is anarchic and resistant to\norganization. Gorky has done all that one man could to preserve the\nintellectual and artistic life of Russia. I feared that he was dying,\nand that, perhaps, it was dying too. But he recovered, and I hope it\nwill recover also.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[2] Electrification is desired not merely for reorganizing industry,\nbut in order to industrialize agriculture. In _Theses presented to the\nSecond Congress of the Communist International_ (an instructive little\nbook, which I shall quote as _Theses_), it is said in an article on\nthe Agrarian question that Socialism will not be secure till industry\nis reorganized on a new basis with \"general application of electric\nenergy in all branches of agriculture and rural economy,\" which \"alone\ncan give to the towns the possibility of offering to backward rural\ndistricts a technical and social aid capable of determining an\nextraordinary increase of productivity of agricultural and rural\nlabour, and of engaging the small cultivators, in their own interest,\nto pass progressively to a collectivist mechanical cultivation\" (p. 36\nof French edition).\n\n[3] In _Theses_ (p. 34) it is said: \"It would be an irreparable error\n... not to admit the gratuitous grant of part of the expropriated\nlands to poor and even well-to-do peasants.\"\n\n\n\n\nIV\n\nART AND EDUCATION\n\n\nIt has often been said that, whatever the inadequacy of Bolshevik\norganization in other fields, in art and in education at least they\nhave made great progress.\n\nTo take first of all art: it is true that they began by recognizing,\nas perhaps no other revolutionary government would, the importance and\nspontaneity of the artistic impulse, and therefore while they\ncontrolled or destroyed the counter-revolutionary in all other social\nactivities, they allowed the artist, whatever his political creed,\ncomplete freedom to continue his work. Moreover, as regards clothing\nand rations they treated him especially well. This, and the care\ndevoted to the upkeep of churches, public monuments, and museums, are\nwell-known facts, to which there has already been ample testimony.\n\nThe preservation of the old artistic community practically intact was\nthe more remarkable in view of the pronounced sympathy of most of them\nwith the old regime. The theory, however, was that art and politics\nbelonged to two separate realms; but great honour would of course be\nthe portion of those artists who would be inspired by the revolution.\n\nThree years' experience, however, have proved the falsity of this\ndoctrine and led to a divorce between art and popular feeling which a\nsensitive observer cannot fail to remark. It is glaringly apparent in\nthe hitherto most vital of all Russian arts, the theatre. The artists\nhave continued to perform the old classics in tragedy or comedy, and\nthe old-style operette. The theatre programmes have remained the same\nfor the last two years, and, but for the higher standard of artistic\nperformance, might belong to the theatres of Paris or London. As one\nsits in the theatre, one is so acutely conscious of the discrepancy\nbetween the daily life of the audience and that depicted in the play\nthat the latter seems utterly dead and meaningless. To some of the\nmore fiery Communists it appears that a mistake has been made. They\ncomplain that _bourgeois_ art is being preserved long after its time,\nthey accuse the artists of showing contempt for their public, of being\nas untouched by the revolutionary mood as an elderly _bourgeoise_\nbewailing the loss of her personal comfort; they would like to see\nonly the revolutionary mood embodied in art, and to achieve this\nwould make a clean sweep, enforcing the writing and performance of\nnothing but revolutionary plays and the painting of revolutionary\npictures. Nor can it be argued that they are wrong as to the facts: it\nis plain that the preservation of the old artistic tradition has\nserved very little purpose; but on the other hand it is equally plain\nthat an artist cannot be drilled like a military recruit. There is,\nfortunately, no sign that these tactics will be directly adopted, but\nin an indirect fashion they are already being applied. An artist is\nnot to blame if his temperament leads him to draw cartoons of leading\nBolsheviks, or satirize the various comical aspects--and they are\nmany--of the Soviet regime. To force such a man, however, to turn his\ntalent only against Denikin, Yudenitch and Kolchak, or the leaders of\nthe Entente, is momentarily good for Communism, but it is discouraging\nto the artist, and may prove in the long run bad for art, and possibly\nfor Communism also. It is plain from the religious nature of Communism\nin Russia, that such controlling of the impulse to artistic creation\nis inevitable, and that propaganda art alone can flourish in such an\natmosphere. For example, no poetry or literature that is not orthodox\nwill reach the printing press. It is so easy to make the excuse of\nlack of paper and the urgent need for manifestoes. Thus there may\nwell come to be a repetition of the attitude of the mediaeval Church to\nthe sagas and legends of the people, except that, in this case, it is\nthe folk tales which will be preserved, and the more sensitive and\ncivilized products banned. The only poet who seems to be much spoken\nof at present in Russia is one who writes rough popular songs. There\nare revolutionary odes, but one may hazard a guess that they resemble\nour patriotic war poetry.\n\nI said that this state of affairs may in the long run be bad for art,\nbut the contrary may equally well prove to be the truth. It is of\ncourse discouraging and paralysing to the old-style artist, and it is\ndeath to the old individual art which depended on subtlety and oddity\nof temperament, and arose very largely from the complicated psychology\nof the idle. There it stands, this old art, the purest monument to the\nnullity of the art-for-art's-sake doctrine, like a rich exotic plant\nof exquisite beauty, still apparently in its glory, till one perceives\nthat the roots are cut, and that leaf by leaf it is gradually fading\naway.\n\nBut, unlike the Puritans in this respect, the Bolsheviks have not\nsought to dig up the roots, and there are signs that the paralysis is\nmerely temporary. Moreover, individual art is not the only form, and\nin particular the plastic arts have shown that they can live by mass\naction, and flourish under an intolerant faith. Communist artists of\nthe future may erect public buildings surpassing in beauty the\nmediaeval churches, they may paint frescoes, organize pageants, make\nHomeric songs about their heroes. Communist art will begin, and is\nbeginning now, in the propaganda pictures, and stories such as those\ndesigned for peasants and children. There is, for instance, a kind of\nRake's Progress or \"How she became a Communist,\" in which the Entente\nleaders make a sorry and grotesque appearance. Lenin and Trotsky\nalready figure in woodcuts as Moses and Aaron, deliverers of their\npeople, while the mother and child who illustrate the statistics of\nthe maternity exhibition have the grace and beauty of mediaeval\nmadonnas. Russia is only now emerging from the middle ages, and the\nChurch tradition in painting is passing with incredible smoothness\ninto the service of Communist doctrine. These pictures have, too, an\noriental flavour: there are brown Madonnas in the Russian churches,\nand such an one illustrates the statistics of infant mortality in\nIndia, while the Russian mother, broad-footed, in gay petticoat and\nkerchief, sits in a starry meadow suckling her baby from a very ample\nwhite breast. I think that this movement towards the Church tradition\nmay be unconscious and instinctive, and would perhaps be deplored by\nmany Communists, for whom grandiose bad Rodin statuary and the crudity\nof cubism better express what they mean by revolution. But this\nrevolution is Russian and not French, and its art, if all goes well,\nshould inevitably bear the popular Russian stamp. It is would-be\nprimitive and popular art that is vulgar. Such at least is the\nreflection engendered by an inspection of Russian peasant work as\ncompared with the spirit of _Children's Tales_.\n\nThe Russian peasant's artistic impulse is no legend. Besides the\ncarving and embroidery which speak eloquently to peasant skill, one\nobserves many instances in daily life. He will climb down, when his\nslowly-moving train stops by the wayside, to gather branches and\nflowers with which he will decorate the railway carriage both inside\nand out, he will work willingly at any task which has beauty for its\nobject, and was all too prone under the old regime to waste his time\nand his employer's material in fashioning small metal or wooden\nobjects with his hands.\n\nIf the _bourgeois_ tradition then will not serve, there is a popular\ntradition which is still live and passionate and which may perhaps\npersist. Unhappily it has a formidable enemy in the organization and\ndevelopment of industry, which is far more dangerous to art than\nCommunist doctrine. Indeed, industry in its early stages seems\neverywhere doomed to be the enemy of beauty and instinctive life. One\nmight hope that this would not prove to be so in Russia, the first\nSocialist State, as yet unindustrial, able to draw on the industrial\nexperience of the whole world, were it not that one discovers with a\ncertain misgiving in the Bolshevik leaders the rasping arid\ntemperament of those to whom the industrial machine is an end in\nitself, and, in addition, reflects that these industrially minded men\nhave as yet no practical experience, nor do there exist men of\ngoodwill to help them. It does not seem reasonable to hope that Russia\ncan pass through the period of industrialization without a good deal\nof mismanagement, involving waste resulting in too long hours, child\nlabour and other evils with which the West is all too familiar. What\nthe Bolsheviks would not therefore willingly do to art, the Juggernaut\nwhich they are bent on setting in motion may accomplish for them.\n\nThe next generation in Russia will have to consist of practical\nhard-working men, the old-style artists will die off and successors\nwill not readily arise. A State which is struggling with economic\ndifficulties is bound to be slow to admit an artistic vocation, since\nthis involves exemption from practical work. Moreover the majority of\nminds always turn instinctively to the real need of the moment. A man\ntherefore who is adapted by talent and temperament to becoming an\nopera singer, will under the pressure of Communist enthusiasm and\nGovernment encouragement turn his attention to economics. (I am here\nquoting an actual instance.) The whole Russian people at this stage in\ntheir development strike one as being forced by the logic of their\nsituation to make a similar choice.\n\nIt may be all to the good that there should be fewer professional\nartists, since some of the finest work has been done by men and groups\nof men to whom artistic expression was only a pastime. They were not\nhampered by the solemnity and reverence for art which too often\ndestroy the spontaneity of the professional. Indeed a revival of this\nattitude to art is one of the good results which may be hoped for from\na Communist revolution in a more advanced industrial community. There\nthe problem of education will be to stimulate the creative impulses\ntowards art and science so that men may know how to employ their\nleisure hours. Work in the factory can never be made to provide an\nadequate outlet. The only hope, if men are to remain human beings\nunder industrialism, is to reduce hours to the minimum. But this is\nonly possible when production and organization are highly efficient,\nwhich will not be the case for a long time in Russia. Hence not only\ndoes it appear that the number of artists will grow less, but that the\nnumber of people undamaged in their artistic impulses and on that\naccount able to create or appreciate as amateurs is likely to be\ndeplorably small. It is in this damaging effect of industry on human\ninstinct that the immediate danger to art in Russia lies.\n\nThe effect of industry on the crafts is quite obvious. A craftsman who\nis accustomed to work with his hands, following the tradition\ndeveloped by his ancestors, is useless when brought face to face with\na machine. And the man who can handle the machine will only be\nconcerned with quantity and utility in the first instance. Only\ngradually do the claims of beauty come to be recognized. Compare the\nmodern motor car with the first of its species, or even, since the\nsame law seems to operate in nature, the prehistoric animal with its\nmodern descendant. The same relation exists between them as between\nman and the ape, or the horse and the hipparion. The movement of life\nseems to be towards ever greater delicacy and complexity, and man\ncarries it forward in the articles that he makes and the society that\nhe develops. Industry is a new tool, difficult to handle, but it will\nproduce just as beautiful objects as did the mediaeval builder and\ncraftsman, though not until it has been in being for a long time and\nbelongs to tradition.\n\nOne may expect, therefore, that while the crafts in Russia will lose\nin artistic value, the drama, sculpture and painting and all those\narts which have nothing to do with the machine and depend entirely\nupon mental and spiritual inspiration will receive an impetus from the\nCommunist faith. Whether the flowering period will be long or short\ndepends partly on the political situation, but chiefly on the rapidity\nof industrial development. It may be that the machine will ultimately\nconquer the Communist faith and grind out the human impulses, and\nRussia become during this transition period as inartistic and soulless\nas was America until quite recent years. One would like to hope that\nmechanical progress will be swift and social idealism sufficiently\nstrong to retain control. But the practical difficulties are almost\ninsuperable.\n\nSuch signs of the progress of art as it is possible to notice at this\nearly stage would seem to bear out the above argument. For instance,\nan attempt is being made to foster the continuation of peasant\nembroidery, carving, &c., in the towns. It is done by people who have\nevidently lost the tradition already. They are taught to copy the\nmodels which are placed in the Peasant Museum, but there is no\ncomparison between the live little wooden lady who smiles beneath the\nglass case, and the soulless staring-eyed creature who is offered for\nsale, nor between the quite ordinary carved fowl one may buy and the\namusing life-like figure one may merely gaze at.\n\nBut when one comes to art directly inspired by Communism it is a\ndifferent story. Apart from the propaganda pictures already referred\nto, there are propaganda plays performed by the Red Army in its spare\nmoments, and there are the mass pageant plays performed on State\noccasions. I had the good fortune to witness one of each kind.\n\nThe play was called _Zarevo_ (The Dawn), and was performed on a\nSaturday night on a small stage in a small hall in an entirely amateur\nfashion. It represented Russian life just before the revolution. It\nwas intense and tragic and passionately acted. Dramatic talent is not\nrare in Russia. Almost the only comic relief was provided by the\nTsarist police, who made one appearance towards the end, got up like\ncomic military characters in a musical comedy--just as, in mediaeval\nmiracle plays, the comic character was Satan. The play's intention was\nto show a typical Russian working-class family. There were the old\nfather, constantly drunk on vodka, alternately maudlin and scolding;\nthe old mother; two sons, the one a Communist and the other an\nAnarchist; the wife of the Communist, who did dressmaking; her\nsister, a prostitute; and a young girl of _bourgeois_ family, also a\nCommunist, involved in a plot with the Communist son, who was of\ncourse the hero of the play.\n\nThe first act revealed the stern and heroic Communist maintaining his\nviews despite the reproaches of father and mother and the nagging of\nhis wife. It showed also the Anarchist brother (as might be expected\nfrom the Bolshevik hostility to Anarchism) as an unruly, lazy,\nne'er-do-well, with a passionate love for Sonia, the young\n_bourgeoise_, which was likely to become dangerous if not returned.\nShe, on the other hand, obviously preferred the Communist. It was\nclear that he returned her love, but it was not quite clear that he\nwould wish the relation to be anything more than platonic comradeship\nin the service of their common ideal. An unsuccessful strike, bringing\nwant and danger from the police, together with increasing jealousy on\nthe part of the Anarchist, led up to the tragic denouement. I was not\nquite definite as to how this was brought about. All violent action\nwas performed off the stage, and this made the plot at times difficult\nto follow. But it seemed that the Anarchist in a jealous rage forged a\nletter from his brother to bring Sonia to a rendezvous, and there\nmurdered her, at the same time betraying his brother to the police.\nWhen the latter came to effect his arrest, and accuse him also, as the\nmost likely person, of the murder, the Anarchist was seized with\nremorse and confessed. Both were therefore led away together. Once the\nplot is sketched, the play calls for no comment. It had not great\nmerit, though it is unwise to hazard a judgment on a play whose\ndialogue was not fully interpreted, but it was certainly real, and the\nlink between audience and performers was established as it never\nseemed to be in the professional theatre. After the performance, the\nfloor was cleared for dancing, and the audience were in a mood of\nthorough enjoyment.\n\nThe pageant of the \"World Commune,\" which was performed at the opening\nof the Third International Congress in Petrograd, was a still more\nimportant and significant phenomenon. I do not suppose that anything\nof the kind has been staged since the days of the mediaeval mystery\nplays. It was, in fact, a mystery play designed by the High Priests of\nthe Communist faith to instruct the people. It was played on the steps\nof an immense white building that was once the Stock Exchange, a\nbuilding with a classical colonnade on three sides of it, with a vast\nflight of steps in front, that did not extend the whole width of the\nbuilding but left at each side a platform that was level with the\nfloor of the colonnade. In front of this building a wide road ran\nfrom a bridge over one arm of the river to a bridge over the other, so\nthat the stretches of water and sky on either side seemed to the eye\nof imagination like the painted wings of a gigantic stage. Two\nbattered red columns of fantastic design, that were once light towers\nto guide ships, stood on either side midway between the extremities of\nthe building and the water, but on the opposite side of the road.\nThese two towers were beflagged and illuminated and carried the\nlimelight, and between and behind them was gathered a densely packed\naudience of forty or fifty thousand people. The play began at sundown,\nwhile the sky was still red away to the right and the palaces on the\nfar bank to the left still aglow with the setting sun, and it\ncontinued under the magic of the darkening sky. At first the beauty\nand grandeur of the setting drew the attention away from the\nperformers, but gradually one became aware that on the platform before\nthe columns kings and queens and courtiers in sumptuous conventional\nrobes, and attended by soldiers, were conversing in dumb show with one\nanother. A few climbed the steps of a small wooden platform that was\nset up in the middle, and one indicated by a lifted hand that here\nshould be built a monument to the power of capitalism over the earth.\nAll gave signs of delight. Sentimental music was heard, and the gay\ncompany fell to waltzing away the hours. Meanwhile, from below on the\nroad level, there streamed out of the darkness on either side of the\nbuilding and up the half-lit steps, their fetters ringing in harmony\nwith the music, the enslaved and toiling masses coming in response to\ncommand to build the monument for their masters. It is impossible to\ndescribe the exquisite beauty of the slow movement of those dark\nfigures aslant the broad flight of steps; individual expressions were\nof course indistinguishable, and yet the movement and attitude of the\ngroups conveyed pathos and patient endurance as well as any individual\nspeech or gesture in the ordinary theatre. Some groups carried hammer\nand anvil, and others staggered under enormous blocks of stone. Love\nfor the ballet has perhaps made the Russians understand the art of\nmoving groups of actors in unison. As I watched these processions\nclimbing the steps in apparently careless and spontaneous fashion, and\nyet producing so graceful a result, I remembered the mad leap of the\narchers down the stage in _Prince Igor_, which is also apparently\ncareless and spontaneous and full of wild and irregular beauty, yet\nnever varies a hair-breadth from one performance to the next.\n\nFor a time the workers toiled in the shadow in their earthly world,\nand dancing continued in the lighted paradise of the rulers above,\nuntil presently, in sign that the monument was complete, a large\nyellow disc was hoisted amid acclamation above the highest platform\nbetween the columns. But at the same moment a banner was uplifted\namongst the people, and a small figure was seen gesticulating. Angry\nfists were shaken and the banner and speaker disappeared, only to\nreappear almost immediately in another part of the dense crowd. Again\nhostility, until finally among the French workers away up on the\nright, the first Communist manifesto found favour. Rallying around\ntheir banner the _communards_ ran shouting down the steps, gathering\nsupporters as they came. Above, all is confusion, kings and queens\nscuttling in unroyal fashion with flying velvet robes to safe citadels\nright and left, while the army prepares to defend the main citadel of\ncapitalism with its golden disc of power. The _communards_ scale the\nsteps to the fortress which they finally capture, haul down the disc\nand set their banner in its place. The merry music of the _Carmagnole_\nis heard, and the victors are seen expressing their delight by dancing\nfirst on one foot and then on the other, like marionettes. Below, the\nmasses dance with them in a frenzy of joy. But a pompous procession of\nPrussian legions is seen approaching, and, amid shrieks and wails of\ndespair, the people are driven back, and their leaders set in a row\nand shot. Thereafter came one of the most moving scenes in the drama.\nSeveral dark-clad women appeared carrying a black pall supported on\nsticks, which they set in front of the bodies of the leaders so that\nit stood out, an irregular pointed black shape against the white\ncolumns behind. But for this melancholy monument the stage was now\nempty. Thick clouds of black smoke arose from braziers on either side\nand obscured the steps and the platform. Through the smoke came the\ndistant sound of Chopin's _Marche Funebre_, and as the air became\nclearer white figures could be dimly seen moving around the black pall\nin a solemn dance of mourning. Behind them the columns shone ghostly\nand unreal against the glimmering mauve rays of an uncertain and\nwatery dawn.