{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_1738/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_1738","id":"gutenberg_1738","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1738","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Classics of Literature","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Classical literature","Political science -- Early works to 1800"],"text":"Produced by Sue Asscher\n\n\n\n\n\nSTATESMAN\n\nBy Plato\n\n\nTranslated by Benjamin Jowett\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.\n\nIn the Phaedrus, the Republic, the Philebus, the Parmenides, and the\nSophist, we may observe the tendency of Plato to combine two or more\nsubjects or different aspects of the same subject in a single dialogue.\nIn the Sophist and Statesman especially we note that the discussion is\npartly regarded as an illustration of method, and that analogies are\nbrought from afar which throw light on the main subject. And in his\nlater writings generally we further remark a decline of style, and of\ndramatic power; the characters excite little or no interest, and\nthe digressions are apt to overlay the main thesis; there is not the\n'callida junctura' of an artistic whole. Both the serious discussions\nand the jests are sometimes out of place. The invincible Socrates is\nwithdrawn from view; and new foes begin to appear under old names. Plato\nis now chiefly concerned, not with the original Sophist, but with the\nsophistry of the schools of philosophy, which are making reasoning\nimpossible; and is driven by them out of the regions of transcendental\nspeculation back into the path of common sense. A logical or\npsychological phase takes the place of the doctrine of Ideas in\nhis mind. He is constantly dwelling on the importance of regular\nclassification, and of not putting words in the place of things. He has\nbanished the poets, and is beginning to use a technical language. He is\nbitter and satirical, and seems to be sadly conscious of the realities\nof human life. Yet the ideal glory of the Platonic philosophy is not\nextinguished. He is still looking for a city in which kings are either\nphilosophers or gods (compare Laws).\n\nThe Statesman has lost the grace and beauty of the earlier dialogues.\nThe mind of the writer seems to be so overpowered in the effort of\nthought as to impair his style; at least his gift of expression does\nnot keep up with the increasing difficulty of his theme. The idea of the\nking or statesman and the illustration of method are connected, not like\nthe love and rhetoric of the Phaedrus, by 'little invisible pegs,'\nbut in a confused and inartistic manner, which fails to produce any\nimpression of a whole on the mind of the reader. Plato apologizes for\nhis tediousness, and acknowledges that the improvement of his audience\nhas been his only aim in some of his digressions. His own image may be\nused as a motto of his style: like an inexpert statuary he has made the\nfigure or outline too large, and is unable to give the proper colours\nor proportions to his work. He makes mistakes only to correct them--this\nseems to be his way of drawing attention to common dialectical errors.\nThe Eleatic stranger, here, as in the Sophist, has no appropriate\ncharacter, and appears only as the expositor of a political ideal, in\nthe delineation of which he is frequently interrupted by purely logical\nillustrations. The younger Socrates resembles his namesake in nothing\nbut a name. The dramatic character is so completely forgotten, that a\nspecial reference is twice made to discussions in the Sophist; and this,\nperhaps, is the strongest ground which can be urged for doubting the\ngenuineness of the work. But, when we remember that a similar allusion\nis made in the Laws to the Republic, we see that the entire disregard\nof dramatic propriety is not always a sufficient reason for doubting the\ngenuineness of a Platonic writing.\n\nThe search after the Statesman, which is carried on, like that for\nthe Sophist, by the method of dichotomy, gives an opportunity for many\nhumorous and satirical remarks. Several of the jests are mannered and\nlaboured: for example, the turn of words with which the dialogue\nopens; or the clumsy joke about man being an animal, who has a power\nof two-feet--both which are suggested by the presence of Theodorus, the\ngeometrician. There is political as well as logical insight in refusing\nto admit the division of mankind into Hellenes and Barbarians: 'if a\ncrane could speak, he would in like manner oppose men and all other\nanimals to cranes.' The pride of the Hellene is further humbled,\nby being compared to a Phrygian or Lydian. Plato glories in this\nimpartiality of the dialectical method, which places birds in\njuxtaposition with men, and the king side by side with the bird-catcher;\nking or vermin-destroyer are objects of equal interest to science\n(compare Parmen.). There are other passages which show that the irony\nof Socrates was a lesson which Plato was not slow in learning--as, for\nexample, the passing remark, that 'the kings and statesmen of our day\nare in their breeding and education very like their subjects;' or the\nanticipation that the rivals of the king will be found in the class\nof servants; or the imposing attitude of the priests, who are the\nestablished interpreters of the will of heaven, authorized by law.\nNothing is more bitter in all his writings than his comparison of the\ncontemporary politicians to lions, centaurs, satyrs, and other animals\nof a feebler sort, who are ever changing their forms and natures. But,\nas in the later dialogues generally, the play of humour and the charm of\npoetry have departed, never to return.\n\nStill the Politicus contains a higher and more ideal conception of\npolitics than any other of Plato's writings. The city of which there\nis a pattern in heaven (Republic), is here described as a Paradisiacal\nstate of human society. In the truest sense of all, the ruler is not\nman but God; and such a government existed in a former cycle of human\nhistory, and may again exist when the gods resume their care of mankind.\nIn a secondary sense, the true form of government is that which has\nscientific rulers, who are irresponsible to their subjects. Not power\nbut knowledge is the characteristic of a king or royal person. And the\nrule of a man is better and higher than law, because he is more able\nto deal with the infinite complexity of human affairs. But mankind, in\ndespair of finding a true ruler, are willing to acquiesce in any law or\ncustom which will save them from the caprice of individuals. They are\nready to accept any of the six forms of government which prevail in the\nworld. To the Greek, nomos was a sacred word, but the political idealism\nof Plato soars into a region beyond; for the laws he would substitute\nthe intelligent will of the legislator. Education is originally to\nimplant in men's minds a sense of truth and justice, which is the divine\nbond of states, and the legislator is to contrive human bonds, by which\ndissimilar natures may be united in marriage and supply the deficiencies\nof one another. As in the Republic, the government of philosophers, the\ncauses of the perversion of states, the regulation of marriages, are\nstill the political problems with which Plato's mind is occupied. He\ntreats them more slightly, partly because the dialogue is shorter, and\nalso because the discussion of them is perpetually crossed by the other\ninterest of dialectic, which has begun to absorb him.\n\nThe plan of the Politicus or Statesman may be briefly sketched as\nfollows: (1) By a process of division and subdivision we discover the\ntrue herdsman or king of men. But before we can rightly distinguish him\nfrom his rivals, we must view him, (2) as he is presented to us in a\nfamous ancient tale: the tale will also enable us to distinguish the\ndivine from the human herdsman or shepherd: (3) and besides our fable,\nwe must have an example; for our example we will select the art of\nweaving, which will have to be distinguished from the kindred arts;\nand then, following this pattern, we will separate the king from his\nsubordinates or competitors. (4) But are we not exceeding all due\nlimits; and is there not a measure of all arts and sciences, to which\nthe art of discourse must conform? There is; but before we can apply\nthis measure, we must know what is the aim of discourse: and our\ndiscourse only aims at the dialectical improvement of ourselves and\nothers.--Having made our apology, we return once more to the king or\nstatesman, and proceed to contrast him with pretenders in the same\nline with him, under their various forms of government. (5) His\ncharacteristic is, that he alone has science, which is superior to law\nand written enactments; these do but spring out of the necessities of\nmankind, when they are in despair of finding the true king. (6) The\nsciences which are most akin to the royal are the sciences of the\ngeneral, the judge, the orator, which minister to him, but even these\nare subordinate to him. (7) Fixed principles are implanted by education,\nand the king or statesman completes the political web by marrying\ntogether dissimilar natures, the courageous and the temperate, the bold\nand the gentle, who are the warp and the woof of society.\n\nThe outline may be filled up as follows:--\n\nSOCRATES: I have reason to thank you, Theodorus, for the acquaintance of\nTheaetetus and the Stranger.\n\nTHEODORUS: And you will have three times as much reason to thank me\nwhen they have delineated the Statesman and Philosopher, as well as the\nSophist.\n\nSOCRATES: Does the great geometrician apply the same measure to all\nthree? Are they not divided by an interval which no geometrical ratio\ncan express?\n\nTHEODORUS: By the god Ammon, Socrates, you are right; and I am glad to\nsee that you have not forgotten your geometry. But before I retaliate on\nyou, I must request the Stranger to finish the argument...\n\nThe Stranger suggests that Theaetetus shall be allowed to rest, and that\nSocrates the younger shall respond in his place; Theodorus agrees to the\nsuggestion, and Socrates remarks that the name of the one and the face\nof the other give him a right to claim relationship with both of them.\nThey propose to take the Statesman after the Sophist; his path they\nmust determine, and part off all other ways, stamping upon them a single\nnegative form (compare Soph.).\n\nThe Stranger begins the enquiry by making a division of the arts and\nsciences into theoretical and practical--the one kind concerned with\nknowledge exclusively, and the other with action; arithmetic and the\nmathematical sciences are examples of the former, and carpentering and\nhandicraft arts of the latter (compare Philebus). Under which of the two\nshall we place the Statesman? Or rather, shall we not first ask, whether\nthe king, statesman, master, householder, practise one art or many? As\nthe adviser of a physician may be said to have medical science and to be\na physician, so the adviser of a king has royal science and is a king.\nAnd the master of a large household may be compared to the ruler of a\nsmall state. Hence we conclude that the science of the king, statesman,\nand householder is one and the same. And this science is akin to\nknowledge rather than to action. For a king rules with his mind, and not\nwith his hands.\n\nBut theoretical science may be a science either of judging, like\narithmetic, or of ruling and superintending, like that of the architect\nor master-builder. And the science of the king is of the latter nature;\nbut the power which he exercises is underived and uncontrolled,--a\ncharacteristic which distinguishes him from heralds, prophets, and\nother inferior officers. He is the wholesale dealer in command, and the\nherald, or other officer, retails his commands to others. Again, a ruler\nis concerned with the production of some object, and objects may be\ndivided into living and lifeless, and rulers into the rulers of living\nand lifeless objects. And the king is not like the master-builder,\nconcerned with lifeless matter, but has the task of managing living\nanimals. And the tending of living animals may be either a tending of\nindividuals, or a managing of herds. And the Statesman is not a groom,\nbut a herdsman, and his art may be called either the art of managing\na herd, or the art of collective management:--Which do you prefer? 'No\nmatter.' Very good, Socrates, and if you are not too particular about\nwords you will be all the richer some day in true wisdom. But how would\nyou subdivide the herdsman's art? 'I should say, that there is one\nmanagement of men, and another of beasts.' Very good, but you are in too\ngreat a hurry to get to man. All divisions which are rightly made should\ncut through the middle; if you attend to this rule, you will be more\nlikely to arrive at classes. 'I do not understand the nature of my\nmistake.' Your division was like a division of the human race into\nHellenes and Barbarians, or into Lydians or Phrygians and all other\nnations, instead of into male and female; or like a division of number\ninto ten thousand and all other numbers, instead of into odd and even.\nAnd I should like you to observe further, that though I maintain a class\nto be a part, there is no similar necessity for a part to be a class.\nBut to return to your division, you spoke of men and other animals as\ntwo classes--the second of which you comprehended under the general name\nof beasts. This is the sort of division which an intelligent crane would\nmake: he would put cranes into a class by themselves for their special\nglory, and jumble together all others, including man, in the class of\nbeasts. An error of this kind can only be avoided by a more regular\nsubdivision. Just now we divided the whole class of animals into\ngregarious and non-gregarious, omitting the previous division into tame\nand wild. We forgot this in our hurry to arrive at man, and found by\nexperience, as the proverb says, that 'the more haste the worse speed.'\n\nAnd now let us begin again at the art of managing herds. You have\nprobably heard of the fish-preserves in the Nile and in the ponds of the\nGreat King, and of the nurseries of geese and cranes in Thessaly. These\nsuggest a new division into the rearing or management of land-herds and\nof water-herds:--I need not say with which the king is concerned. And\nland-herds may be divided into walking and flying; and every idiot knows\nthat the political animal is a pedestrian. At this point we may take a\nlonger or a shorter road, and as we are already near the end, I see no\nharm in taking the longer, which is the way of mesotomy, and accords\nwith the principle which we were laying down. The tame, walking, herding\nanimal, may be divided into two classes--the horned and the hornless,\nand the king is concerned with the hornless; and these again may be\nsubdivided into animals having or not having cloven feet, or mixing or\nnot mixing the breed; and the king or statesman has the care of animals\nwhich have not cloven feet, and which do not mix the breed. And now, if\nwe omit dogs, who can hardly be said to herd, I think that we have only\ntwo species left which remain undivided: and how are we to distinguish\nthem? To geometricians, like you and Theaetetus, I can have no\ndifficulty in explaining that man is a diameter, having a power of two\nfeet; and the power of four-legged creatures, being the double of two\nfeet, is the diameter of our diameter. There is another excellent jest\nwhich I spy in the two remaining species. Men and birds are both bipeds,\nand human beings are running a race with the airiest and freest of\ncreation, in which they are far behind their competitors;--this is a\ngreat joke, and there is a still better in the juxtaposition of the\nbird-taker and the king, who may be seen scampering after them. For,\nas we remarked in discussing the Sophist, the dialectical method is no\nrespecter of persons. But we might have proceeded, as I was saying,\nby another and a shorter road. In that case we should have begun by\ndividing land animals into bipeds and quadrupeds, and bipeds into winged\nand wingless; we should than have taken the Statesman and set him over\nthe 'bipes implume,' and put the reins of government into his hands.\n\nHere let us sum up:--The science of pure knowledge had a part which\nwas the science of command, and this had a part which was a science of\nwholesale command; and this was divided into the management of animals,\nand was again parted off into the management of herds of animals, and\nagain of land animals, and these into hornless, and these into bipeds;\nand so at last we arrived at man, and found the political and royal\nscience. And yet we have not clearly distinguished the political\nshepherd from his rivals. No one would think of usurping the\nprerogatives of the ordinary shepherd, who on all hands is admitted to\nbe the trainer, matchmaker, doctor, musician of his flock. But the royal\nshepherd has numberless competitors, from whom he must be distinguished;\nthere are merchants, husbandmen, physicians, who will all dispute his\nright to manage the flock. I think that we can best distinguish him by\nhaving recourse to a famous old tradition, which may amuse as well as\ninstruct us; the narrative is perfectly true, although the scepticism of\nmankind is prone to doubt the tales of old. You have heard what happened\nin the quarrel of Atreus and Thyestes? 'You mean about the golden lamb?'\nNo, not that; but another part of the story, which tells how the sun\nand stars once arose in the west and set in the east, and that the god\nreversed their motion, as a witness to the right of Atreus. 'There is\nsuch a story.' And no doubt you have heard of the empire of Cronos, and\nof the earthborn men? The origin of these and the like stories is to be\nfound in the tale which I am about to narrate.\n\nThere was a time when God directed the revolutions of the world, but\nat the completion of a certain cycle he let go; and the world, by a\nnecessity of its nature, turned back, and went round the other way.\nFor divine things alone are unchangeable; but the earth and heavens,\nalthough endowed with many glories, have a body, and are therefore\nliable to perturbation. In the case of the world, the perturbation is\nvery slight, and amounts only to a reversal of motion. For the lord of\nmoving things is alone self-moved; neither can piety allow that he goes\nat one time in one direction and at another time in another; or that God\nhas given the universe opposite motions; or that there are two gods, one\nturning it in one direction, another in another. But the truth is, that\nthere are two cycles of the world, and in one of them it is governed by\nan immediate Providence, and receives life and immortality, and in the\nother is let go again, and has a reverse action during infinite ages.\nThis new action is spontaneous, and is due to exquisite perfection of\nbalance, to the vast size of the universe, and to the smallness of the\npivot upon which it turns. All changes in the heaven affect the animal\nworld, and this being the greatest of them, is most destructive to men\nand animals. At the beginning of the cycle before our own very few of\nthem had survived; and on these a mighty change passed. For their life\nwas reversed like the motion of the world, and first of all coming to a\nstand then quickly returned to youth and beauty. The white locks of the\naged became black; the cheeks of the bearded man were restored to their\nyouth and fineness; the young men grew softer and smaller, and, being\nreduced to the condition of children in mind as well as body, began to\nvanish away; and the bodies of those who had died by violence, in a few\nmoments underwent a parallel change and disappeared. In that cycle of\nexistence there was no such thing as the procreation of animals from one\nanother, but they were born of the earth, and of this our ancestors, who\ncame into being immediately after the end of the last cycle and at the\nbeginning of this, have preserved the recollection. Such traditions are\noften now unduly discredited, and yet they may be proved by internal\nevidence. For observe how consistent the narrative is; as the old\nreturned to youth, so the dead returned to life; the wheel of their\nexistence having been reversed, they rose again from the earth: a few\nonly were reserved by God for another destiny. Such was the origin of\nthe earthborn men.\n\n'And is this cycle, of which you are speaking, the reign of Cronos,\nor our present state of existence?' No, Socrates, that blessed and\nspontaneous life belongs not to this, but to the previous state, in\nwhich God was the governor of the whole world, and other gods subject\nto him ruled over parts of the world, as is still the case in certain\nplaces. They were shepherds of men and animals, each of them sufficing\nfor those of whom he had the care. And there was no violence among them,\nor war, or devouring of one another. Their life was spontaneous, because\nin those days God ruled over man; and he was to man what man is now\nto the animals. Under his government there were no estates, or private\npossessions, or families; but the earth produced a sufficiency of all\nthings, and men were born out of the earth, having no traditions of\nthe past; and as the temperature of the seasons was mild, they took no\nthought for raiment, and had no beds, but lived and dwelt in the open\nair.\n\nSuch was the age of Cronos, and the age of Zeus is our own. Tell me,\nwhich is the happier of the two? Or rather, shall I tell you that the\nhappiness of these children of Cronos must have depended on how\nthey used their time? If having boundless leisure, and the power of\ndiscoursing not only with one another but with the animals, they had\nemployed these advantages with a view to philosophy, gathering from\nevery nature some addition to their store of knowledge;--or again, if\nthey had merely eaten and drunk, and told stories to one another, and\nto the beasts;--in either case, I say, there would be no difficulty in\nanswering the question. But as nobody knows which they did, the question\nmust remain unanswered. And here is the point of my tale. In the fulness\nof time, when the earthborn men had all passed away, the ruler of\nthe universe let go the helm, and became a spectator; and destiny and\nnatural impulse swayed the world. At the same instant all the inferior\ndeities gave up their hold; the whole universe rebounded, and there was\na great earthquake, and utter ruin of all manner of animals. After a\nwhile the tumult ceased, and the universal creature settled down in\nhis accustomed course, having authority over all other creatures,\nand following the instructions of his God and Father, at first more\nprecisely, afterwards with less exactness. The reason of the falling off\nwas the disengagement of a former chaos; 'a muddy vesture of decay'\nwas a part of his original nature, out of which he was brought by his\nCreator, under whose immediate guidance, while he remained in that\nformer cycle, the evil was minimized and the good increased to the\nutmost. And in the beginning of the new cycle all was well enough, but\nas time went on, discord entered in; at length the good was minimized\nand the evil everywhere diffused, and there was a danger of universal\nruin. Then the Creator, seeing the world in great straits, and fearing\nthat chaos and infinity would come again, in his tender care again\nplaced himself at the helm and restored order, and made the world\nimmortal and imperishable. Once more the cycle of life and generation\nwas reversed; the infants grew into young men, and the young men became\ngreyheaded; no longer did the animals spring out of the earth; as the\nwhole world was now lord of its own progress, so the parts were to\nbe self-created and self-nourished. At first the case of men was very\nhelpless and pitiable; for they were alone among the wild beasts, and\nhad to carry on the struggle for existence without arts or knowledge,\nand had no food, and did not know how to get any. That was the time when\nPrometheus brought them fire, Hephaestus and Athene taught them arts,\nand other gods gave them seeds and plants. Out of these human life was\nframed; for mankind were left to themselves, and ordered their own ways,\nliving, like the universe, in one cycle after one manner, and in another\ncycle after another manner.\n\nEnough of the myth, which may show us two errors of which we were guilty\nin our account of the king. The first and grand error was in choosing\nfor our king a god, who belongs to the other cycle, instead of a man\nfrom our own; there was a lesser error also in our failure to define\nthe nature of the royal functions. The myth gave us only the image of\na divine shepherd, whereas the statesmen and kings of our own day very\nmuch resemble their subjects in education and breeding. On retracing our\nsteps we find that we gave too narrow a designation to the art which was\nconcerned with command-for-self over living creatures, when we called it\nthe 'feeding' of animals in flocks. This would apply to all shepherds,\nwith the exception of the Statesman; but if we say 'managing' or\n'tending' animals, the term would include him as well. Having remodelled\nthe name, we may subdivide as before, first separating the human from\nthe divine shepherd or manager. Then we may subdivide the human art of\ngoverning into the government of willing and unwilling subjects--royalty\nand tyranny--which are the extreme opposites of one another, although we\nin our simplicity have hitherto confounded them.\n\nAnd yet the figure of the king is still defective. We have taken up a\nlump of fable, and have used more than we needed. Like statuaries, we\nhave made some of the features out of proportion, and shall lose time in\nreducing them. Or our mythus may be compared to a picture, which is well\ndrawn in outline, but is not yet enlivened by colour. And to intelligent\npersons language is, or ought to be, a better instrument of description\nthan any picture. 'But what, Stranger, is the deficiency of which you\nspeak?' No higher truth can be made clear without an example; every\nman seems to know all things in a dream, and to know nothing when he is\nawake. And the nature of example can only be illustrated by an example.\nChildren are taught to read by being made to compare cases in which they\ndo not know a certain letter with cases in which they know it, until\nthey learn to recognize it in all its combinations. Example comes into\nuse when we identify something unknown with that which is known, and\nform a common notion of both of them. Like the child who is learning his\nletters, the soul recognizes some of the first elements of things;\nand then again is at fault and unable to recognize them when they are\ntranslated into the difficult language of facts. Let us, then, take\nan example, which will illustrate the nature of example, and will also\nassist us in characterizing the political science, and in separating the\ntrue king from his rivals.\n\nI will select the example of weaving, or, more precisely, weaving of\nwool. In the first place, all possessions are either productive or\npreventive; of the preventive sort are spells and antidotes, divine and\nhuman, and also defences, and defences are either arms or screens, and\nscreens are veils and also shields against heat and cold, and shields\nagainst heat and cold are shelters and coverings, and coverings are\nblankets or garments, and garments are in one piece or have many parts;\nand of these latter, some are stitched and others are fastened, and of\nthese again some are made of fibres of plants and some of hair, and of\nthese some are cemented with water and earth, and some are fastened with\ntheir own material; the latter are called clothes, and are made by the\nart of clothing, from which the art of weaving differs only in name, as\nthe political differs from the royal science. Thus we have drawn several\ndistinctions, but as yet have not distinguished the weaving of garments\nfrom the kindred and co-operative arts. For the first process to which\nthe material is subjected is the opposite of weaving--I mean carding.\nAnd the art of carding, and the whole art of the fuller and the mender,\nare concerned with the treatment and production of clothes, as well as\nthe art of weaving. Again, there are the arts which make the weaver's\ntools. And if we say that the weaver's art is the greatest and noblest\nof those which have to do with woollen garments,--this, although true,\nis not sufficiently distinct; because these other arts require to be\nfirst cleared away. Let us proceed, then, by regular steps:--There are\ncausal or principal, and co-operative or subordinate arts. To the causal\nclass belong the arts of washing and mending, of carding and spinning\nthe threads, and the other arts of working in wool; these are chiefly\nof two kinds, falling under the two great categories of composition and\ndivision. Carding is of the latter sort. But our concern is chiefly with\nthat part of the art of wool-working which composes, and of which one\nkind twists and the other interlaces the threads, whether the firmer\ntexture of the warp or the looser texture of the woof. These are adapted\nto each other, and the orderly composition of them forms a woollen\ngarment. And the art which presides over these operations is the art of\nweaving.\n\nBut why did we go through this circuitous process, instead of saying\nat once that weaving is the art of entwining the warp and the woof? In\norder that our labour may not seem to be lost, I must explain the whole\nnature of excess and defect. There are two arts of measuring--one is\nconcerned with relative size, and the other has reference to a mean or\nstandard of what is meet. The difference between good and evil is the\ndifference between a mean or measure and excess or defect. All things\nrequire to be compared, not only with one another, but with the mean,\nwithout which there would be no beauty and no art, whether the art of\nthe statesman or the art of weaving or any other; for all the arts guard\nagainst excess or defect, which are real evils. This we must endeavour\nto show, if the arts are to exist; and the proof of this will be\na harder piece of work than the demonstration of the existence of\nnot-being which we proved in our discussion about the Sophist. At\npresent I am content with the indirect proof that the existence of such\na standard is necessary to the existence of the arts. The standard or\nmeasure, which we are now only applying to the arts, may be some day\nrequired with a view to the demonstration of absolute truth.\n\nWe may now divide this art of measurement into two parts; placing in\nthe one part all the arts which measure the relative size or number\nof objects, and in the other all those which depend upon a mean or\nstandard. Many accomplished men say that the art of measurement has to\ndo with all things, but these persons, although in this notion of theirs\nthey may very likely be right, are apt to fail in seeing the differences\nof classes--they jumble together in one the 'more' and the 'too much,'\nwhich are very different things. Whereas the right way is to find the\ndifferences of classes, and to comprehend the things which have any\naffinity under the same class.\n\nI will make one more observation by the way. When a pupil at a school is\nasked the letters which make up a particular word, is he not asked with\na view to his knowing the same letters in all words? And our enquiry\nabout the Statesman in like manner is intended not only to improve our\nknowledge of politics, but our reasoning powers generally. Still less\nwould any one analyze the nature of weaving for its own sake. There\nis no difficulty in exhibiting sensible images, but the greatest and\nnoblest truths have no outward form adapted to the eye of sense, and are\nonly revealed in thought. And all that we are now saying is said for the\nsake of them. I make these remarks, because I want you to get rid of any\nimpression that our discussion about weaving and about the reversal of\nthe universe, and the other discussion about the Sophist and not-being,\nwere tedious and irrelevant. Please to observe that they can only be\nfairly judged when compared with what is meet; and yet not with what is\nmeet for producing pleasure, nor even meet for making discoveries, but\nfor the great end of developing the dialectical method and sharpening\nthe wits of the auditors. He who censures us, should prove that, if our\nwords had been fewer, they would have been better calculated to make men\ndialecticians.\n\nAnd now let us return to our king or statesman, and transfer to him the\nexample of weaving. The royal art has been separated from that of other\nherdsmen, but not from the causal and co-operative arts which exist\nin states; these do not admit of dichotomy, and therefore they must be\ncarved neatly, like the limbs of a victim, not into more parts than are\nnecessary. And first (1) we have the large class of instruments, which\nincludes almost everything in the world; from these may be parted off\n(2) vessels which are framed for the preservation of things, moist or\ndry, prepared in the fire or out of the fire. The royal or political art\nhas nothing to do with either of these, any more than with the arts\nof making (3) vehicles, or (4) defences, whether dresses, or arms, or\nwalls, or (5) with the art of making ornaments, whether pictures or\nother playthings, as they may be fitly called, for they have no serious\nuse. Then (6) there are the arts which furnish gold, silver, wood, bark,\nand other materials, which should have been put first; these, again,\nhave no concern with the kingly science; any more than the arts (7)\nwhich provide food and nourishment for the human body, and which furnish\noccupation to the husbandman, huntsman, doctor, cook, and the like, but\nnot to the king or statesman. Further, there are small things, such as\ncoins, seals, stamps, which may with a little violence be comprehended\nin one of the above-mentioned classes. Thus they will embrace every\nspecies of property with the exception of animals,--but these have been\nalready included in the art of tending herds. There remains only the\nclass of slaves or ministers, among whom I expect that the real rivals\nof the king will be discovered. I am not speaking of the veritable slave\nbought with money, nor of the hireling who lets himself out for service,\nnor of the trader or merchant, who at best can only lay claim to\neconomical and not to royal science. Nor am I referring to government\nofficials, such as heralds and scribes, for these are only the servants\nof the rulers, and not the rulers themselves. I admit that there may be\nsomething strange in any servants pretending to be masters, but I hardly\nthink that I could have been wrong in supposing that the principal\nclaimants to the throne will be of this class. Let us try once more:\nThere are diviners and priests, who are full of pride and prerogative;\nthese, as the law declares, know how to give acceptable gifts to\nthe gods, and in many parts of Hellas the duty of performing solemn\nsacrifices is assigned to the chief magistrate, as at Athens to the\nKing Archon. At last, then, we have found a trace of those whom we were\nseeking. But still they are only servants and ministers.\n\nAnd who are these who next come into view in various forms of men and\nanimals and other monsters appearing--lions and centaurs and satyrs--who\nare these? I did not know them at first, for every one looks strange\nwhen he is unexpected. But now I recognize the politician and his troop,\nthe chief of Sophists, the prince of charlatans, the most accomplished\nof wizards, who must be carefully distinguished from the true king or\nstatesman. And here I will interpose a question: What are the true forms\nof government? Are they not three--monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy?\nand the distinctions of freedom and compulsion, law and no law, poverty\nand riches expand these three into six. Monarchy may be divided into\nroyalty and tyranny; oligarchy into aristocracy and plutocracy; and\ndemocracy may observe the law or may not observe it. But are any of\nthese governments worthy of the name? Is not government a science, and\nare we to suppose that scientific government is secured by the rulers\nbeing many or few, rich or poor, or by the rule being compulsory or\nvoluntary? Can the many attain to science? In no Hellenic city are there\nfifty good draught players, and certainly there are not as many kings,\nfor by kings we mean all those who are possessed of the political\nscience. A true government must therefore be the government of one, or\nof a few. And they may govern us either with or without law, and whether\nthey are poor or rich, and however they govern, provided they govern on\nsome scientific principle,--it makes no difference. And as the physician\nmay cure us with our will, or against our will, and by any mode of\ntreatment, burning, bleeding, lowering, fattening, if he only proceeds\nscientifically: so the true governor may reduce or fatten or bleed the\nbody corporate, while he acts according to the rules of his art, and\nwith a view to the good of the state, whether according to law or\nwithout law.\n\n'I do not like the notion, that there can be good government without\nlaw.'\n\nI must explain: Law-making certainly is the business of a king; and yet\nthe best thing of all is, not that the law should rule, but that the\nking should rule, for the varieties of circumstances are endless, and no\nsimple or universal rule can suit them all, or last for ever. The law is\njust an ignorant brute of a tyrant, who insists always on his commands\nbeing fulfilled under all circumstances. 'Then why have we laws at all?'\nI will answer that question by asking you whether the training master\ngives a different discipline to each of his pupils, or whether he has a\ngeneral rule of diet and exercise which is suited to the constitutions\nof the majority? 'The latter.' The legislator, too, is obliged to lay\ndown general laws, and cannot enact what is precisely suitable to each\nparticular case. He cannot be sitting at every man's side all his life,\nand prescribe for him the minute particulars of his duty, and therefore\nhe is compelled to impose on himself and others the restriction of a\nwritten law. Let me suppose now, that a physician or trainer, having\nleft directions for his patients or pupils, goes into a far country, and\ncomes back sooner than he intended; owing to some unexpected change in\nthe weather, the patient or pupil seems to require a different mode of\ntreatment: Would he persist in his old commands, under the idea that all\nothers are noxious and heterodox? Viewed in the light of science,\nwould not the continuance of such regulations be ridiculous? And if the\nlegislator, or another like him, comes back from a far country, is he to\nbe prohibited from altering his own laws? The common people say: Let a\nman persuade the city first, and then let him impose new laws. But is a\nphysician only to cure his patients by persuasion, and not by force? Is\nhe a worse physician who uses a little gentle violence in effecting the\ncure? Or shall we say, that the violence is just, if exercised by a rich\nman, and unjust, if by a poor man? May not any man, rich or poor, with\nor without law, and whether the citizens like or not, do what is for\ntheir good? The pilot saves the lives of the crew, not by laying down\nrules, but by making his art a law, and, like him, the true governor\nhas a strength of art which is superior to the law. This is scientific\ngovernment, and all others are imitations only. Yet no great number\nof persons can attain to this science. And hence follows an important\nresult. The true political principle is to assert the inviolability\nof the law, which, though not the best thing possible, is best for the\nimperfect condition of man.\n\nI will explain my meaning by an illustration:--Suppose that mankind,\nindignant at the rogueries and caprices of physicians and pilots, call\ntogether an assembly, in which all who like may speak, the skilled as\nwell as the unskilled, and that in their assembly they make decrees\nfor regulating the practice of navigation and medicine which are to\nbe binding on these professions for all time. Suppose that they elect\nannually by vote or lot those to whom authority in either department is\nto be delegated. And let us further imagine, that when the term of their\nmagistracy has expired, the magistrates appointed by them are summoned\nbefore an ignorant and unprofessional court, and may be condemned and\npunished for breaking the regulations. They even go a step further, and\nenact, that he who is found enquiring into the truth of navigation and\nmedicine, and is seeking to be wise above what is written, shall be\ncalled not an artist, but a dreamer, a prating Sophist and a corruptor\nof youth; and if he try to persuade others to investigate those sciences\nin a manner contrary to the law, he shall be punished with the utmost\nseverity. And like rules might be extended to any art or science. But\nwhat would be the consequence?\n\n'The arts would utterly perish, and human life, which is bad enough\nalready, would become intolerable.'\n\nBut suppose, once more, that we were to appoint some one as the guardian\nof the law, who was both ignorant and interested, and who perverted the\nlaw: would not this be a still worse evil than the other? 'Certainly.'\nFor the laws are based on some experience and wisdom. Hence the wiser\ncourse is, that they should be observed, although this is not the best\nthing of all, but only the second best. And whoever, having skill,\nshould try to improve them, would act in the spirit of the law-giver.\nBut then, as we have seen, no great number of men, whether poor or rich,\ncan be makers of laws. And so, the nearest approach to true government\nis, when men do nothing contrary to their own written laws and national\ncustoms. When the rich preserve their customs and maintain the law, this\nis called aristocracy, or if they neglect the law, oligarchy. When an\nindividual rules according to law, whether by the help of science or\nopinion, this is called monarchy; and when he has royal science he is\na king, whether he be so in fact or not; but when he rules in spite of\nlaw, and is blind with ignorance and passion, he is called a tyrant.\nThese forms of government exist, because men despair of the true king\never appearing among them; if he were to appear, they would joyfully\nhand over to him the reins of government. But, as there is no natural\nruler of the hive, they meet together and make laws. And do we wonder,\nwhen the foundation of politics is in the letter only, at the miseries\nof states? Ought we not rather to admire the strength of the political\nbond? For cities have endured the worst of evils time out of mind;\nmany cities have been shipwrecked, and some are like ships foundering,\nbecause their pilots are absolutely ignorant of the science which they\nprofess.\n\nLet us next ask, which of these untrue forms of government is the least\nbad, and which of them is the worst? I said at the beginning, that each\nof the three forms of government, royalty, aristocracy, and democracy,\nmight be divided into two, so that the whole number of them, including\nthe best, will be seven. Under monarchy we have already distinguished\nroyalty and tyranny; of oligarchy there were two kinds, aristocracy and\nplutocracy; and democracy may also be divided, for there is a democracy\nwhich observes, and a democracy which neglects, the laws. The government\nof one is the best and the worst--the government of a few is less bad\nand less good--the government of the many is the least bad and least\ngood of them all, being the best of all lawless governments, and the\nworst of all lawful ones. But the rulers of all these states,\nunless they have knowledge, are maintainers of idols, and themselves\nidols--wizards, and also Sophists; for, after many windings, the term\n'Sophist' comes home to them.\n\nAnd now enough of centaurs and satyrs: the play is ended, and they\nmay quit the political stage. Still there remain some other and better\nelements, which adhere to the royal science, and must be drawn off in\nthe refiner's fire before the gold can become quite pure. The arts of\nthe general, the judge, and the orator, will have to be separated from\nthe royal art; when the separation has been made, the nature of the king\nwill be unalloyed. Now there are inferior sciences, such as music and\nothers; and there is a superior science, which determines whether\nmusic is to be learnt or not, and this is different from them, and the\ngovernor of them. The science which determines whether we are to use\npersuasion, or not, is higher than the art of persuasion; the science\nwhich determines whether we are to go to war, is higher than the art of\nthe general. The science which makes the laws, is higher than that which\nonly administers them. And the science which has this authority over the\nrest, is the science of the king or statesman.\n\nOnce more we will endeavour to view this royal science by the light of\nour example. We may compare the state to a web, and I will show you how\nthe different threads are drawn into one. You would admit--would\nyou not?--that there are parts of virtue (although this position is\nsometimes assailed by Eristics), and one part of virtue is temperance,\nand another courage. These are two principles which are in a manner\nantagonistic to one another; and they pervade all nature; the whole\nclass of the good and beautiful is included under them. The beautiful\nmay be subdivided into two lesser classes: one of these is described\nby us in terms expressive of motion or energy, and the other in terms\nexpressive of rest and quietness. We say, how manly! how vigorous! how\nready! and we say also, how calm! how temperate! how dignified! This\nopposition of terms is extended by us to all actions, to the tones of\nthe voice, the notes of music, the workings of the mind, the characters\nof men. The two classes both have their exaggerations; and the\nexaggerations of the one are termed 'hardness,' 'violence,' 'madness;'\nof the other 'cowardliness,' or 'sluggishness.' And if we pursue\nthe enquiry, we find that these opposite characters are naturally at\nvariance, and can hardly be reconciled. In lesser matters the antagonism\nbetween them is ludicrous, but in the State may be the occasion of\ngrave disorders, and may disturb the whole course of human life. For\nthe orderly class are always wanting to be at peace, and hence they pass\nimperceptibly into the condition of slaves; and the courageous sort are\nalways wanting to go to war, even when the odds are against them, and\nare soon destroyed by their enemies. But the true art of government,\nfirst preparing the material by education, weaves the two elements into\none, maintaining authority over the carders of the wool, and selecting\nthe proper subsidiary arts which are necessary for making the web. The\nroyal science is queen of educators, and begins by choosing the natures\nwhich she is to train, punishing with death and exterminating those who\nare violently carried away to atheism and injustice, and enslaving those\nwho are wallowing in the mire of ignorance. The rest of the citizens she\nblends into one, combining the stronger element of courage, which we\nmay call the warp, with the softer element of temperance, which we\nmay imagine to be the woof. These she binds together, first taking\nthe eternal elements of the honourable, the good, and the just, and\nfastening them with a divine cord in a heaven-born nature, and then\nfastening the animal elements with a human cord. The good legislator can\nimplant by education the higher principles; and where they exist there\nis no difficulty in inserting the lesser human bonds, by which the State\nis held together; these are the laws of intermarriage, and of union for\nthe sake of offspring. Most persons in their marriages seek after\nwealth or power; or they are clannish, and choose those who are like\nthemselves,--the temperate marrying the temperate, and the courageous\nthe courageous. The two classes thrive and flourish at first, but they\nsoon degenerate; the one become mad, and the other feeble and useless.\nThis would not have been the case, if they had both originally held\nthe same notions about the honourable and the good; for then they\nnever would have allowed the temperate natures to be separated from the\ncourageous, but they would have bound them together by common honours\nand reputations, by intermarriages, and by the choice of rulers who\ncombine both qualities. The temperate are careful and just, but are\nwanting in the power of action; the courageous fall short of them in\njustice, but in action are superior to them: and no state can prosper in\nwhich either of these qualities is wanting. The noblest and best of all\nwebs or states is that which the royal science weaves, combining the two\nsorts of natures in a single texture, and in this enfolding freeman and\nslave and every other social element, and presiding over them all.\n\n'Your picture, Stranger, of the king and statesman, no less than of the\nSophist, is quite perfect.'\n\n...\n\nThe principal subjects in the Statesman may be conveniently embraced\nunder six or seven heads:--(1) the myth; (2) the dialectical interest;\n(3) the political aspects of the dialogue; (4) the satirical and\nparadoxical vein; (5) the necessary imperfection of law; (6) the\nrelation of the work to the other writings of Plato; lastly (7), we may\nbriefly consider the genuineness of the Sophist and Statesman, which\ncan hardly be assumed without proof, since the two dialogues have\nbeen questioned by three such eminent Platonic scholars as Socher,\nSchaarschmidt, and Ueberweg.\n\nI. The hand of the master is clearly visible in the myth. First in the\nconnection with mythology;--he wins a kind of verisimilitude for this\nas for his other myths, by adopting received traditions, of which he\npretends to find an explanation in his own larger conception (compare\nIntroduction to Critias). The young Socrates has heard of the sun rising\nin the west and setting in the east, and of the earth-born men; but he\nhas never heard the origin of these remarkable phenomena. Nor is Plato,\nhere or elsewhere, wanting in denunciations of the incredulity of 'this\nlatter age,' on which the lovers of the marvellous have always delighted\nto enlarge. And he is not without express testimony to the truth of his\nnarrative;--such testimony as, in the Timaeus, the first men gave of the\nnames of the gods ('They must surely have known their own ancestors').\nFor the first generation of the new cycle, who lived near the time, are\nsupposed to have preserved a recollection of a previous one. He also\nappeals to internal evidence, viz. the perfect coherence of the tale,\nthough he is very well aware, as he says in the Cratylus, that there may\nbe consistency in error as well as in truth. The gravity and minuteness\nwith which some particulars are related also lend an artful aid. The\nprofound interest and ready assent of the young Socrates, who is not too\nold to be amused 'with a tale which a child would love to hear,' are a\nfurther assistance. To those who were naturally inclined to believe that\nthe fortunes of mankind are influenced by the stars, or who maintained\nthat some one principle, like the principle of the Same and the Other\nin the Timaeus, pervades all things in the world, the reversal of the\nmotion of the heavens seemed necessarily to produce a reversal of the\norder of human life. The spheres of knowledge, which to us appear wide\nasunder as the poles, astronomy and medicine, were naturally connected\nin the minds of early thinkers, because there was little or nothing in\nthe space between them. Thus there is a basis of philosophy, on which\nthe improbabilities of the tale may be said to rest. These are some of\nthe devices by which Plato, like a modern novelist, seeks to familiarize\nthe marvellous.\n\nThe myth, like that of the Timaeus and Critias, is rather historical\nthan poetical, in this respect corresponding to the general change in\nthe later writings of Plato, when compared with the earlier ones. It\nis hardly a myth in the sense in which the term might be applied to the\nmyth of the Phaedrus, the Republic, the Phaedo, or the Gorgias, but\nmay be more aptly compared with the didactic tale in which Protagoras\ndescribes the fortunes of primitive man, or with the description of\nthe gradual rise of a new society in the Third Book of the Laws. Some\ndiscrepancies may be observed between the mythology of the Statesman and\nthe Timaeus, and between the Timaeus and the Republic. But there is no\nreason to expect that all Plato's visions of a former, any more than\nof a future, state of existence, should conform exactly to the same\npattern. We do not find perfect consistency in his philosophy; and still\nless have we any right to demand this of him in his use of mythology and\nfigures of speech. And we observe that while employing all the resources\nof a writer of fiction to give credibility to his tales, he is not\ndisposed to insist upon their literal truth. Rather, as in the Phaedo,\nhe says, 'Something of the kind is true;' or, as in the Gorgias, 'This\nyou will think to be an old wife's tale, but you can think of nothing\ntruer;' or, as in the Statesman, he describes his work as a 'mass of\nmythology,' which was introduced in order to teach certain lessons; or,\nas in the Phaedrus, he secretly laughs at such stories while refusing to\ndisturb the popular belief in them.\n\nThe greater interest of the myth consists in the philosophical lessons\nwhich Plato presents to us in this veiled form. Here, as in the tale\nof Er, the son of Armenius, he touches upon the question of freedom and\nnecessity, both in relation to God and nature. For at first the universe\nis governed by the immediate providence of God,--this is the golden\nage,--but after a while the wheel is reversed, and man is left to\nhimself. Like other theologians and philosophers, Plato relegates his\nexplanation of the problem to a transcendental world; he speaks of what\nin modern language might be termed 'impossibilities in the nature of\nthings,' hindering God from continuing immanent in the world. But there\nis some inconsistency; for the 'letting go' is spoken of as a divine\nact, and is at the same time attributed to the necessary imperfection of\nmatter; there is also a numerical necessity for the successive births\nof souls. At first, man and the world retain their divine instincts, but\ngradually degenerate. As in the Book of Genesis, the first fall of\nman is succeeded by a second; the misery and wickedness of the world\nincrease continually. The reason of this further decline is supposed to\nbe the disorganisation of matter: the latent seeds of a former chaos are\ndisengaged, and envelope all things. The condition of man becomes more\nand more miserable; he is perpetually waging an unequal warfare with the\nbeasts. At length he obtains such a measure of education and help as is\nnecessary for his existence. Though deprived of God's help, he is not\nleft wholly destitute; he has received from Athene and Hephaestus a\nknowledge of the arts; other gods give him seeds and plants; and out of\nthese human life is reconstructed. He now eats bread in the sweat of his\nbrow, and has dominion over the animals, subjected to the conditions of\nhis nature, and yet able to cope with them by divine help. Thus Plato\nmay be said to represent in a figure--(1) the state of innocence; (2)\nthe fall of man; (3) the still deeper decline into barbarism; (4) the\nrestoration of man by the partial interference of God, and the natural\ngrowth of the arts and of civilised society. Two lesser features of\nthis description should not pass unnoticed:--(1) the primitive men are\nsupposed to be created out of the earth, and not after the ordinary\nmanner of human generation--half the causes of moral evil are in this\nway removed; (2) the arts are attributed to a divine revelation: and so\nthe greatest difficulty in the history of pre-historic man is solved.\nThough no one knew better than Plato that the introduction of the gods\nis not a reason, but an excuse for not giving a reason (Cratylus), yet,\nconsidering that more than two thousand years later mankind are still\ndiscussing these problems, we may be satisfied to find in Plato a\nstatement of the difficulties which arise in conceiving the relation of\nman to God and nature, without expecting to obtain from him a solution\nof them. In such a tale, as in the Phaedrus, various aspects of the\nIdeas were doubtless indicated to Plato's own mind, as the corresponding\ntheological problems are to us. The immanence of things in the Ideas, or\nthe partial separation of them, and the self-motion of the supreme\nIdea, are probably the forms in which he would have interpreted his own\nparable.\n\nHe touches upon another question of great interest--the consciousness of\nevil--what in the Jewish Scriptures is called 'eating of the tree of the\nknowledge of good and evil.' At the end of the narrative, the Eleatic\nasks his companion whether this life of innocence, or that which men\nlive at present, is the better of the two. He wants to distinguish\nbetween the mere animal life of innocence, the 'city of pigs,' as it\nis comically termed by Glaucon in the Republic, and the higher life of\nreason and philosophy. But as no one can determine the state of man\nin the world before the Fall, 'the question must remain unanswered.'\nSimilar questions have occupied the minds of theologians in later ages;\nbut they can hardly be said to have found an answer. Professor Campbell\nwell observes, that the general spirit of the myth may be summed up in\nthe words of the Lysis: 'If evil were to perish, should we hunger any\nmore, or thirst any more, or have any similar sensations? Yet perhaps\nthe question what will or will not be is a foolish one, for who can\ntell?' As in the Theaetetus, evil is supposed to continue,--here, as the\nconsequence of a former state of the world, a sort of mephitic vapour\nexhaling from some ancient chaos,--there, as involved in the possibility\nof good, and incident to the mixed state of man.\n\nOnce more--and this is the point of connexion with the rest of the\ndialogue--the myth is intended to bring out the difference between the\nideal and the actual state of man. In all ages of the world men have\ndreamed of a state of perfection, which has been, and is to be, but\nnever is, and seems to disappear under the necessary conditions of human\nsociety. The uselessness, the danger, the true value of such political\nideals have often been discussed; youth is too ready to believe in\nthem; age to disparage them. Plato's 'prudens quaestio' respecting the\ncomparative happiness of men in this and in a former cycle of existence\nis intended to elicit this contrast between the golden age and 'the\nlife under Zeus' which is our own. To confuse the divine and human, or\nhastily apply one to the other, is a 'tremendous error.' Of the ideal\nor divine government of the world we can form no true or adequate\nconception; and this our mixed state of life, in which we are partly\nleft to ourselves, but not wholly deserted by the gods, may contain some\nhigher elements of good and knowledge than could have existed in the\ndays of innocence under the rule of Cronos. So we may venture slightly\nto enlarge a Platonic thought which admits of a further application to\nChristian theology. Here are suggested also the distinctions between\nGod causing and permitting evil, and between his more and less immediate\ngovernment of the world.\n\nII. The dialectical interest of the Statesman seems to contend in\nPlato's mind with the political; the dialogue might have been\ndesignated by two equally descriptive titles--either the 'Statesman,' or\n'Concerning Method.' Dialectic, which in the earlier writings of Plato\nis a revival of the Socratic question and answer applied to definition,\nis now occupied with classification; there is nothing in which he takes\ngreater delight than in processes of division (compare Phaedr.); he\npursues them to a length out of proportion to his main subject, and\nappears to value them as a dialectical exercise, and for their own sake.\nA poetical vision of some order or hierarchy of ideas or sciences has\nalready been floating before us in the Symposium and the Republic. And\nin the Phaedrus this aspect of dialectic is further sketched out,\nand the art of rhetoric is based on the division of the characters\nof mankind into their several classes. The same love of divisions is\napparent in the Gorgias. But in a well-known passage of the Philebus\noccurs the first criticism on the nature of classification. There we\nare exhorted not to fall into the common error of passing from unity to\ninfinity, but to find the intermediate classes; and we are reminded that\nin any process of generalization, there may be more than one class to\nwhich individuals may be referred, and that we must carry on the process\nof division until we have arrived at the infima species.