\n\nThe second part of the pageant opened in July 1914. Once again the\nrulers were feasting and the workers at toil, but the scene was\nenlivened by the presence of the leaders of the Second International,\na group of decrepit professorial old men, who waddled in in solemn\nprocession carrying tomes full of international learning. They sat in\na row between the rulers and the people, deep in study, spectacles on\nnose. The call to war was the signal for a dramatic appeal from the\nworkers to these leaders, who refused to accept the Red Flag, but\nweakly received patriotic flags from their respective governments.\nJaures, elevated to be the symbol of protest, towered above the\npeople, crying in a loud voice, but fell back immediately as the\nassassin's shot rang out. Then the people divided into their national\ngroups and the war began. It was at this point that \"God Save the\nKing\" was played as the English soldiers marched out, in a comic\nmanner which made one think of it as \"_Gawd_ save the King.\" Other\nnational anthems were burlesqued in a similar fashion, but none quite\nso successfully. A ridiculous effigy of the Tsar with a knout in his\nhand now occupied the symbolic position and dominated the scene. The\nincidents of the war which affected Russia were then played.\nSpectacular cavalry charges on the road, marching soldiers, batteries\nof artillery, a pathetic procession of cripples and nurses, and other\nscenes too numerous to describe, made up that part of the pageant\ndevoted to the war.\n\nThen came the Russian Revolution in all its stages. Cars dashed by\nfull of armed men, red flags appeared everywhere, the people stormed\nthe citadel and hauled down the effigy of the Tsar. The Kerensky\nGovernment assumed control and drove them forth to war again, but soon\nthey returned to the charge, destroyed the Provisional Government, and\nhoisted all the emblems of the Russian Soviet Republic. The Entente\nleaders, however, were seen preparing their troops for battle, and the\npageant went on to show the formation of the Red Army under its emblem\nthe Red Star. White figures with golden trumpets appeared foretelling\nvictory for the proletariat. The last scene, the World Commune, is\ndescribed in the words of the abstract, taken from a Russian\nnewspaper, as follows:--\n\n    Cannon shots announce the breaking of the blockade against\n    Soviet Russia, and the victory of the World Proletariat. The\n    Red Army returns from the front, and passes in triumphant\n    review before the leaders of the Revolution. At their feet lie\n    the crowns of kings and the gold of the bankers. Ships draped\n    with flags are seen carrying workers from the west. The\n    workers of the whole world, with the emblems of labour, gather\n    for the celebration of the World Commune. In the heavens\n    luminous inscriptions in different languages appear, greeting\n    the Congress: \"Long live the Third International! Workers of\n    the world, unite! Triumph to the sounds of the hymn of the\n    World Commune, the 'International'.\"\n\nEven so glowing an account, however, hardly does it justice. It had\nthe pomp and majesty of the Day of Judgment itself. Rockets climbed\nthe skies and peppered them with a thousand stars, fireworks blazed on\nall sides, garlanded and beflagged ships moved up and down the river,\nchariots bearing the emblems of prosperity, grapes and corn, travelled\nslowly along the road. The Eastern peoples came carrying gifts and\nemblems. The actors, massed upon the steps, waved triumphant hands,\ntrumpets sounded, and the song of the International from ten thousand\nthroats rose like a mighty wave engulfing the whole.\n\nThough the end of this drama may have erred on the side of the\ngrandiose, this may perhaps be forgiven the organizers in view of the\noccasion for which they prepared it. Nothing, however, could detract\nfrom the beauty and dramatic power of the opening and of many of the\nscenes. Moreover, the effects obtained by movement in the mass were\nalmost intoxicating. The first entrance of the masses gave a sense of\ndumb and patient force that was moving in the extreme, and the\nfrenzied delight of the dancing crowd at the victory of the French\n_communards_ stirred one to ecstasy. The pageant lasted for five hours\nor more, and was as exhausting emotionally as the Passion Play is said\nto be. I had the vision of a great period of Communist art, more\nespecially of such open-air spectacles, which should have the grandeur\nand scope and eternal meaning of the plays of ancient Greece, the\nmediaeval mysteries, or the Shakespearean theatre. In building,\nwriting, acting, even in painting, work would be done, as it once was,\nby groups, not by one hand or mind, and evolution would proceed slowly\nuntil once again the individual emerged from the mass.\n\nIn considering Education under the Bolshevik regime, the same two\nfactors which I have already dealt with in discussing art, namely\nindustrial development and the communist doctrine, must be taken into\naccount. Industrial development is in reality one of the tenets of\nCommunism, but as it is one which in Russia is likely to endanger the\ndoctrine as a whole I have thought it better to consider it as a\nseparate item.\n\nAs in the matter of art, so in education, those who have given\nunqualified praise seem to have taken the short and superficial view.\nIt is hardly necessary to launch into descriptions of the creches,\ncountry homes or palaces for children, where Montessori methods\nprevail, where the pupils cultivate their little gardens, model in\nplasticine, draw and sing and act, and dance their Eurythmic dances\nbarefoot on floors once sacred to the tread of the nobility. I saw a\nreception and distributing house in Petrograd with which no fault\ncould be found from the point of view of scientific organization. The\nchildren were bright-eyed and merry, and the rooms airy and clean. I\nsaw, too, a performance by school children in Moscow which included\nsome quite wonderful Eurythmic dancing, in particular an\ninterpretation of Grieg's _Tanz in der Halle des Bergkoenigs_ by the\nDalcroze method, but with a colour and warmth which were Russian, and\nin odd contrast to the mathematical precision associated with most\nDalcroze performances.\n\nBut in spite of the obvious merit of such institutions as exist,\nmisgivings would arise. To begin with, it must be remembered that it\nis necessary first to admit that children should be delivered up\nalmost entirely to the State. Nominally, the mother still comes to see\nher child in these schools, but in actual fact, the drafting of\nchildren to the country must intervene, and the whole temper of the\nauthorities seemed to be directed towards breaking the link between\nmother and child. To some this will seem an advantage, and it is a\npoint which admits of lengthy discussion, but as it belongs rather to\nthe question of women and the family under Communism, I can do no more\nthan mention it here.\n\nThen, again, it must be remembered that the tactics of the Bolsheviks\ntowards such schools as existed under the old regime in provincial\ntowns and villages, have not been the same as their tactics towards\nthe theatres. The greater number of these schools are closed, in part,\nit would seem, from lack of personnel, and in part from fear of\ncounter-revolutionary propaganda. The result is that, though those\nschools which they have created are good and organized on modern\nlines, on the whole there would seem to be less diffusion of child\neducation than before. In this, as in most other departments, the\nBolsheviks show themselves loath to attempt anything which cannot be\ndone on a large scale and impregnated with Communist doctrine. It goes\nwithout saying that Communist doctrine is taught in schools, as\nChristianity has been taught hitherto, moreover the Communist teachers\nshow bitter hostility to other teachers who do not accept the\ndoctrine. At the children's entertainment alluded to above, the dances\nand poems performed had nearly all some close relation to Communism,\nand a teacher addressed the children for something like an hour and a\nhalf on the duties of Communists and the errors of Anarchism.\n\nThis teaching of Communism, however necessary it may appear for the\nbuilding of the Communist state of the future, does seem to me to be\nan evil in that it is done emotionally and fanatically, with an appeal\nto hate and militant ardour rather than to constructive reason. It\nbinds the free intellect and destroys initiative. An industrial state\nneeds not only obedient and patient workers and artists, it needs also\nmen and women with initiative in scientific research. It is idle to\nprovide channels for scientific research later if it is to be choked\nat the source. That source is an enquiring and free intellect\nunhampered by iron dogma. Beneficial to artistic and emotional\ndevelopment therefore, the teaching of Communism as a faith may well\nbe most pernicious to the scientific and intellectual side of\neducation, and will lead direct to the pragmatist view of knowledge\nand scientific research which the Church and the capitalist already\nfind it so convenient to adopt.\n\nBut to come to the chief and most practical question, the relation of\neducation to industry. Sooner or later education in Russia must become\nsubordinate to the needs of industrial development. That the\nBolsheviks already realize this is proved by the articles of\nLunacharsky which recently appeared in _Le Phare_ (Geneva). It was the\nspectre of industry that haunted me throughout the consideration of\neducation as in the consideration of art, and what I have said above\nof its dangers to the latter seems to me also to apply here.\nMontessori schools belong, in my view, to that stage in industrial\ndevelopment when education is directed as much towards leisure\noccupations as towards preparation for professional life. Possibly the\nfine flower of useless scientific enquiry belongs to this stage also.\nNobody in Russia is likely to have much leisure for a good many years\nto come, if the Bolshevik programme of industrial development is\nefficiently carried out. And there seemed to me to be something\npathetic and almost cruel in this varied and agreeable education of\nthe child, when one reflected on the long hours of grinding toil to\nwhich he was soon to be subject in workshop or factory. For I repeat\nthat I do not believe industrial work in the early days of industry\ncan be made tolerable to the worker. Once again I experienced the\ndread of seeing the ideals of the Russian revolutionaries go down\nbefore the logic of necessity. They are beginning to pride themselves\non being hard, practical men, and it seems quite reasonable to fear\nthat they should come to regard this full and humane development of\nthe child as a mere luxury and ultimately neglect it. Worse still, the\nfew of these schools which already exist may perhaps become exclusive\nto the Communists and their children, or that company of Samurai which\nis to leaven and govern the mass of the people. If so, they will soon\ncome to resemble our public schools, in that they will prepare, in an\nartificial play atmosphere, men who will pass straight to the position\nof leaders, while the portion of the proletariat who serve under them\nwill be reading and writing, just so much technical training as is\nnecessary, and Communist doctrine.\n\nThis is a nightmare hypothesis, but the difficulties of the practical\nproblem seem to warrant its entertainment. The number of people in\nRussia who can even read and write is extremely small, the need to\nget them employed industrially as rapidly as possible is very great,\nhence the system of education which develops out of this situation\ncannot be very ambitious or enlightened. Further it will have to\ncontinue over a sufficiently long period of time to allow of the risk\nof its becoming stable and traditional. In adult education already the\npupil comes for a short period, learns Communism, reading and\nwriting--there is hardly time to give him much more--and returns to\nleaven the army or his native village. In achieving this the\nBolsheviks are already doing a very important and valuable work, but\nthey cannot hope for a long while to become the model of public\ninstruction which they have hitherto been represented to be. And the\nconditions of their becoming so ultimately are adherence to their\nideals through a very long period of stress, and a lessening of\nfanaticism in their Communist teaching, conditions which, unhappily,\nseem to be mutually incompatible.\n\nThe whole of the argument set out in this chapter may be summed up in\nthe statement of one fact which the mere idealist is prone to\noverlook, namely that Russia is a country at a stage in economic\ndevelopment not much more advanced than America in the pioneer days.\nThe old civilization was aristocratic and exotic; it could not survive\nin the modern world. It is true that it produced great men, but its\nfoundations were rotten. The new civilization may, for the moment, be\nless productive of individual works of genius, but it has a new\nsolidity and gives promise of a new unity. It may be that I have taken\ntoo hopeful a view and that the future evolution of Russia will have\nas little connection with the life and tradition of its present\npopulation as modern America with the life of the Red Indian tribes.\nThe fact that there exists in Russia a population at a far higher\nstage of culture, which will be industrially educated, not\nexterminated, militates against this hypothesis, but the need for\neducation may make progress slower than it was in the United States.\n\nOne would not have looked for the millennium of Communism, nor even\nfor valuable art and educational experiment in the America of early\nrailroading and farming days. Nor must one look for such things from\nRussia yet. It may be that during the next hundred years there,\neconomic evolution will obscure Communist ideals, until finally, in a\ncountry that has reached the stage of present-day America, the battle\nwill be fought out again to a victorious and stable issue. Unless,\nindeed, the Marxian scripture prove to be not infallible, and faith\nand heroic devotion show themselves capable of triumphing over\neconomic necessity.\n\n\n\n\nV\n\nCOMMUNISM AND THE SOVIET CONSTITUTION\n\n\nBefore I went to Russia I imagined that I was going to see an\ninteresting experiment in a new form of representative government. I\ndid see an interesting experiment, but not in representative\ngovernment. Every one who is interested in Bolshevism knows the series\nof elections, from the village meeting to the All-Russian Soviet, by\nwhich the people's commissaries are supposed to derive their power. We\nwere told that, by the recall, the occupational constituencies, and so\non, a new and far more perfect machinery had been devised for\nascertaining and registering the popular will. One of the things we\nhoped to study was the question whether the Soviet system is really\nsuperior to Parliamentarism in this respect.\n\nWe were not able to make any such study, because the Soviet system is\nmoribund.[4] No conceivable system of free election would give\nmajorities to the Communists, either in town or country. Various\nmethods are therefore adopted for giving the victory to Government\ncandidates. In the first place, the voting is by show of hands, so\nthat all who vote against the Government are marked men. In the second\nplace, no candidate who is not a Communist can have any printing done,\nthe printing works being all in the hands of the State. In the third\nplace, he cannot address any meetings, because the halls all belong to\nthe State. The whole of the press is, of course, official; no\nindependent daily is permitted. In spite of all these obstacles, the\nMensheviks have succeeded in winning about 40 seats out of 1,500 on\nthe Moscow Soviet, by being known in certain large factories where the\nelectoral campaign could be conducted by word of mouth. They won, in\nfact, every seat that they contested.\n\nBut although the Moscow Soviet is nominally sovereign in Moscow, it is\nreally only a body of electors who choose the executive committee of\nforty, out of which, in turn, is chosen the Presidium, consisting of\nnine men who have all the power. The Moscow Soviet, as a whole, meets\nrarely; the Executive Committee is supposed to meet once a week, but\ndid not meet while we were in Moscow. The Presidium, on the contrary,\nmeets daily. Of course, it is easy for the Government to exercise\npressure over the election of the executive committee, and again over\nthe election of the Presidium. It must be remembered that effective\nprotest is impossible, owing to the absolutely complete suppression of\nfree speech and free Press. The result is that the Presidium of the\nMoscow Soviet consists only of orthodox Communists.\n\nKamenev, the President of the Moscow Soviet, informed us that the\nrecall is very frequently employed; he said that in Moscow there are,\non an average, thirty recalls a month. I asked him what were the\nprincipal reasons for the recall, and he mentioned four: drinking,\ngoing to the front (and being, therefore, incapable of performing the\nduties), change of politics on the part of the electors, and failure\nto make a report to the electors once a fortnight, which all members\nof the Soviet are expected to do. It is evident that the recall\naffords opportunities for governmental pressure, but I had no chance\nof finding out whether it is used for this purpose.\n\nIn country districts the method employed is somewhat different. It is\nimpossible to secure that the village Soviet shall consist of\nCommunists, because, as a rule, at any rate in the villages I saw,\nthere are no Communists. But when I asked in the villages how they\nwere represented on the Volost (the next larger area) or the Gubernia,\nI was met always with the reply that they were not represented at all.\nI could not verify this, and it is probably an overstatement, but all\nconcurred in the assertion that if they elected a non-Communist\nrepresentative he could not obtain a pass on the railway and,\ntherefore, could not attend the Volost or Gubernia Soviet. I saw a\nmeeting of the Gubernia Soviet of Saratov. The representation is so\narranged that the town workers have an enormous preponderance over the\nsurrounding peasants; but even allowing for this, the proportion of\npeasants seemed astonishingly small for the centre of a very important\nagricultural area.\n\nThe All-Russian Soviet, which is constitutionally the supreme body, to\nwhich the People's Commissaries are responsible, meets seldom, and has\nbecome increasingly formal. Its sole function at present, so far as I\ncould discover, is to ratify, without discussion, previous decisions\nof the Communist Party on matters (especially concerning foreign\npolicy) upon which the constitution requires its decision.\n\nAll real power is in the hands of the Communist Party, who number\nabout 600,000 in a population of about 120 millions. I never came\nacross a Communist by chance: the people whom I met in the streets or\nin the villages, when I could get into conversation with them, almost\ninvariably said they were of no party. The only other answer I ever\nhad was from some of the peasants, who openly stated that they were\nTsarists. It must be said that the peasants' reasons for disliking the\nBolsheviks are very inadequate. It is said--and all I saw confirmed\nthe assertion--that the peasants are better off than they ever were\nbefore. I saw no one--man, woman, or child--who looked underfed in the\nvillages. The big landowners are dispossessed, and the peasants have\nprofited. But the towns and the army still need nourishing, and the\nGovernment has nothing to give the peasants in return for food except\npaper, which the peasants resent having to take. It is a singular fact\nthat Tsarist roubles are worth ten times as much as Soviet roubles,\nand are much commoner in the country. Although they are illegal,\npocket-books full of them are openly displayed in the market places. I\ndo not think it should be inferred that the peasants expect a Tsarist\nrestoration: they are merely actuated by custom and dislike of\nnovelty. They have never heard of the blockade; consequently they\ncannot understand why the Government is unable to give them the\nclothes and agricultural implements that they need. Having got their\nland, and being ignorant of affairs outside their own neighbourhood,\nthey wish their own village to be independent, and would resent the\ndemands of any Government whatever.\n\nWithin the Communist Party there are, of course, as always in a\nbureaucracy, different factions, though hitherto the external pressure\nhas prevented disunion. It seemed to me that the personnel of the\nbureaucracy could be divided into three classes. There are first the\nold revolutionists, tested by years of persecution. These men have\nmost of the highest posts. Prison and exile have made them tough and\nfanatical and rather out of touch with their own country. They are\nhonest men, with a profound belief that Communism will regenerate the\nworld. They think themselves utterly free from sentiment, but, in\nfact, they are sentimental about Communism and about the regime that\nthey are creating; they cannot face the fact that what they are\ncreating is not complete Communism, and that Communism is anathema to\nthe peasant, who wants his own land and nothing else. They are\npitiless in punishing corruption or drunkenness when they find either\namong officials; but they have built up a system in which the\ntemptations to petty corruption are tremendous, and their own\nmaterialistic theory should persuade them that under such a system\ncorruption must be rampant.\n\nThe second class in the bureaucracy, among whom are to be found most\nof the men occupying political posts just below the top, consists of\n_arrivistes_, who are enthusiastic Bolsheviks because of the material\nsuccess of Bolshevism. With them must be reckoned the army of\npolicemen, spies, and secret agents, largely inherited from the\nTsarist times, who make their profit out of the fact that no one can\nlive except by breaking the law. This aspect of Bolshevism is\nexemplified by the Extraordinary Commission, a body practically\nindependent of the Government, possessing its own regiments, who are\nbetter fed than the Red Army. This body has the power of imprisoning\nany man or woman without trial on such charges as speculation or\ncounter-revolutionary activity. It has shot thousands without proper\ntrial, and though now it has nominally lost the power of inflicting\nthe death penalty, it is by no means certain that it has altogether\nlost it in fact. It has spies everywhere, and ordinary mortals live in\nterror of it.