\n\nThese precepts are not forgotten, either in the Sophist or in the\nStatesman. The Sophist contains four examples of division, carried on\nby regular steps, until in four different lines of descent we detect\nthe Sophist. In the Statesman the king or statesman is discovered by\na similar process; and we have a summary, probably made for the first\ntime, of possessions appropriated by the labour of man, which are\ndistributed into seven classes. We are warned against preferring the\nshorter to the longer method;--if we divide in the middle, we are most\nlikely to light upon species; at the same time, the important remark\nis made, that 'a part is not to be confounded with a class.' Having\ndiscovered the genus under which the king falls, we proceed to\ndistinguish him from the collateral species. To assist our imagination\nin making this separation, we require an example. The higher ideas,\nof which we have a dreamy knowledge, can only be represented by images\ntaken from the external world. But, first of all, the nature of example\nis explained by an example. The child is taught to read by comparing\nthe letters in words which he knows with the same letters in unknown\ncombinations; and this is the sort of process which we are about to\nattempt. As a parallel to the king we select the worker in wool, and\ncompare the art of weaving with the royal science, trying to separate\neither of them from the inferior classes to which they are akin. This\nhas the incidental advantage, that weaving and the web furnish us with a\nfigure of speech, which we can afterwards transfer to the State.\n\nThere are two uses of examples or images--in the first place, they\nsuggest thoughts--secondly, they give them a distinct form. In the\ninfancy of philosophy, as in childhood, the language of pictures is\nnatural to man: truth in the abstract is hardly won, and only by use\nfamiliarized to the mind. Examples are akin to analogies, and have a\nreflex influence on thought; they people the vacant mind, and may often\noriginate new directions of enquiry. Plato seems to be conscious of the\nsuggestiveness of imagery; the general analogy of the arts is constantly\nemployed by him as well as the comparison of particular arts--weaving,\nthe refining of gold, the learning to read, music, statuary, painting,\nmedicine, the art of the pilot--all of which occur in this dialogue\nalone: though he is also aware that 'comparisons are slippery things,'\nand may often give a false clearness to ideas. We shall find, in the\nPhilebus, a division of sciences into practical and speculative, and\ninto more or less speculative: here we have the idea of master-arts,\nor sciences which control inferior ones. Besides the supreme science\nof dialectic, 'which will forget us, if we forget her,' another\nmaster-science for the first time appears in view--the science of\ngovernment, which fixes the limits of all the rest. This conception\nof the political or royal science as, from another point of view, the\nscience of sciences, which holds sway over the rest, is not originally\nfound in Aristotle, but in Plato.\n\nThe doctrine that virtue and art are in a mean, which is familiarized\nto us by the study of the Nicomachean Ethics, is also first distinctly\nasserted in the Statesman of Plato. The too much and the too little\nare in restless motion: they must be fixed by a mean, which is also\na standard external to them. The art of measuring or finding a mean\nbetween excess and defect, like the principle of division in the\nPhaedrus, receives a particular application to the art of discourse. The\nexcessive length of a discourse may be blamed; but who can say what is\nexcess, unless he is furnished with a measure or standard? Measure is\nthe life of the arts, and may some day be discovered to be the single\nultimate principle in which all the sciences are contained. Other forms\nof thought may be noted--the distinction between causal and co-operative\narts, which may be compared with the distinction between primary and\nco-operative causes in the Timaeus; or between cause and condition in\nthe Phaedo; the passing mention of economical science; the opposition of\nrest and motion, which is found in all nature; the general conception\nof two great arts of composition and division, in which are contained\nweaving, politics, dialectic; and in connexion with the conception of a\nmean, the two arts of measuring.\n\nIn the Theaetetus, Plato remarks that precision in the use of terms,\nthough sometimes pedantic, is sometimes necessary. Here he makes the\nopposite reflection, that there may be a philosophical disregard of\nwords. The evil of mere verbal oppositions, the requirement of an\nimpossible accuracy in the use of terms, the error of supposing that\nphilosophy was to be found in language, the danger of word-catching,\nhave frequently been discussed by him in the previous dialogues, but\nnowhere has the spirit of modern inductive philosophy been more happily\nindicated than in the words of the Statesman:--'If you think more about\nthings, and less about words, you will be richer in wisdom as you grow\nolder.' A similar spirit is discernible in the remarkable expressions,\n'the long and difficult language of facts;' and 'the interrogation of\nevery nature, in order to obtain the particular contribution of each to\nthe store of knowledge.' Who has described 'the feeble intelligence of\nall things; given by metaphysics better than the Eleatic Stranger in\nthe words--'The higher ideas can hardly be set forth except through\nthe medium of examples; every man seems to know all things in a kind of\ndream, and then again nothing when he is awake?' Or where is the value\nof metaphysical pursuits more truly expressed than in the words,--'The\ngreatest and noblest things have no outward image of themselves visible\nto man: therefore we should learn to give a rational account of them?'\n\nIII. The political aspects of the dialogue are closely connected\nwith the dialectical. As in the Cratylus, the legislator has 'the\ndialectician standing on his right hand;' so in the Statesman, the king\nor statesman is the dialectician, who, although he may be in a private\nstation, is still a king. Whether he has the power or not, is a mere\naccident; or rather he has the power, for what ought to be is ('Was\nist vernunftig, das ist wirklich'); and he ought to be and is the true\ngovernor of mankind. There is a reflection in this idealism of the\nSocratic 'Virtue is knowledge;' and, without idealism, we may remark\nthat knowledge is a great part of power. Plato does not trouble himself\nto construct a machinery by which 'philosophers shall be made kings,' as\nin the Republic: he merely holds up the ideal, and affirms that in some\nsense science is really supreme over human life.\n\nHe is struck by the observation 'quam parva sapientia regitur mundus,'\nand is touched with a feeling of the ills which afflict states. The\ncondition of Megara before and during the Peloponnesian War, of Athens\nunder the Thirty and afterwards, of Syracuse and the other Sicilian\ncities in their alternations of democratic excess and tyranny, might\nnaturally suggest such reflections. Some states he sees already\nshipwrecked, others foundering for want of a pilot; and he wonders not\nat their destruction, but at their endurance. For they ought to have\nperished long ago, if they had depended on the wisdom of their rulers.\nThe mingled pathos and satire of this remark is characteristic of\nPlato's later style.\n\nThe king is the personification of political science. And yet he is\nsomething more than this,--the perfectly good and wise tyrant of the\nLaws, whose will is better than any law. He is the special providence\nwho is always interfering with and regulating all things. Such a\nconception has sometimes been entertained by modern theologians, and by\nPlato himself, of the Supreme Being. But whether applied to Divine or\nto human governors the conception is faulty for two reasons, neither of\nwhich are noticed by Plato:--first, because all good government supposes\na degree of co-operation in the ruler and his subjects,--an 'education\nin politics' as well as in moral virtue; secondly, because government,\nwhether Divine or human, implies that the subject has a previous\nknowledge of the rules under which he is living. There is a fallacy,\ntoo, in comparing unchangeable laws with a personal governor. For the\nlaw need not necessarily be an 'ignorant and brutal tyrant,' but gentle\nand humane, capable of being altered in the spirit of the legislator,\nand of being administered so as to meet the cases of individuals. Not\nonly in fact, but in idea, both elements must remain--the fixed law\nand the living will; the written word and the spirit; the principles of\nobligation and of freedom; and their applications whether made by law or\nequity in particular cases.\n\nThere are two sides from which positive laws may be attacked:--either\nfrom the side of nature, which rises up and rebels against them in the\nspirit of Callicles in the Gorgias; or from the side of idealism, which\nattempts to soar above them,--and this is the spirit of Plato in the\nStatesman. But he soon falls, like Icarus, and is content to walk\ninstead of flying; that is, to accommodate himself to the actual state\nof human things. Mankind have long been in despair of finding the true\nruler; and therefore are ready to acquiesce in any of the five or six\nreceived forms of government as better than none. And the best thing\nwhich they can do (though only the second best in reality), is to reduce\nthe ideal state to the conditions of actual life. Thus in the Statesman,\nas in the Laws, we have three forms of government, which we may venture\nto term, (1) the ideal, (2) the practical, (3) the sophistical--what\nought to be, what might be, what is. And thus Plato seems to stumble,\nalmost by accident, on the notion of a constitutional monarchy, or of a\nmonarchy ruling by laws.\n\nThe divine foundations of a State are to be laid deep in education\n(Republic), and at the same time some little violence may be used in\nexterminating natures which are incapable of education (compare Laws).\nPlato is strongly of opinion that the legislator, like the physician,\nmay do men good against their will (compare Gorgias). The human bonds\nof states are formed by the inter-marriage of dispositions adapted to\nsupply the defects of each other. As in the Republic, Plato has observed\nthat there are opposite natures in the world, the strong and the gentle,\nthe courageous and the temperate, which, borrowing an expression derived\nfrom the image of weaving, he calls the warp and the woof of human\nsociety. To interlace these is the crowning achievement of political\nscience. In the Protagoras, Socrates was maintaining that there was only\none virtue, and not many: now Plato is inclined to think that there\nare not only parallel, but opposite virtues, and seems to see a similar\nopposition pervading all art and nature. But he is satisfied with laying\ndown the principle, and does not inform us by what further steps the\nunion of opposites is to be effected.\n\nIn the loose framework of a single dialogue Plato has thus combined two\ndistinct subjects--politics and method. Yet they are not so far apart\nas they appear: in his own mind there was a secret link of connexion\nbetween them. For the philosopher or dialectician is also the only true\nking or statesman. In the execution of his plan Plato has invented or\ndistinguished several important forms of thought, and made incidentally\nmany valuable remarks. Questions of interest both in ancient and modern\npolitics also arise in the course of the dialogue, which may with\nadvantage be further considered by us:--\n\na. The imaginary ruler, whether God or man, is above the law, and is a\nlaw to himself and to others. Among the Greeks as among the Jews, law\nwas a sacred name, the gift of God, the bond of states. But in the\nStatesman of Plato, as in the New Testament, the word has also become\nthe symbol of an imperfect good, which is almost an evil. The law\nsacrifices the individual to the universal, and is the tyranny of the\nmany over the few (compare Republic). It has fixed rules which are the\nprops of order, and will not swerve or bend in extreme cases. It is\nthe beginning of political society, but there is something higher--an\nintelligent ruler, whether God or man, who is able to adapt himself to\nthe endless varieties of circumstances. Plato is fond of picturing the\nadvantages which would result from the union of the tyrant who has power\nwith the legislator who has wisdom: he regards this as the best and\nspeediest way of reforming mankind. But institutions cannot thus be\nartificially created, nor can the external authority of a ruler impose\nlaws for which a nation is unprepared. The greatest power, the highest\nwisdom, can only proceed one or two steps in advance of public opinion.\nIn all stages of civilization human nature, after all our efforts,\nremains intractable,--not like clay in the hands of the potter, or\nmarble under the chisel of the sculptor. Great changes occur in the\nhistory of nations, but they are brought about slowly, like the changes\nin the frame of nature, upon which the puny arm of man hardly makes an\nimpression. And, speaking generally, the slowest growths, both in nature\nand in politics, are the most permanent.\n\nb. Whether the best form of the ideal is a person or a law may fairly be\ndoubted. The former is more akin to us: it clothes itself in poetry and\nart, and appeals to reason more in the form of feeling: in the latter\nthere is less danger of allowing ourselves to be deluded by a figure\nof speech. The ideal of the Greek state found an expression in the\ndeification of law: the ancient Stoic spoke of a wise man perfect in\nvirtue, who was fancifully said to be a king; but neither they nor Plato\nhad arrived at the conception of a person who was also a law. Nor is it\neasy for the Christian to think of God as wisdom, truth, holiness, and\nalso as the wise, true, and holy one. He is always wanting to break\nthrough the abstraction and interrupt the law, in order that he may\npresent to himself the more familiar image of a divine friend. While\nthe impersonal has too slender a hold upon the affections to be made the\nbasis of religion, the conception of a person on the other hand tends to\ndegenerate into a new kind of idolatry. Neither criticism nor experience\nallows us to suppose that there are interferences with the laws of\nnature; the idea is inconceivable to us and at variance with facts. The\nphilosopher or theologian who could realize to mankind that a person\nis a law, that the higher rule has no exception, that goodness, like\nknowledge, is also power, would breathe a new religious life into the\nworld.\n\nc. Besides the imaginary rule of a philosopher or a God, the actual\nforms of government have to be considered. In the infancy of political\nscience, men naturally ask whether the rule of the many or of the few is\nto be preferred. If by 'the few' we mean 'the good' and by 'the many,'\n'the bad,' there can be but one reply: 'The rule of one good man\nis better than the rule of all the rest, if they are bad.' For, as\nHeracleitus says, 'One is ten thousand if he be the best.' If, however,\nwe mean by the rule of the few the rule of a class neither better nor\nworse than other classes, not devoid of a feeling of right, but guided\nmostly by a sense of their own interests, and by the rule of the many\nthe rule of all classes, similarly under the influence of mixed motives,\nno one would hesitate to answer--'The rule of all rather than one,\nbecause all classes are more likely to take care of all than one of\nanother; and the government has greater power and stability when resting\non a wider basis.' Both in ancient and modern times the best balanced\nform of government has been held to be the best; and yet it should not\nbe so nicely balanced as to make action and movement impossible.\n\nThe statesman who builds his hope upon the aristocracy, upon the\nmiddle classes, upon the people, will probably, if he have sufficient\nexperience of them, conclude that all classes are much alike, and that\none is as good as another, and that the liberties of no class are\nsafe in the hands of the rest. The higher ranks have the advantage in\neducation and manners, the middle and lower in industry and self-denial;\nin every class, to a certain extent, a natural sense of right prevails,\nsometimes communicated from the lower to the higher, sometimes from the\nhigher to the lower, which is too strong for class interests. There have\nbeen crises in the history of nations, as at the time of the Crusades or\nthe Reformation, or the French Revolution, when the same inspiration has\ntaken hold of whole peoples, and permanently raised the sense of freedom\nand justice among mankind.\n\nBut even supposing the different classes of a nation, when viewed\nimpartially, to be on a level with each other in moral virtue, there\nremain two considerations of opposite kinds which enter into the problem\nof government. Admitting of course that the upper and lower classes are\nequal in the eye of God and of the law, yet the one may be by nature\nfitted to govern and the other to be governed. A ruling caste does not\nsoon altogether lose the governing qualities, nor a subject class easily\nacquire them. Hence the phenomenon so often observed in the old Greek\nrevolutions, and not without parallel in modern times, that the leaders\nof the democracy have been themselves of aristocratic origin. The people\nare expecting to be governed by representatives of their own, but the\ntrue man of the people either never appears, or is quickly altered by\ncircumstances. Their real wishes hardly make themselves felt, although\ntheir lower interests and prejudices may sometimes be flattered and\nyielded to for the sake of ulterior objects by those who have political\npower. They will often learn by experience that the democracy has become\na plutocracy. The influence of wealth, though not the enjoyment of\nit, has become diffused among the poor as well as among the rich; and\nsociety, instead of being safer, is more at the mercy of the tyrant,\nwho, when things are at the worst, obtains a guard--that is, an\narmy--and announces himself as the saviour.\n\nThe other consideration is of an opposite kind. Admitting that a few\nwise men are likely to be better governors than the unwise many, yet\nit is not in their power to fashion an entire people according to their\nbehest. When with the best intentions the benevolent despot begins his\nregime, he finds the world hard to move. A succession of good kings has\nat the end of a century left the people an inert and unchanged mass. The\nRoman world was not permanently improved by the hundred years of Hadrian\nand the Antonines. The kings of Spain during the last century were at\nleast equal to any contemporary sovereigns in virtue and ability. In\ncertain states of the world the means are wanting to render a benevolent\npower effectual. These means are not a mere external organisation of\nposts or telegraphs, hardly the introduction of new laws or modes of\nindustry. A change must be made in the spirit of a people as well as\nin their externals. The ancient legislator did not really take a blank\ntablet and inscribe upon it the rules which reflection and experience\nhad taught him to be for a nation's interest; no one would have obeyed\nhim if he had. But he took the customs which he found already existing\nin a half-civilised state of society: these he reduced to form and\ninscribed on pillars; he defined what had before been undefined, and\ngave certainty to what was uncertain. No legislation ever sprang, like\nAthene, in full power out of the head either of God or man.\n\nPlato and Aristotle are sensible of the difficulty of combining the\nwisdom of the few with the power of the many. According to Plato, he is\na physician who has the knowledge of a physician, and he is a king who\nhas the knowledge of a king. But how the king, one or more, is to obtain\nthe required power, is hardly at all considered by him. He presents\nthe idea of a perfect government, but except the regulation for mixing\ndifferent tempers in marriage, he never makes any provision for the\nattainment of it. Aristotle, casting aside ideals, would place the\ngovernment in a middle class of citizens, sufficiently numerous for\nstability, without admitting the populace; and such appears to have\nbeen the constitution which actually prevailed for a short time at\nAthens--the rule of the Five Thousand--characterized by Thucydides as\nthe best government of Athens which he had known. It may however be\ndoubted how far, either in a Greek or modern state, such a limitation is\npracticable or desirable; for those who are left outside the pale will\nalways be dangerous to those who are within, while on the other hand\nthe leaven of the mob can hardly affect the representation of a great\ncountry. There is reason for the argument in favour of a property\nqualification; there is reason also in the arguments of those who would\ninclude all and so exhaust the political situation.\n\nThe true answer to the question is relative to the circumstances of\nnations. How can we get the greatest intelligence combined with the\ngreatest power? The ancient legislator would have found this question\nmore easy than we do. For he would have required that all persons who\nhad a share of government should have received their education from the\nstate and have borne her burdens, and should have served in her fleets\nand armies. But though we sometimes hear the cry that we must 'educate\nthe masses, for they are our masters,' who would listen to a proposal\nthat the franchise should be confined to the educated or to those who\nfulfil political duties? Then again, we know that the masses are not our\nmasters, and that they are more likely to become so if we educate them.\nIn modern politics so many interests have to be consulted that we are\ncompelled to do, not what is best, but what is possible.\n\nd. Law is the first principle of society, but it cannot supply all the\nwants of society, and may easily cause more evils than it cures. Plato\nis aware of the imperfection of law in failing to meet the varieties of\ncircumstances: he is also aware that human life would be intolerable if\nevery detail of it were placed under legal regulation. It may be a great\nevil that physicians should kill their patients or captains cast away\ntheir ships, but it would be a far greater evil if each particular in\nthe practice of medicine or seamanship were regulated by law. Much has\nbeen said in modern times about the duty of leaving men to themselves,\nwhich is supposed to be the best way of taking care of them. The\nquestion is often asked, What are the limits of legislation in relation\nto morals? And the answer is to the same effect, that morals must take\ncare of themselves. There is a one-sided truth in these answers, if they\nare regarded as condemnations of the interference with commerce in\nthe last century or of clerical persecution in the Middle Ages. But\n'laissez-faire' is not the best but only the second best. What the\nbest is, Plato does not attempt to determine; he only contrasts the\nimperfection of law with the wisdom of the perfect ruler.\n\nLaws should be just, but they must also be certain, and we are obliged\nto sacrifice something of their justice to their certainty. Suppose\na wise and good judge, who paying little or no regard to the law,\nattempted to decide with perfect justice the cases that were brought\nbefore him. To the uneducated person he would appear to be the ideal of\na judge. Such justice has been often exercised in primitive times, or at\nthe present day among eastern rulers. But in the first place it depends\nentirely on the personal character of the judge. He may be honest,\nbut there is no check upon his dishonesty, and his opinion can only be\noverruled, not by any principle of law, but by the opinion of another\njudging like himself without law. In the second place, even if he\nbe ever so honest, his mode of deciding questions would introduce an\nelement of uncertainty into human life; no one would know beforehand\nwhat would happen to him, or would seek to conform in his conduct to\nany rule of law. For the compact which the law makes with men, that they\nshall be protected if they observe the law in their dealings with\none another, would have to be substituted another principle of a more\ngeneral character, that they shall be protected by the law if they act\nrightly in their dealings with one another. The complexity of human\nactions and also the uncertainty of their effects would be increased\ntenfold. For one of the principal advantages of law is not merely that\nit enforces honesty, but that it makes men act in the same way, and\nrequires them to produce the same evidence of their acts. Too many laws\nmay be the sign of a corrupt and overcivilized state of society, too few\nare the sign of an uncivilized one; as soon as commerce begins to\ngrow, men make themselves customs which have the validity of laws. Even\nequity, which is the exception to the law, conforms to fixed rules and\nlies for the most part within the limits of previous decisions.\n\nIV. The bitterness of the Statesman is characteristic of Plato's later\nstyle, in which the thoughts of youth and love have fled away, and we\nare no longer tended by the Muses or the Graces. We do not venture to\nsay that Plato was soured by old age, but certainly the kindliness and\ncourtesy of the earlier dialogues have disappeared. He sees the world\nunder a harder and grimmer aspect: he is dealing with the reality of\nthings, not with visions or pictures of them: he is seeking by the aid\nof dialectic only, to arrive at truth. He is deeply impressed with the\nimportance of classification: in this alone he finds the true measure of\nhuman things; and very often in the process of division curious results\nare obtained. For the dialectical art is no respecter of persons: king\nand vermin-taker are all alike to the philosopher. There may have been a\ntime when the king was a god, but he now is pretty much on a level with\nhis subjects in breeding and education. Man should be well advised that\nhe is only one of the animals, and the Hellene in particular should be\naware that he himself was the author of the distinction between Hellene\nand Barbarian, and that the Phrygian would equally divide mankind into\nPhrygians and Barbarians, and that some intelligent animal, like a\ncrane, might go a step further, and divide the animal world into cranes\nand all other animals. Plato cannot help laughing (compare Theaet.) when\nhe thinks of the king running after his subjects, like the pig-driver\nor the bird-taker. He would seriously have him consider how many\ncompetitors there are to his throne, chiefly among the class of\nserving-men. A good deal of meaning is lurking in the expression--'There\nis no art of feeding mankind worthy the name.' There is a similar\ndepth in the remark,--'The wonder about states is not that they are\nshort-lived, but that they last so long in spite of the badness of their\nrulers.'\n\nV. There is also a paradoxical element in the Statesman which delights\nin reversing the accustomed use of words. The law which to the Greek was\nthe highest object of reverence is an ignorant and brutal tyrant--the\ntyrant is converted into a beneficent king. The sophist too is no\nlonger, as in the earlier dialogues, the rival of the statesman, but\nassumes his form. Plato sees that the ideal of the state in his own day\nis more and more severed from the actual. From such ideals as he had\nonce formed, he turns away to contemplate the decline of the Greek\ncities which were far worse now in his old age than they had been in his\nyouth, and were to become worse and worse in the ages which followed. He\ncannot contain his disgust at the contemporary statesmen, sophists who\nhad turned politicians, in various forms of men and animals, appearing,\nsome like lions and centaurs, others like satyrs and monkeys. In this\nnew disguise the Sophists make their last appearance on the scene: in\nthe Laws Plato appears to have forgotten them, or at any rate makes only\na slight allusion to them in a single passage (Laws).\n\nVI. The Statesman is naturally connected with the Sophist. At first\nsight we are surprised to find that the Eleatic Stranger discourses\nto us, not only concerning the nature of Being and Not-being, but\nconcerning the king and statesman. We perceive, however, that there is\nno inappropriateness in his maintaining the character of chief speaker,\nwhen we remember the close connexion which is assumed by Plato to exist\nbetween politics and dialectic. In both dialogues the Proteus Sophist\nis exhibited, first, in the disguise of an Eristic, secondly, of a false\nstatesman. There are several lesser features which the two dialogues\nhave in common. The styles and the situations of the speakers are very\nsimilar; there is the same love of division, and in both of them the\nmind of the writer is greatly occupied about method, to which he had\nprobably intended to return in the projected 'Philosopher.'\n\nThe Statesman stands midway between the Republic and the Laws, and is\nalso related to the Timaeus. The mythical or cosmical element reminds us\nof the Timaeus, the ideal of the Republic. A previous chaos in which\nthe elements as yet were not, is hinted at both in the Timaeus and\nStatesman. The same ingenious arts of giving verisimilitude to a fiction\nare practised in both dialogues, and in both, as well as in the myth at\nthe end of the Republic, Plato touches on the subject of necessity and\nfree-will. The words in which he describes the miseries of states seem\nto be an amplification of the 'Cities will never cease from ill' of the\nRepublic. The point of view in both is the same; and the differences not\nreally important, e.g. in the myth, or in the account of the different\nkinds of states. But the treatment of the subject in the Statesman is\nfragmentary, and the shorter and later work, as might be expected, is\nless finished, and less worked out in detail. The idea of measure and\nthe arrangement of the sciences supply connecting links both with the\nRepublic and the Philebus.\n\nMore than any of the preceding dialogues, the Statesman seems to\napproximate in thought and language to the Laws. There is the same\ndecline and tendency to monotony in style, the same self-consciousness,\nawkwardness, and over-civility; and in the Laws is contained the pattern\nof that second best form of government, which, after all, is admitted\nto be the only attainable one in this world. The 'gentle violence,' the\nmarriage of dissimilar natures, the figure of the warp and the woof,\nare also found in the Laws. Both expressly recognize the conception of\na first or ideal state, which has receded into an invisible heaven. Nor\ndoes the account of the origin and growth of society really differ in\nthem, if we make allowance for the mythic character of the narrative in\nthe Statesman. The virtuous tyrant is common to both of them; and the\nEleatic Stranger takes up a position similar to that of the Athenian\nStranger in the Laws.\n\nVII. There would have been little disposition to doubt the genuineness\nof the Sophist and Statesman, if they had been compared with the Laws\nrather than with the Republic, and the Laws had been received, as they\nought to be, on the authority of Aristotle and on the ground of their\nintrinsic excellence, as an undoubted work of Plato. The detailed\nconsideration of the genuineness and order of the Platonic dialogues has\nbeen reserved for another place: a few of the reasons for defending the\nSophist and Statesman may be given here.\n\n1. The excellence, importance, and metaphysical originality of the two\ndialogues: no works at once so good and of such length are known to have\nproceeded from the hands of a forger.\n\n2. The resemblances in them to other dialogues of Plato are such as\nmight be expected to be found in works of the same author, and not in\nthose of an imitator, being too subtle and minute to have been invented\nby another. The similar passages and turns of thought are generally\ninferior to the parallel passages in his earlier writings; and we might\na priori have expected that, if altered, they would have been improved.\nBut the comparison of the Laws proves that this repetition of his own\nthoughts and words in an inferior form is characteristic of Plato's\nlater style.\n\n3. The close connexion of them with the Theaetetus, Parmenides, and\nPhilebus, involves the fate of these dialogues, as well as of the two\nsuspected ones.\n\n4. The suspicion of them seems mainly to rest on a presumption that in\nPlato's writings we may expect to find an uniform type of doctrine and\nopinion. But however we arrange the order, or narrow the circle of the\ndialogues, we must admit that they exhibit a growth and progress in the\nmind of Plato. And the appearance of change or progress is not to be\nregarded as impugning the genuineness of any particular writings, but\nmay be even an argument in their favour. If we suppose the Sophist and\nPoliticus to stand halfway between the Republic and the Laws, and in\nnear connexion with the Theaetetus, the Parmenides, the Philebus, the\narguments against them derived from differences of thought and style\ndisappear or may be said without paradox in some degree to confirm their\ngenuineness. There is no such interval between the Republic or Phaedrus\nand the two suspected dialogues, as that which separates all the earlier\nwritings of Plato from the Laws. And the Theaetetus, Parmenides, and\nPhilebus, supply links, by which, however different from them, they may\nbe reunited with the great body of the Platonic writings.\n\n\n\n\nSTATESMAN\n\n\nPERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Theodorus, Socrates, The Eleatic Stranger, The\nYounger Socrates.\n\n\nSOCRATES: I owe you many thanks, indeed, Theodorus, for the acquaintance\nboth of Theaetetus and of the Stranger.\n\nTHEODORUS: And in a little while, Socrates, you will owe me three\ntimes as many, when they have completed for you the delineation of the\nStatesman and of the Philosopher, as well as of the Sophist.\n\nSOCRATES: Sophist, statesman, philosopher! O my dear Theodorus, do my\nears truly witness that this is the estimate formed of them by the great\ncalculator and geometrician?\n\nTHEODORUS: What do you mean, Socrates?\n\nSOCRATES: I mean that you rate them all at the same value, whereas they\nare really separated by an interval, which no geometrical ratio can\nexpress.\n\nTHEODORUS: By Ammon, the god of Cyrene, Socrates, that is a very\nfair hit; and shows that you have not forgotten your geometry. I will\nretaliate on you at some other time, but I must now ask the Stranger,\nwho will not, I hope, tire of his goodness to us, to proceed either with\nthe Statesman or with the Philosopher, whichever he prefers.\n\nSTRANGER: That is my duty, Theodorus; having begun I must go on, and not\nleave the work unfinished. But what shall be done with Theaetetus?\n\nTHEODORUS: In what respect?\n\nSTRANGER: Shall we relieve him, and take his companion, the Young\nSocrates, instead of him? What do you advise?\n\nTHEODORUS: Yes, give the other a turn, as you propose. The young always\ndo better when they have intervals of rest.\n\nSOCRATES: I think, Stranger, that both of them may be said to be in some\nway related to me; for the one, as you affirm, has the cut of my ugly\nface (compare Theaet.), the other is called by my name. And we should\nalways be on the look-out to recognize a kinsman by the style of his\nconversation. I myself was discoursing with Theaetetus yesterday, and\nI have just been listening to his answers; my namesake I have not yet\nexamined, but I must. Another time will do for me; to-day let him answer\nyou.\n\nSTRANGER: Very good. Young Socrates, do you hear what the elder Socrates\nis proposing?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: I do.\n\nSTRANGER: And do you agree to his proposal?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: As you do not object, still less can I. After the Sophist,\nthen, I think that the Statesman naturally follows next in the order\nof enquiry. And please to say, whether he, too, should be ranked among\nthose who have science.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: Then the sciences must be divided as before?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: I dare say.\n\nSTRANGER: But yet the division will not be the same?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: How then?\n\nSTRANGER: They will be divided at some other point.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: Where shall we discover the path of the Statesman? We must\nfind and separate off, and set our seal upon this, and we will set\nthe mark of another class upon all diverging paths. Thus the soul will\nconceive of all kinds of knowledge under two classes.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: To find the path is your business, Stranger, and not\nmine.\n\nSTRANGER: Yes, Socrates, but the discovery, when once made, must be\nyours as well as mine.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very good.\n\nSTRANGER: Well, and are not arithmetic and certain other kindred arts,\nmerely abstract knowledge, wholly separated from action?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: True.\n\nSTRANGER: But in the art of carpentering and all other handicrafts, the\nknowledge of the workman is merged in his work; he not only knows, but\nhe also makes things which previously did not exist.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: Then let us divide sciences in general into those which are\npractical and those which are purely intellectual.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Let us assume these two divisions of science, which is\none whole.\n\nSTRANGER: And are 'statesman,' 'king,' 'master,' or 'householder,' one\nand the same; or is there a science or art answering to each of these\nnames? Or rather, allow me to put the matter in another way.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Let me hear.\n\nSTRANGER: If any one who is in a private station has the skill to advise\none of the public physicians, must not he also be called a physician?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: And if any one who is in a private station is able to advise\nthe ruler of a country, may not he be said to have the knowledge which\nthe ruler himself ought to have?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: True.\n\nSTRANGER: But surely the science of a true king is royal science?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: And will not he who possesses this knowledge, whether he\nhappens to be a ruler or a private man, when regarded only in reference\nto his art, be truly called 'royal'?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: He certainly ought to be.\n\nSTRANGER: And the householder and master are the same?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Of course.\n\nSTRANGER: Again, a large household may be compared to a small\nstate:--will they differ at all, as far as government is concerned?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: They will not.\n\nSTRANGER: Then, returning to the point which we were just now\ndiscussing, do we not clearly see that there is one science of all\nof them; and this science may be called either royal or political or\neconomical; we will not quarrel with any one about the name.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not.\n\nSTRANGER: This too, is evident, that the king cannot do much with his\nhands, or with his whole body, towards the maintenance of his empire,\ncompared with what he does by the intelligence and strength of his mind.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly not.\n\nSTRANGER: Then, shall we say that the king has a greater affinity to\nknowledge than to manual arts and to practical life in general?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly he has.\n\nSTRANGER: Then we may put all together as one and the\nsame--statesmanship and the statesman--the kingly science and the king.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly.\n\nSTRANGER: And now we shall only be proceeding in due order if we go on\nto divide the sphere of knowledge?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very good.\n\nSTRANGER: Think whether you can find any joint or parting in knowledge.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Tell me of what sort.\n\nSTRANGER: Such as this: You may remember that we made an art of\ncalculation?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: Which was, unmistakeably, one of the arts of knowledge?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: And to this art of calculation which discerns the differences\nof numbers shall we assign any other function except to pass judgment on\ntheir differences?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: How could we?\n\nSTRANGER: You know that the master-builder does not work himself, but is\nthe ruler of workmen?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: He contributes knowledge, not manual labour?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And may therefore be justly said to share in theoretical\nscience?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true.\n\nSTRANGER: But he ought not, like the calculator, to regard his functions\nas at an end when he has formed a judgment;--he must assign to the\nindividual workmen their appropriate task until they have completed the\nwork.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: True.\n\nSTRANGER: Are not all such sciences, no less than arithmetic and the\nlike, subjects of pure knowledge; and is not the difference between the\ntwo classes, that the one sort has the power of judging only, and the\nother of ruling as well?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: That is evident.\n\nSTRANGER: May we not very properly say, that of all knowledge, there are\ntwo divisions--one which rules, and the other which judges?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: I should think so.\n\nSTRANGER: And when men have anything to do in common, that they should\nbe of one mind is surely a desirable thing?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.\n\nSTRANGER: Then while we are at unity among ourselves, we need not mind\nabout the fancies of others?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not.\n\nSTRANGER: And now, in which of these divisions shall we place the\nking?--Is he a judge and a kind of spectator? Or shall we assign to him\nthe art of command--for he is a ruler?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: The latter, clearly.\n\nSTRANGER: Then we must see whether there is any mark of division in the\nart of command too. I am inclined to think that there is a distinction\nsimilar to that of manufacturer and retail dealer, which parts off the\nking from the herald.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: How is this?\n\nSTRANGER: Why, does not the retailer receive and sell over again the\nproductions of others, which have been sold before?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly he does.\n\nSTRANGER: And is not the herald under command, and does he not receive\norders, and in his turn give them to others?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.\n\nSTRANGER: Then shall we mingle the kingly art in the same class with the\nart of the herald, the interpreter, the boatswain, the prophet, and the\nnumerous kindred arts which exercise command; or, as in the preceding\ncomparison we spoke of manufacturers, or sellers for themselves, and of\nretailers,--seeing, too, that the class of supreme rulers, or rulers for\nthemselves, is almost nameless--shall we make a word following the\nsame analogy, and refer kings to a supreme or ruling-for-self science,\nleaving the rest to receive a name from some one else? For we are\nseeking the ruler; and our enquiry is not concerned with him who is not\na ruler.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very good.\n\nSTRANGER: Thus a very fair distinction has been attained between the man\nwho gives his own commands, and him who gives another's. And now let us\nsee if the supreme power allows of any further division.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: By all means.\n\nSTRANGER: I think that it does; and please to assist me in making the\ndivision.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: At what point?\n\nSTRANGER: May not all rulers be supposed to command for the sake of\nproducing something?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: Nor is there any difficulty in dividing the things produced\ninto two classes.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: How would you divide them?\n\nSTRANGER: Of the whole class, some have life and some are without life.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And by the help of this distinction we may make, if we please,\na subdivision of the section of knowledge which commands.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: At what point?\n\nSTRANGER: One part may be set over the production of lifeless, the other\nof living objects; and in this way the whole will be divided.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: That division, then, is complete; and now we may leave one\nhalf, and take up the other; which may also be divided into two.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Which of the two halves do you mean?\n\nSTRANGER: Of course that which exercises command about animals. For,\nsurely, the royal science is not like that of a master-workman,\na science presiding over lifeless objects;--the king has a nobler\nfunction, which is the management and control of living beings.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And the breeding and tending of living beings may be observed\nto be sometimes a tending of the individual; in other cases, a common\ncare of creatures in flocks?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: True.\n\nSTRANGER: But the statesman is not a tender of individuals--not like\nthe driver or groom of a single ox or horse; he is rather to be compared\nwith the keeper of a drove of horses or oxen.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, I see, thanks to you.\n\nSTRANGER: Shall we call this art of tending many animals together, the\nart of managing a herd, or the art of collective management?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: No matter;--whichever suggests itself to us in the\ncourse of conversation.\n\nSTRANGER: Very good, Socrates; and, if you continue to be not too\nparticular about names, you will be all the richer in wisdom when you\nare an old man. And now, as you say, leaving the discussion of the\nname,--can you see a way in which a person, by showing the art of\nherding to be of two kinds, may cause that which is now sought amongst\ntwice the number of things, to be then sought amongst half that number?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: I will try;--there appears to me to be one management of\nmen and another of beasts.\n\nSTRANGER: You have certainly divided them in a most straightforward and\nmanly style; but you have fallen into an error which hereafter I think\nthat we had better avoid.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What is the error?\n\nSTRANGER: I think that we had better not cut off a single small portion\nwhich is not a species, from many larger portions; the part should be a\nspecies. To separate off at once the subject of investigation, is a most\nexcellent plan, if only the separation be rightly made; and you were\nunder the impression that you were right, because you saw that you would\ncome to man; and this led you to hasten the steps. But you should not\nchip off too small a piece, my friend; the safer way is to cut through\nthe middle; which is also the more likely way of finding classes.\nAttention to this principle makes all the difference in a process of\nenquiry.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean, Stranger?\n\nSTRANGER: I will endeavour to speak more plainly out of love to your\ngood parts, Socrates; and, although I cannot at present entirely explain\nmyself, I will try, as we proceed, to make my meaning a little clearer.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What was the error of which, as you say, we were guilty\nin our recent division?\n\nSTRANGER: The error was just as if some one who wanted to divide the\nhuman race, were to divide them after the fashion which prevails in this\npart of the world; here they cut off the Hellenes as one species, and\nall the other species of mankind, which are innumerable, and have\nno ties or common language, they include under the single name of\n'barbarians,' and because they have one name they are supposed to be of\none species also. Or suppose that in dividing numbers you were to\ncut off ten thousand from all the rest, and make of it one species,\ncomprehending the rest under another separate name, you might say that\nhere too was a single class, because you had given it a single name.\nWhereas you would make a much better and more equal and logical\nclassification of numbers, if you divided them into odd and even; or of\nthe human species, if you divided them into male and female; and only\nseparated off Lydians or Phrygians, or any other tribe, and arrayed them\nagainst the rest of the world, when you could no longer make a division\ninto parts which were also classes.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very true; but I wish that this distinction between a\npart and a class could still be made somewhat plainer.\n\nSTRANGER: O Socrates, best of men, you are imposing upon me a very\ndifficult task. We have already digressed further from our original\nintention than we ought, and you would have us wander still further\naway. But we must now return to our subject; and hereafter, when there\nis a leisure hour, we will follow up the other track; at the same time,\nI wish you to guard against imagining that you ever heard me declare--\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What?\n\nSTRANGER: That a class and a part are distinct.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What did I hear, then?\n\nSTRANGER: That a class is necessarily a part, but there is no similar\nnecessity that a part should be a class; that is the view which I should\nalways wish you to attribute to me, Socrates.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: So be it.\n\nSTRANGER: There is another thing which I should like to know.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What is it?\n\nSTRANGER: The point at which we digressed; for, if I am not mistaken,\nthe exact place was at the question, Where you would divide the\nmanagement of herds. To this you appeared rather too ready to answer\nthat there were two species of animals; man being one, and all brutes\nmaking up the other.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: True.\n\nSTRANGER: I thought that in taking away a part, you imagined that the\nremainder formed a class, because you were able to call them by the\ncommon name of brutes.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: That again is true.\n\nSTRANGER: Suppose now, O most courageous of dialecticians, that some\nwise and understanding creature, such as a crane is reputed to be,\nwere, in imitation of you, to make a similar division, and set up cranes\nagainst all other animals to their own special glorification, at the\nsame time jumbling together all the others, including man, under the\nappellation of brutes,--here would be the sort of error which we must\ntry to avoid.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: How can we be safe?\n\nSTRANGER: If we do not divide the whole class of animals, we shall be\nless likely to fall into that error.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: We had better not take the whole?\n\nSTRANGER: Yes, there lay the source of error in our former division.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: How?\n\nSTRANGER: You remember how that part of the art of knowledge which\nwas concerned with command, had to do with the rearing of living\ncreatures,--I mean, with animals in herds?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: In that case, there was already implied a division of all\nanimals into tame and wild; those whose nature can be tamed are called\ntame, and those which cannot be tamed are called wild.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And the political science of which we are in search, is and\never was concerned with tame animals, and is also confined to gregarious\nanimals.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: But then we ought not to divide, as we did, taking the whole\nclass at once. Neither let us be in too great haste to arrive quickly at\nthe political science; for this mistake has already brought upon us the\nmisfortune of which the proverb speaks.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What misfortune?\n\nSTRANGER: The misfortune of too much haste, which is too little speed.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: And all the better, Stranger;--we got what we deserved.\n\nSTRANGER: Very well: Let us then begin again, and endeavour to divide\nthe collective rearing of animals; for probably the completion of the\nargument will best show what you are so anxious to know. Tell me, then--\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What?\n\nSTRANGER: Have you ever heard, as you very likely may--for I do not\nsuppose that you ever actually visited them--of the preserves of fishes\nin the Nile, and in the ponds of the Great King; or you may have seen\nsimilar preserves in wells at home?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, to be sure, I have seen them, and I have often\nheard the others described.\n\nSTRANGER: And you may have heard also, and may have been assured by\nreport, although you have not travelled in those regions, of nurseries\nof geese and cranes in the plains of Thessaly?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: I asked you, because here is a new division of the management\nof herds, into the management of land and of water herds.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: There is.\n\nSTRANGER: And do you agree that we ought to divide the collective\nrearing of herds into two corresponding parts, the one the rearing of\nwater, and the other the rearing of land herds?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: There is surely no need to ask which of these two contains the\nroyal art, for it is evident to everybody.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: Any one can divide the herds which feed on dry land?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: How would you divide them?\n\nSTRANGER: I should distinguish between those which fly and those which\nwalk.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Most true.\n\nSTRANGER: And where shall we look for the political animal? Might not an\nidiot, so to speak, know that he is a pedestrian?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: The art of managing the walking animal has to be further\ndivided, just as you might halve an even number.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly.\n\nSTRANGER: Let me note that here appear in view two ways to that part\nor class which the argument aims at reaching,--the one a speedier way,\nwhich cuts off a small portion and leaves a large; the other agrees\nbetter with the principle which we were laying down, that as far as we\ncan we should divide in the middle; but it is longer. We can take either\nof them, whichever we please.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Cannot we have both ways?\n\nSTRANGER: Together? What a thing to ask! but, if you take them in turn,\nyou clearly may.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Then I should like to have them in turn.\n\nSTRANGER: There will be no difficulty, as we are near the end; if we had\nbeen at the beginning, or in the middle, I should have demurred to your\nrequest; but now, in accordance with your desire, let us begin with the\nlonger way; while we are fresh, we shall get on better. And now attend\nto the division.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Let me hear.\n\nSTRANGER: The tame walking herding animals are distributed by nature\ninto two classes.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Upon what principle?\n\nSTRANGER: The one grows horns; and the other is without horns.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly.\n\nSTRANGER: Suppose that you divide the science which manages pedestrian\nanimals into two corresponding parts, and define them; for if you try to\ninvent names for them, you will find the intricacy too great.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: How must I speak of them, then?\n\nSTRANGER: In this way: let the science of managing pedestrian animals\nbe divided into two parts, and one part assigned to the horned herd, and\nthe other to the herd that has no horns.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: All that you say has been abundantly proved, and may\ntherefore be assumed.\n\nSTRANGER: The king is clearly the shepherd of a polled herd, who have no\nhorns.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: That is evident.\n\nSTRANGER: Shall we break up this hornless herd into sections, and\nendeavour to assign to him what is his?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: By all means.\n\nSTRANGER: Shall we distinguish them by their having or not having cloven\nfeet, or by their mixing or not mixing the breed? You know what I mean.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What?\n\nSTRANGER: I mean that horses and asses naturally breed from one another.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: But the remainder of the hornless herd of tame animals will\nnot mix the breed.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.\n\nSTRANGER: And of which has the Statesman charge,--of the mixed or of the\nunmixed race?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly of the unmixed.\n\nSTRANGER: I suppose that we must divide this again as before.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: We must.\n\nSTRANGER: Every tame and herding animal has now been split up, with\nthe exception of two species; for I hardly think that dogs should be\nreckoned among gregarious animals.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not; but how shall we divide the two remaining\nspecies?\n\nSTRANGER: There is a measure of difference which may be appropriately\nemployed by you and Theaetetus, who are students of geometry.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What is that?\n\nSTRANGER: The diameter; and, again, the diameter of a diameter. (Compare\nMeno.)\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?\n\nSTRANGER: How does man walk, but as a diameter whose power is two feet?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Just so.\n\nSTRANGER: And the power of the remaining kind, being the power of twice\ntwo feet, may be said to be the diameter of our diameter.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly; and now I think that I pretty nearly\nunderstand you.\n\nSTRANGER: In these divisions, Socrates, I descry what would make another\nfamous jest.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What is it?\n\nSTRANGER: Human beings have come out in the same class with the freest\nand airiest of creation, and have been running a race with them.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: I remark that very singular coincidence.\n\nSTRANGER: And would you not expect the slowest to arrive last?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Indeed I should.\n\nSTRANGER: And there is a still more ridiculous consequence, that the\nking is found running about with the herd and in close competition with\nthe bird-catcher, who of all mankind is most of an adept at the airy\nlife. (Plato is here introducing a new subdivision, i.e. that of bipeds\ninto men and birds. Others however refer the passage to the division\ninto quadrupeds and bipeds, making pigs compete with human beings and\nthe pig-driver with the king. According to this explanation we must\ntranslate the words above, 'freest and airiest of creation,' 'worthiest\nand laziest of creation.')