\n\nThe third class in the bureaucracy consists of men who are not ardent\nCommunists, who have rallied to the Government since it has proved\nitself stable, and who work for it either out of patriotism or because\nthey enjoy the opportunity of developing their ideas freely without\nthe obstacle of traditional institutions. Among this class are to be\nfound men of the type of the successful business man, men with the\nsame sort of ability as is found in the American self-made Trust\nmagnate, but working for success and power, not for money. There is no\ndoubt that the Bolsheviks are successfully solving the problem of\nenlisting this kind of ability in the public service, without\npermitting it to amass wealth as it does in capitalist communities.\nThis is perhaps their greatest success so far, outside the domain of\nwar. It makes it possible to suppose that, if Russia is allowed to\nhave peace, an amazing industrial development may take place, making\nRussia a rival of the United States. The Bolsheviks are industrialists\nin all their aims; they love everything in modern industry except the\nexcessive rewards of the capitalists. And the harsh discipline to\nwhich they are subjecting the workers is calculated, if anything can,\nto give them the habits of industry and honesty which have hitherto\nbeen lacking, and the lack of which alone prevents Russia from being\none of the foremost industrial countries.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[4] In _Theses_ (p. 6 of French edition) it is said: \"The ancient\nclassic subdivision of the Labour movement into three forms (parties,\ntrade unions, and co-operatives) has served its time. The proletarian\nrevolution has raised up in Russia the essential form of proletarian\ndictatorship, the _soviets_. But the work in the Soviets, as in the\nindustrial trade unions which have become revolutionary, must be\ninvariably and systematically directed by the party of the\nproletariat, i.e. the Communist Party. As the organized advanced guard\nof the working class, the Communist Party answers equally to the\neconomic, political and spiritual needs of the entire working class.\nIt must be the soul of the trade unions, the soviets, and all other\nproletarian organizations.\n\n\"The appearance of the Soviets, the principal historical form of the\ndictatorship of the proletariat, in no way diminishes the directing\nrole of the party in the proletarian revolution. When the German\nCommunists of the 'Left' ... declare that 'the party itself must also\nadapt itself more and more to the Soviet idea and proletarianize\nitself,' we see there only an insinuating expression of the idea that\nthe Communist Party must dissolve itself into the Soviets, so that the\nSoviets can replace it.\n\n\"This idea is profoundly erroneous and reactionary.\n\n\"The history of the Russian Revolution shows us, at a certain moment,\nthe Soviets going against the proletarian party and helping the agents\nof the bourgeoisie....\n\n\"In order that the Soviets may fulfil their historic mission, the\nexistence of a Communist Party, strong enough not to 'adapt' itself to\nthe Soviets but to exercise on them a decisive influence, to force\nthem _not to adapt themselves_ to the bourgeoisie and official social\ndemocracy, ... is on the contrary necessary.\"\n\n\n\n\nVI\n\nTHE FAILURE OF RUSSIAN INDUSTRY\n\n\nAt first sight it is surprising that Russian industry should have\ncollapsed as badly as it has done, and still more surprising that the\nefforts of the Communists have not been more successful in reviving\nit. As I believe that the continued efficiency of industry is the main\ncondition for success in the transition to a Communist State, I shall\nendeavour to analyse the causes of the collapse, with a view to the\ndiscovery of ways by which it can be avoided elsewhere.\n\nOf the fact of the collapse there can be no doubt. The Ninth Congress\nof the Communist Party (March-April, 1920) speaks of \"the incredible\ncatastrophes of public economy,\" and in connection with transport,\nwhich is one of the vital elements of the problem, it acknowledges\n\"the terrible collapse of the transport and the railway system,\" and\nurges the introduction of \"measures which cannot be delayed and which\nare to obviate the complete paralysis of the railway system and,\ntogether with this, the ruin of the Soviet Republic.\" Almost all those\nwho have visited Russia would confirm this view of the gravity of the\nsituation. In the factories, in great works like those of Putilov and\nSornovo, very little except war work is being done; machinery stands\nidle and plant is becoming unusable. One sees hardly any new\nmanufactured articles in Russia, beyond a certain very inadequate\nquantity of clothes and boots--always excepting what is needed for the\narmy. And the difficulty of obtaining food is conclusive evidence of\nthe absence of goods such as are needed by the peasants.\n\nHow has this state of affairs arisen? And why does it continue?\n\nA great deal of disorganization occurred before the first revolution\nand under Kerensky. Russian industry was partly dependent on Poland;\nthe war was conducted by methods of reckless extravagance, especially\nas regards rolling-stock; under Kerensky there was a tendency to\nuniversal holiday, under the impression that freedom had removed the\nnecessity for work. But when all this is admitted to the full, it\nremains true that the state of industry under the Bolsheviks is much\nworse than even under Kerensky.\n\nThe first and most obvious reason for this is that Russia was quite\nunusually dependent upon foreign assistance. Not only did the\nmachinery in the factories and the locomotives on the railways come\nfrom abroad, but the organizing and technical brains in industry were\nmainly foreign. When the Entente became hostile to Russia, the\nforeigners in Russian industry either left the country or assisted\ncounter-revolution. Even those who were in fact loyal naturally became\nsuspect, and could not well be employed in responsible posts, any more\nthan Germans could in England during the war. The native Russians who\nhad technical or business skill were little better; they almost all\npractised sabotage in the first period of the Bolshevik regime. One\nhears amusing stories of common sailors frantically struggling with\ncomplicated accounts, because no competent accountant would work for\nthe Bolsheviks.\n\nBut those days passed. When the Government was seen to be stable, a\ngreat many of those who had formerly sabotaged it became willing to\naccept posts under it, and are now in fact so employed, often at quite\nexceptional salaries. Their importance is thoroughly realized. One\nresolution at the above-mentioned Congress says (I quote verbally the\nunedited document which was given to us in Moscow):\n\n    Being of opinion that without a scientific organization of\n    industry, even the widest application of compulsory labour\n    service, as the great labour heroism of the working class,\n    will not only fail to secure the establishment of a powerful\n    socialist production, but will also fail to assist the country\n    to free itself from the clutches of poverty--the Congress\n    considers it imperative to register all able specialists of\n    the various departments of public economy and widely to\n    utilize them for the purpose of industrial organization.\n\n    The Congress considers the elucidation for the wide masses of\n    the workers of the tremendous character of the economic\n    problems of the country to be one of the chief problems of\n    industrial and general political agitation and propaganda; and\n    of equal importance to this, technical education, and\n    administrative and scientific technical experience. The\n    Congress makes it obligatory on all the members of the party\n    mercilessly to fight that particular obnoxious form, the\n    ignorant conceit which deems the working class capable of\n    solving all problems without the assistance _in the most\n    responsible cases_ of specialists of the bourgeois school, the\n    management. Demagogic elements who speculate on this kind of\n    prejudice in the more backward section of our working classes,\n    can have no place in the ranks of the party of Scientific\n    Socialism.\n\nBut Russia alone is unable to supply the amount of skill required, and\nis very deficient in technical instructors, as well as in skilled\nworkmen. One was told, over and over again, that the first step in\nimprovement would be the obtaining of spare parts for locomotives. It\nseems strange that these could not be manufactured in Russia. To some\nextent they can be, and we were shown locomotives which had been\nrepaired on Communist Saturdays. But in the main the machinery for\nmaking spare parts is lacking and the skill required for its\nmanufacture does not exist. Thus dependence on the outside world\npersists, and the blockade continues to do its deadly work of\nspreading hunger, demoralization and despair.\n\nThe food question is intimately bound up with the question of\nindustry. There is a vicious circle, for not only does the absence of\nmanufactured goods cause a food shortage in the towns, but the food\nshortage, in turn, diminishes the strength of the workers and makes\nthem less able to produce goods. I cannot but think that there has\nbeen some mismanagement as regards the food question. For example, in\nPetrograd many workers have allotments and often work in them for\neight hours after an eight hours' day in their regular employment. But\nthe food produced in the allotments is taken for general consumption,\nnot left to each individual producer. This is in accordance with\nCommunist theory, but of course greatly diminishes the incentive to\nwork, and increases the red tape and administrative machinery.\n\nLack of fuel has been another very grave source of trouble. Before the\nwar coal came mostly from Poland and the Donetz Basin. Poland is lost\nto Russia, and the Donetz Basin was in the hands of Denikin, who so\ndestroyed the mines before retreating that they are still not in\nworking order. The result is a practically complete absence of coal.\nOil, which is equally important in Russia, was also lacking until the\nrecent recovery of Baku. All that I saw on the Volga made me believe\nthat real efficiency has been shown in reorganizing the transport of\noil, and doubtless this will do something to revive industry. But the\noil used to be worked very largely by Englishmen, and English\nmachinery is much needed for refining it. In the meantime, Russia has\nhad to depend upon wood, which involves immense labour. Most of the\nhouses are not warmed in winter, so that people live in a temperature\nbelow freezing-point. Another consequence of lack of fuel was the\nbursting of water-pipes, so that people in Petrograd, for the most\npart, have to go down to the Neva to fetch their water--a considerable\naddition to the labour of an already overworked day.\n\nI find it difficult to believe that, if greater efficiency had existed\nin the Government, the food and fuel difficulties could not have been\nconsiderably alleviated. In spite of the needs of the army, there are\nstill many horses in Russia; I saw troops of thousands of horses on\nthe Volga, which apparently belonged to Kalmuk tribes. By the help of\ncarts and sledges, it ought to be possible, without more labour than\nis warranted by the importance of the problem, to bring food and\ntimber into Moscow and Petrograd. It must be remembered that both\ncities are surrounded by forests, and Moscow at least is surrounded by\ngood agricultural land. The Government has devoted all its best\nenergies hitherto to the two tasks of war and propaganda, while\nindustry and the food problem have been left to a lesser degree of\nenergy and intelligence. It is no doubt probable that, if peace is\nsecured, the economic problems will receive more attention than\nhitherto. But the Russian character seems less adapted to steady work\nof an unexciting nature than to heroic efforts on great occasions; it\nhas immense passive endurance, but not much active tenacity. Whether,\nwith the menace of foreign invasion removed, enough day-by-day\ndetailed energy would exist for the reorganization of industry, is a\ndoubtful question, as to which only time can decide.\n\nThis leads to the conclusion--which I think is adopted by most of the\nleading men in Russia--that it will be very difficult indeed to save\nthe revolution without outside economic assistance. Outside assistance\nfrom capitalist countries is dangerous to the principles of Communism,\nas well as precarious from the likelihood of fresh causes of quarrel.\nBut the need of help is urgent, and if the policy of promoting\nrevolution elsewhere were to succeed, it would probably render the\nnations concerned temporarily incapable of supplying Russian needs.\nIt is, therefore, necessary for Russia to accept the risks and\nuncertainties involved in attempting to make peace with the Entente\nand to trade with America. By continuing war, Russia can do infinite\ndamage to us, especially in Asia, but cannot hope, for many years, to\nachieve any degree of internal prosperity. The situation, therefore,\nis one in which, even from the narrowest point of view, peace is to\nthe interest of both parties.\n\nIt is difficult for an outsider with only superficial knowledge to\njudge of the efforts which have been made to reorganize industry\nwithout outside help. These efforts have chiefly taken the form of\nindustrial conscription. Workers in towns seek to escape to the\ncountry, in order to have enough to eat; but this is illegal and\nseverely punished. The same Communist Report from which I have already\nquoted speaks on this subject as follows:\n\n    _Labour Desertion._--Owing to the fact that a considerable\n    part of the workers either in search of better food conditions\n    or often for the purposes of speculation, voluntarily leave\n    their places of employment or change from place to place,\n    which inevitably harms production and deteriorates the general\n    position of the working class, the Congress considers one of\n    the most urgent problems of Soviet Government and of the Trade\n    Union organization to be established as the firm, systematic\n    and insistent struggle with labour desertion, The way to fight\n    this is to publish a list of desertion fines, the creation of\n    a labour Detachment of Deserters under fine, and, finally,\n    internment in concentration camps.\n\nIt is hoped to extend the system to the peasantry:\n\n    The defeat of the White Armies and the problems of peaceful\n    construction in connection with the incredible catastrophes of\n    public economy demand an extraordinary effort of all the\n    powers of the proletariat and the drafting into the process of\n    public labour of the wide masses of the peasantry.\n\nOn the vital subject of transport, in a passage of which I have\nalready quoted a fragment, the Communist Party declares:\n\n    For the most immediate future transport remains the centre of\n    the attention and the efforts of the Soviet Government. The\n    improvement of transport is the indispensable basis upon which\n    even the most moderate success in all other spheres of\n    production and first of all in the provision question can be\n    gained.\n\n    The chief difficulty with regard to the improvement of\n    transport is the weakness of the Transport Trade Union, which\n    is due in the first case to the heterogeneity of the personnel\n    of the railways, amongst whom there are still a number of\n    those who belong to the period of disorganization, and,\n    secondly, to the fact that the most class-conscious and best\n    elements of the railway proletariat were at the various fronts\n    of the civil war.\n\n    Considering wide Trade Union assistance to the railway workers\n    to be one of the principal tasks of the Party, and as the only\n    condition under which transport can be raised to its height,\n    the Congress at the same time recognizes the inflexible\n    necessity of employing exclusive and extraordinary measures\n    (martial law, and so forth). Such necessity is the result of\n    the terrible collapse of the transport and the railroad system\n    and is to introduce measures which cannot be delayed and which\n    are to obviate the complete paralysis of the railway system\n    and, together with this, the ruin of the Soviet Republic.\n\nThe general attitude to the militarization of labour is stated in the\nResolution with which this section of the Proceedings begins:\n\n    The ninth Congress approves of the decision of the Central\n    Committee of the Russian Communist Party on the mobilization\n    of the industrial proletariat, compulsory labour service,\n    militarization of production and the application of military\n    detachments to economic needs.\n\n    In connection with the above, the Congress decrees that the\n    Party organization should in every way assist the Trade Unions\n    and the Labour Sections in registering all skilled workers\n    with a view of employing them in the various branches of\n    production with the same consistency and strictness as was\n    done, and is being carried out at the present time, in\n    relation to the commanding staff for army needs.\n\n    Every skilled worker is to return to his particular trade\n    Exceptions, i.e. the retention of the skilled worker in any\n    other branch of Soviet service, is allowed only with the\n    sanction of the corresponding central and local authorities.\n\nIt is, of course, evident that in these measures the Bolsheviks have\nbeen compelled to travel a long way from the ideals which originally\ninspired the revolution. But the situation is so desperate that they\ncould not be blamed if their measures were successful. In a shipwreck\nall hands must turn to, and it would be ridiculous to prate of\nindividual liberty. The most distressing feature of the situation is\nthat these stern laws seem to have produced so little effect. Perhaps\nin the course of years Russia might become self-supporting without\nhelp from the outside world, but the suffering meantime would be\nterrible. The early hopes of the revolution would fade more and more.\nEvery failure of industry, every tyrannous regulation brought about by\nthe desperate situation, is used by the Entente as a justification of\nits policy. If a man is deprived of food and drink, he will grow weak,\nlose his reason, and finally die. This is not usually considered a\ngood reason for inflicting death by starvation. But where nations are\nconcerned, the weakness and struggles are regarded as morally\nculpable, and are held to justify further punishment. So at least it\nhas been in the case of Russia. Nothing produced a doubt in our\ngoverning minds as to the rightness of our policy except the strength\nof the Red Army and the fear of revolution in Asia. Is it surprising\nthat professions of humanitarian feeling on the part of English people\nare somewhat coldly received in Soviet Russia?\n\n\n\n\nVII\n\nDAILY LIFE IN MOSCOW\n\n\nDaily life in Moscow, so far as I could discover, has neither the\nhorrors depicted by the Northcliffe Press nor the delights imagined by\nthe more ardent of our younger Socialists.\n\nOn the one hand, there is no disorder, very little crime, not much\ninsecurity for those who keep clear of politics. Everybody works hard;\nthe educated people have, by this time, mostly found their way into\nGovernment offices or teaching or some other administrative profession\nin which their education is useful. The theatres, the opera and the\nballet continue as before, and are quite admirable; some of the seats\nare paid for, others are given free to members of trade unions. There\nis, of course, no drunkenness, or at any rate so little that none of\nus ever saw a sign of it. There is very little prostitution,\ninfinitely less than in any other capital. Women are safer from\nmolestation than anywhere else in the world. The whole impression is\none of virtuous, well-ordered activity.\n\nOn the other hand, life is very hard for all except men in good posts.\nIt is hard, first of all, owing to the food shortage. This is familiar\nto all who have interested themselves in Russia, and it is unnecessary\nto dwell upon it. What is less realized is that most people work much\nlonger hours than in this country. The eight-hour day was introduced\nwith a flourish of trumpets; then, owing to the pressure of the war,\nit was extended to ten hours in certain trades. But no provision\nexists against extra work at other jobs, and very many people do extra\nwork, because the official rates do not afford a living wage. This is\nnot the fault of the Government, at any rate as regards the major\npart; it is due chiefly to war and blockade. When the day's work is\nover, a great deal of time has to be spent in fetching food and water\nand other necessaries of life. The sight of the workers going to and\nfro, shabbily clad, with the inevitable bundle in one hand and tin can\nin the other, through streets almost entirely empty of traffic,\nproduces the effect of life in some vast village, rather than in an\nimportant capital city.\n\nHolidays, such as are common throughout all but the very poorest class\nin this country, are very difficult in Russia. A train journey\nrequires a permit, which is only granted on good reasons being shown;\nwith the present shortage of transport, this regulation is quite\nunavoidable. Railway queues are a common feature in Moscow; it often\ntakes several days to get a permit. Then, when it has been obtained,\nit may take several more days to get a seat in a train. The ordinary\ntrains are inconceivably crowded, far more so, though that seems\nimpossible, than London trains at the busiest hour. On the shorter\njourneys, passengers are even known to ride on the roof and buffers,\nor cling like flies to the sides of the waggons. People in Moscow\ntravel to the country whenever they can afford the time and get a\npermit, because in the country there is enough to eat. They go to stay\nwith relations--most people in Moscow, in all classes, but especially\namong manual workers, have relations in the country. One cannot, of\ncourse, go to an hotel as one would in other countries. Hotels have\nbeen taken over by the State, and the rooms in them (when they are\nstill used) are allocated by the police to people whose business is\nrecognized as important by the authorities. Casual travel is therefore\nimpossible even on a holiday.\n\nJourneys have vexations in addition to the slowness and overcrowding\nof the trains. Police search the travellers for evidences of\n\"speculation,\" especially for food. The police play, altogether, a\nmuch greater part in daily life than they do in other countries--much\ngreater than they did, for example, in Prussia twenty-five years ago,\nwhen there was a vigorous campaign against Socialism. Everybody breaks\nthe law almost daily, and no one knows which among his acquaintances\nis a spy of the Extraordinary Commission. Even in the prisons, among\nprisoners, there are spies, who are allowed certain privileges but not\ntheir liberty.\n\nNewspapers are not taken in, except by very few people, but they are\nstuck up in public places, where passers-by occasionally glance at\nthem.[5] There is very little to read; owing to paper shortage, books\nare rare, and money to buy them is still rarer. One does not see\npeople reading, as one does here in the Underground for example. There\nis practically no social life, partly because of the food shortage,\npartly because, when anybody is arrested, the police are apt to arrest\neverybody whom they find in his company, or who comes to visit him.\nAnd once arrested, a man or woman, however innocent, may remain for\nmonths in prison without trial. While we were in Moscow, forty social\nrevolutionaries and Anarchists were hunger-striking to enforce their\ndemand to be tried and to be allowed visits. I was told that on the\neighth day of the strike the Government consented to try them, and\nthat few could be proved guilty of any crime; but I had no means of\nverifying this.\n\nIndustrial conscription is, of course, rigidly enforced. Every man and\nwoman has to work, and slacking is severely punished, by prison or a\npenal settlement. Strikes are illegal, though they sometimes occur. By\nproclaiming itself the friend of the proletarian, the Government has\nbeen enabled to establish an iron discipline, beyond the wildest\ndreams of the most autocratic American magnate. And by the same\nprofessions the Government has led Socialists from other countries to\nabstain from reporting unpleasant features in what they have seen.\n\nThe Tolstoyans, of whom I saw the leaders, are obliged by their creed\nto resist every form of conscription, though some have found ways of\ncompromising. The law concerning conscientious objectors to military\nservice is practically the same as ours, and its working depends upon\nthe temper of the tribunal before which a man comes. Some\nconscientious objectors have been shot; on the other hand, some have\nobtained absolute exemption.\n\nLife in Moscow, as compared to life in London, is drab, monotonous,\nand depressed. I am not, of course, comparing life there with that of\nthe rich here, but with that of the average working-class family. When\nit is realized that the highest wages are about fifteen shillings a\nmonth, this is not surprising. I do not think that life could, under\nany system, be very cheerful in a country so exhausted by war as\nRussia, so I am not saying this as a criticism of the Bolsheviks. But\nI do think there might be less police interference, less vexatious\nregulation, and more freedom for spontaneous impulses towards harmless\nenjoyments.\n\nReligion is still very strong. I went into many churches, where I saw\nobviously famished priests in gorgeous vestments, and a congregation\nenormously devout. Generally more than half the congregation were men,\nand among the men many were soldiers. This applies to the towns as\nwell as to the country. In Moscow I constantly saw people in the\nstreets crossing themselves.\n\nThere is a theory that the Moscow working man feels himself free from\ncapitalist domination, and therefore bears hardships gladly. This is\nno doubt true of the minority who are active Communists, but I do not\nthink it has any truth for the others. The average working man, to\njudge by a rather hasty impression, feels himself the slave of the\nGovernment, and has no sense whatever of having been liberated from a\ntyranny.\n\nI recognize to the full the reasons for the bad state of affairs, in\nthe past history of Russia and the recent policy of the Entente. But I\nhave thought it better to record impressions frankly, trusting the\nreaders to remember that the Bolsheviks have only a very limited share\nof responsibility for the evils from which Russia is suffering.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[5] The ninth Communist Congress (March-April, 1920) says on this\nsubject: \"In view of the fact that the first condition of the success\nof the Soviet Republic in all departments, including the economic, is\nchiefly systematic printed agitation, the Congress draws the attention\nof the Soviet Government to the deplorable state in which our paper\nand printing industries find themselves. The ever decreasing number of\nnewspapers fail to reach not only the peasants but even the workers,\nin addition to which our poor technical means render the papers hardly\nreadable. The Congress strongly appeals to the Supreme Council of\nPublic Economy, to the corresponding Trade Unions and other interested\ninstitutions, to apply all efforts to raise the quantity, to introduce\ngeneral system and order in the printing business, and so secure for\nthe worker and peasant in Russia a supply of Socialist printed\nmatter.\"\n\n\n\n\nVIII\n\nTOWN AND COUNTRY\n\n\nThe problem of inducing the peasants to feed the towns is one which\nRussia shares with Central Europe, and from what one hears Russia has\nbeen less unsuccessful than some other countries in dealing with this\nproblem. For the Soviet Government, the problem is mainly concentrated\nin Moscow and Petrograd; the other towns are not very large, and are\nmostly in the centre of rich agricultural districts. It is true that\nin the North even the rural population normally depends upon food from\nmore southerly districts; but the northern population is small. It is\ncommonly said that the problem of feeding Moscow and Petrograd is a\ntransport problem, but I think this is only partially true. There is,\nof course, a grave deficiency of rolling-stock, especially of\nlocomotives in good repair. But Moscow is surrounded by very good\nland. In the course of a day's motoring in the neighbourhood, I saw\nenough cows to supply milk to the whole child population of Moscow,\nalthough what I had come to see was children's sanatoria, not farms.\nAll kinds of food can be bought in the market at high prices. I\ntravelled over a considerable extent of Russian railways, and saw a\nfair number of goods trains. For all these reasons, I feel convinced\nthat the share of the transport problem in the food difficulties has\nbeen exaggerated. Of course transport plays a larger part in the\nshortage in Petrograd than in Moscow, because food comes mainly from\nsouth of Moscow. In Petrograd, most of the people one sees in the\nstreets show obvious signs of under-feeding. In Moscow, the visible\nsigns are much less frequent, but there is no doubt that\nunder-feeding, though not actual starvation, is nearly universal.\n\nThe Government supplies rations to every one who works in the towns at\na very low fixed price. The official theory is that the Government has\na monopoly of the food and that the rations are sufficient to sustain\nlife. The fact is that the rations are not sufficient, and that they\nare only a portion of the food supply of Moscow. Moreover, people\ncomplain, I do not know how truly, that the rations are delivered\nirregularly; some say, about every other day. Under these\ncircumstances, almost everybody, rich or poor, buys food in the\nmarket, where it costs about fifty times the fixed Government price.\nA pound of butter costs about a month's wages. In order to be able to\nafford extra food, people adopt various expedients. Some do additional\nwork, at extra rates, after their official day's work is over. For,\nthough there is supposed to be by law an eight-hours day, extended to\nten in certain vital industries, the wage paid for it is not a living\nwage, and there is nothing to prevent a man from undertaking other\nwork in his spare time. But the usual resource is what is called\n\"speculation,\" i.e., buying and selling. Some person formerly rich\nsells clothes or furniture or jewellery in return for food; the buyer\nsells again at an enhanced price, and so on through perhaps twenty\nhands, until a final purchaser is found in some well-to-do peasant or\n_nouveau riche_ speculator. Again, most people have relations in the\ncountry, whom they visit from time to time, bringing back with them\ngreat bags of flour. It is illegal for private persons to bring food\ninto Moscow, and the trains are searched; but, by corruption or\ncunning, experienced people can elude the search. The food market is\nillegal, and is raided occasionally; but as a rule it is winked at.\nThus the attempt to suppress private commerce has resulted in an\namount of unprofessional buying and selling which far exceeds what\nhappens in capitalist countries. It takes up a great deal of time\nthat might be more profitably employed; and, being illegal, it places\npractically the whole population of Moscow at the mercy of the police.\nMoreover, it depends largely upon the stores of goods belonging to\nthose who were formerly rich, and when these are expended the whole\nsystem must collapse, unless industry has meanwhile been\nre-established on a sound basis.\n\nIt is clear that the state of affairs is unsatisfactory, but, from the\nGovernment's point of view, it is not easy to see what ought to be\ndone. The urban and industrial population is mainly concerned in\ncarrying on the work of government and supplying munitions to the\narmy. These are very necessary tasks, the cost of which ought to be\ndefrayed out of taxation. A moderate tax in kind on the peasants would\neasily feed Moscow and Petrograd. But the peasants take no interest in\nwar or government. Russia is so vast that invasion of one part does\nnot touch another part; and the peasants are too ignorant to have any\nnational consciousness, such as one takes for granted in England or\nFrance or Germany. The peasants will not willingly part with a portion\nof their produce merely for purposes of national defence, but only for\nthe goods they need--clothes, agricultural implements, &c.--which the\nGovernment, owing to the war and the blockade, is not in a position to\nsupply.\n\nWhen the food shortage was at its worst, the Government antagonized\nthe peasants by forced requisitions, carried out with great harshness\nby the Red Army. This method has been modified, but the peasants still\npart unwillingly with their food, as is natural in view of the\nuselessness of paper and the enormously higher prices offered by\nprivate buyers.\n\nThe food problem is the main cause of popular opposition to the\nBolsheviks, yet I cannot see how any popular policy could have been\nadopted. The Bolsheviks are disliked by the peasants because they take\nso much food; they are disliked in the towns because they take so\nlittle. What the peasants want is what is called free trade, i.e.,\nde-control of agricultural produce. If this policy were adopted, the\ntowns would be faced by utter starvation, not merely by hunger and\nhardship. It is an entire misconception to suppose that the peasants\ncherish any hostility to the Entente. The _Daily News_ of July 13th,\nin an otherwise excellent leading article, speaks of \"the growing\nhatred of the Russian peasant, who is neither a Communist nor a\nBolshevik, for the Allies generally and this country in particular.\"\nThe typical Russian peasant has never heard of the Allies or of this\ncountry; he does not know that there is a blockade; all he knows is\nthat he used to have six cows but the Government reduced him to one\nfor the sake of poorer peasants, and that it takes his corn (except\nwhat is needed for his own family) at a very low price. The reasons\nfor these actions do not interest him, since his horizon is bounded by\nhis own village. To a remarkable extent, each village is an\nindependent unit. So long as the Government obtains the food and\nsoldiers that it requires, it does not interfere, and leaves untouched\nthe old village communism, which is extraordinarily unlike Bolshevism\nand entirely dependent upon a very primitive stage of culture.\n\nThe Government represents the interests of the urban and industrial\npopulation, and is, as it were, encamped amid a peasant nation, with\nwhom its relations are rather diplomatic and military than\ngovernmental in the ordinary sense. The economic situation, as in\nCentral Europe, is favourable to the country and unfavourable to the\ntowns. If Russia were governed democratically, according to the will\nof the majority, the inhabitants of Moscow and Petrograd would die of\nstarvation. As it is, Moscow and Petrograd just manage to live, by\nhaving the whole civil and military power of the State devoted to\ntheir needs. Russia affords the curious spectacle of a vast and\npowerful Empire, prosperous at the periphery, but faced with dire want\nat the centre. Those who have least prosperity have most power; and\nit is only through their excess of power that they are enabled to live\nat all. The situation is due at bottom to two facts: that almost the\nwhole industrial energies of the population have had to be devoted to\nwar, and that the peasants do not appreciate the importance of the war\nor the fact of the blockade.\n\nIt is futile to blame the Bolsheviks for an unpleasant and difficult\nsituation which it has been impossible for them to avoid. Their\nproblem is only soluble in one of two ways: by the cessation of the\nwar and the blockade, which would enable them to supply the peasants\nwith the goods they need in exchange for food; or by the gradual\ndevelopment of an independent Russian industry. This latter method\nwould be slow, and would involve terrible hardships, but some of the\nablest men in the Government believe it to be possible if peace cannot\nbe achieved. If we force this method upon Russia by the refusal of\npeace and trade, we shall forfeit the only inducement we can hold out\nfor friendly relations; we shall render the Soviet State unassailable\nand completely free to pursue the policy of promoting revolution\neverywhere. But the industrial problem is a large subject, which has\nbeen already discussed in Chapter VI.\n\n\n\n\nIX\n\nINTERNATIONAL POLICY\n\n\nIn the course of these chapters, I have had occasion to mention\ndisagreeable features of the Bolshevik regime. But it must always be\nremembered that these are chiefly due to the fact that the industrial\nlife of Russia has been paralysed except as ministering to the wants\nof the Army, and that the Government has had to wage a bitter and\ndoubtful civil and external war, involving the constant menace of\ndomestic enemies. Harshness, espionage, and a curtailment of liberty\nresult unavoidably from these difficulties. I have no doubt whatever\nthat the sole cure for the evils from which Russia is suffering is\npeace and trade. Peace and trade would put an end to the hostility of\nthe peasants, and would at once enable the Government to depend upon\npopularity rather than force. The character of the Government would\nalter rapidly under such conditions. Industrial conscription, which is\nnow rigidly enforced, would become unnecessary. Those who desire a\nmore liberal spirit would be able to make their voices heard without\nthe feeling that they were assisting reaction and the national\nenemies. The food difficulties would cease, and with them the need for\nan autocratic system in the towns.\n\nIt must not be assumed, as is common with opponents of Bolshevism,\nthat any other Government could easily be established in Russia. I\nthink every one who has been in Russia recently is convinced that the\nexisting Government is stable. It may undergo internal developments,\nand might easily, but for Lenin, become a Bonapartist military\nautocracy. But this would be a change from within--not perhaps a very\ngreat change--and would probably do little to alter the economic\nsystem. From what I saw of the Russian character and of the opposition\nparties, I became persuaded that Russia is not ready for any form of\ndemocracy, and needs a strong Government. The Bolsheviks represent\nthemselves as the Allies of Western advanced Socialism, and from this\npoint of view they are open to grave criticism. For their\ninternational programme there is, to my mind, nothing to be said. But\nas a national Government, stripped of their camouflage, regarded as\nthe successors of Peter the Great, they are performing a necessary\nthough unamiable task. They are introducing, as far as they can,\nAmerican efficiency among a lazy and undisciplined population. They\nare preparing to develop the natural resources of their country by the\nmethods of State Socialism, for which, in Russia, there is much to be\nsaid. In the Army they are abolishing illiteracy, and if they had\npeace they would do great things for education everywhere.\n\nBut if we continue to refuse peace and trade, I do not think the\nBolsheviks will go under. Russia will endure great hardships, in the\nyears to come as before. But the Russians are inured to misery as no\nWestern nation is; they can live and work under conditions which we\nshould find intolerable. The Government will be driven more and more,\nfrom mere self-preservation, into a policy of imperialism. The Entente\nhas been doing everything to expose Germany to a Russian invasion of\narms and leaflets, by allowing Poland to engage in war and compelling\nGermany to disarm. All Asia lies open to Bolshevik ambitions. Almost\nthe whole of the former Russian Empire in Asia is quite firmly in\ntheir grasp. Trains are running at a reasonable speed to Turkestan,\nand I saw cotton from there being loaded on to Volga steamers. In\nPersia and Turkey, revolts are taking place, with Bolshevik support.\nIt is only a question of a few years before India will be in touch\nwith the Red Army. If we continue to antagonize the Bolsheviks, I do\nnot see what force exists that can prevent them from acquiring the\nwhole of Asia within ten years.\n\nThe Russian Government is not yet definitely imperialistic in spirit,\nand would still prefer peace to conquest. The country is weary of war\nand denuded of goods. But if the Western Powers insist upon war,\nanother spirit, which is already beginning to show itself, will become\ndominant. Conquest will be the only alternative to submission. Asiatic\nconquest will not be difficult. But for us, from the imperialist\nstandpoint, it will mean utter ruin. And for the Continent it will\nmean revolutions, civil wars, economic cataclysms. The policy of\ncrushing Bolshevism by force was always foolish and criminal; it has\nnow become impossible and fraught with disaster. Our own Government,\nit would seem, have begun to realize the dangers, but apparently they\ndo not realize them sufficiently to enforce their view against\nopposition.\n\nIn the Theses presented to the Second Congress of the Third\nInternational (July 1920), there is a very interesting article by\nLenin called \"First Sketch of the Theses on National and Colonial\nQuestions\" (_Theses_, pp. 40-47). The following passages seemed to me\nparticularly illuminating:--\n\n    The present world-situation in politics places on the order of\n    the day the dictatorship of the proletariat; and all the\n    events of world politics are inevitably concentrated round one\n    centre of gravity: the struggle of the international\n    bourgeoisie against the Soviet Republic, which inevitably\n    groups round it, on the one hand the Sovietist movements of\n    the advanced working men of all countries, on the other hand\n    all the national movements of emancipation of colonies and\n    oppressed nations which have been convinced by a bitter\n    experience that there is no salvation for them except in the\n    victory of the Soviet Government over world-imperialism.\n\n    We cannot therefore any longer confine ourselves to\n    recognizing and proclaiming the union of the workers of all\n    countries. It is henceforth necessary to pursue the\n    realization of the strictest union of all the national and\n    colonial movements of emancipation with Soviet Russia, by\n    giving to this union forms corresponding to the degree of\n    evolution of the proletarian movement among the proletariat of\n    each country, or of the democratic-bourgeois movement of\n    emancipation among the workers and peasants of backward\n    countries or backward nationalities.\n\n    The federal principle appears to us as a transitory form\n    towards the complete unity of the workers of all countries.\n\nThis is the formula for co-operation with Sinn Fein or with Egyptian\nand Indian nationalism. It is further defined later. In regard to\nbackward countries, Lenin says, we must have in view:--\n\n    The necessity of the co-operation of all Communists in the\n    democratic-bourgeois movement of emancipation in those\n    countries.\n\nAgain:\n\n    \"The Communist International must conclude temporary alliances\n    with the bourgeois democracy of backward countries, but must\n    never fuse with it.\" The class-conscious proletariat must\n    \"show itself particularly circumspect towards the survivals of\n    national sentiment in countries long oppressed,\" and must\n    \"consent to certain useful concessions.\"\n\nThe Asiatic policy of the Russian Government was adopted as a move\nagainst the British Empire, and as a method of inducing the British\nGovernment to make peace. It plays a larger part in the schemes of the\nleading Bolsheviks than is realized by the Labour Party in this\ncountry. Its method is not, for the present, to preach Communism,\nsince the Persians and Hindoos are considered scarcely ripe for the\ndoctrines of Marx. It is nationalist movements that are supported by\nmoney and agitators from Moscow. The method of quasi-independent\nstates under Bolshevik protection is well understood. It is obvious\nthat this policy affords opportunities for imperialism, under the\ncover of propaganda, and there is no doubt that some among the\nBolsheviks are fascinated by its imperialist aspect. The importance\nofficially attached to the Eastern policy is illustrated by the fact\nthat it was the subject of the concluding portion of Lenin's speech to\nthe recent Congress of the Third International (July 1920).\n\nBolshevism, like everything Russian, is partly Asiatic in character.\nOne may distinguish two distinct trends, developing into two distinct\npolicies. On the one side are the practical men, who wish to develop\nRussia industrially, to secure the gains of the Revolution nationally,\nto trade with the West, and gradually settle down into a more or less\nordinary State. These men have on their side the fact of the economic\nexhaustion of Russia, the danger of ultimate revolt against Bolshevism\nif life continues to be as painful as it is at present, and the\nnatural sentiment of humanity that wishes to relieve the sufferings of\nthe people; also the fact that, if revolutions elsewhere produce a\nsimilar collapse of industry, they will make it impossible for Russia\nto receive the outside help which is urgently needed. In the early\ndays, when the Government was weak, they had unchallenged control of\npolicy, but success has made their position less secure.