\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: Then here, Socrates, is still clearer evidence of the truth of\nwhat was said in the enquiry about the Sophist? (Compare Sophist.)\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What?\n\nSTRANGER: That the dialectical method is no respecter of persons, and\ndoes not set the great above the small, but always arrives in her own\nway at the truest result.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly.\n\nSTRANGER: And now, I will not wait for you to ask, but will of my\nown accord take you by the shorter road to the definition of a king.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: By all means.\n\nSTRANGER: I say that we should have begun at first by dividing land\nanimals into biped and quadruped; and since the winged herd, and that\nalone, comes out in the same class with man, we should divide bipeds\ninto those which have feathers and those which have not, and when they\nhave been divided, and the art of the management of mankind is brought\nto light, the time will have come to produce our Statesman and ruler,\nand set him like a charioteer in his place, and hand over to him the\nreins of state, for that too is a vocation which belongs to him.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very good; you have paid me the debt,--I mean, that you\nhave completed the argument, and I suppose that you added the digression\nby way of interest. (Compare Republic.)\n\nSTRANGER: Then now, let us go back to the beginning, and join the links,\nwhich together make the definition of the name of the Statesman's art.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: By all means.\n\nSTRANGER: The science of pure knowledge had, as we said originally, a\npart which was the science of rule or command, and from this was derived\nanother part, which was called command-for-self, on the analogy of\nselling-for-self; an important section of this was the management of\nliving animals, and this again was further limited to the management\nof them in herds; and again in herds of pedestrian animals. The chief\ndivision of the latter was the art of managing pedestrian animals which\nare without horns; this again has a part which can only be comprehended\nunder one term by joining together three names--shepherding pure-bred\nanimals. The only further subdivision is the art of man-herding,--this\nhas to do with bipeds, and is what we were seeking after, and have now\nfound, being at once the royal and political.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: To be sure.\n\nSTRANGER: And do you think, Socrates, that we really have done as you\nsay?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What?\n\nSTRANGER: Do you think, I mean, that we have really fulfilled\nour intention?--There has been a sort of discussion, and yet the\ninvestigation seems to me not to be perfectly worked out: this is where\nthe enquiry fails.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: I do not understand.\n\nSTRANGER: I will try to make the thought, which is at this moment\npresent in my mind, clearer to us both.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Let me hear.\n\nSTRANGER: There were many arts of shepherding, and one of them was the\npolitical, which had the charge of one particular herd?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: And this the argument defined to be the art of rearing, not\nhorses or other brutes, but the art of rearing man collectively?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: True.\n\nSTRANGER: Note, however, a difference which distinguishes the king from\nall other shepherds.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: To what do you refer?\n\nSTRANGER: I want to ask, whether any one of the other herdsmen has a\nrival who professes and claims to share with him in the management of\nthe herd?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?\n\nSTRANGER: I mean to say that merchants, husbandmen, providers of food,\nand also training-masters and physicians, will all contend with the\nherdsmen of humanity, whom we call Statesmen, declaring that they\nthemselves have the care of rearing or managing mankind, and that they\nrear not only the common herd, but also the rulers themselves.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Are they not right in saying so?\n\nSTRANGER: Very likely they may be, and we will consider their claim.\nBut we are certain of this,--that no one will raise a similar claim as\nagainst the herdsman, who is allowed on all hands to be the sole and\nonly feeder and physician of his herd; he is also their match-maker\nand accoucheur; no one else knows that department of science. And he is\ntheir merry-maker and musician, as far as their nature is susceptible of\nsuch influences, and no one can console and soothe his own herd\nbetter than he can, either with the natural tones of his voice or with\ninstruments. And the same may be said of tenders of animals in general.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.\n\nSTRANGER: But if this is as you say, can our argument about the king\nbe true and unimpeachable? Were we right in selecting him out of ten\nthousand other claimants to be the shepherd and rearer of the human\nflock?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Surely not.\n\nSTRANGER: Had we not reason just to now to apprehend, that although we\nmay have described a sort of royal form, we have not as yet accurately\nworked out the true image of the Statesman? and that we cannot reveal\nhim as he truly is in his own nature, until we have disengaged and\nseparated him from those who hang about him and claim to share in his\nprerogatives?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.\n\nSTRANGER: And that, Socrates, is what we must do, if we do not mean to\nbring disgrace upon the argument at its close.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: We must certainly avoid that.\n\nSTRANGER: Then let us make a new beginning, and travel by a different\nroad.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What road?\n\nSTRANGER: I think that we may have a little amusement; there is a famous\ntale, of which a good portion may with advantage be interwoven, and then\nwe may resume our series of divisions, and proceed in the old path until\nwe arrive at the desired summit. Shall we do as I say?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: By all means.\n\nSTRANGER: Listen, then, to a tale which a child would love to hear; and\nyou are not too old for childish amusement.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Let me hear.\n\nSTRANGER: There did really happen, and will again happen, like many\nother events of which ancient tradition has preserved the record, the\nportent which is traditionally said to have occurred in the quarrel of\nAtreus and Thyestes. You have heard, no doubt, and remember what they\nsay happened at that time?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: I suppose you to mean the token of the birth of the\ngolden lamb.\n\nSTRANGER: No, not that; but another part of the story, which tells how\nthe sun and the stars once rose in the west, and set in the east, and\nthat the god reversed their motion, and gave them that which they now\nhave as a testimony to the right of Atreus.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Yes; there is that legend also.\n\nSTRANGER: Again, we have been often told of the reign of Cronos.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, very often.\n\nSTRANGER: Did you ever hear that the men of former times were\nearth-born, and not begotten of one another?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, that is another old tradition.\n\nSTRANGER: All these stories, and ten thousand others which are still\nmore wonderful, have a common origin; many of them have been lost in\nthe lapse of ages, or are repeated only in a disconnected form; but the\norigin of them is what no one has told, and may as well be told now; for\nthe tale is suited to throw light on the nature of the king.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very good; and I hope that you will give the whole\nstory, and leave out nothing.\n\nSTRANGER: Listen, then. There is a time when God himself guides and\nhelps to roll the world in its course; and there is a time, on the\ncompletion of a certain cycle, when he lets go, and the world being a\nliving creature, and having originally received intelligence from its\nauthor and creator, turns about and by an inherent necessity revolves in\nthe opposite direction.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Why is that?\n\nSTRANGER: Why, because only the most divine things of all remain ever\nunchanged and the same, and body is not included in this class. Heaven\nand the universe, as we have termed them, although they have been\nendowed by the Creator with many glories, partake of a bodily nature,\nand therefore cannot be entirely free from perturbation. But their\nmotion is, as far as possible, single and in the same place, and of the\nsame kind; and is therefore only subject to a reversal, which is the\nleast alteration possible. For the lord of all moving things is alone\nable to move of himself; and to think that he moves them at one time in\none direction and at another time in another is blasphemy. Hence we must\nnot say that the world is either self-moved always, or all made to go\nround by God in two opposite courses; or that two Gods, having opposite\npurposes, make it move round. But as I have already said (and this is\nthe only remaining alternative) the world is guided at one time by an\nexternal power which is divine and receives fresh life and immortality\nfrom the renewing hand of the Creator, and again, when let go, moves\nspontaneously, being set free at such a time as to have, during infinite\ncycles of years, a reverse movement: this is due to its perfect balance,\nto its vast size, and to the fact that it turns on the smallest pivot.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Your account of the world seems to be very reasonable\nindeed.\n\nSTRANGER: Let us now reflect and try to gather from what has been said\nthe nature of the phenomenon which we affirmed to be the cause of all\nthese wonders. It is this.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What?\n\nSTRANGER: The reversal which takes place from time to time of the motion\nof the universe.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: How is that the cause?\n\nSTRANGER: Of all changes of the heavenly motions, we may consider this\nto be the greatest and most complete.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: I should imagine so.\n\nSTRANGER: And it may be supposed to result in the greatest changes to\nthe human beings who are the inhabitants of the world at the time.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Such changes would naturally occur.\n\nSTRANGER: And animals, as we know, survive with difficulty great and\nserious changes of many different kinds when they come upon them at\nonce.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.\n\nSTRANGER: Hence there necessarily occurs a great destruction of them,\nwhich extends also to the life of man; few survivors of the race are\nleft, and those who remain become the subjects of several novel and\nremarkable phenomena, and of one in particular, which takes place at the\ntime when the transition is made to the cycle opposite to that in which\nwe are now living.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What is it?\n\nSTRANGER: The life of all animals first came to a standstill, and the\nmortal nature ceased to be or look older, and was then reversed and grew\nyoung and delicate; the white locks of the aged darkened again, and the\ncheeks the bearded man became smooth, and recovered their former bloom;\nthe bodies of youths in their prime grew softer and smaller, continually\nby day and night returning and becoming assimilated to the nature of a\nnewly-born child in mind as well as body; in the succeeding stage they\nwasted away and wholly disappeared. And the bodies of those who died by\nviolence at that time quickly passed through the like changes, and in a\nfew days were no more seen.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Then how, Stranger, were the animals created in those\ndays; and in what way were they begotten of one another?\n\nSTRANGER: It is evident, Socrates, that there was no such thing in the\nthen order of nature as the procreation of animals from one another; the\nearth-born race, of which we hear in story, was the one which existed\nin those days--they rose again from the ground; and of this tradition,\nwhich is now-a-days often unduly discredited, our ancestors, who were\nnearest in point of time to the end of the last period and came into\nbeing at the beginning of this, are to us the heralds. And mark how\nconsistent the sequel of the tale is; after the return of age to youth,\nfollows the return of the dead, who are lying in the earth, to life;\nsimultaneously with the reversal of the world the wheel of their\ngeneration has been turned back, and they are put together and rise and\nlive in the opposite order, unless God has carried any of them away to\nsome other lot. According to this tradition they of necessity sprang\nfrom the earth and have the name of earth-born, and so the above legend\nclings to them.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly that is quite consistent with what has\npreceded; but tell me, was the life which you said existed in the reign\nof Cronos in that cycle of the world, or in this? For the change in the\ncourse of the stars and the sun must have occurred in both.\n\nSTRANGER: I see that you enter into my meaning;--no, that blessed and\nspontaneous life does not belong to the present cycle of the world, but\nto the previous one, in which God superintended the whole revolution of\nthe universe; and the several parts the universe were distributed under\nthe rule of certain inferior deities, as is the way in some places\nstill. There were demigods, who were the shepherds of the various\nspecies and herds of animals, and each one was in all respects\nsufficient for those of whom he was the shepherd; neither was there any\nviolence, or devouring of one another, or war or quarrel among them;\nand I might tell of ten thousand other blessings, which belonged to that\ndispensation. The reason why the life of man was, as tradition says,\nspontaneous, is as follows: In those days God himself was their\nshepherd, and ruled over them, just as man, who is by comparison a\ndivine being, still rules over the lower animals. Under him there were\nno forms of government or separate possession of women and children;\nfor all men rose again from the earth, having no memory of the past. And\nalthough they had nothing of this sort, the earth gave them fruits in\nabundance, which grew on trees and shrubs unbidden, and were not planted\nby the hand of man. And they dwelt naked, and mostly in the open air,\nfor the temperature of their seasons was mild; and they had no beds, but\nlay on soft couches of grass, which grew plentifully out of the earth.\nSuch was the life of man in the days of Cronos, Socrates; the character\nof our present life, which is said to be under Zeus, you know from your\nown experience. Can you, and will you, determine which of them you deem\nthe happier?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Impossible.\n\nSTRANGER: Then shall I determine for you as well as I can?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: By all means.\n\nSTRANGER: Suppose that the nurslings of Cronos, having this boundless\nleisure, and the power of holding intercourse, not only with men, but\nwith the brute creation, had used all these advantages with a view to\nphilosophy, conversing with the brutes as well as with one another, and\nlearning of every nature which was gifted with any special power, and\nwas able to contribute some special experience to the store of wisdom,\nthere would be no difficulty in deciding that they would be a thousand\ntimes happier than the men of our own day. Or, again, if they had merely\neaten and drunk until they were full, and told stories to one another\nand to the animals--such stories as are now attributed to them--in this\ncase also, as I should imagine, the answer would be easy. But until some\nsatisfactory witness can be found of the love of that age for knowledge\nand discussion, we had better let the matter drop, and give the reason\nwhy we have unearthed this tale, and then we shall be able to get on.\nIn the fulness of time, when the change was to take place, and the\nearth-born race had all perished, and every soul had completed its\nproper cycle of births and been sown in the earth her appointed number\nof times, the pilot of the universe let the helm go, and retired to his\nplace of view; and then Fate and innate desire reversed the motion of\nthe world. Then also all the inferior deities who share the rule of the\nsupreme power, being informed of what was happening, let go the parts\nof the world which were under their control. And the world turning\nround with a sudden shock, being impelled in an opposite direction from\nbeginning to end, was shaken by a mighty earthquake, which wrought a new\ndestruction of all manner of animals. Afterwards, when sufficient time\nhad elapsed, the tumult and confusion and earthquake ceased, and the\nuniversal creature, once more at peace, attained to a calm, and settled\ndown into his own orderly and accustomed course, having the charge and\nrule of himself and of all the creatures which are contained in him, and\nexecuting, as far as he remembered them, the instructions of his\nFather and Creator, more precisely at first, but afterwords with less\nexactness. The reason of the falling off was the admixture of matter in\nhim; this was inherent in the primal nature, which was full of disorder,\nuntil attaining to the present order. From God, the constructor, the\nworld received all that is good in him, but from a previous state came\nelements of evil and unrighteousness, which, thence derived, first of\nall passed into the world, and were then transmitted to the animals.\nWhile the world was aided by the pilot in nurturing the animals, the\nevil was small, and great the good which he produced, but after the\nseparation, when the world was let go, at first all proceeded well\nenough; but, as time went on, there was more and more forgetting, and\nthe old discord again held sway and burst forth in full glory; and at\nlast small was the good, and great was the admixture of evil, and there\nwas a danger of universal ruin to the world, and to the things contained\nin him. Wherefore God, the orderer of all, in his tender care, seeing\nthat the world was in great straits, and fearing that all might be\ndissolved in the storm and disappear in infinite chaos, again seated\nhimself at the helm; and bringing back the elements which had fallen\ninto dissolution and disorder to the motion which had prevailed under\nhis dispensation, he set them in order and restored them, and made the\nworld imperishable and immortal. And this is the whole tale, of which\nthe first part will suffice to illustrate the nature of the king. For\nwhen the world turned towards the present cycle of generation, the age\nof man again stood still, and a change opposite to the previous one was\nthe result. The small creatures which had almost disappeared grew in and\nstature, and the newly-born children of the earth became grey and\ndied and sank into the earth again. All things changed, imitating and\nfollowing the condition of the universe, and of necessity agreeing with\nthat in their mode of conception and generation and nurture; for no\nanimal was any longer allowed to come into being in the earth through\nthe agency of other creative beings, but as the world was ordained to be\nthe lord of his own progress, in like manner the parts were ordained\nto grow and generate and give nourishment, as far as they could, of\nthemselves, impelled by a similar movement. And so we have arrived at\nthe real end of this discourse; for although there might be much to tell\nof the lower animals, and of the condition out of which they changed\nand of the causes of the change, about men there is not much, and that\nlittle is more to the purpose. Deprived of the care of God, who had\npossessed and tended them, they were left helpless and defenceless, and\nwere torn in pieces by the beasts, who were naturally fierce and had\nnow grown wild. And in the first ages they were still without skill or\nresource; the food which once grew spontaneously had failed, and as\nyet they knew not how to procure it, because they had never felt the\npressure of necessity. For all these reasons they were in a great\nstrait; wherefore also the gifts spoken of in the old tradition\nwere imparted to man by the gods, together with so much teaching and\neducation as was indispensable; fire was given to them by Prometheus,\nthe arts by Hephaestus and his fellow-worker, Athene, seeds and plants\nby others. From these is derived all that has helped to frame human\nlife; since the care of the Gods, as I was saying, had now failed men,\nand they had to order their course of life for themselves, and were\ntheir own masters, just like the universal creature whom they imitate\nand follow, ever changing, as he changes, and ever living and growing,\nat one time in one manner, and at another time in another. Enough of\nthe story, which may be of use in showing us how greatly we erred in the\ndelineation of the king and the statesman in our previous discourse.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What was this great error of which you speak?\n\nSTRANGER: There were two; the first a lesser one, the other was an error\non a much larger and grander scale.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?\n\nSTRANGER: I mean to say that when we were asked about a king and\nstatesman of the present cycle and generation, we told of a shepherd of\na human flock who belonged to the other cycle, and of one who was a\ngod when he ought to have been a man; and this a great error. Again,\nwe declared him to be the ruler of the entire State, without explaining\nhow: this was not the whole truth, nor very intelligible; but still it\nwas true, and therefore the second error was not so great as the first.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very good.\n\nSTRANGER: Before we can expect to have a perfect description of the\nstatesman we must define the nature of his office.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: And the myth was introduced in order to show, not only that\nall others are rivals of the true shepherd who is the object of our\nsearch, but in order that we might have a clearer view of him who is\nalone worthy to receive this appellation, because he alone of shepherds\nand herdsmen, according to the image which we have employed, has the\ncare of human beings.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.\n\nSTRANGER: And I cannot help thinking, Socrates, that the form of\nthe divine shepherd is even higher than that of a king; whereas the\nstatesmen who are now on earth seem to be much more like their subjects\nin character, and much more nearly to partake of their breeding and\neducation.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: Still they must be investigated all the same, to see whether,\nlike the divine shepherd, they are above their subjects or on a level\nwith them.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Of course.\n\nSTRANGER: To resume:--Do you remember that we spoke of a\ncommand-for-self exercised over animals, not singly but collectively,\nwhich we called the art of rearing a herd?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, I remember.\n\nSTRANGER: There, somewhere, lay our error; for we never included or\nmentioned the Statesman; and we did not observe that he had no place in\nour nomenclature.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: How was that?\n\nSTRANGER: All other herdsmen 'rear' their herds, but this is not a\nsuitable term to apply to the Statesman; we should use a name which is\ncommon to them all.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: True, if there be such a name.\n\nSTRANGER: Why, is not 'care' of herds applicable to all? For this\nimplies no feeding, or any special duty; if we say either 'tending' the\nherds, or 'managing' the herds, or 'having the care' of them, the same\nword will include all, and then we may wrap up the Statesman with the\nrest, as the argument seems to require.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Quite right; but how shall we take the next step in the\ndivision?\n\nSTRANGER: As before we divided the art of 'rearing' herds accordingly as\nthey were land or water herds, winged and wingless, mixing or not\nmixing the breed, horned and hornless, so we may divide by these same\ndifferences the 'tending' of herds, comprehending in our definition the\nkingship of to-day and the rule of Cronos.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: That is clear; but I still ask, what is to follow.\n\nSTRANGER: If the word had been 'managing' herds, instead of feeding or\nrearing them, no one would have argued that there was no care of men in\nthe case of the politician, although it was justly contended, that there\nwas no human art of feeding them which was worthy of the name, or at\nleast, if there were, many a man had a prior and greater right to share\nin such an art than any king.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: True.\n\nSTRANGER: But no other art or science will have a prior or better right\nthan the royal science to care for human society and to rule over men in\ngeneral.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true.\n\nSTRANGER: In the next place, Socrates, we must surely notice that a\ngreat error was committed at the end of our analysis.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What was it?\n\nSTRANGER: Why, supposing we were ever so sure that there is such an\nart as the art of rearing or feeding bipeds, there was no reason why\nwe should call this the royal or political art, as though there were no\nmore to be said.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not.\n\nSTRANGER: Our first duty, as we were saying, was to remodel the name,\nso as to have the notion of care rather than of feeding, and then to\ndivide, for there may be still considerable divisions.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: How can they be made?\n\nSTRANGER: First, by separating the divine shepherd from the human\nguardian or manager.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And the art of management which is assigned to man would again\nhave to be subdivided.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: On what principle?\n\nSTRANGER: On the principle of voluntary and compulsory.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Why?\n\nSTRANGER: Because, if I am not mistaken, there has been an error here;\nfor our simplicity led us to rank king and tyrant together, whereas they\nare utterly distinct, like their modes of government.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: True.\n\nSTRANGER: Then, now, as I said, let us make the correction and divide\nhuman care into two parts, on the principle of voluntary and compulsory.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: And if we call the management of violent rulers tyranny, and\nthe voluntary management of herds of voluntary bipeds politics, may we\nnot further assert that he who has this latter art of management is the\ntrue king and statesman?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: I think, Stranger, that we have now completed the\naccount of the Statesman.\n\nSTRANGER: Would that we had, Socrates, but I have to satisfy myself\nas well as you; and in my judgment the figure of the king is not\nyet perfected; like statuaries who, in their too great haste, having\noverdone the several parts of their work, lose time in cutting them\ndown, so too we, partly out of haste, partly out of a magnanimous desire\nto expose our former error, and also because we imagined that a king\nrequired grand illustrations, have taken up a marvellous lump of fable,\nand have been obliged to use more than was necessary. This made us\ndiscourse at large, and, nevertheless, the story never came to an end.\nAnd our discussion might be compared to a picture of some living being\nwhich had been fairly drawn in outline, but had not yet attained the\nlife and clearness which is given by the blending of colours. Now to\nintelligent persons a living being had better be delineated by language\nand discourse than by any painting or work of art: to the duller sort by\nworks of art.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very true; but what is the imperfection which still\nremains? I wish that you would tell me.\n\nSTRANGER: The higher ideas, my dear friend, can hardly be set forth\nexcept through the medium of examples; every man seems to know all\nthings in a dreamy sort of way, and then again to wake up and to know\nnothing.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?\n\nSTRANGER: I fear that I have been unfortunate in raising a question\nabout our experience of knowledge.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Why so?\n\nSTRANGER: Why, because my 'example' requires the assistance of another\nexample.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Proceed; you need not fear that I shall tire.\n\nSTRANGER: I will proceed, finding, as I do, such a ready listener in\nyou: when children are beginning to know their letters--\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What are you going to say?\n\nSTRANGER: That they distinguish the several letters well enough in very\nshort and easy syllables, and are able to tell them correctly.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: Whereas in other syllables they do not recognize them, and\nthink and speak falsely of them.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.\n\nSTRANGER: Will not the best and easiest way of bringing them to a\nknowledge of what they do not as yet know be--\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Be what?\n\nSTRANGER: To refer them first of all to cases in which they judge\ncorrectly about the letters in question, and then to compare these with\nthe cases in which they do not as yet know, and to show them that the\nletters are the same, and have the same character in both combinations,\nuntil all cases in which they are right have been placed side by side\nwith all cases in which they are wrong. In this way they have examples,\nand are made to learn that each letter in every combination is always\nthe same and not another, and is always called by the same name.