\n\nOn the other side there is a blend of two quite different aims: first,\nthe desire to promote revolution in the Western nations, which is in\nline with Communist theory, and is also thought to be the only way of\nobtaining a really secure peace; secondly, the desire for Asiatic\ndominion, which is probably accompanied in the minds of some with\ndreams of sapphires and rubies and golden thrones and all the glories\nof their forefather Solomon. This desire produces an unwillingness to\nabandon the Eastern policy, although it is realized that, until it is\nabandoned, peace with capitalist England is impossible. I do not know\nwhether there are some to whom the thought occurs that if England were\nto embark on revolution we should become willing to abandon India to\nthe Russians. But I am certain that the converse thought occurs,\nnamely that, if India could be taken from us, the blow to imperialist\nfeeling might lead us to revolution. In either case, the two policies,\nof revolution in the West and conquest (disguised as liberation of\noppressed peoples) in the East, work in together, and dovetail into a\nstrongly coherent whole.\n\nBolshevism as a social phenomenon is to be reckoned as a religion, not\nas an ordinary political movement. The important and effective mental\nattitudes to the world may be broadly divided into the religious and\nthe scientific. The scientific attitude is tentative and piecemeal,\nbelieving what it finds evidence for, and no more. Since Galileo, the\nscientific attitude has proved itself increasingly capable of\nascertaining important facts and laws, which are acknowledged by all\ncompetent people regardless of temperament or self-interest or\npolitical pressure. Almost all the progress in the world from the\nearliest times is attributable to science and the scientific temper;\nalmost all the major ills are attributable to religion.\n\nBy a religion I mean a set of beliefs held as dogmas, dominating the\nconduct of life, going beyond or contrary to evidence, and inculcated\nby methods which are emotional or authoritarian, not intellectual. By\nthis definition, Bolshevism is a religion: that its dogmas go beyond\nor contrary to evidence, I shall try to prove in what follows. Those\nwho accept Bolshevism become impervious to scientific evidence, and\ncommit intellectual suicide. Even if all the doctrines of Bolshevism\nwere true, this would still be the case, since no unbiased examination\nof them is tolerated. One who believes, as I do, that the free\nintellect is the chief engine of human progress, cannot but be\nfundamentally opposed to Bolshevism, as much as to the Church of Rome.\n\nAmong religions, Bolshevism is to be reckoned with Mohammedanism\nrather than with Christianity and Buddhism. Christianity and Buddhism\nare primarily personal religions, with mystical doctrines and a love\nof contemplation. Mohammedanism and Bolshevism are practical, social,\nunspiritual, concerned to win the empire of this world. Their founders\nwould not have resisted the third of the temptations in the\nwilderness. What Mohammedanism did for the Arabs, Bolshevism may do\nfor the Russians. As Ali went down before the politicians who only\nrallied to the Prophet after his success, so the genuine Communists\nmay go down before those who are now rallying to the ranks of the\nBolsheviks. If so, Asiatic empire with all its pomps and splendours\nmay well be the next stage of development, and Communism may seem, in\nhistorical retrospect, as small a part of Bolshevism as abstinence\nfrom alcohol is of Mohammedanism. It is true that, as a world force,\nwhether for revolution or for empire, Bolshevism must sooner or later\nbe brought by success into a desperate conflict with America; and\nAmerica is more solid and strong, as yet, than anything that\nMohammed's followers had to face. But the doctrines of Communism are\nalmost certain, in the long run, to make progress among American\nwage-earners, and the opposition of America is therefore not likely to\nbe eternal. Bolshevism may go under in Russia, but even if it does it\nwill spring up again elsewhere, since it is ideally suited to an\nindustrial population in distress. What is evil in it is mainly due to\nthe fact that it has its origin in distress; the problem is to\ndisentangle the good from the evil, and induce the adoption of the\ngood in countries not goaded into ferocity by despair.\n\nRussia is a backward country, not yet ready for the methods of equal\nco-operation which the West is seeking to substitute for arbitrary\npower in politics and industry. In Russia, the methods of the\nBolsheviks are probably more or less unavoidable; at any rate, I am\nnot prepared to criticize them in their broad lines. But they are not\nthe methods appropriate to more advanced countries, and our Socialists\nwill be unnecessarily retrograde if they allow the prestige of the\nBolsheviks to lead them into slavish imitation. It will be a far less\nexcusable error in our reactionaries if, by their unteachableness,\nthey compel the adoption of violent methods. We have a heritage of\ncivilization and mutual tolerance which is important to ourselves and\nto the world. Life in Russia has always been fierce and cruel, to a\nfar greater degree than with us, and out of the war has come a danger\nthat this fierceness and cruelty may become universal. I have hopes\nthat in England this may be avoided through the moderation of both\nsides. But it is essential to a happy issue that melodrama should no\nlonger determine our views of the Bolsheviks: they are neither angels\nto be worshipped nor devils to be exterminated, but merely bold and\nable men attempting with great skill an almost impossible task.\n\n\n\n\nPART II\n\nBOLSHEVIK THEORY\n\n\n\n\nI\n\nTHE MATERIALISTIC THEORY OF HISTORY\n\n\nThe materialistic conception of history, as it is called, is due to\nMarx, and underlies the whole Communist philosophy. I do not mean, of\ncourse, that a man could not be a Communist without accepting it, but\nthat in fact it is accepted by the Communist Party, and that it\nprofoundly influences their views as to politics and tactics. The name\ndoes not convey at all accurately what is meant by the theory. It\nmeans that all the mass-phenomena of history are determined by\neconomic motives. This view has no essential connection with\nmaterialism in the philosophic sense. Materialism in the philosophic\nsense may be defined as the theory that all apparently mental\noccurrences either are really physical, or at any rate have purely\nphysical causes. Materialism in this sense also was preached by Marx,\nand is accepted by all orthodox Marxians. The arguments for and\nagainst it are long and complicated, and need not concern us, since,\nin fact, its truth or falsehood has little or no bearing on politics.\n\nIn particular, philosophic materialism does not prove that economic\ncauses are fundamental in politics. The view of Buckle, for example,\naccording to which climate is one of the decisive factors, is equally\ncompatible with materialism. So is the Freudian view, which traces\neverything to sex. There are innumerable ways of viewing history which\nare materialistic in the philosophic sense without being economic or\nfalling within the Marxian formula. Thus the \"materialistic conception\nof history\" may be false even if materialism in the philosophic sense\nshould be true.\n\nOn the other hand, economic causes might be at the bottom of all\npolitical events even if philosophic materialism were false. Economic\ncauses operate through men's desire for possessions, and would be\nsupreme if this desire were supreme, even if desire could not, from a\nphilosophic point of view, be explained in materialistic terms.\n\nThere is, therefore, no logical connection either way between\nphilosophic materialism and what is called the \"materialistic\nconception of history.\"\n\nIt is of some moment to realize such facts as this, because otherwise\npolitical theories are both supported and opposed for quite\nirrelevant reasons, and arguments of theoretical philosophy are\nemployed to determine questions which depend upon concrete facts of\nhuman nature. This mixture damages both philosophy and politics, and\nis therefore important to avoid.\n\nFor another reason, also, the attempt to base a political theory upon\na philosophical doctrine is undesirable. The philosophical doctrine of\nmaterialism, if true at all, is true everywhere and always; we cannot\nexpect exceptions to it, say, in Buddhism or in the Hussite movement.\nAnd so it comes about that people whose politics are supposed to be a\nconsequence of their metaphysics grow absolute and sweeping, unable to\nadmit that a general theory of history is likely, at best, to be only\ntrue on the whole and in the main. The dogmatic character of Marxian\nCommunism finds support in the supposed philosophic basis of the\ndoctrine; it has the fixed certainty of Catholic theology, not the\nchanging fluidity and sceptical practicality of modern science.\n\nTreated as a practical approximation, not as an exact metaphysical\nlaw, the materialistic conception of history has a very large measure\nof truth. Take, as an instance of its truth, the influence of\nindustrialism upon ideas. It is industrialism, rather than the\narguments of Darwinians and Biblical critics, that has led to the\ndecay of religious belief in the urban working class. At the same\ntime, industrialism has revived religious belief among the rich. In\nthe eighteenth century French aristocrats mostly became free-thinkers;\nnow their descendants are mostly Catholics, because it has become\nnecessary for all the forces of reaction to unite against the\nrevolutionary proletariat. Take, again, the emancipation of women.\nPlato, Mary Wolstonecraft, and John Stuart Mill produced admirable\narguments, but influenced only a few impotent idealists. The war came,\nleading to the employment of women in industry on a large scale, and\ninstantly the arguments in favour of votes for women were seen to be\nirresistible. More than that, traditional sexual morality collapsed,\nbecause its whole basis was the economic dependence of women upon\ntheir fathers and husbands. Changes in such a matter as sexual\nmorality bring with them profound alterations in the thoughts and\nfeelings of ordinary men and women; they modify law, literature, art,\nand all kinds of institutions that seem remote from economics.\n\nSuch facts as these justify Marxians in speaking, as they do, of\n\"bourgeois ideology,\" meaning that kind of morality which has been\nimposed upon the world by the possessors of capital. Contentment with\none's lot may be taken as typical of the virtues preached by the rich\nto the poor. They honestly believe it is a virtue--at any rate they\ndid formerly. The more religious among the poor also believed it,\npartly from the influence of authority, partly from an impulse to\nsubmission, what MacDougall calls \"negative self-feeling,\" which is\ncommoner than some people think. Similarly men preached the virtue of\nfemale chastity, and women usually accepted their teaching; both\nreally believed the doctrine, but its persistence was only possible\nthrough the economic power of men. This led erring women to punishment\nhere on earth, which made further punishment hereafter seem probable.\nWhen the economic penalty ceased, the conviction of sinfulness\ngradually decayed. In such changes we see the collapse of \"bourgeois\nideology.\"\n\nBut in spite of the fundamental importance of economic facts in\ndetermining the politics and beliefs of an age or nation, I do not\nthink that non-economic factors can be neglected without risks of\nerrors which may be fatal in practice.\n\nThe most obvious non-economic factor, and the one the neglect of which\nhas led Socialists most astray, is nationalism. Of course a nation,\nonce formed, has economic interests which largely determine its\npolitics; but it is not, as a rule, economic motives that decide what\ngroup of human beings shall form a nation. Trieste, before the war,\nconsidered itself Italian, although its whole prosperity as a port\ndepended upon its belonging to Austria. No economic motive can account\nfor the opposition between Ulster and the rest of Ireland. In Eastern\nEurope, the Balkanization produced by self-determination has been\nobviously disastrous from an economic point of view, and was demanded\nfor reasons which were in essence sentimental. Throughout the war\nwage-earners, with only a few exceptions, allowed themselves to be\ngoverned by nationalist feeling, and ignored the traditional Communist\nexhortation: \"Workers of the world, unite.\" According to Marxian\northodoxy, they were misled by cunning capitalists, who made their\nprofit out of the slaughter. But to any one capable of observing\npsychological facts, it is obvious that this is largely a myth.\nImmense numbers of capitalists were ruined by the war; those who were\nyoung were just as liable to be killed as the proletarians were. No\ndoubt commercial rivalry between England and Germany had a great deal\nto do with causing the war; but rivalry is a different thing from\nprofit-seeking. Probably by combination English and German capitalists\ncould have made more than they did out of rivalry, but the rivalry\nwas instinctive, and its economic form was accidental. The capitalists\nwere in the grip of nationalist instinct as much as their proletarian\n\"dupes.\" In both classes some have gained by the war; but the\nuniversal will to war was not produced by the hope of gain. It was\nproduced by a different set of instincts, and one which Marxian\npsychology fails to recognize adequately.\n\nThe Marxian assumes that a man's \"herd,\" from the point of view of\nherd-instinct, is his class, and that he will combine with those whose\neconomic class-interest is the same as his. This is only very\npartially true in fact. Religion has been the most decisive factor in\ndetermining a man's herd throughout long periods of the world's\nhistory. Even now a Catholic working man will vote for a Catholic\ncapitalist rather than for an unbelieving Socialist. In America the\ndivisions in local elections are mainly on religious lines. This is no\ndoubt convenient for the capitalists, and tends to make them religious\nmen; but the capitalists alone could not produce the result. The\nresult is produced by the fact that many working men prefer the\nadvancement of their creed to the improvement of their livelihood.\nHowever deplorable such a state of mind may be, it is not necessarily\ndue to capitalist lies.\n\nAll politics are governed by human desires. The materialist theory of\nhistory, in the last analysis, requires the assumption that every\npolitically conscious person is governed by one single desire--the\ndesire to increase his own share of commodities; and, further, that\nhis method of achieving this desire will usually be to seek to\nincrease the share of his class, not only his own individual share.\nBut this assumption is very far from the truth. Men desire power, they\ndesire satisfactions for their pride and their self-respect. They\ndesire victory over rivals so profoundly that they will invent a\nrivalry for the unconscious purpose of making a victory possible. All\nthese motives cut across the pure economic motive in ways that are\npractically important.\n\nThere is need of a treatment of political motives by the methods of\npsycho-analysis. In politics, as in private life, men invent myths to\nrationalize their conduct. If a man thinks that the only reasonable\nmotive in politics is economic self-advancement, he will persuade\nhimself that the things he wishes to do will make him rich. When he\nwants to fight the Germans, he tells himself that their competition is\nruining his trade. If, on the other hand, he is an \"idealist,\" who\nholds that his politics should aim at the advancement of the human\nrace, he will tell himself that the crimes of the Germans demand\ntheir humiliation. The Marxian sees through this latter camouflage,\nbut not through the former. To desire one's own economic advancement\nis comparatively reasonable; to Marx, who inherited eighteenth-century\nrationalist psychology from the British orthodox economists,\nself-enrichment seemed the natural aim of a man's political actions.\nBut modern psychology has dived much deeper into the ocean of insanity\nupon which the little barque of human reason insecurely floats. The\nintellectual optimism of a bygone age is no longer possible to the\nmodern student of human nature. Yet it lingers in Marxism, making\nMarxians rigid and Procrustean in their treatment of the life of\ninstinct. Of this rigidity the materialistic conception of history is\na prominent instance.\n\nIn the next chapter I shall attempt to outline a political psychology\nwhich seems to me more nearly true than that of Marx.\n\n\n\n\nII\n\nDECIDING FORCES IN POLITICS\n\n\nThe larger events in the political life of the world are determined by\nthe interaction of material conditions and human passions. The\noperation of the passions on the material conditions is modified by\nintelligence. The passions themselves may be modified by alien\nintelligence guided by alien passions. So far, such modification has\nbeen wholly unscientific, but it may in time become as precise as\nengineering.\n\nThe classification of the passions which is most convenient in\npolitical theory is somewhat different from that which would be\nadopted in psychology.\n\nWe may begin with desires for the necessaries of life: food, drink,\nsex, and (in cold climates) clothing and housing. When these are\nthreatened, there is no limit to the activity and violence that men\nwill display.\n\nPlanted upon these primitive desires are a number of secondary\ndesires. Love of property, of which the fundamental political\nimportance is obvious, may be derived historically and psychologically\nfrom the hoarding instinct. Love of the good opinion of others (which\nwe may call vanity) is a desire which man shares with many animals; it\nis perhaps derivable from courtship, but has great survival value,\namong gregarious animals, in regard to others besides possible mates.\nRivalry and love of power are perhaps developments of jealousy; they\nare akin, but not identical.\n\nThese four passions--acquisitiveness, vanity, rivalry, and love of\npower--are, after the basic instincts, the prime movers of almost all\nthat happens in politics. Their operation is intensified and\nregularized by herd instinct. But herd instinct, by its very nature,\ncannot be a prime mover, since it merely causes the herd to act in\nunison, without determining what the united action is to be. Among\nmen, as among other gregarious animals, the united action, in any\ngiven circumstances, is determined partly by the common passions of\nthe herd, partly by imitation of leaders. The art of politics consists\nin causing the latter to prevail over the former.\n\nOf the four passions we have enumerated, only one, namely\nacquisitiveness, is concerned at all directly with men's relations to\ntheir material conditions. The other three--vanity, rivalry, and love\nof power--are concerned with social relations. I think this is the\nsource of what is erroneous in the Marxian interpretation of history,\nwhich tacitly assumes that acquisitiveness is the source of all\npolitical actions. It is clear that many men willingly forego wealth\nfor the sake of power and glory, and that nations habitually sacrifice\nriches to rivalry with other nations. The desire for some form of\nsuperiority is common to almost all energetic men. No social system\nwhich attempts to thwart it can be stable, since the lazy majority\nwill never be a match for the energetic minority.\n\nWhat is called \"virtue\" is an offshoot of vanity: it is the habit of\nacting in a manner which others praise.\n\nThe operation of material conditions may be illustrated by the\nstatement (Myers's _Dawn of History_) that four of the greatest\nmovements of conquest have been due to drought in Arabia, causing the\nnomads of that country to migrate into regions already inhabited. The\nlast of these four movements was the rise of Islam. In these four\ncases, the primal need of food and drink was enough to set events in\nmotion; but as this need could only be satisfied by conquest, the four\nsecondary passions must have very soon come into play. In the\nconquests of modern industrialism, the secondary passions have been\nalmost wholly dominant, since those who directed them had no need to\nfear hunger or thirst. It is the potency of vanity and love of power\nthat gives hope for the industrial future of Soviet Russia, since it\nenables the Communist State to enlist in its service men whose\nabilities might give them vast wealth in a capitalistic society.\n\nIntelligence modifies profoundly the operation of material conditions.\nWhen America was first discovered, men only desired gold and silver;\nconsequently the portions first settled were not those that are now\nmost profitable. The Bessemer process created the German iron and\nsteel industry; inventions requiring oil have created a demand for\nthat commodity which is one of the chief influences in international\npolitics.\n\nThe intelligence which has this profound effect on politics is not\npolitical, but scientific and technical: it is the kind of\nintelligence which discovers how to make nature minister to human\npassions. Tungsten had no value until it was found to be useful in the\nmanufacture of shells and electric light, but now people will, if\nnecessary, kill each other in order to acquire tungsten. Scientific\nintelligence is the cause of this change.\n\nThe progress or retrogression of the world depends, broadly speaking,\nupon the balance between acquisitiveness and rivalry. The former makes\nfor progress, the latter for retrogression. When intelligence provides\nimproved methods of production, these may be employed to increase the\ngeneral share of goods, or to set apart more of the labour power of\nthe community for the business of killing its rivals. Until 1914,\nacquisitiveness had prevailed, on the whole, since the fall of\nNapoleon; the past six years have seen a prevalence of the instinct of\nrivalry. Scientific intelligence makes it possible to indulge this\ninstinct more fully than is possible for primitive peoples, since it\nsets free more men from the labour of producing necessaries. It is\npossible that scientific intelligence may, in time, reach the point\nwhen it will enable rivalry to exterminate the human race. This is the\nmost hopeful method of bringing about an end of war.\n\nFor those who do not like this method, there is another: the study of\nscientific psychology and physiology. The physiological causes of\nemotions have begun to be known, through the studies of such men as\nCannon (_Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage_). In time, it\nmay become possible, by physiological means, to alter the whole\nemotional nature of a population. It will then depend upon the\npassions of the rulers how this power is used. Success will come to\nthe State which discovers how to promote pugnacity to the extent\nrequired for external war, but not to the extent which would lead to\ndomestic dissensions. There is no method by which it can be insured\nthat rulers shall desire the good of mankind, and therefore there is\nno reason to suppose that the power to modify men's emotional nature\nwould cause progress.\n\nIf men desired to diminish rivalry, there is an obvious method. Habits\nof power intensify the passion of rivalry; therefore a State in which\npower is concentrated will, other things being equal, be more\nbellicose than one in which power is diffused. For those who dislike\nwars, this is an additional argument against all forms of\ndictatorship. But dislike of war is far less common than we used to\nsuppose; and those who like war can use the same argument to support\ndictatorship.\n\n\n\n\nIII\n\nBOLSHEVIK CRITICISM OF DEMOCRACY\n\n\nThe Bolshevik argument against Parliamentary democracy as a method of\nachieving Socialism is a powerful one. My answer to it lies rather in\npointing out what I believe to be fallacies in the Bolshevik method,\nfrom which I conclude that no swift method exists of establishing any\ndesirable form of Socialism. But let us first see what the Bolshevik\nargument is.\n\nIn the first place, it assumes that those to whom it is addressed are\nabsolutely certain that Communism is desirable, so certain that they\nare willing, if necessary, to force it upon an unwilling population at\nthe point of the bayonet. It then proceeds to argue that, while\ncapitalism retains its hold over propaganda and its means of\ncorruption, Parliamentary methods are very unlikely to give a majority\nfor Communism in the House of Commons, or to lead to effective action\nby such a majority even if it existed. Communists point out how the\npeople are deceived, and how their chosen leaders have again and\nagain betrayed them. From this they argue that the destruction of\ncapitalism must be sudden and catastrophic; that it must be the work\nof a minority; and that it cannot be effected constitutionally or\nwithout violence. It is therefore, in their view, the duty of the\nCommunist party in a capitalist country to prepare for armed conflict,\nand to take all possible measure for disarming the bourgeoisie and\narming that part of the proletariat which is willing to support the\nCommunists.\n\nThere is an air of realism and disillusionment about this position,\nwhich makes it attractive to those idealists who wish to think\nthemselves cynics. But I think there are various points in which it\nfails to be as realistic as it pretends.\n\nIn the first place, it makes much of the treachery of Labour leaders\nin constitutional movements, but does not consider the possibility of\nthe treachery of Communist leaders in a revolution. To this the\nMarxian would reply that in constitutional movements men are bought,\ndirectly or indirectly, by the money of the capitalists, but that\nrevolutionary Communism would leave the capitalists no money with\nwhich to attempt corruption. This has been achieved in Russia, and\ncould be achieved elsewhere. But selling oneself to the capitalists\nis not the only possible form of treachery. It is also possible,\nhaving acquired power, to use it for one's own ends instead of for the\npeople. This is what I believe to be likely to happen in Russia: the\nestablishment of a bureaucratic aristocracy, concentrating authority\nin its own hands, and creating a regime just as oppressive and cruel\nas that of capitalism. Marxians never sufficiently recognize that love\nof power is quite as strong a motive, and quite as great a source of\ninjustice, as love of money; yet this must be obvious to any unbiased\nstudent of politics. It is also obvious that the method of violent\nrevolution leading to a minority dictatorship is one peculiarly\ncalculated to create habits of despotism which would survive the\ncrisis by which they were generated. Communist politicians are likely\nto become just like the politicians of other parties: a few will be\nhonest, but the great majority will merely cultivate the art of\ntelling a plausible tale with a view to tricking the people into\nentrusting them with power. The only possible way by which politicians\nas a class can be improved is the political and psychological\neducation of the people, so that they may learn to detect a humbug. In\nEngland men have reached the point of suspecting a good speaker, but\nif a man speaks badly they think he must be honest. Unfortunately,\nvirtue is not so widely diffused as this theory would imply.\n\nIn the second place, it is assumed by the Communist argument that,\nalthough capitalist propaganda can prevent the majority from becoming\nCommunists, yet capitalist laws and police forces cannot prevent the\nCommunists, while still a minority, from acquiring a supremacy of\nmilitary power. It is thought that secret propaganda can undermine the\narmy and navy, although it is admittedly impossible to get the\nmajority to vote at elections for the programme of the Bolsheviks.\nThis view is based upon Russian experience, where the army and navy\nhad suffered defeat and had been brutally ill used by incompetent\nTsarist authorities. The argument has no application to more efficient\nand successful States. Among the Germans, even in defeat, it was the\ncivilian population that began the revolution.\n\nThere is a further assumption in the Bolshevik argument which seems to\nme quite unwarrantable. It is assumed that the capitalist governments\nwill have learned nothing from the experience of Russia. Before the\nRussian Revolution, governments had not studied Bolshevik theory. And\ndefeat in war created a revolutionary mood throughout Central and\nEastern Europe. But now the holders of power are on their guard. There\nseems no reason whatever to suppose that they will supinely permit a\npreponderance of armed force to pass into the hands of those who wish\nto overthrow them, while, according to the Bolshevik theory, they are\nstill sufficiently popular to be supported by a majority at the polls.\nIs it not as clear as noonday that in a democratic country it is more\ndifficult for the proletariat to destroy the Government by arms than\nto defeat it in a general election? Seeing the immense advantages of a\nGovernment in dealing with rebels, it seems clear that rebellion could\nhave little hope of success unless a very large majority supported it.\nOf course, if the army and navy were specially revolutionary, they\nmight effect an unpopular revolution; but this situation, though\nsomething like it occurred in Russia, is hardly to be expected in the\nWestern nations. This whole Bolshevik theory of revolution by a\nminority is one which might just conceivably have succeeded as a\nsecret plot, but becomes impossible as soon as it is openly avowed and\nadvocated.\n\nBut perhaps it will be said that I am caricaturing the Bolshevik\ndoctrine of revolution. It is urged by advocates of this doctrine,\nquite truly, that all political events are brought about by\nminorities, since the majority are indifferent to politics. But there\nis a difference between a minority in which the indifferent acquiesce,\nand a minority so hated as to startle the indifferent into belated\naction. To make the Bolshevik doctrine reasonable, it is necessary to\nsuppose that they believe the majority can be induced to acquiesce, at\nleast temporarily, in the revolution made by the class-conscious\nminority. This, again, is based upon Russian experience: desire for\npeace and land led to a widespread support of the Bolsheviks in\nNovember 1917 on the part of people who have subsequently shown no\nlove for Communism.\n\nI think we come here to an essential part of Bolshevik philosophy. In\nthe moment of revolution, Communists are to have some popular cry by\nwhich they win more support than mere Communism could win. Having thus\nacquired the State machine, they are to use it for their own ends. But\nthis, again, is a method which can only be practised successfully so\nlong as it is not avowed. It is to some extent habitual in politics.\nThe Unionists in 1900 won a majority on the Boer War, and used it to\nendow brewers and Church schools. The Liberals in 1906 won a majority\non Chinese labour, and used it to cement the secret alliance with\nFrance and to make an alliance with Tsarist Russia. President Wilson,\nin 1916, won his majority on neutrality, and used it to come into the\nwar. This method is part of the stock-in-trade of democracy. But its\nsuccess depends upon repudiating it until the moment comes to practise\nit. Those who, like the Bolsheviks, have the honesty to proclaim in\nadvance their intention of using power for other ends than those for\nwhich it was given them, are not likely to have a chance of carrying\nout their designs.\n\nWhat seems to me to emerge from these considerations is this: That in\na democratic and politically educated country, armed revolution in\nfavour of Communism would have no chance of succeeding unless it were\nsupported by a larger majority than would be required for the election\nof a Communist Government by constitutional methods. It is possible\nthat, if such a Government came into existence, and proceeded to carry\nout its programme, it would be met by armed resistance on the part of\ncapital, including a large proportion of the officers in the army and\nnavy. But in subduing this resistance it would have the support of\nthat great body of opinion which believes in legality and upholds the\nconstitution. Moreover, having, by hypothesis, converted a majority of\nthe nation, a Communist Government could be sure of loyal help from\nimmense numbers of workers, and would not be forced, as the\nBolsheviks are in Russia, to suspect treachery everywhere. Under these\ncircumstances, I believe that the resistance of the capitalists could\nbe quelled without much difficulty, and would receive little support\nfrom moderate people. Whereas, in a minority revolt of Communists\nagainst a capitalist Government, all moderate opinion would be on the\nside of capitalism.\n\nThe contention that capitalist propaganda is what prevents the\nadoption of Communism by wage-earners is only very partially true.\nCapitalist propaganda has never been able to prevent the Irish from\nvoting against the English, though it has been applied to this object\nwith great vigour. It has proved itself powerless, over and over\nagain, in opposing nationalist movements which had almost no moneyed\nsupport. It has been unable to cope with religious feeling. And those\nindustrial populations which would most obviously benefit by Socialism\nhave, in the main, adopted it, in spite of the opposition of\nemployers. The plain truth is that Socialism does not arouse the same\npassionate interest in the average citizen as is roused by nationality\nand used to be roused by religion. It is not unlikely that things may\nchange in this respect: we may be approaching a period of economic\ncivil wars comparable to that of the religious civil wars that\nfollowed the Reformation. In such a period, nationalism is submerged\nby party: British and German Socialists, or British and German\ncapitalists, will feel more kinship with each other than with\ncompatriots of the opposite political camp. But when that day comes,\nthere will be no difficulty, in highly industrial countries, in\nsecuring Socialist majorities; if Socialism is not then carried\nwithout bloodshed, it will be due to the unconstitutional action of\nthe rich, not to the need of revolutionary violence on the part of the\nadvocates of the proletariat. Whether such a state of opinion grows up\nor not depends mainly upon the stubbornness or conciliatoriness of the\npossessing classes, and, conversely, upon the moderation or violence\nof those who desire fundamental economic change. The majority which\nBolsheviks regard as unattainable is chiefly prevented by the\nruthlessness of their own tactics.\n\nApart from all arguments of detail, there are two broad objections to\nviolent revolution in a democratic community. The first is that, when\nonce the principle of respecting majorities as expressed at the\nballot-box is abandoned, there is no reason to suppose that victory\nwill be secured by the particular minority to which one happens to\nbelong. There are many minorities besides Communists: religious\nminorities, teetotal minorities, militarist minorities, capitalist\nminorities. Any one of these could adopt the method of obtaining power\nadvocated by the Bolsheviks, and any one would be just as likely to\nsucceed as they are. What restrains these minorities, more or less, at\npresent, is respect for the law and the constitution. Bolsheviks\ntacitly assume that every other party will preserve this respect while\nthey themselves, unhindered, prepare the revolution. But if their\nphilosophy of violence becomes popular, there is not the slightest\nreason to suppose that they will be its beneficiaries. They believe\nthat Communism is for the good of the majority; they ought to believe\nthat they can persuade the majority on this question, and to have the\npatience to set about the task of winning by propaganda.\n\nThe second argument of principle against the method of minority\nviolence is that abandonment of law, when it becomes widespread, lets\nloose the wild beast, and gives a free rein to the primitive lusts and\negoisms which civilization in some degree curbs. Every student of\nmediaeval thought must have been struck by the extraordinarily high\nvalue placed upon law in that period. The reason was that, in\ncountries infested by robber barons, law was the first requisite of\nprogress. We, in the modern world, take it for granted that most\npeople will be law-abiding, and we hardly realize what centuries of\neffort have gone to making such an assumption possible. We forget how\nmany of the good things that we unquestionably expect would disappear\nout of life if murder, rape, and robbery with violence became common.\nAnd we forget even more how very easily this might happen. The\nuniversal class-war foreshadowed by the Third International, following\nupon the loosening of restraints produced by the late war, and\ncombined with a deliberate inculcation of disrespect for law and\nconstitutional government, might, and I believe would, produce a state\nof affairs in which it would be habitual to murder men for a crust of\nbread, and in which women would only be safe while armed men protected\nthem. The civilized nations have accepted democratic government as a\nmethod of settling internal disputes without violence. Democratic\ngovernment may have all the faults attributed to it, but it has the\none great merit that people are, on the whole, willing to accept it as\na substitute for civil war in political disputes. Whoever sets to work\nto weaken this acceptance, whether in Ulster or in Moscow, is taking a\nfearful responsibility. Civilization is not so stable that it cannot\nbe broken up; and a condition of lawless violence is not one out of\nwhich any good thing is likely to emerge. For this reason, if for no\nother, revolutionary violence in a democracy is infinitely dangerous.\n\n\n\n\nIV\n\nREVOLUTION AND DICTATORSHIP\n\n\nThe Bolsheviks have a very definite programme for achieving\nCommunism--a programme which has been set forth by Lenin repeatedly,\nand quite recently in the reply of the Third International to the\nquestionnaire submitted by the Independent Labour Party.\n\nCapitalists, we are assured, will stick at nothing in defence of their\nprivileges. It is the nature of man, in so far as he is politically\nconscious, to fight for the interests of his class so long as classes\nexist. When the conflict is not pushed to extremes, methods of\nconciliation and political deception may be preferable to actual\nphysical warfare; but as soon as the proletariat make a really vital\nattack upon the capitalists, they will be met by guns and bayonets.\nThis being certain and inevitable, it is as well to be prepared for\nit, and to conduct propaganda accordingly. Those who pretend that\npacific methods can lead to the realization of Communism are false\nfriends to the wage-earners; intentionally or unintentionally, they\nare covert allies of the bourgeoisie.\n\nThere must, then, according to Bolshevik theory, be armed conflict\nsooner or later, if the injustices of the present economic system are\never to be remedied. Not only do they assume armed conflict: they have\na fairly definite conception of the way in which it is to be\nconducted. This conception has been carried out in Russia, and is to\nbe carried out, before very long, in every civilized country. The\nCommunists, who represent the class-conscious wage-earners, wait for\nsome propitious moment when events have caused a mood of revolutionary\ndiscontent with the existing Government. They then put themselves at\nthe head of the discontent, carry through a successful revolution, and\nin so doing acquire the arms, the railways, the State treasure, and\nall the other resources upon which the power of modern Governments is\nbuilt. They then confine political power to Communists, however small\na minority they may be of the whole nation. They set to work to\nincrease their number by propaganda and the control of education. And\nmeanwhile, they introduce Communism into every department of economic\nlife as quickly as possible.\n\nUltimately, after a longer or shorter period, according to\ncircumstances, the nation will be converted to Communism, the relics\nof capitalist institutions will have been obliterated, and it will be\npossible to restore freedom. But the political conflicts to which we\nare accustomed will not reappear. All the burning political questions\nof our time, according to the Communists, are questions of class\nconflict, and will disappear when the division of classes disappears.\nAccordingly the State will no longer be required, since the State is\nessentially an engine of power designed to give the victory to one\nside in the class conflict. Ordinary States are designed to give the\nvictory to the capitalists; the proletarian State (Soviet Russia) is\ndesigned to give the victory to the wage-earners. As soon as the\ncommunity contains only wage-earners, the State will cease to have any\nfunctions. And so, through a period of dictatorship, we shall finally\narrive at a condition very similar to that aimed at by Anarchist\nCommunism.\n\nThree questions arise in regard to this method of reaching Utopia.\nFirst, would the ultimate state foreshadowed by the Bolsheviks be\ndesirable in itself? Secondly, would the conflict involved in\nachieving it by the Bolshevik method be so bitter and prolonged that\nits evils would outweigh the ultimate good? Thirdly, is this method\nlikely to lead, in the end, to the state which the Bolsheviks desire,\nor will it fail at some point and arrive at a quite different result?\nIf we are to be Bolsheviks, we must answer all these questions in a\nsense favourable to their programme.\n\nAs regards the first question, I have no hesitation in answering it in\na manner favourable to Communism. It is clear that the present\ninequalities of wealth are unjust. In part, they may be defended as\naffording an incentive to useful industry, but I do not think this\ndefence will carry us very far. However, I have argued this question\nbefore in my book on _Roads to Freedom_, and I will not spend time\nupon it now. On this matter, I concede the Bolshevik case. It is the\nother two questions that I wish to discuss.\n\nOur second question was: Is the ultimate good aimed at by the\nBolsheviks sufficiently great to be worth the price that, according to\ntheir own theory, will have to be paid for achieving it?\n\nIf anything human were absolutely certain, we might answer this\nquestion affirmatively with some confidence. The benefits of\nCommunism, if it were once achieved, might be expected to be lasting;\nwe might legitimately hope that further change would be towards\nsomething still better, not towards a revival of ancient evils. But if\nwe admit, as we must do, that the outcome of the Communist revolution\nis in some degree uncertain, it becomes necessary to count the cost;\nfor a great part of the cost is all but certain.\n\nSince the revolution of October, 1917, the Soviet Government has been\nat war with almost all the world, and has had at the same time to face\ncivil war at home. This is not to be regarded as accidental, or as a\nmisfortune which could not be foreseen. According to Marxian theory,\nwhat has happened was bound to happen. Indeed, Russia has been\nwonderfully fortunate in not having to face an even more desperate\nsituation. First and foremost, the world was exhausted by the war, and\nin no mood for military adventures. Next, the Tsarist regime was the\nworst in Europe, and therefore rallied less support than would be\nsecured by any other capitalist Government. Again, Russia is vast and\nagricultural, making it capable of resisting both invasion and\nblockade better than Great Britain or France or Germany. The only\nother country that could have resisted with equal success is the\nUnited States, which is at present very far removed from a proletarian\nrevolution, and likely long to remain the chief bulwark of the\ncapitalist system. It is evident that Great Britain, attempting a\nsimilar revolution, would be forced by starvation to yield within a\nfew months, provided America led a policy of blockade. The same is\ntrue, though in a less degree, of continental countries. Therefore,\nunless and until an international Communist revolution becomes\npossible, we must expect that any other nation following Russia's\nexample will have to pay an even higher price than Russia has had to\npay.\n\nNow the price that Russia is having to pay is very great. The almost\nuniversal poverty might be thought to be a small evil in comparison\nwith the ultimate gain, but it brings with it other evils of which the\nmagnitude would be acknowledged even by those who have never known\npoverty and therefore make light of it. Hunger brings an absorption in\nthe question of food, which, to most people, makes life almost purely\nanimal. The general shortage makes people fierce, and reacts upon the\npolitical atmosphere. The necessity of inculcating Communism produces\na hot-house condition, where every breath of fresh air must be\nexcluded: people are to be taught to think in a certain way, and all\nfree intelligence becomes taboo. The country comes to resemble an\nimmensely magnified Jesuit College. Every kind of liberty is banned as\nbeing \"_bourgeois_\"; but it remains a fact that intelligence\nlanguishes where thought is not free.\n\nAll this, however, according to the leaders of the Third\nInternational, is only a small beginning of the struggle, which must\nbecome world-wide before it achieves victory. In their reply to the\nIndependent Labour Party they say:\n\n    It is probable that upon the throwing off of the chains of the\n    capitalist Governments, the revolutionary proletariat of\n    Europe will meet the resistance of Anglo-Saxon capital in the\n    persons of British and American capitalists who will attempt\n    to blockade it. It is then possible that the revolutionary\n    proletariat of Europe will rise in union with the peoples of\n    the East and commence a revolutionary struggle, the scene of\n    which will be the entire world, to deal a final blow to\n    British and American capitalism (_The Times_, July 30, 1920).