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: Are not examples formed in this manner? We take a thing and\ncompare it with another distinct instance of the same thing, of which we\nhave a right conception, and out of the comparison there arises one true\nnotion, which includes both of them.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Exactly.\n\nSTRANGER: Can we wonder, then, that the soul has the same uncertainty\nabout the alphabet of things, and sometimes and in some cases is firmly\nfixed by the truth in each particular, and then, again, in other cases\nis altogether at sea; having somehow or other a correct notion of\ncombinations; but when the elements are transferred into the long and\ndifficult language (syllables) of facts, is again ignorant of them?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: There is nothing wonderful in that.\n\nSTRANGER: Could any one, my friend, who began with false opinion ever\nexpect to arrive even at a small portion of truth and to attain wisdom?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Hardly.\n\nSTRANGER: Then you and I will not be far wrong in trying to see the\nnature of example in general in a small and particular instance;\nafterwards from lesser things we intend to pass to the royal class,\nwhich is the highest form of the same nature, and endeavour to discover\nby rules of art what the management of cities is; and then the dream\nwill become a reality to us.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.\n\nSTRANGER: Then, once more, let us resume the previous argument, and as\nthere were innumerable rivals of the royal race who claim to have the\ncare of states, let us part them all off, and leave him alone; and, as I\nwas saying, a model or example of this process has first to be framed.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Exactly.\n\nSTRANGER: What model is there which is small, and yet has any analogy\nwith the political occupation? Suppose, Socrates, that if we have no\nother example at hand, we choose weaving, or, more precisely, weaving of\nwool--this will be quite enough, without taking the whole of weaving, to\nillustrate our meaning?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: Why should we not apply to weaving the same processes of\ndivision and subdivision which we have already applied to other classes;\ngoing once more as rapidly as we can through all the steps until we come\nto that which is needed for our purpose?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: How do you mean?\n\nSTRANGER: I shall reply by actually performing the process.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very good.\n\nSTRANGER: All things which we make or acquire are either creative or\npreventive; of the preventive class are antidotes, divine and human, and\nalso defences; and defences are either military weapons or protections;\nand protections are veils, and also shields against heat and cold, and\nshields against heat and cold are shelters and coverings; and coverings\nare blankets and garments; and garments are some of them in one piece,\nand others of them are made in several parts; and of these latter some\nare stitched, others are fastened and not stitched; and of the not\nstitched, some are made of the sinews of plants, and some of hair; and\nof these, again, some are cemented with water and earth, and others are\nfastened together by themselves. And these last defences and coverings\nwhich are fastened together by themselves are called clothes, and\nthe art which superintends them we may call, from the nature of the\noperation, the art of clothing, just as before the art of the Statesman\nwas derived from the State; and may we not say that the art of weaving,\nat least that largest portion of it which was concerned with the making\nof clothes, differs only in name from this art of clothing, in the same\nway that, in the previous case, the royal science differed from the\npolitical?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Most true.\n\nSTRANGER: In the next place, let us make the reflection, that the art\nof weaving clothes, which an incompetent person might fancy to have been\nsufficiently described, has been separated off from several others which\nare of the same family, but not from the co-operative arts.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: And which are the kindred arts?\n\nSTRANGER: I see that I have not taken you with me. So I think that we\nhad better go backwards, starting from the end. We just now parted off\nfrom the weaving of clothes, the making of blankets, which differ from\neach other in that one is put under and the other is put around: and\nthese are what I termed kindred arts.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: I understand.\n\nSTRANGER: And we have subtracted the manufacture of all articles made\nof flax and cords, and all that we just now metaphorically termed the\nsinews of plants, and we have also separated off the process of felting\nand the putting together of materials by stitching and sewing, of which\nthe most important part is the cobbler's art.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Precisely.\n\nSTRANGER: Then we separated off the currier's art, which prepared\ncoverings in entire pieces, and the art of sheltering, and subtracted\nthe various arts of making water-tight which are employed in building,\nand in general in carpentering, and in other crafts, and all such\narts as furnish impediments to thieving and acts of violence, and are\nconcerned with making the lids of boxes and the fixing of doors, being\ndivisions of the art of joining; and we also cut off the manufacture\nof arms, which is a section of the great and manifold art of making\ndefences; and we originally began by parting off the whole of the magic\nart which is concerned with antidotes, and have left, as would appear,\nthe very art of which we were in search, the art of protection against\nwinter cold, which fabricates woollen defences, and has the name of\nweaving.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.\n\nSTRANGER: Yes, my boy, but that is not all; for the first process to\nwhich the material is subjected is the opposite of weaving.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: How so?\n\nSTRANGER: Weaving is a sort of uniting?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: But the first process is a separation of the clotted and\nmatted fibres?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?\n\nSTRANGER: I mean the work of the carder's art; for we cannot say that\ncarding is weaving, or that the carder is a weaver.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not.\n\nSTRANGER: Again, if a person were to say that the art of making the warp\nand the woof was the art of weaving, he would say what was paradoxical\nand false.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: To be sure.\n\nSTRANGER: Shall we say that the whole art of the fuller or of the mender\nhas nothing to do with the care and treatment of clothes, or are we to\nregard all these as arts of weaving?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not.\n\nSTRANGER: And yet surely all these arts will maintain that they are\nconcerned with the treatment and production of clothes; they will\ndispute the exclusive prerogative of weaving, and though assigning\na larger sphere to that, will still reserve a considerable field for\nthemselves.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.\n\nSTRANGER: Besides these, there are the arts which make tools and\ninstruments of weaving, and which will claim at least to be co-operative\ncauses in every work of the weaver.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Most true.\n\nSTRANGER: Well, then, suppose that we define weaving, or rather that\npart of it which has been selected by us, to be the greatest and noblest\nof arts which are concerned with woollen garments--shall we be right?\nIs not the definition, although true, wanting in clearness and\ncompleteness; for do not all those other arts require to be first\ncleared away?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: True.\n\nSTRANGER: Then the next thing will be to separate them, in order that\nthe argument may proceed in a regular manner?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: By all means.\n\nSTRANGER: Let us consider, in the first place, that there are two kinds\nof arts entering into everything which we do.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What are they?\n\nSTRANGER: The one kind is the conditional or co-operative, the other the\nprincipal cause.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?\n\nSTRANGER: The arts which do not manufacture the actual thing, but which\nfurnish the necessary tools for the manufacture, without which the\nseveral arts could not fulfil their appointed work, are co-operative;\nbut those which make the things themselves are causal.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: A very reasonable distinction.\n\nSTRANGER: Thus the arts which make spindles, combs, and other\ninstruments of the production of clothes, may be called co-operative,\nand those which treat and fabricate the things themselves, causal.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.\n\nSTRANGER: The arts of washing and mending, and the other preparatory\narts which belong to the causal class, and form a division of the\ngreat art of adornment, may be all comprehended under what we call the\nfuller's art.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very good.\n\nSTRANGER: Carding and spinning threads and all the parts of the process\nwhich are concerned with the actual manufacture of a woollen garment\nform a single art, which is one of those universally acknowledged,--the\nart of working in wool.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: To be sure.\n\nSTRANGER: Of working in wool, again, there are two divisions, and both\nthese are parts of two arts at once.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: How is that?\n\nSTRANGER: Carding and one half of the use of the comb, and the other\nprocesses of wool-working which separate the composite, may be classed\ntogether as belonging both to the art of wool-working, and also to one\nof the two great arts which are of universal application--the art of\ncomposition and the art of division.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: To the latter belong carding and the other processes of which\nI was just now speaking; the art of discernment or division in wool and\nyarn, which is effected in one manner with the comb and in another with\nthe hands, is variously described under all the names which I just now\nmentioned.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.\n\nSTRANGER: Again, let us take some process of wool-working which is also\na portion of the art of composition, and, dismissing the elements of\ndivision which we found there, make two halves, one on the principle of\ncomposition, and the other on the principle of division.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Let that be done.\n\nSTRANGER: And once more, Socrates, we must divide the part which belongs\nat once both to wool-working and composition, if we are ever to discover\nsatisfactorily the aforesaid art of weaving.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: We must.\n\nSTRANGER: Yes, certainly, and let us call one part of the art the art of\ntwisting threads, the other the art of combining them.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Do I understand you, in speaking of twisting, to be\nreferring to manufacture of the warp?\n\nSTRANGER: Yes, and of the woof too; how, if not by twisting, is the woof\nmade?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: There is no other way.\n\nSTRANGER: Then suppose that you define the warp and the woof, for I\nthink that the definition will be of use to you.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: How shall I define them?\n\nSTRANGER: As thus: A piece of carded wool which is drawn out lengthwise\nand breadthwise is said to be pulled out.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: And the wool thus prepared, when twisted by the spindle, and\nmade into a firm thread, is called the warp, and the art which regulates\nthese operations the art of spinning the warp.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And the threads which are more loosely spun, having a softness\nproportioned to the intertexture of the warp and to the degree of force\nused in dressing the cloth,--the threads which are thus spun are called\nthe woof, and the art which is set over them may be called the art of\nspinning the woof.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.\n\nSTRANGER: And, now, there can be no mistake about the nature of the part\nof weaving which we have undertaken to define. For when that part of the\nart of composition which is employed in the working of wool forms a web\nby the regular intertexture of warp and woof, the entire woven substance\nis called by us a woollen garment, and the art which presides over this\nis the art of weaving.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.\n\nSTRANGER: But why did we not say at once that weaving is the art of\nentwining warp and woof, instead of making a long and useless circuit?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: I thought, Stranger, that there was nothing useless in\nwhat was said.\n\nSTRANGER: Very likely, but you may not always think so, my sweet friend;\nand in case any feeling of dissatisfaction should hereafter arise in\nyour mind, as it very well may, let me lay down a principle which will\napply to arguments in general.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Proceed.\n\nSTRANGER: Let us begin by considering the whole nature of excess and\ndefect, and then we shall have a rational ground on which we may praise\nor blame too much length or too much shortness in discussions of this\nkind.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Let us do so.\n\nSTRANGER: The points on which I think that we ought to dwell are the\nfollowing:--\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What?\n\nSTRANGER: Length and shortness, excess and defect; with all of these the\nart of measurement is conversant.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: And the art of measurement has to be divided into two parts,\nwith a view to our present purpose.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Where would you make the division?\n\nSTRANGER: As thus: I would make two parts, one having regard to the\nrelativity of greatness and smallness to each other; and there is\nanother, without which the existence of production would be impossible.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?\n\nSTRANGER: Do you not think that it is only natural for the greater to be\ncalled greater with reference to the less alone, and the less less with\nreference to the greater alone?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: Well, but is there not also something exceeding and exceeded\nby the principle of the mean, both in speech and action, and is not this\na reality, and the chief mark of difference between good and bad men?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Plainly.\n\nSTRANGER: Then we must suppose that the great and small exist and are\ndiscerned in both these ways, and not, as we were saying before, only\nrelatively to one another, but there must also be another comparison of\nthem with the mean or ideal standard; would you like to hear the reason\nwhy?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: If we assume the greater to exist only in relation to the\nless, there will never be any comparison of either with the mean.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And would not this doctrine be the ruin of all the arts and\ntheir creations; would not the art of the Statesman and the aforesaid\nart of weaving disappear? For all these arts are on the watch against\nexcess and defect, not as unrealities, but as real evils, which occasion\na difficulty in action; and the excellence or beauty of every work of\nart is due to this observance of measure.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: But if the science of the Statesman disappears, the search for\nthe royal science will be impossible.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.\n\nSTRANGER: Well, then, as in the case of the Sophist we extorted the\ninference that not-being had an existence, because here was the point\nat which the argument eluded our grasp, so in this we must endeavour\nto show that the greater and less are not only to be measured with one\nanother, but also have to do with the production of the mean; for if\nthis is not admitted, neither a statesman nor any other man of action\ncan be an undisputed master of his science.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, we must certainly do again what we did then.\n\nSTRANGER: But this, Socrates, is a greater work than the other, of which\nwe only too well remember the length. I think, however, that we may\nfairly assume something of this sort--\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What?\n\nSTRANGER: That we shall some day require this notion of a mean with a\nview to the demonstration of absolute truth; meanwhile, the argument\nthat the very existence of the arts must be held to depend on the\npossibility of measuring more or less, not only with one another, but\nalso with a view to the attainment of the mean, seems to afford a grand\nsupport and satisfactory proof of the doctrine which we are maintaining;\nfor if there are arts, there is a standard of measure, and if there is a\nstandard of measure, there are arts; but if either is wanting, there is\nneither.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: True; and what is the next step?\n\nSTRANGER: The next step clearly is to divide the art of measurement into\ntwo parts, as we have said already, and to place in the one part all the\narts which measure number, length, depth, breadth, swiftness with their\nopposites; and to have another part in which they are measured with the\nmean, and the fit, and the opportune, and the due, and with all those\nwords, in short, which denote a mean or standard removed from the\nextremes.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Here are two vast divisions, embracing two very\ndifferent spheres.\n\nSTRANGER: There are many accomplished men, Socrates, who say, believing\nthemselves to speak wisely, that the art of measurement is universal,\nand has to do with all things. And this means what we are now saying;\nfor all things which come within the province of art do certainly in\nsome sense partake of measure. But these persons, because they are\nnot accustomed to distinguish classes according to real forms, jumble\ntogether two widely different things, relation to one another, and to a\nstandard, under the idea that they are the same, and also fall into\nthe converse error of dividing other things not according to their real\nparts. Whereas the right way is, if a man has first seen the unity of\nthings, to go on with the enquiry and not desist until he has found all\nthe differences contained in it which form distinct classes; nor again\nshould he be able to rest contented with the manifold diversities which\nare seen in a multitude of things until he has comprehended all of them\nthat have any affinity within the bounds of one similarity and embraced\nthem within the reality of a single kind. But we have said enough on\nthis head, and also of excess and defect; we have only to bear in mind\nthat two divisions of the art of measurement have been discovered which\nare concerned with them, and not forget what they are.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: We will not forget.\n\nSTRANGER: And now that this discussion is completed, let us go on to\nconsider another question, which concerns not this argument only but the\nconduct of such arguments in general.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What is this new question?\n\nSTRANGER: Take the case of a child who is engaged in learning his\nletters: when he is asked what letters make up a word, should we say\nthat the question is intended to improve his grammatical knowledge of\nthat particular word, or of all words?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly, in order that he may have a better knowledge of\nall words.\n\nSTRANGER: And is our enquiry about the Statesman intended only to\nimprove our knowledge of politics, or our power of reasoning generally?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly, as in the former example, the purpose is\ngeneral.\n\nSTRANGER: Still less would any rational man seek to analyse the notion\nof weaving for its own sake. But people seem to forget that some things\nhave sensible images, which are readily known, and can be easily pointed\nout when any one desires to answer an enquirer without any trouble or\nargument; whereas the greatest and highest truths have no outward image\nof themselves visible to man, which he who wishes to satisfy the soul\nof the enquirer can adapt to the eye of sense (compare Phaedr.), and\ntherefore we ought to train ourselves to give and accept a rational\naccount of them; for immaterial things, which are the noblest and\ngreatest, are shown only in thought and idea, and in no other way, and\nall that we are now saying is said for the sake of them. Moreover, there\nis always less difficulty in fixing the mind on small matters than on\ngreat.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very good.\n\nSTRANGER: Let us call to mind the bearing of all this.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What is it?\n\nSTRANGER: I wanted to get rid of any impression of tediousness which we\nmay have experienced in the discussion about weaving, and the reversal\nof the universe, and in the discussion concerning the Sophist and the\nbeing of not-being. I know that they were felt to be too long, and I\nreproached myself with this, fearing that they might be not only tedious\nbut irrelevant; and all that I have now said is only designed to prevent\nthe recurrence of any such disagreeables for the future.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very good. Will you proceed?\n\nSTRANGER: Then I would like to observe that you and I, remembering\nwhat has been said, should praise or blame the length or shortness of\ndiscussions, not by comparing them with one another, but with what is\nfitting, having regard to the part of measurement, which, as we said,\nwas to be borne in mind.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.\n\nSTRANGER: And yet, not everything is to be judged even with a view to\nwhat is fitting; for we should only want such a length as is suited to\ngive pleasure, if at all, as a secondary matter; and reason tells us,\nthat we should be contented to make the ease or rapidity of an enquiry,\nnot our first, but our second object; the first and highest of all being\nto assert the great method of division according to species--whether the\ndiscourse be shorter or longer is not to the point. No offence should\nbe taken at length, but the longer and shorter are to be employed\nindifferently, according as either of them is better calculated to\nsharpen the wits of the auditors. Reason would also say to him who\ncensures the length of discourses on such occasions and cannot away with\ntheir circumlocution, that he should not be in such a hurry to have\ndone with them, when he can only complain that they are tedious, but he\nshould prove that if they had been shorter they would have made\nthose who took part in them better dialecticians, and more capable of\nexpressing the truth of things; about any other praise and blame, he\nneed not trouble himself--he should pretend not to hear them. But we\nhave had enough of this, as you will probably agree with me in thinking.\nLet us return to our Statesman, and apply to his case the aforesaid\nexample of weaving.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very good;--let us do as you say.\n\nSTRANGER: The art of the king has been separated from the similar arts\nof shepherds, and, indeed, from all those which have to do with herds\nat all. There still remain, however, of the causal and co-operative arts\nthose which are immediately concerned with States, and which must first\nbe distinguished from one another.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very good.\n\nSTRANGER: You know that these arts cannot easily be divided into two\nhalves; the reason will be very evident as we proceed.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Then we had better do so.\n\nSTRANGER: We must carve them like a victim into members or limbs, since\nwe cannot bisect them. (Compare Phaedr.) For we certainly should divide\neverything into as few parts as possible.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What is to be done in this case?\n\nSTRANGER: What we did in the example of weaving--all those arts which\nfurnish the tools were regarded by us as co-operative.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: So now, and with still more reason, all arts which make any\nimplement in a State, whether great or small, may be regarded by us as\nco-operative, for without them neither State nor Statesmanship would\nbe possible; and yet we are not inclined to say that any of them is a\nproduct of the kingly art.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: No, indeed.\n\nSTRANGER: The task of separating this class from others is not an easy\none; for there is plausibility in saying that anything in the world\nis the instrument of doing something. But there is another class of\npossessions in a city, of which I have a word to say.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What class do you mean?\n\nSTRANGER: A class which may be described as not having this power; that\nis to say, not like an instrument, framed for production, but designed\nfor the preservation of that which is produced.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: To what do you refer?\n\nSTRANGER: To the class of vessels, as they are comprehensively termed,\nwhich are constructed for the preservation of things moist and dry, of\nthings prepared in the fire or out of the fire; this is a very large\nclass, and has, if I am not mistaken, literally nothing to do with the\nroyal art of which we are in search.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not.\n\nSTRANGER: There is also a third class of possessions to be noted,\ndifferent from these and very extensive, moving or resting on land or\nwater, honourable and also dishonourable. The whole of this class has\none name, because it is intended to be sat upon, being always a seat for\nsomething.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What is it?\n\nSTRANGER: A vehicle, which is certainly not the work of the Statesman,\nbut of the carpenter, potter, and coppersmith.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: I understand.\n\nSTRANGER: And is there not a fourth class which is again different, and\nin which most of the things formerly mentioned are contained,--every\nkind of dress, most sorts of arms, walls and enclosures, whether of\nearth or stone, and ten thousand other things? all of which being made\nfor the sake of defence, may be truly called defences, and are for the\nmost part to be regarded as the work of the builder or of the weaver,\nrather than of the Statesman.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: Shall we add a fifth class, of ornamentation and drawing, and\nof the imitations produced by drawing and music, which are designed for\namusement only, and may be fairly comprehended under one name?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What is it?\n\nSTRANGER: Plaything is the name.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: That one name may be fitly predicated of all of them, for none\nof these things have a serious purpose--amusement is their sole aim.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: That again I understand.\n\nSTRANGER: Then there is a class which provides materials for all these,\nout of which and in which the arts already mentioned fabricate their\nworks;--this manifold class, I say, which is the creation and offspring\nof many other arts, may I not rank sixth?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?\n\nSTRANGER: I am referring to gold, silver, and other metals, and all\nthat wood-cutting and shearing of every sort provides for the art\nof carpentry and plaiting; and there is the process of barking and\nstripping the cuticle of plants, and the currier's art, which strips off\nthe skins of animals, and other similar arts which manufacture corks and\npapyri and cords, and provide for the manufacture of composite species\nout of simple kinds--the whole class may be termed the primitive and\nsimple possession of man, and with this the kingly science has no\nconcern at all.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: True.\n\nSTRANGER: The provision of food and of all other things which mingle\ntheir particles with the particles of the human body, and minister to\nthe body, will form a seventh class, which may be called by the general\nterm of nourishment, unless you have any better name to offer. This,\nhowever, appertains rather to the husbandman, huntsman, trainer, doctor,\ncook, and is not to be assigned to the Statesman's art.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not.\n\nSTRANGER: These seven classes include nearly every description of\nproperty, with the exception of tame animals. Consider;--there was the\noriginal material, which ought to have been placed first; next come\ninstruments, vessels, vehicles, defences, playthings, nourishment; small\nthings, which may be included under one of these--as for example, coins,\nseals and stamps, are omitted, for they have not in them the character\nof any larger kind which includes them; but some of them may, with a\nlittle forcing, be placed among ornaments, and others may be made to\nharmonize with the class of implements. The art of herding, which has\nbeen already divided into parts, will include all property in tame\nanimals, except slaves.