\n\nThe war here prophesied, if it ever takes place, will be one compared\nto which the late war will come to seem a mere affair of outposts.\nThose who realize the destructiveness of the late war, the devastation\nand impoverishment, the lowering of the level of civilization\nthroughout vast areas, the general increase of hatred and savagery,\nthe letting loose of bestial instincts which had been curbed during\npeace--those who realize all this will hesitate to incur inconceivably\ngreater horrors, even if they believe firmly that Communism in itself\nis much to be desired. An economic system cannot be considered apart\nfrom the population which is to carry it out; and the population\nresulting from such a world-war as Moscow calmly contemplates would\nbe savage, bloodthirsty and ruthless to an extent that must make any\nsystem a mere engine of oppression and cruelty.\n\nThis brings us to our third question: Is the system which Communists\nregard as their goal likely to result from the adoption of their\nmethods? This is really the most vital question of the three.\n\nAdvocacy of Communism by those who believe in Bolshevik methods rests\nupon the assumption that there is no slavery except economic slavery,\nand that when all goods are held in common there must be perfect\nliberty. I fear this is a delusion.\n\nThere must be administration, there must be officials who control\ndistribution. These men, in a Communist State, are the repositories of\npower. So long as they control the army, they are able, as in Russia\nat this moment, to wield despotic power even if they are a small\nminority. The fact that there is Communism--to a certain extent--does\nnot mean that there is liberty. If the Communism were more complete,\nit would not necessarily mean more freedom; there would still be\ncertain officials in control of the food supply, and these officials\ncould govern as they pleased so long as they retained the support of\nthe soldiers. This is not mere theory: it is the patent lesson of the\npresent condition of Russia. The Bolshevik theory is that a small\nminority are to seize power, and are to hold it until Communism is\naccepted practically universally, which, they admit, may take a long\ntime. But power is sweet, and few men surrender it voluntarily. It is\nespecially sweet to those who have the habit of it, and the habit\nbecomes most ingrained in those who have governed by bayonets, without\npopular support. Is it not almost inevitable that men placed as the\nBolsheviks are placed in Russia, and as they maintain that the\nCommunists must place themselves wherever the social revolution\nsucceeds, will be loath to relinquish their monopoly of power, and\nwill find reasons for remaining until some new revolution ousts them?\nWould it not be fatally easy for them, without altering economic\nstructure, to decree large salaries for high Government officials, and\nso reintroduce the old inequalities of wealth? What motive would they\nhave for not doing so? What motive is possible except idealism, love\nof mankind, non-economic motives of the sort that Bolsheviks decry?\nThe system created by violence and the forcible rule of a minority\nmust necessarily allow of tyranny and exploitation; and if human\nnature is what Marxians assert it to be, why should the rulers\nneglect such opportunities of selfish advantage?\n\nIt is sheer nonsense to pretend that the rulers of a great empire such\nas Soviet Russia, when they have become accustomed to power, retain\nthe proletarian psychology, and feel that their class-interest is the\nsame as that of the ordinary working man. This is not the case in fact\nin Russia now, however the truth may be concealed by fine phrases. The\nGovernment has a class-consciousness and a class-interest quite\ndistinct from those of the genuine proletarian, who is not to be\nconfounded with the paper proletarian of the Marxian schema. In a\ncapitalist state, the Government and the capitalists on the whole hang\ntogether, and form one class; in Soviet Russia, the Government has\nabsorbed the capitalist mentality together with the governmental, and\nthe fusion has given increased strength to the upper class. But I see\nno reason whatever to expect equality or freedom to result from such a\nsystem, except reasons derived from a false psychology and a mistaken\nanalysis of the sources of political power.\n\nI am compelled to reject Bolshevism for two reasons: First, because\nthe price mankind must pay to achieve Communism by Bolshevik methods\nis too terrible; and secondly because, even after paying the price, I\ndo not believe the result would be what the Bolsheviks profess to\ndesire.\n\nBut if their methods are rejected, how are we ever to arrive at a\nbetter economic system? This is not an easy question, and I shall\ntreat it in a separate chapter.\n\n\n\n\nV\n\nMECHANISM AND THE INDIVIDUAL\n\n\nIs it possible to effect a fundamental reform of the existing economic\nsystem by any other method than that of Bolshevism? The difficulty of\nanswering this question is what chiefly attracts idealists to the\ndictatorship of the proletariat. If, as I have argued, the method of\nviolent revolution and Communist rule is not likely to have the\nresults which idealists desire, we are reduced to despair unless we\ncall see hope in other methods. The Bolshevik arguments against all\nother methods are powerful. I confess that, when the spectacle of\npresent-day Russia forced me to disbelieve in Bolshevik methods, I was\nat first unable to see any way of curing the essential evils of\ncapitalism. My first impulse was to abandon political thinking as a\nbad job, and to conclude that the strong and ruthless must always\nexploit the weaker and kindlier sections of the population. But this\nis not an attitude that can be long maintained by any vigorous and\ntemperamentally hopeful person. Of course, if it were the truth, one\nwould have to acquiesce. Some people believe that by living on sour\nmilk one can achieve immortality. Such optimists are answered by a\nmere refutation; it is not necessary to go on and point out some other\nway of escaping death. Similarly an argument that Bolshevism will not\nlead to the millennium would remain valid even if it could be shown\nthat the millennium cannot be reached by any other road. But the truth\nin social questions is not quite like truth in physiology or physics,\nsince it depends upon men's beliefs. Optimism tends to verify itself\nby making people impatient of avoidable evils; while despair, on the\nother hand, makes the world as bad as it believes it to be. It is\ntherefore imperative for those who do not believe in Bolshevism to put\nsome other hope in its place.\n\nI think there are two things that must be admitted: first, that many\nof the worst evils of capitalism might survive under Communism;\nsecondly, that the cure for these evils cannot be sudden, since it\nrequires changes in the average mentality.\n\nWhat are the chief evils of the present system? I do not think that\nmere inequality of wealth, in itself, is a very grave evil. If\neverybody had enough, the fact that some have more than enough would\nbe unimportant. With a very moderate improvement in methods of\nproduction, it would be easy to ensure that everybody should have\nenough, even under capitalism, if wars and preparations for wars were\nabolished. The problem of poverty is by no means insoluble within the\nexisting system, except when account is taken of psychological factors\nand the uneven distribution of power.\n\nThe graver evils of the capitalist system all arise from its uneven\ndistribution of power. The possessors of capital wield an influence\nquite out of proportion to their numbers or their services to the\ncommunity. They control almost the whole of education and the press;\nthey decide what the average man shall know or not know; the cinema\nhas given them a new method of propaganda, by which they enlist the\nsupport of those who are too frivolous even for illustrated papers.\nVery little of the intelligence of the world is really free: most of\nit is, directly or indirectly, in the pay of business enterprises or\nwealthy philanthropists. To satisfy capitalist interests, men are\ncompelled to work much harder and more monotonously than they ought to\nwork, and their education is scamped. Wherever, as in barbarous or\nsemi-civilized countries, labour is too weak or too disorganized to\nprotect itself, appalling cruelties are practised for private profit.\nEconomic and political organizations become more and more vast,\nleaving less and less room for individual development and initiative.\nIt is this sacrifice of the individual to the machine that is the\nfundamental evil of the modern world.\n\nTo cure this evil is not easy, because efficiency is promoted, at any\ngiven moment, though not in the long run, by sacrificing the\nindividual to the smooth working of a vast organization, whether\nmilitary or industrial. In war and in commercial competition, it is\nnecessary to control individual impulses, to treat men as so many\n\"bayonets\" or \"sabres\" or \"hands,\" not as a society of separate people\nwith separate tastes and capacities. Some sacrifice of individual\nimpulses is, of course, essential to the existence of an ordered\ncommunity, and this degree of sacrifice is, as a rule, not regretable\neven from the individual's point of view. But what is demanded in a\nhighly militarized or industrialized nation goes far beyond this very\nmoderate degree. A society which is to allow much freedom to the\nindividual must be strong enough to be not anxious about home defence,\nmoderate enough to refrain from difficult external conquests, and rich\nenough to value leisure and a civilized existence more than an\nincrease of consumable commodities.\n\nBut where the material conditions for such a state of affairs exist,\nthe psychological conditions are not likely to exist unless power is\nvery widely diffused throughout the community. Where power is\nconcentrated in a few, it will happen, unless those few are very\nexceptional people, that they will value tangible achievements in the\nway of increase in trade or empire more than the slow and less obvious\nimprovements that would result from better education combined with\nmore leisure. The joys of victory are especially great to the holders\nof power, while the evils of a mechanical organization fall almost\nexclusively upon the less influential. For these reasons, I do not\nbelieve that any community in which power is much concentrated will\nlong refrain from conflicts of the kind involving a sacrifice of what\nis most valuable in the individual. In Russia at this moment, the\nsacrifice of the individual is largely inevitable, because of the\nseverity of the economic and military struggle. But I did not feel, in\nthe Bolsheviks, any consciousness of the magnitude of this misfortune,\nor any realization of the importance of the individual as against the\nState. Nor do I believe that men who do realize this are likely to\nsucceed, or to come to the top, in times when everything has to be\ndone against personal liberty. The Bolshevik theory requires that\nevery country, sooner or later, should go through what Russia is going\nthrough now. And in every country in such a condition we may expect to\nfind the government falling into the hands of ruthless men, who have\nnot by nature any love for freedom, and who will see little importance\nin hastening the transition from dictatorship to freedom. It is far\nmore likely that such men will be tempted to embark upon new\nenterprises, requiring further concentration of forces, and postponing\nindefinitely the liberation of the populations which they use as their\nmaterial.\n\nFor these reasons, equalization of wealth without equalization of\npower seems to me a rather small and unstable achievement. But\nequalization of power is not a thing that can be achieved in a day. It\nrequires a considerable level of moral, intellectual, and technical\neducation. It requires a long period without extreme crises, in order\nthat habits of tolerance and good nature may become common. It\nrequires vigour on the part of those who are acquiring power, without\na too desperate resistance on the part of those whose share is\ndiminishing. This is only possible if those who are acquiring power\nare not very fierce, and do not terrify their opponents by threats of\nruin and death. It cannot be done quickly, because quick methods\nrequire that very mechanism and subordination of the individual which\nwe should struggle to prevent.\n\nBut even equalization of power is not the whole of what is needed\npolitically. The right grouping of men for different purposes is also\nessential. Self-government in industry, for example, is an\nindispensable condition of a good society. Those acts of an individual\nor a group which have no very great importance for outsiders ought to\nbe freely decided by that individual or group. This is recognized as\nregards religion, but ought to be recognized over a much wider field.\n\nBolshevik theory seems to me to err by concentrating its attention\nupon one evil, namely inequality of wealth, which it believes to be at\nthe bottom of all others. I do not believe any one evil can be thus\nisolated, but if I had to select one as the greatest of political\nevils, I should select inequality of power. And I should deny that\nthis is likely to be cured by the class-war and the dictatorship of\nthe Communist party. Only peace and a long period of gradual\nimprovement can bring it about.\n\nGood relations between individuals, freedom from hatred and violence\nand oppression, genera diffusion of education, leisure rationally\nemployed, the progress of art and science--these seem to me among the\nmost important ends that a political theory ought to have in view. I\ndo not believe that they can be furthered, except very rarely, by\nrevolution and war; and I am convinced that at the present moment they\ncan only be promoted by a diminution in the spirit of ruthlessness\ngenerated by the war. For these reasons, while admitting the necessity\nand even utility of Bolshevism in Russia, I do not wish to see it\nspread, or to encourage the adoption of its philosophy by advanced\nparties in the Western nations.\n\n\n\n\nVI\n\nWHY RUSSIAN COMMUNISM HAS FAILED\n\n\nThe civilized world seems almost certain, sooner or later, to follow\nthe example of Russia in attempting a Communist organization of\nsociety. I believe that the attempt is essential to the progress and\nhappiness of mankind during the next few centuries, but I believe also\nthat the transition has appalling dangers. I believe that, if the\nBolshevik theory as to the method of transition is adopted by\nCommunists in Western nations, the result will be a prolonged chaos,\nleading neither to Communism nor to any other civilized system, but to\na relapse into the barbarism of the Dark Ages. In the interests of\nCommunism, no less than in the interests of civilization, I think it\nimperative that the Russian failure should be admitted and analysed.\nFor this reason, if for no other, I cannot enter into the conspiracy\nof concealment which many Western Socialists who have visited Russia\nconsider necessary.\n\nI shall try first to recapitulate the facts which make me regard the\nRussian experiment as a failure, and then to seek out the causes of\nfailure.\n\nThe most elementary failure in Russia is in regard to food. In a\ncountry which formerly produced a vast exportable surplus of cereals\nand other agricultural produce, and in which the non-agricultural\npopulation is only 15 per cent. of the total, it ought to be possible,\nwithout great difficulty, to provide enough food for the towns. Yet\nthe Government has failed badly in this respect. The rations are\ninadequate and irregular, so that it is impossible to preserve health\nand vigour without the help of food purchased illicitly in the markets\nat speculative prices. I have given reasons for thinking that the\nbreakdown of transport, though a contributory cause, is not the main\nreason for the shortage. The main reason is the hostility of the\npeasants, which, in turn, is due to the collapse of industry and to\nthe policy of forced requisitions. In regard to corn and flour, the\nGovernment requisitions all that the peasant produces above a certain\nminimum required for himself and his family. If, instead, it exacted a\nfixed amount as rent, it would not destroy his incentive to\nproduction, and would not provide nearly such a strong motive for\nconcealment. But this plan would have enabled the peasants to grow\nrich, and would have involved a confessed abandonment of Communist\ntheory. It has therefore been thought better to employ forcible\nmethods, which led to disaster, as they were bound to do.\n\nThe collapse of industry was the chief cause of the food difficulties,\nand has in turn been aggravated by them. Owing to the fact that there\nis abundant food in the country, industrial and urban workers are\nperpetually attempting to abandon their employment for agriculture.\nThis is illegal, and is severely punished, by imprisonment or convict\nlabour. Nevertheless it continues, and in so vast a country as Russia\nit is not possible to prevent it. Thus the ranks of industry become\nstill further depleted.\n\nExcept as regards munitions of war, the collapse of industry in Russia\nis extraordinarily complete. The resolutions passed by the Ninth\nCongress of the Communist Party (April, 1920) speak of \"the incredible\ncatastrophes of public economy.\" This language is not too strong,\nthough the recovery of the Baku oil has done something to produce a\nrevival along the Volga basin.\n\nThe failure of the whole industrial side of the national economy,\nincluding transport, is at the bottom of the other failures of the\nSoviet Government. It is, to begin with, the main cause of the\nunpopularity of the Communists both in town and country: in town,\nbecause the people are hungry; in the country, because food is taken\nwith no return except paper. If industry had been prosperous, the\npeasants could have had clothes and agricultural machinery, for which\nthey would have willingly parted with enough food for the needs of the\ntowns. The town population could then have subsisted in tolerable\ncomfort; disease could have been coped with, and the general lowering\nof vitality averted. It would not have been necessary, as it has been\nin many cases, for men of scientific or artistic capacity to abandon\nthe pursuits in which they were skilled for unskilled manual labour.\nThe Communist Republic might have been agreeable to live in--at least\nfor those who had been very poor before.\n\nThe unpopularity of the Bolsheviks, which is primarily due to the\ncollapse of industry, has in turn been accentuated by the measures\nwhich it has driven the Government to adopt. In view of the fact that\nit was impossible to give adequate food to the ordinary population of\nPetrograd and Moscow, the Government decided that at any rate the men\nemployed on important public work should be sufficiently nourished to\npreserve their efficiency. It is a gross libel to say that the\nCommunists, or even the leading People's Commissaries, live luxurious\nlives according to our standards; but it is a fact that they are not\nexposed, like their subjects, to acute hunger and the weakening of\nenergy that accompanies it. No tone can blame them for this, since the\nwork of government must be carried on; but it is one of the ways in\nwhich class distinctions have reappeared where it was intended that\nthey should be banished. I talked to an obviously hungry working man\nin Moscow, who pointed to the Kremlin and remarked: \"In there they\nhave enough to eat.\" He was expressing a widespread feeling which is\nfatal to the idealistic appeal that Communism attempts to make.\n\nOwing to unpopularity, the Bolsheviks have had to rely upon the army\nand the Extraordinary Commission, and have been compelled to reduce\nthe Soviet system to an empty form. More and more the pretence of\nrepresenting the proletariat has grown threadbare. Amid official\ndemonstrations and processions and meetings the genuine proletarian\nlooks on, apathetic and disillusioned, unless he is possessed of\nunusual energy and fire, in which case he looks to the ideas of\nsyndicalism or the I.W.W. to liberate him from a slavery far more\ncomplete than that of capitalism. A sweated wage, long hours,\nindustrial conscription, prohibition of strikes, prison for slackers,\ndiminution of the already insufficient rations in factories where the\nproduction falls below what the authorities expect, an army of spies\nready to report any tendency to political disaffection and to procure\nimprisonment for its promoters--this is the reality of a system which\nstill professes to govern in the name of the proletariat.\n\nAt the same time the internal and external peril has necessitated the\ncreation of a vast army recruited by conscription, except as regards a\nCommunist nucleus, from among a population utterly weary of war, who\nput the Bolsheviks in power because they alone promised peace.\nMilitarism has produced its inevitable result in the way of a harsh\nand dictatorial spirit: the men in power go through their day's work\nwith the consciousness that they command three million armed men, and\nthat civilian opposition to their will can be easily crushed.\n\nOut of all this has grown a system painfully like the old government\nof the Tsar--a system which is Asiatic in its centralized bureaucracy,\nits secret service, its atmosphere of governmental mystery and\nsubmissive terror. In many ways it resembles our Government of India.\nLike that Government, it stands for civilization, for education,\nsanitation, and Western ideas of progress; it is composed in the main\nof honest and hard-working men, who despise those whom they govern,\nbut believe themselves possessed of something valuable which they\nmust communicate to the population, however little it may be desired.\nLike our Government in India, they live in terror of popular risings,\nand are compelled to resort to cruel repressions in order to preserve\ntheir power. Like it, they represent an alien philosophy of life,\nwhich cannot be forced upon the people without a change of instinct,\nhabit, and tradition so profound as to dry up the vital springs of\naction, producing listlessness and despair among the ignorant victims\nof militant enlightenment. It may be that Russia needs sternness and\ndiscipline more than anything else; it may be that a revival of Peter\nthe Great's methods is essential to progress. From this point of view,\nmuch of what it is natural to criticize in the Bolsheviks becomes\ndefensible; but this point of view has little affinity to Communism.\nBolshevism may be defended, possibly, as a dire discipline through\nwhich a backward nation is to be rapidly industrialized; but as an\nexperiment in Communism it has failed.\n\nThere are two things that a defender of the Bolsheviks may say against\nthe argument that they have failed because the present state of Russia\nis bad. It may be said that it is too soon to judge, and it may be\nurged that whatever failure there has been is attributable to the\nhostility of the outside world.\n\nAs to the contention that it is too soon to judge, that is of course\nundeniable in a sense. But in a sense it is always too soon to judge\nof any historical movement, because its effects and developments go on\nfor ever. Bolshevism has, no doubt, great changes ahead of it. But the\nlast three years have afforded material for some judgments, though\nmore definitive judgments will be possible later. And, for reasons\nwhich I have given in earlier chapters, I find it impossible to\nbelieve that later developments will realize more fully the Communist\nideal. If trade is opened with the outer world, there will be an\nalmost irresistible tendency to resumption of private enterprise. If\ntrade is not re-opened, the plans of Asiatic conquest will mature,\nleading to a revival of Yenghis Khan and Timur. In neither case is the\npurity of the Communist faith likely to survive.\n\nAs for the hostility of the Entente, it is of course true that\nBolshevism might have developed very differently if it had been\ntreated in a friendly spirit. But in view of its desire to promote\nworld-revolution, no one could expect--and the Bolsheviks certainly\ndid not expect--that capitalist Governments would be friendly. If\nGermany had won the war, Germany would have shown a hostility more\neffective than that of the Entente. However we may blame Western\nGovernments for their policy, we must realize that, according to the\ndeterministic economic theory of the Bolsheviks, no other policy was\nto be expected from them. Other men might have been excused for not\nforeseeing the attitude of Churchill, Clemenceau and Millerand; but\nMarxians could not be excused, since this attitude was in exact accord\nwith their own formula.\n\nWe have seen the symptoms of Bolshevik failure; I come now to the\nquestion of its profounder causes.\n\nEverything that is worst in Russia we found traceable to the collapse\nof industry. Why has industry collapsed so utterly? And would it\ncollapse equally if a Communist revolution were to occur in a Western\ncountry?\n\nRussian industry was never highly developed, and depended always upon\noutside aid for much of its plant. The hostility of the world, as\nembodied in the blockade, left Russia powerless to replace the\nmachinery and locomotives worn out during the war. The need of\nself-defence compelled the Bolsheviks to send their best workmen to\nthe front, because they were the most reliable Communists, and the\nloss of them rendered their factories even more inefficient than they\nwere under Kerensky. In this respect, and in the laziness and\nincapacity of the Russian workman, the Bolsheviks have had to face\nspecial difficulties which would be less in other countries. On the\nother hand, they have had special advantages in the fact that Russia\nis self-supporting in the matter of food; no other country could have\nendured the collapse of industry so long, and no other Great Power\nexcept the United States could have survived years of blockade.\n\nThe hostility of the world was in no way a surprise to those who made\nthe October revolution; it was in accordance with their general\ntheory, and its consequences should have been taken into account in\nmaking the revolution.\n\nOther hostilities besides those of the outside world have been\nincurred by the Bolsheviks with open eyes, notably the hostility of\nthe peasants and that of a great part of the industrial population.\nThey have attempted, in accordance with their usual contempt for\nconciliatory methods, to substitute terror for reward as the incentive\nto work. Some amiable Socialists have imagined that, when the private\ncapitalist had been eliminated, men would work from a sense of\nobligation to the community. The Bolsheviks will have none of such\nsentimentalism. In one of the resolutions of the ninth Communist\nCongress they say:\n\n    Every social system, whether based on slavery, feudalism, or\n    capitalism, had its ways and means of labour compulsion and\n    labour education in the interests of the exploiters.\n\n    The Soviet system is faced with the task of developing its\n    own methods of labour compulsion to attain an increase of the\n    intensity and wholesomeness of labour; this method is to be\n    based on the socialization of public economy in the interests\n    of the whole nation.\n\n    In addition to the propaganda by which the people are to be\n    influenced and the repressions which are to be applied to all\n    idlers, parasites and disorganizers who strive to undermine\n    public zeal--the principal method for the increase of\n    production will become the introduction of the system of\n    compulsory labour.\n\n    In capitalist society rivalry assumed the character of\n    competition and led to the exploitation of man by man. In a\n    society where the means of production are nationalized, labour\n    rivalry is to increase the products of labour without\n    infringing its solidarity.\n\n    Rivalry between factories, regions, guilds, workshops, and\n    individual workers should become the subject of careful\n    organization and of close study on the side of the Trade\n    Unions and the economic organs.\n\n    The system of premiums which is to be introduced should become\n    one of the most powerful means of exciting rivalry. The system\n    of rationing of food supply is to get into line with it; so\n    long as Soviet Russia suffers from insufficiency of\n    provisions, it is only just that the industrious and\n    conscientious worker receives more than the careless worker.\n\nIt must be remembered that even the \"industrious and conscientious\nworker\" receives less food than is required to maintain efficiency.\n\nOver the whole development of Russia and of Bolshevism since the\nOctober revolution there broods a tragic fatality. In spite of outward\nsuccess the inner failure has proceeded by inevitable stages--stages\nwhich could, by sufficient acumen, have been foreseen from the first.\nBy provoking the hostility of the outside world the Bolsheviks were\nforced to provoke the hostility of the peasants, and finally the\nhostility or utter apathy of the urban and industrial population.\nThese various hostilities brought material disaster, and material\ndisaster brought spiritual collapse. The ultimate source of the whole\ntrain of evils lies in the Bolshevik outlook on life: in its dogmatism\nof hatred and its belief that human nature can be completely\ntransformed by force. To injure capitalists is not the ultimate goal\nof Communism, though among men dominated by hatred it is the part that\ngives zest to their activities. To face the hostility of the world may\nshow heroism, but it is a heroism for which the country, not its\nrulers, has to pay the price. In the principles of Bolshevism there is\nmore desire to destroy ancient evils than to build up new goods; it is\nfor this reason that success in destruction has been so much greater\nthan in construction. The desire to destroy is inspired by hatred,\nwhich is not a constructive principle. From this essential\ncharacteristic of Bolshevik mentality has sprung the willingness to\nsubject Russia to its present martyrdom. It is only out of a quite\ndifferent mentality that a happier world can be created.\n\nAnd from this follows a further conclusion. The Bolshevik outlook is\nthe outcome of the cruelty of the Tsarist regime and the ferocity of\nthe years of the Great War, operating upon a ruined and starving\nnation maddened into universal hatred. If a different mentality is\nneeded for the establishment of a successful Communism, then a quite\ndifferent conjuncture must see its inauguration; men must be persuaded\nto the attempt by hope, not driven to it by despair. To bring this\nabout should be the aim of every Communist who desires the happiness\nof mankind more than the punishment of capitalists and their\ngovernmental satellites.\n\n\n\n\nVII\n\nCONDITIONS FOR THE SUCCESS OF COMMUNISM\n\n\nThe fundamental ideas of Communism are by no means impracticable, and\nwould, if realized, add immeasurably to the well-being of mankind. The\ndifficulties which have to be faced are not in regard to the\nfundamental ideas, but in regard to the transition from capitalism. It\nmust be assumed that those who profit by the existing system will\nfight to preserve it, and their fight may be sufficiently severe to\ndestroy all that is best in Communism during the struggle, as well as\neverything else that has value in modern civilization. The seriousness\nof this problem of transition is illustrated by Russia, and cannot be\nmet by the methods of the Third International. The Soviet Government,\nat the present moment, is anxious to obtain manufactured goods from\ncapitalist countries, but the Third International is meanwhile\nendeavouring to promote revolutions which, if they occurred, would\nparalyse the industries of the countries concerned, and leave them\nincapable of supplying Russian needs.\n\nThe supreme condition of success in a Communist revolution is that it\nshould not paralyse industry. If industry is paralysed, the evils\nwhich exist in modern Russia, or others just as great, seem\npractically unavoidable. There will be the problem of town and\ncountry, there will be hunger, there will be fierceness and revolts\nand military tyranny. All these things follow in a fatal sequence; and\nthe end of them is almost certain to be something quite different from\nwhat genuine Communists desire.\n\nIf industry is to survive throughout a Communist revolution, a number\nof conditions must be fulfilled which are not, at present, fulfilled\nanywhere. Consider, for the sake of definiteness, what would happen if\na Communist revolution were to occur in England to-morrow. Immediately\nAmerica would place an embargo on all trade with us. The cotton\nindustry would collapse, leaving about five million of the most\nproductive portion of the population idle. The food supply would\nbecome inadequate, and would fail disastrously if, as is to be\nexpected, the Navy were hostile or disorganized by the sabotage of the\nofficers. The result would be that, unless there were a\ncounter-revolution, about half the population would die within the\nfirst twelve months. On such a basis it would evidently be impossible\nto erect a successful Communist State.\n\nWhat applies to England applies, in one form or another, to the\nremaining countries of Europe. Italian and German Socialists are, many\nof them, in a revolutionary frame of mind and could, if they chose,\nraise formidable revolts. They are urged by Moscow to do so, but they\nrealize that, if they did, England and America would starve them.\nFrance, for many reasons, dare not offend England and America beyond a\npoint. Thus, in every country except America, a successful Communist\nrevolution is impossible for economico-political reasons. America,\nbeing self-contained and strong, would be capable, so far as material\nconditions go, of achieving a successful revolution; but in America\nthe psychological conditions are as yet adverse. There is no other\ncivilized country where capitalism is so strong and revolutionary\nSocialism so weak as in America. At the present moment, therefore,\nthough it is by no means impossible that Communist revolutions may\noccur all over the Continent, it is nearly certain that they cannot be\nsuccessful in any real sense. They will have to begin by a war against\nAmerica, and possibly England, by a paralysis of industry, by\nstarvation, militarism and the whole attendant train of evils with\nwhich Russia has made us familiar.\n\nThat Communism, whenever and wherever it is adopted, will have to\nbegin by fighting the bourgeoisie, is highly probable. The important\nquestion is not whether there is to be fighting, but how long and\nsevere it is to be. A short war, in which Communism won a rapid and\neasy victory, would do little harm. It is long, bitter and doubtful\nwars that must be avoided if anything of what makes Communism\ndesirable is to survive.\n\nTwo practical consequences flow from this conclusion: first, that\nnothing can succeed until America is either converted to Communism, or\nat any rate willing to remain neutral; secondly, that it is a mistake\nto attempt to inaugurate Communism in a country where the majority are\nhostile, or rather, where the active opponents are as strong as the\nactive supporters, because in such a state of opinion a very severe\ncivil war is likely to result. It is necessary to have a great body of\nopinion favourable to Communism, and a rather weak opposition, before\na really successful Communist state can be introduced either by\nrevolution or by more or less constitutional methods.\n\nIt may be assumed that when Communism is first introduced, the higher\ntechnical and business staff will side with the capitalists and\nattempt sabotage unless they have no hopes of a counter-revolution.\nFor this reason it is very necessary that among wage-earners there\nshould be as wide a diffusion as possible of technical and business\neducation, so that they may be able immediately to take control of big\ncomplex industries. In this respect Russia was very badly off, whereas\nEngland and America would be much more fortunate.\n\nSelf-government in industry is, I believe, the road by which England\ncan best approach Communism. I do not doubt that the railways and the\nmines, after a little practice, could be run more efficiently by the\nworkers, from the point of view of production, than they are at\npresent by the capitalists. The Bolsheviks oppose self-government in\nindustry every where, because it has failed in Russia, and their\nnational self-esteem prevents them from admitting that this is due to\nthe backwardness of Russia. This is one of the respects in which they\nare misled by the assumption that Russia must be in all ways a model\nto the rest of the world. I would go so far as to say that the winning\nof self-government in such industries as railways and mining is an\nessential preliminary to complete Communism. In England, especially,\nthis is the case. The Unions can command whatever technical skill they\nmay require; they are politically powerful; the demand for\nself-government is one for which there is widespread sympathy, and\ncould be much more with adequate propaganda; moreover (what is\nimportant with the British temperament) self-government can be brought\nabout gradually, by stages in each trade, and by extension from one\ntrade to another. Capitalists value two things, their power and their\nmoney; many individuals among them value only the money. It is wiser\nto concentrate first on the power, as is done by seeking\nself-government in industry without confiscation of capitalist\nincomes. By this means the capitalists are gradually turned into\nobvious drones, their active functions in industry become nil, and\nthey can be ultimately dispossessed without dislocation and without\nthe possibility of any successful struggle on their parts.\n\nAnother advantage of proceeding by way of self-government is that it\ntends to prevent the Communist regime, when it comes, from having that\ntruly terrible degree of centralization which now exists in Russia.\nThe Russians have been forced to centralize, partly by the problems of\nthe war, but more by the shortage of all kinds of skill. This has\ncompelled the few competent men to attempt each to do the work of ten\nmen, which has not proved satisfactory in spite of heroic efforts. The\nidea of democracy has become discredited as the result first of\nsyndicalism, and then of Bolshevism. But there are two different\nthings that may be meant by democracy: we may mean the system of\nParliamentary government, or we may mean the participation of the\npeople in affairs. The discredit of the former is largely deserved,\nand I have no desire to uphold Parliament as an ideal institution. But\nit is a great misfortune if, from a confusion of ideas, men come to\nthink that, because Parliaments are imperfect, there is no reason why\nthere should be self-government. The grounds for advocating\nself-government are very familiar: first, that no benevolent despot\ncan be trusted to know or pursue the interests of his subjects;\nsecond, that the practice of self-government is the only effective\nmethod of political education; third, that it tends to place the\npreponderance of force on the side of the constitution, and thus to\npromote order and stable government. Other reasons could be found, but\nI think these are the chief. In Russia self-government has\ndisappeared, except within the Communist Party. If it is not to\ndisappear elsewhere during a Communist revolution, it is very\ndesirable that there should exist already important industries\ncompetently administered by the workers themselves.\n\nThe Bolshevik philosophy is promoted very largely by despair of more\ngradual methods. But this despair is a mark of impatience, and is not\nreally warranted by the facts. It is by no means impossible, in the\nnear future, to secure self-government in British railways and mines\nby constitutional means. This is not the sort of measure which would\nbring into operation an American blockade or a civil war or any of the\nother catastrophic dangers that are to be feared from a full-fledged\nCommunist revolution in the present international situation.\nSelf-government in industry is feasible, and would be a great step\ntowards Communism. It would both afford many of the advantages of\nCommunism and also make the transition far easier without a technical\nbreak-down of production.\n\nThere is another defect in the methods advocated by the Third\nInternational. The sort of revolution which is recommended is never\npractically feasible except in a time of national misfortune; in fact,\ndefeat in war seems to be an indispensable condition. Consequently, by\nthis method, Communism will only be inaugurated where the conditions\nof life are difficult, where demoralization and disorganization make\nsuccess almost impossible, and where men are in a mood of fierce\ndespair very inimical to industrial construction. If Communism is to\nhave a fair chance, it must be inaugurated in a prosperous country.\nBut a prosperous country will not be readily moved by the arguments of\nhatred and universal upheaval which are employed by the Third\nInternational. It is necessary, in appealing to a prosperous country,\nto lay stress on hope rather than despair, and to show how the\ntransition can be effected without a calamitous loss of prosperity.\nAll this requires less violence and subversiveness, more patience and\nconstructive propaganda, less appeal to the armed might of a\ndetermined minority.\n\nThe attitude of uncompromising heroism is attractive, and appeals\nespecially to the dramatic instinct. But the purpose of the serious\nrevolutionary is not personal heroism, nor martyrdom, but the creation\nof a happier world. Those who have the happiness of the world at heart\nwill shrink from attitudes and the facile hysteria of \"no parley with\nthe enemy.\" They will not embark upon enterprises, however arduous and\naustere, which are likely to involve the martyrdom of their country\nand the discrediting of their ideals. It is by slower and less showy\nmethods that the new world must be built: by industrial efforts after\nself-government, by proletarian training in technique and business\nadministration, by careful study of the international situation, by a\nprolonged and devoted propaganda of ideas rather than tactics,\nespecially among the wage-earners of the United States. It is not true\nthat no gradual approaches to Communism are possible: self-government\nin industry is an important instance to the contrary. It is not true\nthat any isolated European country, or even the whole of the Continent\nin unison, can, after the exhaustion produced by the war, introduce a\nsuccessful form of Communism at the present moment, owing to the\nhostility and economic supremacy of America. To find fault with those\nwho urge these considerations, or to accuse them of faint-heartedness,\nis mere sentimental self-indulgence, sacrificing the good we can do to\nthe satisfaction of our own emotions.\n\nEven under present conditions in Russia, it is possible still to feel\nthe inspiration of the essential spirit of Communism, the spirit of\ncreative hope, seeking to sweep away the incumbrances of injustice and\ntyranny and rapacity which obstruct the growth of the human spirit, to\nreplace individual competition by collective action, the relation of\nmaster and slave by free co-operation. This hope has helped the best\nof the Communists to bear the harsh years through which Russia has\nbeen passing, and has become an inspiration to the world. The hope is\nnot chimerical, but it can only be realized through a more patient\nlabour, a more objective study of facts, and above all a longer\npropaganda, to make the necessity of the transition obvious to the\ngreat majority of wage-earners. Russian Communism may fail and go\nunder, but Communism itself will not die. And if hope rather than\nhatred inspires its advocates, it can be brought about without the\nuniversal cataclysm preached by Moscow. The war and its sequel have\nproved the destructiveness of capitalism; let us see to it that the\nnext epoch does not prove the still greater destructiveness of\nCommunism, but rather its power to heal the wounds which the old evil\nsystem has inflicted upon the human spirit.\n\n\n\n\n  _Printed in Great Britain by_\n  UNWIN BROTHERS, LIMITED, THE GRESHAM PRESS, WOKING AND LONDON\n\n\n\n\nERRATA\n\n\nP. 20, l. 11. For \"teaching\" read \"reaching\"\n\nP. 23, between l. 18 and l. 19. Insert \"violence in the transition\nmust be faced. Unfortunately,\"\n\nP. 43, l. 12. For \"dying\" read \"very ill\"\n\nP. 44, last sentence. Substitute \"But he recovered, and I hope it will\nrecover also.\" (replacing: \"I hope I was mistaken in both respects.\")\n\nP. 60, l. 6 from below. For \"waving triumphant hands and\" read\n\"expressing their delight by\"\n\nP. 61, l. 21. For \"professional\" read \"professorial\"\n\nP. 85, l. 2. For \"This\" read \"Thus\"\n\nP. 91, l. 8. For \"losses\" read \"hopes\"\n\nP. 104, l. 9. For \"leave\" read \"leaves\"\n\nP. 105, last line. Substitute \"which has been already discussed in\nChapter VI\" (replacing: \"which is better reserved for a separate\nchapter.\")\n\nP. 120, l. 19 For \"desires\" read \"desire\"\n\nP. 132, l. 5 from below. For \"Caunon\" read \"Cannon\"\n\nP. 148, l. 5 from below. For \"by\" read \"in\"\n\nP. 155, l. 13. For \"scheme\" read \"schema\"\n\nP. 172, l. 15. For \"Zenghis\" read \"Yenghis\"\n\nP. 187, l. 15. Delete comma.\n\n\n\n\nBY THE SAME AUTHOR\n\n\nROADS TO FREEDOM\n\nPRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION\n\nINTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL PHILOSOPHY\n\nTHE ANALYSIS OF MIND\n\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nTypographical errors corrected in text:\n\npage 19: happinesss changed to happiness\npage 163: genera to general\n\n\n       *       *       *       *       *","title":"The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":38111}