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.\n\nSTRANGER: The class of slaves and ministers only remains, and I suspect\nthat in this the real aspirants for the throne, who are the rivals of\nthe king in the formation of the political web, will be discovered;\njust as spinners, carders, and the rest of them, were the rivals of the\nweaver. All the others, who were termed co-operators, have been got rid\nof among the occupations already mentioned, and separated from the royal\nand political science.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: I agree.\n\nSTRANGER: Let us go a little nearer, in order that we may be more\ncertain of the complexion of this remaining class.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Let us do so.\n\nSTRANGER: We shall find from our present point of view that the greatest\nservants are in a case and condition which is the reverse of what we\nanticipated.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Who are they?\n\nSTRANGER: Those who have been purchased, and have so become possessions;\nthese are unmistakably slaves, and certainly do not claim royal science.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not.\n\nSTRANGER: Again, freemen who of their own accord become the servants of\nthe other classes in a State, and who exchange and equalise the products\nof husbandry and the other arts, some sitting in the market-place,\nothers going from city to city by land or sea, and giving money in\nexchange for money or for other productions--the money-changer, the\nmerchant, the ship-owner, the retailer, will not put in any claim to\nstatecraft or politics?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: No; unless, indeed, to the politics of commerce.\n\nSTRANGER: But surely men whom we see acting as hirelings and serfs, and\ntoo happy to turn their hand to anything, will not profess to share in\nroyal science?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not.\n\nSTRANGER: But what would you say of some other serviceable officials?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Who are they, and what services do they perform?\n\nSTRANGER: There are heralds, and scribes perfected by practice,\nand divers others who have great skill in various sorts of business\nconnected with the government of states--what shall we call them?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: They are the officials, and servants of the rulers, as\nyou just now called them, but not themselves rulers.\n\nSTRANGER: There may be something strange in any servant pretending to be\na ruler, and yet I do not think that I could have been dreaming when\nI imagined that the principal claimants to political science would be\nfound somewhere in this neighbourhood.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.\n\nSTRANGER: Well, let us draw nearer, and try the claims of some who have\nnot yet been tested: in the first place, there are diviners, who have\na portion of servile or ministerial science, and are thought to be the\ninterpreters of the gods to men.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: True.\n\nSTRANGER: There is also the priestly class, who, as the law declares,\nknow how to give the gods gifts from men in the form of sacrifices which\nare acceptable to them, and to ask on our behalf blessings in return\nfrom them. Now both these are branches of the servile or ministerial\nart.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, clearly.\n\nSTRANGER: And here I think that we seem to be getting on the right\ntrack; for the priest and the diviner are swollen with pride and\nprerogative, and they create an awful impression of themselves by\nthe magnitude of their enterprises; in Egypt, the king himself is not\nallowed to reign, unless he have priestly powers, and if he should be\nof another class and has thrust himself in, he must get enrolled in\nthe priesthood. In many parts of Hellas, the duty of offering the most\nsolemn propitiatory sacrifices is assigned to the highest magistracies,\nand here, at Athens, the most solemn and national of the ancient\nsacrifices are supposed to be celebrated by him who has been chosen by\nlot to be the King Archon.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Precisely.\n\nSTRANGER: But who are these other kings and priests elected by lot who\nnow come into view followed by their retainers and a vast throng, as the\nformer class disappears and the scene changes?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Whom can you mean?\n\nSTRANGER: They are a strange crew.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Why strange?\n\nSTRANGER: A minute ago I thought that they were animals of every tribe;\nfor many of them are like lions and centaurs, and many more like satyrs\nand such weak and shifty creatures;--Protean shapes quickly changing\ninto one another's forms and natures; and now, Socrates, I begin to see\nwho they are.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Who are they? You seem to be gazing on some strange\nvision.\n\nSTRANGER: Yes; every one looks strange when you do not know him;\nand just now I myself fell into this mistake--at first sight, coming\nsuddenly upon him, I did not recognize the politician and his troop.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Who is he?\n\nSTRANGER: The chief of Sophists and most accomplished of wizards, who\nmust at any cost be separated from the true king or Statesman, if we are\never to see daylight in the present enquiry.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: That is a hope not lightly to be renounced.\n\nSTRANGER: Never, if I can help it; and, first, let me ask you a\nquestion.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What?\n\nSTRANGER: Is not monarchy a recognized form of government?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: And, after monarchy, next in order comes the government of the\nfew?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Of course.\n\nSTRANGER: Is not the third form of government the rule of the multitude,\nwhich is called by the name of democracy?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: And do not these three expand in a manner into five, producing\nout of themselves two other names?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What are they?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What are they?\n\nSTRANGER: There is a criterion of voluntary and involuntary, poverty and\nriches, law and the absence of law, which men now-a-days apply to them;\nthe two first they subdivide accordingly, and ascribe to monarchy two\nforms and two corresponding names, royalty and tyranny.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.\n\nSTRANGER: And the government of the few they distinguish by the names of\naristocracy and oligarchy.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: Democracy alone, whether rigidly observing the laws or not,\nand whether the multitude rule over the men of property with their\nconsent or against their consent, always in ordinary language has the\nsame name.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: True.\n\nSTRANGER: But do you suppose that any form of government which is\ndefined by these characteristics of the one, the few, or the many, of\npoverty or wealth, of voluntary or compulsory submission, of written law\nor the absence of law, can be a right one?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Why not?\n\nSTRANGER: Reflect; and follow me.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: In what direction?\n\nSTRANGER: Shall we abide by what we said at first, or shall we retract\nour words?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: To what do you refer?\n\nSTRANGER: If I am not mistaken, we said that royal power was a science?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: And a science of a peculiar kind, which was selected out\nof the rest as having a character which is at once judicial and\nauthoritative?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: And there was one kind of authority over lifeless things and\nanother other living animals; and so we proceeded in the division step\nby step up to this point, not losing the idea of science, but unable as\nyet to determine the nature of the particular science?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: True.\n\nSTRANGER: Hence we are led to observe that the distinguishing principle\nof the State cannot be the few or many, the voluntary or involuntary,\npoverty or riches; but some notion of science must enter into it, if we\nare to be consistent with what has preceded.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: And we must be consistent.\n\nSTRANGER: Well, then, in which of these various forms of States may the\nscience of government, which is among the greatest of all sciences and\nmost difficult to acquire, be supposed to reside? That we must discover,\nand then we shall see who are the false politicians who pretend to be\npoliticians but are not, although they persuade many, and shall separate\nthem from the wise king.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: That, as the argument has already intimated, will be our\nduty.\n\nSTRANGER: Do you think that the multitude in a State can attain\npolitical science?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Impossible.\n\nSTRANGER: But, perhaps, in a city of a thousand men, there would be a\nhundred, or say fifty, who could?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: In that case political science would certainly be the\neasiest of all sciences; there could not be found in a city of that\nnumber as many really first-rate draught-players, if judged by the\nstandard of the rest of Hellas, and there would certainly not be as\nmany kings. For kings we may truly call those who possess royal science,\nwhether they rule or not, as was shown in the previous argument.\n\nSTRANGER: Thank you for reminding me; and the consequence is that any\ntrue form of government can only be supposed to be the government of\none, two, or, at any rate, of a few.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: And these, whether they rule with the will, or against the\nwill, of their subjects, with written laws or without written laws, and\nwhether they are poor or rich, and whatever be the nature of their\nrule, must be supposed, according to our present view, to rule on some\nscientific principle; just as the physician, whether he cures us\nagainst our will or with our will, and whatever be his mode of\ntreatment,--incision, burning, or the infliction of some other\npain,--whether he practises out of a book or not out of a book, and\nwhether he be rich or poor, whether he purges or reduces in some other\nway, or even fattens his patients, is a physician all the same, so long\nas he exercises authority over them according to rules of art, if he\nonly does them good and heals and saves them. And this we lay down to\nbe the only proper test of the art of medicine, or of any other art of\ncommand.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true.\n\nSTRANGER: Then that can be the only true form of government in which\nthe governors are really found to possess science, and are not mere\npretenders, whether they rule according to law or without law, over\nwilling or unwilling subjects, and are rich or poor themselves--none\nof these things can with any propriety be included in the notion of the\nruler.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And whether with a view to the public good they purge the\nState by killing some, or exiling some; whether they reduce the size of\nthe body corporate by sending out from the hive swarms of citizens,\nor, by introducing persons from without, increase it; while they act\naccording to the rules of wisdom and justice, and use their power with\na view to the general security and improvement, the city over which they\nrule, and which has these characteristics, may be described as the only\ntrue State. All other governments are not genuine or real; but only\nimitations of this, and some of them are better and some of them are\nworse; the better are said to be well governed, but they are mere\nimitations like the others.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: I agree, Stranger, in the greater part of what you say;\nbut as to their ruling without laws--the expression has a harsh sound.\n\nSTRANGER: You have been too quick for me, Socrates; I was just going to\nask you whether you objected to any of my statements. And now I see that\nwe shall have to consider this notion of there being good government\nwithout laws.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: There can be no doubt that legislation is in a manner the\nbusiness of a king, and yet the best thing of all is not that the law\nshould rule, but that a man should rule supposing him to have wisdom and\nroyal power. Do you see why this is?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Why?\n\nSTRANGER: Because the law does not perfectly comprehend what is noblest\nand most just for all and therefore cannot enforce what is best. The\ndifferences of men and actions, and the endless irregular movements of\nhuman things, do not admit of any universal and simple rule. And no art\nwhatsoever can lay down a rule which will last for all time.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Of course not.\n\nSTRANGER: But the law is always striving to make one;--like an obstinate\nand ignorant tyrant, who will not allow anything to be done contrary to\nhis appointment, or any question to be asked--not even in sudden changes\nof circumstances, when something happens to be better than what he\ncommanded for some one.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly; the law treats us all precisely in the manner\nwhich you describe.\n\nSTRANGER: A perfectly simple principle can never be applied to a state\nof things which is the reverse of simple.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: True.\n\nSTRANGER: Then if the law is not the perfection of right, why are\nwe compelled to make laws at all? The reason of this has next to be\ninvestigated.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: Let me ask, whether you have not meetings for gymnastic\ncontests in your city, such as there are in other cities, at which men\ncompete in running, wrestling, and the like?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Yes; they are very common among us.\n\nSTRANGER: And what are the rules which are enforced on their pupils by\nprofessional trainers or by others having similar authority? Can you\nremember?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: To what do you refer?\n\nSTRANGER: The training-masters do not issue minute rules for\nindividuals, or give every individual what is exactly suited to his\nconstitution; they think that they ought to go more roughly to work, and\nto prescribe generally the regimen which will benefit the majority.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.\n\nSTRANGER: And therefore they assign equal amounts of exercise to them\nall; they send them forth together, and let them rest together from\ntheir running, wrestling, or whatever the form of bodily exercise may\nbe.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And now observe that the legislator who has to preside over\nthe herd, and to enforce justice in their dealings with one another,\nwill not be able, in enacting for the general good, to provide exactly\nwhat is suitable for each particular case.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: He cannot be expected to do so.\n\nSTRANGER: He will lay down laws in a general form for the majority,\nroughly meeting the cases of individuals; and some of them he will\ndeliver in writing, and others will be unwritten; and these last will be\ntraditional customs of the country.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: He will be right.\n\nSTRANGER: Yes, quite right; for how can he sit at every man's side all\nthrough his life, prescribing for him the exact particulars of his duty?\nWho, Socrates, would be equal to such a task? No one who really had the\nroyal science, if he had been able to do this, would have imposed upon\nhimself the restriction of a written law.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: So I should infer from what has now been said.\n\nSTRANGER: Or rather, my good friend, from what is going to be said.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: And what is that?\n\nSTRANGER: Let us put to ourselves the case of a physician, or trainer,\nwho is about to go into a far country, and is expecting to be a long\ntime away from his patients--thinking that his instructions will not be\nremembered unless they are written down, he will leave notes of them for\nthe use of his pupils or patients.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: True.\n\nSTRANGER: But what would you say, if he came back sooner than he had\nintended, and, owing to an unexpected change of the winds or other\ncelestial influences, something else happened to be better for\nthem,--would he not venture to suggest this new remedy, although not\ncontemplated in his former prescription? Would he persist in observing\nthe original law, neither himself giving any new commandments, nor the\npatient daring to do otherwise than was prescribed, under the idea\nthat this course only was healthy and medicinal, all others noxious and\nheterodox? Viewed in the light of science and true art, would not all\nsuch enactments be utterly ridiculous?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Utterly.\n\nSTRANGER: And if he who gave laws, written or unwritten, determining\nwhat was good or bad, honourable or dishonourable, just or unjust, to\nthe tribes of men who flock together in their several cities, and are\ngoverned in accordance with them; if, I say, the wise legislator were\nsuddenly to come again, or another like to him, is he to be prohibited\nfrom changing them?--would not this prohibition be in reality quite as\nridiculous as the other?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: Do you know a plausible saying of the common people which is\nin point?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: I do not recall what you mean at the moment.\n\nSTRANGER: They say that if any one knows how the ancient laws may be\nimproved, he must first persuade his own State of the improvement, and\nthen he may legislate, but not otherwise.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: And are they not right?\n\nSTRANGER: I dare say. But supposing that he does use some gentle\nviolence for their good, what is this violence to be called? Or rather,\nbefore you answer, let me ask the same question in reference to our\nprevious instances.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?\n\nSTRANGER: Suppose that a skilful physician has a patient, of whatever\nsex or age, whom he compels against his will to do something for his\ngood which is contrary to the written rules; what is this compulsion to\nbe called? Would you ever dream of calling it a violation of the art,\nor a breach of the laws of health? Nothing could be more unjust than for\nthe patient to whom such violence is applied, to charge the physician\nwho practises the violence with wanting skill or aggravating his\ndisease.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Most true.\n\nSTRANGER: In the political art error is not called disease, but evil, or\ndisgrace, or injustice.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true.\n\nSTRANGER: And when the citizen, contrary to law and custom, is compelled\nto do what is juster and better and nobler than he did before, the last\nand most absurd thing which he could say about such violence is that\nhe has incurred disgrace or evil or injustice at the hands of those who\ncompelled him.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.\n\nSTRANGER: And shall we say that the violence, if exercised by a rich\nman, is just, and if by a poor man, unjust? May not any man, rich or\npoor, with or without laws, with the will of the citizens or against\nthe will of the citizens, do what is for their interest? Is not this the\ntrue principle of government, according to which the wise and good\nman will order the affairs of his subjects? As the pilot, by watching\ncontinually over the interests of the ship and of the crew,--not by\nlaying down rules, but by making his art a law,--preserves the lives of\nhis fellow-sailors, even so, and in the self-same way, may there not\nbe a true form of polity created by those who are able to govern in a\nsimilar spirit, and who show a strength of art which is superior to the\nlaw? Nor can wise rulers ever err while they observing the one great\nrule of distributing justice to the citizens with intelligence and\nskill, are able to preserve them, and, as far as may be, to make them\nbetter from being worse.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: No one can deny what has been now said.\n\nSTRANGER: Neither, if you consider, can any one deny the other\nstatement.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What was it?\n\nSTRANGER: We said that no great number of persons, whoever they may be,\ncan attain political knowledge, or order a State wisely, but that the\ntrue government is to be found in a small body, or in an individual, and\nthat other States are but imitations of this, as we said a little while\nago, some for the better and some for the worse.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean? I cannot have understood your previous\nremark about imitations.\n\nSTRANGER: And yet the mere suggestion which I hastily threw out is\nhighly important, even if we leave the question where it is, and do not\nseek by the discussion of it to expose the error which prevails in this\nmatter.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?\n\nSTRANGER: The idea which has to be grasped by us is not easy or\nfamiliar; but we may attempt to express it thus:--Supposing the\ngovernment of which I have been speaking to be the only true model, then\nthe others must use the written laws of this--in no other way can they\nbe saved; they will have to do what is now generally approved, although\nnot the best thing in the world.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What is this?\n\nSTRANGER: No citizen should do anything contrary to the laws, and any\ninfringement of them should be punished with death and the most extreme\npenalties; and this is very right and good when regarded as the\nsecond best thing, if you set aside the first, of which I was just now\nspeaking. Shall I explain the nature of what I call the second best?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: By all means.\n\nSTRANGER: I must again have recourse to my favourite images; through\nthem, and them alone, can I describe kings and rulers.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What images?\n\nSTRANGER: The noble pilot and the wise physician, who 'is worth many\nanother man'--in the similitude of these let us endeavour to discover\nsome image of the king.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What sort of an image?\n\nSTRANGER: Well, such as this:--Every man will reflect that he suffers\nstrange things at the hands of both of them; the physician saves\nany whom he wishes to save, and any whom he wishes to maltreat he\nmaltreats--cutting or burning them; and at the same time requiring them\nto bring him payments, which are a sort of tribute, of which little or\nnothing is spent upon the sick man, and the greater part is consumed by\nhim and his domestics; and the finale is that he receives money from the\nrelations of the sick man or from some enemy of his, and puts him out of\nthe way. And the pilots of ships are guilty of numberless evil deeds of\nthe same kind; they intentionally play false and leave you ashore when\nthe hour of sailing arrives; or they cause mishaps at sea and cast away\ntheir freight; and are guilty of other rogueries. Now suppose that we,\nbearing all this in mind, were to determine, after consideration, that\nneither of these arts shall any longer be allowed to exercise absolute\ncontrol either over freemen or over slaves, but that we will summon an\nassembly either of all the people, or of the rich only, that anybody who\nlikes, whatever may be his calling, or even if he have no calling, may\noffer an opinion either about seamanship or about diseases--whether as\nto the manner in which physic or surgical instruments are to be applied\nto the patient, or again about the vessels and the nautical implements\nwhich are required in navigation, and how to meet the dangers of\nwinds and waves which are incidental to the voyage, how to behave when\nencountering pirates, and what is to be done with the old-fashioned\ngalleys, if they have to fight with others of a similar build--and that,\nwhatever shall be decreed by the multitude on these points, upon\nthe advice of persons skilled or unskilled, shall be written down on\ntriangular tablets and columns, or enacted although unwritten to be\nnational customs; and that in all future time vessels shall be navigated\nand remedies administered to the patient after this fashion.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What a strange notion!\n\nSTRANGER: Suppose further, that the pilots and physicians are appointed\nannually, either out of the rich, or out of the whole people, and that\nthey are elected by lot; and that after their election they navigate\nvessels and heal the sick according to the written rules.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Worse and worse.\n\nSTRANGER: But hear what follows:--When the year of office has expired,\nthe pilot or physician has to come before a court of review, in which\nthe judges are either selected from the wealthy classes or chosen by lot\nout of the whole people; and anybody who pleases may be their accuser,\nand may lay to their charge, that during the past year they have not\nnavigated their vessels or healed their patients according to the letter\nof the law and the ancient customs of their ancestors; and if either of\nthem is condemned, some of the judges must fix what he is to suffer or\npay.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: He who is willing to take a command under such\nconditions, deserves to suffer any penalty.\n\nSTRANGER: Yet once more, we shall have to enact that if any one is\ndetected enquiring into piloting and navigation, or into health and the\ntrue nature of medicine, or about the winds, or other conditions of the\natmosphere, contrary to the written rules, and has any ingenious notions\nabout such matters, he is not to be called a pilot or physician, but a\ncloudy prating sophist;--further, on the ground that he is a corrupter\nof the young, who would persuade them to follow the art of medicine or\npiloting in an unlawful manner, and to exercise an arbitrary rule over\ntheir patients or ships, any one who is qualified by law may inform\nagainst him, and indict him in some court, and then if he is found to\nbe persuading any, whether young or old, to act contrary to the written\nlaw, he is to be punished with the utmost rigour; for no one should\npresume to be wiser than the laws; and as touching healing and health\nand piloting and navigation, the nature of them is known to all, for\nanybody may learn the written laws and the national customs. If such\nwere the mode of procedure, Socrates, about these sciences and about\ngeneralship, and any branch of hunting, or about painting or imitation\nin general, or carpentry, or any sort of handicraft, or husbandry, or\nplanting, or if we were to see an art of rearing horses, or tending\nherds, or divination, or any ministerial service, or draught-playing, or\nany science conversant with number, whether simple or square or cube,\nor comprising motion,--I say, if all these things were done in this way\naccording to written regulations, and not according to art, what would\nbe the result?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: All the arts would utterly perish, and could never be\nrecovered, because enquiry would be unlawful. And human life, which is\nbad enough already, would then become utterly unendurable.\n\nSTRANGER: But what, if while compelling all these operations to be\nregulated by written law, we were to appoint as the guardian of the laws\nsome one elected by a show of hands, or by lot, and he caring nothing\nabout the laws, were to act contrary to them from motives of interest\nor favour, and without knowledge,--would not this be a still worse evil\nthan the former?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.\n\nSTRANGER: To go against the laws, which are based upon long experience,\nand the wisdom of counsellors who have graciously recommended them and\npersuaded the multitude to pass them, would be a far greater and more\nruinous error than any adherence to written law?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: Therefore, as there is a danger of this, the next best thing\nin legislating is not to allow either the individual or the multitude to\nbreak the law in any respect whatever.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: True.\n\nSTRANGER: The laws would be copies of the true particulars of action as\nfar as they admit of being written down from the lips of those who have\nknowledge?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly they would.\n\nSTRANGER: And, as we were saying, he who has knowledge and is a true\nStatesman, will do many things within his own sphere of action by his\nart without regard to the laws, when he is of opinion that something\nother than that which he has written down and enjoined to be observed\nduring his absence would be better.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, we said so.\n\nSTRANGER: And any individual or any number of men, having fixed laws, in\nacting contrary to them with a view to something better, would only be\nacting, as far as they are able, like the true Statesman?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: If they had no knowledge of what they were doing, they would\nimitate the truth, and they would always imitate ill; but if they had\nknowledge, the imitation would be the perfect truth, and an imitation no\nlonger.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true.\n\nSTRANGER: And the principle that no great number of men are able to\nacquire a knowledge of any art has been already admitted by us.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, it has.\n\nSTRANGER: Then the royal or political art, if there be such an art, will\nnever be attained either by the wealthy or by the other mob.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Impossible.\n\nSTRANGER: Then the nearest approach which these lower forms of\ngovernment can ever make to the true government of the one scientific\nruler, is to do nothing contrary to their own written laws and national\ncustoms.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very good.\n\nSTRANGER: When the rich imitate the true form, such a government is\ncalled aristocracy; and when they are regardless of the laws, oligarchy.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: True.\n\nSTRANGER: Or again, when an individual rules according to law in\nimitation of him who knows, we call him a king; and if he rules\naccording to law, we give him the same name, whether he rules with\nopinion or with knowledge.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: To be sure.\n\nSTRANGER: And when an individual truly possessing knowledge rules, his\nname will surely be the same--he will be called a king; and thus the\nfive names of governments, as they are now reckoned, become one.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: That is true.\n\nSTRANGER: And when an individual ruler governs neither by law nor by\ncustom, but following in the steps of the true man of science pretends\nthat he can only act for the best by violating the laws, while in\nreality appetite and ignorance are the motives of the imitation, may not\nsuch an one be called a tyrant?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: And this we believe to be the origin of the tyrant and the\nking, of oligarchies, and aristocracies, and democracies,--because men\nare offended at the one monarch, and can never be made to believe that\nany one can be worthy of such authority, or is able and willing in the\nspirit of virtue and knowledge to act justly and holily to all; they\nfancy that he will be a despot who will wrong and harm and slay whom he\npleases of us; for if there could be such a despot as we describe, they\nwould acknowledge that we ought to be too glad to have him, and that he\nalone would be the happy ruler of a true and perfect State.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: To be sure.\n\nSTRANGER: But then, as the State is not like a beehive, and has no\nnatural head who is at once recognized to be the superior both in body\nand in mind, mankind are obliged to meet and make laws, and endeavour to\napproach as nearly as they can to the true form of government.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And when the foundation of politics is in the letter only\nand in custom, and knowledge is divorced from action, can we wonder,\nSocrates, at the miseries which there are, and always will be, in\nStates? Any other art, built on such a foundation and thus conducted,\nwould ruin all that it touched. Ought we not rather to wonder at the\nnatural strength of the political bond? For States have endured all\nthis, time out of mind, and yet some of them still remain and are not\noverthrown, though many of them, like ships at sea, founder from time\nto time, and perish and have perished and will hereafter perish, through\nthe badness of their pilots and crews, who have the worst sort of\nignorance of the highest truths--I mean to say, that they are wholly\nunaquainted with politics, of which, above all other sciences, they\nbelieve themselves to have acquired the most perfect knowledge.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.\n\nSTRANGER: Then the question arises:--which of these untrue forms of\ngovernment is the least oppressive to their subjects, though they are\nall oppressive; and which is the worst of them? Here is a consideration\nwhich is beside our present purpose, and yet having regard to the whole\nit seems to influence all our actions: we must examine it.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, we must.\n\nSTRANGER: You may say that of the three forms, the same is at once the\nhardest and the easiest.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?\n\nSTRANGER: I am speaking of the three forms of government, which I\nmentioned at the beginning of this discussion--monarchy, the rule of the\nfew, and the rule of the many.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: True.\n\nSTRANGER: If we divide each of these we shall have six, from which the\ntrue one may be distinguished as a seventh.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: How would you make the division?\n\nSTRANGER: Monarchy divides into royalty and tyranny; the rule of the\nfew into aristocracy, which has an auspicious name, and oligarchy; and\ndemocracy or the rule of the many, which before was one, must now be\ndivided.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: On what principle of division?\n\nSTRANGER: On the same principle as before, although the name is now\ndiscovered to have a twofold meaning. For the distinction of ruling with\nlaw or without law, applies to this as well as to the rest.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: The division made no difference when we were looking for the\nperfect State, as we showed before. But now that this has been separated\noff, and, as we said, the others alone are left for us, the principle of\nlaw and the absence of law will bisect them all.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: That would seem to follow, from what has been said.\n\nSTRANGER: Then monarchy, when bound by good prescriptions or laws,\nis the best of all the six, and when lawless is the most bitter and\noppressive to the subject.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: True.\n\nSTRANGER: The government of the few, which is intermediate between that\nof the one and many, is also intermediate in good and evil; but the\ngovernment of the many is in every respect weak and unable to do either\nany great good or any great evil, when compared with the others, because\nthe offices are too minutely subdivided and too many hold them. And this\ntherefore is the worst of all lawful governments, and the best of all\nlawless ones. If they are all without the restraints of law, democracy\nis the form in which to live is best; if they are well ordered, then\nthis is the last which you should choose, as royalty, the first form, is\nthe best, with the exception of the seventh, for that excels them all,\nand is among States what God is among men.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: You are quite right, and we should choose that above\nall.\n\nSTRANGER: The members of all these States, with the exception of the\none which has knowledge, may be set aside as being not Statesmen but\npartisans,--upholders of the most monstrous idols, and themselves idols;\nand, being the greatest imitators and magicians, they are also the\ngreatest of Sophists.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: The name of Sophist after many windings in the argument\nappears to have been most justly fixed upon the politicians, as they are\ntermed.\n\nSTRANGER: And so our satyric drama has been played out; and the troop of\nCentaurs and Satyrs, however unwilling to leave the stage, have at last\nbeen separated from the political science.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: So I perceive.\n\nSTRANGER: There remain, however, natures still more troublesome, because\nthey are more nearly akin to the king, and more difficult to discern;\nthe examination of them may be compared to the process of refining gold.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What is your meaning?\n\nSTRANGER: The workmen begin by sifting away the earth and stones and\nthe like; there remain in a confused mass the valuable elements akin to\ngold, which can only be separated by fire,--copper, silver, and other\nprecious metal; these are at last refined away by the use of tests,\nuntil the gold is left quite pure.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, that is the way in which these things are said to\nbe done.\n\nSTRANGER: In like manner, all alien and uncongenial matter has been\nseparated from political science, and what is precious and of a kindred\nnature has been left; there remain the nobler arts of the general and\nthe judge, and the higher sort of oratory which is an ally of the royal\nart, and persuades men to do justice, and assists in guiding the helm of\nStates:--How can we best clear away all these, leaving him whom we seek\nalone and unalloyed?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: That is obviously what has in some way to be attempted.\n\nSTRANGER: If the attempt is all that is wanting, he shall certainly be\nbrought to light; and I think that the illustration of music may assist\nin exhibiting him. Please to answer me a question.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What question?\n\nSTRANGER: There is such a thing as learning music or handicraft arts in\ngeneral?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: There is.\n\nSTRANGER: And is there any higher art or science, having power to decide\nwhich of these arts are and are not to be learned;--what do you say?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: I should answer that there is.\n\nSTRANGER: And do we acknowledge this science to be different from the\nothers?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: And ought the other sciences to be superior to this, or no\nsingle science to any other? Or ought this science to be the overseer\nand governor of all the others?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: The latter.\n\nSTRANGER: You mean to say that the science which judges whether we ought\nto learn or not, must be superior to the science which is learned or\nwhich teaches?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Far superior.\n\nSTRANGER: And the science which determines whether we ought to persuade\nor not, must be superior to the science which is able to persuade?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Of course.\n\nSTRANGER: Very good; and to what science do we assign the power of\npersuading a multitude by a pleasing tale and not by teaching?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: That power, I think, must clearly be assigned to\nrhetoric.\n\nSTRANGER: And to what science do we give the power of determining\nwhether we are to employ persuasion or force towards any one, or to\nrefrain altogether?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: To that science which governs the arts of speech and\npersuasion.\n\nSTRANGER: Which, if I am not mistaken, will be politics?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very good.\n\nSTRANGER: Rhetoric seems to be quickly distinguished from politics,\nbeing a different species, yet ministering to it.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: But what would you think of another sort of power or science?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What science?\n\nSTRANGER: The science which has to do with military operations against\nour enemies--is that to be regarded as a science or not?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: How can generalship and military tactics be regarded as\nother than a science?\n\nSTRANGER: And is the art which is able and knows how to advise when we\nare to go to war, or to make peace, the same as this or different?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: If we are to be consistent, we must say different.\n\nSTRANGER: And we must also suppose that this rules the other, if we are\nnot to give up our former notion?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And, considering how great and terrible the whole art of war\nis, can we imagine any which is superior to it but the truly royal?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: No other.\n\nSTRANGER: The art of the general is only ministerial, and therefore not\npolitical?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Exactly.\n\nSTRANGER: Once more let us consider the nature of the righteous judge.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very good.\n\nSTRANGER: Does he do anything but decide the dealings of men with one\nanother to be just or unjust in accordance with the standard which he\nreceives from the king and legislator,--showing his own peculiar virtue\nonly in this, that he is not perverted by gifts, or fears, or pity, or\nby any sort of favour or enmity, into deciding the suits of men with one\nanother contrary to the appointment of the legislator?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: No; his office is such as you describe.\n\nSTRANGER: Then the inference is that the power of the judge is not\nroyal, but only the power of a guardian of the law which ministers to\nthe royal power?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: True.\n\nSTRANGER: The review of all these sciences shows that none of them is\npolitical or royal. For the truly royal ought not itself to act, but to\nrule over those who are able to act; the king ought to know what is and\nwhat is not a fitting opportunity for taking the initiative in matters\nof the greatest importance, whilst others should execute his orders.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And, therefore, the arts which we have described, as they\nhave no authority over themselves or one another, but are each of them\nconcerned with some special action of their own, have, as they ought to\nhave, special names corresponding to their several actions.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: I agree.\n\nSTRANGER: And the science which is over them all, and has charge of the\nlaws, and of all matters affecting the State, and truly weaves them\nall into one, if we would describe under a name characteristic of their\ncommon nature, most truly we may call politics.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Exactly so.\n\nSTRANGER: Then, now that we have discovered the various classes in\na State, shall I analyse politics after the pattern which weaving\nsupplied?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: I greatly wish that you would.\n\nSTRANGER: Then I must describe the nature of the royal web, and show how\nthe various threads are woven into one piece.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly.\n\nSTRANGER: A task has to be accomplished, which, although difficult,\nappears to be necessary.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly the attempt must be made.\n\nSTRANGER: To assume that one part of virtue differs in kind from\nanother, is a position easily assailable by contentious disputants, who\nappeal to popular opinion.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: I do not understand.\n\nSTRANGER: Let me put the matter in another way: I suppose that you would\nconsider courage to be a part of virtue?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly I should.\n\nSTRANGER: And you would think temperance to be different from courage;\nand likewise to be a part of virtue?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: True.\n\nSTRANGER: I shall venture to put forward a strange theory about them.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What is it?\n\nSTRANGER: That they are two principles which thoroughly hate one another\nand are antagonistic throughout a great part of nature.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: How singular!\n\nSTRANGER: Yes, very--for all the parts of virtue are commonly said to be\nfriendly to one another.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.\n\nSTRANGER: Then let us carefully investigate whether this is universally\ntrue, or whether there are not parts of virtue which are at war with\ntheir kindred in some respect.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Tell me how we shall consider that question.\n\nSTRANGER: We must extend our enquiry to all those things which we\nconsider beautiful and at the same time place in two opposite classes.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Explain; what are they?\n\nSTRANGER: Acuteness and quickness, whether in body or soul or in the\nmovement of sound, and the imitations of them which painting and music\nsupply, you must have praised yourself before now, or been present when\nothers praised them.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: And do you remember the terms in which they are praised?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: I do not.\n\nSTRANGER: I wonder whether I can explain to you in words the thought\nwhich is passing in my mind.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Why not?\n\nSTRANGER: You fancy that this is all so easy: Well, let us consider\nthese notions with reference to the opposite classes of action under\nwhich they fall. When we praise quickness and energy and acuteness,\nwhether of mind or body or sound, we express our praise of the quality\nwhich we admire by one word, and that one word is manliness or courage.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: How?\n\nSTRANGER: We speak of an action as energetic and brave, quick and manly,\nand vigorous too; and when we apply the name of which I speak as the\ncommon attribute of all these natures, we certainly praise them.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: True.\n\nSTRANGER: And do we not often praise the quiet strain of action also?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: To be sure.\n\nSTRANGER: And do we not then say the opposite of what we said of the\nother?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: How do you mean?\n\nSTRANGER: We exclaim How calm! How temperate! in admiration of the slow\nand quiet working of the intellect, and of steadiness and gentleness in\naction, of smoothness and depth of voice, and of all rhythmical movement\nand of music in general, when these have a proper solemnity. Of all such\nactions we predicate not courage, but a name indicative of order.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.\n\nSTRANGER: But when, on the other hand, either of these is out of place,\nthe names of either are changed into terms of censure.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: How so?\n\nSTRANGER: Too great sharpness or quickness or hardness is termed\nviolence or madness; too great slowness or gentleness is called\ncowardice or sluggishness; and we may observe, that for the most part\nthese qualities, and the temperance and manliness of the opposite\ncharacters, are arrayed as enemies on opposite sides, and do not mingle\nwith one another in their respective actions; and if we pursue the\nenquiry, we shall find that men who have these different qualities of\nmind differ from one another.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: In what respect?\n\nSTRANGER: In respect of all the qualities which I mentioned, and very\nlikely of many others. According to their respective affinities to\neither class of actions they distribute praise and blame,--praise to\nthe actions which are akin to their own, blame to those of the opposite\nparty--and out of this many quarrels and occasions of quarrel arise\namong them.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: True.\n\nSTRANGER: The difference between the two classes is often a trivial\nconcern; but in a state, and when affecting really important matters,\nbecomes of all disorders the most hateful.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: To what do you refer?\n\nSTRANGER: To nothing short of the whole regulation of human life. For\nthe orderly class are always ready to lead a peaceful life, quietly\ndoing their own business; this is their manner of behaving with all\nmen at home, and they are equally ready to find some way of keeping the\npeace with foreign States. And on account of this fondness of theirs for\npeace, which is often out of season where their influence prevails, they\nbecome by degrees unwarlike, and bring up their young men to be like\nthemselves; they are at the mercy of their enemies; whence in a\nfew years they and their children and the whole city often pass\nimperceptibly from the condition of freemen into that of slaves.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What a cruel fate!\n\nSTRANGER: And now think of what happens with the more courageous\nnatures. Are they not always inciting their country to go to war, owing\nto their excessive love of the military life? they raise up enemies\nagainst themselves many and mighty, and either utterly ruin their\nnative-land or enslave and subject it to its foes?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: That, again, is true.\n\nSTRANGER: Must we not admit, then, that where these two classes exist,\nthey always feel the greatest antipathy and antagonism towards one\nanother?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: We cannot deny it.\n\nSTRANGER: And returning to the enquiry with which we began, have we\nnot found that considerable portions of virtue are at variance with one\nanother, and give rise to a similar opposition in the characters who are\nendowed with them?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: True.\n\nSTRANGER: Let us consider a further point.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: What is it?\n\nSTRANGER: I want to know, whether any constructive art will make\nany, even the most trivial thing, out of bad and good materials\nindifferently, if this can be helped? does not all art rather reject the\nbad as far as possible, and accept the good and fit materials, and from\nthese elements, whether like or unlike, gathering them all into one,\nwork out some nature or idea?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: To, be sure.\n\nSTRANGER: Then the true and natural art of statesmanship will never\nallow any State to be formed by a combination of good and bad men, if\nthis can be avoided; but will begin by testing human natures in play,\nand after testing them, will entrust them to proper teachers who are the\nministers of her purposes--she will herself give orders, and maintain\nauthority; just as the art of weaving continually gives orders and\nmaintains authority over the carders and all the others who prepare the\nmaterial for the work, commanding the subsidiary arts to execute the\nworks which she deems necessary for making the web.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true.\n\nSTRANGER: In like manner, the royal science appears to me to be the\nmistress of all lawful educators and instructors, and having this\nqueenly power, will not permit them to train men in what will produce\ncharacters unsuited to the political constitution which she desires to\ncreate, but only in what will produce such as are suitable. Those\nwhich have no share of manliness and temperance, or any other virtuous\ninclination, and, from the necessity of an evil nature, are violently\ncarried away to godlessness and insolence and injustice, she gets rid of\nby death and exile, and punishes them with the greatest of disgraces.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: That is commonly said.\n\nSTRANGER: But those who are wallowing in ignorance and baseness she bows\nunder the yoke of slavery.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Quite right.\n\nSTRANGER: The rest of the citizens, out of whom, if they have education,\nsomething noble may be made, and who are capable of being united by the\nstatesman, the kingly art blends and weaves together; taking on the one\nhand those whose natures tend rather to courage, which is the stronger\nelement and may be regarded as the warp, and on the other hand those\nwhich incline to order and gentleness, and which are represented in\nthe figure as spun thick and soft, after the manner of the woof--these,\nwhich are naturally opposed, she seeks to bind and weave together in the\nfollowing manner:\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: In what manner?\n\nSTRANGER: First of all, she takes the eternal element of the soul and\nbinds it with a divine cord, to which it is akin, and then the animal\nnature, and binds that with human cords.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: I do not understand what you mean.\n\nSTRANGER: The meaning is, that the opinion about the honourable and\nthe just and good and their opposites, which is true and confirmed\nby reason, is a divine principle, and when implanted in the soul, is\nimplanted, as I maintain, in a nature of heavenly birth.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Yes; what else should it be?\n\nSTRANGER: Only the Statesman and the good legislator, having the\ninspiration of the royal muse, can implant this opinion, and he, only in\nthe rightly educated, whom we were just now describing.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Likely enough.\n\nSTRANGER: But him who cannot, we will not designate by any of the names\nwhich are the subject of the present enquiry.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very right.\n\nSTRANGER: The courageous soul when attaining this truth becomes\ncivilized, and rendered more capable of partaking of justice; but when\nnot partaking, is inclined to brutality. Is not that true?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.\n\nSTRANGER: And again, the peaceful and orderly nature, if sharing in\nthese opinions, becomes temperate and wise, as far as this may be in a\nState, but if not, deservedly obtains the ignominious name of silliness.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true.\n\nSTRANGER: Can we say that such a connexion as this will lastingly unite\nthe evil with one another or with the good, or that any science would\nseriously think of using a bond of this kind to join such materials?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Impossible.\n\nSTRANGER: But in those who were originally of a noble nature, and who\nhave been nurtured in noble ways, and in those only, may we not say\nthat union is implanted by law, and that this is the medicine which art\nprescribes for them, and of all the bonds which unite the dissimilar and\ncontrary parts of virtue is not this, as I was saying, the divinest?\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.\n\nSTRANGER: Where this divine bond exists there is no difficulty in\nimagining, or when you have imagined, in creating the other bonds, which\nare human only.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: How is that, and what bonds do you mean?\n\nSTRANGER: Rights of intermarriage, and ties which are formed between\nStates by giving and taking children in marriage, or between individuals\nby private betrothals and espousals. For most persons form marriage\nconnexions without due regard to what is best for the procreation of\nchildren.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: In what way?\n\nSTRANGER: They seek after wealth and power, which in matrimony are\nobjects not worthy even of a serious censure.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: There is no need to consider them at all.\n\nSTRANGER: More reason is there to consider the practice of those who\nmake family their chief aim, and to indicate their error.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true.\n\nSTRANGER: They act on no true principle at all; they seek their ease and\nreceive with open arms those who are like themselves, and hate those who\nare unlike them, being too much influenced by feelings of dislike.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: How so?\n\nSTRANGER: The quiet orderly class seek for natures like their own, and\nas far as they can they marry and give in marriage exclusively in this\nclass, and the courageous do the same; they seek natures like their own,\nwhereas they should both do precisely the opposite.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: How and why is that?\n\nSTRANGER: Because courage, when untempered by the gentler nature during\nmany generations, may at first bloom and strengthen, but at last bursts\nforth into downright madness.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Like enough.\n\nSTRANGER: And then, again, the soul which is over-full of modesty and\nhas no element of courage in many successive generations, is apt to grow\ntoo indolent, and at last to become utterly paralyzed and useless.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: That, again, is quite likely.\n\nSTRANGER: It was of these bonds I said that there would be no difficulty\nin creating them, if only both classes originally held the same opinion\nabout the honourable and good;--indeed, in this single work, the whole\nprocess of royal weaving is comprised--never to allow temperate natures\nto be separated from the brave, but to weave them together, like the\nwarp and the woof, by common sentiments and honours and reputation, and\nby the giving of pledges to one another; and out of them forming one\nsmooth and even web, to entrust to them the offices of State.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: How do you mean?\n\nSTRANGER: Where one officer only is needed, you must choose a ruler who\nhas both these qualities--when many, you must mingle some of each, for\nthe temperate ruler is very careful and just and safe, but is wanting in\nthoroughness and go.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly, that is very true.\n\nSTRANGER: The character of the courageous, on the other hand, falls\nshort of the former in justice and caution, but has the power of action\nin a remarkable degree, and where either of these two qualities is\nwanting, there cities cannot altogether prosper either in their public\nor private life.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly they cannot.\n\nSTRANGER: This then we declare to be the completion of the web of\npolitical action, which is created by a direct intertexture of the brave\nand temperate natures, whenever the royal science has drawn the two\nminds into communion with one another by unanimity and friendship, and\nhaving perfected the noblest and best of all the webs which political\nlife admits, and enfolding therein all other inhabitants of cities,\nwhether slaves or freemen, binds them in one fabric and governs and\npresides over them, and, in so far as to be happy is vouchsafed to a\ncity, in no particular fails to secure their happiness.\n\nYOUNG SOCRATES: Your picture, Stranger, of the king and statesman, no\nless than of the Sophist, is quite perfect.","title":"Statesman","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":40100}